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HOW ISRAEL'S DENIAL OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS AFFECTS ANTI-ISRAELI ATTITUDES OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON

by

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
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Approved by:

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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

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Title: How Israel's Denial of Palestinian Rights Affects Anti-Israeli Attitudes of Palestinian Refugees in Lebnaon

        The current study investigated the relationship between Israel's denial of Al-Nakba and its effect on Palestinian refugees' attitudes towards Israelis and willingness to reconcile. Previous literature on reconciliation has shown that one of the conditions for reconciliation is that victims have to be empowered (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). The literature also identified trust, identity, and values as important factors that can affect reconciliation (Nalder & Liviatan, 2006; Halloran, 2007; Ginges & Atran, 2008; Verkuyten & Maliepaard, 2013). Seventy Palestinian refugees from Beirut's refugee camps (Mar Elias, Shatila, and Burj El-Barajneh) read an alleged policy that the Israeli government is considering either denying Al-Nakba, offering financial compensation, offering a symbolic Right of Return, or offering a full Right of Return. After reading the policy, the participants were assessed on their attitudes towards Israelis and their willingness to reconcile with Israelis. An ANOVA showed Attitudes and willingness to reconcile with Israelis were lowest when Israel denied Al-Nakba and highest when Israel offered a full Right of Return. The results demonstrated that Palestinians could reconcile with Israelis if Israel's policy changed.

Keywords: Israel, Palestine, Intractable Conflict, Attitudes, Sacred Values, Reconciliation, Identity

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CHAPTER I

OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION OF PALESTINIAN

REFUGEES

One of the biggest stumbling blocks to a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the

fate of 4.5 million refugees who are descended of those who were expelled from what is now

Israel during the events Palestinians know as Al-Nakba (Redwine, 2010). Al-Nakba occurred

between 1947-1948 when hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were displaced from their

homes and forbidden to return to their lands (Pappe, 2006). Most of them became refugees in

the surrounding Arab countries but have maintained a distinct identity (Ram, 2009). Following

the events of 1948, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 194 which states

that "refugees wishing to return to their homes and to live at peace with their neighbors should

be permitted to do so at the earliest possible date," although it has never been implemented

(Khalidi, 1992. p.33). The Palestinian refugees continue to insist on returning to their homes that

lie inside Israel and it is one of the major stumbling blocks in negotiations between Israelis and

Palestinians (Redwine, 2010).

Israel denies that the Palestinians who fled in 1948 are refugees and prevents them from

returning under various laws such as the absentee property law which declares the Palestinians

"absent" and forfeiting their properties (Leon, 2006). This is because most Israelis insist that any

return of Palestinian refugees is "suicide" due to the loss of a Jewish majority if all of the

Palestinian refugees were to return (Scharnzer, 2001). The "Arab Demographic Threat" has been

listed as one of the most pressing existential threats facing Israel by Israeli officials, such as Michael Oren, Israel's ambassador to the United States, and Benjamin Netanyahu, the current Prime Minister of Israel (Haaretz, 2003; Oren, 2009). Research on Palestinian attitudes regarding various proposals on resolving the Palestinians refugee issue reveal that, while 95 percent of Palestinians believe that the Right of Return is a sacred value that cannot be compromised, attitudes towards living in Israel are nuanced depending on when Palestinians would return (immediate or delayed) and what citizenship they would obtain (Palestinian or Israeli) (Shikaki, 2003).

Despite Israel's claims to the contrary, the Palestinian Right of Return is both realistic and compatible with international law (Abu-Sitta, 2008). The only barrier is Israel's insistence on maintaining its exclusionary status as a "Jewish state" (Abu-Sitta, 2008). This leads the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians to become intractable since neither side is willing to compromise over the issue of Palestinians returning (Bar-Tal, 2007). As the conflict develops its own mindset, the conflict becomes part of a group's identity (Bar-Tal, 2000). The way to end an intractable conflict is by compromises over values (Ginges & Atran, 2008). The place where the conflict is most intense for Palestinians is Lebanon due to problems that will be elaborated in the next section. In addition to the problems the Palestinian refugees face from Israel, they also face exclusion in Lebanon.

A. Palestinian refugees: The Lebanese case

Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are a special case because in addition to being refugees from Palestine, they also face social exclusion in Lebanon (Chaaban, Ghattas, Habib, Hanafi, Sahyoun, Salti, Seyfert,& Naamani, 2010). As the Palestinian refugees arrived in 1948 and 1967, there was fear that the arrival of the Palestinian refugees would upset the delicate sectarian

balance of Lebanon (Siklawi, 2010). Tensions were exacerbated with the sudden arrival of the

Palestine Liberation Organization from Jordan following the Black September massacres which

caused Palestinian nationalism to greatly expand (Hanafi, Chaaban, & Seyfret, 2012). After the

Israeli invasion of 1982 and the PLO moving to Tunis, the Palestinian refugees found themselves

increasingly at the mercy of the Lebanese state (Hanafi et al., 2012). The refugee camps in the

Central Beirut Area (Shatilla, Burj al-Barajneh, and Mar Elias) contain 22% of Lebanon's

425,640 Palestinian refugees (Chaaban et al., 2010). The camps in Central Beirut have the lowest

rates of poverty of all the Lebanese camps (Chaaban et al., 2010).

According to Shikaki's (2003) poll, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are the most

determined to exercise the Right of Return compared to Palestinian refugees in Syria and Jordan.

They also reject living in peace and security with Israeli Jews, the highest of any Palestinian

refugees, which locks them into an intractable conflict (Shikaki, 2003). The miserable conditions

for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have created a sense of urgency over the issue of resettling

Palestinians in Lebanon first (Sayigh, 2001).

The fate of the 4.5 million refugees has created an intractable conflict between Israelis

and Palestinians for over 60 years. Despite the fact that Abu-Sitta (2008) has demonstrated that

the Right of Return is physically possible, the question the present study attempts to answer is

will granting the Right of Return lead to Palestinians reconciling with Israelis. According to

Shnabel and Nadler's (2008) needs-based model of reconciliation, the way to end an intractable

conflict is by empowering a victim and having a perpetrator be forgiven. Since intractable

conflicts become a part of groups' identities, literature on identity and how identity can affect

reconciliation will be examined as well (Bar-Tal, 2000). Identity also interacts with values in

bringing about reconciliation so literature on sacred values will be reviewed as well (Halloran,

2007; Ginges & Atran, 2008).

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been defined as an intractable conflict as both sides have made considerable investments in fighting over a long period of time (Bar-Tal, 2004). Although many people have come to believe that conflict is insolvable, research has been conducted on ways to end intractable conflict using the situation between the Israelis and Palestinians (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009). From previous research on ending intractable conflict, Shnabel and Nadler (2008) proposed the needs-based model of reconciliation as a way to end intractable conflicts.

Bar-Tal (2000) also highlighted the importance of group identity in sustaining an intractable conflict. Research by Ray, Mackie, Rydell, and Smith (2008) demonstrate how identity defines attitudes towards out-groups. While Verkuyten and Maliepaard's (2013) research demonstrated that identity determines an individual's attitudes towards a policy, Guimond et al.'s (2013) research demonstrated that policy determines the level of prejudice individuals have towards an out-group. Verkuyten and Maliepaard's (2013) research as well as Guimond et al.'s (2013) research deals with how society values multiculturalism through policies. Values interact with identity in bringing reconciliation as demonstrated by Halloran's (2007) research. Research by Ginges and Atran (2008) specifically demonstrated how compromising over sacred values can bring reconciliation in an intractable conflict.

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A. Intractable conflict

Bar-Tal (2007) explains the nature of intractable conflict as two or more parties locked in a protracted conflict where neither side is willing to compromise. These conflicts also become defined by considerable investment along with a mindset that the conflict cannot be solved (Bar-Tal, 2007). Bar-Tal (2004) claims that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict fits this criteria as it is "zero sum [in] nature, irreconcilable, and total" (Bar-Tal, 2004, p. 672). Intractable conflicts are also characterized by a violent nature in addition to their durability (Bar-Tal, 2000). Over time, the people in a conflict develop a mindset about the conflict which provides for the continuation of a conflict over long periods of time (Bar-Tal, 2000).

Research by Nadler and Liviatan (2006) investigated the roles that empathy and assumption of responsibility play in reconciliation. Nadler and Liviatan (2006) state than an apology from a perpetrator that contains empathy and assumption of responsibility can negate the need for revenge on the victims' part. By apologizing, the perpetrator creates a debt that only the victim can cancel through forgiveness (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006). Nadler and Liviatan (2006) pointed out that trust moderated this effect where victims tended to forgive perpetrators when trust was high. Using the case of Israel and Palestine, Nadler and Liviatan (2006) explored research on forgiveness that claims if an aggressor apologizes and the victim forgives the aggressor, the nature of the relationship is improved. Nadler and Liviatan (2006) hypothesized that Israeli university students who heard an apology from a Palestinian leader would have more positive attitudes towards Palestinians.

Sixty Israeli university students in Israel read a speech by a Palestinian leader (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006). The authors mentioned that data was collected during a period of relative calm (May-June 2000). This speech varied in acknowledging the pain Palestinians have caused

Israelis (empathy) and acknowledging Palestinians' role in causing Israelis pain (responsibility).
. As a control, some of the speeches contained no expressions of responsibility or empathy (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006). After reading the speech, the participants completed questionnaires about their attitudes towards Palestinians and if reconciliation was possible in the future (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006). Nadler and Livitan (2006) also assessed participants on trust towards Palestinians on two items. Since the first study had a small sample size and was conducted before the second intifada, a second study was run during the summer of 2001 with a larger sample size of 89 students.

The findings of the research emphasized the effects of an apology on Israelis evaluations of Palestinians and the moderating role of trust. Israelis who heard a speech by a Palestinian leader that expressed empathy with them had more positive attitudes towards Palestinians compared to participants who heard a Palestinian leader express responsibility for the conflict (Nadler &Liviatan, 2006 Manipulation checks showed expressions of empathy and responsibility were not orthogonal. This effect was attributed to participants perceiving the apologies to be more effective than they were supposed to be. This effect lead to participants perceiving the apologies to be more effective than they were supposed to be (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006). Nadler and Liviatan (2006) note that this effect was moderated by trust. When participants did not trust Palestinians, an apology increased their feelings of victimization and made participants think more negatively of Palestinians (Nadler & Livitan, 2006). Nadler and Liviatan (2006) acknowledged that given the disproportionate balance of power in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israelis and Palestinians would have different needs. Israelis need acknowledgment that they are also victims and Palestinians need to be empowered in order for reconciliation to occur (Nalder & Liviatan, 2006).

Initially, it appeared that Israelis evaluated Palestinians more positively when hearing an empathetic apology One of the limitations of Nadler and Liviatan's (2006) study was the use of "marginally significant" where *p* values are above the normally accepted .05 limit. Although Kazdin (2003) acknowledges that there are times when results outside of *p<.05* are valid, the researchers must justify why they are accepting those results before the study takes place. Taking the significant results of Nadler and Liviatan's (2006) study, trust is the only factor that is consistently related to better attitudes towards Palestinians following the speech. Trust did often interact with the empathy condition, but the effects of empathy and responsibility on the reconciliation measures were limited even when controlling for trust (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006). Instead, expressions of empathy and responsibility caused participants to evaluate the speaker more positively (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006).

Nadler and Liviatan (2006) stated that the power dynamic in a conflict meant that different parties in a conflict had different needs that had to be met to end a conflict. Several researchers have proposed that intractable conflicts can be resolved through an emotional exchange that satisfies both parties' needs such as the victim's need for empowerment and the perpetrator's need for forgiveness (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009). Shnabel and Nadler's (2008) needs-based model of reconciliation proposes that if a perpetrator restores a victim's sense of power and a victim restores a perpetrator's moral image, reconciliation can occur. This stems from victims' attempts to correct feelings of inferiority and perpetrators attempts to correct their moral image so they don't face isolation (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). In order to validate the needs-based model of reconciliation, Shnabel and Nadler (2008) created a multi-study experiment.

