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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA AND THE WEST

DURING THE YEARS 1918-1921

A study of the Armenian Question
as it developed during the brief life
of the Republic of Armenia

by
by

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INTRODUCTION

The years 1918-1920 were a period of hope and excitement in the history of the Armenian people. One part of the Armenian people around Mount Ararat, showed a tendency of independent living and expressed its will to save its existence and looked hopefully to the future. Armenia was under unfavorable conditions. It was surrounded by unfriendly neighbors - Kemalists Turkey, Soviet Russia, Moslem Azerbaijan and Chauvinistic Georgia. It had internal difficulties - Armenian refugees and orphans from Turkey, lack of food and an abundance of contagious diseases; but had the pride that at least the Caucasian Armenians were saved from the Turkish Massacre and had profound faith that these difficulties would be done away with through its strength and laboriousness, and through the cooperation of the Allied Powers, to whom Armenia had served wholeheartedly during the years 1914-1918 both on the Western and Eastern fronts.

The formation of the Republic of Armenia was not only a safety for the existence of the Armenian nation, but also a guarantee for the solution of the Armenian Question. The Republic brought a change in the handling

of the Armenian Question. Since 1878 our cause had been presented to the Western Powers as a petition, but with the Republic that was changed. Now existed a body, an Armenian state which, instead of presenting petitions, presented demands and claims, and in some cases was ready to settle it by force. Now the Armenian Question was not an orphan, subject to the piety of the Great Powers. On the contrary, it had its father or protector, the Armenian Republic.

The hopes of the Armenians by and by were realized. The Armeno-Azerbaijani and Armeno-Georgian conflicts were solved partly by force, partly by negotiation. In Paris, London and San Remo the Armenian just wishes and territorial claims were taken into consideration and in the Treaty of Sèvres these claims were accepted and to President Wilson was given the right of arbitration to adjust the frontiers of Armenia and Turkey. It was a period of supreme joy, but Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey were not sleeping; they collaborated to abolish the Armenian Republic. Finally their attempts were successful. Armenia was sovietized in December, 1920.

The aim of this thesis is to study the history of those turbulent years (1918-1921), as much as possible, based on primary sources, i.e. on documents, state papers, memoirs, etc. Special emphasis is put on British, American, and Turkish documents, parts of which are rarely used in Armenian historiography.

To make the story interesting a list of the "actors" and a chronology of important events are attached to the work.

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Abstract

This thesis aims to portray the Armenian Question during the years 1918-1921. Since during this period the Armenian Question was not an orphan, it was patronized by the Armenian Republic of Erivan, so this thesis was pressed to narrate the story of the activity of the Republic. The examination of the Armenian Question being closely related to Armenia's immediate neighbours - Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Soviet Russia on one part, and the Great Powers - Great Britain, France, the United States, and Italy on the other part.

The First Chapter tells the story of the Armenian Question during the years 1914-1918. The story starts from the Armenian Reforms of 1914, expresses the attitudes of Russia, Great Britain, and France towards the question, and ends in describing the effort of Transcaucasia to establish its independence.

Chapter II portrays the first steps of independent Armenia and its effort to come to terms with Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.

Chapter III describes the preparation of Armenia for the peace talks of Paris. It gives the formation of the two Armenian Delegations, their efforts and their terri-

torial demands put before the Paris Peace Conference.

Chapter IV narrates the response of the Allies, especially of the United States, to the demands of their Lesser Ally. It narrates the story of the different Missions and Commissions - King-Crane Commission, Haskell's Mission, and American Military Mission to Armenia. It gives the outcome of their investigation.

Chapter V tells the story of those conferences - of London and of San Remo which led to the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres. It shows the difficulty of the solution of the Armenian Question, and the transfer of the question to the arbitration of President Wilson.

The last chapter gives the account of the downfall of the Republic. It is focused on the effort of the Republic to defend itself against the joint attack of Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey. A heroic struggle, which resulted in the downfall and the sovietization of the Republic.

In the Epilogue, in a rapid survey, the story of the Armenian Question is carried on till the Treaty of Lausanne (1923).

CHAPTER I

The Armenian Question During the Years 1914-1918

On May 28, 1918, an Armenian independent Republic was proclaimed having Erivan as its capital. The Republic, in its two and a half years' existence, devoted itself to the fulfillment of the territorial claims of the Armenian nation. This thesis which tries to portray that endeavor can be incomplete, if allusion is not made to the facts of the preceding years of 1914-18, because the questions relating to the period 1918-1920 have their origin in the preceding years. The Armenian Reforms of 1914 can be taken as the starting point.

On February 8, 1914, a plan of reforms was ratified in Constantinople between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. The plan had in mind the division of the six Armenian vilayets of the Ottoman Empire into two equal groups, each one having a foreign Inspector-General, whose duties comprised the administration, justice and gendarmerie of the area. These reforms did not meet the Armenian expectations and aspirations. Boghos Nubar Pasha alluding to these reforms stated: "Such as it was, it offered at least a beginning of reforms, giving reason to hope that

in time it could be improved."¹ But these hopes vanished soon. The beginning of World War I provided the necessary excuse to the Porte to suspend the execution of the above-mentioned reforms. And, in order to bury once and for all the Armenian Question, the Ottoman Empire began to impliment its plan of extermination and annihilation, so as to free these six Armenian vilayets of their Armenian elements. Circumstances being favorable, it reached that aim.

The Ottoman Empire had not yet entered into the war, but preparations were being carried out to declare war against Russia. The Ottoman Government appealed to the General Meeting of the Dashnak party, held in Erzerum in July 1914, so as to pass a decision asking the Armenians living under Tzarist Russia to rebel against it. But the Meeting gave a logical answer. The Armenians in Turkey were ready to do their civil duty by helping the Ottoman Government, but they cannot force the Armenians of Transcaucasia to do the same.² The Russians had a similar project in mind.

¹Eliot Grinnell Mears, Modern Turkey (New York, 1924), p. 70.

²Simon Vratzian, Haiaastani Hanrapetoutioun (2nd ed., rev.; Beirut, 1958), p. 10. Hereafter to be cited as Haiaastani...

By August 30, Sazonov instructed the Viceroy of Transcaucasia to prepare an uprising of the Turkish Armenians and Kurds, since war was imminent.¹

Actually the Armenians of Transcaucasia were following the anti-Turkish line, and feeling that a Russo-Ottoman clash was imminent, were busily forming volunteer detachments to help the Russian army. In September 1914, an Armenian National Bureau was formed in Tiflis (the capital of Georgia) to deal with this task. The political plan of the Bureau was "autonomy for six vilayets and their inseparable part, Cilicia, under Russian rule."²

The Catholicos of Etchmiatzin was involved in political activities, so as to improve the lot of his people. On August 5, 1914, he sent a letter to Vorontzov-Dashkov, viceroy of Caucasia, which stated: "The Armenian vilayets of Anatolia should be united into a single province and put under a Christian governor-general, selected by Russia and independent of the Porte; and a considerable degree of autonomy should be granted to the Turkish Armenians. The carrying out of this reform should be entrusted to Russia exclusively, otherwise no Armenian would believe in it."³

¹G. Jay Smith, The Russian Struggle for Power, 1914-17 (New York, 1956), p. 75.

²S. Vratzian, Haiastrani..., loc. cit.

³G. Tchalkhouchian, Le Livre Rouge (Paris, 1919), pp. 11-12.

Vorontzov-Dashkov replied that these hopes and wishes could be fulfilled, but until then the Armenians should have to abstain from any independent activity.¹

In October, 1914, the Catholicos of Etchmiatzine had an interview in Tiflis with the Tzar, Nicholas II, who solemnly declared: "Tell your flock, Holy Father, that a most brilliant future awaits the Armenians."² Was the Tzar being sincere in his statement or not? The facts of the near future will show that he was not.

On November 15, 1914, Russia's Premier Goremykin had spoken to Maurice Paléologue, the French Ambassador in Petersburg, in a private fashion on the general aims which the three Allied Powers ought to pursue during the war. Goremykin stated that "Russia would be obliged to annex a part of Armenia."³

On November 21, 1914, the Tzar received the French Ambassador Maurice Paléologue and confirmed what Goremykin had said about the Armenian Question by declaring: "In Asia Minor I shall have to consider the question of the

¹Ibid., p. 13.

²Kapriel Lazian, Haiastan ev Hay Date (Cairo, 1946), p. 198.

³C. Jay Smith, Op. cit., p. 98.

Armenians, of course! I certainly could not let them return to the Turkish yoke. Ought I to annex Armenia? I shall only do so if the Armenians expressly ask me to. I shall establish an autonomous regime for them."¹

Early in December the Armenian Catholicos asked the Russian Viceroy of Transcaucasia to issue a proclamation to the Armenians modeled on that of the Poles.² The Viceroy turned the matter to Stolitsa, a representative of the Foreign Ministry on his staff. He replied on December 7, stating that the proclamation of the Poles had been exclusively "to forestall the going over of the Poles to the side of our enemies."³

As for the Armenians they are on our side. No proclamation was to be issued until Russian troops had penetrated deeply into Turkish Armenia,⁴ to avoid the possible reactions of France, Great Britain, and Kurdistan. The Armenians claimed Cilicia, but since the district was on the Mediterranean, they could have trouble with Britain and France.⁵ As for Kurdistan, its boundaries overlapped with

¹An Ambassador's Memoirs (New York, 1923), Vol. I, p. 192.

²The proclamation regarding Poland was issued on August 16. It promised the resurrection of the Polish nation and its fraternal union with Russia.

³C. Jay Smith, Op. cit., p. 124.

⁴Ibid., p. 125.

⁵Ibid.

those of Armenia. The reaction of the Kurds to an Armenian proclamation should be considered.¹

The reply to Stolitsa was drafted on December 15 by Gulkevich, ~~Go~~nselar of the Second Political Division of the Foreign Ministry. On the whole he accepted Stolitsa's basic recommendation, but enlightened him on the ministry's *general* policy towards the Armenians:

"Of course," he said, "the hour has still not come for the decision of the question as to whether an autonomous Armenia will remain under the suzerainty of Turkey, or be placed under a protectorate of Russia. But in either case, Armenia must be in the sphere of our direct influence and this completely independently of the desires of our Allies. Also, the territorial limits of the future autonomous district definitely must be defined by us exclusively from the viewpoint of Russian state interests."²

Gulkevich pointed out that, during the discussions on the Armenian reforms of 1914, Russia was compelled to recognize Germany's pretensions to a predominant position in Cilicia. But the war has changed this. Now Russia must strive towards "the secure future of Armenia, and, as a

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 126

consequence, an exit to the Mediterranean Sea for us."¹
The separation of Caucasian Armenia and Cilician Armenia was not permissible. Nor should any other European power be permitted to establish itself in Cilicia.²

Gulkevich feared that the initiative of a proclamation on behalf of Armenians could be taken by Germany, who might persuade the Porte to ~~pour~~^{grant} autonomy to the Armenians. The appearance of such a Turkish manifesto could cause disputes in the ranks of the Armenians, could deliver a blow to the Russian prestige in the area concerned, and could raise difficulties before the Russian troops in Armenia. His conclusion was that in any case Russia must eventually "proclaim far and wide to the Armenians the intention of the Russian Sovereign to liberate them from the age-old yoke and to grant them autonomy."³

Gulkevich's intention not to permit the establishment of any European power in Cilicia had a short life. When France's intentions for Cilicia were known in Petersburg, the Russian Foreign Ministry did not oppose them.

On March 14, 1915, Maurice Paléologue presented a note to the Russian Ministry giving the conditions of peace with

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 127.

³Ibid.

Turkey. He wanted to have the consent of the Emperor in ceding to France "Syria, including the province of the Gulf of Alexandrette, and Cilicia to the Taurus Range."¹

Deputy Minister A. A. Neratov who replaced Sazonov in the latter's absence, pointed out that the French aspirations ran counter to Armenian nationalist desires, which dreamed of having Mersina. But if France considered the annexation of Mersina necessary, then of course they would not oppose this.²

Tzarist Russia desired to establish an Armenian client state reaching the Mediterranean at Mersina and Alexandretta, but to appease France, it agreed to cede Cilicia.

On April 17, a Russian Armenian Dr. Zavriev having talks with Sazonov went to Paris and London to plead the cause of Armenian nationalism. He brought with him a plan for an autonomous Armenia, nominally under Turkish suzerainty, but actually under the joint protection of Russia, Britain, and France. The autonomous Armenia would extend from Transcaucasia to the Mediterranean, embracing Mersina and Alexandretta.³

¹Ibid., p. 233.

²Ibid., pp. 233-234.

³Gabriel Lazian, Haia stan ev Hai Date, p. 189.

When Izvol'ski, Russian Ambassador at Paris sent an anxious telegram to Sazonov on the mission of Dr. Zavr'iev, Sazonov replied that their conversation with the Armenians had a purely academic character. Zavr'iev had been told that they could not support such desires because of the predominance of French interests in Cilicia.¹

C. Jay Smith is of the opinion that Dr. Zavr'iev was sent by Sazonov, who wanted to take advantage of the Franco-British differences over the future of Asiatic Turkey.² But perhaps seeing the wrath of the French Foreign Ministry, wanted to minimize Dr. Zavr'iev's role.

Dr. Zavr'iev and Boghos Nubar Pasha tried to interest the French in Kurdistan instead of Cilicia, but as later events will show, they only wetted French appetites, without achieving their goal.³ Only parts of Kurdistan were taken in the French zone of influence. Russia was having secret negotiations with England and France so as to divide the booty that would be the outcome of their collective victory. The secret agreement which interests us is that of April 26, 1916, which says:

"Russia obtains the provinces of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis, as well as territory in the southern part

¹Ibid., p. 190.

²Op. cit., p. 242.

³Ibid., 243.

of Kurdistan, along the line Mush - Sert - Ibn - Omar - Amajie - Persian frontier. The limit of Russian acquisitions on the Black Sea coast will be fixed later on at a point lying west of Trebizond.

"France obtains the coastal strip of Syria, the vilayet of Adana, and the territory bounded on the south by a line Aintab - Mardin to the future Russian frontier, and on the north by a line Ala Dagh - Zara - Egin - Kharput."¹

The Big Powers played this political tactic on the small nations. They introduced themselves as Knights, as liberators, but their speculative tendencies soon became evident. Tzarist Russia soon showed its real motives. Just after the conquest of the Armenian provinces of Turkey,² it showed a spirit of intolerance against the Armenians and their aspirations. At the beginning, Tzarist Russia had encouraged the formation of the Armenian volunteer detachments, but now it disbanded them. It formed a new plan for the conquered or occupied lands of Turkish or Western Armenia; a plan which was against the natural rights of the Armenians. The Tzar had promised autonomy for these provinces, but the new plan was to settle Russian refugees there.

¹Eliot Grinnell Mears, Op. cit., p. 617.

²On Oct. 28, 1914, Ottoman Empire had declared war on Russia. In 1916, the Turks lost Erzerum (February 16), Trebizond (April 18), and Erzinjan (July 25).

On April 18, 1915, the Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian army presented this plan: "I consider it necessary that (Russian) special refugees be sent (with the advancing Russian army), whose duty must be to exploit those lands which are abandoned by the Kurds and the Turks. The Armenians have the intention of conquering these abandoned lands for their refugees."¹

In a letter dated June 27, 1916, which Sazonov sent to Nicholas Nicholayevitch, Viceroy of Caucasia, he rejected the idea of autonomy for Armenia, on the basis that the Armenians have never consisted of the majority of the population in Metz Hayk (Greater Armenia), especially after the last massacres.² The Viceroy's answer (dated July 16, 1916) was more desperate for the Armenian Question: "In my deep conviction, in the present frontiers of the Russian Empire there is no Armenian Question, and even no permission must be given to the mention of such a question."³

Why this sudden change of attitude on the part of Tzarist Russia? An explanation could be the fact that the military support of the Armenians was necessary for the conquest of Western Armenia. Once this objective was achieved, Russia did not need help. So it adopted a negative attitude. As regards the Ottoman Empire, it followed

¹Arpiar Karamanlian, "Mayis 28i Vaverakroutioun," Arevelk, Vol. XI (June 4, 1956), p. 2.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

a radical solution - to deport and massacre the Armenians of Turkish Armenia. Both Russia and the Ottoman Empire were giving disastrous blows to the Armenian Question.

Armenian Activities

In the West, the four Armenian political parties of the United States: the Dashnak, the Huntchak, the Vera-gazmial, and the Ramgavar parties decided on November 12, 1914, to carry on diplomatic activity for the Armenian Question and, in case of necessity, to create an armed force.

On May 20, 1915, the Huntchak and Ramgavar parties of Egypt ratified the following agreement in Alexandria:

"1. The nearest goal of the contracting parties is an Autonomous Armenia and Cilicia.

"2. The Autonomous Armenia and Cilicia will be put under the protectorate of the Triple Entente or Russia, depending on the future development of the political conditions.

"3. The two parties declare themselves absolutely opposed to the idea of Autonomous Armenia (with Cilicia) under Turkish sovereignty."¹

¹Gabriel Lazian, Haiastan ev Hai Date (Cairo, 1957), p. 199.

The same idea was cherished by Mark Sykes, who was one of the architects of the secret agreements of 1915-1916. In a letter, dated March 12, 1916, sent to the English Ambassador in Petrograd, he found it impossible to leave Turkish Armenia under Turkish rule, because of the cruelty and severity of the massacres of 1914-1916. Therefore, the possible solutions of the Armenians Question were:

"1. To found an Armenian state under Turkish rule.

"2. To create an Armenian state under international control.

"3. The complete surrender of Armenia to Russia, without preliminary preparations.

"4. To decide on the issue so that the old Roman or Lesser Armenia be given to France, and Russia has to annex the territories which are in yellow circle of the map, attached to this letter. I consider this last solution as the most satisfactory."¹

And actually the secret agreement, to which to^I referred earlier, was signed on this basis.

In the West, there was an official organ or committee which was dealing with the Armenian Question, the Armenian National Delegation, headed by Boghos Nubar Pasha. He was appointed as the representative of the Catholicos of All

¹Gabriel Lazian, Haiastan ev Hai Date (Cairo, 1946), pp. 206-207.

Armenians before the European Powers.¹ The Delegation had been active since 1914. It was ready to help the Allied cause in order to satisfy Armenian national aspirations. This readiness was exploited by France. Negotiations were carried on between George Picot and Boghos Nubar Pasha for the military help of Armenians to the Allied cause. Boghos Nubar Pasha was ready to furnish that help, on condition that the Armenian volunteers had to fight against Turkey and not on any other front. It is recorded that George Picot had stated "that France, at the end of the war, after conquering Cilicia, will create an Autonomous Armenia, so that the Armenian race will develop and the Armenian nation will be strengthened under French control."²

In a short time many Armenian volunteers responded to the appeal of Boghos Nubar Pasha. These volunteers formed the Armenian Legion. But the same unfortunate fate awaited the Armenian military help on the western front, as it had on the eastern front. France conquered Cilicia, without giving autonomy to it, or creating an Armenian Autonomous Cilicia. On the basis of a political bargain, she evacuated

¹Alexander Khatissian, "The Memoirs of a Mayor," The Armenian Review, Vol. III, No. 1 (March, 1950), p. 103.

²Vahan Papazian, Im Houshère (Cairo, 1957), Vol. III, pp. 49-50.

and left it to the Kemalists. The Armenians who were assembled there, fearing a massacre, left for Syria and Lebanon.

The Armenian Question was in a desperate condition, when the Russian Revolution of February 1917 broke out, which created a semi-chaotic state in Caucasia.

If the outbreak of World War I brought with it the burial of the Armenian Reforms of 1914 and the massacre of Turkish Armenians, the two Russian Revolutions of 1917 paved the way for the creation of the Transcaucasian Independent Republics, Armenian, Georgian, and Azerbaijani. Without these revolutions, the existence of an independent Armenia in Caucasia was not even dreamed of. And speaking of the Western Armenia, we saw the policy of Tzarist Russia, after the victories of 1915-1916, which was not only a rejection of autonomy, but a policy of having "an Armenia without Armenians."

The February Revolution and the Armenian Question

On February 28, 1917, a revolution broke out in Russia, which threatened all Russia, and especially Transcaucasia. The Provisional Government which took power on March 22, 1917, named a special committee for Transcaucasia, the Special Transcaucasian Committee, generally known as Ozakom. It had administrative, rather than legislative, powers.

The peoples of Transcaucasia, especially the Armenians, showed a respectful attitude and obedience towards the Provisional Government and to its local agent, Ozakom. They welcomed the downfall of a Tzarist Russia, whose policy had been negative in the last two years towards Armenia, but they feared instability in Russia, because that might disorganize the frontier, and such disorganization might make the Armenians of Transcaucasia defenseless against the Turks. The sympathy of the Armenians increased when the Provisional Government issued a decree for continuing the war, and a special decision related to the status of Turkish Armenia, until the summoning of the Constituent Assembly. The chief of the Provisional Government Kārensky declared: "We can't evacuate Armenia (Turkish Armenia), because in that case nothing remains from Armenia; it will be lost under the knives of Kurds and Turks."¹

The Provisional Government promulgated a decree (dated April 17, 1917), which was related to Turkish Armenia, and was composed of four articles. It declared that Turkish Armenia is now directly under the control of the Central Government; it appointed general Averyanov as special commissar-general, and, his assistant for civil

¹H. Irazek, Modig Antzialitz (Beirut, 1956), p. 9.

affairs Dr. Zavrarian. It demanded also a report on the needs of this region.¹ The Provisional Government stated that this administration was being established "pending the final solution of the question of Turkish Armenia by a peace treaty."²

The Provisional Government's policy was a great contrast to the policy of Tzarist Russia. This positive attitude of the Provisional Government bore its fruits, and in a short time the Turkish Armenians returned to their homeland and dedicated themselves to restoring their economy.

A Conference was held in Tiflis (from September 29 to October 9) comprising all the Armenian political parties. It reached the decision that "Russian Armenia recognized the authority of the forthcoming Constituent Assembly and should be, together with the rest of the Caucasus, a part of a federal Russian Republic." The resolution in regard to Turkish Armenia said that this question "should be solved in accordance with the wishes of the local population."³

The Conference formed a National Assembly and an administrative body, the National Council.⁴ The Council

¹Simon Vratzian, Haiastrani..., pp. 24-25.

²Ibid., p. 23.

³Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (Oxford, 1951), p. 45.

⁴This body replaced the National Bureau, which was created in 1914.

wanted to strengthen the Caucasian front, because this latter showed signs of weakness due to Bolshevik propaganda. And as we saw that the endurance of the Caucasian front was a vital problem for the Armenians of Transcaucasia, so the National Council wanted permission to concentrate the Armenian soldiers fighting in the Russian armies on the Caucasian front. That permission was given, and an Armenian Corps was formed under the command of Armenian generals.

The October Revolution and Transcaucasia

While the February Revolution was cheerfully welcomed, the October Revolution was looked at with enmity, especially by the Armenians who feared it, because they needed a strong Russia to defend Transcaucasia against Turkish invasion, but the Revolution was weakening it. One of its slogans was to stop the war. So, in an official bulletin, the representatives of the Transcaucasian peoples condemned the seizing of power by the Bolsheviks, and Kerensky's Provisional Government was recognized as the legal body till the election of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. The Ozakom had lost its prestige, so a new body was needed. On November 28, 1917, that local body was created with its legislative organ - The Transcaucasian Seim, and its administrative organ - The Transcaucasian Commissariat.

Transcaucasia was far from separatist tendencies. If a local rule was created, that was the result of immediate

needs. There was the imperative need for some sort of political authority in a country left to its fate and exposed to internal and external dangers.¹ Within few months, the Transcaucasian peoples declared their independence. But this act was done unwillingly. It was due to Turkish pressure.

The October Revolution brought also a change in the schemes of the Allies. Now that Russia was out of the war, a change of the secret agreements was necessary. On December 23, 1917, in Paris, negotiations were carried on between Lord Milner and Clemenceau and reached to this convention on the subject of activity in Southern Asia. The activity directed by France was to be developed north of the Black Sea, while the activity directed by England was to be developed southeast of the Black Sea against the Turks.

The English zone would comprise the Cossack territories, the territory of the Caucasus, Armenia, Georgia and Kurdistan. The French zone: Bessarabia, the Ukraine, the Crimea.²

During these days Lenin's decree was promulgated (December 31, 1917), which was generous or beneficial to the Armenians. It stated: "The Council of People's Commissars declares to the Armenian people that the Proletarian and Peasant Government of Russia defends the

¹Richard Pipes, the Formation of Soviet Union (Cambridge, 1954), p. 103.

²Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs (1930, London), Vol. II, p. 836.

right of self-determination, till complete independence, of the Armenians in Turkish Armenia now occupied by Russia.

"The Council of People's Commissars accepts that the realization of that is possible under a series of preliminary pledges.

"1. To remove Russian forces from the frontiers of Turkish Armenia. To form immediately an Armenian popular militia, in order to guarantee the lives and properties of the population of Turkish Armenia.

"2. Without delay to return to Turkish Armenia the Armenian fugitives, as well as the Armenian emigrants dispersed in different countries.

"3. Without delay to return to Turkish Armenia those Armenians, who were driven out forcefully to the interior of Turkey by the Turkish Government during the war.

"4. To form a Provisional Government in Turkish Armenia."¹

Apparently it was an ideal decree, but in its essence it was impracticable. It envisaged independence, the creation of an Armenian army and the regrouping of emigrants, but all these were on theoretical grounds,

¹Vahan Papazian, Op. cit., pp. 309-310.

because they had no firm foundation.¹ The Russian soldiers were abandoning the front and returning home. The newly formed Armenian Corps was not enough to defend the front against the Turkish forces. This was the main reason why this decree did not receive much attention.

The danger of Turkish invasion was imminent. So Transcaucasia tried to defend itself. The Armenian National Council increased the strength of the Armenian Corps, which now comprised three infantry divisions, a cavalry brigade, and territorial regiments. To these were added volunteers recruited from among the Armenians of Turkish Armenia.

The advance of the Turkish forces was a menace to the Armenians, because the apple of discord was the Armenian vilayets of Turkey. The Armenians who had been rehabilitated in some parts of the Armenian vilayets, were now obliged to leave them once again; in addition there was a possible massacre of the Armenians of Transcaucasia. So, for the Armenians, the struggle against the Turks was a vital question, a question of life and death. For this reason the Armenian soldiers fought conscientiously and

¹The draft of the decrees was prepared by Vahan Terian, an Armenian poet. Terian had stressed the necessity of keeping considerable Russian forces in Turkish Armenia, until Armenian popular militia was formed, to defend the frontiers against any danger (Yerker (Yerevan, 1956), pp. 591-592).

courageously, but they were in a desperate situation. The Georgians were not friendly, and the Azerbaijanis being co-religionists with the Turks did not want to fight against them.

On December 5, 1917, the Erzinjan Armistice was signed between the Transcaucasian Commissariat and the Turkish Government. Although Turkey signed it, she sought for a pretext to violate the armistice. She secretly helped the Turko-Tartar elements of Transcaucasia to create trouble.

On February 23, 1918, the legislative body of Transcaucasia, The Seim, opened its first session. Three important groups prevailed in it - Social Democrats Mensheviks (30 seats), Musavatists (30 seats), and Dashnaktzutiun (27 seats).¹ The major item on the agenda was the question of peace with Turkey. The Dashnak party was ready to cease fire if Turkey acknowledged the right of autonomy of Turkish Armenia. The Azerbaijanis were against this, because in their opinion such a demand was an attempt to mingle in the internal affairs of Turkey.² In the formulation of peace terms with Turkey, the view of the Dashnak party was taken into consideration in a modified form.

¹Firuz Kazemzadeh, Op. cit., p. 86.

²Simon Vratzian, Op. cit., p. 75.

The peace terms were stated as follows:

"1. The Seim is competent to make peace.
"2. The Seim considers that its task is to make a final peace with Turkey.

"3. The peace treaty with Turkey must be based on the restoration of the frontiers of 1914.

"4. The Transcaucasian Delegation will strive to secure the self-determination for Eastern Anatolia, and in particular to secure the autonomy of Turkish Armenia within the framework of the Turkish state."¹

All sections of the Armenian people were against the idea of having an autonomous Armenia within the framework of a Turkish State. We saw the attitude of the Huntchak and Ramgavar parties in Egypt. The Armenians of Transcaucasia, as well as those of Turkish Armenia were opposed to such a scheme, especially after the disastrous experience of 1915-1916, when more than one million and a half Armenians were deported and massacred by the Turks. But under the new circumstances that was the only choice. And we must not forget that even this demand was incorporated with difficulty in the peace terms with Turkey.

The Delegation was preparing to leave for Trebizond, where the peace talks would take place, but at the last

¹Ibid., pp. 78-79.

minute a telegram from Karakhan¹ came like a thunderbolt. It gave information regarding the peace terms of Brest-Litovsk (signed on February 21, 1918).

Although Transcaucasia did not recognize the Council of People's Commissars as a legal government, yet this latter was signing a treaty, where the fate of Transcaucasia and Turkish Armenia were in question. The articles relating to these territories stated:

"Art. I. The Russian Republic undertakes to demobilize and dissolve the Armenian bands, whether of Russian or Turkish nationality now in the Russian and Ottoman occupied provinces and entirely to disband them.

"Art. II. Within three months after the ratification of the present treaty, two Turkish-Russian joint commissioners shall be appointed by the contracting parties, one of these will be charged with the duty of re-establishing the dividing line between Turkish and Russian territory from the point where the line strikes the boundary of the three sanjaks of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum.²

Not only the Armenians, but also the Georgians, who were losing the port of Batum were in despair. The

¹An Armenian Bolshevik, who was the secretary of the Bolshevik Delegation to the peace talks of Brest-Litovsk.

²Eliot Grinnell Mears, Op. cit., pp. 623-624.

Commissariat had an extraordinary session and telegrams of protest were sent to Brest-Litovsk and to important capitals. In the protest it was stated that any peace treaty dealing with the frontiers of Transcaucasia which is signed without its participation, is without any international value and cannot bind the Commissariat.¹

Although these declarations and protests were made, common sense demanded acting otherwise. A. Khatissian who participated in the Delegation, describes the consensus of opinion: "We hesitated - to go or not to go? But at last we felt that it was necessary to go... It was necessary in any case to come to an agreement with the Turks, especially when the war news from Europe was not encouraging for us. The people wanted peace, and we could not refuse to go."²

On March 7, 1918, the Delegation left Tiflis for Trebizond. On March 12 it had its first meeting with the Turkish Delegation. The Turkish demands were:

"1. The declaration of the independence of Transcaucasia.

¹Simon Vratzian, Op. cit., p. 80.

²Haïastani Hanrapétoutian Dzagoumn ou Zargatzoume (Athens, 1930), pp. 25-26. Hereafter to be cited as Haïastani Hanrapétoutian...

"2. The acceptance of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk by the Transcaucasian Delegation and the withdrawal of its demand on Batum, Kars, and Ardahan.

