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SOCIAL MOVEMENTS CHALLENGING ENVIRONMENTAL  
POLICIES? REFRAMING THE GARBAGE CRISIS IN  
LEBANON

by  
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## AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

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This master's thesis explores the social movement formed as a response to the Lebanon garbage crisis during the summer of 2015. This was arguably the largest such movement organized by Lebanese civil society in the post-civil war years as the protestors' shifted from merely demanding effective waste polices to a wider movement against a corrupt class of political elites and failed state. While the political and sectarian elite have largely instrumentalized or restricted Lebanon's social and environmental movements, thus fragmenting them, the 2015 crisis managed, at least for an initial period, to coalesce various disparate groups into a movement that briefly threatened this elite.

The purpose of this research is thus to investigate *if* and *how* this movement reacting to the garbage crisis shaped the wider environmental and social policy debate in Lebanon; and *why* it eventually failed to influence the final policy outcome that basically entailed a return to the *status quo ante*. While traditional policy analyses utilize positivist, rational theory frameworks, this thesis applies an interpretive policy analysis, which posits that multiple interpretations are possible in the social world. In particular, it uses a narrative analysis framework to understand this crisis. As such, it distinguishes the various groups (protestors, civil society, government, political elite) competing to shape the policy debate; and analyzes their respective narratives without attributing a truth-value to them. Such an approach views stories as carriers of meanings. The research techniques include literature review, document analysis, and participatory observation with guided conversations.

The analysis shows that the demonstrations seriously contested the political elite's dominant narrative, and thus shaped the debate around both the environmental failures and larger corruption endemic to Lebanon's political structure. Issues such as decentralization and the immediate holding of parliamentary elections came to the forefront. However, the movement gradually lost its focus and fragmented as the government narrative reasserted itself and affirmed a policy outcome that eschewed any of the changes demanded by the protestors. This thesis found that power-differentials between the citizens and the elites in power are the major reason for the failure to shape the policy outcome. The elite effectively made use of sectarian and clientelist networks in order to inhibit change. Thus, after being taken aback at the extent and effectiveness of the mass protests, the initially divided political elite unified—and reasserted its narrative—once more to block effective policy change.

Approaching the first anniversary of the protests, however, it is clear that the potential of the 2015 social movement remains. It managed to prevent the complete instrumentalization of the debate if not the policy outcome, and its legacy continued as it inspired, for the first time, non-sectarian affiliated groups to contest Lebanon's 2016 municipality elections. This contestation keeps the policy debate alive.

**KEYWORDS:** Garbage crisis Lebanon, Social movement, Solid waste management, Policy debate, Environmental policy, Public policy, Instrumentalization, Narrative analysis.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

AUB	American University of Beirut
CDR	Council for Development and Reconstruction
CoM	Council of Ministers
CSO	Civil Society Organization
EU	European Union
FPM	Free Patriotic Movement
GBA	Greater Beirut Area
GoL	Government of Lebanon
H2020 CB/MEP	Horizon 2020 Capacity Building/ Mediterranean Environment Program
IMF	Independent Municipal Fund
MoE	Ministry of Environment
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoIM	Ministry of Interior and Municipalities
MP	Member of Parliament
MSW	Municipal Solid Waste
MSWM	Municipal Solid Waste Management
NIMBY	Not-In-My-Backyard
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OMSAR	Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform
PSP	Progressive Socialist Party
SWEMP	Solid Waste/Environmental Management Project
SWM	Solid Waste Management
t	ton
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Program
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WM	Waste Management
WMS	Waste Management Sector
WtE	Waste-to-Energy

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 2015, waste piled up in the streets of Beirut and Mount Lebanon. This marked the beginning of Lebanon's current garbage crisis. The proximate reason for this garbage crisis lies in the protests of the residents close to the Naameh landfill. This landfill had been inaugurated in 1997 as the emergency solution for a crisis that had shaken Beirut and Mount Lebanon at the time.<sup>1</sup> The solution, supposedly an interim one, was still in place almost two decades after its elaboration despite numerous protests of the close by residents in these years. These residents, pacified by promises that the landfill would be closed soon throughout these years, would not cave this time and their protests led to the closure of the landfill on July 17<sup>th</sup>, 2015.<sup>2</sup> Simultaneously, the contract of the private company Sukleen (which operates together with the company Sukomi for waste disposal under the umbrella of the Averda group) assigned with the sweeping, collection and treatment of the waste in the greater Beirut area (GBA), expired. Once this mistrusted and overpaid company had to halt its services because its storage sites were overloaded, the waste remained in the streets of Beirut and Mount Lebanon and accumulated to mountains of garbage. It did not take long thereafter that the residents of the GBA gathered and protested against these unsanitary and environmentally catastrophic circumstances. The general public in

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<sup>1</sup> MOE/UNDP/ECODIT, *State and Trends of the Lebanese Environment 2010* (2011).

<sup>2</sup> "Protesters enforce Naameh dump closure," *The Daily Star*, July 17, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Jul-17/307104-activists-to-act-as-human-shields-in-naameh-landfill-closure.ashx> [last accessed on March 20, 2016].

Lebanon joined the residents of Naameh in their protests and demanded an environmentally sound treatment of their waste. Soon, the *tul'it rihetkun* (You Stink-) campaign transformed into a fulcrum of the protests.

On the ministerial level, the Minister of Environment Mohammad Machnouk was initially the official responsible with finding a solution to the ongoing crisis. However, due to slow reaction to the crisis, he soon came in the cross fire of the protesters and was forced to withdraw from a committee assigned with finding solutions by the Prime Minister Tammam Salam. Consequently, Akram Chehayeb, Minister of Agriculture, was appointed by Salam to chair the garbage crisis committee established on the 31<sup>st</sup> of August 2015.<sup>3</sup> On September 4<sup>th</sup>, Chehayeb delivered a new trash plan to the Prime Minister. The plan was divided in two phases, the first being an 18-month interim contingency-solution and the second being a sustainable long-term solution. The long-term solution was very vague but promised to include the return of Solid Waste Management (SWM) responsibilities to the municipalities, which by law have the right and duty to treat their waste.<sup>4</sup> The short term phase, however, was once again subject of many protests throughout the country, as it included the establishment of two landfills: one in Akkar in the north and another one in the Bekaa, in eastern Lebanon. The concerned residents refused to take the waste of the GBA, which is responsible for the majority of the waste produced in the country.

As no solution was yet found, Sukleen was requested by the government to resume its services of waste collection. The refuse was openly dumped mainly close to

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<sup>3</sup> "Chehayeb to chair new garbage crisis committee," *The Daily Star*, August 31, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Aug-31/313428-chehayeb-to-chair-new-garbage-crisis-committee.ashx> [last accessed on February 10, 2016].

<sup>4</sup> Issa, P., & Hawat, D., "Garbage plan fails to secure key endorsements," *The Daily Star*, September 17, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Sep-17/315565-garbage-plan-fails-to-secure-key-endorsements.ashx> [last accessed on February 10, 2016].

the port of Beirut, where it piled up unprotected from the rain pouring in the rainy winter season. In March 2016 the garbage crisis committee elaborated another contingency-solution similar to the one of 1997, which is being implemented at the moment of writing. The trash committee agreed to open two new landfills in Costa Brava, south of Beirut, and Bourj Hammoud, northeast of the capital; and temporarily reopen the Naameh landfill.<sup>5</sup> Throughout these eight months of crisis, the protesters were not silent and kept gathering and demanding an environmentally friendly and socially sound solution to the crisis. The protests soon gained momentum and reached tens of thousands of people gathering in the streets. However, the first big groups demanding an end to the garbage crisis (*tul'it rihetkun* - You Stink) and transparency in Lebanese politics (*badna nhasib* - We Want Accountability) soon split and many different demands were made during the organized protests. After time, the momentum of the protests faded. However, they were not silenced completely and at the moment of writing the groups still gather against the most recently implemented solution to the crisis. Additionally, different political wings have emerged out of the movement and contested the political elite in the municipal elections of May 2016. In Beirut, these were the campaign *Beirut Madinati* (Beirut my City) and the secular party *Mouwatinoun Wa Mouwatinat fi Dawla* (Citizens within a State).

These protests against the situation in the waste sector were not the first ones the country experienced. As mentioned above, the Naameh landfill was an interim solution to a garbage crisis in 1997. This crisis was triggered by a protest of the

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<sup>5</sup> Basim, F., "Lebanon trash committee agrees to landfills, Cabinet set to vote Saturday," *The Daily Star*, March 11, 2016, retrieved from <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2016/Mar-11/34176...ebanese-ministers-hopeful-of-reaching-deal-on-trash-crisis.ashx> [last accessed on March 20, 2016].

residents of Bourj Hammoud against the then operating dumpsite in their neighborhood. Consequently, the 1997 emergency-strategy was elaborated for the GBA. This strategy was supposed to last for six years, until 2003. However, the landfill ended up operating until the protests and the resulting crisis of July 2015.<sup>6</sup>

Another crisis related to waste shook Lebanon in earlier years. In the chaos of the Civil War (1975-1990), a Lebanese firm, supervised by the then fighting militia *Lebanese Forces*, elaborated a deal in 1987 to import toxic waste from Italy. In 1988 the deal came to public knowledge and led to a popular outrage, strong enough to make the Italian government take back the waste and the post-war Lebanese parliament introduce an environmental regulation related to the import of toxic waste.<sup>7</sup>

The two examples of the Bourj Hammoud-case and the one regarding the import of toxic waste to Lebanon show that protests played a special role in shaping the solid waste sector. The following section is going to introduce the struggles for environmentally sound strategies and regulations. These struggles are not phenomena specific to the solid waste sector nor to Lebanon. Struggles, environmental movements and protests have been spreading all over the world for the past half century under the umbrella of environmentalism, an ideology and social movement for the protection of the environment.

### **1.1 Environmentalism: Movements and their Influence**

This section will present different environmental struggles. First, literature on the environmentalism of the poor will be introduced, as it was found to be the trigger

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<sup>6</sup> “Protesters enforce Naameh dump closure,” *The Daily Star*, July 17, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Jul-17/307104-activists-to-act-as-human-shields-in-naameh-landfill-closure.ashx> [last accessed on April 26, 2016].

<sup>7</sup> Hamdan, F., “The Ecological Crisis in Lebanon,” in *Lebanon's Second Republic: Prospects for the Twenty-first Century*, ed. Ellis, K.C., (Florida: University Press Florida, 2002), 175-18.

points for larger movements in Lebanon. It was the poorer residents of Naameh who first mobilized against the landfill in their neighborhood. In a later stage, the protest matured to an environmental middle-class movement, typical for countries of the Global North. Finally, the movement grew into larger demands for decentralization, the end of corruption and a change of the electoral law and the political system. This maturation of the protests of 2015 in Lebanon will be embedded in the following literature review.

Ramachandra Guha, in his book *Environmentalism, A Global History*, tackles the rise of environmentalism throughout the world.<sup>8</sup> His chapter, *The Southern Challenge*, is particularly relevant to the case of Lebanon, as it talks about the struggle of the poor in the Global South over the right to a say in the matter of their environment. This struggle is known as the Environmentalism of the Poor. He introduces several examples of small, farming communities in the rural areas of the Global South, which stood up against the exploitation of their forests, their rivers and their wildlife. It is enough for the scope of this thesis to introduce two of the most famous environmental movements in the Global South, described in Guha's book: The Chipko movement in India and the Chico movement in Brazil. The latter, named after the labor organizer Francisco Chico Mendes, was a response to the excessive exploitation of the Amazon by private companies. This response came from the communities, which lived off, but did not have legal titles to, the land and forests. These communities confronted loggers with the government on their side, whose goal was to develop the country. In the mid 1970s, local communities, aided by men such as Mendes, hindered the loggers and ranchers in proceeding with their destructive path by marches in the forest, with joined hands. These activities helped save two million acres of forest over the following

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<sup>8</sup> Guha, R., *Environmentalism: A Global History* (New York, NY: Longman, 2000).

decade. However, the conflict between communities and companies intensified and led to the assassination of Chico Mendes in 1988.

The environmental initiative Chipko arose in 1973 in a small Himalayan village. It was there that peasants forced loggers, who received the permit from the state forest department – who owned the land – to refrain from felling trees. Soon, a wave of similar initiatives concerning the felling of trees and later other issues (grazing land, rivers, forests) erupted throughout India in the 1970s and 1980s. These protests, picked up by the press, remarkably shaped the debate over the management of the Himalayan forests. Eventually, the debate arose from a regional one to a national debate concerning the forest policy in the whole country.

The global trend towards environmentalism also facilitated the rise of anti-dam movements. These anti-dam movements supported the spread of environmentalism and fostered environmental awareness in many countries reciprocally. Patrick McCully introduces several examples of anti-dam movements in the chapter *We Will Not Move: The International Anti-Dam Movement* of his book *Silenced Rivers. The Ecology and Politics of Large Dams*.<sup>9</sup> The cases mainly relevant for this thesis, however, are those of Eastern Europe. There, the movements follow a similar maturation-process as the protests in Lebanon. According to McCully, it was in countries of these areas where the struggle for improving resettlement conditions or for stopping a certain dam transformed into more mature forms of movements. The latter included demands concerning decision-making processes, which they wanted to be more transparent and democratic. In the case of Eastern Europe, McCully introduces four countries in which anti-dam movements led to or influenced heavily the change of the then prevailing

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<sup>9</sup> McCully, P., *Silenced Rivers: The Ecology and Politics of Large Dams* (London: Zed Books, 2001).

system: Hungary, Latvia, Bulgaria and Georgia. In Hungary the construction of the Nagymaros-dam on the Danube river was subject to discussion in the Hungarian establishment. On this level, the fossil-fuel lobby clashed with the water management bureaucracy, which had planned to build the dam and was backed by the Soviet Union. Scientists, therefore, got the space to pose questions over the environmental impacts of the plans. Although public speaking and media coverage of the dams were prohibited, an independent citizen's group, the Duna Kor – Danube Circle, was set up by a group of dam opponents. These opponents started with petitions against the Dam and later organized protests. They helped people overcome their fear of the system and were successful in 1989, when works at the dam were suspended. According to Andreas Biro, a journalist and part of the movement: “The breakthrough to political change occurred when the government suspended work on the dam”.<sup>10</sup>

In Bulgaria, Ecoglasnost (an environmental group) organized a march of several thousand people against previous arrests of some of their members. They also delivered their petition against hydro-electric projects on the Stuma and Mesta rivers to the National Assembly. This march not only led to the suspension of the projects but also the fall of the then president Zhivkov.

Also, in Latvia, the success of anti-dam movement represents the kick-off of organized objection against Soviet predominance and a democratic independence movement. Similarly, in Georgia, a manifestation against the Khudoni Dam composed a major step in the freedom movement and forced authorities to stop its construction.

The above examples show the success of environmentalism expressed through protests in making changes by shaping the debate of policies concerning the

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<sup>10</sup> McCully, 2001, p. 291.

environment on a national level or even with influencing, supporting or triggering the change of the prevailing system. Below, these examples are going to be linked to the case of Lebanon, through the introduction of environmentalism in Lebanon. First, the Lebanese environmentalism of the poor and then the environmentalism of the intellectuals is going to be tackled and the institutions it transformed into. This is done as combination of both can be found within the movement of 2015.

Lebanon has a history of environmentalism: Makdisi sees the social and political mobilization of the Shi'a community in the south and east of Lebanon prior to the Civil War as an example of Environmentalism of the Poor.<sup>11</sup> This community, mainly relying on agriculture as a livelihood, was excluded politically as well as from the modernization and urbanization of Beirut. According to Makdisi, the community therefore perceived problems concerning the environment as what he calls a “crisis of participation”.<sup>12</sup> This entailed the demand for a fair distribution of natural resources as well as participation in decision-making.<sup>13</sup> Later, in the 1960s and shortly before the outbreak of the Civil War, two other movements, the *Mouvement Social Libanais* and the *Harakat al-Mahrumeen* (Movement of the Deprived), both with the aim of social justice, saw the light. However, the Lebanese Civil War, which broke out in 1975 lasting for 15 years, gave a halt to these social and environmental movements.

Nevertheless, according to Makdisi, the roots of environmentalism in the country lie in these movements prior to the Civil War. During the war itself, major environmental destruction and degradation took place. It was in these years that the above introduced dumping of toxic waste from Italy in Lebanon occurred. The after-war

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<sup>11</sup> Makdisi, K., “Rise and Decline of Environmentalism in Lebanon,” in *Water on Sand. Environmental Histories of the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Mikhail, A. (New York NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), 207-229.

<sup>12</sup> Idem, p. 218.

<sup>13</sup> Idem, p. 218.

years were characterized by reconstruction and development, led by Rafiq Hariri who rose to power in 1992, and by a growth of environmental awareness informed by global trends (such as the Rio Earth Summit in 1992). Typical examples for the evolution of regulations concerning the environment in Lebanon are the ones regarding the establishment of the nature reserves in the country. In 1972, the same year in which the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was held in Stockholm, Friends of Nature (FON)<sup>14</sup>, the first Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) dedicated to environmental issues, was established in Lebanon. This NGO was founded by Ricardus Haber who was successful in lobbying the former president and head of the patronage network in Zgharta (region in the north of Lebanon) for the preservation of wildlife through the establishment of the Horsh Ehden nature reserve as well as the Palm Islands protected area in 1992. However, according to Makdisi, the numerous environmental NGOs, projects and initiatives existing in Lebanon today struggle “to unify the various political and communitarian strands embedded in the country's post-colonial history”<sup>15</sup>, which is drawn along sectarian lines.

Paul Kingston, in his book *Reproducing Sectarianism: Advocacy Networks and the Politics of Civil Society in Postwar Lebanon* also writes about environmentalism in Lebanon.<sup>16</sup> More specifically, he dedicates one of the chapters to the emergence of environmental policy in the country. According to Kingston, the debate surrounding environmental policy is highly political in Lebanon. On the one hand, the elites of the country tried to keep boundaries to the policy domain, in order to define the new arena in a way that it would not hinder or restrict their maneuverability. Therefore, the newly

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<sup>14</sup> Makdisi, K. (2013).

<sup>15</sup> Idem, p. 224.

<sup>16</sup> Kingston, P.W.T., *Reproducing Sectarianism: Advocacy Networks and the Politics of Civil Society in Postwar Lebanon* (Albany, NY: Suny Press, State University of New York, 2013).

arising environmental policy domain was instrumentalized for the realization of certain objectives. These were confronted, on the other hand, by a growing number of environmental organizations and experts, who worked for the implementation of regulatory policies to impede the country's elite. Between these two parties operates a third one: International organizations, which intensified the debate between the former two groups through their own financial and political interventions.<sup>17</sup>

Despite all the politicking, the newly established Ministry of Environment was active in elaborating laws and regulations for the Lebanese environment. Almost non-existent, however, is the implementation and enforcement of these regulations. This is additionally hindered by the overlaps and conflicts between the different agencies tasked with the elaboration, execution and enforcement of regulations.<sup>18</sup> Other challenges are the lack of continuity in program development, implementation and management, while each ministry and governmental policy agency has its own agenda.<sup>19</sup> The solid waste sector is a prime example for these challenges in the environmental policy domain, as will be shown in Chapter 3. This Chapter will introduce the different actors in the sector and their overlapping and conflicting responsibilities.

Returning to Kingston's division of the environmental policy domain between three political groups (the elites, the environmentalists and international organizations), I found that the solid waste sector in Lebanon, as part of the domain of environmental policy, includes a fourth party: the protestors. These shaped the debates of the sector considerably, as will be shown in more detail below. The social movements in Lebanon

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<sup>17</sup> *Idem*, p. 129.

<sup>18</sup> "Policy Paper on the Environment in Lebanon, 1996", *LCPS*, January 1, 1996, retrieved from <http://www.lcps-lebanon.org/publication.php?id=94&show=summary> [last accessed on May 26, 2016].

<sup>19</sup> *Idem*.

concerning the situation in the solid waste sector throughout the past two decades follow the same scheme as the above described anti-dam movements. The protests were first shaped mainly by a Not-in-my-backyard-syndrome (NIMBY)<sup>20</sup> and were conducted by residents against a specific landfill in their area. In 2010, the government introduced a plan to install incinerators as a solution to the waste situation in Lebanon. This invoked opposition from many environmental NGOs throughout the country, which gathered in a Zero Waste Coalition. Finally, in the crisis of 2015, the protests matured and went beyond mere NIMBY and environmental movements and led to the request of more participation, accountability, transparency and decentralization in the sector and the country in general.

In this context, parallels can be drawn to events, which happened recently in history and close to the Mediterranean context of Lebanon: in Campania, southern Italy. This region was experiencing waste emergency situations from the mid 1990s until 2008. Throughout these years, the citizens of the region have been mobilizing, according to D'Alisa Giacomo et al., in an environmental justice movement.<sup>21</sup> As in the case of Lebanon, NIMBY-inspired opposition and environmental movements preceded until culminating in movements against the abuse of power by the authorities and demands for participation in decision-making.<sup>22</sup> The crisis in Italy ended through the stringent introduction of top-down regulations, which rendered protesting close to landfill or incinerator-sites illegal and annulated the obligation for Environmental Impact Assessments for the location of facilities.

Italy provides another example of resistance to top-down environmental

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<sup>20</sup> NIMBY refers to the opposition of residents to a development in their neighborhood or close to them.

<sup>21</sup> D'Alisa G., Buralassi, D., Healy, H., Walter, M., "Conflict in Campania: Waste emergency or crisis of democracy," *Ecological Economics* 70 (2010): 239–249.

<sup>22</sup> Idem, p.247.

decision-making in the waste sector. In 2003 an unprecedented, massive protest was ongoing for two weeks in the Basilicata region in the South of Italy.<sup>23</sup> It was organized against the decision to construct a nuclear-waste storage facility in the poor region. While environmental protests were already known in the Basilicata, the enormous scale of the protests was new as it went beyond the usual protesters of the Left and the environmentalist groups. This protest “cut across all lines of difference: gender, generation, politics, class and locality. Together with all of the local institutions, the people managed to organize, act and make their influence felt.”<sup>24</sup> What began as a NIMBY-movement in southern Italy matured to a question of participation in decision-making in an environment where environmental concerns were tackled as issues of national security by a patrimonial state. The protests in this case were successful as they illustrated these patrimonial characteristics of the state, which they countered with their own technical-scientific discourse.

Before studying social movements within the solid waste sector in Lebanon throughout the years, a glimpse is given of other mobilizations of the Lebanese population in the after-war years.

Karam Karam recognizes three mobilization cycles when analyzing the movements of the years between 1995 and 2008.<sup>25</sup> First, he classifies the years 1995 until 2000 as years of “Civil Mobilization”,<sup>26</sup> in which mainly the middle class and the intellectuals of Beirut made claims for a change of the system. It was in these years that the ideas of decentralization, deconfessionalization and the change of the electoral law

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<sup>23</sup> Zinn, D.L., “The Case of Scanzano: Raison d’Etat and the Reasons for a Rebellion” in *Policy Worlds: Anthropology and the Analysis of Contemporary Power. EASA Series*, eds. Shore C., Wright S. and Pero D. (Oxford, NY: Berghahn Books, 2011), 227-245.

<sup>24</sup> Zinn, D.L. (2011). pp. 227-228.

<sup>25</sup> Karam, K., “An Analysis of Political Change in Lebanon in Light of Recent Mobilization Cycles,” in *Arab State and Neo-Liberal Globalization: The Restructuring of State Power in the Middle East*, eds. Guazzone, L., & Pioppi, D. (Ithaca Press, 2009), 47-72.

<sup>26</sup> Idem, p. 54.

were introduced and put forward by some groups. However, the political field was ‘closed’ (the power was distributed between the big Lebanese families and warlords) and these groups had no possibility for entering the political scene and changing it from the inside. Therefore, the civil actors organized in these years against certain policies, instead of opposing or confronting the regime and the system itself. These years were also characterized by cooptation strategies on the part of political figures: it was the years of reconstruction and development, mainly led by the then Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. He distributed shares and advantages among certain followers in order to remain in power and secure followers. These years were followed by the years of “Sovereign Mobilization”<sup>27</sup> between 2000 and 2005. Characteristic for these years were the movement of some elites and groups for sovereignty and against the Syrian regime, which was controlling the country then. Although this time saw the evolution of arenas for protest, a gap remained between the protesters and the political elite, who was anxious to preserve its privileges. Finally, Karam identifies in the years between 2005 and 2008 a “Partisan Mobilization”.<sup>28</sup> The Syrian regime was impeding the control over Lebanon through major protests following the assassination of Rafic Hariri in 2005. In a new climate of hope for political change, leftist parties arose (such as the Communist Party and the Democratic Left Party), which aimed a non-confessional mobilization. In these years “(...) demonstration has become the sole mode of political expression of the Lebanese.”<sup>29</sup> However, they faced difficulties to mobilize as they were opposed by strong political figures who personalized ideological and communitarian stances. Although the Lebanese public perceived and still perceives them as corrupt and inefficient, the political elite is still able to mobilize en masse, based on the patronage-

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<sup>27</sup> Idem, p. 61.

<sup>28</sup> Idem, p. 64.

<sup>29</sup> Naba’a (2007), cited from Karam (2009), p. 61.

and confessional system.

In contrast to Karam, Heiko Wimmen, who also studies civic political action, does not divide the post-war years into cycles. He rather analyses three civil political mobilizations in Lebanon between 1996 and 2005: The campaign for municipal elections (1997), the campaign for a facultative civil personal status law (1998) and the mobilizations of February-March 2005.<sup>30</sup> One of the overall motivations for the activists to mobilize and participate in these campaigns was “the chance to find avenues of influence and participation from outside the discredited realm of conventional politics”.<sup>31</sup> The campaign for municipal elections was a response to the parliament’s vote to delay the first post-war municipal elections by two years, which extended the tenure of the mayors then in office.<sup>32</sup> The driving force for the campaign was the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE), which was eventually successful and the constitutional council declared the decision unconstitutional in the same year. According to Wimmen, this success was reached because the campaign focused on grassroots mobilization and thus kept distance from the political sphere. Keeping this distance helped to prevent the instrumentalization of the campaign by political figures for the conflict within the government (the Christian president vs. the Muslim Prime Minister and the Speaker of Parliament), which would have de-legitimized the campaign among the Muslim population.<sup>33</sup>

The second campaign tackled by Wimmen is the one for a facultative civil personal status law, put forward in 1998. However, this campaign was less successful in

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<sup>30</sup> Wimmen, H., “Citizens of the Void: Power-sharing and Civic Political Action in Lebanon,” in *Democratic Transition in the Middle East: Unmaking Power*, eds. Sadiki, L., Wimmen, H., & Al-Zubaidi, L. (New York: Routledge, 2013), 22-41.

<sup>31</sup> Wimmen, H. (2013). P. 28.

<sup>32</sup> Idem, p. 28.