In the first study, Shnabel and Nadler (2008) told participants they would write slogans to

evaluate their potential for work in advertising. Participants were then separated into writers who would write the slogans and judges who would evaluate the slogans. The judges, who were the perpetrator group, were given instructions to judge writers harshly, who were the victim group, to advance to the second phase of the experiment (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). Shnabel and Nadler (2008) also included a control group that received no such instruction. Manipulation checks demonstrated that participants had a clear idea who the perpetrators were and who the victims were in the simulation (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). Shnabel and Nadler (2008) demonstrated that victims had a need to restore their sense of power while perpetrators felt a need for social acceptance thus confirming the needs of both perpetrators and victims.

The second phase of Shnabel and Nadler's (2008) study had the judges group receive a message supposedly from the writers group and the writers group supposedly receive a message from the judges group. These messages either restored the participants' sense of power, social acceptance, or neither (control) (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). Victims were more willing to reconcile with perpetrators when the message was perceived as being empowering, and perpetrators were more willing to reconcile with victims when they received a message of social acceptance (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). The third study tested the needs-based model of reconciliation in a real world scenario while the fourth study assessed participants' willingness to reconcile before and after receiving a message from their partner (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). All studies demonstrated that victims were more willing to reconcile after receiving an empowering message while perpetrators were more willing to reconcile after receiving a message of acceptance (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008).

One of the main differences between Shnabel and Nadler's (2008) study and Nadler and Livitan's (2006) study was that Shnabel and Nadler focused on willingness to reconcile while

Nadler and Liviatan (2006) focused on attitudes. It is unclear whether participants' attitudes in Shnabel and Nadler's (2008) studies changed along with their willingness to reconcile. Shnabel and Nadler (2008) did not examine the effects of trust. Shnabel and Nadler (2008) stated that manipulation checks demonstrated that messages containing acceptance or empowerment themes were non-orthogonal which means messages containing themes of acceptance were also perceived to contain message of empowerment and messages containing themes of empowerment were also perceived to contain messages of acceptance. Shnabel and Nadler (2008) claimed that the spillover was inevitable and did not diminish the overall findings of the study. This claim was supported by manipulation checks that demonstrated that victims and perpetrators had different needs and that the two groups were affected based on these needs.

To extend the generalizabilityof the needs-based model of reconciliation, Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, and Carmi (2009) applied their findings to massacres where Jews were the victims in one and the aggressors in another. In the first study, Sixty-two Jews and 60 Arab participants read a message from an out-group member about the Kefar Kasem killings where Jews were the perpetrators and Arabs were the victims. The messages were either one of empowerment that affirmed the participant's group's right to power and self-determination or a message of acceptance that called for acceptance of the participant's group. After reading the message, participants were surveyed about whether they found the speech to be one of empowerment or acceptance and their willingness to reconcile. Following the model proposed by Shnabel and Nadler (2008), Arab participants had higher willingness to reconcile scores when reading a message they perceived as empowering and Jewish participants had higher willingness to reconcile scores when they read a message they perceived as accepting.

Shnabel et al.'s (2009) second study had 56 German and 65 Jewish participants read a

speech from an out-group about the holocaust where Germans were the perpetrators and Jews were the victims. The procedures were identical to the first study where participants read a message, rated it as being either empowering or accepting, and then indicated their willingness to reconcile (Shnabel et al.). Consistent with the results of the first study, Jewish participants had higher willingness to reconcile scores when they perceived the message to be empowering and Germans were more willing to reconcile when they viewed the message as being accepting (Shnabel et al.).

The studies by Shnabel and Nadler (2008) and Shnabel et al. (2009) validated the needs-based model of reconciliation in both laboratory and real life settings. Reconciliation requires not only an apology, but for victims to feel empowered by perpetrators and for perpetrators to feel accepted by their victims (Shnabel and Nadler, 2008; Shnabel et al., 2009). The studies did not observe attitudes or trust as were recorded in Nadler and Liviatan's (2006) study which indicated there could be a difference between attitudes and willingness to reconcile. In the studies on reconciliation, an important construct in identifying victims and perpetrators is group identity (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; Shnabel et al., 2009). According to Bar-Tal (2000), intractable conflict contributes to the identity of a society and identity can help sustain an intractable conflict.

B. Social Identity Perspectives

Social Identity Theory (SIT) states that individuals define themselves as part of a group in order to enhance self-esteem (Ray, Mackie, Rydell, & Smith, 2008). Social Categorization Theory (SCT) states that people carry multiple identities so membership in a group is determined by relevant social cues (Ray et al., 2008). Ray et al. (2008) demonstrated how identity can

inform individuals' opinions based on the current social situation. One hundred and thirty-two University of California, Santa Barbara students were primed to think of themselves as either students or Americans and were surveyed on their attitudes towards Muslims and police (Ray et al.) Participants who were primed for being students demonstrated more positive attitudes towards Muslims while participants who were primed as Americans demonstrated more positive attitudes towards police (Ray et al.). Ray et al.'s study drew upon identities that were correctly viewed as being in conflict with each other. In intractable conflict, identity becomes an important part of sustaining an intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007).

Identity also plays a role in attitudes towards actions and policies adopted by the in-group, particularly when it comes to dealing with out-groups. Verkuyten and Maliepaard (2013) investigated how an individual's identity plays a role in the policy that an individual supports. Using Cohen's (2003) "party over policy" effect, an individual will support a policy that their group supports even if the policy conflicts with the expected values of the group. Group members will look to the leader of the group to inform their views on a policy. As long as the members of a group accept a leader, the leader has the power to change in-group attitudes.

To test how far individuals would support their party on different policies, Verkuyten and Maliepaard (2013) interviewed participants in the Netherlands over the phone about their support for multicultural policies. Participants were asked whether they supported statements for or against multiculturalism from a spokesperson of one of the two main political parties (Verkuyten & Maliepaard, 2013). Afterwards, the participants were asked what political party they identified most with (Verkuyten & Maliepaard, 2013). Participants agreed more with a statement about multiculturalism when it was made from an in-group regardless of whether the statement was for or against multiculturalism (Verkuyten & Maliepaard, 2013).

Guimond et al. (2013) investigated how a country's policies towards multiculturalism affected the level of prejudice in a society. Theories on identity and intergroup relations have tried to explain the reasons for prejudice and intergroup conflict in diverse cultures and societies. Guimond et al (2013) proposed that a country's given policy towards diversity affects cultural norms which in turn affect attitudes. Using participants from Germany (low multiculturalism), the United States and United Kingdom (medium multiculturalism), and Canada (high multiculturalism), participants were surveyed on how they perceived the norm of their society towards multiculturalism and their personal attitudes towards multiculturalism (Guimond et al.). Participants were also assessed on items from the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) scale regarding group-based dominance and opposition to equality as well as anti-Muslim prejudice (Guimond et al). One group of participants was primed with measures of cultural norms of their society and a list of items based on what most people in their society believed (Guimond et al.). Guimond et al. demonstrated that participants from Canada, the country with the most pro-multicultural policies, had lower levels of prejudice towards Muslims.   Guimond et al.'s (2013) results also demonstrated that how a society confronts its identity through policies also affects the values of a society. Guimond et al.'s (2013) results contradicted the study by Verkuyten and Maliepaard (2013) that claimed that support for policies was a function of identity. Participants who lived in a multicultural society and identified with the norms of the society they lived in valued multiculturalism. According to Guimond et al. (2013), policies affected not only the way the society identified itself, but also what was valued in the society.

C. The Role of Sacred Values

Atran and Axelrod (2008) claimed that the values people hold as sacred have the

potential to entrench conflicts and make them appear intractable. Sacred values, which are not necessarily religious values, can be anything that a person holds as important (Sheikh, Ginges, Coman, &Atran, 2012). According to Ginges, Atran, Sachdeva, & Medin (2011), sacred values are moral imperatives that individuals act on without regards to personal consequences because they are seen as morally right. Individuals are resistant to compromising sacred values and attempts to persuade an individual by material compensation can often backfire (Sheikh, et al., 2012). Atran and Axelrod (2008) explained that policy makers discount the role sacred values play and think people are only motivated by rational calculation and personal gains. Atran and Axelrod (2008) claim some individuals can be characterized as "devoted actors" who are not motivated by rational thought or material gain, but are dedicated more to sacred values despite seemingly impossible odds.

Values interact with identity to determine the attitudes and actions of an individual. Halloran (2007) investigated how values, identity, and collective guilt interact in regards to reconciliation towards indigenous people in Australia. In the first study, 197 Australian university students were asked to complete questionnaires from their own personal perspective or an Australian perspective (Halloran, 2007). Participants then completed the 56-item Schwartz value survey and were asked to rate how important each value was as a guiding principle in their life (Halloran, 2007). Participants then read a piece urging participants either as Australians or people to support reconciliation with Aboriginal-Australians and were asked to indicate their agreement with reconciliation (Halloran, 2007). Participants who endorsed egalitarian values were more likely to support reconciliation with Aboriginal-Australians (Halloran, 2007). Participants were also more likely to support reconciliation if support for reconciliation was framed as part of their Australian identity (Halloran, 2007).

Halloran's (2007) second study focused on how identity could be used to induce collective guilt and observed the effects of identity and collective guilt on attitudes towards reconciliation. Using 161 adult Australians, participants completed the 16-item Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) scale and were primed for identity by either listing things Australians do well or they personally do well (Halloran, 2007). Participants then read a favorable or unfavorable passage related to Australia's treatment of Indigenous Australians and were then surveyed on their attitudes towards reconciliation (Halloran, 2007). Manipulation checks were done to make sure the tone of the historical passages were perceived correctly by participants and that participants identity was primed by listing things they did well (Halloran, 2007). Participants who were primed as individuals were more supportive of reconciliation attitudes when reading a positive portrayal of Australian history and when collective guilt was low (Halloran, 2007). Participants who were primed for Australian identity were more likely to reconcile when reading an unfavorable view of Australian history and when collective guilt was high (Halloran, 2007). These results demonstrated an interaction of identity and collective guilt where collective guilt moves participants to reconcile when they view themselves as part of a group yet stop individuals from reconciling.

Halloran (2007) attributes the effect of participants who identified as individuals having higher reconciliation attitudes when reading a favorable account of Australian history to the idea that a negative account of Australian history is taken as a personal attack. Halloran's (2007) first study demonstrated that valuing egalitarianism was strongly supported as an "Australian" value. Egalitarianism also predicted positive support for reconciliation (Halloran, 2007).

Ginges and Atran (2008) investigated how humiliation affects willingness to compromise over sacred values in peace negotiations. In the first study, Palestinian participants were asked to

nominate emotions they felt when thinking about different aspects of the Israeli population with a particular focus on whether humiliation was the emotion nominated since Ginges and Atran (2008) believed that humiliation would have a negative correlation in support for violence (Ginges & Atran, 2008). Afterwards, participants were asked to nominate an emotion when they heard news of a suicide attack (Ginges & Atran, 2008). Joy and pride were the most common positive responses (Ginges & Atran, 2008). Ginges and Atran (2008) also asked participants what they believed the position of Islam was on suicide attacks. Participants who indicated more feelings of humiliation at different aspects of the Israeli occupation were less likely to nominate joy when hearing of suicide attacks and less likely to believe Islam supports suicide attacks (Ginges & Atran, 2008). Ginges and Atran (2008) concluded that participants who were humiliated by the Israeli occupation were less likely to support political violence.

In Ginges and Atran's (2008) second study which was distributed to 720 Palestinians students, half of the participants were reminded about experiences at checkpoints and then asked to nominate an emotion at the news of a suicide bombing while the other half of participants were asked to nominate an emotion at news of a suicide bombing and then reminded of checkpoints. Participants were also asked to nominate an emotion regarding checkpoints (Ginges & Atran, 2008). When participants indicated that checkpoints were humiliating, those participants who were primed for humiliation by reading about checkpoints were less likely to report joy when hearing the news of a suicide bombings (Ginges & Atran, 2008).

