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GLADSTONE AND THE EGYPTIAN

CRISIS OF 1881 - 1882

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ABSTRACT

In 1877, in an article entitled "Aggression on Egypt and Freedom in the East".^{*} William Ewart Gladstone refuted in succession all arguments which were supposed to render some kind of occupation in Egypt expedient and even imperative. He was inclined to believe "...that every scheme for the acquisition of territorial power in Egypt, even in the refined form with which it has been invested, is but a new snare laid in the path of our policy." To these words, later events gave striking verification. It was ironical that the author of these words should have been the man under whose ministry the occupation of Egypt was accomplished.

This paper therefore, attempts to account for the forces responsible for this change of policy on the part of Gladstone, the British Prime Minister.

^{*}W.E. Gladstone, "Aggression on Egypt and Freedom in the East", Nineteenth Century, London, Vol. 1/- August, 1877.

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I

THE REVOLT OF SEPTEMBER

September 9th, 1881.

The Revolution of September 9th, 1881 led by Colonel Arabi brought Egypt to the forefront of the attention of Gladstone, the English Prime Minister.

The demonstrators at Abdin Square had three demands; the dismissal of Prime Minister Riad Pasha, the increase of the army to eighteen thousand soldiers and the granting of a constitution. The demands were answered immediately, the new ministry was formed on September 14th, Cherif Pasha became Prime Minister and Mahmud Sami al Barudi War Minister. Both were chosen by Arabi. The convocation of the old Chamber of Notables of one hundred and fifty members and the increase of the army were successively decreed.¹

The demands made by the military leaders of the revolt reflected more than purely personal ambitions. The revolt of September 9th, was a convergence of two trends; the first expressing the feelings of the Nationalists and the Ulemas and the second reflected the desires of the military leaders as a separate professional group.

The objects of the National Movement of Egypt were outlined in a program known as the National Manifesto of November 9th, 1879. The committee which drew up this document comprised Egyptians as well as Turks and included such persons as Sultan Pasha, Sami Pasha, Ali Bey Yemen:

¹Wilfrid Blunt, Secret History of The English Occupation of Egypt, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1907), pp. 114-115.

²For full text see Appendix I.

Ismail Pasha Yusri, Osman Pasha Lutfi and Cherif Pasha.³

The Nationalists stood against foreign intervention in the affairs of their country, called for the restoration of constitutional government in Egypt and the settlement of Egypt's public debt. The National Program of finance was therefore as follows:⁴ The return of the domain land to the state, withdrawal of all privileges for special creditors, standardization of all debts at four percent and the establishment of a special and temporary international control for the sole purpose of overseeing the payment of debt.

The second influence in the successful revolt of September 9th, was the demands made by the military leaders, namely, Ahmed Arabi, Ali Fehmi and Abdul Aal and presented to the government of the Khedive on various occasions. In 1879, the first of these demands was made when Colonel Arabi and his colleagues demonstrated against the dismissal of two thousands and five hundred officers, mostly Egyptians, from the service by the ministry of Nubar Pasha.⁵

Again, on May 20th 1880, Arabi sent a petition to the War Minister Osman Rifqi - a Turco-Circassian - complaining about arrears of pay, conditions of service and the unfavourable treatment the Egyptian soldiers received from Turco-Circassian officers, who also

³John Ninet, "Origin Of The National Party In Egypt" Nineteenth Century, Vol. XIII, January 1883, p. 131.

⁴loc., cit.

⁵Abdul Rahman al Rafii, al Thawrat al Arabiyeh Wa al-Lhtilali al-Inglizi, (Cairo, 1959), p. 100.

looked down on the native Egyptian 'peasant officer'.⁶ Arabi, the first Egyptian to become a brigadier was prevented by his Turco-Circassian and Albanian colleagues from obtaining the one hundred and fifty feddans of land usually given to every new brigadier.⁷

The complaints were proved to be justified by an official committee formed under pressure from the British and French Consuls General at Cairo to investigate these complaints. In this matter the French Consul, M. de Ring, took the part, of the officers, and from that time gave them, to a certain extent, his protection, especially when during the course of the inquiry he had found himself in personal altercation with Riad Pasha.⁸

The petition of May 20th, was followed on January 17th, 1881 by a personal protest made by Arabi, Ali Fehmi, Colonel of the Black Regiment and Abdul Aal. They presented Prime Minister Riad Pasha with their request for the dismissal of Osman Rifqi against whom they had many grievances, the most recent of which was his decision to deprive them of their commands and dismiss them from the service.⁹

Subsequent to their personal protest, the three colonels received an order to attend Kasr-el-Nil Palace under a pretext, where they were placed under arrest.¹⁰ Arabi maintained that it was intended

⁶ Amin Said, Tarikh Misr al Siyasi, (Cairo: 1959), p. 100.

⁷ loc. cit.,

⁸ Polson Newman, Great Britain in Egypt, (London: Cassel, 1928), p. 55.

⁹ A.R. al Rafii, op. cit., p. 90.

¹⁰ D. Mackenzie Wallace, Egypt and The Egyptian Question, (London: Macmillan & Co., 1883), p. 71.

to put them on board a steamer and have them drowned in the Nile.¹¹ The officers however, had taken precautions. Ali Fehmi's regiment under the command of Major Mohammad Obeid moved to their rescue, forced the palace doors and caused the Circassian officers, including War Minister Osman Rifqi to flee. In the ensuing crisis, Osman Rifqi was dismissed from office and Mahmud Sami al Barudi, a friend of the military leaders and a nationalist, became War Minister.¹²

During the summer of 1881, contacts between Arabi and the Nationalists were established through Sultan Pasha. Cherif Pasha and the Constitutionalists agreed that the army should use its influence to exert pressure on the Khedive to remove Riad Pasha and obtain constitutional measures.¹³ Accordingly, a petition was signed by delegates of ulema, notables and sheikhs of villages. One thousand and six hundred signatures were on the petition denouncing Riad Pasha and calling for a new chamber. It was this petition and the strength of the regiments that made Arabi speak as forcefully as he did on September 9th.¹⁴

Although the revolt of September 9th was organized and executed by the military, yet the military leaders were not out of sympathy with the aspiration of the Nationalists for constitutional government.

¹¹W. Blunt, op.cit., p. 105.

¹²Baron de Kusel, An Englishman's Recollections of Egypt, 1863-1887, (London: John Lane, n.d.), p. 154.

¹³W. Blunt, op.cit., p. 110.

¹⁴loc.cit.

Colonel Arabi, the architect of the successful revolt sympathized with many of the ideas propagated by the Nationalists. He held

That the army itself is but the representative of the people, its guardian till such time as the people shall no longer need it. We have won for the people the right to speak in an assembly of notables and when our Parliament has learned to speak, our duty will be over.¹⁵

Arabi had no love for the Turks, who had misgoverned Egypt for centuries, but made a distinction between the Ottoman and the religious authority of the Sultan, whom he was bound to respect and honour as the head of religion. But he was convinced that Egypt should be politically independent.¹⁶

Concerning the Dual Control, Arabi admitted the good that had been done through regularizing the finances, but felt that England and France must not stand in the way of national regeneration by supporting the Khedive's absolute rule, through the old Circassian pashas.¹⁷

Everything crystallized on September 8th, when Daoud Yakan, a Circassian general and brother-in-law to Khedive Tewfik issued orders for the departure of the two regiments; Arabi's to Alexandria and Abdul Aal's to Damietta. These orders were in compliance with

¹⁵ibid., p. 130.

¹⁶ibid., p. 131.

¹⁷ibid., p. 132.

the Khedive's and Riad Pasha's instructions.¹⁸

On receiving the orders, the colonels decided on immediate action, lest through delay they should lose their power, rendering their previous efforts to be of no avail. Consequently, on September 9th, they staged a huge military demonstration at Abdin Square. Witnessing the demonstration were the Khedive, Sir Charles Cookson, (the British Consul at Alexandria temporarily in charge of the British Agency in Sir Edward Malet's absence on leave), Sir Auckland Colvin, the English financial controller, and the Austrian Consul at Cairo; all having been previously informed by the colonels themselves of the exact date and time of the demonstration.¹⁹

The three demands were personally presented to the authorities by Arabi and were accepted on the spot. The affair concluded without bloodshed, thanks largely to Cookson who took a major part in effecting the solution which was agreed upon, the dismissal of Riad Pasha, the recalling of Cherif Pasha to office and the return to constitutional life.²⁰

However peaceful the events of September in Egypt, in England their repercussions were the subject of much concern. Immediately after the revolution of September, Gladstone sketched an Egyptian

¹⁸A.R., Al Rafii, op.cit., p. 109.

¹⁹A. Said, op.cit., p. 101. W. Blunt, op.cit., p. 114.
de Kusel, op.cit., p. 160.

²⁰P. Newman, op.cit., p. 59.

policy for Lord Granville, his foreign minister;

... I sum up thus: 1. Steady concert with France. 2. Turkish General to go if need be 3. Turkish troops, in preference to any others. 4. No British or French force, unless ships be needful for bona fide protection of subjects. 5. Apart from all this, I long for information on the merits of the quarrel; as on them I suppose may depend the ulterior question of reducing, or disbanding, the Army.²¹

The British wanted above all not to interfere in Egypt and at the same time to carry the French in their wake. The policy of Her Majesty's Government was, "To act cordially with France without allowing her any predominance. For the status-quo can be maintained in Egypt, if Turkey, England and France do nothing to disturb it."²² Therefore, when the French began to talk of an expedition, the British gave it serious consideration. Lord Granville reminded Lord Dufferin, (The British Ambassador at Constantinople) that Gladstone had pledged himself to the country against aggression in Egypt - if an expedition should become necessary in the final analysis, the British wanted the Turks to make it, not Britain or France.²³ Indeed, Malet visited Constantinople on his way back to Cairo and was received by the Sultan to whom he urged intervention in Egypt to suppress the rebellion if it became necessary.²⁴ While continuing joint diplomatic action with

²¹ Agatha Ramm, The Political Correspondance Of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, 1876-1886, (Oxford: 1962), Vol. 1, September 13th, 82, p. 29

²² As quoted by Robinson and Gallagher, Africa And The Victorians, (New York, St. Martins Press, 1961), p. 95.

²³ loc.cit.

²⁴ Edward Malet, Egypt, 1879-1883, (London; John Murray, 1909), p. 142.

France, England was therefore against any mixing either by Britain or France in the affairs of Egypt. Great Britain's attitude towards interference whether military or political in Egyptian affairs was outlined clearly in the letter sent by Lord Granville to Malet on November 4th, Great Britain according to Granville

...desires no partizan ministry in Egypt. In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, a partizan ministry founded on the support of foreign power or upon the personal influence of a Foreign Diplomatic Agent, is neither calculated to be of service to the country it administers, nor to that in whose interest it is supported to be maintained. It can only tend to alienate the population from their true allegiance to their sovereign and to give rise to counter - intrigues which are detrimental to the welfare of the state. The only circumstances which could force us to depart from the course of the conduct I have above indicated would be the occurrence in Egypt of a state of anarchy...²⁵

France, however, had a different stand on Egypt. From the beginning France objected strongly against Turkish intervention insisting upon Anglo-French action to halt the National Movement in Egypt. It was considered in France to be a part of a general Pan-Islamic movement directed by the Sultan and aiming at ousting France from Algeria and Tunisia.²⁶

²⁵For full text of the letter see Appendix II.

²⁶M. Carroll, French Public Opinion And Foreign Affairs 1870-1914, (New York: The Century Co., 1931), p. 93.

Adams, the British Chargé D'Affaires in Paris reported to Lord Granville on an interview with St. Hilaire, the French Foreign Minister, describing French willingness to come to any agreement with Granville on the question of Egypt.²⁷ Adams added that the French strongly opposed sending Turkish troops to Egypt for this could lead to the strengthening of the Sultan's influence in Egypt, the development France desired least. Instead of a Turkish General, St. Hilaire proposed to send two generals; one from France and the other from England.²⁸ This idea however, was not accepted by Granville who wrote back Paris;

"I do not like the idea of the two Generals and it would be unpopular here."²⁹

The Anglo-French concert was now at stake. The English Cabinet, eager for continued French co-operation, decided to soften its stand and not to press the subject of a Turkish commissioner. Accordingly, Granville wrote Dufferin

...instructing him to avoid committing the Government over Egypt and to advise the Porte to avoid hasty actions, but to use pacifying language.³⁰

The Sultan, who had his own thoughts about the problem, decided to send Ali Nizami Pasha and Ahmed Ratib Bey to the Khedive as advisors.³¹

²⁷Theodore Rothstein (trans in Arabic), Egypt's Ruin, (Cairo: 1936), p. 149.

²⁸loc.cit.

²⁹A. Ramm, op.cit., (Granville to Gladstone, October 1st, 1881), p. 297½

³⁰ibid., (Granville to Gladstone, September 14th, 1881), p. 292.

³¹P. Newman, op.cit., p. 65.

