NEHRU'S CHINA POLICY

by

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PREFACE

The Chinese attack on India in 1962 was a great shock to Nehru. It represented the failure of his China.policy. The present study tries to describe and analyze Nehru's attitude towards China during the entire period, from the establishment of the People's Republic to the death of Nehru. It is descriptive rather than critical.

The main sources of this study are Nehru's speeches and India's governmental publications. It is to be regretted that non-availability of Chinese sources restricted the present study to India's position. No effort has been made to view the question from Chinese standpoint. It is, therefore, worthwhile to continue the investigation on the basis of Chinese sources.

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I. FROM KMT CHINA TO THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION

Nehru and KMT China. Before the independence of India and the Communist revolution in China, Nehru sympathized with Kou-Min-Tang (KMT) China. As a national revolutionary leader, Nehru felt affiliated with the Chinese by virtue of their common struggle against Imperialism. Although both countries were pre-occupied with their domestic affairs and the relations between them were indirect, Nehru tried to develop friendly relations.

The International Congress against Imperialism was held at Brussels in February 1927. Jawaharlal Nehru was appointed the Indian Congress representative. The Congress provided Nehru the first opportunity for direct contact with the Chinese leaders. Madame Sun Yet-sen represented the Chinese Kou-Min-Tang and both Nehru and Madame Sun were included among the five honory presidents of the organization established by the Congress, Council of the League against Imperialism.[1]

The Congress drew up a resolution in the form of

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[1] J. Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography (London: The Bodley Head, 1958 reprinted), p. 161.

a joint declaration by the Chinese and Indian delegates, referring to "the most intimate cultural ties" which had "united the two countries for more than three thousand years" before the advent of British rule in India, and emphasized the need for their revival. It condemned the British use of Indian men and money against the Chinese people and expressed the hope that the Indian leaders would co-ordinate their struggle with that of the Chinese by providing active support to China thus assuring the final victory of both India and China.[1] Both Nehru's and Indian National Congress's attitude toward KMT China followed the lines established in this declaration. During 1927 and 1928, the Indian Congress several times sent its "warmest greetings" to the Chinese people, and strongly criticised the use of Indian troops against them.[2]

On the other hand, Nehru believed that the Chinese attitude toward India would be nothing but peaceful. In 1931, Nehru wrote at some length in Gandhi's weekly, Young India, analyzing the problems of India's defence. He predicted that China would be occupied with her own difficulties for a long time, and stated that it was difficult to imagine that India's relations with her would be anything but friendly. To him, only Afganistan and

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[1] J. Nehru, "Report on the International Congress Against Imperialism held at Brussels", The India National Congress, 1927(Madras: The All Indian Congress Committee, 1928), pp. 61-78.

[2] Bimla, Prasad, The Origin of Indian Foreign Policy (2nd. edition, Calcutta: Bookland Privat LMT., 1962), pp. 81-2.

Russia remained as potential threats to India.[1]

Under the leadership of Nehru, the Congress even more actively supported China when she was invaded by Japanese in 1937. In October of that year, the All Indian Congress Committee viewed, according to Bimla Prasad, with "grave concern and horror", the Imperialist aggression of Japan, and applauded the solidarity of the Indian people with the Chinese people. It also called upon the Indian people to boycott Japanese goods.[2] When the Congress held its annual session in February 1938, it again condemned the Japanese aggression and called for a boycott.[3] June 12, 1938 was celebrated throughout India as China Day. Meetings and demonstrations in rural as well as urban areas avowed sympathy with the Chinese people and at several places Indian Congress and Chinese flags were unfurled together as a token of the solidarity of the two countries.[4]

On 1 September 1938, an ambulance unit consisting of five doctors was sent to China. This action of the Congress was very much appreciated by all sections of the

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[1] Young India, September 24, & October 1, 1931, cited by Bimla Prasad, ibid.

[2] Indian National Congress, 1936-37, p. 15, cited by Bimla Prasad, ibid., p. 137.

[3] Report of the Fifty-First Indian National Congress, pp. 189-199, cited by Bimla Prasad, ibid., pp. 137-138.

[4] Foreign Department Newsletter, June 23, 1938, cited in Bimla Prasad, ibid., p. 138.

Chinese people. In a message to Nehru in March 1939, Shelly Wang, of the Chinese Foreign Office at Chungking, mentioned the Indian medical unit and wrote that it was working indefatigably.[1] The unit was attached to the Eighth Route Army under Communist command whose leader, Mao Tse-tung, also informed Nehru of his appreciation and conveyed thanks to the Indian people.[2] At its annual session in March 1939, the Congress again sent greetings to the Chinese people and congratulated them on their heroic resistance.[3] The imperialist pressure seemed to have created feelings of fraternity between the Indian and the Chinese people.

The high point of Indian-Chinese relations in this period came in the summer of 1939 when Nehru, who had long wanted to visit China, spent a fortnight as the guest of the Chinese Government, staying for the most part in Chungking. He met all kinds of people, official as well as non-official, and was treated with great hospitality wherever he went. The Chinese people seemed to him anxious and eager for the friendship of the Indian people. This greatly pleased Nehru, for friendship between them was his heart's desire. Concerning the Kou-Min-Tang, Nehru said: "It is very complicated and I have

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[1] The Hindu, March 10, 1939, cited by Prasad, ibid., pp. 138-139.

[2] The Hindu, 11 July, 1939, cited by Prasad, ibid., p. 139.

[3] Report of the Fifty-Second Indian National Congress, pp. 84-85, cited by Prasad, ibid., p. 139.

still the foggiest notion of how it is formed and how it functions. I did gather, however, that it was not a very democratic body, though it calls itself democratic."[1]

He was enthusiastic about Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek. He met them many times and discussed the present and the future of India and China. He found, to his joy, that his desire for closer relations between them was fully shared by China's leaders and more especially by "that great man who had become the symbol of China's unity and her determination to be free." Nehru was extremely satisfied with the trip. He wrote that those two weeks were "memorable ones," both for himself personally, and for the future relations of India and China. He returned to India an even greater admirer of China and the Chinese people, with a picture of a future federation including China, India, Burma and Ceylon in his heart.[2]

Nehru's feeling of solidarity with China continued. He wrote in an article in April 1940 that there could be "no stable order, or effective co-

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[1] J. Nehru, China, Spain, and the War; Essays and Writings (Allahabad: Kitabistan, 1940), pp. 21-53.

[2] J. Nehru, Toward Freedom: the Autobiography of Jawaharlal Nehru (New York: Jhon Day, 1941), p. 367.

operation" in the world if China and India were ignored, not only because of "the vast numbers of human beings" of the two countries, of their "rich past heritage", but because of their "enormous resources and potential political and economic strength." China and India would have "a powerful effect on the shape of things to come", whatever that shape might be, and what happened in China would affect India.[1] China and India would and should go hand in hand.

Chinese leaders voiced the same sentiments. Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, on behalf of the Eight Route Army, expressing their appreciation of the moral support and the medical mission the Congress had given, declared that the great Indian people and the Chinese had "a common destiny." Both peoples had "the glorious tradition of fighting for liberty and freedom." Furthermore, the emancipation of all the two peoples would be the signal of the emancipation of all the down-trodden and oppressed.[2] One could assume that Nehru thought Mao Tse-tung had met him on the same ground.

The bonds with China were further strengthened by the official visit of Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek in February 1942 to India. They arrived on February 10, as the guests of the Government of India

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[1] J. Nehru, "India's Demand and Britain's Answer", Atlantic Monthly, (April, 1940), cited by Prasad, op. cit., pp. 187-188.

[2] Foreign Department, Newsletter, 18 July 1940, cited by Bimla Prasad, ibid., pp. 188-189.

and had long and cordial talks with both Gandhi and Nehru, particularly with the latter. It was officially stated in India on February 17 that Chiang's main objects in India were: to discuss arrangements by which India would become an important supply route to China in the event of the Burma Road being cut; to consider the joint defence of Burma, India and China; and to make a personal appeal to Indian political leaders to join China and the Allies in the struggle against the German and Japanese menace. On February 19, the following official statement was issued in Chungking: "Concrete measures were decided upon for the transportation of supplies direct from India to China...."[1]

Chiang was enthusiastically welcomed by all sections of the Indian population and by all shades of Indian political opinion. Speaking at a mass rally in New Dehli on February 12, Nehru said that he had discussed with Chiang the Indian situation, emphasized the affinities between the ancient Indian and Chinese civilizations, and outlined a plan for a federation embracing India, China, Persia and smaller countries, with the object of maintaining their independence and contributing to world peace.[2]

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[1] Keesing's Comtemporary Archives, (Keesing's Publication Limited, London), IV 1940-43, p. 5053.

[2] Ibid.

In his farewell message, the Generalissimo emphasized the centuries-old friendship between India and China and declared that they had not only identical interests, but the same destiny. In order to enable India to play her proper part in the world conflict, he appealed on the one hand to the Indian people to join China, Great Britain, the United States, and Russia to participate in the struggle for the survival of the free world, and on the other hand to the British Government to give Indians real political power as speedily as possible.[1] This greatly pleased the Congress leaders, especially Nehru. The bonds that tied India and China, wrote Nehru, grew stronger, and so did the desire to line up with China and other nations against the common adversary.[2] Nehru also reciprocated by paying tribute to Chiang as "a remarkable man who had proved himself a very great leader and captain in war."[3]

After Chiang's visit, the official communication between the two countries improved. Chungking announced on April 1, 1942, the appointment of Mr. Shen Shin-hwa as first Chinese High Commissioner. At New Delhi, on April 6, 1942, Sir M. Zafrulla Khan was appointed first Indian representative in China with the rank of Agent-General.[4]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] J. Nehru, The Discovery of India (New York: John Day, 1946), pp. 457-458.

[3] J. Nehru, Before and after Independence, ed. J. S. Bright (New Delhi: Indian Printing Works, 1950), p. 216.

[4] Keesing's Comtemporary Archives, op. cit., IV, (1940-43), p. 5126.

On October 22, 1946, it was announced in New Delhi that the Governments of India and China would raise their diplomatic missions to the rank of Embassies.[1] In April 1948, the first Indian Ambassador, K. M. Panikkar, arrived in China.[2]

On 1 September 1946, the new Interim Government of India was announced, with Nehru as Vice-President and Viceroy Lord Wavell as President.[3] In his broadcast as Vice-President of the Interim National Government, Nehru once again praised China as "a mighty country with a mighty past" who "had been India's friend through the ages", and predicted that friendship would "endure and grow".[4]

However, between the establishment of the Interim Government in September 1946 and December 1949, several points of friction arose. At the Asian Relations Conference, presided over by Nehru in New Delhi in March 1947, the KMT delegates objected to the display of a map of Asia in which Tibet was shown to be a territory outside China, and had the map removed.[5]

There was another friction concerning Tibet. The

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[1] Ibid., vol. VI 1946-48, p. 8246C.

[2] K. M. Panikkar, In Two Chinas, Memoirs of a Diplomat (London: George Allen & Unwen Ltd., 1955), p. 18.

[3] Keesing's Comtemporary Archives, op. cit. Vol. VI 1946-48, p. 8107.

[4] J. Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, September 1946-May 1949 (Government of India: The Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1958), vol. I , p. 4.

[5] Kurunakar Gupta, "India-China Relations", Seminar, No. 50 (October, 1963), p. 14.

Chinese Ambassador in India complained to the Indian Government against the continuation of the services in Tibet of Hugh Richardson, a champion of Tibetan independence, who was formerly the Officer-in-Charge of the British Mission and who was regarded by China as persona non grata. The Government of India continued the services of this controversial British citizen in the then Indian Mission in Lhasa until 1949.[1] A border dispute also took place. In November 1949, the KMT Ambassador sent a note objecting to the boundary of Kashmir shown in a map incorporated in a documentary film.[2]

The Government of India was not pleased with the attitude of KMT China in the Security Council towards the Kashmir question. KMT China took a lukewarm attitude towards the Indian complaint in the Security Council about the tribal invasion of Kashmir, and Pakistan's complicity in it. On the issue of Dutch aggression in Indonesia, against which India tried to mobilise Asian opinion as well as to move the Security Council, KMT China failed to respond favourably. On the other hand, the big-brotherly attitude shown by some KMT diplomats

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[1] Ibid.
[2] Ibid.

toward Indian delegates in U. N. and elsewhere was irritating.[1]

The various frictions illustrated above were only introductory. The serious conflicts started when the new Communist regime was established at the end of 1949. The Tibetan disputes, the border clashes, and the Chinese seat in the Security Council will be discussed in detail in the following chapters.

Nehru's reactions to the Communist revolution.

K. M. Panikkar, the first Indian Ambassador to China, arrived in Nanking in April 1948, at a turning point in the history of the Kou-Min-Tang. Only a year later, the KMT Government, shifted to Canton. The Communist occupied Nanking in April 1949.

K. M. Panikkar, the appointee of Nehru and his foreign affairs adviser, a strange, unstable, brilliant man, from the start fully supported the Communist Government.[2] His attitude towards the KMT and the Communist Governments was similar to that of Nehru. Perhaps Panikkar had influenced Nehru's attitude toward the Communist revolution.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Chester Bowles, Ambassador's Report (New York: Harper, 1954), p. 222.

While the negotiations between the KMT delegates and the Communists were still going on in Peking, Panikkar returned to India for instructions about what he should do in case the Communists occupied Nanking. He believed that Chinese public opinion, including South China, from where the strength of the KMT came, favoured the Communists, that KMT soldiers were weary of fighting, and that the provincial war lords were drifting towards the Communists.[1]

As for the KMT Government, Panikkar criticised the patronizing big-brotherly attitude of Chinese officials towards India. Independence of India was welcomed to the KMT, wrote Panikkar, but of course it was understood that China, as the recognized Great Power in the East, expected India after the war to know her place.[2] As for Chiang Kai-shek himself, Panikkar described him as "a man of a forceful personality, a man of determination and character, but hard and self-centered with a streak of cruelty." In contrast, Mao Tse-tung was "pleasant, benevolent and kind." Though Mao had experienced "many hardships and endured tremendous sufferings", his face showed "no signs of bitterness, cruelty or sorrow." In fact Mao Tse-tung gave him "the impression of a philosophical mind, a

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[1] Panikkar, op. cit., pp. 46-47.
[2] Ibid., p. 27.

little dreamy but absolutely sure of itself."[1] Unable to meet the Chinese leaders himself, Nehru's personal opinion about them was affected by his Ambassador.

Like Panikkar, Nehru was not only sympathetic to, but also admiring of, Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary movement, which, he estimated, had a background of twenty-five years of struggle. Particularly, he greatly praised the "Long March" which meant "being hunted, being harassed, with many people collapsing and some surviving"[2] in China, and their fight against the Japanese invasion.[3] Nehru also complimented the revolution which had given China a strong centralized government. For more than forty years since the end of the Manchu dynasty, Nehru told the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches at Lucknow, China had been continually in civil war. The Communist revolution had unified China at last.[4]

Nehru believed in the teachings of Marx. In the early 1930s, while he was in prison, he wrote that he had "long been drawn to socialism and Communism", that the Communist philosophy of life gave him "comfort and hope", and that the theory and philosophy of Marxism had "lightened

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[1] Ibid., pp. 81-82.

[2] J. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op. cit. p. 309.

[3] K. P. Karunakarn, India in World Affairs, 1950-1953 (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 77.

[4] J. Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiogrphy, op. cit. pp. 361-365.

up many a corner of his mind." In India, only a "revolutionary plan" of Communism or socialism could solve the major problem.[1] Nehru even took a favourable view to Chinese Communism. In pre-Communist days, Nehru had written about China's "traditional freedom from dogma", and "her reliance on reason and common sense." He assumed that the old "flexibility of the mind", which he found among Chinese more than among any other people, would ultimately break through the rigid Communist doctrines.[2] Nehru was "genuinely convinced" that Chinese civilization was too old and too deeply rooted to succumb to Marxism, and that the Chinese Communists would adapt Marxism to suit Chinese needs and traditions.[3] Sharing a similar viewpoint, Panikkar wrote that Mao Tse-tung, who was well read in the literature of China and who had received same Buddhist training, would have something more than the dry theories of Marxism in his mental make-up.[4] Both Nehru and Panikkar believed that the Communist revolution was going to serve China well.

Nehru's views on the Communist revolution was expressed clearly in a speech to Lok Sabha on November

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[1] J. Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography, op. cit., pp. 361-365.

[2] Bowles, op. cit., p. 222.

[3] Michael Brecher, Nehru, A Political Biogrphy (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 590.

[4] Panikkar, op. cit., p. 82.

27, 1959:"It was perfectly clear that this revolution was not some kind of palace revolution. It was a basic revolution involving millions and millions of human beings. It was a stable revolution with strength behind it and popularity behind it at that time, whatever might have happened later."[1] As far as the national revolution in a general sense was concerned, Nehru regarded it as "a domestic affair." It was for China itself to decide who should rule. "Our liking it or disliking it had nothing to do with it. Naturally, we came to the decision that this Government should be recognized."[2]

The recognition of Communist China, December 31, 1949. The Central Government of the People's Republic of China was proclaimed on the 1 October 1949. When the new Government sent its communication inviting the establishment of diplomatic relations, Nehru replied in two days in very friendly terms, indicating that there would be early recognition and exchange of representatives.[3] Panikkar was sent back by Nehru as the Ambassador to the new regime in November 1949, though some of the chief permanent officials in the Foreign Office were opposed to his appointment on the ground that it would be against protocol to

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[1] J. Nehru, India-China Relations (Government of India: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, the Publications Division, 1959), p. 11.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Panikkar, op. cit., p. 61.

send up his name in view of the fact that he had already been Ambassador to the KMT regime.[1]

In India, although there was no difference of opinion about the necessity of recognizing the new China, there was a difference of opinion among the leaders about its timing. The more conservative members of the Congress leadership, supported by a powerful section of the Civil Service, including some of the senior officials of the Foreign Office, wanted to proceed slowly. Nehru, however, in a speech to the Indian Parliament, said that Communist China should not be given a sense of isolation from the rest of the world and that she should be encouraged to resume normal relations with other countries.[2] During his visit to Britain and America in October 1949, Nehru pleaded with both governments for an early recognition of the new regime, for he considered it to be a stable regime enjoying the allegiance of a vast body of the population in China.[3]

The first country to recognize the Communist regime as the legal government of China was the Soviet Union, which did so on 2 October 1949. Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Czecholovakia, and Yugoslavia immediately fol-

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[1] Ibid., p. 67.
[2] Karunakaran, op. cit., pp. 77-78.
[3] Gupta, op. cit., p. 15.

lowed.[1] The first non-Communist country which recognized Communist China was Burma, which did so on December 9, 1949. Burma was anxious that it should be the first state outside the Soviet bloc to recognize the new China, and India was approached with a request to wait for a few days in order to give Burma the start. India recognized the new regime on 31 December 1949.[2] By the middle of January 1950, the Peking Government had received the recognition of the major Asian States: Burma, India Pakistan, Ceylon, Israel and Afghanistan.[3] From January 1950, the Government of India consistently pleaded in the U. N. that the People's Republic of China be seated as a permanent member of the Security Council in place of the KMT China. This will be elaborated in Chapter VIII.

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[1] Keesing's Comtemporary Archives, op. cit., vol. VII 1948-50, p. 10443.

[2] Panikkar, op. cit., pp. 68-69.

[3] Keesing's Comtemporary Archives, op. cit.

II. THE TIBETAN DISPUTE, 1950-51

The ambiguous status of Tibet. In the first half of the 8th century the "first-ever" treaty was signed between Tibet and China. China became the "Maternal Uncle", and Tibet became "the Nephew". They "agreed to unite their kingdoms" in heart and mind, but not by political boundaries.[1] The temporal power of the Lamas, or the priests, in Tibet began in the 13th century, when Kublei Khan, the first Mongol Emperor of China, granted rights, sometimes referred to as soveriegn rights, in Tibet to a Tibetan Lama.[2] In 1640 the Mongols, then ruling China, established in Tibet the Fifth Dalai Lama, or the Fifth Grand Lama, as the sole indigenous authority with both temporal and spiritual power.[3] In 1652 the first Manchu Emperor of China invited the Fifth Dalai Lama to China and received him as

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[1] Chnakya Sen (ed.), Tibet Disappears; A Documentary History of Tibet's International Status, the Great Rebellion and Its Aftermath (Bombay, London, New York: Asia Publishing House, 1960), p. 33.

[2] Peter Calvocoressi, and others, Survey of International Affaris 1949-1950, (London: Oxford University Press), p. 366.

[3] International Commission of Jurists, The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law (Geneva, 1959), p. 75.

King of Tibet.[1]

The period of direct Chinese interference and control in Tibet began in 1720, when the Chinese, after helping the Tibetans expel the Mongols, stationed a garrison and two Chinese representatives, called Ambans, in Lhasa,[2] who exerted considerable temporal authority.[3]

Towards the end of the 19th century the British Government of India wanted to trade with Tibet. Various small border disputes had arisen between the Tibetan and the British in the Himalayas. Britain had to decide whether to negotiate these matters with Tibet itself or with China. In 1893 Britain signed a convention with China fixing the boundary and giving Britain trading rights in Southern Tibet. The Tibetan Government refused to honor the convention of which it was not a party.[4]

The British became increasingly irritated. Lord Curzon, the British Viceroy of India, sent a military force to Lhasa in 1903, and defeated the Tibetan army. In 1904 Britain signed a convention with Tibet confirming the boundary and trading rights. It was also agreed that no foreign power should be allowed to intervene in Tibetan

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[1] Ibid.; Calvocoressi, op. cit. p. 366.

[2] Calvocoressi, op. cit. p. 366.

[3] International Commission of Jurists, op. cit. p. 75.

[4] David Howarth(ed.), My Land and My People: The Autobiography of His Holiness the Dalai Lama(Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962), p. 66.

[5] Ibid. p. 67.

affairs without the consent of the British Government. China was not mentioned in the document.[1] The Chinese were in no position to effect the concessions granted in 1893, and the British resumed these concessions from the Tibetan Government in 1904. There was left "small room for doubt" that the Tibetan Government could at this time "act independently of China without let or hindrance."[2]

Nevertheless, Chinese suzerainty was still recognized by some countries. In 1906 British Government honored the Chinese position by signing an agreement with China ratifying the Anglo-Tibetan convention. In 1907 Britain and Russia signed an agreement in which they both undertook not to interfere in Tibet, and to negotiate with Tibet only through China. According the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, suzerainty was "perhaps the nearest western political term to describe the relationship between Tibet and China from 1720 to 1890", but, to him the term was not very accurate. It did not take into account the reciprocal spiritual relationship, or recognize that the relationship was a personal matter between the Dalai Lama and the Manchu Emperor.[3]

In 1908 the trade matters were once again discussed

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[1] Ibid. [2] International Commission of Jurists op. cit. pp. 77-79.

