

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS ON U.S
FOREIGN POLICY
THE CASE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT

by
KAREEN HASSAN BAYDOUN

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
Approved by:



Dr. Hiba Khodr, Associate Professor
PSPA
Advisor



Dr. Hilal Khashan, Professor
PSPA
Member of Committee



Dr. Carmen Geha, Visiting Assistant Professor
PSPA
Member of Committee

Date of thesis defense: September 16, 2015

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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

Kareen Hassan Baydoun for Master of Arts
Major: Public Administration

Title: The Implications of the Arab Uprisings on U.S Foreign Policy
The Case of the Government of Egypt

The core objective of this thesis is to study the effect of the Egyptian uprising on the American foreign policy in the country to assess whether there was an increase in foreign assistance provided to the government of Egypt as well as a change in the United States' broad foreign policy goals post the uprising. The assessment is done through an analysis of the foreign aid to Egypt since the year 1946 and through a content analysis of official announcements, declarations, speeches and U.S positions pre and post Egypt's uprising. For a more organized analysis, the time interval is divided into three periods that are cautiously selected according to key events which took place in both the U.S and Egypt such as the United States' September 11 attacks in 2001 and the downfall of Mubarak, the Egyptian president, in February 2011. The first spans the period of time starting on the events of 9/11 and ending on the downfall of President Mubarak. The second starts from Mubarak's resignation and Morsi's election until Morsi's stepping out of office. The third covers the post Sisi's election period.

The thesis contends that there was a policy shift in the broad American foreign policy objectives toward Egypt such as maintaining the Egypt-Israel Treaty, having priority access to the Suez Canal and others driven by the effects of the Arab uprising in general, and the Egyptian uprising in particular as well as an increase in foreign assistance as an outcome of the uprising..

The analysis undertaken is based on the realist approach that is the most applied by International Relations scholars in foreign policy analysis. The study uses Kegley and Wittkopf's theoretical framework to test for the existence of a policy shift through selecting two of the five sources adopted by the framework; the first source is the role of the president and key high-ranking officials within the American administration who have contributed in the formulation of foreign policy toward Egypt. The other source is the external source which, in this case, refers to the effect of the Egyptian uprising on the making of American foreign policy. This study analyzes the economic and military aid provided by the U.S government to Egypt across the aforementioned timeline, in addition to publically available documents including official statements, presidential addresses, recorded speeches, interviews, government reports and press releases.

The most important finding of this thesis suggests that there exists a contradiction in the U.S administration's foreign policy showing support to the Egyptian uprising while having supported the autocratic regime for years. Furthermore, the thesis concludes that although the U.S never cease to stress on its intention to implement democracy and promote human rights in the region, its main interests are rather discouraging interstate conflict that can threaten allies like Israel, and preserving the flow of energy resources and commerce while ensuring transit access to facilities for military operations; this contradiction is visible in the U.S support to Morsi, the President from the Muslim Brotherhood organization. The thesis suggests that the former interests are always sacrificed at the expenses of the latter ones and does not validate the presence of a U.S foreign policy shift post Egypt's uprising given that the United States broader foreign policy goals have remained unchangeable.

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“They all know we are not friends, we just have a mutual interest”

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The objective of chapter one is to provide an introduction and an overview about the components and chapters of this thesis. Moreover, it introduces our topic and research question which aims at answering whether American foreign assistance has increased post Egypt’s uprising and to assess if the United States’ broad foreign policy objectives have changed as a result of the uprising. The United States remains the world’s political leader and one of the most influential countries in achieving its desired foreign policy objectives worldwide (Adelman, 2013), despite China’s rising global economic super power according to the International Monetary Fund’s assertions of its GDP (Kamrany & Jiang, 2015).

American foreign policy refers to the actions taken by the United States abroad to pursue its goals (Nguyen, 2013). The Department of State as the U.S leading agency of foreign affairs is concerned about creating a more secure, democratic and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community in addition to other major goals such as fighting terrorism. U.S foreign policy both affects and is affected by the political scene in the Middle East. This provides a meaningful insight for looking into the implications of the Arab uprisings, particularly the case of Egypt, to observe whether there was a policy shift in U.S foreign policies dealing with

the changes in Egypt starting from the onset of the uprising in January 25, 2011 until the presidency of Sisi in June 2014.

The Arab uprisings have optimistically begun to start a paradigm shift from authoritarianism to democracy. This is inferred from the downfall of authoritarian systems through the revolutions in different countries such as Tunisia, Egypt and Libya (Krayem Ed., 2014). Despite the importance of revolutions in different countries, Egypt possesses a unique identity due to its special relationship with the U.S since the signature of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty in 1979. It has also the largest population in the Middle East. Moreover, the relationship with Egypt is critical for the U.S national interests and international relations, which makes it more difficult for the U.S to build the sort of partnerships that it has built in the past in order to advance certain goals such as counterterrorism and fostering the Arab-Israeli peace. In addition to that, Egypt is one of the largest receivers of U.S aid in the world receiving roughly 20% of the American aid package worldwide with around US\$1.55 billion assistance annually (Sharp, 2013). Despite all the aid provided to Egypt, most Egyptians agree that the financial assistance of the U.S has a negative impact on their country and the majority (81%) express an unfavorable opinion towards the U.S (PEW Research Global Attitudes Project, 2013). This is mainly due to the Egyptians' concern about the intention of the aid being provided, and which is perceived as being political rather than developmental, and aiming to meet political agendas rather than the needs of Egyptian people.

With all the power that the United States possesses in terms of aid provided to Egypt on several levels, be it military or economic, many doubts still exist on the direction of political reform towards democratization following the Arab uprising. This in turn allows us to explore several components which fall under the main question of this thesis on whether there is or is not a policy shift in U.S foreign policies dealing with the government of Egypt since the downfall of Mubarak, a president who maintained his commitment to the Camp David Peace Accords . The questions which aid in this analysis include; how did the changes after the downfall of Mubarak affect Egypt's relationship with the U.S? What are the implications of the U.S support on the Egyptian government? And lastly, what is the role of the U.S towards Egypt since the uprising?

1.1 Direction of the Thesis

This thesis examines the shift of U.S foreign policy formulation process towards the government of Egypt after the first phase of the revolution that toppled President Mubarak in February 2011. The thesis provides a brief historical overview (1973 – 2010) of the relationship between the U.S administration and the Egyptian government, the main changes in U.S foreign policy, and an overview of its military and economic aid to Egypt. The thesis analyzes the evolving relationship and its dynamics between the United States and Egypt through outlining the timeline of key events while highlighting others such as the Camp David agreement, post September 11 attacks, the Arab uprising, the downfall of President Mubarak, the election of President Morsi, and the latest presidency of Sisi, taking into account key official statements, interviews,

press releases, etc. The findings assist in answering the question of whether what we observe today is a drastic shift in U.S foreign policy towards the Egyptian government or a continuum of something that had already started prior to the Arab uprising.

The thesis is divided into three major parts; the first presents the theoretical framework and methodology used (Chapter 2), the second includes the literature review and a historical background (Chapters 3-4) to set the context for the last section of the empirical analysis, discussion, and conclusion (Chapter 5-6).

Chapter 2 discusses the international relations' mostly used theory of realism that relies on the notion that the state is a rational actor. This chapter sets the theoretical framework of Kegley and Wittkopf's "funnel of causality", a causal model describing American Foreign Policy based on Rosenau's classification scheme of the sources of foreign policy.

Chapter 3 briefly reviews the Arab uprisings starting from its onset in Tunisia to reach Egypt. Moreover, a historical background of the major events that happened in Egypt is outlined. This chapter finally explores the particularities of Egypt's uprising which led to the downfall of Mubarak while highlighting the United States' response to it.

Following the description of the Arab uprisings and the march toward the Egyptian uprising, chapter 4 is dedicated to explore U.S Foreign Policy making process from a public policy perspective, especially in terms of its formulation, the actions toward the Middle East in general and toward Egypt in particular. Finally, this chapter highlights the relationship between the United States and Egypt to further explore the

question of this thesis regarding the existence of a policy shift in U.S broad foreign policy dealing with the government of Egypt since the downfall of Mubarak in February 2011.

Chapter 5 is dedicated to the analysis of U.S foreign aid to Egypt since 1946 and U.S foreign policy toward Egypt, particularly its broad foreign policy goals through a content analysis of the most prominent U.S declarations and comes up with the main emerging themes of this research. In order to provide a more systematic analysis, the analysis is divided over three periods that are selected based on the most significant events. The first stage of the analysis begins from post Sep.11 events until the downfall of Mubarak to explore U.S foreign policy in Egypt during this period. The second stage analyzes U.S foreign policy between Mubarak's downfall until Morsi's presidency. The third stage analyzes U.S foreign policy during Sisi's presidency. Moreover, the analysis focuses on key political declarations and positions in both countries; those were inferred from official speeches, statements, announcements, or any other social and communication tools within the mentioned periods.

Finally, chapter 6 discusses the findings describing the changes in U.S foreign policy post the uprising and concludes that the United States needs Egypt as an ally regardless if the regime is an autocracy or a democracy in order to protect its interests in the region. Nevertheless, in all the public announcements of the administration, although there is a persistent message that calls for democracy and human rights, other interests underlie allowing for visible contradictions in U.S foreign policy in addition to a clear "wait and see" attitude based on regional developments. As such, in times when

democracy and other U.S interests contradict, future studies might be needed to explore cases on the United States' response during these times of contradiction.

In chapter one, I have provided an overview of the content of each of the chapters of my thesis, an introduction to the topic, and the main questions addressed. In chapter two, I will introduce the theoretical framework and methodology that will be utilized in an aim to answer our research question on the increase in U.S foreign aid and a change in the United States' broad foreign policy goals toward Egypt post Egypt's uprising.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK & METHODOLOGY

While in chapter one, I have provided an overview of the components, the organization, and the flow of my thesis, the objective of chapter two is to explain the theoretical framework of Kegley and Wittkopf used in answering our research question on the increase in foreign aid and a shift in U.S broader foreign policy objectives post the Egyptian uprising. The chapter more specifically describes the external source and the role source which were selected from the five sources of the framework and provides evidence on why these two sources were selected over others in answering our question. Moreover, it introduces content analysis, be it the methodology used to derive the emerging themes of our research from key speeches, press releases, declarations, and other official U.S announcements.

The Foreign Policy of a particular country or state is a set of goals outlining how the country will interact with other countries economically, politically, socially and military; it is primarily concerned with the boundaries between the external environment outside the state and the internal or domestic environment, with its variety of sub-national sources of influence (Webber & Smith, 2000). Foreign policies are designed to help protect a country's national interests, national security, ideological goals, and economic prosperity. This can occur as a result of peaceful cooperation with other nations, or through conflictual relations (Wanjohi, 2011). Given this definition, it

is quite obvious that creating and implementing foreign policies is not a simple process, but a process which involves several factors often referred to as determinants.

International Relations Scholars have discussed, analyzed and adopted several approaches to foreign policy analysis. The multiple theoretical traditions of foreign policy which exist vary from realism, liberalism, constructivism, to rational choice theories and others. These diverse theories have created a complexity in the study of foreign policy and made it problematic to identify the one best way for studying the field. There are inherent disagreements within the field on the most appropriate manner to analyze its content, but there also exists a relative consensus on what constitutes the subject matter of foreign policy analysis (Carlsnaes, 2004).

While there are many approaches to explain foreign policy, this thesis limits its discussion and analysis to the mindset of realism while relying on a theoretical framework - the “funnel of causality”, a causal model developed by Kegley and Wittkopf to explain American Foreign Policy specifically and is based on Rosenau’s classification scheme about the five sources of foreign policy. This foreign policy approach is concerned with foreign policy decision-making, the individual decision makers, processes, and conditions that affect foreign policy and the outcomes of these decisions. Moreover, the thesis relies on the conceptualization that the state is a rational unitary actor and a basic unit of analysis as a simplification tool to the complex nature of international relations (Waltz, 1979).

