AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

REPRESENTATION AND STABILITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE 1957 AND THE 1960 ELECTIONS IN LEBANON

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts to the Department of Public Administration and Political Studies of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at the American University of Beirut

> Beirut, Lebanon February 2015

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

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Finally, I would like to send my love to my two young children, hoping to teach them one day, that nothing worthwhile in this life is easy. As for my wife, no words can do justice to her constant support, belief in me and unending love, without which none of this would have been possible.

ABSTRACT

<u>Ibrahim Jouhari</u> for <u>Master of Arts</u> <u>Major</u>: Political Studies

Title: <u>Representation and Stability: A Comparative Study of the 1957 and 1960 Elections in Lebanon.</u>

This thesis explored the relation between representation and stability, taking Lebanon and consociational system as a case study, comparing the 1957 and the 1960 elections.

The first half of this thesis explored the theoretical framework of the Lebanese political system and its history, while the second was an analytical comparison of the two elections. The results of the comparison was equivocal, the 1960 elections was significantly more representative than 1957 and the period following 1960 was much more stable than 1957's.

In order to ascertain the relation between the two variables, this thesis tested the relationship between representation and stability to other significant factors, both internal and external that lead to the 1958 crisis. The results pointed toward the preeminence of representation among the different factors that influenced stability.

Finally, based on the previous findings, this thesis offered several electoral reform recommendations to strengthen the stability of Lebanon, by increasing representation. Faced with the prevalent aversion to change and reform by the current elites, and their entrenched interests, this thesis opted for gradual changes and small measured steps. Such as increasing the number of deputies, easing access to the political arena and carefully increasing the dose of proportionality.

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TIMELINE I

MAJOR HISTORIC EVENTS IN LEBANON

1920 September	Creation of the state of greater Lebanon
1926	First constitution of Lebanon
1932	Last official census conducted in Lebanon
1943	President Khoury appoints Riad Solh PM
1943 November	Lebanon is independent
1947	first parliamentary election in independent Lebanon
1952	President Khoury resigns
1952	President Camille Chamoun is elected
1956	France, UK, and Israel attack Egypt
1957	Parliamentary election
1958	First major civil struggle erupts in Lebanon
1958	US marines land in Beirut
1958	Crisis ends, General Fouad Chehab elected President
1969	Lebanon signs Cairo agreement
1975	Starts of the 15 years civil war
1978	First Israeli limited invasion of Lebanon
1982	Second Israeli invasion, reaches Beirut
1982 August later	Bashir Gemayel elected President, assassinated a month
1989 October	Lebanese deputies sign constitutional amendment at Taef
1992	Lebanese parliamentary election, Christians boycott it
2000	Israel end occupation of South Lebanon
2005	Assassination of PM Rafic Hariri, Syrian army withdraws

TIMELINE II

SPECIFIC EVENTS OF THE PERIOD OF STUDY

1952	President Bichara Khoury resigns, after rosewater revolution
1952	Camille Chamoun elected President
1955	Formation of Baghdad Pact. Chamoun refuses to join it
1956 Oct-Nov	Suez war, by France, England and Israel against Egypt
1956 Nov 13	Arab Summit in Beirut Chamoun refuse to sever ties with Fr-UK
1956 November	New Lebanese government, with pro-western majority
1957 March	Lebanon's formal acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine in
1957 April 5	Government wins noconfidence vote. Opposition deputies resign
1957 April	Opposition forms umbrella group called 'National Front'
1957 May 30	Large Opposition rally, defies government ban and ends in blood
1957 June 9	Parliamentary elections is held over four consecutive Sundays
1958 February 1	Syria and Egypt unite, forming the United Arab Republic
1958 May 8	Assassination of Journalist Nasib al Matni
1958 May-July	Intensification of clashes, 2/3 of country in hand of rebels
1958 July 14 July	Fall of Pro-western Hashemite Kingdom in Iraq
1958 July 15	14,000 US marines debark in Beirut
1958 July 31	President Chamoun resigns, General Chehab succeeded him
1958 Sep 24	First government formed under Chehab
1958 Sep-Oct	Counter-revolution, spearheaded by Pierre Gemayel
1958 October 15	Cabinet of national unity formed
1958 October 25	Withdrawal of US troops from Lebanon
1960 June-July	1960 parliamentary election is held
1961	Failed Coup d'etat by SSNP

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Overview

1. General historic overview

Lebanon gained its independence from France in 1943 at the time its population was evenly divided between Christians and Muslims, which could be further broken down into 18 recognized religious sects, with three main ones: Maronite Christians, Sunni, and Shi'a Muslims. In this newfound Lebanese republic, a power-sharing consociational system emerged. This system was based on the 1943 "national accord" oral agreement that was forged between the Maronite President Bishara al-Khoury and Sunni Prime Minister Riad al-Solh, to define the division of power in the young state.¹ However, Lebanon's post-independence history was marked by alternating periods of political stability and unrest. Several major crises shook the country: the 1958 civil strife, the 15 years civil war that started in 1975, and the recent limited 2008 internal conflict. After each crises, only a bargain struck by the opposed elites, with foreign mediation opened the door to political agreement between the opposed Lebanese factions, restoring stability to the country. What is striking is that in each of those examples the cornerstone of this political agreement has been a reform of the electoral system.

¹ Michael Hudson, *The Precarious Republic* (London: Westview Press, 1985)106.

2. The 1955-1961 period in Lebanon

Between 1943 and until the end of 1954, Lebanon enjoyed peaceful and prosperous existence, and serious attempts were made by President Chamoun at administrative and electoral reforms, to meet the rising challenges demographic and regional challenges, but they failed.² Prior to 1955, Lebanon took a neutral position between Arab states and played the role of peace-maker among them. At the same time, Lebanon maintained friendly relations with all the big powers and avoided becoming involved in the East-West conflict, or joining international alliances. The year 1955, was the turning point in that period.³ The year 1955 witnessed the rise of regional tensions that were reflected internally. President Chamoun and a majority of Christians parties, like the Kateb, chose to side with the West and its Baghdad alliance, meanwhile the main Sunni Muslims powers; allied with Kamal Jumblatt's Druze sided with Nasser's Pan Arab movement. Despite the crystalizing opposite positions, the situation was kept under control until the advent of 1957 parliamentary election that preceded the 1958 crises.⁴ The 1957 parliamentary election, which was depicted by most scholars, first-hand political actors and observers as suffering from widespread gerrymandering,⁵ mal-apportionment and electoral irregularities. This led to the exclusion of major opposition figures from the parliament.⁶

The crisis was resolved with the intervention of US marines and a regional detente between the Russian and Western camps and with the election of consensus President Fouad Chehab, who was the army Commander during the 1958 events.⁷ Yet

² Fahim Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)27.

³ Fahim Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)27.

⁴ Caroline Attie, *Struggle in the Levant* (New York: Center for Lebanese Studies, 2004)158.

⁵ Jacob M. Landau, "Elections in Lebanon," *The Western Political Quarterly* 14, no. 1 (1961)140.

⁶ Attie, *Struggle in the Levant* (New York: Center for Lebanese Studies, 2004)144.

⁷ Michael Hudson, *Politcal Change in Lebanon 1943-1963* (New York: Yale University, 1963)282.

the crisis was only fully resolved once the 1960 elections were held.⁸ These elections were held after major changes occurred to the electoral law by following a uniform law by means of an already established administrative district (the Qaza) to draw electoral districts. It also increased the number of parliamentary seats (from 66 to 99),⁹ introduced secret ballots, and implemented several other reforms¹⁰. According to most scholars, these factors significantly increased the level of parliamentary representation, also the 1960 elections resulted in the inclusion of most political leaders, several of whom were at the forefront of the 1958 crisis after being excluded in 1957 elections.¹¹ Consequently, the 1960 electoral law was later used without major changes in all parliamentary elections before the 1975 war,¹² and was even resurrected recently for the 2009 parliamentary elections, with the endorsement of all major Lebanese political factions.

3. Parliamentary elections in Lebanon

Lebanon's parliamentary elections and the laws that govern it have always been the center of intense debates, and at times the cause of strife and clashes. Every four years, at the eve of each election, the Lebanese political elites and public at large fiercely discuss, propose, and veto a myriad of different electoral laws, while each political/sectarian faction try to implement the electoral law that befits its aspirations. It

⁸ Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)164.

 ⁹ Nicola A. Ziadeh, "The Lebanese Elections, 1960," *The Middle East Journal* 14, no. 4 (1960)368.
 ¹⁰ Malcolm H. Kerr, "The 1960 Lebanese Parliamentary Elections," *Middle Eastern Affairs* 11, no. 9 (1960)269.

¹¹ Malcolm H. Kerr, "The 1960 Lebanese Parliamentary Elections," *Middle Eastern Affairs* 11, no. 9 (1960)268.

¹² Abdo Baaklini, *Legislative and Politcal Development: Lebanon, 1842-1972* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1976)144.

is important to note that Lebanon is one of the few countries,¹³ in the world that has parliamentary seats proportionally divided between its different religious sects, while using a majoritarian electoral law with a list system in multi-seats mixed districts (called a bloc vote system.)¹⁴

Even though the 1960 electoral law was praised and endorsed by all major Lebanese politicians for 2009 elections,¹⁵ it was subsequently deemed unfair by most Christian politicians from opposite sides of the political spectrum, when it was time for the 2013 elections. In reality, communities who are suffering from a demographic decline feel that proportionality and parity are no longer enough to fulfill their 'true' representation. They feel that although they are awarded half the seats, many Members of Parliament (MPs) are elected by Muslim majorities and their leaders, not by Christians and their leaders. Thus, they are not beholden to their sects and they did not represent the will/affiliation of the majority of that sect, and "impairing communal representation."¹⁶

4. A new representation paradigm

Proportionality and parity, long held as the corner stone of consociational democracies and conflict resolution in divided societies, are no longer sufficient to maintain the delicate balance of power between the different sects to maintain stability,

¹³ Andrew Reynolds, Ben Reilly and Andrew Ellis, *Electoral System Design* [Electoral System Design]International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2005)44.

¹⁴ International Foundation for Electoral Systems, The Lebanese Electoral System (Lebanon: IFES,[2009]),

http://www.ifes.org/~/media/Files/Publications/SpeechCommentary/2009/1382/IFES_Lebanon_ESB_Pap er030209.pdf (accessed 16/09/2014).

¹⁵ International Crisis Group, *The New Lebanese Equation: The Christians' Central Law* International Crisis Group, [2008]) (accessed 09/27/14).

¹⁶ Tamirace Fakhoury Muhlbacher, *Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather* (Germany: VS Research, 2007)101.

hence requiring a new level of representation. This is a new dimension of representation, which is interesting to explore further. The 1957 and 1960 parliamentary elections coupled with the 1958 crisis that marked that period exemplify this issue. In both elections the sectarian proportional distribution of seats was maintained (at the time, it was a 6/5 Christians to Muslims ratio, that was agreed upon after the independence of Lebanon and enshrined in its national accord).

Undeniably, the delicate confessional balance was preserved in 1957 elections, for example the Druze seat in the Chouf was won by a Druze MP while the Druze majority leader Kamal Jumblatt was ousted due to severe gerrymandering and electoral fraud. So did most of the opposition figures at the time, while securing large majorities in their sectarian, regional and partisan constituencies.¹⁷ On the other hand, in 1960, all the political figures of the oppositions won their seats with flying colors.¹⁸ According, to many authors and observers, this mal-representation was one of the two major internal causes of the 1958 civil war (the other being President Chamoun bid for reelection).¹⁹ This thesis will explore this concept of intra-sectarian representation and its interaction with the broader inter-sectarian representation in the Lebanese polity.

B. Research question

Recurrent bout of violence and civil wars have been plaguing the region and several other countries with plural and divided societies like Iraq, Yemen and Syria, Ukraine, and previously former Yugoslavia. Therefore, the causes of this cyclic flare up of violence, and the sharp rise of ethnic conflicts, civil wars and the lack of stability in

¹⁷ Kerr, *The 1960 Lebanese Parliamentary Elections*, Vol. 11, 1960)268.

¹⁸ Malcolm H. Kerr, "The 1960 Lebanese Parliamentary Elections," *Middle Eastern Affairs* 11, no. 9 (1960)268.

¹⁹ Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)30.

plural societies have become a heated debate subject in political science, with a focus on the reasons why some plural societies enjoy peace and stability, while others have fallen into civil strife. Some scholars have argued that the causes were a failure of consociationalisim, or a result of it.²⁰ Others have argued that the regional setting and external meddling played a large role in destabilizing these divided societies, while others blamed the recent demographic changes and the lack of minorities' representation. Exploring all the causes of the spreading instability is beyond the scope of this thesis, and it will focus on one of the acknowledged causes: representation and its effects on stability.

It is proposed to study the cause of representation and its effects on stability via a case study: Lebanon during the 1955-1961 period. Lebanon is considered a divided society par excellence, in which no single sect hold the majority, where warring political parties are constantly vying to increase their share of power, while faced with a changing demographic balance and regional upheavals.²¹ Moreover, the 1958 crisis and the 1955-1961 period framing it, exemplify this focus, witnessing two elections with different laws, and consequently different level of representation.²²

This research through exploring the relation between representation and stability, will take into account how representation was affected by reconciliation agreement, the electoral reforms they introduced, and then will apply this new model of representation to the exploration of the relationship between the representation and stability. Once, the relationship between stability and representation has been fully

²⁰ Sara G. Barclay, *Consociationalism in Lebanon* (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania, 2007).

²¹ Richard Hrair Dekmejian, "Consociational Democracy in Crisis: The Case of Lebanon," *Comparative Politics* 10, no. 2 (January, 1978), 251-265.

²² Michael Hudson, "The Lebanese Crisis: The Limits of Consociational Democracy," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, sec. 5, Spring-summer, 1976.

explored, this thesis would have positively expanded the research about the political stability of divided societies, especially in opening up new aspects of representation. Finally, this thesis concluded its discussion with a set of guidelines that might help frame future discussion of new electoral law in Lebanon, and any country sharing these characteristics, in view of the relation between representation and stability.

Research Question: Exploring the relation between representation and stability; comparing the 57 and 60 parliamentary elections in Lebanon.

C. Methodology

This thesis used the comparative research method as opposed to the experimental or the statistical methods. In general, research methods aim at scientific explanation, consisting of the establishment of general empirical relationships among two or more variables, while all other variables are held constant.²³

Nevertheless, the comparative method suffers from two interrelated problems: the existence of too many variables, and a small number of cases. The former is common to virtually all social science research regardless of the particular method and renders the problem of handling many variables more difficult to solve.²⁴ Therefore, in order to minimize this problem Lijphart suggests several remedies, like increasing the number of cases or focusing on comparable cases, or analyzing a single country diachronically, a "comparison that of the same unit at different times generally offers a better solution to the control problem than comparison of two or more different but similar units." Diachronical studies have more constants and relatively fewer variables

²³ Arend Lijphart, *Thinking about Democracy* (New York: Routledge, 2008)246.

²⁴ Earl Babbie, *The Practice of Social Research* (Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2004).

than in many cross-national studies. Yet the differences could hardly be sharper."²⁵ This is expected to narrow the scope of research, yet secure more robust results.

This thesis explored the political history of Lebanon diachronically, focusing on a short period of time, from 1955 to 1961, in order to limit the number of variable and be able to highlight the two varible that form the basis of this study: representation and stability. Accordingly, two different parliamentary election in Lebanon, the 1957 and the 1960 election were studied, since they were held in a close period, and were based on different laws and ushered two dissimilar periods, the first witnessing a civil war, and the second started a relatively calm decade.

1. The two variables

<u>Representation:</u> Various theorists postulated a wide selection of rival and incompatible definitions of representation. In this thesis, the emphasis will be on the communal component of representation rather than the individual one and on the proportional representation and the new level of representation aspect discussed earlier. In specific, this thesis scrutinized the more practical and mechanical aspect of representation, mainly electoral laws and their applications.²⁶

<u>Stability:</u> this thesis defines stability as the lack of political violence (as opposed to mundane criminal violence), civil unrest, and civil wars. It is also understood that a stable period would benefit from positive and vibrant economic growth, prosperity, functioning government and institution, political reform, which could also be counted as additional peripheral indicators of stability in this thesis.

²⁵ Lijphart, *Thinking about Democracy* (New York: Routledge, 2008)253.

²⁶ Hanna Pitkin, *Representation* (New York: Atherton Press, 1969).

2. Research approaches

This thesis used two different approaches to explore the relation between the two variable, representation and stability. Based on these criteria the extent, importance and width of the relations between the two variables was determined.

a. A comparative study of both variables

Based on the definition of the two variables, and the criteria set in the previous section, a comparative study was implemented, with two different approaches. First, the two parliamentary election were scrutinized and compared to the other, using pre-set criteria used to determine the fairness of elections. The European Commission and the Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) have each published election observation handbooks.²⁷ These handbooks enumerate several election standards that must be followed in order to support, protect, and promote democratic governance, human rights, and representation. These standards stem from key concepts enshrined in universal principles, and they include periodic elections, genuine elections, free elections, fair elections, universal and equal suffrage, voting by secret ballot, and honest counting and reporting of results. Additionally, these handbooks offer detailed criteria based on these concepts: state interference, number of deputies, campaign finance, unbiased public institution, gerrymandering, monetary incentives, and detailed electoral procedures – preprinted ballots, secret booth, open electoral registrar. These criteria will be used to compare the level of representation between the 1957 and 1960 elections.

²⁷ Retrieved online from <u>http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/68439?download=true</u>, and <u>http://eeas.europa.eu/eueom/pdf/handbook-eueom_en.pdf</u>

Similarly, the level of stability was studied after each election based on the general criteria set forth previously. Therefore, this discussion of stability, which could be explained as the lack of violence, would focus on number of violent incidents, clashes and the number of casualties, and the geographic spread of violence, how many parties where involved and the army's position. Additionally, the state of public institutions, and their effectiveness was also be a factor: are the security forces able to maintain order over all the territory, is the parliament and the council of minister meeting regularly and are they issuing laws and decrees. Second, a more nuanced approach focusing on exploring the new aspect of representation discussed earlier was taken. This new approach focused on the issue whereas proportionality and parity are no longer sufficient to maintain the delicate balance of power between the different sects to maintain stability, thus requiring a new level of representation, or relative representation. This approach explored the question why sectarian communities feel disenfranchised even though members belonging to said sect are holding public offices.

b. <u>Discourse analysis</u>

This thesis undertook a discourse analysis of writings of the main political players, observers (ambassadors, journalists) and scholars who tackled that period. The thesis polled their conclusions concerning the causes of the 1958 crisis, and how the political system and its stability was affected by representation. It also delved into how these key figures considered the relationship between representation and stability, and what other factors, in their opinion, affected stability.

It is important to highlight that this thesis focus was on this particular relationship and the key variables. Despite the fact that there are several other variable

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that affected the level of violence and instability in Lebanon in that period. An example of these variables could be the external situation and more specifically regional pressure and conflict. Such as the Suez war in 1956, the spread of the Nasserist movement in the Arab world and the formation of the United Arab Republic.²⁸ These other variables do not affect the results of this thesis, as the main aim is to prove that the relationship between the two variables is measurable and significant. However, in an effort to ascertain the significance of this thesis main hypothesis, the relationship between representation and stability, was compared to the other proposed explanation and causes of the 1958 crisis.

3. Sources

This thesis used main sources (books, articles, and academic journals and articles) that tackled the primary theoretical issues explored therein, such as democracy, specifically representative democracy, representation, the issue of electoral reforms and how they affect representation and stability. The thesis also overviewed literature on consociational democracy, using primary sources by the scholars who first formulated these theories (Lijphart, McGarry, and Norris) and their main critics (like Horowitz and Reilly). Moreover, the thesis used current literature on electoral engineering, the classification of electoral systems and different effects of these systems on the political life in divided societies. In order to conclude how representative each system can be, and how suitable are they in severely divided societies. This thesis also used more specific sources focused on Lebanon's history, and political development, during the

²⁸ Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)29.

period between 1955 and 1961. Therefore, research materials was mainly drawn from primary sources and secondary sources.

a. Primary Sources:

- Interviews and memoires of that period's major political figure, such as MP Saeb Salam, President Chamoun, MP Kamal Jumblatt, PM Solh).
- Newspaper and archival materials from the period
- Firsthand accounts and analysis, written during that period, as well as archival material such as newspaper articles, books like Qubain's "crisis in Lebanon" written in 1961, and Hudson's "the Precarious republic" written in 1968
- Moreover, this thesis used archival sources obtained during a research trip to the United State and collected from the State Department declassified archive, at the National Archive in Washington DC, and from the UK The National Archives in Kew, London. The focus of these documents was the 1955-1961 period of study and how the US and the UK perceived the Lebanese elections, their level of representation and the country's stability. These documents included secret US and UK embassy dispatches to the State Department, analysis and firsthand account of the Lebanese election, the results and the prevailing political atmosphere, in addition to briefs about the major political figure of the period, and a rundown of the violence that followed the election. ²⁹

²⁹ Original research will be available upon request.

b. Secondary Sources

Furthermore, this thesis also used secondary sources, such as analysis and interpretation of the 1955-1961 period, based on recently declassified materials, including:

- Books like "Struggle in the Levant" (Attie 2004) and "Notes from the Minefield" by Gendzier, and other books and article focusing on that period.
- Jointly to the previous, this thesis will also use many Arabic sources and materials, which will be listed in the bibliography.
- Thesis and journals written on Lebanon and its political system, like Dr. Nawaf Salam thesis on the 1958 crisis.
- Classic work on Lebanon's political system and history by Dr. Theodor Hanf, Michel Chiha, and Dr Samir Makdisi.

D. Thesis Outline

There are seven chapters in this thesis. The first one is the current introduction lying out the main ideas, research question, and methodology. The remaining six chapters are divided into two. The first three are more theoretical in nature, while the last three are more analytical.

Chapter 2: this chapter laid the general theoretical framework of the thesis, exploring democracy and plural societies. The chapter then focused on power sharing models such as consociationalisim, discussing its main characteristics, critics and the moving on to alternatives like the integrative model and the power division one. The second chapter ended with an exploration of representation and stability and how these concepts will be used in this thesis.

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Chapter 3: this chapter dealt with the specific nature of the Lebanese political system, exploring its origin, developments, and major changes. Then the Chapter moved to explore the different components of the Lebanese political system, such as its constitution, the National Accords. The chapter also surveyed Lebanon major political institutions such as the executive and the legislative branches, and ended with a full discussion of the history and development of the Lebanese electoral system.

Chapter 4: this chapter overviewed the historic events of the period of study from 1955 to 1961. It explored the events prior to President Chamoun election, and the foreign and internal developments that preceded the 1958 crisis. The chapter focused on the impact of the external events such as the 1956 Suez crisis, the Baghdad pact and the adoption of the Eisenhower doctrine by President Chamoun. In addition to the internal events such as the 1957 elections, President Chamoun bid for reelection, and the assassination of Nassib Matni.

Chapter 5: this chapter is the first analytical chapter of this thesis. It analyzed and compared both the representative nature of the 1957 and the 1960 elections, based on the preset criteria, such as districting, number of deputies, and electoral systems, and by undertaking a comprehensive discourse analysis. The chapter also compared the stability of the two periods following both elections, in order to ascertain the level of representation and stability of the 1957 and 1960 elections.

Chapter 6: This chapter tested the relation between representation and stability against the other hypotheses proposed to explain the 1958 crisis. Several alternative factors were cited, both internal and external, such as Chamoun reelection bid and Muslims grievances. On the external side the cold war, the rise of Arab nationalism and the Suez crisis were listed. The method used in this analysis was also based on the same

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methodology as Chapter five, starting with an analytical study, followed by discourse analysis.

Chapter 7: The concluding chapter of this thesis discussed the relevance of this study, and the significance of the Lebanese parliament in view of the predominance of sectarian elites. Additionally, this chapter explored the different factors that complicates any electoral reform efforts, such as immobility, sectarian leaders' vested interests, and illustrated them in a comparison of the 2005 and 2009 elections. The chapter then offered a few recommendations as a conclusion of this thesis.

CHAPTER II

DEMOCRACY AND POWER SHARING IN PLURAL SOCIETIES

As previously discussed, this thesis will explore the relation between representation and stability in the framework of plural society, ruled by a power sharing consociational political system. Before moving to the comparison and analysis of the two variables, there is a need to build up the theoretical framework. This Chapter will explore democracy and its applications, especially in plural societies, and discuss the different power sharing models, and the theoretical understanding of the representation and stability. It will conclude with a brief summary of the pertinent points that can support and strengthen this thesis main argument about the relation between representation and stability.

A. Democracy and plural societies

The history of democracy can be summed as a series of great transformations, the first occurred during the fifth century B.C. in Greece, when the nondemocratic citystates became democracies. For the next two thousand years, the idea and practice of democracy were associated almost exclusively with small city states, and their model of direct democracy. However, city-states were supplanted by the emergence of the national states, ushered with the peace of Westphalia in 1648.³⁰ In this second

³⁰ Croxton Derek, "The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty," International History Review 21, no. 3 (1999)571.

transformation, the scale of democracy became much larger. This transformation was built upon a novel idea, which is now considered a core democratic value: representation.³¹ Democracy was no longer an assembly or a direct democracy, but a representative democracy. Control over public policy became constitutionally vested in elected officials, who are chosen in "frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon. And practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials and in running for office." ³² Consequently, the electoral arena became the most important aspect of representative democracy, as the primary forum of competition between different individuals and groups, embodied by the legislature, where differences must be arbitrated, rather than on the streets, violently.³³

This thesis will utilize the overreaching concept of representative democracy model, used as synonym of what Dhal calls "polyarchy". He explained that polyarchy is an inclusive and highly competitive regime characterized by political participation, wide civil and political liberties and a tolerated opposition.³⁴ Additionally, polyarchy is not a system of government, which fully embodies all democratic ideals, but one that approximates them to a reasonable degree.³⁵ Dahl explained that he "used the term polyarchy to differentiate the institutional complex of modern democracy not only form assembly democracy, but also from democracy in the ideal sense." ³⁶

It is also worthy to mention Anderson's view of democracy, who explained that "Democracy is about winning and losing at election. Yet, democratic governance is also

³¹ Robert Dahl, "A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness Versus Citizen Participation," *Political Science Quarterly* 109, no. 1 (1994)25.

³² Robert Dahl, "A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness Versus Citizen Participation," *Political Science Quarterly* 109, no. 1 (1994)24.

³³ Timothy Sisk, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996)30.

 ³⁴ Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New haven: Yale University Press, 1971)120.
 ³⁵ Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (London: Yale University Press, 1974).

³⁶ Dahl, A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness Versus Citizen Participation, Vol. 109, 1994)26.

about how the political system deals with the winners and losers of democratic contests after the election is over." ³⁷ Robert Dahl also spoke about the importance of mutual security as a prerequisite to electoral competition and the need for a minimum level of the protection of basic interests and rights, so that defeat at the ballots will not jeopardize physical survival.³⁸

This thesis will be exploring a specific case of societies that suffer from deep cleavages and divisions, therefore it is important to define and discuss what a plural society is, in order to explore how best to ensure its stability.

A plural society is divided by what Eckstein calls "segmental cleavages." They exists where political divisions follow very closely, lines of objective social differentiation, which are particularly salient in that society.³⁹ Segmental cleavages can be of a religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, or ethnic nature. ⁴⁰ Political parties, interest groups, media of communication, schools, and voluntary associations also tend to be organized along the lines of segmental cleavages. Population groups adhering to such cleavages will be called the segments of a plural society, or communities. ⁴¹ These communities live side by side, yet separated within the same polity. Extreme cases of fragmentation are described by Verba as a political system "made up of two closed camps with no overlapping a membership. The only channels of

³⁷ Christopher Anderson J. and Christine A. Guillory, "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems," *The American Political Science Review* 91, no. 1 (1997)66.

³⁸ Sisk, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996)30.

³⁹ Harry Eckstein, *Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966)34.

⁴⁰ Theodor Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon. Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation* (London: , 1993)21.

⁴¹ Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (London: Yale University Press, 1974)4.

communication between the two camps would be at the highest level."⁴² In such societies, members will direct their loyalty towards one particular group or segment. Furthermore, Hanf pointed out that cleavages based on religions have intensified conflict in many cases, as they involve principles that are indivisible, therefore non-negotiable.⁴³ By contrast, societies with crosscutting cleavages, overlapping memberships, and individual cross-pressures that lead citizens to moderate attitudes and a cooperative political culture.⁴⁴ In a plural society there will be no such cross-pressure, attitudes will be fragmented and loyalties concentrated and inflexible, leaving little room for compromise.⁴⁵

Within consensual, non-coercive approaches to managing plural societies there are but two options: partition or democracy. Partition is rare and even more rarely peaceful, is a "solution of the last resort."⁴⁶ It is a viable option only in deeply divided societies, where ethnic groups are homogeneously concentrated in specific geographical areas, and only if the new states themselves do not include significant minorities and the main state accept the session, conditions that are rarely met. If peaceful partition is an unlikely and highly unusual outcome in divided societies, and authoritarian methods are at best a short-term solution to the management of such societies, then the only applicable model is democracy.⁴⁷

⁴² Sidney Verba, "Organizational Membership and Democratic Consensus," *Journal of Politics* 27 (1965)470.

⁴³ Theodor Hanf, *Dealing with Differences* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999)394.

⁴⁴ Arend Liphart, "Consociational Democracy," World Politics 21, no. 2 (1969)208.

 ⁴⁵ Helga Malmin Binningsbo, "Consociational Democracy and Post Conflict Peace. Will Power-Sharing Institutions Increase the Probability of Lasting Peace After Civil War?" (Norway, Department of Sociology and Political Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 2005).
 ⁴⁶ Sisk, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington DC: United States

Institute of Peace, 1996)34.

⁴⁷ Timothy Sisk, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996)28.

B. Power sharing

The dominant state model in the west is a democratic nation-state, and at the core of its society is the individual citizen. The impartial state is neutral toward all and treats all its citizens equally, disregarding their ethnic, religious, linguistic, cultural, racial, and national origin.⁴⁸ This model of majoritarian democracy is individualistic; it does not recognize group and community rights, except in "rare case by establishing" special protections for discriminated groups in order to equalize their conditions in society."⁴⁹ Majoritarian democracy is based on two features, socio-cultural homogeneity and majoritarian consensus, and characterized by a majority governments, centralized power, and a disproportional electoral system. However, in the early 1960s several scholars recognized the limitation of applying majoritarian democracy in divided societies, which lacked homogeneity.⁵⁰ However, rejection of majoritarian democracy does not mean rejection of democratic values, consequently Liphart and Nordlinger established a new model, known as consociational democracy. Consociationalisim, with a continental flavor rather than a anglo-american one, both in origin and orientation, embraced the necessity for recognizing the existence of distinct ethnicities as major, legitimate components in deeply divided societies, and extended these groups or segments collective rights and protections, in order to usher the establishment of a just, representative, and democratic polity.⁵¹ The theory became part of the broader framework of power sharing democracies, and used its high theoretical

⁴⁸ Sammy Smooha, "Types of Democracy and Modes of Conflcit Management in Ethnically Divided Societies," *Nations and Nationalism* 8, no. 4 (2002)423.

⁴⁹ Ilan Peleg, "Transforming Ethnic Orders to Pluralist Regimes" In *Democracy and Ethnic Conflict*, ed. Adrian Guelke (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)11.

⁵⁰ Fakhoury Muhlbacher, *Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather* (Germany: VS Research, 2007)35.

⁵¹ Peleg, *Transforming Ethnic Orders to Pluralist Regimes*, ed. Guelke (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)10.

and empirical potential, to become the democratic model considered as the most viable in managing conflicts and ensuring the stability of divided societies. No sooner were studies on the European plural societies published that attention shifted to explore other plural countries in the world such as Lebanon, Cyprus, Malaysia, South Africa, Ghana, and India.⁵²

Advocates of applying power sharing in divided societies agree on the danger of majoritarianism. They claim that one of the main hurdles in applying majoritarian democratic systems to plural societies are caused by the minorities' fear of electoral competition, especially when the expected consequences of a majority victory is discrimination against them. Especially, when the loss of an election by a minority group is a grave matter, as it might endanger its survival.⁵³ These majoritarian democracies are usually typified by the Westminster system, using small electoral districts with first past the post electoral rules, in which the party that wins a majority of seats form the government and rule while the other parties remain in a loyal opposition. Additionally, scholars identified many pitfall with applying such an electoral system to plural societies, citing the potential distortions in vote-to-seat outcomes, the inability of geographically dispersed minorities parties to achieve representation and the likelihood that a single ethnic group or coalition could exclusively govern to the detriment of other segments. Liphart identified the core problem as the potential for majority dictatorship.⁵⁴ Another noted scholar, Horowitz explained that under conditions of simple majority rules, ethnic parties developed, majorities took power, and minorities

⁵² Fakhoury Muhlbacher, *Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather* (Germany: VS Research, 2007)37.

⁵³ Sisk, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996)31.

⁵⁴ Arend Lijphart, "Power Sharing in South Africa," Policy Papers in International Affairs 24 (1985)102.

took shelter. The prospect of minority exclusion from government, underpinned by ethnic voting, was potentially permanent. He added that "Simple majority rule results in minimum winning coalitions that exclude a significant minority, and when minority preferences are intense, with little chance of the minority becoming majority, a recipe for conflict exists. Civil violence, military coups, and the advent of single party regimes can all be traced to this problem of inclusion-exclusion."⁵⁵ This is why the power sharing model is considered a serious alternative to the Westminster model or majoritarian democracy, specifically in plural societies because "The realistic choice is not between the British normative model of democracy and the consociational model, but between consociational democracy and no democracy at all."⁵⁶

In principle, power sharing enables conflicting groups to settle longstanding patterns of antagonism and discrimination, address political grievances and maintain political stability, while preserving civil peace and controlling internal violence. The essence of power sharing is not to suppress democratic competition but to contain it within acceptable boundaries, so that differences of opinion along ethnic lines do not inevitably lead to intergroup violence.⁵⁷ Institutionally, there are several methods used to apply the democratic power-sharing model.⁵⁸ The most widely used and studied model is the previously mentioned consociational power-sharing model, which is most closely associated with the work of Lijphart, and more recently with that of McGarry and O'Leary. Nevertheless, several other approaches that were put forth, such as

⁵⁵ Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (London: University of California Press, 1985)629.