[3] Howarth, op. cit. p. 68.

and re-settled in negotiations at which the British and Chinese appeared as plenipotentiaries and the Tibetans appeared as subordinates to the Chinese. Both the position of the signatories and the content of the Trade Regulations indicate that the Chinese had established their authority in Tibet. The International Commission of Jurists concluded: "It would seem that the status of Tibet at this time was something akin to a Protectorate."[1]

In 1910 China invaded Tibet. The 13th Dalai Lama fled to India and Tibet was occupied.[2] The autumn of 1911 saw the end of the Manchu dynasty and the national revolution in China. In 1912 the Tibetans drove the Chinese troops, together with the Ambans, out of the "country". Tibet became "completely indpendent", and from 1912 until the Chinese invasion in 1950, "neither the Chinese nor any other state had any power whatever in Tibet".[3] Although on 21 April 1912 the President of the Republic of China, Yuan Shih-kai, declared Tibet a province of China, the British Government was not willing to recognize the subjection of Tibet.[4]

The Chinese were no longer in Tibet, and there is "strong presumption that the old suzerainty vassal relationship disappeared with the overthrow of the personal suzerain." The International Commission of Jurists held

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[1] International Commission of Jurists, op. cit. pp. 82-83.

[2] Ibid. p. 83.

[3] Howarth, op. cit. p. 69.

[4] I.C.J., op. cit. p. 84.

[5] Ibid. p. 85.

that Tibet's position could "fairly be described as one of de facto independence" and said that there are "strong legal grounds" for thinking that any form of legal subservience to China had vanished.[1]

The British wanted to formally set the northern border and invited the Chinese and the Tibetans to a tripartite conference at Simla, in India, on 13 October 1913. The Chinese Government refused to sign the convention and it was signed on 3 July 1914 by Britain and Tibet only. The convention declared that "so long as the Government of China withholds signature of the aforsaid convention she will be debarred from the enjoyment of all privileges accruing therefrom."[2]

The Simla Convention established the international status of Tibet for a long period. Chinese suzerainty was accepted by Britain, Russia and the United States; but, within this suzerainty, Tibet was autonomous. If there were a Chinese mission in Lhasa, so must there be a British mission also. Tibet was divided into Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. China would not convert Tibet into a province. Great Britain could not annex it or any portion of it. The Fourteenth Dalai Lama, commenting on the convention, said, "China never signed it, and so never claimed su-

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[1] Ibid. p.85. [2] Ibid., p.86.

zerainty in this legal form."[1]

In 1928 the KMT Government of China sent a mission to Lhasa inviting Tibet to join the Chinese Republic, but the invitation was ignored.[2] In 1931 China again declared Tibet to be a province of China.[3] Hostilities between the Tibetan and Chinese Nationalist Governments occurred in 1931 and in 1932, as the KMT China tried to assert authority over the territories of Amdo and Kham, where the Tibetan recognized the Lhasa Government. In 1934 a Chinese mission was sent to Lhasa in connection with the death of the 13th Dalai Lama, and remained there until the Communist victory in China in 1949.[4]

Though the Chinese Government continued to insist that Tibet was part of China, the 14th Dalai Lama asserted that for 38 years Tibet had pursued her independent way. Tibet took no part in the Sino-Japanese war, and in the Second World War she remained neutral and refused to allow the transport of war material through Tibetan territory. In 1947 when the conference of all Asian countries was held in Delhi, the Tibetan flag flew among the flags of the other nations. In 1948 a trade delegation from Tibet visited India, China, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and the passports which the Tibetan Government had issued to the dele-

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[1]Howarth, op. cit. p. 70. [2]Calvocoressi, op. cit. p. 368.
[3]I.C.J. op. cit. p. 88. [4]Calvocoressi, op. cit. p. 368.

gates were accepted by the governments of all these countries. Though there was a Chinese mission in Lhasa from 1934, its position was "exactly the same as those of Nepal and Britain". In 1949 the Chinese mission was expelled from the country.[1]

Despite continued Tibetan resistance to Chinese attempts to assert authority in Lhasa, the Chinese continued to view Tibet as a province of China. The Chinese claimed that in 1946 Tibet participated in the Chinese National Assembly drafting a Chinese Constitution including Tibet in the Chinese territory. Tibetans were present in the Chinese National Assembly in 1948, but there is no evidence that they were authorized by the Lhasa Government. When the Chinese Communists completed the establishment of an "apparently stable control of mainland China", the Lhasa Government did not regard itself as a subordinate of Peking, and the people of Tibet were loyal to Lhasa."[2]

China marches into Tibet. When the Chinese Communists assumed power towards the end of 1949, they proclaimed Tibet an integral part of China. On 1 January 1950 Peking declared the "liberation" of Tibet as one of the basic tasks of the People's Liberation Army. The Chinese were suspicious about alien activities in Tibet

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[1]Howarth, op. cit. pp. 70-71.

[2]Calvocoressi, op. cit. pp. 307-308.

and disliked the Tibetan repudiation of Chinese authority. India was thought to be invloved.[1]

The Government of Tibet appealed to various countries for help against China but received no concrete assistance. The Indian Government replied that they would not give Tibet military help and advised the Tibetans not to offer any armed resistence, but to open negotiations for a peaceful settlement on the basis of the Simla Convention.[2] Accordingly, Dalai Lama appointed a seven-man mission in April, 1950, to restore friendly relations. The mission, unsure of the Chinese Government's attitude toward it, decided to undertake the preliminaries in India, if possible with the aid of the Indian Government, so it established its headquarters in Kalimpo.[3]

In May the Peking Radio repeated the earlier announcement for "liberation" but promised to respect the interests, traditions, and religions, of all nationalities of the People's Republic of China, and called upon the Tibetan Government to send to Peking plenipotentiaries "to conduct peace in Peking in order to save the Tibetan people from unnecessary losses." The Tibetan mission did not go to Peking because the British authorities refused them visas to Hong Kong.[4]

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[1] Karunakaran, op. cit., p. 78.

[2] Howarth, op. cit., p. 75.

[3] Keesing's, op. cit., VIII, 1950-52, 11101; Ram Gopal, op. cit., pp. 31-32.

[4] Ibid.

In September the Chinese Ambassador arrived in New Delhi for talks with the Tibetan mission about the future relations between Tibet and China but he made no commitment. On the advice of the Government of India, the mission agreed to go to Peking for talks with the Chinese Government. On 31 September 1950, the Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, announced his Government's "determination to liberate the people of Tibet and stand on guard at the Chinese frontiers," by "peaceful means through negotiations."[1]

The mission left Delhi on 25 October, but got only as far as Calcutta when the Chinese Government requested that negotiations be held in New Delhi. However, two weeks previously, on 7 October, Chinese forces had invaded Tibet and on 19 October captured Chamdo.[2] On the afternoon of 25 October, the Chinese Government issued a communique in Peking saying that these forces had been ordered to advance into Tibet to free three million Tibetans from "imperialist oppression and to consolidate the national defences of China's Western frontier."[3]

That Tibet would be quickly overrun was obvious, and the Tibetan Government decided to negotiate surrender. When the Tibetan delegation arrived in Peking at the beginning of 1051, they were presented with an agreement

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[1]Gopal, op. cit. , p. 32.
[2]I.C.J. op. cit. , p. 94.
[3]Sen, op. cit. , p. 65.

which they could not alter. This agreement was based on the premise that Tibet, though internally autonomous, was part of China.[1]

The Seventeen Point Agreement, as it was named, was signed on 23 May 1951 without the knowledge of the Government of Tibet. The Dalai Lama remarked that "it was a terrible shock" to hear the terms of the agreement. The delegation had accepted it because they were under duress.[2]

The attitude of the Indian Government. When Great Britain granted independence to India, the traditional British policy toward Tibet was inherited by the new Indian Government which lacked the military and political strength to continue the policy. Nevertheless, India continued to operate the facilities formerly managed by Britain and continued to be interested in political developments in Tibet both because of religious, cultural, and ethnic affinities between the Indian, and the Tibetan people, and also for economic and military reasons.[3] The new Indian Government continued to post a political agent in Lhasa, send trade agencies to Gyantse, Yatung, and Gartok, and maintain post and telegraph offices along the trade route to Gyantse. India had kept a small mili-

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[1]Ginsburgo, "Peking-Lhasa-New Delhi", Political Science Quarterly, LXXV (September, 1960), pp. 342-343.

[2]Howarth, op. cit., p. 81.

[3]Ginsburgo, op. cit. , p. 341.

tary escort stationed at Gyantse for the protection of this trade route for over forty years.[1]

The Indian Government, however, intended to abandon the British policy. K. M. Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador to China, said that the only area where Chinese and Indian interests overlapped was Tibet. Knowing the importance that "every Chinese Government had attached to exclusive Chinese authority over Tibet," he had, even before he went to Peking in 1948, concluded that the British policy of considering Tibet an area in which India had special interest could not be maintained. Prime Minister Nehru had agreed with this view.[2]

The Indian view was clarified by Nehru at a press conference in London during November, 1949. India had always recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, but Tibet was considered an autonomous unit and was dealt with on that basis. India had no desire to follow the old British imperial policy, but wanted to preserve her trade and cultural interests in Tibet.[3] On 6 February 1950, Nehru added that India would not interfere in the Tibetan Chinese issue.[4]

In August, 1950, the Indian Government informally urged both parties to reach peaceful settlement. The Chinese replied that they hoped the postponed talks in

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[1] Sen, op. cit. , p. 74. [2] Panikkar, p. 102.

[3] Karundakaran, op. cit. , p. 78.

[4] Hindu, 7 February 1950, cited by Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 371.

New Delhi between the Chinese Ambassador and the Tibetan mission would produce a solution, for which the Indian Government would deserve some credit.[1] The optism was shaken in October when China invaded Tibet, and relations between Delhi and Peking became strained.[2]

On 21 October 1950, the Indian Government sent a memorandum to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, stating that the Indian Government was "solely interested in a peaceful settlement" of the issue, and warned China that military action would give those countries which were unfriendly to China "a handle for anti-Chinese propaganda at a crucial and delicate juncture in international affairs," and would "give powerful support to those who were opposed to the admission of the People's Government to the United Nations," to which "the Government of India attached the highest importance."[3] On 26 October, after Peking had announced that the "liberation had started", the Government of India sent another note to the Foreign Minister of China. It said that the Chinese decision to take military action of which India had received no prior intimation was "most surprising and regrettable." The note also explained the circumstances under which the departure of Tibetan mission was delayed, denying that "any foreign influence hostile to China" was responsible. It remarked

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[1] New York Herald Tribune, 31 August 1950, cited by Calvocoressi, ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Sen, op.cit., pp. 69-70.

that China's "deplorable" action was "not in the interests of China and peace."[1]

The Chinese Government angrily replied on 30 October that the Tibetan issue was "a domestic problem" and that "no foreign interference would be tolerated." The note said: "The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people, and defend the frontiers of China." Peking insisted that the Tibetan mission had delayed its departure under "outside instigation" and charged that India's viewpoint must have been "affected by foreign influences hostile to China." It also pointed out that the problem of Tibet and the problem of the participation of People's Republic of China in the United Nations are two "entirely unrelated problem."2

Meanwhile, the India press continued talking about Chinese aggression. Sardar Partel, the Deputy Prime Minister, made an unfriendly speech. Some official in the External Affairs Ministry supported the view that India should act vigorously to protect Tibet.[3] The Hindu of Madras reported on October 28 that official circles in New Delhi, including Pandit Nehru, were "extremely perplexed and disappointed" at the Chinese Government's action without a word of explanation in advance. On the same day, news of the Chinese advance into Tibet was confirmed in

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[1] Ibid., pp. 70-71. [2] Ibid., p. 72.
[3] Panikkar, op. cit., p. 113.

Lhasa. The Tibetan Government requested India's help and asked that India bring the matter to the Security Council.[1] The requests were ignored.

On 29 October Nehru gave an interview to Reuter's diplomatic correspondent in which he said that the Chinese Government's intentions were not clear, but he admitted that there were certain disputed areas in Eastern Tibet where China had been given the right to station garrisons under the terms of former agreements.[2] Nehru added that although the current Chinese policy might not be directed by Moscow, much of the information upon which this policy was based came from Soviet sourees. For example, Moscow had repeatedly said that Anglo-US "intrigues" in Tibet aimed at bringing that country into Anti-Communist Bloc of sphere of influence. However unfounded these accusations might be, Nehru wondered whether they might not have influenced the Chinese decision to move into Tibet.[3]

On 31 October 1950 the Indian Government replied to the Chinese note of October 30. India expressed its "amazement" and categorically repudiated the Chinese charge that India's policy was affected by foreign influences hostile to China. The Indian Government had "no political or territorial ambitions" in Tibet and did

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[1] Sen, op. cit., p. 65. [2] Ibid., pp. 65-66.

[3] The Hindu, 30 October 1950, cited by Sen, op. cit. pp. 66.

"not seek any novel privileged position," but only to continue the existing "cultural and commercial relations." The Indian Government's repeated suggestions were "not unwarranted interference in China's inter-affairs," but "well-meant advice by a friendly government which had a natural interest in the solution of problems concerning its neighbors by peaceful means." The note further said that it had been "a basic policy of the Government of India to work for friendly relations between India and China," but recent developments in Tibet had "affected these friendly relations and the interest of peace all over the world."[1]

On 16 November 1950 China issued a communique to reaffirm its position. The Chinese Government complained that the Indian Government had attempted to "influence and obstruct the exercise of its sovereign rights in Tibet," which could not but make the Chinese Government "greatly surprised." The Peking Government again maintained that the Tibetan mission had delayed its departure "obviously as a result of continued outside obstruction," and that "foreign forces and influences" were obstructing the "peaceful settlement" of the problem of Tibet. The communique strongly affirmed that "no foreign intervention would be permitted." It also stated that the Chinese Government "could not but deeply regret" that the Indian

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[1] Sen, op. cit. pp. 72-74.

Government had regarded "a domestic problem" of the Chinese Government as an "international dispute calculated to increase the present deplorable tensions in the world."[1]

On 7 November 1950 the Tibetan National Assembly and cabinet addressed a complaint to the United Nations. On 14 November, the chairman of the delegation of El Salvador, Hector David Castro, formally requested the President of the United Nations General Assembly to include Tibet on the agenda of the next session. The Indian representative, the Jam Sahab of Nawanagar, pointed out that, in the latest note received by his government, the Peking Government had declared that it had not abandoned its intention to settle those difficulties by peaceful means and that the Chinese forces had ceased to advance after the fall of Chamdo, a town some 480 Kilometers from Lhasa. India, therefore, supported the United Kingdom's proposal that the question should be dropped. This was done by unanimous vote.[2]

The Tibetan issue was debated in the Indian Parliament in December 1950. Nehru stated that policy of the Indian Government on the Tibetan problem, which had been expressed in the memorandum and notes to the Chinese

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[1] Ibid. pp. 75-77.

[2] United Nations, General Assembly, General Committee (GAOR/A1534, 24 November 1950).

Government in October. He reasserted that India did "not challenge Chinese suzerainty, or sovereignty over Tibet and the Tibetan autonomy, both of which were regarded as "a historical fact"[1] and were recognized by "all previous governments in India and elsewhere."[2] Nehru concluded that the deciding voice concerning Tibet should be "the voice of the people of Tibet and of nobody else."[3] It should be "the wishes of the people of Tibet that should prevail and not any legal or constitutional arguments."[4]

Nehru's stand was assailed by his critics in the Parliament. They did not like his acceptance of China's occupation of Tibet as a political reality, and wished he would withhold his recognition and sponsor Tibet's cause in the United Nations. At the same session of the Parliamentary debate, Professor N. G. Ranga warned that India could "not be so confident that China was the same as it used to be." He was "surprised" to find the Indian Government "repeatedly professing friendship" to China. He suggested that India should have helped the United Nations to "counter this menace of sovereignty of one country over another."[5] Another member, Dr. S. P. Mukherjee, criticized Nehru's China policy because this

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[1]Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 320-323.

[2]Ibid., p. 314.

[3]Ibid., p. 303.

[4]Ibid.,

[5]Sen, op. cit., p. 112-

would affect the security of India.[1] Acharya J. B. Kripalarri pointed out that Communists were a "new kind of tyrannies, of totalitarian regime."[2] M. R. Masani remarked that the Communist regime had "not been friendly towards India."[3] The New China News Agency, he said, had written that "Anglo-American imperialist and their running dog, Prime Minister Nehru, were plotting a coup in Lhasa for the annexation of Tibet."[4] Masani urged a re-estimate of the Chinese Communist regime. He further said that there could be "no larger illusions about friendship, about comradeship in Asia", and thus China had shown her utter contempt for the idea that India embraced of "a free and a united Asia."[5] Another member, M. A. Ayyanger, said that if India had armed itself and were ready for an offensive, "China would not have ventured upon Tibet."[6]

The protest of India against the Chinese invasion proved "completely fruitless."[7] The steady advance of the Chinese troops into Tibet soon brought the capitulation of the Dalai Lama's regime and the conclusion, on May 23, 1951, of the Seventeen Point Agreement. Nehru, who had always recognized Chinese claims to sovereignty over Tibet, gave the accord whole-hearted approval.[8]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 112-113.
[2] Ibid., p. 115.
[3] Ibid., p. 115.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., pp. 114-115.
[6] Ibid., p. 116.
[7] Ginsburgo, op. cit. pp. 342-343.
[8] Ibid.

The once self-styled independent country, Tibet, was lost to Communist China. This angered the Indian public and the Parliament, but India took no corrective action. All that occurred was an exchange of angry notes.

III. THE KOREAN EPISODE

The Korean war and the China Question. On June 25, 1950, the Korean war started. On that day the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution condemning North Korea as an aggressor and calling for the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th parallel.[1] Two days later, the Security Council passed another resolution recommending that United Nations members assist South Korea.[2] India supported both resolutions. Nehru commented that the Korean war was "a well-planned invasion" by North Korea of South Korea.[3]

On 27 June 1950, President Truman stated that the attack upon South Korea showed that Communism had "passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations" and would "use armed invasion and war." He also said that the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be "a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area", and that, accordingly, he had ordered

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[1] United Nations, Doc. S/1501.

[2] United Nations, Doc. S/1511; S.C.O.R., Fifth Year No. 16, p. 4.

[3] Keesing's Comtemporary Archives, op. cit., VIII (1950-52), p. 10847.

the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa.[1]

The defence of South Korea was "a corporate obligation" of the United Nations, but the protection of Formosa was "a private enterprise" of the United States.[2] The Indian Government felt it unfavourable that the Formosa and Korea issues had become connected. Nehru said that this enlargement was not only wrong but also had "dangerous consequences" on world peace. He wanted to avoid the Formosan question.[3] K. M. Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in China, complained that the United States had "stepped directly into the Chinese civil war", which had already ended. Panikkar attached "much greater importance to Truman's action in respect of Taiwan than to the United Nations intervention in Korea.[4]

On 12 July 1950, Nehru, with the acknowledgement and appreciation of the Chinese Government, sent personal messages to Marshal Stalin and the US Secretary of State. Nehru stated that India's Korean policy was to "localize the conflict" and to facilitate an early peaceful settlement. He stressed the necessity of the

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[1] Shiv Dayal, India's Role in the Korean Question (New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1959), p. 75.

[2] Ibid., p. 77. [3] Ibid.

[4] Panikkar, op. cit., p. 103.

presence of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China on the Security Council. (The Soviet Union's boycott of Security Council meetings, on the issue of Chinese representation, since 13 January 1950, enabled the Western powers to by-pass the Soviet veto and launch UN military action against North Korea.) Stalin accepted Nehru's appeal to discuss Korea in the Security Council on condition that China be seated. Dean Acheson, the U.S. Secretary of State, refused this condition on the ground that Peking's membership in the UN was not an issue to be considered at the same time as the Korean conflict.[1]

According to Nehru, to seat Communist China on the Security Council was a matter of urgency rather than of right or wrong,[2] and he declared China's seating a necessary condition for the United Nations to end the Korean conflict.[3] Nehru argued that China was the country most concerned with the Korean crisis,[4] and "whatever happened in Korea must be of the utmost significance to the Chinese people; therefore, any solution that may be reached must be with the co-operation or acquiescence of China."[5] Both the United States and India had linked

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[1] Ibid., pp. 104-105.

[2] Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 417.

[3] Keesing's Comtemporary Archives, op. cit. VIII 1950-52, p. 10847.

[4] Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 417.

[5] Keesing's Comtemporary Archives, op. cit., VIII 1950-52, p. 11120.

the Korean war to the larger China question.

Chinese reaction to the Korean crisis was "absolute calm" but the US intervention in Formosa was considered to be "a direct threat."[1] Panikkar was afraid of a war between Communist China and Formosa.[2] However, the offer of 25,555 troops by Chiang Kai-shek to fight in Korea was declined by the United States.[3] During the last week of August, the American Government issued five statements on Taiwan, the last of which said that once the Korean issue was settled America would withdraw her protection from Taiwan. Acheson followed up with a statement that America "had no aggressive intentions against the mainland of China."[4] Panikkar concluded that the situation had eased.[5]

India's role as a mediator. The American landing at Inchon changed the situation in Korea.[6] By September the North Korean forces were routed, and the United Nations forces were approaching the 38th parallel.[7] The debate whether or not to cross the parallel began in the Security Council.

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[1] Panikkar, op. cit. pp. 106-107.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid., p. 104.
[4] Ibid., p. 106.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid., p. 107.
[7] Dayal, op. cit., p. 100.

When the eight-Power draft endorsing the crossing of the 38th parallel was introduced in the General Assembly,[1] Nehru objected by saying that the purpose of UN action, the repelling of aggression, had been accomplished, and it would be wrong to carry further military operations. Nehru wished to conclude peace on the territorial basis of the 38th parallel.[2] The Indian delegate, B. N. Rau, stated that India feared that if the UN forces crossed the 38th parallel the conflict might be prolonged and might even extend the area of conflict.[3] He suggested that the eight-Power draft resolution should be limited to the recommendation for the creation of an independent and unified Korea by means of free elections and for providing economic assistance to Korea.[4]

On 25 September 1950 China, for the first time, indicated to Panikkar that the Chinese would not let the Americans come up to the Chinese border. On 2 October 1950 Chou En-lai, at midmight, sent for Panikkar. Chou En-lai thanked Nehru for what he had been doing in the cause of peace, and said that China was "most anxious for a peaceful settlement", and accepted Pandit

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[1] U. N. Doc. A/C 1/558.

[2] Bowles, op. cit., pp. 239-240.

[3] G. A. O. R., Fifth Session First Committe, vol. I, p. 33, paras., 17-18.

[4] Ibid., p. 18.

