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DEWEY'S CONCEPT OF GROWTH APPLIED TO
THE TEACHING OF ENGLISH LITERATURE
IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS

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ABSTRACT

Criticisms of Dewey often ignore the many sided continuums, interconnections and balances that he proposes. The holistic approach to Dewey is best made through his concept of growth. The thesis has outlined this concept for the purpose of application of Dewey to the learning process. This is done in six sections, namely, the description of the natural process of growth, growth as continuous reconstruction of experience, the social - individual continuum, intellectual growth through inquiry and the problem solving method, the esthetic experience as the model of educationally "sound" experiences, and moral growth as essentially growth in the critical capability.

The concept has then been applied to the aims of teaching literature at the secondary level, as formulated by the various official bodies.

The thesis shows that these aims have changed somewhat from the traditional aims of teaching literature, especially in their consideration of literature as "experience area" rather than a "content area". This is more true of the American statements rather than the British statements, which has led many Americans to question whether the

discipline of literature is not disintegrating in the consideration of literature as growth.

Dewey's concept of growth however, could provide an axis round which the study of literature could be built in secondary schools; for its position is intermediate between the traditional aims and what many modern prescribers of curricula are doing. This does not mean however, that Dewey has nothing original to say apart from occupying this middle position. His conception of experience is unique.

The second part of the thesis deals with the study of the aims of teaching literature in the light of Dewey's concept of growth.

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INTRODUCTION

Sydney Hook remarked about John Dewey's writings that they are more often referred to than read.¹ Particularly the criticism regarding Dewey's "anti-intellectualism" bears this out. "I would readily agree that Dewey's writings on education have encouraged the introduction of many valuable teaching methods in the school, but it is difficult to deny also that they are at least partly responsible for the disappearance of any coherent notion of content in American education...." The article further concludes that "... in a score of years, John Dewey may well be a fair way to joining Herbert Spencer on the shelf reserved for historical antiquities."²

Barton voices the same feelings when he asks whether Dewey's ideas can guide American education any more, adding however, that he is too important for American tradition to be by-passed completely. With some modifications he could still play a vital role.³

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1. OU-Tsuin Chen, "A re-evaluation of the Educational theory and Practice of John Dewey", "Educational Forum." Vol. XXV (March, 1961), p. 280.
 2. D. Holden, "John Dewey and his Aims of Education", Educational Forum, Vol. XVIII (Nov. 1953), p. 18.
 3. G.E. Barton, "John Dewey: Too Soon a Period Piece?", School Review, Vol. 67, (Summer 1959), pp. 129-130.

The "anti-intellectual" criticism usually centers round the following issues: (1) Dewey's advocacy of freedom, (2) his philosophy of adjustment, (3) the child centered school, (4) that education is life and not a preparation for it, and (5) his neglect of spiritual values.¹

Freedom that Dewey proposes is not a "do-as-you-please" freedom. "It is negatively freedom from physical stricture in the process of thinking and positively freedom of intelligence, of observation and of judgment exercised in behalf of purposes that are intrinsically worthwhile."²

Life adjustment is an important concept in Dewey's philosophy. "But his whole concept of the philosophy of experience forbids one to understand adjustment as accommodation, as his critics think he understood it. Even an inferior organism in interaction with environment never passively modifies himself and environment to say nothing of human beings."³

Although Dewey often asserts that education is life not a preparation for it, yet this is an overstatement. "What he meant was that since children live in the present and since their present life is worth living, education has to make the most of the present which has its own value."⁴

1. OU-Tsuin Chen, "A re-evaluation of the Educational theory and Practice of John Dewey," Educational Forum, Vol. XXV (March 1961), p. 280.

2. Ibid., p. 281.

3. Ibid., p. 282.

4. Ibid., p. 283.

But it is also full of possibilities for the future and when these are taken care of, the future will take care of itself. "Dewey did not object to preparing for the future; he objected to considering education as mere preparation for the future. He objected to the way we prepare and not preparation itself."¹

He becomes vulnerable to such charges because his system is fundamentally opposed to scholasticism or the Greek "intellectus". In his concept of experience, for example, doing is primary and knowing secondary. Thus knowing is "practical" . But Dewey's concept of the practical is different from the popular notion of that which has a strict function such as an umbrella for rain. Doing is primary because it comes before cognition.

Method of knowing is stressed more than the results of knowing or content, because the quality of content is determined by the method used to acquire it. This does not imply an absence of content.

The following is an example of humanistic criticism. Referring to John Dewey's philosophy of "barbarism", Douglas Bush says, "If that phrase seems unduly harsh, I may say that I have in mind Dewey's hostility to what he regarded as leisure-class studies; his anti-historical attitude, his desire - intensified in his followers - to immerse studies in

¹. Ibid., p. 283.

the contemporary and immediate; his denial of a hierarchy of studies, his doctrine that all kinds of experience are equally valuable ..."¹ Such a one-sided view is the result of overemphasis in a certain direction and disregard for the innumerable interconnections and balances within the numerous "continuums" that Dewey proposes. As Barton points out in reply to the above criticism "... of the two aspects of Dewey's 'experience' forget the longitudinal one called continuity, remember only the lateral one called interaction, and you end with Dewey's 'philosophy of barbarism' which wants to immerse students in the contemporary and the immediate. Again Dewey's continuity refers to the fact that any present experience is what it is by virtue of the way it is modified by the past and modifies the future. Ignore the reference to the future, and you may complain that progressivism is 'strong in believing that the present is important and real - weak in believing that the future is equally important and real'. But forget the reference to the past and you may start talking about Dewey's anti-historical attitude. Again Dewey's interaction between an individual and what in any situation constitutes his environment, remember only the individual and Dewey appears as an irresponsible radical teaching children that the world is their oyster. Remember only the environment, and Dewey is transmogrified into a stupid conservative bent on adjusting the young to the roles in which

1. L.D. Bush, "The Humanities", Educational Record. Vol. XXXVI., (Jan. 1955), p. 81.

they are cast by contemporary culture. Again Dewey treats education in terms of qualities of experience, which may range from educative to miseducative. Failing to notice this some assert that Dewey takes all experience to be educative..."¹

Thus Barton has shown that any consideration of Dewey as regards the learning situation, must make this holistic approach - an approach that would subsume the two "ends" of the innumerable continuums and the interconnections between these.

The writer believes that such a unified approach is possible and desirable through the consideration of Dewey's concept of growth - a concept central to his educational philosophy.

This is an attempt to investigate the nature of this concept, to establish as many relationships and coordinations as possible which lead to satisfaction of growth in Dewey. It is with a view to establishing a basis for an application of Dewey to learning process.

The writer also believes that such an application is possible to a subject - matter, popularly conceived of as beyond "pragmatic consideration", namely, the teaching of literature. In fact certain aspects of practice in the teaching of literature reflect the influence of Dewey's concept of growth.

¹. Barton, op. cit., pp. 129-130.

The study of literature in theory and in practice, seems to show a new trend. I.A. Richards has considered the problem of poetry in an age of science. In order to explain its uses he has separated the poetic use of language from the scientific use of it. Furthermore, he has constructed a "scientific" theory of value.¹ Max Eastman has gone even further and relegated literature in an age of science to the position of a tool of enjoyment. "Literature can offer ideas not for belief but for enjoyment."² It no longer affords the statement and discovery of "essential truths". Pointing out at the educational situation he says, "'left' wants literature to be made an object of investigation somewhat in the manner of ultra-violet ray, or fossils, or fish ... or anything else..." The members of the 'right' on the other hand, rigidly insist upon ... literature to continue a subject."³

He recommends however, that "... psychology itself is sufficiently specialized and divided up in its labors so that a whole branch of it is, or may well be, devoted to the understanding of the uses of language in literature."⁴

1. I.A. Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism, (International Library of Psychology, Philosophy & Scientific Method; Paul, 1938).

2. Max Eastman, The Literary Mind: Its Place in an Age of Science, (New York: C. Scribners & Sons), p. 247.

3. Ibid., p. 275.

4. Ibid., p. 291.

That method is gaining a new emphasis in the teaching of literature is clear from Henry's remark: "With the explosion of knowledge at hand, the liberal arts must ask where English belongs in the new attempts at the unity of knowledge.... The liberal arts must ask, too, how shall English fit into an increasingly non-religious, secular, non-Western world?. How English should relate itself to the reality that mathematical physics is unfolding. How English should be related to the bottom of the barrel in the social order. To frame such questions as these is the meaning of method. In this sense method is inseparable from liberal".¹

Russel recommends scientific investigation into the study of literature. "It is in this third area (the teaching and learning of literature) for which I am especially recommending the empirical 'scientific' methods of research ... They usually attempt to deal with observable language behavior in speaking, writing, spelling, appreciation of literature, and other phenomena."² (underlining mine).

Where practice is concerned there is a perceptible shift from literature being regarded as a "content area" to that of literature being treated as an "experience area".

¹. G.H. Henry, "Method: The New Home of the Liberal Spirit", English Education Today. (Selected addresses delivered at the conference on English Education, Indiana University, March 28-30, 1963), Ed. D.L. Burton, p. 23.

². D.H. Russel, "Research: A Priority", *Ibid.*, p. 31.

One official publication includes literature written specially for adolescents, in the scheme of studies at the secondary school level.¹

I.A. Gordon concludes, noting the indifference of so many students to literature that "what has been sorely lacking in all discussions on childrens' reading is an objective survey of the real taste of secondary school children at various ages, and at different types of secondary schools..."²

Certain catch-phrases reflect that Dewey's influence has not yet lost its hold on American education. "Growth leading to more growth" is the avowed intention of the year-book of the "National Society for Study of Education".³ The English Journal has an article entitled "Reading Literature as a Problem-Solving." "The fact that 'reading literature and problem-solving' do not ordinarily rub shoulders is I suppose, one more instance of the feud between the sciences and the humanities that so troubles us today ... Why not help the beginning reader acquire the problem-solving attitude as a conscious piece of intellectual equipment."⁴

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1. D.L. Burton & N. Larrick, "Development In and Through Reading", Sixty-Sixth Yearbook of the National Society for the study of Education, Part (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961) p. 197.
 2. I.A. Gordon, The Teaching of English, (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1947), p. 52.
 3. Ibid., 1.
 4. S. Chatman, "Reading Literature as Problem Solving", The English Journal, Vol. LII, (May 1963), p. 346.

Finally F.R. Leavis and L.C. Knights point out that the study of literature forks out into other fields and therefore, it should explore in directions other than literary too. "Political, economic history, social change, philosophical and scientific thought-determinants of the future into which we have entered - would be parts of an organic discipline essentially literary. The aim is to produce a mind that will approach the problems of modern civilization with an understanding of their origins, a maturity of outlook, and not a nostalgic addiction to the past..."¹

Considering the recent changes in the teaching of literature it no longer seems imperative to keep literature within the "traditional" bounds of a humanistic study. The thesis proposes to appraise the aims of teaching literature in the light of Dewey's concept of growth with this hypothesis in view that the teaching of literature as shown by policy statements of some official publications is closer to Dewey's views than popularly believed to be.

1. F.R. Leavis, Education and the University, A sketch for English Schools, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1943), p. 32.

CHAPTER I

DEWEY'S CONCEPT OF GROWTH

The Process of Growth: Its Description. The three fundamental assumptions of the instrumental philosophy - Darwinian evolution, the Democratic ideal, and the special character of science and technology - are basic to the understanding of Dewey's concept of growth. Evolution points out that growth is a natural connected process working itself out in an organism that faces the challenge of the precarious and changing world; Democracy has so far proved to be the only form of government that assures most growth for most human beings; the technological and scientific revolution promises a greater control over nature, reducing the precarious element and thus extending and deepening possibilities of growth.

Life is a history of innumerable growths and deaths. This is true not only of the natural processes, but also of social institutions. The individual, the social, the natural are all highly connected.

The two chief strains of thought in Dewey are thus the Darwinian - Genetic, concerned with the historical sense as to how things come to be, what we experience them to be, and the other the pragmatic instrumental, concerned with the

direction towards which things are tending, and what we can do to direct their course to ends that seem most desirable.

The Process of Growth:

"We intend taking evolution seriously"¹

Growth is a process of change in the course of an organism's interaction with its environment. Dewey accepts the implication of the theory of evolution that man is included in and continuous with the rest of nature, but different to the extent that he has learned to think in the course of successfully encountering the challenge of life.

Dewey explains this word "nature" at some length. It is connected etymologically with the root meaning "to grow". "Now growth is change, it is coming into being, alternating between the two extremes of birth and death. The adjective physical is in the sense of being marked by change. But we also speak of the nature of things, so nature in its most emphatic eulogistic sense consisted of unchanging substances within fixed essential characters or natures."²

1. Growth is continuous: The historic process from infancy to maturity exemplifies the meaning of continuity. In this process childhood is not to be regarded as a phase of getting ready for "the supreme dignity of adulthood," nor that adult life is merely an unrolling by way of mechanical effects of the "causal forces" found in childhood.

1. John Dewey, Experience & Nature, (Chicago - London: Opencourt Publishing Co. 1925), p. 15.

2. Ibid., p. 175.

fulfillments. If this were so it would be a case of ungrowth. Growth requires the condition of immaturity, which is thus a positive force, and it does not have to be educed or drawn out.

It is not difficult to see why Dewey's concept is opposed to the Actual - Potential, and the Infolded - Unfolding concepts. For the former, reality is basically absolute and unchanging. There is an ultimate end towards which all aspects of the universe strive. Everything is in the act of becoming, of trying for the sake of some outcome near or remote from the ultimate reality. Individual things must be understood in the context of the end they serve. Becoming presupposes something that does not become and is in a state of rest. "All processes are actuated by ends which are already implicit in them. And Faith points to an infinite Reality beyond this world, a being to whom no change can be attributed."¹ This state of affairs does not inhabit the evolutionary scheme of things.

"Giving definite expression to ideas and mental images, this rendering of the inner, outer, is the great Froebellian doctrine of creativeness. It is the practical application of the principle of self-activity together with

¹. L. Carrée, Nominalism and Realism, (London: Exford University Press, 1946), p. 72.

the doctrines of continuity and connectedness, which forms the heart of Froebel's system."¹

It is best to answer this in Dewey's own words. According to him this doctrine shows the "last infirmity of the mind in its transition from static to dynamic."² It is an externalized, goal bound concept of growth. For life is thought of as unfolding towards an external goal, and each stage is a mere preparation for the rest. Thus there is a break with evolutionary continuity.

The living organism secures continuity by the accumulated experience; accumulation is here meant as in each phase of the embryo: "Only that is carried on which is led up to, otherwise there is arrest and a break."³ Growth is defined as cumulative action towards a later result. But this result or end must again be seen relatively, instead of occupying a fixed point, it must be seen as recurrent.

2. Growth is Connected: Connectedness is an organized process mindful of the past and future. It is

1. E. Bowen, Froebel & Education through Self Activity. (New York: P. Scribners & Sons, 1903), p. 54.

2. John Dewey, Democracy & Education, (New York: MacMillan Paperbacks, 1961), p. 28.

3. Ibid., p. 57.

"... a moving stream, a constant change which nevertheless has axis and direction, linkages, associations as well as initiations, (for living is) ... an inclusive affair involving connection, inter-connection."¹ Time becomes the organized and the organizing medium of this activity. Time as organization in change is growth, and growth signifies that a varied series of change enters upon intervals of pause and rest, of completions that become initial points of new processes of development.

This process of serial connection of operations to bring about a close is intermediate and instrumental. The "causal" linkages between any two events are not final or logically complete. They only establish a temporary unique continuous history.

Connection is vital to the concept of growth and runs throughout nature from the highest to the lowest. Besides, the connection is not only between parts of each organism but also between various organism. Therefore in man, "there is no intrinsic psychological division between the intellectual and the sensory aspects, the emotional and the ideational, the imaginative and the practical."²

1. Ibid., p. 282.

2. John Dewey, Art as Experience, (New York: Minton, Balch & Co., 1934), p. 248.

The more inter-connections an organism forms, the more it grows. However, connection is not automatic, and there are degrees of connectedness, hence of growth. "There is no isolated occurrence in nature yet inter-connections and connections are not wholesale, homogeneous. Interconnecting events have tighter and looser ties which qualify them with certain beginnings and endings and which mark them off from other fields of interaction."¹

This continued connectedness is dynamic. By dynamic Dewey does not mean as possessing force, but change in a connected series of events. Every end is both static and dynamic. The concluding term conserves within it the meaning of the entire process and leads into another.

Organic life is a process of activity. The word life is not a generalized static word but denotes a function, a comprehensive activity in which organism and environment interact. The kind of interaction determines the kind of growth. So the organism is not just a structure but a characteristic way of interaction.

As organisms become more complex in structure and thus related to a more complex environment, particular acts may become more difficult and imperative. A critical juncture may be reached where a right or wrong choice could mean life or death.

¹. John Dewey, Democracy & Education. (New York:MacMillan Paperbacks, 1961), p. 51

Every need denotes absence of adequate adjustment with surroundings. "Life itself consists of phases in which the organism falls out of unison with it (environment) either through effort or by some happy chance. And in a growing life the recovery is never mere return to a prior state for it is enriched by the state of disparity and resistance through which it has successfully passed. If the gap between organism and environment is too wide, the creature dies. If its activity is not enhanced by the temporary alienation, it merely subsists. Life grows when a temporary falling out is a transition to a more extensive balance of the energies of the organism with those of the conditions under which it lives."¹

Life involves expenditure of energy and the energy expended can be replenished only as the activities performed succeed in making return draft upon the environment. The energy that is drawn in is not forced from without. It is a consequence of energy expended. If there is a surplus balance, growth occurs. If there is a deficit, degeneration commences. The organism therefore, grows by turning the environment to advantage.

In environment, physical conditions are enmeshed in cultural conditions. Environment is not something external

¹. John Dewey, Art as Experience, (New York: Minton, Balch & Co., 1934), p. 14.

to human activities. It is their medium. "Narrowing of the medium is the direct source of all unnecessary impoverishments in human living."

As organisms become differentiated in structure or become more complex, the environment expands. Things previously indifferent, enter into the life functions.

As interactions become differentiated, the need for maintaining a balance among them increases. In other words, the need for a unified environment. As long as life continues normally conditions are maintained so as to make later interactions possible. "The processes, in other words, are self-maintaining in a sense in which they are not in the case of the interactions of non-living things."¹

To the degree that an organism maintains a balance between doing and undergoing, between itself and the environment, it grows. What is the point of most significant growth? "Significant stages in growth are found not in excess of attainment but in those crises in which a seeming fixity of habits gives way to a release of capacities that have not previously functioned in times that is, of readjustment and redirection."²

1. John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, (London: Capricorn Books, J. Putnam & Co., 1963), p. 225

2. John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, (New York: The Modern Library, 1930), p. 81.

The point of greatest immediate need defines the height of consciousness. This is the point when greatest redirection, readaptation and reorganization occurs. In man it results in greater control over environment and the ability to foresee consequences. The greater the challenge the greater the response, and the more significant is the quality of growth. In settled and closed conditions growth is hampered.

It is important that adjustment be understood in its active sense of control of means for achieving ends. This is to see important links and use them as functionally significant in a process. All control depends on conscious perception of relations between things. And this is achieved through method. "Ultimately method is intelligence and intelligence, method."¹

1. J.L. Childs, Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism, (New York - London: J. Appleton - Century - Crofts Inc., 1931), p. 61.

Growth: The Continuous Reconstruction of Experience.

"Every experience should do something to prepare a person for later experiences of a deeper and more expansive quality. That is the very meaning of growth, continuity and reconstruction of experience."¹

As interaction is continuous so is experience and its reconstruction. That is not to say that every daily happening is an experience. For many a time life is inchoate. "Things are experienced but not in such a way that they are composed into an experience. There is distraction and dispersion; what we observe and what we think, what we desire and what we get, are at odds with each other."² In contrast there are experiences that run their course, are well defined and limited in the sense of having clear demarcations, within the general stream of experience. "A piece of work is finished in a way that is satisfactory; a problem receives its solution, a situation ... is so rounded out that its close is a consummation and not a cessation. Such an experience is a whole and carries with it its own individualizing quality and self sufficiency. It is an experience."³

1. John Dewey, Experience and Education, (New York: MacMillan & Co., 1938), p. 47.

2. John Dewey, Art as Experience, (New York: Minton, Balch & Co., 1934), p. 35.

3. Ibid.,

Significant achievement in growth depends on such experiences.

Although complete by itself experience moves easily into successive experiences and thus is established a continuous flow. At each significant stage occurs the reconstruction of what went before and a projection into the future. The unity of experience forms its quality. The reconstruction is the result of reflection which makes experience integrate with what went before and the significance that it might have for the future. Therefore, experience and the reflection that it generates form the basis of growth.

It must be noticed that two kinds of experiences have been omitted as to their relevance here. The above discussion considers only the instrumental knowledge experience, this is not to say that other forms of experience, immediate and final, are not recognized. In fact life is full of them, but they do not constitute what Dewey refers to as an experience.

The other kind is what is called an Absolute Experience which asserts that it is the only real kind of experience. This is an instance of unnecessary dissection, and dualism, while the other defines the contingent and the finite. Whereas in nature there is always the blend of the two. "The content as well as the form of ultimate, Absolute Experience are derived from and based upon the features of actual experience; ..."¹

1. John Dewey, Experience and Nature, (Chicago - London: Opencourt Publishing Co., 1925), p. 61.

1. Experience is in Nature: Experience is of and within nature. For there is a continuous link between experienced objects and experiencing organism. "Nature and experience are not alien. Experience is not a veil that shuts man off from nature, it is a means of penetrating continually further into the heart of nature."¹ To construct a dualism between experience and nature is to recognize an impasse in life, of inability to make transition from natural power to its regulation and understanding, when the need to transcend it, instead of integrating it would not arise at all. "Only when obstacles are treated as challenges to remaking of personal desire and thought, so that the latter integrate with the movement of nature and by participation direct its consequences, are opposition and duality rightly understood."²

2. Experience is Organized: But that does not make it outside of nature. Organization is evident throughout nature. The interaction of parts of plants is an instance of nature's organization. They utilize and conserve consequences of past activities so as to be able to adapt to subsequent changes. This organization does not point at an original organizing force outside nature.

3. Experience has a biological, temporal, and cultural continuum: This continuity is the essence of

1. Ibid., p. 3.

2. Ibid., p. 242.

experience. For there are no isolated objects in actual experience. An object of event is always a special part, phase or aspect of an experienced world. No act stands out in isolation.

4. Experience is Determined by the Proportion of Doing to Undergoing: Struggle and conflict although often painful are enjoyed because they are a means to further development. There is then an element of suffering in undergoing. "Otherwise there would be no 'taking in' of what preceded. 'For 'taking in' in any vital experience is somewhat more than placing something on top of consciousness, over what was previously known. It involves reconstruction which may be painful."¹

When the relationship between doing and undergoing is not perceived, experience is limited. Excesses on either side make a difference to the quality of experience. "Unbalance on either side (doing or receptivity) blurs the perception of relations and leaves the experience partially distorted with scant or false meaning."² "Lust for doing" leaves an experience of extreme paucity. It becomes miscellaneous and dispersed as it is not given time and thought to mature. The opposite is when receptivity is prized above

1. John Dewey, Art as Experience, (New York: Minton, Balch & Co., 1934), p. 41.

2. Ibid., p. 252.

perception of the meaning of experience. A meaningful experience is interaction, that is it assigns equal rights to both factors of experience - objective and internal conditions. "Because every experience is constituted by interaction between 'subject' and 'object', between a self and its world, it is not itself either merely physical or merely mental no matter how much one factor or the other predominates."¹

5. The 'Close' or 'End': Every integral experience moves towards a close or end. It comes to a stop when energies inherent in it have worked themselves out. "This closure or a circuit is the very opposite of arrest of stasis. Maturation and fixation are polar opposites."² An end is an anticipated terminal outcome and becomes an end-in-view, a purpose, a prediction, in other words a plan to shape the future. All ends are to be taken in this sense, of a temporary close.

The close which completes a total experience is the institution of a felt harmony. Every vital and continuous experience must reach such a close.

6. An Integral Experience takes time to Complete: it has form and is a dynamic organization. "There is inception, development, fulfilment. Material is ingested through interaction with that vital organization of the results of the prior experience that constitutes the mind of the worker.

1. Ibid., p. 246.

2. Ibid., p. 41.

This also makes clear why experience as instantaneous occurrence is an impossibility; for it is the product of continuous and cumulative interaction. By this arduous method, common experience is capable of "developing from within itself methods which will secure direction for itself and will create inherent standards of judgment and value."¹ This is literally growth in experience.

7. Experience is not primarily cognitive: It is an active-passive affair, and is best understood by the term "experiment". "When we experience something we act upon it, we do something with it; then we suffer and undergo the consequences. We do something to the thing and it does something to us in return: such is the peculiar combination. Experience as trying involves change, but change is meaningless transition unless it is consciously connected with the return wave of consequences that flow from it."² Thus doing is primary and knowing secondary.

But action is not for its own sake. It is to contribute to the scope of conscious field. It must be moderated for the sake of learning.

