



AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

SATANIC PANIC: DISCOURSE ON METAL AND MORALITY  
IN LEBANESE TELEVISION

by

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# AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

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This study examines the media discourse on non-normative subgroups in Lebanon, and how their social construction as folk devils can lead to a moral panic. Lebanese media's juxtaposition of metal music, drugs, and demon worship, and the marginalization of the metal scene, is drawn on as a case in point. A critical discourse analysis (CDA) is used to determine the ideological frames employed in Lebanese news reports and evening socio-political programmes that have discussed metal fans, and whether they are given folk devil status. The social and religious political context of Lebanon is considered, as is 'moral' regulation and its relationship to power. This research has implications for the understanding of how the Lebanese media treat and regulate sub-groups and their 'deviance.'

*Keywords:* moral panic, media discourse, youth subculture, heavy metal, Lebanon

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“They couldn't see what I thought would be so obvious  
They hide behind the laws they made for all of us  
The ministry of truth, that deals with pretense  
The ministry of peace, that sits on defense  
I'm washing my hands of what they're trying to do  
It's for me, It's for me, It's for you, It's for you

I'm just a rock n' roll rebel  
I'll tell you no lies  
They say I worship the devil  
They must be stupid or blind  
I'm just a rock n' roll rebel

They live a life of fear and insecurity  
And all you do is pay for their prosperity  
The ministry of fear, that won't let you live  
The ministry of grace, that doesn't forgive  
Do what you will to try and make me conform  
I'll make you wish that you had never been born

'Cause I'm a rock n' roll rebel  
I'll do what I please  
Yes I'm a rock n' roll rebel  
And I'm as free as the breeze  
I'm just a rock n' roll rebel

They'll try playin' with your hearts  
They know it rules your head  
If they could read between the lines  
You know they'd see the real day

...

'Cause I'm a rock n' roll rebel  
I'll tell you no lies  
They say I worship the devil  
Why don't they open their eyes?  
I'm just a rock n' roll rebel  
A rock n' roll rebel  
I'm just a rock n' roll rebel”

(Rock n' Roll Rebel, Ozzy Osbourne, 1983)

## Satanic Panic: Discourse on Metal and Morality in Lebanese Television

There has been a sporadic yet recurring image in the Lebanese media of what has been termed “Satan worshippers” – (Ar. ‘abaddat al Shaytan) or “devil worshippers”- (Ar. ‘abaddat shayateen).<sup>1</sup> Every few years this “satanic panic” reemerges with the media discovery of some heavy metal concert or an arrest of “Satanists.” The scare spreads among the media outlets, each hoping to offer a more interesting story to the public. The evidence used and sources interviewed in news stories and evening talk shows are often substandard, incendiary, and panic inciting. In a number of these broadcasts, rock and metal music fans are denied a voice, labeled as drug abusers and morally deviant, and sometimes ridiculed (see Al Jadeed, 2012a; MTV Lebanon, 2012).

The almost constant association in the Lebanese press, for well over a decade, of heavy metal music with drugs and Satan worship has contributed to the marginalization, harassment, arrest, and trial of many persons who fit the stereotype image of the metal subgroup. Recently, some local and international news reports and blogs have discussed the stereotyping of this subculture in the media (Al Arabiya, 2012; Didymus, 2011; Euronews, 2012; Katerji, 2012; LBC International, 2012; Meguerditchian, 2011). Reports of the number of related arrests in Lebanon vary between 59 (Meguerditchian, 2011) and 750 (MTV, 2012).

Al-Salman (2012) offers an insider’s take on the media “crusade” on heavy metal, being a journalist and a metal fan himself. He expresses his disdain towards the lack of professionalism in the media, stemming from reporters who handle the topic by spreading

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<sup>1</sup> Satan worshippers (Ar. ‘abbadat al Shaytan) and devil worshippers (Arabic: ‘abbadat shayateen’) are the labels most used in the Lebanese media to refer to the folk devil. In this paper the terms *devil worshippers*, *Satan worshippers*, and *Satanists* will be used interchangeably as they describe the same phenomenon and are represented with the same imagery. As often as possible, they will reflect the ways they were used in the texts under discussion.

fear and misinformation. This type of media coverage corresponds with what has become known as a “moral panic.”

This study critically examined the Lebanese media’s discourse on the rock and metal subculture and its association with demon worship, through an understanding of moral panics and folk devils. The analysis was situated in the theoretical frameworks of cultural studies, political economy and critical discourse analysis (CDA), and accordingly has taken into consideration the cultural and religious context of Lebanon. I have compared the Lebanese moral panic of Satanism to other such incidents around the world, as although there are similarities, there are also differences pertaining to socio-economic issues (Williams, 2011), media institutions (Silverblatt, 2004), and cultural inclinations (McClure, 2011).

According to Cohen (1973) a *moral panic* is a common event in which a “condition, episode, person, or group of persons becomes defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media;” gatekeepers, opinion leaders, politicians and priests step in to uphold the moral boundaries of society (p. 29). The subject of the moral panic is known as a “folk devil”; whether a group of people or a condition, it is painted as an evil threat to the moral order. Satanists, for example, are a folk devil that has been invoked in many cultures at different periods of time. The folk devil is demonized and stereotyped in the media and the authorities are usually called in to intervene. However, in due time the story becomes less important and hype dies down, but the moral panic may have had effects on society or policy (McClure, 2011).

Stanley Cohen’s seminal 1973 study on the construction of mods and rockers as folk devils and the moral panic that erupted in Britain defined and described the phenomena of a moral panic. Cohen (1973) highlighted the importance of understanding the societal construction of rules and the labeling of the transgression of those rules by society or “agents of social control” as “deviant or problematic” (pp. 31-34).

Watson and Hill (1984) defined the situation of a moral panic as follows: “individuals and groups can by their very activities emerge as a basis for outrage expressed by influential members of society who perceive these activities as seriously subverting the mores and interests of the dominant culture” (as cited in Critcher, 2006, p. 2). The subjects of moral panics are fairly varied, and these media induced scares can surface repeatedly in some situations; these are called “serial moral panics.” Serial moral panics emerge and then fade and then emerge again whenever the media takes notice of an event or crime that is newsworthy enough and possibly related to the imagined threat. The re-confirmation of social values is however behind all moral panics, whether they surface once or again and again (Critcher, 2006). The media is essential to today’s moral panics and the construction of folk devils, a role previously held by the religious institution (Silverblatt, 2004).

Cohen (1973) understood that the mass media play an important part in constructing, outlining and transmitting what constitutes a social problem, when it is newsworthy, and the proper response to the problem. When the news focuses on deviance, it functions to delineate the margins of acceptable behavior to a mass audience; “it informs us about right and wrong, about the boundaries beyond which one should not venture and about the shapes the devil can assume” (p. 35). This thought is typical to the transactional approach to deviance, which puts the labeling and sanctioning of deviants at the center of the analysis of deviance. Agents of social control, which include media channels and those who speak through them, mobilize others and categorize the deviant (Critcher, 2003), and in doing so also outline what constitutes proper behavior.

Heavy metal fans have often been portrayed as a threatening or corruptive group in Lebanese media, even prompting those vilified to create a Facebook group and an online petition to reach the media and rectify their image, something that was not technologically possible at the time of the first few recurrences of the moral panic. In the latest episode of this

satanic panic in November of 2012, the reaction from heavy metal fans through social media outlets prompted some stations to rectify their stories (see Al Jadeed, 2012b; Al Jadeed, 2012c) or offer a different position than in stories on other stations. They addressed the mistakes other stations had made offering explanations as to why, or offered the metal fans' side of the story (Katerji, 2012; LBC International, 2012). This may ultimately have had a mitigating effect on the marginalization of these youth and it is possible that media coverage of this subgroup in Lebanon will no longer tend toward their demonization. It is still however too early to tell the exact impact of the social media response on mainstream media coverage. Although this is discussed in the analysis, only preliminary examples are given, as this is not the focus of this study. During work on this research another report on a "Satanic" party did surface on Future TV (a private channel); it did not spread to other stations, and actually voiced opinions from both sides.

This research systematically analyzed how Lebanese television news reports and evening talk shows have constructed the issue of "devil worshippers". The themes and cultural codes used to frame the media discourse were examined to determine whether metal and rock subculture was stereotyped and portrayed as a satanic folk devil. The analysis has taken into account factors such as the narrative structure of news and talk show genres, representation (lexical, visual, and auditory), and a number of social and cultural factors. The questions asked through a critical discourse analysis (CDA) allow us to determine meaning making and the frames used in the media (Fairclough, 2002; McClure, 2011).

The media in this study are considered to be one of the *ideological state apparatuses* (ISAs) identified by Althusser (1971), and one that is ever more important as our lives become increasingly mediated. "Ideological state apparatuses" are the institutions and instances, such as the school, the family, the church, the press, and so on, that help preserve

the division of labor and reproduce the means of production by imbuing workers and future workers with the proper ideology of submission to

the ‘rules’ of good behaviour, i.e. the attitude that should be observed by every agent in the division of labour, according to the job he is ‘destined’ for: rules of morality, civic and professional conscience, which actually means rules of respect for the socio-technical division of labour and ultimately the rules of order established by class domination. (sic) (p. 132)

As a critical method, CDA examines the underlying ideologies in texts to expose power structures in society (Machin and Mayr, 2012, Van Dijk, 1983).

The study of this phenomenon can aid us in understanding how Lebanese reality-genre television discourses construct and react to non-normative sub-groups and deviant behavior and the local and global ideological frames in which they are inserted, to maintain and promote normative behavior and the status quo. As sub-cultures continue to develop and emerge in Lebanon, this research can help make sense of and hopefully reform the way they are dealt with in the local media and accordingly by the authorities (and, by extension, society). It can also situate Lebanese media’s moralistic tendencies in relation to other countries in which these same folk devils have been invoked, for example Israel (Cavaglion & Sela-Shayovitz, 2005), Iran, Egypt, Morocco (Levine, 2009) and South Africa (Falkof, 2010). These countries, among others (see below), have all encountered satanic panics. Comparing the similarities and differences between the case in Lebanon and others elsewhere offers a better understanding of how culture and specific power structures can affect the characteristics of a moral panic.

### **Key Institutions and State Apparatuses**

Any critical analysis requires a survey of the relevant ideological and repressive state apparatuses (RSAs)<sup>2</sup> that contribute to the context in which a text is created and which it helps to create. Lebanon is constitutionally a power-sharing democracy.<sup>3</sup> The small Middle Eastern country has a reputation for tension caused by societal rifts, which stems from the diversity of religious and cultural groups that make up the social fabric. Another tension-causing rift stems from the modern age of globalization. Considering that for the youth (especially those from the upper and middle class), Western ‘secular modernity’ has been challenging the moral boundaries of pre-colonial and now pre-globalization Middle Eastern Abrahamic<sup>4</sup> society; a new global Americanized culture, and therefore morality, is emerging among the younger generations, as it has elsewhere in the world (Kim and Kim, 2006). Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) contend that moral panics are likely to transpire when moral boundaries are challenged or facing change or redefinition.

Lebanon has a diverse population in regards to religious sects, levels of education, and socio-economic class. All of the people of Lebanon do however hail from an Abrahamic religious background, whether Christian, Muslim, Druze, or any other variant. Religion is deeply entrenched in the country’s legislative and political systems and makes up a large part of daily life; from how many seats each sect is allowed in parliament to divorce law. It is not surprising that in a country where a multi-decade civil war based on religious division threatens to erupt again, for a large portion of the population, religious identity constitutes a significant part of personal identity (Haddad, 2010) and the identity of media institutions (Nötzold & Pies, 2010). Following from this, it is easy to see why religious figures, such as

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<sup>2</sup> *Repressive State Apparatuses* also identified by Althusser (1971) as state apparatuses, such as the police or prison systems, that use physical force to control populations.

<sup>3</sup> This is debatable as during the writing of this thesis, the country is witnessing the unconstitutional cancellation of the elections for the second consecutive time.

<sup>4</sup> Abrahamic religions are monotheistic religions of Semitic origin that view God as external and a source of moral code; Abrahamic religions all feature the belief that God revealed himself to Abraham. The three most prominent Abrahamic religions are Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

priests and sheikhs, are seen by many, including media professionals, as experts and authorities on a wide range of topics. This is amplified for topics with a religious aspect, such as a Satanism scare; in coverage of Satanism these religious figures are usually asked to define the phenomena.

Apart from the religious and media institutions, another state institution (an RSA in this case), that has importance for this research topic, is the Internal Security Forces (ISF), Lebanon's equivalence of a police force. The head of the ISF in Lebanese policy is the Minister of the Interior, who at the most intense period of the Satanic panic was Elias El-Murr, son of Michel El-Murr (who held the same post directly before him), and part of the wealthy Murr family, which owns MTV (Murr TV), one of the more prominent Christian television stations in Lebanon. In continuation of his father's campaign against the heavy metal culture, Elias El-Murr spearheaded the crusade against Satan worshippers during his 5-year reign in the prominent position of Minister of the Interior and head of the ISF. He vowed to open a special office within the ISF to fight Satan worshippers, and many dark-clad youth and males with long hair were arrested while he held command (Mohsen, 2011).

Although this office never came to be, the culture of fear of subcultural youth displaying what many mistook to be Satanic symbols, and their surveillance and harassment by members of the ISF, took root throughout the country and became a sensational topic for the media to discuss (see below section for further discussion). It is important to note that worshipping Satan or demons is not a crime in Lebanon, although public blasphemy and irreverence to religion is, and is punishable by up to three years of incarceration, according to lawyer and human rights activist Nizar Saghie (as cited in Luca, 2011).

Other ideological institutions worth brief mention are the schools and families that sanction subcultural youth using different means than incarceration and perpetuate the stereotypes and boundaries set by the state and media. From here I would like to move to the



most important institution for this analysis, and offer a brief overview of the Lebanese media setting.

Lebanon's media scene and its history are interesting, complex, and politically charged, yet a detailed description is beyond the scope of this thesis. From a legal perspective, Lebanon has a constitutionally free press, yet one that

faces numerous "red lines" drawn legally through regulations stated in the Law of Publications (Republic of Lebanon, 1994)<sup>5</sup> and the Audiovisual Media Law (Republic of Lebanon, 1994). These laws clearly prohibit the publishing of any material that insults any of the religions recognized in the country or incites religious or racist feuds, or endangers the national security, national unity or state frontiers and international relations (Republic of Lebanon, 1994: Article 5). On the contrary, they do not prohibit the violation of human rights or discrimination based on gender, sexual, or class biases. (Mandour, 2013, p.10)

Also, all materials intended for publication, must pass through the General Security censorship office.

As for television, which is the medium on which this research is focused, there is one public channel, TeleLiban, broadcasting out of a shabby building in Beirut. Corruption and the lack of funds have rendered it unable to compete with its private counterparts, and it is often ridiculed as belonging in the past. During the writing of this thesis, TeleLiban has come under new management and is receiving an overhaul (Kullab, 2014), which may change its position in the market, but it is still too early to tell. One high-ranking news professional from TeleLiban informed me that the station does not cover issues such as Satan worship, they tend to focus on political and safety news and would not risk crossing any red lines with

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<sup>5</sup> The Constitution of the Republic of Lebanon, as cited in Mandour (2013).

religious figures. “You would be better off searching for such stories in the more sensationalist loving private channels, such as MTV and LBC.”

There are eight private television stations in Lebanon providing an allegedly sectarian equilibrium. These channels are “owned and/or directly affiliated with the Lebanese post-war political sectarian ruling class” (Mandour, 2013, p. 10). The Christian channels are Tele Lumiere,<sup>6</sup> LBCI, OTV, and MTV; the first is a religion-focused station, the last is Orthodox, and LBCI and OTV are Maronite. Future TV is the only Sunni channel and is largely a mouthpiece for the Future Movement, a Sunni party. NBN and Al-Manar are the two Shiite channels, the former belongs to the Amal Movement, and the latter is the official channel for Hezbollah. Al Jadeed is an independent channel with leftist affiliations (Mandour, 2013).

The highly politicized media scene in the country led to a focus on the everyday political issues of Lebanon and a neglect of social issues in the press (Mandour, 2013; Nötzold, 2009). According to Mandour (2013), this “has been encouraged for a long time by the conservative sectarian regime that prevailed both in politics and the media” (p.10-11). This did begin to change in the 90’s when globalization, market-economy driven competition, and a reliance on advertising began to affect the stations.

During that time and still today Lebanon is becoming more globalized, and Americanized, via US cultural and political hegemony over global culture, policy, the Internet, and the more traditional media. Jenkins (1992) considers the diffusion of American ideas across two channels, the low (media and pop culture) and the high (accessible to elites, these are academic and governmental developments). These ideas and ways of doing things are often considered the norm, yet there can be resistance to this Americanization (as cited in Critcher, 2003, p.127-128), particularly when there is anti-American sentiment. American media representations on heavy metal and Satanism could have been seen by Lebanese talk

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<sup>6</sup> Tele Lumiere is a non-profit religious Christian channel that is funded via private donations.

show crews and journalists during research and preparation for their episodes or articles, which may have conveyed the ‘model’ for discussing the topic and can explain why many of the claims made in the programs are similar to the claims made by the American media.

### **Chronology of the Lebanese Satanic Panic**

According to Bassem Deaibess, lead singer of “Blaaykum” (a prominent Lebanese metal band) and long time public defender of metal music, during the 80’s metal had a big following in Lebanon and radio and TV stations would play music from worldwide bands (as cited in Luca, 2011). As the metal scene flourished amidst the civil war, in 1986 the state descended upon a group of alleged Satanists in a hotel North of Beirut (Othman, 2003). No information is available on the time period between then and 1994.

In 1994 or 1996 (reports differ), a 14-year-old boy committed suicide with his father’s gun, allegedly leaving behind rock CDs and a suicide note. The boy’s father worked in the security apparatus (Deaibess, personal communication, December 11, 2012). This is most likely when the suicide and metal connection began for the state and the media. In July of 1995, the Interior Ministry prohibited heavy metal, and the ISF confiscated cassettes and CDs from shops around the country. In September of that same year, the Lebanese government banned British band Iron Maiden from entering the country to give a concert for which approximately 5,000 tickets had already been sold. The government gave no official reason, but it was claimed that the concert would incite suicide among youth (Spillius & Theodoulou, 1995). The zealous surveillance and arrest of subcultural youth ensued until 1998 (Luca, 2011), signifying the end of the first wave; however, metal kept its criminalized status.

In late 2002 and 2003, at the height of El-Murr’s campaign, another wave of the panic emerged. Newspapers and televisions covered the arrests of youth accused of Satan worship and discussed the dangers of metal and risk of suicide. It is regrettable that no television

coverage could be obtained for analysis from this period. It was at this time that Elias El-Murr proclaimed that he would open a Satanist-fighting office in the ISF. Some of El-Murr's claims, which spread across media outlets were: they pose a big danger to a portion of the youth in Lebanon, laws against these people should become more tightly enforced, 11 people have committed suicide in connection to the "groups" in the last few years, they are found in the cities, a threat to the security, advancement, and traditions of society (as cited in Othman, 2003). These claims were echoed in news articles, media programs, homes and schools. The ISF enforced raids on concerts and bars and some schools took action against subcultural youth, banning them from wearing jewelry and black clothing (Othman, 2003). Over 50 people were arrested during this wave on suspicion of Satan worship (Meguerditchian, 2011).

Deaibess was arrested several times due to his proclivity for long hair and wearing dark colors. One of those times was during this wave; he was not read his rights or given access to a lawyer. Further, he was arrested by the military police. They asked him whether he liked Nirvana (the band); he said no. He was then asked if he liked Metallica, to which he replied yes; the response was "come with us" (Ar. *tfaddal ma'na*). In interrogation he was subjected to verbal abuse and some physical abuse; he was extensively questioned about his religious beliefs and choice of music. The 'charges' section of the police report was left blank (Deaibess, personal communication, December 11, 2012). This arrest is one example of the convergence of rock and metal with the idea of Satan worship among members of the security forces, and the population at large, one that is chiefly dependent on what is projected in the mass media. Many youth arrests like this took place; a few led to convictions for insulting religious rites, drug use, and homosexuality (which is illegal in Lebanon).

