AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

HIZBALLAH: THE SURVIVAL OF GROWTH

by
MARCUS BURKE HALLINAN

A thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
to the Department of Political Studies and Public Administration
of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences
at the American University of Beirut

Beirut, Lebanon
July 2016

AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

Marcus Burke Hallinan for Master of Arts
Major: Political Studies

Title: Hizballah: The Survival of Growth.

This thesis examines how Hizballah has evolved from its revolutionary goal of creating an Islamic state in Lebanon to becoming a significant actor in both Lebanese politics and regional affairs. The methodology of this thesis utilizes an approach that extracts four common characteristics of revolutionary groups and applies the four common characteristics to Hizballah. From these four characteristics I derive four assertions. First, Hizballah is composed of political, economic and socially marginalized people in Lebanon. Second, Hizballah was forced to revise its ideology and change its behavior to construct more realistic goals that would allow them to remain a legitimate entity and retain power and support. Third, after Hizballah achieved its more realistic goal, it sought to remain in power by modifying its ideology, behavior and goals once more, resulting in a loss of support. Finally, Hizballah was used as a proxy force. In addition to highlighting these four phases pertaining to Hizballah, an early history of the Shia in Lebanon is provided to supply the essential foundation on which Hizballah was built upon. This study concludes that Hizballah had in fact evolved in a prototypical manner in accordance with these four assertions, with the exception of losing vast amounts of support following the Israeli withdrawal in 2000 up until 2008. Furthermore, Hizballah has become so adept in maintaining power that it has become the hegemon in Lebanon—this phenomenon closely resembles the purportedly negative features Hizballah was originally established to combat. Finally, this thesis suggests that any future evolutionary stage Hizballah undergoes will almost certainly involve the group maintaining its weapons, as Hizballah will not voluntarily relinquish them in the near future.

CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v

ABSTRACT vi

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS xi

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION 1

A. Why Hizballah? 1

B. Significance 2

C. Outline 4

II. THE FOUNDATION OF HIZBALLAH 7

A. Introduction 7

B. Shia in Lebanon 7

C. Oppression and Persecution 8

D. Political and Economic Marginalization 11

E. Political Mobilization 15

F. Militarization 19

G. Conclusion 22

III. LITERATURE REVIEW 23

A. Formation 24

B. Ideological Evolution 26

1. Party Shifts 26

2. Group Shifts ... 28

C. Remaining in Power and Losing Support ... 29

D. Proxy Usage ... 32

E. Methodology ... 35

IV. THE RADICALIZATION PHASE (1982-1985) ... 38

A. Introduction ... 38

B. Operation Peace for Galilee ... 38

C. Hizballah ... 40

D. *Al-Dawa's* Influence ... 43

E. Foreign Sponsors ... 45

1. Iran ... 45
2. Syria ... 48

F. Radicalism ... 50

1. Radical Islam ... 50
2. Radical Violence ... 52
   a. Hostage Taking ... 53
   b. Suicide Bombing ... 54

G. Hizballah's Open Letter ... 58

H. Conclusion ... 60

V. FOCUSING ON FIGHTING ISRAELI OCCUPATION AND ENTERING POLITICS (1986-2000) ... 61

A. Introduction ... 61

B. Shifting the Fight toward Ending the Israeli Occupation ... 61

1. Amal vs. Hizballah ... 61
2. Tehran Concedes Lebanon to Damascus ... 64
3. Syrian-Hizballah Relations ... 65
4. Legitimizing the Fight against Israel ... 67

C. 1992: Hizballah Enters Lebanese Elections ... 69

1. Election Results ... 71

D. 1990s: Hizballah-Israeli Confrontations ... 73

1. 1993: Operation Accountability ... 73
2. 1996: Operation Grapes of Wrath ... 75

E. 1990-2000: Tactics to Defeat Israel ... 78

1. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) ... 79
   a. Media ... 79
   b. Direct Threats ... 80
   c. Katyusha Rockets ... 81
2. IEDs and TOWS ... 82
3. Intelligence Improvements and Targeting the South Lebanese Army (SLA) ... 82
4. Eroding the Israeli Public Opinion and IDF Morale ... 83

F. 2000: Israeli Withdrawal ... 86

G. Conclusion ... 88

VI. HIZBALLAH POST 2000 ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL (2000-2008) ... 89

A. Introduction ... 89

B. Maintaining the Resistance ... 89

1. Shebaa Farms ... 91
2. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 ... 94

C. Hariri Assassination and Syrian Withdrawal ... 96

D. Hizballah after the Syrian Withdrawal ... 97

E. July 2006 War ... 100

F. Post July War Lebanon ... 105

G. Conclusion ... 109

VII. THE ARAB SPRING AND SYRIAN INTERVENTION (2011-PRESENT) ... 111

A. Introduction ... 111

B. Arab Spring ... 112

C. Hizballah Intervention 114

D. Blowback 121

E. Conclusion 127

VIII. CONCLUSION 128

Appendix

I. FIGURES 134

REFERENCES 140

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure Page

A1. 1932 Lebanese Census 134

A2. The Israeli Occupied Zones 135

A3. Shebaa Farms 136

A4. Qusayr and Qalamoun Region 137

A5. Hizballah Embleme 138

A6. Middle East Region 138

A7. Lebanon Map 139

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Why Hizballah?

Before I arrived in Lebanon for the first time in 2013 to attend the American University of Beirut's (AUB) Intensive Summer Arabic Program, I was familiar with Hizballah, but lacked a complete understanding of the group's true capabilities, the depth and complexities of its organization and how it rose to the powerful stature it has today. However, as I continued to live in Beirut from 2014 to 2016 working towards my graduate degree in Political Studies, I became more intrigued by Hizballah. I started keeping current with Hizballah-related news and began continuously researching its history in an effort to understand the current events as they unfolded. This ultimately led to my remarkable realization of how truly powerful Hizballah was not only in Lebanon, but also how the relatively tiny group played such a pivotal role and was a keystone to the entire Middle East's power balance. Hizballah, and its allies, Syria and Iran, are in a cold war against almost every other Sunni Arab nation, in addition to Israel and most of the West, including the United States. Moreover, my interest and curiosity in Hizballah was further heightened after various Hizballah-related acts played out in Lebanon while I was living there. Some examples include a tit-for-tat clash against Israel in the disputed Shebaa Farms region on January 28, 2015, which resulted in Hizballah killing two Israeli soldiers, in addition to one Spanish United Nations (UN) peacekeeper being killed by Israeli artillery fire. Another example is the November 12, 2015, twin suicide bombing that killed 44 people and wounded another 250 in Beirut's southern suburbs, deemed as the deadliest attack since the end of Lebanon's bloody civil war in 1990. The

Islamic State (IS) claimed the explosions, which were understood to be in retaliation for Hizballah's involvement in the Syrian civil war. Furthermore, just days before this writing on June 12, 2016, while sitting in my bedroom working on this paper, my eight-story apartment building in the Hamra neighborhood of West Beirut was rocked by a powerful bomb explosion just three blocks away. The 30 to 40 pound bomb claimed no lives, and lightly injured one person. The blast was widely viewed as very suspicious. The target was one of Lebanon's largest banks' headquarters, Blom Bank. The Lebanese banks and Hizballah are currently at odds over Lebanon's banking sector's compliance with the 2015 US law, known as the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act (HIFPA). These sanctions ultimately sought to shut out any bank associated or doing business with Hizballah and any of its known members from the US and international banking system. No group claimed the attack and the bomb was detonated when the bank was closed on a Sunday, just after sundown during Ramadan. This raised many red flags, as most Muslims were known to be indoors breaking their fasts with *iftar*. Although Hizballah still remains silent on the issue, many suspect the Shia organization was behind the blast, believing the bomb was not meant to kill, but to intimidate. These three specific examples offer a perfect microcosm into the domestic, regional and international fronts and obstacles in which Hizballah operates and navigates through. In an effort to fully comprehend the complex dynamics and intricacies of Hizballah, I approached a professor and Hizballah expert, Dr. Hilal Khashan, who only further expanded my enthusiasm regarding Hizballah for my thesis topic.

B. Significance

By demonstrating that Hizballah has evolved from its revolutionary goal of

creating an Islamic state in Lebanon to becoming an actor in both Lebanese politics and regional affairs, I expose that Hizballah will be forced yet again to evolve after its latest calculated move in Syria. Hence, the timing of my research is rather significant. Currently, Hizballah finds itself slowly being backed in to a corner by domestic and international foes alike. Nearly 5,000 Hizballah fighters in Syria are fighting alongside the Assad regime that is accused of using chemical weapons and barrel bombs against its own populace. Hizballah has an image crisis as a result. The 1,048,000 Syrian refugees registered as of March 2016 in Lebanon puts a devastating strain on an already weak Lebanese government who has 5 million citizens of its own and nearly 500,000 Palestinian refugees in the country. Furthermore, the Lebanese people are suffering from deadly attacks by radical Sunni militant groups such as the Islamic State, in response to Hizballah's presence in Syria. Regionally, not only do the Sunni Arab monarchies that comprise the Gulf Cooperation Council fight Hizballah by proxy in Syria, they also have recently taken other indirect measures to pressure the group. In February 2016, Saudi Arabia halted nearly $4 billion USD worth of aid meant for the Lebanese Security Forces. This was in addition to some of the GCC countries restricting travel of their citizens to Lebanon, as well as recalling diplomats and citizens home. Both actions are mainly due to Hizballah fighting in Syria. The United States even took measures against the "Party of God" by enacting a 2015 law on June 2016 intended to stem Hizballah's financing. The Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act (HIFPA) sought to shut out any bank associated with or doing business with Hizballah and any of its known members from the US and the international banking system. These actions are all in addition to what Hizballah's main enemy and *raison d'etre*, Israel, has in store for the group. It is inevitable that even if Hizballah, Iran and Assad are victorious in Syria, Hizballah will not be the same organization it was before entering

Syria in March 2011. Hizballah will need to continuously evolve, as it has in the past, in order to survive their recent flurry of problems. In Hizballah's case, their behavior in the past can be studied in order to make predictions regarding their future behavior.

C. Outline

This thesis demonstrates how Hizballah evolved from its revolutionary goal of creating an Islamic state in Lebanon during the early 1980s when it was first founded, to becoming an actor in both Lebanese politics and regional affairs. This thesis highlights the main influences, key events and other important contributing factors that helped Hizballah reconfigure itself throughout time. This thesis is divided in to six main chapters:

Chapter II provides an essential history of the Shia community in Lebanon from its earliest beginnings in the 7th century up until 1982, right before Hizballah's founding. This section examines the early oppression and persecution, as well as the political and economic marginalization of the Shia community in Lebanon. It concludes with the political and military mobilization of the Lebanese Shia with the Amal movement; later rogue Amal members would break away from the group and later form Hizballah.

Chapter III reviews the relevant literature and provides a methodological framework. This section provides the reader with similar instances of revolutionary groups and organizations who have gone through evolutionary phases that resemble those that Hizballah went through. Chapter III additionally details the factors and influences which caused these revolutionary groups and organizations to change over time.

Chapter IV is the first chapter in which Hizballah itself is introduced,

highlighting the group's radicalization phase, from 1982 to 1985. Here, important events discussed are the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon through the Operation Peace for Galilee and Hizballah's formation and goals, including overthrowing the Lebanese government and creating an Islamic state. Influential contributors to Hizballah's development, like the *al-Dawa* movement and foreign sponsors are also discussed. In addition, this chapter includes the radical Islamic ideology and behavior Hizballah partook in. This chapter concludes with Hizballah's 1985 Open Letter, which the organization debuted itself to the public.

Chapter V covers 1986 to 2000, in which Hizballah shifts its focus and ideology from radical behavior to focusing on resisting the Israeli occupation. Chapter V also touches on Hizballah-Amal relations, Syrian-Hizballah relations and how Hizballah became a legitimate resistance force in Lebanon against Israel. This section also focuses on Hizballah's entrance in to Lebanese parliamentary politics in 1992 and details Israeli-Hizballah military confrontations in 1993 and 1996 and the fighting tactics utilized by Hizballah. This chapter concludes with Israel's withdrawal in 2000, following its 18 year illegal occupation of southern Lebanon.

Chapter VI highlights how Hizballah adapted to Lebanon without an Israeli occupying presence in southern Lebanon, as it had achieved its stated goal for the most part and seeks to remain in power. I explain how Hizballah strategically maneuvers to maintain its special status as a "national resistance" force in Lebanon. Chapter VI examines Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri's assassination in 2005 and its impact, which ultimately led to the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. Hizballah's response to the Syrian withdrawal and the July 2006 war in which Hizballah battled Israel is also discussed.

Lastly, Chapter VII considers Hizballah's position on the Arab Spring

movement in 2011 and its military role in the Syrian conflict. This component ultimately analyzes Hizballah’s current phase, in which the group transforms into a regional Iranian proxy force.

CHAPTER II

THE FOUNDATION OF HIZBALLAH

A. Introduction

This chapter provides a historical analysis of the Shia presence in Lebanon. I cover their earliest years beginning in the Ummayad period in the 7th century until 1982. By fully comprehending the treatment and evolutionary process the Shia community in Lebanon has endured throughout these 13 centuries, this section properly sets the stage for why and how Hizballah developed in the early 1980s.

B. Shia in Lebanon

The precise period regarding when and how Twelver Shia Islam was established in present-day Lebanon is estimated to have begun during the Ummayad period in the 7th and 8th centuries. The majority of Shia in Lebanon follow this specific sect of Islam. Numerous versions exist on how this sect of Islam might have first arrived there. Albert Hourani explained that through oral tradition by Shia scholars in Lebanon, Shiism was founded in present-day Lebanon sometime in the 7th century by Abu Dharr, a companion of the Prophet Mohammed and a strong supporter of Ali's claim to the caliphate. Dharr is said to have been exiled to the rural district of Greater Syria, after he was journeying to Damascus from Medina. The link between Dharr and Ali can be seen as an act of validation by the Shia community of Lebanon to authenticate Shiism. Other scholars such as Philip Hitti and Henri Lammens have stated that the first Shia in Lebanon were actually Persian. Hitti's and Lammen's theories, however, are highly disputed by many Lebanese Shia claiming that this idea is simply

“designed to diminish the Arabic roots of their sect” (Shanahan, 2005, 13). Furthermore, some contemporary studies diverge from both of those views and have shown that some Lebanese Shia families are in fact originally descendants from Yemeni tribes who came to Lebanon right before the 10th century. There are in fact written records that show that by the 10th century, the Shia were heavily dispersed throughout the Levant. The Isma’ili Shia Fatimad caliphate (908-1171 CE) was based in Cairo, the Persian Twelver Shia Buyids (932-1055 CE) was based in Baghdad, and the Arab emirate of the Hamdanids was in northern Syria and upper Mesopotamia (Shanahan, 2005, 14).

In Lebanon specifically, Shiism had spread vastly and was most powerful during the Ummayad (661-750) and the Abbasid (750-1258) periods. The Shia’s prominence at this time was reflected through their presence encompassing all parts of present-day Lebanon, including Tripoli and the Akkar plains in the north, which was then a Shia stronghold, the Kisirwan region of Mount Lebanon, including Byblos, Baalbeck and the Biqa’ Valley in the east, and finally, in southern Lebanon. One researcher even proclaimed that Lebanon’s population was nearly 85% Shia during this peak period (Nakash, 2006, 29; Mauzahem, 2015, par. 9). After the Fatimads lost power, in combination with Syria falling to Sunni Salah al-Din Ayyubi in 1171, and the Abbasids defeat to the Mongols under Hluaghu in 1258, the Shia’s prominence was lost throughout the region and they became heavily oppressed and persecuted. The Lebanese Shia were no exception (Hamzeh, 2004, 9).

C. Oppression and Persecution

The Mamluks began excursions in 1291 against the Shia in present-day Lebanon due to their alliance with the enemy Crusaders who they were fighting in the

region. The Mamluks forced many of the Shia out from the regions they occupied. In the north, the Shia were driven out of Tripoli and other locations to be replaced by Turkman clans. This was done in order for the Turkman clans to provide protection over the coastal area, as well as the roads leading to Damascus. Shia in the Kisirwan region would be expelled because the area had overlooked the roads along the coast. Lastly, they were banished from the Lebanese coastal cities and were replaced by Sunnis due to these areas being important trade centers for the Mamluks (Hamzeh, 2004, 9). By 1309, religious persecution of the Shia was underway. A *fatwa* (religious law) was issued by an extremist Damascus clergyman named Ibn Taymiyyah who called for these killings. Some Shia who remained in areas that were facing persecution had practiced *taqqiyah* (dissimulation), in which they had pretended to have converted to Sunnism or Christianity for protection. Most others went in to exile and fled to the remote areas of Lebanon for safety. The two main destinations for the Shia to resettle in were Jabal ‘Amil, the mountainous region of southern Lebanon, and the plain of the Biqa’ Valley (Mouzahem, 2015, par. 12; Hamzeh, 2004, 9).

When the Sunni Ottoman Empire (1516-1918) took control of Lebanon, the Shia continued to be persecuted and oppressed. Making matters worse for the Shia under Ottoman jurisdiction, the Safavid Empire in the early 16th century named Shiism its official religion, creating a sense of suspicion towards the Shia within the Ottoman lands. Shia were placed under Sunni jurisdiction of the courts, and conscripted to the Ottoman army during times of war. This was unlike the treatment received by other sects under the Ottomans (Hamzeh, 2005, 9). Moreover, throughout Ottoman rule, the majority of Shia in Lebanon were heavily concentrated in the remote parts of southern Lebanon and the Biqa’ Valley. This resulted in the Shia being cut off from the main trade and finance centers, as well as becoming separated from the resources, culture and

symbols of Damascus, Sidon and Acre. Consequently, the Shia had a "peripheral role, both geographically and politically" ("Hizbullah", 1998, 3.2; Ajami, 1985, 779; Nakash, 2006, 31). In the 16th century, the Ottomans began eliminating Shia in Lebanon due to a Shia revival. A prominent Lebanese Shia cleric named Muhammad Bin Makki had directed the Shia to end the practice of *taqiyyah* and instructed his followers to resume practicing their religion openly. This decree led to the resumption of constructing Shia mosques and *Huseiniyyahs* throughout Shia areas in modern-day Lebanon. As a direct result of this resurrection of Shiism, the Sunni Ottomans began committing horrific massacres against them. The most infamous massacre was the slaughtering of nearly 44,000 Shia in Jabal 'Amil by Sultan Selim between 1524 and 1574 (Mouzahem, 2015, pars. 11-12). Furthermore, in 1638, Ottoman forces led by Prince Fakhr al-Din al-Ma'ani, entered Jabal 'Amil and killed approximately 1,500 Shia. This devastating attack resulted in the Shia of the south to claim their independence, but this declaration was met with a fierce counter by the empire, as Ottoman forces entered Nabatiya and killed many more Shia, extinguishing their proclamation (Hamzeh, 2004, 10). Nearly 150 years later, in 1781, the Ottoman forces led by Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar looked to regain control of Jabal 'Amil once again since the Shia there had been operating autonomously for some time. Al-Jazzar's forces had fought the Shia of the south in many battles beginning in 1782 until 1785. After intense fighting during these years, the Shia were eventually subdued. These protracted, intense battles resulted in al-Jazzar's forces razing many Shia fortified villages, burning libraries of Shia religious scholars and ultimately had Ottoman governors appointed in the captured territory to maintain Ottoman control. Moreover, many Shia had died during the fighting and a vast proportion of their crops was completely destroyed. These factors had a long-lasting, compounding effect on the population of Jabal 'Amil, as an even heavier economic

burden was felt by the survivors that remained in the south to produce even more taxable goods for al-Jazzar and the Ottomans. These taxes were in addition to local taxes the Shia of Jabal ‘Amil were already required to pay (Shanahan, 2005, 24; Nakash, 2006, 31).

Accounts of how truly crippling al-Jazzar’s excursions in Jabal ‘Amil had been recorded and documented by two travelers to the region during the 18th and 19th centuries. C.F. Volney, a French author, described al-Jazzar’s treatment of the Shia in Jabal ‘Amil as “incessantly labored to destroy them…it was probable they will be totally annihilated, even their name become extinct” (Quoted in Ajami, 1985, 780). Another well-known traveler to the region was an Englishman, David Urquhart. He documented that the region of Jabal ‘Amil was “vastly underdeveloped” and noted how the residents there had still blamed al-Jazzar’s tyranny decades ago for the region’s poor standard of living, even in the mid-19th century (Shanahan, 2005, 24-25).

D. Political and Economic Marginalization

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire following World War I, the Shia would be used as a strategic pawn by the ruling French who were now controlling the mandated region which Lebanon was part of. The French had ideas of creating a state to benefit their Maronite allies, but the Shia opposed this idea fearing a Maronite-controlled state may “sentence them to oblivion” (Hamzeh, 2004, 11). By 1919, tensions were rising between Maronites and Shia in Jabal ‘Amil. This caused clashes which resulted in French forces of nearly 4,000 soldiers, backed by Maronites, to conduct air bombardments on Shia villages and towns. By June 1920, the Shia *ulama* (religious leaders) and dignitaries of Jabal ‘Amil were forced by the French to sign a declaration stating they were at fault for the clashes. The defeat of the Shia in the south by the

French and Maronite forces made it much easier for the French to coerce the Shia areas of Jabal ‘Amil and Biqa’ in to joining the newly proposed Lebanese state (Hamzeh, 2004, 11). However, hard power was not the only method used by the French to coerce the Shia.

With the establishment of “*Lubnan Al-Kabeer*” (Greater Lebanon) in 1920, the situation for Shia in Lebanon would slightly change from a religious perspective. For the most part, the French-created Lebanese state was not supported by many Muslims, mostly Sunni. Roughly around the same time of the creation of the new Maronite-dominated state, a Sunni Arab nationalist movement in the region had sprung up. The Sunni nationalists believed that modern-day Lebanon should become a part of an independent Syrian Arab state they wished to create following the Ottoman defeat in World War I. Realizing the Sunnis stark displeasure to become a part of Greater Lebanon, the French had targeted and persuaded the Lebanese Shia community in a ‘divide and rule’ strategy to ease the concerns of the Shia community in Jabal ‘Amil and the Biqa’ about officially joining the newly created state; they had not yet joined in 1920. The proposition the French put forth to the Shia was the opportunity to have Shiism be officially recognized as a separate religious entity within the new Lebanese state. The Shia accepted the offer and in 1926 the French High Commissioner officially passed legislation allowing the Shia to employ their *Ja’fari* school of jurisprudence by a Shia judge for personal status legal actions. The French gained the support of the Shia with this agreement, including the prominent families of Jabal ‘Amil and the Biqa’. This is critical, as the Shia in Jabal ‘Amil and Biqa’ did not have significant ties to Beirut or Mount Lebanon at the time. By the 1920s, many ‘Amili Shia had more economic ties to the port of Haifa. Similarly, many Shia in the Biqa’ were attached economically and politically with Damascus. By attracting the Shia, the French had hoped to curb support

of the Sunni nationalist movement (Shanahan, 2005, 29-30).

When Lebanon gained independence in 1943, the broader Shia community still failed to progress politically, economically and socially in the immediate decades to follow. This can be attributed to the strength of the feudal system in which the Lebanese Shia still operated within. Ajami (1985) stated that the two main concepts for the creation of an independent Lebanon were a Maronite country emphasizing Lebanon's Christian identity and secondly, a state with a Sunni Arab character, sustained by the merchants of Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon, that would be part of the larger Arab world. The Shia did not fit anywhere in this model (781). The political structure that was adopted was based on the 1943 unwritten agreement, or National Pact (*Mithaq al-Watani*). This aimed to give proportional political power to each confessional group based on the 1932 census taken in Lebanon, which till this day is the only census taken in recent history. The census figures (See Appendix I, Figure 1) resulted in the Maronites being the majority religious group, followed by the Sunni and Shia, respectively. Thus, political positions allocated in order of importance were a Maronite president, a Sunni prime minster, and finally, a Shia parliamentary speaker. In addition to these allotted posts for specific sects, high-ranking executive and military positions were proportional as well (Hamzeh, 2004, 12). One might assume that being the third largest confessional group in Lebanon's new bureaucracy would allow the Shia to finally begin to slowly advance from centuries of political, economic and cultural oppression, but this did not transpire. The Shia in Lebanon would now become doubly marginalized: within their own sect in addition to the state. Ahmed Beydoun argued that the Shia had not progressed after Lebanon's independence, like the Sunnis and Maronites at the time, because the Shia had not formed a cohesive and united religious establishment. Due to this factor, the power that ruled the Shia community would be the *zu'ama* (political bosses) (Siklawi,

2012, 4).

The Shia had languished under this new system of proportional confessional government due to the small number of powerful Shia families who held a monopoly on the political offices set aside for their sect. They became known as *zu'ama*. The Usayrans of Sidon, al-Khalils of Tyre, and al-Zains of Nabatiya had become wealthy merchant families during the late 19th century when they purchased large amounts of land or became *multazims* (tax agents) for the Ottomans. In the Biqa', powerful clans and tribes who were dominant throughout the years, such as the al-As'ads of Tayibi and Hamadas of Baalbek, were also *multazims* and had controlled the Shia positions in the assembly and ministries. The *zu'ama* almost always went unchallenged and through their local economic might, dominated elections by getting "plient constituents" to vote for them in nearly every election (Norton, 1984, 21-22). Finally, adding to their political misfortunes, there was rarely ever any outspoken criticism by the *zu'ama* for more representation for the Shia community. More representation in government would pose a direct challenge to the limited number of *zu'ama* who held a tight grip on the influence and power over the Shia population. Hence, non-notable Shia were rarely a source of concern to their representatives (Shanahan, 2015, 32).

In addition to being slighted politically after Lebanese independence, the Shia were spurned economically. As previously mentioned, from independence onwards, the prominent *zu'ama* in the Shia regions took little interest in advancing their community as a whole. This left the majority of the sect to fend for themselves. Economic development in Jabal 'Amil and the Biqa' was desperate. The Shia in the south frequently complained of paying more taxes yet receiving the least amount of government funds and resources compared to other parts of Lebanon. Jabal 'Amil had few paved roads, in addition to the vast amount of villages lacking electricity and fresh

water. Until 1943, there was not even a single hospital in southern Lebanon. With the Shia community being the most disadvantaged community in Lebanon, while simultaneously living in the least developed parts of the state, Karl Deutsch referred to this dilemma as "double trouble". Compared to the Sunni and Maronite communities who were overrepresented in the most profitable sectors of commerce, finance and real estate, the Shia were overrepresented in the poor working classes in the underdeveloped agriculture and industry sectors. Nearly 85% of the Lebanese Shia population near the middle of the 20th century lived in rural south Lebanon and the Baalbeck-Hermel districts in the Biqa' (Nakash, 2006, 105; Hamzeh, 2004, 13). Furthermore, due to the fighting in the Palestine War in 1948, the Shia in the south of Lebanon were the most severely affected of all the Lebanese sects because of their location, which bordered northern Israel. With the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, crucial economic business links for the Shia of the south with Palestine had been immediately severed. This left a gap that would go unfilled, leaving the southern Lebanese Shia "forgotten, out of business, conceptually, politically, and economically" ("Hizbullah", 1998, par. 3.2). This negative effect was compounded with nearly 100,000 Palestinian refugees who fled the fighting and resettled in Lebanon, many in the south. This massive influx altered the economic structure in the south, as these Palestinians created a pool of very cheap laborers which undercut the traditional Shia workforce (Norton, 1998, 83).