1. Dewey, op. cit., p. 38.

2. Dewey, op. cit., p. 139.

Consciousness or perception involves a continuum of meaning in the process of formation. Perception is more than recognition. Receptivity (not passivity) is a process which consists of a series of responsive acts which accumulate and move to a fulfilment. Mere recognition does not involve any commotion in the organism, "but an act of perception proceeds by waves that extend serially throughout the entire organism ... the perceived object or scene is emotionally pervaded."¹ The self is contained in a perception rather than a perception being presented to the self.

It is the process of knowing or experiencing rather than the product, which is important. Then the problem of knowledge means the art of guiding it most effectively in the experimental process. This is where reflection comes in. It is utilized for tentative solutions of problems and not for the attainment of fixed ends. From this common experience techniques involved in making adjustment are discovered and become capable of extension to cases where fancy prevailed previously. "A larger and larger field of ideas becomes susceptible of analytic objective reference, with the promise of approximate validity. The secret of this technique lies in control of the ways in which the organism participates in

1. John Dewey, Art as Experience, (New York: Minton, Balch & Co., 1934), p. 53.

the course of events."¹ Thus knowledge issuing from reflection is experimental in the literal sense of the world.

8. Experience is in Communication: "Failure to acknowledge the presence and operation of natural interaction in the form of communication creates the gulf between existence and essence."² Communication involves the reconsidering and revision of natural events and objects. It extends and deepens the meaning of life. For it is through conversation that we identify ourselves dramatically with acts and deeds under pressure and opportunity of social cooperation.

Communication is both consummatory and instrumental.³ It is enjoyed for its own sake and is also a means to establishing cooperation and order.

The human contribution is the determining factor in an experience. Personality or selfhood are functions that emerge with complexly organized interactions. The individual possessed of some unity participates in the genesis of every experienced situation. He makes a difference to the quality of the thing experienced. His emotions might give their own colour and selectivity to it. Then they act as a cementing force. Hence emotion which is personal will make an experience personal to that degree.

1. John Dewey, Experience and Nature, (Chicago - London: Opencourt Publishing Co., 1925), p. 347.

2. Ibid., p. 67

3. Note: Further discussion on p. 79

What kind of experiences are educationally sound? Dewey has a long passage to explain this. "The belief that all genuine education comes about through experiences does not mean that all experiences are genuinely or equally educative. Experience and education can not be directly equal to each other. For some experiences are mis-educative. Any experience is mis-educative that has the effect of arresting or distorting the growth of further experience. An experience may be such as to engender callousness, it may produce lack of sensitivity and of responsiveness. Then the possibilities of having richer experience in the future are restricted. Again a given experience may increase a person's automatic skill in a particular direction and yet tend to land him in a groove or rut; the effect again is to narrow the field of further experience".¹

Does it follow from Dewey's conception of education as experience that it is incompatible with organized subject-matter? Dewey again explains his stand. "I have often been forced to speak in general and often abstract language. But what has been said is organically connected with the requirement that experiences in order to be educative must lead out into an expanding world of subject-matter of facts or information and of ideas. This condition is satisfied only as the educator views teaching and learning as a continuous

1. Dewey, Experience & Education, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

process of reconstruction of experience"¹. As Dewey explains the principle of continuity of educative experience requires that equal taught and attention should be given to the solution of this educational problem as that given to securing educationally sound experiences.

1. Ibid., p. 111.

Human Growth is Social:

"The essential purpose is to grow and take shape through the process of social intelligence."¹

1. The Social - Individual Continuum: The union of the discrete or individual with the continuous or the relational is a characteristic of nature. Dewey sees growth as an individual-social process of continuous reconstruction of experience. The reconstruction takes place within the social context. The life of the individual contains these influences is conditioned by them and through the gaining of knowledge changes them. This is a creative process and can be carried on by a mind that has learned to pose questions and inquire into all of the varied aspects of its experience. Therefore there is no basic antagonism between the individual and society, although there may be individuals at variance with certain forms of a social set-up. "Man is born free and is everywhere held in chains by society," does not pose itself as a problem for Dewey. "To talk about priority of society to the individual is to indulge in nonsensical metaphysics,"² or of the individual to society one might add.

1. John Dewey, Experience and Education, (New York: MacMillan & Co., 1938), p. 85.

2. John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, op. cit., p. 62.

An individual's desires take shape under the influence of the human environment. The material of his thought and belief come to him from others with whom he lives. The growth of individuality, therefore, takes place through social organization. "The history of setting free individual power in desire, thought, and initiative is upon the whole the history of the formation of more extensive and complex social organization."¹ Social life liberates and directs individual energies otherwise torpid and latent and also exacts that they be used in ways consistent with its interests. Without this congruency of action on the part of individual components an extensive and a complex society would dissolve. "The world of action is a world of which the individual is one limit and humanity the other."² Cooperation brings in a fuller life and greater freedom of thought and action for the individual. As he participates in the existent systems of conduct, appreciates their worth and realizes their possibility, he achieves for himself a controlled, orderly body of mental and physical habits. He grows.

Apart from the social medium the individual can not know himself. "He would never become acquainted with his own needs and capacities ... the wider and richer the social relationships into which an individual enters the more fully are his powers evoked and the more fully is he brought to

1. J. Dewey & J.H. Tufts, Ethics, (Revised Ed.; New York: Henry Hold & Co., 1932), p. 428.

2. Ibid., p. 430.

recognize the possibilities latent in them."¹ The existing social conditions, encourage and select certain tendencies at the expense of others. The individual learns to discriminate. "Even habits of personal criticism, of private projection of a better order which are pointed out as proofs of the purely 'inner' nature of morality are the results of a complex social order."²

The higher forms of curiosity are aroused under social stimuli. This is in the process of achieving greater control and direction over environmental factors. Thus freedom is not some abstraction with which an individual is born. It is achieved.

2. Growth in Communication: Man is naturally a being who lives in association, in communities with others, possessing a language and therefore enjoying a transmitted culture. This culture "is the product not of efforts of men put forth in the void or just upon themselves, but of prolonged and cumulative interaction with environment."³ Through language, communication, the consequences of experience of one form of life are integrated in the behavior of others. Where human beings are concerned not only their

1. Ibid., p. 433.

2. Ibid., p. 434.

3. John Dewey, Art as Experience. (New York: Minton, Balch & Co., 1934), p. 28.

own distant world of time and space is involved in their conduct, but also the world of their fellows. The possibilities of integration or growth are infinitely widened through recorded speech. "When consequences which are unexperienced and future to one agent are experienced and past to another creature with which it is in communication, organic prudence becomes conscious expectation and future affairs, living present realities."¹ When habit forming is not continuously renewed and informed in communication it wears grooves establishing a monotonous regularity, not conducive to growth.

In a genuine community all are cognizant of the common end and all interested in it and regulate their specific activities in view of it. "This would involve communication. Each would have to know what the other was about and would have to have some way of keeping the other informed as to his own purpose and progress."²

But this is an ideal condition and we have to face the fact that even within the most social group there are many relations which are not as yet social. People use each other without reference to consent or emotional and intellectual dispositions of each other. The crucial point is

1. John Dewey, Experience and Nature, (Chicago - London: Opencourt Publishing Co., 1925), p. 274.

2. John Dewey, Democracy and Education, (New York: MacMillan Paperbacks, 1961), p. 5.

the degree of sharing of purposes, a communication of interests.

The connection and modification of behavior of each being is the result of interaction, and interaction and communication form the basis of Dewey's whole interpretation of social experience. "But it is decidedly not an interaction between pre-existing individuals and some artificial creature like the state and society. The state ... comes into being as an administrator of this very interaction."¹

What is the nature of individuality and the nature of society for interaction depends on that. Society does not stand above the individuals. It is "one word but infinitely many things. It covers all the ways in which by associating together men share their experiences and build up common interests ... Society is the process of associating in such ways that experiences, emotions, values are transmitted and made common."² There is no clash between individual in the abstract and society in the abstract. For society has laid its fingers on everything that is human. Society is in fact individuals in their relations to each other. Their interaction determines the meaning of both individual and society.

1. Philosophy of John Dewey, Ed. P.A. Schlipp. (2nd. ed.; The Library of Living Philosophers; New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1939), p. 347.

2. John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1948), p. 36.

3. Sharing is Vital to Interaction: This is grounded in human nature itself. The satisfaction that is derived from sharing in activities increases in direct ratio to the scope of the constructive work engaged in. In a shared activity individuals become cooperative or interacting parts. Dewey has an illustration to explain what he means by "shared activities". A horse does not share in the social activity to which he is put. It is used to secure a result in which he has no vital interest apart from being rewarded for the work. He is then not a partner in a shared activity and has no interest in its accomplishment. "In many cases activity of immature human beings is simply placed upon to secure habits which are useful."¹ To the degree that human beings identify themselves emotionally and intellectually, understanding the ends, and the means utilized to accomplish these ends, they are mature.

In machine technology and mass production, sharing assumes a new significance. It has given us a new corporate age in which collective scheme of interdependence assumes great importance.

Commenting on the series of articles "Individualism Old and New," Naumburg, says, "For Dr. Dewey, individualism can never be that condition of matured and separate growth still discoverable in the old culture of Europe; nor can

¹. John Dewey, Democracy and Education, (New York: MacMillan Paperbacks, 1961), p. 14.

it apparently be expressed for him in the germinating strength of those who spend their lives in such seclusions as brings forth art and science for the benefit of society as well as of themselves. For to him the individualism of the past is inevitably tied to the laissez-faire economics of big business; and this he dismisses briefly as unproductive to the group of our future social order. The new individualism as he foresees it is something quite different. 'Assured and integrated individuality' he says, is the product of social relationships and publicly acknowledged functions."¹

Defending Dewey, Childs says that individualism requires fresh consideration.² It is useless to long for a return to a simple life. Unless individuality is interwoven in the new scheme of things, it will not be integral with the deeper social tendencies. Dewey champions socialization but not for its own sake. It is advocated to the degree that it makes the release of a finer individuality possible. "A new culture expressing the possibilities immanent in a machine and material civilization will release whatever is distinctive and potentially creative in individuals and individuals thus freed will be the constant makers of a continuously new society."³

1. Quoted in J.L. Childs, Education & the Philosophy of Experimentalism, (New York - London: J. Appleton - Century Crofts Inc., 1931), p. 235.

2. Ibid., p. 246.

3. J. Dewey, Freedom & Culture, (New York: G. Putnam & Sons, 1939), p. 59

The word "adjustment" is often misused by Dewey's critics. It is to be understood as a two way process. Individual is not merely fashioned by the so called "external" social influences. He is, continuous with these social influences, is at the center making his preferences in his own unique manner of interacting, and by participation shapes the social influences. It is thus reciprocal modification.

Individuality is dynamic. Not setting any fixed goals and ideals, the way is left open for indefinite individual variation and growth. "Of course if experimentalism be interpreted to mean that no long range hypotheses can be evolved, then it would indeed be a philosophy at the mercy of the forces dominant in the immediate situation. As such it would be unfavorable to the growth of finer individuality. But it would seem that an experience philosophy is under the inescapable obligation of accepting into its scheme of things anything that experience shows to be possible and desirable. Now experience does reveal connections and tendencies consequently by its own inherent nature it makes possible the formulation of forward reaching directive principles."¹

4. The Democratic Ideal: It is the best form of social organization so far because it assures the freest exchange of experience. When this free mode of interchange

¹. J.L. Childs, Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism, (New York - London: J. Appleton - Century - Crofts Inc., 1931), p. 246.

is arrested each individual loses in meaning. The result is a separation into a privileged and a subject class. "The evils thereby affecting the superior class are less material and less perceptible, but equally real. Their culture tends to be sterile, to be turned back to feed on itself; their art becomes a showy display and artificial, their wealth luxurious their knowledge overspecialized, their manners fastidious rather than humane."¹ Intellectual stimulation is unbalanced as it is static. Diversity of stimulation means novelty and novelty means challenge to thought. There are two elements here which points to democracy as an ideal. For Dewey it is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living. Then there is freer interaction between social groups which brings about change in social habit, its continuous readjustment through meeting the new situations produced by varied intercourse.

The ideal of shared common interests is not confined to national boundaries. "The secondary and provisional character of national sovereignty in respect to the fuller, freer and more fruitful association and intercourse of all human beings with one another must be instilled ..."²

1. John Dewey, Democracy & Education. (New York:MacMillan Paperbacks, 1961), p. 85.

2. Ibid., p. 98.

One is bound to come to this conclusion, Dewey says, if we regard education as a freeing of individual capacity in a progressive growth directed to social aims.

5. Implications for Education: J.L. Childs enumerates five educational derivatives from the Democratic ideal: (1) It is an attempt to embody in social relationships the principle which regards each individual as possessing intrinsic worth or dignity, so the child's present experiences, felt needs should be employed to determine educational program, (2) Democracy implies a society in which individuals enjoy the status of ends, and institutions are means. Society has no good beyond the good of its members. This implies genuine educational opportunity for all, (3) As each individual is to be treated as an end, it means that each should be so educated as himself to be the judge of values, (4) Respect for individuals implies prizing of individual differences. A Democratic society will encourage a healthy diversity, restrictions being placed only when coordination is sought, (5) It places emphasis on the importance of method. Adjustments of the diverse groups (since force is not to be used) must be through discussions, conferences, etc. The school should be organized in such a way as to give actual experience in this.¹

¹ J.L. Childs, "Educational Philosophy of Dewey," Philosophy of John Dewey, Ed. P.A. Schlipp. (2nd. ed., The Library of Living Philosophers; New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1939), pp. 440-443.

"Development of experience comes about through interaction means that education is essentially a social process. This quality is realized in the degree in which individuals form a community group."¹ The community, although based on natural sociability, does not organize itself spontaneously. It requires thought and planning ahead. Hence "socialized education."

This planning is to be of the sort that would be "flexible enough to permit free play for individuality of experience and yet firm enough to give direction towards continuous development of power."²

Referring to free - play, how "free" is the individual child to be in a "socialized" education? Dewey has something to say to that. "The amount of external freedom which is needed varies from individual to individual. It naturally tends to decrease with increasing maturity, though its complete absence prevents even a mature individual from having the contacts which will provide him with new materials upon which his intelligence may exercise itself. The amount and quality of this kind of free activity as a means of growth is a problem that must engage the thought of the educator at every stage of development."³

As education is a means to social continuity, by renewing of the social group, it means that it exists

1. Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, op. cit., p. 65.

2. Dewey, Experience and Education, op. cit., p. 73.

3. Ibid.

through a process of transmission, "as much as biological life". The renewal of the social fabric is achieved through transmission (communication) and reconstruction. The two intervening produces a dynamic society. The problem of education is how to transform the quality of experience till it "partakes in the interests, purposes and ideas" current in the social group.

Such a transformation occurring in our machine age with its material possibilities will Dewey feels, "release whatever is distinctive and potentially creative in individuals and individuals thus freed will be the constant makers of a continuously new society."¹

Transmission is vital, but it is not to be wholesale transmission or an uncritical one. Man would be the poorer for it, was it not for the process of transmission of experience, its preservation and communication through language. "Growth is achieved through the interaction of the native impulse and tendencies of the child with the customs and traditions of the group. Where society as well as the child are flexible, both should gain new meanings out of the interaction, customs and institutions are to be continuously evaluated in terms of their educational effect."² Criticism of established modes and their revitalization carried on

1. John Dewey, Individualism Old and New. (New York: Minton Balch & Co., 1930), p. 57.

2. J.L. Childs, Education & the Philosophy of Experimentalism, op. cit., p. 231.

continuously is the very essence of experimental education. The problem is "to extract the desirable traits of forms of community life which actually exist and employ them to criticize undesirable features and suggest improvements."¹ Commenting on this instrumental character of education, Geiger says that the developing and socializing of human capacities "... goes beyond simply the acquiring of intellectual graces, it is certainly not confined to formal training and the school. Human capacities differ in quality and quantity but each individual ... must be given full opportunity to exploit himself and his environment so that he actually does grow."²

In concrete, what does the foregoing argument imply for education? In the first place education should set up conditions which "stimulate certain visible and tangible ways of acting." "Making the individual a sharer, or partner in the associated activity so that he feels its success as his success, its failure as his failure is the completing step. As soon as he is possessed by the emotional attitude of the group, he will be alert to recognize the special ends at which it aims and the means employed to secure its success. His beliefs and ideas will take a form similar to those of others in the group. He will also achieve pretty much the

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1. Dewey, Democracy & Education, op. cit., p. 83.
 2. J.L. Childs, Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism, op. cit., p. 173.

same stock of knowledge since that knowledge is an ingredient of his habitual pursuits."¹

The socialization of education would also mean providing richer human contacts. "The child must be brought into contact with more grown people and with more children in order that there may be the freest and richest social life."²

The primary object of education is not how much history, geography or literature the child should learn. "The growth of the child in the direction of social capacity and service with larger and more vital union with life, becomes the unifying aim and discipline, culture and information fall into place as phases of this growth."³

Education must take into consideration the native activities of the child and guide them in such a way that maturity is achieved. "His impulses (babies) are merely starting points for assimilation of the knowledge and skill of the more matured beings upon whom he depends. They are tentacles sent out together that nutrition from customs which will in time render the infant capable of independent action. They are energies for transfer of existing social power into personal ability; they are means of reconstructive growth.

1. Dewey, Democracy & Education, op. cit., p. 14.

2. John Dewey, School & Society, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1911), p. 53.

3. Ibid., p. 107.

Abandon an impossible individualistic psychology and we arrive at the fact that native activities are organs of re-organization and readjustment."¹

Flexibility in organization of education is the key word so that the two extremes of undirected instincts and overorganized customs are avoided.

¹. Dewey, Human Nature & Conduct, op. cit., p. 102.

Intellectual Development:

"We do not 'stop and think' unless there is interference."¹

Dewey seriously and consistently embedded his thought in a social and biological matrix. He stressed the development of intelligence to effect a continuous reconstruction of experience in the direction of continuous growth, both of the individual and of society. Reconstruction of experience means training in reflective thought.

1. Thinking is continuous with other natural processes: Instrumentalism sees the thinking man within nature. For mind is not an "intruder from without" but the result of successive and successful adjustment of the organism - environment complex. "Since both the inanimate and the human environment are involved in the function of life, it is inevitable if these functions evolve to the point of thinking and if thinking is naturally serial with biological functions that it will have as the material of thought, even if it is erratic imaginings the events and connections of this environment."² Two views regarding the nature of intelligence are discounted. One holding that natural development is not continuous with intellectual development

1. Dewey, Experience and Nature, op. cit., p. 314.

2. Ibid., p. 279.

indeed the latter as distinguishing man from animal is over and above it; the other holding that intelligent behavior does not have any differential features from organic behavior. The instrumental position is that organic responses have a mental quality in the degree to which they deal with the uncertain. It thus recognizes continuity and difference. "It can in principle if not as yet in detail give a genetic account of the development of mental and intellectual processes. There is neither a sudden jump from the merely organic to the intellectual, nor is there complete assimilation of the latter to primitive modes of the former."¹

A complex organism like man is a response to a complex environment. Each act of his goes to the establishment of conditions favorable to subsequent acts to maintain the continuity of the life processes which become more and more difficult, and uncertain as to the right kind of action increases. "Behavior is thus compelled to become more hesitant and varied, more expectant and preparatory. In the degree that responses take place to the doubtful as the doubtful, they acquire mental quality. If they are such as to have a directed tendency to change the precarious and problematic into the secure and resolved, they are intellectual as well as mental."² This is the situation in which learning takes place.

1. John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, (London: Capricorn Books, J. Putnam & Co., 1963) p. 231.

2. Ibid., p. 225.

Life-activity involves the expenditure of organic-environmental energies to result in the modification of both. Learning and discovery is within the problem solving situation. "Inquiry in settling the disturbed relations of organism - environment (which defines doubt) does not merely remove doubt by recurrence to a prior adaptative integration. It institutes new environing conditions that occasion new problems."¹

How things grow and develop is not to be studied with reference to prior conceptual constructions, but by what actually takes place. For "if one denies the supernatural then one has the intellectual responsibility of indicating how the logical may be connected with the biological in a process of continuous development."²

Contemplation is not the function and rationality not the ideal of intellectual development, the ideal held from the time of Aristotle. Hutchins is in this tradition when he asks, "Is it too much to say that if we can teach our students to lead the life of reason we shall do all that can be done for the whole man? The task of education is to make

1. John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1938.), p. 35.

2. Ibid., p. 26.

rational animals more perfectly rational."¹ The "inherently rational" theory entails that reason in man is an outside spectator of an already complete rationality. "It deprived reason in man of an active and creative office."² Whereas the intelligent act is only nature realizing its own potentialities. "Intelligence within nature means liberation and expansion as reason outside of nature means fixation and restriction."³

The new logic, as opposed to the old, is a logic of experience. It is "an account of the sequence of the various typical functions or situations of experience in their determining relations to one another. (It) ... makes no pretense to be an account of a closed and finished universe. Its business is not to secure or guarantee any particular reality or value. Per contra, it gets the significance of a method,"⁴ for it has to judge the right relationships and adjustments of the various phases of experience. Reflection as considered by a naturalistic metaphysics is therefore only a naturalistic event.

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1. R.M. Hutchins, Great Books of the Western World, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 37.
 2. Dewey, Quest for Certainty, op. cit., p. 211.
 3. Ibid.
 4. John Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1953), p. 98.

When organic behavior is transformed to intellectual behavior with its marked properties of the logical, it is because the individuals live in a cultural environment. "Such living compels them to assume in their behavior the stand point of customs, beliefs, institutions, meanings and projects which are at least relatively general and objective."¹ Occupying a significant function in the cultural complex, language becomes an institution among other institutions. It is (1) the agency by which other institutions and acquired habits are transmitted, and, (2) it permeates both the forms and the contents of all other cultural activities. Moreover (3) it has its own distinctive structure which is capable of abstraction as a form.² As a medium of communication it integrates consequences of experience of one life with the behavior of others. "With the development of recorded speech, the possibilities of this integration are indefinitely widened."³

To sum up, "Dewey is empiricist and naturalist to the extent that he recognizes the derivative role of thought, the dependence of thought upon a non-logical subject-matter; the subject matter of ordinary experience continuous within nature.

1. Dewey, Logic, op. cit., p.45.

2. Ibid.

3. Dewey, Experience & Nature, op. cit., p. 280.

He is rationalist in recognizing the paramount role of intelligence in the conduct of life."¹

To consider intellectual development one must consider Dewey's epistemology.

2. The Act of Knowing: Knowing is an active process and not the result of passive assimilation. There is no perception without experience, without that is, "conjoint trying and undergoing". "It is assumed that mind can grasp them (objects) if it will only give attention and that this attention may be given at will irrespective of the situation. Hence the deluge of half observations, of verbal ideas and unassimilated 'knowledge', which afflicts the world."² The act of knowing is highly complex and is best effected by analysis into a number of distinct processes which bear serial relations to one another. To know, is to perceive connections to form judgments.

It is supposed that judgments come after perceptions, in order to compare them. "It is alleged that the mind perceives things apart from relations; that it forms ideas of them in isolation from their connections - with what goes before and comes after. Then judgment or thought is called

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Philosophy of John Dewey, Ed. P.A. Schlipp, (2nd ed., The Library of Living Philosophers; New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1939), p. 109.

2.

Dewey, Democracy & Education, op. cit., p. 144.

upon to combine the separated items of 'knowledge' so that their resemblance or causal connection shall be brought out. As a matter of fact, every perception and every idea is a sense of the bearings, use and cause of a thing."¹ Discernment of relations is the genuinely intellectual matter. An extensive quotation from Democracy and Education will illustrate this further. "A wagon is not perceived when all its parts are summed up; it is the characteristic connection of the parts which makes it a wagon. And these connections are not those of mere physical juxtaposition; they involve connection with the animals that draw it, the things that are carried on it, and so on."² Therefore thought is the discernment of relations between what we try to do and what happens in consequence.

No experience having any meaning is possible without some element of thought in it. There are however two types of experiences according to the amount or proportion of thought found in them. All experiences have a phase of what is called "trial and error". Some experiences have little more than this. Act and consequence are connected up but we do not know how. "We do not see the details of the connection; the links are missing, our discernment is very gross. In other cases we push one observation further. We analyze

1. Dewey, Democracy & Education, op. cit., p. 144.

2. Ibid., p. 143.

to see just what lies between so as to bind together cause and effect, activity and consequence. This extension of our insight makes foresight more accurate and comprehensive."¹

Now these connections are made with a view to the reconstruction of experience. The starting point of knowing are the natural impulses and desires. But there is no growth in knowledge unless these are organized and reconstructed continuously. "Speaking then from the stand point of temporal order we find reflection or thought, occupying an intermediate and reconstructive position. It comes between a temporally prior situation (an organized interaction of factors) of active and appreciative experience wherein some of the factors have been discordant and incompatible and a later situation, which has been constituted out of the first situation by means of acting upon the findings of reflective inquiry."²

The knowledge object is defined in terms of the use to which it is put. We cannot "know" a chair by enumerating its various parts and qualities. It is by connecting these up with a view to see what use it is put to, the purpose which makes it a chair, that we come to "know" it.