<sup>33</sup> Idem, p. 29.

gaining grassroots support and was contested by many counter-movements organized by big religious figures and thus failed.<sup>34</sup> Finally, Wimmen analyses the mobilization of February and March 2005, which followed the assassination of Rafic Hariri. In the first few days, young activists and student organizations across the different sects operated freely and with little supervision from specific parties. They held demonstrations and sit-ins in Downtown Beirut under the label “Freedom Camp”, for the liberation from Syrian presence in the country.<sup>35</sup> However, on March 8, the two Shia parties Hezbollah and Amal organized a powerful pro-Syrian counter-movement close to the camp. The anti-Syrian political class responded with the organization of a mass-mobilization on March 14. Thus, what started as movements for a change by some actors from the civil society was soon instrumentalized and reflected the confessional and political divisions within the country. The movement contributed to the success in liberating the country from Syrian presence. However, sectarian tensions remained, peaking in violent confrontations in May 2008. Through his analysis, Wimmen comes to the conclusion that civil political activists have been successful in mobilizing in one way or another and sometimes in receiving concessions from the political actors. However, their mobilization failed to lead to actual change regarding the implementation of political and legal norms.<sup>36</sup>

Social movements in Lebanon are also studied in Carmen Geha’s book *Civil Society and Political Reform in Lebanon and Libya: Transition and Constraint*. She writes about the difficulties of the new NGOs arising out of the spirit of political change felt in the movements of 2005. However, these NGOs had difficulties to actually lead to change and to represent an alternative political society because they had to gain “the

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<sup>34</sup> Idem, p. 31.

<sup>35</sup> Idem, pp. 32-33.

<sup>36</sup> Idem, p. 37.

approval of the sectarian elites to advance their agenda and to continue their activities. The sectarian system after 2005 entrapped nascent NGOs and challenged their ability to reform the system.”<sup>37</sup> This was not the only way of impeding political change in the country: In the course of the 2005-movement, one of the demands of the civil society was the change of the electoral law. As a response to the demands, a specialized commission to study reforms in the law was created but most of the proposed reforms were not enacted. Therefore, the political elite was able to instrumentalize the social movement of 2005 and take advantage of them in order to consolidate its power within the sectarian system.

This is a phenomenon shared by many other movements in different contexts, as Larry Lohmann states: “never underestimate the ability of modern elites to work out ways of coming through a crisis with their power intact.”<sup>38</sup> The crisis he talks about is climate change and the response of the elites to it. He warns about the cooptation of NGOs, which could lose their important feature of pushing governments and businesses into a less destructive direction by being used for the governments’ credibility: “It is governments who decide who is allowed to say what, just as it is governments who will be signing agreements. ... NGOs are expected to carry governments’ message to the people and help them stay in power.”<sup>39</sup> Lohmann shows therefore the difficulty to contest the elites in power.

However, some of the above introduced cases of social resistance within and outside the environmental domain give space to hope as they have been successful in

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<sup>37</sup> Geha, C., *Civil Society and Political Reform in Lebanon and Libya: Transition and Constraint* (New York: Routledge, 2016), p. 97.

<sup>38</sup> Lohmann, L., “Whose Common Future?” in *Green Planet Blues: Four Decades of Global Environmental Politics 4th edition*, eds. Dabelko, G. D., & Conca, K. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2010), 218-223.

<sup>39</sup> *Idem*, p. 222.

contesting power through non-violent resistance. Timothy Garton Ash concludes the book *Civil Resistance and Power Politics* with the chapter *A Century of Civil Resistance: Some Lessons and Questions*, in which he summarizes the ingredients needed for a successful non-violent resistance.<sup>40</sup> He comes to the conclusion that the mass needs to be unified, which is usually achieved through the definition of a common enemy and a common identity. Secondly, leadership is important, represented by an individual leader, who is able to keep the movement non-violent. However, non-violent resistance also depends on “the heroes of retreat”, such as Mikhail Gorbachev.<sup>41</sup> Finally, he states that whenever people speak truth to power, they are themselves empowered and able to reach some changes. However, the timescale of success of non-violent protests can be very long.<sup>42</sup>

Makdisi, reflecting on environmentalism and environmental initiatives in Lebanon, concludes that the problems of environmental initiatives in the after-war years lie in the inability to unify political and communitarian divisions in the country. The latest protests against the garbage crisis in Lebanon, which were the country’s largest ever gatherings organized by civil society, overcame sectarian and political divisions, at least for some time. This cross-societal character of the movements, its size, endurance and persistence shed new light on environmental initiatives in the country. Additionally, the literature review illustrated that most of the NGOs, which emerged from the protests in Lebanon, and the protests themselves experienced some sort of instrumentalization by the political elite. It seems that the movement of 2015 has learnt from past experiences and remained resistant to this instrumentalization thus far. These new

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<sup>40</sup> Ash, T. G., “A Century of Civil Resistance: Some Lessons and Questions,” in *Civil Resistance and Power Politics*, eds. Roberts, A., & Ash, T. G. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 371-391.

<sup>41</sup> *Idem*, p. 382.

<sup>42</sup> *Idem*, p. 389.

events in environmentalism and social movements in the country lead to the following research question.

## **1.2 Research Question**

The present thesis is going to take a deeper look into the relation between public protests and the process of elaboration of environmental policies in Lebanon by posing the following research question: How has the social movement of 2015 shaped the framing of the policy problem in the solid waste sector? It is hypothesized that new debates arose as the crisis broke out and that the policy debate was enlarged and went beyond the previous discussions. During the research for this thesis, in March 2016, a solution was adopted to the garbage crisis, which essentially was a return to the *status quo ante*. If the hypothesis verifies through the research and an analysis of the policy debate, then a second, more pressing question needs to be posed: If the social movement enlarged the policy debate and reframed the problem, why did it fail to shape the final outcome of the policy, which was a return to the situation prior to the outbreak of the crisis? In this context, the hypothesis is that power-differentials were the reason for this outcome, since governmental institutions usually have larger resources (political, economic, social etc.) to their disposition than Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), especially when they are created ad hoc, in times of a crisis. Therefore, governmental institutions, which are captured by the political elite of Lebanon, have a better position of argumentation, as they have greater access to information and their arguments can consequently be more rooted in information and knowledge. While building on the former, the second research question is the primary subject of the thesis.

Policies concerning the solid waste sector have been chosen as an example of

environmental policies due to its topicality and its long history of crises and social movements. While previous crises and social movements are going to be introduced, the focus is going to be posed on the crisis of 2015 and 2016 and the way the response to it had shaped the policy debate and elaboration.

The question is going to be addressed by analyzing the policy process, the procedure of framing, elaboration, formulation and implementation of policies in the solid waste sector. This is done by applying the Interpretive Policy Analysis framework. The latter allows for distinguishing the ways in which the policy problem was framed, which were applied by different actors to the problem concerning the treatment of solid waste. These framings and the actors applying them prior to the 2015 crisis and after the following protests are going to be distinguished. This way, it is possible to identify whether the protests led to a difference concerning the framing of the problem by different actors and therefore to the policy process in general. Through the analysis of the different frames and narratives it can be understood why the social movement eventually failed in shaping the final outcome of the policy debate. The following method is going to be applied in the research of the present thesis.

### **1.3 Methodology**

As first step of the analysis, an in-depth literature review was conducted. Once the research question was formalized, the case study was chosen as a research method. This method is generally applied “to understand complex social phenomena.”<sup>43</sup> As such, case studies are the preferred research method to examine contemporary events, such as

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<sup>43</sup> Yin, R. K., *Case Study Research: Design and Methods 4th ed.: Applied social research methods*, Vol. 5, (Washington DC: Sage Publications, 2009), p. 4.

the protests responding to the garbage crisis in Lebanon.<sup>44</sup> “A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly given.”<sup>45</sup> These boundaries are not given in the studied case since it is not evident why the protests did not shape the policy outcome.

Case studies allow for the application of methods such as interviews and observation, which could not be applied if other research methods, such as experiments, were implemented. Experiments focus on only one or two variables which are studied in a controlled environment (laboratory or specific field) through methods such as statistical analysis. However, in this case this could not include the multiple variables possible, which led to the final policy outcome. Therefore, a case study, or more precisely, a single case intrinsic case study was conducted for explanatory rather than descriptive purposes. Single case means that only one site or case was studied rather than the study and comparison of multiple cases. This was done because the case in question is very complex and interesting itself as its intrinsic character shows. It is intrinsic in the sense that the case studied is a unique phenomenon. Waste crises have been breaking out in other contexts, such as the ones in Campania, Italy, throughout the 1990s and most famously the crisis of 2007-2008. As in Lebanon, the crises in the region of Campania were triggered by NIMBY-inspired protests.<sup>46</sup> However, the waste crisis in Lebanon affected not only one area but the country as a whole and triggered protests throughout the nation. This differentiates the crisis in Lebanon from the one in Calabria. Additionally, the fact that the crisis triggered a social movement that went

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<sup>44</sup> Idem, p. 11.

<sup>45</sup> Idem, p. 18.

beyond the crisis itself and eventually turned against the sectarian-based political system in Lebanon is unique to this case.

Finally, the type of the case study is an explanatory one, designed in order to find an explanation to the posed research question.<sup>47</sup> Therefore, through this case study of the policy process in Lebanon, the possible causal relationships between the variables social movement and policy outcome are examined.

For the analysis of the policy process in the solid waste sector of Lebanon, the Interpretive Policy Analysis framework has been applied. This approach provides a guideline for identifying the communities involved in the studied policy process as well as the meanings they have towards the said policy. Those meanings, in turn, were classified through the identification of language, objects, and acts, which are representative artifacts of the meanings. These actors, meanings and artifacts were identified through an in-depth analysis of documents published by ministerial offices or international organizations, newspapers, television and radio broadcasts, websites, blogs and published interviews concerning the issue. Therefore, an in-depth document analysis took place, which is an important source for data collection if a case study is conducted. The sources were those published in English. A major source consulted was therefore the local newspaper published in English, The Daily Star. The articles of The Daily Star were found through the consultation of the newspaper's website and its search-option. The keyword used was *garbage crisis* and it was selected to include *all* the findings (instead of *or/exact*). In the category-field proposed by the website, *Lebanon news* was chosen and findings of the *past year* were considered. This search was conducted between the 11<sup>th</sup> and the 14<sup>th</sup> of February, 2016 and a number of 1,021

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<sup>47</sup> Eller, W.S., Gerber, B.J., Robinson, S.E., *Public Administration Research Methods: Tools for Evaluation and Evidence-Based Practice*, (New York, Oxon: Routledge, 2013), p. 135.

results were proposed by the search engine. Many of these were not related to the issue in consideration and a number of 285 were finally filtered for the analysis. The findings were crosschecked through the analysis of articles published by the English newspapers Now news and Ya-Libnan. On the websites of both newspapers the key-words *Lebanese garbage crisis* were entered into the search-option. Now news provided a total of 69 results, which were all consulted. No total number of results was shown at the website of Ya-Libnan. However, a total of 30 results were inquired from this website.

Documents may not be free of bias and it needs to be kept in mind that all those documents were written and conducted for a specific purpose. Therefore, the different articles were crosschecked with each other for corroboration. Additionally, documents, such as reports, presentations, newsletters, summaries and studies, prepared and published by ministerial offices, international organizations and NGOs were consulted.

The findings through the analysis of these documents were crosschecked with other forms of data-collection: a major source of evidence was provided by participant observation. Participant observation refers to the observation of people over a long period of time. This method also includes talking to the observed people about their activities and the reasons why they are doing, saying and thinking something.<sup>48</sup> Therefore, the method includes a mix of observation and interviewing. Observation is done by living with the people who are studied, thinking and reflecting about what is observed and finally talking to the people to check whether the personal interpretations are correct. The observation can occur through the total or partial immersion.<sup>49</sup> The total immersion foresees the entry of the field by the researcher for two years or more, while

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<sup>48</sup> Delamont, S., "Ethnography and Participant Observation," in *Qualitative Research Practice*, eds. Seale C., Gobo, G., Gubrium, J.F. (SAGE Publications Ltd, 2013).

<sup>49</sup> Idem, p. 206.

the partial immersion includes field visits on a daily basis only. In this case, a total immersion took place as the field was entered for two and a half years.

Regarding participation, the term does not refer to actual execution of the same activities, which the studied people are executing. Rather, it refers to the interaction with the people while they are doing something. However, some of the activities should be performed by the researcher in order to realize what it means to carry out these activities. This technique has been applied when participating in a couple of demonstrations: While the first demonstration was attended on September 19, 2015, another demonstration was joined on March 12, 2016. The protest activity taking place in September was not directly related to the waste issue. It was a market organized in Downtown Beirut, through which the participants reclaimed the capital's heart as a political figure claimed it was only for the upper social class. Even though it was not directly related to the movement against the garbage crisis, it was a demonstration activity that took place in the spirit of the social movement of 2015. The participation allowed receiving the reality from within the event and to access groups and individuals who participated. While these were great benefits from the participation, there are also biases, which couch in such a technique. The major bias is the loss of objectivity compared to an observer external to the situation and event.<sup>50</sup> The researcher may become biased toward the studied group and become a supporter of the group.<sup>51</sup>

As introduced above, the observations and the thoughts and impressions gained through it should be verified through meetings with the people involved in the studied environment. In this context, members of the identified actors in the solid waste sector were met. These are representatives of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Non

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<sup>50</sup> Idem, p. 113.

<sup>51</sup> Idem, p. 113.

Governmental Organizations (NGOs), concerned Ministries and International Organizations. Meetings were held with two members of the *You Stink* movement, with three activists who protested as individuals, without the affiliation to a group, with a member of the *Legal Agenda* (provided legal consultation to the activists on the ground) and the *Lebanese Transparency Association* (the representative met was a member of Chehayeb's committee assigned with the task to find a solution to the garbage crisis). In addition to the activists who have been protesting, two individuals who did not join the protests were consulted about their view of the situation. Of course, these two are not representative for the whole part of the population who has not been protesting. However, they illustrate some possible rationale of the individuals who did not join the movement.

Four directors of private companies involved in the sector were consulted: one from the Mores (stylized 'mores') group and one from Cedar Environmental (both environmental engineers), Recycle Beirut (a fairly new business offering the collection of source-sorted material), and Zero Waste Act (carries out recycling services since 2011). Representatives of the following environmental NGOs and groups, all involved in the policy domain, were interviewed as well: *Arc en Ciel*, *Byblos Ecologia*, *IndyAct*, *Greenline*, *Terre Liban* and *Green Area*. The academic view was also included and therefore two professors of AUB working on the issue were consulted.

Finally, officials of the following governmental offices were met: two of the Office of the Minister of State Administrative Reform (OMSAR), two of the Ministry of Environment (MoE) (also a former employee of the MoE was met, giving inside-information on evolvments and opinions within the ministry) and one of the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR). All these meetings were held in form of a

guided conversation. This was done in order to gain information relevant for the case study conducted while not influencing or biasing the received information. Therefore, the counterparts were encouraged to speak freely about the crisis and the protests. Of course, the people met are not free of bias, may have difficulties to recall certain events or had difficulties in articulate, especially since English is not their first language (except for the person met from Recycle Beirut). However, the information gathered was corroborated through cross-checking with information derived from other meetings and the document analysis. Three people became major informants: the person from the Legal Agenda (who provided insight from meetings within the social movement), one of the activists who protested as an individual (provided insight to the protests from a different point of view and toured throughout the country to meet with the activists of other cities) and finally a former minister (who provided insight into meetings within the CoM in 2010 and insight into the movement of 2015). Through the consultation of three different informants, their information could be cross-checked and it was avoided to rely on the information and view of one person only.

Data was gathered through taking detailed notes or, if possible, through the recording of all these interactions. Notes were taken of all the observed and participated events in field notes. Following the data gathering, reflection took place, which is the most important part of fieldwork as it is the way to strive for reliability and validity of the gathered information.<sup>52</sup>

In terms of limitations, these were expected to mainly lie in the lack of knowledge of Arabic. However, local and international media published in English covered the topic very well. Additionally, the people consulted speak English and

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<sup>52</sup> Idem, p. 214.

through these meetings the limitation could be mitigated. Another limitation is represented by the fact that the subject is still ongoing and therefore the findings of this thesis are subject to change. Finally, a major source used was the Daily Star, a local newspaper published in English. The newspaper has ties to the Hariri-bloc, which might influence its publications. Additionally, the fact that the newspaper is published in English shows that it addresses a certain type of Lebanese citizens, which are English speaking and likely upper-middle class, and expats. This might also influence the paper's communication and information brokerage. However, the information gathered from the Daily Star was crosschecked and complemented with other newspaper sources, participant observation and meetings.

Regarding biases, cultural inheritance of the researcher is a biasing factor: European background, grown up in an environment in which sorting at source and recycling are a part of the daily life and in which social mobilization is easier and the demands of the public are taken into consideration more carefully. However, having lived in Lebanon for the past two years and a half, a very clear picture of the Lebanese culture, history, political situation and challenges have been acquired.

Additionally, a *bias for hope*, as introduced by Albert O. Hirschmann, was adopted in this study. This bias refers to the hope that the exercise of human reason can lead to societal development and institutional change.<sup>53</sup> The reader is therefore invited to scrutinize critically the outcomes of the present thesis. Finally, a bias towards the movement might also have influenced the outcome of the study. However, the researcher was aware of this bias throughout the research and was equally open to the narratives of both parties. The narrative analysis provided the opportunity to present

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<sup>53</sup> Schoen, D.A., & Rein, M., *Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution of Intractable Policy Controversies*. (New York: Basic Books, 1994), p.55.

both narratives, without attributing a truth-value to either. Both narratives were analyzed objectively according to their coherence and the way they addressed the framed problem, as will be shown in Chapter 5.

#### **1.4 Conclusion**

This chapter first introduced the social movement in Lebanon of the summer of 2015 and then embedded the discussion about the protests in a larger picture of environmental movements worldwide and movements in Lebanon in general. This positioning resulted in the formulation of the following two research questions: how has the social movement shaped the policy debate? And why has the movement not been able to shape the final outcome of the policy debate? Once these research questions were formulated, this chapter introduced the methodology applied for this thesis. This research is a single site intrinsic case study and includes a combination of document analysis and participant observation.

The framework applied for the study of the policy process is the Interpretive Policy Analysis framework and more specifically its subcategory, the Narrative Analysis framework. Both frameworks will be presented in detail in the following Chapter 2. Chapter 3 provides a general overview to the solid waste sector in Lebanon, introducing the composition of the waste in the country. The same chapter provides a historical overview and introduces the main controversies and inconsistencies evolving in the sector throughout the years. Chapter 4 introduces the role of movements in leading or reacting to previous crucial events in the sector and tackles the protests of 2015 and 2016 detailed. Chapter 5 applies the Narrative Analysis framework to the situation in Lebanon and distinguishes the different actors in the solid waste sector and

the way they frame the policy-problem prior to and after the 2015 garbage crisis.

Building on these findings and through further analyzing the policy process, Chapter 5 provides possible reasons for the final policy outcome. In the Conclusion, the major findings are summarized according to which recommendations and suggestions for further research are drawn. The thesis concludes with presenting the legacy of the movement of 2015 and 2016.

## CHAPTER 2

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: ANALYZING POLICIES

Traditionally, policy analysts study policies as ‘objective entities’, which result from decisions made by rational authorities (such as the government, a committee etc.), reorganizing bureaucratic action to solve a particular ‘problem’ and produce a certain outcome (known or desired).<sup>54</sup> This way of analyzing policy processes, however, assumes an ideal situation, which in reality is not or rarely preexisting. Policies are not necessarily created on a rational basis, but rather in an environment shaped by power relationships and social change. This is specific to the context of Lebanon, where policy-making is shaped by sectarian and clientelistic characteristics instead of objective and rational processes. The sectarian and clientelistic system prevailing in Lebanon will be presented more detailed in the following Chapter 3. The traditional way of analyzing policy is also not able to show the myriad of interactions and alliances involved in shaping a policy. The multiple actors involved (government officials, lobby-groups, individuals) come from local, national and international institutions and each follow their own agenda and interact through negotiations and political struggles to influence and form policies.<sup>55</sup> In the context of environmental policies in Lebanon, Kingston identified three major groups, which shape the policies: the political elite, the environmentalists and the international organizations with their funds and knowledge. In the solid waste sector, I identified a fourth group, which is represented by the

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<sup>54</sup> Shore C., Wright S. and Pero D., eds., *Policy Worlds: Anthropology and the Analysis of Contemporary Power. EASA Series*, (Oxford, NY: Berghahn Books, 2011).

<sup>55</sup>Idem, p. 7.

protesters. The interpretive policy analysis allows to include all these actors and to study their positions and the way they shaped the policy process. Finally, the traditional approaches see policies as something stable, rigid or clinical. Instead, policies have agency themselves and are “productive, performative and continually contested.”<sup>56</sup> As such, policies themselves have the ability to actively reshape the environment that created them in the first place.

Two approaches see the world of policies not as linear processes but as a complex series of events that continuously contest and shape the outcome, interpretation and reframing of policies: *Interpretive Policy Analysis* and *Anthropology of Policy*. The latter focuses on the streets, on the people and on how policy affects their everyday lives.<sup>57</sup> As such, it does not merely look at the policy processes but also emphasizes the way in which people in different contexts enact policies. *Anthropology of policy* looks at the meaning of policies, their outcome, whose interest a certain policy promotes and what social effects the policy leads to.<sup>58</sup> I would have applied this framework if I were to investigate the power struggle between different elitist interest groups within the government, which led to the strategies in the solid waste sector. However, in this thesis I investigate whether the public movement has been shaping the policy-debate of the solid waste sector, keeping the imbalanced power-relationships in mind. For that purpose, I adopt the *Interpretive Policy Analysis* is.

## 2.1 Interpretive Policy Analysis

The traditional, positivistic methods to study policies depart from the idea that


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<sup>56</sup>Idem.

<sup>57</sup>Idem, p. 8

<sup>58</sup>Idem, p. 8.

it is “possible, to make objective, value-free assessments of a policy from a point external to it.”<sup>59</sup> This is challenged by the *Interpretive Policy Analysis*, which sees multiple interpretations possible in the social world. The objects interpreted within this approach are the meanings of policies. In other words, the values, feelings and beliefs, which policies express and invoke are studied. As a first step, the meanings invoked by certain policies are identified. Once this is done, the way these meanings are communicated and how the audience reads the meanings is investigated. These meanings (values, beliefs and feelings) are expressed through symbols or artifacts.<sup>60</sup> Artifacts are tangible, visible and expressed in language, objects and acts. Consequently, by analyzing these concrete artifacts, we can understand the abstract meanings they represent. Additionally, it is not only the meanings which influence the artifacts; instead, the artifacts themselves are able to influence the meanings. Therefore, the shaping of artifacts and their meanings is a dynamic process, as shown in Figure 1.



*Figure 1: The use of artifacts maintains or changes underlying meanings (Yanow D., 2000, p.16.)*

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<sup>59</sup> Yanow, D., *Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis. Sage University Paper series on Qualitative Research Methods Series* Vol. 47, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2000), p. 5.

<sup>60</sup> Idem, p. 14.

Consequently, all forms of language, objects and acts can carry meaning and can therefore be interpreted by all actors involved in a policy process. The actors involved are both those elaborating, formulating and implementing a policy (legislators, implementers, consultants, clients) and those on the other side of the policy, the affected population or other stakeholders.

The interpretive policy analysis follows four steps of analysis. The first step for the interpretive policy analysis is the identification of the artifacts, which carry significant meanings for the communities, relative to the studied policy issue. The second step happens simultaneously: the relevant communities need to be identified as it is those who create and/or interpret these artifacts.<sup>61</sup> Thirdly, meanings and their conceptual source are identified and attributed to the previously recognized artifacts. And finally, the meanings in conflict with each other are distinguished.

According to Dvora Yanow, there are three carriers of meaning, or artifacts, which can be identified and analyzed accordingly. These are symbolic language, symbolic objects and symbolic acts. Hereafter, the three artifacts and their differing ways of analysis are being introduced.

### ***2.1.1 Symbolic Language***

A wide range of language is analyzed within the interpretive policy analysis framework. It includes written language surrounding the policy itself and extends to the oral and written language of stakeholders' and agencies' documents, interviews and

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<sup>61</sup> Idem, p.20.

other forms of debates and testimony within the investigated domain.<sup>62</sup> Yanow suggests two ways of analyzing this language: the metaphor analysis and the category analysis. For the metaphor analysis, a metaphor is defined as the “juxtaposition of two superficially unlike elements in a single context, where the separately understood meanings of both interact to create a new perception of the focus of the metaphor.”<sup>63</sup> Within the policy context, metaphors can be organizational and carriers of policy meanings. As such, metaphors can give a new insight into the situation they describe, while they also suggest possible action in response to the situation.<sup>64</sup> Therefore, by uncovering the metaphors within policy language and acts, the composition of the policy argument can be discovered. The first step in the metaphor analysis is the identification of the conceptualizations, the metaphor, which policy-relevant actors use. Once this policy or organizational metaphor is discovered, its meaning, within the context in which it was created (be it spatial or chronological) can be deciphered. The meaning of the metaphor, introduced by a policy actor, must be understandable within a shared public context for it to be applied and distributed throughout the policy agency and beyond it. Yanow continuously mentions the importance of access to local knowledge for the analysis of the policy. This is acquired through observation, participation, document study or interviews.

Concerning the category analysis, categories are often created by public policies through the identification and the naming of groups or people they govern or organize.<sup>65</sup> In this context, it is difficult to identify the origin of the categorization, as it often derives from the language that is generally used in the public sphere and then

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<sup>62</sup>Yanow, D. (2000). p. 41.

<sup>63</sup>Idem, p. 42.

<sup>64</sup>Idem, p. 43.

<sup>65</sup>Idem, p.48.

integrated into the policy language. For example, if refugees in Lebanon are categorized on a policy level according to their origin (Palestinians, Sudanese, Syrian, Syrian-Palestinians etc.) the language used for this categorization might derive from the public language generally in use. Another example provides the policy issue analyzed in this thesis, the waste sector in Lebanon. A policy might categorize solutions for the sector according to their environmentally friendliness. The notion of this categorization might derive from an internationally recognized categorization, might form a new categorization or might derive from one that is generally in use in public. Categories “highlight elements deemed similar within the boundaries they draw and different from elements beyond those boundaries”.<sup>66</sup> As such, categories are characterized by common sets, which differentiate them from elements outside their category. The categories are carriers of ideas about the subject they describe. By analyzing the categories incorporated in or expressed through a policy (which actualizes the category administratively), the ideas they are carrying can be looked at more explicitly and can give insight into social dimensions. However, the categorization of certain issues puts more focus on specific sets or characteristics than others. The analyst needs to be aware of that and also look at the characteristics, which are being obscured. Once this is done, analyzing categories can then help to identify the composition of the policy argument. If we go back to the example of the refugee policy in Lebanon, categorizing refugees by their origin might obscure other characteristics, such as their religious (sunni, schi’a, others) or linguistic (Arabic or others) background. Again using the example of environmentally sound waste disposal, this categorization might obscure other elements to the policy, such as the economic feasibility of the waste disposal, the legal

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<sup>66</sup>Idem, p. 49.

characteristics and others. It is important to add that the categorization itself can be contested and therefore be the subject of policy debate itself.

Finally, there is a third way of analyzing symbolic language: the narrative analysis. In this context, stories are seen and analyzed as carriers of meanings. Often, there are multiple stories involved and a counter-narrative might contest the dominant narrative. The discrepancy between the competing narratives illustrates the presence of power differentials and uncertainties surrounding a policy. In this context, the role of the analyst is to enable people to express their stories and his/her focus is not to find the *right* or *true* story. Instead, it is to show that there are multiple policy-actors, which attribute different meanings to a policy. Using a narrative or frame enables the analyst to focus on the active engagement of clients, community members and other individuals impacted by the policy. These groups and individuals are attributing a meaning to the policy. This meaning as well as the reaction to policy issues are shaped by metaphoric aspects of language (different frames applied to an issue or problem) and are as such part of the narrative analysis.