The Sultan's action was constitutional one. Egypt, although self-administered was a province of the Ottoman Empire whose Sovereign was the Sultan, and as Sovereign of the Empire, the Sultan had the right to intervene. Moreover, the request for a Turkish commissioner had now been made by the Khedive.³²

In Britain, the Sultan's action was described as an 'unlucky' step³³ and immediately the British Government protested strongly Turkish interference with administration. Gladstone informed Granville on October, 2nd, that the British Government should

...join with France in opposing strongly as you say interference of the Turkish emissary with administration, while he should be received with personal respect.³⁴

Malet, on being asked by Granville on October, 4th, whether he could suggest any useful action that England could take in concert with France with respect to the Sultan's move, recommended a joint Anglo-French communication that would promise assistance in maintaining the independence of the Khedive against any attempt of the Turkish envoys to control his administration.³⁵ Granville felt this was reasonable and suggested to St. Hilaire that the two consuls should inform the Khedive and Cherif Pasha that they would support the Government of His Highness in preserving Egyptian independence as

³²T. Rothstein, *op.cit.*, p. 138.

³³A. Ramm, *op.cit.*, (Granville to Gladstone, Oct. 1st, 1881), p. 297.

³⁴*ibid.*, (Granville to Gladstone, October 2nd, 1881), p. 297.

³⁵*ibid.*, (Granville to Gladstone, October 4th, 1881), p. 298.

prescribed by the firmans. He further requested that France join England in sending two ships of war to Alexandria to emphasize their determination.³⁶ St. Hilaire accepted Granville's proposal and the two ships were despatched.³⁷

The crisis was soon to be resolved, the Turkish envoys were to return to Constantinople, while Arabi rejoined his regiment in the interior and the ships quit Egyptian waters.³⁸ An illusory condition of quietude enveloped Egypt. Gladstone and Granville convinced themselves that their demonstration of concern and action had been sufficient to check the Nationalists and restore the Khedive's authority, Egypt's ostensible independence and the position of the Dual Control.

In December, Britain's optimism was jarred by a new and resolute spokesman for intervention. Gambetta, the new French Foreign Minister, decided that joint action in Egypt was necessary and therefore on December 14th, he approached Lord Lyon.³⁹ Gambetta looked at the development of constitutionalism in Egypt with apprehension and fear and therefore he wanted to halt it in cooperation with Great Britain. This he outlined clearly in his interview with Lyon on December 14th,

He observed that the approach of the meeting of the Chamber of Notables at Cairo made him uneasy. It was, he said, impossible to foresee what line they would take. They might be moderate, support the Khedive's authority, and assist the Government

³⁶T. Rothstein, op.cit., p. 148.

³⁷Alexander Broadley, How We Defended Arabi And His Friends, (London: Chapman & Hall, 1884), p. 82.

³⁸T. Rothstein, op.cit., pp. 150-151.

in carrying into effect useful and practical measures. It was on the other hand, quite as probable that they might make common cause with the Colonels, and insist upon the reactionary and anti-European schemes of the so-called National Party. It might be taken for granted that they would be beset by intrigues proceeding from Constantinople, as well as from Egypt itself. In short, their meeting might put an end to the present apparent tranquility, and be the signal for a fresh and more serious crisis than that which had been recently tided over.³⁹

Therefore, Gambetta considered it urgently necessary to strengthen the authority of Tewfik Pasha.

Britain did not share Gambetta's uneasiness at the constitutional developments in Egypt, nor did she regard the convocation of the Chamber as an imminent danger to international engagements.⁴⁰ Gambetta, rebuffed by British coolness to his proposal, reacted by hardening his position and on December 26th, he invited the British to join in a declaration that the two powers were determined to uphold the Khedive's authority and support the Financial Control.⁴¹

Gambetta's anxiety over the convocation of the Chamber was shared by Sir Auckland Colvin, who addressed a memorandum to Lord Granville on the very same day, urging him to take immediate measures for the protection of all international engagements.⁴² Colvin

³⁹As quoted by E. Malet, op.cit., p. 213.

⁴⁰See chapter II, p. 15

⁴¹Robinson & Gallagher, op.cit., p. 96.

⁴²E. Malet, op.cit., p. 215.

maintained that the constitutional developments in Egypt

...will ultimately take the form of making the ministers responsible to the chamber and of giving the chamber the right to discuss and sanction the Budget. Therefore, Colvin urged that the two Governments should now, when the movement is in its infancy, state authoritatively that while leaving full liberty to the Egyptians to frame what measures they would please for their internal government so far as they are not inconsistent with the status acquired by the powers, they in no way renounce the national interest and the guarantees which they possess, and that it is their intention to maintain them.⁴³

These two pressures, combined with an English hope that a joint declaration might pacify all the concerned parties by preserving the status-quo, made Granville reconsider his earlier attitude towards Gambetta's proposal and finally to accept it.⁴⁴

⁴³loc. cit.

⁴⁴A. Ramm, op.cit., (Granville to Gladstone, January 2nd, 1882), p. 325.

II

THE JOINT NOTE

January 8th., 1882.

On December 26th 1881, the Chamber of Delegates was summoned to discuss the articles of the Organic law. The meeting was formally convened by the Khedive, whose attitude for the movement was somewhat altered, for as Malet reported to Lord Granville,

I found His Highness for the first time since September cheerful in mood and taking a hopeful view of the situation.¹

The only doubtful point was now the attitude of the deputies to the details of the Organic law. Cherif Pasha, the Prime Minister, had given the Chamber the right to discuss the budget but not to vote it. The Chamber was forbidden to discuss tribute due to the Sublime Porte, the service of the Public Debt, all matters relating to the Debt and resulting from the law of liquidation, or conventions existing between the foreign powers and the Egyptian Government.²

The Egyptian budget was at that time divided into two parts, one dealing with the revenues assigned to the payment of the interest on the Debt, and the other with the remainder of the revenues, which were left at the disposal of the Government. The Chamber of Notables claimed the right to vote the second part of the budget, and this was opposed by Cherif Pasha and the controllers, on the grounds that this would ultimately deprive them from having control over the finances

¹As quoted by W. Blunt, op.cit., p. 137.

²T. Rothstein, op.cit., p. 146.

of the country.³

Gladstone himself had sympathized with the nationalist aspiration for constitutional government and with their hatred of international control.

...I am not by any means pained, but I am much surprised at this rapid development of a national sentiment and party in Egypt. The very ideas of such a sentiment and the Egyptian people seemed quite incompatible. ... 'Egypt for the Egyptian' is the sentiment to which I should wish to give scope: and could it prevail it would I think be the best, the only good solution for the 'Egyptian Question'.⁴

Gladstone doubted whether a true nationalist movement could in any case be halted for long. Like Malet, he regarded

...with the utmost apprehension a conflict between the Control and any sentiment truly national, with a persuasion that one way or other we should come to grief.⁵

Yet it was also clear from his letter, that Gladstone doubted the sincerity of the existing national sentiment in Egypt and suspected that the military was the active force behind it.⁶ Therefore, in further-ance with the policy of "intimidation by threat", the British Cabinet decided to confront the Nationalists, including the military

³E. Newman, op.cit., p. 68.

⁴A. Ramm, op.cit., (Gladstone to Granville, January 4th, 1882), p. 327.

⁵loc.cit.

⁶loc.cit.

party by accepting Gambetta's proposal for a joint note. It was hoped that the Note would sober Arabi and the Nationalists and restore their respect for the Khedive's authority, Europe's financial rights and the existing order of things.⁷

Was it the Cabinet's goal to prevent the Egyptian Chamber of Notables from discussing and voting on the budget? This was not the intention of Gladstone. On January 4th. he instructed Lord Granville in the following words:

...yet I think words might be added conveying the Malet an assurance of our reliance on him not to commit this country to a total or permanent exclusion of the Chamber from handling the Budget.⁸

Furthermore, when Gladstone was asked by Mr. Mollv in the House of Commons⁹ whether Her Majesty's Government action in Egypt was directed to prevent the Egyptian Chamber from exercising its right to vote its budget, Gladstone replied by stating that;

Undoubtedly, there has been no action on the part of the Government directed towards preventing the Egyptian chamber from exercising its right to vote its own budget. Of course, I do not mean to say what precise amount of control can be given to the Egyptian chamber because this depends on several reasons; first, the Egyptian people are the population of a province of a particular Empire and subject in the first place to the immediate rule of their own

⁷ibid., (Granville to Gladstone, Jan. 12, 1882), p. 328.

⁸ibid., (Gladstone to Granville, Jan. 4, 1882), p. 326.

⁹Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, Vol. 273, Cols. 151-54, August 11, 1882.

local ruler. Second, they have obligations arising out of matters connecting them with foreign countries which rest upon right long incorporated with the constitution of Egypt and lastly with the sovereignty of the Sultan.¹⁰

The Joint Note was then accepted by the British Government, because it was essential, in view of Gambetta's determination, to keep in step with France and preserve the concert which was being endangered by Bismarck's pro-French policy.¹¹ Accord with France was necessary to preclude unilateral French action, which would threaten British interests in Egypt especially the Suez Canal. For Britain's policy was still a policy of no direct intervention either jointly or separately in Egyptian affairs.¹²

Above all, the Joint Note did not bind Great Britain to any particular course of action or indeed to any action whatsoever.

"Her Majesty's Government", Granville wrote Lyons:

Assented to the draft declaration with the reservation that they must not be considered as committing themselves, thereby to any action, if action should be necessary.¹³

Gambetta observed with pleasure:

...that the only reservation of the Government of the Queen, is as to the mode of action to be employed by the two countries when action is considered necessary and this is a reservation in which we participate.¹⁴

¹⁰ ibid., Col. 1536.

¹¹ A. Ramm, op. cit., (Granville to Gladstone, Jan. 12th, 1882), p. 328.

¹² loc. cit.

¹³ Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, Vol. 271, Col. 377, June 26, 82.

¹⁴ loc. cit.

On January 8th, the Joint Note was delivered to the Khedive by the representatives of England and France at Cairo.¹⁵ The aim was to convey collectively to Tewfik Pasha the two Governments' guarantee to maintain His position as Khedive on the terms laid down by Imperial Turkish Firmans and officially recognized by the two governments. It was stated that the two Governments, being closely associated in their resolve to guard by their united efforts against all complications, internal or external which might menace the order of things, did not doubt that the public assurance of their intentions avert the dangers to which the Government of the Khedive might be exposed. And which would certainly find England and France united to oppose them.¹⁵ At Cairo,

The Joint Note fell like a bombshell. Nobody there had expected any such declaration, and nobody was aware of any reason why it should have been launched. What was felt was that so serious a step on such a delicate ground could not have been adopted without deliberate calculations, nor without some grave intention. The Note was, therefore, taken to mean that the Sultan was to be thrust still further in the background, that the Khedive was to become more plainly the puppet of England and France, and that Egypt would sooner or later in some shape or another be made to share the fate of Tunis. The present effect was, therefore, mischievous in the highest degree. The Khedive was encouraged in his opposition to the sentiments of his chamber. The military, national, or populous party was alarmed. The Sultan was irritated. The other European powers were made uneasy.

¹⁵For full text see Appendix III.

Every element of disturbance was roused into action.¹⁶

Malet nearly had the same thing to say on the effect of the Joint Note,

All seemed to promise to go smoothly until the collective note was presented. Since then, the idea having spread that we intend intervention, nothing has been heard of but Arabi Bey and his redoubtable colonels.¹⁷

Moreover, the fact that the Joint Note was interpreted in Egypt as an attempt made by the two powers to suppress the new Organic law did not escape the attention of Malet who again on January 11th, wrote Granville;

...It must be borne in mind that the Egyptians have distinctly, for good or evil entered into a constitutional path. That the organic law of the chamber in their charter of liberties... The chamber exists and will continue to do so, unless, it is forcibly suppressed which can only be done by intervention, and this is a last resort.¹⁸

But Gladstone did not want intervention and still hoped to effect a compromise between the demand made by the Notables to vote the budget and Gambetta's resolute stand against giving the Chamber any such right;

I suppose we ought to make our way to a part concession, with adequate reserves, for if they admit, the Chamber, in good faith the international engagements, as a preliminary, might not a compromise then be considered.¹⁹

¹⁶John Morley, The Life Of William Ewart Gladstone, (London, Macmillan, 1903), pp. 75-76.

¹⁷E. Malet, op.cit., p. 229.

¹⁸ibid., p. 239.

¹⁹A. Ramm, op.cit., (Gladstone to Granville Jan. 17, 1882), p. 330.

In these words Gladstone outlined his position on January 17th.

Neither the Chamber nor Gambetta were willing to concur with Gladstone's wish for a compromise. In Egypt a rupture between the ministry of Cherif Pasha and the Notables became imminent.²⁰ This became inevitable when the two consuls sent another note to the Khedive on January 26th, asking him not to give the Chamber the right to decide on the budget.²¹ Cherif's ministry, which was under constant pressure from the French and British Consuls to reject the demand of the Chamber, was forced to resign on February 2nd.²²

Therefore, the Joint Note created an unfavourable effect which was not expected by Britain.²³ It led to the strengthening of Arabi who became the Minister of War in the new ministry formed by Mahmud Sami al Barudi and strengthened the cause of the Chamber who in accordance to article thirty five of the approved new Organic Law obtained the right to vote the budget.²⁴

In a word, the Joint Note failed. To enforce it meant armed intervention, but Great Britain remained opposed to armed intervention whether singly or jointly and saw objections to every kind of intervention;

²⁰T. Rothstein, op.cit., p. 165.