Nehru's approach. Chou En-lai then indicated that South Korea did not matter, if the Americans crossed the 38th parallel, China would be "forced to intervene." Immediately after the talk, Panikkar telegraphed to Nehru who then transmitted it to the West.[1] Nevertheless, on 7 October the General Assembly accepted the eight-Power resolution to authorize General Macarthur, the UN Commander, to cross the 38th parallel and unify Korea,[2] knowing full well that the Chinese had indicated their determination to intervene.[3]

The UN forces very soon crossed the 38th parallel, but, by the middle of October, no immediate evidence of Chinese intervention had come. Both in India and in America there was some criticism of Panikkar and Nehru for their apparently false information.[4]

At the end of October, however, the UN Command headquarters confirmed the presence of Chinese troops in Korea.[5] In November the UN forces were defeated and compelled to withdraw from most of N$_o$rth Korea. President Trumen declared a national emergency in the United States

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[1]Panikkar, op. cit., p. 111. [2]U. N. Doc. A/1422.
[3]Panikkar, op. cit., p. 111. [4]Ibid., pp. 112-113.
[5]Ross N. Berkes & Mohinder S. Bedi, The Diplomacy of India(Standford, London: Standford, Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 118.

and announced on 1 December 1950 that he was thinking of using the atom bomb.[1]

On 12 December 1950 N. B. Rau and other twelve members of the Arab-Asian group sumitted a draft resolution to the General Assembly requesting the President of the Assembly to appoint three people to determine the basis on which a cease-fire in Korea could be arranged. Rau told the Political Committee of the General Assembly that, since China had been ravaged for almost a generation, the people of China should not want another war and would welcome peace.[2] The General Assembly adopted the resolution on 14 December, and organized a cease-fire group consisting Entezam of Tran, N. B. Rau of India, and Lester Pearson of Canada.[3] The group's work, in which Rau played a prominent part, failed. The Chinese Government insisted on the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and Formosa as a prior condition to negotiations.[4]

On 13 January the cease-fire group submitted certain principles for a cease-fire in Korea,[5] which were drafted under Nehru's influence on the meeting of

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[1]Karunakaran, op. cit., p. 105.

[2]U. N. Doc. A/C 1/641; G.A.O.R., Fifth Session, First Committee, p. 433, para. 1.

[3]G.A.O.R., Fifth Session, Plenary Meetings, p. 666, para. 2.

[4]Karunakaran, op. cit., pp. 107-108.

[5]Dayal, op. cit., p. 123.

the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London early in January 1951.[1] The General Assembly approved the principles and conveyed them to the Peking Government. On 17 January Chou En-lai rejected them but submitted a counter-proposal for a seven-nation conference on Far Eastern problems to be held in China and to lead to the ceasation of hostilities in Korea.[2] On 22 January, B. N. Rau introduced a lengthy Chinese amplification of its January 17 response, forwarded by Panikkar from Peking as the result of conversations with the Chinese Government, stating that Peking would consider reaching a limited cease-fire as the first item on the agenda of its proposed seven-Power Far Eastern conference. India also asked for a forty-eight-hour ajournment to give the delegates time to study the Chinese proposal. The Indian suggestion narrowly won. On 24 January, the General Assembly reassembled.[3]

On India'a initiative, the twelve Arab-Asian delegations submitted a revised draft resolution to the General Assembly. This draft resolution proposed that the seven Powers, mentioned in China's reply, should meet to obtain all necessary "elucidations and amplifi-

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[1] Dayal, op. cit., p. 123.

[2] U. N. Doc. A/C 1/653; G.A.O.R., Fifth Session Annexes, vol. II, Agenda Item 76, pp. 14-15.

[3] Berkes, op. cit., pp. 125-126.

cations" from the Chinese Government and to make arrangements towards the peaceful settlement of the Korea and other Far Eastern problems. It provided that the Seven-Power Conference should agree on appropriate cease-fire arrangements. The Indian representative told the General Assembly that his government had been informed that these proposals had been regarded in Peking as providing a basis for a peaceful settlement.[1]

Though the Chinese reply to the proposals of the cease-fire group was a "qualified acceptance", the Americans declared that it was "a contemptuous rejection,"[2] and submitted to the General Assembly on 20 January 1951 a draft resolution to condemn Communist China as an aggressor.[3]

Nehru said of the Chinese reply that it appeared at first to be unfavorable and was described by some as a rejection, but on closer examination, it became clear that "it was not a rejection."[4] In part it was "acceptance" and in part it consisted of "fresh suggestions."[5] The subsequent amplification of the Chinese Government

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[1] U. N. Doc. A/C 1/642/Rev. 1; G.A.O.R., Fifth Session, Annexes, vol. II, Agenda Item 76, pp. 5-6.

[2] Panikkar, op. cit., p. 123.

[3] U. N. Doc. A/C 1/654; G.A.O.R., Fifth Session, Annexes vol. II, Agenda Item 76, p. 15.

[4] Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 422

[5] Ibid.

brought out further that there was "a very wide area of agreement and the gap of disagreement had been very much narrowed."[1] The reply was "an attempt to pursue negotiations, not to break off", Nehru concluded.[2]

Nehru warned against branding China as an aggressor. He argued that the American proposal to call China an aggressor "would not lead to peace but to an intensification of the conflict and might close the door to further negotiations"[3], and that it would "not help to in the slightest to call each other names, unless they wanted that war to come sooner rather than later."[4] Nehru was convinced, through the information he received from Panikkar, that China was "eager to have negotiations for a settlement of the Korean dispute and of other problems in the Far East."[5] In the General Assembly the Indian delegate warned that no useful purpose would be served by branding the Peking Government as an aggressor, and the negotiations would have to be abandoned.[6]

On 30 January 1951, the General Assembly rejected the Arab-Asian proposal. On that day, the General Assembly

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Berkes, op. cit., p. 422.

[3] Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 420-1.

[4] Ibid., p. 417.

[5] Ibid., p. 421.

[6] G.A.O.R., Fifth Session, First Committee, vol. II, p. 524, para. 71.

adopted the American draft resolution, with some amendments, by 44-7-9. Burma, India and the Communist States voted against it.[1]

After the dismissal of General MacArthur on 10 April 1951, events began to move toward a cease-fire in Korea. Dean Acheson stated on 2 June 1951 that the military objectives in Korea were to repel armed attack and restore peace. Neither the United Nations nor the United States were obliged to unify Korea by force.[2] This confirmed, to a certain extent, Nehru's argument in September 1950.

Speaking on 23 June 1951 in a UN broadcast, Jacob Malik, U.S.S.R. representative to the UN, declared that the cease-fire negotiations could be started with some hope of success.[3] The American Ambassador in Moscow, Admiral Kirk, contacted the Soviet Foreign Office for further information on this proposal. The Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, told him that the cease-fire was to be an "interim military armistice" which would involve no political or territorial questions.[4] The Secretary General declared that the United Nations Com-

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[1] United Nations, Year Book of U. N., 1951 (New York: Department of Public Information, 1952), pp. 223-5.

[2] G.A.O.R., Fifth Session, First Committee, vol. II, pp. 110-111.

[3] "The Price of Peace", United Nations Bulletin, XI, (July 1951), p. 86.

[4] Dayal, op. cit., p. 140.

manders were empowered under the Security Council resolutions to conduct military negotiations for a cease-fire, leaving the political discussions to be considered later.[1] Thereupon General Ridgeway, the Commander of UN Forces, initiated the move for a cease-fire. The armistice negotiations started on July 8, 1951.[2]

The Korean Armistice talks were difficult. Each side had its own objectives and did not trust the other. The Communists insisted that South Korean forces be withdrawn below the 38th parallel and that all UN troops be removed from the country. This, of course, the United States would not accept. Meanwhile the war continued. On 27 November 1951, the agreement on a provisional cease-fire was reached.[3] It was only on July 27, 1953 that the armistice was signed.[4] The fighting continued during all this period.

When the General Assembly met again in September 1952, the chief remaining obstacle to peace in Korea was the question of prisoners-of-war.[5] The United States, along with twenty other Powers, moved on 24 October 1952

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[1] United Nations Bulletin, op. cit., XI(July 1951), p. 47.

[2] Dayal, op. cit., p. 140.

[3] G.AO.R., Fifth Session, First Committee, vol. II, p. 112.

[4] U. N. Doc. S/3079.

[5] G.A.O.R., Fifth Session, First Committee, vol. II, p. 114.

to repatriate prisoners "in accordance with humanitarian principles", that is, to affirm the principle of non-forcible repatriation.[1] The Soviet Union also submitted a draft resolution requiring the General Assembly to establish a Commission for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The Commission, consisting of the United States, Britain, Soviet Union, France, Communist China, India, Burma, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, North and South Koreas, would assist in the repatriation of all prisoners-of-war on both sides.[2] Many other members also put forward their own proposals.

On 17 November 1952, V. K. Menon, the Indian delegate, submitted a draft resolution which the General Assembly passed by 54-5-0. By the suggested Indian formula - "no detention by force and no repatriation by force" - the question was solved on moral considerations.[3] On 15 December 1952 China, in its first comment on the Indian resolution, accused India of allying herself with the West in "hostile actions" against China, and rejected the resolution.[4] She denounced the resolution as a revamped version of the twenty-one Power draft re-

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[1] U. N. Doc. A/C, 1/725; G.A.O.R., Seventh Session, First Committee, Annexes, Agenda Item 16, p. 29.

[2] U. N. Doc. A/C 1/729.

[3] U. N. Doc. A/C, 1/734; G.A.O.R., Seventh Session, First Committee, Annexes, Agenda Item 16, pp. 32-34.

[4] U. N. Doc., A/2354; G.A.O.R., Seventh Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 16, pp. 47-50.

solution. North Korea also rejected it.[1] Hopes of an early settlement vanished.

On 11 April 1953 the United Nations Command and the Communists concluded an agreement which provided for the repatriation of the sick and wounded. On 26 April the armistice delegations met to continue negotiations. The Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Vulunteers Command proposed that a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission composed of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, and India should be established to take custody of the prisoners alleged to be refusing repatriation. The United Nations Command delegation accepted this offer but proposed that the Indian member should be the Chairman of the Commission and that India alone should supply guards of the prisoners. On 8 June 1953 an agreement on repatriation of other prisoners of war besides the sick and the wounded was finally concluded. The provisions of this agreement were similar to those proposed by India on 17 November 1952. After fighting for another six months North Korea and China reached the same solution they had rejected. Both the West and the Communists jointly invited India to undertake the major responsibility of repatration.[2]

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[1] U.N. Doc., A/2354; G.A.O.R., Seventh Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 16, pp. 51-2.

[2] Dayal, op.cit., 182-5.

The relations improved. India's policy during the Korean war was governed, as Panikkar pointed out, by the realization of the necessity of recognizing New China and the desire to bring about an understanding between new China and the West.[1] From 1950 to 1953, Nehru had repeatedly emphasized, in the Indian Parliament and in press conferences, that India tried to intermediate between China and the United States, United Kingdoms as well as those of other countries.[2] India had "a rather special responsibility" in regard to China because India was "one of the very few countries represented there."[3] India was "the only country, besides the countries of the Soviet Group, which was in a position to find out through its Ambassador what the reactions of the Chinese Government to the developing events were."[4] The Indian mission had also "kept in touch with thought in the countries they were accredited to."[5] Nehru concluded, "that is why we were able to frame our resolution largely in accordance with the Chinese view point as we thought it to be."[6] Concerning the role of a mediator, Nehru said that India was "favourably situated" because India had "good friendly relations with the parties concerned."[7] The response

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[1]Kumar, op.cit., 22-3.

[2]Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., 423.

[3]Ibid., 417. [4]Ibid. [5]Ibid., 423. [6]Ibid.

[7]J.Nehru, Press Conference, 1952(Information Service of India), pp.45-6.

to India had "always been a very friendly response." Nehru believed that there was "an extreme desire on the part of every party concerned for a settlement."[1] Because of India's role of a mediator between the People's Republic of China and the West, Sino-Indian relations had improved.

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[1] Ibid., 91.

IV. FRIENDLY RELATIONS

Friendly communications. The improvement of China's attitude towards India was shown by trade contracts and exchange visits between the two countries. The first unofficial Indian goodwill mission went to China in September 1951. About two months later, the first Chinese cultural mission visited India. Early in February 1952, Chou En-lai told Panikkar that he was "very happy" about the way the Chinese cultural delegation had been received in India, and expressed the hope that the Indian goodwill mission would arrive soon. At the end of April 1952, the Indian goodwill mission arrived in Peking. The delegation, led by Mrs. Shrimati Vijayalakshmi Pandit, the Indian delegate in the U. N., included scientists, economists, engineers, archaeologists - all men of distiction and achievement. Panikkar wrote that the delegation was received with "great enthusiasm".[1]

A series of natural disasters in the summer and early autumn of 1950 caused widespread crop failures

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[1] Panikkar, op. cit., pp. 170-171.

which brought near-famine to many parts of India. China made a favourable impression on India public opinion by offering assistance to India.[1] On 1 January 1951 the Indian Government concluded a rice-jute agreement exchanging 50,000 tons of Chinese rice for 37,000 bales of Indian jute during the first quarter of 1951.[2] On April 7, 1951, China offered 1,000,000 tons of food grains in exchange for several kinds of commodities, and agreed to send 50,000 tons immediately. On 26 April, arrangements were made for the depatch of the 50,000 tons of rice.[3] Another agreement was signed in Peking on 22 May 1951 wherby China agreed to supply 400,000 tons of milo. On 27 May a purchase contract was signed providing for the import of 100,000 metric tons of rice at "reasonable prices." On June 4, 1951 it was stated that India was importing 80,000 tons of rice and 450,000 tons of milk from China.[4]

The Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet. After the Seventeen-point Agreement of May 23, 1951 between China and Tibet recognizing Tibet as part of China, the rela-

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[1] Karanukaran, op. cit., p. 81.

[2] Keesing's Comtemporary Archives, op. cit., vol. VIII 1950-52, p. 11222.

[3] Ibid., p. 11538.

[4] Ibid., p. 12248.

tions between India and Tibet needed a new basis. Negotiations on relations between India and China concerning Tibet were initiated by India[1] and began on 31 December 1953 in Peking. Agreement was reached only four months later, on 29 April 1954.[2] Nehru said that it took "a considerable time" to arrive at the agreement because "the number of small points were so many and had to be discussed in detail", but "not because of any major conflict or difficulty."[3]

According to the agreement the Chinese Government would establish trade agencies in New Delhi, Calcutta, and Kalimpong, while the Indian Government would establish similar agencies in the Tibetan towns of Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok. The agreement made a provision for Lamaist, Hindu, and Buddhist pilgrims to visit specified religious shrines in India and Tibet. Travel regulations for pilgrims and traders of both countries were strictly defined. Traders and pilgrims of both countries might travel by the following passes: (1) Shipki La Pass; (2) Mana Pass; (3) Niti Pass; (4) Kungribingri Pass; (5) Durma Pass and (6) Lipu Lekh Pass. The agreement was to remain in force for eight years and might be renewed.[4]

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[1] Gupta, op. cit., p. 16.

[2] Lok Sabha Secretariat, Foreign Policy of India, Texts of Documents, 1947-58 (New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1958), p. 87.

[3] Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 303.

[4] Lok Sabha Secretariat, op. cit., pp. 87-91.

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[3] Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 303.

[4] Lok Sabha Secretariat, op. cit., pp. 87-91.

An exchange of notes between the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister, Chang Han-fu, and the Indian Ambassador, N. Raghavan, supplemented the agreement. India agreed to withdraw the military escort stationed at Yatung and Gyantse, and to hand over to the Government of China at a reasonable price the post, telegraph, public telphone services with equipment, and twelve rest houses. The two governments agreed to protect the persons and the property of traders and pilgrims.[1] India thereby gave up her special interests and privileges in Tibet which she had inherited from British. India recognized Tibet as an integral part of China.

In a speech in Lok Sabha, 15 May 1954, Nehru commented that the agreement was "a very important event." It was "important from the point of view of India's trade, pilgrim traffic, trade posts, communications, and the rest in Tibet", but "the major thing" about this agreement was the five principles of peaceful co-existance, later known as Panchsheel, in the preamble. They are:

(1) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;

(2) Mutual non-aggression;

(3) Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs;

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[1] Ibid., pp. 91-93

(4) Equality and mutual benefit; and

(5) Peaceful co-existence.

Nehru said that it was a statement of "wholesome principles." It was "a matter of importance" to India and China that the two countries, which had almost about 1,800 miles of frontier, "should live on terms of peace and friendliness, respect of each other's sovereignty and integrity, and agree not to interfere with other." This agreement had, therefore, ensured "peace to a very large extent in a certain area of Asia." He wished that "this area of peace could be spread over the rest of Asia and indeed over the rest of the world." If these principles were adopted in the relations of various countries with one another, "a great deal of the trouble of the present-day world would probably disappear."[1] The five principles of peaceful co-existence assured India of Communist China's peaceful intent toward India.[2]

Though the agreement and especially the five principles was welcomed in India, some members of parliament criticised the agreement during the debate on foreign affairs in May 1954. Acharya J. B. Kripalani pointed out that China had committed an act of "colonial aggression"

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[1]Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 303-304.

[2]Gupta, op. cit., p. 16.

in Tibet and warned that China had "aggressive designs" on India since "it demolished a buffer state, Tibet."[1] Asoka Meheta, another member, said that the five principles had lost their "motive power" if Tibet was accepted as "the Tibet region of China." He claimed that the cultural and religious relationship between India and Tibet was deeper than that between Tibet and China.[2] N. C. Chatterjee commented that India was appeasing aggression, and was drifting towards the totalitarian bloc. India's attitude was "not independent", "not dynamic". He warned that Sino-Russian bloc was making North Korea, Manchuria, Singkiang and Tibet "strong military bases" and was thereby "threatening the security of Asia and the world."[3] Acharya Kripalani again signaled that India should be cautious of the deprivation of a buffer state.[4] Nehru replied that Chinese sovereignty in Tibet had not been challenged for two or three hundred years by an outside Power, not even by the British Indian Government. After the Communist regime came to power, the Chinese Government was able to exercise that sovereignty and had made some "factual changes." Therefore India simply formally recognized the situation there, which she had in fact recognized two or three years previously. Nehru argued that the British Government had established

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[1] Sen, op. cit., pp. 121-122. [2] Ibid., p. 127.
[3] Ibid., p. 127. [4] Ibid., p. 128.

their influence in Tibet by force, and it was "impossible and improper" for India to continue arrangements in Tibet which were inherited from the British Empire and tainted by imperialism. India also had no right to have a military escort of 300 troops in Tibet or any other country. Nehru concluded that it was "practical", "historical, and "inevitable" for India to make an agreement to face the changed circumstances.[1] Though several members did not like this agreement, Nehru insisted that India had "done no better thing than this" since India became independent. He had "no doubt" that India had "not made any mistake."[2]

On 1 April 1955 the Indian and Chinese governments signed a protocol in Lhasa, whereby the postal telegraph, and public telephone service in Tibet formerly operated by the Indian Government, with equipment, were transferred as a gesture of goodwill to the Chinese Government without compensation. The twelve rest houses were handed over at an agreed price.[3] Later in the month, India relaxed travel regulations across the Indo-Tibetan border by dispensing with travel documents for pilgrims, frequent travellers and petty traders.[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 120. [2] Ibid., p. 123.

[3] Keesing's Comtemporary Archives, op. cit., vol. X 1955-56, p. 14141.

[4] M. S. Rajan, India in World Affairs, 1954-56 (Bombay, London, New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964), p.219.

Chou En-lai's first visit to India, June 1954.

On his way back from the Geneva Conference on the Far East to Peking, Chou En-lai stopped in New Delhi on June 25, 1954, and stayed there for three days as the guest of the India Government. It was his first visit to India.[1]

At a state banquet held in Chou En-lai's honor on 26 June, Nehru spoke of the "traditional good neighborliness of the two countries in the previous two thousand years. The two peoples had "come into contact in many lands" through "the peaceful commerce of ideas, of religion and of art and culture", and there was "no record of war" between them. He "earnestly" trusted that the minds of two peoples would be directed towards the "growing feeling of oneness and to the pursuit and realization of the common ideals that animate humanity", instead of "laying stress on the divisions and differences" between the two countries.[2]

To this welcome speech, Chou En-lai responded that the "traditional friendship" had even improved in recent years because relations had been established on the five principles of peaceful co-existence. He said that the agreement on Tibet had strengthened the cul-

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[1] Keesing's Comtemporary Archives, op. cit., vol. IX 1952-54, p. 13661.

[2] Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 306-307.

tural and economic ties between the two countries and he praised India's contribution in bringing about the Korean armistice, as well as her support of the efforts made at the Geneva Conference to restore peace in Indo-China. Referring to peace in Asia, Chou En-lai said, "Asia today is no longer the Asia of yesterday. The age when out side forces could decide at will the fate of Asia has gone forever. We are confident that the hope of peace-loving nations and peoples of Asia would frustrate the scheme of war instigations." Because of India's "great significant" position for "safeguarding peace in Asia", he hoped that the Chinese and Indians would "co-operate ever more closely in the noble aim of safeguarding peace in Asia."[1]

At a press conference a couple of days later, he supported the five principles by saying that "all nations whether big or small, strong or weak, and no matter what kind of social system they had, could co-exist peacefully on the basis of the Five Principles." He also expressed that it would be desirable "for appropriate responsible persons of the principle Asian countries to meet occasionally and consult each other" in order to seek common measures for maintaining peace and security in Asia.[2] Chou

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[1] Keesing's Comtemporary Archives, op. cit., vol. IX 1952-54, p. 13661.

[2] Ibid.

once again emphasized the peaceful intentions of the Chinese people.

After Chou's visit, New Delhi issued a joint statement by the prime ministers of India and China on 28 June 1954. It stated that during Chou's visit, the two prime ministers discussed "many matters of common concern to India and China"; in particular, "the prospects of peace in South East Asia." The talks between the Prime Ministers aimed at helping peaceful settlements being made in Geneva and elsewhere. Their main purpose was "to arrive at a clearer understanding of each other's point of view in order to help the maintenance of peace." They reaffirmed the "five principles" and suggested that they be applied in "international relations" because these principles "would form a solid foundation for peace and security and the fears and apprehension" would "give place to a feeling of confidence." The adoption of the principles would help in creating "an area of peace, thus lessening the chances of war and strengthening the cause of peace all over the world." The two Prime Ministers expressed "their confidence in the friendship between India and China which would help the cause of world peace and the peaceful development of their respective countries as well as other countries of Asia." Both agreed that their countries should continue to be full understanding

between them." They appreciated "greatly the present opportunity of meeting together and having a full exchange of ideas leading to a clearer understanding and co-operation in the cause of peace.[1]

Nehru's visit to China, 18-28 October, 1954. Nehru paid a ten-days visit to China in October 1954. During the ten-mile drive from Peking airport to the city, about one million people acclaimed Nehru.[2] It was the biggest popular welcome in China ever accorded to any visiting statesman. Nehru described it as "a mighty welcome."[3]

During a state banquet in Nehru's honor, Chou said that the two peoples cherished the same desire to bring about "a peaceful international environment" so as to "build up their own countries", and to shake off "economic backwardness" so as to"achieve complete national independence." All this not only provided "a basis for friendly co-operation", but also further strengthened "the profound friendship" between the two peoples. He urged that India and China had "an obligation to carry out the five principles of peaceful

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[1]Lok Sabha Secretariat, op. cit., pp. 97-98.

[2]Keesing's Comtemporary Archives, op. cit., vol. IX 1952-54, p. 13890.