⁵⁶ Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (London: Yale University Press, 1977)238.

⁵⁷ Sisk, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996)33.

⁵⁸ Ian O'Flynn, David Russell and Donald Horowitz, *Power-Sharing: Institutional and Social Reform in Divided Societies* (New York: Pluto Press, 2005)1.

Horowitz's and Reilly's integrative models⁵⁹, which are based on tweaking the design of various electoral mechanisms that would encourage the election of moderate representatives.⁶⁰ There is also a third model proposed by Roeder and Rothchild, called power dividing. It is an institutional option for ethnically divided societies, based on three central strategies: civil liberties, multiple majorities and checks and balances.⁶¹ The next section will further explore and discuss these models, in order to better understand the theoretical framework that will guide the analysis of the relation between the two variables.

C. Consociationalism and alternative models of power sharing

1. Consociationalism

Consociationalism is a pragmatic approach to the problem of nation building and ensuring the stability of plural societies. The nation-state model is incompatible with these societies given their deeply fragmented character. Consociationalism recognizes the existence of differences in segmented plural societies, yet when consociational devices are used, these differences do not prevent the creation of a viable political and democratic entity. Consociational theory emphasizes the role of the elite in bridging segmental differences and containing potential conflict.⁶² The basic argument for consociationalism, as opposed to a simple majority rule, is that it prevents the outbreak of open conflict in socially heterogeneous societies. Indeed, consociational systems usually result from stalemate, when no side can win all sides accept the second

⁵⁹ Benjamin Reilly, *Democracy in Divided Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)11.

⁶⁰ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (London: University of California Press, 1985)92.

⁶¹ Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild, *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars* (New York: Cornell university Press, 2005)6.

⁶² Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (London: Yale University Press, 1974).

best solution: power-sharing⁶³. Additionally, in countries, especially developing ones, suffering from internal violence, a consociational form of democracy is more likely to ensure lasting peace.⁶⁴ The consociational model is based on the assumption that the best way to deal with division is by taking division seriously, as Lijphart explained: "It is in the nature of consociational democracy, at least initially, to make plural societies more thoroughly plural. Its approach is not to abolish or weaken segmental cleavages but to recognize them and to turn the segments into constructive elements of stable democracy."⁶⁵ Consequently, the model aims to treat conflicting communities as the basic building blocks of political engagement by institutionalizing them as distinctive or separate entities within the power-sharing framework. As the case of the Netherlands demonstrates, this approach can succeed over time in dealing successfully with division and in building a just and peaceful democracy. Indeed, it can even help create conditions that might mitigate tensions to a point that the significance of perceived differences and the corresponding need for power sharing wither away, leading to the introduction of a plural democratic model, based on a majoritarian electoral system.⁶⁶

As discussed earlier Arend Lijphart has been instrumental in constructing the theory of consociationalisim and is still one of the most prolific writer on this model and its application to deeply fragmented societies. Lijphart's theory was originally inspired by the empirical observations of smaller European countries as well as Lebanon.⁶⁷ At the heart of consociational democracy, lies the necessity of elite accommodation.

⁶³ Hanf, *Dealing with Differences* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999)391.

⁶⁴ Samir Makdisi and Marcus Marktanner, "Trapped by Consociationalism: The Case of Lebanon." *IFE Lecture and Working Paper Series* (2008)1.

⁶⁵ Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (London: Yale University Press, 1977)42.

⁶⁶ O'Flynn, Russell and Horowitz, *Power-Sharing: Institutional and Social Reform in Divided Societies* (New York: Pluto Press, 2005)5.

⁶⁷ Fakhoury Muhlbacher, *Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather* (Germany: VS Research, 2007)40.

Political stability in fragmented cultures is based on the representatives of the different segments who make "deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing and destabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation." Lijphart was praised to transcend static and deterministic conditions of political development, and with the introduction of the idea that elites can willingly and deliberately change the course of events. He succeeded in presenting "elite behavior as the missing link between a plural society and political stability."⁶⁸

According to Lijphart, the best examples of consociational democracy in Europe are Switzerland since 1943, Austria from 1945 to 1966, Belgium since 1970, and the Netherlands from 1917 to approximately 1967. In Latin America and Asia, he considered Colombia from 1958 to 1974, Malaysia from 1955 on and Lebanon from 1943 to 1975 as successful examples of consociational democracy. Lijphart defines consociational democracy in terms of four characteristics, and a number of favorable conditions. The next section will explore these two parameters, in addition to the criticisms and alternative models proposed.

a. The characteristics of consociationalisim

1- The first and most important characteristic of the consociational model is government by a grand coalition. The political leaders representing the different segments form this coalition, which may take on different forms such as a parliamentary cabinet or a coalition of the president with other officeholders in a presidential system. In a grand coalition, the politics of accommodation lays the

⁶⁸ Lijphart, Consociational Democracy, Vol. 21, 1969)75.

foundations for political security.⁶⁹ A grand coalition government is preferable in plural societies, because political stakes are high and opinions divergent, thus a coalition government broaden the base of support and includes most segments. The fact that most political factions are brought together in the same government or coalition, stimulates them to compromise, while enhancing the political stability and security of the various segments.

- 2- The "mutual veto" or "concurrent majority rule" refers to the veto each segment in society can use against the decision made by the governing body or another segment. The mutual veto serves as an additional guarantee to minority interests, considering that participation in a grand coalition offers important political protection for minority segments, but not an absolute protection. Indeed, decisions in grand coalitions are reached by majority vote, minority segments can be outvoted by a majority.⁷⁰ When such decisions directly affect the interests of a segment, majority rule can become unacceptable. Hence, a "mutual veto" among segments should be another pillar added to the system, to provide full political guarantees to each segment. Such a guarantee can be an informal agreement or a clause integrated in the constitution and has the additional benefit of reinforcing the sense of communal integration and mutual trust.⁷¹
- 3- Proportionality is a third characteristic of consociational democracy. It is based on the democratic principles of universal representation. However, proportionality ensures balance, or even parity, between the different communities, rather than equality between individuals. Proportionality rules

⁶⁹ Fakhoury Muhlbacher, *Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather* (Germany: VS Research, 2007)42.

⁷⁰ Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (London: Yale University Press, 1977)34.

⁷¹ Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (London: Yale University Press, 1977)36.

should be the governing principle in political representation, civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds, in a consociational system. The principle of proportionality overrules the possibility of a tyrannical majority by allowing minorities to be overrepresented. Parity and overrepresentation serve to protect small segments and give them a sense of security.⁷²

Consociational states give up the majoritarian electoral system, in favor of a fixed quota system reserved for each segment or community. Thus, minority rights are not only protected constitutionally, but also institutionally by proportional representation in the governmental structure. ⁷³ Additionally, Steiner defines the proportional model as in which all groups influence a decision in proportion to their numerical strength. In this respect, too, the proportionality and grand coalition rules are linked, as e further explained: "A roughly proportional distribution of influence in policy problems can usually only be assured if the decision is bargained over with the participation of all groups." ⁷⁴ Proportionality adds a refinement to the grand coalition concept: not only should all significant segments be represented in decision-making organs, but they should also be represented proportionally.⁷⁵

4- Segmental autonomy, gives each segment the right of independent rule in their own affairs and local or particular matters (such as religious, financial, or social issues, geographical concerns...). It is a delegation of power and the

⁷² Fakhoury Muhlbacher, *Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather* (Germany: VS Research, 2007)43.

 ⁷³ Nada Dumani, "Problems of Consociational Democracy in Lebanon" American University of Beirut),
 18.

⁷⁴ Jurg Steiner, "The Principles of Majority and Proportionality," *British Journal of Political Science* 1, no. 1 (1971)64.

⁷⁵ Jurg Steiner, "The Principles of Majority and Proportionality," *British Journal of Political Science* 1, no. 1 (1971)64.

proportional allocation of funds to various segments. It gives each group the power of self-government in matters that do not affect national interest.⁷⁶ Segmental autonomy increases the plural character of society. This characteristic forms the basis of the consociational idea: not to abolish or weaken cleavages, but on the contrary to explicitly recognize them and turn these cleavages into constructive elements. Segmental autonomy can take one of two forms: either territorial in the context of a federation or confederation, or legal-cultural where individuals are subject to their own code concerning personal status.⁷⁷

b. Favorable conditions

A comparative analysis of consociational cases has led Lijphart to formulate a series of prerequisites and factors that are favorable to establishing and maintaining consociational democracy. He based his analysis on five cases of consociational democracy, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Lebanon. The following favorable factors appear to be particularly important in this respect: a multiple balance of power, small size and passive or unaligned foreign policy of the country involved, overarching loyalties and sense of common belonging, segmental and geographical isolation, prior traditions of elite accommodation, a small number of segment (ideally three of four equal in size and power). These factors contribute to cooperation among segmental leaders and their loyal support by segmental followers.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (London: Yale University Press, 1977)41.

 ⁷⁷ Dumani, *Problems of Consociational Democracy in Lebanon*American University of Beirut, 1984)19.
 ⁷⁸ Fakhoury Muhlbacher, *Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather* (Germany: VS Research, 2007)41.

Additionally, there are several inferred favorable conditions for consociational democracy, concerning the role of the elites, and their need to share the commitment to maintain the unity of the country, while upholding its democratic practices and institutions. They must also have a basic willingness to engage in cooperative efforts with the leaders of other segments in a spirit of moderation and compromise. At the same time, they must retain the support and loyalty of their own followers. The elites must also enjoy a solid and wide representation inside their own segments. It clear that the elites are a crucial element of consociational democracy.⁷⁹ All these are conditions that are helpful not only in establishing consociational democracy in a plural society but also, once it is established, in maintaining and strengthening it.⁸⁰

c. <u>Critics of the theory</u>

Lijphart himself acknowledged that consociational democracy has several disadvantages. First, he questioned some of the democratic quality of the model and argued that "it is the best kind of democracy that can realistically be expected in divided societies."⁸¹ Indeed the model has been criticized for its atrophied or lessened democratic qualities. It falls short of the democratic trinity of liberty, equality, and fraternity, focusing instead on communal rights and identities rather than individual rights. Additionally, while most political factions are part of the coalition government, the opposition – an integral part of democracy- is weakened and even nonexistent.⁸²

⁷⁹ Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (London: Yale University Press, 1977)53.

⁸⁰ Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (London: Yale University Press, 1977)54.

⁸¹ Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (London: Yale University Press, 1977)48.

⁸² Robert Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998)194.

Second, consociational democracy may impede efficiency in decision-making and bring about stagnation and instability. In a grand coalition, decision-making is slow, and mutual veto may lead to immobilism and deadlock. Recruitment on the basis of proportionality also undermines individual merit. Furthermore, segmental autonomy demands the establishment of many agencies and units, increasing bureaucracy and ballooning the budget.⁸³ Several scholars, such as Horowitz, Makdisi,⁸⁴ and Barry considered that the adoption of consociational devices may reinforce inter-communal tensions and friction instead of mitigating them. Meanwhile Horowitz, questioned the assumption that groups in a plural society act cohesively and have a unitary leadership. He explained that a grand coalition may only exacerbate intra-ethnic competition, and it is indeed rare that a coalition of leaders speaks for the entire community. He expressed doubts about the ability of the elites to unite, arguing that "leadership has often limited freedom to choose its own path, and might be restricted, despite good intentions, by external conditions, or even from centrifugal forces arising from followers or from intra segmental electoral competitors."⁸⁵

Nevertheless, Lijphart addressed these points in one of his latest books about the consociational model, titled "Thinking about Democracy". He argued that even though the model violates the principle of majority rule, it does not deviate very much from normative democratic theory. He explained that most democratic constitutions prescribe majority rule for the normal transaction of business, but in case of constitutional amendments or when the stakes are too high, extraordinary majorities are needed. In fragmented systems, most decisions are perceived as involving high stakes, therefore

⁸³ Fakhoury Muhlbacher, *Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather* (Germany: VS Research, 2007)48.

⁸⁴ Makdisi and Marktanner, Trapped by Consociationalism: The Case of Lebanon., 2008)13.

⁸⁵ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (London: University of California Press, 1985)574.

they require more than simple majority rule. "Similarly, majority rule does not suffice in times of grave crisis in even the most homogeneous and consensual of democracies. Great Britain and Sweden, both highly homogeneous countries, resorted to grand coalition cabinets during the Second World War."⁸⁶ Nyerere, using the history of Western democracies, observed that "it is an accepted practice in times of emergency for opposition parties to forgo their differences and join together in forming a national unity government."⁸⁷ Just as the formation of a national unity government is the appropriate response to an external emergency, so the formation of a grand coalition cabinet or an alternative form of elite cartel is the appropriate response to the internal crisis in plural societies.⁸⁸

It should be pointed out, however, that the characteristics of consociationalism responsible for these minor disadvantages have a positive impact on the peace and effectiveness of decision-making. For instance, in Switzerland by virtue of the federal structure demands are split up among different political levels, which contributes consequently, to the alleviation of the burdens of decision-making at that level and a lower probability of immobilism. At the end Lijphart repeated that although the consociational model might suffer from some flaws, but it is the model that has the most successful record of keeping peace and stability in plural societies.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Lijphart, *Thinking about Democracy* (New York: Routledge, 2008)30.

⁸⁷ Nyerere, "One Party Rule" In *The Ideologies of Developping Nations*, ed. Paul E. Sigmund (New York: , 1963)199.

⁸⁸ Lijphart, *Thinking about Democracy* (New York: Routledge, 2008)31.

⁸⁹ Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (London: Yale University Press, 1977)238.

Alternative power sharing models

As discussed previously, two alternative models were proposed: the integrative and the power dividing models:

2. Integrative model

By way of alternative proposal, Horowitz and Reilly have stressed the need for greater political integration between the members of conflicting communities as well as across society. They argued against designing rigid power-sharing institutions, in which elected representatives have to work together after elections have taken place. They claimed that the consociational model enshrines ethnic division in these societies and is only a temporary solution to alleviate violence and instability in the short-term.⁹⁰. Horowitz stated that sustainable democracy is more likely to be achieved through the provision of electoral incentives that reward political parties and leaders who are willing to compromise with one another across the political divide and, by compromising, fend off the uncompromising extremes within their own communities.⁹¹ Their approach focused on the design of various electoral mechanisms (especially the use of the "alternative vote" or "instant runoff") that would encourage the election of moderate representatives.⁹² Horowtiz also advised the devolution of power and reservation of offices on an ethnic basis in an effort to encourage interethnic competition at the local level. He also recommended the adoption of policies that encourage alternative social alignment, such as social class and territory by placing political emphasis on

⁹⁰ Reilly, *Democracy in Divided Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

⁹¹ Benjamin Reilly, *Democracy in Divided Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)11.

⁹² Pippa Norris, *Electoral Engineering* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004)37.

crosscutting cleavages, and the reduction of disparities between groups through managed distribution of resources.⁹³

This model has gained traction among scholars who tried to explain why the consociational model failed in several countries. For example, Dr. Makdisi argued that in order to stabilize plural countries, the consociational model may serve only as temporary arrangement towards a more viable political system. He explained that it is best to redirect the elites from intra-sectarian towards inter-sectarian accountability, by use of social cohesion building and electoral engineering, echoing Horowitz's integrative model.⁹⁴

3. the power-dividing model

This model was formulated by Roeder and Rothchild's, in their "Sustainable Peace" book. They rejected the classic options of majoritarian democracy, power sharing, protectorates and partition as long-term solutions that can provide stable democracy in plural societies. They advocated the power-dividing model associated with the US constitution, focusing on civil liberties, multiple majorities and checks and balances, as an alternative strategy to manage plural societies.⁹⁵ They claim that consociational power sharing is a useful short-term mechanism to overcome commitment problems that may prevent conflicts; however, it is detrimental to peace and stability in the long term. Three strategies are central to power dividing: civil liberties, multiple majorities and checks and balances. They result in an allocation of

⁹³ Sisk, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996)40.

⁹⁴ Makdisi and Marktanner, Trapped by Consociationalism: The Case of Lebanon., 2008)13.

⁹⁵ Roeder and Rothchild, *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars* (New York: Cornell university Press, 2005)15.

power between government and civil society, taking many responsibilities out of the hands of government, and distributing the rest among separate, independent organs that represent alternative, crosscutting majorities, balancing one decision making center against another so as to check each majority. While the most important issues that divide ethnic groups, are decided by a government common to all ethnic groups. ⁹⁶ The two authors explained that power dividing is based on key institutional instruments: first, an extensive human rights bill that is meant to leave key decisions to the private sphere and civil society. Second, the separation of powers between the branches of government and a range of specialized agencies dealing with specific and clearly delimited policy areas, ruled by multiple and changing majorities.⁹⁷ Third, checks and balances aimed to keep each of the decision making centers that represents a specific majority from overreaching their authority. Thus, the power-dividing approach favors presidential over parliamentary systems, bicameral over unicameral legislatures and independent judiciaries with powers of judicial review extending to acts of both legislative and executive branches.⁹⁸

D. Representation

The ideal form of government is in which sovereignty is vested in the entire aggregate of community, where every citizens has an actual part in the exercise of that ultimate sovereignty and plays a role in the government.⁹⁹ Such direct democracy was

⁹⁶ Stefan Wolff, "Conflict Resolution between Power Sharing and Power Dividing, Or Beyond?" *Political Studies Review* 5 (2007)381.

⁹⁷ Roeder and Rothchild, *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars* (New York: Cornell university Press, 2005)15.

⁹⁸ Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild, <i>Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars</i> (New York: Cornell university Press, 2005)17.

⁹⁹ Pitkin, *Representation* (New York: Atherton Press, 1969)177.

perhaps possible in the small Greek city-states, yet in the current much larger, national state it is unwieldy and almost impossible to apply. Thus, representation was established, and the final steps in forming the modern idea of representation was linking the concept of representation with agency and acting for others, and linking these institutions with democracy.¹⁰⁰ It is based on the idea that in democracy sovereign power resides in the community as a whole, and in default of unanimity and the polling of all citizens, the opinion that is supported by a majority during elections, is more likely to approximately represent the opinion of the whole body.¹⁰¹

Representation has had many different definitions, like Hobbes' investiture of power in a man or assembly of men who will be authorized to take all actions and judgments as if the people made them, in order to live peacefully among themselves and be protected from other men.¹⁰² Alternatively, more modern definition were proposed explaining that "representation of an individual in a society is a condition which exists when the characteristics and acts of a person in power are in accord with the desires, expressed and unexpressed, of the individual."¹⁰³ It is clear there is a central and important point of contention between the two previous examples, which has been fiercely discussed in literature about representation: Should the representative do what his constituents want or to use his own judgment?

In this thesis' framework, representation gains an additional aspect, in which the electoral arena became the most important aspect of representative democracy, because

¹⁰⁰ Hanna Pitkin, *Representation* (New York: Atherton Press, 1969)4.

¹⁰¹ Marie Collins Swabey, "The Representative Sample" In *Representation*, ed. Hanna Pitkin (New York: Atherton Press, 1969)86.

¹⁰² Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (New York: Everyman's Library, 1937)90.

¹⁰³ Harold Foote Gosnell, "Pleasing the Constituents" In *Representation*, ed. Hanna Pitkin (New York: Atherton Press, 1969)104.

it is the primary forum of competition between different groups, vying for individual votes. ¹⁰⁴ On the other hand, power sharing models focus on the representation of the communities that form these plural societies. Undeniably, these models emphasis communal representation rather than the classical individual representation. In order to ensure the representation of these segments, consocitionalists favors proportionality. Steiner defines the proportionality as "where all groups influence a decision in proportion to their numerical strength. And a proportional distribution of influence in policy problems can only be assured if the decision is bargained over with the participation of all groups."¹⁰⁵ Proportionality also adds a refinement to the grand coalition concept: not only should all significant segments be represented in decision-making organs, but they should also be represented proportionally.

In order to achieve this proportional representation, power-sharing theories offered several methods: dividing the representative body proportionally between the different segments, and reserving these seats for each community, ensuring that regardless of the electoral results each segment will receive its pre-allotted number of seats. Or by using proportional electoral systems that would distribute seats proportionally based on the results elections. The first method is a proportional preallocations of seats, while the second is a post-election proportional allocation of seats.

E. Political Stability

Political stability will be used in this thesis as a multidimensional concept, combining ideas that are frequently encountered in the comparative politics literature:

¹⁰⁴ Sisk, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996)30.

¹⁰⁵ Jurg Steiner, "The Consociational Theory and Deliberative Politics" In *Conflict and Compromise in Plural Democracies*, ed. Stenphen Brooks (Wesport: Praeger, 2002)25.

system maintenance, civil order, legitimacy, and effectiveness. The most important characteristics of a stable democratic regime are its high probability of remaining democratic and low level of actual and potential civil violence. These two dimensions are closely related; the latter can also be viewed as a prerequisite for, and as an indicator of, the former. Similarly, the degree of legitimacy that the regime enjoys and its decisional effectiveness are related to each other and to the first two factors. Jointly and interdependently, these four dimensions characterize democratic stability.¹⁰⁶

Additionally, scholars have pinpointed several key factors that are crucial in achieving political stability. Moderation and inclusiveness as two of these key factors.¹⁰⁷ Indeed, civil violence, military coups, and instability in general can be traced to this problem of inclusion-exclusion.¹⁰⁸ Meanwhile, several conditions and triggers that might lead plural communities to move away from cooperation, towards violence, have also been identified. Sisk pointed out that crosscutting cleavages and the level of government repression are early warning indicators of instability. Additionally, he identified events, known as triggers that may cause direct violence, such as failed elections, provocative acts by political leaders, abrupt changes in the regional environment and security.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy* (London: Yale University, 1999).

¹⁰⁷ Ian O'Flynn, ed., *Power Sharing* (London: Pluto Press, 2005)61.

¹⁰⁸ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (London: University of California Press, 1985)629.

¹⁰⁹ Sisk, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996)22.

F. Conclusion

• Why democracy and power sharing?

Stability in plural societies has been a hard goal to achieve, yet not impossible, as the case of the Netherlands demonstrates.¹¹⁰ In this regard, there is no viable alternatives to democracy as a system of just and stable conflict management.¹¹¹ Lijphart explained that "not only have non-democratic regimes failed to be good nation builders; they have not even established good records of maintaining order and peace in plural societies.²¹¹² Democracy has a better record of peace and stability both internally and externally (between different countries), than any other system.¹¹³ Plural societies are faced with only two peaceful and non-coercive choices partition or democracy. Peaceful partition are an unlikely and highly unusual outcome in divided societies, and authoritarian methods are at best a short-term solution to the management of such societies, then the only applicable model is democracy.¹¹⁴ However, applying majoritarian democracy (FPTP and Westminster model) is problematic to plural societies, because of exclusion-inclusion and the tyranny of majority issues. Thus, plural societies are left only with the choice of a power sharing model or no democracy at all.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁰ O'Flynn, *Power Sharing* (London: Pluto Press, 2005)5.

¹¹¹ Sisk, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996)29.

¹¹² Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (London: Yale University Press, 1977)277.

¹¹³ Binningsbo, Consociational Democracy and Post Conflict Peace. Will Power-Sharing Institutions Increase the Probability of Lasting Peace After Civil War?, Norway ed.Department of Sociology and Political Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 2005)5.

¹¹⁴ Sisk, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996)28.

¹¹⁵ Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (London: Yale University Press, 1977)238.

• The role of representation in democracy and power sharing

Representation and elections are at the heart of democracy. So is managing the relations between minorities and majorities after elections, indeed the electoral arena is the most important aspect of representative democracy, as it is the primary forum of competition between different groups. "It is in the halls of parliament, and not in the streets that individuals and groups in multiethnic societies are expected to arbitrate their differences." ¹¹⁶ Meanwhile, the practical side of representation, such as the design of electoral systems matter quite significantly in the political stability, and the capacity of the system to manage conflict and violence.¹¹⁷

Additionally, Power sharing in all its different models focus primary on reinforcing and increasing representation and inclusion, in the short term in order to increase stability and foster democracy on the long term. Even the integrative and the divisive models are based on fine-tuning the democratic institutions, especially the ones dealing with representation such as the parliament, in order to strengthen stability. Consociationalisim cites proportionality as one of its four main tenants, moreover representation forms an integral part of the main thrust of the theory: elite accommodation. These elites represent the different segment of a plural societies, thus they are able debate and strikes bargains between them in the interests of their segments, and in order to preserve peace and stability. The implied point is that these elites must represent their own communities, so that their constituency would accept the deals they struck with the rest of the segments. However if they are just figureheads, that happened to be from that particular segment (religious, or geographical) the citizens

¹¹⁶ Sisk, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996)30.

¹¹⁷ Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *Electoral Systems and Democracy* (Baltimor: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006)ix.

who are part of these segments will feel excluded from the power sharing agreement. They will believe that their interests are not represented by these elites, leading them to refuse these bargains, reigniting the feeling of exclusion, which will negatively affect the stability of the whole polity, and might lead to civil violence, military coups, issues that can all be traced to the problem of inclusion-exclusion.¹¹⁸ Thus, the elites must represent the aspirations and political outlook of their segments, and reflect the intra community majority. Once the governing elites represent each segment of a plural societies, they can start negotiations and the process of accommodation, that should increase stability.

Thus, there is two different level of representation. The intra segment representation, which leads to the elections or choosing of elites that represent the will of a majority of this segment's members. And the inter-segment representation, how each segment is represented in the political structure of the polity, whether in parliament or the government, or what the consocitionalists call proportionality. Consequently, the two level of representation must be met and strengthened in order to increase the representative nature of the system and increase its stability. As a final note it is important to note that there is no single mechanism that can ensure peace and stability in divided societies, but there is a range of mechanisms beyond the core prescriptions of each theory that are necessary for peace, democracy, and stability to prevail over violence.¹¹⁹ After this focused and detailed theoretical discussion of the relation between representation and stability, this thesis can move forward to an exploration of the Lebanese political system and its history.

 ¹¹⁸ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (London: University of California Press, 1985)629.
 ¹¹⁹ Wolff, <i>Conflict Resolution between Power Sharing and Power Dividing, Or Beyond?</i>
 Vol. 5, 2007)389.

CHAPTER III

LEBANON'S PRE-TAEF POLITICAL SYSTEM

This chapter will explore the Pre-Taef Accords political system in Lebanon, starting with its genesis in 1840, passing through the French mandate, until independence and the national accords. It is important to know that the Taef Accords¹²⁰ passed significant constitutional and political changes in the Lebanese system. This chapter will also detail the different characteristics of the Lebanese political system, its executive and legislative branches, and consociational aspects.

A. Introduction

The history of Lebanon goes back to ancient times, and is rich with tumultuous events and upheavals. This thesis will specifically focus on the 1955 -1961 period. Yet to fully understand the Lebanese modern political system, it is important to explore how it developed and evolved. The roots of the pre-1975 system goes back to the 1840-1860 period that witnessed ethnic conflicts and conflagrations that resulted in widespread massacres and civil strife. That era ended with the application of a new political system, drawn by the great powers of the time. The agreements abolished the previous feudal rule of the Emirs and ushered a new period in the history of Lebanon that continued until World War One.

¹²⁰ The Taef Accords were a constitutional amendment, reached by consultation by most Lebanese factions to end the civil war that started in 1975. It was agreed upon in the Taef city in the KSA, in 1989.

B. Origin

Lebanon stayed under the rule of the Ottoman Empire for three centuries up to World War One. However, local groups, such as the Druze, were granted semiautonomous rule. Meanwhile, areas outside Mount Lebanon fell under the control of Damascus and local feudal lords, who followed the Ottoman Sultan. In 1842, the Shihabi Emirate, one of these autonomous areas, collapsed after their failed alliance with Egypt, marking a new era in the political history of Lebanon.¹²¹ The fall of the Shihabi dynasty was followed by a tumultuous period of sectarian strife and riots, between Druze and Christians, culminating with the massacre of the Christians at Deir El Qamar. This invited foreign intervention by European powers, resulting in an agreement with the Ottoman Empire to divide Mount Lebanon between the two warring factions, along the Beirut Damascus road.¹²² This agreement was struck between Ottomans on one hand and the five great powers at the time, Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia, which divided Mount Lebanon into two districts, called Qaim Maqamiyah. One with a Christian majority in the North and the other Druze in the South, each ruled by a governor of the dominant religion, and a council representing the various religious groups.¹²³ Thus, the first sectarian geopolitical division of Lebanon was born, which has since been the basis of the Lebanese political system.¹²⁴

Unfortunately, the instability and upheavals did not end. The 1843 agreement failed as it polarized the conflict which started as a socioeconomic conflict between the dying feudal system and the Maronite church allied with the peasantry along sectarian

¹²¹ Imad Salamey, *The Government and Politics of Lebanon* (London: Routledge, 2013)15.

¹²² Samir Khalaf, *Lebanon's Predicament* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987)60.

¹²³ Albert Hourani, "Lebanon the Development of a Political Society" In *Politics in Lebanon*, ed. Leonard Binder (London: John Wiley and Sons, 1966)22.

¹²⁴ Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon (London: Routledge, 2013)16.

lines¹²⁵, and it did not take into account the numerous mixed villages in both qaimmaqamiyah, which caused the resurfacing of inter-sectarian violence.¹²⁶ After a period of instability, 1860 witnessed an even bloodier civil war that resulted in the death of thousands of Christians. It reached a sectarian climax with the second sacking of the Maronite stronghold Deir al Kamar, followed with another massacre of Christians in Damascus, which gave France a compelling cause to intervene.¹²⁷ French and British troops landed in Beirut, in 1861, and a few months later a new accord was set up to regulate Lebanon. On June 9 1861 Turkey, and with the previously mentioned European powers signed the Organic Law for Lebanon in Constantinople, which was amended once in 1864, and lasted till World War One.¹²⁸

The 1861 Organic Law for Lebanon considered the entire Mount Lebanon as an autonomous territory, called the Mustasarrifiyah, to be administrated by a Christian non-Lebanese Governor-General appointed by Turkey with the approval of the five powers, for a term of five years.¹²⁹ A Central Administrative Council of twelve members divided by sects (two for each of the Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Sunnis, Shiaas, and Druze)¹³⁰ was charged with assessing taxes, and administrative revenues and expenditures. The underlying assumption of the new system was that the different communities could live together, with a clear Maronite demographic dominance.¹³¹ Mount Lebanon was further divided into seven districts,

¹²⁵ Baaklini, *Legislative and Politcal Development: Lebanon, 1842-1972* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1976)45.

¹²⁶ Khalaf, *Lebanon's Predicament* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987)60.

¹²⁷ Wade Goria, *Sovereignty and Leadership in Lebanon 1943-1976* (london: Ithaca Press, 1985)17.

¹²⁸ Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)12.

¹²⁹ Salamey, *The Government and Politics of Lebanon* (London: Routledge, 2013)20.

¹³⁰ Baaklini, *Legislative and Politcal Development: Lebanon, 1842-1972* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1976)49.

¹³¹ Hourani, *Lebanon the Development of a Political Society*, ed. Binder (London: John Wiley and Sons, 1966)23.

called Qaza, and each was allotted a set number of seats to be filled on a confessional basis. Thus, the confessional ratio system, or proportionality was introduced in each of the districts and in Mount Lebanon as a whole.¹³² Internal police was tasked security and no Turkish troops were allowed in the land. Mount Lebanon became virtually separate from the Ottoman Empire, and its autonomy was guaranteed by the five European powers.¹³³ The remainder of the nineteenth century saw a relative period of stability in Mount Lebanon, with each community focusing on cultural and economic development. It should be noted however that this political system legitimized sectarian representation and foreign intervention in Lebanon and the region.¹³⁴ The outbreak of World War One brought an end to the previous era, and ushered a new political phase for Lebanon, based on the same sectarian principles.¹³⁵

C. French mandate

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, following World War One, the League of Nations placed Lebanon under French mandate. In order to create Greater Lebanon, the French added to the Mountain of Lebanon an area twice its own size, comprising the Bekaa, and the coastal zones. These areas were religiously heterogeneous, thus the Sunni population was increased eight times, the Shia four times, while the Maronite population only increased by a third.¹³⁶ Understandably, this annexation changed the sectarian demographic balance. Mount Lebanon population was majoritarly Maronite, but after the creation of Greater Lebanon, all Christian sects

¹³² Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)13.

¹³³ Fahim Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)13.

¹³⁴ B. J. Odeh, Lebanon: Dynamic of Conflict (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1985)39.

¹³⁵ Salamey, *The Government and Politics of Lebanon* (London: Routledge, 2013)22.

¹³⁶ Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)16.

together had a slight majority, with the Maronite having the largest sub-group. Thus, the focus of inter-sectarian conflict changed from Maronite-Druze to Maronite-Sunni.¹³⁷ A local advisory Council, derived from the Central Administrative Council was formed, and it was transformed in 1922 into the Representative Council of Greater Lebanon. The 17 Seats of this Council were proportionally divided among the sects: 6 Maronites, 3 Orthodox, 1 Catholic, 4 Sunnis, 2 Shias, and 1 for the Druze.¹³⁸ This council, a few years later, ushered in the Lebanese Republic and became its first Chamber of Deputies.¹³⁹

On May 23 1926, the Lebanese Representative Council, acting in its capacity as a constitutional assembly, adopted the first constitution of modern Lebanon. The constitution originally established a bicameral system, composed of a chamber of deputies and a senate. A year later, they were merged into a single chamber. Legislative authority was vested in this chamber of Deputies, and executive authority was vested in the President of Republic, who exercised it with the aid of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers.¹⁴⁰ The constitution tasked the Chamber of Deputies with electing a President, for a single six years term, and bestowed him with strong legislative and executive powers. Although, confessionalisim was enforced, it was not directly stated in the constitution. It was the result of various deals and agreements struck between the ruling elites.¹⁴¹

¹³⁷ Hourani, *Lebanon the Development of a Political Society*, ed. Binder (London: John Wiley and Sons, 1966)25.