Ginges and Atran's (2008) third study asked the same participants from the second study to evaluate whether they and their fellow Palestinians would support a state in Gaza and the West Bank (taboo deal), a state in Gaza and the West Bank but with financial compensation (taboo with financial compensation), or a state in Gaza and the West Bank along with Israel

symbolically renouncing sovereignty over the West Bank (symbolic compromise deal).

Participants were asked 1) to choose which emotions best represented them, 2) whether they

would support the deal, and 3) to predict how many Palestinians they thought would vote for the

deal (Ginges & Atran, 2008). Ginges and Atran (2008) demonstrated in a sample of Palestinians

that humiliation made them less likely to support the compromises that are needed for peace

deals. Ginges and Atran (2008) claim that Israeli compromise over sacred values moderated

feelings of humiliation for the Palestinians and increased support for a peace deal since

Palestinians who associated humiliation with a peace deal were less likely to support it.

One of the limitations of the Ginges and Atran (2008) study was its construct of support

for political violence. The first two studies used positive emotions as the construct of support for

political violence while the third study directly asked participants about their support for political

violence (Ginges & Atran, 2008). This may indicate why Ginges and Atran's (2008) first two

studies found negative correlations between humiliation and support for political violence while

the third study found no relation between humiliation and support for political violence. Another

interesting point is that the mean for percentage of other Palestinians predicted to vote for the

peace deal in scenario 1 was below the midpoint with high variability.

The Right of Return for Palestinian refugees has been held up as a sacred value of the

Palestinians (Ginges, Atran, Sachdeva, & Medin, 2011). Ginges et al. conducted research that

demonstrated Palestinians were more likely to make compromises if Israel recognized the

legitimacy of the Right of Return. Research suggests that if Israel's message was more in

agreement with Palestinian values, Palestinians would be more likely to be open to Israel's

message (Ginges & Atran, 2008; Ginges et al., 2011). According to Ginges et al., an apology or

recognition of a sacred value, while insufficient on its own, is necessary to break the deadlock on

an intractable conflict and slowly change attitudes so a successful resolution can occur.

A compromise over a sacred value through a policy change should bring about reconciliation. While previous research has demonstrated some success through a message, policies have been more affective in changing attitudes towards out-groups. According to the needs-based model of reconciliation, the aggressor needs to empower a victim and a victim needs to forgive an aggressor for reconciliation to occur. Empowering a victim is based on the values the victim holds as sacred.

CHAPTER III

AIMS AND HYPOTHESIS

Palestinians may have negative attitudes towards Israelis and may be unwilling to reconcile because Israel has refused to accept Al-Nakba and the Palestinians' sacred value of Right of Return (Ginges & Atran, 2008; Ginges, Atran, Sachdeva, & Medin, 2011; Nadler & Liviatan, 2006; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). Evidence from the previous literature also suggests that if Israel takes a more accepting attitude towards the Right of Return and empowers the Palestinians through granting the Right of Return, attitudes towards Israelis and willingness to reconcile may improve (Ginges & Atran, 2008; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009). The current study aimed to demonstrate that negative Palestinian attitudes towards Israelis and lack of willingness to reconcile are partially based on Israel's policies dealing with Al-Nakba and the Right of Return.

Another objective of the present study was to demonstrate how changing policies from one that disempowers Palestinians (i.e. denying Al-Nakba and Palestinians' right to return) to one

that empowers Palestinians (i.e. allowing Palestinians to return to their homes) will improve attitudes towards Israelis and willingness to reconcile. Shnabel and Nadler (2008) were able to improve willingness to reconcile through a message while Nadler and Liviatan (2006) were unable to improve attitudes through a message. Guimond et al. (2013) showed that there is a link between the policies a country adopts and the attitudes of that countries' citizens towards an out-group. Verkuyten and Maaliepaard (2013) showed that a person who represents a group can change in-group attitudes. This opens up the possibility that the group representative can affect out-group attitudes as well. The present study will investigate how a country's policy will be evaluated by the out-group.

Nadler and Liviatan's (2006) study demonstrated that a speech containing no policy changes may improve attitudes towards a speaker, but attitudes towards an out-group were relatively stable. Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, and Carmi's (2009) study did not assess attitudes (positive or negative) towards Israelis; nonetheless, Palestinians in Israel were more willing to reconcile with Israelis after hearing an empowering message. Previous research demonstrated that willingness to reconcile would improve with an empowering message but attitudes did not improve (Nadler & Livitan, 2006; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; Shnabel, Nadler Ulrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009). Guimond et al., 2013 demonstrated that a country's policies might be a factor in improving attitudes towards certain groups.

The current study also built on Ginges and Atran's (2008) study and compared the different effects of a symbolic Israeli compromise on the Right of Return (e.g. 2000 refugees returning per year) with a full Israeli compromise on the Right of Return (e.g. all Palestinian refugees returning) on attitudes towards Israelis. While Ginges and Atran (2008) did demonstrate that symbolic compromise was more effective than other initiatives such as financial

compensation, the fact that mean support for the peace deals proposed in their third study never crossed the midpoint shows that the deals might be biased against the Palestinians. The Shikaki (2003) poll lays out in detail various attitudes involving both a symbolic Right of Return and full Right of Return that the current study included in the scenarios presented to Palestinian participants. In other words, the current study balanced the conditions by adding a condition that is based on the Palestinian position with regards to the Right of Return, the policy allowing Palestinian refugees the full Right of Return.

The sacredness of the Right of Return to Palestinians has been affirmed both by Shikaki (2003) and Ginges, Atran, Sachdeva, and Medin (2011). Ginges and Atran's (2008) study demonstrated that ignoring sacred values increased feelings of humiliation as well as opposition to a peace deal. Halloran's (2007) study demonstrated how a manipulation of values can bring reconciliation. The current study controlled for the sacredness of the Palestinian Right of Return to Palestinian participants.

The Right of Return is a core component of Palestinian identity making the issue highly relevant to Palestinians (Ginges, Atran, Sachdeva,& Medin, 2011). The more Palestinians endorse their national identification, the more Palestinians may hold dear core issues such as the Right of Return and hence may have more negative attitudes towards Israelis and be unwilling to reconcile (Halloran, 2007; Ray, Mackie, Rydell, & Smith, 2008). If trends with Palestinian identity are consistent with Halloran's (2007) and Ray et al.'s results, those who are high in Palestinian identity may have more negative attitudes towards Israelis and be less willing to reconcile.

The current study also included trust which was found to be a consistent covariate in Nadler and Liviatan's (2006) study. In Nadler and Liviatan's (2006) study, Israeli participants

who had high trust towards Palestinians indicated more positive attitudes towards Palestinians. Trust was not measured on how it affects willingness to reconcile (Shnabel et al., 2009). Shikaki's (2003) poll seems to indicate that Palestinian refugees have little trust in Israel when it comes to the Right of Return and their willingness to reconcile is very low. The current study included trust as a covariate to see how it affects attitudes towards Israelis and willingness to reconcile in a more direct way.

Controlling for age, gender, and how sacred Palestinian refugees consider the Right of Return, the following hypotheses were proposed for the study:

Hypothesis 1: As policies change from denying Al-Nakba to granting a full Right of Return, attitudes towards Israelis should be more positive.

Hypothesis 2: As policies change from denying Al-Nakba to granting a full Right of Return, participants should be more willing to reconcile with Israelis.

Hypothesis 3: Participants who are high in trust should have more positive attitudes towards Israelis and be more willing to reconcile with them.

Hypothesis 4: Participants who are high in Palestinian identity should have less positive attitudes towards Israelis and be less willing to reconcile with them.

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

A. Research Design

The present study recruited Palestinian refugees from Beirut's three refugee camps (Burj-El Barajneh, Mar Elias, and Shatilla) in order to investigate the effects of Israeli policy on Palestinian attitudes towards Israelis. There were four different Israeli policies towards Palestinians: the first policy denied Al-Nakba and considered the Palestinians not to be refugees; the second policy accepts that the Palestinians are refugees and offers them financial compensation in lieu of the Right of Return; the third policy offers Palestinians a limited Right of Return of 500 Palestinian refugees per year; and the fourth policy offers a full Right of Return where any Palestinian who wishes can return to their home. The research was conducted with a repeated-measures design where each participant reviewed all four policies in varying order. Based on previous literature, important variables were identified, such as Palestinians' trust in Israelis to honor agreements with Palestinians, the sacredness of the Right of Return, and how much participants identified as being Palestinian.

Each survey battery was prepared and placed inside a sealed envelope which participants could return to the co-investigator once they completed their participation in the study. The survey battery included: the informed consent sheet (check Appendix G for the Arabic version), a demographics sheet including questions about trust, Palestinian identification, and how sacred the Right of Return was (in some versions this appeared at the end of battery), and four Israeli policy sheets, each with an Israeli policy, an attitudes thermometer, and a 5-item willingness to reconcile scale.

1. *Translation of the Scales*

The informed consent, the policies, and different scales of the study were translated by a bilingual committee composed of two translators and one reviewer who were fluent in both English and Arabic. The one translator translated the informed consent while the other translator

translated the policies and questionnaires. One reviewer checked over all of the materials and then all the changes were reconciled into a final version.

B. Measures

1. Independent Variable

a. Israeli policy

The policies in the experimental condition consisted of four different policies to test which policy improved attitudes towards Israelis and willingness to reconcile. The hypothetical policies were composed from an identical paragraph that was created by the co-investigator. This paragraph that differed on only a few words in order to insure that the policies only varied on acceptance of Al-Nakba and how to compensate the Palestinians. The four policies either denied Al-Nakba and didn't consider the Palestinians as refugees, accepted Al-Nakba and offered the Palestinians financial compensation, accepted Al-Nakba and offered the Palestinians a limited Right of Return, or accepted Al-Nakba and offered the Palestinians a full Right of Return (See Appendices C, D, E, and F for details).

2. Dependent Variables

The dependent variables were attitudes towards Israelis and willingness to reconcile with Israelis. The present study included both attitudes towards Israelis and willingness to reconcile to see if using a policy had a different effect than using a message. Attitudes towards Israelis was measured with a single item while Shnabel et al.'s Willingness to Reconcile scale was adapted to the context of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon.

a. *Attitudes towards Israelis.* A single item was used to assess attitudes towards Israelis. Respondents were asked to indicate if their attitudes are more positive or more negative towards Israelis after reading a given policy. This instrument used a 5-point Liker ttype scale

ranging from 1 (*more negative*) to 5 (*more positive*) (See Appendix C for the scale item).

b. *Modified Willingness to Reconcile (Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009).*Willingness to reconcile towards Israelis was measured using five of the original 10 items of the Willingness to Reconcile scale (Shnabel et al.). Five items were dropped as they contained constructs that had a weak link to reconciliation. The remaining items were adapted for use with Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The items included: a) decreases your willingness to act for promoting reconciliation between [Arabs] and [Israelis] [Reverse coded], b)increases you willingness to express good will toward [Israelis], c) makes you feel optimistic regarding the future relations between [Arabs] and [Israelis], d) decreases the tension between [Arabs] and [Israelis], e) improves the atmosphere between [Arabs] and [Israelis]. The items were assessed on a 5-point Likert type scale ranging from 1 (*strongly agree*) to 5 (*strongly disagree*). The scale had good reliability (Cronbach's α=.94 & .95) for both Israelis and Israeli Arabs (Palestinians) across the two independent variables in Shnabel et al.'s study. In the present study, items b,c,d, and e correlated well with each other (Cronbach's α=.91, .95, .92, .92).

