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PATRONAGE, CLIENTALISM, AND THE MAINTENANCE OF THE CONFESSIONAL STATE

by

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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

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Patronage and clientalism are a system of service provision and support networks based on personality or political party which frequently supplant the national state. In Lebanon, patronage networks are especially strong due to the inherently designed weakness of the state structure. Lebanon's state structure is also based on a confessional power sharing model based on religion. This thesis argues that there is a deep relationship between the pervasive and all encompassing nature of patronage in Lebanon and the resilience of sectarianism and confessional politics. It argues several hypotheses; that Lebanese Sunnis will have more faith in connections than personal merit, that they will have more faith in patronage networks than state services, that there will be a relationship between income and greater connections and access to patronage, and that there will be a relationship between greater connections and greater levels of political activity.

The thesis uses quantitative data gathered from a 300 person survey of Lebanese Sunnis to examine the relationship between patronage and sectarianism in Lebanon. The data found that a relationship does exist, and that respondents generally have low faith in the ability of the state to provide for its citizens and that patronage networks are much more effective than the state in comparison. The data also found that respondents who are more politically active and hold more sectarian viewpoints are more likely to receive the benefits of patronage networks and are more likely to have higher incomes. The respondents who were politically active also overwhelmingly supported sectarian Sunni parties; this reinforces the belief that access to patronage networks reinforces and requires sectarian sentiment and solidarity, contributing to the maintenance of confessionalism in Lebanon

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Chapter I: Introduction

This chapter will introduce the central topic of the thesis, that of patronage clientalism and the sectarian Lebanese state. It will then briefly outline the structure of the thesis and the research design. Patronage and clientalism are and have been a major factor in the political system of Lebanon since at least the early modern period. Patronage is essentially an exchange between two parties, a patron and a client, in which the patron provides his clients with a service, and the clients provide the patron with support. These services can range from physical goods such as welfare, healthcare, money, or food, to intangibles such as business connections or security. The support can also range from voting for the patron, to volunteering for the patron's cause, to taking up arms on behalf of the patron. The patronage system is not new, nor is it unique to Lebanon; examples of the clientalist exchange can be seen throughout the developing and the developed world. However, I will argue that in Lebanon the patronage system has a deeper effect on the Lebanese state due to its unique confessional nature. Lebanon is one of the world's only confessional democracies, in which power is officially and semi-officially shared between its major religious sects in government. This system of enforced sectarianism has proven extremely resilient, both politically and socially, and has been the source of a great deal of destabilization within the country. This thesis intends to explore the nature of patronage and sectarianism in Lebanon, and will argue that there is a relationship between patronage service provision and the maintenance of sectarian politics and the confessional state. This argument is made by using quantitative means, primarily through an anonymous survey discussing the respondent's perceptions of patronage and their relationship to the state.

A. Background

Lebanon began its modern history as a deeply divided society based on religious sect which codified sectarianism into a governmental system. This led to creating a state which is inherently weak by design; the power sharing model that the Lebanese system is based on ensures that no single group can fully take control of the state; however, it also ensures that the state is rarely strong or cohesive enough to provide for all of its citizens. Thus, the Lebanese population has frequently been required to seek out local patrons for their basic services, needs, and provisions for success.

Due to the fact that patrons are frequently powerful actors within the state structure, patrons are also generally tied into the sectarian system as it exists. This essentially means that accessing the goods and services that patrons provide is usually done through a patron of the same sectarian group. Patronage is a two way street; this also means that the patron will primarily target members of his same sect group as clients. Part of the clientalist exchange thus requires that clients take part in the political process, and this can inevitably mean that most politically active people in Lebanon will only support members of their own sectarian group and the sectarian parties which represent them.

This has a very destabilizing effect on the state. As sectarian groups and political groups are one in the same, political disputes can quickly become sectarian and ethnic conflicts. In addition, as the primary actors in the state are sectarian actors as well as patrons, political parties are in a constant state of conflict over state resources to distribute to their clients Certainly there are many other drivers of sectarian conflict and the maintenance of the confessional state; social, religious, and geopolitical factors cannot be overstated. However, considering that patronage politics are pervasive in Lebanon, and political patrons are also sectarian political forces,

patronage networks and the clientalist exchange must have some effect on the sectarian system within Lebanon.

B. Structure

In this thesis I will first discuss the nature of patronage and clientalism, what the system is, and how it works. I will first focus on the essential aspects of patronage. Firstly, it is a hierarchical system with a patron on top and a client on the bottom. Second, it is a contingent good, in which the patron's service provision is contingent on the client's support, and the client's support is contingent on the patron's services. Third, patronage is an iterated relationship, which is not a one-time bargain but an ongoing and even multi-generational relationship. I will then discuss the history and context of the development of patronage networks and sectarian politics in Lebanon. This is a system which began in the Ottoman period and the development of the confessional system and the independent Lebanese state, and has adapted and grown throughout the civil war and the post-Taif period. I will also discuss how patronage works in Lebanon today, mainly focusing on how patronage is focused on not only services but also on control of the state apparatus, employment provision, healthcare, and education.

I will then discuss the methodology to be used in this thesis. The thesis will use quantitative data garnered from a survey conducted among Lebanese Sunnis from Beirut, Tripoli and Saida. The methods of population selection, survey implementation, data coding, and data analysis will be described, as well as the hypotheses and assumptions to be tested. I will display my findings and analyze the data using a variety of cross tabulations and correlation tests in an attempt to examine the relationship between sectarianism and patronage. I will then conclude by discussing the implications of these finding and what they mean on a micro and a macro level for Lebanese society and the Lebanese state.The next chapter will be a review of the existing

literature on patronage and clientalism, both as a phenomena and as specifically related to Lebanon.

Chapter II: Literature Review

The previous chapter introduced the thesis, presented the problem to be studied, provided some background on the issue. It then described the basic structure of the thesis. This chapter will provide a review of the literature on patronage and clientalism in Lebanon. It will begin with a description of patronage and clientalism itself and the state of literature on the phenomena. It will then briefly cover the modern history of Lebanon, specifically as it relates to the formation of the confessional state and patronage networks. It will then conclude with a description of how specifically patronage networks function in Lebanon, and their relationship to politics.

A. Clientalism and Patronage

Clientalism and patronage is a political system which is highly pervasive throughout the world and has proven to be adaptable throughout history. It is also a term which is rarely specifically defined. Hopkin (2006) describes political clientalism in very basic terms as the distribution of selectivebenefits to individuals or clearly defined groups in exchange for political support. This political clientalism can be found in all parts of the world, even in so called "advanced" socio-economic contexts, such as special interest politics or "pork barrel" spending in the United States. According to Roniger (2004), political clientalism involves asymmetric but mutually beneficial relationships of power and exchange. It also implies selective access to resources and markets from which others are normally excluded. Thus, those in control (patrons) provide selective access to goods and opportunities and place themselves and their supporters in places where they can divert more resources in their favor. Their clients are expected to return their benefactors help by working for them at election times or boosting their prestige or reputation.

However, clientalism can and often does have more personal and anthropological definitions. Clientalism, according to Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984), is a form of personal, dyadic exchangeusually characterized by a sense of obligation, and often also by an unequal balance ofpower between those involved. Boissevain (1966) describes anthropological patronage as:

> "...founded on the reciprocal relations between patrons and clients. By patron I mean a person who uses his influence to assist and protect some otherperson, who then becomes his "client", and in return provides certain services for his patron... Patronage is thus the complex of relations between those who use their influence, social position or some other attribute to assist and protect others, and those whom they so help and protect." (Boissevain, 1966)

Thus, anthropological patronage could also be to be heavily dependent on personal relationships as opposed to political benefits; influence and social position can be just as useful as access to political power. This exchange is not necessarily related to votes, but can refer to political support, reciprocated favors, or even the willingness to engage in violence; as long as the exchange is between two actors with an asymmetrical relationship exchanging mutually beneficial and open ended transactions (Hamzeh, 2001).

Weingrod (1966) takes care to point out that the anthropological definitions of patronage and the political science definitions of patronage are indeed separate things. To an anthropologist patronage refers to a type ofsocial relationship, while to a political scientist patronage is a feature of government. The anthropologist who studies patronage considers

patronage to be primarily a "dyadic" relationship,while the political scientist studies a formal organization. Patronagefor anthropologists is an enduring relationship, while in the political sciencesense patronage is most clearly enunciated during election campaigns. Weingrod advocates for pursing a new definition of political patronage which takes into account many situations and cases in which political party patronage and personal patronage have become essentially interchangeable, and in which the political science definitions of patronage and the anthropological both apply.

It is difficult to distinguish how clientalism is to be defined in states in which the political sphere is characterized by a political party directed patronage system in which elements of the political science and anthropological definitions of patronage can be found. Especially in decentralized environments with a weak democratic state such as Lebanon, political parties and personalized patronage networks are functionally identical (Cammett, 2011). In this kind of environment, patron and patronage networks frequently make up for the state's deficiencies, as well as direct state resources and benefits towards their client populations in return for support, both in the electoral and the community level arena (Makhoul& Harrison, 2004, Hamzeh, 2001). Thus, it is important that we define what exactly constitutes clientalism in this context, how it functions, and its role in the context of the Lebanese state.

1. Hierarchical Nature

Clientalism first and foremost has a hierarchical nature. Scott (1972) explains the hierarchical relationship as an individual of higher socio-economic status using his influence and resources to provide protection or benefits to a person of lower status who reciprocates by offering his own services or support and assistance to the patron. Essentially, patron-client relationships are an alliance between two persons of unequal status, power orresources, each of

whom finds it useful to have asan ally someone superior or inferior to himself (Lande, 1977, in Hicken, 2011). The patron generally has disproportionate power and thus enjoys wide latitude as to how to distribute the assets under his control. However, most patrons are not independent actors, but are links within a larger grid of contacts, usually serving as middlemen who arrange exchanges between larger level patrons and their client populations. (Kettering 1988, in Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith 2002). This diffused network is an important facet of the clientalist hierarchy. In fact, many clients have little contact with their actual patrons, as the top level patrons frequently work through a chain of client relationships that move downward to the local level. (Muno, 2010, Kitschelt& Wilkinson, 2007) Thus, those patrons who are placed at the top level of patronage will have access to the largest resources (potentially the resources of the state structure), and they pass these benefits down towards their clients, who in turn will pass it on to clients of their own. Reversely, these patronage recepients give support in the form of votes or services back up the chain of patrons. (Krishna, 2007) These clientalist networks frequently manifest as political machines, with the top patrons as the heads of political parties, or even states, and dispensing political office or party resources to lower level patrons who in turn will ensure that their own client populations vote for or otherwise support the requisite party. (Weingrod 1968, Makhoul& Harrison 2004) Patronage networkswith their multiple horizontal layers and large numbers of patrons servicing and being serviced by clients, are complex structures, yet nevertheless operate in a hierarchy with high level decision making and a client population which is obliged to its higher up patrons.

ii. Contingent goods

The hierarchical relationship above highlights the next important facet of clientalist systems, that of contingent goods. The patrons in the patron-client relationship would have little

incentive to provide benefits for their target client populations if there were no services provided in return. Thus, all benefits given by patrons are goods which are contingent upon further service or support. In addition, the support provided by a client is contingent upon the benefits of the patron. (Roniger, 2004, Binkerhoff& Goldsmith, 2002) This quid pro quo system is what differentiates clientalist relationships from other forms of political particularism. Political particularism generally refers to politicians targeting narrow interests or populations; however in clientalism that targeting always comes with strings attached. Thus, it is important to distinguish clientalism from political particulates. Firstly, the benefits must be targeted at a certain population in particular. Secondly, the benefits must be contingent upon further support, and the support must be contingent upon further benefits (see Fig 1).



Figure 1: Clientalism vs. Other Benefits

(Hicken, 2011)

Patrons thus generally supply benefits only toindividuals or groups that support or promiseto support the politician, as opposed to politicians who promise benefits as a way to gain support. Likewise, the client supports only that patron who delivers a valued benefit in returnfor the client's support. (Hicken, 2011) In addition, the level of benefits received from the patron is frequently tied to the level of support given. Cammet (2014) for example discusses how the level of welfare received from political institutions in Lebanon is frequently tied to the level of activism displayed by the welfare recipients. This does not mean that patrons are necessarily unwilling to expand their networks toward populations which have yet to provide them with services; courting new clients is an important facet of the patronage system. For example, Khashan (1994) details how Islamic movements have used their development programs to create pseudo patron-client relationships as a way to increase their numbers as well as their legitimacy. In many political contexts where patronage is the norm new arrivals to politics must attempt to woo clients away from their patrons by offering them more benefits; Hezbollah's rise to prominence in Lebanon is an excellent example of this (Norton, 2007). However, at a certain point these clientalist exchanges are contingent on support.

iii. Iterated Relationships

Another important facet of clientalism which distinguishes it from other forms of corruption and political particularism is that the patron-client relationship is an iterated relationship. It is a repeated interaction based upon a personal and ongoing relationship. Clientalism is not a bribe, and it is not a political promise or gift based upon one-off vote buying. Both of these cases involve two actorswith no real expectation of interacting in the future. The client and patron relationship by contrast is a long lasting and ongoing two-way street, with each side anticipating future interaction. (Hicken, 2011) This repeated interaction ensures that both

client and patron will fulfill their side of the patronage bargain. Clientalist exchanges generally require that one party must trust the other to provide its required duty, whether this means supporting the patron or providing benefits for the client. A repeated or iterated interaction formed over a longer term thus ensures that the other party will be held accountable for its actions. (Einstadt&Roniger, 1984, Keefer, 2007) In addition, an iterated interaction is more easily targeted and can more easily monitored. If the client is known to the patron over a long period of time it is a simple matter to ensure that the client is voting correctly, advocating for the party, publicly displaying loyalty, or attending the requisite events. In addition, if the client has a long relationship with the patron he is held accountable to provide the promised benefits. This also allows the patron to more greatly reward their most loyal supporters, displaying to other targeted clients the value of greater loyalty. Cammett (2011) for example discusses how many in Lebanon can directly trace their current "patrons" back to Ottoman Empire era large landowning families. In addition, at the mid-level and local level of patronage networks, family, sect and personal loyalties can become extremely important. In many areas, especially in areas of highly decentralized or weak governments, local level leaders have been responsible for their client populations for generations, with the patronage network and it clients passing from father to son. (Makhoul& Harrison, 2004) This long term iterated interaction between patron and client can lead to strong feelings of loyalty, especially when combined with communal or sectarian dimensions. Hamzeh (2001) describes how patronage networks essentially created the Shi'ite revival in Lebanon during the civil war, and how patronage networks and clientalism can reinforce sectarian loyalty and discourage inter-communal cooperation. Thus, the iterated interaction between patron and client, sometimes ongoing for generations, is a key factor in the clientalist system.

