AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN JORDAN: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

by

EDWARD MCGOWAN WYRWICZ

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts to the Center for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at the American University of Beirut

Beirut, Lebanon
October 2014
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN JORDAN: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

by

EDWARD MCGOWAN WYRWICZ

Approved by:

Dr. Tariq Tell, Assistant Professor Advisor
Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Dr. Waleed Hazbun, Associate Professor Member of Committee
Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Dr. Betty Anderson, Associate Professor Member of Committee
Department of History
Boston University (Boston, MA, USA)

Date of thesis defense: October 13, 2014
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

THESIS, DISSERTATION, PROJECT RELEASE FORM

Student Name: Wyszycz Edward

☐ Master’s Thesis ☐ Master’s Project ☐ Doctoral Dissertation

☐ I authorize the American University of Beirut to: (a) reproduce hard or electronic copies of my thesis, dissertation, or project; (b) include such copies in the archives and digital repositories of the University; and (c) make freely available such copies to third parties for research or educational purposes.

☐ I authorize the American University of Beirut, three years after the date of submitting my thesis, dissertation, or project, to: (a) reproduce hard or electronic copies of it; (b) include such copies in the archives and digital repositories of the University; and (c) make freely available such copies to third parties for research or educational purposes.

Signature ___________________________ Date 13. Oct 2014
I want to first thank my adviser, Dr. Tariq Tell. Dr. Tell has been a gracious and patient adviser, as well as a valuable academic mentor. I owe my interest in Jordan to him. I also want to thank the other members of my committee, Drs. Waleed Hazbun and Betty Anderson. Both provided valuable advice and comments and I thank them for their time and support.

I also thank my parents Joan and Stan, and my brother James. Without their love and support my studies in Beirut would not have been possible. Finally, I thank all of my friends and fellow students that I met during my three years in Beirut. Many of them were essential in helping me become the person I am today, and I will always be grateful for the time we spent together.
AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

Edward McGowan Wyrwicz for Master of Arts
Major: Middle Eastern Studies

Title: Political Liberalization in Jordan: A Comparative Study

This thesis compares two distinct periods of political liberalization in Jordan’s history: 1953-1957, and 1984-1994. It uses Uriel Dann’s model of Jordanian politics in order to analyze the nature of the regime elite and the opposition in the two periods, while also utilizing other approaches in order to adjust the model accordingly. Different external and internal dynamics in the two periods shaped the nature of the liberalization process, as well as the relative strength of the political opposition to the regime. In the first period, King Hussein and the regime elite face a challenge from a broad-based opposition coalition that ultimately seeks to remake Jordan in its own image. This is not the case in the second period. Instead, we see a weaker opposition that is easily co-opted by the regime, legitimizing the process of regime-led liberalization that continues to this day.
CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................................................v
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................................................vi

Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................................................1
   A. Introduction .............................................................................................................................................1
   B. Research Questions .................................................................................................................................3
   C. Literature Review .................................................................................................................................5
   D. Approach ...............................................................................................................................................15
   E. Argument ..............................................................................................................................................17
   F. Thesis Plan ...........................................................................................................................................24

II. 1953–1957 .................................................................................................................................................26
   A. Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................26
   B. Political Development in the Mandate Period .........................................................................................27
   C. The 1948 War and its Aftermath ...........................................................................................................30
   D. Formation of the Jordanian National Movement ..................................................................................33
   E. A limited opening: The Fawzi al-Mulqi Cabinet .................................................................................38
   F. The return of Tawfiq Abu al-Huda ......................................................................................................41
   G. The Baghdad Pact .................................................................................................................................44
   H. Glubb’s dismissal and the Elections of 1956 .......................................................................................49
   I. The JNM in Power: The Government of Suleiman al-Nabulsi ..............................................................54
   J. Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................................61

III. 1984–1994 .................................................................................................................................................63
   A. Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................63
   B. A Weakening Economy and External Reshuffling ..............................................................................64
   C. Recalling Parliament and the 1986 Election Law .............................................................................68
   D. Disengagement from the West Bank, Economic Crisis, and the Elections of 1989 .......................70
   E. The National Charter and the Second Gulf War ...............................................................................77
   F. The Tahir al-Masri and Zaid bin Shaker Cabinets ............................................................................81
   G. The 1993 Elections and the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty .............................................................86
   H. Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................................92
IV. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................95
   A. Findings..................................................................................................................95
   B. Implications...........................................................................................................98
   C. Limitations and Further Research.........................................................................101

BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................102
CHAPTER I:
INTRODUCTION

A. Introduction

Following increasing domestic dissent towards neoliberal economic reforms and the events of the Arab Spring, Jordan has again embarked on a program of political liberalization. Jordan’s recent program of political liberalization has won plaudits from abroad. Fareed Zakaria, one of the most prominent mainstream commentators on international affairs, favorably contrasts Jordan and Morocco with Egypt and Tunisia, saying, “the best role models for the region might well be the two small monarchies.”  

This view of Jordan has been successfully constructed by Western and Jordanian policymakers and is built around the premise that Jordan is a moderate Arab state and an important strategic ally in an unstable region. Sean Yom notes that King Abdullah II “has cultivated the reputation of a benevolent leader” and has built a reputation as someone “who could safeguard the U.S.-Jordanian alliance while gradually enlightening his backward Arab nation with democratic reform.”  

Yom wryly characterizes the standard view of Jordan as “the Goldilocks of the Arab world-not as repressive as Syria, not as democratic as Tunisia, not as religious as Saudi Arabia, not as fractious as Iraq, and not as poor as Egypt.”

Political openings are not a recent phenomenon for Jordan, however. Peter Gubser argues that throughout its contemporary history, Jordan’s political life has oscillated

---

1 Fareed Zakaria, “Arab Spring’s hits and misses,” Washington Post, 31 January 2013
3 Ibid., 129.
4 Ibid., 129.
between authoritarianism and pluralism. Periods marked by “vigorouos, but decorous, debate in the parliament” and “the sustenance of economic and personal freedom” are contrasted with periods marked by a reversion to authoritarianism. Throughout, Jordanian politics were characterized by “the reality that ultimate power and decisions on national questions remain with a relatively narrow group centered on the palace.”

The “narrow group” Gubser refers to is the so-called Jordanian elite, a concept that has taken hold in many previous studies of Jordan’s politics. This is a legacy that is in large part to the work of Uriel Dann, who is given credit for showing that “Jordan is not the King’s one man show.”

Historical works on Jordan by Asher Susser, Lawrence Tal, Robert Satloff, and Shumel Bar owe considerable debt to Dann’s ideas on the Jordanian elite, which I will address in more detail shortly. Scholars studying political liberalization in Jordan since 1989 have also directed their focus on the Jordanian elite. Malik Mufti credits Jordan’s political liberalization to a number of decisions taken by a small number of elites at key “conjectures” or “strategic situations.”

Mufti’s approach is rooted in the democratic transition paradigm that was embraced by American political science in the last two decades of the twentieth century. This paradigm is built on the assumption that following a period of political liberalization; a country embarks on a path from authoritarianism to democracy.

---


but this treated as a part of the natural process of democratization. However, Mufti’s political sociology is similar to that of Dann and his followers, who view Jordanian history from 1949 to 1970 through the lens of actions taken by a narrow elite entrenched in the Palace and upper reaches of the military.

This thesis will compare two distinct periods of political liberalization in Jordan’s history using Dann’s definition of the elite and the opposition as a starting point. It will show that different external and internal dynamics in the two periods shaped the nature of the liberalization process, affecting the strength of the political opposition as well as the nature of the regime elite. Comparing the two periods allows us to draw out the differences between them more clearly. On the surface, both periods provide an example of an opposition working against the regime in order to gain power and enact its own policies. However, a close comparison reveals that the opposition in these two periods was quite different, and that the regime elite had not only changed, but also served a different purpose in the second period than it did in the first.

**B. Research Questions**

Dann defines Jordan’s political sphere as being contested by two different groups, the “establishment” and the “anti-establishment.” The establishment is defined as “the high-level decision makers and the high-level decision enforcers; the manipulators, but not

---

9 Ibid., 7.
11 Ibid., 145.
the manipulated.”12 This includes the king, the prime minister, cabinet posts such as the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Information, the Commander-In-Chief of the army and the commanders of the elite units, as well as the head of the mukhabarat.13 It is also made up of an informal group that Dann calls the “king’s friends,” men who often fill the positions of Chief of the Royal Court or senior personal aides.14 On the other hand, the anti-establishment is defined as “the part of the political public which essentially rejects ‘the image’ of Jordan.”15 The definition of the anti-establishment was spelled out more clearly in his later work. It consists of “the Palestinians when they organized as such, a stratum of intellectuals in the East Bank, and ‘radicals,’ whether pan-Arab, Communist, Muslim-fundamentalist, or unspecified ‘progressives.’”16

These ideas of the Jordanian establishment and anti-establishment yield a number of interesting questions. Has this narrow group remained the same over time, or has it changed? Is it even possible to say that Jordan has a cohesive elite? What has been the nature of the political opposition to this group? Where is the king’s place in it? What is that of the elite actors that surround him? How do they and the palace connect to society at large? How, if at all, are they influenced by it? In order to carefully study these questions, this thesis will look at two periods where there were shifts back forth between authoritarianism and pluralism: 1953-1957 and 1984-1994. The first period begins with the appointment of Fawzi al-Mulqi as Prime Minister in 1953 and ends with the installation of

12 Ibid., 150.
13 Ibid., 150.
14 Ibid., 150.
15 Ibid., 151.
a military government and the establishment of martial law in 1957. The second period begins with the recall of parliament by King Hussein in 1984, and ends with Jordan signing a peace treaty with Israel in 1994.

C. Literature Review

1. The Jordanian Elite

In his study of Jordanian politics, Uriel Dann delineates clearly elitist categories through which he analyzes sociopolitical relations in Jordan from 1949-1970. They are: the image of Jordan, the population of Jordan, and the politically active public.\(^\text{17}\) The “image of Jordan” is defined as “a kingdom, hereditary in the Hashemite family, successor to the British-mandated emirate of Transjordan…an establishment jealous for the independence of the state…determined to lean on the West and dependent on its aid.”\(^\text{18}\) Were any of these components to change, a fundamentally different Jordan would emerge.\(^\text{19}\) The population is broken up into natives of the East Bank and Palestinians, and then further along regional lines.\(^\text{20}\) Ultimately, Dann arrives at four discernable “vertical” population sectors: the Bedouin, the townspeople and villagers in the East Bank, the townspeople and villagers of the West Bank, and the Palestinian refugees on both banks.\(^\text{21}\) Dann defines the “politically active public” in Jordan as either belonging to the “establishment” or the “anti-


\(^{18}\) Ibid., 146.

\(^{19}\) Ibid., 146.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., 146-150.

establishment”, the definitions for which were given earlier in this chapter. As stated earlier, the establishment’s goal is to protect and advance the image of Jordan, while the anti-establishment seeks to supplant this image. Dann goes through many of the cabinets from 1949-1970, finding that “the establishment has been exposed to incessant challenges of different description and in permanently changing circumstances. It has found the proper response to all of them so far, without changing its character.” The establishment is not fluid, but rather a “political organism” that is the result of “its evident success in the struggle for survival.”

Dann portrays Jordanian society at this time as one in which tradition was paramount. He argues that Jordanian society “was by no means monolithic” but “was still governed largely by traditional perceptions, and traditional perceptions in this political context meant respect to customary authority and obedience to the rulers of the state.” The townspeople follow a “tradition of passive obedience” as long as a number of expectations are met. “The king is expected to govern, and if the government meets certain expectations, if it is Muslim, if it shows reasonable respect for the subjects privacy, if it is not unbearably rapacious, and above all if it is self-reliant.” This supposed predisposition to obedience serves the interests of the elite, which “held that the best politics for its citizens was abstention from politics, whether realized by political parties or

23 Ibid., 179.
24 Ibid., 179.
26 Ibid., 166.
27 Ibid., 166.
otherwise.” Dann explains this by saying “this preference can be traced back to fundamental concepts of Muslim society. Abstention from politics was one of the dividing lines between the traditional regimes in the Middle East and the mobilizing ideology of radical regimes.” Overall, Dann’s quasi-Orientalist view of Jordanian society fails to account for the fact that the Hashemites were actually foreigners who came to power thanks to an imperial patron. He does not look at the way in which the Hashemites were able to build a loyal base of support in Jordan. Rather, he takes that support base as a given.

The Jordanian elite has been an important framing point for other historical studies of Jordanian politics. In his biography of Wasfi al-Tall, Asher Susser casts al-Tall as “an exemplary representative of the ‘Jordanian entity’ and the Trans-Jordanian political elite.” This elite’s “unflinching support for the Hashemite regime has been a crucial factor contributing to its vitality and longevity.” According to Susser, al-Tall was one of the more capable members of this elite, along with Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, Samir al-Rifa’i, Zaid al-Rifa’i, and ‘Abd al-Hamid Sharaf. The constant cohesion of this elite as a major factor in preserving Jordan against threats to its stability. Susser does not differentiate between the imported external elite and the local East Bank notables. Instead, he adopts an all-encompassing definition that fails to provide any insight into why policy splits have occurred within the elite throughout his period of study.

---

28 Ibid., 15.
29 Ibid., 15.
31 Ibid., 172.
32 Ibid., 176.
33 Ibid., 177.
As opposed to Susser’s sweeping definition, Robert Satloff adopts a more restrained approach. He is careful to differentiate between the local Trans-Jordanian elite and the external elite imported to run the country under ‘Abdullah and the British, whom he calls the “King’s Men.”\(^{34}\) These men had no political base within Jordan itself, and as a result their loyalty to the Hashemites was their only means of attaining power. As a result, “their vested interest in the survival and prosperity of Hashemite Jordan was almost as great as that of the Hashemites themselves.”\(^{35}\) Satloff examines the period of 1949-1957, and concludes that the brief periods of liberal policies during this time were the result of immaturity on the part of King Hussein.\(^{36}\) This immaturity ceded “almost indifferently the political initiative to men and ideas that were fundamentally at odds with the Hashemites’ core principles.”\(^{37}\) When this led to a showdown with the opposition, Hussein brought the “king’s men” back into the fold to preserve Hashemite rule, meaning after the end of Jordan’s first period of liberalization in 1957 the “contours of Hussein’s monarchy bore a strong resemblance to the regime built up by ‘Abdullah, Kirkbride, and Glubb in the years before the 1948.”\(^{38}\) These two periods were connected by the “politics and personalities of the ‘king’s men.’ They kept the kingdom intact in its period of uncertainty and provided the bridge that permitted Hussein to mature fully into his grandfather’s heir.”\(^{39}\)

Shumel Bar has applied Dann’s idea of the Jordanian elite more recently.

According to Bar, the three major characteristics of the Jordanian polity are the role of the

\(^{35}\) Ibid., 7.
\(^{36}\) Ibid., 144.
\(^{37}\) Ibid., 144.
\(^{38}\) Ibid., 175.
\(^{39}\) Ibid., 175.
Bedouin tribes and the army as the mainstays of the regime, the existence of an East Bank Jordanian elite which holds the key positions in the power structure, and the perpetual conflict between East Bankers and Palestinians. Bar notes that the “king’s men” were replaced by new members of the elite who were native to Jordan: Fawzi al-Mulqi, Hazza’ al-Majali, Wasfi al-Tall and Bahjat al-Talhuni. This was a precursor to the development of a new Jordanian elite following Black September, made up of men with similar backgrounds to King Hussein himself. Importantly, they were all born and raised within Jordan. He concludes that, in the twenty fives years following the Jordanian civil war, the tribes lost some of their influence in politics, while the political elite remains largely of East Bank origin and the economic elite has become predominately Palestinian.

Lawrence Tal also looks at Jordan’s decision-making establishment in his study of Jordan from 1955-1967, which he splits into foreign policy and security professionals drawn from the monarchy, the political elite, and the military. Unlike Dann, Tal sets out to rid his model of the Jordanian elite of any Orientalist overtones. He does not see Jordanians as people who are naturally inclined to support the Hashemites as a result of traditional ties. He notes “the Hashemite family from Arabia was widely viewed by Jordanian inhabitants as the collaborator with a foreign power.” Instead, Tal classifies Jordan as a “neo-patrimonial rentier state” that built political support through external

41 Ibid., 226.
42 Ibid., 226-7.
43 Ibid., 227.
sources of funding. Tal characterizes the political elite as “cohesive in terms of their ideological belief in the legitimacy of the Hashemite state.” However, despite this ideological cohesion, “Jordan’s political elite often disagreed over policy formulation and formed factions, or informal alliances, with other actors between 1955 and 1967. Some members of the establishment even formed alliances with non-establishment figures in order to gain an advantage over their rivals. However, Tal sees these alliances not as a way to challenge the establishment, but rather a means to influence national security policy. At the end of the day, “the elite understood that they owed supreme loyalty to the Hashemite state.”