¹³⁸ Traboulsi Fawaz, A History of Modern Lebanon From the Imarah to the Taef Accords (Beirut: Riad El-Rayyes Books, 2008)150.

¹³⁹ Salamey, *The Government and Politics of Lebanon* (London: Routledge, 2013)24.

¹⁴⁰ Pierre Rondot, "The Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy" In *Politics in Lebanon*, ed. Leonard Binder (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966)128.

¹⁴¹ Salamey, *The Government and Politics of Lebanon* (London: Routledge, 2013)27.

D. Independence

Lebanon gained its independence from France in 1943, following the November 8 parliamentary elections, when the Lebanese government and the parliament amended the constitution, striking off all articles referring to the mandate and the powers of the high commissioner, unilaterally ending the mandate. French authorities retaliated by arresting the president and prime minister, but they relented after widespread strikes and civil disturbances. The French finally accepted Lebanon's independence on November 22 1943.¹⁴² At the time, Lebanon's population was evenly divided between Christians and Muslims, according to the last official census of 1932. In addition to the constitution written in 1926, the "National Accord", an unwritten agreement forged at independence, between the Maronite President Bishara al-Khoury and Sunni Prime Minister Riad al-Solh, ¹⁴³ was critical in shaping the delicate confessional balance of power and the shape of the political system of the young state.¹⁴⁴

E. The National Accord

The foundation of the independent Lebanese republic was based on an unwritten gentlemen's agreement: the National Accord. It was the result of numerous consultations between the country's Maronite and Sunni elites, and was later approved and supported by their followers and the rest of the Lebanese factions. It was a compromise between the two sects; the Christians would stop seeking foreign protection, France's in particular, while the Muslims would not make any attempt to bring Lebanon into any political union with Syria or other Arab nations.¹⁴⁵ The pact

¹⁴² Imad Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon (London: Routledge, 2013)29.

¹⁴³ Hudson, *The Precarious Republic* (London: Westview Press, 1985)106.

¹⁴⁵ Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)18.

recognized the various sectarian elements of the country and laid the foundation of a sectarian power sharing system that had its roots in the 1843 and 1861 law, exchanging foreign and regional alliances and patronage for a share in the state spoils and protection.¹⁴⁶ It formalized the confessional distribution of the highest public offices and top administrative posts based on the proportional distribution of sects, according to the last official census conducted by the French in 1932, which revealed a slight Christiane dominance over Muslims. Thus, the seats in the chamber of deputies were distributed according to a 6 to 5 ratio favoring the Christians. This proportional distribution was applied to all public offices equitably between the recognized confessions, especially the three top positions: the President would be a Maronite; the Prime Minster would be a Muslim Sunni; and the Speaker a Muslim Shia.¹⁴⁷

Like most other Lebanese institutions, the Accord was a cross breed of rational and traditional elements, contractual and sectarian consideration, even though it was not written, it was considered as an integral part of the Lebanese Constitution.¹⁴⁸ The National Accord was a pragmatic *modus operendi*, an entente between religious groups whose political orientations and frames of references were different. The main concern was the utilization of political institutions not to resolve communal conflicts but merely to contain it. Its goal was to freeze sectarian differences, in order to avoid the emotional and confessional upsurges associated with them, preventing ideological conflictive issues from destroying the precarious political institutions and the young state.¹⁴⁹ The function of the national pact was to enhance stability, security, and equilibrium within

¹⁴⁶ Salamey, *The Government and Politics of Lebanon* (London: Routledge, 2013)30.

¹⁴⁷ Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)18.

¹⁴⁸ Rondot, *The Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy*, ed. Binder (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966)128.

¹⁴⁹ Enver M. Koury, *The Operational Capability of the Lebanese Political System* (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1972)66.

the confessional political system, and preserve the delicate balanced distribution of power among the various interest groups and religious sects.¹⁵⁰ It also aimed to guarantee a semblance of democracy and freedom of expression, and to regulate the interplay of various confessional groups of a pluralistic society, trying to shield the system from disruptive internal and external influences and flare-ups. Most scholars agree that it has proved to be a very effective palliative,¹⁵¹ and a "bulwark against disruptive potential of irrational confessionalisim."¹⁵²

The ingenuity of the national pact was its flexibility and ability to provide acceptable and enduring arrangements. Unlike constitutional commitments, the pact has a wide enough scope to be applied to various circumstances, and establishing political balance between the two divergent Muslims and Christians views, through the process of reason, and mutual consent. Also, through negotiations, it took an additional dimension of promoting national identity and unity by demonstrating that debate, persuasion, pragmatic bargaining, rather than emotion and sectarianism provided the only way to assure national coexistence. Political scholars agree that the pact has been largely instrumental in the attainment of relative stability of the system, by reconciling the differences of its sectarian communities and is mainly responsible for the maintenance of the country's independence.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ Enver M. Koury, *The Operational Capability of the Lebanese Political System* (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1972)265.

¹⁵¹ Khalaf, *Lebanon's Predicament* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987)115.

¹⁵² Clovis Maksoud, "Lebanon and Arab Nationalism" In *Politics in Lebanon*, ed. Leonard Binder (New York: Wiley, 1966)241.

¹⁵³ Koury, The Operational Capability of the Lebanese Political System (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1972)xi.

F. The 1932 Census

As previously mentioned, the National Accord and the amended constitution of the Lebanese Republic based their sectarian power sharing formula on the result of the last officially held census in 1932. Thus, it is imperative to explore and discuss the census results.

Community	Resident	Percentage of total	Emigrants	Percentage	Percentage	
	Population	resident		of total	of Total	
	number	population		Emigrant	(resident +	
				population	emigrants)	
Maronites	227,800	28.7	123,397	48.4	33.5	
Greek Orthodox	77,312	9.7	57,031	22.4	12.8	
Greek Catholic	46,709	5.9	29,627	11.6	7.3	
Armenians	31,992	4.0	2,424	1.0	3.3	
Other Christians	13,133	1.7	3,365	1.3	1.6	
Total Christians	396,946	50	215,844	84.7	58.5	
Sunni Muslims	178,100	22.5	17,205	6.7	18.6	
Shia Muslims	155,035	19.5	11,501	4.5	15.9	
Druze	53,334	6.7	8,750	3.4	5.9	
Other non-	9,981	1.3	1,678	0.7	1.1	
Christians (of						
which 3588 are						
Jews)						
Total Muslims	396,450	50	39,143	15.4	41.5	

Table 1. Official results of the 1932 census.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁴ 1932 official census. Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya (Official Gazette), no. 2718 (1932).

In a system of proportional representation, census are highly politicized. This is particularly true in Lebanon, because any population statistic is a measure of the relative strength of the different communities, and by consequences the distribution of power. Consequently, the last official census was made in 1932, all later figures are estimates.¹⁵⁵

The exploring the results of the census show that the resident population of Lebanon in 1932 was equally divided between Muslims and Christians. However, in order to maintain a Christian control of the political system, the French colonial patrons, on behalf of the Maronite leaders, counted the emigrant population (who were mostly Christians, numbering around 84.7% of total emigrant). Therefore, with the total Christian population (resident + emigrants) topping 58% the ratio of 6 to 5 became the rule. All subsequent Chamber of Deputies were subject to this sectarian division ratio, up until the Taef Accords in early nineties, when it was changed to parity (6 to 6). The apparent Christian majority in Lebanon was a heavily politicized majority based on the debatable inclusion of significant numbers of emigrants. The character of the Lebanese state was forged by projecting a demographic "reality" indicating that the population was predominantly Christian, thereby securing and legitimizing Christian political dominance. ¹⁵⁶

 ¹⁵⁵ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon. Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation* (London: , 1993)86.
 ¹⁵⁶ Rania Maktabi, "The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited. Who are the Lebanese?" *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 26, no. 2 (1999), 219.

G. The Executive

1. The President

The 1926 constitution established a strong presidential structure, allowing the Maronite president to play a central role in the Lebanese political arena. The president was the only leader able to cut across vested interests, standing above different communities, families and sects. He was considered final guarantor of both the unity and the special character of Lebanon.¹⁵⁷ The President was bestowed with considerable constitutional prerogatives. He had the power to determine the legislative agenda and initiative, along with a veto power, and the power to dissolve the parliament and the council of ministers.¹⁵⁸ Unlike the cabinet, the president was not accountable to parliament except in instance of constitutional or criminal violations. These powers were balanced by a constitutional term limit, thus the president was elected for one term of six years by the chamber of deputies, and he was not allowed to be elected twice in successions. Additionally, the President was able to muster and mobilize even more formidable unofficial powers and prerogatives. He was the supreme patron manipulating the machination of lesser patron and their clients, who are all seeking a greater shares of spoils and privileges of office. He also held a position of monopolist over vital services, protection security and employment.¹⁵⁹

2. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet:

The Cabinet is a mosaic structured in order to satisfy the sectarian balance of power. Its role is more complex, more dynamic and less stable than that of either the

¹⁵⁷ Hourani, *Lebanon the Development of a Political Society*, ed. Binder (London: John Wiley and Sons, 1966)29.

¹⁵⁸ Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon (London: Routledge, 2013)29.

¹⁵⁹ Khalaf, Lebanon's Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987)96.

president or the parliament.¹⁶⁰ The Cabinet also plays the role of the institution that gathers the official representatives of various political forces to lead the various governmental departments and agencies, in formulating and implementing policies under the leadership of the President. Equitable representation of sects in the Cabinet has been maintained since 1943, according to the National Accord. Indeed the constitution and the accord provide a system of checks and balances between the President and the Prime Minister. Although it might seem that the President holds the upper hand with his prerogatives of dissolving the Cabinet and sacking the Prime Minister. Yet, it is important for the President to choose a strong and well supported Prime Minister in his Sunni community in order to guarantee a broad political support for his executive. Several Presidents tried to sideline their Prime Ministers, or chose a weak one, the sectarian backlash, and the tensions that was the result of such action were significant.¹⁶¹ In practice, executive power in the pre-Taef system was balanced between the two strongest communities: the Sunnis and Maronites, with an advantage to the President.¹⁶²

H. The legislature

The third dimension of the political balancing process in Lebanon is the Parliament; it reflects communal life and is a mirror image of sectarian politics. It is structurally based on compromise to satisfy the needs of the various communities. Therefore, it could not take the lead in society, as it serves as a platform of dialogue and

¹⁶⁰ Koury, *The Operational Capability of the Lebanese Political System* (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1972)287.

 ¹⁶¹ Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon. Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation (London: , 1993)91.
 ¹⁶² Koury, The Operational Capability of the Lebanese Political System (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1972)288.

the agent of inter-confessional union. Its main aim is to prevent radical changes, which endanger confessional vested interests and alter the balance of power. The Chamber also act as a buffer to mitigate tensions, thus increasing stability. ¹⁶³ The Chamber of Deputies enjoyed legislative powers to promulgate laws, barring a Presidential veto, and could theoretically force the resignation of the Cabinet by a no confidence vote. Yet in all the pre-Taef history of, the Parliament has never given a vote of no confidence. The most serious indictment against the chamber is its impotence in grave times, during most crisis the parliament has been virtually crippled. Thus, political initiative was not to be found inside the halls of Parliament, but in the hands of the real actors in the system: religious figures, sectarian leaders, prominent business men and bankers.¹⁶⁴ Accordingly, proportionality took precedence over all other aspects, even efficiency, as it tends to reduce strain by making the parliament consistent with the more inclusive values of the confessional society.¹⁶⁵

1. The composition of the chamber of deputies

The basis of the Lebanese electoral system was set by the 1926 Constitution and since then it was not significantly changed until 1990 with the end of the 1975 civil war. It is based on a combination of a single Electoral College and proportional representation of sectarian communities, in which deputies are elected according to the simple majority, single ballot system. The system is built on the principles established

¹⁶³ Rondot, *The Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy*, ed. Binder (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966)132.

¹⁶⁴ Khalaf, *Lebanon's Predicament* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987)141.

¹⁶⁵ Koury, *The Operational Capability of the Lebanese Political System* (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1972)296.

in 1922 for the Representative Council of Greater Lebanon and confirmed by the 1926 constitution, and upheld by the subsequent electoral laws.¹⁶⁶

Conceptually the system was conceived to enable each sect to be represented in the chamber of deputies based on its size, according to the 1932 census, but without becoming a state within a state. Article 95 of the constitution stated that: "in order to promote harmony and justice, the communities will be equitably represented in government employment and in the composition of ministries without jeopardizing the good of the state."¹⁶⁷ Therefore, unlike the Cabinet the balancing process within the parliament was fixed by the national pact. Consequently, the number of deputies followed a fixed plan, and since 1947 the chamber has always included a number of deputies divisible by 11 (55,77,44,66,99) in a 6 Christian to 5 Muslim ratio. This ratio of eleven is not a mere historic accident, it is a carefully designed mosaic, reflecting an intimate association between sectarianism and regionalism.¹⁶⁸ The Muslims who believe they have equaled or exceeded the Christians in numbers, question this ratio for the proportional distribution of seats. Though it was considered shaky, the compromise that resulted in the use of the 5 to 6 ratio was still accepted and used, up until the last election in 1972 before the civil war of 1975.¹⁶⁹

Additionally, before each election, the parliament promulgated an electoral law setting the total number of candidate, the size and number of districts, dividing the country into electoral districts, and regulating the rest of the electoral process.¹⁷⁰ The

¹⁶⁶ Rondot, *The Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy*, ed. Binder (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966)128.

¹⁶⁷ Khalaf, *Lebanon's Predicament* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987)92.

¹⁶⁸ Koury, *The Operational Capability of the Lebanese Political System* (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1972)296.

¹⁶⁹ Rondot, *The Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy*, ed. Binder (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966)129.

¹⁷⁰ Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)19.

French introduced a list system in multi seats district, this principle is considered as the most important contribution made by the French to the Lebanese political system. Theoretically, such a system encouraged each candidate to depend on votes outside his own religious community, by forming wider groups and alliances to form a strong list of candidates.¹⁷¹ This system could ensure that electoral alliances and programs would cut across communal divisions, resulting in the election of a chamber of deputies that helped the development of a common political life.¹⁷² Indeed, there is a clear article in the constitution (Article 27) stating that each deputy represented the whole nation, and not only his sect or geographical region.¹⁷³ However, because of the lack of a party system and organization, this resulted in the formation of lists centered on the strongest sectarian leader in each district. These strong lists would then attract the members of other minority sects in the district, to form a single overwhelmingly strong list, subservient to the sectarian leader, thus negating the possible benefit of such system in reducing sectarianism and increasing compromise and accommodation.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ Baaklini, *Legislative and Politcal Development: Lebanon, 1842-1972* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1976)195.

¹⁷² Hourani, *Lebanon the Development of a Political Society*, ed. Binder (London: John Wiley and Sons, 1966)26.

¹⁷³ Rondot, *The Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy*, ed. Binder (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966)131.

¹⁷⁴ Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)16.

2. Elections:

Term in	Christians sects								Muslims sects		
office	Maronite	Greek	Greek	Armenians	Armenians	protestant	Minorities	Sunni	Shia	Druze	1
		orthodox	Catholics	orthodox	Catholics						
1947-51	18	6	3	2	0	0	1	11	10	4	55
1951-53	23	8	5	3	1	1	1	16	14	5	77
1953-57	13	5	3	1	1	0	1	9	8	3	44
1957-60	20	7	4	3	1	0	1	14	12	4	66
1960-64	30	11	6	4	1	1	1	20	19	6	99
1964-68	30	11	6	4	1	1	1	20	19	6	99
1968-72	30	11	6	4	1	1	1	20	19	6	99

Table 2. The sectarian distribution of seats in the parliamentary elections. ¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁵ The data for these tables have been collected from several sources, mainly Hudson, Salamey, Qubain, Rondot, and Baaklini.

Term in	Regions										Total	
office	Beirut		Mount Lebanon		North Lebanon		South Lebanon		Bekaa			
	Seats	Districts	Seats	Districts	Seats	Districts	Seats	Districts	Seats	Districts	Seats	Districts
1943-47	9	1	17	1	12	1	10	1	7	1	55	5
1947-51	9	1	17	1	12	1	10	1	7	1	55	5
1951-53	13	1	23	3	16	3	14	1	11	1	77	9
1953-57	7	5	14	9	9	8	8	7	6	4	44	33
1957-60	11	2	20	8	14	7	11	7	10	3	66	27
1960-64	16	3	30	6	20	7	18	7	15	3	99	26
1964-68	16	3	30	6	20	7	18	7	15	3	99	26
1968-72	16	3	30	6	20	7	18	7	15	3	99	26

Table 3. Geographical distribution of electoral seats. ¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁶ The data for these tables have been collected from several sources, mainly Hudson, Salamey, Qubain, Rondot, and Baaklini.

Even though, the basic premise of proportional distribution of seats based on a sectarian and geographical balance was always part of the electoral system, the Lebanese politicians tried a variety of districting methods. Up until 1953, there were a small number of large districts (for example in 1951 there were 9 districts for 77 deputies). Therefore, in each district a long list of candidates, belonging to various sects, opposed one another. Meanwhile, in 1953 the number of districts was substantially increased, while the number of deputies was decreased (33 districts for 44 deputies). Hence, short lists including one or two candidates were commonly used. However, from 1957 onwards, the system became a hybrid, mixing both long and short lists. (In 1957 there were 28 districts and 88 deputies, while in 1960 there was 19 districts and 99 deputies.)

These changes had significant effects on the electoral results. For example, long lists in large districts caused the candidate to be part of larger coalitions, which includes representatives of other communities, which should have encouraged moderation and pre-election accommodation and agreements. On the other hand, such systems increased the power of local sectarian leaders, allowing them to pack the list with their own clients and pushing it through by their own influence and prestige.¹⁷⁷ Meanwhile, the short list in small districts, restrained the influence of local leaders. However, most of these districts were sectarian-homogenous, or with strong majorities, thus candidate depended mostly on the vote and support of their own sects. Deputies in general irrespective of their political affiliation or ideologies continued to show greater concern for their constituencies and the patron-client relationships, rather than national issues.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁷ Rondot, *The Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy*, ed. Binder (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966)132.

¹⁷⁸ Khalaf, *Lebanon's Predicament* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987)139.

Thus, the mixed system was introduced in 1960 elections, to mitigate the drawbacks, and increase the benefit of each opposing system.¹⁷⁹

I. The consociational aspect:

The Lebanese political model from 1943 until 1975 has been considered as a successful case of consociational democracy, by the Lijphart¹⁸⁰ himself, in addition to many others such as Hanf, Fakhoury, Dekmejian¹⁸¹, Hudson¹⁸², Koury,¹⁸³ and Salamey¹⁸⁴. Even the scholars who critiqued the consociational theory, considering it one of the causes of the 1975 civil in Lebanon, like Makdisi¹⁸⁵ and Horowitz, accept that Lebanon was a consociational Democracy.

Beside the essential characteristic of consociationalism that are deeply integrated in the Lebanese system, which will be discussed in the next section, several favorable internal conditions contributed to the probability of a consociational take off in Lebanon. First, no compact majority group exists that is able to govern by itself. Thus, majorities can only be formed by bargaining. Second, past violence among subcultures branded conflict management by violence, as a negative and unprofitable strategy by all groups. In Lebanon, the 1840-1860 sectarian conflicts left an undeniable mark on the popular psyche. Third, with the small number of elites, with their old feudal ties, there

¹⁷⁹ Rondot, *The Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy*, ed. Binder (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966)132.

¹⁸⁰ Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (London: Yale University Press, 1977)147.

¹⁸¹ Dekmejian, Consociational Democracy in Crisis: The Case of Lebanon, Vol. 10, 1978)252.

¹⁸² Michael Hudson, "The Problem of Authoritative Power in Lebanese Politics: Why Consociationalism Failed." In *Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus*, eds. Nadim Shehadi and Dona Haffar Mills (London: The Center of Lebanese Studies; I.B. Tauris, 1988)227.

¹⁸³ Koury, *The Operational Capability of the Lebanese Political System* (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1972)206.

¹⁸⁴ Salamey, *The Government and Politics of Lebanon* (London: Routledge, 2013)10.

¹⁸⁵ Makdisi and Marktanner, Trapped by Consociationalism: The Case of Lebanon., 2008).

exist intense informal communication between them, making it easy to bargain and strike deals.¹⁸⁶

As previously discussed, the essential characteristics of consociationalism are: government by a grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality, and segment autonomy are an integral part of the Lebanese political system. Even though, the mutual-veto was not legally incorporated in the system. It was practically applicable due to the proportional distribution of high offices and the balance of power between the different sects.¹⁸⁷

1. The grand coalition:

The grand Coalition is considered as the cornerstone of the consociational model, and in Lebanon it is embodied in the National Accord.¹⁸⁸ Additionally, the organization of the Lebanese Political system and the distribution of power is a form of grand coalition: a Maronite president, a Sunni prime minister and a Shia speaker, and a Greek orthodox deputy speaker and deputy prime minister. The numerical strength of the sects was reflected in the relative importance of the offices. The cabinet in which sects were also proportionally represented is also part of this grand coalition. ¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁶ Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Consociational Democracy in the International System," *European Journal of Political Research*, no. 3 (1975)381.

¹⁸⁷ Hudson, *The Problem of Authoritative Power in Lebanese Politics: Why Consociationalism Failed.*, eds. Shehadi and Haffar Mills (London: The Center of Lebanese Studies; I.B. Tauris, 1988)227.

¹⁸⁸ Fakhoury Muhlbacher, *Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather* (Germany: VS Research, 2007)78.

¹⁸⁹ Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (London: Yale University Press, 1977)148.

2. Proportionality

The different religious groups are proportionally represented in the parliament and the cabinet, which are regarded as representative power-sharing body, in a six Christians to five Muslims ratio. Proportionality was also observed in the appointment of civil servants.¹⁹⁰ The electoral arrangement can be characterized as a preset proportional representation on a religious or sectarian basis.¹⁹¹

3. Segmental autonomy

Segmental autonomy is another strong consociational feature of Lebanese democracy. It is an integral part of the constitution and the accord, which made sure that the state would not interfere in the area of intra-confessional affairs. Indeed, each sects has its own school, social institutions, and welfare organizations, and each sect personal status laws are administrated by separate sectarian courts.¹⁹² Thus, Segmental autonomy and limited state interference allowed each segment to administer its own affairs, and each segment wase to a large extent "an autonomous power centers."¹⁹³

4. Mutual Veto

Although mutual or minority veto was informal and unwritten, it was present in the Lebanese system. The two major communities, Maronite and Sunni enjoyed a concurrent majority, which made them deliberate jointly, thus bestowing them with the

¹⁹⁰ Fakhoury Muhlbacher, *Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather* (Germany: VS Research, 2007)78.

¹⁹¹ Michael Suleiman, *Political Parties in Lebanon: The Chalenge of a Fragmented Political Culture* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967b)45.

 ¹⁹² Leonard Binder, ed., *Politics in Lebanon* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966)295.
 ¹⁹³ Fakhoury Muhlbacher, *Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather* (Germany: VS Research, 2007)78.

ability to veto any decision they did not approve of.¹⁹⁴ Indeed, the most important state institutions such the Council of Ministers, the Parliament, and the public institutions top position were proportionally divided between the various sects. This enabled all the different communities to have a say in the political process and protect their interests, allowing them to at least imped any detrimental decision, if not veto it outright.¹⁹⁵

J. Conclusion

After this exploration of the pre-Taef political system it is clear that the proportional sectarian and geographical representation of all communities, which form the Lebanese sectarian mosaic, has been an important factor that permeates all aspects of the system. This inclusive form of representation has been part of the system since the mid-19th century and was further reinforced at each historic junction.

Additionally, there are strong theoretical evidence, supported by many scholars who agree that proportional representation has been critical in ensuring the stability of Lebanon's divided society through a very delicate balancing act. The state and its institutions, guaranteed the security and respected the interests of the different sects, while playing the role of an inclusive arena for accommodation and dialogue. Contrary to western countries, Lebanese democratic institutions have been a prerequisite for political stability.¹⁹⁶ Indeed, Lebanese institutions were critical in preserving the stability and security, using the widest sectarian inclusiveness, by prioritizing proportional representation, above all other aspects.

¹⁹⁴ Michael Suleiman, "Elections in a Confessional Democracy." *The Journal of Politics* 29 (1967a)111. ¹⁹⁵ Fakhoury Muhlbacher, *Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather* (Germany: VS Research, 2007)78.

¹⁹⁶ Hudson, *The Precarious Republic* (London: Westview Press, 1985)9.

These political institutions were based on two keystones: the executive balance of power, and the proportional representation of all sects. On the executive side, the President had extensive powers and prerogatives, both officials and unofficial, balanced and checked with the one consecutive term limit and the unofficial balance with his Prime Minister. These powers were meant to balance the immobilisim and inability to modernize the system, caused by the wide proportional representation in the parliament and the council of ministers. Meanwhile the proportional distribution of power, in most of the state institutions was meant to ensure that all sects were represented in the state and had a political outlet that enabled them to express their interests and defend them, while sharing part of the spoils and benefits.

Thus, a semblance of stability was achieved, and even when sectarian tensions were at their highest, most contentions were solved through accommodation and dialogue, even when regional or international aspects were involved. As long as no side tried to subvert the state, and use its institutions to change the preset balance of power. However, once a community tried to use the state's institutions as a tool in sectarian conflict or in order to change the balance of power, the system broke down. For example, if the Maronite president tried to extend his term, sideline his Prime Minister, or threaten the sectarian balance in parliament (directly or indirectly)¹⁹⁷, the Muslim considered this an attack on their sect's prerogative, eliciting a harsh sectarian reaction. Indeed, the different sect considered their sectarian share of power, not only a matter of pride, but a matter of survival. The state was the only guarantor of common safety and security for all, and once a sect was pushed outside this umbrella, its own existence

¹⁹⁷ Indirectly changing the sectarian representation refers to the efforts of sectarian leaders to sideline or exclude their opponent from other sects, by supporting alternative representative of this same sect, who do not enjoy sufficient support in their own sects.

became at risk, pushing it to seek foreign help and support. An additional aspect threatened the whole edifice, proportional representation was based on a delicate sectarian division of power using the 1932 census. With time, it became obsolete with the changing demographic balance (Muslims have been growing faster than Christians, and the Christians emigration was higher).¹⁹⁸ Meanwhile, the governing elites and institutions failed to change or modernize the system, which slowly exacerbated tensions, and increased instability.

¹⁹⁸ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon. Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation* (London: , 1993)86.

CHAPTER IV

PERIOD OF STUDY: 1955-1961

A. Introduction: The rosewater revolution

After independence, Christian President Bishara Khoury and Sunni Prime Minister Riad Solh became national heroes. However, the President's prestige started to decline in 1947, after seeking reelection, contrary to the constitution. He was accused of rigging the elections of 1947 and 1951, in addition to charges of corruption and nepotism. The election of 1951 proved to be his undoing, especially after he lost his strongest Sunni pillar of support, when Riad Solh was assassinated in Jordan. Solh was killed by a member of the SSNP, in retaliation for the execution of their leader Antun Saadeh in 1949, after a failed coup d'etat by the SSNP.¹⁹⁹ The death of Solh, weakened the carful sectarian and political balance, and Khouri became increasingly vulnerable.²⁰⁰

Following the 1951 election, an opposition front was formed. It included Kamal Jumblatt, a Druze leader, who headed the Socialist Progressive Party (PSP)²⁰¹, and enjoyed a strong following in his Chouf stronghold. The front had also a strong Christian wing, formed by Camille Chamoun, a Maronite sectarian leader also from the Chouf, and Hamid Frangieh another Maronite leader form North Lebanon. A number of Sunni dignitaries like Abdallah Yafi and Saeb Salam and several Christian politicians, also joined the opposition.²⁰²

¹⁹⁹ Theodor Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon. Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation* (London: , 1993)114.

²⁰⁰ Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)23.

²⁰¹ Fawaz, A History of Modern Lebanon From the Imarah to the Taef Accords (Beirut: Riad El-Rayyes Books, 2008)211.

²⁰² Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)22.

In early September after several strikes and demonstrations held by the oppositions, Prime Minister Sami Solh delivered a highly emotional and explicit indictment of President Khoury's corruption, then resigned and left the chamber. President Khoury efforts to form a government failed, as Sunni leaders refused to cooperate.²⁰³ Even though the president still enjoyed a parliamentary majority, that did not matter as the political struggle has moved outside the chamber of deputies.²⁰⁴ On September 17 fourteen deputies urged, the president to resign, and at this stage, the army entered the picture and decided the issue. Army commander General Fouad Chehab made it clear that the army would try to keep law and order, but he refused to use troops against the strikers. He insisted on remaining neutral and was unwilling to interfere in politics.²⁰⁵ On the morning of September 19th, having lost Sunni support, while the army stood neutral, President Khoury had no choice but to resign, as a result of what was later called the "rosewater" revolution.²⁰⁶ On September 23rd the chamber unanimously, with only one blank vote, elected Camille Chamoun as President. Jumblatt and the nationalist socialist front, which spearheaded the movement for the resignation of Khoury, sided with Chamoun and ensured his election. ²⁰⁷

B. Camille Chamoun's mandate

President Camille Chamoun ruled from 1952 to 1958, who together with Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt spearheaded the opposition to Khoury. During the first few years, Chamoun showed promise, serious attempts were made at administrative and

²⁰³ Hudson, *The Precarious Republic* (London: Westview Press, 1985)106.

²⁰⁴ William W. Harris, *Faces of Lebanon* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1997)140.

²⁰⁵ Fawaz, A History of Modern Lebanon From the Imarah to the Taef Accords (Beirut: Riad El-Rayyes Books, 2008)212.

²⁰⁶ Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon. Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation (London: , 1993)114.

²⁰⁷ Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)23.

electoral reforms, to meet the rising demographic and regional challenges, but they failed.²⁰⁸ On the other hand, his economic laissez-faire policy brought prosperity, and President Chamoun became very popular, especially among the Muslims, because of his pro-Palestinian position, while he was Lebanon's ambassador at the UN from 1947-1949. President Chamoun styling himself as a modernizer, declared war on political feudalism, and started efforts to weaken the different sectarian leaders.²⁰⁹ Consequently, Chamoun tried to destroy the big list system, which strengthened the local feudal leaders, and he enacted the 1952 electoral law which was a stark departure from previous ones. It made voting compulsory to all and granted suffrage to all women meeting primary school requirements, while dividing Lebanon into 33 electoral districts, compared to nine previously. Eleven of these districts were comprised of two deputies each, while the remaining 22 were single member districts.²¹⁰ Despite his effort, most sectarian leaders managed to be elected, especially his previous ally, Kamal Jumblatt, who started drifting away from the President after his election, as Chamoun refused to follow Jumblatt's heavy reform agenda. Goodwill towards the President evaporated in 1955, when internal tensions started to rise and Jamal Abdel Nasser, the new President of Egypt, dominated the regional scene, with his rising popularity among Arab Muslim, including Lebanon.²¹¹

²⁰⁸ Fahim Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)27.

 ²⁰⁹ Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon. Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation (London: , 1993)115.
 ²¹⁰ Fawaz, A History of Modern Lebanon From the Imarah to the Taef Accords (Beirut: Riad El-Rayyes Books. 2008)224.

²¹¹ David C. Gordon, Lebanon the Fragmented Nation (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1980)51.

C. The tumultuous years: 1955 onwards

Under Khoury's mandate and Chamoun's first few years, Lebanon generally took a neutral position, while simultaneously playing the role of peacemaker, in most inter-Arab quarrels. This policy was even expressed by Chamoun as late as 1955 when he said : " the preservation of the unity of the Arab front and cooperation among Arab league states is vital and should be placed above all other considerations."²¹² At the same time, Lebanon maintained friendly relations with all the big powers and avoided becoming involved in the East-West conflict, or joining international alliances.²¹³ 1955 was the turning point of that period. It witnessed the rise of regional tensions that were reflected locally, as internal dissatisfaction and grievances coincided with changes in the Arab region, following the upsurge of Arab nationalism and the flare up in the east-west conflict.²¹⁴ These regional events exacerbated tensions internally, and polarized the political arena.²¹⁵ The US in its effort to contain the USSR, pushed for the formation of the Baghdad Pact as a bridge between NATO and the South Atlantic Pact. Turkey, Pakistan and the Kingdome of Iraq joined it. The strongest opposition came from Nasser's Egypt, allied with Syria and Saudi Arabia which shared Nasser's position. Consequently, Lebanon political arena was split between those favoring the pact and those against it.²¹⁶ President Chamoun and a majority of Christians parties, like Pierre Gemayel's Kateb, chose to side with the West and its Baghdad. On the other hand, most Muslim politicians, former President Bishara Khoury, and the Maronite Patriarch, and

²¹² Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)27.

²¹³ Fawaz, A History of Modern Lebanon From the Imarah to the Taef Accords (Beirut: Riad El-Rayyes Books, 2008)226.

²¹⁴ Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)27.

²¹⁵ Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon. Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation (London: , 1993)116.

²¹⁶ Harris, *Faces of Lebanon* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1997)142.

Jumblatt were against it. ²¹⁷ Despite the crystalizing opposite positions, the situation was kept under control until the advent of 1957 parliamentary election that preceded the 1958 crises.²¹⁸

Chamoun did not try to find a strong Muslim prime minister to form a partnership with, which exacerbated the Muslims sense that an omnipotent Maronite president held them in check politically and economically. Additionally, the Muslims felt that a lot of prerogatives resided with the president, considering that the demographic advantage the Christians had in 1932 were no longer accurate. On the external front, Chamoun opted for openly pro-western foreign policy; by maintain diplomatic relations with France and the United Kingdome that attacked Egypt and then by embracing the Eisenhower doctrine. Lebanon twice antagonized the entire Arab world, and neither act could be reconciled with the national pact. ²¹⁹ Indeed, in 1956 during the Suez invasion lead by Israel, France and Britain against Egypt, Chamoun was the only Arab President, at the Arab league conference, to refuse to break off diplomatic relations with the two European countries. This act lead to the resignation of Sunni Prime Minister Abdallah Yafi, and Saeb Salam. Additionally, President Chamoun move worsened the relations between Lebanon and Egypt, and angered the Egyptian president Jamal Abdel Nasser and alienated many of the Muslim Nasserite supporter at home. ²²⁰

The President then tasked Sami Solh, relative of slain Prime Minister Riad Solh, with the formation of a new government, and appointed Charles Malik, a known prowestern professor as Foreign Minister.²²¹ Both moves were violently denounced by the

²¹⁷ Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)49.