E. Political Mobilization

Beginning in the mid-20th century, the Lebanese Shia community would go through demographic, political and socio-economic changes. These events created an opportunity for them to finally transition from a marginalized sect to a politically active one. Due to the harsh economic situation the Shia were dealing with in southern

Lebanon, in addition to being caught in the crossfire of the PLO-Israeli fighting, many were forced to migrate, internally and externally. Domestically, a large proportion of poorly educated, mostly landless, unemployed Shia from the south and the Biqa' moved to slums in the southern and eastern suburbs of Beirut. These two areas specifically would become known as the "belt of misery" (Hamzeh, 2004, 14). Others would leave the dreadful conditions of their villages for the United States, West Africa and the Arab oil countries of the Gulf (Hamzeh, 2004, 14; Norton, 1984, 37). But by the 1960s, they were "buffeted by the winds of modernization, winds that uprooted the Shia and rendered them more available for political mobilization", as Augustus Norton stated (1984, 30). Shia exposure to the press and television, progressive educational advancements, the decline of agriculture and the rise of the service sector, in addition to increased travel within and outside of Lebanon had dramatically transformed villages and urban slums that the Shia called home. During this time, dominant *zu'ama* began slowly losing power over their Shia constituents, due in large part to the state bureaucracy providing political goods the *zu'ama* had once given in return for political support. This erosion of feudal power was also due to the ruling elites not developing a sufficient policy to address the rapid economic and social changes throughout Lebanon. Now, many Shia were demanding security, education, health services and employment opportunities (Norton, 1984, 30, 33; Mansour, 2010, 86).

Adding more seriousness to Shia demands was the massive demographic explosion experienced within their confessional community beginning in this same period during the mid-20th century. Their dramatic expansion would give the Shia more political weight through the power of numbers. In the period from 1921 to 1956, the Shia community rose from 100,000 to 250,000, but their sect's overall sum remained stable at 19% of Lebanon's total population. Due to this stability, Lebanon's

proportional political structure based on confessional identity was still balanced. However, from 1956 to 1975, the Shia population tripled, rising from 250,000 to 750,000, which increased the Shia sect to roughly 30% of the total population. By the 1980s it was widely believed that the disenfranchised sect was the largest group in Lebanon at 1,400,000. This was compared to Maronites and Sunnis at roughly 800,000 each (Hamzeh, 2004, 13). A blatant display of how rapidly the Shia grew was their presence in Beirut over time. As early as 1920 there were roughly 1,500 Shia living in Lebanon's capital. By the 1990s, the southern Beirut suburb of Dahiya alone had an estimated 850,000 Shia living there, making it the most populated Shia region in all of Lebanon (Nakash, 2006, 113-114; Alagha, 2006, 26).

Not beholden to the *zu'ama* any longer, by the 1960s and 1970s, the large, frustrated and fragmented Shia community in Jabal 'Amil, the Biqa', and especially the new Shia in Beirut began testing the political waters by becoming vocal, active members of leftist and religious political parties and militias that had sprouted up within Lebanon. Siklawi (2012) referred to this period as the "Shia Transformation" (5). Many were attracted to various leftist parties due to their marginalized experiences as a communal group and desire for better employment and housing opportunities, in addition to improved health and social services. Some of the most appealing leftist parties that shared the Shia ideology and goals were the Lebanese Communist Party, anti-establishment organizations, such as the Organization of Communist Action and the Lebanese National Movement. Many secular, anti-establishment parties such as the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) were also popular on the ideological right side of the political spectrum. Also, sharing a common bond with the hardships the Palestinians refugees in Lebanon were enduring, in tandem with the Shia's fascination with the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel, many joined *feda'i* organizations and

parties linked to Palestinian resistance. The Shia were drawn to groups such as the Arab National Front, The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), as well as the Arab Nationalist Movement and pro-Iraqi and pro-Syrian branches of the Baath Party. It is worth noting that no one group ever claimed a vast majority of the Shia (Norton, 1984, 65-66; Norton, 1998, 83; Mansour, 2010, 87).

In December of 1958, Imam Musa al-Sadr, a charismatic religious leader, arrived in Lebanon from Iran. Al-Sadr would significantly change the Shia community in Lebanon, politically, economically and socially. Mansour (2010) noted that al-Sadr had systematically mobilized the Shia, while he "advocated an enlightened and open religious discourse and tried to build a third force between traditional leadership…and the parties of the left…which were highly influential among the southern public, especially the youth" (87). Al-Sadr would begin to lay the groundwork for the Shia community which would energize the mobilization efforts they had been yearning for by providing a cohesive message that the various political parties at the time had lacked. Imam Musa would also challenge the *zu'ama* elite and the system itself. To do this, the Iranian-born cleric "channeled the Shia demands through a distinctly Shia voice, hardening the community's vertical alignment", while fighting for proportional representation and to end discrimination (Mansour, 2010, 87). The Imam was responsible for organizing the disenfranchised sect on three levels. First, socially, through fundraising campaigns in Iran, he established educational and charitable institutions within Lebanon. Second, organizationally, he organized and cultivated ties between all the Shia communities throughout Lebanon. As Norton (1984) states in reference to al-Sadr organizing the entire geographically fragmented Lebanese community, "Despite the sometimes palpable sociological differences between the slum dweller of Beirut, the peasant of the south, and the clansman of the [Biqa'], he

succeeded in giving many Shia in Lebanon an inclusive identity" (68-69). Third, politically, he held meetings with Lebanese government officials to grant the Shia community official distinction from the Sunni community and gain equality within the government system (Azani, 2009, 53-54). His efforts became tangible with the creation of the Supreme Islamic Shia Council (SISC), a government organization administering Shia affairs, in 1969. The council was a democratically elected organization responsible for representing Shia interests, as well as providing a voice to the Shia who were unable to penetrate the political system. Al-Sadr became its first elected leader (Mansour, 2010, 87-88; Hamzeh, 2004, 21). The SISC was a watershed moment for the Lebanese Shia on two fronts. First, it had united and mobilized the entire Shia sect for the first time. Secondly, until 1969 the Sunnis of Lebanon had run the Shia's religious affairs and endowment property (Siklawi, 2012, 7; Nakash, 2006, 116).

F. Militarization

The militarization of the Shia in Lebanon can be traced back to various contributing factors. Following the Arab countries' defeat by Israel in the Six Day War of 1967, many Palestinian refugees already living in refugee camps in Lebanon became more militant and used southern Lebanon as a base to launch attacks against Israel. Encouraging this activity was the Cairo Agreement of 1969, in which the Arab countries allowed the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to continue its fight against Israel from the Arqoub region of southern Lebanon. Due to this, these armed PLO militants would pose a direct challenge to the Lebanese government in Beirut and began operating a state-within-a-state. Making matters worse, following the Jordanian civil war in 1970-1971, in which the PLO was defeated by the Jordanian military and forced out of the Hashemite Kingdom, a second wave of Palestinians entered Lebanon.

This wave of “armed and aggressive” PLO members would enhance their autonomy within Lebanon (Norton, 1998, 83; Norton, 1987, 8). Now, tens of thousands of PLO militants controlled West Beirut, southern Lebanon and much of the Biqa’ (Hamzeh, 2004, 15).

In 1974 al-Sadr established the Movement of the Deprived (*Harakat al-Muhrumin*) to pool and formalize the Shia political and socio-economic demands. The group’s overall goal was to reform the political system and seek justice for all deprived Lebanese, even though the group was Shia. By 1975 al-Sadr developed a security and military branch of the Movement of the Deprived referred to as Amal (*Afwaj Muqawamat al-Lubnaniyya*), an acronym for the Lebanese Resistance Detachments. In order to provide personal security and protect property of the Shia of the south, Amal was created. Amal filled the vacuum left by an incompetent Lebanese military and acted as guardian of the Shia that were trapped in between the crossfire of Lebanon’s civil war, in addition to Israeli attacks on the PLO. The militia was especially needed after the ethnic cleansing of Shia in east Beirut by Christian militias during the beginning of the civil war, as well (Mansour, 2010, 87; Harik, 2004, 22; Hazran, 2009, 4). Deeb (1998) argues that Amal mainly focused on eroding the power of the Shia *zu’ama,* as well as the powerful feudal-style Shia landowners. The same author explained that Amal’s intention was to function as al-Sadr’s conduit to consolidate and extend the clergy’s influence in southern Lebanon, while claiming that the militia was formed to defend the Shia of southern Lebanon from Israeli intervention and attacks (683). Beyond this, al-Sadr seized the opportunity to promote his organization to the Shia as the true leader of social justice, as by 1975 the failures of the secular leftist movements and Arab socialism were profound (Nakash, 2006, 117). During its early phase, Amal, with nearly 800 mainly unpaid or poorly paid volunteers, entered a strategic alliance

with the Fatah faction of the PLO. By doing this, the Shia militia received training and weapons and hoped to strategically plot against the Palestinians to begin retaking control of areas in southern Lebanon that had been administered by Palestinians since the 1960s. By the late 1970s, three major events had caused Amal to become more radicalized and mobilized, in addition to expanding. These events would eventually end the good relationship between the Shia and Palestinians. First, Musa al-Sadr disappeared during a trip to Qaddafi's Libya in 1978, never to be seen or heard from again. The Shia had rallied around this due to the Shia history of the absent Imam (*al-imam al-ghaib*). Secondly, Israel invaded Lebanon in 1978 and 1982. Both excursions intended to destroy the PLO's mini-state within Lebanon and had successfully turned the Shia against the Palestinians, which had been Israel's goal. The Shia's security, property and agriculture had been continuously compromised from Israeli attempts at eroding the PLO. This was a contributing factor to the diminished relations amongst the PLO and Shia of the south. Thirdly, the Shia Islamic state in Iran was established in 1979. This gave the Lebanese Shia a political identity that was transnational. Amal's increased militarization can also be attributed to the Syrian invasion of Lebanon in the Biqa' in 1976 (Siklawi, 2012, 9; Deeb, 1988, 685; Nakash, 2006, 118-119). Continuing, relations between Palestinian militants and Amal were further damaged when the Israelis had left Lebanon after invading in 1978 during Operation Litani. Afterward, Amal fighters restricted PLO members trying to re-enter southern villages, as many had relocated during the invasion. Mainly due to these multiple issues, violent clashes between Palestinians and Amal fighters became frequent. In 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon again as part of Operation Peace for Galilee; Amal had welcomed the Israelis with hopes they would destroy the Palestinians militants in southern Lebanon, as the Shia of the south now viewed the Palestinians as an occupying enemy force (Norton,

2007, 23). Lacking protection from the PLO, the Shia would look upon Amal to provide defense from any aggressors. This in turn caused vast amounts of Shia to end their support of Palestinian groups, only to switch to joining Amal. By the early 1980s, Amal was the leading Shia movement in Lebanon (Nakash, 2006, 119).

G. Conclusion

This chapter provided a historical context of the Shia community in the area encompassing modern day Lebanon from the 7th century to 1982. Due to their religious beliefs, the Shia in Lebanon were oppressed and persecuted early on, forcing many to move to the most remote areas of Lebanon. This caused the Shia to become secluded and mostly unattached to any of the larger cities, major industries, politics or trade. Later, with the fall of the Ottoman Empire following World War I and even after the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 and an independent Lebanese state in 1943, the Shia community was still politically and economically marginalized and remained fragmented throughout the country. However, due to several factors including a population boom, the arrival of Imam Musa al-Sadr to Lebanon, the start of the Lebanese civil war, migration and technological advancements and Israeli invasions of Lebanon, the Shia finally started to become a cohesive and major player in Lebanon's sectarian based political system through Amal, and additionally became militarized.

CHAPTER III

LITERATURE REVIEW

The previous chapter provided an essential analysis of the Shia's oppressive and marginalized history, as well as the sect's mobilization and politicization efforts up until 1982. This was done to provide a foundation in which Hizballah can now properly be introduced, which will be done in Chapter IV.

Chapter III provides a literature review which is the product of extensive research and study relative to patterns and characteristics of various revolutionary organizations, nationalist groups and political parties around the globe after the second half of the 20th century.

This chapter provides a broad familiarity and comprehension of the four essential common features of how these revolutionary groups are formed, their ideological evolution, how these groups lost supporters after accomplishing their main stated objective and finally, how these organizations became involved in a patron-client relationship, then used as a proxy.

To effectively demonstrate the phases and evolution of these revolutionary movements, this literature review will look at multiple groups at specific points throughout their history and highlight the four major phrases previously listed. By analyzing these specific themes, the reader will comprehend the reasons, motivations and factors that were used to operationalize the statement of this thesis; Hizballah has evolved from its revolutionary goal of creating an Islamic state in Lebanon to becoming an actor in both Lebanese politics and regional affairs.

A. Formation

This section details and analyzes the underlying causes of how and why revolutionary groups are formed. The groups examined in this section include Fidel Castro's July 26th Movement (J26M) in Cuba in 1959, One September Revolution of Libya during 1969, the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) in 2011.

In 1959, Fidel Castro led his J26M guerillas to successfully oust Cuban Dictator Fulgencio Batista. According to Slee (2008), this was largely part due to the help of a country-wide general strike by workers, peasants and students in Cuba. This strike destroyed Batista's control on the island (3, 24). Thomas (1963) explained how the Cuban masses believed that Cuba was being "severely exploited by U.S. and Cuban capitalists that the condition of the working class eventually became intolerable". This feeling was only escalated under Batista's tyranny (449).

Castro felt the Cuban people's frustration towards Batista and his government. He used this to his advantage when he stated that Cuban society "attributed unemployment, poverty, and the lack of schools, hospitals, job opportunities and housing -almost everything- to administrative corruption, embezzlement and the perversity of the politicians" (Slee, 2008, 12-13). With the majority of Cubans from all socio-economic classes outside of the ruling elite sharing a similar negative attitude towards the Batista dictatorship, Cuban society provided a fertile political landscape that politically, ideologically and militarily supported the J26M guerillas takeover of Cuba in 1959.

Using tactics and strategies similar to Cuba's organized strikes through coalition building and impressive mobilization maneuvering, Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic clergy played a dominant role in the triumphant Islamic revolution in Iran

during 1979 which ousted the Shah of Iran from power. Parsa (2011) has shown that by 1977, workers had joined students, intellectuals and *bazarris* (merchants, shop keepers and artisans), by organizing and forming "Strike Committees" throughout the country. By 1978 oil workers, who numbered 30,000, joined the strikes. Oil workers striking was significant due to the fact that oil revenues were the essential pillar to maintaining the Shah of Iran's ability to control the country since the natural resource had been the main funding source of the regime. With the vast majority of Iranians from all classes and sectors united and organized against the Iranian monarchy's brutality, as well as economic, political and social practices, large demonstrations were held by the end of 1978 (66).

Buchan (2013) also points out that with millions of Iranians marching through Tehran and Iranian towns during the mourning month of December in 1978, it was clear that Khomeini had become the "undisputed leader of the rebellion" (425). Further, Parsa (2011) claimed that Khomeini's stark opposition to the dictatorship and defense of freedom and national interests, not his theological ideology, were the main reasons for his popular support by Iranian society (66).

Much like in Cuba and Iran, the Libyan population's strong distaste for the head of government, King Idris, created a hostile atmosphere that allowed middle level Libyan military officers, known as the Free Unionists Officers, to execute a bloodless revolutionary *coup d'état* in 1969. Collins (1974) explained how King Idris' lack of investing any significant amounts of the vast oil revenues accumulated by the Libyan state since the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967 led to the ease of the coup (15). The working class that was demanding of him to diversify the economy, increase employment opportunities, services and goods did not support King Idris. Rather, Idris drew his support from "feudal and tribal elements which consumed wealth rather than

invested in it" (Collins, 1974, 15). Idris' support base also backed the foreign exploitation of Libyan natural resources, which many Libyans opposed. With little Libyan support for Idris, in 1969 the Free Unionist Officers made their attempt to remove the King. The officers had enormous approval from "impoverished peasants, unemployed city migrants, and some tribal elements", in addition to employees of the public sector and middle level military officers (Collins, 1974, 15). The inaction of King Idris to invest in Libyan society proved to be his demise.

The last group examined is the Sudan Revolutionary Front which formed from the four strongest rebel groups from Darfur and South Kordofan/Blue Nile in Sudan in 2011. The SRF's mission was to overthrow Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in hopes of creating a "more equitable Sudan". The four major rebel groups that made up the SRF shared similar characteristics which were the main pillar for the creation of the group. The majority of the rebels came from peripheral, underdeveloped parts of Sudan. Additionally, the SRF is composed of 'African' groups, who identify as neither Arab, nor Muslim, who have been culturally, politically and economically discriminated by Bashir's "Arabization and Islamization campaigns" (McCutchen, 2014, 5, 9).

B. Ideological Evolution

Section two evaluates revolutionary parties and groups to understand how and why these bodies have strategically evolved from their original ideological principles that were heavily responsible for their ascension into power. This section explains why ideological shifts are necessary to maintain support, legitimacy and ultimately, power.

1. Party Shifts

Anwar Sadat of Egypt, Muammar Qaddafi of Libya and Ali Osman Taha of

Northern Sudan were leaders and top officials in their states through the Free Officers in 1952, the Free Unionist Officers in 1969 and the Islamist-militant Al-Ignaz in 1989, respectively. All three are similar in the fact that they had altered some of their key original ideological views of state socialism, nationalistic tendencies and numerous other policies in order to garner widespread support in their attempts to consolidate and remain in power.

Wolf (2014) explains that in 1979 Sadat needed to align with the United States to revive Egypt's frail economy by utilizing US aid and gaining access to the US markets. Before this was possible, however, Sadat had to show signs of good faith to America by making peace with Israel, Egypt's enemy, via the Camp David Accords. This was in addition to enacting more liberal, open policies (known as *intifah*), economically and politically, within Egypt (131-133), which Sadat did.

Similar to Sadat, St. John (2008) asserts that Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi had turned to liberalizing his economic policies during the 1980s when his oil-based economy was strangled by regional and international isolation. The same author noted Qaddafi's decision was "based on political calculations…to primarily reduce popular discontent, and thus shore up the regime" (97-98).

Lastly, Al-Ignaz's Taha strived for an "economic salvation" of Sudan's dire economy post 2000. Taha realized that in order for his economic plan to function, the Islamist Al-Ignaz needed to achieve regional peace and drop its radical image. This was done in hopes of lifting international sanctions and attracting investment from the wealthy Arab Gulf states. If achieved, this would best position Taha's massive domestic projects to succeed. Al-Ignaz officials recognized "The jihad and martyrs rhetoric had outlived its usefulness" and the "'new' image of the Al-Ignaz would be as a peacemaking government instead of a war-mongering regime would undoubtedly prove

popular with foreign partners and the Sudanese population" (Verhoeven, 2013, 130).

In 2005, the military-Islamist Al-Ignaz reached a peace deal with its rival rebel group, Sudan's People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) via the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), in addition to improving its Egyptian relations which were nearly non-existent when Al-Ignaz took over in 1989.

2. Group Shifts

The Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were revolutionary groups whose intended purposes were uniting Ireland, liberating Palestine and protecting the ideals of the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979, respectively. The constantly changing international climate played a large role in how and why the ideologies of these groups evolved, mostly due to whether their support and funds increased or decreased over time.

Cochrane (2005) argues that the "The Greening of the White House" campaign by Irish-America (IA), influential businessmen, politicians, non-governmental organizations (NGO) and lobbies, which since 1970 attempted to use the American government in place of the violent IRA to challenge British policy regarding Northern Ireland, was extremely effective. IA's effort to "reduce funding, publicity and support" for the IRA within America eventually became successful. This, in addition to the zero-tolerance laws pertaining to the support and funding of terrorism for the IRA in the US following the September 11, 2001 attacks, were powerful motives in the IRA's decision to officially disarm and seek a peaceful, democratic solution in 2005 (217, 220, 225).

Like the IRA, the PLO's support and funding had dried up after 1979 when the Middle East was going through a political reorganization. With the idea of pan-Arab

unity dead, Egypt's peace with Israel and Arab alliances deteriorated, leaders of Arab states began focusing on nation-state supremacy. This led to the PLO's "services" in providing Arab regimes legitimacy being no longer needed. The PLO's new goal of "removing the infidels" (Zionists in former Palestine, present day Israel), as opposed to "liberating Palestine", was tailored to attract a broader, more radical Arab-Muslim support base to fill the void left from Arab leaders and states who supported the PLO pre-1979 (el-Khazen, 2008, 40-43).

In contrast to the IRA and PLO, Ansari (2010) concludes that the IRGC's "largesse of money and proximity to power" it acquired since 1979, compounded with the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, which greatly enhanced a perceived threat to Iran from America, led to the election of hardliner Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Once elected, Ahmadinejad had given the IRGC "free reign" over foreign policy, Iranian involvement in Iraq and domestic security issues that went virtually unchallenged by the Iranian state (56).

C. Remaining in Power and Losing Support

How and why do specific revolutionary groups lose support? The tendency is for revolutionary leaders and subgroups to want to maintain control and power once they have seized it, since achieving their intended goal(s). This mostly results in the loss of support. The cases examined in this portion will include Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic Revolution, Algeria's FLN and Cuban Dictator Fidel Castro and his July 26th Movement.

Parsa (1979) details how Ayatollah Khomeini enjoyed support from the vast majority of Iranians prior to the overthrow of the Shah of Iran, due to political reasons, such as his strong stance against the dictatorship, and support of freedom, in addition to

national interests—not mainly due to his radical ideological views. However, once the Shah was removed, Khomeini's fundamentalist supporters looked to maintain power by eliminating their former allies that formed the broad coalition that helped overthrow the Shah. Khomeini, through repression, isolation and imprisonment, demobilized any opposition to his clerical regime's rule. Furthermore, the militant clerics seized the opportunity to exploit external conflicts, such as the American hostage crisis of 1979 and the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s (66-67).

By 1981, Khomeini had announced that he had reversed his original position pertaining to himself and the clerics not holding political positions in Iran. Now, Khomeini shockingly declared the clergy should in fact become politically involved in Iran "because no one else was competent or willing to implement all Islamic rules" (Parsa, 1979, 65-67). Buchan (2013) explains that for Khomeini to successfully seize power in Iran after the revolution, nearly 10,000 Iranians died in prison, 200,000 had fallen in the Iran-Iraq War by 1981 and a half a million went in to exile. The author claims that this was the "greatest catastrophe to befall Iran since the Middle Ages" (426).

Another example of a leader attempting to remain in control and gain sole power at the expense of the people is found in Algeria. The Algerian nationalist movement *Front de Liberation Nationale* (FLN) achieved its revolutionary goal of ending French colonialism in 1962, but following this achievement, FLN's President Ahmed Bin Balla tried seizing complete control of the country through creating a dictatorship, which led to the group losing vast amounts of key support and its ultimate downfall. Lewis (1966) explains that shortly following Algeria's independence, divisions emerged within the FLN amongst its diverse members. Issues at hand were "wartime misdemeanors, ideology, ethnic ties, loyalties to particular personalities and

common perspectives on the nature of post-independence Algerian society" (166). By 1965, Ahmed Bin Balla, the FLN's first post-revolution president, began strategically moving away from the FLN's socialist model in Algeria and attempted to consolidate his own political power by moving more towards a communist dictatorship with complete control. In attempting to do this, Bin Balla alienated his political allies and constituency, in addition to attempting to erode the power of the Algerian armed forces, the ANP (the National Liberation Army). Noticing this unauthorized attempted power seizure, the ANP, led by Colonel Houari Boumedienne, staged a successful bloodless coup to remove Bin Balla (166-167, 169-171). Boumedienne later announced via radio broadcast that Algeria had "found itself prey to shadowy intrigues and to conflicts of interests and factions resurrected so that the government might have resource to the old game" and that the coup would regain its freedom ("Counter", 2012, pars. 3-4). St. John characterizes the motivation for the Boumedienne's coup as, "a swift response of seizing power from a politician who sought uncontested power over a military regime" (Quoted in "Counter", 2012, pars. 3-4). The FLN's revolutionary prestige is now nearly non-existent and the party's national status, which was once domestically revered, is more symbolic due to internal divisions, lack of momentum and clear purpose after achieving success in ending French colonialism in 1962 (Lewis, 1966, 161).

Unlike the FLN's Bin Balla, Fidel Castro did manage to seize full power of his country and become a communist dictator shortly after the J26M achieved their main objective of overthrowing Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista. This harsh move by Castro had caused many former Cuban supporters to stop supporting the J26M and Castro altogether. After the coup in 1959, a vast array of J26M supporters believed the J26M would "restore the 1940 constitution, create an honest administration, reinstate full civil liberties, and undertake moderate reforms" ("Fidel Castro: Political", 2015, pars. 8, 10).

In direct contrast to this thought, Castro eventually created a one-party government to ease his path to becoming a communist dictator and gained complete control over Cuba's political, economic and cultural life. Further, Castro began suppressing all political dissent and opposition to his rule ("Fidel Castro: Political", 2015, pars. 8, 10).

Castro's radical ideology and attempt at consolidating power caused many former Cuban supporters and members of the J26M to turn against the movement and Castro. Slee (2008) notes early on that following the coup, within the J26M itself, factions occurred between the right-wing elements of the movement who wanted to ally themselves with the United States and the socialist left wing. The right wing faction eventually became counter-revolutionary forces (31). Prevost (2012) also pointed out that large portion of moderates in the old democratic parties in 1959 resigned in protest, which resulted in many of them going into exile after Castro took power (22). Finally, by the mid-1960's a vast number of the lower and middle classes, in addition to skilled labors, left the island nation for the US due to the failed economy, Castro's stripping of political freedoms and the abolishment of all private property ("Fidel Castro: People", 2004, par. 8).

D. Proxy Usage

Section four highlights examples of revolutionary and national liberation groups that were supported in a "patron-client" relationship. Here, the patron state would support politically, militarily and/or financially its client in order to advance that certain state's power, influence and regional objectives. This section focuses on the dynamic relationships between Castro's Cuba and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the IRA's support from Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi beginning in the 1970s, the United States' support of the contras in Nicaragua after the 1979 Sandinista coup

and finally, Pakistan's support for the *mujihadeen* in Afghanistan following the Soviet invasion of 1979.

In the years after Fidel Castro's July 26th Movement succeeded in 1959, the Soviet Union saw a strategic angle in supporting the new anti-American revolutionary regime in Havana. Bain (2010) points out that after Joseph Stalin's death in 1953, the Soviet Union was looking to alter its foreign policy by increasing its geopolitical presence worldwide. Cuba's location near the United States of America was optimal during the Cold War. Additionally, the Soviet Union could also use supporting Cuba in "answering Chinese accusations of Soviet revisionism" (128).

Furthermore, Slee (2008) wrote that the new Cuban regime sought out the Soviet Union to deter a possible strike from the United States, who was looking to overthrow Castro. This threat and the eventual Cuban-Soviet alliance led the USSR to build missile bases in Cuba, which were used as a counterbalancing measure for American missiles in Turkey and Italy directed towards the Soviet Union. This ultimately triggered the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 (31).

Next, an odd alliance between the Irish Republican Army and Libya was formed when the IRA began receiving support from Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi starting in the 1970s via political support, as well as weaponry for the group to fight against its colonial adversary, the British. According to Rodrigo (2015), once Libyan revolutionary leader Muammar Qaddafi took power in 1969, he began to support anti-imperialist causes, including the IRA's, whom he viewed as comrade-in-arms against the British. This was in part done to reinforce his image as the heir apparent to the late anti-imperialist personification of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser (pars. 7-8). Qaddafi's hardware support of guns, bullets, as well as explosives provided to the IRA had dramatically transformed the Irish group from a terrorist organization to a small

army. Colonel Qaddafi seemed increasingly motivated to ramp up IRA support due to his strong sense to "harm Britain as much as possible" after the British had allowed the United State to conduct bombing missions in Libya in 1986 from English bases (McKittrick, 2009; Harnden, 2011).