2.1 Realism

Realism is the theory mostly used in analyzing foreign policy. It is a school of thought in International Relations which states that the structure of the international system, defined by the distribution of power among states is the primary determinant of a state's foreign policy behavior (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1996). In fact, realism suggests that the most significant driving forces behind foreign policy decisions are materialistic factors such as military and economic power which are used to accomplish as many resources as possible in order to survive. The realist's image of foreign policy sees the State as the main rational actor in foreign policy, seeking to maximize its national interest and objectives (Morgenthau, 1993). Realists therefore, aim to identify causal correlations among different variables and suggest that foreign policy may be understood from a rational actor perspective and therefore a product of rational choice. While relying on realism as the school of thought to further analyze the hypothesis of this thesis, the assumption we use is that, governments and their political leaders, think and act in a rational manner to attain power and order (Rosati, 1995). This assumption goes in line with the realism school of thought as previously discussed. Moreover, such rationality assumes that individuals perceive the world accurately and arrive at decisions through rational choice where they consider a wide range of alternatives to take the decision that maximizes the benefits while minimizing the costs. In the case of this thesis, the rational state is the United States and the rational decision maker is the President of the State. Although the thesis will rely on the rational actor concept, but will hold in mind the limitation to this assumption whereby policy decision-makers are not always rational in

their choices and they do not always possess perfect information because human cognition is bounded and people satisfice rather than optimize (Simon, 1985).

2.2 Kegley and Wittkopf's Funnel of Causality

There is no doubt that understanding a state's foreign policy is problematic and governments, politicians, and non-state actors compete to influence foreign policy formulation. Therefore, analyzing how preferences are developed and later expressed in the international environment, is crucial to analyzing foreign policy and is done through specific tools such as the "funnel of causality" explained hereafter.

The funnel of causality is a theoretical framework about the formulation process of American Foreign Policy where sustaining values and interests of the U.S is determined through five major categories of sources: (i) the external environment, (ii) the societal environment of the nation, (iii) the governmental setting, (iv) the roles of foreign policymakers, and (v) the individual personalities of foreign policy-making elites (Wittkopf et al, 2008).

The "funnel of causality" model and sources previously identified are based on five types of independent variables in foreign policy formulation of a country identified by Rosenau; these are the individual, role, governmental, societal and systemic.

The external source category includes all aspects of the external environment and any actions that take place abroad such as the behaviors of other states which impact the decisions made by the U.S decision makers (Rosenau, 1966). The factors within the

international system include the distribution of power and globalization for instance (Wittkopf, 2008).

The societal source consists of the domestic social and political system of the United States that affects its external behavior too. These include the main values and beliefs of the American people, the degree of domestic unity, and the extent of its industrialization (Rosenau, 1980).

The governmental sources are those features of a nation's governmental system that shape its foreign policy (Saleh, 2009). The role source refers to the impact of the office on the behavior of its resident such as the role of the president, the congress, the National Security Council (NSC), the State Department and others (Rosenau, 1980).

Finally, the individual source includes other aspects of a decision-maker such as values, talents, and previous experiences that shape his or her foreign policy choices (Rosenau, 1980). The "funnel of causality" is presented in Figure 1.




Figure 1.
Kegley and Wittkopf's Sources of American Foreign Policy as a Funnel of Causality
(Source: Kegley & Wittkopf, 1996)

The factors located in these categories are considered inputs into the foreign policy-making of the U.S which shape and direct actions of the United States abroad. As mentioned and for a more accurate and comprehensive analysis, the thesis will rely on this theoretical framework about the formulation process. Although no source category acts independently from the other, the analysis of the research question on whether a shift in U.S broad foreign policy objectives exists, in addition to the existence of an increase in foreign aid post Egypt's uprising utilizes two of the five mentioned sources, the external source and the role source.

These two sources are selected over other sources in the study of this thesis for the high impact they have in validating or invalidating the research question and undergoing the analysis. In fact, while observing the U.S foreign policy toward Egypt, the external source which refers to the external environment is a key aspect to observe. In the case of this analysis, the external source refers to the events of the Arab uprisings particularly the Egyptian uprising which is an external condition that is studied as affecting the formulation process of U.S foreign policy toward Egypt. Moreover, the second source is the role source, more importantly the role that the president of the United States possesses in the policy formulation process. In fact, it was found that the U.S executive authority is more centralized in the president where this authority has rarely been challenged. Although the role of the congress, state department and other entities is very important too and will be utilized during the analysis, yet the president's power in the final say allows for a more focus on the role of the president (Yost, 1972). It is worth mentioning at this stage that the role of the president especially that of the

Obama administration has a remarkably different approach to foreign policy from that of the Bush administration for instance which also emphasizes the importance of the president's role (Easterly, 2006).

In the case of this thesis, the societal source will not be looked at as the general public has built the tendency to agree on presidential decisions post the Sept. 11 attacks to protect their security and support counterterrorism initiatives. Moreover, even if they do not agree with presidential decisions, the public opinion although plays a role in foreign policy, but does not appear to exert substantial, consistent influence on foreign policy makers (Saleh, 2009). The structure of the government which is the governmental source has a more significant role in the internal rather than the external policies and is therefore not focused on in the analysis of this thesis. Finally, the individual role corresponds to the psychological behavior of the individual and is not studied in this thesis as we do not intend to focus on the individual psychological behavior, but rather more on the individual's decisions and policy approach. Accordingly, the thesis and for a more accurate analysis, limits its analysis to two of Kegley & Wittkopf's sources which are the external source and the role source.

It is important to mention though that the source category variables which are the independent variables operate as inputs to the foreign policy process, whereas the actual U.S foreign policy performed abroad is conceived as the output, which is the dependent variable determined by the input. The output variable again influences the input variables, making it a process of continuous influence. This interaction is reflected

in figure 1. and is referred to as a causal relationship and accordingly is in line with the rational actor model.

2.3 Methodology

The method used in this thesis is a content textual analysis of primary and secondary sources; facts are analyzed using an iterative content analysis, where findings serve to illustrate some of the theoretical perspectives in the prevailing relevant literature.

Content analysis is a qualitative social science method and a tool used to determine the presence of certain words, concepts, and/or themes within texts and to compute their presence in a systematic manner (Berelson, 1952). The results allow for making conclusions about the messages computed and analyzed. Accordingly, one is able to deduce the motivating factors behind the decision-making process. Moreover, qualitative case studies provide a wider context to understanding the results of the content analysis and since it directly examines communication from primary texts, key speeches, announcements, press releases and others, it represents the core of social interaction. In my research on the hypothesis of a policy shift in U.S foreign policy post Egypt uprising, the qualitative method helps us identify and analyze different sources which in turn aid in proving or disproving our hypothesis. It also serves as a better tool in understanding the sources of American foreign policy without relying purely on quantitative figures (George & Bennett, 2005).

In fact, after carrying out content analysis, we are able to observe intentions behind particular statements of major actors and decision makers as well as forecast

their intended outcomes. The data is mainly derived from careful and thorough review of national and international commentaries and interviews reported in Egyptian and international newspapers, other media outlets such as TV talk shows, internet blogs, websites, official public statements, presidential addresses, recorded speeches, interviews, government reports and press releases by key high ranking officials within the American administration as well as key reports and publications.

Moreover, the thesis looked into actual foreign policy decisions made through reading the most important foreign and political publications of the White House releases, the National Security Strategies (NSS). As the thesis uses rhetoric analysis, it is quite important to understand that this approach is a way in which fundamental principles and ideas are formulated, expressed and then developed in an argumentative action (Finlayson, 2004). Moreover, this thesis while using the realist and rationalist approach understands actions taken by policy makers and explains instead of just stating these actions to study whether American policies have shifted post the uprising.

Finally, the qualitative policy analysis is conducted for the main current discourses and the underlying future assumptions divided into the following three phases: (1) September 11 attacks up to Mubarak's downfall in February 2011 (2) Morsi's presidency (June 30, 2012 – July 3, 2013) and (3) Sisi's presidency as of June 8, 2014. Dividing the timeline addresses the question on the policy shift of U.S foreign policy in dealing with the government of Egypt following the Arab uprising in a more accurate and organized manner.

In the conclusion, it is decided whether foreign policy has changed or continues to be the same toward Egypt, specifically if any change in the attitude is perceived toward the Egyptian government post the uprising. In chapter two, I have explained Kegley & Wittkopf's "funnel of causality" theoretical framework on the formulation of American foreign policy, especially the role and the external sources selected over others from the five sources of the framework. The role source corresponds to the role that the U.S president plays in formulating American foreign policy and the external source refers to the external environment which is the Egyptian uprising in this case, in affecting U.S foreign policy. These two sources will be later utilized in our analysis. Finally, the chapter explained the method of content analysis while introducing the theory of realism as the approach to be used. In chapter three, I will begin with providing an overview of the Arab uprisings; more specifically a historical outline of the events that took place before and during Egypt's uprising. Since Egypt's uprising is perceived as the turning point that might have stroke a shift in U.S foreign policy toward Egypt in terms of foreign assistance and broader U.S foreign policy objectives, a more detailed overview on the march toward the Egyptian uprising will be presented. The coming chapter also includes U.S interaction with Egypt throughout the aforementioned period and since the signature of the Camp David Accords in 1978.

CHAPTER 3

THE ARAB UPRISINGS AND U.S REACTION

Chapter two described Kegley and Wittkopf's theoretical framework and the methodology used in the analysis of this thesis. The objective of chapter three is to explore the turning point referred to as the Arab uprising particularly Egypt's uprising to further test whether it caused a change in U.S broad foreign policy objectives toward the government of Egypt in addition to an increase in U.S foreign assistance post the uprising.. The chapter is divided into three sections, the first explains the concept and events of the Arab uprising; the second provides a historical background of the major happenings that took place in Egypt prior to the uprising while highlighting the United States' international affairs and interaction with Egypt since the Camp David Accords in 1978. Finally, the third section portrays the march toward the Egyptian uprising and some of the most prominent actors and causes behind it.

3.1 The Arab Uprisings

The Arab uprising is defined as a series of antigovernment pro-democracy protests, uprisings and armed rebellions that spread across the Middle East, which begun in Tunisia in December 2010 to challenge some of the region's deeply rooted authoritarian regimes. Demonstrators expressing political and economic complaints faced violent suppressions by their countries' security forces (Arab Uprising, 2013). Most demonstrations were large, organized, and occurred most commonly on Fridays,

following afternoon prayers. In fact, during this period, leaders have tried to announce their willingness to step down upon the end of their current terms in an attempt to calm down the situation.

Nevertheless, in January and February 2011, protests in Tunisia and Egypt succeeded in a matter of weeks in toppling two regimes that were thought to be of the most stable in the region. The first demonstration started in Tunisia in December 2010, after a 26 year old man named Mohamed Bouazizi set fire to himself in protest of his bad treatment by local officials while selling vegetables in Sidi Bouzid area. The protest movement was named the “Jasmine Revolution” and has quickly spread through the country leading to the step down and exile of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011 after 23 years of power (Arab Uprising, 2013).

Tunisia held its first free election and begun building a new political system to become the prime example of shifting towards democratization in the Arab World. The Arab uprising which started in Tunisia reached Egypt with massive protests in late January 2011; the Egyptian government also tried, but failed to suppress protestors. The success of protestors in Tunisia and Egypt to culminate their regimes encouraged protest movements in other countries of the region mainly Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, and Syria. The effects of the Arab uprising were felt elsewhere throughout the Middle East and North Africa as many of the countries experienced pro-democracy protests. In Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman for instance, rulers offered a variety of reforms and constitutional changes, in order to back off the spread of protest movements in their respective countries (Arab Uprising, 2013).

In Jordan, the protests caused the resignation of the government and the appointment of Aoun Al-Kasawneh by King Abdullah as prime minister to form a new government (Gulf Times, 2011).