### ***2.1.2 Symbolic Objects***

In addition to language, policy meanings are also expressed through symbolic objects, such as built spaces. As such, policies lead to the creation of agencies or departments that are needed for the enactment of the programs. The agencies or departments, in turn, need to be allocated to a certain space. This space may communicate policy meanings other than those expressed in the policy or might even contradict them. This is because the way the space (e.g. building, square) is designed can reveal meanings through their analysis. For example, a large building can symbolize

power or certain building materials, such as marble, can reflect costliness or quality. In this context, it is important to understand that space has an emotive quality. In other words, it can intimidate or welcome and can accordingly invoke other emotions in the visitor, observer or a pedestrian walking by.

The second symbolic objects, policy programs, are also created through the policy itself. The policy program might carry meanings, which differ from the meanings named and denoted by the original policy language. Additionally, the meaning of policy programs often varies, depending on different interpretive communities. These different interpretations of policy programs might lead to a difficulty in the implementation of a policy. In this context, the first step is to identify whether there is a program-related object within the policy, which carries a symbolic meaning for policy-stakeholders. Secondly, it is investigated whether the objects carry different meanings for different communities. Finally, it is assessed whether these potentially differing meanings are in conflict with each other. This analysis might be difficult as program meanings are often dynamic: They are bound to values and other societal influences, which might change with time.

### ***2.1.3 Symbolic Acts***

In addition to language and objects, also acts are interpreted by policy-relevant groups. Acts are represented by activities such as agenda setting, legislation, implementation and communication of policy meanings. Basically, anything a policy-relevant agency undertakes that represents the policy to members of the public, can communicate policy meanings.<sup>67</sup> Similar to the language and the objects, the interpretation of the various acts by certain policy actors might differ from the meaning

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<sup>67</sup> Idem, p. 74.

intended to communicate. This interpretation, differing from its intention, might lead to reactions by the public, which are again different than those intended or anticipated and this might affect the policy implementation. Analyzing acts as a policy analyst is the most difficult analysis of the three categories of artifacts. This is because they are the least tangible and visible, especially for an outsider to the investigated culture.

## **2.2 Rationale for applying the Narrative Analysis**

As introduced above, the interpretive policy analysis provides different ways of analyzing policies, their debates, their framing and their processes. For the analysis of the solid waste policy domain, a combination of the metaphor and the narrative analysis were chosen. Language provides the most tangible artifact for this analysis. Acts, as artifacts, are in general quite difficult to analyze and a lot of acts on the policy level in Lebanon are carried out behind closed doors and in Arabic. Objects were also excluded as an artifact for analysis. Spaces as objects are not relevant for this study as they were never part of a discussion. The only space causing major problems and disputes in the solid waste sector in Lebanon is the one of facility location, which however is better studied through another lens. The analysis of space as an object looks rather into emotions communicated through department or administrative buildings or squares.

Programs for the implementation of policies, which are also part of the object analysis, were also found to be inappropriate for the analysis in this case. The government never carried out actual programs; it rather elaborated emergency responses to a crisis, or strategies. Thus, the government framed the problems through the elaborated strategies for the sector in a certain way. The public, in turn, contested this framing of the problem at times, which led to a debate. However, the strategies or plans

were never implemented. These strategies and the response to them are thus best studied through the analysis of the language used. Therefore, for this thesis, a combination of the metaphor and the narrative analysis will be applied. Both allow to look into the framing of policy problems, which is the matter of investigation in this thesis. Category analysis, even though part of the language analysis, was also excluded as an analysis option. This was done because the main categorization in the context of solid waste management in Lebanon was environmentalism (in the sense of protection of the environment). This categorization was contested itself: while the government side (MoE, CDR), together with the international organization UNDP claimed that incineration of waste is an environmentally friendly way of dealing with the waste, this was contested by environmental NGOs. The latter claimed that incineration would lead to the environmentally questionable emission of toxins and the production of hazardous fly ash. However, the analysis through categorization is not able to include other frames and objects contested within the solid waste domain. Therefore, the metaphor analysis together with the narrative analysis were chosen. Combined, these are able to include a wide range of frames, which shaped the policy domain in question. The narrative analysis was chosen to study the issue on a macro level, while metaphor analysis was chosen for the micro-level. Hereafter a closer look is given to the narrative analysis as a framework.

Roe elaborated a structural analysis of policies<sup>68</sup> and found that narrative analysis was to be applied as a loophole in policy-issues that are highly complex, uncertain and polarized. Narratives have an organizing function as they consist,

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<sup>68</sup> Roe, E.M., "Narrative Analysis for the Policy Analyst: A Case Study of the 1980-1982 Medfly Controversy in California," *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, 8,2 (1989, Spring): 251-273.

according to Roe, of a beginning, middle and an end. Since policy-narratives are constructed in that manner, they are able to bring all the information, be it real or hypothetical, from different sources and stakeholders together in a coherent way, in which elements follow each other logically.<sup>69</sup> Next to these types of narratives, there are other ones concerning a certain policy, which do not strictly follow this construction: critiques. These often lack a beginning and are rather, what Roe calls *antistories* or *counterstories* to other, more conventionally structured arguments or stories about the policy issue in question.<sup>70</sup> Counterstories are strongly linked to the story they contest and are bringing up many arguments *against* the latter. However, they often lack in making arguments *for* another case. It is not the analyst's role to find the truth-value in the different narratives. Rather, the analyst is aware of power differentials in the different policy domains and seeks to empower different groups to tell their stories as was outlined by Hampton.<sup>71</sup> The latter attributes to the narrative analysis the ability of including public values and preferences in decision-making. This is done in the present research by giving a voice to the activists and identifying how their demands have shaped the policy domain and what new or old frames have been applied to the issue. Finally, possible reasons for the inability of the activists to shape the final policy outcome are drawn. Therefore, its organizational character justifies applying this framework of analysis to a highly complex, uncertain and polarized policy issue. Additionally, the narrative analysis permits to give voice to the less powerful party in the domain by presenting the activists' narrative and providing possible reasons for their

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<sup>69</sup> Ciomaga, B., "Diversity in the National Basketball Association: a narrative policy analysis," *International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics*, 6,3 (2013, October): 491-511.

<sup>70</sup> Roe, E.M. (1989).

<sup>71</sup> Hampton, G., "Narrative policy analysis and the integration of public involvement in decision making," *Policy Sciences*, 42 (2009): 227-242.

lack of success.

First, however, it needs to be seen whether the criteria provided by Roe for the application of the narrative analysis are given: polarization, uncertainty and complexity.

As will become clearer below in the analysis, the policy domain of solid waste in Lebanon is highly polarized. This is visible through the two main discourses, which are led by the main actors and incompatible with each other. This polarization is also a major source for uncertainty: since different frames are applied to the policy issue, it is not clear which one should prevail and how the problem should be addressed.

Uncertainty is additionally given, as not many studies are available for the sector, which the two main discourses could build upon. Another layer of complexity is added to the issue since various actors interpret the policy issue in different manners, especially in times of crisis. These interpretations are often not compatible with each other.

Finally, for the analysis of the solid waste sector, the terminology of frames is borrowed from Schoen and Rein.<sup>72</sup> The latter identify frames as structures of belief, perception and appreciation, which underlie policy positions. The problems in a certain policy can therefore be framed in a different manner, which may lead to policy controversies. The latter are disputes in which the contending parties hold conflicting frames.<sup>73</sup> From this situation, a discrepancy in the proposed solutions to the problem might be a consequence.

## **2.3 Conclusion**

This chapter introduced the Interpretive Policy Analysis framework, which is applied in this thesis. This framework is adopted, as conventional policy analysis

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<sup>72</sup> Schoen, & Rein. (1994).

<sup>73</sup> Idem, p.23.

frameworks realize the policy process as a logical one, executed by a rational and objective entity. However, this is rarely the process which leads to creation of policies. Rather, irrational policy-making led by power games and grievances determine the policy process and a myriad of actors are involved in the process. The Interpretive Policy Analysis realizes these irrational processes and allows to include the multiple actors involved. Thus, the framework and its different subcategories were introduced and from these subcategories, the narrative analysis framework was chosen for this thesis. This was done due to its organizing character to an uncertain, polarized and complex situation, as the one in the garbage crisis of Lebanon. In addition, the narrative analysis gives voice to the less powerful party involved in the policy process and allows to find possible reasons for its lack of success.

The following chapter will introduce the solid waste sector in Lebanon and present the main actors involved, who are the ones framing the policy problem and shaping the policy debate.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE SOLID WASTE SECTOR IN LEBANON: AN OVERVIEW

The present chapter seeks to give an overview over the waste sector in Lebanon. Therefore, it first introduces general facts and figures concerning the waste composition. This is done in order to illustrate the challenges the sector faces and why proper policy-making is crucial. Thereafter, a historical overview will be drawn over the evolvments in the decades following the Civil War. The introduction of these events shows the irregularities within the sector and explains the discontent of the citizens with the solid waste management (SWM). Thereafter, the stakeholders playing a major role in the sector are going to be introduced. These stakeholders are the ones shaping and leading the policy debate and are therefore important for the further analysis. Finally, the political system in which these actors are embedded is going to be outlined. This is done as it explains the mismanagement of the sector and the difficulties of the public to contest this political system.

#### **3.1 Composition of the Waste**

Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) composes 90% of the total solid waste generated in Lebanon.<sup>74</sup> This type of waste consists of disposals from households, commercial establishments and street markets as well as waste derived from operations such as street cleaning and public park pruning. A relatively small percentage only is composed by special household waste (e.g. batteries) and used tires, industrial and

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<sup>74</sup> MOE/LEDO/ECODIT, *Lebanon State of the Environment Report*, 2001.

medical wastes. Industrial and medical wastes include hazardous wastes, slaughterhouse waste and waste from olive pressing. No special treatment occurs of special household waste, nor of used tires.<sup>75</sup> The same is true for industrial and hazardous wastes: both are mixed with MSW (with the exception of some municipalities which require industries to treat the waste they generate) and no legal nor institutional framework exists to plan and control these wastes.<sup>76</sup> Some progress has been made in the past years concerning medical waste: Decree 8006 was elaborated in 2002, which makes medical institutions responsible for the treatment of the waste they generate. Currently, two on-site treatment facilities for health care waste in medical institutions exist as well as five off-site facilities.<sup>77</sup> These off-site facilities are operated by the NGO *Arc en Ciel*, which has been providing health care waste-treatment since 2003. However, the above-mentioned decree lacks proper implementation as many hospitals are still reluctant to pay for the treatment of their waste and treatment facilities are not adequately monitored.

In order to present the composition of the MSW, first the Lebanese population and living patterns will be introduced. Lebanon's population is composed of 7.7 million inhabitants. This number includes the 5.85 million Lebanese and Palestinians in the country as well as the 1.85 million Syrian Refugees, who fled the Conflict persisting in the neighboring country since 2011.<sup>78</sup> Three types of living conditions prevail in the country: Urban (6.21 million people), Rural (1.31 million people) and Refugees (around 0.18 million people who live in Informal Settlements). Accordingly, there exist three types of waste generation patterns. Generally, the composition of the Solid Waste depends not only on the area, rural versus urban, but also on the season. In rural areas,

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<sup>75</sup> Idem.

<sup>76</sup> SWEEPNET, & giz, *Country report on the Solid Waste Management in Lebanon*, April 2014.

<sup>77</sup> Idem.

<sup>78</sup> UNHABITAT & Muhanna Foundation, *Wasteless Lebanon 2022: Integrated Waste Management Policy Paper*, December 2015.

the composition of the Solid Waste is characterized by more organic waste than in urbanized and commercial areas, where the production of paper and plastic wastes is higher than in rural areas. Regarding the season, a difference can be observed between the wet and the dry season: During summertime, more fresh fruits and vegetables are consumed, which leads to a higher amount of organic waste.<sup>79</sup> Taking a national average of waste composition of the Urban and Rural areas in Lebanon, 52.5% of the total waste is organic, while Refugee populations produce approximately 70% of organic waste.<sup>80</sup> Consequently, the solid waste in the country is characterized by a high moisture content, often over 60%.<sup>81</sup> The second biggest component of Lebanese waste are Paper and Cardboard with 16%, followed by 11.5% Plastics, 5.5% Metal, 3.5% Glass and finally 11% of different wastes categorized as Others.<sup>82</sup> The national average of MSW generation per capita per day is estimated to be around 1.05 kg/p/d (kilograms per person per day). In rural areas MSW generation per person is 0.86 kg/p/d, which is lower than in urban areas, where up to 1.2 kg/p/d are produced.<sup>83</sup>

The biggest percentage of MSW is produced by the Greater Beirut Area (GBA), consisting of Beirut and Mount Lebanon (excluding the administrative district of Byblos), which generates 51% of the total waste of the country. The private operator Sukleen has collected the approximately 2,850 tons generated every day in GBA for the past almost two decades. Sukleen (responsible for sweeping and collecting) and Sukomi (disposal and operation of facilities) are operating under the umbrella of the Averda group, serving the GBA. Other bigger urban areas along the coastline are also served by private operators, such as Tripoli by Lavajet and Saida and Jezzine by NTCC. Rural

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<sup>79</sup> MOE/UNDP/ECODIT (2011).

<sup>80</sup> UNHABITAT & Muhanna Foundation (2015).

<sup>81</sup> SWEEPNET & giz (2014).

<sup>82</sup> Idem.

<sup>83</sup> Idem.

areas have their own collecting systems, also often executed by private operators. However, the quality of collection in rural areas often suffers due to a lack of skills and equipment in those areas. Consequently, open dumping and burning frequently characterize rural area waste management. This trend was intensified due to the presence of Refugees in the rural and informal settlements in recent years.<sup>84</sup> Hereafter, an overview of evolutions in the sector following the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) until the present-day situation will be given.

### 3.2 Historical Overview

Prior to the Lebanese Civil War, the municipality of Beirut had been executing its own solid waste collection.<sup>85</sup> The municipality's waste was incinerated in the plants of Amroussieh and Quarantina. In Lebanon, several decrees attribute the responsibility of waste collection and disposal to municipalities. Decree 7975 of May 5, 1931 states that garbage is to be delivered to the municipal department responsible and determines that it is forbidden to deposit waste close to residences.<sup>86</sup> Later, Decree 118 of December 27, 1977 hands the right and duty to organize solid waste collection and disposal to municipalities.<sup>87</sup> By that year however, the Civil War had already broken out and made it impossible for municipalities to carry out their responsibility of solid waste management (SWM) due to a lack of funds. During the Civil War, household waste and at a later stage construction material produced in Beirut were dumped in the Normandy

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<sup>84</sup> MOE/EU/UNDP, *Lebanon Environmental Assessment of the Syrian Conflict & Priority Interventions*, 2014.

<sup>85</sup> Article 1 of Legislative Decree No.118 of June 1977: the municipality is a local government, which enjoys financial autonomy and self-management.

<sup>86</sup> ELARD in association with Envirotech and Tebodin, *Legal Framework for Solid Waste Management in Lebanon*. Submitted to The World Bank in August 2004.

<sup>87</sup> Idem.

dump, a coastal dumpsite close to the area that is today known as Downtown Beirut.<sup>88</sup>

After the Civil War, the municipalities were weakened financially and administratively and therefore unable to resume their responsibility of SWM. Consequently, the government, in 1992, put the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) in charge for solid waste services. Originally, the role played by CDR in the 1970s was one of a policy planning entity.<sup>89</sup> This role expanded progressively over time, while the Council of Ministers (CoM) had power to reject decisions made by the board of the CDR. Nowadays, the CDR is responsible for the development, supervision and implementation of policies and major projects in the fields of transportation, energy, industry, agriculture and – since 1992 – waste management.

Later, in 1994, the CoM contracted the company Sukleen, founded by Maysarah Khalil Sukkar, for the solid waste management of Beirut. Sukleen's responsibility was gradually expanded from managing the waste of Beirut to that of the GBA (excluding Byblos). The company was and is currently paid through mechanisms that are still pending regularization and are therefore illegal disbursements, as can be seen in the contracts in Appendix 1. The money is taken directly from the treasury and will be taken from the Independent Municipal Fund (IMF), created by the Council of Ministers and managed by the Ministry of Finance<sup>90</sup> once the mechanisms are regularized. This fund is fed by 10% of all the bills collected by the central government through the national electricity company *Electricité du Liban* (EDL), the water

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<sup>88</sup> Sadek, S., & el-Fadel, M., "The Normandy landfill: a case study in solid waste management," *Journal of Natural Resources and Life Sciences Education*, 29 (2000): 155-161.

<sup>89</sup> Idem.

<sup>90</sup> Idem.

authorities and different taxes.<sup>91</sup> Some finances, however, were never allocated to this fund<sup>92</sup> and are instead spent by institutions on the national level (such as CDR and the MoIM) directly from the treasury and are not distributed to the municipalities first.

In the same year, in 1994, the operation of the Normandy landfill was suspended, mainly because of its location in the historical and business heart of Beirut and the therefore high interest in reconstruction in the said area.

In 1997, an emergency SWM plan was implemented (CoM Decision No. 58, dated 2/1/1997) for Beirut and GBA.<sup>93</sup> Following the implementation of this plan, the then operating dumpsite of Bourj Hammoud was replaced by the following sites, each with different tasks: Quarantina and Amrousieh (sorting and baling), Coral facility (composting), Bourj Hammoud (temporary storage of large and recyclable materials), Naameh (disposal of sorted Municipal Solid Waste) and Bsalim Landfill (disposal of bulky items).<sup>94</sup> This emergency plan was still in operation almost two decades after its implementation, although different strategies have been elaborated within this period. One of the different strategies was formulated in 2002, when the MoE prepared a Municipal Solid Waste Management Strategy for Lebanon and a Draft Law for the sector through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The strategy, however, did not provide specific guidelines, while the Law is still awaiting the ratification of the parliament. Another plan for SWM was elaborated by a private company (supervised by the MoE), financed by the CDR and approved by the CoM in

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<sup>91</sup> SWEEPNET & giz (2014) p. 28.

<sup>92</sup> Atallah, S., *Liberate the Municipal Fund from the Grip of Politicians*, LCPS, October 2015, retrieved from <http://www.lcps-lebanon.org/featuredArticle.php?id=52> [last accessed on May 7, 2016].

<sup>93</sup> MOE/UNDP/ECODIT (2011).

<sup>94</sup> Idem.

2006 (Decision 1/4952 dated 18 August 2005). This was supposed to be a 10-year municipal plan, which divided the country into four SWM service areas (North & Akkar, Beirut & Mount Lebanon, Bekaa & Baalbak-Hermel, South & Nabatiyeh) and “propose[d] an integrated approach to SWM involving collection and sorting, recycling, composting, and landfilling”.<sup>95</sup> For that purpose, sorting and composting facilities were planned for each of the 26 districts, with eight sanitary landfill sites (2 per service area), in addition to Bsalim for inert materials to serve GBA. However, the 2006-plan was not implemented due to a multitude of factors: the July 2006-war, the lack of public funding, the lack of political will and consensus on the location of the necessary facilities.<sup>96</sup>

Since the implementation of the 2006-plan failed, the MoE elaborated a national integrated strategy, which was approved by the COM, issuing Decision 55 (dated 1/9/2010). This strategy restates the commitment to the 2006 SWM plan and additionally advocated pyrolysis technologies.<sup>97</sup> Although in 2010 pyrolysis was discussed<sup>98</sup>, later reports<sup>99</sup> refer to WtE-technologies and specifically to incinerators when introducing the 2010 strategy. Accordingly, hereafter it will be referred to WtE or incineration when discussing the 2010 strategy. Once the plan was approved, the CDR and the MoE were responsible for preparing and conducting a bidding process in order to hire an international consulting firm for the conduction of an environmental and economical feasibility study for the WtE-strategy and tender documents. The Danish

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<sup>95</sup> Idem, p. 273.

<sup>96</sup> Idem.

<sup>97</sup> Pyrolysis is a process, which treats organic material in order to produce carbon-rich char.

<sup>98</sup> Dr. Charbel Nahas, Minister of Labour in 2010, the year in which Sukleen’s contract was renewed within the SWM plan of that year, in conversation with the author, Beirut, January 2016.

<sup>99</sup> SWEEPNET & giz (2014).

MOE/UNDP/ECODIT (2011).

UNHABITAT & Muhanna Foundation (2015).

company Ramboll, which won the bidding process, elaborated the requested studies and presented them to the CoM. Besides that, however, no further steps were undertaken to implement the study.

Between 1994 and 2015, the contracts with the company Sukleen have been continuously extended. Sukleen's rates increased exponentially throughout these years, reaching 147\$ per ton as of 2015, which is horrendously high relative to the global (75\$ per ton) and regional average (around 40\$ per ton) prices. It is no surprise, then, that the contracts were never open to the public. Additionally, the site of Naameh, although meant to be temporary, has been in operation and constantly enlarged since 1997. Not for the first time, the residents next to the Naameh landfill stood up against this almost two decade-long "temporary" solution in July 2015. This time, the protests led to the closure of the landfill. At the time of the closure, no alternative had been provided. On top of this, the contract with Sukleen expired but the company was asked by the government to continue its services. However, the company halted its activities due to the lack of a disposal site and consequently refuse piled up in the streets of Lebanon's capital in the summer of 2015. Finally, Sukleen restarted its waste collection and ultimately stacked the refuse mainly close to the port of Beirut.

### **3.3 The Actors**

In this section, the different governmental actors who are involved in the SWM of Lebanon are introduced. Thereafter, actors outside the government, such as the private sector, international organizations, Civil Society Organizations (CSO) academia and the protesters are identified.

### ***3.3.1 The Actors within the Government of Lebanon (GoL)***

The foregoing section already mentioned that from a legal point of view, it is the municipalities which have the right and duty to manage their solid waste. Decree 7975 of May 5, 1931 states that garbage should be delivered to the municipal department responsible and prohibits the disposal of waste close to residences.<sup>100</sup> Decree 118 of December 27, 1977 empowers municipalities to organize their solid waste collection and disposal.<sup>101</sup> Another decree concerning municipalities is Decree 9093 of 2002, which arranges incentives for municipalities that host a waste management facility.<sup>102</sup> On the national level, it is the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MoIM) representing municipalities. This ministry therefore has jurisdiction over the solid waste sector. Together with the CDR, the MoIM has been responsible for the formulation and elaboration of strategies for the sector in the 1990s. The MoIM is also responsible for the allocation of the previously introduced Independent Municipal Fund (IMF), through which most of the solid waste projects are funded. The different sources of funds and responsibilities concerning the distribution of funds will be described below. Next to the MoIM, the MoE has jurisdiction over the policies, regulations, strategies and planning in the solid waste sector. Additionally, the ministry's responsibilities are monitoring and controlling all operational solid waste projects, and the review of Environmental Impact Assessment studies related to those projects and the execution of certain projects (e.g. Saida dump). The ministry has

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<sup>100</sup> ELARD, Envirotech & Tebodin (2004).

A complete table of laws concerning the SWM in Lebanon can be found in ELARD, Envirotech & Tebodin (2004), pp. 11-20.

<sup>101</sup> Idem.

<sup>102</sup> SWEEPNET & giz (2014).

elaborated strategies for the solid waste sector, under the umbrella of UNDP, in the years of 2002 and the latest one in 2010. In the aftermath of the Civil War, when municipalities were unable to comply with their responsibilities in the solid waste sector, the CDR was put in charge of SWM by the CoM. Consequently, in the 1990s it was the authorities within the CDR who elaborated the plans and strategies for SWM. In 2005, the CDR was asked by the CoM to elaborate a strategy for the solid waste sector. The different strategies elaborated by CDR, MoIM, MoE and UNDP throughout the years and their content have been introduced above. CDR is generally responsible for the preparation of Terms of References and tender documents as well as commissioning and executing (in GBA and Tripoli) for SWM projects. Today, the CDR has direct responsibility for MSWM in the GBA and Tripoli, together with, but to a lesser extent, the MoE and MoIM.<sup>103</sup>

Finally, the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR) has played a role in the solid waste sector. It has executed and financed (through the European Union – EU) several solid waste projects and awareness campaigns. It also monitors and controls related operational solid waste projects. Lastly, OMSAR assists municipalities in running its SWM facilities for three years once they are operational, supported financially by the government.

Through this introduction of the major stakeholders and agencies under the Lebanese government it becomes clear that responsibilities are not clearly defined and a single board or entity responsible for the solid waste sector does not exist. This has repeatedly been found to be one of the problems for the difficulties in this sector in

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<sup>103</sup> Idem.

Lebanon.<sup>104</sup> Additionally, the different ministerial entities responsible for elaborating the solid waste strategies have shaped the outcome of the plans.



*Figure 2 Key governmental actors SWM: MoE, OMSAR, CDR, MoIM, Local Authorities (LA) (Municipalities (Mu)/ Unions of Municipalities (UoMu)).*

In the years after the Civil War it was mainly the CDR, together with the MoIM, responsible for the creation of strategies and plans regarding the solid waste sector. Once an emergency plan was implemented to deal with the garbage crisis of 1997, the MoE, through the UNDP, elaborated a strategy for the sector which lacked any specific guidance. In 2005, the CDR presented a Waste Management Plan to the CoM, which approved it in June 2006. However, this plan has never been

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<sup>104</sup> Idem.  
UNHABITAT & Muhanna Foundation (2015).

implemented.<sup>105</sup> The latest strategy was again elaborated by the MoE, through UNDP, in the form of a national integrated strategy for SWM and was presented to and approved by the CoM in 2010. This plan was based on the previous strategies of 2002 and 2006 for the inland areas of the countries and Waste-to-Energy (WtE) technologies (mainly through incineration) in the larger coastal cities.

Similar to the distribution of responsibilities, the funding of the solid waste sector is not a clearly set task of one agency. Instead, different governmental institutions through different channels fund the sector. Currently, there are four mechanisms through which funding is carried out.<sup>106</sup> Firstly, in order to cover waste treatment plants, the CDR may assign capital from the treasury of the Ministry of Finance (MoF). The MoIM subtracts this amount directly from the IMF. The second mechanism is also executed by the CDR, which may allocate budget directly from the IMF, supervised by the MoIM, which is the responsible entity for the IMF. Thirdly, international donors through loans or grants fund many projects. These institutions and their role will be introduced below. Finally, some municipalities outside of the GBA are financing treatment plants and landfills (e.g. Zahle) through local taxes and the IMF, as envisaged by law.

Regarding the costs of the solid waste sector, these vary remarkably throughout different areas in Lebanon. In the GBA (excluding Byblos), the total cost per ton for collection, transport, treatment and disposal of municipal waste is estimated to be at around US\$ 175/t; US\$ 30/t of the total amount are related to collection and transport. In Zahle and Tripoli, the costs for collection and disposal are around US\$ 45-50/t and in some rural areas with open dumping the cost is around US\$ 20-30/t.

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<sup>105</sup> SWEEPNET & giz (2014).

<sup>106</sup> Idem, p. 28.

As stated above, international organizations are funding many SW-projects and are consequently important stakeholders in the sector. These actors are introduced hereafter.

### **3.3.2 International Organizations**

International organizations are one of the four mechanisms of funding of the waste sector in Lebanon. They therefore play a major role for the realization of projects and shaping of the sector in general. The main institutions supporting solid waste projects and funding the sector through loans or grants are the UNDP, the World Bank (WB) and the EU. The UNDP has a special role in the policy-making in the sector as it has been majorly involved in elaborating strategies with the MoE for the solid waste sector. The organization's influence in the sector has faced some critique in recent years by former ministers and Civil Society Organizations. This is due to different facts: Firstly, the head of the UNDP environment department Edgar Chehab is closely linked to the Hariri bloc, as he is an adviser to the said bloc. Secondly, it was the same Edgar Chehab who held a presentation to the CoM in 2010 regarding the pyrolysis-technique for the solid waste sector.<sup>107</sup> These meetings were characterized by irregularities, which will be analyzed in more detail in Chapter 5. Additionally, the environmental soundness of WtE in Lebanon is highly questionable and was contested by many environmental NGOs. Besides its influence in policy-making, the UNDP has additionally been involved in the realization of many projects such as the rehabilitation of the Saida dump.