"3. The self-determination of the peoples of Anatolia, and the question of autonomy for Turkish Armenia are Turkish internal problems and it is impossible to put them forward as questions for examination."¹

Before the opening of the talks of Trebizond, the Transcaucasian Commissariat had received from Vehib Pasha, the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish forces on the eastern front, a letter demanding the evacuation of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum on the basis of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.² Receiving a negative answer the Turkish forces advanced, having the cooperation of the Transcaucasian moslems, who gave themselves to secret as well as open conspiracy.³

On March 19, 1918, Ardahan was taken, and on April 12, the fortress of Kars. Where the Turkish forces entered, Armenian massacres took place. The Armenian National Council and the Bolshevik Government of Russia sent telegrams of protest to the German Ministry of External Affairs and to the President of the Reichstag.⁴

¹"The Negotiations of Trebizond," Haiastani Gotchnak, Vol. XVIII, No. 38 (Sept. 21, 1918), p. 1523.

²Simon Vratzian, Op. cit., p. 81.

³Firuz Kazemzadeh, Op. cit., p. 96.

⁴Haiastani Gotchnak, Vol. XVIII, No. 16 (April 20, 1918), p. 2005.

These successes on the front made the peace talks in Trebizond difficult. On April 5 the Transcaucasian Delegation expressed its readiness to leave to Turkey, Olti, the southern part of the district of Ardahan, the southwestern part of the district of Kars, and the western part of Kaghzivan. Armenians and other peoples must be allowed to return to Turkish Armenia and to receive pledges of safety.¹

Raouf Bey, Chief of the Turkish Delegation coming in contact with his Government brought an ultimatum of 48 hours - to accept the treaty of Brest-Litovsk and to declare the independence of Transcaucasia. On April 10 the Transcaucasian Delegation declared its readiness to accept the treaty of Brest-Litovsk and to carry on further negotiations based upon it.²

Although the treaty of Brest-Litovsk was accepted as the basis of the negotiations, there remained yet another question, that of independence for Transcaucasia. On April 13, Raouf Bey reminded the Delegation of this. Next day the Transcaucasian Delegation received a telegram from the Transcaucasian Commissariat ordering them to stop the negotiations and return to Tiflis. This was done. Why this sudden change?

¹Firuz Kazemzadeh, Op. cit., p. 98.

²Ibid.

On April 13 the Seim heard a report on the negotiations of Trebizond. Gegechkori, as Prime Minister and Minister of War, had declared: "By accepting the treaty of Brest-Litovsk it would mean that, Transcaucasia as an independent republic will cease to exist and will become a province of the Turkish Empire."¹ The same opinion was expressed by the majority of the representatives; the Azerbaijanis excepted. So it was decided to call back the Transcaucasian Delegation and to declare a general levy.

The levy had a short life. The next day the city of Batum fell into the hands of the Turks. It was defended by the Georgians. The fall of Batum gave a big blow to the military disposition of the Georgians. Hereafter they became more cautious. Although the Armenians wanted to reject the Turkish demands and to carry on the military campaign, but being aware of the weakness of the Georgian forces and the reluctance of the Azerbaijanis, they were ready to cooperate with their neighbours.

On April 22, the session of the Seim was dedicated to the declaration of Transcaucasian independence. The official declaration stated:

"The peoples of Transcaucasia are faced with the following tragic situation: either to proclaim themselves at present an inseparable part of Russia, and in this

¹Simon Vratzian, Op. cit., p. 98.

manner to repeat all the horrors of the Russian Civil War and then become an arena of a foreign invasion, in this case Turkish; or to proclaim independence and with their own powers defend the physical existence of the whole country. When the issues boil down to this, then the only solution is the immediate proclamation of political independence and the creation of the independent Transcaucasian Federative Republic."¹

The negotiations were resumed. On May 6 the Transcaucasian Delegation reached Batum to carry on peace talks on the basis of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. On May 11 it became evident that the two sides were antagonistic. Khalil Bey, the head of the Turkish Delegation did not accept the Brest-Litovsk treaty as the sole basis of the present negotiations, because "after the negotiations of Trebizond, clashes and bloodshed had taken place between the Turks and the Transcaucasian soldiers. So the nature and the basis of our declarations have been changed."² The Turks knew the weakness of the Transcaucasian Federal Republic, so gradually stronger demands were put forward.

¹Richard Pipes, Op. cit., p. 107.

²Alexander Khatissian, Haiastrani Hanrapétoutioun..., p. 52.

In a sealed envelope Khalil Bey presented the new peace conditions, which were very severe for Georgia, but more so for Armenia. Georgia was going to lose the region of Batum, with its port; the province of Akhaltzkha. Armenia was going to lose Alexandrapol, Akhalkalak, the greater part of Shirak and Etchmiadzin, Sourmalou, the railway Alexandrapol - Kars and Alexandrapol - Djoulfa.¹ This railway was needed in order to transport Turkish soldiers against the English forces, who were in Persia.

The Georgian Avalov, who was a member of the Transcaucasian Delegation, makes this grave statement: "For Armenia the new frontier was equal almost to a complete annihilation."²

The German General Von Lossow, who was present at this meeting, took a copy of the Turkish demands on the pretext of examination. The same night he sent a telegram to the German Ambassador in Constantinople in which he expressed his complaint against the Turkish demands: "The Turks have exceeded all limits by demanding the cession of purely Armenian provinces, such as Akhalkalak, Alexandrapol, and parts of the region of Erivan, against the dispositions of

¹Ibid., p. 53.

²"Batumi Khorhertajoghove," Vem, Vol. II, No. 2 (March-April, 1934), p. 92.

the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and obviously have the intention of annihilating the Armenians in Transcaucasia."¹

On June 9, 1918, Von Hindenburg sent to Enver Pasha the following telegram:

"In the name of the German Supreme Command I ask Your Excellency to order all Turkish forces to evacuate Caucasia except Kars, Ardahan, and Batum."²

This German attitude or policy was not the result of sympathy towards the Armenian cause, but of German interests. The Germans wanted the Turks to move towards South-Bagdad, where the English forces had reached, and not towards north - Transcaucasia. But Turkish interests were Pan-Turanian. They wanted to come in contact with the Turanian people of Central Asia. There is a second possibility, that the Germans wanted to keep Caucasia for themselves with its mineral resources.

The negotiations of Batum did not reach a conclusion. The two sides had their demands. On May 18 Von Lossow presented his mediation, which was accepted by the Transcaucasian Delegation. On May 24 he informed that his mediation had failed.

¹Alexander Khatissian, Op. cit., p. 54. Khatissian has quoted Johannes Lepsius without mentioning the page-Deutschland und Armenia (Berlin, 1919).

²Ibid., p. 55.

On May 26, 1918, the Turkish Delegation gave a new ultimatum containing new conditions: the addition of the provinces of Nakhitchevan and Akhaldzkha. But new events had taken place in Tiflis, the Seim was having its last session. On the insistence of the Georgians, the Seim and the Federative Republic were solved. The causes of the dissolution had been the fundamental divergences in war and peace problems which came out among the nations constituting the Transcaucasian Federative Republic.¹

Those responsible for the dissolution were the Georgians and the Azerbaijanis. The latter were openly against any hostile act towards the Turks. They were co-religionists with the Turks, therefore, why be afraid? The Georgians were in secret negotiation with Von Lossow in Poti, on the north of Batum, and on May 28, political and economic agreements were signed.² Under the protection of Germany, they hoped to declare their independence and to save their country from Turkish invasion. The Armenians actually remained alone against the Turkish aggression. In the last weeks of May bloody battles were fought in Sardarapat, Gharakilissé, Pash Aparan, which ended in a victory for Armenia.

¹ Firuz Kazemzadeh, Op. cit., pp. 122-123.

² Louis Fischer, Op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 85.

Georgia declared its independence on May 26. The next day Azerbaijan did the same. The Armenian members of the Transcaucasian Delegation returning from Batum (on May 27) insisted on the declaration of Armenian independence. On May 28 the Armenian National Council at Tiflis sent a separate delegation to Batum to negotiate with the Turks on behalf of independent Armenia.

Although May 28 is recognized as the date of Armenian independence, actually, the declaration of Armenian independence took place on May 30, 1918. It stated:

"With the dissolution of Transcaucasian political entity and confronted with the new situation created by the independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan, the Armenian National Council declares itself as the supreme and sole authority of Armenian provinces. Under pressure of certain grave causes, and leaving the formation of National Government of Armenians to the near future, the Armenian National Council temporarily takes charge of all the governmental functions to guide the political and administrative helm of the Armenian provinces."¹

The Armenian Delegation entered into negotiation with Vehib Pasha's Delegation and on June 4, 1918, the treaty of Batum was signed. It was the first international treaty

¹Simon Vratzian, Op. cit., p. 153.

of Independent Armenia. Armenia lost Kars, Ardahan, the district of Borchalou, parts of the districts of Etchmiazin and Sharur, as well as the larger part of the districts of Nakhitchevan.

The independence of Transcaucasia was the result of external causes, mainly the Civil War of Russia and of the intention of Turkey to create buffer states between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. The peoples of Transcaucasia had wished for independence, but did not have enough strength to defend it. Once involved in it, they wholeheartedly fought for it. Especially this was true in the case of Armenians, who unwillingly declared their independence, became its fervent supporters.

The Armenian political parties and leaders had fought almost for half a century to create autonomy for Armenian vilayets. They did not dream of creating an Armenian independent state in Caucasia. The deplorable situation of the Turkish Armenians had forced the Armenian political parties and leaders to find means to ameliorate their lot. As we saw in the secret talks and agreements the main stress was put on Turkish Armenia. But Caucasian Armenia had the chance to get the result of the efforts directed for Turkish Armenia.

CHAPTER II

The First Steps of Independent Armenia

On May 28, 1918, although an Independent Armenia was created, but on both political and economic grounds it was in a pitiful condition. It was surrounded by enemy states. In the South and the West there were the Turks, with whom although a peace treaty had been signed, but friendly relations did not exist. With Azerbaijan in the East, and Georgia in the North, there were frontier disputes and other problems.

Armenia had been a theater of war for four years; it had lost not only the whole of Western Armenia, but also big portions of Eastern Armenia. It did not possess a self-sufficient economy. In the past, imports were made from Russia; now, that was impossible, because of civil war in Russia. Armenia did not possess a port and so the imports were brought through Batum. "Friendly" Georgia raised transit difficulties and often reserved for itself some of the goods as transit tax.

On these difficulties were added the Armenian refugees of Western Armenia, whose number exceeded 500,000,¹ and

¹The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover (New York, 1952), Vol. 1, p. 387.

were a burden to a state which was newly built. These refugees reached the plain of Erivan barefooted and almost naked. They brought with them orphans, famine, and several kinds of contagious diseases.

The new leaders of the Republic shouldered the responsibility under these unlucky conditions and they strove wholeheartedly to solve the above-mentioned questions. Their solution did not depend solely on Armenia, but also on its immediate neighbours - Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Russia, and its Allies. This solution relied mainly on force, petitions, negotiations, etc.

The first Cabinet of Independent Armenia was formed in Tiflis. On July 17, 1919, the Cabinet and the Armenian National Council left for Erivan. On the same evening an official reception took place, where the Prime Minister Hovhannes Kachaznuni said: "Our state is not called Republic of Armenians, but Republic of Armenia. This shows that our state is the fatherland for all those who live in it."¹

This proclamation is somewhat extraordinary to foreigners, who do not know the Armenian spirit and traditions. Indeed, to be deceived and forgotten by the civilized world, and yet to be the pioneers of humanitarian

¹Simon Vratzian, Haiastrani..., p. 77. 182.

principles. To be deceived by Russia, to be massacred by Turkey, and yet to give freedom of life to Russians and Turks living within ^{it} the frontiers and to proclaim that the fatherland belongs to all. The key of the question lies in the fact that Armenians had suffered much from injustice and so they wanted to be just towards others.

On August 1, the first session of the Armenian Parliament took place. The representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Persia were present. The Prime Minister presented the general policy of his Cabinet. Its foreign policy contained the following aims:

"1. To strengthen the peaceful ties with the Ottoman Empire and to establish good relations with it. To adhere strictly to all those duties that we have undertaken towards the Ottoman Empire and to ask the Ottoman Government do the same for us.

"Especially to solve the question of the evacuation of the Ottoman forces from our country and the return of Armenian refugees.

"2. To come to a mutual agreement with Azerbaijan and Georgia, in order to solve the question of common frontiers, on the basis of the ethnic principle, as the only one which corresponds to the spirit and aims of democratic states.

"3. To come to an agreement with Azerbaijan and Georgia to liquidate establishments and material that have remained from the Transcaucasian Republic."¹

No allusion is made to other states, because Armenia had immediate problems to solve with these neighbours.

The Armeno-Turkish Relations

While the first Armenian Cabinet was in Tiflis it received an invitation from the Turkish Government to take part in a Conference, which would be opened on June 25, 1918, in Constantinople. The participants were Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria, in addition the newly formed Transcaucasian states.² The Armenian Cabinet was of the opinion that Germany wanted to re-examine the treaty of Batum and change it on the basis of the Brest-Litovsk treaty. Soon a delegation was formed comprising of A. Aharonian, M. Babajanian, and A. Khatissian, and on June 14 it left for Constantinople.

The Conference was postponed many times and finally it did not take place, because of the defeat of the Central

¹Ibid., p. 58.

²Alexander Khatissian thinks that the Conference was the result of the activities of H. Ohanjanian and A. Zohrabian, who were in Berlin in those days on a special mission (Op. cit., p. 77).

Powers. The Delegation remained there four months, waiting for the opening of the Conference, and at last it came back bringing with it a copy of the Mudros armistice.

During these four months, while the Delegation was waiting, it was carrying out simultaneously political and diplomatic activities with the Turkish statesmen and with the ambassadors of the Central Powers.

The talks were carried out in three lines:

- 1) Suitable frontiers for a lively Armenia.
- 2) The Conference of Constantinople.
- 3) The unbearable conditions of Armenians in Transcaucasia.¹

The Delegation had interviews with Khalil Bey (the President of the Turkish Delegation to the Conference of Batum), Talaat, Enver, Necim Bey (Foreign Minister), Djanpolat Bey (Minister of Interior), Husein Djahid Bey (Editor of Tanin newspaper), Reouf Bey (Minister of Marine), Ahmed Riza Bey, etc.

These Turkish leaders were well-disposed towards an Armeno-Turkish friendship. Why this attitude? They had massacred a million and a half Armenians and had confiscated their goods and properties; but they saw that the

¹Ibid., p. 80.

international horizon was cloudy. The Central Powers were losing the war and that the Armenian Question was becoming an international issue. The Armenians of the world with their own means and through their friends were carrying out an anti-Turkish propaganda. Of course, such a policy was unpleasant for the Turks. Vehib Pasha had declared in the Conference of Batum: "We need the favorable propaganda of the Armenians abroad."¹

For their Pan-Turanian ideals the Turks needed a free and easy passage to Central Asia, and the friendship of Armenia was of a necessity. Turkey had lost the Balkans and the Arab lands; now her eyes were directed towards East-Azerbaijan and Turkestan. A policy of Drang Nach Osten.

Yet it is possible to mention the fact that the Turkish leaders hoped to create through the friendship of Armenia a buffer state between Russia and Turkey.

Having this in mind, they tolerated the creation of an Armenian state near their frontiers; a state which had to be satisfied with what it actually had, and which should make no demands on Akhalkalak, Lori, Zangezur, Karabagh, and Nakhitchevan.

¹Ibid., p. 70.

These dispositions were openly expressed by Enver Pasha in the reception given to the Armenian Delegation in the Ministry of War: "I and my colleagues created Armenia, and with that we gave satisfaction to the national aspirations of Armenians and thus we solved the Armenian Question. At the same time we did that outside the Turkish frontiers, on Russian soil; and we had two successes: 1) we created Armenia, and 2) we kept intact the Turkish territory. It is only under that condition that we agreed to be reconciled with the existence of the Armenian Republic. Now, how is it possible to demand that we annex new territories to Armenia? Can we do that without touching to the old and new Turkish territories?"¹ And coming to the return of the Armenian refugees to Turkish Armenia, Enver declared that he was unable to give them freedom of return and to guarantee their lives.

As a result of the talks of the Armenian Delegation with the ambassadors of the Central Powers, the Austria-Hungarian Government gave its consent to send Austrian forces to Armenia, as German forces were promised to be sent to Georgia, but the defeat of the Central Powers on the Western front forced them to abandon that plan.

¹Ibid., p. 83.

When Turkey was obliged to sign the Mudros armistice with the Allies on October 30, 1918, Raouf Bey, Ottoman Minister of Marine, invited the Armenian Delegation to appear together before the English Admiral and to be present at the signature of the armistice agreement taking place that same night. He wanted to show to the English that the Armenians and the Turks had been reconciled. He considered this fact of a necessity in the coming peace talks.

Khatissian asked about the frontiers of Armenia, and Raouf Bey answered: "The frontiers of 1914, with a correction on behalf of the valley of Alashkirt."¹ The Armenians hoped to receive more, because of the victory of the Allies; so the Delegation refused the invitation. Next day receiving a copy of the armistice agreement of Mudros, the Delegation was disillusioned, because no articles were found in the agreement stating the occupation of the Turkish Armenia by the Allied forces and the disarmament of the Turkish forces.

The Delegation left Constantinople on November 1 bringing with it an order from Izzet Pasha to Shucri Pasha to evacuate Alexandrapol and Kars on December 6, 1918.

¹Ibid., p. 94.

Armenia and Georgia

Between Armenia and Georgia there were certain misunderstandings. Although Tiflis was the capital of Georgia, it was under the influence of Armenians. In 1914 Tiflis had a population of 345,000. While the Georgians constituted 20 %, Armenians constituted 38 % of the population.¹ The majority of public offices in the state of Georgia were held by Armenians. From 1870-1916 Tiflis had eleven mayors, nine of whom were Armenians and only two were Georgians.² To these situations were added territorial disputes.

Once the Georgians declared their independence they wanted to weaken the influence of the Armenians in Georgia. Even during the existence of the Transcaucasian Federative Republic that tendency was apparent. After the declaration of their independence it became more obvious. When the Armenian National Council and the Armenian Cabinet left Tiflis for Erivan (in June, 1918) no Georgian representative had come to bid farewell.

Armenia did not have any access to the sea. Foreign aid which was coming through the Black Sea, had to pass

¹"Yerek Amis I Caucase," Halastani Gotchnag, Vol. XX, No. 16 (April, 1920), p. 497.

²A. Khatissian, "The Memoirs of a Mayor," The Armenian Review, Vol. II, No. 3 (September, 1948), p. 41.

through Georgian territory. Georgia imposed a transit tax which in some cases comprised part of the goods.

The major issue was the frontier problem. In consequence of the Turkish advance of 1918, the Georgian army aided by German units had occupied Borchalo. The Armenian National Council protested, but received Jortania's answer explaining that it was a temporary occupation made for defence purposes against Turkish danger. Once that danger vanished, the Georgian forces would be removed.¹ But events showed that it was a permanent occupation. In the beginning of June, 1918, in a conciliatory meeting, Tseretelli declared that the frontiers of Georgia have to include the provinces of Akhalkalak, Ghazakh, Borchalo, and the region of Pambag in the province of Alexandrapol.

The diplomatic relations were severed. Armenia for the time being was unable to solve the dispute by force, but the chance had to come. In October 1918, when the Turkish forces evacuated the region of Lori-Pambag one of the *disputed* areas, an Armenian general, occupied it. Telegrams of protest were exchanged, and at last Georgia considered it favorable to summon a Transcaucasian Conference to solve the different questions. On October 27, 1918, the Georgian Government invited Armenia, Azerbaijan,

¹Simon Vratzian, Op. cit., p. 206.

and the Republic of the Mountaineers of the Northern Caucasus to attend a Conference in Tiflis.

The invitation stated: "The Georgian Government has decided to examine at the Conference the following questions:

"1. Recognition of each other's independence;

"2. Solution of all disputes, including those over the frontiers, through arbitration.

"3. Mutual obligation not to enter into agreements detrimental to the interest of one of the Transcaucasian republics or the Union of Mountaineers.

"4. Mutual support and solidarity at the forthcoming peace Conference in the defence of the common interests of the republics of the Caucasus."¹

The Government of Armenia, which was interested in solving the problem of its frontier disputes with Georgia through peaceful negotiations, received perhaps the best opportunity, but gave a negative answer to this invitation. Georgia had an equal status with the other Transcaucasian states, but without preliminary consultation with the guests, had invited them, she alone deciding on the place, date and items of the agenda. Armenia being aware of the

¹Firuz Kazemzadeh, Op. cit., p. 175.

cordial relations of Georgia and Azerbaijan, did not want to solve her frontier disputes in a Conference where the Azerbaijani delegates sat with the Georgians. On the proposal of the Armenian Government the meeting was postponed till November 14th, but Armenia again abstained from attending.

There was another cause for refusal. The opening of Paris Peace Conference was imminent. The Armenian Question had become an international issue. It was thought that the question of Armenian frontiers will find its final solution in that Conference; therefore, why to precipitate and to reach a temporary agreement?¹

The Georgians had other plans. At first, they had hoped for a German victory and had put their country under German protection, but with the defeat of Germany, they looked for the sympathy of the Allies. Georgia wanted to solve its disputes with Armenia and through this to secure prestige in the coming international conferences.

On December 5, 1918, the Turkish forces evacuated Akhalkalak, and the Georgian forces entered declaring it annexed to Georgia. In the region of Lori trouble was created by the Georgian Government. Protests being in vain, the use of force remained the only solution.

¹A. Khatissian, Haiastani Hanrapetoutian..., p. 101.

Armeno-Georgian conflicts began on December 13, 1918. On December 25, 1918, an agreement was signed in Tiflis by General Raigroft (British), Colonel Chardigny (French), and Jortania (President of the Republic of Georgia). Archag Tchamalian, the Armenian representative in Tiflis, did not sign the agreement, being against the annexation of Akhalkalak by Georgia.

The Agreement stated:

"1. The northern part of Bortchalo must be under Georgian control, while the southern part under Armenian control. Akhalkalak must be under Georgian control.

"2. The Georgian forces have to remain on the line that they actually occupy; the Armenian forces have to retreat till Tsegh-Tchalal-Oghli line.

"3. The representatives of the two states: Georgia and Armenia, will soon be sent to Europe, where the question relating to frontiers will be solved by the Great Powers."¹

Armenia had its first disappointment from the Allies after its independence. Georgia who had followed a pro-German policy, got more sympathy from the Allies than Armenia, who had followed a pro-Allied policy and expected more sympathy. But the High Commissioners of the Allied

13. Vratzian, Haiastani..., p. 58.

Powers had their center in Tiflis. The Georgians had easy contact with them. Moreover, the Georgians with their etiquette, dancing parties, and through other means influenced them.

Military activities continued until December 31, 1918. In the beginning of January a delegation left Erivan for Tiflis, where negotiations began. They took around three months.

In March the negotiations ended. On March 8, 1919, Georgia recognized the independence of Armenia, and on March 24 Armenia did the same to Georgia.

On April 27, in Tiflis the first Conference of the four Caucasian Republics took place. The Conference lasted three weeks, but they did not reach a tangible result. Caucasia being under the threat of an invasion by the Volunteer Army, Georgia and Azerbaijan signed a defensive alliance. Armenia did not sign the alliance, because it did not fear Denikin's Volunteer Army.¹

On September 17, 1919, a new Armeno-Georgian Conference was opened in Tiflis. The main items of the agenda were the questions of transit and territorial claims.

¹Georgia feared that Armenia was not alone against it. Armenia was in agreement with General Denikin. General Walker of the British Command told Tigranian that in case of combined attack on Georgia, Britain would come to Georgia's assistance (Firuz Kazemzadeh, Op. cit., p. 181).

The two sides were ready to make concessions in the question of territory. The Georgians were ready to leave to Armenia the whole plain of Lori, and the railway till Sanahin would go to Armenia. This was a temporary solution. When Armenia's territorial claims on Turkish Armenia materialised, this frontier had to be re-examined.¹ Georgia was ready to make concessions in the district of Lori, but not in Akhalkhalaki.

The Armenians were ready to accept conditionally to concede the greater part of Akhalkalak keeping for themselves the lakes found in the district and some parts in the district of Lori. The main difference was centered on the copper mines of Allahverdi.

The frontiers disputes were not solved. But a temporary agreement was reached on August 29-30 in Tiflis with the participation of General Peach. It was agreed to keep intact the status of Lori agreed upon in January 1919.² A neutral zone had been created then in Lori, under the British control. The Georgians and the Armenians had their forces and stations in the zone. When the British left Caucasia, the mixed-authority of the region was kept intact.

¹Simon Vratzian, Haiastani..., p. 347.

²Ibid., p. 349.

On November 3, 1919, it was agreed to have free transit of materials, between the two states. A second agreement was made stating that the parties undertake to solve their disputes by mutual understanding.¹

Armeno-Azerbaijani Relations

Armenia had territorial disputes not only with Georgia, but also with Azerbaijan. The difficulties with the latter had also other foundations; mainly, religious and racial - Pan-Turanian. Armenia with its geographical situation was a barrier for the pan-Turanian movement. As long as Armenia remained strong and independent, it would create trouble or difficulties for the easy means of transportation from the Ottoman Empire to Central Asia.

The Armenians and the Tartars lived for centuries in comparative peace. Only at the beginning of 20th century that peace was destroyed, mainly by Tzarist Russia. In 1905, Armeno-Azerbaijani riots and clashes occurred in Transcaucasia, mainly assisted by the Russian authorities. Firuz Kazemzadeh states: "The Russian authorities played an infamous part in the Armeno-Azerbaijani riots. They had the power to prevent bloodshed, but instead abstained from interfering in the feud of the two peoples."²

¹Ibid., p. 348.

²Op. cit., p. 19.

The enmity had its roots also in economic spheres. Baku being an oil center, had attracted the Armenians. In 1914 Baku had a population of 249,000. 41 % were Moslems, 27 % Russians, 23 % Armenians, and 9 % miscellaneous.¹ In a short time the Armenians had acquired half the wealth of the city and played a big role in the oil business.²

We saw the relation of the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis during the period of Transcaucasian disintegration and the advance of the Ottoman forces. The Azerbaijanis did not fear the Turks. On the contrary, being co-religionists, they considered them as saviours and had the right to think so.

Although Armenia had declared its independence, there were on its territory Tartar semi-independent districts, for example the Republic of Western Caucasus, with the shura³ of Kars, the Republic of Eastern Caucasus-Surmalu, Sharur-Nakhitchevan, etc. These districts were subsidized by Azerbaijan.

When the Ottoman Army evacuated the Armenian districts, the Armenian forces entered Kars (January 8, 1919) and Sharur-Nakhitchevan (April 24, 1919). In these districts there were English forces. When they were evacuated, Moslem riots or uprisings took place. On July 1 in Boyuk Vedi,

¹H. Khachadurian, "Yerek Amis I Caucas," Haiastani Gotchnag, Vol. XX, No. 16 (April, 1920), p. 497.

²Ibid.

³The Tartar local governments.

on July 20-21 in Sharur-Nakhitchevan, on August 7 in Goghb, on August 18 in Kars.

While the fighting was going on, General Haskell¹ arrived at Erivan and promised his support to settle the Armeno-Azerbaijani disputes.² Haskell went to Baku on August 29 and signed an agreement with Nasib Bek Usubbekov, main article of which related to the status of Sharur-Nakhitchevan. The two sides had to evacuate their forces and the provinces of Sharur and Nakhitchevan would be neutralized and governed by a Governor-General appointed by General Haskell.³ Armenia protested against it and received a counter-protest from Azerbaijan. Negotiations were carried on and later General Haskell appointed Colonel Edmond R. Daily as Governor-General.

There was also the question of Karabagh. During the 17th-18th centuries it had become the fortress of Armenian independence. Both Armenians and Tartars had claims to it, but on ethnic basis it belonged to the Armenians, because the majority of the population were Armenians, 150,000, against 58,000 Moslems.⁴ But the British were inclined to

¹High Commissioner in Armenia on behalf of the Supreme Council.

²S. Vratzian, Haiaستاني..., p. 303.

³Ibid., p. 305.

⁴Ibid., p. 309.

cede it to Azerbaijan.¹ With the approval of General Thomson, Dr. Sultanov was appointed temporarily Governor-General of Karabagh, to keep order in the district.² From January to August 23, 1919, the enmity was carried on and at last on August 23 a temporary agreement was reached. The agreement was ratified by the Azerbaijani Government and the 7th Conference of the Armenians of Karabagh. The agreement stated:

"1. This temporary agreement is accepted by both sides till it is solved by the Supreme Council, whose decision is equally obligatory to both sides.

"2. The mountainous part of Karabagh considers itself temporarily a part of the Republic of Azerbaijan."³

The Paris Peace Conference was the omnipotent tool, on which great hopes were put. "The representatives of the Great Powers always assured that all the territorial disputes would be solved in the Paris Peace Conference, but both sides attempted to create favorable conditions for themselves, in order to put the Conference before a fait accompli."³

On March 6, 1919, the Armenian Government appointed Vice-Colonel Arsen Shahmazian as Governor of Zangezur, and

1A. Khatissian, Haiastani Hanrapetoutian..., p. 143.

2S. Vratzian, Op. cit., p. 320.

3A. Khatissian, Op. cit., loc. cit.

on March 31 he was elected in the name of the Regional Council of Zangezur-Karabagh. Clashes began on April 15 and lasted till the end of November 1919. On May 2 Mayor Mac Mazine came to Koris and presented the following demands:

"1. To recognize the authority of Azerbaijan to establish order and rule in the country.

"2. To give facilities to the nomads to live on the mountains of Zangezur."¹

The Regional Council rejected these saying that Zangezur is a part of the Republic of Armenia and the nomads living out of the Republic do not have the right to exploit these mountains.

At the end of October, Dr. Sultanov appealed to the Armenian population of Zangezur to recognize the Azerbaijani authority promising to safeguard their persons and goods. But he received a negative answer. On November 1 the Tartar invasion began, but the Armenian population vigorously opposed it. The Allies intervened and the Prime Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan met in the office of Colonel Ray in Tiflis. On November 23 an agreement was signed. The agreement provided:

¹S. Vratzian, Op. cit., p. 332.

"1. The Governments pledge themselves to stop the present hostilities and not to resort again to force of arms.

"2. They agree to open roads to Zangezur to peaceful traffic.

"3. All controversies, including borders, are to be settled by peaceful agreement, or, failing this, are to be left to a neutral party as arbitrator, said party to be the High Commissioner.

"4. An International Conference was called to discuss all questions causing dispute or friction, the delegates being given full authority to settle same by agreement or arbitration."¹

On December 14, 1919, an Armeno-Azerbaijani Conference was opened in Baku. The main item was the frontier question. The Armenian Delegation proposed a temporary solution of the question, but the Azerbaijani Delegation wanted to reach a final solution.² The Armenian Delegation accepted the

¹Foreign Relations of United States, Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Vol. 9, p. 606. See also Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 1st Series, Vol. 2, pp. 569-570.