2. Political Liberalization in Jordan since 1989

Drawing on the contingent choice model of political liberalization that dominated early studies of democratic transition, Malik Mufti describes Jordan’s political liberalization policies from 1989-1999 as “a fundamental transformation of the country’s political order.” His focus is on the elite level, and he attributes the path of the Jordanian liberalization process to a “series of bargains struck by a handful of individuals in the government and the opposition.” For Mufti, political liberalization served the needs of both the monarchy and the opposition. The monarchy was able to secure legitimization

46 Ibid., 3.
47 Ibid., 15.
48 Ibid., 15-16.
49 Ibid., 17.
50 Ibid., 17.
52 Ibid., 102.
from the opposition, while the opposition was tempted by a potential in-road to decision-making that could protect their interests.53 Mufti’s work is reliant on interviews with senior Jordanian officials from the government and the opposition. As a result, he is well informed as to policy debates that went on behind the scenes. However, his account fails to provide for the actions of anyone outside the elite.

Reflecting the optimistic view of political liberalization that underpins the contingent choice model, Curtis Ryan argues that political liberalization in Jordan created a new political space that could lead to democratization in the long run. Although the interest of the Jordanian state may have been self-serving, “the very act of political liberalization changes the political space, creating the possibility for a broader public sphere and the development of a stronger civil society.”54 However, Ryan also admits “the question is whether such groups can effectively challenge or reform the enormous power of the Jordanian state. At present [he is writing in the early 2000s] the answer would certainly appear to be no.”55

In contrast, Russell Lucas is critical of the contingent choice model used by Mufti and Ryan to analyze the early stages of political liberalization in the 1990s, pointing out “the contingent choice model of democratization generally does not account for a stable political liberalization that does not lead to democratization.”56 Lucas specifically looks at political liberalization in Jordan in the 1990s with a historical institutionalism approach that stresses the historical roots of the Hashemite regime’s authoritarianism. Lucas argues that

53 Ibid., 115.
55 Ibid., 20.
the continued survival of authoritarianism in Jordan is a result of the institutional features of Jordan’s monarchy, which were shaped by the regime’s response to various internal and external crises throughout history. Lucas classifies Jordan as a monarchical authoritarian regime, in which the king stands at the center of a broad regime coalition and some degree of political pluralism is allowed. The coalition is made up of five different groups that Lucas calls “pillars”: the East Bank tribes, the East Bank minorities (the Christians, Chechens, and the Circassians), the state bureaucracy, the military, and the Palestinian-dominated private sector. These groups work within political venues that were shaped by regime-led state building: the palace, the cabinet, the parliament (made up of the elected House of Deputies and appointed Senate), the judicial system, and the press.

The key contrast between the historical institutional approach advocated by Lucas and the contingent choice model appears when considering the options taken in the face of pressures to liberalize. When faced with an external threat, these regimes use survival strategies that are geared towards insuring the regime’s survival, not far-reaching democratic reforms. Lucas analyzes the Jordanian regime’s manipulation of three institutions that are the three major objects of political discussion in Jordan: political parties, the Jordanian Parliament, and the press. In addition, Lucas identifies three factors that help determine the success or failure of these survival strategies: the resourceful use of constitutional rules by the regime, reinforcing the opposition’s disunity against the

---

57 Ibid., 13.
58 Ibid., 7.
59 Ibid., 21.
60 Ibid., 22-3.
61 Ibid., 7.
regime’s polices, and not imposing costs that could weaken the regime’s coalition.\textsuperscript{62} Lucas argues that the potential success or failure of these interventions depend on context and historical background: “Past events-especially past successes or failures of survival strategies-can influence the outcome of a later episode by offering new interpretations of institutional rules, by creating differing degrees of opposition disunity, or by resulting in various levels of regime coalition unity.”\textsuperscript{63} Lucas’ approach is useful in illustrating the historical roots of Jordan’s ultimately successful policies of repression in order to manage liberalization. In particular, he shows that institutional interventions used by the palace are effective because they have been used throughout Jordan’s history. However, he still relies on an elite-focused and narrow model of Jordan’s political field.

3. Comparing Political Liberalization in the 1950s and 1990s

Ellen Lust analyzed political liberalization in the 1950s and 1990s in Jordan through the lens of a comparison of the role of political parties. She compares the relative strength of the political party system in the two periods, which she determines by looking at mass-party linkages and party-government influences, as well as the relative strength of individual political tendencies.\textsuperscript{64} According to her findings, “the forces that have emerged in the 1950s and the 1990s are not fundamentally different” and “the opposition parties’ willingness to form broad coalitions challenging the monarchy on domestic and regional

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 9.
issues is also unchanged.”65 Furthermore, she concluded, “political liberalization in Jordan comes in response to increasing domestic threats. It is intended to preserve the regime, not foster political change.”66

Betty Anderson, on the other hand, characterizes the liberalization periods of the 1950s and 1990s as more different than similar. She argues that “the two eras experienced superficially similar political and economic transformations and crises, but ones which ultimately established different political milieus.”67 The 1950s in Jordan “witnessed the maturation and political success of an influential grassroots political movement”, while “the 1990s has seen an opposition fragmented by political differences and apathy.”68 Anderson attributes the relative success of the Jordanian National Movement in the 1950s to “leadership shifts in the government, regional rivalries, and the massive influx of Palestinian refugees into Jordan, all of which upset the political, demographic, and economic balance established by the British and King Abdullah prior to 1948.”69 In contrast, the period of political liberalization beginning in 1989 unfolded very differently. The political forces that emerged were divided into a number of relatively weak religious and secular parties, and the liberalization process was no longer driven by the opposition, but instead by the government.70

Anderson takes a noticeably different approach in her study of the 1950s than Dann and those influenced by him. These studies take it as given that the Hashemites were the

65 Ibid., 563.
66 Ibid., 565.
68 Ibid., 207.
69 Ibid., 208.
70 Ibid., 211-13.
legitimate rulers of the country, and that the opposition movement (the Jordanian National Movement) that arose in the 50s was made up largely of Palestinians who benefited greatly from outside aid in their attempt to overthrow the monarchy.\textsuperscript{71} The Jordanian role in the opposition is either largely dismissed or explained as a result of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s influence, and the wider Jordanian public is assumed to be loyal to the Hashemites.\textsuperscript{72} Anderson, on the other hand, seeks to address the questions of why certain elements of society chose to support the Hashemites, and why other elements of society chose to support the JNM. She focuses her attention on the urban areas of Jordan and their institutions (or agencies of socialization): government offices, schools, and the press. Anderson argues that these institutions were important not only in shaping a pro-Hashemite national identity, but also an anti-Hashemite identity, which included both Palestinians and Jordanians, that saw the Hashemite state as a colonial instrument.\textsuperscript{73} Ultimately, thanks to the services it offered, the Hashemite state was able to gain support from the population.\textsuperscript{74} Despite the JNM presenting themselves as “nationalists bent on overthrowing the ‘alienness of the ruling group’” and capitalizing on the agency of Arab nationalism, they were unable to defeat the Hashemites.

**D. Approach**

In this thesis, I will use Dann’s framework as a starting point for historically analyzing the two periods of 1953-1957 and 1984-1994. Dann’s approach is still relevant

\textsuperscript{71} Betty Anderson, *Nationalist Voices in Jordan: The Street and the State*. Austin, TX: University of Texas, 2005, 4.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 6-7.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 204.
today, as evidenced not only by the debt owed to his work by historical studies of Jordan, but also by the implicit assumptions of much of the literature on democratic liberalization in Jordan. Scholars utilizing the contingent choice model to study Jordan’s political liberalization from 1989 to the present focus their attention on a small amount of elite actors in the palace, the parliament, and the political parties. Other studies utilizing historical institutionalism present Jordan’s current political field as narrowly defined and highly segmented, with the king acting as the “linchpin” of the system.75 This portrayal of Jordanian politics owes debt to Dann as well, who himself not only characterized the king as the “linchpin of the political machine”76 but also presented Jordanian political society as being made up of defined sectors that “played distinct political parts as actors and objects.”77

Although this thesis uses Dann’s model as its frame, I also make necessary adjustments. In the first period, I utilize Betty Anderson’s history of the Jordanian National Movement in order to bring in popular politics and the street as well as challenge the notion that the opposition was made up of Palestinians and a few East Bank radicals. In addition, I draw on the refinements of the concept of the Jordanian establishment made by Satloff in order to show that, in this period, the establishment was divided between the “king’s men” inherited from the mandate and local elites.

In the second period, I use a more externally oriented account in order to draw attention to the external factors that led King Hussein to restart parliamentary life in 1984, as well as to illustrate the different external threats Jordan faced at the time as opposed to the 1950s. I will outline these differences below, but it is important to note that this different environment was reflected not only in the relative power of the various opposition parties, but also within the elite factions in the regime. I use Dann’s framework as a basis in this period as well, but I also call upon other literature that views Jordanian politics in a similar manner. I bring in Russell Lucas’ historical institutionalism approach to help illustrate how political liberalization did not lead to democratization, as predicted by the contingent choice model. The first period covered in the thesis also acts as an important counterweight to the contingent choice model. With the first period, we have a historical example of political liberalization in Jordan leading not to democracy, but to a consolidated authoritarian state.

E. Argument

First, it is necessary to trace the internal and external events that shaped the run up to these two periods. In the early 1950s, Jordan was facing significant internal and external threats to continued Hashemite rule. The war with Israel in 1948 allowed Jordan to take control of the West Bank, but it also forced Jordan to take in hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees. The refugees placed a huge strain on the economies of the East and West Banks, leading many people to move to the cities in search of work. The labor market was unable to keep up with the demands for work and many of the new urban dwellers
were forced to live in overcrowded and underserviced neighborhoods. To make matters worse, seasonal labor markets in Palestine that previously employed thousands of Jordanians were now shut off. Villages in the West Bank were subjected to frequent Israeli raids, which culminated in the massacre at Qibya in 1953. The waves of Palestinian migration also brought more organized and radical political parties to the Jordanian scene. These Palestinians linked up with a Jordanian opposition that had slowly grown in strength since the end of the Second World War\(^{78}\), and the opposition grew in strength thanks to not only the adverse economic conditions and security conditions outlined above, but also thanks to developments at the regional level. Nasser’s meteoric rise to the top of the Arab world seemed to indicate that Arab nationalism and anti-imperialism was on the rise, and rulers like the Hashemites were a thing of the past. Furthermore, there was instability at the top of the regime. When Hussein came to power in 1953, he was the third king in as many years. His grandfather ‘Abdullah was assassinated in 1951 and his father Talal was forced to abdicate due to rumored mental illness in 1952.

In the first period, the conditions outlined above created an environment that allowed the opposition to gain power quickly. Jordanian society underwent a period of rapid change, which placed strain on the economy and the political system. This created a large amount of popular discontent, which the opposition was able to tap into and channel in order to challenge the regime on certain policies. Furthermore, the regional trend at this time was unfavorable to the Hashemites, who had gained power as a result of British

colonial policy. As a result, the opposition was able to look towards countries such as Nasser’s Egypt, and use that as their inspiration for how they wanted the new Jordan to take shape.

In contrast, Jordan was in a very different place by the early 80s, both internally and externally. Following a large increase in the price of oil beginning in the early 1970s, Jordan’s economy boomed. The boom was fueled by external support from the Gulf countries, United States, and Iraq, as well as remittances from Jordanians working abroad. This economic boom made Jordanian society as a whole more urbanized, wealthier, and better educated than it was in the 50s.79 However, Jordan’s quasi-rentier economic model made it susceptible to external shocks. By 1984, as oil prices dropped and the Iran-Iraqi war threatened Jordan’s close economic relationship with its neighbor, Jordan’s economy was in recession.

Regionally, Jordan found itself in a less threatening environment. Egypt, which had been a thorn in Hussein’s side under Nasser, was brought back into the Arab fold by Hussein after it had been ostracized following the Camp David Accords of 1979. Jordan’s main regional antagonist was now Syria, but a détente with Syria launched by King Hussein and Zaid al-Rifa’i in 1985 succeeded in lowering the tension between the two countries considerably. Jordan’s greatest ally in the region was Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, a relationship built not only on close economic ties but also on warm personal ties between the two leaders. Jordan also enjoyed close economic ties with the Arab Gulf countries, which provided Jordan with billions of dollars in foreign aid. The Jordanian economy also

become increasingly reliant on remittances sent from the Gulf by Jordanian citizens working in the region. Unlike the 50s, in which Jordan found itself caught in the middle of the Arab Cold War, Jordan was now faced with a relatively peaceful regional order, held together by the oil wealth of the Gulf and mutual dislike of revolutionary Iran.

Jordan no longer faced an external threat from Israel in this period either. Following Israel’s occupation of the West Bank in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, Israeli-Jordanian relations were marked by a covert “collusion” on a range of matters. The conflict that had led to the June War and a war of attrition from 1968-1970 cooled significantly as Amman cooperated with Jerusalem against the rising power of the PLO. Jordan’s claim to the West Bank had seemingly become largely symbolic following the Rabat meeting of the Arab League in 1974 at which the PLO was declared to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Yet the Reagan’s administration’s peace plan called for Jordan to have a role in governing the West Bank, which gave King Hussein hope that he could reenter the West Bank as a political actor.

In the first period, internal and external conditions proved to be beneficial to the opposition’s growth. These conditions proved to be less conducive towards producing an effective opposition in the second period. On the whole, Jordanians were wealthier, more educated, and more urbanized. As a result of a large expansion of state largesse, many were tied to the state economically. Externally, Jordan enjoyed good relations with the Arab Gulf states and Egypt, while working together with Israel. Jordan’s primary external antagonist was Syria, but relations between the two countries warmed as a result of King Hussein and Zaid al-Rifa’i’s overtures to Asad. Furthermore, popular Arab nationalism had
declined significantly as an ideological force. The Hashemites did not face the same threat from the political Islam espoused by the Muslim Brotherhood, which failed to articulate a clear alternative to the status quo.

After thoroughly explaining the background of the two periods, we will then look at the periods themselves through the lens of Dann’s characterization of the “politically active public” being split into the “establishment” and the “anti-establishment.” As I stated in my previous section, I will use other sources for both periods in order to make adjustments to Dann’s model. For one, Dann’s view of Jordanians as a largely obedient population fails to explain how a broad opposition coalition was able to form in the 1950s. This thesis will show that the JNM had its roots in nationalist opposition that first emerged in the late 1920s. Following the ’48 War, East Bank opposition parties linked up with their ideological counterparts in the West Bank, and thanks to favorable external and internal conditions, the opposition was able to grow powerful enough to challenge the regime. In the second period, it was Jordanians from the southern towns, which are often characterized as the backbone of support for the Hashemites, who drove the protests that forced King Hussein to hold elections. This resulted from an economic restructuring plan that threatened their livelihood, something the supposed traditional ties between the Hashemites and the people could not allay.

Dann’s model also fails to take into account differences within the establishment and anti-establishment blocs. The establishment cannot be seen just as a monolithic bloc of elites. In the first period, there were important distinctions between members of the imported elite brought in by the British under ‘Abdullah, and local elites whom had been
co-opted by the Hashemites. In the second period, there were splits between a bloc closely tied to the *mukhabarat* and East Bank nationalists, and a bloc made up of the descendants of the imported Mandatory elite and the business community. These groups clashed over Jordan’s orientation to Syria, as well as the government’s policy towards the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, a group of Jordanian nationalists within the elite were opposed to Hussein’s policies in the West Bank and his peace treaty with Israel, on the grounds that it failed to account for Jordan’s national self-interest. It is important to draw these distinctions in order to understand why the different factions within the elite supported the policies they did. For example, on the issue of the Baghdad Pact, the opposition of men like Sa’id al-Mufti was not, as maintained in the account offered by Dann, the result of his weakness. Instead, it was a result of his position as one of the leaders of Jordan’s Circassian community, making him reliant on a domestic constituency. The massive popular mobilization against the treaty made it difficult for any leader with a local constituency to come out in the treaty’s favor. In the second period, opposition to the regime’s policies in the West Bank and towards Israel was the result of a long-standing fear of Jordanian nationalists that Palestinians would usurp their role in the state. It was also a reflection of wider opposition towards normalization with Israel across the political spectrum. Unlike the first period, however, popular opposition was not significant enough to influence policy.

The anti-establishment took on a very different character in the two periods under study in this thesis. In the first period, it was united under the Jordanian National Movement (JNM) grouping. Dann underestimates the JNM’s influence on the East Bank,
which is evidenced by the success the JNM had mobilizing its supporters in places such as Amman, Irbid, al-Salt, and al-Karak. At the same time, I argue that the anti-establishment cannot be broadly defined. Radical parties such as the Communists and the Ba’th had very different agendas from the largest party in the opposition, the National Socialist Party (NSP). Furthermore, the leading members of the National Socialist Party were men from elite backgrounds in their own right whose adherence to the message of the opposition was largely out of political convenience. When the NSP took over with Suleiman al-Nabulsi as leader, his government’s turn towards the radical Arab states and the Soviet Union had more to do with finding budget security than ideological preference. However, al-Nabulsi’s Communist and Ba’thist allies got more and more radical, and were able to slowly pull the NSP onto a collision course with the regime. As a result of the opposition’s radical turn, symbolized by the People’s Congress held in Nablus in 1957, Hussein was able to excuse the crackdown in 1957 as a necessary step against a potential Communist takeover.

