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THE RELATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WITH
THE ARAB COUNTRIES
1955-1964

RANDA FUAD FARRA

Submitted in partial fulfillment for the requirements
of the degree of Master of Arts
in the Department of Political Studies
and Public Administration of the
American University of Beirut
Beirut, Lebanon
May, 1965

COMMUNIST CHINESE-ARAB RELATIONS

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this study is to analyze the relations between the People's Republic of China and the Arab countries. Another equally important purpose, however, is to try to expose the growing role that the Chinese Communists are playing in some Arab countries. The Chinese attitude towards the Afro-Asians and newly developing countries is quite an important and recent field of study. Its significance has increased since the Bandung Conference. A study of Communist Chinese-Arab relations during this decade and in the light of the Sino-Soviet dispute is interesting.

I have used a substantial number of Chinese Communist media such as: the Peking Review, Pekin Information, a great number of pamphlets, compiled documents published by the Foreign Language Press, Hsinhua News Agency publications from the Chinese embassies in Cairo and in Damascus and others. Add to this Arabic sources (Arab Communist periodicals, reports and documents from Arab embassies...), and some Western references.

This study is made of two parts. The first part is devoted to a survey of the general ideological framework into which China has tried to fit its relations with the Arab countries. The Second part includes a more detailed analysis of China's political, economic and

cultural relations with the five Arab countries (Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Algeria) with which it has close relations, and China's attitude vis-a-vis the Palestine problem. Following the conclusion an appendix summarizes China's relations with Sudan, Morocco and Tunisia. Those Arab countries with which China has no diplomatic relations are ^{INTS} not covered by this study.

In its relations with the Arab countries, the People's Republic of China seems to be guided by three main objectives: (1) To establish friendly relations with them by supporting their national liberation movements and by promoting trade and cultural relations. (2) To remove Western influence by opposing military, political and economic blocs and by encouraging revolutionary forces against the West and pro-Western régimes. (3) To remove Soviet influence by trying to win the sympathy of both the Arab leaders and the Arab Communists.

China's main objective seems to be the searching of friends, prestige and influence in the Arab world.

While Peking cannot compete with the Soviet Union (and the West) in the economic, technical and military aid, they seem to be far ahead of the Soviets in championing the cause of the Arabs in national liberation movements (the Algerian war of national independence and the Palestinian liberation movement) over which the Soviets are sometimes hesitant. China has a freer hand since it is not restricted by international organizations or by diplomatic relations with most of the rival Western powers interested in the area, particularly the U.S.A., and need not, therefore, fear embarrassing repercussions.

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INTRODUCTION

In 1955, the People's Republic of China which had consolidated itself internally (the Communist regime had been in existence for five years), was seeking to end its isolation. It was recognized by Communist Bloc countries and by a few others, mainly some neighboring Asian countries. It felt the need to play an international role and to develop an attitude of amity towards the Afro-Asians.

Chinese participation and attitude at the Geneva Conference in 1954 had paved the grounds for its acceptance as a member at the Bandung Conference. Add to this the agreement reached between China and India on April 29 1954 in Peking, on Tibet, at which the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were first declared. Since 1955, the "Bandung Spirit" was emphasized by the Chinese in their relations with the Afro-Asians. The Ten Principles of Peaceful Coexistence laid the foundations and opened the gate for "organized cooperation" and for "common struggle against imperialism."

Out of the twenty nine members, nine independent Arab countries were represented at that conference: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. They had all recognized Chiang Kai Chek's régime. However, the Egyptian, Syrian and Yemeni anti-imperialist attitudes were viewed with favor by the Chinese Communist delegation, while the role played by some pro-Western Arab representatives, Charles Malik (Lebanon) and Fādīl al Jamālī (Iraq) who attacked Communism, was con-

sidered as "negative".

The anti-western policy of Egypt (and other Arab countries), the more friendly attitude of the Soviet Union towards the neutralist régimes after Stalin's death, and the Bandung Conference led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between People's China and Egypt in May 1956. This was followed by Syria, in July, and the Yemen in August 1956. Only a radical change in the Iraqi régime could bring the two countries together, in 1958. Among the French colonies of North Africa only Algeria, which was morally and materially supported in its liberation war, established strong relations with Peking.

In their relations with Communist China, the Arab countries could be classified in three categories:

(1) The five Arab countries which are sometimes referred to as "liberated" and which claim to be "socialist" - each following its own path of socialism. These are: The United Arab Republic, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Yemeni Republic, the Iraqi Republic and the People's Republic of Algeria. These countries have developed friendly relations with the Communist Bloc and with the People's Republic of China.

(2) The second group includes: Sudan, Morocco and Tunisia, which established relations with Communist China, but have each a particular policy. They have developed some cultural and trade relations (especially Morocco and Sudan) with Peking. However Tunisia and Morocco remain suspicious of Chinese and Communist influence in Africa. The common denominator between these three African countries and people's China seems to be "mutual cooperation" and "anti-imperialist policy" (the

last item is less stressed than by the countries of the first group).

(5) The third group has no diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. It includes Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Kuwait. Kuwait is extending trade relations with Peking and is expected to establish diplomatic relations.

Apparently their policy is decided by three factors: a) their distrust of Communism b) their pro-western policy c) American pressure and influence. The alienation of these countries from Communist China is, in the Chinese view, caused by the imperialists. These are "hanging on like death to their oil interest in this region." The Chinese leaders firmly believe that by means of "aid, subversion, and other conspiracies the U.S. has made inroads in Britain's traditional source of oil and supply and has become the biggest exploiter of Middle Eastern Oil."¹

China's main relations are with the first group, therefore this study will be devoted to them. It has had formal diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with the second group. These will be discussed briefly in an appendix. It has had no formal diplomatic relations with the third group, therefore it is not included in this study.

In its relations with the Arab countries (this is also applicable to the African countries), the People's Republic of China declares that it takes the following stand: It supports the Arabs:

¹"Struggle for Middle-East Oil," Peking Review, No. 46 (Nov. 17, 1961), p. 19.

- (1) In their struggle to fight imperialism, to win and safeguard national independence,
- (2) in pursuing a policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment,
- (3) in their desire to bring about solidarity and unity in the form of their own choice,
- (4) in their effort to settle their dispute through peaceful consultation,
- (5) it holds that [their] sovereignty should be respected by all countries and that encroachment and interference from any quarter should be opposed.²

How and to what extent these five principles guided Communist China in its policy towards the Arab World, will be discussed in the following chapters. However, before discussing detailed relations it is necessary to consider the general ideological framework into which China has tried to fit its relations with the Arab countries.

²"Premier Chou En Lai Reports on His Visit to Fourteen Countries," Peking Review, No. 18 (May 1, 1964), p. 9.

PART I

CHINESE IDEOLOGY

CHAPTER 1

CHINESE VIEWS ON PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND WAR

I. Peaceful Coexistence

How do the Chinese Communists reconcile the idea of peaceful coexistence with the theory of contradictions between the different social systems? On one hand, they argue that there are basic contradictions between the socialists and the capitalists, between the imperialists and the nationalists, between the oppressing ruling classes and the oppressed peoples. On the other, they advocate Lenin's principle of peaceful coexistence.

A. Lenin's Principle of Peaceful Coexistence

This principle advanced by Lenin arose only after socialist countries became established in the world following the October Revolution. It was formed under circumstances Lenin had predicted before the October Revolution when he said: "Socialism can't achieve victory simultaneously in all countries. It will achieve victory first in one or several countries while the others will remain bourgeois or pre-bourgeois for some time."¹

Lenin's principle of peaceful coexistence is a basic reference point of the Chinese Communists. They write: "It designates a relation-

¹"Peking on Peaceful Coexistence," Foreign Affairs: An American Quarterly Review, XXXVIII (No. 1-4, 1959-1960), p. 677.

ship between countries with different social systems and must not be interpreted as one pleases. It should never be extended to apply to relations between the oppressors and the oppressed classes and never be described as the main content of the transition from capitalism to socialism, still less should it be asserted that peaceful coexistence is mankind's road to socialism."²

Thus in the Chinese view, peaceful coexistence is advantageous by helping to achieve the international environment necessary for socialist construction and for isolating imperialism. It must not, however, be arbitrarily interpreted.

B. The Principle Negatively Considered

1. Peaceful Coexistence is not the Categorical Imperative of Modern Times

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rejects the Soviet reasoning and justification of the urgent need for peaceful coexistence in our modern times. The Soviet leaders maintain that "peaceful coexistence is the overriding and supreme principle for solving contemporary social problems." They assert that it is "the categorical imperative of modern time and the imperious demand of the epoch."³

²A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement. The letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in reply to the letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of March 30, 1963 (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1963), p. 34.

³Peaceful Coexistence - Two Diametrically Opposed Policies. "Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU," VI, Peking: F.L.P., December, 1963, p. 17.

Khrushchev in his formal report to the Supreme Soviet on October 31, 1959 said: "Peaceful coexistence was not something to be desired or not desired." It was an "objective necessity" proceeding from the "present situation in the world," namely that both sides "possess weapons which would cause perilous consequences if they were put into action."⁴

To the Chinese Communists peaceful coexistence is not a necessary consequence of the "balance of terror." They refuse to alter their theories on peaceful coexistence, war, and the People's struggle just because of the change in technology.

2. It is not a Universal All Embracing Principle

They refuse to adhere to it without conditions and warn that "unconditional peaceful coexistence is wrong and against Marxism-Leninism."⁵ They emphasize that it is not a universal all-embracing principle, and this has two implications: The first implication is that it does not apply to relations between oppressed and oppressor classes. Considering the proletarian international duty of supporting the people's revolutionary struggle as the basic and fundamental Leninist principle, they accuse the Soviet leaders of violating Lenin's theory of peaceful coexistence by making it an all embracing principle and thus disregarding their duty of struggle in support of oppressed people.

⁴Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 281.

⁵"On Peaceful Coexistence," The Asian Recorder, VIII, No. 17 (April 23-29, 1962), p. 4537.

Peaceful coexistence, the Chinese hold, cannot be the main content of the transition from capitalism to socialism. "The reason is that it is one thing to practice peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems....the transition from capitalism to socialism in various countries is quite another thing."⁶

The second implication is that peaceful coexistence does not apply to relations between oppressed and oppressor nations, because the task of the latter is "to strive for their own liberation and the overthrow of imperialism and its lackeys. They should not practice peaceful coexistence with the imperialists and their lackeys, nor is it possible for them to do so."⁷ Hence this principle should not preclude wars of national liberation.

The Chinese Communists condemn the Soviet leaders for considering peaceful coexistence as the prerequisite for victory and for declaring very recently that "it was precisely in conditions of peaceful coexistence...that the social revolution triumphed in Cuba, that the Algerians gained national independence...that the influence of the world communist movement increased."⁸

The Chinese reject this statement on the grounds that the victory of the national revolution of all colonies and dependent countries

⁶ A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement, op.cit., p. 54.

⁷ Peaceful Coexistence - Two Diametrically Opposed Policies, op.cit., p. 29.

⁸ Ibid., p. 19.

must be won primarily through the revolutionary struggle of their masses. They criticize the Soviets for undermining the effect of revolutions in the people's emancipation and stressing peaceful coexistence with the "imperialists," and for implying that the oppressed nations "must wait for the natural collapse of imperialism through peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition."⁹

In the light of their own experience and fight against the Kuomintang, the Chinese Communists strongly advocate armed struggle of the people, first for their liberation from foreign domination and second for the transition to socialism. They came to the conclusion that peaceful coexistence and the people's revolutions are two totally different concepts, and that the first cannot be substituted for the people's revolutions and for the international communist movement.

C. The Principle Positively Delimited

The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party are not totally negative in their views on this principle. They affirm that as far as they are concerned, there is no obstacle to the practice of peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems. The obstacle always comes from the "imperialists" and the "bourgeois reactionaries".

This principle of peaceful coexistence is in any case positively delimited. Basically, it denotes a transitional relationship between countries with different social systems. It cannot be durable, since on

⁹ Apoligists of Neo-Colonialism. "Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU," IV; Peking: F.L.P., October, 1963, p. 9.

one hand the "imperialists and their lackeys" push on with their plans of aggression; on the other, the oppressed people have to wage struggles and cannot coexist peacefully with their enemies. The Chinese leaders firmly believe that "only after victory in the revolution is it possible and necessary for the proletariat to pursue the policy of peaceful coexistence."¹⁰

While discussing the correct handling of contradictions among the people, Mao Tse Tung maintained that the Chinese and the socialist countries should also unite with the people of the imperialists and "strive to coexist in peace with these countries, do business with them and prevent any possible war, but under no circumstances should we harbour any unrealistic notion about them."¹¹

In the Chinese belief the Socialist countries can establish such peaceful relations with their enemies, by "compelling one imperialist country or another to do so," and by "relying on their own strength, the expansion of the revolutionary forces of the peoples, the unity with the nationalist countries and the struggle of all the peace-loving peoples."¹² They argue that this is possible because the international balance of forces grows increasingly in favour of socialism and the imperialist forces daily become weaker and the contradictions sharper.

¹⁰Peaceful Coexistence - Two Diametrically Opposed Policies,
op.cit., p. 28.

¹¹Ibid., p. 14.

¹²Ibid., pp. 14-16.

Peaceful coexistence at best involves only partial cooperation with capitalist and imperialist countries. The CCP hold that in its application general cooperation is excluded, and struggles between the socialist and imperialist countries are unavoidable in the political, economic and ideological spheres.¹³

It involves only partial cooperation because their policy of peaceful coexistence is based on the standpoint of international class struggle and not international class collaboration.

First and foremost, peaceful coexistence means coexistence with the newly-developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. These are qualified as friendly and peace-loving peoples struggling against the aggressive plans of imperialism. The antagonism is therefore between them and their oppressors, whereas with the socialists they can establish peaceful relations.

In their defence against the charges of the leaders of the CPSU, who accuse them of lacking faith in peaceful coexistence, the Chinese Communists remind the Soviets that they have initiated the celebrated Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence at the Bandung Conference in 1955, in which the USSR was not represented.¹⁴

It is important to note that negotiations with the imperialists are admissible. The Chinese do not exclude them as peaceful means to

¹³A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement, op.cit., p. 35.

¹⁴This will be discussed at length in the second chapter, while exposing Chinese doctrines on the underdeveloped countries.

resolve conflicts and disputes, but they declare: "It is impermissible to pin hopes for world peace on negotiations," for if emphasized they might paralyze the fighting will of the peoples.¹⁵

These negotiations should not mean détente with their enemies. The Chinese attacks on the Soviet principle of peaceful coexistence are so violent not because it is in contradiction with the proletarian internationalist duty, but because it implies a rapprochement between the two great powers. Add to this the Chinese Communist consideration of the United States as its number one enemy. They said in December 1963 that "Soviet-U.S. collaboration is the heart of the CPSU Leader's general line of peaceful coexistence."¹⁶ They quoted Khrushchev's speech at the United Nations General Assembly in September 1960 when he said that the Soviet Union and the United States "will be able to find a basis for concerted actions and efforts for the good of all humanity and can march hand in hand for the sake of consolidating peace and establishing international cooperation."¹⁷

The Chinese were ironical in their criticism and attacks on the Soviet principle of peaceful coexistence, as one can notice from their comment on the open letter of the CPSU: "The U.S. imperialist" they write, "have not become beautiful angels inspite of Khrushchev's bible reading and psalm singing, they have not turned into compassionate Buddhas inspite of Khrushchev's prayer and incense burnings...They continue to

¹⁵ Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace
("Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU," V;
Peking: F.L.P., Nov. 19, 1963), p. 54.

¹⁶ Peaceful Coexistence - Two Diametrically Opposed Policies,
op.cit., p. 40.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 18.

slap him in the face and reveal the bankruptcy of his ridiculous theories prettifying imperialism."¹⁸

II. War

A. The Inevitability of War

The CCP adheres to the belief that peace will be interrupted periodically by imperialist-launched "unjust wars" or by historically inevitable "just wars" for national liberation or emancipation from capitalism. This is a matter of necessity, for as long as imperialism and exploitation of man by man persists, "a world without wars and without weapons...is sheer illusion."¹⁹ The stand taken by the Chinese on this issue accords with the thinking of Lenin, who believed that "until the imperialist system and the exploiting classes come to an end, wars of one kind or another will continue to occur..."²⁰

As is known, Khrushchev has on more than one occasion repudiated the validity of this view. At the 1960 Rumanian Communist Party Congress, for instance, he denounced the mechanical repetition of Lenin's formula. Later in April 1963, he affirmed that the "growing preponderance of the forces of socialism...is leading up to a point where even before the victory of socialism on earth, while capitalism still exists in part of

¹⁸Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace, op.cit.,
p. 14.

¹⁹A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement, op.cit., p. 29.

²⁰Long Live Leninism (3rd. ed.; Peking: P.L.P., Aug. 1960),
p. 30.

the world, it will actually be possible to exclude war from the life of society."²¹ The Chinese, however, dismiss such ideas as too naive and still insist that the contradictions between the imperialist and socialist camps and between the imperialists and their colonies and semi-colonies are basic, irreconcilable and acute and will sooner or later lead to wars.²² It is important to note that in the Chinese concept of the inevitability of war more stress is laid on local than on general wars.

B. General War

1. The Chinese Communists Oppose but Do Not Fear a General War

In his speech of February 1957 entitled "On the correct handling of contradictions among the people," Mao Tse-tung has clearly stated the Chinese Communist attitude towards a general war. He said: "People in all countries of the world are now discussing whether or not a third World War will break out. Our attitude on this question is the same as our attitude towards all disturbances: firstly we are against it; secondly we are not afraid of it." He went on to say that the first World War was followed by the birth of the Soviet Union with a population of 200 million and the second World War by the emergence of the Socialist camp with a population of 900 million. "If the imperialists," he concluded, "should insist on launching a third World War, it is cer-

²¹"Reply to the Chinese Party's Negotiations Proposals," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XV, (May 1, 1963), p. 5.

²²More on the Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us (Peking: F.L.P., March 4, 1963), pp. 25-27. Krushchev is vulnerable to the charges made against Togliatti.

tain that several hundred million more will turn to socialism."²³

Khrushchev retorted to this by saying that in the case of many peoples the question of socialism would be eliminated altogether because they would have disappeared from our planet. He defended the position of Marxist-Leninists who "cannot propose to establish a Communist civilization on the ruins of centres of world culture."²⁴

2. Peoples not Weapons Decide the Outcome of War

The Communist leaders of the Soviet Union seem to readjust their theories according to nuclear developments of the century, by holding that the "atomic bomb does not adhere to the class principle...and does not distinguish between the imperialists and working people..."²⁵ Contrarily, the Chinese leaders, with Mao Tse-tung at their head, do not fear the atom bomb, and call it "a paper tiger, with which the U.S. reactionaries try to terrify the people. It looks terrible, but in fact is not. Of course the atom bomb is a weapon of mass destruction but the outcome of war is decided by the people not by one or two new weapons."²⁶

This position advanced by the Chinese Chairman in 1946 has not become outmoded. Still now it is quoted in most of the Chinese writings, although nuclear progress has in the intervening years increased. The

²³Chairman Mao Tse-Tung on Imperialism and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers (Peking: P.L.P., Oct. 1958), p. 10.

²⁴Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace, op.cit.,
p. 24.

²⁵Ibid., p. 25.

²⁶Chairman Mao Tse-tung on Imperialism and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers, op.cit., p. 10. (In an interview with the American Journalist Anne Louise Strong).

CCP seems to disregard these developments and accepts without alteration "these brilliant expositions of Comrade Mao Tse-tung of the relations between politics and technology"--as a Chinese Communist writer puts it--for such ideas "not only refuted the theory that weapons decide every thing, but also further developed the Marxist-Leninist theory that man is the decisive factor in war."²⁷

The Chinese do not subscribe to the declaration of the Soviet government which "pretends" that the failure of Great Britain and France in the war of aggression against Egypt in 1956, the "failure of the U.S.A. in its attempt to threaten Syria with arms in 1957" and anticipated American-British "intervention" in Iraq in 1958 were caused by the threat of Soviet nuclear arms. They hold that all these failures of the imperialists were due in the first place to the struggle of the people of Egypt, Syria and Iraq. The Chinese believe that the support given to the Arabs by the people of the world, including the Soviet Union, counted heavily, yet, without all merit to the nuclear arms of the Soviet Union.²⁸

5. How to Prevent a New World War

A new world war can be prevented provided the Communists with the help of peace-loving peoples stand resolute against the "aggressive" plans of the imperialists. An important and basic condition for the elimination of world war, emphasized by the Chinese leaders, is the

²⁷ Kuo Ko, "The Victorious Road of National Liberation War," Peking Review, No. 46 (Nov. 15, 1963), p. 9.

²⁸ "Déclaration du Porte-Parole du Gouvernement Chinois" Apropos de la Déclaration du Gouvernement Soviétique en date du 21 Aout, Pékin Information, No. 5 (9 Septembre 1963), p. 10.

unity of the Communist parties of the world. With the widening of the rift between Moscow and Peking, and the appearance of "polycentrism" in Communism, the Chinese accuse the Soviet leaders of "splittism" and "revisionism". They bluntly call them the "greatest splitters of our times," and accuse them of regarding U.S. imperialism, qualified as the most ferocious enemy of the world, "as their most reliable friend," and treating the fraternal parties and countries adhering to Marxism-Leninism--the People's Republic of China and Albania--as their enemies.

They quote American sources praising Khrushchev for being "sufficiently in earnest in his desire for a détente with the West that he is willing to risk a split in the Communist movement to achieve it."²⁹ Since this appraisal comes from their enemies, they conclude that the greatest service of Khrushchev's schism is to the Western world and not to International Communism. The Soviet-U.S. rapprochement, especially as realized in the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, is not considered by the Chinese as a positive step to prevent world war, but a capitulation in the "hope of binding China hand and foot" and of seeking Soviet-U.S. cooperation for the domination of the world.³⁰

So the Chinese Communists' chief concern is to keep the International Communist Movement united against "imperialism" in general and

²⁹The Leaders of the CPSU are the Greatest Splitters of our Times ("Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU," VII: Peking: P.L.P., Feb. 4, 1964), p. 23.

³⁰"Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government," A Comment on the Soviet Government's and Statement of Aug. 3, Peking Review, No. 23, (Aug. 16, 1963), p. 7.

the United States in particular. They maintain that they "can smash the imperialist plan for launching a new world war...provided they expose the imperialist frauds and see through the revisionist lies."⁵¹

C. Local Wars

The Communist Party of China holds that the direct contradictions are not between the Socialist and the imperialist camps, but between the reactionary cliques of the imperialist countries and its own people, between the imperialist countries and their colonies and semi-colonies and among the imperialist countries. These contradictions are believed to lead to inevitable limited or local wars, colonial wars being the most likely.⁵²

1. Just and Unjust Wars

They differentiate between "just" and "unjust" wars. The unjust wars are, in their view, the imperialist wars of suppression against the colonial countries and the imperialist wars of suppression against the people in metropolitan countries. The just wars are the national liberation wars in the colonies and the people's revolutionary wars in the capitalist countries. The Chinese publicly declare their full support of the "just wars" and are not deterred by the possibility that these local wars might spread into general ones.

⁵¹ Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace, op.cit.,
p. 36.

⁵² Zagoria, op.cit., p. 315 (quoting Red Flag April 1960).

At the Moscow Conference of January 1961, Khrushchev expressed his fear of local wars mushrooming into larger conflicts and thermo-nuclear rocket wars, and has therefore called for combatting both world wars and local wars. On the other hand the Chinese proclaim that the wars of national liberation and the revolutionary people's wars that have taken place since World War II have not led to a world war.³³

2. Significance of the Just Wars

Great significance is attributed to the "just wars" for they consider them as: (1) direct blows at imperialism; (2) important component of the proletarian world revolution; (3) a mighty force in defence of world peace.³⁴ In their ideological writings the Chinese pay great attention to national liberation wars and to revolutionary people's wars, which in their view are not only "inevitable" but also "necessary" for world peace.

The revolutionary civil wars are according to the CCP inevitable, given the unwillingness of "domestic reactionaries" to give up their privileges and their readiness to suppress their own people by force of arms. Moreover, it believes that such wars contribute to the progress of the Socialist Revolution and therefore ought to be encouraged. With Lenin, the party affirms:

"Whoever recognizes the class struggle can't fail to recognize civil wars, which in every class society are

³³A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement, op.cit., p. 31.

³⁴Apologists of Neo-Colonialism, op.cit., pp. 17-18.

the natural, and under certain conditions, inevitable continuation, development and intensification of the class struggle. All the great revolutions prove this. To repudiate civil war or to forget about it, would mean sinking into extreme opportunism and renouncing the Socialist revolution."⁵⁵

The Chinese leaders have thus come to emphasize that civil wars are the best means of achieving socialism. The Russian and the Chinese Revolutions are cited as appropriate examples. In the civil wars the proletarian parties would of course play the leading role, unite the masses, the peasants, workers, national bourgeoisie in a broad front against the reactionary ruling class.

Conclusion

In brief, we can say that according to the Communist leaders of China, wars will continue to occur as long as imperialism, aggression and oppression exist; and world peace can only be achieved with their disappearance--that is, when Communism wins. They hold that the "victory of socialism all over the world will completely remove the social and national causes of wars."⁵⁶

Because of their stress on coexistence and peaceful theory of inevitability of wars, mainly under imperialism exists, and their warm support of revolutionary movements, the Chinese are obviously more warlike than other Communists.

⁵⁵ Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace, op.cit.,
p. 20.

⁵⁶ More on the Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us,
op.cit., p. 88.

"Some people" says Mao Tse-tung, "ridicule us as advocates of the omnipotence of revolutionary wars; that is good not bad, it is Marxist."³⁷ The Chinese see ample justification for this in their own experience: "It is with their guns," they assert, "that the Chinese people have created a socialist political power."³⁸ On the other hand, they reject the charges of exploiting wars for the spread of Communism and declare that "no Marxist-Leninist party favours socialist countries spreading revolution by starting a war."³⁹

³⁷Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace, op.cit.,
p. 21.

³⁸Ibid., p. 21.
Mao Tse-tung, in 1958 put the thesis that political power grows out of a barrel of gun. The above quotation is taken from his Selected Military Writings in 1963, p. 273.

³⁹"Official View of War and Peace" article published in October 31, 1960 in the Red Flag. Extracted from The Asian Recorder, VI, No. 48, Nov. 26-Dec. 2, 1960, p. 3656.

CHAPTER 2

CHINESE VIEWS ON THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

The Chinese sources seldom refer to these countries as the "underdeveloped countries". They prefer to call them colonial or semi-colonial, dependent or newly-independent countries. Sometimes they refer to them by the name of a geographical area: North Africa, Middle East, South-East Asia, Latin America...or by their own names. While a colonial country is dominated by a foreign imperialist power, a semi-colonial or dependent country is politically independent but not economically, since it depends on Western assistance, economic aid, loans, etc.

I. The Significance of the Underdeveloped Countries

The Chinese Communist leaders attach great importance to these underdeveloped countries: first, for their vital role in the world-wide revolutionary struggle; second, for considering the Chinese revolution as "a classical example," a model of revolution for Asian and African countries.

The underdeveloped countries are regarded by the Chinese as "the focus of all capitalist contradictions," "the storm center of world revolution." "The revolutionary cause of the international proletariat

as a whole hinges on the outcome of the people's struggle in these regions."¹ Thus these areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America where the various types of contradictions in the contemporary world are concentrated are the "most vulnerable areas" since they deal direct blows at imperialism.

The dogma that inspired Mao Tse-tung was Lenin's stress on the significance of the awakening of the backward countries: weakening the imperialists and thus facilitating the European Revolution. While Lenin considered this revolution as the "key stone" to the International Proletarian Revolution, Mao gives it priority in the over-all strategy of world revolution.