²¹⁸ Attie, *Struggle in the Levant* (New York: Center for Lebanese Studies, 2004)158.

²¹⁹ Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon. Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation (London: , 1993)117.

²²⁰ Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon (London: Routledge, 2013)38.

²²¹ Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)49.

pro-Arab nationalists among the population, particularly the Sunni Moslems. Instead of bridging the widening confessional gap in the country, Chamoun eventually accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine. This act convinced the Muslims that the government had abandoned the 1943 National Pact and was steering the country towards a completely pro-Western (and by implication anti-Arab) policy. Chamoun had obviously overplayed his hand and could no longer be acceptable to the "Moslem half" of the population.²²²

On March 16, 1957 Lebanon officially embraced the Eisenhower doctrine, designed to fight subversion and provide American economic and military aid, to all countries, fighting communism who requested it. ²²³ This led to a storm of protests, and the government accepted to hold a no confidence vote and debate the electoral law. Although Chamoun's government won the vote, but seven deputies, including the main Muslim deputies of Beirut, resigned in protest. ²²⁴ In Lebanon, many Muslims perceived the adherence to the Eisenhower Doctrine, as a violation of the National Pact, thus detrimental to political stability.²²⁵

D. The United National Front and the Third Force

Until, the vote of no-confidence in April 1957, the opposition was an amorphous grouping of men and political parties working independently, many times at opposition. Officially embracing the Eisenhower doctrine led to the formation of a unified opposition group called the United National Front (UNF), in April. Its purpose was to prepare for the parliamentary elections in June. The opposition agenda of the Front was

²²² Suleiman, Elections in a Confessional Democracy., Vol. 29, 1967a)113.

²²³ David Gilmour, Lebanon the Fractured Country (New York: St. martin's Press, Inc., 1983)31.

²²⁴ Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)49.

²²⁵ Attie, *Struggle in the Levant* (New York: Center for Lebanese Studies, 2004)128.

mainly directed against Chamoun's bid for reelection as well as his foreign policy.²²⁶ The UNF included 23 political leaders, including most of the Sunni leaders like Yafi and Salam, with Jumblatt, and several Christians heavy weight, like Hamid Franjieh, and former president Khoury. Although the group enjoyed the support of the Maronite patriarch, it lacked a sizable popular Christian majority.²²⁷ Meanwhile, Chamoun policy did not only antagonize the Muslims, but a Christian splinter group headed by Henry Faron and Charles Helou declared their opposition to Chamoun, and formed a political group by the name of "the third force". The group expressed its refusal of the sever political polarization, and tried to bridge the gap between the two, without adhering to the Arab Nationalist doctrine.²²⁸

E. 1957 elections

Chamoun turned the 1957 into an informal plebiscite on his foreign policy. He was careful not to repeat Former President Khoury's mistake of open and blatant electoral fraud, but he did not hesitate to heavily gerrymander the districts of his opponent, especially in Beirut and the Chouf. These districts were redrawn to increase and include Christian majorities in all districts, while splitting mulsim voters.²²⁹

At this early stage of the crisis, the UNF was preparing for the elections and on May 12th Salam and Yafi issued a list of demand before the chamber sessions. They demanded that the chamber should be expanded to 88 members and not 66 as the president Chamoun proposed, and it asked the government to resign and appoint a

²²⁶ Caroline Attie, *Struggle in the Levant* (New York: Center for Lebanese Studies, 2004)120.

²²⁷ Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)49.

²²⁸ Fawaz, A History of Modern Lebanon From the Imarah to the Taef Accords (Beirut: Riad El-Rayyes Books, 2008)228.

²²⁹ Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon. Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation (London: , 1993)116.

"neutral" government, as per tradition, that will supervise the upcoming parliamentary elections. The Front also demanded that the present cabinet refrain from entering into agreements with any foreign powers until after the elections (meaning the Baghdad pact). Additionally, the UNF stressed its refusal of any constitutional amendment to enable the reelection of President Chamoun.²³⁰

On May 27, 1957 the united front warned the president that unless he dismissed the Solh government within 24 hours, in favor of neutral caretaker government to supervise the elections, they would call for a general strike and peaceful demonstrations beginning May 30. In response, premier Solh prohibited all demonstrations. Riots broke out and several demonstrators were killed and Saeb Salam was injured. The claim of the premier was that the opposition was staging a coup d'état, and more than 300 demonstrators were detained. Subsequent event showed that the government actions were a serious blunder.²³¹ At this point, General Fouad Chehab entered the scene as a mediator and a compromise was struck: all measures adopted by the police (controlled by Chamoun at the time) shall be subject to the approval of the army commander. In other words handing the control of all security forces to General Chehab. Additionally, two "neutral" ministers were added to the government to ensure the fairness of the elections. The two neutral ministers, Dr. Yusuf Hitti, and Muhammad Ali bayhum, formed a four members ministerial committee to examine complaint about the election and conduct the necessary investigations.²³²

The parliamentary elections of 1957 were fought in a highly unpleasant atmosphere, with the government accusing its opponents of being the "candidates of

²³⁰ Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)49.

²³¹ Fahim Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)56.

²³² Fahim Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)56.

Nasser", while the opposition was furious at the adoption of the Eisenhower doctrine.²³³ Elections were held on four consecutive Sundays, starting June 9. On June 9 the election were held in Beirut and south Lebanon, with 11 seats each. On June 16th Mount Lebanon with 20 seats. On 23rd the Bekaa with 10 seats. Finally on 30th north Lebanon with 14 seats. The results were a major victory for the president camp; government candidates won 10 out of 11 seats in Beirut. In Mount Lebanon 20 seats were won by Chamoun's supporters. The opposition accusation of ballot rigging could not be proved. However, most scholars, first-hand political actors and observers spoke of widespread gerrymandering,²³⁴ and mal-apportionment. Strong pressure was brought to bear to insure the elections of some candidates, and electoral irregularities. This led to the exclusion of major opposition figures from the parliament. Indeed, Saeb Salam, Abdallah Yafi in Beirut and Kamal Jumblatt in the Chouf, lost their seats, despite their significant popularity.²³⁵ Additionally, in the middle of the elections, on June 17th the two neutral ministers resigned because they could no longer tolerate the general atmosphere. Although they did not find any fault with technical details, they hinted that pressure of various kinds have been brought to bear on voters. The press meanwhile was cynical about the elections L'orient, a government supporter said that "candidates of all colors had been buying votes wholesale, so no one could complain." Even Pierre Gemayel the supporter of President Chamoun, was quoted as saying that the elected candidates represent only 10 per cent of the electorates.²³⁶ The united national front refused to recognize the election result. It charged the president of openly interfering in

²³³ Gilmour, Lebanon the Fractured Country (New York: St. martin's Press, Inc., 1983)32.

²³⁴ Landau, *Elections in Lebanon*, Vol. 14, 1961)140.

²³⁵ Attie, *Struggle in the Levant* (New York: Center for Lebanese Studies, 2004)144.

²³⁶ Gordon, Lebanon the Fragmented Nation (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1980)52.

the election and said that "pressure and intimidation were exercised and most of the state machinery was used in various ways to falsify the will of the voters."²³⁷

F. The 1958 crisis

The 1957 election exacerbated an already tense internal situation. Meanwhile, the formation in February 1958 of the United Arab Republic (UAR) by Egypt and Syria started a chain reaction with both regional and internal consequences. In Jordan, and Iraq, Arab nationalist pressure was building up against the pro-British Hashemite regimes. Meanwhile, in Lebanon, Nasser became the hero of the Muslims and Arab nationalist all over the country welcomed the formation of the UAR with enthusiasm.²³⁸ Meanwhile, this announcement was greeted with trepidation by most Christians and President Chamoun.²³⁹

Small incidents start occurring, culminating with the assassination of Nasib al Matni on May 8, a known anti-Chamoun journalist, and owner of a newspaper. A general strike was called to demand the immediate resignation of Chamoun. The leaders of the opposition met, and each one was delegated to control his own region of influence: Jumblatt in the Chouf, Salam turned the Basta district in Beirut into a fortress, and Rashid Karame was to direct the fight in Tripoli. On the other hand, Chamoun had the support of the gendarmerie, the SSNP, the Dashnak Armenian party, and Pierre Gemayel's Kataeb unenthusiastic backing. The army, under the command of General Chehab remained neutral, except in few instances, when for example it intervened to stop juumblatt from seizing Beirut international airport.²⁴⁰ After two

²³⁷ Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)58.

²³⁸ Gilmour, Lebanon the Fractured Country (New York: St. martin's Press, Inc., 1983)31.

²³⁹ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon. Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation* (London: , 1993)117.

²⁴⁰ Gordon, Lebanon the Fragmented Nation (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1980)53.

months of fighting the largely Christian regions of the central mountains, East Beirut and its hinterlands, remained loyal to the government. Meanwhile, the opposition took control of two third of the country, including west Beirut the southern part of the mountain and most of the peripheral regions.²⁴¹ However, the civil war did not develop into a fully confessional confrontation as some influential Christian personalities like the patriarch Meouchy, and the Franjieh clan in the north, stood with the opposition, however they controlled only a minority Christian support.²⁴² The security situation slowly turned into a deadlocked face-off, with no side able to military resolve the crisis. Once again, regional developments changed the situation.

In May 1958, several mediation efforts were attempted. They focused on allowing the President to continue his term, while officially announcing that he will not seek re-election via a constitutional amendment, and the formation of a caretaker government, headed by General Chehab. All efforts failed, as the opposition insisted on the resignation of Chamoun and the President refused to declare his position on re-election.²⁴³ At that point, President Chamoun accused the UAR of interfering in Lebanon's affairs and filed a complaint to the United Nations and the Arab League, which inflamed the opposition. The UN decided to send International observers to assess the situation and the truth behind Chamoun's accusation to the UAR of aiding and providing arms to the opposition. By July, the first report was inconclusive, explaining that infiltration through the Syrian borders was minimal and without consequences.²⁴⁴

²⁴¹ Fawaz, A History of Modern Lebanon From the Imarah to the Taef Accords (Beirut: Riad El-Rayyes Books, 2008)231.

²⁴² Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon. Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation (London: , 1993)117.

²⁴³ Abass Abu Saleh, *Al-Azma Al-Loubnaniah Aam 1958* (Beirut: Al Manshwrat al Arabia, 1998)115.

²⁴⁴ Abass Abu Saleh, Al-Azma Al-Loubnaniah Aam 1958 (Beirut: Al Manshwrat al Arabia, 1998)131.

G. US intervention and the resolution of the crisis

The crisis might have dragged on inconclusively, but for one dramatic event. On 14 July 1958, the pro-western government of Iraq, member of the Baghdad pact, was overthrown and King Feisal and his prime minister were killed, and a pro-Arabism regime took power. It seemed that Nasser would sweep the Arab world. ²⁴⁵ Chamoun, who asked for US intervention several times during the early events of the crisis, renewed his appeal for US militarily intervention, in order to protect the independence of Lebanon, as per the Eisenhower Doctrine. On July 15, 1958 14,000 US marines debarked in Beirut to maintain the peace, on orders of the President of the United States.²⁴⁶

The US administration quickly grasped the complexity of the domestic situation in Lebanon and ordered its troops to refrain from any involvement in civil war. As neither sides could gain the upper hand, military or politically, they agreed with discreet American mediation to end the crisis.²⁴⁷ The war formally ended with the slogan "neither winners, nor losers". After half a year of fighting and about 2000-4000 dead, the country elites returned to the National Pact. Thus, the 1958 crisis came to end after an inter-elite bargain was struck between the Lebanese nationalist and the pro Nasser factions. Chamoun resigned and General Chehab succeeded him, and was elected by Parliament on July 31. He was considered a consensus candidate and was supported by both factions.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁵ Salamey, *The Government and Politics of Lebanon* (London: Routledge, 2013)40.

²⁴⁶ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon. Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation* (London: , 1993)117.

²⁴⁷ Salamey, *The Government and Politics of Lebanon* (London: Routledge, 2013)39.

²⁴⁸ Suleiman, *Elections in a Confessional Democracy.*, Vol. 29, 1967a)113.

Chehab adopted a centrist and moderate stance, and like Bishara Khoury, he understood that Lebanon could only survive by compromise. Therefore, Chehab returned Lebanon's foreign policy to a neutral stance.²⁴⁹ Tensions between the two factions eased and Rashid Karami formed a new government in 1959. Once the situation stabilized, US troops withdrew on October 25, 1958.²⁵⁰ The new president started a reform drive, focusing on restoring national unity and infusing the administration with a sense of professionalism in its various departments. Additionally, Chehab turned his attention to the neglected peripheral areas of the nation, and started several large public works. He also made sure that governmental posts were more equitably allocated between the various Lebanese sects, which enhanced his reputation as an unbiased broker. However, Chehab reliance on military and security institutions, including the army, gave it unprecedented influence in the country. This slowly created tension and friction, leading to the 1970 purge of the military intelligence (second bureau) and the end of Chehabisim.²⁵¹

The 1958 crisis was the most serious challenge to Lebanon's independence since its foundation. It made clear the parameters beyond which the Lebanese leaders could not go unless they wanted to jeopardize the country's independence. It also showed the extent to which real power was extra governmental.²⁵² Scrutinizing the actions of the Lebanese elites in the 1958, it can be concluded that both parties acted contrary to the pact. Chamoun went against several of its stipulations: by excluding Muslim sectarian leaders from the parliament, by refusing to preserve Lebanon's neutrality in foreign affairs, and by calling in US military intervention. Meanwhile, the opposition accepted

²⁴⁹ Gilmour, Lebanon the Fractured Country (New York: St. martin's Press, Inc., 1983)33.

²⁵⁰ Salamey, *The Government and Politics of Lebanon* (London: Routledge, 2013)39.

²⁵¹ Attie, *Struggle in the Levant* (New York: Center for Lebanese Studies, 2004)232.

²⁵² Gordon, *Lebanon the Fragmented Nation* (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1980)53.

military aid from Syria and Egypt, and Jumblatt even accepted Syrian Druze soldiers. Chamoun tried to govern as if he was in a homogenous country, ruling with the support of only half of the population, which goes against the spirit of the national pact.²⁵³ Yet, the first government under Chehab failed to heed this lesson. Once appointed Premier Karami refused to include any supporter of Chamoun in his cabinet, only opponents and members of third force. This induced a counter revolt by the Gemayel's Phalanges and Chamoun supporters. The region that remained loyal to Chamoun rose up against the new government and again the result of the smaller scale fighting was inconclusive. After a month both sides realized that, they could not govern without the other half of the country. Thus, both Karami and Gemayel, the protagonists, agreed on a cabinet of national unity, in which each held half the posts.²⁵⁴

H. 1960 elections

The crisis was resolved with the intervention of US marines, and the election of consensus President Fouad Chehab, who was the army Commander during the1952 and the 1958 events.²⁵⁵ Yet the crisis was not fully resolved until the 1960 elections were held.²⁵⁶ Although the electoral law of 1960, retained the same confessional distribution of seats, but President Chehab introduced major reforms to the electoral law. Districting was based on an uniform law by means of an already established administrative district (the Qaza), the number of parliamentary seats was increased (from 66 to 99),²⁵⁷ secret

 ²⁵³ Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon. Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation (London: , 1993)118.
 ²⁵⁴ Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon. Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation (London: , 1993)118.

²⁵⁵ Hudson, Politcal Change in Lebanon 1943-1963 (New York: Yale University, 1963)282.

²⁵⁶ Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)164.

²⁵⁷ Ziadeh, *The Lebanese Elections*, 1960, Vol. 14, 1960)368.

ballots were introduced, and several other technical reforms implemented.²⁵⁸ For example, the number of polling centers was considerably increased to make for greater and easier access to the polls. The government for the first time, photographed the voters' lists instead of having them copied, thus eliminating many errors, intended or otherwise. President Chehab policy of neutrality in the Arab world and abroad, combined with a less tense regional and international atmosphere, reduced to a vanishing point any outside interference to influence or direct the election.²⁵⁹

The 1960 elections resulted in the inclusion of most political leaders, several of whom were at the forefront of the 1958 crisis after their exclusion in the 1957 elections.²⁶⁰ Jumblatt, Salam, Karameh, the leaders of the opposition returned to the parliament. Even former President Chamoun was elected, and his bloc returned with four deputies, out of the five he had in 1957. No major political party or leaders were excluded from the 1960 parliament, and the new electoral law allowed many new faces to enter the chamber of deputies for the first time.²⁶¹ Out of the 99 deputies, only 32 were deputies in the 1957 chamber. Consequently, the 1960 electoral law was later used without major changes in all parliamentary elections before the 1975 war,²⁶² and was even resurrected recently for the 2009 parliamentary elections, with the endorsement of all major Lebanese political factions.

Finally, although the Arab context remained as tumultuous as ever, and it inevitably found reflection in the Lebanese microcosm. However, Chehab judicious

²⁵⁸ Kerr, *The 1960 Lebanese Parliamentary Elections*, Vol. 11, 1960)269.

²⁵⁹ Suleiman, *Elections in a Confessional Democracy.*, Vol. 29, 1967a)114.

²⁶⁰ Kerr, *The 1960 Lebanese Parliamentary Elections*, Vol. 11, 1960)268.

²⁶¹ Fawaz, A History of Modern Lebanon From the Imarah to the Taef Accords (Beirut: Riad El-Rayyes Books, 2008)243.

²⁶² Baaklini, *Legislative and Politcal Development: Lebanon, 1842-1972* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1976)144.

policies and political reforms eased the pressures against Lebanon's sovereignty, and for a few precious years, Lebanon enjoyed a peace. ²⁶³

²⁶³ Gordon, Lebanon the Fragmented Nation (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1980)59.

CHAPTER V

COMPARING THE REPRESENTATION AND STABILITY OF THE 57 AND 60 ELECTIONS

Introduction:

In order to fully explore the relation between representation and stability, it is imperative to analyze in details the two elections that form this thesis case study. This chapter will be divided in two sections. The first one will investigate and compare the representative nature of the two elections. The second section will deal with the stability side of the equation.

In the first section, the two parliamentary elections will be scrutinized, using pre-set criteria, in order to compare the level of representation between the 1957 and 1960 elections. The European Commission and the Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) have each published election observation handbooks.²⁶⁴ These handbooks enumerate several electoral standards that must be followed in order to support, protect, and promote democratic governance, human rights, and representation. These standards stem from key concepts enshrined in universal principles, which were previously detailed in this thesis. This section will focus on a number of these criteria that are relevant in this case study and can be analyzed with sufficient confidence. These criteria will be: the electoral system, number of deputies in the chamber, boundary delineation or districting, unbiased public institution and state interference,

²⁶⁴ Retrieved online from <u>http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/68439?download=true</u>, and <u>http://eeas.europa.eu/eueom/pdf/handbook-eueom_en.pdf</u>

security, secret ballots, and other technical electoral procedures such as financing, preprinted ballots, sufficient number of electoral centers, judicial oversight, and open electoral registrar.

Similarly, the level of stability will be studied after each election based on the general criteria set forth previously. Therefore, the study of stability, which could be explained as the lack of violence, and it would take into consideration the number of violent incidents, clashes and the amount of casualties, and the geographic spread of violence, how many parties where involved and the army's position. Additionally, the effectiveness of public institutions would also be a factor: are the security forces able to maintain order over all the territory, is the parliament and the council of minister meeting regularly and are they issuing laws and decrees.

A. Representation

1. The electoral system

First, this thesis shall compare the electoral system of the two case studies, whether it is a majoritarian or a proportional system, a single seat or multi seats districts, Lebanon electoral system is based on a combination of a single Electoral College and proportional representation of sectarian communities. ²⁶⁵ Deputies are elected according to the simple majority, single ballot system, using lists in multi seats districts. Meanwhile, the proportional distribution of seats was fixed by the national pact, and the number of deputies followed a fixed equation, always divisible by 11 in a 6 Christian to 5 Muslim ratio. ²⁶⁶

²⁶⁵ Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)19.

²⁶⁶ Koury, *The Operational Capability of the Lebanese Political System* (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1972)296.

The electoral system is the only part of the electoral law that has not been changed throughout all elections, until the Taef Accords in 1989, when only the sectarian ratio was changed to parity (6 Muslims to 6 Christians). Therefore, as both the 1957 and the 1960 election, used the same majoritarian system in multi seats districts, there is no need to further analyze this issue in this comparative study.

2. Number of Deputies

In 1957, President Chamoun raised the number of Deputies from 44 to 66, despite the opposition's to increase the numbers of seats, to at least 88 or even more. ²⁶⁷ Once General Chehab took office in 1960, as part of his general reform efforts, he increased the number of deputies to 99. The number of deputies is very important, as Michel Chiha said that Lebanon's experience has proven that the lower the number of deputies in the chamber is, the higher sectarianism rises. He explained, "the best way to govern Lebanon is to leave the lower possible number of political forces outside the parliament. In Lebanon, what is important is not the number of deputies, but stability and peace. Lowering the number of deputies does not lower the number of feudal and landed political forces. On the contrary, it lowers the number of new entrant and new blood going new and alive forces coming into the parliament." This is best illustrated in the below table.

²⁶⁷ Baaklini, *Legislative and Politcal Development: Lebanon, 1842-1972* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1976)194.

Elections of	New entrants	Total number	percentage
1957	26	66	39.4%
1960	52	99	52.5%

Table 4. New entrants to the parliament in the 1957 and 1960 elections.²⁶⁸

Several scholars theorized that lowering the number of deputies leads to instability.²⁶⁹ In the same logic, the higher the number of deputies is, the more inclusive, and representative the chamber becomes. Indeed, increasing the number of seats has been one of the oppositions top demands before the 1957 electoral law was promulgated.²⁷⁰

Additionally, increasing the size of parliament has the advantage of allowing even the smallest of minorities to have a seat of their own. For example, in 1957, with only 66 seats, the protestant numbering 1% of the total population were denied fair representation, and had to share one representative with several others sects, which numbers around 3% of the population, for only 1.5% share of the seats. Meanwhile, in 1960 the protestant had one representative of their own, and the seat share came in line with their population size (1% of the population for 1% of the seats.) At the same time, the representation of the remaining minorities also improved, as they now represented only 2% of the population and had 1% of the seats. Had the parliament been further enlarged, several other minorities would have their own. For example in the 2009 parliament, which is based on the 1960 law, but with 128 deputies, the Alawites, a small

²⁶⁸ Abdo Baaklini, *Legislative and Politcal Development: Lebanon, 1842-1972* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1976)173.

²⁶⁹ Nadi 22 Tshreen al-thani, Al-Mowatn Wal-Intikhabat (Beirut: , 1968)11.

²⁷⁰ Leila Raad, Tarikh Lubnan Al-Siyasi Wal-Iktisadi 1958-1975 (Beirut: Maktabat al-Sa'h, 2004)63.

Muslim minorities received two seats of their own. They were previously counted with

the Shiite.²⁷¹

Table 5. Shares of seats in 57 and 60 elections compared to total population (Complied with information from Saadeh,²⁷² Majed,²⁷³ Qubain,²⁷⁴ and Hudson.²⁷⁵)

	sect	Population	Percentage	Seats	Percentage	Seats	Percentage
		in 1956	of	in	of seats in	in	of seats in
			population	1957	1957	1960	1960
Muslims	Sunni	286,000	20.2	14	21.1	20	20.2
	Shiite	250,000	17.8	12	18.1	19	19.1
	Druze	88,000	6.3	4	6	6	6
	Total	624,000	44.3%	30	45.4	45	45.3%
Christians	Maronite	424,000	30	20	30.3	30	30.3
	Greek orthodox	149,000	10.6	7	10.6	11	11.1
	Greek Catholics	91,000	6.5	4	6	6	6
	Armenian orthodox	64,000	4.5	3	4.5	4	4
	Armenian catholic	15,000	1	1	1.5	1	1

²⁷¹ Muhamad Mraad, *Al Intikhabat Al-Niyabiyah Fi Lubnan, 1920-2009* (Beirut: Lebanese University Publications, 2013)313.

²⁷² Fares Saadeh, *Mawsuaat Al-Hayat Al-Niyabiah Fi Lubnan*, Vol. 11 (Beirut: Maktabat el-Karim al-Haditha, 1996)396 11.

²⁷³ Majed Majed, Al-Intikhabat Al-Lubnaniah 1861-1992 (Beirut: Majd, 1992)126.

²⁷⁴ Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)20.

²⁷⁵ Hudson, The Lebanese Crisis: The Limits of Consociational Democracy, Vol. 5, 1976)22.

	Protestant	14,000	1	0	0	1	1
	Jewish	7,000	0.49	0	0	0	0
	Syrian	6,000	0.42	0	0	0	0
	Catholics						
	Syrian	5,000	0.35	0	0	0	0
	Orthodox						
	Latin	4,000	0.28	0	0	0	0
	Nestorian	1,000	0.01	0	0	0	0
	Minorities	7,000	0.5	1	1.5	1	1
	Total	787,000	55.7%	36	55.4%	54	54.4%
TOTAL		1,411,000		66		99	

It is evident, that increasing the number of deputies increase representation and the inclusive nature of the parliament. Thus the 1957 parliament with 66 seats, was less representative than the 1960 parliament, which had 50% more seats, with 99. In the same venue, most of the sources agreed that an increase in the number of seats would have resulted in an increase in stability. Additionally, a number of opposition leaders believed that President Chamoun limited the number of deputies to just 66, as a method to affect the results and exclude his political opponents.

Abd al-Aziz Chihab the Director General of the Interior Ministry (tasked with holding and securing the elections) at the time of 1957 election explained the methods the Chamoun Government used to ensure its victory and the defeat of the opposition. He said "Chamoun limited the number of deputies to 66, instead of the 88 proposed earlier. Which allowed the exclusion of a big number of opposition members." ²⁷⁶ Meanwhile, President Chamoun argued that he was not against increasing the number of deputies in the parliament in principle. However, he feared that "because of the lack of organized political parties, a large increase could transform the chamber into a circus where disorganized debates would go on forever."²⁷⁷ On the other hand, Jumblatt accused President Chamoun of deliberately limiting the number of deputies to 66, in order to better control the Chamber and to stop Leftist politicians, and new younger representatives from entering the parliament."²⁷⁸

Henry Faroun, one of the leader of the third force faction that tried to mediate between the opposition and President Chamoun, explained that an increase in the number of deputies would have automatically lead to an increased national representation, and that the lowering of the number of deputies could have been a factor behind the crisis.²⁷⁹

UK Ambassador Mr. Middleton, explained in a dispatch to the Foreign Office that "a larger number [of deputies in the parliament] would have been in the country's interests. But, it was the smaller number that was adopted, largely it is believed, because the President felt he could still control a chamber of this size."²⁸⁰

In another dispatch, Middleton also explained that "44 deputies were too few to allow either adequate representation in the chamber of all the main interests in the country. The larger the chamber the less easy it will be to pack it, and the less likely to prove amenable to dictation from above. However, too small a chamber would prevent

²⁷⁶ Nawaf Salam, L'Insurrection De 1958 Au Liban (Paris: Universitee Sorbonne, 1979)25.

²⁷⁷ Camile Chamoun, Crise Au Moyen-Orient (Paris: Gallimard, 1963)376.

²⁷⁸ Kamal Jumblatt, Ossus Bina'a Al-Dawla Al-Lubnaniah W-Tanzim Chou'Ounaha (Beirut: Dar al-Takadumiah, 2012)36.

²⁷⁹ Salam, L'Insurrection De 1958 Au Liban (Paris: Universitee Sorbonne, 1979)123 IV.

²⁸⁰ M. Middleton Beirut, M4900 52683-1A VL1001/1

ventilation of public grievances in a constitutional manner and would risk excluding from the chamber leading figures, whose embittered opposition from outside might be more dangerous for the survival of the regime than anything they could do as members of the chamber.²²⁸¹

Meanwhile, Gordon explained that the 1960 election introduced a renewed representative parliament, in which only 32 survived of the 66 members of the previous parliament, and many new personalities entered the parliament for the first time, bringing fresh blood into the Lebanese political arena.²⁸²

In conclusion, comparatively and according to the opinion of a majority of sources, with the exception of President Chamoun, agree that a larger Chamber is more representative, and less prone to control and manipulation. Additionally, a larger chamber allows a greater influx of a newer and younger generation of politicians to the public sphere. As such, the 1960 having 99 deputies, a 50% increase over the 66 in the 1957 chamber, this thesis can conclude that 1960 election was more representative than the 1957.

3. Districting

This section will compare the districting of the 1957 electoral law to the 1960 one, in order to ascertain their fairness and to show if there was any attempts of gerrymandering. As part of its assessment of an electoral system when asked to observe and monitor elections, the European Commission set the standards for the delineation of electoral boundaries. It explained that "the drawing of boundaries should be undertaken

²⁸¹ M. Middleton Beirut, VL 1015/8, 1957

²⁸² Gordon, Lebanon the Fragmented Nation (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1980)59.

using a transparent and consistent procedure, established by law, and may include the use of criteria such as population size and geographical or administrative boundaries. Electoral boundaries should be regularly reviewed to reflect demographic changes. It should be taken into consideration that the drawing of electoral boundaries can be undertaken in such a way as to manipulate the outcome of an election – so-called 'gerrymandering'."²⁸³

In the 1957 election, president Chamoun and his government played an active role in the districting process. No uniform criteria was adopted, and each region was divided on an ad-hoc arbitrary basis. On the other hand, in the 1960 election, President Chehab tried to restore the sectarian balance and found a middle ground for districting by using medium constituencies, based on a pre-existing uniform administrative district called Qaza.²⁸⁴ While exploring the 1957 districting and the literature about it, several regions were found problematic, especially Beirut and the Chouf. Therfore, the next section will focus on these two distrcits.

a. <u>Beirut</u>

In 1957, Beirut was divided into two district, in such a way as to ensure Christian pro-Chamoun majorities in each one. While in 1960, the city was divided into three district ensuring that each sect enjoyed a majority in one of them, with a third mixed one. In 1957, the first district in Beirut included two neighborhood with Sunni

 ²⁸³ Election Teams, *Handbook for European Union Election Observation* (Sweden: European Commission,[2008]), eeas.europa.eu/eueom/pdf/handbook-eueom_en.pdf; (accessed 02/11/2014).
 ²⁸⁴ Raad, *Tarikh Lubnan Al-Siyasi Wal-Iktisadi 1958-1975* (Beirut: Maktabat al-Sa'h, 2004)118.

majority and three neighborhood with Christian majority. This created a big district of 5 seats, with a significant Christian majority. ²⁸⁵

District	Christians (of different denominations) seats	Druze / Sunni seats	Total
Beirut 1	3	2	5
Beirut 2	3	3	6

Table 6. Distribution of seats by sect in Beirut in 1957.²⁸⁶

Table 7. Distribution of seats by sect in Beirut in 1960.²⁸⁷

District	Christians (of different denominations) seats	Druze / Sunni seats	Total
Beirut 1	8	0	8
Beirut 2	1	2	3
Beirut 3	1	4	5

Additionally, a sectarian breakdown of the received votes by each candidates will show

how the districting tipped the scales in favor of the President candidates.

²⁸⁵ Majed, Al-Intikhabat Al-Lubnaniah 1861-1992 (Beirut: Majd, 1992)118.

²⁸⁶ Majed Majed, Al-Intikhabat Al-Lubnaniah 1861-1992 (Beirut: Majd, 1992)118.

²⁸⁷ Majed Majed, Al-Intikhabat Al-Lubnaniah 1861-1992 (Beirut: Majd, 1992)118.

Areas that formed	Votes for Sami Solh	Votes for Abdullah	Difference of or			
District Beirut I in	(pro-Chamoun)	Yafi (opposition)	against Solh			
1957						
Areas with Christian n	najority					
Ashrafieh	5936	1942	+3994			
Rumayl	4411	955	+3456			
Sayfi	1969	218	+1751			
Total of Areas with	12316	3115	+9201			
Christian majority						
Areas with Muslim ma	Areas with Muslim majority					
Musaytiba	4260	4844	-584			
Mazra	2322	8270	-5948			
Total of Areas with	6582	13114	-6532			
Muslim majority						
Total	18898	16229	+2669			

Table 8. Detailed results of the 57 elections in Beirut. (using numbers from AnNahar²⁸⁸ newspaper, Salam²⁸⁹, and Majed²⁹⁰)

The above illustration shows that the opposition candidate received an overwhelming majority in the Muslim areas (Yafi received 13,114 to solh's 6582). Meanwhile, the pro-Chamoun Solh received a large majority of votes in the Christian areas (12,316 to Yafi's 3115). As the Christian areas were more numerous, the total numerical advantage allowed Solh and the other pro-Chamoun to be elected, despite winning only a minority of Muslim votes. ²⁹¹

²⁸⁸ Annahar, "Results of the 1957 Election," Annahar14 June, 1957.

²⁸⁹ Salam, L'Insurrection De 1958 Au Liban (Paris: Universitee Sorbonne, 1979)27.

²⁹⁰ Majed, Al-Intikhabat Al-Lubnaniah 1861-1992 (Beirut: Majd, 1992)118.

²⁹¹ Salam, L'Insurrection De 1958 Au Liban (Paris: Universitee Sorbonne, 1979)27.