3. Covariates and control items.

A single item assessing the sacredness of the Palestinian Right to Return was included as a control item as well as two demographics questions. Trust and identity were included as covariates in line with previous literature.

a. Sacredness of Right of Return. In order to confirm the sacredness of the Right of Return mentioned in Shikaki's (2003) poll, a control item was included to assess how sacred the Right of Return was to participants. Agreement with the item, "I hold the Palestinian Right of Return sacred" was assessed on a 5-point Likert type scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to

5 (strongly disagree).

b. Trust. A single item was adapted for the present study from Nadler and Liviatan's (2006) study to assess trust. The item stated, "I trust the Israelis to honor an agreement concerning the Right of Return for Palestinians." A 5-point Likert scale was used to indicate agreement with the statement ranging from 1 (*strongly agree*) to 5 (*strongly disagree*).

c. Palestinian Identification Scale (Fischer, Harb, Al-Sarraf, &Nashabe, 2008). Palestinian identification was measured with an adapted version of Fischer at al.'s (2008) National Identity scale with three items: "I love my country," "I am proud to be Palestinian," and "Being Palestinian is an important part of my identity." A 5-point Likert type scale was used to indicate agreement with the statements ranging from 1 (*strongly agree*) to 5(*strongly disagree*). The National Identity scale had high reliability in the Palestinian sample (Cronbach's α=.82).

d. Demographic Questions. Participants indicated demographic information which included: gender and age.

C. Pilot Study

A pilot study was conducted on a small sample of Palestinian participants (N=15) to ensure the appropriateness of all of the instruments used in the study and confirm the time it would take for participants to complete the questionnaire. The average time it took participants to fill out the questionnaire was 15 minutes. Participants had an easy time understanding the questionnaires and did not indicate that there were any problems. No modifications were necessary. Since no changes were made from the pilot study, the data was included in the results.

D. Main Study

1. Procedure.

Approval was sought from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) to conduct the present study. Although the study was submitted for expedited review which is supposed to be maximum one month, the approval process took three months due to safety concerns. This was partly due to the sensitive nature of traveling to the Palestinian refugee camps and the legal liability to AUB if something happened. Another issue was that the co-investigator was not fluent in Arabic so data collectors had to be recruited to accompany the co-investigator and explain the informed consent process. The issue of traveling to the camps required a waiver form to be filed with the Dean of Student Affairs while the IRB held approval over the data collectors who would be a part of the study.

In order to insure the safety of the co-investigator and any associates, permission to conduct research in the refugee camps was sought from the camps' Popular Committees. The Popular Committees were considered the gatekeepers as they had the power to allow or deny entry into the refugee camp as well as being responsible for the camps security. After consultations, the members of the Popular Committees agreed that permission should be sought from the Palestinian embassy as the embassy was considered to be the representative of the Palestinian state and have authority of the Popular Committees. After submitting a proposal and several meetings with the embassy to outline any concerns, the embassy granted approval to conduct research inside the refugee camps.

The co-investigator was always accompanied by a data collector who was CITI certified and a resident of the camp. Since residents were initially weary of speaking to outsiders, an accompanying resident of the camp allowed the co-investigator and data collector to talk to camp residents. Female data collectors were told to dress conservatively given the setting of the camps

and no one wore anything that could be considered a political statement. Although sampling was supposed to take place equally across the three camps, most of the data was collected from Shatila refugee camp. More participants responded from Shatila because Mar Elias is significantly smaller than the other two camps and participants in Burj El-Barajneh were more distrustful due to a larger presence by the Lebanese army. Due to the large number of people involved, data collection took place according to the data collectors' schedules over the course of three weeks. When data collection occurred, it was generally between 11 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Sunday from January 14th to February 2nd.

When approaching participants, the data collectors or the camp resident introduced themselves before the data collectors explained that they were students at the American University of Beirut conducting a study of Palestinians attitudes towards Israelis based on Israeli policy. The data collectors also confirmed whether the participants were Palestinian before they proceeded to explain the informed consent sheet. The data collector also gave the participant the informed consent sheet which they were told they could read and keep a copy of. Participants were approached while they were alone in market places and coffee shops in order to insure privacy. Participants who consented orally were handed an envelope containing the survey materials and answered any questions the participants had. Once all questions were answered, the data collectors left the participant to complete the survey and returned 15 minutes later to collect the material.

    a. <u>Order effects and counterbalancing</u>**.** Using a Soloman Four-Square design which produced four unique orders in which policies were presented to control for order effects, eight versions of the survey battery were created to counter balance the order the policy appeared (4 levels). Since the background questionnaire could serve as a prime by

mentioning issues such as trust or identity, the demographic and covariate questions appeared at the beginning or the end of the survey battery (2 levels). The policy pages contained the modified versions of both the the Attitudes towards Israelis item and the adapted Willingness to Reconcile scale along with a paragraph explaining the Israeli policy. The demographics and covariate section contained questions asking age, gender, how much the Palestinians trust Israelis, how sacred they hold the Right of Return, and the adapted Palestinian Identification scale.

2. *Sample Characteristics*

The sample consisted of 70 Palestinian refugees recruited from Mar Elias, Shatilla, and Burj El-Barajneh. The average age (M=37.64, SD=16.53) of the sample was 38 ranging from 18 to 79. There were of 40 males, 24 females, and 6 participants not indicating their gender.

CHAPTER V

RESULTS

The following section contains a preliminary analysis consisting of missing value analysis, normality assumptions, and checking for univariate and multivariate outliers. This was followed by scale psychometrics and descriptives. The section concludes with a correlation matrix and the main analysis (ANOVA).

A. Preliminary Analysis

1. *Missing Value Analysis*

A missing values analysis was conducted using SPSS syntax. Demographic variables (i.e. age and gender), the covariates (i.e. trust, sacredness of the Right of Return, and Palestinian

identification) and the dependent variables (i.e. Attitudes towards Israelis and Willingness to Reconcile), all had more than 5% missing data with the exception of Willingness to Reconcile in scenario 3.Missing data on demographic variables was 8.6% for both age and gender. Missing data for trust, sacredness of the Right of Return, and Palestinian identification were 7.1%, 7.1%, and 5.7% respectively. Missing data on the Attitudes towards Israelis scale across scenarios was very high ranging from 15.7% to 20% while the Willingness to Reconcile scale missing data ranged from 4.3% to 8.6% across scenarios. Little's MCAR test was conducted to determine if there was a pattern to the missing data. Little's MCAR test was not significant meaning that that data was missing completely at random (MCAR). Since the data is missing completely at random, missing values were not replaced.

2. *Normality*

Assumptions for normality were checked using z-scores for skewness with a criterion of 1.96. With these criteria, Willingness to Reconcile for the deny al-Nakba condition and attitudes towards Israelis for the deny al-Nakba and financial compensation conditions as well as age, trust in Israelis to honor agreements, sacredness of the Right of Return, and Palestinian identification were significantly non-normal. According to Fields (2009), ANOVA is robust against violations of normality when cell sizes are equal with at least 20 degrees of freedom. In repeated-measures ANOVA, equal sample size is not an issue and the current study had more than 20 degrees of freedom. Z-scores for the variables are reproduced in Table 1.

Table 1

Z-scores for skewness by variables

Variable	Z-score
Age	2.33

Trust in Israelis to Honor Agreements	7.18
Sacredness of the Right of Return	11.41
Palestinian Identification	7.19
Scenario 1 Attitudes towards Israelis	6.49
Scenario 2 Attitudes towards Israelis	2.19
Scenario 3 Attitudes towards Israelis	1.94
Scenario 4 Attitudes towards Israelis	1.19
Scenario 1 Willingness to Reconcile	6.41
Scenario 2 Willingness to Reconcile	1.83
Scenario 3 Willingness to Reconcile	.91
Scenario 4 Willingness to Reconcile	.67

3. *Outliers*

Univariate outliers were checked in the variables age, trust in Israelis to honor agreements, Sacredness of the Right of Return, Palestinian identification, Attitudes towards Israelis and Willingness to Reconcile in the deny Al-Nakba, financial compensation, limited Right of Return, and full Right of Return conditions. Using box plots, as well as z-scores greater than 3.29, five cases were identified as univariate outliers in the variables Sacredness of the Right of Return, Palestinian identification, Attitudes towards Israelis and Willingness to Reconcile in the deny Al-Nakba condition. Multivariate outliers were checked using Mahalanobis distances with a criterion of *p<.001*. With 13 predictor variables, no cases had a value greater than $\chi 2(13)= 34.528$ which meant that there were no multivariate outliers. Since no cases were univariate and multivariate outliers, no cases were deleted from the analysis.

29

4. *Psychometrics*

a. <u>Reliability Analysis</u>

A Reliability analysis was conducted to determine the internal consistency of the Willingness to Reconcile scale used in the study. The scale had 5 items with the first item being reverse coded. The Willingness to Reconcile scale in the deny Al-Nakba condition had Cronbach's α of .71 which was due to the first item. This was because the first item was reverse coded which caused some participants to think that the Arabic was mistranslated causing unstable responses. The first item lowered the reliability considerably and was removed to give the scale excellent internal reliability. Since removing the first item in all scenarios makes Cronbach's α above .9 for the Willingness to Reconcile scale, the first item was removed from all Willingness to Reconcile scales to strengthen internal reliability and insure all measures contained the same number of items. The Palestinian Identification scale had good internal reliability with Cronbach's α of .82. The scale reliabilities are reproduced in Table 2.

Table 2

Scale Reliability

Scale Reliability	α
Willingness To Reconcile Scenario 1	.91
Willingness To Reconcile Scenario 2	.95
Willingness To Reconcile Scenario 3	.92
Willingness To Reconcile Scenario 4	.92
Palestinian Identification	.82

B. Descriptives

Table 3 presents the aggregate means and standard deviations for the variables in the sample.

In order to keep the Willingness to Reconcile Scale consistent with the Attitudes Thermometer and other scales, the items of the Willingness to Reconcile scale were reverse coded so higher scores indicated tendencies towards reconciliation with Israelis. In order to produce aggregate scores, the five items of each of the Willingness to Reconcile Questionnaires were averaged in SPSS. Sacredness of the Right of Return and Palestinian Identification both produced ceiling effects with 80% of responses being agree or strongly agree and were dropped from the analysis. Trust in the Israelis to honor their agreements with the Palestinians (M=1.69, SD=1.2) was well below the mid-point indicating a potential floor effect with participants demonstrating very little trust in the Israelis. Trust in Israelis to honor their agreements was also dropped from the analysis.

Scenario 1, the policy where Israel denies the Nakba and does not consider the Palestinians to be refugees, had the worst Attitudes towards Israelis (M=1.52, SD=1.04) and Willingness to Reconcile scores (M=1.52, SD=.76). The Attitudes towards Israelis and Willingness to Reconcile scores showed almost a floor effect well below the midpoint which meant that participants were less willing to reconcile and had the most negative attitudes towards Israelis after reading the policy in the first scenario. Scenario 4, where Israel offers the full Palestinian Right of Return, had the only Attitudes towards Israelis (M=3.21, SD=1.45) and

Willingness to Reconcile (M=3.1, SD=1.28) scores that crossed the midpoint. This means that the only time participants were willing to reconcile and had better attitudes towards Israelis were when Israel offered the full Right of Return.

Table 3
Descriptives

	Mean	Standard Deviation
Age	37.64	16.53
Trust in Israelis to honor agreements	1.69	1.2
Sacredness of the Right of Return	4.78	.76
Palestinian Identification	4.72	.62
Deny Nakba Attitudes towards Israelis	1.52	1.04
Financial Compensation Attitudes towards Israelis	2.07	1.1
Limited Right of Return Attitudes towards Israelis	2.27	1.23
Full Right of Return Attitudes towards Israelis	3.21	1.44
Deny Nakba Willingness to Reconcile	1.53	.76

Financial Compensation Willingness to Reconcile	2.24	1.18
Limited Right of Return Willingness to Reconcile	2.58	1.22
Full Right of Return Willingness to Reconcile	3.1	1.28

C. Correlation Matrix

The Preason's correlations between variables are reproduced in Table 4.

A Pearson's correlations table was produced in table 4 in order to observe relationships within the data. Multicollinearity wasn't an issue as none of the variables were correlated above .8. Age showed a non-linear relationship with Attitudes towards Israelis and Willingness to Reconcile and was not analyzed (Scatterplots are reproduced in Appendix N).