Libya and Yemen struggled to re-establish order after civil war conditions and the fall of dictators (Bauer & Schiller, 2012). In the case of Libya, the civil war resulted in the fall of the regime and the Libyan leader Muammar Al-Ghaddafi was killed on October 20, 2011 (Jerusalem Post, 2011). In Yemen, President Abdullah Saleh announced his step down on April 23, 2011 where he later backed up (Abu-Naser, 2011).

On the other hand, there are other Arab countries which have not witnessed major protests such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman as well as the African Country of Sudan (Salih, 2011).

In Syria, a debate exists on whether the current situation still resembles an uprising. Clashes have started between the Assad's regime and the protesters in spring 2011, but these clashes have spread to become armed conflicts between the regime and different armed groups such as the FSA (Free Syrian Army). The situation has become more of a regional conflict with the support of Russia to Syria (Kirkup, 2013) and a debate exists whether the case of Syria still resembles or is part of the uprising.

There is no doubt that these events caused a political change in the whole region, this change is visible through the change of political systems whereby political movements and actors started getting involved not only in toppling dictator governments, but also in re-writing the constitution. Moreover, the rise of the concept of

political Islam and the role of Islamic parties has started to become more important and visible.

Islamic groups are having a major say in shaping the new constitutions and political systems, this is evident in the appearance of Islamic parties in elections in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco. Accordingly, the thesis also examines U.S foreign policy with regard to Islamic parties particularly the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt who succeeded in getting their president on board through fair and transparent elections just after Mubarak stepped down.

3.1 Pre-Egypt's Uprising, a Historical Background

This section provides a historical background of the most prominent events that took place prior to Egypt's uprising. In fact, it is relevant to begin with the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood organization (MB), given that the first freely elect Egyptian president after the downfall of Mubarak belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood. In the late 1920's, the Muslim Brotherhood was founded by Hassan al-Banna, after that, the movement spread and its headquarters was established in Cairo in 1932. It was not long before the movement clashed with the authorities after fringe elements within the movement began carrying out attacks on government officials including judges and ministers and in 1949, Hassan al-Banaa was assassinated. Internal competition and conflict forced the MB to choose a new advisor, Hassan al-Hodeibi who was not a member of the Brotherhood at the time, but a close associate of al-Banna and a well-known judge. Hodeibi had inherited an organization that was externally under extreme

pressure from the newly emerging free officers movement, and internally had been stagnated by conflict. Externally, Hodeibi was faced by Jamal Abdul Nasser who in January 1954 dissolved the movement (Al-Awadi, 2004). Although the Brotherhood have slightly regained power and expanded during the days of al-Sadat, Nasser's successor who used the Muslim Brotherhood in an attempt to counterbalance the presence of Nasserite and leftists, still they did not attain any legal status and continued to be oppressed during the days of Mubarak whom they considered to be corrupt (Laub, 2014).

As part of the regional events taking place at that time, Egypt sent troops to fight in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. In 1953, Egypt was declared a republic and coup leader Muhammad Najib becomes president. In October 1956, the tripartite invasion of Egypt by Britain, France, and Israel takes place due to the nationalization of the Suez Canal. Nasser dies in September 1970 and is replaced by his Vice-President Anwar al-Sadat. Although around that time, the treaty of friendship was signed between Egypt and the Soviet Union in 1971, it soon ended in 1976 by al-Sadat who replaces his Soviet Union friends with the Americans. On another note regarding the national developments within Egypt, the Suez Canal was re-opened in June 1975 after it was closed since the 1967 war.

As a startup to the Egyptian-American affairs, the signature of the Camp David Accords takes place on September 17, 1978. This agreement was signed by the Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, following twelve days of secret negotiations at Camp David. The two framework

agreements were signed at the White House, and were witnessed by the United States President Jimmy Carter. The second of these frameworks led directly to the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty which excluded Egypt from the Arab League back then. In October 1981, Anwar al-Sadat was assassinated by Jihad members during a military parade and a national referendum approved Hosni Mubarak as the Egyptian President. Since then, Mubarak begins his consecutive terms as Egypt's president and starts implementing emergency laws as part of his battle against activists and expands police powers (The Guardian, 2012). Mubarak confirms that Egypt will stick to the 1979 peace treaty with Israel and becomes a major mediator in the Arab-Israeli peace process to remain an obedient U.S ally receiving billions of dollars of American aid annually (Sharp, 2014).

In 1990, activists launched an uprising to set up an Islamic state, and attempted to assassinate Mubarak in 1995 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, upon his arrival to the summit of the Organization of African Unity, but Mubarak succeeds to crush the movement by 1997 instead, and bans religious political parties. He blocks the Muslim Brotherhood from officially participating in Egypt's political life and gets re-elected three times with more than 90% approval at each time.

It was only until May 2005 that a referendum vote backs a constitutional amendment to allow for multiple candidates to stand in presidential elections, but Mubarak was still re-elected in September 2005 for his fifth consecutive term with an easy win over ten other candidates (The Guardian, 2012).

In December 2005, parliamentary polls end with clashes between police and supporters of the opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood. The National Democratic Party has also retained their large parliamentary majority and for the first time, independents, who were supporters of Muslim Brotherhood, win 20% of seats. After these events took place in Egypt, President Mubarak promised of democratic and constitutional reform in an address to parliament in November 2006. However, an upsurge in arrests of the Muslim Brotherhood was also observed where in April 2008, military courts sentence 25 leading Muslim Brotherhood members to jail and arrested more than 800. The regime claims in the year after, that the arrests were based on suspicion in helping Hezbollah send money and aid to Hamas in Gaza. Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood criticized and withdrew their candidates, who ran as independents, from the second round of voting in the 2010 parliamentary elections (Sharp, 2014).

There is no doubt that looking at all these events from the Egyptian side provides a historical overview on pre Egypt's uprising, yet it is worth noting Obama's 2009 speech in Cairo as a component of the American interactions, one of the most important with the Arab World where he calls for a new beginning between the United States and the Muslim world. During his speech, he declares that all people can speak their mind stating: "(...) the ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed; confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice; government that is transparent and doesn't steal from the people; the freedom to live as you choose. These are not just American ideas; they are human rights. And that is why we will support them everywhere" (Anderson, 2011, p.7). In February 2010, we also

recall that former UN nuclear chief Mohammed El-Baradei returns to Egypt and forms together with the opposition figures and activists, a coalition for political change. In the June 2010 Shura elections, the Muslim Brotherhood claims that votes were arranged after they failed to win any of the seats.

Finally, there is no doubt that the U.S-Egypt interaction since the Camp David Accords has been very strategic and stable for U.S interests in the Middle East and for the Egyptian interest in receiving significant economic and military aid from the United States (Cook, 2011). In this section of chapter 3, I have outlined the historical events pre Egypt's uprising and highlighted other major and key events related to the United States' interaction with Egypt. In the coming section of this chapter, I will elaborate on the events which are part of the march toward the Egyptian uprising and I will portray the key actors and causes behind it.

3.3 The March to the Egyptian Uprising

In the previous sections of chapter 3, the Arab uprisings and a historical background prior to Egypt's uprising were outlined while highlighting key international affairs between the United States and Egypt such as the Camp David Accords. This section describes the march toward the Egyptian uprising which has led to the downfall of Mubarak in February 2011 up until Sisi's presidency in June 2014.

Inspired by the Tunisian revolution, protests began in Egypt against 28 years of Mubarak's authoritarian regime. January 25, 2011 marks the Arab uprising in Egypt where thousands of anti-government protesters clash with the police in Cairo after being

moved by the Tunisians, demanding Mubarak's removal. Three days later, the United States reacts on January 28, claiming the reassessment of U.S foreign assistance to Egypt, one of the main components that will be analyzed in this thesis. Mubarak begins his first attempt to try and remain in presidency through a televised speech on the 29th of January. A day after that, Clinton expresses her desire for a new political order in Egypt and we observe that Mubarak names a new cabinet on the 31st of this month.

A protest referred to as the “March of Millions” takes place during Mubarak’s second speech to the nation where he requests peaceful transfer of power and promises constitutional reform. “Tahrir Square”, the liberation area where most protests took place witnessed a battle between supporters of Mubarak and the opposition during the first days of February 2011 after which Mubarak made several negotiation attempts to remain in power (Hosni Mubarak’s rule and downfall timeline, 2012). On the first day of February, Margret Scobey, the U.S Ambassador to Egypt talks to El-Baradei to convey support for orderly transition in Egypt. On February 3, 2011, the Obama administration proposes Mubarak’s immediate resignation and negotiations follow leading to the release of Wael Ghonim who is the founder of the Facebook page titled “We are all Khaled Said” on February 7, 2011. On February 10 of that year, Mubarak speaks his defiant speech and February 11, 2011 marks his resignation after which the military council begins ruling.

Although during the uprising, all sectors of the society joined to oppose the regime such as leftists, Islamists and others, yet they did not share a united vision about the future of Egypt (Grewal, 2015). We now observe the residues of the non-united

vision in Egypt's current situation which we might argue is one of the main reasons which have negatively affected their uprising in addition to many other critiques of what made Egypt's revolution different (Grewal, 2015). The military establishment led by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) takes power after Mubarak's resignation and in June 2012, Mohammed Morsi who belongs to the Muslim brotherhood, one of the most organized groups in Egypt and considered to be moderate Islamic movements back then, gets elected as president with 51.7% of the votes after topping the first round of votes in May 2012 and after the Muslim Brotherhood has achieved a legal status on June 6, 2011 (Jamal, 2012). Public opposition to President Morsi began in November 2012, when he issued a decree granting himself non-feasible powers and pushing for an Islamist draft constitution. More events started to unfold and in December 2012, the Islamist dominated assembly constituent approves a draft constitution that boosts the role of Islam and restricts freedom of speech and assembly. In the time the public has approved it in a referendum, excessive protests took place by secular opposition leaders, Christians and women groups. On December 4, 2012; a march toward the Presidential Palace takes place and protests return to Tahrir Square on January 25, 2013.

Following these events and after millions of protesters went to the streets in June 2013, Morsi was given a 48-hours deadline by the army to meet the demands of the demonstrators, after which he was overthrown by the military on July 3, 2013 (Hellyer, 2011). After that, Adly Mansour becomes the interim head of state as the existing Chief of Justice.

In the time Obama, condemns the situation in Egypt in August 2013, he does not cut the aid. In January 2014, the Egyptians vote in a referendum on a new constitution drafted since the July 2013 overthrow of the Islamist-led government. Egypt's presidential elections takes place in May 2014, free of the participation of the Muslim Brotherhood to choose between Abdel Fattah El-Sisi who is the former defense Minister and Hamdeen Sabahi who is an Egyptian politician and journalist. The elections ended with 94.5% of the votes to Sisi who becomes the Egyptian president in June 2014. The analysis section of this thesis ends with the election of President Sisi on June 8, 2014.

Apart from being moved by the Tunisians, there are other factors which have led to Egypt's uprising and to Mubarak's downfall in February 2011. Among the common causal characteristics that led to the uprisings are the socio-economic problems, poverty, high unemployment rates especially within the younger educated generation, corruption, and inequality. These socio-economic factors are relevant to the Arab uprisings in general as well as the case of Egypt. In the time we have seen different numbers as part of the mobilization and demobilization of protestors during the uprising; we observe that the Egyptian protests in general portray a high degree of discipline. In addition, the media has also played a major role in mobilizing protestors through spreading the word and ensuring coverage of the situation, despite the pressure of the regime on international media such as Al-Jazeera not to broadcast. Furthermore, social media was a key element in supporting the organization of protests (Dalacoura, 2012). Despite the fact that the social media and the reactions of the regime on

protestors have contributed in mobilizing protestors, yet the major underlying cause goes back to the socio-economic status of the Egyptians where the government did not even provide the basic needs to its people. With a high rate of poverty and unemployment, the regime, its controllers, and elites were increasing their fortunes and the people entering into more poverty on the other side. This in turn has increased the protestors' inspiration to keep marching toward the uprising (Anderson, 2011).