B. The Lebanese State

1. Lebanon in the Early Modern Period

Clientalism and clientalist exchanges have a long history in Lebanon. As mentioned before, clientalism is a universal system common around the world and throughout history. However, the pervasiveness of clientalism in Lebanon can be traced to the feudal environment of the Mount Lebanon region in the 18th century, in which local landowners allowed peasants and their families to use land in return for unquestioned loyalty. (Hamzeh, 2001) The iqta'system of governance was implemented by the Ottoman rulers of Lebanon as a system of tax farming, with muqta' referring to district which was controlled by a local prominent leader or family known as a muqta'ji. These leaders were in turn subservient to an amirwho controlled the region and was responsible for providing a designated amount of taxes to the Ottoman sultan. This system would allow for the rise of prominent feudal style families who would de-facto rule over the Mount Lebanon region. It would fall upon the muqta'jiand the amirto maintain peace and order in his territory, and to arbitrate disputes between competing families. (Harik, 1965)

This system, as in much of the Ottoman Empire's iqta'system, began on a personalized landowner-peasant (and patron-client) basis. However, in the Mount Lebanon region the system quickly shifted to a more sectarian style of patronage. The peasant uprisings of 1820, 1840, and 1856 marked the beginning of this shift. While the revolts were largely a peasant uprising against the ruling class muqta'ji class, be they Christian or Druze, they took on sectarian undertones as Christian or Druze muqta'ji leaders rallied rival muqta'ji families' peasants against their leaders. The revolts of 1858-1860 especially defined the conflict as one between the Christian Marionite peasants of the north against their Christian muqta'jis and ChristainMarionite peasants against their Druze muqta'jis of the south. (Traboulsi, 2007) The Catholic Church in

Lebanon, as one of the primary landowners in the region, also became a primary player in the conflict, and this move in particular gave the uprisings a more sectarian coloring, as peasants no longer saw themselves as tied into primarily the iqta' system and saw themselves shifting into more communal and sectarian ties as local co-religionist leaders became available as viable sources of patronage. While the revolt was largely limited to Christian peasants, this shift from a primarily personal style of patronage to a sectarian based style of patronage as a result of the peasant uprisings would form the basis of the Lebanese political system. (Hamzeh, 2001)

2. The Mutasariffiyaand French Mandate Period

One of the other results of the 19th century peasant revolts would be that that Mount Lebanon was divided up into Christian and Druze districts in 1841, making the relationship between patron and client one which was generally homogenous in terms of sect. In 1861 this would evolve into the Lebanese mutasariffiya, which would divide Lebanon into seven districts and would form a central administrative council which would be divided up proportionally among sectarian lines and would answer to a Christian amir from outside Lebanon. (Traboulsi, 2007) The major feudal families would be absorbed into this system as politicians, and would maintain their patron relationships with their now generally religiously homogenous client populations. Thus, as the mutasariffya period continued the two major facets of Lebanese politics (clientalism and confessionalism) became essentially institutionalized.(Hamzeh, 2001) This institutionalization of sectarianism in the Mount Lebanon region would manifest itself in the future Lebanese state, as the confessional split in representation would be a central facet of the future government of Greater Lebanon.

Following the years of the mutasariffya, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the French Mandate would further change the Lebanese state. The French,

heavily influenced by Marionite Christian lobbying, separated Mount Lebanon from the greater Syrian region it had been a part of under the Ottomans, and established the Lebanese Mandate in 1920. A constitution was established in 1926 which would establish a parliamentary rule system. While the new parliament was generally controlled by the French authorities and Christian dominated, Muslim participation was ensured. This would reinforce early ideas of confessional representation in a democratic context. (Traboulsi, 2007)

3. The National Pact and the Zu'amaSystem

As Lebanon neared independence and the idea of a Greater Lebanon encompassing the coastal cities and their largely Sunni population became unpopular with those who wished to rejoin Syria, bargains had to be struck with the political leadership of the Sunni community to ensure their support for the Greater Lebanon project. To mobilize the Sunni population and ensure their legitimacy, a new kind of patron emerged in the coastal cities. The Sunnis generally dominated trade at the time, and prominent merchant families as opposed to feudal landowners became a new force in the political landscape. (Gates, 1989) These merchants were generally forced to become patrons to their local populations as clientalism had become the primary means of political power. These new Sunni elites would be the primary force behind the "coastal conferences" which pushed for Lebanon to rejoin a greater Syria, however many in the Sunni elite patron population would eventually come to support the idea of a united Lebanon as a means to control trade in the Middle East and maintain good relations with European powers. (Traboulsi, 2007) As the mandate period drew to a close the issue was far from decided, and the face of the new Lebanese state remained somewhat unknown. The would require the Christian and Muslim elites and patrons in the country to establish some kind of compromise in the form of the National Pact to clarify the ideas behind the Lebanese state.

The National Pact, agreed upon by BesharaKhory and Riad el-Solh, formally defined the nature of the new post-independence Lebanese state and crystallized the confessional nature of the country's politics. The National Pact, an unwritten agreement between the major powers within the country establishes Lebanon as a confessional state in which power is shared somewhat proportionally amongst the major religious groups based on the census of 1932, with a ratio of 6:5 Christian-Muslim. The major offices of government would be split up confessionally as well, with a Christian President, a Sunni Prime Minister, and a Shi'ite President of the National Assembly. Other positions are also traditionally split up along confessional lines. This would have drastic implications for the patronage and clientalist systems in the state. Firstly it allowed the existing patron families in Lebanon, regardless of sect, to officially enter politics as members of parliament and government ministers. This emphasized the client population's importance; they were now required to turn out and vote for their patrons. This in turn would lead to the rise of sectarian political parties dominated by powerful families who would pass their control of the parties down to their sons and family members. (Traboulsi, 2007) Secondly, the Lebanese state was designed in the National Pact to be an intentionally weak state. All decisions and positions of power were to be divided up amongst the major sects. As these positions of power were controlled by major patron families, the resources of the state were incorporated into the patronage structure. The state's resources such as government jobs, state spending, and the legal structure of the state could thus be directed as benefits toward the client population.

These developments would lead to what Hamzeh (2001) describes as the zu'ama system. A za'im is described as a political leader rather than exclusively an office holder. A za'im has the power to manipulate elections and the office holders he helps to elect. He does this by ensuring

that his clients vote for the proper candidates, and that his candidates direct benefits in the proper way. Zu'ama (pl.) use their connections (wasta) with their client populations, be they elected official or electorate population, to maintain control of the system. The process of za'im formation was not only influenced by kinship or family but also by confessional association as well due to the confessional nature of Lebanese politics. These ties of both kinship and confession were mutually reinforcing; it is also argued that the za'im system reduced inter-sectarian conflict as most competition for clients was within sects as opposed to between sects. The maintenance of this system would also create a complicated network of brokers and clients, with large segments of the Lebanese state's bureaucracy and government having a za'im to thank for his appointment, and with large segments of the population using the services of these bureaucrats or receiving preferential treatment from them in return for their support. (Roniger, 1984)

4. The Civil War and Post-Civil War

As the Lebanese Civil War broke out, clientalism would again change in Lebanon to a kind of militia style clientalism. Due to the lead up to the war and increasing tensions within the country as a result of the PLO's arrival in Lebanon, zu'ama increasingly became required to support an armed militia. In addition, as the state services essentially collapsed patronage networks were forced to look for alternate avenues of income and benefits. (Deeb, 1980) The militias would control territory (a neighborhood, village, or city), and would appropriate the rents and "taxes" from the local population. In addition, the militias would be primarily of one sect and derive its support from sectarian affiliation. This would eventually lead to some erosion of the za'imsystem, and would also allow for new actors to emerge. (Hamzeh, 2001) Hezbollah is an excellent example of this; using funds gathered from sources inside and outside Lebanon,

Hezbollah was able to create social support networks which would attract large segments of Shi'ite society. Hezbollah's creation of a social welfare regime, especially in South Lebanon, the Bek'aa, and the southern suburbs of Beirut, allowed them to become a major political force both during and after the war, and became an excellent example of a patronage network not based upon the powerful Lebanese families. (Norton, 2007, Haddad, 2013)

Following the Civil War, Syrian domination of the country would further alter the clientalist system. Militia style clientalism, while still widely present, grew weaker with the Syrian monopoly on power. As such, political patrons were forced to use new benefits to maintain clientalist networks. Civil society organizations, ostensibly set up as charities but in reality owned and controlled by political patrons, became a new form of sectarian style patronage. (Makhoul& Harrison, 2004) Social welfare, scholarships and employment provided by civil society groups and NGOs became a new form of clientalist exchange in which support was (and is) contingent on sectarian or party affiliation. (Haddad, 2013, Cammett, 2011)

C. Clientalism in Lebanon

Clientalism in Lebanon today is a highly varied and fluid process which take on a variety of forms. In this section I will discuss several of the iterations of clientalist exchange which take place in Lebanon today.

1. Control of State Apparatus

As mentioned previously, the primary patrons in the Lebanese system have gained control of the state apparatus. While clientalism generally thrives in an environment where the state is weak and unable to provide for the population, clientalism is also generally forced to

operate outside of the normal mechanisms of the state. In fact, Roniger (1984) notes how generally traditional patrons try to build their domains locally and are interested in keeping government agencies away or supplanting them with their own services. However, in Lebanon the opposite is often the case. As the patrons or zu'ama in Lebanon are generally tied into the state structure, they make use of its resources and make control of the state resources a primary concern of their strategy. This can be noted in the control of the state security services, which are generally divided up amongst the various parties and sects in a proportional manner, so that each group will have control over a particular branch of service. (Haddad, 2013) However, this is not only limited to security forces, but also government bureaucracies and regulatory agencies. In essence, to access the services of the Lebanese state, the Lebanese citizen must frequently obtain the backing of a higher level patron to facilitate the process. (Hamzeh, 2001) Whether this is presented in terms of wasta or not, it is clear that dealing with the state apparatus is far easier for those with connections to patrons; those who are less powerful and unable to access the state apparatus generally report dealings with the Lebanese state as anything but simple. (Makhoul& Harrison, 2004)

This control of the state apparatus is not only limited to bureaucracy or security forces. Of great importance is the clientalist control of the legal sector. This is not limited to control of police, but also the courts and legal systems in place, including judges, lawyers, and tribunals. One does not need to follow Lebanese politics too closely to observe that who is and is not prosecuted for crimes is largely dependent upon who is backed by powerful patrons. This is not a uniquely Lebanese experience; Chubb (1982) discusses how a similar system came into place in southern Italy, especially in the 1950s-1970s. Mafia bosses would ensure the election of politicians, judges, and police chiefs, who would turn a blind eye to their illegal activities or

ensure their innocence in trials in return for promised electoral support. Lebanese judges are not elected but are instead appointed by judicial committees made up of political leaders. This ensures that to be considered for a legal career one must generally find support from a community leader and enter into the patronage structure. As clientalism is a contingent exchange, this is reciprocated by being more lenient towards plaintiffs or defendants who are somehow connected into the same patronage structure or who are protected by another patron. (Hamzeh, 2001, Cammett, 2014) Thus, one of the primary benefits of access to a political patron can be not only ease of access to the state structure, but also immunity from it as well.

2. Provision of Welfare-Healthcare, Schooling, Food, Funding

Lebanese clientalism also frequently takes advantage of more direct forms of welfare provision. Politicians, political parties, and local patrons will often give supporters, clients, or potential clients direct forms of welfare. For example, sectarian parties provide aid for health and educational needs, food and financialassistance, and act as intermediaries to facilitate access to citizen "entitlements." In Lebanon citizens with demonstrated need are legally entitled to state coverage of upto 85% of hospitalization costs for the treatment of certain serious conditions. However, in practice most Lebanese cannot access this benefit, partly because of soaring budgetdeficits accruing to the Ministry of Public Health and partly because politicians andparties act as gatekeepers to this and other ostensibly public benefits. Sectarian partyrepresentatives use connections to reserve hospital beds and arrange governmentpayment for the hospitalization costs of supporters. After paying the remaining 15% of fees not covered by the state, politicians and parties often claim credit for the full costs of care for hospital stays. (Cammett, 2011) Lebanese zu'ama, politicians and political parties also frequently involved in the direct provision of food, funds, or other benefits in return for support; generally more devoted or powerful clients

are targeted for this direct welfare provision as they potentially have the most to offer to the patron. However, potential clients in need of direct welfare can also be targeted for direct welfare provision as a way of guaranteeing their future support. (Makhoul& Harrison, 2004)

As mentioned above, indirect welfare provision is also an extremely important facet of the Lebanese clientalist state. This "indirect" welfare takes the form of NGOs, charities, and government programs which are directly or indirectly controlled by political actors, *zu'ama*, or political parties, and which make the access to this welfare somehow dependent upon support. For example, Cammett (2011) writes how religious charities and sectarianparties play a particularly critical role in primary health care. About 17% ofmedical centers and dispensaries are run by Christian charities and 11% byMuslim charities. Among political parties, Sunni and Shi'i political groups alsorun important health care networks, such as the Sunni Future Movement of theHariri family as well as Shi'ite parties such as Hezbollah and the Amal Movement.Sunni and Shi'ite parties account for about 7% and 8% of all basic health care institutions. Although public institutions ostensibly account forabout 9% of total primary health care centersand dispensaries; in reality, manyof these institutions are linked to or controlled by different political factions. Some political groups have expanded beyond health care; for example, Hezbollah's social services provision include schools, garbage collection, and potable water delivery in neighborhoods controlled by the party. (Haddad, 2013) The Hariri foundation, the RandaBerri Foundation, the BachirGemayel Foundation, the Rene Moawad Foundation, and other charitable groups are all generally understood to be "owned" by political patrons as a way to provide services to their clientele. (AbiYaghi, 2012) While many of these "owned" charities do provide services for all groups and sects in Lebanon, it is much easier to access these charitable services if one is a member of the targeted sect. Potential clients can often go through

middle men with connections to both the charity and the political party as a way of accessing the services and entering into the clientalist exchange. (Makhoul& Harrison, 2004) This is not only limited to established political parties as well; Khashan (1994) discusses how development programs of Islamist groups are useful in attracting new adherents.