Despite the apparent parallels between the experience of the leftist JNM during the 1950s and that of the Islamist IAF and the Muslim Brotherhood, there are significant differences between the two different political movements. First of all, the “anti-establishment” opposition that in the 50s had been ready to overthrow the monarchy no longer existed. The stature of leftist and Arab nationalist parties had declined considerably as a result of unfavorable regional trends and government repression. With the loss of the West Bank, the left had also lost a major part of its domestic support. The Muslim Brotherhood replaced the left as the prominent grouping within the opposition, but they did not seek to change the established order. The Brotherhood had survived in Jordan thanks to
its policy of collaboration and accommodation with the Hashemites, and instead of seeking to mobilize disaffected Jordanians against the regime, it welcomed the opportunity to formally join the political system. Unlike the first period, where the opposition was able to use discontent on the street in order to increase its power and bring pressure on the regime, the opposition never sought to use the street in order to put forth their demands. Instead, the opposition parties looked to become part of the political system, not to change it. The Brotherhood, as well as the aforementioned leftist and nationalist parties, were tied to the reform process by agreeing to the National Charter, by which they effectively swore their loyalty to the Hashemite regime. Unlike in the 50s, where the opposition was able to force concessions from the regime and score an electoral victory, in the second period the liberalization process was entirely regime controlled.

F. Thesis Plan

- Chapter II: 1953-1957

This chapter will begin by summarizing the internal and external situation in the run up to 1953. I note that the Jordanian National Movement benefited from a series of internal and regional factors that fueled the growth of the opposition on both the West and the East Banks. The rest of the chapter will provide a narrative of events throughout the period. I define this period as beginning with Hussein’s coronation and Fawzi al-Mulqi replacing Tawfiq Abu’l-Huda as prime minister. It ends with Hussein surviving a supposed coup attempt, dismissing the JNM government under Suleiman al-Nabulsi, declaring martial law, and securing American aid through the Eisenhower Doctrine.
• **Chapter III: 1984-1994**

This chapter will be structured in the same manner as Chapter II. I will summarize the internal and external situation leading up to 1984, and provide a narrative of the events from 1984-1994. I define this period as beginning with Hussein announcing his intention to reactivate Parliament in 1984, and the signing of the peace treaty with Israel at Wadi Araba in 1994.

• **Chapter IV: Conclusion**

In my conclusion, I will provide a final analysis on the two periods with relation to the Dann framework as well as the adjustments made in the two chapters. In particular, I will offer a critique of the contingent choice model of democratization based on the comparison of the two periods under study.
CHAPTER II:
1953-1957

A. Introduction

This chapter shows that the liberalization process in this period was driven by the opposition, and not controlled by the regime. The Jordanian National Movement was a broad-based coalition that had its roots in the nationalist opposition that first emerged in the late 1920s. Following the annexation of the West Bank, Palestinian political parties linked up with their Jordanian counterparts and built a movement that was able to mobilize supporters throughout the country against the monarchy. Taking advantage of the new constitution, the popular ideology of Arab nationalism, as well as waning British influence, the opposition was able to win the elections of 1956 and force King Hussein to choose the leader of its largest party as Prime Minister. However, once in power, its more extreme members pulled the opposition in a radical direction. This made confrontation with the regime inevitable, and the opposition was ultimately unable to prevail against the monarchy.

During this period, King Hussein filled the positions of power by alternating between the remaining king’s men and members of the local elite. Leaders with local powerbases proved to be sensitive to the power of the opposition, which led Hussein to rely almost exclusively on the king’s men when he cracked down against the opposition in 1957. The crackdown marked the beginning of Jordan’s reliance on the United States as its
external source of rents, as well as a process of authoritarian consolidation led by the
mukhabarat and the army.

**B. Political Development in the Mandate Period**

Jordan first began to take shape when the British formally declared a separate
mandate (from Palestine) over it in May 1923. The British had already found their man in
‘Abdullah, who had first travelled to the area with a small force in the fall of 1920.
Following a meeting with the Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill in 1921, who had been
convinced of ‘Abdullah’s suitability by a group of Arabists lead by T.E. Lawrence,
‘Abdullah was crowned Emir of Transjordan. Initially, ‘Abdullah’s close relationship with
Arab nationalists (or istiqlalists) was a source of constant aggravation for the British.⁸⁰
However, due to ‘Abdullah’s relatively weak position, especially in comparison to that of
his rival Ibn Saud, the British were able to force ‘Abdullah to sign over administrative and
budgetary control and expel the istiqlalists in 1924.⁸¹ ‘Abdullah’s subservience was
formalized in a treaty between Transjordan and Britain in 1928 which emphasized that all
local authority would be subordinate to the British crown.⁸² Along with this treaty, an
Organic Law was issued that allowed for the creation of a 21-seat Legislative Council with
limited powers.⁸³

The Organic Law set out the framework of political life for Jordan under the
Mandate. Of the Legislative Council’s 21 members, 7 of them were appointed members,
making it extremely difficult for a potential anti-British or Hashemite bloc to be formed.

---
⁸¹ Ibid., 30.
⁸² Ibid., 36.
⁸³ Ibid., 38.
The Legislative Council could be dissolved at the whim of the emir, and it only sat in session for three months out of the year. It was designed as a means to co-opt the elite, not to make policy. Nonetheless, economic hardship and a lack of opportunities for Jordanians in the new state structures fueled a nationalist opposition movement that was given a further boost by the treaty with the British. The Transjordanian National Congress (TNC), as the movement became known, called for an independent Jordan and used the slogan “Jordan for Jordanians” as its rallying cry. The TNC eventually split in the early 30s as a result of disputes between its notables over potential Zionist investment and land purchases, but its presence shows that oppositionists could effectively tap into anti-British and anti-Zionist sentiment amongst the larger population.

Jordanian politics followed a similar pattern throughout the Mandate period. An imported administrative elite, made up of men such as Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, Ibrahim Hashim, and Samir al-Rifa’i, held the offices of Prime Minister and other senior administrative positions. Meanwhile, local Transjordan elites organized political parties that were personal, not ideological. As a result, much of the political activity was a reflection of local rivalries. For example, the Majali clan, a prominent group from al-Karak, became major supporters of ‘Abdullah, while their rivals, the Tarawnah clan, were heavily involved in the TNC. Meanwhile, the impoverished state of the tribes in eastern Transjordan continued to threaten stability in the country. Under the leadership of John

---

84 Ibid., 46.
86 Ibid., 80.
87 Ibid., 80.
89 Ibid., 46.
Bagot Glubb, the Arab Legion was able to co-opt the tribes, tying them to the state through employment in the arm and on public works projects, as well as access to aid through relief committees.\footnote{Ibid., 44-5.} By the late 1930s, Glubb had created a force that the British used in order to protect their oil infrastructure in Iraq.

The years of World War 2 proved to be a surprising boon to Transjordan’s economy. A combination of large inflows of British aid, wartime building projects, and Jordan’s value in the Allies wartime supply chain led to massive economic growth in urban areas.\footnote{Tell, \textit{The Social and Economic Origins of Monarchy in Jordan}. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.} Construction projects initiated by the British provided opportunities to earn extra income, and rising grain prices allowed farmers to ease their tax burden.\footnote{Ibid., 109.} The war had also brought about a large expansion of the Arab Legion. Under the command of John Glubb, it grew to 10,000 men and, as a result, was increasingly relied upon by the British as a regional security force.\footnote{Ibid., 109-110.} The wartime economic boom, which benefited Jordanians across various social strata, combined with the growth of the Arab Legion, produced a largely stable country after the war ended. Britain and Jordan signed the Treaty of London on March 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 1946, which gave Jordan nominal independence, although the British kept its military bases and British officers remained in most of the command positions of the Arab
Legion.\textsuperscript{94} The treaty was renegotiated in 1948, partly as a result from internal opposition in Jordan, but Jordan remained a client state of Britain in practice.\textsuperscript{95}

C. The 1948 War and its aftermath

By this time, Jordan had become embroiled in the escalating conflict between Jews and Palestinians within Mandate Palestine. The Arab League had adopted a policy against any partition plan, along with threats to use military force in order to prevent a Jewish state from being established anywhere in Palestine.\textsuperscript{96} King ‘Abdullah, however, driven by his regional ambitions and his own rivalries with the head of the Arab Higher Committee, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, sought to add the area of Palestine designated for an Arab state to his kingdom.\textsuperscript{97} The king held a secret meeting with Golda Meyerson (later Meir), at the time the head of the Jewish Agency’s Political Department, on November 17\textsuperscript{th}, 1947, at which both sides supposedly reached a tacit agreement that allowed Jordan to capture any lands set aside for an Arab state.\textsuperscript{98} On November 29\textsuperscript{th}, the United Nations announced that Palestine would be partitioned into a Jewish and an Arab state, leaving the door open for ‘Abdullah to realize his goal. Whether the British encouraged ‘Abdullah to occupy the Arab part of Palestine remains disputed. According to those who believe collusion took place, British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin consented to ‘Abdullah’s plan in a meeting

with Tawfiq Abu’l-Huda and John Glubb on February 7th, 1948. Other accounts, however, make the case that Bevin did not give consent to ‘Abdullah’s plan and that the British were concerned that any support for ‘Abdullah would negatively impact their relations with other Arab states and the United States. Furthermore, a number of revisionist Israeli scholars have also questioned if ‘Abdullah reached an agreement with the Zionists at all. Nevertheless, ‘Abdullah’s contacts with the Zionists led to rumors of collusion that would hound him the rest of his life.

Whether or not any sort of collusion occurred with the British or the Israelis, the collapse of Palestinian resistance and Israel’s declaration of independence, combined with internal and external pressures compelled ‘Abdullah to invade Palestine on May 15th, 1948. The Arab Legion was able to capture all of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and the subsequent armistice between Jordan and Israel gave ‘Abdullah de facto Israeli recognition for his control of the West Bank. However, the Arab Legion’s embarrassing withdrawal from Lydda and Ramlah in the last stages of the war cast a shadow over Jordan’s war effort. Riots broke out in Amman and Glubb’s car was stoned as he was blamed for the defeat, which caused rumors to emerge of plots against ‘Abdullah’s life. ‘Abdullah’s negotiations with the Israelis following the war’s conclusion brought further attacks from

99 Ibid., 112.
his opponents, especially in light of Israel’s refusal to make significant territorial compromises with him.\textsuperscript{104} In a further blow to ‘Abdullah’s prestige, the former military governor of Jerusalem, ‘Abdullah al-Tall, revealed ‘Abdullah’s contacts with the Israelis in the Egyptian press.\textsuperscript{105} Despite the opposition arrayed against him, ‘Abdullah had already begun the process of annexing the West Bank. Thanks to their lack of alternatives, Palestinians slowly realized that ‘Abdullah’s rule was their only choice.\textsuperscript{106} Through a series of conferences held by Palestinian notables whom proclaimed their support for Hashemite rule and the endorsement of the Jordanian parliament, Jordan was able to claim some level of popular mandate for the move.\textsuperscript{107} In April 1950, elections for parliament were held, and Palestinians were given half of the seats (20 out of 40) as well as half of the positions in the cabinet.\textsuperscript{108} Jordan’s promise that “the annexation is without the least prejudice to the final settlement of the Palestine question” was an attempt to stave off wider Arab opposition.\textsuperscript{109} It was not enough, however. In the end, “‘Abdullah used the rhetoric of Arab nationalism to legitimize his position within Transjordan and to justify his ambitions beyond his borders. But he failed to distance himself sufficiently from Great Britain to give his rhetorical position reality.”\textsuperscript{110}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 206.
  \item \textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 204.
  \item \textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 190.
  \item \textsuperscript{109} Discussion of Jordan’s plan to annex Arab Palestine, Central Intelligence Agency, 7 June 1950, reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System (Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2014)
\end{itemize}
‘Abdullah was assassinated in Jerusalem on July 20th, 1951, in Jerusalem. Flimsy evidence was found connecting the assassin to Hajj Amin al-Husseini, ‘Abdullah’s old enemy. The important thing was not who was behind the plot, but why the plot happened in the first place. ‘Abdullah was killed as a result of what many saw as collusion in the partition of Palestine.\textsuperscript{111} Arab nationalism, the ideology that ‘Abdullah had sought to use in order to legitimize his policies, ended up costing him his life. ‘Abdullah’s assassination showed the power of Arab nationalism as a tool that could be used against the Hashemites. With the incorporation of the West Bank, this problem would be felt even more acutely.

Annexing the West Bank had completely changed Jordan. The population tripled, with the existing population in the West Bank joined by hundreds of thousands of refugees from other parts of Palestine. The population increase placed a large strain on the economy in both the West and the East Banks. Unemployment reached 40 percent in the West Bank, and East Bankers were no longer able to work seasonally in Palestine.\textsuperscript{112} King Hussein inherited this uncertain situation when he ascended to the throne in May 1953. Following his grandfather ‘Abdullah’s assassination Jerusalem in 1951, his father Talal had been quickly removed from the throne due to reported mental instability. Hussein was only 17 at the time, but he soon faced a variety of external and internal threats to his throne.

\textbf{D. Formation of the Jordanian National Movement (JNM)}

The JNM had its roots in the reemergence of nationalist opposition following the conclusion of World War 2. The early impetus for its formation was opposition to Jordan’s

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 203.
treaty with Britain in 1946. A small party known as the Jordanian Arab Party managed to get two of its members elected to the parliament in 1947, and future opposition leaders such as Suleiman al-Nabulsi were among the party members. The opposition was unable to attract a large popular following at this time, but their pressure did succeed in forcing ‘Abdullah and the British to slightly modify the treaty in 1948. The annexation of the West Bank allowed the Jordanian opposition to merge with the Palestinian Arab nationalist and leftist movements, which had just suffered the shock of defeat by Israel. Merging under the umbrella of the JNM, the opposition parties were able to build popular support thanks to a number of favorable conditions. The aftermath of the war with Israel left Jordan’s economy in a poor state. Haifa, the port through which the majority of trade had been conducted, was now in Israel. Seasonal work in Palestine, which had been so important in absorbing surplus labor during the Mandate years, was now no longer possible. To make matters worse, the conflict left both the West and East Banks with large numbers of refugees with little more than the clothes on their backs. This placed the economy of the West Bank under particular strain, as real wages fell and unemployment rose. The dire economic situation, along with a population embittered the destruction of

114 Ibid., 41.
115 Ibid., 41.
118 Ibid., 117.
their society as a result of the Israeli victory, meant that it was not surprising that support
for the JNM was strongest in the West Bank.

The rapid increase in population also placed the agricultural sector under greater
strain. Agricultural land in Jordan was primarily divided into small plots that were hardly
enough for sustenance even in good years, let alone during droughts.\textsuperscript{119} Investment in
agriculture was insufficient to meet the demands of the increased population, which forced
peasants off the land and to the cities in order to look for work.\textsuperscript{120} Furthermore, people
living in West Bank border villages lost their lands in what was now Israel, while also
being forced to bear the brunt of Israeli reprisal raids. Despite small-scale growth of the
industrial sector, it was not enough to incorporate the large number of available workers.
As a result, unemployment increased, and recent arrivals to urban areas often settled in
overcrowded and poorly serviced neighborhoods. This combination of increased
unemployment, urbanization, and disenchantment with government services gave the JNM
a support base in the urban underclass.\textsuperscript{121}

Although the JNM was able to rely on the urban poor to play an important role in
street politics, the most enthusiastic cadres were found in schools. The expansion of the
education system allowed for the growth of party cells in schools, and students and
teachers became an important backbone for the opposition parties.\textsuperscript{122} Aggressive Israeli
raids into the West Bank also contributed to increased radicalization, thanks to the inability

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 51.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 55.
\textsuperscript{122} Anderson, \textit{Nationalist Voices in Jordan: The Street and the State}. Austin, TX: University of Texas, 2005, 119.
of the state to stop them. Nasser’s success in 1952 and the continued favoritism shown
towards British officers in the Arab Legion fed the growth of conspiratorial cells in the
army.\textsuperscript{123} Lastly, pan-Arabism was an attractive ideology to a large portion of the
population, especially in light of the recent success of Israel and the Arab world’s
experience with imperialism as a whole.\textsuperscript{124} All together, these factors contributed to a rapid
growth of the political parties that formed the JNM.