There are also other factors worth mentioning which have enhanced the eruption of protests, namely the exhaustion of the regime where Mubarak has ruled for almost three decades and as a result, the people blamed him for being the cause of their suffering. Moreover, he was also looked at as being inefficient (Osman, 2010, p. 186). Among the main characteristics of Mubarak's regime, is also a personalized power concentrated in Mubarak himself as an individual rather than in the regime's political institutions (Niakoe, 2013).

The major historical events within Egypt and the United States in addition to the events of Egypt's uprising that were described in this chapter, are also outlined in a timeline table in Appendix A of this thesis. Finally, it is worth noting that there is a limitation to be acknowledged in outlining such events. The limitation falls in the fact that there exist other important events which are not included in our exploration; because they do not seem to be major to the general public and the media, yet they have had either a direct or an indirect effect on the progress of major events and decisions taken. In fact, there are several secret meetings, negotiations, and unpublicized events that took place which are not revealed to the public while they also still have an effect on

negotiations and foreign policy decisions. This sense of secrecy is also a reason for not including such events in our timeline and might be perceived as a limitation. Despite the mentioned limitations, listing the key events prior to the uprising up until Sisi's presidency in June 2014 is necessary and serves as a tool to provide at least a historical background of fundamental proceedings to further reflect on their implications in terms of foreign policy decisions.

In chapter three, I have described the Arab uprisings as a series of diverse interconnected events (Dalacoura, 2012). Furthermore, the chapter outlined the historical background pre Egypt's uprising while highlighting U.S and Egypt affairs. The chapter ends with the march to the Egyptian uprising that led to the downfall of a dictator, but a partial overthrow of authoritarian regimes (Dalacoura, 2012) up until Sisi's presidency on June 8, 2014. This event is important in answering our research question as it is the turning point which we contend have led to an increase in U.S foreign assistance to Egypt as well as a change in U.S broad foreign policy objectives in dealing with the government of Egypt. In Chapter five, I provide an overview of U.S foreign policy as a public policy topic. I also reflect on the United States' foreign policy making process in both the Middle East and Egypt in order to set the context for the aid and content analysis post Egypt's uprising.

CHAPTER 4

U.S FOREIGN POLICY AS A PUBLIC POLICY

In chapter three, an overview of the Arab uprisings was provided in addition to a historical background of the most prominent events that took place in Egypt up until the march toward the uprising while highlighting key U.S-Egypt interactions. The objective of chapter four is to set the context for exploring the United States' response to the Egyptian uprising and further examine the question of this thesis on the existence of a shift in U.S foreign policy since the downfall of Mubarak in February 2011 until Sisi's presidency in June 2014 as well as examining whether there is an increase in foreign aid post Egypt's uprising. Accordingly, chapter four review the literature to understand briefly who the main actors in formulating U.S foreign policy are and examine linkages of American foreign policy with the country's public policy. It is followed with a brief historical overview of U.S foreign policy in the Middle East in general and toward Egypt in particular since the 1973 October War¹. In addition to that, it describes the importance of Egypt as a strategic partner which results in this sort of unique relationship between the two countries and the importance of U.S foreign policy decisions in defining this relationship.

¹ On October 6, 1973, hoping to win back territory lost to Israel during the third Arab-Israeli war, in 1967, Egyptian and Syrian forces launched a coordinated attack against Israel on Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar. Taking the Israeli Defense Forces by surprise, Egyptian troops swept deep into the Sinai Peninsula, while Syria struggled to throw occupying Israeli troops out of the Golan Heights. Israel counterattacked and recaptured the Golan Heights. A cease-fire went into effect on October 25, 1973.

4.1 Foreign Policy Making in the U.S

It is apparent that the United States' president plays the most important role within the administration, having the final say to enter into war for instance. However, presidents have to contend with an active Congress, oversee a complex executive bureaucracy, and respond to pressures and ideas generated by the press, think tanks, and public opinion (Hamilton & Dussen, 1978). Another reason for why this thesis focuses on the role source, particularly the role of the president in analyzing foreign policy decisions and studying whether a shift in foreign policy exists.

The Congress, although not very popular among Americans where only 11% approve of it, still plays a key role in the formulation of some aspects of foreign policy. Evidence exists on how the congress for example opposes any president who deviates from the pro-Israeli line, whether Bush 1 or Obama (Walt & Mearsheimer, 2007).

The U.S governmental structure also has an influence on the formation and implementation of U.S foreign policy. Power diffusion and high decentralization implies that no single actor can command the country's policies. Under the constitution, power is shared between the presidency and a bicameral Congress. The Pentagon, departments of State and Defense, the National Security Council (NSC), and the intelligence agencies are other prominent features of the American policy-making process. This implies that the U.S governmental structure allows for a wide range of political actors in the making process of foreign policy (Cameron, 2003). All these actors play a crucial role in the formulation of American foreign policies related to the Middle East and Egypt and are further explored hereafter.

Despite the importance of all the mentioned actors in U.S foreign policy formulation, the thesis limits its discussion to the role source, one of the sources extracted from the “funnel of causality” theoretical framework and focuses on the role of the President with the assumption that he is a rational actor. Additionally, the analysis focuses on the external source which in this case are the external environmental and circumstances such as the Arab uprising, more specifically the Egyptian uprising. These factors play a major role in the formulation of American foreign policy where they are the inputs and can be referred to as determinants and sources to give the output which is American foreign policy. As previously mentioned, the thesis picks two prominent sources from the “funnel of causality” in order to provide a more accurate analysis in answering the question of this thesis on U.S broad foreign policy goals’ change in addition to an increase in foreign aid post the uprising.

In an attempt to link U.S foreign policy to the actual public policy making of the country and in the time we have outlined the major contributors to the making of American foreign policy, it is worth noting that these institutions and policy makers are as active on the domestic level as on the international level, namely the president, the congress, the bureaucracy and others. In their capacity and the role they play, these actors use similar methods and techniques in formulating both the foreign policy of the country as well as the domestic public policy. This observation is notable in the role that the U.S president plays. In fact, the president picks among a wide range of alternatives when making decisions whether they are related to the international affairs of the United States or whether they are part of the national affairs. His role is highlighted in Kegley

& Wittkopf's International Relations' theoretical framework and is similarly outlined by Kingdon in his "Multiple Streams" theory of Public Policy. Kingdon speaks of the power that the President possesses in affecting the setting of the agenda for instance (Larkin, 2012). Additionally, he reflects on the president's powerful ability in shaping and shifting public opinion where this active power is implemented on both public and foreign policies (Damania, 2011). With respect to the second source, the external environment, chosen from Kegley & Wittkopf's theoretical framework for the analysis of this thesis and which falls under Rosenau's external events, there is a link with public policy formulation in the way these external changes may affect policy actors. In fact, external events have an effect on the members and players within the system that is within the U.S administration who also contribute to the making of public policy.

Finally, we may conclude that foreign policy is in many cases an extension to national politics and when domestic issues are more important they outweigh foreign issues. It is apparent that some of the actors involved in foreign policy making are themselves main actors in the public policy making of the country which provides a linkage between foreign policy and public policy within the U.S (Ingram & Fiederlein, 1988).

4.2 U.S Foreign Policy in the Middle East

The United States did not seem to interfere in the Middle East region prior to World War II, where Britain and France were in charge of ruling the region on behalf of the Western world. However, after the end of the second World War and due to the Cold

war between the years 1945 and 1947, the United States' interest in the Middle East region increased, where it noticed the importance of the region's oilfields, military bases, and lines of communication to its own national security interests as well as the vitality of maintaining stability and friendship with the region that at some point was perceived as a troublesome part of the world for U.S interests (Hahn, 2006).

While reviewing the literature on the main interests of the United States in the region, the following broad policy goals are captured. Policies include discouraging interstate conflict that can threaten allies like Israel, preserving the flow of energy resources and commerce that is vital to the U.S. economies, moreover; ensuring transit access to facilities for military operations, fostering countering terrorism, restricting the proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons, and finally promoting economic growth, democracy, and human rights (Blanchard, 2012).

Although the U.S has focused on diplomacy initiatives to preserve its interest, yet several incidents have occurred and ignited the relationship with the Middle East namely the al-Qaeda terrorist attack on the United States in September 11, 2001 which in turn triggered the U.S to undergo military action in Afghanistan. Another prominent event that took place in the Middle East is the invasion of Iraq in 2003 which was launched by President George W. Bush after which an international and national debate aroused to criticize and question the presence of sufficient causes for the invasion. There remains to be voices on questions about the clashes with the Muslim world, where some voices on both sides asserted that such a conflict was inevitable (Hahn, 2006).

All these events have shaped U.S foreign policies in the region to create more allies on one side and isolate others considered as enemies or friends of enemies on the other side. Although, when examining the foreign policy of the U.S prior to the uprising, there seems to be one line of action with no major changes, nevertheless, the Arab uprising which started in early 2011 is likely to have reflective consequences on U.S. policy goals in the region (Blanchard, 2012).

There is no doubt that the U.S. maintains a good relationship with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) which includes Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman. This relationship is crucial for U.S key interests in the region, particularly in securing the flow of oil worldwide. Moreover, these states support its military access to facilities which in turn support its operations in the region. As an example, the United Arab Emirates buys one of the most sophisticated missile defense systems from the U.S, the THAAD (Theater High Altitude Air Defense system). Moreover, Bahrain and Kuwait are designated as Major Non-NATO allies (MNNA). There still exist around 40,000 U.S. militaries in the Gulf region, including 23,000 in Kuwait, 7,500 in Qatar, 5,000 in Bahrain, and about 3,000 in the UAE, along with much smaller numbers in Saudi Arabia and Oman, even after the U.S. withdrew from Iraq.

Bahrain on the other hand, hosts the headquarters for all U.S. naval forces in the Gulf while the current unrest in Syria affects a number of U.S. national interests such as preserving regional peace and limiting the spread of weapons of mass destruction as well as a delay in the hope for a new government in Damascus which

could cooperate less with Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, a direct interest for the United States' ally Israel. This is due to the fact that many congressmen strongly support U.S. commitments to Israel's security, including the provision of large amounts of military assistance to Israel and their major concern on Iran's nuclear weapons (Blanchard, Arieff, Danon, Katzman, Sharp, & Zanotti, 2012).

4.3 U.S Foreign Policy toward Egypt (1973 - 2010)

To move from the broader view on the United States foreign policy and its relationship with the Middle East, this section narrows down to provide a historical overview on U.S foreign policy toward Egypt. Furthermore, the section elaborates on why Egypt is strategic for U.S interest and is therefore selected as the case study of this paper to examine U.S foreign policy shift post the uprising, be it one of the countries in the instigation of the uprising.

After the 1973 October War between Egypt and Israel, President Anwar Sadat (1970-1981) believed that he could not bear a continuous conflict with Israel. Although this was a bad news for the Soviet Union, with whom Egypt had allied during President Nasser's era and the first few years of Sadat's term, but definitely a better one for the U.S. In an aim to secure an acceptable peace with Israel, Sadat turned to U.S Secretary of State Henry Kissinger for diplomatic negotiations leading to an improved Egyptian-American relation. The United States began to explore Egypt for economic opportunities as the Suez Canal was reopened and Egypt started an open-door economic policy, whose main goal was to attract foreign investment (Tauber, 2013).

In September 1978, the Camp David accords took place which is an agreement signed between Israel and Egypt that led to the Israel-Egypt peace treaty the following year. The peace treaty is the first of its kind between Israel and any of the Arab countries. It is prominent to mention that U.S President Jimmy Carter underwent the negotiations between Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat at the U.S. presidential retreat at Camp David, Maryland (Camp David Accord, 2014).