1. Dewey, Democracy & Education, op. cit., p. 143.

2. Dewey, Experience & Education, op. cit., p. 74.

The worth of any object of knowledge is dependent upon the intelligence employed in reaching it. And "intelligence is the means, operations, actually performed in the modification of conditions including all the guidance that is given by means of ideas both direct and symbolic."¹ Therefore a cognitive conclusion of any value depends upon the method by which it is reached. Knowledge is then conceived of in terms of the operations by which stable beliefs are progressively formed and utilized. The opposite of these are beliefs "not constructed upon the ground of operations and conceived in terms of their actual procedures and consequences, they are necessarily formed in terms of preconceptions derived from various sources, mainly cosmological in ancient and mainly psychological (directly or indirectly) in modern."²

It must be remembered that the observer and the observed, behavior agent and behavior object act together in the operation of knowing. Observation is a human operation and the object observed is as much a part of the operation as is the observing organism. "Our position is simply that since man as an organism has evolved among other organisms in an evolution called 'natural' we are willing under hypothesis to treat all of his behaviors including his most advanced knowings, as activities not of himself alone nor

1. Dewey, Quest for Certainty, op. cit., p. 200.

2. Dewey, Logic, op. cit., pp. 534-535.

even as primarily his, but as processes of the full situation of organism ... environment."¹ Dewey's approach throughout is against such dualisms and sharp distinctions. It is a holistic approach. Knowledge is the result of inquiry and not vice versa. It is the result of satisfactory termination of this process. "And since it is by inquiry and investigation that most reliable knowledge is acquired, it is to inquiry that we must go to find what it is."²

Thinking is selective. "To object to the operation is to discard all thinking ... in ordinary matters as well a scientific inquiries. We always retain the sense that material chosen is selected for a purpose."³ To select means to make a choice and "choice that is avoided is an experiment to be tried on its merits and tested by its results."⁴ The purpose of scientific and philosophical thinking is to render choice more significant and less arbitrary.

To sum up;"(1) In experimental knowing, the antecedent is always the subject-matter of some experience which has its origin in natural causes, but which, not having been controlled in its occurrence is uncertain and problematic.

1. John Dewey, & A.F. Bentley, Knowing and the Known, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1949), p. 104.

2. D.A. Piatt, "Dewey's Logical Theory," Philosophy of John Dewey, op. cit., p. 198.

3. Dewey, Experience & Nature, op. cit., p. 36.

4. Ibid.

Original objects of experience are produced by the natural interactions of organism and environment, and in themselves are neither sensible, conceptual nor a mixture of the two. They are precisely the qualitative material of all our ordinary untested experiences. (2) The distinction between sense data and interpretive ideas is deliberately instituted by the process of inquiry, for sake of carrying it forward to an adequately tested conclusion, one with a title to acceptance. (3) Hence each term of the distinction is not absolute and fixed, but is contingent and tentative. Each is subject to revision as we find observational data which supply better evidence, and as the growth of science provides better directive hypotheses to draw upon. (4) Hence the material selected to serve as data and as regulative principles constantly check one another; any advance in one brings about a corresponding improvement in the other. The two are constantly working together to effect a rearrangement of the original experienced material in the construction of a new object having the properties that make it understood or known."¹

3. Reflective Thought: "The cult of rationality," as coming down from Aristotle is criticized as being the intellectual equivalent of class division of the genteel tradition which made thought universal and necessary but left its "distribution" to the accident of birth, economic

¹. Dewey, Quest for Certainty, op. cit., p. 173.

and civil status. "The more it is asserted that thought and understanding are 'ends in themselves' the more imperative it is that thought should discover why they are realized only in a small and exclusive class. The ulterior problem of thought is to make thought prevail in experience, not just the results of thought by imposing them upon others, but the active process of thinking."¹

Nature of reflection is of the problematic. "Demand for the solution of a perplexity is the steadying and guiding factor in the entire process of reflection."² As the proportion of knowledge of consequences increases, the quality of experience changes. This significant change in an experience makes it reflective.

To say that reflection is the process of problem solving is also to imply that it is specific in nature, because problems are specific. Its results because of continuity of experience may be of wider import, the situation in which it originates is specific.

Reflection also implies a concern, an identification with the issue at hand, as to the outcome of the course of events. Through a widening of experiences, through a growth

1. Dewey, Experience & Nature, op. cit., p. 120.

2. John Dewey, How We Think, (Boston: Heath & Co., 1910), p. 11.

Dewey defines reflective thinking as "Active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends."¹ Often a belief is accepted without any basis or adequate support for it. In some cases this basis is deliberately sought and its adequacy examined. This is reflective thinking. And it is this thinking alone which has educative value.

There is a succession of things thought of involved in reflection. But it is not a mere sequence of ideas, it is a consequence, "a consecutive ordering in such a way that each determines the next as its proper outcome, while each in turn leans back on its predecessors."² Each phase is a step leading into something else.

Reflective thinking must aim at knowledge, belief, truths or facts. "It is marked by acceptance or rejection of something as reasonably probable or improbable. There are two distinct types of beliefs involved in this phase. Some beliefs are picked up from sources such as tradition, instruction, imitation - all of which depend upon authority in some form or appeal to our own advantage or fall in with a strong passion ... such thoughts are prejudices, that is pre-judgments, not judgments proper that rest upon a survey of

1. Ibid., p. 6.

2. Ibid., p. 3.

evidence."¹

There are thoughts leading to conscious inquiry into the nature, conditions, and bearings of the belief. "The consequences of a belief upon other beliefs and upon behavior may be so important then, that men are forced to consider the grounds or reasons of their belief and its logical consequences - this means reflective thought - thought in its eulogistic and emphatic sense."²

Reflection involves effort and is always more or less troublesome as "it involves overcoming the inertia that inclines one to accept suggestions at their face value; it involves willingness to endure a condition of mental unrest and disturbance. Reflective thinking, in short means judgment suspended during further inquiry, and suspense is likely to be somewhat painful ... the most important factor in the training of good mental habits consists in acquiring the attitude of suspended conclusion and in mastering the various methods of searching for new materials to corroborate or to refute the first suggestions that occur."³

There are five logically distinct steps in a complete act of thought: (1) a felt difficulty, (2) its location and definition, (3) suggestion of possible solution, (4) development by reasoning of the bearings of the suggestions, (5)

1. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. p. 13.

further observation and experiment leading to its acceptance or rejection.

Often the first and the second steps blend. After the problem has been felt, sometimes accompanied by a shock, there is the necessary deliberation, observation to bring to light exactly what the problem is. "In large measure, the existence or non-existence of this step makes the difference between reflection proper, or safeguarded critical inference and uncontrolled thinking. Where sufficient pains to locate the difficulty are not taken, suggestions for its resolution must be more or less random."¹

Suggested solutions are a further development of inference. The problematic situation calls up something not present to the senses. As Dewey says this is the very heart of inference and involves going from what is present to that which is absent. It is speculation. "Since inference goes beyond what is actually present, it involves a leap, a jump, the propriety of which can not be absolutely warranted in advance no matter what precautions be taken. Its control is indirect, on the one hand, involving the selection and arrangement of the particular facts upon perception of which suggestion issues."² These suggestions are tentative and can be

1. Ibid., p. 74.

2. Ibid., p. 75.

designated as hypothesis and on a more elaborate level - theory. Cultivation of a variety of alternative hypotheses is essential in reflective thinking.

Ideas are inferred from given facts and from ideas proceeds reasoning. More thorough investigation prevents acceptance of conjectures that seem plausible at first. Even if reasoning does not lead to complete rejection of the original conjectures as to the solution, "it develops the idea into a form in which it is more apposite the problem."¹

The last step is some kind of verification of the tentative conclusion, or some kind of experimental corroboration. Until this is done, the conclusion is still hypothetical. Hence thought requires "some experimental observation to confirm it while experiment can be economically and fruitfully conducted only on the basis of an idea that has been tentatively developed by reasoning."² Thus the two are linked.

A little earlier a distinction was made between reflection and thinking on the plane of trial and error. Dewey says "It is the extent and accuracy of steps three and four (i.e. a careful survey of all attainable consideration which will define and classify the problem in hand, and a consequent elaboration of the tentative hypothesis to make it more

1. Ibid., p. 76.

2. Ibid., p. 78,

precise and more consistent because squaring with a wider range of facts) which mark off a distinctive reflective experience from the one on the trial and error plane."¹

In an article (Educational Liberalism and Dewey), Scheffler points out the denial in Dewey of any valid distinction between the descriptive and the instrumental functions of thought. The insistence on the problem origin of thinking, on the consequences of reflection within specific situations on the functioning of knowledge in life, is quite obvious. Taken by itself, the limits of reflection are "too narrow, in effect opposing the 'fixity' ideas by the fixity of problems."² Again, "What reason do we have for assimilating all reflective thinking to the problem - solving model in general? In ordinary speech, for example, the poet is thinking in the process of composition, the artist in creation, the translator in attempting a translation, and yet none is seeking the answer to a question. Though subsidiary questions need to be answered in the course of each activity, no answer or set of answers as such brings each activity to a unified and resolved close; only a satisfactory poem, painting, or translation will do."³

According to Hutchins, Dewey's How We Think is an incomplete analysis of thinking. "... Prof. Dewey limits his

1. Dewey, Democracy & Education, op. cit., p. 151.

2. Philosophy & Education, Ed., I. Scheffler, (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 1958), p. 270.

3. Ibid.

discussion of thinking to its occurrence in learning by discovery. But that is one of the two main ways we think ... (the cause of this error) may be due to the false supposition that teaching and research are activities, whereas reading and being taught are merely passive. In part also these errors are due to an exaggeration of the scientific method which stresses investigation or research as if it were the only occasion for thought. There probably was a time when the opposite error was made, when men overemphasized the reading of nature ... either extreme is equally bad. A balanced education must place a just emphasis on both types of learning and on the arts they require."¹

Jacques Maritain gives the Thomistic view point as to the nature of thinking. "Thinking begins not with difficulties but with insights and ends up with insights which are made truly rational by proving or experimental verifying, not by pragmatic sanction that human thought is able to illumine experience to realize desires which are human because they are rooted in the prime desire for unlimited good and to dominate, control and refashion the world. At the beginning of human action, in so far as it is human, there is truth, grasped or believed to be grasped for the sake of truth. Without trust in truth there is no human effectiveness, such is to my mind the chief criticism to be made of the pragmatic

1. Hutchins, op. cit., pp. 43-44.

and instrumentalist theory of knowledge."¹

Dewey's How We Think was first written in 1910. Recently Hullfish and Smith have reconsidered it. The basis that Dewey asserted for reflective thinking (the writers call it "A more reflective situation" and not "The reflective situation") remains the same. Dewey's five steps have been compressed into four: (1) The presence and recognition of a problematic situation, (2) Clarification of the problem, (3) Hypotheses formed, tested, and modified, (4) Action taken on the basis of the best supported hypothesis.

The reflective situation as the writers see is as follows. "So long as activity goes forward in terms of recognition, however, there is no need to exercise conscious control of it. No problems are confronted. But when recognition fails, even momentarily, the situation calls forth feelings of uncertainty and doubt. This is the ground from which reflective activity (often designated in a more limited and limiting way as 'problem solving') arises. And it is a ground we should note, which intermingles emotional involvement and reflective activity."²

After the Classical Aristotelian theory of thinking, Wertheimer points out the second great theory is that of

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1. J. Maritain, Education at Crossroads, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), p. 13.
 2. H.G. Hullfish & P.G. Smith, Reflective Thinking: The Method of Education, (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1961), pp. 36-37.

Classical Associationism. "Thinking is a chain of ideas... The way to understand thinking is clear: we have to study the laws governing the succession of ideas ... what is the fundamental law of the succession, of the connection of these items ... if two items, a and b, have often occurred together, a subsequent occurrence of a will call forth b in the subject."¹

Dewey, specially in his early career was much influenced by Herbart, an associationist. To see why he rejects associatism as a method of thinking is to contrast him with Herbart. Dewey himself points out the difference in his work. How We Think. According to Herbart, what one apprehends of the unknown depends upon its relation to what one already knows. "Hence the process of learning the new will be made easier if related ideas in the pupil's mind are aroused to activity - are brought to the foreground of consciousness."² "Apperceptive masses" are stirred up that assist in the learning of the new. After new facts have been gathered up, the next step is to get general principles or conceptions.

As Dewey points out, there is obvious resemblance between the steps of reflective thinking and the Herbartian steps.³ "In each account there is the sequence of (i) specific facts and events, (ii) ideas and reasonings and, (iii)

1. M. Weirth Heimer, Productive Thinking, (New York & London: Harper & Bros., 1945), p. 8.

2. Dewey, How We Think, op. cit., p. 202.

3. Ibid., p. 203.

application of their result to specific facts. In each case the movement is inductive - deductive. We are struck also by one difference: the Herbartian method makes no reference to a difficulty, a discrepancy requiring explanation, as the origin and stimulus of the whole process. As a consequence it often seems as if the Herbartian method deals with thought simply as an incident in the process of acquiring information, instead of treating the latter as an incident in the process of developing thought."¹

The second point which Dewey criticizes is that with the Herbartian steps the aim of learning comes from the teacher and is imposed upon the child. "Strict Herbartians generally lay it down that statement - by the teacher - of the aim of a lesson is an indispensable part of preparation ... To the teacher the statement of an end is significant, because he has already been at the end, from a pupil's standpoint the statement of what he is going to learn is something of an Irishball. If the statement of the aim is taken too seriously by the instructor, as meaning more than a signal to attention, its probably result is forestalling the pupils own reaction, relieving him of the responsibility of developing a problem and thus arresting his mental initiative."²

Regarding the final step of Application (as developed

1. Ibid., pp. 203 - 204.

2. Ibid., p. 208.

by Herbart's followers) Dewey is of the opinion that more often than not it is used as a form of drill, with the inherent danger that a generalization may be used mechanically rather than with insight. "To treat application as a separate final step is disastrous. ... when general meaning is regarded as complete in itself, application is treated as an external, non-intellectual use to which, for practical purposes alone, it is advisable to put the meaning. The principle is one self-contained thing. When this divorce occurs, principles become fossilized and rigid; they lose their inherent vitality their self-impelling power ... True general principles tend to apply themselves ... something is wrong when artificial tasks have arbitrarily to be invented in order to secure application for principles."¹

The greatest defect of the method, however, seems to be the fact that it has no provision for verification of the general principles it purports to establish. There is no check provided in case a wrong conclusion has been reached. Lacking the self-corrective aspect, it is very likely to result, as Dewey puts it, in "glittering generalities".

4. Reflection and activity: as the last step of the method shows, activity is of the essence of reflective thought. Whether ideas are "good" or "bad" is judged by the consequences to which they lead when acted upon. They are acted upon for

1. Ibid., p. 213.

the purpose of reconstructing the environment. Thus ideas become "anticipatory plans". "Experimental inquiry or thinking signifies directed activity, doing something which varies the conditions under which objects are observed and directly had and by instituting new arrangements among them. Things perceived suggest to us (originally just evoke or stimulate) certain ways of responding to them, of treating them."¹ Ideas are a response to the (practical) problems of life for "uncertainty is primarily a practical matter. It signifies uncertainty of the issue of present experiences; these are fraught with future peril as well as inherently objectionable."² To escape the uncertainty, "men have longed to find a realm in which there is an activity which is not overt and which has no external consequences ... with those to whom the process of pure thinking is congenial and who have the leisure and the aptitude to pursue their preference, the happiness attending knowing is unalloyed, it is not entangled in the risks which overt action cannot escape."³

The following passage shows how thought and action are tied up. "The intrinsic troublesome and uncertain quality of situations lies in the fact that they hold outcomes in suspense; ... the natural tendency of man is to do

1. Dewey, Quest for Certainty, op. cit., p. 123.

2. Ibid., p. 223.

3. Ibid., p. 8.

something at once; there is impatience with suspense and lust for immediate action; ... Intelligence signifies that direct action has become indirect. It continues to be overt, but it is directed into channels of examination of conditions and doings that are tentative and preparatory. Instead of rushing to 'do something about it' action centers upon finding out something about obstacles and resources and upon projecting inchoate later modes of definite response. Thinking has been well called deferred action. But not all action is deferred; only that which is final and insofar productive of irretrievable consequences. Deferred action is present exploratory action."¹

To separate thought and action is to commit the error of dualism. They are to be treated as a continuum. "We still retain the notion of a division of activity into two kinds having very different worths. The result is the depreciated meaning that has come to be attached to the very meaning of the 'practical' and the useful."²

Classical tradition made the mistake of enhancing thought at the cost of action. And we are not to move to the other extreme. For "more activity, blind striving gets nothing forward. Regulation of conditions upon which results depend is possible only by doing, yet only by doing which has

1. Ibid., p. 167.

2. Ibid., p. 32.

intelligent direction, which takes cognizance of conditions observes relations of sequence and which plans and executes in the light of this knowledge.

Dewey explains that philosophers have inclined to believe that there is some other road than that of action, directed by knowledge, to achieve ultimate security of higher ideals and purposes. "Ancient science, that is what passed for science, would have thought it a kind of treason to reason as the organ of knowing to subordinate it to bodily activity or material things, helped out with tools that are also material. It would have seemed like admitting the superiority of matter to rational mind an admission which from its standpoint was contradictory to the possibility of knowledge."¹

Scheffler has considered Dewey regarding the latter's polemics against ideas that do not pass into action, and theory that is divorced from practice. Dewey is quite explicit about these as the two passages will illustrate. "Ideas are worthless except as they pass into actions which rearrange and reconstruct (them) in some way, be it little or large, the world in which we live."² "Experimental practice of knowing, when taken to supply the pattern of philosophic doctrine of mind and its organs, eliminates the age old separation of theory from practice."³

1. Ibid., p. 88.

2. Ibid., p. 138.

3. Ibid., p. 167.

Dewey aims, ofcourse, at empirical control and opposes all assertions that are not warranted by empirical evidence. "But", Scheffler says, "his conception of the nature of empirical control is ... unduly narrow, and fails to do justice to abstract, theoretical considerations in the scientific assessment of evidence. Ideas in science are not all of one kind and only certain simple types can be analyzed as instruments for transformation of the world. With the growth of complicated theoretical structures, fundamental statements in science can no longer be understood in the same way. They do not refer to our common world, which is describable by empirical evidence, and they do not in themselves, guide our activities at all. It is only the whole many - leveled structures in which they are embedded which tie up, at sporadic points, with our world of evidence and action. Since they must, moreover, meet such requirements as simplicity, formulation in acceptable terms, naturalness, likelihood of connection with other structures etc., their superiority over alternatives within given systems is often not a question of systematic superiority in "passing into actions which reconstruct the world in which we live", but is judged in purely theoretical terms."¹

In view of this criticism Sheffler reconstructs Dewey's stand and gives the following interpretation.

¹. I. Scheffler, "Educational Liberalism & Dewey's Philosophy," Philosophy & Education, Ed., I. Scheffler, (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 1958), p. 268.

"Dewey's emphasis on empirical control is perhaps then best expressed if we take his above statement to refer, not to single theories but to whole systematic structures themselves. Granting that parts of such structures need not themselves connect up with our world, we may interpret him as insisting that the whole structures must make connection, though purely theoretical considerations indeed enter into their design and and acceptance."¹

What is the significance of ideas which do not tie up with our narrow limited future world of practice? "It is just their transcendence of our own practical environment which enables them to enlarge the intellectual perspectives of the student. What is of questionable educational value is trivial, petty, narrow learning, not theoretical study which, though illuminating broad reaches of our world, is without practical reference for our own present and future problems."²

It is now necessary to consider the nature of experimental inquiry.

Inquiry is "the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole."³

1. Ibid., pp. 267-268.

2. Ibid., p. 269.

3. Dewey, Logic, op. cit., p. 118.

This transformation from the indeterminate to the determinate is achieved by means of operations of two kinds which correspond to each other in a functional manner. The two kinds of operations are (1) which deals "with ideational or conceptual subject-matter. This subject matter stands for possible ways and ends of resolution ... the other kind of operation is made up of activities involving the techniques and organs of observation."¹ (2) A practical factor is necessarily contained in all controlled inquiry. "The conduct of scientific inquiry, whether physical or mathematical, is a mode of practice; the working scientist is a practitioner above all else, and is constantly engaged in making practical judgments; decisions as to what to do and what means to employ in doing it."²

It has already been pointed out the process of inquiry reflects and embodies the experiential continuum which is established by both biological and cultural conditions. "Every special inquiry is as we have seen a process of a progressive and cumulative reorganization of antecedent conditions ... there is no such thing as an instantaneous inquiry."³ The function of earlier conclusions is to prepare the way for later inquiries and judgments and the latter are dependent upon facts and conceptions instituted in earlier ones.

1. Ibid., p. 105.

2. Ibid., p. 161.

3. Ibid., p. 246.

The significance of experimental method lies, ofcourse, in its verifiability, that it confirms, or refutes or modifies a hypothesis. This interpretation holds good from the standpoint of personal interest of inquirer. What is more important is that new individual objects with new features are brought to light. "As far as objective course of knowledge is concerned this is more important; in comparison with it verification of a hypothesis is secondary and incidental."¹

The indeterminate situation has the following traits. "The biological antecedents of this situation are in a state of imbalance in the organic - environmental interactions ... Restoration of integration is attained only by those operations that modify the existing conditions and not by any mental processes. So the doubtfulness of a situation is not only in a subjective sense.

A problem is instituted in the very process of being subjected to inquiry. There is nothing intellectual in a problematic situation although it is the necessary condition of cognitive operations or inquiry. "The first result of evocation of inquiry is that the situation is taken, adjudged to be problematic. To see that a situation requires inquiry is the initial step in inquiry."²

To mistake a problematic situation means that subsequent inquiry will be irrelevant and go astray. For the

1. Dewey, Quest for Certainty, op. cit., p. 190.

2. Dewey, Logic, op. cit., p. 107.

way in which a problem is entertained, determines the subsequent suggestions to its solution. "It is the criterion of relevancy and irrelevancy of hypotheses and conceptual structures."¹ The point is to avoid "seeming intellectuality" or preoccupation with scientific activity which is not really so.

The determination of a genuine problem is a progressive inquiry. The question is how the formation of a genuine problem is controlled so that further inquiries will move towards a solution. The first thing to recognize is that no completely indeterminate situation can be converted into a problem.

A relevant hypothesis once suggested is not a solution until it has been proved to be so experimentally. It might then be accepted, or rejected or accepted with some modifications. Therefore the objective subject-matter of inquiry undergoes temporal modification.

The method of science shows that all ideas are hypothetical, even those that are instituted as facts are liable to change if new conditions arise. Even scientific conceptions are not fixed for ages to come. "They are a system of hypotheses, worked out under conditions of definite test, by means of which our intellectual and practical traffic with nature is rendered freer, more secure and more significant."²

1. Ibid., p. 108.

2. Dewey, Quest for Certainty, op. cit., p. 165.

Hypotheses are conditional and have to be tested out by the consequences of the operations they define and direct and not by any rules that exist prior to them. This human experience consciously guided by ideas evolves its own standards and measures, new experiences are constructed, and new ideas and ideals firmly grounded in experience. Thus "ability to frame hypotheses is the means by which man is liberated from submergence in the existences that surround him and that play upon him physically and sensibly."¹

A hypothesis must possess some quality of verifiability and secondly it must be able to order and account for its proximate subject-matter.

In the introduction to "Logic: Theory of Inquiry", Dewey mentions that "In some of the more technical chapters, I have availed myself freely of the superior knowledge and competence of Dr. Ernest Nagel."² To define a hypothesis more adequately perhaps it is better to turn his contribution in "An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method."

The essential function of a hypothesis is to direct search for order among facts. The suggestions formulated in the hypothesis may or may not be solutions to a problem. A hypothesis must of necessity regard some facts significant and others not, if it is to direct inquiry effectively.

1. Ibid.

Some hypothesis effect relevant connection of facts and others do not. "A hypothesis is believed to be relevant to a problem if it expresses determinate modes of connections between a set of facts, including the fact investigated; it is irrelevant otherwise."¹

There are no rules for hitting upon a hypothesis that is relevant - inquiry will determine the relevancy of one. But if there is absence of knowledge regarding a subject-matter, these can be no well-founded judgments of relevance. "It follows that the valuable suggestions for solving a problem can be made only by those who are familiar with the kinds of connections which the subject-matter under investigation is capable of exhibiting ... The hypotheses which occur to an investigator are therefore a function in part at least, of his previous knowledge."²

Hypotheses must be formulated in such a manner that consequently a decision can be reached as to whether or not they explain the facts considered. Some of the most valuable hypotheses of science are such that they cannot be verified directly, for example that two bodies attract each other inversely as the square of their distances. "The hypothesis must therefore be stated so that by means of the well established techniques of logic and mathematics its implications can be clearly traced, and then subjected to experimen-

1. M.R. Cohen, & E. Nagel, An Introduction to Logic & the Scientific Method, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1934), p. 202.
2. Ibid.

tal confirmation."¹

A hypothesis cannot be verified unless each of its constituent terms denote a determinate experimental procedure. The belief in a strong Providence making for righteousness in the lives of human beings, for example, cannot have verifiable consequences "unless we can assign an experimental process for measuring the relative strength of the 'forces' involved."²

The second condition that a hypothesis must provide is an answer to the problem which generated the inquiry. A false hypothesis however has its own uses in that it might direct attention to important facts otherwise unnoticed. Besides many a wrong hypothesis has later been proved true.