The Chinese Communists claim the tutelage of revolutionary movement in all underdeveloped countries. They proclaim their own revolution as "a classical example," a "key factor in the world revolution" as Mao Tse-tung said. In 1956, he anticipated its victory and its effect on the toiling masses of the colonial countries who "will follow the example of China and win a similar victory of their own."²

We can detect the wish of the Chinese to replace the Soviets as leaders of revolutionary movement in these underdeveloped areas. Before the Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Peking, Liu

¹Hilton Kovner, "The Sino-Soviet Dialogue," Current History, XXIV, No. 265 (Sept. 1963), p. 120. (Quoting the Peking Review, March 15, 1963).

²Stuart R. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 256. An extract from Edgar Snow's interview with Mao Tse-tung, July 25, 1963.

Shao-Ch'i boldly put forward that the classical type of revolution in imperialist countries is the Soviet October Revolution, and that the classical type of revolution in the colonial and semi-colonial countries is the Chinese Revolution, which is of "inestimable value for the people of these countries."³

II. Afro-Asian Peoples

The Afro-Asian concept came clearly into existence in 1955 at the Bandung Conference, where 29 Asian and African countries met. "A new Asia and Africa have been born," declared President Sukarno. "Gone forever are the days where the destiny of the Asian and African peoples was manipulated at will by others," said China's Premier Chou En Lai.⁴

Premier Chou En Lai who headed the delegation of the People's Republic of China presented the Chinese view. He maintained that the people of these two continents created brilliant ancient civilization and made tremendous contributions to mankind. Nevertheless, he added, they remained in a stagnant state of poverty and backwardness because they have been subjected to colonial plunder and oppression. Stressing the fear and distrust of former colonial powers, the Chinese Premier tried to associate his people with those of Asia and Africa. He identified the Chinese sufferings, aims and aspirations with those of the Afro-Asians when he said: "Our voices have been suppressed, our aspirations shattered and our destiny placed in the hands of others. Thus we

³Kurt London, "Communism in Africa: The Role of China," Problem of Communism, XI, No. 4 (July-August 1962), p. 24.

⁴"The Bandung Spirit Grows," Peking Review, No. 16 (April 21, 1961), p. 11.

have no choice but to rise against colonialism. Suffering from the same cause and struggling for the same aim, we, the Asian and African peoples, have found it easier to understand each other and have long had deep sympathy and concern for one another."⁵

We conclude from this that the Chinese hope is to dispel the suspicions of these newly-developing countries (who consider them as having different interests and aims because of their adherence to communism) and to convey the impression that they are genuinely on the side of the Afro-Asian countries. "In past experience, in present circumstances and in cherished hopes, China has much in common with the countries of Asia and Africa which have just freed themselves from the rule of colonialism..."⁶

The desires and demands of these people, as enumerated by the Chinese in 1955, are the following: opposition to colonialism and striving for complete national independence; opposition to aggressive wars and defending world peace; and promotion of friendly cooperation between the Asian and African countries.

⁵Main Speech by Premier Chou En Lai, Head of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China, Distributed at the Plenary Session of the Asian-African Conference, "China and the Asian African Conference (Documents), (Peking: F.L.P., 1955), p. 10.

⁶"Liu Shao li, Political Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the 8th National Congress of the Party, Sept. 15, 1956," China Supports the Arab People's Struggle for National Independence. A selection of important documents compiled by the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs (Peking: F.L.P., 1958), p. 29.

Premier Chou En Lai summarizes the Afro-Asian as well as the Chinese aims into two: independence and peace. He advocates friendship and cooperation between them to carry their struggles to victory. In all the Afro-Asian Conferences in which the Chinese were represented, the stress was on the necessity for these people "to strengthen their unity still further in order to carry this struggle to victory."⁷

As for peace and mainly world peace, the Chinese believe that it is cherished by the people of this Bloc, qualified as peace-loving, because they have suffered from the misery of war and from oppression, and were the victims of new war preparations. They have an urgent need for a peaceful international environment in order to carry out their economic development. World peace is firmly advocated by them simply because it is in their interest.

III. Peaceful-Coexistence

A. Peaceful Coexistence Does Not Erase Differences

By advocating peaceful coexistence between these different social systems, as well as between these underdeveloped or newly-developing countries and Communist China, the Chinese admit that among themselves they do have different ideologies and different social systems.

"We do not wish to conceal the fact that we differ in our social and political systems," Premier Chou En Lai reported on his visit to

⁷"Afro-Asian Conference Success," Peking Review, No. 7 (Feb. 15, 1963), p. 5.

eleven countries in Asia and Europe in 1957. But he added that such differences do not "prevent us from entering into friendly cooperation with each other," and he stressed the common desire of the Asians and Africans in consolidating their national independence.⁸

It is true that none is asked to give up his own views, because "difference in viewpoint is an objective reality," yet it is emphasized that the Afro-Asian peoples should not let their differences hinder them from achieving agreement as far as their main task is concerned.⁹

Within the family of the Afro-Asian people, the Chinese hold that all disputes and differences can be resolved, for they have been "deliberately created by imperialism or left over as a result of the aggressive activities of imperialism," e.g., boundary disputes.¹⁰ There is every reason, they argue, to solve them on the basis of the principles and spirit of the Bandung Declaration.

B. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence

The Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation adopted by the Asian-African Conference fully embodies the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The Conference used in its declaration the term "live together in peace" instead of "peaceful coexistence," for as Chou En Lai explained it, people have different views on the

⁸"Premier Chou En Lai's Report on Visits to Eleven Countries in Asia and Europe, March 5, 1957," China Supports the Arab People's Struggle for National Independence, op.cit., p. 53.

⁹"Supplementary Speech by Premier Chou En Lai at the Plenary Session of the Afro-Asian Conference," China and the Asian-African Conference, op.cit., p. 23.

¹⁰"Afro-Asian Conference Success," op.cit., p. 5.

wording of peaceful coexistence. But, he pointed out, "in actual fact, for countries of different social systems, to live together in peace-- a term used in the preamble of the Charter of the United Nations-- is the same as peaceful coexistence."¹¹

The Declaration sets ten principles, five of which are similar to the four of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. The first five principles are: (1) respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; (2) refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country; (3) abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country; (4) recognition of the equality of all nations, large and small; (5) promotion of mutual interest and cooperation.¹²

These are exactly similar to the following four of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, namely: (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) non-aggression; (3) non-interference in each other's internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit. The fifth principle is that of peaceful coexistence, and can only be realized if the four precedent are followed.

The Chinese Communists consistently affirm that they were the first to initiate these celebrated Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in 1954, and that together with other Asian and African countries,

¹¹"Premier Chou En Lai's Report on the Asian-African Conference, Made at the Meeting of the Standing Committee of the National's People's Congress," China and the Asian-African Conference, op.cit., p. 40.

¹²Ibid., p. 41.

they formulated the Ten Principles on the basis of the Five Principles at the Bandung Conference in 1955.

C. Economic and Cultural Cooperation

Cooperation is not only viewed in the political field--to achieve independence and peace--but also in the economic and cultural spheres which are complementary and necessary to the first. Premier Chou En Lai believes that this cooperation is necessary to facilitate the elimination of the economic and cultural backwardness caused by the long period of colonial exploitation and oppression.

In the economic field he advocates complete independence and holds that trade relations and economic cooperation should be carried out on the basis of mutual benefit and mutual respect for national sovereignty. "Though the scope of such cooperation cannot be very extensive," Chou En Lai asserted in 1955, "the most essential fact is for these countries to develop their own production and rely on their own efforts."¹⁵ Even among the African and the Asian countries, economic cooperation should first be based on mutual benefit and not on conditions or privileges. He concluded with a specific reference to China, which is willing to cooperate with all Asian and African countries economically and asks no special privilege.

Chen Yi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs elaborated on this view by saying that the countries which have just won independence and which want to develop an independent national economy and raise the

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 44.

living standards of their people, "need not now go hand in hand to their former oppressors." He advanced another alternative for them: "to look forward to assistance from the socialist states in both modern equipment and technical experiences, with no strings attached."¹⁴

On the other hand the Chinese realize that they can not confine economic cooperation to two continents and to the Socialists. This is why Chou En Lai declared that the Chinese do not prevent these countries from having economic cooperation with any other country or accepting economic aid from them. However, he expressed the desire to see that such economic aid be given to them free from conditions and actually designed to help them.¹⁵

As for the cultural exchange, in the Chinese viewpoint, it should be based on respect for the development of the national culture of each country and should not ignore the characteristics and special merits of any country so that the Asians and Africans may learn and benefit from each other. Here, too, the basis of cultural cooperation should be equality and mutual benefit, with no conditions or strings of any kind.

IV. National Liberation Movements

A. Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism

Colonialism has been defined by Premier Chou En Lai as a "product of capitalism." In his view both colonies and semi-colonies

¹⁴"Chen Yi on Present International Situation and Our Foreign Policy, Sept. 25, 1956," China Supports the Arab People's Struggle for National Independence, op.cit., p. 37.

¹⁵"Premier Chou En Lai's Report on Visits to Eleven Countries in Asia and Europe, March 5, 1957," Ibid., p. 57.

are countries which have been deprived of their sovereignty in varying degrees as a result of aggression by foreign capitalist countries. The essence of colonialism, as expressed by him at the Bandung Conference, is plunder and exploitation practised by capitalist countries against the backward countries, the transformation of the latter into the former's monopolized markets, sources of raw material and place of investment, and their military strategic bases.¹⁶

From the Chinese viewpoint, colonialism has not disappeared but has simply taken on new forms and has on that account become more sinister and pernicious. They refute the Soviet view that colonialism is disappearing from the present-day world and that the only remnants are to be found in such places as Portuguese Angola and Mozambique in Africa. They emphasize that most countries in Asia and Africa are still victims of imperialist aggression and oppression of the colonialists and that the old colonialists have changed into "neo-colonialists, and retain their colonial rule through their trained agents."¹⁷ According to the Chinese, the imperialists headed by the U.S.A., continue to enslave and control their old colonies after their independence through different means, such as: military blocs, bases, federations, and puppet régimes. The Chinese consider economic aid as a form of neo-colonialism, since "the neo-colonialists retain these countries as markets and outlets for their exports or capital."¹⁸

¹⁶"Premier Chou En Lai's Report on the Asian-African Conference," China and the Asian-African Conference, *op.cit.*, p. 37.

¹⁷Apologists of Neo-Colonialism, *op.cit.*, p. 3.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 3.

"U.S. imperialism" is to the Communists of China the main bulwark of neo-colonialism, and the worst enemy of the Asian and African peoples. They accuse the Americans of using methods more sinister than those used by the old colonialists to undermine and suppress the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America, in order to replace the old colonialists.

The United Nations is also regarded as "an important tool... for subjecting the old colonies to military, cultural and economic aggression."¹⁹ Hence, they criticize Khrushchev for looking upon the U.N. as a possible instrument of liberation from foreign oppression. Their opposition to the U.N. may also be due to their exclusion from the organization. The pressure applied by the U.S.A. to prevent them from gaining admission accounts for their contention that the world organization is still under imperialist control.

B. The National Liberation Wars

The term "national liberation war" was applied by Lenin to wars directed against colonial oppression. Consequently Lenin and the Communists in general consider them as "progressive," "revolutionary" and "righteous." The Chinese argue that since "every struggle of the oppressed nations for survival won the warm sympathy and praise of Marx, Engels and Lenin,"²⁰ a fundamental task of the international communist movement is to support the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and peoples. Their support of all movements directed against imperialism

¹⁹Ibid., p. 15.

²⁰More on the Differences Between Comrade Fogliatti and Us,
op.cit., pp.44-45.

and aimed at national independence is manifested in their celebration of the Anti-Colonialism Day, which falls on the closing day of the First Asian-African Conference, i.e., on April 24. Another celebrated day is the African Liberation Day, greeted by the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity for its call to root out old and new colonialism from their continent.

National liberation wars are usually associated by the leaders of the CCP with "armed struggle". Since the imperialists and colonialists never bestow freedom and independence on the oppressed nations and peoples, these people cannot but resort to armed struggle. Dien Bien Phu is an example to them. The Chinese asserted their conviction that "for an oppressed nation there is only one way--take up arms and wage a determined struggle against the aggressor."²¹

While Khrushchev has readjusted his theories of national liberation wars to our thermonuclear age by supporting these movements but at the same time warning that "even a tiny spark can cause a world conflagration," that a world war must necessarily be a thermonuclear war and that local wars in our time might endanger peace, the Chinese strongly reject these ideas and accuse the Soviets of compromising with the imperialists by giving priority to negotiations and diplomacy. They gave as example the Algerian people's war of national liberation in which the leaders of the CPSU "not only withdrew support for a long period but actually took the side of French imperialism,"²² by hesitating to

²¹"Historic Significance of the Dien Bien Phu Victory," Peking Review, No. 20 (May 15, 1964), p. 18.

²²Apologists of Neo-Colonialism, op.cit., p. 14.

recognize the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria.

To the Soviet leaders, armed violence in the colonial wars is not always fruitful and might lead to hostilities with the West, to more Western intervention and to more friction. This is why they are not categorical on this issue. It is declared in the Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism that non-violent revolution has great advantages because it permitted a "radical reorganization of social life" with "the least sacrifices on the part of the Workers."²³ Suslov criticized the Chinese leaders for their misunderstanding of the essence of the present stage of the national liberation revolution. He said: "They are blind to the differences prevailing in the situation, in various countries and are offering the peoples of all countries just one prescription--armed struggle and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat." "Such prescription" he added, "may if put into practice undermine the national front and strengthen the positions of the colonialists and neo-colonialists."²⁴

The Chinese denounce the idea that "resistance to imperialist oppression and aggression inevitably leads to armed intervention and that accommodation which is therefore necessary in the interest of peace."²⁵ Iraq is cited as example of a country which as a result of

²³Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1960), pp. 424-425.

²⁴"Suslov's Anti-Chinese Report," Peking Review, No. 18, (May 1964), p.19.

²⁵"Soviet and Chinese Views of the Non Socialist East," Mizan Newsletter, No. 6 (May 1959), p. 2.

its national revolution and liberation is today a "stronghold of peace after being a war base of imperialism." They deny the Soviet theory that the national liberation movement has entered upon a "new stage" having economic tasks as its core. The Soviet argument is that whereas "formerly, the struggle was carried on mainly in the political sphere," today the economic question has become the "central task." The Chinese counter-argument is that the struggle is still being waged fiercely in the political, economic, military, cultural, ideological and other spheres, and that the kind of "new stage" described by the Soviet leaders is nothing but a stage in which the national liberation movement is no longer desired.²⁶

C. Nationalism

While they decried national oppression, Marx and Engels had little sympathy with the demands of small states for national independence. They assumed that the European working class would liberate the colonies, so they considered national liberation movements as secondary, and gave priority to the revolutions in the capitalist and industrial European countries.

With the emergence of modern national trends after World War I-- the rise of Sun Yat Sen, Mustafa Kamal, the Indian National Congress Party and others--Lenin became aware of the significance of nationalism. The Marxist-Leninists, however, could not adopt a decisive attitude towards the nationalists. At the Second Congress of the Communist

²⁶Apologists of Neo-Colonialism, op.cit., p. 7.

International in 1920, there was a debate between the Indian Communist leader M.N. Roy and Lenin on whether or not these nationalist movements led by the bourgeoisie should be supported. The Universal Revolution was the only thing that really interested Lenin; nationalism presented a real problem: it might divert the proletariat from their main task of overthrowing the bourgeoisie. He wanted primarily to assure the proletarian international solidarity and could not ignore the implication of nationalist trends in the colonial countries. Therefore he deduced highly relativist conclusions concerning the nationality problem.

"A national struggle directed against a capitalist state was to be supported by the communists because it tended to weaken the imperialist chain. A similar movement against the socialist state was to be looked upon as a crime against the revolution."²⁷

The Chinese Communist line on nationalism has to a great extent been influenced by Lenin. They declare that the proletariat's world outlook is internationalism and not nationalism. However, they differentiate between progressive nationalism which they support and reactionary nationalism which they condemn. They do not deny that "nationalism may signify progressiveness on certain occasions and in certain countries"--in other terms in non-communist countries. Yet, in China or a communist country whose duty is to endorse international unity, "it can only represent the reactionary side," reflecting "the selfishness and egoism of the bourgeoisie," which would place the interests of

²⁷Wladyslaw W. Rulski, Peaceful Coexistence ("Foundation for Foreign Affairs Series," XX, No. 5, Chicago: Regnery, 1959), pp.188-189.

China above the overall international interests - the proletariat.²⁸

In short, we can say that the Chinese favour revolutionary nationalism in non-communist countries but not in the conservative, bourgeois and reactionary ones. They denounce nationalist trends in socialist countries as harmful to internationalism. From their own theories the Chinese Communists convey the impression that their outlook is internationalism and not nationalism. Recent Chinese claims on Mongolia led the Soviets to accuse them of struggling not only against the USSR but also against the world communist movement. Pravda criticized the "openly expansionist program" which has "far-reaching pretensions." The Soviet newspaper accused Peking of persistently having published maps showing China as the rightful controller of vast areas of Soviet territory, plus Burma, Vietnam, Korea, Thailand, Malaya, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim.²⁹ Chinese claims on Soviet territory is said total more than 1.5 million square kilometers (more than 500,000 square miles). Pravda attacked Mao's thesis that the world population was distributed unevenly and that justice therefore demanded a redistribution of territory. "History" it said, "knows" many cases where reactionary wars were started with a view to expanding "lebensraum" (living space), thus Mao's pronouncements about 'unfair distribution of territory' are not so very new. He has

²⁸A.M. Halpern, "Chinese Communist Line on Neutralism," China Quarterly, No. 5 (Jan.-March, 1961), p. 94.

²⁹"Moscow Rejects Mongolia Claim by Chinese Reds," New York Times (Sept. 5, 1964), p. 3.

predecessors of whom he can hardly be proud."³⁰ Mao's claim to "lost territories" and his denunciation of "unequal treaties" is an aspect of Chinese nationalism. Mao had declared in 1936: "It is the immediate task of China to regain all our lost territories."³¹

D. Nationalism and Communism

It was precisely this question of the scope of collaboration between the Communists and the Nationalists, raised as early as 1920, that is still debated between the Chinese and the Soviets. The discussions between M.N. Roy, the leader of the Indian Communist Party, and Lenin in 1920 and recent controversies between Moscow and Peking suggest that the issue has not yet been solved.

At the Second Comintern Congress in 1920 the debate was whether the Communist International and local communist parties should support bourgeois nationalist movements in the colonial countries. Roy seemed to take the harder line. He did not have confidence in these nationalist leaders and argued that the leadership of the colonial revolution should be from the beginning in the hands of a "communist vanguard." He emphasized that the Communists should not abandon the leadership of these revolutionary movements for national independence to the nationalists and was in favour of a restricted collaboration between these two forces for the elimination of imperialism.

³⁰Ibid., p. 3.

³¹Allen Whiting, "Foreign Policy of Communist China," Foreign Policy in World Politics, ed. Roy G. Macridis (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962), p. 258.

Roy and Lenin agreed that such a collaboration should be strengthened only when the national liberation movements are "really revolutionary," that is when they do not hinder the Communists from organizing the masses in a revolutionary spirit.

After the Second World War, several countries in Asia and Africa that achieved independence were ruled by nationalist rulers. It was only after the death of Stalin and the Bandung Conference that the Soviets and the Chinese inaugurated a benevolent attitude towards these nationalist countries which had adopted a policy of positive neutralism.

With the persecution of the Communists in some newly developing countries and the restriction of their activity the issue that was at the root of the Lenin-Roy controversy reappeared again: to what extent could the communist parties cooperate with the nationalists without placing in jeopardy their own interests? This issue which is nowadays facing the Communists is a major one in the ideological dispute between Moscow and Peking. They questioned in the recent years how much reliance should be put upon nationalist leaders like Nasser, Nehru, Nkrumah, Ben Bella and others at the expense of local communists and for how long.

The Chinese seem to follow Roy's line by voicing their impatience with the nationalist leaders, looked upon as untrustworthy. They accused them of being inclined to "compromise with the imperialists" and of having a dual nature. They did not deny the progressive role played by the bourgeoisie in Asia and Africa in opposing imperialism and feudalism. Nevertheless, they hold, "after all the bourgeoisie is the bourgeoisie. When in power it does not follow resolute revolutionary lines,

it oscillates and compromises." Therefore, they conclude, "it is out of the question for these countries to pass to socialism, nor is it possible for them to accomplish in full the tasks of the national democratic revolution."⁵²

The OCP criticizes the Soviet political and economic support to "dictatorial" national bourgeois governments and argues that such aid was misplaced (especially the economic one), because by strengthening such governments the revolutionary forces, the Communists in other words, were weakened.

The unreliability of the national bourgeoisie was discussed at the meeting of the 81 Communist parties in Moscow in November 1960. A new concept of a "State of National Democracy" was advanced. The national democratic tasks of the progressive forces in a country that had won independence are: "the consolidation of political independence, the carrying out of agrarian reforms in the interest of the peasantry, the elimination of the survivals of feudalism, the uprooting of imperialist economic domination...the development of national industry, the improvement of the living standard, the democratisation of social life, the pursuance of an independent and peaceful foreign policy and the development of economic and cultural cooperation with the socialist and other friendly countries."⁵³ Thus a State of National Democracy is one which

⁵²Ten Glorious Years (Peking: P.L.P., 1960), pp. 276-279.

⁵³G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal and Roderick MacFarquhar, The Sino-Soviet Dispute (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 193-194. (The whole text of the 1960 Moscow Statement).

is isolated from the West and in which Communist parties are not subjected to restrictions. One of its major characteristics is the rejection of dictatorial and despotic method of government and the guarantee of broad democratic rights and freedoms (of speech, press, association, demonstration, of forming political parties...), in other terms a régime that is revolutionary in its domestic reforms while it authorizes the local Communist apparatus to struggle energetically against reactionary tendencies.

This has been directed against some liberated countries where the Communist parties were not only illegal but even suppressed and imprisoned (United Arab Republic). This call for national democracy is a struggle for the extension of Communist influence in nationalist governments.

V. Neutrality

A. Opposition to Neutrality

The leaders of the Russian Revolution did not envisage a third road or a neutral path between Communism and capitalism. They asserted that there could be no neutral attitude and Lenin condemned such position in these words: "Any kind of propaganda of neutrality is either hypocritical cover of counter-revolution, or an appearance of complete unconsciousness... The idea of neutrality is nothing but a mistaken and contemptible excuse."⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Masco Onoe, "The Communist View of Neutrality," A Report to the Fourth International Conference on World Politics (Athens: September 1962), p. 5.

Until 1955 the Chinese Communist line on neutrality was influenced by Leninism. President Liu Shao-Ch'i in 1948 viewed the world as divided into two hostile camps or poles. "On one hand, there is the reactionary forces of imperialism, and on the other there is the world anti-imperialistic camp of progressive forces." These camps, he held, included all the peoples of the world--of all countries, classes sections of the population, parties and groups.³⁵

Neutrality was denounced as an "impossibility" in Liu Shao-Ch'i's terminology, or as a "mere camouflage" in Mao Tse-tung's own words. The latter justified his principle of "no third road" on the basis of Chinese Communist "accumulated experiences". He held that the forty years of Sun Yat-Sen and the twenty-eight years experience of the CCP have taught the Chinese to "lean to one side" if they wanted to achieve victory and consolidate it. "All the Chinese," he added, "without exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism, for sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road."³⁶

B. Benefits of Neutrality

While they rejected neutrality as a principle, the Chinese Communists did not rule it out as a means of seeking some benefits. The term neutrality was rarely used in reference to a trend in the newly-

³⁵ Anderson Shih, "Position and Actions of Communist China Towards Non-Aligned Countries," *Ibid.*, p. 3. (Quoting Liu Shao-Ch'i, "Internationalism and Nationalism.")

³⁶ Mao Tse-tung, On the People's Democratic Dictatorship. (Peking: P.L.P., 1949), p. 7.

developing countries, but rather in reference to some Western countries where such a policy meant a split in the capitalist world. Chen Yi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, recognized the value of this trend when he declared in 1956 that such a policy adopted by "various capitalist countries to counter U.S. war policy conforms completely to their own interests" and is "of benefit to the preservation of world peace."⁵⁷

In Asia and Africa a great number of countries which have won national independence adopted the policy of neutrality. In the second half of the 1950's the leaders of the CCP endorsed the policy of non-alignment, and in most of their speeches, official statements and writings on this subject, they associated "neutrality" with "peace". The value of such a trend was praised and at times encouraged for the following reasons:

(1) A policy of neutrality does not imply a renunciation of active participation in world affairs, and one of its important aspects is the struggle against imperialism. Thus it pursues objectives considered by the Chinese as progressive.

The military value of neutralism has been recognized and welcomed by them. This trend advocates a refusal to participate in military alliances with either camp, but the Chinese prefer to interpret it as a refusal to join the military blocs of the United States, and an alienation of the capitalist and imperialist world from the non-aligned coun-

⁵⁷Chen Yi on Present International Situation and our Foreign Policy, Sept. 25, 1956, "China Supports the Arab People's Struggle for National Independence, op.cit., p. 39.

tries.

(2) A second benefit pointed out by the Chinese and resulting from the first is that this attitude of peace and neutrality "has put a powerful check on the colonial aggrandizement of U.S. imperialism."⁵⁸

(3) Another advantage deduced by the Chinese is that this road of neutrality is in accord with the national independence of the countries in question. "By pursuing such a policy, they can defend their independence," declared Chou En Lai, "keep away from imperialist control, reduce to the minimum their military expenditures so as to use their resources to develop national construction..."⁵⁹

(4) Under a policy of peace and neutrality there is a fourth practical gain. It would be possible for the neutralist régimes to seek economic aid from various quarters without any conditions. Given without any strings attached, the aid and loans could not any more be used to control and enslave them. This also implies that the non-aligned countries need not restrict their economic and trade relations with the Socialist camp. As we have remarked the leaders of China advocated a development of these relations on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

The Chinese doctrine of neutrality became more flexible in the second half of the 1950's, for they hoped to win over these progressive

⁵⁸ "Liu Shao-Chi: Political Report on the Central Committee of the CCP to the 8th National Congress of the Party Sept. 15, 1956," Ibid., p. 25.

⁵⁹ "Premier Chou En Lai's Report on Visits to Eleven Countries in Asia and Europe, March 5, 1957," Ibid., p. 66.

forces and push them in the opposite camp from the imperialists. A.M. Halpern correctly pointed out that the Chinese outlook on neutralism seems originally to have been that Asian countries already neutral could be moved by Chinese support of their aims, into opposition to the West, while neutralism in non-neutral countries could be encouraged.⁴⁰

VI. Transition to Socialism

A. Soviet-Chinese Controversy: Armed Struggle or Peaceful Transition

Unlike the leadership of the CPSU which has since 1956 tended to emphasize the possibility of peaceful transition to socialism, the Chinese Communists are inclined to think of armed struggle as the only realistic means of achieving socialist power. In their view the Soviet thesis is not only "soft" but also quitty of a "clear revision of Marxism-Leninism" and a "clear denial of the universal significance of the October Revolution."⁴¹

They do not deny that it would be in the best interest of the people if the proletariat could attain power and carry out the transition to socialism by peaceful means and admit that it would be wrong not to make use of such a possibility if and when it occurs. However, they add that such an occurrence is extraordinarily rare in the history of revolutions. "Possibility and reality, the wish and its fulfilment are two different things" wrote the Peking Review in January 1963, "history has not as yet witnessed a single example of peaceful transi-

⁴⁰Halpern, loc.cit., p. 111.