[3]Rajan, op. cit., p. 223.

co-existence in their mutual relations", in order to "facilitate the gradual realization of peaceful co-existence among other Asian countries and the countries of the world." He praised Nehru's policy of establishing an area of peace in Asia which Chou contrasted with that of the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) bloc, and promised China's co-operation in this task. Chou concluded that "the friendly co-operation of the 960 million people of India and China constituted an important factor in safeguarding peace in Asia and the world." He hoped that "the established friendship" would be further strengthened so that Sino-Indian relations would be "a model for the whole world of peaceful co-existence between countries with different social customs and ideologies."[1]

Nehru, in reply, repeated that in two thousand years there was "no record of conflict", but only that of friendship, trade, and cultural exchange." Though there were many differences in experiences, problems and methods, the two countries had much in common, the essential of which was "goodwill and friendship" between the two countries. Nehru was convinced that the peoples of China and India were "devoted to the cause of peace",

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[1] Keesing's Comtemporary Archives, op. cit., IX 1952-54, p. 13890.

which was "the greatest need" of the day in the world. Again he emphasized the necessity of the five principles of peaceful co-existence, and the possibility of peaceful co-existence of the countries with different ways of life. He argued that "any attempt to impose the will of one nation on another or the way of life of one people on another, must necessarily produce conflict and endanger peace." He believed that the peoples of China and India would devote themselves to "create a real climate of peace" which would lead to co-operation among nations."[1]

On 26 October, Nehru held a press conference. He praised the Geneva Conference which showed the advantage of people meeting and discussing problems, but criticised such defence organizations as SEATO. Although India's basic approach was "somewhat different from China's in regard to some matter," he was "happy" that there had been "a large measure of agreement."[2]

His visit made him feel even stronger than before that, for the good of both countries as well as for the good of the world, peaceful co-operation between India and China was "highly necessary."[3] Referring to China's

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

[3] The Hindu, 31 October, 1954, cited by Rajan, op. cit., p. 224.

future intentions, he said that nobody could forsee what would happen in the future, but one should trust one another because "trust begets trust and love begets love."[1] Nehru at this time was optimistic about the future of China. Describing Mao Tse-tung as "a great warrior, a great revolutionary, a great builder and consolidator", Nehru added, "May he now be a great peace-maker also."[2] He believed that his visit would leave a permanent impression on the history of the two countries and perhaps it was also of importance to the world. He said that the meeting of the two Prime Ministers was "an event of great historical significance."[3]

On his way to China and back, Nehru visited Rangoon, Vientiane, Hanoi, Saigon, and Pnom Penh, and reportedly assured the statesmen of those countries of his conviction that China had no aggressive intentions against them. He told them that China was fully preoccupied with internal reconstruction and that peaceful co-existence with a Communist state was the only possible course to adopt. The alternative was a cold war which would inevitably lead to a hot war.[4]

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[1] The Hindu, 2 November 1954; cited by Rajan, op. cit., p. 225.

[2] Ibid., 28 October 1954; cited by Rajan, op. cit., p. 224.

[3] The Hindu, 3 November 1954, cited by Rajan, op. cit., p. 225

[4] Rajan, op. cit., p. 227.

On 13 November 1954 Nehru gave a press conference on his visit to China. He said that after forty five years of internal trouble, China had "peace and order". Nehru admired the effective administration of China. He said the Chinese structure of government was different from the parliamentary system. He noted the absence of freedom of the press in China, but he said that whether or not a system could be called democratic, that system was the best which yielded the best results from the point of view of human welfare. Nehru considered the Chinese Communist economic and political system in China was "not full-blooded communism", but was "partly Marxist ideas and partly adapted to conditions in China."[1]

The Bandung Conference, 18-24 April 1955. In December 1953, when the five Colombo states - Indonesia, Burma, India, Ceylon, and Pakistan - met at Bogor in Indonesia to lay plans for the Bandung Conference, Nehru proposed to invite Communist China.[2] Pakistan and Ceylon were opposed to the idea. They feared that the Chinese presence might induce some of the Asian countries, such as the Philipines and Siam, to desert the Conference, especially if the United States pressured them. These

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[1]Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 309-312.

[2]George McTurnan Kahin, The Asian-African Conference(New York: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 2.

arguments were rejected by Nehru and the Burmese Prime Minister, U Nu, who held that Communist China should be allowed to participate if she recognized the principle of solidarity and friendship among the Asian nations. Both men had recently visited China and they gave their opinion that China was a co-operative and peace-loving country.[1]

Nehru had three main objectives for Chinese presence in the Bandung Conference: to introduce Communist China into Asian society as a peace-loving country; to decrease the Formosan crisis; and to create a public audience for China's adherence to the five principles of peaceful co-existence. The Bandung Conference stimulated friendly relations between India and China because those objectives of Nehru were fulfilled.

Nehru and U Nu believed that many of the non-Communist countries of Asia seriously exaggerated the warlike position of China and underestimated the desire of the Chinese Government for peace.[2] In his opening statement, Chou En-lai explained that his delegation had come "to seek common ground and not to create divergence", "to seek unity and not to quarrel."[3] He said

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[1]Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Asian-African Conference: Bulletin, No. 1 March 1955(Indonesia, 1955), pp. 19-20.

[2]Kahin, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

[3]Keesing's Comtemporary Archives, op. cit., X 1955-56, p. 14182.

that the Chinese Government was "willing to establish normal relations and live together in peace and co-operate in friendship" with all countries, especially their neighbors.[1] Chou En-lai laid the foundation for a feeling among the delegates that he was "reasonable, conciliatory and sincerely anxious to establish the genuiness of China's peaceful inclinations."[2] Many delegates left the Conference with their image of China looking less grim and forbidding. China's conduct at Bandung had done much to convince previously skeptical delegates that Nehru's thesis was plausible and the peaceful co-existence with Communist China was possible. At least for the present, China sincerely wanted peace.[3] As Nehru wished, the Conference permitted the Chinese to understand the realities of the international environment and to familiarize non-Communist Asia and the African states with the attitude of Chinese leaders toward both the non-Communist Asians and the West.[4] Throughout the Conference, Nehru "deftly" played "mother hen" to Chou En-lai, and arranged a number of private gatherings to bring Chou En-lai into closer contact with other delegates.[5]

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[1] Kahin, op. cit., p. 63. [2] Ibid., p. 15.
[3] Ibid., p. 35. [4] Ibid.
[5] Carlos P. Romulo, The Meaning of Bandung (U.S.A.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1956), p. 10.

From September 1954 to March 1955 China had been attacking the off-shore islands of Formosa. One of the reasons India and the four other sponsor countries wanted to hold the Conference was that they were concerned over the increasingly dangerous tensions between China and the United States which they feared might lead to a world war.[1] Many informal talks on the crisis were held between delegates and Chou En-lai. On 23 April 1955 Chou stated that Chinese people were friendly to the Americans, that they did not want war with the United States, and that they were willing to negotiate with the United States on the relaxation of tensions in the Far East, especially in the Formosan area.[2] In his final statement, Chou repeated the statement and said that the Chinese Government was willing to sit down and enter into negotiations with the United States Government. Chou's statements supported the growing belief of most dlegates that Communist China was conciliatroy and sincerely desired to avoid war with the United States.[3] Nehru and Krshina Menon, the Indian representative at the United Nations, had several conversations with Chou and discussed Formosa. Nehru also agreed to Menon's accepting Chou's invitation to continue the Bandung talks in Peking. Referring to Chou's statement made

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[1] Kahin, op. cit., p. 4. [2] Ibid., p. 62.
[3] Ibid., pp. 28-29.

on 23 April, Nehru said that China had been willing to enter into direct talks with the United States. The Chinese attitude was not new, but its being publicly stated at a gathering of Asian-African nations represented "a further and wholesome development." If this was availed of by all concerned, it could "lead to an approach towards peaceful settlement."[1] The Conference's five sponsors were convinced that the moral pressure for peace and conciliation at Bandung and their own between-sessions talks with Chou En-lai urging a peaceful resolution of the Formosa issue were responsible.[2]

Though Nehru thought that China was disposed to follow the five principles of peaceful co-existence, there remained some doubt in his mind. Nehru stated that it was necessary to give the Peking Government a chance to prove whether or not it would honor this pledge. He developed this thesis by speaking of creating an environment to make it difficult for China to flout these principles, and to increase her disposition to honor them. This environment could be created by China's reiterated public pledge of adherence to the five principles and the watchful scrutiny of Asian public opinion. Such an environment could prevent China's

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[1]Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 278.
[2]Kahin, op. cit., p. 29.

deviation from these principles. The more frequently China pledged to observe these principles, and the wider the audience which heard the pledge, the more substantial would be the moral restraint. Nehru used the Bandung Conference to provide this environment.[1] Nehru's objective was fulfilled.

In his opening speech at the Conference, Chou En-lai declared that the Chinese were prepared to establish normal relations with all countries, especially their neighboring countries, "on the basis of the strict adherence to the five principles of peaceful co-existence. When the Conference discussed the five principles of peaceful co-existence, a hot debate took place on military alliances. Pakistan and Turkey particularly stressed the right of collective security. Nehru antagonize these Western-aligned states by attacking any security alliances. Chou En-lai, in the increasing tension, stepped in to demonstrate the reasonableness and peacefulness of China and to bridge the widening gap between the positions of India and the Western-aligned states. Because the five principles could not be accepted by all the delegations, Chou En-lai proposed an alternate set of seven principles, which incorporated the five principles

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[1] Ibid., p.8.

of peaceful co-existence.[1]

In his speech in Lok Sabha, on 30 April 1955, Nehru commenting that the most important decision of the Bandung Conference was the "Declaration on World Peace and Co-operation." One could find in this declaration the "full embodiment of those Five Principles and the addition to them of elaborations which reinforce these principles." He felt "happy" that the Conference, representing more than half the population of the world, had declared its adherence to the tenets that "should guide their conduct and govern the relations of the nations of the world if world peace and co-operation are to be achieved."[2]

Chou En-lai's second visit to India. Sino-Indian relations at the popular level were continued by a second visit by Chou En-lai to India in November 1956. The Indian people gave Chou the same rousing reception the Chinese people had given Nehru.[3]

The theme of Chou's speeches during this visit was the closeness and cordiality of Sino-Indian relations. In his speech to the Indian Parliament, he re-

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[1]Kahin, op. cit., pp. 24-25.
[2]Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 276-7.
[3]Rajan, op. cit., p. 228.

called that his previous visit to India in 1954 resulted in the formulation by Nehru and himself of the five principles which had later been adopted by an increasing number of countries, including the twenty-nine countries of the Bandung Conference. Throughout their history, China and India had influenced but never interfered with each other. It was essential for them to continue to respect each other's independent development and to draw on what was useful in each other's experience.[1] Although the two countries held different views on some international problems, Chou believed that by adopting the five principles as a starting-point they could solve any problems between them, and "thereby to set an example of peaceful co-existence and friendly co-operation" strengthening "universal peace." Chou paid tribute to India's effort for peace, mentioning in pearticular its contribution to the restoration of peace in Korea and Indo-China, its role in formulating the five principles and in initiating the Bandung Conference, and its policy on the question of disarmament and the banning of weapons of mass destruction. He claimed that the solidarity of India China would become "a gigantic moral and material force in stabilizing the situation in Asia and Africa."[2]

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[1] Keesing's, op.cit., XI (1957-58), p. 15436.
[2] Ibid.

On 30 November 1956, Nehru also stressed the international importance of friendship and co-operation between India and China. A new force, he declared, had arisen in the world when these two countries attained their independence, and this new force would "influence world events to a very great extent."[1]

On another occasion Chou claimed that the Chinese Government and people would "never forget India's consistent and firm support" to the Chinese struggle for the unification of China and for restoring China's legal rights in the United Nations. In return, China would always defend India's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and support its promotion of world peace. Chou reiterated the importance of following the principles of peaceful co-existence, of the Chinese abhorrence of using force in international relations, and emphasized the great need of China for international peace.[2]

Chou En-lai left India on 10 December to visit some neighboring countries and returned to India on 30 December for a few days. The two Prime Ministers resumed their earlier discussions. Nehru had then returned from talks with President Eisenhower in the United States. Reportedly, the main topic of their talks was China's

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Rajan op. cit., p. 228.

[3] Ibid., p. 229.

relations with the Western bloc, in particular, the ways and means of normalizing the strained relations between China and United States. Nehru had acquainted himself earlier with the Chinese point of view which he reported to President Eisenhower, and then reported to Chou the American view based on his talks with President Eisenhower and other American leaders. The precise issues were not revealed. Chou merely said that he had "long talks" and "very useful exchange of views" with Nehru.[1]

Thus, at the end of this period, Sino-Indian relations were as deep and firm as they could be between a liberal democracy and a Communist state. They were not based merely on vague sentiment, but, as Chou said, they were "acquiring new content and significance as a result of mutual assistance and co-operation in practical fields of activity."[2] There were commercial relations, particularly the trade agreement of 14 October 1954 with a supplementary barter agreement, cultural exchanges, visits to both countries by study teams in various fields, military missions, and educational delegations. India and China had worked together at the Bandung Conference. They had also consulted and co-operated about resolving the Indo-China conflict and the Formosan question as well

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[1] Ibid., p. 229. [2] Ibid.

as the release of United States airmen detained in China. On the popular level, friendship and mutual regard was uninhibited and had been amply demonstrated by the exchange visits of the Prime Ministers. On the official level, both governments reflected in their words and actions the warm affection between the two peoples.[1]

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[1] Ibid.

V. THE TIBETAN REVOLT, MARCH, 1959

The Tibetan revolt. The Seventeen-point Agreement of May, 1951 between Tibet and China determined the following: Chinese Army entered Lhasa; the Tibetans kept their freedom of religion; the Chinese controlled the external affairs of Tibet. Several major question such as the implementation of reform programs in Tibet and the definition of the word "autonomous" as applied to Tibet, were left undetermined. Many basic issues remained unaffected. The Tibetans were suspicious of the Chinese, and the conflict between the Chinese "dynamic society" and the Tibetan "static society" remained.[1]

Tibetan resistance to Chinese rule started in 1950, principally from the tribesmen of the remote province of Kham in eastern Tibet. Occasionally the Chinese tried to put down the Kham rebellions, some of which reached considerable proportions. Apart from military action, the Chinese removed a large number of Khampas to other parts of Tibet; particularly in the

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[1] Chao Kuo-chun, "The Chinese-Indian Controversy," Current History, XXXVII (July-December, 1959), p.356.

south. Although dispersed, the Khampas continued their guerilla activities. They were supported by the local populations and extended their influence to Lhasa and other centers.[1]

At the end of 1955, uprisings took place in northeastern and eastern Tibet, and spread westwards.[2] The eastern Tibetans, the Khampas in particular, were described by the fourteenth Dalai Lama as a "tough and resolute people." They knew their mountains, which were ideal places for guerilla warfare. They raided Chinese roads and depots.[3]

The Dalai Lama was "very despondent" about the "desperate situation," which had become worse than it had been during the previous two years. He wrote that "the vicious circle of dictatorial repression and popular resentment" again enclosed the Tibetans. He tried unsuccessfully to reach a peaceful solution. Instead of attaining peace, he was losing control of his people - because they had determined to oppose the Chinese, with violence if necessary. The Dalai Lama's position was "becoming almost insupportable." On the one hand, the Chinese were trying to undermine his political authority;

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[1]Keesing's, op.cit., XII (1959-60), 16797.
[2]International Commission of Jurists, op.cit.,12.
[3]Howarth, op.cit., p.122.

on the other hand, in so far as he opposed "the people's violent instincts," he was helping the Chinese destroy the people's trust in him. In the depth of his "despondency," he decided to withdraw from politics for "the best interests of Tibet," and accepted Nehru's invitation to go to India.[1]

The Dalai Lama arrived in India on 25 November 1956 and decided to stay in India until "there was some positive sign of a change in Chinese policy." For the first time he met foreigners who felt "true sympathy for Tibet."[2] When the Dalai Lama met Nehru, he explained "how desperate things had become in eastern Tibet" and how the Tibetans feared that "worse troubles would spread through the rest of the country." The Dalai Lama complained that the Chinese meant to destroy Tibetan religion and customs, thereby cutting off the historic ties of Tibet with India. All Tibetans "pinned their remaining hopes on the government and people of India." He said that he wanted to stay in India until the Tibetans could win back their freedom by peaceful means. Nehru answered that nothing could be done for Tibet at that time because nobody had ever formally recognized Tibet's independence. Agreeing that it was useless to fight the Chinese, Nehru

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[1] Ibid. 123. [2] Ibid. 132.

advised the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet and work peacefully for the Seventeen-point Agreement. The Dalai Lama insisted that he had done his best to carry it out, but the Chinese had refused to honor it. He could see no sign of a change of heart by the Chinese. Nehru promised to speak to Chou En-lai, who was coming to India the following day.[1]

When, shortly thereafter, Chou En-lai met the Dalai Lama in Delhi, he advised the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet because the situation there was worsening. Repeating his people's "grievances against the Chinese occupation," the Dalai Lama told Chou En-lai that , though Tibetans were "willing to forget whatever wrongs had been done" to them, the "inhuman treatment and oppression" had to be stopped. Chou En-lai answered that Mao Tse-tung had made it "perfectly clear" that reforms would only be introduced according to the wishes of the people.[2] In 1959, Nehru gave account of his meetings with Chou En-lai and the Dalai Lama, in a speech in the Lok Sabha. He showed how hard he had tried to "steer a middle way to bring about a reconciliation between Chou En-lai and the Dalai Lama.[3] According to Nehru's account, Chou En-lai had told him that, because the

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[1] Ibid. p. 133. [2] Ibid. pp. 136-37.
[3] Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit. p. 353.

people of Tibet were different from the people of China, the Chinese did not "consider Tibet as a province of China" but as "an autonomous region which would enjoy autonomy." Chou En-lai further said that "it was absurd for anyone to imagine that China was going to force communism on Tibet." He said that Communism could not be enforced on a very backward country, and the Chinese had no wish to do so, even though they would like to reform progressively. Nehru had then told the Dalai Lama of "Chou's friendly approach and of his assurance that he would respect the autonomy of Tibet." Nehru suggested to him "that he should accept these assurances in good faith and co-operate in maintaining that autonomy and bringing about certain reforms in Tibet." The Dalai Lama agreed that his country was "very backward socially and economically, and reforms were needed."[1]

In their final meeting, the Dalai Lama told Nehru that he had decided to go back, because of Nehru's advice and because of Chou En-lai's promises.[2] The Dalai Lama left for Tibet in April, 1957.

In 1957 the situation worsened. Mao Tse-tung attempted to forestall a revolt by saying that reforms would not be introduced in Tibet during 1958-62 and

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[1] Ibid. 324. [2] Howarth, op.cit. p.138.

that thereafter the introduction of reforms would depend on the wishes of the Tibetan people. Nevertheless, uprisings occurred. Incidents broke out when some high Tibetan personalities, who were not sympathetic to the Chinese, were invited to parties by the Chinese Military Commanders and were either killed or imprisoned.[1]

The revolt became full scale opposition when, on March 9, 1959, the Chinese Commander in Lhasa invited the Dalai Lama to attend a theatrical performance at Chinese military headquarters. The Dalai Lama was requested to attend alone, without a bodyguard. Contrary to the usual practice, the invitation was delivered to him personally by a junior official instead of through his cabinet or household officials. The Dalai Lama felt this was "curious," and described it as a "strange" invitation. News of the invitation leaked out to the people of Lhasa. The city was crowded at the time with monks and pilgrims celebrating the Tibetan New Year. The unusual procedure immediately aroused suspicion among the people, who feared that the Dalai Lama would be kidnapped by the Chinese. Great numbers of people besieged the palace urging the Dalai Lama not to accept. The invitation was declined. Five thousand Tibetan

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[1] International Commision of Jurists, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

women wanted to march to the Chinese Foreign Bureau to present a manifesto denouncing the Seventeen-point agreement and demanding Chinese withdrawal from the country. They asked the consuls of India, Nepal and Bhutan to accompany them but this request was refused and they did not march at all. A declaration of independence, signed by the Tibetan Cabinet, the Tibetan National Assembly, and representatives of the principal monasteries, was presented to the Chinese authorities. There were daily demonstrations in Lhasa, culminating on March 17 when the Chinese fried two shells on the palace and a machine-gun was heard. The Dalai Lama left for India the day the Lhasa revolt erupted. He reached India on 31 March and was granted political asylum.[1]

Reports reaching the India frontier spoke of several days of heavy fighting in Lhasa. A conservative estimate was that at least 2,000 Tibetans had been killed. On 27 March, reports reached Kalimpong, an Indian frontier town, that the Chinese had crushed the revolt in Lhasa and had placed the city under military rule. On 28 March, the Chinese issued their first statement on the Tibetan revolt which said that the Chinese Central

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[1]Howarth, op.cit., pp. 150-176; Keesing's, op.cit., XII (1959-60), p.16797.

Government had dissolved the local government of Tibet and replaced it by a sixteen-member "Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region," headed by the Panchen Lama[1] and containing four Chinese officials.[2]

The reactions of the Government of India. The revolt and the exile of the Dalai Lama came as a shock to the Indian public, but the government had been aware of the situation in Tibet for years. The Chinese Government did not permit any Indian scholars to do research in Tibet and requested the Government of India to cancel Nehru's visit to Tibet in 1957 on the ground that they could not guarantee his safety.[3] The Dalai Lama wrote that the Chinese authorities would not dare to allow a statesman from the outside world to see what they were doing.[4]

On 10 July 1958, the Foreign Office of China gave

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[1]The Panchen Lama is traditionally second only to the Dalai Lama in eccelsistical importance, but his temporal powers are limited and he has no rights of succession to the throne of the Dalai Lama. Communist Chiha has installed the Panchen Lama as a puppet rival to Dalai Lama and he has become the principal Tibetan spokesman for the Chinese authorities in Tibet. The Panchen Lama is the ninth in line of suceession.

[2]Keesing's Comtemporary Archives, op. cit., XII, (1959-1960), p. 16797.

[3]S.C.S., "Indian Reactions to the Crisis in Tibet," World Today, XV, (June, 1959), pp. 236-237.

[4]Howarth, op. cit., p. 142.

a note to the counsellor of India regarding "the exigency of the stepped up subversive and disruptive activities against China's Tibetan region carried out by the United States and the Chiang Kai-shek clique in collusion with fugitive reactionaries from Tibet using India's Kalimpong as a base." The note said that Chou En-lai, during his 1956 visit to India, had complained to Nehru about subversive activities in Kalimpong. Nehru indicated that if the Chinese Government could produce evidence, the Indian Government would take action. On 12 January 1958 Chou En-lai referred again to this question in an interview with the Indian Ambassador to China, R. K. Nehru. On 22 January 1958, the Chinese Foreign Minister delivered to the Indian Embassy samples of propaganda leaflets sent to Tibet from Kalimpong. The note mentioned that subversive activities had recently increased. By using Kalimpong as a base, the American-Chiang Kai-shek clique, local special agents, and Tibetan reactionaries were "actively inciting and organizing a handful of reactionaries hidden in Tibet for an armed revolt there in order to attain the traitorous aim of separating the Tibet region from the People's Republic of China." The note conveyed detailed information about the activities, which the Chinese Government regarded as "a direct threat." The Indian Government was requested to repress

the activities.[1]

On 2 August 1958, the Indian Minister of Foreign affairs replied that the Government of India was "greatly surprised" at the Chinese note in which the statements were based on a "complete misunderstanding of facts." The Government of India had no evidence that the United States or the KMT regime were using Kalimpong as a conspirational base. The Government of India would never permit "any portion of its territory to be used as a base of activity against any foreign government, not to speak of friendly Government of People's Republic of China." The Tibetans, many of whom had settled in northeast India for years, were allowed to stay in India only if they carried on their activities peacefully. The Government of India denied there were any reactionary organizations and publications in Kalimpong, or that arms and ammunition were smuggled from Kalimpong to Tibet. Nevertheless, the Indian Government promised to enquire and to take action against anyone who indulged in any such activities.[2] The following day, the Chinese Ambassador complained that Tibetans in Kalimpong had set up an organization called "Committee for giving

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[1]Government of India, Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements signed between the Governments of India and China, 1954-59, White Paper I, pp. 60-61.