The largest, and least radical, of the parties in the JNM was the National Socialist
Party (NSP). Led by Suleiman an-Nabulsi, it attracted the support of progressive notables,
as well as large parts of the East Bank’s population, thanks to its relatively moderate
political platform.\textsuperscript{125} The NSP was at first pro-Iraqi, but following Nasser’s rise in
prominence it moved closer to Egypt.\textsuperscript{126} It’s platform called for ending the Anglo-
Jordanian treaty, removing British officers from the army, and a moderate version of state
socialism.\textsuperscript{127} Of the more radical parties, the Jordanian Communist Party (JCP) was the
largest and best organized.\textsuperscript{128} The main strength of the JCP lay in the West Bank towns and
cities such as Nablus, Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Bethlehem, but also in Irbid and Amman
on the East Bank.\textsuperscript{129} In order to contest elections, the JCP played a major role in
establishing the National Front, which was necessary due to a law banning the Communist

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{126} Ibid., 48.
\item \textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 48.
\item \textsuperscript{129} Ibid., 432-3.
\end{itemize}
Party and any activities associated with Communism. The JCP focused much of its activities on recruiting members of the educated classes, although many of its leaders were from a modest background. Jordanian graduates from Syrian and Lebanese universities established the Jordanian branch of the Ba’th Party, and its base was also found in Nablus, Jerusalem, and Ramallah on the West Bank, as well as Amman and Irbid on the East Bank. The Ba’th Party called for free elections, establishment of political parties, and for the parliament to have a stronger role in policymaking. The Arab Nationalist Movement was the smallest of the radical parties. Accounts on the founding of the party differ, but its primary goal was the return of Palestinians to their homeland. The party was a close ally of Nasser, and it’s platform revolved around the ideas of “Unity, Liberation, Revenge” and “Blood, Iron, Fire” in order to take revenge for the Arab defeat in 1948.

There were two other groups that made up the JNM. The first was the Tahrir Party, which sought to establish a democratic government with an Islamic slant. The second was the Free Officers’ Movement, which was made up primarily of Jordanian military officers and called for unity with Syria in order to establish a stronger army.

130 Ibid., 420-1.
131 Ibid., 433-4.
135 Ibid., 111.
137 Ibid., 48.
important omission from the JNM was the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood’s branch in Jordan had been established in 1945, but at this time the Brotherhood enjoyed a cozy relationship with the monarchy, which was consolidated by the opposition to populist Arab nationalism of both parties. As a result, the Brotherhood supported the monarchy whenever the opposition seriously challenged it during this period.

E. A limited opening: the Fawzi al-Mulqi Cabinet

All told, the factors mentioned above that allowed for the growth of the opposition certainly presented the young King Hussein with a set of serious challenges to his rule. The reign of his father King Talal had been short-lived, but he did preside over the passing of a new constitution in 1952. The constitution is a relatively liberal document that guarantees freedom of the press, assembly, and ascribes the source of all power to “the nation.”138 One of Hussein’s first acts as king was to make his friend, Fawzi al-Mulqi, Prime Minister. Al-Mulqi succeeded Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, who had a large hand in writing the Jordanian constitution and arranging for Hussein’s ascent to the throne. Al-Mulqi had become friends with Hussein while the latter was being educated at Harrow and Sandhurst.139 He also held the honor of being Jordan’s first native-born Prime Minister, although his family origins were in Damascus. In al-Mulqi’s ministerial statement, he promised to enforce the freedoms outlined in the Constitution, improved border security, and solidarity with the struggle against imperialism and foreign influence.140 The Constitution was amended so

---

140 Ibid., 78.
that a simple majority in the parliament was required in order for the cabinet to resign. In the first months of al-Mulqi’s rule, he largely kept his promises. Press controls were relaxed and many political prisoners were released, and al-Mulqi began working towards further constitutional reform. However, continued tensions with Israel along the border threatened to undermine the government. Palestinians who had been displaced from Israel continued to cross the border to cultivate their fields, which brought aggressive responses from the Israeli military against border villages. According to the al-Mulqi, the Arab Legion had been given specific orders to only defend the border and not carry out reprisal attacks in Israel. The prime minister’s response to the situation was to request military aid from Britain, only to back out when the Arab League failed to support the request. Israeli action finally culminated in a cross-border raid on the village of Qibya on October 13th-14th, 1953. The Israelis initially shelled the village with mortars and artillery, and following the artillery barrage demolition teams entered the villages in order to destroy homes and shops. All told, over 45 people were killed (the vast majority of them

144 Ibid.
civilians), 39 homes were destroyed, and dozens were wounded both in Qibya and in the surrounding villages.  

The Israeli attack on Qibya marked the beginning of the end for al-Mulqi’s cabinet. Demonstrations broke out across Jordan following news of the attack, and the opposition seized upon the attack as an opportunity to call for the dismissal of Glubb and all other British officers in the army. The United States announced that it was suspending all economic aid to Israel in response to the attack, but within Jordan there was anger over the United Nations Security Council refusing to specifically address the Qibya attack. As tensions between Jordan and Israel continued to rise, Israel invoked Article XII of the General Armistice Agreement (GAA) signed by Jordan and Israel in 1949, which required the Secretary-General to “convoke a conference of representatives of the two Parties for the purpose of reviewing, revising, or suspending any of the provisions of this Agreement.” This move by Israel forced al-Mulqi into a bad position. On one hand, if the government refused to attend the conference, it was possible that Israel would denounce the armistice all together. On the other hand, any public meeting with Israel officials would be a public relations disaster for al-Mulqi, especially in light of the widespread outcry in Jordan following the attack. The US embassy in Amman conveyed al-Mulqi’s fear that his and his

147 Ibid.
cabinet’s lives might be in jeopardy if they agreed to a conference under Article XXII. The end, with opposition in the cabinet led by the Foreign Minister Hussein al-Khalidi, the Jordanian government refused to attend the proposed conference. Al-Mulqi’s continued attempts to appease the opposition began to trouble King Hussein, who backed him publicly, but began to plan his removal in private. The last straw came when the parliament sent a telegram to Soviet delegate to the UN Andrei Vishinsky thanking Russia for its stand in support of the Arab position. In May 1954, al-Mulqi was finally dismissed. His replacement was the man whom he had succeeded, Tawfiq Abu al-Huda.

F. The return of Tawfiq Abu al-Huda

Tawfiq Abu al-Huda was perhaps the most prominent of the so-called “king’s men” who had helped govern the country since the Mandate period. He had played an essential role, in conjunction with Kirkbride, in ensuring Talal received the throne following ‘Abdullah’s assassination. He had also managed to ward off Iraqi attempts to capitalize on Talal’s illness to place an Iraqi Hashemite on the throne, allowing the young King Hussein to take the throne. Abu al-Huda’s appointment was not well received within the

---


157 Ibid., 52-56.
parliament, as he had a personal history of conflict with the opposition.\textsuperscript{158} He filled his
cabinet entirely with Hashemite loyalists, only keeping one cabinet member from al-
Mulqi’s cabinet.\textsuperscript{159} In January earlier that year, al-Mulqi’s government had passed a law
authorizing the formation of political parties. As a result, by mid-June 1954, four parties
had filled requests for recognition: The Nation Party, which was led by Samir al-Rifa’i, the
National Socialist Party, the National Front (made up mostly of Communists), and the
Ba’th Party.\textsuperscript{160} Abu al-Huda attempted to delay recognizing the applications until after he
passed his confidence vote, but as the tide of events pointed to a negative vote, Abu al-
Huda was able to persuade King Hussein to dissolve parliament. Abu al-Huda’s
government then embarked on a crackdown against the more radical elements of the
opposition. The newspapers of the Movement of Arab Nationalists, Ba’th Party, and the
Communist Party were banned, and the government issued three Defense Regulations that
gave the cabinet more control over public organizations and activities.\textsuperscript{161} With the
opposition seen as being on the ropes, elections were held on October 16\textsuperscript{th}, 1954. Abu al-
Huda drew up a plan with Glubb that gave the army an essential role in making sure the
elections went the government’s way. Arab Legion soldiers were instructed to vote for
government candidates, and soldiers would cast their ballots on base as opposed to at
polling centers.\textsuperscript{162} The government promised that the election would be free, but this did
not curb public anger following the announcement of the results. Demonstrations broke out

\textsuperscript{158} Anderson, \textit{Nationalist Voices in Jordan: The Street and the State}. Austin, TX: University of Texas, 2005,
151.
\textsuperscript{161} Anderson, \textit{Nationalist Voices in Jordan: The Street and the State}. Austin, TX: University of Texas, 2005,
152.
across the country; crowds in Amman attacked the United States Information Agency (USIA) building, and rioting spread to Irbid, Salt, Nablus, Jerusalem, and Ramallah.\textsuperscript{163} The Arab Legion used deadly force for this first time against the demonstrators, and 14 were killed during the three days of rioting.\textsuperscript{164}

The elections returned a parliament that can only be characterized as overwhelmingly loyalist. The opposition only managed to elect four members: two Communists who ran as independents and two National Socialists.\textsuperscript{165} Following the riots and the blatant electoral engineering, although the government had a firm foothold in parliament, Abu al-Huda’s position within the country weakened significantly. Prominent politicians such as Sa’id al-Mufti, Fawzi al-Mulqi, and Samir al-Rifa’i asked Hussein to not allow Abu al-Huda to stay on as prime minister, while others painted Abu al-Huda as a British lackey.\textsuperscript{166} In an attempt to outflank his critics, Abu al-Huda announced on November 7\textsuperscript{th} that he would seek to renegotiate the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty.\textsuperscript{167} Abu al-Huda himself had been responsible for negotiating the most recent version of the treaty with Ernest Bevin in 1948, but he was operating from a weak position. Britain’s recent loosening of its ties with Egypt and Iraq made it unlikely that it would grant similar concessions to Jordan.\textsuperscript{168} Negotiations took place between the Jordanians and the British in December 1954 in London. The Jordanian delegation, led by Abu al-Huda, was unable to

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{163} Anderson, \textit{Nationalist Voices in Jordan: The Street and the State}. Austin, TX: University of Texas, 2005, 155.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{167} Ibid., 99.
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., 101.
\end{flushleft}
wrest any concessions out of the British. He undermined Jordan’s bargaining position from the outset by remarking that he had not come to London to discuss treaty revision, but instead to discuss paying the Arab Legion subsidy directly to the Jordanian government and strengthening the National Guard.\textsuperscript{169} This position contradicted previous statements from Hussein on the matter.\textsuperscript{170} The British flatly refused to change the nature of the Arab Legion subsidy or to increase funding for the National Guard.\textsuperscript{171} Furthermore, Abu al-Huda told British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden that Jordan would not wish to be left out of a potential regional defense plan.\textsuperscript{172} Departing London empty-handed, Abu al-Huda was reluctant to face the music in Amman. He took a vacation in Beirut while King Hussein debated over whether to sack him.\textsuperscript{173} Hussein decided to keep Abu al-Huda on, but concerns over the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty were soon overshadowed by the choice of whether or not to join the Baghdad Pact.

\textbf{G. The Baghdad Pact}

In the eyes of the United States, the need for the Baghdad Pact (or Central Treaty Organization) grew out of the Middle East’s strategic value as well as the weakening of British and French influence in the region. The White House acknowledged, “future efforts to prevent the loss of the Near East will require increasing responsibility, initiative, and

\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., 102.
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., 102.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid., 102.
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., 103.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., 103.
leadership by the United States in the area.”\textsuperscript{174} The goal was to create a “Northern Tier” of states consisting of Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan, with US military and economic aid being the glue that would hold the alliance together.\textsuperscript{175} The British were wary of the Northern Tier concept, as it threatened to undermine their own plans for regional defense in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{176} On February 24\textsuperscript{th}, 1955, Turkey and Iraq announced that they had signed a mutual defense treaty, a move engineered by Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri as-Sa’id, who had returned to power in August 1954.\textsuperscript{177} They would be joined later in the year by Britain, Pakistan, and Iran. Jordanian officials were undecided on whether they wished to join the alliance or not. Following a visit to Egypt, King Hussein was initially “sold on the Egyptian viewpoint”, which was that Iraq’s treaty with Turkey threatened to undermine collective Arab security in the face of Israel.\textsuperscript{178} Nasser made this point both at the Arab League and at the Bandung Conference in April 1955. However, by March 1955, Hussein had changed his tone. In a meeting with American ambassador Lester Mallory, Hussein said Jordan was “prepared to listen to any request from US to join in agreements” and that


he held a “ready acceptance and appreciation of our view”. On the other hand, Abu al-Huda was coy on his position to the treaty. He wished to play the United States and Britain off against each other in order to secure a revision of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty, and as a result remained publicly neutral on the issue. Abu al-Huda’s stance further isolated him from Hussein, especially after Iraq aggressively courted many of Jordan’s oppositionists and secured their tentative backing towards joining the alliance. Abu-l Huda was finally dismissed at the end of May 1955, and was replaced by Sa’id al-Mufti.

Sa’id al-Mufti, unlike men such as Tawfiq Abu al-Huda or Samir Rifa’i, was a leading member of the local political order. As the head of Amman’s Circassian community, he was bound to a constituency and as a result more tuned in to local public opinion. Al-Mufti’s cabinet was distinctly East Bank in orientation as well as pro-Iraq, signaling the intent of King Hussein join the Baghdad Pact. Public opinion, on the other hand, was firmly against joining the alliance. Nasser announced on September 27th that he agreed to an arms deal with the Soviet Union, which served to further highlight the divide between pro and anti-Soviet states in the region. According to Mallory, there was “universal popular Jordanian enthusiasm for the flame of Arab political liberation ignited by Nasser’s arms deal with the Soviet bloc.” The tide had been turned with regards to the

---


181 Ibid., 106.

182 Ibid., 109.

Jordanian opposition’s position on Nasser, which had initially been lukewarm. The threat of opposition was judged to be very real by Mallory, who noted that, “mass pressure now so sways Amman authorities they fear mob action if government tries to move against current Arab thinking.” Indeed, by this time, American and British opinions on the Baghdad Pact had begun to differ. The British, who were initially opposed to Jordanian participation, had over time become in favor Jordan’s membership. The Americans, however, were concerned that other Arab states joining the Baghdad Pact risked undermining their secret plan for an Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement (Project ALPHA).

The approach to the Jordanians to join the Baghdad Pact was made first by Turkey. On November 2nd, 1955, Turkish President Celal Bayar and Foreign Minister Fatin Zorlu arrived in Amman with the goal of having Hussein agree to the pact when they left. The Turks reassured Jordan that their close relationship with Israel was over, and that Jordan’s membership would give Turkey an ally against future Israeli aggression. For their part, the Jordanians asked for an assurance that the pact would not interfere with Jordan’s obligations to the Arab Collective Security Pact or its position with regards to a future

---


184 Anderson, Nationalist Voices in Jordan: The Street and the State. Austin, TX: University of Texas, 2005, 158.


188 Ibid., 113.
Palestinian settlement, as well as a massive expansion of the army and the air force.\textsuperscript{189} Although the Turks left Amman without securing Jordan’s agreement to join the pact, their case had made an impression on King Hussein. The day after the Turks left, Hussein informed British Ambassador Charles Duke that Jordan would be ready to join the Baghdad Pact immediately.\textsuperscript{190} Agreeing to support Project ALPHA, and an American threat that Jordan’s membership would make it difficult for the United States to support the pact, however, momentarily hamstrung the British.\textsuperscript{191} In an attempt to appeal to Jordanian public opinion, Egypt sent it’s minister of war, ‘\textasciitilde{}Abd al-Hakim \textasciitilde{}Amir, and Anwar Sadat to Jordan for a state visit on November 30th. Their visit was well received in Jordan, but it also acted as a symbol for an Arab alternative to continued reliance on the British.\textsuperscript{192} The timing of this visit convinced British officials to send General Sir Gerald Templer to Amman in order to secure Jordan’s accession to the pact.\textsuperscript{193} Templer arrived on December 6\textsuperscript{th}, but after a week of meetings he was unable to convince the government to join the alliance. A split cabinet along East Bank-Palestinian lines followed, resulting in al-Mufti’s resignation and Templer returning to London empty handed.

Al-Mufti’s replacement was Hazza’ al-Majali, who was determined to bring Jordan into the Baghdad Pact. Majali’s plan was to use the parliament, which had resulted from Abu’l Huda’s electioneering in 1954, to secure approval for joining the Baghdad Pact, as

\textsuperscript{191} Ibid., 114. And see Secretary Dulles thanks British for cooperation with the Alpha project in the Middle East, Department of State, 26 August 1955, reproduced in \textit{Declassified Documents Reference System} (Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2014).
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid., 27.
opposed to the cabinet.\textsuperscript{194} However, events quickly moved beyond Majali’s control. Rioting erupted across the country on December 17\textsuperscript{th}, with the American embassy in Amman reporting: “Disturbances now widespread throughout Jordan…Amman heavily patrolled by Legion. Groups [of] students and demonstrators throwing stones at cars and pedestrians…Americans and British warned keep off streets.”\textsuperscript{195} The demonstrations forced al-Majali to resign and Hussein to announce that parliament had been dismissed.\textsuperscript{196} In a potentially worrying sign to the government, Suleiman al-Nabulsi and other members of the opposition played an essential role in organizing the demonstrations.\textsuperscript{197} It was clear that determined public opposition to the Baghdad Pact had made Jordan’s potential membership impossible. The JNM had scored its first major political victory, while at the same time dealing a mortal blow to British prestige in Jordan. Jordanian public opinion against the treaty had proven to be more powerful that British attempts to convince the government to join it.

