TOCQUEVILLE, BAUDE AND DESJOBERT ON
THE ALGÉRIAN PROBLEM
1830 - 1848

by

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A Synopsis

During the first two decades of the French occupation in Algeria, confusion reigned as to the proper policy to follow. Occupied in 1830 for arbitrary reasons at a time when France had no imperialistic vocation, Algeria was a dilemma to the government and to the enlightened section of public opinion. A mystified France was faced with three main choices which she was unable to decide between: L'abandon, restricted control, or total control. In order to understand what this problem meant to France, this paper will consider three responses to the Algerian problem of three contemporary patriotic French intellectuals: Baude, Desjobert, and Tocqueville.

Baude, Desjobert, and Tocqueville differed in their explanations and solutions of the Algerian problem because each man saw it from a particular perspective. To Baude, it seemed like an opportunity to advance the interests of a dynasty. To Desjobert, Algeria was a source of weakness to a France he wanted strong continentally, and to Tocqueville, it seemed to provide an opportunity to rejuvenate France through stimulating her people with a vision of grandeur and mission. Baude wanted France to establish an Orleanist Vice-Royalty in Algeria. Desjobert believed that while France should hold on to two or three strategic ports, the remainder of Algeria should constitute an independent native state, and Tocqueville favored the extension of France as a state across the Mediterranean into Algeria, and the transformation of Algeria into a French province.

The analyses and the solutions of these three Frenchmen can be used to measure the policies France actually followed, as well as to understand the Algerian problem and the French presence during the July Monarchy (1830-1848). One might speculate as to whether, had their wisdom and sympathetic understanding been listened to, the resistance of Abdel Kader, the rebellion of 1871, and finally, the Revolution of 1954-1962 might not have occurred. The discussion in this paper focuses on what Algeria meant to France, not the converse. It seeks to throw light on an experience which can be described as a reluctant imperialism, but one which, in a sense, presented a model and a starting point, for the more positive Imperialism to come later when France was to create her second empire.
To: Anne and Jack
With love and admiration
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"At the epoch-making moments in history, the critical and analytical faculties of the participants are sharpened and intensified. The issues, heightened and dramatized, are presented in vivid form; the degree of self-consciousness of those involved in the crisis is raised to a higher level. The existential situation of the groups, classes, states, or nations engaged in the struggle is developed to the fullest. In such a moment there is, of course, the attendant danger of partisanship and deep emotional and irrational involvement. But at the same time, for the wise and perceptive individual who endeavors to see the broader implications of the issues, there is an unparalleled opportunity to tell the story 'definitively.' As crises often call forth the best resources of a people, elevate and frequently ennoble those caught up in their storms, so they often call forth the best efforts of those who undertake to chronicle them."

Page Smith, The Historian and History.
Chapter I

THE BACKGROUND

During the first two decades of the French occupation in Algeria, confusion reigned as to the proper policy to follow. Occupied in 1830 for arbitrary reasons at a time when France had no imperialistic vocation, Algeria was a dilemma to the government and to the enlightened section of public opinion. A mystified France was faced with three main choices which she was unable to decide between: l’abandon, restricted control, or total control. In order to understand what this problem meant to France, this paper will consider three responses to the Algerian problem of three contemporary patriotic French intellectuals: Baude, Desjobert, and Tocqueville. Their analyses and the solutions they preferred can be used to measure the policies France actually followed, as well as to understand the Algerian problem and the French presence during the July Monarchy (1830-1848). One might speculate as to whether, had their wisdom and sympathetic understanding been listened to, the resistance of Abdel Kader, the rebellion of 1871, and finally the Revolution of 1954-1962 might not have occurred. The discussion in this paper focuses on what Algeria meant to France, not the converse. It seeks to throw light on an experience

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which can be described as a reluctant imperialism, but one which, in a sense, presented a model and a starting point, for the more positive Imperialism to come later when France was to create her second empire.

A Case of Casual Imperialism

France, in the early years of the nineteenth century, could hardly be called a colonial power. It is true that she still had a few minor outposts sprinkled around the world, but she had lost her 'old empire', established by Richelieu and Colbert, in a series of disastrous wars with England which had finally ended with Napoleon's collapse in 1815. Consequently, France's destiny appeared not to be connected to colonial ventures but rather to continental affairs. This likelihood was strengthened by the lack of general interest of the French people in overseas expansion and the absence of the grand ambition on the part of the restored Bourbons which had characterized the Napoleonic era. The emphasis was on the internal problems of an exhausted France. It was only at the end of the nineteenth century that France was able to establish herself once more as a colonial power with an empire second only to that of Great Britain's.

That the French acquired Algeria in 1830 is a fact that seems to violate the general trend of the times and demands some explanation. The acquisition appears to be, at first sight, the initial move towards the establishment of the new French empire of the late nineteenth century; however,
it was not motivated by those impulses and doctrines which propelled the later conquests. Nor, on the other hand, was it inspired by the ideas of the 'old empire' of Richelieu and Colbert. The conquest then belongs neither to the colonial efforts of the 'old empire' based on the *pacte colonial*, nor does it have anything in common with the imperialism of the 1880's. Algeria is a *rara avis*—a unique colonial experience.¹

After France had lost her 'old empire', she seemed to accept, with more resignation, her role as a continental power only. Colonial adventures were forgotten for the moment. In fact, there was a tendency to denounce the idea of colonies. René Valet, in his study, *L'Afrique du Nord devant le Parlement au XIXᵉ Siècle*, analysed this tendency in the years preceding the Algiers expedition. He mentioned a number of articulate opponents of colonial expansion who spoke frequently in Parliament. Deputy Beugnot argued that colonies, supposedly founded for the benefit of the mother country, cost more than they produced and were more of a

¹ This is not to deny that Algeria indirectly and subsequently influenced the course of France's "new imperialism". On the contrary, Algeria prepared the way for the later "new imperialism" because its comparative success as a colonial venture created a powerful group of vested interests among commercial, maritime, bureaucratic, and military circles of France. These groups were to play a crucial role in the expansion of their country after 1880. Algeria, in addition, gave birth to a powerful, militant, and pro-colonial bloc in parliament which transcended party groupings.
detriment than an aid.\(^2\) General Sebastiani preferred to have the funds allocated to colonies spent on agricultural developments at home.\(^3\) Likewise, Humblot-Conté, in an important speech to the House in 1822, attacked the colonies on the grounds that they were a serious drain on France’s economic wealth. He believed that colonies would be the ruin of European governments.\(^4\) Bessières pointed out the significant fact that "the two Americas were now open to France and that there were no colonies which could equal the trade between France and this double continent."\(^5\) Both Tocqueville and Desjobert concluded that France’s vocation was not in the colonial field, Tocqueville arguing that the "French genius was not favourable to colonization"\(^6\) and that "It must be recognized because experience has demonstrated it, that in

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\(^3\) Ibid., p. 26.

\(^4\) Ibid.


founding a colony, France would be undertaking a perilous and
uncertain enterprise."7 Desjoubert claimed that the French cha-
character was not suited to colonial enterprises.8 Not only was
opinion adverse to colonial ventures, the time was not propi-
tious. France, an exhausted nation, bleeding from a heavy
loss in man power and wealth as a result of Napoleon's reck-
less adventures, needed to concentrate on the difficult task
of revitalizing an exhausted society. This internal task
weighed heavily on the Bourbon Restoration. And yet, within
a few years, France was to embark once more on another reck-
less adventure, the expedition to Algiers. What could have
cause such a surprising volteface? Is there a logical ex-
planation for this seemingly sudden and complete change in
attitude toward empire?

Causes and Entanglements

The causes for France's decision to conquer Algeria
are complex and for this conquest many explanations have been
advanced. Most interpretations begin with the Bacri-Busnach9

7 Ibid., p. 40.

8 Amédée Desjoubert, La Question D'Alger: Politique,

9 Bacri and Busnach were two Jewish merchants of Algiers
who supplied France with a considerable amount of wheat during
the period of the Directory. France refused to settle the entire
debt owed to the two merchants and in the meantime the Dey of
Algiers had also managed to get himself involved in the deal.
The legal position of the Dey's debt had been recognized of-
ficially by Talleyrand but the Dey had never received any com-
ensation. The French Consul in Algiers, Pierre Deval, was
asked to explain why his government would not honour the debt
and it was during this interview on April 29, 1827 that the
"fly-whisk stroke" incident took place.
affair and the subsequent "fly-whisk stroke". In 1827, the Dey of Algiers, on one occasion, while discussing the Bacri-Busnach affair with Deval, the Consul of France, was exasperated by the Consul's attitude and insulted Deval by hitting him with his fly whisk. This famed "fly-whisk stroke" transgressed the protocol deemed appropriate in such a situation. The events which succeeded this incident, however, indicated that France was not too eager to avenge this affront immediately. The French government was very slow and hesitant in its reaction and limited itself to presenting the Dey with a stiff diplomatic note demanding an apology. When Dey Hussein refused to apologize, a French fleet was ordered to blockade Algiers. This retaliatory measure was hardly effective because the blockading fleet was not in a position to disturb the Dey seriously. Frequent gales in that exposed section of the North African coast often scattered the squadrons and caused much damage to the vessels.

10 Leon Galibert in an early work entitled L'Algérie Ancienne et Moderne published in 1844 quotes the first two articles of the diplomatic note to the Dey as follows:

1 Les principaux personnages de la régence, à l'exception du dey, se rendront à bord du commandant pour faire, au nom de ce prince, des excuses au consul-français.

2 A un signal convenu, le palais du dey et tous les forts devront arborer le pavillon français et le saluer de cent un coups de canon.


11 A fine gravure picturing Dey Hussein watching the blockading squadrons tossed about during a gale like corks in stormy waters is found in A. Berbrugger's, Algérie Historique Pittoresque et Monumentale, 1843.
The resulting stalemate was humiliating to France. The blockade proved to be a costly farce. Hence, another attempt at a negotiated settlement with the Dey was decided upon. In July 1829, two years after the celebrated "fly-whisk stroke", two French ships flying flags of truce, entered the port of Algiers. Eager to reach a reasonable solution, the French gave their special envoy, M. La Bretonnière, some latitude to conciliate Hussein. But once again France's offer was rejected. The negotiations broke down and the two French vessels while leaving the harbour of Algiers, still under flags of truce, were fired upon by the coastal batteries. The French vessels did not return the fire in spite of the fact that a number of shots found their mark.\textsuperscript{12} This unprovoked bombardment, viewed as a grave breach in international practice, provided the French with a pretext for more extended action, but the actual motive for the exploitation of this incident is to be found in the French domestic political scene.

The real cause of France's subsequent action in Algiers is to be explained more in terms of the internal problems facing the Bourbons than in their conscious desire to expand overseas. J.J. Baude aware of this fact, said: "The government of Charles X wanted to conquer Algiers only because it

\textsuperscript{12} Galibert, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 261.
could then strengthen a weakening home front. A military
victory would support a tottering regime." Thus the Dey's
provocations provided an unpopular government with a means
of possibly weakening opposition in France and gaining public
support. The government in Paris was quick to see the ad-
vantage it could derive by engaging in reprisals against the
Dey of a piratical state. Besides European opinion was
sympathetic to France, and more important still, public
opinion in France was eager to avenge an additional affront
to the French flag. The Napoleonic legend, still stirring
the imagination of Frenchmen, accentuated the contrast between
the greatness of Napoleon and the insipid regime of Charles X.
If the latter could act in a fashion that would defend the
national honour, he might gain popular support which he woefully lacked. It was Polignac, prime minister at this time,
who became convinced that a dramatic stroke by France in
Algiers would swing an important section of public opinion
in favour of this regime on the decline. This dramatic
stroke would be to send an expedition to capture Algiers, to
chastise the Dey, and to flatter France's pride with a military
victory. War would afford an excuse to muzzle opposition
directed against the regime, and provide some drama to a people
suffering from 'national boredom', as some intellectuals put it.

13 J.J. Baude, "Du Système d'Établissement à Suivre",
Thus, the reasons for the conquest, in our opinion, were political. Explanations that stress economic or strategic considerations are really less plausible.  

One factor encouraging France in 1830 to envision such a conquest was that European opinion was sympathetic to any forceful action against Algiers. The reason is twofold. For one thing, the Dey never bothered to construct a favorable reputation for himself in Europe. He frequently treated Europeans with a great deal of disrespect, and even diplomats suffered indignities. Such ill-treatment is quite discernible in the case of the imprisonment of the Dutch consul in 1808 as a result of a delay of his government's annual tribute. European sympathies were further alienated by the piratical actions of the Deys and by the practice of enslaving Christians. The second reason lies in the nature of the contemporary European conscience. Europe was still influenced by a relic of former times, a crusading spirit which was clearly revealed in the language of contemporary life. Lord Exmouth, head of a British naval force assisted by a squadron of six Dutch vessels on his way to bombard Algiers in 1818, disclosed that he was

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14 Yves Lacoste, André Nouschi, and André Prenant defend the economic interpretation. According to them the conquest was motivated by a desire "to please the bourgeoisie...to satisfy the merchants of Marseilles...and those of Lyons, soucieux d'écouler leurs tissus..." in Y. Lacoste, A Nouschi, A. Prenant, L'Algérie: Passé et Present (Paris: Editions Sociales 1960) p. 241.
a "humble instrument in the hands of Divine Providence for bringing to reason a ferocious government, and destroying for ever the insufferable and horrid systems of Christian slavery,..." and that "the battle was fairly at issue between a handful of Britons, in the noble cause of Christianity and a horde of fanatics, assembled round their city, and enclosed within its fortifications to obey the dictates of their despot."\textsuperscript{15} Another example, this time French, was Chateaubriand's reference in 1816 to piracy in the Barbary states. Before the \textit{Chambre des Pairs}, he declared, "The first Crusade was preached in France, and it is in France that the banner for the last Crusade should be lifted."\textsuperscript{16} Polignac adhered to the crusading spirit when he described the expedition as a triumph for the entire Christian world.\textsuperscript{17} (Needless to say, he was attempting to allay British fears.)


\textsuperscript{16} Claude Martin, \textit{Histoire de l'Algérie Française} (Paris: Ed. Aymon, 1963), p. 55. With regard to the 'last crusade' preached by Chateaubriand in 1816, it is interesting to note that Field Marshal Viscount Slim's recent article in the \textit{Spectator}, (April 30, 1965) was entitled the "Last Crusade". It was a short analysis of the failure of the British Empire contingent at Gallipoli (This is not to imply, however, that F.M. Slim was moved by religious motives).

\textsuperscript{17} Great Britain, \textit{Papers Relative to the Occupation of Algiers by the French: Presented to the House of Commons by command of Her Majesty} (1838).
Although the French government was eager to act in a spectacular fashion in regard to the Dey, it was not very certain of the way to accomplish this. Algiers was strongly fortified and its occupation would require a large expenditure in men and money which the parliament and the press would denounce. To avoid such expenditure Polignac endorsed a plan, originally suggested by Muhammad Ali, in which the Egyptian Army would attack Dey Hussein and in return for this action, Egypt would receive four naval vessels and a loan from France. The advantage in following this plan was that France would have a third party do the dirty work for her. The disadvantage was England's opposition to any plan that would upset the careful balance of forces in the Ottoman Empire. Muhammad Ali would strengthen his own position by a successful action in Algeria, and so, further weaken the prestige of the declining Turkish sultanate. In fact, England, upon hearing the plan, immediately made it known to the parties concerned that she would not tolerate such an action. The Sublime Porte was asked to restrain their impetuous Egyptian vassal and Polignac had to abandon his plan. It was very important to Polignac that French policy be made palatable to Britain. He knew that British policy was committed to preserving the integrity of the Sultan's empire and the Dey of Algiers was, at least nominally, a vassal of the Porte. Thus, Polignac stressed, in an exchange of correspondence in March 1830, that France was not interested in territorial gains, and that she was fully aware of
the Sultan's legal position regarding any future settlement of the Algerian problem. France, in a direct action against Algeria (which Polignac admitted as the only door open), would respect the Sultan's rights. France only sought...."the complete destruction of piracy, the total abolition of slavery with regard to Christians, the suppression of the tribute which the Christian powers paid to the Regency." Against this, the British felt unable to raise serious objections. She wanted the Dey chastized; she was allied to France; she wanted the Bourbon monarchy to be maintained against revolutionary forces. These factors outweighed her suspicion of the motives of France in North Africa, and England did not want to antagonize France after the unpopular settlement of the Belgian question during the Congress of Vienna, which had been unfavourable to the French. Thus, England adopted her typical policy of "wait and see." She did not oppose Polignac's plan for the occupation of Algiers.

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Ibid. Correspondence: Prince Polignac to the Duc de Laval, (Paris, 12 March 1830) describing France's aims as follows:

"La destruction définitive de la Piraterie; L'Aboli-
tion absolue de l'Esclavage des Chrétiens; la
suppression du tribut que les Puissances Chrétiennes
payent à la Régence."
Conquest and Colonization

a) Period of Indecision: 1830-1838

In June 1830, three years after the original insult to France, Admiral Duperré landed a French expeditionary force at Sidi-Ferruch near Algiers and met with virtually no opposition. The Algerians, expecting a direct attack on the city of Algiers itself, were unprepared for this flanking movement. The Dey's army, estimated by the French sources at 40,000 men, tried to stop the French army at Stageli but was severely defeated. Hussein, realizing the futility of further resistance, capitulated on July 5, 1830 and the French began their one hundred and thirty years of rule in Algeria.