⁴¹The Origin and the Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the COSU ("Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU," I; Peking: P.L.P., Sept. 1963), p. 9.

tion to socialism."⁴²

Lenin did not discard--in some exceptional cases--the possibility of a pacific bourgeois renunciation of power, in a small state, the neighbor of which has accomplished a social revolution." It happens if this bourgeois government is convinced that any resistance is hopeless and if it prefers to save its heads." "It is most probable," he remarked, that "even in small states, socialism is not achieved without civil wars." This is why he concluded, "the unique program of the International Social Democracy is the recognition of this war, although in our ideal there is no place for violence as far as men are concerned."⁴³

The Chinese assert that the proletariat is "compelled" to resort to "armed revolution." It is the bourgeoisie itself that stands in the way of peaceful transition. "The question is not whether the proletariat is willing to carry out a peaceful transformation, it is rather whether the bourgeoisie accept such a peaceful transformation."⁴⁴

Mao Tse-tung emphasis upon armed struggle challenged Khrushchev's and Togliatti's championing of the "parliamentary path to power" for Communist parties in newly developed countries. "Guerilla warfare is inevitable," Mao declared, for the building of socialism in China has been linked with this form of struggle. "We know that in China there

⁴²Kovner, op.cit., p. 150.

⁴³"Déclaration de Dix Membres du Comité Central du Parti Communiste de Ceylan," Pékin Information, No. 21 (9 Décembre 1963), p. 33. (Ce que dit Lenin du passage pacifique).

⁴⁴Long Live Leninism, op.cit., p. 43.

would be no place for the proletariat, no place for the people, no place for the Communist Party and no victory for the revolution without armed struggle."⁴⁵ Guerilla warfare, is in his view, in a backward, a big semi colonial country and for a long time, the inevitable and best form of struggle for the people's armed forces to overcome the armed enemy and create their own stronghold.

The Soviet criticize their Chinese Comrades for considering "armed insurrection," everywhere and at any time, the main principle of the revolutionary spirit, and for denying the pacific forms of the struggle in achieving the revolutionary social victory. They hold that Marxism-Leninism teaches that the Communists should use all forms of revolutionary struggle, violent as well as non-violent.⁴⁶

It should be noted here that the Soviet thesis on the possibility of peaceful transition to socialism in no way rules the alternative of armed struggle or implies an abandonment of the principle of class conflicts. In January 1963, Khrushchev challenged the Chinese to name an instance when a Communist party in any country decided to undertake an uprising, and the CPSU came out against the method of armed struggle. "No" he said, "they can't give an example of this for none exists."⁴⁷ The Chinese have subsequently cited the Iraqi case.

⁴⁵Schram, op.cit., (Mao Tse-tung, "Guerrilla Warfare is the Inevitable Path"), p. 257.

⁴⁶"Lettre Ouverte du CC du Parti Communiste de l'Union Soviétique aux Organisations du Parti et a tous les Communistes de l'Union Soviétique," Pékin Information, No. 3 (Special), (29 Juillet 1963), p. 44.

⁴⁷Kovner, op.cit., 131.

The Soviet leaders have been in fact less extrovert than the Chinese in encouraging people's struggles and more concerned to demonstrate their attachment to world peace.

B. The Role of the Communist Party

Communist parties in the colonial, newly independent (and even Western) countries have a mission to fulfill. Having cooperated with the nationalists in the first stage of the revolution, i.e., in national independence, they still have the second stage to achieve, i.e., transition to socialism. It is their task and the outcome of this stage depends on the extent of their struggle and tactics.

Communist China's own bitter experience in collaborating with the Kuomintang is offered as evidence that unless the Communists, from the beginning assume active leadership in the national struggle and retain their identity in the national front, the battle is lost for them. Mao Tse-tung stressed that the indigeneous Communist party should struggle for leadership in the national revolution, but in his Hunan Report in 1927, he disregarded Communist leadership. It is because at that time the Chinese Communist Party accepted Stalin's advice to keep its United Front with the Kuomintang. He revised this report in 1951, and referred directly to Communist leadership.

The Communist party, in striving for a socialist future, has first to fight against all imperialist and reactionary forces and stand in the forefront of the national revolutionary movement. The proletariat and its party must have confidence in the strength of the masses. Their task is to unite with the peasants and to establish a solid worker-

peasant alliance. According to Mao "the strength of the peasants constitutes the principle force of the Chinese revolution."⁴⁸ We should bear in mind that these newly developing countries are not industrial, but rather agricultural, and that the peasants constitute the majority of the population. This explains the Chinese emphasis on the "primary importance for advanced members of the proletariat to work in the rural areas, help the peasants to get organized and raise their class consciousness."⁴⁹

The proletarian party must put forward a programme of its own, which consists in working independently among the masses, constantly expanding the progressive forces and isolating the reactionary forces. "Only thus can it carry the national democratic revolution through to the end and guide the revolution on to the road of socialism."⁵⁰

The masses are the focal point in Mao's theories of transition to socialism. "Internally arouse the masses of the people" he declared in 1949. That is unite the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, to form a United Front, but under the leadership of the working class, in order to advance from this to the establishment of a state which is a People's Democratic Dictatorship. Thus the advice of the Chinese to the Communist parties

⁴⁸Justus M. Vander Koef, "Lenin, Mao, Aidit," China Quarterly, No. 10 (April-June 1962), p. 56. (Extracted from "On New Democracy," F.L.P.)

⁴⁹A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement, op.cit., p. 15.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 18.

is: "Go to the people" for this is the way of success.⁵¹

What are the means used by the Communists in their struggle to establish the Dictatorship of the Proletariat? In the Chinese belief, in order to lead the proletariat and working people in revolution, Marxist-Leninist parties must master all forms of struggle. They should know how to substitute one form for another quickly as the conditions of struggle change. They should master these different forms of struggle-- peaceful and armed; open and secret; legal and illegal; parliamentary struggle and mass struggle, etc... The Chinese are not as their critics (Togliatti and the Soviets) accuse them, against parliamentary struggle. They hold that it is wrong to refuse parliamentary and other legal forms of struggle when they can and should be used. However they add, "if a Marxist-Leninist party falls into legalism or parliamentary cretinism, confining the struggle within the limits permitted by the bourgeoisie, this will inevitably lead to renouncing the proletarian revolution and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat."⁵²

Whether the Communist Parties use peaceful or non peaceful means depends on the resistance put up by the reactionary circles. The proletariat must be well organized, "highly principled," flexible" and on some occasions it must make some compromises. But it must never abandon the goal of revolution. "It will not miss the opportunity to overthrow

⁵¹Mao Tse-tung, On the People's Democratic Dictatorship, op.cit., p. 6.

⁵²A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement, op.cit., p. 20.

the reactionary régime and establish a new state power when the conditions for revolution are ripe "otherwise the proletarian party will throw away the opportunity of seizing victory."⁵³

The Chinese are aware of the implication of such views. This presumably encourages the overthrow of non-Communist regimes in the semi-colonial and newly independent countries and even the capitalist ones. In discussing the five principles on which China's relations with other countries are concerned, it is pointed out that "the peoples of all countries have the right to choose their own form of government and way of life and other countries should not interfere in this." It is also stated that "revolutions cannot be exported and it is not permissible to interfere from out in the expressed will of a country's people."⁵⁴

These arguments are concerned with denouncing the "slanderous fabrication" that China aims at "Communist expansion."

The leaders of the CCP believe that it would be "left" adventurism if the proletarian party should rashly launch a revolution before the right and objective conditions are ripe. On the other hand, they hold that it would be "right" opportunism if the proletarian party should not dare to lead a revolution and to seize state power when the objective conditions are ripe. This is their direct answer to the question of timing.

⁵³Ibid., p. 24.

⁵⁴"Soviet and Chinese View of Non-Socialist East," Mizan Newsletter, op.cit., p. 5 (Quoting Yi Li-Yu).

Having discussed the general ideological framework into which China has tried to fit its relations with the Arab countries we can study Chinese relations with the five Arab countries with which they have been closest: Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Algeria, and China's attitude towards the Palestine problem which is common to all the Arabs.

PART II

CHINA AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES

CHAPTER 3

EGYPT

I. The Bandung Conference and the Recognition of China

The beginning of Communist China's diplomatic relations with Egypt dates from the Bandung Conference in April 1955 when Premier Chou En Lai met President Nasser. This meeting occurred at a time when Egyptian foreign policy was influenced by two events which had implications on Cairo's relations with the Communist Bloc and, consequently, with People's China: the Baghdad Pact signed on February 24th 1955, which strained Egyptian-Western relations, and the Israeli raids on the Gaza strip (February 27, 1955), which increased the tension on the Israeli Egyptian border and led to an arms deal with Czechoslovakia.

At the Bandung Conference, the common denominator between Chou En Lai and Nasser was their struggle against "imperialism." Nasser's criticisms of the great powers' policy in exerting political pressure on small states to make them serve the former's interests were applauded by the Chinese delegation. As for the Chinese Premier, he won the sympathy of Nasser and of other Arab representatives by supporting "the struggle of the peoples of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia for self-determination and independence" and "the Arab people of Palestine for human

rights."¹

This contact at Bandung and this exchange of views paved the way for Egypt to become the first Arab and African state to establish official relations with the People's Republic of China. Full diplomatic recognition took place just over a year after the first Afro-Asian Conference, in May 1956. It was preceded by a cultural agreement (signed on May 31, 1955) and a trade agreement (in August) by which China agreed to buy Egyptian cotton which could find no other outlet. This recognition occurred when tension between Egypt and the West had much increased after the Czech arms deal.

Viewed from another angle, the recognition of Peking had an impact on the Suez crisis. The withdrawal of the Western loan for the High Dam project was not decided immediately after the arms deal. Rather the immediate Anglo-American reaction to it had been an increased willingness to help with the High Dam and in February 1956 a provisional agreement was announced between the Egyptian government and the World Bank.² The American Congress became annoyed only when Nasser recognized Communist China in the Spring of 1956. Pressure was exercised on the Congress not only by its "China lobby," but also by its Zionist lobby which was

¹"Speech by Premier Chou En Lai at the Closing Session of the Asian-African Conference," China and the Asian-African Conference, op.cit., p. 30.

²It was agreed that this Bank would lend Egypt 200 million dollars and the Americans with the British would lend her 70 million dollars.

alarmed by the build-up of Communist weapons in Egypt.³

II. Sino-Egyptian Relations at their Peak

The refusal of credit for the Aswan Dam by the United States and consequently by the World Bank and Britain led to the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. Mao Tse-Tung and his government firmly supported this move and referred to it as a "just", "lawful" and "righteous" action taken by Egypt in defense of its sovereignty and independence. The Chinese leaders attacked the colonialists who "for almost a hundred years encroached upon the sovereignty of Egypt and exploited the Egyptian people through the company."⁴

They refuted the American, British and French allegations--as expressed in their Joint Communiqué of August 2, 1956--that freedom of navigation through the Canal had been threatened and maintained that these three powers arbitrarily confused the issue of nationalization with that of freedom of navigation, in order to preserve their colonial privileges and to deprive Egypt of its sovereign rights over the Canal. They took the side of Nasser by holding that freedom of navigation has not been affected in the least since the nationalization and that the Egyptian government has pledged to respect this principle. They praised the "spirit of peaceful negotiation--which is in line with the spirit of the Bandung Conference--as demonstrated by Egypt," in proposing a confe-

³ John Marlow, Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism (London: The Cressent Press, 1961), p. 128.

⁴ "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Suez Canal Question, Aug. 1956," China Supports the Arab People's Struggle For National Independence, op.cit., p. 87.

rence with the broad participation of countries concerned, for the purpose of reviewing the Constantinople Convention.⁵

When the Anglo-French Israeli attack took place, the Chinese strongly condemned it as "the most outrageous and shameless act of aggression in human history."⁶ Their reaction to the attack was manifested by sending a telegram of protest to Britain and France, and by adopting, as they said, "all effective measures." Their support materialized in an offer without compensation, a gift of 20 million Swiss francs in cash. The Chinese Red Cross Society donated 170,000 francs to the Egyptian Red Cross for relief work. This was greatly appreciated by the Egyptians, and their ambassador to Peking declared: "I am sure China will forever be the foremost among Egypt's best and surest friends."⁷

Other measures were also adopted in China. The various "Chinese Democratic Parties" and People's Organizations jointly decided on November 8 to set up a "Chinese People's Committee to support Egypt's Resistance to aggression." This Committee declared that people throughout China have demanded that Egypt should be supported with manpower and supplies and that people of all circles including military, medical, engineering and technical communications and transport personnel have expressed their willingness to carry out the struggle against aggression together with the Egyptians. The Committee decided to mobilize and orga-

⁵Ibid., p. 90.

⁶"Protest of the Government of the People's Republic of China to the Government of Britain and France, Nov. 1956," Ibid., p. 112.

⁷"Gift of 20 Million Swiss Francs for Egypt," The Asian Recorder, I, No. 101 (Dec. 1-7, 1956), p. 1165.

nize these forces "so as to realize their desire to support Egypt with concrete action" for "to resist aggression is a sacred task of the Chinese people."⁸ In fact, Radio Peking reported that the Egyptian ambassador to People's China declared that 250,000 Chinese had volunteered for service in Egypt. Reference was also made to Muslim Chinese volunteers.

The Chinese government was very enthusiastic about sending volunteers to Egypt. Yet it seemed unlikely that they would stretch their communications through the hostile Pacific and Indian Oceans to reach Egypt, without meeting British and French opposition. Probably the Egyptian government was cautious about implication of such an acceptance, for it would jeopardize its position vis-a-vis the U.S.A. and the Western World, and would minimize the justice of the struggle. The U.S.A. which refused to support its allies would have had to intervene on their side against Communist intervention. In fact, Eisenhower told a news conference that the United States--probably through the United Nations--would oppose any intervention in Egypt by Soviet or Chinese Communist volunteers.⁹ Chinese Communist volunteers were not invited for another reason: the invasion troops withdrawal from Egyptian territory was facilitated by the United Nations Emergency Force.

⁸"Declaration of the Chinese People's Committee to Support Egypt's Resistance to Aggression Nov. 8, 1956," China Supports the Arab People's Struggle for National Independence, op.cit., pp.124-125.

⁹"Eisenhower Alarmed," The Arab World, Nov. 15, 1956, p.2.

The Chinese support and offer was appreciated. Nevertheless, it should not be exaggerated, for most of the credit for stopping the aggression and the lion's share of the propaganda accrued to Moscow. There was a warm and friendly reaction in the Arab East to the Soviet anti-imperialist threat and to the USSR's readiness to send volunteers.

However, the Chinese stand during this crisis became a stock phrase, a classical example of China's support to national liberation movements. Since 1956, in most of the Sino-Egyptian meetings (mainly 'Alf Sabri's visit to China and Chou En Lai's visit to Egypt in December 1963) the Chinese recall the "friendly attitude at the time of the tripartite aggression on Egypt," and seek signs of gratitude. During the Chinese Premier's visit to U.A.R. Nasser paid tribute to the "great Chinese people who backed us when imperialism launched an armed attack against us."¹⁰

The aftermath of the Suez crisis was of decisive importance from the Chinese point of view. The Eisenhower Doctrine was announced early in January 1957. Nasser and public opinion in the Arab world rejected it, and naturally this was hailed by the Communists. Chou En Lai argued that the United States government, in putting forward the Eisenhower Doctrine was again using as a smoke screen the slogan of "opposition to the Communist menace" or "defence against Communism." The anti-Communist and anti-Soviet slogan, he added was used as a pretext to create

¹⁰"Chou Hails Ancient Culture," New York Times, December 15, 1963.

tension and as a means to suppress national independence movements, squeezing the colonial interests of Britain and France and expanding its own colonial influence.¹¹

The Chinese expressed their satisfaction with the decisions reached by the Arab Conference convened by Nasser in 1957 and held by the heads of states of Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. They confirmed these countries' adherence to the policy of national independence and neutrality and held that the defence of the Arab world should be outside the sphere of foreign pacts (Baghdad Pact or Eisenhower Doctrine).¹²

Sino-Egyptian relations were at their peak during the Suez crisis. The Chinese Communist leaders were trying to keep them up to this level and if possible to achieve more progress. This was manifested in the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference which met for the first time in Cairo towards the end of 1957. It was viewed by Westerners as a sign of close collaboration not only between Nasser and the Soviets but also between the former and the Chinese. Nasser, however, took precautions against Communist propaganda which might harm Egypt's newly-won prestige.

III. 1958-1963: Cooling of Relations

A. The Union

When the United Arab Republic was proclaimed in February 1958, People's China recognized it immediately as "a great event in the poli-

¹¹"Premier Chou En Lai Reports on Visits to Eleven Countries of Asia and Europe, March 5, 1957," China Supports the Arab People's Struggle for National Independence, op.cit., p. 62.

¹²Ibid., p. 68.

tical life of the Egyptian and Syrian people."¹³ The Chinese gave several reasons for welcoming it:

(1) It was founded on the common interests and desires of the two peoples in safeguarding peace and national independence. The stress was on Syria's security which was threatened by its hostile neighbors, especially Turkey, and behind it, the United States.

(2) It was a blow to Western powers. Since their policy was to "undermine and split the Unity of the Arab people, to divide and rule and to conquer them one by one."¹⁴

(3) It encouraged the Arab people to unite under the banner of anti-colonialism; thus it was a tremendous impact on the other Arab countries. The Chinese considered those who refused to follow Egypt and Syria's path (of peace, neutrality, national independence and Arab Unity), as facing the second alternative: to join the U.S. military blocs to the detriment of their own sovereignty and national interests... and this would bring discord and antagonism among the Arab states.¹⁵

(4) It would create more favourable conditions for the economic development of Egypt and Syria.

In recognizing the U.A.R. the Chinese leaders reaffirmed their support of Arab Nationalism, Arab Unity and their chief exponent President Nasser. Their support of Arab Nationalism in 1958 was also manifested when they recognized the new Iraqi Republic which was considered as another version of Nasserism. This did not mean, however, that their

¹³"Unite Under the Banner of Anti-Colonialism," Ibid., p. 172.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 175.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 175.

attitude towards Arab Nationalism and Arab Unity was unequivocal and unconditional.

It is interesting to note that while Sino-Egyptian relations seemed to be unaffected by the framework of the local Arab Communist Parties, the situation started to change after the Union. This period should be studied in the light of Nasser's relations with the Arab Communists, for these were the chief cause of the tension between Cairo and Peking.

The Egyptian Communist Party welcomed the Union with enthusiasm. On January 1, 1958 (before it was declared) its politbureau considered it as a "gigantic start towards an increase of victories and gains."¹⁶ A couple of months later, their organ Ittiḥād al Sha'b praised the U.A.R. as "the liberated area in the Arab world...the only state free from imperialist domination and interference...the garrison of liberty...the voice of free Arabs."¹⁷ The Egyptian Communists would have to change their tone in the coming months.

As for the Syrian Communist Party, which was better organized than the Egyptian, it was lukewarm on the issue of the Union, and was openly for a "federal union" or a "confederation" in which each Republic would preserve its identity and its international personality. However, when the Union was proclaimed it hailed it and praised Nasser as "the man of Arab Nationalism, the one who recorded great national victories

¹⁶ Iliās Murqos, Tarīq al Ahzāb al Shuyūḥiyah (Beirut: Dār al Talīfah, 1964), p. 106.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 107.

and who shook imperialist bases."¹⁸ Nevertheless, the Syrian Communist Party was determined to fight the Union for it was achieved at its expense. The Ba'th Party which had cooperated with the Communists in the period following Adnān Mālikī's assassination favored the Union for several reasons. Besides its fear of outside aggression, the Ba'th was moved by fear of a Communist take-over. Ba'thist participation in the talks on the Union was a stab in the Communists' backs. Khāled Bakdāsh, the Secretary of the Syrian Communist Party left Damascus in order not to vote on this Union.

Thus while Peking welcomed or seemed to welcome the Union, the Syrian Communist Party had a different attitude. Two possible explanations can be presented: either the Chinese were ignorant about the internal situation of this Arab Communist Party and about its mistrust of a union that aimed at weakening it; or they simply disregarded this party and sacrificed it in order to strengthen their relations with Nasser.

Most probably Chinese disenchantment with Nasser was caused by his attitude towards the Communists. Although formally banned, the Syrian and Egyptian Communist Parties were in practice allowed to propagate their views.

The Syrian Communist Party started its campaign against Nasser when in June 1958 Bakdāsh used a colloquium which met in Prague to criticize Nasser's agrarian reform. Later on, in September 1958 he declared in the World Marxist Review, that the Americans were supporting him and

¹⁸Ibid., p. 104. Al Nūr published on Feb. 21 an editorial entitled "Long Live the U.A.R.;" and on Feb. 26 an article "Welcome to President Nasser to Damascus."

that these reforms were of benefit to the "Kulaks."¹⁹

Nasser's counter-attacks came on December 23, 1958, in his speech on Al Nasr Feast. He violently denounced the Syrian Communist Party and accused it of "working against the Union" and of "calling for secession."²⁰ Later on the Syrian Executive Council closed USSR cultural offices in several towns. Relations between the Soviet Union and the U.A.R. worsened. Direct confrontation between the two was evident in Khrushchev's speech at the 21st Congress in January 1959, when for the first time he addressed direct criticisms to Nasser. The exchange of polemics continued in the coming months.

As for the Chinese leaders, who had not yet joined in the dispute, they expressed their disillusionment with Nasser by echoing Soviet criticisms. In April 1959, an article by some members of the Chinese Politbureau appeared in Red Flag bitterly attacking Nasser's régime in Egypt. It denounced his neutralism: "the slogan 'neither East nor West' is only a deliberate attempt to confuse friends with enemies. It is tantamount to saying 'neither enemies nor friends'. But those who want no friends will naturally not be feared by any enemy. Indeed this will become a step toward going over to the enemy." The article went on to compare Nasser with Chiang Kai Chek in 1927. The fact that both Nasser and the Chinese leader imprisoned Communists was also noted.²¹

¹⁹Khaled Bakdash, "The Crisis and the Problems of the Middle East," World Marxist Review, I (London: Central Books Ltd., Sept. 1958), p. 69.

²⁰"Syrian Communist Party Resisting the Union," Al Ahrām, (Egypt), December 24, 1958, p. 1.

²¹H.R. Seton Watson, "The Great Schism: Sino-Soviet Conflict," Encounter, IX (No. 5, May 1965), p. 65.

The Chinese Communist Party wanted to avoid such a Communist disaster by objecting to any Communist Bloc's gradualist line towards the national bourgeoisie. It criticised the Soviets for their policy of support to neutralist states and asked for economic pressure on Nasser. Although the Soviets were dissatisfied with Nasser, they were not ready to withdraw their loan for the Aswan Dam.

Chinese Communist relations with the U.A.R. soon began to cool, for Cairo suspected that Peiping was throwing its support to Iraqi Communists. In fact, Nasser's attacks on the Communists increased and on March 11, 1959, he accused the Iraqi government headed by Kassem, who was flirting with the Communist Bloc of being Communist-controlled and of attempting to detach Syria from the U.A.R. in order to unite it with Iraq. It is believed that the initial cause for the deterioration of the relations between Nasser and the Communist powers--the Soviet as well as the Chinese--in 1959, was mainly caused not by the persecution of the Communists in U.A.R., but by the backing given by the Communist powers to Kassem, in his opposition to Nasser's Arab policy. This led Nasser to accuse the Arab Communists of "working at the behest of foreign masters" and of making Baghdad their headquarter from which to establish a "Communist Fertile Crescent."²²

The Peking People's Daily attacked him in an editorial and stressed that the real way to achieve Arab Unity was to help in the

²²"The U.A.R. and Iraq," Keessing's Contemporary Archives, XII (May 29, 1959), p. 16794.

fighting in Algeria, Oman, etc.

In the Summer of 1959, the Chinese expressed their protests against Nasser's anti-Communist measures when the Lebanese Communist leader, Farjallāh al Hīlī, was arrested in Damascus (June 1959). While Moscow remained silent on the issue, a Jen-min-jih pao article reflected the Chinese protest and said that the "Chinese people were most anxious about his life and freedom."²⁵

B. The Bakdāsh Incident

A China-U.A.R. dispute arose when Chinese authorities presented Khāled Bakdāsh, the leader of the banned Syrian Communist Party, as one of the speakers at a rally held in Peking on September 28, 1959, to celebrate the tenth anniversary of Communist rule. Even before Bakdāsh delivered his speech the U.A.R. reacted sharply to his presence. Mr. Riād Kilānī, U.A.R. Charge d'Affaires in Peking left the official ceremony when the Chinese Premier declared that Bakdāsh was to be among the speakers; Kilani considered this action contrary to diplomatic traditions.

The leader of the Syrian Communist Party delivered his speech in the presence of the Chinese President, China's Premier, China's leader Mao Tse-tung, the delegations of many countries and over ten thousand people who were invited to attend the ceremony. After paying tribute to the Communist leadership of China for transforming the country within the short span of ten years, and after thanking the People's Republic of China for the support "they always gave to the cause" of his country, Syria, he launched an attack on Nasser. He said that Nasser's

²⁵Zagoria, op.cit., p. 261.

anti-Communist campaign "constitutes a serious threat to all the main victories scored by the Arab liberation movements in the course of the past few years." He viewed the experiment in unity between Syria and Egypt as "plots woven by the U.A.R. ruling quarters against the Republic of Iraq."²⁴ He also accused Nasser of reaching an understanding with Kings Saud and Hussein, of having an open door policy in respect of imperialist capital while at the same time wooing the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and other Socialist countries.

Bagdāsh described the U.A.R. government as a "dictatorial, terroristic rule which makes use of fascist methods in its fight against all the patriotic and democratic forces of the country," attacked the "monopolistic clique of the Egyptian bourgeoisie" in "using anti-Communism as a front for the application of a policy dictated by its narrow egoistical class ambition and greed" and accused "Egyptian Criminal Investigation Department in Damascus" of kidnapping Farjallāh Hilū and carrying out most atrocious forms of torture..."²⁵ He also attacked the Union, warning against Nasser's Pan-Arabism in Lebanon and Iraq and ended by predicting the failure of his policy.

This was the most violent and bitter attack on Nasser and the U.A.R. ever launched by a Communist spokesman. It was given endorsement by the Chinese authorities, since it was broadcasted two days later, on September 30, by the Peking Radio, while Moscow remained silent and

²⁴"Bagdāsh's Speech at Peking's Rally," Al Midā' as quoted in The Arab World, October 1, 1959, p. 2.

²⁵Ibid., pp.2-3.

ignored this speech. In fact it neither broadcasted nor published it.

The U.A.R.'s reaction was a formal protest handed in by its Acting Foreign Minister Hussein Zulfīqār Sabrī to Chinese Communist Ambassador in Cairo. Furthermore, the U.A.R. delegation boycotted the celebrations in Peiping while orders went out from President Nasser to all government officials in Cairo that they were to shun a big dinner party at the Chinese Embassy.²⁶ The U.A.R.'s Communique described Bakdash's speech as "insolent." Other measures were also taken by Cairo: it was announced that the charge d'affaires in Peking was being recalled and that the new U.A.R. ambassador would postpone his departure to Peking. "The subsequent attacks of Cairo newspapers included a comparison of China with Hitler Germany."²⁷ Cairo's al Qumhūriah accused the Chinese government of going too far in their actions, which turned the atmosphere of friendship between the two nations into one of tension and allowing Bakdash in a public meeting to attack the U.A.R."²⁸ Al Akhbār reminded the Chinese leaders that Egypt had "defied" the world powers to recognize their government when shunned by others.²⁹

²⁶"Cairo Urges a Cut in Ties to Peiping," New York Times, Oct. 2, 1959, p. 3.

²⁷"A China-U.A.R. Dispute," China Quarterly, I (No. 1, Jan.-March, 1960), p. 114.

²⁸"Cairo Urges a Cut in Ties to Peiping," op.cit.

²⁹"Clash with Bakdash in Peiping," The Arab World, Oct. 1, 1959, p. 5.