Thus, Saeb Salam and Abdullah Yafi the leaders of the opposition lost to Pro-Chamoun candidates, receiving each 15,725 and 16,270 respectively. Their opponents, the Prime Minster at the time Sami Solh got 19,098 and Khalil Haber got 17,907. Yet in 1960 Salam received a slightly higher number of votes with 17,357 while his opponent's support fell to only 9,181. Meanwhile, in the majority Christian district Pierre Gemayel the ally of Chamoun in 1957 won with a strong showing, receiving 21,283 to the 12,282 of his opponent. This shows that Salam support was almost equal in the two elections. However, in 1957 his opponent received the majority of his vote from the Christians' areas, that where merged with Salam's (Muslim) district's in 1960.²⁹²

After the election, President Chehab explained that it was not acceptable to merge the Christian Achrafieh area with the predominantly Muslim ones, such as Basta and Musaytbeh, (as it happened in 1957) because the Christians will vote against Muslim leaders. He also stated that the defeat of Salam or Yafi in the elections was unnatural.²⁹³

b. The Chouf

In southern Mount Lebanon, the region called Chouf, the stronghold of Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, was cut into three small districts, in 1957, despite the relatively small number of seats (66). While, in 1960 the same area was divided into only two districts, even though there was a higher number of overall deputies in the chamber (99). Additionally, the districting in 1957 divided the large Druze voter block between

²⁹² Saadeh, *Mawsuaat Al-Hayat Al-Niyabiah Fi Lubnan*, Vol. 11 (Beirut: Maktabat el-Karim al-Haditha, 1996)75.

²⁹³ Raad, Tarikh Lubnan Al-Siyasi Wal-Iktisadi 1958-1975 (Beirut: Maktabat al-Sa'h, 2004)118.

three districts, making sure that they are a minority in every one of them. On the other hand, in the 1960 election the two district were evenly divided between the different sects. The number of allocated seats is better illustrated below:

The 3 District of	Christians (of different	Druze / Sunni	Total
Chouf	denominations) seats	seats	
Baaklin-Joun	2	1	3
Deir Camar-cheeim	1	1	2
Aley-Daamour	2	1	3

Table 9. Distribution of seats by sects in the Chouf in 1957.²⁹⁴

Exploring and comparing the results, builds up an even stronger case of gerrymandering in the 1957 elections. In the first district Kamal Jumblatt got 7120 votes and lost to Quhtaan Hamedeh with 9074, meanwhile Henry Trabulsi (a pro Chamoun Christian) received 10048 vote to the 6056 votes Amine Saad received (a Christian allied with Jumblatt). Alternately, in 1960, the Chouf Qaza held 8 seats, divided between 4 Christians and 4 Muslims and Druze. Kamal Jumblatt received the second highest number of votes with 19,728, while the same pro-Chamoun opponent who won in 1957, Quhtaan Hamaedeh, only received 13,061 and lost. Additionally, Henry Trabulsi managed a weak 12,382, compared to Jumblatt Christian ally Aziz Aoun who received 19,968.²⁹⁵ It is clear after this analysis, that the districting in 1957 was not fair, as it consolidated the pro-government voters, while dividing the opposition's. Barring

²⁹⁴ Majed, Al-Intikhabat Al-Lubnaniah 1861-1992 (Beirut: Majd, 1992)118.

²⁹⁵ Saadeh, *Mawsuaat Al-Hayat Al-Niyabiah Fi Lubnan*, Vol. 11 (Beirut: Maktabat el-Karim al-Haditha, 1996)75.

the districting, many of the opposition figures would have succeeded in the 1957, as shown by the number breakdown and the number of votes they received in 1960.

Furthermore, there is an large number of sources, both primary and secondary that support the conclusion that several districts in the 1957 election were gerrymandered. Even Prime Minister Sami Solh, was convinced of this. He explained in his memoirs, "... the opposition fell because of the districting. Especially, Kamal Jumblatt, Ahmad Assaad, Yafi and Salam."²⁹⁶ Furthermore, The British Ambassador, one of the staunchest allies of President Chamoun, acknowledged that 'there is some truth in the opposition's accusations that the elections were manipulated in favor of government candidates.²⁹⁷

Abd al-Aziz Chehab the director general of the Interior Ministry, another Chamoun supporter also explained, "districting in its self is enough to explain the defeat of Jumblatt in the Chouf, Asaad in the South and Salam and Yafi in Beirut." He further added: "District Beirut 1 was constituted by the merger of Musaytiba and Mazra (areas with Sunni majority) with three sectors of Christian majority (Ashrafieh, Rmayle, Sayfi) which gave an overwhelming Christian majority in the district (and at the time most of the Christians were pro-Chamoun)"²⁹⁸

On the other hand Chamoun insisted, in his memoir, that the election of 1957 was honest, and that the defeated leaders tried to make up through violence for being punished by their constituencies, who wanted a country free of Syria-Egyptian subversion and from communism.²⁹⁹ However, in his book, Chamoun ignores any

 ²⁹⁶ Sami Solh, *Lubnan, Al-Aabath Al-Syasi Wal-Masir Al-Majhoul* (Beirut: Dar Annahar, 2000)266.
 ²⁹⁷ Middleton to Lloyd, Confidential, 31 June 1958, FO 371/127999.

²⁹⁸ Salam, L'Insurrection De 1958 Au Liban (Paris: Universitee Sorbonne, 1979)27.

²⁹⁹ Chamoun, Crise Au Moyen-Orient (Paris: Gallimard, 1963)384.

discussion of his intention for reelection and why Pierre Gemayel gave him limited support and the Patriarch none.³⁰⁰

Meanwhile, Kamal Jumblatt, one of the opposition's leaders, described Chamoun by saying "Lebanon never witnessed such a leader skilled with gerrymandering."³⁰¹ He also explained, "The electoral districting was fully gerrymandered. Qurtuba was attached to Kesserwan, even though they were divided by a river. Contrariwise, the Chouf was an example of cutting and merging different part of administrative districts, forming strange shapes on the map. Even Saida, part of the south, and the Bekaa were affected. The districting must be reviewed at least to follow the geography of the land."³⁰²

Qubain, in one of the major books about that era, wrote just after the crisis in 1961 that "Kamal Jumblatt defeated was effectively insured by gerrymandering his district to include pro-government Christians who did not vote for him."³⁰³ He added that cumulative circumstantial evidences indicates that the elections were fraudulent. Government candidates won 10 out of 11 seats. In Mount Lebanon 20 seats were won by the government supporters.³⁰⁴ Qubain insisted that "several leaders from South Lebanon, Mount Lebanon and Beirut, were gerrymandered out of their customary seats."³⁰⁵

Abu Saleh said that "the districting divided the opposition voting bloc, and consolidated the government loyalist votes, which lead to the victory of the pro-

³⁰¹ Kamal Jumblatt, *Hakikat Al-Thawra Al Lubnaniah* (Beirut: Dar Al-Takadumiah, 1987)48.

³⁰⁰ Gordon, *Lebanon the Fragmented Nation* (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1980)56.

³⁰² Jumblatt, Ossus Bina'a Al-Dawla Al-Lubnaniah W-Tanzim Chou'Ounaha (Beirut: Dar al-Takadumiah, 2012)34.

³⁰³ Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)57.

³⁰⁴ Fahim Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)58.

³⁰⁵ Fahim Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)218.

Chamoun loyalists. For example, in the Chouf the Sunni district was split from the Druze one, thus giving the Christian voters in each district the majority. Similarly, in Beirut the Sunni voters were divided between the two districts, again giving the Christian a majority in both. Incidentally the majority of Christians were pro-Chamoun, resulting in a victory of the government's list, in these districts." ³⁰⁶ Jamal el-Din also said that Chamoun "cut the districts in Beirut and elsewhere, in a very peculiar and revolting way, which resulted in a victory of Sami Solh. Even though, Solh received only a few votes from his own neighborhood and people."³⁰⁷

Modern Western scholars such Theodor Hanf explained that while Chamoun did not make Khoury's mistake of open electoral fraud, he "did not hesitate to heavily gerrymander the districts of his opponent, especially in Beirut and the Chouf. These districts were redrawn to increase and include Christian majorities in all districts."³⁰⁸ While William Harris stated that Chamoun regime frontally challenged the political leaders in the 1957 parliamentary elections in ways that put previous manipulation in the shade. He added "An imaginative gerrymander created constituency boundaries that splintered the support bases of leading opposition's politicians. Jumblatt and Saeb Salam lost their seats in their strong holds." ³⁰⁹ Additionally, David Gordon reported that Chamoun seemed to repeat the tactics of the man he ousted as president, as he rigged the parliamentary election of 1957, pushing Lebanese politics to the streets.³¹⁰

Among modern Lebanese scholars, Baaklini also stated, "In 1957 redistricting was done with the stated intention of reducing the power of the feudal lords, like

³⁰⁶ Abu Saleh, Al-Azma Al-Loubnaniah Aam 1958 (Beirut: Al Manshwrat al Arabia, 1998)67.

³⁰⁷ Najib Jamal el-Din, Fi Samim El-Maaraka (Beirut: , 1958)25.

³⁰⁸ Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon. Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation (London: , 1993)116.

³⁰⁹ Harris, *Faces of Lebanon* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1997)142.

³¹⁰ Gordon, *Lebanon the Fragmented Nation* (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1980)52.

Jumblatt, al Assa'd, Salam, and Karami in Tripoli, who threatened Chamoun's power."³¹¹ So did Nassif "The President, though the electoral law changes, knew how to use the districting to his advantage."³¹² In addition to Leila Raad who said "Chamoun amended the 1957 electoral law, with the aim to insure the victory of the largest majority of deputies supportive of his local and foreign policies. Thus, he introduced districting that was unfavorable with the opposition's interests."³¹³ Similarly, Sarofim explained "the 1957 law was gerrymandered in order to divide the voters of the opposition and consolidate the voters loyal to the government."³¹⁴

Meanwhile, Attie explained that the 1957 elections crystallized the opposition against Chamoun and marked a point of no return for its leading members. These leaders who lost their seats in those elections, largely due to Chamoun's efforts. She added the fact that Chamoun engineered the defeat of a number of traditional political leaders in the 1957 elections ensured their enmity, as he had broken the cardinal rule of Lebanese politics by consensus. Furthermore, she said that in the 1957 elections, "Chamoun attempted to break the power of the sectarian leaders by engineering their loss in their traditionally solid constituencies, by rearranging the boundaries of their electoral constituencies."³¹⁵ She also said that "Chamoun was personally involved in defining the numbers and areas of the electoral districts. Chamoun had basically rearranged the constituency boundaries in order to weaken the support base of each of the prominent opposition leaders and thereby ensure their defeat."³¹⁶

³¹¹ Baaklini, *Legislative and Politcal Development: Lebanon, 1842-1972* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1976)144.

³¹² Nicola Nassif, *Camille Chamoun, Akher Al-Aamalikat* (Beirut: Dar Annahar, 1988)72.

³¹³ Raad, *Tarikh Lubnan Al-Siyasi Wal-Iktisadi 1958-1975* (Beirut: Maktabat al-Sa'h, 2004)65.

³¹⁴ Antoine Sarofim, *Al_intikhabat Al-Niyabiah Fi Zahleh Wal-Bikaa*, Vol. 2 (Beirut: , 1996)153.

³¹⁵ Attie, *Struggle in the Levant* (New York: Center for Lebanese Studies, 2004)148.

³¹⁶ Caroline Attie, *Struggle in the Levant* (New York: Center for Lebanese Studies, 2004)132.

Finally, after this discussion of the ample evidences and firsthand accounts of the gerrymandering efforts deployed by President Chamoun during the 1957 elections to ensure his victory, it can be safely concluded that the 1957 election were significantly less representative than the 1960, in this criteria. As a finale point of note, the fact that elections in the Bekaa', Zahle, and north Lebanon (areas where little to no gerrymandering occurred) yielded mixed results, as the opposition was able to win a few seats, shows the decisive impact of gerrymandering. Meanwhile, the 1960 was based on a pre-existing administrative district, and yield an inclusive parliament. Therefore, when comparing the two elections based on districting, there is no contest that the 1960 was significantly more representative.

4. State pressure and public institution interference

The EU commission also sets the standards for state interference saying "The election administration at all levels should act in a professional and neutral manner, and the voting, counting, and tabulation processes should be absent of fraud or manipulation."³¹⁷ Although, measuring interference, pressure and intimidation are hard due to their secretive nature, there are several very indicative examples in this cases studies that show a measurable trend.

In the 1957 elections, the government and many of the public institutions were heavily involved in the elections, and strong pressure was brought to bear to insure the elections of some candidates. Additionally, despite the decade long practice to entrust the elections to a neutral government to ensure impartiality, Chamoun refused to form a

³¹⁷ Election Teams, *Handbook for European Union Election Observation* (Sweden: European Commission, 2008)18, eeas.europa.eu/eueom/pdf/handbook-eueom_en.pdf; (accessed 02/11/2014).

neutral government. The President disregarded the demands of the opposition and only accepted the appointment of two neutral ministers.³¹⁸ However, these two impartial ministers resigned midway through the elections. They stated that they resigned because they could no longer tolerate the general atmosphere. Although they could not find any fault with technical details they hinted that pressure of various kinds have been brought to bear on voters.³¹⁹ On the other hand, just before the 1960 election, the government resigned and a special caretaker neutral government was formed with non-candidate ministers³²⁰. This government was charged with the organization and the overseeing of the elections.³²¹

Additionally, there were many first and second hand reports about political interference and pressures exerted by the President, his entourage and public officers in the 1957 elections. Meanwhile, reports about President Chamoun and his government interference in the 1960 were much lower than in 1957, and several incidents led credence to President Chehab neutrality. For example: former President Chamoun, and three of his supporters won in the election, despite their enmity with Chehab. In addition to the defeat of Clovis Khazen, a relative of President Chehab, and Taki el-Dein Solh a supporter of Chehab.³²² On the other hand, in 1957, there were corroborated reports that President Chamoun himself was involved in ensuring the election of his foreign minister Dr. Charles Malek. The Minister was faced with a strong candidate, Fuad el Ghoson, who was brought to the presidential palace and after two meetings, he was pressured to withdraw. The opposition claimed that he and his family were

³¹⁸ Nadia Karami and Nawaf Karami, Wakii Al-Thwara Al-Lubnaniah (Beirut: , 1959)27.

³¹⁹ Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)57.

³²⁰ Raad, Tarikh Lubnan Al-Siyasi Wal-Iktisadi 1958-1975 (Beirut: Maktabat al-Sa'h, 2004)119.

³²¹ Ziadeh, *The Lebanese Elections*, 1960, Vol. 14, 1960)371.

³²² Raad, Tarikh Lubnan Al-Siyasi Wal-Iktisadi 1958-1975 (Beirut: Maktabat al-Sa'h, 2004)119.

threatened; others reported that he was paid one hundred thousand dollars.³²³ Ghosn's withdrawal left the field open for Malik and a third communist candidate who did not have a chance of success.³²⁴ (This story was reported by several authors and primary sources, like Abu Saleh,³²⁵ Nassif,³²⁶ Raad³²⁷, and Salam) Ghosn himself, in his withdrawal speech said that "I withdrew in favor of my relative and friend Dr. Charles Malik, due to my trust in him, and for the sake of unity, at the request of important friends."³²⁸ Even the US Ambassador Mr. Donald Heath related this incident saying, "Malik's election was a clear example of overkill and a blatant indication of presidential interference, for Chamoun had to induce the popular incumbent Fuad Ghosn to withdraw his candidacy in order to ensure Malik's victory."³²⁹

Dr Yusuf Hitti and Mohammad Ali Beyhum, the two neutral ministers appointed to the cabinet to supervise the electoral process of the 1957 elections, resigned stating that the general atmosphere prevailing during the elections did not encourage them to continue their mission. While they stated that from an administrative point of view the elections in Mount Lebanon were carried out in a correct manner the consensus of general opinion was that Chamoun had used the full force of the government's administrative machinery and had gerrymandered the districts to defeat his opponents who had traditionally held safe seats.³³⁰ President Chamoun, on the other hand, refused any claim of fraud and interference and explained his victory in 1957 was due to

³²³ Jamal el-Din, Fi Samim El-Maaraka (Beirut: , 1958)25.

³²⁴ Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)57.

³²⁵ Abu Saleh, Al-Azma Al-Loubnaniah Aam 1958 (Beirut: Al Manshwrat al Arabia, 1998)215.

³²⁶ Nassif, Camille Chamoun, Akher Al-Aamalikat (Beirut: Dar Annahar, 1988)72.

³²⁷ Raad, Tarikh Lubnan Al-Siyasi Wal-Iktisadi 1958-1975 (Beirut: Maktabat al-Sa'h, 2004)71.

³²⁸ Saadeh, *Mawsuaat Al-Hayat Al-Niyabiah Fi Lubnan*, Vol. 11 (Beirut: Maktabat el-Karim al-Haditha, 1996)368.

³²⁹ Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 2917, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 3 June 1957.

³³⁰ Attie, *Struggle in the Levant* (New York: Center for Lebanese Studies, 2004)144.

Nasser's interference and his agent terrorist acts that turned the national sentiment against the opposition.³³¹ Similarly, Albert Mukhaybir, a pro-Chamoun politician, excluded any fraud in the elections. He explained that the opposition leaders lost because they supported Nasser, and that casted shadow on them in the eyes of their Christian supporters.³³² However, Kazim Al Khalil a Chamoun supporter and minister in the Solh Government affirmed that "although the President did not use fraud in the election but he used his full influence to ensure victory."³³³

Chamoun's personal involvement in the elections extended beyond the technical aspects of the process. In order to maximize his scope for patronage prior to the elections, Chamoun personally took over (from the municipalities) the power to appoint and remove senior officials from the municipalities and also centralized control over the expenditure on roads. Thus, President Chamoun took direct control of the expenditure of these funds, ensuring the loyalties of local dignitaries in the upcoming elections.³³⁴

On the side of the opposition, Kamal Jumblatt talked of "election that were marred with violence, pressure, and bribes."³³⁵ While, Saeb Salam, accused Chamoun government of direct electoral fraud saying "while they were counting the votes in First Beirut district, we were ahead by 2000 votes. Then suddenly, the electricity was cut and when they came back on, the pro-Chamoun list had 4000 votes added..."³³⁶ Additionally, Abdallah Mashnuk, another Sunni leader of the opposition claimed that the 1957 were falsified. He explained, "President Chamoun forged the results of the elections that is why the opposition leaders like Jumblatt and Yafi lost. He stopped

³³¹ Chamoun, Crise Au Moyen-Orient (Paris: Gallimard, 1963)376.

³³² Salam, L'Insurrection De 1958 Au Liban (Paris: Universitee Sorbonne, 1979)IV 232.

³³³ Nawaf Salam, L'Insurrection De 1958 Au Liban (Paris: Universitee Sorbonne, 1979)25.

³³⁴ Attie, *Struggle in the Levant* (New York: Center for Lebanese Studies, 2004)133.

³³⁵ Jumblatt, Hakikat Al-Thawra Al Lubnaniah (Beirut: Dar Al-Takadumiah, 1987)51.

³³⁶ Salam, L'Insurrection De 1958 Au Liban (Paris: Universitee Sorbonne, 1979)IV 39.

playing his constitutional role of arbiter, once he excluded all the oppositions' leaders there was no more room for dialogue with him.³³⁷ Consequently, the opposing United National Front refused to recognize the election result. It issued an official statement charging the president of openly interfering in the election and said that "pressure and intimidation were exercised and most of the state machinery was used in various ways to falsify the will of the voters.³³⁸ Meanwhile, Raymond Idda, a politician of the third force faction, in an interview, answered a question if the government committed electoral fraud and directly interference and answered, "yes, yes, yes!"³³⁹

Lebanese political writer and analyst Zein el-Dein, explained that the election of 1957 was characterized by substantial fraud and pressures, exerted by the President. ³⁴⁰ While, Landau a political scholars, stated that despite the fact that the outgoing Government did not push forward anyone as its own candidate in the 1960 elections, ample opportunity remained for pressure and bribery by those who knew how to manage it and could afford it.³⁴¹ Samir Khalaf, said "President Chamoun thrived on political manipulations, and used his unofficial powers to their fullest. Khalaf added that Chamoun conducted, if not blatantly fraudulent and rigged, then certainly subtle but scarcely impartial national elections in which many of their prominent rivals were excluded.³⁴² While, Goria, explained that "Using a combination of fraud and coercion, Lebanese security forces were encouraged to intervene during the 1957 election, in order to secure Chamoun's victory." ³⁴³ Qubain added that "the 1957 election were

³³⁷ Nawaf Salam, L'Insurrection De 1958 Au Liban (Paris: Universitee Sorbonne, 1979)IV 3.

³³⁸ Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)58.

³³⁹ Salam, L'Insurrection De 1958 Au Liban (Paris: Universitee Sorbonne, 1979)IV 163.

³⁴⁰ Ahmad Zein el-Dein, *Tatawor Qanoun Al-Intikhabat Fi Lubnan (1840-2000)* (Beirut: Dar Leila111.

³⁴¹ Landau, *Elections in Lebanon*, Vol. 14, 1961)142.

³⁴² Khalaf, *Lebanon's Predicament* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987)96.

³⁴³ Goria, Sovereignty and Leadership in Lebanon 1943-1976 (london: Ithaca Press, 1985)40.

carried out with unmistakable government interference as the interior situation deteriorated."³⁴⁴

Finally, during the 1957 election, President Chehab used all the tools of power in his possession to ensure the widest victory in the elections. He refused to appoint a neutral government, and did not hesitate to interfere personally in the election. Most analysis and firsthand accounts agree on that. On the other hand, in 1960 Chehab made sure not to get involved in the election, tasking an interim neutral government with organizing the election. He also enacted new administrative laws, to punish all public officers who attempt to interfere in the electoral process. Finally, as mentioned previously, it is impossible to say that there was no interference or pressures exerted during the 1960. However, we can safely assume that in comparison the 1960 election was significantly less prone to public interference than 1957. As such, the 1960 election was more representative than the 1957 in this regard.

5. Campaign Financing

The EU commission standards for regulating the financing of electoral campaigns are based on transparency. Indeed, limits on campaign spending may be necessary to prevent disproportionate or one-sided campaigns, however they should not be so strict as to prevent effective campaigning. Therefore, it is common practice for candidates and political parties to be obliged to disclose funding sources and provide reports and accounts of their campaign expenditure. It is important to note that there are

³⁴⁴ Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)253.

specific standards set for foreign funding stating "Reasonable restrictions on campaign funding can include limits on funding from foreign or anonymous sources."³⁴⁵

The electoral laws for both elections did not tackle the issue of campaign financing, and mentioned obliquely the issue of advertising, freeing it from tax but limiting street posters and signs to specific billboards set by the administration.³⁴⁶ The 1960 law introduced additional reforms to campaign advertising, barring the distribution of any campaign leaflets on the day of elections. The 1960 law also forbid public and municipal employees from distributing campaign advertising to any of the candidates.³⁴⁷ This lessened public institution interference in the campaign advertising aspect of the election. Both President Chamoun's side and the opposition, which competed in the 1957 accused the other side of receiving money from its foreign patrons. Chamoun accused the opposition of getting funds from Egypt and Syria, while the opposition accused Chamoun of getting financial help from the US and the UK. Indeed, there are strong evidence that both claims are true. However, in the 1960 elections, President Chamoun's policy of neutrality in the Arab world and abroad, combined with a relaxed regional and international atmosphere, reduced any outside interference to influence or direct the election. ³⁴⁸

Abdallah Mashnuk, a Sunni leader of the opposition, explicitly said that he was helped financial by Egypt, through his newspaper, explaining that "they sent us some money for our expenses." However, he added that in the 1960 election "I did not need any financial help."³⁴⁹

 ³⁴⁵ Election Teams, *Handbook for European Union Election Observation* (Sweden: European Commission, 2008)52, eeas.europa.eu/eueom/pdf/handbook-eueom_en.pdf; (accessed 02/11/2014).
 ³⁴⁶ Articles 52,53,54 of the 1957 Law, and Articles 61,62

³⁴⁷ Article 63 and 64 of the 1960 Law

³⁴⁸ Suleiman, *Elections in a Confessional Democracy.*, Vol. 29, 1967a)114.

³⁴⁹ Salam, L'Insurrection De 1958 Au Liban (Paris: Universitee Sorbonne, 1979)IV 34.

Evidence of American financial assistance to President Chamoun, has been revealed in details in books by former intelligence operatives such as Wilbur Eveland and Miles Copeland. Eveland, one of the CIA officers sent to Beirut as a special envoy of the White House, stated that the US ambassador to Beirut, Donald Heath was the master mind behind the 1957 elections that resulted in the victory of Chamoun.³⁵⁰ Additionally, a diplomatic dispatch form the US embassy in Beirut said that the embassy gave several of the pro-western candidates (pro-Chamoun) funds that equaled what Egypt and Syria gave to the opposition's candidates.³⁵¹ Eveland, in his book, explicitly stated that he transported large sum to President Chamoun: "Throughout the elections I traveled regularly to the presidential palace with a briefcase full of Lebanese pounds, then returned late at night to the Embassy with an empty twin case I'd carried away for Harvey Armada's CIA finance-office people to replenish. Soon my gold DeSoto with its stark white top was a common sight outside the palace, and I proposed to Chamoun that he use an intermediary and a more remote spot. When the president insisted that he handle each transaction by himself, I reconciled myself to the probability that anybody in Lebanon who really cared would have no trouble guessing precisely what I was doing".352

British assistance to Chamoun was also forthcoming during the elections, at the urging of the British ambassador. He wrote that in order to maintain Chamoun's friendly attitude towards Britain, "we must bring our weight to bear in support of the President and his followers and do what we can to frustrate the activities and influence

 $^{^{350}}$ Heath to Dulles NO/1967 and NO/2066 December 13 and 16, 1957

³⁵¹ Wilbur Eveland, *Ropes of Sand: America's Failur in the Middle East* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1980)252.

³⁵² Wilbur Eveland, *Ropes of Sand: America's Failur in the Middle East* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1980)252.

of his opposition.³⁵³ While the extent of British monetary assistance is unknown, the comment by Sir William Hayter, the Deputy Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, that "we were quite active during the recent elections and may need to do no less during the Presidential election." This comment provides further evidence of direct British involvement in the parliamentary elections.³⁵⁴

On the other hand, the opposition were also financed by Syria and Egypt. The British ambassador wrote the following report on the eve of the elections: "There is no doubt at all that large quantities of money and arms have been supplied to the leaders of the opposition and their supporters by the Egyptian and Syrian authorities. I have direct evidence of the arrival of a consignment of arms at the Egyptian Embassy in Beirut, delivered by a Syrian military vehicle. ... We know of the sum of half a million pounds (Syrian) distributed by the Egyptians to the Opposition and their supporters."³⁵⁵

Alin, a political scientist stated that "during Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik visit to the US he claimed that US assistance was necessary to counteract the impact of Egyptian, Syrian and Saudi financial aid to the opposition. Consequently, the Eisenhower administration decided to provide covert financial support to pro-Chamoun candidates, channeled through the US embassy and Prime Minister Solh."³⁵⁶

Additionally, there is the vote buying tradition in Lebanon, and both elections suffered from that. The process is quite widespread and entrenched. It is usually done through influential local dignitaries, clan or family leaders, called electoral keys. The patron or sectarian Zaima followed by these leaders, ask for their support and they

³⁵³ Middleton to Lloyd, confidential 27 February 1957, FO 371/127999.

³⁵⁴ Minute by Hayter, 20 December 1957, FO 371/128000

³⁵⁵ Middleton to Lloyd, confidential, 5 June 1957, FO 371/127999.

³⁵⁶ Erika Alin, *The United States and the 1958 Lebanon Crisis* (New York: University Press of America, 1994)57.

oblige by promising a number of votes, and they are paid accordingly.³⁵⁷ However, with the introduction of the secret ballot and pre-printed envelops in the 1960, the level of corruption was a bit lower but it was not eradicated. Hudson explained that in 1960 election there was the usual vote buying and the various charges of unfair pressure.³⁵⁸ Qubain also explained, "vote buying is certainly a normal electoral practice in Lebanon, particularly in highly competitive districts." He stated that both the opposition and progovernment candidates resorted to corrupted practices.³⁵⁹ Indeed, L'Orient, a progovernment newspaper reported on the 1957 election, "Candidates of all colors had been buying votes wholesale, so no one could complain." ³⁶⁰

Bribery, vote buying, and transporting voters to polling centers, are all common and widespread forms of corruption in the Lebanese electoral process. Both elections witnessed these practices and although the reforms implemented in 1960 had a definite impact, and there was significant foreign financing in 1957. However, the evidence on foreign financing are circumstantial and based on a small number of sources. Additionally, there is a large number of official appeal and petitions demands submitted to the electoral committee, during the 1960 elections to cast doubt on it.³⁶¹ Thus, the comparison of the two elections based on this criteria, will be considered as nonconclusive for the sake of accuracy.

³⁵⁷ Ziadeh, *The Lebanese Elections*, 1960, Vol. 14, 1960)371.

³⁵⁸ Hudson, *Politcal Change in Lebanon 1943-1963* (New York: Yale University, 1963)138.

³⁵⁹ Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)252.

³⁶⁰ Fahim Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)58.

³⁶¹ Saadeh, *Mawsuaat Al-Hayat Al-Niyabiah Fi Lubnan*, Vol. 11 (Beirut: Maktabat el-Karim al-Haditha, 1996)112 12.

6. Secret ballot and technical electoral reforms

Voting by secret ballot is one of the main criteria listed in the EU report. The fairness and representative nature of the election necessitates that "voters mark their ballots alone, in the privacy of a secure voting booth, and in a manner that the marked ballot cannot be viewed before it is deposited in the ballot box and cannot later be identified with a particular voter."³⁶²

The Lebanese electoral law of 1957 had a very general article concerning secret voting, stating, "the voting will be in secret."³⁶³ The detailed application of the mandatory secret ballot was introduced in 1960 electoral law, which reserved three different articles to the secret ballot.³⁶⁴ The secret ballot gave the voters a larger guarantee to vote according to their own will, without pressure or interference.³⁶⁵ Additionally, the 1960 electoral law introduced several other new reforms that were not in the previous law. Pre-printed envelops for the voting³⁶⁶ were used for the first time, and the number of voting booth was significantly increased, from one for 200 citizen in villages and one booth for 500 citizen in cities in the 1957 law, to one booth per 100 citizens in villages, and one booth per 400 citizens in cities.³⁶⁷ This eased the voting process, reduced waiting time, and curtailed the ability of candidates to influence or control a small number of voting booth and their surroundings.³⁶⁸ It is although worthy to note that the parliamentary commission for electoral appeals of the 1957 elections, recommended that the electors freedom of voting should be preserved and the proper

³⁶² Election Teams, *Handbook for European Union Election Observation* (Sweden: European

Commission, 2008)19, eeas.europa.eu/eueom/pdf/handbook-eueom_en.pdf; (accessed 02/11/2014).

³⁶³ Article 5 of the 1957 electoral law.

³⁶⁴ Article 47,49, and 50 of the 1960 electoral law.

³⁶⁵ Nadi 22 Tshreen al-thani, Al-Mowatn Wal-Intikhabat (Beirut: , 1968)13.

³⁶⁶ Article 46 of the electoral law of 1960.

³⁶⁷ Articles 34 of the 1957 law and article 39 for the 1960 law.

³⁶⁸ Suleiman, *Elections in a Confessional Democracy.*, Vol. 29, 1967a)114.

ways to preserve it should be implemented (secret ballot), based on the number of irregularities and violations reported on this issue.³⁶⁹

Consequently, most of the comments, articles and studies on the 1960, had positive views on the implemented electoral reforms and how they increased the representativeness and fairness of the electoral system in Lebanon. Indeed, some Lebanese politicians were clamoring for these reforms as far as 1958. For example

Kamal Jumblatt insisted that the secret ballot should be implemented, the number of deputies should be significantly increased, while limiting the candidate electoral expenditure, and tasking a judicial committee with overseeing all issues with the elections.³⁷⁰

Baaklini also explained, "In 1960, the electoral law was amended to insure secrecy of election and independence of the voters. Each electoral center was equipped with an isolated room or booth, where each voter is allowed to exercise his choice privately and independent of pressure."³⁷¹ Jisr also mentioned that the 1960 elections introduced several new reforms to the process.³⁷²

Meanwhile, Suleiman explained that "the considerable increase in the number of polling centers made greater and easier access to the polls, and the isolated election booth was well enforced to assure freedom of voting. More important, perhaps, was the fact that the government for the first time, photographed the voters' lists instead of having them copied, thus eliminating much error, intended or otherwise."³⁷³ And so did

³⁶⁹ Saadeh, *Mawsuaat Al-Hayat Al-Niyabiah Fi Lubnan*, Vol. 11 (Beirut: Maktabat el-Karim al-Haditha, 1996)410.

³⁷⁰ Kamal Jumblatt, *Fi Mujra Al-Siyasah Al-Lubnaniah* (Beirut: Lajnat Turath Kamal Jumblatt, 1978)36.

³⁷¹ Baaklini, *Legislative and Politcal Development: Lebanon, 1842-1972* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1976)145.

³⁷² Bassem Jisr, *Mithak 1943* (Beirut: Dar An Nahar, 1978)268.

³⁷³ Suleiman, *Elections in a Confessional Democracy.*, Vol. 29, 1967a)114.

Kerr and Gordon who mentioned that the 1960 law introduced secret ballots, and implemented several other reforms.³⁷⁴ While Landau also said that the erection of polling booths affording screen-secrecy as well as the use of opaque envelopes for the first time in Lebanese elections, lessened electoral fraud.³⁷⁵

Finally, during the 1957 election there was no privacy booth and a total absence of the secret ballot and the previously mentioned electoral improvements, which were only introduced in 1960. Thus, it is safe to conclude that the electoral reforms of the 1960, increased its representative nature compared to the 1957 elections.