Most Attitudes towards Israelis and Willingness to Reconcile scales had moderate to large correlations within their respective scenarios. Attitudes towards Israelis in the deny Al-Nakba and financial compensation conditions had a significant moderate positive correlation with Willingness to Reconcile in the deny Al-Nakba and financial compensation conditions respectively ($r=.48$, $r=.45$, $p<.05$). Attitudes towards Israelis in the limited and full Right of Return conditions had a significant large correlation with Willingness to Reconcile in the limited and full Right of Return conditions respectively($r=.55$, $r=.53$, $p<.05$). The high correlation between Attitudes towards Israelis and the Willingness to Reconcile scale is unsurprising since they are similar constructs without being multicollinear. There were also large significant

positive correlations in the limited and full Right of Return conditions for both Attitudes towards Israelis and Willingness to Reconcile respectively (*r*=. 58, *r*=.54, *p<.05*). This suggests that participants see the financial compensation and limited Right of Return conditions as being very similar.

Table 4

Pearson's correlations table

	Deny Al-Nakba Attitudes	Financial Compensation Attitudes	Limited Right of Return Attitudes	Full Right of Return Attitudes	Deny Al-Nakba Willingness to Reconcile	Financial Compensation Willingness to Reconcile	Limited Right of Return Willingness to Reconcile	Full Right of Return Willingness to Reconcile
Deny Al-Nakba Attitudes	1							
Financial Compensation Attitudes	-.12	1						
Limited Right of Return Attitudes	.16	.54**	1					
Full Right of Return Attitudes	-.14	-.04	.03	1				
Deny Al-Nakba Willingness to Reconcile	.48**	.19	.28*	-.24	1			
Financial Compensation Willingness to Reconcile	.09	.45**	.39**	.01	.43**	1		

Limited Right of Return Willingness to Reconcile	.09	.49**	.55**	-.01	.35**	.54**	1
Full Right of Return Willingness to Reconcile	-.1	.2	.27*	.53**	.15	.45**	.42**	1

**.Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*.Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

D. Gender

A one-way ANOVA was run to test the effects of gender on Attitudes towards Israelis and Willingness to reconcile. Although the assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated for Attitudes towards Israelis in scenarios 1, $F(1, 51)=4.4$, $p<.05$, and 4, $F(1, 49)=4.67$, p<.05, as well as Willingness to Reconcile in scenario 4, $F(1, 59)=6.57$, $p<.05$, the F-statistic is robust against violations of the assumption of homogeneity of variance (Fields, 2009). The F-table was not significant for any of the DVs which mean that gender did not have an effect on participants' attitudes towards Israelis or their willingness to reconcile and was not included as a covariate.

E. Order Effects

Two MANOVAs were run to test the effect of counterbalancing for Attitudes towards Israelis and Willingness to Reconcile. The assumption of equality of error variances was violated for Attitudes towards Israelis in scenario 1, $F(7, 45)=4.04$, p<.05, and for Willingness to Reconcile in scenario 1, $F(7, 56)=3.21$, p<.05. Since samples sizes are equal, Pillai's Trace is robust against violations of the assumption of equality of error variances(Fields, 2009).There were no main effects of counterbalancing for either Attitudes towards Israelis or Willingness to Reconcile so there was no need to control for order effects.

F. Main Analysis: Repeated-Measures ANOVA

The present study sought to test how different Israeli policies on the Nakba and the Palestinian Right of Return affected attitudes towards and willingness to reconcile with Israelis. There was a single independent variable of policy which contained four different policies with Attitudes towards Israelis and Willingness to Reconcile as the dependent variables. Both trust and age were not included as covariates due to a non-linear relationship with the Attitudes towards Israelis and Willingness to Reconcile (an ANCOVA with the covariates is produced in Appendix M). According to the study's first hypothesis, participants were expected to have better attitudes towards Israelis as policies move from Israel denying Al-Nakba to implementing a full Right of Return (H1). The second hypothesis (H2) was that participants would be more willing to reconcile the more policies move from Israel denying Al-Nakba to implementing a full Right of Return.

1. *Statistical Assumptions*

The ratio of cases to IVs and the assumption of linearity were met. Although normality was violated, Fields (2009) states that ANOVA is robust against violation of normality with 20 degrees of freedom which is satisfied by the sample size (N=53). No outliers were deleted and no missing data had to be replaced.

a. Sphericity

A repeated-measures ANOVA would automatically violate independence of scores in the experimental condition so the assumption of sphericity (denoted by ε) was needed to make sure the *F*-test was accurate (Fields, 2009). The assumption of sphericity is that the dependence of the

scores between experimental conditions is roughly equal (Fields, 2009).The assumption of sphericity was met for the Willingness to Reconcile scale but the assumption was not met for the Attitudes Thermometer, $\chi 2$ (5) $=18.87$, $p<.05$. Since (ε) $=.69$, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used to detect main effects.

2. *Repeated-Measures ANOVA*

A Repeated Measures ANOVA was run with policy as the IV with 4 levels using the Attitudes Thermometer and the Willingness to Reconcile scale as the measures.

   a. <u>Main Effects</u>

Israeli policies had significant effects on Attitudes towards Israelis, F (3, 156) $=23.31$, $p<.05$ partial $\eta^2=.31$, and Willingness to Reconcile, F (3, 156) $=30.22$, $p<.05$, partial $\eta^2=.37$. These large effect sizes showed that participants reacted very differently towards Israeli policies. To specifically test H1 and H2, post-hoc tests of adjusted means were carried out.

   i. *Adjusted Means*

The means for Attitudes towards Israelis and Willingness to Reconcile scores by scenario were adjusted. Adjusted means across the four scenarios are produced in table 5 below.

Table 5
Adjusted Means

Measure	Scenario	Mean	Std. Error
Willingness to Reconcile	Deny Al-Nakba	1.49	.11
	Financial	2.22	.17

	Compensation		
	Limited Right of Return	2.59	.18
	Full Right of Return	3.16	.18
Attitudes towards Israelis	Deny Al-Nakba	1.49	.13
	Financial Compensation	2.08	.15
	Limited Right of Return	2.3	.17
	Full Right of Return	3.32	.19

Estimated Marginal Means of Willingness to Reconcile scale

Estimated Marginal Means of the Attitudes towards Israelis scale

ii.   Post hoc tests

Since there were no specific comparisons to be made, post hoc tests were used to compare significant differences between all groups. Pair-wise comparisons with Bonferroni corrections were used to test the main hypothesis for attitudes towards Israelis and Willingness to Reconcile.

Participants had the most negative attitudes towards Israelis when Israel denies Al-Nakba. Participants had non-significant differences in attitudes towards Israelis between policies when Israel offered financial compensation or when Israel offers a limited Right of Return. Participants indicated the most positive attitudes towards Israelis when Israel offered the full Right of Return which was significantly different from the previous policies. Hypothesis 1 was confirmed.

Participants were the least willing to reconcile with Israelis when Israel denies Al-Nakba. Participants had non-significant differences in Willingness to Reconcile between policies when Israel offered financial compensation or when Israel offers a limited Right of Return. Participants indicated they were most willing to reconcile when Israel offered the full Right of Return which was significantly different from the previous policies. Hypothesis 2 was confirmed.

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION

The present study sought to test several hypotheses relating to how policy can affect reconciliation and attitudes. Hypotheses 1 (H1) stated that as Israeli policy moves from Israel denying Al-Nakba to implementing a full Right of Return, participants should have more positive attitudes towards Israelis. This hypothesis was partially confirmed as the first policy that denied Al-Nakba did have the most negative attitudes towards Israelis, and participants expressed the most positive attitudes towards Israelis when Israel allowed Palestinians to return. Hypothesis 2 (H2) stated that a policy that participants should be more willing to reconcile with Israelis if Israel moved from denying Al-Nakba to allowing a full Right of Return. H2 was also partially confirmed as participants expressed they were the least willing to reconcile when Israel denied Al-Nakba but most willing to reconcile when Israel allowed for the full Right of Return.

Previous literature focused on how an apology can bring about reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009). The current study expanded on the previous works including policy as a factor in changing attitudes (Guidmond, Crisp, Oliveria, Kamiejski, Kteily, Kuepper, Lalonde, Levin, Pratto, Tougas, Sidanius, & Zick, 2013). Most of the main hypotheses for the present study were upheld. Differences between the policy where Israel denies the Nakba and the other policies were consistent with previous literature on reconciliation (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009). The differences between policies were also consistent with previous literature on sacred values (Ginges & Atran, 2008).

A. Review of Results

      1. *Aggregate scores of the variables.*

      Participants generally expressed low attitudes towards Israelis and willingness to reconcile but these scores rose as Israel's policies were more in line with Palestinian demands. Only when the policy allowed for a full Right of Return did attitudes and willingness to reconcile cross the mid-point towards greater attitudes and willingness to reconcile. This meant that only when a policy that had a full Right of Return did participants exhibit any positive attitudes and willingness to reconcile.

      Participants also exhibited very high levels of identification as Palestinians and held the Right of Return as sacred with little variability. As Ginges, Atran, Sachdeva, and Medin (2011) mentioned, the Right of Return is a sacred value for Palestinians and participants confirmed this almost unanimously. The Right of Return may be especially sacred for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon as Palestinians have been traditionally excluded by the Lebanese state (Chaaban, Ghattas, Habib, Hanafi, Sahyoun, Salti, Seyfert, & Naamani, 2010).

      2. *Main effects*

      There was a main effect for policy on both attitudes towards Israelis and willingness to reconcile. The first policy in which Israel denied Al-Nakba had the most negative attitudes and participants were the least willing to reconcile. A complete rejection of what participants almost unanimously declared a sacred value unsurprisingly lead to a complete rejection of Israelis and reconciliation with them (Atran & Axelrod, 2008; Ginges & Atran, 2008). The deny Al-Nakba condition is most in line with current Israeli policy which leaves Palestinian needs to have the right to return to one's homeland unfulfilled and is perpetuating an intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000; Bar-Tal, 2007; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008, Shnabel et al.).

Although both the financial compensation and limited Right of Return conditions were significantly different from the deny Al-Nakba condition, the financial compensation and limited Right of Return conditions were not significantly different from each other. While participants viewed them as better than the first policy, attitudes towards Israelis and willingness to reconcile did not cross the midpoint. According to Ginges and Atran (2008), participants should have showed significantly better attitudes towards Israelis when a symbolic Right of Return was offered because financial compensation should have been seen as insulting whereas a limited Right of Return would be an acknowledgment of a Palestinian sacred value. Some participants viewed compensation as a step that should take place in addition to the Right of Return. Most participants had similar views of both the financial compensation and limited Right of Return policy. It is possible that participants view these policies as Israeli attempts to avoid implementing a full Right of Return.

The full Right of Return condition had the highest attitudes and Willingness to Reconcile scores among participants. This policy was the only one where both attitudes towards Israelis and Willingness to Reconcile scores were above the midpoint. This policy is considered a fulfillment of Palestinian needs in order for reconciliation to occur (Shnabel & Nadler, 2006; Shnabel et al.). This also complements Ginges and Atran's (2008) study by comparing a symbolic compromise to a full compromise. Unfortunately, trust could not be measured as a covariate in the present study. In Nadler and Liviatan's (2006) study, trust was the main predictor of attitudes towards Palestinians in Israelis. So few participants in the present study trusted the Israelis to honor agreements that a linear relationship could not be established between trust and the dependent variables.

B. Implications and Recommendations

The present study sought to test several hypotheses relating to how policy can affect reconciliation and attitudes. Hypotheses 1 (H1) stated that as Israeli policy moves from Israel denying Al-Nakba to implementing a full Right of Return, participants should have more positive attitudes towards Israelis. This hypothesis was partially confirmed as the first policy that denied Al-Nakba did have the most negative attitudes towards Israelis, and participants expressed the most positive attitudes towards Israelis when Israel allowed Palestinians to return.

Hypothesis 2 (H2) stated that a policy that participants should be more willing to reconcile with Israelis if Israel moved from denying Al-Nakba to allowing a full Right of Return. H2 was also partially confirmed as participants expressed they were the least willing to reconcile when Israel denied Al-Nakba but most willing to reconcile when Israel allowed for the full Right of Return.

