AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PREDICTORS OF REVOLUTIONARY COLLECTIVE ACTION: ABOLISHING SECTARIAN QUOTAS IN LEBANON

by

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at the American University of Beirut

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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

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Social psychological research on collective action has focused primarily on the social change goal of amelioration, with little emphasis on revolutionary collective action. Moreover, most research has focused on goals that are either progressive *or* regressive, with more emphasis on the former. In the present study, we examine social psychological predictors of a revolutionary social change goal, namely abolishing the quota system from political posts in Lebanon, and examine the possibility that different groups may join the same "revolutionary" collective action but for largely conflicting social change goals, thus making the social change progressive for some groups but regressive for others.

Using a survey study among a sample of Lebanese students at the American University of Beirut, we use the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA) to examine predictors of collective action for a revolutionary goal, namely abolishing sectarian quotas from political positions in Lebanon. In particular, we examine if national identification, which is often called upon to resolve Lebanon' sectarian conflicts, predicts collective action intentions for abolishing sectarian quotas both directly, and indirectly through its influence on perceived injustice of sectarian quotas, and group efficacy. Importantly, we extend the SIMCA model by examining if national identification predicts collective action differently depending on: 1) whether participants perceive the abolishment of confessional quotas to affect the power of their sect positively, negatively, or to have no effect, and 2) on how sectarian they are.

Our results show that national identification does not always promote collective action: among those who think the abolishment of sectarian quotas will increase the power of their sect and who are low on sectarianism, greater national identification is linked with *lower* collective action tendencies. Additionally, collective action was not always driven by progressive motives as lower sectarianism was not always associated with greater collective action tendencies: among those who thought the abolishment of sectarian quotas will increase the power of their sect and who were highly identified with Lebanon, collective action was independent of sectarianism, suggesting both those low and high in sectarianism were equally attracted to collective action. In addition, although perceived injustice emerged as an important mediator of the link between national identity and collective action, group efficacy played a less important role than predicted by the SIMCA model. Theoretical and practical implications of the study are discussed.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Since December 2010, the Arab world has witnessed a series of popular uprisings where protestors united under slogans like 'bread, freedom, and dignity', managing to put aside their ideological differences, at least temporarily, with the aim of abolishing long-standing authoritarian regimes (Blight, Pulham, & Torpey, 2012; Teti & Gervasio, 2011). In Lebanon, there were similar attempts, such as the Laique Pride and "Isqat el Nizam al Taifi" movements, calling for overthrowing the sectarian political system (Bahlawan, 2014; El Houri, 2012). These movements believed the strict division of sectarian quotas on which the system is built is the source of the social and economic burdens of the country (Antelava, 2010; Maaroufi, 2014). However, despite noticeable environmental deterioration, unemployment, increased corruption, social inequality, and uneven regional development (Makdisi & El-Khalil, 2013), recent attempts at abolishing the sectarian political system at the time of writing this thesis had not led to widespread cross-sectarian mobilization (El Houri, 2012).

The current study aimed to identify the social psychological predictors of revolutionary collective political action aimed at abolishing a pillar of the sectarian political system in Lebanon, namely sectarian quotas allocated to political power positions. According to Wright, Taylor and Moghaddam (1990), "a group member engages in collective action anytime that he or she is acting as a representative of the group and the action is directed at improving the conditions of the entire group" (p. 995, as cited in Wright, 2001). This definition has become commonplace in social psychology (van

Zomeren & Iyer, 2009). Collective action can take various forms, ranging from relatively mild nonviolent actions such as signing petitions, attending meetings, protesting, or boycotting, to more militant actions such as strikes or riots (Simon, Loewy, Sturmer, Weber, Freytag, Habig, et al., 1998). In the present study, we focused on predictors of nonviolent forms of collective action. We begin with a brief overview of the sectarian political system in Lebanon and how the abolishment of sectarian quotas constitutes a revolutionary goal, after which we turn to the proposed predictors of collective action for such a revolutionary goal, and outline our hypotheses.

A. The Sectarian Political System in Lebanon

Lebanon is made up of 18 officially recognized religious groups, which consist of four Muslim sects, 12 Christian sects, the Druze sect, and Judaism (Traboulsi, 2007). Although it has been argued that no single sect constitutes a clear majority in Lebanon, recent demographic changes suggest that Shiites might presently constitute the largest sectarian group (Mikdashi, 2011). Throughout its history, Lebanon has been governed by a meticulously balanced power sharing system known as consociationalism, also referred to as confessionalism (Makdisi & El-Khalil, 2013; Muhanna, 2012). Under this system, all parliamentary seats and top executive governmental posts are divided according to sectarian quotas, with the goal of promoting stability and harmony in a religiously heterogeneous society. The unwritten national pact of the independence movement divided parliamentary seats between Christians and Muslims according to a 6:5 ratio, in favor of the Christian community (Traboulsi, 2007). It was agreed upon under this pact that the president of the republic would be Christian Maronite, the Prime Minister Muslim Sunni, and the speaker of parliament Muslim Shi'ite (Traboulsi, 2007).

The aim of this agreement was to circumvent Christian and Muslim fears of the dominance of one group over the other, and to build a common national identity between Lebanese Muslims and Christians. To elaborate, Christians felt threatened that they would be overwhelmed by the Muslim communities and the neighboring Arab states, while Muslims were threatened by the relationship of the Christians with the West, namely France, and feared Western hegemony. As such, Christians promised not to seek Western protection and to welcome Lebanon as an Arab state, while Muslims promised to recognize the sovereignty of Lebanon and abandon ties with Syria (Bray-Collins, 2013; Traboulsi, 2007). Accordingly, the confessional system managed Christian-Muslim conflict for around three decades.

Although its goal was to uphold stability and democracy, and although it has been credited for Lebanon's three decades of stability (Bray-Collins, 2013; Dekmejian, 1978), the confessional system is believed to have promoted a weak and paralyzed central authority, which could not prevent the country from entering into a civil war (Choucair, 2006; Makdisi & El-Khalil, 2013). The civil war ended with the Ta'if accord, which reaffirmed the principle of power sharing, but readjusted the balance of power among Christians and Muslims, equalizing it according to a 5:5 ratio (Makdisi & El-Khalil, 2013). In addition, the Ta'if accord severely curtailed the privileges of the (Christian) president of the republic, who lost most executive powers to the prime minister, the cabinet, and the Parliament and its speaker (Traboulsi, 2007). Importantly, however, the amended Article 95 of the constitution stated that, after a transitional phase, the principle of confessional representation was to be abolished and replaced by the principle of merit (Makdisi & El-Khalil, 2013).

However, the goal of abolishing sectarianism has been largely ignored, and the current system of representation does not take into account that Muslims have constituted the predominant demographic majority at least since the 1960s (Ofeish, 1999). Moreover, the current power sharing system is seen by some (e.g. Makdisi & El-Khalil, 2013; Muhanna, 2012) to allow the confessional elites to fight over parochial self-interests while ignoring general welfare.

Another consequence of the confessional political system in Lebanon is that it makes it difficult to separate one's sectarian identity from political participation, due to the representative quotas assigned to each sectarian group, which effectively means that Lebanese citizens compete for political seats based on their sectarian identity (Di Ricco, 2011). In this way, the relationship between the Lebanese citizen and the state is mediated by one's respective confessional community. In fact, it has been argued that "confessional cleavages have intensified as a result of consociationalism in Lebanon and power sharing among the different confessions has only served to highlight divisions based on religious identity (Bray-Collins, 2013; Salamey & Payne, 2008). Consequently, one cannot be "exempted from a confessional identity" within such a system (Di Ricco, 2011, p. 78). Furthermore, Lebanese citizens do not have a united legal civil status law. Personal status laws, including issues related to marriage and inheritance, are dealt directly with the respective sectarian communities, leaving the state out of such issues and thus reinforcing the social and political role of these communities. As such, secular individuals and non-confessional political parties clearly start from a disadvantaged position when trying to take part in national politics, and struggle to play an influential role in the power-sharing process (Bray-Collins, 2013; Di Ricco, 2011).

B. The Anti-Sectarian Movement in Lebanon

Against the backdrop of repeated sectarian conflicts throughout Lebanese history (Al Jazeera, 2014; Knutsen, 2014; Nassif, 2014), there have been repeated demands by various sectors of society to abolish the confessional political system and create a national identity by separating religion from politics. Demands for secular reforms were made prior to the civil war and throughout the postwar era (Bray-Collins, 2013; Khayat, 2012). Some relatively recent examples of government-led secular demands include former president Hrawi's civil marriage bill as a first step in his campaign to set up a secular state (Ziade, 1998), Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri's call to establish a national committee to abolish political sectarianism (Ghaddar, 2010), and more present-day popular movements and campaigns led by civil society, such as the campaign initiated by the Civic Center for the National Initiative for civil marriage (Muhanna, 2013b), the Laique Pride, and the Isqat el Nizam movement calling for abolishing the sectarian system (Bahlawan, 2014; Gino, 2011; Meier, 2013). Some civil society activist groups believe that to create political stability and accountability in Lebanon, the country needs to have a secular form of governance where equal rights among citizens are recognized regardless of sect (Muhanna, 2010b; Traboulsi, 2007).

Since the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon in 2005, demands for political reform and "deconfessionalization" have gained momentum, with the most vocal voices coming from the Lebanese youth (Bray-Collins, 2013). According to some, this "postwar generation" has organized some of the biggest demonstrations in Lebanese history and has managed to mobilize secular political parties in Lebanon who are not affiliated with confessional groups (Bahlawan, 2014; Bray-Collins, 2013). In fact, the withdrawal of Syria

from Lebanon happened after the Independence Intifada of 2005, where youth from independent leftist or left-leaning student movements, as well as right-leaning political parties, took part hoping to create an independent and secular political movement. Both left-leaning and right- leaning parties were demanding the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon, but the leftist movements also wanted to secularize the political system (Bray-Collins, 2013; Schlotterbeck, 2009). This movement, however, did not result in a fundamental change in the political system because it got co-opted by confessional leaders (Bray-Collins, 2013; Gahre, 2011; NOW, 2007; Schlotterbeck, 2009). The country became further divided after 2005 with the political vacuum created by the Syrian withdrawal, into two main opposing coalitions (March 8 and March 14) that exist until today (Bray-Collins, 2013; Gahre, 2011). There are Christian and Muslim groups on both sides that hold "contradictory positions on the identity, direction, and foreign orientation of Lebanon and that are driven by concerns over "'getting their share' and fears of domination by the other" (Bray-Collins, 2013, p. 284).

The "Arab Spring" gave a new momentum to civil society groups in Lebanon, and gave rise to the anti-sectarian movement (Bahlawan; 2014; Meier, 2013). There had been other movements before the Isqat el Nizam movement calling for secularizing certain aspects of the system, such as the campaign to remove one's religious sect from national identity cards (Abizeid, 2009), and the Laique Pride movement, which consisted of activists demanding a secular state, mainly focused on a secular law for personal status (Bahlawan, 2014; Meier, 2013). The Laique pride was organized through Facebook and largely consisted of educated youth (Bray-Collins, 2013; Meier, 2015). Meanwhile, the Isqat el Nizam movement explicitly called for overthrowing the sectarian system, mainly by

abolishing the quota system and having a unified civil personal status law (Chit, 2012;

Meier, 2015). This movement conveyed demands akin to those of protesters in the Arab

Spring, where the anti-sectarian movement (ASM) raised slogans similar to those used in

Egypt and Tunisia (Bahlawan, 2014; Meier, 2013). The main slogan used during this

movement was "the people want to bring down the regime" (الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام) borrowed

from the Arab Spring and adding "confessional" (الطائفي) at the end to make it more specific

to the Lebanese context (Meier, 2013). Although these groups had no unified long-term

strategy of achieving their aims (Bahlawan, 2014; Meier, 2015), they managed to mobilize

relatively large numbers of people in various cities (e.g. Saida and Tripoli) (Meier, 2013).

They were also successful in mobilizing diverse segments of the society, such as men and

women from different age groups and sects, and they were able to re-introduce the issue of

secularism into the public discourse (Meier, 2013). Another anti-sectarian movement that

started in the summer of 2012 was Take Back Parliament (TBP), which differentiated itself

from other movements by developing a clear political agenda and aiming to take part in

parliamentary elections and infiltrating the system by getting independent candidates into

the Lebanese parliament (Bahlawan, 2014; Maaroufi, 2014). The goal of TBP was to tackle

all aspects of the Lebanese sectarian system and establish a secular state, a just economic

system, and democratic representation (Maaroufi, 2014). The group aimed to fight

corruption by establishing a secular system through changing the electoral law, legalizing

civil marriage, and reforming the judicial system (Meier, 2015).

So far, however, Lebanon has been resistant to change in terms of achieving secular

reforms (Bray-Collins, 2013; Khayat, 2012). Proposals to change the current system of

quotas are regarded with suspicion, since it is believed that they might decrease the

representation of a particular sect in parliament (Muhanna, 2012; Zbeeb, 2012) and undermine minority rights and religious freedom (Makdisi & El-Khalil, 2013). Therefore, even though many Lebanese complain about the problems inherent in the current system, such as corruption, unemployment, and poverty, to name a few (USAID, 2012), there is impotence on the civic side, and no collective action opposing the entire sectarian leadership had, at the time of writing this thesis, attracted a large number of people (Al-Amine, 2012; el Houri, 2012).

In the current study, our aim is to examine the social psychological predictors of collective action aimed at altering one aspect of the political sectarian system in Lebanon, which is the abolishment of confessional quotas from political positions in Lebanon (Muhanna 2010a). We hereafter refer to secularism as abolishing sectarian quotas from all political positions in Lebanon, because, as per the Taif agreement, it is considered a "fundamental national objective" (Amiri, 2009; Turkmen-Dervisoglu, 2012), although it has been argued that establishing a secular system in Lebanon is not simply about abolishing these quotas but about building an entirely new system from the bottom up (Muhanna, 2009). We consider collective action for the abolishment of confessional quotas to constitute a revolutionary collective action goal, for reasons we explain next.

CHAPTER II

REVOLUTIONARY COLLECTIVE ACTION

Collective action can have a wide range of social change goals, ranging from reform to revolution. In a recent typology of social change goals, Sweetman, Leach, Spears, Pratto, and Saab (2013) identified revolution as a unique social change goal, defined as "a

fundamental change in one or more (sub) systems (e.g., economic, political, kinship, or cultural/religious) in a society", with the goal of improving the situation of disadvantaged groups within the social system (p. 306). As such, a revolutionary goal involves the rejection of current authorities and institutions and the ability to imagine the establishment of alternative institutions, rather than focusing on changing the outcomes of disadvantaged groups within the *current* system. According to Sweetman et al. (2013), this imaginative aspect, as well as the perception that it is impossible to change one's situation within the current system, is central to the development of a revolutionary change.

Sweetman et al. (2013) argue that most previous research in the social psychology of collective action has focused on the social change goal of amelioration (akin to reform), whereby a disadvantaged group aims to improve their situation *within* the current system (Sturmer & Simon, 2004; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2010). Little research, however, has focused on predictors of *revolutionary* social change goals, an aspect that we tackle in the present study. The abolishment of sectarian quotas in Lebanon, which is the object of study of the present research, can be considered a revolutionary form of social change due to its potential to lead to a fundamental change in the power structure.

Sweetman et al. (2013) further differentiate between progressive and regressive revolutions depending on the scope of inclusiveness of social change. Inclusiveness defines which groups stand to benefit from the social change, and whose needs and well-being are taken into account, or whose social value is being increased. A regressive revolution has the goal of improving the situation of only certain subgroups within society (a particular sect in this case) and is thus exclusive, while a progressive revolution aims to benefit all groups within the system (i.e. the Lebanese people as a whole) and is thus inclusive. For example,

according to Sweetman et al. (2013), the Russian Revolution of 1917 can be considered a regressive revolution because it excluded and marginalized all opposing political parties and considered the Communist party superior to the rest of the group. Conversely, the revolutionary values advocated by Martin Luther King Jr. to eradicate racism and poverty are progressive because they call for "unconditional love for all men" as well as justice and equality regardless of race, religion, class, or nationality (Martin Luther King, Jr., 1967, as cited in Sweetman et al., 2013).

Previous research mostly focused on collective action for progressive rather than regressive goals (e.g. Sturmer & Simon, 2004; Subasic, Reynolds, Reicher, & Klandermans, 2012; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008a). Furthermore, previous research has tended to focus on collective action motives for either progressive (e.g. Tausch & Becker, 2013) *or* regressive goals (e.g. Cakal, Hewstone, Schwar, & Heath, 2011). Less attention has been given to contexts where the same collective action can be pursued for both progressive and regressive motives, thus drawing members with potentially differing ideologies to the same campaign. For example, during the ostensibly popular revolution of Egypt, which ended the 30-year autocracy of President Hosni Mubarak, and called for liberty, dignity and social justice, secular revolutionary groups, leftist movements, the working classes, and more conservative counter-revolutionary groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, took part in the protests (Gaber, 2014; North, 2011) . It can be argued that these different groups that participated in the same movement did so for differing ideologies and aims. Even though leftist movements might have organized it for progressive values, the Muslim Brotherhood could have done so for regressive strategic reasons, mainly to get to power (Alim, 2013; Daher, 2011; Gaber, 2014). However, it has

also been argued that the Muslim Brotherhood never really wanted to be in control but was content with being represented (Hamid & Brooke, 2011). Therefore, it is worthwhile to study contexts where different groups come to take part in the same collective action, but for different long-term goals in mind.