As mentioned above, welfare (both direct and indirect) is not limited to healthcare and basic needs. Schooling and tuition fees are an important aspect of the clientalist system in Lebanon.In 2006, abouthalf of Lebanon's approximately 2,800 primary and secondary schools wereprivately run, with the Catholic School System accounting for the bulk of privateschools and important school networks linked to political organizations. (Cammett, 2011) Scholarship funding is highly dependent upon clientalism, and it is well known that political parties and those NGOs and charities connected to them will have greater access to scholarship funds. This has dual purposes. Firstly, it ensures the student and the family's support for the patron for as long as they are in school, and likely beyond that. Secondly, at least in terms of primary and secondary schools, it can reinforce sectarianism. Private schools in Lebanon are largely religious, and patrons often make scholarships contingent upon attendance at a particular school. This ensures that the student will have less contact with those from other sects and helps to increase support for the sectarian political party of the patron. (Baylouni, 2010) Schooling is another example of Lebanon's status as a weak state being used by political patrons; while education in Lebanon is in theory universal and non-sectarian, in practice the Lebanese public schools are among the worst in the country, enrollment is not enforced, and are generally avoided by many Lebanese. As such, those who want to educate their children but lack the means to do so must turn to political patrons if any kind of decent educational level is to be achieved. (Jawad, 2009)

3. Employment

Provision of employment is one of the primary forms of patronage in Lebanon. Robinson and Verdier (2013) go into great detail discussing the value of employment provision as a clientalist good. Providing employment to a client is one of the strongest clientalist bonds, as it ensures that the client is bound to the patron for the duration of the job. Essentially if the client somehow breaks the clientalist bargain, the patron can ensure that the client loses the job which was provided for him. In addition if the client is placed in certain employment positions, such as a public official, judge, general, police captain, or any other position of relative power, the patron can make use of the clients services as well. Employment provision thus forms the foundation of many patronage networks, with patrons ensuring their clients employment, and the clients using their services to benefit other members of the clientalist network. Patrons are also able, as a part of the state structure, to create jobs as a way of providing for their political and client base. Nir (2011) discusses how this was made possible with the council of the south development projects; this is by no means an isolated incident in Lebanese politics.

Employment provision is extremely easy for patrons, especially in Lebanon, who are in control of the state apparatus as they are able to appropriate state positions as a way of rewarding clients or creating networks for themselves within the state structure. Lebanese political patrons can thus fill entire institutions with their clients, kin, and supporters and ensure that any new potential clients can obtain jobs in this controlled institution. They can also, through relationships with other patrons, ensure employment for their clients by way of another patron. (Baylouny, 2010) Employment provision in Lebanon is also an effective form of clientalist exchange for the simple reason that the economic and employment situation in Lebanon is quite dire. Clientalism is often strongest in countries in which productivity and employment levels are

low; the clients are much more dependent upon patrons for jobs or welfare provision. (Robinson &Verdier, 2013) Economic growth in Lebanon has been in the 1-3% for the past three years, and the Lebanese economy is highly dependent on banking and import export sectors, neither of which traditionally provide large numbers of jobs. Unemployment in Lebanon is high, at an estimated 20%, and approximately 28% of the population is below the poverty line. (Sakr, 2013, CIA, 2013) In an economic environment such as this, employment and access to employment is an extremely important resource, and the maintenance of any kind of job is a guarantee of support in the contingent patron-client relationship.

D. Conclusion

In conclusion, clientalism and patronage is a major force in Lebanese politics, Lebanese political development, and the confessional system in Lebanon. From the beginning of the early modern period when Lebanon was under Ottoman rule, clientalism was a primary means of ensuring the support of the local population through the iqta' system. While this was not necessarily built upon a sectarian basis, as the Mount Lebanon region was initially ruled by Druze and Christian princes with a majority Christian peasant population, the peasant revolts of the 19th century would take on a more sectarian character and push clients into seeking patrons from their own sect. As the Lebanon mutasariffiya was created in response to these revolts, an early system of confessionalism was created to ensure representation to the major sects of the Mount Lebanon region. This further forced patrons to seek out clients from within their own sect as a way to compete with other local notables within their own sectarian groups. Following the Ottoman Empire's collapse and the French Mandate period, Mount Lebanon was merged with the coastal cities traditionally part of Syria and formed into the Republic of Lebanon. This would force the Sunni merchant elites of the coast to enter into the clientalist exchange with their

own populations to maintain their status and compete with the established Christian and Druze patrons in the new Greater Lebanon entity. After the National Pact was formed as a way of maintaining Greater Lebanon as a separate entity from Syria, the confessional system already in place was essentially codified into the new government. This would turn the traditional patron-client relationship into a tool of governmental control, as client were now valuable as voters as well as service providers. The Civil War would further increase sectarian divisions in patronage networks, to the point that recruiting clients or finding patrons from outside of one's sect was nearly impossible thanks to the new "militia clientalism". Following the civil war, clientalism would again take new forms as traditional patrons and political parties took control of civil society and NGOs as a way of providing further benefits to their client populations. By ensuring that client populations are provided with social welfare, employment, and legal and physical protection, patrons are able to receive their support as part of the contingent clientalist exchange. This maintains their hold on the Lebanese state by allowing their re-election, which in turn allows them to direct more state and non-state services and benefits to both their clients and potential clients whom they wish to attract. Thus, as the clientalist exchange and sectarian confessional politics have become so deeply engrained in Lebanese history and political culture the two systems have become mutually reinforcing and difficult to separate from one another. The next chapter will discuss the methodology of the research design, how the hypotheses were developed and the assumptions inherent in them, and the data collection process. It will then discuss the design of the statistical analysis used to test the hypotheses.

III. Methodology

This chapter provides information on the methodology used in this thesis. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between patronage and clientalism in Lebanon, and the maintenance of the confessional system and the weak state. A quantitative survey research method was chosen. The sampling technique has been described, followed by a description of the implementation of the survey. The survey design has also been described, using Likert scales and yes and no questions to measure participants perceptions of several issues in Lebanon related to patronage and the state. Data collection and data analysis have been described, as well as a list of specific assumptions and hypotheses to be answered. The chapter is closed by a list of limitations inherent in the study.

A. Research Design

I will be attempting to answer several hypotheses in an attempt to examine the relationships between the Lebanese people and patronage networks and the state. This is a topic which has not received a large amount of academic attention. While there have been dedicated studies on patronage and clientalist systems (see Wiengrod, Einstadt, and Roniger), by its very nature patronage and clientalist systems are difficult to study in a quantitative fashion. Thus, most patronage studies are heavily dependent on mixed methods or purely qualitative methods. In addition, comparatively less attention has been given to Lebanon's patronage issues in particular, with the exceptions of Melanie Cammet and A. Nizar Hamzeh. I will thus be attempting to use a purely quantitative approach to produce original data regarding the prevalence of patronage networks, and their effects on the Lebanese political landscape. This will be undertaken with a survey on perceptions of state services, political party and patronage services, and political participation in Lebanon.

B. Sampling

A population of 300 Lebanese Sunnis from was chosen as the sample population using stratified random sampling. The Lebanese Sunni population, as opposed to Shiite, Christians, or a mixed survey was chosen for a variety of reasons. First, selecting only one sect allows the community to be viewed in greater detail; with only 300 respondents selecting from among all Lebanon's major communities could potentially create confusing or difficult to analyze data. Selecting only one community makes trends and patterns much easier to detect and extrapolate. Secondly, Lebanon has not held an official census since 1932 due to a variety of political factors. While estimates have been made as to the demographic makeup of the country, there is no way to ensure their accuracy without an official census. It would also thus be very difficult to measure the statistical relevance of the survey to the population, and could over represent certain groups.

Sampling was then further stratified by city. 150 responses were taken from Beirut, 100 taken from Tripoli, and 50 taken from Sidon. This is generally proportional to estimates of the relative sizes of the Sunni community in these three areas, which are generally regarded as the 3 largest populations of Sunnis in the country. The sample was first drawn using clusters - Statistics Lebanon has divided Lebanon into 10,560 "clusters", which are generally made up of people of similar ethnic, sectarian, and social classes. Probability proportional to size (PPS) sampling was used to select the optimal clusters of Sunnis to investigate while attempting to reach the required numbers of respondents in the three cities. Each cluster is roughly 100-150 households, with an intended 10 households per cluster being investigated. The survey team consisted of four trained surveyors, a team leader, and a fieldwork manager. Skip sampling was used at the cluster level, using a skip of 7 households. A surveyor would go door to door within

the selected cluster, and administer the survey. He would then proceed seven households down, and administer the next survey. If no one was home, the next household would be approached. Once a survey was administered, seven more houses would be skipped until the required number of households was reached or the cluster was completed.

C. Assumptions, Hypotheses, and Analysis

As I have mentioned, the purpose of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between patronage and clientalism in Lebanon, and the maintenance of the confessional system and the weak state. In addition to other observations I will make in my findings section, I have made a set of several assumptions the nature of patronage, the state, and the individual. I will list these assumptions and then propose a hypothesis using the previously created scales listed above. I will then discuss how these hypotheses will be tested.

Assumption 1

In Lebanon, there is a the perception that the Lebanese state is incapable of providing for its citizens. This is not only limited to social welfare, but also to issues of economy, stability, employment, and ease of business. Because of this, many Lebanese turn toward group support networks, such as political parties, local patrons and welfare providers.Cammett (2014) documents how the relative absence of a state based social safety net, as well as the (not coincidental) prevalence of non-state providers has been one of the defining features of the Lebanese system. Lebanon's state based welfare regime is highly fragmented, as well as essentially unregulated, which has allowed sectarian political parties to supply (and take credit for) social services which are normally provided by the state. I thus assume that Lebanese who have low expectations of being able to rely on the state will also show a higher belief in the

ability to receive the same services from more localized group support networks. I also argue that the majority of Lebanese will feel this way.

Hypothesis 1

There is a relationship between respondents with low State Reliance and high Group Support.

Assumption 2

There is the perception in Lebanon that personal merit is not useful in becoming successful, and that talent and ability are not as useful in Lebanon as they would be elsewhere. There is also the perception that people cannot function in society without connections, and that connections are essential for succeeding in education, doing business or any interaction with the state. The necessity of "connections" to succeed is a well documented phenomena in clientalist societies (Eisenstadt&Roniger, 1984). Studies done in Lebanon show that it is no different; "wasta" is perceived as necessary to succeed or to interact with any official entities (Makhoul& Harrison, 2004). The prevalence of connections and "wasta" to further oneself in society would naturally be to the detriment (or perceived detriment) of merit based advancement and fairness within the system. This does not mean that all individual success in Lebanon is somehow tied to connections; I merely argue that it is much more difficult, and that the perception that connections are necessary leads many to believe that there is relatively low value in personal merit. I thus assume that Lebanese who believe that merit and personal ability are unimportant in Lebanon will show a much firmer belief that the only way to succeed in Lebanon is by being connected, and that connections are more important than merit in Lebanon.

Hypothesis 2

There is a relationship between respondents with low belief in the value of merit and high belief in the value of connections.

Assumption 3

Possibly the primary benefit provided by patronage systems are access to physical welfare, jobs, scholarships, and other economic and social benefits. Patronage studies is very much focused on how these economic benefits are targeted, who they target, and what their purpose and effectiveness is (Eisenstadt&Rongier, 1984). It is also well documented that impoverished populations are particularly susceptible to welfare based patronage, as they are generally in greater need and more willing to enter into the patron-client relationship (Kettering, 1988); welfare providing patrons also primarily target groups which they believe will offer them the greatest support or the most useful power base, especially among the highly competitive Lebanese political landscape (Kitschelt& Wilkinson, 2007, Cammett, 2014). It thus stands to reason that lower income individuals will be more likely to engage with patronage networks, as they are more necessary to their daily lives. I assume that poorer individuals will thus be more inclined to look toward their in-groups and patronage networks, and will be more likely to believe that these are a necessary factor of life, as opposed to higher income individuals who will have less need for patrons and welfare based patronage systems as a whole

Hypothesis 3

There is a relationship with low income status and higher faith in group support and connections.

Assumption 4

People who are personally connected to patronage networks in Lebanon are considered to have a serious advantage over those who are not. Patronage gives access to jobs, education, business and government connections, all of which are extremely helpful when building personal wealth and career success. As mentioned in the literature review, patronage is generally a conditional act, requiring the client to support the patron as much as the patron supports the client (Roniger, 2004, Binkerhoff& Goldsmith, 2002). In Lebanon, patrons are almost always affiliated with sectarian political parties, and the political party and the sect is frequently indistinguishable (Hamzeh, 2001). As patronage is a conditional act, the patron will always demand some form of service or support from its clients; in Lebanon with its blurring of patron and party, this naturally will translate into demanding political support such as voting, party membership, and volunteering. Cammett (2014) goes into great detail about the chicken and egg relationship between party supporters receiving greater support from their patrons, and patrons directing support towards clients to ensure their participation in the political process. As such, I assume that people who have higher levels of personal connections and connections to group support mechanisms will have higher levels of political participation, and also be wealthier in general.

Hypothesis 4

There is a relationship between high personal connections and income and political activity.