The WB has also been very active throughout the years in the Lebanese solid

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<sup>107</sup> Nahas, C., et al., *Request for clarifications, investigations and appropriate measures concerning the role of the UNDP and its staff in covering waste management corruption in Lebanon*, September 22, 2015, retrieved from <http://charbelnahas.org/?p=1101> [last accessed on April 20, 2016].

waste sector. In 1995, the WB started the Solid Waste/Environmental Management Project (SWEMP) with the CDR as the local implementation agency.<sup>108</sup> This project foresaw the distribution of vehicles for waste collection as well as the construction of disposal facilities. However, the project failed and the only facility constructed was a landfill in Zahle.<sup>109</sup>

The EU was also very much involved in the realization of projects on a municipality level outside the GBA, through OMSAR. Between December 2004 and December 2015, the Union financed 18 projects in the solid waste sector all over the country through a fund of €14 million. The projects led to the distribution of 14,000 containers, 70 collection vehicles and the construction of several composting and sorting facilities in rural areas of the country.

Single countries, mainly Italy and the United States (through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)) have also supported some projects. The Italian Cooperation for Development has been supporting Baalbak with technical assistance related to waste and was active in the South in the support and implementation of waste projects. As for USAID, it financed several small community-based composting plants, which were executed by the local NGO YMCA. These small projects were performed next to a sorting plant in Zahle and a composting plant in Jbeil. Many other NGOs and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have been involved in the sector as is shown in the next section.

All these international organizations and countries have been very active in the

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<sup>108</sup> World Bank, *Implementation completion Report on a loan in the amount of US\$10.09Million to the Lebanese Republic for a Solid Waste/Environmental Management Project*, June 2014.

<sup>109</sup> Idem.

solid waste sector in the past years. However, their work has not been free of critique. As already mentioned above, all of the planned facilities within the SWEMP project could not be executed, with the exception of a landfill in Zahle. This was due to political and NIMBY-reasons.<sup>110</sup> Also, the USAID-financed projects have been found to face technical and operational deficiencies.<sup>111</sup> As for the projects financed by the EU and carried out through OMSAR, they have also faced some critique. While interviewed OMSAR officials state that all their projects have been a success,<sup>112</sup> critical voices have been found in other interviews, inter alia former OMSAR-employees.<sup>113</sup> These say that actually not all of the projects were a success and some facilities are still not operating even though they are ready to be operated. It has not been possible to verify either of the critical voices.

### ***3.3.3 Civil Society Organizations***

Prior to the 2010-plan, there were only a few CSOs influencing the sector on a rather apolitical level by complementing the sector or through campaigns for environmentally sound waste treatment and disposal. This has been done by carrying out awareness campaigns and conducting small projects on a local, decentralized level, filling gaps regarding garbage collection (e.g. collection and treatment of medical waste through Arc en Ciel).<sup>114</sup> Throughout the years, there have been protests by local residents against the implementation of waste treatment facilities. These residents have

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<sup>110</sup> World Bank. (2014).

<sup>111</sup> SWEEPNET & giz (2014), p.39.

<sup>112</sup> Representative of OMSAR, interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, April 6, 2016. Tape recording.

<sup>113</sup> Farouk Merhebi, Director of Environmental Health, Safety & Risk Mananagement at AUB, former employee at OMSAR, and was member of Akram Chehayeb's Committee to solve the garbage crisis. Interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, March 17, 2016. Tape recording.

<sup>114</sup> A list of the major NGOs and their projects in the solid waste sector can be found in UNHABITAT, Wasteless Lebanon (2016), p. 41.

been protesting for the closure of an existing site or against the construction of a planned one. This behavior is internationally recognized as the Not-in-my-backyard-syndrome (NIMBY) and has been a major problem in Lebanon throughout the years mainly due to the country's population density as well as its sectarian character. After the 2010-strategy, elaborated by the MoE, the expression of discontent went beyond the local residents and included environmental NGOs. The major reason for the spread of opposition came from the focus of this strategy on incinerators. Many environmental NGOs were against this particular technique to create energy from waste. They soon formed the Zero Waste Coalition, which also included non-environmental NGOs.

#### ***3.3.4 Academia***

The Lebanese solid waste sector has been a subject of research in academic institutions throughout the years. Since the sector has been working on the basis of an emergency solution since 1997, many academics from different Lebanese universities (such as the Lebanese University, the American University of Beirut and the Lebanese American University) have been dedicating their research on this issue and trying to provide applicable solutions to the situation. However, the academic institutions have played a limited role in influencing the actual outcomes of strategies elaborated by the ministries and the CDR (they have not been consulted). The institutions influencing the decision-makers were rather international organizations and international or national consultants from the private sector. Some academic institutions entered partnerships with CSOs for the promotion of a specific issue. One example in this regard is the Université Saint Joseph (USJ), which entered a partnership with the Zero Waste Coalition. The private sector also had its representatives in the solid waste sector as

introduced below.

### **3.3.5 The Private Sector**

In Lebanon, it is mainly the private sector, contracted by the government or in some cases by certain municipalities, who is carrying out services related to the solid waste. As already mentioned above, the company Lavajet is responsible for waste disposal in Tripoli. In Saida and Jezzine, NTCC is contracted for the collection and disposal of waste. In Zahle it is a local service provider that operates the solid waste facility. In the GBA, the company Sukleen is responsible for waste collection and sweeping, and Sukomi for the disposal and the operation of the solid waste facilities. Both companies are under the umbrella of the Averda group. Sukleen has been subject to many controversies in the past years and therefore, its case is investigated further, below.

#### **3.3.5.1 Sukleen**

Sukleen's contract of 1995 was due to expiration at the end of 2000. However, annex 5 of its contract allowed for its renewal until the Minister of Interior terminates it. Consequently, the contract was renewed in 2000, 2007, 2010 and lately in 2015. This was done despite the Court of Accounts' decision 99/1 issued on March 30 1999, in which it stated that the contracts with Sukleen are illegal.<sup>115</sup> According to Article I of Decree Law no. 132 (dated April 14, 1992), the Court of Accounts has the responsibility

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<sup>115</sup> يمكن لا وكوارث لمسؤولين اداثة :كنعان المقيلة الجلسة الى النفايات بملف المعنيين الوزراء دعوة طلبت المال لجنة <sup>115</sup> عنها السكوت , *National News Agency*, March 17, 2016, retrieved from <http://nna-leb.gov.lb/ar/show-news/212291/nna-leb.gov.lb/ar> [ast accessed on May 12, 2016].

to watch over public funds and to secure that their use is in accordance with existing laws and regulations.<sup>116</sup> As such, this entity found that the contracts with Sukleen were not complying with the law because the tendering requirements foreseen for a company carrying out public services were not fulfilled.<sup>117</sup> In addition, the municipalities, which by law have the responsibility to provide their own SWM, were excluded from the contracts and the IMF was spent without the consent of the municipalities, but was handed over by the government directly to Sukleen.

That not enough, the contracts with Sukleen were also horrendously expensive, compared to a global and regional average. The global average of waste collection per ton amounts to US\$75. While in Amman, US\$38 are paid per ton to manage the refuse, in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, the amount paid per ton is US\$147.<sup>118</sup> Finally, the contracts with Sukleen were not transparent, and insight into them was even refused to members of the Council of Ministers.<sup>119</sup> Despite those facts, the contracts were continuously renewed until 2015 and Sukleen is operating still at the moment of writing. Additionally, Sukleen never went through bidding processes, foreseen for a company to carry out public services. This is not surprising since the company is closely linked to major political figures (such as Hariri).<sup>120</sup> Suspecting these links and the distribution of

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<sup>116</sup> Iskandar, A., *Public Service Accountability in Lebanon*, American University of Beirut, retrieved from <http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/PSAccount/PSAccount-1.html> [last accessed on February 2, 2016].

<sup>117</sup> Leenders, R., "Nobody Having too Much to Answer for: Laissez-Faire, Networks, and Postwar Reconstruction in Lebanon," in *Networks of Privilege in the Middle East, The Politics of Economic Reform Revisited*, ed. Heydemann, S. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 169-200.

<sup>118</sup> Issa, P., "Trash collection prices draw controversy," *The Daily Star*, August 25, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Aug-25/312607-trash-collection-prices-draw-controversy.ashx> [last accessed on February 2, 2016].

<sup>119</sup> Dr. Charbel Nahas, in conversation with the author, Beirut, January 2016.

<sup>120</sup> Leenders, R., *The Politics of Corruption in Post-War Lebanon* (Doctoral dissertation, London University, 2004), retrieved from AUB Jafet Library (J364.1323:L486p:c.1).

shares deriving from the waste sector between main political figures, some ministers tried to contest the expansion of the contracts in 2010. However, they did not succeed.

### **3.3.6 The Protesters**

The public has been successful in some cases in shaping the sector. Two major examples (the Toxic Waste-scandal during the Civil War and the case of Bourj Hammoud in 1997) will be examined in detail in the following Chapter 3. The same chapter is also dedicated to the protests of 2015 and will tackle the different groups active during these protests. This is done because the later analysis is focusing on the events and the contestation of 2015. These actors therefore deserve a closer examination.

## **3.4 The Political System**

All these above introduced actors and stakeholders operate in a specific political environment. The political system in Lebanon is based on two systems, built upon each other: sectarianism and patron-client relationships or clientelism. Sectarianism refers to the political life in Lebanon, which is structured along sectarian lines.<sup>121</sup> This system foresees the distribution of governmental and public posts according to sectarian quotas. The same is true for public resources, which are formally and informally distributed across sects.<sup>122</sup> Sectarianism was prevailing in Lebanon prior to the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) and was again institutionalized through the Ta'if agreement, which ended the war. The current political system is therefore based on the Ta'if agreement, which again centered the sect as the main axis of political

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<sup>121</sup> Cammett, M., *Compassionate Communalism: Welfare and Sectarianism in Lebanon*. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2014), p. 58.

<sup>122</sup> Idem, p. 58.

representation.<sup>123</sup> As such, the prevailing sectarianism continues to undermine secular national ideas and instead creates religious loyalties.<sup>124</sup> Thus, the “sectarian nationalism and the politics of nationalist elitism”<sup>125</sup> of the pre-war period were reestablished at the end of the war. Therefore, “although formally a consociational democracy with a constitution, a parliament, and regular elections, real political power in Lebanon derives from the informal networks that are governed by the various sectarian elites”.<sup>126</sup> In this system, the Lebanese state remains captured by the old and new elites and paralyzed by their feuds about access to and redistribution of resources among themselves.<sup>127</sup> These elites accumulated massive wealth inter alia in the reconstruction period of the post-war years, with no institutional obligation to redistribute this wealth among the Lebanese citizens. Therefore, the elites were successful in controlling the access to surplus in the country, thus maintaining the inequality in the society.<sup>128</sup> The sectarian system “legitimated a system of patronage and a division of spoils among the elites.”<sup>129</sup> Thus, this situation fosters the second system the Lebanese political environment operates in: clientelism. This system is based on the bond between the patrons and the clients: The patron receives compliance for the exchange of protection and resources.<sup>130</sup> In order to maintain and strengthen his dominance, the patron controls resources (economic, political, social etc.) and limits the degree of their redistribution.<sup>131</sup> Thus, the average Lebanese citizens remain dependent on linkages and connections to the patron and his

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<sup>123</sup> Idem, p. 60.

<sup>124</sup> Idem, p. 25.

<sup>125</sup> Makdisi, U., “Reconstructing the Nation-State: The Modernity of Sectarianism in Lebanon,” *Middle East Report*, 200, Minorities in the Middle East: Power and the Politics of Difference (1996, July-September): 23-26+30, p.25.

<sup>126</sup> Kingston, P. W.T., “Patrons, Clients and Civil Society: A Case Study of Environmental Politics in Postwar Lebanon,” *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 23,1 (Winter 2001): 55-72, p. 57.

<sup>127</sup> Idem, p.26 & Kingston, P. (Winter 2001), p. 68.

<sup>128</sup> Kingston, P.W.T. (Winter 2001), p. 68.

<sup>129</sup> Makdisi, U. (1996, July-September), p.25.

<sup>130</sup> Kingston, P.W.T. (Winter 2001), p. 56.

<sup>131</sup> Idem, p. 56.

representatives in order to gain access to these resources. Since the elites in the country are interested in maintaining their power and dominance, they sustain the patron-client system, which has severe implications on the effectiveness of public policies. The two systems together hinder conventional policy-making and the clear assignment of responsibilities, the elaboration of rules and policies and their implementation.<sup>132</sup> Instead, the process of policy-making remains fragmented, fostering informal networks of power, which are linked to clan and class.<sup>133</sup> Thus, the informal practices of the political elite, acting according to its own religious, clan and economic interests, led to the immobilization of the Lebanese state.<sup>134</sup>

The environmental policy domain, arising in the post-war years, was generally misused by the political elite to consolidate its power. This was done on two levels: On the regional level in form of the monopolization of the control over funds for environmental projects and on the national level in form of cooptation and penetration of the CSOs, which tried to impede the elite's power execution.<sup>135</sup> The Solid Waste Sector as part of this policy domain represents a particular example in this regard. The centralization and the immobilism in this sector make only sense when explained through the interests related to clientelism.<sup>136</sup> Additionally, donor-funds for the sector were continuously misused by the political elite and did not lead to the improvement of the sector.<sup>137</sup> The clientelistic aspects of the society generally easily mute social

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<sup>132</sup> Kingston, P.W.T. (2013), p. 180.

<sup>133</sup> Idem.

<sup>134</sup> Idem, p. 135 & p. 180.

<sup>135</sup> Kingston, P.W.T. (Winter 2001), p. 70.

<sup>136</sup> Kingston, P.W.T. (2013), p. 135.

<sup>137</sup> Idem, p. 181.

movements and protests against this situation within and outside the solid waste sector.<sup>138</sup>

These political systems operating in the country lead to a specific economic environment equally instrumentalized and exploited by the political elite. The political economy, which Lebanon is based on, will be introduced in the following section.

### 3.5 The Political Economy

Lebanon has a long history of a liberal economy operating in a laissez-faire environment.<sup>139</sup> This led to the Lebanese state operating today as a minimalist state with low taxes, a liberal monetary system, little state enterprise and the dominant role of the private sector.<sup>140</sup> However, in the political system that Lebanon is based on, it is not the market, with its pure merit or competitive advantage to obtain contracts, replacing the lack of state intervention.<sup>141</sup> Instead, *networks* of informal relations between businessmen and politicians, the importance of informal contacts and *wasta* (personal connections) reign the economy in the country.<sup>142</sup> This led to an environment in which public infrastructure is mostly carried out by private companies with special ties to the political elite. The elites were interested in keeping the bureaucratic institutions weak in order to minimize the obligation to redistribute resources on a local and regional level.<sup>143</sup> Therefore, taxes and fees were collected in a centralized manner and the above-introduced IMF was created for their management.<sup>144</sup> The fund was used to realize

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<sup>138</sup> Potter, M.L., *Conservation in Lebanon – Obstacles to an Effective Solid Waste Management Program*. (Master Thesis, American University of Beirut, 2006), retrieved from AUB Jafet Library (MICTM Mic-T:4739:Master:c.1).

<sup>139</sup> Leenders, R., *Nobody* (2004), p. 169.

<sup>140</sup> Idem.

<sup>141</sup> Idem, p. 178.

<sup>142</sup> Idem, p. 177.

<sup>143</sup> Idem, p. 181.

<sup>144</sup> Idem, p. 182.

public services carried out by private companies such as the SWM in the GBA by Sukleen and Sukomi (Averda group). The head of the Averda group, Maysara Sukkar, acknowledged the need for ties with politicians in order to make his business flourishing.<sup>145</sup> Thus, the Waste Management was contracted to Sukleen, while the Beirut City Council would have provided the service for less than half the cost of what was charged by Sukleen. This illustrates the misuse of public funds by the political elite in the solid waste sector. The political elite has also misused other sectors, such as the quarrying sector or the real estate sector. However, for the purpose of this thesis it is enough to focus on the solid waste sector.

### **3.6 Conclusion**

This chapter first introduced the solid waste sector in Lebanon, in order to give a clearer picture of its challenges and possibilities. Then, the chapter provided an overview over the evolvments within the sector over the past two decades. This overview illustrated the irregularities within the sector, which are one of the reasons leading to the discontent of the Lebanese citizens mobilizing in 2015. After providing this overview, the chapter presented the actors involved in the sector. These are the ones shaping the policy debate and thus important for the further analysis. Finally, an overview over the system in which the Solid Waste Sector is organized and in which the above-introduced actors are operating was given. Placing the sector and its actors into the prevailing system shows the difficulties of the involved parties to lead to an improvement of the sector: Governmental institutions are trapped within the informal system of service provision, which elitist figures benefit from. Taxes and fees remain

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<sup>145</sup> Leenders, R., *Politics* (2004), p.85.

managed in a centralized manner in order to minimize the need for their redistribution. Often, the funds of international organizations are misused, while their implemented projects might be boycotted. Simultaneously, some members of the international organizations might benefit themselves from the patron-client relationships as the accusations toward Edgar Chehab might indicate. The same is true for CSOs: they are the ones trying to impede the political elite's continuous power expansion, which takes place at the expense of the Lebanese citizens and the environment. However, the same CSOs are at times infiltrated or coopted by the political elite and some are happily benefitting from the patron-client relationships prevailing in the system. Regarding social movements and protests within this system, both are proven to be difficult and expressed discontent is usually easily muted. Activists take some risks by taking to the streets as they are likely lose their safety-net provided by the clientelistic system. However, expression of discontent and social movements did take place throughout the after-war years. The following chapter will introduce some of the major examples in which social movements and public outcry have taken place in the context of waste management. First, two examples in the past, the scandal of toxic waste imported from Italy during the Civil War and the protests against the Bourj Hammoud dumpsite are going to be introduced. Then, the protests of the summer 2015, which triggered and responded to the garbage crisis of the same year will be tackled in more detail.

## CHAPTER 4

### CRISES, MOVEMENTS AND SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT IN LEBANON

Environmentalism has its history in Lebanon, as both Makdisi and Kingston have shown.<sup>146</sup> Kingston looked into the politicking of the arising environmental policy domain. In this context, he identified two opposing groups: the environmental grassroots organizations (with environmentalists as well as scientists on board) and the decision-making elite of the country. He also identifies a third group, operating between the two opposing positions, composed of international organizations. These have their own agenda and provide funding for the opposing groups. The evolvments of the solid waste sector show that in this particular sector of the environmental domain, a fourth party can be included into Kingston's picture: the protestors. These are introduced as a separate entity, independent of the environmentalists, because the people going to the street are not necessarily environmentalists. They are citizens, mobilizing due to motives such as concerns over their health or due to a scandal. The below introduced cases intend to present the important role of protestors in the sector of solid waste and thus sought to exemplify why they are introduced in this thesis as an independent party.

#### **4.1 Toxic Waste from Italy**

In 1987, in the chaos of the then ongoing Lebanese Civil War, a ship filled with 15,800 barrels and 20 containers of toxic waste entered the port of Beirut coming

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<sup>146</sup> Makdisi, K. (2013).  
Kingston, P.W.T. (2013).

from Italy.<sup>147</sup> The contents of the barrels, falsely but officially declared as raw materials, were sold as paint, fertilizers and pesticides. As for the empty barrels in which the toxic waste used to be stored, they were sold to Lebanese citizens. These citizens, unaware of the original purpose and content of the containers, used them for storage of food, drinking water and agricultural purposes. Not all the material, however, was sold for reuse. Some barrels were burnt and others dumped into the Mediterranean Sea or into water streams within the country, leading to their contamination, as well as of the ground water.

The scandal came to public attention in 1988 and the strength of the local media covering the issue, as well as the powerful popular outcry forced the then Prime Minister Salim Al-Hoss to undertake action.<sup>148</sup> He instructed the state prosecutor Dr. Hamdan to conduct an official investigation on the issue. The outcome of his research led to a report describing the environmental disaster, which the import of toxic waste caused in the country. In addition, a committee of scientific experts was instructed by the Lebanese government to investigate the waste situation. The conclusion of these scientists was that the imported material was 100 percent toxic<sup>149</sup> and their report called for the tracing, proper collecting and storing of the hazardous waste, with its eventual exportation.<sup>150</sup> Lebanon had no capacity of environmentally sound disposal or treatment of toxic waste. Again, the report and the tightened pressure coming from the public, mainly media and environmental groups, pushed Prime Minister Al-Hoss to action: He requested, in July 1988, the financing of the tracing and shipping of the waste from

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<sup>147</sup> Hamdan, F., *Toxic Attack against Lebanon, Case One: Toxic Waste from Italy, Chronology 1887-1997*, Greenpeace-Report, May 1997.

<sup>148</sup> Makdasi, K., *Implementing Environmental Treaties in Developing Countries: Using Flows to Explain how Lebanon dealt with Trade in Hazardous Waste*. Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting March 23, 2006, San Diego.

<sup>149</sup> Idem.

<sup>150</sup> Idem.

Italian authorities<sup>151</sup>.

Realizing the immense public pressure and official indignation, the then Italian ambassador in Lebanon, Antonio Mancini, assured that Italy would take back the toxic waste. Four ships were loaded with the hazardous waste in the port of Beirut. Of these four ships, however, only one reached the Italian shore, while the destiny of the other three remains a mystery. Some indications show that the ships have been sunk in the sea together with their toxic load.<sup>152</sup> While the Italian authorities declared the project as successful, frustration and fear continued to circulate in Lebanon; the media continued to report about hidden toxic waste all over the country and barrels washed ashore the Lebanese coast, probably from the sunken ships carrying the Italian waste. In the middle of this scandalous situation and the public outcry it resulted in, the Lebanese Parliament passed Law No. 64/88 on August 12, 1988.<sup>153</sup> The latter prohibits the import and transport of nuclear or toxic waste. Violation of the law can, depending on the severity, lead to a prison sentence of three years, hard labor during the imprisonment, life sentence under hard labor and in some cases even death penalty.<sup>154</sup> Consequently, the scandal and the resulting public outcry and pressure, which went beyond the media and environmentalist groups to the concerned public, not only pressured the local and international authorities to deal with the problem, but finally led also to the adoption of this stringent law.

The case of the Italian toxic waste was reopened in 1994 when residents of the Kisirwan Mountains were frightened and mobilized due to a series of events: the attempted dumping of foul-smelling waste by representatives of the MoE in their region;

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<sup>151</sup> Idem.

<sup>152</sup> Idem.

<sup>153</sup> Idem, p.7.

<sup>154</sup> Idem.

35 barrels of waste were found in ‘Ayun al-Siman; and waste barrels of unknown origin were spotted throughout the Kisirwan mountain region.<sup>155</sup> In January 1995, Greenpeace published a study of the waste of ‘Ayun al-Siman, which was found to be hazardous. This report, together with the loud public unrest led to the reopening of the Italian toxic waste case. However, the case was closed in the same year by the then Minister of Environment Pierre Pharoun, who stated that there was no toxic waste present in Lebanon, even though reports of Greenpeace proved otherwise.<sup>156</sup> In 1996, two cases of toxic waste shipment from Germany, Belgium and Canada to Lebanon took place. In that year however, the remarkable public and international pressure led those countries to return their waste. According to Makdisi, in all of the above mentioned cases, it was the public pressure, which pushed the government to react to the scandals.<sup>157</sup>

Another example in which the public, mainly through its mobilization, led to a change of events, happened in Bourj Hammoud, almost a decade after the toxic waste scandal.

#### **4.2 The Protests of Bourj Hammoud**

In the aftermath of the Lebanese Civil War, the solid waste sector in the country was not guided by a specific strategy. The waste outside the Greater Beirut Area (GBA) was mainly openly dumped or burnt, while the destination of the waste of Beirut was the Normandy dump, before its rehabilitation, and the dumpsite of Bourj Hammoud. The residents of Bourj Hammoud, however, refused to continue to accept

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<sup>155</sup> Makdisi, K., *Trapped between sovereignty and globalization: Implementing international environmental and natural resources treaties in developing countries. The case of Lebanon* (Doctoral dissertation, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, 2001).

<sup>156</sup> Idem.

<sup>157</sup> Idem, p. 233.

the mountain of garbage, growing without any treatment or limit within their neighborhood. Just as it was the case with the Naameh landfill, its closure was planned but continuously postponed. Instead of the Bourj Hammoud site, the incinerators of Amroussieh and Quarantina were to get reopened.<sup>158</sup> Since the government delayed the implementation of the plan once again in the summer of 1997, the Armenian Tashnag party called for a strike and deputies of the Metn area pushed for the closure of the Bourj Hammoud dumping site.<sup>159</sup>

At the same time, the residents of Amroussieh scrutinized and rejected the rehabilitation of the incinerators as compensations for the Bourj Hammoud site. In order to prevent the operation of the Amroussieh site, angry residents burnt the facility, which was situated within their residential area. While Sukleen announced on July 19<sup>th</sup>, 1997 its halt of collecting refuse, the Bourj Hammoud landfill was finally closed on July 20<sup>th</sup>, due to the pressure of the residents. By then, however, no alternative solution for the disposal and treatment of the waste was found. Consequently, the same happened as in this past summer: Refuse piled up in the streets next to residential areas, mainly in the southern suburbs of Beirut and the coast north of Beirut. After 8 days of open dumping in these areas, Sukleen was requested by the government to transfer the refuse to the al-Maramel area, south of Beirut, next to the Airport Road. Just under a month later, on August 18<sup>th</sup>, the mayor of Beirut authorized the CDR to utilize the area of Naameh next to the St. George Monastery (site number 1721) for sanitary landfilling.<sup>160</sup> Next to this site, another landfill was built in Naameh's former crushing plant. For both cases,

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<sup>158</sup> Boutros, J., "Garbage Crisis in Lebanon – 1997: Same Policy, Repeated History," *The Legal Agenda*, October 16, 2015, retrieved from <http://english.legal-agenda.com/article.php?id=728&lang=en> [last accessed on January 27, 2016].

<sup>159</sup> Idem.

<sup>160</sup> Idem.

Sukomi was put in charge to execute the projects and operate the landfills.

The examples of Bourj Hammoud and Amroussieh show that strong protests have led to drastic changes in the sector. While there was no elaborated strategy in the sector prior to 1997, from then onwards, the solid waste of Beirut and GBA was managed through an emergency-plan. The latter was drafted by Sukleen and adopted by the Lebanese government. The emergency-plan for Beirut and the GBA led, in addition to the operation of Naameh (for disposal of sorted MSW), to the application of the following sites, each with different tasks: Quarantina and Amroussieh (sorting and baling), Coral facility (composting), Bourj Hammoud (temporary storage of large and recyclable materials), Naameh (disposal of sorted Municipal Solid Waste), Bsalim Landfill (disposal of bulky items). Incineration as an alternative for landfilling could not be discussed at the time being due to the strong rejection: Residents of Amroussieh set the incineration facility in their neighborhood on fire to prevent its reopening. The newly introduced interim projects and solutions faced little opposition from the public, apart from the residents of Naameh, which were assuaged by the then Minister of Environment Akram Chehayeb.