A primary aim of the current study is to determine whether collective action for abolishing the quota system is undertaken as a progressive or regressive revolutionary goal. We propose that the abolishment of sectarian quotas in Lebanon can be considered a progressive revolutionary goal by some and a regressive goal by others. On one hand, abolishing sectarian quotas is progressive to the extent that it can potentially seriously weaken current political leaders of each sect and religious institutions who currently control social and political life (Ghazal, 2006), put an end to the recurrent sectarian strife (Ghazal, 2006; Makdisi & El-Khalil, 2013), and it gives all citizens non-exclusive access to all positions of power (Peeters, 2010). Even back in 1969, Hudson (1976) proposed that a revolution of secularization would be the only hope of creating a united Lebanon. Indeed, according to Makdisi and El-Khalil (2013), establishing a secular state, which is inclusive of the Lebanese multi-religious society, would greatly enhance the legitimacy and accountability of Lebanese political institutions. Moreover, abolishing sectarian quotas from political posts can be considered progressive because it implies an equal treatment of all Lebanese citizens regardless of sect (Muhanna, 2010a), and is thus inclusive of all sectarian subgroups within Lebanon.

On the other hand, the removal of sectarian quotas is also viewed as a regressive goal by some sects, in particular some Christian groups, who fear that abolishing the current system will lead to a shift in power and privilege in favor of Muslims who

constitute a demographic majority, thus resulting in their dominance over the affairs of the nation (Makdisi & El-Khalil, 2013). This has caused Christian groups to adamantly oppose abolishing political sectarianism (Traboulsi, 2007), even though they used to constitute a secularized middle class (Asmar, Kisirwani, & Springborg, 1999). Consistent with this, a survey of 500 Lebanese by Information International in 2010 found that the greatest percentage in each sect of those opposed to the elimination of political sectarianism were Maronites (43%). Interestingly, a majority of Shiites supported abolishing political sectarianism (89%). Some argue that Shi'ites call for eliminating the sectarian system knowing that it is their community that stands to gain the most, while Maronites, who are currently over-represented, will lose their current privileges (Mikdashi, 2011; Peeters, 2010). Therefore, abolishing the sectarian quotas might be perceived as regressive because it can be considered exclusive of certain sectarian subgroups, in particular some Christian groups and minority sects.

In fact, one of the reported difficulties of the campaigns against the confessional system in Lebanon was the divergent motives that the various groups had. For example, some perceive that one problem that the Isqat el Nizam Movement faced was that political parties and groups with separate agendas tried to co-opt the movement, and groups affiliated with leading political parties in the country (who are part of the system) infiltrated the movement (e.g. Syrian Social Nationalist Party, Amal Movement) (Anderson, 2011; Chit, 2012; Elali, 2011; Hermez, 2011; Meier, 2015). This meant that attacking the existing political system was possible so long as the particular leaders and parties of these members were not on the receiving end. This created a division within the movement, which led to demands that were too general and fragmented, to the point where the movement's position

regarding the established political elite became unclear (Hermez, 2011; Meier, 2015).

Other theoretical problems arose when the group tried to reconcile the desire of some

activists taking the path of reform within the system by creating opportunistic alliances

with political parties, while others wanted a revolutionary path which refuses any kind of

collaboration with current parties and rejects their legitimacy (Bahlawan, 2014; Chit, 2012;

Meier, 2013; Meier, 2015). In the present research we seek to uncover whether the same

revolutionary collective action can attract those who have a progressive goal and those have

a regressive goal. We use sectarianism as an indicator of whether a revolution is undertaken

for regressive or progressive reasons. We elaborate on this idea next.

CHAPTER III

PREDICTORS OF REVOLUTIONARY COLLECTIVE ACTION

A. Sectarianism

Sectarianism is central to any political discourse in Lebanon, since it permeates the

entire system and continues to dominate social and political life (Traboulsi, 2007). It is

believed to be maintained through the confessional power sharing system (Kobeissi, 2013),

which promotes patrimonial relationships and highlights sectarian divisions (Traboulsi,

2007). Sectarianism is defined as ingroup bias and favoritism based purely on one's

affiliation with a confessional group (Cairns, Kenworthy, Campbell, & Hewstone, 2006;

Harb, 2010). It can be considered similar to racism (Harb, 2010), and extreme levels of

sectarian ingroup bias have been found to often lead to prejudicial behavior against

members of other sects (Cairns et al., 2006). It has also been linked to discrimination

towards members of other sects (e.g. favoring budget cuts from the other sect rather than one's own sect) (Niens, Cairns, & Bishop, 2004).

A study assessing the social psychological profiles of a representative sample of 1200 Lebanese youth found that they highly endorsed sectarianism (ingroup bias), irrespective of gender, confession, or geographic region (Harb, 2010). In another study in the Lebanese context, Henry and Hardin (2006) found that both Christians and Muslims expressed equal levels of outgroup prejudice, measured as greater negative feelings towards the other religious group. Additionally, Kobeissi (2013) found that Lebanese university students scored moderately high on sectarianism, indicating a bias towards their own sectarian groups. Hence, research suggests that sectarianism is prevalent among Lebanese youth.

To determine whether collective action to abolish the confessional quotas in Lebanon is taken to achieve progressive or regressive goals, we rely on the directional link between sectarianism and collective action. We base this rationale on the Social Dominance Theory literature (SDT), which has shown that social dominance orientation (SDO) differentiates between people who endorse hierarchy-enhancing and hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths. Hierarchy-enhancing myths are ideologies that enhance social inequalities and legitimize discrimination (e.g. meritocracy) while hierarchy-attenuating myths are ideologies that are egalitarian and promote greater social equality (e.g. feminism) (Pratto & Cathey, 2002; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Pratto, Stallworth, & Conway-Lanz, 1998; Sidanius, Pratto, Sinclair, & van Laar, 1996). The SDT literature has shown that SDO negatively predicts the endorsement of hierarchy-attenuating ideologies (i.e. those low on SDO have a preference for inclusiveness and group equality), while it

positively predicts the endorsement of hierarchy-enhancing ideologies (i.e. those high on

SDO have a preference for group status and power and endorse inequality between groups).

Moreover, people low on SDO pursue careers in hierarchy-attenuating institutions (e.g.

social welfare and civil rights organizations) while people high on SDO pursue careers in

hierarchy-enhancing institutions (e.g. the police, financial houses, and many corporations)

(Pratto & Cathey, 2002; Sidanius et al., 1996).

Accordingly, we posit that if those low on sectarianism are more likely to engage in

collective action for abolishing confessional quotas, the collective action is aimed at

improving the situation of the Lebanese as a whole, and conclude that collective action has

a *progressive* revolutionary goal. Conversely, if those high on sectarianism are more likely

to take part in such collective action, this means the action is intended to increase their own

power and representation, and their actual aims are exclusive of the rest of the subgroups

within the system (i.e. other sects). In this case, we would consider collective action to have

a *regressive* revolutionary goal. Therefore, we define a goal as progressive if sectarianism

negatively predicts collective action, and we define it as regressive if sectarianism

positively predicts collective action.

Furthermore, if there is no link between sectarianism and collective action, we

suggest that both those high and low on sectarianism may engage in collective action for

abolishing confessional quotas. We base this interpretation on the SDT literature, which has

shown that in some cases both those high and low on SDO will support a particular policy,

but for different ideological reasons. For example, Pratto et al. (1998) showed that both

people high and low on SDO supported the nomination of Clarence Thomas, a Black

conservative, to the Supreme Court. Those high on SDO supported his nomination for

hierarchy-enhancing reasons (because he was conservative) and those low on SDO supported his nomination for hierarchy-attenuating reasons (because he was Black). According to Pratto and Cathey (2002), it is possible for SDO not to correlate with policy attitudes, especially when it is unclear whether the policy will help the powerful or the powerless (Pratto & Cathey, 2002). Accordingly, we propose that it is possible for a lack of link between sectarianism and collective action to mean that both those high and low on sectarianism are equally likely to take part in collective action. In this case, collective action can have both progressive and regressive goals.

We further argue that whether collective action for abolishing sectarian quotas has a progressive or regressive goal depends on people's perception of how abolishing confessional quotas will impact their own sect. We explain in the next section how the link between sectarianism and collective action should be moderated by perceived sectarian group interest.

B. Perceived Sectarian Group Interest

Research suggests that people take action based on the interests of the social groups to which they belong, even if they do not stand to personally gain or lose from these actions (O'Brien, Garcia, & Crandall, 2010). Group interest is similar to the notion of in-group favoritism in social identity theory, which consists of giving preferential treatment to individuals who are perceived to be part of the ingroup, whether the groups in question are arbitrarily set or have cultural or historical significance (Brewer, 1999). Social dominance theory also suggests that high status group members are motivated to maintain their power in a group-based hierarchy (Ellemers & Bos, 1998; Pratto et al., 1998; Scheepers &

Ellemers, 2005). Similarly, Lowery, Unzueta, Knowles, and Goff (2006) suggest that "pure group interest" plays an important role in what policies group members support (p. 961).

Group interest has been studied as a predictor of support for affirmative action policies. Affirmative action refers to policies taken by governments, universities, and private employers to combat discrimination against historically disadvantaged groups such as women and ethnic minorities, particularly in the United States (Crosby, Iyer, Clayton, & Downing, 2003), by favoring them for certain posts or providing them with special opportunities. In a direct examination of the group interest perspective, Lowery et al. (2006) presented White participants with different versions of a company's hiring policies that differed in the affirmative action procedures they used and how effective they were in hiring ethnic minorities. Participants then indicated their support for the policies and how much they perceived it would harm Whites. Results revealed that the more the policies were perceived to harm Whites' chances of being hired, the less support they received. Therefore, harm to the ingroup was a critical factor in determining support for the policy (Lowery et al., 2006). Various other studies have shown that group interest plays a critical role in what policies group members support (Chow, Lowery, & Hogan, 2013; Iyer & Ryan, 2009; O'Brien et al., 2010).

Accordingly, perceived group interest might play an important role in determining support for the abolishment of sectarian quotas in Lebanon. It has been argued that changing the confessional quotas will be rejected by the confessional elites, especially by those who perceive they would stand to lose power from such a change (Bray-Collins, 2013). In fact, some have argued that Lebanon is akin to "the board of a corporation where each party pursues its own interest" (Bray-Collins, 2013, p. 286). As previously mentioned,

various confessional subgroups will indeed be influenced differently if the sectarian quotas are eliminated. For example, Christians, who currently occupy 50% of the positions in parliament, may think that they stand to lose from such a change since they are now estimated to constitute a demographic minority. High status Christian groups such as the Maronites may thus seek protection within the status quo of the confessional system, out of fear of the rising power and numbers of other sects such as the Shi'ites and the Sunnis. However it is also possible that some Maronites might perceive that they will not be affected by the removal of the quota system because, as argued by the late Member of Parliament Pierre Gemayel (who was Maronite) in 2005, Maronites may not have the quantity but they have the quality (Karam, 2006). Indeed, even though the current system over-represents them in theory, they might find a meritocratic system more beneficial for them if they believe in this quality vs. quantity argument. Furthermore, some Maronites might perceive that the current system is not beneficial for them since it allowed some Christian positions, such as the presidency, to be vacant for some time in recent years (Lakkis & Dakroubi, 2014). Conversely, Muslims, such as the Shi'ites may think they stand to gain, since they are thought to constitute a larger share of the population than their current parliamentary representation would suggest (Bray-Collins, 2013; Mikdashi, 2011). As such, Muslims groups might perceive the current system as one that denies them the power they deserve (Asmar et al., 1999). It has also been argued that the late leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, Kamal Jumblat (who was Druze) promoted the establishment of a secular state under a progressive and revolutionary pretext, only to revitalize the role of the Druze minority in Lebanon (Khayat, 2012). It must also be noted, however, that the last official census in Lebanon was conducted in 1932 (Lebanese Information Center, 2013). As

such, projections based on demographics regarding the consequences of abolishing

confessional quotas for each sect are rooted in perceptions and speculations. Therefore,

rather than relying on group membership as an indication of group interest, we examine

perceived group interest in the present research as a predictor of collective action for

abolishing sectarian quotas.

In sum, group status raises concerns about status enhancement for low status

groups, and status protection for high status groups (Gonzalez & Brown, 2006; Tajfel &

Turner, 1986). Based on this reviewed research, and taking into account that the removal of

sectarian quotas is perceived to influence the various sectarian subgroups differently, it can

be argued that sectarian youth will differ in their inclination to pursue the abolishment of

confessional quotas, depending on their perceived sectarian group's interests.

In particular, we hypothesize that among participants who perceive their sect to be

positively affected by the secularization of the system (high perceived sectarian interest,

perhaps typically majority group members, e.g. Sunnis, Shiites), sectarianism should have

no link with collective action, because both those high and low on sectarianism will be

interested in taking action. Those high on sectarianism will engage in action because it is in

the interest of their sectarian group, while those low on sectarianism will engage in action

because they prefer a meritocratic system. As such, we propose that collective action can be

both progressive and regressive in this case. Conversely, among those who perceive their

sect to be negatively affected by the secularization of the system (perhaps typically

minority groups members, e.g. Maronites), sectarianism will negatively predict collective

action, because only those who are low on sectarianism and prefer a meritocratic system

will engage in action. Collective action should have a progressive goal in this case. In sum,

perceived sectarian group interest should moderate the impact of sectarianism on collective action.

A second aim of the present research is to examine the impact of national identification on collective action for abolishing confessional quotas in Lebanon.

C. Identity

Researchers have implicated the role of social identification with one's social group in mobilizing a large number of people for collective action (Reicher, 2004; Simon et al., 1998; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Social identity is defined as "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his [or her] knowledge of his [or her] membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63). While personal identity gives rise to interpersonal comparisons, social identity gives rise to intergroup comparisons (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). As such, the psychological shift from individual to social identity is the tenet of collective behavior (Reicher, Hopkins, Levine, & Rath, 2005). It is a qualitative shift, where the individual starts to focus on the group's status and goals rather than individual outcomes (Wright, 2001).

Therefore, the extent to which people identify as members of a disadvantaged group, they will engage in actions aimed at improving the situation of the group as a whole. However, according to self-categorization theory, the effects of social identification on collective action are complicated by the reality that people have multiple identities modeled as part of a hierarchical system of organization, becoming more inclusive as one moves higher up the categories (Reicher et al., 2005; Turner & Onorato, 1999). These

representations range from the individual level (how "I" differ from "you"), to the social

level (how "we" differ from "them"), and finally to the human level (how humans differ

from non-humans) (Reicher et al, 2005), and shift in salience depending on circumstances

(Klandermans, 2002). Therefore, one can define oneself as a woman, Shi'ite, Lebanese, or

Arab, depending on the salient social context, with each level of identification having

different implications for action.

A wide body of empirical research has established the relationship between social

identification with one's social group and collective action against a disadvantage suffered

by one's group (Kelly, 1993; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Klandermans, 1997; Sturmer &

Simon, 2004; Simon et al., 1988). Kelly and Breinlinger (1995) showed that identification

as a woman predicts participation in women's groups as well as taking part in protests,

rallies, and meetings about women's issues. Another study by Fischer, Harb, Al-Sarraf, and

Nashabe (2008) showed that national identification predicted support for armed resistance

against US intervention among a sample of Iraqi students.

Our study focuses on national identity for two reasons. First, it has been argued that

establishing a common national identity in Lebanon is key to reducing sectarianism and

establishing a democratic and secular system (Haddad, 2010). For example, the two

Lebanese citizen movements, the Laique Pride and Isqat el Nizam, advocated putting aside

sectarian differences and rallying around a common national identity (Muhanna, 2010b).

Second, the social psychological literature on prejudice reduction also suggests that

establishing a common superordinate identity for groups in a conflictual relationship is an

effective method of decreasing prejudice (Gaertner, Dovidio, Rust, Nier, Banker, Ward, et

al., 1999).

In particular, the common ingroup identity model suggests that when members of different groups perceive each other as belonging to one common superordinate group, this decreases the salience of subordinate identities and leads to lower intergroup bias and decreased intergroup conflict (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993; Gaertner et al., 1999; Stone & Crisp, 2007). That is, processes that produce ingroup bias are extended to former outgroup members (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Validzic, 1998, Gaertner et al., 1999). National identity was found to positively predict intergroup forgiveness between left- and right-wingers in Chile, between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland (Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, Manzi, & Lewis, 2008), as well as between Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims (Cehajic, Brown, & Castano, 2008). In a test of the common ingroup identity model in Lebanon, Licata, Klein, Saade, Azzi and Branscombe (2011) found that identification of Maronite Lebanese with Lebanon predicted positive attitudes towards Muslims, while identification as Maronite predicted negative attitudes towards Muslims. Accordingly, increasing Lebanese national identification should create an increased perception that all Lebanese citizens belong to the ingroup irrespective of their sect and should therefore be treated equally. As such, one would expect national identification to positively predict collective action for abolishing sectarian quotas.