Assumption 5

Sectarian solidarity and the belief in the sect being a supportive community has become a kind of political idea and the fundamental aspect of the patronage network in Lebanon. As

mentioned above, the sect and the political party have become essentially the same thing in Lebanon. This is due to the confessional nature of the (especially post-Taif)Lebanese political system which makes secular or broad appeal parties impossible; it is also partially due to the long legacy of sectarian clientalism and conflict in the modern history of Lebanon (Cammett, 2014, Hamzeh, 2001, Traboulsi, 2007). I would thus assume that, as party and sect are indistinguishable to many Lebanese, those who feel more strongly about sectarian solidarity would be more politically active as an expression of this.

Hypothesis 5

There isa relationship between high sectarian solidarity and political activity.

Analysis Tests

To test the variables used in these assumptions and hypotheses, I will be using several standard statistical tests. A test will be run to discover correlation values between the variables and their significance using Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficient (Pearson's correlation). For any results to be valid, they must be significant at the 0.01 or at least the 0.05 level. The strength of the Pearson's correlation between the tested variables will be as follows:

0.13-0.20 = Weak

0.21-0.25 = Moderate

0.26-0.35 = High

0.36+ = Very High

Each set of variable pairs will also be tested with Goodman-Kuskal's Gamma symmetric analysis to test the association and direction of the variables. The strength of Gamma will be as follows:

.01- .09 = Weak Association

.10 – .29 = Moderate Association

.30 – .99 = Strong Association

D. Instrument Design

The survey that was administered was designed to measure several variables, and had a cover letter and consent form attached to the front explaining the rights of the participant, the confidentiality of the answers and the purpose of the research, as well as the researcher's contact information. The survey could be given in English or Arabic upon request. The Arabic version was translated by a professional translator whose native language is Arabic; it was then back translated by myself, a native English speaker to ensure validity. It was designed in two parts: Part A consists of -- questions on a variety of topics in Lebanon related to patronage, social welfare, government involvement, government services and political participation. Part B consists of -- personal identifier questions, such as age, marital status, income, employment, and neighborhood. A five point Likert scale were used for the questions in Part A, and range from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree.

The questions in Part A of the survey are tailored to answer the five hypotheses of the thesis, and are grouped into several categories, each intended to measure a separate variable for the respondent. These variables will be discussed in greater detail in the data analysis section of this chapter, but they in general attempted to measure factors such as the respondents on the

opinions on the reliability of state services, of political party services, of their sectarian solidarity, or on the importance they place on group support mechanisms. Other questions asked about the respondent's political affiliations in a two part format (Do you x?, if yes whom?), such as whether the sympathize with a political party, whether they have volunteered for a political party, or who they voted for in the last elections. A set of questions then attempts to measure the respondent's personal connections and use of patronage, such as whether they believe they have access to party controlled services, whether they have access to an MP, or the degree to which they personally use connections. A final set of two questions is longer, and uses hypothetical questions and longer statements to attempt to measure the degree to which a person identifies either with their sect or with the Lebanese state, using Likert scales. The survey itself is attached in Appendix I.

E. Data Collection and Coding

The results were collected over the course of one month, September of 2014. It was given to me by Statistics Lebanon in a Microsoft Excel sheet with an attached code sheet. It was organized numerically, with the respondents, numbered 1-300 placed in the rows and the questions placed in the columns. The data was transferred to and analyzed in IBM SPSS Statistics 20.

First, frequencies were run on the data for each individual question on the survey and the personal information section (See Appendix II). The questions were then recoded to reflect the direction of the data and combined, as mentioned above, into seven distinct scales intended to measure different aspects of the respondents beliefs. These scales are as follows:

Merit Scale- The belief that personal merit is important to success in Lebanon.

Questions included were Q1.1 and 1.2. An example question is "It is possible to get a job in Lebanon based on Merit."

State Reliance Scale- The belief that one can rely on the Lebanese state and Lebanese state services in a time of need.

Questions included were Q 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8. An example question is "The Lebanese state provides sufficient services for the poor".

Connections Scale- The belief that connections are necessary for success, especially success in education or career, in Lebanon.

Questions included were Q 1.9, 1.10, 1.11, 1.12, 1.13. An example question is "Knowing a community leader or political leader helps you get a job."

Group Support Mechanisms Scale- The belief that one can rely on group support mechanisms, such as political parties or sectarian groups, in a time of need. This is more focused on group support in terms of need (welfare, legal help, etc.) than "achieving success".

Questions included were Q 1.14, 1.15, 1.16, 1.17. An example question is "Charities in Lebanon provide welfare to members of their own sect first."

The next set of scales attempted to measure not only the respondent's beliefs, but also their levels of personal involvement and participation in patronage structures.

Personal Connections Scale- Measures the degree to which the respondent personally has formed connections to patronage systems and structures.

Questions included were Q 7, 8, 9, 10. A sample question is "Do you know any community leaders to approach in a time of need?"

Sectarian Solidarity Scale- Measures the respondents willingness to identify more with their sect than the greater Lebanese population.

Questions were longer form, and were Q 11.1 and 11.2. A sample question is "Lebanon's government is currently polarized and ineffective. With the recent deteriorating political situation, and the lack of consensus in the Lebanese government, I tend to look to my own community more than I look to the state.

Party Support Scale- Measures the respondents personal involvement in the political process.

Questions included were Q 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. A sample question would be "Do you actively support a political party?"

After creating the scales they were re-coded again, using the most statistically relevant frequency to create simple cutoff points, with a score of 1 being "low" and 2 being "high". The cutoff was chosen by selecting the last frequency with a large number of respondents falling into it as the cutoff between "low" and "high", however some personal discretion was used. Thus, all respondents were coded into "High" or "Low" values for each scaled variable measuring their beliefs and personal attributes in the survey.

F. Limitations

This study has several major limitations. The primary limitation is that, as mentioned above, the study is limited to only one sect in Lebanon. While this is, in the authors opinion, a necessary factor in undertaking the research, the study will inevitably not speak to the universal

Lebanese experience and is by its nature tailored to the Sunni experience. While I would argue that the information gleaned from the study and the opinions of the respondents reflect the general Lebanese society, this is impossible to know without looking into studies specifically targeting other communities. In addition, the sample size is small, with only 300 respondents. While this is a statistically valid number for a small survey, it will never be able to replicate surveys done on the same topic with a larger pool, such as the work done by Melanie Cammett (Cammett, 2014).

In addition, regarding questions related to sectarianism and sectarian solidarity, Lebanon is at a particularly volatile period in its history. Due to events both within and outside of Lebanon, primarily the civil war in Syria, sectarian sentiment is generally believed to be higher than usual especially between the Sunni and Shiite parties. This is difficult to quantify, especially in relation to patronage and social welfare. Other variables are also difficult to quantify, such as support for political parties or political movements. People choose to support political parties for a wide variety of reasons besides patronage; historical grievances, locality, and actual ideological beliefs are key among them. To attempt to relate all politcal activity as somehow tied into patronage networks would be disingenuous to those who are impartial members of the political process. However, as the focus of this thesis is on the relationship between patronage and politics, this comparison is unavoidable.

A final limitation is the truthfulness of the respondents themselves. The difficulties of conducting cross-cultural surveys and measuring their validity is a well documented topic (Peng, Nisbett& Wong, 1997). Designing surveys which touch upon culturally sensitive topics will always force the researcher to accept that some respondents may not answer truthfully for a variety of factors. In the Lebanese case specifically, there are going to be limitations regarding

questions related to social welfare provision and political party support. For many Lebanese, the idea of being forced to request or receive social welfare assistance can be a shameful topic and they may be reluctant to admit to it. I have attempted to mitigate this by focusing the survey on perceptions, such as asking whether the respondent believes that they could receive welfare if needed, as opposed to asking whether they have received welfare in the past.In addition, there is a stigma for many Lebanese attached to people who are "politically active", as it may imply that they are corrupt. Thus, many respondents may support political parties, but be unwilling to admit this. This is addressed further in the findings, especially when comparing the respondents who claim to be politically active to those who have voted for a political party, and I have attempted to control for this in the "Party Support" scale.

The next chapter will be a presentation of the data found using this methodology. It will describe the profile of the respondents, display important themes in the data, discuss the relevant cross tabulations used to test the hypotheses, and confirm or deny the validity of the hypotheses tested.

IV. Findings and Results

A. Introduction

In this section I will discuss the survey data and the findings of the survey. I will begin with a brief description of the basic dataset and the demographics of the respondents, and will then focus on several key findings and the values of the scales that were created as discussed in the methodology chapter. Finally, I will give an analysis of the data using the variables discussed in my proposed hypotheses, including all relevant charts, graphs, and tests for statistical validity.

B. Description of Respondents

As mentioned above, there were 300 Sunni respondents in the survey, with 150 located in Beirut, 100 in Tripoli, and 50 in Sidon. 67.3% of the respondents were male, and 32.7% were female. This is slightly unbalanced in terms of actual representation in Lebanon, which has a .95/0 Male/Female ratio (CIA, 2014). However, it is statistically irrelevant for the purposes of the data. They ranged in age from 18 to over 60. The respondents held a variety of occupations, and came from diverse socio-economic conditions. Their occupational information is displayed in Appendix II, and their income level is displayed in Table 1

Table 1

Income

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Under $500	39	13.0	13.0	13.0
	$501-$1000	107	35.7	35.7	48.7
	$1001-$2000	112	37.3	37.3	86.0
	$2001-$3500	31	10.3	10.3	96.3
	$3500+	11	3.7	3.7	100.0

Total	300	100.0	100.0	

The majority of respondents were married, with 31.7% (95 respondents) reporting being single and 68.3% (205 respondents) reporting being married.

C. Basic Findings

Respondents were given a variety of statements about life in Lebanon and were asked to rate their feelings about these statements on a Likert scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. A full list of these questions and the responses to them are listed in the final survey data in the Appendices. However, I will be displaying several of the more interesting or relevant statistics here. I will also display the information on the scales which were created by combining several questions on similar topics, as discussed in the methodology chapter in section E. The individual questions will be given with their Likert values, however the combination scales will be given using the cutoff points created to give High or Low values. I will generally be displaying one question as an example of what made up the scale, followed by the combined scale which measures the value being described.

The first scale was a "Merit Scale", which attempts to measure the degree to which the respondents believe that personal merit or qualifications are important to succeed in Lebanon. The scale combined two questions, an example is below (Table 2) followed by the scale (Table 3).

Table 2

Q1: It is possible to get a job in the Lebanese state apparatus based on merit.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree	16	5.3	5.3	5.3
	Neutral	19	6.3	6.3	11.7
	Disagree	265	88.3	88.3	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Table 3

Merit Scale

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	High	63	21.0	21.0	100.0
	Low	237	79.0	79.0	79.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

As we can see, a very large number of respondents regard the idea of the importance personal merit in Lebanon quite pessimistically. While responses this strong would normally indicate a flaw in the research design or the selection of respondents, there does exist a good deal of pessimism amongst the Lebanese population in general about their prospects and the idea of "fairness" in Lebanese society; as such, I believe the statistics are generally representative and valid.

The second scale is the "State Reliance" scale. Questions concern the perceptions of the respondent about the ability of the Lebanese state to provide for its citizens. This includes questions on state welfare for the poor, employment provisions, and state services in general. The data for two sample questions, and the scale itself are below in Tables 4, 5, and 6.

Table 4

Q1.4: The Lebanese state provides sufficient services for the poor

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	5	1.7	1.7	100.0
	A	4	1.3	1.3	98.3

	N	17	5.7	5.7	97.0
	D	32	10.7	10.7	91.3
	SD	242	80.7	80.7	80.7
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Table 5

Q1.6: It is easy to receive a pension from the Lebanese state

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	28	9.3	9.3	100.0
	A	24	8.0	8.0	90.7
	N	57	19.0	19.0	82.7
	D	39	13.0	13.0	63.7
	SD	152	50.7	50.7	50.7
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Table 6

State Reliance Scale

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	High	65	21.7	21.7	100.0
	Low	235	78.3	78.3	78.3
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Again, these statistics demonstrate a deep pessimism about the ability of the Lebanese state to provide for its citizens. With nearly 80% of the respondents falling into the "Low" category in terms of their belief in the ability to rely on the Lebanese state, this is a broad indictment of the governance capacity of the Lebanese state apparatus.

The third scale is the "Connections Scale", which measures the perceived importance of personal connections in Lebanon, specifically the need for connections of some kind to succeed in Lebanon. Tables 7 and 8 illustrate a sample question and the scale below.

Table 7

Q1.11: It is impossible to get a job in the Lebanese state without connections

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	232	77.3	77.3	100.0
	A	30	10.0	10.0	22.7
	N	21	7.0	7.0	12.7
	D	10	3.3	3.3	5.7
	SD	7	2.3	2.3	2.3
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Table 8

Connections are Necessary Scale

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	High	220	73.3	73.3	100.0
	Low	80	26.7	26.7	26.7
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Again, the respondents are overwhelmingly of the opinion that connections are necessary and important in Lebanese society. This is not a surprise to anyone who has spent time in Lebanon, however several of the individual questions are quite telling. For example, Question 1.13 shows that the respondents believe that connections are necessary not only for expanded economic opportunities, but also educational opportunities (Table 9)

Table 9

Q1.13: Being connected to a political party makes it easier to get a scholarship

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	155	51.7	51.7	100.0
	A	79	26.3	26.3	48.3
	N	43	14.3	14.3	22.0
	D	6	2.0	2.0	7.7
	SD	17	5.7	5.7	5.7
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

The next scale is the "Group Support Mechanism" scale. It attempts to measure the perception of the availability of group support mechanisms outside the state. As stated before, this is different from personal connections, as group support attempts to measure the belief that one can rely on group support mechanisms, such as political parties and political connections, or sectarian groups, in a time of need. This includes religious charities, political party disbursements, or local community leaders. A "time of need" is the emphasis here; the focus is on welfare, charity or legal aid as opposed to success, such as educational opportunities or career advancement. As we can see from the data below, the individual questions again reflect that the respondents deeply believe that group support mechanisms are reliable, at least in comparison to the state.