The function of verification is to supply satisfactory evidence of eliminating or preserving some or all related hypotheses under consideration. A good hypothesis must be able to maintain itself and not be eliminated in the face of every possible attempt at verification. We must try, by repeating the process to eliminate all the relevant alternatives to some one hypothesis. "This is an ideal which guides our inquiry, but it can rarely, if ever be realized. And we are fortunate indeed if the hypotheses we had initially regarded as relevant are not all eliminated in the development of the inquiry."³

1. Ibid., p. 207.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 210.

Many criticisms of Dewey are valid as Levit points out. "He psychologized and sociolized thought so much that the needlessly de-emphasized formal procedures or moments of thought."¹ He thus contributed to the current educational confusion between "steps in problem-solving" and "critical scientific intelligence."² He often made his views on some topic to fit his general philosophy thus stretching a point too far. "Although he clearly knew that experimental corroboration of a hypothesis does not necessarily prove it, he was so fascinated by his doctrine of the emerging union of the ideal and the real that he was sometimes inclined to suggest that work ability constituted proof of the truthfulness of an idea."³ But still the doctrine is, as Levit says, the most secure way of knowing. "This is not to say that it will be so always. For ideas will surely move beyond Dewey one day. But this has not yet occurred to any significant degree... Where science does not mean intelligence applied to social ends and arrangements, to the unquestioned context within which this science operates, then we depart from and do not need Dewey."⁴

1. Martin Levit, "The Context of a Contextual Philosophy," School Review, Vol. 67, (Summer 1959), p. 255.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

Esthetic Growth:

"... that strange thing, an end in itself."¹

In the integration of the consummatory and instrumental phases of experience lies the essence of Dewey's esthetics. The dictionary description of "consummatory" is that which is brought to completion and perfection. Whereas the instrumental is the efficient agent or means.²

The aspects of enjoyment, of savouring appreciation are strong connotations of the word "consummatory", just as it is implied that these aspects are lacking in "instrumental". Integration of the two aspects forbids such a clearcut distinction. The former is not bare enjoyment, but enjoyment as consummation of the previous cumulative processes and responses. Similarly tools or instruments can be a direct source of enjoyment. Although "this additive fact does not alter the meaning definition of a tool; it remains a thing used as an agency for some concluding event."³

Consummatory and Instrumental form two points on the experiential continuum. Dewey gives the example of scientific discourse which is instrumental in function but is always capable of becoming an enjoyed object to those concerned with it.⁴

1. Dewey, Experience & Nature, op. cit., p. 365.

2. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, (Cleveland & New York: World Publishing Co., 1957).

3. Dewey, Experience & Nature, op. cit., p. 129.

4. Ibid., p. 203.

Consummatory experiences if they are to be of any value must not only be terminal but initial or instrumental to further such experiences. Thus finality and continuity are inherent in any integral experience moving towards a close. Innumerable sentences strewn here and there throughout Dewey's works uphold this view of experience. "Fulfilling, consummating are continuous functions not mere ends, located at one place only."¹

In the experience of a work of art, appreciation does not reach a complete and absolute closure, or a static point, an end product. "Its (artistic experience) various parts are linked together and do not merely succeed one another. And the parts through their experienced linkage move towards a consummation and a close, not merely to cessation in time."²

The distinction between the instrumental and the final as adopted in the philosophic tradition³ was intended to solve

1. Ibid., p. 56.

2. Ibid., p. 55.

3. Note: Aristotle first distinguished the fine arts from the useful and fixed the purpose of them, above the service of necessities to that of mind's enjoyment alone. "At first he who invented any art that went beyond the common perceptions of man was naturally admired by men, not only because there was something useful in the inventions but because he was thought wise and superior to the rest. But as more arts were invented and some were directed to the necessities of life, others to its recreation, the inventors of the latter were naturally always regarded as wiser than the inventors of the former, because their branches of knowledge did not aim at utility." (Metaphysics I 981 b 13). Quoted in J.H. Smith & E.W. Parks, The Great Critics, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1951), p. 27.

the problem of their relationship, "a problem so far reaching that it may be said to be the problem of experience."¹ Art is limited when it upholds that means are external and servile, and ends are enjoyed objects whose further causative status is unperceived.

The argument is not that there is no distinction between the instrumental and consummatory - there are ends which if they fulfil antecedent activity are consummatory and there are means to achieving this end. Rather it is to disprove the holding of them as distinct from each other which Aristotle sums up thus: "When there is one thing which is means and another that is end, there is nothing common between them except in so far, as the one, the means produces and the other, the end, receives the product."²

The meaning of "consummatory" is best understood in the distinction that Dewey draws between the artistic as objectively productive, and the esthetic. Both involve a perception of meanings in which the instrumental and the consummatory peculiarly intersect. "In esthetic perceptions an object interpenetrated with meanings is given, it may be taken for granted; it invites and awaits the act of appropriate enjoyment."³ The ensuing sense of satisfaction differs

1. Dewey, Experience & Nature, op. cit., p. 370.

2. Ibid., p. 369.

3. Ibid., p. 375.

from mere gratification of the sensual nature which occurs in ways "not informed with the meaning of materials and acts integrated into them."¹ Whereas in satisfaction as implied above tendencies are perceived in such a way as to release and arouse.

The integration is progressive and experimental, not momentarily accomplished. Difference in artistic integration as achieved by ordinary person and a genius is a matter of degree. The intensity or height of the final act of perception depends upon the adequacy of linking that the perceiver has formed. "In some happily constituted persons, this effect in the creation of a new object of appreciation."²

Dewey points out that the present confusion in the fine arts and esthetic criticism seems to be the result of the underlying, although unavowed separation of the instrumental and the consummatory. We often forget that "a consummatory object that is not also instrumental turns in time to dust an ashes of boredom. The 'eternal' quality of great art is its renewed instrumentality for further consummatory experiences."³

An experience is what it is because of the way it is carried through. Lack of instrumentalities and of skill by

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., p. 376.

3. Ibid., p. 377.

which to analyze and follow the particular efficacies of the immediately enjoyed object lead to imputation to it of undue degree of importance. The art of consummatory enjoyment is "the outcome of skilled and intelligent art of dealing with natural things for the sake of intensifying, purifying, prolonging and deepening the satisfactions which they spontaneously afford."¹

Often however the opposite is true, when instrumentalities are indulged in for their own sake, when the formal characteristics of art are given undue emphasis. "At their worst these products are 'scientific' rather than artistic; technical exercises, sterile and of a new kind of pedantry, At their best, they assist in ushering in new modes of art and by education of the organs of perception in new modes of consummatory objects; they enlarge and enrich the world of human vision."²

Consummatory phase of experience has two more aspects which have not been mentioned. It is the result of a struggle, of a stress, and covers an appropriate timespan. "In the process of living, attainment of a period of equilibrium is at the same time the initiation of new adjustments to be made through struggle. The time of consummation is also one of beginning anew. Any attempt to perpetuate beyond its term

1. Ibid., p. 389.

2. Ibid., p. 392.

the enjoyment attending the time of fulfilment and harmony constitutes withdrawal from the world. Hence it marks the lowering and loss of vitality."¹

The whole argument is to the effect that barriers between fine arts, and useful arts, instrumental and consummatory are artificial and should be broken down. Dewey insists that there is a social phenomenon, namely that of class division, which continues to uphold this, supported by its dualistic metaphysics and esthetics. For once art is not confined to the leisured, and for leisure, it is bound to find its integration of these two aspects.

Art is not an end in itself, no more than morals. "Frequently moralists make acts they find excellent or virtuous wholly final, and treat art and affection as mere means. Estheticians reverse the problem and see in good performance ... that strange thing, an end in itself."² Thinkers interested in esthetic experience find goodness and value in the experience itself, which then is to be cherished for itself and not for any end beyond it. These philosophers confine their observations of human nature isolated from nature. Such an esthetics points at an urgent problem. For art has an instrumental function. It is, or rather should be a process of making the world a different place to live in. As things

1. Dewey, Art & Experience, op. cit., p17.

2. Dewey, Experience & Nature, op. cit., p. 365.

stand art is always in the danger of becoming merely 'academic' and therefore decaying. New movements, breaking away from tradition are efforts to prevent such mortal arrest. If properly conceived, "experience in the form of art, when reflected upon, solves more problems which have troubled philosophers and resolves more hard and fast dualisms than any other theme of thought. It demonstrates the intersection of individual and generic, of chance and law, of instrumental and final."¹

A complete absorption in a work of art, excluding analysis can not be sustained for long. There must be a varied rhythm of contemplation and reflection. For we must ask where the object of art is leading us and how it is leading us. The total and overwhelming impression of a work of art comes first. But it is impossible to prolong this phase indefinitely. There is only one way to maintain the high-level of this "seignure". And that is through the intervening period of discrimination.

The instrumental function of art lies in its function to carry us to a refreshed attitude towards circumstances of ordinary experience. "The work in the sense of working of an object of art does not cease when the direct act of perception stops. It continues to operate in indirect channels ... persons who drawback at the mention of 'instrumental' in connection

¹. Ibid., p. 393.

with art often glorify art for precisely the enduring of vision that are induced by it."¹ Their interpretation of "instrumental" refers to narrow ends, direct use, in the way that an umbrella is directly used for rain. For Dewey arts that are merely useful are not arts but routines. Similarly arts that are merely final are not arts but passive amusements and distractions. Indulging in these is a sort of refined kind of self-indulgence.

Art has an important function to perform. The closer the work of art to common life and the more widely enjoyed the more it becomes a symbol of collective life. Not only this, but objects of art can become aids in the creation of such a life too. "In the degree in which art exercises its office, it is also a remaking of the experience of the community in the direction of greater order and unity."²

2. The moral functions of art: The social effects of art are not negligible, noting just the novels of Dickens alone. His work however was on a conscious plane. At the less conscious level, the effect is even greater. "Even technological arts, in their sum total, do something more than provide a number of separate conveniences and facilities. They shape collective occupations and thus determine direction of interest and attention, and hence affect desire and purpose."³

1. Dewey, Art as Experience, op. cit., p. 139.

2. Ibid., p. 81.

3. Ibid., p. 345.

Man is what he is only partly because of his native constitution. His participation in his culture is the more determining factor. The arts are the indication of the quality of that culture. Compared with their influence, things taught directly by word and precept are insignificant.

"Shelley did not exaggerate when he said that moral science only 'arranges the elements that poetry has created', if we extend 'poetry' to include all products of imaginative experience."¹

Apart from furnishing a record of past experiences, literature is significant for present experiences and is prophetic of the larger movement of the future. "Only imaginative vision elicits the possibilities that are interwoven within the texture of the actual ... change in the climate of the imagination is the precursor of the changes that affect more than details of life."²

Many theories of art that attribute direct moral effect to it fail because they do not take into account the collective civilization within whose context the works of art are produced as well as enjoyed. Poetry is a criticism of life not directly but by "disclosure, through imaginative vision addressed to imaginative experience (not to set judgment) of possibilities that contrast with actual conditions.

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., pp. 345-346.

A sense of possibilities that are unrealized and that might be realized are when they are put in contrast with actual conditions, the most penetrating 'criticism' of the latter that can be made. It is by a sense of possibilities opening before us that we become aware of constrictions that hem us in and of burdens that oppress."¹

Imagination is the chief instrument of the good. Hence art is more moral than codes of morality. "The moral prophets of humanity have always been poets."² Religion and art have common roots as history shows. But the imaginative presentations of prophets have been hardened into semi-political institutions. Ideals that should command thought and desires have become rules of policy. It is art that keeps their meaning alive.

3. Pragmatic esthetics: S.C. Pepper points out that the traits of a pragmatic esthetic are as follows:-
(1) Experience as historical duration. The process is continuous with a past sloughing off, a central present and a future coming in. It is the result of interaction. (2) Relational texture of experience. Whatever experience one has is felt to be interconnected with other experiences. The threads of connection can be followed and their terminations predicted or by means of instruments attained. Frustrations,

1. Ibid., p. 348.

2. Ibid.

blockings, are intrinsic to experience. (3) Quality as the esthetic differentia of experience often unifying a texture of relations resulting in an immediacy of perception of various degrees of vividness. A "seizure" is a vivid experience. Broadly the esthetic field is identified with the qualitative phase of experience. (4) Extensity, depth and vividness of quality as the basic criteria of esthetic judgment. (5) Organization and conflict as secondary criteria - organization is instrumental for increasing the extent and depth of an esthetic experience and conflict for increasing vividness. (6) The work of art as an instrument for the control of esthetic values with its own (though related) criteria of evaluation. A physical work of art is a continuant in the environment constructed so as to control esthetic values by acting as a stimulus to an organism whence an esthetic work of art is generated.¹

4. The esthetic experience: The nature of experience, discussed in a previous section, was defined as follows: it is grounded in nature, and a significant experience is continuous, cumulative and reaches a consummatory close from whence it gives rise to further significant experiences. It is then preparatory for further experience, as well as an end in itself. Every experience is potentially esthetic in as much as

1. S.C. Pepper, "Some Questions on Dewey's Esthetics", Philosophy of John Dewey, op. cit., pp. 374-375.

it has genuine initiations and conclusions. No experience of whatever sort is a unity unless it has this esthetic quality - the experience may be intellectual or practical. An esthetic experience avoids two poles - one is the loose succession of happenings that do not begin at any particular place and that end - in the sense of ceasing - at no particular place. At the other end is construction, arrest, proceeding from parts having only a mechanical connection with each other. "The enemies of esthetic are neither the practical nor the intellectual. They are the humdrum slackness of loose ends; submission to convention in practice and intellectual procedure. Rigid abstinence, coerced submission, tightness on one side and dissipation, incoherence and aimless indulgence on the other, are deviations in opposite directions from the unity of an experience."¹

An esthetic experience cannot be coerced into a moment. If it is immediate then it is only the climax of prior long enduring processes arriving at an outstanding movement, which sweeps everything else into it, so that the previous preparation is forgotten.

Disorder in life lends charm to experience, it adds emphasis, and is therefore desirable so long as it does not prevent a cumulative carrying forward. It is a temporary clash which summons up the energy. "The difficulty becomes

¹. Dewey, Art as Experience, op. cit., p. 40.

objectionable when instead of challenging energy it overwhelms and blocks it."¹

The past does not enter into an esthetic experience by sheer remembrance or recollection. In an automatic action the past experience is subordinated to the extent of not appearing in consciousness at all. In other cases the past material comes to consciousness and is employed consciously as a means to deal with a present difficulty. It serves a special end. "If the experience is predominantly one of investigation it has the status of offering evidence or of suggesting hypotheses, if 'practical' of furnishing cues to present action."²

On the contrary, in esthetic experience, "the material of the past neither fills attention, as in recollection, nor is subordinated to a special purpose. There is indeed a restriction imposed upon what comes. But it is that of contributing to the immediate matter of an experience now had. The material is not employed as a bridge to some further experience, but as an increase and individualization of present experience. The scope of a work of art is measured by the number and variety of elements coming from past experience that are organically absorbed into the perception had here and now."³

1. Ibid., p. 167.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 123.

The unique quality of a work of art is that of clarifying and concentrating meanings contained in scattered and weakened ways in the material of other experiences. The esthetic is the clarified and intensified development of traits that belong to every normally complete experience.

In the interactional rhythm of doing and undergoing in an experience, the undergoing phase supplies the unity. Otherwise it would be an aimless succession of excitations. "An object is peculiarly and dominantly esthetic, yielding the enjoyment characteristic of esthetic perception, when the factors that determine anything which can be called an experience are lifted high above the threshold of perception and are made manifest for their own sake."¹

The undergoing phase is essentially the esthetic phase of experience. This however does not contradict the previous statement about a significant experience being that which is a peculiar balance of doing and undergoing. Undergoing involves surrender but it is not passive receptivity. For "adequate yielding of the self is possible only through a controlled activity that may well be intense ... perception is an act of the going out of energy in order to receive, not a withholding of energy ... we must summon energy and pitch it at a responsive key in order to take in."²

1. Ibid., p. 57.

2. Ibid., p. 53.

How and in what way, if at all, are the intellectual and the esthetic connected? For Dewey the difference is only a matter of the place where emphasis falls in the constant rhythm of interaction. The ultimate matter and form of both types of experiences is the same. "The odd notion that an artist does not think and a scientific inquirer does nothing else, is the result of converting a difference of tempo and emphasis into a difference in kind. The thinker has his esthetic moment when his ideas cease to be mere ideas and become the corporate meanings of objects."¹ The artist thinks and solves his problem as he works for the scientist the end is comparatively remoter.

Dewey is against all sharp distinctions between the intellectual, practical and esthetic. Where art is distinguished from other phases of life, it becomes esoteric. The difference is that science states meanings, and art expresses them. Science gives directions by which one may arrive at an experience. Art constitutes an experience. In this respect science becomes the instrumentality of art, as it is the intelligent factor in it.

5. Perception, criticism and appreciation: "A philosophy of art is sterile unless it makes us aware of the function of art in relation to other modes of experience and unless it indicates why this function is so inadequately

1. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

realized and unless it suggests the conditions under which the office would be successfully performed."¹ In general, theory of criticism fails to accomplish its full office of indicating what to look for and what to find in concrete esthetic objects. It must put art and the esthetic experience in the realm of nature.

As Dewey takes great pains to put art in the realm of nature, it is necessary to clarify this point a little further. Naturalism, in the broad sense, is a necessity of all art even the most religiously conventional or abstract painting or drama that deals completely with urban life. It here means with "reference to the particular aspect and phase of nature in which the rhythms that mark all relationships of life and its setting are displayed."² Natural conditions are necessary to carry through to completion the expression of values that belong to an integrated experience in its immediate quality. But naturalism in art means more than the fact that all art of necessity has to employ the natural and the sensuous media. "It means that all which can be expressed is some aspect of the relation of man and his environment, and that this subject matter attains its perfect wedding with form when the basic rhythms that characterize the interaction of the two are depended upon and trusted with abandon."³ It is

1. Ibid., p. 13.

2. Ibid., p. 151.

3. Ibid.

alleged often that naturalism signifies a disregard for values which can not be reduced to the physical and the animal. "But so to conceive nature is to isolate environing conditions as the whole of nature and to exclude man from the scheme of things. The very existence of art as an objective phenomena using natural materials and media is proof that nature signifies nothing less than the whole complex of the results of the interaction of man, with his memories and hopes, understanding and desire ... The true antithesis of nature is not art but arbitrary conceit fantasy and stereotyped convention."¹

Conventions of art in themselves are not barren or unesthetic. They become so when they stop being part of the life of the community and continue in art. Genuine naturalism arises from the experience of the things expressed. When an object of art is supposed to evoke a set response, it becomes a dead convention. Genuine naturalism recognizes that the emotions do not reach a state of fixity and are expressed in a variety of rhythms.

Judgment of a work of art is an act of controlled inquiry demanding a rich background and a disciplined insight. "It is much easier to 'tell' people what they should believe than to discriminate and unify. And an audience that is itself habituated to being told, rather than schooled in thoughtful inquiry, likes to be told."²

1. Ibid., p. 152.

2. Ibid., p. 300.

Regarding the so called "infallibility" of models, Dewey believes that rules of criticism are general and objects of art, individual. Prior reliance upon rules is a weakened form of appreciation. The obvious result of this kind of criticism is that it fails so often to cope with new modes of life experience that demand new modes of expression. "Unless the critic is sensitive first of all to 'meaning and life' as the matter which requires its own form he is helpless in the presence of the emergence of experience that has a distinctively new character."¹

The important thing to remember in criticism is to avoid the two extremes of judicial criticism (which is based on the supposed applicability of general rules to all cases) and "impressionistic" criticism, which denies that criticism in the form of judgment is possible at all and "should be replaced by statement of the responses of feeling and imagery the art object evokes. In theory though not always in practice, such criticism reacts from the standardized 'objectivity' of ready-made rules and precedents to the chaos of a subjectivity that lacks objective control, and would, if logically followed out, result in a medley of irrelevancies."² To go beyond impressionism is to define an impression, but the beginning of any definition is the total qualitative unanalysed effect that things and events make on us. To define or

1. Ibid., p. 305.

2. Ibid., p. 304.

analyze a thing means to give the grounds on which it rests and the consequences which follow from it.

Impressions are of different kinds. We must differentiate the insights of a cultivated mind from the gush of the immature enthusiast's stand on the same level. There is always the implication that an impression takes place at a "certain hour" as such its meaning is limited to that brief hour. This is the case with the latter kind of impression and is what Dewey calls the fundamental fallacy of impressionist criticism. "Every experience, even that containing a conclusion due to long processes of inquiry and reflection, exist at a 'given moment'."¹

Because there is no external object of approximation, it does not follow that objective criticism is not possible. "What follows is that criticism is judgment; that like every judgment it involves a venture, a hypothetical element; that it is directed to qualities which are nevertheless qualities of an object, and that it is concerned with an individual object, not with making comparisons by means of an external pre-established rule between different things."²

A critics judgment is the summary of the outcome of his objective examination. His criticism remains as a "social document" to be reappraised by those who have the same objective material available. Hence a good critic while

¹. Ibid., p. 306.

². Ibid., p. 308.

making any pronouncements must base them on the objective traits of the object, laying emphasis on these rather than pronouncing a work of art as poor or excellent. "Then his surveys may be of assistance in the direct experience of others, as a survey of a country is of help to the one who travels through it, while dicta about worth operate to limit personal experience."¹

But is it really possible to make a survey without really passing the judgment as to whether or not a work of art is good? Is it possible merely to enumerate the elements of a work of art without touching upon its worth? Enumeration and valuation are both parts of criticism. A critic surveys a country, why can not he at the same time pronounce that it is worth visiting. To be sure there is a personal element in this but can this element be detached from simple survey as such. What Dewey is afraid of, it seems, that many judgments of value are made so hastily and taken up by the unthinking public so easily in its attitude, it is safer that a viewer be guided by the critic as far as possible, but reaching his final "valuation himself". In this way the "freshness" of approach is preserved. That pronouncements of good and bad are inevitable, Dewey is aware of as this passage shows. "Hence the critic if he is wise, even in making pronouncements of good and bad, of great and small in value,

¹. Ibid., p. 309.

will lay more emphasis upon the objective traits that sustain his judgment than upon values in the sense of excellent and poor."¹ It is a bad critic indeed who gives no reasons as to why he has pronounced a work of art good or bad. There is then this little ambiguity concerning Dewey's stand on the valuation of a work of art.

There are no fixed standards to which a work of art must approximate, and therefore no fixed rules of criticism. This is not to say that there are no criteria, the overall criterion being the kind of experience that constitutes a work of art. "As far as the conclusions are valid, they are of use as instrumentalities of personal experience, not as dictations of what the attitude of any one should be stating what a work of art is as an experience, may render particular experiences of particular works of art more pertinent to the object experienced, more aware of its own content and intent. This is all any criterion can do; and if and as far as the conclusions are invalid, better criteria are to be set forth by an improved examination of the nature of works of art in general as a mode of human experience."²

Judgments are made on the basis of the twin functions of analysis and synthesis which can not be separated from each other. For analysis is of parts of a whole. "This operation is the opposite of picking to pieces or dissection,

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

even if something of the latter sort is required in order to make judgment possible. No rules can be laid for the performance of so delicate an act as determination of the significant parts of a whole, and of their respective places and weights in the whole."¹ Discrimination is achieved through analytic judgment, therefore it is the test to be passed by good criticism. However, the critic must be "consumed" with informed interest, with natural sensitivity and natural liking for certain subject matters, otherwise the best - informed critic is likely to pass a judgment that will not go deep down into a work of art.

But liking itself, is no basis for an appraisal. The critic's insights should be the product of rich and full experience. "Learning must be the fuel of warmth of interest. For the critic in the field of art, this informed interest signifies acquaintance that is more than knowledge about them since it is derived from personal intimacy with the objects that have formed the tradition. In this sense acquaintance with masterpieces, and with less than masterpieces, is a 'touchstone', of sensitiveness, though not a dictator of appraisals."²

A critic is aware of a variety of traditions in arts and is thus saved from a snap judgment of a piece, which has matter to which he is not accustomed. He should broaden his

1. Ibid., p. 310.

2. Ibid., pp. 310-311.

background of the conditions under which the subject-matter of varied modes of experience move to fulfilment. Thus to perceive an object of art requires some preparation on the part of perceivers. If he sees a picture, he must be prepared through the building up of past experiences. Some kind of motor preparation is necessary. "This motor preparation is a large part of esthetic education in any particular line. To know what to look for and how to see it is an affair of readiness on the part of motor equipment."¹ One does not have to know about mixing of paints. But it is necessary that a motor responses be trained to look for, or to hear something. This depends on the native constitution plus education through experience.