The news of the fall of Algiers was greeted with silence and indifference in Paris while in Marseilles, public opinion was jubilant. What Polignac had hopefully anticipated did not materialize. The conquest of Algiers did not prevent the fall of the Bourbons. Their successor, the July Monarchy, inherited the conquest that had failed to save the Bourbons. The government decided to retain the Regency of Algiers and not to make any further conquests of territory. Algiers, and the Algerian question with all its implications for the future, now

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19 Valet, op.cit., p. 56.
belonged to France. Across the channel, England observed a silence that was remarkable considering that France was ignoring the promises made to the British government concerning the limited nature of France's action in the Regency. The new government in Paris did not even attempt to negotiate with the Sultan of Turkey over Algeria and behaved as though Ottoman sovereignty in the Regency was past history. Explanation for England's abstinence from action is clear upon consideration of interests closer to her heart. Once again, the Belgian crisis had tempted French interference and England wanted to deny France any excuse for interference. The Belgian question had a direct influence on Algeria and Palmerston could forgive France for capturing Algeria as long as she renounced her rights over Antwerp. As a French historian neatly put it, "Antwerp was to be a ransom for Algiers." Hence, England was very careful not to provoke France by intervening in the Algerian question. The Algerian question, whether in its genesis or in its final solution one-hundred and thirty years later, must, of course, be seen in a larger international context.

Following her conquest of Algiers, the immediate questions

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France faced was how far to expand into the hinterland and the extent to which the land was to be colonized with European settlers. These were urgent matters necessitating a clear expression of policy. Yet from 1830 to 1838 the attitude towards colonization and conquest was ambivalent. During this same period, there were some who advocated a withdrawal from Algeria and sponsored what was to be called la politique de l'abandon, a policy which found a limited support in government circles. Although in 1833, France declared Algeria a French possession and two special fact-finding 'Commissions on Africa' advised the conservation of the old Regency, the shape the French presence was to take remained unclear.

At the time, the French government was beset by domestic problems, social and economic, which, in turn, enfeebled French diplomacy. The working classes in Paris were not content with Louis Philippe’s newly installed government. Those who had fought at the barricades felt cheated because their employers, now in control of the government, were enforcing legislation against trade-unions. The government was also beset with economic problems requiring a restriction in expenditure. King Louis Philippe, contenting himself with maintaining peace and promoting business enterprise, was not tempted by foreign adventure and military glory. As a result, France’s diplomacy, as evidenced by the Muhammad Ali affair, was feeble. In fact it was only saved from complete discredit by Talleyrand, the French Ambassador in London. Entrusted
with the delicate mission of wheedling British support for France's position in Algeria, Talleyrand was able to carry out this difficult task with his customary dexterity. He was helped by the internal situation in England itself in 1832 since the Whigs, now in power, were easier to handle because of their suspicion of colonialism, than the empire-minded Tories. But such support from Britain did not help to end the confusion in France's policy within Algeria. Many important decisions, some even affecting policy, continued to be made by the commanders on the spot often without referring to Paris for sanction. In turn, confusion was compounded by the alarming rate at which the generals succeeded one another in Algeria. Seven years saw seven generals. First was Clauzel (September 1830); then came Berthezène followed by Rovigo, Voirlol, Drouet d'Erlon, and Clauzel once more in 1835, Domrémyont and Vallery (1837). Often these generals made decisions of their own which contradicted the directives from Paris. Thus Guizot's ministry outlined a reasonably clear policy for Algeria in 1835 which aimed at holding Algiers and a restricted area adjacent to it, but it opposed any further military action outside this area. Guizot, adhering to a laissez-faire policy which believed that colonization should grow spontaneously through private initiative, announced that he did not want the state to participate.

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22 Claude Martin, op.cit., p. 72.
officially in efforts to colonize the land. Clauzel, on the other hand, favoured extending French action and, ignoring warnings from Paris, embarked on colonial ventures of his own creation. He refused to confine his efforts to Algiers and the immediate hinterland, and fired by a grandiose taste for military glory, attempted to extend French control. Disregarding cautionary advice from Paris, he engaged a French army in a disastrous attempt to occupy Constantine in the winter of 1836. Planned hastily and poorly equipped, the expedition failed in its enterprise and was forced to retreat with severe losses, and the French were badly humiliated. The fiasco cost Clauzel his post.

The contradiction of the policies between General Clauzel in Algeria and Guizot's ministry in Paris exemplify the dichotomy of objectives often characteristic of the history of European colonialism, a dichotomy between a central government's policy at home and that of the men-on-the-spot in overseas territories. (This dichotomy, parenthetically was also apparent between London and India.) The men-on-the-spot, in Algeria were often faced with a situation that was not

23 Esquer, op. cit., p. 19.

24 Baude analysed carefully the causes of the failure at Constantine. He was convinced of Clauzel's responsibility in this matter.
always fully appreciated in the mother country, a situation which John S. Galbraith, referring to India, aptly described as that of a "turbulent frontier" where, given the problem of a dangerous but fluid frontier, there is an irresistible temptation to consolidate and defend a position by conquering adjacent territories especially when these territories are not powerful enough to offer serious resistance. 25 The temptation is greater if the hinterland, as in the case in Algeria, consisted of feuding tribes. 26 There was also a tendency for a "turbulent frontier" to expand beyond the limits of Algeria to the neighboring North African States, as was evidenced later by French incursions into Tunisia and Morocco. Desjoubert, having seen this danger at its genesis, warned that France was going to get herself involved more and


26 Local rivalries between the chieftains provided France with an ideal opportunity for diplomatic and military manipulations. To begin with, there was a basic rivalry between a Turkish or Turkified ruling elite and the native Arab leaders. There was the traditional rivalry between the tribes themselves, and also between the Berber speaking Kabyles of the mountains and the Arab tribes of the plains. On another level there were tensions between the religious orders. Four principal religious brotherhoods—the Ta'ibiyya, the Derqawiyya, the Qadiriyya, and the Tijaniyya fought for the spiritual and political mastery of Algeria. (Marcel Emery, L'Algérie à l'époque d'Abd-el-Kader, Paris: 1951, pp. 200-202). On still another level, sometimes overlapping the religious struggle, there was the clash of strong personalities. Abdel Kader fought bitterly with Tijani and considered Ahmad, the Bey of Constantine as a dangerous rival. In the Kabylia, the Berbers hated all strangers and defended their mountainous strongholds against all new comers whether Turk, Arab, or French.
more deeply in Africa and that involvement would be at a
great cost both in armies and in money.

b) The Making of French Algeria: 1838-1848

In the history of Algeria under the July Monarchy,
two distinct periods are apparent: the first, 1830 to 1838,
has already been described as a period of indecision.
French historians refer to it as L'ère des tatonnements.
The second, 1838 to 1848, was by contrast, a period in
which French policy became clear and forceful. France
decided to destroy all native opposition once and for all
and bring the entire country under her own direct domina-
tion as a preliminary step to converting Algeria into a
French territory where a massive colonization of the land
could take place.

The budget for 1838 (voted in 1837) had provided for
the maintenance of an Army of 22,921 men in Algeria. How-
ever, early in 1838, the government told parliament that
the forces in Algeria had increased to 48,000 men and, by
arguing that France was now in an excellent position to
establish herself permanently in Algeria, it was able to
persuade parliament to vote for an emergency budget to
meet the new situation. In Algeria, Marshal Valée

27 Ministère de la Guerre, Tableau de la Situation des
Etablissements Français dans l'Algérie (Paris: L'Imprimerie
Royales, 1838) p. viii. "Le moment est venu d'entrer dans une
voie où l'on puisse marcher avec suite et persévérance. Notre
situation dans l'Algérie permet enfin de s'occuper de l'étab-
lissemement permanent."
decided to reorganize the administration of the province of Constantine by placing French officers as civil governors over the districts. Thus France's total control in Algeria extended to the towns of Algiers, Oran, Bone, Bougie, and Constantine together with limited areas in their vicinity.

In 1837, the province of Oran, with the exception of the coastal towns of Oran, Arzeu and Mostaganem, had been recognized by the Treaty of Tafna (1837) as belonging to Abdel Kader, but 1839 saw a definite turning point. The fight against Abdel Kader was resumed in earnest and finally with the arrival of Marshal Bugeaud, Abdel Kader was eventually destroyed, but only after having presented France with the most formidable resistance she was to experience until 1954.

The Emir's heroic struggle was the more extraordinary because he depended, almost entirely, on his own resources. Unlike the case of the Algerian Liberation Movement (1954-1962), there was no massive assistance forthcoming from sympathetic sources outside Algeria. He had to rely on his own

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28 Constantine finally was occupied by a French army the year following Clauzel's resounding defeat, after four days of intensive bombardment. Ahmad Bey's resistance was determined and the governor-general of Algeria, Damremont was killed in the action.

29 St. John wrote to Palmerston on Feb. 8, 1838 that "He (Valée) evidently wishes to break with Abdel Kader as soon as possible." Great Britain, Public Record Office, F.O. 3/41.
ability, a handful of faithful followers, the very limited help he received from Morocco, and luck. Abdel Kader was born in 1808 into the Hachem family which claimed a descent from the Prophet. His early education, typical of that age in Islam, was based on the Koran and on the Islamic religious traditions. According to one sympathetic biographer, W. Blunt, Abdel Kader's ambition was to become a great marabout (a Moslem sage). During his early lifetime, many prophecies circulated concerning the end of Turkish rule in Algeria and apparently Abdel Kader was regarded as some sort of a messiah who would turn the prophecies into reality. In times of adversity, his fantastic courage, indomitable will, and religious fortitude maintained him when all seemed lost. The tenacity with which he fought his adversary was tempered by a chivalry which many Frenchmen admired but found incongruous in the nineteenth century. It seems that the Emir bore more resemblance to a hero of classical antiquity or a

knight of the Middle Ages than to his contemporaries. 31

Although he failed to impress Baude and Tocqueville as a
great man, Desjoubert regarded him as an admirable leader who
could be entrusted with the task of creating a new state in
Algeria. What were the ambitions Abdel Kader had for Algeria?
Marcel Emerit claims that "Abd-el-Kader's ambition is to gain
independence for the Arabs in Algeria and to unite them under
his scepter. This is a novel conception. It is not based
on the Koran since it (the Koran) does not take into considera-
tion the principle of nationality... His only aim, therefore,
is to establish an Algerian Arab nationality. 32 Most authori-
ties would not go so far in attributing a sort of Arab nation-
alism to Abdel Kader. An interesting alternative is suggested
in Foreign Office correspondence between Algiers, Gibraltar,

31
In a letter to Palmerston, H.B. M.'s Consul St. John,
commented: "It is gratifying to every friend of humanity to
find that Abdel Kader, instead of following the example of the
French in giving no quarter, has in this instance spared the
lives of his prisoners, and it is to be hoped that this system
will be adopted in the future by both sides." Great Britain,
Public Record Office, F.0. 3/43, (St. John to Palmerston,
Aug. 25, 1840).

This commentary is all the more surprising because
St. John was not sympathetic to Abdel Kader whom he regarded
as vain and ambitious. St. John advised Palmerston, on several
occasions to be wary of any approaches Abdel Kader might make
to the British Government and emphasized the danger to Franco-
British relations if such approaches were known to the French-
Great Britain, Public Record Office, F.0. 3/41 (St. John to
Palmerston, Jan. 12, 1836) and G. B., Public Record Office,
F.0. 3/45 (St. John to Palmerston, Feb. 16, 1842).

32
Marcel Emerit, L'Algérie a l'Epoeque d'Abd-el-Kader
and London (Jan. 15 to Feb. 16, 1842). St. John in Algiers had heard "from Gibraltar that a Col. Scott had been sent by the Emir to London with some communication to your Lordship (Palmerston)" and in the meantime, Woodford in Gibraltar had written to Lord Stanley that "Scott represents the Emir as strong in force and means and very desirous of establishing himself as an hereditary Prince and Vassal of the Porte, under the auspices of the European powers."33 If so, Abdel Kader, apparently wanted to follow the example of Muhammad Ali. However, what was to keep Abdel Kader's ambitions from being realized was not the nature of those ambitions, but rather the renewed force of the French military. The war waged by Bugeaud was brutal—even to the point of being described by Desjobert as a war of extermination. Villages and crops were burnt during Bugeaud's relentless razzias (as he called them) and no quarter was given to Abdel Kader's fighters. With ample troops, Bugeaud devastated Abdel Kader's state until the exhausted Emir and his small force had to give up the struggle. In 1847 he surrendered and in spite of promises concerning his safe conduct to an exile in Turkey, he was interned at Pau (in France) by Louis Philippe. Five years later, Napoleon III in an act of spontaneous generosity or because he wanted to impress

33 Great Britain, Public Record Office, F.O. 3/45 (Woodford to Lord Stanley, Gibraltar, Jan. 15, 1842,) and (St. John to Palmerston, Algiers, Feb. 16, 1842.)
people with a dramatic show of liberalism, set Abdel Kader free.

The Government of Algeria, during this period, suffered from an excessive centralization which threatened administrative paralysis. It was dominated by the military figure of Bugeaud who was determined to keep all authority in his own hands. He was as stubborn on the question of government as he was on military colonization, and his régime du sabre was denounced in France as well as in Algeria. The colons, in particular, hated his regime's arbitrary and brutal character.

The period of Bugeaud's generalship also marked the beginning of a serious colonization of Algerian land by European settlers. In the past, Bugeaud had thought that Algeria was not worth colonizing and had referred to it as "un funeste présent de la Restauration à la France", but as soon as he had assumed his new post in 1841 he declared that he would become an ardent colonizer. His firm belief in military discipline affected his approach to colonization and he wanted to imitate the soldier-farmer colonies established in the Roman Empire. Conquering Algeria by the sword and the plough was a philosophy he pursued by inducing French soldiers to settle on Algerian soil. On the other hand, he regarded the civilian colon as a parasite feeding on the army.

and did not give him any encouragement. But France was eager to accelerate the process of colonization, and the prospective colon, knowing that the war with Abdel Kader was turning to the advantage of France, was therefore increasingly more attracted to the idea of settling in Algeria. There was an influx of land-hungry settlers despite Bugeaud's unpopularity; the colon population doubled from 1840 to 1843 and doubled again from 1844 to 1846 to reach a total of over one hundred thousand Europeans. The period from 1838 to 1848 was remarkable for the variety of theories, projects, and experiments in colonization. A few examples will suffice to demonstrate the extent to which this problem stimulated the imagination of Frenchmen. In addition to the military colonies proposed by Bugeaud, which incidently ended in failure, the Saint-Simoniens and in particular Père Enfantin proposed a "colonisation scientifique."35 There was a marked preference in his plan for German peasants because of their discipline and their lack of individuality. The Fouriéristes also proposed a communal experiment in colonization in 1845, believing that Algeria would provide a fresh starting point for their utopian-socialist ideas concerning society.36 Irish immigrants were invited to settle,37 and there was even a project to

36 Julien, op. cit., p. 247.
transplant Maronites from Mount Lebanon to Algeria. Also to be concerned with the problems and challenges of the July Monarchy's inherited acquisition, were Baude, Desjohbert and Tocqueville, the subjects of the present study.

The literature on this subject is quite varied. Louis de Baudicour in La Colonisation de L'Algérie (Paris: Lecoffre, 1856), pp. 234-250, wrote that he proposed in 1847 to transport Maronites from Lebanon to Algeria. He claimed that during the Crusades, Saint-Louis, King of France, "Leur accorda à tous (Maronites), par une Charte, les droits de citoyens français..... Les Maronites, qui sentent toujours couler dans leurs veines du sang français...etc." Baudicour then referred to the political unrest in Mount Lebanon after 1840 and to the fact that the Maronites were being persecuted by the Turks and the Druzes with the tacit support of a perfidious Great Britain. "The Maronites", he said, "form, so to speak, a portion of the French nation in the land of the Orient", and his proposal was designed to save them from an alleged persecution and at the same time, to "consolidate the conquest of Algeria with the added strength of a Christian people who conform to the character of Algeria." Baudicour claims that his project was accepted by the French government but that the Ottoman authorities rejected it.

In 1860, during the disturbances in Mount Lebanon, P. Vaysettes pleaded for the scheme to transplant the Maronites on the soil of Algeria. His book carried a dramatic title; Sauvons les Maronites par L'Algérie et pour l'Algérie (Alger: Bourget, 1860). His arguments were very similar to Baudicour's.

There are also two articles dealing with this subject: G. Yver, "Les Maronites et L'Algérie" Revue Africaine (1920) pp. 185-211 and an anonymous in the Revue de l'histoire des Colonies Françaises entitled, "Maréchal Bugeaud and the Maronites of Lebanon as Colonizers in Algeria." (March-April, 1932), pp. 183-186.