Table 10

Q1.14: Political parties provide more welfare to members of their own sect first

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	96	32.0	32.0	100.0
	A	75	25.0	25.0	68.0
	N	90	30.0	30.0	43.0
	D	10	3.3	3.3	13.0
	SD	29	9.7	9.7	9.7
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Table 11

Q1.15: Charities in Lebanon provide welfare to members of their own sect first

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	111	37.0	37.0	100.0
	A	55	18.3	18.3	63.0

	N	97	32.3	32.3	44.7
	D	15	5.0	5.0	12.3
	SD	22	7.3	7.3	7.3
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

As we can see in Tables 10 and 11 above, welfare provision from political parties and charities is viewed to be much more effective than state based sources by a wide margin. In addition, we can also infer that these are sectarian sources. As discussed in Chapter 2, political parties are inherently sectarian in Lebanon; in addition, Q1.15 makes it clear that at least in perception charities in Lebanon are tied to and preferential toward particular sectarian groups. Regarding legal protection, a sample question below (Table 12) shows that Lebanese are also quite pessimistic regarding the fairness and impartiality of their legal system.

Table 12

Q1.16: It is easier for someone with political connections to break the law in Lebanon

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SD	13	4.3	4.3	4.3
	D	7	2.3	2.3	6.7
	N	48	16.0	16.0	22.7
	A	42	14.0	14.0	36.7
	SA	190	63.3	63.3	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Again, as political parties are inherently sectarian, perceptions about the political parties' effect legal system are at least partially going to be perceptions about the sect. Overall, the Group Support Mechanism Scale (Table 13) tends to line up with the scales above in depicting a general belief that need based services are more easily provided by forces outside of the state.

Table 13

Group Support Networks are Necessary Scale

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	High	212	70.7	70.7	100.0
	Low	88	29.3	29.3	29.3
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

The next scale is the Personal Connections scale. As discussed in the methodology chapter, this scale attempts to measure the respondents personal use of or access to "wasta", political groups, and group support. It should be differentiated from the Group Support or Connections scales, in that while those scales attempt to measure the respondent's perceptions of the prevalence of or usefulness of group support or connections, this scale attempts to roughly measure the respondent's perceived access to these services. The data gathered on this scale was surprising; while respondents almost overwhelmingly (and predictably) have the belief that "wasta", political party services, and connections are extremely prevalent, a large majority of them fell on the "Low" end of the scale in terms of their self-perceived personal connections, as seen in Table 14.

Table 14

Personal Connections Scale

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	High	63	21.0	21.0	100.0
	Low	237	79.0	79.0	79.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

This belief is expressed across the board on the individual questions as well. Questions 8 and 9 (Table 15 & 16) have correspondingly low numbers, expressing the belief of the majority of respondents that they have no access to connections themselves.

Table 15

Q8: Do you know any community leaders to approach in a time of need?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	66	22.0	22.0	22.0
	No	234	78.0	78.0	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Table 16

Q9: Do you believe you have connections?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	46	15.3	15.3	15.3
	No	254	84.7	84.7	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Regarding this scale and these responses, I believe that the low reporting regarding personal connections could be a reflection of a few possibilities. Firstly, it is possible that patronage networks and connections systems are not as developed as generally documented in the literature, and that many (if not the majority) of Lebanese "fall through the cracks" of patronage networks and do not receive sufficient benefits. However, Melanie Cammett's recent book was an extremely in depth study of Lebanese patronage systems, and quite sufficiently demonstrated the widespread nature of Lebanese clientalism.. Secondly, it is possible that respondents may have hesitated to admit to having connections for personal or cultural reasons. Finally, the questions, which are generally related to intangible personal connections, do not address more tangible patronage service provision, such as food or medical care. However, for the purposes of this study, we can definitely (and with more confidence) say that those who scored high on the Personal Connections scale are indeed "connected" individuals.

The next scale is the Sect Solidarity scale. This scale attempts to measure the respondents willingness to identify more with their sect than with the greater Lebanese population. It was comprised of longer form Likert scale questions, and produced interesting results. The two questions, Question 11.1 and 11.2 are below in Table 17 and 18:

Table 17

Q11.1: Lebanon's government is currently politically polarized and ineffective. With the recent deteriorating political situation and the lack of consensus in Lebanese government, I tend to look to my own community more than I look to the state.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	159	53.0	53.0	100.0
	A	53	17.7	17.7	47.0
	N	53	17.7	17.7	29.3
	D	14	4.7	4.7	11.7
	SD	21	7.0	7.0	7.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Table 18

Q11.2: Lebanon is currently in a state of crisis. Despite my opinion about political issues or the political situation, I sometimes find it unavoidable to follow a leader from my own sect.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	97	32.3	32.3	100.0
	A	53	17.7	17.7	67.7
	N	44	14.7	14.7	50.0
	D	25	8.3	8.3	35.3
	SD	81	27.0	27.0	27.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

As we can see, there were a diverse range of responses, with no clear pattern. After recoding the data and combining it into a scale with the high and low cutoffs, the responses are equally mixed (Table 19).

Table 19

Sect Solidarity Scale

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	High	148	49.3	49.3	100.0
	Low	152	50.7	50.7	50.7
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

The numbers on the Sect Solidarity scale are almost exactly evenly split. While this on its own is interesting in and of itself, when examined in tandem with the other scales it will make it much more enlightening in terms of detecting patterns and correlations.

The final scale is the Party Support scale attempting to measure the level to which the respondent is politically active and a party supporter. I will also discuss some of the other interesting findings regarding questions of political party support, as they are both interesting and relevant to my argument. Firstly, the scale itself, which combines five questions related to the respondent's support for political groups, showed a lower frequency of respondents who scored "High" in levels of party support (Table 20).

Table 20

Party Support Scale

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	High	88	29.3	29.3	100.0
	Low	212	70.7	70.7	70.7

	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

I believe, as discussed in the limitations section of the Methodology chapter, that this scale is an especially difficult one to measure accurately. It is a prevalent belief in Lebanese culture that active participation in political parties is somewhat of a degenerate activity; people frequently decry involvement with political parties and politicians, and yet just as frequently live in neighborhoods dominated by political party flags and sloganeering. I would argue that the real statistics for this scale would be a good deal higher than they are due to respondent bias.

The individual questions which make up the scale also are quite enlightening in describing the relative levels of activism and belief of the respondents. Firstly, respondents were asked if they voted in the last elections, which is the lowest benchmark of political activity (Table 21). In addition, those who were too young to have voted were asked if they would have voted (Table 22).

Table 21

Q3: Did you vote in the last elections?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	140	46.7	46.7	46.7
	No	160	53.3	53.3	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Table 22

Q4: If you are too young to have voted in the last elections would you have?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	17	5.7	5.7	5.7
	No	52	17.3	17.3	23.0
	N/A	231	77.0	77.0	100.0

	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Respondents were also asked who they voted for, or who they would have voted for. Their responses were taken, and the group they listed was classified as a Sunni party or a non-Sunni party. I have defined a "Sunni party" using the Melanie Cammett's definition of a sectarian party, which is a political party which utilizes largely sectarian imagery and specifically targets and is comprised of primarily one sect (Cammett, 2014). "Non-Sunni parties" are political parties which are sectarian, but not Sunni, secular parties which attempt broad societal appeal, or those who voted but claimed a "White Card" and submitted an empty ballot. The results of those who have voted are below, in Table 23.

Table 23

Q3.1: If yes, for which party?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Sunni Movement	97	32.3	69.3	69.3
	Non-Sunni Movement	43	14.3	30.7	100.0
	Total	140	46.7	100.0	

We can see here that of those who voted, Sunni parties are the large majority, but not as high as one might expect. However, when examining other indicators of political party support, the data becomes much more uniform in its responses. Looking at the next level of political activity, that of an actual party supporter as opposed to a voter, the number of respondents who claim to support a party is relatively low as seen in the party support scale (Table 24).

Table 24

Q5: Do you actively support a political party?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	82	27.3	27.3	27.3

	No	218	72.7	72.7	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Table 25

Q5.1: If yes, who?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Sunni Movement	79	26.3	96.3	96.3
	Non-Sunni Movement	3	1.0	3.7	100.0
	Total	82	27.3	100.0	

However, overwhelmingly respondents who claim to be party supporters support Sunni political parties (Table 25). The percentage grows smaller when examining the final level of political activity, volunteering for a political party, and the sectarian aspect of this support is equally clear (Table 26).

Table 26

Q6: Have you ever volunteered for a political party?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	15	5.0	5.0	5.0
	No	285	95.0	95.0	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q6.1: If yes, who?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Sunni Movement	15	5.0	100.0	100.0

We can draw several conclusions from this, which will be expanded upon in the discussion section; however, there is a clear and overwhelming relationship between political party activity, and support for political parties of the same sect. While the general level of activity in the Party

Support Scale is low for the entire pool of respondents, it is safe to say that those who score high in Party Support almost exclusively support Sunni political movements.

D. Data Analysis

I will now test my hypotheses presented in Section E of the methodology chapter by submitting the relevant scales to Gamma validity tests and Pearson correlation tests. I will then shortly discuss the findings and their meaning.

Hypothesis 1

There is a relationship between respondents with low State Reliance scores and high Group Support scores.

Table 27

State Reliance Scale * Group Support Networks are Necessary Cross Tabulation

Count

		Group Support Networks are Nessecary		Total
		Low	High	
The state can be relied upon	Low	55	180	235
	High	33	32	65
Total		88	212	300

Correlations

		The state can be relied upon	Group Support Networks are Nessecary
The state can be relied upon	Pearson Correlation	1	-.248**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	300	300
Group Support Networks are	Pearson Correlation	-.248**	1

Necessary	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	300	300

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Asymp. Std. Error[a]	Approx. T[b]	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Gamma	-.543	.103	-3.839	.000
N of Valid Cases		300			

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

As we can see from Table 27, the correlation in the variables is significant at the 0.01 level, the Pearson is moderately correlated, and the Gamma has a strong negative relationship, thus in the showing that there is a relationship between the variables. Specifically, my original assumption that respondents who score low in their belief in the ability to rely on the state very much tend to score high in their belief that one can rely on group support mechanisms in a time of need has proven accurate. While the Gamma value would normally be viewed as suspiciously high, I am satisfied with the relationship; as discussed before in Section C, there is a very deep pessimism in Lebanon about the Lebanese state. We can thus assume that respondents who largely believe that the Lebanese state is of no use in a time of need or for welfare purposes instead believe that group support networks, such as political parties or sectarian welfare organizations are better and more reliable providers for need based assistance.

Hypothesis 2

There is a relationship between respondents with Low Merit scores and High Connections scores.

Table 28

Merit Scale * Connections are Necessary Scale Cross Tabulation

Count

		Connections are Necessary		Total
		Low	High	
Merit is Important in Lebanon	Low	52	185	237
	High	28	35	63
Total		80	220	300

Correlations

		The state can be relied upon	Group Support Networks are Necessary
The state can be relied upon	Pearson Correlation	1	-.248**
	Sig. (1-tailed)		.000
	N	300	300
Group Support Networks are Necessary	Pearson Correlation	-.248**	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.000	
	N	300	300

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Asymp. Std. Error[a]	Approx. T[b]	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Gamma	-.480	.115	-3.188	.001
N of Valid Cases		300			

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

Again, the Pearson correlation is significant at the 0.01level and is moderate and the Gamma has a strong association. We can thus infer that the hypothesis was valid and that the belief in the value of personal merit in Lebanon is correlated to the belief in the value of connections being necessary to success in Lebanon. We can also say with confidence that the respondents who have a low belief in the value of personal merit have a high belief that connections are necessary

to succeed; in addition, it is important to note that this is a good representative of the opinions of the respondents as a whole, as the large majority of respondents feel this way.

Hypothesis 3

There is a relationship with low income status and higher scores in group support and connections score.

As discussed in the methodology section, my assumption is that low income individuals are more likely to believe in the value of group support networks and connections, as they are more likely to have to rely on them in a time of need than wealthier individuals. Table 29 is a tabulation of Income and Group Support scores, and Table 30 is a tabulation of Income and Connections scores.

Table 29

Income * Group Support Networks are Necessary Scale Cross Tabulation

Count

		Group Support Networks are Necessary		Total
		Low	High	
Income	Under $500	16	23	39
	$501-$1000	35	72	107
	$1001-$2000	30	82	112
	$2001-$3500	5	26	31
	$3500+	2	9	11
Total		88	212	300

Correlations

		Income	Group Support Networks are Necessary
Income	Pearson Correlation	1	.146**

	Sig. (1-tailed)		.006
	N	300	300
Group Support Networks are Necessary	Pearson Correlation	.146**	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.006	
	N	300	300

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Asymp. Std. Error[a]	Approx. T[b]	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Gamma	.248	.094	2.577	.010
N of Valid Cases		300			

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

The Pearson correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. It is a weak correlation, however it is still correlated, and the Gamma relationship is a moderate association. This is an interesting set of crosstabulations; it disproves my hypothesis that lower income respondents would be more likely to score high on the Group Support scores.

Table 30

Income * Connections are Necessary Scale Cross Tabulation

Count

		Connections are Necessary		Total
		Low	High	
Income	Under $500	13	26	39
	$501-$1000	32	75	107
	$1001-$2000	23	89	112
	$2001-$3500	9	22	31
	$3500+	3	8	11
Total		80	220	300

Correlations

		Income	Connections are Necessary
Income	Pearson Correlation	1	.061

	Sig. (1-tailed)		.147
	N	300	300
	Pearson Correlation	.061	1
Connections are Nessecary	Sig. (1-tailed)	.147	
	N	300	300

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Asymp. Std. Error[a]	Approx. T[b]	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Gamma	.126	.102	1.231	.218
N of Valid Cases		300			

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

Regarding the cross tabulation of income and belief in the value of connections, the data is not significant at the 0.01level and thus cannot be used.

Hypothesis 4

There is a relationship between high personal connection scores and income and political activity scores.

I had argued that those with higher scores in personal connections would have more access to resources available from patronage networks and thus be relatively more wealthy due to their ability to use those connections for personal or professional gain. I also argue that they will be more likely to be politically active, as patronage is a conditional act and access to connections is frequently tied to political activity.