[2]Ibid., pp. 63-65.

support to resistance against violence." Fifteen Tibetan aristocrats and rebels held a meeting resolving to send petition to various countries.[1]

Although the situation in Tibet became worse, Nehru acted with restraint. The above-mentioned notes were not published. Nehru commented in March, 1959 that there were troubles in Kham but discounted reports about disturbances in central Tibet. He pointed out that Kham was long ago integrated into China and had been a difficult part to govern even in early years. On 17 March Nehru spoke in Lok Sabha that there had been no large-scale violence in Tibet and that the situation represented "more a clash of wills at present than a clash of arms or physical bodies." The Delhi Hindustan Standard, in an editorial on 20 March, observed critically that Nehru had not only understated the situation in Tibet but had also given the impression that the understatement was deliberate. On 23 March, in Lok Sabha, Nehru disclosed the disturbances in central Tibet and expressed his anxiety about the Dalai Lama. He counselled the Indians to exercise restraint and declared that India had "no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of China" with whom India had friendly relations.[2]

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[1] Ibid., p.66. [2] S.C.S., op.cit., pp.236-39.

In a later speech, Nehru still restrained himself on the Tibetan question but showed some signs of losing his patience. He reiterated that India had never desired to interfere in the Tibetan question, and that she had in fact given up its previliges in Tibet and recognized Chinese sovereignty in Tibet. However, what had happened in Lhasa was a "completely new development." He separated the Lhasa revolt from the Kham troubles. He argued that Kham was never adequately controlled by either the Tibetans or the Chinese. After the Chinese started introducing reforms, they met troubles from the Khampas. The Lhasa incident was unfortunate for the Tibetans because the Chinese Government was much stronger than local recruits of the Tibetan Army. India's sympathies went out "very much to the Tibetans, quite apart from who was to blame and who was not to blame." India wanted to make friends with both the Tibetans and the Chinese, but this did not mean to subject India to "any kind of dictation from any country however great" it might be. It meant that India "should exercise a certain measure of restraint and wisdom, and not to do anything in excitement which might lead India into difficulties." He pointed out that the Chinese complaint that Kalimpong was "the commanding centre of

the rebellion" was wrong because the Government of India was unaware of any activity in many previous months.[1] When the Dalai Lama reached India on 31 March 1959 he was received by an Indian frontier officer who had been instructed by Nehru. Nehru announced in Lok Sabha that the Dalai Lama would receive "respectful treatment."[2] On 21 April the Dalai Lama went to Mussorie and stayed there.

On 26 April, the Indian Foreign Secretary officially notified the Chinese Government that India had granted the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugees asylum and had issued "strict instructions to disarm them." The Government of India regretted that the National People's Congress in Peking had made "unbecoming and unjustified" charges against India and had made "patently untrue" allegations against Indian government and officials. The Chinese had charged that the statements of the Dalai Lama attacking China were imposed on him by foreigners. The Indian government said that the Dalai Lama came to India at his own request, acted entirely on his own, and was free to return. Though he would be accorded "respectful treat-

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[1] Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit. 314-17.
[2] Ibid. 318-19.

ment," he was not expected to carry on any political activities from India. China had also alleged that Indians were "working in the footsteps of the British imperialist" and "habouring expansionist ambitions towards Tibet." The Government of India replied that India had "no desire to interfere in internal happenings in Tibet," but because of "long standing religious and cultural contacts with the people of Tibet" the people of India were interested in developments there. "The recent tragic events" in Tibet affected the Indian government considerably. The Government of India were "distressed" that a "furious and unworthy campaign" had been started in the press and in radio Peking, the effect of which could only damage the friendly relations between India and China. The Government of India considered it "most unfortunate that political asylum had led responsible persons in China to make serious allegations," which were "unbecoming and entirely void of substance."[1]

The following day, China protested in an angry note that on 20 April eighty Indians had demonstrated before the Chinese Consulate-General in New Delhi and

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[1] White Paper I , op.cit., pp. 68-9.

condemned China's suppression of the Tibetan rebellions. The demonstrators had pasted a portrait of Mao Tse-tung on the wall of the Consulate-General and had thrown tomatoes and eggs at it. Policemen did not interfere and even helped correspondents take pictures.[1] Three days later, India replied that investigations had been made. Contrary to China's charge, policemen had intervened. The portrait was only a small picture and only a few tomatoes and two eggs were hurled at it. It was on the wall only a minute or two before being removed by the police. A number of press photographers accompanied the procession and it was "possible that one of them managed to get a snap shot" of it. India was satisfied that the police did not help the demonstrators. Processions were frequent in India and lawful so long as they were peaceful. Indians often voiced slogans against high officials in India, including Mahatma Gandhi and the Prime Minister. Though India appreciated the resentment of the Chinese Government at such an incident, she regretted the language used in the Chinese memorandum on the incident.[2]

On 27 April 1959 Nehru spoke on Tibet in Lok Sabha. He regretted that Mao Tse-tung had been insulted;

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[1] Ibid. 70. [2] Ibid., pp. 71-2.

and he warned Indians not to be"swept away into wrong causes." Instead, he urged, India should "exercise restraint and wisdom" and use "moderate and precise" language. Nevertheless, he was "greatly distressed at the tone of the comments and the charges made against India by responsible people in China." The charges were "so fantastic that he found it difficult to deal with them." The charges and the language worsened Sino-Indian relations and might have "far-reaching consequences." India's "broad policy" was governed by three factors: (i) the preservation of the security and integrity of India; (ii) India's desire to maintain friendly relations with China; and (iii) India's deep sympathy for the people of Tibet. It was "a correct policy for the present and more so for the future." It would be a tragedy for the peace of Asia and the world if the two great countries of Asia which had been peaceful neighbors for ages past should become hostile to each other.[1]

Nehru continued that the difference between China and Tibet was great and "there appeared to be hardly any meeting point." Tibet was "a static, unchanging society, fearful of what might be done to it in the name of reforms."[2]

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[1]Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., pp. 321-23.
[2]Ibid., pp.323-24.

To say that a number of "upper strata reactionaries" in Tibet were solely responsible for the revolt was "an extraordinary simplification of a complicated situation." Even according to Chinese sources, the revolt was of "considerable magnitude" and its basis must have been "a strong feeling of nationalism" which affected not only upper class people but others also." Nehru hoped that the authorities in China would not use their great strength against the Tibetans but would win them to friendly co-operation in accordance with the assurances they had given about the autonomy of Tibet. The events in Tibet had created "tremendous interest among the people of India and in the world Press." The reaction was essentially not political, but was based on humanitarian reasons and kinship with the Tibetan people. It was an "instinct reaction." Nehru had a long talk with the Dalai Lama on 24 April and said that all his sympathy went out to that young man who at an early age had had "to shoulder heavy burdens and to face tremendous responsibilities." India had "no desire to interfere in Tibet," but had "every desire to maintain friendship between India and China." At the same time India had "every sympathy for the people of Tibet," and was "greatly distressed

at their helpless plight."[1]

In Rajya Sabha, the Upper House of Indian Parliament, on May 4, Nehru said that India still kept her policy of non-alignment. It was "a tragedy" that the non-alignment for which they had striven for many years and "enshrined" in Panchsheel and in Bandung had "suffered considerably in people's mind." The words of Bandung and Panchsheel began to lose their meaning. The word "peace" became "almost a thunderbolt." He said that India, as a sovereign country, had "every right" to give the Dalai Lama and some thousands of refugees asylum. China had charged that the "commanding centre of the rebellion in Tibet had shifted to Mussoorie" where the Dalai Lama took asylum. Nehru said that this charge was a shock to him because it was made by the people whom India had "not only honoured and respected" but whom India had considered "particularly advanced in culture and politeness and the gentler art of civilization." To accuse India of being stooges of the British was "an extraordinary thing" and was "completely untruthful." Nehru stressed that the Dalai Lama was "not kept under duress" and that he, Nehru,

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[1] Ibid., p. 325.

would be happy if the Dalai Lama went back to Tibet "with dignity."[1]

On 16 May the Chinese ambassador stated to the Indian foreign secretary, that India, particularly in Nehru's speech of 27 April, was interfering in Chinese internal affairs. India, both before and after the outbreak of the rebellion had slandered China on Tibetan affairs. Responsible persons of many Indian political parties openly called Tibet a "country," and described the Chinese action in Tibet as "banditry and imperialism." Some demanded that the Tibetan question be submitted to the United Nations and some proposed the holding of a tripartite conference of India, China and Tibet. Most of the Indian political parties formed organizations to support Tibetan rebellions. These words and deeds sabotaged Sino-Indian friendship. They could not be justified by any pretext, either by freedom of speech or by feelings of kinship. The Chinese people also felt kinship towards the Indian people, but China had "never used this as a pretext to interfere in India's internal affairs," and would never do so. Responsible members of the Indian Government refused "to accept the Chinese Government's account

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[1] Ibid., 326-27.

of the facts" and said that the basis of the rebellion was not "upper strata reactionaries" but the feeling of nationalism. The two statements by the Dalai Lama advocating Tibetan independence and attacking the Chinese Government were the result of influence by the Indian Government. One of these statements was distributed by an Indian official of the Ministry of External Affairs and was published in official bulletins of Indian Embassies abroad. The "impressive welcome" to the Dalai Lama and Nehru's long talks with him meant welcome to a Chinese revel. The Indian Government thus undoubtedly played an objective role of encouraging the Tibetan rebels." This was interference to an "intolerable extent." China had not replied to this Indian interference previously because of the Five Principles and Sino-Indian friendship.[1]

The note went on to charge that the Dalai Lama was "abducted to India by the Tibetan rebels" and still was surrounded and under control." It was, therefore, "futile" to send some one to see him before he had "freed himself from encirclement and control." In her relations with India, China"consistently adhered to the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and worked for the development of friendly co-operation between the two countries."

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[1] White Paper I, op.cit., pp.73-4.

The Chinese Government hoped that "the dark clouds overcasting Sino-Indian relations" would "disperse" and that "through current trial," friendship would "develop even better." India had been a friend of China for the past thousand and more years, and would "certainly continue" to be so. The Chinese Government assured India that the enemy of China lay in the East. China's main attention was "directed to the east, to the west Pacific region, to the vicious and aggressive United States imperialism, and not to India or any other country in the southeast Asia and south Asia." China would "not be so foolish as to antagonize the United States in the east and again to antagonize India in the West." The complete control of Tibet by China would "not in the least endanger India." India would ultimately see whether relations between the Tibet region of China and India were friendly or hostile by watching the future. The quarrel between the two countries in the past few years, particularly in the last three months, was but "an interlude in the course of thousands upon thousands of years of friendship between the two countries." [1]

A week later, on 23 May, India replied that she was disappointed by China's discourteous note. It was

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[1] Ibid., pp. 75-6.

"an act of forgetfulness" to a friendly country. India regretted that China ignored the facts given by Nehru in Lok Sabha on 27 April and some subsequent occasions. The system of China was different from India, but neither could interfere in the other. In India, unlike China, the law recognized many parties, and protected the expression of different opinions. The Government of India themselves were often criticized and opposed by some sections of the Indian Parliament. India endeavoured to cultivate the friendship of two countries in spite of differences of opinions and avoided to interfere in China's internal affairs. India would continued this policy but would not discard any of its own policies under any outside pressure.[1]

On 9 September 1959, the Dalai Lama cabled the United Nations Secretary General asking for "the intervention of the United Nations... in view of the inhuman treatment and crimes against humanity and religion" to which the people of Tibet were being subjected.[2] Nehru objected that to raise the issue in the United Nations would only result in "an angry debate" after the fashion of the cold war, and would "produce reactions on the Chinese Government" which would be "more adverse to

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[1] Ibid., 77-8.

[2] Keesing's, XII (1959-60), 17091.

Tibet and the Tibetans" than before.[1]

On 25 August 1959, the Indian Parliament revealed that because of political disturbances in Tibet trade between India and Tibet had been reduced to about one fourth of its normal rate. Indian traders in Tibet were harassed by the Chinese authorities. China had declared the Indian rupee unacceptable in Tibet. The Chinese authorities in Tibet had imposed restrictions on the movement of the Indians and Indian representatives. The Indian Government sent several notes protesting their treatment.[2]

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[1] Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., p.346.

[2] Sudershan Chawla, "Tibet: The Red Chinese Challenge to India," Current History XL (March, 1961), pp. 174-75.

VI. THE BORDER DISPUTE, 1954-59

Nehru maintains that the India-Chinese border extends over 3,520 miles from the junction of Afghanistan, China and India in the north to the junction of Burma, China, and India in the east. The border is divided into four sectors:[1]

(i) Western Sector (the boundary between Jammu and Kashmir of India and Sikkim and the Tibet region of China);

(ii) Middle Sector (the boundary between the States of Punja, Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh of India and the Ari district of the Tibet region of China);

(iii) Eastern Sector (the boundary between the North East Frontier Agency of India and the Tibet region of China);

(iv) Northern boundaries of Bhutan and Sikkim on the one hand and the Tibet region of China on the other.

The Government of India considers herself responsible for

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[1] Government of India, Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question (Government of India: Ministry of External Affairs, 1961), p. 4.

NORTHERN FRONTIER OF INDIA

Sikkim and Bhutan-Towns are attached to India by special treaties

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





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the borders of Sikkim, Bhutan, and Nepal. On 31 July 1950, India signed a treaty with Nepal which provided that the two countries would inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring state likely to affect the friendly relations between India and Nepal.[1] India signed a treaty with Sikkim on 5 December 1950 by which special relations were established between India and Sikkim and the latter's foreign affairs and defense were put under India's control. India signed a treaty with Bhutan on 8 August 1949 whereby Bhutan agreed to be guided by the advice of the Indian Government in regard to its external relations. From the beginning, India was thus aware of the problem of national security in Sino-India relations.[2]

Exchanged notes between the governments of India and China. The border disputes between India and China were mainly in three regions:

(i) Bara Hoti (called Wu-Je by the Chinese) - a small border pass along Uttar Pradesh in India.

(ii) The Ladakh region of the State of Jammu and Kashmir of India.

(iii) The MacMahon Line: The Simla Convention

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[1] Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 373-4.

[2] Kumar, op. cit., p. 24.

> of 1914, convened by Britain, Tibet and China, laid down a boundary commonly known as the MacMahon Line between Tibet and India from Bhutan to Burma. The Indian region along the MacMahon Line is the North East Frontier Agency(NEFA).

The first note on the border issue was sent by China to India, on 17 July 1954. It complained that over thirty Indian troops armed with rifles had crossed the Niti Pass and intruded into Wu-Je of the Ari area of the Tibetan region of China. China hoped that India would promptly withdraw the troops. A month later, the Chinese Counsellor sent another note, saying that the unit consisted of thirty-three men attached to a local garrison in Uttar Pradesh. China asked to know the result of the steps India had taken in this matter. The Indian Government replied on 27 August that the Chinese allegation was "entirely incorrect". A party of Indian Border Security Force was in Bara Hoti which was south-east of Niti Pass and was in Indian territory. None of them crossed the Niti Pass. In contrast, some Tibetan officials tried to pass into Indian territory in Bara Hoti without the documents required under the Sino-Indian Agreement of April 1954.[1]

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[1]White Paper I, (1954-59), op. cit., pp. 1-3.

The following year, on 28 June, the Indian Government complained that some Chinese with five tents and twenty horses entered the Indian territory without the proper documents and camped at Barahoti. India requested the Chinese Government to instruct the Tibetans and the Chinese not to enter Indian territory as the Indian Government had instructed the Indians not to cross into Tibet. On 11 July 1955, the Chinese Counsellor in India replied that there never had been any case of Chinese personnel crossing the border near the Niti Pass. Instead, he charged that the another group of over thirty Indian soldiers crossed Wu-Je in Tibet on 25 July 1955 and engaged in constructing fortifications at places close to a Chinese garrison. On the bsis of the Five Principles, the Indian Government replied that the Indian troops had not "under any circumstances" crossed the Chinese border into Tibet, but instead that the Chinese troops were in Indian territory and should be withdrawn. A month later, the Indian Government notified the Chinese Counsellor that a Tibetan official with the Chinese troops at Barahoti had collected grazing tax from Indian herdsmen grazing goats in the area. The Chinese Counsellor reiterated on 26 September 1955 that no Chinese personnel ever crossed the border into Wu-Je area, but that Indian troops intruded into Wu-Je which always belonged to the

Tibetan region within the Chinese territory. On 5 November 1955, India replied that they were positive that Indian personnel never intruded into Wu-Je area of Tibet but remained at Bara Hoti which was two miles south of the Tunjun La, another border pass. Chinese troops came south of the Tunjun La and were camping at Bara Hoti alongside Indian troops. Strict instructions should be issued that no personnel from Tibet should cross into India without Indian permission. Indians never entered the Wu-Je area becuase they never crossed the Tunjun La border pass, and Wu-Je was 12 kilometers north of this pass.[1]

On the same day the Government of India sent another note to the Chinese Counsellor. It said that on 15 September 1955, when an Indian detachment from Hoti Plain was approaching Damzan, ten miles south of the Niti Pass, they were stopped by twenty Chinese soliers "trespassing" on Indian territory. A "serious clash" was avoided by the "great restraint" of the Indian detachment. Damzan was "clearly within Indian territory." It was situated at longitude 79.51°, latitude 30.49° and was ten miles south of the Niti Pass which had been recognized by the Sino-Indian Agree-

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[1] Ibid., pp. 4-9.

ment of April 1954 as the border pass. Incidents such as these, therefore, violated the Five Principles and might have "grave consequences."[1]

On May 2, 1956, India protested that twelve Chinese soldiers equipped with tommy and sten guns and telescopes came within half a mile east of Nilang on 28 April. Nilang and the area right up to Tsang Chokla pass was within Indian territory. If the Chinese soldiers refused to withdraw and thus violated the 1954 Agreement, it might lead to "serious incidents" and mar the friendly relations.[2]

In June and July, three notes were exchanged concerning Bara Hoti. On 7 June 1956, India sent a note to the Chargé D'Affaires saying that the Indian personnel camping at Bara Hoti south of Tunjun La pass reported that a party of twenty or thirty Chinese troops were preparing to cross Tunjun La. Becuase Indians never crossed the Tunjun La, India requested the Chinese not to enter the area. The following day, the Chinese Foreign Office claimed that both the Wu-Je area and the Tunjun La were within Chinese territory. No historical record showed Tunjun La as a border pass between India and China. China was willing to continue consultation

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[1] Ibid., p. 10. [2] Ibid., p. 11.

with India in a joint investigation, as India desired. Besides normal diplomatic negotiations, China suggested that both governments should refrain from sending troops into the Wu-Je area so as to avoid "confrontation of two troops and to maintain the normal relations along the Sino-Indian border." India and China should abide by the Five Principles and the question of Wu-Je would "undoubtedly be settled satisfactorily through the Clarification of historical facts by means of investigation." On 26 July, in another note on Wu-Je, China urged that the Indian troops in Wu-Je area be withdrawn because no Chinese garrisons were there that year. Though she was pleased that the Indian government had agreed to a joint investigation, the Chinese Government maintained that Wu-Je was within Chinese territory.[1]

On September 1956, the Government of India protested that on 1 September 1956, ten Chinese Army personnel entered and took up positions about one quarter mile from Hupsang Khad on the Indian side of Shiki La Pass. The Party withdrew after Indian Police pointed out that Indian territory extended up to the Shipke La Pass. To cross this Pass without visaes violated the 1954 Agreement which recognized Shipki La as a

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[1] Ibid., pp. 12-6.

border pass. China was requested to issue strict instructions that no unauthorized person should cross into Indian territory, or there would be the danger of "breach of peace." Two weeks later, India again protested that the Indian border policemen sighted a party of Chinese military personnel on 10 September 1956 on the Indian side of the frontier of Shipki La Pass. The Chinese refused to withdraw, threw stones on the Indian patrol and threatened to use grenades. The Chinese troops said that the Chinese border extended up to Hupsang Khad, which they had not passed. On 20 September, a party of 27 Indian Border Security Force faced a party of 20 Chinese troops two miles on the Indian side of the Shipke La Pass. The Chinese party refused to withdraw and said that if the Indians went beyond Hupsang Khad they "would oppose it with arms," and were "prepared to face the consequences." India was "pained and surprised" at such incidents. The "natural and direct result of such attitudes" might be "clash of arms." The Government of India considered any crossing of Shipki La Pass by armed personnel as aggression "which they would resist." The Government of India attached "great importance" to this matter and requested immediate action by the Chinese Government, otherwise there might be an unfortunate clash on

the border leading to "undesirable results."[1]

On 3 October 1956, India sent another note on Bara Hoti. During the previous twelve months, a number of conversations were held in New Delhi and Peking on the ownership of Bara Hoti and Wu-Je. The Government of India declared its position as follows: Bara Hoti had historical evidence to support its belonging to India and the Tunjun La was always the border pass. The precise location was 30°-53' latitude north and 79°-59' longitude east. India agreed that it would be easier to reach a friendly settlement if both governments refrained from sending troops into this area.[2]

Two years later, on 2 July 1958, the Indian Government protested that Chinese troops had crossed into Indian territory, and occupied the Khurnak Fort within India in the Ladakh region of Kashmir. Although no formal agreement had ever been reached, Indian jurisdiction over the Khurnak Fort had never been disputed. India would send a reconnaissance party to the area which would remain within Indian territory.[3]

On 2 August 1958, the Chinese Government said that since 8 July 1958, more than twenty Indian personnel had entered Wu-Je of the Tibetan region of

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[1] Ibid., pp.17-9. [2] Ibid., pp. 20-1.
[3] Ibid., pp.22.

China bringing with them wireless communication apparatus. They were sent by the Government of India, who were "attempting to change the existing situation of Wu-Je and to create a new dispute." The Chinese Government lodged a protest and demanded an immediate withdrawal. The Indian Government replied that they were civilian revenue officials operating normal revenue settlement. Though both China and India had agreed not to send civil officials to the area, China had sent some to Bara Hoti on 29 June 1958. Since the Indian Government had informed China about the visit of Indian civilian officials to Barahoti during that summer, the Chinese Government had no legitimate cause for protest against such action, particularly since it was "an internal domestic matter" within Indian territory. In addition, the Indian officials carried only shotguns for protection against animals, and they came not attempting to "change the existing situation and to create a new dispute."[1] On 10 December 1958 the Indian Government said that, because of the Chinese protest, India had already withdrawn her Revenue Party on 9 September. On the other hand, a Chinese party carrying arms and ammunition entered Barahoti and camped there. On 26 September twenty-five Chinese military personnel were added. The

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[1] Ibid., pp. 23-5.