²¹loc.cit.

²²A.R. Rafii, op.cit., p. 201.

²³A. Ramm, op.cit., (Granville to Gladstone, Jan. 12, 1882), p. 328.

²⁴W. Blunt, op.cit., Appendix III, p. 394.

M. Gambetta would probably desire joint intervention, the objections to this are immense...single occupation by England or by France, still more so. Turkish occupation under...control by France and England although a great evil would not be less bad than the three alternatives I have mentioned.²⁵

The concert was confronting formidable difficulties. Granville for a time contemplated the idea of Anglo-French intervention under a mandate from the Concert of Europe.²⁶ But Lyon warned Granville that the French reaction against calling in other powers would be so violent that the accord would be broken

...for this would give rise to suspicion that we were trying to use the other powers for the purpose ousting France from Egypt.²⁷

Furthermore, the Joint Note failed because Lord Granville himself had little faith in its practical value. In his despatch of January 17th to the French Foreign Ministry reported that Granville thought of the Note as "a Platonic encouragement not conveying the promise of any action."

In the last days of January, British anxiety and fear that Gambetta might steal a march against them in Egypt faded as the French Government was tottering.²⁹ On January 21st, Granville wrote privately to Gladstone:

²⁵As quoted by Robinson & Gallagher, op. cit., (Granville to Lyon, January 17th), p. 99.

²⁶loc. cit.

²⁷As cited by ibid., p. 99.

²⁸Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, Vo. 271, Col. 272, June 29, 1882.

²⁹Robinson and Gallagher, op. cit., p. 99.

I doubt his having recourse to the desperate steps of anticipating us by a French occupation. It is very desirable that Gambetta should know that we object to joint intervention and have a slight leaning to Turkish aid.³⁰

In early February there was a French policy shift. Freycinet supplanted Gambetta and the French attitude towards Egypt drew closer to the British.³¹ Immediately after Freycinet took over the Foreign Ministry, Granville approached him on the subject of Egypt, and specifically on the question of sending Turkish troops there. Freycinet opposed intervention of any kind and especially Turkish intervention.³² Granville was relieved by Freycinet's attitude. Both countries at this stage saw no reason for intervention since the new government in Egypt had promised to respect all international engagements including the arrangements pertaining to the Public Debt.³³

But England now decided on precautions for future eventualities. Gladstone and Granville contemplated the idea of bringing the subject of Egypt before a European conference, firstly to free themselves from such a large responsibility for the 'Egyptian Problem' and secondly to weaken the possibilities of unilateral intervention.³⁴

³⁰A. Ramm, op. cit., (Granville to Gladstone, January 21, 1882), p. 334.

³¹Robinson and Gallagher, op. cit., p. 99.

³²T. Rothstein, op. cit., p. 173.

³³ibid., p. 174

³⁴loc. cit.

The idea of a European conference was implied in Malet's letter of January 20th, as one possibility to resolve the feud that existed between Cherif Pasha and the notables over the question of the Budget;

...I think that the chamber would listen to reason if the Great powers would listen to reason. If the Great powers were to refuse to consent to the transfer of power to the chamber but to state that, while otherwise maintaining the status-quo, they will guarantee a constitution compatible with international engagements and will take steps to come to an agreement on the subject. I think that this is the only way out of a situation which is rapidly leading both us and the Egyptians to extremities.³⁵

Freycinet accepted Granville's proposal and both Governments agreed to send a note to the powers of Europe asking them if they were willing to come to an agreement over the Egyptian Question.³⁶ Granville rejoiced at the French acceptance of his proposal and on February 10th, he told Malet;

...you will be glad that all questions of immediate occupation by us and the French is to an end. I hope it will not be necessary to have the Turks in. It is the lesser evil but a great one. You see the French have agreed to some communication with the powers - if these behave well, which of course is a question, will Arabi venture to stand against such a phalanx?³⁷

³⁵ Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, Vol. 273, Col. 1932, August 16, 1882.

³⁶ T. Rothstein, op. cit., p. 174.

³⁷ E. Malet, op. cit., p. 263.

III

FROM THE ULTIMATUM

To

THE RIOTS AT ALEXANDRIA

Following the constitutional strife, the state of affairs of Egypt seemed to run smoothly, but appearances were misleading. Britain and France in the course of April discussed the possibility of deposing Tewfik and giving the throne to Prince Halim as one of the means of resolving the struggle for power between Arabi and Khedive.¹ Nothing however, came out of this plan; first, because the French refused to communicate their proposal for constitutional settlement to the Sultan² and secondly because of the discovery of the Circassian plot, which threw Egypt again into a sea of troubles.

On April 25th, the Circassian plot,³ aimed at the life of Arabi was frustrated. The conspirators including the former minister of war Osman Rifqi and thirty nine other Circassian officers were tried by a secret court martial, found guilty and condemned to exile on the White Nile.⁴ On May 2nd, the Khedive, pressed by Arabi to sign the sentences of exile on the Circassian officers, called upon Malet for advice. Malet's counsel, fortified by a promise of English support, was to refuse to sign the verdict.⁵ Indeed, Malet and the Khedive found that the verdict was too severe, virtually equivalent to the death

¹A. Ramm, op.cit., (Gladstone to Granville, April 5th, 1882), p. 354.

²loc.cit.

³For full account see al Waga'ya' al Misriyeh, May 22, 1882.

⁴loc.cit.

⁵E. Malet, op.cit., p. 293.

penalty.⁶

The refusal, aggravated by the fact that it had been suggested by a foreign consul created hostility between the ministry of al-Barudi and the Khedive.⁷ Letters were sent by the Prime Minister to the members of the Chamber, requesting their attendance at Cairo, a large number of them came and met in the House of the Speaker of the Chamber, Sultan Pasha. It was resolved, by forty-five votes to thirty, that if Tewfik persisted in intriguing with the French and British Consuls against them, there was no alternative to deposing him.⁸

The meeting was unconstitutional, but posed a grave threat. Malet once more intervened to suggest that a Turkish commissioner should be invited to arbitrate between the Arabi faction and the Khedive. He added that a naval demonstration would be needed to enforce the Commissioner's decision.⁹ But Freycinet continued to object to Turkish intervention. Granville then proposed sending a Turkish general to restore discipline in the Egyptian army by 'moral force'.¹⁰ Again the French refused the idea and instead suggested the assignment of two generals, one British and the other French.¹¹

⁶ ibid., p. 303.

⁷ W. Blunt, op.cit., pp. 204-205.

⁸ loc.cit.

⁹ E. Malet, op.cit., p. 299.

¹⁰ A. Ramm, op.cit., (Granville to Gladstone, April 22nd, 1882), p. 363.

¹¹ loc.cit.

Granville finally compromised on the despatch of three generals, one Turkish, one French, and one British,¹² but had no illusions about their ending the crisis. He only wanted to show that Britain and France continued to act together. "If the French agree", he told Gladstone, "It would have good moral effect to be able to contradict Bismarck and to say that the two powers are quite agreed."¹³

Early in May the French, fearing that Bismarck might push the Turks to intervene in Egypt, pressed the British for joint action.¹⁴ On May 12th, Freycinet suggested a plan which closely resembled that of Malet. He agreed on an Anglo-French naval demonstration, while maintaining his objections to independent Turkish action.¹⁵ While accepting the French position on naval measures, the British once more noted that the consequences might call for armed intervention, which should it become necessary, should be by Turkish troops.¹⁶

Freycinet's proposal was in fact a compromise which held out two principal advantages to the British; the continuance of Anglo-French cooperation and a reduced possibility of unilateral occupation.¹⁷

¹²loc.cit.

¹³loc.cit.

¹⁴Robinson and Gallagher, op.cit., p. 102.

¹⁵loc.cit.

¹⁶A. Ramm, op.cit., (Gladstone to Granville, May 14, 1882), p. 369.

¹⁷Robinson and Gallagher, op.cit., p. 104.

On May 15th, the joint squadron, consisting of two ironclads, two smaller ships and two gunboats, was despatched to Alexandria.¹⁸ According to a statement made to the House of Commons by Sir Charles Dilke, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the action was taken:

...to protect life and property, and we hope that its presence there will contribute without the employment of force, to the maintenance of the status-quo in Egypt, of the sovereignty of the Sultan, of the position of the Khedive and of the liberties of the Egyptian people, as well as to the prudent development of their institutions and to the observance of the international engagements of Egypt.¹⁹

The instructions to Admiral Seymour, commanding the joint squadron, were in this spirit. He was instructed to communicate with the British Consul General upon arrival at Alexandria and in concert with him and in cooperation with the naval forces of France, support Khedival and foreign interests. A landing force was authorized, but restricted to the field of fire upon to naval gunnery without additional instructions from London.²⁰ The fleet arrived at Alexandria on May 17th.²¹

On May 24th, the British once more called upon France to join with them in inviting Turkey to send troops.²² Freycinet wavered and refused, instead proposed an Anglo-French forces. Granville immediately

¹⁸A. Broadley, op.cit., p. 87.

¹⁹Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, Vol. 269, Col. 1404-5, May 23, 1882.

²⁰ibid., Vol. 272, Col. 286, July 13, 1882.

²¹A.R. Rafii, op.cit., p. 269.

²²Robinson and Gallagher, op.cit., p. 103.

returned a negative reply.²³

Nevertheless, and despite this change of policy on the part of Freycinet, both countries decided to make the best of the naval demonstration. On May 25th, both countries delivered the Khedive ultimatums demanding; (1) The retirement of Arabi from Egypt, (2) The retirement of Ali Fehmi Pasha and Abdul Aal to the interior and (3) The resignation of the ministry of Mahmud Sami al-Barudi.²⁴

Thus were the architects of the Revolution of September 9th, openly challenged. The naval demonstration was intended by Granville as a 'brutum fulmen', which was to achieve acquiescence to Anglo-French demands without recourse to violence. The ultimatum was rejected immediately by the Egyptian ministry in letters sent to the British and French Consuls at Cairo. The ministry accused both countries of encroachment on Egypt's recognized rights and of interference in its internal private affairs.²⁵ On the same day, the ministry presented its resignation to the Khedive in protest against the Khedive's acceptance of the terms of the ultimatum.²⁶

At this juncture Gladstone, after agreement with Sir Stratford Northcote, leader of the opposition, brought about an adjournment of the Commons to avoid inconvenient questions during this most critical

²³ loc.cit.

²⁴ U.A.R. al Qadiyeh al Misriyeh 1882-1954, (Cairo: 1955), p. 3.
See also E. Malet, op.cit., p. 359. For full text see Appendix IV.

²⁵ ibid., p. 4 (For full text see Appendix V).

²⁶ ibid., pp. 4-5.

period.²⁷ But the actual motion for adjournment permitted back-benchers in opposing the motion, to raise questions about government policy on Egypt.²⁸

Three important themes appeared in this short debate. The first was expressed by Sir Wilfrid Lawson²⁹ who spoke vehemently against a policy of cooperation with the Ottoman Empire, for a policy of non-intervention and asked the government for assurances that no warlike steps should be taken in Egypt during the period of adjournment.³⁰

The second was expressed by Joseph Cowen³¹ who spoke forcefully against cooperation with France:

²⁷A. Ramm, op.cit., (Granville to Gladstone, footnote 2, May 25th, 1882), p. 373.

²⁸Parliamentary Debates, 3d. series, Vol. 269 Cols. 1711-1732, May 26, 1882.

²⁹Sir Wilfrid Lawson (1829-1906), English politician and an extreme radical. He was first elected to Parliament in 1859 for Carlisle, lost his seat in 1865, but in 1868 was returned again as supporter of Gladstone and was member till 1885. From 1886-1900 he represented in Parliament the New Cocker-mouth division of Cumberland. In 1903 he was returned for the Camborne division of Cornwall and in 1906 he was once more elected for his old constituency in Cumberland. (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th edition, 1910-11, V. 15-16 p. 310)

³⁰Parliamentary Debates, 3d Series, Vol. 269, Col. 1711, May 26, 1882.

³¹Joseph Cowen (1831-1900) English politician and journalist. In 1874 was elected member of Parliament for the borough (Newcastle on Tyne) on the death of his father who had held the seat as liberal since 1865. (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th edition, 1910-11, Vol. 7-8, p. 346.)

...whose designs were different to ours if not hostile to them. England unlike France" he contended, "was not seeking for conquest, all that she required was to maintain her road to the east. While France is striving to assert her supremacy along the whole of the northern coast of Africa. It was her disguised aim to make the Mediterranean a French lake.³²

The third theme was a call for the ministry to take its hand off Egypt and set Egypt free to determining her own internal affairs. This policy was again echoed by Joseph Cowen who had stated

That Egypt had a right to manage her own affairs, we were not concerned to interfere, except in so far as our interest in the Suez Canal was endangered.³³

Sir Wilfrid Lawson who shared this view had this to say:

...I do honestly think it would be a great deal better for us to obtain the pacification of Ireland before we set work on the regeneration of Egypt.³⁴

³² ibid., Col. 1722.