7. Security

Elections should be conducted in a peaceful manner, while the safety and security of the voters and all participant must be assured by the local police or armed forces, without any interference in the voting process.³⁷⁶

Both elections were secure, with very limited security incidents. Raad explained that according to neutral observers the election in Mount Lebanon in 1957, was chaotic and filled with disturbances. However, the 1960 election occured in a calmer atmosphere.³⁷⁷ Although, some incidents did occur in Beirut, Ba'albek, Zgharta, Sidon, and elsewhere during the 1960 election. The election were relatively safe due to strict enforcement of the ban on the carrying of firearms during election time, and due to the arrests, before the elections, of a sizable number of turbulent and suspicious characters. In addition, to the deployment of more than 6,000 soldiers, police officers, and security

³⁷⁴ Kerr, *The 1960 Lebanese Parliamentary Elections*, Vol. 11, 1960)269.

³⁷⁵ Landau, *Elections in Lebanon*, Vol. 14, 1961)142.

³⁷⁶ Election Teams, *Handbook for European Union Election Observation* (Sweden: European Commission, 2008)19, eeas.europa.eu/eueom/pdf/handbook-eueom en.pdf; (accessed 02/11/2014).

³⁷⁷ Raad, Tarikh Lubnan Al-Siyasi Wal-Iktisadi 1958-1975 (Beirut: Maktabat al-Sa'h, 2004)119.

officers to prevent disturbance.³⁷⁸ Ziadeh also supported that argument saying that "In so far as the actual polling was concerned it went rather peacefully one serious incident being reported from Hirmil."³⁷⁹

All in all, both elections happened under relatively calm security conditions, even though the overall tension and discontent level in 1957 was much higher than in 1960, but the elections were both held in a peacefully, barring a few incidents. It is important to note that this section is specifically discussing security incident during the elections, the months before and after the 1957 witnessed a lot of clashes and security breaches, and this will be discussed in a different section.

8. Concluding remarks on representation

It can be safely concluded that the 1960 electoral law was measurably more representative than the 1957 one. Indeed, considering the number of deputies, districting, government interference, and secret ballots, it is enough to conclude that the 1960 elections was vastly more representative than the 1957. Especially, if we take into account that even allies of President Chamoun declared that the 1957 Chamber did not represent the Lebanese population, as Pierre Gemayel stated that "the parliament represents, in my opinion only ten percent of the population. At the moment the real parliament is out in the streets."³⁸⁰Additionally, US Ambassador to Lebanon McClintock noted in May 1958, "Opposition representation in the Chamber of Deputies, is not proportional to its popular support."³⁸¹ Meanwhile, Hamid Frangieh also said "the state officials managed to exclude a former Speaker and former Prime

³⁷⁸ Landau, *Elections in Lebanon*, Vol. 14, 1961)141.

³⁷⁹ Ziadeh, *The Lebanese Elections*, 1960, Vol. 14, 1960)372.

³⁸⁰ Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)58.

³⁸¹ Embassy in Beirut, department of state, may 4 1958, foreign relations 11

Ministers and Ministers from the parliament. How could we say that the chamber represent the people, after this maneuver."³⁸² However, what lend even more credence to the representative nature of the 1960 law, was that even pro-Chamoun loyalist, former President Chamoun, and three of his supporters won in the election, despite their enmity with Chehab. Additionally, Clovis Khazen, a relative of President Chehab, and Taki el-Dein Solh a supporter of Chehab were both defeated.³⁸³ The 1960 election witnessed the inclusion of large number of new Deputies (over 50%), who served for the first time. Indeed the 1960 elections resulted in the inclusion of most political leaders, several of whom were at the forefront of the 1958 crisis after being excluded in 1957 elections.³⁸⁴ Jumblatt, Salam, Karameh, the leaders of the opposition returned to the parliament. No major political party or leaders were excluded from the 1960 parliament. The 1960 election can best be described by the words of Hudson "it marked the return to normal election practices… these elections were the most orderly in the history of the republic."³⁸⁵

It is important to restate here the delicate differentiation this thesis make to the concept of representation. Throughout both elections, the sectarian allocation of seats stayed the same following the preset ratio of 11, with 5 Muslims to 6 Christians seats. What was different was whether these deputies represented the popular majorities of their own sects or they were just figureheads elected with the support of other sects. Representation in this thesis is not only about parity and proportional distribution of seats, it is about intra-sectarian representation and if it is translated on the inter-sectarian political arena of the Chamber of deputies. As previously mentioned the 1957 election

³⁸² An Nahar newspaper, 20/06/1957

³⁸³ Raad, Tarikh Lubnan Al-Siyasi Wal-Iktisadi 1958-1975 (Beirut: Maktabat al-Sa'h, 2004)119.

³⁸⁴ Kerr, The 1960 Lebanese Parliamentary Elections, Vol. 11, 1960)268.

³⁸⁵ Hudson, *Politcal Change in Lebanon 1943-1963* (New York: Yale University, 1963)137.

failed in achieving that, while the 1960 elections was significantly more representative in this regard.

Finally, the strongest argument that support this thesis hypothesis about the representative nature of the 1960 electoral law, is that the 1960 law was used without major changes in all parliamentary elections before the 1975 war.³⁸⁶ It was even resurrected for the 2009 elections, when the Lebanese leaders forged another agreement to put an end to civil strife that erupted in May 8, 2008. The return to the 1960 electoral law was one of the main clauses of the Doha agreement. Here, it is worthy to point out that after the 2009 election, several political parties –especially Christian ones-, who were behind the adoption of the 1960, started criticizing it. Their argument was centered on the need to achieve the genuine representation of Christian, or for the Christian to elect their own representative, what was referred earlier in this thesis as the new dimension of representation, and the interaction between inter and intra sectarian representation. This fact does not undermine the argument about the level of representation of the 1960 law. This thesis is not arguing the absolute representative level of the 1960 law, all what it is saying is that the 1960 law is measurably more representative than the 1957 one.

B. Stability

The Term stability was previously defined as the lack of political violence (as opposed to mundane criminal violence), civil unrest, and civil wars. It is also understood that a stable period would benefit from positive and vibrant economic

³⁸⁶ Baaklini, *Legislative and Politcal Development: Lebanon, 1842-1972* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1976)144.

growth, prosperity, functioning government and institution, political reform, which could also be counted as additional peripheral indicators of stability.

It is clear after the historical overview of the period of study that the period following the 1957 election was followed by a six-month civil war that engulfed the whole country. It cost almost 4000 lives, and at one-point large peripheral areas of the country, almost two thirds, were outside the government's control. Bridges, telephone poles and public building were attacked and blown up, chaos reigned. Meanwhile, President Chamoun helped with a few Christian political parties and the police hunkered in the core Christian area in northern Mount Lebanon and East Beirut. The army stood neutral and intervened only when the red lines set by General Chehab were crossed.³⁸⁷ Then, foreign troops debarked in Beirut, and stayed for several months. A political agreement was reached and a few months later, the war formally ended with the slogan "no winners, no losers".³⁸⁸

On the other hand, once the crisis was resolved and the 1960 elections organized, a period of restructuring and rebuilding started, witnessing many economic, administrative and social reforms, especially in the poor Muslim peripheral regions. Chehab's mandate is still remembered to this day, as a period when most of the state's social institution, like social security were established, and when the foundation of modern Lebanon were set with the creation of the central bank among many other public institutions.³⁸⁹ The only threat to stability that marred the post 1960 period was the 31 December 1961 SSNP failed coup d'état, that was subdued in a matter of days,

³⁸⁷ Gordon, *Lebanon the Fragmented Nation* (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1980)53.

³⁸⁸ Suleiman, *Elections in a Confessional Democracy.*, Vol. 29, 1967a)113.

³⁸⁹ Kamal Dib, *Warlords and Merchants, the Lebanese Buisness and Policitical Establishment* (London: Ithaca Press, 2004)188.

with limited casualties.³⁹⁰ Nevertheless, the reason behind the SSNP revolt were not caused by a misrepresentation or political exclusion, rather they were caused by more ideological and historical roots. The issue of stability will be further discussed below, based on several criteria.

1. The geography and political mosaic of the 58 crisis

After the 1957 election were held, a short lull occurred, as each side muster their strength and prepared for the upcoming battle. On 8 May, 1958 a vocal anti-Chamoun journalist was assassinated, and the whole situation exploded. The opposition was divided into three groups: Sunni leaders such as Yafi, Salam, and Mashnouk were concentrated in the main urban centers of Beirut, while Marouf Saad controlled Saida, and Rashid Karameh was the strong man of Tripoli. These leaders challenged, with the help of their armed supporters, the authority of President Chamoun and his government. Meanwhile, in the rural areas of the Bekaa, and the South, the Shiite leader Ahmad al-Assad mobilized his followers in Hasbayya, while Sabri Hamadah and Tawfiq Haydar controlled Baalbek.³⁹¹ Kamal Jumblatt spread his control in his Chouf stronghold.

a. Beirut

In Beirut the western district, with a Muslim majority, became controlled by the opposition, and was declared by the army as out of bound to all security forces. The opposition set up barricades in the city, particularly in the constituencies of opposition leaders, such as the Basta area where Saeb Salam lived. These areas became

³⁹⁰ Hudson, *The Precarious Republic* (London: Westview Press, 1985)174.

³⁹¹ Bassam Namani, "Confessionalism in Lebanon, 1920-1976" Columbia University), 215.

independent for all practical purposes, while eastern Beirut areas stayed under control of the government.³⁹²

b. Tripoli and Sidon

Tripoli, the northern city where the revolt started, witnessed the heaviest fighting. The city was divided into two sections: The old city under the control of opposition leader Rashid Karami, with the rest of the city under government control.³⁹³ Government forces besieged the areas under rebel control, stopping food arms and other essential from reaching them. The city suffered the most extensive damage of the 1958 crisis. Meanwhile, in the Southern city of Sidon, local leader Marouf Saad took control of the city with his 1000 strong men, of which a number were later dispatched to neighboring areas. ³⁹⁴

c. Mount Lebanon

The Chouf was the best organized opposition sector. Jumblatt established a parallel government with armed forces, police, justice, and administrative units, with al-Mukhtarah as the capital. The area was subjected to the heaviest and most continuous fighting. Jumblatt forces tried several times in mid-May to occupy the summer presidential palace, but were unsuccessful. On the other hand, the loyalist tried to attack the Mukhtarra, and they failed. In June Jumblatt forces attacked several towns and won

³⁹² Attie, *Struggle in the Levant* (New York: Center for Lebanese Studies, 2004)173.

³⁹³ Karami and Karami, Wakii Al-Thwara Al-Lubnaniah (Beirut: , 1959)54.

³⁹⁴ Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)75.

them over, expanding the area under their control, to include the Baruk and Ayn Zhalta.³⁹⁵

d. The border areas

A few days after the start of the revolt, the regions bordering Syria were overrun by the opposition. In this large area comprising almost half the country from the north of Tripoli, passing through Baalbek and then south through the Bekaa towards Hasbayah. The area was under the control of several opposition leaders like Karami in the north, Sabri Hamedah in Baalbek, to Ahmad al Assad in the South. The only government forces that remained in Baalbek was a fortified army post south of the city.³⁹⁶

Although, the opposition enjoyed Christian support, by the Patriarch Maoushi and Hamid Frangieh. However, none of these Christian leaders participated in the actual fighting on either side of the conflict.³⁹⁷ On the other hand, the police and gendarmerie were firmly on the side of President Chamoun's, in addition to the Phalanges and the SSNP. Although the phalange helped the gendarmerie in the countryside, but their main activity was focused on Beirut. They aided the police to patrol the streets and fought with the opposition. Meanwhile, the SSNP played a much larger and active role in the crisis. Aside from the police, they were the main supporters of the government and Chamoun; they were active in the countryside, and in the cities like Beirut, Sidon, and Zahleh.³⁹⁸

³⁹⁵ Fahim Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)75.

³⁹⁶ Fahim Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)78.

³⁹⁷ Namani, *Confessionalism in Lebanon, 1920-1976*Columbia University, 1982)218.

³⁹⁸ Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)85.

Starting with May 1958, the security situation in Lebanon steadily deteriorated. Army troops remained in defensive positions in peripheral areas like Baalbek, Tripoli and Sidon in the south. Rebel leaders in these areas gradually took control and called for the overthrow of the government. On May 12, Jumblatt grew bolder and attacked the Summer Presidential Palace in Beiteddine but was repulsed by government forces. ³⁹⁹ Another large offensive occurred during the last week of June following a brief period of calm while the UN secretary general visited Lebanon. Kamal Jumblatt's forces led the attack from the east of Beirut and came within six miles of the airport, to the outskirt of Shemlan, but were unable to control it. While Jumblatt was attacking Beirut, Rashid Karami activated the opposition front in Tripoli. Finally, the second week of July marked a substantial decrease in military activity on the part of the rebels. Indeed, intelligence sources indicated a reduction in the flow of men and arms into Lebanon. ⁴⁰⁰

The previous overview of the geographic spread of the 1958 crisis and the different parties involved shows the extent of instability that engulfed the country. In 1960, following the election Lebanon enjoyed a period of economic and political stability that extended for several years. In conclusion, it is quite clear that the level of stability following the 1960 election is significantly and measurably better than in 1957-1958.

2. The Lebanese army

The army's role in the crisis was crucial on many levels. Similarly to the events of 1952, the Commander in Chief of the Lebanese Army, General Fuad Chehab, steered

³⁹⁹ Attie, *Struggle in the Levant* (New York: Center for Lebanese Studies, 2004)173.

⁴⁰⁰ Caroline Attie, *Struggle in the Levant* (New York: Center for Lebanese Studies, 2004)191.

a neutral course and did not forcefully put down the insurrection. He feared that the army would disintegrate along sectarian lines, with large-scale desertion by its Muslim members if they had to open fire on co-religionists.⁴⁰¹ In a conversation with the American ambassador, the general predicted a prolonged and indefinite struggle with neither side able to overpower the other. He believed that a possible move by the army against the Muslim quarter of the Basta, Salam's stronghold could have jeopardized the unity of the multi-confessional army, transforming it into a supporter of one of the warring factions. Therefore, by maintaining a neutral position General Chehab was able to remain above the conflicting parties, appearing as an honest broker, allowing him to be elected the President, with the support of the opposition may have influenced General Chehab. All the opposition leaders were his personal friends, who descended from old families that wielded vast influence on the lives of thousands of people, and they were former Prime ministers, ministers, and public officers.⁴⁰³

However, the army did not hesitate to deploy and act in force at certain critical junctures, when the opposition verged on outright victory. On June 14 and 15, for example when street fighting in Beirut grew out of hand, the army intervened and shelled the house of Saeb Salam.⁴⁰⁴ Additionally, once Jumblatt forces expanded out of their stronghold the army intervened and pushed Jumblatt's forces out of Ayn Zhalta. General Chehab and Jumblatt met and settled on a 12 point agreement, freezing the advance of security forces (police and gendarmerie loyal to Chamoun), and insured the

⁴⁰¹ Namani, Confessionalism in Lebanon, 1920-1976Columbia University, 1982)224.

⁴⁰² Attie, *Struggle in the Levant* (New York: Center for Lebanese Studies, 2004)187.

⁴⁰³ Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)82.

⁴⁰⁴ Fahim Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)74.

passage of food and civilians to Beiteddine.⁴⁰⁵ However, on June 30, Jumblatt forces went again on the offensive, trying to take Shimlan, a village that overlooked and commanded Beirut international airport, enabling the Druze to link with Beirut's opposition forces.⁴⁰⁶ The army once again intervened in force to stop Jumblatt and after a pitched battle, in which the army used 1200 soldiers and heavy artillery, which caused hundreds of casualties, Jumblatt's attack was stopped.⁴⁰⁷

In comparison, despite the Lebanese army overall neutral position in the events of the 1958, it did intervene at several crucial juncture in order to keep the balance between the warring faction. However, in 1960 the army's role was limited to peacekeeping and there was no large scale battles of any fighting to speak of. The only event was the December 1961 attempted coup d'état that was foiled in a few days. Thus, it can be concluded that the years following the 1960 elections were significantly more stable than the one following the 1957 elections, based on this criteria.

3. Numbers of insurgent and armed men:

This section will overview the number of insurgents and armed men that took part in the 1958, in order to further the evidence showing how unstable the period following the 1957 election was. On the other hand, the years following the 1960 elections witnessed significant peace and level of security and an almost total absence of insurgent and armed men. With the exception of the attempted coup d'état that was previously mentioned, in 1961, and was resolved in a matter of days.

⁴⁰⁵ Raad, Tarikh Lubnan Al-Siyasi Wal-Iktisadi 1958-1975 (Beirut: Maktabat al-Sa'h, 2004)86.

⁴⁰⁶ Fawaz, A History of Modern Lebanon From the Imarah to the Taef Accords (Beirut: Riad El-Rayyes Books, 2008)231.

⁴⁰⁷ Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)78.

Namani, a Lebanese scholar estimated the Muslim rebels' strength at about 10,000 men, dispersed in bands of 400 to 2,000. The Christians loyalist had similar numbers. However, these irregulars were lightly armed and achieved little organization, with hardly any central command and communication control.⁴⁰⁸

US military intelligence estimated the number of the opposition's insurgents involved in the fighting to be around 5000 men while the gendarmerie numbered 2100. On the other hand, the Partisans of Chamoun together with members of the anti-Nasser Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) also fought against the rebels, numbering around 4000 armed men, with 1500 in Tripoli, 2000 in the Bikaa, and 1000 in the South.⁴⁰⁹ The 5500-man army maintained a defensive stance and did not openly engage the insurgents except when they threatened to close in on the pro-Chamoun forces, or attack a vital public area like the airport.⁴¹⁰ Additionally, the American ambassador gave a figure of "between five and seven thousand men on the insurgent side".⁴¹¹ Meanwhile, President Chamoun estimated rebel strength to be between 10,000 to 12,000 men, 25 per cent of whom were Syrian or Egyptian. The same figure was reported by a member of the UN observation team reported a similar figure.⁴¹²

4. Casualties

The number of casualties that resulted from the events following each elections is also a very good indicator of stability level. According to most reports and primary

⁴⁰⁸ Namani, *Confessionalism in Lebanon*, 1920-1976Columbia University, 1982)222.

⁴⁰⁹ Karami and Karami, Wakii Al-Thwara Al-Lubnaniah (Beirut: , 1959)54.

⁴¹⁰ US Army Beirut to Department of Army Washington DC, No. CX 153, Secret, 13 June 1958.

⁴¹¹ United States Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1962, Vol. 88, No. 10, pp. 65–79.

⁴¹² Middleton to Lloyd, 25 June 1958, FO 371/134125

sources, such as Gordon,⁴¹³ Hanf,⁴¹⁴ and Namani,⁴¹⁵ the 1958 crisis resulted in 3000 to 4000 casualties, with around 1500 death. A number corroborated by the commander-inchief of the Lebanese army, who reported that as of 22 June, 1400 persons had been killed as a result of the ongoing disturbances that had broken out in May. Of this figure, 40 were army casualties.⁴¹⁶ Meanwhile, after the 1960 elections no major incident were reported, and consequently no casualties to speak of.

It is one more indicator that unequivocally shows that the period following the 1957 election was clearly and measurably less stable than the period following the 1960 election.

5. Foreign troops intervention

Similarly, to previous sections, this one will compare each period following the two elections, based on a single criteria: the presence of foreign troops on Lebanese soil, to compare the level of stability between them. In July 15, 1958, US troops landed in Beirut and stayed until 25 October 1958. They reached a peak of 14,300 of which 8500 were US Army and 5800 were marines.⁴¹⁷ The troops first moved to Beirut international airport and occupied it. On the 16th the Lebanese army tried to stop a US column marching to Beirut. The situation escalated and General Chamoun, US ambassador McClintock, and the commander of the marines rushed to the area and a compromise was agreed upon. A smaller US forces than originally planned entered Beirut and was escorted by Lebanese army patrols. The main body of troops remained stationed outside

⁴¹³ Gordon, *Lebanon the Fragmented Nation* (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1980)52.

⁴¹⁴ Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon. Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation (London: , 1993)117.

⁴¹⁵ Namani, *Confessionalism in Lebanon, 1920-1976*Columbia University, 1982)246.

⁴¹⁶ Attie, *Struggle in the Levant* (New York: Center for Lebanese Studies, 2004)190.

⁴¹⁷ Robert Murphy, *Diplomat among Warriors* (New York: Praeger, 1964)409.

Beirut, and only a very small number was deployed in the city. Additionally, at no time did the US troops interfere in the internal conflict or support the government forces against the opposition.⁴¹⁸ Friendly relations and cooperation between US troops and Lebanese forces developed, and soon four men patrols made up of two Lebanese and two US troops patrolled regularly in Beirut to promote friendly relations and peace. Even more US troops had no authority over Lebanese citizens. The only casualties among US troops during the whole deployment came to less than eight persons, all accident with exception of one. Not a single Lebanese suffered injury of any kind as a result of US military actions.⁴¹⁹

On the other hand, no foreign troops were present on Lebanese soil after the 1960 elections. A point might be raised about the presence of Palestinian commandos, who were present throughout the whole period of study. At the time from 1955 until 1961, there numbers were small and they played no significant internal role, and they were present in both compared periods. Hence, they shall not be considered as a factor in this section.

In conclusion, following the 1957 elections around 15,000 foreign troops debarked in Beirut, at the demand of the President Chamoun. In 1960 there was no foreign troops on Lebanese soil. Thus, it can be safely concluded that stability of the years following the 1960 elections were measurably more stable than the years following the 1957, in regard to this criteria.

⁴¹⁸ Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)119.

⁴¹⁹ Fahim Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)121.

6. Legislative activity




Figure 1. The number of extraordinary Parliamentary sessions held.⁴²⁰

The above illustration shows that in 1957 and 1958 the number of extraordinary session fell to a half. Once the crisis was resolved in 1959 it came back up to 5 sessions per year. It was worthy to note that in 1960 the Chamber of Deputies voted to grant President Chehab full legislative power, which explain the dip in number of session held in 1961.⁴²¹

7. Economic activity

Prior to President Chenab's establishment of the Central Bank in 1964 and the Central Economic Census Bureau established in 1962 few reliable numbers exists on Lebanon's economy. However, this section will explore the public budget numbers, in

⁴²⁰ Baaklini, *Legislative and Politcal Development: Lebanon, 1842-1972* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1976)255.

⁴²¹ Abdo Baaklini, *Legislative and Politcal Development: Lebanon, 1842-1972* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1976)255.

order to study the economic health of Lebanon, which is also an indicative of the overall stability.




Figure 2. The growth of public revenues and budget surplus.⁴²²

The numbers show a significant dip in revenue and budget surplus when the political situation in Lebanon started degrading in late 1956 up to include mid-1958, when the civil war erupted. The economic situation witnessed an important turnaround once the political crisis was resolved. These numbers illustrate how unstable Lebanon was after the 1957 elections and the 1958 crisis.

8. Concluding remarks on stability

Therefore, it can be safely concluded that the period following the 1957 election was less stable than the period following the 1960 elections, by a significant and

⁴²² Dib, Warlords and Merchants, the Lebanese Buisness and Policitical Establishment (London: Ithaca Press, 2004)589.

measurable margin, considering the previously discussed criteria: Number of casualties (almost 4000 in 1958 to less than a 100 in 1960). Areas controlled by the central state and its armed forces, in 1958 it fell below 1/3, while in 1960 the army and police forces controlled the whole country. Foreign troops presence 15,000 in the 1957 to zero in 1960. Additionally, several tangential criteria, such as legislative activity and economic growth also support this thesis hypothesis that the period following the 1957 election Lebanon was significantly less stable, than the one after the 1960 elections.

C. Conclusion

In this analytical chapter, the 1960 election was found to be significantly more representative than 1957, based on both an analytical and comparative study of several important criteria. Similarly, the aftermath of the 1960 election was significantly more stable than 1957, based on another set of criteria. The question on how significant the relation between the two variable is, when other factors are taken into consideration, will be explored in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VI

TESTING THIS THESIS HYPOTHESES AGAINST OTHER PROPOSED CAUSES OF 1958

In the previous chapter, this thesis compared representation and stability in both the 1957 and the 1960 elections. Strong evidences were found pointing out that the 1960 election was significantly more representative than the 1957 election. Similarly, the stability level post the 1960 elections was much higher than in the period after the 1957 election.

However, in order to test the strength of the relation between the two variables, this chapter compares the relation between representation and stability to different hypotheses put forth to offer alternative explanation to the reasons behind 1958 crisis. Among the listed factors, there was the 1957 elections and other internal grievances like President Chamoun's bid for reelection, or external factors like the spread of Nasser's Arabism, the polarization of the Arab world, and the West-East cold war.

A. Theoretical analysis: Linking consociationalisim, the national Pact, and elections to Representation

This thesis previously established in Chapter 2 and 3 that representation, elections, and managing the relations between minorities and majorities after elections are at the heart of democracy. Indeed the electoral arena is the most important aspect of representative democracy, as it is the primary forum of competition between different groups. "It is in the halls of parliament, not in the streets that individuals and groups in

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multiethnic societies are expected to arbitrate their differences."⁴²³ Additionally, power sharing in all its different models focus primary on reinforcing and increasing representation and inclusion, in the short term in order to increase stability and foster democracy on the long term.⁴²⁴

Likewise, this thesis has found strong theoretical evidence and scholarly agreement that proportional representation has been critical in ensuring the stability of Lebanon's divided society through a very delicate balancing act. Indeed, Lebanese public institutions were critical in preserving the stability and security, using the widest sectarian inclusiveness, by prioritizing proportional representation, above all other aspects. The proportional distribution of power was meant to ensure that all sects were represented in the state and had a political outlet that enabled them to express their interests and defend them, while sharing part of the spoils and benefits. However, the most important aspect of this inclusive participation in the state's institution is mutual self-preservation, of even the weakest segments. Thus, at least in their collective psyche if not in reality, any sect that found itself excluded from the state stripped of all protection, faced extinction. Example of such a grim fate abound in this region, from the Christians of Palestine, to the Armenians of Turkey, to the Christians of Iraq.⁴²⁵

Another previously discussed aspect of the Lebanese political system is the National Accord. The unwritten agreement on which the Lebanese power sharing system was based on. It is a compromise between the Sunni and Maronite sects. A quidpro-quo whereas the Christians would stop seeking foreign protection, France's in particular, while the Muslims would not make attempt to bring Lebanon in any political

⁴²³ Sisk, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996)30.

⁴²⁴ See Chapter 2, section 2.2 of this thesis.

⁴²⁵ See Chapter 2, section 2.1 of this thesis.

union with Syria or other Arab nations.⁴²⁶ The pact also recognized the various sectarian elements of the country and laid the foundation of a sectarian power sharing system that had its roots in the 1843 law. It was an elite bargain, exchanging foreign and regional alliances and patronage for a share in the state spoils and protection.⁴²⁷ It is also important to note that the main concern of the Pact was the use of political institutions as a tool not to resolve communal conflicts but merely to contain it. Its goal was to freeze sectarian differences, in order to avoid the emotional and confessional upsurges associated with them, preventing ideological conflictive issues from destroying the precarious political institutions and the young state.⁴²⁸ Thus, the national pact, through its representative nature played a critical role in enhancing stability, security, and equilibrium within the confessional political system, while preserving the delicate balanced distribution of power among the various interest groups and religious sects.⁴²⁹ It also regulated the interplay of the various confessional groups that underline the body politic of a pluralistic society, trying to shield the system from disruptive internal and external influences and flare up.⁴³⁰

Finally, the pact embodied the representative nature of the Lebanese power sharing system. Thus, any attempt to undermine the pact, affected representation and the inclusiveness of the political construct, and was immediately faced by a sectarian backlash threatening the stability of the whole system. The pact was the first and last defensive line of the different segments, once it was threatened their trust in the system and even in the state as a whole evaporated. As the pact was a deal to forgo old foreign

⁴²⁶ Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)18.

⁴²⁷ Salamey, *The Government and Politics of Lebanon* (London: Routledge, 2013)30.

 ⁴²⁸ Koury, *The Operational Capability of the Lebanese Political System* (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1972)66.
 ⁴²⁹ Enver M. Koury, *The Operational Capability of the Lebanese Political System* (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1972)265.

⁴³⁰ Khalaf, *Lebanon's Predicament* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987)115.

patrons in order to build a common state, while sharing power, once the pact was weakened, the different sects sought protection, help and guarantees from their old foreign patrons.

B. Exploring the internal and external factors that lead to the 1958 crisis

A number of internal factors that lead to the 1958 crisis were put forth. This section will analyze each one and list supporting evidence and analysis from primary and scholarly sources. Indeed, the previous chapter showed the 1957 suffered from widespread gerrymandering, state interference, lack of secret ballots, in addition to several other factors, which negatively affected the 1957 elections level of representation. This chapter tested the relation between representation and stability, by comparing and weighing it against the other factors that affected stability and lead to the 1958 crisis.

1. The internal factors

There was three main internal factors: The 1957 election, President Chamoun bid for reelection, and Muslim grievances. This sub-section will analyze the different internal factors, followed by a discussion of foreign factors, and a comprehensive discourse analysis of both internal and external factors, as many sources discussed them together.

a. The 1957 elections

Representation forms the bedrock of the Lebanese political system, and elections are the mechanism through which the wills of the people is translated into elected officials that represent them. The 1957 failed at translating the will of large part of the Lebanese people, especially the Muslims. Several of the leaders who represent a majority of Muslim were excluded from parliament, such as Yafi and Salam for the Sunni in Beirut, Jumblatt for the Druze, and Asaad for the Shiite. These leaders represented their own sects, in which they held an intra-sectarian majority support. For example, Yafi received more than 66% of the Sunni vote, yet Sami Solh who only received 33%, defeated him due to overwhelming Christian vote. Once these leaders were excluded from the parliament, it not only affected their followers, but their defeat was considered as a the defeat of the whole sect, due to their intra-sectarian popularity. After the 1957 election most of the Muslims felt disenfranchised, the state of Lebanon that was supposed to be governed by a shared representative rule, excluded them. Thus the Muslim felt excluded from parliament and consequently from the state as whole. This misrepresentation and exclusion of a large segment of the Lebanese population had direct and serious consequences on stability:

1- Exclusion robs sectarian leaders, their followers, and their sects from any official venues to express their opinion, present their demands and protect their interests, and from participating in dialogue and reaching compromise in an official political arena. Thus, once excluded these sects turne to the streets and paramilitary activities to let their voice be heard, and to protect their interests.⁴³¹ Additionally, excluding sectarian leaders form the state's institutions, weaken them. This negatively

⁴³¹ Attie, *Struggle in the Levant* (New York: Center for Lebanese Studies, 2004)148.

influence their power to strike bargain with other elites, and by consequences damage the whole edifice of consociational power sharing that relies on elite bargaining as the method to solve problems and avert crisis in divided societies.

2- The exclusion of the Muslim leaders was a direct violation of the national pact, which stressed the importance of inclusiveness and power sharing. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Accord was the only framework that held the fragile political balance in place. Excluded parties feel they are no longer bound by the accord's stipulation, which encourages the remaining sects to abandon the pact, creating a cascading domino effect. With this negative feedback loop in place the only possible result is the disintegration of the central state and the rise of sectarian leaders and their paramilitary forces as the only acceptable alternative protection.

3- Additionally, in the case of Lebanon exclusion has even more damaging consequences, as the state represent the only credible protection for the different sects and their survival. Exclusion render these sects vulnerable, pushing them to lose faith in the national accord, relying on themselves, while seeking further protection and aid from foreign or neighboring allies. This opens the doors to full foreign interference, which in turn exacerbates the crisis, adding additional external divisive elements, rendering any possible peaceful solution and accommodation even more challenging.

b. President Chamoun's reelection

One of the most cited cause of the 1958 crisis is President Chamoun bid for reelection. As previously discussed the president extensive powers and prerogatives were balanced by a non-renewable six year term. This delicate balancing act was part of the power sharing agreement struck between the Muslim and Christian. Consequently,

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President Chamoun bid was in direct contradiction to the National Accord and the constitution, and was perceived by the Muslims as a Christian effort to increase their power base, at the detriment of their own. A feeling that was compounded by the results of the 1957 elections. It is important to note that this internal factor is also directly linked to representation, as it is linked to a breach of the National Accord. Additionally, renewing the mandate of the Christian president increased his share of power, and by consequence the Christian share of power in the state. As the political system was a power sharing agreement, craftily and delicately balanced between the different sects, any efforts by one sect to increase their share directly meant a decrease in the share of the others. Thus, the Muslim share of power was diminished, and they were no longer adequately represented in the political arena, increasing their exclusion.

c. Muslim dissatisfaction

Muslim dissatisfaction was caused by the perception that they were second-class citizens in Lebanon. The best and most powerful positions, both in politics and economic circles, were held and controlled by the Christians, especially the Maronite. Indeed, not only do the Christians outranked the Muslims in government jobs but they also far outnumbered them. The Muslims also complained that economic and social services of the state especially under Chamoun rule have benefited Christians areas to the detriment of Muslims ones. Therefore, the Muslims called for a constitutional amendment to increase their share of power and representation in the state. They asked for an increase in the prerogatives of the prime minister and a corresponding decrease of the president's.⁴³²

⁴³² Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)30.

Percentage of (From 1943 to 1961)	Maronite	Greek orthodox	Greek catholic	Total Christians	Sunni	Shia	Druze	Total Muslims	Total
Population	30	10	6	46	20	18	6	44	1,430,908
Parliamentary seats (43-61)	30.8	10.85	6	47.65	20.45	18.4	6.6	45.45	398
Ministerial portfolio (43- 61)	20	15.7	10.5	46.2	26	13.8	13	52.8	369
Cabinet Ministers (43- 61)	25.1	12.1	11.3	48.5	23.8	13.4	13.4	50.6	231
Higher administration and diplomatic posts 1946	38.7	19.3	3.2	61.2	29	3.2	6.4	38.6	31
Higher administration and diplomatic posts 1955	40	11.7	9	60.7	27	3.6	7.2	37.8	111

Table 10. Political representation of the six major sects⁴³³ in Lebanon.⁴³⁴

It is very interesting to note that Muslim grievances are in fact substantiated, especially in the administrative and diplomatic posts, with a very wide margin between percentage of population and percentage of jobs. Once again, in this third internal factor, representation is the deep underling cause, generating exclusions and a breach of the National accord, whit the same consequences discussed above.