Chinese action amounted to a change of the existing situation during the talks between the two governments. Such unilateral action was undesirable and countrary to the friendly spirit of the talks.[1]

The two governments exchanged three notes concerning the Ladakh region. On 18 October 1958, India protested that China had built the Yecheng-Gartok road or Sinkiang-Tibet highway, the completion of which was announced in September, 1957, across the eastern part of the Ladakh region of the Jammu and Kashmire State. The India-China boundary in theLadakh sector was "traditionally well-known" and followed "well marked geographical features." The territory which the road traversed had been part of the Kadakh region of India for centuries and the "old established frontiers" had been accepted by the Chinese in a Treaty of 1842 as the international boundary. In an official communication, a Chinese member of the Boundary Commission of 1847-49 accepted the boundary as "sufficiently and distinctly fixed" so that it would be"best to adhere to this ancient arrangement" and it would "prove far more convenient to abstain from any additional measure for fixing them." Travellers to the area referred to

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[1] Ibid., pp.31-2.

it as part of Ladakh, and Atlases like the Johnston's Atlas of India, edition 1894, and maps published by the Survey of India showed it "unmistakably as part of Ladakh." It was, therefore, "a matter of surprise and regret" that China should have constructed a road through "indisputably Indian territory" without obtaining the permission of India. India pointed out that Chinese personnel engaged in constructing and maintaining the road, as well as Chinese travellers traversing this road contravened Article V of the 1954 Agreement. India, however, was "anxious to settle these petty frontier disputes so that the friendly relations between the two countries" might not "suffer." India also asked for information about a missing Indian party in the area near Shinglian in Indian territory. The Chinese Government admitted that they had detained on September 8 and 12, 1958, two groups of Indian armed personnel at Tahungliutan and Kesrekirekan on the Sinkian-Tibet road for their "unlawful intrusion." China deported them on 22 October 1958 through the Karakram pass.[1]

On 17 January 1959, India protested for the first time against Chinese "transgressions" into the

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[1] Ibid., pp. 26-8.

North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) area. Two parties of Chinese troops had crossed into Lohit Frontier Division of the NEFA in September and in October 1958. On 23 June 1959, China alleged that over two hundred troops "intruded, shelled, and occupied" the Migyitun area in the south eastern part of Tibet (in the NEFA of India), and colluded "with the Tibetan rebel bandits to carry on illegal activities." Several hundred Indian troops occupied the area of Samgar Sanpo north east of Migyitun and nearby Molo and Gyala where they colluded with the Tibetan rebels. The above-mentioned places were "indisputably" Chinese territory. Such actions constituted "grave encroachments on Chinese sovereignty and flagrant interference in Chinese internal affairs." Later India replied that the Chinese allegations were untrue. According to the "traditional border" (the MacMahon Line), Migyitun, Samgu Sanpu, Molo and Gyala were within Chinese territory. The Government of India disarmed the Tibetan refugees and warned them not to use Indian territory for hostile action against China. India "scrupulously enforced" these measures and there was no question of Tibetan refugees' violation of Chinese territory, far less of Indian collusion with them. The Northernmost Indian outpost was at Long Ju, south of Migyitun. Another was at Tamadem, some miles south of Samgu Sampo. Both these outposts were established peace-

fully and there was no question of shelling or using force. India placed "great value on the maintenance of friendly and good neighborly relations with China" and stood "firmly by Pachsheel." They believed that the Chinese note must have been based on wrong information.[1]

On 30 July 1959, the Government of India noted that on 28 July 1959 an Indian police party came across a Chinese armed detachment in Indian territory near the Western Pangong Lake (33.39 N and 78.46 E) in the Ladakh area of the Jammu and Kashmir State. The Chinese detachment camped at Spanggur (33.34 N and 78.48 E), refused to withdraw, and detained the six Indian police officers. India lodged a "strong protest" against the violation of the Indian border and the arrest of the Indian party. India requested the immediate release of the policemen and the evacuation of Indian territory by the Chinese armed detachment. On 6 August 1959 China admitted that she had the six Indian policemen, but claimed that areas west of Digra, and south of Pangong Tse were within Chinese borders. The policemen had entered Chinese territory. The protest lodged By India, therefore, "greatly surprised" the Chinese Government. Such

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[1] Ibid., pp.32-6.

"unlawful intrusion" constituted "serious contravention of friendship and Five Principles." The Chinese Government deported the six Indians as an "act of friendly consideration," and requested effective measure to prevent recurrence of similar incidents.[1]

On 11 August 1959, the Indian Ambassador wrote to the Chinese Foreign Office that an armed Chinese patrol of two hundred violated the Indian border at Khinzemane (longitude 91.46' E and latitude 27.46' N.). It refused to withdraw and pushed the Indian patrol to the bridge at Drokung Samba (longitude 91.47' E and latitude 27.46' N). A couple of days later, the Indian Ambassador expressed his surprise that the Chinese Government in its note of 6 August claimed the places where the six India policemen were detained. The claim was unfounded, India maintained; and she requested the withdrawal of the Chinese party camping at Spanggur.[2]

On 27 August 1959, the Chinese Government protested that on 25 August a group of Indian armed troops intruded into Chinese territory south of Migyitun and opened fire on Chinese frontier guards stationed at Migyitun. The Indian troops left only after the Chinese guards fired

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[1] Ibid., pp. 38-40. [2] Ibid., pp. 41-42.

back in self-defence. The Chinese Government asked the prevention of renewal of violation of Chinese territory otherwise the Indian side "must be held responsible for all serious consequences arising therefrom.[1]

On 28 August, 1959, the Indian Ambassador complained that the Chinese Government made no reply on the Khinzemane issue of 11 August, and on the Spanggur region issue of 13 August. On 25 August, a "strong" Chinese detachment crossed into Indian territory south of Migyitun on the NEFA border, fired on Indian pickets and arrested them. Thereafter the Chinese detachment outflanked an Indian outpost of Lonju and fired on it from a distance of about 800 yards. The Indian Government regarded it as "a case of deliberate aggression on Indian territory." The Indian Government "strongly" protested against these repeated violations of Indian territory by Chinese armed forces.[2]

The map controversy. During 1952 maps of China appeared in China showing large areas of India as Chinese. When the Indian Government informally raised the issue with the Chinese Government, they explained that these maps were the legacy of the previous KMT

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[1] Ibid., p. 43. [2] Ibid., pp. 44-45.

regime and that they had no time to revise them. But a revised edition of these maps showing even larger areas of India and also of Burma as parts of China was officially released by the Chinese Government and distributed in India along with the Chinese fortnightly, People's China, dated 1 November 1954. The Chinese Government persisted in its explanation and the Indian Government ignored the matter. In reply to a question in Parliament whether the Chinese Government had not recognized India' frontiers, Nehru replied that there was no question about "anybody recognizing absolute facts." This was typical of many such statements he had been making on the issue from the time of independence.[1]

On 21 August 1958, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs gave note to the Chinese Counsellor in India on the map issue. A map of China published on the China Pictorial magazine (No. 95, July 1958) had "clear inaccuracies concerning China's border with India." The border of the map included as Chinese territory (i) four of the five Divisions of India's NEFA; (ii) some areas in the north of the State of Uttar Pradesh; and (iii) large areas in eastern Ladakh which form part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The entire Tashgang area

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[1] Rajan, op. cit., pp. 230-231.

of Eastern Bhutan and a considerable slice of territory in north-west Bhutan had also been included as Chinese territory. The note pointed out that in the past, similar inaccurate maps were published in China. When Nehru visited China in October 1954, he took this matter up with Chou En-lai. Chou replied that current Chinese maps were based on the old maps of the KMT regime and the PRC had no time to correct them. Because the PRC was in office for many years and new maps were being repeatedly printed in China, the Government of India suggested that "necessary corrections in the Chinese maps should not be delayed further."[1]

On November 1958, China replied that the maps published were drawn on the basis of the KMT regime. The Chinese Government believed that a new way of drawing the boundary of China would be decided after consultations with the neighboring countries and a survey of the border regions.[2]

On 14 December 1958, Nehru wrote to Chou En-lai on the map issue. Nehru said that he was surprised that the map of China ran across Indian territory in several places. Nehru reminded Chou En-lai that the

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[1] White Paper I, op.cit., p.46.
[2] Ibid., p. 47.

latter had said, during Nehru's visit to China, that the map was a reproduction of old pre-liberation maps and China had not had time to revise it. Concerning the MacMahon Line, Chou En-lai, during his visit to India, had told Nehru that "the Chinese government were of the opinion that they should give recognition to the Line." Though the MacMahon Line was "established by the British Imperialists" and was "not fair," China should recognize it because it was "an accomplished fact" and because of "the friendly relation between China and India." Chou En-lai proposed to discuss the line with the Tibetan authorities. Nehru complained that the borderline of the map of China, published in the magazine China Pictorial, went "right across Indian territory." A large part of Indian NEFA as well as some other parts, which had "long been well recognized" as parts of India and had been administered by India in the same way as other parts of India, were shown to be part of Chinese territory. A "considerable region" of Bhutan was also shown as being on the Chinese side. Nehru stated that there never was any border dispute between the two countries so far as India was concerned. No mention of the border dispute was made in the course of the Sino-Indian talks on Tibet which resulted in the Agreement of 1954. The map was printed

after the PRC had been in power for nine years. Nehru concluded that there could be "no question of" and "no dispute about" "these large parts of India being anything but India" and no kind of surveys could affect "these well-known and fixed boundaries."[1]

On 23 January 1959, Chou En-lai answered Nehru's letter. Chou En-lai pointed out that the Sino- Indian boundary had never been "formally delimited." Historically no treaty or agreement on the Sino-Indian boundary was ever concluded between both governments. Border disputes did exist between the two countries. The Government of China did not raise the issue in 1954, because "conditions were not then ripe for settlement," and because China then had "no time to study the question." In the past few years, questions as to the side to which certain areas on the Sino-Indian border belonged were on more than one occasion taken up between the two countries through diplomatic channels. Chou En-lai denied that the Chinese Government ever recognized the MacMahon Line. It was "a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet Region of China," and had "aroused the great indignation of the Chinese people." The Chinese Govern-

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[1] Ibid., pp. 48-50.

ment, on the one hand, found it necessary to take a more or less realistic attitude towards the Line and, on the other hand, could not but act with prudence and needed time to deal with this matter. Chou En-lai admitted that the current maps were drawn on the basis of the maps of the past several decades. China did not hold that every portion of this boundary was drawn accurately, but it would be "inappropriate for China" to make changes without having surveys and without having consulted the countries concerned. Furthermore, it would be difficult to make such changes because they would confuse the Chinese people and bring censure on the Chinese Government. On the other hand, the Chinese people also expressed surprise at the way the Sino-Indian boundary, particularly its western section, was drwan on maps published in India. In recent years, there occurred some minor border incidents which were difficult to avoid pending the formal delimitation of the boundary. Chou En-lai proposed to the Indian Government that, as a provisional measure, the two sides temporarily maintained the status quo. Each side would keep for the time being to the border areas at present under its jurisdiction and not go beyond them. Chou En-lai regretted that the negotiations on the Wu-Je issue had

as yet reached no agreement.[1]

For the first time, China had officially repudiated the traditional boundary between the two countries.[2]

Nehru sent another letter to Chou En-lai on 22 March 1959, in which he expressed his surprise that the frontier had not been accepted at any time by the Chinese government. Nehru maintained that the "traditional frontier" followed "the geographical principle of watershed on the crest of the High Himalayan Range," and apart from that, in most part, it had the"sanction of specific international agreements between the then Government of India and China. Nehru further presented his argument as the following:

(1) Sikkim:

The boundary of Sikkim, a protectorate of India, with the Tibet Region of China was defined in the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and jointly demarcated on the ground in 1895.

(2) The Ladakh Region of the State of Jammu & Kashmir:

A treaty of 1842 between Kashmir on the one hand

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[1] Ibid., pp.52-4.

[2] A. Appadorai, "The India-China Border Question" International Studies V (July-October, 1963),p.6.

and the emperor of China and the Lama Guru of Lhasa on the other, mentioned the India-China boundary in the Ladakh region. In 1847, the Chinese Government admitted that this boundary was sufficiently and distinctly fixed. The area claimed by Communist China was always depicted as part of India on official maps, and was surveyed by Indian officials and even a Chinese map of 1893 showed it as Indian territory.

(3) The MacMahon Line:

The MacMahon Line ran eastwards from the eastern borders of Bhutan and defined the boundary of China on the one hand and India and Burma on the other. Contrary to Chou's argument, the line was drawn at a Tripartite Conference held at Simla in 1913-14 between the Plenipotentiaries of the Government of China, Tibet and India. At the time of acceptance of the delineation of this frontier, Lonchen Shatra, the Tibetan plenipotentiary, in letters exchanged, stated explicitly that he had received orders from Lhasa to agree to the boundary as marked on the map appeared to the Convention. The line was drawn after "full discussion" and was confirmed subsequently by a formal exchange of letters; and there was "nothing to indicate that the Tibetan authorities were in any way dissatisfied with the agreed boundary." Although the Chinese Plenipotentiary at the Conference

objected to the boundaries between Inner and Outer Tibet and between Tibet and China, there was "no mention of any Chinese reservation in respect of the India-Tibet frontier either during the discussions or at the time of their initialling the Convention. This line had "the incidental advantage of running along the crest of the High Himalayan Range" which formed "the natural dividing line between the Tibetan plateau in the north and the sub-montane region in the south. Nehru pointed out that during his previous discussions with Chou En-Lai and particularly during Chou En-lai's visit to India in January 1957, Chou En-lai had indicated that the Chinese Government were prepared to accept the Line.

Nehru stated that in these three different sectors covering much the larger part of the boundary with China, there was "sufficient authority based on geography, tradition as well as treaties for the boundary as shown in Indian published maps." The remaining sector from the junction of Nepal, India and Tibet up to Ladakh was traditionally recognized and followed "well-defined geographical features." The continuing publication of Chinese maps showing considerable parts of Indian and Bhutanese territory "as if they were in China" was

"not in accordance with long established usage as well as treaties," and was "a matter of great concern" to India.[1]

White Paper. Until that time, Nehru had publicly minimized the gravity of the Chinese offence. The border disputes and the map controversy from July 1954 to August 1959 were kept in diplomatic privacy and were not mentioned in Parliament or to the public. As the situation worsened, Nehru began to doubt the sincerity of the Chinese government, and the public began to notice the disturbances. The controversy finally came into the open when Nehru admitted the incidents in the Indian Parliament on August 28, 1959.

Nehru made two speeches on the incursions in the Ladakh area. On 28 August, in Lok Sabha, Nehru said that a large area in eastern and north Ladakh was "practically uninhabited," because it was mountainous and even the valleys were at an altitude exceeding 13,000 feet. India had some police check posts in this area but they were some distance from the internal border. Nehru reported that incidents

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[1] White Paper I, op.cit., pp.55-7.

occurred at Khurnak Fort, Spanggur and other places, and said that the frontier in these mountainous passes had no physical demarcation although Indian maps were clear on the subject. Nehru calmed the Parliament by saying that Indian territory was not occupied by China but that Chinese patrols came within Indian territory two or three miles. Some members asked whether China had built a highway passing through Indian north-eastern Ladakh. Nehru admitted that fact and said that one of the two reconnaissance parties sent there was captured. The Indian Government protested and the party was released. Nehru, however, argued that these areas were "extraordinarily remote," "almost inaccessible" and it took weeks and weeks marching on foot to get there. There was no actual demarcation in all this area, and any dispute was to be discussed, although the Indian maps clearly indicated that these areas were included in India. Answering the question whether the Indian Government had taken or would take positive action on the Chinese aggression on the border, Nehru replied that some parts were not clearly demarcated, that nobody was interested in the disputed area, and that India should take "a normal way" by correspondence and negotiation. Nehru concluded that the disputes

related to only two or three places for two or three miles. These should be settled separately and should not be confused as a two thousand mile border dispute. Three days later in Rajya Sabha Nehru made another speech on Ladakh, in which he revealed that some Chinese maps showed some Indian territory as Chinese and that China had built a highway through Aksai Chin of Indian Ladakh area. He gave historical evidence to prove that Ladakh, including Aksai Chin, was Indian territory. Being asked why the Parliament had not been taken into confidence earlier, Nehru replied that the government thought they "might make progress by correspondence and when the time was ripe for it" they could inform Parliament. To the question why the government did not take action either to bomb the road or to oust the Chinese by force, Nehru answered that decisions in places like this could "only be made by conferences, by agreement." Countries did not and should not go to war without proceeding in these other ways. Nehru answered another question by saying that if the Chinese did not answer the protest, India could only keep sending them reminders. Nehru admitted that there were some other incursions in the Ladakh area.[1]

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[1]Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit. pp.328-34.

On 28 August, Nehru spoke in Lok Sabha on incursions in NEFA. He admitted that, in the previous two or three years, there had been intrusions but "not very frequent" and only "petty intrusion on Indian border by some platoon or other of the Chinese troops." This was "nothing extraordinary" because no demarcation existed at all. After India protested in 1957-58, the Chinese withdrew, and the matter ended. Nehru reported the incidents occurred in Migyitun Khinzemane, Subansiri Frontier Division. Immediately after these incidents, India protested and took other steps to strengthen India's various posts in the area. India had placed the entire border area of NEFA directly under Indian military authorities. Some members stated that there was no alternative for India but to defend her borders. Nehru answered that minor incidents should be settled by negotiations, and India should "not become alarmist and panicky" and thereby take wrong action. He added that it was difficult to understand what lay behind these minor incidents. India, however, had to be vigilant and to protect her borders as best she could. Concerning the Chinese map, he said that it was "totally and manifestly unacceptable," and India should stick to the MacMahon Line. India should "sit round a conference table and settle" the minor incidents, but when it came

to "huge chunks of territory," as shown in the map, it was "not a matter for discussion." A member, A. B. Vapayee, suggested that the Government should issue a White Paper detailing all these developments so that world opinion might be well-informed.[1]

On 7 September 1959, the Indian Government issued the requested White Paper. It included the forty-four notes exchanged between the Governments of India and China from July 1954 to August 1959, which were analyzed in the first section of this chapter. It also included analyses of Chinese maps and of disturbances in Tibet and Kalimpong. The White Paper ended with the agreement of both sides for a joint investigation of the location of the Bara Hoti/ Wu-Je area.

After the publication of the White Paper, the whole nation exploded with indignation and demanded to know why the country was kept in ignorance of the events. Nehru had no alternative but to confess that he himself was responsible for not publicizing the Sino-Indian differences.[2] Small popular demonstrations took place. Political parties, including the

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[1] Ibid., pp. 335-338. [2] Rajan, op. cit., pp. 231-2.

Communist party, and newspaper editorials gave critical statements. The Indian Parliament called for resistance.[1] This was, gowever, only the preliminary stage of a grave dispute between the two countries which was later to shake the very foundations of Sino-Indian relations.[2]

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[1]Werner Levi, "Chinese-Indian Conpetition in Asia," Current History, XXXVIII (No. 222, 1960), p. 67.

[2]Rajan, op. cit., p. 231.

VII THE CHINESE ATTACK, SEPT.-OCT.,1962

The worsening situation. Between the publication of the first White Paper in September 1959 and January 1964, the Government of India published nine other White Papers. In these White Papers, numerous notes and letters between India and China on border incidents were published. Each government accused the other of committing territorial aggression. In the letters between the Prime Ministers, the enthusiasm of both Nehru and Chou En-lai for negotiated settlements was evident.

Before the end of 1959, the Chinese dropped their evasive manner and openly challenged India's conception of the entire Sino-Indian border. Nehru's letter of 22 March, 1959, protesting Chinese incursions into Indian territory and drawing Chou En-lai's attention to the international agreements upon which the Indian maps were based, the Chinese left unanswered until September. Chou En-lai said that the Sino-Indian boundary was "a complicated question left over by history." He listed historical facts to re-

pudiate the MacMahon line and Nehru's arguments for India's claim to Ladakh. He challenged the entire border as a product of British aggression against China. The Chinese policy on the border question was that the border had never been delineated, and that China would seek for a peaceful settlement.[1] Nehru replied that he was shocked by Chou En-lai's claim to about 40,000 square miles of Indian territory.[2]

By this time, Nehru was losing confidence in China's good intentions, but he was still optimistic about avoiding open war. In Lok Sabha, on 10 September 1959, Nehru admitted that he had made a mistake not to have brought the facts before the House. He said that the Indian people had been aroused by ill-treatment from the Chinese but they were not disturbed by the Chinese claim to a "patch of territory." Nothing could be more "fantastic" and "a more amazing folly" than for India and China to get into war for the possession of a few mountain peaks. Nehru complained that the Chinese valued India's friendship only to a very

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[1] Government of India, Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Government of India and China; White Paper II, Sept.-Nov. 1959 (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1959), pp. 27-30.

[2] Ibid., pp. 34-35.

small extent. Nevertheless, India should continue to work for friendly India-Chinese relations. He said that the matter was serious because he did not know how the Chinese mind worked. Although he admired the Chinese mind which was "logical, resonable, and relatively clean," he feared that these old qualities had been "partly overwhelmed." He deduced that the Tibetan incident had angered China and had affected the Chinese mind. It was because of this that the Chinese were taking this uncompromising attitude.[1] Two days later, Nehru commented on Chou's letter of 8 September in Lok Sabha. He said that it made no difference to China or India whether a few yards of territory in the mountain were on this side or on that side, but it would make a great deal of difference if that was done in an "insulting, aggressive, offensive, violent manner." He declared that there could be no "mediation, conciliation, or arbitration" about the demands of the Chinese for large pieces of territory.[2] He pointed out that it was the first time the Chinese claimed the areas in India which had been included in the Chinese maps.[3]

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[1] Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., pp.348-52.
[2] Ibid., pp.353-4. [3] Ibid., p.361.

In the official communications between the two governments, India tried to make clear the factual data supporting her position and she made several unsuccessful attempts to obtain an equally clear statment from the Chinese.[1] China, on the other hand, tried several times to gain Indian agreement to proposals favorable to China. On 7 November 1959, Chou En-lai wrote Nehru suggesting that, in order to maintain the status quo of the Sino-Indian border, the armed forces of China and India should each withdrew 20 kilometers from the MacMahon Line in the east, and from the Line up to which each side exercised actual control in the west. The two sides, while maintaining civil administrative personnel and unarmed police should refrain from sending armed personnel to the zones being evacuated.[2]

Ten days later, Nehru rejected the proposal. He pointed out that, in the East, Chinese forces had occupied no point south of the Indian border except at Longju. Border clashes there would be avoided if the Chinese withdrew, for the Indians would agree not to

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[1]Magaret W. Fisher, & others, Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Inc., 1963),p.88.