In 2008, there was some buzz about Satanists according to Bassem Deaibess (personal communication December 11, 2012), when he was invited on to *Ahmar bil Khat el Arid* (En. The Bold Red Line), a prominent social program on LBCI, one of Lebanon's most watched

channels, which was featuring an episode on “Rebellion Through Music.” Here metal and rap were discussed; budding Arab musicians from both genres were featured, with a hidden guest from the Lebanese rock scene, as well as a music producer and a music critic. In 2009, the General Secretariat of Catholic Schools in Lebanon sent a letter to parents of Catholic school students throughout the country in the days before the first-ever Beirut Rock Festival. The letter warned of “a dangerous event in town” that would include risk of Ecstasy distribution, Satan worshipping and the “spread of dark thoughts.” (Lynch, 2009, para. 3)

In mid-September of 2011, eight people were arrested in Mount Lebanon under suspicion of Satan worship; they were charged with insulting religious rites and some of them with drug use by the military police (LBCI, 2011; Luca, 2011; Meguerditchian, 2011). Judge Saqr Saqr stated that the authorities were still searching for 12 people (Luca, 2011). The fact that two of the arrested were young women and another two were army personnel was widely discussed. That November, *Ahmar bil Khat el Arid* (mentioned above) produced an episode on “secret groups,” which discussed Satan worship. This video, along with 3 others was selected for analysis in this research, and is discussed further in the analysis.

On July 13<sup>th</sup> 2012, another eight people were arrested (Al Joumhouria, 2012). A few months later, in November of 2012, Massacore, a fully licensed, Halloween-themed, heavy metal and break core<sup>7</sup> concert took place in an abandoned school in the mountains above Beirut. The media events that followed inspired this research study and are discussed in detail in the following sections.

## **The Social Problem**

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<sup>7</sup> A style of EDM (electronic dance music) that is fast, heavy, and often industrial.

The literature on moral panics hails largely from the Western world; there has been little scholarly research on the cultural politics surrounding subcultures in today's Asian societies (Liew and Fu, 2006). This is undeniably the case for the Middle East. These types of studies are necessary in post-colonial societies that are beset with the effects of rapid modernization, industrialization, urbanization, and migration, societies in which "new social and cultural networks and references have emerged." For many youth these are found in subcultures that take their cue "from the increasingly global appeal and transmissions of Western-based popular media" (Liew and Fu, 2006, p. 101).

In Lebanon, the Middle East, and some Asian societies, as in the West, members of heavy metal and rock subcultures are given deviant and sometimes criminal status. Any perceived threat to tradition or society is "readily picked up by the media, the extrapolations of which render passive public consent and active demands from moral entrepreneurs for the deployment of the repressive apparatus of the state" (Liew and Fu, 2006, p.101). For the duration of most of the Lebanese Satanic panic, and others around the world, members of youth subcultures could not access mediums of mass communication as opposed to political and religious claims makers who often do have the means or distinction to appear on television. This leaves these youth open to exaggerated misrepresentation and repercussions from their peers, schools, society and the state. This research topic is important for us to better understand the socio-cultural milieu that can marginalize a segment of a nation's youth, and the mechanisms through which a discourse of marginalization takes place. According to Foucault (in the Chomsky-Foucault Debate: On Human Nature, 1971),<sup>8</sup>

The real political task in a society such as ours is to criticize the workings of institutions that appear to be both neutral and independent, to criticize and attack them in such a manner that the political violence that has always exercised itself

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<sup>8</sup> This was a televised debate between the two scholars; the source for the transcript can be located in the references.

obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight against them. (para. 176)

This study is a critical analysis of a social problem that has caused violence against a portion of society. The ideological justification for this violence has for many years been handed to the public by the media institutions that are married to the interests of Lebanese politicians, as well as indirectly owned by them, through their families and other members of the big business and political “elite” (Nötzold, 2009). This research has the aim of denaturalizing the dominant ideology and its morally regulating discourse. The widely broadcast public discourse of the television stations constructs an identity for non-mainstream youth that in many cases has led to physical and emotional harm to them from peers, schools, parents, and the state. It also constructs an identity for the Lebanese via the othering of this youth, a moral and pious Lebanon, a God-fearing people, opposed to evil, and primed to follow their religious and sectarian leaders.

The purpose of the study was to analyze this public, mediated discourse of morality and othering, to determine whether it can be categorized as moral panic discourse. This has shed light on the Lebanese media’s cultural output and identity forming function, as opposed to most social and media studies from the region that tend to focus on politics, war, and gender. Following this introduction, I will discuss the literature on moral panics, focusing on satanic panics from around the world, before explicating the theoretical basis for this research. The first part of the theoretical framework will bring together ideas from cultural studies, political economy, and CDA to theorize moral panics via the relation of mass media to the moral order and youth subcultures. The second part of the theoretical framework also brings together ideas from the same three approaches to theorize the case of the Lebanese satanic panic. Here economy, dominance, hegemony, ideology, cultural production and the media setting are brought to bear on how television discourse spreads moral codes and

excludes particular groups. The method section follows, in which the selection of the corpus, the procedure, and CDA are explained before moving to the findings.

## **Literature Review**

The literature on moral panics from around the world provides a plethora of case studies demonstrating the phenomenon, ranging from Satanism (Jenkins & Maier- Katkin, 1992), to pedophilia (Kitzinger, 1999), to asylum seekers (Pearce & Charman, 2011). The sociological frameworks used to discuss moral panics are no less diverse (Critcher, 2006). According to Critcher (2006), moral panics arise in reaction to a group or object understood as subversive to mainstream values, and in conjunction with cultural myths. In the process of constructing an “illusory enemy” normative boundaries are reconfirmed and social cohesion is strengthened among the in-group (p. 8). An unambiguous, highly connotative label (such as devil worshippers) is usually attached to the subject of the moral panic and a ‘discursive legacy’ is set (Critcher, 2006).

There is no one model for a moral panic that can describe the complex social interactions that surround this phenomenon and there is disagreement among scholars regarding the different mechanisms of society and power that govern the media and their coverage of deviance. Most moral panic work, some of which is reviewed here, is critical in that attention is usually paid to state institutions and relations of power. The focus of moral panic research in general tends away from the study of deviants themselves; rather it examines the “definers of deviance” and is usually approached from a qualitative perspective (David, Rohloff, Petley, & Hughes, 2011).

### **Satanic Panics Around the World**



The satanic panic phenomenon has manifested in many cultures and countries. Although it is usually understood with reference to Western Judeo-Christian frames and narratives, this specific moral panic is not exclusively Western and has extended to a number of Muslim and/or Middle Eastern societies as well. This section will survey some of the literature on heavy metal or Satanism related panics from around the world, state and societal reactions, and the attributes assigned to or associated with the folk devils in media discourse.

A number of studies have shown how heavy metal fans have been targeted in both the UK and the US in the past few decades (e.g. Williams, 2011; Markson, 1990; Cohen, 1973; among others). Other countries such as New Zealand (Griffiths, 2010) and South Africa (Falkof, 2010) have also displayed these patterns. When reporting on murders and school shootings in the English-speaking world, media discourse has consistently highlighted a link between metal/goth subculture and Satanism (Williams, 2011; Griffiths, 2010). A connection of metal to youth suicide has also featured heavily in American news (Wright, 2000).

Heavy metal fans have often been labeled a threat to society, with their music and subcultural style held up as signs of their wickedness; further, perpetrators are seen as representative of the entire sub-group (Williams, 2011). In their study of U.S. media reports on Satanism, Rowe and Cavender (1991) found that the media preferred expert sources, such as police officials, psychiatrists, and religious figures to youth participants. Heavy metal was often portrayed as a facilitator of Satanism. The victimization and alienation of children, human sacrifice, and improper youth behavior and sexual rituals were consistent themes. These themes from US media narratives in the 1980's regarding Satanism correspond to those present in the narrative of the Lebanese media for the past two decades (e.g. Elia Mssawir, 2011; Al Jadeed, 2012d; also see analysis).

New Zealand did not have its own homegrown Satanism scare, but rather the local media imported a fear of goth culture from the US's post-Columbine discourse on gothic

youth. Although goths in Auckland experienced less surveillance and negative attention than their American counterparts, they still felt the repercussions of moral panic media coverage. Griffiths (2010) studied the experience of New Zealand goths during post-Columbine discourse on goths. One of the participants, for example, reported that in her high school she and her friends had been verbally abused and threatened with violence. A school counselor also sent letters home to the parents of implicated students, warning of the dangers of gothic culture and a propensity towards suicide and self-mutilation. Similar events have taken place in schools in Lebanon, and are perfect examples of the educational institution as an Althusserian Ideological State Apparatus (ISA) at work. Goths in New Zealand individually and collectively reached out to the media, and then through media channels, leading to a relatively swift dissolution of the scare and a lack of any serious damage to members of the gothic subculture (Griffiths, 2010).

The Nordic countries also have had their share of the satanic panic. In Finland, news media discourse constructed Satanism as a social problem, Evangelical Christians often spoke out through the media, and Satanism was used to explain events such as cemetery vandalism (Taira, 2006). A 2009 study conducted by Hjelm, Bogdan, Dyrendal, and Peterson investigated Satanism and the scares surrounding it, which began in the 1990s, in each of the Nordic and Lutheran contexts of Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Norway. They also examined the amount of attention given by the public to the matter and what led to the waning of public interest. A noteworthy finding was that although church attendance and religiosity tends to be low among the general population, Christian discourse surrounded these Satanism scares and defined Satanism for the public. The discourse in each of the Nordic countries borrowed heavily from the themes, claims, and “information” of traditional American media coverage on satanic allegations.

Norway is by far the most interesting case of the Nordic Satanic panics, in that the metal community actually flamed the media fire with their highly public transgressions. Norwegian Black Metal, a.k.a. NBM is a form of metal that grew from a few bands and their fans that would convene in a record shop owned by a man who was behind the music scene and the producer of much of its music. NBM was a metal movement that identified with a Satanism, which unlike most popular atheistic and individualistic Satanism, was centered on the Christian Satan and was intentionally sacrilegious, to the extent where band members burned down a number of churches, at least one of them historic. Members of the NBM community were also involved in a series of murders, a suicide, and incidents of assault that were highly publicized, again in the American fashion, and thus used by other NBM community members to create a more extreme image for the scene (Smith, 2009; Hjelm et al., 2009). As NBM grew in global recognition; some bands later adopted Nazi ideology and symbols (Smith, 2009) in what seemed to be a constant attempt to be perceived as extreme.

Satanic panics are not limited to American and European ‘democracies’; Falkof (2010) studied the Satanism scare that occupied white South Africa between 1984 and 1992. Using a historical cultural studies and social anxiety approach, he concluded that the moral panic was a symptom of the threats to the Christian values and cultural hegemony of White society. The Satanism scare allowed anxiety stemming from social and economic issues to be displaced onto an evil enemy and the normative boundaries of a White national identity to be set. The narrative of fear included references to the influence of drugs and Western music; the dark imagery of certain rock bands was highlighted as a sign of the moral decay of youth. This fear of youth subculture led non-normative adolescent rock fans to be vilified as satanic. According to Falkof, the scare was an ideological tool for repressing dissent and creating the ‘other’ in a transitional society.

Israel, like South Africa, has also had its spell of satanic panic. Cavaglioni and Selashayovitz (2005) examined the discourse on satanic activities in Israel by conducting a textual analysis of 63 local newspaper articles. In a typical signification spiral, the press greatly exaggerated the number of members and pervasiveness of the “satanic cult.” Youth from respectable middle-class homes, seen as the future of society, were said to be participating in seditious monstrous activities that threatened morality. This, according to the authors, signified anxiety about moral boundaries that seemed to be shifting due to a perceived lack of control over modern youth. Stories portrayed satanic groups in a moralistic manner. They were also linked to scenes of dark, abandoned places, which the authors state is symbolic of urban decay (see Analysis for examples of such images in Lebanon’s media). Heavy metal was, as usual, singled out as a main culprit. The authors attribute the lack of any serious consequences of the panic mostly to the lack of the devil as a paranoid theme in the Jewish religion and culture.

The problem of Satan, according to Levine (2009), begins with Christianity’s use of the image of Satan to enforce discipline and normative boundaries and control against potentially dissenting populations, such as in witch-trials and the Inquisition (p. 566). Building on Christianity, Islam hails Satan (*Ar. al-Shaytan*) as evil, a constant threat whispering temptations to goad us away from a righteous path (Levine, 2009). The casual apposition of Satanism with paganism and insidious influence in the media discourse in Lebanon is a regional twist to the Western satanic panic.

Since the 1990s, Lebanon and several countries in the Middle East and the Muslim world – including Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, and Iran – have exhibited satanic panics and subsequent state crackdowns on the heavy metal community. Levine (2009) analyzed the experience of and response to heavy metal in these countries, situating it in the concept of Satan in the three dominant Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. For the

latter two, Christianity and Islam, Satan is a corruptive threat, and heavy metal has largely been associated with that threat. Yet heavy metal is also a cultural resource, which allows youth to “criticize the status quo” in a part of the world that has endured “war, violence, lack of democracy, and underdevelopment” (Levine, 2009, p. 570). The notable youth bulge across the Muslim world and growing fears of youth westernization and secularization, may explain why authorities would fear and target heavy metal (Levine, 2009).

Further to the East, the satanic/ heavy metal scare has also reared its horns. Liew and Fu (2006) studied the metal-related panics of Singapore and Malaysia in relation to the socio-political contexts of each country. In Singapore, although there were certain state and media reactions to heavy metal style in the few decades before the 90’s, such as the outlawing of long hair for males, the censorship and banning of rock bands, and the requirement for metal concerts to receive police approval, in the late 1990’s the state apparatuses began to ease their control on the music and subculture as the government of Singapore attempted to promote a modern, secular, and cosmopolitan identity. Only 30 percent of the population in Singapore was Christian and Muslim during that time, which also added to the lack of a foothold for the satanic panic. The mainly anti-Christian and euro-centric message of most rock bands did not have cultural resonance as deviance or anti-religious in the mostly non-Abrahamic society. Grievances were frequently related to the volume at which the youth played their music.

The case in Malaysia manifested in a different manner, exemplifying how social context can affect the creation, maintenance and diffusion of a moral panic. Beginning in the 1970’s with the resurgence of Islam globally, Malaysian Islamic parties and religious authorities pronounced Western forms of music as forbidden (Ar. *haram*) and enforced bans on some of the music they believed could challenge the traditional values they were championing. In 2001, news and tabloid reports surfaced of black metal fans burning the

Qur'an and circulating anti-religious and blasphemous texts, precipitating a public outcry.

This led to the involvement of repressive state apparatuses:

Shortly after the reports, youths began to find themselves as the target of social surveillance both by the state law enforcement agencies as well as religious authorities. In the months that ensued, police raids were conducted on shopping centers and schools, with an estimated 700 youths detained and questioned for alleged criminal activity relating to religious desecration, devil worship, drug use and promiscuous behaviour. 4000 magazines, 180 videocassettes and 68 CDs were confiscated from shops in a five-day operation (Time Magazine, 2001). In schools, students were strip-searched for Black Metal tattoos and forced to surrender 'metal'-music related articles. (sic) (Liew and Fu, 2006, p. 106)

The explanation given for the satanic cult in Malaysian media was of "certain Muslims willing to be used by Satan or the devil to the point that they deliberately commit heinous and cruel crimes" (New Straits Times, 2001 as cited in Liew and Fu, 2006, p. 106). This satanic panic stems from a local, Muslim understanding of Satan, one that was not imported from America and Europe. Nevertheless, the pattern is still similar: claims makers and authorities rush to the media to disparage the Western influence and uphold the morality of the youth.

Scholarship on moral panics has been seen from a number of regions in the world, but as mentioned by Liew and Fu (2006), much of the research is still limited to Europe and the United States, with limited discussion on moral panics and their relationship to contemporary Asian culture. This academic discussion "is crucial for postcolonial societies struggling to reconcile with the destabilizing effects of rapid modernization and industrialization. With the disruptive demographic displacements caused by migrations and urbanization, new social and cultural networks and references have emerged" (p. 101).

Youth subcultures make up some of these networks, and whether it is the rap or gothic subculture in either Singapore or in Lebanon, these modern youth are taking many cultural references from the Western media (Levine, 2009; Liew and Fu, 2006). In a country and region where media representation, identity formation, and the cultural aspects of the media are severely understudied, cultural media research such as this study, is in short supply, and is necessary in today's largely mediated society and Western-dominated academic discourse.

In addition, few studies have shed light on the folk devils (the subjects of the moral panic); instead the models are usually used to describe media discourse and representation of the folk devils, as well as the interaction with state apparatuses (Griffiths, 2010). While this study primarily dealt with the mass media discourse I also attended to the folk devil's response and how they can organize to fight stereotypical and fear inciting media discourse.

## **Theorizing the Moral Panic**

### **Moral Order and the Media**

The mass media are among the greatest influences on public consciousness regarding a number of issues (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, & Roberts, 1978), especially those to which the public has no direct access (Cohen, 1973). The concept of moral panic has been used by Hall et al. (1978) to underline how the media can transmit hegemony and ideology that favors or lends "legitimacy to a 'more than usual' exercise of control" by the state (p. 42). This means that events are signified in an ideological manner that heightens their perceived threat in what Hall et al. have described as a *signification spiral*. One central mechanism of this spiral is *convergence*, in which activities are signified as corresponding to one another, in this example heavy metal and devil worship. The imagery of Satanism is juxtaposed with that of heavy metal to give the latter a problem context within which to be

understood, while mystifying it by overstating this convergence and constructing an inauthentic identity of the deviant. The escalatory part of this ideology comes from a focus that is limited to the threatening aspect of the folk devil, and it functions to justify a heavier “coercive reaction by both the public and the state” (p. 46).

In Smith’s (2009) work on the rhetoric of fear, identity and metal music culture, he states that in times of crisis, whether social, political, or cultural, scapegoats are pointed out through a “rhetoric of fear” allowing blame to be absorbed by an entity outside of the original crisis (p. 17). Lebanon is a country rife with crises, whether the rising price of petrol, union strikes, political conflict, corruption, and much more. Episodes tend to co-occur with national issues, which authorities would prefer are kept out of national debate.

The veiled connotation of these discourses, for Victor (1993), embodies the objection that “the moral order of our society is being threatened by mysterious and powerful evil forces, and we are losing faith in the ability of our institutions and authorities to deal with the threat” (p. 54). Markson (1990) states that rock music (which here includes hard rock, heavy metal, gothic metal, etc.) is defined as a threatening social problem in a political process. Crucial to this process are the “cognitive structures” we use to “receive and process information” in order to understand the world around us. Those who are dominant in society secure power by prompting a certain understanding of the social world; to do this, cultural production must be kept in check and a crusade led against those who deviate from or resist the mainstream (p. 32). Markson (1990) maintains that rock music is symbolic of youth resistance to the mainstream and to authority; accordingly it is often made a scapegoat for criticism of the younger generation. Those who make claims against rock music and culture construct it as a social problem using moral terms, thus implying that once the deviance is eradicated normative boundaries will be restored (Markson, 1990; Williams, 2011). Rock, in its imagery and style, is still an easy target for this type of moral regulation today.



## **Youth, Subculture, and Alternative Style**

The ‘othering’ of subcultures in official or quasi-official discourse is far from new. Hebdige (1983), a pioneer in the study of subcultures, states that those othered in Victorian times, the “undeserving poor” and the “criminal classes,” came to be replaced by subcultures such as the skinheads, the rastas, and the punks, among others. In Elizabethan England discourses on the “youth problem” abounded, rendering subcultures into a spectacle for the horrified, interested, and concerned ‘proper folk.’ Experts and media institutions, such as the BBC, were quick to denounce youth subcultures as dangerous to the “British way of life” (p. 74-78). The imagery displayed by certain subcultures (such as the mods, punks, and rockers) allowed the average citizen to put a face on crime and direct a “compassionate and punitive gaze” toward these lost souls. As Hebdige states, “These are the people we wouldn’t dare to stare at in the street. These are the signs of our times” (p. 77). The youth is constructed as a problem of the times, of urbanization, of Americanization, of poverty. It is this understanding of subculture, largely beholden to Foucault, which is applied in this study.

In Hebdige’s classic 1983 work on subculture “Posing threats...striking poses: Youth surveillance and display” he lays down three propositions, still relevant today, by which to understand subculture. The first is that the “youth” are only acknowledged when considered “a problem.” When youth display a rebellious attitude, “challenge the symbolic order,” or act in a non-normative fashion, “they get talked about, taken seriously, their grievances are acted upon. They get arrested, harassed, arraigned before the courts. They get interrogated, interviewed, photographed, admonished, disciplined, incarcerated, applauded, punished, vilified, emulated, listened to... They get noticed” (p. 85). They become the subjects of a discourse emanating from the media, law enforcement, schools, and other state apparatuses.