Importantly, however, we argue that the influence of national identification on collective action will not always be positive. Instead, it will depend on accompanying levels of sectarianism and on perceived sectarian group interest. That is, the impact of national identification on collective action should be moderated by sectarianism and by sectarian group interest. We explain this next.

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D. The Interaction between National Identification, Sectarianism, and Perceived Sectarian Group Interest

It has been argued that having a common superordinate identity does not always lead to favorable intergroup orientations. According to the ingroup projection model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999), group members have a tendency to claim that their own subgroup is prototypical of the superordinate category, and devalue other less prototypical subgroups, thus exacerbating intergroup tensions. Relatedly, Dovidio, ten Vergert, Stewart, Gaertner, Johnson, Esses et al. (2004) assert that it is only possible to reap the prejudice reduction benefits of a common superordinate identity if the superordinate category is framed to include within it all subgroups. Only then would empathic concern, perceptions of similarity, and prejudice reduction generalize toward all subgroups. Identification with the superordinate category will then decrease the competition over resources and shift the focus to fairness concerns (Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996). Based on this line of reasoning, it is possible to be both high in identification with a superordinate identity and yet be prejudiced towards other subgroups (Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Boettcher, 2004). In other words, it is possible to be both high on Lebanese identification and high on sectarianism, especially since sectarianism and national identification have been found to be independent from one another in the Lebanese context ($r = .09$, $p > .05$) (Sagherian, 2010). Importantly, this means that Lebanese identification does not necessarily motivate collective action for abolishing confessional quotas. Instead, the impact of national identification on collective action for abolishing confessional quotas should be shaped by the degree of sectarianism that one holds and one's perceived sectarian group interest, i.e. whether one perceives sectarian benefits or losses from a change in this system.

Let us first consider those who perceive their sect to be negatively affected by the secularization of the system. Here, if participants are low on sectarianism, greater identification with Lebanon should promote a desire to empower all citizens and thus abolish confessional quotas, even if one's sect stands to lose from such a change. Hence, we hypothesize that among non-sectarian participants, greater national identification should promote greater collective action for removing confessional quotas (Figure 1.1). Conversely, among sectarian participants, the more they identify with Lebanon, the more they are presumed to identify with a sectarian Lebanon, and the more they will seek to avoid the removal of confessional quotas since it is feared to be to the disadvantage of their sect. As such, among sectarian youth, national identification will hinder collective action (Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.1. The interaction between national identity and sectarianism among the negatively affected group for individuals low on sectarianism

Figure 1.2. The interaction between national identity and sectarianism among the negatively affected group for individuals high on sectarianism

Let us now consider those who perceive their sect to be positively affected by the secularization of the system. Among sectarian participants, national identity should not affect collective action, because sectarian participants should engage in collective action for abolishing confessional quotas regardless of their levels of national identification, since

abolishing the quotas promotes rather than compromises their sectarian group's interests (Figure 1.3). However, among non-sectarian youth, those who identify with Lebanon and thus have inclusive identities, may fear that one group might become too powerful and undermine the rights of other subgroups within the system. As such, they would be more likely to refrain from any action to abolish the sectarian quotas. Hence, among non-sectarian youth, national identity may *hinder* collective action (Figure 1.4).

Figure 1.3. The interaction between national identity and sectarianism among the positively affected group for individuals high on sectarianism

Figure 1.4. The interaction between national identity and sectarianism among the positively affected group for individuals low on sectarianism

CHAPTER IV

MEDIATORS OF THE EFFECT OF NATIONAL

IDENTIFICATION ON COLLECTIVE ACTION

The final aim of the present research is to examine the mediators linking national identification to collective action. We focus on two established mediators of the effects of social identity on collective action, namely perceived injustice and group efficacy, which have been previously integrated into the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA, van Zomeren et al, 2008a). We elaborate on these mediators next.

A. Injustice

Revolutionary social change involves altering a certain social system, such as an economic, political, and/or cultural system (Sweetman et al., 2013). For such a systemic change to be sought, the existing system must be viewed as unfair/illegitimate and alternative systems must be envisaged (Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2008; Passini & Morselli, 2013). Central to the evaluation of the legitimacy of a political system is the notion of procedural injustice (Sweetman et al., 2013; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & McGraw, 1986), typically defined as the belief that the procedures used by a government or authority figures to arrive at decisions are fair, neutral, and transparent (Levi, Saks, & Tyler, 2009). To perceive a system as just, citizens must feel they have a voice in the government, can influence policy, and are properly represented (Levi et al., 2009). Conversely, constant underrepresentation of a group or the assignment of permanent minority status increases their sense of injustice and decreases their obedience to authority (Levi et al., 2009).

When the system is considered just, members of a disadvantaged group attribute their disadvantage to themselves and consider it the ingroup's responsibility to change their situation within the current system (Sweetman et al., 2013). Conversely, when the system is perceived to be unjust, group members will blame their disadvantaged position on "institutional power and its rules" and are more likely to demand a change in procedures (Sweetman et al., 2013, p. 229). Tyler and McGraw (1986) provide an interesting example to illustrate this process. The social stratification system in the United States is based on the myth that it is a "contest" (p. 120), where everyone has an equal opportunity of improving their status. The public is under the illusion that "equal opportunity exists" (p. 120). In this view, even if one is born poor, it is possible to improve one's status through effort and hard

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work. Consequently, low status is attributed to lack of ability or effort rather than the structures of the system. Therefore, if the disadvantaged focus on the myth of equal opportunity, without thinking twice whether opportunity for social mobility actually exists, they will accept their status and will not revolt against the system (Tyler & McGraw, 1986). Therefore, violations of fairness judgments in resource allocation lead to dissatisfaction and rebellion (Tyler, Rasinski, & McGraw, 1985).

Empirical evidence has consistently shown the predictive role of injustice in support for collective action. For example, injustice was a significant predictor of support for armed resistance among Iraqi students against US forces, the primary administrative power at the time of the study (Fischer et al., 2008). Unjust and unfair treatment of women in the workplace regarding hiring policies and promotion practices was also a significant predictor of collective action among women (Iyer & Ryan, 2009). In another study, when faculty members judged the budget allocation processes creating group-based differences in salaries to be illegitimate, they were more likely to feel angry and to subsequently take action (Smith, Cronin, & Kessler, 2008). Moreover, van Zomeren, Spears, Leach, & Fischer (2004) showed through three different experiments that procedural unfairness gives rise to increased support for collective action in response to disadvantage, compared to fairly created disadvantage. In sum, there is ample evidence of the link between injustice and collective action.

The current study focuses on the Lebanese citizens' perception of the injustice of using sectarian quotas in the allocation of political power positions in Lebanon. We hypothesize that injustice will positively predict collective action in support of the abolishment of the quota system.

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B. Group Efficacy

The concept of group efficacy, which is the conviction that it is possible to change the disadvantaged situation of the group through collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008a), is thought to be a central motivation for undertaking collective action. The higher the perceived efficacy of the group, the higher the group members' investment in collective undertakings, and the higher the chances of persevering in the face of impediments (Bandura, 2000).

A wide body of literature has shown the positive link between group efficacy and collective action (Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, Mielke, 1999; van Zomeren et al., 2004). Mummendey et al. (1999) found that group efficacy positively predicts collective action on behalf of the disadvantaged East Germans against the West Germans. Group efficacy also influenced the willingness of Dutch university students to protest against a proposed increase in tuition fees (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2010), as well as faculty members' willingness to protest against inequalities in salaries (Smith et al., 2008). Indeed, the dual pathway model established by van Zomeren et al. (2004) shows that there are two separate and independent pathways to collective action, the efficacy and the injustice pathways, both of which positively predict collective action tendencies.

The importance of a sense of group efficacy has also been underscored in Sweetman et al.'s (2013) recent theorizing on revolution as a social change goal, who stress that for revolution to be possible, group members must be able to envisage an alternative system. They argue that the inability to visualize a different future while exclusively focusing on the negative aspects of the current system is one of the causes of the political apathy present

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in some groups (Sweetman et al., 2013). According to Rahal (2012), this seems to be the case in Lebanon, where the public is convinced that it is near impossible to change the Lebanese political system. The present study thus predicts that the higher the perceived group efficacy of the Lebanese in abolishing the sectarian quota system, the higher the likelihood that they will participate in collective action for that goal.

CHAPTER V

THE SIMCA MODEL

In an influential meta-analysis, Van Zomeren et al. (2008a) tested the independent effects of social identification, perceived injustice and efficacy on collective action and found that all three variables positively and independently predict collective action (Figure 2). Importantly, the authors provided a theoretical integration of these effects, thus establishing the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA), which holds that identity is both a direct and indirect predictor of collective action, via perceptions of injustice and efficacy. According to the model, therefore, when individuals identify with their social group, they are more likely to perceive collective disadvantage and take subsequent action on behalf of their group. Intergroup comparisons lead to the awareness of relative disadvantage, thus creating the spark for collective action (Reicher, 2002; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995). Identification also increases individuals' efficacy beliefs regarding collective action, thus triggering collective action by fostering a sense of empowerment and collective power (Drury & Reicher, 2009). In turn, efficacy increases collective action. Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008a) meta-analysis provided empirical support for the SIMCA model.

Figure 2. The SIMCA model

Subsequent studies further substantiated the model. For example, van Zomeren et al. (2010) replicated the SIMCA model in the context of a student union protest against tuition fees increase in the Netherlands as well as a Greenpeace protest in Italy. In another study, Cakal et al. (2011) showed that the three SIMCA predictors significantly influence collective action to benefit the ingroup among both high status Whites and low status Blacks in South Africa. The study further showed that the influence of social identification on collective action is mediated by relative deprivation (akin to perceived injustice) and group efficacy among the advantaged Whites. The SIMCA model has also been replicated in Lebanon during a period of increased tension and conflict between Christian and Muslim groups (Tabri & Conway, 2011). This study assessed university student's identification with their sect, their perceived injustice and group efficacy in terms of sect, as well as their intentions of taking normative collective action to improve the situation of their ingroup, and found that all expected SIMCA paths were significant in the expected directions for both Christian and Muslim groups.

Following the SIMCA model (van Zomeren et al., 2008a), we propose that when national identification positively predicts collective action for abolishing confessional quotas, it may do so directly and indirectly by increasing the perceived injustice of sectarian quotas and group efficacy for eliminating them. Conversely, when national identification negatively predicts collective action for abolishing confessional quotas, it may do so directly and indirectly by decreasing the perceived injustice of sectarian quotas and group efficacy for eliminating them.

Since we hypothesize that the impact of national identification on collective action will be moderated by sectarianism and group interest, in each group interest category (positively and negatively affected) we therefore explore: a) whether the direct paths from national identification to collective action are moderated by sectarianism, and b) whether the indirect paths from national identification to collective action via perceived injustice and group efficacy are moderated by sectarianism (Figure 3).

Figure 3. The conceptual model

CHAPTER VI

AIMS AND HYPOTHESES

To sum up, our study's broad aim is to examine the social psychological predictors of collective action for the removal of confessional quotas in Lebanon, which we consider a revolutionary collective action goal.

In particular, our study aims to answer three research questions. The first research question is whether the same collective action can be motivated by both progressive and regressive intentions, and whether collective action for abolishing sectarian quotas is necessarily progressive. We argue that this is not always the case, and that collective action for secularism can be motivated by both progressive and regressive reasons.

The second research question is whether national identity, which is considered an inclusive identity, will necessarily promote collective action for abolishing confessional quotas as suggested by civil society movements working for secularism in the country. We argue that, contrary to the SIMCA model, this is not always the case and that this depends on sectarianism and perceived group interest. In fact, we argue that in some cases, national identity will even *hinder* collective action.

Thirdly, we examine the mediators of the effect of national identity on collective action, and take into account the mediators proposed by the SIMCA model, namely group efficacy and perceived injustice.

The study provides several novel contributions to the collective action literature. First, it tests the SIMCA model in the context of collective action for a revolutionary social change goal (changing the political system), an under-investigated social change goal in the

collective action literature (Sweetman et al., 2013) and yet one which is of great relevance considering the recent uprisings that have swept large parts of the Middle East. Second, while previous work has contrasted individual and group-level motives behind collective action (e.g. Sturmer & Simon, 2004), and contrasted the motives of advantaged and disadvantaged group members for engaging in collective action that benefits the disadvantaged group (e.g. Iyer & Ryan, 2009), no work has examined how the same collective action can be pursued for both progressive and regressive group goals, despite the prevalence of such forms of collective action. Third, previous work on the SICMA model has not examined the simultaneous and interactive influence of inclusive identities (such as national identification) and exclusive tendencies (such as sectarianism) on collective action.

Besides its scientific relevance, the study also has practical implications. Other than a study by Tabri and Conway (2011) that assessed the predictors of collective action participation in Lebanon to benefit one's sect, no other published studies have analyzed the social psychological predictors of collective action participation in Lebanon, especially in terms of transcending sectarian group membership and taking action as a Lebanese citizen aiming to improve the situation of all members regardless of sect. As such, the study might provide some practical guidelines to civil society organizations and policy-makers working on social change in Lebanon in terms of highlighting the variables that are important for influencing mass mobilization for secularism.

It must be noted that we do not measure actual engagement in collective action, but rather collective action intentions. Measuring actual engagement in collective action is sometimes difficult, which is why researchers have usually used proxies to measure it, such

as attitudes towards collective action, or willingness to participate in collective action

(action tendencies) (Van Zomeren et al., 2008a). Although effect sizes between the

SIMCA predictors and collective action decrease the more the measure taps into actual

behavior, the effect sizes linking the SIMCA variables to actual behavior are reliably

different from zero (van Zomeren et al., 2008a). This implies that even though we are only

measuring collective action intentions, the effects of the predictors on collective action

should still generalize to actual behavior.

Our proposed models are displayed in Figure 4. We summarize our hypotheses next.

In the negatively affected group:

1) Sectarianism will negatively predict collective action, and although this effect should be

moderated by national identification, the effect should remain negative whether at high or

low levels of national identification. Collective action constitutes a progressive

revolutionary goal in this group.

2) National identity will affect collective action but this effect will be moderated by

sectarianism, such that national identity will reduce collective action among individuals

high on sectarianism, but among individuals low on sectarianism, national identification

will positively predict collective action.

3) In line with the SIMCA model, group efficacy and perceived injustice should mediate

any significant effects of national identification on collective action.

In the positively affected group:

4) Sectarianism will have no effect on collective action. Collective action can constitute a

progressive or a regressive goal in this group.

5) National identity will affect collective action, but this link will be moderated by sectarianism, such that among those high on sectarianism, national identity will have no effect on collective action, but among those low in sectarianism, national identity will lead to lower collective action.

6) In line with the SIMCA model, group efficacy and perceived injustice should mediate any significant effects of national identification on collective action.

Figure 4.1. The proposed model for the negatively affected group. The question marks for this and the following figure indicate that the paths were left for exploration.

Figure 4.2. The proposed model for the positively affected group

CHAPTER VII

METHODOLOGY

A. Participants

Three hundred eighty three students from the American University of Beirut participated in this study during the fall semester of 2014-2015. Two hundred and sixty of them were from the psychology pool of students while 123 were non-psychology AUB students from all majors. Participants were required to be Lebanese citizens or holders of a dual citizenship with one of the nationalities being Lebanese. Non-Lebanese students were excluded from the study. There were no restrictions concerning gender.

B. Research Design and Procedure

1. Pilot study. After receiving approval from the Institutional Review Board, a pilot study was conducted prior to the main study on a sample of 15 AUB students. This was to ensure that all the items were appropriate and understandable for the participants, to ensure there is sufficient variability in the responses, and to specify the time it takes to fill out the entire questionnaire. After they filled out the questionnaires, participants were asked to comment on the survey and provide advice, if they had any, on how to improve the measures. In general, participants found the items intelligible, but some of them asked what we mean by "confessional quotas." Accordingly, we added a definition of the term in the actual study.

2. Main study. During the main study, students enrolled in PSYC 201 in AUB during the fall 2014 semester were contacted via email by the psychology pool coordinator,

which contained a unique link to access the LimeSurvey. Non-psychology AUB students were also invited to participate in the study .This is because we noticed that one of our central variables, the group interest variable, showed an unexpected pattern. More than half of our participants had picked the "unaffected" category, leaving only a low proportion in the "positively affected" and "negatively affected" categories. The co-investigator electronically advertised the study (via the AUB Facebook pages) to inform students about the opportunity to participate in the study, with a link directing students to the survey. The Facebook pages where the study was posted included the pages of social clubs known to be affiliated with political parties, as well as independent clubs and forums, and AUB Facebook pages to help out students. As such, the Facebook pages where the study was posted are: the Lebanese Armenian Heritage Club, the Secular Club, the Lebanese Mission Club, the Youth Club, the Cultural Club of the South, the Social Club, the Freedom Club, the Civil Welfare League, the Communications Club, the Lebanese Youth Movement, the Insight Club, the Feminist Forum, Human Rights and Peace Watch, AUB Psychology Students, Center for Civic Engagement, AUB off campus housing and roommate search, and AUB courses/teachers guru. The co-investigator also used snowball sampling to contact AUB students and ask them to fill the survey and forward it to their friends. Additionally, psychology professors advertised the study to their students by sending them an e-mail advertisement with the link to the survey (appendix B).