None of these projects materialized and in fact the exact reverse took place during the period of the Mandate.
Chapter II

BAUDE: PARTISAN OF AN ORLEANIST ALGERIA

Among early nineteenth century Frenchmen who showed a deep interest in Algeria was a distinguished administrator who had been at one time or another a Conseiller d'État, a Commissaire du Roi en Afrique, a member of the French Chamber of Deputies for the Loire district, and a chief of the Sûreté of Paris.\(^1\) It was probably through his father, who had served under Kléber in Egypt that Baude acquired his admiration for the policy of Napoleon in the East,\(^2\) and so became aware of the importance of the Mediterranean world and praised Bonaparte's genius for handling the delicate problem of governing the Egyptians.\(^3\) But in spite of this sympathy for Napoleon, Baude was a royalist. He supported the Bourgeois Monarchy, and in regard to Algeria, he promoted the idea of a special regime for Algeria under an Orleanist Viceroy. As member of several commissions on Algeria, he had access to confidential reports. His works reflect a rich

\(^1\) It is unfortunate that, in spite of much research in sources in Lebanon, more biographical information could not be obtained.


\(^3\) Ibid., pp. 271-272.
documentation together with a general critical outlook, and
the sensitivity of a traveller who could appreciate the rich
colours of the Algerian scene. Moreover he was able to trans-
mit his impressions to the reader in a lively style filled
with historical insights and flashbacks.

His two major works on Algeria appeared in 1835 and
1841. The first one, in the form of a long searching art-
cicle in the Revue des Deux Mondes, was entitled: "The System
of Establishment to be Followed in Algeria." The second
work, appearing after a visit to Algeria in 1836, was a
major two-volume work entitled L'Algérie. In these works
intelligent concern for the future of a territory recently
conquered by his country and for the problem of converting
that conquest into an asset rather than a liability is evident.
Algeria, in fact, was probably his major preoccupation in
life; a modest research into the body of his works has shown
almost no material that does not relate to the Algerian
question.

Baude wrote that five years after the fall of Algiers,
France's position in Algeria was still very insecure and the

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4 J.J. Baude, "Du Système d'Etablissement à Suivre en
Algérie," Revue des Deux Mondes, Tome II, (15 April, 1935),
pp. 137-166. His other works are "De l'Esclavage des Noirs
dans le Nord de l'Afrique", Annales Maritimes, Tome I, (1838),
p. 927 and Rapport au Nom de la Commission Chargée de l'Examen
de Projet de Budget pour l'Exercice 1837 (Paris: Ministère de
la Guerre, 1836), p. 113.
sacrifice, in terms of money and soldiers, exceeded by far the meagre returns. He began his 1835 article by stating that "the conquest of Algiers is costing France thirty million francs a year and is keeping thirty thousand soldiers fully occupied." The profit derived from this colossal sacrifice was almost nil and it did not surprise him that Algiers was regarded in some quarters as a burden to be discarded, the sooner the better. He noted that the process of colonization had impeded French-Algerian commerce rather than increased it and had caused a devastation of Algerian land instead of contributing to agricultural production; besides, there did not seem to be any program forthcoming that included a more rational expenditure of arms and of funds that would remedy the situation. And considering the newly conquered territory from a military point of view, he asked, "What would happen to France if a war on the continent of Europe were to break out.... would the expeditionary force presently committed in Algeria be in a position to protect France's independence?" Baude's answer, stated with vehemence, was "assurément non."
The strategic implication of diverting a comparatively large portion of the French Army to Algeria and the results of this move in terms of France's potential to defend herself in Europe clearly alarmed Baude. The dilemma of France was serious. Strategically speaking, to keep an army of conquest and of occupation on Algerian soil would have disastrous consequences. It would cripple the power of France to wage war in Europe, and since wars had occurred in Europe with a frequency of one every twenty years, and since the present was pregnant with issues which made a clash conceivable (i.e. the Belgian crises, the border with Germany along the Rhine, the Eastern Question complicated further by Muhammad Ali's ambitions), France must keep her power intact. Baude stated his concern regarding the state of France's defenses in 1835 but developed it more comprehensively in his *L'Algérie* (1841). French forces in Algeria totalling thirty-five thousand men in 1835 had already doubled by 1840, handicapping France all the more. These were employed either in chasing elusive Arabs all over the Algerian countryside or in protecting conquered territory. They would hardly be of help to the safety of France if suddenly she was faced with "powerful enemies in the Alps or on the Rhine."8 Insisting that the principal interests of France were not in Africa but in

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Europe, he anticipated Delcassé's view of fifty years later (during the Fashoda Crisis) that France should not be involved in a war with England over African interests and even anticipated an argument used much later during the Algerian Revolution—that a military commitment in Algeria would weaken NATO and so French interests in Europe. Arguing the point further, Baude drew upon history for an apt example. If Napoleon, in 1813 had not committed a substantial military force to the Spanish peninsula, the enemies of France would have been checked and the country saved from invasion.

In addition to his observations concerning the strategic implications of maintaining a large army in Algeria, Baude also criticized the actual conduct of the war and the manner in which military campaigns were prepared. He was critical of the quality of troops fighting in Algeria and called for a removal of incompetent and inexperienced soldiers. He argued that an army of twenty thousand men selected from troops actually present in Algeria would operate more efficiently than the fifty thousand that were being then employed. This reduced but highly efficient army would live in well designed quarters, be given intensive training,

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9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., p. vi.
11 Ibid., II, 375.
and be provided with special equipment for the conditions of Algerian warfare.\textsuperscript{12} Cavalry forces with lighter equipment and smaller horses, would be used to match the highly mobile Arab horsemen.\textsuperscript{13} The Arab fighter was a slippery figure who would not commit the folly of fighting in the open. He possessed, by instinct, a primitive notion of guerilla tactics which the rigidity of the French methods of combat could not overcome.\textsuperscript{14} Baude stressed that warfare in Europe was not the same as warfare in Algeria. Hardly practical were the sluggish columns which blundered their way through the countryside in search of an invisible enemy. "How is it", Baude asked, "that with fifty thousand men, we are not able to overcome the resistance of Arabs who used to tremble before five or six thousand Turks. There is therefore something wrong with our system. The Arabs have not changed and in order to force them to submit, we have to use special troops with an organization, training and equipment suitable to the situation."\textsuperscript{15} Baude went on to describe his own method of overcoming resistance; a method that was later to be associated with General Bugeaud. Baude was remarkably

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 377.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 380.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 381.
prophetic when he wrote that the real conqueror of Algeria would have to display the qualities of "Caesar fighting in Gaul" by remembering that his task consisted more in pacifying a rebellious population than in defeating armies in the open. Thus, encounters with the enemy would have to be short but hard-hitting; the rebel would have to be constantly harassed and his property destroyed and, the land itself relentlessly devastated. Not only was this type of warfare necessary, Baude asserted, but every chance should be taken of pitting one tribe against another and so ruling by dividing.

To illustrate his criticisms of the military, Baude devoted a chapter to the disastrous campaign against Constantine in 1836. He did not have much sympathy for the leader of the expedition, General Clauzel, and felt that he should be held responsible for the fiasco. He accused Clauzel of misleading the government in Paris, and he denounced the illusions of a general who could claim fictiously that "his personal influence on the native Algerians was at least equal to that of Abdel Kader's." In evaluating the causes for the failure at Constantine, Baude focused his attention on two principal points: the lack of adequate

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16 Ibid., II, 433.
17 Ibid., I, 315.
preparation and the time of year chosen for the expedition. There was a deplorable shortage of transport and the rainy season had started making movement of the columns difficult. No provision had been made for extra supplies in case the army was slowed down. In addition, the wrong sort of artillery had been brought. Siege guns were needed to reduce the defenses of Constantine, but instead, the expedition used light artillery that not only was not of much use but, moreover, impeded the progress of the army.\(^\text{18}\) According to Baude, Clauzel did not have the courage to explain the real causes for the failure. He was trying to avoid responsibility and the excuse he gave for the retreat before Constantine was flimsy and dishonorable. It seemed that a French unit had looted the supplies intended for the entire expedition and Clauzel claimed that he had been forced to lift the siege because of this.\(^\text{19}\)

In addition to France's military errors, Baude thought that she was neglecting an important lesson to be learned from Abdel Kader. Up to now, France had not given her attention to economic development as a possible solution to her difficulties in Algeria. A war of conquest was too costly and destructive. On the other hand, the language of

\(^\text{18}\) Ibid., I, 345-346.

\(^\text{19}\) Ibid., pp. 343-344.
commercial interests could be as effective as the language of war and France should explore this new possibility. Abdel Kader, having recognized the exhaustion of the Arabs and the fact that they had not responded to his *Jihad* with any intensity, "decided to consolidate his position through peace and commerce." Having been particularly impressed by Muhammad Ali's economic experiments in Egypt which he had analyzed carefully during a pilgrimage to Mecca, Abdel Kader instituted a system of state monopolies very much like Muhammad Ali's. But the Emir could not, even so, compete with the "free trade conditions enjoyed by Arabs in territories under French administration." The Algerian leader, perceiving that sooner or later, his own partisans would be lured away by the advantages of the *Pax Gallica*, preferred to resume the war in order to preserve his power. Baude knew that France was unconsciously using an economic argument against Abdel Kader, but he wanted her to be more conscious of it and to intensify her economic campaign.

22 *Ibid*.
23 *Ibid*.
24 *Ibid.*, II, 161. This reason for Abdel Kader resuming the war is Baude's and is not entirely correct. France's own responsibility for the resumption of the war after the Treaty of Tafna is no longer in dispute.
What Baude was advocating, in effect, was a rational plan of economic warfare to complement the military effort. By promoting the idea of trade protected by the French flag, a community of interests would be given birth with the result that the Algerians would then prefer to see the system perpetuated rather than to oppose it by force of arms. The Algerian economy was vulnerable since the territories in the interior had to depend on a safe access to the sea also on the safety of caravan routes. Baude claimed that a policy of protecting caravan routes would contribute significantly to improving the political situation within Algeria. Thus Sheikh Tijani, a powerful local leader, was interested in ensuring that the caravan trade passed through Ain Mahdy. Tijani who was already an enemy of Abdel Kader, was encouraged in his hostility to the Emir, by understanding perfectly well that France was the only power he could depend on to keep Ain Mahdy secure and its trade flourishing. If France aimed at improving the conditions of commerce in Algeria, the amicable relations with Tijani could be exploited. Hence, Baude's originality as a critic of the Algerian scene lay in his recognition of other alternatives besides the purely military solution. He advocated an economic type of war that was positive since it aimed at

25 Ibid., pp. 163-164.

26 Ibid., pp. 176-179.
improving the conditions of commerce in Algeria, interior caravan trade as well as to maritime commerce.

Critical of French military and economic policies, Baude also questioned the administrative methods of the French and the type of government they seemed to be establishing. He felt France was simply transplanting her own institutions to an alien soil. "France was placing a cavalry saddle on a camel", he suggested. The whole success or failure of France in Algeria depended on the way governing institutions were organized. To be successful, they should be in harmony with the character of the population. The sociological disparities between France and Algeria were too basic to be bridged successfully. Baude claimed to have studied the problem seriously and stated: "I have tried, first of all, to learn their (the Algerians) social state...and I came to realize, finally, why the Turkish dominion over Algeria was exercised with the help of eight thousand men while ours by contrast is so uncertain." Furthermore, Baude commented that a realistic outlook recognized the fact that "fusion is impossible," although he did not give the reasons.

27 Ibid., I, iii.
28 Baude uses the expression "état social".
29 Baude, "Du Système...", p. 139.
30 Baude, L'Algérie, I, vii.
Baude was particularly vehement in his denunciation of administrative centralization in Algeria. He argued that this child of French metropolitan institutions was a failure in Algeria and the cause of a great number of abuses. The people of Algeria considered it an imposition and it did not even satisfy those imposing it.\textsuperscript{31} A centralized form of government, organized and directed by Paris, would eventually give birth to a desire for independence from the mother country; a situation which Spain and England had experienced in America: \textsuperscript{32} "Conquering nations have often lost valuable possessions because of a desire to govern directly with institutions that are typical of the conquering nations."\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Ibid.}, p. vii. In actual fact Baude was a great admirer of England's decentralization policies in her colonies although he does mention England's failure in North America. This admiration is present in his two major works on Algeria: "The English are successful in preserving their hold over colonies. They organize their possessions by respecting the special characteristics that pertain to each one of them. The local authority is given complete power in government thus making action more effective and more responsible. There is little fear that decentralization would cause a break in unity. On the contrary, it results in an identity of political direction especially because the possibility of friction on minor details is greatly reduced. The success of Algeria does not depend, therefore, on a direct imposition of metropolitan forms of administration. On the contrary, such a policy alienates the population." Baude, \textit{L'Algérie}, I, xvii-xviii.

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Ibid.}, p. xvii.
obstacle to subjection was the lack of homogeneity of the provinces which were different in their respective "mores, cultures, sects, and commercial relations." Referring to the province of Bone, Baude prescribed that it be "freed from a centralized military regime that is causing it to remain sterile." What this province needed was a local administration (régie par une administration immédiate). For Algeria, Baude proposed that the ridiculous policy of imposed tutelage be changed into a policy which dealt with Algeria as a loose association and that France preserve the Algerian nationality (nationalité) of the Arabs rather than submit it with a direct form of rule. It should be noted that the tone of Baude's criticism is practical rather than philosophical. He did not seem to be against the idea of centralization in all cases and assumed that it worked perfectly well in France.

The process of colonization that the French employed did not escape the disapproval of Baude either. Most advocates of Algerian colonization under the July Monarchy tended to be extreme in their views. They wanted to force the Arabs out of the fertile farmlands and to substitute, in their place,

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34 Ibid., p. xxi.
35 Ibid., p. xxv.
36 Ibid.
a European population of farmers. Baude opposed these views on practical rather than ethical grounds. He wrote that "the partisans of colonization would like to extend to Algeria the most permanent form of all controls which is the settlement and exploitation of land."37 The advocates of this plan flattered themselves into thinking that Algeria could be an Eldorado and Baude reminded them that their plans could only work in America where the ground was virginal and unoccupied.38 In Algeria, in contrast, the conditions of the land did not resemble the American situation. Algerian land was occupied by Arabs and by Kabyles who would fight hard to protect their rights of ownership. What the 'colonizers' wanted in fact, said Baude, was a "transposition of property from the hands of their present owners to that of civilized Europeans... (a transposition) that would frankly cause a complete social revolution and lead to the most bitter of wars."39 To use Baude's expression, the 'so-called colons' were a bunch of mere speculators eager to make a quick profit without risking their

37 Baude, "Du Système..." p. 141.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
capital. He saw no possible advantages to be derived from such an unrestrained colonization of the land since it could be only achieved by brute force because a large army would have to remain in Algeria in order to protect European farmers from those who had lost their lands. This would not only involve a prohibitive price but it would also leave the colons at the mercy of events in Europe since a European war would necessitate a withdrawal of troops from Algeria leaving the colons completely defenseless.

Although Baude doubted the value of Algeria, for the reasons given so far he felt nevertheless that Algeria could be turned to profit. The case was not hopeless. If the present policy of unlimited warfare was abandoned in favour of a careful plan aimed at the control of strategic points on the Algerian coastline, then a military disadvantage to France could become a source of naval strength. Algerian bases

40 Baude also made certain general observations as to the nature of the colons. He claimed that Frenchmen were quite happy to remain at home in France; there was no pressure on emigration. (Baude, L'Algérie, II, 249) He was probably referring to the fact that emigration was often caused by religious and economic pressures. He noted that the French population of Algeria was less than half of the total European population and that the mortality rate of colons was twice as high as the rate in France. He further indicated that colonization seemed to attract the unsettled type of Frenchman and that life in Algeria seemed to cause the European to drink excessively. To illustrate, he gives the following figures: "627 licenses for cabarets have been issued... to 405 Frenchmen, 212 other Europeans and 10 Jews." (Ibid., p. 238)

41 Ibid., I, ix.
could be a useful support to the French navy and they would enlarge its scope of operations. Warships would be able to use the Algerian coast as well as Toulon and Corsica. Interested in naval affairs, Baude devoted a large chapter in L'Algérie to an analysis of the maritime potential of the Algerian coastline. At first he wanted to "realize Napoleon's great dream of converting the Mediterranean Sea into a French lake." This was his view in 1835 but by 1840 he was to modify it. "We do not pretend," he said, "to have the right which Rome had to refer to the Mediterranean as NOTRE MER, nor do we pretend to possess the power to turn it into a LAC FRANÇAIS as Napoleon thought he could at a time when France controlled Malta and Egypt. But although we reject the idea of exerting our domination over this sea we can not, in turn, suffer that of any other power over it." The combination of Toulon, Corsica and the bases along the Algerian coast would match England's powerful Mediterranean combination of Gibraltar, Malta, and Corfu. According to Baude, then,

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42 Ibid., II, Chapter 13.
43 Baude, "Du Système...", p. 165.
44 Baude, L'Algérie, I, xiii.
45 Baude, "Du Système...", p. 162.
France should consider Algeria as a future naval establishment. Efforts should be concentrated to acquire strategically located bases and to "create an Algerian navy capable of supporting the French navy effectively."46

Besides being of strategic military use to France, a naval establishment in Algeria would also improve trading facilities enabling France to expand her commerce.47 A historical study of the Algerian coast proved to Baude the effectiveness of the Algerians as seafaring people. Five years before the French conquest, fourteen men-of-war and a considerable number of coastal trading vessels operated from the port of Algiers.48 Baude observed that powerful Arab navies were being assembled by the Imam of Muscat on the Arabian coast and by Muhammad Ali in Egypt.49 Baude could dream of a French sponsored Algerian navy cooperating both in military and in commerce with the Arab navies of Muscat and Egypt. Thus, to France's benefit, a community of interests would link the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea and the Arabian

46 L'Algerie, I, x.
47 Ibid., p. xv.
48 Ibid., II, 189.
49 Ibid., p. 196.
Finally, the establishment of a naval Algeria would solve France's chronic shortage of naval crews as Algerian seamen could be used to make up the shortages. Opposing abandonment because Algeria could be of value, what proposals did Baude make for the governing of Algeria? In 1835, he had already proposed a compromise solution for the Algerian problem. It was a compromise between the total abandonment of the colony and the policy of an unrestricted colonization of the land. The second proposal outlined in L'Algérie (1841) was more original. It called for the establishment of an Algerian State with a character of its own, but which was also to be closely associated with France having at its head a viceroy from the House of Orleans. It was a partisan solution rising from Baude's desire to support the Orleanist cause.