Another patron-client example that began in the 1970s occurred when Nicaragua's American supported dictator Anastacio Somoza was overthrown by socialist Sandinista rebels in 1979. America immediately viewed this as another Soviet advancement and threat in Latin America during the Cold War, which could not go unchecked.

U.S. President Ronald Reagan perceived the new Nicaraguan Sandinista government to be out of line with American interests in the region. In an effort to defeat the Soviet Union in Nicaragua, Reagan believed "anti-communist insurgents", the contras (counter-revolutionaries), should be supported, funded and trained by the American government via the CIA ("Reagan", 2011, par. 3). The contras were in reality Somoza's former National Guard unit just relabeled as contras, or freedom fighters. Reagan used the contras to launch a guerilla war against the Soviet backed Sandinistas, in combination with economic warfare through American foreign economic policy and American coercion of its allies who put similar economic pressure against the Sandinista government ("Contra", 2006, pars. 6-7).

Finally, immediately following the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan had made it clear that it was determined to expel the communist's attempt to consolidate power in Afghanistan. Rais (1993) states a Soviet presence in Afghanistan would have posed a direct, real threat to Pakistani security. From Islamabad's perspective, "Moscow had supported Afghanistan's position on the Pushtunistan issue, recognized India's occupation of Kashmir, and more disturbingly,

gave strong indications encouraging secessionist movements inside Pakistan" (907).

Through Pakistan's intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the country supported the *mujihadeen* in Afghanistan as a proxy force for strategic rather than ideological reasons. The *mujihadeen* were Islamist insurgents in Afghanistan who were fighting the Soviet Union and allied Afghan groups. Support given to the Islamic insurgents by Pakistan was an abundance of "training, weapons, and funds, in addition to running training camps in tribal areas with the American intelligence agency". Further supporting and aiding Pakistan's cause in Afghanistan was the United States of America's Cold War policy. American policy funded and supported anti-communist insurgencies worldwide. Due to this, Pakistan had received a substantial boost in economic aid and military sales from the US, totaling $3.2 billion, for their effort fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan through its proxy force. Lastly, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided a conduit for Pakistan to counter domestic and regional security threats, as previously mentioned, in addition to the possibility of installing a Pakistani-friendly regime in Kabul (Sial, 2013, 2; Rais, 1993, 907). This made supporting the *mujihadeen* fighters even more worthwhile for Pakistan.

E. Methodology

In addressing the central component of this thesis—Hizballah's evolution from its revolutionary goal of creating an Islamic state in Lebanon to becoming an actor in both Lebanese politics and regional affairs—this thesis employs a theoretical framework based on analyses developed through researching numerous revolutionary groups, organizations and leaders beginning in the second half of the 20th century, which was discussed in the Literature Review. The framework derived from my analyses revealed that the revolutionary groups in question have generally undergone a similar pattern

comprised of four key stages. In the first stage, the revolutionary groups were largely composed of marginalized peoples, whether economic, politically or socially. Secondly, one or more major events outside of their control caused the revolutionaries to eventually modify their agendas. Here, the revolutionary groups' initial ideology, behavior and goals are either dropped completely or altered in order to remain legitimate, retain support and maintain power. Thirdly, once these groups achieved their initial goals, they once again shifted their behavior and ideology to remain in power. This usually resulted in the loss of some support. Finally, the fourth stage (which does not have to follow in chronological order, as the first three stages do) demonstrates how revolutionary groups become used as proxy forces. By creating a framework based on these revolutionary characteristics, I apply these assertions to Hizballah:

- Hizballah was originally founded and supported by marginalized people in Lebanon.
- Events outside of Hizballah's control forced the organization to revise its ideology and change its behavior to construct more realistic goals that would allow them to remain a legitimate entity as well as retain support and power.
- When Hizballah's more realistic goals were achieved, it sought to remain in power by modifying its ideology, behavior and goals once more. This ultimately led to Hizballah losing support.
- Hizballah was used as a regional proxy force.

In order to operationalize these four statements, I will employ content and historical analyses of numerous books, reports, dissertations, government documents, journal articles and newspaper articles. The following chapters in this thesis explore these four assertions as a core theoretical framework to properly research, demonstrate and operationalize the thesis statement: Hizballah has evolved from its revolutionary

goal of creating an Islamic state in Lebanon to becoming an actor in both Lebanese politics and regional affairs.

CHAPTER IV

THE RADICALIZATION PHASE (1982-1985)

A. Introduction

Chapter III provided an extensive literature review of which the methodological framework of this thesis is based on. From that literature review, four common components that made up the evolutionary phases of those revolutionary groups were illustrated and applied to Hizballah. This section, Chapter IV, will analyze the first assertion: Hizballah's original founders and supporters emerge from marginalized people in Lebanon. This chapter also seeks to determine who supported Hizballah financially, ideologically and socially, as well as what Hizballah's original main goal was. By properly identifying these components, the reader will be better equipped to interpret the evolution Hizballah has undergone.

B. Operation Peace for Galilee

To understand what truly enabled the favorable conditions that eventually spawned Hizballah's emergence, one must look no further than the year 1982. This year is key for the organization and is regarded as the year of its founding in the Biqa' Valley city of Baalbeck. On June 6, 1982, Israel had invaded Lebanon for the second time in four years. Operation Peace for Galilee was also the first time Israel had ever invaded an Arab capital. Israel initiated its war due to the continuous PLO raids originating from southern Lebanon, as well as the attempted assassinations of Israelis abroad, including Israeli Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Shlomo Argov. Due to the Israeli state and its citizens being threatened by Palestinian militants, in addition to the PLO's armed

capabilities growing in southern Lebanon, Israel had decided to take action via Operation Peace for Galilee. As Jacobs (1995) states pertaining to the 1982 invasion, "Like the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914, Ambassador Argov's death provided the spark to ignite a war" (3). The Israeli mission had the intentions to advance its forces as far north in Lebanon to Beirut with having three goals to accomplish: first, to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization's military and political apparatus once and for all; second, to push the Syrians, who had been in Lebanon since 1976, out of the country; and finally, to install a pro-Israeli Christian government in Beirut (Friedman, 1985, par. 4). Israel would achieve all three of these goals. The PLO was eventually forced to leave Lebanon, leaving Israel in control of Beirut and the territory southward and the Syrian military retreated to the Syro-Lebanese border. Additionally, Bashir Gemayel was elected President; Gemayel was a Maronite leader of the Christian Lebanese Forces and ally of Israel who also wanted to see the removal of PLO forces from Lebanon (Hamzeh, 2004, 16-17; Norton, 2000, 23; Simbar & Zibaei, 2011, 80). However, this victory came at a steep cost for the Shia in Lebanon and caused a major unforeseen blowback for Israel. During Operation Peace for Galilee, Israel had killed nearly 18,000 Lebanese and wounded 30,000. This was in addition to causing massive financial damage equivalent to $2 billion USD in 1982 (Hamzeh, 2004, 16; "Operation", n.d., par. 25). Further, president-elect Gemayel was assassinated nearly one month before assuming office. To avenge Gemayel's killing, the Lebanese Forces with Israeli assistance, entered the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila in September 1982, murdering over 1,000 civilians. Many Shia were the victims of this horrific act, as they had also lived in the Palestinian refugee camps (Hamzeh, 2004, 17). Following these two massacres, the Multi-National Force (MNF), mainly composed of US, French and Italian troops, were sent to Lebanon as a

peacekeeping force. The foreign MNF quickly became perceived as the "international militia" for its supposedly biased position towards the unpopular Christian regime in Lebanon (Norton, 2000, 23). These multiple unintended consequences that directly and negatively affected the Lebanese Shia community following Israel's 1982 Peace for Galilee mission was said by then-Israeli cabinet members to have ultimately "[l]et the Shiite Genie" out of the bottle (Quoted in Friedman, 1985, par. 54) and for Israel having simply "traded the hostility of 7,000 Palestinians for the hostility of 700,000 Shiites," as claimed by Israeli statesman Abba Eban (Quoted in Friedman, 1985, par. 55). Out of this violent climate in 1982 Lebanon, Hizballah would be established.

C. Hizballah

In early 1980 Amal had transitioned from a militia to a political party under its leader Nabih Berri. Ideologically, Amal was a secular party and began removing its Islamic content under Berri. Amal's moderate political stance was no more apparent two years later during the week following the Israeli invasion in 1982. Here, Amal opted to cooperate with Christians and willfully joined the National Salvation Committee formed by then Lebanese President Ilyas Sarkis. Berri's decision to politically bargain with the Israelis through the National Salvation Committee instead of confronting them militarily had caused a fracture within the Amal party between secular and more religious Shia elements. The Islamist members within Amal began questioning their party's devotion to the Shia cause. This led Hussein Musawi, a leading figure within Amal, to break away and create an Islamic faction—Islamic Amal. Joining Hussein Musawi were the radical Islamists within Amal who believed in the ideals of the Iranian Revolution, as well as being ideologically inspired by it. Hussein Musawi's Islamic Amal had eventually attracted many other fundamentalist Lebanese clerics from

various organizations who openly rallied behind radical Islam and its enemies- Israel and the United States (Nakash, 2006, 120; Harik, 2004, 22; DeVore & Stahli, 2015, 340, 339). These radicals included:

> "from Hizb al-Da'wah, such as Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi and Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli; from Amal, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Sayyid Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid, Shaykh [Naim] Qasim, Shaykh Muhammad Yazbak, and others; from the Islamist wing of Harakat Fatah, Imad Mugniyyah and Abu Hasan Khudr Salamah; and from the Lebanese Communist Party, Adb al-Hadi Hamadih" (Hamzeh, 2004, 24).

Hussein Musawi's organization was joined by several Shia Islamic groups, various clerics who returned from studying in Najaf, Iraq, including Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, as well as Islamists from across Lebanon, especially Shia from southern Lebanon and the Biqa' who were in search of a new political identity (Nakash, 2006, 120; Majed 2010, 4). These Shia revolutionary clerics and radicals pledged their loyalty to Ayatollah Khomeini as its supreme political leader, as they adhered to Khomeini's *Wilayat al-Faqih* (rule of the supreme jurist). With the group's pledge of loyalty, in addition to the leading clerics in this group's relationships with Khomeini from their time as students together in Najaf, Iran sent 1,500 Revolutionary Guards to the radicals' base in Baalbeck to assist, guide, aid and train them to resist the Israeli occupation (Hamzeh, 2004, 24-25; Osman, 2009, par. 5; DeVore & Stahli, 2015, 337). Hussein Musawi had chosen Baalbeck as the group's base due to three key strategic purposes. First, it was far away from the enemies of the group that would later become Hizballah: Israel, the Lebanese government and the Amal movement. Second, the Biqa's geographical location allowed Khomeini's Islamic Revolutionary Guards to easily enter Baalbeck through Syria. Third, a vast number of Shia organizations, groups and pre-movement structures that had also pledged allegiance to Ayatollah Khomeini as their religious and political leader, in addition to also wanting to pursue the

establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon, were conveniently located nearby (Azani, 2009, 60).

These radical clerics and Islamists would eventually take on the name *Hizballah* (Arabic for 'The Party of God'). The name was specifically chosen as a banner to attract and unite all Islamists, as Ayatollah Khomeini had instructed Hizballah's founders to do. Its origin is found in the Quranic verse, *"those who accept the mandate of God, his prophet and those who believed, Lo! The Party of God, they are victorious"* (Surat al-Ma'ida, 5:56) (Hamzeh, 2004, 25). Once Hizballah was formed, the Shia within Lebanon were presented with a more religious and radical alternative to Amal. It is vital to understand both Hizballah's and Amal's positions in 1982 to better understand Hizballah's actions during this phase. Azani (2009) accurately notes Hizballah's status, ideology, sources of support and overall goals, in contrast to Amal's at this phase. By the time Hizballah was formed, Amal was by then a secular social protest movement that was already institutionalized. Further, Hizballah's ideology was based off a religious and pan-Islamic prototype, which looked to Ayatollah Khomeini and his successors as their authoritative figures. Hizballah sought to create an Islamic regime in Lebanon, as it looked to overthrow the Lebanese government who they saw as unlawful. However, Amal by 1982 was a secular, national Lebanese movement, looking to advance the Shia community's interests through the Lebanese political process. Iran was clearly Hizballah's sponsor who provided the group with "inspiration, funding, training, weapons" (62). In return for this Iranian support, Hizballah had taken pro-Iranian stances. Amal had received its support from Syria, especially political support within the Lebanese political system to benefit not only Amal, but Syrian interests as well. Hizballah's overall goals were threefold. First, it sought to drive out all international forces in Lebanon. Second, it aimed to liberate Jerusalem. Finally, it

wanted to create an Islamic government in Lebanon. On the contrary, Amal aimed to work within the Lebanese political system to achieve change. Similarly, Amal did want to see foreign forces leave Lebanon. However, it did not believe in the tactics or methods Hizballah applied to achieve this goal. Amal was not attracted to the idea of the liberation of Jerusalem, nor did it act outside of the Lebanese borders in an attempt to achieve its goals. Amal and Hizballah had also sought support from the same target demographic, the Lebanese Shia community. Hizballah offered the Shia an alternative option outside Amal and the establishment. During the early years of 1982 to 1985, Hizballah attempted to create its popular movement against Amal, who was undergoing a rise in popularity from not only the Shia community, but politically as well (62-63). Hizballah's overall quest to create an Islamic state based off the Iranian model was the main objective within the organization. To grasp why Hizballah held this and other radical views, *al-Dawa* (The Call) and its influence on Hizballah must be examined.

D. *Al-Dawa's* Influence

Hizballah's religious ideology focused on three aspects: the belief in Shia Islam, the adoption of *Wilayat al-Faqih* and *jihad* (spiritually and physically) (Saab, 2008, 9). Hizballah's goals were combatting the Israeli occupation in Lebanon, as well as mobilizing the politically and economically underrepresented Shia. It also aimed to see the de-confessionalizaton of Lebanon's electoral system. If true democracy with 'one man-one vote' was initiated in Lebanon, Hizballah viewed this as an easier path to establish its Islamic state in Lebanon, as the Shia sect was the majority in the country. Finally, and most importantly, Hizballah's ultimate goal was the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon based on the Iranian model. This would all be part of Hizballah's fixed goal of *dawa*, to spread Islam's influence in Lebanon (Wiegand, 2009,

670-671; Dagher, 2008, par. 27). To interpret *dawa* and why it is such a powerful ideology within Hizballah, one must look at the leading clerics of the Lebanese revolutionary movement. Norton (2000) states, "If [Hizballah's] founders were inspired by Iran, their roots in the *Hizb al-Dawa* should also be noted" (24). The Iraqi *al-Dawa* party was formed by Imam Musa al- Sadr's cousin, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr, in 1958. The Iraqi *al-Dawa* party itself was heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, a religious, political and social movement originating in Egypt in the late 1920s. The Iraqi *al-Dawa* party was considered the Muslim Brotherhood's Iraqi branch (Mamour, 2015, par. 2). The clerics within *al-Dawa* argued that they should have an oversight role in the Iraqi secular government to enforce its clerical power by subjugating executive laws as "un-Islamic". *Al-Dawa's* mission was to unite Muslims in an effort to eventually seize power in order to create an Islamic State. In order to obtain this, the group advocated for martyrdom and self-sacrifice. Additionally, the organization heavily promoted a Shia revivalist message throughout the Shia populated areas of the Middle East, and had political branches in Iraq, Lebanon and the Persian Gulf. This was in effort to stoke revolutionary activities. Also, many leading clerics and founders of Hizballah had studied under Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr in Iraq and had forged relations with Ayatollah Khomeini, who was in exile in Najaf, Iraq, at the same time. During the 1970s, Iraq's government had begun cracking down on *al-Dawa*, resulting in these Lebanese students studying under al-Sadr to return home. Upon going back to Lebanon, the clerics eventually joined Musa al-Sadr's Amal; Baqr al-Sadr was his cousin (Devore & Stahli. 2015, 340; Hamzeh, 2004, 19). Three leading Hizballah founders, Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Shaykh Raghib Harb and Shaykh al-Tufayli were highly influenced by *al-Dawa's* ideology of creating an Islamic state, and were even more encouraged when Iran had successfully completed this task.

Further, it is crucial to understand that following Imam Musa al-Sadr's disappearance in 1978, Ayatollah Fadlallah began to promote *al-Dawa's* transnational Shia revivalism message to the Shia community in Lebanon. This ideology was in direct contrast to what the Shia of Lebanon had heard from Imam Musa al-Sadr who inspired his followers to adopt a Lebanese identity (Hamzeh, 2004, 6, 11, 23, 24; Norton, 2000, 24).

E. Foreign Sponsors

Hizballah was afforded the luxury of having both Iran and Syria aid the organization. Both these states, mainly Iran, played a large role in enabling Hizballah to not only become successful early on, but also allowed it to act in a violent manner. Syria did contribute to Hizballah's rise early on, but played a more direct role after 1990. By realizing why Syria and Iran came to aid and assist Hizballah, one will be able to fully appreciate the causes of how Hizballah was able to expand its power throughout Lebanon in a relatively short period. Finally, this Iranian-Hizballah connection would be the eventual beginning of the patron-client relationship.

1. Iran

Iran and Hizballah seemed to be a natural alliance from the start. Many of Hizballah's founders and leaders of the Islamic Revolution were fellow religious students in Najaf, dating before 1979 and 1982. This allowed both sets of clerics to form similar political stances, as well as close personal ties amongst one another (Szekely, 2012, 115). These similar beliefs the clerics shared included adhering to *Wilayat al-Faqih*, having similar Islamic principles, favoring liberation movements and rejecting the Israeli occupation (Wiegand, 2009, 670-671). Pragmatically, at the time of Hizballah's inception, Iran was engaged in fighting Iraq in the deadly Iran-Iraq War

(1980-1988). As Baer (2008) points out, Ayatollah Khomeini's revolutionary dilemma was at stake and entering the Lebanese arena seemed logical.

> "The 1979 Islamic Revolution was, after all, supposed to unite Muslims against outside oppression and colonialism rather than shed Muslim blood. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon was a heaven-sent opportunity for Iran to regain its revolutionary credentials fighting a non-Muslim enemy" (37).

Moreover, by supporting Hizballah, Iran could reap additional benefits. It would allow Khomeini to create a political-military organization to counter Iraq's support from the Gulf Cooperation Council during the Iran-Iraq War, and would have a direct line of contact to the largest Arab Shia population outside of Iraq. Additionally, Iran could use Lebanon as a base to become involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as champion the Palestinian cause. Supporting the Palestinians would allow the Iranians to bridge the Shia-Sunni gap and enable Iran to connect with the wider Arab population. Finally, Iran could lash out against not only Israel, but also the United States in Lebanon via Hizballah. This would be done in effort to curb American influence in Lebanon, as well as hope to try and shift America's "tilt" towards Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war (Hamzeh, 2004, 25-26; Khashan, 2013, 82; Baer, 2008, 40). Beyond personal relations, ideological and pragmatic similarities, Khomeini had a strong desire to "export" his Islamic revolution. Since the poor Lebanese Shia were the most receptive to his message to the "downtrodden", in addition to the fact Hizballah's leaders were seeking assistance from the new Islamic state—the Hizballah-Iranian alliance would be advantageous for all involved (Baer, 2008, 37; El-Hokayem, 36, 2007; Hamzeh, 2004, 18; Wiegand, 2009, 670).

Iran began supporting Hizballah to achieve their mutual interests after Israel's Operation Peace for Galilee. Magnus Ranstrop concludes that the Iranians assisted Hizballah in establishing itself in three phases. In the first phase, after the 1982 Israeli

invasion, Iran had sent 1,500 Iranian *Pasadaran* (Iranian Revolutionary Guards) to provide military training, assistance in systematic recruitment efforts and ideological indoctrination of the radical Shia in the Biqa'. Furthermore, Iran began supplying funding to pay for military training, as well as various community services, such as schools, clinics, hospitals and cash subsistence to the poor. In this phase Hizballah's charter and constitution was created calling for the establishment of an Iranian-style Islamic republic. Second, Hizballah became active in the Beirut southern suburbs where many Shia had migrated due to the Israeli invasion and desperate economical condition. Third, Hizballah expanded in the south. Hizballah's control of the south was due to numerous factors: the departure of the Palestinians, Amal's failure to challenge Israel in the south and Hizballah's successful suicide attacks against the US and French contingencies of the MNF in Beirut in 1983. This was in addition to targeting the Israelis in southern Lebanon, and the Iranian aid to and influence of local clerics, such as Shaykh Raghib Harb, which collectively contributed to creating a more radical environment (Hajjar, 2002, 7).

However, the most important resource provided was the vast sums of Iranian money that flowed to Hizballah during its earliest phase, which is estimated to be as high as $140 million USD annually, according to DeVore and Stahli (2015, 337). This influx of cash allowed Hizballah's fighting capacity to grow rapidly. Hizballah was able to peel away experienced Shia fighters from Amal and Palestinian groups by offering higher monthly salaries of approximately $150-$200. This expanded the combat wing of Hizballah, named the Islamic Resistance, to nearly 7,000 people. Hizballah's money combined with its radical ideology had also attracted future Jihad Council leader Imad Mugniya from Arafat's elite Force 17 and Husayn al-Khalil, who eventually managed Hizballah's security service and advised its secretary general. The money also allowed

the group to purchase massive arms caches from Palestinian groups (DeVore & Stahli, 2015, 337, 342). Finally, the Iranian financial, militarily and ideological assistance provided to Hizballah in the early stages of its development are not only directly responsible for its rapid rise, but also its strong anti-Israeli and anti-western radical stances that were similar to that of Iran and Syria (Hamzeh, 2004, 5).

2. Syria

Before the existence of Hizballah, the Shia community in Lebanon had a relationship with then-Syrian President Hafez al-Assad that dated back to the early 1970s. Before his mysterious disappearance in Libya, in 1978, Imam Musa al-Sadr had officially recognized Assad’s Alawite sect as a subgroup of Shiism. This had provided the Assad regime with much needed legitimacy. Later, Assad’s Syria would become the only Arab country to vow support for the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. Hizballah, Syria and Iran’s relationship would later become intertwined on a religious level when Shia shrines located within Syria would become a part of the transnational Shia pilgrimage network, tying all three together symbolically and economically (El-Husseini, 2010, 810). However, when the Israelis had invaded Lebanon in 1982, followed by the arrival of the MNF, Syria, Iran and Hizballah’s mutual interest in removing Israel and the western presence in Lebanon would intersect again. From Syria’s geopolitical perspective, it had just been defeated by the Israeli military during the invasion and was witnessing its Lebanese ally, Amal, pursuing the United States in a possible peace agreement in Lebanon. If this were to be achieved, Syria would have its western border with Lebanon headed by a government allied with the United States and Israel (Norton, 1998, 86). If isolated regionally, Syria feared Lebanon could also possibly become a base for internal subversion that would threaten

the Assad regime's entire existence. In order to avoid any of these possible outcomes, Syria strengthened ties with Iran. The intensified alliance allowed Syria to reap economic benefits in the form of free oil and political rewards in an anti-western and anti-Israeli constituency. In return, Syria permitted Iran to run a supply route through Syria to connect it with Hizballah, located in the Biqa'. Syria had also allowed Hizballah to use the Syrian-controlled Biqa' as a radical sanctuary (Hamzeh, 2004, 26; DeVore & Stahli, 2015, 341). However, the secular regime in Damascus was not as enthusiastic as Tehran was with having a militarized, radical Islamic group like Hizballah so close to its border. Nevertheless, they desperately needed a strong ally to fight for its interests in Lebanon. Besides preventing the aforementioned possible scenarios, Syria's usage of Hizballah would offer the Assad regime an opportunity to be able to strike at Israel in an effort to force them to eventually withdraw from the country and hence reopening the opportunity for Syrian domination of Lebanon. Although Syria did have allies in Lebanon at the time following its departure from most of Lebanon in 1982, these allies consisted of the Lebanese Baath Party, the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, the Lebanese Communist Party and its largest ally in Amal, all of which were committed to a non-confrontational, peaceful solution with Israel at this point. By allowing Hizballah to train in the Syrian controlled Biqa' and allowing Iran to transport aid and supplies through Syrian territory, it gained a strategic ally in Hizballah (DeVore & Stahli, 2015, 341). Continuing, in the summer of 1982, the arrival of 1,500 Revolutionary Guards to Baalbeck was the first use of the Syrian pipeline under the supervision of Iran's ambassador to Damascus, Ali Alkbar Mohtashemi (Norton, 1998, 86). Later, with the entrance of the western MNF in to Lebanon, Syria positioned itself as a moderate force, cultivating deniability by using its authentic Lebanese resistance movement in Hizballah to indirectly strike at the United States, in addition to Israel and

their proxy force in the south, the South Lebanese Army (SLA), and its Lebanese allies, including Amal (Usher, 1997, 62). El-Hokayem (2007) describes how Syria strategically used Hizballah throughout the early 1980s through *Realpolitik*—the Assad regime viewed its relationship with Hizballah as: “What Syria would not do, Hizballah and others would” (37). Although, it is important to note that throughout the 1980s, Syrian relations with Iran were rocky. This was in addition to Syria not fully trusting Hizballah, as proven through Syria’s simultaneous support of Hizballah’s rival Amal (Norton, 2012, 35).

F. Radicalism

This section is divided in two parts. The first part explains the factors that allowed Hizballah to rapidly expand throughout Lebanon and how it enforced its strict Islamic beliefs within areas under its control. The second part analyzes how the radical behavior by Hizballah was systematically enabled by leading Shia clerics within the group, and later on Ayatollah Khomeini and other prominent clerics within Lebanon. This will highlight Hizballah’s violent control, violent behavior and escalated tactics used from 1982 to 1985.

1. Radical Islam

Hizballah began enforcing its radical Islamic ideologies in the territories it controlled soon after its founding. The Shia group was able to successfully impose its ways in the areas it administered due to the absence of Lebanese military control over the country during the civil war, in addition to the departure of Syrian and PLO forces from most of Lebanon following Israel’s invasion (Saab, 1996, 96). Another contributing factor rendering Shia areas of the southern suburbs of Beirut and the Biqa’

more likely to accept Hizballah rule was the fact that these regions were poor and bereft of services from the state. Moreover, with Iranian funding, Hizballah began providing these impoverished Shia populations with services that the state would normally provide such as water and sanitation (Khashan, 2013, 81-82). Beginning in 1983, Hizballah also began offering social services including medical clinics and hospitals. Emily Picard details how the organization incorporated social services as a way to further attract supporters in its overall effort of creating its Islamic state:

> "The group created institutions of a state structure both to further its military objectives and provide charitable services for its constituents-going so far as to characterize the group as setting up the "rudimentary structures for an Islamic state". Backed by millions of dollars of Iranian financial and material assistance, [Hizballah] embarked on the construction of a complete social-welfare system within the Shiite communities, including the construction of schools, hospitals, and charitable relief centers. [Hizballah] was able to provide higher quality of social services to some communities in the midst of the civil war than they had received from the Lebanese state" (Quoted in Early, 2006, 120).

Hizballah's strategy of exchanging services for loyalty to the Shia was successful as its military presence in the Biqa' expanded to southern Beirut and southern Lebanon. Consequentially Hizballah had substantially grown in size due to its enlarged support base and was now a reputable, established force in pursuit of becoming the dominant Shia force in Lebanon by the end of 1983 (Khashan, 2013, 81-82).