During both phases, the emails advertised the study conducted by the PI, Dr. Rim Saab. The survey was administered online to preserve the anonymity of the participants and reduce experimenter effects. As an incentive for participation, PSYC 201 students received one extra credit for their participation, while non-psychology AUB students were given the

chance to enter a prize draw, where three random participants could win a cash prize of $35 each.

The study lasted about 20-30 minutes, was anonymous, and was administered in English. The research was introduced as a study on the social and political attitudes of the Lebanese. As such, the study included passive deception since the purpose of the study was not explicitly stated. Once they clicked on the link, and before they started the survey, students received a computerized consent form that contains: the purpose of the study, the procedures of the study, possible risks and benefits, the participants' right to skip any answers in the surveys in case of discomfort, their right not to participate or terminate their participation at any time, and confidentiality issues (appendix C). Participants agreed to start the survey by clicking "I consent". If participants chose at any point during the experiment to discontinue the survey, they had the option of clicking "click here to exit survey". This automatically redirected them to a debriefing form which explained in detail the purpose of the study and the means by which researchers intended to examine it.

Once the survey was completed, students were redirected to a debriefing webpage (appendix D). The debriefing page explained more clearly the purpose of the study and also provided participants with the contact information of the PI in case they had questions or concerns. To keep track of which students participated, participants were asked on the debriefing page to enter a six-digit unique code and to keep a record of it so PSYC 201 students could earn their credit and non-psychology students could enter the prize draw. Participants were informed that this is a separate webpage and that this code is stored separately from participants' responses to the survey, ensuring that no personal identifiers

can be linked with participants' responses. The debriefing form also included a question asking participants if they would still like to share their data after having read a detailed summary about what the study is about.

PSYC 201 participants were asked to email the code to their PSYC 201 instructors, who confirmed participation of the student by checking with the codes provided by the PI via email. Non-psychology AUB students were asked to e-mail their codes to the PI. The PI had no way of linking participants' responses with their codes, as the codes were stored in a separate data file. Only information that could not be traced to the participants was used in reports or manuscripts published or presented by the investigator. Raw data on data-recording systems will be kept in a secure electronic folder for a minimum of three years after data collection.

C. Instruments

1. Sectarianism. This measure was adopted from Harb, Schmidt, and Hewstone (2009) and consisted of five Likert-type scale items ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Examples include "I am proud to belong to my sect" and "My sect can serve Lebanon better than any other sect." The scale has been found to have good reliability among the Lebanese sample with a Cronbach's α = .85. An additional item adapted from Faour (1998) was also used, which states: "My sect is superior to all other sects". This last item was added to go beyond assessing positive attitudes towards one's own sect and measuring perceptions of the superiority and desire for dominance of one's own sect. The full scale for this measure and all subsequent measures can be found in Appendix A.

2. Perceived Sectarian Group Interest. This measure used a single item developed for the purpose of this study, which asked: "Do you think that abolishing the sectarian quotas in the Lebanese parliamentary system will a) substantially decrease b) maintain or c) substantially increase the current political power of your sect?" Participants were allowed to pick one option only.

3. National Identification. Identification with the Lebanese people was measured using ten items from the identification scale used by Sagherian (2010). The original items were adapted from two identification scales, Phinney's revised Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure and from the study by Fischer et al. (2008) by Leach, van Zomeren, Zebel, Vliek, Pennekamp, Doosje, et al. (2008). Items were rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The scale has been found to be reliable within the Lebanese context with a Cronbach's α greater than .70 (Sagherian, 2010). Sample items include "I feel strong attachment towards Lebanon" and "I derive pride from my Lebanese background."

4. Injustice. This measure assessed the perceived fairness of the principle of allocating political seats in Lebanon based on a sectarian quota system. It consisted of four items from Tausch, Becker, Spears, Christ, Saab, and Singh (2011) as well as one item developed for the purposes of this study. Items were rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Examples include "Allocating sectarian quotas to political positions is unfair," and "Allocating sectarian quotas to political positions is justified." The scale has high reliability with a Cronbach's α of .91 (Tausch et al., 2011).The item developed for the study is "I think that seats in government should be allocated according to merit alone with no consideration for one's sect." This last

item was added to assess participants' preference for a meritocratic system rather than one based on sectarian quotas.

5. Group Efficacy. The group efficacy measure was adapted from van Zomeren, Saguy, and Schellhaas (2012). It is a 4-item measure using a 5-point Likert type scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). The scale has high reliability with a Cronbach's α = .96. Sample items include "I believe that the Lebanese, as a group, can abolish the sectarian quotas from the Lebanese political system." and "I believe that the Lebanese, together, can abolish the sectarian quotas from the Lebanese political system." One item was deleted from the original scale to avoid redundancy. Two additional items were added to the scale to get a more refined measure of group efficacy. These items tapped into participants' perceptions of the possibility of achieving the goal of abolishing the quota system, and as such tackled the issue of cognitive alternatives and the ability to imagine a different system, which is a key aspect of undertaking revolutionary collective action. These items are "It is impossible to abolish sectarian quotas in Lebanon," and "I can imagine a Lebanon where sectarian quotas do not exist."

6. Collective Action. Collective action tendencies were measured using a 5-item scale adapted from van Zomeren, Spears, and Leach (2008b) to the current research context. The measure had an acceptable reliability in the original study, with a Cronbach's α = .72. Sample items include "I would participate in a future demonstration calling for abolishing the sectarian quota system from political posts in Lebanon" and "I would participate in raising the collective voice of the Lebanese calling for abolishing the sectarian quota system from political posts in Lebanon." To further refine the measure, two extra items were developed for the purposes of this study, which specifically measured

global support for revolution in Lebanon instead of support for particular collective actions. These items are "I would support a nonviolent popular revolution in Lebanon aimed at abolishing sectarian quotas from political posts," and "I would join a nonviolent popular uprising that aims to abolish sectarian quotas in political posts."

7. Demographic Information. Demographics included age, gender, sect, political party affiliations, and number of years lived in Lebanon. This section also included an item asking participants whether they think abolishing sectarian quotas from political posts in Lebanon represents a minor reform to the political system, a major reform to the political system, or a revolutionary change in the political system. The scales and the demographic questions were not counter-balanced.

CHAPTER XIII

RESULTS

A. Preliminary Analyses

1. Missing value analysis. Twenty-five participants were not Lebanese, and one case was missing on nationality so they were excluded from further analysis because we wanted to make sure that all our participants are Lebanese.

A missing value analysis (MVA) was run to determine the percentage of missing values in the data set. All of the variables had less than 5% of the values missing, except for group interest, which had 11.8% of the values missing. Moreover, Little's MCAR test was significant ($p < .001$), meaning that the data are not missing completely at random and therefore may be problematic in further analyses. Since the missing values on the group

interest variable were above the 5% mark, and since Little's MCAR test was significant, independent samples t-tests were run to determine if there was a significant difference between those missing and not missing on group interest, and the rest of our variables. The results indicated that there were significant differences between those who responded compared to those who did not respond to the group interest item on three of the collective action items: "I would participate in raising the collective voice of the Lebanese calling for abolishing the sectarian quota system from political posts in Lebanon" (t (347) = 2.31, $p <$ .05), "I would sign a petition to abolish the sectarian quota system from political posts in Lebanon." (t (348) = 2.11, $p <$ .05), and "I would support a nonviolent popular revolution in Lebanon aimed at abolishing sectarian quotas from political posts" (t (248) = 2.30, $p <$ .05). These differences were such that those who responded scored higher on these items than those who did not respond. There were also significant differences between those who responded and those who did not respond to the group interest item on socio-economic status (t (337) = -3.17, $p <$ .01, where those who responded scored lower ($M =$ 3.37, $SE =$ .04) than those who did not respond ($M =$ 3.79, $SE =$ .13). This means that our sample may be over-estimating collective action tendencies and underestimating the SES of our participants.

Considering that we could not replace any missing values on the group interest measure as it is a one-item scale and considering its centrality for our research, all missing values on this variable were deleted (42 cases in total). We replaced the missing values on the rest of the measures using the Expectation Maximization algorithm (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013) instead of deleting them to preserve as much statistical power of the data as

possible, especially since moderations are typically hard to detect[1]. The final sample included 315 participants.

2. Psychometrics.

a. Factor analysis. Separate factor analyses were conducted on all of the scales (sectarianism, national identification, group efficacy, injustice, and collective action) using the principal component extraction method (PCA) and an oblimin rotation, without specifying the number of factors. The group interest measure was not included since it is a single-item scale. A summary of the factor analysis diagnostics and results are reported in Table 1. Generally, there were no issues of multicollinearity or singularity in the data because all determinants were larger than .00001. Although some of the correlations in the correlation matrix were above .80, we do not need to worry about multicollinearity since we are running a PCA (Field, 2013). Furthermore, Bartlett's test of sphericity was significant for all scales, indicating that correlations between items were sufficiently large for PCA and therefore PCA is appropriate. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) values were above .70 for all scales, except for the group efficacy scale, indicating that patterns of correlations are relatively compact, so factor analysis should yield distinct and reliable factors. As for the group efficacy scale, the KMO was .66, but this is still an acceptable value according to Field (2013), as it is still above .5. Furthermore, measures of sampling adequacy (MSA) values were all above .5, meaning that no item required exclusion. We can therefore assume that our data is factorable.

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[1] The sample size would drop from n=315 to n=290 if we delete the missing values.

All of the analyses, except that of national identification, yielded single component solutions. All of the extracted components explained a large amount of the variance in the respective scales (Table 1). As for the national identification scale, it resulted in a two component solution, which cumulatively explained 70.14% of the variance in the data. Examination of these two components revealed that the first component assesses a sense of belonging and attachment to Lebanon (items 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10), while the second component assesses the amount of effort put into finding out more about one's Lebanese background (items 1, 4, and 5). Since considering the measure a single component scale yielded very high reliability (see reliability analysis section below), we decided to use the measure as a single component scale. Other identification scales similarly merge all subscales together (Leach et al., 2008).

Table 1
FA Criteria of Scales

Scale	Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	KMO	% of Variance Explained
Sectarianism	$\chi^2(15)=1054.28, p<001$	.88	66.37
National Identity	$\chi^2(45)=2070.52, p<001$	.89	70.14
Injustice	$\chi^2(10)=723.245, p<001$	.78	59.43
Group Efficacy	$\chi^2(6)=631.98, p<001$	.66	62.18
Collective Action	$\chi^2(21)=2232.23, p<001$	.91	77.62

b. Reliability Analysis. Reliability analyses were conducted for all scales. Before conducting the analyses, the third items of the injustice and efficacy scales were reverse coded. All scales had high reliability as their Cronbach's alpha exceeded .70 (see Table 2).

Table 2

Reliability Coefficients of Scales

Scale	Number of Items	Cronbach's Alpha
Sectarianism	6	.90
National Identity	10	.91
Injustice	5	.81
Group Efficacy	4	.79
Collective Action	7	.95

3. Outliers. Before checking for univariate and multivariate outliers the different

items were averaged together to make a scale. We inspected for univariate outliers by

obtaining z-scores for all non-categorical variables. Univariate outliers were defined as

those crossing the mark of |3.29| as this represents the standard deviation marker where

scores are said to be too far from the mean to be acceptable (Field, 2013). Two participants

had z-scores of -3.32 on the national identification scale, implying that they scored very

low on this variable. One participant has a z-score of -3.31 on the injustice scale. As we

expect 1% of the cases to be above or below z=3.29, these cases were not deleted. Two

participants had z-scores of 12.42 and 12.43 on the age variable respectively. Inspection of

the cases revealed that the participants had entered the year they were born (1995 and 1996)

rather than their age. These values were adjusted accordingly (replaced with 20 and 19

respectively). One participant had a z-score of 4.62 on the variable number of years lived in

Lebanon. Inspection of the case revealed that the participant was 47 years old and has been

living in Lebanon for 47 years. This case was not deleted. No other univariate outliers were

found in the data.

To check for multivariate outliers, Mahalanobis distance values were saved by

running a regression using age, knowledge in politics, number of years lived in Lebanon,

socioeconomic status, group interest, sectarianism, group efficacy, national identification, injustice, and collective action as IVs, and gender as a DV. According to the Chi-square table (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2013), the critical value of the chi squared test for 10 variables at a $p < .001$ significance level is $\chi^2 = 29.59$. Inspection of the frequency tables revealed that 4 cases exceeded this value. Further inspection of Cook's distance showed that none of the values exceeded 1.00, implying that none of these cases would have undue influence on regression coefficients. Accordingly, these cases were not deleted.

We also tested for outliers across levels of group interest since our analyses are done per group. For univariate outliers, among the "negatively affected" group, two participants had z-scores of 3.42 and 6.58 on age, and these participants were 34 and 47 years old respectively. The 47 year old participant was also an outlier on number of years lived in Lebanon ($z = 4.33$) because she had been living in Lebanon for 47 years. These cases were not deleted, and no other outliers were found for this group.

For the "unaffected" group, three participants had z-scores of 3.57, 4.50, and 5.91 on the age variable. These participants were 27, 29, and 32 years old respectively. Finally, one participant from this group had a z-score of -3.36 on collective action, showing almost no tendency to undertake collective action. As we expect 1% of cases to have z-scores above 3.29, this participant was not deleted. No other univariate outliers were found for this group.

For the "positively affected" group, two participants had z-scores of 3.81 and 4.46 on the age variables, and these participants were 25 and 26 years old respectively. These cases were not deleted, and no other univariate outliers were found for this group.

To check for multivariate outliers across groups, Mahalanobis distance values were saved by running a regression using age, knowledge in politics, number of years lived in Lebanon, socioeconomic status, sectarianism, group efficacy, national identification, injustice, and collective action as IVs, and gender as a DV. According to the Chi-square table (Tabachnik and Fidell, 2013), the determined value of the chi squared test for 9 variables at a $p <.001$ significance level is $\chi^2 = 27.89$. Inspection of the frequency tables revealed that, for the "negatively affected" group, one participant exceeded this value (43.94), and another participant exceeded this value for the "unaffected" group (36.10). No other multivariate outliers were found for the other groups. Further inspection of Cook's distance showed that none of the values exceeded 1.00 for any of the groups, implying that none of these cases would have undue influence on regression coefficients. Accordingly, no cases were deleted.

4. Normality tests. We looked at the z-skewness and z-kurtosis of the variables across the three groups to determine their normality (See Table 3). Significant skewness and kurtosis were concluded if the z-skewness or z-kurtosis scores of the variable were above 3.29 in absolute value. None of the variables showed significant deviations from normality (Table 3).

Table 3
Skewness and Kurtosis Scores

Variable	Negatively Affected Group		Unaffected Group		Positively Affected Group	
	z-skewness	z-kurtosis	z-skewness	z-kurtosis	z-skewness	z-kurtosis
Sectarianism	-1.26	-0.23	-0.68	-0.91	-1.28	-0.21
Identity	-3.24	1.80	-1.34	-0.75	-0.74	1.21
Injustice	-1.13	0.71	-0.90	-2.21	0.26	-1.73
Group Efficacy	-0.60	-1.29	-3.14	-0.16	-1.45	0.81
Collective Action	-2.74	0.72	-2.44	0.97	0.09	-1.01

B. Sample Descriptives

The final sample included 315 participants, 74.6% of whom were Lebanese, and 25.4% of whom had a dual nationality. Of this final sample, 214 (67.9%) participants were Psychology 201 students and 101 (32.1%) were AUB students from all majors. Participants' ages ranged from 17 to 47 years. Females were slightly predominant in the sample, where 58.9% of the sample was female and 41.1% were male. The sample was generally from a high socioeconomic status, where 5.6% of participants classified themselves as "wealthy", 35.1% as "better than most", 50.8% as "good", 7.9% as "so-so", and only 0.7% identified themselves as "poor". Seven point four percent of the sample was Christian Catholic, 13.9% Christian Maronite, 11.3% Christian Orthodox, 8.4% Druze, 26.9% Muslim Shi'a, 26.5% Muslim Sunni, and 5.5% "other." This latter category included one Greek Catholic, one Christian Evangelical, one Christian Apostolic, one Armenian Orthodox, one Christian Protestant, one Christian Protestant/Muslim Sunni, one Muslim Shi'a/Christian Orthodox, one Armenian Catholic, one Atheist, three who identified as

Muslim only, one who had removed his/her sect from official records, and two who wrote

"stop asking this". A majority of the sample, 63.9%, did not support any political party.

Among those who did support a party, the highest support went to Hezbollah (11.6%) and

the second highest to the Future Movement (6.1%). The rest of the sample was divided

between the Amal Movement (1.3%), Armenian Revolutionary Federation (1.3%), El

Marada (0.6%), Free Patriotic Movement (2.6%), Islamic group (0.3%), Lebanese

Communist Party (0.6%), Lebanese Forces (3.2%), Lebanese Phalange Party (1.6%),

Progressive Socialist Party (2.3%), Syrian Social Nationalist Party (1.9%), and "other"

parties (2.6%). Similarly, a majority of the sample did not support any political alliance

(66.1%), while 18.1% supported March 8th and 15.8% supported March 14th. As for

participants' knowledge of politics, they were in general well informed about the political

issues in Lebanon, as the mean of this variable was above the midpoint ($M = 3.24$, $SD =$

1.03). More specifically, 4.5% were not knowledgeable about the political issues of the past

few years in Lebanon, while 17.4% were a little knowledgeable, 40.8% somewhat, 24.1% a

lot, and 13.2% extremely knowledgeable.