³³ ibid., Col. 1723.

³⁴ ibid., Col. 1711. Gladstone's second ministry (1880-1885) was faced with formidable problems in Ireland. Gladstone's Land Act of 1881, giving fair rents and security of tenure did not solve the land question, still less break up the formidable union of land agitation with political demand for Home Rule, which Parnell new policy of 'obstruction' was forcing on the notice of the British House of Commons. The agrarian - Nationalist revolution in Ireland provided the Central issue for the clashes between Radicals and Whigs. Radicals and moderate liberals insisted upon liberal land and local government legislation to keep peace and reduce the distress of Irish tenantry, the Whigs, Hartington, Spencer and Argyll, backed by Tory majority in the Lords, demanded that order be restored and property protected by means of coercive emergency powers. This dispute was responsible for the overthrow of the ministry in 1885 and for the schism in the liberal party in 1885-1886. Benian et.al. (eds.) The Cambridge History of The British Empire, Vol. 3, (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1959), p. 131.

Gladstone maintained that his government could not have its hands tied on the Egyptian Question. He argued strongly for a policy of maintaining the integrity and sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire

...that with regard to the sovereignty of the Sultan, in our opinion it ought to be respected when it is not abused and it is part of our duty to respect it. Any attempt to disturb it in our opinion would not be wise, would not be consistent with good faith, would not be consistent with the views of the other powers of Europe.³⁵

Gladstone's change of attitude with regard to co-operation with the Ottoman Empire, was necessitated by political developments in Europe. In June, 1881 Bismarck at last managed to revive the Three Emperor's League - dissolved after the Congress of Berlin.³⁶ Before that date he had needed to promote the collaboration of France and England in order to prevent France from drifting into dependence on Russia.³⁷ Having secured the alliance, he felt free to oppose French initiative in Egypt, and, though he approved the French occupation of Tunisia, he wanted Britain and not France to play the leading role in Egypt, in the hope of keeping the two powers divided.³⁸

³⁵ ibid., Col. 1716.

³⁶ William Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890, (New York, Knopf, 1950), pp. 197-212.

³⁷ ibid., p. 267.

³⁸ ibid., pp. 277-278.

More important however, was the change of front by the other European powers after the delivery of the Joint Note. On February 2nd, 1882, they issued identical notes to the Sultan declaring that the status-quo in Egypt should not be modified without previous understanding between the Great Powers and Turkey.³⁹

This action on the part of the Great Powers encouraged the English with respect to their real preference for an international rather than a dual solution, which was the beginning of the breach between England and France.⁴⁰ But this breach was widened as the result of yet another complication: indecisiveness on the part of France. Freycinet had little of Gambetta's determination to keep the initiative.⁴¹

By the first of June, it was generally acknowledged that the policy of intimidation by mere threat had ignominiously failed. The ultimatum had clearly demanded that Arabi should leave Egypt, and not only had Arabi refused to comply, but the Khedive had been obliged under popular pressure to reinstate him with greater powers.⁴² The

³⁹ ibid., p. 261.

⁴⁰ E. Benian et.al (eds.), The Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. 3, (Cambridge: University Press, 1959), p. 111.

⁴¹ loc.cit.

⁴² E. Malet, op.cit., pp. 370-371.

British ministry therefore had three choices; either to withdraw without further reference to the situation, or to exact the fulfillment of the ultimatum by force, or to attempt to use the Porte as the instrument for satisfactorily resolving the crisis.

England had chosen the third alternative. On May 29th, Gladstone told Granville privately:

I suppose we have no alternative but to preserve and urge decisively Turkish action, with France or even without her."⁴³ For according to Gladstone: "...if Freycinet...lags behind he will find himself in self-wrought isolation for now that Arabi is in power and in full revolt against the Khedive, we must revert to our proposal and invite the Sultan's troops."⁴⁴

Moreover, in the Cabinet some ministers began to have second thoughts on the value of an Anglo-French concert on Egypt. Hartington, the Secretary of State for India took the Foreign Minister to task for failing to get the French to agree to Turkish military preparations in support of the joint naval demonstration at Alexandria. But the Secretary for India's chief complaint was against the French:⁴⁵

⁴³A. Ramm, op.cit., (Gladstone to Granville May 29th 1882), p. 375.

⁴⁴loc.cit.

⁴⁵Meanwhile, the Indian Empire seemed to be endangered by Russian expansion in Central Asia toward the North West Frontier, and on the North East by French designs upon Burma, Siam and Indo-China. Suez, 'The Spinal cord of the Empire' was threatened by possible Franco-Russian naval hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean and by the prevailing Egyptian crisis which invited the interposition of the continent power across Egypt to India. Benian et.al. (eds.), The Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. 3, (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1959), pp. 145-6.

The French seem to be behaving worse than badly. Freycinet's communication...appears to be nothing less than a breach of faith... Unless the French keep their word to us and are prepared to go in for Turkish intervention at once, we had much better cut loose from them. What is the use of such allies? They have brought us into the frightful mess we are in, and I believe it would be easier to act with the Turks, and with the whole of the remaining European powers, than with them alone.⁴⁶

From this time onward, the heir to the Duchy of Devonshire was to have as much influence upon Egyptian policy as Gladstone and Granville. The Secretary for India distrusted Gladstone's sentimental Cobdenite notions of foreign policy as a danger to the national interests abroad; and he disliked almost as much Granville's appeasement of France.⁴⁷ Convinced that British supremacy in India and in the Mediterranean was now at stake in Egypt, he was determined that the Egyptians should not be permitted any longer to endanger a vital Imperial interest and that no longer should Britain's weakness in dealing with the French, the Turk and the Egyptian flaw her strength in the world.⁴⁸

A Commissioner was consequently asked for at Constantinople. The request, although made by the Khedive, was suggested by Granville.⁴⁹ In June, the necessity for action became so urgent that Granville, without even consulting Paris, telegraphed Dufferin that "Her Majesty's

⁴⁶As quoted by Robinson and Gallagher, op.cit., p. 106.

⁴⁷loc.cit.

⁴⁸loc.cit.

⁴⁹T. Rothstein, op.cit., pp. 196-197.

Government considered it most desirable that no time should be lost by the Sultan, who should send an order to support the Khedive, to reject the accusation of the fallen Ministry with regard to His Highness, and to order the three military chiefs, and perhaps also the ex-President of the Council, to come to explain their conduct at Constantinople."⁵⁰ Freycinet agreed to this course, but he did so with reluctance.⁵¹

After much vacillation, the Sultan, finally sent two envoys. The visit of Dervish Pasha⁵² and Sheikh Ahmed Assad, the religious sheikh of one of the tarikats at Medina proved to be unsuccessful.⁵³ Immediately after his arrival at Cairo on June 8th, Dervish Pasha outlined his program for resolving the problem in a meeting with Arabi on June 10th.⁵⁴ Dervish Pasha asked Arabi to resign his military position temporarily and to go to Constantinople as a preliminary step towards setting the difficulties.⁵⁵ Dervish's program bore the imprint of Granville.

⁵⁰P. Newman, op.cit., p. 75.

⁵¹loc.cit.

⁵²Dervish Pasha was the military officer in command of the campaign of 1862 against Montenegro and was appointed Governor General and Commander-in-Chief in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He lost this post however, after the revolution of 1875. In 1877 he received command of the troops stationed at Batum and was able to keep the Russians in check. At the end of the war (1877-8) he was sent against the Albanians. Died in 1896. Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. 1 Leyden: 1913, pp. 950-51.

⁵³P. Newman, op.cit., p. 75.

⁵⁴A.R. Rafii, op.cit. p. 288.

⁵⁵loc.cit.

However, nothing substantial came out of the meeting. Arabi refused to depart at that stage for Constantinople, out of fear of being prevented from returning. He argued that his presence in Egypt was essential since he had assumed the great responsibility of preserving the lives and property of the foreigners, a pledge he gave to the foreign consuls at Cairo.⁵⁶

One day after this meeting, a bloody riot occurred at Alexandria, originating in a quarrel between an Egyptian donkey boy and a Maltese. The riot spread to include the native inhabitants and the foreign population.⁵⁷ Alexandria, more a Mediterranean than an Egyptian city, had a large foreign population numbering about sixty eight thousands.⁵⁸ The riot lasted for about four hours, and a total of over fifty persons lost their lives from both sides.⁵⁹

The deeper causes for the riot remain a subject of controversy. Doubtless, feelings of hostility between the native and foreign populations at this time were aggravated by the presence of the fleet and by the

⁵⁶E. Malet, op.cit., p. 383.

⁵⁷A.R. Rafii, op.cit., p. 291.

⁵⁸Made up of the following nationalities; 30,000 Greeks, 15,000 French, 15,000 Italians, 4,000 British and 4,000 Austrian and German subjects. Parl. Deb. op.cit., vol. 270, col. 1257, June 15th, 1882.

Ali Pasha Mubarak in his 3 volumes book, Khitat al Tewfikiyeh al Jadida, stated that the number of foreigners in Alexandria alone was in 1872, 47, 316, Cairo, 19, 120 and al Wagh al Bahri 13, 260. The total population of foreigners was therefore 79, 696. The native population of Alexandria in 1872 was about 164, 727. The total population of Alexandria was therefore 212, 043. Ali Pasha Mubarak, Khitat al Tewfikiyeh al Jadida, (Cairo: Boulaq Press 1887), vol. 7, p. 65.

insecurity generated by recent developments at Cairo.⁶⁰ It is interesting to note that Malet wrote Granville on the eve of the arrival of the fleet that

...political advantage of the arrival of the fleet is so great as to override the danger it might possibly cause to Europeans at Cairo.⁶¹

But who was ultimately responsible for the riots? Cromer maintained that Arabi and his friends were responsible for the massacre; because Arabi had encouraged sectarian feelings at Alexandria.⁶² Egyptian historians along with European writers believed that the riot if not actually instigated by the governor of Alexandria Omer Lutfi, at least was encouraged by him. Omer Lutfi according to Sir Wilfrid Blunt,

...was opposed to the national movement, enemy to Arabi and a member of the Court Party.⁶³

His aim was to discredit Arabi by showing that he was unable to protect the lives and property of the Europeans, incapable of maintaining order in the country, thus making European intervention necessary.⁶⁴

Theodore Rothstein in Egypt's Ruin, maintained that Omer Lutfi was implicated in the whole affair.⁶⁵ He quoted a telegram sent by the Khedive to Omer Lutfi on June 3rd, stating that "Arabi had pledged

⁶⁰ A.R. Raffi, op.cit., p. 302.

⁶¹ ibid., p. 325.

⁶² Earl of Cromer, (trans. in Arabic), Thawrat Arabi, (Cairo: n.d.) p. 184.

⁶³ W. Blunt, op.cit., p. 236.

⁶⁴ T. Rothstein, op.cit., p. 199.

⁶⁵ ibid., pp. 198-200.

himself in presence of the Foreign Consuls for preserving the lives of the Europeans. If he succeeds, his prestige will be enhanced and ours will be diminished. The fleet is present, the feelings of the inhabitants native and foreign are excited and a clash between them is not far away. Therefore, choose the man you want to serve."⁶⁶

Moreover, Theodore Rothstein mentioned a meeting held at Cairo on June 9th, and attended personally by Omer Lutfi, to decide on the date and the final arrangements of the riot.⁶⁷

The Alexandria riot was a watershed in Egypt's history. England pressed France to join in preparing Turkish intervention with a mandate from the concert of Europe.⁶⁸ In London, several ministers placed upon Arabi the blame for the massacre and for the spread of anarchy in other parts of Egypt.⁶⁹ The exodus of the foreigners strengthened this attitude, for after the riot more than forty thousand left Alexandria. The question of safety of the Europeans in the interior became a paramount issue.⁷⁰ Gladstone, Chamberlain and Dilke were convinced that Arabi had thrown off the mask and stood exposed as a

⁶⁶ ibid., p. 200. The content of the telegram was disclosed for the first time in 1883 by Randolph Churchill before the House of Commons Rothstein, op.cit., p. 200. See also Amin Said, op.cit., p. 121.

⁶⁷ loc.cit.

⁶⁸ Robinson and Gallagher, op.cit., p. 104.

⁶⁹ Robinson and Gallagher, op.cit., p.

⁷⁰ E. Malet, op.cit., pp. 415-424.

military adventurer.⁷¹ Hartington, Northbrook, First Lord of the admiralty and Kimberley, Secretary of the State for Colonies joined to press for military measures to protect the Canal.⁷² They wanted above all some sort of effective action. Their spokesman, Hartington, wrote to Granville on June 19th:

I am afraid that we are going to give in and submit to a complete defeat in Egypt. I do not think that I can stomach this, whatever may be the risks of any other course.⁷³

His faction threatened to resign unless the Prime Minister and Granville dispatched some kind of expedition to Egypt.⁷⁴ A Turkish expedition would be the lesser evil, Hartington and Northbrook agreed; but they doubted whether it could come quickly and moreover, they suspected that the Sultan was making a bargain with Arabi.⁷⁵ If the Turks could not be brought in, then an Anglo-French expedition should be sent. If this did not work, Hartington was ready to send a British expedition.⁷⁶ He wrote

I believe it would now be the best chance of stimulating the Turks, France and the other powers to some effective action, and if it fails

⁷¹A. Ramm, op.cit., (Gladstone to Granville, June 2nd 1882), p. 378. See also Robinson and Gallagher, op.cit., p. 107.