Peking tried to justify itself by holding that Bakdash had spoken as the representative of the Syrian Communist Party and was free to express his views. Nevertheless, the Chinese could not find a justification for associating themselves with Bakdash, for providing him with a large audience to criticize Nasser before them, and finally for broadcasting the speech to Arab listeners. Riad Kilani told Cheng-sen, the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister (who summoned him to the Ministry to express surprise at the U.A.R. boycott of the ceremonies) that the invitation extended to Bakdash indicated "encouragement of a separatist movement in the U.A.R. and interference in the internal affairs" of the latter.⁵⁰

This incident created tension between the two countries. Perhaps as a counter to the Chinese attitude, Cairo Radio accused China on October 1, 1959, of violating the five principles of peaceful coexistence and criticized the Chinese Communists for their action in the Tibet. This period of the year witnessed a rapid fall in Sino-U.A.R. relations. The U.A.R.'s attacks on People's China became more than propaganda warfare when the foreign office in Cairo sent word to twenty-five nations of the Bandung Conference suggesting that those governments recall their ambassadors from Peiping in protest against recent "aggression" against Tibet, India, Laos and the U.A.R. Cairo was not suggesting that they sever diplomatic relations, but rather to reduce their representation to a chargé d'affaires level.⁵¹

⁵⁰"Bakdash," Asian Recorder, V (No. 42, Oct. 17-23, 1959), p. 2952. (Quoting the Cairo Radio).

⁵¹"Cairo Urges Cut in Ties to Peiping," New York Times, op.cit., p. 8.

Facing such a challenge the Chinese softened their attitude. It was not until October 25, 1959, that the U.A.R. accepted Communist China's "sincere regrets,"⁵² for the Bakdash case.

C. The Other Obstacles

Yet China's chances to improve her relations with the U.A.R. were still impaired by her conflicts with Yugoslavia and India, two countries friendly to Nasser, by her attacks on neutralism, her attitude towards the Secessionist Syrian régime and by her opposition to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

In the Spring of 1958, Peking assumed a bitterly hostile attitude towards Yugoslavia and accused Tito of revisionism, condemning his neutralist policy, which was praised by Nasser.

The Chinese ideologies of "inevitability of war" and their implications of isolation from the West could not be accepted by the U.A.R. and by most of the non-aligned countries which depended to a large extent on Western aid. In 1959-1960 Peking launched an attack on non-alignment and its chief exponents: Nasser, Tito and Nehru. The Belgrade Conference of September 1961 alienated China from the non-aligned countries since People's China was not invited to participate, and this strengthened the Tito-Nehru-Nasser axis.

Since U.A.R. relations deteriorated for still another reason: the friendly Chinese attitude towards the Secessionist régime in Syria, after

⁵²"United Arab Republic," Deadline Data on World Affairs, October 2, 1959, p. 56.

the separation of the latter from the U.A.R. The Chinese leaders were willing to provide this government loans free of interest.⁵³

The Sino-Indian boundary issue put China in a rather embarrassing position vis-a-vis the United Arab Republic and other Afro-Asian countries. Nasser's efforts at mediation in this conflict, when it broke out again on November 1, 1962, were completely ignored in Peking. Cairo's proposal that China withdraw back to the position held before the conflict with India started was rejected by the Chinese Communist government. In December of the same year, the U.A.R. participated with five other non-aligned countries (Indonesia, Ceylon, Cambodia, Burma and Ghana) in the Colombo Conference. India appeared disappointed at the outcome of the conference, a communiqué aiming at bringing the two nations together for negotiations and a cease fire. India protested that the communiqué "has in no way denounced or even mentioned the Chinese aggression and had on the contrary refused--with the exception of the U.A.R.--to pass judgement on the case."⁵⁴ The Indian Minister of the Interior had said that the U.A.R. is the only country among those who participated in the Colombo Conference who had really understood the situation."⁵⁵

⁵³See the chapter on Syria: The Secessionist Regime.

⁵⁴Le Monde, le 14 Decembre 1962 (as quoted in Deadline Data on World Affairs, "UAR," December 10, 1962, p. 125).

⁵⁵Republique Arabe Unie, Annuaire 1963 (Le Caire: Maison Nationale de la Publication, 1963), p. 69.

The U.A.R. was careful not to alienate the Chinese by openly taking the side of India. As for China it was trying to ameliorate its relations with the U.A.R., if not to win the Egyptian sympathy at least to keep it neutral. Hence it invited to Peking 'Ali Sabrī, Chairman of the Executive Council of Ministers of the U.A.R., and U.A.R. representative at the Colombo Conference. A great number of speeches were exchanged between the Chinese leaders and Sabrī, in which they expressed their common desires for closer relations between Cairo and Peking. The U.A.R. stand in relation to this boundary issue, from that date on became more careful not to pass severe judgements on the People's Republic of China or even to use the word "aggression." 'Ali Sabrī had declined to commit himself and his government in any public statement. He argued: "We are not in a position to say whether this side or that side is the aggressor." "I do not think," he added, "this will serve a useful purpose."⁵⁶

The Sino-Indian boundary issue was still being discussed when the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed (in the Summer of 1963). It was a point of divergence not only between Peking and Moscow but also between Peking and several Afro-Asian countries. The U.A.R. as well as the Arab countries sided with the Soviet Union (and the West) by accepting it. As for the Chinese leaders they opposed it because it was concluded by the U.S.A., Britain and the Soviet Union "with a view to monopolizing nuclear weapons." The U.A.R. manifested its disagreement with Peking by

⁵⁶"Mr. Ali Sabri's News Conference," Asian Recorder, IX (No. 7, Feb. 12-18, 1963), p. 5039.

signing this Test Ban Treaty.⁵⁷

It is true that Sino-U.A.R. relations remained lukewarm up to Chou En Lai's African tour and visit to Egypt. Nevertheless this straining of relations should not be exaggerated for Peking made great efforts to eliminate all misunderstandings and to regain her position as a friendly country. This was manifested in a series of cultural and trade delegations sent by the Chinese leaders as well as by a great number of visitors they invited from Cairo.

IV. Chou En Lai's Visit or Return to Friendly Normal Relations

Chou En Lai's visit to Africa between December 14, 1963, and February 5, 1964 was a sign of China's search for friends, prestige and influence. China's aims in visiting the U.A.R. were: to consolidate the friendship between the two peoples (which in Chou's terms "will last throughout the ages like the ever flowing Nile and the Yellow Rivers,") to conserve the "Bandung Spirit," to part Nasser from his close relationship with the Soviet Union, India and Yugoslavia and to project a friendly and peaceloving image of China.

While the Egyptian press (Al Gushūriyah) did not disregard the "disaccords between Peking and Cairo on many international questions,"⁵⁸

⁵⁷At the Executive Committee of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization which met in Nicosia in the second week of September 1963, a resolution was passed "appreciating the efforts made by more than 80 countries that signed the Test Ban Treaty." "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," China Quarterly (No. 16, Oct.-Dec., 1963), p. 177.

⁵⁸"Press Gives Chou En Lai Warm Welcome," The Arab World, Dec. 17, 1963, p. 7. Al Ahrām held that China was a very distant country, but added that "if today we share China's problems and hopes as she shares ours, it is because our two peoples have passed through the same experiences and have similar objectives in life."

President Nasser welcomed Chou En Lai as the Prime Minister of "one third of the human race." The reaction, however, of the Egyptian public was much more enthusiastic to Khrushchev's visit than to Chou's five months later.

Since this visit the Chinese leaders have been praising one particular policy of Nasser, his anti-imperialism. They avoid lengthy appraisal of his internal policy, although there are references to the "developing national economy and culture of the people of the U.A.R."³⁹ During his visit to Egypt in December 1963, the Chinese Premier avoided any mention of the U.A.R.'s socialism, thus refusing either to recognize or reject it. Khrushchev surpassed the Chinese by praising Nasser's socialist transformations and by expressing Soviet satisfaction and welcome of U.A.R.'s decision "to march towards the building of socialism." He also stated that "the Soviet people rejoice in the proclamation of the U.A.R. as a Democratic and Socialist state based on the alliance of the working forces of the people."⁴⁰

Until Khrushchev's visit, the Arab Communists rejected Nasser's socialism. Khrushchev's declarations came as the first recognition of Egypt's "marching towards socialism." This led the pro-Soviet Arab Communist Parties to change their attitude. In their communiqués of June and of December 1964, they recognized for the first time the "progressive" nature of U.A.R.'s economic and social achievements.⁴¹

³⁹Joint Communiqué of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United Arab Republic. Information Bulletin. (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Cairo). December 24, 1964.

⁴⁰"China, the Arab World and Africa," Mizan Newsletter, VI (No. 5, May 1964), p. 65.

⁴¹"Meeting and Exchange of Views on Present Issues," Al Akhbār (Beirut-Communist Organ), June 7, 1964, p.1.

Nasser's socialist measures were not really appreciated by the People's Republic of China. Several articles issued in 1962 and 1963 considered nationalization as "a fraud by the bourgeoisie" and criticized socialist trends in non-aligned countries especially in India and in Yugoslavia (but there was no explicit reference to the U.A.R.), who "beg for U.S. aid" and who try to replace proletarian socialism with bourgeois socialism inside the working class movement."⁴²

As far as Nasser's policy in the Arab World is concerned, the Chinese fervently upheld his anti-imperialist demands for the liquidation of all foreign bases such as Aden and Libya. Nasser's and the Arab position on the Palestine Question is viewed as just by the Chinese leaders (this will be discussed at length in a later chapter).

On the question of Arab Unity, they officially support the "Arab people in their desire to bring about unity and solidarity in the form of their choice."⁴³ However, their support is conditional: (1) On the external level, this union should have as a target the safeguard of national independence and the strengthening of an anti-colonialist front. (2) On the internal level, it should work in harmony with the "democratic forces" (the "Communists" among them). Discussions on Arab unity between Chou En Lai and Nasser were brief, while Khrushchev elaborated on this subject. He called for a modification of the slogan "Arabs Unite" into "Arab workers, Arab peasants, Arab intelligentsia,

⁴²"Nehru's Socialism: A Farce," Peking Review, No. 15 (April 12, 1963), pp. 9-11.

⁴³"Premier Chou En Lai Reports on His Visit to 14 Countries," Peking Review, No. 18 (May 1, 1964), p. 9.

all working people unite against the exploiters, your own Arabs and international exploiters." In such an association there is a place for other nations too.⁴⁴ The Chinese preferred to win the friendship of Nasser and other Arab heads of states by supporting Arab Nationalism and Arab Unity in general terms. Yet their opinions on Arab Unity favored a "federal union" when they discussed this subject with a Syrian delegation of the Secessionist régime.

Nasser's anti-imperialist trend in the non-Arab world is not only praised by Peking but also warily supported. The achievements of the U.A.R., Chou En Lai held, have greatly encouraged the Arab people in their struggle against imperialism and furnished the national liberation movements with a great impetus in Africa. He also viewed Cairo as a fortress where "fighters striving for national independence from various African countries are gathered..."⁴⁵ Communist Chinese news agencies and press quote with satisfaction Nasser's denunciation of "American imperialist policy" in sending troops to the Congo and arms to Tshombe.⁴⁶ "U.S. imperialism" was condemned for using aid as pressure on the U.A.R. trying to stop its support of the Congolese (Leopoldville) people.⁴⁷

⁴⁴"China, the Arab World and Africa," Mizan Newsletter, VI (No. 5, May 1964), p. 65.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 50 (Cairo Radio, Dec. 15 and 21, 1963).

⁴⁶Daily Hsinhua Bulletin (Damascus), Aug. 19, 1964, p. 2.

⁴⁷"U.A.R. is not to Be Bullied," Peking Review, No. 2 (Jan. 8, 1965), p. 26.

During his African tour, Chou En Lai viewed with favor the policy of non-alignment and Nasser's trend of neutrality. The Chinese Premier went so far as to give at least lukewarm approval to the idea of a second conference of non-aligned countries, of which Nasser was a leading sponsor. However, he was also concerned with winning support for a "Second Bandung Conference" of Afro-Asian countries as a counter-proposal for a non-aligned one which favors India and Yugoslavia. The second non-aligned conference, or the Cairo conference took place in the Fall of 1964. It did not condemn the Chinese explosion of an atom bomb or consider its implication for South-East Asia's security. People's China is preparing for the second Afro-Asian conference which will be held in Algiers in the Summer of 1965.

V. The Non-Political Relations

As a means to develop diplomatic relations with Egypt, People's China encouraged trade and cultural exchanges between Peking and Cairo.

According to the Chinese, trade relations between Egypt and China go back to the second century A.D.⁴⁸ Since the "independence" of the two countries and up to Chou En Lai's visit to Egypt, there have been four major trade agreements. The first signed in 1955 was a milestone in the history of trade relations--since it paved the way for the promotion of diplomatic relations--the second in 1956, the third in

⁴⁸"A Visit for Friendship, Solidarity and Peace," Peking Review, No. 51 (Dec. 20, 1963), p. 19.

1962 and the fourth in 1963. By Chinese calculation, trade between the two countries has doubled the amount of 1955 and the commodities exchanged are increasing. Communist China first established trade relations with Egypt (and Syria) by buying their cotton which had no other outlet and then signed the trade agreement with them in 1955. Its move, which occurred at an opportune time was appreciated by the Egyptians.

China exports over seventy kinds of commodities to the U.A.R., such as tea, steel products, sugar, cereals, frozen beef and mutton, chemicals, light industrial products and building materials. Formerly the amount of Chinese tea exported to the U.A.R. was small but now Chinese tea occupies one third of the total amount imported.⁴⁹ It is only recently that China has supplied the U.A.R. with steel products.

The People's Republic of China has recently declared its intention to provide the U.A.R. with industrial equipment, amounting to \$80,000,000 useful in its second Five Year Plan. The Chinese loan will be given without interest and will be repayed in ten years beginning from 1972. As for the equipment it will be delivered in 1965.⁵⁰

Chinese economic aid to the U.A.R. is modest compared with the Soviet and the Western. This explains their opposition to these aids. Nasser's speech at Ismailia (December 1964) in which he scorned American aid and denounced the U.S. for "trying to use [it] to bring the U.A.R.

⁴⁹New Development of Trade Relations Between China and the U.A.R. By Liu Hsi-Wen, Director of the Fourth Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the People's Republic of China (Typewritten report. From the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Cairo).

⁵⁰"80 Million Dollars, Industrial Equipments from China to U.A.R.," Al Hayât (Beirut), January 1, 1965.

to heel"⁵¹ fits in with Chinese expectations. The Chinese call for a "national independent economy through mutual help" without relying on assistance from the United States is also coupled with a warning against Soviet aid. Chinese stress on self reliance and complete independence, even from Soviet offers, intensified as the rift between Moscow and Peking widened.

In the Summer of 1964, they warned the underdeveloped nations (especially Egypt), that they would become "subject to Soviet domination if they accepted economic aid from Moscow." Nan Hand Chen, head of the Chinese Communist delegation to the Second Asian Economic Seminar, in Pyongyang, the Capital of North Korea, asserted that the "Russians sometimes provide equipment while withholding technique so as to make Asian and African countries economically dependent on them."⁵² The Chinese looked with suspicion on Soviet aid, objected and doubted their motivations. They have themselves refused to accept Soviet experts for as they declared: "To be frank, the Chinese people cannot trust you."⁵³

This policy is to be explained in the light of Chinese experience. They themselves confessed that the Soviet Union pursued a "res-

⁵¹"United Arab Republic: U.S. Can Drink From Sea," Peking Review, No. 1 (Jan. 1, 1965), p. 26.

⁵²"China Questions Soviet Aid Aims," New York Times (June 22, 1964), p. 1.

⁵³"Letter of the C.C. of the CPC of February 29, 1964 to the C.C. of the CPSU Feb. 29 1964," Peking Review, No. 19 (May 8, 1964), p. 14.

trictive and discriminatory trade policy against China"; it cut its aid and violated the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship Alliance and Mutual Assistance. They added that the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party made a "unilateral decision to withdraw 1,590 Soviet experts working in China, to tear up 343 contracts and supplementary contracts on the employment of experts and to cancel 257 projects of scientific and technical cooperation."⁵⁴

The impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute on Nasser's foreign and mainly loan policy, should not be minimized. Nasser who has mastered the balancing techniques between the East and the West would seize the opportunity to use this game with the Soviets and the Chinese. It is believed that it was not by accident that, while Mr. Shelepin, the Russian Deputy Minister was in Cairo in December 1964, Dr. 'Azīz Sidqī, Vice Premier in charge of industry, was in Peking. The latter could get from People's China \$60 million to buy industrial equipment and heavy industry, while the Soviet Union would give the U.A.R. 100 million sterling pounds in aid which was promised by Khrushchev when he visited Egypt.⁵⁵ With the division in the Communist Bloc, Nasser's chances to bargain for more aid are greater.

The People's Republic of China also tried to develop friendly relations with the U.A.R. through a variety of cultural delegations to and

⁵⁴The Leaders of the CPSU Are the Greatest Splitters of our Times, op.cit., p. 18.

⁵⁵"Vice Premier Shelepin," The Arab World, (Dec. 21, 1964), p. 9 (Quoting the BBC, Dec. 20, 1964).

from China such as: the Writers' delegation which attended Afro-Asian Writers' Conference in Cairo on February 19, 1962, the Chinese Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (January 14-19, 1963), the Educational delegation led by the Minister of Education (visited from April 1-14, 1964), the Vice President of All China's Student Federation (ACSF) who attended the Second Conference of the General Union of Palestine Students in Gaza (October 10, 1962).

Several Chinese delegations visited Cairo in order to participate in different Afro-Asian conferences such as: the Women's delegation which attended the Afro-Asian Women's Conference in Cairo in January, 1961, other delegations participated in the Afro-Asian Railway Conference (March 20, 1964) and in the Afro-Asian Organization for Economic Cooperation Council meeting (May 24, 1962).

Representatives from various delegations visited the U.A.R.: dancing troops (August 8, 1960), a military delegation (October, 1960), a sports delegation (June, 1962), a T.V. delegation which attended the International Festival in Cairo (September, 1963), and medical delegations (Parasitic diseases of the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, in March, 1962).⁵⁶

Every year Chinese Muslim delegations visit some of the Arab countries either before going to Mecca, for the "Hajj," or after the pilgrimage. They are usually led by the President of the Chinese Muslim Association.

⁵⁶ "China, the Arab World and Africa," Mizan Newsletter, VI, No. 5 (May 1964), pp. 38-39.

On the other hand the People's Republic of China encouraged visitors to China from the U.A.R.: trade, cultural, educational, agricultural and commercial delegations; carpet experts as well as other delegations. The Arab Federation of Labour and the Printing Workers' Union attend May Day celebrations in Peking every year.

Conclusion

From its rapprochement with Cairo, Peking can hope to gain a good deal against the West and "imperialism." It has gained greater moral support against Chiang Kai Chek: its "right" to recover Taiwan and to be represented at the United Nations was endorsed by Nasser. However, no radical realignment, as far as the Soviet Union and India are concerned, can be hoped for by the Chinese Communists in getting closer to the U.A.R. They are not yet in a position to assume rival arms, financial, technical and industrial burdens. Hence they cannot compete with the Soviets. Furthermore Soviet aid and moral support in Arab problems are of great significance to the Arabs. Thus any rapprochement with the U.A.R. cannot be at the expense of the USSR. On the other hand China's bitter quarrel with India is an obstacle to close rapprochement with the Arabs (friendly relations continue between Cairo and Delhi after Nehru's death, and the Arabs appreciate the Indian support on the Palestine issue and India's refusal to recognize Israel).

CHAPTER 4

SYRIA

I. The Recognition

Syria recognized Communist China on July 3, 1956, approximately two months after the Egyptian recognition. As in the case of Egypt this move was preceded by trade agreements. Egypt's initiative was welcomed by "official and popular quarters: members of the conservative 'People's Party' (such as Dr. Munīr 'Ajlānī), the former Justice Minister in the Cabinet, Marūf Dawalībī, another prominent populist and a spokesman for the Moslem Brotherhood..."¹ Thus rightist elements who were still impressed by Nasser as an Arab Nationalist leader manifested a favourable reaction to his extension of relations with Red China.

However, all the credit for the Syrian recognition should not go to Nasser. A brief survey of the internal situation in Syria reveals the causes of this policy. After 1954, there was in Syria a return to the old constitutional game that prevailed in the post independence period and before Husnī Za'im's coup d'état. The difference, however, consisted in two factors: (1) Military officers were becoming more

¹"Red China: Recognition," The Arab World, May 18, 1956, p. 2 (Quoting Al Dyār).

"progressive" and had leftist inclinations. This was spurred by 'Adnān Mālikī's assassination, officially denounced as a plot designed to suppress the chief of staff and officers hostile to the Baghdad Pact and to the West. (2) The Communists and the Ba'thists emerged as political parties with seats in the Parliament. After the assassination of 'Adnān Mālikī and in the Pre-Union period, the two parties were similar in two respects: (1) in their anti-western and anti-rightist policy; (2) in their friendly attitude towards the Soviet Union, the Communist Bloc and consequently People's China. The recognition of the latter was an item in Khāled Bakdāsh's programme during the electoral campaign of 1954.

The recognition was eased by a change in the Syrian Cabinet. On June 14, 1956, a coalition cabinet under the National Party leader, Sabrī al 'Asalī, came into power, and major political parties were represented, including for the first time the Ba'th. The Ba'th had two major portfolios: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ṣalāh al Biṭār) and the Ministry of National Economy (Khalīl Kallās).

II. The Pre-Union and the Union Period

After the Suez crisis the Chinese Communists shifted their attention to Syria. They took the defense of Syrian sovereignty against the "Eisenhower Doctrine" and the "subversive activities woven by the American Imperialists." They attacked Turkey for massing troops on the Syrian-Turkish border, as instigated by the United States to be the vanguard in the planned invasion of Syria. American "aggressive" objectives were confirmed by their sending of the Sixth Fleet to the East

Mediterranean. The Chinese leaders praised the "solidarity and heroism" of the Syrian people and in a cable to President Shukry al Kuwatly, Chairman Mao reiterated the "firm stand of the government and the people of China to support resolutely the just struggle of the Syrian people to defend independence and peace."² They also endorsed the "just position" of the Soviet Union in warning the "aggressors" (Soviet assurances of assistance to Syria were coupled with threats to Turkey).

Another factor relevant to the pre-Union period should be considered, the strengthening of the Communist Party. Due to their tactical alliance with the Ba'th the Communists achieved major gains in the civilian and military sectors. Moreover, public opinion was aroused against the West and trials were held of those who participated in the "American plot" in Damascus. Hence, the political atmosphere was favourable for Communist Bloc - Syrian rapprochement.³

When the Union was proclaimed between Syria and Egypt, the Chinese Communists expressed the hope that it would benefit the common struggle against colonialism. The attitude of China towards the U.A.R. (1958-1961) has been discussed in the previous chapter. The Bakdāsh incident which affected Sino-U.A.R. relations during this period had a significance. It was interpreted as Chinese approval of an independent Syrian Republic where the Communist Party could work freely.

²"Hands Off Syria," (Renmin Ribao editorial, Oct. 18, 1957), China Supports the Arab People's Struggle for National Independence, op.cit., p. 153.

³Premier Khāled al'Azam was working for a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. An agreement provided credit to Syria of \$140,000,000.

III. Chinese Attitude Towards the Secessionist Régime

Since Chiang Kai Chek was one of the first to acclaim Syria's secession from the United Arab Republic, the Chinese Communist government adopted an attitude of "wait and see." It was not yet known whether the new Syrian régime would recognize Taiwan in return for its early recognition of Ma'mūn al Kuzbarī, or would prefer to resume diplomatic relations with People's China. Had the Chinese Communist leaders recognized it immediately, their move would have meant support of Syria's secession. They chose an opportune time to announce their decision, after Nasser's acknowledgement of "Syria's decision to quit the U.A.R." and instructions to the U.A.R. delegates in the U.N. and the Arab League not to impede Syria's application to resume membership;⁴ and a couple of days after the Soviet, the Bulgarian and the Czechoslovakian recognition.

Foreign Minister Chen Yi, on October 11, 1961 (fourteen days after the secession) informed Ma'mūn al Kuzbarī, Premier and Foreign Minister of the Arab Syrian Republic of China's decision to recognize and to exchange diplomatic representatives of ambassadorial rank with it. The Chinese justified their act by holding that "on September 30, the Foreign Ministry of the Arab Syrian Republic had sent a note to the Chinese Consulate General in Damascus expressing a desire for earlier recognition and the reestablishment of good relations between the two countries."⁵

⁴"Arab Republic of Syria," The Arab World, Oct. 6, 1961, p. 1.

⁵"China Recognizes Arab Syrian Republic," Peking Review, No. 42 (Oct. 20, 1961), p. 19.

The Chinese wishes for free Communist activity in Syria under this new régime were not realized and the crisis that was created at the 10th Anniversary of the Liberation of China seemed fruitless. Bakdāsh who saluted "the great historic event--Syria's liberation from the yoke of enslavement, tyranny and dictatorship--which took place thanks to the solidarity existing between the people and the army"⁶ was not permitted to come back and was barred from participating in the elections. However, this régime seemed to be more tolerant, for the Arab Communist campaign against it came to an end, especially following the release of Communists imprisoned by the U.A.R. régime. Apparently the Chinese Communist leaders were ready to develop their relations with the Syrian Arab Republic irrespective of the Syrian Communist Party's situation. Even the post-Union Syrian government's turning to the West for assistance (to West Germany for the Euphrates Dam) did not affect either the Soviet aid or the willingness of Communist China and other countries of the Communist Bloc to offer new credits. The Syrian government was in great need of loans. Pressure was exercised by the Socialists, Akram al Hūrānī and his group, to get them from Communist countries, at a time when there were talks about a Japanese \$100 million loan.⁷

Contacts were made with the Ambassador of the People's Republic of China in Damascus. Consequently, a Syrian economic delegation, led

⁶"Bakdāsh's Cable to Syrian Prime Minister," The Arab World, Oct. 10, 1961, p. 2.

⁷Interview with Nuḥād Ibrāhīm Pacha, Minister of Planning in Khaled al 'Azam's Cabinet, February 27, 1965 (before the Ba'thist coup). (He was to preside over the Syrian delegation that was projected to go to Japan).

by the Minister of Communications, Subhi Kahāla, visited China for twenty days (February 5, 1963 to February 25, 1963), to reach an agreement. When the talks ended, the Chinese loan was raised from 30 million Swiss Francs to 35 and then to 70 million. At the beginning the 30 million were granted with an annual interest of 2%, and the Chinese apologized for the limited amount of their aid on the grounds that their economy had faced serious economic difficulties due to the successive years of drought. At the Syrian representatives' insistence the loan was raised to 35 Swiss Francs and would be interest-free. It was only after their meeting with Premier Chou En Lai that the loan was raised to seventy million Swiss Francs free of interest and to be repaid in ten installments.⁸ Agreements on trade, payment and technical cooperation were signed. Thus the Syrian delegation concluded agreements compatible with the Syrian economic interest, for the first time free of interest and on better terms than with any other foreign country.⁹

The Chinese leaders impressed their visitors by their warm welcome: banquets and receptions presided over by Liu Shao Chi, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En Lai, in which friendly speeches were delivered and stress was put on the common ties that link the modern history of the two countries. These were said to be the following:

⁸ The raise of the loan to 70 million was hastened by a letter from Khāled al'Azam. (Chou En Lai and the Syrian Premier had personal contacts at the Bandung Conference).

⁹ Report by the Syrian Economic and Technical Delegation on the Outcome of its Talks with the People's Republic of China During its Visit (Feb. 3-Feb. 25, 1963), p. 4. (Files of the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

1. Their struggle against imperialism and reactionaries. This seemed to refute Nasser charges that the Syrian Secessionist government was reactionary.

2. Their success in liberating their countries from foreign enslavement after centuries of exploitation.

3. Their common struggle in rebuilding their economy, industrializing, and raising the standard of living of their peoples.

4. Their effort in consolidating World Peace, the policy of peaceful coexistence, the Bandung Principles and the solidarity of the Afro-Asian people.