Hizballah's radical ideology was clearly on display in the areas in which it controlled during its incipient phase. One of the earliest public displays by Hizballah was when nearly 500 masked supporters had taken over the town hall and Lebanese army barracks in Hizballah's stronghold of Baalbeck on the eve of the Lebanese independence anniversary in 1982. Hussein Musawi addressed these supporters in Baalbeck saying, "We are ready to fight Israel, we are martyrdom seeking (*shahadah*),

and we will fight them even from the graves" (Deeb, 2003, 82; Hamzeh, 2004, 25). After securing Baalbeck, Hizballah established roadblocks and banned alcohol, makeup, loud music and coed singing and dancing. By 1984, predominantly Sunni West Beirut came under the revolutionary group's control. Hizballah members there wore green cloth on their heads that read "Allah Akbar" (God is Greater). In winter of the same year, Hizballah had begun spreading leaflets in its newly acquired territory warning residents not to keep alcohol in their homes or purchase American vehicles. Hizballah also insisted that women wear the chador in Hizballah territory. During a 1984 Ashura festival in West Beirut, several bars and nightclubs were attacked. Hizballah's strict enforcement of its Islamic policies even went as far as closing coffee shops in areas under its control in southern Lebanon (Simbar & Zibaei, 2011, 81-82; Szekely, 2012, 117).

2. Radical Violence

Backed by Iranian funds and ideology, Hizballah attracted experienced fighters from Palestinian groups and Amal, including Hussein Musawi, al-Khalil and Mugniya. The rank-and-file soldiers below Hizballah's militant leaders were also battle-tested and hardened veterans of the Lebanese Civil War. From a soldier's perspective, Hizballah was attractive because it was not a corrupt organization, like Arafat's Fatah or Berri's Amal. Hizballah specifically elevated the role of honesty within the organization to make it more appealing. Hizballah's founders had previous experience in running large organizations, which meant that the group was run efficiently since its inception. The group used their Iranian funds wisely to entice fighters and to gain support from their families. The organization also became attractive by paying adequate salaries, providing a generous welfare system to gain support of a potential soldier's family and

establishing a martyrdom institution to provide for a martyr's family after he had been killed. These are some of the factors that resulted in Hizballah's militant wing becoming a well-trained, well-funded and well-organized arm. This arm of Hizballah employed three main tactics in its early phase fighting Israel, the SLA and the western MNF: irregular/guerilla warfare, hostage taking and suicide bombings (DeVore & Stahli, 2015, 342-344, 351). In 1983, with the arrival of the American soldiers as a part of the MNF to Lebanon, Iran had transformed Hizballah into an arm of its intelligence branch. Iran began having Hizballah and its affiliates orchestrate kidnappings and carry out much more violent tactics to hamper the West's intelligence capabilities within Lebanon (Fisk, 1996, 74). Besides combatting the Israelis and the western presence in Lebanon, Hizballah also fought domestic opponents who challenged them for potential Shia recruits. This included a campaign that consisted of the killings and assassination of dozens, if not hundreds of members of the Lebanese Communist Party, as well as notable activists, ideologues and academics who were also advocating for the Shia Left in 1984 and 1985 (Norton, 1998, 89; Khashan, 2013, 82). Moreover, an in-depth look at these tactics, specifically hostage taking and suicide missions against Israel and the West in Lebanon, reveal why Hizballah was successful in partially achieving their goal of removing foreigners from Lebanon. This would eventually lead to them gaining more support and power over time. Finally, by employing these violent techniques against their enemies, Hizballah would also elevate the level of violence in Lebanon, in addition to making this radical, violent behavior acceptable and a viable alternative choice for the Shia.

a. Hostage Taking

Hizballah and its network of umbrella groups, including Islamic Jihad, the

Movement of the Disinherited Earth and the Revolutionary Justice Organization (Norton, 2012, 28) began kidnapping westerners in 1982 and incorporated the same techniques it used during the civil war. The group's overall strategy through this tactic was to influence western policy within Lebanon by severely weakening and inhibiting their capabilities, in addition to extracting demands from these same governments. Over a period of seven years, 87 Europeans and Americans had been kidnapped, resulting in western countries being extorted in various ways for release of their citizens. Types of extractions included: paying ransoms, releasing imprisoned terrorists, expelling Iranian dissidents and even selling Iran weaponry. The massive exodus of westerners from Lebanon greatly reduced foreign influence there. Hizballah's strategy of kidnapping hindered western countries' intelligence agencies and foreign ministries capabilities to productively operate and effectively influence policy within Lebanon (DeVore & Stahli, 2015, 348-349).

b. Suicide Bombing

By 1983 the vicious climate that Hizballah found itself in combined with its radical ideology had dictated the group's escalating savage approaches to obtaining its objectives. That same year, the entire Shia community, including Hizballah, Amal and Shia public opinion, had progressively grown more radical due to violent events and protests that fed off one another. One pivotal moment that escalated the already tense atmosphere within the Shia community transpired in Nabatiya in October 1983 between local Shia participating in an Ashura procession and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). In Nabatiya, an IDF convoy drove into the crowd of procession goers causing the Shia participants to retaliate by throwing stones and overturning the IDF vehicles. The Israeli soldiers reacted to this behavior by firing on the crowd which resulted in killing and

injuring several Shia. This incident turned the Shia community outright against Israel and the MNF, who was viewed also as Israel's puppet. Following the events in Nabatiya, Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, head of the Supreme Islamic Shia Council, issued a *fatwa* calling for restraint from the Shia community and forbidding retaliation on Israeli troops (Helmer, 2006, 80; Azani, 2009, 66). The following month, an individual member of Hizballah committed the group's second suicide attack in the same southern Lebanese coastal city of Tyre, hitting an Israeli military residency quarters yet again. This second attack killed 29 Israeli soldiers. The first suicide mission occurred on November 11, 1982. The first attack's outcome was hailed as the deadliest attack against Israel since its establishment in 1948, killing 76 Israeli military personnel (DeVore & Stahli, 2015, 348; Alagha, 2006, 35). Due to the second suicide mission, and the subsequent Israeli retaliation, the pragmatic Lebanese Shia who had relations with Israel were now non-existent. The success of the second Tyre attack by a well-functioning and organized Hizballah, Amal's muted response and the rage felt against Israel had shifted the entire Shia community to accept a more radical approach to fighting Israel and the west in Lebanon. Further enabling the use of "martyrdom missions" (suicide bombings) was that the IRGC had begun favoring this technique. This specific type of attack was also sanctioned by Ayatollah Khomeini and Hizballah's Grand Ayatollah Fadlallah. Khomeini endorsed the suicide attacks with theological justification, while Fadlallah justified martyrdom missions as a legitimate act of resistance to counter the Israeli occupation. This was in addition to the MNF's and Israeli motives to preserve the Christian government in Lebanon (DeVore & Stahli, 2015, 347, 351; Alagha, 2006, 139; Helmer, 2006, 75). With the Shia community supporting the radical tactics against Israel, Amal strategically calculated to engage in plotting attacks against Israel in the south to continue to vie with Hizballah for support

amongst their sect (Azani, 2009, 66-67). With a radicalized Shia youth supporting these violent attacks against Israel, Hizballah's clerics, including Raghib Harb, began combining Islamist and military activities. An example of this is the Karbala Paradigm borrowed by Hizballah from Khomeini's revolution. The Karbala Paradigm, referring to Hussein's martyrdom at the behest of the Ummayads in 680 CE at Karbala, promoted the "ideas of martyrdom, sacrifice, commitment to a cause and passion" (El-Husseini, 2010, 805, 809). Iran's use of this technique combined the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist message of Iran's Ali Shariati with Ayatollah Khomeini's "oppressed" and "oppressor" rhetoric throughout the lead up to the 1979 Iranian revolution. Hizballah embraced this tactic and instead of revolting against the oppressor in the Iranian case, Hizballah altered it to "resist the oppressor"—as in the case of Israel and the United States (El-Husseini, 2010, 805, 809). Adding this religious aspect and the prominent clerics' approval of "martyrdom missions", Harb began organizing Shia youths to carry out attacks against the IDF (Azani, 2009, 66-67). In April 1983 the American embassy was bombed and left 63 dead. This was a tactical success for Hizballah as it had prolonged the signing of the Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty for another month. Nearly six months later on October 23, 1983, Hizballah unleashed a double suicide bombing on the United States Marine Barracks and French compound buildings, claiming the lives of 241 Americans and 58 Frenchmen. The American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had determined that at the time it was the deadliest attack that targeted Americans and the largest non-nuclear explosion on earth since World War II (Levitt, 2013; Helmer, 2006, 78). Fisk (1996) notes Hizballah's success in attacking America and its influence in Lebanon in 1983, stating, "The bombing of the American embassy took out the eyes of the CIA. The suicide bombing of the U.S. Marines six months later took out America's claws" (74). Similarly devastating in this strike, the French had suffered their

highest death toll since their involvement in the end of the Algerian War in 1962. A month following this attack, Hizballah took to the radio to justify their dual suicide missions against the US and France, while also promising there was more inline: "It has become certain to us that our enemies will not leave our country unless we fight them…Al-Tufayli made an oath by God that death will reach them at the hands of the believers (*al-mu'minin*) even if they are in their lofty fortresses". Hizballah's message to the MNF was clear at this point: "Leave Lebanon, or die" (Levitt, 2013; Helmer, 2006, 78). Hizballah's tactic to use suicide bombers to force the foreign MNF to depart Lebanon was effective. In February 1984, American and Italian members of the peacekeeping force left Lebanon, followed by French forces in April 1984. After the MNF left Lebanon, the Lebanese government and armed forces were unable to uphold their responsibilities of the American-sponsored May 17 Accords peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon. This subsequently led to the closure of the Israeli mission in Lebanon that was established to administer the treaty. The departure of the MNF also led to a spike in violence and hostility against Israel, resulting in nearly one Israeli soldier dying every three days in Lebanon. Hizballah's "hit and run" ambushes and other guerilla tactics accounted for nearly two-thirds of the Israeli soldiers killed between 1983 and 1985. This forced the Israelis to retreat to their "security zone" in southern Lebanon in January 1985 (See AppendixI, Figure 2). The Israeli "security zone" was comprised of nearly ten percent of Lebanon's territory (Norton, 2007, 81; DeVore & Stahli, 2015, 344). By March 1985, Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din issued another *fatwa*, this time calling for "defensive jihad" against the Israelis but restricted within Lebanese territory. Defensive jihad differs from offensive jihad, as defensive is the duty of the individual, and not limited to the community, as in offensive (Azani, 2009, 66-67). By 1985, only three years after its founding, Hizballah was responsible

for forcing the Multi-National Force from Lebanon and pressured the IDF to withdraw from Beirut and the majority of southern Lebanon to just occupying its "security zone" (Helmer, 2006, 79). Hizballah's success would lead the organization to finally issue its Open Letter in 1985.

G. Hizballah's Open Letter

Hizballah's founding was in 1982, however, on February 16, 1985, it introduced an Open Letter addressed to the world's "downtrodden". Hamzeh (2004) notes that Hizballah officially and publically came out of the shadows from "working invisibly under Iranian sponsorships and with Syria as its willing accomplice" (26). The letter was read out loud by the party's official spokesman on the first anniversary of the assassination of Shaykh Raghib Harb. After nearly three years of existence, Hizballah would address its "ideological, *jihad*, political and social visions, as well as the launch of its political movement" (Qassem, 2005, 98). Alagha (2006) mentions that the Open Letter was Hizballah's political constitution or political manifesto and had revealed the establishment of Hizballah, as well as its military wing, Islamic Resistance (37). The document opens by answering the question--"Who are we":

> "We are the sons of the *umma* (Muslim community) - the party of God (Hizballah) the vanguard of which was made victorious by God in Iran. There the vanguard succeeded to lay down the bases of a Muslim state which plays a central role in the world. We obey the orders of one leader, wise and just, that of our tutor and *faqih* (jurist) who fulfills all the necessary conditions: Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini. God save him!" ("Open Letter", 1988, par. 2).

The letter also points out that its military apparatus is interwoven within its social fabric, stating "each of us is a soldier. And when it becomes necessary to carry out the Holy War… (Hizballah) will fight in accordance…under the tutelage of the Commanding Jurist" and Hizballah will "repel aggression, and defend our religion, our

existence, our dignity" ("Open", 1988, par. 5). It highlights how the Zionists (Israel), who are occupying the holy land of Palestine, the United States and its allies have invaded Lebanon and have "destroyed our villages, slit the throats of our children, violated our sanctuaries and appointed masters over our people who committed the worst massacres against our *umma*" ("Open", 1988, par. 7). Hizballah's message also addresses the atrocities committed against them by the Phalangists and Israel during the Sabra and Shatila massacres, and underscores the fact that no one, not even international organizations, had denounced these attacks. Adding, Hizballah will not tolerate this "injustice, aggression and humiliation" ("Open", 1988, par. 7). Hizballah points out its justification for bearing arms and fighting since there is "no alternative but to confront aggression by sacrifice" ("Open", 1988, par. 9). The three immediate objectives Hizballah addresses in their document in order to achieve their ultimate goal of creating an Islamic State in Lebanon are addressed as follows:

> "(a) to expel the Americans, the French and their allies definitely from Lebanon, putting an end to any colonialist entity on our land; (b) to submit the Phalanges to a just power and bring them all to justice for the crimes they have perpetrated against Muslims and Christians; (c) to permit all the sons of our people to determine their future and to choose in all the liberty the form of government they desire. We call upon all of them to pick the option of Islamic government which, alone, is capable of guaranteeing justice and liberty for all. Only an Islamic regime can stop any further tentative attempts of imperialistic infiltration into our country" ("Open Letter", 1988, par. 11).

Finally, as Hizballah's Deputy Secretary General Shaykh [Naim] Qassem (2005) notes pertaining to the Open Letter, "with this declaration Hizballah entered a new phase, shifting the Party from secret resistance activity that ran free from political or media interactions into public political work" (98). Helmer (2006) states that the Open Letter was "Hizballah's bid for legitimacy" and proved successful (80). This would open a new phase for Hizballah.

H. Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated that Hizballah was initially established and supported by people belonging to the most politically, economically and socially marginalized sect in all of Lebanon: the Shia. Chapter IV also observed that Hizballah was heavily influenced by *al-Dawa* and Iranian ideology, and was also supported militarily, financially and socially by Iran. Hizballah was additionally enabled by Syria in that the group was allowed to train, coordinate and operate out of the Syrian-controlled Biqa' Valley, while simultaneously using Syria as a conduit to obtain the majority of its assistance, whether it be money, trainers and weaponry, from Iran. This chapter established that Hizballah was allowed to act in such a violent manner and impose its radical ideology on territories it controlled not only due to the aforementioned factors, but also because of Israel's Operation Peace for Galilee and Israel's subsequent occupation of Lebanon, as well as because of the Lebanese government and military's virtual powerlessness during the civil war. Finally, by 1985 these compounding factors resulted in Hizballah becoming so potent that it publically announced its existence, as well as its ultimate goal to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon.

CHAPTER V

FOCUSING ON FIGHTING ISRAELI OCCUPATION AND ENTERING POLITICS (1986-2000)

A. Introduction

The previous chapter demonstrated that Hizballah in fact followed the first common characteristic of a revolutionary group's formation stage outlined in the methodology section. It was demonstrated that Hizballah was established and supported by the most marginalized people in Lebanon: the Shia. Chapter IV also confirmed *al-Dawa*, Iran and Syria all played influential roles in its earliest, most radical phase. All of the various types of support towards Hizballah were also made possible due to the atmosphere created by the 1982 Israeli Operation Peace for Galilee and subsequent occupation, which occurred during Lebanon's civil war. Furthermore, Chapter IV argues that Hizballah continues to follow the second stage of a revolutionary organization's evolution. This section will analyze whether Hizballah shifted from its original radical ideology and behavior as well as abandoning its goal of creating an Islamic state in Lebanon due to larger events outside of Hizballah's control.

B. Shifting the Fight toward Ending the Israeli Occupation

This subsection will detail the causes and effects of why and how Hizballah evolved from its hardline, radical approach to creating an Islamic state in Lebanon, to focusing its mission on eradicating the Israeli occupation of Lebanon.

1. Amal vs. Hizballah

Immediately following Hizballah's Open Letter in March 1985, the radical

Shia group and groups linked to it continued to target western interests in Beirut, whether it be to directly benefit themselves or Iran. This continuation of bold actions eventually led to violent wars between Amal and Hizballah, starting in 1988 and ending in 1990. However, the underlying reason for the fighting was the encroachment of Hizballah's influence and infrastructure spreading throughout Amal's stronghold in southern Lebanon, which posed a grave threat. However, major events such as the June 1985 TWA flight 847 hijacking increased tensions between Amal and Hizballah. This incident was significant due to the plane being hijacked by what was thought to be Hizballah. When Amal's Berri tried to intervene to solve the issue, Berri and Amal were exposed for being completely powerless when it came to dealing with the radical Shia group. The crisis finally ended when secret negotiations were held between Israel, Syria and Iranian Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani, which resulted in the release of 766 Lebanese prisoners, mainly from the Atlit prison in Israel. Further, the "turning point" of Hizballah and Amal relations had occurred in 1989 when both Shia organizations began directly fighting for control of southern Lebanon and Beirut's Shia southern suburbs. This fighting would initially stem from when a group called the "Believer's Resistance", a splinter group of Amal that was sympathetic towards Hizballah, kidnapped US Marine Lieutenant William Higgins. Higgins had been serving with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL was enacted following Israel's 1978 Operation Litani. Its mission was restoring security and peace, in addition to aiding the Lebanese government bring about its authority in the affected areas of the conflict in Lebanon. UNIFIL was also sent to enforce Israel's withdraw from Lebanon in accordance to United Nations Security Council Resolution 425 (also known as UNSCR 425). Continuing, the kidnapping directly challenged Amal's position of cooperating with UNIFIL at the time, as well as Amal's status and

reputation in southern Lebanon. Amal was unable to track down the location of Higgins and he was later killed. The fighting between the two groups in southern Lebanon initially resulted in Hizballah's expulsion from the south. However, the internal-sect fighting spread to Beirut, its southern suburbs, the Biqa' region and Iglim al-Tuffah, a hilly region east of Sidon that stretches to the security zone. In Beirut's southern suburbs, the fighting was most violent, including heavy gunfire, kidnappings and executions. This vast amount of violence severely damaged property and killed and injured civilians, causing them to flee the area. Hizballah did defeat Amal in Beirut; however they were more concerned with re-entering southern Lebanon, as it was strategically important for them to carry out resistance activities. Re-gaining Hizballah's foothold in the south also was essential in order to maintain their weapons as a "national resistance" organization, not a militia, as Taif negotiations were taking place planning to disarm all militias in the country. The fighting between the Shia groups ended with the Syrian-Iranian brokered Damascus Agreement in 1990. The wider Shia community had supported the agreement to end the destructive and deadly fighting. By the time terms were reached and the fighting had ceased, Hizballah had handily defeated Amal in the southern suburbs of Beirut, where half the Shia population lived, and eroded Amal's power in southern Lebanon. Following the Syrian-Iranian agreement, Hizballah chose to confront Amal in the political spectrum in the future. Hizballah would also use its position of resisting the Israeli occupation and providing social services to attract new Shia supporters, in place of trying to militarily destroy Amal (Norton, 1998, 91, 93; Berti, 2011, 948-949; Azani, 2009, 77, 79-83). Moreover, following Hizballah's victory over Amal in southern Lebanon, the radical Shia organization began heavily increasing the Islamisation of the area, in addition to seizing state institutions. However, the imposition of Islamic laws and Sharia courts had alienated many of the residents in

southern Lebanon. Hizballah's rule there also destroyed the local tourist economy, resulting in empty beaches and restaurants, and the closure of coffee shops. As a result of its failed attempt at creating an Islamic state, in addition to fighting a bloody intra-Shia war with Amal, many in southern Lebanon began to question their support for Hizballah at this point. A potential loss of support from the residents of southern Lebanon was critical, as Hizballah knew that in order to successfully defeat the Israelis in a guerilla war, support from the local population was essential. This led to Hizballah's strategic response to win back the population of southern Lebanon by providing social services and entering politics (Gabrielson, 2013, 3). By the late 1980s, Hizballah decided to drop its call for an Islamic state in Lebanon (Usher, 1997, 63). Following these developments, Hizballah later regained its legitimacy from the residents of southern Lebanon and the number of attacks began to rise against Israel in southern Lebanon (Gabrielson, 2013, 3).

2. Tehran Concedes Lebanon to Damascus

In the approximate five-year period from Hizballah's Open Letter in March 1985 until the Taif Accord in 1989, which ended Lebanon's Civil War, Hizballah had gone through its first alteration as an organization. Hizballah's Iranian sponsor, due to its geopolitical position, as well as its domestic policies greatly affected Hizballah's metamorphism. By the late 1980s, Iran underwent its own transformation. The Iran-Iraq War had ended by 1988, somewhat marginalizing Hizballah's importance to Iran (Norton, 1998, 91-92). Additionally, Iran's failure to defeat Iraq and its unsuccessful attempt to export its revolution outside its domestic borders had heavily influenced the Iranian leadership to reevaluate the actual possibility of executing its goal of creating an Islamic State in Lebanon (Berti, 2011, 949). This reality of a Lebanese Islamic state was

further hampered when Ayatollah Khomeini died in 1989 and Iran's leadership and foreign policy was now in the hands of Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani. Rafsanjani had aimed to separate himself from the violent militias in Lebanon, as Tehran viewed the bloody and deadly fighting between Hizballah and Amal with disgust and disdain. Further, Iran was looking to attract support from the broader Shia community in Lebanon, not just Hizballah (Norton, 1998, 91-92). Moreover, with Hizballah heavily dependent on Iranian funds and material resources, Rafsanjani had manipulated how Hizballah would act by limiting Iranian resources given to Hizballah; this restricted Hizballah's ability to carry out international terrorist behavior, as well as any other attacks on foreign targets outside of Israel (Norton, 2006, 60; Berti, 2011, 949). During this same time period, Iran had also begun its transition to supporting Syrian President Hafez al-Assad's hegemonic role over Lebanon (Berti, 2011, 949).

3. Syrian-Hizballah Relations

Syria's relationship with Hizballah had always been a cautious one and at some points even deadly. An example of this was when Syria intentionally excluded Hizballah from its efforts to negotiate peace for the Lebanese Civil War, including the Syrian sponsored Tripartite Agreement in December 1985. The differences between both Syria and Hizballah were also highlighted with Hizballah's direct support of the Palestinian resurgence in Lebanon. This was in contrast to Amal and Syria who were fighting to prevent the Palestinian return to power during what became known as the "war of the camps" in 1985 (El-Hokayem, 2007, 37; Norton, 2007, 477). Additionally, both Syria and Hizballah had been involved in direct fighting that resulted in deaths on both sides early in their relationship during the mid- to late 1980s. This is illustrated through clashes between Syria and their allies against Hizballah over dominance of

West Beirut in the 1980s, in addition to a major bump in relations in 1987 when Syria killed 23 Hizballah members in revenge for Hizballah holding a Syrian army major, the major's driver and an assistant, in which the driver was killed (El-Hokayem, 2007, 37; Norton, 2006, 60). This violence between Hizballah and Syria could be attributed to the proxy war playing out in Lebanon between Iran's Hizballah and Syria's Amal during this period. However, also in 1987, Tehran had eventually conceded that Damascus was the ultimate power in Lebanon and Hizballah's leadership was clearly made aware of this. Due to this Iranian-Syrian agreement, Hizballah forfeited its idea of becoming the lone Shia party in Lebanon, as well as directly challenging Syria's domination within Lebanon (Early, 2006, 120). By 1989, following Ayatollah Khomeini's death and Iran's more pragmatic approach to foreign policy succeeding its revolution fatigue (El-Hokayem, 2007, 37), two additional events would allow Syria to further dominate Lebanon. These events would ultimately force Hizballah to forge a closer relationship with Syria. The first event was the 1989 Taif Agreement that ended Lebanon's 15-year civil war and strengthened Lebanon's power-sharing structure. Taif neutralized Hizballah's attempt to create an Islamic state and also required all militias to disarm. Additionally, following the Taif Agreement in 1991, the Lebanese government ratified and accepted the Lebanese-Syrian Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination, which essentially turned Lebanon into an autonomous protectorate of Syria. Rejecting Syria's role in post-war Lebanon would have put Syria and Hizballah in a direct confrontation (El-Hokayem, 2007, 38; Early, 2006, 120). Second, through US diplomatic efforts, Syria had joined the US coalition against Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the Israeli peace process in 1991. With Syria signing on to the American efforts in the region, the United States had "looked the other way" (Norton, 2006, 60) and allowed Syria to control the Lebanese political system. These

events would result in essentially forcing Hizballah to begin to "strategically coordinate" with Syria (El-Hokayem, 2007, 37; Norton, 2006, 60). Finally, to survive in Lebanon post-Taif, Hizballah would be required to make realistic and pragmatic alterations to its goals and identity if it ever wanted to have a future in Lebanon (Early, 2006, 120). Hizballah realized it was neither in a position to politically or military challenge Syria's control over Lebanon, as 35,000 Syrian troops were in the Lebanese state at this time. To protect Hizballah's hard fought gains since 1982 and prevent itself from becoming marginalized in the post-Taif era, Iran had advised Hizballah to seek change from within the new political realm in Lebanon (Ranstorp, 1998, 117).

4. Legitimizing the Fight against Israel

Following the Taif Agreement, Hizballah reformed itself into a political entity. Every other militia in Lebanon, besides Palestinians in refugee camps, was forced to disband their weapons if they wanted to join the new emerging political system. This however did not apply to Hizballah. This was due to then-Syrian President Hafez al-Assad's strong role in Lebanon. Assad saw strategic value in Hizballah to recoup the Syrian Golan Heights, which was captured by Israel in the 1967 war. The President of Syria was also hoping to eventually obtain peace with Israel and expand Syria's importance throughout the region. Many western and Arab diplomats came to informally recognize an understanding that if and when peace would be achieved between Syria and Israel, a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel would soon follow. The perceived Lebanese-Israeli treaty would then force the disarmament of Hizballah and the integration of Hizballah fighters in to the regular Lebanese army (El-Hokayem, 2007, 38; Norton, 1998, 95). Continuing, Syria had authorized Hizballah's entrance into politics without relinquishing its weapons by brokering a deal between the Lebanese

political status quo and Hizballah. The requirements set out for Hizballah in this arrangement would be for Hizballah to fully abandon its ambitions to create an Islamic state in Lebanon ruled by Sharia law. It would also be required to drop its radical ideology and revolutionary tone against the Lebanese government, although it was allowed to become a "loyal opposition" against it. In exchange, the Lebanese government would endorse Hizballah as a legitimate Lebanese political party. Moreover, the Lebanese government would recognize Hizballah as a "national resistance" against the Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon (Wiegand, 2009, 674). Thus, Hizballah being labeled as a "national resistance" allowed the group to circumvent the Taif Agreement because it was no longer branded as a militia and all militias were required to disarm in order to participate politically (Wiegand, 2009, 674). With Hizballah being the sole former militia possessing arms in order to fight Israel, Hizballah's importance had risen significantly for Syria (Bar, 2007, 482). This transition of Hizballah from a "revolutionary movement into a major political, social, and military player within a post-civil war environment" was led by Hizballah's third Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah (Ranstorp, 1998, 121). Hizballah's abandonment of an Islamic Revolution in Lebanon and readjusted focus on ending the Israeli occupation was clear with Nasrallah's election as Secretary General, which occurred due to the Israeli assassination of Hizballah's second Secretary General Abbas al-Musawi in 1992. Nasrallah was from southern Lebanon and this was significant as well as symbolic towards Hizballah's new energy focused on fighting Israel. All of the previous Secretary Generals of Hizballah hailed from the Biqa'. Nasrallah's youth and unexceptional religious position, compared to the likes of Shaykhs Abbas al-Musawi, al-Tufayli and Yazbeck, also symbolized Hizballah's transition from the radical "old guard" who had established Hizballah, to a younger, more pragmatic generation. This

generation was more accommodating and willing to adapt to the political, social and military realities of Lebanon following its civil war in order to survive. This meant not only giving up Hizballah's revolutionary dream, but it also entailed working with Syria, at times cooperating with Amal, while simultaneously producing an image of obedience to Iran (Ranstorp, 1998, 120-121).