⁷²Robinson and Gallagher, op.cit., p. 107.

⁷³loc.cit.

⁷⁴loc.cit.

⁷⁵loc.cit. The decoration of Arabi by the Sultan caused this suspicion. A.R. Rafii, op.cit., p. 288.

⁷⁶loc.cit.

in this, the sooner we are prepared to act the better.⁷⁷

Yet Gladstone and Granville continued to base their policy on their hopes for Turkish intervention, while on June 21st, the Cabinet asked the Conference of European powers which met on June 23rd, to authorize military intervention other than Turkish, in case if the Sultan declined to send troops to Egypt.⁷⁸ This was another attempt to secure the Porte's support for an expedition by a veiled threat.

Gladstone and Granville also hoped that this decision would quench the thirst of Hartington and other cabinet ministers for intervention. Granville summed up his position when he wrote on June 22nd;

I am ready to go to any lengths for reparation, and I set great store about making the Canal safe. But I own to dreadful alarm at occupying Egypt militarily and politically with the French. I think the majority of the Cabinet would rather like to do so this... it is nasty business, and we have been much out of luck.⁷⁹

When the Conference, called by France, met at Constantinople on June 23rd, hopes for Turkish intervention were still entertained by Granville who stated:

"It is quite on the cards that the Sultan may send troops after all."⁸⁰

⁷⁷As quoted by ibid., pp. 107-108.

⁷⁸A. Ramm, op.cit., (Memorandum by Mr. Gladstone June 21st, 1882) p. 381.

⁷⁹As quoted by Robinson and Gallagher, op.cit., pp. 108-9.

⁸⁰ibid.

IV

THE CONFERENCE

AND

THE BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA

On June 23rd, 1882, the conference which was proposed by France and assented to by the other European powers (except Turkey) assembled at Constantinople. The basic aims of the conference were outlined by Sir Charles Dilke in the House of Commons as being:

The maintenance of the sovereignty of the Sultan, and of the Khedive, the upholding of the international engagements and the arrangements existing under them. The preservation of the liberties secured by the firmans of the Sultan, together with the prudent development of the Egyptian institutions and the settlement of the measures necessary to restore order.¹

France saw the conference as the surest means of blocking Ottoman action on the British invitation to take measures to check the revolutionary party of Egypt by force of arms.²

Gladstone's Government had suggested to the Sultan;

That it is desirable under the new aspects of affairs that the flag of Turkey should be displayed in Egyptian waters and that a Turkish man of war should convey a commission to Egypt.³

The Porte did not object to intervention, but opposed action on what amounted to an internal matter under a mandate from the concert of Europe.⁴ This was the basis for the Porte's refusal to participate

¹Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, vol. 269, col. 1779, June 1st, 1882.

²T. Rothstein, op.cit., p. 197.

³Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, vol. 269, col. 1779, June 1st, 1882.

⁴A. Ramm, op.cit., (Gladstone to Granville, July 13th, 1882), p. 393.

in the conference. Said Pasha, the Foreign Minister of the Porte in conversations with each of the Ambassadors at Constantinople,

...gave unequivocal, categorical refusals to attend the Conference on the grounds that such an assembly was unnecessary, inopportune and inconsistent with the interests of Turkey.⁵

Said Pasha went further and accused

...the French and the British governments of interfering in the affairs of the subjects of the Sultan and that both countries committed an error in twice sending fleets to Alexandria without first consulting us, if they hazard last blunder, that is, Conference, it will be le couronnement de la betise.⁶

The Sultan's refusal to take part in the deliberations of the conference in a sense, stimulated Gladstone's fond hopes for a Turkish expedition, under some form of mandate from the powers, thus avoiding either unilateral British military action or joint measures with France. Gladstone therefore instructed Dufferin to observe the following:

1. Propose in Conference that Sultan should send troops. 2. Support proposal with reasons. 3. Intimate that if Conference decline, or if Sultan decline, we shall invite Conference to concert effectual means for the reestablishment of legality and security in Egypt. 4. So far as we can at present Judge, the form of this invitation will be to ask the powers to provide for or sanction a military intervention

⁵As cited in Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, vol. 272, col. 1879. July 20th, 1882.

⁶loc.cit.

other than Turkish under their authority.⁷

By June 21st, it was evident that only Hartington favoured direct intervention in Egypt. Occupation was not even considered. Indeed, Gladstone and Granville rejected out of hand the Sultan's offer on June 25th to virtually hand over the protectorate of Egypt to Britain alone,⁸ which on the Turkish side was a rather superfluous attempt to divide the powers. Without conferring with his cabinet, Gladstone immediately rejected the offer. He noted that Britain was opposed to any single power having a preponderant influence, his desire being to maintain the status-quo with relatively minor modifications.⁹

On July 1st, in a letter to Granville, Gladstone laid down the points on which the Cabinet had agreed.¹⁰ They would demand reparations for the Alexandrian massacres. No precise Egyptian policy was to be decided upon until the conference had dealt with, or refused to deal with the problem. There would be no negotiation with Arabi apart from the Khedive, a rejection of Freycinet's proposal on talks with Arabi for settling the difficulties in Egypt. Lastly, the Cabinet stated its support for the instructions sent to Dufferin

⁷A. Ramm, op.cit., (Memorandum by Gladstone), p. 381.

⁸loc.cit., (Granville to Gladstone, June 25th, 1882).

⁹ibid., (Gladstone to Granville, footnote 2, June 25th, 1882), p. 382.

¹⁰ibid., (Gladstone to Granville, July 1st, 1882), p. 383.

on the day before the conference. At the end of his letter, Gladstone posed the following formidable question:

If neither Sultan, nor Conference, nor France, will act—and if the Khedive, really or ostensibly, settles his affairs with Arabi—and if we have no difficulty in dealing separately with the question of reparation—are we then, on our sole account, to undertake a military intervention to put Arabi down?

But this question has not yet, as it seems to me, arrived.¹¹

Meanwhile at Constantinople the conference, while regretting the absence of Turkey approved the self-denying protocol presented by the Italian Ambassador.¹² The Protocol stated:

The Governments represented by the undersigned engage themselves, in any arrangement which may be made in consequence of their concerted action for the regulation of the affairs of Egypt, not to seek any territorial advantage, nor any concession of any exclusive privilege, nor any commercial advantage for their subjects other than these which any other nation consequently obtain.¹³

However, the British Government insisted on excepting cases of force majeure which

Would compromise not only in danger to the Suez Canal, but any other unexpected change in the political situation in Egypt which might call for immediate action.¹⁴

On June 29th, the conference deliberated the main problem

¹¹ loc. cit.

¹² Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1891), Vol. 4, p. 3088.

¹³ loc. cit.

¹⁴ Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, Vol. 272, col. 1083, July 20th, 1882.

on its agenda; the possible despatch of Turkish troops to Egypt.¹⁵ On July 5th, the objects and conditions for such intervention were outlined. These were: (1), the maintenance of the status quo. (2), the limitation of the period of the occupation. (3), the payment of the expenses by Egypt. (4), the reorganization of the Army and (5), the obligation to observe these conditions.¹⁶ On July 15th, the identic notes signed by the Ambassadors attending the conference and embodying the British proposal for Turkish armed intervention in Egypt (under the conditions agreed upon on July 15th) were communicated to the Sultan.¹⁷

It was during the deliberations of the conference on the question of sending Turkish troops to Egypt that the bombardment of Alexandria took place.

The immediate cause of the bombardment was the erection of earth works commanding the entrance to Alexandria harbour.¹⁸ The erection of shore batteries stopped on June 6th due to the intervention of the Sultan, but work was nevertheless resumed at the beginning of July, threatening to the means of preventing access to the port and city.¹⁹

¹⁵ ibid., p. 3090.

¹⁶ loc. cit.

¹⁷ For full text see Appendix VI.

¹⁸ Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, vol. 271, col. 1940, July 10th, 1882.

¹⁹ loc. cit.

Admiral Seymour, anxious about the safety of his fleet asked permission to bombard if the work was not stopped. His letter of July 6th, to the military governer of Alexandria stated:

Sir, I have the honour to inform you that it has been officially reported to me that yesterday two more additional guns were mounted and that other war-like preparations are being made on the northern face of Alexandria against the squadron under my command. Under these circumstance I have to notify your excellency that unless such prodeedings be discontinued, or if, having been discontinued, they should be renewed, it will become of my duty to open fire on the works in course of construction.²⁰

To this letter a reply was received denying that such activity was taking place.²¹ The following day the Consuls General of the five powers addressed the Admiral to ask "Whether the admiral was satisfied with the reply of the Egyptian Government in reference to the fortification works."²² In case the reply should not be satisfactory, the Consuls General added:

We think we are in a position to obtain you more complete assurance.²³

To which the Admiral replied:

...I most strictly adhere to the terms of my communication sent to the military commandment should the slightest attempt be made to renew

²⁰loc.cit.

²¹loc.cit.

²²loc.cit.

²³loc.cit.

offensive works. In any case, twenty four hours notice shall be given.²⁴

It was observed on July 8th and 9th that more guns were being mounted.²⁵ Under these circumstances Admiral Seymour, with the approval of Her Majesty's Government, sent notice to the foreign consuls: "That at daylight of July 11th, his ships would commence fire unless the Ports on the Isthmus and those commanding the entrance to the harbour were temporarily surrendered for the purpose of being disarmed."²⁶

The terms of the ultimatum were not fulfilled and at 7 a.m. on July 11th, the British squadron opened fire on the ports. Action was ended at 5.30 p.m. of the same day.²⁷ On July 12th bombardment was resumed and continued sporadically until the next day when Seymour received instructions to open communications with the Khedive and invite him to assert his authority for restoring order in Alexandria. The Admiral was further authorized

...on invitation, or with concurrence with Khedive, or in the absence of any Egyptian authority in Alexandria you may land seamen and marines for police purposes to preserve order.²⁸

²⁴ loc.cit.

²⁵ ibid., col. 1941.

²⁶ loc.cit.

²⁷ ibid., vol. 272, col. 32, July 11th, 1882.

²⁸ ibid., col. 284.

It was evident that these instructions did not authorize or imply military occupation. Further measures were limited to police action. Indeed, Gladstone had with utmost reluctance authorized the execution of the ultimatum. Pressure on him had increased, for Hartington, Northbrook and Childers, holding portfolios for India, War and the Navy had become convinced of the necessity to land British troops and occupy the Suez Canal.²⁹

Dilke and Chamberlain insisted that Arabi must be removed from power. Granville agreed, and told Gladstone of his hope that a bombardment of Alexandria might break Arabi's power.³⁰

Gladstone therefore felt compelled to accept the bombardment plan, and informed Granville privately (on July 9th): I do not feel the necessity but I am willing to defer to your decision and judgements.³¹ Gladstone at heart considered the ultimatum to be unwise³² and felt that a military invasion could compel the defacto ruler of Egypt, Arabi, to react by blocking the Canal.³³ Secondly, he considered that England had no separate rights which justified the adoption of unilateral military measures in respect to this international waterway without

²⁹A. Ramm, op.cit., (Granville to Gladstone, July 5th, 1882), p. 385.

³⁰Robinson and Gallagher, op.cit., p. 113.

³¹A. Ramm, op.cit., (Gladstone to Granville, July 9th, 1882), p. 388

³²loc.cit.

³³ibid., (Gladstone to Granville, July 5th, 1882), p. 385.

prior reference to Europe. He felt that any assertion of separate rights with regard to the Suez Canal to be an act full of menace to the future peace of the world, likely to supply dangerous precedents which might be as easily applied to the Panama project, or to the Dardanelles and Bosphorus.³⁴

The British cannonade only strengthened Arabi's hold on the country. Anti-European riots spread from Alexandria to the interior, and Arabi proclaimed a holy war on the British.³⁵ The Khedive fled to Alexandria and placed himself under the protection of the fleet. His officials were driven from their posts in the Canal area and replaced by Arabi's colonels. In short the safety of the Canal seemed to be endangered.³⁶

Hartington once again took the lead. He proposed asking that the powers authorize unilateral British intervention, even at the cost of giving up any pretence of concert with France.³⁷ But the Prime Minister insisted upon action through the conference and with France, and his view prevailed. He told Granville:

I think you will probably still wish to work with the French but to avoid the danger of seeming to ask the Conference for a monopoly or privilege.³⁸

³⁴ ibid., p. 386.

³⁵ A.R. Rafii, op.cit., p. 390.

³⁶ Robinson and Gallagher, op.cit., p. 113.

³⁷ loc.cit.

³⁸ A. Ramm, op.cit., (Gladstone to Granville, July 14th, 1882), p. 396.

Gladstone however was in a highly difficult position when he faced the House of Commons on the following day. He defended the Government's action with his usual vigour, for he was now fully committed. The point of no return had been reached.