At first, Baude was more interested in applying to Algeria the same sort of policy which the Turks had elaborated. He noted that they had been able to dominate Algeria for

50 Baude may have been hinting to the Suez Canal project because he wrote an article on the subject. "De l'Isthme de Suez et du Canal maritime à ouvrir de la Méditerranée à la Mer Rouge." Revue des Deux Mondes (Paris: 1855), p. 36.

51 Baude, op. cit., p. 198.

52 Baude wrote in his foreword that his goal "is not to cast blame...what is needed is not criticism but solutions" L'Algérie (1841).
three centuries by using a simple and effective formula: "To us (the Turks) the towns and the sea coast; to you (the Arabs) the interior." The Turks preferred not to intervene in the affairs of the hinterland unless called in to act as mediators between warring factions. Impressed by such a policy, Baude proposed that France imitate the Turks by avoiding entanglement in the affairs of the interior. To show the merit of a policy of disengagement, he pointed to its success in India and Egypt during the Napoleonic interlude. What it would involve would be the transferring of the direction of Algerian affairs from the hands of 'Grands Seigneurs' and of military commanders to a rational administration whose main preoccupation would be commerce. The future was to depend entirely on the adoption of such policies. Baude, mindful of the religious issue, proposed that his governing bodies show a tolerant attitude towards Islamic institutions and ensure the protection of local customs and property. So far, France had failed to convince the Arabs that she was not an opponent of

53 Baude, "Du Système...", p. 146.

54 Ibid. Baude here discussed at length England's policy of decentralization in India. The English seemed eager to respect the customs of the native population. They did not permit the European to settle on the land or to mix with the people. Thus the social and political structure of the country was preserved. The only addition by Britain was the creation of commercial interests.

55 Ibid.
Islam. A number of gross blunders had been committed which had alienated more than necessary the world of Islam. The confiscation of the Habous property (the Algerian equivalent of the Wūqūf) had disturbed the Algerians and as a result, Baude pointed out, Mecca was deprived of her traditional revenues. Baude’s solution consisted of asking for an official recognition of France’s position in Algeria in return for the remittance, once more, of this highly symbolic revenue to Mecca. In short, what Baude proposed in 1835 was an intelligent and practical solution to the problems of Algeria. He wanted to see the old Turkish system applied, and it is difficult to deny that such a system had proved to be successful in practice for three hundred years. He rejected the two extreme policies of the total abandonment of the colony and of its unrestricted colonization. His solution was an Aristotelian golden mean which the Turks had been intelligent enough to follow. "In one word", said Baude, "the history of the past, the experience of the present, everything points to the fact that the effective domination and civilization (of Algeria) can be accomplished only by imitating the political organization of the Turks and by developing the commercial potential of the country." But Baude’s balanced

56 Ibid., p. 155. Improving the relations with Turkey constituted another urgent matter for Baude. France had "to find a way of negotiating the Algerian question with the Sublime Porte." Ibid., p. 162.

57 Baude, it would seem, had not realized that the Turks’ task in Algeria was facilitated because they were Muslims.
solution which he put forth in 1835 was to give place to a more elaborate and original one in 1840 when he noted that in spite of a tremendous effort, the occupation had so far proven a failure.\textsuperscript{58} But this did not mean that the failure was caused by something intrinsic in the character of Algeria. Baude was convinced that the causes lay with France who had to learn more about this 'mysterious land' and to stop saddling it with the centralized institutions of metropolitan governments.\textsuperscript{59} As discussed above France had also to change her military approach, in the first place, because a large army in Algeria could be maintained only at the expense of France's internal security in case of war in Europe, and, in the second place, because the type of warfare waged by the army in Algeria was inefficient. Instead of seeking to pacify the population, the army was extending the war in the manner of a geometric progression. Instead of winning over the local population by a careful regard for their religion and property, France was thinking in terms of an unrestricted

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 152.

\textsuperscript{59} Baude had exclaimed, "When I think of what we have done in Algeria in ten years at such tremendous cost and what we could have done in France with this effort, I regret to say, that if this condition were to persist, it would be wiser to abandon the territory immediately." (\textit{L'Algérie}, I, iv.) "Only madmen can believe that a domination exerted from Paris and subject to the caprices of a parliamentary regime, will be treated with respect and affection by the Algerian Arabs." (\textit{Ibid.}, II, 434.)
colonization of the land which would, in effect, amount to a permanent struggle. Perturbed by this state of affairs, Baude elaborated his solution. His major premise was that "it is better to have Algeria as an ally than as a subjugated territory." His long term goal, therefore, was to turn the country into a "political satellite of France which would resemble the relation of Hanover to Britain while at the same time preserving natural institutions of Algeria." Behind this was his general theory that states may be overthrown by war but that a population can only be won over by a careful exercise of one's wisdom. The needs and special interest of a population must remain the supreme guide to action. Otherwise "we lose control; our conquest is at the mercy of events, and in fact, being disgusted with the whole thing, we are heading towards l'abandon." The regime chosen by Baude, most capable of intelligent rule, was one headed by a prince.

"We bicker bitterly over the causes of a failure for which we alone are responsible. The shortcomings of a military regime makes us wish for a civilian government and we forget that this too has its own weaknesses. The Chef Suprême of a land as vast as Algeria

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60 Ibid., I, xv.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., II, 432.
63 Ibid., p. 430.
must wield the sword as well as the hand of justice and this double charge is too heavy for a simple citizen to carry. A princely rule is the only reality that has enough authority and stability to ensure the foundation of a new establishment. We will surely fail if we persist in forcing Algeria into a metropolitan mould."64

Baude's concrete proposal for the future of Algeria was in the form of fifteen articles with which he ended his two-volume work. The articles were brief but they cover a variety of subjects. In them great emphasis was placed on maritime considerations (for instance articles 10, 11, and 14). Article 12 would permit Algerians to enroll in France's army, navy, and special schools. Article 5 provided for the protection of Algerians residing abroad through the channels of France's diplomatic and consular agencies. But the first two articles were the most significant:

"I. Algeria forms, under France's patronage, a state that is regulated by an administration and an institutional system of its own. However, France will regulate its foreign relations.

II. Algeria is governed by a French prince appointed by the King of France. This prince will bear the title of Viceroy and will be invested with all governing powers including the legislative, administrative, and military powers. This viceroy will swear allegiance to the King of France and will promise to govern in accordance with the common interests of France and Algeria. He will not have any relations with foreign powers except through French diplomatic representation. France will allocate to the viceroy an annual donation."65

64 Ibid., II, 435.

65 Ibid., p. 436.
Thus, Baude concluded, "Algeria will have a nationality."66

In regard to Baron J.J. Baude's solution to the Algerian question in 1840, it is possible to formulate several conclusions. One might dismiss the solution as simply the work of a partisan of the House of Orleans who was trying to promote a cause either because it was sacred to him or because he had a vested interest in it. However much truth there may be in these reasons, it is also possible to argue that Baude's solution, regardless of its motivation, was a positive one. In fact, one might add, it was a revolutionary one for the age in which Baude lived. To begin with, the responsible contemporary solutions to colonial problems that were formulated in the same spirit as Baude's were not numerous. Even Durham's famous report for the future of Canada referred to a territory founded on new ground by people of a European civilization. The report was not meant to be implemented in a territory like India where the society was not European. Baude's plan, on the other hand, was more radical as it called for a transformation of a conquered territory still inhabited by its original occupants with European immigrants numbering only twenty-five thousand of which less than ten thousand were French citizens, into an autonomous state. The solution was original also since it envisioned the establishment of a nation-state, something that Algeria had not

66 Ibid., p. 441.
experienced before. Baude's idea of a royalist state would not have been considered as going against the force of contemporary political progress, since it was customary in the nineteenth century to provide new states with monarchs. Judged by practical and not by ethical criteria, Baude's plan could have been a successful gamble especially when one considers the fact that Algeria was still very far from the days when its European population was to reach a million colons. The state demanded by Baude would have had to absorb only twenty-five thousand Europeans and, it must be remembered, that he consistently opposed any plans to colonize the land at the expense of its Algerian owners. Lastly, an Algerian nation-state would have perhaps succeeded in filling the power vacuum created by the destruction of the local authority in Algiers and Constantine. It is true that this was France's responsibility, but if the question is viewed in terms of the idea of a progressive government machinery (so dear to the minds of nineteenth century Europeans) then France was doing Algeria a favour by destroying the power of the Dey of Algiers and of Ahmed of Constantine, who could hardly be called ideal rulers as they epitomized blind despotic rule without the hope of future reform.

That Baude stressed, throughout his work, the desire of finding a solution that would be in harmony with the nature of things in Algeria makes it appear that he was contradicting himself. It could be argued that a French principality
in an Islamic North African society would not create harmony but would only cause disruption. But a possible answer to this objection is that abandon, the only alternative Baude saw, would have plunged Algeria into civil war. But was there not also a possibility, a more radical one to be sure, which Baude missed—that of creating a principality under a native rather than a French prince, that is Abdel Kader? Would not this have answered Baude’s call for a government in harmony with this reality of the Algerian situation? It is this possibility which Desjobert, the next subject of this study, was to envisage. In anticipation, however, one might suggest, and this only speculatively, that a foreign prince alone might have been able to get Arab and Berber to cooperate; that an Abdel Kader, despite a common religion, might have been less able than an Orleanist prince of inspiring Berber confidence in a regime free from a long legacy of internecine rivalries.

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67 The hostility between Abdel Kader and Tijani is one example of such an explosive possibility.
Chapter III

DEJSJOBERT: `GAD-FLY TO THE COLONIALISTS

In 1846, after France had carried out a variety of experiments in Algeria for sixteen years, Amédée Desjubert looked at the situation and remarked: "What is the net result of all our victories? -- A thousand bulletins and the enormous paintings of Horace Vernet."¹

Desjubert has been considered the most intransigeant opponent of Algerian colonization during the periods of the July Monarchy and the Second Republic.² This opposition was expressed categorically in his first two works published in 1837 and 1838 as well as in his other works published in 1844 and 1846. On one occasion he was a member of a special commission which also included Tocqueville set up in the House to study Algerian Problems.³ As a representative of the Seine-Inférieure in the Chamber of Deputies from 1833 to 1848, he tried to inform his electors of the situation in

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² Julien, Claude Martin, Vâlet, Berque, J.J. Chevalier, and A. Jardin are all of the same opinion in this respect.

North Africa. His writings reflect the zeal of an idealist, a liberal-economist in the tradition of J.B. Say, and a dedicated parliamentarian. This chapter presents his evaluation of the influence the Algerian problem had upon public opinion, his views on the possibility of genocide, his ideas on colonization, and his proposed solution to the Algerian problem.

Public Opinion

Desjoubert claimed that a group of men were manipulating public opinion and exploiting it as a powerful weapon to advance their sordid interests in Algeria. "Public opinion", said Desjoubert, "is always regarded as a respectable thing because it allegedly expresses only the truth. However public opinion can occasionally be the expression of an error and a lie." In regard to Algeria, his point was that a group of powerful speculators had succeeded in corrupting public opinion and winning it to their point of view by using highly emotional language: "They talked about national honor, military glory, and used the terminology that always succeeds

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4 Desjoubert's L'Algérie en 1846 is dedicated to the electors of the arrondissement of Neuilly (Seine-Inférieure).

in stirring French hearts with noble sentiments." These exploiters of Algerian lands were able to convince public opinion in France that any sensible questioning of the policies of colonization was equivalent to supporting a policy of l'abandon. In addition, by presenting a simplified version of the basic historical rivalry between France and England, they were able to persuade many Frenchmen that England would like nothing better than to see France abandon Algeria so that it would eventually become a British possession. But, said Desjobert, "the English are not at all keen to see France leave Algiers." To support this assertion, he referred to an address a General Clauzel before the House in which the ex-governor general affirmed Britain's support for France's
Algerian presence. Another tactic of the colons and their supporters in winning over public opinion was to have a Chamber of Commerce in Algiers circulate economic reports to the chambers in France and act as a sort of propaganda bureau in the financial circles of the country. Its efforts were aided by Marseilles, which now considered itself as a guardian angel to the new possession and to the cause of the colons. Desjobert noted that the bloc of Southern France in the House

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9 Ibid., p. 11. Clauzel's address was as follows: "Europe and England desire that France should keep this colony. England wants to see France colonize and she has expressed this wish through her ambassador. In Parliament, Mr. Peel explained this point of view stating that he is not indulging in politics of sentiment but in politics of interest and these demanded that France colonizes Algiers because there are now more English ships trading in Algiers in six months than there were in any three years. I have never heard foreign representatives complain about our colonizing projects. During my five month's residence in Algiers, the diplomatic representative of England called on me at headquarters and informed me that he had received express instructions from his government not to oppose any moves that the French commander, namely myself, might make with regard to colonization."

A perusal of the diplomatic correspondence between Consul St. John, England's representative in Algiers and the Foreign Office confirms Clauzel's statements regarding the British attitude towards Algeria. St. John referred often to the increased benefits England was deriving from trade with French Algeria. In 1843, he wrote to Palmerston as follows:

"Looking at the occupation of this Regency in a commercial point of view, it appears that Great Britain reaps a great advantage, not only from the great increase in manufactures and coals disposed of by it, but by the employment of upwards of five thousand Maltese everyone of whom, when in health, is able to earn a comfortable livelihood."

(the Midi) was forever campaigning in favour of the extension of colonization.\textsuperscript{10} If Marseilles was the guardian of Algerian colonization, Desjobert was the guardian of public opinion against falsehood. He claimed that it was his duty as a representative of the people to defend their interests even in spite of themselves.\textsuperscript{11} Algeria presented an excellent field where the government could gain popularity by according favours to certain interests\textsuperscript{12}, and France should know that its government was using the colony to satisfy the private ambitions of soldiers and politicians.

According to Desjobert, public opinion had also been led to think that Algeria was an added source of strength to France, while in actual fact, "the way Algeria was being administered ensured that France's political power would be weakened, her finances undermined, and her commerce, contrary to popular opinion, adversely affected."\textsuperscript{13} He claimed that the government and the press were constantly exploiting the image of France's new status as a power; "but", he retorted, "it is difficult to conceive how an enterprise absorbing eighty thousand men and devouring one hundred million francs

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 13.
\item \textsuperscript{11} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 15.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Desjobert, \textit{L'Algérie en 1844}, (Paris: Guillaumin, 1844), p. 3.
\item \textsuperscript{13} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 11.
\end{itemize}
a year without any returns, could ever augment our power."

The strategic gains were unimportant. Toulon was the real center of French naval power and France's position had not improved strategically by the occupation of territory in the Regency of Algiers. Nor should Frenchmen be deluded into thinking that Algeria was providing a good training ground for French soldiers. The type of warfare waged in Algeria was demoralizing and caused the army to commit many excesses. France should be informed "that each year Algeria plunders our families removing 20,685 young men—one third of whom never return. It has to be told that the survivor returns with an infirm body and barbarous habits."

It is remarkable how full Algerian history is of recurring themes and how many of Desjober's arguments were repeated a century later during the bitter conflict over Algerian independence.