²S. Vratzian, Haiastrani..., p. 350.

proposal, but a new one was presented - to form a Caucasian confederation to solve the internal disputes. The Armenians found impracticable the formation of a Transcaucasian confederation when the frontiers of each Republic were not known. The Conference did not reach a conclusion.¹ The same plan was taken up in Tiflis during the Transcaucasian Conference, and no conclusion was reached.

For the later development of the Armeno-Azerbaijani territorial disputes we will have the chance to speak in the last chapter of this work.

So much to say that the Supreme Council took consideration of these disputes and came to the following conclusion: "The frontiers between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Georgia respectively will be determined by direct agreement between the states concerned.

"If either case the states concerned have failed to determine the frontier by agreement at the date of the decision, the frontier line question will be determined by the Principle Allied Powers, who will also provide for its being traced on the spot."²

This article was incorporated in the Treaty of Sévres under Article 92.

¹Ibid.

²The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923 (New York, 1924), Vol. II, p. 816.

CHAPTER III

The Armenian Question Before the Paris Peace Conference

Before dealing with the Peace Conference, perhaps it is better to have a bird's eye view of the promises which had been made and talks which took place before the opening of the Conference.

During the year 1916, secret negotiations were carried on between Tzarist Russia, France, and England resulting in secret agreements dismembering the Ottoman Empire. In the first chapter we referred to the plans relating to Armenia.

The Russian Revolutions (February and October) and the Wilsonian 14 points gave serious blows to these secret agreements. Kerensky's Provisional Government declared on March 27, 1917: "Peace without annexations, nor contributions, on the basis of the right of peoples to be exercised by them."¹ The October Revolution gave an even more serious blow by publishing the secret agreements and so putting them at the disposal of international public opinion.

¹A. Mandelstam, *La Société des Nations et les Puissances devant le Problème Arménien* (Paris, 1926), p. 140.

In 1917, President Wilson had asked the Allies to define their war aims and in the joint reply (January 10, 1917) these aims were stated to be: "The setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; and the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign of western civilization."¹

Lloyd George, Prime Minister of the British Empire, twice had expressed his sympathetic view on the Armenian Question. On December 21, 1917, in the House of Commons he had declared: "Armenia must never be replaced under the disastrous domination of the Turks."²

In his address to the delegates of the Trade Unions assembled in London, L. George stated (January 5, 1918): "Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine are in our judgment entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions... It would be impossible to restore to their former sovereignty."³

George Clémenceau, the French Prime Minister in a letter addressed to the President of the Armenian National

¹L. George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties (London, 1938), Vol. II, p. 757.

²H. Turabian, ed., L'Arménie et la Question Arménienne (Paris, 1922), p. 18.

³L. George, Op. cit., p. 759.

Delegation (July 14, 1918) declared: "France, victim of the most unjust aggression, has inscribed in her claims the liberation of the oppressed nations... I am happy to confirm to you that the Government of the Republic, as well as of the United Kingdom, have not ceased to consider the Armenian nation among those peoples whose fate the Allies plan to decide upon according to the superior principles of Humanity and Justice."¹

An Inquiry-Memorandum submitted on December 22, 1917 by Foreign Ministry of the U.S. of America, speaking on the war aims and the peace terms, suggests the following policy:

"6. We must see that the control of the two military terminals of Berlin-Bagdad remain in the hands of an administration friendly to the western nations.

"7. As a result of the accomplishments of the foregoing, we must secure a guaranteed autonomy for the Armenians, not only as a matter of justice and humanity but in order to re-establish the one people of Asia Minor capable of preventing economic monopolization of Turkey by the Germans."²

¹H. Turabian, ed., Op. cit., pp. 18-19.

²U.S.A. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919 (Washington, 1942), Vol. 1, p. 43. Hereafter to be cited as U.S.A., Papers Relating...

In a suggested statement of peace terms, speaking of Turkey, the Inquiry-Memorandum found necessary to free the subject races of the Turkish Empire from oppression and misrule. It was thought to give, at the very least, autonomy for Armenia.¹

Luzzatti, ex-president of the Italian Parliament, had paid a visit to Orlando in the name of the Italian Pro-Armenia Society, and Orlando had given this answer alluding to the Armenian cause: "Tell the Armenians that their Question is mine." This personal engagement was also publicly accepted in the session of Italian Parliament of November 26th, 1918, where Luzzatti reminding Orlando of his personal promise, the latter replied that his personal engagement now became an engagement before the Parliament.... He would keep that engagement.²

President Wilson dealing with the same topic stated in his 14 points (January 8, 1918):

"The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development."³

¹Ibid., p. 52.

²H. Turabian, ed., Op. cit., pp. 98-99.

³Eliot Grinnell Mears, Op. cit., p. 622.

On November 2, 1918, in an Anglo-French joint declaration, it was stated: "Complete and final enfranchisement of peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and the establishment of National Governments and Administrations receiving their authority from the initiative and the free choice of the native peoples."¹

These quotations are brought here for a special purpose - to show that the interest in the Armenian Question did not belong to one power, but to all Allied Powers. The above mentioned promises and declarations were made not by insignificant people, but by the top leaders of France, Great Britain, Italy, and U.S.A. Therefore they reflect the official attitudes and points of view of the above-mentioned Governments. In the shaping of this attitude both humanitarian feelings and economic prospects had their part, but in my opinion it was mainly the pressure of an old debt which pressed much on the hearts of the statesmen of the West. In the past, occasions had been presented to ameliorate the lot of the Armenian people, but both the British Empire and France had not whole-heartedly supported the case; and it is even possible to say that England by imposing on Russia the summoning of the Congress of Berlin,

¹H. Turabian, ed., Op. cit., p. 94.

had delayed the amelioration of the lot of Armenians.

Lloyd George openly accepts this responsibility and states:

"The Treaty of San Stefano provided that Russian troops should remain in occupation of the Armenian provinces until satisfactory reforms were carried out. By the Treaty of Berlin (1878) - which was entirely due to our minatory pressure and which was acclaimed by us as a great British triumph which brought 'Peace with honour' - that article was superseded. Armenia was sacrificed on the triumphal altar we had erected."¹

Speaking from the humanitarian side the successive massacres of 1894-1896, 1909 and especially that of 1915 which resulted in the extermination of a million and a half Armenians and in the evacuation of Western Armenia created horror against the Turks and sympathy towards the misfortunate Armenians, scattered here and there, barefooted and hungry.

Vast Pro-Armenian propaganda was carried out both by foreigners and by Armenians, by Missionaries, Pro-Armenian Societies and Armenians abroad. Speaking about the public opinion of the United States of America related to the Armenian Question, Herbert Hoover stated: "Probably Armenia was known to the American school child in 1919 only a little

¹Op. cit., p. 1257.

less than England. The association of Mount Ararat and Noah, the staunch Christians who were massacred periodically by the Mohammedan Turks, and the Sunday School collections over fifty years for alleviating their miseries - all cumulate to impress the name Armenia on the front of the American mind."¹

Regarding economic prospects and plans, the American Government saw in the Armenian autonomy a counterbalancing element to the German economic plans, referred to in page 59.

The western positive attitude was the outcome of these factors. But one must be cautious that all these promises were on paper. When the occasions came to fulfil them, the West abstained from positive support. They were disposed towards the formation of an autonomous or independent Armenia without the financial and military support of the West was unable to support itself and to defend its independence against the possible attacks of the Turks and the Russians. And actually, Independent Armenia not receiving that support collapsed by the joint attacks of the Turks and the Russians in December, 1920.

As Lloyd George states in his Memoirs, in the beginning the war was not carried out for the liberation of oppressed races; but by and by it took that character and the bellige-

¹The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, (New York, 1952), Vol. II, p. 385.

rents openly expressed it.¹ But in reality these expressions or statements were not honest; because although these declarations were made, France and England did not resign from their schemes of zones of influence. In making these declarations, perhaps they wanted to win the peoples in question over in order to receive their military support. At least it is possible to mention here the cases of the Arabs and the Armenians (we refer here to Cilicia). At the end of the war France and England kept territories given to them by their secret agreements, not on the pretext of zones of influence, but as mandatories. A change of names or items, but sameness of situation.

With the creation of the Armenian Republic, accomplished by the military power of the Armenian people, the Armenian Question found a partial solution, but yet there was the defense of this Republic, the financial help to it, and moreover, the question of Turkish Armenia, for which the above-mentioned promises had been made.

In spite of these promises, when the chance came, the Allies hesitated to fulfill them. The Armistice of Mudros was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies. The armistice was prepared by a Vice Admiral of the British Navy - the Honorable Sir Somerset Arthur Gough - Calthorpe,

¹ Op. cit., p. 752.

British Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean station.

It was signed on October 30, 1918. It provided:

"4. All allied prisoners of war as well as Armenian interned persons and prisoners are to be collected at Constantinople and handed over unconditionally to the Allies.

"11. Immediate withdrawal of the Turkish forces in northwestern Persia behind the prewar frontier, already ordered, and part of Transcaucasus to be evacuated by Turkish troops, as already ordered; the remainder to be evacuated if required by the Allies after they have studied the situation.

"16. Withdrawal of the Turkish troops from Cilicia, except those necessary to maintain order.

"23. In case of disorder in the six Armenian vilayets, the Allies reserve for themselves the right to occupy any part of them."¹

Perhaps it was the best favourable occasion for the evacuation of the Armenian territories. Turkey was exhausted and defeated. But the Allies did not provide for the evacuation of the Armenian vilayets, perhaps thinking to solve that question at the Peace Conference. With the treaty of Sèvres the Armenian vilayets were promised to their real masters, but it was too late. The Kemalist movement had risen and even the signatory powers found it difficult to implement the treaty.

¹George Grinnell Mears, Op. cit., pp. 625-626.

Articles No. 11 and 15 of the Armistice demanded the evacuation of Transcaucasia by the Turkish forces, and Mehmed Ali Pasha, the Turkish representative in Erivan, informed the Armenian Minister of war that in six weeks the Turkish army will evacuate those lands beyond the frontiers fixed by the Preslitovsk Treaty.¹ On November 18, 1918, the Armenian army entered Kharakilissé; on December 4, 1918, Alexandrapol. The lands lost by the treaty of Batum were taken back.

Besides the Armenian army the English forces also occupied territories which were assigned by the Armistice of Mudros. On November 17, 1918, English forces entered Baku, and then Batum. On January 8, 1919, on the basis of an agreement, the British forces handed over the city of Kars to the Armenian Republic, and on April 24, 1919, did the same with Sharur and Nakhitchevan.

Coming to Cilicia, the Armistice provided for the withdrawal of the Turkish forces from these, except those necessary to maintain order. So orders were given for the evacuation of Cilicia - On December 13, 1918, for the evacuation of the eastern part of the Djihan River, on December 17, for the eastern part of the Sihun River and the north of the Adana-Darson line, and on December 21 till Bozanti.²

¹ Simon Vratzian, Maiastani..., p. 200.

² Col. Edouard Brémond, "Cilicia 1919-20", Haigashen Almanach (Constantinople, 1922), pp. 334-335.

From the signing of the Armistice till February 1, 1919, Cilicia was to be governed by the Ottoman officials. For five months, i.e. till July 1919, Cilicia remained under British protectorate on the basis of the Armistice and of the additional agreement of February 20, 1919.

In July, 1919, an agreement was signed between Lloyd George and Clemenceau replacing the British forces in Cilicia by the French.

The Armenians were aware that an understanding existed between George Picot and Boghos Nubar Pasha for the creation of an Armenian Autonomous Cilicia. The occupation of Cilicia by the Allies and of the Armenian Volunteers gave the hope for the fulfilment of that project. So encouraged by this, Armenian refugees returned from Syria to settle in Cilicia. But soon they were disillusioned. France had the intention to keep Cilicia for itself. This disappointed weighed heavy on many Armenians and a coup d'état was attempted by Mihran Tamatian, which lasted only one hour.¹

On October 1921, France to appease the Kemalist movement signed the Agreement of Angora and left Cilicia to Turkey.

The Two Armenian Delegations

At the end of 1918, when the Allied victory was certain,

¹ Ibid., p. 369.

the Armenian reinforced their political activities. Both the Republic of Armenia and the Armenians abroad thought that a peace conference was the logical result of the victory, so they began to cooperate and to formulate their demands. Due to the geographical conditions and to personal ambitions, two separate Delegations were formed in order to pursue the Armenian demands.

I. The Armenian National Delegation

This Delegation had existed since 1912. The axis of the Delegation was Boghos Nubar Pasha. He was recognized as the representative of the Catholicos of all Armenians as well as the representative of the Patriarch of Constantinople.

He descended from a distinguished family. His father, Nubar Pasha had had an important role in Khedive's Egypt. An engineer by profession Boghos Nubar Pasha had executed big plans in Egypt. He was one of the founders of the Armenian General Benevolent Union (A.G.B.U.) which exists until now.

Living outside Armenia life he had a false idea of Armenian mentality and psychology,¹ Kazemzadeh describes his portrait in the following line: "Boghos Nubar Pasha had received a good education, spoke several languages and represented a finished type of gentleman who combined in himself the social graces of both the East and the West."²

¹ "Vsemapayl Boghos Nubar Pasha", Gotchnak Haiastani, Vol. XIX, No. 6 (February 8, 1919), p. 172.

² Op. cit., p. 253.

It was not extraordinary to see a man like Boghos Nubar Pasha occupied by the Armenian Cause, because he was carrying the flag raised by his father. In 1878, the Arminian Patriarchate of Constantinople had requested Nubar Pasha to take over the defence of the Armenian Question before the Congress of Berlin.

Although the National Delegation had other members, Boghos Nubar Pasha through his personal charm and through his distinguished family was recognized as the legal head of the Armenian political ease.¹

The Delegation had been inactive during 1914-18.² At the end of 1918, encouraged by the Allied victory it wanted to react and to work out a new plan of action. For a while Boghos Nubar Pasha had suspected the activity of his Delegation³, because an Armenian Independent Republic had been created in the Caucasus. But an Invitation (dated October 15th, 1918) showed that the Delegation wanted to keep its existence. The Invitation was extended to All Armenians. 33 delegates had to assemble in Paris on February 1, 1919, and had to discuss the items of the agenda, which were:

"1) To work out a plan for Armenian demands in accordance with the new situation created by the events;

¹ Vahan Papazian, "Armenian Delegations to the Paris Peace Conference", Armenian Review, Vol. XIII, No. 2 (July, 1960), p. 49.

² We must not forget the secret talks carried on between George Picot and Boghos Nubar Pasha in 1916.

³ M. Tamatian, "Hai Askaine Batouiragoutian Shurj", Gotchnag, Vol. XVIII, No. 38 (September 21, 1918), p. 1515.

"2) To elect an Executive organ (composed of seven members), whose function must be to pursue the realization of that plan.

"The Executive organ will be the representative of the Armenian Nation near the Powers, and will pursue the realization of the Armenian demands. Its center will be Paris, and it will designate its representatives in London, Rome, Washington, and wherever it is needed."¹

The Congress was officially opened on February 24, 1919, and was closed on April 22. Altogether there were 38 members, of whom 12 were Ramgavars or pro-Ramgavars, 13 Dashnaks, and 12 (Huntchaks and nonpartisans), excluding the delegates from Armenia - Avetis Aharonian and Hamo Ohanjanian, members of the Armenian Republic Delegation, who participated in the Congress in an advisory capacity.

It is possible to guess that it was difficult to expect fruitful activity from such a Congress. It was inevitable to have clashes of points of view. Vahan Papazian who took part in the Congress states: "Ideologically, the Congress was made up of contradictory and centrifugal elements, the only thing which cemented them together being, no doubt, the sacred ideal: To put an end to the Armenian suffering and to win a

¹ Hai Askaine Batouiragoutioun, "Hraver", Gotchnag, Vol. XVIII, No. 51 (December 21, 1918)pp. 1347-1348.

National Home".¹

The National Congress dealt with different items - Memorandum presented to the Peace Conference,² election of the National Delegation, etc. The new members of the National Delegation were - Boghos Nubar Pasha, Abraham Der Hagobian, Arshag Chobanian, Karekin Bastermadjian, H. Nevrouze, and Vahan Tekeyan.

Boghos Nubar Pasha did not have a high esteem for the Republic of Armenia. He considered it a Government of the Ararat area, with no jurisdiction over Western Armenia.³ It was his Delegation's right to deal with it. But the Congress followed a moderate view and adopted the policy of cooperation with the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia, and even combining with it to form the Delegation of All Armenia, and to pursue the demands mentioned in the Memorandum.⁴

The Congress sent telegrams to President Wilson, to Prime Ministers Clémenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando; it sent an appeal to the Allied Powers, and its brotherly warm salutes to the Republic of Armenia in which it saw "the joyous picture of Armenian freedom reawakened for the first time for six centuries."⁵

¹"The Armenian National Congress in Paris", The Armenian Review, Vol. XII, No. 4 (February, 1960), p. 56.

²While the Congress was in session the heads of the two Armenian Delegations were invited to expose their Memorandum to the Peace Conference on February 12, 1919.

³Vahan Papazian, Op. cit., loc. cit.

⁴Gotchnag Haiastani, Vol. XIX, No. 23 (June 7, 1919), p. 731.

⁵Ibid., pp. 732-733.

The Delegation of the Republic of Armenia

When the Allies became victorious, the Parliament of Armenia knowing that a Peace Conference was imminent in Paris, had closed sessions in order to consult on the questions to be presented to that Conference. There were three points of view about the Armenian territorial demands. The Prime Minister Hovhannes Katchajnouni advocated an Armenia without any access to the Sea (moderate view); a group demanded an Armenia with an outlet or access on the Black Sea (middle way), and an Armenia from Mediterranean to the Black Sea (the demand of the Popular Party). The Parliament voted for an Armenia with an access to the Black Sea, thus excluding the demand on Cilicia.¹ Dealing with the question of mandate, preference was given to the U.S.A., then to England, France, and last to Russia.²

The Peace Delegation was composed of three persons - Avetis Aharonian, President (presented by the Dashnak party), Michael Babajanian (by the Popular party), and Hamo Ohanjanian, who was in Berlin in those days on a special mission. The Cabinet instructed the Delegation to establish a harmonious relationship with the Delegation of Boghos Nubar Pasha, and

¹A. Klatissian, Op. cit., p. 98.

²S. Vratzian, Op. cit., p. 200.

even in case of need to hand him over the presidency, keeping the vice-presidency for Aharonian.¹

On December 12, 1918, the Delegation left Erivan for Paris passing through Tiflis, Batum, Constantinople, and Marseilles. On February 4, 1919, it reached Paris.

In the beginning it had some misunderstanding and there was mutual antipathy between the two Delegations. The Armenian National Delegation presided over by Boghos Nubar Pasha considered the official Delegation as a minor one, representing the Armenians once living under Russian control. The National Delegation represented the claims and aspirations of Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire. But by and by, the Armenian National Delegation recognized the authority of the official Delegation, but it also carried on its independent activity. On February 12, 1919, a joint memorandum was submitted to the Peace Delegation by Avetis Aharonian and Boghos Nubar Pasha. We will speak about it in the following pages.

We saw also the attitude of Aharonian's Delegation to the National Congress held in Paris in those days. Although hopes of a united Delegation existed, even negotiations were carried on in that line, but they were not successful. The two Delegations kept their separate existence, but Aharonian's Delegation

¹ A. Khatissian, Op. cit., loc. cit.

tion received the honour to sign the treaty of Sèvres, because it represented an organized state.

On May 28, 1919, the Parliament of Armenia declared the act of United Armenia (Unification of the Eastern and Western Armenias), inviting 12 Western Armenian deputies to sit in the Parliament. The National Delegation considered it an illegal act, a confiscation, because it considered itself the only legitimate body to deal with the questions and rights of the Western Armenians.

Boghos Nubar Pasha had the intention to raise an official protest against the Government of Armenia, but cold-blooded persons mediated and the two Delegations published a joint declaration on the issue: "The National Delegation immediately informed the representatives of the Armenian Republic in Paris, that because of political as well as of legal grounds, it does not give its approval to the above-mentioned declaration or proclamation, taking into consideration those conditions under which it was made".¹

The Declaration informed that negotiations had begun between the two Delegations and the National Delegation was prepared to send a delegation to Erivan to come to a final agreement. In the middle of October 1919 the negotiations started.

¹ "Bashtonagan Haitararoutioun Amboghtehagan Haiastani Batouragoutian", Gotchnag Haiastani, Vol. XIX, No. 34 (August 23, 1919), p. 1096.

It was a very extraordinary phenomenon. Two sides of Armenian people - an organized Republic and a self-elected body were in negotiations on burning national issues. Outwardly they were discussing national questions, but in its essence the meeting was divisional. The representatives of Armenia belonged to the Dashnak party, while the ones of the National Delegation to the Ramgavar - Popular party.

The negotiations continued from October 29 - November 6 and were resumed on March 25. The items of the agenda were:

- 1) The post of the Prime Minister.
- 2) The election of a new Parliament and the proportion of the Western Armenians.

The two sides stood on different grounds. Therefore an agreement was impossible. The two Delegations continued their separate existences trying to coordinate their activities.

The Armenian Question at the Paris Peace Conference

While dealing with the formation of the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia, we spoke about the demands that the Armenian Parliament handed over to the Delegation. The latter reached Paris on February 4 and the Peace Conference was opened on January 18, 1919, with the participation of the Five Great Powers - U.S.A., England, France, Italy, and Japan.

There was a hope that the Armenian Question would find its positive solution, based on the official promises of the Allies. The two Delegations were in active preparations.

Already on November 30, 1918, Boghos Nubar Pasha had sent a letter to each of the Allied and Associated Governments, in which he proclaimed: "The Armenian National Delegation, in complying with the unanimous wish of the whole Armenian Nation, a part of which has actually been established as an independent republic, proclaims the independence of an integral Armenia under the aegis of the Allied Powers and the U.S., or of the League of Nations, as soon as it is formed."¹

On January 20, 1919, Boghos Nubar Pasha sent a letter to President Wilson proposing the inclusion of this Delegation in the participants of the Conference. In his reply dated January 23rd, 1919, Wilson stated: "It is very difficult indeed, as you will realise, to assign representatives to political units which have not yet been received into the family of nations."² But, he continued, that will not bring the slightest harm to the Armenian interests, and that these will be defended as if the delegation was present. This promise was not made by a diplomat, but by the pious, humanist - Wilson, who wholeheartedly supported the Armenian Question.

¹ Rita Jerrahian, "From the Armistice to the Treaty of Sévres", The Armenian Review, Vol. IX, No. 2 (Summer, 1956), p. 125.

² Vahan Papazian, Im Houshere, Vol. 3, p. 308.

The same topic or issue was raised by Avetis Aharonian. Accompanied by Boghos Nubar Pasha he had his first interview with the French Foreign Minister S. Pichon, on February 10, 1919. Aharonian remarked that Armenia then was not regarded as a belligerent nation and had not been admitted to the Peace Conference. S. Pichon answered that only the organized powers were admitted to the Conference. Aharonian said that if Turkish Armenia was not yet a state, the Caucasian Armenia was organized and established. S. Pichon suggested to present a memorandum in this sense to the Conference.¹

On February 5, 1919, the Editor-in-Chief of the "Temps"² J. Herbette, had an interview with A. Aharonian. The conversation was centered on Cilicia. Aharonian explained that Armenia was forced to seek by all means an exit on the Mediterranean Sea, not because of the cotton and other resources of Cilicia, but to receive without hinderance the aid of the West in the hour of need. Herbette replied that for centuries France has had vast interests in Cilicia, Aharonian retorted that Cilicia had been an Armenian state for four centuries and her last king lied there in Paris, alongside French kings. Herbette replied "I am very sorry that, even before she is organized, Armenia has taken imperialistic airs."³

¹ "From Sardarapt to Sèvres and lausanne", The Armenian Review, Vol. XV, No. 3 (September, 1962), pp. 4-5.

² "Temps", the semi-official organ of the French Government.

³ Ibid., pp. 5-6.

The world of politics is very extraordinary. France did not have any colony in Cilicia, but had economic interests, and wanted to monopolize the country. She wanted to do it on the pretext of defending the Christians, and considered her act as humanitarian and legal. But a people, like the Armenians, who for centuries had lived in a territory, had poured out their sweat and blood on that same territory, had created there a principality and later on a kingdom (which contributed so much to the Crusader movement), when trying to be the master of its territory, its attempt is called imperialistic.

In its original plan the Delegation of the Armenian Republic did not include the demand of Cilicia. Why was it excluded? Because it was thought that its inclusion might irritate and create the reaction of France, which had got it as a share in the secret agreements of 1916. Therefore why this change? That demand was included in order to satisfy the National Delegation, which did not imagine an Armenian Republic without Cilicia.

Kazenzadeh gives another interpretation to this question: "In Tiflis, Loris - Melikov heard rumours that it was Sazonov who prodded the Armenians to claim Cilicia. Presumably Sazonov hoped that Russia would soon be restored and would obtain Cilicia with the rest of Armenia."¹

This rumour might be right, but the Armenians did not need

¹ Op. cit., p. 255.

external instigation to include the demand of Cilicia in their plan. As we saw Boghos Nubar Pasha's personal negotiation with George Picot had in mind the autonomy of Cilicia.

On January 30, 1914, the Peace Conference dealt with the German colonies and with the question of the mandate of backward nations. The conclusion was that "because of the Historic misgovernment of the Turks of subject peoples and the terrible massacres of Armenians and others in recent years, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Kurdistan, and Arabia must be completely severed from the Turkish Empire."¹ The separate promises of the Allies were combined here and now a collective promise was the outcome.

On February 12, 1919, a joint memorandum was submitted to the Peace Conference by Avetis Aharonian and Boghos Nubar Pasha. It was entitled "The Armenian Question at the Peace Conference".

The Memorandum tells a long story, but we will try to summarize its main points.

It stated that in the name of All Armenians whose elected representatives were in session in Paris, the National Delegation had the honour to present to the Conference the claims and aspirations of the Armenians. Not only Armenians had suffered much in the last war, which in fact entitled them to independence, but also they had been belligerents by supplying volunteers to

¹ U.S.A., Papers Relating..., Vol. III, p. 873.

the cause of the Allies.¹ Then it tells the story of the metamorphosis of the Armenian Question as from 1878, the date of the San Stefano agreement. The points mentioned were the Congress of Berlin (1878), the massacres of 1894-96 and the Reform movement, the Ottoman Constitution of 1908, the Balkan war of 1912-13, the Agreement of 1914, and the massacres of 1915.

Then it tells the story of 1915-18 that we dealt with in Chapter I. The idea is to show that the Armenian nation had been a belligerent like the Allied Powers, and therefore for their sacrifices they had to receive a just compensation, that is complete independence.²

Knowing that the population living in a territory is the major decisive factor of the fate of that territory, an echo of the principle of self-determination advocated by Wilson, the memorandum stated that the statistics to be taken into consideration must be the ones prepared before the World War I and especially before 1894-1896, because the massacres of 1894-96 and 1909 caused 300,000 victims^{ims} and the migration of a considerable Armenian population. It is not acceptable to utilize the massacres committed for the supremacy of the Turkish element. The Voice of all Armenians, both dead and alive, must be heard.³

¹ *Haigagan Hartze Khaghaghoutian Joghovine Artchev, (2nd edition, Boston, 1919), p. 1.

² Ibid., p. 3.

³ Ibid., p. 5.

Although the Armenians were a minority in the Armenian vilayets, Trebizond, and Cilicia compared with the total population, they were equal to the Turkish and Kurdish elements put together. There were 1,403,000 Armenians, 943,000 Turks, and 482,000 Kurds.¹ The memorandum further stated:

"On the other side the quantity is not the sole factor which is going to decide the territories and the boundaries, that would be given to our state. Also the scale or level of civilization and the fact that the Armenians are the sole element, who can now organize a state capable of civilization and progress should be considered".²

Armenian Demands

The summary of the Armenian National demands is the following: The Delegation demanded:

"1. The recognition of an Armenian Independent State, which had to be formed with the unification of the territories of the seven vilayets, of Cilicia, and of the Armenian Republic of Caucasus.

The territorial demands were:

a) Seven vilayets of Turkish Armenia - Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir, Kharpert, Sivas, Erzerum, and Trebizond, excluding

¹ "The population of All Armenia in 1914", Ibid., p. 32.

² Ibid., p. 5.

the territories on the southern side of the Tigris River and on the western side of Ordu-Sivas line.

"b) The four Cilician sanjaks: Marash, Khozan, Jebel Bereket, and Adana with the town of Alexandretta.

"c) All the territory of the Armenian Republic of the Caucasus, including the entire province of Erivan, the southern portion of the former province of Tiflis, the southern part of the government of Elisavetpol, the district of Kars, with the exception of the area north of Ardahan. (The final frontiers of Armenia have to be drawn by special committees elected for this purpose).¹

"2. That the Armenian state, formed on this basis, be put under the collective guarantee of the Allied Powers and of U.S.A., or of the League of Nations, of which Armenia demands to participate, became a member.

"3. That a special mandate be given by the Peace Conference to one of the Powers for a transitory period... The duration of the mandate has to be a maximum of 20 years.

4. That an indemnity be decided by the Peace Conference as compensation for the losses of the Armenian nation inflicted during the massacres, departations and spoils.

"5. The mandatory Power would have the following obligations:

¹ Ibid., p. 6.

a) To force the Turks, the Azerbaijanis, and others, to evacuate all Armenian territories.

b) To disarm the population.

c) To expel and punish those who had participated in the massacres, done violence to the Armenian population, plundered, or profited from the spoils of the victims.

d) To drive out of the country the elements of disturbance and disorder, and to expel the nomadic tribes.

e) To expel the mohajers, who had settled in the eastern vilayets under the regimes of Abdul Hamid and the Young Turks.

f) To take the necessary steps for the return to Christianity of all women and children kept in Turkish harems or forcibly converted to Islam".¹

The Memorandum concluded: "The Armenian Question is not a local and national question, it has a link with the peace of Europe, and on its solution depend the tranquility, progress and development of the Near East."²

On the evening of February 24, Aharonian received an invitation from the Peace Conference to appear two days later, before the Council of the Ten to present the Armenian claims. Boghos Nubar Pasha had not received a similar invitation.³ Aharonian called an emergency session of the

¹ Ibid., pp. 9-10.

² Ibid., p. 11.

³ A. Aharonian, "From Sardarapat to Sèvres and Lausanne", The Armenian Review, Vol. XV, No. 3 (September, 1962, p. 6.

Delegation to make them deal with the things to be presented to the Peace Conference. The general opinion was that if Aharonian was left alone in the Conference, he would defend the entire Armenian case, otherwise Aharonian would dwell mainly on the political, ethnographic, and factual status of Caucasian Armenia, while Pasha would defend the rights of Turkish Armenia. And both of them would defend the idea of a United Armenia.¹

Boghos Nubar Pasha through the mediation of Balfour got the agreement of S. Pichon, who in the absence of Clemenceau, was presiding over the session.