The operation of yesterday" Gladstone stated in a reply, was "strictly speaking one of self-defense, ...the government had no intentions to rule the people of Egypt still less to massacre them. ...We took upon the present conditions of things in Egypt as the prevalence of something which is not adequately described even by the unfavourable phrase of a military despotism, but it is not entitled to be called that, because a military despotism means, at any rate, a regular and regularly organized government, acting by some kind of law. That which prevails in Egypt at the present moment, however, is simply a state of military violence without any law whatever. And the question whether that state of military violence is agreeable to the people has not yet been answered. We know that this military violence is in defiance of the orders of the Sultan, the Khedive and the people of Egypt.³⁹

The argument that the action of the fleet was an act of self-defense did not appeal to the members of the House. Mr. O'Kelly⁴⁰ for example, doubted the fact that the fleet was in danger.

³⁹Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, vol. 271, col. 178. July 12th, 1882.

⁴⁰Mr. James O'Kelly, Irish statesman and a liberal; in 1881 elected member of Parliament for Roscommon Country.

...The fleet was not in danger from the guns at Alexandria, for our officers knew well before hand the capacity of the guns in the forts and that no one of them could have done any serious damage to the fleet. It was well known that the Egyptians had no fuses for their shells before the forts were attacked.⁴¹

Mr. Illingworth⁴² pursued the same theme in stating that:

...if the fleet was in danger he thought it might have been withdrawn--the action which had been taken he regarded most inconsiderate.⁴³

Dilke rose to defend the position of the Government, declaring that the bombardment was necessary for the safety of the fleet and strongly denying that hostilities had broken out.⁴⁴

Neither Dilke's defense nor the Prime Minister's statement held conviction convinced Mr. Richard.⁴⁵ His position was that

⁴¹Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, vol. 271, col. 182, July 12th, 1882.

⁴²Mr. Alfred Illingworth. English politician, a liberal, in 1881 elected member of Parliament for Bradford.

⁴³Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, vol. 272, col. 184, July 11th, 1882.

⁴⁴ibid., col 190.

⁴⁵Mr. Henry Richard (1812-1888), Welsh politician, chiefly known as the advocate of peace and arbitration. In 1848 he became secretary of the peace society and helped to organize a series of conferences in the capitals of Europe. In 1868 he was elected member of Parliament for the Merthyr borough and he remained in the house until his death in 1888.

(Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th edition, 1910-11, vols. 23-24 p. 297.)

if the bombardment was not an act of war, it was murder.⁴⁶

Chaos and anarchy beset Alexandria after the bombardment. The army withdrew, leaving the city in the hands of incendiaries who set the town on fire, while the mob pillaged and several murders were committed.⁴⁷

The complete breakdown of order and security generated questions concerning Admiral Seymour's failure to carry out his instructions, which were explicit on the means by which lives and property were to be protected. In accusing Admiral Seymour, Sir Henry Drummond-Wolff⁴⁸ noted that his instructions of May 15th, gave him the right to land forces to protect the Khedive. Sir Henry stated that no attempt was made to maintain order in the city after the incidents of July 11-13th.⁴⁹ Gladstone in reply denied that Admiral Seymour failed to follow instructions. He noted that the Royal Navy was directed to land a force, if required, to support the Khedive. The instructions, the Prime Minister stated were of conditional nature.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, vol. 271, cols. 196-197, July 11th, 1882.

⁴⁷ ibid., vol. 272, col. 255, July 13th, 1882.

⁴⁸ Sir Henry Drummond Wolff (1830-1908), an English diplomat and a Conservative politician. In 1880-85 he sat for Portsmouth. In 1886 he was sent as Minister to Tehran and from 1892-1900 he was Ambassador at Madrid. He was the founder of the Primrose League. (Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th edition 1910-11, vols. 27-28 p. 775.)

⁴⁹ Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, vol. 272, cols. 901-2, July, 18th 1882.

⁵⁰ ibid., col. 903.

By July 13th, Britain had found herself in a new situation. The French naval force had decamped on the eve of the bombardment, their government having previously informed the British Ambassador in Paris that the proposed operation would be an act of war against Egypt, and as such, without authorization by the Chamber of Deputies, would be in violation of the Constitution.⁵¹ European life and property were in peril everywhere in Egypt, the Canal seemed in immediate danger, and the military revolution was complete.⁵² On July 20th ministers heard "that Arabi had turned the salt water from the lake into the great fresh Canal."⁵³ De lesseps himself, who had hitherto trusted Arabi not to touch the Canal, appealed to his government on July 19th to protect it, for Arabi had warned him that he would destroy the Canal in the defense of Egypt.⁵⁴

Gladstone described the new situation to the Commons on July 22nd:

We should not fully discharge our duty, if we did not endeavour to convert the present interior state of Egypt from anarchy and conflict to peace and order. We shall look during the time that remains to us to the cooperation of the powers of civilized Europe if it be in any case open to us. But if every chance of obtaining cooperation is exhausted, the work will be undertaken by the single power of England.⁵⁵

This was the first public intimation that the British government was considering "going it alone" in Egypt.

⁵¹John Morley, op.cit., p. 81.

⁵²Robinson and Gallagher, op.cit., p. 113.

⁵³As quoted in loc.cit.

⁵⁴loc.cit.

⁵⁵As quoted by John Morley, op.cit., p. 82. (a similar view to be found in Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, vol.272, col.1589, July 24, 1882.)

V

THE PROTECTION OF THE
SUEZ CANAL
TEL AL KEBIR

Subsequent to the Alexandrian massacres, the British Cabinet expressed increased concern over the security of the Suez Canal. Hartington, Northbrook, Chamberlain, Dilke and Granville urged that troops be landed to protect the Canal and to break Arabi's power.¹

Gladstone continued to oppose unilateral action, holding to the view that arrangements for the protection of the Canal should not be made without prior reference to the authority of the European Concert.² He was not at that moment willing to go beyond asking the Khedive for guarantee concerning the safety of the Canal.³

French opposition to military measures for protection of the Suez Canal were based on the Suez Canal Company's assurances that the Canal was safe and that the only danger it would arise from foreign intervention to protect it. It was the Company's view that this would provoke Egyptian attacks on the Canal traffic.⁴ It would seem that neither country wished to take any steps until the outcome of the conference at Constantinople became known.

¹Robinson and Gallagher, op.cit., p. 107.

²A. Ramm, op.cit., (Gladstone to Granville June 21st, 1882), p. 380.

³ibid., (Gladstone to Granville, June 24th 1882), p. 381.

⁴Robinson and Gallagher, op.cit., p. 108.

During the next fortnight, hopes for Turkish intervention in Egypt faded. The French withdrawal on the eve of the bombardment and their proposal of negotiations with Arabi heightened their influence in Cairo at Britain's expense.⁵ Finally, the French refusal on June 24th, to join with England in protecting the Canal, coupled with Arabi's threat that he would destroy the Canal in the defense of Egypt completed the transformation of Gladstone's attitude.⁶ On July 8th Granville wrote:

Gladstone admitted to me yesterday for the first time that we are bound to protect the Suez Canal.⁷

The July 11th bombardment of Alexandria added to Gladstone's commitment to unilateral action as his hopes, that Turkey would intervene and settle the whole dispute, waned. On July 13th Gladstone, in a conversation with Musurus Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador said of the bombardment:

...that it had made a clear way for the Sultan troops into Alexandria, that he had a great opportunity. That it was a supreme moment for the Ottoman Empire, which moment it was still possible to use for good, but that time was precious and this opportunity would probably be the last.⁸

⁵A. Ramm, op.cit., (Granville to Gladstone, July 2nd 1882), p. 384.

⁶loc.cit.

⁷As quoted by Robinson and Gallagher, op.cit., p. 111.

⁸A. Ramm, op.cit., (Gladstone to Granville, July 13th, 1882), p. 394.

Later, on August 16th, Gladstone's disillusionment was made clear to the Commons.

We continued to look for that purpose (i.e. intervention) till after the bombardment, and we were indeed of opinion that the bombardment itself has afforded extraordinary facilities and great opportunities to the Sultan. It is certainly in my knowledge, that these feelings on our part were made to the Ottoman Government, but the Sultan, in the exercise of his own discretion did not avail himself of that opportunity. It was that opportunity of acting as the exclusive agent in the Egyptian disorder that I stated had passed away.⁹

This was the background of Gladstone's decision to go ahead with measures to protect the Canal without Turkey. On July 13th, he once more invited the French to join in these measures and at this point Freycinet reversed his position and accepted.¹⁰

The protection of the Suez Canal however did not imply intervention in the interior. This was clearly evident from Gladstone's letter to Granville on July 13th,

As regards the settlement of the interior of Egypt. I know you feel scruples and difficulties as to an Anglo-French operation, as to which I concur or sympathize. As to the Suez Canal the question is simpler as one of their custody and I can conceive that an Anglo-French operation is practicable and might be accepted in principle under the authority of the conference given in answer to the Anglo-French initiative.¹¹

⁹ Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, vol. 274, col. 1947-8, August 16th, 1882.

¹⁰ A. Ramm, op.cit., (Gladstone to Granville, July 13th, 1882), p. 394.

¹¹ loc.cit.

Consequently, on July 17th, Great Britain and France proposed to the conference that a designation should be made of powers who might, in case of need, take the necessary measures for the protection of the Canal. In order to save time, the powers so designated, once they had accepted the mandate, should be authorized to decide on the mode of action. This action would be exercised in every case on the principle of the self-denying protocol.¹²

On July 19th, France and Britain formally applied to the conference for authority to join in measures for the defence of the Suez Canal.¹³ They sent an ultimatum to the Porte that if he did not send troops on their conditions within twelve hours, other powers would be invited to intervene at once.¹⁴

But Turkish delaying tactics continued, with Gladstone of the opinion that time was so precious that inaction could no longer be tolerated.¹⁵ Therefore, on July 21st, Gladstone told Granville "...that we are free to prosecute the question of the Canal."¹⁶

On July 22nd, Gladstone again instructed Granville to propose to France through Lord Lyon that their representatives at the conference

¹²Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, vol. 272, col. 1083, July 20th, 1882.

¹³Hertslet, op.cit., p. 3090.

¹⁴loc.cit.

¹⁵A. Ramm, op.cit., (Gladstone to Granville, July 14th, 1882), p.395.

¹⁶ibid., (Gladstone to Granville, July 21st 1882), p. 400.

should inform the other delegates that they could not longer rely (if the Sultan did not repond to the ultimatum) on Turkish intervention. The French should be told that Britain considered immediate action necessary to prevent further loss of life and continuance of anarchy, and that Britain offered, unless the Conference had an alternative plan, to devise (with a third power if possible) military means for procuring a solution. Italy should be asked to be that third power and to consult immediately on the division of the labour.¹⁷

In these circumstances, the Cabinet decided to send an expeditionary force under Sir Garnet Wolseley to Cyprus and Malta to prepare for operations in any part of Egypt.¹⁸

But what would be the legal basis for British military action against Arabi? Gladstone had asked Granville on July 21st:

...to query whether we ought not to press very gravely on the Khedive the necessity of denouncing Arabi as a rebel or in some way promptly clearing the position now so insecure. It seems plain that first, that he has no longer any excuse for inaction in personal danger; secondly that his own position and claim upon us to maintain it, depend essentially upon this for our title as against Arabi is implicated in the question.¹⁹

¹⁷ ibid., (Gladstone to Granville, July 22nd 1882), pp. 401-2.

¹⁸ John Morley, op.cit., p. 83.

¹⁹ A. Ramm, op.cit., (Gladstone to Granville, July 21st, 1882), p. 400.

The Khedive complied with this request and declared Arabi to be in rebellion.²⁰ Gladstone felt that this was an important justification for the policy which circumstances had forced him to adopt. Two days later, the government asked the Commons for £2,300,000 to pay for the expedition and the Prime Minister proposed to meet the bill by increasing income tax by three-half pence.²¹

In presenting the bill, Gladstone assured the House that a British expedition was the only hope of protecting the Suez Canal. He explained that

...the insecurity of the Canal, it is plain, does not exhibit to us the seat of the disease, the insecurity of the Canal is a symptom only and the seat of the disease is in the interior of Egypt, in its disturbed and its anarchial condition... Britain must substitute the rule of the law for that of military violence in Egypt in Partnership with other powers if possible, but alone if necessary.²²

Dilke stressed the importance of Egypt to the Empire. With reference to the Canal, he told the House:

...England has a double interest; it has a predominant commercial interest, because 82% of trade passing through the Canal is British trade, and it has a predominant political interest caused by the fact that the Canal is the principle highway to India, Ceylong, the Straits and British Burma, where 250,000,000 people live under our rule; and also to China, where we have vast interests and 84% of the external trade

²⁰ ibid., (Gladstone to Granville, July 23rd, 1882), p. 403.

²¹ Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, vol. 272, cols. 1574-5, July 24th, 1882.