As one of a few, late Member of Parliament Wadi Aqel for the Chouf region addressed the government with the following questions about the Naameh landfill: “Are we to know what types of waste the government intends to dump in Naameh? Has there been a scientific study conducted in this regard, taking into consideration the damage to Naameh and its surroundings? Will the landfilling process –even if the latest standards thereof are adopted- not pollute the atmosphere of the region and its groundwater? Will

waste be sorted before landfilling and where?”<sup>161</sup> Aqel’s questions were never answered and the decision started to be implemented. This plan and the Naameh landfill site were still operating in 2015, the year in which a new crisis broke out.

### **4.3 Protests of 2015 and 2016**

In this section, the social movement of 2015 and 2016, a timeline of its major events and the participating groups and actors will be introduced. For the purpose of more clarity, it is subdivided and will first introduce an overview of the events and the proposed solutions to the crisis. Following, the protesting groups will be tackled and finally the response of the authorities to the protests will be examined.

#### **4.3.1. The events**

In order to tackle the protests of 2015 and 2016, two foregoing incidents need to be mentioned, since they are part of the occurrences experienced today. These events are the protests of the residents neighboring the Naameh landfill of January 2014 and January 2015. Already before the outbreak of the 2015 crisis, the residents had repeatedly called for a closure of the supposedly temporary landfill in their neighborhood. In January 2014, activists have blocked the access road to the Naameh landfill for over a week, from the 17<sup>th</sup> until the 25<sup>th</sup>. These sit-ins led to garbage piling up in the streets of the Beirut and were finally suspended after a police crackdown.<sup>162</sup> A year later, on January 17<sup>th</sup> 2015, the landfill of Naameh was supposed to get closed and

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<sup>161</sup> Aqel Asks the Government About Landfilling in Naameh, *Al-Nahar newspaper*, August 25, 1997, p. 10, Boutros, J. (2015).

<sup>162</sup> El Hassan, J., & Knutsenl, E., “Sit-in at Naameh landfill suspended after crackdown,” *The Daily Star*, January 25, 2014, retrieved from <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Jan-25/245243-sit-in-at-naameh-landfill-suspended-after-crackdown.ashx> [last accessed on April 25, 2016].

the contracts with the company Sukleen were set to expire on the same date. However, no alternative to the landfill had been found and it was not shut down. Therefore, environmentalists and the residents living close to the landfill blocked its entrance once again. They faced security forces, who took a stand in and around the landfill to prevent an escalation.<sup>163</sup> Another protest was held on January 31<sup>st</sup> 2015, when again the roads to the landfill-site were blocked.<sup>164</sup> Despite all efforts by the activists, the closure of the landfill was postponed once again, while also the contracts with Sukleen remained in force and both were supposed to expire on the 17<sup>th</sup> of July 2015. Since both, the landfill and the company, were still in operation by the end of that day, the residents together with environmental activists organized yet another sit-in at the landfill-site.<sup>165</sup> The day after, also residents close to the Hbaline-landfill, where the waste of Byblos is dumped, blocked the roads to the site, fearing that Beirut's waste would be disposed of in their landfill.

Garbage piled up in the streets of Beirut and its suburbs and the angry citizens organized a sit-in on the 21<sup>st</sup> of July 2015 in the capital's Downtown, demanding an end to the crisis.<sup>166</sup> The activists were joined a day later by residents close to the landfill of Nabatieh in the south, which demanded a closure of that landfill as well.<sup>167</sup> Since there

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<sup>163</sup> "Angry residents block entrance to Naameh dump," *The Daily Star*, January 17, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Jan-17/284443-angry-residents-block-entrance-to-naameh-dump.ashx> [last accessed on April 25, 2016].

<sup>164</sup> "Naameh residents block road near landfill," *National News Agency*, January 31, 2015, retrieved from <http://nna-leb.gov.lb/en/show-news/39963/Naameh-residents-block-road-near-landfill> [last accessed on April 25, 2016].

<sup>165</sup> "Naameh Landfill Closure Deadline Expires, Protesters Stage Sit-in," *Naharnet*, July 17, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/184961-naameh-landfill-closure-deadline-expires-protesters-stage-sit-in> [last accessed on April 25, 2016].

<sup>166</sup> "Conflict Incident Report", *Lebanon Support*, 2015, retrieved from <http://cskc.daleel-madani.org/sir/sit-riad-solh-square-demanding-government-address-waste-crisis> [last accessed on April 26, 2016].

<sup>167</sup> "Residents of Kfour, Follow Naameh, Prevent Dump Trucks from Unloading," *Naharnet*, July 22, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/185386-residents-of-kfour-follow-naameh-prevent-dump-trucks-from-unloading> [last accessed on April 26, 2016].

was no prospect to an end of the garbage crisis, another protest- activity was carried out on the 24<sup>th</sup> of July, close to Downtown Beirut. Furious activists blocked a major road with burning trash.<sup>168</sup> On July 25<sup>th</sup>, the Minister of Environment announced the resumption of the trash pickup, which took effect two days later.<sup>169</sup> However, the Minister did not inform the public where the waste was dumped.

The end of July and beginning of August were characterized by protests in Beirut for an end to the garbage crisis and by road-blocks of residents of different areas throughout the country, such as Akkar and Mount Lebanon, to prevent the transport of the capital's waste to their neighborhood.<sup>170</sup> It was in the early days of the protests that the *You Stink*-campaign became a fulcrum of the social movement. This slogan reflects the discontent with the corrupt political elite, which fails to provide public services such as 24hours electricity, running water, public spaces, social security and waste management, to name but a few.<sup>171</sup> The group, which organized its first big campaign on the 8<sup>th</sup> of August, initially demanded a solution to the garbage crisis<sup>172</sup> and soon the

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<sup>168</sup> "Furious residents block Beirut roads with burning trash," *The Daily Star*, July 24, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Jul-24/308178-furious-residents-block-beirut-roads-with-burning-trash.ashx> [last accessed on April 26, 2016].

<sup>169</sup> "Lebanon declares end to trash crisis; waste pickup to resume," *The Daily Star*, July 25, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Jul-25/308321-minister-announces-end-of-garbage-crisis-collection-to-resume-tonight.ashx> [last accessed on April 30, 2016].

"Garbage collection resumes in Lebanon after temporary solution found" *YaLibnan*, July 27, 2015, retrieved from <http://yalibnan.com/2015/07/27/garbage-collection-resumes-in-lebanon-after-temporary-solution-found/> [last accessed on April 30, 2016].

<sup>170</sup> For a detailed timeline of the garbage crisis, see: Civil Society Knowledge Centre, Lebanon Support, *Waste Management Conflict*, 2015, retrieved from <http://goo.gl/gwA4Y2> [last accessed on April 26 2016].

<sup>171</sup> Lebanon Support, *Waste Management Conflict (Starting January 25, 2014)*, August, 2015, retrieved from <http://cskc.daleel-madani.org/timelines/31033#29> [last accessed on April 26, 2016].

<sup>172</sup> Abdallah, M., "The groups protesting in Beirut," *Now.*, September 2, 2015, retrieved from <https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/reportsfeatures/565838-the-groups-protesting-in-beirut> [last accessed on May 28, 2016].

resignation of the Minister of Environment Mohamad Machnouk.<sup>173</sup>

Already in these early days, first arrests of protesters took place and antiriot-police and water hoses faced some of the roadblocks.<sup>174</sup> These arrests led to the mobilization of more individuals who sympathized with the arrested activists and demanded their release. Although a long-term solution to the garbage crisis in the country remained a central issue for the protesters, the social movement became also a platform for other and broader demands. From August 8<sup>th</sup> onwards, thousands of citizens gathered regularly to protest the widespread corruption in the country, some demanding the change of electoral law and a change of the ruling elite as a solution to the many problems the country faces. Some even demanded an end to the sectarian system, which the Lebanese government is built on since the Taif-agreement was signed at the end of the Civil War. Others demanded a sustainable, environmentally friendly disposal of the waste, embedded in a long-term strategy. Decentralization became a major demand as well, as by law, it is the municipalities' responsibility to deal with their own waste.

Two critical days of the protests were the 22<sup>nd</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup> of August 2015 when tens of thousands of protesters gathered in Downtown Beirut and their movement was faced by police who fired teargas and water-canon to disperse the protests.<sup>175</sup> These clashes, the most violent in the chronology of the protests thus far, were accompanied by arbitrary arrests of protesters and led to a decrease in number of participants to the

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<sup>173</sup> "You Stink' Campaigners Back to the Streets of Beirut," *Naharnet*, July 28, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/185842-you-stink-campaigners-back-to-the-streets-of-beirut> [last accessed on April 26 2016].

<sup>174</sup> "Beirut-South Highway Reopened, 7 People Injured in Anti-Trash Clash," *Naharnet*, July 27, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/185737-beirut-south-highway-reopened-7-people-injured-in-anti-trash-clash> [last accessed on April 26 2016].

<sup>175</sup> "Downtown Beirut Turns into War Zone as Police Battle Anti-trash Protesters," *Naharnet*, August 22, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/188097-anti-garbage-protesters-call-for-regime-s-fall> [last accessed on April 26 2016].

protests. However, smaller but continuous sit-ins were organized regularly and NGOs organized solidarity movements with the protesters.<sup>176</sup> It was in these days that the *You Stink* movement split. One of the newly arising groups was the *We Want Accountability*-group, which launched its first gathering on August 29.<sup>177</sup> On September 1<sup>st</sup> 2015, activists of the *You Stink* campaign stormed the Ministry of Environment and organized a sit-in to demand the resignation of the Minister Mohamad Machnouk. However, the building was cleared on the same day and the Minister did not resign.<sup>178</sup> The decision to storm the ministry was criticized by many of the other emerged groups, which will be introduced below, and led to a first major split in the social movement.

As mentioned above, on September 9<sup>th</sup> 2015, the Committee of Akram Chehayeb presented its solution to the crisis, consisting of an interim-phase of 18 months and a following long-term solution. The first phase of the solution would see the reopening of the Naameh landfill and two landfills in Akkar and the Bekaa valley. The content of the second phase, envisaging decentralization and environmentally friendly disposal of the waste, was not very detailed and did not provide means for actual realization.<sup>179</sup> This plan led to a second split in the movement as some of the environmentalists met with Akram Chehayeb and agreed with the plan, while others criticized it for not taking into consideration the environmental damages of the (re)openings of the landfills and for neglecting the prerogatives of the rights of the municipalities to independently manage their waste. The plan was rejected by most activists and opposed strongly by the residents of the areas that were to receive the

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<sup>176</sup> Civil Society Knowledge Centre, & Lebanon Support, August 2015.

<sup>177</sup> Abdallah, M. (2015, September 2).

<sup>178</sup> Aboulmona, R. S. & Hassan, N., "Protest ongoing as police clear Ministry of Environment," *The Daily Star*, September 1, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Sep-01/313556-you-stink-campaign-protesters-storm-into-ministry-of-environment-building-in-downtown-beirut.ashx> [last accessed on April 28, 2016].

<sup>179</sup> Nahas, C., et al. (2015, September 22).

waste. Eventually, the plan was cancelled and new solutions needed to be found. On December 1<sup>st</sup> 2015, the Cabinet delivered three decrees that allowed for the distribution of long outstanding funds (US\$795million mainly deriving from revenues of the Ministry of Telecommunication) to the municipalities in order to handle the garbage crisis.<sup>180</sup> The second solution to put an end to the garbage crisis was announced by the Cabinet on December 21<sup>st</sup>, which planned for the export of the waste.<sup>181</sup> However, also this plan failed due to scandals related to corruption.<sup>182</sup>

Finally, on March 12<sup>th</sup>, the cabinet approved a solution proposed by the garbage crisis-committee (headed by Chehayeb), to reopen the Naameh landfill for two months and for setting up new landfills around the capital, in Nahr Ghadir (Costa Brava, south of Beirut) and Bourj Hammoud (north-east). As the plan of 1997, this solution would be an interim one, being in force for the coming four years.<sup>183</sup> While the movement has not been able to shape the outcome of the policy-debate, it was successful on other levels: The movement led to the creation of campaigns and parties, which contested the political elite in the municipal elections taking place in May 2016. These political groups, together with the major campaign, *You Stink* and many other groups it divided into will be introduced hereafter.

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<sup>180</sup> “Cabinet decrees release key funds to help trash crisis,” *The Daily Star*, January 1, 2016, retrieved from <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Sep-01/313556-you-stink-campaign-protesters-storm-into-ministry-of-environment-building-in-downtown-beirut.ashx> [last accessed on April 28, 2016].

<sup>181</sup> Massena, F., “Lebanon holds breath for deal to export trash abroad,” *Al-Monitor*, February 1, 2016, retrieved from <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/02/lebanon-trash-crisis-tender-export-waste.html#ixzz46vS9lxc3> [last accessed on April 26, 2016].

<sup>182</sup> Basim, F. (March 12, 2016).

<sup>183</sup> Basim, F., “Cabinet approves opening 3 landfills to end trash crisis,” *The Daily Star*, March 12, 2016, retrieved from <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2016/Mar-12/341880-cabinet-eyes-landfill-solution-to-end-waste-crisis.ashx> [last accessed on April 26, 2016].

### 4.3.2 *The activists*

As already mentioned above, the fulcrum of the protests was the *You Stink* (*tul'it rihetkun*) group. The group's leadership consisted mainly of educated men from an urbanized Beirut-background.<sup>184</sup> The activists of this group are also characterized by their youth, and their significant social, but unstable economic capital.<sup>185</sup> The group itself was *inter alia* formed by independent individuals and activists from the Civil Society, environmental and human rights groups. Its main goal was to push for an end to the ongoing garbage crisis. In a meeting with Assaad Thebian, one of the leaders of the *You Stink* movement, he explained that the group sees itself as a catalyst for change, raising awareness about corruption and unconstitutional events and mobilizing people to stand up for their rights.<sup>186</sup> Thebian explained further that the group does not want to be involved in politics, it rather leaves this arena to the groups *Beirut Madinati* (Beirut my City) and the secular party *Mouwatinoun Wa Mouwatinat fi Dawla* (Citizens within a State), which run for the municipal elections in Beirut in May 2016. According to Thebian, *You Stink* had four major demands: 1) to end the garbage crisis; 2) the resignation of the Minister of Environment Mohamad Machnouk; 3) accountability of the people responsible for the violent responses to the peaceful protests and 4) revitalizing the institutions through a new law.

Other groups had more political demands, such as the *We Want Accountability* (*badna nhasib*) group. This group is a left-leaning collective and openly includes the following political parties: the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party; the Socialist Arab

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<sup>184</sup> AbiYaghi, M.-N., Catusse, M., Younes, M., *From isqat an-nizam at-ta'ifi to the garbage crisis movement: political identities and antisectarian movements*, (unpublished chapter) Lebanon Support, 2016.

<sup>185</sup> Idem, p. 5.

<sup>186</sup> Interview with Assaad Thebian, one of the leaders of the *You Stink* movement, on May 19<sup>th</sup>, 2016.

Lebanon Vanguard Party (*Hizb al Taliyeh Lubnan Al- 'Arabi Al-Ishtiraki*), which is the Lebanese branch of the Iraqi Baath party; the People's Movement (*Harakat Al-Shaab*); and a party formed of former members of the Communist Party. The *We Want Accountability* group connected the garbage crisis to the corrupt political elite and were more pushing for a change of the system.<sup>187</sup> This group saw the light after the protests of the 22<sup>nd</sup> of August and demanded firstly that the persons responsible for the violence against the protesters should be held accountable. Other demands posed by this group were: returning the responsibilities for waste disposal to the municipalities; dropping the charges against arrested protesters; the right to protest and freedom of speech; a new secular electoral law; resignation of the Lebanese cabinet.

*You Stink* and *We Want Accountability* were the two major groups within the movement of 2015 and 2016. However, these two groups were not always unanimous regarding ideas, demands and visions. For example, Assaad Thebian stated that the *We Want Accountability* group did not agree with *You Stink's* slogan *All means All* (referring to all the political elite, which should be held accountable).

Another leftist group, *The People Want (ash-sha 'ab yurid)*, incorporating grassroots movements and smaller political parties (such as the Socialist Forum), has been less effective in mobilizing people, but has been active on the ground (handing out leaflets and holding public debates).<sup>188</sup> The group's demands were similar to the ones of the above introduced groups: the release of the arrested protesters, accountability of security forces for the violence on protests, the resignation of Nohad Machnouk (Minister of Interior) and Mohammad Machnouk (Minister of Environment), handing waste management to municipalities, the prosecution of corruption and parliamentary

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<sup>187</sup> AbiYaghi, M.-N., Catusse, M., Younes, M., (2016), p.6.

<sup>188</sup> Idem, p.6.

elections.<sup>189</sup> This group also aimed in forming a common ground for the established groups.

The *Ecomovement*, which includes around 60 environmental NGOs across the country, represents the environmentalists. The president of the group, Paul Abi Rached, has been invited by Akram Chehayeb to discuss the first solution. This split the civil society, as a large part of the opposition did not agree with the plan and most of the movement did not see itself represented by the *Ecomovement*.<sup>190</sup> The environmentalist group gathered on March 5 2016 with experts (industrialists, professors, lawyers, syndicates, independent experts) to elaborate a roadmap for an environmentally sound solution to the garbage crisis, which was signed by 220 NGOs.<sup>191</sup> However, this roadmap has received little attention by the media and by officials.<sup>192</sup>

Besides the larger groups mentioned thus far, the movement also split into many smaller groups. These include the *ash-shara 'a* (To The Streets) group (gathered activists from the Democratic Left Movement), the *thawrat 22 ab* (Revolution Of August 22) or *chabab 22 Ab* (Youth of the 22nd of August) group (consistent of independent leftist activists and well-known Journalists), the Feminist Bloc (notably around the feminist movement *sawt an-niswa* (The Voice of the Women)), and *tol'it rihetkun, al harakat al tas'hihiyat* (You Stink, Corrective Movement).<sup>193</sup>

The group *To The Streets* became famous for holding a banner with photos of political figures, which they accused of being corrupt. The banner included Hassan

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<sup>189</sup> Abdallah, M. (2015, September 2).

<sup>190</sup> Ali Darwish, NGO Greenline, interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, March 20, 2016. Tape recording.

<sup>191</sup> Antoine Abou Moussa, Board Member of NGO Terre Liban (part of Zero Waste Coalition and Ecomovement). Interview by author, Baabda, Lebanon, March 17, 2016.

<sup>192</sup> Idem.

<sup>193</sup> AbiYaghi, M.-N., Catusse, M., Younes, M., (2016), p. 21.

Lebanon Support, August 2015.

Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, which led to controversial reactions. The group had similar demands as the ones introduced above (resignation of M. Machnouk and N. Machnouk, solution to the garbage crisis, accountability for the violence against protesters, holding the Ministry of Energy accountable for corruption).<sup>194</sup> The group *Revolution Of August 22* split from *You Stink* as they were convinced that a revolution does not need *You Stink* for people to be mobilized. The group was calling for a radical change of the system and for taking down the political system.

Lawyers and employees of the NGO *The Legal Agenda*, provided consultation to the groups on the ground regarding legal issues.<sup>195</sup> All these groups gathered in a meeting once the huge number of tens of thousand protesters was reached who took to the streets on the 22<sup>nd</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup> of August 2015. The political figure and long-established activist Charbel Nahas was also part of this meeting. They reached the consensus of keeping their focus on the issue of the garbage. However, the implementation of this consensus was not necessarily reached as different demands were posed in the following protests, some of which went beyond the garbage issue.<sup>196</sup>

While the major driving force came from the activists of Beirut, significant mobilization took place in other areas of the country as well: in Akkar (*akkar mana mazbaleh* (Akkar is not a Dumpsite)), in the Bekaa (*hirak ba'albeck* (The Movement of Baalbak)) and in the districts of the Metn and the Chouf (*Jal el Dib revolution, barja, al-hamleh al-ahliya li 'iqfal matmar ann-na'meh* (The Campaign of the Community to close the Naameh landfill)). The main figures of the movement were mostly male, civil society and political activists, which had experience from previous movements (notably

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<sup>194</sup> Abdallah, M. (2015, September 2).

<sup>195</sup> Employee of The Legal Agenda, in conversation with author, Beirut April 13, 2016.

<sup>196</sup> Assaad Thebian, in interview with author, Beirut, May 19, 2016.

from a campaign against the sectarian regime in 2011) and who are coming from an urbanized background and from different religious backgrounds.<sup>197</sup>

The movement gathered figures mainly from the radical leftist movements, civil movements and socialist and nationalist movements.<sup>198</sup> Later, political groups formed out of the social movement, which contested the autochthonous elites in the municipal elections of May 2016. In Beirut, these groups were represented by Charbel Nahas' *Citizens within a State* and *Beirut my City*. While *Beirut my City* was focused on Beirut and the improvement of the living conditions within the city<sup>199</sup>, Nahas' party competed in a number of municipal elections across the country. The party's main goal is to break the bonds of the traditional elitist leaders and instead built a "secular, democratic, just and potent state".<sup>200</sup> These groups were the most visible outcome of the movements. However, the leadership of these political groups does not always include the leadership of the movement. Thus, the leading figures of the social movement and the leading figures of the alternative political campaigns differ. Therefore, the movement is rather the root from which the political campaigns derived, and does not include the same stakeholders. In the next section, the reaction of the authorities to the protesters will be discussed.

### ***4.3.3 The response***

As already mentioned when introducing the sequence of the events above, a

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<sup>197</sup> AbiYaghi, M.-N., Catusse, M., Younes, M. (2016). (unpublished chapter). p. 6.

<sup>198</sup> Idem, p.7.

<sup>199</sup> Website of Beirut Madinati, retrieved from <http://beirutmadinati.com/program/?lang=en> [last accessed on May 26, 2016].

<sup>200</sup> Citizens within a State, Press release, retrieved from <http://mmfidawla.com/2016/03/24/press-release-citizens-within-a-state-movement-launched/> [last accessed on May 25, 2016].

major way of responding to the protests consisted in arbitrary arresting of protesters and the confrontation of protesters with antiriot police, teargas and water-cans. Next to these overtly violent steps, others focused on subverting and destabilizing the movement. Thus the protesters were called drug addicts in public statements, while the arrested activists were forced to undertake and pay for their urine tests.<sup>201</sup> Additionally, protesters were accused by the Minister of Interior Nohad Machnouk of being funded and manipulated by “a small Arab country”<sup>202</sup>, and consequently protesters were called *infiltrators*, next to *rioters* or *troublemakers*. The histories and backgrounds of the leaders of the major activist groups were studied and they were attacked and humiliated over findings. One example hereof represents the disclosure and accusation of connection between one of the *You Stink*-leaders Assaad Thebian and Jumblatt’s Socialist Party, as the latter used to be part of the party in the past.<sup>203</sup> Another response strategy adopted was ‘sectarianizing’ the discourse: The Minister of Environment Mohammad Machnouk is of the Sunni sect and *You Stink*’s demand of his resignation was denounced as an attack against the Sunni sect in Lebanon.

Another way to respond to the protests was the inclusion of activists in decision-making. Activists, mainly from the environmentalist bloc, were consulted by the Chehayeb-committee, before announcing the plan to introduce landfills in Akkar and the Bekaa.

Chehayeb promoted this plan as posing an end to two decades of corruption.<sup>204</sup> This statement reflected a major request of the protesters, which was the end to the corruption of the political elite. Therefore, the politicians absorbed the arguments of the

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<sup>201</sup> Idem, p.15.

<sup>202</sup> AbiYaghi, M.-N., Catusse, M., Younes, M. (2016). (unpublished chapter). p. 15.

<sup>203</sup> Activist, in interview with author, Beirut, April 25, 2016.

<sup>204</sup> Nahas, C., et al. (2015, September 22).

protesters. This can be seen as another strategic response to the protests. The major reaction to the protests observed were therefore coercive responses next to undermining and finally inclusion, cooption and absorption of the arguments of the movement. A closer look into these reactions will be given in Chapter 5, which analyses the narratives of the protests and the responses to it.

#### **4.4 Conclusion**

This chapter sought to show the important role of the public in shaping the solid waste sector through its mobilization. In the case of the toxic waste scandal, it was the public pressure and outcry pushing for a reaction of the government. Regarding the situation of Bourj Hammoud, the mobilization of the residents led to the closure of the dumpsite in their neighborhood. The same is true for the 2015-movement: The sit-ins of the Naameh residents led to the closure of the landfill, which in turn resulted in the garbage crisis and a larger movement nationwide.

However, in the case of the protests of 2015, the demands went beyond the garbage issue and contested the sectarian and clientelistic system prevailing in the country. The protesters saw these systems as reasons for the mismanagement of the solid waste sector, as they allow policy-making according to the grievances of political figures. The above description of the coercive and strategic responses by the elites to the protests illustrate the difficulties of the protesters in contesting this system of sectarianism. This chapter also sought to demonstrate the strength and endurance of the movement of 2015. Given this special role of the protests throughout the years and the exceptional strength of the demonstrations of 2015, this thesis explores how the movement of 2015 shaped the policy debate in the solid waste sector and the reason for

its failure in shaping the final outcome. In order to do so, the Interpretive Policy Analysis framework will be applied to the policy process in the said sector. The findings of this analysis will be presented in the following chapter.

## CHAPTER 5

### FRAMING A PROBLEM

The first step of this chapter is to explore how the protests of 2015 have shaped the framing of the problem in the policy domain of solid waste through their demands and their mobilization. In order to do so, this section will look at the main narratives of the crisis and compare them to those after the crisis and the protests that resulted. The focus of the pre-crisis debate will be posed on the debate following the introduction of the 2010 strategy through the MoE. This is done, as it was the latest strategy introduced before the outbreak of the 2015 crisis. This strategy additionally faced the main opposition and therefore led to major discussions since the settlement with the emergency solution of 1997. Through this analysis it will become clear that the mobilization had indeed led to demands that were new within the solid waste sector. The second step is therefore a further analysis of the policy process, in order to explain why the demands were not met and the final outcome was the (re)opening of landfill sites.

#### **5.1 Post-2010**

Although an Integrated Waste Management plan was in place in Beirut and the Greater Beirut Area (GBA), it relied on the emergency plan of 1997. The latter was implemented due to a waste-crisis the capital faced after the closure of the then operating Bourj Hammoud site, due to protests of the nearby residents. The emergency plan was supposed to be in place for a transitional period, while long-term strategies

were to be elaborated. However, the plan remained in place until 2015 and the then introduced landfill site of Naameh, was continuously expanded and extended. Therefore, a new, elaborated strategy was needed, one which was created outside the crisis context. A couple of plans together with a draft law were elaborated throughout the years, as discussed in Chapter 2. The 2010 strategy was one of these plans. It was described more detailed above and its main contents will only be mentioned here briefly. The strategy is based on the Solid Waste Masterplan of 2006, which divided the country into four service areas. Along general lines, the content of the 2006-Masterplan was kept and in addition Waste-to-Energy (WtE)-technologies were introduced as ways to deal with the country's waste. The MoE under UNDP elaborated this strategy and presented it to the CoM, which approved the strategy in the same year. The CoM instructed the CDR and the MoE to hire an international company for the elaboration of a feasibility study and the preparation of the tendering documents. The company hired was the Danish company Ramboll, which published its study in 2012. The CDR and the MoE are seen as the main defenders within the government of Lebanon of the newly introduced WtE-technologies. Outside of the government, the UNDP played a major role in promoting the strategy, as one of its officials presented the technologies to the CoM as an environmentally friendly and modern way of waste disposal.<sup>205</sup> Additionally, the Horizon 2020 Capacity Building/Mediterranean Environment Program (H2020 CB/MEP) is another initiative supporting the WtE-technologies. This EU funded project was requested by the Lebanese government to conduct a study visit of Lebanese stakeholders of the sector to European cities, with a focus on WtE-facilities. The H2020 CB/MEP prepared additionally a consultation meeting for different stakeholders in the

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<sup>205</sup> Dr. Charbel Nahas, in conversation with the author, Beirut, January 2016.

waste sector.<sup>206</sup> These entities, CDR, MoE, UNDP and H2020, are the main defenders of the newly introduced strategy but the latter faced major opposition as soon as it was approved. Many environmental and other NGOs<sup>207</sup> united and formed the *Zero Waste Coalition*. They opposed the strategy for environmental reasons as will be discussed below.