**H. Glubb’s dismissal and the elections of 1956**

To replace al-Majali, King Hussein appointed Ibrahim Hashim on December 21st, who was tasked with supervising elections for a new parliament, which were scheduled for April 1956. The opposition, however, had received a massive boost with the resignation of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[197] Ibid., 162.
\end{footnotes}
the al-Mufti and al-Majali governments. The potential landslide victory of the opposition in the upcoming election convinced King Hussein to reconsider his dissolution of parliament. A number of parliamentarians had filed a suit declaring that the dissolution was unconstitutional, and on Hashim’s advice Hussein referred the case to the Supreme Council for the Interpretation of Law, which promptly ruled the dissolution unconstitutional.198 Hashim resigned immediately after, but demonstrations erupted across the country again on January 6th, 1956. In the crackdown that followed, many of the protesters arrested were from East Bank towns such as Karak, Ma’an, Salt, and Madaba, illustrating that street action was hardly exclusive to Palestinians at this time.199 Samir al-Rifa’i was named to replace Hashim, and he announced that his government was opposed to any new pacts.200 It was expected the new government would be quickly forced out, but al-Rifa’i instituted a nation-wide curfew that calmed the security situation.201 In a sign of clear support for the regime, the British reinforced their garrison in Cyprus and passed on a request from Hussein to Iraq for military support.202 Iraq was only too happy to honor this request in its own bid for Hashemite unity. Following the expiration of the curfew, al-Rifa’i attempted to ease tensions with conciliatory measures. He released a number of political prisoners and

199 Anderson, Nationalist Voices in Jordan: The Street and the State. Austin, TX: University of Texas, 2005, 165.
201 Ibid. And see Anderson, Nationalist Voices in Jordan: The Street and the State. Austin, TX: University of Texas, 2005, 165.
managed to reach an agreement with Nasser to tone down the propaganda war between the two countries. With the country momentarily quiet, King Hussein was faced with a potentially problematic relationship with the Arab Legion, which was now seen by much of the population as a tool of Glubb and the British. Hussein had previously expressed support for “Arabizing” the army while at Sandhurst, but he had not dismissed Glubb or the other British officers in the Legion during his initial years of rule. However, Britain’s failure to bring Jordan into the Baghdad Pact was clear evidence of Britain’s decreasing influence in the country. The riots resulting from the negotiations to join the Baghdad Pact had undermined British influence over Jordan tremendously. As a result, Hussein had his chance to remove Glubb and eliminate the last vestiges of imperial British rule in Jordan.

Hussein coordinated his plan with a group of young officers led by ‘Ali Abu Nuwwar in order to insure that Glubb and his loyalists would not pose any threat. On March 1st, 1956, Hussein summoned al-Rifa’i and told him that he wanted to dismiss Glubb. Al-Rifa’i passed the orders onto Glubb, who supposedly accepted them without incident. In Glubb’s own account, al-Rifa’i asked him to leave the country in two hours, eventually acquiescing to Glubb’s departure taking place the next day. The British were caught completely off-guard by Glubb’s abrupt dismissal, despite the fact that the British

204 Ibid., 138.
206 Ibid., 167.
embassy in Amman had reported on the growing tensions between Hussein and Glubb. All other British officers seconded to the Legion were removed, and the Eden government expressed its feeling that the Arab Legion would collapse without direct British support. King Hussein, however, had undoubtedly won a domestic victory. The government called for a three-day holiday and celebrations spilled into the streets, with people chanting pro-Hussein slogans. However, pro-Hussein sentiment died down in the weeks after the move. In the end, the boost Hussein was given was dwarfed by the victory Glubb’s dismissal gave to the opposition. The JNM had scored two massive victories in the run up to the elections later that year. The opposition’s influence was such that the American embassy reported that, “Jordan is being increasingly lost to our side.

After Glubb’s dismissal and Britain’s recall of its seconded officers, Hussein faced the task of filling the vacated command positions with lower-level Jordanian officers. Not surprisingly, his friend ‘Ali Abu Nawwar was promoted from major to major general. Two of Nawwar’s associates were promoted to brigadier general, but members of the so-called


Free Officers largely fell by the wayside. The rapid promotion of junior officers to the senior ranks was done so based on necessity and politics, not competence. As a result, the army was far less prepared for war than before, and factionalism was rife among the officer corps. By May, Hussein had fallen out with al-Rifa’i over the issue of Algeria. The king came out openly in support of the rebels in Algeria in an effort to outflank Nasser, who expressed only tepid support for the rebels. Al-Rifa’i was replaced on May 22nd with Sa’id al-Mufti, but al-Mufti’s government was dead on arrival. Although he promised to seek treaty revision with the British, the opposition called for dissolving the parliament and abrogating the treaty with Britain. This pushed the parliament to declare that they would not give al-Mufti’s government a vote of confidence, prompting his immediate resignation and replacement with Ibrahim Hashim. Hashim’s new government scheduled elections for October 21st.

Going into the election campaign, it appeared that the conditions were perfect for an opposition victory. Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956, in defiance of the West, gave the opposition a further boost and sparked demonstrations throughout Jordan in support of the action. This prompted Jordan to make an effort to improve military relations with Egypt and Syria, but this rapprochement of sorts drew Israel’s

---

217 Ibid., 150.
attention. Israel launched a number of major raids into the West Bank that killed hundreds of Jordanians, drawing the ire of the United States and raising fears that Jordan was being pushed towards dissolution. Although it looked as though a war was certain between Israel and Jordan, the elections were held anyway. They were generally regarded as being free and fair. The National Socialist Party won 11 seats; the National Front (which was dominated by Communists) won 3 while the Ba’th Party managed to only win 2. As the head of the party that had received the most votes, Suleiman al-Nabulsi was chosen by Hussein to head the new government, even though he had failed to win a seat in parliament himself. Al-Nabulsi filled his cabinet with members of not only the NSP, but also the Ba’th Party and the National Front. In a remarkable turnaround from the elections of 1954, the JNM had come to power. For the first time in its history, Jordan had a government led by the political opposition and backed by an electoral mandate.

I. The JNM in power: the government of Suleiman al-Nabulsi

Al-Nabulsi’s cabinet faced an important test almost immediately after it was formed. Jordan signed an agreement with Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt to unite their military commands under ‘Abd al-Hakim ‘Amir the day before the election. On October 29th, Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula with France and Britain joining the next day. This

\[\text{\textsuperscript{219}}\text{Ibid., 172.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{220}}\text{Memorandum for the Record, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 15 October 1956, reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System (Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2014)}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{222}}\text{Anderson, Nationalist Voices in Jordan: The Street and the State. Austin, TX: University of Texas, 2005, 176.}\]
prompted King Hussein to openly declare his support for Egypt.\textsuperscript{223} Al-Nabulsi, however, wisely advised the king to wait to see how the conflict unfolded. Luckily for Jordan, American pressure exerted on France and Britain ended the war on November 7\textsuperscript{th}. In light of British collusion with Israel and Britain’s pledge not to defend Jordan if it entered the war, the Anglo-Jordanian treaty was all but dead.\textsuperscript{224} Facing the potential end of the British subsidy, an effort was launched to secure America’s replacement as Jordan’s financial benefactor. ‘Ali Abu Nuwwar guaranteed that Jordan would “follow US policies” if Jordan received American aid, but he warned that if the US was not forthcoming, the Soviet Union would fill the void.\textsuperscript{225} Hussein himself followed up with a personal appeal, to which Washington cautioned Hussein against “jumping from [the] frying pan into [the] fire.”\textsuperscript{226} Al-Nabulsi was unaware of these approaches, and his priorities were made clear by his statement that “Jordan cannot live forever as Jordan.”\textsuperscript{227} Unfortunately for Hussein, his appeal for increased American aid went unanswered. There was already talk amongst senior American officials that Jordan was not a viable state, and Hussein was advised that, “Jordan should not lightly terminate its present financial relations with UK, especially in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{223} Ibid., 176.
\end{itemize}
the absence of clear and acceptable alternatives.” Without a commitment from the United States, Jordan was forced to look for other sources of funding. Hussein lent his support to al-Nabulsi’s effort to secure Arab funding, and on January 19th, 1957, Jordan signed the Arab Solidarity Agreement in Cairo with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria. Under this agreement, the three other signatories agreed to pay Jordan 12.5 million Egyptian pounds per year for ten years.

Bolstered by the signing of the Arab Solidarity Agreement, the al-Nabulsi government’s orientation moved further away from the West. The government was increasingly pushed in this direction by the radicals in the cabinet led by the Ba’thist Foreign Minister ‘Abdullah al-Rimawi. The Ba’th and the NSP had already squabbled previously over their respective candidate lists in the elections, a dispute which caused al-Rimawi to briefly remove the Ba’th from the opposition coalition. Those who argued for the government to take a more radical approach also felt that their support in the streets would carry the day in a showdown with the king. However, the government’s turn away from the West was complicated by the declaration of the Eisenhower Doctrine on January 5th, 1957, in which aid was promised to any Arab state threatened by Communism. In a signal of changing moods in Washington, the State Department leaked that Jordan had

---


230 Ibid., 162.


asked for an increase in aid with no strings attached. Al-Nabulsi declared that Jordan would not accept the Eisenhower Doctrine. Instead, he allowed for a Communist newspaper to be published and ordered the release of the party’s head, Fu’ad Nasser, from jail. Hussein countered by issuing a letter in which he warned, “the Eastern camp is now trying to entice us with its doctrines…But we now detect the danger of Communist infiltration in our Arab homeland, and the threat posed by those who feign loyalty to Arab nationalism.” Hussein’s rebuke earned praise from Washington: “Please immediately inform King that we [are] highly gratified at his recent public action in pointing out [the] Communist menace.” King Hussein had “publicly shown himself to be on our side” and furthermore “he cannot expect genuine support from [the] Nabulsi government.” Al-Nabulsi responded to Hussein’s letter by forcing Tass to close down its offices and banning Communist literature, but he also contacted the Soviet ambassador in Damascus and said that he was interested in opening diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Al-Nabulsi’s flirtation with the Soviet bloc was clearly in conflict with Hussein, who was resolved to accept American support. Both men were momentarily distracted by

---

235 Ibid., 179.
the negotiations to end the Anglo-Jordanian treaty, which wrapped up amicably in March 1957. Mallory wrote that al-Nabulsi was “intent on destroying Jordan as presently constituted and throwing out King in favor of still undefined federation with Syria and Egypt.” He also said that the “probabilities of sort of ‘coup de palais’ in near future [are] growing.” A showdown was on the horizon.

On April 3rd, al-Nabulsi announced that he would establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, in direct opposition to the king’s wishes. The cabinet also gave Hussein a list of proposed civil servant retirees that included Hussein’s security head, Bahjat Tabara. In another ominous sign, on April 8th troops from the First Armored Regiment deployed around Amman until Hussein ordered them back to their barracks. In response, Hussein asked for and received al-Nabulsi’s resignation on April 10th. Al-Nabulsi and the rest of the JNM were confident they had the support of the people, and thanks to the JNM’s parliamentary majority, Hussein struggled to find a suitable prime minister who could form a government. After Sa’id al-Mufti failed to form a government on April 13th, an incident occurred which to this day remained shrouded in mystery.

Following rumors the king had been killed, fighting broke out at an army base in Zarqa between troops loyal to Hussein and troops loyal to ‘Ali Abu Nawwar. The king travelled

---

241 Ibid.
243 Ibid., 164.
to Zarqa with Nawwar, who was nearly killed by loyalist troops along the way.\footnote{Anderson, \textit{Nationalist Voices in Jordan: The Street and the State}. Austin, TX: University of Texas, 2005, 183.} Upon arriving in Zarqa, Hussein supposedly calmed his men down personally. Whether what occurred in Zarqa was an aborted coup remains disputed to this day. Some accounts credit the loyalist Bedouin forces with stopping a coup attempt that was initiated by ‘Ali Abu Nawwar and the Free Officers.\footnote{P.J. Vatikiotis, \textit{Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion 1921-1957}. London: Frank Cass & Co., 1967, 130.} Other politicians from the time say that the “coup attempt” was in fact a government plot in order to find a pretext to eliminate the JNM.\footnote{Anderson, \textit{Nationalist Voices in Jordan: The Street and the State}. Austin, TX: University of Texas, 2005, 184.}

Whatever the true story of the Zarqa incident is, Hussein used the incident as an excuse to initiate a crackdown. In an attempt to regroup, the JNM organized a “People’s Congress” in Nablus on April 23rd. The congress, which was attended by 23 members of parliament and representatives from all the major opposition parties, called for a new NSP-Ba’th-National Front government and a federal union with Egypt and Syria.\footnote{Ibid., 185.} It also issued a call for a general strike to take place the next day if its demands were not met.\footnote{Ibid., 185.} These demands were a direct challenge to monarchical authority, and it illustrates the completion of a radical turn in the JNM’s approach. Despite this show of unity, the opposition was to fall victim to Hussein’s maneuvers. First, he appointed Ibrahim Hashim to head a conservative-dominated cabinet.\footnote{Ibid., 185.} The new government was made up primarily of the remaining king’s men, marking the end of Hussein’s “experiment in parliamentary
The new government imposed martial law and a nationwide curfew, banned political parties, and arrested hundreds of political activists. On April 24th, King Hussein gave a radio address in which he excoriated the opposition: “They used foul play and exceeded their power, and they claimed credit and pretended to be nationalists…disregarding the great evils which the enemy are reserving for us.” His new American patrons supported Hussein wholeheartedly in his efforts. President Eisenhower publicly declared his support for Jordan and dispatched the Sixth Fleet to the region. In addition, Eisenhower eventually agreed to give Jordan $10 million under the Mutual Security Act, effectively replacing the lost British subsidy. With most of its leaders arrested or in exile, the JNM had been crushed.

In the immediate aftermath of the showdown with the JNM, Hussein used the backing of the Eisenhower Doctrine to begin a process of authoritarian consolidation. Hussein utilized an intelligence service that he ran himself in order to try and convict members of the opposition. According to Jack O’Connell, a CIA operations officer in Amman at the time, Hussein declared himself “the head of the intelligence service.”

---

252 Ibid., 187.
256 Ibid., 4.
force would later become formally institutionalized in 1964 as the General Intelligence Directorate, better known as the mukhabarat. Hussein also used American funds in order to expand the army considerably, with force levels rising from 23,815 men in 1956 to 36,455 by 1960 and 55,000 in 1967. During this time, American aid to Jordan totaled over $700 million, making Jordan second only to Israel in receiving American aid per capita. Expanding the army with the new funds made its officers dependent on royal patronage, while also tying enlisted men from rural areas to the largesse of the state. This process turned the army from a potential threat into a loyal bulwark, which Hussein could use in order to buttress his regime against any future internal threats.

**J. Conclusion**

When King Hussein came to the throne in 1953, Jordan was faced with significant external and internal threats. The establishment of Israel, and Jordan’s subsequent annexation of the West Bank, placed Jordan’s western border under the constant threat of Israeli attacks. Secular Arab nationalism, embodied by Nasser, looked poised to sweep across the entire region. To compound matters, Jordan’s imperial patron, Great Britain, would soon withdraw from the Middle East as a whole. Internally, Palestinian migration to both the West and East Banks, combined with urbanization, placed the economy of Jordan under a great deal of strain. All told, these factors combined to create an atmosphere in which the JNM was able to exert serious pressure on the palace.

---


258 Ibid., 187.

This chapter shows us that despite the threat posed to the established order by the rise of the opposition, the Jordanian elite was not a singular entity during this time. Tawfiq Abu al-Huda’s authoritarian methods, although successful in returning a docile parliament, alienated many of the other members of the elite. On the issue of the Baghdad Pact, four governments fell because of divisions within the elite on whether to join the alliance or not. The opposition was vehemently opposed to the Baghdad Pact, and the immediate period following Jordan’s refusal to join the alliance also saw Glubb’s dismissal and the JNM scoring a victory in the elections of 1956. The opposition, however, was not a cohesive “anti-establishment” bloc either. The more radical parties pushed the al-Nabulsi cabinet further and further into confrontation with the palace, which ultimately played into Hussein’s hands. It is worth noting that Hussein, at this time, did not have the popularity that he would enjoy later in his life. Luckily for him, the opposition’s increasingly radical agenda gave Hussein the chance to secure backing from the United States on the grounds that Jordan was under the threat of a Communist takeover. This external guarantee allowed him to ultimately quickly crush the opposition.
CHAPTER III:
1984-1994

A. Introduction

This chapter begins by linking Hussein’s decision to recall parliament in 1984 to developments on the regional scene. The king sought to reintroduce parliamentary life in order to force the PLO to accept a larger role for Jordan in the peace process as well as to reassert his continued desire to keep the West Bank within Jordan in some manner. However, it was domestic unrest that ultimately influenced him to allow for the holding of relatively free elections in 1989. In this period, the opposition’s momentum from its electoral results in 1989 was short-lived. The promulgation of the National Charter, and the acceptance of it by all of the major political groupings in the country, virtually guaranteed that the palace would be able to retain control over any process of liberalization. The king was able to use institutional interventions to keep the opposition further off-balance and return a more docile parliament in 1993. Ultimately, he was able to pass the peace treaty with Israel through parliament with little fight.