C. 1992: Hizballah Enters Lebanese Elections

In 1992, Hizballah had entered Lebanon's first parliamentary elections held in 20 years. Hizballah's decision to enter the elections was a strategically calculated move for a handful of reasons, besides the fact that the nature of the Lebanese patron-client system now dictated that an actor must be present in the post-Taif political system. First, by entering the elections, Hizballah legitimized itself in order to preserve itself against any domestic or foreign attempts to disband or disarm it. Hizballah acknowledged that in order to continue its "resistance project" in southern Lebanon fighting the Israeli occupation, it would need political support that it could gain from its own representatives within the Lebanese political system (Ranstorp, 1998, 125). Hizballah's deputy Naim Qassem gave an interview with *Al-Ahad* in August of 1992, in which he spoke on the importance of Hizballah joining the political arena in order to protect its fight against Israel:

> *"[Hizballah] has decided that it must represent those of us who are fighting the Israeli enemy, that [it must] be a pioneering force of "The Resistance" against the Israeli occupation, and [that it must] gather around it all those fighting the Zionist enemy. ... Our participation in parliament will not change our principles and we will continue to fight ... we will fight within parliament even as we continue to fight outside of it. I wish to stress that our participation in elections will not cause us to abandon our principles, so there is nothing to worry about in this regard"* (Azani, 2012, 743).

Second, with a political wing, Hizballah would not be solely reliant on its

military branch for an identity. Through its political representatives, Hizballah would be able to exploit its position to speak out regarding the dissolution of confessionalism in Lebanese politics. It would also have a say in how to create any potential new political system if confessionalism were ever abandoned (Ranstorp, 1998, 125-127). Third, Hizballah also used its legitimate political branch to create a more acceptable image of itself to attract more Shia and non-Shia Lebanese voters. This was referred to as the "Lebanonization" of Hizballah, done in order to broaden its domestic constituency appeal. Hizballah understood it needed to accept Lebanon's diverse citizens and the state institution. It also realized it needed to maintain the support of the growing Shia middle class, who had dubious feelings towards Amal's corruption, and had viewed Hizballah as trustworthy. Hizballah also knew it must downplay its revolutionary tone to keep and attract many of its old and potentially new constituents. As Norton claims, the Shia middle class in Lebanon did not want to live in an Islamic Republic, let alone an Islamic Republic in Lebanon (Norton, 2007, 45; Wiegand, 2009, 673; Norton, 1998, 93). To undergo its "Lebanonization", Hizballah campaigned against corruption and economic policies, having a strong anti-government stance. The group mainly directed its criticisms towards the Hariri government and towards Amal for abandoning the Shia community. Hizballah fought to increase more state resources to be appropriated directly towards the Shia community, which would not only be popular, but would also relieve Iran from providing the majority of resources to Hizballah. Further, Hizballah had abandoned its call for an Islamic state and even began opening up an Islamic-Christian dialogue. This was exemplified by the group's open letter sent to John Paul II. Hizballah also tried widening its appeal by providing domestic legitimacy that Hizballah was indeed a Lebanese party, and not an organization controlled by Iran. Hizballah's Politibureau stated, "[Hizballah] is a Lebanese party, with a Lebanese

leadership and Lebanese decisions. When it makes a decision, it takes the interests of Lebanon, not Iran into consideration" (Ranstorp, 1998, 125-127).

1. Election Results

Following the parliamentary elections in 1992, Hizballah had a successful showing. Its Loyalty to the Resistance Party Bloc had eight of their party members elected, which formed the largest single bloc in the Lebanese Parliament (Azani, 2012, 743; Usher, 1997, 64). It is worth noting however, that the majority of Christian voters had boycotted the elections and Hizballah had entered an alliance with Amal and Walid Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). Many observers tend to think that Hizballah's success in the 1992 elections had less to do with Hizballah's activities against Israel and its ideology. Rather, it had to do much with Hizballah's effective social services system that had been so generous to the poor Lebanese Shia. This was underscored when Hizballah came to the aid of government abandon Shia villages during a brutal winter in 1992 (Usher, 1997, 64).

Four years later in the 1996 parliamentary elections, Hizballah seemed set on easily winning the Biqa' and roughly 60% of the Shia mandates in the south, potentially due to Hizballah's immediate role in quickly coming to the aid of the Lebanese following the destructive April 1996 Israeli Operation Grapes of Wrath. Hizballah claims to have "'repaired 5,000 homes in 82 villages', rebuilt roads and other infrastructure, and paid compensation to 2,300 farmers, all within a two-month time frame" (Usher, 1997, 64). Hizballah also had exploited its role in the 1996 fight against Israel as being the guardian of the residents in southern Lebanon, even seeking international guarantees for their safety (Azani, 2012, 745). Further, in an effort to garner support in 1996, Hizballah created campaign posters that read: "They resist with

their blood. Resist with your vote" (Norton, 2000, 35). Additionally, Hizballah's members of parliament and their allies that were elected in 1992 had earned a reputation for being a constructive opposition, railing against Prime Minister Hariri's multibillion-dollar exorbitant reconstruction efforts, in addition to charging Amal with abandoning any true social rehabilitation in southern Lebanon. They were seen as deputies who were flexible, possessed integrity and being incorruptible and non-discriminatory when it came to providing social and health care services (Usher, 1997, 64; Norton, 2000, 35). Due to Hizballah's expected favorable returns in the 1996 election, in August 1996, Amal's Berri offered Hizballah the idea of running on a joint slate. Not only was this idea rejected, but Hizballah responded by stating it would run against Amal and Hariri candidates in Mount Lebanon and Beirut elections. Hizballah also announced it may run individually or seek an alliance with leftists, independent or Sunni Islamist groups. The prospect of a "nationalist coalition" had angered Damascus, as Hizballah's political actions were deemed a threat to the Taif Accord. Also, Syria did not want to see Amal, its closest ally in Lebanon, overshadowed by Hizballah. Rafiq Hariri's campaign also tried damaging Hizballah's efforts by labeling the election as a "battle between moderation and extremism" (Usher, 1997, 64; Norton, 2000, 34). Following the elections, seven Hizballah deputies were elected, compared to eight in 1992. Also, three supporters who joined the opposition were elected compared to four in 1992. These results were mainly due to Syria limiting Hizballah's political potential by meddling with electoral districts, placing Hizballah at a disadvantage. This was in addition to Syria eventually forcing Hizballah to join a joint ticket with Amal (Ranstorp, 1998, 104; Norton, 2000, 34). Referring to the vast amounts of pressure applied from Amal, PSP and Hariri supporters due to Hizballah's rapid political growth, the Lebanese daily newspaper *al-Nahar* stated: "Hizballah is facing a merciless war by three powerful

leaders…aimed at clipping the wings of the bird that has outgrown all others so fast that all now panic" (Usher, 1997, 65). Finally, Hizballah also began putting candidates in municipal elections by 1998 in areas such as Beirut, the south and areas of the Biqa', which the government viewed as important locales (Azani, 2012, 747).

D. 1990s: Hizballah-Israeli Confrontations

Both Israeli Operations Accountability in 1993 and Grapes of Wrath in 1996 were key aspects to Hizballah's evolution, as both events were followed by Hizballah gaining major legitimacy, concessions and support. This portion will also highlight the important events that occurred throughout this period that had a major impact on Hizballah's fight against the Israeli occupation, which further strengthened Hizballah's position to eventually force Israel to withdraw from Lebanon in May of 2000.

1. 1993: Operation Accountability

On July 8, 1993, the relatively small Damascus based Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) had ambushed an IDF patrol in the security zone, killing two IDF soldiers and injuring three more. The following day, Israel responded by attacking a PFLP-GC base in south Beirut, in addition to shelling the Iqlam al-Tuffah region, a Hizballah stronghold. Hizballah responded by attacking an IDF post later that day, which killed three IDF soldiers and injuring two more. This attack was the largest IDF death toll in years in the occupied security zone, which led to a discussion regarding the Israeli role in Lebanon. However, Israel chose to strike Iqlam al-Tuffah again, causing Hizballah to send 24 rockets into the security zone. Back and forth clashes between Israel and Hizballah for the following 15 days had resulted in the large amount of damage, civilian casualties and the death of another IDF soldier. On

July 25, 1993, Israel launched Operation Accountability ("Civilians", 1996, pars. 179-181). Israel's mission in Operation Accountability was threefold: first, it wanted to strike and eliminate Hizballah hubs, including their facilities and headquarters. Second, it wanted to make sure the mission sent a strong message that would act as a deterrent to Hizballah from launching future attacks. Third, it wanted to turn the Lebanese population against Hizballah through making the Lebanese people suffer. Then-Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin stated, "We have said repeatedly that, if security and quiet will not prevail in our northern towns and villages, there will be no security and quiet for residents of southern Lebanon north of the security zone" (Quoted in Byman, 2011, 922). Rabin also pointed out that the Lebanese government "has the option of empowering the Lebanese military to prevent katyusha fire at Israel" and "only if fire at Israel's northern communities will cease, will you be able to return to your homes in southern Lebanon" (Quoted in Byman, 2011, 922). Nearly 300,000 residents of southern Lebanon fled due to the 1993 Israeli operation. The fighting came to a halt after a ceasefire on July 31, 1993. By that time, Israel had killed approximately 120 Lebanese and injured nearly 500 more. According to Israeli sources, between 50 and 75 Hizballah fighters were killed but Lebanese and international sources place the number much lower, around eight. Hizballah's rocket strikes had also killed two Israeli civilians, injured 24 Israelis and killed one IDF soldier. The estimated destruction done in southern Lebanon by Israel was estimated at $28.2 million. The ceasefire called for a mutual understanding that Hizballah would not launch rockets into Israel if Israel would halt all attacks on civilians in southern Lebanon (Byman, 2011, 922-923; "Civilian", 1996, par. 12). However, according to the United Nations, Israel had violated these rules 231 times and Hizballah had also violated the understanding 13 times following the agreement up until 1996 (Gabrielsen, 2013, 4). Moreover, this unwritten agreement

between Hizballah and Israel would become known as the “Rules of the Game” (Norton, 2006, 57). With acknowledgment of Israel’s concern over rockets being launched into Israel proper, Hizballah realized the strategic effect its katyushas had on Israel by making normal life in northern Israel unbearable. Hizballah walked away from Operation Accountability as the winner simply because it did not lose, and converted that into a propaganda victory. Hizballah also showed the Israeli military the tolerance of pain the organization could endure (Byman, 2011, 922-923). Finally, Hizballah’s use of katyusha rockets effectively marginalized Israel’s “security zone” since this area at some points was only ten kilometers wide and katyusha rockets had a range of twenty kilometers (Gabrielsen, 2013, 4).

2. 1996: Operation Grapes of Wrath

The agreement both Israel and Hizballah had adhered to that ended the 1993 Operation Accountability fighting between the two rivals had deteriorated by 1996. Norton (2007) claims the fighting originated due to Hizballah’s firing of katyushas into Israel in response to Israel killing Lebanese civilians (84). Between March 4th and April 10th 1996, five weeks of military exchanges between Israel and Hizballah left seven IDF soldiers, one Hizballah fighter and three Lebanese civilians dead. This was in addition to 16 injured IDF soldiers, seven Lebanese civilians, and six Israeli civilians. These deadly exchanges also happened to occur during an Israeli election campaign, which created additional pressure for the Israeli Labor Party-led coalition to respond to Hizballah with a strong military response, without acting in accordance to the July 1993 understanding (“Civilians”, 1996, par. 155). Continuing, Operation Grapes of Wrath was launched on April 11, 1996 and lasted 16 days with the intentions and goals similar to the 1993 Operation Accountability: putting vast amounts of pressure on the Lebanese

government as well as Lebanese civilians against supporting Hizballah. Israel did this by destroying the Lebanese infrastructure and displacing nearly 400,000 Lebanese in the south. The campaign also claimed 154 Lebanese civilians and roughly 24 Hizballah fighters. The 16 days of fighting, which included the firing of nearly 600 katyushas into Israel and 25,000 shells from Israel, came to an abrupt halt after Israel had struck a UN refugee compound that killed more than 100 refugees seeking shelter there (Byman, 2011, 923; Norton, 2000, 29). This incident at the Lebanese village of Qana ultimately led to the "April Understanding", which was similar to the 1993 agreement. However, this was a written agreement reached through intense efforts by France, Iran, Israel, Syria and the United States stating that Hizballah would not launch rockets into northern Israel in exchange for the IDF and SLA ceasing all attacks that may cause deaths to Lebanese civilians, in addition to hitting civilian targets (ex. power stations). The April Understanding also created a monitoring group that would be based at the UNIFIL main headquarters in Naqura, in south Lebanon. The group was made up of American, French, Israeli, Lebanese and Syrian participation. This monitoring group had no true enforcement powers and acted on the basis of unanimity. Its purpose was to strengthen Israel and Hizballah's compliance of the "Rules of the Game" (Gabrielsen, 2014, 161; Norton, 2000, 29). The updated version of the rules of the game allowed Hizballah to effectively operate in Lebanese villages and rural areas, in addition to Hizballah increasing its armed activities due to the legitimacy it now enjoyed (Gabrielsen, 2014, 261). The 1996 agreement gave Hizballah recognition in fighting a low-intensity war against a more conventionally stronger opponent in Israel (Ranstorp, 1998, 130). Further, the written agreement, an upgrade from the "mutual understanding" of 1993, essentially formalized Hizballah's actions to attack Israeli forces in the security zone since Israel never questioned Hizballah's right to fight the IDF in the security

zone. Due to this, Israel ultimately acknowledged it was an occupying force in Lebanon (Ranstorp, 1998, 109; Norton, 1998, 98). The agreement also allowed Hizballah's fight against Israel to create an image of being the "undamaged, confident and significantly strengthened and unrivaled" defender of the Lebanese in southern Lebanon (Ranstorp, 1998, 109). Further damaging to Israel was the Qana massacre itself. This brutal attack on innocent refugees somewhat corroborated Israel's portrayal by many Lebanese as simply immoral. It also created a sense of utter hatred towards Israel from many in Lebanon as well (Norton, 1998, 96-97). Qana was also exploited by Hizballah's leaders to highlight the fact that Hizballah has never attacked Israeli civilians initially, only in defense and reacting to the "occupying army's" actions against non-combatants in southern Lebanon (Ranstorp, 1998, 109). Moreover, Israel's targeting of the Lebanese infrastructure, power facilities and civilians made many Lebanese question whether Hizballah was indeed right the entire time regarding its approach to fighting Israel (Rowley, 1996, par. 4, 27). Israel's behavior during the 1996 campaign and its actions in Qana outraged the world, but more importantly it also led Hizballah to gain the support of many Lebanese in a somewhat common nationalist cause (Ranstorp, 1998, 108). This was epitomized when every Lebanese politician defended Hizballah following Grapes of Wrath. Another example would be when the Lebanese government was even preparing to protect Hizballah in front of the United Nations (Gabrielsen, 2013, 3). Following Grapes of Wrath, Hizballah also attained the support of the wider Arab community. Israel's 1996 mission not only failed to destroy Hizballah's military capabilities, but it also failed to turn the Lebanese public against Hizballah as it had hoped. In fact, it created the exact opposite outcome. It ironically bolstered the group's support, morale and image. Operation Grapes of Wrath's $400 million USD price tag confirmed Israel could not defeat Hizballah through airstrikes or conventional fighting

on the ground, unless it was willing to risk mass casualties (Ranstorp, 1998, 108; Rowley, 1996, par. 4).

In closing, after two destructive Israeli campaigns in Lebanon in 1993 and 1996, Hizballah became directly involved in treating and compensating victims of Hizballah-Israeli clashes. One of the most important features of the group was the reconstruction efforts through its organizations, especially *al-Jihad al-Bina'a* (Holy Struggle for Reconstruction) (Azani, 2012, 746; Ranstorp, 1998, 114). Following 1993's Operation Accountability, Hassan Nasrallah pledged Hizballah would repair all damage done to houses and the infrastructure, costing roughly $8.7 million. Likewise, following 1996's Grapes of Wrath, Hizballah swiftly arrived to war-torn areas after the fighting to repair nearly 5,000 homes and the infrastructure damaged during the campaign. Hizballah's response was far ahead of the United Nations arrival, which earned it praise from the Lebanese government and the local population, alike (Ranstorp, 1998, 114, 124). Overall, from 1992 to 2000, Hizballah repaired nearly 17,212 damaged homes. Hizballah's heavy involvement in the reconstruction efforts put Israel in a conundrum—the more Israel wanted to inflict punishment on Hizballah through targeting civilians and inflicting collateral damage, the more Hizballah gained support through its reconstruction efforts (Gabrielsen, 2013, 3).

E. 1990-2000: Tactics to Defeat Israel

This section discusses some of the old and new tactics and weaponry that were applied in fighting the Israeli occupation during the 1990s. In addition to standard guerilla warfare techniques as well as new arms, Hizballah also began targeting the Israeli public opinion through various media outlets, using propaganda as a tool to force an Israeli withdrawal. Further, Hizballah's efforts to drain the morale of the troops

stationed in Lebanon, while simultaneously eroding Israeli public support was key. According to Gabrielsen (2014), Hizballah had often cited the American experience during the Vietnam War as its basis for its attritional guerilla war against Israel in southern Lebanon (258). This section is essential to my main question as it demonstrates how Hizballah was able to achieve an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, as well as demonstrating how Hizballah attained a fighting balance, mainly through katyushas and propaganda, even though Israel was vastly superior militarily.

1. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)

a. <u>Media</u>

Psychological operations (PSYOPS) played an instrumental role in Hizballah's strategy to remove Israel from Lebanon. PSYOPS played such a large role in Hizballah's approach to fighting the Israelis that Hizballah Secretary General Nasrallah asserted that the defeat of Israel would not be achieved without Hizballah's *al-Manar* TV station (Gabrielsen, 2013, 4). Much of the propaganda was targeted directly at the Israeli public. For instance, The IDF's Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz held a positive press conference on January 19, 2000, and disclosed that the previous year had been a successful year for the IDF in Lebanon in which only 13 Israeli soldiers were killed. The day following this announcement, Hizballah conducted a campaign targeting IDF soldiers and killed seven IDF soldiers in the course of three weeks. This type of behavior allowed Hizballah to claim victory and to continue to test the limits of Israeli public opinion regarding the occupation of Lebanon (Gabrielsen, 2013, 5). Filming Hizballah operations would also have a dramatic impact. As a Hizballah official once stated, "In the field, we hit one Israeli, but a tape of him crying for help affects thousands of Israelis" (Gabrielsen, 2014, 259). Israeli (res.) Colonel Shmuel Gordon

pointed out that Hizballah's TV reports made a larger impact than the operations themselves (Gabrielsen, 2014, 259). Schleifer (2006) also notes that the "quality" of the footage shot by Hizballah was important because it could be later be aired on *al-Manar*. With this footage, Israelis watched on TV in horror of IDF soldiers walking in to a Hizballah ambush, stepping on planted mines, or being attacked in their fortified bases. This left Israelis in a state of revulsion (49). Another example of the media's impact was when an Israeli soldier was being treated by a medic on the Lebanese side of the Israeli-Lebanese border and it was filmed from the Israeli side. The following day the Israeli *Maariv* newspaper's headline included a picture of the soldier being treated and a headline that read: "Pictures from Hell". A similar instance was also done after Hizballah ambushed and killed 11 Israeli commandos in the so-called *Insariyah* operation on September 5, 1997. The media had published the pictures of the dead Israelis in this case (Ranstorp, 1998, 113; Gabrielsen, 2014, 259). Hizballah also used the media to undermine the credibility of the IDF. For example, Hizballah would claim it advanced into an IDF position and would release limited footage of the attack. The IDF would deny this claim, but following the denial, Hizballah would release the entire video, which clearly verified Hizballah's assertion. The media would then accuse the Israeli Defense Force of lying (Gabrielsen, 2014, 259-260).

b. Direct Threats

PSYOPS also came in the form of direct threats from Hizballah. During Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996, *al-Manar* broadcast footage of 70 suicide bombers "ready to strike" Israel. Further, in 2000 following SLA Commander Antoine Lahd's suggestion that his troops should remain in southern Lebanon following any possible IDF withdrawal, Hizballah's leader Nasrallah claimed his fighters would "enter every

agent's home and slaughter him in his bed". Following the IDF's withdrawal, there were no revenge killings and Nasrallah stated that his direct threats were "within context of psychological warfare" (Gabrielsen, 2014, 260).

c. Katyusha Rockets

Katyusha rockets were a crucial part of Hizballah's fighting against Israel. Hizballah first utilized katyusha rockets by firing them in to Israel in 1992 in retaliation for the Israeli assassination of Hizballah's first Secretary General and one of its founders, Abbas al-Musawi. Hizballah learned from the rockets launched into Israel from Iraq during the Gulf War that casualties and damage within Israel itself had an extreme psychological effect, in addition to also bringing daily Israeli life to an immediate standstill. The katyushas were proven to be so effective that the Israelis were coerced both in 1993 and in 1996 to end their military campaigns in Lebanon in agreement for Hizballah's termination of launching rocket attacks (Gabrielsen, 2014, 260). In 1996, Hizballah's Nasrallah went on *al-Manar* and stated to Israelis, "you have the power to prevent katyushas falling on your heads" (Ranstorp, 1998, 113). The psychological effect katyushas had was enormous, as well as being economically costly for Israel. It would amount to roughly $2.4 million dollars per day when Israel would order its citizens, as many as one million, in northern Israel to retreat to bomb shelters. When Hizballah would not even fire rockets, Israeli citizens would exit the shelters after as many as three days and blame their own government, not Hizballah. Not only did the IDF lose the moral high ground to Hizballah because of katyushas, but this was in addition to the Israeli public now doubting the true ability of the Israeli state to protect them (Gabrielsen, 2014, 261; Gabrielsen, 2013, 4). The fear katyusha rockets presented was so real, the Israeli government had to entice citizens of northern Israel with

financial incentives to not relocate to other parts of Israel (Gabrielsen, 2013, 4).

2. IEDs and TOWS

IEDs (improvised explosive devices) played a major role as one of Hizballah's tactical weapons of choice. By the late 1990s, IEDs were responsible for nearly half of all the IDF casualties (Gabrielsen, 2013, 3). Even as late as 1997, the IDF still had not figured out how to prevent Hizballah's mastery use of radio-operated roadside bombs on Israeli patrols throughout the security zone. This success led directly to the IDF relying on transporting its troops in and out of the security zone by helicopter (Honig, 1997, 61). In 1998 alone, IEDs were behind an estimated 16 out of 24 IDF deaths. In February 1999, Hizballah succeeded in killing the top Israeli commander in Lebanon, Erez Gerstein, with an IED (Gabrielsen, 2013, 3). Another tactical and more advanced weaponry system Hizballah began to use in January 2000 was the TOW (Tube-Launched, Optically tracked, Wire-Guided) missile. Using this weapon allowed Hizballah to penetrate the heavily fortified observation posts IDF soldiers were stationed in. The majority of the seven IDF soldiers killed between January and February 2000 were victims of this weapon (Norton, 2000, 30).

3. Intelligence Improvements and Targeting the South Lebanese Army (SLA)

Hizballah's intelligence capabilities rose to a professional level throughout the 1990s. The group's intelligence efforts were mainly focused on the SLA, to mostly encourage desertions through offers of amnesty, backed up by instilling fear in the troops by assassinating officers. The SLA's second in command, Aql Hashim, was assassinated by Hizballah. Other notable intelligence successes occurred in 1997 when Hizballah ambushed 16 Israeli naval commandos, killing 12 of them. Hizballah had also

intercepted an Israeli UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) video transmission through a double agent. This event effectively brought an end to Israeli raids north of the security zone (Gabrielsen, 2013, 3). Also, in an effort to force Shia members of the SLA to reconsider fighting in southern Lebanon, Hizballah specifically targeted them by publishing records of the SLA soldiers, implying them to "defect or face the consequences". UNIFIL also observed Hizballah firing mortars in a strategic pattern, specifically meant not to kill the SLA Shia units, but clearly sending a message to these same units that Hizballah doesn't want to kill you, but we could if we choose (Gabrielsen, 2014, 259).

4. Eroding the Israeli Public Opinion and IDF Morale

With a combination of the previously mentioned tactics and more, Hizballah's aim through its attrition warfare against the SLA and IDF was to "break the spirit" of the individual soldiers. Hizballah's abundance of operations had a direct impact on achieving this. This is especially highlighted by the spike in attacks during the last six years of Israel's occupation before its withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000. The average attack rate in the 12 month period from April 1994 to March 1995 was 38 per month. However, between May 1999 and May 2000, there was an average of 140 attacks per month. Following the 1996 Grapes of Wrath Operation in May 1996, Hizballah's attack frequency slumped all the way until April 1997, most likely due to Hizballah's concentration on reconstruction following the 1996 Israeli campaign. In this same period, Hizballah only had one month with more than 50 attacks. Although from May 1997 to May 2000, Hizballah attacks never dropped below 50 per month (Gabrielsen, 2014, 262). With 1,528 attacks in 1999 alone, Hizballah referred to it as "the year of resistance par excellence" (Gabrielsen, 2013, 3). The last 25 days of the

Israeli occupation consisted of an astounding 323 operations against the IDF and SLA forces. This was most likely in an effort to create the image that Hizballah was forcing the Israeli military to retreat while "withdrawing under fire" (Gabrielsen, 2014, 262).

Another key to Hizballah's triumph in defeating the Israeli military was their ability to adapt to the conditions of the battlefield against Israel. This success leveled the playing field by creating an almost even kill ratio between Israeli/SLA and Hizballah soldiers. Hizballah suffered many casualties in the late 1980s at the hands of Israel, creating an unbalanced, wide-gapped ratio between killed Hizballah fighters compared to IDF and SLA soldiers. In 1990, the proportion of dead Hizballah to IDF soldiers was roughly 5:1, respectively. Moreover, this gap had shrunk significantly by the mid to late 1990s. Both in 1997 and 1998, there were more total lives lost when IDF and SLA soldiers were combined against Hizballah fighters killed (Gabrielsen, 2013, 3). Additionally, since 1995 less than two Hizballah fighters for every one IDF soldier were killed reflected the closing margin of deaths between the two forces (Norton, 1998, 98). The IDF's total loss of 657 dead, including nearly 3,887 wounded, in Lebanon from 1985 to 2000 was a smaller amount of total killed IDF soldiers in all of Israel's previous military campaigns with the exception of the Suez Campaign. Nevertheless, these past Israeli wars were seen as vital to the survival of the Israeli state, as opposed to Israel's occupation of Lebanon, which looked to simply "eliminate the terror nuisance" in Hizballah (Gabrielsen, 2013, 3; Barzilai, 1996, 148).

The effects of Hizballah's strategy of applying attrition warfare bore fruit towards the late 1990s. Many IDF and SLA soldiers shared similar opinions questioning whether the Israeli occupation in Lebanon was worth their lives. This is exhibited by nearly 70 IDF soldiers of the Givati brigade fleeing their positions, in addition to 200 IDF troops being imprisoned for refusing to serve in Lebanon. An Israeli military

historian noted that the "spirit of self-sacrifice" that Israel had garnered from their loyal troops in earlier conflicts with Arabs was clearly lacking in comparison to the current Israeli soldiers serving in Lebanon (Gabrielsen, 2014, 262). Towards the end of the Israeli occupation in Lebanon, SLA troops had been facing high death tolls and defections and were "not reliable anymore" (Quoted in Gabrielsen, 2014, 263), according to a UNIFIL spokesman and senior adviser. In June 1999, the SLA had withdrawn from Jezzine and in March 2000 UNIFIL observers witnessed SLA "self-service" checkpoints in which the drivers themselves would move barricades to pass; this indicated the state-of-mind some SLA troops were in, not wanting to become one of the last fatalities of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon (Gabrielsen, 2014, 263). In addition, due to Hizballah's effectiveness in attacking IDF soldiers within the security zone, Israel had to lengthen IDF soldier's tours of duty to minimize the risk of being killed due to rotating soldiers in and out of the security zone. By 1999, only eight of the 50 posts in the security zone were manned by IDF soldiers, and the remaining 42 by the SLA (Norton, 2000, 30).