These were the two groups that led the policy-debate in the years between 2010 and the outbreak of the crisis in 2015. Other stakeholders, however, have not been passive in these years. International organizations, mainly the Italian Development Cooperation and the EU have been carrying out and financially supporting waste projects in the rural areas of the country. Academics have also been active throughout these years. AUB professors have been conducting studies on landfill siting and many other factors have been studied as well. However, little research has been conducted concerning the major debate throughout the five years in question: waste incineration. The Université Saint-Joseph, however, has formed a partnership with the *Zero Waste Coalition* and was therefore part of the Zero Waste group.

Both of the distinguished groups told a different story concerning the issue as will be shown below. The story told by the NGOs, which opposed the strategy, will be referred to as ZeroWaste-story, named after the *Zero Waste Coalition* they formed. The narrative of the government will be named hereafter the incinerator-story, as it promoted incinerators. Calling these narratives stories is not meant to devaluate their content. Instead, there is much uncertainty over the merits and disadvantages of both in

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<sup>206</sup> Horizon 2020, *Waste-to Energy as a complementary option to Integrated Sustainable Waste & Resource Management in Lebanon* (Background document for the preparation of the Consultation Meeting of 27-28 May 2014 in Beirut), 2014.

<sup>207</sup> Around 60 NGOs were part of this coalition according to their members Fifi Kallab (Byblos Ecologia) and Dr. Nagi Kodeih (Greenline and IndyAct), in meeting with author, Beirut February 25, 2016 and March 22, 2016 respectively.

the context of Lebanon.

### 5.1.1 *The ZeroWaste-Story*

I derived the content of the ZeroWaste-story from interviews with representatives of NGOs, which are part of the Zero Waste Coalition.<sup>208</sup> The ZeroWaste-story does not consist of the traditional beginning, middle and end, which a conventional narrative is composed of according to Roe. Rather, it forms counter-arguments to the contents of the incinerator-story. As such, the promoters of the ZeroWaste-story frame the problem differently than the advocates of the incinerators. In this story, the problem is framed as an environmental one and the arguments are constructed accordingly. The major critique of this group is the environmental soundness of the incinerators. The arguments rely on an internationally recognized waste-pyramid,<sup>209</sup> which sees incineration, after reducing, reusing and recycling, only as the fourth step of dealing with the waste. Introducing WtE-technologies in Lebanon would therefore skip the first three steps of the pyramid. It is additionally argued that incineration in a developing country like Lebanon is risky. It is questionable, according to this story, whether the hazardous fly ash emissions would be filtered and disposed of in a manner with minimal implications on the public health and the environment.

The counterarguments, as thought of by Roe, are arguments *against* a certain

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<sup>208</sup> Shady Sadek, NGO Terre Liban, interview by author, Baabda, Lebanon, March 17, 2016. Fifi Kallab, NGO Byblos, interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, February 25, 2016. Dr. Nagi Kodeih, NGO IndyAct, interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, March 22, 2016. Tape recording.

Christ Sarkassian, NGO Arc en Ciel, interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, March 18, 2016. Tape recording.

Ali Darwish, NGO Greenline, interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, March 20, 2016. Tape recording.

Antoine Abou Moussa, Board Member of NGO Terre Liban (part of Zero Waste Coalition and Ecomovement). Interview by author, Baabda, Lebanon, March 17, 2016.

<sup>209</sup> EU. *Directive 2008/98/EC on waste (Waste Framework Directive)*, retrieved from <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/framework/> [last accessed on April, 16 2016].

narrative, which they contest, but lack in providing something people can be in favor of. The ZeroWaste-story or counterargument, however, also promotes an alternative way of dealing with the waste. It lobbies for, as the name says, zero waste: The implementation of reducing, reusing, recycling, and composting in the country, which will hereafter be together referred to as recycling. Recycling is the solution to the problem, which the ZeroWaste-story has framed as an environmental one. This is a coherent argumentation as an environmentally sound solution to an environmental problem was proposed. However, this story lacks studies on the feasibility of recycling in Lebanon. No study has been conducted on the willingness to sort at source (which is a major step in order to facilitate recycling) of Lebanese citizens and the kind of incentives needed for the implementation of this solution. It is also not proven, whether a market exists that can absorb all the recyclables recovered.

### ***5.1.1 The Incinerator-Story***

The incineration-story is promoting incinerators as an environmentally sound method of waste disposal.<sup>210</sup> However, the problem in the solid waste sector in Lebanon is not framed as an environmental one. Instead, the major driver for the promotion of incinerators is the widely spread opposition to landfill-sites by the Lebanese population and the wide spread NIMBY-syndrome. This story recognizes that Lebanese citizens have made negative experiences in the past with landfill-sites (e.g. Bourj Hammoud and especially the case of Naameh), which increased NIMBY-opposition further.<sup>211</sup> Therefore, many projects and programs failed over the years due to the NIMBY-syndrome and the rejection of the local population to accept a landfill in their

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<sup>210</sup> H2020. (2014).

<sup>211</sup> Official of CDR, involved in SWM. Interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, April 5, 2016.

neighborhood.

Regarding the composition of the story, it is a coherent one as it follows the scheme proposed by Roe and consists of a beginning, a middle and an end.<sup>212</sup> The beginning can be interpreted to lie in the protests in Bourj Hammoud in 1997, which led to a crisis and to garbage piling up in the streets of Lebanon's capital. This crisis was coped with through an emergency solution, which saw the opening of the Naameh landfill and was in place for almost two decades. Throughout these years, the implementation of several projects, such as the SWEMP project, funded by the World Bank,<sup>213</sup> failed. According to this story, these projects could not be implemented due to NIMBY-inspired opposition to the projects. This story sees the reason for the lack of implementation of the 2006-plan as the difficulty to find a location for the proposed facilities in the four distinguished service-areas.<sup>214</sup> The incinerator-story ends with the argument that incinerators are the solution to this desperate situation. Consequently, incinerators can be interpreted as the metaphor for the only solution to the problem framed to be NIMBY-opposition. Incineration as solution to the NIMBY-problem is a juxtaposition of two concepts, which are not necessarily compatible: Little are the arguments as to why the citizens would accept incinerators instead of landfills. No studies have been conducted whether the local population would be willing to accept incinerators in their neighborhood. In fact, historically, a negative tendency can be observed towards incinerators: In 1997 not only the site of Bourj Hammoud was opposed but also the reopening of the incinerator in Amroussieh. The latter was burnt by residents in order to prevent its reopening.

Another argument, put forward by the incinerator-promoters is the

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<sup>212</sup> Roe, E.M. (1989), p.252.

<sup>213</sup> World Bank. (2014).

<sup>214</sup> H2020. (2014).

environmentally friendliness of waste incineration and energy recovery. It is argued that many developed countries are adopting this solution to cope with their waste in an environmentally sound way. This argument was contested by the ZeroWaste-story, as shown above.

The ZeroWaste-story was not the only opposition to the 2010 strategy. Another story contested the strategy more silently within the government itself: Some ministers have questioned the incinerator-story itself by accusing it of hiding a bigger picture. The contents of this story are summarized hereafter, named the transparency-story. This is done as the promoters of this story tried to gain insight into the Sukleen-contracts and requested clarification for some of the events surrounding the 2010 strategy. I derived the content of the transparency-story from an open letter to the UNDP by the promoters of this story. Through this letter, they requested clarification over the involvement of some of its personnel in the inconsistencies surrounding the waste sector, and particularly the evolvments regarding the 2010 strategy.<sup>215</sup>

### ***5.1.3 The Transparency-Story***

The promoters of this story included ministers within the CoM of 2010, who framed the problem as one of corruption and faced it by requesting transparency of the Sukleen-contracts and other demands. This story begins on March 30<sup>th</sup>, 2010 when the CoM gathered to discuss the contracts with Sukleen. The major debate was the extension of the contracts, which were due to expire within ten months following the meeting. The extension was contested by some of the ministers, as the contents of the

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<sup>215</sup> Nahas, C., et al, (2015, September).

Nahas, C., et al., *Request for clarifications, investigations and appropriate measures concerning the role of the UNDP and its staff in covering waste management corruption in Lebanon*, December 2, 2015.

contracts in discussion were not accessible for them. The meeting ended with a settlement that foresaw the creation of a committee, assigned with the task to find a new plan for the sector within a month. However, already on April 6<sup>th</sup> 2010 a new session was convened, even though the deadline of the created committee has not been exceeded. The purpose of this session was again the extension of the contracts with Sukleen, this time until the implementation of the plan, which the created committee would come up with. Again, the contracts were not disclosed to the CoM. However, the contracts with Sukleen were not due to expiration until another 10 months so the extension passed. Another passage was added to the decision, which was not discussed during the meeting, stating that the duration of this extension could not exceed four years. Finally, a third meeting took place on the 1<sup>st</sup> of September 2010. In this session the plan to introduce Waste-to-Energy (pyrolysis) was adopted. It was additionally declared that an introduction of this technology would need four years. This amount of time coincides with the four years added subsequently to the decision of April 6<sup>th</sup>. The promoters of this story see therefore in the incineration-story a mere excuse to extend the contracts with Sukleen. These indeed irregular events of 2010 form the middle of the transparency story. The end is provided by the fact that no steps were undertaken to actually introduce the Waste-to-Energy technologies, besides a study conducted by the Danish company Ramboll. The government, instead, launched a bid for landfills in December 2014. Additionally, during the months of crisis in 2015, incinerators were not (openly) discussed as a solution as is shown below. 2015 saw some shifts in the framing of the problem as will be presented in the following section.

## 5.2 Post-2015

Once the crisis broke out, two major opposing groups formed: the government and the public opposition. Both created different narratives based on two different frames. The government-side held on to the NIMBY-dilemma as the major problem in the sector. Since incinerators were not discussed as a solution to this problem (at least not openly), the narrative in this context will be named the NIMBY-story. In contrast to the narrative of the Zero Waste Coalition prior to the crisis, the problem was not framed as an environmental one by the opposition in the crisis-context. Although it was clear that the garbage crisis led to environmental and public health problems, the reason for the crisis itself was seen to lie in another problem: corruption. This narrative is therefore introduced as the corruption-story. Both stories are tackled in the following sections independently.

### 5.2.1 *The Corruption-Story*

The Civil Society, composed of NGOs, environmental ones and otherwise, activists and individuals using protesting campaigns, framed the problem differently after the outbreak of the crisis. The promoters of the above introduced transparency-story are also part of this group. The main problem was seen to be corruption, which was at the core of the crisis and the reason for its outbreak. The crisis itself became a metaphor for the corrupt and incapable government. One of the campaigns was dubbed *You Stink*, referring to the corrupt government.

As discussed above, the ZeroWaste-story, promoted by environmental NGOs prior to the outbreak of the crisis, opposed the incineration-story and was rather a counterargument. The corruption-story, instead, is composed of a beginning, middle and

an end, and is therefore not a counterargument but stands as an independent counternarrative. The beginning is represented by the negotiation of the opaque contracts with the company Sukleen, known to have strong ties with the then prime minister Rafic Hariri.<sup>216</sup> The middle of the story is exemplified in the past two decades, in which the service area of Sukleen was continuously expanded and the prizes paid to the company increased egregiously. Finally, the outbreak of the crisis presents the culmination of the story. According to this story, the outbreak of the crisis was due to the disunity of the political elite on how the revenues derived from the solid waste sector should be allocated among them.

Different requests were made by the protestors in response to the crisis and their discontent with the Lebanese government. While some of the demands of the protests were not in line with the garbage crisis, such as the demand for 24h electricity supply, public spaces etc., here, only the ones relevant for the garbage crisis will be investigated. In this context, the major requests can be summarized as following.<sup>217</sup> Firstly, environmentally sound disposal of the waste, which is not harming the public health and the health of the environment, continued to be requested by environmental and other NGOs, individuals and activists. This was not a new request in the context of waste management. As mentioned above, the Zero Waste Coalition requested recycling instead of the incineration-strategy. Additionally, campaigns for environmentally sound waste disposal, sorting at source etc. have been conducted by environmental NGOs throughout the after-war years.

Secondly, the population requested an end to corruption. Corruption allegations in the context of solid waste are, again, nothing new. In 2003, Greenpeace demonstrated

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<sup>216</sup> Leenders, R. (2004).

<sup>217</sup> Employee of The Legal Agenda. Conversation with author, Beirut April 13, 2016.

outside the offices of the CDR for transparency in the solid waste sector.<sup>218</sup> Also, when NGOs of the *Zero Waste Coalition* were invited in May 2014 to participate at the consultation meeting organized by H2020, members of the Coalition requested the NGOs to boycott the corrupt plan.<sup>219</sup> As became visible through the transparency-story above, corruption was also an issue within the government as some of the ministers demanded transparency in the sector.

A third demand was represented by the change of the electoral law. This demand shows the discontent of the protesters with the political class of Lebanon. Some even demanded the change of the sectarian to a secular system. These demands are also not new in Lebanon, as they have been made in the spirit of the Arab Spring in 2011, during the movements of 2005 and even earlier, during and after the Civil War. However, it is new in the context of the waste sector as the demand was linked to the corruption in the sector.

Finally, decentralization of the waste management duties was a constant topic throughout the protests. This demand was also new for the sector and mainly made in order to comply with the law and reduce corruption in the waste sector.

### ***5.2.2 The NIMBY-Story***

In the crisis of 2015 and the resulting protests, the government's narrative and framing of the problem remained the same: The outbreak of the crisis was yet another example of NIMBY-inspired opposition to a landfill-site.<sup>220</sup> Finding a site where to dispose of the waste continued therefore to be the major problem in the sector. The

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<sup>218</sup> Kingston, P.W.T. (2013).

<sup>219</sup> Former Employee of the Ministry of Environment. Interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, March 16, 2016.

<sup>220</sup> Official of CDR, involved in SWM. Interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, April 5, 2016.

crisis became a metaphor to the government-side for the impossibility of finding a solution that would receive the approval not only of the residents close to a planned site, but of the Lebanese population as a whole. The difficulty to find a solution was illustrated by the citizen's refusal of the solutions proposed by the committee headed by the Minister of Agriculture Akram Chehayeb. The minister, who was already responsible for the elaboration of the 1997-emergency plan, was assigned with the duty to find a solution to the 2015-crisis. The first solution elaborated by the committee was the creation of landfills in the north (Akkar) and in the east (Bekaa) of the country. According to a member of the committee, some parts of the plan elaborated by this committee deferred from the officially published plan.<sup>221</sup> The English version of this officially published plan can be found in Appendix 2. However, the residents of the proposed areas opposed the plan, as they were not willing to host the dumpsites for the capital's waste. The unwillingness to receive the waste was also explained with sectarian reasons: The areas were not willing to host waste from the sects their residents did not belong to. The NIMBY-problem was therefore broadened with a sectarian component and thus complicated further.<sup>222</sup> The demonstrations in the capital supported the ones of the residents in these areas.

Since no consensus to a location for a new landfill was to be found, exportation of the waste was presented as the second solution to the problem. This solution was also not applied due to corruption allegations. Therefore, the solution had to be found once again in the set up of landfills and the waste committee eventually agreed on three landfill sites: the transitionally reopening of the Naameh landfill and the introduction of the landfill-sites of Costa Brava (south of Beirut) and Bourj Hammoud (east of the

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<sup>221</sup> Farouk Merhebi, interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, March 17, 2016

<sup>222</sup> Idem.

capital) for the following four years.

Although incinerators were not discussed openly in this context as a loophole to the situation, it remained and remains a solution discussed by ministerial officials. This became clear through talks with representatives of the governmental institutions.<sup>223</sup> In public, the narrative in the crisis-context, however, was not centered on incinerators, as it was the case in the years between 2010 and 2015. The crisis itself became the metaphor for the NIMBY-problem, which was seen as the main problem faced in the sector. Just as in the context of the years before the outbreak of the crisis, the government's NIMBY-narrative is composed of a beginning (Bourj Hammoud, 1997), middle (difficulty to implement projects throughout the years due to NIMBY-syndrome) and an end (outbreak of the crisis and difficulty to find a solution due to the public's opposition). As mentioned above, incinerators are still discussed very seriously as a solution to the problem. It was argued, in meetings with officials, that crises will continue to break out since the unwillingness to accept landfills is still present and no solution to that problem was found, except for incinerators.<sup>224</sup> The opposing narrative also does not recognize the problem solved through the (re)opening of the three landfill-sites, which was eventually introduced as a plan.

Investigating the NIMBY-story and the corruption-story and comparing both to the years prior to the crisis show that the civil society framed the problem differently after the outbreak of the crisis. Additionally, new demands were posed or the civil society reinforced old ones. Since this shift in the debate and an increased juggling with

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<sup>223</sup> Representative of OMSAR, interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, April 6, 2016.  
Official of CDR, involved in SWM. Interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, April 5, 2016.

<sup>224</sup> Representative of OMSAR, interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, April 6, 2016.  
Official of CDR, involved in SWM. Interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, April 5, 2016.

demands, confrontations and requests took place, which shaped the policy debate, the following question is introduced accordingly: How come these demands and frames have not been successful in shaping the outcome of the policy, which was a return to the *status quo ante*? In order to answer this question, a closer look will be given to the argumentation of the NIMBY-story with the solutions proposed and the corruption-story with the demands, which have been claimed by its promoters.

### **5.3 Solution to a Problem**

Both parties were in one way or another seeking to find solutions to the crisis, whose trigger was framed differently by each group. As introduced in the foregoing section, the promoters of the corruption-story saw the trigger for the crisis in the disunity of the political elite on how the shares from the solid waste sector should be distributed among them. Accordingly, they framed the policy-problem in the solid waste sector as corruption. The demands, here tackled as proposed solutions to the problem, were not necessarily respondent to this problem. The first proposed solution investigated is recycling (including reusing, reducing and composting). This solution to the problem was mainly promoted by environmental NGOs, gathered under the *Ecomovement*. The latter elaborated a guideline, which can be found in Appendix 3, for dealing with the waste in Lebanon.

However, if the problem and the reason for the outbreak of the crisis were framed as a problem of corruption, recycling is not the solution. The argumentation is therefore not a coherent one and is not a response to the defined problem. Undoubtedly, the waste crisis led to an environmental disaster and to environmental problems and recycling would mitigate this catastrophe. However, environmentally friendly disposal

of the waste rather treats the symptoms of the crisis, whose origins lie in corruption.

The second demand posed was the change of the electoral law. Requesting this change needs to be seen in the context of Lebanese reality today: A civil war is reigning in the neighboring country for half a decade and Daesh (also known as IS) poses a threat to the country. Additionally, the experiences of other Arab countries during and following the Arab Spring, in which demands for a change of the system were made, are not very promising. All of these factors and experiences are not encouraging for a major change in the country and it has proven to be difficult to gather masses behind this idea. Finally, this demand went beyond the garbage crisis and did not see the latter as the center of the problem anymore. It therefore lacked in posing a solution to the crisis faced at the moment.

Thirdly and fourthly, the public requested an end to the corruption and decentralization. These are going to be combined in the further analysis. This is done because the demand of decentralization is a result of the demand for the end of corruption, as many studies came to the conclusion that decentralization leads to a decrease in corruption.<sup>225</sup> As introduced in the Historical Overview of Chapter 2, it is the municipalities, which by law have the right and responsibility to dispose of their waste. As also tackled in Chapter 2, the MoIM has continually managed the municipalities' money in a centralized manner, without prior delivery to the municipalities. This way, the municipalities, mainly of the greater Beirut area, have no control nor say on the spending of their money. Some achievement has been reached

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<sup>225</sup> Shah, A., *Corruption and Decentralized Public Governance*. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3824, January 2006.

Fishman, R. & Gatti, R., "Decentralization and corruption: evidence across countries," *Journal of Public Economics*, 83,3 (March 2002): 325-345.

Gulsun Arikan, G. (2004). Fiscal Decentralization: A Remedy for Corruption?. *International Tax and Public Finance*, 11, 175-195.

with the release of a total of US\$795 million owed to the municipalities from telecom revenues.<sup>226</sup> These funds were desperately needed for the municipalities to cope with the ongoing waste crisis. The decentralization was found to be the most coherent solution and way of argumentation if the problem is framed as lying in corruption. This argumentation did not lose track of the crisis and was anchored in the garbage crisis and posed a direct response to it. In contrast, the demand of the electoral law lost sight of the garbage crisis and went beyond the crisis.

Since many different demands were posed and the social movement split into many smaller groups, none of the demands could gather all the groups behind it. Through this analysis I argue that the activists would have acted wisely in unifying behind one realistic and achievable demand, which in this context was found to be decentralization. Demanding decentralization also means to push for a right that is already stipulated by law. This fact provides a great ground for argumentation. Additionally, there are some municipalities, such as Ain Dura, Beit Mery, Hasmieh and others, which have successfully started to pursue their own waste collection in response to the garbage crisis. Some of these municipalities are doing so by introducing Zero Waste – mechanisms (e.g. Beit Mery). These success-stories show that municipalities are able to provide their own waste collection and disposal. However, the municipalities are still struggling financially and therefore, the release of the IMF to them remains a necessity.

In summary, having analyzed closer the corruption-story and the argumentation within this narrative, the following reasons for the failure to shape the outcome were found. Proposed solutions were either not in line with corruption, which was framed as

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<sup>226</sup> “Lebanon Municipality Funds finally released: minister,” *The Daily Star*, February 06, 2016, retrieved from <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2016/Feb-06/336009-lebanon-municipality-funds-finally-released-minister.ashx> [last accessed on April, 16, 2016].

the problem, or they went beyond the garbage crisis. The demands posed were many, which made it impossible to unify and gather forces behind one solution, responding to the identified problem.

However, also the argumentation within the NIMBY-story was not coherent. Three solutions were proposed to the problem, which was framed to be the difficulty to find locations for landfill-facilities. However, two of these solutions were landfills once again. The only solution not proposing landfills was the second proposal, suggesting exportation of the waste. The argumentation surrounding this proposition was found to be the most coherent one, as an alternative solution to landfills was suggested. The environmental and economic feasibility of the exportation-solution, however, is highly questionable. Eventually, this solution did not succeed due to corruption allegations. As for the other solutions, their proposal was not found to be a coherent argumentation: Both are proposing landfills to a problem that is framed to lie in the difficulty to locate landfill-sites due to NIMBY-opposition. Accordingly, the first proposal foreseeing landfill facilities in Akkar and the Bekaa, failed due to technical challenges (e.g. distance to Beirut is more than 100km of the former and around 80km of the latter) and public opposition. Eventually, the solution proposing the reopening of the Naameh landfill and the opening of sites in Bourj Hammoud and Costa Brava succeeded and is implemented at the moment of writing.

Through this analysis it becomes clear that the argumentation within both stories is rather incoherent and neither stories are rooted in facts and rather in assumptions. It can not be explained through the analysis of the argumentation of both, therefore, why the outcome of the policy was the one proposed by the promoters of the NIMBY-story instead of the protesters. This can only be explained through power-

differentials as the following section will illustrate.<sup>227</sup>

#### 5.4 Stories and Power

Both stories rely on arguments, which are in neither cases rooted in facts deriving from scientific studies nor are the arguments coherent. It is therefore difficult to determine objectively, which of the arguments is stronger or weaker.<sup>228</sup> Nevertheless, the NIMBY-story eventually prevailed over the corruption-story by determining the outcome of the policy debate and the question remains: Why this one and not the other?

In a situation of uncertainty and complexity, only the unequal access to recourses can explain the outcome of the policy-debate. The asymmetry of the stories relies on the power of making the own narrative perceived in a specific way or on the ability of enforcing the own narrative.<sup>229</sup> In the case of the Lebanon garbage crisis, the power differential between the two groups is rather obvious. The violent responses to the protests are very clear expressions of coercive power. The same is true for the positioning of policemen next to the current and future landfill sites. These are open and obvious expressions of power but there is another level to power, that of soft power.<sup>230</sup> As mentioned above, another reaction to the protesters was their de-legitimization through humiliation of some of the leading activists. Another response was the invitation of the head of the *Ecomovement* to discuss the first solution proposed by the government (landfills in Akkar and Bekaa). This courting of acceptance can be seen as a cooption-strategy and was promoted by the NIMBY-side as having green light for the plan from the Civil Society. However, the plan was strongly contested by the activists

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<sup>227</sup> Roe, E.M. (1989). p. 264.

<sup>228</sup> Idem, p. 266.

<sup>229</sup> Idem.

<sup>230</sup> Soft power is a term coined by Joseph Nye and refers to strategies such as attraction and cooption instead of applying force.

on the ground, which did not see them represented by the *Ecomovement*. Other environmentalists also contested the plan and its presentation thus fueled mistrust and splits amongst the activists. Finally, the arguments of the protesters were also absorbed by some of the political figures such as Chehayeb. The minister stated when proposing the first solution that it would pose an end to two decades of corruption in the sector. Therefore, he acknowledged the corruption-allegations of the public and seemingly presented a solution to it.

Another form of soft power can be found outside the public debate: For this research, meetings were conducted with those involved in the public protest, and some individuals who refrained from the demonstrations who were asked about their reasons for doing so.<sup>231</sup> They had different explanations and responses but had one aspect in common: fear. One individual was afraid of losing his *wasta* (connections, influence).<sup>232</sup> Another person explained that he was afraid about the violence taking place during the demonstration. Of course, these two people are not representative for the whole part of the population who did not protest. However, it reveals that part of the population might have refrained from protesting due to soft power. Therefore, while protesting has become the only way for the public to shape the sector (as has been shown in Chapter 3) and public policies in general (as shown in Chapter 1), the ability to protest itself is confined and controlled through the exercise of soft and hard power.

Another reason leading to the asymmetry of the stories and the lack of power of its promoters was the split within the social movement. The disunity can be shown by

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<sup>231</sup> Individual, did not participate in protests. Conversation with author, Beirut, Lebanon, April 20, 2016.

Individual, did not participate in protests. Conversation with author, Beirut, Lebanon, May 8, 2016.

<sup>232</sup> *Wasta* is a very common term in Lebanon, having its roots in the clientelistic system prevailing in the country. It mainly refers to connections and influence in order to achieve certain things (governmental transactions, getting hired etc.)

the different demands made. The four demands tackled in the section above (recycling, change of electoral law, end of corruption and decentralization) are only the ones regarding the waste crisis, while many other demands (e.g. public spaces) were heard during the demonstrations.