Over the past three decades in Lebanon, the gothic, metal, and punk youth have been noticed in this fashion by the relevant authorities: the law, media, clergy, and others. As

mentioned above, many young men and women have been arrested, interrogated, humiliated, and often verbally and physically abused. In schools and chapels, teachers, preachers, and even other teens, after seeing devil worshippers on TV, warned each other and gave the same treatment to students who were part of these subcultures, or looked like they were.

The news and evening talk shows hosted and spread the scare of “devil worshippers.” On the news we saw young men bound, with their faces covered, and a table on which their supposedly Satanic paraphernalia was spread out; these included rock CDs, printed out pictures of gothic and fantasy art, T-shirts, accessories with pagan and gothic symbols, and other items. Police were interviewed, as was the Minister of the Interior (Elias El-Murr), concerts were raided, and speculations made. On the evening talk shows, ‘experts’ were brought in to analyze the situation: priests, sheikhs, police officers, and also youth and musicians belonging to the subcultures, as well as alleged ex-satanists; the latter two are far from applauded though. A good deal of the conversation surrounded the clothing and hairstyle choices of the youth; the audience was told what the danger signs are: dark clothes, loud music, distance, rebellion, a refusal to go to church or religious places; parents and educators were put on guard (see analysis for further discussion).

Hebdige’s second proposition is that this form of youth rebelliousness stems from the power structures in place. In other words, this display by youth is the only exercise of power they can muster to resist the dominant power structures. Shocking others and making them uncomfortable is a form of resistance or negotiation for these youth, one that is carried out symbolically and largely through consumption. Many of the non-normative youth in Lebanon basked in this attention. The panic also spread the word that this was something to be feared, something against social norms, giving youth who wanted to make an anti-social statement, or to stand out from the crowd, the idea of how to do so. It was not long before jewelry, accessory and clothing stores who catered to this growing sub-culture began to pop up, stores

with names such as “Metallica” and “House on Mars.” Virgin Megastore was also quick to capitalize on the growing market, being one of the rare places to find the loud and hard music that these youth craved, from Marilyn Manson to Anathema, and even opening a tattoo and piercing shop inside the store: “American Body Art.”

Hebdige’s third proposition somewhat refines the second and brings us back to Foucault: Youth subculture is not a simple negation of the dominant culture, “it is both a declaration of independence, of Otherness, of alien intent, a refusal of anonymity, of subordinate status. It is an *insubordination*. And at the same time it is also a confirmation of the fact of powerlessness, a celebration of impotence” [emphasis in original] (p.87). Some of the youth in Lebanon taking part in goth, metal, and punk subcultures may have dabbled in some teenage witchcraft, or even formed Satanic covens or houses; however there was never evidence of any serious crimes, graves actually being dug up, or of any of the polyamorous orgies referred to in talk shows. Smith (2009) refers to this as the “snowball effect” (p. 96). Typical of a moral panic, the snowball effect is characterized by periods in which mediation on Satanists causes more mediation, producing the belief that there is a problem, although there is no support for the claims outside of the discourse itself.

Young boys and girls, in Lebanon and other countries, that take part in the sub-culture of metal and other forms of rock music, and even other subcultures, are attempting to display their difference, their rejection of society’s normative boundaries; they want to shock, to be insubordinate (and it is precisely this that elicits the panic reaction from the relevant moral boundary upholders). However, the means for the youth to do this are confined largely to their shopping choices; the CDs, band t-shirts, studded leather accessories, and their choice of bars and concerts. As Foucault so incisively recognized, their resistance is not possible without the system they are rebelling against.

According to Hebdige (1983), the unconventional dress of youth subcultures relays a need for self-expression and the articulation of a unique identity, one that is carried out through cultural appropriation, consumption, and display, display being a central concern. These youth seek to take control of the only things they can: how they dress and what they do for fun. State apparatuses, however, do recognize this as resistance and act to suppress it.

In a noteworthy study that hoped to lend a voice to teenage Satanists, Lowney (1995) wanted to understand a young coven of Satanists. She recognized these teens as resisting and critiquing the dominant culture. Lowney made several strong arguments, pointing out that those who proclaim Satanism a threat tend to be clergy, ex-Satanists, and members of the psychiatric community. These claims makers are heavily featured in media programs on Satanism, and tend to see Satanism as dangerous to the people who practice it, and to others in society, predominantly children. The reason often attributed to the scourge of Satanism is the dissolution of morality and family values in today's society, which can affect vulnerable and predisposed youth. In Lebanon, the claims makers and their arguments tend to be largely similar. As in many other countries, including the US, law enforcement could be added to the list. Another point Lowney made is that in the history and literature of Satanism, members or adherents are generally adults. The thrill-seeking actions of youth tend to be misperceived by the relevant state apparatuses in what Ellis (1991) termed the "legend trip."

Lowney's de-alienating article gave a voice to members of part of this subculture and positioned the "teenage Satanists as *social critics* of the dominant culture" (p. 456). The young Satanists in Lowney's study inverted the dominant culture of their hometown and acknowledged the sense of power that dressing anti-normatively and shocking the "good" Christian townsfolk gave them. Ultimately they knew they could never change the culture of their town and still frequented the mall to obtain their 'sub-culture gear' and music. After the mall closed on Friday nights they would attend Sabbats (secret ritualistic meetings) in the

woods and by abandoned bridges to spend time in each other's company, perform small rituals, listen to rock, and criticize the town's Christian and "superficial" way of life. Their style represented the contradictions they faced in their society and acted as an "imaginary solution" to the shared experience of those contradictions (Grossberg, 1984).

Hebdige later revisits subculture in his 2012 essay: "Contemporizing 'Subculture': 30 Years to Life," in which he compares the socio-political, economical, media, art, and academic situation of the late 1970's to the current day. He states that in the rise of the prevailing, connected, global commodity economy, punk subculture has been stabilized into permanence "as a fashion (or anti-fashion) statement, as a (marginally) marketable music genre, Halloween costume cliché, casual leisure option and hardcore secessionist lifestyle choice" (p. 411). This is extendable to many subcultures, heavy metal and rock among them.

The rock, metal, and goth subcultures have taken the place of the punks, and before them the mods and rockers, as the most prominent subjects of youth-centered moral panic. According to Smith (2009), metal has long been targeted and constructed as threatening; there has been "a normalization of non-metal and a focused subjugation of metal as a deviant style and culture" (p. 12). For him, satanic panics are largely tied to Christianity, and the binaries that it ascribes to, binaries that are often inverted and challenged by metal music and culture. The confrontation between rock and Christianity as an institution is far from new. From the 1970's bands, such as Black Sabbath, have appropriated religious and political symbols and inverted them or given them new meanings. Anton La Vey, founder of the Church of Satan and self-publicist, was also known to invert the symbols of Christianity.

The rhetoric of fear and evil surrounding metal culture that originated in America makes metal a scapegoat for crimes that are difficult for people to understand (Smith, 2009), such as a teen suicide or the desecration of a grave. In a moral panic, claims that are superstitious at best are given credence to account for the threat of a secretive teen world

“where violence, sex, gangs, drugs, and the occult combine” (p. 106). The public discourse on metal has defined the music, musicians, and fans as deviant; the symbols of the genre have become charged with these constructed identities, and the bands and youth have also recognized the power of these symbols to inspire fear (Smith, 2009). In Lebanon, this has resulted in crackdowns on metal concerts or the arrest of youth that fit the profile of what the media say a Satanist is supposed to look like: a metal or rock fan.

Many similarities can be drawn between the UK’s and the USA’s responses to the punks, mods, and rockers in the 1950s and 1960s (see Cohen, 1973 and Hebdige, 1983) and contemporary reactions to heavy metal and gothic culture. These subcultures and the music they have grown from and with, all in the family of rock, share symbols and clothing displays. This dark sense of style includes elements such as heavy boots, fishnets, unnatural colors for hair combed or shaved in odd styles, painted nails for women and men, piercings, tattoos, and gothic, vampiric, and gory imagery of skulls, satanic and even borrowed pagan symbology, emblazoned on surfaces from T-shirts to pencils. This devilish and deathlike imagery evokes and displays the darker, usually hidden, violent and sexual sides of humanity, ones outside the moral boundaries expected of “good” citizens. And as the subcultures share these images and self representation, they share the same form of surveillance and vilification by the claims makers, the upholders of social morality, the punishers of deviance, and the taste-dictators: the social scientists, the priests, the law, and the media.

For the past few decades in a world of consumer logic, rising self-awareness, uniformity, and mass-produced fashion, expression and distinction have become largely connected to style (Hebdige, 1983). Women especially have greater concerns when related to style, as a woman’s style of dress, make up, hair, nails, even her choice of drink may speak volumes about her sexual proclivity (Hebdige, 1983). Whilst subcultures tend to be more

male-centered, women and adolescent girls who display the subculture style are perceived as more outrageous, as Hebdige (1983) noted of punk girls

playing with themselves in public, puncturing, distending, parodying the conventional iconography of fallen womanhood - the vamp, the prostitute, the slut, the waif, the stray, the sadistic mistress, the victim-in-bondage. Punk girls interrupting the flow of images, in a spirit of irony inverting consensual definitions of attractiveness and desirability, playing back images of women as icons, women as the furies of classical mythology. In punk, girls played with the forbidden iconographies of menstruation and female desire. Punk propelled girls onto the stage and once there, as musicians and singers, they systematically transgressed the codes governing female performance. (p. 83)

This is not lost in media discourse on ‘Satanists’ in Lebanon. Girls in the subculture are more cause for concern; their exposure to non-normative sexual behavior is seen as a larger threat than it is for their male counterparts. While subcultures may allow women space to express issues that are usually hushed in the mainstream, both genders are still unable to transgress the capitalist power structures in which they are both oppressed and created.

The goth or metal head subcultures are not the only youth subcultures, which in the past few decades, have been targeted as folk devils or been the subjects of moral panic around the world. Rap music and the subculture surrounding it have also been subject to fear and censorship. Both metal and rap are typically accused of causing moral decay, usually among youth; however discourse on rap is more likely to focus on gang violence and misogyny than on Satanism, evil, and ritualized or self-inflicted violence (Lynxwiler & Gay, 2000). The fact that moral panics continue to arise around youth subcultures “reveals a deeper social anxiety towards the fear of erosion of landmarks and icons of traditional

society” (Liew and Fu, 2006, p.101). Satanic panics have taken a number of forms around the world and have demonstrated the rhetoric of evil that can accompany this social anxiety.

### **Theorizing the Satanic Panic in Lebanese Media Texts**

In a consideration of how a moral panic transpires and folk devils are created, the media are of utmost importance (Cohen, 1973; Critcher, 2003; Hall et al. 1978). Cultural inclinations also play a part in the construction and manifestation of the phenomena in the media, as journalists are a part of the society to which they cater (Nötzold, 2009; Williams, 2011). As we have seen, moral panics are complex social phenomena with many aspects that must be studied in order for them to be understood or described properly. These include the media discourse, linguistic and visual representation, journalistic routines, culture, the audience, and the social, economic, historical, and political context. It is for this reason that no one theory can properly account for or explain all the aspects of moral panic.

The best place to start is with Cohen’s formative 1973 study, which introduced the analytical concept of the moral panic. Since, moral panics from around the globe have been studied, explained, and compared through a number of theoretical frameworks, without one specific framework or method typically used for moral panic research. The result is a varied and wide-ranging body of literature. Most commonly, scholars engage moral panics with cultural studies, subcultural theory, symbolic interaction, semiotics, framing, a politics of anxiety, and social psychology or cognition. This study espouses a theoretical approach that triangulates cultural studies, political economy, and CDA to explore issues of mass mediated discourse in its relation to culture, society, and power. The triangulation of these approaches and the dialectical interactions between them reduces some shortcomings in each and magnifies their exploratory power to cover:

- Ideological discourses that create and are created by their social and political context



- How the genre these discourses are presented in can produce unquestioned statements
- The biased and marginalizing representations of certain groups in the mass media and how they affect and reflect our cultural understanding of reality
- The moral regulation inherent in some dominant media messages and how this benefits powerful stakeholders in a society
- The suppression and restriction, economically, through censorship, or otherwise, of other representations by a hegemonic discourse that sustains the formations of power

The three approaches, political economy, cultural studies, and CDA, allow an explanation of the moral panic at three levels: the overarching political and economical distribution of power as well as hegemony, and the restriction and production of texts; the cultural creation and understanding of texts; and the meaning of the actual discourse in texts, respectively. Below I outline how the combination of ideas from political economy and cultural studies can help the analysis at each of the three levels. The theories behind CDA are approached in this chapter but will be further elaborated in the methodology section.

### **Economy, hegemony, ideology.**

Those with power in today's societies, the political and industrial elite, have the means to produce and distribute certain cultural commodities; they also have the means to limit others. To understand the structures of dominance and power relations in the Lebanese context, I refer to theories of political economy to help bring to light how the institutions of power and repressive and ideological state apparatuses work in a moral panic situation. The ideological discourse and meaning making in the mass media are largely decided by power relations, which are fundamentally dependent on economic and political considerations, and reflective of the social order. For political economists mass mediated texts are apparatuses through which ideology is spread (Garnham, 1995). According to Foucault (1978), whether

or not we ascribe to the ideology laid down in dominant discourses, the routines laid down by the dominant culture structure our existence.

To understand the discourses present in the cultural commodities we consume, and the way in which they create identities and moral boundaries, cultural studies will serve as a guide. By integrating cultural studies with political economy we can achieve a proficient contextual understanding, which is an essential component of a CDA. Cultural studies considers how messages or mediums interrelate with identity, politics, ideology, the power to spread messages and other meaning making forces. This perspective elucidates a moral panic by contributing to the understanding of how meaning is made through discourses present in media coverage, as well as by taking into consideration the relationship between those discourses and the cultural milieu and power dynamics of a society. This can help clarify the marginalization of certain groups (in this case the heavy metal/goth community) in a society and its media (e.g. Hall et al., 1978). A theoretical assumption shared by political economy and cultural studies is that a hegemonic ideology influences our experience of reality to maintain the status quo and structures of dominance (Williams, 2011). For both of these frameworks [a preferred] “cultural meaning is imposed upon the audience rather than [...] created by the audience” (Jhally, 1989, p. 72).

The purview of political economy is the manner in which the system reproduces itself; in recent history, this has mainly come to mean the capitalist system. For political economists, economy is the major determinant; with that in mind, structures of dominance and power are understood to create control and profit as well as disseminate ideology and produce consciousness. For the case of the Lebanese satanic panic, political economy helps to identify the political, economical, and social structures that contribute to the discourse. It also offers us the understanding of who has the power to produce mediated discourse and

disseminate it to a mass audience, and why certain subgroups, goth and heavy metal youth, are singled out as a cause for fear and concern.

Political economists, such as Mosco (2009), regard more behavioral approaches to media, such as uses and gratifications, as limited in accounting for causality. From this perspective, social life is a totality, constituted of unquantifiable and overlapping processes, which can only be uncovered through critical examination. These foci coincide with those of cultural studies; leading to certain disagreements, sometimes acrimonious, amid scholars in the respective schools, for example, Grossberg and Garnham in *Colloquy/Critical Studies of Mass Communication* (1995). However, this overlap has also been cause for authors, such as Grossberg (1984), Mosco (2009), and Williams (2011), to call for a fortification of their perspective with knowledge appropriated from the other, a view advanced in this paper.

Jhally (1989) set out to understand culture and society from a perspective of political economy, in which society is understood to oscillate between stability and change. For the powerful in capitalist societies, stability and the maintenance of the status quo is desirable. For the larger section of society, the wage earners, change is desirable. The ruling elite can forward an agenda of stability and regulation in two ways, or in a combination of both, which results in the reproduction of the system of dominance. The first is through violence, via Althusserian “repressive state apparatuses” (1971). The second, decidedly more common in capitalism, is via the consent of the masses (Garnham, 1979). The power of the elites in a society manifests in different ways to maintain itself via their access to “scarce social resources, such as force, money, status, fame, knowledge, information, ‘culture,’ or indeed various forms of public discourse and communication” (Van Dijk, 2001, p. 355).

Gramsci (1971) outlined this “hegemony” describing how dominated groups, and others, may accept and internalize the norms, boundaries, laws, practices, and morality of the dominant class, finding them to be “natural.” Following from this, the ideas and people who

oppose the mores of the dominant elites are unnatural; a theme that consistently emerges in Satanic panic discourse. Society, including journalists, editors, teachers, parents, police officers, and other proselytizers of 'culture' all add to this denaturalizing and marginalizing of an other in order to uphold the ideology and moral boundaries of the dominant culture, which in turn reproduces the structures of power that they have been born into.

According to Jhally (1989), the mass of society must be misled into considering themselves free for the system to reproduce, and one of the most of important agents of misleading the public and naturalizing dominant ideology is indubitably the media: "far from providing a free marketplace of ideas [the media] work to legitimate the existing distribution of power by controlling the context within which people think and define social problems and their possible solutions" (p.67).

Political economy perceives culture as structural; a consciousness industry exists to maintain the capitalist economy and the social status quo, ultimately producing stability for the elite. The theory falls short however by not addressing how it is that the media, as a consciousness industry, produce culture (Jhally 1989, p. 70). For Mosco (2009), political economy considers reality as neither completely objective nor completely socially constructed (p. 1). Our social reality comes from different sources; one of the most important of these is the media. In this study, the elite-owned dominant media are understood as integral to the social construction of deviant youth as a problem, as they served as the most substantial source of information on 'Satanists' for the Lebanese public. Silverblatt (2004) maintains that the media, as social institutions, have the capability and influence to produce social reality and a culture that sustains and reproduces the system. This has implications for deviant subgroups that represent youth resistance to this system.

For a study of moral panics, specifically one that uses CDA, political economy can enhance cultural studies with its more historical and pragmatic approach and interpretation of

society as a totality. Another way political economy adds to the discussion, and compensates for one shortcoming of cultural studies, is the analysis of media as institutions, which has proven essential for understanding corporate control of content and the processes involved in creating the media texts under scrutiny. Political economy itself, however falls short of describing certain issues useful to moral panic research, including meaning making, discourse formation, and resistance and cultural production by those outside the elite (Mosco, 2009).

Political economy explains why the elite-owned media would mass mediate a demonic portrayal of deviants and how they have the power to transmit a hegemonic message. Subcultural youth (such as Lebanese metal and rock fans) are often given folk devil status in the dominant media, whether state or privately owned, which leads to their marginalization, and in many cases their abuse or harm (Williams, 2011). With regards to the particular texts that produce this marginalization, political economy does not offer much; a more textual outlook, such as cultural studies, or a specific discourse dissecting method, such as CDA, is better suited to the study of moral panic discourse.

### **Media, Cultural Production, and Dominance**

Contrasting himself from the general position of political economists, Grossberg (1995) maintains that cultural studies goes further than class and power structures (as opposed to political economy) in its explanation of the different social formations and dominance reproducing structures, which he understands as more nuanced, more culturally aware, and more attentive to globalization. Essentially, Grossberg recognizes the significance of culture in determining social relations that are not sufficiently understood with the economically deterministic focus on elites, commodity, and labor. By combining power structures as understood by political economy and a cultural understanding of non-normative

youth and discourse formation in Lebanon, this analysis of moral panic discourse can be contextually supported.

Grossberg (1995) agrees with other cultural studies scholars, who affirm that alternative viewpoints do exist in culture and are transmitted in some circles, although largely overshadowed by the dominant discourse. “Cultural studies emphasizes the complexity and contradictions, not only within culture, but in the relations between people, culture, and power” (Grossberg, 1995, p.76).

Stuart Hall, the most prominent of cultural studies scholars, has made a substantial contribution to the work on moral panics. From the viewpoint of cultural studies, moral panics serve as a form of moral regulation. This happens when the public perceives someone or something as panic inciting. Once the fear is created, this then leads the public to support more restrictions – moral, legal, or violent – towards the folk devil. Culture is the sphere or the element in which social reality and meaning is constructed and transmitted. The frequently cited 1978 Hall et al. study on the panic surrounding mugging has become an essential text in the cultural discussion of moral panics.

For Hall (1974), although production (the structure of the communication industry and journalistic routines) is essential to the “communitive process,” specifically in initiating it, the encoding and decoding of the message is the subject that deserves most of our attention. Hall appears to dismiss the effect of production on the message itself and includes production and reception in a whole social process. Political economists, on the other hand, approach the press as a “cultural industry.” For them, the output of the media is a commodity, rather than a text, and is determined largely through economic considerations instead of cultural ones as in cultural studies. Schiller (1989) understands the newscast as a commodity that has an ideological function. It transmits values conducive to maintaining the status quo and concealing capitalist power structures by providing “spectaculars” for the commodity

audience. For political economists, such as Meehan (2002), cultural scholars have a “blind spot” with regards to “political economy and political action,” and rely too heavily on decoding mediated messages to uncover elite ideology.