Another fallacy that the colonial bloc led people to believe was that the one hundred thousand soldiers deployed in Algeria were there only temporarily and that as soon as Abdel Kader's power was destroyed, this army would be recalled to France. Desjober perceived, contrary to the colon's

14 Ibid., p. 153.


16 Desjober, L'Algérie en 1846, p. 110.
assertion, that the country was being dragged into yet further
conquests. He claimed that Marshal Bugeaud had asked for an
extra ten thousand men for his proposed campaign in the
Kabylia and France was preparing herself for a serious clash
with Morocco. Desjoubert's words are eloquent: "Ever since
1837, I have warned", he said, "that a war with Morocco is
an inevitable extension of our present commitment in Algeria.
...It is frightening how the press and the 'tribune' are
pushing us today in this direction....Not content with the
one hundred thousand men already in Algeria, they would like
to push another hundred thousand into Morocco. What are we
then going to do when we have two hundred thousand soldiers
in Africa?" 17 Finally, the colonial interest, Desjoubert
argued, had succeeded in over-simplifying the causes for
native resistance. The colons and their friends described
the struggle in Algeria as being essentially a war between
"the four hundred bad horsemen of Abdel Kader and the
hundred thousand good soldiers of France." 18 However
Desjoubert argued the reality was something quite different.
The French army in Algeria represented a physical force which
no other physical force could overcome. The Arabs, on the
other hand, were opposing it with a different sort of force

17 Ibid., p. 16.
18 Ibid., p. 17.
a spiritual one. "The Arabs (were) defending a nationality, a religion, and the family...and physical force cannot overcome ideas, sentiments, and passions. Abdel Kader with no physical force, and no soldiers, no organization, no financial resources (was) nevertheless able to summon sympathy, assent and obedience everywhere because he embodied the ideas, the sentiments, and the passions of the country."19 Desjobert did not entertain the popular illusion over the future of Algeria once Abdel Kader was destroyed. His prophetic conjecture might be stated in full:

"The partisans of colonization in Algeria who repeated every morning for twelve years: let us capture Abdel Kader and all our troubles will be over, display little sense. The death of Abdel Kader would not change our position, nor that of the Arabs. We will always be regarded as the enemies of their religion and their nationality as well as the destroyers of their family structure and the invaders of their property. They will always hold on to the same interests, the same ideas, the same passions. After Abdel Kader, another man will rise who will represent these ideas, sentiments, and passions. He might take some time to manifest himself but he will eventually appear because each period always produces the man for the moment."20

19 Ibid., p. 18.
20 Ibid.
Extermination

On the basis of information he believed correct, Desjoubert became convinced that the French policy to colonize Algeria with Europeans included a policy of native extermination, a policy that was brutal and heartless, and foreign to the conscience of the French populace. Considering Bugeaud's scorched-earth warfare and the literature which glorified the refoulement of the native Algerians, Desjoubert found it easy and logical to believe that the French army was engaged in an Algerian genocide. His reaction was sharp and to the point: "The politiques having decreed the extermination of the Arabs, the savants (were) busy establishing its theoretical legality." And he supported his accusation with concrete evidence. Doctor Bodichon, for instance, believed that the Arab race in Algeria and Morocco was inevitably doomed and

21 Ibid., p. 23. Desjoubert quoted Bugeaud's famous declaration to the Arabs: "You will not plough, you will not sow, you will not graze, without our permission." And to the Kabyles, Bugeaud announced: "I will go into your mountains, I will burn your villages and your crops and I will cut down your fruit trees." Desjoubert also presented Bugeaud's definition of his type of warfare. "A sudden attack which aims to surprise the tribes, kill the men and capture the women, children, and cattle...." Bugeaud's reason for the razzias: "The power of Abdel Kader depends on the economic resources of his tribes; therefore in order to ruin his power, it is necessary to ruin the Arabs...We have burnt and destroyed on a large scale." (Ibid.)

22 Ibid.
that its extinction would benefit humanity. Desjober also cited Professor of Agriculture, M. Moll, who was sent to study agricultural improvement in Algeria and who remarked: "The entire earth belonged by right to civilization and that a weak race must necessarily disappear as did the anti-deluvian animals... The 1200 years old Arab domination over Algeria was doomed...(and)... France in planting her flag in Algeria, etc." (the etc. is Desjober's). Desjober also referred to remarks made by three generals. According to General de Castellane, the French army "subjugated the country with an arsenal of axes and matches...(and) became the masters of a population reduced to a state of famine and despair." General Letang claimed that "the methods of warfare adopted by the French army in Algeria were obviously designed either to push the Arabs into the desert or to exterminate them completely." General Duvivier was certain of the fact that "an increasingly ferocious campaign of massacre and destruction had developed in the past eleven years." Desjober quoted

23 Ibid., p. 22. Bodichon's statement is a timid preview of Gobineau's Essay on the Inequality of Races, which appeared a few years later in 1853.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., p. 23.
26 Ibid., p. 24.
27 Ibid.
in his own support Lamartine's statement that the news of France's terrible warfare was echoing through the Moslem world and that the "execution of Dahra was felt in Syria and Christians were burnt in their churches."  

It is easy to see from this collection of "witnesses" how Desjebert concluded, although wrongly, that the French were involved in a program of extermination. In reality, however, the majority of the Algerian population living in the towns and in the territory under French control was not affected by the so-called war of extermination, and even in the unconquered areas, any possible attempt at extermination was limited, usually, to specific military targets, i.e. to the Algerians engaged in actual combat against the French army.

But it is to the credit of Desjebert that he denounced all forms of extermination, direct and indirect on moral grounds. In referring to a passage in the Democracy In America, in which Tocqueville claimed that "the ruin of these people (the American Indians) began when the Europeans landed on their shores," 29 Desjebert was convinced that this

28 Ibid. The 'Dahra execution' is a reference to one of the more horrible episodes of the conquest of Algeria in which a large group of Algerians were 'smoked' to death in a cave by the French army.

29 La Question, p. 65.
should not happen to the Arabs in Algeria. "To repeat the American example," he said, "would be to violate morality." And Desjebert felt certain that the French conscience would rebel against such an action. Thus we observe the 'gad-fly' worried, but resolute, amassing information, presenting forcefully his evidence, and exaggerating the issue in order, perhaps, to prick the French conscience.

Colonization

Desjebert's anti-colonial stand was based upon at least three premises. First, he did not believe that the French character was suited to colonial enterprise. Secondly, colonization was a ruinous process to the mother country. France simply could not afford to have her economy ruined by Algeria, and thirdly, colonization, in addition to being ruinous, would never succeed in Algeria. All efforts would end in total failure.

30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., p. 305.
32 La Question..., p. 3. He was especially opposed to French efforts in this field which he equated with the "search for Eldorados." He condemned the expeditions that had been mounted at the end of the Seventeenth Century against Madagascar, the illusions that had been entertained in the Mississippi, and the sacrifice of an entire fleet and a good army by Bonaparte in Egypt (La Question, p. 5). That Desjebert was critical of Napoleon at a time when the Napoleonic legend was at its height indicates an independent spirit.
Desjoubert described the French national character as "essentially democratic in spirit—analytical—loving discussion, and not prone to religious submission." These traits, he felt, were incompatible with a colonizing spirit. He believed that the English aristocracy, the mercantile nobility of Holland, and the Company of Jesus, on the other hand, were better suited to effective colonization because of their religious and aristocratic spirit. In contrast to democracy, which he characterized as being "apprehensive (inquiète), personal, impatient, and requiring frequent changes in men and in ideas," he viewed religion and aristocracy as "essentially persevering; men may die but the ideas are perpetuated and the final end is reached because of a continuity of effort." Desjoubert loved the national character of France and he believed that "it had accomplished great things in many fields." He did not want to see it modified.

The central criticism of Desjoubert of colonization in Algeria was that it would ruin the mother country economically.

33 Ibid., p. 39.
34 Ibid., p. 40.
35 Ibid. It is in La Question d'Alger that Desjoubert quotes Tocqueville (Democracy in America) which suggests Desjoubert was influenced by this persuasive thinker.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
"The idea of colonizing Algeria", he said, "was invented by those who ignore completely the simplest laws of political economy and who fail to draw any conclusions from colonial experiences in the world." 38 Desjoubert felt that France's increased financial burden could not be taken lightly. The army in Algeria had reached the enormous figure of one hundred thousand men. Not only did this establishment necessitate a large expenditure in money but the terms of military service being seven years, France had to support the additional charge of recruiting 14,285 men annually to replace those demobilized. 39 The actual losses in men was equally demoralizing. For sixteen years, France had been losing an average of seven thousand men a year. This total of over one hundred thousand men killed in Algeria was not a figure France could afford. A significant fact, which did not escape Desjoubert, was that the high mortality rate in Algeria was not due mainly to combat but to disease. 40

In addition to the drain in man-power, there was the crippling financial drain which Desjoubert reckoned to be one

38 L'Algérie en 1846, p. 8.
39 Ibid., p. 13.
40 Ibid., p. 15. "C'est dans les hôpitaux que nous avons perdu les 100,000 hommes que l'Afrique a dévorés."
hundred twenty-five million francs a year. The problem was especially acute because France was experiencing a period of intensive construction of roads, railways, prisons, and other public works. The annual budget had risen from one thousand million francs in 1830 to one thousand five hundred million francs in 1846, and Desjobert saw that the development of France necessitated a concentration of her economic wealth for projects at home. Instead, France was allocating ten per cent of her total annual budget to a sterile venture in Algeria and thereby contributing, uselessly, to her increasing deficit. The heavy taxation which was being forced on the country worried him. It was preventing Frenchmen from buying consumer articles, and French goods were no longer competively priced in the international trade. High taxation, in short, was forcing French products out of the world's market. To Desjobert, the economic results of the Algerian venture was the determining factor against colonization: "C'est là le côté économique, le côté de la question le plus important de tous." To conclude his arguments, he referred to the

41 Ibid., p. 25. "L'Afrique est la ruine de nos finances, la cause incessante de nos déficit annuels. L'Afrique a déjà englouti plus d'un milliard. Ces dépenses s'éleveront pour l'année 1846 à 125,762,993.

42 Ibid., p. 29.

43 Ibid., p. 89.

44 Ibid., p. 85.
free-trade theorists, to Adam Smith, de Tracy, Chalmers, Henri Parnell, and J.B. Say, makers of a new science—l'économie politique, whose verdict on colonies was that, "The time will come when we will be ashamed of so much foolishness, a time when the colonies will be defended only by those individuals holding positions in the colonial sphere or by the persons who placed them in these positions."\(^4\!\!5\)

Desjardin's stand on the economic consequences of the Algerian problem brings to mind a similar stand adopted by Raymond Aron exactly one hundred and ten years later at a time when a new phase of the Algerian problem was plaguing France. Aron's principal thesis in La Tragédie Algérienne (1957) was that France could not afford Algeria,\(^4\!\!6\) and the violently bitter attack launched by Jacques Soustelle in answer to Aron was that the argument "hit the French in the wallet." (L'argument l'Algérie coûte trop cher qui vise les Français au portefeuille.)\(^4\!\!7\) The interesting parallel is that Desjardin also had his réponse from Algeria in the form of an open Lettre à M. Desjardin sur la Question d'Alger.


published by Pélissier de Reynaud (Algiers, 1837). The tone of this reply was very polite and constructive unlike the violent polemics of Soustelle, but at the same time, it tried to show Desjobert that there were other aspects to be considered besides the economic ones.

Besides opposing colonization on economic grounds, Desjobert was convinced that a European colonization could never be a success in Algeria. Making a careful inventory of the theories of colonization circulating in France, he concluded that they were full of contradictions, but, containing so many variations, they were certain to be accepted by the fertile imagination of his countrymen. Some theorists called for "a military colonization, (others for) a civil colonization, or a subsidized colonization, a spontaneous (free) colonization, and the eclectics wanted all of them at the same time." And still other theorists advocated the Greco-Roman system of colonization, the English system in India, the Dutch in Java, or the manner with which the U.S.A. was colonized. Desjobert condemned all these theories and

48 Pélissier de Reynaud, Lettre à M. Desjobert sur la Question d'Alger (Alger: l'Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1837). Pélissier made a significant observation in his letter which will be used later in this chapter, to criticize Desjobert's solution.

49 L'Algérie en 1846, p. 105.

50 La Question..., p. 45.
systems as being impracticable. He ridiculed Bugeaud's project for a colonization by military personnel and could not understand how a general who was at one time "inclined to evacuate Algeria completely" could propose a ten-year plan involving the settlement of one hundred and twenty thousand military families in Algeria which would cost some three hundred million francs. Bugeaud's solution to the problem of forming families which included matching wives from the more sordid circles of France with his soldiers was not ideal in creating a family unit. Desjibert noted that military colonization had already proven a failure. He cited as example the Fouka project which had started with one hundred-forty-seven colonists and after only one year, had lost one hundred. As to the types of colonization established by the Greeks and the Romans in antiquity, these were no longer feasible because they would be anachronisms in the nineteenth century. In regard to the theorists who wanted to imitate English policies in India, Desjibert accused them of ignorance, since England's policies were aimed at preventing a European colonization of Indian lands. The statistics he advanced to prove his point were eloquent. The population of India was a total of 100,577,000 living in a country of

51 L'Algérie en 1846, pp. 49-50.
52 Ibid., p. 51.
53 L'Algérie en 1844, p. 85.
514,190 square miles which England controlled with a force of 223,461 men (1830). Yet England, at the same time, had permitted only 2,016 Europeans to settle in the country. There was, therefore, no colonization of the land in India for the French to imitate. On the other hand, the success of the American colonial settlements was a serious challenge to Desjobert's criticisms and his answer was that there was no guarantee that the American success would be repeated in Algeria because the U.S.A. (was) a new country (pays neuf) while Algiers (was) an exhausted country (pays épuisé). 54

As already stated, Desjobert condemned for moral reasons policies which aimed at exterminating the native population. 55

Other projects for colonization were also examined by Desjobert. In referring to a pilot scheme in the Staoueli plain, he observed humorously: "It is not only with families, (an oblique reference to Bugeaud's military families) that this (colonization) was attempted, but bachelors were also tried...The Trappist monks were being used in the plains of Staoueli. They were given 1,020 hectares, a subsidy of sixty-two thousand francs, herds of cattle, sheep, trees, seeds, and they were given military prisoners to help them start the project...During 1844, eight out of the thirty-eight Trappists

54 Ibid., p. 6.

55 La Question, p. 60.
died; the rest were more or less ill. Out of one hundred and fifty military prisoners in Staoueli, thirty-seven died and the rest were violently ill. How is Staoueli faring today? And supposing the project had been successful, what would it have proved?—That a few bachelors could survive when helped by everybody..."56

In addition to denouncing all colonization, Desjobert refuted arguments concerning the possibility of a 'fusion' between a French and an Algerian society on the grounds that there was too great a disparity between their religious characters and their histories.57 Pelissier de Reynaud had advanced the possibility of racial fusion in his Annales Algériennes but Desjobert criticized him for assuming that 'fusion' was possible just because it had "worked with the Franks and the Gauls."58 Another theorist, M. Perier had thought that mixed marriages and the creation of a mixed race could "form the cornerstone of a future Algerian edifice."59 But Desjobert replied that M. Perier was in fact arguing for the "union of the Christian (man) and the Arab woman; the union of the Bible and the Koran."60 This was a possibility that he refused to envisage.61

56 L'Algérie en 1846, p. 47. In actual fact, this project was a success.
57 La Question D'Alger, p. 282.
58 Ibid.
59 L'Algérie en 1846, p. 37.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
As for the pro-colonialist argument that France had a "mission civilisatrice" Desjoubert again proved sceptical.

This argument was known to him through the writings of Lingay who claimed that "France, by conquering Algeria, has taken up the special duty to civilize Africa" and also through the

62 The idea of a mission civilisatrice is usually associated with the period in the history of French Colonialism after 1830. It is interesting to note that Desjoubert seems to have studied it closely as early as he did.

63 Lingay held a number of senior appointments in the French government. He was Secretary to a government commission set up to study African affairs in 1842. Desjoubert quoted the following passage from Lingay, *La France en Afrique*, pp. 3-5.

"It is the duty of great nations to carry civilization to far regions of the globe by force of arms and by commerce. Russia and England are fulfilling this duty in Asia and the United States is fulfilling its duty in America. But Africa has been neglected, forgotten, unknown. France, by conquering Algeria, has taken up the special duty to civilize Africa... It is a mission entrusted by Providence and confirmed by the glorious footsteps of one hundred thousand French soldiers... In Africa, France manifests herself, acts, and deploys herself everywhere and in every direction; this is her special bent, her duty, her interest, her law." (L'Algérie en 1846, pp. 57-58.)

Lingay's statement is reminiscent of another spokesman for the mission civilisatrice, Jules Harmand. The following excerpt from his *Domination et Colonisation* (1910) provides an interesting comparison with Lingay.

"We must therefore accept as our basic principle the fact that a hierarchy of races and civilizations exists, and that we belong to the highest race, the highest civilization. But we must realize, too, that, our superiority imposes important duties on us, as well as giving us certain rights. For we are superior not only in the economic and military, but especially in the moral sense. That fact constitutes our main justification for the conquest of native peoples."