The knowledge of the development of an artist, as seen from his successive works, helps the critic to discriminate. An artist can not be criticized by a single specimen of his activity. Understanding of his whole career broadens the background upon which criticism is based. Every artist has his own predilection. It is not right to criticize an artist because he deals, for example, exclusively with "the dark and death". A critic guided by a personal predilection might become a prey to partisanship.

The synthesizing or the unifying phase of criticism is the creative response of the one who judges. No rules can

¹. Ibid., p. 315.

be laid down for this. It depends on insight. At this point the criticism itself becomes an art. This is not achieved through striking a balance between the merits and the demerits of a work of art. The critic should "seize upon some (unifying) strain or strand that is actually there, and bring it forth with such clearness that the reader (or any appreciator) has a new clue and guide in his own experience ... A painting may be brought to unity through relations of light, of planes, of colour structurally employed, and a poem through predominant lyric or dramatic quality."¹

Two frequent fallacies of criticism are those of reduction or oversimplification, and the other the confusion of categories. Of the former examples are to be found in any criticism that is made exclusively from a historical, political or economic point of view, or much of the psychoanalytical criticism. A work of art stands on its own merits, not on that of the historical - cultural information which might feature in it or any obscure detail of the life of the artist. "Knowledge of social conditions of production is, when it is really knowledge, of genuine value. But it is no substitute for understanding of the object in its own qualities and relations."²

In the confusion of categories, inquiry appropriate to one field is applied to the esthetic. Work of art may

1. Ibid., p. 314.

2. Ibid., p. 316.

provide a historian with some data, but that is not to equate it with historical judgment. The commonest form of this fallacy is however the assumption that the "material that has already a recognized status, moral philosophic, historical or whatever, (the artist) then renders it more palatable by emotional seasoning and imaginative dressing. The work of art is treated as if it were a reëditing of values already current in other fields of experience."¹

C.S. Pepper discovers that a part from the pragmatic theory of esthetics, as revealed in Art as Experience; there is a very strong element of organic idealistic esthetics, and the two theories existing side by side are quite incompatible. "Dewey said so much about the organic character of art that, when I had finished reading his book, this side of his work stood out for me more than the pragmatic. Was Dewey reverting to Hegelianism in his later years?"²

The traits of pragmatic esthetics have been pointed out. Those of organistic esthetics are as follows. (1) coherence, (2) value as degrees of coherence, (3) differences of value as differences of cohering materials, the esthetic field being that of feelings rendered coherent, (4) creative imagination or the process of rendering feelings coherent, (5) potentialities for coherence in specific esthetic materials

¹. Ibid., p. 318.

². C.S. Pepper, op. cit., p. 372.

as the intimate criteria of value in the arts.¹ The difference between the two are (1) for organicism the coherence of feelings is central, while for pragmatism it is secondary and instrumental. For pragmatism quality is central while for organicism, although not neglecting it, it is only a corollary, "being the concreteness of experience which is automatically attained with greater organization."² (2) The work of art for an organicist is an integrated whole of feelings. If it is really coherent, it does not elicit varied perceptions in different perceivers. "The value of the work is objectively there, the variations and incapacities to appreciate merely indicate a 'weakness of the spectator' and his own lack of integration and reality."³ The pragmatist rejects the hypothesis of an absolute coherent structure of nature. "He must therefore distinguish between immediate experiences had (the esthetic work of art), and the environmental instrument for the control of these experiences (the physical work of art)."⁴ Although not all objectivity of judgment is dissolved, esthetic judgment is nevertheless relativistic. (3) Conflicts and frustrations are illusory and have no value where the organicist is concerned. For the pragmatist they form reality, conflict being valuable in its

1. Ibid., p. 375.

2. Ibid., p. 376.

3. Ibid., p. 377.

4. Ibid.

own right."... the organization sought in works of art is mainly or organization of conflicts. For he finds conflict a principal source of the vividness of quality, and thereby esthetically valuable in its own right."¹

From this the writer goes on to point out the inconsistencies in Dewey's esthetics. The conclusion he reaches is that "Dewey's eclecticism ... has damaged his pragmatism without adding any thing we could not gather elsewhere concerning organicism. This damage is of two sorts: the pressure of organicism inhibited the full growth of a pragmatic esthetics in Dewey's hands, and the simultaneous presence of both theories produced a confused book."² The summary of the whole exposition is that Dewey uses an eclecticism employing two incompatible theories, which would have better been dealt with separately. In that case much of the polemic against certain other theories lose its force. "Why for instance is a coherent whole to be accepted but are current form of the platonic type to be rejected?"³

Apart from the innumerable deep insights that Art as Experience presents, perhaps it is the message rather than an esthetic theory which is of lasting importance. The underlying theme throughout is the idea that art must be brought closer to daily life - making it a common property

1. Ibid., p. 378.

2. Ibid., p. 385.

3. Ibid., p. 388.

where appreciation is concerned, rather than leaving it to specialists, estheticians, and certain classes of society. It is a plea that esthetic experience can be realized in the commonest and meanest of things. Art is to be approached neither from the point of view of indulgence for its own sake in the esthetic experience, nor from the point of view of harrassed individuals of the modern world who might find in it some kind of relief. For "art itself is more than a stir of energy in the doldrums of the dispirited, or a calm in the storm of trouble."¹ It is a mode of deepening and extending life.

1. Dewey, Art as Experience, op. cit., p. 132.

Moral Growth:

"Moral theory cannot emerge when there is positive belief as to what is right and what is wrong, for then there is no occasion for reflection."¹

Method is usually thought of as subordinate or instrumental to the reaching of a goal - an end which is "consummatory", or reaching a certain finality when realized in experience. The whole thing revolves round the question of ends and means. Therefore it is appropriate to begin the section thus.

Dewey quotes Aristotle on the question of ends - means, to which his concept is opposed. "When there is one thing that is means and another thing that is end, there is nothing common between them except in so far as the one, the means produces, and the other the end, receives the product."² For Dewey, on the other hand they form two points on the same continuum.

People persist in looking at codes of morality as ends in themselves. They are so only in the sense that they are such important means to life. "Life is limited when the so called means remain external and servile and the so called ends are enjoyed objects, whose further causative status is unperceived, ignored or denied."³ On the other hand, it is

1. John Dewey, & J.H. Tufts, Ethics, (Revised Ed., New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1932), p. 173.

2. Dewey, Experience & Nature, op. cit., p. 370.

3. Ibid., p. 360.

abnormal to think of means as being disserved from ends. In a changing world ends also change, therefore a code of morality is not fixed for all times to come. To do so would be an arbitrary act in a world that knows no absolute fixity. The problem is to determine codes of morality that would not be arbitrary, but the result of a long and arduous reflection.

If there are no far reaching ends, how do we guide our activity? To this Dewey's answer is the end-in-view. The basic difference between ends (hierarchy of virtues in traditional ethics) and ends-in-view, is that the latter are not fixed once and for all as intellectual or moral goals. They are subject to revision if reflection so demands. Their use is that they act as sign posts in the regulation of action. Their attainment is not final for they may serve as starting points to further activity. Thus the horizon of ends keeps on widening, as knowledge and activity keeps on widening. The other fundamental difference is that their basis is not some ideal metaphysical realm, but the world of experience of human beings.

The difference between means and ends is only analytical, formal and not material and chronological. For they are parts of a process. Every end is an end-in-view, and every end-in-view is likely to become a means to further action.

The end-in-view is a plan which is contemporaneously operative in selecting and arranging materials. The latter, brick, stone, wood and mortar are means only as the end-in-view is actually incarnate in them, in forming them. "Literally they are the end in the present stage of realization. The end-in-view is present at each stage of the process; it is present as the meaning of the materials used and acts done, without its informing presence, the latter are in no sense 'means', they are merely extrinsic causal conditions."¹

The ends, objectives of conduct are those foreseen consequences which influence present deliberation and which finally bring it to rest by furnishing an adequate stimulus to overt action. Consequently ends arise and function within action. They are not as implied by many theories, things lying beyond activity at which the latter aims. They are not termini of action but those of deliberation and as such turning points in activity. Moral theories usually place them beyond action altogether - as unattainable in entirety. "The entire popular notion of ideals is infected with this conception of some fixed end beyond activity at which we should aim. According to this view ends-in-themselves come before aims. We have moral aim only as our purpose coincides with some end-in-itself. We ought to aim at the latter whether we actually do or not."²

1. Ibid., p. 374.

2. Dewey, Human Nature & Conduct, op. cit., p. 275.

How do we formulate the ends-in-view? By reflecting on the consequences that they produce. "These consequences constitute the meaning and value of an activity as it comes under deliberation. ... Actually consequences that is effects which have happened in the past, become possible future consequences of acts still to be performed. This operation of imaginative thought complicates the relation of ends to activity, but it does not alter the substantial fact."¹ Ends are foreseen consequences which arise in the course of activity and which are employed to give activity added meaning and to direct its further course. They are in no sense ends of action. In being ends of deliberation they are redirecting pivots in action.

To have a goal or aim is to define and deepen the meaning of activity. Aims are means by which an activity becomes adapted which otherwise would be blind and disorderly, or mechanical.

To define an end is to state the respect in which it is important. And this gives the clew as to the necessary action to be performed under the existing circumstances. Then it becomes a foreseen object which stimulates the act, which relieves existing troubles. It presents the occasion for making reasoned choices.

1. Ibid., p. 225.

An aim or an end becomes only so when it is worked out in terms of concrete conditions available for its realization, in terms of "means", that is the survey of present conditions to be utilized as means of its realization. Not to recognize this "simply throws us back upon past habits ... the result is failure ... we fall back on the consoling thought that our moral ideals are too good for this world and that we must accustom ourselves to a gap between aim and execution."¹

At the same time it is recognized that persons of a "practical" bent of mind accept the world as it is. They form habits on the basis of what they know of the world, so that they may turn it "to their own private account." They do not frame ends arbitrarily but use intelligence in selecting and arranging the means to achieve it. "But there intelligence is confined to manipulation; it does not extend to construction. It is the intelligence of politician, administrator (etc.) ... the kind of intelligence which has been given a bad meaning to a word that ought to have a fine meaning; opportunism. For the highest task of intelligence is to grasp and realize genuine opportunity; possibility."²

The attention to consequences is of the essence of formulating ends. This is nothing more than the scientific

1. Ibid., p. 223.

2. Ibid., p. 234.

method applied to ethical questions. We "try out" a policy and if it is good, it is then isolated into a principle. And the application of scientific method produces more reliable results. The testing of consequences is taken not necessarily to be immediate but over the historical span of time.

1. Reflection, inquiry and the moral situation: Dewey would have us apply the method of intelligence, criticism, to all aspects of life. "Intelligent action" is his ultimate value. The function of philosophy then, is primarily critical. It becomes the criticism of criticism. Its other function is reconstructive - to build the gap between things that have been thought of as unrelated, dualistic. As such there is no intransigent difference or division between science, morals and esthetic appreciation. "All alike exhibit the difference between immediate goods casually occurring and immediate goods which have been reflectively determined by means of critical inquiry ... All cases manifest the same duality and present the same problem; that of embodying intelligence in action which shall convert casual natural goods, whose causes and effects are unknown, into goods valid for thought, right for conduct and cultivated for appreciation."¹

1. Dewey, Experience & Nature, op. cit., p. 407.

If philosophy is criticism, what is the relation of philosophy to metaphysics? "Qualitative individuality and constant relations, contingency and need, movement and arrest are common traits of all existence; both immediate possession which is casual and of reflection which is a precondition of secure attainment and appropriation. Any theory that detects and defines these traits is therefore but a ground map of the province of criticism, establishing base lines to be employed in more intricate triangulations."¹ It is in terms of this metaphysical perspective that Dewey's concept of morality must be viewed. The essence of it is the problematic situation, a specific situation requiring solution, hence the need for reflection, and at a higher level of scientific inquiry. This is not to say Dewey believes in scientific inquiry giving a set of moral imperatives. For if his faith in the scientific method is great his suspicion of imperatives is even greater. Science as such is not the source of moral imperatives for Dewey and it is also clear for him that failure to utilize science as a check on moral beliefs must end in disaster. Growing out of the conditions of contemporary life are problems that philosophy must try to resolve. What revisions and surrenders of current beliefs about authoritative ends and values are demanded by the

1. Ibid., p. 413.

method and conclusions of natural science? What possibilities of controlled transformation of the content of present belief and practice in human institutions and associations are indicated by the control of natural energies which natural science has effected?"¹ Dewey's attempt to reconsider values is a quest in that direction.

2. The nature of values; Their nature is not fixed nor their existence. "Values are as unstable as the forms of clouds. The things that possess them are exposed to all the contingencies of existence and they are indifferent to our linkings and tastes."² For good things change and vanish, as the environment changes and as we change.

How are values arrived at (for we must have them as directive ends-in-view)? It is by a process of extraction from common experience of those courses of action whose consequences have proved them worthwhile.

The process is as follows. An experience is at first simply enjoyed. But a brief course in experience enforces reflection; for somethings sweet in having to begin with may not be so good in the long run. "Enjoyment ceases to be a *detum* and becomes a problem. As a problem it implies intelligent inquiry into the conditions and consequences of a value-object; that is criticism."² This is not an easy

1. Dewey, Quest for Certainty, *op. cit.*, pp. 252-253.

2. Dewey, Experience & Nature, *op. cit.*, pp. 398-399.

process for there occurs a conflict between the immediate value object and the ulterior value object: that which is a given good and that which is arrived at reflectively. This is true at the individual as well as at the social level. Institution of reflection makes the difference to our lives. "Either then, the difference between genuine, valid good and counterfeit, specious good is unreal, or it is a difference consequent upon reflection, or criticism, and the significant point is that made by discovery of relationships, of conditions and consequences.

When a question is raised as to the real value of a belief, it must be resolved by intelligent criticism. "And the court of appeal decides by the law of conditions and consequences."¹ The result and inquiry leads to enstatement of objects of value which then mark an end, static to a degree unless further events necessitate re-examination. Unlike ordinary moral ends, this " 'end' is a conclusion; hence it carries credentials."²

The nature of the good can now be defined. What has been said goes to show that "goods" are not a hierarchy of preordained values, fixed for all times to come. "Good consists in the meaning that is experienced to belong to an activity when conflict and entanglement of various incompatible impulses and habits terminate in a unified orderly

1. Ibid., p. 406.

2. Ibid., p. 405.

release in action. This human good, being a fulfilment conditional upon thought, differs from the pleasures which an animal nature ... hits upon accidentally. Moreover there is a genuine difference between a false good, a spurious satisfaction, and a 'true' good, and there is an empirical test for discovering the difference... In quality the good is never twice alike. It never copies itself."¹

Values as things of contemplation, of reflection in themselves, do not exist. To be sure there is a quality of intrinsicness about them, but to give them this quality irrespective of their generative condition and the consequences to which they give rise is to confuse causal categories with immediate qualities. "To take into account reason for liking and enjoyment concerns the cause of the existence of a value has nothing to do with the intrinsicness or nature of the value-quality, which either does or does not exist."²

In this scheme of constructing values a number of questions arise, which it seems that Dewey, although having posed has not quite answered them all. "How can the distinction between seeming and being capable of application to what is good? Is critical appraisal possible without a standard means of values? Is it derived from the value objects to which it is applied? If so, what authority does

1. Dewey, Human Nature & Conduct, op. cit., pp. 211-212.

2. Dewey, Experience & Nature, op. cit., p. 397.

it possess over and beyond that of particular cases? What right has it to pass judgment upon its own source and authors. Does a standard exist transcendentally in independence of concrete cases judged? If so, what is its source, and what is the ground and guarantee of its applicability to alien material? Is sense and moral sense ultimate its own final judgment in every case as it arises? What in that event, saves us from chaotic anarchy? Is there among men a common measure of value? If so, is it grounded outside of man in an independent objective form of Being?"¹

How intimately values are linked up with reflection, the following will make clear. "To value" means first to prize or esteem and second to appraise or estimate. It means that in the act of valuing or appreciating something, we inevitably pass a judgment upon its nature or value as compared with something else. In this sense it is evaluation. "The distinction coincides with that something made between intrinsic and instrumental values. Intrinsic values are not objects of judgment, they can not (as intrinsic) be compared or regarded as greater and less better or worse. They are invaluable; and if a thing is invaluable, it is neither more nor less so than any other invaluable. But occasions present themselves when it is necessary to choose, when we must let one thing go in order to take another. This establishes

¹. Ibid., p. 402.

an order of preference a greater and less, better and worse. Things judged or passed upon have to be estimated, in relation to some third thing, some further end. With respect to that they are means or instrumental values."¹

3. Desire, belief, and knowledge: It is usual to describe desires in terms of their objects, which figure in imagination as goals. Depending on the object, a desire is supposed to be noble or base, involving emotion. The outcome or end result of desire is an end-in-view or object consciously desired.

"Desire is the forward urge of living creatures. When the push and drive of life meets no obstacle, there is nothing which we call desire. There is just life - activity."¹ Desire is the outcome of an obstruction which disperses and divides activity. The goal of desire then is what would reunify activity and restore the ongoing process. Thus the objects of desire are not desired for their own sake but as they restore the ongoing unity of activity. "Equilibration of activities rather than quiescence is the actual result of satisfied desire."² Neither pleasure nor quiescence is the end sought by desire. A practical man fixes his attention on the object desired without giving much thought to eventualities which follow in their own natural course if it is

1. Dewey, Human Nature & Conduct, op. cit., p. 249.

2. Ibid., p. 252.

reached. But "the success of the ultra - practical man is psychologically like the refined enjoyment of the ultra - esthetic person. Both ignore the eventualities with which every state of experience is charged. There is no reason for not enjoying the present, but there is every reason for examination of the objective factors of what is enjoyed before we translate enjoyment into a belief in excellence. There is every reason in other words for cultivating another enjoyment, that of the habit of examining the productive potentialities of the object enjoyed."¹

Impulse is primary and intelligence secondary, in a sense derivative. This recognition of the fact rather exalts intelligence. For it makes thought the controller of impulse. Intelligence changes desire into systematic plans, reporting events and analyzing them. Strong emotion by itself can be dispersed without accomplishing anything. Without a plan impulse burns itself out. Through intelligence thus desire is converted into an impulse which has sense of an objective. Here desire and thought are not opposed because desire includes thought within itself. The question that arises is whether the work of thought has been done adequately. It may be that plans are built not from the study of conditions but round emotional indulgence. "No issue of morals is more far-reaching than the one here-

1. Ibid., p. 254.

with sketched. The separation of warm emotion and cool intelligence is the great moral tragedy. This division is perpetuated by those who depreciate science and foresight in behalf of affection as it is by those who in the name of an idol labelled reason would quench passion. The intellect is always inspired by some impulse even the most case - hardened scientific specialist the most abstract philosopher, is moved by some passion. But an actuating impulse easily hardens into isolated habit. It is unavowed and disconnected. The remedy is not lapse of thought, but its quickening and extension to contemplate the continuities of existence, and restore the connection of the isolated desire to the companionship of its fellows."¹

4. The nature of principles: Intelligence is not only concerned with foreseeing the future so as to direct the course of action but also to formulate criteria of judgment or principles. There is no basic difference - or should not be any between principle and habit. For "a principle is intellectually what a habit is for direct action."² It is to be treated, not as a fixed rule but a helpful method or else it affects, obstructs the ongoing nature of experience. If it is thus conceived of, then there are no "readymade rules available at a moments notice for settling any kind of moral difficulty and resolving every species of moral doubt."³

1. Ibid., p. 259.

2. Ibid., p. 238.

3. Ibid.

One would not have ready made prescriptions for bodily health, the same is true of other aspects of life.

It is readily believed, as the general public is not used to the idea of not having fixed principles of authoritative prestige, that lack of ready made principles is equivalent to moral chaos. Every new situation is a challenge to intelligence, to refer problems always to fixed principles is not to meet this challenge. To meet it is to create new principles as situations demand. "Morals must be a growing science if it is to be a science at all, not merely because all truth has not yet been appropriated by the mind of man, but because life is a moving affair in which old moral truth ceases to apply. Principles are methods of inquiry and forecast which requires verification by the events."¹

But the experimental character of moral judgments does not mean complete uncertainty and fluidity. We must fall back upon principles as hypotheses that have been tested in the past, for human history is long. To regard some such principles lightly is the height of foolishness. "But social situations alter; and it is also foolish not to observe how old principles actually work under new conditions, and not to modify them so that they will be more effectual instruments in judging new cases."²

1. Ibid., p. 239.

2. Ibid.

To most people choice appears between either throwing away rules previously developed or sticking to them. A more intelligent alternative is to revise and adapt them. The problem is how to maintain this continuous, vital re-adaptation.

Each moral situation is unique and consequently general moral principles are instrumental to developing the individualized meaning of situations. But general principles are needed. However this does not mean absence of continuity. "Only there is no principle at all, that is, no conscious intellectual rule, for thought is not needed... all habits has continuity and while a flexible habit does not secure in its operation bare recurrence nor absolute assurance, neither does it plunge us into the hopeless confusion of the absolute."¹ Continuity of growth and not atomism is thus the alternative.

5. Moral evaluation: To say that moral judgment merely "apprehends and enumerates" some ends in themselves is to deny the existence of any genuine moral judgment. "For according to this notion there is no situation which is problematic. There is only a person who is in a state of subjective moral uncertainty or ignorance."² His business then is not to judge the objective situation in order to take

1. Ibid., p. 244.

2. Dewey, Logic, op. cit., p. 168.

a course of action that is morally satisfactory and right, "... but simply to come into intellectual possession of a predetermined end-in-itself."¹ Previous experience surely helps in reaching a judgment. But it is material to be surveyed and evaluated depending upon the kind of action needed in the situation. "The position which holds that moral judgment is concerned with an objective unsettled situation and that ends-in-view are framed in and by judgment as methods of resolving operations is consistent with the fact that because of recurrence of similar situations, generic ends-in-view as ways of acting are built up and have a certain prima facie claim to recognition in new situations."² But these standardized "prepared" principles are not final; though highly valuable means, they are still means for examining the existing situations and appraising what mode of action they demand. Situations may and often do lead to their reappraisal and reframing. "Consciousness ... will always be on the look out for the better. The good man not only measures his acts by a standard but is concerned to revise his standards ... the highest form of conscientious is interest in constant progress."³

Moral judgments are judgments of practice, therefore

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1. Dewey, Logic, op. cit., p. 168.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Dewey, Ethics, op. cit., p. 422.

the meaning of the word "practical" must be examined. "It is easier to start a legend than to prevent its continued circulation. No misconception of the instrumental logic has been more persistent than the belief that it makes knowledge merely a means to a practical end, or to a satisfaction of practical needs, practical being taken to signify some quite definite utilities of a material or bread and butter type."¹ But the term "pragmatic" means the rule of referring all reflective considerations to consequences for final meaning. These consequences may be esthetic, political, moral or religious in quality. What is required is that they be consequences of thinking in some way and of thinking acted upon in connection with other things. For action or practice plays a fundamental role in instrumentalism. "... instrumentalism means a behaviorist theory of thinking and knowing. It means that knowing is literally something which we do; that analysis is ultimately physical and active; that meaning in their logical quality are stand-points, attitudes, and methods of behaving towards facts, and that active experimentation is essential to verification."² Knowing is practical in the sense of being a response to the problematic, to the natural, and inquiry and reconstruction point to their control. However it is unnecessary to carry this

1. Dewey, Essays on Experimental Logic, op. cit., p. 331.

2. Ibid.

quality of practicalness to the consequences. For it does not "imply anything about the intrinsic or the instrumental character of the consequent situation. This is whatever it may be in a given case."¹ Knowledge is "practical" in the sense that a particular mode, method or practice determines its quality. "How practical it may be in any other sense than this is quite another story. The 'object of knowledge' marks an achieved triumph, a secured control - that holds by the very nature of knowledge. What other uses it may have depends upon its own inherent character, not upon anything in the nature of knowledge."²

Moral, as esthetic and intellectual traits, reach down into nature as Dewey puts it, and life continues as the response to the precarious continues. Ethics are a response to the precarious for only then can it be connected with nature.

Stuart questions this "natural" basis for a theory of ethics. Precariousness is not, he says a ground in which ethics can rise and grow. "A precarious situation is one in which what we already prize is endangered. In an ethical situation nothing is for us in danger but our success in achieving what shall be better worth our prizing. To identify these two dangers is the empty individual experience

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., p. 331.

and human history of all distinctive meaning."¹

In ethical situation, it is a quest for values, whereas in adaptative precariousness it is "animal drive" that motivates reflection. As criticism of the whole theory of ethics as Dewey conceives of it, Stuart points out at its discrepancies. When a good man evaluates his conduct, it is in reference to a standard, and his measurement will only be "good" if the standard itself is good. An individual involved in a problematic situation acts in a manner that is radically experimental. "Towards ethical action, experimental inquiry into matters of objective fact, however necessary in particular cases can never be decisive or more than incidentally contributory."²

He feels that there is some danger to the cause of progress when statements like these are made: "What is needed is intelligent examination of the consequences that are actually effected by inherited institutions and customs in order that there may be intelligent consideration of the ways in which they are to be intentionally modified in behalf of generation of different consequences."³

What exactly is this "intelligence", and how is it to work? Dewey provides the answer, "where will regulation come from if we surrender familiar and traditionally prized

1. H.W. Stuart, "Dewey's Ethical Theory", Philosophy of John Dewey, op. cit., pp. 307-308.

2. Ibid.

3. Dewey, Ethics, op. cit., p. 56.

values as our directive standards? Very largely from the findings of the natural sciences ... (though ofcourse) ... it would be too optimistic to say that we have as yet enough knowledge of the scientific type to regulate our judgment of value very extensively."¹ But, as Stuart says, the findings of natural sciences are only descriptive and interpretative of action and can not therefore regulate conduct in the way that values do. Besides "consequences are, in the logic of ethics, incompetent to serve as tests of validity until they have themselves been weighed and measured and assigned their provisional degree of ethical significance."² Thus the naturalistic method of Dewey if freely followed to its conclusions destroys many a thing once cherished.