Another role that Egypt played in advancing U.S policy interests was through President Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011) during the Gulf War. At that time, Mubarak called for an Arab summit and announced that Egypt is willing to participate in a joint Arab force that would help remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

In 2001, President George W. Bush promoted a new Middle East agenda that no longer emphasized Egyptian-Israeli relations but Iraq, Iran, and Syria instead and highlighted the importance of freedom and democracy, especially after the 9/11 attacks. The U.S still valued Egyptian stability, but its interests shifted to military, counterterrorism, and diplomatic cooperation within the country. After that, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice started pushing for the concepts of democracy and human rights and President Bush criticized Egypt for violations of human and political rights and was always calling for free elections throughout his administration (January 2001- January 2009).

However, in 2009, Obama's administration shifted the focus of foreign policy away from democracy promotion entirely, and instead was determined to enhance

mutual relations with Egypt. Obama has also cut monetary assistance to civil society organizations from \$50 million to \$20 million to enhance the United States' diplomatic relationship with Cairo in 2010. This was a method that inhibited the ability of Egyptian NGOs and CSOs to operate effectively, because they were subject to more control by the regime as well as less funding received.

Early in 2010, the Obama administration has also criticized the Egyptian government and mentioned the need for a free political process. Nonetheless, Mubarak turned down the U.S and did not allow international and domestic monitors in the parliamentary elections, which have also resulted in corrupt elections.

During the beginning of the Arab uprising, the Obama administration sent mixed messages where it initially supported Mubarak's regime, but later on showed support to the protestors. In fact, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton claimed that Egypt was stable and looked for ways to respond to the people's demands shortly after protests started in Tahrir Square. A week later, President Obama called for a meaningful reform and a governmental transition (Tauber, 2013).

4.4 Egypt: A Strategic U.S Partner

There is no doubt that the government of Egypt is a strategic partner for the U.S, particularly since the signature of the 1979 Israeli-Egypt peace treaty (Blanchard, 2012). Other reasons exist such as Egypt's geography, demography, and diplomatic posture which also give the country a unique identity for U.S. national security interests (Sharp, 2012).

Geo-strategically, Egypt controls the Suez Canal, one of the world's key waterways where 8% of all global maritime shipping passes annually. The access to Suez Canal is crucial for the United States power in the Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf and in protecting the global oil and other shipments (Blanchard, 2012). Moreover, Egypt is capable of speeding up the passage of dozens of U.S. Naval vessels through the Canal, this also provides a strategic benefit to U.S. forces deploying to the Mediterranean Sea or Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean during critical operations (Sharp, 2012).

The Egyptians are also believed to be U.S partners in fighting terrorism during the days of Mubarak who contended what are so called the extremist groups, in that time the Muslim Brotherhood which have later regained power and probably witnessed a shift of U.S policy towards them and other extremist groups who re-emerged during the Egyptian uprising. This point will be explored in our analysis of U.S reaction to leading groups during the uprising, one of which are the Muslim brotherhood.

Demographically, Egypt is the largest Arab country with its population of around 83 million.

There is no doubt though, that some of the policymakers in the U.S may begin to see Egypt as less strategically important than in previous eras, where the last significant U.S.-Egyptian joint military operation was in 1991. Another reason for that is the absence of a resolution of the Arab- Israeli conflict in order to consider the country of Egypt as diplomatically noticeable as in previous years in this regard.

Although the Israeli-Egyptian relations were perceived as strong during the days of Mubarak, the relationship with the new governments is later analyzed. Additionally, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks allowed U.S policy makers to begin making possible links between authoritarian systems and terrorism, where Egypt's system is obviously viewed as authoritarian prior to 2011. Accordingly, there is a continuous call from the U.S for political reform in Egypt, be it an authoritarian system which may foster global Islamist engagement in terrorist acts according to the United States (Sharp, 2015).

The U.S actively placed Egypt on the top of its agenda after the 2011 Arab uprising, and after a two and a half year period of U.S. efforts to promote a democratic transition in Egypt, the return of authoritarian rule that began when the military took over in July 2013 as well as all the other presidential actions that followed have left the U.S. policymakers in a dilemma.

Finally, there was a continuous expression for the President and his administration that authoritarian governance and the denial of basic human and political rights creates an atmosphere which leads to the growth of violent extremists.

In chapter four, I have explained the making of the American foreign policy and concluded on the important role that the U.S president plays in formulating U.S foreign policy. Moreover, the chapter provided linkages of the role source and the external source selected from Kegley & Wittkopf's theoretical framework of International Relations with Kingdon's "Multiple Streams" theory of Public Policy to reflect on the making of American foreign policy from a Public Policy perspective.

Finally, the chapter provided an overview of the United States' foreign policy toward the Middle East in general and toward Egypt in particular since the year 1973. It has also outlined the importance of Egypt as a strategic U.S partner, a main reason of why it was selected as the case study of our thesis. In chapter five, an analysis will be undertaken on two levels in an aim to answer our research question. The first level is an analysis of the aid to Egypt since the year 1947 to look whether it has increased post Egypt's uprising. The second level of analysis is a content analysis of the main announcements, interviews, speeches, and other U.S positions to compute emerging themes under the role source and the external source to finally answer whether U.S broad foreign policy objectives toward Egypt have changed as a result of the uprising.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS

5.1 U.S Aid to Egypt

Chapter four described the making of American foreign policy, the link between American foreign policy and public policy, and the United States foreign policy toward the Middle East and Egypt where the latter represents a strategic U.S partner. . The intention of chapter five is to analyze the economic and military aid to Egypt and later the key speeches, statements, and official positions in an aim to test the existence of a U.S foreign policy shift post Egypt’s uprising. Hereafter, we begin with a deep analysis of all what needs to be known about the aid to Egypt between the years 1946 and 2015.




Figure 2. U.S Assistance to Egypt

Source: Appropriations data from CRS, denominated in current year US \$. Obligations data from US Overseas Loans and Grants, aka the Greenbook, denominated in 2011 constant US \$. Government obligations are defined as a “binding agreement that will result in outlays, immediately or in the future. Budget resources must be available before obligations can be legally incurred.”

There is no doubt that the U.S aid have had a positive impact on the country on several levels, be it economic, an increase in per capita income and exports, a decrease in infant mortality, better education levels, and so forth since the year 1975 (USAID, 2015). Accordingly, this section discusses and analyses the figures of both military and economic aid since the year 1948 in an attempt to study whether the U.S foreign policy towards Egypt has shifted, particularly in terms of aid being provided post the uprising as a tool to study if the hypothesis of this thesis holds true especially that foreign assistance is always intensely political and policy makers see the aid to Egypt as an investment towards a more stable region to sustain the peace treaty and build a good relationship with the Egyptian military.

The United States provided Egypt with \$76 billion between the years 1948 and 2015 in bilateral foreign aid which include \$1.3 billion a year in military aid from 1987 till March 2015. In fact, the numbers have not changed much since the signature of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty in 1979 (Sharp, 2015). Although there is no written commitment or any memorandum of understanding which forces the U.S to provide aid to Egypt, but these have been the figures based on allocations specified by Congress just like any other allocations specified to other countries with the most recent of \$1.3 billion of military aid to Egypt in 2014 (Sharp, 2015). The three main sources of aid to Egypt are the FMF (Foreign Military Financing), ESF (Economic Support Funds), and IMET (International Military Education Training) (Sharp, 2014).

In fact, with the United States' significant military and economic assistance since late 1970s, Egypt was identified as the second largest recipient, after Israel, of US

bilateral foreign assistance (Tarnoff & Nowels, 2005). Between the years 1974 and 2000, we see \$24 billion in economic aid and \$28 billion in purchased advanced arms (Quandt, 1990, Gerges, 1995, Meital, 1998, Satloff & Clawson, 1998). During the 1980s and 1990s, more of the aid was in the form of economic loans and grants for various projects related to infrastructure, education, and others and this commitment continued to decrease since the late 1990s for both Egypt and Israel after the “Glide Path Agreement”². In 1998, economic aid decreased over a 10 year period from \$815 million to \$411 million in 2008 (Sharp, 2011).

What about the 9/11 attacks and their implication on the aid to Egypt which has already encountered a decrease since the year 1990. In fact, we do not see that the amount of foreign assistance to Egypt was affected only until 2009 with a \$200 million dollars reduction in economic aid due to tensions between the U.S administration and Egypt while the former was pushing for free elections in 2005 as part of promoting human rights in addition to other occasional tensions on differences over the war on terror, the definition of terrorism, and ways of combatting it. Moreover, the government of Mubarak refused to accept any contributions for promoting democracy as well as any aid given to its civil society. Accordingly and despite the fact that we see a good relationship between the U.S administration and the Egyptian government particularly during the Bush Administration, yet this does not seem to be the case post the

² In 1990, the US agreed to gradually reduce economic aid to Israel while promising to increase military aid. As Israeli's economic aid decreased, Egypt's did too, according to the CRS Report.

September 11, 2001 events and particularly during the U.S initiative vis a vis the war on terrorism.

The effects of the attacks were however visible on the policy level whereby the Bush Administration has redirected its policy in the Middle East and launched a whole new campaign titled the war on terrorism. During that time, the ultimate goal of the U.S was to promote democracy, specifically in the Arab and Muslim world. Accordingly, we see Bush's decision of invading Iraq in 2003 under the umbrella of preventing human rights abuse and this in turn is a good example of the power that the President possesses in taking decisions to enter war or not.

The Obama Administration takes office in 2009 after which the economic aid to Egypt increases by \$50 million during FY2010. Visible reprogramming of funds towards political transition took place after Mubarak's resignation in 2011; around \$65 million of the \$165 million allocated were re-directed towards political transition. Obama delivers a speech on May 19, 2011 at the State Department in which he requests \$1.55 billion for Egypt (\$1.3 billion in military aid and \$250 million in economic aid) and the U.S's contribution remains as is for the year 2012. Despite the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood have taken over through Morsi being Egypt's President, yet Secretary of State Kerry has handed \$250 million to Morsi for economic reform, but did not approve that Morsi applies for a \$4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund. There was a hold in military assistance after the overthrow of Morsi in July 2013, but later returned (Heydemann, 2014).

The below figure illustrates that the economic aid to Egypt since the year 2009 is only at around 16% of the total foreign assistance where this is a reversal of up until 1987, whereby most of the aid was directed toward economic development back then (Sowa, 2013).




Figure 3. Annual Appropriations, U.S Assistance to Egypt FY2001-2014
 Source: Annual Congressional appropriations by account, as reported in Congressional Research Service report “Egypt: Background and US Relations,” June 27, 2013. FY2014 figures represent requested appropriations

The next figure shows the sectors under which the economic aid is divided.




Figure 4. U.S Economic Assistance to Egypt: Appropriations by Sector
 Source: US Foreign Assistance Dashboard, Accessed July 2013. Figures represent ‘Planned Spending’ for Egypt for all sectors (excluding ‘Peace and Security’ which represents FMF funding) and all reporting agencies.

Finally, although no major changes in figures in terms of foreign assistance are observed throughout the years, yet the uprising has resulted in the finding of the Office of the Special Coordinator for Middle East Transitions (MET) in September 2011 by the State Department in order to coordinate the provision of foreign assistance to the uprising countries such as Egypt and others in support of political transformation (U.S. Department of State, 2011). Moreover, the MET expanded to include the new component named MEPI (Middle East Partnership Initiative) in late 2013 to include all Arab states.

In conclusion, we see that the amount and direction of aid varies according to the president as well as the political circumstances, where the major cut in aid to

promote democracy was observed in addition to a notable decline in U.S interest in the Arab uprising since 2014 (Dettmer, 2014). Moreover and despite the fact that the uprising is perceived as a major event, yet there was no remarkable change in the design and implementation of aid programs post the uprising (Sharp, 2012). We can therefore conclude that the aid provided to Egypt since the signature of the peace treaty has an average of \$1.5 billion per year, not majorly affected by any events, but rather in the direction to which it is programmed which implies that the U.S foreign assistance to Egypt was consistent throughout all the presidents of Egypt regardless of the type of ruling regime. In fact, we are also able to observe that the aid to the whole MENA region has not majorly changed post the uprising.