Lingay also made an interesting observation which is suggestive of Bismarck. It will be recalled that the Iron Chancellor's policy, after 1871, encouraged French colonial ventures in order to divert her attention from the Rhine, to compensate for Alsace-Lorraine, and possibly to involve France in a colonial conflict with England. Lingay, writing twenty years earlier reversed the situation (so-to-speak) when he said: "France's enterprise in Africa was the best way to prove to Germany that we were no longer interested in the left bank of the Rhine." (L'Algérie en 1846, p. 58 quoting Lingay, *La France en Afrique*, p. 234.)
writings of M. de Carné who affirmed that "Providence had sent France to Algeria." Unimpressed, Desjobert observed: "France, according to some views, appears to have received a sense of mission from Providence. But, in the sphere of human affairs and of politics, the only guide to action should be reason and state interest not Providence and mission."65

As earlier suggested, Desjobert's opposition to colonization was not based entirely upon moral and rational grounds. Being a representative of the Seine-Inférieure in the Chamber of Deputies, he had to consider his district's economic interests and these were based on textile manufacturing especially cotton. It was believed at the time that Algeria would eventually compete with the district's cotton mills and Desjobert voiced this fear quite openly. According to Valet, Desjobert once declared in a speech: "I have great fear that our cotton factories will be condemned by the introduction of Algerian cotton."66 Generally speaking, historians of Algeria including experts like Julien, Claude Martin, and Valet tend to overemphasize this particular electoral motive for

64 Ibid., p. 105.

65 Ibid.

66 Valet, L'Afrique du Nord, p. 133.
Desjobert's opposition while neglecting, for the most part, the other more altruistic reasons for his stand against colonization. In criticism of Desjobert, one might observe that the future of Algerian colonization was to refute this dogmatic assertion that no colonization at all was possible in Algeria: "Toute colonisation Européenne est donc impossible, et par les difficultés d’acclimatation de la population, et par les difficultés économiques de la production, et par les difficultés même de la culture." But his view of the long-range vulnerability of such a colonization was to prove prophetic.

Solutions

Before examining Desjobert's proposed solution to the Algerian problem it is necessary to criticize an assumption that French historians of Algeria have consistently made as to his position on l'Abandon. Desjobert has traditionally been described as an anti-colonialist, an impractical dreamer, and an advocate of l'Abandon not only by these historians


68 L'Algérie en 1846, p. 82.
but by his contemporaries as well. But this assumption is incorrect. While critical, he accepted France's presence, however deplorable, as a fait accompli and he attempted to show how the best advantage could be derived from a bad situation. "We have not mentioned the abandonment of Algeria," he stated in 1836, "nor do we think that we are condemned to such a measure which would hurt our national pride. We still think that France could derive honorable returns from Algeria but she would have to give up, once and for all, all ideas of colonization." Again, in 1846, he stated, "We have always

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69 One notable exception seems to be Ch.-A. Julien, who, in his latest work on Algeria, tried to rehabilitate the 'Cad-fly' of colonialism. "Desjobert," he said, "who is usually laughed at for his eternal call for evacuation (of Algeria), was not treated as a maniac (by his colleagues in parliament) but as a person whose arguments merited attention." (Julien, Histoire de l'Algérie Contemporaine, p. 256.) But Julien still regarded him as an advocate of l'abandon: "Les anticolonistes regurent l'appui d'un nouveau député, qui siégeait à gauche, Amédée Desjobert, gros propriétaire de Seine-Inférieure qui, douze ans durant, allait se montrer le plus ardent promoteur de l'abandon." (Ibid., p. 113) (my own italics). However, on p. 119, Julien qualifies somewhat his assertion made on p. 113.

For the more 'traditional' view of Desjobert, see Vâlet, L'Afrique du Nord devant le Parlement, pp. 130-131. Vâlet does not treat Desjobert kindly: "Desjobert avouait simplement qu'il ignorait tout de l'Algérie" (which Desjobert never did) and "Ayant ainsi bien établi et justifié son ignorance profonde de tout ce qui concerne l'Algérie, Desjobert entreprend de convertir la Chambre a ses idées." In actual fact, Desjobert shows a remarkable knowledge of the Algerian question; a knowledge which his contemporary, PELLISSIER de REYNAUD, prominent expert on Algeria, recognized and appreciated. (see PELLISSIER's letter to Desjobert).

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70 La Question, p. 307.
thought that a system of maritime occupation without colonization conformed best to France's interest and we are still of the same opinion..."71 Others, with their stupidity and calumny, have translated my system into an idea of l'Abandon."72 All Desjobert had asserted was that if the only two alternatives facing France were l'abandon and colonisation, he would have preferred the former since, to him, colonisation would have led to an inexorable war of extermination in Algeria.73

Assuming that France had other alternatives, Desjobert formulated a program, the "Sysem Arabe," based upon three principles: One, "the recognition of an Arab nationality"; two, "a restricted French occupation of key maritime points"; and three, "a French declaration that European colons not be recognized and that those who enter the Regency would do so at their own risk and would, in any case, be subject to local

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71 By maritime occupation he meant "Two or three points along the coast including Mers-el-Kebir" (L'Algérie en 1846, p. 113.)

72 Ibid. The most extreme statement he made concerning L'Abandon was: "If l'abandon was really the best policy to pursue, then it should be adopted; however, we do not believe it is necessary." (Ibid.)

73 La Question, p. 307.
government authority." The *Système Arabe* called for a centralized governing power under a ruler who would act in conformity with the teachings of Islam. To wield this power Desjoubert advanced the candidacy of Abdel Kader whom he admired considerably and regarded as the "true representative of the Algerian Arabs" believing him to possess necessary qualities of leadership combined with a high sense of morality and justice. Desjoubert was convinced that France would greatly benefit by leaving the administration of the country in the hands of Abdel Kader. Even after it was clear that Abdel Kader's power had been destroyed by Bugeaud, Desjoubert still argued in his favor claiming that "Abdel Kader would have been of great assistance to (France)... He was the really

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74 Ibid.

75 Ibid., p. 317. It will be recalled that Pellissier and Desjoubert engaged in a mild polemic over the Algerian question. Pellissier's criticism of a shortcoming in the *Système Arabe* was made in a long letter published in Algiers: "I admit, more than anyone else, that Abdel Kader has the ability (to govern an Arab state in Algeria), but how can we be sure of his successor? The Emir has many attractive qualities which he has already proven in the exercise of power... but he is not immortal. Can we afford to place in another person the hopes we have placed in the Emir?" (Pellissier, Lettre à M. Desjoubert sur la Question d'Alger, p. 14).

In regard to the *Système Arabe*, it is noted in passing that Napoleon III's proposed *Royaume Arabe* (originally suggested by I. Urbain) was to have roughly the same characteristics as Desjoubert's *Système Arabe*. It is perhaps unfortunate that both these proposals were rejected although their merit was unquestionable.

76 Ibid.
progressive man of his time and therefore subject to attacks by the fanatics of his own country. His genius for organization was beginning to centralize Arab society. He also wanted to imitate Egypt and Turkey by sending young Algerians to France for instruction."77 Anticipating objections concerning the longstanding enmity between the Arabs and Kabyles, he declared that, in spite of some differences, the two peoples constituted one nationality. ("formant une seule nationalité")78 To support this assertion, he quoted an expert on Algerian affairs, M. Walewski, who had reported that "the Arabs and the Kabyles possess nearly the same character, the same customs, the same prejudices... (thus) ... I would classify them under the general denomination of Arabs."79

According to Desjobert, the SystèmeArabe would, ensure the eradication of piracy forever. The French possessions along the coast would assist France strategically and commercially and the annual expenditure on Algeria would be reduced from one hundred twenty-five million francs to four

77 L'Algérie en 1846, p. 114.
78 La Question, p. 324.
million francs. The Système Arabe would also put to an end the present chaotic situation in which "a minister commands a general who does not obey."\(^{30}\) What is remarkable in this revolutionary proposal is not only its tone but also the consistency with which Desjardin defended it from 1837 to 1846 even when it appeared as though France was about to eliminate Abdel Kader, the only serious threat to her presence at the time. What Desjardin advocated was a complete withdrawal of France to the coastline precisely at the moment, then, of victory on the grounds that a massive European implantation on Algerian land would lead to a permanent state of war. In the light of the contemporary history of Algeria, he has been prophetic. The European colons in Algeria proved themselves to be, consistently, the major stumbling block to the peaceful solution of the Algerian problem.

\(^{30}\) L'Algérie en 1846, p. 112.
Chapter IV

TOCQUEVILLE: PARTISAN OF A SEGREGATED
AND DECENTRALIZED ALGERIA

Tocqueville’s fame has rested more on his performance
as a thinker than as a man of action. It was not in his
career as an homme politique in the Chamber and, for a short
term, as a Foreign Minister of France that he made his mark.
In fact, not only did he fail to emerge as a leader, but, one
must admit, the influence he did exert in the Chamber was quite
insignificant. There is little doubt that he had an ardent
ambition to succeed as an homme politique perhaps even more
than as a man of letters, but he was also aware of his own
shortcomings.¹ In a letter to his intimate friend, Beaumont,
he wrote: "You drive me to despair when you speak of a great
part for me. I know better than anyone what I lack for a
part of that kind—self-confidence, to begin with. Moreover,
what good can you expect in this Dead Sea of politics? The
great parts in politics need great passions to fill them."²

¹ Charles Pouthas, "A. de Tocqueville, Représentant de la
Manche", Alexis de Tocqueville: Livre du Centenaire 1859-1959,

² J.P. Mayer, Alexis de Tocqueville: A Biographical Study
Politics under the July Monarchy were uninspiring and failed to interest Tocqueville. The thought of having to choose between Thiers or Guizot in order to advance his career was distasteful to him, and, in the long run, he preferred to isolate himself from party politics and work as an independent.

Tocqueville temperamentally was an intellectual seeking to understand the larger issue behind the smaller, the movement behind the circumstance, the trend behind the event; who is opposed to supporting one side of a question without putting it to severe test and who, after a comprehensive examination of contrasting views, remains devoted to neither. In a letter to Henry Reeve, Tocqueville remarks:

"My critics insist upon making me out a party-man; but I am not that. Passions are attributed to me where I have only opinions; or rather I have but one opinion, an enthusiasm for liberty and for the dignity of the human race. I consider all forms of government merely as so many more or less perfect means of satisfying this holy and legitimate craving. People ascribe to me

3 He describes his contempt for the party politician thus: "Mais au milieu de ces petits partis dynastiques, si peu différents par la fin qu'ils se proposaient, si semblables par les mauvais moyens qu'ils mettaient en pratique, quel sentier conduisait visiblement à l'honnête, même à l'utile? Où était le vrai? Où était le faux? De quel côté les méchants? De quel côté les gens de bien? Je n'ai jamais pu dans ce temps-là, le discernent pleinement, et je déclare qu'aujourd'hui même je ne saurais le bien faire. La plupart des hommes de parti ne se laissent ni désespérer ni énerver par de pareils doutes; plusieurs même ne les ont jamais connus, ou ne les connaissent plus."

alternately aristocratic and democratic prejudices. If I had been born in another period, or in another country, I might have had either the one or the other. But my birth, as it happened, made it easy for me to guard against both...Balanced between the past and the future, with no natural instinctive attraction towards either, I could without an effort quietly contemplate each side of the question."4

On another occasion, Tocqueville described himself as a new man to the voters in Valognes during the electoral campaign which finally led him to the Chamber of Deputies. In what sense was he an "homme nouveau"? His remarkable interest in the New World and his appraisal of its potential role in history was new as was his perception of the changes taking place in European society leading to the emergence of the masses. Tocqueville's "newness" was also displayed in his sympathy with the expansion of a Europe which he believed had a mission civilisatrice, and as a patriot, he wanted France to receive her part of the world Europe would conquer. His methodology, also quite modern in many respects, was to gather material from first-hand reports and submit them to critical examination. His notes, which even record his doubts about the validity of his own assertions, are so carefully arranged and the information so well organized, that they were used by him almost without revision in reports and debates in the Chamber. 5

4 Mayer, op.cit., p. 43.

His main concern in his studies of the U.S.A. and *The Ancien Régime*, as well as of Algeria was the relationship between liberty (his foremost passion) and centralization. The problem of centralization, he regarded as "a fundamental question." He noted that the governments of Europe had a remarkable propensity for centralization, one encouraged by the demands of growing democratic egalitarianism. This propensity could lead to tyranny, as power and decision-making became increasingly centered in one place, the capital, and as bureaucracy grew in size and power. "In proportion as the duties of the central power are augmented," he said "the number of public officials (fonctionnaires) by whom that power is represented must increase also. They form a nation within each nation." The centralization of power causes the state to interfere unduly in the private concerns of the citizens. The individual is overpowered by the giant state which engulfs him and forces him to submit to its will. Centralization tends, in effect, to negate liberty. The problem was, then, how to preserve liberty in the increasingly centralized democratic state. Liberty, he believed, depended upon effective local government.

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7 Mayer, op.cit., p. 35.

8 Ibid.
"Principle of centralization and principle of election of local authorities:" Tocqueville wrote in 1835 "principles in direct opposition...Means of combining the two principles to some extent, since the one is essential to the power and existence of the State, the second to its prosperity and liberty. England has found no other secret. The whole future of free institutions in France depends on the application of these same ideas to the genius of our laws."9

The tyranny of centralization, then, could be averted, by the counterforce of administrative bodies, local and municipal, of a free press, independent law courts and parliamentary immunity. These would safeguard liberty by limiting central power. In a short notice entitled "Ideas Concerning Centralization and the Introduction of the Judicial Power into the Administration", he explained that "the necessity of bringing the judicial power into the administration (was) one of those central ideas to which I (was) brought back in all my researches to discover what allows and can allow men the enjoyment of political liberty."10

As for local institutions, they "are to liberty what primary schools are to knowledge. Local institutions make liberty accessible to the people accustoming them to a peaceful use of it. It is possible for a nation to create a free government without local institutions but this nation will not possess the spirit of liberty."11 It was this notion

10 Ibid., p. 95.
of the need to temper and combat centralization that formed the basis of Tocqueville's proposals for the administration of French Algeria.

**Tocqueville and Colonialism**

As a patriot, Tocqueville wanted France to share in Europe's expansion overseas, yet, paradoxically, he was an anti-colonialist in theory, at least initially. Evidence to support this assertion are a short essay entitled "Some Thoughts Concerning the Reasons That Inhibit the French from Having Good Colonies", certain remarks Tocqueville made during his visit to the New World, and his article entitled "Fifteen Days in the Desert." These represent the early attitude of Tocqueville.

One of the many questions that interested Tocqueville was whether France had a colonial vocation or not. He finally came to the conclusion that the 'genius' of France and the character of her institutions were ill-suited to colonialism. To Tocqueville this genius, oriented towards the continent, was a "national characteristic composed of a singular mixture of penchant casaniers and passionate recklessness."\(^{12}\)

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\(^{12}\) Tocqueville, O.C., III, 36. "un singulier mélange de penchants casaniers et d'ardeur aventurière." There is no exact equivalent for the word 'casaniers' in English. Perhaps the nearest meaning is "the stay-at-home-type."
France's geographical position and the large fertile expanse of her land caused her to assume the rank of a leading continental power whose interests made maritime commerce a sideline for her. Tocqueville claimed that France was not a sea-going nation; her citizens "were never attracted by the ocean nor will they ever be"; they lacked the deep feeling of respect that the nations of merchant navigators have shown towards the sea. In addition "the Frenchman loved his home, the view of the bell tower of his church, and more than any other person in the world, the joy of family life...But, once he is transplanted elsewhere, the Frenchman will suddenly feel a taste for violent emotions and for danger... he will live without any regard for the future." These two contrasting strains of the French genius could not sustain colonial ventures.

In addition to this first obstacle, Tocqueville observed that the centralized character of French political and legislative institutions was an even greater handicap in a colony than it was in the homeland and that France had

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13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 37.
always insisted in "transporting beyond her shores, principles of government and administrative habits that contradicted the very nature of things." To prove his point, Tocqueville summoned the evidence of history by comparing the respective achievements of France and England in the New World. He described how France had carefully worked out a plan to establish a vast colonial Empire in the New World from Canada to Louisiana linking the St. Lawrence to the Mississippi. The French government had spent a great deal of effort and money to ensure a permanent and successful settlement, but in spite of this, the colonies did not prosper. In fact a distinctly static situation had developed in the new colonies; "Population hardly grew, ignorance was widespread and finally, the implanted society succumbed to foreign aggression after a heroic fight." In the meantime, next door, the English settlements prospered. It seemed "once Englishmen had set foot on American soil, they became complete strangers to their homeland." They created their own local government machinery one independent of a mother country freed from the expense of administration, and, although seemingly abandoned, the colonies "were able to double their population every twenty

16 Ibid., p. 38. "...s'efforcer sans cesse de transporter au delà des mers des principes de gouvernement et des habitudes administratives que repoussait la nature même des choses."

17 Ibid., p. 39.

18 Ibid., p. 39.
two years and to become rich centers of enlightenment."\textsuperscript{19}

For these reasons, Tocqueville indicated that France's colonialism had serious limitations. "It must be recognized", said Tocqueville, "because it is proved by experience, that colonial enterprise is full of perils for France."\textsuperscript{20}

There were also moral considerations which led Tocqueville to object to colonialism. During his travels in North America, he was struck by the tragic fate of the Indian as a result of the impact of the Anglo-Saxon community; "the worst fate", he said, "that can befall a people is to be conquered."\textsuperscript{21} In a letter to his mother from America in 1831, he described the tragedy of the Indians who were leaving their ancestral grounds "in order to be free."\textsuperscript{22} He was certain that the Indian race would eventually become extinct in the New World and he disapproved of the extermination policies which were a part of the American solution to the Indian problem. However, what disturbed him most was the serenity with which the American conscience accepted this

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 40.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 124.