The king was aided by the fact that the opposition had largely ceased to be anti-establishment. The largest party was now the Muslim Brotherhood, which had a long history of collaboration and cooperation with the regime. The leftist and nationalist parties, which had been strong in the 50s, had now fallen by the wayside as a result of government repression and the weakening of Arab nationalism as a political force. Within the establishment, divisions arose over the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the palace’s policy towards the West Bank and Israel. By this time, however, King Hussein’s
stature had grown to the point where differences within the elite had little effect on policy. In the end, Hussein’s wishes carried the day on important issues.

**B. A Weakening Economy and External Reshuffling**

When King Hussein recalled parliament in 1984, Jordan was situated in a quite different position than it was in 1957, both domestically and internationally. The Jordanian economy enjoyed a boom throughout the 1970s, largely as a result of Arab foreign aid and remittances sent home by Jordanian workers working in the Gulf countries.\(^\text{260}\) From 1970-1980, foreign aid was equivalent to 30% of Jordan’s gross domestic product on average.\(^\text{261}\) This aid and remittance fueled boom allowed the Jordanian state to expand greatly, in particular through employment and economic subsidies.\(^\text{262}\) By 1984, however, thanks to a slacking oil market and the Iraqi-Iranian war, Jordanian economic growth had slowed considerably, despite the fact that remittances had remained steady.\(^\text{263}\) Faced with slacking private investment and a private sector that was loosing confidence in the government, King Hussein sought to reverse the economic decline with the appointment of Zaid al-Rifa’i as Prime Minister in April 1985.\(^\text{264}\) Al-Rifa’i was tasked with turning around the economy by stimulating the private sector and attracting foreign investment.\(^\text{265}\) The al-Rifa’i government quickly announced that it would look to start privatizing large industrial


\(^{262}\) Ibid., 270


\(^{264}\) Ibid., 500.

\(^{265}\) Ibid., 500.
projects as well as seek to encourage the growth of small businesses.\(^{266}\) Al-Rifa’i’s new policies marked a break from the previous government under Ahmad ‘Ubaydat. Unlike the Harvard-educated al-Rifa’i, ‘Ubaydat was a former director of the General Intelligence Directorate, like his predecessor Mudar Badran. In his one year in office, ‘Ubaydat set out to crack down on corruption in the kingdom, but he soon fell out with Hussein.\(^{267}\) Specifically, Hussein thought that ‘Ubaydat’s anti-corruption drive might prove to be too politically damaging.\(^{268}\) The regime was now faced with the difficult task of balancing al-Rifa’i’s privatization agenda with maintaining government largesse that had resulted from the economic boom of the 1970s.

Externally, Jordan found itself in a far more secure position than it had been in the tumultuous 1950s. Egypt had signed the Camp David Accords with Israel in 1979 and was no longer a potentially disruptive influence to Hashemite rule. Crown Prince Hasan was a particularly enthusiastic proponent of bringing Egypt back into the Arab fold. He lauded Mubarak’s Egypt as an Arab, Islamic Egypt, as opposed to the “Pharanoic Egypt” of Anwar al-Sadat.\(^{269}\) Jordan and Egypt officially re-established diplomatic relations in 1984, and subsequent visits by Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and King Hussein to each other’s respective countries solidified the new relationship.\(^{270}\) Jordan was the first Arab country to reestablish official relations with Egypt following Egypt’s expulsion from the Arab League in 1979.

\(^{266}\) Ibid., 500.
\(^{269}\) Ibid., 524.
\(^{270}\) Ibid., 524.
Throughout the period of Ba’th party rule in Syria, Jordan’s relations with Syria could only be characterized as hostile. Syria gave its support to the Jordanian Ba’th and Communist parties, while also instigating terrorist acts against Jordanian targets around the world.271 On the other side, the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood openly lent its support to the Syrian Brotherhood’s uprising, which culminated in the Syrian government’s massacre at Hama in 1982. The Jordanian Brotherhood benefited from close relations with Mudar Badran (Prime Minister from 1976-1979 and again from 1980-1984) and Ahmad ‘Ubaydat, both of whom had formed close ties with the Brotherhood during their reigns as the head of the GID.272 As a result, the Jordanian Brotherhood activities were seen as having implicit government backing. By 1985, however, there were increased signs of tension between the Brotherhood and the palace. King Hussein criticized the fundamentalist approach to Islam publicly, remarking that, “praising and hailing the past and empty words on the greatness of ancestors cannot build the present and the future.”273

The dismissal of ‘Ubaydat and the appointment of al-Rifa’i was a signal of not only the palace’s frustration with the Brotherhood, but also of it’s intention to seek a rapprochement with Syria, as al-Rifa’i was well-known to have a good relationship with Hafez al-Asad.274 King Hussein also sought closer relations with Syria in an attempt to forge a unified Arab position on ending the Iraqi-Iranian war, which was disrupting Jordan’s close economic ties with Iraq.275 In order to appease Asad, Hussein publicly confirmed that senior

[271] Ibid., 526.
[274] Ibid., 529.
Jordanian officials had been involved in the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s uprising.\textsuperscript{276} Rifa’i later met with Asad and the two issued a joint statement rejecting direct negotiations with Israel as well as partial solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict.\textsuperscript{277}

Jordanian-PLO relations were in a complex state in the years leading up to the period covered in this thesis. Jordan had accepted the Arab League’s declaration at the Rabat summit of 1974 that the PLO was the sole representative of the Palestinian people. However, King Hussein remained hopeful that the two banks could be reunited, which placed him at odds with the wishes of East Bank Jordanian nationalists.\textsuperscript{278} Constitutional amendments were passed in 1974 and 1976 that allowed for indefinitely postponing elections, which prevented elections from being held solely on the East Bank (such an election would have symbolized a permanent break with the West Bank).\textsuperscript{279} These moves allowed King Hussein to bide his time and hope for more favorable conditions down the road. After Israel invaded Lebanon in an attempt to eliminate the PLO in 1982, the Reagan administration put forth a plan that called for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza, with self-government in the West Bank under the auspices of Jordan.\textsuperscript{280}

Although this plan was rejected by Israel and the Arab world as a whole, King Hussein attempted to negotiate with ‘Arafat in order to guarantee a Jordanian role in governing the West Bank.\textsuperscript{281} Despite relations between the two sides warming thanks to frequent meetings (signified by the PLO choosing Amman as the venue to host the

\textsuperscript{277} Ibid., 245.
\textsuperscript{281} Ibid., 159.
Palestinian National Council gathering in 1984), Jordan’s attempts to force the PLO to recognize Resolution 242 and King Hussein’s goal of an autonomous West Bank within a Jordanian dominated federal state seemingly made the positions of the two sides incompatible. Nonetheless, King Hussein announced in February 1985 that he and the PLO had agreed upon a framework for peace negotiations with Israel. The agreement called for an international peace conference that would be attended by all five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council as well as all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In addition, the PLO delegates to the conference would attend as part of a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. Most importantly, the agreement stated that the Palestinians would have the right to self-determination within the framework of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. This agreement served the interests of both sides. For ‘Arafat, a confederation meant independent Palestinian statehood, while for Hussein it gave him a way move back into the politics of the West Bank.

It was within this atmosphere of a weakening domestic economy, but a strengthened position regionally, that Jordan began to prepare to lay the early groundwork for its political liberalization program.

C. Recalling parliament and the 1986 Election Law

King Hussein first announced that parliament would be recalled in November 1983, nine years after it had been suspended following the Arab League summit in Rabat. This move allowed the king to assuage growing concerns that Jordan suffered from a lack of

democracy. According to a senior Jordanian official, the consensus had been reached that “we in Jordan feel that it is not realistic to expect our own political development to be forever frozen because of lack of progress on resolving the Palestinian issue.”

Restarting parliamentary life had another motive as well. Recalling parliament allowed the king to put pressure on the PLO by challenging their exclusive position that they had been granted in Rabat. In 1984, after Parliament was recalled, vacant seats were filled in the West Bank by choosing from the pool of surviving members of parliament, while in the East Bank vacant seats were filled through by-elections. The elections were contested vigorously, which generated some optimism that this energy would carry over to the parliamentary floor. However, al-Rifai set out to undermine the new parliament from the start. Nevertheless, the cabinet passed a new Election Law in December 1985 and in the parliament in March 1986.

The law increased the number of parliamentarians from sixty, which had been evenly divided between the West and the East Banks, to 142. These seats were also divided evenly, but 11 of the seats designated to the West Bank represented Palestinian refugee camps in the East Bank. The law also reserved 15.5% of the seats for the Christian and Chechnen/Circassian minorities, far more than the most optimistic estimates for their share of the population. It also distributed seats in order to favor rural areas at the expense of urban areas. For example, Amman and Zarqa, which contained half of the population of the

286 Ibid., 191.
288 Ibid., 157.
East Bank, were given only 27 of the 82 East Bank seats. The Election Law of 1986 was a clear reflection of the continued Jordanian desire to incorporate the Palestinians in the East Bank and the occupied West Bank into a Jordanian-dominated state. For their part, Palestinians felt that the West Bank should be excluded from the new parliament. Nonetheless, the Hashemite dream of a united two banks would soon be abandoned due to a series of events that left the Jordanian position completely untenable.

D. Disengagement from the West Bank, Economic Crisis, and the Elections of 1989

PLO-Jordanian relations deteriorated quickly following the announcement of the joint framework in February 1985. The PLO refused to accept Resolution 242 unconditionally, and the United States would not agree to endorse a peace conference until the PLO had accepted Resolution 242. Both the PLO and the United States refused to budge, and Hussein gave a public speech that cast the blame fully on the PLO on February 19th, 1986. Following Hussein’s repudiation of the 1985 agreement with the PLO, he immediately sought to attempt to restore Jordanian influence in the West Bank. Concerned with the poor economic state of the area as well as a rise in political radicalism, King Hussein sought to use an ambitious and highly publicized Five-Year development plan in order to erode popular support for the PLO. Although this plan was supported by the

---

290 Ibid., 427.
293 Ibid., 443.
294 Funding Development on the West Bank, Department of State, 15 Dec 1986, reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System (Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2014)
United States, in the end the funding for the plan fell far short of what was needed. The plan was also criticized from within the Jordanian elite. Ahmad ‘Ubaydat and two other cabinet ministers wrote a letter to Egyptian President Mubarak in which they criticized the policy and warned of a “grand plot to normalize Arab-Israeli relations in the West Bank and Gaza according to Zionist aims.” By 1987, however, only $11.7 million of the promised $1.292 billion had been spent.

The hostility between Jordan and the PLO was evident in the London Agreement, which King Hussein concluded with Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres in 1987. Hussein and Peres agreed to use an international conference to legitimize bilateral negotiations between Jordan and Israel on the basis of Resolution 242, while the PLO would be excluded from any Jordanian delegation. The London Agreement was never formalized, but it would not have mattered in light of the start of the First Intifada in December 1987. The Intifada was not instigated by the PLO, but instead led by activist groups in the West Bank and Gaza working under the umbrella of the United National Leadership of the Uprising. The initial energy behind intifada forced the PLO leadership in Tunis to endorse it, which brought local leaders and the PLO into close cooperation. In

298 Ibid., 250.
light of the resistance against Israel in the West Bank, King Hussein was seen as enjoying a
good relationship with the Israelis, which severely undermined any pan-Jordanian support
that remained in the West Bank.\textsuperscript{301} Jordan’s position was further undermined at the 1988
Arab League summit in Algiers, where the PLO was promised diplomatic support as well
as funds in order to continue the intifada.\textsuperscript{302}

On July 31\textsuperscript{st}, 1988, King Hussein announced that Jordan would disengage its legal
and administrative ties with the West Bank. The king had dissolved parliament a day
earlier, which allowed him to renounce ties to the West Bank without asking parliament to
end Jordan’s claim of sovereignty over the West Bank or amending the constitution.\textsuperscript{303}
King Hussein’s decision had the unintended consequence of helping to worsen the state of
Jordan’s economy. Palestinian capital began leaving Jordanian banks, and the massive
external debt Jordan had accumulated in order to offset decreasing remittances placed
pressure on the dinar, which lost nearly half of its value by the end of 1988.\textsuperscript{304} By 1989, the
government was faced with a debt bill it could not pay. This forced the government to
approach the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to negotiate a bailout program. In
the agreement reached in April 1989, Jordan agreed to a five-year economic stabilization
program in which it promised to tighten borrowing policies, strengthen foreign reserves,
reduce inflation and improve its current account balance.\textsuperscript{305} The government also pledged
to reduce its budget deficit from 24 percent of GDP to 10 percent by 1990, which

\textsuperscript{302} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{303} Ibid., 163.
\textsuperscript{304} Lucas, \textit{Institutions and the Politics of Survival in Jordan: Domestic Responses to External Challenges,
\textsuperscript{305} Rex Brynen, “Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan,”
necessitated large spending cuts.\textsuperscript{306} Despite this, government ministers said publicly that they would not be cutting subsidies to basic goods, leaving many Jordanians unprepared for the government’s decision to raise the price of fuel on April 16\textsuperscript{th}.\textsuperscript{307}

Following the first round of subsidy cuts, riots broke out across the country. They began in the southern city of Ma’an on April 18\textsuperscript{th}, and quickly spread to Tafila, Karak, Madaba, and Salt. The protesters demanded a reversal of the price increases and the resignation of the Rifa’i government, which was widely seen as corrupt.\textsuperscript{308} The protests were at their strongest in the southern towns, which are often characterized as bastions of Hashemite support.\textsuperscript{309} The south had not shared in Jordan’s economic boom of the 1970s and 80s, and many of its inhabitants were dependent on fixed government salaries or pensions.\textsuperscript{310} These fixed incomes did not keep up with inflated prices that resulted from the subsidy cuts, squeezing residents even further. Although the government did its best to cast the rioters as dissatisfied Islamists\textsuperscript{311}, it is worth noting that the Muslim Brotherhood did not attempt to capitalize on the situation. Whereas economic grievances had been one of the major factors behind the JNM’s support in the 50s, this time the opposition chose not to use the dire economic circumstances in order to challenge the regime.

King Hussein was out of the country at the time the riots began, and following his return he quickly accepted Rifa’i’s resignation and appointed his cousin Zaid bin Shakir as the new Prime Minister. The king’s own advisors were split on the correct course of action

\textsuperscript{306} Ibid., 90.
\textsuperscript{310} Ibid., 453.
\textsuperscript{311} Ibid., 454.
in order to address the riots. Some argued that free elections would result in a series of
events that would quickly spread out of control and produce a Palestinian-dominated
parliament, while others argued that elections would be an effective way to manage the
discontent.\textsuperscript{312} King Hussein decided in favor of holding elections, but the decision may
have been one of convenience than anything else, especially in light of the fact that an
election law had already been passed three years earlier.\textsuperscript{313} The government was well
positioned to respond to the people’s demands because they were not radical, but instead
complaints from its own support base.\textsuperscript{314} In order to pave the way for the election, the new
government quickly passed amendments to the election law that not only recognized the
disengagement from the West Bank, but also eliminated the 11 seats reserved for
Palestinian refugee camps in the East Bank.\textsuperscript{315}

The environment in the run up to the elections was one that could be characterized
as partially free. Although many of the prisoners that were arrested during the riots were
subsequently freed, the restrictive Press and Publication Law, which gave the government
power to close any newspaper without recourse, remained intact.\textsuperscript{316} On the other hand, the
government chose not to enforce Article 18, Paragraph E of the election law, which banned
all candidates from running who had ties to “illegal political organizations” (at the time
political parties were still banned).\textsuperscript{317} As a result, candidates with known political

\begin{flushright}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{313} Ibid., 106.
\textsuperscript{316} Ibid., 459.
\end{flushright}
affiliations were allowed to participate. The election law also laid out a first-past-the-post system in which voters were allowed to cast votes for every seat in their respective constituency. This system incentivized voters to cast their ballots in favor of not only candidates who could deliver patronage, but also candidates who reflected their political viewpoints.\footnote{Mufti, “Elite Bargains and the Onset of Political Liberalization in Jordan,” \textit{Comparative Political Studies} 32, no.1 (February 1999): 107.}

The Jordanian political landscape had changed greatly since the last elections had been held in 1967. The opposition had previously been dominated by Pan-Arab and left-wing parties, but by 1989 these parties had weakened considerably. The left had lost an essential support base in the West Bank, and Pan-Arabism was on a decline as a result of, among other things, the ’67 War, Nasser’s death, and the Camp David Accords.\footnote{Ellen Lust-Okar, “The Decline of Jordanian Political Parties: Myth or Reality?” \textit{International Journal of Middle East Studies} 33, no.4 (November 2001): 557.} On the other hand, Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood were allowed to operate openly in Jordan. Throughout the 70s and 80s, when left-wing opposition parties were banned, the Brotherhood was allowed to operate as a social organization and raise its profile by building and operating schools and hospitals.\footnote{Ibid., 559.} As a result of the long-standing cooperation between the Hashemite regime and the Brotherhood, it would be wrong to say that Muslim Brotherhood wanted to truly change the political order. Instead, the Brotherhood sought to reform certain aspects of the system without challenging the overall authority or Islamic legitimacy of the Hashemites.\footnote{Quintan Wiktorowicz, \textit{The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan}, 2001, 93.} Despite the change in conditions, the
government believed that Islamist candidates would only win between 8 and 15 seats.\textsuperscript{322} The elections were held on November 8\textsuperscript{th}, and the results were surprising to the palace. Out of the 26 candidates the Muslim Brotherhood ran, 23 were elected, while an additional 13 candidates were elected who were affiliated with either leftist or Arab nationalist parties.\textsuperscript{323} Islamist candidates had certainly outperformed expectations, and the leftists and Arab nationalists remained relevant, even if their stature had fallen since the heyday of the Jordanian National Movement.