Chou En Lai told the members of the delegation, representing Khāled al Azm's government, that any Chinese support to Syria would be as significant as the Arab Syrian people's support to liberated countries and to the Chinese people. He praised the heroic role of Syria in national liberation movements and referred to the "positive" role of the Syrian delegation headed by Khāled al Azm, at Bandung and compared it with the "negative" attitude of the Lebanese delegation headed by Charles Malik.¹⁰

With this Syrian economic mission representing a "Secessionist regime," Liu Shao Chi and Chou En Lai expressed their support for the Arab people's effort to achieve "Federal Union," and their appreciation of their natural motives. The term "Federal Union" or ittihād rather than "Union" was mostly used in their talks. Reference to this particular term seemed conscious and even intentional on the part of the

¹⁰Ibid., p. 12.

Chinese, who were addressing representatives of a government that came into power after a coup d'etat against the Union and that aimed at the rebirth of the Syrian entity. Premier Chou En Lai pointed out two main advantages gained by the Arabs as a result of such a Federal Union: (1) The organization of a strong front against imperialism... (2) A greater economic benefit in exploiting their natural resources--oil in particular... On the other hand, he presented two pieces of advice: First, an Arab Federal Union should emanate from the people and take into consideration their opinion. Second, it should not be coloured with "chauvinism."¹¹

On the Sino-Indian boundary issue, the Chinese leaders were anxious to explain how "correct" their foreign policy was. They concentrated very much on their love for peace, and their policy of peaceful coexistence inspired by the Bandung principles... Dencouncing imperialist propaganda, they firmly held that they could not think of aggression since all their efforts should be focussed on their economic progress. They argued that this crisis was an artificial one created by Western imperialism and Indian reactionaries, and they justified their actions on the border as a "repression" of India's "aggressive" plans and the latter's occupation of the others' territories.¹² The Chinese leaders tried to win Syrian sympathy by insisting on the justice of their case and their peaceful intentions--in solving all their boundary problems with their neighboring countries through peaceful negotiations--and by

¹¹Ibid., p. 12.

¹²Ibid., p. 13.

denouncing India's "negative" attitude. As for the Syrian representatives, they adopted a neutral position in a "dispute between two friends." They expressed their conviction that the "wisdom and farsightedness of People's China would enable her to overcome this crisis and reach a right-ful solution acceptable to both sides."¹³

It is noteworthy to mention in this context that Khāled al Azm's position on the Sino-Indian boundary dispute was not very clear. While Nasser's proposals were much closer to India's own (cease-fire and withdrawal of the Chinese troops to the lines they occupied before the dispute), Khāled al Azm aroused the dissatisfaction of the Indian Ambassador in Damascus by making public statements proposing cease-fire and peaceful negotiations, without referring to Chinese withdrawal of troops, or acknowledging "Chinese aggression."¹⁴ Khāled al Azm's attitude was considered as a pro-Peking move in support of China's territorial gains.

It is mere speculation to assume that he was anticipating or preparing the grounds for a Chinese loan (the Sino-Indian crisis occurring towards the end of October 1962, it was on December 3, a month later that the Syrian Premier thanked Communist China, through its ambassador in Damascus for offering financial and economic assistance to Syria.)¹⁵

¹³ Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁴ Interview with Izzat Trābulsi, Minister of National Economy in the Cabinet of Ma'rūf al Dawalibi (Secessionist Regime), November 18, 1963.

¹⁵ "Communist China and Syria," The Arab World, Dec. 3, 1963, p. 2.

IV. Chinese Attitude Towards the Ba'thist Régime

With the Ba'thist régime that seized power in Syria on March 8, 1963--a month after the Ba'thist coup d'état in Iraq--the Chinese seemed willing to continue if not to strengthen their relations. They had already started to develop a friendly attitude towards the Iraqi Ba'thists and had been bitterly condemned by the Arab Communists for such a cooperation at their expense. In general the Arab Communist attacks were directed against the Iraqi Ba'th Party for its "fascist," "bloody," and "criminal" policy against the Kurds and the Communists. They also condemned the Chinese Communist leaders for taking sides with the "anti-people Ba'thist gangs." They referred sometimes to the Ba'th as a party with ideologies without explicit reference to the Syrian or the Iraqi one and denounced the Chinese leaders for disregarding Ba'thist hostility towards Communism and for considering them "as enemies of imperialism and protectors of socialism." They criticized them for concluding ties of cooperation and exchanging visits.¹⁶ Thus to the Arab Communists the Ba'th Party is a "ʿAflaqī-Saʿdī," in other words a Syrian-Iraqi single party. The present Syrian ruling party is a continuation of the precedent Iraqi Ba'thist one, "even if there are some personal differences." However, they add, "the case is not a personal one, it is one of policy and programme...which guide the party..."¹⁷

¹⁶Voice of Iraqi People in Arabic for Iraq, 1400 GMT, April 11, 1964.

¹⁷Khaytār al Hilū, "Ruling Ba'th is Seeking for a Legal Outlet," Al Nidā' (Beirut), Dec. 3, 1964, p. 1.

Peking seems not to be hindered in developing its relations with the present Syrian regime by the banning of the Syrian Communist Party, most likely because the latter is siding with Moscow against People's China in its dispute. While splits are to be noticed in some Arab countries,¹⁸ it cannot yet be confirmed whether there is a pro-Peking faction in the Syrian one.

Syrian Communist criticisms of the Chinese Communists has been voiced on different occasions. Bakdash had in a long article in April 1964 exposed their fallacies, their revisionism and factionalism.... Their fallacies consisted in holding:

1. That capitalism has been restored in Russia.
2. That the Soviet Union has become an imperialist country, which collaborates with American Imperialism in dividing spheres of influence.
3. That factionalism inside the movement on the international level is one of the laws of dialectical evolution.

He rejected them and took the defence of the Soviet Union and of the "vanguard" of Communism, the CPSU. He assured the Chinese Communist leaders that their revisionism would not find an echo or a fertile soil in Syria or in any other Arab country. He refuted Peking's charges that the Arab Communists are mere "pawns on the chess of the Soviet policy," by arguing that these views coincide with the imperialist ones.

¹⁸A pro-Peking Faction in the Lebanese Communist Party hailed the removal of Khrushchev by declaring "the traitor has fallen." "Pro-Peking Party in Lebanon Blasts Khrushchev," The Arab World, Oct. 21, 1964, p. 5.

Finally he praised the friendship between the Arab Communists and the Soviet Union, as well as the Arab-Soviet friendship in general.¹⁹

Therefore, since the Syrian Communist Party is a pro-Soviet one, it does not approve any rapprochement between Damascus and Peking.

As for the Syrian ruling Ba'thists, they are careful not to alienate the Soviet Union with which they are negotiating military and economic aid (negotiations on the question of the Euphrates Dam project). They made this clear in their official organ, al Thawrah, thanking China for its stand with the Arabs against Israel on the Palestine issue and seeking to improve and strengthen economic and cultural relations. Syria was not taking sides in the "doctrinal" war going on between the USSR and China. "We trust that our friend the Soviet Union will not interpret our increased effort to strengthen our relations with People's China as having adopted this country's point of view," the paper wrote. They justified their rapprochement with Peking by holding that their only guide in political life is their national interest and the interest of their people.²⁰

Peking's rapprochement with Damascus was manifested when the diversion of the Jordan River was preoccupying Syrian and other Arab governments. Chinese support to the Arab cause was highly appreciated and praised by the Ba'th. They maintained that the "Chinese stand is

¹⁹Khāled Bakdāsh, "Three Unpardonable Fallacies in the Attitude of the Chinese Leaders," Al Akhbār (Communist Weekly), April 12, 1964, p. 1.

²⁰"Syria Neutral in USSR-China Rift," The Arab World, May 15, 1964, p. 5.

not merely a moral one but is a direct practical and material support..." They declared that the "Chinese attitude has won the admiration and thanks of our struggling Arab people."²¹

When China exploded its atomic bomb, the Ba'th expressed its sympathy towards this country, which is "facing imperialist threat." The possession of an atom bomb by People's China was viewed as "the result of U.S. Far Eastern policy and the extension of U.S. arms and military bases in the area." It is added that "imperialist threats prompt nations to look for means of protecting themselves at any cost."²² The Chinese Ambassador in Syria reassured the Syrian government (Dr. Nouriddin Atasi, Vice Premier) that the Chinese nuclear test was made for the purpose of self-defence.

Sino-Syrian rapprochement is indefinite. It depends to a great extent on the Soviet role in the Syrian economy, which is in great need of loans and aid. It should also be noted that although the Chinese openly praise the Ba'th, they have not revealed a more friendly policy to it than to Nasser.

V. The Non-Political Relations

The two countries developed trade relations before the recognition by Syria of Communist China. A trade agreement was signed on Novem-

²¹Syria Comment on the CPR's Attitude on Palestine, Damascus Home Service, 1115 GMT, May 3, 1964.

²²"China's Future Possession of Atomic Bomb Said Result of Necessity Created by U.S.A.," The Arab World, Oct. 2, 1964, p. 5. (Quoting Al Ba'th).

ber 30, 1955 (it was later amended in July, 1957). While in 1952 it was only China which was exporting goods to Syria; in 1954 it imported from Syria.

When Syria recognized China officially in July 1956, the government of Peiping "at the request of the Syrian government," declared its decision to buy 5 million worth of Syrian wheat. This quantity of wheat had been left over after the Syrian government barred wheat shipments to France in protest against the latter's policy in Algeria.²³ From the four main commodities exported by Syria--cotton, wheat, barley and wool--China imported mainly cotton. If we compare the quantity (in tons) and the value (in thousand of Syrian pounds) of cotton exported by Syria to China and to the USSR, we find the following:²⁴

	1957		1959		1960		1962		1963	
	Q.	V.	Q.	V.	Q.	V.	Q.	V.	Q.	V.
China	14872	85051	201	439	4172	8318	5420	13086	31745	76112
USSR	4328	9554	6369	12669	8255	17734	6196	14812	19249	45975

The table on the next page gives the total number of the exports and imports by main countries of destination and origin to Syria. The increase or decrease in exports and imports by China to Syria were to a great extent influenced by the political situation in Syria, and the latter's relations with the Communist Bloc. This explains the increase in exports (and in imports) by the Communist countries to Syria in 1957

²³"Trade Between Syria and China," The Arab World, July 6, 1956, p. 4.

²⁴Syrian Republic, Ministry of National Economy, Directorate of Statistics, Summary of Foreign Trade (1957; 1959, 1960, 1962, 1963).

SYRIA: EXPORTS AND IMPORTS BY MAIN COUNTRIES OF DESTINATION AND ORIGIN - 1952-1962

(MILLIONS OF SYRIAN POUNDS)²⁵

Period	China		Czechoslovakia		U.S.A.		U.S.S.R.	
	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.
1952	-	2.2	-	7.1	15.9	66.7	-	0.3
1953	-	32.9	-	3.7	20.8	56.6	-	0.2
1954	21.4	7.7	0.0	5.8	19.2	76.3	-	0.4
1955	0.6	0.5	4.6	8.3	21.3	74.3	-	0.6
1956	5.6	1.1	21.1	9.2	21.2	73.2	4.1	1.8
1957	35.8	1.8	23.8	11.7	20.8	69.1	12.3	11.5
1958	24.1	4.1	21.0	35.5	14.5	61.4	66.6	13.1
1959	0.5	6.1	12.2	12.6	26.1	49.2	15.5	21.4
1960	8.5	4.5	21.4	12.9	11.9	114.9	23.5	26.2
1961	43.3	4	18.1	10.5	12.4	108.6	11.7	28.9
1962	15.7	13.3	21.3	24.5	8	106.3	19.0	13.7

²⁵Banque Centrale de Syrie, Bulletin Périodique, I, No. 2, 1963.

(increase of 50 million Syrian pounds in Chinese exports), while in 1959 (after the deterioration of relations) there was a remarkable drop. In the case of China, there was a decrease from 24.1 in 1958 to 0.5 in 1959. This decrease was also caused by the economic difficulties which were facing China in 1958.

With the secession of Syria from the U.A.R. People's China came again to develop trade, economic and technical relations. These agreements were signed on February 21, 1963. As we have already mentioned the loan was raised to 70 million Swiss Francs free of interest. It was granted in different forms: industrial equipment, machines, services and the Syrians were free to choose the equipment they preferred. Furthermore, the trade agreement was amended to add new products and merchandise on the Chinese and Syrian lists of exports. The Chinese expressed their willingness to strengthen their economic and trade relations and to increase their imports from Syrian products (especially in cotton and cereals). They apologized for declining the Syrian offer to export gasoline, on the ground that there were difficulties in exportation, and that their imports from the Soviet Union were sufficient.²⁶

The Syrian economic delegation had not yet reached its homeland when the Ba'thist coup d'état occurred. The Ba'thist government declared its decision to uphold the loan agreement with Peking; it contacted the Chinese Ambassador in Syria to put into effect these agreements.

²⁶ Report of the Syrian Economic and Technical Delegation..., op.cit., p. 7.

People's China has been supplying Syria with frozen meat (600 tons in Dec. 1963; 800 tons in October 1964) and Syria has been importing a large quantity of Chinese rice and purchased five large mechanical flour mills.²⁷ Communist China has extended credit to the amount of about \$30,100,000 to Syria and followed this up with industrial and other delegations.²⁸

An industrial and technical Chinese delegation led by Chao Li-chun arrived on May 6, 1964 in connection with the economic and technical cooperation agreement. Welcoming the delegation the Syrian Minister of Economy declared that in 1963 "China bought almost one third of our cotton crop,"²⁹ thereby assuming the most significant place in Syria's economy, and prospects are for continued purchase. He also said that a number of projects have been studied for discussion with missions, namely that of a paper factory, an industry for making small electrical units such as motors and transformers and also a project relating to transformation of gases into chemical industries.³⁰

In developing friendly relations with Syria, People's China sent Muslim delegations to visit the country on its way to or from Mecca.

²⁷"Syria," The Arab World, Oct. 7, 1964, p. 6.

²⁸Dana Adams Schmidt, "Red Star Rises in East," New York Times, Feb. 3, 1965, p. 4.

²⁹"China, the Arab World and Africa," Mizan Newsletter, op.cit., p. 35.

³⁰"Chinese Industrial Mission to Visit Syria," The Arab World, op.cit., p. 5.

People's China has been supplying Syria with frozen meat (600 tons in Dec. 1963; 800 tons in October 1964) and Syria has been importing a large quantity of Chinese rice and purchased five large mechanical flour mills.²⁷ Communist China has extended credit to the amount of about \$50,100,000 to Syria and followed this up with industrial and other delegations.²⁸

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²⁹"China, the Arab World and Africa," Mizan Newsletter, op.cit., p. 35.

³⁰"Chinese Industrial Mission to Visit Syria," The Arab World, op.cit., p. 5.

In April, 1964, a Muslim delegation that was led by Hajj Muhammad ALI Chang, referred to the old ties binding China and the Arab countries and to the development of Islam in its country, assuring the Deputy Minister of Waqfs that the Chinese were free to practice Islam. The delegation's itinerary included visits to Palestinian refugee camps. It reiterated that China supports the Arab cause against imperialism and that it was in favour of the Palestine refugees recapturing their homeland. The mission also visited ancient religious places before its return.⁵¹

Thus Islam and the Palestine question were the two major items chosen by this delegation to win the sympathy of its listeners.

Conclusion

Throughout the Syrian coups, Peking's objective seemed to be the same: to continue and to consolidate its relations with every government, whether national bourgeois, unionist, secessionist or Ba'thist. In general Sino-Syrian relations have been steadily increasing, especially after the secession of Syria from the U.A.R. Only for a brief period, during China's encouragement of Bakdash at the Peking celebrations in 1959, were good relations suspended.

⁵¹"Chinese Islamic Mission," The Arab World, May 6, 1964, p. 6.

CHAPTER 5

THE YEMEN

Sino-Yemeni relations reveal one particular aspect of China's foreign policy towards the Arab countries, its willingness to begin relations with any one of them, be it a kingdom, a republic or any type of reactionary or liberated regime. However, Peking's leaders justify themselves by putting the stress on the anti-imperialist policy of the country in question.

I. China and the Mutawakiliyāh Kingdom of Yemen

In recognizing People's China on August 22, 1956, Imam Ahmad was following in the footsteps of Egypt and Syria to whom he was linked in a military alliance. His aim was to associate his country with "liberated" and nationalist Arab countries. He was also developing a friendly attitude towards the Communist Bloc. Thus he sent Crown Prince Saif al-Islām Muḥamad al-Badr on a visit to Poland, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and People's China. During his two week visit to China (from December 31, 1957, till January 15, 1958) al Badr conferred with the Chinese leaders and reached agreements with them.

Welcoming this move the Chinese leaders emphasized that "similar experiences, common desires and common support bound them together." They referred to ancient times when the Arab countries were already on

close trading terms with China and the Yemen was situated on the trade route between them. It was the "intrusion of the colonialists" in Asia and Africa that brought this close relationship to an end. They concluded that now, after the two peoples have gained their independence "no force in the world" would "be able to obstruct their daily growth."¹

Non-political affairs were the focus of the Sino-Yemeni relations, for besides their anti-imperialist struggle and its implications for Aden, there was no major political issue between them. Crown Prince al-Badr concluded with Peking's leaders in January 1958 a treaty of friendship and commerce and an agreement on scientific technical and cultural cooperation. In this first treaty, the contracting parties promised to maintain "everlasting friendship between the two countries" and to be guided by the moral principles of the U.N. Charter, the resolutions of the Bandung Conference and the five principles of peaceful co-existence...² They decided to establish diplomatic relations and to negotiate other agreements. Under the second agreement, China would grant Yemen a ten-year loan of 70 million Swiss Francs (about \$16,380,000) which would be used to pay for Chinese construction of a 300 mile road, a textile mill, a cigarette factory and several other plants. Technicians and skilled workers would also be sent to Yemen.³

¹"New Stage of Sino-Yemeni Friendly Cooperation," (Renmin Ribao editorial, Jan. 15, 1958), China Supports the Arab People's Struggle for National Independence, op.cit., p. 166.

²"Treaty of Friendship," Ibid., p. 160.

³New York Times, April 1, 1958.

These agreements permitted hundreds of Chinese Communists to work in Yemen. In the late 1950's and beginning of 1960's, they were more numerous in this country than in any other part of the Middle East. "Seven hundred Chinese and two hundred European Communist exercised great influence in the country," wrote the Economist in 1959. "For eighteen months while the Communists were moving in not a single American diplomat set foot in Ta'iz."⁴ However, later on, the Imam tried to regain a balance between East and West, invited an American legation to join the growing diplomatic corps in Ta'iz and requested shipments of wheat from the U.S.A. to relieve famine.⁵ The American Point Four aid - which amounted to \$20 million for building a highway from San'a to Ta'iz, was stopped in 1960. This happened for many reasons, but mainly because the U.S.A. demanded to import its construction equipment through Aden rather than Hudaydah and to start the road "suspiciously near the disputed Aden frontier."⁶ The Imam's anti-American decision undoubtedly pleased the Chinese.

The main Chinese contribution to the Kingdom of Yemen was the Hudaydah-San'a Highway, stretching some 200 kms. and in rugged terrain. It was nevertheless built in a short period, nearly two years.⁷ Its

⁴"Russian and Chinese in Yemen," The Economist, CVIII, (July 25, 1959), pp. 227-228.

⁵The Chinese had in June 1959 offered as the first part of a gift 7,700 tons of wheat to relieve famine. Mizan Newsletter, VI, No. 5 (May 1964), p. 41.

⁶The Statesman, 7.29.60 (as quoted in Deadline Data on World Affairs, "Yemen," p. 14.

⁷Its opening was celebrated in January 1962 a month after its completion. Chen Chia Keng, Chinese Minister to Yemen headed the delegation to the ceremony. Mizan Newsletter, op.cit., p. 41.

benefits should not be minimized. It was the first, and remained until very recently the only, asphalt road in Yemen. It connected the high hinterland with the coast, hence its importance in developing domestic and foreign trade. Moreover, it linked Yemen's two biggest economic centers: Port Ahmad (built with Soviet aid) and San'a, the capital. "The Yemeni people," a Chinese reporter wrote, "called it 'Yemen's economic artery'." He added that the Yemeni people are "full of praise for these two projects"--the Chinese and the Soviet one--and "they hailed them as 'expressions of the sincere friendship of the Soviet and Chinese people for Yemen'."⁸ Another benefit is that it was a source of employment and income for many Yemenites.

There is one feature of this loan which differs from other Chinese aid to Arab countries, i.e., the presence of more than 500 Chinese for over a period of two years on Arab soil. This permitted real contact between the Chinese and the local people. During this period the former's activities were not confined to the construction of the Highway. They themselves held that they trained about a thousand Yemeni men, many of them former peasants to become truck and bus drivers, operators of various engines and drilling machines, semi-skilled and road maintenance crews. A group of students had also been selected by the Yemeni government to undergo training in a special class led by experienced Chinese experts.⁹

⁸Kuan Yun-Chiu, "Port Ahmad and the Hudaydah-San'a Highway," Peking Review, No. 19 (May 12, 1961), pp. 11-12.

⁹Ibid., p. 12.

The Chinese experts claimed to have made firm friendships as they worked with and shared the life of their Yemeni colleagues, on the job and off. They seemed to be happy among this "friendly" people who "manifested hospitality and a warm welcome on different occasions." One example was the anniversary of China's National Day in 1960 when "over 700 local workers and inhabitants in the town where Chinese experts stayed, led by local government officials greeted the Chinese experts...performed folk dances...hailed Sino-Yemeni friendship."¹⁰

The presence of the Chinese Communists on the Yemeni soil had on the other hand created some problems. The Yemenis are known to be very sensitive to foreign intrusion or domination. The presence of the Chinese caused some incidents of discontent which were rapidly propagated among the tribes.¹¹

The effectiveness of the Treaty can be questioned since the textile, cigarette, aluminium and other factories promised in 1958 were not built. A possible reason is that until the end of 1961 the Chinese concentrated all their energy on the long and difficult highway. Another reason is that after the secession of Syria from the U.A.R., Imam

¹⁰Ibid., p. 12.

¹¹One conflict arose between a Chinese supervisor on the Highway and a Yemeni worker, the latter being beaten and two Chinese being killed in the ensuing dispute. Another incident was that of a Yemenite being imprisoned by the Yemeni authorities for attacking a Chinese photographer. This led to anti-Chinese propaganda among some tribes. (Interview with a Yemeni Republican Official who wishes to remain anonymous. February 21, 1965).

Ahmad revealed his anti-socialist ideas. In a poem of December 1961, he called for an Arab Union based on the Sharī'ah and urged the Arabs to rid themselves of all "disastrous innovations which pretend to permit what Islam forbids...to take away by force the fortune of people is a crime in the eyes of Islamic law."¹² The Imam warned against Communist influence and Communist atheistic ideas.¹³ Previously he had banned the Yemeni Communist Organ Al Tallāh, that was directed by Abdullāh Bāzīb and issued during a short period from 1958 to 1959. All this explains why after the Chinese completed the highway and left the country no new projects were started. Only a small group of twenty remained for the maintenance of the highway especially clearing from rock slides.

After the death of Imam Ahmad and in the short period of al-Badr's rule, more liberated than his father, talks were opened concerning a textile factory which was to be a gift from China. Yemen's only textile factory was built in Bājel by "La Societe Alsacienne" but did not work for long. Chinese experts would build the factory and would train Yemenites.¹⁴ It was only in 1964, after Sallāl's visit that this factory

¹²Le Monde, Dec. 29, 1961 (as quoted in Deadline Data on World Affairs, "Yemen," Dec. 26, 1961, p. 16. This poem led Nasser to dissolve the "United Arab States" which after Syria's secession was restricted to Egypt and Yemen.

¹³The Statesman reported that when the Imam heard that the Chinese were spreading atheistic ideas he sent them a stern warning and threat of expulsion, 7.29.60 (See Deadline Data on World Affairs, "Yemen," p. 14).

¹⁴A Lebanese Director of a textile factory, Mr. Munzir Sammakiyyah, travelled to Yemen in August 1962 to direct the Bājel textile factory. The Minister of Public Works in al-Badr's new Cabinet, Mr. Al Hassan Bān Al'Alī, on September 25 told him about this Chinese gift and about its benefits to Yemen's economic development. He met some of the Thirty Student Delegation who were sent to China to work and practice in textile factories. They all returned complaining of the pressure and the way of living.

finally materialized.

In the period 1958-1962, cultural and religious exchanges took place between the Mutawakiliyah Kingdom of Yemen and the People's Republic of China. The Chinese Legation was an active cultural and propagandistic center. It had a cinema, one of the few in Ta'iz, where Chinese films were weekly projected. Pamphlets and leaflets were also distributed.¹⁵ As for the exchanges and visits of the delegations, three main Chinese missions were sent to the Yemen: (1) A 27 member acrobatic troupe was invited by the Imam (May 28, 1960). (2) A Muslim pilgrim delegation ended a three week visit to Yemen on September 24, 1960. (3) A Chinese exhibition of export samples was held from November 15, 1960 till the end of January 1961 in Hudaydah and was seen by more than 10,000 people. In return the Chinese invited cultural and Muslim delegations from the Yemen. A government and cultural delegation led by Sayyid Muhammad Hasan Musa, editor in-chief of an-Nasr, arrived on November 5, 1960, and spent a month in China. A Muslim delegation arrived on November 20, 1960, led by Ahmad Muhammad Tabbarah, Chairman of the Yemeni Religious Laws Committee.¹⁶

The Yemen's major anti-imperialist issue its demands over Aden, was ever since the Bandung Conference fully supported by the Chinese Communists. In their joint communiqué in 1958 the two parties condemned the "colonial powers' plots to create discord and tension in the Middle

¹⁵Personal interview with a Yemeni Official, February 21, 1965.

¹⁶Mizan Newsletter, op.cit., p. 41.

East..." The Chinese officials expressed their full sympathy and supported "Yemen's recovery of its territories in Aden and in the Southern parts of the Yemen known as Protectorates..."¹⁷ In return the Imam held that the proper rights and position of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations should be promptly bestowed.

In conclusion on this part, we can say that nothing could seem more incongruous than the Chinese Communists' economic aid and friendly policy to an absolute theocratic monarchy whose methods of maintaining its rule were reactionary and even more reactionary than some Arab countries with a pro-Western policy.

II. China and the Yemeni Republic

After the coup d'état against Imam al-Badr on September 26, 1962, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi, on October 10, 1962, sent a message to the Yemeni Foreign Minister, informing him of China's decision to recognize the Yemeni Arab Republic. The two sides decided in mid-February 1963 to raise diplomatic representation from consular to embassy level.¹⁸

With the return to normal diplomatic and friendly relations between Cairo and Peking after Premier Chou En Lai's visit to the U.A.R., Field Marshal Abdullāh al-Sallāl, President of the Arab Republic of

¹⁷"New Stages of Sino-Yemeni Friendly Cooperation," China Supports the Arab People's Struggle for National Independence, op.cit., p. 168.

¹⁸Mizan Newsletter, op.cit., p. 41.

Yemen visited Communist China on the invitation of the latter. During this visit which took place in June 1964, the Chinese attitude towards the new régime became clarified. The Chinese congratulated the Yemeni people on the victory of their revolution of September. They expressed firm support for the Yemeni struggle against imperialism and "reactionaries", and for safeguarding their sovereignty and territorial integrity.¹⁹ In their joint communiqué, friendship treaties and banquet speeches, the Chinese leaders avoided explicit reference to the Imam or to the ancient régime. The only possible allusion to it was the term "reactionaries" since the Royalists are anti-socialist. However, this term could also mean or include Saudi Arabia's rulers who were and still are giving assistance to the counter-revolutionary tribes.