5.2 Content Policy Analysis

Drawing on the aforementioned narrative, this section meticulously analyzes the status of the American foreign policy toward Egypt prior to the Egyptian revolution, in the midst of it, and subsequent to Mubarak's removal from office. The executed analysis is attempted to unveil the contradictions which lie, covertly and overtly, at the core of the United States' foreign policy and are manifested by this policy's support to the revolutionary movement that called for democracy and regime change, and its simultaneous backing to repressive regimes. As previously mentioned, we use from the literature official public statements, presidential addresses, recorded speeches, interviews, government reports and press releases by key high ranking officials within the American administration, primarily including the White House and the U.S

department of state. Moreover, our analysis is based on two sources; the role source and the external source, selected from Kegley and Wittkopf's funnel of causality while having the mindset of realism.

According to Collins and Rothe (2014), geopolitical intervention of Western states in the internal affairs of other countries undergoing a shift in their political system is rather tied to the West's own geopolitical and economic self-interests than to the flaunted dogmas of democracy and human rights. In the following, we will present a brief on the American-Egyptian history in order to detect if and how the American foreign policy shifted through three different time intervals: from 9/11 until Mubarak's downfall, from Morsi's stepping in office until his step out, and following Sisi's election.

If one looks at the American foreign policy towards the Middle East in general and the Arab uprising in Egypt in particular, one might mistakenly conclude a surge to support political democracy, human rights, freedom of speech and termination of repression, dictatorships, corruption and all forms of abuse. Ignored however, is the American support for all Egyptian authorities that made it into office, regardless of their nature and executive practices of dictatorship, and taking into account their diverse practices of oppression, torture, and dissents suppression.

One evident example of the contradictory American policy is the support provided by the U.S to a 30-year repressive rule by Egyptian former President Hosni Mubarak (Schwedler et al, 2011). Depicting this relationship is a classified U.S Embassy cable in 2009 made public by WikiLeaks. It includes the following:

"President Mubarak and military leaders view our military assistance program as the cornerstone of our mil-mil relationship and consider the USD 1.3 billion in annual FMF as "untouchable compensation" for making and maintaining peace with Israel. The tangible benefits to our mil-mil relationship are clear: Egypt remains at peace with Israel, and the U.S military enjoys priority access to the Suez Canal and Egyptian airspace." (Reif, 2011, para. 5)

In this, we see that the United States is acting in a "rational" manner, utilizing its monetary power to sustain its own interests with Egypt. Moreover, Egypt's response is perceived as the external environment source in shaping American foreign policy in the region.

Nevertheless, peace with Israel, exploitation of the Suez Canal, strategic military access, and access to oil and local economic market are not the only conditions that made Cairo a geopolitical interest to Washington. According to Amar (2011), Egypt engages in an abiding affiliation with U.S Central Intelligence Agency CIA. After 9/11, the Bush administration created the Kill and Capture policy as part of its War on Terror (Collins, 2009). This policy's main features is the CIA black sites – detention facilities held by the CIA and distributed all over the world in countries like Poland, Libya, Syria, and obviously, Egypt (Collins, 2009). As not part of the U.S sovereign territory – U.S laws are not hence enforceable; U.S administration could use these sights to inflict harsh interrogation and detention techniques without congressional oversight and judiciary access. In other words, these sites were the place where torture was 'legalized'

in a yet highly classified manner. To account for these practices, U.S former CIA operative Robert Baer says: "if you want a serious interrogation, you send a prisoner to Jordan. If you want them tortured, you send them to Syria. If you want someone to disappear – never to see them again – you send them to Egypt". (American Civil Liberties Union, 2005, para. 2)

Obviously, a corrupted, autocratic regime would better assist in the achievement of any of the aforementioned interests. According to Human Rights Watch (2005, p.3), "Western governments believed their interests in the region would be better served by authoritarian ruler's illusionary promises of 'stability' than by the uncertainties of elected government." Again, we are able to observe how the U.S acts in a manner to widen its interest.

As a result, to account for the contradictory American foreign policy in Egypt, we consequentially attempt to analyze the stances and policy reactions of both former President Georges W. Bush and President Barack Obama since we are focusing on the role source from the funnel of causality, particularly the role of the president. In November 2003, Bush said in a presidential address:

"Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe – because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a

place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready to export (Bush, 2003, para. 39."

When relating to Egypt, during her journey to Cairo in January 2007, Condoleezza Rice praised Mubarak "for spending so much time with her to talk about the issues of common interest in the Middle East. Obviously the relationship with Egypt is an important strategic relationship – one that we value greatly."

Where the Egyptian revolution got the American foreign policy towards Egypt is the focus of this thesis. According to a release from the White House (2011), following the first events in Tunisia but before any protest took place in Egypt; President Obama expressed his concerns to Mubarak in a phone call in which he "called for calm and an end to violence." As protests started spreading reaching Egypt, the stance of the White House seemed ambiguous at first. In fact, President Obama voiced his support for democracy, freedom of expression, and human rights, yet did not outwardly call for Mubarak to step down from his position. All presidential stances towards Egyptian events and the violations of human rights committed by Mubarak were neutral and limited to urging the Egyptian President to listen to the people.

This is articulated in the following release from the White House Press Secretary on the first day of protests, January 25, 2011:

"As we monitor the situation in Egypt, we urge all parties to refrain from using violence, and expect the Egyptian authorities to respond to any protest peacefully. We support the universal rights of the Egyptian people including the

rights of freedom of expression, association and assembly. The Egyptian government has an important opportunity to be responsive to the aspirations of the Egyptian people, and pursue political, economic, and social reforms that can improve their lives and help Egypt prosper." (Collins & Rothe, 2014, p.11)

Nevertheless, it was until the Egyptian regime intensified the use of power in the street that the American administration hardened its language against Mubarak, calling for a serious restraint of the use of power against protestors. This messaging got across in several releases by American administration including this presidential speech on February 1st 2011:

"We have spoken on behalf of the need of change. After his speech tonight, I spoke directly to President Mubarak. He recognizes that the status quo is not sustainable and that the change must take place. Indeed, all of us who are privileged to serve in positions of political power do so at the will of our people. Through thousands of years, Egypt has known many moments of transformation. The voices of the Egyptian people tell us that this is one of those moments; this is one of those times." (Obama, 2011, para.1)

Obama stressed on his support for the Egyptian opposition and the call for freedom and democracy on February 11, the day Mubarak stepped down. He said that "By stepping down, President Mubarak responded to the Egyptian people's hunger for change. (...) For Egyptians have made it clear that nothing less than genuine democracy will carry the day." He also spoke on the United States' readiness to support Egypt and

to further promote its alliance with the U.S; "The United States will continue to be a friend and partner to Egypt. We stand ready to provide whatever assistance is necessary -- and asked for -- to pursue a credible transition to a democracy." (Obama, 2011, para.4)

This stance was also endorsed by Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, when she told the Egyptians on March 15 2011 that "this moment of history belongs to [them]," and they should use it to build on the success of the revolution that overthrew the country's dictatorial regime and to hold on to democratic restructurings. Clinton added:

"This courage and solidarity will serve the people of Egypt well, because the road to democracy, as the United States knows, being the oldest democracy in the world, although nothing like the oldest civilization in the world. We know how hard this path is. And we congratulate you on embarking on what will be a very important next chapter in the storied history of Egypt. (...)We are looking for ways to support the opposition with whom I met last night. But we believe that this has to be an international effort and there has to be decisions made in the Security Council in order for any of these steps to go forward." (Clinton, personal communication, March 15, 2011)

This American support for the Egyptian uprising continued following the election of Mohammad Morsi on the 24th of June 2012 as the first democratic President in the history of Egypt. According to Monshipouri and Assareh (2011), "The United States more often than not supported authoritarian regimes out of the fear that by

supporting democracy anti-American Islamist regimes might come to power." Similarly, although the U.S administration was reluctant at first to fully support Morsi's rule as it might end up being anti-western and anti-Israeli (Collins and Rothe, 2014), supportive language persisted. A statement by the American Press Secretary stated the following:

"We look forward to working together President-elect Morsi, and the government he forms on the basis of mutual respect, to advance the many shared interests between Egypt and the United States. (...) The United States intends to work with all parties within Egypt to sustain our long-standing partnership as it consolidates its democracy. (...) We believe it is essential for the Egyptian government to continue to fulfill Egypt's role as a pillar of regional peace, security and stability. And we will stand with the Egyptian people as they pursue their aspirations for democracy, dignity, and opportunity, and fulfill the promise of their revolution." (The White House, 2012, para.4)

Even when demonstrations were still ongoing, seemingly inclining towards more violence, the same American discourse was taking place. According to a read out of the Obama's call with President Morsi of Egypt, "President Obama encouraged President Morsi to take steps to show that he is responsive to their concerns, and underscored that the current crisis can only be resolved through a political process." He also "underscored his deep concern about violence during the demonstrations, especially sexual assaults against female citizens. He reiterated his belief that all Egyptians protesting should express themselves peacefully, and urged President Morsi to make

clear to his supporters that all forms of violence are unacceptable." (Obama, 2013, para. 2)

While events continued to unfold, the American stance did not vary. Contradiction could still be pointed at between the American promotion for peace and human rights and the U.S continuous support to the regime in charge of the violation of these values. In fact, following the removal of Morsi from office by Egyptian military early June 2013, President Obama spoke in a presidential statement the following:

"The United States is monitoring the very fluid situation in Egypt, and we believe that ultimately the future of Egypt can only be determined by the Egyptian people. Nevertheless, we are deeply concerned by the decision of the Egyptian Armed Forces to remove President Morsi and suspend the Egyptian constitution. I now call on the Egyptian military to move quickly and responsibly to return full authority back to a democratically elected civilian government as soon as possible through an inclusive and transparent process, and to avoid any arbitrary arrests of President Morsi and his supporters." (Obama, 2013, para. 2)

On the other hand, and as the situation continued to prove tumultuous and unpredictable, it was obvious that the U.S administration has become more supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood. In this regard, the aid to Egypt during that year was still at 1.5 billion dollars. The U.S has later sat on the fence, not making any new move politically or financially since the overthrow of President Muhammad Morsi and the

military took over. Since Egypt is the United States' second largest recipient of foreign military aid, it is natural that the U.S would be wary to make a quick decision on what group to support in all of the turmoil. In fact, Obama's speech to the United Nations on September 24, 2013 presented the U.S position on the situation in Egypt back then (Obama 2013). He affirmed that despite the fact that President Morsi was elected through democratic channels, he did not behave in a way his electorate found to be satisfactory, something the United States did not approve of.

President Obama also mentioned that although the U.S will continue to deliver socioeconomic aid to Egypt, so as not to punish civilians, it has deliberately not been delivering certain military capabilities to the new military regime. Most importantly, the president stated that his administration has not chosen a side in the conflict. Additionally, President Obama stated that although the military had done what many Egyptians wanted, that is, to remove the Muslim Brotherhood from power; but had done so in a way that did not follow the principles of Western democracy (Obama, 2013). Again, this position with respect to the United States' position of the Muslim Brotherhood President, Morsi, was contradictory to what President Obama called for in July 2013 whereby asking the military to reinstate President Morsi to power as the democratically chosen leader of Egypt, despite the problems he caused in representing the constituents who elected him.