To remedy this, cultural studies thinkers make the distinction between cultural and economic levels for media texts (Meehan, 2002), thus accounting for the economic while still retaining a focus on the cultural. In cultural studies the commodity audience does not necessarily exist. For research into discourse, representation, and the reactions they elicit, the concept of the commodity audience is mostly ineffectual (Meehan, 2002, p. 314). This is especially relevant in societies, such as Lebanon, which have not become infected with a “generic capitalism.” For this study the cultural construction of deviance and moral boundary setting in Lebanese media texts are paramount, and there was no need to assume a commodity audience. In a more functional approach to political economy, as propounded by authors such as Grossberg (1984), Jhally (1989), and Critcher (2011), culture is brought into the purview of the theory. Political economy is more conducive to elucidating the context in which the satanic panic is birthed, rather than to explaining specific cases. However the economic, political, and social context is essential to understanding a moral panic and to conducting a *critical* discourse analysis.

Usually, a few political actors model a discursive environment that produces ideological and hegemonic social constructions (Reese, 2010); as discussed above, in Lebanon this is very much the case. Political economy highlights the importance of the structures of ownership, routine practices, and distribution power of the dominant media that greatly helps to reproduce the ideology of the ruling elite and keep them in power (e.g. Schiller, 1989; Barker, 1989). As discussed in the introduction, media ownership in Lebanon is apportioned almost solely to the leaders and leading families of the largest and richest

political actors. A typical media institution in Lebanon “operates as a voice for a political or sectarian faction, reinforcing and encouraging divisions in society” (Dajani, 2013, p. 1).

In her comprehensive mixed method study of Lebanese television institutions, Nötzold (2009) described the way in which the stations, reporters, the political scene and conditions of post-war society converge to create the Lebanese television landscape. She found that the overwhelming focus of Lebanese media coverage (pre-2006) was on the political elite; marginal groups were among those denied a voice. This is consistent with Entman (2010), who states that media professionals usually privilege the voices of the elite, while other voices are usually stifled. Further, many studies have shown that opinion formation can be considerably shaped by partiality in news reports (Brewer & Gross, 2010). In studying any media messages it would be unwise to overlook the connection between the power to create and disseminate a message to a mass audience and the actual message itself.

### **Television Discourse, Morality, Exclusion**

To engage these texts, perspectives from cultural studies and CDA are preferred to those of political economy, which, as mentioned, is not suitable for work with individual texts; the exception is the political economic understanding of the rhetoric of fear (discussed in more detail below). Cultural scholars, such as Hall, focus on the connotation of media messages, the cultural codes in a text that bear meaning and ideologies, as well as convey and transmit the power dynamic. When a text is produced, it is encoded and signified through genre, narrative, and linguistic structures, which call for a particular “dominant” or “preferred” decoding of that text (Hall, 1974). An assumption of cultural studies, and other text analytic approaches, such as CDA, is that the text produces experience and structure in the social world. For example, Hall et al. (1978) assert that the media are an integral source



of public consciousness and opinion on a number of matters, especially those that are foreign or unknown to a majority of the public (Cohen, 1973), such as metal culture.

Scholars working within political economy, cultural studies, and CDA assume that the audience will accept the message and therefore do not attend to their actual reactions. Stabile (2001) criticizes Hall et al. (1978) for assuming that if a moral panic is thriving in the press it must have taken hold with the public. However, evaluating audience reactions on a mass scale is beyond the scope of this paper; moreover, opinion polls are far from common in Lebanon, and there is no official polling authority from which credible information can be retrieved. In the case of Lebanon, it is not a risky assumption to make that the Lebanese public's perception of the black-clad youth was fashioned by dominant discourses. According to Brewer and Gross (2010), much research has shown that bias in the news can have a significant effect on the process in which opinions are formed. For most of the public, who did not have access to the relatively new metal or goth cultures, the mass media were the only source of information on the *'abbadat shayateen* (En. devil worshippers), the label used liberally by media institutions, the clergy, the security forces, and transmitted to the public.

The discursive representation of the heavy metal community in Lebanese mass media helped to produce a dominant social construction of this subgroup as fear inciting. Religious and sectarian identity was identified as an integral part of several realms of Lebanese daily life, including politics and journalist employment in media institutions (Nötzold, 2009). As discussed above, the imagery of metal and goth culture tends to clash with the ideals of followers of Christianity and Islam. The illustration of news events in Lebanon significantly corresponds to the political discourse of the powerful gatekeepers (i.e. news editors and elite owners), and the frames used by Lebanese reporters are guided by “a mind-set influenced by their social, religious, and ethnic background” (p. 328).

The rhetoric and “culture of fear” is a concept borrowed from political economy and developed by Critcher (2011), who stresses its value for understanding moral panics. The mass media produces and transmits texts that have the function of disguising the realities of dominance in societies and help to reproduce the social order creating “false consciousness.” In a rhetoric of fear, a subject is identified and vilified through a culturally evocative “problem frame” (Critcher, 2011). It also makes for a more spectacular commodity.

### **Approaching the Texts**

After applying the economic and cultural understanding of the texts from political economy and cultural studies, I utilized both the theories of CDA and cultural studies to explore the ideological frames present in the media and how they are spawned from social contexts that award them cultural resonance. The focus here is how a reality genre can create credibility and acceptance for biased portrayals that influence social understanding and ideology (Williams, 2011) and how youth sub-cultures are marginalized by mass messages that also regulate normative boundaries (Cohen, 1973; Hall et al., 1978).

Before moving on, it is important to note that by triangulating CDA with political economy and cultural studies I am able to fulfill one of its requirements and address two of its shortcomings. Cultural studies allows for the required understanding of the cultural and social context in which any media text is produced, and which the text helps to produce. Political economy elucidates the effects that media production and structures of ownership can have on a text and the possible effects that texts can have on the consciousness of an audience, both areas CDA has been criticized for not attending to (Machin & Mayr, 2012).

CDA is not an established theoretical approach but is rather a body of work with different approaches with a specific set of assumptions and questions, based in sociolinguistics, semiotics, discourse analysis, and the works of the Frankfurt School

(Titscher, Meyer, Wodak, & Vetter, 2000; Machin & Mayr, 2012). What is important to CDA is the way in which power and “social and cultural processes and structures” are signified and negotiated through language and symbols (whether textual or visual). Language, as a social practice, can serve to advance and naturalize certain ideologies through specific linguistic choices; it “both *shapes* and *is shaped* by society” [emphasis in original] (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p. 4). Using methods of linguistic analysis CDA scrutinizes a text for its underlying assumptions and ideology, which the goal is to expose and denaturalize.

It is advantageous to combine the methodological approach of CDA with cultural studies as it can lend “the understanding, skills and tools by which we can demonstrate the place of language in the construction, constitution and regulation of the social world” (Barker & Galasiński, 2001, p. 1). CDA attends to one shortcoming of cultural studies research that usually does not offer an explanation or evidence for the way in which culture is discursively constructed. The linguistic and semiotic insights of CDA can support our understanding of the ideology, frames, and modes of discourse found in a text (Barker & Galasiński, 2001).

Another issue that warranted attention is the reaction of heavy metal fans to their marginalization during the latest Lebanese satanic panic of 2012 on social media outlets, which then prompted an assuaging response from several local mass media outlets. According to Griffiths (2010), the response of a demonized subgroup to their marginalization is a topic that has been neglected in much of the moral panic literature.<sup>9</sup> He advances a model of folk devil reactions distinguishing between private and public reactions and their various sentiments that was used in this paper. Private reactions refer to communication among the subgroup, and public reactions to refer to communication directed at society at large or the media; for example members of the metal community trying to voice their opinions to an audience during a call-in or interview on a talk show. On several of the programs analyzed

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<sup>9</sup> The increasing popularity of social media platforms and their use by such groups may lead to more academic discussion on folk devil reactions.

for this study, there are call-ins or guests who try to debunk the myths and fear surrounding metal and rock.

The Lebanese satanic panic has recurred for over a decade with the stereotypical coverage of rock, metal, and goth music and the subcultures surrounding them. Although most scholars in the field tend to stick to one particular form of music subculture such as goth metal, or black metal, I believe this largely limits the analysis and does not correspond to media coverage that does not discriminate among the different genres.

As we shall see, the Lebanese case corresponds largely to the Critcher/Cohen processual model of the moral panic. Critcher (2003) provides the model for moral panics that will be used to determine whether the Lebanese discourse does indeed fit the moral panic criteria. He builds on the two most prominent works on moral panics, that of Cohen (1973) and of Hall et al. (1978), to provide a seven-stage, nonlinear model for moral panics. The model is built from the repeatedly quoted opening passage of Cohen's (1973) "Folk Devils and Moral Panics." Each of the stages is "loosely defined" and the process is not necessarily linear; if problems occur at any stage the "moral panic may fail." Critcher (2003) provides guiding questions to see if the model fits different case studies, such as,

Why and in what ways is [the problem] perceived as a threat to the moral or social order? ... Who are the significant moral entrepreneurs, whether groups or individuals? Do they lead, follow, or operate alongside the media? ... What solutions are advocated and by whom? (p. 17-18)

The first stage of the moral panic is emergence; the folk devil is constructed as threatening to social and moral values. The second stage is media inventory. Here we consider the stereotypes and strategies presented in the mass media, such as symbolization, exaggeration/distortion, and prediction. The third is moral entrepreneurs: Individuals and groups step in, offering explanations of the cause of deviance and the solutions; they create

images of the folk devil, and provide orientation to the public on the issue. In his opening paragraph Cohen (1973), in jest, calls these “right-thinking people.” The fourth is ‘experts’, where self-proclaimed and media-made experts offer claims, prognoses, and solutions. The fifth stage is the coping resolutions, where effective and/or symbolic measures are brought to the fore, such as legal changes or proposed ways of dealing with the folk devil. The sixth is fade away, in which the concern begins to wane; less coverage is accorded to the “threat.” The seventh and final stage is the legacy, the remnants and effects of the moral panic on society and law (Cricher, 2003, p. 17-19).

This study analyzed the way in which the dominant Lebanese media contribute to a moral panic and represent non-normative youth. This research is important for an understanding of the moralistic tendencies and normative cultural constructions of the Lebanese media, which may be directed at any number of deviant subgroups now and in the future, such as the gay and transgender communities or new-age hippies. It also allows an understanding of how us/them divisions are discursively erected in a society that suffers greatly from such divisions, usually sectarian or regional. This study also offers the possibility for scholars to compare the Lebanese case with other moral panics in other regions of the world, as well as to demonstrate the application of theoretical approaches, originating in the West, in contexts with different social, religious, economic, and political arrangements.

## **Research Objectives**

This media discourse on the panic and the frames used to portray were analyzed to understand how panic in the media can act as regulation of deviance in a particular context. According to Wodak (2001) discourse analysts should ask certain questions pertaining to five discursive strategies that are tied to the following: linguistics and labeling, attribution, argumentation schemes, perspective, explicitness and intensity (p. 72-73). Accordingly, this

study was organized around answering the following questions to understand how Lebanese TV news and socio-political programs frame metal and subcultural youth.

- What are the terms used to name or label the phenomena of Satanism, deviant youth, subcultural music and events? This question relates to the lexical and semiotic choices for connotative labels in the texts.
- What attributes, characteristics, actions, and values are assigned to members of the subculture and the music scene? This research question belongs to the textual and intertextual levels of analysis and addresses what is said about heavy metal and satanic youth, how they are described and framed in the discourse, and where these images come from.
- What arguments are used to vindicate the marginalization and regulation of heavy metal fans and their concerts? Here claims made against the music, subculture, and Satanism were examined. This includes a consideration of the persons who appear in the television segments analyzed and the different status given to each, the claims makers and ‘experts’, the reporter or television host, as well as guests and call ins. The arguments offered by each of these figures will be assessed, as will the suggestions for dealing with the subculture.
- To what extent is the threat of this subculture amplified and exaggerated by using a rhetoric of fear or a threatening signification spiral. Here the question that was posed to the texts relates to whether metal, rock and the subculture that surrounds them are constructed as a threat or a dangerous social problem or in a panic-inciting manner.
- What are the ideologies or understandings of the world that are embedded in the discourse and promoted by it, and how do they benefit the existing social order? This question addressed the perspectives presented in the media discourse as a whole and

how it is related to the larger social, historical, religious, political, and economical context in which the texts were produced and which they help to (re)produce.

- What was the reaction of the subculture to the coverage and how did the media respond? Here I looked at how metal musicians and fans stood against their depiction in the media and what implications it had for media coverage.

## **Method**

### **Corpus**

The corpus analyzed consisted of two news reports and two episodes of sociopolitical programs dealing with the subject of “devil worshippers” or heavy metal in Lebanon. Both of the news reports and one of the sociopolitical program episodes were created during the latest occurrence of the media panic in November of 2012. The second of the news reports on the satanic panic analyzed in this thesis challenges the usual discourse and followed the protests of Lebanese metal and rock fans. The first three texts will be analyzed together, whereas the second news report (LBCI) will be analyzed in lieu of the discourses found in those more traditional media texts and the response of the folk devil.

According to Machin and Mayr (2012), the usual practice in CDA is for the researcher to choose the texts (usually a very small sample consisting of only a few texts) according to his or her interest or the observation of “ideology in operation” (p. 207). Television segments, rather than newspaper stories or radio segments, were chosen for analysis due to several factors, but primarily for the considerably larger saturation of television in Lebanese households than newspaper readership (Mandour, 2013), which is dwindling in Lebanon as elsewhere. Television not only has a larger audience, but also an ability to cut across a range of ages, education levels, and classes.

The texts were chosen from a small pool of videos including news reports and talk show programs, according to the popularity of the channels as news providers and the popularity of the specific sociopolitical programs as well as their relevance to the topic at hand, although this makes it difficult to generalize the observations to other media texts dealing with the same issue. The Al Jadeed news report was chosen as it was typical of the others and was the initiatory report of the 2012 scare. The *Enta Horr* segment was chosen for the large response it received on social media and the ideological claims and arguments made by the host. The *Ahmar bil Khat el Arid* episode was selected due to its relevance to the topic and the ability to demonstrate the range of experts and voices present in the debate, due to the extensive guest list. The LBCI news report was chosen to analyze the mass media's reaction in 2012, as it was not a specific retraction, unlike the Al Jadeed report.

Unfortunately, no televised media coverage was obtainable from the first wave of panic in 1996 until 2008, which limited the ability to draw conclusions about the evolution of moral panic discourse during this period. The texts were taken from the three channels with the highest average daily viewership share in Lebanon during 2011, LBC, Al Jadeed, and MTV, with 38.4%, 35%, and 28.7% of the viewership share respectively (Battah, 2012).<sup>10</sup> According to Mandour (2013), LBC and Al Jadeed also have the most diverse audiences due to their relative editorial freedom compared to other Lebanese party owned media institutions. These texts were obtained from television station websites, as well as from the public domain in cases where they were uploaded to YouTube. Obtaining texts from Lebanese television stations proved to be an arduous task, a limitation that stems from

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<sup>10</sup> These statistics were the only ones found on viewership rates in Lebanon. Although they do not cover the period in which all of the texts were produced, the viewership rates will tend to fluctuate between LBC, Al Jadeed, and MTV. These statistics originate from a private company IPSOS STAT Beirut. Interestingly, both LBC and Al Jadeed claim to have the highest viewership on their official websites.



Lebanon itself, which has no law to regulate access to media archives. Thus “a researcher is at the mercy of archive staff” (Nötzold, 2009, p.121).

For cultural studies, what is important are the connotations of a message and the cultural codes it evinces, which have the power to make meaning and transmit ideology (Hall, 1974); therefore, the news report or program from start to end was considered the unit of analysis as it is not one specific instance or scene, but the meaning making functions of the entire message from start to end that is of interest. Discourse fragments such as statements, arguments, language, and visual communication in the television segments within different themes or discourse strands should be diachronically scrutinized to uncover the discourse formation and mass mediated “knowledge” of the subculture through time. However, since texts preceding 2008 could not be found, the analysis is limited to the post 2008 period.

### **Critical Discourse Analysis**

This study approached the Lebanese satanic panic from a qualitative perspective using a CDA of the sampled texts. This approach corresponds to the research objectives of this study in that it can aid in the understanding of discourse according to the social context and power relations in Lebanon (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000). According to McClure (2011), CDA methodology and moral panic theory are complementary for this reason. Considering this is the first study to address moral panics in the Lebanese media, a qualitative approach was used, as it is more appropriate for the information gathering function of exploratory research and case studies (Nötzold, 2009), both categories that this study fits into.

A discourse analysis was needed to define the obstacles for the dissolution of the satanic panic in Lebanon and to better understand the mass media output on this particular folk devil (Fairclough, 2002). In this study media discourse is considered a principal cause of

the moral panic, and the greatest obstacle to its dissolution; the second chief cause, Elias El-Murr's ISF campaign, would cease to have justification without the media discourse.

The analysis took place on several levels, one of which was the semantic level of the texts, which deals with the meaning of discourse rather than with specific linguistic structures, such as syntax (Van Dijk. 1983). Oppositions and frames were inspired by the literature, social and historical context, generated from the texts themselves, and extracted from the observational notes recorded during the readings and re-readings of the corpus. These general categories or discourse strands served to organize data segments and, in keeping with the qualitative tradition, were subject to alteration as the study progressed and patterns emerged (Marshall & Rossman, 2002). These allowed a flexible and qualitative understanding of discursive formation and meaning making in the sample.

Each text was analyzed on several levels; Fairclough (1992) advocates a linguistic and intertextual analysis. The text should be analyzed linguistically i.e. its grammar, vocabulary, sentence structure, structural cohesion, and dialogue dynamics are considered. The intertextual analysis demonstrates how the text is related to other texts and orders of discourse, narratively, through production and journalistic conventions, and through the social interpretations of the text's producers (p. 194). The analysis should then connect the text's micro attributes to the macro socio-economic structure, to fulfill the critical function.

### **Procedure.**

The first step of CDA (as laid out by Fairclough, 2001; Fairclough, 2002) is to identify a social issue or problem that has a semiotic aspect – in the case of this study the portrayal of the heavy metal subculture in the Lebanese media and their marginalization. The second step consists of defining the obstacles for the dissolution of the social issue; this includes an analysis of the discursive practices it is related to, of the link between the

semiosis and other elements of this practice, and of the actual discourse itself. I discuss the analysis (part of the second step) in more detail below. Third, the researcher must consider whether the “social order” needs the problem; if the discourse is ideological it will contribute to the maintenance of a social order. The questions asked in this step are: who is benefiting from the social problem? And why does it exist? Fourth, ways to transgress the obstacles found in step two must be identified. Here suggestions will be offered to ameliorate the semiotic and discursive aspect of the problem, for example how to empower members of the subculture. Fifth and finally, a critical analysis of the analyses conducted in steps one through four is required to determine how effective the critique has been and whether it can help solve the social problem identified in step one. In this step the researcher must examine his/her own background and how this has added or detracted from the analysis (see Evaluation and Conclusions).

The method of discourse analysis in the second step of Fairclough’s CDA (2001; 2002; see also Titscher, Meyer, Wodak, & Vetter, 2000) involves finding the obstacles to the dissolution of the social problem, which are the genres, orders of discourse, semiosis, discursive practices, and social practices that make up the Lebanese media discourse in question, considered here a main obstacle to ending the marginalization of the subculture. Texts, as a social activity, are subjected to paradigmatic (lexical/semiotic choices) and syntagmatic (narrative/structural organization) analyses. The “structurings of semiotic difference,” or structural oppositions in a text, paint a picture through language, genre, and discourses, which have the power to represent realities, values, and group identities.

The first level of the non-linear analysis, linguistic and semiotic *text* analysis, describes representations and social meanings in the ‘discursive event.’ This allows the researcher to make an interpretation of the way the discourse was produced and the way it may be consumed and/or understood; this interpretation of the *discursive practice* is the

second level of textual analysis or the interdiscursive analysis, which relates the text to social and cultural discourses and genre. This helps to explain the *sociocultural practice* that is the discourse in relation to its context. This social analysis forms the third level of analysis and embodies the critical aspect of the methodology, bringing in notions of power, ideology, and hegemony (Machin and Mayr, 2012; Titscher et al. 2000). As a method, CDA involves asking informed questions of the text. These questions examine the text in its totality, ranging from when the text was produced, to who produced it, to what metaphors are used, to what music accompanies what statements.