On February 26, 1919, the two chiefs got their chance to speak to the Council. First spoke Aharonian. He read his memorandum. He centered on three major issues: 1) The formation of the Armenian Republic in Transcaucasia; 2) The right of the Armenian Nation to have a seat at the Peace Conference; 3) Reasons for the reunion of the Republic with the Armenian provinces of Turkey.

Aharonian telling the story of the events of 1914-1918 stated that there were 2 million Armenians in Transcaucasia who rallied wholeheartedly to the Russian flag in support of the Allied cause more than 180,000 Armenians defended the freedom of nations.² Armenians were the most sincere

¹ Ibid.

² U.S.A., Papers Relating..., Vol. IV, p. 148.

helpers of the kerensky regime. After the October Revolution of 1917 the Armenian people in the Caucasus summoned the National Congress, which appointed a National Council, a Government for National defence. This body directed the life of the Armenians in Caucasus till June 1918. The Council reorganised and maintained an Armenian army. The Armenians were encouraged by the declarations made in the British House of Commons and the French Chamber of Deputies.

Ending the first part of his memorandum Aharonian stated: "The Armenian Republic asks for recognition of the independence it won on the battlefield.... In view of the sacrifices which Armenia made, without bargaining, for the cause of the Allies, I have the honour to demand, on behalf of the Armenian Nation, that it should be given, through its delegates, a well-merited seat at the Peace Conference".¹

Aharonian then proceeded to enumerate the reasons for the reunion of the Armenian Republic with the Armenian provinces of Turkey. The main reasons stated - were historical, geographical, and economic. The idea was to show that though separated from each other, the two parts were identical as regards essential characteristics.

¹ Ibid., p. 150.

He concluded that "Our history has proved that unity and independence alone have served the Armenian Nation."¹

Boghos Nubar Pasha made the following statement: The Armenians have been belligerents. Both in the Legion d'Orient and in the Foreign Legion there were Armenian Volunteers, who took so brilliant a share in the great Palestine victory. If to the victims of massacres and deportations, be added Armenian losses on the field of battle, it will appear that the tribute of life paid by Armenia is heavier than that of any other belligerent nation.²

Speaking about the territories of Independent Armenia he stated that it should comprise all Armenian territory and should be formed of:

1. Cilicia (with Sandjak of Marash), six vilayets of Erzerum, Bitlis, Van, Diarbekir, Kharpert, Sivas and a portion of the vilayet of Trebizond giving access to the Black Sea.

2. The territory of the Armenian Republic of the Caucasus the population of which demands union with its brothers in Turkey under one single Armenian State.³

Boghos Nubar Pasha proceeded stating that the rumours

¹ Ibid., p. 151.

² Ibid., p. 152.

³ Ibid., p. 153.

were untrue that they wished to include within the limits of their state territories which are not Armenian. The whole Mekkiari, the South of Diarbekir, and the Turkish region west of Sivas should be excluded from Armenia. As to Trebizond, though the population is mainly Greek, but it is the only considerable outlet ~~for~~ the whole of upper Armenia to the Black Sea. Regarding Cilicia, which is claimed by Syria, it is essentially an Armenian province. It was for four centuries the state of the last Kingdom of Armenia. Geographically, historically, eth^ologically Cilicia is an integral part of Armenia and its natural outlet in the Mediterranean.¹

Boghos Nubar Pasha speaking about the population of Turkish Armenia stated that the Turkish statistics are intentionally falsified to reduce the number of the Armenian population. The Turks have massacred and departed Armenians. The dead must count as much as the living. It must be taken into consideration that the Turks also have at least sustained equally heavy losses due to the war.

He pointed out that our program of an Armenian State is already described from a geographical standpoint. From the political point of view the program may be summed up in three points:-

¹ Ibid., p. 154.

1. Liberation from the Turkish yoke.

2. Joint protection by the Powers over Armenia. By this he meant that kind of protection which would prevent aggression from outside, and not interfering with internal and political affairs.

3. A mandate by one of the Great Powers to administer and organise Armenia.¹

An Armenian reporter wrote the following: "All the small nations were heard at the Peace Conference before us, but none of them created so much noise and occupied or kept busy the French Press, as much as the Armenians. The cause of this noise can be explained by the fact that it is not the first time that the Armenian Question is put at an international Conference".² There are other reasons: The last massacres, had moved the human conscience. Also, the Armenian propaganda machine - was effective - there were Armenian colonies everywhere and they had formed committees for the Armenian Cause. Even foreigners had formed Pro-Armenian societies. Moreover, the Armenians demanded Cilicia, which was claimed by France also.

On February 27, 1919, the editorial of the "Temps" journal was entitled "The Armenian Empire". It was a sympathetic, but a critical article. It concluded: "The Armenian Delegation having to choose between a small fatherland or

¹ Ibid., p. 156.

² Haiastani Gotchnag, Vol. XIX, No. 15 (April 12, 1919), pp. 461-462.

a vast Empire, expressed the idea of an Empire".¹

The Armenian territorial claims were against the secret agreements of the Allied powers. The Armenian Delegation claimed that the history, population, economic relations, and geography of Cilicia made the region part of Armenia. France had her own plans, and J. Herbette had declared to the Armenian Delegations that France in this question could not agree with them.²

The Armenian territorial claims were against the aspirations of the Azerbaijanis, the Georgians, the Kurds, the Syrians, and of the Turks. Also they were against Russian appetites; but for the time being Russia was in internal turmoil and was not ready to be busy with her aspirations. We have to add the Greeks of Trebizond. In January 1919 the Prime Minister of Greece presented a memorandum to the Peace Conference, where he stated that the 350,000 Greeks of the vilayet of Trebizond and the 70,000 Greeks of the vilayet of Adana could be annexed to the Armenian State.³ The president of the National Union of

¹ Ibid.

² A. Aharonian, "From Sardarapat to Sèvres and Lausanne", Armenian Review, Vol. XV, No. 3 (September, 1962), p. 5.

³ Haiaastani Gotchnag, Vol. XIX, No. 4 (January 25, 1919), p. 123.

Pontals protested against this, saying that such annexation is against the democratic principles of the Allied powers.¹

These Armenian claims were taken seriously and special steps were taken to examine them. In the Conferences of London (February-March 1920) and of San Remo (April 18-26, 1920) these claims were studied. Owing to the difficulty of the question, it was considered suitable to appeal to President Wilson for delimiting the frontiers between Turkey and Armenia.

This story would be told in the following chapters.

¹ Ibid., No. 14 (April, 1919), p. 441.

CHAPTER IV

The Activities of the Different Commissions

The Peace Conference had at her table the aspirations and grievances of the small nations. Different commissions were created to deal with them. The ones which dealt with the Armenian claims were:

King-Crane Commission

Haskell's Mission

American Military Mission

Haskell's Mission was mainly dedicated to Armenia, the others to the Ottoman Empire. Chronologically King-Crane Commission being first, we will take that one first.

King-Crane Commission (June 10-July 21, 1919)

At the meeting of the Council of Four on March 20, 1919, the case of the mandate of Syria was discussed. President Wilson was in favour of sending a special Interrallied commission selected from the ablest men that could be obtained to go to Syria. Their object should be to elucidate the state of opinion and the ground ~~to~~ be worked on by any mandatory.¹ Clémenceau adhered in principle to an inquiry, but

¹ David Lloyd George, Op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1071-1072.

he said, it must not be confined to Syria alone, but also to Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Armenia, because mandates also were required for these countries. Lloyd George gave his consent easily because the English were not closely concerned with Armenia.¹

At Lloyd George's request President Wilson undertook to draft the terms of reference for the Commission.

Later on the French refused to participate in the Commission, followed by the British², who did not want to irritate the French, because the French regarded the British officers as the stimulators of the anti-French feeling.³

Finally the Commission was formed only by Americans, headed by Charles R. Crane and Henry Churchill King, assisted by experts. They did research work from June 10 to July 21, 1919, in Palestine, Syria, Cilicia and Constantinople.

In Constantinople, the Commission posed these three questions to the chiefs of the Turkish political parties and Armenian Communities:

- 1) What are your wishes?
- 2) In case it is necessary to establish a mandate, upon which state do you prefer to confer it?

¹ Ibid., p. 1074.

² U.S.A., Papers Relating..., Vol. XII, p. 748.

³ David Lloyd George, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1077.

3) What is your point of view of the subject of an Armenia, large or small?¹

The Commission does not give the collected data, but other sources have kept the answers of the Chiefs of the Turkish political parties and of the Armenian communities.

Ahmed Riza bey, one of the founders of Committee of Order and Progress and President of the Ottoman Parliament, declared that they wished the Armenians a happy and quiet life, on condition that the prosperity of the Armenians was not to be obtained at their expense.²

Ex-Minister of Interior - Moustapha Bey was against the creation of an Independent Armenia in the eastern vilayets. His rejection was on the basis that the Armenians have never constituted the absolute majority of the population in any part of Turkey. If the statistics prepared by the Ottoman Government were considered false, then it was possible to consult those which were established by the French and English authors.³ A good proposal, but it can deceive only the naive reader. If we ask Moustapha

¹ Michel Paillarés, Le Kémalisme devant les Alliés, (Paris, 1922), p. 6.

² Ibid., p. 7.

³ Ibid., p. 7.

Bey who provided the statistical data for these French and English authors, his answer will be the Ottoman Government.

Suspicion towards the statistics of the Ottoman Empire was expressed by a member of the Armenian Delegation who had an interview with the commission. It was said that even the Armenians had falsified their figures for the following reasons: 1) The Armenians had not transmitted the birth of a son to the Government, in order to be free from military service; 2) The existence of girls had been kept unknown fearing kidnapping. Moreover, the Armenian Church registered the names of the baptized children, therefore the Patriarchate of Constantinople would have the exact statistics of the Armenians.¹ This problem is very subtle and needs careful study.

Damad Ferid Pasha, President of Soulh ve Selamet (Peace and Security) political party and ex-minister of war declared: "We are persuaded that it is materially impossible to create an Armenia in Ottoman territory. We will consent, for the benefit of the two sides - to a mutual exchange of territories and populations and to a slight rectifications of frontiers in favour of the Armenians".²

¹ Gabriel Lazian, Haiastan ev Hai Date (Cairo, 1957), p. 204.

² Michel Paillarès, Op. cit., p. 9.

Safeddine bey, ex-vali of Scodra, spoke in the name of the Liberal Entente. "For the time being" he said, "we can't give a definite answer to the creation of an independent Armenia. This question can be solved in a friendly way. Our party has always considered infamous the attitude of the Committee of Union and Progress towards the Armenians".¹

The Armenians were represented by the Patriarch Zaven Yeghiayan, the locum tenens of the Armenian catholic patriarch - Seiahian, and the head of the protestant community. A delegation from the Popular party had a separate interview. They presented facts about the Armenian massacres.² They expressed their equal acknowledgement to France, Great-Britain, and the United States for their benefits. They were unable to give preference for the mandatory power.³ Ramgavar party's view differed somehow. Its delegates gave preference to United States. If they accepted. They expressed for an Armenia from Sea to Sea, and were opposed to the idea of having two Governments, one for Turkish Armenia, the other for Eastern Armenia.⁴

¹ Ibid., p. 11.

² Ibid., p. 15.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Gabriel Lazian, Op. cit., pp. 204-206.

The conclusion of the Commission was that a separate Armenian state was to be urged in the interests of the Armenians, of the Turks, and of the peace of the world alike.¹ This conclusion was the outcome of thirteen reasons given in the report. The major ones are the facts that the Turks have demonstrated unfitness to rule the Armenians and they have massacred them with cruelty. The Armenians have earned their right of independent living by their sufferings, their loyalty to principles, their industry, self reliance and ability.²

If a separate Armenian state is the logical compensation to the Armenian people, what is the conception of such a state? Should there be a Large Armenia or a Small Armenia? The commission preferred a small Armenia, if that state is to be practicable. Speaking about the extent and boundaries of the Armenian State, it is stated:

- 1) The Armenians should be provided with a definite territory, and organized as soon as practicable into a self-governing independent state.
- 2) This area should be taken from both Turkish and Russian territory.

¹ U.S.A., Papers Relating..., Vol. XII, p. 813.

² Ibid., p. 814.

- 3) The Armenians are entitled to an amount of Turkish territory as compensation for their losses during the massacres.
- 4) They should not be given an excessive amount of Turkish territory.
- 5) The proposed larger Armenia, to extend from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, is probably impossible of realization.¹

In their opinion an Armenia reduced to the Armenian highlands in both Turkey and Russia, with an outlet on the Black Sea, had a good chance of prosperity and continuance. That state had to be created by the unification of present territory of Russian Armenia with the area of Turkish Armenia which the Russians held in 1917. Such a state was easier to defend compared to the large Armenia.

To these were added estimates of the population of an Armenian state. If the plan of small Armenia were accepted (Smaller Turkish Armenia with Russian Armenia) by 1925 the Armenians could be in a small majority. Under favorable conditions, they could have 1,536,000 against 1,231,000 Moslems (Turks, Kurds, Tcherkez, etc.).²

¹ Ibid., pp. 819-823.

² Ibid., p. 827.

Such a small Armenia is very easy for a mandatory power to rule. And if Armenians follow the plan of having a large Armenia would be in genuine danger of grasping too much and losing all.¹

The Armenians had to organize their state in a restricted area, excluding Cilicia. If Anatolia failed to develop as a well knit and successful state, in the future, the question could be resumed of connecting Cilicia with Armenia.

An American Mandate was desired. It satisfied all - the Allies, the Armenians and the Turks, who though not wishing any separate Armenian state, would probably favor an American Mandate for Armenia.²

On the whole it is possible to say that the Commission's report had a sympathetic attitude towards the Armenian Question. It did not negate the right of the Armenians to have a Large Armenia, but the Commission gave preference to create such an Armenia which was practicable, easy to rule, and one which did not irritate its neighbours. Actually this report was a guide when Wilson delimited the Armenian boundaries in 1920.

¹ Ibid., p. 823.

² Ibid., p. 820.

Relief Plans and General Haskell

The Armenian Republic during 1918 fought against two enemies - the Turks and starvation. The second was the outcome of the first. As a result of the Armeno-Turkish clash around 500,000 refugees were gathered in the Armenian Republic.¹ As a result of the state of warfare it was impossible to cultivate the land, and even no seeds existed. Armenia was unable to satisfy the needs in clothing, medicines, food, and the result was widespread cholera, followed by typhus.

Vratzian states that in six months, due to starvation and illness, around 180,000 died.²

Herbert Hoover, United States food Administrator quotes from the reports sent to him: "In the larger towns the dead and dying were everywhere in the streets, children wandering about like dogs looking through the offal.

"I have seen women stripping flesh from dead horses with their bare hands.

"There is abundant evidence of cannibalism.

"Typhus is rampant".³

The year 1919 brought a slight amelioration, but the

¹ Herbert Hoover, The Memories of Herbert Hoover,
(New York, 1952), Vol. I, p. 387.

² Haiastani...., p. 192.

³ Op. cit., p. 386.

two big enemies existed in a somehow changed form. The Armeno-Tartar boundary disputes had replaced the Armeno-Turkish clashes. The lack of medicines and crops continued.

On January 22, 1919, the Prime Minister of Armenia Hovhannes Kachaznoui presenting the economic situation of Armenia to his cabinet, proposed to come in contact with the Allied powers and in order to stop the starvation, to transport crops from foreign markets, especially from U.S.A.¹

On February 4, 1919, the Armenian Parliament proposed to the Prime Minister to go abroad especially U.S.A., and to secure the necessary crops. He left Erivan on April 16, 1919. Already American humanitarian institutions had taken care of Armenian needs. The American Near East Relief Committee under the leadership of Arthur Curtiss James and Cleveland Dodge of New York started to help Armenia. Their shipments began in January, 1919. The same committee opened orphanages in Armenia.

Herbert Hoover helped the Committee's activity and a few months later took charge of Armenia and sent Major Joseph C. Green with a staff of officers. Beginning May

¹ S. Vratzian, Op. cit., p. 241.

the American relief poured in. But the Georgian Government demanded huge consignments of food or great sums of money for tolls. Hoover secured a sharp dispatch from Prime Minister Clemenceau (July 19) and was able to secure the free passage or transportation of relief materials.¹

The American aid was temporary; it had to end on July 1. But because the need of relief was so huge that it was decided to continue it for another year. So Major Green and his associates were relieved and a new man was appointed - General Haskell, but instead of being the representative of United States in his new post, he was representing the Four Great Powers - United States, Great Britain, France and Italy.

The relief plan of other states was insignificant; but in some cases there were private organizations and persons who were interested in the financial situation of Armenia. In the British Parliament A. Williams asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on this issue (in the session of March 26, 1919) and received the following answer from under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Cecil Harworth: "The whole question of revictualling the country is now in the hands of the Food Section of Supreme Econo-

¹ H. Hoover, Op. cit., p. 387.

mic Council at Paris. And in such parts of Armenia as are in British occupation, relief work is done chiefly by using of surplus army stocks, and in some giving facilities of American Relief.¹ The same question was raised again another time (November 3, 1919) by A. Lunn, to which Harmsworth replied that there were no Government funds which could be applied to the relief of Armenian refugees, but he was glad that the job was undertaken by private organizations both in Great Britain and the U.S.²

General Haskell's Mission

The Council of Four, in its session of July 5, 1919, at Lansing's proposal adopted a resolution, by which Col. William N. Haskell was appointed to act as High Commissioner in Armenia on behalf of the Four Powers. His function was to take full charge of all relief organizations operating in Armenia.³

On August 21, 1919, Haskell reached Erivan and received cordial welcome. Armenians had great hopes on the Peace Conference and they were ready to welcome anybody expediated

¹ Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 1919, 5th series, Vol. 114, pp. 391-392.

² Ibid., Vol. 120, pp. 1163-1164.

³ British Documents..., Series 1, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 22.

by that Conference. The same behaviour was shown to General Harbord's mission, that we will see at the end of this chapter.

The first telegram of General Haskell was read by Clemenceau to the Council of Four, meeting on August 29, 1919. Haskell was stating that the work of relief was possible, provided he was supported with troops, because the Tartars were attacking on the east and the south and Tartar uprisings were increasing daily. On the spot there were British troops, which were leaving Caucasus. He proposed that new orders be given to British forces to stay and protect the Armenians, or to find other troops and to expediate them to Armenia. The telegram ended "Arrival of even one regiment might decide fate of our Armenian allies who may be exterminated at any time unless troops are rushed".¹

George Clemenceau expressed his readiness to send about 12,000 French troops from Cilicia to occupy points mentioned by Col. Haskell. A note from the French General Staff was read outlining the plan of carrying out this expedition. The note was entitled "Protection of the Armenians". It gave information about the size of expeditionary

¹ Ibid., p. 574.

force, about the points of debarkation (ports of Cilicia - Mersina and Alexandretta), about the food supply, etc. It concluded that the operation contemplated was possible to begin after September 10 if the preliminary requirements were accomplished.¹

Balfour (from Paris) sent a long telegram to Curzon commenting on the French offer. He stated: "... an Armenian massacre is imminent. We cannot retain a single battalion in the Caucasus, because the state of our Treasury does not permit. We have to welcome the French offer, though perhaps it is not guided by purely humanitarian or altruistic intentions. There are minor objections (related mainly to the passage of the French troops), but it would be the worst possible policy to hamper the French plan by raising small difficulties and formal objections. I doubt their scheme succeeding, but do not let it be said that we have made it fail".²

The project was criticized by the British cabinet on military grounds. Balfour defended the French project on political grounds - public opinion in U.S., Great Britain, and France wanted to save Armenia. And defended his position

¹ U.S.A., Papers Relating..., Vol. 8, p. 11.

² British Documents, first series, Vol. 4, pp. 745-746.

saying that, "Whatever we may think or even know of the real motives of France it seems to me that politically it would be fatal to do anything except to accept this offer with gratitude".¹

The English statesmen did not see a philanthropic element in the French offer. Admiral J. de Robeck saw a danger in the French scheme. The French force will probably arrive at Mersina too late in the season to undertake a march to Armenia, and therefore they must need suitable stations for troops until the spring. Thus they will occupy important places in Syria.²

United States Government informed the French Government that it had the intention to send troops.³ So the French Government withdrew its offer.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (from Constantinople) sent a telegram (October 23, 1919) to Sir E. Crowe telling that Col. Haskell 'reached here and we had a conversation. Haskell informed me that General Harbord has gathered totally erroneous impression of state of things in Anatolia and Caucasia, and considers the dispatch of Allied troops unnecessary'. The impression of Col. Haskell is entirely different "and one with which I am fully in accord namely that situation is extremely precarious, that presence of Allied troops will be

¹ Ibid., p. 748.

² Ibid., p. 761.

³ Marguerite Bargamian, "The Armenian Question...", The Armenian Review, Vol. IX, No. 35 (Sept., 1956), p. 43.

indispensable before repatriation of Armenians can commence, and that delay in announcing the peace terms is having worst possible effect".¹

Col. Haskell on his way to Paris met J. de Robeck at Constantinople and had talks with him. Continuing his journey he reached Paris and on November 14, 1919, had a chance to give the Council of Four a brief summary of the conditions in which he explained that there was enmity among the three republics of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Speaking about the relief work he stated that in Armenia alone some 800,000 destitutes were being relieved and about 15,000,000 francs per month was being spent for this purpose. He had been entrusted to represent the Supreme Council in Armenia, but he asked for extension of his office to include relief work in Azerbaijan and Georgia.² In its next day's session the Supreme Council adopted a resolution extending General Haskell's powers to include Georgia and Azerbaijan in matters concerning relief work.³

This new appointment or extension of powers was not liked by some persons of the British Foreign office. Kidston in a letter dated November 28, 1919 to E. Crowe stated that the extension of Haskell's power has filled us with

¹ Ibid., Vol. 4, pp. 843-844.

² U.S.A., Foreign Relations..., Vol. 9, pp. 167-168.

³ Ibid., Vol. 9, pp. 179-180.

dismay here. Several men returning from Caucasus agree that "Haskell is the last person who should be entrusted with such a delicate and difficult task. He is not decisive and utterly unsuited to deal with Orientals." He advocates Wardrop, the English High Commissioner in Tiflis, for the post stating that "he has an almost uncanny facility for managing these people, and enjoys perhaps a greater prestige than any European living".¹

This negative attitude or antipathy towards General Haskell was not based on his personal defects. The General had experience not only in relief plans, but also in politics. He was responsible for the truce being signed between the Armenians and the Tartars.

Some circles of the British Foreign Ministry did not want the solution of the Caucasian problems completed by foreign hands. The prestige that they had, was overshadowed by American officials. In addition, the picture of the Caucasus that they presented in lively colours, did not correspond to the one described by General Haskell. So they criticized Haskell on this ground.

Haskell's mission stayed in Armenia for a year (July 1919 - July 1920). During this period the mission was

¹ British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 328-329.

supported by the Grain Corporation, Near East Committee, and by private relief agencies.

As we said before mainly these organizations took in their hands the relief work of Armenia. Even the Supreme Economic Council in Rome was unable to assist Armenia because it had no available resources to offer (November 21-23, 1919).¹

These resolutions of the Supreme Economic Council in Rome were read at the Supreme Council's meeting of December 6, 1919, and Col. Logan stated that he had received a telegram from Hoover informing him that an arrangement had been made with the Grain Corporation to supply 35,000 tons of cereals, and American Red Cross had given 1,700,000 dollars for relief purposes.²

Herbert Hoover gives the statistical balance sheet with Armenia,³ which is helpful to bring in here:

	<u>Supplies</u>		
	Food (Tons)	Clothing Medical Miscellaneous (Tons)	Total (Tons)
From U.S.	119,149	16, 614	135,763

¹ U.S.A., Papers Relating..., Vol. 9, p. 509.

² Ibid., p. 505.

³ Op. cit., p. 389.

Financed by

Charity from the U.S.	\$ 12,671,722
Loans " " "	15,492,304
" from the United Kingdom (transportation)	<u>631,400</u>
	\$ 28,795,426

The Armenians were grateful for the relief work of U.S. Armenian political personalities had expressed their warm thanks for this. A. Klatissian writes: "Without exaggeration it is possible to say that the American relief saved the Armenians from complete starvation".¹ And V. Papazian writes: "Col. Haskell played an important role in the physical salvation of the population of Armenia".²

American Military Mission to Armenia

As we saw in Chapter III the Armenian Delegations demanded a mandatory power, at least for 20 years, in order to be able to organize their state. But Britain, France, and Italy already had undertaken responsibilities towards

¹ Op. cit., p. 111.

² Im Houshere, Vol. III, p. 67.

Mesopotamia, Palestine, Anatolia, Syria, Africa and the Southern Seas. Therefore they had heavy burdens, so they did not want to overburden themselves. If these powers rejected such a mandate over Armenia, perhaps they were thinking that such a project did not bring financial profit to the mandatory power - on the contrary it would have been a burden on their state treasury. It was a humanitarian task, rather than financial.

In addition, they were thinking that the mandatory power would have conflicts with Turkey and Russia, because some of the territories incorporated in independent Armenia were considered by the Turks as parts of their fatherland, and the other parts as zones of influence of Tzarist Russia.

In normal conditions "Russia would have been the fittest choice for a mandatory in Armenia and the Straits",¹ but the Bolshevik Revolution had altered the plans. Actually the Straits were given to Russia in the secret agreements of 1916, but in the present conditions that was impossible. Russia was the prey of a distractive ideology and of a civil war. Therefore it was put out of the family of Nations. Even the Allies were helping to destroy that ideology. There-

¹ David L. George, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1256.

fore new Powers had to be found for this necessary role, President Wilson with his idealism was ready to consider such a plan.

At a meeting of the Council of Four on May 14, 1919, David Lloyd George proposed the creation of mandates over Armenia, and the Straits. President Wilson accepted the proposal on behalf of the United States of America and subject to the consent of the Senate.¹

The sympathetic attitude of President Wilson somewhat reflected the opinion of the American Nation. Herbert Hoover states that "probably Armenia was known to the American school child in 1919 only a little less than England".² The same idea was stated by the Committee for the independence of Armenia in its telegram cabled to President Wilson (dated June 22, 1919), that "without regard to party or creed the American people are deeply interested in the welfare of the Armenian people".³

¹ Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 1262-1263.

² Op. cit., p. 385.

³ "American Military Mission to Armenia", The Armenian Review, Vol. II, No. 1 (February, 1949), p. 67.
The Committee was composed of Charles Evans Hughes, Elihu Root, Henry Cabot Lodge, John Sharp Williams, Alfred E. Smith, James W. Gerard, Frederick Courtland Renfield, and W. Eliot.

President Wilson needed necessary information and data related to Armenia and the Straits. The King - Grane Commission had submitted its report, but the commission had visited Cilicia and Constantinople, and had no contact with the Armenian Republic. A new Mission had to go to Armenia.

Under Secretary of State Frank L. Polk who communicated the decision of President Wilson to General J.G. Harbord designating him the head of the Mission, instructed him to investigate and report on political, military, geographical, administrative, economic phases of the area.¹

The Mission was composed of 52 members.² Four of the members were Armenian. The Mission before leaving Paris collected the available data on Armenia and the Armenian Question found in Paris. Harbord and some of his aides had interviews with the two Armenian Delegations and gathered valuable information on the military force, geography and transportation system of Armenia.

The Mission spent thirty days in Asia Minor and Transcaucasia. The places they visited were Constantinople, Adana, Tarsus, Ayas, Mersina, Aleppo, Mardin, Diarbekir,

¹ Ibid., p. 69.

² General Harbord gives a list of the personnel of the Mission (see International Conciliation, June 1920, No. 151, p. 275), but it is not complete. James H. Tashjian taking from the Memoirs of Harry Khathadourian, gives the complete list accompanied by biographical notes. See the Armenian Review, Vol. II, No. 2 (May, 1949), pp. 66-67.

Kharpert, Malatia, Sivas, Erzinjan, Erzerum, Kars, Erivan, Tiflis, Baku, Batum. Members of the Mission also traveled from Ulakishla to Sivas, Samsun, Marsovan, Trebizond to Erzerum, Khorasan, Bayazid, from Erivan to Nakhitchevan, Etchmiadzin. The Mission travelled a total of 6031 miles.

The Mission interviewed at length representatives of every government exercising sovereignty in the region, as well as individuals - Turks, Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, Tartars, Georgians, Russians, Persians, Jews, Arabs, British, and French, including Americans, for some time domiciled in the country.¹

The Mission while in Erzerum met Kiazim Karabekir whose high officials asked Harry Khatchadourian to tell the Armenians the following: "Armenians, it would be well to be friends with the Turks, and become reconciled, since there is nothing to be expected by the Armenians from the foreigners."² This paragraph reflects the whole tragedy of the Armenian Question, because it contains a cold reality. The Armenians were ready to be reconciled with the Turks because actually they were neighbours and good friendly

¹ James G. Harbord, "American Military Mission to Armenia", International Conciliation - Documents of the American Association for International Conciliation 1920, No. 151 (June, 1920), p. 276. Hereafter to be cited as International Conciliation.

² James H. Tashjian, "The American Military Mission to Armenia", The Armenian Review, Vol. III, No. 1 (March, 1950), p. 81.

relations were essential for Armenia. The later^t was not rejecting such an offer, but it demanded first the doing of justice, that is the return of Armenian territories to the Armenian Republic. But Turkey wanted friendship with Armenia without paying its debt. Even this spirit of friendship was not sincere. Turkey having been defeated and weak, sought for the friendship of its neighbours. We had seen its arrogant attitude towards the Caucasian states while she was at the peak of her power in 1918.

As to the second part of the paragraph - nothing to be expected from the foreigners - this was proved when not state took the responsibility of Armenia on its shoulders. We will see this later. For the time being let us return to the activity of the Mission.

The Mission reached the boundaries of the Armenian Republic on September 26, 1919. En route it visited Etchmiadzin, where the Catholicos of all Armenians resided. It reached Erivan, on September 29, 1919 and was received with great ceremony. It remained in Erivan four days. Consultative meetings were held and the collected data were transmitted. A. Khatissian the Prime Minister writes: "We knew that much depended on this report, and we made serious

preparations to receive the Mission. Almost forty men worked two months to prepare the information asked for".¹

In one of these consultative meetings General Harbord advocated Turco-Armenian friendship saying to Khatissian: "A peace agreement be made with the Turks so that the Armenians might live with the Turks as friends."² Harbord added too, that in the course of his journey through Turkey, he had seen no concentration of Turkish forces against the Armenians. On the contrary, he said, the Turks have told him that "they were willing to readmit native Turkish Armenians, to protect them and give them equal rights with the Turkish natives."³

Khatissian replied: "It would be suicide for Turkish Armenians to return to their former haunts merely on the basis of Turkish promises and 'friendly' proposals; and that repatriation was possible only at that moment when Turkish Armenia was separated fully and absolutely from Turkey."⁴

General Harbord did not know the Turkish character well enough. He considered the simple promises as suf-

¹ Haiastani Hanrapetoutian..., p. 165.