Furthermore, a look at the American stance following the election of Abdelfattah al-Sisi on June 8 2014 is reminiscent of that following the election of his

former ancestor Morsi. On June 4th 2014, the White House Press Secretary released the following:

"The United States looks forward to working with Abdelfattah al-Sisi, the winner of Egypt's presidential election, to advance our strategic partnership and the many interests shared by the United States and Egypt. (...) Egypt and its people have made clear their demands for dignity, justice, and political and economic opportunity. The United States fully supports the democratic aspirations of the Egyptian people and we will stand with them as they pursue the future that they deserve." (The White House, 2014, para. 1)

In a nutshell, the American administration seems to be consistently supportive of the Egyptian successive regimes, sequentially affirming their legitimacy regardless of the violations they are committing. In other words, publicizing democracy, human rights, freedom of expression and assembly, and democratic political reform was symbolic. In this respect, Robert Kagan wrote in an article featured in the Washington Post the following:

"(...) the Obama administration bears much blame. It put little or no meaningful pressure on Mubarak to make even minor political reforms that might have been enough to prevent the anti-regime outburst that exploded at the end of 2010. Then it put little or no tangible pressure on Morsi to end his undemocratic practices, which might have forestalled the most recent crisis. Americans provide \$1.5 billion a year in assistance to Egypt, \$1.3 billion of which goes to

the Egyptian military. It has leverage over the decisions of the IMF and influence with other international donors on whom Egypt's economy depends. The assumption in Egypt, as in much of the Arab world, is that nothing happens unless the United States wills it. The problem is not that the U.S has no power but that the Obama administration has been either insufficiently interested or too cautious and afraid to use what power the United States has."

Moreover, during the days of Sisi; the congress seemed less concerned and we observe that after six years of waiting, the United States and Egypt have re-started an official strategic dialogue during John Kerry's latest visit to Cairo in August 2015. Kerry in his visit, met with the country's Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry. Egyptian analysts state that President Sisi has a new paradigm in doing business with the United States, and President Obama does not seem to be eager to invest more in the Middle East if it is not rewarding, especially as his second term approaches its end (Huffingtonpost, 2015).

A concluding thought would then be that the United States needs Egypt as an ally. It does not matter whether this ally is a depicted dictatorship or democracy as long as the American interests in the region are being met. However, before accomplishing any of its goals in the region, the American administration needs to maintain its self-proclaimed legacy as a leader of the neoliberal world, which explains the persistent message that called for democracy and human rights and which was featured in nearly all presidential addresses and high ranking officials' speeches.

As the content analysis progressed, the upcoming table, Figure 3, presents themes that have emerged from studying the two main sources selected from Kegley and Wittkopf's theoretical framework. It is worth noting at this stage that the role of the president is critical as it constitutes the main platform to where foreign policy decisions are made. Moreover, the importance of this role is reflected in the content of presidential speeches, announcements, and interviews during critical times as it is the authority which has rarely been challenged throughout the American history (Hossain & Saleh, 2009). The United States' president is also one of the main sources affecting American foreign policy as he is in charge of negotiating treaties, nominating high government officials, and has the veto power (Norton, 2004). Wittkopf et al. (2008) also provides two other reasons that constitute the importance of the president's role. The first is that the constitution has increased, over time, the central role of the President in formulating and executing American foreign policy. The second is that this role was further expanded due to the United States' role in a fast changing international environment. Accordingly, presidential leadership in conducting foreign affairs was strongly needed and the importance of presidential decisions on foreign policy went virtually unchallenged. In all this, we see that when we look at the role source, we look at all aspects within the role of the president that contribute to foreign policy decisions mainly his speeches, official statements, interviews, presidential declarations, etc. where all these components prove the legitimacy of using the role source in our analysis and come up with the emerging themes presented hereafter. On the other hand, the external environment constitutes all attributes of the international system that affect American

policy whereby in this thesis, the ultimate and main attribute is the Egyptian uprising and all the events within the uprising that shaped American foreign policy. Some of the main components of the external environment include the distribution of power and globalization for instance (Hossain & Saleh, 2008).

The following table highlights the emerging themes under both the external and role sources based on our analysis.

Emerging Themes	
External Source	Role Source
<p><u>U.S Underlying Contradictions in Response to the Egyptian Uprising:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Egypt’s different governments received American support as soon as each of the different presidents begin their term regardless of practices of dictatorship and oppression - Continuous support of the U.S administration to all authoritarian governments to protect broader interests other than the call for democracy, freedom of speech, and termination of oppression - Egypt’s changing circumstances did not trigger any change in the \$1.3 billion dollars of yearly military assistance which the U.S views as a compensation for maintaining peace with Israel 	<p><u>Monetary Power</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - President reduces \$200 million in economic aid after failure to push for free elections in Egypt in 2005 - Obama administration increases economic aid by \$50 million during FY 2010 and decides on reprogramming of funds. - Obama requests \$1.5 billion aid for Egypt (contribution remains as in in FY 2012 during Morsi’s presidency to enhance relationship with the government) - Obama administration cuts \$50 million of aid to NGOs and CSOs to enhance relationship with the government - Average of \$1.3 billion per year in military aid since 1979

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Major cut in aid for democracy promotion
<p><u>Morsi and Sisi Governments Maintain the U.S Support</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The United States officially announces that it will continue to be a friend and partner to Egypt post the uprising and during the different presidential terms - Hilary Clinton also embarks Egypt's transition and continues to support the opposition - The U.S announces its continued cooperation to work with Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood president who was never a U.S ally - The United States shows consistent support for both Morsi and Sisi governments regardless of their violations 	<p><u>The Obama Administration's 'Wait and See Attitude'</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Obama asks Mubarak to calm down and end violence at first - Obama only urges Mubarak to listen to the Egyptian people, but not to step down - Obama hardens his language only after the regime intensifies the use of power - Obama stresses his support to the Egyptian opposition and the call for democracy the day Mubarak steps down - Obama encourages Morsi to take steps to show his response to the people's concern despite the dissatisfaction of the people - Obama is first concerned that the military takes over, but later continues to coordinate with Sisi as a winner of Presidential elections.
<p><u>Egypt, a Strategic U.S Ally regardless of the Ruling Regime</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The U.S administration needs Egypt as an Ally regardless if it is an autocracy or a democracy 	<p><u>Persistent Presidential Messages Calling For Democracy & Human Rights</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Call for democracy and human rights in official speeches, yet other underlying interests exist

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - U.S acts with the different Egyptian governments in a manner so as to maintain its interests 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Military investment of \$1.3 billion aims at maintaining Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, another U.S interest
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Table 5.1 Emerging Themes Based on Kegley & Wittkopf's Theoretical Framework

In fact, under the external source there are obviously U.S underlying contradictions in response to the Egyptian Uprising. Regardless of the external changes and circumstances that might affect American foreign policy toward Egypt, the U.S administration stayed focused on maintaining its broad interests. These interests include, but are not limited to keeping Egypt's peace with Israel, enjoying priority access to Suez Canal and the Egyptian airspace. Preserving these interests contradicts the U.S interests of promoting democracy and human rights as they were supportive to Egypt's 30-year autocratic regime. Moreover, both governments of Morsi and Sisi have maintained the U.S support regardless of any violations they underwent. In addition to that, Egypt remained a strategic U.S ally regardless of its ruling regime. Under the role source, the President of the U.S utilizes his monetary power to preserve the country's broad goals. In doing so, the U.S President acts in a "rational" manner to maximize the states' interest which stems from the mindset of realism. The Obama Administration's 'wait and see' attitude is clear to the extent that he has exercised precaution in all official statements and major opinions/decisions. In fact, the President has only intensified his language after major events with a clear direction took place in Egypt.

Finally, there is a persistent message in all presidential official speeches which calls for democracy and human rights, yet the U.S administration still cares of other unspoken, but well known interests.

Chapter five has provided an analysis on two levels; the first is with respect to foreign aid provided to Egypt since the year 1947 and concluded that military aid is an investment to preserve peace with Israel given it has remained constant with an average of \$1.3 billion per year since the signature of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty. Moreover, aid to Egypt did not increase post Egypt's uprising since the year 2011, but remained unchangeable instead with only a partial re-programming of economic aid toward political transition during that year. Finally, the president used foreign assistance as a pressuring tool toward the government of Egypt depending on the circumstances taking place, more specifically the economic aid. Furthermore, the chapter has computed key emerging themes through a content analysis of the most prominent U.S announcements, declarations, and other official positions toward Egypt to later conclude on the research question regarding the existence of a shift in the United States' broad foreign policy objectives. The key emerging themes computed from our content analysis fall under the role source and the external source. Under the external source we find that there are U.S underlying contradictions with respect to Egypt's uprising, a U.S support maintained to the Morsi and Sisi governments when in power, and we view Egypt as a strategic U.S ally regardless of its ruling regime. Under the role source, our emerging themes include the monetary power that the U.S president possesses and uses as a pressuring tool, the 'wait and see' attitude that the president portrays, and finally a consistent presidential

message calling for democracy and human rights, while other U.S interests underlie. In chapter six, we will utilize the data analyzed on foreign aid and the computed emerging themes of chapter five to come up with the conclusion of the thesis on whether there is a change in U.S broad foreign policy goals as a result of the Egyptian uprising.

In Politics, we are only friends if we have a mutual interest

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Chapter five analyzed the aid to Egypt and has mainly concluded that there is no change in foreign assistance since the year 2011, the year which marks Egypt's uprising in an answer to our research question regarding the aid to Egypt. Moreover, the previous chapter has computed key messages under the role source and the external source through a content analysis of the most prominent speeches, press releases, and official announcements of the U.S. The objective of chapter six is to come up with a conclusion on the research question of this thesis regarding an increase in foreign aid post Egypt's uprising and on the existence of a shift in U.S broad foreign policy objectives through the data analyzed and the emerging themes computed in chapter five. There is no doubt that the Islamists' capture of power in Egypt has triggered questions not only regarding the destiny of the uprisings and the sought of change, but also regarding the transformations in the relation between the U.S administration and the newly elected Egyptian government.

Accordingly, the objective of the thesis was to argue that that there is a U.S foreign policy shift toward Egypt post Egypt's uprising, taking into consideration that Egypt is one of the most strategic Arab countries for U.S interests and that the Egyptian

uprising had an impact on the balance of power on the Arab, regional, and international levels.

The thesis analyzed the aid to Egypt in addition to an analysis of the key speeches, official statements, announcements, and declarations as they constitute the most appropriate platforms to conduct a content analysis of the U.S administration's position.

The analysis reveals that the United States' military aid to Egypt is nothing but an investment to sustain the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel regardless of the ruling regime in Egypt. The argument for our finding is that there are no major changes in military aid to Egypt since the signature of the peace treaty with an average of \$1.3 billion per year even post the uprising during the different ruling regimes.

The second finding of the thesis is that the U.S administration uses its monetary power to achieve its interests in Egypt such as promoting democracy, but also as a pressuring tool for when tensions arise between the two countries. Moreover, the U.S seems to treat Egypt and Israel as a one correlated package. These findings are visible due to a significant cut in economic aid at two stages: the first being after the glide path agreement was signed in 1990, and the second being after Mubarak's regime refused to listen to the U.S in holding free elections in 2005 and when Mubarak did not agree on the war on terror initiative that the Bush administration was undergoing.

One of the most prominent findings of this thesis is also the contradiction present in U.S foreign policy where the U.S has always been supportive of the revolution, but also of the autocratic regime of Mubarak as long as its interests were preserved. Although the

U.S often has a persistent message in all official statements which is the call for democracy and human rights, other interests are also embedded such as discouraging interstate conflict that can threaten allies such as Israel, preserving the flow of energy resources and commerce, ensuring transit access to facilities for military operations, etc. (Blanchard, 2012). This contradiction is visible in the U.S support to Morsi, the President from the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, as soon as Morsi became a major player in Egypt's politics, the Obama administration began to reverse decades of mistrust and hostility as it sought to forge closer ties with the organization that has been viewed previously as irreconcilably opposed to its ideology in politics and religion as well as its interests and aspirations in the region. In fact, after long years of marginalization, the Arab uprisings helped achieving an exceptional representation of the Islamic parties in the presidential elections, a whole new feature that the U.S had to deal with during the Obama administration especially after an unfriendly environment with the Muslim world during the Bush administration. All recent events in the Muslim and Arab world have largely defied textbooks assumptions about social movement theories, democratization, robustness of regimes, and the hegemonic role of the Uni-Polar U.S in the region, more specifically, in the Middle East. An "open" political vacuum has become a window for Islamist organizations, many of which had been previously banned hence shifting the locus of power and the dynamics of the political arena in the Muslim world. The U.S administration has recognized this, and has acted accordingly in an obviously contradicting manner.