Finally, Hizballah's carefully planned strategy of eroding the Israeli public opinion in relation to the Israeli occupation of Lebanon proved a major success. By 1997, Israeli public opinion had turned against supporting the occupation, which ultimately led to the weakening of political support for its continuation. This is attributed to two major events that compounded the strong sense that Israel had no realistic strategy to win in Lebanon, all while the deaths of IDF soldiers in Lebanon continued. First, two Israeli helicopters crashed in Lebanon in February 1997, not due to enemy fire, killing 73 IDF soldiers. This event led to the creation of the Four Mothers group, which became the source of what would eventually become a much larger movement that began in Israel, which criticized the IDF's role in Lebanon. Second, in

September 1997, Hizballah had killed 11 Israelis from an elite naval assault team during the *Insariyah* operation (Byman, 2011, 925). To determine the Israeli perception of its occupation in Lebanon, yearly surveys were carried out by Israelis and a gradual increase of support for a unilateral withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon was detected. Asked in these surveys from 1997 to 2000 if Israeli citizens supported unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon, 1997 showed 41% saying "Yes". In 1998 there were 44% saying "Yes", followed by 55% in 1999, which was the first time a majority of Israelis had supported the unilateral withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon. By 2000, 62% were in favor of an Israeli unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon. To show what a dramatic contrast this was in Israeli public support for the occupation, in 1982 nearly seven out of eight Israelis supported the Lebanese invasion and 60% supported it even after the Sabra and Shatila massacres (Gabrielsen, 2014, 262; Gabrielsen, 2013, 3). Finally, in 1999, nearly 74% of Israelis stated that the security zone in Lebanon was not worth Israeli soldiers dying. This changing ideology was reinforced with an overwhelming 86% of Israelis agreeing once more in 2000 that the security zone in southern Lebanon was not worth the lives of IDF soldiers (Gabrielsen, 2014, 262).

F. 2000: Israeli Withdrawal

Negative Israeli public opinion towards the Israeli occupation in Lebanon was confirmed when Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak came to power in May 1999. Barak had vowed to withdraw the IDF from Lebanon within in a one year time period of him entering office, regardless if there was a peace agreement or not between Israel and Syria ("Stuck", 2000, 1). When negotiations between Israel and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad fell apart in March 2000, Israel began developing a plan to begin unilaterally withdrawing from Lebanon. With this notion came a sense of uncertainty about possible

revenge killings, as well as an abundance of chaos and confusion in Beirut and Damascus over what would follow an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. However, Hizballah's Nasrallah presented himself as cool, calm and collected about the situation. He reiterated that Hizballah had a plan for a post-Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and reaffirmed there would be no revenge killings. On May 24, 2000, Israel withdrew from Lebanon, in what it perceived to be finally in compliance with the 1978 UN Resolution 425, which ordered Israel to evacuate the country (Honig, 1997, 61). Not only were there zero revenge killings, but there was hardly any violence at all once Israel departed southern Lebanon. Israel's Lebanese ally, the SLA, had either fled to Israel with them or the ones who did stay in Lebanon were tried for collaborating with the enemy and given a relatively short sentence of four to five years. In the south, tens of thousands of residents returned to their formerly occupied villages in joy (Norton, 2007, 478). Hizballah had also exploited the Israeli exit as symbolic victory for the organization, as well as "The Resistance" (Azani, 2012, 747). Moreover, Hizballah's Nasrallah held meetings with Christian leaders to reaffirm there would be no sectarian violence from Hizballah following the withdrawal. Nasrallah also explained to the Christian clerics that the Israeli exit was a "national victory, not a victory by one sect or militia" (Norton, 2000, 32). Finally, former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak acknowledged Israel's role in creating one of its most deadly enemies when it entered Lebanon in 1982 to rid Lebanon of the PLO: "When we entered Lebanon…there was no [Hizballah]. We were accepted with perfumed rice and flowers by the Shia in the south. It was our presence there that created [Hizballah]" (Quoted in Norton, 2007, 478). After approximately a two-decade Israeli military occupation of Lebanon, Israel's own "Little Vietnam" was over (Honig, 1997, 61). However, an armed and powerful Hizballah remained and persevered.

G. Conclusion

Chapter V demonstrated that Hizballah had altered its radical ideology, behavior and main goal in a pattern that aligns with the second stage of my theoretical framework of a revolutionary group's evolution. Due to geopolitical factors in Iran and Lebanon, Hizballah was forced to readjust its stance. In Iran, its war with Iraq ended in 1988, followed by the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, which restructured Iranian priorities. With a more pragmatic Iranian foreign policy, Hizballah was no longer supported to act in the violent manner in which it had previously conducted itself. Further, Iran had tightened its financial support to limit Hizballah's violent behavior towards the occupying Israeli force, as opposed to domestic opponents or foreign enemies outside of Israel. Equally as important to Hizballah's metamorphism was the Taif Accord signed in 1989, which ended Lebanon's bloody 15-year civil war. Following this major event, Syria became the clear hegemon in Lebanon, which forced Hizballah to enter the new Lebanese political system in 1992. Through Syrian and Iranian pressure, in combination with the Taif Agreement, Hizballah had to abandon its goal of overthrowing the Lebanese political system in order to create an Islamic state. Hizballah's new goal would be to focus its energy and resources on fighting and ultimately removing the occupying Israeli force from Lebanon. This goal, in addition to joining the political process, allowed the group to retain its power, support and legitimacy in Lebanon, as well as to continue to act on behalf of Iran in Lebanon. Hizballah's goal of eradicating the Israeli presence in Lebanon occurred in May 2000 through the benefits it derived from earlier conflicts throughout the 1990s, in addition to applying a variety of tactics discussed in this chapter.

CHAPTER VI

HIZBALLAH POST 2000 ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL (2000-2008)

A. Introduction

In Chapter IV this thesis argued the first subset claim of the theoretical framework. Hizballah's formation and most radical stage was established and supported by the most marginalized community in Lebanon: the Shia. It also had foreign influences, Syria and Iran, as well as ideological influential factors, namely *al-Dawa*. In the previous chapter, a major event, the Taif Agreement in 1989, in addition to geopolitical alterations in Iran and pressure from Syria, forced Hizballah to drop its radical tone, behavior and core goal of overthrowing the Lebanese government in order to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon. Hizballah's new goal was removing the Israeli presence in Lebanon, which it eventually attained in May 2000. Chapter VI will posit that Hizballah follows the third stage of the revolutionary group's evolutionary framework. Chapter VI will analyze Hizballah in order to answer the third subset argument: to remain powerful following accomplishing its goal, Hizballah altered its behavior, ideology or goals, which ultimately led to the loss of support.

B. Maintaining the Resistance

In the years following Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon on May 24, 2000, Hizballah had largely minimized its hostile activity along the Blue Line that separated Lebanon and Israel. Both Israel and Hizballah had also adhered to most of the "Rules of the Game" (also known as the "April Understanding" that ended Operation Grapes of Wrath) (Saab, 2008, 97). Domestically, Hizballah was on good terms with other

Lebanese political parties during the early 2000s (Wiegand, 2009, 676). However, as the euphoria from the Israeli withdrawal started to wane in 2002, support outside the Shia community for Hizballah began to fade. Many Christians, Sunnis and others began to ask why Hizballah's militant wing was still intact after Israel had withdrawn in 2000 (El-Hokayem, 2007, 43). Moreover, not only were Hizballah's armed combatants still in southern Lebanon, the group continued to increase and improve its weaponry capabilities as if it were still fighting Israel (Talbot & Harriman, 2008, 29). Additionally, many skeptics of Hizballah began to accuse the group of trying to "monopolize" the resistance, acting without respect for the Lebanese state and finally, operating a "state within a state" in southern Lebanon (Berti, 2011, 954). When Israel departed in 2000, the Lebanese state had a major opportunity to enforce its authority throughout the entire country thanks to the terms of the Taif Accord. Yet, the Lebanese government ceded control of southern Lebanon to Hizballah. This was due to Syria's strong support for Hizballah to continue its hostility towards Israel, as well as the Lebanese army and government's inability and/or unwillingness to prevent Hizballah from fighting Israel. This was in addition to concerns that the Lebanese government had by placing government troops in the south and having Israel hold them accountable for possible Hizballah actions that the Lebanese troops would be unable to control (Early, 2006, 124). Furthermore, many Shia, Sunni, Christians and Druze living in the former occupied south who had suffered at the hands of Israel had accepted the idea of Hizballah offering to protect southern Lebanon from possible future Israeli aggression (Norton, 2006, 54). However, many others in Lebanon who were critical of Hizballah sought to see the group to finally disarm (Berti, 2011, 954).

1. Shebaa Farms

Hizballah had kept up its fight against its Israeli adversary for not only ideological reasons, but also because an end to hostilities between Israel would jeopardize the power and prestige Hizballah had won and protected since its formation (Early, 2006, 124). As a former Hizballah official stated in regards to Hizballah's need to maintain its fight against Israel to remain relevant: "Resistance is like a one-wheel bike that Hizballah is riding. If it stops pedaling, it falls" (El-Hokayem, 2007, 44). Therefore, following the Israeli withdrawal in May of 2000, Hizballah had a serious internal debate as to whether to devote its full energy in to the Lebanese political arena or continue its resistance activities in Lebanon and throughout the region. After these debates Hizballah chose the latter option. Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was also consulted by Hizballah's Nasrallah and the Iranian leader gave the group his blessing to continue its usual activities. In order to justifiably continue its fight against Israel, Hizballah had claimed the Israeli withdrawal of Lebanon was not complete (Norton, 2006, 57). Hizballah would point to the 15 square mile border area of Lebanon and Syria, referred to as Shebaa Farms (See Appendix I, Figure 3), claiming it was Lebanese territory still occupied by Israel. Both Syria and Lebanon assert the Shebaa Farms area is Lebanese territory, however, Israel maintains the position that the disputed land is part of the Syrian Golan Heights, which has been occupied by Israel since the 1967 Six-Day War (El-Husseini, 2010, 807-808). The Shebaa Farms area is also internationally recognized as Syrian territory (Fuller, 2007, 144). Further, other issues like Israel's refusal to provide maps of landmines in southern Lebanon, as well as its unwillingness to release Lebanese prisoners of war had further angered and prompted Hizballah to continue its armed fight against Israel. Pertaining to the Shebaa Farms claim made by Hizballah, many Christian and Sunnis saw this simply as a "trivial

excuse" to maintain their arms and the organization's favored resistance status applied to them by the Lebanese government (El-Husseini, 2010, 807-808). Moreover, the Shebaa Farms issue had originally been brought up by Amal's Berri via Damascus, as a way of permitting Hizballah to continue its aggression towards the Israeli state. As of early May 2000, right before the Israeli departure from Lebanon, many leading figures in the Hizballah organization were unfamiliar with Shebaa Farms. Similarly, many Lebanese had most likely never even heard of the area (Norton, 2006, 56). Regardless of how minor the land was, the Lebanese government approved of Hizballah's resistance activities in southern Lebanon to liberate Shebaa Farms, as the government had recognized it as Lebanese territory. The Lebanese government had openly endorsed and supported Hizballah to recoup this area instead of its own forces due to the fact Hizballah was better equipped and more willing to take casualties fighting for Shebaa Farms (Wiegand, 2009, 676). As Early (2006) points out, Shebaa Farms served as a major strategic purpose for both Hizballah and the Lebanese government. First, claiming that Shebaa Farms was Israel's last military outpost in "occupied" Lebanon, it provided ample justification for Hizballah to retain its special status as a national resistance group with an armed wing. Second, allowing Hizballah to liberate Shebaa Farms from the Israelis through military force provided a way out for the Lebanese government to have to finally confront Hizballah and force it to disarm, which the government fears it cannot successfully accomplish (24).

In the fall of 2000, Hizballah carried out its first mission against Israel in the Shebaa Farms region. This operation resulted in the capture of three Israeli soldiers after Hizballah militants had ambushed their vehicle. All three members of the IDF eventually died, either from the ambush itself or later from their wounds. Following this act, Israel began to violate Lebanon's airspace and waters. Israel had ceased this type of

activity following its withdrawal in May 2000 when it was trying to acquire certification from the United Nations in accordance to UNSCR 425. The Israeli violations included Israeli planes flying into Lebanese airspace, as well as intelligence drones. Israeli planes would also buzz over Beirut causing sonic booms. This type of behavior from Israel caused Hizballah to respond by firing anti-aircraft rounds that would eventually land in Israel, in addition to firing katyushas, but the rockets were restricted to being fired into the Golan area. In fact, the vast majority of any flare ups and clashes between Israel and Hizballah from 2000 to 2006 before the July War was mostly be restricted to the Golan region, as both Israel and Hizballah had adhered to the “rules of the game”. This set of written rules were so well established that the Lebanese, Israeli and Hizballah officials, including the media, would often be quoted stating that certain actions performed were within the “rules of the game”. Also supporting the notion that both sides adhered to the rules of the game was the reduction of the civilian and combatant death toll. Eighteen IDF soldiers were killed along the Blue Line by Hizballah from 2000 to 2006. This comes to an average of three IDF soldiers killed per year in that area. This is in comparison to 25 Israeli soldiers killed annually by Hizballah during the occupation, highlighting an enormous reduction in fatalities. Norton (2006) does not have exact numbers of how many Hizballah fighters were killed during this period along the Blue Line, but estimates that it was roughly the same amount as dead IDF soldiers. As for civilians, one Israeli boy was killed with an anti-aircraft round that was fired in the sky at Israeli aircraft and landed in Israel. Lebanese casualties included a 16-year-old shepherd in the Shebaa Farms area. Other civilian deaths were mainly caused from cluster bombs and minefields laid by the Israelis before they had left Lebanon in 2000. The exact amount of deaths is unknown, however. Continuing, southern Lebanon still had incidents of harassing fire, aggressive patrolling and hostile language by both Israel

and Hizballah. This included overflights and sonic booms over Lebanon, as well as billboards facing Israel from Lebanon that read in Hebrew "If you come back, we'll come back". Also, there was a Hizballah-sponsored stone throwing at Israeli positions that Israel soldiers had resided in. However, from 2000 to 2006, the fighting between Israel and Hizballah had mainly been restricted to the Shebaa Farms area of the Golan Heights where both sides had vented their anger occasionally. Nevertheless, when looking at the deadly confrontations between both sides since 1982, fighting from 2000 to 2006 was mostly peaceful and tame (Norton, 2006, 57-58).

2. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559

Hizballah's position of prominence following the Israeli withdrawal was met with domestic and regional issues that threatened the group shortly afterwards. Rafiq Hariri's Future Movement had done exceptionally well in Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon during the 2000 parliamentary elections. This was obviously a concern for Hizballah and led them to strengthen ties with the Syrian-backed President of Lebanon at the time, Emile Lahoud. In 2003, the American invasion of Iraq jeopardized Syria's grip on Lebanon. This forced Syria to seek the unconstitutional re-election of Lahoud in 2004, which was heavily criticized by Hariri and his allies within the Lebanese political system (Knio, 2013, 865). Hariri had immediately resigned from the office of Prime Minister following Lahoud's three-year extension (Norton, 2007, 482). The illegal meddling of Syria in the Lebanese political process had drawn a response from the United Nations Security Council. The UNSC would enact Resolution 1559 (also known as UNSCR 1559) in 2004, which focused on three major points in an effort to "dismantle Hizballah": first, it sought the disarmament of all militias within Lebanon (Hizballah). Second, it advocated for free and fair elections, without foreign meddling

(by Syria). Finally, it advised the removal of all foreign troops within Lebanon (Syrian troops) (Berti, 2011, 954). This resolution was in addition to the pressure being put on Hizballah from the United States, who after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, had tried to convince its European allies to label Hizballah as a terrorist organization. Moreover, the United States realized the difficulties of pressuring Lebanon, Syria and Iran to end their support of Hizballah, thus America tried to target Hizballah's funding, reportedly up to $100 million dollars per year from Iran. This was in addition to attempting to remove the Syrian presence in Lebanon (Early, 2006, 125). Hizballah had responded to the United Nations resolution by claiming that Resolution 1559 was an act of illegal foreign intervention constructed by the West (Knio, 2013, 866). Specifically in protest against any possible Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, Hizballah stated it stood with "sisterly Syria under the leadership of President Bashar al-Assad in the face of all pressures that Syria is being subjected to" (Quoted in Berti, 2011, 954). Also important to note, during this period of domestic and international pressure being put on Hizballah and Syria, Hizballah had taken an unprecedented step of using its political wing to fully defend the military wing's possession of arms. The political arm began attempting to prevent the group's disarmament directly, while the military wing would act in defiance of the Lebanese government and discredit its leaders. This was evident when Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was still in office and traveled to France in order to reassure European countries that "[t]he truth is that we really want peace…Up till now, following the Israeli withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon, Hizballah has behaved well" (Quoted in Berti, 2011, 954). Simultaneously, Hizballah had deliberately carried out an attack in Shebaa Farms that killed one IDF soldier, but as Berti (2011) remarks, "Hariri's international credibility" was also killed in the attack. This specific instance by Hizballah of acting out in this manner sparked domestic debates regarding Hizballah's

"resistance" activities and disruption of the Lebanese political process (954).

C. Hariri Assassination and Syrian Withdrawal

On February 14, 2005, four months after his resignation, former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was assassinated, along with 10 of his colleagues, by a massive car bomb in Beirut. Syria was accused of killing Hariri which had enraged many Lebanese, who now were even more determined to end Syrian control over Lebanon. On February 16, 2005, Hariri's funeral was held and it eventually led to large protest rallies in Beirut against Syrian forces in Lebanon. The political movement that began protesting demanded to have the complete removal of Syrian troops and their intelligence services from Lebanon, as well as the dismissal of the heads of the Lebanese intelligence agency. Additionally, they were insisting on installing a "neutral" government in order to prepare for new parliamentary elections in May 2005 (Wiegand, 2009, 676). To counter the strong anti-Syrian demonstrations Hizballah and its allies, Amal and the Christian Free Patriotic Movement, later known as the March 8 Alliance, staged a "good-bye, but thank you" demonstration on March 8, 2005, following Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's announcement that Syrian troops would in-fact withdrawal from Lebanon. Nasrallah had showed his support and appreciation to Syria, as the leader presented Syria's intelligence head in Lebanon with an Israeli rifle seized by Hizballah (El-Hokayem, 2007, 43). This pro-Syrian rally in Beirut was attended by, according to some estimates, over one million supporters (Early, 2006, 126). In an additional effort to stem anti-Syrian rhetoric during this time, Hizballah's Nasrallah had sent a message to his supporters claiming that it was too early to charge Syria with murdering Hariri and advised all Lebanese political leaders to safeguard the Syro-Lebanese linkage to protect Hizballah's resistance activities against Israel. However, on March 14, an alliance of

Sunni, Druze and some Maronite political groups, led by the Future Movement, later known as the March 14 Alliance, conducted another large anti-Syrian protest to counter the March 8 pro-Syrian rally (Knio, 2013, 866). This rally is also said to have had roughly one million demonstrators attend in Beirut (Norton, 2007, 485). The anti-Syrian sentiment in Lebanon following these protests was too strong, as it ultimately led to the resignation of two top pro-Syrian government officials in Lebanon, President Emile Lahoud and his newly appointed Prime Minister Omar Karami resigned for a second time. Karami's first resignation was February 28, 2005, due to his inability to form a new cabinet. Najib Makati was placed as head of the new interim government that was responsible for arranging new parliamentary elections scheduled for approximately May or June 2005 (Knio, 2013, 866). On April 26, 2005, the anti-Syrian protests in Lebanon, which became known as the "Cedar Revolution", compounded with strong international pressure, led Syria to finally withdraw from Lebanon after entering the country nearly 29 years earlier in 1976 (Berti, 2011, 955). However, the Syrian departure from Lebanon did not exactly weaken Hizballah. As Early (2006) notes, the outcome of Syria no longer having troops stationed in Lebanon, in addition to Syria vowing to not interject itself into the Lebanese political system or affairs had left a power vacuum where Hizballah now became the strongest political and military entity in Lebanon (126).

D. Hizballah after the Syrian Withdrawal

When the next round of parliamentary elections was held in May 2005, the anti-Syrian March 14 coalition won 72 of the 128 seats. This was a strong showing, but just short of the 86 seats required to pass constitutional amendments (Knio, 2013, 867). Hizballah's Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc had gained two seats in addition to the 12 in

which they already were in control of (Alagha, 2005, 35). By this time, it was clear that Lebanon was divided into two separate political parties: the anti-Syrian March 14 movement and the pro-Syrian March 8 movement (Knio, 2013, 867). In post Syrian-occupied Lebanon, Hizballah had three main objectives to achieve: retain the resistance's special status given by the Lebanese government, maintain its weaponry and finally, shed its image as a Syrian pawn (El-Hokayem, 2007, 44). Following the 2005 parliamentary elections, Hizballah for the first time joined the government, led by Prime Minister Fuad Siniora, a long-time ally of Rafiq Hariri. Hizballah was given two ministry positions. In exchange for joining the cabinet, Hizballah once again had procured its armed wing's acknowledgment by the Lebanese government as a resistance force, which safeguarded its arms (Norton, 2007, 483). Thanks to Hizballah's strong presence within the parliament ever since 1992, the organization was justified in occupying a cabinet position. Nevertheless, the group always refused a cabinet position in the government and remained in the opposition knowing they were a small minority and they did not want to be associated or be held accountable for any unfavorable actions the government would pass with a two-thirds majority. However, in 2005, following the Syrian withdrawal, Hizballah no longer had direct Syrian political protection (Alagha, 2005, 35). In an *al-Safir* interview with Hizballah's Deputy Secretary General Shaykh Naim Qassem, the Hizballah official revealed why Hizballah chose to finally join the government:

> "After the Syrian withdrawal however, Hizballah felt that the Lebanese cabinet would be faced with decisions that might have grave consequences for the future of Lebanon, specifically the country's official state of war with Israel, the status of the disputed Shebaa Farms and the status of the resistance" (Quoted in Alagha, 2005, 36).

Hizballah's Secretary General Nasrallah spoke on this same issue of Hizballah joining the government and stated that the 2005 parliament was the "most important and

most dangerous parliament since 1992" and that Hizballah "deemed it necessary to seek a seat at the cabinet table so as to be able at least to speak strongly and directly to power against steps it opposes" (Quoted in Alagha, 2005, 36). Hizballah continued to use its political wing by becoming "more active, more vocal and more aggressive" when it joined the government to safeguard its military apparatus (Berti, 2011, 955). On May 25, 2005, one month after the Syrian withdrawal, and on the fifth anniversary of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, Hassan Nasrallah gave a stern, direct message relating Hizballah's view on disarming: "If anyone entertains the idea of disarming Hizballah, we will fight him as martyrs did in Karbala" (Quoted in Berti, 2011, 955). Throughout June 2005 till February 2006, the March 14 coalition had endlessly attempted to achieve two main goals. Firstly, it wished to deploy the Lebanese military to the southern border with Israel. Secondly, March 14 desired to disarm and confiscate all weapons possessed by Hizballah in accordance with UN Resolution 1559. These two acts by the anti-Syrian coalition were countered by Hizballah and its allies through the blocking power it garnered in government. Adding to the government's dysfunction during this period, Lebanon's pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud had stood behind the opposition. The Lebanese political tension and gridlock was further aggravated by multiple political assassinations of well-known anti-Syrian politicians, MPs (members of Parliament) and journalists, including Samir Kassir, George Hawi and Gebran Twaini (Knio, 2013, 867). Moreover, even though Syria had left Lebanon, Damascus still had a vested interest in its "Lebanese Card" and openly and directly assisted Hizballah to secure its weapons. For example, in mid-July 2005 Syria's Prime Minister had stated that any disarmament by Hizballah would threaten Syria's national security and turn Lebanon into "a playground for Israeli intelligence" (Quoted in Alagha, 2005, 37). In a tactic to place pressure on the Lebanese government to allow Hizballah to retain its arms in defense of

Lebanon's sovereign territory, the Assad government had shut down the economically important Beirut-Damascus highway on the Lebanese-Syrian border. This closure had stranded Lebanese goods bound for the Syrian and Arab marketplace in Lebanon, as Lebanon faces the Mediterranean on its west, Israel to its south and Syria on its north and eastern borders. Shortly after the border closure, a policy was passed by 92 votes permitting Hizballah to possess its arms and the highway was reopened (Alagha, 2005, 37).

E. July 2006 War

The rising tension between the March 14 and March 8 coalitions had resulted in the Lebanese government being in a state of paralysis for quite some time. In an effort to relieve some of the hostility, the Lebanese Speaker of Parliament had organized a "National Dialogue" that was attended by all of Lebanon's political actors from the Shia, Sunni, Druze, and Maronite sects (Knio, 2013, 867). These leaders included Nasrallah, Aoun, Berri, Geagea, Siniora, Saad al-Din Hariri, Rafiq Hariri's son, and former president Amine Gemayel. The National Dialogue was held for four months, from March to June 2006. The Dialogue attempted to discuss three main issues, among others: the United Nations-led investigation of the Rafiq Hariri assassination, the application of United Nations Resolution 1559 and Lebanese-Syrian relations. By June 2006, the issue of disarming Hizballah went unresolved, even though a large segment of the Lebanese population was insisting the group turn over its weapons. Nasrallah and Hizballah had argued three main points to justify maintaining their arms: first, Lebanon lacked a sufficient protector to defend itself from Israel. Second, the Shebaa Farms area was still occupied by Israel. Third, Hizballah noted Siniora's agreement with Hizballah that was formed when the organization joined the Lebanese cabinet. The agreement

again reaffirmed Hizballah as a “national resistance”, not a militia. Thus, it still did not have to disarm neither under Taif, nor under UNSCR 1559 (Norton, 2007, 483).