Giving a closer look to the major demands that have been posed on the ground, it becomes clear that the movement has been split on how these demands should be addressed.<sup>233</sup> This is illustrated through the demand of the end of corruption: Part of the group saw the necessity of canceling of the opaque Sukleen contracts. The other part, however, found this problematic, as there is no alternative company that could carry out the waste collection, treatment and disposal. This also adds to the above mentioned power-differential, as the government-side had the power over the waste collection; if the public does not agree with the presented solution and continues to mobilize, there is always the threat that garbage piles up in the streets ones again. Besides the Sukleen-contracts, another divide within the civil society was the question about what should be done with the piled-up garbage mountains.<sup>234</sup> Parts of the Civil Society was pushing for the removal of the wastes, while the other part saw the potential in these garbage mountains: As long as garbage is piling up in the streets, the problem is visible and people will be more motivated to mobilize. Thirdly, there was a discrepancy in the perception of the movement and whether it should be a political confrontation or whether the focus should remain on the garbage crisis.<sup>235</sup> A large part of the movement felt a sentiment against the system and included demands for the change of the sectarian system and pushed for the change of the electoral law. Others, however, wanted to focus

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<sup>233</sup> Charbel Nahas, talk with author, June 1<sup>st</sup>, 2016.

<sup>234</sup> Idem.

<sup>235</sup> Idem.

on the waste sector specifically, as it is a pillar of the current system, which the elite derives vast gains from.

Finally, a fourth problematic was given within the decentralization-demand, which included the distribution of the IMF to the municipalities.<sup>236</sup> While the movement seemed quite unified regarding this demand, the municipalities did not join the movement for its achievement, which might have contributed to the weakening of the demand. These divergences led to the lack of the demand of an achievable goal, such as the end of the contracts with Sukleen that could have been pushed for. The demands were thus kept general and quite broad, which weakened their effect.

As mentioned earlier, however, counterarguments and counterstories have often the difficulty to provide and agree on an argument to be in favor for.<sup>237</sup> The social movement, however, had even difficulty to find a common denominator of who to be against. While nobody would deny that corruption is the biggest problem in the sector, it could not be agreed on the corrupt political figures. In the first weeks, the system, the political elite and the corruption were denounced in general. After a while, *You Stink* applied the slogan *killun ya 'ni killun* ("everyone means everyone"). In another move, the group *3alshare3* (to the street) accused specific political figures whose photos, marked with comments making fun of them, were carried in the demonstration. This triggered a major discussion, especially regarding the picture of Hassan Nasrallah (Hezbollah) and finally led to the deletion of his photo. This, together with other reasons, was seen as a tendency of the movement towards March 8 and might have led to a loss of sympathizers.<sup>238</sup> Although the social movement was characterized by many

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<sup>236</sup> Idem.

<sup>237</sup> Roe, E.M. (1989).

<sup>238</sup> AbiYaghi, M.-N., Catusse, M., Younes, M. (2016). (unpublished chapter).

divergences, there was an agreement on continuing the mobilization, which unified the different groups. However, the crisis went on for nine months, wherefore it was difficult to keep the mobilization alive.

Concluding, this section sought to explain the reasons for the power discrepancy between the two opposing positions. The following section is going to look at other effects, which this power discrepancy led to: the instrumentalization of the policy debate surrounding the waste sector.

## **5.5 Instrumentalization**

As was mentioned in Chapter 1, the political elite has instrumentalized the policy debate in the environmental domain. The same chapter introduced that the social movements had a history of instrumentalization: They started as independent movements and were then instrumentalized by the political elite for a certain goal. This section aims to explore whether the policy debate in the solid waste sector and the social movement of 2015 have been victims of instrumentalization. The notion instrumentalization in this context is borrowed from Daan Boezeman et al.: instrumentalization is recognized as a process in which actors use a project, in this case the policy process and the debate, as a means to realize their own objectives, without reconsidering these objectives or the scope of the problem definition.<sup>239</sup> In two decades, the political elite of Lebanon, together with officials from UNDP and the private company Sukleen, led the policy process in the solid waste sector. These stakeholders framed the problem throughout the years as a NIMBY-problem. Thus, these stakeholders elaborated plans, strategies and a draft law in order to solve this NIMBY-

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<sup>239</sup> Boezeman, D. et al., "Participation Under a Spell of Instrumentalization? Reflections on Action Research in an Entrenched Climate Adaptation Policy Process," *Critical Policy Studies*, 8,4 (2014): 407-426, p. 3.

problem. However, these plans contradicted each other at times. For example, in 2005, the CDR stated in a document that incineration of the waste is no longer further explored as an option of solid waste disposal in Lebanon due to its environmental and economic implications.<sup>240</sup> Only five years later, the plan to incinerate the waste emerged again on the agenda and was put forward inter alia by the CDR itself. Additionally, none of the elaborated plans and strategies was ever implemented and little was done in order to reach their implementation except for a study presented by Ramboll for waste incineration in 2012. In this context, it is unclear why only one option of waste disposal was explored, while no feasibility studies for recycling or other options were conducted, which could have been compared to the incineration-option. These facts might reveal that the discussion about different solutions for the waste sector was instrumentalized by the ones in power in order to maintain the *status quo*. This assumption derives mainly from the fact that different, at times conflicting plans were discussed, while the implementation of the plans was never put forward.

The residents of Naameh contested this instrumentalization and the resulting maintenance of the status quo. Once the landfill was closed and the crisis broke out, a greater part of the public in Beirut and throughout the country joined this contestation. In order to respond to the crisis and the public demands, different solutions were discussed and proposed. However, the solution eventually implemented is a return to the *status quo ante*, a return to the situation prior to the outbreak of the crisis. It is striking that the only solution actually implemented in the past two decades is one that does not change the *status quo*. This is yet another indication that the debate and the 2015-crisis might have been instrumentalized in order to inhibit change within the

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<sup>240</sup> CDR, *National Physical Master Plan of the Lebanese Territory*, 2005, retrieved from <http://www.cdr.gov.lb/study/indexstudye.asp> [last accessed on May 20, 2016].

sector. The statement of a CDR official exemplifies this: When confronted with sorting at source and recycling as a solution to the crisis of 2015, he replied that he would welcome that; but in the context of a crisis it could not be implemented.<sup>241</sup> This shows that the crisis provides a welcome excuse to maintain the *status quo*. Through this analysis, it can be seen that there is no actual will on the part of the political elite to change the situation in the sector.

Another example of instrumentalization of the policy debate during the crisis is provided by the continuous change of positions of the different political figures. Three examples will be mentioned in this context: Michel Aoun, Change and Reform-bloc Member of Parliament (MP) and head of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM); Walid Jumblatt, MP and head of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP); Nouhad Mashnouk, Minister of Interior. According to Assaad Thebian, Michel Aoun was initially very sympathetic to the *You Stink* group and later changed his position towards the demonstrations.<sup>242</sup> Indeed, in the course of the huge protests of August 22<sup>nd</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup>, Aoun congratulated the movement for its peacefulness, denounced the violence of the security forces against the demonstrators and warned politicians from taking advantage of the “noble demonstrations” for their political gains.<sup>243</sup> Two ministers of his FPM have earlier even descended to the streets and tried to join the protests.<sup>244</sup> This illustrates both the early support of the FPM, which is headed by Aoun, and that he does not seem to mind if members of his party try to take advantage of the “noble demonstrations.”

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<sup>241</sup> Official of CDR, involved in SWM. Interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, April 5, 2016.

<sup>242</sup> Assaad Thebian, in interview by author, Beirut, May 19, 2016.

<sup>243</sup> “Aoun Hails ‘You Stink’ Campaign Demonstrations,” *Naharnet*, August 23, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/188114> [last accessed on May 20, 2016].

<sup>244</sup> “Shouting match erupts between Salam, Basil at Cabinet Meet,” *Lebanonnews*, July 9, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.lebanonnews.net/En/2015/07/09/shouting-match-erupts-between-salam-bassil-at-cabinet-meet/> [last accessed on May 20, 2016].

However, the protesters did not accept the two ministers among them and asked them to retire from their positions before aligning with the protesters. The ministers, though, refused to do so and left the demonstrations. A few days after praising the protests, Aoun's support already seemed to destabilize: During a press conference, he announced his backing of the protests. However, he stressed that he agreed only partly with the demonstrators, as unlike their claims, there were also reformist and uncorrupt politicians in Lebanon.<sup>245</sup> During the same press conference, he attacked the *You Stink* campaign for having stolen his slogans (change and reform).<sup>246</sup> Briefly after this statement, supporters of the FPM started to attack some leading individuals of the *You Stink* campaign.<sup>247</sup> Finally, Aoun warned of the similarities of the protests to the Arab Spring and called for their end before they would lead to a "creative chaos."<sup>248</sup>

Another example illustrating officials' position changing is presented by the Minister of Interior, Nouhad Machnouk. He first denounced the protesters to be infiltrators, manipulated and funded by a small Arab country.<sup>249</sup> Political analysts have

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<sup>245</sup> "Aoun Holds onto President's Election by the People, Calls for Demo Next Friday," *Naharnet*, August 28, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/188543> [last accessed on May 20, 2016].

<sup>246</sup> LEBANON IZNOGOOD-blog, retrieved from <http://lebanoniznogood.blogspot.com/2015/08/aoun-youstink.html> [last accessed on May 20, 2016].

"الشعب القادمة الجمعة للتظاهر أنصاره ويطالب.. شعاراتنا سرقوا: "ريحتكم طلعت" متظاهري يهاجم "عون ميشيل""، *Marsess*, August 28, 2015, retrieved from <https://www.masress.com/alshaab/239268> [last accessed on May 26, 2016].

"شعاراته بسرقة اللبنانيين المتظاهرين ويتهم الشعبي الحراك في يشكك عون", *Al Maghreb Alaam*, August 28, 2015, retrieved from <https://www.maghrebalaan.com/archives/7099> [last accessed on May 26, 2016].

<sup>247</sup> "NGOs support You Stink activist after FPM criticism," *The Daily Star*, August 31, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Aug-31/313482-ngos-support-you-stink-activist-after-fpm-criticism.ashx> [last accessed on May 20, 2016].

<sup>248</sup> "Lebanon at a Rubbish Crossroads," *Alsharq Blog*, September 9, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.alsharq.de/2015/mashreq/libanon/lebanon-at-a-rubbish-crossroads/> [last accessed on May 20, 2016].

<sup>249</sup> "لبنان في الشعب أعمال بدعم قطر يتهم المشنوق", *Middle East Online*, September 2, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.middle-east-online.com/?id=206776> [last accessed on May 26, 2016].

"لبنان في الحاصلة الشعب أعمال في بالتورط قطر يتهم لمشنوق" *Arabi Press*, September 2, 2015, retrieved from <http://arabi-press.com/news/873828> [last accessed on May 26, 2016].

found that the expression “small Arab country” refers to Qatar.<sup>250</sup> However, Saad Hariri declared these rumors as baseless<sup>251</sup> and also Machnouk emphasizes that he never mentioned Qatar.<sup>252</sup> Additionally, he stated that he did not say that there is a country behind the protests but behind the riots. These opinion changes might be another indicator of how the debate was instrumentalized by the elite in order realize certain objectives, such as support gain for better bargaining positions.

Walid Jumblatt is another example of political figures whom changed their minds over the protests. Similar to Aoun, his position toward the protests was quite friendly, acknowledging their “rightful demands” and praised the movement’s success in creating a new wave, different than the conventional movements aligned to political parties.<sup>253</sup> He also warned the activists of political manipulation and hindering of their movement.<sup>254</sup> In addition, he warned political parties against criticizing the *You Stink* campaign.<sup>255</sup> Just over two weeks later, he accused the protesters of obstructing the first solution proposed by the government to end the garbage crisis.<sup>256</sup> Briefly after, he criticized media coverage of the movement, which would threaten the national

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<sup>250</sup> “الشغب أعمال في بالتورط قطر إلى تتجه لبنانية اتهام أصابع,” *Al-Arab*, September 2, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.alarab.co.uk/pdf/2015/09/02-09/p1000.pdf> [last accessed on May 26, 2016].

<sup>251</sup> “Politicians, activists spar over accountability,” *Businesspulse*, September 3, 2015, retrieved from [http://businesspulse.qa/en/eqstory/DS03092015\\_dsart-313796/](http://businesspulse.qa/en/eqstory/DS03092015_dsart-313796/) [last accessed on May 20, 2016].

<sup>252</sup> “قطر اذكر لمو عربية دولة هناك الشغب اعمال وراء ان قلت: المشنوق,” *Mulhak*, September 2, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.mulhak.com/الدفى-حقاً-ليست-الشائم-الداخلية-وزير/> [last accessed on May 26, 2016].

<sup>253</sup> “Jumblatt Advises 'You Stink' Activists to Avoid Falling Victim to Political Manipulation,” *Naharnet*, August 30, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/188675> [last accessed on May 20, 2016].

<sup>254</sup> Idem.

<sup>255</sup> “Jumblatt warns parties against criticizing You Stink,” *The Daily Star*, August 31, 2015, retrieved from [http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Aug-31/31...utm\\_medium=social&utm\\_source=twitter.com&utm\\_campaign=buffer](http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Aug-31/31...utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer) [last accessed on May 20, 2016].

<sup>256</sup> “Jumblatt: Protesters impeding urgent trash solution,” *The Daily Star*, September 14, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Sep-14/315139-jumblatt-protesters-impeding-urgent-trash-solution.ashx> [last accessed on May 20, 2016].

security.<sup>257</sup>

National security was also the major point of concern of the heads of international institutions such as the UN. The UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Sigrid Kaag, stated that “Lebanon’s leaders must act in the national interest, especially at this critical time,” and added that “Lebanon cannot afford further stagnation or continued domestic political crisis, harming the economy, undermining the level of basic services and ultimately eroding the country's stability and security.”<sup>258</sup> The country’s security situation is one of the main factors that facilitates the instrumentalization of the policy debate. Situated in a fragile region with a civil war reigning in the neighboring country, Lebanon’s national security can be used as an argument to condemn voices of discontent as posing a threat to the unstable security, as has been done by Jumblatt.

Other factors facilitating the instrumentalization of the debate are the following. First, the high stakes that are attributed to the sector: The sector offers huge economic benefits while the debate can lead to political sympathy and followership. Secondly, powerful interests in the sector and the power game over the outcome of the debate are facilitated through the institutional vacuum in the sector: No responsibilities are assigned to specific stakeholders, while no significant laws exist to regulate the sector. Thirdly, the big power discrepancy between the groups can lead to the instrumentalization of the debate as a result of the power play taking place: On the one hand, the power-holding elite is contested and thus might instrumentalize the debate in

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<sup>257</sup> “Jumblatt criticizes media coverage of trash crisis,” *The Daily Star*, September 16, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Sep-16/315421-jumblatt-criticizes-media-coverage-of-trash-crisis.ashx> [last accessed on May 20<sup>th</sup> 2016].

<sup>258</sup> “Kaag urges ‘political accountability’ over Lebanon trash crisis,” *The Daily Star*, August 24, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Aug-24/312513-kaag-urges-political-accountability-over-lebanon-trash-crisis.ashx> [last accessed on May 26, 2016].

order to maintain its power. On the other hand, the opposition might also instrumentalize the situation for a gain in power to succeed in the contestation of the elites. Finally, instrumentalization is furthered by the pressuring factor of the crisis context with garbage piling up in the streets and leading to health risks and an environmental disaster. This emergency situation allows for ad-hoc solutions, which do not need to be elaborated and based on studies such as an Environmental Impact Assessment. Meanwhile, the population can be easier convinced of the necessity to accept the proposed solution to end the crisis.

The public, on the other hand, had only minimal ways to make its voice heard and to push for change in the sector: through protests, sit-ins and movements. Through the movement, it contested the conventional way of policy-making, which maintained the *status quo*. The protesters also refused the support of the political leaders to inhibit the instrumentalization of the movement by a political bloc. This was a lesson learned from the 2005 movements of March 8 and especially March 14. While the movement was successful in remaining independent of a political leader, they were not able to inhibit the instrumentalization of the debate and they could not shape the outcome of this policy process. However, the movement was able to contest the conventional game of power and avoided its instrumentalization. This contestation did not fade once the protests lost momentum as new political groups emerged from the movement. These are the campaign *Beirut Madinati* (Beirut my City) and Charbel Nahas' secular party *Mouwatounoun Wa Mouwatinat fi Dawla* (Citizens within a State); both run in the municipal elections in Beirut in May 2016. Although neither of the groups has gained seats in the Municipal Board of Beirut, they proposed an opposition to the conventional

powers and the elections showed they had many supporters.<sup>259</sup> Not only in Beirut but also outside of the capital a new spirit can be seen as individuals, activists and environmentalists run for the municipal elections (e.g. with Adham Hussainie who run in Ain W Zein (in the Chouf); an individual who run in Kfar Roman (in Nabatyieh); in Kfardebian (in Mount Lebanon), where a woman with environmental background won in the municipal elections; in Tripoli, where Ashraf Rifi won against the long-established conventional political elite).<sup>260</sup> The movement spread hope all over the country and was an inspiration for these individuals to contest the conventional powers in the elections of May 2016. This is characteristic for the movement of 2015-2016, as in previous years rather NGOs than political parties crystalized once the movements faded. The contestation of the power might continue through the campaigns and groups that met and unified within the movement and *You Stink* will follow up and keep an eye on the garbage issue, which it realizes is a major pillar of the regime.<sup>261</sup>

## 5.6 Success to a Revolution

The Associate Professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science, George Lawson, found three factors, which would lead to successful revolutions: the level of state effectiveness, the degree of the elite fracture and the organizational capacity and ideological unity of the opposition.<sup>262</sup> Putting these factors in the context of Lebanon and the above findings might further reveal the reasons for

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<sup>259</sup> Atallah, S., "Despite its Loss at the Polls Beirut Madinati Provides Hope for Change," *The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies*, May 2016, retrieved from <http://www.lcps-lebanon.org/featuredArticle.php?id=76> [last accessed on May 20, 2016].

<sup>260</sup> Assaad Thebian, interview by author, Beirut, May 19, 2016.

<sup>261</sup> Idem.

<sup>262</sup> Lawson, G., *Arab Uprisings, Revolution or Protests?* retrieved from [http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR011/FINAL\\_LSE\\_IDEAS\\_TheArabUprisings\\_Lawson.pdf](http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR011/FINAL_LSE_IDEAS_TheArabUprisings_Lawson.pdf) [last accessed on May 26, 2016].

why the protests were not able to shape the policy outcome. Lebanon's state effectiveness has severe lacks, which became most visible through the outbreak of the garbage crisis. However, the degree of the elite fracture remained negligible and the elites were able to maintain influence over the coercive apparatus. Since the instrumentalization of the movement and the openly coercive responses to the movement failed to silence the movement, the political elite resorted to other measures. The other measures used were mainly the humiliation and accusation of the protests and its leaders. As shown above, the *You Stink* movement was accused by Nohad Machnouk to be funded by a "small Arab country." According to Assad Thebian, other figures accused the movement to be Zionists, or to be manipulated by Hizbollah and by the US.<sup>263</sup> This shows that the political elite was acting in concert, applying the same strategies. Another factor illustrating the unity of the elite is the coalition of political figures in the municipal elections of May 2016. Although factions within the elite might have been the trigger of the outbreak of the garbage crisis, the elite reunited when surprised by the strong and persistent protests.

Regarding the movement, its organizational capacity on the side of the social movement was strong and it reached and mobilized tens of thousands of people. However, the movement faced a lack of ideological unity. While everybody would agree that corruption is the major issue in the sector, what political figures to accuse is not agreed upon. Many followers of the March 14 bloc felt that the movement was leaning toward the March 8 bloc, as mainly Future Movement figures were attacked (Minister of Environment, Mohamad Machnouk; Minister of Interior, Nohad Machnouk; Prime Minister Tammam Salam).<sup>264</sup> Also, the demands deferred:

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<sup>263</sup> Assad Thebian, interview by author, Beirut, May 19, 2016.

<sup>264</sup> Activist, participated in demonstrations and toured through country for mobilization and

decentralization, end of corruption, change of the electoral law and environmentally sound waste disposal were only the major demands posed in regard to the garbage crisis. While the movement agreed in general lines on these demands, the way they should be addressed led to further divisions as indicated above.

Some of the demands regarding public services in general were: public spaces, women's rights, better electricity-provision and public transportation. More political demands were posed as the fall of the regime and the change of the sectarian system to a secular one. However, not everybody would agree with these latter demands. Another feature weakening the opposition is fear: As already mentioned above, people are afraid due to the instability of their region. As illustrated above, the political elite exploited this fear, pointing out that the movement would weaken the country's national security. In addition, the many problems the country faces, the many lacks of public services and the many threats posed to public health are another set of excuses for not implementing changes in the solid waste sector. The country would face too many obstacles, which first need to be dealt with, before an all-round SWM master-plan could be elaborated.<sup>265</sup> Thus, while the political elite remained unified and strong, the opposition was fragmented and split. However, the movement was able to manifest the people's discontent with the political elite and showed that patron-client relationships are controvertible. It gave hope to people and mobilized the civil society against unconstitutional behavior and the lack of service provision. The movement provided an opportunity for the mingling and meeting of like-minded people across sects and social contexts and led to the creation of political groups, contesting the long-standing political elite.

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information sharing, interview by author, Beirut, April 26, 2016.

<sup>265</sup> Representative of OMSAR, interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, April 6, 2016.

## 5.7 Conclusion

This chapter first illustrated how the social movement of 2015 and 2016 shaped the policy debate. This was done through a narrative analysis of the debate in the years prior to the garbage crisis of 2015 (specifically the debate surrounding the 2010 strategy) and the debate during the crisis. A comparison between the phases and the different narratives showed that the government's narrative did not change and framed the problem as a NIMBY-problem. Also parts of the narrative of the public remained the same, although the problem was framed differently. In the pre-crisis years, the problem was framed as an environmental one, while once the crisis broke out, the civil society agreed that the major problem in the sector is corruption. Accordingly, demands already posed in the past were reinforced, such as the end of corruption and environmentally sound waste disposal. Also, some new demands arose, including decentralization of the solid waste sector and the change of the electoral law. The latter is not a new demand in Lebanon; however, it is new in the context of the solid waste sector. Since the argumentation of neither the government, nor the public was found to be stronger or weaker than the other, the prevailing of the government-narrative could only be explained through power-differentials. The government employed a wide range of power, both coercive (tear gas and arrests) and soft power (de-legitimization, cooption of parts of the CS and adaptation of arguments). One expression of soft power is represented by instrumentalization. It was found that the activists were able to inhibit the instrumentalization of the movement itself. However, the debate was instrumentalized in order to return to the *status quo ante*.

The analysis and the findings of the power discrepancies and the instrumentalization of the debate are summarized in the following conclusions.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

In the summer of 2015, a garbage crisis broke out in Lebanon. This crisis was triggered by NIMBY-inspired protests and was responded by larger protests throughout the country, which demanded an end to the crisis and grew to a movement against the corrupt political elite. In this thesis, the movement of 2015 was first put in the context of environmental movements worldwide, which have been able to shape the policy debate or have been trigger points for the fall of the system (e.g. the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe). Then, the movement was seen in a larger debate about environmentalism in Lebanon and the evolution of the environmental policy domain in Lebanon. This allowed for the illustration of the challenges in the field, such as the struggle against the political elite and fragmentation of the Civil Society. Finally, the movement of 2015 was put within the history of social movements in Lebanon, other than environmental ones. This has shown that movements, or the NGOs that were created as a result, have often become victims of instrumentalization. The movement of 2015 seemed to have overcome the fragmentation typical for the environmental NGOs and the instrumentalization by political figures. Thus, the following research questions arose: How have the protests of 2015 shaped the policy debate in the sector and why were they not able to shape the final policy outcome.

In order to find answers to the posed research question, an explanatory single-site case study was conducted. The policy process was analyzed through the narrative analysis framework, which was chosen because the sector is characterized by

uncertainty, polarization and complexity. These characteristics make it difficult to analyze policies in a conventional manner, which studies policies as objective entities, created by a rational authority through a logical process. As the case of Lebanon shows, this ideal situation is rarely realized and the narrative analysis takes this into account. The framework helps to include points of view of involved individuals or groups who have less power to dominate the policy debate. The different parties involved and their positions were identified through an in-depth document analysis together with data gathering through participant observation and meetings with key-figures and informants.

As a first step, it was explored how the movement of 2015 shaped the debate regarding the solid waste sector in Lebanon. For that purpose, the major actors and their narratives prior to the outbreak of the crisis were identified and categorized. These were compared with the major narratives after the outbreak of the crisis and the protests responding to it. The major opposition in the policy debate was found to be between the government and the Civil Society. It was found that on the government-side, the argumentation and the problem-framing prior and after the crisis remained the same: The problem was framed as a NIMBY-problem. On the side of the public opposition, the framing of the problem changed: Prior to the crisis, it was framed as an environmental problem and after as a problem of corruption. Thus, old demands such as environmentally friendly waste disposal and end of corruption were reinforced while new demands for the solid waste sector were for decentralization and the change of electoral law. Given that it was found in this first step that the protests were able to shape the debate leading to the final outcome, possible reasons for the failure of the protests to shape that policy outcome were explored.

Through the application of the narrative analysis, it was found that both parties,

the government as well as the protesters, had difficulties to ground their arguments on scientific facts and studies because these are scarcely available. Most of the arguments on both sides were found to be weak and therefore, it could not be found that the prevalence of the government-rational was based on stronger arguments. Instead, it was found that power-differentials were the reason for the final policy outcome. The government-side had different sources of power within its disposal and was therefore able to respond to the protests or inhibit the participation in protests: hard power and soft power. Hard power includes the open use of violence through the application of teargas and arbitrary arrests of protesters. Soft power is a subtler form of power, less visible but still effective. Some people may have been afraid of participating in the protests in the first place, as they were anxious of loosing their ties with politicians, possible benefits or that they might have difficulties to find future jobs. This is one form of soft power; another one is represented by the non-violent responses to the protests by officials. These were embodied by the de-legitimization of the protests through calling the protesters infiltrators (as sponsored by a foreign country) and drug-addicts. The arguments of the movement were soon also applied by figures within the government. An example is the introduction of the first solution, which was declared to put an end to two decades of corruption, confirming one of the accusations and one of the demands of the protesters. Additionally, some of the members were coopted in the decision-making process in order to seek approval of the Civil Society. This led to a split within the Civil Society and the movement. In general, the movement split soon after its appearance and different demands were made on the ground. Although the groups agreed on some major demands, they were at odds with each other regarding the way these should be addressed. This also contributed to the weakness of the movement. It was thus found

that the power-differentials between the citizens and the elites in power are the major reason for the failure to shape the policy outcome. For that reason, the following recommendations and outlines for future research are drawn.

## **6.1 Recommendations**

The struggle in the waste sector in Lebanon is by no means concluded with the implementation of the decision of the Cabinet on March 12<sup>th</sup>, 2016. The latter led to the reopening of the Naameh landfill and additionally the opening of the Bourj Hammoud and the Costa Brava landfill sites. The country is still in a crisis situation and the greater Beirut area is facing a huge environmental challenge. The garbage crisis continues to be a dominant discussion topic and the Civil Society still finds the problem in the sector to be corruption.