Drawing on Fairclough, Schneider (2013) offers a step-by-step guide to conducting a discourse analysis. Discourse is social, and as such no CDA is complete without an examination of the context in which the text was created; this is essential for each of the levels of analysis mentioned above. The context of each analyzed video is presented, as are the attributes of its producers. Once the texts have been contextualized the textual analysis can begin; the discourse strands, or the general themes of the discourse on the satanic threat are extracted from the transcriptions of the videos. The data are then coded according to these categories allowing the analyst to lay out statements or discourse fragments that belong under each discourse strand across the texts and map out how these strands are woven to uncover ideological assumptions, shared attributes given to the subject, and recurring arguments.

The structural features of the texts, such as how the argument is presented, concluding statements, and the layout of the discourse are then assessed, helping to answer the third and fourth of the research objectives. The intertextuality of different discourse fragments, or how they refer to or rely on previous texts or knowledge is then considered, helping to illuminate the answers to the fifth research objective. A simple example of this intertextuality is if a politician quotes the Bible in an anti-gay marriage speech. In this situation his or her discourse is drawing from a cultural reference as well as another text, also clarifying the

ideology or worldview that informs his or her argument. The linguistic and rhetorical mechanisms of the text are also examined; here value judgments, labeling, absences, oppositions, legitimization (Reyes, 2011), and tone are made clear, which is essential to answer the first and second research objective.

While interrogating the text from these angles an interpretation can be made which ties the context to production and language to give a base to the sociocultural level of analysis. The characteristics of the discourse which lead to the stereotyping and marginalization of youth subculture, and thus moral panic, as well as the broadcasting of an ideological appeal to normalcy, would have been uncovered and explained. After this, informed suggestions for the amelioration of such practices can be offered.

#### **Limitations of method.**

A limitation to consider when solely studying texts –without the effect they have on the audience –is that a particular encoding of a news item or report may not be decoded according to the preferred reading; “we cannot assume effects simply from origins” (Grossberg, 1984, p. 403). However, the news and socio-political programs that constitute the televised coverage of devil worship in Lebanon fit into the “factual genre”- described as a form with a cultural meaning that lies upon its recognizable function to present facts –unlike comedy or horror. The audience is supposed to receive the information, presented in narrow narratives and closed to interpretation without much critical thought (Williams, 2011). Although we can not be sure that the Lebanese public absorbs the media discourse exactly as it is served to them, according to Hall (1974) and Hall et al. (1978), the encoding and signification of a message within genre and linguistic structures produce or call for a certain decoding; i.e. a “preferred” or “dominant reading” is implied in the structure of the discourse.

CDA does not allow us to draw conclusions about how a text will be reacted to or dealt with by the audience; neither does it allow us to infer the intentions of an author. We can only observe the semiotic choices made and understand how those choices were affected by sociopolitical power structures and how they in turn might affect them (Machin & Mayr, 2012). That said, all discourse or even utterance is targeted at a particular audience and anticipates their reaction. In addition, according to CDA theory, discourse is inherently ideological and “socially constitutive”, i.e. it is both created by and creates the social context (Fairclough, 2001; Fairclough, 2002; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Titscher et al. 2000). The point of a CDA is essentially to understand discourse as a social practice.

A number of scholars have argued that analytic methods, including CDA, need the support of quantitative methods such as content analysis to become generalizable, yet CDA is a tool for a deep analysis of certain significant texts (Hall, 2012), while quantitative content analysis looks for quantifiable patterns in a much larger corpus. For this research topic, CDA also offered an advantage over other qualitative textual analysis methods, which are not as concerned with critical theory. CDA seeks to link discursive practices found in texts to the wider social and cultural context and processes (Fairclough, 1996), in order for the researcher to draw conclusions about social structures (Titscher et al., 2000). The goal here is not to generalize the results to other texts, but to understand the social context, which has shaped a discourse, and which that discourse will help to shape as a social practice.

## **Findings and Analysis**

This section begins with a contextual discussion of the texts, commencing with genre and then introducing each of the texts. Each of the research objectives is then accorded a section. The first is answered in ‘Sign of the beast - Labeling a folk devil,’ which is focused on the lexical and semiotic choices made in defining the threat, as well as the culturally

specific structural oppositions that they activate (Machin & Mayr, 2012). The subsequent section, ‘Drawing the Demon – Attributes of the folk devil’ addresses the second objective; here the representation of the satanic threat is laid out. What are Satan worshippers? What do they do? How are hard rock and heavy metal conduits for youth corruption? This section covers the ideological textual representation of the youth subculture. The third objective is answered in ‘Who will cage Satan? – Marginalizing the folk devil,’ in which the narratives and arguments used to repress the folk devil, and who the claims makers are, as well as the importance and status given to figures in the discourse and the roles of the reporter or moderator are discussed. The next section ‘Suicide guitar – Exaggerating a threat’ covers the fourth research objective and attends to the fear rhetoric and exaggerated claims that surround the youth subculture. ‘Shepherds of morality – Setting social boundaries’ addresses the ideologies that the discourse represents and creates and how they contribute to the maintenance of the social order. This is the most macro-focused section of the analysis. ‘Diffusing a moral panic – The devil responds’ looks at the media discourse in the wake of the reaction of the youth subculture in the last wave of the Lebanese Satanic panic (2012). A summary of the analysis ensues, followed by a critical analysis of the study itself. Suggestions for further research and for the solution of the social problem identified here are offered in the concluding remarks.

### **Contextualizing the Texts**

This section addresses the texts in context, specifically the genre in which the message is delivered and the attributes of the texts’ producers, as well as general characteristics of the programs. A brief discussion of the reality genre and what this means for messages delivered through television news and socio-political programming begins the

section and is followed by a summarized background for each of the texts analyzed. After explaining the socio-historical and message context the text-based findings are discussed.

An important point to note is that much of the literature has documented that stories about Satanism tended to appear in local and tabloid media channels (e.g. Cavaglioni & Selashayovitz, 2005; Victor, 1993). The case in Lebanon, a considerably small country, is different. The most popular channels announced the satanic threat, which trickled down to the smaller publications, such as blogs and provincial news sites, which relied heavily on the reports featured in the elite-owned media.

### **The news and talk show genres.**

According to Fairclough (1992) the content of media texts cannot be properly interpreted without understanding form, as the form of a message is part of its content. Genre plays a decidedly large role in the form of any televised message as well as how it is received or understood by the audience. News and infotainment, such as evening talk shows or documentaries, are understood by audiences to be factual, rather than fictional, and to contain information from the real world (Hill, 2007). Accordingly, when news or evening talk shows discuss a threat to society, moral or otherwise, the threat is more concrete and factual; it is something that has happened to people in the audience's own community.

In Lebanon, even what Mandour (2013) calls "secular channels" still offer up conservative and religiously aligned discourse. "Socially concerned talk shows" try "to adopt an "objective" yet morally-charged discourse out of "concern over social wellbeing," which tends to "reinforce[s] stereotypes and conservative discourses." They usually rely on clergy members as "moral and ethical references" (p. 15), as was evident in the *Ahmar bil Khat el Arid* episode discussed further below. These talk shows discuss topics that are scandalous in the social setting (Mandour, 2013), such as divorce, virginity, homosexuality, Free Masonry,



marital rape, and so on. The shows also cover political and public affairs, especially *Enta Horr* (En. You Are Free) of MTV (discussed below) and *Lil Nasher* (En. For Publication) on Al Jadeed, which also featured a segment in the aftermath of the Massacore concert.

The language and semiotics of television adds a complexity to discourse above the written or radio text: moving images straight from the scene, the format of a news report that identifies it as news rather than fiction, different shots, lighting techniques, perspectives, music, and so on. This television grammar helps us understand what is happening in a certain television text and can “generate impressions and ideas in people” (Berger, 1998, p. 31).

According to Ilie (2001), the talk show is a form of infotainment that displays practices from a variety of discourse types, such as casual conversation and the news interview. The chronological layout, the turn taking, and operative objectives of questions and the responses they elicit are part of the unique amalgamation that is a talk show. The argumentative value and discursive functions of certain sequential meaning making actions such as “metalinguistic utterances”, and “question-response adjacency pairs” depend

on the *discursive roles assigned to the speakers*, on the *discursive roles assumed by the speakers themselves* in relation to the other participants, on the *relevance of the topic to the individual participants*, on their *assumptions and expectations*, as well as on the more or less *controlling role of the show host*, and on the *reactions of the by-standing audience*. [emphasis in original] (p. 211)

The researcher must ask questions of these discursive characteristics of a text to uncover who has the power to determine the ideology that characterizes the text.

The format of television news and talk programs, and the form of exchanges that take place within them, contribute to the types of discourse they represent and consequently play a role in message delivery (Ilie, 2001; Williams, 2011). A number of studies have attended to the form of argumentation that takes place within the news interview, and within talk shows

of a political (Lauerbach, 2007) and social nature (Ilie, 1999). For example, Ilie (2001) draws upon conversation and discourse analysis, linguistics, and cultural studies, among other disciplines to consider the features of talk television, classifying it as a form of semi-institutional discourse. The talk show host is the authority in the dialogue and holds significantly more power than the guests and studio audience. The interviewer takes it upon him or herself to bestow the qualification and moral judgment of each account given, coloring the show with his or her personal touch (Ilie, 2001). This has had implications for understanding of how ‘Satanists’ are presented in the evening talk programs in Lebanon, such as *Ahmar Bil Khat el Arid* and *Enta Horr*.

***Ahmar bil Khat el Arid* episode, 30/11/2011.**

The episode of *Ahmar bil Khat el Arid* analyzed here appeared on LBCI, the satellite arm of LBC (Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation), on the 30th of November 2011. The talk-show, which first aired in March 2008, is described by the LBCI website as

a weekly rendez-vous for discussing controversial social and human issues on LBCI... Its revolutionary way of approaching taboos and controversies is based on discussions with people who lived these experiences. The weekly show brings together guests from Lebanon and the Arab world who share testimonies with Malek Maktabi, the host, who in turn highlights solutions with experts from different fields. (LBCI, 2014)

The name *Ahmar bil Khat el Arid*, (En. The Bold Red Line), is based on the red line (Ar. khat ahmar), a term used to mean a line that cannot be crossed, presumably here the line of social taboo. In the introduction to this pre-taped show, the host is shown stepping over a simulated red line. The studio in which the episode is filmed has a lit red line down the middle of the floor, with the host moving across it to address the guests and audience. On one side sit the accused or “the problem,” and on the other side the “experts.” In this particular episode, two

representatives from the metal community sit across from a priest and a sheikh (See Figure 1. Appendix A). This sets Abrahamic religion as the opposite of or the solution to metal. It is also worth questioning why two members of the metal community were invited to an episode dealing with satanic groups? Another guest on the show remains behind a screen and speaks in to a voice-altering microphone; he is seated at the origin of the red line opposite a screen on which edited reports are shown. This guest remains anonymous and is supposedly an ex-member of a satanic group; however, his explanation of Satanism has no relation to the religions of Satanism or Thelema,<sup>11</sup> the founders of which he cites. Maktabi takes him as an authority on Satan worshippers during the show, and eggs him on as his responses become more fear inciting and grotesque, as he does with other guests later. One of the two metal fans brought in for the filming of the episode informed me that many of the good arguments they made against the church or in defense of metal music and its fans, were edited out of the show before it was aired (Msawwir, personal communication, October 2, 2014).

***Enta Horr* segment, 7/11/2012.**

*Enta Horr* (En. You Are Free) was a socio-political program broadcast on MTV, a private channel with a largely Christian identity, founded and run by the El-Murr family. The show was cancelled in May of 2013 after the host, Joe Maalouf, was fired from MTV, allegedly for expressing opinions with which the administration disagreed. Maalouf brought his tabloid background to *Enta Horr*, which was often scandalous, and Maalouf's sensationalist and opinionated monologue characterized the program. The show engaged political, economic, environmental, and social issues. *Enta Horr*'s influence can be demonstrated in the police raid of a Lebanese cinema and gay meeting place after an exposé

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<sup>11</sup> Thelema is a set of occult inspired religious beliefs, established in England in the early 1900's by Aleister Crowley.

by Maalouf, in which he asked that the authorities put a stop to such lascivious behaviors. Several men were arrested and some were tortured (see Mandour, 2013).

The 17-minute segment on the Massacore concert appears half way through the 77-minute episode. The Massacore ‘expose’ comes after a discussion of a garbage incineration plant in northern Lebanon and is followed by a report on setting standards for public schools in the country. Maalouf begins the segment with an incendiary monologue on youth deviance, perversion, and Satanism, and then shows a video taken from the concert focusing on the mosh pit.<sup>12</sup> After the report he expresses his disgust at the event and asks that religious and political leaders become aware and not rent out what he incorrectly insisted was a monastery to such “pro” Satan worshipping groups. He also accuses ministers and NGO’s of sponsoring the event, wondering why and how they could support such activities. He then takes a phone call from someone who was supposedly at the concert out of curiosity and who insisted that it was satanic. Maalouf listens to this caller yet constantly interrupts and ridicules one of the performers from Massacore (Bassem Deaibess, mentioned above) when he calls in to object. After arguing with Deaibess, Maalouf goes on to conclude, and asks organizations and government officials to stop sponsoring such events. He claims that he allowed the organizers to state their opinion, but “of course we don’t believe them” and ends the segment by stating that he is doing this “so you know where your children are going, and what they are doing”, and that in the absence of God, havoc and Satan worship will ensue. This segment sparked a considerable response from the metal community in Lebanon (see Diffusing a Moral Panic section).

### **Al Jadeed news report, 6/11/2012.**

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<sup>12</sup> A mosh pit is the area in front of the stage at a rock concert where members of the audience mosh or dance, some would say violently. Moshers will often crash into each other but there is a general understanding that no one should be harmed. See Figure 2 (Appendix A) for a snapshot from the *Enta Horr* show playing footage of the Massacore mosh pit.

Al Jadeed, also known by its former name and English translation, New TV, is a private channel that is without party affiliation, yet is traditionally leftist. Lebanese businessman Tahseen Khayyat owns the channel. Al Jadeed is one of Lebanon's leading stations (Battah, 2012) and is known for its bold approach to the news. This three and a half-minute report, which was reported by Dalal Bazzi, filmed by Saad al Deen al Rifai, and edited by Nadine Abou Abdo, appeared almost half way through the evening news on November 6th. This report was also the first TV story to appear on Satan worship or the metal and rock subcultures during the 2012 wave; several were to follow within the month.

After the negative response to the story on social media, Al Jadeed published a follow up, but this time by one of their top reporters, Youmna Fawaz, which was to provide the other side of the story. It aired on the 10th of the same month. It is interesting to note that Dalal Bazzi, who was behind the first story, prodigiously titled *The Truth of Satan worshippers in Dahr el Wahesh*,<sup>13</sup> was not chosen to front the second, *The Lie of Satan worshippers in Lebanon*. The station never formally apologized or retracted but instead, the second story claimed that after hearing the complaints of residents around the Massacore venue, who had contacted them and other media institutions, they would contact those who were the subject of the complaints, the organizers of Massacore. By doing this they positioned themselves as a channel that gives two sides to every story and avoided making an outright apology for Bazzi's mistake. This second report did however severely criticize Bazzi's report, critiquing its arguments and the lack of professional reporting, even showing different shots of symbols from the former report with the organizers of Massacore explaining how they were twisted and misconstrued. On the 12th, *Lil Nasher*, Al Jadeed's most prominent socio-political program tackled the topic with a segment on *Metal Music and*

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<sup>13</sup> Dahr el Wahesh is the name of the area in which the Massacore concert took place in early November. Dahr el Wahesh means the back of the beast in Arabic.

*its Relation to Satan Worship* (See Diffusing a Moral Panic section for more on these discourse re-routing broadcasts).

The original story was evidently poorly researched. As one of the Massacore organizers noted in the follow up, the security forces were never contacted and asked as to whether they had put a stop to the event. Instead of evidence, investigation, and facts, Al Jadeed broadcast images of graffiti, and questionable eyewitness accounts, throughout which Bazzi nods in agreement.

### **LBCI news report, 10/11/2012**

LBCI is the satellite channel that has grown out of LBC, a privately owned Maronite Christian channel. It is one of the top performing channels in Lebanon and takes a modern approach to the news that considers audience ratings. The news on LBCI has supported civil society causes before, and had responded to Joe Maalouf's exposé on homosexuality in 2012 by criticizing him and standing for the civil rights of the arrested men (Mandour, 2013). Such stances may have to do with the employment of Khaled Saghiech at LBCI in 2012. Saghiech moved from Al-Akhbar, a progressive leftist paper that often aligns itself with causes of civil rights and freedoms (the newspaper also published several articles and blog posts disparaging journalists for their uninformed and panic-inciting coverage regarding youth Satanism and rock music) to an editorial position in the news department of LBCI. In an interview with Mandour (2013), who commends his impact on LBCI's coverage of sexual rights and class struggles, Saghiech states, "LBCI was in a severe need to drastically raise the viewership of its news bulletin...so I struck a package deal with them...I said I guarantee you a higher viewership on the condition of bringing with me this agenda" (p. 16).

The text analyzed here is a 1 minute and 47 second news report broadcast on the 10th of November, a few days after the initial Al Jadeed report, the *Enta Horr* segment, and the

social media backlash to those two texts. Whether the report came out of Saghie's influence, a need to counter Maalouf, the opportunity to draw in a younger audience, or to actually stand against the rumors and moral panic is unknown. The rhetoric is largely de-escalating, fights the stereotype of satanic metal fans, and derides other news outlets that try to distract from Lebanon's problems, specifically sectarianism and corruption, by scaring citizens.

### **Sign of the Beast – Labeling a Folk Devil**

As discussed above, the subject of a moral panic is usually given an explicit and highly connotative label that establishes the 'discursive legacy' (Cricher, 2006). The first research objective is concerned with this aspect of the discourse. The most common labels attached, in Lebanon and other Middle Eastern countries), to youth thought to be satanic, i.e. heavy metal fans and goths, are devil or demon worshippers (Ar. *Abbadat shayateen*) or Satan worshippers (Ar. *Abbadat Al Shaytan*). Satanism, as a religion, is never seriously discussed in the sample for this study, although a few references to Laveyan Satanism and Thelema are made in the *Ahmar bil Khat el Arid* episode. These terms, Satan worship and devil worship, for both Western society and the mostly Abrahamic Middle Eastern societies, stand in direct connotative opposition to the worship of God or *Allah*, who is the essence of goodness, while Satan embodies evil. It is used across the texts and in newspapers, as well as by the security forces. 'Devil worshippers' signifies more than one devil, as the Arabic term is in plural. This is perhaps a reflection of Islam's distaste towards paganism and idolatry. For Islam God is one, and there is no other god. From a historical perspective, the crowning moment of Islam came when the prophet Mohamed rid Mecca of polytheism by smashing the idols of the city, a prominent connotative act. Although the Qur'an is respectful of other Abrahamic faiths, especially Judaism and Christianity, the pre-Islamic pagan faith of the Arab peninsula was scorned, "[The Pagans], leaving Him [God], call but upon female deities:

They call but upon Satan the persistent rebel” (Al Nisaa, 4:117). Here both the plurality of demons/deities and Satan (Ar. *Al Shaytan*) are the opposite to the good of the Abrahamic God. According to McClure (2011), the moral panic phenomenon results from a cultural inclination to regard certain groups or situations as essentially evil, bad, or threatening.

The word *bid'a* is worth noting as it recurs several times in the discourse of authority figures, such as by a priest in the *Ahmar bil Khat al Arid* episode, while referring to devil/Satan worship. It also appears several times in a 2003 article on devil worshippers in the Lebanese Army Publication, *Al Jaish*. This is a term that is difficult to translate but has the meaning of something of flimsy earthly invention rather than divine creation; the word has a negative connotation. *Bid'a* is not the only word that was used recurrently; the term phenomenon (Ar. *thahira*) was used in all of the texts except for the LBCI news report (which is mostly discussed in the ‘Diffusing a Moral Panic’ section). In the closing statement of the Al Jadeed news report and the opening statement of the *Enta Horr* segment the term “strange phenomenon” (Ar. *thahira ghareeba*) is used to describe the subject.