Surprisingly, more than half the sample believed that abolishing sectarian quotas

from political positions in Lebanon will not substantially affect the current political power

of their sect (52.4%, N = 165), while 28.6% (N = 90) believed it will decrease their current

political power and 19% (N = 60) thought it will increase their current political power[2].

This result was unexpected given that we anticipated that most of our participants,

particularly those coming from the main Muslim sects (Sunnis and Shias), would pick the

"increase" option, while those coming from the main Christian sects (Maronites and Greek

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[2] It must be noted that the majority of the sample (63.9%) were not politically affiliated.

Orthodox) would pick the "decrease" options. We added the "will not substantially" effect

option post hoc in case we got participants who do not really know how their sect will be

affected by the removal of the quota system. We did not initially have hypotheses for this

group but we had to keep it in the analysis since the majority of participants picked this

option.

Given that most participants picked the unaffected category, we explored sectarian

distribution in response to the group interest variable. Surprisingly, sectarian distribution

did not map onto group interest in the manner we expected (see Table 4). It was not the

case that the majority of Muslim sects (Sunnis or Shi'ites) picked the high interest group,

nor did an overwhelming majority of Christian sects pick the low interest category.

Table 4
Distribution of Perceived Group Interest Across Sectarian Groups

	Christian Catholic (N = 23)	Christian Maronite (N = 43)	Christian Orthodox (N = 35)	Druze (N = 26)	Muslim Shi'a (N = 83)	Muslim Sunni (N = 82)	Other (N = 17)
Negatively Affected	34.8%	53.5%	25.7%	23.1%	20.5%	26.8%	17.6%
Unaffected	47.8%	37.2%	54.3%	53.8%	48.2%	61%	64.7%
Positively Affected	17.4%	9.3%	20%	23.1%	31.3%	12.2%	17.6%

A majority (63.3%) of participants thought that abolishing sectarian quotas from

political posts in Lebanon represents a revolutionary change in the political system, 27.5%

thought it represents a major reform to the political system, while a mere 9.3% thought it

represents a minor reform to the political system.

Compared to other AUB samples (Kobeissi, 2013; Sagherian, 2010), our sample

was quite unique in that it was relatively low on sectarianism as the average score on this

scale was slightly below the midpoint ($M = 2.90$, $SD= .96$). Our sample was also high on

national identification ($M= 3.62$, $SD= .79$) and collective action tendencies ($M = 3.72$, $SD =$

.87), as well as perceptions of injustice ($M= 3.72$, $SD= .82$) and group efficacy ($M= 3.22$,

$SD= .96$).

Table 5

General Sample Descriptives

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation
Knowledge of Politics	3.24	1.03
SES	3.37	0.74
Years lived in Lebanon	15.55	6.81
Sectarianism	2.90	0.96
National Identity	3.62	0.79
Injustice	3.72	0.82
Group Efficacy	3.22	0.96
Collective Action	3.72	0.87

Table 6

Descriptives Across Group Interest

Variable	Negatively Affected Group		Unaffected Group		Positively Affected Group	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Sectarianism	2.90	0.92	2.78	0.95	3.24	0.97
Identity	3.64	0.85	3.64	0.75	3.53	0.81
Injustice	3.65	0.80	3.78	0.84	3.67	0.80
Group Efficacy	2.97	1.03	3.38	0.89	3.17	0.97
Collective Action	3.54	0.93	3.82	0.84	3.70	0.81

Inspection of the correlation matrix (Table 7) among the overall sample revealed

that national identification had a significant, positive, but small correlation with collective

action ($r = .20$, $p < .001$). As expected, sectarianism had a significant, negative, and

moderate relationship with collective action ($r = -.34$, $p < .001$) and was not significantly

correlated with national identification ($r = .06$, $p = .274$, *ns*). However, sectarianism was significantly and negatively correlated with both injustice ($r = -.43$, $p < .001$) and group efficacy ($r = -.19$, $p = .001$). As for the proposed mediators, both injustice ($r = .54$, $p < .001$) and group efficacy ($r = .30$, $p < .001$) were significantly and positively correlated with collective action. Interestingly, national identification was not significantly correlated with injustice ($r = -.05$, $p = .405$, *ns*). However, it was weakly but significantly correlated with our second mediator, group efficacy ($r = .18$, $p = .001$). As for the relationship between our mediators, group efficacy was significantly, positively, and weakly to moderately correlated with injustice ($r = .22$, $p < .001$). The correlation matrix is also provided for each group separately (See tables 8, 9, and 10).

Table 7
General Intercorrelation Matrix

	Correlations				
	Sectarianism	National Identity	Injustice	Group Efficacy	Collective Action
Sectarianism	1				
National Identity	.06	1			
Injustice	-.44**	-.05	1		
Group Efficacy	-.19**	.18**	.22**	1	
Collective Action	-.34**	.20**	.54**	.30**	1

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 8

Negatively Affected Group

		Correlations			
	Sectarianism	National Identity	Injustice	Group Efficacy	Collective Action
Sectarianism	1				
National Identity	.17	1			
Injustice	**-.34****	-.16	1		
Group Efficacy	**-.23***	**.30****	.08	1	
Collective Action	**-.30****	.18	**.51****	**.28****	1

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 9

Unaffected Group

		Correlations			
	Sectarianism	National Identity	Injustice	Group Efficacy	Collective Action
Sectarianism	1				
National Identity	.07	1			
Injustice	**-.50****	.11	1		
Group Efficacy	**-.11**	.14	**.27****	1	
Collective Action	**-.41****	**.36****	**.54****	**.26****	1

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 10
Positively Affected Group

	Correlations				
	Sectarianism	National Identity	Injustice	Group Efficacy	Collective Action
Sectarianism	1				
National Identity	-.07	1			
Injustice	**-.41**[**]	**-.29**[*]	1		
Group Efficacy	**-.28**[**]	.09	.30[*]	1	
Collective Action	-.24	-.17	**.59**[**]	.33[*]	1

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

C. Analytic Strategy

Current recommendations for calculating indirect effects rely on the bootstrapping procedure (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). However, to our knowledge, there is no program that can take into account two continuous mediators, one continuous moderator, and one categorical moderator at three levels using bootstrapping. This was further confirmed after a personal communication with Dr. Andrew Hayes, the originator of the Process macro, which is the software used to calculate moderated mediation models. Therefore, we resorted to subgroup analysis, i.e. splitting the data into three separate datasets depending on group interest and analyzing the model separately across each group. As discussed extensively by Hayes (2013), this is a commonly used procedure, although it has some limitations which will be discussed later. Therefore, across each level of group interest, we tested a parallel moderated mediation model of whether sectarianism moderates the direct effect of national identification on collective action, as well as the effect of national

identification on each of the mediators, group efficacy and injustice. In other words, we

tested whether there are direct and indirect effects of national identification on collective

action and whether these are conditional on sectarianism.

We used the PROCESS macro, specifying model 8, which depicts mediation of the

effect of X (national identification) on Y (collective action) by M_1 (group efficacy) and M_2

(injustice), with both the direct and indirect effects of X moderated by W (sectarianism)

(Hayes, 2013) (Figure 5). An indirect effect in such a model is the product of the effect of X

on M and the effect of M on Y controlling for X, and the direct effect is the effect of X on Y

controlling for M. But since both of these effects are moderated, they are functions of W

(Hayes, 2013). In this model, moderation of the indirect effect is proposed as resulting from

moderation of the effect of X on M_1 and M_2 by W. This moderation renders the indirect

effect conditional on W. The direct effect is also proposed as moderated by W, so the direct

effect is also conditional on W (Hayes, 2013).

Figure 5. Statistical model

However, according to Hayes (2015), it is not enough to look at the interaction effect only, since it does not quantify the relationship between the moderator and the indirect effect. It only estimates the simple moderation of the effect of *X* on *M* by *W*. A formal test of moderated mediation examines the relationship between the proposed moderator and the size of the indirect effect, to establish whether the indirect effect depends on the moderator. This relationship is quantified by the index of moderated mediation (Hayes, 2015).

Therefore, a mediation process is moderated if the proposed moderator variable has a nonzero weight in the function linking the indirect effect of *X* on *Y* through *M* to the moderator (Hayes, 2015). This weight is a product of at least two regression coefficients. A test as to whether this weight, i.e. the *index of moderated mediation*, is different from zero is considered a formal test of moderated mediation. Importantly, evidence of a statistically significant interaction between any variable in the model and a proposed moderator is *not* a requirement of establishing moderation of a mechanism (Hayes, 2015). Similarly, establishing that a component of an indirect effect is moderated does not necessarily establish that the indirect effect is (Hayes, 2015). Therefore, "the index of moderated mediation is a direct quantification of the linear association between the indirect effect and the putative moderator of that effect (Hayes, 2015, p. 3)." This method of inference minimizes the number of statistical tests employed, by using a single inferential test to determine if moderated mediation is supported. This inference is based on the size of the index of moderated mediation (Hayes, 2015).

Just as in ordinary moderation analysis, where an interaction implies that any two simple slopes are significantly different from each other, evidence that the moderator is

linearly related to the indirect effect implies that *any* two conditional indirect effects defined by different values of the moderator are statistically different. Conversely, if the indirect effect is not moderated, this means that no two conditional indirect effects are significantly different from each other (Hayes, 2015).

As for the inference about the size of the index of moderated mediation in the population being investigated, Hayes (2015) recommends the bootstrap confidence interval for the index of moderated mediation, based on 10,000 bootstrap samples. The end points of the 95% bootstrap confidence interval are the two values of the index in the distribution of 10,000 values that define the 2.5^{th} and 97.5^{th} percentiles of the distribution. If the confidence interval does not include zero, we can conclude that the relationship between the indirect effect and the moderator is not zero, i.e. moderated mediation (Hayes, 2015). It is important to note that bootstrapping makes no assumptions about the normality of the sampling distribution of the indirect effect (Hayes, 2009; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Consequently, bootstrap confidence intervals take into account the "irregularity of the sampling distribution of *ab*" and as such result in more accurate inferences as compared to the normal theory approach (Hayes, 2013, p. 106). Bootstrapping can also be used to estimate effects in multiple linear regression when the assumption of normality is broken (Field, 2013, p.350).

In all the analyses that follow, all variables that are used to construct products are first mean centered in order to make the regression coefficients for these variables interpretable, although this has no effect on the index of moderated mediation or inference about its size (Hayes, 2015). Next, we report the results of our models separately per group interest.

1. Conditional process analysis.

a. Negatively affected group. The resulting model coefficients, standard errors, p-values, and model summary information for the conditional process model can be found in table 9 (Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1. The resulting model for the negatively affected group. The bold lines represent significant paths, while the dashed lines represent non-significant paths. The numbers represent unstandardized regression coefficients and their respective standard errors.

Table 11
Model Coefficients for the Conditional Process Model for Negatively Affected Group

	M_1 (Grp. Eff.)			M_2 (Injustice)			Y (CA)		
					Consequent				
Antecedent	Coeff.	SE	P	Coeff.	SE	p	Coeff.	SE	p
National Identity	**0.41**	**0.12**	**<.001**	-0.10	0.10	.316	**0.24**	**0.10**	**<.05**
Group Efficacy	___	___	___	___	___	___	0.13	0.09	.128
Injustice	___	___	___	___	___	___	**0.57**	**0.11**	**<.001**
Sectarianism	**-0.32**	**0.11**	**<.01**	**-0.27**	**0.09**	**<.01**	-0.14	0.10	.150
Interaction Effect	0.11	0.13	.911	0.07	0.10	.669	-0.02	0.10	.808
Constant	**2.97**	**0.10**	**<.001**	**3.64**	**0.08**	**<.001**	**1.07**	**0.47**	**<.05**
	R^2=16.51 %			R^2=13.16%			R^2=36.75%		
	$F(3,86)$=5.67, p<.01			$F(3,86)$=4.34, p<.01			$F(5,84)$=9.76, p<.001		

As can be seen from the table, the direct effect of national identification on collective action (while controlling for the two mediators, group efficacy and injustice) was positive and significant ($b = 0.24$, 95% CI = -0.35 to 0.78, $p < .05$). Evidence of

moderation of the direct effect is found in a statistically significant coefficient for the product term, c'_3. Since c'_3 was not statistically significant ($b = -0.02$, 95% CI $= -0.23$ to 0.18, $p = .808$), the direct influence of national identification on collective action is independent of sectarianism.

Furthermore, national identification positively and significantly predicted group efficacy ($b = 0.41$, 95% CI $= 0.17$ to 0.65, $p < .001$), but group efficacy did not significantly predict collective action ($b = 0.13$, 95% CI $= -0.04$ to 0.30, $p = .128$), indicating that there is no indirect effect of national identification on collective action via group efficacy. The effect of national identification on group efficacy was also not moderated by sectarianism, as indicated by the value of a_3, which is not significantly different from 0 ($b = 0.01$, 95% CI $= -0.24$ to -0.26, $p = .911$). The index of moderated mediation ($b = 0.001$) was also not significantly different from zero, since the 95% bootstrap confidence interval for this index was -0.03 to $+0.04$. Accordingly, we conclude that there is no significant indirect effect of national identification on collective action via group efficacy, and no evidence that this indirect effect is moderated by sectarianism.

As for the indirect effect of national identification on collective action through injustice, ordinary least squared (OLS) regression showed that national identification did not significantly predict injustice ($b = -0.10$, 95% CI $= -0.29$ to 0.09, $p = .316$), but injustice significantly and positively predicted collective action ($b = 0.57$, 95% CI $= 0.35$ to 0.78, $p < .001$), indicating that there is overall no significant indirect effect of national identity on collective action via injustice. Again, the interaction (a_6) was not significantly different from 0 ($b = 0.07$, 95% CI $= -0.13$ to 0.27, $p = .506$). The index of moderated mediation also did not show a significant moderation since the 95% confidence interval

included zero ($b = 0.04$, 95% CI = -0.10 to 0.17). Accordingly, we conclude that national identity promotes collective action for abolishing confessional quotas among those who are negatively affected by this change, but this effect is not mediated by injustice or group efficacy. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the direct or indirect effects of national identity on collective action are moderated by sectarianism. That is, none of the hypothesized paths from national identification to collective action were moderated by sectarianism.

On the other hand, sectarianism had no direct effect on collective action, ($b = -0.14$, 95% CI = -0.34 to 0.05, $p = .150$). And although sectarianism significantly and negatively predicted group efficacy ($b = -0.32$, 95% CI = -0.54 to -0.09, $p < .01$), group efficacy did not affect collective action, indicating that there is no indirect effect of sectarianism on collective action via group efficacy. However, sectarianism negatively predicted injustice ($b = -0.27$, 95% CI = -0.45 to -0.09, $p < .01$), which in turn positively predicted collective action, indicating a potential indirect effect of sectarianism on collective action through injustice. To estimate this indirect effect, we ran an additional test of a parallel mediation model controlling for the effect of national identification, which confirmed that the indirect effect of sectarianism on collective action via injustice was negative and significant ($b = -0.16$, 95% CI = -0.33 to -0.04). Since lower sectarianism is (indirectly) linked to greater collective action for abolishing confessional quotas, collective action among the negatively affected group constitutes a progressive revolutionary goal.

Therefore, for participants who believe their sect will be negatively affected if sectarian quotas are abolished, greater national identification is directly linked to greater collective action, regardless of sectarianism levels. This effect is not mediated by injustice

or group efficacy. Additionally, lower sectarianism is linked to greater perceived injustice of the quota system, which in turn is linked to higher collective action. In sum, for the negatively affected group to take collective action to abolish confessional quotas, they must be high on national identification and low on sectarianism. Furthermore, perceived injustice, but not group efficacy, constitutes an important mediator of the effect of sectarianism on collective action.

   b. Unaffected group. Model coefficients, standard errors, p-values, and model summary information for the conditional process model for this group can be found in table 10 (Figure 6.2).

*Figure 6.*2. The resulting model for the unaffected group. The bold lines represent significant paths, while the dashed lines represent non-significant paths. The numbers represent unstandardized regression coefficients and their respective standard errors.