The tribute paid to the new Yemeni régime is nearly the same as the one paid to the ancient régime: the government's adherence to the policy of peace and neutrality, its devotion to the cause of solidarity among the Arab and Afro-Asian countries, its opposition to imperialism... and its efforts in developing the national economy and in striving for social progress.²⁰

Just as they supported Imam Ahmad's anti-imperialist policy, so they reiterated their firm support for the "Yemeni people of Aden and the other occupied areas of South Yemen and Oman" and condemned the

¹⁹"Joint Communiqué of Chinese and Yemeni Heads of State," Peking Review, No. 25 (June 19, 1964), p. 12.

²⁰"President Abdullah al-Sallal in Peking," Peking Review, No. 25 (June 5, 1964), p. 5.

"fresh crimes of military aggression committed by imperialism in Aden..." and "British aerial bombing in the Radfan region."²¹ They firmly held that the plan outlined by Colonial Secretary Sandys in the House of Commons "to give independence" to the South Arabian Federation and to link it with the strategic base of Aden was doomed to failure, for such manoeuvres cannot face the rising nationalism of the Arab people. Furthermore they strongly attacked the United States for voting with Britain against the resolution submitted by the United Nations Decolonization Committee.²²

In return for Chinese support, the Yemeni President exposed the successes achieved by the Chinese people and pledged "firm support for the restoration of China's legitimate rights" for "there is only one China, the so-called two Chinas simply do not exist."²³

On the question of Union between the United Arab Republic and the Yemen, the Chinese leaders seemed to avoid the issue during Sallāl's visit to Peking. Whenever they gave their opinion, it was formulated in general terms. President Liu Shao-chi briefly declared his government's "support of the Arab people's desire to achieve unity and solidarity in the way of their choice."²⁴

²¹"China Supports the People of Aden and South Yemen," Peking Review, No. 21 (May 22, 1964), p. 4.

²²"South Yemen: Torch of Struggle Aflame," Peking Review, No. 21 (May 22, 1964), pp. 21-22.

²³"China and Yemen Sign Friendship Treaty," Peking Review, No. 24 (June 12, 1964), p. 5.

²⁴"Let the Arab Unite in the Way of their Own Choice," Al Hayat (Beirut), September 10, 1964, p. 1.

Thus basically, there was no change in Communist China's foreign policy to the Republic of Yemen. It was in a way a repetition or a continuation of their previous policy.

The Non-Political Relations

A treaty of friendship, a cultural cooperation agreement and an economic technical cooperation agreement were signed during Sallāl's visit.

The treaty of friendship would remain in force for a period of ten years, superceding the first treaty of 1958 and restating its propositions (peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries, the five principles of Bandung, and economic and cultural cooperation).

Chinese loans would help to build another road from Ṣan'ā to Ṣa'dā and a textile factory (which was not realized under the Imamate). The Chinese project would include: a printing and dyeing factory, an electrical generator, and workers' houses.²⁵ A Chinese delegation of twenty eight engineers and technicians came to Ṣan'ā to help in the building of the textile factory.²⁶

Although a great number of Chinese Communists left the Yemen after the completion of the Ṣan'ā-Ḥudaydah Highway, they are returning to work on the new plants.

Cultural exchanges were also encouraged between the two countries. For example a Yemeni journalist delegation headed by the Minister of

²⁵ The Yemeni Arab Republic, Summary of the Achievements of the Revolution from 1963-1964 (The Yemeni Arab Republic Press), p. 16.

²⁶ "28 Engineers and Technicians from China to Yemen," Al Hayat (Beirut), Sept. 10, 1964, p. 1.

Information was invited to China in September 1964 by the Chinese Committee on Cultural Affairs.²⁷

Conclusion

The Chinese limited aid programme to the Yemen is far from overcoming the latter's stage of backwardness, for which even the Soviet, American and other assistance programmes are not sufficient. The Soviets have become more numerous and more active than the Chinese. With the construction of the Hudaydah Port, they made it their operations center while their embassy was still in Ta'iz. Some of them know Arabic, others are Moslems. They are teaching Russian and granting scholarships. The Soviet Union has recently provided for further Soviet aid in expanding agricultural production, constructing cement factories, fish canning plants, and supervising the building of a road between Hudaydah and Ta'iz.²⁸

One major reason why the Yemeni Republic has to seek assistance from Soviet or Chinese sources is the limited amount of Western, American and United Nations' aid to it. This is mainly caused by the complex political situation in Yemen where Royalists, Republicans, Egyptians, Saudi Arabians, British and American are involved and also by the Yemeni Republic's suspicion of the West.

²⁷Hsinhua News Agency Daily Release (Damascus), Sept. 23, 1964, p. 1.

²⁸"Arrival of Soviet Equipments to Yemen," Al Jaridah (Beirut), Oct. 23, 1964, p. 1.

It is doubtful whether the change in the Yemeni régime, from a monarchy to a republic caused a great rapprochement with China. Undoubtedly the Egyptian presence on the Yemeni soil restricts the activity of the Chinese.

CHAPTER 6

IRAQ

Had the Revolution of July 14, 1958, not occurred in Iraq and had the Hashemite rule continued, Iraq would have remained a distant country to the People's Republic of China, like Jordan. Unlike Egypt, Syria and Yemen where the recognition was prepared gradually, only a radical change of the régime, a revolution, could in 1958 bring this member of the Baghdad Pact in contact with Peking.

During the period 1958-1964, Sino-Iraqi relations passed through different stages: cultural and trade relations were developed under Kassem; Chinese attitude towards the Iraqi Ba'athists provoked attacks and criticisms from the Iraqi Communists. Later they were faced with a pro-Nasserite régime headed by 'Aréf.

I. People's China and Iraq under Kassem

The Iraqi Revolution of July 14, 1958, was a "great leap forward"¹ in the Chinese Communist view. It changed Iraq from a reactionary autocracy to a Republic, from a tool to split Arab Unity to a

¹ Mao Tun, "We Whole Heartedly Support the Just Struggle of the Arab People," We Are With You Arab Brothers, ed. Mao Tun and Others (Peking: F.L.P., 1958), p. 8.

factor strengthening that Unity..."² Moreover it was a "blow to the Baghdad Pact," and had a tremendous significance to the Asian and African peoples.

The landing of American troops in Lebanon and British troops in Jordan, on July 17, three days after the Iraqi revolution, and the "concentration of forces" in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the area of the Persian Gulf were considered by the Chinese as "an attempt to invade the Republic of Iraq from several directions."³

For the second time after the Suez crisis, People's China manifested its "worries" about the "security" of the Middle East, on a large popular level. Hundreds of pamphlets, articles, poems and caricatures were published expressing two main ideas: attacks on imperialism and support of the Arabs. Demonstrations were held in protest against the "armed intervention." It was reported that in one of the demonstrations, where half a million Peking citizens gathered--in the Tien An Men Square--"more than two hundred akhungs and caliphs...., moslems from forty mosques in all corner of the capital" were present. A Chinese Muslim, Saleh An Shih-wei told the demonstrators: "Today the Iraqi people have realized their ideals, we Chinese Muslims offer our hearty congratulations to them on their victory."⁴

²"Victory Belongs to the Arab People," (Renmin Ribao editorial, Aug. 3, 1958), China Supports the Arab People's Struggle for National Independence, p. 241.

³"Protest of the Government of the People's Republic of China to the British Government," July 18, 1958. Ibid., p. 184.

⁴Renmin Ribao Correspondent "Voice of 600 Million," We Are With You Arab Brothers, op.cit., pp. 5-6.

The Chinese Communists implied in many articles their desire for a military course of action in the Middle East to counteract Western intervention and to consolidate the Iraqi Republic. A Renmin Ribao editorial of July 20 stated that they would not stand by with "folded arms." "Only by carrying out determined struggle can we teach these imperialist pirates a lesson..."⁵ As in the case of the Suez war, the Chinese leaders were ready to send volunteers. Peiping Radio stated on July 20, that Communist Chinese army units have volunteered to fight in the Middle East if necessary.⁶

The Chinese Communist leaders were urging the Soviet Union to intervene effectively. They held that the latter would have to take necessary steps in order to ensure its safety, for the "aggressive activities" were carried in regions near Soviet territories. They reminded the Soviet leaders that "nothing can be saved by yielding to evil" and that the "only language they [Imperialists] understand is that of force." Their encouragement for intervention in the Middle East was coupled with affirmations that they were "not afraid of war," for "the present balance of forces" was "unfavourable as never before to the U.S. and British imperialists."⁷

⁵"We Will not Look on With Folded Arms," (Renmin Ribao editorial, July 20, 1958), China Supports the Arab People's Struggle for National Independence, op.cit., pp. 211-216.

⁶"China," Deadline Data on World Affairs, July 20, 1958, p. 43.

⁷"We Will Not Look on With Folded Arms," China Supports the Arab People's Struggle for National Independence, op.cit., p. 216.

The Middle Eastern crisis, which, as the Chinese firmly held, threatened the security of the Iraqi Republic, revealed an important aspect of the Sino-Soviet dispute. While Peking was demanding emergency measures, Khrushchev in a letter to President Eisenhower, Premier de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan on July 19, proposed an emergency session of the General Assembly to reach solutions reasonably and calmly.⁸ He did not object to a summit conference within the framework of the U.N. Security Council, for he was hoping to reach some concessions on Berlin (recognition of the status quo in East Europe) and on disarmament. The Chinese were against such a meeting at which Nationalist China, as one of the five Great Powers, would be represented. Under Chinese pressure and after talks with the Chinese leaders in Peking early in August, Khrushchev changed his position on the summit conference.⁹

In conclusion on the Iraqi Revolution, a final remark can be noted. The Chinese Communists refer to it to confirm their theory that national independence can be won by armed struggle, "at the cost of our blood, not by hoping for favours from the imperialists."¹⁰

⁸ New York Times, July 19, 1958.

⁹ Robert North, "The First Decade: Sino-Soviet Alliance," China Quarterly, I (No. 1, Jan.-March, 1960), p. 59.

¹⁰ Mao Tun, op.cit., p. 9.

With the establishment of diplomatic relations (on August 25, 1958) the Chinese Communist leaders' concern was to develop all kinds of friendly relations with the new Iraqi regime. They did not wait long to sign trade and cultural agreements and to encourage exchanges of visitors. An Iraq-China Friendship Association was also formed.

A few months after the Iraqi revolution, the Communist Bloc's preferences went to Kasse'm rather than to Nasser. While the Egyptian and Syrian Communists were persecuted, the Iraqi Communists were better off than in any period in history. The Winter of 1958-1959 and the period following the Mosul uprisings (March 1959) witnessed a rapid growth of Communist influence. "The trade union movement emerged from underground activity and in a short time organized 308,000 workers in 46 trade unions."¹¹

While the organ of the Iraqi Communist Party, Ittihad al-Sha'b, was an underground one, soon after the Iraqi Revolution it received permission to appear legally and its circulation reached 35,000.¹² Some of its articles praised the Chinese Communist system which contributed to the progress of the "Leap Forward"... The People Communes were also viewed as successful...¹³

¹¹"The Fifth WFTU Congress in Moscow," Mizan Newsletter, II (No. 1, Jan. 1961), p. 5.

¹²"The Middle East in Soviet Press," Mizan Newsletter, II (No. 9, Oct. 1960), p. 15.

¹³"Communique on the Precedent Session of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party," Ittihad al-Sha'b, (Iraq), April 9, 1959.

The Soviet and the Chinese assumed that understanding existed between the Party and the Iraqi government. Izvestia quoted Kassem speaking of the Communists as "patriots who did nothing against the country's interests."¹⁴

The Communists were gaining influence in different fields. Men reputed to be Communists or pro-Communists held key economic posts (such as Ibrāhīm Kubbah--Minister of Economy), or gained influence in the Cabinet and in the army (the Commander of the Air Force Jalāl al Awqāfī). On the eve of the first anniversary of the July 14 Revolution, Mrs. Naziha ad-Dulsini, the well-known leader of the League for the Protection of Women's Rights and Dr. Faysal Sāmer, both known as outright Communists were appointed in the Iraqi Cabinet.¹⁵

The internal developments in Iraq were of great interest to the Soviets as well as to the Chinese. It has been suggested that 'Azīz Sharīf, President of the pro-Communist "Partisans of Peace," who attended the World Peace Council, in Moscow in February 1959, was influenced by the Chinese delegation's views on "mass struggle for peace," and that on his return he brought 250,000 of his men from all over Iraq to Mosul to demonstrate.¹⁶ This provoked mutiny of a section of the garrison at Mosul, under the leadership of Colonel 'Abdul Wahāb Al-Shawwāf. This

¹⁴"Anti-Communism in Iraqi Soviet Reaction," Mizan Newsletter, III (No. 3, March 1961), p. 2.

¹⁵"Communist Plot Averted," Arab World, July 14, 1959, p. 2.

¹⁶W.A.C. Adie, "The Middle East: Sino-Soviet Discords," Polycentrism, ed. Walter Laqueur (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1962), p. 228.

revolt which was essentially directed against Kassem and through him at the Communists, to keep Iraq from diverging from the main stream of Arab Nationalism, ended with massacres and with the death of Al-Shawwāf.

The Chinese Communists implicitly supported Kassem against these pro-Nasser officers' incidents and condemned such a revolt directed against the Communists in general and the Peace Movement in particular. In an article attacking Tito, Nasser's best friend, they criticized him for being sympathetic to a revolt in Iraq against revolutionary Premier Kassem. They held that the "hypocrisy" of his so called coexistence enabled the "people to see more clearly that the Shawwāf rebellion was part of an organized international conspiracy."¹⁷

The Chinese Communist attitude towards the Iraqi Communist Party was not very clear. In 1959, there were some extremists among the Iraqi Communists, who differed with the moderates on the question of means and of timing, how and when to strike for power. Some Western thinkers like Donald Zagoria and W.A.C. Adie believed that the "extremist wing" was favoured by Peking while the "moderate wing" was favoured by Moscow. However, there is no clear evidence that the Chinese, contrary to Soviet wishes, were pushing forward the left wing for action. Their role in the Mosul and Kirkuk incidents are up to day not known. The only basis for judgement is which Iraqi Communist views, the leftist or the moderate ones were publicized by Moscow and which ones by Peking.

¹⁷New China News Agency, March 12, 1959, as quoted by Daniel Treliak, "The Founding of the Sino-Albanian Entente," China Quarterly, No. 10 (April-June, 1962), p. 158.

By publishing the moderates' views on February 17, 1959, the Polish paper "Zyciewarszawy" suggested that it was this group which enjoyed the favour of the Soviets. It quoted an Iraqi Communist publicist Azīz Al-Hājī saying that his Party "doesn't proclaim the necessity to create a Communist Society now" and that "an anti-government conspiracy would be a crime in any Arab state struggling against imperialism, even if Communists were persecuted."¹⁸

The publishing in full of the Iraqi Communist Party's account of its policy shortcomings appeared in the Soviet press, Pravda (August 17) and Kommunist (No. 12.19.59), "while it was not reported in China."¹⁹

In fact, the Iraqi Communist Party published on August 3, 1959, a long apologia. This was caused by the serious measures taken by Kassem against the Iraqi Communists following the Kirkuk incidents (July 14, 1959). Kassem on July 29 accused them of responsibility for the Kirkuk massacres. Their trade unions were dissolved, the "People's Resistance Force" was suspended, etc. In their long apologia, which Zagoria believed, was issued under Soviet pressure, the Iraqi Communist Party publicly condemned itself for "criminal acts, emotionalism, and miscalculations." It declared that it "had miscalculated the political situation and the nature of the highest authorities and the national forces," and added that "all criminal acts attributed to Communists were acts of ill-advised

¹⁸Zagoria, op.cit., p. 436.

¹⁹W.A.C. Adie, "China, Russia and the Third World," China Quarterly, No. 11 (July-Sept. 1962), p. 205.

leadership."²⁰ It also recognized that there had been cases of "extreme measures such as punitive actions, purges, tortures and other violations of Party principles," that "leftist political errors" had been committed. It ended by promising to take some corrective measures to adopt "a gradual purge of opportunist extremist and undisciplined elements from the Party."²¹ It pledged itself to remain loyal to the revolution and the Republic under the leadership of Kassem.

As we have already noted, it is difficult to know the explicit Chinese view on the Iraqi incidents of 1959. With the widening of the rift between Moscow and Peking, the split in some Arab Communist parties, and the exchanges of polemics, new lights are thrown on the Chinese position towards the Iraqi Communist Party. The issue of "transition to socialism" has become important in the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute. While the Soviet leaders cited the events of 1959 in Iraq as example of "premature slogans of socialist transformation where conditions for them has not yet matured,"²² the Chinese leaders criticized the Soviets for their soft line. This can be best illustrated by the recent attacks of September 1964 made by the pro-Peking Lebanese faction, which split from the original Communist party and called itself "Party of the Socialist Revolution." They denounced outstanding pro-Soviet Arab Communist leaders

²⁰"Kassem Rejects Communist Demand for Representation," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, XII (July 25-Aug. 1, 1959), p. 16931.

²¹"The Iraqi Communist Party," Mizan Newsletter, No. 9 (Sept., 1959), p. 11.

²²Zagoria, op.cit., p. 260.

like Bakdāsh, and three other Lebanese, Nichola Shawī, Yūsuf Khattār Hilū, Hassan Qraitām as traitors for their interference in the Iraqi Communist affairs, in an attempt to prevent them in 1959 from seizing power, and for putting pressure on the latter to follow the national bourgeoisie and Kassem. They also attacked them for avoiding criticism of the government and for holding that the declaration of Iraq a "People's Republic" under the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasants would lead the national bourgeoisie in the other Arab countries away from the Communists in the arms of the imperialists.²³

These arguments which could be interpreted as Chinese Communist encouragement of Iraqi Communist seizure of power in 1959 and of excessive Communist activity at that time, are not very solid, since this pro-Peking Party is engaged in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Hence it is difficult to separate their polemics from reality.

Kassem's balancing act of trying to retain the support of both the Communists and the anti-Communist pan-Arab nationalists (using the one against the other), his attitude towards the Iraqi Communists from the second half of 1959 till the end of his rule, made of him a "national bourgeois leader" in the Soviet and Chinese view. The campaign he launched against the Communists in Iraq due to the Kirkuk incident, was not an all-out one. It is true that the Communist organ Ittihad al-Sha'b was closed down in October 1960 and that some trade union activists were persecuted; however, Kassem licensed Dāwūd al-Ṣayigh's party

²³ Communiqué of the Party of the Socialist Revolution, Aug., 1964.

as the official Communist party. This was the rival group of the Iraqi Communist party and was viewed by the Soviets as "opportunist and subversive."

Most probably in their discussions with the Soviets over the question of aid to leaders who, although nationalist, remained bourgeois, the Chinese had in mind Kassem, besides Nasser, Sukarno and Nehru. In the statement issued by the November meeting of the Communist parties (the CPC included) in Moscow 1960, Iraq was perhaps in the mind of those who adopted the new classification "national democracies" to apply to states which while not "socialist" pursue a policy which is considered favourable to Communist ideals. Iraqi government leaders, like Dr. Ibrahim Kubbah spoke a few months after this conference of Iraq's regime as a "national democratic revolution."²⁴

The Chinese views of Kassem's internal policy, his land reform and his demands that some oil companies should give up their unutilized concession areas are not well known. It appears that although these were viewed as progressive measures, they had, in the Soviet and Chinese views, shortcomings. The Soviets maintained that after the implementation of the reforms "more than half of the present number of the families remained without land."²⁵ As far as the oil companies were concerned, nationalization was always regarded by the Chinese as ideal in the Middle East.

²⁴"Soviet Views and Iraqi Problems," Mizan Newsletter, III, (No. 1, Jan. 1961), p. 10.

²⁵Izvestia, June 14, 1959 as quoted in Mizan Newsletter, I (No. 7, July 1959), p. 6.

It would remove Western influence, and Western "exploitation".

The fact that the Soviet Union was more interested than the Chinese in the fate of the Iraqi Communist Party, which was loyal to the Soviet Union, was evident in the Soviet public disagreements with the measures taken by Kassem against them in the period 1960-1963 (February 8, 1963, end of Kassem's rule). During this period Sino-Iraqi relations mainly developed in the non-political field.

The Trade, Cultural and Other Relations

Very early in 1959, the Chinese Communists encouraged the development of trade and cultural relations with Iraq.

1. Trade agreements

The first was signed in the beginning of January 1959. It was renewed in the following years (on May 25, 1960; on October 18, 1961; and the last one to be signed under Kassem's régime was on January 18, 1963). In 1959, it was agreed that China would export to Iraq rolled steel, aluminium sheets, machines, machine parts, complete sets of equipment for light industrial plants, telecommunication equipment, electrical installations, tea, and other products. As for Iraq it would export to China such items as dates, hides and skins, wool, cotton, cereals, oil seeds and vegetable oil. In the following years some new items were added to the two lists: various consumer goods from China to Iraq; crude oil, petroleum products and cement from Iraq to China...²⁶

²⁶Al Waqā' al 'Irāqiyyah, No. 15, 1959, No. 89, March 15, 1960, No. 611, Oct. 18, 1961 (In all these documents there is no mention of the quantity and of the value of the goods).

2. Cultural relations

Particular attention was given to the cultural relations and to closer cooperation between the two countries. This was promoted by the creation of a Sino-Iraqi Friendship Association in April 1959. The President of this association was the Inspector-General of Education in Iraq, 'Abbūd Zalzala. The Vice-President was 'Azīz Sharīf (whose name was mixed up with the Mosul events).²⁷ The members of this Association praised the "great Chinese leader Mao-Tse tung," and in his speeches 'Abbūd Zalzala fervently praised the "gigantic role of People's China in the national liberation movements."²⁸ This Association was always in contact with the visiting Chinese delegations especially the cultural ones. Their official receptions were attended by eminent Iraqi political figures, known as friends of China, such as: Colonel Faddīl 'Abbās Al Mhdawī, Kassew's cousin who "on the morning of the execution of nationalist officers, tried by his television court for their part in the Mosul uprisings, left for China to attend the meeting held to celebrate the 10th Anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic."²⁹

Several cultural agreements were signed in the four years following the Revolution. The first one was signed on April 4, 1959 and was

²⁷The other members of the Association were mentioned in Ittihād al-Sha'b (Iraq), April 1, 1959.

²⁸Ibid., April 9, 1959. He also praised the Soviet Union.

²⁹Adie, Polycentrism, op.cit., p. 230.

renewed in the following years. These agreements provided for the exchange of cultural delegations, of experts, professors and students; exchanges of cultural and scientific materials; exhibitions and special television and radio programmes on the respective national days of the two countries. They also stipulated that China would send teachers to teach Chinese in the Baghdad University.⁵⁰

Under the cultural cooperation agreements several Iraqi delegations visited China, as: students' delegation (July 22, 1959; a cultural cooperation delegation (April 4-May 16, 1960); the Iraqi General Union of Students led by its President Mahdī Ahmad Hāfīz (August 20, 1960); a delegation of educationalists (October 30, 1960); a 10 member delegation of Iraqi engineers (January 9, 1961); a basket-ball team (January 15, 1961); an educationalists' delegation invited by the Chinese Ministry of Education (June 28-September 4, 1962).⁵¹

On the other hand, Chinese cultural missions visited Iraq. As in Yemen and Sudan, some Chinese Communist Industrial Exhibitions were held. The Chinese Council for Promotion of International Trade led a delegation to the Chinese economic exhibition which opened in Baghdad on November 5, 1960. The opening was attended by Kassem who declared that "Iraq would follow China's lead in overthrowing imperialism."⁵² As for

⁵⁰Al Waqāi' al 'Irāqiyyah, No. 107 (April 4, 1959), and "Sino-Iraqi Agreement," Peking Review, No. 49 (Dec. 8, 1961), p. 18.

⁵¹"China, the Arab World and Africa," Mizan Newsletter, op.cit., p. 18.

⁵²"Iraq Hails China Accord," New York Times, Nov. 6, 1960.

the students' delegations, there were mainly two: a thirty member youth art group who arrived on July 9, 1960, as guests of the Iraqi government, and a students' delegation, which left in October after attending the Sixth Congress of the International Union of Students.³³

On the National Day celebration in Baghdad on July 14, the Chinese were always represented, while Iraqi military delegations were invited to the 10th Anniversary celebration held in Peking in October.

In brief, trade and cultural relations between Peking and Baghdad under Kassem were developed. This was best illustrated by the continuous exchange of missions between the two capitals.

II. People's China and the Iraqi Ba'thists

Ba'thist seizure of power in Iraq, on February 8, 1963, led to the persecution of the Communists, "Democrats" and Kurds and consequently to the deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union. As for the Sino-Iraqi relations they continued as if nothing happened.

According to the Iraqi Communists more than ten thousand Marxist-Leninist Iraqis were killed, more than seventy thousand Communists and Democrats were imprisoned, and a genocidal war was launched against the Kurds.³⁴ The Chinese Communist reaction to Ba'thist persecutions and their attitude towards this regime were provoked by the Iraqi Communists.

³³Mizan Newsletter, op.cit., p. 18.

³⁴"Agreement Between the Chinese Leaders and the Iraqi Ba'thists Against Peace and National Liberation Movements," Al Nidā' (Beirut), Sept. 27, 1963.

Together with the other Arab Communists who remain pro-Soviet, they denounced Chinese "treason" to the Communist and internationalist cause. Here too, it is extremely difficult to distinguish between the Arab Communists' polemics--for they are publicly siding with the Soviet Union and condemning the Chinese with the same Soviet charges--and the actual Chinese position.

From the Iraqi Communist speeches and articles four main lines of the Chinese Communist policy could be traced:

1. They did not support the "Kurdish National Liberation Movement." This led the Iraqi Communists to accuse them of adopting a negative attitude towards the Kurdish Revolution and of "blessing the criminal acts of Al Sa'di," a prominent Iraqi Ba'thist leader.³⁵ The Iraqi Communists considered them as hypocritical because they "pretended" to uphold national liberation movements while in reality, they have adopted a "shameful", and "infamous" position on that issue. They openly accused them of seeking friendly relations with the Ba'thists ("the engineers of the racial war of aggression") instead of spreading propaganda in favour of the Kurdish Revolution--described as hostile to imperialism, reaction and Fascism--and of furnishing it with material and moral support.³⁶

Another charge addressed to the Chinese leaders in this context is their "silence" about "the genocide" committed against the Kurdish

³⁵"Meeting and Exchange of Views on Present Problems," Al Akhbār (Lebanon), June 7, 1964.

³⁶"Iraqi Communists' Denunciation of Chinese Leadership," Voice of the Iraqi People in Arabic for Iraq, 1400 GMT, April 11, 1964.

people in order not to "embarrass their Ba'thist friends."

2. The Chinese Communists' negative position on the persecution of the Iraqi Communists, aroused the indignation of the latter. The Iraqi Communists questioned the sincerity of "Chinese Internationalism." They maintained that Chinese "evil, immoral, subversive and unbalanced endeavours against the Iraqi Communist Party are as clear as day light." They added that Peking's leaders were not moved by any of their international principles or by sheer courtesy to condemn the Ba'thist crimes or to share the tragedy of the Iraqi Communists, as had the Soviet Communists. They accused them of being unable to conceal their "malicious joy over the plight of the Iraqi Communists," and for concluding behind the scene deals and bargains with the Ba'thist rulers on the fate of Communist Party of Iraq, at the expense of the Party's structure, cadres, principles and unity.³⁷

The Iraqi Communists concluded by wondering whether Chinese disagreement with them excused their support for the "Fascist" Ba'thist and their silence about the "slaughter of the Communists."

3. Their friendly attitude towards the Iraqi Ba'thists was manifested in different ways: While the "horrible massacres" of the Communists and the Kurds were taking place, Peking's leaders "drank toasts to honour the Iraqi diplomatic mission to celebrate the triumph of Fascists over the toiling forces of the people."³⁸ According to

³⁷"Iraqi Communists' Criticism of the Chinese Communists," Voice of the Iraqi People in Arabic for Iraq, 1810 GMT, May 24, 1964.