Another term used to discuss the threat by Malek Maktabi in the *Ahmar bil Khat al Arid* text is secret societies or groups (Ar. *Al Jama'aat Al Sirriyyat*), which connote a culture that is hidden from view, away from the light, with members doing deeds that are cryptic and esoteric. These societies exist beneath ours, are not ours, and are not known by us. In fact, the title of the episode is “Secret groups, have they resurfaced?” This assumes that they have been there for a while, and have surfaced before, perhaps in reference to previous waves of satanic panic. Maktabi also combines the two terms into ‘devil worshipping groups’ (Ar. *Majmoo'aat Abbadat Al Shayateen*); here it is also assumed that there is more than one group of practicing devil worshippers and that religion for these people is not a private affair. The threat to youth doesn't come from a lone teen dabbling in the occult in his or her bedroom but congregations that recruit, teach, and spread their pernicious influence (this is elaborated in



the next section, ‘Drawing the Demon’). Joe Maalouf also refers to the threat as coming from a group throughout the *Enta Horr* segment, referring to the threat as coming from ‘organized’ Satan worshipping groups (Ar. *Jame’aat ‘abbadat Al Shaytan*).

The images used to represent the satanic threat are discussed in more detail below but one worth mentioning here is the Sigil of Baphomet.<sup>14</sup> According to the Church of Satan’s official website, this powerful symbol is an inversion of the pentagram, which is an old and holy embodiment of the Holy Spirit, the star of the magi, and also the star of Islam. After describing the symbology behind the sigil, the Church of Satan website states, “thus in one sigil, we find a confluence of several cultures’ approach to embodying what we call Satan” (Gilmore, 1999). Considering Lavey’s gift for self-promotion and the substantial media attention given to the Church of Satan since it was founded, the sigil has become the image most associated with Satanism and used indiscriminately to represent satanic thought to the public. One example of this association of this Satanic symbol with a heavy metal concert in the Lebanese media occurs at approximately two minutes into the Al Jadeed news report on the supposedly satanic ritual that was the “Massacore” concert:

Reporter VO: *Its [the abandoned Qortbawi school, the venue for the event] wide space and abandoned rooms are not something unfamiliar for a place where the war has eaten and drunk. But what is unfamiliar is the existence of strange slogans/symbols (Ar. shi’araat) and drawings on the walls, and what confirms, although in principle their [the Satan worshippers] presence in this place, is this star on the wall, and it is the same one that is available on the pages of the Internet,*

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<sup>14</sup> The Sigil of Baphomet is the main symbol and registered trademark of Anton Lavey’s Church of Satan. It is the first symbol one sees when conducting a search engine query on Satanism. The occult symbol is, however, much older than the Church of Satan and takes the form of a goat’s head inside an inverted (two points ascending) pentagram or five pointed star.

[Switch to image of inverted pentagram on the wall, which is then shown side by side with an image, presumably from the Internet, of an inverted pentagram with a goat's head pendant (See Figure 1. Appendix A). Eerie background music rises in volume]

Reporter VO: *which belong to those... who are named... "Satan worshippers"*

There was no evidence to suggest that the concert organizers or attendees had graffitied anything on the wall but the Massacore logo. In the subsequent news report by Al Jadeed, which attempted to rectify or offer the other side of the story, one event organizer states that the star was drawn long before the concert. In the climactic section of the news report quoted above, the reporter, Dalal Bazzi, names the threat, and does so with several dramatic pauses. The naming serves as a conclusion to her proof of the Satan Worshippers existence *here*. There is a lack of questioning on the reporter's part as to the truth of these rumors and the witness accounts, one of which is from a small boy, or as to the existence of such groups. Her statement that they exist here assumes that they do exist; she is simply confirming that they were in this location. The next section covers the lexical and semiotic choices in these texts that depict the rock and metal subcultures and the threat of devil worshippers, such as the focus on graffiti and qualifying terms such as "strange" slogans/ symbols.

### **Drawing the Demon – Attributes of the Folk Devil**

During the process of data collection strands of discourse, or discursive themes, began to emerge, many of them similar to those found in literature on satanic panics from around the world. These include an association of metal and rock music with Satanism, and with drugs and dubious sexual practices, youth suicide, digging up graves, animal sacrifice, sacrilege of religious symbols, the corruption of girls, and other objectionable acts. This section is a study of the lexical fields or the associations awakened by the discourse, such as what issues were put in the forefront, what issues were suppressed, and what signs were used

to symbolically represent the threat (Machin & Mayr, 2012). The discourse portrays the subcultural folk devil as estranged from and rebelling against society and God, or the society of God, functioning under the surreptitious influence of the West, and posing the danger of spreading like an unchecked social disease. All of these attributes, among others that are associated with young rock and metal fans can be categorized between two major strands of discourse: the first is deviance from tradition and social norms; the second is a threat to society (which includes a threat to morality and to security). This section covers the portrayal of the subculture and “Satan worshipping groups”; not all of the associations found could be elaborated here for a lack of space, only the most salient are discussed.

Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish* (1995) describes the social creation of normativity through institutional discourse. Simply, one is rewarded for ascribing to normativity and punished for deviating from it. Institutional discourses, such as those in the media, detail what is considered deviant, and hail the deviant subject. More often than not, deviants are described in moral terms. This was evidenced in the Lebanese coverage analyzed here and is important because according to Cohen (1973), the public’s reaction to the deviant is related to the amount of knowledge about the deviance available to them, and so the media play a central part, as they are the main source of knowledge on the subculture for the majority of the population, indeed they may be the only source.

### **Sex, drugs, and rock ‘n’ roll.**

For a culture built on Abrahamic understandings of the world the signs and symbols of metal frighten and confuse. The horror imagery, loud sounds, black clad long haired males and short haired females, piercings, tattoos, liberal sexualities, and a celebration of the dark fit easily into the rhetoric of fear that surrounds them and creates the rebellious identity associated with the musical genre. According to Smith (2009), in a study based mostly on US

discourse, “when the experts addressed metal as a problem, they gave it the properties of a mental illness or a drug addiction, a deviant cause with deviance as an effect” (p. 23).

This deviance is largely connected to sex, drug use, and the symbols of the music, which are sometimes anti-religion, and is discussed in the framework of destructive moral decadence. One example is from a self-acclaimed ex-Satan worshipping respondent renouncing Satanism on *Ahmar bil Khat el Arid*,

*The existential questions were answered by Aleister Crowley, that are, in summary: destroy yourself, as much as you want delve into earthly pleasures, have sex, take drugs, listen to heavy metal or rock and roll, uh, do everything that destroys you...*

Rock music here is equated to sex and drugs, sins in the eyes of a relatively conservative society; it is an earthly pleasure among those that have been supposedly encouraged by a man who was dead long before rock music was born. These ‘sins’ and earthly pleasures here are considered destructive, related to the evil world of the occult that stands in direct opposition to the values of the God-fearing folk. This was an example of the sex, drugs, and rock ‘n’ roll discourse strand from a religiously framed argument. The following is from a security frame and is a quote from the security expert also in the *Ahmar bil Khat el Arid* episode,

*Some of them have files of drug use and files of prostitution and files of homosexuality (Ar. liwat). They were forbidden (Ar. nmana’o) from continuing these operations and there was strong regulation!*

Here the satanic threat is again connected to illicit and “deviant” sex and drugs, things that activate the need for prevention. The same expert, Brigadier General Anwar Yehya of the judiciary police, in revealing subsequent “security information” about a concert that was also mistaken for a satanic ritual, focuses largely on the subcultural style of metal. He highlights tattoos, odd hairstyles, and piercings as signs of this deviance, connecting metal fans that

display subcultural style with these illicit acts and deviant sexualities, and in effect criminalizing and marginalizing them.

*This is [unintelligible], look at how the hair is, his hair, look at how he has painted himself white, he has earrings in his ear, his beard, the hair of his beard is long...*

[Scene cuts to a video which goes down a path then cuts back to Yehya holding an image of another young man whose face is blurred]

*This is the assistant of the devil, also a foreigner, look how his neck is, look at how his hair is put*

[Yehya switches to another image this time of a young woman; her face is blurred]

*This was one of the ones present who is with them, it seems that she went into (Ar. fetit b) the Satan worshippers, she is wearing her cross, upside down, I mean the head of it is pointing downward and look at the tattoo she has on her forearm*

[He circles with his pen over a tattoo on her arm, then switches to another picture]

She has “gone into” Satan worship, this implies that it has not originated from her, or that she was influenced by someone. An assumption not made for the males featured in the photos.

On air allegations of drug use at these underground concerts is common. In the *Enta Horr* segment, Maalouf shows a video of the Massacore mosh pit supposedly obtained for the show;<sup>15</sup> he then takes a call from “a young Lebanese man,” identified as Eddy, who was at Massacore out of ‘curiosity.’

*Eddy: these people...as you saw...they did things we can't mention on the air, today they were hallucinating,*

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<sup>15</sup> This video was uploaded to YouTube by one of the Massacore attendees, before the *Enta Horr* episode aired. This person was never credited by Maalouf; he instead made it seem that the show’s investigators were able to “obtain” the video. The sound quality of the video uploaded to YouTube was substandard. For the cut for the show the crew added Gun’s and Roses’ *November Rain* over the footage. Maalouf states that this was similar to the music playing, which is also another distortion of the truth. The most extreme shots were chosen for the show.

Maalouf: *Yes, yes, it's obvious*

Eddy: *one...two, they weren't conscious (Ar.ma keno we'yeen), they were alcoholic in a way that is not normal, for sure ecstasy, for sure this noisy music (Ar. Moosiqa sakhbe), for sure this...other than the music, the words that are satanic words, and other things I don't want to mention on the air.*

Moshing has not only been misunderstood in Lebanon, but was banned in Singapore in the early 90's due to fears of youth aggression and violence induced by the music (Liew & Fu, 2006). In this excerpt, criminalizing accusations of ecstasy and 'abnormal' alcohol consumption, one that might be better leveled at the events of high profile international DJs who visit Lebanon or some of the country's most expensive and renowned nightclubs, are brought to bear on this loud and misunderstood music and the events in which local talents play. Add to this the satanic element and the things which Eddy can not mention on air, which are left to the imagination of the viewer and based on the twisted material they have gleaned from previous media reports and horror films on these "satanic rituals."

### **The aberrant and the grotesque.**

As with many satanic panics around the world, there is a focus on the grotesque, on animal and human sacrifice, perverse rituals, blood, gore, grave digging, and other morbid curiosities. These stories, rumors, and images are sensational; they capture viewer interest, and furnish the discourse with the boundaries of what is considered normal behavior, what is deviant, and what is evil. The lexical choices that set these boundaries of abnormality and strangeness involve terms and statements such as "*deviant/perverse acts*" (Ar. a'mal shaatha), "*strange rituals accompanied by unusual music*" (Ar. toqooson ghareeba mas-hoobatan b-moosiqa ghair 'aadiya), "*unfamiliar*," "*strange symbols*," "*strange phenomena*," "*arrested for practicing witchcraft and activities that are unfamiliar*," "*the places that the*

*group of practitioners of Satan worship and the practitioners of deviant/perverse (Ar. shaath) acts, and especially those who attack religion,” and “these scenes we are seeing (referring to Massacore mosh pit), these are people that are not normal, people are now seeing it on air, this is abnormal!”*

These choices set heavy metal concerts and the mostly harmless exploratory behaviors of youth outside the boundaries of the normal and in to the unfamiliar and aberrant. This distinction not only defines what is unacceptable behavior for youth, it also marks them as a strange and frightening social ‘other’ with these boundaries (this is discussed further in the sub-section ‘Constructing a moral other’).

The voyeuristic detailing of supposedly satanic rituals by ‘experts’ and self-proclaimed satanic cult members feature heavily in satanic panic discourse around the world, and of course in Lebanon. This is best demonstrated with the *Ahmar bil Khat el Arid* text; as a longer program there is more time for discussion of the satanic threat. Maktabi asks two of the guests to describe Satan worshipping rituals in detail; he marks their statements with his taken aback expression of “*oooff*” and asks questions about the participation of girls, how Satan is procured, the digging up of graves, and other shock factor rumors. The ex-Satan worshipping respondent and the priest comply with their goriest of stories, grossly exaggerated tales (made to sound much more fearful and abnormal than they actually are in LaVey’s Satanic rituals), the likes of mixing a virgin’s blood with semen to be delivered to newly baptized members after sexual intercourse is had with them by the “boss” wearing a goat’s head, atop an inverted pentagram drawn on the floor, as they are watched over by other actors in the ceremony (this one came from the priest).

According to Victor (1993) these stories have human-interest value, and when talk show hosts display “uncritical acceptance” of these incendiary and unlikely claims they create an “aura of credibility” for these urban myths.

These stories which combine human sacrifice, the drinking of blood, and the eating of human flesh function as symbols of ultimate evil incarnate in some group. As is the case where there is much anxiety and fear, the more outrageous the storyteller's tale, the more believable it appears to be. (p. 19)

This type of frightening and shocking story represents the idea that the morality of society, and especially of youth, is at risk due to the hidden powers of evil (Victor, 1993).

### **Self harm, urban decay, and other associations.**

The metal-suicide connection has been witnessed in a number of moral panics, most notably in America. Of the four texts subjected to deep analysis only the *Ahmar bil Khat el Arid* episode discusses suicide; however this has been a recurrent theme through the years and was also found among the other texts that were not selected for the CDA. Heavy metal is largely portrayed as a facilitating or encouraging influence for youth suicide. Shocking and disturbing incidents within a society, such as the young boy committing suicide at the start of the satanic panic, are difficult to comprehend and explain. Unable to deal with the taboo of mental illness in Lebanon and the image of an unhappy family, a scapegoat was needed to absorb the blame for the incident. The boy's love for metal pointed the finger at the music. In the discourse, suicide is largely understood as a sin, as against God, as something Satan tells young boys and girls to do, drags them towards. In both Christianity and Islam, suicide is considered a sin. As the sheikh in this same episode passionately said,

*“in the end the Devil is going to get him to a place; in the end he tells him commit suicide!”*

And before him the police expert, not sparing the music as the devilish influence.

*“Heavy metal and gothic, with lyrics that invite people to go away from this life and go towards death”*



Another aspect of this connection is the focus on self-harm in addition to suicide, mainly cutting behaviors, which were mentioned several times in the text in the form of testimonies of the priest and the sheikh in the episode. An important absence here is the discussion of possible mental disorders such as depression or bipolar disorder. Although while discussing treatment for these young “apostates,” as the priest so aptly named them, he mentions the help of the psychologist and a medical doctor in treating addiction. However the unquestioned and naturalized reason for a person’s suicide or for them to cut their wrists is satanic influence, which is easily available in metal music, and not their drug addiction or the factors that predisposed them to addiction. The drug addiction was seen as secondary or as another symptom of the influence of Satanism.

One of the visual associations seen across the three texts was the linkage of the subcultural threat with images of urban scenes, run-down abandoned places, vandalism, and graffiti. In both the *Ahmar bil Khat el Arid* episode and the Al Jadeed news report such images were used. The Al Jadeed news report is permeated with shots of the abandoned Qortbawi building, which connotes urban decay, and in Lebanon, the destructiveness of war. Additionally, during the report there was an excessive focus on graffiti; it was in fact taken as the sign, which “confirmed” the supposedly satanic ritual (see Figure 4, Appendix A). This association has been mentioned several times in moral panic literature, such as in the report on the Israeli satanic panic (Cavaglioni & Sela-Shayovitz, 2005).

The young metal fans were recontextualized as a satanic threat in the discourse. This threat involves drugs, perverse acts, a closeness to death, it manifests in alienated urban youths, often from wealthy families, who are more integrated into Western culture than their less privileged counterparts, religious youth who would be more likely to vote for their sectarian leaders or carry arms in case of another civil war. With this Western culture there are dangers, negative influences. The Western origins of the culture, the music, the rituals

and churches of Satan worshippers, leaders of the supposed satanic group, and Western subcultural style, are highlighted in the texts. Youth were presented as accessing this culture through Western music, books, and the Internet. This was also similar to the satanic panic focus in Israel on bored wealthy youths, which signified a threat to middle-class morality and that the future of the community is in danger which as we have seen, “helps inflate more moral panic” (Cavaglione & Sela-Shayovitz, 2005). Victor (1993) has also noted this symbolic representation of children as the future of society in American satanic panic discourse.

Another association of importance was the funding of these ‘underground groups’; in the *Ahmar bil Khat el Arid* episode this was mentioned by the anonymous respondent yet was not followed through with as a line of questioning by the host, Maktabi. In the *Enta Horr* segment Maalouf repeatedly questions why ministries and NGO’s would sponsor such concerts. That these Satan worshipping groups are funded insinuates that there is some conspiracy. There has been a connection between Satan worshippers and the Free Masons in satanic panic discourse in Lebanon and in America; however in the chosen sample this was only touched upon in passing during the *Ahmar bil Khat el Arid* episode.

One of the most interesting metaphors in the discourse was the positioning of Satan worshippers as a disease or a social illness. Either outright or in the use of verbs (Berger, 1998) the association of the threat with disease was evident in the three texts. Examples of such lexical choices are: “*The phenomenon spreads again...in Lebanon and in a broader way... and the ones we are treating (Ar. n’aalejon), they are renouncing...*” The Arabic word for spreads used here is “*tatafasha*,” which is usually reserved for diseases in a population or a rash on the skin. More examples from the text that reflected this theme include, “*What we saw is that there are people who have become inflicted (Ar. mosaabeen) with demonic control,*” or the use of “*purging campaign*” (Ar. hamlet el tot-heer). The ‘disease’ was consistently portrayed as proliferating and in need of curbing.

## **Who will Cage Satan? – Marginalizing the Folk Devil**

The arguments used in the first three texts marginalize young metal and rock fans by labeling them Satanists, as seen above; moreover, in adherence to the spirit of moral panics, they largely supported the surveillance and regulation of these deviant youth and their music. The arguments fell under two major categories, those that used a moral-religious/deviance problem narrative and those that used a socio-legal/security problem narrative, for example the moral corruption of youth, the “strange” style and music of the subculture, and the criminal activities attached to Satanism. However, none of the three texts featured only one type of these arguments. All involved a threatening depiction in addition to both marginalizing frames. The speakers also proposed solutions to the subculture problem. The arguments tended to be emotional, rather than factual, and were pervaded with logical fallacies and exaggeration. These arguments against the music and youth, those who make them, and the solutions they posed are discussed in this section.

### **The experts.**

Those who offered the arguments in the discourse against metal and Satan worship tended to be representatives of RSAs and ISAs: police officers, security officials, priests, sheikhs, self-proclaimed experts of psychology and psychiatry, journalists, and talk show hosts, the former two being the foremost authority in the texts, as mentioned above. The discourse also featured the testimonials of supposed ex-devil worshippers and concerned citizens. The cuts chosen tended to reflect the ideological statements of the dominant group. Both the *Ahmar bil Khat el Arid* episode and the *Enta Horr* segment featured subcultural members who attempted to debunk the marginalizing and criminalizing claims.

In both of the socio-political evening programs discussed here the arguments of the subcultural representatives were undermined and they were subjected to personal attacks by

the host or other guests. During the *Ahmar bil Khat el Arid* episode the sheikh and priest argued against the statements of two heavy metal fans that the music is not an evil influence and that Satanism does not exist in Lebanon. Both of them reproach the more assertive of the two youths for “defending the Satanists” and question the possibility of him being one himself, thus discrediting him in front of viewers via this ad hominem argument and making him and his companion’s defense seem like a lie to keep the Satan worshippers hidden.

In *Enta Horr*, Bassem Deaibess, who performed at Massacore, called in to express his issues with Maalouf’s report and right the many false claims. He was consistently silenced, patronized, misinterpreted, and dismissed by the host. This type of response was not given to the first caller (Eddy), who spoke against Massacore. After Deaibess explained moshing, the choice of location, and tried to clear the allegations of drug use, all the while dealing with the hostile authority figure, Maalouf sarcastically ended the call.

Maalouf: [Interrupting] *Mr. Bassem, yes Mr. Bassem. I thank you tonight for making us more aware, and I call upon all the mothers tonight to send their children to these parties and let them try the mosh pit, so that we can become more cultured musically, and so that we know to listen to heavy music or metal music... I feel very sorry, really, that, all the time, we try to find a cover for certain things.*

In his conclusion to the segment Maalouf said this in regards to Deaibess’ statement,

*...that we have given it what it deserves, and we brought up the other side to justify his point of view, but of course, we have not been convinced. Enta Horr is not going to leave this subject...*

He not only dismissed Deaibess’ statements, perhaps the only credible and expert source among all of the guests and call-ins in the corpus, but also positioned him as “the other side,” while creating a more positive image for his show as offering both perspectives.