Following the elections, the king tasked Mudar Badran, who was chief of the Royal Court at the time, with forming a cabinet. The choice of Badran was an unpopular one, as Badran had previously served as the head of the mukhabarat and as the prime minister, disappointing many Jordanians hoping for some “new blood” in the prime ministry.\textsuperscript{324} However, Badran surprised his critics by freeing a number of political prisoners, easing government control over the press, and returning passports that had been previously confiscated from political dissidents.\textsuperscript{325} Badran also reached out to the opposition in his cabinet formation process, eventually including six independent Islamists and two members from the Democratic Bloc, an umbrella organization of the leftist and Arab nationalist parties.\textsuperscript{326} In exchange for support from the Islamist deputies, Badran accepted a 14-point plan that called for moving towards the implementation of Islamic law and the


\textsuperscript{325} Ibid., 23.

\textsuperscript{326} Ibid., 23.
abolition of martial law. With the elections successfully completed and the Badran cabinet confirmed by parliament, King Hussein could now focus his efforts on what was to be the basis by which the opposition and the monarchy were to interact in the future: the National Charter.

E. The National Charter and the Second Gulf War

King Hussein had first expressed his idea for a National Charter shortly after the riots of 1989. In his view, the National Charter would ensure that any continued political liberalization would not affect the standing of the monarchy. In Hussein’s mind, democracy had a potentially “ugly face” when parties prioritized “their narrow interests over the common and general good of the state.” He feared a return to the politics of the 50s, which he said were “less than satisfactory” and a time in which the political parties were mainly concerned with the interests of their outside backers. In choosing members for the Royal Committee that was tasked with writing the charter, the palace reached out to the opposition through the king’s advisor Adnan Abu Odeh. Abu Odeh promised opposition members that if they recognized the legitimacy of the monarchy, the regime would allow for political pluralism going forward. This method allowed the monarchy to choose which opposition members it wanted to talk to, and it also forced any opposition member who disagreed with the National Charter’s basic premise to risk complete exclusion from

329 Ibid., 468.
the political system. The fear of possible exclusion was evident following King Hussein’s first meeting with the leadership of the Jordanian Communist Party on April 15th, 1990. Following the meeting, Communist Party officials admitted they feared being left out of the new political order.\textsuperscript{331} The 60-member committee was appointed on April 10\textsuperscript{th}, 1990, and deliberations continued until a draft was produced in December 1990. The National Charter’s purpose was explicitly clear in its first principle:

\begin{quote}
The system of government in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is parliamentary, monarchic, and hereditary. Adherence by all to legitimacy and to respect of the letter and spirit of the Constitution shall enhance the union between the people and their leadership.\textsuperscript{332}
\end{quote}

In essence, the National Charter affirmed the monarchy’s sole control over the political system. The Charter did allow for the formation of political parties and called for a commitment for political tolerance, but it forced political parties to focus their activities entirely on Jordan.\textsuperscript{333} The National Charter represented a clear triumph for the monarchy, as any future opposition activity was now predicated on recognizing the supremacy of the king. Although the initial draft was finished in December 1990, passing the Charter was put on hold following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait presented King Hussein with a serious dilemma. Jordan enjoyed close ties with Iraq and the Jordanian public overwhelmingly opposed foreign intervention on the matter. The Jordanian press was effuse with praise for Saddam’s actions, while politicians from across the political spectrum condemned the United States

\textsuperscript{331} Mufti, “Elite Bargains and the Onset of Political Liberalization in Jordan,” \textit{Comparative Political Studies} 32, no.1 (February 1999): 112.


\textsuperscript{333} Ibid.
and offered support for Iraq. On the other hand, opposing the United States on the matter risked damaging Jordan’s relationship with the world’s sole remaining superpower. The king was stuck between a rock and a hard place, so to speak. Popular support for Iraq continued to build throughout 1990, with thousands of Jordanians pledging to join the “Jordanian Committee for Support of Iraq against Foreign Aggression” in order to fight for Iraq. The Muslim Brotherhood organized rallies on behalf of Iraq and against the “infidel crusader forces”, risking the ire of their primary benefactor in Saudi Arabia. However, it should be noted that support for Iraq was not universal. Tribal leaders along the southern border expressed their support for Saudi Arabia, while other members of the political elite argued that Jordan’s security needs necessitated an anti-Iraqi stance. In the end, the king came out in favor of an Arab solution to the Iraqi invasion. In order to shore up support for the government’s position, Prime Minister Badran reshuffled the cabinet, bringing in five members of the Muslim Brotherhood, two independent Islamists, and three members of leftist parties. Jordan’s position aroused hostility from the Arab Gulf nations, who expelled hundreds of thousands Jordanian expatriate workers, who return to an already saturated labor market. Many of the workers were uncompensated by Kuwait when their savings were converted into Iraqi dinars as a result of the invasion. Moreover, UN

336 Ibid., 470.
337 Ibid., 473.
sanctions were levied against Iraq, which at the time was still Jordan’s largest trading partner. As a result, Jordan lost an estimated $450 million dollars in export and transit business with Iraq.  

Jordan’s position on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was not only damaging economically and within the region, but internationally as well. With the United States, King Hussein responded positively to a trip in early 1991 from Richard Armitage in order to brief him, stating, “I welcome the continuation of our dialogue and would suggest that further conversations in Amman are most welcome.” However, the Bush administration grew annoyed with the king’s attempt to straddle the fence. On February 6th, 1991, Hussein gave a speech in which he said the goal of the coalition was to put Arab “homeland, nation, aspirations, and resources under direct foreign hegemony.” Following the speech, President George H.W. Bush expressed his frustration with Hussein:  

I am not going to hide my deep disappointment with your speech of February 6. I had not expected, so soon after I sent a personal envoy to you and immediately following your friendly letter urging further dialogue, to read such a vitriolic attack on the intentions and actions of the multinational coalition that is liberating Kuwait.  

Fortunately for Hussein, the quick defeat of Iraq, Jordan’s strategic importance to the United States, and the Bush administration’s hope to kick start Arab-Israeli peace

341 Ibid.
344 Text of a message to Jordanian King Hussein from President George H.W. Bush expressing disappointment over a 2/6/91 speech made by Hussein in which he attacked the intentions and actions of the multinational coalition that is liberating Kuwait from Iraqi occupation, National Security Council, 9 February 1991, reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System (Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2014).
negotiations meant that any hostility between the two could be quickly forgotten.

Following Iraq’s surrender, King Hussein expressed his “deep joy at the conclusion of hostilities” and “determined to contribute my utmost to the healing of wounds.”  

In March, President George H.W. Bush gave a speech in front of Congress in which he called for a “comprehensive peace grounded in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace. This principle must be elaborated to provide for Israel’s security and recognition and the same time for legitimate Palestinian political rights.”

The president also personally pushed Hussein to sign on to the peace process, asking for “Jordanian assistance in forming a Palestinian delegation that meets with acceptance in the Arab world and Israel alike” and saying “we need Jordan to attend a peace conference.”

In order to prepare Jordan for the upcoming peace negotiations, Hussein looked to reshuffle the cabinet once again. Prior to this, however, the 2,000 members of the national conference ratified the National Charter on June 9th, 1991. The king’s new choice for Prime Minister, Tahir al-Masri, was given the task to continue the political liberalization process.

F. The Tahir al-Masri and Zaid bin Shaker cabinets

---

345 Text of a message from Jordanian King Hussein to President George H.W. Bush expressing his joy that hostilities between the U.S. and Iraq have ended, Department of State, 1 March 1991, reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System (Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2014).
The Muslim Brotherhood had recently been brought into the new Badran cabinet, but their staunchly anti-negotiation stance made them something of a liability. Tahir al-Masri, who is of Palestinian origin, was appointed on June 19th, 1991 in Badran’s place. Unlike the previous Badran cabinet, al-Masri’s cabinet contained many members of the left. Five representatives from the Jordanian Arab National Democratic Alliance (JANDA), which included the Ba’th Party, the Communists, and the Popular Democratic Unionist Party (essentially an offshoot of the PFLP), were chosen for the cabinet.\textsuperscript{348} Masri’s first move was to recommend repealing martial law, which had been in place since 1967, a recommendation that was endorsed by Hussein.\textsuperscript{349} However, Masri’s cabinet almost immediately ran into trouble. The Muslim Brotherhood announced that they would not give al-Masri’s cabinet a vote of confidence, and conservative deputies led by Dhuqan al-Hindawi joined them in their opposition.\textsuperscript{350} Al-Masri’s government ended up escaping by a vote of 47 to 31 in favor, but Jordan’s commitment to attend the Madrid Peace Conference brought renewed criticism from the Islamists and the left.\textsuperscript{351} In response, the king delayed the parliamentary session from October to December, which allowed him to use a national congress to express the Jordanian position on the upcoming talks.\textsuperscript{352}

The king’s commitment to attend the peace conference had bought him the full support of the Bush administration, which asked him to “do everything possible to thwart

\textsuperscript{349} Ibid., 491.
\textsuperscript{350} Ibid., 492.
\textsuperscript{352} Ibid., 53.
disruptive actions in this delicate period.” 353 Jordan also received assurances that although there would be a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, Jordan would be able to negotiate directly with Israel on concerns relating to their bilateral relations. 354 In the end, despite the optimism expressed by the attendees of the conference, no concrete agreements were reached. During the run up to the Madrid Conference, al-Masri continued to struggle with opposition. A number of leftist ministers resigned from the cabinet, and al-Masri’s cabinet reshuffle failed to placate growing opposition to his government from regime-aligned conservatives. On October 7th, 49 members of parliament signed a petition calling for his resignation, meaning that al-Masri would not be able to survive a confidence vote by the time parliament reconvened in December. 355 Al-Masri resigned on November 16th, and the king brought Zaid bin Shaker back in his place.

Shaker’s cabinet went in a different direction than those of Badran and al-Masri. Instead of including Islamists or leftists, Shaker chose upon regime loyalists from the Constitutional and Nationalist blocs. Despite opposition from both the Muslim Brotherhood and the left, Shaker’s government passed a confidence vote by a margin of 46 to 27. 356 Shaker’s government was given the task of formalizing essential principles of the National Charter, the passing of which had been overshadowed by the Madrid conference.
and bickering over al-Masri’s government. Work began on drafting a political parties law that would finally legalize political parties for the first time since 1957. Much of the initial debate focused on the law’s definition of a political party. The government sought a narrow definition of a political party, by which a party needed to be organized around a specific platform and work by “legal and peaceful means in accordance with the rules of democratic practice.”\(^{357}\) In contrast, the parliament wanted a broader definition that allowed for more flexibility in a party’s organization in order to include the dozens of political parties that had emerged in Jordan since 1989.\(^{358}\) A compromise was eventually reached where the law did specify that party must have goals, but not a “program”. This was to the opposition’s benefit, as many of the parties in Jordan at the time were organized around ideology rather than policy.\(^{359}\) The law was formally passed on August 23\(^{rd}\), 1992, and by the end of the year eleven parties had applied to the Ministry of Interior for official status.\(^{360}\) It is worth noting that although Islamist and conservative parties attained official status with relative ease, leftist and Arab nationalist parties were not granted initial approval. The Interior Ministry rejected all the applications of the Jordanian Communist Party, the Ba’th Party, and the Jordanian Popular Democratic Party. However, following an outcry from across the political spectrum and from parliament, the Interior Ministry worked with the three parties on their charters and legalized them in January 1993.\(^{361}\)


\(^{358}\) Ibid., 55.

\(^{359}\) Ibid., 56.


Following the legalization of political parties, the government moved on to address the issue of the press. At the time, the Jordanian press was largely owned by the state. Television and radio were fully owned by the state, while the government was a partial owner of the three largest Arabic newspapers, *Al-Ra’i*, *Al-Destour*, and *Sawt al-Sha’b*. Initial drafts of the new Press and Publications Law submitted by the al-Masri governments offered hope for the possibility of a free press in Jordan, a right that is guaranteed in the National Charter. The draft that was approved, however, was far more restrictive than the earlier drafts. For example, initial drafts of the law allowed journalists to keep their sources secret, but the final draft of the law allowed the courts to take that right away if it was decided that the case involved the “security of the State.” Journalists were also banned from writing any story that offended the king or the royal family, insulted Arab, Islamic, or friendly heads of state, or that offended the armed forces and the security services. The Law Committee of parliament issued a recommendation to delete this clause, but it was carried through with majority support in the lower house. Throughout the debate over the press law, the Jordanian Senate adopted a more moderate position as compared the House. Although the law was clearly flawed, it was undoubtedly better than the previous press law.

---

The new Press and Publications Law was signed into law on March 29th, 1993, just two days before the conclusion of parliament’s session.367 On May 29th, Zaid bin Shakir resigned as Prime Minister and was replaced by ‘Abd al-Salam al-Majali, who up until that time had been the head of Jordan’s negotiation team in peace talks with Israel. Jordan and Israel had already made significant progress in their bilateral talks, but any successful conclusion of the talks depended on progress on the Palestinian-Israeli and the Israeli-Syrian tracks.368 After the successful passing of the Political Parties and Press and Publication laws, King Hussein was able to turn his full attention towards the elections scheduled for November 1993 and the peace talks with Israel.

G. The 1993 Elections and the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the results of the 1989 elections surprised the Jordanian government. The Muslim Brotherhood had benefited from a favorable electoral law and a well-established organizational structure that it had built over a period of decades. With the need for parliament to pass any peace treaty with Israel and the Brotherhood’s unwavering opposition to peace negotiations with Israel, King Hussein wanted the new elections to return a more compliant parliament. The regime was helped by the fact that some of the Brotherhood’s more extreme positions had cost them popular support. For example, attempts by Brotherhood cabinet ministers to segregate schools to an

extreme degree were met with widespread criticism. Nonetheless, the regime did not take any chances. On August 4th, 1993, the king dissolved parliament, which prevented the convening of an extraordinary session to discuss any changes to the election law. On August 17th, Hussein signed the amendments of the election law into effect. The open-list system was changed to a “one-man, one-vote” system, which would become known as the single nontransferable vote. This meant that no matter how many seats were contested in any electoral district, a voter could only vote for one of those candidates. The districts, which already favored the rural areas at the expense of urban areas, were kept the same. Government officials acknowledged privately that the single nontransferable vote system was primarily aimed at harming the Brotherhood’s electoral prospects. The new system also made it impossible for parties to form alliances with local notables, which forced voters to choose between their local tribal or clan representative and a candidate with a similar ideology.

King Hussein justified the amendments by referencing his experiences in the 1950s, when practices of the opposition had led to a “faltering of Jordan’s democratic march.”

He also directly challenged the Brotherhood’s political arm, the Islamic Action Front (IAF):

---

371 Ibid., 76.
I am also most concerned about our sons, some of whom have been chosen to belong to a front, which they have named, the Islamic front. What I wish for them, and from them, is that they truly practice their historic responsibilities in striving to live up to the name they have chosen, and to proceed, with Allah’s help, towards true Islam…\textsuperscript{375}

The speech quieted talk among the opposition in favor of boycotting the election, and despite indications from the regime that elections would be delayed\textsuperscript{376}, they were held on schedule in November. By this time, over 20 political parties spread across the political spectrum had received official status from the Interior Ministry.\textsuperscript{377}

The election results were notably different than the results of 1989. Voter turnout actually increased from 41 percent in 1989 to 52 percent.\textsuperscript{378} This increased turnout, however, did not work in the opposition’s benefit. Only 7 candidates from leftist and Arab nationalist parties were elected, compared with 13 in 1989.\textsuperscript{379} The IAF won 16 seats, down from 23 in 1989, while other parties won 8 seats.\textsuperscript{380} Leftist parties were harmed by their inability to coordinate on a joint list, while IAF was also unable to agree on an electoral strategy that would maximize their potential seats.\textsuperscript{381} The effects of the single nontransferable vote system and gerrymandered electoral districts were clear, especially in light of the fact that the IAF actually received a higher percentage of the total vote (from

\textsuperscript{378} Ibid., 182.
\textsuperscript{380} Ibid., 21.
\textsuperscript{381} Ibid., 22.
15.6% to 16%).\textsuperscript{382} Of the previous 80 members of parliament, only 25 were returned to their seats.\textsuperscript{383} Nonetheless, despite the damage done to the parliamentary share of the opposition and noticeably the IAF, the opposition remained committed to working with the government.