² James H. Tashjian, Op. cit., Vol. III, No. 2 (June, 1950), p. 109.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

ficient guarantee for the creation of Armeno-Turkish good neighborliness. Otherwise, if he had followed the history of the reform movement in the Ottoman Empire and had seen the fate of the reform promises, he would have acted otherwise. The Armenian who had received the blow of the Ittihad movement, did not have confidence on the Turkish Nationalist movement which had succeeded the former, and he had great hopes on the Paris Peace Conference which would do justice to him. Khatissian's opinion was that even if they entered negotiations with the Turks, probably they were not going to receive practical and satisfactory results.¹

The Mission left Erivan on October 2, 1919. In his farewell telegram General Harbord stated: "I take with me only pleasing memories about the Armenian people and I feel illimited sympathy towards those, who had left their native homes and now are protected by your Government."²

General Harbord reaching Batum sent a telegram to the Peace Conference where he gave a short report of his activity.

¹ Haiastani Hanrapetoutian..., pp. 164-165.

² Gotchnag Haiastani, Vol. XIX, No. 50 (December 13, 1919), p. 1513.

On his return, while on board U.S.S. Martha Washington, General Harbord prepared his report, which is dated October 16, 1919. The conclusion of the report was that the two mandates of 1) Armenia, 2) Constantinople and Anatolia had to be exercised by the same power. If separate powers exercised such a mandate the inevitable jealousies, hatreds, exaggerated separatist tendencies, and economic difficulties would cause failure.¹

He expressed himself against the scheme of separating territories from Turkey and incorporating them in a separate Armenia, because that would result in the massacre of Christians, if Turkey is not occupied by the same strong power.

Referring to the mandatory power which was going to assume the responsibility, he said that it must be prepared to carry out a continuity of policy for at least a generation; and it must send its gifted sons to leadership in this region; it must have a strong sense of altruism and international duty to the peace of this region and must have the unanimous wish of other parties to the covenant of the League of Nations.²

¹ International Conciliation, No. 151 (June, 1920), p. 293.

² Ibid., p. 298.

He thought that a plebiscite fairly taken would result in a demand for American mandate, but if U.S. accepts the mandate "there should be specific pledges in terms of formal agreements with France and England and definite approval from Germany and Russia of the dispositions made of Turkey and Transcaucasia, and a pledge to respect them".¹

Before taking the mandate the following prerequisites are necessary:- absolute control of the foreign relations of the Turkish Empire, the ending of foreign control over Turkey's financial machinery, evacuation of the foreign troops, etc.

In conclusion General Harbord cited the reasons for and the reasons against U.S. accepting the mandate:

The reasons for were (we will mention the essential ones):

1. The United States is morally bound to accept the obligations and responsibilities of a mandatory power, being one of the chief architects of the League of Nations.

2. The Near East presents the greatest humanitarian opportunity of the age.

3. America is practically the unanimous choice and fervent hope of all the peoples involved.

¹ Ibid., p. 305.

4. America is already spending money there for humanitarian purposes and this could be done better if in control.

5. America is the only hope of the Armenians.

6. The building of railroads would offer opportunities to our capital.

7. Intervention would be a liberal education for our people in world politics.

8. It would definitely stop further massacres of Armenians and Christians.

9. It would increase the strength and prestige of the U.S. abroad.

10. America has strong sentimental interests in the region - our missions and colleges.

11. Better millions for a mandate than billions for future wars.

12. Here is a man's job that the world says can be better done by America than by any other.¹

Reasons against were:

1. The United States has prior and nearer foreign obligations.

2. This region has been a battleground of militarism and imperialism for centuries.

¹ Ibid., pp. 306-311.

3. Other powers, particularly Great Britain and Russia, have shown continued interest in the welfare of Armenia.

4. Our country would be put to great expense, involving probably an increase in the Army and Navy.

5. Peace and justice would be equally assured under any other of the great powers.

6. The first duty of America is to its own people and its nearer neighbours.

Our country in this adventure has to advance for the first five years \$756,014,000.¹

"If we refuse to assume it for no matter what reasons satisfactory to ourselves, we shall be considered by many millions of people as having left unfinished the task for which we entered the war, and as having betrayed their hopes".²

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid., p. 312.

CHAPTER V

The Treaty of Sèvres

Before dealing with the Treaty of Sèvres we have to consider the preliminary activities which led to the signature of the treaty. In the preliminary activities were the recognition of independent Armenia, the Conferences of London and San Remo, etc.

The Recognition of Armenian Independence

Although Allied representatives were working in Transcaucasia, and official commissions had visited Armenia, and heads of Armenian Delegations had appeared before the Peace Conference, yet the official recognition of Armenian independence was delayed due to unstable conditions in Russia and the delay in the formulation of the peace terms with Turkey. The settlement of the question related to the Turkish Empire presented greater difficulties to the Conference than that of any other enemy country because the Empire was a medley of races, and the jealousies among the Allies made things worse.

Wardrop, the British representative in Transcaucasia, sending a telegram to Curzon (dated September 19, 1919)

was advocating the recognition of the Transcaucasian republics, and was stressing this as a matter of urgency. The independence of Transcaucasia, in his point of view, had a prime importance for the sake of India and Persia, because, he thought, Russia under any regime was going inevitably cause continual trouble to British interest in these areas. He added that Germany and Turkey had already recognized Georgia.¹

Curzon was not sure about the scope of the recognition, because the arguments for recognition appeared to apply to Georgia alone, while the conclusion was for all.²

Wardrop answered that arguments for the recognition of Georgia were stronger juridically, politically and economically, but Armenia and Azerbaijan should at the same time be recognized.³

We have presented here in detail the exchange of telegrams to show that it might have influenced the delay of the recognition of the independence of Armenia, because Georgia and Azerbaijan were recognized first (January 12, 1920) and Armenia later (January 19, 1920).

¹ British Documents, 1 series, Vol. 3, No. 435, p. 562.

² Ibid., 1 series, Vol. 3, No.455, p. 577.

³ Ibid., 1 series, Vol. 3, p. 601.

In the Supreme Council's meeting of January 19, 1920, the representatives of the Republics of Georgia and of Azerbaijan were introduced. Tseretelli, the Georgian representative, in his speech made allusion to the case of Armenia and said we would like to know why Armenia had not received de facto recognition, because there are three Transcaucasian republics, and not two. He concluded: "That recognition would help us all and render easier resistance to any aggression whatsoever."¹

When the representatives of the two Transcaucasian republics left the session, Lord Curzon felt the necessity of giving the explanation of the question. He said that he had made the original proposal of recognizing the two republics. Why did he not propose to recognize Armenia also? Because "the question of Armenia had still to be decided by the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. It was felt that recognition at that time would be to anticipate the work of the Peace Conference."²

Carrying on his reasoning he stated that things had changed, and there were strong reasons for the recognition of the independence of Armenia. The then existing Armenia

¹ U.S.A., Foreign Relations..., Vol. 9, p. 893.

² Ibid., Vol. 9, p. 901.

formed a part of the old Russian Empire as did Georgia and Azerbaijan. The Armenian state was ready to defend Transcaucasia against the Bolsheviks. He found it "just and clear" to recognize Armenia, "but on the reservation that this act does not prejudice the ultimate delimitation of Armenia, the boundaries of which have to be decided in the peace treaty with Turkey."¹

In December England had refused to take such a step. De facto recognition of the Transcaucasian republics was Curzon's answer to the Denikin debacle.² Recognition of these separatist states could have hurt Denikin, who wanted an undivided Russia. Now that he was fallen, resistance to Bolshevism could be continued through the Transcaucasian states.

Louis Fisher thinks that to Curzon and Montagu, the Viceroy of India, Transcaucasia "would round out the empire. It would give Britain a bridge from Europe to Persia. With the Caucasus and the Trans-Caspia in England's grip, Afghanistan could not be defiant. India would be safe."³

The acquisition of the oil of Baku and the safety

¹ Ibid.

² Louis Fisher, The Soviets in World Affairs (London, 1930), Vol. I, p. 217.

³ Ibid.

of the British Empire were the directing factors of the British policy in the Caucasus.

The proposal of Curzon did not create any objections, and therefore was adopted as it stood.

On January 27, 1920, the General Secretary of the Peace Conference informed the President of the Delegation of the Armenian Republic, that the Supreme Council, in its session of January 19th, had decided to recognize de facto the Armenian State and its government. De Jure recognition was to be obtained by the Treaty of Sèvres of August 10, 1920.

The "strong reasons" presented by Curzon for the delay of the recognition of the Armenian republic were not reasonable and therefore Lord Curzon's attitude was not justifiable. Armenians had wholeheartedly fought for the Allied victory and were receiving a second rank attention.

When the Armenian Government heard that the two Transcaucasian republics were recognized, and Armenia was forgotten, Prime Minister A. Khatissian sent a telegram of discontent to Wardrop, who replied that the Allies wanted to recognize simultaneously both the Russian and

Turkish Armenias, and the delay was due to this cause.

The Delimitation of Armenian Boundaries in the Conference
of London

The Allied plenipotentiaries assembled in Paris were confronted with a gigantic task - preparing five separate Peace Treaties for five defeated countries. So, different commissions were created to make the preliminary preparations and then to come to conclusions.

The Conference of London (February-March 1920) dealt with the Turkish Empire. The Conference of Foreign Secretaries and Ambassadors, assembled in London, created a Commission for the Delimitation of the Boundaries of Armenia composed of eight members from four countries - England, France, Italy, and Japan. It had consultations with the Armenian Delegations.

On February 21, 1920, Boghos Nubar Pasha and A. Aharonian had a meeting with the Commission - and the Armenian territorial claims were restated and presented. The Armenian Boundaries stretched from Trebizond to the west of Dersim and Kharpert. Kamerer, the French representative was unhappy, because the last two regions were found in the French zone of influence. Seeing this,

Boghos Nubar Pasha and Aharonian declared that they are ready to abandon the claim, if France was going to keep them.¹

If France was interested in Dersim and Kharpert, England had the same interest towards Lazistan, a strip of land on the shore of the Black sea, having a population estimated from 50-60 thousand, all of them moslems. Both Georgia and Armenia had it in their claims. The Armenian Delegation demanded it not on historical, ethnological or legal grounds, but on economic grounds. Armenia needed a free access or outlet to the sea. Lazistan with its two small ports - Rizé and Atiné - presented a solution. But what about Trébizond? Did it not solve or satisfy the Armenian needs? No. Because there were great obstacles for its acquisition. Although Venizelos had accepted to annex it to Armenia, the native Greek population resented it. And then the non-willingness of the French was a handicap. So "demanding both Trébizond and Rizé and Atiné," declares Aharonian, "we hoped at least to get one of them."²

This second demand was against the British plan. Vansittart, the British representative in Paris, had

¹ A. Aharonian, "From Sartarapat to Sèvres and Lausanne" (Boston, 1963), p. 44.

² Ibid., p. 45.

tried to persuade the Armenian representative to abandon the claim of Lazistan, because England proposed to annex it to the neutral state of Batum.¹

Kaimmerer asked if it was possible to rule such a vast territory stretching till Kharpert and Erzinjan. The answer was that Armenia already had an army of 40-50 thousand soldiers, and if the Allies were ready to arm it, Armenia was ready to occupy the above-mentioned lands.

The Secretary of State of U.S. Bainbridge Colby sending a letter to the French Ambassador in Washington (March 24, 1920) stated that his government had genuine interest in the plans for Armenia. Special rights over Lazistan would hardly assure to Armenia an easy access to the sea. Trébizonde had always been the terminus of the trade route across Armenia. His government will be glad to see the Powers willing to grant Trébizonde to Armenia.²

On February 27, 1920, the conference heard the report and proposals of the Commission.

The report stated:

- 1) Erzinjan and Trébizonde should not be included

¹ Ibid.

² U.S., Papers Relating..., Vol. III, 1920, pp. 752-753.

within the boundaries of Armenia.

2) The boundary between Armenia and the Free State of Batum should be determined, on the spot by an inter-Allied Commission.

3) The Conference should for the present await the results of the agreement provided for in the existing treaties between the three republics in regard to the delimitation of their respective frontiers by the states themselves.

The Conference added to this proposal that 'an inter-Allied Commission should subsequently be appointed to demarcate the line.'

4) Creation of an autonomous state of Lazistan under the nominal suzerainty of Armenia.¹

This last proposal created much discussion. Colonel Chardigny proposed the creation of an independent Lazistan, and to Armenia be given "the right to convert into carriage roads the bad roads from Baiburt to Surmeneh, thus obtaining an outlet to the Black Sea through Lazistan".² The Marquis Imperiali and Cambon stated that Lazistan should remain under Turkish suzerainty with a servitude to the roads.

¹ British Documents, 1st series, Vol. 7, p. 280.

² Ibid., p. 281.

Curzon found the latter proposal very dangerous, because it would constitute a "danger to the independence of Armenia and would encourage Turkish Ambitions for the recovery of Batum."¹

Berthelot considered the ^{pro}posals of the Commission as the best solution to the question. The Conference, after much discussion, accepted the proposal of the Commission.²

It was very easy to delimit the boundaries of Armenia on a map, but was it possible to apply it? Was it easy to secure these lands? The Allied Powers knew that Armenia alone was unable to defend its rights. It needed material help - namely arms, ammunition, money, Allied officers to train its army. Who was going to procure these? The Allied Powers knew that all these were necessary demands, but they were not ready to give concrete, tangible help to save their small confident ally.

While discussing the report of the Commission, Curzon had proposed that the Turkish troops would have to be withdrawn from the zone allotted to Armenia then? Was Armenia

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

able to protect itself? The opinion of Colonel Char-
dingny was that a force of 15 to 20 thousand Allied
troops would have to be maintained in Armenia for the
first two ^{or} ~~re~~ three years, to protect the country against
the Turkish population in and around the country. It
had to withdraw after the formation of a strong Armenian
army.¹

Curzon found it difficult, because 1) it was not
easy to supply so large a force, 2) by this act the
Allied Powers would thereby become responsible for the
safety of Armenia, and later withdrawal would be impossi-
ble.² Therefore he asked whether Armenia set up a national
army if she were supplied with the necessary arms, money
and munitions? If these were not sufficient, could volun-
teers be supplied, and where from?

Marquis Imperialli found it very difficult to supply
these arms, and in his opinion none of the Allied Powers
could undertake such a duty.³

It was thought that the best solution was to send
the question to the League of Nations. The latter, al-
though recently formed, but in their opinion, it possessed

¹ Ibid., p. 283.

² Ibid., p. 284.

³ Ibid.

great authority and could appeal to the civilized world for the supply of the necessities.¹

Actually they escaped from responsibility. It is not fair to blame them for not being interested in the lot of the Armenian people. On the contrary they showed much sympathy. But sympathy alone without concrete help, is not enough in the life of nations. Armenia needed money and a well disciplined, organized army.

In the session of March, 12, 1920, the question of supervising the future organization of Armenia was taken up again. Curzon reported that the determination of the frontiers of Armenia had already provisionally been done and there remained the provision for the future existence of the Armenian State. He had information² that the Armenians were ready to supply the men to constitute the army, provided a certain number of Allied officers, arms and munitions were found. France and Great Britain were sending a certain quantity of arms and munitions, but these were not sufficient to cover the needs. Someone

¹ Ibid.

² That assurance was given by the Armenian Delegations. Aharonian tells us that both in London and in Paris the politicians had advised him to declare that the Armenians were able to occupy and defend their frontiers (From Sartarapat to..., (Boston, 1943), p. 46).

ought to be responsible for the future organization of Armenia.¹

The League of Nations was the golden key to the solution of the question. The League was to have a private meeting that same day, and a public meeting the next day in Paris. Therefore the conclusion was to send the proposal to the League.²

The Armenian Question and the League of Nations

As we saw earlier the Supreme Council acknowledged the principle of creating a free Armenian State, but unable to find a mandatory power, referred the question to the League of Nations, so as to protect the future independent state of Armenia. The first reaction of the League was to reject the proposal, but then they thought that perhaps this was a good opportunity to show that the League was a real, vital organization. So they decided to make certain proposals.³

The League of Nations' Secretariat came in contact with the Armenian Delegations and became aware of the con-

¹ British Documents, Vol. 7, p. 748.

² Ibid.

³ A. Aharonian, From Sartarabad to... (Boston, 1943), p. 53.

ditions under which the League might protect the Republic of Armenia. The Council of the League of Nations in its special meetings held in Paris between April 9 and 11 examined the question and gave its reply.

The report stated that in examining the above-mentioned question, the principal concern of the Council had been to find means to secure the independence of Armenia and maintenance of order and security in Armenian territory. The Council was in full accord with the Supreme Council as to the claims of the Armenian nation. The establishment of an independence and safe Armenian state was an obligation of civilized humanity. The report stated that within the limits of its own authority and capacity the League was ready to cooperate to this end, but it realized its shortcomings or limitations that it was not a state, it had no army and no finances. The stipulation of article 22 of the League did not contemplate the League itself accepting and exercising a mandate. It gave the right to supervise the mandates. The future of Armenia could be best assured if a member of the League or some other power could be found, who would be willing to accept the mandate, under the supervision and with the full support of the League.¹

¹ League of Nations, Official Journal, No. 3 (April-May, 1920), p. 86.

The mandate over Armenia was a humanitarian act in its essence. Actually Armenia was not a prosperous country or a country rich in minerals. Moreover the last massacres had exhausted the country. So the mandatory could derive no benefit. Therefore nobody wanted to take the responsibility. The Council knew this and was aware also that no state was ready to accept such a duty alone. Therefore it tried to produce a cordial cooperation of its members.¹

This report on the whole gave a negative answer to the question of the mandate over Armenia. The League was a newly formed body and it lacked the necessary means to help. For this failure, she was not responsible. We have to blame those who wanted to refer the question to the League of Nations, namely the Supreme Council, which lacked the necessary readiness to help Armenia.

The Second Report

On March 24, 1920, the Commission for the Delimitation of Armenian frontiers produced a second report (Report on the Formation of a Future Armenian State) and annexed

¹ Ibid., p. 87.

draft clauses for inclusion in the Turkish Treaty. As we saw the Commission was formed for this purpose and already had presented or submitted an earlier report. But the information gathered from different channels - Allied Commissioners and different delegations¹ - made the submission of a second report necessary.

The first report proposed^o the creation of the Free State of Batum. The new report provided for the creation of a free port in Batum, but the town and the province would go to Georgia, under express conditions ensuring freedom of transit both to Armenia and Azerbaijan. It was proposed that Chorok Valley and that of the Imer Kheri should be allotted to Armenia as a corridor to the sea.²

As regards the communications between Erivan and Batum, the first report proposed to give to Armenia the Kars-Ardahsn road as far as the frontier of the Batum Free State. Under the new plan the road from Ardahan to Batum fell under Georgian rule. But the communications could be assured by the articles guaranteeing Armenia's access to Batum. There was another possibility. If the

¹ For example the head of Georgian Delegation addressing a letter to the Supreme Council saying that access to the Black Sea may be organized with special stipulations without prejudice to the sovereignty of Georgia on the territories in question, i.e. Batum (See Documents on Brit. Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, First series, Vol. VII, 1920, p. 649).

² Ibid., Vol. 7, p. 643.

Emir-Valley was given to Armenia, the latter was able to construct a road from Ardahan to the Chorok Valley.

The second alteration in the second report related to the status of Lazistan. The first report had provided for an autonomous state of Lazistan under the nominal suzerainty of Armenia.† This provision was dropped. The Commission tried to compensate the Armenian state for its losses in the Batum affair. So it proposed the solution of incorporating Lazistan in the Armenian state. There were also other considerations: The Lazes did not constitute a national unit or community, and the autonomy of Lazistan might create a new problem, a "Lazistan question". Furthermore, the autonomy might encourage the pressure of Moslem Turkey eastwards towards Batum.¹ The Lazes had no greater claim to autonomy than the other minorities, that were living in Armenia. The rights and interests of those communities would be safeguarded by the Minorities Treaty which Armenia would have to sign before she got her new territories.

The second Report contained the following nine articles to be included in the Peace Treaty:

¹ Ibid., Vol. 7, p. 640.

- 1) Turkey recognizes Armenia as an independent state.
- 2) The delimitation of the frontiers of Armenia with Turkey, Kurdistan, Persia, Azerbaijan, Batum, and the Black sea.
- 3) Formation of Boundary Commissions.
- 4) The frontiers between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Georgia to be settled by agreement between the interested parties; in case of failure, the delimitation will be determined by the Principle Allied Powers.
- 5) The boundary of the demilitarised area in Turkey lying to the west of the western frontier of Armenia.
- 6) The local autonomy of Lazistan.
- 7) Minorities' Turkey.
- 8) Armenia's acceptance of payment of the war indemnities.¹
- 9) Subsequent agreements to decide all questions that may arise.²

The Commission added that the report had been agreed upon by the Italian and British representatives. It had

¹ Some parts of the Ottoman Empire being given to Armenia, the latter had to resume a part of the war indemnities of the Ottoman Empire.

² Ibid., Vol. 7, pp. 642-649.

been impossible to consult the French and Japanese representatives, due to pressure of other work.¹

During these days, on March 25, the British war office submitted a memorandum to the British Foreign Ministry. It described the situation in Turkey. The memorandum stated that the population of Turkey would be prepared to fight bitterly to avoid parts of its territory being handed over to a foreign power, especially to Greece or Armenia.²

The Turkish forces on the Armenian front were: regulars - 10,000, Nationalists - 18,5000, increasing possibly in the event of a National rising. Armenians had an army of 20,000, with 36 mountain guns.³

The memorandum was wise enough to see that "of all the conditions of the Treaty of Sèvres, the one which will arouse the greatest opposition among the Turks and which will be the hardest to enforce is that under which a large area of Turkey in Asia is to be handed over to Armenia".⁴

Direct military assistance of the Allied would have

¹ Ibid., Vol. 7, p. 649.

² British Documents..., Vol. 13, p. 26.

³ Ibid., p. 31.

⁴ Ibid., p. 35.

been needed to acquire these territories. The Allied were not ready for such a sacrifice. The British General Staff was of the opinion that the military assets of Great Britain were barely sufficient for the needs of the British Empire and of the newly acquired territories.¹

The Conference of San Remo (April 18-26, 1920)

In the Conference of San Remo, held between April 18 and 26, 1920, the vital question was the preparation of the treaty with Turkey. One of the major issues was the inclusion of the city of Erzerum in the territories of Armenia. It created much discussion, because the city was at that time the center of the Turkish Nationalist Movement, headed by Mustapha Kemal. Some questions were raised: Had Armenia any ethnic right to acquire Erzerum? In case of refusal to evacuate, was it possible to take the city by force? If yes, who was going to force - the Armenian state of Erivan or the Allied Powers? If Erzerum was given to Armenia, were they not going to be confronted with the difficulty of forcing the Turks to sign the Treaty?

¹ Ibid., p. 37.

Because the city was inhabited mainly by moslems, was it not against the principle of self-determination to give it to Armenia, a principle so much advocated by the Allies? If Erzerum was not given to Armenia, was it possible to create a strong and stable Armenian state?

On April 20, 1920, in the meeting of the Supreme Council, Curzon reported on the memorandum received from the Council of the League of Nations. The Council had raised three important points: 1) the financial resources required to set up the Armenian state; 2) the military resources to defend it; 3) the outlets to the sea that it would require. Curzon stated that he had heard from Fisher, the British representative in the Council of the League, that Norway would undertake the mandate.¹

Millerand stated that as far as financial assistance was concerned he would have to consult the Minister of Finance, but as to military assistance, he could offer no promises.²

Nitti adopted the same attitude - no military assistance and financial help.

Lloyd George said that neither Great Britain could

¹ British Documents..., Vol. 8, p. 47.

² Ibid.

supply troops. But he understood this was not required. Armenians did not need Allied troops; they needed equipment and training. He thought that the Allies could certainly supply these. He suggested to refer this matter to the military advisers.¹ His major preoccupation was the completion of the treaty. As the soon as the question of the access to the sea ^{and} ~~in~~ the boundaries of Armenia were settled, it would be possible to sign the treaty.

Curzon remarked that in the treaty clauses had to be inserted demanding the recognition of a Free State of Armenia, and of its boundaries. In such a case the Allies would assume certain responsibilities: they had to equip and train the Armenian army. He proposed to give an answer to the League to summon its Assembly in order to raise the financial resources required.²

Millerand stated that the Powers already had heavy burdens; therefore the League of Nations had to find a state, be it Norway or some other state, and the Powers will welcome and encourage such a state.³

Lloyd George believed that an appeal from the League of Nations to America to accept the mandate over Armenia

¹ Ibid., p. 49.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., p. 50.

would be successful. It was agreed to refer to the military advisers of the principle Allied Powers the question of the equipment of the military forces of Armenia.¹

In the following meeting, held on April 22, 1920, the frontiers of Turkey were discussed again. The general opinion of the members was to delimit the frontiers in such a way as to make them acceptable to the Turks - and enforceable if need be by the use of force on the part of the Allied Powers. Nitti remarked that if Erzerum were to be included in Armenia, to fulfill the theory of a greater Armenia, then some questions have to be faced. In the vilayet of Erzerum the Moslems superceded the Armenians. The city was the center of the Turkish Nationalists. If the Turks were driven out of the city there would be a massacre of Armenians.²

The same question was raised again by Lloyd George in the afternoon session and was argued almost on the same line. He said that on ethnic ground there were very few Armenians in Erzerum, the majority of the population being composed of Turks and Musulmans. This phenomenon was not the result of the war or of the extermination of Armenians.

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid., p. 94.

Therefore it is impossible under any principle to defend the surrendering of the place to Armenia. If the surrender was forced the Turks might not sign the treaty. Armenia was surrounded by hostile neighbours - Azerbaijanis, Kurds, and the Turks. So in order to defend such a vast territory they needed a strong army, which they did not possess at the time. The Allies also were not ready to help.¹

Berthelot accepted the strong arguments of Lloyd George, but said that the arguments against them were more powerful. He expressed that the natural development of Armenia would be handicapped if Erzerum was left out, because it would cut off Armenia from the sea. Without Erzerum, Armenia was unable to have access to the sea; and without any access to the sea, how was it possible for Armenia to prosper? Berthelot concluded: "The Allies were bound by their pledge of honour to constitute Erzerum a part of the new Armenian State".²

Curzon said that the statistical figures put forward by Nitti did not correspond to reality. "Before the war

¹ Ibid., p. 108.

² Ibid., p. 109.

the Turks in the Erzerum district had numbered some 360,000, and the Armenian population had numbered about 160,000".¹ But the Armenian population had been reduced by a series of massacres. Further, the commission on Armenian frontiers had recommended that Erzerum be granted to Armenia and the Conference of London had adopted this recommendation on strategical rather than on moral grounds, which were the following: 1) It was impossible to have an independent Armenia, with Erzerum in the hands of the Turks. 2) A barrier state was needed against future Pan-Turanian movement. 3) Certain assurances were given both to the Armenian Delegations and the League of Nations, regarding the future frontiers of Armenia, which practically amounted to pledges.²

Lloyd George pointed out that the Armenians had no right to indulge in unjustifiable hopes.³

Curzon said that if that reflected the Supreme Council's view, it was a bitter blow to the Armenians. In his opinion, Armenia would not get Trébizonde, if Erzerum was left in the hands of the Turks.⁴

Nitti repeated his argument that the inclusion of

¹ Ibid., p. 110.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

Erzerum in the territories of Armenia would make difficult the signature of the treaty by Turkey. He acted so on the best interests of the Armenians.¹

Lloyd George said that the Allies had not only to make treaties, but also to enforce them. Armenians could not conquer Erzerum themselves and there was nobody to help them in that matter. He brought forth two suggestions: 1) To find out whether President Wilson was prepared to assist effectively the Allies to carry out the treaty as present drafted. If the support of the United States was given, then the Supreme Council might follow the line indicated by the London Conference; 2) Armenia for the time being might be placed under the aegis of the League of Nations, till a mandatory power² was found.

Berthelot, speaking on behalf of the French delegation, said that they were compelled to accept Lloyd George's suggestions, although these did not in any way solve question of Erzerum.³

In Millerand's opinion to conceive of an Armenia without Erzerum was no solution at all. He thought that the best thing for the Supreme Council to do was to adopt

¹ Ibid., p. 111.

² Ibid., p. 113.

³ Ibid.

the views and the conclusions which had been reached by the London Conference.¹

The discussion of this item was suspended until the arrival of the Armenian delegation, which had been invited to attend the meeting.

When Boghos Nubar Pasha entered the Council Chamber Nitti and Lloyd George asked two Questions: 1) Was Armenia ready to defend her new frontiers, and did she desire the inclusion of Erzerum in those frontiers? 2) Was Armenia able to reorganize her army and to defend the new state?

Boghos Nubar Pasha answered that Armenia had already a small but powerful army of 15,000 and it was possible without difficulty to raise another 40,000, if the Allies provided the necessary munitions and equipment. The possession of Erzerum was absolutely essential to the security of Armenia. An Armenian massacre was impossible, because no Armenians were found in the district of Erzerum, all of them having been massacred. He concluded that there had been an Armenian majority in the last century in the district of Erzerum and he was ready to supply the necessary figures.²

¹ Ibid., p. 114.

² Ibid., p. 119.

Next day, on April 25, 1920, Aharonian (the head of the Delegation of the Armenian Republic) was heard by the Supreme Council. Nitti on behalf of the Supreme Council asked two questions: 1) Supposing the Allied Powers were ready to supply the necessary equipment, munitions, and officers, would the Armenian armies be able to capture Erzerum and secure the new frontiers? 2) Having regard to Armenia's best interests, what was the most suitable frontier to be laid down?¹

Aharonian's answer almost corresponded to that of Boghos Nubar Pasha. Aharonian said that Mustapha Kemal's army was really greatly inferior to what was imagined. The Armenians had an army in being which varied from 20,000 to 25,000. It might be possible to raise an army numbering not less than 40,000 men. The Armenian armies needed munitions and equipment, and above all officers. If the Armenians had these, they would be able to capture Erzerum and other provinces. He concluded that "without Erzerum it was impossible to conceive of a secure Armenian State".²

The Allied military representatives were present in this meeting. Marshal Fach, the head of the representatives,

¹ Ibid., p. 120.

² Ibid., p. 121.

said that Erzerum was a powerful fortress. The Turkish forces there were mostly demobilised, but they presented a potential force of considerable value. The Armenian forces had a strong national feeling, but they lacked in resources, that is to say, in arms, munitions and equipment. Erzerum would fall before a very energetically conducted attack.¹

The report of the Allied military advisers was negative. It reported that it would take a long time to organize the Armenian army and would not produce serious effects for a longtime. The Allied forces could not be sent to Armenia. Therefore it seemed to them that the Armenian forces were incapable of capturing Turkish Armenia and Erzerum specially. Even if small Allied contingents were sent as assistant forces, their failure would oblige them to send a true expedition.²

The Supreme Council wanted to postpone the question for the next day's meeting and it was done so. But Berthelot wanted to remind them that without Erzerum it would be impossible to construct an Armenian State, either morally or materially.³

¹ Ibid., p. 122.