2. External Factors

From 1957 onwards, the region became subject to heightened tensions caused by the cold war on a scale and intensity it never experienced before. Additionally, the

⁴³³ Baaklini, *Legislative and Politcal Development: Lebanon, 1842-1972* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1976)100.

⁴³⁴ Hudson, *The Precarious Republic* (London: Westview Press, 1985)320.

Arab world was witnessing internal political upheavals, which increased pressures on the Lebanese polity. The Arab world split into two camps, one headed by Nasser's Egypt championing the Arabism cause, with the support of the USSR, while the other camps, headed by Iraq sided with the West.⁴³⁵ Meanwhile, the appeal of Nasser's message of Arab nationalism, unity, and defiance of the West found much support in Lebanon and was a destabilizing factor, by polarizing the population along pro- and anti-Nasser lines. This polarization became clearly visible in the wake of the Suez invasion when Chamoun rejected the request of Prime Minister Yafi and Minister Salam to break diplomatic ties with Britain and France, and accepted the resignations of these two leading Muslim politicians.⁴³⁶

Chamoun's position following the Suez war, and his rapprochement with the Baghdad Pact alliance exacerbated the Lebanese relations with its Arab neighbors. Additionally, the 1957 elections, contributed to the deterioration of the relation between the United States on one hand and Egypt and Syria on the other. Even more, when the Eisenhower doctrine was proposed, Egypt and Syria rejected it, while Chamoun's government adopted it. These external factors had a negative impact internally, dividing the country into two main groups: one composed of the administration and its media and a large part of the Maronite community, and political organization such as the phalanges and the SSNP. Meanwhile, the rest of the country including a majority of influential leaders, both Muslims and Christians, and a large part of the population opposed it. Opposition to the doctrine rested on two main argument: Lebanon's adherence to the doctrine brought it openly into the west-east conflict in favor of the

⁴³⁵ Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)46.

⁴³⁶ Attie, *Struggle in the Levant* (New York: Center for Lebanese Studies, 2004)231.

west and second by adopting it Lebanon was siding with the US against Egypt and Syria. On both counts, it was a violation of Lebanon's traditional neutral foreign policy as stated in the 1943 national pact. Consequently, such a foreign policy was against the national pact, thus affecting the sectarian balance of power and representation. ⁴³⁷ Among the Christians, especially the Maronite, there was genuine fear and conviction that the UAR in collaboration with Lebanese Muslims were planning the annexation of Lebanon. It should be noted that Muslim leaders repeatedly stressed their dedication to the country's independence and to the 1943 pact, and few called for full unity with the UAR. The fear of Nasser's supporters in Lebanon, real or imaginary, by a segment of Lebanon's population was another important factor behind the 1958 crisis. ⁴³⁸

Lebanon's political system lent itself easily to foreign interference, including foreign policy, and even elections, both at the parliamentary and presidential level. That has been an endemic theme in Lebanon's modern history, it goes back to the genesis of the Lebanese sectarian system during the 1840-1860 period. At the time, the main foreign powers each 'adopted' a sect, and supported it against the Ottoman Empire and against the other Lebanese sects.⁴³⁹

Regional events steered the Lebanese crisis of 1958 once it was ignited. Both Chamoun and the opposition tried to capitalize on foreign support. The British and Americans supported Chamoun's bid for re-election. On the other side, the opposition sought to channel popular adulation for Nasser in order to mobilize support against Chamoun. Nasser did not hesitate to exploit the grievances of the opposition in his attempt to extend his influence over Lebanon.⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁷ Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)46.

⁴³⁸ Fahim Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)40.

⁴³⁹ See Chapter 3, section 3.1 of this thesis.

⁴⁴⁰ Attie, *Struggle in the Levant* (New York: Center for Lebanese Studies, 2004)136.

The divided loyalties of the population roughly coincided with the religious divide whereby Christians traditionally looked towards the West as the guarantor of their independence in a predominantly Muslim Arab world. Meanwhile Muslims held aspirations for closer ties with the Arab world, which sometimes were expressed in calls for unity within a larger Arab state. The National Pact of 1943 had sought a compromise between these loyalties, striking a bargain where both segment forgo their foreign patrons and protectors, in order to share power and representation in the nascent Lebanese state. However, once the system broke down and each side accused the other of breaching the national pact, the compromise no longer held.

a. Final remarks on external factors:

It is important to note that even the external factors can also be linked to representation. First, President Chamoun militant foreign policy and his efforts to join the Bagdad alliance and the Eisenhower doctrine, were a clear violation of the 1943 national accord, which stipulated the neutrality of Lebanon's foreign policy. Consequently, as the National Accord embodies the representative nature of the system, any breach of the pact is a breach of the different sect's representation in the political system.

Second, the different sects' readiness to seek foreign protector is deeply rooted in their insecurities, and their fear of prosecution going back to the 19 century. It is a survival mechanism; the only way to counter it was the elite bargain that was struck between Muslims and Christians in 1943, stipulating the surrender of foreign support in return for coexistence in one state, under a power-sharing agreement based on

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representation. Thus, once this agreement and its underlining representation were threatened, each segment feared for its existence and turned, once more, to foreign powers for protection. It is only within a power-sharing political agreement and full participation in the state, that the different sects felt protected, and their continued safety ensured. Indeed, once the 1958 crisis ended, all politicians agreed, to return to the 1943 national accord, and share power with the same opponents they were waging war against a few days prior.⁴⁴¹

Third, foreign factors played a major role in exacerbating the crisis. Yet without divided local actors, split into two or more factions, the foreign factors would have found no traction, and no fuel to spread. Additionally, the exact relation between foreign and local actors is difficult to ascertain. Who started the relation? Did the foreign actors (Nasser and the West) push the different Lebanese politicians to take sides by supporting them? Or were the Lebanese politicians already divided and they thought foreign aid against their opponents? The next two sections will shed more light on the interaction of local and foreign factors.

C. Discourse analysis

In this section the different explanations offered by primary sources (politicians and others actors from the period) and secondary sources (scholarly analysis) will be explored and compared.

⁴⁴¹ Caroline Attie, *Struggle in the Levant* (New York: Center for Lebanese Studies, 2004)233.

1. Primary sources

The opinion of the main actors of the period were diverse. Some stressed the importance of internal factors in leading to the 1958 crisis, like Kamal Jumblatt who stated that the main reasons behind the 1958 insurrection were the 1957 elections, Chamoun bid for reelection, and Muslim grievances. He explained that this crisis was caused by the government of Sami Solh, adding that President Chamoun actions contributed greatly to the crisis, and that it was an internal insurrection against tyranny and corruption.⁴⁴² Similarly, Saeb Salam, also explained that Camille Chamoun was the only cause of the crisis, as his politics pushed the different sects against each other.⁴⁴³ The position of the opposition leaders' was understandable, as it was in their benefit to highlight the internal nature of the crisis, rather than follow President Chamoun's position who claimed that the UAR prepared and encouraged the opposition to launch the insurrection. Chamoun explained that Egypt trained and armed the opposition fighters and even sent volunteers to help them. The President insited that the opposition's military operations were guided by Syrian officer Abdul Hamid Sarraj. The president also cited the big press and radio campaign waged by Egypt against him and his faction, as a proof of foreign interference. The President added that the ultimate goal was to change the political system of Lebanon, as the liberty of Lebanon and its people was anathema to them.⁴⁴⁴ President Chamoun's position was supported by several of his ministers, like Taniyus Saba who stressed the importance of the UAR external interference in starting the crisis, and so did Albert Moukhayber who explained that in

⁴⁴² Jumblatt, *Hakikat Al-Thawra Al Lubnaniah* (Beirut: Dar Al-Takadumiah, 1987)20-25.

⁴⁴³ Salam, L'Insurrection De 1958 Au Liban (Paris: Universitee Sorbonne, 1979)127.

⁴⁴⁴ Chamoun, Crise Au Moyen-Orient (Paris: Gallimard, 1963)413.

addition to the UAR interference, the convergence of internal and external instability also played a role in leading to the crisis.⁴⁴⁵

In the same venue, the Foreign Affairs Minister at the time Charles Malik said that what was at stake was not a person or the government, but the existence of Lebanon as a free state in the middle east, where Muslims and Christians could live in peace and harmony, a state that could decide its fate freely and independently. He added that the UAR encouraged the rebels to perpetrate terrorist acts against the states, in order to radically change the political system.⁴⁴⁶

However, not all the allies of President Chamoun had the same opinion. Prime Minister Solh explained that the efforts to amend the electoral law and redraw the districts in order to influence the results lead to the formation of a strong opposition. Especially, the redrawing of the districts in Beirut, which ignited sectarianism in such an unexpected intensity and extent.⁴⁴⁷ He added, "after the elections results were announced, armed men of the opposition started blowing up bridges and rail roads, and firing on the police and security forces... and violent clashes erupted in several areas, like Beirut, Saida, Tripoli, and Rashia region."⁴⁴⁸ The Prime Minster also spoke of the effects of the 1957 elections and the exclusion of the opposition's leaders. He explained that the Christian parties, who were frightened by the rise of Nasser's supporters, were behind the districting in 1957, which lead to the surprising loss of the leaders of the opposition, and reignited sectarianism in such an unexpected intensity and extent. However, the Prime Minister Solh also claimed that the tripartite attack on Egypt and the Arab league conference and the competition for power, lead to the division of the

⁴⁴⁵ Salam, L'Insurrection De 1958 Au Liban (Paris: Universitee Sorbonne, 1979)111.

⁴⁴⁶ Nawaf Salam, L'Insurrection De 1958 Au Liban (Paris: Universitee Sorbonne, 1979)111.

⁴⁴⁷ Solh, Lubnan, Al-Aabath Al-Syasi Wal-Masir Al-Majhoul (Beirut: Dar Annahar, 2000)264.

⁴⁴⁸ Sami Solh, Lubnan, Al-Aabath Al-Syasi Wal-Masir Al-Majhoul (Beirut: Dar Annahar, 2000)266.

Lebanese public opinion, mirroring the division of their sectarian leaders, into two camps. One camp supporting Syria and Egypt, while the second camp was in favor of the policies of the Lebanese state.⁴⁴⁹

Additionally, US Ambassador to Beirut McClintock, one of the main supporters of President Chamoun, also had an opposite description of the 1958 crisis than Chamoun himself. He said that "the United States became more convinced that the whole issue assumed the character of a civil disturbance which precluded external interference.⁴⁵⁰ Additionally, the UK ambassador also spoke of importance of internal factors saying "It appears that President Chamoun's desire to have the Parliament filled with loyal supporters. This led him temporarily to lose sight of the fact that the future of Lebanon depends upon the cooperation of the Moslem population. In short, the lure of immediate political gains seems to have outweighed considerations which, if followed, might have provided longer term stability."⁴⁵¹

Saeb Salam, one of the top Sunni leaders of the opposition explained the reasons behind the 1958 crisis in an interview with Nawaf Salam, saying that there was both internal and external factors. He added that the crisis occurred in a time of international polarization between the US and the USSR, then the Suez crisis occurred and President Chamoun refused to break diplomatic relations with France and the UK. He pointed out that from that time the situation started to deteriorate, especially when Chamoun started using sectarian rhetoric. The elections of 57, Salam added, caused a polarization of the positions and increased the number and unity of the opposition front. Finally, Salam declared that Chamoun's bid for reelection was the most important factor in his opinion.

⁴⁴⁹ Sami Solh, Lubnan, Al-Aabath Al-Syasi Wal-Masir Al-Majhoul (Beirut: Dar Annahar, 2000)263.

⁴⁵⁰ Namani, *Confessionalism in Lebanon, 1920-1976*Columbia University, 1982)233.

⁴⁵¹ Heath to dulles , foreign service dispatch no 22, department of state central files, 783A.00 17 july 1957

However, Salam did admit to receiving monetary aid and arm transfers from the UAR. He even acknowledged the presence of a 120 Syrian commando force in Beirut, fighting on his behalf. However, he considered their participation very negatively and ineffectual.⁴⁵² Meanwhile, the pro-opposition Maronite Patriarch Moushi warned western states from interfering in Lebanese affairs, saying that the 1958 crisis "is an internal Lebanese dispute between the ruling power and the majority of the Lebanese people, and there is no truth that the crisis is caused by external interference."⁴⁵³

Henry Faroun, one of the leaders of the third force faction that tried to mediate between the opposition and President Chamoun, explained that the main factors behind the crisis was President Chamoun bid for reelection. He also stated that lowering the number of deputies in the 1957 election could have been a factor leading to the crisis, as it curtailed representation. Concerning the international aspect, he said that as each faction had an international supporter, thus these external interferences canceled each other.⁴⁵⁴ Depute Philip Takla spoke about the need for the government's foreign policy to enjoy the support of the whole nation or a large majority, in accordance with the National Pact.⁴⁵⁵ Consequently, President Chamoun foreign policy, that was opposed by most Sunnis and the broader opposition was in direct violation of the National Pact, an opinion supported by Salam as well.⁴⁵⁶

Rashid Karameh, the Sunni opposition leader, and Prime Minister explained that the crisis was caused by both internal and external factors. He explained that President Chamoun refusal to break up relations with the UK and France after the Suez crisis, and

⁴⁵² Salam, L'Insurrection De 1958 Au Liban (Paris: Universitee Sorbonne, 1979)55 IV.

⁴⁵³ Nassif, *Camille Chamoun, Akher Al-Aamalikat* (Beirut: Dar Annahar, 1988)98.

⁴⁵⁴ Salam, L'Insurrection De 1958 Au Liban (Paris: Universitee Sorbonne, 1979)123 IV.

⁴⁵⁵ Abu Saleh, *Al-Azma Al-Loubnaniah Aam 1958* (Beirut: Al Manshwrat al Arabia, 1998)62.

⁴⁵⁶ Salam, L'Insurrection De 1958 Au Liban (Paris: Universitee Sorbonne, 1979)11.

his rapprochement to the Baghdad pact aggravated the situation. He added that both the opposition and the government loyalist tried to use international support to their advantage in the internal struggle, against their Lebanese opponents.⁴⁵⁷ Abdallah Mashnouk, another opposition Sunni leader explained that the reasons behind the crisis were President Chamoun support of the Baghdad Pact, the Eisenhower doctrine, and the 1957 elections, in addition to Chamoun reelection bid. He stressed the UAR did not really want to annex Lebanon. However, its effort were focused on stoppping Chamoun from allying with the West and toppling his regime. Additionally, he added "President Chamoun forged the results of the elections that is why the opposition leaders like Jumblatt and Yafi lost. He stopped playing his constitutional role of arbiter, once he excluded all the oppositions' leaders there was no more room for dialogue with him."⁴⁵⁸

Ismail al-Yusuf, a Lebanese author wrote in 1958 enumerating the causes of the crisis. He explained that there were several causes, such as adopting the Eisenhower doctrine, Lebanon's government hostile position towards neighboring countries. Additionally, he added "Chamoun efforts to extend his mandate, the fraud and oppression that permeated the 1957 election, which was the first spark that led to the crisis."⁴⁵⁹ Al Yusuf, continued explaining that "The reason why the 1958 started can be linked to the long list of Muslim grievances against the government." He added that the Sunni and Shiite suffered from endemic under-representation in the civil services and the top governmental positions. Additionally, rural Muslim areas, Shiite in particular suffered from underdevelopment and poverty, in contrast to Beirut and the Christian

⁴⁵⁷ Nawaf Salam, L'Insurrection De 1958 Au Liban (Paris: Universitee Sorbonne, 1979)111 IV.

⁴⁵⁸ Nawaf Salam, L'Insurrection De 1958 Au Liban (Paris: Universitee Sorbonne, 1979)19 IV.

⁴⁵⁹ Ismail Al-Yusuf, *Thwrat Al-Ahrar Fi Lubnan* (Beirut: Manshourat al-Zein, 1958)11.

areas. And finally, the Muslim played a minor role in the formulation of foreign policy.⁴⁶⁰

Nawaf Salam in his doctoral thesis on the 1958 crisis wrote that the main internal factors were the Muslim dissatisfaction due to misrepresentation in public institutions, the 1957 elections, and President Chamoun's bid for reelection.⁴⁶¹

2. Secondary sources

Modern scholars were more nuanced in their analysis, offering a more comprehensive scope, that tried to present a wider range of causes. For example Fahim Qubain, who wrote the major book on the 1958 crisis, explained that it was caused by a "division in the soul of Lebanese society". This division involves the concepts in which the Lebanese holds their identity, its relations to Arab neighbors, and to the world at large, especially the Christian west. He added that each Lebanese segment held different concepts on how to deal with these issues. Meanwhile, no segment held a clear majority, this created sever stresses on political functioning of the state both internal and external affairs.⁴⁶² He also specified that President Chamoun's strong-arm electoral tactics in 1957 contributed substantially to the crisis of 1958. He explained that there is little doubt that the elections were neither honest nor free, stating that "The election campaign was conducted in an atmosphere of tension and bitterness and was indeed the signal for mass violence, which continued to increase in intensity until the end of Chamoun's presidency."⁴⁶³ Qubain also described the foreign factors explaining that the 1957 elections, contributed to the deterioration of the relation between the United States

⁴⁶⁰ Ismail Al-Yusuf, *Thwrat Al-Ahrar Fi Lubnan* (Beirut: Manshourat al-Zein, 1958)11.

⁴⁶¹ Salam, L'Insurrection De 1958 Au Liban (Paris: Universitee Sorbonne, 1979)134.

⁴⁶² Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)28.

⁴⁶³ Fahim Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)58.

on one hand and Egypt and Syria on the other. He added when the Eisenhower doctrine was proposed, Egypt and Syria rejected it, while Chamoun's government adopted it. These external factors had a negative impact internally. He also spoke about the fear and the conviction of the Christians, especially the Maronite, that the UAR in collaboration with Lebanese Muslims were planning the annexation of Lebanon. Indeed, he pointed out that "the fear of Nasser's supporters in Lebanon, real or imaginary, by a segment of Lebanon's population was another important factor behind the 1958 crisis."⁴⁶⁴

Another, Lebanese scholar Namani, wrote in the same venue that the breakdown of the 1943 national pact was one of the causes behind the outbreak of the civil war in May-June 1958. He explained that the 1958 crisis involved many internal actors, that it was very hard for any external power to effectively manipulate. Additionally, on July 9 Chamoun decided to end of the one irritant issues of the civil war, when he declared that he would not run for a second term. Meanwhile, US forces stood by idly for two months, without interfering in what they considered as an internal conflict.⁴⁶⁵ Gilmour also had the same opinion, writing, "The crisis was simply a reaction to Chamoun's disregard of the national pact."⁴⁶⁶

Nawaf Salam in his Doctorate dissertation wrote a comprehensive analysis of all the possible factors, ranging from the internal to the external, stating that the result of the election that lead to the exclusion the opposition leaders, whose presence in the parliament was a necessity of political balance. Additionally, the exclusion and disregard of the balance of power in the formation of the council of ministers was also

⁴⁶⁴ Fahim Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961)40.

⁴⁶⁵ Namani, Confessionalism in Lebanon, 1920-1976Columbia University, 1982)234.

⁴⁶⁶ Gilmour, Lebanon the Fractured Country (New York: St. martin's Press, Inc., 1983)32.

another internal factor. He added, the external factors cannot be ignored. He insisted that using a single explanation or factor is impractical due to the complexity of any political study, it is the convergence of all these different issues that lead to the crisis.⁴⁶⁷

Recently, Attie a US scholar wrote an exhaustive analysis of the 1958 crisis and US involvement in Lebanon. She explained that although the 1958 conflict had several important internal causes, the external variable of foreign interference was instrumental in intensifying the conflict and extending its duration. She explained that the appeal of Nasser's message of Arab nationalism found much support in Lebanon and was a destabilizing factor, by polarizing the population along pro- and anti-Nasser lines.⁴⁶⁸Attie also specified several internal causes such as: President Chamoun bid for re-election, Muslim grievances and dissatisfaction in the political system, and of course the 1957 parliamentary election. She stressed that most of the internal causes were complaints felt by one sect or another. Muslims felt that they were not properly represented in the government, parliament and in the distribution of public and social benefits. In other words, these factors were indirectly linked to a lack of representation, despite the fact that the agreed upon proportionality in most public offices was always preserved.⁴⁶⁹ Attie also spoke about the importance of the 1957 election as a factor, saying that it crystallized opposition to Chamoun and marked a point of no return for the leading members of the opposition, most of whom lost their seats in those elections, largely due to Chamoun's efforts. She added the fact that Chamoun engineered the defeat of a number of traditional political leaders in the 1957 elections ensured their enmity, as he had broken the cardinal rule of Lebanese politics by consensus. Indeed,

⁴⁶⁷ Salam, *L'Insurrection De 1958 Au Liban* (Paris: Universitee Sorbonne, 1979)160.

⁴⁶⁸ Attie, *Struggle in the Levant* (New York: Center for Lebanese Studies, 2004)231.

⁴⁶⁹ Caroline Attie, *Struggle in the Levant* (New York: Center for Lebanese Studies, 2004)5.

Attie stressed that tension increased after the elections, particularly in the Druze area of the Shuf, bringing an amorphous opposition together and hardening their commitment against Chamoun. The elections also widened the scope and number of the opposition.⁴⁷⁰ However, Attie also linked the internal factors to the external ones, saying that the 1957 elections clearly show the close interaction between domestic and foreign policy in Lebanon. She explained that the elections were seen as a referendum for the foreign policy of the Solh government, as the two main issues that dominated the parliamentary elections were the presidential elections and Lebanon's pro-Western foreign policy.⁴⁷¹

Alin, another US scholars argued that the 1957 elections barred the most important Lebanese Muslim politicians from exercising national level influence through the parliament, after. Consequently, once tensions started mounting in 1958, the parliament could not serve as an effective arena for reconciling sectarian and political differences, especially that it no longer accurately reflect the political sentiment of a large segment of the Lebanese population.⁴⁷² Meanwhile Gordon explained that Chamoun seemed to repeat the tactics of the man he ousted as president. He rigged the parliamentary election of 1957, according to his critics. The outcome of the election was dramatic and its impact traumatic. Two members of the supervisory committee resigned in protest. Charles Malik was elected after his opponent was asked to withdraw. Pierre Gemayel was quoted as saying that the elected candidates represent only 10 per cent of

⁴⁷⁰ Caroline Attie, *Struggle in the Levant* (New York: Center for Lebanese Studies, 2004)145.

⁴⁷¹ Caroline Attie, *Struggle in the Levant* (New York: Center for Lebanese Studies, 2004)132.

⁴⁷² Alin, *The United States and the 1958 Lebanon Crisis* (New York: University Press of America, 1994)59.

the electorates. Eminent men like Saeb Salam, Adbadallah yafi, Ahmad al assad and Kamal Jumblatt were defeated. Lebanese politics moved to the streets.⁴⁷³

Namani, a Lebanese scholar explained that The Lebanese government's public endorsement of the Eisenhower doctrine and the support of the Lebanese opposition of Nasser, removed the regional and international support of Lebanese's security and temporarily nullified the integrative national pact. Lebanese no longer maintained delicate balance in its foreign policies between the west and the Arab neighbors.⁴⁷⁴ Additionally, Namani stated that western intelligence reports on the 1958 crisis, explained that the opposition has no other common objective other than forcing Chamoun from office, and no common leader. Implying that if the domestic political grievances of the diverse array of political leaders that made up the opposition were alleviated, foreign policy and other concerns would not form a sufficient political cement to maintain opposition unity.⁴⁷⁵ In other words, Namani believed that the opposition military actions would cease if the internal issues were solved, because of its diversity and lack of ideological unity. Although Jumblatt believed in the Arabism of Lebanon, he stopped short of the extremism of Arab unionists. Meanwhile, the Christian wing of the opposition, and the patriarch were not so keen on Nasser's pan-Arabism.⁴⁷⁶ Once the crisis was over, Namaani explained that the balance achieved at the regional-international level permitted the Chehab Karameh team to reinvigorate the national pact. The new regime strengthened confidence between the Maronite and the Sunni communities and vigorously pursued an equitable sectarian quota in the

⁴⁷³ Gordon, *Lebanon the Fragmented Nation* (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1980)52.

⁴⁷⁴ Namani, *Confessionalism in Lebanon*, 1920-1976Columbia University, 1982)212.

⁴⁷⁵ Alin, *The United States and the 1958 Lebanon Crisis* (New York: University Press of America, 1994)58.

⁴⁷⁶ Namani, *Confessionalism in Lebanon*, 1920-1976Columbia University, 1982)219.

bureaucratic hierarchy, and instituted wide ranging socio-economic and administrative reforms. ⁴⁷⁷

Nassif, a modern Lebanese author explained that the 1957 elections was not the sole reason behind the 1958 crisis. He enumerated the foreign policy of President Chamoun undertook, that followed the upheavals that chook the region. Such as the 1955 Baghdad Pact, the 1956 tri-partite attack on Egypt, and the Eisenhower doctrine.⁴⁷⁸

Nir, in an exploration of the 1958 crisis, said that both internal and external factors brought about the outbreak of the crisis. He added that the crisis was a result of political deterioration in the Lebanon of the mid 1950s, between the supporters of prowest president Camille Chamoun and those of the Pan-Arab leader, Egyptian president Jamal Abdel Nasser. President Camille Chamou interference ensured the election of those candidates who would later elect a successor who would follow his own policy, or even his own re-election. Consequently, Nir added that Chamoun's actions he blocked the parliament not only to extremist opposition leaders, but also to the moderates. This prevented any possibility for a dialogue with these moderate elements and imposed on them an alignment with the extremists, and in fact, strengthened the power of the latter. Nir concluded saying that Chamoun's rivals, including Shi'ites Ahmed al-As'ad and his son Kamel, Druze Kamal Jumblatt, Sunnites Rashed Karami and Saib Salam, and Christians Suleiman Faranjiya, Henri Far'un and Renya Mu'awad, combined forces as an organized opposition, and were almost immediately supported by Syria and Egypt.⁴⁷⁹

⁴⁷⁷ Bassam Namani, "Confessionalism in Lebanon, 1920-1976" Columbia University), 361.

⁴⁷⁸ Nassif, *Camille Chamoun, Akher Al-Aamalikat* (Beirut: Dar Annahar, 1988)76.

⁴⁷⁹ Omri Nir, "The Shi'Ites during the 1958 Lebanese Crisis," *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 6 (2004)110.

Saleh also wrote about the 1958 crisis. He listed most of the previously discussed factors, explaining that the 1957 elections and the exclusion of the opposition's leaders had a negative effect on stability. He explained that Lebanon's political arena was split on the government's foreign policy. This divergence of opinion was based on a deep contradiction of how each camps perceived Lebanon's identity and his foreign policy. He added that the efforts of Foreign Minister Malik's that dragged Lebanon into foreign alliance with no tangible benefits, incensed the opposition especially as it was a breach of one of the National Accord's clauses. In his conclusion, he stated that the crisis was caused by interlocked internal, regional, and external factors, stressing the core cause was Lebanon's historically divided nature.⁴⁸⁰

Raad another modern Lebanese author also had a more comprehensive approach listing both internal issues, like the 1957 elections, and President Chamoun's bid for reelection. She also spoke of the external factors like Lebanon's adoption of the Eisenhower doctrine, Chamoun's alliance with the West.⁴⁸¹ Saadeh also explained that President Chamoun and his foreign Minister tried to internationalize the crisis and focus on the regional aspect, in order to divert the attention from its internal causes. Their strategy was to involve the great powers, especially the US in order to benefit from its support against the other Lebanese leaders and factions, and to profit from its economic and military aid.⁴⁸²

3. Concluding remarks on discourse analysis

After this exploration, it is clear that most of the explanation of primary sources were split into two opposite groups. Several neutral politicians and authors, in addition

⁴⁸⁰ Abu Saleh, *Al-Azma Al-Loubnaniah Aam 1958* (Beirut: Al Manshwrat al Arabia, 1998)62.

⁴⁸¹ Raad, Tarikh Lubnan Al-Siyasi Wal-Iktisadi 1958-1975 (Beirut: Maktabat al-Sa'h, 2004)100.

⁴⁸² Abed Salam Mohamad al-Saadeh, *Al-Tatawurate Al-Siyasyah Fi Lubnan, 1958-1975* (Egypt: Misr al-Arabia lil Nasher w Altawzii, 2010)158.

to opposition supporters considered that President Chamoun internal policies, were the primary factors behind the 1958 crisis, mainly his interference in the 1957 elections, his bid for reelection, and Muslim grievances. As previously demonstrated, all these factors can be directly linked to representation. This line of thought will be fully explored in the next section.

Meanwhile, those who supported President Chamoun believed that the UAR interference in Lebanon's affairs, and Nasser's efforts to annex Lebanon, caused the crisis. There are evidence that that the UAR sent funds, arms, and even soldiers to the opposition during the crisis of 1958. Even Saeb Salam and several other opposition leaders admitted that they received funds from the UAR and that there was even a 120 Syrian commandos supporting Salam's forces in Beirut. Additionally, there is a very well documented radio and press campaign waged by Egypt in Lebanon. However, Salam belittled the help, when compared with the other factors on the ground, and he was adamant that the opposition never contemplated any plans of unification with the UAR.⁴⁸³ In short, the UAR did interfere in Lebanon, and external factors played a role in fomenting the crisis, but the majority of opinion considered that without the internal factors, external interference would have found no significant allies to support and no fertile soil to flourish. Rashid Karameh went even further, saying that the different Lebanese political actors used the international and regional powers as a source of support internally in their struggle against their Lebanese opponents. Additionally, several pro-Chamoun personalities went against the President emphasis of external factors. Prime Minister Solh and the US ambassador both close allies of Chamoun, stated that the causes of the crisis and even its nature was mostly internal. It is clear that

⁴⁸³ Salam, L'Insurrection De 1958 Au Liban (Paris: Universitee Sorbonne, 1979)65 IV.

a majority of primary sources stressed the internal factors more than the external ones. The explanation of PM Solh, the Internal Security Chief, and both the UK and US Ambassador are strong argument in favor of the prevalent importance of internal factors over external ones.

On the secondary sources front, modern scholars who wrote about that period, like Attie and Tamirace offered a more comprehensive explanation, listing both internal and external factors, while stressing that several of the externals ones were linked to President Chamoun disregard of the National Accord. Thus, as previously demonstrated representation is at the core of all the internal factors. Even the few relevant external actors can also be linked to representation, directly or via the disregard of the national accords. This line of thought will be further explored and discussed in the next section.

D. Conclusions

After this in depth theoretical and then discourse analysis, this thesis shall draw the proper conclusion on the interplay between the internal and external variable in an effort to discern their relative prevalence.

1. Internal factors

As it was discussed earlier, all internal factors are rooted in representation, from the issue of renewing President Chamoun's mandate, to misrepresentation of Muslims in public institutions until the 1957 elections. This argument is also shared by a majority of sources, there is a large number of them who directly linked the 1958 crisis to the 1957 election and representation, and another group who add several other internal factors (reelection of Chamoun, Muslim grievances). This thesis has shown that even

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these secondary internal factors were also linked to representation, either directly (Muslim grievances) or indirectly through a breach of the national accord, which is based on representation and sectarian balance.

2. External factors

On the other hand of the equation this thesis explored the external factors, ranging from Nasser's Arabism to Chamoun alliance with the West and his adoption of the Eisenhower doctrine. In addition, to President Chamoun's foreign policy, which was one of the main foreign factors behind the crisis. Lehmbruch explained that it is the role of internal elites to "prevent an intensification of internal conflicts from outside by choosing nonalignment in international disputes."⁴⁸⁴ Additionally, most of these external factors can also be linked to a breach of the national accord, and subsequently representation. Indeed, there is no doubt that external threats can be highly disadvantageous if internal conflicts have not been earlier resolved in a way as to "make international affiliations secondary to identification with the national community."⁴⁸⁵

In conclusion, it can be safely assumed that external factors may have exacerbated the crisis, but without prior internal conflicts and issues, they could not have had such an effect. Indeed Hanf explained, "Internal conflicts always invite foreign intervention."⁴⁸⁶ Additionally, most of the foreign factors were linked to internal issues (breach of the national accord, and consequently representation). Even more, the fact that President Fouad Chehab's efforts to resolve the crisis were more focused on a return to the National Accord and the resolution of internal grievances, by increasing the

⁴⁸⁴ Lehmbruch, Consociational Democracy in the International System, 1975)386.

⁴⁸⁵ Fakhoury Muhlbacher, *Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather* (Germany: VS Research, 2007)114.

⁴⁸⁶ Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon. Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation (London: , 1993)39.

representation of Muslims in public offices, designing a more balanced electoral law, and giving more prerogatives to the Muslim PM, shows the importance of internal factors. Meanwhile, on the regional and international scene, a detente and a broad agreement was struck between the US and Nasser's. However the same issues were still present: the cold war was ongoing, and the UAR didn't break up until 1963. Therefore, these findings further reinforce the hypotheses of this thesis, on the importance of the relation between representation and stability, when compared to the remaining factors. Yet, it is important to restate that there is a complex interrelationship between internal and external factors, and once the external and internal dimensions of the crisis collided, elucidating direct causality is beyond the scope of this thesis. Undeniably, this thesis is only highlighting the importance of representation, among other possible factors, that influence stability.

Chapter VII

SIGNIFICANCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The concluding chapter of this thesis will discuss the relevance of this study, and whether the Lebanese parliament is significant. Additionally, this chapter explores the different factors that complicates the proposal of any recommendation for electoral reform, illustrating them in a comparison of the 2005 and 2009 elections. Finally, the chapter will offer a few recommendation as a conclusion of this thesis.