In his article, D. Holden says that all of Dewey's social and individual aims come to naught because his naturalism is morally neutral. "No Deweyan can give one good reason one that goes beyond expedience why he prefers democracy to totalitarianism or why he regards other men as his moral equals."³ In his social aims particularly it seems that he does accept some kind of fundamental values. "... In wishing to develop democracy, better distribution of material wealth, more rationality in action, and soon, he is accepting

1. Ibid., p. 58.

2. H.W. Stuart, op. cit., p. 329.

3. D. Holden, op. cit., p. 79.

a certain idea of the good. These are the Deweyan absolutes. Dewey's ethics may be the ethics of common sense and practical action, but it is nevertheless founded on implied absolutes."¹

1. Ibid.

CHAPTER II
THE AIMS OF THE STUDY OF LITERATURE
AT THE SECONDARY SCHOOL LEVEL

Introduction: In the consideration of the aims of teaching literature, as far as possible the question of what literature is, will not be brought in. For our question is not what poetry is or what literary criticism is, but what are the uses to which the study of literature is put, at the secondary school level. Although this can not be considered without having in mind a working conception of poetry and literature and of the profitable ways of tackling literature.

As the aims are considered, it is not to be assumed that these can really be broken down into separate categories. Actually the divisions are all highly connected and are separated for the sake of convenience only.

Theoretical Background:

1. Historical Review: Investigation into the nature and value of imaginative literature has a long history. A brief review of this will give the necessary theoretical basis that the aims of teaching literature often reflect.

The tradition goes as far back as Plato who pronounced that "all poetic imitations are ruinous to the understanding of the hearers."¹ The reasons why he banished poets from his Republic were firstly that poetry of necessity is thrice removed from reality (being an imitation of an imitation) and as such not concerned with the true. Secondly it deals with things in an emotional manner and as such is not intended "to please or to affect the rational principle in the soul ... but the passionate and the fitful."² This it makes use of what he calls "the inferior part of the soul," emotions and makes the task of controlling them difficult. "Any defence of poetry against Plato would have to tackle first the epistemological argument, that poetry is inferior because it is an imitation of an imitation, proceed to show that the poetic gift derives from a uniquely significant human faculty, and finally demonstrate that if poetry arouses passion it is only in order in the long run to allay or

1. J.H. Smith, & E.W. Parks, The Great Critics. (3rd. ed., rev., New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1951), p. 7.

2. Ibid., p. 20.

discipline it. The triple task is brilliantly achieved by Aristotle in his *Poetics*."¹

Plato's is a trend of inquiry made from the point of view of the use made of poetry, and reflects the "ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry, and at the same time appeals to the man of affairs to whom any activity is suspect if it can not be directly related to an obvious pragmatic goal."²

Aristotle's concern is with the meaning and value of poetry and his views on "Imitation", "Probability" and "Katharsis" lead upto it.

The aim of poetry is "purging" the soul of dangerous emotions, by exhausting them through arousing the feelings of pity and terror. As it has been pointed out by many critics, that Aristotle is here claiming some kind of a therapeutic value for literature.

The value of poetry is brought out with its comparison with history. It is "more philosophical and a higher thing than history: for poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular. By the universal I mean how a person of a certain type will on occasion speak or act according to the law of probability or necessity; and it is this universality at which poetry aims..."³ History can only arrange

1. D. Daiches, Critical Approaches to Literature, (London: New York: Longmans Green & Co., 1957), p. 23.

2. Smith & Parks, op. cit., pp. 37-38.

3. Daiches, op. cit., p. 37.

facts and comment on them and thereby miss out what probably must have happened, in terms of human nature and how it reacts to circumstances. Poetry, then, is an "illumination of an aspect of the world as it really is."¹

According to Daiches, two new notions are involved in this view of probability. "First there is the notion that a historical falsehood may be an ideal truth, that a 'probable impossibility' may reflect a more profound reality than an 'improbably possibility', and second, there is the perception that literary artist produces a work which has a unity and a formal perfection of its own, a work which thus creates its own world of probability within which truth can be recognized and appreciated."² It follows that art, instead of being thrice removed from reality is a means of exploring it. A literary work is then a form of knowledge, presenting insight into human nature. Also "probability" as it works out within a piece of literature, leads to satisfaction by recognition and appreciation of the unity of a work of art.

The perception of this double aspect together, i.e. "the relation between art as pattern and art as knowledge, - and we see how ... different kinds of literary art can stress one or other aspect, the cognitive or the purely formal, until

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

we reach the point at which the work which combines the communication of "profound insight with the satisfaction of formal perfection (e.g. Hamlet) is greater than a work which demonstrates only the latter quality (such as a perfect detective story)."¹

Literature is thus valued for three reasons: (1) it communicates special insights, (2) it provides aesthetic satisfaction when the unity of form and matter is perceived and (3) it provides an outlet to otherwise dammed up disturbing emotions.

Plato's attack on poetry as an agent of immorality continued into the Renaissance when Sydney took up its defense. His stand was that poetry is the best instructor in morality as it gives delight while teaching. The poet is elevated to the position of a teacher of morals. "... The poet with that same hand of delight, doth draw the mind more affectionately, and so a conclusion not unfitlie ensueth: that as vertue is the most excellent resting place for all wordlie learning to make his end of: so Poetrie, being the most familiar to teach it, and most princelie to move towards it, is the most excellent workman."² Poetry is justified not as an art but as one means of communicating moral or historical truth. "Sydney is here expressing a view that has long

1. Ibid., p. 38.

2. Smith & Parks, op. cit., p. 208.

been popular and is still very common among lay readers of poetry. Imaginative literature can be justified if it communicates historical or philosophical or moral truths in a lively and pleasing manner."¹

Dryden takes up the "instruction and delight" theory of the value of literature. In his "Of Dramatic Poesy" he says that a tragedy "ought to be a just and lively image of human nature, representing its passions and humours, and the changes of fortune to which it is subject for the delight and instruction of mankind."² The value of poetry is in the insight, the knowledge that it affords about human nature. The function of poetry is informative although conveyed in a lively and agreeable manner. Pleasure comes from the way human nature is presented and the recognition of fundamental psychological truths. The career of the characters provides the "moral instruction". "Literature would be a form of knowledge and it would bear the same relation to psychology as in Sydney it does to ethics."³

Johnson further extends Dryden's definition in his consideration of the general and particular aspects of human nature that the poet represents.

That which is most general is most real. And this

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1. Daiches, op. cit., p. 53.
 2. Smith & Parks, op. cit., p. 310.
 3. Daiches, op. cit., p. 53..

is common to human nature at all times and places. "Nothing can please many and please long, but just representations of general nature. Particular manner can be known to few and therefore few only can judge how nearly they are copied."¹

Johnson is presuming that human beings differ in trivialities only. "Indeed any theory of literary value which sees literature as some kind of illumination of the nature of man to the position that nature is unchanging unless it is prepared to concede that the literature of past ages has ceased to be of value."²

Beneath the surface differences a great poet sees the common humanity and the source of pleasure is the recognition of general nature in the different characters. However the ultimate end of poetry is not to provide "recognition" for its own sake but that the reader might be instructed morally and "the end of poetry is to instruct by pleasing."³

That poetry might convey some special kind of awareness, although conveyed in a way that the reader recognizes it, is a claim made by Romanticism. Moreover poetry is to be understood through a study of the psychology of poetic creation, i.e., through its creator. The poet is endowed with more sensibility and enthusiasm and a great knowledge

1. Smith & Parks, op. cit., p. 446.

2. Daiches, op. cit., p. 75.

3. Ibid., p. 85.

of human nature. As Wordsworth says, "... the Poet binds together by passionate knowledge the vast empire of human society."¹

Wordsworth therefore (unlike Pope and Johnson) does not maintain "that a poem is the handling of a paraphraseable content in skillful and pleasing versification and insists on the uniqueness of the poets kind of perception ..."² As he insists on the moral dignity of pleasure he does not need to hold on to the "instruction and delight" formula.

For Coleridge the immediate aim of poetry is to give pleasure. Poetry as distinct from say scientific prose as it has pleasure and not truth as its immediate object and this pleasure comes from the whole work and is led upto by the pleasure that we take from each of the seperate components of a literary piece.

In his consideration of primary and secondary imagination he ventures into the field of aesthetics, of philosophical quest in the tradition of Aristotle.

The primary imagination is the ordering principle - an agency for discrimination and ordering. The act of creation is the bringing of order out of chaos. The secondary imagination is the conscious use of this ordering faculty. It projects and creates new harmonies. A poem is the result

1. Smith & Parks, op. cit., p. 509.

2. Daiches, op. cit., pp. 97-98.

of secondary imagination. A poem is therefore the harmonizing of meaning with a special handling of language. "The immediate object of a poem is pleasure, not truth ; the immediate object of poetry in the larger sense may be truth ... or it may be pleasure. The criterion of a poem qua poem is the degree to which it provides immediate pleasure by proposing to itself such delight from the whole, as is compatible with a distinct gratification from each component."¹

1. Ibid., p. 108.

2. Science and Poetry: For Arnold, the new scientific knowledge of the 19th century seemed to threaten the factual basis of religion. He turned to poetry as a source of values. He reevaluated the uses to which poetry could be put in an age of science. His aim was to separate the two - science and poetry - in order to effect some kind of reconciliation - the two being basically opposed. The province of poetry was still immense once it was freed from direct responsibility of conveying scientific truth. "In poetry as in criticism of life under the conditions fixed for such a criticism by the laws of poetic truth and poetic beauty, the spirit of one race will find, we have said as time goes on and as other helps fail, its consolation and stay. But the consolation and stay will be in proportion to the power of criticism."¹

Thus poetry was to provide the consolation of religion and by acting as a critic of life, assure the quality of living.

I.A. Richards is in the same line of critics as Mathew Arnold, who faces the challenge of science to poetry and give it the important function of becoming the source of civilized activity.

He has also drawn a distinction between poetry and science. Poetic language is emotive or attitudinal that of

1. Smith & Parks, op. cit., p. 625.

science referential, and they enshrine different types of belief. Scientific belief accepts the referential truth of a statement, emotional belief is for the sake of imaginative experience. Although a strong emotional attitude feels like belief, it is yet objectless as different from scientific belief which has an object. The value of poetry lies precisely in this "objectless" belief. It is the basis of the value of poetic experience. "... The peculiar sense of ease, of restfulness, of free unimpeded activity and the feeling of acceptance of something more positive than acquiescence. This feeling is the reason why such states may be called beliefs."¹ The only verifiable knowledge is in science and this is purely referential that is pointing at things and telling us how they behave. As a solution he suggests that we "cut our pseudo-statements (poetry) from belief and yet retain them in this released state as the main instruments by which we order our attitudes to one another and to the world."² Poetry would retain the function as Matthew Arnold foresaw, of saving us, of becoming the means of overcoming chaos. It is thus the orderer of experience. "Like Arnold Richards declares the death of the Catholic dogmatic synthesis and turns to poetry as a new orderer of human experience."³

Richards relates an account of value of poetry to an

1. Richards, op. cit., p. 18.

2. Ibid., p. 19.

3. W.H. Madden, "The Divided Tradition of English Criticism", PMLA, Vol. 73, 1958), p. 75.

account of the "communicative efficacy" of the art work, which in turn rests on standards of mental health.

"The two pillars upon which a theory of criticism must rest are an account of value and an account of communication."¹ And Richards has given account of both in the light of his general outlook, which is "scientific". "In order to explain the uses to which poetry can be put he has had to construct a theory of value on the basis of modern psychology which has resulted in a theory of esthetics so different from what esthetics generally propound... and it is worth noting that in the last analysis, in order to prove the value of poetry in a scientific age Richards had to construct a completely new general value theory: no other critic had had that kind of temerity."²

In "The Principles of Literary Criticism" Richards points to "days of abstract investigation into the Good, the Beautiful and the True", and says that modern esthetics is based on the assumption that this is the result of some special kind of mental activity. "I shall be at pains to show that they are (aesthetic experiences) closely similar to many other experiences; that they differ chiefly in the connections between their constituents and that they are only a further development, a finer organization of ordinary experiences and not in the least a new and different kind of

1. Daiches, op. cit., p. 23.

2. Ibid., p. 133.

thing."¹ We make the description of these experiences unnecessarily difficult when we put them in the realm of the extraordinary. This is a "regrettable" attitude and leads to statements as that of A.C. Bradley. The nature of aesthetic value "is to be not a part, nor yet a copy, of the real world (as we commonly understand that phrase) but a world in itself, independent, complete, autonomous."² This kind of a mystic attitude has a pernicious effect and creates a habit of mind which loves to wallow in mysteries "whatever the disadvantages of modern aesthetics as a basis for a theory of criticism, the great advance made upon pre-scientific speculation into the nature of beauty must also be recognized. That paralyzing apparition beauty, the ineffable ultimate, unanalysable, simple idea, has at last been dismissed and with her have departed a flock of equally bogus entities."³ And so he tries to show that no special ethical or metaphysical ideas need to be introduced in order to explain value. It becomes a branch of psychology.

Theory of values: Richards avowed intention is to link even the common places of criticism to a systematic exposition of psychology. A theory of values is to be derived from descriptions of psychological states and so

1. Richards, op. cit., p. 16.

2. Quoted in Richards, Ibid., p. 17.

3. Ibid., p. 19.

values are to be assessed strictly in terms of their function. What he is trying to arrive at is not so much a knowledge of what values are but "valuable" states of minds. For, "A theory of knowledge is needed only at one point, the point at which we wish to decide whether a poem for example is true or reveals reality and if so in what sense; admittedly a very important question. Whereas a theory of feeling, of emotion, of attitudes and desires of the affective - volitional aspect of mental activity is required at all points of our analysis."¹

The conduct of life throughout is an attempt to organize impulses in such a way that "success is obtained for the greater number or mass of them, for the most important and the weightiest set."² The problem arises as to which are the more important impulses and which different organization will yield more or less value. "We may start from the fact that impulses may be divided into appetencies and aversions, and begins by saying that anything is valuable which satisfies an appetency or 'seeking after'."³ It is all a matter of priority and expediency. "Thus morals become purely prudential, and ethical codes merely expressions of the most general scheme of expediency to which an

1. Ibid., p. 91.

2. Ibid., p. 46.

3. Ibid., p. 47.

individual or a race has attained."¹ Ethics is includedly redefined. What is good is that which produces value and what is valuable is that which harmonizes functions within the organism. "... Our proper task, the attempt to outline a morality which will change its values according to circumstances, ... a morality free from occultism, absolutes, and arbitrariness, a morality which will explain, as no morality has yet explained the place and value of the arts in human affair."²

In a good experience, the impulses that make it are fulfilled and successful and not interfering with more important impulses. What impulses are more important can only be discovered by an extensive inquiry into what actually happens. The problem of morality is how we can obtain the greatest possible value from life. It is a problem of organization of individual life as well as how this is to be adjusted to other lives. The valuable experiences are those that lead to further valuable experiences and states of mind. The most valuable states of mind are those which involve the widest and most comprehensive activities to the extent that they tend to reduce waste and frustration.

The artist records and perpetuates experiences which seem to him valuable. "He is the point at which the growth

1. Ibid., p. 48.

2. Ibid., p. 58.

of the mind shows itself. His experiences those at least which give value to his work, represent conciliations of impulses which in most minds are still confused, inter-teammellèd and conflicting. His work is the ordering of what in most minds is disordered."¹

Communication: How does literature cause states of mind? In other words, how does language communicate attitudes which result in values. This literary criticism in Richards is linked with semantics which is the scientific study of how words operate in communicating meaning. The distinctive features of the mind are due to the fact that it is an instrument of communication. The arts are the supreme form of communicative activity. Therefore Richards implies that criticism should not be concerned with what the poet "intended" to communicate but how to correspond the communicative efficacy of the poet's impulses with those of his reader's. "... Imaginative literature represents a kind of psychological adjustment in the author which is valuable for personality and that the reader if he knows how to read properly, can have this adjustment communicated to him by reading the work. The qualification 'if he knows how to read properly', is important for Richards insists that only the properly perceptive kind of reading can receive the true value of a work. Training in reading with care and sensi-

¹. Ibid., p. 62.

tivity is therefore insisted by him ... and thus has had a great influence on modern criticism."¹ The tone is to be scientific in its emphasis on careful analysis, and meticulously defined terminology. The value of a literary piece is to be discovered by careful investigation as to how it operates.

1. Daiches, op. cit., p. 134.

The Aims:

1. Place of English studies in the scheme of secondary education: The Committee reporting on the "Basic Issues in the Teaching of English" gives a tentative answer to the question of what comprises "English Studies". "We agree generally that English composition, language and literature are neither our province but we are uncertain whether one boundries should include world literature in translation, public speaking, journalism, listening, remedial reading and general academic orientation ..."¹ The Committee felt that if "English" were not to lose its fundamental liberal discipline, its areas ought to be limited somewhat.

Such a limitation is provided by a group of researchers as reported by Early and Steinburg. They recommend that "questions relating to the teaching of English at every level could be seen in their inter-relationships if placed in a framework of three dimensions: language patterns; the manipulation of these patterns in modern discourse (communication), and the manipulation of these patterns in aesthetic forms (literature)."²

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1. The 1958 Conference on Basic Issues in the Teaching of English as reported in the PMLA. Vol. LXXIV. (Sept. 1959.) p.4
 2. M. Early & E. Steinburg, "Dimensions of Research in the Teaching of English", Educational Forum, Vol. 27. (May, 1963). p.489.

The curriculum committee of National Council for Teachers of English, gives English studies a double function - language as medium of communication through oral and written composition, and as a finished artistic product - the teaching of literature."¹

A book issued by the Ministry of Education in London, describes English as "... a three fold skill, the ability to express one's self in spoken or written speech, the ability to understand the spoken or written speech of others and so to complete communication; and the ability to feel or appreciate the appeal of literature ... the third is the extension of the second at a different level."²

Thus literature usually forms one of the three areas of "English", the primary purpose of which is communication (understanding others and being understood by them in written and oral language), and secondarily the appreciation of literature which is dependent on this ability to communicate successfully. "The third and the last objective is the training in appreciation of literature. How far this can be taught at all is still a matter for argument. But

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1. Curriculum Committee in Training of Teachers of English, (Champaign: NSTE), Vol. V, p. 246.
 2. Ministry of Education, Language: Some Suggestions for Teachers of English, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954), Pamphlet No. 26, p. 48.

there is a general agreement that no course in English is complete which does not introduce pupils to the richness and beauty of ... literature..."¹

2. English as providing "unity" to secondary education: Three official English publications² point out that English as a subject should provide the necessary unifying element in the course of studies of the secondary school which is otherwise in danger of becoming split up into isolated subject matter fields. "... the principle weakness of the secondary curriculum, taken as a whole is that too often it is not centered round any core or related to any one main - stream of learning, or way of looking at life; we believe that this is true and that the lack of the unifying principle such as used to be provided by a classical education, is responsible for a great deal of wastage and misdirected effort in the class-room ... we recommend that it be found in the teaching of English and that assembly of subjects which are often spoken of as the English subjects: chief among them is the training in clear and precise expression of ideas in English both orally and in writing."³

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1. Report on Secondary Education, with special reference to Grammar Schools and Technical High Schools, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1938, Reprinted, 1947), p.173.
 2. Language: Some Suggestions for Teachers of English, op. cit.; Report on Secondary Education, op. cit.; Report of the Committee of Secondary School Examinations, Curriculum & Examinations in Secondary Schools, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1941).
 3. Report on Secondary Education, op. cit., p. 173.

The curriculum then is to be developed round an attitude to life; for the reading, reflection or discussion that English provides and often stimulates are capable of exercising a wide influence up on the life and outlook of the adolescent more than any other subject.

Therefore the language report says: "we have treated it as a subject but at the same time as a method whereby education may achieve its ultimate of giving a wide outlook on life. When that aim is kept in view, it will be found that English as a subject must take not any place which may happen to be taken but the first place; and that English as a method must have entry everywhere."¹

The Harvard Committee Report on General Education in a Free Society, also points out that one of the urgent needs today is that for a principle of unity, "Since without it the curriculum flies to pieces and the studies of any one student are atomic or overbalanced or both."² But it points out that four answers have been found to this depending on the philosophical bent of mind of those implementing the curricula.

The first solution is sectarian, particularly Roman Catholic; the second is in the tradition of Western culture

1. Ibid., p. 56.

2. The Harvard Committee Report, General Education in a free Society, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946). p. 32.

as embodied in the great writings of the past and therefore "traditional" in nature; the third recognizes the spirit of change in life and builds the curriculum round problems which students face and will have to face in the future; and the fourth is the pragmatic solution which sees in science and scientific outlook this saving unity."¹

3. Literature in its relation to other English components: What is the connection between the study of language and literature? Here "the teaching of English in England", cautions that study of literature must be treated primarily for itself and not for its language. "We must treat literature, not as language merely, not as ingenious set of symbols, a superficial and superfluous kind of decoration or a graceful set of traditional gestures, but as the self expression of great natures."²

On the question of language and literature and their connection in English classes, there is some variation in the British and American statements here considered. Both stress the connection between the various English components, but the British version goes much further to say that there is no study of language or rather a most sterile kind of

1. Harvard Committee Report, op. cit., pp. 39-40.

2. Report by the Departmental Committee set up to inquire into the position of English in the Educational System of England, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1921), p. 118.

study, without close contact with literature. Although the Harvard Committee Report says that "the study of literature is throughout the study of language"¹, yet the yearbook on reading of the National Society for the Study of Education² and the National Council of Teachers of English publication³ seem to stress in the "experiences" that it provides for adolescents and seem not even to consider incidentally the important influence that literature might have on the use of language.

The teaching of language is dealt with under various headings or skills at various age levels, and is not consciously connected anywhere with the teaching of literature. It is a skill and its teaching a science, its primary aim utilitarian.

An English statement on the contrary runs as follows. "Reading ... is not primarily ... a practical or a social activity, though it can and often does occupy itself with the ordinary matters of communication. Reading without literature would be a poor thing and no amount of practical reading matter, however plain, would keep a living sense of language alive. The language is preserved, renewed, and invigorated by its highest and most unpractical forms - its

1. The Harvard Committee Report, op. cit., p. 116.

2. "Development in and Through Reading", Sixtieth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part I, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1961).

3. English Language Arts in the Secondary School, NCTE, Curriculum Series, Vol. III. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1956).

literature, its history, its poetry. Any scheme of teaching that divorces writing from reading or reading from literature, is likely to be sterile. Writing, speaking and listening, in their different ways should anlist from time to time, the great and worthy themes of literature; and this is not only for pupils of high intelligence but for all; the noble utterance is often also the simple one. This unity of 'literature and language' has important implication for an English curriculum."¹ This is to prevent language teaching from becoming wholly mechanical or being given up to wrestling with elements of composition and comprehension. For this would be "... excluding large number of children not only from a glimpse of civilized experience but from the possibility of becoming literate in any real sense of the term."²

Holloway is also of the same opinion. "This vital point is simply that our ideal 'use of English' ... must be traced firmly back to the masters of plain prose in our literature. It throws into sharp relief the fact that if proficiency in the use of English is seen merely as the 'acquiring of skills', it is travestied."³

Literature being the highest form of language

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1. Language: Some Suggestions for Teachers of English, op. cit., p. 47.
 2. Ibid., p. 162.
 3. J. Holloway, The colours of Clarity: Essays on Contemporary Literature & Education, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964), p. 38.

it is the most reliable guide to learning the varied use of words. The most important contribution of literature to the study of language is the variety, subtlety and imaginative use of words and encourages their scrupulous use. It is an indirect influence.