³⁸Ibid.

the Iraqi Communists, the Chinese referred in their press to the Ba'thist régime in Baghdad as a "revolutionary government,"³⁹ and openly defended in students' organizations, the Ba'thist National Union Organization (in Arabic: *munazzamat al-ittihād al watanī*).⁴⁰

'Azīz Al Hājj, member of the Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party added another argument against the Chinese. The Chinese authorities refused to allow Iraqi students and other Iraqis in Peking to "express their feelings against the Ba'thist persecution of democratic forces."⁴¹

Various incidents of relevance to Ba'thist good relations were reported in Arab Communist articles:

a) The Chinese military attaché's visit to the areas where "atrocities had been committed against the Kurdish people." The most interesting point is that he had "joined" the American, the British and the Pakistani military attachés.⁴²

b) Renewal of the economic and trade agreements and the agreements on cultural and technical cooperation with the Ba'this rulers of Iraq.

³⁹"Chinese Communists Accused of Waging Campaign Against Iraqi Communist Party," The Arab World, Dec. 18, 1963, p. 9.

⁴⁰Voice of the Iraqi People in Arabic for Iraq, 1400 GMT, April 11, 1964.

⁴¹"Chinese Communists Accused of Waging Campaign Against the Iraqi Communist Party," The Arab World, op.cit., p. 9.

⁴²Voice of the Iraqi People, 1810 GMT, op.cit.

The Tass Agency quoted Arabic newspaper (Rose Al Yūsuf) reporting that the Chinese government proposed loans and military aid to the Iraqi Ba'thists.⁴³

c) An Iraqi Ba'thist team of radio and television led by the director of radio and television bureau - which launched an anti-communist campaign, calling for the persecution of the Communists... visited Peking from September 27, 1963, to October 25. The team was invited as honoured guests of the Chinese government.⁴⁴

The Iraqi Communists' charges against the Chinese leaders are not only limited to their cooperation with "Al Sa'di's clique" and the Ba'th ruling party. They also denounced them as the "bearer of the banner of sabotage and division" in the Arab countries as they had already done in Australia, India, Belgium, Brazil, etc...⁴⁵ They argued that the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and the leaders of the Iraqi Ba'th Party had a common denominator: their anti-Soviet policy and their common desire to create tension in the area.

It is true that the Chinese reaction to the anti-Communist campaign launched by the Ba'thists in Iraq was not as explicit as the Soviet one. However, the Chinese could defend themselves against the charge that they kept silent about the massacres, by referring to a

⁴³Al Nida' (Beirut), Sept. 27, 1963, op.cit.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Al Akhbār (Beirut), June 7, 1964.

Renmin Ribao article, quoted in the Peking Review. This is the only article on this issue, written in this weekly periodical about the Ba'thist rule in Iraq.

Although the terms "terror," "brutalities," "massacres" were used in this article, yet, in general, the tone was mild compared with the Soviet and the Arab Communists' one. Whenever there is mention of the "Iraqi authorities' persecution of the patriotic forces," instead of condemning them, the commentator simply exposed the consequences of such acts. He said that "they are not only detrimental to the fundamental interests of the Iraqi nation, but will weaken the Arab peoples' common struggle against imperialism." The Chinese call for "an immediate stop to the arrests and massacre of the Iraqi Communists and other patriotic progressives" was expressed as "the demand of all people of the world who love justice."⁴⁶

As far as the Iraqi Communist Party is concerned, the Chinese Communists put the blame for its breakdown on Khrushchev.⁴⁷ As for the Chinese relations with the Iraqi Ba'thists, they were not in general affected by the fate of the pro-Soviet Iraqi Communists. However, real cooperation was lacking between Peking and Baghdad in 1963, for there is no clear evidence of Chinese loans or military aid, and no extraordinary cultural and trade agreements.

⁴⁶"The Persecution of the Patriots," Peking Review, No. 9, (March 1, 1963), p. 25.

⁴⁷"Peking Accuses Moscow," Al Nahār (Beirut), quoting People's Daily, April 1, 1964.

Conclusion

It is too early to pass a judgement over the Chinese line of policy towards 'Abd al-Salām 'Ārif's régime. Yet, there is ample evidence that Peking is always willing to achieve "closer cooperation" with Baghdad. Exchanges of cultural delegations and military ones on National Day celebrations continue.⁴⁸

Mr. Tsiang Hsi Lin, the Vice President of the Chinese Committee on Cultural Affairs with Foreign Countries, declared that "there is no policy of great powers in the Sino-Iraqi relations...for the links between China and Iraq are based on friendship."⁴⁹ He meant that Chinese policy towards Iraq was not guided by power politics and that the friendship between the two countries survived the different coup d'états. However, this is self-contradictory, for if the Chinese Communists aspire to maintain good relations with every Iraqi social régime that is in power, irrespective of its ideologies (with Kassem, the Ba'thists, 'Ārif, and even with Mūrī al-Saīd if he was willing), the only explanation is that contrary to their official declarations, they pursue some political interest in Iraq.

⁴⁸ "An Iraqi Cultural Mission Visited China," Al Nahār (Beirut), June 2, 1964.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

CHAPTER 7

ALGERIA

I. China's Attitude Towards French Algeria

For all Communists the Algerian war of national liberation led by the "Front de Liberation Nationale" (FLN) during seven years was a classical example of a "just war" against the colonialists. Ever since the Bandung Conference and on different occasions (as at the Cairo Afro-Asian Solidarity Council of 1957--where the FLN was offered a Vice-Presidency--and the Conakry Conference of 1960 ...) the Chinese Communist attitude towards this Revolution remained consistent: they publicly continued to support Algeria's demand for independence.

Undoubtedly the Chinese official commitments to support the Algerian rebels were more outspoken than the other Communist countries, mainly because this was compatible with their ideology on national liberation movement,¹ and because they were not restricted by diplomatic relations with France and did not risk harmful repercussions. This explains why the Chinese government was the first and only Communist one to recognize the "Gouvernement Provisoire de la Republique Algerienne" (GPRA), on September 9, 1958, just after its formation in exile.

¹As we have seen in the first part, the emphasis was on armed struggle.

The Soviet Union which had diplomatic relations with France, interests in Europe, and looked with favour and hope on De Gaulle's independent attitude towards the United States and NATO, (while the Chinese were more pessimistic on the question of wooing the French away from the United States), would wait two years before extending a de facto recognition.

The Chinese position encouraged the GPRA to send several delegations to confer with Peking's leaders on the question of material support: loans and arms. During the four years preceding Algerian independence, five main GPRA delegations visited China; the first taking place after the recognition towards the end of November, was received by Chou En Lai; the second was headed by the GPRA Minister of Armaments and Supply (in April 1959); the third by Ben Youssef Ben Khedda (in October 1959); the fourth by Krim Belkacem (in April 1960), and the fifth by Farhāt 'Abbās (in September 1960). In all these visits arrangements were made for the supply of aid.

China's independent attitude towards this national liberation war was sometimes embarrassing to the Soviets. The Chinese leaders' position on the question of Algerian self-determination and negotiations with France differed from the Soviet one. On September 16, 1959, De Gaulle's proposal of self-determination had different reactions in Algeria, France, China and the Soviet Union. The Algerian Communist Party rejected it as "unacceptable" and was supported by the French Communists. The GPRA was very cautious in the sense that it proposed before the end of September "to negotiate about guarantees for self-

determination and offered to stop fighting if the guarantees were satisfactory."² While the Chinese denounced such proposals as "nothing but a sugar-coated poison pill...,"³ Khrushchev held in his speech to the Supreme Soviet that "De Gaulle's proposals for self-determination, if supported by concrete steps, could play an important role in the settlement of the Algerian question."⁴ He also expressed the hope that negotiations between the two sides would take place and would bring the war to an end. It is evident that Moscow was not advising the FLN to stop fighting in the hope of a negotiated settlement. The Soviets were doing their best to exert pressure on France through the United Nations.⁵ Khrushchev's declarations, however, led the French Communists and the International Communist Movement--except the Chinese, who repeated that De Gaulle's offer was "nothing but a trick from A to Z"--to reverse their position.

In mass rallies, "Imperialist Quit Africa Day" and "Algerian Day" celebrations, the Chinese denounced the French "intrigues" and continued to voice their opposition to a settlement through negotiations. As nothing came out of De Gaulle's proposals, the FLN maintained that they

²Richard Lowenthal, "China," Africa and the Communist World, ed. Zbigniew Brzezinski (California: Stanford University Press. London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 171.

³Ibid., p. 172.

⁴Zagoria, op.cit., p. 272.

⁵Most probably Khrushchev was willing to show good will to the French prior to his visit to France (March, 1960).

would uphold their struggle until they "win true independence." Krim Belkacem was sent in May 1960 to negotiate for increased Chinese aid, and on his return to Cairo he declared that "China was willing to support the Algerian revolution in the military and financial spheres."⁶

However, when Franco-Algerian talks took place at Melun in the Summer of 1960, the Chinese leaders changed the tone of their voice and held that it was a success for the FLN. The French "could not avoid asking for negotiations" and the Chinese, "having supported the FLN's struggle" also "support negotiations as a means to win independence."⁷

After the failure of these talks, the Chinese who had been the least enthusiastic about them, seemed to be right. Khrushchev told the Algerians that he was deeply deceived by General De Gaulle and that he had sincerely believed in the possibility of an entente between the French President and the GPRA. As for the Chinese, whose position was strengthened, they reproached the Algerians for going to Melun and affirmed that the "only victory of Melun is its failure," for if the Algerians have accepted or if the French have made concessions so as to let them accept, the Algerian Revolution would have died.⁸

With the failure of the Melun talks, the GPRA started looking for new means to intensify the struggle. In Peking, where he was invited

⁶Zagoria, op.cit., p. 275.

⁷Peking Review(July 5, 1960), (See Lowenthal, op.cit., p. 175).

⁸Jean Daniel "La Guerre: L'Aide Soviëto-Chinoise," L'Express, 20 Octobre, 1960.

by Chou En Lai to attend the October celebrations, Ferhat Abbās found himself the center of Peking's political interest. He was hailed by thousands of civilians and militia men, and on October 1, he stood at Mao Tse tung's right hand, between the latter and Chou En Lai. In general, the Chinese warm welcome reserved to Algerian, African and visiting nationalist leaders increased the latter's confidence in the justice of their struggle, and in the Chinese support. The Chinese Chairman encouraged the Algerians in their fight when he said: "The stronger you are the more help you will get. China's help to you is total and unconditional. It will take many forms and will increase." However, he added, "you must insist on real and solid independence, not accept any compromise with imperialism but stand firm on principle... The longer the war lasts the more your enemy's position will deteriorate both diplomatically and psychologically..."⁹

The Chinese support and declarations seemed to defy those who maintained that a recognition of this government was premature because it did not hold a definite territory under administrative control. Chou En Lai pointed out that the Algerian struggle had entered a new phase after the establishment of the GPRA and that the FLN had achieved great victories in freeing vast areas in Algeria inhabited by more than half of its population and had established there its own organs of state power.¹⁰

⁹"Mr. Ferhat Abbas' Visit to Peking and Moscow," Keessing's Contemporary Archives, XII (Dec. 24-31, 1960), p. 17852.

¹⁰Isaac Deutscher, "Uneasy Allies," The Reporter, Vol. XLIII (July-December 1960), p. 22.

The question of "internationalization of the Algerian conflict" which was the GPRA's plan after the failure of the negotiations with France, did not find a favourable reaction by the Chinese. By "internationalization" 'Abbās intended an appeal to the United Nations for a referendum in Algeria. Khrushchev advised the Algerians to accept a referendum, even in the presence of the French Army, but controlled by the United Nations.¹¹ However, Chinese suspicion of this international organization and its activities in areas of tension was clearly expressed.¹² An alternative plan for "internationalization" was favoured by the Chinese. At the Afro-Asian Conakry Conference in April 1960, they supported the idea of an "Afro-Asian Volunteer Army" for Algeria--a proposal which would have sanctioned Chinese volunteers into Algeria. However, this was promptly rejected by Mikoyan in a press conference in Baghdad.¹³

The far reaching official Chinese support to the GPRA undoubtedly had its impact on Khrushchev's decision to recognize the Provisional Government while Farhāt 'Abbās was still in Peking. Other incidents should also be noted as relevant to the Soviet recognition: the failure Melun talks, the collapse of the Summit Meeting, the postponement of the Berlin issue, and the talks on October 2, 1960, between Khrushchev and Krim Belkacem, the Foreign Minister of the GPRA who was attending the UN General Assembly in New York. The projected Moscow Conference of

¹¹Daniel, op.cit.

¹²The Chinese Communists condemned the UN forces in the Congo and accused them of Lumumba's death.

¹³Lowenthal, op.cit., p. 176.

December 1960 in which all Communist parties including the Chinese, might be considered as an additional factor. Thus the Soviet recognition, which was a de facto recognition took place two years after the Chinese one. Later on, when polemics between Moscow and Peking were publicly exchanged, this delay was denounced by the Chinese Communist Party's leaders. They criticized the Soviet leaders who "did not dare to recognize" the GPRA for a long time and not until the Algerian victory was assured. They concluded that "this unseemly attitude brought shame on the Socialist countries."¹⁴ Even before Chinese criticisms were publicly pronounced, the Soviet leaders who were embarrassed by the Chinese stress on the question of recognition of the GPRA made it known that the quantity of aid or material support was more important than recognition. Mikoyan was precisely addressing the Chinese when he declared in Iraq that: "We are giving the greatest support to Algeria, even more than do some of the countries which have recognized the Algerian government."¹⁵

In the pre-independence period, and since the start of the Evian talks on May 20, 1961, the Chinese leaders did not exclude the possibility of attaining independence by "means of negotiations" while conducting "armed struggle."¹⁶ Nevertheless one condition should be fulfilled: Al-

¹⁴Apologists of Neo-Colonialism, op.cit., p. 15.

¹⁵Moscow Radio, Home Service, April 18, 1960 (See Zagoria, op.cit., p. 274).

¹⁶"Algerian Diplomatic Mission," Peking Review, No. 21 (May 26, 1961), p. 21.

geria must have "complete independence" and should be completely "decolonized." They rejected Louis Joxe's "association" between Algeria and France, for "it would leave Algeria entirely under French control in the economic, financial, technical cultural and defence fields and would put the Sahara (which comprises four fifth of Algeria's territory) under French control..."¹⁷ In general negotiations with the French, the Melun talks of 1960 and the Evian-Lugrin talks of May and July 1961, were considered by the Chinese as "political chicanery." They continued to back the GPRA's demands for the territorial integrity of Algeria, including the Sahara.

The Extent of Chinese Aid

The aid from the other Communist countries as well as the Chinese aid was appreciated by the Algerian rebels. Mohammad Yazid, the FLN Minister of Information and one of the most pro-Western Algerian leaders remarked: "When you are fighting a life or death battle you take arms wherever you can get them."¹⁸

Peking granted gifts and loans. A "voluntary contribution was made by the Chinese public to the first FLN delegation. This donation amounted to \$172,000."¹⁹ As for the loans, they were interest-free in

¹⁷"Algeria must have Complete Independence," Peking Review, No. 25 (June 23, 1961), p. 23.

¹⁸Edmond Taylor, "The Chinese Invasion of North Africa," The Reporter, XXI (July 21, 1959), p. 32.

¹⁹"The People's Republic of China," Deadline Data on World Affairs, May 7, 1958, p. 43.

convertible currencies (\$10 million is the most frequent given estimate in 1959) "to be repaid after independence."²⁰

The Chinese also made arrangements for supplying the Algerians with arms and military equipment including mortars, heavy machine guns and light anti-aircraft weapons. The main difficulty that faced them was the shipment of arms. It was agreed that they would be shipped to friendly harbors. Another problem had to be solved, namely the smuggling of these arms across the Algerian frontier to the guerrilla groups. The major supply line was through Morocco. It is believed that Rabat-Peking diplomatic relations facilitated the Chinese aid for the FLN. Another consequence is the opening of a Chinese consulate at Ouida, on the Algerian frontier, which was also the principal base of exiled FLN forces in Morocco.²¹ Tunisia's President Bourguiba, who had not established full diplomatic relations with Peking, was known to have raised some objections to the transfer of Chinese arms through his territory.

Arrangements for the training of selected Algerian officers in China were reported to have been made as early as the Spring of 1959.²²

²⁰Lowenthal, *op.cit.*, p. 162. See Philippe Schneyder "Pekin a l'assaut du Tiers Monde" in *Revue Militaire d'Information*, Paris, April 1960. The amount of the Chinese loan was given as 12 million dollars by Premier Kassen when opening the Chinese economic exhibition in Baghdad in November 1960.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 165.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 162.

The New York Times also reported in August 1960 that Algerian volunteers who had been trained in China were ready to fight the French. Other Western sources pointed out that the Chinese had prepared to supply in the Summer of 1960, 1000 technicians who would give instructions to FLN fighters on how to handle the Chinese weapons.²³

Although the GPRA did not accept Chinese volunteers it announced after the failure of the Melun talks its readiness to "accept volunteers from Eastern countries and particularly from Communist China."²⁴ These declarations were aimed at putting pressure on the West and on France and at conveying the impression that such measures might become an actuality.

What was important about the Chinese aid was that they were granted at times when the Algerians were in great need for them. Ferhat Abbas was promised after the failure of the Melun talks "total and unconditional aid." Sino-Algerian talks had remained secret, even after Algerian independence. They could have given us a hint as to the quantity and quality of the Chinese aid. In general the Chinese promised on different occasions to provide the rebels with arms and other aid. Other Communist countries had also taken an active and more concealed part in supplying arms to the FLN. Soviet arms were exported via Czechoslovakia. Albania also served as a transit country. The Chinese aid, which was accompanied with great publicity, had a tremendous psychological effect on the soldiers. It impressed the Algerian fighters

²³Times Herald, July 20, 1960 (See Zagoria, op.cit., p. 275).

²⁴New York Times, December 4, 1960.

who had the tendency to see analogies between the Chinese guerilla warfare and the Algerian struggle, and who "felt close to the Chinese people."²⁵ Apparently, because People's China was a remote country, the Chinese aid was not viewed with distrust and suspicion.

The Significance of the Algerian War

In the Chinese view, the Algerian Revolution has a tremendous significance. It had set "a shining example" or model for all "oppressed nations." It proved their theory that the colonialists "do not abandon their possessions voluntarily and that armed struggle is the most effective means. It also furnished a "fresh proof" that a weak unexperienced and poorly-armed guerrilla force could develop into well-equipped strong guerilla bases."²⁶

It is interesting to note that the Chinese attacks against the "French colonialists" were very frequently diverted to attacks on the "American imperialists." In general, the Chinese Communist leaders, writers and orators have the tendency to implicate the United States in every colonial war. They emphasized that "the Algerian people is not only facing one enemy, French imperialism, but also a more vicious one:

²⁵Djamila Bouhired, an Algerian heroine, declared during her visit to China in March 1963 that "while in prison Algerian fighters pored over books about China...felt close to the Chinese people," Peking Review, No. 13 (March 29, 1963), p. 6.

²⁶Amr Ouzegane, Minister of State, held that Mao Tse tung's books were read by Algerian officers and soldiers in towns and in villages. They wanted to learn from others experiences... "Amitié Sino-Algerienne," Pekin Information, No. 18 (28 Octobre, 1963), p. 4.

²⁶Mao Sun, "Algerien Fight for Freedom," Peking Review, No. 45 (Nov. 10, 1961), p. 10.

American Neo-Colonialism."²⁷ They also argued that the French could not have continued their war in Algeria without the active support of the "U.S.-Led Nato," and that in the period between 1950 and 1960, the military aid to France amounted to \$4,500 million; 75% of the weapons used by the French came from the U.S. and other Nato countries, and under the label of "technicians" U.S. military personnel were stationed on French Air Fields in Algeria. "Any 'sympathetic American pose' they held is an attempt to confuse the people and strangle the Algerian struggle." They backed their arguments by quoting Ben Khedda who said on November 1, 1960, "We have not forgotten that the U.S. stands at the head of Nato. Facts show who are our sincere friends and who are our enemies. We shall never forget this."²⁸

It is true that there was a tactical rapprochement between the Algerian fighters and the Chinese. On the other hand we cannot deny the existence of a left wing among the FLN. Frantz Fanon, one of the FLN theoreticians exposed the doctrines of this wing when he vigorously attacked the ruling parties in underdeveloped countries and emphasized that it was not their example which would inspire the Algerians. On the contrary it was their duty to present the "model of a revolution

²⁷Speech of Liu-Chi Po, Vice President of the Chinese Federal Trade Unions, at the Rally organized on the occasion of "Solidarity with Algeria's Day," The Chinese People Firmly Support the Just Struggle of the African People (in Arabic), (Peking: F.L.P., 1962), p. 108.

²⁸Mao Sun, op.cit., p. 11.

pushed to the end, that is to total decolonization."²⁹ There were also radicals among the FLN who went far in their rapprochement with the Socialist countries and especially with China. From here comes the "legend of a Chinese clan," wrote Christian Hebert in France Observateur. There was an impression especially among Westerners that there existed an important leftist Marxist wing in the FLN. "In reality," Herbert maintained, "those men who went to China and who had talks with the Socialist countries were far from Marxist ideologies. Precisely because they were Muslims, assured of the superiority of Islam over other faiths, they concluded without uneasiness a tactical alliance with the Socialist countries, in order to achieve their objective: a Muslim Algeria purged of all colonial remnants..."⁵⁰

II. China and Independent Algeria

After the achievement of Algerian independence the Chinese made special efforts to maintain very close and friendly relations with the Algerian FLN. The banning of the Communist Party by Ben Bella, on November 25, 1962, or more exactly the licensing of only one party, the

²⁹Franz Fanon, a physician from Antilles, established in Algeria, who then sought refuge in Tunis. He wrote "Les Damnés de la terre." His attacks were vigorously pronounced after the discard of Farhat 'Abbās in 1961 (Ben Khedda became head of the GPRA), and when Franco-Algerian negotiations were started on new basis. He believed that the national bourgeoisie was an unreliable element in the revolution and that the "masses of the peasants in the colonial countries are the only revolutionary force." See Gilles Martinet "La Charte du Jacobinisme Algerien," France Observateur, 30 Novembre 1961, p. 8.

⁵⁰Christian Hebert, "Tendances au Sein du CNRA," France Observateur, 1er Mars, 1962, p. 9.

National Liberation Front, which the Communists could join, but not as groups, was not met by protest from Peking, although the Soviet Communist Party issued a statement expressing "deep regret and anxiety about the ban on the Algerian Communist Party" and warned that this step would "hamper the development of Algeria and give encouragement to the camp of the imperialists and colonialists."³¹ Apparently the pro-Soviet attitude of the Algerian Communist Party, which was closely linked with the French Communist Party, the reversal in the position of both parties which was obviously caused by Khrushchev's attitude following De Gaulle's proposal of self-determination in 1959, are among the main reasons for the Chinese silence. Peking's leaders did not hesitate to publish the criticisms made by the Algerian Minister of State 'Ammār Ouzegan, ex-Communist, and addressed to the leaders of the French and Algerian Communist Parties, who have "vacillated in the revolution or were opposed to it." They also referred to Ouzegan's criticism of the leaders of the Algerian Communist Party who "considered the struggle of the people as adventurous and imprudent" and who preferred to demand social reforms rather than lead the national liberation movement.³² In Chinese phraseology, the Algerian Communist Party danced to the music of Khrushchev's flute and to that of the French Communist Party, this is why they lost the confidence of the Algerian people as well as their role in Algeria's political life.³³ On

³¹"China," Deadline Data on World Affairs, op.cit., p. 183.

³²"Amitié Sino-Algérienne," Peking Information, No. 18 (Oct. 28, 1963), p. 3.

³³Al Nahar (Beirut), April 1, 1964. Quoting the "People's Voice," p. 1.

the other hand, Al 'Arabi Bouhāli, the leader of the Algerian Communist Party remained loyal to Moscow and denounced Chinese activities and "splittism," especially in Afro-Asian conferences.

The Algerian anti-imperialist military and revolutionary spirit is viewed with great satisfaction by the Chinese Communists. Ben Bella is considered by them as more revolutionary than Nasser, although no explicit and direct comparison was pronounced. They do not doubt his anti-imperialist attitude, while they hesitate to trust Nasser in his game between the East and the West. "The position and policy of the Algerian government and people in international affairs" is viewed by the Chinese leaders as "correct" and "highly admired." Independent Algeria is considered by them as "an important pillar of the African people in resisting imperialism..."⁵⁴ No Arab government has been described with such favourable terms.

On the other hand, the Chinese leaders praised and continue to praise the "revolutionary" internal policy of Ben Bella. During his visit to Algeria in December 1963, Chou En Lai acclaimed the achievements of the Algerian government in the "liquidation of the colonial forces," and the realisation of social reforms: the nationalization of all land occupied by the colonialists, the land reform which is going in process, the confiscation of large numbers of colonialist enterprises, the control of foreign trade... "All these correct measures" Chou En Lai held, "show that the Algerian Revolution is irresistably developing in depth. This

⁵⁴"Tenth Anniversary of Algerian Revolution Marked in China," Peking Review, No. 45 (Nov. 6, 1964), p. 9. The quotation is from the speech of Liu Ning-I, Vice Chairman of the China Peace Committee.

gives joy and encouragement to the Chinese people..."³⁵ His recognition and approval of the Algerian policy went as far as to declare: "As the banner of the Cuban revolution is flying over Latin America, so the banner of the Algerian revolution has risen high over the African continent."³⁶

The Chinese appraisal of the Algerian "successes" in consolidating independence, in eliminating "colonialist vestiges" and domestic forces of "reaction," and in developing the national economy and culture were not equivalent to a full recognition of Algerian socialism. The Chinese leader referred to Algerian people's efforts "to push ahead their revolution and to take the socialist road."³⁷ It seems that the Soviets were more lenient on this issue. They applied the Chinese statement on Algerian efforts to become socialist to Egypt, while as we have already mentioned, the Chinese refrained from making public comments on Nasser's socialism. As in the case of Ben Bella's socialism, the Soviet leaders, or more exactly Khrushchev, went further than the Chinese in recognizing Algeria's socialism and its argument as to the non-bourgeois nature of Islam.³⁸

³⁵"Chou En Lai's speech at Algerian Cadres Meeting on December 27, 1963." Hsinhua News Agency Daily Release (Dec. 29, 1963), Cairo Office, p.2. (From the Chinese Embassy in Cairo).

³⁶Ibid., p. 3.

³⁷Siao Ming "Anniversaire de la Révolution Algérienne: la Chine Salue l'Indépendance de l'Algérie," Peking Information, No. 19 (11 Novembre, 1963), p. 19 (See also Ibid., p. 2.).

³⁸Ben Bella held that during the Algerian talks with Khrushchev in Egypt in May 1964, "we explained to our friends that we are at the same time Socialist and Muslim, and that our Islam is a revolutionary religion and not a bourgeois one... Khrushchev and our friends were very understanding and recognized that we are Moslems and Socialists," Al Jaridah (Beirut), May 20, 1964, p. 6.

Premier Chou En Lai who affirmed the Algerian "march along the socialist road under the leadership of Ben Bella and the FLN," believed that the Chinese experience in building socialism might benefit the Algerians "only in principle, because the position in the two countries are not similar."³⁹

The Non-Political Relations

Since Algeria's independence, Sino-Algerian relations are following an upward trend. The Chinese leaders offered gifts, loans and cooperation in the cultural, technical, economic and other fields. Different gifts had been granted: (1) a gift of 9,000 tons of wheat, 3,000 tons of rolled steel and 21 tons of medical supplies, (on August 21, 1962); (2) a gift of 25,572 yuan or about £ 4,000 from the Chinese Red Cross Society (on December 20, 1962); (3) a gift of 200 tents for families of Algerian army (on February 13, 1963); (4) a gift of 20,000 yuan and goods and medicine to value of 80,000 yuan for flood victims (on January 27, 1964, after Chou En Lai's visit to Algeria); (5) a gift for reconstruction of Algiers University Library (April 21, 1964).⁴⁰ Besides the gifts the Chinese extended aid to the Algerian government in a long term interest-free loan of 250 million French Francs, to be repaid from 1970 to 1969. This loan was confirmed during Chou En Lai's visit to Algeria in May 1964.