A. Relevance: why are the findings of this thesis important?

This thesis has shown, that representation is significant in most aspect of a power sharing system, and is especially important in the case of Lebanon, with its multitude of segments and deep cleavages. Even more, this thesis demonstrated the importance of the relation between representation and stability in particular. This opens up additional venue of research on the macro power sharing level, emphasizing representative electoral engineering as a method of maintaining and strengthening stability in divided societies, among other consociational elements.

1. An irrelevant Chamber of deputies?

Yet there is an important question that needs to be tackled conserning the specificity of the Lebanese system. Despite the clear relation between representation and stability, the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, the legislative body that translate the will of the people into deputies through representation, is sidelined and ignored at the first hint of trouble. Once a crisis erupts the parliament is virtually crippled, it becomes irrelevant and deadlocked. Even more, this deadlock spreads to other public institutions, like the executive, and the judicial branches. As a result, political initiative is transferred into the hands of the real actors in the system: religious figures, sectarian leaders. Both the executive and the legislative bodies are bypassed by elite bargaining and informal accords, usually struck between the main sectarian leaders. For example, the Taef accords was agreed upon by the different international and regional actors, mainly the US, Syria and Saudi Arabia and presented to the Lebanese Deputies as a fait accompli to rubber stamp it. Similarly, the Doha accords that stopped the 2008 mini civil war, was fiercely discussed and agreed upon after intense negotiation between the sectarian leaders, in Doha Qatar, outside the official institutions. It was much later that pieces of the agreement (electoral law, electing a president) were submitted to the parliament for formal approval.

This issue raises a serious question that if the parliament is ignored at the onset of any crisis, is it an important institution? Consequently, how important is representation, not only in regard to stability, as this thesis has proposed, but for the whole political structure?

2. The paradox of the Lebanese parliament

In order to answer that question, it is important to study the issue from all angles. These same elites and sectarian leaders, who sidestepped the parliament, fight tooth and nail for every vote, and every seat in parliament. Every sectarian leader deploy tremendous efforts to win in the elections, using any means necessary. Deals, even with bitter, sworn enemies are struck, and long held alliances are forgotten in a blink of an eye, just to gain one seat. These leaders mobilize their considerable client

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network, both in the public and private spheres, to assure victory. Fleets of cars and buses transport people to and from electoral centers, restaurant chains send free meals to the volunteers and paid workers helping in the overseeing and votes counting. These leaders' media empires work full throttles to mobilize the public. They spend fortunes; even from their own pockets to win a few seats in a peripheral district, meanwhile even their regional and international patron contribute large sums to ensure the victory of their clients. Undeniably, there were corroborated reports of billions of dollars spent by the different states backing Lebanese factions, in the 2009 elections. For example, there was several mentions of 100 of millions of dollars spent by Saudi Arabia in support of their 14 March allies in the election. Similarly, Iran also spent similar amounts in support of Hezbollah and its March 8 allies.⁴⁸⁷

3. Fruitless electoral reform efforts

Another striking factor is the great political melee that erupts on the eve of deciding which electoral law to implement. At times, the fight over the law is much harsher than the election itself. Usually, popular opinion, political and demographic changes, or even the specter of upcoming election periodically pushes the issue of electoral law reform to the forefront of the political arena. Each political faction and sectarian leader state their preferences, and declare that only their own proposal can safeguard his sect's interests. Thus, the Lebanese political life becomes consumed with these discussions.

⁴⁸⁷ National Democratic Institute, Final Report on the 2009 Lebanese Parliamentary Elections (01/12/2014: National Democratic Institute,[2010]), https://www.ndi.org/node/16115.

Yet when it is time to choose, sectarian leaders usually revert to old tested laws to guarantee the status-quo or they completely deadlock the issue. The 2005 elections was severely criticized as being unfair, and in an effort to quell the demands of a large portion of Christians who felt misrepresented, PM Sinioura formed the National Commission on Parliamentary Electoral Law Reform (henceforth mentioned as the Boutros Committee). The committee was tasked with proposing means to reform the electoral system in Lebanon and preparing a new Parliamentary Electoral draft law in accordance with the principles of the Constitution and the Taef Agreement. This draft law was set to achieve "as much fair representation and equality among candidates and voters as possible, and to provide the necessary conditions for free electoral competition and for the impartiality of the administration of the electoral process by the competent authorities".⁴⁸⁸

The Boutros committee reached interesting conclusions. It recommended a mixed law with 50% of the seats elected through the 1960 law, and the other 50% would be elected using a proportional law, in additional to significant reforms, such as introducing a women's quota at candidacy level, lowering the voting age from 21 to 18, allowing none resident to vote, and many important reforms to electoral mechanism . The Taef Accords also drew a detailed road map for electoral reforms, recommending the formation of a senate reserved for the critical issues of state, tasking the non-sectarian lower chamber with the daily management of the state. In the interim, great efforts by committees, non-governmental organization, and scholars to spur electoral reformed.

⁴⁸⁸National Commission on Parliamentary Electoral Law Reform, Final Report and Recommendations (Beirut: National Commission on Parliamentary Electoral Law Reform,[2006]), http://www.elections-lebanon.org/elections/docs_3_1_1_e.aspx?lg=ar (accessed 01/12/2014).

Yet despite all these proposals, electoral reform is never implemented, and all these efforts have never been brought to fruition. Even smaller technical reform efforts like imposing pre-printed ballot papers, are stonewalled and rejected by different sectarian leaders. Law proposal are left forgotten in drawers, and nothing is accomplished. When popular pressure for reform mount, other committees are formed, and discussion starts anew, just to be swept under the rug once more. Indeed, in 2008, after months of protracted discussions, and countless committee meetings, the Lebanese elites failed to agree on a law. It took a mini civil war to force their hand. These leaders met in Doha, and under intense international and regional pressure, they finally agreed to resurrect the old 1960 law. Meanwhile, since the 2009 election Lebanon has been searching for a law for the last six years, and the elections have postponed twice, by extending the deputies mandate.

4. The reasons

It is an interesting phenomenon that has important reasons. This thesis has demonstrated the importance of representation, and consequently of elections, and Lebanon is no exception. Elections are so important that no political or sectarian leader is willing to change the old tested law, fearing a change of the status quo. Even though the parliament is sidestepped and these leaders strike bargains between them but the source of their power, their ability to strike bargains is ultimately based on this same parliament that translate their people's support into a tangible, measurable, and quantifiable parameters: Deputies. Therefore, once the elections translate people's will into deputies, these leaders become national and even regional players, able to represent their sects, building their political power base on this representative support. Once they

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reach this stage, they are able to sideline the same institutions on which their power is built on and strike bargains and deals, in parallel unofficial venues.

Elections and the subsequent distribution of seats in the chamber of deputies are vitally important not only because they measure the inter-sectarian balance of power, fixed by the national accord (as each sect had a fixed share of the total number of seats, with an overreaching parity between Muslims and Christians), but they also measure the intra-sectarian balance too:

- Actually, the inter-sectarian balance of power is always shifting with the alliance of different sects together, and with the outliers, the deputies who did not follow the sectarian leaders of their own sect. (Currently, at the end of 2014, the balance of power hinge on the 7 deputies of Druze leader Jumblatt, striking a balance between the 14 March coalition and the 8 March coalition).
- Most importantly, elections decide the intra-sectarian balance of power. In other words, which leader will speak for his sect, which leader will represent his sect and strike bargains on its behalf, with the other sects and leaders! Lijphart discussed this issue briefly saying that from a consociational point of view, the representatives of each sect must enjoy an intra-sectarian majority support, to be able to champion the causes of their sects.⁴⁸⁹ Pappalardo, another consociationalist scholar, wrote that elite intra-sectarian predominance is one of the condition for the maintenance of consociational democracy.⁴⁹⁰ Lehmbruch,⁴⁹¹ supported his findings, and so did Fakhoury who applied it to the case of Lebanon, and found out that the degradation

⁴⁸⁹ Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (London: Yale University Press, 1977)149.

⁴⁹⁰ Adriano Pappalardo, "The Conditions for Consociational Democracy: A Logical and Empirical Critique," *European Journal of Political Research* 9, no. 4 (2006)379.

⁴⁹¹ Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Consociational Democracy in the International System," *European Journal of Political Research*, no. 3 (1975)386.

of elite intra-sectarian predominance was one of the causes that brought the collapse of the consociational system in Lebanon in 1975.⁴⁹² Pappalardo also explained that in the 1970s, the erosion of elite predominance had catastrophic results on consociational politics, and consequently on the collapse of the whole political system leading to the war.

Therefore, these factors explain the critical importance of the Chamber of Deputies, and why sectarian leaders consider elections, and consequently, both intra and inter sectarian representation as a vital condition for their own personal survival, the survival of their sects and the maintenance of the whole political system, which they dominate. At the end, their hesitation in choosing a new electoral law and approving any structure of reform is elucidated: they need to balance several factors, which are at times disparate. On one hand, they want to ensure a wider, and at times a more proportional inter-sectarian representation, increasing their sect's and by consequences their own share of power. On the other hand, they need to simultaneously ensure an iron grip on intra-sectarian representation, snuffing the rise of any counter-elites that might threaten their almost dictatorial control of their own sects, which can only be accomplished through majoritarian electoral practices.

B. A complex system

As previously mentioned, this thesis has shown that there is a high correlation between representation and stability, especially in divided societies ruled by a power sharing political system, like Lebanon. Thus, the recommendation of this thesis for

⁴⁹² Tamirace Fakhoury Muhlbacher, *Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather* (Germany: VS Research, 2007)114.

future electoral laws in Lebanon should be fairly simple: design an electoral law that offers the highest possible level of representation, taking into account the pre-allotted sectarian proportional distribution.

However, Politics do not deal with absolute. A perfectly representative system can only be achieved in an impractical direct democracy, where every citizen is his own representative. Additionally, blindly increasing representation to highest possible levels, beyond ensuring the inclusion of all the different segments, can similarly sound true in theory, yet in practice there are several additional factors that complicates the picture.

1. Immobility and deadlock

The Lebanese political framework, like most power sharing systems that relies heavily on representation, suffer from immobility and constant political deadlock. This is partly due to its nature that is based on consensus politics, mutual veto, and proportional electoral laws, rather than competition and opposition-government alternation. Indeed, this is the same duality found in electoral engineering, between proportional system and majoritarian ones. The first focuses on representation while the second take at heart the effectiveness of the system. The two variable work in parallel and are inversely proportional. The more representative a system is the less effective and prone to deadlock it becomes, and vice versa. Additionally, representative electoral system result in fragmented parliament, making it harder to form stable governments. On the other hand, a majoritarian system, which highly distorts proportional representation, is very effective. Yet, scholars and policy makers have opted for representative systems because they ensure the stability of their divided polities. It is not a choice between different levels of effectiveness; it is a choice between stability and

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civil war. In other words, it is better to have a deadlocked system rather than civil war, and sectarian violence. Undeniably, the conclusion of this thesis supports this link between stability and representation. This has been the case in Lebanon since its inception, ensuring the representation of all segments through proportional systems, has been crucial for the stability of the country, despite the resulting immobility and deadlocks. However, on the long term, mounting changes create tension and frustration that must be dealt with. Therefore, the system must allow a certain mobility and a degree of flexibility, in order to adapt to the rising changes and reform itself. After ensuring the effective representation and the balanced inclusion of all the different segments, a delicate balance must be struck between further proportionality or effectiveness, in order to reap the benefits of both, while minimizing their negative traits.

Lebanon offers a good example of this issue. Since the 2009 elections, Lebanon has known long periods of immobility and deadlock. Currently it has been 6 years since the last election and the political faction have not yet agreed on a new electoral law, and the mandate of the deputies has been extended twice. The Lebanese political system already has a preallocated sectarian proportional division of seats in parliament and in public offices. An additional introduction of proportionality in the electoral system, similar to the Orthodox Gathering electoral law,⁴⁹³ could greatly increase immobility, and deepen inter-sectarian cleavages and division, for a small increase of stability on the short term, but with disastrous consequences on the long term. Therefore, alternative

⁴⁹³ The law consists of each sect electing its own Deputies, via a proportional electoral system in a single district.

methods of increasing representation with no negative effect on effectiveness must be found.

2. Change

Political landscapes are not static; there are always changes underway, both externally and internally. Changes on the international scene can greatly affect the internal balance of power, and can be highly challenging to deal with. For example, the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1978, was detrimental in the formation of Hezbollah in the early eighties and its subsequent growth and transformation into a major party in Lebanon. Hezbollah is currently a key player in the Lebanese political scene and with its ally, the Amal party, they speaks for most of the Shiites, playing a critical role in the current balance of power.

On the internal side, economic and even cultural changes greatly influence the political scene. However, demography has been one of the factors that had the most impact on the Lebanese political system. Incidentally, Lebanon has been witnessing a constant demographic change, caused by population growth, emigration, and social developments, like urbanization and the formation of poverty belts. Demography is such a key factor because the Lebanese political system is a representative power-sharing contract, based on the results of the last official census of 1932 and then changed to parity in the 1989 Taef Accords. Thus, political power stems from sectarian population numbers, rendering any new districting, or change to the pre-allocated sectarian seats distribution a very polarizing issue, that raises sectarian tensions, as it affects representation and exclusion. For example: in the past, there was a significant Christian

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population in the north, especially in Tripoli and in Akkar. However, with the shifting demography, the Sunni have now overwhelming majorities in these two Qazas, and the seats reserved for the Christian are now decided by Sunni votes, robbing the Christian of their share of seats. Similarly in the south with several Sunni and Druze seats in Hasbaya, that are now decided by Shia voters.⁴⁹⁴

Therefore, any new electoral law reform or changes must take into account that what is considered as a representative law today could rapidly become the cause of misrepresentation and exclusion in a few years, whether by perception or in reality. Consequently, electoral reform must open the door for further changes down the road, and encourage adaptability and flexibility in any proposed law, shying away from rigid and closed proposals, especially in districting and seat allocations. No matter how representative an electoral system is, if it cannot adopt and foster change, to deal with evolving circumstances it would be a failure and would have negative consequences. It would only ensure stability on the short term, while postponing and exacerbating the problem on the medium and long terms.

3. Vested interests of Politicians

Any proposed formulas to strengthen the stability of Lebanon by proposing a new electoral system or even tweaking the political framework, must take into account that it would be stonewalled by the vested interests of the different sectarian leaders. These leaders, with their oft competing entrenched interests, sphere of influence, and their sects' interests regard the political arena as a zero sum game, with each gain one

⁴⁹⁴ Muhamad Mraad, *Al Intikhabat Al-Niyabiyah Fi Lubnan, 1920-2009* (Beirut: Lebanese University Publications, 2013)407.

sect achieves another would certainly lose. That is one of the reasons why most of the proposed reforms of the electoral laws, in the past few years have seldom been implemented.

As previously discussed, politicians have conflicting expectations of an electoral law (conserving their dictatorial grip on intra-sectarian politics while striving for a greater share of proportional representation on the inter-sectarian level). Therefore, politicians usually prefer to maintain current laws despite all their issues, rather than take a chance with a new law that might disturb their power base and current level of representation. There is a high resistance to reform and change shared among most politicians. Nevertheless, there are exceptions to this rule: any party or faction that feel excluded from power or misrepresented would usually push for change, in hope of increasing their share.

It is important to note that factions demanding change are usually not the same, alternating between the different segments. For example, in the 50s, the Muslim felt misrepresented, and they were part of the opposition, excluded from the parliament after the 1957 election. Therefore, they spearheaded the demands for a reform of the electoral law, which resulted in the application of the new 1960 law. Alternatively, after the Taef Accord, the Christian felt excluded from power, and their demand for changes in the electoral law are still ongoing. Christians demands for reform coalesced in the 2008 Doha accord when they pushed for the application of the 1960 law, which paradoxically was first implemented in 1960 to correct the representation of Muslims! Incidentally, this point further supports this thesis finding on the representative nature of the 1960 electoral law.

This introduces another important factor that must be taken into account, when making recommendations for electoral reform. The previously mentioned factors affecting the appetite of sectarian leaders to change and reform, must be taken into consideration, thus ruling out any sweeping changes and structural overhauls, no matter how beneficial and gradual these changes appear. Indeed, these leaders' power is built around spheres of influence and a positive feedback loop of client patron relations, strengthened by winning elections, and controlling top position. Every electoral victory increases these leaders share of power and the numbers of loyal supporters in public offices. This in turn, widen their power base, and their ability to offer social and economic help to their supporters, thus further increasing their popularity, hence enabling them to receive more vote but more importantly a larger share of votes inside their sects. As the intra-sectarian power of these leaders grow, they become more powerful and capable of grabbing a larger share of inter sectarian power. Consequently, any threat to their electoral supremacy, no matter how benign it looks, threatens a critical part of their well-oiled machine, and would be viciously opposed.

4. 2005 vs 2009 elections

This section will compare the 2005 and 2009 elections, in order to put into context the factors that were previously discussed, and demonstrate how they affect the process of electoral reform. This comparison would also help test this thesis finding, on the relation between representation and stability, on a different period of the history of Lebanon.

a. The electoral system and the numbers deputies

The 2005 and the 2009 electoral laws were based on the same system used for the 1957 and 1960 elections. Throughout its history, Lebanon has used an electoral system where deputies are elected according to a simple majority, single ballot system, using lists in multi seats districts. Meanwhile, the proportional distribution of seats was fixed by the national pact, and the number of deputies followed a fixed ratio of 6 Christians to 5 Muslims that was changed in the Taef Accords to a parity of 6 to 6. The 2005 and 2009 elections followed this same system. The only change in the electoral system from this thesis main case study is the ratio (all post-war elections used parity) and the number of deputies. In 1957 the number of deputies was 66 and it was raised to 99 in 1960. Then the number of deputies was raised to 128 for all post-war elections, including the 2005 and the 2009. Thus, concerning this factor, both elections have similar level of representation.⁴⁹⁵

b. The laws and the technical electoral mechanisms

The 2005 elections were held according to the 2000 electoral law. The law was promulgated, while the Lebanese political system was under the full control of the Syrian regime and their Lebanese allies. The 2000 was tailor made to limit PM Rafik Hariri's power but curtailing his ability to form a large parliamentary bloc. Meanwhile, the 2009 elections were held based on the 1960 electoral law, following its districting and sectarian distribution of seats, with significant reform to electoral mechanisms. Undeniably, the 2009 law introduced several important reforms, like the establishment of an independent committee, called the Supervisory Commission for Electoral

⁴⁹⁵ See Chapter 3 section 3.7 of this thesis.

Campaigns (SCEC) formed of judges, lawyers and media experts, tasked with supervising compliance with campaign finance, media, and advertising regulations.⁴⁹⁶

Additionally, the 2009 law introduced stricter oversight of electoral funding, like mandating the candidates to deposit all electoral funds and spending to one account in the central bank that can be supervised by the SCEC. Moreover, the 2009 election law had a comprehensive section on electoral advertising, like forbidding electoral advertisement 24 hours before the elections, and allowing domestic and international election observers to observe the elections. Most of the reforms implemented in 2009, were totally absent in the 2005 law.⁴⁹⁷ These reforms were based, in part, on the work of the Boutros Committee, established after the 2005 elections in an effort to answer the demands of several political factions, which criticized the representation level of the 2005 law, especially concerning the ability of the Christians to elect their own representatives.

c. Districting

On the districting side, the 2005 elections, originally based on the 2000 law, suffered from noticeable gerrymandering, to favor the candidates allied with the Syrians. For example, the Mount Lebanon Mohafazat was divided according to the Qaza administrative districts, and adding each two together in an effort to drown Christian majorities in more pro-Syrian Muslim ones. For example, the Bisharreh Christian Qaza, with a strong anti-Syrian sentiment, holding a 44,000 Christians voting

⁴⁹⁶ Muhamad Mraad, *Al Intikhabat Al-Niyabiyah Fi Lubnan, 1920-2009* (Beirut: Lebanese University Publications, 2013)569-613.

⁴⁹⁷ Muhamad Mraad, *Al Intikhabat Al-Niyabiyah Fi Lubnan, 1920-2009* (Beirut: Lebanese University Publications, 2013)569-613.

bloc, was added to Akkar and Al Minieh, two northern Qazas with a 165,000 Sunni majority, drowning the Christian votes into a sea of Sunni voters. Similarly, in the South, Saida with around 50,000 Sunni votes was added to the larger South Mouhafazat, with a Shiite majority of almost 280,000 voters. Undeniably, the districting of the 2005 law did not follow defined preset administrative consistencies, and the difference in sizes between the districts was glaring. It ranged from three district of six seats each to three districts of 11 seats each and even one with 17 seats!⁴⁹⁸

Meanwhile, the 2009 elections followed the districting of the 1960 electoral law, that was based on a uniform, clear and unbiased rules, using the Qaza as its basis.⁴⁹⁹ Additionally, in the one district that did not follow the 1960 districting, Beirut was divided in such a way to safeguard each sect's ability to elect their own representatives. In 2005 the different area were mixed in order to ensure that Christians and Sunni majorities were diluted, in an effort to limit PM Rafic Hariri's parliamentary bloc and consequently his political power base. In 2009 the Christian constituencies were grouped together, and the same was applied to the Sunni ones, allowing for a more genuine intra-sectarian representation, as each sect was able to choose its own representatives freely.

Finally, after this comparison of different factors, it is clear that the 2009 was significantly more representative than the 2005 election.

⁴⁹⁸ Muhamad Mraad, *Al Intikhabat Al-Niyabiyah Fi Lubnan, 1920-2009* (Beirut: Lebanese University Publications, 2013)340-350.

⁴⁹⁹ See Chapter 5 of this thesis for a broader more detailed discussion of the 1960 electoral law.

5. Concluding remarks

Comparing the 2005 elections to the 2009 in terms of representation, mirrors the comparison of the 1957 and the 1960 elections. Both the 1957 and the 2005 laws were designed to increase the political gains and influence of one faction, disregarding the overall power-sharing agreement and the fair representation of all segments. In 1957 President Chamoun personally devised the law in order to fill the parliament with his supporters and remove his opponents.⁵⁰⁰ Similarly, the 2005 election re-used the 2000 law that was drawn by the Syrian regime in an effort to curtail the rising political power of PM Rafik Hariri. Meanwhile, the 1960 law, and by consequences the 2009 law that was based on it, was based on inclusive principals, formulated by President Chehab in order to resolve any lingering tensions after the 1958 crisis, in a return to the fundemantals of the National Accords. Additionally the genesis of both the 1960 and the 2009 law hold similar parallels. In both cases, a large segment of the Lebanese population considered the previous elections as unrepresentative, which caused their exclusion. In 1960 the Muslims considered the 1957 elections as misrepresentatives, while in 2009 a large part of the Christians headed by Michel Aoun, considered that the 2005 law misrepresented them, since a large number of the Christian deputies were elected with the help of Muslim majorities. Following the 2006 war, the Shias ministers left the government, protesting the adoption of the Special tribunal for Lebanon, to investigate the assassination of PM Rafik Hariri. Once they resigned, they considered that without the Shia component, the Council of Ministers has become anticonstitutional, as it no longer assured a grand coalition of all sects. Issues of exclusion and misrepresentation are very serious in Lebanon, as demonstrated in this thesis, and in

⁵⁰⁰ See Chapter 5 of this thesis.

this case, the opposition (Hezbollah, Amal, and Aoun) who represented the majority of Shias and a plurality of Christians felt excluded from power. Meanwhile, the 14 of March coalition, formed by a majority of Sunnis, Druze and a sizable components of Christian refused to resign and cede power.

It took a mini-civil strife to break the deadlock and bring back all the different leaders to the table to draft a new elite agreement: the Doha accord, to resolve the most present issues, and re-infuse the power-sharing agreement with life. As the crisis dealt with representation, the electoral law was amongst the hotly debated issues, along with the election of a new president. General Aoun insisted on the 1960 law, arguing that it increased the representation of Christians allowing them to elect their own representatives with their own votes, enjoying majorities in the smaller districts rather than drowning in larger district with Muslim majorities. The adoption of the 1960 in the 2009 election was considered a victory for General Aoun and his sect and it s representation. However, two years later, this same 1960 law was described, by those who championed it, as being the sources of all the problems they were facing and utterly refused to use it again in any future elections, claiming it did not adequately represent them. General Aoun asked for a new law to be implemented, stating the need for "a new more representative law" that would allow the Christians an increased level of representation. Meanwhile, those who opposed the re-adoption (March 14) of the 1960 law, became attached to it and refused any further changes to the electoral law, insisting on using the 1960 law for the next elections (slated for 2013).

This example illustrates the difficulty of electoral reform in Lebanon, and how only great crisis can overcome the reluctance of politician to change and reform. It also shows that what is considered representative today can within a year or two be

perceived as a source of exclusion and misrepresentation. Furthermore, the representation of any electoral law can be slowly eroded due to demographic and other changes. Therefore, this thesis is going to propose a set of specific recommendations, that are based on these findings, using the factors previously analyzed in these section as guidelines.

C. Recommendations

Rather than offering a constructed, comprehensive and overreaching reform plan, that would be impractical to implement, faced with the system's immobility and the politicians' aversion to reform. This thesis is going to present several crucial smaller and gradual recommendations. These steps would be based on the previously explored factors, and focused on strengthening the stability of Lebanon, by finding alternative methods to increase representation, while safeguarding the system's effectiveness and its ability to reform and adapt to unavoidable change. Additionally, these recommendations will steer away from wide overreaching changes and system overhauls that would be rejected by politicians, focusing instead on small and gradual steps, in order to overcome the reluctance of politicians to reform.

1. Opening up of the political arena and increasing the number of deputies

Throughout Lebanon's history, the percentage of new entrants to the political arena, especially the parliament was quite low. In times of crisis and sectarian polarization, it almost drops to zero. Many structural impediments limit the ease of entrance to politics. For example, there is an age limit for running in the elections, currently set to 25 years old and above. Also there is a monetary insurance of eight

million Lebanese pounds to be paid by every candidate, of which only six millions are refundable in case of victory or receiving more than 20% of the votes. Meanwhile, running an electoral campaign is very expensive, and there is no help from the state, or any rule of equal access to state media.⁵⁰¹ In an effort to increase representation, without impeding effectiveness new entrants to politics must be encouraged, which in the long term could invigorate politics, lessen sectarian polarization and weaken the power of the traditional sectarian leaders. Additionally, it could foster the creation of new political parties and currents that focus more on the day-to-day needs of citizens rather than on sectarian divisive issues. In the same vein, introducing quotas to increase women participation in politics and especially in the parliament is another practical and important method to increase representation and introduce new blood in the political arena.

Similarly, an increase in the number of deputies has a high chance not be stone walled by the different leaders, as it will increase their power base, while preserving the sectarian balance, following the current sectarian and geographical distribution. Moreover, such an increase has historical precedence. At the Taef meeting, the issue of the number of deputies was discussed and there was an agreement to raise it to just 108 in order to achieve parity. Yet once the electoral law was changed, the sectarian leaders decided to raise the number to 128.⁵⁰² Undeniably, an increase in the number of deputies post, thus lowering competition and increasing representation. Additionally, an increase of the total number allows a wider representation, especially of the smallest segment's that

⁵⁰¹ Muhamad Mraad, *Al Intikhabat Al-Niyabiyah Fi Lubnan, 1920-2009* (Beirut: Lebanese University Publications, 2013)590.

⁵⁰² See Chapter 3, section 3.7 of this thesis.

are usually not properly represented in the chamber. For example, in the 1957 elections the protestant did not have a seat for their own, their representation was merged with several other small segment into one deputies who is tasked with representing all minorities. Once the number of deputies was increased in 1960 to 99, the protestant received one seat to represent them in the chamber.⁵⁰³ An increase in the number of deputies could also fix the issue of Christian misrepresentation. Currently, the main Christian political parties consider that the 1960 law does not allow them to elect all their deputies with their own votes, in districts where they enjoy large majorities. Indeed, according to various calculations the Christians using the 1960 law can vote only 63% of their deputies with their own majorities. Thus, increasing the number of deputies would allow the concentration of the extra deputies in the districts where the Christians have uncontested majorities, without changing the current distribution and incurring the objections of the sectarian leaders who currently control them. For example, the Maronite seat of Tripoli is decided by Sunni majorities, many demands for shifting it to neighboring qazas with Christian majorities have been stonewalled and put on hold, as different factions tried to win the seat to their side.

Overall, lowering the hurdles to entering the political arena and increasing the number of deputies are examples of the small gradual steps that should not face a lot of opposition, while having a significant impact on representation and by consequence on stability. These steps, especially the increase in number of deputies can be very significant as they effectively increase the political arena's size, enabling the emergence of new political forces and parties, outside the control of the main sectarian leaders.

⁵⁰³ See Chapter 5, section 5.1.2 of this thesis.

2. Proportion electoral system

The issue of proportional electoral law has been previously discussed, how an increasingly large dose of proportionality beyond the necessary representation of all segments, could negatively affect the already immobile Lebanese political system. Currently, in Lebanon proportionality is limited to the pre-allocation of seats, both on a geographic and sectarian basis. It has not been introduced to the electoral system per se; such a gradual infusion of proportionality could be really beneficial in answering the needs of the different sects for better representation. The Boutros commission plan to slowly increase proportionality over several electoral cycles hold merit. It is very effective in increasing representation especially intra-sectarian representation, and allowing each sect to elect its own representative. Additionally if the proportional law is applied in medium mixed district, it could encourage national cohesion, and the creation of new political party.

The introduction of proportionality could have many benefits. The idea might find resistance from sectarian leaders, as the main proposal of the Boutros reform was a mixed proportional and majoritarian system, and it was disregarded in the 2009 elections. However, the idea of mixed system has recently resurfaced and several proposal were floated, arguing for different districting and mix between proportional and majoritarian seats, but knowing the resistance to change of the political class it might not get implemented.

3. Small technical electoral reform

No matter how contradictory the interests of the different segments are, there are always small technical reforms that could be taken. These reforms and small changes would not face a lot of resistance from sectarian leaders, and could on the long haul be very beneficial to the system, increasing its representation and therefore its stability.

The few technical electoral reforms that were accepted by the sectarian leaders and implemented in 2009, positively influenced the representative nature of the elections. I believe that it is an effective trend that should be continued. Thus, it might be worth pushing for pre-printed ballot , electronic voters' register, strengthen the independent committee that supervise the elections and making it permanent, and even electronic voting. These steps would be gradual and would greatly help with representation on the long term by increasing transparency, lowering fraud and state interference in the elections. Some of the proposed steps might be refused by different leaders, but overall it is a good strategy to pursue on the long term.

4. More comprehensive steps

The next section offers more ambitious recommendations, which would certainly be faced by resistance if not outright refusal by some or even most leaders. However, they were included to show alternative methods to increase representation and strengthen stability.

One of the methods to increase representation in a power sharing system, with limited increase in immobility, is the division of power. This model was discussed at length in chapter 2, It involves the dilution of power and spreading it to different power

centers, rather than consolidating it in one or two centers.⁵⁰⁴ It involves devolution of power and responsibilities to different smaller and more local power centers, which reduce sectarian competition and increase opportunities for new entrants to politics. This model hold promise in the case of Lebanon, since it increases the number of power-centers, allowing more sects to be represented at the higher posts. For example, currently only Sunni, Shias and Maronites and Greek Orthodox have top tier representatives (Speaker, PM, and President, Deputy PM and Vice Speaker.) While others like the Druze or Armenians can only attain a ministerial position, even though the Druze form almost 6% of the population, with a similar percentage to the Armenians.⁵⁰⁵

Applying this model to Lebanon could take the form of a bicameral system. The Taef Accords laid a road map for that, stating that after the election of a non-sectarian chamber of deputies a Senate, representing the different sects, should be formed to exclusively deal with critical issues. Meanwhile, the lower chamber would focus on daily routine affairs of state. However, as it was previously discussed, these reform steps have been shelved since the Taef was first agreed upon, and expecting a change in this regard to apply seems farfetched. Thus, gradual and smaller steps in this regard, should be considered. For example, abolishing the multiplication of mandate by not allowing deputies to become ministers, which in turn increase the number of top tier public posts, opening up the political arena for new entrant, lowering competitivity, and diluting the power of these super-posts. Additionally, a devolution of power to

 $^{^{504}}$ See Chapter 2, section 2.3.3 of this thesis.

⁵⁰⁵ See Chapter 6, section 6.2.1 of this thesis.

additional political institution like local assemblies or even Mayors, could also be very beneficial.

D. Conclusion

There is no single remedy to solve Lebanon's instability. Even in western countries with entrenched democracies there is real resistance to reform, and in some countries like the US gerrymandering and archaic electoral system like the Electoral College for the presidential elections, are still alive and kicking. However, this thesis highlights the critical importance of representation and by consequences the importance of electoral and structural reforms that strengthen it.

Unfortunately, electoral reform in Lebanon has become a politicized issue, especially the electoral system and districting. Every political leader has set his sight on a specific proposal, which incidentally favors his own interests and negatively affect his opponents. Thus, the debate is deadlocked. However, the previous section has demonstrated the possibilities of circumventing the issue, by trying to achieve important reforms with different, gradual steps, that would not be faced with strong resistance.

Consequently, gradual changes and small measured steps are the only way forward in the case of Lebanon, among the conflicted forest of sectarian and personal interests. It is not a hopeless cause, it happened before in Lebanon's short history. The 1960 electoral law was at the time a breakthrough, significantly increasing representation and even when it was resurrected in 2009, it offered relief and a lowering of tensions that almost started a civil war in 2008. Additionally, the history of that electoral law taught us that politics are not frozen in time, and no matter how good a law is it must be dynamic and flexible enough to evolve and adapt.

One final note, during the research undertook for this thesis, I was able to observe and study many good ideas and serious efforts directed to electoral reform and ameliorating representation. Despite all impediments, and the ongoing polarization and immobility, the fact many electoral reforms were included in the 2009 electoral law, is a sure indicator that reform and an increase of representation is possible, and consequently the vision of a stable, prosperous, and peaceful Lebanese system is attainable.

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