[2]Government of India, Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Government of India and China; Nov. 1959-March 1960(New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1960), pp. 44-6.

reoccupy it. As for the West, because India disagreed with China about the Ladakh, a status quo agreement would be meaningless, because the Chinese exaggerated her actual control in Ladakh. He made a counter proposal for Ladakh. He suggested that Chinese troops withdraw behind the border claimed by India, and Indian troops withdraw behind the border claimed by China. There would be left an unadministered no man's land.[1] On 17 December, Chou En-lai rejected Nehru's proposal as unfair to China. In so doing, he stated explicitly that the 1956 Chinese map correctly showed the "traditional boundary" in Ladakh.[2]

In several speeches in Lok Sabha in November, 1959, Nehru spoke of the possibility of war. He said that no country was foolish enough to jump into war, but the possibility was in Indian minds.[3] He said, "I doubt if there is any country in the world which cares less for peace than China today."[4] He realized that a strong China was "normally an expansionist China." The great push towards industrialization and the mazing pace of its population increase would create "a most dangerous situation" leading to war.

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[1] Ibid. pp.46-51. [2] Ibid. pp.51-56.
[3] Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit.,p.360.
[4] Ibid.,p.370.

As years passed by, this became more apparent. He also realized that all revolutions tended to founction abnormally, and China was "very, very far from normality." This was a "misfortune" both for India and for the world, because abnormality easily led to war.[1]

In India there was "widespread and deep-seated reaction" affecting almost everyone, from infant to adult. Nehru appealed to the Indians that they should not only avoid war but also prepare themselves. The conflict between India and China would be a tragedy for China, Asia and the world. Nehru said that he would avoid war by every means in his power. Although India should not take any steps which would automatically push her into war, she would be prepared and would fight with all her strength if war was thrust upon her. To build up India's strength was necessary, but it did not mean shutting all possible doors to a peaceful settlement.[2]

In December, 1959, hot debates took place in the Indian parliament. Nehru said that the present crisis was a long-range problem. He pointed out that the problem was not that India could not trust China-- no country could trust the other entirely-- but that India had always to live next to China. India could

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[1] Ibid., pp. 369-70. [2] Ibid., pp. 365-68.

not run away from her geographical position. Even if the Indians were hundred per cent friendly with the Chinese, the fact remained that there was a mighty power sitting on India's border.[1]

The opposition leader, Acharya Kripani, pointed out that there was no possibility of negotiations with China. Nehru answered that the Indians would "negotiate, negotiate, negotiate and negotiate to the bitter end." Nehru said that speeches in Lok Sabha exihibited resentment at what China had done. He argued that the alternative to negotiation was war. He argued that war with China would have no end. Both countries were strong with great resources and neither could defeat the other.[2]

However, he told the parliament that any Chinese step would be resisted to the best of India's ability. India had already taken defensive actions, particularly in NEFA where India had prevented China from entry except at Longju, a tiny enclave of three or four miles. The difficulties were in Ladakh where China had infiltrated in mass. Therefore, India's policy should be to negotiate and to strengthen herself.

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[1] Ibid., p.373. [2] Ibid. pp. 381-82.

[3] Ibid.,

The border talks. In his letter of 7 November 1959, Chou En-lai suggested that the two Prime Ministers should hold talks on the border question.[1] Nehru gave a cool acceptance to the idea of Chou En-lai's coming to New Delhi for talks.[2] During the subsequent exchange of letters, the Chinese pressed for an early meeting of the two Prime Ministers. Chou En-lai finally came to New Delhi on April 14, 1960 and stayed until 25 April.

On 20 April 1960, Nehru spoke at a banquet held in honor of Chou En-lai in New Dehli. He said that it was a matter of "deep satisfaction" that the two great countries of Asia were "forging bonds of friendship in the present age." This friendship and co-operation was a guarantee of peace in Asia. The friendship with China was one of the corner-stones of India's policy. Nehru regretted that the two Prime Ministers were meeting under difficult circumstances with serious disagreement between their two countries. It was a misfortune for both China and the world. It was "a double misfortune for India" because India had long followed the teachings of Buddha and Gandhi, who believed in peace and considered war a thing of horror. Nehru said that it was sad for the Indians to fear danger along the Himalayan

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[1] White Paper III, op.cit., p.45.
[2] Ibid., pp.49-50.

mountains which they had loved for thousands of years and which had stood as sentinels guarding and inspiring them. Nehru appealed to Chou En-lai that both countries should not only halt deterioration in their relations concerning the frontiers but also improve them.[1]

After the talks ended, Chou En-lai held a press conference in New Delhi at which he stated that he had sought unsuccessfully to obtain Indian agreement to his six principles as a basis for further negotiations. Chou said that the MacMahon Line was unacceptable to China, nevertheless she was willing to maintain the present boundary in the Eastern Sector, and would not cross it. He then suggested that since China was prepared to accommodate India in the eastern sector, India should accommodate China in the western sector.[2] As Nehru pointed out to newsmen on the following day, what Chou En-lai had attempted to do was to link Chinese acceptance of the MacMahon Line to Indian recognition of Chinese occupation of Ladakh. Nehru declared that there could be no question of barter in such matter.[3]

On 26 April in Lok Sabha, Nehru further commented

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[1] Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 383-384.

[2] Asian Recorder: A Weekly Digest of Asian Events (New Delhi) VI No. 19(May, 1960), p. 3302.

[3] Ibid.

on Chou En-lai's statements. Nehru and the members repudiated Chou En-lai's suggestion of "a line of actual control" mentioned in his six principles. "A line of actual control" meant "military control" and would give Longju and part of Ladakh to China.[1] Nehru remarked that the sovereignty of a country did not change because somebody came and sat in a corner of its territory.[2] China insisted that from ancient times her border had extended from the Karakoram range to the Kongka pass, which included a large area of Ladakh. Nehru argued that the area was like the Gobi desert. It was uninhabited and China did not have normal administrative personnel there. Nehru complained that China never gave precise boundaries.[3]

A joint communique was issued at the conclusion of the Nehru-Chou En-lai talks on 25 April 1960, which specified that:

> Officials of the two Governments should meet and examine, check and study all historical documents, records, accounts, maps and other material relevant to the boundary question,, on which each side relied in support of its stand, and draw up a report for submission to the two Governments. This report would list the points on which there was agreement and the points on which there was disagreement or which should be examined more fully and clarified. This report should prove helpful towards further consideration of these problems by the two Governments.[4]

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[1] Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit.,pp.386.
[2] Ibid.,p.383. [3] Ibid., pp.388-89.
[4] Asian Recorder, op.cit., VI. No.19,p.3302.

Nehru told Parliament that the communique was a result of more than twenty hours of talks, but no solution was found. The talks with Chou En-lai did not help in the least to solve the problems.[1] Nehru was pessimistic about the results of the talks recommended by the joint communique. He told Parliament that because the officials would not have any authority to deal politically, the talks could not solve the problem, although they might throw some light on the factual situation.[2]

Officials from both governments met in Peking from June to October, in New Delhi from August to October, and in Rangoon from November to December, 1960. At the end of the Rangoon meetings, a joint report of six hundred pages was issued explaining the position taken by each side and summarising the proofs advanced in support of their respective claims. The Chinese and the Indians were responsible separately for the preparation of their own section of the report. The statments and comments of each side in the report, as the jointly signed preface stated, explained each side's understanding of the factual material and the discussions held during the meetings.[3] On 1 April 1961, Nehru commented

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[1] Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., p.389.

[2] Ibid., pp.387-88.

[3] Government of India, Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question, op.cit., p.3.

in Lok Sabha that the report was a product of patient hard work of Indian officials and was the result of years of research even before the Chinese troubles had come. He hoped that the right position of India might "dawn" upon the Chinese Government's mind, and make the Chinese realize that they had wronged India.[1]

The talks failed to provide a basis for negotiations; they made obvious the Chinese disinterest in negotiation.[2] During the border talks at Peking on 27 June,1960, the Chinese published a map incorporating an additional 2,000 square miles of Ladakh.[3] After the talks relations between the two countries deteriorated and there was an almost complete breakdown in normal communications.

The Chinese attack: September-October, 1962.

On 4 December 1961, a Chinese note was received in New Delhi suggesting that the two powers negotiate a new trade treaty to replace the 1954 agreement which was due to expire on 3 June 1962.[4] The Indian Government

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[1] Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., p.394.

[2] Fisher, Himalayan Battleground, op.cit., p.133.

[3] Ibid., p.129.

[4] Government of India, Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Governments of India and China; White Paper VI, Nov.1961-July 1962 (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1962), p.188.

replied that a new trade treaty could not be separated from border issues and that talks on it could not be held until China abandoned her aggressive policies. India complained that China had not only violated the Five Principles of co-existance set out in the preamble to the 1954 agreement but had occupied over 12,000 square miles of Indian territory and that she continued to extend her illegal claims.[1] On 3 June 1962, when the agreement expired, the Chinese government demanded that the Indian trade agencies in Tibet be removed within a month. The agencies were withdrawn within two weeks. From then on, Nehru commented, trade and intercourse with Tibet would be regulated by the laws of the countries concerned.[2] This meant the cessation of trade with Tibet. The notes exchanged between the two governments suggested that India viewed the outcome with much more calmness than did China.

The border talks held during 1960 did not lessen the tension in Ladakh, but both sides made use of the time to strengthen their military positions in the disputed area. Between 1960 and 1962, a number of Chinese posts were established and new roads were constructed deeper into the Aksai Chin to support the

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[1] Ibid., pp.188-9.

[2] Fisher, Himalayan Battleground, op.cit., pp.133-34.

most advanced basis. Beginning in 1959, the Indian Government pushed countermeasures to reduce Chinese advantages. Both land and air communications were improved.[1] By the end of 1961 Nehru could make an optimistic appraisal of Indian prospects. By mid-1962, forty-three new Indian posts had been established within territory claimed by China on the 1960 map. Their effectiveness was enhanced by the establishment of year-round barracks near the border. During the winter of 1961-62 both Chinese and Indian forces had withdrawn from advanced positions because of difficulties in supply and maintenance.[2]

By the beginning of 1962 the situation was changed. The new Indian posts leapfrogged Chinese posts in an effort aimed both at blocking potential lines of advance, and at forcing the withdrawal of Chinese forward posts by interspersing Indian posts and patrol activities between them, cutting supply lines where possible. Nehru reported in August, 1962, that control had been regained over 2,500 square miles of the 12,000 miles previously lost to the Chinese.[3]

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[1] Magaret W. Fisher & Leo E.Rose, "Ladakh and the Sino-Indian Border Crisis," Asian Survey II (October,1962),pp. 32-33.

[2] Fisher, Himalayan Battleground, op.cit.,p.131.

[3] The Weekly Review, (27 August,1962),p.2; quoted by Fisher, ibid., 131.

A serious incident occurred in July,1962, just after an Indian post had been established to cut the Chinese supply line to a new Chinese post on the Galwan River in the Ladakh area. A numerically superior Chinese force encircled the Indian post, apparently hoping to intimidate the Indians into withdrawal. The Chinese soldiers advanced to within fifteen yards of the post, and halted only when the Indians threatened to open fire. The situation remained tense for several days of continued siege while notes were exchanged between the two governments. The Indians stood firm and the Chinese eventually retired.[1]

This incident indicated that the Indians were prepared to face the Chinese with arms. China could no longer advance with only the threat of arms. An order that had prohibited Indian forces from firing until they had first been fired upon was rescinded.[2]

The conflict exploded in the NEFA on 8 September when the Chinese sent a detachment across the MacMahon line and established a post near the Indian post of Dhola, two miles south of the border. The Indian Government's order to eject the intruders was called by the Chinese "an attack upon China." The Chinese

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[1]Government of India, White Paper VI, op.cit. pp. 78-93.

[2]Fisher, Himalayan Battleground, op.cit., p.132.

began a massive attack in the name of self-defense on the Indians, who were immediately defeated.[1] Nehru, in a broadcast, said that for five years the Chinese had continued aggression on the Ladakh frontier, but that they had left NEFA alone. Just when the Indians were trying to reduce tension and there was some chance of the two governments meeting together, China attacked the NEFA border. This was "typical" of the Chinese treatment of India. Nehru appealed to the Indians to "steel" their wills and to direct the nation's energy and resources to make China withdraw.[2]

After the Chinese had occupied a considerable portion of NEFA the Chinese government then called for negotiations on the basis of the existing situation. India rejected any cease-fire proposal without the proper withdrawal of Chinese forces to the positions held on September 8, the date of the Chinese intrusion south of the MacMahon Line in the Dhola area.[3] On September and on 10 October the Chinese forces again attacked on Indian posts in NEFA.[4] The Indian forces

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[1] Ibid. pp.135-36.

[2] Jawarharlal Nehru, Jawarharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1957-63 IV (Government of India: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1964), 227-29.

[3] Fisher, Himalayan Battleground, op.cit.p.136.

[4] Government of India, Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Governments of India and China; White Paper VII, Oct.1962-Jan.1963 (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1963), p.126.

at Tse La and Walong were outflanked and forced to withdraw. Chinese forces advanced deeply into the western (Kameng division) post of NEFA and threatened to erupt onto the plains of Assam.[1] On October 20, the Chinese forces launched an all-out military offensive on all sectors of the entire India-China boundary.[2] Nehru pointed out in Lok Sabha that this was a well-organized and well-prepared invasion on a large scale.[3]

The cease-fire. After having forced the Indian army to retreat from Ladakh and NEFA, Peking suddenly announced on November 21 that it was unilaterally imposing a cease-fire at midnight November 21-2, and that, starting on December 1, Chinese troops in both Ladakh and the northeast frontier area would withdraw twenty kilometers to the north and east of what was termed "the line of actual control" as of 7 November 1959. India was warned to withdraw an equal distance to the south and west of this 1959 line. The Chinese announced that they would retain civil police posts along the "line of actual control" in order to insure the normal

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[1] Fisher, Himalayan Battleground, op.cit.,p.136.

[2] Government of India, White Paper VII, op.cit. p. 126.

[3] Jawarharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1957-63, op.cit. p.251.

movement of the inhabitants in the Chinese-Indian border area, forestall the activities of saboteurs in the Chinese-border area, and maintain order there.[1]

On 8 November 1962, Nehru announced in Lok Sabha that India had accepted China's challenge. He said that the massive attack had shocked India and other countries as well. Although China had violated Indian territory for five years, India had never concluded that China would indulge in massive invasion. This was an act of imperialism. Nehru pointed out that the Chinese had some initial successes, but he did not know if the Chinese wanted to use these successes as "a bargaining counter" for some other "evil designs". Whatever the consequences, Nehru said that India would never submit to Chinese aggression. All Indians should be armed with "weapons of arms" and "weapons of agriculture and industry."[2] Three days later, some members in Lok Sabha charged the government with unpreparedness. Nehru replied that the "mentality" of the Indians had been conditioned to peace. Before 20 October, the government did not realize what danger might confront India. Nevertheless, the government had considered what should be done if the Chinese

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[1]White Paper No. VIII,(October, 1962-January 1963), pp. 17-19.

[2]Nehru's Speeches, op. cit., pp. 230-235.

attacked.[1] India began countermeasures from 1959. From then until 1961 more Indian troops went into Ladakh and established many posts there to prevent future Chinese advance. Indian posts did push back the Chinese a little. War between India and China could not be thought of as victory or defeat because neither would surrender. India would finish war only when she restored her position prior to 8 September both in NEFA and Ladakh.[2]

On 1 December 1962 Nehru wrote Chou En-lai rejecting the latter's proposal of November 21. Nehru wrote that "the line of actual control" of 7 November 1959 was along the line of control established by Chinese forces after the massive attacks mounted since 20 October 1962. The Chinese cease-fire proposal was attempting to retain under cover of preliminary cease-fire arrangements physical possession over the area which China had secured only by a massive attack by Chinese forces. The Chinese "line of actual control of November 1959" included Bara Hoti which never belonged to China. It also included Longju which was under Indian control until August, 1959 when China attacked

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[1] Nehru's Speeches, 1957-63, op.cit., pp.235-38.
[2] Ibid., pp.247-48.

the garrison there. It also included Khinzemane and the Dhola region which were under India control until China attacked on 8 September 1962. In the western sector, many places were included in the Chinese line which China occupied only after October 1962. Nehru reiterated that the Chinese proposal clearly aimed at securing control of areas which were never under Chinese control either on 7 November 1959 or at any time prior to 8 September 1962.[1]

On 10 December 1962 in Lok Sabha Nehru repeated India's standing of the status quo of 8 September 1962. Nehru said that the cease-fire had been effected, though there were a number of breaches of it on the Chinese side in the first few days. Withdrawal also had been accomplished, but its extent was not clear and considerable Chinese forces were still in forward positions. However, India could not accept the Chinese proposal of "the line of actual control" of 1959. To yield to it would mean not only letting China have what she wanted but also exposing India to further inroads. India could not conduct any talks until the latest aggression was ended and

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[1]Government of India, Notes, Memoranda, and Letters Exchanged between the Governments of India and China, October 1962-January 1963, White VIII(New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1963), pp. 28-30.

the status quo prior to 8 September was restored. Between the line of actual control prior to the 8 September 1962 and the line of actual control on the 7th November 1959, as defined by China, there was a difference of about 2,500 square miles of Indian territory.[1]

Nehru pointed out that China was untruthful. China preached against imperialism but acted in "the old imperialist and expansionist way." Chinese policy was one of "unabashed chauvinism." The Chinese justified their occupation of 20,000 square miles of Indian territory as being self-defence. The whole thing was "manifestly and outrageously improper and wrong" and involved "utter misuse of words." He stated that it was difficult to deal with the Chinese "who indulged in double talk," and that the Chinese government could not be relied upon.[2]

From December 10 to 12 six non-aligned countries held a conference in Colombo to consider recommendations to resolve the differences between India and China. On December 17, the envoy of the Ceylonese Prime Minister, Mrs. Sirimavo Bondarandaike, brought the Colombo Conference proposals to New Delhi. The text of the Colombo pro-

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[1] Jawarharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1957-63, op. cit, pp. 249-53.

[2] Ibid.

posals was published on 1 January 1963. With regard to the Western sector, the Conference appealed to the Chinese government to carry out their 20 kilometers withdrawal of their military posts as had been announced by Peking on 21 November 1962; the Conference appealed to the Indian government to keep their existing military position; and the area vacated by the Chinese military withdrwal would be a demilitarized zone to be administered by civilian posts of both sides. With regard to the Eastern sector, the line of actual control in the areas recognized by both governments could serve as a cease-fire line to their respective positions, while the remaining areas could be settled in their future discussions. The Middle sector would be solved by peaceful means. These proposals, once implemented, should pave the way for discussions between representatives of both parties for the purpose of solving problems entitled in the cease-fire postion.[1]

Nehru announced on 23 January 1963 in Lok Sabha that India favored the proposals. As Nehru interpreted the proposals, the 8 September position in the eastern sector was restored with the exception of the Thag La ridge area near the Dhola post, three miles within the MacMahon Line. In the middle sector, the status quo

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[1] Keesing's, op.cit., XIV (1963-64), 19335-6.

ante was to be restored. In the western sector, the status quo prior to 8 September 1962 was also to be restored except for two or three posts west of Sumdo Bur which compensated for by Chinese withdrawal from Shanggur and areas further south. Nehru informed Mrs. Bandaranaike of India's acceptance. The latter then telegraphed Nehru the Chinese answer. Chou En-lai accepted in principle the proposals as a preliminary basis for the meeting of Indian and Chinese officials. The Chinese government, however, maintained two points of interpretation in their memorandum. Firstly, the proposal regarding the Indian troops keeping their existing military positions would be equally applicable to the entire China-Indian border, and not the western sector alone. India would continue to refrain from sending her troops to re-enter the areas south of the actual control line as of November 7, 1959 vacated by the Chinese position guards, and would send there only civilian personnel carrying arms of self-defence as India had done up to then. Secondly, no Chinese frontier guards or civilian check posts would be stationed in the Che Dong area and Longju in the eastern sector, Wu-ju in the middle sector and the areas in the western sector where India once set up forty-three strong points, provided Indian troops or civilian

personnel would not re-enter these places.[1] Nehru said that these two points of the Chinese interpretation were so vital to India that the latter considered that China had not accepted the proposals. Nehru told the Parliament that there could be no talks between officials unless the Government of China accepted the Colombo Conference proposal as a whole. Meanwhile India should continue to strengthen her Defence Forces and economic position because she found it "very difficult to believe in the bona fides of the Chinese Government."[2]

On 25 January 1963, Nehru described China as an aggressive country to the Lok Sabha. He said that many other countries agreed with India that China was an aggressive expansionist country with vast designs for the future. China believed in the inevitability of major wars, but not in the Five Principles. Nehru concluded that China was a menace to the world.[3]

On 23 March 1963, Nehru said that the Ministry of National Defence of China had issued a statement that Chinese troops had withdrawn along the entire India-China border on China's own initiative and the

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[1] Asian Recorder, op.cit., IX No.8 (Feb. 1963), p. 5053.

[2] Jawarharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1957-63, op. cit. pp. 255-66.

[3] Ibid., 262-66.

withdrawal had been completed by the end of February. The statement added that the Chinese forces were then far behind their positions on 8 September 1962. On the third of March, Chou En-lai wrote Nehru that China had done all that was possible for her to do. Therefore, there was no more reason to delay the holding of talks between Chinese and Indian officials. Nehru replied that if China were sincere in her professions at peaceful settlement, she would accept the Colombo Conference proposals without reservations just as India had done. Nehru pointed out that the Government of China had used "sharp and provocative language" in their notes to the Indian government, and that China had sent additional troops into Tibet and had projected further road consturction along Indian borders. Although the Chinese had withdrawn 20 kilometers from what they called "the line of actual control," their troop concentrations behind this narrow strip were still there. Nehru added that there were other factors and recent developments which made it difficult to believe in the repeated Chinese professions of their desire for peaceful settlement. Some statements by Chinese authorities revealed that the Chinese were contemplating further aggressive action at a time of their own

choosing. Nehru concluded that the Indians had to be prepared to meet any eventuality that might arise.[1]

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[1] Ibid., pp.267-268.

VII. THE CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Nehru's view of Formosa. Formosa was incorporated in the Chinese Manchu Empire in 1684. With the defeat of China in Sino-Japanese War of 1894 the island was ceded to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Towards the end of the second World War, the future of Formosa and other territories acquired by Japan was considered by the Allied Powers. China, Great Britain, and the United States decided at the Cairo Conference in December 1943 that all territories which Japan had taken from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, would be returned to the Republic of China. The Cairo Declaration was confirmed in the Potsdam Proclamation, which stated that Japanese sovereignty should be limited to the principal islands of Japan and such minor islands as would be determined. With the unconditional surrender of September 1, 1945, Japan accepted the Potsdam Proclamation. In October 1945, China reoccupied Formosa. On 1 September 1951, at San Francisco, Japan specifically renounced in the

Peace Treaty each of the territories included in the Proclamation. Formosa and Pescadores were included.