² Ibid., p. 131.

³ Ibid., p. 123.

The question of Erzerum occupied two days of the Supreme Council and was going to get another day. On April 24, 1920, Lloyd George wanted to get rid of it and brought new proposals to Millerand, in a special conversation held at the Hotel Royal, at San Remo. He openly expressed himself against the plan of Larger Armenia.¹ He had consulted Balfour who took precisely the same view as he did. He thought the British Cabinet would also take this view. The creation of a Larger Armenia would create bad feeling among the Moslems in India and all the world over. He proposed to suspend this question until the United States of America would decide finally whether they could take a mandate. If America became the mandatory power she would decide on the issue.²

Millerand brought two proposals which were accepted by Lloyd George:

1) To ask President Wilson if America would undertake the mandate of Armenia. If this were accepted, the question was settled.

2) If America would not accept, to ask President Wilson to arbitrate and to say whether Erzerum should be

¹ Ibid., p. 145.

² Ibid.

neutralized or should form part of Armenia.¹

In the afternoon, the Supreme Council had a meeting. Lloyd George and Millerand referred to their conversation held in the morning. They brought their agreement to the Supreme Council. Lord Curzon made minor criticisms, but the Supreme Council gave the right to Lloyd George to draft an article which would replace the present Armenian chapter of the treaty.²

The cause of precipitation was due to the fact that the Turkish representatives had been invited to Paris on the 10th of May, and the treaty should be ready to be presented to them.

On April 25, 1920, Lloyd George on behalf of the British delegation submitted to the Supreme Council certain draft conclusions in respect of the frontiers of the future Armenian State.

"a) To make an appeal to President Wilson that the United States of America should accept a mandate for Armenia within the limits set forth by the Commission of delimitation of Armenian Frontiers.

"b) That, if the United States of America are un-

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

willing to accept a mandate, the President of the United States should be asked to arbitrate on the boundaries of Armenia as set forth in the draft article below.

"c) That an article in regard to Armenia should be inserted in the Treaty of Peace in the following sense:

"Turkey and Armenia and other high contractory parties agree to refer to the arbitration of the President of the United States of America the question of the boundary between Turkey and Armenia, in the vilayets of Erzerum, Trébizond, Van and Bitlis and to accept his decision thereupon, as well as any stipulation he may prescribe as to access to the sea for the independent state of Armenia.

"Pending the arbitration, the boundaries of Turkey and Armenia shall remain as at present.

"The boundaries of Armenia on the north and east, that is between Armenia and Georgia, and between Armenia and Azerbaijan, shall be laid down by the Supreme Council at the same time as those between Armenia and Turkey, failing a spontaneous agreement on this subject between the three Caucasian States.

"d) That the drafting committee shall amend the treaty prepared by the Commission of delimitation of Armenian

frontiers and to insert these articles".¹

On April 26, 1920, the Supreme Council after some remarks approved the despatch to President Wilson regarding Armenia; a similar despatch to the League of Nations, and the draft articles to be inserted in the Turkish Treaty.²

The incorporation of Erzerum in the Armenian frontiers was advocated by Curzon and Berthelot. Both of them had taken part in the conference of London and they were responsible for the delimitation of the Armenian boundaries. They had thought much on the issue, so they firmly advocated the inclusion of Erzerum in Armenian territories. Actually being the architects of the proposals or of the plan, they defended it. The opponents of the plan were Lloyd George and Nitti. They had in their mind that they were not only planners, but also had responsibilities of applying these plans.

The Armenian Question presented three problems in those days: 1) the delimitation of Armenian boundaries; 2) the mandate over Armenia; 3) Armenia's need of munitions and equipment.

¹ Ibid., pp. 177-178.

² Ibid., p. 217.

None of them were solved radically. The Conference of London decided to appeal to the Council of the League of Nations, but received a negative answer. The Supreme Council in San Remo decided to appeal to President Wilson, and we will see the answer. The Supreme Council did not adopt the proposals of the Conference of London, which delimited the Armenian boundaries, and it appealed to President Wilson to intervene as arbitrator for the delimitation of Armenian boundaries. Coming to the problem of equipment and munitions, the Supreme Council did not give a positive answer. Its members said that already they were overburdened. ^{As} When Great Britain and France began to send munitions, the Turco-Armenian war had started and it was too late to use them effectively.

We have to accept that the Armenian claims created difficulties which were very hard to solve easily. Military force was needed to realize these claims. But the Allies were not ready for such a sacrifice. The Supreme Council fearing future responsibility, sent the question to President Wilson, having the satisfaction that it had compensated the Armenian people, and at the same time had achieved it ^{without} directly involving itself in the affair.

Lloyd George and Nitti had a big responsibility in the

affair. Lloyd George in his memoirs speaking of the Treaty of Berlin says that Great Britain had changed the article of San Stefano, the article which was related to Armenian reforms. "Armenia was sacrificed on the triumphal altar we had erected."¹ History had put him in a position to correct that mistake, but he hesitated. It was a good chance, for Great Britain to do that justice, but its state interests did not want such a solution. The moslem inhabitants of the British Empire might protest against the creation of a large Armenia. Therefore it was better to find a midway. And the appeal to President Wilson was that midway.

The changes being done, the Treaty of Peace with Turkey was ready and it was handed to Tewfiq Pasha and his colleagues on May 11, 1920, in Paris. The delegation expressed its readiness to examine it and give its reply in a month.²

The Turkish Delegation presented observations on the proposed Turkish peace treaty. On July 7, 1920, in the Conference of Spa, the Allied representatives considered them and they agreed that the proposals of the Turkish

¹ Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 257.

² A. Aharonian, Sardarabaditz..., p. 76.

Government should be refused under all heads, subject to one or two minor modifications.¹ At the meeting of July 11, 1920, the draft reply to Turkish considerations was read and approved. The reply stated that during the past twenty years Armenians had been massacred under conditions of unexampled barbarity. It was estimated that since 1914 the Turkish Government had massacred 800,000 Armenians, and had deported more than 200,000 Armenians from their homes, For these reasons the Allies could "make no change in the provisions which provide for the creation of a free Armenia within boundaries which the President of the United States will determine as fair and just".²

The Mandate Over Armenia and U.S.A.

Both the Democrats and the Republicans of the United States had warm sympathies for the Armenians and for the political status of Armenia - creation of an independent state consisting of the former Turkish and Russian Armenias. Their difference lay in their views of the form of the

¹ British Documents..., Vol. 8, p. 449. The content of these observations are not given in the British Documents. The observations are published by the Turkish Delegation under the title Observations générales présentées par la Délégation Ottomane à la Conférence de la Paix (Paris, 1920).

² British Documents..., Vol. 8, p. 554.

Armenian-American political relationship.¹

President Wilson and his party had favored a mandate over Armenia, while the Republicans were opposed to such a plan, but demanded outright recognition of Armenia's independence and were ready to promise a loan by way of consolidating the new republic.²

President Wilson had asked for the postponement of the signature of the treaty with Turkey, giving impression to the Great Powers that the United States would assume a mandate over Armenia.³ But not being very well acquainted with all the Eastern problems wanted firsthand information. These were secured by the King - Crane Commission and General Harbord's Mission. This delayed the solution of the Armenian Question. In addition, there was the American internal disagreements and the controversy between the Republicans and the Democrats in regard to the peace settlement at Paris. The Republicans, who carried the weight of American public opinion, favored an isolationist policy.

The American public opinion was in this situation

¹ Marguerite Bargamian, "The Armenian Question and U.S. Foreign Policy and Public Opinion", The Armenian Review, Vol. IX, No. 3 (September, 1956), p. 41.

² Ibid.

³ Simon Vratzian, Armenia and the Armenian Question, (Boston, 1943), p. 91.

when on May 20, 1920, the Supreme Council addressed a letter to President Wilson for the solution of the difficulties of the Armenian Question, because the United States was the only Great Power which was qualified by its sympathies and its material resources to undertake such a responsibility on behalf of humanity. This was the demand and expectation of the civilized world.¹ For these reasons they appealed to the United States Government to accept the mandate over Armenia. By this act they did not escape from any responsibilities, but they believed that "the appearance on the scene of a Power emancipated from the pro possession of the old world would inspire a wider confidence and afford a firmer guarantee for stability".²

The letter further stated that the plan of an Armenia from sea to sea was abandoned as impracticable and there remained the question of determining what portions of the vilayets of Erzerum, Trébizonde, Van, and Bitlis could properly and safely be added to the existing Armenian State of Erivan. The boundaries of Armenia on the North-West, North, and North-East, it was hoped, would be settled

¹ David L. George, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1326.

² Ibid.

by mutual agreement between the three Transcaucasian Republics.

Armenia needed munitions and equipment. Already the Allies - Great Britain, and France - were sending arms and ammunition, but these were not sufficient. The United States was considered to be the best Power to supply them.

The main statement of the letter was: "Whatever may be the answer of the United States Government, on the subject of the mandate, the President of the United States should be asked to arbitrate on the boundaries of Armenia".¹

The personal sympathies of President Wilson towards the Armenian Question were very well known to everybody and to the Supreme Council. The United States Government had pressed the Supreme Council to adopt a sympathetic attitude towards the Armenian Question. So, fortified with these reasons the Supreme Council appealed to President Wilson for the difficult task of Armenian mandate and for the delimitation of Armenia's boundaries.

There was another reason for this appeal. The Supreme Council did not want to take upon its shoulders the responsibility of the solution of the Armenian Question,

¹ Ibid., p. 1328.

because it presented many difficulties. In case of failure they wanted to save their own honor.

President Wilson was glad that the Supreme Council at San Remo had appealed to him. And on May 24, 1920, he sent a message to Congress where he proposed to accept the mandate over Armenia. In the message the President stated that he had received with great interest and with genuine gratification the resolution of the Senate of the United States to recognize the independence of Armenia with wishes for its future prosperity - (May 14, 1920).¹ The Council at San Remo had formally requested the United States Government to assume the duties of a mandatory power over Armenia and to arbitrate over the boundary question between Turkey and Armenia and the vilayets of Erzerum, Trébizonde, Van, and Bitlis.

He continued: "In response to the invitation of the council at San Remo, I urgently advise and request that the Congress grant the Executive power to accept for the United States a mandate over Armenia. I make this suggestion in the earnest belief that it will be the wish of the people of United States that this should be done. The sympathy

¹ International Conciliation, No. 151 (June, 1920), p. 13.

with Armenia has proceeded from no single portion of our people, but has come with extraordinary spontaneity and sincerity from the whole of the great body of Christian men and women in this country."¹

The President was conscious that he was urging upon the Congress a very difficult choice, but he did it in the confidence that he was speaking in the spirit and in accordance with the wishes of the "greatest of the Christian peoples".²

On June 1, 1920, after a brief and somewhat partisan debate, the Senate, by a vote of 52 to 23, passed the following resolution declining to accede to President Wilson's appeal:

"Resolved by the Senate (the House of the Representatives concurring), that the Congress hereby respectfully declines to grant to the Executive the power to accept a mandate over Armenia as requested in the message of the President dated May 24, 1920".³

We don't have at our disposal the actual debate and the reasons for the refusal of the Armenian mandate, but Philip Marshall Brown, in an editorial comment tries to

¹ Ibid., p. 15.

² Ibid., p. 16.

³ Ibid.

enumerate the reasons. His strong conviction is that the refusal of Congress was stipulated by General Harbord's report. The fundamental objections were three-fold: 1) military - preserving internal order in Armenia and guarding it against external aggression from troublesome neighbors. 2) Political - interjecting the United States into the maelstrom of the Eastern Question. 3) Financial - a burden of seven hundred and fifty six million dollars for the first five years.¹

Though General Harbord's observations applied to a large mandate involving Turkey and Armenia, and that the proposal of the President was for a lesser Armenia, nevertheless Harbord's conclusions seemed to weigh heavily on the minds of the Senators.²

Philip Marshall Brown continuing his comments stated that the genuine distrust of the League of Nations and of all the responsibilities implied in its membership had their role in the verdict. But the practical problem in the minds of the Senators was unquestionably whether the United States should be made an active party to the Eastern Question.³

¹ "The Mandate over Armenia", The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 14 (1920), p. 397.

² Ibid., p. 398.

³ Ibid., p. 399.

Brown then criticized this offer of the Supreme Council. The chief concern of the European Powers in the Near East had been the attainment of selfish materialistic ends, that is, division of territory. Having reached there, they now appealed to the United States to accept the thorniest and the most undesirable task of a mandate over Armenia. If "Europe is callously indifferent to the needs and the rights of the Armenians, there is no obligation on us to undertake Europe's own peculiar task."¹

Although this statement expresses the personal opinion of the writer, but that might justly be said by any American. Brown concluded that the fact is that the world seems to stand indifferent to the rights of an ancient race still in bondage".²

One must not feel too much sorrow for the rejection or the refusal of Armenian mandate by the Congress. We must not forget that the Congress even had refused the participation of United States to the League of Nations, an institution which was formed or founded on the principles of one of its great men - President Woodrow Wilson. America's isolationist policy was too strong in those days,

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

The Monroe Doctrine was still ruling on the minds of the American people.

The motives of President Wilson in appealing to the Senate were purely humanitarian, but an Armenian Soviet historian A.B. Borian sees in it imperialistic tendencies or aims. "A mandate over "Free Armenia" was thought of as the basis and the argument for the ethico-political grounding of the American mandate of conquest".¹

A similar interpretation is given by a living Armenian historian who states that in reality America in accepting the mandate wanted to remove Great Britain from the Caucasus, to control the oil mines, and to take possession of the Straits.²

Lord Curzon transmitting the news of the refusal of American mandate over Armenia, to A. Aharonian and Boghos Nubar Pasha expressed openly that the Armenian Republic must rest on the strength of its people, and the Allied Great Powers will show moral and diplomatic support.³

The Signature of the Treaty

The signature of the Treaty took place at Sèvres on

¹ Armenia, (Moscow, 1928), Vol. II, p. 71.

² "Amerikian Hokataroutioun", Aztarar, Vol. IV, No. 204 (September 28, 1946), p. 7.

³ "Hai Haigagan Panagtzoutiounnére", Vem, Vol. VI, No. 1 (November-January, 1938), p. 108.

August 10, 1920. As Principle Allied Powers the following signed, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan. As Allied Powers - Armenia, Belgium, Greece, the Hedjaz, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, the Serb-croa-Sloven state, and Czechoslovakia. The peace was between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey. Armenia's plenipotentiary was Avetis Aharonian, President of the Delegation of the Armenian Republic; and Turkey's delegation consisted of General Haadi Pasha, Senator; Riza Tewfiq Bey, Senator; Rechad Khalil Bey, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Turkey at Berne.

The articles related to Armenia were:

"Article 88. Turkey hereby recognizes Armenia as an independent state.

"Article 89. All the contracting parties agree to submit for the arbitration of President Wilson the question of the frontier to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia in the vilayets of Erzerum, Trébizonde, Van and Bitlis.

"Article 90. After the arbitration of President Wilson, the territories have to be transferred to Armenia, and Turkey has to renounce all rights and title over the territory so transferred.

"Armenia has to assume responsibility of paying her share of the Turkish debt, which will be decided after the arbitration of President Wilson.

"Article 91. After the arbitration of President Wilson, a Boundary Commission will be constituted to trace on the spot the frontier between Armenia and Turkey.

"Article 92. The frontiers between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Georgia respectively will be determined by direct agreement between the states concerned. In case of failure, the question will be ~~dete~~ determined by the Principal Allied Powers.

"Article 93. Armenia accepts and agrees to embody in a Treaty with the Principal Allied Powers promises to guarantee the interests of inhabitants of Armenia who differ from the majority of the population in race, language, or religion. And also agrees to sign a Treaty where provisions are put to guarantee the freedom of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of other nations".¹

A. Aharonian alluding to the signature of the treaty of Sèvres wrote in his diary: "It is the happiest day of

¹ The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923 (New York, 1924),
C Vol. II, pp. 814-816.

my life. My struggles protests, strife, and hopes of thirty years are crowned with glorious success." But this happiness had a short life. Even before the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres, the Italian Foreign Minister speaking in the Italian Parliament stated: "Turkey wants to live, to progress, and have a place in future society. We gave our cordial and honest collaboration on economic and moral grounds. Our policy corresponds to our best economic interests".²

France also wanted to follow the example of Italy and to appease the Turks. The United States of America following an isolationist policy was out of the game. Great Britain remained virtually alone to enforce the Treaty of Sèvres. Great Britain to save herself had advocated to appeal to President Wilson, and we saw the answer.

The postponement of the immediate solution of the Ottoman Empire, advocated by President Wilson, had been a

¹ Hamaskayini Tarekirk, 1953 (Beirut, 1952), p. 54.

² Khoren Kapikian, "Yevropayi Nahanche", Azatarar, Vol. IV, No. 203 (October 26, 1946), p. 7.

big blow and had fatal effects on the Near East in general, and in particular on the Armenian Question. Precious time was lost, almost one year, during which the old jealousies and fears of the Allies were awakened and Mustapha Kemal had had the chance to strengthen himself and to challenge the West.

CHAPTER IV

The Downfall of the Armenian Republic

H. Irazek makes a grave, but just statement about the Treaty of Sèvres: "In reality it gave nothing to the Armenians, but it raised to its climax the wrath of Kemalist Turkey against Europe, and principally against Armenia and the Armenians".¹ There were reasons for such an attitude. The city of Constantinople had been occupied by Great Britain; Smyrna was occupied by the Greeks; the Ottoman Parliament was dissolved; many of the political leaders were imprisoned. And now the Treaty of Sèvres was dismembering the Empire. Although in Constantinople the Ottoman Government existed, but the Milli or Turkish Nationalist Movement led by Mustapha Kemal had acquired much power and strove to pose itself as the real representative of Turkey, and fiercely rejected such an agreement or treaty, and fought by all means to change it.

The last chapter of this thesis is dedicated to that effort. We have to accept it openly that this effort culminated in the downfall of the Armenian Republic.

¹ Modig Antzialitz (Beirut, 1956), p. 64.

In the preceding chapters we had the chance to see the evolution of Armeno-Turkish relations from 1914-1918. The Ottoman Empire had been the first state to sign a treaty with the new Armenian Republic and to recognize its independence (June 4, 1918). It was a small Republic, with almost 97,000 kms². With the armistice of Mudros the boundaries of the new Republic were enlarged, reaching the frontiers of 1914. But these were temporary. The final settlement of the Armeno-Turkish boundaries would be settled at the Paris Peace Conference. And we saw the effort of the Supreme Council on this issue.

On May 28, 1919, the Armenian Parliament proclaimed the act of United Armenia, that is the union of Turkish and Caucasian Armenias in theory. This was almost a declaration of war against the Ottoman Empire.

The Armenian territorial claims were annoying both the Turkish Government and the people. In order to free themselves from the Armenian Question once and for all, the Young Turk Government had created a plan of deportation and massacre, and it had the satisfaction that its aim was achieved; but the Turkish Government was faced with the renewal or rebirth of the same question.

On February 26, 1919, the Armenian claims were presented to the Peace Conference. The climate of opinion was that justice had to be done to this unfortunate people and that justice meant the cession of the Armenian vilayets to the Republic of Erivan. This perspective created fury in the Turkish people. On July 10, 1919, the ~~Acting~~ Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a letter addressed to A. Carthope, ^{stated} that the over-excitement of the moslem population is increased due to the rumours concerning the extention of the territory of the Armenian Republic till Sivas.¹

Basically only one Turkish attitude existed towards the Armenian Question and this was non-compromising. But due to circumstances or external pressures, two attitudes were created. While dealing with the King-Crane Commission in Chapter IV, we saw the attitudes of the heads of the political parties ruling in those days. Only one of them advocated a minor rectification of frontiers. But on June 23, 1919, when Damad Ferid Pasha submitted his Government's memorandum to the Paris Peace Conference, knowing the intention of the Allies and wishing to win their sympathies, adopted a moderate or conciliatory attitude - in case the Armenian Republic of Erivan was recognized by the Allies,

¹ British Documents..., 1st Series, Vol. 4, p. 689.

the Ottoman Delegation would consent to discuss ad referendum the frontier line between the Republic and the Ottoman State. The latter was ready to grant all facilities in its power to those who wished to remain in Turkey and they would enjoy, like all the other minorities, free cultural, ^{al}morla, and economic development.¹

This mild or compromising attitude was achieved by force. Constantinople was under the control of the Allies. When proposals were sent to make some changes in the peace treaty, the Supreme Council made only minor, insignificant changes.²

An altogether different attitude was adopted by the Milli Movement. Developing in the inner parts of Turkey, far from the access of the Allies, it adopted a militant, aggressive and non-compromising attitude. The leader of the movement was Mustapha Kemal. In the beginning of 1919, he was sent by the Cabinet of Damad Ferid Pasha to Anatolia, as inspector general of the 3rd army corps. In a few months, he was recognized as the chief of the Turkish Nationalist Movement.

On June 10, 1919, a report from Captain J.S. Perring

¹ Ibid., 1st Series, Vol. IV, p. 649.

² Ibid.

(from Samson) stated that Kemal had chosen Amassia as the point of concentration for his bands to be used in Armenia to oppose any separation.¹

By July 1919, Mustapha Kemal felt strong enough to summon a Congress at Erzerum (July 23, 1919), where the political creed of his Movement was proclaimed. The following resolutions were taken:

"1. The Eastern vilayets, with the vilayet of Trébizonde and the district of Djanik, constitute integral part of the Ottoman Empire. These vilayets are: Erzerum, Sivas, Diarbékir, Kharpout, Bitlis. They cannot be detached one from the other.

"2. We consider that every attempt of occupation and intervention will be made by the foreign powers in favor of the Greeks and Armenians. We have resolved unanimously to resist against such attempts.

"3. The return of refugees to the eastern vilayets is strictly forbidden, without the permission of the representative Committee".²

The Congress of Sivas (September 9, 1919) which followed that of Erzerum, put forward the first formal declaration of the Kemalists. This document was the predecessor of the

¹ Ibid., 1st Series, Vol. 4, p. 721.

² Michel Paillarès, Op. cit., pp. 56-57.

Turkish National Pact. The Congress's resolutions comprised of:

"1. All of the Turkish territory within the frontier outlined on 30 October, 1918, between the Ottoman Government and the Allies, and inhabited by a preponderate majority of Turkish population, will form an undivided and inseparable whole.

"2. Against all intermeddling or occupation of no matter what part of the Ottoman territory, and in particular against every movement tending toward the formation, at the expense of the mother country, of an independent Armenia and of an independent Greece on Aidin, Magnesi^a, and Balikhissar fronts, we are absolutely resolved to resist and to defend our rights".¹

On the basis of these resolutions one can imagine the futile efforts of Mustapha Kemal endeavouring to show goodwill towards the Armenians. He had stated to the United States Radio Press: "We are sure that America is the only country able to help us. We guarantee that no new Turkish violences against the Armenians will take place".

¹ Eliot Grinnell Mears, Op. cit., p. 627.

² British Documents, 1st Series, Vol. 4, p. 826.

The same promise was given to General Harbord, to which we referred while speaking on the activity of the American Military Mission to Armenia. M. Kemal knew that both the American Government and the people had genuine interest in the Armenian Question, for that reason he showed this goodwill, but actually the Armenians did not have faith in such oral promises. The experiences of the past warned them to be cautious towards Turkish promises.

Under these circumstances it is easy to understand the fierce reaction of the Turkish Nationalists to the Treaty of Sèvres. The Eastern vilayets were not only considered by them as the integral parts of their fatherland, but actually they were the cradle of Turkish nationalism. So, the Ottoman Government at Constantinople might ratify the Treaty of Sèvres, but they were radically opposed to it. It was an act of treachery to accept such a treaty. In their attitude they were supported by Soviet Russia. Each side had its own aims and interests. The Soviets wanted to destroy the power of the Allies in Asia, especially that of Great Britain, and then to fight against world imperialism.¹ The Kemalists knew this and wanted to take advantage of it.

¹ A.N. Mandelstam, La Société des Nations et les Puissances devant le Problème Arménien (Paris, 1926), p. 133.

Armeno-Azerbaijani Conflicts

At the end of Chapter II we dealt with Armeno-Azerbaijani conflict. The British were mediators in this issue. They sided with Azerbaijan, appointing a moslem, Dr. Sultanow, as Governor General of Karabagh. When the British forces left Transcaucasia, Armeno-Azerbaijani fighting was resumed.

On April 11, 1920, the three Caucasian Governments came to an agreement to sink their territorial and other difficulties. The resolutions were:

"Terminate all armed conflicts in Kazakh, Nakhitchevan, Ordubad, and Karabagh.

"Azerbaijan - Armenian Government will immediately take strictest measures to prevent possibility of future conflicts between Armenians and Musulmans in this territory".¹

At the next session the Conference agreed to restore the status quo which existed before the fighting.² It sent delegations to communicate the decisions to the respective Governments and to the population of the districts.

The Conference had in mind to create a Transcaucasian

¹ British Documents..., 1st Series, Vol. 12, p. 595.

² Simon Vratzian, Haiastani..., p. 375.

Confederation, with a central body - the Transcaucasian Council, whose duties were to defend the respective boundaries of the republics and to promote the peaceful solution of boundary disputes.

In the session of April 16, the Azerbaijani Delegation raised the problem of military co-operation against the Soviet menace.¹ The Armenian representatives were against these proposals. Colonel Stokes considered the hesitation of Armenia to join the Confederation mainly due to French intrigues.² The British Authorities in Transcaucasia had pro-Tartar tendencies, and would be hurt if French support was given to Armenian interests which conflicted with British interests. The Armenians claimed Zangezur, and they were supported by the French. The Armenians did not need the recommendations of the French to claim Zangezur or to reject the plan of a Transcaucasian Confederation. They were afraid of such schemes, because the friendship of Georgia - and Azerbaijan might hurt the interests of Armenia. Coming to the defensive alliance against the Soviet menace, the Armenian Delegation pointed out that the Turks were allies of the

¹ Ibid., p. 376.

² British Documents..., 1st Series, Vol. 12, p. 578.

Soviets, therefore the same attitude should be adopted towards them.¹ Azerbaijan feared Soviet Russia, and Armenia feared Kemalist Turkey. No agreement was reached.

An earlier attempt of defensive alliance had had the same fate. On June 16, 1919, a defensive alliance was signed between Georgia and Azerbaijan against Denikin's army. Armenia did not support the agreement, because she had no quarrel with Denikin.² On the contrary, Denikin was looked on by Armenia with sympathy, because he threatened to put an end to the Soviet regime. The Soviets were detested by the Armenians, because in the Brest-Litovsk treaty they had given up the cause of Turkish Armenia.

The Azerbaijani fears of a Soviet menace were not without foundation. In the middle of April, concentration of Soviet forces on the frontier of Azerbaijan had been reported. On April 27, 1920, the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Azerbaijan profiting from a Cabinet crisis, gave an ultimatum demanding the surrender of power to the Communists. Meanwhile, Soviet troops entered Azerbaijan. The Government hearing the news of penetration of 6,000 Bolshevik troops, wanted to recall its forces fighting in

¹ Simon Vratzian, Loc. cit.

² Firuz Kazemzadeh, Op. cit., p. 247.

Karabagh. Therefore it appealed to the British Political Officer in Batum to secure Georgian military co-operation and Armenian guarantee against possible attack.¹ It was too late. Even if the Azerbaijani army was concentrated against the Red forces, the outcome would not have been different. The Communists conquered Azerbaijan without firing a shot. This made a grave impression on Georgia and Armenia.

Next day Husseinov, as Foreign Minister of the Azerbaijani Soviet Government, sent an ultimatum giving the Armenian Republic three days to withdraw ^{its} ~~his~~ regulars from Karabagh and Zangezur, failing which Azerbaijani troops would invade Armenia.²

On May 1, 1920, a second ultimatum was sent, this time, by the 11th Red Army Commander, who demanded to cease fire within 24 hours and to withdraw Armenian troops from the abovementioned territories.³ Protests were sent to Soviet leaders, but, in vain.

The success in Azerbaijan encouraged the Communists to launch attacks on Georgia and Armenia. Georgia was compelled to accept an armistice with Soviet Russia. The peace treaty

¹ British Documents..., 1st Series, Vol. 12, p. 599.

² Ibid., p. 602.

³ Simon Vratzian, Op. cit., p. 445.

was signed on May 7, 1920, In Armenia, an uprising took place in May, which was suppressed.

The Levon Chanth Mission to Moscow

When the Denikin's army was defeated and the Northern Caucasus fell under Soviet regime, the Transcaucasian Republics wanted to come to terms with Soviet Russia. That was felt more when the Red troops reached the borders of Azerbaijan. To forestall imminent Soviet danger, the only way was to appeal to Moscow and to open negotiations with its representatives. Immediately a Mission was sent to Moscow to conduct negotiations and conclude a treaty of friendship. The Mission was headed by Levon Chanth, a well known writer, and was assisted by Hampardzoum Terterian, and Levon Zarafian. The Mission was entrusted to conduct negotiations on the following points:

"1. Recognition of the Republic of Armenia, including in her boundaries Mountainous Karabagh.

"2. The acceptance in principle of the annexation of Turkish Armenian provinces to Armenia.

"3. Soviet Russia would not interfere in the internal affairs of Armenia, directly or indirectly.

"4. Armenians then living in Northern Caucasus and Russia should have the right to return to Armenia together with their movable possessions.

"5. Full compensation for Armenian workers material losses as a result of the imperialistic war".¹

The Delegation took off from Erivan on April 30 and through Tiflis, it reached Moscow in the middle of May. Why had negotiations not taken place before the sovietization of Azerbaijan? Because Armenia had friendly ties with the Allied Powers. The latter did not recognize Soviets as the legal Government of Russia. They were helping Denikin and the other rebel generals in their attempts to overthrow the Soviet regime. The Armenian case had been taken over by the Great European Powers and was finding its logical solution in the Paris Peace talks. A rupture would have meant, in the thought of those days, a burial for the Armenian Question, But the Soviet menace being near to its doors, the Republic was obliged to move and save its independence.

The opposite view also had its supporters. Some political leaders thought that "the minute Armenian negotiators

¹ Hampardzoum Terterian, "The Levon Chanth Mission to Moscow", The Armenian Review, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (June, 1955), p. 6.

crossed the Caucasian mountain chain, the Allies, the English in particular, would hasten to meet the Armenian demands, lest the Armenians threw themselves into the lap of the Bolsheviks".¹

On May 20, 1920, the Armenian Delegation had its first meeting in the office of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Soviet Russia was represented by Chicherin, Commissar of Foreign Affairs, and his assistant Levon Karaghen, an Armenian by nationality.