As noted above, the experts that were positioned as authorities in the shows tended to be RSA and ISA representatives. Their arguments vindicated the marginalization of the folk devil using several frameworks and discursive strands, such as the corruption of youth, the folk devil as a social or moral threat, and the folk devil as criminally deviant. The shows and news segment also featured the voice of the ordinary citizen or the good, concerned towns' folk. These expert and common claims makers sometimes indicated the perceived solutions for dealing with the threat. The most salient frameworks for these arguments are discussed in the following sub sections.

### **Corrupting our youth.**

One of the more flagrant of the discursive strands was the construction of Satanism as threatening to the safety and morality of the nation's youth. This is consistent with the historical benevolent and punitive focus on modern urban youth as a "potentially delinquent juvenile crowd" and as "a particular urban problem" (Hebdige, 1983, p. 72). This strand was found in every video in the sample and also in all of those that were not selected for deep analysis. The threat "spreading" among adolescents and teenagers, whether from Satan's influence or the advocating of cutting or suicide in the music, the availability of drugs at concerts and parties, the dangerous influence of "Satan worshipping groups," or non-normative sexuality was always resorted to, and many times, centered on.

In the *Ahmar bil Khat el Arid* episode, Maktabi repeated the age (14 years) five times in a period of 20 seconds, after the self proclaimed Satan worshipping respondent answered the question of "*How old were you when you joined the Satan Worshippers?*" This was the first question Maktabi asked him about the group. That same episode was opened with a short and dramatic monologue by the host that set the tone, portrayed every parent's nightmare, and hopefully kept them from changing the channel during the break that followed it,

Maktabi: *The time was around 10, she called out to him, he didn't answer... she looked for him, she couldn't find a trace... in his room a cypher, strange clothes, religious books... and the sign of blood... The secret groups, have they resurfaced?* [He takes a deep breath and faces another camera.] *Practices, rituals, testimonies, field reports, and security reports uncovered for the first time... Devil Worshippers, after the break.*

The implicit suggestion here is that this danger can reach your children in the safety of the home; it is made poignant by the distraught mother searching for her child, an easily relatable theme in a country that has experienced a violent civil war. This also set the stage for the subsequent defining of the strange risks in store for youths, such as non-normative clothing, an existential, religious, or philosophic interest, then of course sex, drugs, rock, death.

The focus on the age of participants was important to Maalouf as well, and the *Enta Horr* segment focused on youth participation, and violent unconscious “15-16 year olds who don't know what they are doing.” Maktabi in the *Ahmar bil Khat el Arid* episode also asks the priest about the age of participants. The reply gives a telling explanation, from the religious framework, of why youth are supposedly targeted.

Khonaissar: *their ages, as he was saying, they take the age of teens (Ar. morahaka), so that they can bleed out man and bleed out the youth. If today I want to say, our element is the future of the Church as Christians, they are destroying the youth so that they can destroy religion...*

Maktabi: *Father, the respondent was talking about when he would preach and let new people join him, the devil worshippers, he would go to the teen and ask him some of the existential questions that he had, and didn't have answers to, and said that he didn't find them in the church. What do you say here? To these questions, that they use to hunt victims.*

*Khonaisser: here, the role we play as priests in accompanying youth...we should be ready for any question that is asked by an individual around whether God exists, whether I exist, and any questions asked of the Christian religion or from the bible...*

In this exchange we see the priest's reasoning behind why the 'Satan worshippers' choose young adherents; they are out to destroy religion, and consequently morality. We also see the host's acceptance of the threat to "victims" in his usage of a predator metaphor. It is not a question as to whether they are a threat to children (the future of society) or if they exist at all, but why they are doing this and what we can do? Maktabi does once ask whether these stories could possibly be the creation of someone under the effect of hallucinogens, but the priest quickly denies this, which Maktabi takes as proof enough. We can also see the solution for 'at-risk' youth: they must take their existential questions to the church; if a youth asks questions about his or her existence and the existence of God the religious institution must have the answers. Increased religiosity then, parental surveillance, and church visits are the solutions the priest offers. For youth who are beyond this type of help, in what Khoneisser refers to as apostasy, they are to be dealt with by a priest, a medical doctor (for drug rehabilitation), and a psychologist. This will be discussed further in the next sub-section. As for fully-fledged Satan worshipping youth, they are best dealt with by the security forces.

Smith (2009) states that the community and culture must recognize the crisis as central if the fear rhetoric is to take hold. He gives the example of the conservation of the American family and "children at risk" when discussing the American Satanism scares. As stated above, the American experience has diffused to color satanic panics around the world. The crisis of young Lebanese straying away from the traditional norms of the previous generations, and becoming Americanized, allows the same rhetoric which constructs metal as a threat to be transplanted into Lebanese households, previously unexposed to metal. Characterized by the same arguments and the same images, void of critical examination of

rock, metal, and the cultures that surround them, this rhetoric also transcends many of the divisions in Lebanese society, parents from all of Lebanon's Abrahamic sects can fear this pernicious influence. This is reflected in the opening statements of each of the three texts discussed in this section, all of which remark on young people, use the term "strange" and make recourse to unacceptable rituals.

The threat to youth is a global satanic panic characteristic, and is to be expected with a moral panic regarding a youth subculture. As discussed above, capitalism and other social systems reward members that are normative and punish those who are deviant or outside of the mainstream. In most metal and rock culture there is an attempt to invert this reward and punishment (Smith, 2009); the normativity and obedience preached by many religions are regarded with disdain. Since the 80's, for youth trying to assert their individuality, handle the tumultuous years of teen hood, explore their emotions, connect with a sort of spirituality, and express rebellion, the subculture has offered some respite. According to Smith (2009), metal allows for the performance of deviance. Evidence that teen dabbling in the occult is restricted to, or more likely practiced by, members of the metal community than other teens, could not be found. Some heavy metal, death metal, goth metal and other forms of metal and rock music do tend to use an "anti-Christian aesthetic" and many bands and fans do accept the individuality and anti-obedience ideology of popular Satanism (Cordero, 2009). The accounts in these texts however converge heavy metal almost completely with satanic ritual and offer an exaggerated and threat based fear rhetoric to the public.

The arguments against the folk devil fall mainly in two lexical fields, the security related and moral, religious, and social deviance, such as the black and white images of a razor blade, a church, gallows and wet, naked, and unhappy youth (see Figure 5, Appendix A) juxtaposed between the statements of a security official as he describes the dangers of Satanism as crime and through parties exposing youth to strange theatrical scenes. The threat



to youth can come from a variety of sources according to the television discourse, which include, but are not limited to: heavy metal and rock music, corruptive, non-normative religious books, parties in which one meets other heavy metal fans, friends with an interest in the occult or drugs, satanic missionaries, and the internet.

### **Constructing a moral other.**

The metal and goth fans in Lebanon were discursively constructed as a deviant other. This construction serves to produce an “us-them” distinction, thus defining the normative and group boundaries, creating a scapegoat for problems, and distracting from social inequity. Attributes of the folk devil, discussed above, which contribute to this othering, are the Western origins of the threat and the non-normativity of heavy metal culture, style, and the supposed satanic practices that go with it. The rhetoric used to describe subcultural youth and supposed Satan worshippers uses symbols and imagery that inspire fear of this ‘other.’ These are people without religion and morality, without goodness and decency, without respect for authority, and not only without, but also opposed to these things; essentially, they are people who are not like us, and not like you, the audience, and they are dangerous.

These rhetorics are built on institutionalized binaries in the dominant discourses, such as God and Satan, good and evil, citizen and criminal, Us and Them. The binaries create an oppositional identity for the deviant other and by default an identity for the speakers and enforcers against the deviance, and also the audience. The rhetoric of fear elicits counter rhetoric from the metal cultures, which are “complicit in the conflagration of the symbols equated as deviant” (Smith, 2009, p. 18).

This othering is mostly achieved with a socio-religious morality frame, although sometimes a security-related lexical field is activated to call for the restriction of this moral other.

In the *Enta Horr* segment, Maalouf stresses the deceptive<sup>16</sup> and provocative claim that Massacore was held in an abandoned Christian monastery; he repeats the word monastery six times in a 40 second period, insisting that this is a holy place and that men of the cloth must “wake up” (Ar. yoo’o) and know “*who is allowed to use these places.*” Stressing on the monastery as a holy place signifies something sacred to all of “us,” it signifies goodness and purity. This lexical choice signifies that this sacred place should be safeguarded, and “therefore produces greater moral outrage” and signifies the values and identity of the speaker and the ones propounded in the discourse (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p.32). Furthermore this argument explicitly states that some sub-sections of society should be prohibited from using such locations, locations that are sacred to “us.”

The Al Jadeed news report also features this religious frame while portraying Massacore as the scene of strange satanic rituals, which “*do not belong to any heavenly religions*” (Ar. adyaan samawiya; this term is used to describe the Abrahamic religions). The structural opposition that this connotes situates Satanism as hellish religion, i.e. its practitioners are destined for hell. There are a number of othering statements such as these, which place the deviants either outside of or as the opposite to decent society, spread throughout the discourse.

The opening statement of the *Enta Horr* segment offers the perfect illustration of how a heavy metal concert is constructed as something outside of Lebanese society and in opposition to it,

Maalouf: *A strange phenomenon in our Lebanese society and among our youth in Lebanon, everyday we hear about Satan worshippers, everyday we hear about rituals, everyday we hear about perversions/deviances* (Ar. shothooth), *everyday we hear*

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<sup>16</sup> The Qortbawi building was once a school, then army barracks, then was controlled by different militias in the civil war. It is said to be home to a massacre before it was abandoned due to the destruction from shelling and armed combat.

*about a strange proliferation of practices that in Lebanon we say are unfamiliar, I mean something that is not normal in our Lebanese society.*

This perverse influence is spreading among “our youth” and so poses a danger to “our Lebanese society,” at least its traditions.

The solutions for this, as laid out in the discourse, involve some form of therapy for youth suspected to be Satanists, which could mean any subcultural youth who may or may not have been caught with drugs or demonstrate a “*refusal to go to church*” or “*perform their religious duties.*” According to the priest (with the agreement of the sheikh, Maktabi, and a representative of an NGO) on *Ahmar bil Khat el Arid*, this depends on the level of “apostasy” and involves “*taking the individual into the arms*” of the religious institution, which works hand in hand with a psychiatrist or psychologist and a medical doctor (in the case of drug use) to bring the individual back to his or her faith and stop him or her from worshipping Satan, engaging in unspeakable acts, taking drugs, and harming themselves.

### **Policing the threat.**

Another argument that was repeatedly aimed at the folk devil, and that served to marginalize them, was their non-normative behaviors or actions (Ar. a'mel) that set them at the margins of criminality, such as an assumed abnormal sexuality. These security-framed arguments are not limited to the security experts and the hosts or journalists, but also come from the religious figures and common folk, and are distinguished by a lexical field that produces security associations and invites increased surveillance and regulation by the state. Here the folk devil is constructed as a criminal and the social problem is converged with illegality. These statements often sound more official and authoritative than the religious arguments and have an added credibility. Often times statements that are described as

security reports are not actually related to security and serve the function of presenting attributes of the subculture, such as style and tattoos, as evidence of criminal activity.

In what was described by Maktabi as “*security information about devil worshippers, the security forces, and the purging campaign,*” retired Brigadier General Anwar Yehya discusses the satanic threat in a pre-filmed report. His report begins with the story of the young boy’s suicide, then moves to a “*group*” “*operating*” in specific Beirut suburbs, and associates Satan worshippers with charges of prostitution, drug use, and homosexuality (see Sex, drugs and rock ‘n’ roll sub-section above). As Yehya covers these topics a section of the screen turns black and dates and locations in white font appear in the black area, as though from a scene in a military film, adding to the perceived authority of his claims. He then turns to a party, which also took place in a Beirut suburb, pointing out the subcultural gear of the participants (also see Sex, drugs, and rock ‘n’ roll sub-section above), and the bewildered expressions of police officers who had attended the event (Yehya does not state whether they stopped it or made arrests). This essentially makes the weird and deviant into something criminal, and in need of legal action. The sub-section *Shepherds of Ideology- Setting Social Boundaries* below will discuss the ideological functions of such criminalizing arguments.

### **Suicide Guitar – Exaggerating a Threat**

Discourse characterized by a fear rhetoric involves a threat to the audience. The theoretical concept of the threat-amplifying signification spiral, developed by Hall et al. (1978) has been evident in the texts analyzed. If the media uses a panic inciting problem frame to discuss the subculture and its events, the public would be more favorable towards authority, the state in this instance, putting in effect stricter moral boundaries and taking forceful legal action (p. 46).

Wherever moral panics around metal have developed, a problem frame has been used and a rhetoric of fear replaces the examination and understanding of the subcultures.

These rhetorics are built on the dramatistic framing of the social interactions, reconfiguring and applying old symbols to reframe the public understanding of situations that lack public understanding... The rhetoric of fear presents problems of deviance and issues identities of deviants through the rhetorics pattern of inverted hierarchies based on the culturally negative identification of institutional binaries. This pattern frames the norms of the culture at risk and identifies the deviants and deviance creating the risk. (Smith, 2009, p. 18)

The most salient of these binaries in an Abrahamic context is God/ Satan, with man in the image of God or a worshipper of God (for Islam), as opposed to man in the image of Satan or a worshipper of Satan. This creates an understanding of the deviance in a “good versus evil paradigm” (Smith, 2009, p.18). The convergence of heavy metal with satanic deviance in fear rhetorics takes place through mechanisms such as the activation of certain lexical fields while discussing the issue, or via a signification spiral (discussed above), and even explicitly such as in Maalouf’s statement in the *Enta Horr* segment,

*These are dangerous things and dangerous parties.*

The signification spiral in the Lebanese case can be illustrated with the initial Al Jadeed news report. Spooky visual and sound effects were used to color the narrative on the “Satanists” and Massacore. The scene begins in negative film (film with inverted colors, so the lightest parts appear darkest and vice versa), flashing between regular and negative, it showed scenes of the decrepit building and the abandoned path towards it. None of the shots were still. The camera was always moving and with each shot we approached the building. Some abstract shots of trees and the surroundings established the scene, remnant of a horror film. Sinister music begins at 0.04 as we transfer inside the abandoned school. These

additions to the news report intensify the fear of the subculture. Graphic negative film has been shown to increase a story's emotional impact and attention to it (Lang, Newhagen, & Reeves, 2009); and frightening music can stimulate the same emotions one would have during a life-threatening experience (Zhang et al., 2012). Taking 12 seconds just to create this negative and frightening mood, the VO begins, "*The spectre of war that used to roam [Ar. Yahoum] around the area of Dahr el Wahesh during the Lebanese war has been replaced by the spectre of the Devil.*" This equates a devastating civil war with the threat caused by these so-called Satan worshippers, the fearful ghost metaphor adds an extra, haunting touch. The story gives the concert a menacing and secretive sense, linking it to "strange rituals" although it was legitimate, licensed, and advertised; further, all proceeds were donated to the Lebanese Red Cross, factors that the neither the reporter nor the news editor investigated.

The Al Jadeed report, like most of the evening talk shows, uses a problem frame. An interview with a resident of the area tells of security forces intervening and ending the concert as though it were a crime; this witness also thanks the security apparatuses (there was no such interference, see Al Jadeed, 2012b; Al Jadeed, 2012d). Another resident interviewed asks that the authorities put an end to the group:

*They've [the Satanists] been around for a long time... for a time they [the authorities] fought them, and now they are starting to appear again, and they are increasing in number, we are not feeling their presence... and you guys will shed light on this matter, I mean, we should from the beginning, cut it off for them.*

The signification of a hidden threat via a problem frame and fear rhetoric is evident in the primary Al Jadeed report. Instead of critical analysis and investigation, the report relies on the account of a puzzled and opinionated janitor, a little boy speaking of scary masks and music (the concert was also a Halloween party), and the claims of local residents (who were most likely those that contacted the news station to inform on the satanic ritual, precipitating

the report) that graffiti is evidence of Satanism. All the while, Bazzi nods her head and urges them on. The camera disproportionally focused on the graffitied walls of the building, a flier with the logo for *Monster*, an energy drink (the brand sold at Massacore; See Figure 6, Appendix A) as evidence of devil worship. The suspenseful and frightening music and sound effects continue in the background. The story, in which the concert is continuously signified as corresponding to, or converging with Satan worship, ends with this statement:

Reporter VO: *So, the strange phenomenon that has taken up public opinion for a long time, seems to have returned to the forefront... according to the families/residents [Ar. ahali], who are afraid that it will spread again among their teenage children [Shows a dark entrance to the abandoned building]*

Another consistent pattern that appeared in the fear rhetoric of the discourse was the statement that the problem will escalate if people continue to deny or question its existence. This suggests that those who question or oppose the claims about it are contributing to this ‘genuine’ social problem, which will spread rapidly as a result. There is also a sense of conspiracy attached to the secrecy of the threat and certain persons, whether members of the subculture or event sponsors and politicians, who are accused of “*shrouding*” (Ar. *te'teem*) or “*denying the existence of*” (Ar. *nakr wojood*) these “practices” or “groups” for ulterior reasons, which depend on the person accused. The threatening aspect of metal culture and satanic rituals is the focus, with a number of outrageous and obviously exaggerated stories that capture viewer interest and inspire fear. In the *Ahmar bil Khat el Arid* episode, Maktabi encourages these threatening depictions; this is best exemplified when he asks the priest to describe some satanic rituals (see ‘The aberrant and the grotesque’ sub-section above).

Maktabi: [turning to Father Khonaisser] *What are the rituals of the devil worshippers? I mean, Father, the respondent spoke of some of the rituals, he told us about rituals...*

Khonaissier: *First off as rituals...*

Maktabi: *The most threatening of the rituals!*

Khonaissier: *The most threatening of the rituals... we start... we have the order of baptism of babies. The satanic baptism...*

As stated above a focus on the threatening aspect of the folk devil provides the ideological justification for increased surveillance and regulation by the state.

### **Shepherds of Ideology – Setting Social Boundaries**

The third step of Fairclough's CDA is to determine whether the "social order" needs the problem; ideological discourse contributes to or maintains a social order. In this section the ideologies embedded in the texts are discussed, as well as who benefits by constructing this threat and how. As discussed in the theoretical framework, moral panic discourse is largely ideological and tightens or reaffirms normative boundaries. The news media, as a cultural industry and broadcaster of dominant ideology, instills a social reality to reproduce the system in place and give it credence. A culture brought about with fear rhetorics hides economic and social inequity (Critcher, 2011; Jhally, 1989), which explains why such rhetoric is so popular in dominant media. The aim of CDA is to uncover these ideologies and the power structures that they produce and are produced by. Power does not only dominate but can also, through discourse, construct and naturalize "hegemonic attitudes, opinions, and beliefs" that lend legitimacy to regulation and domination (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p.24).

According to Markson (1990), as our understanding of reality is largely produced by the ruling elite, and serves to reproduce the structures of domination, the control of forms of cultural production would be essential to support this dominant reality and restrictions would need to be placed on discourses that may challenge it, such as rock music, with its tendency to represent youth rebellion. Those outside of the mainstream or those who contest it are



subject to a normative crusade (p. 32). As Althusser (1971) noted: “the reproduction of labour power requires not only a reproduction of its skills, but also, at the same time, a reproduction of its submission to the rules of the established order, i.e. a reproduction of submission to the ruling ideology for the workers” (sic) (p. 132-133). It is the schools, churches, the family, media, and other Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) that from a formative age engrain the proper attitudes and accepted behaviors for workers (Althusser, 1971), and today more appropriately, consumers, through discourse.

Heavy metal and the different branches of rock, as well as punk, and a few other music subcultures, are in their nature rebellious, and adversarial towards the obedience and ‘civic morality’ that supports the means of production and the status quo. Many rock and heavy metal songs criticize the system and advocate anarchy, instant gratification, and a rejection of conservative moral norms regarding sex, family, substance use, and taste, and many times even invert them. However, many other songs address tropes such as love, faith, friendship, perseverance, and tolerance. In the moralizing discourse of the different ISAs these songs tend to be overlooked, and the deviance greatly amplified.

The rhetoric of fear in the Lebanese media, whether focused on Satanism, stores that sell rotten meat and expired canned goods, blades found in bread, and any number of other evils that appear on the news and in socio-political shows (in these cases, exposés), can aid in the creation of an environment in which the public is more accepting of increased normative control and a tightening of social boundaries. Lebanese leaders that rely on ethnic, religious, or sectarian ties for their power would benefit from creating this type of campaign to defend ‘morality.’ Political and religious elites also benefit by increasing surveillance and regulation of a potentially rebellious sub-group promoting an ideology that challenges the dominant one.