Table 12
Model Coefficients for the Conditional Process Model for the Unaffected Group

	Consequent								
	M_2 (Grp. Eff.)			M_2 (Injustice)			Y (CA)		
Antecedent	Coeff.	SE	P	Coeff.	SE	P	Coeff.	SE	p
National Identity	0.18	0.09	.055	**0.17**	**0.08**	**<.05**	**0.36**	**0.07**	**<.001**
Group Efficacy	___	___	___	___	___	___	0.09	0.06	.144
Injustice	___	___	___	___	___	___	**0.36**	**0.07**	**<.001**
Sectarianism	-0.12	0.07	.112	**-0.45**	**0.06**	**<.001**	**-0.21**	**0.06**	**<.001**
Interaction Effect	0.05	0.09	.597	0.08	0.08	.291	-0.09	0.07	.171
Constant	**3.38**	**0.07**	**<.001**	**3.77**	**0.08**	**<.001**	**2.17**	**0.30**	**<.001**
	R^2=3.56%			R^2=27.28%			R^2=43.76%		
	$F(3,161)$=1.98, p= .119			$F(3,161)$=20.13, p<.001			$F(5,159)$=24.74, p<.001		

Similarly to the first group, national identification directly and positively predicted collective action ($b = 0.36$, 95% CI = 0.22 to 0.50, $p < .001$), but this effect was not moderated by sectarianism ($b = -0.09$, 95% CI = -0.23 to 0.04, $p = .171$). Furthermore, national identification marginally predicted group efficacy ($b = 0.18$, 95% CI = 0.01 to 0.36, $p = .055$), but the effect of group efficacy on collective action was not significant ($b = 0.09$, 95% CI = -0.03 to 0.20, $p = .144$). The effect of national identification on group efficacy was not significantly moderated by sectarianism ($b = 0.05$, 95% CI = -0.13 to 0.23, $p = .597$). The indirect effect of national identification on collective action via group efficacy was also not moderated by sectarianism, as indicated by the index of moderated mediation, since the corresponding 95% confidence interval included zero ($b = 0.004$, 95% CI = -0.01 to 0.04).

In addition, national identification positively and significantly predicted injustice ($b = 0.17$, 95% CI = 0.02 to 0.32, $p < .05$), which in turn positively and significantly predicted collective action ($b = 0.36$, 95% CI = 0.22 to 0.50, $p < .001$), suggesting that national identification predicts collective action via injustice. As for the interaction effect of national identification and sectarianism on injustice, a_6 was again not significantly different from 0 ($b = 0.08$, 95% CI = -0.07 to 0.23, p = .292). The indirect effect of national identification on collective action via injustice was not moderated by sectarianism, as indicated by the index of moderated mediation since the corresponding 95% confidence interval included zero ($b = 0.03$, 95% CI = -0.03 to 0.08).

Since none of the paths were moderated by sectarianism, to estimate the indirect effects of national identity on collective action, we tested a parallel multiple mediation model where identity was entered as an independent variable, collective action as the

dependent variable, group efficacy and injustice as mediators, and sectarianism as a covariate. This model confirmed that the indirect effect of national identity on collective through injustice was positive and significant ($b = 0.06$, 95% CI = 0.01 to 0.13), but the indirect effect through group efficacy was not reliably significant ($b = 0.01$, 95% CI = -0.004 to 0.07), although the bulk of this latter effect was on the positive side. Hence, among those who perceive their sect to be unaffected by abolishing sectarian quotas, national identification promotes collective action regardless of sectarianism, and does so both directly and indirectly via perceived injustice but not via group efficacy. None of the hypothesized paths were moderated by sectarianism.

Returning to the original model we tested (which included sectarianism as a moderator), we found that sectarianism negatively and significantly predicted collective action ($b = -0.22$, 95% CI = -0.33 to -0.09, $p < .001$). However, sectarianism did not predict group efficacy ($b = -0.12$, 95% CI = -0.26 to 0.03, $p = .119$). It did, however, negatively and significantly predict injustice ($b = -0.45$, 95% CI = -0.57 to -0.33, $p < .001$), suggesting that sectarianism indirectly affects collective action via injustice. To estimate this indirect effect, we ran a parallel multiple mediation model, controlling for national identification, which confirmed that the indirect effect of sectarianism on collective action via injustice was negative and significant ($b = -0.16$, 95 % CI = -0.25 to -0.08). Since lower sectarianism is (directly and indirectly) linked to greater tendencies to engage in collective action for abolishing confessional quotas, collective action among the unaffected group constitutes a progressive revolutionary goal.

Therefore, for participants who perceive that they have nothing to lose or gain from abolishing the quota system, higher national identification is *directly* linked with greater

collective action, regardless of sectarianism levels. Additionally, greater national identification is *indirectly* linked to greater collective action, through its association with increased injustice, which is linked to greater collective action. Furthermore, lower sectarianism is directly linked to greater collective action. Additionally, lower sectarianism is linked to greater perceived injustice of the quota system, which in turn is linked with greater collective action. In sum, for the unaffected group to take collective action to abolish confessional quotas, they must be high on national identification and low on sectarianism. Furthermore, perceived injustice constitutes an important mediator of the effects of both national identification and sectarianism on collective action. Group efficacy, on the other hand, does not constitute a significant mediator of the effect of national identification or sectarianism on collective action.

   c. Positively affected group. Model coefficients, standard errors, p-values, and model summary information for the conditional process model for this group can be found in table 11 (Figure 6.3).

Figure 6.3. The resulting model for the positively affected group. The bold lines represent significant paths, while the dashed lines represent non-significant paths. The numbers represent unstandardized regression coefficients and their respective standard errors.

Table 13
Model Coefficients for the Conditional Process Model for Positively Affected Group

	Consequent								
	M_2 (Grp. Eff.)			M_2 (Injustice)			Y (CA)		
Antecedent	Coeff.	SE	P	Coeff.	SE	P	Coeff.	SE	p
National Identity	0.10	0.16	.516	**-0.27**	**0.11**	**<.001**	-0.02	0.13	.832
Group Efficacy	___	___	___	___	___	___	0.15	0.10	.110
Injustice	___	___	___	___	___	___	**0.58**	**0.14**	**<.001**
Sectarianism	**-0.28**	**0.13**	**<.05**	**-0.37**	**0.09**	**<.001**	0.05	0.10	.653
Interaction Effect	0.07	0.17	.671	**0.35**	**0.12**	**<.01**	-0.07	0.13	.567
Constant	**3.17**	**0.12**	**<.001**	**3.69**	**0.08**	**<.001**	1.09	0.54	.049
	R^2=8.91%			R^2=37.56%			R^2=38.07%		
	$F(3,56)$=1.83, p=.153			$F(3,56)$=11.23, p<.001			$F(5,54)$=6.64, p<.001		

Among this group, national identification had no direct effect on collective action (b = -0.02, 95% CI = -0.26 to 0.21, p = .832), nor was this effect conditional on sectarianism (b = -0.07, 95% CI = -0.33 to 0.18, p = .567). Furthermore, the effect of national identification on group efficacy was not significant (b = 0.10, 95% CI = -0.21 to 0.41, p = .516), and group efficacy did not significantly predict collective action (b = 0.15, 95% CI = -0.04 to 0.35, p = .110). The effect of national identification on group efficacy was not significantly moderated by sectarianism (b = -0.07, 95% CI = -0.32 to 0.18, p = .567). The indirect effect of national identification on collective action via group efficacy was also not moderated by sectarianism, as verified by the index of moderated mediation, since its 95% confidence interval included zero (b = 0.01, 95% CI = -0.04 to 0.10). Hence, there was no path from national identification to collective action through group efficacy.

Importantly, national identification negatively and significantly predicted injustice (b = -0.27, 95% CI = -0.48 to -0.05, p < .05), which in turn positively and significantly predicted collective action (b = 0.58, 95% CI = 0.30 to 0.86, p < .001). The effect of national identification on injustice, however, was moderated by sectarianism, since a_6 was

significantly different from 0 ($b = 0.35$, 95% CI = 0.12 to 0.58, $p < .01$). The index of moderated mediation was also significant, since the 95% confidence interval did not include zero ($b = 0.20$, 95% CI = 0.09 to 0.38). This indicates that the indirect effect of national identification on collective action via perceived injustice is conditional on sectarianism.

With this evidence, the next step is the estimation of the indirect effect of national identification on collective action via injustice for various values of sectarianism, along with an inferential test at those values. Conventionally, we look at the indirect effects at mean levels of sectarianism plus and minus one standard deviation from the mean after centering the variables. The analysis revealed that when sectarianism was high, the indirect effect of national identification on collective action via injustice was non-significant, based on a 95% bootstrap confidence interval (-0.14 to 0.19). Conversely, when sectarianism was low, the indirect effect of national identification on collective action via injustice was negative and significant, based on a 95% bootstrap confidence interval (-0.59 to -0.17). That is, among those who perceive their sect to be positively affected by abolishing confessional quotas, the effect of national identification on collective action depends on sectarianism. Among those who are low on sectarianism, in line with what we expected, national identification *hinders* collective action and does so indirectly by reducing the perceived injustice of the quota system. Conversely, among those who are sectarian, national identification has no effect on collective action.

To visualize this interaction effect, we plotted the two-way interaction effect of national identity and sectarianism on perceived injustice, after centering the independent variable and the moderator (Figure 7)[3].


Figure 7. The two-way interaction of national identity and sectarianism on perceived injustice

As can be seen from the figure, among those low on sectarianism, the higher they are on national identity, the *more* just they perceive the quota system to be. Conversely, among those high on sectarianism, the perceived injustice of the quotas is independent of sectarianism. Therefore, the highest perception of the injustice of the quota system is among those who are low on sectarianism and low on national identity.[4]

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[3] Note that the direct interaction between identification and sectarianism on colletive action (without the mediators) was not significant, indicating only an indirect interaction effect via injustice, which is why we plot the interaction using injustice as the dependent variable.
[4] It must be noted that there we no floor effects on collective action since the lowest score on this variable for the positively affected group was 2. In fact, participants in this groups scored relatively high on this variable, where 46.8% scored 4 or above on collective action.

Finally, sectarianism did not directly predict collective action ($b = 0.05$, 95% CI = -0.16 to 0.25, $p = .653$), and although it negatively and significantly predicted group efficacy ($b = -0.28$, 95% CI = -0.54 to -0.03, $p < .05$), group efficacy had no effect on collective action, indicating that there is no indirect effect of sectarianism on collective action via group efficacy. However, sectarianism negatively and significantly predicted injustice ($b = -0.37$, 95% CI = -0.55 to -0.20. $p < .001$). As mentioned earlier, sectarianism and national identification had a significant interaction effect on injustice.

To examine how sectarianism affects collective action among those high and low on national identity, we reran the model specifying sectarianism as the independent variable, injustice and group efficacy as mediators, national identity as the moderator, and collective action as the dependent variable. Results showed that national identity moderated the path from sectarianism to injustice, as evidenced by the significant interaction effect ($b = 0.35$, 95% CI = 0.12 to 0.58, $p < .01$) and the index of moderated mediation ($b = 0.20$, 95% CI = 0.09 to 0.38). This moderation was such that for those low on national identity, the indirect effect of sectarianism on collective action via injustice was negative and significant ($b = -0.38$, 95% CI = -0.65 to -0.18). However, for those high on national identity, the indirect effect of sectarianism on collective action via injustice was not significant ($b = -0.05$, 95% CI = -0.18 to 0.04).

For ease of interpretation, we plotted the two-way interaction effect with sectarianism as a moderator of the link between national identity and perceived injustice, after centering the independent variable and the moderator (Figure 8).

Figure 8. The two-way interaction effect of sectarianism and national identity on perceived injustice

As can be seen from the figure, among those who are high on national identity, the

perceived injustice of sectarian quotas is independent of sectarianism. However, among

those who are low on national identity, the lower they are on sectarianism, the more likely

they are to perceive the system to be unjust. Therefore, the highest perception of injustice,

and consequently the highest collective action tendencies, is among those who are low on

sectarianism and low on national identification.

Therefore, for those who perceive their sect to be positively affected by the removal

of the quota system, collective action constitutes a progressive revolutionary goal among

those low in national identity. But for those high on national identity, sectarianism plays no

role in predicting collective action, and we suggest that collective action can constitute

either a progressive or a regressive revolutionary goal.

To sum up, among those who perceived their sect to be positively affected by the abolishment of confessional quotas, national identification affects collective action depending on sectarianism levels. Among those who are low on sectarianism, greater national identification is linked with *lower* perceived injustice of the quota system, which in turn is linked with *lower* collective action. Among those high on sectarianism, however, national identification has no effect on collective action. Put differently, for those low on national identity, lower sectarianism is linked with *greater* perceived injustice of the quota system, which in turn is linked with *greater* collective action. In sum, it seems that for the positively affected group to take action, they should be low on both national identification and sectarianism. Furthermore, perceived injustice, but not group efficacy, constitutes an important mediator of the moderated effect of sectarianism on collective action.

CHAPTER XIV

DISCUSSION

A. Review of Results

This study examined the social psychological predictors of collective action for a revolutionary goal, namely abolishing the quota system from all political positions in Lebanon. As initially discussed, most previous social psychological research focuses on the social change goal of amelioration, defined as an attempt to improve the situation of a group *within* the current system, and there is scarce research examining revolutionary social change goals, meaning improving one's condition by aiming to change the current system (Sweetman et al., 2013). We tested an extension of the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA, van Zomeren et al., 2008a) to examine predictors of support for abolishing

confessional quotas in Lebanon, using a convenience sample of students at the American University of Beirut, taking into account national identification, perceived injustice, group efficacy, and their moderation by sectarianism and perceived sectarian group interest.

The results for our central grouping variable, perceived sectarian group interest, were unexpected. While we had anticipated that only a few participants would pick the unaffected category, which we could then exclude from the analysis later, the majority of our sample picked the unaffected category, while the rest thought that their sect will be either positively or negatively affected by a change in the system. In addition, sectarian distribution did not map onto the group interest variable as we had expected, except for the Maronites, the majority of whom believed that their group will be negatively affected by the removal of the quota system. Having no a priori hypotheses for the unaffected category we just explored the model among this group.

The first aim of the study was to examine whether the same collective action can be motivated by both progressive and regressive reasons. Sweetman et al. (2013) propose that collective action can be undertaken for either progressive or regressive revolutionary goals, but they do not take into account that different groups can be motivated to take action for the same goal, but for different underlying reasons, i.e. progressive or regressive. We defined a revolution to be progressive if those low on sectarianism are more likely to take part in it, and as regressive if those high on sectarianism are more likely take part in it. If sectarianism does not predict collective action, we proposed that both progressive and regressive motives might lie behind such an action. We hypothesized that sectarianism will affect collective action to abolish the quota system in Lebanon differently in each perceived group interest category.

Our results suggest that intentions to engage in collective action for abolishing the sectarian quota system in Lebanon often stem from progressive motivations. Among participants who perceive their sect to be negatively affected or unaffected by the abolishment of the quota system, sectarianism negatively predicted collective action. This effect was indirect via injustice, such that those low on sectarianism were more likely to perceive the system to be unjust, which drove them to take action against this system. Therefore, our hypothesis that sectarianism will negatively predict collective action among the negatively affected group, thus constituting a progressive revolution, was supported, although the link was only indirect. In the unaffected group, sectarianism also negatively but directly predicted collective action. Hence, collective action for abolishing confessional quotas was progressive among these two groups.

Among those who perceive their sect to be positively affected by the abolishing of confessional quotas, we found no evidence of a purely regressive motive behind collective action for abolishing confessional quotas. That is, sectarianism did not positively predict collective action. Sectarianism only had an indirect effect on collective action via injustice, and this indirect path was moderated by national identification. For those low on national identification, the indirect path from sectarianism to collective action was negative and significant, such that those low on sectarianism were more likely to perceive the quota system to be unjust and consequently more willing to take collective action to abolish it. Therefore, collective action was progressive among this group. However, among those high on national identification, sectarianism did not predict collective action, suggesting both those low and high on sectarianism could take action, and thus providing preliminary evidence that both progressive and regressive motives might lie behind this action

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Therefore, our hypothesis that sectarianism will have no effect on collective action among the positively affected group, and that the goal here can be either progressive or regressive, was partially supported. Our results seem to suggest that it is possible that intentions for engaging in collective action for abolishing confessional quotas do not differ substantially among those high and low in sectarianism, at least when their national identification is relatively high. These results, however, must be interpreted with caution. One must note that the absence of association between sectarianism and collective action can also be due to lack of power to detect significant effects It is also possible that the interaction effect found in this group resulted from relatively higher sectarianism levels in this group compared to other groups.[5] Future research should seek to test the replicability of this interaction using larger more representative samples.

The second aim was to assess whether national identity, which is a superordinate category, helps promote collective action to abolish the quota system in Lebanon. We had argued that this is not always the case and the effect of national identification will depend on sectarianism and perceived sectarian group interest. We found that national identification did not always promote collective action. Among the negatively affected, national identification positively predicted collective action. However, contrary to what we expected, this effect was not moderated by sectarianism. Therefore higher identification with Lebanon led to higher intentions to undertake collective action among both those high

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[5] A one-way ANOVA showed that sectarianism levels were significantly different among the three interest groups (F (2, 312) = 9.60, $p < .01$), with the positively affected group scoring higher than the unaffected group, but not the negatively affected group. No differences emerged between the different groups on national identification.

and low on sectarianism. Similarly, among the unaffected group, national identification positively predicted collective action, independently of sectarianism levels.