For the government, the results were a rousing success. ‘Abd al-Salam al-Majali was retained as Prime Minister, although his new cabinet was only narrowly approved by the new parliament.\textsuperscript{384} The new government quickly turned its attention to the unexpected developments in the Middle East peace process. In September 1993 Israel and the PLO had surprised the world by issuing joint letters of recognition, which was followed up by the signing of the Oslo Accords in Washington D.C. Although he was at first angry that the Palestinians had concluded a separate agreement with the Israelis, King Hussein realized that he was in a good position to make peace with Israel because he had not broken the “Arab consensus” first.\textsuperscript{385} Also, now that the PLO had signed its own separate agreement, Jordan was not forced to coordinate with the PLO on its own negotiations or tie their fate to the Palestinians in general.\textsuperscript{386} Hussein was free to conclude an agreement that addressed Hashemite interests directly with Israel. Just one day after Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin publicly shook hands in Washington D.C., Jordan and Israel announced that they had agreed on a common negotiation agenda, which the Jordanians had previously not wanted

\textsuperscript{382} Mufti, “Elite Bargains and the Onset of Political Liberalization in Jordan,” \textit{Comparative Political Studies} 32, no.1, (February 1999): 120.
to make public.\textsuperscript{387} In November, following a visit to the United States by Crown Prince Hasan, where he met with Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and President Clinton, the three leaders jointly announced the creation of a Jordanian-Israeli-American economic committee to promote regional economic growth.\textsuperscript{388} President Clinton also promised to support debt relief for Jordan, whose foreign debt bill had grown to $6.5bn., with $1bn. of that owed to the United States.\textsuperscript{389}

From this point, negotiations proceeded slowly throughout early 1994 due to Israel’s focus on a potential peace treaty with Syria and a follow-up deal with the Palestinians. However, following a trip to Damascus to meet with President Assad and pressure from President Clinton, Hussein made the push for a rapid conclusion of the talks.\textsuperscript{390} After joint high-level meetings throughout June and July, Hussein and Rabin agreed to the Washington Declaration on July 25\textsuperscript{th}, 1994, which terminated the state of belligerency between Jordan and Israel.\textsuperscript{391} In a nod to Hussein, the Washington Declaration gave the monarchy a “special role” in the Muslim holy shrines of Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{392} Following a quick resolution of their outstanding issues, Jordan and Israel signed a formal peace treaty on October 26\textsuperscript{th}, 1994, at the border crossing of Wadi Araba.

King Hussein now faced the potentially difficult task of shepherding the peace treaty though the Jordanian parliament. The government knew it faced determined

\textsuperscript{389} Ibid., 473.
\textsuperscript{392} Ibid.
opposition from the IAF as well as the leftist and nationalist parties. For it’s part, the IAF announced that it ended to fight the peace treaty “within the law.”\textsuperscript{393} The IAF, along with seven left-wing parties (including the Ba’th Party, Communist Party, and others) established the Popular Arab Jordanian Committee for Resisting Submission and Normalization, which called for boycotting all contact with Israel.\textsuperscript{394} The professional associations (in which the opposition was very well represented) for writers, journalists, doctors, dentists, engineers, and lawyers told their members to oppose normalization with Israel.\textsuperscript{395} In order to counter the opposition’s efforts against the treaty, the government embarked on a campaign of arrests primarily aimed at Islamists.\textsuperscript{396} An IAF deputy was also badly beaten by unknown assailants after he criticized the peace treaty publicly.\textsuperscript{397}

In order to sell the treaty to the public, the government argued that, strategically, Jordan had no choice but to conclude a peace treaty with Israel. It also argued that a peace treaty with Israel had the potential to boost the Jordanian economy through an increase in tourism and foreign investment.\textsuperscript{398} Hussein also made a concerted effort to present the peace treaty as a result of his own initiative, which made any criticism of the treaty a criticism of Hussein himself. The lobbying effort to the general public was largely a success, as polls indicated that around 80\% of Jordanians the Washington Declaration.\textsuperscript{399}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{395} Ibid., 439.
\textsuperscript{396} Robinson, “Can Islamists be Democrats? The Case of Jordan” \textit{The Middle East Journal} 51, no.3 (Summer 1997): 382.
\textsuperscript{397} Ibid., 382.
\end{flushright}
When the peace treaty was eventually brought to the floor of the Chamber of Deputies, despite a heated debate between proponents and opponents of the treaty, it passed relatively easily with a vote of 55 to 23.400

Support for the treaty was not universal among the elite, however. The treaty was vigorously opposed by Ahmad ‘Ubaydat, who held a seat in the Jordanian senate at the time. ‘Ubaydat argued that the treaty failed to grant Jordan its full water rights, complicated future matters with the Palestinians over Jerusalem, and did not solve the 1967 refugee problem.401 Although the senate voted 32 to 0 to pass the treaty, four opponents of the treaty (including ‘Ubaydat) excused themselves from the voting.402 The other members who were opposed kept their criticism private, but ‘Ubaydat’s public criticism caused King Hussein to remove him from the Senate.403 Nonetheless, despite the opposition’s policy towards the treaty and the dissent from figures like ‘Ubaydat, the wider Jordanian public never mobilized against the peace treaty with Israel.

H. Conclusion

In this period, Jordan was faced with very different internal and external scenes than in the 1950s. In the run up to 1984, Jordan was the first Arab country to reestablish diplomatic relations with Egypt after the Camp David Accords. Relations with Syria, which had been very poor, warmed considerably. Furthermore, the Reagan administration’s Middle East peace plan appeared to Hussein a chance to reinsert himself into the politics of

402 Ibid., 434.
403 Ibid., 435.
the West Bank again. Internally, Jordan was now a wealthier; more educated, and highly urbanized country. An economic boom in the 1970s was driven by high oil prices and remittances, making Jordan effectively a rentier country without oil. However, by 1984, as a result of a drop in oil prices and the continued Iraqi-Iranian War, Jordan was facing a potential economic crisis. This is an important similarity to the first period, as a poor economy in both periods proved to be an important factor in mobilizing opposition against the regime.

We also saw evidence of splits among the Jordanian elite again in this period. In particular, the government’s policy towards the Muslim Brotherhood proved to be a divisive issue. The Brotherhood had benefited from close ties with the GID that were kept in place when Mudar Badran and Ahmad ‘Ubaydat, both former GID directors, were serving as Prime Minister. However, King Hussein grew uncomfortable with the Brotherhood’s public profile, and this was among his motivations to replace ‘Ubaydat with Ziad al-Rifa’i in 1985 and Mudar Badran with Tahir al-Masri in 1991. There were other issues that caused splits within the regime elite, such as the government’s support of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and the IMF economic restructuring program. However, an important factor in this period was Hussein’s popularity and status as a za’im. When Hussein chose a policy, such as the peace treaty with Israel, he made any opposition to the policy opposition to him personally. This made splits within the elite less relevant, as Hussein was ultimately acting as the final arbiter.

The nature of political opposition was quite different in this period than the first one. The so-called “anti-establishment” parties from the 50s were much weaker, and the
Muslim Brotherhood assumed the role of the most prominent opposition party. Yet the
Muslim Brotherhood did not seek to upset the Jordanian establishment, but rather to make
minor alterations to it. Although the Brotherhood worked together with other opposition
parties, most notably in opposition to the peace treaty with Israel, the opposition never
coordinated its activities in order to pressure the regime significantly. The National
Charter, which forced all of the opposition parties to accept the primacy of the monarchy,
effectively spelled the end for an “anti-establishment” opposition in Jordan.
CHAPTER IV:
CONCLUSION

A. Findings

This thesis used Uriel Dann’s sociopolitical model of elite politics Jordan as a basis for analyzing and comparing two periods in Jordan in which shifts between authoritarianism and pluralism occurred. In the first period (1953-1957), we saw that Jordan was faced with a hostile external environment and an unstable internal situation. Britain, which had ruled over Jordan in the Mandate period and guaranteed its security following independence, was steadily declining in influence in the region. A wave of nationalist uprisings displaced regimes in Egypt, Syria, and eventually Iraq. Jordan was also faced with the new Israeli state on its western border. Jordanian-Israeli relations during this time were marred by deadly Israeli raids into the West Bank, which culminated in the Qibya massacre in 1953. Internally, the regime was faced with an opposition that had strong bases of support across both banks of the Jordan. Although it was not directed from abroad, the opposition was part of a wider movement across the Arab world that sought to remake the post-colonial order, embodied in particular by Egypt under Nasser’s leadership. Through mass mobilization and demonstrations, the opposition was able to exert its power, ultimately winning the 1956 elections and using a parliamentary majority to capture the highest offices of government. Once in power, the opposition took an increasingly radical turn that brought it into an open confrontation with the regime. The National Socialist Party, which had started off as pro-Iraqi, found itself dragged along by the more radical Ba’th and Communist parties. The establishment that made up the regime was divided
between men with local bases of support and men who had been imported to run Mandatory Transjordan by the British. In the end, Hussein relied upon his personal intelligence service as well as the army in order to crush the opposition. To fill the positions of power, Hussein once again reverted to the old Mandatory elite.

The story of the second period is a very different one from the first. Externally, following the Camp David Accords and the waning of the Arab Cold War, the region was no longer clearly divided between states allied with the United States and the Soviet Union. Mutual distaste for revolutionary Iran, as well as the wealth being reaped from the increase in oil prices, served to underpin a regional order that was not hostile to Jordan’s existence. Jordan’s relationship with Israel had changed from a confrontational one to a cooperative one, thanks to both countries antagonism with the PLO. The nature of the establishment and the opposition changed as well. The elite surrounding the regime now included a faction of men who made their careers in the mukhabarat, as well as descendants of the Mandatory elite and East Bank notables. Unlike in the 50s, the largest party in the opposition was the Muslim Brotherhood, which had collaborated with the regime for decades and never sought to overthrow the Hashemite state. Leftist and nationalist parties, which had been predominant in the 50s, were considerably weaker. Following the agreement of all of the opposition parties to the National Charter in 1990, the anti-establishment opposition largely ceased to exist in Jordan. Thus, the government was able to use institutional interventions in order to limit the scope of the liberalization process. Furthermore, King Hussein’s status as a leader was significantly greater at this time than in the 50s. If he was in favor of a policy, the opposition or dissident members of the regime
elite stood no chance in outflanking him. Unlike in the 50s, by this time Hussein was the true driver behind national policy, especially in matters relating to foreign affairs. As a result, splits within the elite did not influence policy. The king’s wishes always carried the day.

In the second period, the Muslim Brotherhood never attempted to capitalize on economic grievances against the government in order to build support that it could use to challenge the regime. Unlike the first period, there was little connection between the popular opposition on the street and the organized opposition parties. Instead, the opposition jumped at the first opportunity to be brought into the political system. In the 50s, the opposition was able to use an electoral victory in order to secure the Prime Minister’s office and important positions of the cabinet. The opposition parties may have been at different places along the ideological spectrum, but they shared common beliefs and goals. They could also count on external support regionally from Nasser’s Egypt and internationally from the Soviet Union. In the second period, the opposition was ideologically fractured and not bound together by the same beliefs and goals that had held the opposition together in the 50s. Jordan’s loss of the West Bank, an area in which opposition parties had historically been strong, removed a vital constituency for the opposition in elections. The opposition also lacked the same external support that had buttressed the opposition in the 50s. Jordan’s main regional antagonist was Syria, and Hussein and Zaid al-Rifa’i presided over a warming in relations between the two countries in 1985. Without a strong regional antagonist, Hussein did not need to roll back the liberalization process. This left the regime free to manipulate the liberalization process as it
pleased and for its own interests. The SNTV electoral law, which remains in place today, makes it extremely unlikely that any opposition party or current could gain a majority of the seats in the parliament. In essence, the regime can drag out the liberalization process indefinitely.

The findings of this thesis provide the reader with definitions of the Jordanian elite and opposition and how they were influenced by society at large in the two periods under study. We saw that although the elite was never split on the issue of supporting the Hashemites against potential alternatives, it was not a monolithic bloc. Members of the local elite were still subject to public opinion from their constituents. The opposition was split between parties seeking a radical revision of the status quo and parties seeking only to modify it. The relative strength of the opposition was a major factor in determining how far liberalization went. In the first period, the opposition was able to capitalize on the liberalization process in order to present a direct challenge to the regime’s authority. In the second period, the opposition used the liberalization process in order to become part of the system, not to challenge it. As a result, it is clear that these two periods did not produce political forces with similar goals.

B. Implications

Uriel Dann’s model of elite politics in Jordan has been very influential in the subfield of Jordanian studies. It provided us with a narrow definition of the makeup of Jordan’s political elite and its opposition. We saw that this same narrow focus is present in academic work on the second period in the thesis as well. This thesis, however, highlights
the weaknesses in the model, especially when we look to explain the dynamics that drove the liberalization process. Dann does not account for the internal and external social forces that drove the opposition and proved to be a major threat to the Hashemite regime. His conception of Jordanian society as being largely obedient does not answer the obvious question. If Jordanian society was obedient, how did popular demonstrations bring down governments and force the palace to bow to the demands of the street? Dann characterizes the government’s decision on the Baghdad Pact as being the result of weakness shown by members of the elite. He fails to consider the more likely alternative, which is that the government, recognizing the waning of British influence and the extreme unpopularity of the Pact, chose not to join the alliance as a result. This is an example of the weakness of any elite-oriented model of politics. They tend to explain politics and decision-making as resulting from deliberations within the elite itself, and therefore they cannot account a situation in which the elite bows to pressure from groups outside of the formal political system.

This thesis also presented a skeptical view towards the contingent choice model of political liberalization, and comparing the two periods helps to further illustrate the model’s shortcomings. Much of the literature that emerged on Jordanian political liberalization that followed 1989 was optimistic that liberalization would eventually lead towards democracy. This literature is valuable in that it gives us an account of the decision-making process within the upper levels of the regime. As with the Dann model, however, it’s narrow focus on elites and their counterparts in the opposition does not account for actions outside these spheres. Furthermore, it’s optimism about the prospects for
democracy in Jordan is misplaced. In Jordan’s case specifically, we have a historical example in which that did not happen. In the first period, the regime faced a strong opposition movement with support from across the societal spectrum and from abroad. Yet, the regime ultimately was able to survive. In fact, the regime was able to begin a process of consolidation that made it much stronger. This strength, which was built under an authoritarian atmosphere, allowed the regime to use political liberalization as a tool to manage discontent. As we saw from Lucas’ historical institutionalism approach, the Jordanian government has been adept at using institutional interventions in order make sure the liberalization process never slid out of its control. These policies are not crafted in a vacuum. Rather, they are the result of decades of information on which policies work and which policies don’t. As a result, thanks to this historical comparison, we can draw the conclusion that regime-led liberalization is highly unlikely to ever lead to democratic change. This should cause any observer of Jordan to remain skeptical that the current process of liberalization under King ‘Abdullah II will ever truly change the political order.

Many studies that try to answer the question of why monarchies have been resilient in the Middle East have pointed to the supposed traditional legitimacy of the rulers in these countries. However, this thesis offers evidence against viewing Jordanian society as one in which the population supports the monarchy out of regard for tradition. In the first period, Jordanians did not remain largely obedient, but in fact were able to use street action on numerous occasions in order to force the government to accede to their demands. In the second period, although the protests did not take an overtly political turn, Jordanians were also quick to take to the streets when their economic privileges were jeopardized.
C. Limitations and Further Research

The main limitation of this thesis is that, despite my attempts to introduce adjustments to Dann’s model, the account remains focused on elite actors and opposition elites on the other side. In the second period, it focuses on the external causes behind Jordan’s political liberalization, as opposed to its roots in domestic concerns. Finally, it is also entirely based on primary and secondary sources in English. If I plan to conduct further research on the topic, I will need to acquire research proficiency in Arabic in order to broaden the scope of my research.

When doing my research, I noticed that there was a lack of literature on the social origins behind the riots of 1989, and the opposition’s role (or lack thereof) in them. Further research in this area would be of great benefit to scholars of Jordan. As this thesis showed, social history helped to paint a vastly different picture of the JNM than the one that was commonly accepted. It would be interesting to study why opposition parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood did not seek to use economic grievances against the regime as a mobilizing tool.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Primary Sources and Documents


B. Books and Journal Articles


- Nationalist Voices in Jordan: The Street and the State. Austin, TX: University of Texas, 2005.


- “Jordan: The Ruse of Reform,” Journal of Democracy 24, no.3 (July 2013), 127-139.