Moral panics develop in reaction to a group of people perceived as noncompliant to mainstream values and attached to certain cultural myths. By constructing an “illusory

enemy” the norms and boundaries of the in-group are re-established and social cohesion is increased (Critcher, 2005, p. 8), in this case the God-fearing, majority Christian and Muslim society. As we have seen, the Lebanese satanic panic largely corresponds to Critcher’s moral panic model (2003). It also fits two of Cohen’s (1973) criteria for moral panics, which are extreme exaggeration and connotative moral language, both attributes of the discourse examined here. The emergence, media inventory, moral entrepreneurs, and ‘experts,’ which make up the first four stages of the non-linear processual moral panic model, have been discussed. This section will now discuss the remaining three stages: coping resolution, fade away, and legacy, and offer examples of the ideological nature of the satanic panic discourse.

Coping resolution, the fifth stage of the moral panic, is concerned with the measures suggested in the discourse and brought to bear on the folk devil. Increased surveillance and regulation by the security apparatus is one of the most common ideas invoked and promoted by different claims-makers through the media discourse. For legal action to be enforced against the youth sub-culture the boundaries of acceptable behavior must be tightened and certain acts portrayed as criminal, broadening the reach of state coercion via the repressive state apparatuses and justifying it. The first means of tightening these boundaries are statements that describe the actions and culture of heavy metal fans as abnormal, deviant, strange, unacceptable, and criminal, which as we have seen, proliferates throughout the texts. Once the boundaries of acceptable behavior, forms of dress, musical taste, and events are re-confirmed they are contextualized as threatened and in need of protection, often by the state.

The assertions of the ‘security expert,’ in the form of “security information” in the *Ahmar bil Khat el Arid* episode, exemplify this form of moral boundary setting.

*Yehya: The judiciary police, or the security forces move in the case of two issues, there is either a personal accusation... or built on the information that these things that are happening are motivating people towards immorality (Ar. fojoor) and*

*deviancy/perversion (Ar. inhiraf) from religious values, and the disbanding of the family. [editing cut] The supervision/ surveillance/censorship by the state (Ar. raqqabet eldawle) should be stronger than this, inside the youth that are in this; there should be informants (Ar. mokhbereen) that inform [editing cut] Tell us, for us to intervene in the right time.*

This statement positions the subculture and its members under the jurisdiction of the security forces for the vague charge of motivating people towards immorality and deviance from mainstream religious and family values. This view puts youth sub-cultures and more liberal sub-cultures in the cross hairs and can be used, as here, to enforce restrictions on challenging discourses. It also calls for increased regulation by the state, through the claim that state surveillance and supervision should be stronger, which signifies that it is not strong enough. Yehya also attempts to encourage members of these sub-cultures and other citizens to increase their surveillance of each other and inform the authorities of any suspicious acts. This opens the door for and hails ‘right-thinking citizens’ as state informants and an arm of the apparatuses that ideologically and physically oppress them and their fellow citizens, in order to help the security forces “intervene” to protect from the threat.

The Al Jadeed news report and the *Enta Horr* segment also employ this same rationale. Additionally, Maalouf pledges that the show will infiltrate these groups and expose them. His closing statement shows the ideological background of this discourse theme.

*Tonight Enta Horr is not asking, first of all that we encroach on people’s freedoms... yet there are boundaries for everything... I want to remind those responsible in our government that whenever there is any evil action it is not because God is punishing us, as they sit and say usually, it is the result of our actions, us, our actions that harm us, second as the result of the actions of our government, that is not giving importance to this subject... the ignorance is in the Lebanese government, which in a*

*previous period, during the days of other ministers, and in the past, war was waged against these things...*

By “the days of other ministers” whence “war was waged” against the Satan worshippers, Maalouf is referring to El-Murr and his crackdown on sub-cultural youth, which he glorifies here. This is not surprising considering MTV is Murr TV. As in the above quote from Brigadier General Yehya, he also condemns the state for not providing enough regulation and in addition, of ignorance. Furthermore he categorizes the phenomena as evil. He continues,

*And I caution tonight, so we don't go into names, all the organizations, all the political personages (Ar. maraji3), and the authorities that are sponsoring these parties (Ar. sahraat)... that are suspicious....*

This signifies that certain events do not deserve state or monetary sponsorship, specifically such “strange” and “dangerous” events, i.e. events for non-mainstream music and non-normative people. He shames the clergy men who supposedly rented out the Qortbawi school, which he misrepresents as a monastery, and NGOs, and politicians who support these art forms, or use the events as a platform to spread drug and drunk driving awareness. He wraps up his argument with the call for tighter regulation, infiltrating these subcultures, and letting the good folk know what their children are up to.

*Enta Horr is not going to leave this subject, we are going to the end with this and there is no need for me to tell you that in the absence of God from people's minds, as happens in our Lebanon, regrettably, and we need to wake up, astrologers take his place, fortune tellers take his place, and Satan worshippers take his place. Tonight we have sufficed to showcase what happened two days ago in the abandoned Qortbawi monastery in Dahr el Wahesh, but we are going to follow up on these groups, and I'd like to tell you that there are colleagues from the Enta Horr show that have prepared themselves to infiltrate them and enter into these groups from now on so we can*

*transmit to you the image... so that you can see the image, and know where your children are going, and what is happening with them at these parties.*

At a certain point in each wave, media concern, and consequently public concern, around the threat of the folk devil begins to wane as it becomes less newsworthy and the news agenda shifts, this is the sixth stage of the model. The legacy on society and law, the seventh stage of the model, endures however. The arrest of subcultural youth remains justified and supported in the institutional discourse. Further, the Satanists occupy the status of an urban legend or cultural myth that is awakened when public attention is best diverted away from political events and inequality, such as the union demands for labor reform and wage increase that culminated in conjunction with the 2012 wave of satanic panic.

### **Diffusing a Moral Panic –The Devil Responds**

This section consists of a brief discussion of the reactions and arguments of subcultural youth in the texts discussed, via internet and social media networks, and the response of one channel, LBCI, to the satanic panic. The reaction of folk devils to their portrayal has scarcely received scholarly attention within subcultural and moral panic research (Griffiths, 2010). Folk devils have “private reactions,” between members of the subgroup, and “public reactions,” which are directed at society or the media (Griffiths, 2010). During the *Ahmar bil Khat el Arid* episode, two members of the subculture appeared as guests and during the *Enta Horr* segment, Bassem Deaibess, a heavyweight in Lebanon’s metal scene, calls in. These members of the subculture attempt to voice their opinions to the audience and debunk the misinformation and fear mongering of the hosts and other guests. As mentioned above, in both cases these public folk devil reactions were met with hostility, accusations, constant interruption, and a general lack of regard.

In 2012, after the Al Jadeed report was aired, a number of people shared it on social networks, ridiculing and criticizing the reporting. When Maalouf included the segment on Massacore in *Enta Horr* the next day, there was again much sharing, commenting, and the creation and sharing of satirical memes (see Figure 1, Appendix B for an example). Some members of the metal community created a Facebook group named *Li Motalabat Joe Maalouf bil I'tithaar* (En. For asking Joe Maalouf to apologize). By late 2014 this group had 2,336 members (See Figure 2 Appendix B, for the group statement pinned to the top of the page by an admin; it was written in English and Arabic). Maalouf never apologized but his show was terminated by MTV that season due to another scandal involving the mayor of a Lebanese neighborhood and a gay friendly night club,<sup>17</sup> yet was hired recently by LBCI to host a talk show similar to *Enta Horr* called *Hake Jelis* (En. Straight Talk). Members of the subculture and others sympathetic to their marginalization wrote blog posts and some progressive journalists published articles critiquing Maalouf and Bazzi's coverage.

Following the backlash from members of a subculture that had grown older and more media savvy, Al Jadeed authored a second report to provide the other side to the first (discussed above), and a segment on its socio-political evening program *Lil Nasher* exploring the issue with guests from the metal scene in Lebanon and the lawyer of an NGO accused by Maalouf of sponsoring Massacore. In the days following the exposure LBCI produced a news report titled *Moseeqiyoon mottahamoon bi'ibbaadat Al Shaytan* (En. Musicians accused of Satan Worship), criticizing the satanic panic coverage and stating the reasons for moral panic.

Mandour's (2013) study on Lebanese media discourse on sexuality explains why LBCI and Al Jadeed, but not MTV, responded thusly.

Television channels in Lebanon survive on the profits reaped from the advertising industry, which means that the viewing rates- whatever the content- have the final say

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<sup>17</sup> Mandour (2013) offers an interesting discussion of these events and Lebanese media discourse on sexuality.

in the survival of any given program. Added to this conventional viewership is the emergent social media viewership and activity, which is of increasing concern for TV CEOs as Saghieh asserts. “No CEO wants to wake up and find his TV subjected to shaming or boycotting campaigns all over Facebook and Twitter”. (2012, p. 22-23)

This is consistent with Hebdige’s (1983) observation that youth subcultures have more power and a larger capability for resisting power than they did a few decades earlier. These resources are even more amplified today with the proliferation of access to social media. Mandour (2013) also discusses the heavy role political affiliations play in TV coverage, which explains why MTV (Murr TV) did not offer a retraction or apology.

The narrative of the LBCI report clearly sided with the folk devil, identifying Qortbawi as a non-religious building that has witnessed a massacre and the venue for a private party for fans of metal and rock. One source was interviewed, an unidentified metal fan. He briefly discusses how the satanic panic of 2002-2003 was used to distract the public from political events and scare them. The following is an excerpt from one of his statements followed by the reporter’s concluding statement.

Source 1: *It is rebellious music, towards society, towards politics; each one has his own reason*

Dark scenes of musicians playing.

*Music that has wrath (Ar. ghadab) has a release of tension if you like...But the majority you find have long hair, they have piercings, tattoos, they wear black, maybe more than is necessary, but it doesn't mean the music is deviant (Ar. Shaatha).*

[Cut to images of a rock concert]

Reporter VO: *Ignorance and excitement, even with desire to feel superior, and for many other reasons, some would want to put Satan worshippers in front of our eyes,*

*to remove our sight of the worshippers of sectarianism and the devils of corruption and the demons of weapons, and chaos, and impotence.*

This report received what Griffiths (2010) calls “affirmative folk devil response.” It was shared widely and praised. In the future, other channels may be discouraged from satanic panic coverage in the wake of youth reactions and the clarification by LBCI and Al Jadeed.

## **Evaluation and Conclusions**

Step four of a CDA involves providing suggestions for the amelioration of the social problem, in this case the discourse that marginalizes the youth subculture and labels its members Satan worshippers. I offer a few suggestions to members of youth subculture and those who have an interest in rectifying media coverage of certain subgroups in society. The suggestions are general so that they can be applied to different subgroups and not only Lebanese metal fans, as they have already proven somewhat able to handle the media panic.

Although different ‘experts’ may use different frames in their argument, they all share the false belief that these secret satanic groups exist (Victor, 1993). Members of subcultures who wish to counter the rhetoric built on this belief can begin by organizing themselves. Counter-publics or interest groups that have greater organizational resources are more likely to succeed in garnering mass media support (Thrall, 2007). These resources “may include obvious and tangible assets, like money, staff, and members as well as less tangible assets such as reputation, expertise, and intellectual capital, relationships, and name recognition. News capability is the ability to translate these organizational resources into news coverage” (Thrall, 2007, p. 410). Today increasing these resources for a sub-group lacking most of them is more realizable, due to the proliferation of online networks, such as Facebook. Crowd sourcing may bring members of the subculture together and increase the resources they have



to reach the media. Sympathetic non-members of the subculture can also convene with them on these networks increasing their organizational resources in changing media discourse.

As the messages travel through social media and trend they are picked up by more traditional media who benefit from such messages as they provide them with an edge over the competition, as took place with the LBCI report discussed above. Once there is some semblance of organization, one or a few well-spoken and relatable representatives, should be chosen to act as the faces and defenders of the subculture. Their role will be to reach out and provide information to the media, and the public via the media, about the subculture, downplaying the threat attached to it and rectifying any misrepresentations. Veno and van den Eynde (2007) conducted a successful intervention in an Australian moral panic on Outlaw Motorcycle Clubs (OMCs) using four tactics that could be approximated for the case of Lebanese satanic panic. The first involved “empowering the leadership” of the subgroup, which they did by training members in strategic planning, media skills, political activism, and building coalitions (p. 494). This included designating a spokesperson and molding them to become more ‘media-genic.’ Media scholars, sociologists, and public relations practitioners should rally to the side of repressed sub-groups, share their expertise, and help them create strategies to rectify their coverage in the mass media. The second tactic they implemented was targeted at building a connection between the members of the subgroup and media professionals, which would lead to positive coverage, as the media has the ability to allay fears in addition to dispersing them. The third tactic employed by Veno and van de Eyende was political activism: lobbying individual politicians and civil society groups and forging alliances between them and the subgroup. With the added authority of respected members of civil society, the mass media is more likely to attend to and perhaps broadcast the discourse of members of the subculture that would oppose the discourse of the usually dominant claims makers. The fourth tactic was to legally challenge the police when they suppressed members

of the subculture; this tactic may not transfer to the Lebanese situation, as there is no authority with which to lodge complaints about members of the police force.

This study has concluded that Lebanese television stations, like many other media institutions around the world, construct a dominant and negative portrayal of the metal and rock subcultures and the music itself, associating it with devil worship, drug use, strange rituals, and self-harm. An exaggerated fear rhetoric characterized the texts, which also serve to define the boundaries of acceptable behavior for youth. Members of the public who have had no contact with heavy metal or subcultural youth, save through the television discourse described in this study, are likely to form a stereotyped understanding of this subgroup and to perceive them as a threat, thus leading to their marginalization. More often than not, sources interviewed display bias or ignorance; the ‘reports’ and ‘information’ conveyed to viewers was largely unfounded or purposefully exaggerated. Arguments against the subculture, or more appropriately, directed at members of the subculture who appear in these texts, are not logically sound and the imagery used serves to create a supernatural, evil, and frightening folk devil. Manufacturing a deviant other operates to tighten the moral boundaries of society by delineating what behaviors are unacceptable and worth fearing and fighting. Appeals for the surveillance of youth and intervention by the security apparatus were often made in the texts, constructing metal, rock, and the youth that enjoy them in a socio-legal frame. This is consistent with the moral panic literature and the theoretical framework of this analysis.

This study did have several limitations, the analysis of which makes up the fifth step of Fairclough’s (2001, 2002) CDA. One criticism often directed at CDA research, such as the present case, is that the methodology is not standardized or systematic, and involves the subjective interpretation of the researcher, which is why an analysis of the analysis is so important (Fairclough, 2001; Barker & Galasiński, 2001). Although some may argue that this researcher’s personal history as a subcultural youth may have colored the analysis, Barker

and Galasiński (2001) contend that these experiences “are not merely part of a private person’s make-up, rather they are also cultural patterns that form a part of the analyst’s approach to data”; although proximity to the subject of analysis can pose problems, it also provides “insight and perspectives on the problems at hand” (p. 23). Essentially, this is no different from an African American scholar studying the portrayal of crime in predominantly Black neighborhoods, or a Jewish or Arab scholar studying anti-Semitic discourse.

Second, the study only analyzed mass media content and disregarded micro media, showing only the portrayal of the subgroup by dominant actors. This was however a study of *dominant* discourses<sup>18</sup>, and an attempt to denaturalize the ideologies they represent. Another limitation of this study, and others using CDA (Machin & Mayr, 2012), is that the texts’ producers were not questioned as to the choices they made in their texts; for example, why did the Al Jadeed cameraman use such scary shots of the abandoned Qortbawi building? Such an activity is not only beyond the scope of this report, but also somewhat irrelevant to the audience, which is only exposed to the content that is broadcast, and this was an analysis of that content. This is related to another limitation regarding assumptions of audience reception, which has already been discussed in the ‘Limitations of Methodology’ section. To briefly reiterate, we cannot be sure that the audience will accept the claims of the television stations. Nötzold (2009) however states that the function of content analyses is to emphasize what is transmitted to the audience, rather than how the audience receives it. Nevertheless, the prospect of understanding the effects of moral panic discourse on the Lebanese panic is interesting. Whether the Lebanese internalize the stereotypes and panic that the media have a large role in propagating, and what effects such coverage has on their attitudes towards the subculture, music, and Satanism would make interesting questions for subsequent research.

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<sup>18</sup> Despite the rise of new/social media, television remains the most popular media, particularly in Lebanon (Trombetta, n.d.).

As youth and non-youth subcultures continue to develop in Lebanon, it is important to consider their representation in media texts to be able to suggest solutions for their portrayal and the amplification of their deviance, as well as to ensure that policy changes that may result from the moral panic are taken into proper consideration (Williams, 2011). The point, as Hall says of such research, “was not to perfect theory in a vacuum or to analyse culture for its own sake, but to produce compelling and persuasive analyses of issues of pressing contemporary concern that could connect to and become meaningful for broader more dispersed constituencies outside the academy” (sic) (as cited in Hebdige, 2012, p. 404). The present study was intended to fulfill this function in addition to demonstrating the application of Western theories regarding media, politics, culture, and moral panics to a real life Middle Eastern setting.

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## Appendix A



Figure 1: The studio of LBCI's Ahmar bil Khat el Arid programme. A priest and a sheikh sit on the left side of a red line, while two representatives of the heavy metal community sit on the right. The host Malek Maktabi moderates from the stage.



Figure 2: An image of the mosh pit at the Massacore concert in the Qortbawi building. This video was shown on *Enta Horr* as evidence of the violent satanic nature of the concert.



Figure 3: A pendant with the Sigil of Baphomet is shown next to graffiti of an inverted pentagram during the Al Jadeed evening news report on Nov. 6th 2012 supposedly confirming the existence of Satan Worshippers in an abandoned building where a concert was held.



Figure 4: A shot of the word “rap” graffitied on the wall of the abandoned Qortbawi school, taken as proof of the underground Satanic groups. From the Al Jadeed news report.



Figure 5: Image of an unidentified young man that appears among a series of images during the report given by the security expert in the *Ahmar bil Khat el Arid* episode.



Figure 6: Someone holds up a flier of Monster energy drink upside down for the Al Jadeed camera, as proof of the satanic nature of the event at the abandoned Qortbawi building.

## Appendix B




Figure 1: A satirical meme shared via social networks in the aftermath of the initial media reports in 2012.

PINNED POST



Sam Andraos

11 November 2012

As the truth about Joe Maalouf's fabrications on the Massacore event was made clear on more than a media outlet, we demand this pseudo-journalist to follow in the footsteps of other media outlets who cleared the issue apologetically, and issue a statement on his show acknowledging his negligence and lack of professionalism, and apologizing to all those he defamed and touched on their reputations with respect to their parents, friends, employers and society in general.

This man allowed himself to be judge, jury and prosecutor, issuing his judgements against people whose face were clearly shown on screens, trespassing all the professionals ethics and etiquette, proving once again his pursual of cheap scoops, a charge that has been following him since the beginning of his career and being validated with his every appearance.

Some of the fabrications attributed to him:

1. Claiming and stressing that the event took place in a religious monastery, a blatant lie that has been easily refuted on more than a media outlet showing that the building in question is, in fact, an abandoned school.

2. The claim that the date was chosen because it marks the beginning of the Christian liturgical year, to which it was made clear on more than an occasion that it was because of Halloween.

3. Accusing all the attendees in the concert of collectively abusing drugs, down to the laughable accusation of practicing devil worship. All random accusations that our brilliant reporter failed to prove, in spite of all the videos that have been released and shown on the media as well as online, clearly and in plain sight of every one.

It is worth mentioning here that a police patrol visited the event venue and departed without any notes, which can be confirmed by referring to the authorities in charge.

4. Claiming that the concert was sponsored by the Ministry of Culture, down to the random accusations that the children of some MPs and ministers participate in such "ceremonies", which was denied in person by the Minister of Culture H.E. Gaby Lyon in a phone call to one of the programs.

5. Claiming that the NGO "Kunhadi" has sponsored the event, in a cheap attempt to hint that they support illegal activities, which was refuted on multiple occasions by the organization's attorney and representatives.

Accordingly,

Given all the chaos caused by this pseudo-reporter and his random charges and fabrications against persons, institutions and organizations, we call for moral compensation to everyone who has been harmed and affected by these accusations, on the principle of responsible media accountability we take pride in, and our care to see all aspects of healthy democracy applied in our beloved country.

Unlike · Comment · Share · 100 8

Figure 2: Statement on the Facebook group to ask Joe Maalouf of *Enta Horr* to apologize for his coverage of the Massacore event