It was also articulated that the U.S administration acts in a “wait and see” manner, visible through all official statements since the onset of the revolution where its language has only intensified after the direction of events appeared to be very clear. At the beginning of the uprising, the Obama administration was worried about the fate of its ally Mubarak who has secured a good standing with Israel since the signature of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty. There was an apparent time lap before the U.S administration asked for Mubarak’s resignation and supported the protestors. Subsequently, the administration was concerned about Islamic parties being in power, despite the fact that the Islamic group in Egypt was perceived as the most organized at that time.

President Obama's administration has been quite deliberate in its choice of words and lack thereof. The United States' federal government has refused to explicitly state whether or not the military overtake of the Egyptian government was a coup d'etat, even three months after it became a fact. The Obama administration does not want to officially pin down what has happened, because they would have to put their money where their mouth is and discontinue the aid to Egypt, as the U.S government has a strict policy prohibiting the provision of aid to a country that has had a forceful military transitional government, but one should note that aid was never really stopped. The U.S administration played out all of its options in a ‘wait-and-see’ kind of situation. Obama was not willing to harm the United States' longtime peaceful relations with Egypt, and thus chose not to draw a hard line on whom to support.

Finally, we come to the conclusion that the U.S. needs Egypt as an ally and the opposite holds true. It does not matter whether this ally is a dictatorship or a democracy,

a promoter of human rights or not, these relationships are primarily based on the American interests in the region. However, there is still a consistent message in all official speeches and declarations by the U.S. regarding human rights and democracy, but other more important interests do exist as well. Accordingly, we conclude that there is no U.S. policy shift post the Egyptian uprising particularly in terms of the broad goals of the U.S and we are confident not to validate the existence of a U.S foreign policy shift towards the government of Egypt post the uprising. This was found on the level of military and economic aid and through other announcements which seem to support any president during any government in an attempt to protect the broader permanent U.S. interests in the region. Permanent U.S interests include discouraging interstate conflict that can threaten allies like Israel and preserving the flow of energy resources. Additionally, maintaining commerce that is vital to the U.S. economies and transit access to facilities for military operations. Moreover, fostering countering terrorism and restricting the proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons. U.S interests also include promoting economic growth, having access to the Suez Canal and the Egyptian airspace and finally promoting democracy and human rights; what we observe instead is different approaches that each of the different U.S presidents used in an aim to preserve broader U.S policy goals and interests at the expense of promoting democracy and human rights interests in some cases. Moreover, what we spot is a shift in the stakeholders of Egypt dealing with the Americans whereby the U.S interacts with new governments that were never U.S allies, but are being treated as friends in an aim to support their broader goals, namely overpowering the Muslim Brotherhood, which in

turn reflects on the contradiction that the U.S has in its foreign policy approach. In fact, we learn that in international relations there are no permanent alliances or animosities; only interests, global or regional, are permanent.

Stemming out from this study, future studies can extend the application of the theoretical framework used to include the individual role source whereby the individual personalities of foreign policy-making elites are studied. In this case, the policy decisions of the different U.S presidents shall be compared in an attempt to study the effect of other aspects of foreign policy decision making such as the individuals' values, talents, and previous experiences that shape foreign policy choices to study whether a policy shift exists.

Furthermore, future studies can examine other uprisings such as the Tunisian revolution and compare whether findings about U.S foreign policy response toward the Tunisian revolution will be in line with the findings of this thesis on U.S foreign policy toward the Egyptian revolution. However, in such a case, one should take into account and control for factors which may have an effect on the U.S response in Tunisia which might have made it different than that of Egypt. These different variables may include the power of the military which is not visible in the Tunisian revolution for instance. Moreover, the fact that the Islamic party in Tunisia "Ennahda" is more organized and moderate than the Muslim Brotherhood party in Egypt might trigger a different U.S response to the Tunisian revolution.

Another area worth investigating is the U.S response during times of overlap of different U.S interests through case studies. This recommendation is based on the

administration's persistent message regarding the call for democracy and human rights, but in many cases their response might give weight for some interests over others where there is evidence of U.S. contradictions. Accordingly, we provide a weight for each interest based on past response to predict future responses.

Furthermore, other studies might focus on the relationship between the U.S. government and the Muslim Brotherhood in specific since the September 11 attacks until post the uprising in an aim to analyze this relationship and test on whether a policy shift exists in this particular case since the relationship with the Muslim World especially the Muslim Brotherhood seem to have significantly changed since the days of the Bush administration.

Finally, this thesis completes its analysis with the presidency of Sisi; however future studies might expand the period of analysis regarding U.S. foreign policy response especially with major developments in the region such as changes in Egypt's foreign policy in general since the times of Sisi who seems to have a different approach from former presidents, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the nuclear deal reached with Iran which are part of important regional developments and fall beyond Sisi's election.

These recommendations would benefit further advancements in the field of foreign policy analysis, particularly U.S. foreign policy analysis towards the Middle East region to fill the gap in the existing literature on the topic, especially post the Arab uprisings which have inevitably struck new developments in the whole region.

Appendix 1.

TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS

Year	Event	Country
1928	Muslim Brotherhood founded by Hassan al-Banaa.	Egypt
1948	Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Syria attack the new state of Israel.	Egypt
February 1949	Hassan al-Binna of the Muslim Brotherhood is assassinated.	Egypt
1953	Coup leader Muhammad Najib becomes president as Egypt is declared a republic.	Egypt
October 1956	Tripartite Invasion of Egypt by Britain, France and Israel due to the nationalization of the Suez Canal.	Egypt
September 1970	Nasser dies and is replaced by his Vice-President, Anwar al-Sadat.	Egypt
1971	Treaty of Friendship between Egypt and the Soviet Union is signed	Egypt
June 1975	The Suez Canal is re-opened after it had been closed since the 1967 war.	Egypt
1976	Anwar al-Sadat ends the Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union.	Egypt
September 1978	Camp David Accords for peace with Israel are signed.	Egypt
March 1979	The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel is signed. Egypt is then condemned by other Arab nations and excluded from the Arab League.	Egypt
October 6, 1981	Anwar al-Sadat is assassinated by Jihad members	Egypt
October 1981	A national referendum approves Hosni Mubarak as the new president.	Egypt
October 1987	Mubarak begins his second term.	Egypt
October 1993	Mubarak begins his third term in office.	Egypt

June 1995	Mubarak is the target of an assassination attempt in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, upon his arrival at a summit of the Organization of African Unity.	Egypt
October 1999	Mubarak begins his fourth term in office.	Egypt
May 2005	Referendum vote backs a constitutional amendment that will allow multiple candidates to stand in presidential elections.	Egypt
September 2005	President Mubarak is re-elected for a fifth consecutive term.	Egypt
December 2005	Parliamentary polls end with clashes between police and supporters of the opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood. The National Democratic Party and its allies retain their large parliamentary majority. Muslim Brotherhood supporters, elected as independents, win a record 20% of seats.	Egypt
November 2006	President Mubarak promises democratic and constitutional reform in an address to parliament. Opponents are skeptical.	Egypt
November 2006	Upsurge in arrests of Muslim Brotherhood members.	Egypt
April 2008	Military courts sentence 25 leading Muslim Brotherhood members to jail. More than 800 arrested over a month. Brotherhood boycott municipal elections after only 20 candidates are allowed to stand.	Egypt
April 2009	Egyptian authorities say they arrested 49 people the previous year on suspicion of helping Hezbollah send money and aid to Hamas in Gaza.	Egypt
June 2009	US President Barack Obama makes key speech in Cairo calling for a new beginning between the United States and the Muslim world.	U.S
February 2010	Former UN nuclear chief Mohammed El-Baradei returns to Egypt. He forms together with opposition figures and activists, a coalition for political change. El-Baradei states that he might run in the presidential election scheduled for 2011.	Egypt

June 2010	Muslim Brotherhood fails to win any seats in elections to the Shura consultative upper house of parliament. They claim that votes were arranged.	Egypt
January 25, 2011	Beginning of protests and police Confrontations.	Egypt
January 28, 2011	U.S administration claims reassessment of U.S foreign assistance to Egypt.	U.S
January 29, 2011	Mubarak's televised speech in an attempt to remain in presidency.	Egypt
January 30, 2011	Clinton expresses desire for a new political order in Egypt.	U.S
January 31, 2011	Mubarak names a new cabinet.	Egypt
January 31, 2011	Former Ambassador Frank Wisner conducts personal talks with Mubarak.	U.S
February 1, 2011	The "March of Millions" and Mubarak's Second Speech.	Egypt
February 1, 2011	Margaret Scobey, U.S Ambassador to Egypt talks to El-Baradei to convey support for orderly transition in Egypt.	U.S
February 1, 2011	Call for evacuation of American Citizens from Egypt.	U.S
February 2, 2011	The Battle of Tahrir Square.	Egypt
February 3, 2011	Obama's administration proposes Mubarak's immediate resignation.	U.S
February 4, 2011	Negotiations begin, protests continue.	Egypt
February 7, 2011	Release of Wael Ghonim (the founder of the Facebook page titled "We are all Khaled Said").	Egypt
February 10, 2011	Mubarak's defiant speech.	Egypt
February 11, 2011	Mubarak's resignation.	Egypt
February 13, 2011	Military Council starts ruling.	Egypt
April 2011	Former President Mubarak and his sons, Ala and Gamal, are arrested on suspicion of corruption.	Egypt
June 6, 2011	The Muslim Brotherhood's political party achieves a legal status.	Egypt

May 2012	Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohammed Morsi tops the first round of voting in first free presidential elections, narrowly ahead of Mubarak-era prime minister Ahmed Shafiq.	Egypt
June 24, 2012	Muslim Brotherhood's candidate Mohammed Morsi is declared as a winner in the presidential election with 51.7% of the votes.	Egypt
December 2012	Islamist-dominated constituent assembly approves draft constitution that boosts the role of Islam and restricts freedom of speech and assembly. Public approve it in a referendum, prompting extensive protest by secular opposition leaders, Christians and women's groups.	Egypt
Dec. 4, 2012	March on Presidential Palace.	Egypt
Jan.25, 2013	Protesters return To Tahrir Square.	Egypt
June 21, 2013	Sisi warns Morsi.	Egypt
July 3, 2013	Military removes Morsi from Office.	Egypt
July 4, 2013	Adly Mansour, Head of the Country's High Constitutional Court becomes Egypt's interim president.	Egypt
July 2013	Morsi's supporters in the Muslim Brotherhood reject a timetable for new elections laid out by interim president Adly Mansour.	Egypt
August 15, 2013	Obama's statement about Egypt. He condemns but doesn't cut the aid.	U.S
October 2013	Egypt criticizes U.S decision to suspend large part of \$1.3bn in aid following months of political turmoil.	Egypt
November 2013	A new law restricts public protests.	Egypt
January 2014	Egyptians vote in referendum on a new constitution drafted since the July 2013 overthrow of the Islamist-led government. The new basic law bans parties based on religion.	Egypt
Feb 2014	Government of Prime Minister Hazem el-Beblawi resigns in a surprise move.	Egypt
May 2014	Former army chief Abdul Fattah al-Sisi wins presidential elections.	Egypt
June 8, 2014	Sisi Egypt's President	Egypt

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