There are various legal aspects of the status of Formosa. Four more conspicuous official and unofficial views are: Formosa has been (1) Chinese territory since 1 September 1945; (2) under United Nations sovereignty since 1 September 1945; (3) condominium of the Allied signatories of the Peace Treaty; (4) Chinese territory since the Peace Treaty.[1]

Nehru all along supported Chinese claims to Formosa. In a statement on 30 September 1950 Nehru said that the decisions reached in Cairo and Potsdam should be the basis of discussion and future action. Nehru put the same point of view before the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference at London in January 1951 and the Conference in its final communique declared that the problem of Formosa should be settled "with due regard to international obligations." At a press conference in London on 16 January 1951 Nehru explained that "international obligations" meant settlement in accordance with the terms of the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations.[2]

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[1]D.P. O'Connell, "The Status of Formosa and the Chinese Recognition," American Journal of International Law, L,(1956), pp. 405-416.

[2]Karunakaran, op. cit., p. 82.

Nehru maintained that Formosa should return to Communist China. India did not attend the Peace Treaty of 1951 because Communist China was not a party and India felt that attending an important meeting on the Far East without China would be unfair to China.[1] India also objected to the treaty provisions regarding territorial adjustments which did not restore Formosa to Communist China. To leave the future of the island undetermined was, in India's view, unjust and inexpedient.[2] At a news conference on 24 June 1957, Nehru said that Formosa was definitely part of China. One could not escape the reality that Formosa (the KMT regime) was not the Government of China.[3]

During the Formosan crisis in 1954, Nehru affirmed that the off-shore islands, particularly the Quemoy and Matsu, "obviously and definitely" were parts of (Communist) China. No country could tolerate an enemy sitting ten miles from her shore, bombarding her all the time. He added that it was as certain as anything could be certain that these islands would go to Communist China "by logic, by reason, by anything." The Communist

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[1] A. Appadorai, "Chinese Aggression and India: An Introductory Essay", International Studies, V,(July-Oct., 1963), p. 5.

[2] Karunakarun, op. cit., p. 80.

[3] Asian Recorder, A Weekly Digest of Asian Events, III, (New Delhi, 1957), p. 1532.

Government, therefore, should take these islands over from the Formosan regime.[1]

In September, 1958, Nehru stated in the Lok Sabha that since India did not recognize the KMT regime in Formosa, India held that Formosa and the off-shore islands should go to Communist China. He hoped that this change-over would take place peacefully because the war started in that corner might spread all over.[2]

Nehru's arguments on the admission of Communist China. On 24 January 1951, Nehru broadcast from New Delhi saying that for the past year or more, India urged that the Communist revolution be recognized and Communist China be seated in the United Nations. The Communist China revolution had "brought great changes" to Asia and these changes had to be recognized. The non-recognition of Communist China by the United Nations caused difficulties that continued to trouble the world.[3] On 27 November 1959, he told the Lok Sabha that the Communist Chinese revolutions did not cease to exist just because you disliked them, cursed them or ignored them, One had to deal with them, India had always been con-

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[1] Rajan, op. cit., p. 141.

[2] Government of India, Foreign Affairs Record, IV, (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1958), pp. 163-4.

[3] Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 420-1.

vinced that it was "utterly wrong and harmful and dangerous for the world" not to seat Communist China at the United Nations.[1]

As early as December 1950, Nehru said in parliament that although Formosa was not an immediate issue it was tied up with the other problems of the Far East and had to be considered urgently on that score.[2] In March, 1956 Nehru discussed the East Asian situation with the Foreign Ministers of United States, Britain, and France, during their visit to New Delhi. He told them that so long as Communist China was not recognized and not admitted to the United Nations, the situation in East Asia would not return to normal. Communist China would not feel secure.[3] On 17 January 1960, Nehru told Indian National Congress that he had long been convinced that a great part of the present-day difficulties in the Far East and even in the world was due to "this extraordinary shutting of one's eyes to the fact of China." He was convinced that there would have been no Korean War if the People's Government of China (PGC) had been in the United Nations, because people then could deal with China across the table. He said that there

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[1] Ibid., pp. 368-9. [2] Ibid., p. 419.
[3] Rajan, op. cit., p. 145.

would be no settlement in the Far East or in South East Asia until the PGC was admitted in the United Nations. There would be "far greater assurance of security that way" than through the SEATO and the rest.[1]

Nehru maintained that the non-admission of China had added to the complexities and difficulties of the world's problems.[2] On 3 October 1960, Nehru spoke in the General Assembly of the United Nations. Referring to the Chinese representation, he said that it was "improper for that great and powerful country to remain unpresented," and that this had "an urgent bearing on all world problems," especially those of disarmanent. It appeared to him most "extraordinary" that any argument should be advanced to keep out China and to give the seat to those who "certainly" did not and could not represent China. Nehru pointed out that China was not a new country, but a founder-member of the United Nations, therefore it was "a question of credentials" as to who represented China. Such a "straight forward question" had been twisted around and made the cause of infinite troubles." He concluded that the longer people delayed admitting Communist China, the more harm they caused to

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[1] Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 91.
[2] Ibid.

the United Nations and to the consideration of major problems they had before them.[1]

In spite of the controversy with China, Nehru continued to feel that proper representation of the PGC in the United Nations was "essential."[2] Nehru said that people had been criticising India for being blind by continuing to propose the seating of Communist China in the United Nations, after what had happened in Tibet and on India's borders. Nehru answered that for the last years, India's arguments and proposals had been repeatedly accepted by other countries, although much damage had been done because of their not accepting India's advice earlier. More people were voting for the seating of the PGC in the United Nations; more people who had opposed it became neutral or abstained; and those who had abstained voted for it. On 8 November 1962, after the Chinese massive attack on the Indian borders, Nehru spoke in the Lok Sabha while the House was moving the resolution on the Chinese aggression. He said that it was "unfortunate" that China was not in the United Nations, and asserted that India still supported Chinese admission in spite of her invasion.

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[1] Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 323.

[2] Ibid.

To put China in the United Nations would make "misbehaviour impossible and disarmanent possible." One might "disarm the whole world and leave China, a great, powerful country, fully armed to the teeth." The difficulty was that, if China was excluded from the United Nations, one could not call her up "before any tribunal or world court or anywhere." China would just be "a wholly irresponsible country believing in war as the only way of settling anything and having no love of peace."[1]

Nehru assumed that non-admission caused China's irresponsible behaviours. He told parliament that if (Communist) China went in the United Nations, apart from the fact that one could deal with her face to face there and elsewhere, China would assume certain responsibilities there. The position was "very odd" because sometimes the United Nations passed resolutions giving directions to the PGC. The Chinese response was that since they were not recognized by the United Nations, they would not recognize United Nations' directions. Instead of adding to the "responsibility and laying down ways of co-operation," one thus "shut the door of co-operation," added to the irresponsible be-

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[1]Nehru, Nehru's Speeches, op. cit., pp. 233-234.

haviour of nations in this way," and called it "security." The result was that the influence of the United Nations lessened.[1] In 1963 Nehru wrote that one of the "numerous shortcomings" of the United Nations was that the government of a country "representing a large part of the world's population" was still not "subject to the discipline and the responsibilities that membership in the world organization would impose."[2]

India's efforts in the United Nations. As early as October, 1949, the people's Republic of China (PRC) applied to the Security Council in regard to her representation. On 18 November 1949 the Foreign Minister of the PRC cabled the President of the General Assembly repudiating the legal status of the delegation of Nationalist China and asserting that that delegation had no right to speak on behalf of the Chinese people in the United Nations. At the 258th meeting of the Security Council, on 29 December 1949, the representative of the USSR endorsed the PRC's position; but no action was taken.[3]

In the autumn of 1950, the matter first came up before the General Assembly when the credentials of the

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[1] Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 91-2.

[2] J. Nehru, "Changing India," Foreign Affairs, vol. 41, (April, 1963), p. 465.

[3] The United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950 (New York: Department of Public Information, 1951), p. 422.

Chinese representation were challenged as a result of a Soviet motion. On 19 September 1950, at the 277th meeting of the fifth session of the General Assembly, four draft resolutions were presented. The Indian representative, who sponsored one of the draft resolutions, contended that although the Republic of China was a member of the United Nations and of its various organs, she could not carry out the obligation of a Member under the Charter of the United Nations because she did not actually control the territory of that Member and command the obedience of its people. The Central Government of the PRC was the only Government functioning in the Republic of China. India had recognized the PRC because the New Government was sound and stable; India had thus followed the criteria of recognition in international law, i.e. "the habitual obedienee of the bulk of the population with a reasonable expectancy of permanence." Only the PRC could discharge obligations, and it was illogical to demand fulfilment of obligations while denying rights. The United Nations was open to different systems of government with different policies and ideals. As long as it excluded 415 million people, the United Nations was not fully representative of the world. The Indian draft resolution (A/1365) was rejected

by 33 votes to 16, with 10 abstentions.[1]

The General Assembly resolved to establish a Special Committee to consider the question of Chinese representation and to report back, with recommendations, to the present session. Seven members were appointed in the Special Committee. The Committee met on 15 December 1950 and elected the Indian representative as chairman.[2] The Committee did not meet until 16 September the following year. It rejected a proposal to expel Nationalist China and to seat the PRC instead.[3] It then reported to the General Assembly that it was unable to recommend.[4]

From 1950 on, the USSR proposed at every session of the General Assembly the seating of the PRC; and the Assembly continuously rejected the Soviet proposals and decided not to consider the question. India either voted against the General Assembly decision or abstained.[5] On 20 September 1955, the representative of India said at the 10th session that during the preceeding twelve months an atmosphere of reconciliation between China and the world had emerged and he hoped that the General Assembly

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[1] Ibid., pp. 425-429. [2] Ibid., p. 429.

[3] The United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1951 (New York: Department of Public Information, 1952), p. 52.

[4] Ibid., p. 265.

[5] The United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1952 (New York: Department of Public Information, 1953), p. 68.

would speed up the process of conciliation by seating the PGC in the United Nations. A government representing 600 million people (sic) should have a voice in the United Nations. The PGC - by cannons, practices and established usages of international law and customs - represented the people of China. Referring to the problems of the Far East, he said that their solution required the settlement of the question of representation of China.[1]

At the eleventh session of the General Assembly in 1956, the question of Chinese representation was raised for the first time by India instead of the USSR. The representative of India said that the procedure of the previous years on the question had rendered an adequate discussion impossible. He proposed to include in the agenda an item entitled "Representation of China in the United Nations." He pointed out that the best way to deal with the division in the General Assembly over the question was to discuss it, and the solution depended upon the United States government talking face to face with the Chinese government and vice versa. The General Assembly adopted the United States proposal by 47 votes

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[1] The United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1955(New York: Department of Public Information, 1956), pp. 59-60.

to 24, with 8 abstentions, and the question was not included in the agenda of the eleventh session.[1]

On 24 September 1957, India again asked that the question of Chinese representation be put on the agenda of the General Assembly's twelfth session. The representative of India said that the question was important both because the legitimate rights of the Chinese people and the Chinese government should be considered and because the effectiveness of the United Nations was handicapped by the absence of (Communist) China. It would be far better for the Assembly to consider the matter fully and then to take whatever decision it wished. The question should not be disregarded, as it involved 600 million people in a state of political maturity and great economic progress, with a government which traded with 68 countries. The main point of India's proposal was that the question should be discussed by the Assembly. The Indian proposal was rejected by 43-29-9.[2]

On 14 July 1958, India again asked that the question be put on the agenda of the thirteenth session

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[1] United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1956 (New York: Department of Public Information, 1957), pp. 136-37.

[2] United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1957 (New York: Department of Public Information, 1958), pp. 96-7.

of the General Assembly. V.K.Krishna Menon, then leader of the Indian delegation to the United Nations, stated in the General Assembly that there was no reason against discussing the matter which concerned "gravely the peace of the world, the stability and order in the Far East, (and) the implementation of the purposes and principles of the Charter." If Charter obligations were to be carried out and if any decision in regard to that vast land of 630 million people was to be implemented, he observed, the consent, co-operation and compliance of the PGC were required. He added that it was wrong to avoid an issue just because it was controversial, and that an issue would not disappear just because it was ignored.[1]

Krishna Menon continued that members of the United Nations were states, not governments. The present government of China, its composition and its political and economic policies did not concern this question. Twenty member States had already recognized the PRC. The countries having recognized the PRC had a combined population of 1,040 million. Adding China's 639 million, the total population became 1679 millions, which was the majority of the world's 2,737 million. The

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[1]GAOR (XIII),Plen. 753rd mtg, September 22, paras: 5-47.

United Nations thus far ignored the views of the majority of the population of the world. Moreover, the member States asking for the consideration of this problem were increasing every year.[1]

Some members, particularly the United States, argued that China had disqualified itself by shelling the Quemoy area. Krishna Menon pointed out that the shelling of Quemoy had continued with intermissions for the previous eight years, and was not a new thing. Formosa and its off-shore islands were part of the Chinese mainland; therefore, what went on in the off-shore islands was part of the Chinese civil revolutionary war which had gone on for the previous thirty years. Krishna Menon also pointed to Chou-Enlai's enthusiasm at the Bandung Conference in seeking negotiated settlement with the United States. From 1955 to 1958, the situation was rather quiet while the negotiations were going on. The breakdown of certain negotiations started the troubles again in the Quemoy area. India was "firmly convinced" that China's position at Bandung still held and that a peaceful settlement of this problem was possible. Menon added that that peaceful settlement would be assisted if the General Assembly would let the Chinese know that the United Nations

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[1] Ibid.

was not ignoring the problem. On 23 September 1958, the General Assembly rejected India's proposal. Krishna Menon commented that the refusal to discuss the question in previous years had contributed to the present dangerous situation in the Far East. Not to seat the PRC was "the biggest" "comic opera scene in the march of history."[1]

On 13 July 1959, India repeated her request to put the question on the aggenda of the fourteenth session. The request was rejected by the General Committee on 16 September. Nepal then submitted amendments of the Indian request to the General Assembly.[2] Krishna Menon said in the General Assembly on 22 September that India did not change her position because of the frontier troubles with China. He maintained that India brought up the question not because China was India's neighbor or India's friend, but because India thought of the interests of the United Nations. India had put the item long after the troubles of Tibet took place. The reasons for which India put the item remained the same year after year. The Chinese unfair action towards India would not alter

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[1] Ibid.

[2] United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1959 (New York: Department of Public Information, 1960), pp.76-7.

India's position.[1] Krishna Menon continued that the United Nations was a loser by keeping the PRC out because China could then "reap the awards of friendship without having to conform to obligations." Disarmament policy was impossible without China, who had a standing army of five million at least, and probably another five or ten million in reserve. If there was to be disarmament and suspension or prohibition of nuclear weapons, that could be done only if the great nations, including China, and the small nations of the world were there. He pointed out that it was not because China was a mighty country that it was dangerous to keep her out, but because, with a great part of the world out of the United Nations, a general world settlement could not be achieved. He added that China should not be kept out just because many aspects of China were disapproved. Many countries in the United Nations had also deviated from the principles of the Charter.[2] The Indian request was again rejected.

In 1960 (at the 15th session of the General Assembly), India did not propose to seat the PRC in the United Nations, but the USSR did. Krishna Menon,

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[1] GAOR (XIV), Plen. 803 mts: September 22: paras: 1-49.

[2] Ibid.

however, spoke on the question in the General Assembly. He said that the General Assembly could not be called the Assembly of the world when it excluded one quarter of the world's population. "The empire of the United Nations" was "shrunk by this self-denying ordinance." He pointed out that Formosa had violated the Charter by misrepresenting itself to be able to carry out obligations. It was "false personation, punishable in civil law." The Nationalist Chinese did not and could not speak in the name of China because the Chinese people repudiated them and their refuge in Formosa was protected only by the fleet of the United States.[1]

In September, 1961, at the 16th session, the question was put on the agenda as a result of the proposals of New Zealand and the USSR. The General Assembly in December, turned down the USSR proposal to expel Nationalist China by 48 votes to 36, with 20 abstentions, but passed the five-Power proposal (submitted by Australia, Colombia, Italy, Japan and the United States) which decided that any proposal to change the representation of China was an important question (i.e., requiring a two-thirds majority vote for adoption.)[2]

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[1] G.A.O.R., (XV), Ple. 884th mtg, October 3, paras: 162-216.

[2] United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1961 (New York: Department of public Information, 1963), pp. 124-129.

The question, proposed by the USSR was again put on the agenda of the seventeenth session in 1962 and discussed at plenary meetings from 22 to 30 October. Krishna Menon asserted that the PRC had committed massive aggression of the eastern and western sectors of India's territory, while talking of peaceful negotiations. His delegation believed that the only effective way to check Chinese military adventurism was to make it accept its responsibilities as a Member of the United Nations, and thereby be subjected to the views and disciplines of the United Nations. The USSR draft resolution to restore "the lawful rights" of the PRC in the United Nations was rejected by a vote of 42-56-12.[1]

On 16 September 1963, Albania requested that an item entitled "Restoration of the lawful rights of the PRC in the United Nations" be included in the agenda of the General Assembly's eighteenth session. The Albanian request was approved and the question was discussed by the General Assembly between 16 and 22 October 1963. The Albanian and Cambodian proposal to expel Nationalist China from organs of the United Nations was rejected by a vote of 41-57-12.[2]

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[1]United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1962 (New York: Department of Public Information, 1964), 114-17.

[2]United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1963 (New York: Department of Public Information, 1965), pp. 31-4.

IX. CONCLUSION:
APPRAISAL OF NEHRU'S CHINA POLICY

From the outset of India's independence, Nehru was working for friendly relations with China. Unfortunately, Nehru's China policy failed completely with the Chinese attack.

Like many of the national leaders of newly independent countries, Nehru from the beginning aimed at economic and social progress by developing friendly relations with all the nations of the world. Nehru wrote that the Indians had been "conditioned for 30 years by Mahatma Gandhi and his gospel of peace" and that they had attained freedom through peaceful methods. The Indians entered the family of independent nations "with a clean slate, without any inherited hatreds or enmities or territorial or other ambition," determined to cultivate friendly and cooperative relations with all countries and to devote themselves to the economic and social progress of India "without getting entangled in national or

international conflicts."[1]

Concerning China, Nehru vigorously tried by every possible means to establish a friendly relationship. Nehru was aware of the geo-political significance of India's northern and eastern frontiers. A powerful neighbour should not be provoked or alienated. Being himself an admirer of Chinese culture, and being also attracted by Marxism,[2] Nehru naturally welcomed the end of the Chinese civil war brought about by the Communist revolution and wanted to treat China as an integral part of Asian family.

Gradually China responded to Nehru's courtship, and the friendship between the two countries reached its climax in the trade agreement of 1954. India then recognized Chinese sovereignty in Tibet and worked out the formula of the five principles of peaceful co-existence, or Panchsheel. This honeymoon period of friendship soon ended with the Chinese border incursions and the Tibetan revolts. Nevertheless, Nehru continued his efforts to befriend China.

Nehru's mistake was his lack of comprehen-

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[1]Nehru, "Changing India," op. cit., p. 453.

[2]Nehru, Jawarharlal Nehru, An Autobiography, op. cit., pp. 361-65.

sion of the nature, objectives, and potentialities of the Communist regime. He confessed in parliament that he did not know how the Chinese mind worked. In 1963, he wrote that it was difficult to understand why China concealed her territorial claims for many years, or why she mounted large-scale attacks on the two-thousand-long frontier, or why she rejected any negotiated settlement, or why she conducted world-wide anti-Indian propaganda denouncing India's policies and depicting India as "a tool of reactionaries and imperialism."[1]

Consequently, Nehru overlooked the expansionist tendency of Chinese policy. Since 1949, the goal of Peking has been direct control of Asia through Communist regimes that are political and economic satellites of China. The Chinese attack on India was only one phase of a planned and deliberate scheme of Communist expansionism in countries of South or South East Asia. To win over India and to humiliate Nehru was a necessary step to dominate Asia. Nehru, however, never expected any danger of military invasion by China, and India was left unprepared when she was

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[1] Ibid., p. 460.

attacked.

Instead of containing Chinese territorial expansion in the direction of India, Nehru adopted a policy of appeasement. Appeasing China, India recognized the Chinese position in Tibet, which then ceased to be a buffer zone; the Chinese forces came right up to the Indian frontier. On the other hand, Nehru failed to obtain a definite written assurance from Chou En-lai regarding Chinese recognition of the traditional Indo-Tibetan frontier. The Indo-Tibetan frontier was thus converted to an Indo-Chinese frontier, and the troubles started from there. Ever since June, 1954, when the conflicts over Bara Hoti took place, Chinese incursions continued. The Indian Government kept expressing feeling of "shock, surprise and sorrow." It did not take strong action but declared its intention of settling the dispute by peaceful negotiations. On every occasion the Indian Government protested but withheld the events from public knowledge in the hope that peaceful solutions to the disputes could be found by agreement between the two governments without public excitement on both sides. The Chinese, in the meantime, continued their tactics of clothing every act of

aggression in professions of warm friendship for their victim. Only when the situation became very bad, was the first White Paper published. Even then, nothing tangible was done either to prepare the country or to strengthen the defence forces to meet the growing Chinese threat. Nehru made few concessions to those who argued that to continue to observe Panchsheel meant to appease Peking. He declined to take the Tibetan issue to the United Nations, and, even after 1959, adopted a defensive non-provocative attitude toward Peking, accompanied by protests against trespass and modest steps to improve Indian defenses and influences in the mountain zones.

Being a cultural Sinophile, Nehru regarded Communist China more Chinese than Communist. He advocated enthusiastically the recognition of the Communist regime by other states, and its admission to the United Nations. While the world considered that the motive behind all actions of the Communist regime - such as the Korean, Tibetan, and Quemoy crises - was Communism, Nehru refused to see China as a Communist country, envisioning it instead, as anti-imperialistic great power standing side by side with India. Nehru repeatedly emphasized that Sino-Indian

relations should not be thought of in terms of Communism and anti-Communism. Nehru acted as an honest peace broker in world affairs to bring about an understanding between China and other nations of the world, particulary the United States. It was only after the Chinese attack in 1962 that he realized the Communist character of the new regime.

Analyzing the basis of China's anti-India policy, Nehru concluded in 1963 that China left no room for a country not to be aligned with either the Communist or anti-Communist camps. Communist China viewed the world as divided between imperialists and Communists, between whom not only was war inevitable, but tension in some form must be kept alive: there was, therefore, no place in it for the non-aligned. India was "such an outstanding member of the non-aligned community" that Communist China could not leave her alone.[1]

The Chinese attack finally put an end to Nehru's friendly policy. Despite India's military defeat, Nehru wrote that the Chinese had thus far failed in their main endeavor. Not only had they converted "a friendly country like India into one

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[1] Ibid., pp. 460-461.

basically hostile to them and united and determined against them," but the policy of non-alignment had not broken down and stood confirmed. He added that China had lost the good will of most of the non-aligned countries and even of many of her Communist allies. She stood isolated. Nevertheless, Nehru recognized that the menace from China was a continuing one which India should always prepare to meet.[1]

The failure of Nehru's China policy taught Nehru a lesson in world politics. He wrote in 1963:

> It is learning that in the world today it is not enough to be devoted to peace, or to mind one's own affairs, but that it is also necessary to have adequate armed strength, to adjust our relations with friendly countries in the light of the changing actualities of the international situation...[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 464.

[2] Ibid., pp. 462-463.

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