²² ibid., cols. 1586-90.

of that still enormous Empire. It is also one of the roads to our Colonial Empire in Australia and New Zealand.²³

The vote was carried by 275 to 19 and Gladstone reported to the Queen that

The entire House with infinitesimal exception, recognizes the necessity and justice of the steps now about to be taken.²⁴

This was a complete reversal of Gladstone's cherished principle of non-intervention and he was at pains to justify his policy as the only hope for peace and progress:

I affirm that there are no defacto military authorities at all in Egypt. There are persons in possession of military power, but that they are the authorities of Egypt. I entirely deny. If there was pure rebellion in the world, it is that which prevails in Egypt. But it is a rebellion having peculiar characteristics, one of them, that it is supported by the professional clergy and the old leading class, but it is a rebellion nevertheless. A rebellion is a rising against a lawful government, the government of the Khedive is a lawful government, if there is one in the world...All that can be done for people like the Egyptians, who have submitted to loose their independence, is to restore them by degrees and by judicious and considerable measures to the enjoyment of the privileges of self-government and freedom as far as they can be granted. That is what we desire to do.²⁵

²³ ibid., col. 1720.

²⁴ As quoted by Robinson and Gallagher, op.cit., p. 117.

²⁵ Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, vol. 273, cols. 1947-48, August 16th, 1882.

There were many reasons for the one-sided vote for intervention apart from the idealistic goal of restoring Egypt to order and tranquility. The bondholders, as would be expected, supported and welcomed intervention. Goschen,²⁶ their spokesman in the House spoke strongly and forcefully in this sense.²⁷ The shipping and the great Eastern trade interests which depended on the Canal called for action.²⁸ Chambers of Commerce and shipping associations throughout Britain were pressing the Government for the protection of the Canal.²⁹ Hartington, Northbrook and Childers, were all for intervention and for the control of the Canal as an important section of the Imperial life-line.³⁰ Dilke, Granville and Chamberlain hoped that intervention would break Arabi's power and save Egypt from anarchy.³¹ Gladstone finally swung to this side because he thought

²⁶George Goschen (1831-1907), British statesman, a member of the Liberal party, son of a London merchant. In 1863 he represented the city of London in Parliament. In 1865 he was appointed Vice President of the Board of Trade. In 1871 became First Lord of Admiralty. In 1876 he was sent to Egypt as delegate for British holders of Egyptian bonds in order to arrange for the conversion of the debt. In 1880 he was elected for Ribon and in 1885 for the Eastern division of Edinburgh. In 1886, became chancellor of Exchequer and from 1895-1900 First Lord of the Admiralty, retired in 1900.

(Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th edition, 1910-11, vols. 11-12, p. 262.)

²⁷Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, vol. 273, cols. 1872-89, August 16th, 1882.

²⁸Robinson and Gallagher, op.cit., p. 118.

²⁹loc.cit.

³⁰ibid., p. 107.

³¹loc.cit.

that intervention was the only hope for giving the Egyptians the blessings of a civilized life which they see having been achieved in so many countries in Europe.³² Rank-and-file conservatives supported intervention on the grounds of national interest.³³

Britain's decision to intervene in Egypt forced the Sultan to participate in the deliberations of the conference.³⁴ So, on July 24th, the Ottoman delegates, Said Pasha and Assim Pasha, attended the conference and accepted in principle the despatch of Ottoman troops to Egypt.³⁵ On the following day Said Pasha stated that Ottoman troops were on the point of embarking for Egypt.³⁶ Britain and France on the other hand declared that their governments were ready, should the necessity arise, to undertake to protect the Suez Canal either alone or with the assistance of any other power.³⁷

Gladstone however received the news of the Porte's decision to join the conference with much suspicion:

...the Turk is at his old tricks and having spun all his intrigues outside until he came into the conference he evidently mean to make a fresh start with them from within. I hope the French will feel this and come to mark at once.³⁸

³²Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, vol. 272, col. 1590, July 24th, 1882.

³³ibid., col. 1594.

³⁴Hertslet, op.cit., p. 3091.

³⁵loc.cit.

³⁶loc.cit.

³⁷loc.cit.

³⁸A. Ramm, op.cit., (Gladstone to Granville, July 23rd, 1882), p. 402.

The French Chamber's attitude however did not meet Gladstone's expectation. On July 29th Freycinet's ministry was defeated when it asked for a vote of credit for the expedition to the Suez Canal.³⁹ The French Chamber voted against an Egyptian expedition because it was convinced that Bismarck was plotting to drag the country into a morass of foreign complications.⁴⁰

Ingenious speakers, pointing to Europe covered with camps of armed men; pointing to the artful statesmanship that had pushed Austria into Bosnia and Herzegovina, and encouraged France herself to occupy Tunis; reserving their liberty for future occasions--all urgently exhorted France now to reserve her own liberty of action too.⁴¹

Under the influence of such ideas as these, the Chamber by an immense majority overthrew the government of Freycinet.

France having thus voluntarily withdrawn from the position she had held in Egypt, the invitation for joint intervention was passed to Italy, only to be rejected.⁴² The Italian Government had reasons for refraining from active intervention in Egyptian affairs. It was very anxious at the present moment to reestablish friendly

³⁹John Morley, op.cit., p. 82.

⁴⁰E. Benian, et.al., op.cit., p. 112.

⁴¹John Morley, op.cit., p. 82.

⁴²D. Wallace, op.cit., p. 92.

relations with France, and to carry out successfully a great financial operation for replacing the depreciated paper money by a metallic currency.⁴³ Both of these objects would have been seriously imperilled by military intervention. Besides this, the Cabinet of Rome had already made overtures for joining the Austro-German alliance, and did not wish to take any decided step in foreign relations without the express assent of Prince Bismarck.⁴⁴ Now Bismarck was maintaining with regard to the Egyptian Question an attitude of sphinx-like reserve,⁴⁵ and when consulted as to what Italy should do, he advised the Italian Government to act in accordance to what she considered most consistent with her own interests.⁴⁶ Indeed, when the British Government approached the governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary over the question of military action, they explained to Britain that though they would not give the British a mandate, they were willing to make no objections to a British intervention.⁴⁷ Russia remained embittered, and on the lookout for some plausible excuse for getting the Berlin arrangement of 1878 revised in her own favour, without getting into difficulties with Berlin itself.⁴⁸

⁴³ loc. cit.

⁴⁴ ibid., p. 93.

⁴⁵ loc. cit.

⁴⁶ loc. cit.

⁴⁷ Parliamentary Debates, 3d series, vol. 272, col. 1089, July 20th, 1882.

⁴⁸ John Morley, op. cit., p. 82.

Thus by July 29th, the British found themselves alone in the field, their energetic attempts to internationalize the intervention having come to naught. On the same day, Sir Garnet Wolseley received orders to seize Ismailia and assure the fresh water supply for the Canal towns after which he had to engage the Army of Arabi wherever he found it.⁴⁹ The primary objective remained the safeguarding of the Canal. The expedition arrived at Alexandria on August 16th, 1882.⁵⁰

At this juncture the Ottoman Government sought to intervene,⁵¹ but the British Government had long since given up the hope that the Turks could play a constructive role, and responded by making certain conditions which the Porte must fulfill before their "cooperation" would be acceptable. A proclamation declaring Arabi a rebel, was demanded, and was granted on August 7th.⁵² Then the British Government took the position that no Turkish intervention would be possible until a military convention was signed between England and Turkey for, Gladstone told Granville:

⁴⁹Robinson and Gallagher, op.cit., p. 117.

⁵⁰ibid., p. 120.

⁵¹ibid., p. 119.

⁵²Hertslet, op.cit., p. 3091.

...if the Sultan is very fractious as to the convention ought we to justify our stiffness by referring to the Sultan's conduct towards Arabi in General and in significant terms which might be understood to mean the decoration⁵³ but might also intimate more? Indeed his long hesitations are another formidable fact, patent to all the World.⁵⁴

On the eve of the military action, the British representative informed the Conference of his country's intentions to land troops at certain points necessary for the security of the Canal and reserved entire liberty of action in regard to military movements necessary for the establishment of the authority of the Khedive.⁵⁵

Meanwhile, British soldiers under the command of Sir Garnet Wolseley were marching against Arabi. The end came suddenly at dawn in the morning of September 13th at Tel-al-Kebir. Arabi's 19,000 soldiers were routed by Wolseley's 50,600.⁵⁶ Arabi fled to Cairo where he hoped to continue the resistance, but was overwhelmed with despair and, on September 14th, he surrendered his sword as prisoner of war to General Drury Lowe.⁵⁷

⁵³ Arabi received the Grand and Cordon of Mejidieh by the Sultan on June 8th through Dervish Pasha.
A. Broadley, op.cit., p. 92.

⁵⁴ A. Ramm, op.cit., (Gladstone to Granville August 14th, 1882), p. 410.

⁵⁵ Hertslet op.cit., p. 3091.

⁵⁶ A. R., Rafii, op.cit., pp. 406-407.

⁵⁷ ibid., p. 444.

CONCLUSION

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The Egyptian Question had been reopened by the revolt of Arabi in September 1881. Gladstone immediately defined the aims by which Granville might direct his policy with regard the problem: first, the closest cooperation with France, second, full recognition for the maintenance of Turkish authority in accordance with the principle of observing established rights and third, the advantage of Egypt herself in order to discharge the responsibility of a large country toward a smaller one.

From the beginning, the British Cabinet was embarrassed by the incompatibility of the Dual Control with Gladstone's ideas of national freedom and the idea of 'Egypt for the Egyptians.' Moreover, the British Cabinet wavered between its unwillingness to intervene and its reluctance to see French intervene without them. In its anxiety to accept as little responsibility as possible for maintaining the Khedive's authority, Gladstone preferred to invite Turkey to restore order and preserve the status quo there.

The French, however, opposed strongly Turkish intervention on the grounds that this might strengthen the Sultan's influence and endanger their position in Tunisia and Algeria. The British, upset by this strong French position and in its anxiety to prevent unilateral action by France, abandoned its preference for Turkish

intervention and accepted Gambetta's note pledging the support of the two governments for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority, and the good order and development of general prosperity in Egypt.

But no sooner had the Gladstone's Ministry adopted the policy of Gambetta, than it went back on the pledge of conditional joint action in the note, warned France that it wished to preserve the right of the Sultan and opened negotiations for an international conference.

The reason for this sudden change of policy was the fact that the note produced undesirable effects which Gladstone's Ministry did not expect. More important however, was the attitude of the other major European powers, who in identic notes to the Porte declared that the status quo in Egypt should not be modified without previous understanding between the Great Powers and Turkey.

In any event, this attitude reinforced the preference of the British Government for an international rather than a dual solution for the Egyptian question.

The British policy of internationalizing the problem was the cause of the rift between England and France. This rift was further deepened by Freycinet's indecisiveness. French vacillation was due to fear of Bismarck's intrigues to drive France into foreign complications which would deflect attention from the Rhine and create difficulties

for France with the other powers.

Because of this fear, the keynote of French, as of British policy after the fall of Gambetta was the internationalization of the Egyptian Question. But because Great Britain wanted to secure a mandate for Turkish intervention in Egypt; while France fearing the consequences of this move for her colonial possessions in North Africa, wanted to secure a mandate for joint Anglo-French action. This coincidence of policy failed to bridge the rift in Anglo-French relations. On the contrary, their anxiety to appear publicly united, led the two countries to drift into expedients which only drove the countries apart and conflicted with their desires for internationalizing the problem.

When in the wake of Gambetta's note, the nationalists in Egypt forced a nationalist ministry on the Khedive and then in April began to discuss his dethronement, the two powers decided to confront Arabi's faction by sending their ultimatum of May 25th, supported by a naval demonstration. But Arabi's power was not broken. On the contrary, the two government's action precipitated the Alexandrian riots which helped Arabi to become the de-facto ruler of Egypt.

Egypt was already in Arabi's hands when the conference met at Constantinople on June 23rd. On July 3rd while the conference was still debating the conditions of Turkish intervention, the British government ordered the destruction of earth-works at

Alexandria. This was another change of policy made by Great Britain under the pressure of events in Egypt. More important however, was the insistence upon force displayed by Hartington and the Forward Party who urged intervention when (as they saw it) the vital imperial interest was at stake and British prestige shaken throughout the Orient. The security of the routes to the East was the one interest concerning which the British ministers could not afford to gamble. But Gladstone, who refused the Sultan's offer of the control and administration of Egypt to the exclusion of France, was still determined to avoid the landing of troops as 'disloyal' to the Concert of Europe and was careful to ask France and Italy to cooperate. But Italy refused to join because the powers had undertaken no separate action; and France withdrew her ships on the grounds that bombardment would be an act of war. And when, after the bombardment of July 11th, Great Britain found herself forced to land troops for police purposes, France again refused to join. Freycinet was willing to do so, provided action was limited to the protection of the Canal and a mandate were obtained by the two powers in the name of Europe. But the other powers refused to bind themselves so formally and the French Chamber (convinced that Bismarck was plotting against France) overthrew the Government.

England, which had all along set its face against isolated action, found herself in solitary occupation of Egypt, while the French, who had originally been more inclined to intervention, took

no part. Indeed, the single-handed conquest of Egypt was plainly the outcome which the British Liberals had intended to avoid, at least until the later days of June. They had no long-term plan to occupy Egypt. They had drifted with events. Each fateful step seemed to be dictated by circumstance rather than will. As Granville redalled later: "The misfortune...had been that we hardly ever had anything but bad alternatives to choose from. The objectors to whatever was decided were pretty sure to have the best."¹ What they intended was a quick restoration, not an occupation. Their primary purpose was to restore the old system of security through influence, but this time British influence to be supreme. Not until a year later did the government realize that they plunged themselves into an ever-lengthening occupation and ever-increasing responsibility.