Gurry points out that "At an earlier stage in learning a language, the value of the language of good literature to the learner is that it produces more distinct and more vivid descriptions, narrative, (etc.) ... consequently the meanings of the words become more distinctly and surely impressed on the mind, and there is more complete understanding. If pupils persist in reading often and with some enjoyment or even with avidity, improvement in understanding will certainly increase and after a time should favourably affect their own use of language in speaking and writing."¹

4. Literature as cultural heritage: The part of cultural heritage most available to everyone who has acquired a general education is literature. "... this literary part of one cultural heritage is rich in the past and alive in the present. Ignorance of it would leave one barbarian, in the sense that he would have no real connection with the literature of the past which produced him, or with the deep and significant current of feeling and thought in his own time."² This article goes on to inquire whether present

1. P. Gurry, Teaching English as a Foreign Language, (London, New York, Toronto: Longman's Green & Co., 1955), p. 171.
2. Basic Issues in the Teaching of English, op.cit., p. 2.

present teaching of literature comes up to the mark of fulfilling this aim. "Are we teaching literature in such a way that it truly has a civilizing value, or have we watered down the subject so much, in an attempt to fit it to the supposed interests of the many whom we teach, that we have deprived them of the opportunity to become acquainted with and to experience the best thought and expression of their own time and the cultural heritage which is rightly theirs?"¹ It shows an awareness of the fact that often while stressing the "interests" of students another important aim is often ignored.

This cultural heritage, according to Keniston can be subsumed under four concepts. "... the power of reason, the capacity of the individual for self government, the theory of universal law, the cult of beauty ...,"² the ideals of the Greco-Roman civilization was changed by Christianity. "...We must more and more, concern ourselves, not with the facts of history or literature, but with the values which are unique subject matter of our discipline."³

The Committee on Secondary Education stresses the point that students have "continually in mind a tradition to be maintained and strengthened and a continuity to be preserved."⁴ A deliberate cut condemns an age to ignorance of the

1. Basic Issues in English, op.cit., p. 4.

2. Champions of the Great Tradition, (PMLA, Vol. LXIX: March, 1954), p. 8.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p. 156.

influences which have made it and therefore denies to it real knowledge of itself.

Thus an important aim of teaching literature is to give pupils some idea as to the meaning of civilization and their country's contribution to it.

Pooley points out "... if he (student) is to acquire any considerable part of our culture and to attain knowledge and wisdom leading to mature judgment, his reliance will be upon books. Growth through reading, is therefore, the advancement of each individual in the command of our culture through books."¹

Is there essentially a conflict with the two aspects of the teaching of literature at the secondary level, between the study of literature for its own sake of providing pleasure in imaginative activity, and the acquiring of cultural heritage? Burton and Larrick seem to think not. "There is no real conflict, ofcourse, between this function, though frequently educational discussions seem to assume that there is. ... A dolescent concerns and tradition come together at more joinings than the literature Teaching has time for. For instance the problem of individuality versus conformity a deep concern of adolescents is powerfully dealt in Sophocles 'Antigone!'"² What is important is that students be brought

1. "Development in and Through Reading", op.cit., p. 51.

2. Ibid.

into contact with ideas that have engrossed man over the centuries such as that of the Real versus the Ideal, the search for identity etc. The literary tradition is brought home to an adolescent through contact with these ideas. It is suggested furthermore, to counteract exclusively "traditional" approach to literature, "that books written expressly for adolescents play an important part along with great works of literary tradition so that there will not be an either - or conflict involving 'classics versus contemporary or juvenile literature.'"¹

The English stand regarding heritage and individual likes and dislikes is summed up in the following passage. "A great deal of time has been wasted in the schools, and in public discussion in trying to change the aims of English teaching. All that is needed is a refinement and improvement of method, a more judicious distribution of emphasis."² It does not believe in the assumption that interests and standards are not compatible. But it will be seen that this solution is reached by the British and the American statements here considered in a different manner. The Americans prefer that literature be brought down to the level of the student's "interests" more often than it is being done till some sort of a balance is struck. The British statements

1. Ibid.

2. Language: Some Suggestions for Teachers of English.
op.cit., p. 56.

imply that student's interests be stretched to the level of the literary programme, (however more attention being given to student interests than hitherto), till he comes to like what he is doing. The language publication mentions that "... some of them (teachers) maintain that suitable poetry of good quality appeals as nothing else can to their 'backward' pupils..."¹ The Americans might very well ask whether they are not "watering down" the literary program.

As a concession to individual differences, the book goes on to add that literature classes "... to include reading of many different kinds for many different purposes, not excluding the megazines, adventure stories, school stories and the dated slabs of sentiment that boys and girls read in their own time: a proper tolerance will exclude - or attempt to exclude - only the vicious... All however should share one characteristic: they are the works of authors who use words with their full force and refinement of meaning."²

The Harvard Committee Report seems to be more in line with the English statements. It recommends that nothing but the best should be included in a literary program at the secondary level. "A natural doubt thus arises. If by 'the best authors' we mean the best, rather than good contemporary writing, or writing aimed expressly at different mental stages

1. Ibid., p. 67.

2. Ibid.

or otherwise tempered to assumed limitations of experience in the readers, are not those 'best authors' too hard - too hard, that is for school study under present conditions, large classes, lack of relevant background, teaching power and the rest? The doubt is reasonable as well as natural."¹ However we must not sacrifice the interests of the many to those of the few. The first to be considered are those who will benefit the most from a literature program making whatever modifications are then required to suit the needs of others. It assumes that a work which has instructed and delighted many generations of ordinary readers is to be preferred to a product which is on its way to limbo. "The final ground of the policy for the study of literature here outlined is perhaps this: long continued close contact with excellent work, the best of its kind, has a formative and ordering power specially upon minds still plastic, growing, and active in imitation... The greater the work, the more support can he draw from the dignity of his change ... nothing less than the best practicable literature is good enough for school study..."²

The knowledge that literature offers is as a cultural study of a period and as a source of ideas. Acquiring of knowledge in literature has this double aspect - the

1. Harvard Committee Report, op.cit., p. 110.

2. Ibid.

acquiring simply of the central ideas of a work of art, and fitting it in the historical process viewed from the point of view of present conditions. "... the school has quite properly used the great documents of democracy, poetry, oratory, drama, essays and fiction to create enthusiasm for social aims that may be described according to taste, as humane, humanitarian, or humanistic. The school has been committed, in theory at least to the promulgation of the affirmative tradition, a tradition that embraces the ideal of the conservation of human values and the continuous reconstruction of society for the attainment of those values."¹

As the secondary school report points out that a healthy society has the two facets of conservation and creation. The student must move backwards and forward, retrospectively, prospectively in acquiring the "historical sense" and in making it to bear on present problems for the benefit of the future.

Literature then should partly be treated as the most alive history of a people. Therefore "obviously literature should be read in connection with history ... But a word of warning to utter on this subject. There is a tendency in some quarters to treat literature as a branch of history or sociology. This is in our view a dangerous mistake."²

1. J.J. Deboes: What Shall we teach in High School English. School Review, Vol. LXIV (April 1956), p. 310.

2. Teaching of English in England, op.cit., p.205.

Some suggest that the "eternal element" in literature is akin to philosophy and as such it should be studied in connection with philosophy. "This appears very doubtful. It is true that there is an element of philosophy in nearly all great poetry. For all such poetry involves a view of the world and of the essence and meaning of life. And some might go so far as to claim that, just as Aristotle considered poetry a more philosophical and higher thing than history, so there is a sense in which the truth of poetry is higher as well as far more permanent than that of philosophy itself. But that of course does not prove that they are the same thing..."¹

Trilling points out, "To suppose that we can think like men of another time is as much of an illusion as to suppose that we can think in a wholly different way."² This is only to reiterate that a literary work is partly historical (or philosophical etc.). Helen Gardner says that "when we are confronted with the expression of the mind of some one long dead, embodied in a work of art, the process of coming to understand it seems to me fundamentally the same although we can not ask our questions directly. We have to

1. Ibid., p. 206.

2. L. Trilling, The Liberal Imagination. (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1953), p. 184.

develop a technique of questioning, asking questions which arise out of the work itself. We can only judge whether the answer to any particular question is a good answer by its consistency with our answers to other questions."¹

Adolescents gather a great deal of information from literature from novelists like Jane Austen, Trollope, or George Eliot such as that of customs, beliefs, habits, social attitudes and thought in those times but these are not learnt consciously, nor need there be any questioning to see if pupils have assimilated them. They appeal to the imagination and are grasped intuitively. However whatever information that can be gathered the children should be able to grasp. "... Children are not as a rule sufficiently encouraged to address themselves to books for the purpose of obtaining information ... Here the teacher's part will be to arouse interest, but not to satisfy it, that they must do for themselves."²

Jelinek says that teachers are often led to believe that mere exposure of students to some of the best literary efforts somehow makes it follow as a matter of course that students will not only be stimulated to formulate their own ideas concerning more intelligent living but somehow "will work into concrete action some of the noble hypotheses they

1. H. Gardner, *Business of Criticism*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 32.

2. Language: Some Suggestions for Teachers of English, op.cit., p. 51.

have been exposed to in literature and will thereby satisfy their social responsibilities by thus making contributions to the culture in which they live."¹ Unfortunately results are rarely forthcoming. The major function of the teacher of literature is much more than simply a matter of taking part in the transmitting of knowledge and hypotheses called from the greatest of all time. "The truth of the matter is that they do not comprehend hypotheses at all unless the instructor helps them to translate those hypotheses in terms of their own emotional and intellectual experiences. The problem then is not really one of transmitting knowledge. It is rather one of translating knowledge so that it becomes meaningful in the lives of students."²

5. The study of literature for its own sake: The chief aim of literature is in the quality of enjoyment that it provides. As such it must not be considered exclusively as a subdepartment of any other discipline. In order to derive full benefit from the study of literature, it must not be treated exclusively from the point of view of history, sociology, psychology or for its style and diction. The teaching of English in England mentions "... the study of literature for its own sake, and in virtue of its rich

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

contribution to those aspects of personality and character that are of deeper significance..."¹

Bonamy Dobrée in English studies today says, "I hold by the old phrase that the object of literature is to profit and delight, but also by the dictum born of experience that there can be no profit unless there is delight. And my contention is that our first object in studying literature should be to realize this delight, to see how it is brought about, and then, but not till then, if we can, to assess its value."²

This delight proceeds from certain intrinsic values. The question that arises then is "what values does literature impart" and how does it impart these values?

To quote Dobrée again "... the values to be gained from the study of literature can not be arrived at by a statement of them. They can be imparted only by the work of art itself: what we have to study, what we have to try to get some ideas into our students, is the nature of myth, allegory, image, emblem, metaphor, and their relation with reality. It is a tremendous task, which I don't think many of us have ever really undertaken. "...Literature is imaginative and must be imaginatively grasped and appropriated."³

1. The Teaching of English in England, op.cit., p. 133.

2. English Studies Today, Eds. C.L. Wrenn, & G. Bullough, (London: Oxford University Press, 1951). p. 176.

3. Ibid.

The curriculum commission reporting in its publication mentions that too much attention is being given to secondary aspects of the study of literature. With the result that "... higher values have been obscured. The values with which the teaching of literature is concerned are final and absolute: they can not be broken down into constituent parts: they are beyond the help of the teacher. It is true that in literature natural gifts can be trained or strengthened, but they can not be newly created or enhanced beyond a certain point. Since the values are of this kind, it is impossible at least at this stage (secondary), to test a pupil's appreciation of them by means of an external examination."¹ It goes on to add that the concern of teaching of literature is often with what is past analysis or explanation as such the values of literature must be caught rather than taught: with any kind of frontal attack; the value of literature is destroyed. However the values must be of the intellectual, aesthetic and spiritual nature. They must be concerned with what makes a difference to the quality of life and their realization must be through "an imaginative effort and surrender, comparable with that of the poet ... and what this comes down to is a problem of language."²

The report of the Harvard Committee suggests in a general way where the value of literature lies. It is in

¹. Curriculum & Examinations in Secondary Schools, op.cit., p. 93.

². Report on Secondary Education, op.cit., p. 139.

"... the direct access to the potentialities and norms of living as they are presented to the mental eye by the best authors. All the other aims in the teaching of literature are subordinate to this."¹

John Holloway suggests more or less the same.

"... Literature depicts the norm of life: either at the beginning of the book when we see the origin in ordinary life of the remarkable event which dominates the story; or in the minor characters throughout, or, most important of all perhaps, in the way in which a book makes us see that ordinary life can always, and only too easily moreover, turn extraordinary, the spectacular events we are reading about represent potentialities of life, which are permanently latent only just below its surface."² Here is the bond in literature between the ordinary fabric of life and its extraordinary potentialities.

L.C. Knights reiterates this view that literature deals with values and our business is to apprehend these embodied values with sureness and subtlety. "Literature is simply the exact expression of realized values - and these values are never purely personal: even when they conflict with accepted modes, they are conditioned by them, and it is part of the artist's function ... to give precise meaning to

1. Harvard, Committee Report, op. cit., p. 107.

2. Holloway, op. cit., p. 5.

ideas and sentiments that are only obscurely perceived by his contemporaries."¹

To make an effort at the perception of these values is an education of the imagination. L.C. Knights has a passage which shows clearly what is meant by the imaginative realization of values. It is an activity of the whole soul of man. "Imagination is sometimes referred to as though it were something quite different from - or even opposed to - those mental processes by which we reach out for truth and try to ground ourselves on things as they are. That is not so. Imagination in the writer is that responsive, creative activity by which he realizes - makes real - a particular bit of experience, and embodies in words his sense of it in its directness and fullness - its implications, and its significance and value to him as a living human being. The activity to which his words prompt the reader is similarly an imaginative activity-responsive, creative and realizing. That realizing activity may demand now the use of the discursive reason, now the play of feeling and sympathy, now the awareness of the senses, but it is more than the sum of thinking plus feeling, plus sensing."² He further makes the claim that this imaginative realization to which we are prompted by a poet is a genuine form of knowing (his language

1. L.C. Knights, Explorations, (Middlesex: Penguin Books, In Association with Chatto and Windus, 1964), p.196.

2. English in Education, Eds. B. Jackson, & D. Thomson, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1962), pp.219-220.

is not merely emotive). "The insight or vision that we obtain from poetry, from imaginative literature, is inseparable not only from feeling but from that fullness of realization which I have spoken of as the distinguishing mark of imaginative activity. It is knowledge in this sense - knowledge in depth and fullness, knowledge that involves us as persons and not just as observers - that is made possible by the imaginative, or generative use of language."¹ The discipline of English is characterized as essentially a training to respond to values. What literature is and what it imparts is perhaps best summed up in the following statement made in publication containing some suggestions for teachers of English. "All the uses of language it is true, involve the use of certain literary conventions and to these the imagination furnishes the key. All the uses of language it is true, involve elements of thought, feeling and imagination, and imagination is not only preponderant in literature but is also the cohesive element in all other forms of utterance. ... In literature it is supreme ... The distinctive characteristic of literature is thus not its truth or untruth to observed or historical fact, but the extent to which its material is ordered by a powerful and elevated vision and is expressed through some linguistic form that give it coherence and artistic unity."²

1. Ibid., p. 220.

2. Language: Some Suggestions for Teachers of English, op. cit., p. 134.

This has important implication for the classroom. Methods of historical commentary or the analytical approach can not do full justice to a literary work, nor can the results be measured in term of examination, etc. "Released from the necessity of embarking upon literary study with his pupils in such a way as will yield measurable results, the teacher would be free to revert to his real work, which is simply, the reading of good books with his pupils; indeed we wish that the simple notion of 'reading' could replace in many minds the more pretentious and often harmful idea of 'literature'."¹ If methods of teaching detract from the essentials of literature so do examinations and prescribed textbooks. "We believe that prescribed books do more to injure the growth of a budding sentiment for literature than to encourage it and therefore recommend that books should no longer be prescribed in the school certificate examination."²

Literature is the most readily available of arts especially in a school and should form the basis of aesthetic and emotional training, as the training of the sensibilities. The esthetic enjoyment proceeds perhaps from a gradual awareness of the "miracle of form and matter" in a work of art and to increased sensitivity to the use of language and the consequent emotional response. "The reading of

1. Curriculum & Examinations in Secondary Schools, op. cit., p. 97.

2. Commission on Secondary Education, op. cit., p. 175.

literature is not only an important side of the work in English, but with music and the arts, also plays its part in awakening and cultivation of sensibility. Literature is ofcourse not the only subject of the curriculum in which the emotions are concerned. There is a strong emotional element in the sentiments that a pupil develops for any subject, but in the study of literature emotional training is more direct and more easily developed. This is one reason why the value of wide reading in literature is now universally admitted."¹

Literature as training in morality is often the ground on which literature has been justified in the past. "It is better to distinguish how, over the decades, a dual conception of the instructiveness, educativeness, indeed morality of literature has operated to confuse and also perhaps to fertilize criticism. Morality means no one thing, but anything on a scale from the do's and don'ts of conventional propriety at one extreme, to the deepest sense of life and reality at the other."²

The report of the Harvard Committee speaks of the implications to be kept in mind regarding the teaching of English literature:

1. Ibid.

2. Hollaway, op. cit., p. 150.

"That division into intellectual, aesthetic and ethical components is for analysis only. The whole mind in which these are not separable, is at work in literature always. "That ethical results of literature are not to be seen as obedience to a body of precepts, but come in quickened imagination, heightened delight, and clearer perspective.

"That a common body of tradition to accept, to revolt against, either way to work from - is our primary protection against ethical ignorance."¹

Adolescence is a critical period of growth, of emergent personality. The student is most susceptible to influences which will modify his emotions, ideas and conduct. Mason mentions three ways in which the growth of morals may be affected. "In the first place there is that direct teaching which children will already have found in books like Uncle Tom's Cabin, Pilgrims Progress, (etc.) Some will come from a reading of Dickens with that imaginative perception of others' wretchedness, which at this stage, is the way in which moral sensibility is quickened. At a later stage the novels of Trollope, George Eliot and Hardy sharpen a boy's or girl's understanding of what is central to morality - the importance of choice."²

1. General Education in a Free Society, op.cit., p. 111.

2. W.H. Mason, For Teachers of English, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1964), p. 133.

But all this involves the progressive ability to judge and to criticize. "The reading of literature, in so far as it is anything more than a passtime, involves the continuous development of the power of intelligent discrimination."¹

To discriminate and to evaluate itself becomes a moral activity. "In that literature derives from life, criticism must ultimately be in terms of life. ...I am not saying that the function of criticism is moral didacticism. The moral element lies not in some kind of end product or 'lesson to be learnt', it is intrinsic within the activity itself, even at the humblest level of critically considering two poems in the classroom. Furthermore since 'literature criticism has a reference beyond literature to life' there is a moral dimension in criticism which must comprehend the maintainance of standards in general."²

6. Literature as Discipline: "We do suggest that it is, for those years (secondary school years) the central humanistic study - that it offers peculiar opportunities for achieving the goals previously set forth." (intellectual training)³.

Since the peculiar concern of literature is with values, it must build up a continuous power of discrimination.

1. Knights: Explorations, op. cit., p. 198.

2. Mason, For Teachers of English, op. cit., p. 140.

3. Harvard Committee Report, op. cit., p. 107.

Bonamy Dobrée suggests there are two ways of discriminating value. They are emotional response and analysis. The students must allow themselves to become susceptible to the emotional content of what they read, before proceeding to analyse, and next they must learn to be completely honest about their emotions. Analysis consists of two things, how the words reach the reader, and what they mean to him and then how the words were used by the writer. "I think that in training our students in the technique of practical criticism, we must be very careful not to suggest that by this form of discipline we can arrive at any universal statement, or universally valid judgments, because of necessity, in itself, it relies so much upon purely individual experience. This does not make it any less valuable, so long as, here again, we regard this process not as an end, but as a means, a means to sharpen individual response, and to make the individual himself into an instrument to appreciate the literary object he is faced with ... I am profoundly convinced that this is the real discipline we today have to undergo in place of linguistic..."¹

The report of the Commission on Secondary Education speaks of the appreciation of literature as the third main objective of the teaching of English - especially during the

1. English Studies Today, op. cit., p. 178.

last two years of school. Appreciation includes enjoyment and understanding. "...To widen the range of his pupils' reading the teacher should also be training their power to go below the surface of the written page, to appreciate and criticize, to analyze thought and style ... In short the course at this stage must be both extensive and intensive."¹

For a careful training in appreciation and insight it is not enough to have studied as a whole and in detail certain select masterpieces only. Moreover, "... the last year's work in appreciation should include two additional exercises. First there should be much encouragement of and some insistence on, in writing of original verse, this not in the hope to create poets, nor so much as a training in expression, but to give that appreciation of the art of poetry which can only be felt (in any art or skill) by one who has tried and failed to do it himself. Secondly there should be opportunities for unguided full length critiques of poems or prose passages by unspecified authors, to be followed not only by individual comments on the criticism made, but by a joint class discussion."²

The reading of varied and more prose works in the upper classes is suggested as this would link up more directly than novels or poetry with the children's own writing.

1. Report of Commission on Secondary Education, op. cit.,
p. 224.

2. Ibid., p. 225.

Besides "they would also establish a plainer connection between the real world and the world of literature and the imagination and so help to dissipate the lingering view of literature as a form of escape."¹

The study of literature is impossible without an intelligent understanding of the forms and conventions of literature and the emotive and figurative use of language. Knowledge of literary conventions is indispensable to the proper understanding and appreciation of literature. The National Society for Study of Education yearbook mentions three dimensions of the study of literature. The third of these is the skill dimension in which concern is with skills needed to understand the various genres of this art form.²

"The student's personal as well as aesthetic development through literature is dependent, of course, upon a constant refining of the skills necessary in reading literature. Each of the literary genres - novel, short story, poem, biography, drama - is an art form with its particular conventions, each poses special problems for the reader. The skilful reader must become his own literary critic.

"Skill building is as gradual in literature as in any other area. Concern with the form of a story or poem, and the connection with its meaning or effect, begins in the

1. Language: Some Suggestions for Teachers of English, op. cit., p. 136.

2. Development in and through Reading, op. cit., p. 208.

elementary school. In the junior or senior high school , skill development is spearheaded in the students in class, or intensive experiences with literature ..."¹

The chief end sought in literature is extensive, continuous private reading.² At least at the secondary level it is more an acquisition of and development of an attitude towards reading of good books. "If the pupil grows into the adult whose mental life is completely satisfied by the thriller and the daily newspaper, the school teaching of literature has in this case completely failed."³ And this involves discipline achieved by way of enjoyment. What are the methods by which a teacher could successfully foster this profitable activity through delight? The Committee considering the "Basic Issues in the Teaching of English" asks this question. "What approaches to a literary work are possible and profitable at the various educational level? ... (most teachers) use the same approach: a loose combination of the biographical, the analytic and the didactic. Assuming that we have a good or superior students when is it most appropriate to practice rigorous textual analysis? To employ the historical and sociological approaches? To relate the work to a history of ideas?"⁴

1. Ibid., p. 205.

2. Harvard Committee Report, op. cit., p. 111.

3. Gordon, Teaching of English, op. cit., p.54.

4. "Basic Issues in the Teaching of English", op. cit., p. 4.

Both the Report of the Harvard Committee and the Report of the Committee of Secondary School Curriculum, point out that no method can generally be recommended. There is a peculiar relationship in a literature class between the teacher, subject and pupil as such there should be maximum freedom from prescribed books or methods.¹ "The right method in a given case depends on the book read, on the teacher and the pupil; different books call for different methods and different teacher would approach the same book in different ways; a method suitable for one class would not be suitable for another. The personality of the teacher is in the last resort a decisive influence, both for the interpretation and for the appreciation of a book. We think therefore that at school English literature can be studied successfully only when there is freedom given for the 'variables' of which we have spoken - the teacher, the book under study and the pupil - to be adjusted to each other in the most appropriate way. And that right adjustment can not be dictated in advance; it is discovered during the process of teaching and learning."²

1. Harvard Commission Report, op. cit., p. 113.

2. Curriculum & Examinations in Secondary School, op. cit., p. 93.

CONCLUSION

Traditionally, literature formed part of "... a process of intellectual discipline in the joint arts of word and number, the so called Trivium and the Quadrivium."¹ A part of the humanistic tradition, its purpose was "... the study of man (forming the heart of the liberal education) and the understanding of man's spiritual power."² Traditionally conceived it is a specific body of heritage that has stood the test of time. It deals primarily with values. "We must more and more concern ourselves, not with the facts of history or literature, but with the values which are unique subject matter of our disciplines."³ As such it is superior to science in the hierarchy of subjects. "For science, with its brave hope of solving all of our problems, of ushering in an endless age of progress has proved to be a false prophet. In the physical and material world it has accomplished miracles. But by its very nature, science has nothing to say of moral and spiritual needs. And it is precisely here that the crisis of our time rests."⁴ As a

1. Harvard Committee Report, op. cit., p. 44.

2. Keniston, "Champions of the Great Tradition", op.cit., p.8.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

discipline it is primarily linguistic and provides aesthetic satisfaction through the perception of the union of form and matter.

I.A. Richards construction of a theory of values as a branch of psychology, to be assessed in terms of function, is an attempt to bring values within the domain of science; clearly a change from the traditional view of literature. The division of the two uses of language - emotive and referential - is an answer to the view regarding literature as a source of knowledge. The poet becomes the organiser and the recorder of experiences. What is more the field of aesthetics is not considered by him as a realm of metaphysical entities but a realm within experience capable of psychological and scientific interpretation.

The pragmatic view of literature: The primary value of literature in Dewey's philosophy would not be its "knowledge giving capacity", for knowledge is the result of scientific inquiry. Its value is primarily in the experiences it affords. As Dewey mentions, apart from furnishing a record of past experiences, literature is significant for present experiences and it is prophetic of the future. It has an instrumental function in preserving a "refreshed attitude" to life. Besides, literature by inducing imaginative explorations, is often a source of hypothesis.