On July 12, 2006, even after Hizballah guaranteed it would not put Lebanon’s economically important tourist season in peril, the militant wing of the organization launched an operation against Israel, which violated Israel’s border (Norton, 2007, 483-484). During this mission, Hizballah abducted two Israeli soldiers in hopes of exchanging them for Lebanese soldiers still held captive in Israel. Hizballah had previously used this tactic of abducting IDF soldiers in exchange for Lebanese prisoners as recently as January 2004. Although this type of activity was widely considered within the “rules of the game”, Hizballah had heavily miscalculated this move and still believed that the understanding it had with Israel was based mainly around retaliating in proportionality (Norton, 2006, 64; El- Husseini, 2010, 808). As to why Hizballah carried out the operation at this specific time, Norton (2006) believes that it is reasonable to conclude that Hizballah thought a successful operation that drew a dramatic and devastating Israeli response would gain it more leverage for maintaining its arms and silence its critics who wanted them to disarm, as the disarmament issue was a major topic being discussed at the Lebanese National Dialogue (65). Talbot and Harriman (2008) claim that Iran could have ordered the operation. They point to the coincidence that the day of the operation was the same day that the foreign ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany were in Paris to discuss placing sanctions on Iran (35). Regardless, Hizballah’s actions drew strong criticism from key Sunni Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. Saudi Arabia had railed against the operation as “uncalculated adventures” (Quoted in Norton, 2007, 484), while Jordan’s King Abdullah labeled Hizballah’s actions as “adventures that do not serve Arab interests” (Quoted in

Shanahan, 2008, 37). The Lebanese government had issued a statement during the early days of the war condemning Hizballah's actions and placed sole responsibility on them for Israel's harsh retaliation (Salem, 2008, 15). Furthermore, Hizballah's main constituency, the Shia of Lebanon, were angered by Hizballah's brazen move that provided a reason for Israel to retaliate (Norton, 2006, 67). Israel saw this violation as an opportunity to finally attempt to eliminate Hizballah altogether and restore its blemished image from 2000 as the region's hegemon, one it had earned in the 1967 war as being militarily invincible (Norton, 2006, 64; Salem, 2008, 19). Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert not only sought to free the two Israeli soldiers, but once and for all take out Hizballah with a massive response. Israel's Chief of Staff General Dan Halutz had said the Israeli response would be so unforgiving and relentless it would set back Lebanon's recovery by two decades (Norton, 2007, 484). After 34 days of extraordinary fighting, in which Hizballah had launched more than 4,000 rockets far into Israel proper and Israel had caused major damage in Lebanon, a ceasefire was established on August 16, 2006, via United Nations Resolution 1701. The effects of the war on Lebanon were enormous. Israel had annihilated Hizballah's headquarters in Beirut and killed over 500 of its fighters (Szekely, 2012, 121). Israel is also thought to have taken out Hizballah's long-range missile apparatus, in addition to physically and mentally damaging the Shia community, as Shia areas were heavily bombed (Saab, 2008, 97, 99). By the end of the ceasefire, the wider international community had viewed the immense retaliation by Israel as disproportional due to the Israeli military campaign killing an estimated 1,200 Lebanese civilians and injuring thousands more (Talbot & Harriman, 2008, 37). Israel also was accused of attacking many civilian areas that were understood to not contain any weapons, according to both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International (Norton, 2006, 67). Furthermore, nearly one million

Lebanese were displaced by the war (El-Husseini, 2010, 808), roughly 130,000 homes and apartments were damaged or destroyed, approximately 100 bridges needed to be rebuilt and additional reconstruction was required, including the repairment of miles of roads in southern Lebanon and near the Syrian border. The total damage was estimated to cost Lebanon around $7 billion dollars (Talbot & Harriman, 2008, 32). It was also assessed that it may take two full years, till 2008, to fully repair the Lebanese infrastructure. Economically, Beirut's banking industry had suffered, as many banks and businesses departed Lebanon seeking safer locations. Lebanon's tourism sector, which is crucial to the country's economy, lost approximately $2 billion alone in 2006 and could take years to recover (Norton, 2007, 485). The agriculture sector, which is vital to the economy of southern Lebanon, lost nearly $280 million from the war's devastation (Shanahan, 2008, 36). Considering Lebanon's national debt totaled nearly $40 billion as of 2006, roughly twice its GDP and one of the worst relative to other countries, the July 2006 War was an utmost disaster for Lebanon (Norton, 2007, 485). Lastly, in the last few days before the ceasefire was enacted, Israel had dropped hundreds of thousands of cluster bombs all over southern Lebanon in order to discipline the Lebanese population's support of Hizballah (Norton, 2006, 67).

To justify the war, Secretary General Nasrallah said in an interview on July 26, 2006, on Hizballah's *al-Manar* that Israel was planning to attack Hizballah sometime in the fall of 2006 and his sanctioning of the kidnapping mission of the IDF soldiers had eliminated the element of surprise and pressured Israel into fighting in July instead of the fall. However, a month later on August 27, 2006, Nasrallah gave another interview on Lebanese television. This time the Hizballah leader spoke of his regret of the mission due to the brutal Israeli retaliation on Lebanon and its people. Nasrallah stated,

"We did not think, even one percent, that the capture would lead to a

> war this time and of this magnitude. You ask me, if I had known on July 11…that the operation would lead to such a war, would I do it? I say no, absolutely not" (Quoted in Shanahan, 2008, 37).

Once again following a destructive Israeli military campaign in Lebanon, Hizballah relied on providing for those affected by the war through its swift response from its social services and reconstruction programs. After the war, Hizballah introduced two new practices. It created a new subsidiary of *Jihad al-Bina*, called *Wa'd* (Promise). *Wa'd's* specific focus was the reconstruction of the pummeled Dahiya neighborhood of Beirut's southern suburbs following the war. This was in addition to the distribution of $10,000 checks to families who lost their homes during the war (Shanahan, 2008, 38).

From a military perspective, Hizballah had claimed it defeated Israel in a "divine victory" (El-Hokayem, 2007, 46). The result of the July War from the Israeli perspective was grim. None of their goals were accomplished and Hizballah survived politically and militarily, in addition to Israel never recovering the bodies of the two soldiers (later in 2008 both bodies were returned) (Szekely, 2012, 118). It was the first war that Israel had fought where it did not emerge as the clear victor. Hizballah had survived Israel's all-out onslaught attack and was still able to launch rockets deep in to Israel proper throughout the war, as well as destroying tank and infantry divisions on land, which evaporated Israel's superior military image (Salem, 2008, 18). Further damaging to Israel and enhancing Hizballah's claim to victory was the Israeli Winograd Commission, which investigated the conduct of the 2006 July War. The preliminary report issued by the commission had heavily critiqued the performance of how the war was carried out from an Israeli military perspective and harshly criticized the actions of Israelis in charge of the war, leading to the resignation of the Israeli military's Chief of Staff (El-Husseini, 2010, 809; Shanahan, 2008, 34).

F. Post July War Lebanon

Following the July 2006 War, Hizballah was under serious pressure on numerous fronts. Resolution 1701, which ended the war, restricted Hizballah's ability to militarily run southern Lebanon. Its ability to restock its weapons following the war was seriously hampered with the arrival of at least 15,000 UNIFIL troops, which had a strong European influence, in addition to the arrival of 10,000 Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) deployed to southern Lebanon. The UNIFIL troops had a naval component, as well as tanks and other professional weaponry. A part of the resolution looked to cut off sea lanes and to seal the Syro-Lebanese border. Additionally, Israel began violating Lebanese air space and land borders but Hizballah did not respond (Salem, 2008, 18-20; Norton, 2007, 484; Shanahan, 2008, 34). Norton (2006) dubbed Resolution 1701's application of even more United Nations troops in southern Lebanon as "UNIFIL on steroids" (68). Hizballah had viewed Resolution 1701 as another way America and Israel were applying pressure on Hizballah to disarm. Politically, Hizballah's strong support from other political parties and organizations it enjoyed since the early 2000's had almost completely evaporated (Salem, 2008, 16, 20). Due to the vast amount of destruction Israel had caused due to Hizballah's actions, nearly half of the Lebanese Sunni, Christian and Druze viewed Hizballah in a negative context after the July 2006 War. However, 70% of the Lebanese Shia viewed Hizballah in a more favorable light following the war. It should be noted that the Shia received the majority of social services, health and reconstruction efforts by Hizballah once the war had ended (Talbot & Harriman, 2008, 38; Shanahan, 2008, 45). The aftermath of the war also drew harsh criticism from Lebanese politicians, headed by the American-backed March 14 coalition. The March 14 coalition was once again echoing strong calls for Hizballah to disarm and pledge itself wholly to the Lebanese political system (Wiegand, 2009, 676).

Nasrallah retaliated to the disarmament demands, calling them "immoral, incorrect and inappropriate" (Quoted in Wiegand, 2009, 676). By November 2006, a total of five Hizballah and Amal cabinet members had resigned from their cabinet posts in the government. They had claimed that the March 8 coalition could no longer be able to block the March 14 coalition's agreement on setting up the Rafiq Hariri assassination tribunal with the United Nations. The March 8 coalition had lost their veto power due to earlier defections from cabinet members of the March 14 camp. After the Shia members resigned, March 8 then claimed without the proper Shia representation, the government was no longer constitutional. Hizballah had feared that an international tribunal, which was influenced by America and France, was just another way of curbing Hizballah and Syrian power. The March 8 coalition had then sought a National Unity Government in order to gain veto power through their 'one third plus one' representation (Salem, 2008, 16-17). Further, in December 2006, a Hizballah official spoke on the group's demands for a National Unity Government due to the distrust Hizballah had concerning the Lebanese government during the 2006 War:

> "Now we are demanding (a greater government share) because our experience during the war and the performance of the government has made us unsure. On several occasions they pressured us to lay down our weapons while we were fighting" (Quoted in El-Hokayem, 2007, 46).

In further acts of protesting to the March 14 government and increasing tensions between the March 8 and March 14 opposing alliances, Hizballah and its pro-Syrian supporters, in addition to Michel Aoun's Christian Free Patriotic Movement, held peaceful protests in Beirut in December 2006. These protests were attended by estimated crowd of up to 800,000 people. The demonstrators aimed at seeking the resignation of the Western-backed Prime Minister, Fuad Siniora, in addition to demanding less corruption and expanding the cabinet to grant veto power to March 8,

which would be used for any motions to disarm Hizballah (Wiegand, 2009, 677). Further, Hizballah arranged protest encampments outside of parliament in Beirut beginning on December 1, 2006. The encampments were composed of nearly 1,000 tents, located in Beirut's Riad al-Solh Square and Martyr's Square, directly next to parliament. In January 2007, tensions were so escalated that a Sunni gunmen had gotten into a clash with Shia protesters, killing four (Norton, 2007, 487). From December 2007 to May 2008, Hizballah MPs and their supporters had voted 19 times against electing a president (Wiegand, 2009, 677). Hizballah's behavior starting with its protests in December 2006 in Beirut had left Lebanon "paralyzed and on the brink of war" (Salem, 2008, 15). The apex on tensions was reached on May 7, 2008, when Hizballah had used its weapons against its fellow Lebanese when its militants stormed the Sunni neighborhoods of West Beirut, killing approximately 100 people and injuring 250, during fighting with the Lebanese Armed Forces and different sectarian groups (Talbot & Harriman, 2008, 33-34). Hizballah had essentially taken over Lebanon's capital from May 9 to May 14, 2008 (Wiegand, 2009, 677). Berti (2011) states that it was one of the "worst episodes of violence since the civil war" (956). Hizballah had reverted from its peaceful protests and demonstrations to violence after its protesters had not garnered any of its political demands. This was in addition to two specific actions taken by the Lebanese government in which Hizballah deemed a "declaration of war". Firstly, the government had removed a pro-Hizballah security manager at the Rafiq Hariri International Airport in Beirut. Secondly, the government shut down Hizballah's communication network. Hizballah's seizure of the capital also demonstrated that it would not delay or fear in using force against anyone who threatens its military wing with disarmament (Wiegand, 2009, 677; Berti, 2011, 956). The violent upheaval was finally resolved after six days of negotiations (May 16, 2008 to May 21, 2008) by all the

opposing Lebanese parties, sponsored by Qatar and held in its capital. The "Doha Agreement" would officially resolve the conflict, as all the Lebanese parties agreed to finally form a unity government, in addition to granting Hizballah its veto privilege that it had been demanding since 2006. Other notable changes were the reformed electoral laws, initiation of a national reconciliation process and finally, prohibiting the use of any military force to resolve future political disagreements (Berti, 2011, 956). Once again, Hizballah escaped another political crisis without having to disarm (Wiegand, 2009, 677). On May 25, 2008, following the election of Michael Suleiman as President, Hizballah's Nasrallah gave a speech reassuring the Lebanese people of Hizballah's intentions in the future:

> "We don't want to have control over Lebanon, or to have governance over Lebanon or to impose our ideas over the people of Lebanon, because we believe Lebanon to be a special and diverse country that needs collaboration of everyone" (Quoted in Wiegand, 2009, 678).

A year later, Hizballah issued its 2009 Manifesto that outlined its political objectives in a realistic and sensible way by continuing to elevate its position in Lebanon. The Manifesto had also claimed "the consensual democracy will remain the fundamental basic for governance in Lebanon". However, regarding its weapons, Hizballah made it clear that that it would prevent the government from any attempt to disarm the group. Mohammad Raad, a Hizballah MP at the time, stated that a political crisis would erupt if the government continuously focused on confiscating Hizballah's weapons. Similarly Deputy Secretary General of Hizballah, Naim Qassem, stated:

> "These weapons are linked to the resistance and the resistance is linked to dialogue. Dialogue requires agreement among the parties. Accordingly, this issue is not linked to the results of parliamentary elections" (Quoted in Berti, 2011, 956).

The 2009 Manifesto had outright dismissed the idea of disarming and integrating its militants into the Lebanese Armed Forces. Finally, in its effort to protect

its weapons and military apparatus, as shown in May 2008, Hizballah transformed from a “small sectarian militia to a *de facto* army of regional importance” (Berti, 2011, 956-957).

G. Conclusion

After thorough analysis, Chapter VI found that Hizballah had attempted to remain in power through maintaining its arms, even after achieving its goal of ending the Israeli occupation in 2000. However, it did not lose vast amounts of support as this thesis’ initial claim had suggested, mainly due to Hizballah’s alliance with Aoun’s Christian Free Patriotic Movement which offset any support withdrawn from HIzballah. Further, in order to maintain its weapons, Hizballah had claimed that mainly due to the Israeli occupation of the disputed Shebaa Farms region near the Golan Heights, in addition to Israel not providing maps to mines in Lebanon and not releasing all Lebanese prisoners of war, Hizballah should be able to possess its arms. These issues were in addition to the arguments made by Hizballah during the National Dialogue talks in 2005. Here, Hizballah argued that Lebanon did not possess a capable force of protecting the Lebanese people from future Israeli attacks, as well as making the case that by joining the Lebanese cabinet for the first time in 2005, Prime Minister Fuad Siniora had allowed Hizballah to remain a “national resistance”. Hassan Nasrallah argued that since his group was given a “national resistance” status, Hizballah had earned the privilege of keeping its prized weapons and did not have to disarm, as required by UNSCR 1559. Furthermore, Chapter VI concluded that Hizballah did not lose a sizeable amount of support that affected the group following the Israeli withdrawal in 2000. However, Hizballah did lose some support outside the Shia community in Lebanon, as well as support from Sunni Arab leaders after the Hariri

assassination in 2005, which Hizballah's Syrian ally was accused, Hizballah's meddling in the Lebanese political process through the use of its political and military wing to maintain its arms, the provocation of starting the disastrous and destructive July 2006 War, as well as Hizballah's seizure of West Beirut in 2008 which killed over 100 Lebanese. These compounding events are all important examples of Hizballah attempting to continue to maintain its arms.

CHAPTER VII

THE ARAB SPRING AND SYRIAN INTERVENTION (2011-PRESENT)

A. Introduction

In the previous three chapters, this thesis demonstrated that Hizballah has followed the prototypical framework revolutionary groups tend evolve through, with the exception of losing vast amounts of support when trying to maintain power following the Israeli withdrawal in 2000. In Chapter IV, Hizballah was formed by the marginalized Lebanese Shia. The second evolutionary phase, covered in Chapter V, revealed that due to Iranian and Syrian pressure, in addition to a major event, the Taif Accord in 1989, Hizballah was forced to undergo an ideological transformation. Because of this, Hizballah dropped its revolutionary character, as well as its major goal of creating an Islamic state in Lebanon. Moreover, in 1992 Hizballah joined the same Lebanese political process it originally intended to overthrow, and focused its energy on its new goal of removing the occupying Israeli forces in Lebanon. Hizballah also continued following the pattern of evolution of revolutionary groups after it achieved its goal of forcing an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. Afterwards, Hizballah continued to fight in Lebanon to remain in power by keeping its arms. In order to do so, it revamped its behavior, ideology and goals to adapt to the post Israeli-occupied Lebanon. However, in the process of adaptation, Hizballah lost some support outside its Shia base in Lebanon, as well as regionally, but gained support, mainly from Aoun's Christian Free Patriotic Movement. By not disarming, provoking a war with Israel in 2006 and unleashing a bloody seizure of Beirut in 2008 when it could not politically stop the Lebanese government from clamping down on its behavior and ultimately

moving in on disarming the group. Furthermore, this final chapter argues that Hizballah was used as a regional proxy force.

B. Arab Spring

When the Arab Spring unfolded across the Middle East in 2011, Hizballah had openly supported the demonstrators in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain, as these countries' rulers were closely allied with the West (Salem, 2012, par. 7). Hizballah's Nasrallah even went as far as praising the Arab protesters for striving to obtain their "freedom and dignity" (Quoted in Alagha, 2014, 194), in addition to giving the Arab Spring movement his full blessing. Hizballah's Secretary General also proclaimed to the movement's demonstrators, "...this is the true path when people believe in their resolve…this is the new Middle East created by its own people," and ended by saying, "Your Spring has begun; no one can lead you to another winter. Your belief, vigilance, and resilience, will overcome all difficulties and make you triumphant" (Quoted in Alagha, 2014, 194). Further, Hizballah had embraced these Arab uprisings as "liberation revolutions" against corrupt and oppressive Arab rulers ("Crisis", 2014, 194; Mohn & Bank, 2012, 30). Hizballah had additional reasons to support these movements throughout the Arab world. In 2009, Hizballah had accused Egypt's Mubarak government of collaborating with Israel during Israel's war in Gaza in January of 2009 and tensions between Egypt and Hizballah had remained high ever since. When the Arab Spring came to Cairo, Nasrallah called for Egyptians to "take to the streets in their millions". In Libya, the Lebanese Shia had still not forgotten that in 1978 Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was suspected of killing Imam Musa al-Sadr, as the Shia religious leader of Lebanon disappeared while traveling to the country on an official visit (Salem, 2012, par. 7). In Yemen, Hizballah was thought to have been

supporting the Shia Houthis there well before the revolution began on January 27, 2011. Finally, in Bahrain, where Hizballah's fellow Shia brethren were protesting the 14 of February revolution, Hizballah was highly outspoken regarding the violent suppression of the Shia majority in the country by the ruling Sunni al-Khalifa family, who Nasrallah compared to Egypt's Mubarak and Libya's Gaddafi. However, by March 15, 2011, the Arab Spring had reached Syria. Here, Hizballah remained silent, as it figured that its "indispensable strategic ally" in the Assad regime would swiftly silence his protesters (Alagha, 2014, 194, 196; "Long haul", 2015, par. 7). This did not happen and to make matters worse, following the summer of 2011, the Syrian opposition had become more militarized. Some people within the fractured Syrian opposition fighting Assad had requested international protection from the Syrian government, as Assad continued to slaughter his own citizens and carry out immense state repression. This was in addition to the Syrian opposition asking for an international military response, such as the one dispatched to Libya that led to the downfall of Gaddafi (Mohns & Bank, 2012, 30, 31; Salem, 2012, par. 3). This effort never materialized though, as Syria's allies, Russia and China, had repeatedly vetoed these attempts at the United Nations Security Council (Alagha, 2014, 196). During the early phases of Syria's uprising, Hizballah was suspected of sending small bands of its fighters to assist Assad's regime ("Long haul", 2015, par. 7). In further support of these claims, a Syrian regime defense official, who later defected, claimed the Syrian government's security services were unable to qualm the Syrian protesters, and "needed qualified snipers from [Hizballah] and Iran" (Quoted in Levitt, 2014, 104). These assertions were outright denied by Nasrallah, although Hizballah's leader did claim that the Assad regime was worthy of gaining Hizballah's support, as opposed to the other Arab leaders who had previously fell due to the Arab Spring protests, because Assad had been a strong supporter of the resistance efforts

against Israel ("Long haul", 2015, par. 7). When Nasrallah had finally spoken out about the Syrian conflict, he insisted that both parties, the Assad government and opposition, sit down and find a political solution to the problem and immediately halt the increasing violence that was spreading throughout the country. In an interview as an effort to showcase his even handedness towards the Syrian dilemma, Nasrallah claimed he is "a friend of Syria, but not a Syrian agent" (Quoted in Alagha, 2014, 197). Moreover, Nasrallah praised Russia and China's role for countering American efforts regarding the Syrian impasse. Not before long though, the Syrian conflict had turned into a regional war, where Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey had backed the opposition, in contrast to Iran, Iraq and Hizballah supporting the Assad regime. Internationally, the United States, France and United Kingdom had backed the opposition, while Russia and China supported the Syrian government. Moreover, with Hizballah's support of all the Arab Spring movements throughout the Middle East, but making an exception for Syria, Hassan Nasrallah came under heavy criticism for holding a double standard. In an effort to "defend, justify, and legitimize" Hizballah's unique Syrian stance, Nasrallah announced Hizballah would not intervene militarily in Syria nor in Iran unless the regime in one or both or those states were on the verge of collapsing (Alagha, 2014, 194, 197).

C. Hizballah Intervention

Hizballah had previously sent members of its organization overseas to train foreign forces, including Shia militias in Iraq, Syria's regime-supported militia and the National Defense Force, in addition to Shia rebels in Yemen. However, Hizballah's entrance into Syria is by far the most contentious of them all ("Deadly Experience", 2015, par. 9).

Hizballah viewed Syria as essential, going as far as saying it was "the backbone to the resistance" (Levitt, 2014, 105). According to Victoria Fontan, Hizballah began

> "…fighting in Syria in case of extreme necessity. The fact the [Hizballah] has publically acknowledged its involvement in Syria ought to raise alarm bells for all 'experts' across/on the region. Given that Alagha's book demonstrates how politically astute and capable the [Hizballah] political leadership has been over the years, for Sayid Nasrallah to make the extreme decision to be involved in Syria, a decision that he knows will probably be fatal to its party's stand on the Lebanese political scene, ought not to be dismissed as just a political mistake, but as a suicide mission, a last cartridge to counter what is certainly perceived as a deadly force against Shi'a Islam's survival in the region" (Quoted in Alagha, 2014, 197).

Furthermore, Salem (2012) characterizes Syria's importance to Hizballah:

> "If his (Assad's) regime falls, [Hizballah] is at risk of losing its arms-supply bridge to Iran. It would be unable to compensate for that loss by relying on Lebanese seaports or Beirut's airport, because both could easily be blocked. It would still have its full first strike and retaliatory capacity, but, like a bee, it would be able to sting only once. Without the ability to resupply itself, [Hizballah] would emerge from any future war a significantly weakened force" (par. 9)

Salem (2012) continued to point out that without Hizballah's ability to resupply itself in a timely, effective manner, Israel would take advantage of this opportunity to attack the Party of God. Additionally, as tensions remained high between Israel and Iran at the time of the Syrian conflict's early years, protecting Assad was all the more important (par. 13). This is in addition to if Assad were to fall, Hizballah would not have Assad to protect its special status in Lebanon, and calls for Hizballah to disarm would immediately follow (Slim, 2014, par. 2).

Hizballah's involvement in entering the Syrian conflict had occurred slowly over time, and in progressively increased stages that required various justifications by Hassan Nasrallah. This was done specifically in this strategic manner to maintain Hizballah's constituency and regional appeal (Slim, 2014, 2). In the second half of

2011, Hizballah had first sent communication technicians, military advisors, trainers and snipers to assist the Syrian regime's military and security forces, but avoided participation in a direct combat role within Syria for the most part. By early 2012, the first Hizballah fighters were being sent across the Lebanese border into Syria to protect the Sayyeda Zeinab shrine in Damascus ("Long Haul", 2015, par. 13). Nasrallah had claimed that by Hizballah militants protecting the Shia shrines in Syria from *takfiris* (a derogatory term for Sunni Muslims who label others who do not adhere to their radical interpretation of Islam as apostates), the group was in fact preventing a Sunni-Shia civil war from being unleashed in the Middle East. The Hizballah leader also pointed out that if a wider war between the two Muslim sects were to break out, the shrines would be destroyed or defaced and pointed to the 2006 attack on Imam Askari mosque in Samarra, Iraq, as an example (Slim, 2014, par. 2). Further, although the Sayyeda Zeinab shrine is a highly important Shia pilgrimage site, it offers much more to Hizballah. Since the beginning of the 1980s, Hizballah began utilizing the shrine's strategic location and religious attraction as a recruitment hotbed and meeting point. This was in addition to the shrine specifically providing Saudi Arabian Shia a cover so they could travel to Syria claiming religious purposes, but then having access to training camps in Lebanon and Iran after their arrival. According to American investigators, the majority of the five Saudi Arabian Shia conspirators that killed 19 American Air Force personnel and wounded 372 US citizens in the 1996 Khobar Towers attack in Saudi Arabia had been recruited at the Sayyeda Zeinab shrine. The conspirators also met with the leadership of Saudi Hizballah at the shrine's location to go over the plot's final details days before the attack was carried out (Levitt, 2014, 103). Continuing, during this same time in the beginning of 2012 when Hizballah claimed to have sent fighters to protect Shia shrines in Syria, Hizballah also urged the Syrian population to stand by the regime.

A journalist characterized this announcement by Hizballah as having “torn away the party’s mask of virtue” (Quoted in Levitt, 2014, 103). Approximately around mid-2012, the signs of Hizballah being involved in the Syrian conflict through a combat role were clear. Across southern Lebanon and the Biqa’ Valley, subtle funerals were being held for the killed Hizballah militants (“Long Haul”, 2015, par. 8). The major event that had caused Hizballah to take a more direct combat role in fighting in Syria on behalf of the regime was the suicide attack that occurred on July 18, 2012, in the Syrian capital of Damascus. This attack had killed multiple high-level security advisors for the Assad regime (Lob, 2014, 3). The attack was also considered the turning point for Hizballah because it validated the fact that Assad’s military and security forces were unable to control the opposition, as Hizballah had previously hoped would happen. A Hizballah official was quoted speaking about the significance the suicide attack had for Hizballah, in combination with the regime’s inability to encircle and defeat the opposition north of Damascus and various pockets surrounding the Syrian capital:

> “After the July 2012 bombing [that killed four senior security officials in the heart of Damascus] and subsequent rebel assault on Damascus, the regime began to slide. It faced the very real possibility of losing the capital, which would have amounted to its fall” (Quoted in “Crisis”, 2014, 6).

Further, towards the end of 2012, according to US and Israeli intelligence, Qasem Soleimani, the Iranian Qods Force Commander, had concluded that Assad’s fall to the rebels was imminent. He argued that the Syrian pipeline that Iran uses to funnel materials, weapons and other resources to Hizballah would become non-existent if this were to happen. The Iranian commander then explained Hizballah would have to become more directly involved in the Syrian conflict in order to help prevent the Assad regime’s downfall. When approached with this information, Hizballah’s Nasrallah was said to have denied repeated attempts from Iranian officials to send large numbers of

Hizballah militants to fight for the Assad regime. Although, some top officials in Hizballah agreed with the idea of sending large amounts of fighters, others resented the idea, arguing it would be “bad for business”, as one Hizballah official put it, and jeopardize the group’s brand and Lebanon itself. However, after Nasrallah was told directly by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that the Iranian Supreme Leader expected Hizballah to carry out his orders, Nasrallah finally consented, although still hesitant (Levitt, 2014, 110). From this point forward, Hizballah shifted from having an advisory and training role to more of a direct combative, militaristic one in Syria (Slim, 2013, par. 9). At this time, Hizballah fighters being deployed to Syria had become somewhat of an “open secret” (Blanford, 2016, par. 8). In October 2012, Nasrallah had admitted that various Hizballah fighters were indeed fighting in Syria, however, he claimed these same Hizballah fighters had volunteered in order to protect their villages. The villages Nasrallah was referring to were home to many Lebanese Shia, but were located inside Syria’s territorial borders. Hizballah’s leader claimed that his militants had been protecting the villages and the Lebanese Shia there from *takfiris*. Two months later, in December 2012, Shia Lebanese had begun seeing videos of Hizballah fighters, whose faces were mostly blurred out, participating in combat fighting in the area of southern Damascus, which hosted the Sayyeda Zeinab shrine. In April 2013, Nasrallah had asserted that Hizballah would not allow the Shia inhabited areas of the Qusayr region to fall to Sunni militants, and admitted that some “armed groups” were in Damascus defending the Sayyeda Zeinab shrine (“Long Haul”, 2015, par. 9-10). It should be noted that by 2013 foreign fighters had begun infiltrating the armed opposition in Syria, which resulted in sectarian tensions becoming even more strained. Additionally, hard-core Islamists began taking control of the Syro-Lebanese border region. Two pivotal points in this area, Qusayr and Qalamoun (See Appendix: Figure 4), were used as supply lines

for the opposition in Syria. With the rebels controlling the border region, this risked cutting off the pro-Hizballah Lebanese Hermel area in the northeast corner of Lebanon from Syria. Moreover, with control of this same border region, the Syrian rebels had a direct link to sympathizers in various parts of northern Lebanon and the eastern Lebanese town of Arsal. Also playing a crucial role in Hizballah's involvement in Syria was the opposition's support from Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Iran and Hizballah realized that with the Syrian government at risk of collapsing, not only would both Iran and Hizballah lose an important ally, but they would also see an unfavorable power shift in the Middle East. By late 2013, the proxy war unfolding in Syria was obvious. A Hizballah official stated:

> "As the Syrian conflict became ever more regionalized and internationalized, [Hizballah] could not have stood on the sidelines. The involvement of March 14, Islamists, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, the U.S. and France posed a direct threat to us and to Iran. Not only could it have led to Assad's fall, but it also could have guaranteed that any future Syrian regime would have been under the influence of forces fundamentally hostile to the resistance axis" (Quoted in "Crisis", 2014, 6).