Hypothesis 3 (H3) stated that participants who are high in trust should have more positive attitudes towards Israelis and be more willing to reconcile with them. Trust was problematic because it was very close to having a floor effect (Although less than 80 percent of the data loaded on strongly distrusting Israel). H3 would have been confirmed from the Pearson's correlations table with the exception of trust in attitudes towards Israelis when Israel offered a full Right of Return. There was a negative correlation between trust and attitudes which meant that as participants were more trusting of Israel, attitudes towards Israelis went down. This bizarre correlation shows that Trust in Israelis to honor agreements, while not a full floor effect, was too skewed to be accurately analyzed.

Hypothesis 4 (H4) stated that participants who are high in Palestinian identity should have less positive attitudes towards Israelis and be less willing to reconcile with them. H4 could

not be tested as more than 80 percent of the data loaded onto Palestinians highly supporting their Palestinian identity.

The current study validated Shnabel and Nadler's (2008) Needs-based Model of Reconciliation in Lebanon using Palestinian refugees. The more empowering the policy was for Palestinian refugees, the more willing Palestinian refugees were to reconcile. The different between the present study and Nadler and Liviatan's (2006) work was that attitudes towards the out-group did improve. What was different in the present study from Nadler and Liviatan's (2006) work was that trust had a floor effect. Despite the fact that trust was overwhelmingly negative, participants had more positive attitudes towards Israelis when adopted a policy of allowing the Palestinians to return.

The present study showed that participants were able to overcome the issue of identity when reconciling. In Ray et al.'s (2008) study, participants evaluated different groups as a function of their identity, identity determined their views over policies regarding out-groups. In the present study Palestinians overwhelmingly embraced their identity yet their attitudes towards Israelis were not fixed. The present study also contradicts Verkuyten and Maliepaard's (2013) study by showing that while Palestinians had a very high identification, they could reconcile with Israelis if Israel adopted a different policy. The results of the present study are more consistent with Guimond et al.'s (2013) study where Palestinian attitudes towards an out-group improved depending on the policies being implemented (in this case by Israel as they are the ones in control of whether Palestinians can return).

Participants in the present study affirmed the Palestinian Right of Return with more than 80 percent strongly agreeing that the Right of Return as a sacred value. When Israeli policy was in agreement with values of the Palestinians, Palestinians were more willing to reconcile with

Israelis (Ginges & Atran, 2008; Halloran, 2007). Although Halloran (2007) studied general human values, values were important in bringing reconciliation between Australians and Aboriginals. The difference between the present study and Ginges and Atran's (2008) study was the present study included Israel full accepting a Palestinian sacred value (i.e. the Right of Return). The present study included a condition in which attitudes towards Israelis and willingness to reconcile were just above the midpoint.

The research also demonstrates that offering the Palestinians the Right of Return is not as bad for Israelis as some people believe since Palestinians did not reject the idea of living with Israelis. Although the full Right of Return would not solve all of the problems between Israelis and Palestinians, the fact that offering the full Right of Return was the only time when attitudes and willingness to reconcile crossed the midpoint suggests that reconciliation is possible. Of the 70 participants, only four indicated complete floor effects for attitudes towards Israelis and willingness to reconcile regardless of policy.

C. Limitations and Future Research

The present study had some limitations. The wording of the full Right of Return policy caused some difficulty and confusion. In unstructured post-survey interviews, some participants were reluctant to exercise the Right of Return as long as the country was still called Israel. As long as the country is called Israel, Palestinians thought that they would always be second class citizens. Changing it to Palestine might cause a rise in attitudes towards Israelis and Willingness to Reconcile scores.

Palestinian Identification and Sacredness of Right of Return had low variability which prevented them from being included in the analysis. Including these two variables as covariates

would have strengthened the analysis. Although the item trust had enough variability to be

analyzed, the non-linear relationship with Attitudes towards Israelis and Willingness to

Reconcile made it impossible to include trust as a covariate.

Future researchers may also consider merging the financial compensation and limited

Right of Return policies together as participants did not significantly differentiate between the

two policies. Several of the participants also indicated to the researchers that they

expect both financial compensation and the Right to Return. Future research should include some

mechanism for participants to express any shortcomings they find with the policies.

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Appendix A

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Co-Investigator: Nicholas Thomas
Address: American University of Beirut
        Jesup 104
Phone: 01-350 000
Email: Charles.Harb@aub.edu.lb

CONSENT TO SERVE AS A PARTICIPANT IN A RESEARCH PROJECT
Project Title: How Israel's denial of Palestinian rights affects anti-Israeli attitudes in Palestinian

refugees

Dear participant,

You are invited to participate in research being conducted by the American University of

Beirut investigating Palestinian refugees' attitudes towards Israelis based on Israel's policy

regarding Al-Nakba and the Palestinian Right of Return. The only requirements to participate in

this study are that you have to be Palestinian and 18 years or age or older.

This study will approach participants from Burj El-Barajneh, Shatilla, and Mar Elias.

This consent form is applicable only to those sites. If you are being solicited outside of those

areas, this is in error and this consent form is not applicable and participation in this study is not

possible. After you the participant have been approached, consent will be sought.

In order to participate, we will need a few minutes to explain why we are asking you to

participate and how the information you will provide us will be used. After you read this consent

form and provide oral consent to participate, you will be asked to read some policies and then

answer questionnaires based on those policies in addition to some background information.

These questions have to do with your attitudes towards Israelis and your potential willingness to reconcile with them. The questions may arouse certain emotions as the subject matter is very controversial. Please read and consider each question carefully, but do not worry over your answers. There are no right or wrong answers so feel free to answer what first comes to mind. You will be answering based on your own thoughts and opinions. After completion of the questionnaire, you will return the materials to a sealed envelope which will be collected by the co-investigator.

We are collecting data from 80 participants from the Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut for use in published research as well as academic presentations. Your individual privacy and confidentiality of the information you provide will be maintained in all published and written data analysis resulting from the study. There are no threats for the confidentiality of your results since no direct identifiers will be recorded; no names nor signatures. Moreover, the data will be reported in total.

The primary investigator and the co-investigator will be the only ones who have the data. No confidentiality issues will possibly arise since the data is completely anonymous. All data from this study will be maintained on a password protected computer. The data will be stored for a period of three years before being destroyed.

Participation should take approximately TWENTY minutes. Please understand your participation is entirely on a voluntary basis and you have the right to withdraw your consent or discontinue participation at any time without justification or penalty. Your refusal to participate will not affect your relationship with AUB or AUBMC. There are no foreseeable risks or benefits for participating in this study, however, the results of this study will help researchers understand how policies affect attitudes in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

If at any time and for any reason, you would prefer not to answer any question, please feel free to skip those questions. If at any time you would like to stop participating, you can simply terminate without justification. You will not be penalized for deciding to stop participation at any time.

If you have questions, concerns or complaints about this research study later, you may contact Dr. Charles Harb at 01 350000 ext 4371 or Charles.harb@aub.edu.lb, or contact Nick Thomas at ndt00@aub.edu.lb.

If you are not satisfied with how this study is being conducted, or if you have any concerns, complaints, or general questions about research or your rights as a participant, please contact the AUB Social & Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board (SBSIRB) at AUB: 01-350 000 ext 54454914 or irb@aub.edu.lb.

If you accept the above statements and you are willing to participate, please start answering the questionnaires. By continuing you indicate your consent to participate in the study and authorize the researchers to use your data.

<div align="center">THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION</div>

INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL STAMP:

Appendix B
Preliminary questionnaires
Please indicate your age and gender below.
Gender: _____ Male   _____Female
Age: _____ years

The following are two statements to assess your trust in Israelis and how sacred you hold the Right of Return. Please indicate your agreement with each statement by marking numbers closer to 1 for strongly agree and numbers closer to 5 for strongly disagree. Use the key below.

Strongly agree 1	Agree 2	Neither agree nor disagree 3	Disagree 4	Strongly disagree 5

I trust the Israelis to honor an agreement concerning the Right of Return for Palestinians

| |_____|_____|_____|_____| |
1   2   3   4   5
Strongly agree   Neither agree nor disagree   Strongly disagree

I hold the Palestinian Right of Return sacred

| |_____|_____|_____|_____| |
1   2   3   4   5
Strongly agree   Neither agree nor disagree   Strongly disagree

Palestinian Identification
The following is a short series of statements about Palestinian identity. Please indicate your agreement with each statement by marking numbers closer to 1 for strongly agree and numbers closer to 5 for strongly disagree. Use the key below.

Strongly agree 1	Agree 2	Neither agree nor disagree 3	Disagree 4	Strongly disagree 5

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
1. I love Palestine	1	2	3	4	5
2. I am proud of being Palestinian	1	2	3	4	5
3. Being Palestinian is an important part of my identity	1	2	3	4	5

Appendix C
Scenario 1
Please consider the following scenarios as if they actually happened. After reading each scenario, answer the following questions based on the scenario you just read.
Scenario 1
"The Israeli Prime Minister has tasked his cabinet to prepare Israel's position regarding negotiations with Palestinians. Based on the recommendations, the Israeli government will **not** recognize Palestinian suffering in the event known as "Al-Nakba." The Israeli government will **not** apologize to the Palestinians for the suffering they have endured on behalf of Israel. **In order to further this goal, the Israeli government will put pressure on the UN and other agencies to declassify descendants of Palestinians as refugees**."

ATTITUDES TOWARDS ISRAELIS

The following contains a line and statements to assess your feelings towards Israelis based on the scenario you have just read. First, circle a line corresponding to a number depending how you feel about Israelis with a mark closer to 5 indicating better feelings about Israelis, a mark closer to 1 indicating worse feeling about Israelis, and a mark in the middle being neutral.

After reading this policy, my attitudes towards Israelis are

|_____|_____|_____|_____|

1   2   3   4   5

More Negative   The Same   More Positive

Willingness to Reconcile

The following statements are designed to measure your willingness to reconcile based on what you have just read.Please indicate your agreement with each statement by marking numbers closer to 1 for strongly agree and numbers closer to 5 for strongly disagree. Use the key below.

Strongly agree 1	Agree 2	Neither agree nor disagree 3	Disagree 4	Strongly disagree 5

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
1. The policy decreases my willingness to act for promoting reconciliation between Israelis and Arabs.	1	2	3	4	5
2. The policy increases my willingness to express good will toward Israelis.	1	2	3	4	5
3. The policy makes me feel optimistic regarding future relations between Arabs and Israelis.	1	2	3	4	5
4. The policy decreases tension between Israelis and Arabs.	1	2	3	4	5
5. The policy improves the atmosphere between Israelis and Arabs.	1	2	3	4	5

Appendix D

Scenario 2

"The Israeli Prime Minister has tasked his cabinet to prepare Israel's position regarding negotiations with Palestinians. Based on the recommendations, the Israeli government will recognize Palestinian suffering in the event known as "Al-Nakba." The Israeli government will apologize to the Palestinians for the suffering they have endured on behalf of Israel. **The Israeli government will financially compensate the Palestinian refugees but they will not be allowed to return to their homes in the pre-1967 borders (Israel)."**

ATTITUDES TOWARDS ISRAELIS

The following contains a line and statements to assess your feelings towards Israelis based on the scenario you have just read. First, circle a line corresponding to a number depending how you feel about Israelis with a mark closer to 5 indicating better feelings about Israelis, a mark closer to 1 indicating worse feeling about Israelis, and a mark in the middle being neutral.

After reading this policy, my attitudes towards Israelis are

|_____|_____|_____|_____|

1   2   3   4   5

More Negative   The Same   More Positive

Willingness to Reconcile

The following statements are designed to measure your willingness to reconcile based on what you have just read. Please indicate your agreement with each statement by marking numbers closer to 1 for strongly agree and numbers closer to 5 for strongly disagree. Use the key below.