Table 31

Income * Level of Personal Connections Cross Tabulation

Count

		Level of personal Connections		Total
		Low	High	
Income	Under $500	34	5	39
	$501-$1000	85	22	107

	$1001-$2000	91	21	112
	$2001-$3500	21	10	31
	$3500+	6	5	11
Total		237	63	300

Correlations

		Level of personal Connections	Income
Level of personal Connections	Pearson Correlation	1	.133*
	Sig. (1-tailed)		.011
	N	300	300
Income	Pearson Correlation	.133*	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.011	
	N	300	300

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Asymp. Std. Error[a]	Approx. T[b]	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Gamma	.211	.108	1.899	.058
N of Valid Cases		300			

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

The data is significant at the 0.05 level, is a weak Pearson correlation, and the Gamma association is moderate; thus, this is relevant and useful data. The hypothesis is thus validated and there is some correlation with high personal connections and a higher income. Again, this stands to reason; having access to personal connections allows one to access better employment opportunities, business endeavors, and access to state resources.

Table 32

Personal Connections Scale * Party Support Scale Cross Tabulation

Count

		PartySupport		Total
		1.00	2.00	
Level of Personal Connections	Low	184	53	237
	High	28	35	63
Total		212	88	300

Correlations

		Level of personal Connections	PartySupport
Level of Personal Connections	Pearson Correlation	1	.297**
	Sig. (1-tailed)		.000
	N	300	300
Party Support	Pearson Correlation	.297**	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.000	
	N	300	300

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Asymp. Std. Error[a]	Approx. T[b]	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Gamma	.625	.091	4.518	.000
N of Valid Cases		300			

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

The cross tabulation of Personal Connections and Party Support is especially strong. It is significant at the 0.01 level, has a highly correlated Pearson's value, and a strongly associated Gamma value. It is also particularly enlightening, as it strongly reinforces the hypothesis that people who have strong personal connections are active in party politics. It is important to note that correlation does not equal causation; it is impossible to know whether people who are politically active are rewarded with better connections and services, or whether better connections and services encourage people to become active. It is likely a mix of the two,

however we can definitively say that the relationship exists. In terms of the two cross tabulations above in Tables 31 and 32, it is again important to reinforce the point made in section C that those who scored high on Party support overwhelmingly supported Sunni sectarian political parties.

Hypothesis 5

There will be a relationship between high sectarian solidarity scores and political activity scores.

As discussed in the methodology, sectarian political parties are the norm in Lebanon. In addition, examining the data presented thus far shows us that those who are politically active almost entirely voted for sectarian Sunni parties. Thus, the hypothesis that there is a relationship between political activity and sectarian sentiment is at this point quite self evident.

Table 33

Sect Solidarity Scale * Party Support Scale Cross Tabulation

Count

		PartySupport		Total
		Low	2.00	
solidarity with sect	Low	124	28	152
	High	88	60	148
Total		212	88	300

Correlations

		solidarity with sect	PartySupport
Solidarity with Sect	Pearson Correlation	1	.243**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	300	300
PartySupport	Pearson Correlation	.243**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	300	300

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Asymp. Std. Error[a]	Approx. T[b]	Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal	Gamma	.502	.100	4.323	.000
N of Valid Cases		300			

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

As we see above in Table 33 the correlation is significant at the 0.01 level, has a moderate Pearson's correlation, and a strong Gamma association, making it significant data which reinforces the hypothesis. Respondents who are politically active are more likely to feel solidarity with their sect over the Lebanese state as a whole.

The next chapter will briefly summarize the findings in this chapter. It will then discuss the implications of these findings to Lebanon, Lebanese politics, and the central thesis question on the effect of patronage on the confessional state. It will look at both micro and macro level effects on Lebanon, and draw linkages to the literature review.

V. Implications and Conclusion

The previous chapter displayed the findings of the survey and described the data analysis used to test the hypotheses. This chapter will first summarize and the findings of the study and relate them to the existing knowledge base on patronage and clientalism, Lebanese politics, and the Lebanese patronage structures which were discussed in the literature review. I will then conclude by discussing the implications of these findings to the Lebanese political system, specifically how they relate to the issues of patronage, clientalism and the maintenance of the confessional state and confessional politics.

A. Summary of Findings

Based upon the initial findings we can make several observations about the perceptions of clientalism, patronage, politics and sectarianism in Lebanon. We can also make several observations about specifically what strata of society is participating in these patronage systems, and who is being excluded from them, which in turn can give us some idea about the possible targeting strategies of political groups in Lebanon.

The first major finding regarding Lebanese society is that it is a deeply pessimistic society. Examining the individual questions and the creation of scales, specifically the Merit Scale and the Connections Scale, are ample evidence of this. Overwhelmingly respondents express very little faith in the ability to have a successful life in Lebanon based on any kind of personal ability. Personal merit is widely perceived as being a tertiary aspect to success in Lebanon, while the belief that connections, "wasta", and affiliation with the right groups is a far more useful condition for success. The cross tabulation of the Merit and Connections scales in further reinforces this pessimism, as there is a strong correlation between low faith in the value

of personal merit and high faith in the value of connections, and with almost two thirds of respondents falling into the category of low faith in merit and high faith in connections.

This pessimism also extends to the perception of the usefulness of the Lebanese state apparatus, especially relative to the perception of group support networks such as political parties, religious charities, or local community leaders. The findings display a Lebanese populace that has little to no faith in the Lebanese state. The state is not perceived as providing any useful service, is not perceived as providing welfare, cannot be depended on in a time of need, is not a reliable employer, and is mostly viewed as an obstacle to success. On the other hand group support networks are viewed as much more realistic sources of employment, welfare, and services, as long as the one requesting such services is somehow affiliated with the group, i.e. political party or sect. Another excellent indicator of this pessimism is the almost two thirds of respondents having low faith the Lebanese state and concurrently having high faith in group support networks.

The second major finding is that politics in Lebanon is largely a sectarian activity, and that the degree to which one is involved in politics is a good indicator of their sectarian sentiments. Of those respondents who voted in the last elections the large majority voted for Sunni sectarian political parties. When we examine those who engage in a higher level of political activity, such as actively sympathizing with political parties or volunteering for political parties, the number who vote for Sunni sectarian parties approaches 100%. In addition when we examine the tabulation for the political party support scale and the sectarian solidarity scale measuring sectarian sentiment it had a strongly positive correlation. Thus it is safe to say that political activity and participation in politics is an expression of sectarianism, that most of those who participate in the process are generally doing so along sectarian lines, and that the more

politically involved someone is the more likely they are to hold sectarian sentiments and vote along sectarian lines.

The third major finding is that there is a strong relationship between the degree to which a respondent is personally tied into patronage systems and their income level and the level to which they are politically active. People with strong personal connections networks are more likely to be involved in politics and politically active; the inverse is also true, as those who are not connected to patronage networks are less likely to be politically active. People with access to patronage and connections networks are also more likely to be wealthier. Finally, people with stronger ties to patronage networks also show much higher levels of sectarian solidarity and a deeper attachment to sectarian identity at the expense of a greater Lebanese identity.

B. Micro Level Implications

The implications of these findings shows a Lebanese system in which patronage politics and sectarianism are inextricably related, in some ways by design and in some ways by necessity. As discussed in the literature review, the Lebanese state is weak by design. It was initially developed on a power sharing model which was meant to guarantee that no one group could claim control of the entire state apparatus. While this has generally, especially in the post-Taif period, ensured that no sect or group has truly dominated the state it has also manifested itself in a state structure which is generally incapable of providing welfare or services to its citizens. The Lebanese state is not seen by its citizens to be capable of providing any form of security, financial or otherwise. It is generally viewed as corrupt, based on connections, and tertiary to success.

As a result of the weakness of the Lebanese state, the economic sphere is also perceived as dominated by cronyism and a lack of protections for citizens against various forms of victimization, both economic and legal. This applies to the private sector as well; in a stronger state which is capable of upholding the rule of law, one could reasonably expect that abuses by private actors could be reasonably dealt with and that some semblance of equality of opportunity could be maintained. In Lebanon the perception by the majority of Lebanese Sunnis is that the state is not only incapable of this maintenance, but that it is not the strongest actor within the state itself. In such a context, it is natural that if people do not perceive that they are able to depend on the state for their basic needs, services, security, or success, they will be forced to look to service providers outside of the state apparatus.

The inverse of the weakness of the Lebanese state is the strength of patronage networks which have arisen to supplant the needs of the population that the state cannot provide for. Patronage networks, personal connections, charity groups, and NGOs are perceived by the majority of the population as much more viable outlets of service provision than the state itself. These outside service providers are also seen as a necessary part of success; as the state is weak and corrupt, the only way to succeed is not based on personal merit but on the strength of one's connections to the power brokers outside of the state who are capable of providing the services the state cannot.

It is important to note that these outside service providers is not limited to political parties. Patronage and clientalism in Lebanon is a pervasive an all encompassing reality, which includes educational institutions and scholarships, religious charities, local community leaders, NGOs, and members of the state apparatus. However as discussed in the literature review, these institutions have been frequently co-opted into the existing patronage networks based on notable

familes and individuals and the political parties which have formed around them. At the end of the day however, secondary service providers have in most aspects supplanted the state, and these service providers are generally affiliated, or perceived as affiliated, with specific political actors or sects.

One of the key aspects of patronage politics discussed in the literature review is its conditional nature; that is, support from the patron is conditional on support from the client and vice-versa. As the state cannot be relied upon for support, and as secondary service providers are perceived as necessary for success in Lebanon, Lebanese citizens are forced into accepting an unofficial contract with patrons for services and connections; there is very much the perception that there is no way to succeed in absence of these services and connections. This assertion is borne out by the data; respondents who are report higher levels of personal connections are economically better off.

Politically active respondents are also much more likely to have high levels of personal connections. This reflects the conditional nature of the patron client exchange. It is impossible to know the direction of this exchange; correlation does not equal causation. It is a chicken and egg situation; does the client support the patron because of the services and connections provided, or does the service provider provide the services and connections in return for support? It is very likely dependant on the individual and the patron. Cammett (2014) discusses in great detail how political parties direct their targeting strategies and how individuals assess the costs and benefits of selecting a patron. However, the correlation exists and individuals who are more politically active have higher levels of personal connections, and individuals with higher levels of personal connections are more economically successful, and this in very much related to their dedication to a patron who is inevitably linked to a sectarian political party.

The sectarian aspect of patronage networks is central to the issue of patronage in Lebanon. Patronage networks, and the support systems they provide in absence of a strong state, is necessarily sectarian. This sectarianism is necessary by both design, and by necessity. The Lebanese system is confessional and is based on power sharing and an institutionalized sectarian representation; it is also characterized by a weak central state which is incapable of service provision. The most natural secondary service provider, especially post-Taif, will naturally be the political party; a political party which will be a sectarian party due to the confessional nature of Lebanese politics.

Sectarian political parties not only target their members based on sect; they also reinforce sectarian identities and base their image on common sectarian ideals, values, and imagery (Chandra, 2004, 3). In Lebanon, with its explicitly sectarian political sphere, this requires that citizens who wish to be beneficiaries of the patronage networks must also adopt sectarian identities and ideals if they are to be fully accepted into the patronage system. This is again seen in the data; respondents who report high levels of political connections also responded with high levels of sectarian solidarity, and respondents with high levels of political connections also were politically active with Sunni political parties. This in turn was of benefit to them, as these same respondents reported higher levels of income, reflecting the conditional nature of patronage networks.

In conclusion, on the individual level we can say patronage politics is the result of several features of the Lebanese state. In this regard the first feature of the Lebanese state is its weakness and inability to provide welfare, services, or a stable and equitable economic environment; especially relative to the strength of secondary service providers to supplant the services of the state. This creates a system where individuals are forced to enter into essentially

conditional relationships where services are granted in return for political support, or where political support is rewarded with greater access to services.

The second feature of the Lebanese state is its sectarian and confessional nature. By default due to the structure of the confessional system, most secondary service providers will be sectarian political parties or politically or religiously affiliated groups. Sectarian groups specifically target members of the own sect by definition; thus to gain access to the resources provided by secondary service providers the individual must frequently adopt sectarian beliefs, modes of thinks, iconography, and prejudices demanded by the group providing the patronage. Sectarianism in Lebanon thus frequently becomes a necessary way of life if an individual wishes to achieve success within Lebanese society.

C. Macro Level Implications

There are several implications of this relationship between patronage and politics which have a more macro level effect on the state at large and the way in which the state is run. The first among these is that there is a vested interest on the part of the political actors running the state to maintain the weakness of the Lebanese state. If the Lebanese state was a stronger one, able to provide welfare and equitability to its population, patronage politics would still exist; it is a universal system which exists worldwide in a variety of contexts as discussed in the literature review. However the Lebanese case is unique in that, due to the perceived absence of the state, taking part in patronage is seen as partially necessary for success. Lebanese politicians and political parties use the weakness of the Lebanese state to provide a secondary source of welfare and services in return for political support. If service provision was made more effective in a state wide non-sectarian manner, then these political actors who run the state would lose a valuable means to gain support.

This dichotomy creates a situation in which strengthening the state to provide effective goods and services for the population, while beneficial in the long run to the population, would be directly counter-productive to the recruitment and support strategies of political parties. With effective state service provision the population would no longer be forced to enter into the clientalist agreement, and political actors would be forced to court voters and supporters using more traditional ideological means. I do not argue that political parties in Lebanon do not have ideological platforms, or that citizens in Lebanon select a political party based solely on patronage; obviously there are a wide number of reasons why someone may choose a political party, and not every Lebanese politician is purely self interested at the expense of the state. However, the patron-client system is certainly a major targeting strategy of political parties in Lebanon which is facilitated by the weakness of the Lebanese state, and rectifying this state weakness would be a serious blow to the effectiveness of that strategy.

Another major macro level effect of patronage on the running of the Lebanese state is that it creates a situation in which it is extremely difficult to challenge the status quo to the fact that there are economic penalties to doing so. Voting for issues along sectarian lines is rewarded with patronage; attempting to work across the aisle with other parties is punished . As all major sectarian parties are in direct competition with each other for the existing resources necessary to maintain their patronage networks, a cross-sectarian platform would be detrimental to all political actors. Cooperation efforts can only be undertaken at the expense of another Lebanese political actor, and cross sectarian issues are generally among the most divisive in the political sphere. Take union benefits as an example; trade union issues, especially electrical workers and teachers, have cross sectarian appeal and pose a threat to the sectarian status quo and are thus frequently the most high profile issues in Lebanese politics.