However, among those who perceived their sect to be positively affected by a change in the system, the effect of national identification on collective action was indirect and was moderated by sectarianism, in line with what we hypothesized. This conditional effect was such that for those low on sectarianism, higher identification with Lebanon predicted *decreased* perceptions of injustice, which consequently predicted decreased collective action intentions. In this case, therefore, national identity *hindered* collective action. Meanwhile, among those who were high on sectarianism, national identification played no role in predicting collective action. That is, their tendencies to engage in collective action were independent of their national identification. Therefore, our hypotheses that among the positively affected group the effect of national identification on collective action will be moderated by sectarianism, and the hypothesized directions of these effects, were supported. The present results indicate that those who are low on sectarianism, and who perceive that their sect will become more powerful if the quota system is abolished, are more likely to refrain from taking collective action to abolish confessional quotas, if they have high national identification. This is because they do not perceive the quota system to be so unfair, possibly because they believe that it preserves the rights of those who might lose representation if the quota system is removed. From a theoretical perspective, our results extend previous research which typically focuses on identities that help *promote* collective action (De Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Subasic et al., 2012; Simon et al., 1998; van Zomeren et al., 2008a). Our research instead shows the importance of considering identities which can hinder collective action. Relatedly, our

research emphasizes the importance of considering the role of superordinate identities in influencing revolutionary collective action, especially since research on collective action within a national context typically focuses on the role of identification with a subgroup rather than the superordinate category (e.g. Tabri & Conway, 2011). Furthermore, our research illustrates how the same superordinate national identity can promote or hinder tendencies to engage in the same collective action, even among people who are low on sectarianism (prejudice toward other national subgroups). By illustrating the contradictory effects which the same identity can have on collective action, our results illustrate the contested and complex nature of identities.

Practically, our results are also important in the Lebanese context by showing that among non-sectarian Lebanese youth, identifying with Lebanon can lead some to be more inclined to take collective action to abolish confessional quotas, and others to be less inclined to do so. That is, our research demonstrates that some people in Lebanon may refrain from fully supporting the abolishment of confessional quotas not because they are sectarian, but because they are low on sectarianism. This complicates the role of civil society actors who, besides tackling a sectarian system and attempting to mobilize an apathetic population, must also target a non-sectarian population who wants equality between the groups but does not believe a secular system is the best option (Traboulsi, 2010). As argued by Mikdashi, (2011) "you can have a secular state that is sexist, hyper capitalist, racist, xenophobic, patriarchal, oppressive, and repressive of public opinion," and building a state where justice and equality prevail is not the same as building a secular state.

The third aim of our research was to examine the mediators of the effect of national identity on collective action, based on the SIMCA model. These mediators are group efficacy and the perceived injustice of the quota system.

We found that injustice does not mediate the effect of national identity on collective action among the negatively affected group. This means that although those who identify highly with Lebanon will take action to abolish the quota system, this is not because they think such a system is unfair and they prefer a meritocratic system instead. Therefore, there are probably other mechanisms, which we did not take into account, through which national identity has an effect on collective action among this group. It could be that they do not think that a quota system is unjust in absolute, but that the quota system in place now is discriminatory towards particular sects or groups within the Lebanese system. For example, national identity might predict perceptions of injustice for items such as "I think the sectarian quotas are unjust because they discriminate towards secular people or independent candidates". As such, maybe future studies can add other items to the injustice scale. However, injustice was a significant mediator in both the unaffected and the positively affected groups. Importantly, injustice was a consistent positive predictor of collective action across all groups, in line with previous literature (Fischer et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2008; van Zomeren et al., 2008a). Therefore perceptions of injustice arose as the main variable in predicting collective action to abolish the quota system in Lebanon.

As for group efficacy, it did not significantly mediate the path from national identity to collective action in any of the three groups, nor did it independently predict collective action in any of these groups. This finding is surprising and inconsistent with previous literature on group efficacy. The instrumental pathway to collective action has been found

to predict collective action independent from the emotion-focused path (van Zomeren et al., 2004) and the identity path (Simon et al., 1998). Various studies have shown that group efficacy can predict collective action in various contexts (Smith et al., 2008; Tausch et al., 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2008a; van Zomeren et al., 2010). In our study, however, group efficacy was neither a direct nor indirect predictor of collective action. This could be because group efficacy is simply not important in this context to mobilize people, and there might be other mechanisms (besides injustice) which we did not take into account, that mediate the link between national identification and collective action. Another explanation could be that effectiveness is not in terms of influencing change in the system in Lebanon, but rather whether the action will influence third parties, build an oppositional movement, and express the values of the protesters (Hornsey, Blackwood, Louis, Fielding, Mavor, Morton, et al., 2006; Saab et al., 2014).

In sum, we found some support for the hypothesized mediating role of injustice, and no support for the hypothesized mediating role of group efficacy, in predicting collective action. Our findings underscore the importance for future studies to test the SIMCA model across different groups (Cakal et al., 2011).

B. Limitations, Practical Implications, and Future Directions

The study has several limitations that must be taken into account when interpreting the results of our analyses. First, it must be noted there is a possibility that the non-sectarian clubs and forums were more likely to fill our survey, which could lead to sampling bias in our study. Second, as mentioned previously, we resorted to subgroup analysis to test out our models. Subgroup analysis does not actually test for moderation, and as such a

statistically significant result in one group but not the other does not necessarily imply a statistically significant difference between the groups on the effects of the IV (Hayes, 2013). Thus, subgroup analysis is not a formal test of moderation, and we cannot be certain that the paths we found differ significantly across our three groups. Moreover, tests of linear interactions in regression are low in power to begin with (Hayes, 2015), and splitting our data into three groups resulted in small sample sizes, which may have prevented us from detecting significant differences on the moderating role of sectarianism in the three groups, if they exist. Hence, future research should test our model using larger sample sizes.

Third, we had a high number of deletions since we were obliged to remove the missing values on the group interest variable (11.8%) as well as all participants who were not Lebanese (6.8%). Fourth, due the cross-sectional nature of our research we cannot infer causal associations between the IVs and DV (Hayes, 2013). However, a meta-analysis of the effects of identity, injustice, and efficacy on collective action has shown that there were no significant differences on effect sizes between studies that allowed for causal inferences and those that did not (van Zomeren et al., 2008a). Therefore, there is consistent evidence across the three variables for the causal sequences assumed here, i.e. the assumption that identity, injustice, and group efficacy predict collective action. Fifth, we used a convenient sample of AUB students and our results might not generalize to the rest of the Lebanese population. Moreover, our sample is particular even as an AUB sample, since it was generally low on sectarianism. This might have been due to sample selection bias, where in our general AUB sample members of the secular club might have been more likely to take the survey than members from other sectarian clubs. Our sample also scored high on

national identification, perceptions of injustice of the quota system, and collective action tendencies. As such, the particularity of the sample must be taken into account when interpreting the results of the study, especially since other studies have found that AUB students score above the midpoint on sectarianism (Kobeissi, 2013; Sagherian, 2010). It would be beneficial for future studies to test these effects among a Lebanese community sample, especially considering the practical implications of the study. Sixth, we measured people's intentions to engage in collective action and not their actual participation. Although it has been shown that intentions to participate in collective action are good predictors of actual participation (De Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; van Zomeren et al., 2008a), it is important to examine how our variables influence actual collective action participation. As such, future longitudinal studies might test how these variables are linked to actual participation later on (van Stekelenburg, Anikina, Pouw, Petrovic, & Nederlof, 2013).

Finally, we assessed group interest using a single-item measure, implying that internal consistency reliability cannot be established (Wanous & Reichers, 1996), especially if the construct it is assessing is broad and heterogeneous (Postmes, Haslam, & Jans, 2012). This is particularly problematic since sect did not map onto group interest as we expected, which suggests that there are other considerations at play, besides belonging to a relative majority or relative minority group, that are influencing responses on this question.

It could be that some Sunni participants believed their sect will be negatively affected in terms of power if quotas are abolished, because they think that they will be outnumbered by Shi'ites. Others might think that sect will no longer matter if the quota

system is abolished and thus the sectarian power of *all* sects will decrease. Yet others who perceive that they will be unaffected by abolishing the quota system might have diverse reasons for doing so. This category might include people who do not really know how a change in the quota system will affect their sect, or who think their sect does not have power anyway so removing the quotas will not affect them. Others who picked this category might believe that their sect will not abuse the objectively increased power so their sect's power will be maintained at the same level. Yet others might believe that sect as a construct will not matter anymore and sectarian power will therefore not be relevant, or that sectarian quotas are not important to begin with because real power is determined by other means, such as military power.

Accordingly, the results for the "unaffected" group must be interpreted with caution, since this category may have lumped multiple groups together. The other two groups however, do indeed include people who think their sect will be positively or negatively affected by a change in the system, regardless of their reasons as to why this might be the case. As such, future studies should consider measuring group interest differently, by including categories such as "I don't know" or "Irrelevant, because sectarian power will no longer matter if the quotas are abolished" categories. It would also be useful to add a small introduction to the item which explains the current division of quotas to the participants. This might help participants answer this question since some focus group participants admitted that they do not know what the current distribution of quotas is. Furthermore, we had 12.8% of the values missing on group interest, which might have been left blank by participants who did not know how to answer the question.

Besides validity and generalizability issues, future studies can also improve upon this study conceptually. For example, our injustice items only measured perceptions of the illegitimacy of the quota system. It could be that some people believe a quota system is appropriate for the Lebanese context, but they might want to adjust the current division of quotas to make it more representative of the current demographic division (Muhanna, 2013a). It is also possible that some people might want to keep the quota system as it is but work on other types of reform such as changing the electoral system (Ekmekji, 2012). Some others also claim that the sectarian political system is not the real problem and that without changing the ruling political elite secularism will not lead to democracy, equality, and social justice (Mikdashi, 2011). In fact, such debates about reform versus revolution were one of the central factors that led to the weakening of the "Isqat el Nizam" movement (Chit, 2012; Meier, 2015), and some have argued that although the majority of Lebanese want to abolish the sectarian political system, there is little agreement on what the alternative system will look like (Bray-Collins, 2013). Therefore, it would be interesting to study how national identification and sectarianism predict support for these different strategies and their potential mediators/moderators. Moreover, we only studied support for political secularism, and future studies can examine how our predictors influence support for the social aspect of secularism as well (e.g. civil marriage).

Another interesting future study would be to examine how the Lebanese understand political sectarianism and what they think establishing a secular system entails. It has been argued that most Lebanese think secularism is a Western concept that is not applicable to Lebanon (Traboulsi, 2010; Grafton, 2002), or that it is unclear what the concept of "secularism" would entail in Lebanon (Peeters, 2010). Indeed, a recent poll by Information

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International showed that, while 58% of those surveyed were in favor of abolishing political sectarianism, 24% of the participants did not even know what abolishing political sectarianism means (Information International, 2010). Due to these problems, we were careful not to include the words secularism or political sectarianism in our survey, and it would be interesting to conduct a qualitative study that examines how these terms are understood.

Finally, our results showed that national identity influenced collective action differently depending on group interest, even though all three groups scored high on this variable. This could be because Lebanese identity might mean different things for the different groups. It has been proposed that there is no single definition of what it means to be Lebanese (NOW, 2009), and some argue that Lebanon's communal make-up prevents its citizens from being "just Lebanese," making Lebanon a plurality of people with nothing in common to justify the establishment of a single state (Turkmen-Dervisoglu, 2012; Issa, 2011) . In fact, some say that Lebanon suffers an identity crisis (Issa, 2011): part of its population, mainly the Christians, is believed to be more attached to France and the West, with a mostly Western identity, neglecting the Arabic language and favoring instead the English or French languages (Abi Habib, 2014; Aly, 2014). Meanwhile, the Shi'ites, mostly represented by Hezbollah, are seen to be allied with Iran and the Assad regime in Syria, and the Sunnis are seen to seek the support of Saudi Arabia and to be allied with the opposition in Syria (Aly, 2014). Not only is Lebanon a scene where regional geopolitics play out, but it is even divided regionally, where, according to Aly (2014), "there are Sunni, Christian, and Shi'ite areas, but there are no national areas." In this context, it would be interesting to understand how the different subgroups negotiate their identities and how this influences

conflict between those endorsing these identities and the choices they make by (Harb, 2007). Accordingly, future research can examine the content of Lebanese national identification, and whether this content is different across the various sectarian or interest groups.

The findings of our study provide preliminary guidelines for civil society actors and social movement organizations who seek to mobilize segments of the Lebanese population that are similar to our sample, against the sectarian system. It has been argued that different campaigns appeal to different participation motives (van Stekelenburg et al., 2009). As such, protest organizers must take into account the different motivational drives of their potential participants and tailor their campaigns to them accordingly, by providing participation reasons that fit these motives. By creating such a fit, organizers will decrease disengagement levels and mobilize a larger number of people. Since national identity does not always seem to promote collective action for abolishing quotas, and since its effect is dependent on sectarianism and perceived group interest, appealing to common Lebanese identity to trigger participation will not be beneficial in mobilizing all segments of society. In fact, it appears that this may be counterproductive in mobilizing those who feel they will be positively affected by the abolishment of the quota system. Conversely, reducing sectarianism seems to be an effective strategy for mobilizing people to take collective action for abolishing confessional quotas, because sectarianism negatively predicted collective action tendencies across all levels of group interest, except among high national identifiers who felt their sect will be positively affected by the abolishment of confessional quotas, but even among those, sectarianism did not *increase* collective action, but simply had no effect. While group efficacy did not emerge as a reliable predictor across the

different levels of group interest, increasing perceptions of the injustice and unfairness of the quota system seemed to motivate people across levels of group interest to undertake collective action. This has implications for those who want to mobilize people on campus, as it indicates that they should focus on highlighting the injustice of the quota system rather than citizens' ability to actually bring about a change in the system. However, it is clear from our results that a sense of injustice is not always brought about by an increase in national identification. In fact, national identification did not predict injustice in the negatively affected group, and it *negatively* predicted it in the positively affected group. Therefore, for some a sense of injustice is actually brought about by a decrease in national identification. As such campaigners must consider targeting other forms of identities that may help promote collective action for abolishing confessional quotas among all groups, such as secularist identities, particularly as these are more politicized identities, which have been shown to be more powerful predictors of collective action than identification with established social categories (van Zomeren et al., 2008a), such as national identities. .

CHAPTER XV

CONCLUSION

In summary, this study is the first empirical study to examine collective action in the context of a revolutionary goal. Moreover, most research has focused on goals that are either progressive or regressive. In this study, we investigated whether the same collective action can be undertaken for both progressive and regressive reasons i.e. whether different groups can take action for the same goal but for differing ideologies. The study examined the social psychological predictors of revolutionary collective action by extending the

SIMCA model. It showed that national identification does not always promote collective action, and has differential effects on collective action depending on sectarianism and perceived sectarian group interest. More specifically, among those who are low on sectarianism and think the abolishment of sectarian quotas will increase the power of their sect, greater national identification was linked to *lower* collective action intentions. Additionally, it found preliminary evidence of a potential regressive motive in undertaking action for abolishing the sectarian quotas in Lebanon, since lower sectarianism was not always linked with greater collective action intentions. The study also showed that the mediational role of one of the well-established mediators in the literature, perceived injustice, depends on perceived sectarian group interest. In addition, contrary to the literature, group efficacy played no role in predicting collective action. As such, the study provided a more nuanced analysis of the role of identification and its mediators in influencing collective action than that existing in the literature, and presented practical guidelines for civil society actors in terms of mobilizing citizens.

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Appendix A

Instruments

Instructions: Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements by circling your answer.

Sectarianism Scale

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

	1	2	3	4	5
1. I am proud to belong to my sect.	1	2	3	4	5
2. My sect can serve Lebanon better than any other sect.	1	2	3	4	5
3. Any governing authority needs to take the interests of my sect into consideration.	1	2	3	4	5
4. I have a strong connection to my sect.	1	2	3	4	5
5. My sect should have a larger proportion/quota of government.	1	2	3	4	5
6. My sect is superior to all other sects.	1	2	3	4	5

Group Interest Scale
Do you think that abolishing the sectarian quotas in the Lebanese parliamentary system will (substantially increase/ substantially decrease/ maintain) the current political power of your sect?