Strongly agree 1	Agree 2	Neither agree nor disagree 3	Disagree 4	Strongly disagree 5

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
1. The policy decreases my willingness to act for promoting reconciliation between Israelis and Arabs.	1	2	3	4	5
2. The policy increases my willingness to express good will toward Israelis.	1	2	3	4	5
3. The policy makes me feel optimistic regarding future relations between Arabs and Israelis.	1	2	3	4	5
4. The policy decreases tension between Israelis and Arabs.	1	2	3	4	5
5. The policy improves the atmosphere between Israelis and Arabs.	1	2	3	4	5

APPENDIX E
SCENARIO 3

"The Israeli Prime Minister has tasked his cabinet to prepare Israel's position regarding negotiations with Palestinians. Based on the recommendations, the Israeli government will recognize Palestinian suffering in the event known as "Al-Nakba." The Israeli government will apologize to the Palestinians for the suffering they have endured on behalf of Israel. **Palestinian refugees will only be able to return according to a yearly quota system of 500 Palestinian refugees."**

ATTITUDES TOWARDS ISRAELIS

The following contains a line and statements to assess your feelings towards Israelis based on the scenario you have just read. First, circle a line corresponding to a number depending how you feel about Israelis with a mark closer to 5 indicating better feelings about Israelis, a mark closer to 1 indicating worse feeling about Israelis, and a mark in the middle being neutral.

After reading this policy, my attitudes towards Israelis are

|_____|_____|_____|_____|

1   2   3   4   5

More Negative   The Same   More Positive

Willingness to Reconcile

The following statements are designed to measure your willingness to reconcile based on what you have just read. Please indicate your agreement with each statement by marking numbers closer to 1 for strongly agree and numbers closer to 5 for strongly disagree. Use the key below.

Strongly agree 1	Agree 2	Neither agree nor disagree 3	Disagree 4	Strongly disagree 5

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
1. The policy decreases my willingness to act for promoting reconciliation between Israelis and Arabs.	1	2	3	4	5
2. The policy increases my willingness to express good will toward Israelis.	1	2	3	4	5
3. The policy makes me feel optimistic regarding future relations between Arabs and Israelis.	1	2	3	4	5
4. The policy decreases tension between Israelis and Arabs.	1	2	3	4	5
5. The policy improves the atmosphere between Israelis and Arabs.	1	2	3	4	5

Appendix F
Scenario 4

""The Israeli Prime Minister has tasked his cabinet to prepare Israel's position regarding negotiations with Palestinians. Based on the recommendations, the Israeli government will recognize Palestinian suffering in the event known as "Al-Nakba." The Israeli government will apologize to the Palestinians for the suffering they have endured on behalf of Israel. **All Palestinian refugees will be permitted to return to Israel in accordance with the rules in UN Resolution 194."**

ATTITUDES TOWARDS ISRAELIS

The following contains a line and statements to assess your feelings towards Israelis based on the scenario you have just read. First, circle a line corresponding to a number depending how you feel about Israelis with a mark closer to 5 indicating better feelings about Israelis, a mark closer to 1 indicating worse feeling about Israelis, and a mark in the middle being neutral.

After reading this policy, my attitudes towards Israelis are

|_____|_____|_____|_____|
1   2   3   4   5
More Negative   The Same   More Positive

Willingness to Reconcile

The following statements are designed to measure your willingness to reconcile based on what you have just read. Please indicate your agreement with each statement by marking numbers closer to 1 for strongly agree and numbers closer to 5 for strongly disagree. Use the key below.

Strongly agree 1	Agree 2	Neither agree nor disagree 3	Disagree 4	Strongly disagree 5

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
1. The policy decreases my willingness to act for promoting reconciliation between Israelis and Arabs.	1	2	3	4	5
2. The policy increases my willingness to express good will toward Israelis.	1	2	3	4	5
3. The policy makes me feel optimistic regarding future relations between Arabs and Israelis.	1	2	3	4	5
4. The policy decreases tension between Israelis and Arabs.	1	2	3	4	5
5. The policy improves the atmosphere between Israelis and Arabs.	1	2	3	4	5

Appendix G

الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت

صندوق البريد11-0236

1107 2020رياض الصلح

بيروت, لبنان

استمارة موافقة على المشاركة في بحث

عنوان مشروع البحث: كيفية تأثير إنكار الإسرائيليين لحقوق الفلسطينيين على آراء اللاجئين الفلسطينيين ضد الإسرائيليين

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عزيزي المشترك,

انت مدعو للمشاركة بدراسة تقوم بها الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت تتمحور حول تأثير إنكار السياسات الاسرائيلية حق العودة والنكبة على آراء اللاجئين الفلسطينيين ضد الإسرائيليين. شروط المشاركة في هذا البحث هي فقط كونك لاجئ فلسطيني في سن ال 18 و ما فوق. الدراسة ستضم مشاركين من برج البراجنة, شاتيلا, و مار الياس. استمارة الموافقة هذه تنطبق على الأماكن المعدودة فقط. ان تمت محاولة اشراكك في الدراسة خارج هذه المناطق فذلك عن طريق الخطأ اذ لا ينطبق محوى هذه الاستمارة و المشاركة في الدراسة غير ممكنة. بعد التواصل مع حضرتك المشارك, سيتم السعي للحصول على موافقتك.

قبل أن نبدأ, نودّ أن نأخذ بضع دقائق من وقتك لنشرح لك سبب دعوتنا لك للمشاركة في هذا البحث وما سيحصل بالمعلومات الّتي ستزوّدنا بها. عند قراءة الاستمارة و تزويدنا بالموافقة الشفوية للمشاركة, سيقدم لك عدد من السياسات. بعد قراءة السياسات المختلفة, سيطلب منك ملأ استمارات تتعلق بالسياسات, بالاضافة الى بعض المعلومات الخلفية. هذه الأسئلة تتعلق بآرائك تجاه الاسرائيليين و استعدادك للمصالحة معهم. قد تثير الأسئلة بعض المشاعر لديك بسبب طبيعة الموضوع المثيرة للجدل.نرجو منك قراءة كلّ سؤال بتمعّن, لكن لا تفكّر مطوّلاً بإجابتك. غالباً ما يكون الرّدّ الأوّل هو الأفضل, و ليس هناك أيّ إجابة صحيحة أو خاطئة. عبّر فقط عمّا يعكس آراءك و أحاسيسك. بعد أن تنتهي من الإجابة على الأسئلة عليك ان تضع إجاباتك في مغلّف مختوم سيجمعه منك مساعد الباحث.

سوف نطلب من 80 مشترك من مخيمات الاجئين الفلسطينيين في بيرت المذكورة أعلاه المشاركة في هذا البحث, و المعلومات الّتي سيتمّ جمعها سوف تستخدم في أبحاث منشورة و محاضرات أكاديميّة. سيتمّ التّواصل مع المشتركين في هذا البحث مباشرةً من قبل مساعدي الباحث في عدد من المقاهي و المحلّات في المناطق المختلفة. كل المعلومات المزودة ستحفظ لدى الباحث, و لن يملك أي شخص سوى مدير المشروع و الباحث امكانية الوصول الى المعلومات. ستعامل إجاباتك**بسرّيّة و خصوصيّة تامة**خلال عمليّة البحث وتحليل البيانات و نشر النّتائج. ليس هناك أيّ خطر على سرّيّة المعلومات التي ستزوّدنا بها, فلا وجود لأيّ معلومة شخصية: لا إدلاء بإسمك أو بتوقيعك على أيّ من المستندات.

وحدهما الباحث و مساعد الباحث يملكان البيانات من مجموع المشاركين. لن يكون هناك أيّ مشاكل تتعلّق بسرّيّة المعلومات لأنّ المعلومات المزوّدة مجهولة الهويّة. جميع المعلومات المجموعة في سياق هذا البحث ستحفظ على كمبيوتر مزوّد بكلمة سر لمدة ثلاث سنوات و من ثَمّ تتلف.

ستدوم مشاركتك حوالي **20 دقيقة**. نرجو منك أن تعلم أنّ مشاركتك في هذه الدّراسة **اختياريّة** و يحقّ لك الانسحاب وقت تشاء دون تبرير أو عواقب. لديك الخيار برفض المشاركة في هذه الدّراسة دون عواقب أوّ أيّ خسائر, و هذا لن يؤثّر على علاقتك بالجامعة الأميريكيّة في بيروت أو المركز الطبي للجامعة بأيّ شكل. يمكن أن تتطرّق بعض الأسئلة إلى مسائل شخصيّة, لكن عليك أن لا تقلق لأنّ الإجابات مجهولة الهويّة. ليس هناك أيّ مخاطر أو فوائد مباشرة متوقّعة لك من هذه الدّراسة, لكنّها ستساعد الباحثين على الوصول إلى فهمٍ أعمق لتأثير السياسات على الآراء في سياق الأزمة الاسرائيلية-الفلسطينية.

إذا في أيّ وقت أو لأيّ سببٍ كان شعرت بأنّك تفضّل عدم الإجابة على سؤالٍ ما, نشدّد بأنّ لك الحرّيّة المطلقة في عدم الإجابة و الانتقال إلى سؤالٍ آخر. إذا في أيّ وقتٍ كان قرّرت الانسحاب, نرجو أن تفعل ذلك دون ضرورة التّبرير **بمن تتصل إذا كان لديك أية أسئلة:**

إن هذه الدراسة مراجعة و حائزة على موافقة لجنة الأخلاقيّات في الجامعة الأميركيّة في بيروت كما يشير إليه الختم المرفق مع هذه الوثيقة.

في حال وجود أسئلة عن حقوقك كمشارك, أو بحال وجود أي إصابات متعلقة بمشاركتك في الدراسة, نرجو منك الاتّصال بلجنة الأخلاقيّات في الجامعة الأميركيّة في بيروت على 000 350 01 داخلي 5445 أو على:irb@aub.edu.lb.

إذا لديك أي سؤال او لديك اي مخاوف أو شكاوى, نرجو منك الاتّصال بالدكتور شارل حرب على 000 350 01 داخلي 4371 أو علىcharles.harb@aub.edu.lb أو التواصل مع نيكولاس تامس على ndt00@aub.edu.lb.

إن كنت موافقا على كلّ ما ذكر اعلاه و كنت مستعدّاً للمشاركة, نرجو منك البدء في الإجابة على الأسئلة الاتية. مشاركتك تعني أنّك تأذن للباحثين باستخدام المعلومات التي تقدمها. سوف تحصل على نسخة من استمارة الموافقة هذه لتحتفظ بها شخصيًا.

شكراً جزيلاً علي تعاونكم و مشاركتكم في هذا البحث

Appendix H
<u>**التذييل "باء"**</u>

<u>**الاستبيانات الأولية**</u>

يرجى الاشارة الى العمر و الجنس أدناه

الجنس:___ ذكر ___ انثى

العمر: ___ عاما

وفيما يلي بيانين لتقييم ثقتك في الإسرائيليين و ماذا يعني لك حق العودة. يرجى الإشارة إلى موافقتك على كل عبارة بوضع علامة أرقام أقرب إلى 1، لتوافق وأرقام أقرب إلى 5، لا أوافق بشدة. استخدام المفتاح أدناه.

أوافق بشدة 1	أوافق 2	موافقة أو عدم موافقة 3	لا أوافق 4	لا أوافق بشدة 5

أنا على ثقة بأن الأسرائيليين سيحترمون حق عودة الفلسطينيين

```
 |_____|_____|_____|_____|
 1          2          3          4          5
 لا أوافق بشدة        موافقة أو عدم موافقة        أوافق
```

أنا أعتبر حق عودة الفلسطينيين مقدس

```
 |_____|_____|_____|_____|
 1          2          3          4          5
 لا أوافق بشدة        موافقة أو عدم موافقة        أوافق
```

تحديد الهوية الفلسطينية

ما يلي هو عبارة عن سلسلة قصيرة من البيانات حول الهوية الفلسطينية. يرجى الإشارة إلى موافقتك على كل عبارة بوضع علامة أرقام أقرب إلى 1، لتوافق وأرقام أقرب إلى 5، لا أوافق بشدة. استخدام المفتاح أدناه.