From the first meeting it was well seen that the two sides stood on different standpoints. Chicherin openly stated that the Bolsheviks needed the Turks. Soviet Russia had agreed to support the Turks to drive out the imperialists i.e., the British, the French, and the Greeks. But the Turks need definite guarantees that the Government of Armenia will not strike them from the rear. "Russo-Turkish cooperation at this moment is a matter of life and death for Soviet Russia", said Chicherin, and therefore "it is imperative that the Government of Armenia take a definite stand in the matter."²

The Armenian Delegation had come to Moscow to try to make acceptable "the annexation of Turkish Armenian provinces to Armenia", but was receiving a counter-proposal. Friendship

¹ Ibid., p. 5.

² Ibid., p. 8.

with Turkey, or at least a non-aggression pact, which for the Armenians meant the resignation of the Armenian Vilayets, because the intention of the Kemalist Turks (which was very well known), was not to cede to Armenia even an inch of territory from the Eastern vilayets.

Armenia could not resign itself from its claims, because that would eliminate the Armenian case from the agenda of the forthcoming Conference of August 10 in Sèvres.

On what basis was the Russo-Turkish friendship founded? Each nation had its own immediate and remote benefits or aims. H. Terterian gives us a full explanation. The Turkish game was, under the pretext of fighting the imperialist powers to obtain the necessary aid from Soviet Russia and by pointing out to the possible danger of Armenia striking in the rear, to procrastinate the question of expelling the Europeans and by bringing pressure to bear on the Armenian Government through Soviet Russia, forcing the Armenians to resign from the Treaty of Sèvres. Soviet Russia's game was through the Turkish threat to force the victorious powers to enter into negotiations with Soviet Russia and to recognize her as a de jure government.¹

¹ Ibid., pp. 8-9.

These perspectives were transmitted to Chicherin by the Armenian Delegation at the next meeting, and they pointed out that the Turks, after receiving the necessary supplies from Soviet Russia, would attack the Armenians and Greeks, and then abandoning Soviet Russia, they would come to an understanding with the Allied Powers.

Chicherin replied that they were not so naive as that. Their aim was the sovietization of Turkey in the near future.¹

The Delegation asked what would stop the sovietization of Armenia once Turkey was sovietized? Chicherin answered: "We are moving to the east and the south with the motto of liberating the small nationalities from the yoke of the imperialists. If we sovietize Armenia today, the Soviet Government will be discredited in the eyes of small nationalities and will not be able to reach its planned goal.... Give up the Allies, take out your case from the agenda of the Sèvres Conference, and deliver it to the Soviet Government's arbitration".²

Soviet Russia presented itself as mediator between the Armenian and Turkish Governments. Chicherin wanted a memorandum based on statistics proving Armenian claim to the six vilayets to be presented to the Soviet Government. Chicherin's

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

plan was, on the basis of that memorandum, to delimit the Armenian boundaries and to come to terms with the Turkish Government.

While the Armenian Delegation was in Moscow, a Turkish Delegation, headed by Bekir Sami was also in Moscow negotiating with the Soviet Government. We will refer to their activities.

The memorandum was submitted and on June 10 the two sides had a meeting. The Armenian Delegation was ready to accept the proposal of Soviet Russia to act as mediator between the Government of Armenia and Mustapha Kemal. An oral agreement was concluded which comprised of:

"1. To annex to Armenia certain territories of Turkish Armenia and to secure for her an exit to the Black sea.

"2. Zangezour and the region of Nakhitchevan would be declared outright as Armenian Territories, while Karabagh would be regarded as disputed territory, its legal status to be decided in a future referendum.

"3. All literature pertaining to Armenian culture centralized in Moscow and other cities of Russia would be turned over to Armenia.

"4. All Armenians living in Russia would be permitted to return to Armenia with their movable property.

"5. Financial aid to support its economy."¹

Russia's approval was needed for the creation and the maintenance of Armenian independence. For a century Russia had patronized the Armenian Question, and now when it was having its positive or happy solution, she was put out. Therefore it needed to have its share in the last phase of the question.

Armenia needed the friendly relations of Russia and this was achieved without harming the Treaty of Sèvres. Therefore the Armenian Delegation wholeheartedly supported the points of the agreement. Chicherin promised to put into writing the oral agreement and to present the text of the treaty for signature in a day or two.

Our personal conviction is that there was a positive attitude or sympathy towards the Armenian Question in some circles of the Soviet Government. Was it based on humanitarian or political grounds? We are not sure. But its existence is undeniable. We can give at least the names of Chicherin and Radek, who were Commissars in Soviet Russia. We saw the attitude of Chicherin. We will add fresh proofs while discussing the Turco-Soviet negotiations.

¹ Ibid., p. 13.

Radek also favored the solution of the Armenian frontier question. He had told Djemal Pasha the following (on June 3, 1920): "Until the Allied Powers are freed from the British pressure, let us form a temporary Armenia".¹

The signature of the proposed treaty did not take place. Why? The destructive mediation of defeated Armenian Bolsheviks and the unwillingness of the Turks to cede territories to Armenia. A Bolshevik uprising had taken place during May in Armenia. After their futile attempt, the Armenian Bolsheviks found refuge in Baku, and attempted to defeat the Russo-Armenian negotiations. They sent information to Moscow that the Bolshevik uprising in Armenia was due to a vigorous persecution. Several thousands had been executed and tens of thousands arrested.²

The Bolshevik Armenians wanted to sovietize Armenia, while Soviet Russia's immediate goal was to settle the Armeno-Turkish dispute, to which was added the Armeno-Tartar dispute. Taking advantage of the Red Troops, the Azerbaijani Government wanted to annex Karabagh and Zangezur. Chicherin was obliged to take into consideration these new developments and toward the end of June he presented a new proposal,

¹ Kiazim Karabekir, Istiklal Harbimis (Istanbul, 1960), p.795.

² Simon Vratzian, Op. cit., p. 456.

according to which Karabagh finally would go to Azerbaijan, Nakhitchevan to Armenia, while Zangezur would be disputed territory, its final fate to be decided later by Legrand on the spot.¹

The members of the Armenian Delegation were not unanimous on the question. According to H. Terterian, Levon Chanth found it necessary to telegraph the proposal to Erivan. While the other two members thought to sign the treaty at once, fearing that in time Soviet Russia might change its mind and offer new unacceptable proposals.²

The reply from Erivan came too late - almost after a month. The cause of the delay was unknown. Chicherin notified the Delegation that the negotiations were interrupted and they will be resumed in Erivan. The negotiator was Legrand, the Soviet Plenipotentiary Emissary to Armenia.

The Activity of the Armenian Communist Party

During the month of May, 1920, a bloody uprising took place in Armenia. Encouraged by the victory of the Communists in Azerbaijan, the Armenian Communist Party decided to show its strength during the May Day celebrations. In a few lines let us see the foundation of the party and its activity.

¹ H. Terterian, Op. cit., p. 14.

² Ibid.

When the October Revolution of 1917 took place in Russia, we saw the separation of Transcaucasia from Russia. The latter continued to recognize Transcaucasia as an inseparable part, and on December 18, 1917, appointed an Armenian, Stepan Shahumian, as Provisional Commissar Extraordinary for Caucasian Affairs until the organization of Soviet rule in Transcaucasia.¹ The decree was signed by Lenin and Stalin.

In January, 1918, Shahumian published a declaration to the Soviets of the Caucasus and urged them to create Soviet rule in the Caucasus, and appealed to them to summon immediately, a Conference of all Soviets of the Caucasus to create a central authority.²

This appeal was not effective. Transcaucasia had its own new central administration, the Seim, which was hostile to Soviet rule; the Bolsheviki were not so powerful, as yet, to impose their will.

At the end of 1917, in Moscow, the Commissariat of Armenian Affairs was formed as a branch of the People's Commissariat.³ It had to aim of propagating communist ideas.

The first attempt to form an Armenian Communist Party was made by Turkish Armenian intellectuals, who founded in

¹ Hogtemperian Sotzialistagan Metz Revolutzian ev Sove-
tagan Ishkhanoutian Haghdanage Haiastanoum. Col-
lective ed. (Erivan, 1960), p. 143. Hereafter to be
cited as Hogtemperian...

² Ibid., pp. 175-176.

³ Ibid., p. 250.

Tiflis, during the summer of 1917, the party, and sent a representative to Petrograd to receive money and advice.¹ In the spring of 1918 the Committee was compelled to leave Tiflis and move to Moscow.

There were very few Communists in Armenia. Although most of the Communists in the Caucasus were Armenians, their number in Armenia was negligible, because Armenia being an agrarian country, was unable to provide the necessary basis for the formation of the party. The Communists were mostly centered in Baku and Tiflis.

The number of Armenian Communists in Erivan was increased due to their severe persecution in Georgia and in Azerbaijan at the end of 1918. They found refuge in Armenia, promising not to take part in politics.² But we will show that they did not keep their promise.

On September 22, 1918, Arshavir Melikian, the sole Armenian Communist deputy read a declaration in the session of the Armenian Parliament. His main point was to create cordial relations with Soviet Russia. He stated that the Northern giant cannot forget Caucasus, because for a century

¹ B.A. Borian, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 24.

² Simon Vratzian, Haiastan Bolshevikian Murji ev Terkakan Sali Michev (Boston, 1941), p. 64. Hereafter to be cited as Haiastan Bolshevikian...

both economic and political ties have brought them together.¹ "It does not matter, he said, in whose hands the power is concentrated in Russia - Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, or Cadets, they can be our best friend, because they are our neighbours, we are adapted to one another. We are under the threat of being a second Balkan Peninsula, and fratricidal wars are imminent in Transcaucasia. It is wise to create a Transcaucasian Federation, having strong economic ties with Soviet Russia."²

His position was not strong enough in Parliament, otherwise he would have been aggressive and would have demanded the immediate proclamation of Soviet rule in Armenia.

Wise suggestions existed in the declaration. The goodwill and friendly relations of Russia were needed for the survival of the Transcaucasian Republics. But they feared Communism and did not have the hope that it would triumph in Russia. So they stayed far from it.

During the month of July, 1919, the Caucasian Committee of the Russian Communist Party, an illegal body, sent a representative to Armenia to organize the existing communist cells.³ In September 1919, the first meeting was summoned,

¹ Hogtemperian..., p. 236.

² Ibid., p. 237.

³ Ibid., p. 289.

which decided to create the Armenian Communist Party. The first Conference of the Party took place on January 16, 1920, in Erivan. It openly confessed its resolution to overthrow the Dashnak rule. "The civil war against the ruling classes of Armenia (as well as in Georgia and Azerbaijan), and against the Dashnak government formed by those classes; the forceful downfall of Armenia is the primary question of the Armenian Communist Party."¹ The party had to be ready, at the moment when revolution broke out in the East, to overthrow the rule of the Dashnaks and to form a common front with Soviet Russia.²

Ashot Hovhannessian, a communist deputy who participated in this Conference, stated that sovietization of Armenia would take place when the Red forces approached and revolutions broke out in Georgia and Azerbaijan. The center of the Communist rebellion would be Kazagh and Karabagh in order to have easy contact with Azerbaijan.³

In due course, the Armenian Communists had acquired some power and encouraged by the success of the Communists in Azerbaijan they wanted to show their strength publicly during the May Day celebrations.

¹ Ibid., p. 303.

² Ibid., p. 304.

³ Simon Vratzian, Haiastan Bolshevikian..., p. 77.

The Armenian Republic was in a turmoil. She had received ultimatums from the Azerbaijani Communist Government and from the Red troops stationed in Azerbaijan, demanding the evacuation of the Armenian troops from Zangezur and Karabagh.

The Dashnak party itself a socialist organization and being in power, had decided to celebrate May Day in a pompous manner. It wanted to arouse the popular feeling against the ultimatums.¹ On May 1, 1920, parades were formed and public lectures were given. But the Government in Erivan received bad news from Alexandropol. Due to the weakness of local Government, the local Soviet proclaimed insurrection. An armoured train became the headquarters of the insurgents.

The Central Committee of the Armenian Communist Party, in Erivan, did not plan an uprising,² so it was surprised by the act of the Alexandropol Committee but confronted with the situation, sent instructions to Alexandropol, and on May 10, it proclaimed Soviet regime in Armenia and appealed to the Dashnak Government to surrender.³

The Government did not expect such an uprising, and

¹ Simon Vratzian, Haiastan Bolshevikian..., p. 88.

² Hogtemperian..., p. 333.

³ Ibid., pp. 320-321.

therefore was not ready to face it. It did not take much time - only four days - to organize its forces, and on May 14 the uprising was suppressed, because it was not supported by the Red troops of Azerbaijan. They moved to help the insurgents, but an uprising in Azerbaijan forced them to turn in that direction.¹

All the Armenian political parties, except the Social Revolutionaries, condemned the uprising and supported the Government to suppress it.² The Catholicos of Etchmiadzin also condemned it.³

The liquidation of this uprising had its detrimental effect. It affected the negotiations which were going on in Moscow between Levon Chanth and Chicherin. It was a big burden on the small Armenian army. The Communists were temporarily defeated, but the future was for them.

Russo-Turkish love-making and the Turkish Offensive

Tzarist Russia which had desperately fought for dismembering the Ottoman Empire, for almost a century, its successor, Soviet Russia was making love to Turkey. But

¹ Firuz Kazemzadeh, Op. cit., p. 220.

² Kapriel Lazian, Haiastan ev Hai Date (Cairo, 1957), p. 207.

³ Ibid., p. 209.

in essence it was the same old policy or aim, with a change of tactics. Soviet Russia's goal was the sovietization of Turkey.

Both Russia and Turkey were neglected by the Allies. Russia had fought during World War I and was excluded from the peace talks in Paris. Now Russia thought of revenging by advocating world revolution against Western imperialism. Turkey was in a worse situation. Her territory was partly occupied by the Great Powers, and the near future seemed gloomy. The Treaty of Sèvres was going to render Turkey an Anatolian state. Each side tried to exploit the other for its own benefit. Traditional enemies were now devoted to love-making. The first victim of this activity was to become the Armenian Republic.

The first mediators for a Russo-Turkish rapprochement were the leaders of Union and Progress, who, after the armistice of Mudros had found refuge in Berlin and Moscow. At the end of 1919, Talaat Pasha in a letter to Mustapha Kemal stated that he had sent Enver Pasha, Djemal Pasha and Azmi Bey to Russia, to receive help for the newly created Milli movement.¹ These non-official precursors

¹ Ali Fuad, Milli Mujadele Hatrate, p. 42.

paved the way for a Russo-Turkish understanding.

The military campaign against Armenia was decided, but the exact date was not known. Kazim Karabekir, who was restrained by M. Kemal. Karabekir knew that Armenia was in a weak situation due to the May uprisings. He was aware that an Armenian Delegation had been sent to Moscow to come to terms with the Soviets. Once that goal was reached, it was very difficult to achieve the Turkish plan of coming in contact with the Azerbaijanis. He was furious, because in his opinion it was the last chance to suppress the Armenians and to achieve the immediate contact with the Azerbaijanis.¹ He blamed the leaders of Angora for the fatal mistake of not attacking Armenia.² The same mistake, he said, was made by the Turkish leaders during World War I, who had big plans, but were not able to solve the question of Zangezur, which remained a barrier between the two moslem states of Turkey and Azerbaijan. He feared much of the treaty of friendship signed on May 7, 1920, between Soviet Russia and Georgia.

On May 9, 1920, Karabekir examined the military situation with his High Command. He was much annoyed with

¹Kazim Karabekir, Op. cit., p. 731.

²Ibid.

the military support of Georgians to Armenians.¹

Soviet Russia was against the Turkish attack, she had started good relations with the Western Powers and did not want to lose them.² M. Kemal needed the economic and military assistance of Soviet Russia, so he ordered Karabekir not to mobilise until more favorable conditions were created.

While these aggressive plans were in preparation, the Armenian Republic was acting with speed. It sent Levon Chantk Mission (on April 30) to Moscow. On May 11, 1920, the Allied Powers presented the Peace Treaty with Turkey to Damad Ferid Pasha, the President of the Turkish Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. In Armenia the Government was busy suppressing the Communist uprising of May.

As we saw earlier, the Armeno-Soviet negotiations did not reach a conclusion, owing mainly to the Azerbaijani and Turkish uncompromising attitude.

Djemal Pasha who was in Moscow had talks with Soviet Commissars and in a letter dated June 3, 1920, wrote to

¹ Ibid., p. 714.

² Ibid., p. 715.

M. Kemal: "The Russians sent you an envoy. In their opinion it is necessary to sign a special alliance between Turkey and Russia. Only the solution of one question is considered to be necessary, i.e. the question of boundaries of Armenia. Radek¹ says that until the Allies are freed from British pressure, let us form a temporary Armenia. Doing this, the Armenian Question which is so heavily pursued by our friendly Socialist Parties of Europe will be solved for the time being and they will not have the pretext to attack us".²

M. Kemal found this proposal very grave. "On what basis have the Russians the right to present such a demand and how are we able to cede an inch of territory? We don't find any difference between the Allies and Soviet Russia".³

What were the Allies doing on behalf of Armenia? The treaty of Sèvres was on its way to culmination, but Armenia needed military support to defend itself. The British forces which might help Armenia evacuated Caucasus, and Batum was handed over (July 7) to Georgia against guarantees of full facilities for Armenia and Azerbaijan.⁴

¹ Karl Radek, official in Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in Soviet Government, and head of Third International.

² Kazim Karabekir, Op. cit., p. 795.

³ Ibid., p. 798.

⁴ British Documents..., 1st Series, Vol. 12, p. 623.

Under these circumstances Kemal gave the order to attack. On June 9, 1920, a temporary mobilization was promulgated for the eastern vilayets. On June 23 Kemal ordered to postpone the Turkish attack, because he had received a letter from Chicherin, in which the Soviet Commissar stated his desire to intervene in favour of Turkey in setting the frontiers of Armenia, Persia and Turkey. Russia desired to avoid a Turkish-Armenian War.¹

The offensive was prepared but pretexts were needed. The question of Olti gave that opportunity. Anarchist or lawless elements existed there. The district, though an inseparable part of Armenia proper, had a Moslem shura established by the financial and military aid and the backing of the Nationalist Turks and the Azerbaijanis, and had declared independence. Armenian forces of occupation were sent to Olti to subdue the movement.

On June 24, 1920, Bekir Sami, as Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Turkish National Assembly demanded the movement against the moslem population of the district be stopped. He stated that the Turkish people wished to keep friendly relations with Armenia.²

¹ Kazim Karabekir, Op. cit., p. 808.

² A. Khatissian, Haiastani Hanrapetoutian..., p. 221.

On June 30, 1920, A. Ter Hakobian as Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia stated that the military movement was against the lawless elements of the district and his Government did not have any intention to hurt the peaceful moslem population of the district. Armenia was ready to create good neighbourly relations with Turkey, if the Grand National Assembly was ready to accept the right of Armenian independence in the Turkish Armenian vilayets, and put an end to the activities of its agents on the frontiers of the Armenian Republic.¹

Bekir Sami replied that the region of Olti was the property of the Ottoman Government. "The bases of our relations," he said, "are the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which is officially recognized by the Armenian Republic, and its complement, the Treaty of Batum, which is signed plenipotentiaries of the two sides and is accepted and ratified by the two Governments. On the bases of these treaties Olti is part of Turkey".²

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was negotiated and signed by Soviet Russia, and not by the Republic of Armenia. The

¹ Ibid., p. 223.

² Ibid.

Treaty of Batum was prepared by the two Delegations, but was not ratified by the two Parliaments. Moreover, the Grand National Assembly did not recognize the Sultan's Government, but wanted to recognize and make use of its treaties. Extraordinary tactics.

These remarks were transmitted by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Armenia to Bekir Sami on July 28, 1920.¹ The two sides spoke in different languages and the clash was inescapable. Armenia strengthened by the Treaty of Sèvres, and by the newly arrived military assistance, felt strong enough to face the Turkish menace.

Both Armenia and Kemalist Turkey tried to win the friendship of Soviet Russia. On July 3, 1920, Chicherin sent to M. Kemal the necessary articles of a Russo-Turkish friendship pact and proposed the acceptance of the following by the Milli Parliament: "The peoples living in Turkish Armenia, Kurdistan, in the district of Batum, Eastern thrace, in the districts inhabited by Turks and Arabs, be given the right to decide on their fate. To accept the refugees living in Soviet Russia and those unwillingly expatriated, to participate in the referendum".²

¹ Ibid., pp. 225-226.

² Kazim Karabekir, Op. cit., p. 784.

The answer was amazing. It replied that Turkish western territories were occupied by the Allies, and now Soviet Russia had recovered its appetite for the eastern portions. Does she want to annex the above-mentioned territories?

"What was the meaning of Turkish Armenia"?, he asked. "First of all in Turkey there was neither an Armenia, nor territory inhabited by Armenians. That was true even before the First World War. There were around 3 million Armenians all over the world before the war. Most of them lived on Russian territory, in the Caucasus. Those living in Turkey committed murders and massacres, and had escaped to Iran, America, Europe, and some of them to Armenia. How was it possible to call back these murderers and give them the right to vote"?¹

In these circumstances one may be surprised to see Chicherin's attempt to solve the territorial claims of Armenia peacefully.

When the same proposal was presented to Bekir Sami's Delegation in Moscow on August 13, 1920, the Delegation answered: "In Turkey there has never existed Armenian provinces".²

¹ Ibid., pp. 785-786.

² Ali Fuad, Moscova Hatiralari (Istanbul, 1955), p. 70.

In July, 1920, ex-political leaders having paved the way, a Turkish Delegation reached Moscow for Negotiations. It was headed by Bekir Sami. The Delegation had its first meeting on July 24, 1920, with Chicherin and Karaghan. During the conversation it pressed the necessity of opening the Armenian passage, so as to transport the necessary munitions from Russia to Turkey.¹ The forces of Kolchak and Wrangel in the north and the Allied navy in the Black Sea had closed the sea way, therefore Caucasus was the only safe route of communication between the two powers.

Karaghan replied that measures had been taken and arms and ammunition would immediately be sent to Turkey with Legrand's Delegation, which was leaving soon for Erivan. "We have ordered the occupation of Karabagh, Nakhitchevan, Alageoz, and Zangezur on behalf of Azerbaijan".²

In a note (dated July 19, 1920), Chicherin explained to the Armenian Government that the occupation of the above-mentioned territories was done to stop the bloody conflicts between two neighbours, and it aimed at creating conditions for the objective examination of the disputed areas. Soviet Russia was trying to establish friendly relations with the

¹ Ibid., p. 70.

² Ibid., p. 63.

Milli Government and would use these relations to insure sufficient territory in Asia Minor for the development of the Armenian people.¹

Actually this was hypocrisy. As we saw the disputed areas were occupied for Azerbaijan, and the Milli Government was not ready to transfer even an inch of territory.

This double-face policy towards the Armenian Question was carried on till the downfall of the Armenian Republic.

, While Bekir Samir's Delegation was in Moscow, Karabekir was preparing new plans. He was aware of the proposals of Chicherin, so he presented a new project - to occupy the district of Alexandropol and to negotiate with Moscow as representatives of an army, which had occupied Armenia.²

The Armenian Government was aware of the aggressive intentions of the Milli Government. So it appealed to the Allies to get the necessary support - arms and ammunition. In the beginning of July, Armenia received the military material. The Commanding force of Southern Russia sent three million cartridges half of which was taken by Georgia, the other half went to Erivan. On July 5, 1920, British arms and ammunition were landed in Poti (Georgia)

¹ Hogtemperian..., pp. 352-353.

² Kazim Karabekir, Op. cit., p. 785.

destined for Armenia - 25,000 Boshe rifles, 400 light machin-guns, 58 million Vickerd cartridges, 40,000 uniforms (complete), 500 tele scopes, a great quantity of medicine and surgical instruments.¹

Armenia's best ally, Greece, was ready to assist her. She wanted to supply gratuitously 10,000 Kra rifles, each one having 400 cartridges, the cost of transportation being left to Armenia.²

In June 1920, the Armenian Government found it necessary to improve its economic situation by raising a "Loan of Armenian Independence" from the Armenian colonies. A. Khatissian was chosen as the man for the job. He travelled almost three months (July 19-October 23, 1920) and on his way had interesting talks with different statesmen. In Constantinople he met Allied representatives and had talks on Armenia. He met Admiral J. De Robeck, to whom he expressed his Govern-ment's gratitude for the newly arrived British assistance. Khatissian considered it necessary that Armenians should undertake an advance in the direction of Alashgird contem-poraneously with the Greek advance in Asia Minor, thinking that it might be advantageous with a view to establishing

¹ Hogtemperian..., p. 359.

² Ibid.

Armenia's claim to territory presumably to be allotted to her.¹ But the Armenian Government would not move in this direction without British concurrence. Khatissian expressed the hope that he would be able to visit London and state his case fully to the British Government.²

He met the American Vice-Admiral Bristol with whom he had a "historic conversation". It was historic, because his words were soon realized. The vice-Admiral said: "Don't have confidence in President Wilson, because he does not correspond to the interests of his people and in the next election he will lose his position". He advised to have a rapprochement with the Turkish leaders, to minimize the territorial claims, otherwise a grave future awaits the Armenian political leaders.³

He had a secret meeting with Riza Pasha. Khatissian presented the Armenian claims and proposed solving United Armenia's frontiers by mutual agreement. Riza Pasha, the Minister of Interior, suggested the following frontiers of Armenia:- Russian Armenia, the provinces of Alashgird and Passen, and as a sea-port Rizé. Van, Moush, Erzerum and Trébizonde were left out.⁴

¹ British Documents..., Vol. 12, p. 629.

² Ibid.

³ A. Khatissian, Haiastani Hanrapetoutian..., pp. 197-198.

⁴ Ibid., p. 199.

While Khatissian was on his way to Europe, new important events took place in Armenia.

Legrand reached Baku on July 20 and having talks with the Bolsheviks of Azerbaijan, went to Tiflis to settle the Armeno-Tartar dispute. On August 10, 1920, a preliminary agreement was signed, the final one being left for Erivan.

The Armenian representatives in Tiflis agreed to the cessation of fire and to the temporary occupation by Bolshevik troops of Karabagh, Zangezour and all Nakhitchevan South of Shakhtakhti. The fate of these territories had to be decided in the final agreement or treaty which would be signed in Erivan.¹

The Allied Powers, of course, were against this. Commander Luke expressed amazement at this and said that Armenia's consent to Bolshevik occupation of Nakhitchevan which opened their road into Turkey and north-west Persia almost "amounted to an act of revolt against Great Britain and was particularly deplorable at the moment when Armenia had just received British munitions of war".²

The Armenians defended themselves on the ground that they could resist no longer, and asserted their loyalty to

¹ Simon Vratzian, Haiastani..., p. 457.

² British Documents..., Vol. 12, p. 634.

the Entente. If Bolsheviks did not ultimately evacuate Nakhitchevan, the Armenians expressed readiness to organize further resistance.¹

On August 31, Commander Luke went to Erivan and found that the Armenian Republic was faithful to the Allies. He made proposals to hand over to Great Britain the ports (given to Armenia by the Treaty of Sèvres) and railways of Armenia, but was refused.²

Comte de Martel, the French representative, feared the Armenian inclination to Soviet Russia, but found that it was without foundation.

On September 14, 1920, the Armenian Delegation arrived at Erivan from Moscow and on October 13 resumed negotiations with Legrand. The latter presented a series of demands:

"1- To reject the treaty of Sèvres.

"2- To allow the Bolshevik troops to use the railways and the railroads, which would join the Turkish Nationalists in fighting the Entente.

"3- To solve the frontier dispute among Armenia and her neighbours through the mediation of Soviet Russia".³

The Armenian Delegation categorically denounced or

¹ Ibid.

² Simon Vratzian, Haiastani..., p. 458.

³ Ibid.

rejected the first demand. For the other issues an agreement was reached and the following draft was prepared:

"1- Soviet Russia recognizes the independence of Armenia and its integrity. Zangezur goes to Armenia, while the fate of Karabagh and Nakhitchevan will be settled by arbitration.

"2- Russia is to mediate and stop immediately the Armeno-Turkish war. Neutral Zone is to be created on the frontier of 1914 and the Armeno-Turkish frontier dispute is to be solved through the mediation of Soviet Russia.

"3- Free passage is to be allowed for Red forces to go to Turkey. 30% of the munitions sent to Turkey through Armenia has to be left to Armenia, to be used for defence.

"4- Armenia accepts the mediation of Soviet Russia to solve the territorial disputes of Armenia and its neighbours.

"5- Russia is to help Armenia economically".¹

Legrand went to Baku, to receive the approval of his Government, then to return to Erivan and sign the friendship treaty. He went but did not return.

Legrand was an emissary plenipotentiary. He was able to cable directly from Erivan to Moscow and to receive the

¹ Ibid., pp. 458-459.

approval of his Government. Legrand's behaviour is inexplicable. Khatissian gives his interpretation: "By the policy of negotiations, the Bolsheviks pursued - one objective - to gain time and to decrease our watchfulness, while, in fact, Armenia was being gripped by the iron rings of the Turco-Soviet joint forces".¹

While Legrand was in Armenia, Bekir Sami's Delegation was advancing in its negotiations. Bekir Sami wrote to Angora (on October, 1920) "Although Karaghan is working for Armenia, I believe that the Soviet Government and the Communist Party want to smash the Dashnak Government of Armenia. Although the situation of Anatolia will not tolerate waiting, we hope to come to terms with the Communists soon".²

On September 1920 the Grand National Assembly of Angora recommended to precipitate and to take advantage of chances. The establishment of relations with Azerbaijan and the creation of a fait accompli in Armenia, must not be subject to the approval by Russia.³

The Turco-Soviet negotiations reached a positive understanding and a draft treaty was signed on August 24,

¹ Haiastani Hanrapetoutian..., p. 228.

² Ali Fuad, Moscowa Hatiralari (Istanbul, 1955), p. 75.

³ Ibid., p. 78.

1920. It stated:

"Art. I. The signatories decline to recognize any treaty or agreement which is imposed on the other party. The Russian Republic declines to recognize any agreement concerning Turkey, which is not ratified by the Grand National Assembly.

"Art. III. To secure in all instances unhindered relations and their incessant continuance between the two countries, the two signatories guarantee each other taking all necessary measures to this effect and to ensure the traffic of goods and people, free of all impediments".¹

It is somehow extraordinary to judge the attitude of Soviet Russia. She was a mediator between Armenia and Turkey, but was obliged to accept the terms of Turkey, and to come to agreement with it. Russia had promised to settle the Armenian territorial disputes with Turkey, but actually was guaranteeing the integrity of Turkey. This agreement was obviously directed against the Treaty of Sèvres. The non-compromising attitude of Angora did not leave any room for mediation. Soviet Russia being in need of Kemalist Turkey's assistance was obliged

¹ Ali Fuad Gebesoy, Op. cit., p. 80.

to sacrifice Armenia's demands.