¹As quoted by Robinson and Gallagher, op.cit., p. 120.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX I^{*}

THE PROGRAM OF THE NATIONAL PARTY: ITS CHIEF PARAGRAPH.

At a stormy moment of his fate, Ismail Pasha invoked to his aid the National Party of Egypt whose existence he knew and which he feared. The appeal came too late. No one answered. Now the National Party asserts itself to save Egypt from financial ruin. It claims the right of every nation to be a nation. It would instruct the people themselves to know this right.

The National Party regrets the diplomatic interference which has caused the fall of Egypt's ruler, merited though this be. While bowing to the fact it cannot accept a government imposed by foreign influence, as expressing the wants and wishes of the country, for the country was not consulted. It repudiates such a regime.

Egypt feels herself young and strong. She will regenerate herself through herself.

Egypt declares that she will free herself of debt. She is solvent, but she must pay, in her own way. She must be self-administered.

The National Party proposes to attain its object by peaceable means, resorting only to force in the last instance. It therefore appeals to Europe for justice believing that Europe wished Egypt's

^{*}John Ninet, 'Origin of the National Party in Egypt' Nineteenth Century, vol. XIII, January. 1883, p. 131.

welfare and especially to Prince Bismarck the defender of the principles of nationalities.

Egypt, as before said, accept the debts of her viceroys, but she objects to the pawning of her revenues to special creditors such as those advantaged by the Goschen-Joubert convention and the Rothchild convention.

The National Program of Finance is therefore as follows:

- a.- The return of the Domain lands to the state.
- b.- Withdrawal of all privileges to special creditors.
- c.- Unification of all debts at 4%.
- d.- Establishment of International Control purpose of overseeing the payment of debt.

APPENDIX II^x

Text of the Despatch sent by Lord Granville, Her Majesty's Foreign Secretary to Sir Edward Malet, the British Consul General in Egypt on November 4th, 1881.

"Sir, I gather from the despatches which I have received from you since your return to Egypt that much misapprehension exists in the minds of the great mass of of the population with regard to the policy of Her Majesty's Government in Egyptian affairs; and I desire, by a clear exposition of our views and objects, to obviate the misunderstandings and dangers to which this misapprehension is not unlikely to give rise.

"The policy of Her Majesty's Government towards Egypt has no other aim than the prosperity of the country and its full enjoyment of that liberty which it has obtained under successive Firmans of the Sultan, concluding with the Firman of 1879.

"In our belief, the prosperity of Egypt, like that of every country, depends upon the progress and well-being of the people.

"We have therefore, on all occasions, pressed upon the Government of the Khedive the adoption of such measures as we deemed likely to raise the people from a state of subjection and oppression to one

^xE. Malet, op.cit., pp. 190-4.

of ease and security. The spread of education, the abolition of vexatious taxation, the establishment of land tax on a regular and equitable basis, the diminution of forced labour, have all received our advocacy and support and have been accomplished through the action of the English and French Controllers-General.

"One measure of reform among others remain, to be accomplished, which we consider to be even more necessary than those above enumerated-- the reform of justice as it is administered to the natives. But in this matter Her Majesty's Government have restricted themselves to instructing you not to relax your endeavours to prevail upon the Government of the Khedive to make the necessary reforms. We have felt that the Ministry of His Highness is alone competent to reconcile Western and Mohammedan law and satisfy the requirements of the native population; and for this reason we have consistently opposed the extension of the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts to causes between natives. We should greatly deprecate any attempt to impose upon the Egyptian people a system of jurisprudence which would conflict with that which they have inherited from their fathers.

"At the same time, the proper administration of justice is the keystone of the well being of all natives, and it has been impossible for us to regard its absence in Egypt with indifference. We are convinced that until it is established, no Ministry will enjoy the full confidence of the country, or can be regarded as fitting

of ease and security. The spread of education, the abolition of vexatious taxation, the establishment of land tax on a regular and equitable basis, the diminution of forced labour, have all received our advocacy and support and have been accomplished through the action of the English and French Controllers-General.

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"At the same time, the proper administration of justice is the keystone of the well being of all natives, and it has been impossible for us to regard its absence in Egypt with indifference. We are convinced that until it is established, no Ministry will enjoy the full confidence of the country, or can be regarded as fitting guardians of the state. It is therefore with sincere satisfaction that we have

learned that Chérif Pasha, immediately on assuming office, instructed the Minister of Justice to proceed with the organization of native Law Courts, to look forward with interest and impatience to the accomplishment of a task of such paramount importance.

"You inform me that there was a general impression that Riaz Pasha received the special support of England, and that the Khedive retained him in office in order to avoid offence to His Majesty's Government. It cannot be too clearly understood that England desires no Partizan Ministry in Egypt. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government, a Partizan Ministry, founded on the support of a foreign Power, or upon the personal influence of a foreign Diplomatic Agent, is neither calculated to be of service to the country it administers, nor to that in whose interest it is supported to be maintained. It can only tend to alienate the population from their true allegiance to their Sovereign, and to give rise to counter-intrigues which are detrimental to the welfare of the State.

"I am glad to be able to bear record to the manner in which you have understood and fulfilled your duty in this respect. [italics]"

You gave to Riaz Pasha that loyal support which it was your duty to afford to the Minister selected by the Khedive. Had you gone beyond this limit you would have exceeded the instructions given to you by His Majesty's Government. The whole tenour of your Reports no less than the course of events, proves that you have kept carefully within them.

"It would seem hardly necessary to enlarge upon our desire

to maintain Egypt in the enjoyment of the measure of administrative independence which has been secured to her by the Sultan's Firmans. The Government of England would run counter to the most cherished traditions of national history were it to entertain a desire to diminish that liberty or to tamper with the institutions to which it has given birth. It would not be difficult, if it were necessary, to show by reference to recent events that this Government should be safe from the suspicions which, as you inform me, exist in Egypt with regard to our intentions on this head. On the other hand, the tie which unites Egypt to the Porte is, in our conviction, a valuable safe against foreign intervention. Were it to be broken, Egypt might at no very distant future find herself exposed to danger from rival ambitions. It is therefore our aim to maintain this tie as it at present exists.

"The only circumstance which could force us to depart from the course of conduct which I have above indicated would be the concurrence in Egypt of a state of anarchy. We look to the Khedive, and to Cherif Pasha, and to the good sense of the Egyptian people, to prevent such a catastrophe, and they on their part may rest assured that, so long as Egypt continues in the path of tranquil and legitimate progress, it will be the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government to contribute to so happy a result.

"You are authorized to deliver a copy of this despatch to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, stating that it has been written with the object of dispelling any doubts that may exist as to the

intentions of Her Majesty's Government. We have every reason to believe that the Government of France will continue as heretofore to be animated by similar views. It has been easy for the two countries, acting in concert and with identical objects of no selfish character, to assist materially in improving the financial and political condition of Egypt, and so long as the good of that country is alone the object in view, there should be no difficulty in prosecuting it with the same success. Any self-aggrandizing designs on the part of either Government must, from its very nature, destroy this useful co-operation. The Khedive and his Ministers may feel secure that Her Majesty's Government contemplate no such deviation from the path which they have traced for themselves. [italics].

' I am, etc.,

' Granville."

APPENDIX III^x

Text of the Joint Note delivered to the Khedive on January 8th by E. Malet and M. Scenkiewicz the British and French Consuls-General in Egypt.

"Sir, - You have already been instructed on several occasions to inform the Khedive and his Government of the determination of France and England to afford them support against the difficulties of various kinds which might interfere with the course of public affairs in Egypt.

"The two Powers are entirely agreed on this subject, and recent circumstances, especially the meeting of the Chamber of Notables convoked by the Khedive, have given them the opportunity for a further exchange of views.

"I have accordingly to instruct you to declare to Tewfik Pasha, after having come to an arrangement with M. Scenkiewicz, who is instructed to make an identic and simultaneous communication, that the English and French Governments consider the maintenance of His Highness on the throne, on the terms laid down by the Sultan's Firmans, and officially recognized by the two Governments as alone able to guarantee, for the present and future, the good order and development of general prosperity in Egypt in which France and England are equally interested.

"The two Governments, being closely associated in the resolve to guard by their united efforts against all cause of complications,

^x ibid., pp. 217-218.

internal or external, which might menace the order of things established in Egypt, do not doubt that the assurance publicly given of their formal intentions in this respect will tend to avert the dangers to which the Government of the Khedive might be exposed, and which would certainly find France and England united to oppose them. They are convinced that His Highness will draw from this assurance the confidence and strength which he requires to direct the destinies of Egypt and its people."

APPENDIX IV^{*}

TEXT OF THE ULTIMATUM OF MAY 25th, 1882.

"The undersigned, Agents and Consuls-General of England and France, considering that His Excellency Sultan Pacha, President of the Chamber of Delegates, actuated by a sentiment of patriotism, and desirous of assuring the peace and prosperity of Egypt, has proposed to Mahmoud Pacha Sami, President of the Council, as the only means of putting an end to the disturbed state of the country, the following conditions:-

" 1. The temporary retirement from Egypt of His Excellency Arabi Pacha, with the maintenance of his rank and pay;

" 2. The retirement of into the interior of Egypt of Ali Fehmi Pacha and Abdoullah Pacha, who will also retain their rank and pay;

" 3. The resignation of the present Ministry.

" Considering that these conditions, by reason of the spirit of moderation which dictated them, may prevent the misfortunes which threaten Egypt, acting in the name and with the authorization of their respective Governments, the Undersigned recommend these conditions to the most serious attention of the President of the Council and his colleagues, and, if necessary, will insist on their fulfillment. The Governments of England and France, in intervening in the affairs of

^{*} ibid., pp. 357-359.

Egypt, have no other object than to maintain the status quo and consequently to restore to the Khedive the authority which belongs to him, and without which the status quo is continually in danger."

"The intervention of the two Powers being divested of all character of vengeance or reprisal, they will use their good offices to obtain from the Khedive a general amnesty, and will watch over its strict observance."

APPENDIX V^x

The reply of the Egyptian ministry to the Ultimatum of May 25th, 1882 (trans. from Arabic).

"His Excellency Sultan Pacha, the President of the Chamber, informed the ministers in their meetings of yesterday of his interview with the French Consul General and that he did not present in this meeting any suggestions or made any specific demands.

"As to the demands made by the Note presented by the British and French Consuls-General; these are internal problems pertaining to Egypt's home administration which is independent, having been recognized by the great Powers.

"The Ministry of His Highness therefore, cannot enter into any discussions regarding these demands without infringing on the Sultan's Firmans, the international agreements that gave Egypt its special status and without conflicting with the laws of the Chamber which are at the present moment Egypt's safest guarantee.

"The Ministry of His Highness takes pleasure in hearing the good advice of the French and British Consuls General, but it regrets that it cannot observe the demands made by the Note and if the French

^xUnited Arab Republic, op.cit., p. 4.

and British Governments do not consider that the problem made clear by their Representatives' note an act of interference in Egypt's internal affairs; then this problem should be presented to the other great Powers, who guaranteed Egypt's autonomy under the sovereignty of the Sultan."

APPENDIX VI^x

Text of the Identic Note sent by the Conference to the Sublime Porte on July 15th, 1882.

"Impressed with the necessity of applying a prompt remedy for the troubled state of Egypt and resorting confidence in that country, the Great Powers assembled in the Conference, have decided to appeal to the sovereignty of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan by inviting him to intervene in Egypt and assist the Khedive by sending forces sufficient to re-establish order, put down the usurping faction, and put an end to that state of anarchy which is desolating the country, has led to the effusion of blood, the ruin and flight of thousands of Europeans and Mussulman families and compromised at once national and foreign interest. While assuring by their presence respect for the rights of the Empire, to the re-establishment of the Khedival authority, the Imperial forces will allow at same time, according to the method to be determined hereafter by common consent of the adoption of wise reforms in the military organization of Egypt, without prejudicing by their intervention the prudent development of the civil administrative and judicial institutions of Egypt so as not to conflict with the Imperial Firmans. In addressing themselves to

^xParliamentary Debates, 3d series, vol. 272, col. 895, July 18th 1882.

His Majesty, the Great Powers of Europe, have full confidence that during the sojourn of the Ottoman troops in Egypt the normal status quo will be maintained, and that there will be no interference with the immunities and privileges of Egypt, guaranteed by previous Firmans, or with the regular working of the administration, or with the international engagements and the arrangements which result from them. The sojourn in Egypt of the Imperial troops, the commanders of which will have to act in concert with the Khedive, will be limited to a period of three months, unless the Khedive should ask for its prolongation for additional term, to be fixed by an agreement with Turkey and the Powers, the expenses of the occupation will be defrayed by Egypt, and the amount will be determined by agreement between the six Powers, Turkey and Egypt. If they hope, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan respond to a call made to him by the Great Powers, the application of the clauses and condition above enumerates will form the subject of subsequent agreement between the six Powers and Turkey."

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