\textsuperscript{22} André Martel, "Tocqueville et les problèmes coloniaux de la Monarchie de Juillet" Revue d'histoire Economique et Sociale, XXXII (April, 1954), p. 380.
treatment. In *Quinze Jours au Désert*, he described the insensibility of the American colon towards the native Indians - an ironical insensitivity, as the ministers of the gospel, at the same time, preached that all men were brothers. From the temptation of such behavior presumably he would have France free.

Thus, one gathers the impression from Tocqueville's early writings that he was not a proponent of French colonialism, both because of what he held to be the character of the French and because of his misgivings as to the cruelty that colonization could entail.

While it is possible then to find anti-colonial sentiments in the early writings of Tocqueville, it must be remembered that these sentiments were expressed during his


"Au milieu de cette société de colons si jalouse de moralité et de philanthropie, on rencontre une insensibilité complète, une sorte d'égoïsme froid et implacable lorsqu'il s'agit des indigènes de l'Amérique... C'est le même instinct impitoyable qui anime ici comme ailleurs la race européenne... Satisfait de son raisonnement, l'Américain s'en va au temple où il entend un ministre de l'Évangile lui répéter que les hommes sont frères, et que l'Être éternel, qui les a tous faits sur le même modèle, leur a donné à tous le devoir de se secourir." But the American pursues in his reasoning: "Ce monde-ci nous appartient. Dieu, en refusant à ses premiers habitants la faculté de se civiliser, les a destinés par avance à une destruction inévitable. Les véritables propriétaires de ce continent sont ceux qui savent tirer parti de ses richesses."
travels in the New World. Upon his return to France, however, where he was faced with the issue of France in Algeria, Tocqueville proved that, he was, given such a concrete case, in favour of colonialism. Now he revealed the eagerness of a French patriot to see his nation again a place in the sun, and the conviction that European civilization, as a whole had a mission to expand in the world. On the subject of Algeria, Tocqueville's position was unequivocal. France must retain her new possession at all costs in order to maintain her image as a great power. Having just returned from his 1841 journey to Algeria, he wrote: "I do not think that France can envisage a withdrawal from Algeria."24 His reason was that l'abandon would be regarded by the world as a sure sign of French weakness and a shameful withdrawal before "an opposition of small barbarian tribes inhabiting the country."25 But his was more than just a fear that withdrawal would cause France to lose face in the community of Western nations. Tocqueville was convinced that the mark of a healthy nation was its vigorous participation in world affairs. He once stated, "Every nation that relinquishes conquest early and chooses freely to retire into her old limits proclaims that her great days are over. She conspicuously enters into a period of decline."26

24 C.C. III, 213.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid., p. 214.
Moreover, in terms of power politics, the present was not a propitious time for l'abandon. If France wanted to leave Algeria she should do it at a time when she decided to "undertake great things in Europe and not at a time like the present when she seemed to have joined the ranks of second-class nations resigning herself to allow others to arrange the affairs of Europe." Unfortunately, Tocqueville failed to see how this argument could be reversed, for as long as France committed her military might to Algeria, 110,000 men in 1843, (and 500,000 in 1958), she was unable to participate in European affairs, let alone in world affairs. An example is the French impotence in the Eastern Question although Tocqueville, surprisingly enough, demanded a French

27 Ibid., p. 215.

28 Ibid., p. 214. This statement immediately suggests the Algerian experience.

29 It is possible to claim that Desjobert had a keener insight into this problem than Tocqueville. For instance, Desjobert could see why France was unable to act more effectively in the Eastern Question and appreciated the importance of Lord Palmerston’s declaration in 1840 during the crisis with France over Muhammad Ali in which he maintained "that he would believe our intention (the French) to fight a war when he could see that our military power was no longer mobilized in Algeria." (Desjobert, L'Algérie en 1844, p. 158.)
war with England over Muhammad Ali.\(^{30}\) At a later period, it was to be only by withdrawing from Algeria that De Gaulle was truly able to restore France’s position as a European power and, in many ways, as a world power.

Tocqueville had other reasons for justifying French colonialism besides power politics. Tocqueville saw in Algeria France’s chance to improve her strategic and commercial position in the Mediterranean.\(^{31}\) And then there was the stubborn fact that if France did not keep the old Regency, some other nation would take her place deriving the advantages she derived from her present North African position. Tocqueville was aware that the destruction of the old Turkish power had created an unsettled condition in Algeria and, furthermore, he noted a remarkable change caused by the French

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\(^{30}\) Sister Mary Lawlor, in her study, Alexis de Tocqueville in the Chamber of Deputies, describes how Tocqueville was prepared to go to war against England over the Eastern Question and quotes from Tocqueville’s speech in the Chamber on Dec. 1, 1840. Tocqueville saw in the East, "all societies tottering, all religious weakening, all nationalities disappearing; all lights being extinguished; the ancient Asiatic world disappearing, and in its place, the European world rising." Referring to the effect Europe had in the Orient, he claimed that Europe "punctures it, envelops it, dominates it." Then Tocqueville asked: "Do you think that a nation that wishes to remain great ought to be present at such a spectacle without taking part in it? Do you think we ought to permit two peoples of Europe to master this immense heritage?" His answer was: "Sooner than endure it, I say to my country, I say it with energy and conviction—in preference: war." (Sister Mary Lawlor, Alexis de Tocqueville in the Chamber of Deputies, (Washington: Catholic University of American Press, 1959), pp. 54-55.) Also Drescher, op.cit., pp. 152-161.

\(^{31}\) Tocqueville referring to the Mediterranean as "la mer politique de nos jours" (his own italics) Ibid.
conquest: "The great works" he said "that we have already accomplished in the country, the examples we have shown of our art, of our ideas, and of our power have acted in a trenchant manner on the spirit of the population. It is for these reasons that the Algerians are all the more eager to liberate themselves from French domination."32 The impact of France on the Moslem society had transformed it; the Moslem state which France had destroyed could never be re-established in the same form and with the same ideas even if France were to leave the colony. With his gift for realistic appraisal, what Tocqueville perceived, in effect, was the radical transformation of Algerian society as a result of its inter-action with a Western society:

"on peut affirmer d'avance que la puissance musulmane qui prendrait notre place serait très différente de celle que nous avons détruite; qu'elle viserait plus haut, qu'elle aurait d'autres moyens d'action, qu'elle entrerait en contact habituel avec les nations chrétiennes et serait habituellement dirigée par l'une d'entre elles. En un mot, il est évident pour moi que, quoi qu'il arrive, l'Afrique est désormais entrée dans le mouvement du monde civilisé et n'en sortira plus."33

The domination that Tocqueville wanted France to exert over Algeria might be called radical in as much as it called for a massive implantation of a French colon society. Domination and colonization went hand in hand although he admitted

32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., p. 216.
that domination without colonization would be easier since the dispossession of natives from their lands by the colons could only arouse subsequent resistance. The dilemma, for Tocqueville, was that without colonization his country's dominion would remain "unproductive and precarious." (his own italics)\textsuperscript{34}

It has already been stated that Tocqueville believed in a European mission civilisatrice. Implied in his studies and speeches on foreign policy and colonial affairs, this attitude became unmistakably clear late in his life, in particular during the Indian Mutiny of 1857. In a series of letters to his English friends, he condemned the rebels in the name of a European Christian civilization, and then demanded the maintenance of British domination. "Your difficulties in India", he wrote to Lord Hatherton, "are deeply felt here...I have... never doubted, of your final triumph which I regard as that of Christianity and civilization."\textsuperscript{35} To Nassau William Senior, he indicated that "No one would derive any advantage from the destruction of England's power except barbarism."\textsuperscript{36} Remarkably, Tocqueville appeared far

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 217.


more favourable to the British Empire, than many English liberals who intimated that it was in England's interest to abandon India. In a letter to Lady Theresa Lewis, he remarked that British dominion over India was an important reason for her rank as a major power. 37 Using the same argument he had previously used to justify the retention of Algeria, Tocqueville asserted that, should England withdraw from India, this would indicate she was no longer interested in maintaining her position in the world. It is remarkable also that a Tocqueville, who was genuinely prepared to go to war with England over the Eastern Question, was also praying that England

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37 Passage from letter reads:
"There has never been anything under the sun as extraordinary as the conquest, and above all the government of India by the English, anything which from every corner of the globe more attracts the imagination of man to that small island of whose very name the Greeks were unaware. Do you believe, madame, that a people can, after having filled this immense place in the imagination of the human species, withdraw from it with impunity? I do not believe it. I think that the English are obeying an instinct not only heroic, but just, in wishing to retain India at any price since they possess it. I add that I am perfectly certain that they will conserve it, although, perhaps in less favourable conditions." (Letter of Oct. 18, 1857, Oeuvres (B), VI quoted in Seymour Drescher, Tocqueville and England, (Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 182.
would triumph in India.\textsuperscript{38}

Tocqueville's conviction that European civilization as a whole should sustain an expansionist policy may have also been related to his anticipation of a possible Western decline. He once said:

"Nations fall into decadence and barbarity in two ways: an invasion from the exterior which destroys the social edifice and the more dangerous way which is a collapse from within (Greeks, Indians). This is going to happen to us one day and it would be interesting to consider the origin and starting point of the force which will destroy our modern civilization. It is an error to think that this destruction will be accomplished by an exterior force.\textsuperscript{39}

That the expansion of Europe might refresh the European spirit and postpone the day of its decline seems to have been Tocqueville's belief.

\textsuperscript{38} Tocqueville claimed that the mutiny did not have the character of a national movement caused by democratic ideas. In an earlier study on India, Tocqueville had noted that India was not a nation but a multitude of castes each forming a separate nation (O.C., III, 447). It was a revolt not of the Indians but of their princes and he believed that a revolt that was truly national would succeed in overthrowing British rule in India because even with a large force, England would not be able to control a situation where the Indian masses were moved by a revolutionary spirit. (Drescher, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 181).

In looking at Tocqueville's notes on Algeria and India, I became aware of the importance Tocqueville attached to the dynamic quality of his European Christian civilization. This is evident in his comparisons of Christianity with Islam, his view of Indian society as being fossilized (petrifiée) (O.C. III, p. 509), and always this call for a European participation in the world as an antidote to decadence.

\textsuperscript{39} O.C., III, 509.
Tocqueville and Algeria

Alexis de Tocqueville's first treatment of the Algerian question appeared in two *Lettres sur l'Algérie* (1837) in which he tried to acquaint the reader with the general situation in the country. The 'letters', in the form of newspaper articles, were written before Tocqueville's election to the Chamber and before his journeys to Algeria. They are interesting to consider principally because they provide a significant contrast to the attitudes he adopted later. After a deeper study of the question, Tocqueville concluded that French centralized institutions were unsuited to the Moslem society, and would, if applied, disrupt the status quo which Tocqueville wanted maintained.

The Algeria he described in 1837 was as follows: "The French (were) in Algeria and along the coast; in the West and South, an Arab population (was) awakening and marching under a national leader; in the East, a remnant of the Turkish regime (was) represented by Ahmad..." Thus, in 1837, he was convinced that the future of Algeria lay in an amalgamation of the French and Arab races; the permanent bond formed would be the proper basis for a new state inhabited by a new mixed people. This intermingling of the races was natural, as he thought their characters compatible, and, inevitable.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Ibid., p. 145.}
\footnote{Ibid., p. 151.}
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Besides, he claimed, "Although the majority of Arabs still adhered strongly to their religious faith, the power of religion was weakening.... and was becoming increasingly impotent against the interests of this world."42 This amalgamation he not only predicted but welcomed as the basis for a new nation. This in 1837. Several years later, after a comprehensive study of Islam and after two journeys in Algeria, Tocqueville reversed himself completely to conclude that the differences between the European Christian and Moslem Algerian societies were unbridgeable.43

42 Ibid.

43 Tocqueville studied the Koran and took copious notes on the first twenty-eight chapters. The edition of the Koran he used was M. Savary's two volume translation (Paris, 1783) and the notes were written in March, 1838. They are, for the most part, direct quotations of sections in the Koran which he considered basic, with accompanying comments.

His notes on Chapter I of the Koran carry the following observation: "The Koran, as in the case with Christianity, is closely allied to and a continuation of the Old Testament. Thus, the Koran takes Islam back to the beginning of the World. ....The Koran contains almost all of the ethical principles found in other religions."

In his notes on Surah XI, Tocqueville claims that, "The principal object of the eleventh chapter is to acquaint the Arabs with a complete line of prophets and to paint pictures of the horrible punishment awaiting those without faith." According to Tocqueville, Muhammad, "is more concerned in convincing people to believe in him than he is in prescribing moral laws." He notes that Muhammad, "in making use of the Bible", depended more on the Old Testament than on the New. To Tocqueville, the influence of the Mosaic tradition was present throughout the Koran. He believed that Islam made use of theological terror as a weapon to keep the believers on the right path.

It should be noted, however, that Tocqueville's observation is incorrect from an Islamic point of view. Islamic theology maintains that the Koran is a direct revelation in Arabic by God to Muhammad. There is no question of the Koran being based on the Bible as Tocqueville seems to imply in his study of Surah XI.

(C.C., III, pp. 154-162.)
In Tocqueville's memorable speech in the Chamber during a three day debate on the Algerian problem in 1846, he posed three questions: "What is the present state of the Algerian affair?; where is the evil?; what is the cure."\textsuperscript{44} In the development of his arguments, he stripped the Algerian problems of many misapprehensions under which the government and some of his colleagues laboured, and at a time when Abdel Kader's power was at the point of being destroyed he defended the continuation of the French military pressure in Algeria in spite of its expense.\textsuperscript{45} He denied that French domination could be based on the native population because of the basic hostility of the Arabs towards France. At the same time, he made it clear, that he "did not want the Algerian population to be forced back into the desert (refouler); (he) particularly opposed their extermination as was proposed or, at least, implied in the Chamber and as the press in Algeria demanded

\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 292.

\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 293.
doubtlessly for philanthropic considerations." One thing of which he was certain was that if France wanted to preserve

46 The editors of Tocqueville's Oeuvres Complètes attempted unsuccessfully to locate the article in the Algerian press that called for an extermination of the Arabs which Tocqueville had denounced. It seems that Tocqueville had, in turn, based his statement on a speech made by Corcelle the previous evening when he had read a passage from the newspaper in question before the House. In the course of research made for this study, I came across a similar statement made by Desjobert and by comparing it to the portion of Corcelle's speech, I was able to locate, tentatively at least, the Algerian newspaper in question.

The editors' comments and the evidence gathered from Desjobert are now submitted for a comparison.

a. Editor's comments in a footnote to Tocqueville's statement on extermination (O.C., III, 294):

"Dans son discours de la veille, Corcelle avait dénoncé les 'odieuses maximes contre les indigènes' des journaux d'Alger et en avait donné l'exemple suivant:

'Voici le numéro d'un journal du 2 mai dernier. On y recommande un écrit ainsi intitulé: A quels signes reconnaît-on qu'une race humaine est vouée à la destruction par un décret de la Providence?

'L'auteur prétend que la nature marche sans cesse vers de nouvelles inspirations en détruisant de nombreuses créatures, mais que ce sont là de salutaires inspirations à des existences plus parfaites. Suit l'énormité historique de toutes les races inférieures, selon lui, qui ont dû disparaître devant les races supérieures; les Mexicains, Caraïbes, peaux-rouges, etc.... Arrivant aux Arabes de l'Algérie et du Maroc, l'auteur ne leur tient nul compte de leur ancienne civilisation; il les declare à peu près semblables aux peaux-rouges et prononce, sans plus d'hésitation, leur arrêt de mort. L'extinction de cette race coupable, dit-il, est une harmonie. Sa conclusion, en un mot, c'est que les véritables philanthropes ont la mission humaine de détruire les races qui s'opposent au progrès.'

Des recherches faites dans la presse d'Alger n'ont pu nous faire découvrir le journal qui avait émis ces idées.


"M. le docteur Bodichon pose la question suivante: 'A quels signes reconnaît-on qu'une race humaine est vouée à la destruction par un décret de la Providence?' Il juge que la race arabe de l'Algérie et du Maroc est marquée de ce signe:

'Son extinction est un bien et devient une harmonie.' L'honorable M. de Corcelle, qui a signalé à la tribune ces énormités, s'étonnait que l'on permît en Algérie de telles provocations au meurtre de tout un peuple."