أوافق بشدة 1	أوافق 2	موافقة أو عدم موافقة 3	لا أوافق 4	لا أوافق بشدة 5

|	أوافق بشدة	أوافق	موافقة أو عدم موافقة	لا أوافق	لا أوافق بشدة
1.أحب فلسطين	5	4	3	2	1
2.انا فخور بكوني فلسطيني	5	4	3	2	1
3.فلسطينيتي جزء مهم من هويتي	5	4	3	2	1

Appendix I
السيناريو1

<u>يرجى النظر في السيناريوهات التالية كما لو أنها حصلت في الواقع. بعد قراءة كل سيناريو، أجب على الأسئلة التالية على أساس السيناريو الذي قرأته.</u>

<u>**السيناريو1**</u>

"كلّف رئيس الوزراء الإسرائيلي مجلس الوزراء باعداد موقف اسرائيل بشأن المفاوضات مع الفلسطينيين. بناءً على التوصيات الناتجة, قررت الحكومة الإسرائيلية أن **لا تعترف** بمعاناة الفلسطينيين في أحداث ما يعرف ب"النّكبة". **لن تعتذر**الحكومة الاسرائيلية إلى الفلسطينيين عن معاناتهم التي تسببتها اسرائيل. **من أجل هذا الهدف، الحكومة الاسرائيلية ستمارس الضغط على الامم المتحدة وغيرها من الوكالات عدم اعتبار الاشخاص المتحدرين من فلسطينيين كلاجئين**".

المواقف تجاه الإسرائيليين

البنود التالية تحتوي على خط و عدد من البيانات لتقييم مشاعرك تجاه الإسرائيليين على أساس السيناريو الذي قرأته. أولا، ضع دائرة على الخط التالي لتشير الى مشاعرك تجاه الاسرائيليين, حيث علامة أقرب الى 1 تشير الى مشاعر سلبية و علامة في الوسط تشير الى مشاعر حيادية.

بعد قراءة هذه السياسة، مواقفي تجاه الإسرائيليين

5	4	3	2	1

أكثر إيجابية		نفسها		أكثر سلبية

الاستعداد للتصالح

العبارات التالية مصممة لقياس رغبتك في التصالح مع الاسرائيليين بناءً على السيناريو (السياسة) الذي قرأته. يرجى الاجابة على البيانات من خلال وضع دائرة حول الرقم الأقرب الى موقفك, حيث 1 تشير الى موافقتك بشدة و 5 تشير الى عدم موافقتك بشدة. استخدم المفتاح أدناه.

| غير موافق بشدة
5 | غير موافق
4 | محايد
3 | موافق
2 | موافق بشدة
1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|

غير موافق بشدة	غير موافق	محايد	موافق	موافق بشدة	
5	4	3	2	1	1. السياسة تقلل استعدادي للعمل على تعزيز المصالحة بين الاسرائيليين والعرب.
5	4	3	2	1	2. السياسة تزيد استعدلدي في التعبير عن حسن النية تجاه الاسرائيليين.
5	4	3	2	1	3. السياسة تجعلني متفائلاً بشأن مستقبل العلاقات بين العرب والاسرائيليين.
5	4	3	2	1	4. السياسة تخفض التوتر بين الاسرائيليين والعرب.
5	4	3	2	1	5. السياسة تحسّن الأجواء بين الاسرائيليين والعرب.

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Appendix J

السيناريو2

"كلّف رئيس الوزراء الإسرائيلي مجلس الوزراء باعداد موقف اسرائيل بشأن المفاوضات مع الفلسطينيين. بناءً على التوصيات الناتجة, قررت الحكومة الإسرائيلية أن **تعترف** بمعاناة الفلسطينيين في أحداث ما يعرف ب"النّكبة". ان الحكومة الاسرائيلية ستعتذر إلى الفلسطينيين عن معاناتهم التي تسببتها اسرائيل. **الحكومة الاسرائيلية ستقدّم تعويضات مالية للاجئين الفلسطينيين لكنها لن تسمح لهم بالعودة الى اراضيهم ضمن حدود ما قبل عام 1967 (المعروفة الآن باسرائيل)".**

المواقف تجاه الإسرائيليين

البنود التالية تحتوي على خط و عدد من البيانات لتقييم مشاعرك تجاه الإسرائيليين على أساس السيناريو الذي قرأته. أولا، ضع دائرة على الخط التالي لتشير الى مشاعرك تجاه الاسرائليين, حيث علامة أقرب الى 1 تشير الى مشاعر سلبية و علامة في الوسط تشير الى مشاعر حيادية.

بعد قراءة هذه السياسة، مواقفي تجاه الإسرائيليين

5	4	3	2	1

أكثر إيجابية   نفسها   أكثر سلبية

الاستعداد للتصالح

العبارات التالية مصممة لقياس رغبتك في التصالح مع الاسرائيليين بناءً على السيناريو (السياسة) الذي قرأته يرجى الاجابة على البيانات من خلال وضع دائرة حول الرقم الأقرب الى موقفك, حيث 1 تشير الى موافقتك بشدة و 5 تشير الى عدم موافقتك بشدة. استخدم المفتاح أدناه.

غير موافق بشدة 5	غير موافق 4	محايد 3	موافق 2	موافق بشدة 1

	غير موافق بشدة	غير موافق	محايد	موافق	موافق بشدة	
	5	4	3	2	1	1. السياسة تقلل استعدادي للعمل على تعزيز المصالحة بين الاسرائيليين والعرب.
	5	4	3	2	1	2. السياسة تزيد استعدلدي في التعبير عن حسن النية تجاه الاسرائيليين.
	5	4	3	2	1	3. السياسة تجعلني متفائلاً بشأن مستقبل العلاقات بين العرب والاسرائيليين.
	5	4	3	2	1	4. السياسة تخفض التوتر بين الاسرائيليين والعرب.
	5	4	3	2	1	5. السياسة تحسّن الأجواء بين الاسرائيليين والعرب.

APPENDIX K
السيناريو 3

"كلّف رئيس الوزراء الإسرائيلي مجلس الوزراء باعداد موقف اسرائيل بشأن المفاوضات مع الفلسطينيين. بناءً على التوصيات الناتجة, قررت الحكومة الإسرائيلية أن **تعترف** بمعاناة الفلسطينيين في أحداث ما يعرف ب"النّكبة". ان الحكومة الاسرائيلية ستعتذر إلى الفلسطينيين عن معاناتهم التي تسببتها اسرائيل. **سوف يمنح حقّ العودة للاجئين الفلسطينيين بناءً على نظام حصصي يسمح ل 500 لاجئ فلسطيني فقط في العودة سنوياً".**

المواقف تجاه الإسرائيليين

البنود التالية تحتوي على خط و عدد من البيانات لتقييم مشاعرك تجاه الإسرائيليين على أساس السيناريو الذي قرأته. أولا، ضع دائرة على الخط التالي لتشير الى مشاعرك تجاه الاسرائيليين, حيث علامة أقرب الى 1 تشير الى مشاعر سلبية و علامة في الوسط تشير الى مشاعر حيادية.

بعد قراءة هذه السياسة، مواقفي تجاه الإسرائيليين

| 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |

| أكثر إيجابية | | نفسها | | أكثر سلبية |

الاستعداد للتصالح

العبارات التالية مصممة لقياس رغبتك في التصالح مع الاسرائيليين بناءً على السيناريو (السياسة) الذي قرأته. يرجى الاجابة على البيانات من خلال وضع دائرة حول الرقم الأقرب الى موقفك, حيث 1 تشير الى موافقتك بشدة و 5 تشير الى عدم موافقتك بشدة. استخدم المفتاح أدناه.

غير موافق بشدة 5	غير موافق 4	محايد 3	موافق 2	موافق بشدة 1

غير موافق بشدة	غير موافق	محايد	موافق	موافق بشدة	
5	4	3	2	1	1. السياسة تقلل استعدادي للعمل على تعزيز المصالحة بين الاسرائيليين والعرب.
5	4	3	2	1	2. السياسة تزيد استعدادي في التعبير عن حسن النية تجاه الاسرائيليين.
5	4	3	2	1	3. السياسة تجعلني متفائلاً بشأن مستقبل العلاقات بين العرب والاسرائيليين.
5	4	3	2	1	4. السياسة تخفض التوتر بين الاسرائيليين والعرب.
5	4	3	2	1	5. السياسة تحسّن الأجواء بين الاسرائيليين والعرب.

Appendix L
السيناريو4

"'كلّف رئيس الوزراء الإسرائيلي مجلس الوزراء باعداد موقف اسرائيل بشأن المفاوضات مع الفلسطينيين. بناءً على التوصيات الناتجة, قررت الحكومة الإسرائيلية أن **تعترف** بمعاناة الفلسطينيين في أحداث ما يعرف بـ"النّكبة". ان الحكومة الاسرائيلية ستعتذر إلى الفلسطينيين عن معاناتهم التي تسببتها اسرائيل. **سيسمح لجميع اللاجئين الفلسطينيين العودة الى اسرائيل بناءً على لامبادئ التي ينص عليها قرار الأمم المتحدة رقم 194".**

المواقف تجاه الإسرائيليين

البنود التالية تحتوي على خط و عدد من البيانات لتقييم مشاعرك تجاه الإسرائيليين على أساس السيناريو الذي قرأته .أولا، ضع دائرة على الخط التالي لتشير الى مشاعرك تجاه الاسرائليين, حيث علامة أقرب الى 1 تشير الى مشاعر سلبية و علامة في الوسط تشير الى مشاعر حيادية.

بعد قراءة هذه السياسة، مواقفي تجاه الإسرائيليين

5	4	3	2	1

أكثر إيجابية   نفسها   أكثر سلبية

الاستعداد للتصالح

العبارات التالية مصممة لقياس رغبتك في التصالح مع الاسرائيليين بناءً على السيناريو (السياسة) الذي قرأته يرجى الاجابة على البيانات من خلال وضع دائرة حول الرقم الأقرب الى موقفك, حيث 1 تشير الى موافقتك بشدة و 5 تشير الى عدم موافقتك بشدة. استخدم المفتاح أدناه.

غير موافق بشدة 5	غير موافق 4	محايد 3	موافق 2	موافق بشدة 1

| غير موافق بشدة	غير موافق	محايد	موافق	موافق بشدة	
5	4	3	2	1	1. السياسة تقلل استعدادي للعمل على تعزيز المصالحة بين الاسرائيليين والعرب.
5	4	3	2	1	2. السياسة تزيد استعدلدي في التعبير عن حسن النية تجاه الاسرائيليين.
5	4	3	2	1	3. السياسة تجعلني متفائلاً بشأن مستقبل العلاقات بين العرب والاسرائيليين.
5	4	3	2	1	4. السياسة تخفض التوتر بين الاسرائيليين والعرب.
5	4	3	2	1	5. السياسة تحسّن الأجواء بين الاسرائيليين والعرب.

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Appendix M

Histograms show the distribution of each of the variables in the present study.

Sacredness of Right of Return

Palestinian Identification

Scenario 1 Attitudes towards Israelis

Mean = 1.53
Std. Dev. = 1.037
N = 57

Scenario 2 Attitudes towards Israelis

Mean = 2.07
Std. Dev. = 1.10
N = 57

Scenario 3 Attitudes towards Israelis

Mean = 2.27
Std. Dev. = 1.229
N = 59

Scenario 4 Attitudes towards Israelis

Mean = 3.21
Std. Dev. = 1.449
N = 56

Scenario 1 Willingness to Reconcile

Mean = 1.53
Std. Dev. = .758
N = 64

Scenario 2 Willingness to Reconcile

Mean = 2.24
Std. Dev. = 1.179
N = 66

Scenario 3 Willingness to Reconcile

Mean = 2.58
Std. Dev. = 1.222
N = 67

Scenario 4 Willingness to Reconcile

Mean = 3.10
Std. Dev. = 1.284
N = 66

Appendix N

Scatterplots show the relationship between age and attitudes towards Israelis and willingness to

reconcile by condition.