The major reason for the outcome of the policy process was found to be power differentials, while the major power lies in governmental hands in form of hard and soft power. However, having all this attention and awareness, it is not too late for activists, academia, individuals, the Civil Society to gather and demand unified one solution to the problem, which is framed as corruption. Facing this power-differential, a specific attention should be posed to the unification, as small, fragmented groups cannot contest strong power. An agreed upon solution needs to be found, lobbied for and supported. This recommendation is based on the studies of previous civil resistances, introduced in Chapter 1, which find that unification of the opposition is a major ingredient for its success. It was found in this analysis that decentralization may provide a good basis for argumentation as it is foreseen by law and some of the municipalities have already started to operate their own solid waste facilities. Decentralization is also a demand that

would inhibit large-scale corruption, which all the groups on the ground agreed on as the major problem in the sector

A second recommendation is based on the fact that a narrative analysis was conducted in this context. This was done because most of the argumentation in this sector does not rely on properly conducted, unbiased, scientific studies. It is therefore encouraged to conduct studies concerning the sector, which can be the base of arguments. For the narratives analyzed above, the following studies should be performed in order to base their argumentation on facts. For the incinerator-story, a study concerning the willingness to accept incinerators is recommended, as thus far it is not clear whether residents would accept incinerators rather than landfills. For the environmental solution to the problem, namely recycling, the following research is recommended: cost-benefit-analyses of recycling, willingness to recycle and the incentives needed to implement recycling. In addition, feasibility studies for recycling- whether a market exists that is able to absorb recyclables if a national recycling-plan was adopted- would be needed for a successful argumentation. The necessity of these studies is exemplified through the statements of different ministerial employees that argue that there would be no market for recyclables.<sup>266</sup> Conversely, private companies and environmental NGOs involved in recycling state the opposite, that there is a market for recyclables.<sup>267</sup> Only a feasibility study for recycling in Lebanon can determine if there is or is not a market for recyclables. However, the topicality of the issue led to a wide range of research and some of the above-recommended studies are in progress.

For the elaboration and implementation of policies, it is recommended to apply

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<sup>266</sup> Official of MoE, interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, April 6, 2016.

<sup>267</sup> Alexander McHugh, Recycle Beirut, interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, April 10, 2016.  
Christ Sarkassian, Arc en Ciel, interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, March 18, 2016.  
Yvonne el-Hajj, Zero Waste Act, interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, May 5, 2016.

a participatory approach rather than a top-down approach. The World Bank already recommended this in the 1990s after its projects failed. However, the participatory approach was never implemented and this situation led to continuous discontent and mistrust of the citizens towards the government. Thus, the participatory approach and the collaboration with all stakeholders are highly recommended. A special focus should be posed on the collaboration with municipalities for the successful implementation of future strategies and solutions. This is recommended since the issue is very sensitive nowadays and a major problem was found to be trust in ministerial offices, which a participatory approach could mitigate. For the same purpose and for the regulation and organization of the sector, it is recommended to introduce a law and to assign clear responsibilities in order to inhibit the misuse of the sector.

In terms of further research, a special link between SWM and real estate was found: Dumping waste in coastal areas and reclaiming land from the sea led to new real estate areas by the sea. However, this could not be further explored in this thesis but could be investigated in future research.

Another suggestion for further research is the comparison of the different movements within the solid waste context. Two big public oppositions, the one in Bourj Hammoud in 1997 and the one against the Hazardous Waste scandal in the early 1990s, were introduced in this thesis. However, the analysis of this thesis focused on the crisis and the movement of 2015. Further research might look into these occasions and reveal possible links.

The continuous politicization of subjects is another characteristic of policy-making in Lebanon worth further exploration. Finally, the major reason for the failure in shaping the policy outcome was found to be power-differentials. However, many cases

were introduced in Chapter 1, in which the weaker parties prevailed over the stronger ones. Further research could compare these cases with the one in Lebanon, which might lead to further explanations for the struggle of the Lebanese citizens in contesting the power-establishment in the prevailing system.

This thesis limited the analysis to the policy debate regarding the 2010-strategy and the debate throughout the 2015-2016 garbage crisis. Future research could take a deeper look into the debates throughout the post-war years, which might reveal more irregularities and strategies of the political elite to maintain the *status quo*. Finally, the instrumentalization of the policy debate within the solid waste sector and other environmental sectors could be further explored. For this particular case, it was found that the knowledge of the Arabic language is needed as the statements of the politicians are not always translated and reproduced by English newspapers. The statements of politicians are also directly accessible on Twitter, a major communication platform for some of the political figures, where they mostly tweet in Arabic. The instrumentalization taking place in the solid waste sector will be summarized in the following section, which also presents the legacy of the social movement of 2015.

## **6.2 The Legacy**

It was found that the debate might have been instrumentalized by most of the parties involved over the past two decades. Throughout all these years, different plans, strategies and a draft law were elaborated, some of them contradicting each other. None of the draft ideas were ever implemented or ratified respectively, which might indicate that the debate about the plans was instrumentalized in order to maintain the *status quo*. The crisis of 2015 and the debate surrounding it might also have been instrumentalized

by different political figures. This assumption derives from the fact that the crisis provided an excuse for the return to the *status quo ante*. Regarding the instrumentalization of the debate, political figures such as Michel Aoun, Walid Jumblatt and Nouhad Machnouk have been changing their positions about the movement throughout the crisis. While the reasons of their fluctuations could not be explored, the fluctuations themselves might be another indicator for the instrumentalization of the debate by the officials in order to return to the *status quo ante*. The movement in 2015 contested the decade-long instrumentalization of the debate within the solid waste sector, while it prevented the instrumentalization of the movement itself. This is in contrast to many movements in the Lebanese history and can be seen as a big step forward in contesting the autochthonous elite. The political groups *Beirut Madinati* and *Mouwatinoun Wa Mouwatinat fi Dawla* formed from the movement and contested the old-established powers in the municipal election in Beirut in May 2016. After being taken aback at the extent and effectiveness of the mass protests and the resulting political campaign, the initially divided political elite unified once more to block effective policy change. Thus, the new political campaigns did not win the election; however, they set a clear sign that the citizens are not satisfied with the way the city is governed. Other independent individuals contested the autochthonous elites in different municipalities throughout the country and some of them were able to enter the municipal board. This is remarkable, especially given the fact that different prominent political figures have combined their lists in the 2016 municipal elections fearing the contestation of these individuals. Although the movement did not succeed in shaping the policy outcome, it raised awareness regarding the corruption within the solid waste sector as well as the public health and environmental implications the sector can bring if

mismanaged. Through this movement, experiences were gained and lessons were learnt that can be useful for the future contestation of power. The Civil Society and the new political campaigns keep an eye on evolvments in the solid waste sector and keep the policy debate in the sector alive. Finally, the spirit of the movement was able to inspire individuals to run for the municipal elections and the contestation has still potential and is likely to go on.

## APPENDIX I

### CONTRACTS

مَرْسُومٌ رَقْمُ ١٥٥  
دفع مبلغ /٢٢٩,٩٣,١٧,١٠٤/ أ.د. من الصندوق البلدي المستقل لـ (شركة سوكلين) والعائدة لاشغال  
نفذت في نطاق عقد جمع النفايات المنزلية وكنس مدينة بيروت وبعض المناطق المجاورة لها

إِتِّ مَجْلِسِ الوَزَرَاءِ  
بناءً على الدِّستور لاسيَّما المَادَّة ٦٢ مِنْهُ،

بناءً على المرسوم الاشتراعي رقم ١١٨ تاريخ ١٩٧٧/٦/٣٠ (قانون البلديات) وتعديلاته،  
بناءً على مشروع القانون الصادر بالمرسوم رقم ١٤٩٦٩ تاريخ ١٩٦٣/١٢/٣٠ (قانون المحاسبية  
العمومية) وتعديلاته، لا سيما المادة ١١٦ منه،  
بناءً على المادة (٦٤) من القانون رقم ٣٢٦ تاريخ ٢٠٠١/٦/٢٨ (قانون الموازنة العامة  
والموازنات الملحقه لعام ٢٠٠١)،  
بناءً على المرسوم رقم ١٩١٧ تاريخ ١٩٧٩/٤/٦ (تحديد أصول وقواعد توزيع أموال الصندوق  
البلدي المستقل) وتعديلاته، لا سيما المرسوم رقم ٣٠٣٨ تاريخ ٢٠٠٢/٥/١٩،  
بناءً على كتاب مجلس الانماء والاعمار رقم ١/٨٩٩ تاريخ ٢٠١٥/٣/٥،  
بناءً على كتاب شركة (Price Water House Coopers) المسجل لدى المجلس تحت الرقم  
١٧٣٩/م.ر تاريخ ٢٠١٥/٢/٢٥،  
بناءً على قرارات مجلس الوزراء رقم ٢١ تاريخ ٢٠٠١/٦/٧ ورقم ١٦ تاريخ ٢٠٠٣/٨/١٤ ورقم  
٨٨ تاريخ ٢٠٠٧/١١/١٠ ورقم ٤٥ تاريخ ٢٠٠٨/١٢/٣٠ ورقم ٣٤ تاريخ ٢٠١٠/٤/٦،  
بناءً على اقتراح رئيس مجلس الوزراء ووزير الداخلية والبلديات ووزير المالية،

يرسم ما يأتي:

**المادة الأولى:** يدفع مبلغ /٢٢٩,٩٣,١٧,١٠٤/ أ.د. الى شركة سوكلين من أموال الصندوق  
البلدي المستقل كمتحققات حددها مجلس الانماء والاعمار على مسؤوليته الكاملة  
والعائدة لاشغال نفذت في نطاق عقدي جمع النفايات المنزلية وكنس مدينة بيروت  
وبعض المناطق المجاورة لها والعائد الى الكميات الاضافية، بالاضافة الى تطبيق  
معادلة مراجعة اسعار للسنة التشغيلية الحادية والعشرين (من ٢٠١٤/١/١) ولغاية  
٢٠١٤/١٢/٣١) بما فيها الضريبة على القيمة المضافة.

على أن تقتطع هذه النفقات من حصة البلديات المعنية وفقاً لنسبة استنادتها من هذه الخدمات.

### المادة الثانية : ينشر هذا المرسوم ويبلغ حيث تدعو الحاجة.

بيروت في ١٢ آذار ٢٠١٥

صدر عن مجلس الوزراء  
رئيس مجلس الوزراء  
الامضاء : تمام سلام

وزير الأشغال العامة والنقل وزير الزراعة وزير الاتصالات نائب رئيس مجلس الوزراء رئيس مجلس الوزراء  
الامضاء : غازي زعتر الامضاء : أكرم شبيب الامضاء : بطرس حرب وزير الدفاع الوطني الامضاء : تمام سلام  
الامضاء : سمير مقبل

وزير دولة لشؤون مجلس النواب وزير العالسية وزير السياحة وزير الطاقة والمياه  
الامضاء : محمد فنيش الامضاء : علي حسن خليل الامضاء : ميشال فرعون الامضاء : ارتيور نظريان

وزير الداخلية والبلديات وزير الصناعة وزير الخارجية والمغتربين وزير الصحة العامة  
الامضاء : نهاد المشنوق الامضاء : حسين الحاج حسن الامضاء : جبران ياسين الامضاء : وائل أبو فاعور

وزير البيئة وزير الشؤون الإجتماعية وزير الاعلام وزير دولة لشؤون التنمية الإدارية  
الامضاء : محمد المشنوق الامضاء : رشيد درباس الامضاء : رمزي جريج الامضاء : نيبيل دي فريج

وزير العدل وزير العميل وزير الشباب والرياضة وزير المهجرين  
الامضاء : اشرف زيفي الامضاء : سجعان قزي الامضاء : عبد المطلب الحناوي الامضاء : النيس شبطيني

وزير التربية والتعليم العالي وزير الثقافة وزير الاقتصاد والتجارة  
الامضاء : الياس بو صعب الامضاء : ريمون عريجي الامضاء : الأبن حكيم

## APPENDIX II

### SOLUTION 1 PUBLISHED IN ENGLISH

**Minutes of Meeting Number: 79**  
**Decision No. 1**  
**Year: 2015**

**Government of Lebanon**  
**Council of Ministers**  
**General Secretariat**

**Extracted from the Minutes of the Council of Ministers' Meeting held at the Grand Serail**  
**Wednesday, September 09, 2015**

**Subject:** Solid Domestic Waste (SDW) Treatment Plan

**Reference Documents:**

- Public Accounting Law as amended
- Legislative Decree No. 118 dated 30/06/1977 as amended (Municipalities Law)
- Prime Minister's Decision No. 47/2015 dated 28/02/2015 (Formation of a committee to evaluate all tenders related to the Integrated Solid Domestic Waste Management Plan, including supervision tenders) and Decision No. 63/2015 dated 30/03/2015 (Amendment to the name of the representative of the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR) in the aforementioned committee)
- Cabinet Decision No. 46 dated 30/10/2014 as amended by Decision No. 1 dated 12/01/2015 (Assignment of the Council for Development and Reconstruction to immediately start preparing the Terms of Reference (ToR) for an open tender to award the contract of street sweeping and waste collection and transportation within the Beirut, most of Mount Lebanon and North Lebanon governorates...), Decision No. 46 dated 13/11/2014 (Referral of the presentation of the Ministry of Environment concerning the ToR on street sweeping and waste collection and transportation within the Beirut Governorate and most of the Mount Lebanon and Northern Lebanon Governorates to the Ministerial committee tasked with preparing a National Integrated Solid Waste Plan in light of the Cabinet's discussions) and Decision No. 7 dated 07/05/2015 (Approval to amend some paragraphs of the Cabinet's Decision No. 1 dated 12/01/2015)
- Cabinet Decision No. 1 dated 25/08/2015 (Adoption of the suggestion of the Minister of Environment to dismiss the results of the tenders on the Solid Domestic Waste (SDW) services, and commissioning of the Ministerial Committee to pursue alternatives to be raised to the Cabinet in a timely manner) and Cabinet Decision No. 1 dated 27/08/2015 (Commissioning the Minister of Interior and Municipalities to request municipalities and union of municipalities to inform him about their readiness to plan out and take responsibility for the treatment of SDW, each municipality within its jurisdiction and in the shortest possible time for an appropriate decision to be taken in this regard).
- Report of the Minister of Agriculture and Head of the Experts' Committee for the Treatment of the SDW Crisis.
- Proposition of the Prime Minister during the Cabinet session.

**Cabinet decisions:**

The cabinet examined the above-mentioned documents and after discussions, decided to:

1. Agree on the headlines and guidelines of the Solid Domestic Waste (SDW) Treatment Plan by adopting the principle of treatment decentralization and giving the municipalities and union of municipalities a role in upholding responsibility of the SDW file for a sustainable period and in

accordance with implementation mechanisms set for this purpose, as an intrinsic part of the transitional SDW treatment period. The implementation mechanisms should be based on a balanced standard that takes into account the *caza* divisions or waste quantities, and any available project should be immediately considered by the municipalities and union of municipalities to treat their waste. Supervision of the project implementation would be performed under a centralized technical team headed by the Minister of Interior and Municipalities and composed of representatives from the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Finance, OMSAR, the CDR and a number of experts.

2. Agree on the adoption of two sanitary landfills to be set up and made operational in accordance with environmental standards in the area of Srar in the Akkar and the Masnaa area in the Anti-Lebanon Mountains, after consulting with union of municipalities, and the use of the Saida waste treatment plant to receive part of the solid waste during the interim period. It also agreed on further studying the possibility of using the Burj Hammoud dumpsite in the coming period within the framework of a rehabilitation plan that would serve to develop the area, in light of the studies carried out for this purpose with the Burj Hammoud Municipality and the concerned stakeholders. It further consented to commission the CDR to prepare the necessary studies with the Ministry of Environment to rehabilitate the Ras El Ain dumpsite and proceed to the contract awarding in relation thereto.
3. Agree, in parallel with the onset of the implementation of Paragraph 2, on moving the accumulated waste in Beirut and Mount Lebanon as from 17/07/2015 and to date that was not buried in the Naameh Sanitary landfill that would be reopened to this end for seven days. This should immediately be followed by the surface re-shaping, capping, greening and electricity production processes.
4. Commission the CDR to take the necessary measures to prepare and operate the proposed locations for the treatment and ultimate disposal of waste within one month, in compliance with the technical guidelines and the annexes to this Decision, that are considered an intrinsic part thereto, with the necessary supervision arrangements.
5. Notify the current operator for the Beirut and Mount Lebanon service area of the non-renewal of the treatment and landfilling contracts, and notify him about the non-renewal of the supervision contract on the treatment and landfilling works.
6. Commission the CDR to extend the sweeping, collection and transportation contract with the current operator for a period that does not exceed 18 months from the date the Council of Ministers accedes the extension, and to amend it in accordance with the actual tasks, and to Commission it to draw up a supervision of works contract and conclude a reconciliation contract for the period extending from 17/07/2015 until the date of entry into effect of the aforementioned contract, in addition to the settlement of the expenses of landfilling activities at the Naameh sanitary landfill in accordance with Para. 3 above.
7. Request the CDR to submit the conclusions of the above Para. 4 and 6 as soon as they become available to the Council of Ministers in order to take an appropriate decision thereto.
8. Agree on the proposed decrees by both the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, related to the distribution of the municipalities and their unions' share from the telecommunication revenues of the Independent Municipal Fund funded from the Ministry of Telecommunications without any discount, including the payment by installments of the outstanding amounts for the period between 1995 and 2010.

9. Agree on giving the Higher Relief Committee a Treasury advance of 150 billion Lebanese pounds for development projects in the Beqaa region.
10. Commission the Minister of Agriculture to follow up the implementation of the abovementioned Decisions and to submit periodical reports to the Council of Ministers with the necessary suggestions, for which purpose he may resort to whomever he deems appropriate.

Fuad Fleifel  
Secretary General of the Council of Ministers

**To inform:**

- Presidency of the Council of Ministers
- Higher Relief Committee
- Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR)
- Deputy Prime Minister
- Ministers
- Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs
- Ministry of Agriculture
- Ministry of Interior and Municipalities
- Ministry of Environment
- Ministry of Finance
- Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR)
- Directorate General of the Presidency of the Republic
- Directorate General of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers
- Centre des Archives Nationales
- Information Center
- Archives

Beirut, on 10/09/2015

**Annex 1:**

**Technical Guidelines for the operation of landfill locations receiving waste**

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The construction of a cell for the sanitary landfill of waste would require no less than 3 months, and in the event the landfill receives the waste before the construction of the first cell is completed, a Temporary Controlled Dump Site with an area of 10,000 m<sup>2</sup> should be prepared, provided its surface is equipped with the following:

- A well compacted clay Liner (50cm thickness).
- An isolating High Density Polyethylene Geo Membrane (HDPE) layer.
- A leachate drainage layer composed of gravel and basalt and drainage channels.
- A sand layer (25cm thickness).
- A leachate collection tank (hermetically sealed, whereby the leachate is withdrawn periodically and transferred to a leachate treatment plant).

It is advisable to implement the following measures on the site under tight supervision to reduce odors and dust emissions:

I- Odor Control:

Odors emanate from three sources: the disintegration of waste on site, transportation, leachate generated from disintegrated waste. To reduce odor emissions, the following landfilling measures should be adopted:

**1. Waste disintegration on site:**

- Dispose the waste in 1-meter layers in a way to provide space and reduce the used working area.
- Cover the waste on a daily basis with at least 25-cm sand layer.
- Supply and install odor control techniques, either through the elimination of odors, or through the technique of biological reactions with odors.

**2. Transportation:**

Transportation means should consider the following aspects:

- Waste should be properly baled and well-wrapped when entering the release area;
- Trucks should be equipped with all necessary leachate collection systems to prevent any leakages during transport.
- The neutralization of the collected leachate inside the trucks through the addition of lime and emptying it into the leachate collection tank.

- Periodical and efficient maintenance of waste collection vehicles to prevent any waste spill or sudden halts along the route to the landfill.
- Daily cleaning of transport equipment before loading a new batch of waste and upon unloading them in the unloading area.

**3. Leachate from disintegrated waste:**

- Waste begins to dissolve with time, thus generating leachate which in itself is considered a source of obnoxious odors. Among the best recommendations to control and neutralize odors is to firmly close the leachate tank and empty it periodically.

**II- Dust Emissions Control:**

The waste contractors should adopt all measures to control dust emissions, in particular through the following:

- Expansion and asphaltting of the road towards the landfill (if necessary).
- Continuous water spraying of the road.
- Specifying a dedicated circulation route for waste transport trucks except for areas or points of unloading.
- Ensuring specific locations for the truck wheels wash to avoid polluting main roads with traces of soil and mud from the site.
- Full wrapping of trucks carting clay, gravel and sands to the unloading sites.
- The operator should invest in a mobile, automated and environmental-friendly air quality monitoring station covering the site and that can be easily deployed in its capacity as a station used to monitor ambient air quality and to measure and record average gaseous emissions and polluting particulates.

**Annex 2:**

## Rehabilitation of the Burj Hammoud dumpsite (Draft Project)

The Burj Hammoud Area suffers from chronic environmental problems marked by the existence of a waste mountain that accumulated over decades resulting in health and environmental repercussions.

In the context of the search for solutions to the waste crisis, the Minister of Agriculture Akram Chehayeb is working in collaboration with an Expert Committee and subject-matter experts on the preparation of a vision for a transition from the solid waste crisis to a sustainable solid waste management.

The proposed solutions consist of an interim phase (over a maximum period of 18 months) followed by a sustainable phase.

During the interim period, the Committee suggests that several locations be chosen wherein the waste generated within the service areas currently under AVERDA Group's contract (amounting to about 3,250 tons/day) will be transferred. The interim period provides an opportunity to rehabilitate several sites that were already damaged environmentally and to benefit from them through the solutions to be proposed during the interim period.

Based on the above, the Committee proposes the following:

- A Cabinet Decision shall be taken during the session devoted to the treatment of the waste crisis that would include the plan's components, such as the rehabilitation of the Burj Hammoud dumpsite.
- During the first six months of the interim period, construction works shall be initiated for the installation of a wave breaker to protect the neighboring work area, the sorting of the mountainous pile of waste and the creation of a sanitary landfill cell to contain the sorted waste from the mountain, in addition to backfilling works of the marine area by using the appropriate material extracted from the mountain.
- Six months later, the newly-established landfill cell will start receiving a part of the waste generated from the Burj Hammoud area and its surroundings, and as part of the solution during the interim phase. It is worth noting that the reception of waste generated from outside the waste mountain shall be limited to a maximum period of 12 months and a maximum total quantity of 350,000 tons over that period.
- The dumpsite rehabilitation project shall be resumed after the end of the waste reception period in the sanitary cell from outside the site. After the completion of the rehabilitation works, the Burj Hammoud area would have attained the following positive results:
  - Removal of the mountainous pile of waste and its adverse impacts on the environment and public health.
  - Acquisition of a new plot of land.

- Acquisition of a green area over the sanitary cell with a nearby municipal garden.
- Provision of incentives to the neighboring municipalities, especially the Burj Hammoud municipality, in application of Law No. 280/2014.
- Potential benefit from this project to launch the dynamics of the “Linor” project.
- Improvement of the land use approach on the waterfront of Burj Hammoud which would contribute to the social and economic development of the area.

**Annex 3:**

#### **Measures to be taken at the Naameh Sanitary Landfill during the interim period**

- In order to ensure the appropriate engineering conditions to close down the last cell of the Naameh landfill, transport of waste accumulating since 17/07/2015 will be carried out to the said cell for a maximum period of 7 days (and un-landfilled waste).
- Subsequently, surface re-shaping, capping and greening works shall be conducted in the Naameh landfill.
- Prior to the expiration of the interim period, works designed to generate electricity from emitted gases at the landfill site shall be finalized and the work to operate the energy generating facilities shall start in order to benefit the neighboring villages and municipalities by providing them with free electricity.

## APPENDIX III

### GUIDELINE FOR SWM, ELABORATED BY THE ECOMOVEMENT

## التدوير

### مشروع خارطة طريق تطرحة ٢٠٠ جمعية أهلية على الحكومة والبلديات لحل أزمة النفايات - كانون الثاني ٢٠١٦

تتقدم منظمات المجتمع المدني الموقعة أدناه، إلى الحكومة اللبنانية والبلديات برؤية ومشروع خارطة طريق لحل أزمة النفايات في لبنان، التي لا تزال مستمرة، متخذة أبعاد كارثية على بيئة لبنان وصحة أبنائه والمال العام، كبديل عن الخيارات الأخرى المطروحة، التي لم تحل المشكلة حتى الآن.



#### المبادئ العامة:

١. حل متكامل ومستدام ويحترم مبدأ المساواة بين المناطق والمواطنين.
٢. حل يحترم الهرم العالمي لمعالجة النفايات.
٣. حل لا يؤذي الصحة ولا يشوه الطبيعة.
٤. حل محلي وغير مكلف مادياً.
٥. حل سهل التنفيذ.

#### المسؤوليات:

١. السلطة التنفيذية والتشريعية: تحرير أموال البلديات، إصدار قانون للنفايات يحترم المبادئ العامة المذكورة أعلاه.
٢. البلديات: إدارة النفايات، تلميز ما يلزم، تثقيف المواطن بالتعاون مع الجمعيات البيئية.
٣. القطاع الخاص: أخذ المبادرة في التخفيف والفرز والإستثمار في المعالجة والتدوير والتصنيع.
٤. المواطن ومنظمات المجتمع المدني: التخفيف، والفرز من المصدر، والتدريب والمراقبة والمساعدة.
٥. السلطة القضائية والضابطة البيئية: تفعيل الرقابة وتطبيق القوانين والمراسيم البيئية.

#### عناصر الحل:

١. إنشاء خلية أزمة في كل قضاء بالشراكة بين البلديات أو إتحادات البلديات والمجتمع المدني لاختيار مواقع في نطاق القضاء لتخزين النفايات المتراكمة في الشوارع بطريقة صحية وبيئية من أجل معالجتها لاحقاً. واختيار مواقع وطرق بيئية للتخلص من العوادم استناداً للمعايير البيئية المعتمدة عالمياً.
٢. تشغيل وتطوير كل معامل الفرز والمعالجة في لبنان ولا سيما معمل الكرنيتينا والصروسية ومعمل الكورال وإنشاء مراكز فرز ومعالجة جديدة حيث يلزم وتطوير الفرز الآلي ليزيد من فعاليته وتحسين النوعية.
٣. إستخدام أراض لتسيخ النفايات العضوية وإنتاج محسن للتربة وتطوير تقنيات التسيخ السريع و/أو عمليات الهضم اللاهوائي في المعامل القائمة والجديدة.
٤. دعم وتقديم حوافز لمصانع التدوير في لبنان (الكرتون/البلاستيك/الزجاج/الدوايب، المعادن) وتسهيل التصدير للبضاعة المفردة وغير الممكن تدويرها في لبنان (بعض أنواع المعادن).
٥. تطوير تصنيع منتجات جديدة من متبقيات النفايات وتنظيم تصنيع الوقود البديل من النفايات ذات القيمة الحرارية وغير القابلة للتدوير.

للمزيد من المعلومات الإتصال بالحركة البيئية اللبنانية: ٠٥/٩٢٣٠٦٠ - ٠٣/٣٢٧٩٧٥ - [info@lebanonecomovement.org](mailto:info@lebanonecomovement.org)

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Alexander McHugh, founder of Recycle Beirut. Interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, April 10, 2016.

Ali Darwish, president of the NGO Greenline, subscriber to the letter demanding investigation against the UNDP in Lebanon due to corruption allegations. Interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, March 20, 2016. Tape recording.

Antoine Abou Moussa, Board Member of NGO Terre Liban (part of Zero Waste Coalition and Ecomovement). Interview by author, Baabda, Lebanon, March 17, 2016.

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Christ Sarkassian, project manager at the NGO Arc en Ciel (active in Solid and Hospital Waste Management). Interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, March 18, 2016. Tape recording.

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Individual actively involved in the protests, helped later *Beirut Madinati* in their campaign. Interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, April 29, 2016.

Individual, participated in protests without affiliation to group. Interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, April 5, 2016.

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