[Desjobert's footnotes):

1. L'Echo d'Oran, du 2 mai 1846.
2. Discours du 5 juin 1846.

Therefore, the newspaper in question, if Desjobert's quote is correct, was the Echo d'Oran of May 2, 1846.
her control over Algeria, she would have to implant a large French population. To Tocqueville, "it was no longer necessary to stress (as others were stressing) that the Algerians must be conquered—the native resistance was broken. Nor does it consist in maintaining the Algerians under a regular government since years will pass before this could be made possible."47 The real method would be to "import into Algeria, a European population", and, stressed Tocqueville, "a population of agricultural colons."48

Tocqueville's speech caused much excitement in the House. The government, under attack, reacted by interrupting him on several occasions; and, judging from the notes made by the recorder of the Chamber, Tocqueville's deliberations were taken seriously. He criticized the Minister of War for presenting an unrealistic and false picture of life in Algeria, one which did not conform to a harsher reality, and he attacked the incompetence of the government which was insuring, by its disinterest, that no sane colon would consider setting in the Regency. Dramatically, Tocqueville exclaimed that the Algerian affair which was of vital importance to France, was

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48 Ibid. Tocqueville, at this point, was also criticizing Desjoubert for claiming that the ills of the Algerian question were incurable. (See C.C., III, 294. Footnote 1).
not directed by a government but by Chance (par le hasard). The two present authorities the government in France and the governor-general in Algeria had divergent aims and as a result, chaos reigned in the Regency. They should be replaced by a new special ministry for Algerian affairs which would overcome the confusion of authority.

While in his speeches, Tocqueville showed himself to be a sharp critic of the government, it is in the "Rapports sur l'Algérie (1847)" that he provided his over-all synthesis of and solution to the Algerian problem. After exploring the relations between the conqueror and the conquered, he declared that the integration of Arab and French societies was impossible because they had really nothing in common, and that, first and foremost France had to, at all costs, hold on firmly to Algeria by creating a microcosm of the mother country in the Regency. This, however, should not lead to the destruction of the traditional Moslem Algerian society.

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"Il y a dans ce moment-ci un parfait équilibre entre le gouverneur général et le Gouvernement en France; l'un veut la colonisation militaire, et il faut reconnaître qu'il ne peut pas la faire; l'autre veut la colonisation civile, il ne peut pas non plus y réussir; de telle sorte que, comme je le disais tout à l'heure, les deux pouvoirs se tiennent en échec, et on arrive paisiblement à l'impuissance. (Rires approbatifs à gauche)."
Under two headings: 1. "The Domination and Government of the Natives" and 2. "The Civil Administration—Government of the Europeans", he, advocated the separation of the two societies, French and Arab, in Algérie. The native Algerian territory was to be governed by the generals and by the officers of the Bureaux Arabes and all political power maintained in French hands while the more secondary powers were to be exercised by the Algerians.\textsuperscript{51} Tocqueville described the general attitude to be adopted vis-a-vis the natives. "The Moslem society," he claimed, "...although imperfect and backward is not uncivilized."\textsuperscript{52}

It would be useless and even dangerous for the military government to impose a European civilization on this Arab society, rather a special effort must be made to guide it according to its own way of life.\textsuperscript{53} Instead of forcing the Arabs into European schools, it would be preferable to improve their own so that more teachers and religious men can be formed in their midst. Tocqueville opposed, in his proposals, the attempts made, in certain quarters, to bring pressure on the government to abolish gradually the

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 320. It is presumed that Tocqueville meant the judicial apparatus based on the shari'a.

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 323.

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 325.
institution of Islam on the grounds that the Koran preached a permanent enmity to the non-Moslems: "What we really owe the Arabs", said Tocqueville, "is a good government...directing them in our interest as well as theirs...that is preoccupied with their well-being...and finally, a power that governs without exploiting them." But at the same time, Tocqueville was ever aware that his doctrine had a utopian element and he warned the Chamber not to entertain too great a hope for an easy and peaceful relationship with the Arabs. "To what extent is hope permissible and where does the chimera (chimère) begin?" asked a worried but politically realistic Tocqueville. "Let us not imagine that we can destroy in the hearts of the native population the blind hatred that is always shown towards foreign domination.... What we can hope for is not the elimination of hostility towards our government but we can expect some abatement of the hatred; we must strive to make our yoke supportable, and not aim for it to be loved... It would not be wise to think that we could win the natives by sharing our ideas and habits with them, but we could hope to win them over by a common interest."

54 Ibid., pp. 324-325.
55 Ibid., p. 328.
56 Ibid., p. 329.
sort of enlightened despotism towards the Algerian Arabs, persuading them, from a position of strength, to accept a situation that might be of benefit to them in the long run. This was the best offer he could propose to the native Algerian.

Having indicated the policy to be adopted towards the native Algerian population, Tocqueville then focused his attention on the administration of the 'territoire civil', the portion of the country inhabited for the most part by Europeans. He considered that the serious deficiency of the administration contributed to the sad state of affairs in Algeria and he called for an urgent reform to eliminate its defects. To begin with, a special school had to be established in order to train civil servants for Algeria; a measure that had been successful in training competent civil servants for the Indian government. But the important proposal in his project was the proper reorganization of the administrative services. Tocqueville indicated the need for a simpler and faster government machine. So far, it seemed that the organization in Algiers was modelled closely on that of Paris and, therefore, suffered from excessive centralization of the capital. To make things worse, Algeria had no local executives in the provinces such as préfets who could

57 Ibid., p. 331.
deal with the more immediate problems so that the smallest decisions had to be referred to Algiers. But Algiers, in turn, did not have the right to decide, except in very minor cases, matters that had to be channeled to the Ministry of War in Paris. So in effect, Algeria suffered from a double centralization making it impossible for any administration to function properly. Even within Algiers the different branches were centralized to such an extent that they became virtually independent of one another. Tocqueville cited many examples of the absurd procedures followed in Algiers and Paris. His contention was that the administrative organization in Algeria had only succeeded in multiplying the number of bureaucrats and in creating more artificial positions for civil servants to occupy. The situation Tocqueville described recalls Parkinson’s laws. Therefore the changes called for by Tocqueville included a general decentralization of the entire administrative structure both in Paris and in Algiers, and the creation of an effective local administrative authority on a municipal level. 58 Using the experience acquired in the New World and in England, he indicated the necessity for a massive colon participation in the affairs of the ‘territoire civil’ in order

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58 Ibid., p. 346.
to train them in proper citizenship as the entire spirit of
the administration should manifest a respect for the rights
of the individual and the arbitrary rule of a centralized
military organization with powers to evict Europeans from
the 'territoire civil' as exercised in Algeria was incompat-
ible with liberty. The individual must have the right to
make proper representation to intermediate bodies.\textsuperscript{59} In
addition, the censorship of the press must be lifted, although
Tocqueville felt that the discussion of certain questions
that might endanger France's power in Algeria should not be
discussed.

The goal of his proposals on Algeria was to ensure
that Algeria remain under French domination, be considered
not as a colony but as the actual extension of France on the
other side of the Mediterranean. "(We) must not try to give
birth to a new people with their own laws, interests, and
eventually their own nationality. Our efforts must always
be to implant in Algeria a population that is, in fact,
ourselves."\textsuperscript{60} To attain this end, as indicated, the double
tyrranny of the military and civil authorities must be ended
as well as the double centralization in Paris and Algiers,
and adequate guarantees for law, justice, and property be

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., p. 348.

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., p. 347.
provided in order to attract a colon population into his 'new' France. He wanted to insure that no separatist movement would arise among the French colons, one which might eventually lead to the birth of a new nation, and his final object was not to create a colony, nor a 'new' society such as the American, but simply to expand France across the Mediterranean. With regard to the native problem, Tocqueville's scheme implied that equality would be impossible, but he warned his fellow-countrymen that the future of French Algeria could be grim indeed if they failed to respect the dignity and property of the natives:

"If our actions show that, in our eyes, the old inhabitants of Algeria are nothing more than an obstacle to be pushed aside or trampled upon; if in engulfing their populations, we do not lift them towards happiness and light, but instead we grip them in a stifling stranglehold, then the question of survival, of life and death, will interpose itself between the two races. Algeria, I assure you, will then become sooner or later a closed field, a walled-in arena, where the two people will fight it out without mercy and where one of them will perish. May God save us, Gentlemen, from such a destiny."61

CONCLUSION

Baude, Desjubert, and Tocqueville differed in their explanations and solutions of the Algerian problem because each man saw it from a particular perspective. To Baude, it seemed like an opportunity to advance the interests of a dynasty. To Desjubert, Algeria was a source of weakness to a France he wanted strong continentally, and to Tocqueville, it seemed to provide an opportunity to rejuvenate France through stimulating her people with a vision of grandeur and mission. Baude wanted France to establish an Orleanist Vice-Royalty in Algeria. Desjubert believed that while France should hold on to two or three strategic ports, the remainder of Algeria should constitute an independent native state, and Tocqueville favored the extension of France as a state across the Mediterranean into Algeria, and the transformation of Algeria into a French province.

While Baude's solution was not anachronistic to the general mood of the time, it, nevertheless, had a serious limitation. Unless Baude's viceroy had been prepared to embrace Islam and found a Moslem dynasty, he would have remained an usurper from the point of view of a Moslem society. It was conceivable that a French Moslem viceroy might have ruled an Algerian society in much the same way
as the Albanian Moslem viceroy was then ruling in Egypt. But the rule of a Christian viceroy would have implied a Christian state. This no Moslem society could have accepted. Desjobert's solution presented the interesting and seemingly more plausible alternative of an Algerian state under the authority of a Moslem Arab leader, namely Abdel Kader with French control limited to strategic ports along the Algerian coast. Such an arrangement would have checked the growth of a colon population at an early stage. However Desjobert's proposals were unrealistic for two reasons. One, it was too much to have expected France to withdraw at the moment of a victory won after seventeen years of combat; and two, it was not certain whether Abdel Kader's candidacy would have been acceptable to other Moslems, the Kabyles in particular.

Tocqueville's solution, viewed in terms of the national interests of France in the nineteenth century, was probably the most realistic of the three. He favoured the maintenance of the Algerian Moslem society, albeit under a benevolent despotism, and he also urged, for the colon population, a decentralized governmental institutions with liberty, property and participation in local government guaranteed, all this to encourage massive immigration. The main limitation of Tocqueville's solution was its assumption that inequality between the colon and the native societies would remain a permanent feature in French Algeria. In the final analysis, the way France developed and organized Algeria was not too
different from the solution Tocqueville had proposed, but with one crucial exception. France refused to seriously respect and sustain Algerian Moslem institutions. Instead, the Moslem was treated in ways Tocqueville had cautioned his colleagues in the Chamber against. In a sense, Tocqueville was a prophet of French Algeria’s latter-day collapse. On the other hand, could the segregated French Algeria he envisioned have withstood the force of modern Arab nationalism?

But it is too much to have expected these three students of Algeria to have foreseen a future in which nationalism would shake the easy assumptions of so many Europeans. What is interesting about their views is the insight with which they provide us into intelligent and informed French opinion in the era of the July Monarchy. What is creditable about all three, is that they exhibited a humaneness and a liberality which were to prove only too rare in the unfolding of the Algerian drama, a drama to become one day, for so many Frenchmen, a tragedy.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

The principal sources used in this study include the works of Baude, Desjobert, and Tocqueville on Algeria; the archives of the Public Record Office in London; an official report on Algeria published by the Ministry of War in France in 1838. Other sources used include histories, travel accounts, and other materials published during the period under study (1830-1848); also, bibliographies and studies that are directly related to Baude, Desjobert, and Tocqueville, or to the historical period under study. This material will now be discussed in more detail.

Baude wrote extensively on Algeria. His first study was an article in the Revue des Deux Mondes, (1835), "Du Système d'Établissement à "Suivre en Algérie" which discusses the general situation in Algeria and calls for a limited occupation of the territory. It is critical of the policies that were then adopted. His second and major work is a two volume study, L'Algérie (1841) in which he proposed, among other things, the creation of an Algerian state under an Orleanist Viceroy. For his other works, see page 28 of this study.

Desjobert, a bitter opponent of the colonial bloc in parliament, wrote several books dealing with Algeria. They
are all very critical of France's colonial policies. There is a constant repetition of the same themes but the works, although polemical, are valuable especially because Desjoubert has paid some attention in quoting sources, and the footnotes provide an interesting survey of the contemporary materials on Algeria (see p. 101 of this study). The traditionalist school of French historians of Algeria has not treated Desjoubert kindly; except for Julien, who incidently, cites in his bibliography to the "Histoire de l'Algérie Contemporaine" p. 568, A.M. Gossez's article on Desjoubert, "Un adversaire de la colonisation en Algérie, le député normand Amédée Desjoubert," in Révolution 1848 (March-May 1930)

Tocqueville's importance as a scholar of Algerian affairs is no longer in doubt primarily because of his exhaustive study and evaluation of the Algerian administration. Julien considers him a basic source for a study of Algeria under the July Monarchy. The edition of Tocqueville's works used in this study is the one presently in progress under the direction of J.-P. Mayer and which is now considered to be definitive. The volumes concerning Algeria are the following: Tome III Ecrits et Discours Politiques (1862) which contains the main body of his notes on Algeria, his speeches, reports, etc.; and Tome V, Part II which includes his account of a journey in Algeria in 1841.
Tocqueville is a popular subject in scholarship, but his writings on Algeria have not received as much attention as they should. Andre Martel's article (see bibliography) is useful but was written before the definitive edition of Tocqueville's works appeared. Sister Mary Lawler's work, an analysis of Tocqueville as a parliamentarian, includes his attitudes on the Eastern Question and Algeria (see bibliography). Henri Baudet discusses Tocqueville's colonial thought in *Alexis de Tocqueville: Livre du Centenaire* which, incidentally, contains a number of excellent essays on various aspects of Tocqueville. There is also an excellent introduction by J.J. Chevalier and Andre Jardin in Tocqueville's *Ecrits et Discours Politiques*. The biographical materials include J.P. Mayer's excellent study and Tocqueville's own imitable *Souvenirs*. His works dealing with the problem of centralization and liberty are *De la Démocratie*, ..., the *Journey to England* and his Algerian writings.

The archives of the Public Record Office in London contain valuable sources of information on Algeria. This study was concerned with an examination of the correspondence between Lord Palmerston and the Consul in Algiers, St. John which revealed that the British government considered French Algeria a *fait-accompli*. In fact there is some evidence to show that England was quite happy to see the French in Algiers. The archives also contain some correspondence of Abdel Kader with the British government which ought to be of
great interest to the specialists on Algerian history.

The Ministry of War in France published a series of excellent reports entitled "Tableau de la Situation des Établissements Français dans l'Algérie." This official publication, full of statistical information, was begun in 1838 and finally included nineteen volumes. The series is a basic source for a study of Algerian history although it represents an official position. Tocqueville had made use of the first three volumes. This study employed extensively Volume I (1838) as a background to the French position.

In regard to general histories, the finest work undoubtedly is Julien's recent Histoire de l'Algérie Contemporaine. The documentation in the book is staggering and the bibliography is a masterpiece of historical research. Julien's interpretation is fair and it is difficult to note any partisan feeling. Lacoste, Nouschi, and Frenant's L'Algérie: Passé et Présent (1960), on the other hand, is prejudiced towards anti-colonialism and is definitely leftist in inspiration while Claude Martin's L'Algérie Française (1963) is nostalgic and follows the more 'traditionalist' school of French historical scholarship on Algeria. Baudicour's La Colonisation de l'Algérie (1856) is now over a hundred years old but is still very valuable. There was also a number of histories of Algeria written during the period under study. The finest work in this category is Pellissier de Reynaud's
classic *Annales Algériennes* (three volumes). Camille Rousset's *L'Algérie de 1830 à 1840* (two volumes), Leon Galibert's *L'Algérie Ancienne et Moderne* (1844) and P. Christian's *L'Afrique Française* (1846) are interesting in their description. But M.H. Fisquet's, *Histoire de l'Algérie* (1842) is romantic, superficial and of little interest to the historians.

For the military history of Algeria during this period, Bugeaud's *Par l'épee et par la charrue* is useful together with the Duc D'Orléans' *Campagnes de l'Armée D'Afrique* and Saint-Arnaud's *Lettres* (1832-1854) published in 1958.

The bibliography on Algeria is extensive, and a number of excellent bibliographies and bibliographical studies are available to the student of Algerian affairs. Probably the finest is Julien's bibliography in *Histoire de l'Algérie Contemporaine*, pp. 505-588. Important also is Xavier Yacono's bibliographical essay (1956) which analyzes the material published on Algeria from 1931 to 1956. Playfair includes over seven thousand works in his comprehensive bibliography (1887). Helpful as it contains a double index arranged by subject and author is Tailliat's *L'Algérie dans la Littérature Française: Essai de Bibliographie Méthodique et Raisonnée* (1925).
Note on Transliteration

I had some difficulty in deciding the form of transliteration to be used. I finally opted for the simplest French forms (ex: marabout and staoueli) except for the names of the religious orders such as the Qadiriyya. But in general I have aimed at clarity and simplicity in my spellings.

Tocqueville, Baude, and Desjobert and their contemporaries used the terms Afrique and Algérie interchangeably. In order not to confuse the picture I preferred to translate Afrique as Algeria.

In translating passages from Tocqueville, Baude, and Desjobert and the French sources used for this study, I have tried to use simple language without doing violence to the meaning. But I was unable to do justice to the style of my French sources.
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