³⁹ "Premier Chou En Lai Gives Press Conference, December 26, 1963," Hsinhua News Agency Daily Release, op.cit., December 29, 1963, p. 6.

⁴⁰ Mizen Newsletter, VI (No. 5, May, 1964), p. 4.

During two years a stream of delegations flowed from China. More than twenty Chinese missions visited Algeria and more than ten Algerian delegations visited China. Economic, technical and cultural agreements were signed.

In the cultural field, a Week of Chinese Culture was opened in Algeria on July 22, 1963, a Chinese Film Week was held in April 1964. Youth delegations attended the International Union of Students Executive Committee meeting in Algiers in 1963 and 1964. Educational delegations, Chinese Commissions for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, journalist delegations representing "All China Journalists Association," visited Algeria.

On the other hand, two Algerian journalists' delegations were invited to Peking. The first one was headed by Jacques Verges, Director of the Algerian Weekly "Revolution Africaine" and Djamila Bouhired. The second delegation was a guest of the Chinese Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. Other Algerian cultural missions, some of them led by official members, were also invited.⁴¹

In the economic and technical field: a Chinese economic construction exhibition opened in Algiers in August 1963; a team of Chinese experts visited Algeria from October 6, 1963 to January 7, 1964 at the Ministry of Finance's invitation to study industrial and technical conditions. A Petroleum research delegation led by the President of the China Petroleum and Natural Gas Exploration and Exploitation Corporation, spent the whole month of March (1964) as guests of the Ministries of

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 4-5 (All dates are given).

Foreign Affairs and National Economy.

Other Chinese delegations went to Algeria, some at the request of the Algerian government (medical teams were sent in February, April and August, 1965). Different and numerous delegations were exchanged between the two countries: governmental and other groups attended National Day and May Day celebrations in the respective countries; women's, military, jurist and worker delegations were also exchanged...

The flow of visiting groups between Algiers and Peking continues. This reflects the growing faith of the Chinese in the "correctness" of the Algerian policy and China's practical interests in maintaining close ties with Algeria.

Conclusion

In conclusion we can note that although different in many aspects the Algerian and the Chinese wars of "national liberation" had much in common. While in the case of China, it was a civil war between the nationalists and the Communists, it was different in Algeria, for it was directed against an imperialist power and against the French colons, and thus could win greater moral and material support. The common points between the two experiences were: the intensity of the struggle and its length. Add to this the facts that (1) they both started with unorganized, poorly armed guerilla force which developed into a well equipped army (from 5000 it became 130.000 in Algeria, and armies were organized in exile, in Tunisia and Morocco), (2) they both relied on the masses of the peasants.

The Algerian example is often referred to by the Chinese as a justification of their theory that "armed struggle" or force is the decisive factor in liberation wars since the colonialists do not leave their possessions voluntarily. One remark could be mentioned in this context. Algerian armed struggle during seven years was undoubtedly the major factor leading to independence. However, unlike the Chinese Communists' victory which was achieved militarily (as they affirmed on several occasions, since their enemy was defeated and expelled) there was no Algerian military victory, or in other terms no French military defeat in the classical sense, and the Algerian victory was eased through diplomacy and negotiations.

As for Algerian socialism, the FLN insists that it is a unique form. Chou En Lai recognizes that differences exist between the two countries and concludes that "only in principle" could the Chinese experience benefit the Algerians.

CHAPTER 8

THE CHINESE STAND VIS-A-VIS THE PALESTINE PROBLEM

Although Israel was the first Middle-Eastern country to recognize the People's Republic of China in 1949, no diplomatic relations were established. The Chinese did not take a clear position on the Arab-Israeli conflict for all independent Arab countries recognized Chiang Kai Chek's régime. However, at the Bandung Conference in 1955 the Chinese supported Arab national liberation movements. In their view, the Palestine question and the Taiwan question had much in common. They were both created by "foreign intervention" mainly by "American imperialism." Chou En Lai who made this comparison at this Afro-Asian Conference, maintained that the Palestine question could be settled when the outside factors responsible for the "Palestine tragedy" disappeared.¹ He also held that "the problem of the Arab refugees from Palestine remained to be solved."²

From that date on and up to the first Arab Summit Conference-- which met in Cairo in January 1964 and where a new problem came into the

¹"The Bandung Conference," Kessing's Contemporary Archives, (May 7-14, 1955), p. 14181.

²"Main Speech by Premier Chou En Lai Head of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China, Distributed at the Plenary Session of the Afro-Asian Conference," China and the Asian-African Conference (Documents), op.cit., p. 15.

Palestinian picture, that is Arab reaction to Israeli diversion plan of the Jordan River--Chinese views on this issue were announced in the following terms: In creating Israel the imperialists' aim was to interfere in the Arab world's affairs, to safeguard their own interests and to have a base from which attacks against national liberation movements could be launched and "infiltration" in Asia and Africa facilitated. They stressed the role of "American imperialism" and referred to Israel as a "tool" of the latter.

During Chou En Lai's tour in some Arab countries in December 1963 and January 1964, the Chinese support of the Arab cause was expressed without limitations. He affirmed "the support of the People of Palestine in restoring their legitimate rights and in returning to their homeland."³ When the first Arab Summit Conference met in January 1964, the Chinese government was the first in the world to assure the Arab states of its support. President Liu Shao Chi wished the Conference "success in strengthening the Arab Solidarity and ensuring Arab victory in their struggle against Zionist conspiracy." As for Chou En Lai he declared that the "People's Republic of China sincerely supports the stand of the Arab states on the question of diversion of the Jordan River."⁴

While Chou En Lai was touring in North Africa and publicly confirming Chinese support of the Arab cause, Khrushchev's New Year messages

³"Joint Communique of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United Arab Republic," Information Bulletin (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in U.A.R.), Dec. 24, 1964, p. 6.

⁴"Two Cables from China to the Conference," Al Nahār (Beirut), Jan. 14, 1964, p. 1.

to all states--in which he proposed an international agreement whereby states would renounce the use of force for the settlement of territorial or border dispute--had a bearing on the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is evident that Khrushchev had the East-West dispute over Berlin in mind. However, by coincidence or by intention this proposal fitted the Arab-Israeli conflict and timed with the projected Arab Summit Conference. This became evident when Radio Moscow denounced the Israeli diversion scheme, announced that the Arab-Israeli conflict resulted from the stand taken by Israel and the United States and added that this conflict was developing in a manner which increased the danger to peace in the Near-East and that the state of war currently existing between the Arab states and Israel should not develop into a bloody battle.⁵

The Soviet note was considered as an indication of a serious and fundamental change in the Soviet stand towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. This led Ba'thist publications to praise China's stand on Palestine and to denounce the Soviet Union. The Damascus weekly Kifah Al 'Ummal (The Worker's Struggle) published by the Ba'th sponsored Federation of Trade Unions criticized the Soviet Union in connection with a statement made in Paris in mid April by Alexei Adzhukei, editor of Izvestia and Khrushchev's son in law. He had declared that the USSR's peaceful settlement proposal on border conflicts covered the Arab-Israeli problem, and had called for an easing of tension between the Arabs and

⁵The text broadcast by Radio Moscow was published in full in the Lebanese Communist paper, Al Nida', Jan. 14, 1964 (See also the Arab World, Jan. 14, 1964, p. 2.)

Israel.⁶

Arab public opinion was in a way disappointed with Khrushchev's declarations and doubts were raised as to the sincerity of this Communist power in its support of the Arab cause. Questions were also raised as to whether the Soviet Union would risk a world conflict to side with the Arabs in an Arab-Israeli war. On the other hand, the Chinese Communist support to the Arabs seemed to be quite consistent with its anti-imperialist and especially anti-American policy. Unlike the Soviet Union which had in 1947 sided with the Zionists in voting for the partition of Palestine and the creation of Israel and which had relations with the latter, People's China did not have any unhappy experience likely to compromise its support to the Arabs on this issue.

The Chinese support on the Palestine question was manifested in mass rallies in Peking, in March 1964 and were attended by the President of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, Chinese Officials, Arab diplomats and eminent Palestinians' such as Mohamad Khalil and Mohamed Rif'at. The Chinese vigorously attacked continued American support to Israel, American threats to the Arab countries and the declarations of Alexis Johnson, former U.S. Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, to ensure Israel's "security and integrity," and supported the Arab people in their "just struggle."⁷ This mass rally which was held

⁶"China's Stand on Palestine Hailed Soviet Union's Vigorously Attacked," The Arab World, May 7, 1964, p. 2.

⁷"Mass Rally in Peking in Support of the People of Palestine," Hsinhua News Agency Daily Release, March 17, 1964, p.2.

In this article which is about 2600 words, the term "American Imperialism" was mentioned more than fifty times; "France" and "England" were referred to a couple of times; Zionism or Israel was mentioned

as a sign of support of the Arabs against Israel's plans of diversion of the Jordan River turned out to be mainly directed against "American Imperialism". Chinese support of the Arabs and their condemnations of Israel were manifested in terms of condemnation of "American support of Israel's aggressive policy," of "American aid to Israel" and of "criminal acts committed by Israel and American imperialism." Their attacks on Israel were in a way a continuation of their attacks on imperialism (Zionism is viewed as an imperialist movement) and particularly on the U.S.A. as "the head of imperialism" and their enemy number one. In their attacks on American support of Israel, the Chinese leaders went as far as to maintain that if Israel refused to allow the return of the refugees, it was because they were supported by the United States. As for the Arab and Palestinian representatives they did not particularly emphasize the role played by the United States. In their speeches they referred to the Americans, British and Zionists. The Moroccan ambassador seemed to make some rectifications by declaring that the "imperialists" in general were responsible for the existence of Israel. He did not mention the U.S.A. by name but compared Israel and South Vietnam, South Korea and Taiwan, all of which he maintained "cannot exist without imperialist support."⁸

four times and never alone, but always coupled with "American Imperialism." It is interesting to remark that the cable that was sent to the Mass Rally from different Chinese organizations was to express support of the Palestinian People in their struggle against "American Imperialism" and not Zionism and Israel.

⁸"Speeches at the Mass Rally: 'Attack on the U.S. as a 'Common Enemy'," Al Nahār, March 21, 1964, p. 1.

It appears that Peking's leaders wished to surpass the Soviets in reassuring the Arabs of their solidarity by adding to their verbal and public support some effective measures. In fact on May 1, 1964, before Khrushchev's visit to Egypt, the Chinese government announced its decision to execute all the resolutions reached by the "Arab Boycott" and to prohibit any ship, named in the black list, from entering into Chinese water. They explained that this was compatible with the Arab and Chinese "common cooperation and struggle against imperialism and Zionism" and would "secure Arab rights in restoring Palestine."⁹ Once at the Khān ash-Shaykh camp in Syria, the head of the Chinese Muslim delegation, Hajj Muhammad Ali Chang, who was visiting the Palestinian Refugee Camp there, said that "the Chinese people and government were ready to join the Arab people to fight to restore their country." He hoped that he would visit the Palestinians in Palestine after their liberation.¹⁰

Chinese declarations on this issue could not leave the Soviets silent for a long period. Arab doubts about Soviet support were somewhat dissipated during Khrushchev's visit to Egypt, and his public support to the Arabs on Jordan waters got warm praise by Arab public opinion. Khrushchev declared that the Israeli plan to divert the water into the giant Negev Desert was tantamount to "robbing the Arab world

⁹"In Solidarity with the Arabs, China Boycotts Israel," Al Jaridah (Beirut) May 1, 1964, p. 6.

¹⁰"China, the Arab World and Africa," Mizan Newsletter, op.cit., p. 35.

of its own water."¹¹ However compared to the Chinese, Khrushchev's tone was moderate, especially when he held that Israel should carry out United Nations resolutions on Palestine.

Khrushchev's statements provided the Arab Communists with an argument against their critics and a proof of "Soviet friendship." They affirmed that "thanks to this friendship, the state of Zionism has been frozen and has not extended from the Nile to the Euphrates."¹² The Arab Communists, disregarded Chinese support and continued to pay tribute to their great friend the Soviet Union. Their opinions and demands do not differ from those of Moscow's leaders. They portray themselves as champions of the Palestinians' rights, demand the return of the refugees and bid for reparations and end of Israeli repression of the Arab inhabitants. Like the Soviet Union they insist "on the application of the U.N. resolution to secure Arab independence and international peace."¹³

¹¹"Khrushchev for Arabs in Jordan River," New York Herald Tribune, May 12, 1964.

¹²Al Akhbār as quoted in the Arab World, May 11, 1964, p. 7.

¹³"Meeting and Exchange of Views on Present Issues," Al Akhbār (Lebanese Communist paper), June 7, 1964.

According to a Lebanese Communist who wishes to remain anonymous, the Lebanese Communist Party decided to accept only the Palestinians who were born three years after the tragedy of 1948 because the Party "was deceived by many Palestinian members," Khāled Bekhdāsh had expressed his opposition to Palestinian membership because their past was unknown and because some of them were Nasserite. (Interview in April, 1964).

Conclusion

Thus the Soviet desire for peaceful coexistence, détente with the West and peaceful settlement in areas of tension on one hand, the Chinese stress on armed struggle as a means to achieve peace, their refusal to compromise with the imperialists in national liberation wars on the other, have a tremendous impact on the Palestine question. The Chinese support is unlike the Soviet one clear and embarrassing to the Kremlin, which is more cautious in the choice of its terms. Peking's leaders are publicly siding with the Arabs on every Palestinian issue in which an "imperialist" country is involved. Its encouragements to the Palestine Liberation Organization are manifested in different ways. The establishment of this organization as well as all the measures decided by the Second Arab Summit Conference were considered by the Chinese as a sign of "growing Arab Unity against imperialism."¹⁴ The impact of the Chinese support of Palestine's Liberation should not be neglected. It is of great encouragement to the Palestinian Organization. In fact the latter declared that "funds for the Palestinian Entity" would be raised not only in Arab countries but all over the world and in China.¹⁵ Palestinian delegations would be sent to People's China and to the USSR to get "material aid in order to support the Palestinian national libe-

¹⁴"Growing Arab Unity against Imperialism," Peking Review, No. 38 (September 18, 1964), p. 9.

¹⁵"Al Madani Leads the Palestinian Army," Al Hayāt (Beirut) Oct. 12, 1964, p. 1.

ration war practically,"¹⁶ said Ahmed Al Shukayrī, head of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The Chinese position on this problem is starting to worry some Westerners. Mr. Jo Grimmond, the British leader of the Liberal Party, pointed out the danger that might arise in case China championed the rights of the Arabs in the case of an actual Arab-Israeli conflict. He called for a conference of great powers to agree on a policy which would preserve security in the area and would limit the export of arms.¹⁷

A final remark can be noted on the Chinese stand vis-a-vis this problem. The Chinese leaders greatly stress "American Imperialism" and view the issue from only this aspect. They disregard Zionist influence, pressure and activities not only in New York and the U.S.A. but in different parts of the world. They insist on one formula: Israel is a "tool" of American Imperialism--for this coincides with their general anti-American policy. They do not question to what extent the United States is a "tool" of Zionism nor discuss other aspects of the problem.

¹⁶"The Palestine Liberation Organization Sends Two Delegations to Russia and China," Al Jarīdah (Beirut) October 20, 1964, p. 2.

The Sino-Algerian Communiqué, which was issued at the end of Mr. Chou En Lai's second visit to Algeria, on March 31, 1965, confirmed the Chinese support of the Palestinian People's struggle and of its Liberation Organization. "Sino-Algerian Communiqué," Al Jarīdah (Beirut), April 2, 1965, p. 2.

¹⁷"British elections," Al Jarīdah (Beirut), Oct. 3, 1964, p.2.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

This study on Chinese ideology and attitude towards the Arab countries gives us an idea as to the relation between Chinese Communist theory and practice. Although they justify their policy by referring to Marxist-Leninist doctrines, they have not been consistent in putting them into practice. Their theory of struggle against imperialism was generally converted to struggle against their enemy number one, the United States. They have sometimes reshaped their doctrines to fit their policy (while neutralism was viewed as "mere camouflage," it was later on praised and associated with "peace".) In their relations with the "national bourgeois" Arab leaders the Chinese were oscillating between two policies. They have recently developed a friendly attitude towards Arab nationalist leaders although these leaders had banned the Arab Communist parties. It appears that pragmatism guides the Chinese foreign policy at least as much as, if not more than, ideology.

Underlying the relations between the People's Republic of China and the Arab countries are certain key factors that are clues to other factors.

1. Geographic Remoteness

In the past this factor would have been of greater consequences. Because of the advance of technology and annihilation of distance,

its importance has decreased. Nonetheless it remains of relative importance and explains why People's China did not have direct interest in the area. It also explains why unlike the Soviet Union she does not have security worries. Any fundamental change in the Middle East or the Arab world would not produce a change in China. On the other hand, while the United States and the Soviet Union are directly involved in these areas, Communist China's involvement seems to be more limited to South-East Asia.

It should also be noted that China's remoteness and absence of direct interest is today redounding to her advantages in that China comes under less suspicion than nations that are more directly involved in the area.

2. Historically, she has much in common with the Arabs and the Afro-Asians in general. They are all underdeveloped, "have not" countries, have been subject to colonial rule, have waged long struggles to achieve national independence, and have, in varying degrees, distrust of the colonial powers.

3. Internationally, Communist China is relatively isolated from the world. There are still many countries which have not recognized her (European, Latin American, Asian and approximately half of the independent African states); she is also excluded from international organs. Hence because she has no diplomatic commitments, no representation and no interests with some countries (France up to 1963 and Israel) she has a freer hand. On the other hand she is searching by all means for prestige and influence.

4. Ideologically, Chinese Communism, although different from Soviet Communism, seems to be like the latter a competing ideology (in appealing to the masses, peasants proletariat and intelligentsia, and in promising social reforms). On the other hand, there is affinity between modern "liberated" Arab countries and the Communist Bloc, for to a certain respect there are elements in the thinking of these countries that are similar to Communist ideologies: their class view of life; their anti-imperialism; the inevitability of socialism (the Charter of the U.A.R.); and some materialist interpretation of history. However, except for the Ba'thist, the other heads of states insist that Islam is the religion of the state. In this commitment to spiritual value lies the major difference between Arab socialism and Chinese socialism.

5. The Political Factor

The Arab and the underdeveloped world in general is a disputed area between the East and the West. Most of these countries have joined the non-aligned camp. Fearing an East-West détente and a Soviet-American rapprochement, the Chinese hope to win these middle of the road forces and group them into a "Third Force" which will confront the two great powers.

6. The Economic Factor

Although she is an "unsatisfied," a "have not" country and although she has internal economic difficulties to solve and is not receiving aid from outside (the Soviet Union has slowly cut her aid and withdrew her experts), China is extending economic aid to the Arabs and

Afro-Asians. The economic contribution China could offer was marginal. She could not compete with the Soviet aid, this is why the Chinese tried to compensate by increasing the number of visiting delegations. Nevertheless, "combined with Soviet efforts," Chinese aid "might become important in special strategic cases such as China's participation in large scale cotton purchase from Egypt to help finance Egypt's purchase of arms from Russia."¹ In general Chinese aid was coupled with great publicity and was designed to impress the people's mind. Besides their contribution in Yemen--the Hudaydah-San'a' highway--there are no large scale projects to be mentioned.

Trade was one of the means used by the Chinese leaders to consolidate their relations with the Arabs and to win their sympathy: trade agreements have paved the grounds for diplomatic relations; the meat that China exports to Syria, is itself imported from Latin American countries; China proposed in 1955 to buy Egyptian and Syrian cotton which found no outlet.

From China's behavior and pronouncements to date it is impossible to determine to what extent she hopes eventually to find in the Arab states a source of supply for her own economic needs. The present political situation in such countries as Kuwait, Libya and Saudi Arabia makes China's immediate chances of gaining much Arab oil rather slim. Thus perhaps such economic considerations are not yet a factor in her policies toward the area. Yet if these policies of trying to increase anti-imperialist, and specifically anti-U.S. sentiment and to support Arab socialism bear fruit, they may make it easier for China to import oil,

¹Lowenthal, op.cit., p. 157.

which her economy badly needs in the future.

7. The Strategic Factor

China's strategic location in relation to the Arab world is such that she cannot intervene in it with significant power. Therefore her offers or limits of military aid to the Arabs in problems such as those in Algeria and Palestine are more for propaganda than strategic purposes. On the other hand, the Arab world is too remote to offer bases for a very direct threat to her, as for example, South-East Asia does. The Arab states could under unfriendly régimes offer such a threat to the Soviet Union. This may help explain why China can afford to be less cautious in the area than the U.S.S.R. Yet in the long-run anything that weakens Western and especially American influence in the area is bound to be to China's advantage. Her present Arab policies which are aimed at just such a weakening of "imperialist" influence, therefore, make strategic sense for China. Finally, her support of Arab nationalists' demands for the liquidation of the British base in Aden is also in her own strategic interest.

8. The Sino-Soviet Split

The Sino-Soviet split seems to influence to a great extent Sino-Arab relations. In the light of this split, Chinese policy towards the Arab governments finds its significance. The incident of Bakdash's attack on Nasser in Peking in 1959 can easily be interpreted as an attempt by China to embarrass the U.S.S.R. in its policy of giving economic aid to the U.A.R. régime despite its suppression of the local Communists. Simi-

larly, Chinese friendliness to the Ba'th in Iraq at the time of its suppression of the Iraqi Communist Party may be partly explained by the pro-Moscow attitude of that Party.

On the other hand it should be noted that Chinese moral and material support to the Arab countries provokes a counter Soviet support, since the two are competing for friends and influence.

In her relations with the Arab countries the People's Republic of China seems to be guided by three objectives:

1. To establish and consolidate friendly relations with the different Arab régimes irrespective of their ideologies and policies: autocratic Islamic Monarchy (the Yemen under the Imam), socialist, unitary secessionist, national bourgeois or Ba'thist. However, Chinese preference between the Arab states seems to go to Algeria, since Ben Bella's foreign policy was praised as "correct" and his "march towards socialism" was recognized. It remains to be seen whether they will develop a more friendly policy to the ruling Syrian Ba'th than to Nasser.

2. China's second objective is negative since she aims at removing Western influence, by openly opposing military, political and economic blocs that licensed Western intervention in the Arab world. She has condemned the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Baghdad Pact and the South Arabian Federation, and has opposed "imperialist" bases in Aden, Kuwait, Bizerta, etc. She had also denounced "Western economic exploitation of oil" as well as economic aid--considered as means to enslave people.

3. China's third objective became more evident with the widening of the rift between Moscow and Peking. The Chinese are competing with the Soviets among the Arabs and the Afro-Asians for friends and influence: a) in supporting liberation wars especially those over which the Soviets seem to be hesitant (Palestinian liberation movement); b) in trying to win friends and sympathisers against the Soviets in Afro-Asian Conferences (they appealed to some Arab leaders; Nasser and Ben Bella against Soviet membership in the second Afro-Asian Conference); c) in warning against Soviet aid, by stressing self-reliance and complete independence; d) in winning sympathizers among the Arab Communists by encouraging pro-Peking factions and dissident members to split from the local Communist parties.

Thus the Chinese aim could be summarized in two points: First to win friends among the Arabs and second to gain influence by removing Western and Soviet influence.

In return for their freindly attitude they expect to win the sympathy and support of the Arabs: (1) against Chiang Kai Chek, in rejecting and condemning the "two Chinas" concept and in supporting China's admission to the United Nations; (2) against the U.S.A. in intensifying Arab campaigns and opposition to the latter. Finally since they cannot alienate the Arab leaders (especially of those five countries discussed) from the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and India, they hope that these would at least remain neutral in Chinese disputes with the three countries in question.

APPENDIX

I. Morocco

Although a semi-autocratic Islamic Monarchy, Morocco was willing after its independence to establish in November 1958 full diplomatic relations with People's China, not only because of the "comparatively substantial economic effort which made Peking one of its major trading partners"--China signed a \$25 million trade agreement on October 27, 1958--"but also because of its own curiously complicated internal situation:"¹ (1) pressure from the strong left wing nationalist movement (nationalism was kept militant by unsatisfied territorial claims; (2) solidarity of Morocco with the Algerian rebels; (3) competition in nationalist zeal between the King and the democratic political forces. All this led to the establishment of diplomatic relations with China. It is believed that this measure was mainly adopted to facilitate Chinese aid to the Algerian "Front de Liberation National."

Since then Sino-Moroccan relations have been consistently maintained on the basis of a common anti-imperialist front with Moroccan nationalism. In the Summer of 1960, a branch of the New China News Agency (NCNA) was set up in Rabat (in Accra and in Ghana), and was

¹Lowenthal, op.cit., p. 165.

ered by the West as very propagandist and dangerous, "inviting
nds of extreme nationalist organizations to send delegations to
..."²

Although different and numerous missions were and continue to
changed between the two countries, Morocco is not viewed by China
lly "liberated." Chou En Lai has declared in a press conference
Morocco (and Ethiopia) are independent, however, they "are still
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from American influence."⁵

II. Sudan

Following the military coup d'etat of November 1958, the
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In their meetings (in Khartoum when Premier Chou En Lai visited
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²"China and Africa," China Quarterly, I, No. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1960),

⁵"M. Chou En Lai Constate l'Existence d'une 'Excellente
ion Revolutionnaire' en Afrique," Le Monde, 5 Fevrier, 1964, p. 1.

⁴"China, the Arab World and Africa," Mizan Newsletter, op.cit.,

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Although different and numerous missions were and continue to be exchanged between the two countries, Morocco is not viewed by China as really "liberated." Chou En Lai has declared in a press conference that Morocco (and Ethiopia) are independent, however, they "are still controlled by foreign interest." He added that "Morocco has liberated itself from American influence."³

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²"China and Africa," China Quarterly, I, No. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1960), p. 129.

³"M. Chou En Lai Constate l'Existence d'une 'Excellente Situation Révolutionnaire' en Afrique," Le Monde, 5 Février, 1964, p. 1.

⁴"China, the Arab World and Africa," Mizan Newsletter, op.cit., p. 33.

China in May of the same year), the Chinese reiterated their support to the Sudanese policy of peace and non-alignment and to their struggle against imperialism.

III. Tunisia

It had twice made a decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communists, once in August 1957 and the other time in November 1958. Although it signed in November 1960 a trade protocol with Peking's government, full diplomatic relations were only established after Chou En Lai's visit to Tunis in January 1964. The Chinese had in July 1961 supported Tunisia's "struggle to recover the Bizerta military base" and held that the "maintenance of a huge French military base constitutes a grave threat to Algeria." Bizerta was viewed by them as a U.S. and Nato base for "aggression against the Middle East and North Africa."⁵ On October 27, a Chinese gift of medical equipment and medicine worth 60,000 Yuan has been sent to Bizerta for the relief of victims of French attack.⁶

The Tunisian recognition which followed Chou En Lai's visit to North African countries, timed with the French recognition. Moreover such a policy was more compatible with the so called "Socialist" trend Bourguiba was projecting--the new name he gave to his party was "The

⁵"Hands of Tunisia," Peking Review, No. 30 (July 28, 1961), pp. 8-9.

⁶"Support for Tunisian People," Peking Review, No. 43 (Oct. 27, 1961), p. 27.

Socialist Neo-Destour Party" (al Hisb al Dashtūrī al Ishtirākī). In criticizing the Chinese and pointing out the differences in views, Bourguiba was reassuring the West that this recognition was just formal.⁷

⁷Bourguiba "frankly" told Chou En Lai that he did not agree with the Chinese attitude towards the U.N. and the Chinese use of force in settling boundary problem. "Bourguiba Criticizes Chinese Policy...", Al Jarīdah (Beirut), January 11, 1964, p. 6.

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