A third major macro level effect of patronage on the Lebanese state is that of the appropriation of state resources along confessional lines. As patrons have a duty to provide resources and services among their clients, certain sectors of the Lebanese state become extremely sought after and contested as vehicles for resource redistribution. Sectarian leaders who are able to control valuable ministries, such as electricity, energy, education, healthcare and security services are better able to distribute the benefits of their ministerial "fiefdoms" toward their population first. This has the effect of not only creating gridlock in the political system, as cabinet positions are given out in a sectarian bargaining system, but also has the effect of ensure unequal distribution across the population. It is well known that some areas of the country are neglected more than others as patrons ensure that areas are targeted for resource provision based on their usefulness to the political patron. Patrons also have the ability direct resources from their own networks as a way of supplanting inefficiencies in the state; the control over generator provision in areas with electrical power cuts could be an example of this. Essentially, the system incentivizes a competitive aspect to all state service direction based on sectarian lines as a method of ensuring the continued usefulness of the patron and the system he represents.

Finally, the patronage system has a major effect on Lebanon's foreign policy and foreign political involvement. Lebanese patrons require large sums of money to fund their patronage networks; Lebanon is a middle income country with a state that is desperately in debt and an economy which is at best struggling. The funds do not exist within Lebanon to support the vast patronage networks necessary to run the Lebanese political machine. This forces patrons to look to outside sources for financial (and sometimes military) support in order to continue their service provision, and as a relatively strategic country in an important world region this is a simple prospect. As such, every major Lebanese political party has some kind of foreign patron

providing them with funds and services, and in turn Lebanese parties frequently act as the mouthpiece or representative of their foreign patron's strategic ambitions in the region.

This is a well known phenomena in Lebanese politics. It is generally understood that the Future movement is well funded and backed by Sunni Arab Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia; the same situation exists for Hezbollah and Iran. Lebanese parties and patrons must enter into the clientalist bargain to secure funding to maintain their own patronage networks, and as such are subject to the foreign policy whims of their patrons. As regional events and rivalries, particularly between the Gulf and Iran, grow increasingly volatile this has an effect on the state of gridlock that exists in the Lebanese political sphere. The search for patrons is not the only factor in Lebanese foreign policy, as obviously local sympathies and communal ties play a strong role. However, the effect of large amounts of foreign money provided to political patrons to fund their patronage networks certainly does not come with no strings attached. Leverage in the foreign policy realm is purchased in Lebanon at a high leverage cost, and creates foreign policy gridlock that prevents local actors in Lebanon from reaching mutually beneficial agreements due to regional power plays.

D. Conclusion

In summation, I argue that patronage and clientalism has a contributory effect on the maintenance of the confessional system, and the continuation of sectarianism in Lebanon. As discussed in the literature, Lebanon's early modern system from the Ottoman Mutasariffiya period was designed in such a way that local notable and elite patrons were given effective autonomous control of the area in a power sharing system based on religious confession. These patrons would provide for their clients in a feudal system common around the region; however the confessional power sharing system would have a lasting legacy that would grow with the

state throughout the mandate period following World War I. The French used a semi-democratic model based on this power sharing arrangement, and the local notables and elites of the period would essentially codify the confessional system in the 1943 national pact as a part of the independence process.

As a part of this confessional government system, the notable families who became the new political leaders and power brokers would continue to maintain their feudal network of clients, mostly from the same sectarian group. This created the "za'im" system, in which patrons in Lebanon were seeking not only supporters but also voters to legitimately seize power in the new state. With the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war, the "za'im" would be supplanted with the militia and the political party, with clients now required to seek protection and the patron now required to directly control territory and maintain an armed force. The war, and the chaos it brought, also forced the Lebanese populace to survive in a system in which the state was more or less non-existent, and the political patron/warlord was the primary provider of goods and services.

Following the war and the conclusion of the Taif agreement, confessionalism became officially codified as the structure of the Lebanese state. The warlords and factions of the Civil War period also became the political leaders and political parties of the post-war Lebanese state. New political parties were also formed; however many would adopt or appropriate the existing patronage networks of the past. Though the withdrawal of the Syrian regime from Lebanon would have some reshuffling effect on the Lebanese political system, in general patronage networks have remained a major force in Lebanese politics and service provision has remained the purview of the political patron and not the Lebanese state itself.

The Lebanese state, weak by design to prevent the domination of any one sect, has made patronage politics a necessary part of service provision for much of the population. Using the survey data gathered in this thesis, we can see that Lebanese citizen are by and large disillusioned with their prospects of success in absence of a patron and the connections a patron or political party can provide. We can also see that political patrons specifically target and reward their most fervent supporters, and that this happens on purely sectarian lines. This targeting ensures that to be have an opportunity at success using patronage in Lebanon one must accept the sectarian system and sectarian identity given by the patron group. This also ensures that there is little incentive at cross sectarian appeals, as patronage resources will not generally be directed at other communities.

There are wide reaching effects on the Lebanese state due to this sectarian patronage dichotomy. The Lebanese state, controlled by sectarian parties who depend on their clients for support and who have a vested interest in maintaining their role as the most effective service providers in the state have little incentive to strengthen the state in a way which would benefit the population as a whole. This targeting of inter-sectarian groups also forces the population to enter into the clientalist bargain by reinforcing their own sectarian identity as a way of ensuring success within the state structure. Regional politics also plays into this, as foreign patrons ensure that their Lebanese client political leaders answer to a foreign capital or patron to make foreign policy decisions based on funding as opposed to the national good.

Appendix I

Survey- English

Age:	Under 18	18-25	25-35	35-50	50+
Gender:	Male			Female	
Occupation:					
Income:	Under $500 month	$500-1000	$1000-2000	$2000-3000	$3000+
What neighborhood do you live in:					
Marital Status:	Married			Single	
Children:	0	1-3	3-6	6+	
Sect:					

1: It is possible to get a job in the Lebanese state apparatus based on your own merits.				
	Strongly Agree	AgreeDont Know	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
2: Qualifications are more important than connections in terms of getting a job in Lebanon.				
	Strongly Agree	AgreeDont Know	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
3: The Lebanese state helps people gain employment.				
	Strongly Agree	AgreeDont Know	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
4: The Lebanese state provides sufficient services to the poor.				
	Strongly Agree	AgreeDont Know	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
5: The Lebanese state sufficiently provides for student scholarships				
	Strongly Agree	AgreeDont Know	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
6: It is easy to receive a pension from the Lebanese state				
	Strongly Agree	AgreeDont Know	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
7: The legal system in Lebanon provides justice for everyone equally.				
	Strongly Agree	AgreeDont Know	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
8: The police in Lebanon treat everyone in the state equally.				
	Strongly Agree	AgreeDont Know	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
9: Your sect has no influence on how you are treated by police in Lebanon.				
	Strongly Agree	AgreeDont Know	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
10: Knowing a community leader or a political leader helps you get a job.				
	Strongly Agree	AgreeDont Know	Disagree	Strongly Disagree

11: It is impossible to get a job in the Lebanese state without connections. Strongly Agree AgreeDont Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
12: Political connections are more useful than qualifications in terms of getting a job. Strongly Agree AgreeDont Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
13: Being connected to a political party makes it easier to get a scholarship. Strongly Agree AgreeDont Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
14: Political parties provide more welfare to the poor than the state. Strongly Agree AgreeDont Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
15: Charities in Lebanon provide welfare to members of their own sect first. Strongly Agree AgreeDont Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
16: It is easier for someone with political connections to break the law in Lebanon. Strongly Agree AgreeDont Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
17: Police will not arrest someone in Lebanon if they have political connections. Strongly Agree AgreeDont Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
18: People from different sects receive different treatment from the police. Strongly Agree AgreeDont Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
19: Do you sympathize with a political party? Yes No
If yes, which one?
20: Did you vote in the last elections? Yes No
If yes, for which party?
21: If you are too young to have voted in the last elections would you have? Yes No
If yes, for which party?
22: Do you actively support a political party? Yes No
If yes, which party?
23: Have you ever volunteered for a political party? Yes No
If yes, which party?
24: Have you or any family member ever attempted to a meet with an MP? Yes No
25: Do you know any "community leaders" to approach in a time of need? Yes No
26: Do you believe you have "connections"? Yes No
27: Do you believe it is possible to succeed without "connections" in Lebanon? Yes No
28: Lebanon's government is currently politically polarized and ineffective. With the recent deteriorating political situation, and the lack of consensus in the Lebanese government I tend to I look to my own community more than I look to the state. Strongly Agree AgreeDont Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
29: Lebanon is currently in a state of crisis. Despite my opinion about political issues or my feelings on the political situation, I sometimes find it unavoidable to follow a leader from my own sect. Strongly Agree AgreeDont Know Disagree Strongly Disagree

Survey-Arabic

العمر:	أقل من ١٨ ١٨-٢٥ ٢٥-٣٥ ٣٥-٥٠ +٥٠
الجنس:	ذكر أنثى
الوظيفة:	
الدخل:	أقل من ٥٠٠$ بشهر ٥٠٠-١٠٠٠ ١٠٠٠-٢٠٠٠ ٢٠٠٠-٣٠٠٠ +٣٠٠٠$
ما هو الحي الذي تسكن فيه؟:	
الحالة الزوجية:	متزوج ليس متزوج
الأطفال:	٠ ١-٣ ٣-٦ +٦
الطائفة:	

ضع دائرة أو اكتب الرد الصحيح
ضع دائرة حول الرد الأفضل في رأيك

١: يمكن لك الحصول على وظيفة في أجهزة الدولة اللبنانية بحسب كفائاتك.	موافق جداً	موافق	لا أعرف	غير موافق	غير موافق جداً
٢: المؤهلات اهم من الوسائط من حيث الحصول على وظيفة في لبنان.	موافق جداً	موافق	لا أعرف	غير موافق	غير موافق جداً
٣: الدولة اللبنانية تساعد الأشخاص على إيجاد العمل.	موافق جداً	موافق	لا أعرف	غير موافق	غير موافق جداً
٤: الدولة اللبنانية توفر خدمات كافية للفقراء	موافق جداً	موافق	لا أعرف	غير موافق	غير موافق جداً
٥: الدولة اللبنانية توفر منح تعليمية كافيةٍ للطلاب	موافق جداً	موافق	لا أعرف	غير موافق	غير موافق جداً
٦: من السهل الحصول على معاش بعد نهاية الخدمة من الدولة اللبنانية	موافق جداً	موافق	لا أعرف	غير موافق	غير موافق جداً
٧: النظام القانوني اللبناني يوفر العدالة لكل المواطنين في لبنان.	موافق جداً	موافق	لا أعرف	غير موافق	غير موافق جداً
٨: الشرطة في لبنان تعامل كل المواطنين بالتساوي.	موافق جداً	موافق	لا أعرف	غير موافق	غير موافق جداً
٩: لا يوجد تأثير لطائفة المواطن على معاملة الشرطة في لبنان.	موافق جداً	موافق	لا أعرف	غير موافق	غير موافق جداً
١٠: المعرفة بزعيم سياسي أو شخصية عامة سيساعدك على الحصول على عمل	موافق جداً	موافق	لا أعرف	غير موافق	غير موافق جداً
١١: من المستحيل الحصول على وظيفة في أجهزة الدولة اللبنانية بدون واسطة	موافق جداً	موافق	لا أعرف	غير موافق	غير موافق جداً

١٢: العلاقات السياسية أهم من الكفائات من حيث الحصول على وظيفة موافق جداً موافق لا أعرف غير موافق غير موافق جداً
١٣: تسهل العلاقات مع حزب سياسي الحصول على منحةدراسية موافق جداً موافق لا أعرف غير موافق غير موافق جداً
١٤: تقدم الأحزاب السياسية مساعدات للفقراء أكثر منالدولة موافق جداً موافق لا أعرف غير موافق غير موافق جداً
١٥: توفر الجمعياتالخيرية في لبنان الرعاية لأفراد طائفهم قبل الآخرين موافق جداً موافق لا أعرف غير موافق غير موافق جداً
١٦: من الأسهل على شخص ذو صلات سياسية ارتكابمخالفةضدالقانون في لبنان موافق جداً موافق لا أعرف غير موافق غير موافق جداً
١٧: الشرطة لا تعتقل أشخاص في لبنان إذا كان لديهم واسطة موافق جداً موافق لا أعرف غير موافق غير موافق جداً
١٨: يتلقى الأشخاص من الطوائف المختلفة معاملة مختلفة من الشرطة موافق جداً موافق لا أعرف غير موافق غير موافق جداً

١٩: هلتتعاطفمعحزبسياسي؟	نعم	لا
إذاكانالجوابنعم، لأي حزب؟		
٢٠: هل اقترعت في الانتخابات الأخيرة؟	نعم	لا
إذاكانالجوابنعم،لأي حزب؟		
٢١: إذاكنتأصغرمنالسن القانونية للتصويت، هل كنت تود المشاركة؟	نعم	لا
إذاكانالجوابنعم، لأي حزب؟		
٢٢: هلتساندحزبسياسي؟	نعم	لا
إذاكانالجوابنعم، أي حزب؟		
٢٣: هلتتطوعبوقتكلحزبسياسي؟	نعم	لا
إذاكانالجوابنعم، لأي حزب؟		
٢٤: هل قمت انت أو أي فرد من عائلتك بمحاولة الالتقاء مع عضو بالبرلمان؟	نعم	لا
٢٥: هل تعرف أي زعيم يمكنك الاتصال به عند الحاجة؟	نعم	لا
٢٦: هل لديك واسطة؟	نعم	لا

٢٧: هل تأمن بإمكانية النجاح بدون واسطة في لبنان؟	نعم لا

٢٨: تعاني الدولة اللبنانية من حالة استقطاب سياسي شديد و عدم فاعلية في الوقت الحالي. مع تدهور الوضع السياسي ونقص الإجماع في الحكومة اللبنانية، أميل إلى النظر إلى مجتمعي أكثر من الدولة اللبنانية.