As all art must preserve a balance between the

instrumental and the consummatory, it would mean that literary criticism, the instrument of literary appreciation, must keep pace with absorption in a work of art, a balance between the skilled and intelligent art of dealing with things to the enjoyment of them. Does it also mean that the aims of teaching literature must preserve a balance between the strictly "literary" and the "non-literary" use, such as that suggested by L.C. Knights, namely that as part of the cultural heritage it be used to bear upon the problems of the present.¹ Undoubtedly, for not only is its instrumental function brought out, but it leads to innumerable connections and linkages as regards other subjects, an indispensable condition of growth in knowledge.

Thus literature for Dewey would imply an "experience area" rather than a logical discipline, an area rich in clarified, concentrated, preserved experiences. It would imply the progressive development of the ability to form relevant judgments.

It would imply a balance between the enjoyed or consummatory aspect, and the critical or instrumental, the two being inseparable in literature considered as growth. The experiences it affords are never purely "private", but consciously link up with the past and the future on the individual-social continuum.

¹. L.C. Knights, op. cit.,

When an English statement recommends that the curriculum for secondary schools be built round the discipline of "English" it is in keeping with the humanistic tradition. However, the Harvard Report says that this depends on philosophical viewpoints and may also be supplied by science or theology. Pragmatic philosophy finds it in science. Dewey continuously fought for the inculcation of the scientific spirit.

If Dewey stands for the scientific spirit in education he also stands for the organic-developmental character of education. In that respect he would agree with the British statement regarding the language - literature relationship and the study of the former in conjunction with the latter. For otherwise the learning of language becomes mechanical.

Literature as growth involves its consideration as the experience - tradition continuum and the developmental character of literary appreciation.

The British statements here considered show that literature study is not built round the experiences of the students. Although as a concession to individual differences, a greater variety of reading is advised, yet basically there is little change from the traditional outlook. The following statement is made regarding the teaching of literature in the Sixth Form. "... in the Sixth Form the range of

literature even for non-specialists, is immensely wider than in other part of the school and it includes books read (with however much enjoyment) primarily for their place in English or, if they are contemporary or recent, for their contribution to current thought."¹

Some statements made on the nature of secondary education show that there is some contradiction in the theory and practice. "Curriculum should be thought of in terms of activity and experience rather than knowledge to be acquired and facts to be stored."² Again a Principle is adopted that between the ages of eleven and sixteen, the course of instruction should "... cater to the special needs of adolescence; that is to say it should be related to the natural activities of body and mind during that period and both illuminate and guide the pupil's experience."³

The Handbook of Suggestions for Teachers, implies throughout that curriculum at this stage (adolescence) should cater to differing abilities and interests and that it be related to the immediate needs and interests of children.

Two American volumes (the yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, and the publication of the National Council for the Teachers of English) show a

1. Language: Some Suggestions for Teachers of English, op. cit., p. 78.

2. Curriculum and Examinations, op. cit., p. 5.

3. Ibid.

decided shift from literature considered as "content" to literature considered as growth in experience. This, however does not go unquestioned. The Basic Issues Committee asks, "Should certain works be required at each of the various levels in a basic program? Can we say this person should read this book at this particular stage of life? If not what happens to the great ideas and great works which constitute our cultural tradition? This issue raises the question of whether or not all students should have some literary experience in common. Accordingly the issue could be stated differently. Should certain authors (if not specific works) be required at each level or should the study of a particular genre or literary types ^{be} established for each level?"¹

It is necessary to examine the kind of experiences provided for by the two volumes to judge whether they come close to Dewey's idea of experience. Literature provides extension and deepening of experience through the involvement of emotions, but they "... will be involved only if the material read is well within the ability and the experience of the reader, if the author is capable of carrying young people from the familiar to the unfamiliar and if the teacher sets the stage for an emotional reaction."² Individual differences and progressive experiences are provided

1. Basic Issues in the Teaching of English, op.cit., p. 4.

2. NCTE Publication, op.cit., p. 130.

for by the emphasis on choice. "Stress on requirements and number ignore communication or growth in understanding, appreciation and enjoyment."¹

Social growth in experience is also emphasized as an aid to maturity. "Reading may be a social undertaking,... The common experience may be a point of departure for a wide variety of individual reading taking on meaning from the sharing of insights. Sometimes the book to be read by the class may be chosen by majority vote. Social discussion, focussing on one book is likely to illuminate what the book has to offer."²

The National Society for the Study of Education year book bases its program on the needs of youth. "This means providing books and magazines adjusted to the ability and interests and displaying a sympathetic approval of the youth of these books."³ The book expresses the developmental character of reading in literature and the gradual transition from the simple to the complex. "It is easy at this point (moving from junior to high school) to expect too great a transition too rapidly; the student faced with reading difficulties, unfamiliar literary forms, and an excess of mature concepts, may become discouraged."⁴

1. Ibid., p. 135.

2. Ibid., p. 136.

3. NSSE Year Book, op. cit., p. 52.

4. Ibid., p. 202.

The way it proposes to meet the needs of students is to provide them with vicarious experiences assisting the student in a pressing developmental task. "In this sense, literature is a preparation for experience and it is important that selections whether those written expressly for adolescence or those from the adult tradition be chosen carefully in terms of the verisimilitude of experience portrayed not in terms of historical chronology or of their significance as example of genre."¹

The examination of certain titles recommended as meeting the needs of youth,² would not meet the requirements of Dewey's concept of growth. They might fulfill the latitudinal but not the longitudinal view of experience, specially in their recommendation of literature written specifically for adolescents. The concept of growth is violated on two levels - that educational experiences are selective, that growth proceeds not by mere catering to needs but through a process of challenge and response, and that experience is continuous with and lives by transmission of culture. In the eagerness to provide experiences on the level of the maturity of readers, the quality, continuity, and concentratedness of experience as embodied in the

1. Ibid.

2. See Appendix.

cultural heritage has been lost. The problem is not how to cater to the interests of adolescents thus rendering experience primarily "private", but how to join a line running from experience to another from tradition.

Such an attempt has been made by the Publication of the Modern Languages Association's issue of a continuous cumulative program¹ of literary study from the junior school to the graduate level as a hypothesis to be tested out in practice. This articulated English program claims to be based on the core of experiences, a body of knowledge, and a set of specific skills.

Do the "Aims" resolve the problem of experience and tradition? As the Basic Committee Report points out, "this issue seems crucial to ... any serious approach to the problem. Unless we can find an answer to it, we must resign ourselves to an unhappy future in which the present curricular disorder persists and the whole liberal discipline of English continues to disintegrate ..."²

The British statements here considered make some concession to individual differences in the form of varied readings, but basically preserving the coverage of the ground character; the American swing is to the other extreme.

In different ways therefore, the "Aims" do not fulfill Dewey's concept of growth as regards the experience-

1. See Appendix 1

2. Basic Issues Committee, op. cit., p. 5.

literary tradition continuum.

There is considerable change in the methods of teaching or rather the refusal to recommend any particular methods and allowing freedom for the "three variables" the student, the book, and the teacher. The British statements are emphatic about the harm done by examinations to the study of literature, which is viewed as a continued progress and not as an end result. The Basic Committee Report tries to see in method a continuity, that would connect the experiences of students with the subject-matter field. In this there is a change from the traditional Explication de Texte.

"Assuming that we have good or superior students when is it most appropriate to practice vigorous textual analysis? To employ the historical and sociological approach? To relate the work to the history of ideas? If these can not be done at once, in what order should they be done? Which approach should be emphasized at each of the educational levels? If one of these approaches seem desirable at a given level for the superior student, can it be modified so as to be of value to the less gifted?"¹

A change suggested by L.C. Knights bears directly on the consummatory and instrumental balance in the teaching of literature. It involves the utilization of literature to bear upon the problems of today, and its correlation with other related subjects. Thus tradition would be studied in

¹. Basic Issues, op. cit., p. 4.

relation to the present and the student would learn to form a greater number of connections as he moves into fields other than literature.

These suggestions were taken notice of widely, at least by critics, but have yet to be realized on a wider scale in teaching. "Here and there attempts are made to improve reading ability and to train taste; but at many places literature is still taught by means of cover-the-ground courses in which one bit of information seems as important as any other bit, deliberate personal choice (for teacher and student) is reduced to a minimum, and great books are treated as though they existed in some timeless sphere and had no roots in a life as real, as bewildering and exciting as our own. In English, at all events, there is rarely any attempt made to see the literature of a given period in relation to the economic, social, and cultural forms of that period - its whole complex pattern of living - and to relate the findings of such study to the needs of the present; though one would think it obvious that the condition of health for an 'interest in literature' is that it should be an interest in very much more."¹

He proposes that the teacher show the student how to work back through literature, which is rooted in the social milieu, to the life of our times. This can be done

¹. L.C. Knights, op. cit., p. 196.

(1) through style and language: "the vivid idiomatic raciness of Elizabethan English, the 'polite reasonableness' of Augustan prose, the increasingly literary language of the Nineteenth century poetry, the debased idiom of the modern newspaper - none of these simply arose spontaneously, they were all conditioned by social factors which they can be in part to reveal." (2) Literature indicates the tastes and intellectual ability of the audience for which it was intended; "the student can be encouraged to ask how the interests reflected in literature of different degrees of popularity were formed - by sermon-going, bear-baiting, skill in music, the cinema, at work or in religious ritual, through an interest in practical achievement in the form of social intercourse, or theological controversy, and so on." (3) The writer usually asserts implicitly or explicitly certain standards and the investigator is to ask what the relationship is between these standards and current social codes. In fact the inquiry would ultimately ask "what were the underlying, conscious or unconscious motives and energies which shaped its art and philosophy, its social, moral and legal codes, no less than its scientific industrial and political achievements?" a question that subsumes all others.¹

1. Ibid., pp. 201-202.

The "Aims" stress that in so far as literature is not a mere pastime it must involve continuous development in discrimination; this must ultimately transfer to life itself. It is not to be a mere academic process but a process of growth, for literary criticism must have reference beyond literature to life. It should be a process of sharpening individual response, a process of personal development in method.

Dewey has something specific to say about artistic criticism as the section on "Aesthetic Growth" shows. Briefly the extremes - objective criticism which relies on rules, an impressionistic criticism - must be avoided. It should be search for "facts" that justify the direct reaction inspired by a work of art. This is not a search for values but the objective properties of the object under consideration. The criteria of criticism must be in the kind of experiences that constitute a work of art. Judgments must be based on the twin function of analysis and synthesis. Discrimination is achieved through analytical judgment. The synthesizing phase is the creative response in the one who judges. Here criticism itself becomes an art.

Chatman suggests the problem solving method in the interpretation of literature. Although it does not correspond to Dewey's five steps, it does try to provide the "factual" basis to criticism, roughly corresponding with the

analytical phase of Deweyan criticism. A poem may first be "put right" gramatically. "The best way to raise this problem to a conscious level is to require paraphrases."¹

Lexical analysis or the proper perception of the senses of words in context is the next step. "The third reading mechanism in which problem-solving talent is useful can be called, for lack of better term, interpretational."² The student must learn to perceive the probable limits of reference of a poem.

Although the "Aims" do not closely correspond to Dewey's concept of growth, yet they also show a change, a new trend towards the consideration of literature as growth. In this, the concept of growth can provide an axis to the teaching of literature and prevent its disintegration as a subject-matter field.

1. Chatman, "Reading Literature as Problem-Solving, op. cit., p. 347.

2. Ibid., p. 340

APPENDIX **I**
AN ARTICULATED ENGLISH PROGRAM.
A HYPOTHESIS TO TEST

Hypothesis I

The values of the literary component of English are sequential and incremental. They reside in enlargement of the mind by an experience of discovery and recognition, new discovery and association based upon increased recognition. The process is founded upon a continuous furnishing of the mind, first with such basic matter as mythology, folklore and fairy tale, Biblical lore, and national legends, which interwoven inextricably into the moving pieces of our literary heritage, form the texture of allusion and symbol. Recognized in new combinations and different surroundings, these give a sense of depth and penetration - striking root into a far foretime, at once exciting and illuminating.

Sketch of a program: The present day orientation of elementary school education (grades 1 - 3) in the United States is towards the total development of the child. Success is to be gained by introducing him to and developing his skill in substitutes for one to one experiences with the material and psychological worlds - namely, words in various combinations, read, written, spoken and heard. In

elementary school, subject matter is not divided into various components. Just at this point in a child's education opportunity occurs however, to lay a foundation for the imaginative enjoyment of literature, and for further discovery and recognition. This can be done by introducing him (at his level of comprehension) to the folklore, fairy tales, and national legends which provide material for allusion and symbol used by both past and present writers in the great tradition, to those works the child will later come. This material is the basis but the curriculum need not exclude modern material of literary quality.

Elementary school education in grades 4 - 6 continues the attempt to lead the child towards his individual development by discovering his drives, interests, and motivations, and by nourishing them. Since interests and motivations stem often from stimuli outside the child, and since nourishment always comes from without, these grades provide a place for continuing to feed the imagination of the child by opening up to him (also at this level of comprehension) the field of classical, Nordic, and Biblical story and myth. This program is suggested not to form the whole of the child's elementary education, but rather to give meaning and direction to that part of it which will lead to his further development in what will become later in his schooling the "subject" English. The junior high school

teacher able to count on the child's possession of this background can move with assurance into the teaching of English and American literature as a subject.

In junior high school (grades 7 - 9) the child is supposedly adventuring in and exploring things now to be called "subjects". He is also adjusting himself to the newness of adolescence. Consciousness of literature as an effective way of conveying experience in various forms of poetry, story, and play, should be brought to his attention in his English class.

Here the student must understand not just the excitement of story but what happens to people and what people are like in myth and folklore. He must also be introduced to some of the distinguishing features of each kind of writing and the handles by which he can get hold of the forms and talk about them. His reading might well consist of poems, stories and plays in the great tradition, from both past and contemporary writers (always within his capacity for understanding, but offering him the pleasures and challenges of stretching his mind). Many of the readings should be from works which call upon the literary knowledge he has found in folk tale, mythology, national legend and the Bible. The beginnings of the satisfactions of mature recognition may come to him here, if the teaching is well done. At this point in his education the background circle

for literature may well be widened into history, ancient and modern, and the beginnings of the play of ideas. It will not be hard to supply bibliographies of exciting material, suggesting a wide range, not limited to a special set of five or ten books, yet well within what we may call the literary cultural heritage of England and the Western World. The Iliad, and Odyssey, Job, Ruth, Jonah, chapters from Genesis, Exodus, Samuel, Daniel, and Mathew should certainly appear along with some sagas, children's histories of England and America, and narrative poems of promise. Assurance that students have had this orientation will enable the high school English teacher to begin to approach the subject intellectually.

In the American high school (grades 9 - 12) though development of the individual remains the goal, intellectual development assumes sharper emphasis. The student is by this time well orientated to the concept of subject matter, and knows that adjustment to life demands his mastery of certain blocks of knowledge, outside of himself. The literary heritage is one of those blocks. In considering it, literature should be read and studied as literature, not as documentary evidence for the social sciences. New discoveries are in store for him in the literary heritage, as well as pleasures deriving from recognition and comparison. He should become increasingly aware of literature as a unique

way of reflecting upon and presenting life - a step beyond the story - content and experience transfer of youthful reading.

His reading should widen in types of poetry and plays, in biography, novels, and short stories, in essay and criticism, as well as in more difficult and challenging content.

It is probably inadvisable to try to re-introduce a "set-books" program for high school students. Yet the high school student must have knowledge and experience of certain varieties of literary expression. The books chosen to illustrate them should be of high quality. For example, in the novel, it is necessary and practicable to insist that novels of the following kinds must be read.

Simple narrative (e.g. Robinson Crusoe)

Picaresque novel (Lazarillo de Tormes)

Historical novel (A Tale of Two Cities; The Great Meadow)

Novel of manners (Pride and Prejudice)

Bildungsroman (David Copperfield, Jane Eyre)

Novel of ideas (The Scarlet Letter; Arrowsmith)

Psychological novel (Red Badge of Courage)

In the drama, reading a play with enough imagination to know how it would look and sound on the stage requires training. High school "English" should provide this training, so that students will be able to project onto an imagined

stage the author's description of characters and their actions, stage direction and dialogue. This training might well begin with a few modern plays (by Galsworthy, O'Neill, Arthur Miller) and then move back to a few examples of older drama. By this means the students will learn what the perennial technical problems of the playwright are: chiefly the telling of his complicated story in the short time at his disposal. Suggestions: one Greek tragedy; a comedy and a tragedy by Shakespeare; the School for Scandal; Shaw's St. Joan. In poetry, high school students should know a meditative lyric from a narrative poem, from having read and discussed the kinds of poetry. They should also have limited but precise knowledge of prosody. The discovery of "roots", the gaining of perspective, the awareness of the illuminating capabilities of allusion, and the impressive communication of ideas are here educative in the best sense. In high school also, some introduction should be given by the English teacher of the whereabouts of classical expression of ideas that have animated modern literature in Plato, Lucretius, Cicero, Augustine, Dante and Montaigne. What a foundation for students entering college! What a challenge to those who are not.

Literature for college freshmen and sophomore should survey the English and American tradition and examining the literary effectiveness of treating certain ideas of convention

and revolt as expressed in different periods and amid different forms (such works as Herberts' *The Collar*, Francis Thomson's *Hound of Heaven*, and Waugh's *Brideshead Revisited* come to mind as expressing excellently an Augustinian theme based ultimately on the Greek mean of *Sophrosyne*)...

PMLA Supplement, Vol. LXXIV , (Sept. 1959), pp. 12-14.

APPENDIX II

Some books recommended in The Sixtieth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Development In and Through Reading. pp. 199-203.

Extension of experience through literature:-

Popular and useful fiction in meeting this (adolescent thirst for action) need are the adventure and mystery pieces of James Kjelgaard, Montgomery Atwater, Lew Dietz, Stephen Meader, James R. Ullman, and Ellis Dillon; the sea adventures of Robert DuSoe, Victor Mays, Armstrong Sperry, and Harry Rieseberg; the historical fiction of Merritt Allen, Carol Brink, Gertrude Finney, and Conrad Richter. Also useful are biographies of people of action, such as those by Doris Shannon Garst of American frontier figures. Lustrous, narrative poems - "The Highwayman," "Casey at the Bat," "Ballad of East and West" - find a ready response.

A study of the westward movement might be enhanced by the reading of biographies of frontier heroes or of quality westerns by writers such as Jack Schaeffer, Walter Van Tilburg Clark, Lee Leighton, or A.B. Guthrie. Or the events

leading up to the American Revolution might take on new meaning when presented through the eyes of a teenaged boy in Esther Forbes' Johnny Tremain.

Consideration of contemporary social problems in the social-studies class suggests another possibility for providing the human, emotionalized dimension of understanding - Negro-white relations in Catherine Blanton's Hold Fast to Your Dreams or Phyllis Whitney's Willow Hill; economic problems in Mary Stolz' Ready or Not or Richard Llewellyn's How Green Was My Valley; juvenile delinquency in John F. Carson's The Twenty-third Street Crusaders or Warren Miller's The Cool World.

Science fiction, of the quality written by Robert Heinlein, Ray Bradbury, Isaac Asimov, and Murray Leinster, suggests itself immediately as do biographies of men of science, from Galileo to J. Robert Oppenheimer.

Literature as role-playing: As vicarious experience, imaginative literature affords an opportunity for adolescents to play roles, to try themselves out. Maureen Daly's Seventeenth Summer, the story of a seventeen-year-old girl's first serious love affair; the novel is popular with fourteen or fifteen-year-olds, not seventeen-year-olds. And, indeed,

from a purely literary point of view, skilful reading of Seventeenth Summer and the other love stories by such authors as Anne Emery and Mary Stolz is needed preparation for later reading of, say, Wuthering Heights... zest for Atwater, Mays, Kjelgaard leads on to zest for Hemingway and Conrad as he experiences (not hears about) what literature can do.

Synthesis of experience. Breadth and variety of selection and approach are vital. Selections from the Antigone to Archibald MacLeish's J.B., from Chaucer's Canterbury Tales to James Michener's The Bridges at Toko Ri are needed to set off the mosaic of human nature... Paul Annixter's Swiftwater is a necessary step toward, say, Walter Van Tilburg Clark's The Track of the Cat, after which may come, for example, Hardy's The Return of the Native.

Biography makes an important contribution to students' examination of values as they consider such careers as those of Louis Armstrong (Trumpeter's Tale by Jeannette Eaton), Albert Schweitzer (Genius in the Jungle by Joseph Gollomb), Jane Addams (City Neighbor by Clara Judson), and Clarence Darrow (Clarence Darrow for the Defense by Irving Stone).

Some readings included in The English Language Arts in the Secondary School, prepared by The Commission on the English Curriculum of the NCTE, Volume III. pp. 137-148.

Titles suitable for rapid reading : Jack O'Brien's Silver Chief, Dog of the North, John Tunis' many popular stories, Gregor Felsen's Hot Rod, or Cornelia Otis Skinner and Emily Kimbrough's Our Hearts Were Young and Gay. Suitable for intensive reading: Conrad's The Rover.

Centers of interest for units in literature: The interest may be in sections of our country. Robert Frost's pictures of bending birches, of snowstorms, of fences, and of nature in New England - Edith Wharton's granite outcroppings as revealed in Ethan Frome. Mark Twain, Hamlin Garland, Ole Rolvaag, Ruth Suckow, and Willa Cather reveal something of the diversity of life in the Middle West. Sophomores enjoy pursuing the universal problem of "parent trouble" in such novels as Alice T. Hobart's The Peacock Sheds His Tail (South America), Alice M. Huggins' The Red Chair Waits (China), and John Drinkwater's Bird in Hand (Great Britain). Unit may be centered in frustration, a common theme in literature, as in The Return of the Native, Giants in the Earth, and Cry, the Beloved Country. Problems of growing up, in which Maureen Daly's Seventeenth Summer, Betty Cavanna's

A Girl Can Dream, Mary Stolz's In a Mirror.

Older boys have seen the answer to their fears in The Red Badge of Courage and Journey's End. Both boys and girls are interested in family relationships in Alice Adams, Of Human Bondage, Sorrell and Son, Hamlet, and Antigone. Individual girls, and boys too, have asked for Adam Bede and The Scarlet Letter. Other seniors do well if they read Douglas Gorsline's Farm Boy or Betty Cavanna's Going on Sixteen. The problem is to help each pupil to find the books best suited to his needs and to his level of ability.

Heritage of freedom is effectively revealed in Paul Green's play, The Common Glory, in Clara Ingram Judson's biography of Thomas Jefferson, in Esther Forbes' novel, Johnny Tremain, in the Benéts' collection of poems called Book of Americans, in Walt Whitman's Poems of Democracy, and in Dorothy Thompson's powerful essay, America.

Young people enjoy taking part in acts and scenes from Shakespeare's plays - not only brilliant students but those sometimes deprived of acquaintance with Shakespeare by elders who forget - or never knew - that by some miracle Shakespeare spoke to groundlings as well as to philosophers. Since the language of Shakespeare is a foreign tongue to

many boys and girls, use of recordings, of films, and of television is an invaluable aid to those incapable of discerning without assistance the meaning of the lines.

Poetry, involves the use of the ears and sometimes of movement. So does some prose - rhythmical prose found, for example, in *A Tale of Two Cities* and *Cry, the Beloved Country*. Classes enjoy coming in with a refrain, as in "Sally in Our Alley," Browning's "Cavalier Tunes," and W.R. Benét's "Jesse James." Informal verse choirs add to appreciation. Dialogue enhances old ballads, as do refrains like those in the traditional English ballad, "The Coasts of High Barbary," and the American ballads like John Jacob Niles's version of "The Weep Willow Tree" and Richard Chase's repetitive refrains in his *Hullabaloo and Other Singing Folk Games* and in his *Grandfather Tales and Jack Tales*. Ichabod Paddock's "Blow, Boys, Blow" in Carl Carmer's *America Sings* is also a favorite with younger students. The martial rhythm of Chesterton's "Lepanto" is in marked contrast to the music of Wordsworth's "I Wandered Lonely as a Cloud." The changing rhythm of John Brown's *Body* gains in beauty through an understanding of the poet's purpose in varying it. Masfield's skill in "Sea-Fever" illustrates the beauty of variation in meter in an effort to communicate movement and experience.

Insight into Great Britain through Irving's Sketch Book, Masfield, Riggs's Beowulf, and Marryat; Chaucer's ploughman. Later centuries as represented by Gray, Burns, Goldsmith, Housman, Hardy, Scott, Dickens, Keats, Shelley, Tennyson, Browning, and Auden.

The study of world literature : Sophocles Antigone, Plato's The Republic, Ibsen's An Enemy of the People, Drinkwater's Oliver Cromwell and Abraham Lincoln, Maxwell Anderson's Elizabeth the Queen and Valley Forge, War and Peace, Crime and Punishment, Kristin Lavransdatter, and Conrad's The Rover.

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