National Identification Scale

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

	1	2	3	4	5
1. I have spent time trying to find out more about Lebanon, such as its history, traditions, and customs.	1	2	3	4	5
2. I have a strong sense of belonging to my own Lebanon.	1	2	3	4	5
3. I understand pretty well what my Lebanese membership means to me.	1	2	3	4	5
4. I have often done things that will help me understand my Lebanese background better.	1	2	3	4	5
5. I have often talked to other people in order to learn more about my Lebanese background.	1	2	3	4	5
6. I feel strong attachment towards Lebanon.	1	2	3	4	5
7. I am concerned with the welfare of Lebanon.	1	2	3	4	5

8. I derive pride from my Lebanese background.	1	2	3	4	5
9. My foremost allegiance is to my Lebanese identity.	1	2	3	4	5
10. My identity is mostly defined by my belonging to Lebanon.	1	2	3	4	5

Injustice Scale
The term political positions refers to positions in the Parliament, Presidency, and the Ministry.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. Allocating sectarian quotas to political positions is unfair.	1	2	3	4	5
2. Allocating sectarian quotas to political positions is unjust.	1	2	3	4	5
3. Allocating sectarian quotas to political positions is justified.	1	2	3	4	5
4. Allocating sectarian quotas to political positions is immoral.	1	2	3	4	5
5. I think that seats in government should be allocated according to merit alone with no consideration for one's sect.	1	2	3	4	5

Group Efficacy Scale
We refer to sectarian quotas applied to political positions in the Parliament, Presidency, and the Ministry.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. I believe that the Lebanese, as a group, can abolish the sectarian quotas from the Lebanese political system.	1	2	3	4	5
2. I believe that the Lebanese can, together, abolish the sectarian quotas from the Lebanese political system.	1	2	3	4	5
3. I believe that the Lebanese, through joint actions, can abolish the sectarian quotas from the Lebanese political system.	1	2	3	4	5
4. It is impossible to abolish sectarian quotas in Lebanon.	1	2	3	4	5
5. I can imagine a Lebanon where sectarian quotas do not exist.	1	2	3	4	5

Collective Action Scale

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly

disagree				Agree

	1	2	3	4	5
1. I would participate in a future demonstration calling for abolishing the sectarian quota system from political posts in Lebanon.	1	2	3	4	5
2. I would participate in raising the collective voice of the Lebanese calling for abolishing the sectarian quota system from political posts in Lebanon.	1	2	3	4	5
3. I would do something together with fellow Lebanese to abolish the sectarian quota system from political posts in Lebanon.	1	2	3	4	5
4. I would participate in some form of collective action to abolish the sectarian quota system from political posts in Lebanon.	1	2	3	4	5
5. I would sign a petition to abolish the sectarian quota system from political posts in Lebanon.	1	2	3	4	5
6. I would support a nonviolent popular revolution in Lebanon aimed at abolishing sectarian quotas from political posts.	1	2	3	4	5
7. I would join a nonviolent popular uprising that aims to abolish sectarian quotas in political posts.	1	2	3	4	5

Abolishment of confessional quotas as a revolutionary goal
Do you think that abolishing the confessional quotas from political posts in Lebanon represents:
    a) a minor reform to the political system
    b) a major reform to the political system
    c) a revolutionary change in the political system

Demographic Information
• Gender   ☐ Female   ☐   Male
• Age: ____ years
• Nationality   ☐ Lebanese   ☐ Dual Citizenship
            ☐ Other (please specify) _____
• Sect (according to official records)
    ☐   Christian Orthodox ☐   Christian Catholi ☐   Druze
    ☐   Christian M ☐ nite   Muslim S ☐ ّ a
        Muslim Sunni
    ☐ Other (please specify) _____
• Which political party do you support?
    ☐ Amal Movement/حركة امل
    ☐ Armenian Revolutionary Federation/ حزب الطاشناق

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- ☐ El Marada/تيار المردة
- ☐ Free Patriotic Movement/ التيار الوطني الحر
- ☐ Future Movement/ تيار المستقبل
- ☐ Hezbollah/ حزب الله
- ☐ Islamic group/ الجماعة الاسلامية
- ☐ Lebanese Communist Party/ الحزب الشيوعي اللبناني
- ☐ Lebanese Forces/القوات اللبنانية
- ☐ Lebanese Phalange Party/ حزب الكتائب اللبنانية
- ☐ Popular Nasserite Organization / التنظيم الشعبي الناصري
- ☐ Progressive Socialist Party/ الحزب التقدمي الاشتراكي
- ☐ Social Democrat Hunchakian Party/ حزب الهنشاق
- ☐ Syrian Social Nationalist Party/ الحزب السوري القومي الاجتماعي
- ☐ None
  - Other (please specify) _____
- • ☐ Which political alliance do you support?
  - ☐ March 8th
  - ☐ March 14th
  - ☐ None
- • Number of years lived in Lebanon: ____   years

Appendix B

Advertisements for the Study

E-mail Announcement of the Research Study to PSYC 201 Students

Dear Students,

We invite you to participate in an online survey called "Social and political attitudes" We would be very grateful if you could participate.
This study will involve completing a questionnaire on your social and political attitudes regarding various issues. It is a social psychological research about how people feel towards various aspects of the political system in Lebanon, particularly the aspects relating to the application of confessional quotas in political power positions. The study will take about 20 minutes to complete.
Start date of study: (depending on IRB approval)
End date of study: (two weeks after start date of study)

Please contact me (Rim Saab) at rs147@aub.edu.lb if you have any questions.

If you participate in this study, you will be asked to respond to some questionnaires. Our only requirements is that you be Lebanese and 18 years or older. The questionnaires will be online, a link to the survey will be sent to you through your AUB emails.
To thank you for your participation, you will receive one credit on your final PSYC 201grade.
Should you decide not to participate in this study, you can choose to write a brief report on an article from a psychological journal to receive credit equivalent to 1% point added to your overall average in the course PSYC 101/201. Please contact Dr. May Awaida (mawaida@aub.edu.lb) to learn more about this option.

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Dr. Rim Saab, Assistant Professor

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E-mail Announcement from Psychology Professors and For Snowball Sampling

<u>Invitation to Participate in a Research Study</u>
This notice is for an AUB-IRB Approved Research Study
For Dr. Rim Saab at AUB.
It is not an Official Message from AUB
You are invited to participate in an online survey entitled "Social and Political Attitudes. This is a research study conducted by Dr. Rim Saab, Faculty of Arts and Sciences at the American University of Beirut. The conduct of this study will adhere to the IRB approved conditions and terms. We would be very grateful if you could participate and kindly forward this e-mail to other AUB students who might be interested in participating.
The purpose of the study is to examine how people feel towards various aspects of the political system in Lebanon, particularly aspects relating to the application of confessional quotas in political power positions.
PROCEDURES
This message invites you to:

1. **Read the consent form and consider whether you want to be involved in the study.**

And to note:

- *Participation is completely voluntary.*
- *If you agree to the consent form, completing the questionnaire will take around 20 minutes.*
- *Only the data you provide in the questionnaire will be collected and analyzed.*
- *The results of the survey will be published in the form of a thesis and will be available by the AUB Library in printed from and electronically.*

POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO SUBJECTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY
In you decide to participate in this study, you will have the chance to enter a prize draw and win one of three cash prizes worth $35 each.
The results of the study will contribute to the understanding of political attitudes in Lebanon.
Potential risks for participating in the study
The risks of the study are minimal. The collected data will remain confidential *and anonymous.*
CONFIDENTIALITY
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study will remain confidential. *Only you will know that you returned a questionnaire.*

PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
You can choose whether to be in this study or not. If you volunteer to be in this study, you may withdraw at any time without consequences of any kind.
Agreement of Research Subject
If after reading the consent document and having any questions you might have answered to your satisfaction, you voluntarily agree to take part in the study, please complete the study questionnaire and submit it online.
If you agree to participate, please click on the link below to start the survey:
LINK GOES HERE
Otherwise please ignore this invitation to participate in the study.

Principal Investigator:

Dr. Rim Saab, Assistant Professor
Tel: +961 1 350000 ext 4367
Email: rs147@aub.edu.lb
Office: Jesup 103C
American University of Beirut, Lebanon

Facebook Post

We invite you to participate in an online survey for a research study called "social and political attitudes." We would be very grateful if you could participate.

The study is about how people feel towards various aspects of the political system in Lebanon, and it will take about 20 minutes to complete.

If you participate in this study, you will be asked to respond to some questionnaires. Our only requirement is that you be Lebanese and 18 years or older. A link to the survey is provided below.

To thank you for your participation, you will have the chance to enter a prize draw and win one of three cash prizes worth $35 each.

If you have any questions before participating, your can contact Dr. Rim Saab at rs147@aub.edu.lb; telephone: 01350000 Ext. 4367

If you have any complaints, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, you can contact IRB at AUB: 01- 350 000 ext. 5445 or 5454 or irb@aub.edu.lb.

Appendix C

Consent Forms

Consent Form for PSYC 201 Students

Please read this information carefully before deciding to take part in this research. If you are happy to participate you will be asked to tick a box at the bottom of the page.

What is the research about?

This is a social psychology research about your social and political attitudes. It investigates the social psychological factors that predict Lebanese people's attitudes toward the Lebanese political system, particularly the application of confessional quotas in political positions and the absence of civil laws regarding personal status affairs.

Who can participate?

You can participate if you are a Lebanese AUB student aged between 18 and 64, and enrolled in PSYC 201 during Fall 2014 semester. The study will include 350 AUB students enrolled in PSYC 201 during Fall 2014 semester.

Why have I been chosen?

Lebanese students in PSYC 201 aged 18 and above have been selected for this study.

What will happen to me if I take part?

In this study, you will complete a questionnaire on your opinion regarding various social and political issues in Lebanon. The study will last about 20 minutes.

Are there any benefits in my taking part?

You will contribute to the understanding of political attitudes in Lebanon. You will also obtain intellectual benefits from participating in the research study, namely gaining knowledge pertaining to social psychological surveys.

Are there any risks involved?

No conceivable risks above those associated with everyday living are involved.

Will my participation be confidential?

Your participation will be anonymous. Hence, there will be no way to link your answers to the questions to your personal identity.

Will anyone else know the results?

A report of the study may be submitted for publication or to conference presentations, but individual participants will not be identifiable in any way. No individual data will be analyzed or published, but the aggregate data from the entire sample only. The information obtained during this research will be kept confidential, and no one other than the researchers will see your anonymous responses. However, records might be monitored and audited without violating confidentiality.

What happens if I change my mind?

Your participation is voluntary and you may withdraw your participation at any time. If you have any questions, please send me an email (rs147@aub.edu.lb).If you refuse to participate or decide to withdraw from the study, this will involve NO penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled to. Your refusal to participate will also NOT affect your relationship with AUB.

If you decide not to participate in this study but still want to earn a research credit for PSYC-201 course, you can do that by writing a brief report. If you decide to write a report, please contact PSYC 201 coordinator Dr. May Awaida who will provide you with an empirical article from the Journal of Psychological Sciences. You will obtain the same credit point for either participation in this study or written report.

What happens if something goes wrong?

If you have questions about your rights as a participant in this research project, or if you feel that you have been placed at risk, then you may contact the AUB Social & Behavioral Sciences Institutional review Board (SBSIRB) at AUB: 01- 350 000 ext. 5445 or 5454 or irb@aub.edu.lb.
How do I get credit for my participation?
After you complete the survey, you will receive information on how to receive course credit for your participation. There will be no financial compensation for participation in this study.
Where can I get more information?

If you have any questions about the study before beginning or at any time after participating you may contact Dr. Rim Saab at rs147@aub.edu.lb, tel: +961 1 350000, ext 4367.

Consent

I have read and understood the information about this study. In consenting, I understand that my legal rights are not affected. I also understand that data collected as part of this research will be kept confidential and that published results will maintain that confidentiality. I finally understand that if I have any questions about my rights as a participant in this research, or if I feel that I have been placed at risk, I may contact the AUB Social & Behavioral Sciences Institutional review Board (SBSIRB) at AUB: 01- 350 000 ext. 5445 or 5454 or irb@aub.edu.lb.

I certify that I am 18 years or older. I have read the above consent form and I give consent to participate in the above described research.

If you accept the above statements and you are willing to participate, please start answering the questionnaire. By continuing you indicate your consent to participate in the study and authorize the researchers to use your data.

Consent Form for Non-psychology Pool

Please read this information carefully before deciding to take part in this research. If you are happy to participate you will be asked to tick a box at the bottom of the page.

What is the research about?

This is a social psychology research about your social and political attitudes. It investigates the social psychological factors that predict Lebanese people's attitudes toward the Lebanese political system, particularly the application of confessional quotas in political positions and the absence of civil laws regarding personal status affairs.

Who can participate?

You can participate if you are a Lebanese AUB student aged between 18 and 64.The study will include 350 AUB students.

Why have I been chosen?

Lebanese AUB students in aged 18 and above have been selected for this study.

What will happen to me if I take part?

In this study, you will complete a questionnaire on your opinion regarding various social and political issues in Lebanon. The study will last about 20 minutes.

Are there any benefits in my taking part?

You will contribute to the understanding of political attitudes in Lebanon. You will also obtain intellectual benefits from participating in the research study, namely gaining knowledge pertaining to social psychological surveys.

Are there any risks involved?

No conceivable risks above those associated with everyday living are involved.

Will my participation be confidential?

Your participation will be anonymous. Hence, there will be no way to link your answers to the questions to your personal identity.

Will anyone else know the results?

A report of the study may be submitted for publication or to conference presentations, but individual participants will not be identifiable in any way. No individual data will be analyzed or published, but the aggregate data from the entire sample only.The information obtained during this research will be kept confidential, and no one other than the researchers will see your anonymous responses. However, records might be monitored and audited without violating confidentiality.

What happens if I change my mind?

Your participation is voluntary and you may withdraw your participation at any time. If you have any questions, please send me an email (rs147@aub.edu.lb).If you refuse to participate or decide to withdraw from the study, this will involve NO penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled to. Your refusal to participate will also NOT affect your relationship with AUB.

What happens if something goes wrong?

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How do I get credit for my participation?
After you complete the survey, you will receive information on how to enter the prize draw.
Where can I get more information?

If you have any questions about the study before beginning or at any time after participating you may contact Dr. Rim Saab at rs147@aub.edu.lb, tel: +961 1 350000, ext 4367.

Consent

I have read and understood the information about this study. In consenting, I understand that my legal rights are not affected. I also understand that data collected as part of this research will be kept confidential and that published results will maintain that confidentiality. I finally understand that if I have any questions about my rights as a participant in this research, or if I feel that I have been placed at risk, I may contact the AUB Social & Behavioral Sciences Institutional review Board (SBSIRB) at AUB: 01- 350 000 ext. 5445 or 5454 or irb@aub.edu.lb.

I certify that I am 18 years or older. I have read the above consent form and I give consent to participate in the above described research.

If you accept the above statements and you are willing to participate, please start answering the questionnaire. By continuing you indicate your consent to participate in the study and authorize the researchers to use your data.

Appendix D

Debriefing Forms

Debriefing Form for PSYC 201 Students

If you are interested in learning about the outcomes of the study (note that individual results cannot be provided) please contact Dr. Rim Saab (telephone: 01350000 Ext. 4367). If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, or to report a complaint, you may call:

      IRB, AUB: 01-350000 Ext. 5543 or 5540

Please make sure to save the contact information, either by taking a screenshot or by copying them to another document, if you wish to contact the researcher or the IRB.

IMPORTANT: To receive your credit, you must:

Enter a unique code in the box (see instructions below) and email the code to your PSYC 201/101 instructor, with **your code as a subject of the email**.

> **Yasmine Fayad** yf03@aub.edu.lb
> **Maral Boydjian** md.boyadj@gmail.com
> **Lama Ghanem** lg14@aub.edu.lb
> **Sinine Nakhle** sininenakhle@gmail.com
> **May Awaida** mawaida@gmail.com
> **Nour Nasr** nn44@aub.edu.lb
> **Pascale Nakhle** pascale.nakhle@gmail.com
> **Hala Naffah** hrnaffah@gmail.com

Rest assured that this code will be stored in a separate datafile from your responses to the survey, so it cannot be used to link your responses to your identity.

Instructions: Please enter a code that consists of the last two letters of your first name, your birthday and your age. For example**: ER2025** for Pet**er**, born on the **20**th (month irrelevant), **25** years old

TEXTBOX COMES HERE

This study investigates the social psychological factors that predict Lebanese people's attitudes toward the Lebanese political system, particularly the application of confessional quotas in political positions and the absence of civil laws regarding personal status affairs. This study is part of a Masters student's thesis project. The research investigates how socio-demographic characteristics (gender, age, religion, sect) and identification with the nation, a perceived sense of injustice, and group efficacy predict these attitudes. Additionally, the research examines what role sectarianism and perceived sectarian group interest play in these relationships.

A summary of this research project, and of its results once completed, are available upon

request. To request a summary, please feel free to contact Dr. Rim Saab (rs147@aub.edu.lb). Finally, if you have questions about your rights as a participant in this research project, or if you feel that you have been placed at risk, then you may contact the AUB Social & Behavioral Sciences Institutional review Board (SBSIRB) at AUB: 01- 350 000 ext. 5445 or 5454 or irb@aub.edu.lb.
I have read the above and I agree for my data to be used in this study (Yes/No).

Debriefing Form for Non-psychology Pool

If you are interested in learning about the outcomes of the study (note that individual results cannot be provided) please contact Dr. Rim Saab (telephone: 01350000 Ext. 4367). If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, or to report a complaint, you may call:

      IRB, AUB: 01-350000 Ext. 5543 or 5540

Please make sure to save the contact information, either by taking a screenshot or by copying them to another document, if you wish to contact the researcher or the IRB.

IMPORTANT: to enter the prize draw, you must:

Enter a unique code in the box (see instructions below) and email the code using your AUB e-mailto Dr. Rim Saab at rs147@aub.edu.lb, with **your code as a subject of the email**.

Rest assured that you have been redirected to another page to enter this code, and it will be stored in a separate datafile from your responses to the survey, so it cannot be used to link your responses to your identity.

Instructions: Please enter a code that consists of the last two letters of your first name, your birthday and your age. For example**: ER2025** for Pet**er**, born on the **20**th (month irrelevant), 25 years old

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I have read the above and I agree for my data to be used in this study (Yes/No)