موافق جداً موافق لا أعرف غير موافق غير موافق جداً

٢٩: لبنان في حالة طوارىء. بغضّ النظر عن رأيي في القضايا السياسية ومشاعري اتجاه الوضع السياسي، أجد نفسي مضطراً أن أتبع قائداًمنطائفتي.

موافق جداً موافق لا أعرف غير موافق غير موافق جداً

Appendix II

Survey Data

Frequency Table

Q1: It is Possible to get a job in the Lebanese state apparatus based on merit

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree	16	5.3	5.3	5.3
	Neutral	19	6.3	6.3	11.7
	Disagee	265	88.3	88.3	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q1.2: Qualifications are more important than connections in terms of getting a job in Lebanon

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree	25	8.3	8.3	8.3
	Neutral	24	8.0	8.0	16.3
	Disagree	251	83.7	83.7	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q1.3: The Lebanese state helps people gain employment

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	4	1.3	1.3	100.0
	A	1	.3	.3	98.7
	N	14	4.7	4.7	98.3
	D	28	9.3	9.3	93.7
	SD	253	84.3	84.3	84.3
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q1.4: The Lebanese state provides sufficient services for the poor

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	5	1.7	1.7	100.0

	A	4	1.3	1.3	98.3
	N	17	5.7	5.7	97.0
	D	32	10.7	10.7	91.3
	SD	242	80.7	80.7	80.7
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q1.5: The Lebanese state sufficiently provides for student scholarships

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	14	4.7	4.7	100.0
	A	5	1.7	1.7	95.3
	N	35	11.7	11.7	93.7
	D	40	13.3	13.3	82.0
	SD	206	68.7	68.7	68.7
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q1.6: It is easy to recieve a pension from the Lebanese state

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	28	9.3	9.3	100.0
	A	24	8.0	8.0	90.7
	N	57	19.0	19.0	82.7
	D	39	13.0	13.0	63.7
	SD	152	50.7	50.7	50.7
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q1.7: The legal system in Lebanon provides justive for everyone equally

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	12	4.0	4.0	100.0
	A	11	3.7	3.7	96.0
	N	68	22.7	22.7	92.3
	D	39	13.0	13.0	69.7
	SD	170	56.7	56.7	56.7
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q1.8: The police in Lebanon treat everyone equally

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	24	8.0	8.0	100.0
	A	15	5.0	5.0	92.0
	N	77	25.7	25.7	87.0
	D	44	14.7	14.7	61.3
	SD	140	46.7	46.7	46.7
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q1.9: Your sect has no influence on how you are treated by police in Lebanon

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	21	7.0	7.0	7.0
	A	18	6.0	6.0	13.0
	N	84	28.0	28.0	41.0
	D	56	18.7	18.7	59.7
	SD	121	40.3	40.3	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q1.10: Knowing a community leader or political leadr helps you get a job in Lebanon

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	175	58.3	58.3	100.0
	A	56	18.7	18.7	41.7
	N	34	11.3	11.3	23.0
	D	8	2.7	2.7	11.7
	SD	27	9.0	9.0	9.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q1.11: It is impossible to get a job in the Lebanese state without connections

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	232	77.3	77.3	100.0

	A	30	10.0	10.0	22.7
	N	21	7.0	7.0	12.7
	D	10	3.3	3.3	5.7
	SD	7	2.3	2.3	2.3
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q1.12: Political connections are more useful than qualifications in terms of getting a job

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	214	71.3	71.3	100.0
	A	48	16.0	16.0	28.7
	N	25	8.3	8.3	12.7
	D	3	1.0	1.0	4.3
	SD	10	3.3	3.3	3.3
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q1.13: Being connected to a political party makes it easier to get a scholarship

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	155	51.7	51.7	100.0
	A	79	26.3	26.3	48.3
	N	43	14.3	14.3	22.0
	D	6	2.0	2.0	7.7
	SD	17	5.7	5.7	5.7
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q1.14: Political parties provide more welfare to members of their own sect first

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	96	32.0	32.0	100.0
	A	75	25.0	25.0	68.0
	N	90	30.0	30.0	43.0
	D	10	3.3	3.3	13.0
	SD	29	9.7	9.7	9.7
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q1.16: It is easier for someone with political connections to break the law in Lebanon

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SD	13	4.3	4.3	4.3
	D	7	2.3	2.3	6.7
	N	48	16.0	16.0	22.7
	A	42	14.0	14.0	36.7
	SA	190	63.3	63.3	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q1.17: Police will not arrest someone in Lebanon if they have political connections

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SD	10	3.3	3.3	3.3
	D	17	5.7	5.7	9.0
	N	63	21.0	21.0	30.0
	A	49	16.3	16.3	46.3
	SA	161	53.7	53.7	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q1.18: People from different sects recieve different treatment from the police

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	146	48.7	48.7	100.0
	A	47	15.7	15.7	51.3
	N	85	28.3	28.3	35.7
	D	7	2.3	2.3	7.3
	SD	15	5.0	5.0	5.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q2: Do you sympathize with a political party?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent

	Yes	89	29.7	29.7	29.7
Valid	No	211	70.3	70.3	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q2.1: If yes, who?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Sunni Movement	85	28.3	95.5	95.5
Valid	Non-Sunni Movement	4	1.3	4.5	100.0
	Total	89	29.7	100.0	

Q3: Did you vote in the last elections?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Yes	140	46.7	46.7	46.7
Valid	No	160	53.3	53.3	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q3.1: If yes, for which party?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Sunni Movement	97	32.3	69.3	69.3
Valid	Non-Sunni Movement	43	14.3	30.7	100.0
	Total	140	46.7	100.0	

Q4: If you are too young to have voted in the last elections would you have?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Yes	17	5.7	5.7	5.7
	No	52	17.3	17.3	23.0
Valid	N/A	231	77.0	77.0	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q4.1: If yes, who?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Sunni Movement	13	4.3	76.5	76.5
	Non-Sunni Movement	4	1.3	23.5	100.0
	Total	17	5.7	100.0	

Q5: Do you actively support a political party?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	82	27.3	27.3	27.3
	No	218	72.7	72.7	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q5.1: If yes, who?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Sunni Movement	79	26.3	96.3	96.3
	Non-Sunni Movement	3	1.0	3.7	100.0
	Total	82	27.3	100.0	

Q6: Have you ever volunteered for a political party?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	15	5.0	5.0	5.0
	No	285	95.0	95.0	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q6.1: If yes, who?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Sunni Movement	15	5.0	100.0	100.0

Q7: Have you or a family member ever attempted to meet with an MP?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	48	16.0	16.0	16.0

	No	252	84.0	84.0	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q8: Do you know any community leaders to approach in a time of need?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	66	22.0	22.0	22.0
	No	234	78.0	78.0	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q9: Do you believe you have connections?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	46	15.3	15.3	15.3
	No	254	84.7	84.7	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q10: Do you believe it is possible to succeed without connections in Lebanon?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	62	20.7	20.7	20.7
	No	238	79.3	79.3	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q11.1: Lebanon's government is currently politically polarized and ineffective. With the recent deteriorating political situation and the lack of consensus in Lebanese government, I tend to look to my own community more than I look to the state.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	159	53.0	53.0	100.0
	A	53	17.7	17.7	47.0
	N	53	17.7	17.7	29.3
	D	14	4.7	4.7	11.7
	SD	21	7.0	7.0	7.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q11.2: Lebanon is currently in a state of crisis. Despite my opinion about political issues or the political situation, I sometimes find it unavoidable to follow a leader from my own sect.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	97	32.3	32.3	100.0
	A	53	17.7	17.7	67.7
	N	44	14.7	14.7	50.0
	D	25	8.3	8.3	35.3
	SD	81	27.0	27.0	27.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Age

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	18-39	145	48.3	48.3	48.3
	40-59	91	30.3	30.3	78.7
	60+	64	21.3	21.3	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Gender

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	202	67.3	67.3	67.3
	Female	98	32.7	32.7	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Occupation

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Legislator or Top manager	2	.7	.7	.7
	Specialized Worker	7	2.3	2.3	3.0
	Technician or Specialized Assistant	3	1.0	1.0	4.0
	Writer	25	8.3	8.3	12.3

	Service Worker or Shopkeeper	58	19.3	19.3	31.7
	Worker in Handicrafts or similar	20	6.7	6.7	38.3
	Machine Operator	12	4.0	4.0	42.3
	Part time worker	1	.3	.3	42.7
	Freelancer	62	20.7	20.7	63.3
	Unemployed	27	9.0	9.0	72.3
	Retired	13	4.3	4.3	76.7
	Housewife	54	18.0	18.0	94.7
	Student	16	5.3	5.3	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Income

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Under $500	39	13.0	13.0	13.0
	$501-$1000	107	35.7	35.7	48.7
	$1001-$2000	112	37.3	37.3	86.0
	$2001-$3500	31	10.3	10.3	96.3
	$3500+	11	3.7	3.7	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Q16: Neighborhood

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	AachaBakkar	1	.3	.3	.3
	AbiSamra	11	3.7	3.7	4.0
	AbouChaker	8	2.7	2.7	6.7
	Abousahal street	2	.7	.7	7.3
	Ajam Street - tripoly	1	.3	.3	7.7
	Ardjaloul	5	1.7	1.7	9.3
	Azme Street	10	3.3	3.3	12.7
	Barrad	1	.3	.3	13.0
	Beb al ramal	1	.3	.3	13.3
	Beb el hadid	1	.3	.3	13.7
	Beb el Ramel	5	1.7	1.7	15.3

	Bedawi	1	.3	.3	15.7
	Beirut	6	2.0	2.0	17.7
	Beirut Arab University	2	.7	.7	18.3
	Berjaoui	1	.3	.3	18.7
	borjAbihaydar	3	1.0	1.0	19.7
	Caracas	2	.7	.7	20.3
	Chakriye	1	.3	.3	20.7
	Comodore street	1	.3	.3	21.0
	Cornich el mazraa	5	1.7	1.7	22.7
	Culture Street - tripoly	2	.7	.7	23.3
	Daftardar square	2	.7	.7	24.0
	daher el kamar	1	.3	.3	24.3
	Dam w farz	1	.3	.3	24.7
	Dekrmen	2	.7	.7	25.3
	El hourch	4	1.3	1.3	26.7
	Eskandari	1	.3	.3	27.0
	Fakhani	13	4.3	4.3	31.3
	Hamad Street	4	1.3	1.3	32.7
	Hamad Street	5	1.7	1.7	34.3
	Hededin	1	.3	.3	34.7
	Houri Street	3	1.0	1.0	35.7
	KamilChamoun Sport City	6	2.0	2.0	37.7
	Kaskas	1	.3	.3	38.0
	Kayal square	2	.7	.7	38.7
	Kechek	1	.3	.3	39.0
	Kennen	2	.7	.7	39.7
	Kobbe	10	3.3	3.3	43.0
	Maarad	2	.7	.7	43.7
	Majdlyoun	4	1.3	1.3	45.0
	Makased	6	2.0	2.0	47.0
	Malaab	17	5.7	5.7	52.7
	Maloule	1	.3	.3	53.0
	Mar elias	1	.3	.3	53.3
	Martyrs Square Saida	3	1.0	1.0	54.3
	Midan	1	.3	.3	54.7

	Mina - saida	3	1.0	1.0	55.7
	Mina - Tripoly	2	.7	.7	56.3
	Moharram street	1	.3	.3	56.7
	Motran street	1	.3	.3	57.0
	Mousaytbe	2	.7	.7	57.7
	Msaylha	1	.3	.3	58.0
	Nachabe	1	.3	.3	58.3
	Nejme Square	12	4.0	4.0	62.3
	noueiri	1	.3	.3	62.7
	Old Saida	10	3.3	3.3	66.0
	Ras el nabeh	1	.3	.3	66.3
	Rawass	8	2.7	2.7	69.0
	Rifai	6	2.0	2.0	71.0
	Sabil	22	7.3	7.3	78.3
	Sabra	7	2.3	2.3	80.7
	Saida	2	.7	.7	81.3
	Saida - alboustan	3	1.0	1.0	82.3
	Saida - sabbagh	2	.7	.7	83.0
	Saida - Yahoud section	3	1.0	1.0	84.0
	Saida Square bakery	1	.3	.3	84.3
	Serail - Saida	1	.3	.3	84.7
	Taamir	6	2.0	2.0	86.7
	Talet el khayat	1	.3	.3	87.0
	Tall Square	5	1.7	1.7	88.7
	Tarik jdide	4	1.3	1.3	90.0
	Tebene	2	.7	.7	90.7
	Tripoli	7	2.3	2.3	93.0
	Tripoli - Aatarin	1	.3	.3	93.3
	Tripoli - church street	2	.7	.7	94.0
	Tripoli - freedom street	7	2.3	2.3	96.3
	Tripoli - kanawati	1	.3	.3	96.7
	Tripoli - Rahbet Street	2	.7	.7	97.3
	Verdun	1	.3	.3	97.7
	villas area - Saida	3	1.0	1.0	98.7
	wata	1	.3	.3	99.0

	Zahriye	2	.7	.7	99.7
	Zawya	1	.3	.3	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Area

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Beirut	150	50.0	50.0	50.0
	Tripoli	100	33.3	33.3	83.3
	Sidon	50	16.7	16.7	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Marital Status

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Single	95	31.7	31.7	31.7
	Married	205	68.3	68.3	100.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Merit Scale

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	High	63	21.0	21.0	100.0
	Low	237	79.0	79.0	79.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

State Reliance Scale

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	High	65	21.7	21.7	100.0
	Low	235	78.3	78.3	78.3
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Connections are Necessary Scale

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	High	220	73.3	73.3	100.0
	Low	80	26.7	26.7	26.7
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Group Support Networks are Necessary Scale

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	High	212	70.7	70.7	100.0
	Low	88	29.3	29.3	29.3
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Personal Connections Scale

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	High	63	21.0	21.0	100.0
	Low	237	79.0	79.0	79.0
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Sect Solidarity Scale

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	High	148	49.3	49.3	100.0
	Low	152	50.7	50.7	50.7
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

Party Support Scale

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	High	88	29.3	29.3	100.0
	Low	212	70.7	70.7	70.7
	Total	300	100.0	100.0	

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