Karabekir was in a rush. On August 1, 1920, Izmet Pasha sending a letter to Karabekir told him to stop separate action. He stated that Armenia being occupied with Azerbaijan, was not able to attack Turkey. If Armenia ventured to attack, it would be threatened from the rear, according to Khalil Pasha writing from Moscow.¹

After a few days Karabekir personally went to Angora and tried to convince M. Kemal and Izmet Pasha. M. Kemal hesitated to give his consent. Was Karabekir's force able to defeat Armenia? What was the attitude of Georgia? Was she going to help Armenia? The Turkish Delegation - which was in Baku to attend the Eastern Conference - was able to consult the Georgian Government and received a negative answer.²

The neutrality of Georgia, the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres, and the draft treaty of Turko-Soviet agreement were strong impulses for the start of the Turkish offensive.

Having received the necessary guarantee on the part of Soviet Russia, Karabekir ordered his armies to advance.

¹ Simon Vratzian, Haiastane Bolshevikian..., p. 161.

² Ibid., Haiastani..., p. 465.

On September 29 they took Sarykhamish. At the same time the Red troops in Azerbaijan approached Aksipara. During the month of October the military activities were carried to the district of Kars.

The Armenian Government began its diplomatic and military campaign. Telegrams were sent to Tiflis, Paris, and peace talks were carried on with the Soviet Delegates.

On October 8, the Armenian representative at Tiflis, Begzadian, informed Colonel Stokes that the Bolsheviks were concentrating on the Armenian frontier preparatory to the invasion of Armenia. Actually they were near Akstafa whence they would march to Novo Bayazid.¹

Colonel Stokes wanted to support Fuad bey and Said Shamil² to declare an anti-Bolshevik revolt in North Caucasus. He thought that the success of revolt would probably save Armenia and deliver Trans-Caucasus from the Bolsheviks.³ On October 22, Curzon replied that the British Government could not entertain the idea of financing revolt in North Caucasus.⁴

At the request of the Armenian Prime Minister Col. Stokes proceeded to Erivan. He went to the front of Kars and found it safe for the time being.

¹ British Documents..., Vol. 12, p. 637.

² Two heads of Tribes in North Caucasus.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., Vol. 12, p. 642.

On October 18, 1920, the Armenian Government sent its military Minister Reuben Ter Minassian to convince the Georgian Government to form a common front against the jorât attack of Red troops and Kemalîst forces. The meeting took place on October 25 in Tiflis. The Georgian Government demanded settlement of disputed frontiers as preliminary to negotiating an alliance. The Armenian Delegation demanded an immediate decision regarding alliance, after which the frontier questions could be settled by mutual agreement, or arbitration, as previously arranged. The negotiations failed. The Armenians were convinced that Georgia would not sign the Military Alliance, because Moscow had guaranteed that the Turks would not enter Georgian territory.¹

Gueguechkori the Georgian Foreign Minister was in London in those days. On October 18, he had an interview with Curzon and stated to the British Minister of Foreign Affairs that they were thoroughly conscious of the common danger, and were co-operating with Armenia to the best of their ability.²

On October 23, 1920, the Anatolian Agency felt the

¹Ibid., p. 644.

²Ibid., p. 642.

necessity to notify international public opinion on the Armeno-Turkish clash. It stated that the Armenian Government had massacred the moslem population within its territory, and notwithstanding this, they did the same thing in Karabagh and Kars. Therefore they decided to help their brothers.¹

But we saw the real reasons for the Turkish attack. Before facing the Greek threat, the Turks had first to strengthen their rear. Perhaps they needed the arms and ammunition stored in Kars and Alexandrapol. Or they needed to try their forces first on a weak opponent, and then, acquiring self-confidence, to launch a big enterprise against the Greeks.²

On October 30 the fortress of Kars fell into the hands of the Turks. This caused deep concern. Before this event the Armenian Government had appealed to Captain Court³ asking for arms and ammunition, for an Allied attack on Trébizonde, and for the mediation of Great Britain between Armenia and Turkey.⁴

Curzon replied that the French Government had loaded

¹ A. Khatissian, Haiastani Hanrapetoutian..., p. 234.

² Hovhannes Kachaznuni, Dashnaktzoutioune Anelik Chouni Ailieves (Vienna, 1923), p. 40.

³ Captain H.D. Court, R.E., was acting British representative at Erivan after departure of Captain G.F. Gracey (October, 1920).

⁴ British Documents..., Vol. 12, p. 642.

ten thousand rifles and eight million rounds on the Bulgarian steamer 'Boris' at Varna for Georgia and Armenia. Coming to the question of mediation their Government was not in communication with the Nationalists and Constantinople Government had no control over them.¹

On October 30 the Armenian Cabinet had an extraordinary meeting. The Prime Minister Hamo Ohanjanian gave a report on the fall of Kars and on the military situation. The Cabinet decided to reinforce the front and at the same time to open negotiations with the Nationalists. On November 3 a written proposal was sent. A similar proposal was received from Ahmed Mukhtar, the Turkish Commissar of Foreign Affairs, dated November 2, which stated: "Now that complete victory comes to crown the efforts of our Eastern Army, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey wishes to repeat to the Armenian people the peace proposals which it did some time ago".²

The establishment of peace was possible if Armenia was ready to give tangible guarantees that henceforth it would stop nurturing aggressive plans towards Turkey and would stop being the vanguard of the British capitalists in the East, said the note.³

Both the civil authority and the Military Command of Armenia showed readiness for an armistice. On November

¹ Ibid., p. 643.

² A. Khatissian, Op. cit., p. 245.

³ Ibid., p. 246.

6 Karabekir's terms of armistice were received:

"1. Alexandropol should be evacuated and the Armenian forces should retreat fifteen Kilometers east of Arpa River.

"2. Alexandropol would not be occupied by the Turks, but the railroad station of the city should be put under Turkish control.

"3. In view of the great importance of Alexandropol as the crossing - point of Tiflis-Erivan railroads, its vicinity would be occupied by Turkish troops for the safety of the latter.

"4. No firing should occur on the Turkish forces from any quarter on any occasion.

"5. The above terms should be fulfilled within the next twenty four hours, while the mentioned places and territories had to be evacuated by ten o'clock the next morning.¹

The Armenian Government accepted the terms and on October 8, it sent its approval to start negotiations, saying that they were not serving anybody. On the contrary, they were after their emancipation.²

¹ Simon Vratzian, Haiastani..., p. 482.

² Alexander Khatissian, Haiastani Hanrapetoutian..., p. 247.

But the negotiations did not start. Karabekir had received an order from Ahmed Mukhtar to change his armistice terms. Khatissian and Vratzian give different terms. The ones of Vratzian are very heavy, so we quote them.

"1. For the time being, two thousand rifles with all their equipments and transport animals, 20 heavy and 40 normal machineguns, 3 mountain cannons, 4000 mules, 1000 cases of bullets, 6000 cannon-balls, 2 locomotives and 50 wagons must immediately and completely in usable condition be handed to us.

"2. At most in three days time the Armenian regular and irregular forces must withdraw to definite lines".¹

These terms were rejected: because to accept them would mean the end of Armenian independence. Khatissian stated that he had proposed to accept them, but the Armenian Parliament rejected them and voted for the continuation of war.²

But a week later it was seen that it was impossible to continue the war and on November 18 the armistice was signed in Alexandropol.

On November 17 A. Khatissian was appointed head of

¹ Haiastani..., pp. 482-483. See also Kazim Karabekir, Op. cit., p. 900.

² Alexander Khatissian, Op. cit., p. 251.

the Armenian Delegation for peace talks. He wanted to know what type of assistance the Allied Powers could give, so on November 18 he went to Tiflis, carrying with him the necessary military data of Armenian forces taken from the Armenian Minister of War.

Khatissian met the British, French, Italian, and Greek representatives. They were sympathizers only; they were unable to assist concretely. On November 19, Curzon was saying that his Government was unable to give military aid.¹ On November 29 he stated: "We could obviously not be party to a treaty with the Nationalists, but we realize that Armenians may have no option, alternative of treaty with Soviet being doubtless worse."²

On November 20 Khatissian returned to Erivan and the next day he gave a report to the cabinet. Both Legrand and Mtivani were called to the meeting. The cabinet formed a Delegation for the peace talks of Alexandropol. The members were: Alexander Khatissian - president, Aprahan Kulkhantanian, and Stepan Ghorghanian. Orders were given for the minimum boundaries of Turkish Armenia, and at the same time, knowing that no opportunities existed for the

¹ British Documents..., Vol. 12, p. 649.

² Ibid., p. 653.

continuation of war, it was ordered to sign the peace treaty anyway.

The Cabinet asked the Soviet representatives to put pressure on the Turks and to receive favorable terms for Armenia.¹ Legrand proposed to introduce Soviet troops from Azerbaijan to Armenia, to have enough power to speak with the Turks and impose his will, but the Cabinet rejected it fearing that it may result in the military occupation of Armenia by the Bolsheviks.²

On November 24 the Delegation left for Alexandropol and on November 26 the peace talks started. While these negotiations were taking place, new developments or activities were carried on in Geneva, the center of the League of Nations, and in Erivan.

The Armenian Government had asked the League of Nations to intervene in order to ensure respect for the Treaty of Sèvres. The Council of the League replied that the Treaty was not yet implemented and it was the duty of Powers, who had signed the Treaty of Sèvres to ensure its execution.³

The Assembly of the League of Nations, in its session of November 22nd, 1920, empowered the Council to arrive

¹ Alexander Khatissian, Haiastani Hanrapetoutian..., p. 257.

² Ibid.

³ League of Nations, "Documents and Correspondence Relating to Armenia", Official Journal, No. 8 (November-December, 1920), p. 90.

at an understanding with the Governments of the League of Nations with a view "to entrusting a Power with the task of taking measures to stop the hostilities between Armenia and the Kemalists".¹

The United States of America, Spain, Brazil, Australia, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Sweden, ^{way} Norway, Denmark, Uruguay, France, Honduras, Italy, Peru, Cuba, Great Britain, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Bolivia, Venezuela, ~~Salvador~~, Belgium, Guatemala, Chile, India, Siam, and Poland appreciated the effort of the Council and expressed their readiness to offer their moral and diplomatic support for the peaceful solution of the Turko-Armenian conflict.²

The Council of the League appealed also to President Wilson, and the latter on December 16, 1920, appointed Henry Morgenthau as his personal representative to mediate in the matter of Armenia.³ But the sovietization of Armenia left no room for such mediation.

On November 23, 1920, a new cabinet was formed in Erivan, Simon Vratzian being the Prime Minister. He resumed the negotiations with Legrand on November 24.

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid., pp. 91-103.

³ Ibid., Vol II, Part I (January-February, 1921), p. 79.

Vratzian knew that in these crucial moments Armenia needed the help of Soviet Russia to defend its independence. Legrand answered: the Armenian Government had to call back the Armenian Delegation ^{from} to Alexandropol, and should reject the terms of the Turco-Armenian armistice, and invite Soviet forces to Armenia.¹

These terms were inadmissible, because they could not ameliorate the situation in Armenia. If the peace delegation was called back, who was going to guarantee the safety of Armenia against the Turks? The entrance of Soviet forces in Armenia would mean sovietization of the country, in that case Armenia would lose the provisions despatched to her by the West. Also it would bring an end of Armenian aspirations which were guaranteed, at least on paper, by the West.²

The two sides stood on different standpoints. Armenia was seeking for Soviet help against the Turkish menace, Legrand wanted to sovietize the country. Soon that intention was made clear.

Let us turn and see what was going on in Alexandropol.

¹ Simon Vratzian, Haiastane Bolshevikian..., p. 179.

² Ibid., p. 182.

The Armenian Delegation's plan was the creation of an Armenia incorporating in it the Caucasian Armenia, Van, Moush, the Lake of Van, and Rizé as a seaport, leaving Erzerum and Trébizonde to the Turks.¹

The first formal session was opened on November 26. Kazim Karabekir opening the session put as a prerogative the rejection of the Treaty of Sèvres by the Armenians. At the beginning of the Turco-Armenian hostilities in September, the same demand was put, but was rejected. But Armenia was now under terrible conditions. The Turkish forces were in the Armenian territories. Georgia was neutral, even one might say a bad neighbor, because it had crossed the border into the neutral zone of the Borchalo district and had declared it an indisputable part of Georgia. The disposition of Azerbaijan and Soviet Russia were very well known. They wanted to sovietize Armenia.

The Armenian Delegation under the pressure of these circumstances and conditions thought it wise to accept the rejection of the Treaty of Sèvres, thinking that this act could not harm the Armenian case, on the contrary, at

¹ Alexander Khatissian; Haiastani Hanrapetoutian..., p. 263.

least, it could achieve good neighborly relations between Armenia and Turkey. If the Great Powers, who had signed the Treaty of Sèvres, wanted and were able to fulfill its clauses, this rejection was not a handicap.¹

Both Delegations prepared their respective frontiers, attached with explanatory notes. On November 28 the Armenian plans were submitted to Kazim Karabekir, who found them too vast for a defeated country. On November 30 he sent his own draft of the treaty to the Armenian Delegation. By the terms of the treaty Armenia was going to have a territory of 27,000 km². The provinces of Kars and Surmalu were ceded to Turkey; Nakhichevan and Zangezur were put under Azerbaijani control. Armenia was going to keep 12,000 soldiers, 20 machine guns, 8 cannons. The representatives of the Allies had to leave Armenia.²

It is amazing to compare the size of Armenia with the one drawn by President Wilson. The latter, on November 22, 1920 gave the result of his arbitration. According to his plans, Armenia acquired 42,000 square kilometers of land in addition to the Caucasian section which consisted of an area of 26,491 kilometers. Trébizonde, Van, Moush, Erzerum, and

¹ Ibid., p. 265.

² Alexander Khatissian, Haiastani Hanrapetoutian..., p. 269½

Bitlis were incorporated in the new Republic.

Meanwhile new events were developed in Armenia. The Armenian Bolsheviks who had fled to Azerbaijan, in the middle of November, and had formed a Revolutionary Committee (Revkom) to sovietize Armenia. On November 29 Armenian Bolshevik soldiers, followed by Red troops entered Ichevan and declared the sovietization of Armenia. Legrand, who was negotiating with the Armenian Government, gave a direct order in the name of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party to surrender the power to the Revkom. Negotiations were continued on this line and the conclusion was that on December 2, 1920, the power was to be transferred to a Military-Revolutionary Committee, which was going to rule the country till the arrival of Revkom in Erivan.

The transfer of power was going to take place on December 2, 1920, at 12 o'clock. But meanwhile Kazim Karabekir was putting on pressure. On November 30 he had given the Turkish terms of the treaty and was pressing to have them accepted, otherwise he was going to resume the offensive. The Dashnak Government still in power, knowing that the refusal would result in the occupation of Erivan

and Etchmiadzin by the Turks before the arrival of the Red troops, gave orders to its Delegation to sign the treaty. On December 2, 1920, after 12 o'clock the treaty of Alexandropol was signed.

The signing of this treaty has been the target of much criticism. Had the Dashnak Government the right to sign the treaty? Much ink is poured on the issue, Khatisian who had signed it, tries to defend himself that he was authorized both by the Dashnak Government and the Military-Revolutionary Committee to act as he deemed fit.¹

The terms of the treaty were very severe. They virtually put an end to Armenian independence, but there was no other choice. The Western Allies did not help their Lesser ally, and Armenia's neighbors were expressing aggressive tendencies.

The main provisions of the treaty were:

- "1. Rejection of the Treaty of Sèvres.
- "2. Protection of Armenia against all attacks threatening its independence and territorial integrity.
- "3. The frontiers between Turkey and Armenia - started

¹ Ibid., p. 270.

with the estuary of the Lower KarasSu until the Arax River - Arpa River until Gegagh towards the north, from there to Carahan Valley - Eastern Teghnis - Eastern Greater Gemel - Kiziltash - Greater Aghpapa Mountain.

"4. Armenia's military force was put under Turkish control.

"5. Armenia guaranteed the independent community life of the Moslems in Armenia.

"6. Facilities for transit, free passage of persons, on the roads of the two countries, and the return of Armenian refugees to their homes".¹

By the treaty of Batum (June 4, 1918), Turkey had been the first state to recognize the independence of the Armenian Republic; now Armenia was the first state which was recognizing the independence of the Kemalist Turkey.

¹ Haktemperian..., pp. 408-411.

Epilogue

On December 2, 1920, a peace agreement was concluded at Erivan with which Armenia was sovietized. The Bolsheviks created an atmosphere of terror, during which intellectuals, army officers, common people were imprisoned, and in some cases were exiled. On February 18, 1921, the Armenians revolted and drove the Bolsheviks out. The following month, the Bolsheviks were able to restore their rule.

The sovietization of Armenia had a fatal effect on the future of the Armenian Question. The new regime came to agreement with Turkey and was forced by Soviet Russia to adopt a friendly policy towards Turkey.

The rise of the Kemalist Movement brought a division in the Allied ranks. There was a race to make love to Turkey. Already Soviet Russia had adopted that path. The old game of the 19th century was resumed. Great Powers feared each other and having mutual jealousies left the sick man to recover and impose his will.

The Treaty of Sèvres was a still born child. A sentiment of modifying the Treaty was prevailing. The Conference of London (February 21-March 12) dealt with it. Turkey was present. Bekir Sami, the head of the

Turkish Delegation, presented the Turkish demands - to evacuate the French forces from Cilicia and to accept the Treaty of Alexandropol as the basis of delimiting the frontiers of Armenia.

The Armenian Delegations⁴ insisted on keeping the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, while in Cilicia it advocated the establishment of an autonomous regime with mixed gendarmerie.

There was already a crack in the ranks of the Allies. The Turks had come to London as victors. So the Allies were not able to force their demands. The Wilson line had been abandoned on that the Armenians had a National Home (Foyer) in the eastern vilayets. Signs of retreat were appearing.

The Turkish Delegation left for Angora for Consultation and did not return.

Secret negotiations were undertaken by Italy and by France with the Kemalists. On March 13, 1921, the same day when the London Conference closed its sessions, Italy reached an agreement with the Turks by which it was going to evacuate Anatolia in return for economic

⁴The Delegation of the Armenian Republic kept its existence after the sovietization of Armenia. The Delegation exists till now and has no relations with Soviet Armenia.

concessions. On March 16, 1921, Soviet Russia signed a treaty in Moscow with Turkey and handed over the province of Kars to Turkey. During the London Conference, on February 9, 1921, the French Delegation had conversations with the Turkish Delegation, which led to the Angora Agreement of October 1921. France evacuated Cilicia in return for economic concessions.

On October 13, 1921, Soviet Transcaucasian Republics signed the Treaty of Kars, by which they recognized the articles of the Treaty of Moscow. Thus Kars was ceded to Turkey, and Nakhichevan was put under Azerbaijani control.

While the Great Powers were abandoning the Armenian Question, the League of Nations raised its voice for justice to Armenia. On September 25, 1920, A. Aharonian had appealed to the League for the admission of Armenia to the League of Nations. The Armenian petition was rejected, because the League had to guarantee, if necessary by force, the territorial integrity of its fellow Members. The League did not dare to wage war against Soviet Russia to defend Armenia.

The Second Assembly meeting of the League in September 1921, made the following proposal - to appeal

to the Supreme Council, so as to introduce in the coming peace talks with Turkey such measures which would defend the future of Armenia, and especially to give the Armenians a National Home completely independent of Turkish domination.

While the Greaco-Turkish war was raging, on March 22, 1922, France, Great Britain, and Italy wanted to mediate and they presented truce terms to the belligerents, and on March 26 terms of an armistice were transmitted which included a provision for the creation of an Armenian National Home.

The war was continued. It ended with the defeat of the Greeks. The Turks occupied Smyrna on September, 1922. The Great Powers interfered and on October 11 the armistice of Mudanya was signed.

The third Assembly meeting of the League, in September 1922, reminded the Great Powers of the creation of the National Home, in the forthcoming peace talks.

The circumstances were leading to the replacement of the Treaty of Sèvres by a new one. So the Armenian Delegations showed active preparations. In October 1922 they sent a memorandum and demanded the creation of a

National Home for Armenians in the eastern vilayets of Turkey.

During the peace talks that followed the armistice of Mutania, the Allies stressed the creation of a National Home, but Ismet Pasha categorically rejected it regarding it a new attempt to dismember Turkey.

The Treaty of Lausanne brought the abandonment of the Armenian Question as an international issue. In the Treaty (signed on July, 1923) the Armenians were not even mentioned.

For this abandonment both the sovietization of Armenia and the mutual rivalries of the Allies had their effect. Otherwise the combined efforts of an independent Armenia and of the Allies might have brought a beneficial solution to the Armenian Question.

The Armenian Question, which during the days of the Armenian Republic had been patronized by the latter, had been shrunk once more to the status of an orphan.

CONCLUSION

The years 1914-1920, especially 1918-1920, form a decisive period in the history of the Armenian people. The year 1914 brought a hope - the autonomy of Turkish Armenia under the joint protection of Tsarist Russia, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire. The years 1915-1918, the genocide of the Turkish Armenians, and 1918-1920 the regeneration of the Caucasian Armenians.

The Armenians, who had lost their independence since 1375, during the 19th and in the beginning of 20th centuries did not dream of independence. At most they consciously fought to introduce reforms into Turkish Armenia. But certain circumstances - the October Revolution, the Ottoman disposition towards an independent Armenia in the Caucasus, and the strength of the Armenian military force combined together had created favorable conditions for Armenian independence.

Why did the Armenian Republic have a short life? The reasons are many. From the day of its birth the Republic was confronted with gigantic obstacles, so gigantic that under their weight and pressure the ablest diplomat would have shrunk.

Caucasian Armenia was a mountainous territory. It lacked the necessary resources to feed its population. It had to import from outside. The wealthy classes of the Armenian people were living in Tiflis and Baku. The Armenian Republic was not able to receive their financial support to recover its losses and organize its economy.

No seaports existed in Armenia. The only one was Batum, which was under Georgian control. Difficulties of transit were created by the Georgian Government and the goods destined to Armenia were let loose after a transit tax. Similar difficulties were created by "friendly" Azerbaijan, which restricted the transfer of oil and coal.

To the economic upheaval was added the existence of almost 500,000 Western Armenian refugees, who were scarcely saved from massacre and reached the plain of Ararat barefooted and hungry. They presented not only an economic problem, but also a political one. Their presence forced on the Republic a feeling of revenge. The latter was under pressure of presenting territorial demands, in order to settle these refugees.

The Republic in its two and a half years of existence was in a state of continuous war. Even its birth

was the outcome of a war carried on against the Turks. Frontier disputes with Georgia and Azerbaijan weakened Armenia. The May uprising of the Bolshevik Armenians, and the joint attacks of the Red and Turkish Nationalist Troops gave the final blow to an already weakened state.

No well organized Armenian army existed. The soldiers were recruited from the Russian armies and from the volunteers of the Western Armenians. The Armenian army lacked officers and the necessary equipment. If it was able to defend the country in this crucial period, that was due to the patriotic zeal which fermented them.

Friendly relations did not exist between the three Transcaucasian Republics. Georgia supported first by Germany, later by Great Britain and Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijan always backed by the Turks and in some cases by Great Britain, were intolerant towards the weak Armenian state. Supported by these foreign powers they tried to impose their will on Armenia. Territories with Armenian majorities, were forced to remain under Georgian and Azerbaijani control.

The Armenian people and its political leaders had great hopes and expectations from the Western Allies.

Perhaps this was their greatest mistake. This great confidence or hope, in some cases, did not allow the Armenian leaders to open negotiations with Transcaucasian Republics - Georgia and Azerbaijan, or with Kemalist Turkey. The Allies in Paris were negotiating peace and already had pledges for a fair solution of the Armenian Question, therefore why hurry and come to temporary agreements, which could be a hinderance to the final settlement of the question.

The Allied Powers did not meet that hope. The Armenians both on the Western and Eastern fronts had fought for the Allied cause. After the armistice the anxiety of the Allies was centered on their immediate, interests and they forgot the pledges given to the Armenians during the war. The armistice of Mudros did not disarm the Turkish forces and did not evacuate the Armenian vilayets. France kept Cilicia for itself. In Transcaucasia the new republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan got more sympathy than the Armenian Republic.

A big blow was given to the Armenian Question by President Wilson.. This may seem extraordinary but it is true. The man with a gospel, the man who wholeheartedly

supported the Armenian Question, and even wanted to advance American mandate over Armenia, indirectly and unconsciously prepared the burial of the Armenian Question. Treaties with the defeated countries had already been signed during 1919, while that with Turkey was delayed until August 1920. The delay was due to President Wilson, who had meanwhile sent Commissions to investigate the conditions for an American mandate over Armenia, and to prepare the American public opinion for such a plan. But this delay gave a chance to the Kemalist Movement to strengthen itself in Anatolia, and in the second half of 1920 was powerful enough to challenge both the Ottoman Government at Constantinople and the Allied Powers.

The political leaders of Armenia were honest, patriotic people, but the weight put on their shoulders was very heavy. The conditions in which they were living and acting were very difficult. They lacked the political and governmental traditions to build upon. Most of them were writers and revolutionaries, who were drawn by the events to take over the responsibility of shaping the fate of the Armenian people. Armenian talent had developed towards arts and commerce. The Armenian political thought had not worked towards independence. So,

when it came no specialists existed to guide the helm of the Armenian ship. The two and a half years were a short period for the preparation of such a staff.

Armenia suffered the lack or absence of loyal, powerful opposition political parties.

Did the Armenia territorial demands have an impact on the rise of Kemalist movement? They were one of the factors. The Armenian demands would disrupt part of the Ottoman Empire, and the Kemalist movement was against such repartition of the Empire.

Were the Armenian political leaders wise in demanding vast territories? We have shown that they were compelled to act that way. The Armenian refugees and Boghos Nubar Pasha's Delegation put pressure on them to demand the Armenian vilayets and Cilicia, although in some cases the Armenian Republic was thinking to restrict those demands.

The Armenian Republic was the outcome of the collapse of Tsarist regime. The downfall of Kerensky's government and civil war gave a chance for Transcaucasia to build up independent republics. Once the Soviet regime triumphed in Russia, it strived to restore the old frontiers of Tsarist Russia. Even without the hostility of the

Transcaucasian Republics, the Soviets were going to reconquer these territories, because the latter were considered to be the natural heritage of Russia. Our conviction is that Soviet Russia needed puppet states in Transcaucasia, and not friendly independent states.

The two and a half years of Armenian independence gave a chance to save the Western Armenian refugees, to experience independence and to create favorable conditions for Soviet Armenia to develop. In addition, it ensured the Treaty of Sèvres, a valuable document embodying the Armenian territorial demands.

Both the Armenians of Soviet Armenia and abroad are hopefully waiting for the dawn of justice, when the territories of Western and Eastern Armenias will be united in an independent state, which will have its chance of living prosperously in the family of nations.

CHRONOLOGY

1914

- February 8. Agreement between Russia and Turkey signed relating to the Government of Armenia.
- October 28. Turkey declared war on Russia.

1915

- September 16. Talaat Pasha, Minister of the Interior, ordered that "an end must be put to their (the Armenians') existence, however tragic the measures to be taken, and no regard must be paid to either age or sex, or to "conscientious scruples." Terrible deportations followed.

1916

- February-August. Turks unable to defend Erzerum (February 16), Trébizonde (April 18), Erzinjan (July 25) against Russian Grand Duke Nicholas.
- May 9-17. Sykes Picot Agreement.

1917

- March 6. Secret agreement disclosed regarding partition of Asiatic Turkey.
- November 7. Bolshevik party assumed control in Russia.

1918

- March 3. Brest-Litovsk Treaty between Soviet Russia and Central Powers ratified by Soviet Russia on March 14.

April 13. Armenia and Georgia refused to recognize the cession of territory under the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and fighting broke out in Batum, Kars, and Ardahan after the Turks began military occupation.

May 28. Declaration of the Armenian independence.

June 4. Treaty of Batum between Armenia and Turkey.

1919

May 28. The Armenian Parliament proclaimed the annexation of Turkish Armenia.

September 9. The Nationalist Congress at Sivas issued the Declaration of Sivas, which affirmed ^{the} territorial integrity of Turkey and declared against the Allied occupation and the formation of an Armenian state.

1920

January 19. The Supreme Council gave de facto recognition to the Armenian Republic.

February 9. The French garrison was evacuated from Maras and many Armenian civilians were killed by the Turks. A general Armenian exodus from Southern Turkey began as the French withdrew.

April 1. Mandate over Armenia offered to League of Nations by Supreme Allied Council. Decision was to establish a free and independent republic.

August 10. The Treaty of Sèvres was signed. Armenia was to be recognized as independent, and was ceded the provinces of Erzerum, Trébizonde, Van, and Bitlis. The exact frontier was to be defined by the President of the U.S.

- September 28. Turkish troops, under General Kazim Karabekir attacked Armenia.
- October 19. Russia demanded that Armenia accord free passage to Turks, denounce the treaty of Sèvres, and break all relations with the Allies. Armenia refused and called upon the West for help.
- November 22. President Wilson announced that Trébizond, Erzerum, and virtually all of eastern Anatolia were to be given to Armenia. Meanwhile, Soviet forces entered Armenia from Azerbaijan and declared Armenia a Soviet Republic, thus advancing the sovietization of Transcaucasia.
- December 2. A Soviet government was established at Erivan, capital of the Armenian Republic.
- December 3. Turco-Armenian peace treaty was signed, by which Turkey got Kars and Ardahan, and Armenia (now a Soviet Republic) was reduced to the province of Erivan.
- December 4. Soviet ultimatum to the Turkish Nationalists forbidding them to advance farther into Armenia.
- 1921
- March 16. Treaty of Moscow between Kemal's government and the Soviet Union. Turkey gave up Batum, and Russia recognized Turkey's right to Kars and Ardahan.
- October 13. Agreement between Turkey and the Soviet republics of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan (Treaty of Kars).
- 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.

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- Boghos Nubar Pasha - head of the National Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference.
- Chanth, Leon - head of the Mission to Moscow.
- Clemenceau, George - French Prime Minister.
- Colby, Bainbridge - the Secretary of State of United States.
- Curzon, Lord - Secretary of State for British Foreign Affairs.
- Haskell, Col. William N. - High Commissioner in Armenia on behalf of the Supreme Council.
- Kachaznuni, Hovhannes - the first Prime Minister of the Armenian Republic.
- Karabekir, Kazim - Turkish Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Front.
- Karakhan, Leon - high officer in the Foreign commissariat of Soviet Russia. Armenian by nationality.
- Khatissian, Alexander - Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia.

- Legrand - the Soviet Plenipotentiary Emis-
sary to Armenia.
- Lloyd, David George- British Prime Minister.
- Nitti, Francesco - Italian Prime Minister.
- Stokes, Colonel - successor of ^{Harry Luke} ~~Wardrop~~ as British
commissioner in Transcaucasia
(September 13, 1920).
- Vratzian, Simon - the last Prime Minister of the
Republic of Armenia.
- Wardrop, *Oliver* - the British Commissioner in Trans-
caucasia.

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
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
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