Further exposing the position Hizballah now found itself in by 2013, a journalist close to Hizballah pointed out:

> "Were Assad's regime to have fallen, [Hizballah] would have been next in line. It would have become fully exposed, defenceless vis-à-vis Israel insofar as it would have lost its main weapons supply line. And, across the border, it would have faced hostile forces awaiting the right moment to pounce" (Quoted in "Crisis", 2014, 6-7).

The first Hizballah-led offensive in Syria was to recapture towns and villages in the Qusayr region in mid-April 2013. The crucial Qusayr area had been held by rebels since July 2012, but after 17 days, Hizballah had recaptured it. However, Hizballah had suffered its largest casualties ever in a single battle fighting in Qusayr, reportedly losing 70 to 110 fighters ("Long Haul", 2015, pars. 16, 18). By April 30,

2013, Nasrallah had publically announced Hizballah's active role in the Syrian conflict during a speech. The two key themes of Nasrallah's address about the group's Syrian intervention revolved around religious loyalty and personal security. Moreover, Hizballah's leader made clear the three goals the organization was looking to seek by entering Syria: protecting the Shia majority inhabited villages that were located within Syria, defending the Shia shrines in Syria in order to avert any further sectarian divide and finally, halt any attempts from Sunni extremists in Syria to enter Lebanon. Furthermore, Nasrallah had issued two speeches on May 25 and June 14, 2013, noting that Hizballah had entered Syria due to the group taking pre-emptive measures to defend itself from three enemies: the United States, Israel and *takfiris* (Slim, 2014, 3). Hizballah's well-planned, strategic rhetoric enabled it to enter Syria without much criticism, as was highlighted by the Crisis Group (2014):

> "The deeper the movement's involvement in Syria, the graver and more direct the threats- many of which since have come to pass- it has invoked as justification. Hizballah began talking about the self-defense needs of Lebanese Shiite villagers on the Syrian side of the border; later, it highlighted the necessity of protecting Shiite shrines; ultimately, it advocated a pre-emptive war against *takfiris,* the term it uses to denote Sunni jihadis, thus conjuring up memories of al-Qaeda's slaughter of Shiites in Iraq" (4-5)

Verifying this claim, Hizballah went as far as asserting that all of Lebanon and multiple religious groups within Lebanon were in danger due to the Sunni radicals in Syria:

> "We consider that these groups gaining control over Syria or some specific provinces, especially those close to the Lebanese borders, are a great danger to Lebanon…[They are] a great danger to Lebanon, the Lebanese people, the Lebanese state, and coexistence in Lebanon…to Muslims and Christians [and] to Sunnis first [as takfiris tend to turn against their kin]. Do you want evidence? Look to Iraq." (Quoted in "Crisis", 2014, 5)

As attacks from Sunni rebel groups located inside Syria and Lebanon on

Hizballah and the Lebanese Shia community occurred, Hizballah used them as evidence to further justify its cause on entering Syria. The group made statements like, “If we didn’t fight in Syria, we would now be fighting in Lebanon” (Quoted in “Crisis”, 2014, 5). Nasrallah even stated, “If we withdraw from Syria, then [the Syrian towns of] Qusayr, Qalamoun and the Lebanese border would fall in the hands of armed groups. Car bombs will target all of Lebanon, not only [Dahiya]” (Quoted in “Crisis”, 2014, 5). While Hizballah uses the insulting terminology of “bloodthirsty *takfiris*” to justify its role in Syria, as well as draw support from its base, the Sunni rebels on the other hand also use it in a similar fashion against Hizballah and the Shia, thus creating a “double-edged sword”. The rebel groups see Hizballah’s dehumanizing rhetoric as a sectarian ploy that ultimately increases the sectarian tensions for both Shia Hizballah and Sunni militants (“Crisis”, 2014, 5). Finally, Hizballah’s drawn out explanation of the group’s involvement in Syria—from denial to admittance—reveals Hizballah’s tactic to mold the story in order to win over and retain supporters (“Long Haul”, 2015, par. 12). In April 2014, Nasrallah announced the Assad regime in Syria was secure, however, Hizballah continued to leave its fighters there in hopes of obtaining a total victory (“Crisis”, 2014, 20). At the time of writing in June 2016, Hizballah is still fighting in Syria.

D. Blowback

There is no doubt that Hizballah’s entry in to the Syrian conflict taking on a militaristic role would not only draw criticism domestically, internationally and from within the organization itself. The domestic reaction to Hizballah’s role in Syria has been somewhat calm, but this may be due to Hizballah’s “resoluteness of its base and weakness of its foes” (“Crisis”, 2014, 8). By 2012 many important figures in the Shia

community, including politicians, clerics, intellectuals and activists had openly come out against Hizballah's intervention in Syria. These protesters

> argued that Hizballah's entrance into the Syrian conflict was illegal and was counterproductive for the Shia in Lebanon, as Hizballah would be neglecting its top priority in protecting the Shia from Israel. The Shia critics also noted that Hizballah's intervention in Syria could possibly stoke the flames of a larger sectarian war, in which the Shia are vastly outnumbered by the Sunni, 9-1. The Shia detractors of Hizballah also listed four reasons for why Hizballah's Syrian involvement was harmful to other citizens, as well. First, the opponents argued that only Hizballah, Syria and Iran were benefiting from Hizballah's fighting in Syria, while the rest of Lebanon was burdened with violence and instability. Secondly, these critics stated that the Syrian people's legal and human rights were infringed upon, as they sought freedom, justice and democracy. Thirdly, Hizballah's presence in Syria had violated the sovereignty of Syria and disobeyed the Baabda Declaration, which stated Lebanon's neutrality by disassociation in Syria. Finally, Hizballah's involvement only raised sectarian tensions in Lebanon and the region (Lob, 2014, 4; Levitt, 2014, 105).

In an effort to avoid a sectarian war in Lebanon, Nasrallah had inadvertently infuriated many Lebanese when he attempted to make a gentlemen's agreement amongst Hizballah and Lebanese militants fighting with and supporting the rebels in Syria. This was after Hizballah had shrugged off Lebanon's official state policy of non-intervention in the Syrian crisis. Nasrallah stated,

> "We renew our call for sparing Lebanon any internal clash or conflict. We disagree over Syria. You fight in Syria, we fight in Syria; then let's fight there. Do you want me to be more frank? Keep Lebanon aside. Why should we fight in Lebanon? There are different viewpoints, different visions, and different evaluations of obligations. Well so far so good. However, let's spare Lebanon fighting, struggle and bloody confrontations" (Quotes in Levitt, 2014, 105).

Moreover, by the time of the Syrian conflict's start, there was and still is a large Lebanese Shia middle class that now has vital economic interests through business and investments, which are hinged on Lebanon being stable and secure (Slim, 2013, par. 2). However, due to Hizballah's fighting in Syria, on November 19, 2013, the Iranian

embassy in Dahiya was hit by a double suicide mission via vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED), killing 23 people. The attack was claimed by the Abdullah Azzam Brigades (AAB), a Lebanon-based al-Qaeda inspired group. Before this attack, Dahiya was hit on July 7, 2013, which killed a few people, and again on August 15, 2013, which killed approximately 31 people, both attacks also used SVBIEDs. Furthermore, throughout 2013 rockets were also occasionally hitting the Hizballah stronghold in Beirut (Alagha, 2014, 199). Even though the Iranian embassy bombing was the third SVBIED attack related to Hizballah's intervention in Syria, this specific suicide attack was the first following the announcement of Hizballah militants fighting in Syria. This attack also occurred at the same time as Hizballah's offensive operation unfolded in the Qalamoun region. From the first bombing on July 7, 2013 to June 2014, 12 additional SVBIEDs in 11 different attacks were carried out, mainly in Shia areas of Lebanon. The attacks were claimed by AAB, Jabhat al-Nusra fi Lubnan (the alleged Lebanese branch of Syria's al-Qaeda affiliate) and one by the Islamic State. The total number of dead related to bombings in the time period was approximately 100, leaving 900 wounded. Moreover, the most recent attack also happened to be the most deadly one. On November 12, 2015, a twin suicide attack was carried out in the Bourj Barajneh neighborhood in southern Beirut. It had killed 44 people and wounded 250. The death toll resulted in it being the single most devastating attack since Lebanon's civil war (1975-1990) (Blanford, 2016, pars. 10-11, 15). However, a top Hizballah official spoke of the relatively small toll the car bombings actually took:

> "True, our support for the regime has carried some negative consequences. But the price of not intervening would have been comparatively far higher. We would have been surrounded by our enemies, and our physical link to Iran [via Syria] could have been severed. What price have we paid? A few car bombs? Imagine, had we not intervened, how many dozens of bombs we would have faced, together with opposition fighters in [the Lebanese town of] Arsal

rather than in the [Syrian towns of] Qalamoun" ("Crisis", 2014, 8).

This extreme violence carried out by Sunni groups—including the aforementioned deadly car bombings and suicide attacks in Shia neighborhoods, the Iranian embassy and other pro-Hizballah locations in Lebanon only further crystallized Nasrallah's claim of Hizballah protecting Lebanon from an impending *takfiri* threat and their possible infiltration of Lebanon (Slim, 2014, 4).

Regarding the domestic political arena, the March 14 coalition had accused Hizballah of acting in the manner the Israeli Defense Forces had during its occupation of Lebanon to thwart attacks from Palestinian and Lebanese resistance fighters in order to protect Israel. March 14 stated that Hizballah had invaded and occupied Syria, which is a United Nations member, and had infringed on Syria's 'sovereignty and territorial integrity'. March 14 also highlighted the fact that with Hizballah's focus and resources directed towards Syria, the Lebanese-Israeli border remained vulnerable (Alagha, 2014, 198). Furthermore, some examples of international fallout due to Hizballah's role in Syria are the American Treasury Department labeling Hizballah a terrorist group in August 2012. Further, a 2015 US law, known as the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act (HIFPA), seeks to place sanctions on banks associated or doing business with Hizballah and any of its known members. The sanctions will shut out any offending banks from the US and international banking system, which could have a devastating impact. Similarly, the European Union (EU) labeled the group's military branch a terrorist organization in 2013, banning EU diplomats from meeting with Hizballah officials, as well as restricting Hizballah sympathizers in EU countries from transferring money to members of the organization (Chumley, 2013, pars. 1, 4-5). Also, on March 2, 2016, with Hizballah fighting in Syria and fearing Iran's rising influence in the region, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman,

Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, had officially declared Hizballah a terrorist organization (Savage, 2016, par. 35). Interestingly, even from within terrorist organizations, Hizballah and its leader Hassan Nasrallah have been criticized and even received an official challenge from the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, in June 2013. The Sunni Lebanese group attempted to point out that Hizballah had "fired thousands of shells and bullets upon unarmed Sunnis and their women, elderly and children, and destroyed their homes on top of them" in Syria, yet, have not taken any measures against its supposedly main foe, Israel. The Abdullah Azzam Brigades challenged Nasrallah and Hizballah militants "to fire one bullet at occupied Palestine and claim responsibility for it" (Levitt, 2014, 109). Due to Hizballah's support of the brutal Assad regime in Damascus, Hizballah also threatened its relations with enormous portions of Syrian society that once supported Hizballah, including Sunni lower and middle classes. This is also important to note since the vast majority of Syrians are Sunni and there are over one million Syrian refugees in Lebanon, many who are spiteful of Hizballah's military interjection into Syrian affairs. As one Syrian activist stated, "Syrians will never forget that [Hizballah] fought and killed their (Syrian) families. We might reconcile among each other. However, [Hizballah] will always remain an intruder that killed Syrians and occupied Syria" (Quoted in "Crisis", 2014, 4). If the Syrian refugees remain in Lebanon for years, the dangers of Syrian militancy and the large refugee population entering the political dynamic is expected to challenge that of the Palestinians in Lebanon ("Crisis", 2014, 17). Furthermore, on December 4, 2012, Palestinian group Jihadi Salafi disassociated itself with Hizballah and even went as far as sending its militants to fight against the Assad regime in Syria. Hizballah's strong dissension with Palestinian factions, including Hamas, the PLO, Popular Front for the Liberation for Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and the Democratic Front for

the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) over Syria are also clear indicators that Hizballah had strained its relationships with its Sunni allies. This is in addition to the fact that even the Palestinian Islamist militant factions within Lebanon have openly criticized Hizballah's support for Assad. Moreover, Hizballah's involvement in Syria has sparked deadly sectarian clashes all over Lebanon. In Sidon, on June 23, 2013, confrontations between Hizballah and advocates of a prominent Sunni jihadi Salafi Shaykh, Ahmad al-Asir, led to numerous deaths and ended with the dispatch of the Lebanese Armed Forces to control the situation. Similarly, in Baalbeck, fighting broke out between Hizballah and radical Sunni elements, which also led to the deployment of the LAF (Alagha, 2014, 199-201; Levitt, 2014, 102).

Perhaps the most debilitating outcome from Hizballah fighting in the protracted Syrian conflict is the death toll of not only the group's militants and key figures, but also the Hizballah militants' declining morale. Hizballah is believed to have a fighting force in Syria of roughly 5,000 fighters at any given point, out of its estimated 15,000 total militants, not including reservists (Karam, 2016, par. 4). Since its involvement in the Syrian conflict until January 1, 2016, Hizballah is believed to have lost between 1,500 to 2,200 fighters, many of which are some of the group's most elite militants. To highlight the large toll of combat deaths in Syria for Hizballah by comparison, 1,276 of the group's militants have been killed during its entire resistance campaign against Israel in southern Lebanon from 1982-2000 (Blanford, 2016, pars. 19-21; Dagher, 2014, par. 1). Worse yet, the war in Syria has claimed at least ten of Hizballah's most senior leaders, key operational strategists and a few that were a part of Hizballah's ideological ascendance, including Fawzi Ayoub in 2014, Samir Kantar and Imad Mugniya in 2015 and Mustafa Baddredine in 2016 (Karam, 2016, par. 4). Although the current number of deaths in Syria may not cause real harm to a fighting force of 15,000, the morale of

Hizballah's combatants, their families and some in the base is beginning to take a toll and questions regarding Hizballah's intervention next door are becoming more prevalent (Blanford, 2016, pars. 19-21).

E. Conclusion

This chapter argued that Hizballah was used as a proxy force in regional affairs. This notion was the fourth and final common characteristic of revolutionary groups, in addition to the last phase of Hizballah analyzed in this thesis. Although earlier chapters clearly showed Hizballah working on behalf of Iran, Chapter VII concluded that Hizballah did in fact act on behalf of Iran as a proxy force in a more profound way when it entered Syria, especially after the July 2012 "turning point" in which it took a major militaristic role. According to my research, Hizballah's Nasrallah had attempted to prevent Hizballah's militants taking on a large militaristic role in Syria, but after a direct order from Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, Nasrallah was overruled and forced to send troops in to Syria. By entering Syria in a militaristic role, Hizballah faces a vast assortment of blowback and problems.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Through using the theoretical framework set up in this paper, Hizballah has been shown to have evolved from its revolutionary goal of creating an Islamic state in Lebanon to becoming an actor in both Lebanese politics and regional affairs. In order to support this argument, I illustrated that the four evolutionary phases Hizballah has gone through, based on similar revolutionary groups' metamorphisms, were indeed alike with the acception of losing vast amounts of support following its pursuit to remain in power after the Israeli withdrawal in 2000. During Hizballah's first phase, 1982 to 1985, the organization shared similarities with Castro's July 26th Movement, Gaddafi's One September Revolution, Khomeini's Iranian revolution and the Sudanese Revolutionary Front. All these organizations, including Hizballah's support base, were primarily composed of people who were disenfranchised politically, socially and/or economically, in addition to seeking to overthrow the status quo government. Hizballah clearly follows this schema, as its supporters were composed of the most underprivileged and marginalized religious sect in all of Lebanon: the Shia Muslims.

In Hizballah's second phase from 1986 to 2000, the group dropped much of its original radical behavior, such as kidnapping westerners and enforcing strict Islamic rule over its controlled area, as well as dismissing its ideological goal of creating an Islamic state in Lebanon. Hizballah realized it would need to abandon or revise major components of its ideology in order to retain power; this also transpired in Sadat's Egypt, Qaddafi's Libya, as well as with Northern Sudan's Taha. Further, the IRA, PLO and IRGC all altered their goals and methods following a major event that changed the

environment in which these groups were founded in, including the 9/11 attacks, the failure of pan-Arabism and the 2003 American invasion of Iraq, respectively. In Hizballah's case, Iran and Syria played a large part in altering its radical behavior, in addition to a major event unfolding: the end of the Lebanese civil war. The scaling back of Iranian funds to Hizballah and Iran's numerous domestic and geopolitical changes, including its lost desire to export its Islamic revolution to Lebanon, were also major contributing factors for Hizballah's ideological shift. Additionally, Syria's clear hegemonic stature in Lebanon following the end of the Lebanese civil war also played a significant role. Finally, the need for Hizballah to enter the Lebanese political system after the Taif Agreement was essential for the group's survival in Lebanon. These factors and more had ultimately forced Hizballah to evolve. Moreover, it is important to note that with Hizballah's main goal of creating an Islamic state now irrelevant, the organization had shifted its priorities to resisting Israel, mainly due to wanting to keep its arms, which translated into power and leverage in the Lebanese political system.

Hizballah's third transitional period took place throughout 2000 to 2008, sparked mainly by the Israeli withdrawal in May of 2000 and later the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005. Without its *raison d'etre*, Israeli occupation, Hizballah sought to still maintain its prized "resistance" status, which acted as a conduit for keepings its arms. Hizballah's move to remain the most powerful organization within Lebanon mirrored similar moves made by Ayatollah Khomeini, Fidel Castro and Ahmed Bin Balla in that once the leaders of these powerful organizations achieved their initial stated goals, they still wanted to remain in power. Hizballah was no different, as they fought with their rival domestic political coalition, March 14, to keep their weapons, in addition to perceived external enemy influence in the form of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559. Following Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon

in 2005, Hizballah was most vulnerable to its international and domestic foes alike. Hizballah's military-style takeover of West Beirut in 2008 reflected the organization's fears of what it was ultimately fighting for: the ability to keep its weapons. Following the Doha Agreement which settled the West Beirut occupation and the deteriorating Lebanese political standoff, as well as the political violence in Lebanon, Hizballah once again walked away from negotiations with its arms untouched.

The last period covering Hizballah's position during the Arab Spring in 2011 and the organization's eventual interjection into regional affairs, specifically the Syrian civil war, revealed Hizballah's true face as an Iranian proxy force. By entering Syria to fight against fellow Muslims, the organization no longer can claim its existence as a sole resistance force against Israel. Furthermore, Hizballah attempted to justify its Syrian involvement by ultimately claiming it was protecting Lebanon from an impending *takfiri* threat in neighboring Syria. However, it is clear that the organization is fighting to protect its own as well as Syrian and Iranian interests in the region. This action will force the organization to reconfigure itself, either as the Syrian conflict continues or following its bloody conclusion.

While I thoroughly examined and exposed the major causes that had in fact contributed to Hizballah's four major transformational phases, outlined in Chapters III to Chapter VI, a major implication of this study has become much clearer. As the research for this paper concluded, I ultimately realized that throughout every stage Hizballah had undergone, there remained a common factor consistently appearing to be the underlying main theme that went unaltered: Hizballah's weapons. Hizballah's main goal since 1982 was to create an Islamic state to ultimately gain control and power over Lebanon. By 1990, in order to secure its weapons and enter politics, Hizballah strategically disavowed its Islamic state idea. However, it did not terminate its goal of

obtaining supremacy over Lebanon. Being able to indirectly dominate Lebanon in order to act as it wishes is still at the core of Hizballah's ideology and is key to understanding the group. Furthermore, Hizballah's ability to wield its authority of Lebanon is directly linked to its capacity to maintain its vast arsenal. Without weapons, Hizballah would instantly become a regular Lebanese political party, although the largest, and one that must endure and go through the same political procedures and protocol to try and change Lebanon from within the established political process. Moreover, without its arms advantage, Hizballah's propensity to manipulate its position for its own domestic interests as well as cater to its Iranian patron and Syrian ally is severely hampered. However, with arms and as the most powerful military force in Lebanon, Hizballah has the privilege of operating in a "win-win" scenario. When its political views are popularly supported within the Lebanese political framework, it is a "win". On the alternate side, when Hizballah's political positions are not popular or do not align with the other Lebanese political parties' views, Hizballah can simply choose to continue to do what they feel is necessary, as there is little or no repercussions for their actions, also a "win". This was no more apparent once Syria had left Lebanon in 2005, leaving Hizballah no other option but to exercise its authority outside the political system when it felt threatened. Two relevant examples were witnessed in May 2008 after Hizballah had tried exhausting all its political measures and social mobilization efforts to curb any attempt at ultimately disarming the group. Unsuccessful, Hizballah merely invaded West Beirut, killing over a 100 fellow Lebanese. Even after the 2008 Doha Agreement, which ended the crisis, Hizballah walked away with its arms intact. In 2011 as the outbreak of the Syrian crisis unfolded, Lebanon's official state policy was disassociation. Hizballah eventually gauged Syria as essential to Hizballah's domestic and regional position, in addition to Syria and Iran's, and in response, Hizballah still

sent thousands of fighters to assist the Assad regime. Neither instance produced any consequences that truly affected Hizballah's power position in Lebanon.

Hizballah has in fact been successful in achieving its 1982 goal of gaining control over Lebanon, albeit without imposing its radical religious, Islamic character. Hizballah decides when Lebanon and the Lebanese will have to suffer from wars and conflicts, when the government should be shut down and how the Lebanese people should act. More recently, if Hizballah were behind the 2016 Blom Bank bombing attack, this would be an example of the group imposing its strength directly on the Lebanese economy. Ironically, Hizballah is now an organization that possesses the same negative qualities and attributes of its earliest enemies. Politically, it acts much like the *zu'ama* by simply having the sole goal of maintaining and expanding its power without concern for others in their sect, in addition to non-Shia in Lebanon. Militarily, Hizballah in Syria resembles the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Israeli Defense Forces during their occupations of Lebanon.

In closing, we will continue to see Hizballah evolve in the future, especially after its involvement in Syria. However, this study demonstrated that it does not matter much. As long as a weak Lebanese government remains in which Hizballah fills the vacuum to provide a social safety net, as well as protection and health services to the majority of the Lebanese Shia, which garners their support, in addition to a continuous arms flow and support from Syria and Iran, Hizballah will remain unstoppable. Hizballah's core goal of expanding its power and maintaining its hegemonic role in Lebanon in which it picks and chooses when it wants to act in accordance and outside the established political system will not cease. This thesis signified the evolutionary phases of Hizballah, and assumes Hizballah will continue to evolve. However, any

future transformational phases will almost certainly include Hizballah maintaining its weapons.

APPENDIX I

FIGURES



Fig. A1. 1932 Lebanese Census
Source: Fanack Chronicle (2016). Share of religious groups according to 1932 census [map]; available from https://chronicle.fanack.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/5/2014/10/french-mandate_Lebanon_census1932_02.jpg; Internet; accessed on January 20, 2016..



Fig. A2. The Israeli Occupied Zones
Source: N. Qassem. (2005). *Hizbullah: The story from within*. London: Saqi Books, 97.

Fig. A3. Shebaa Farms
Source: B. Lynfield. (2015 January 28). "Hezbollah convoy attack: Israel considers its response after missiles kill two soldiers on border with Lebanon [map]". *Independent*.



Fig. A4. Qusayr and Qalamoun Region
Source: "Crisis", 2014, 23.

Fig. A5. Hizballah Embleme

Fig. A6. Middle East Region
Source: Baker, M. (2014). Middle East mental map [map]; available from http://www.showme.com/search/?q=mental%20map %20middle%20east; Internet; accessed July, 9, 2016.



Fig. A7. Lebanon Map
Source: Avon, D. & Khatchadourian, A. (2012). Hezbollah: a history of the "party of God". Cambridge, MA and London, England: Harvard University Press.

REFERENCES

Ajami, F. (1985). "Lebanon and its inheritors". *Foreign Affairs, 63*(4), 778-799.

Alagha, J. (2014). "Hezbollah and the Arab spring". *Contemporary Review of the Middle East, 1*(2), 189-206.

Alagha, J. (2006). *The shifts in Hizbullah's ideology: Religious ideology, political ideology and political program*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Alagha, J. (2005). "Hizballah after the Syrian withdrawal". *Middle East Report,* (237), 34-39.

Ansari, A. (2010). "The revolution will be mercantilized". *The National Interest.* 50-60.

Avon, D. & Khatchadourian, A. (2012). *Hezbollah: a history of the "party of God"*. Cambridge, MA and London, England: Harvard University Press.

Azani, E. (2009). *Hezbollah: The story of the party of God: From revolution to institutionalization*. New York, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Azani, E. (2012). "Hezbollah's strategy of "walking on the edge": Between political game and political violence". *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 35*(11), 741-759.

Baer, R. (2008). "Iranian resurrection". *The National Interest,* (98), 36-45.

Bar, S. (2007). "Deterring nonstate terrorist groups: The case of Hizballah". *Comparative Strategy, 26*(5), 469-493.

Bain, M. (2010). "Havana and Moscow, 1959-2009: The enduring relationship"? *Cuban Studies/Estudios Cubanos,* 41, 126-143.

Baker, M. (2014). Middle East mental map [map]; available from http://www.showme.com/search/?q=mental%20map %20middle%20east; Internet; accessed July, 9, 2016.

Barzilai, G. (1996). *Wars, internal conflicts, and political order: A Jewish democracy in the Middle East*. Amherst, N.Y: State University of New York Press.

Berti, B. (2011). "Armed groups as political parties and their role in electoral politics: The case of Hizballah". *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 34*(12), 942-962.

Blanford, N. (2016, January). “Syrian civil war takes toll on Hizbullah ranks”. *Jane's Intelligence Review.*

Buchan, J. (2013). “The Iranian revolution of 1979”. *Asian Affairs, 44*(3), 418-426.

Byman, D. (2011). “The Lebanese Hizballah and Israeli counterterrorism”. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 34*(12), 917-941.

Chumley, C. (2013, July 22). “European Union labels military wing of Hezbollah as a terrorist group”. *Washington Times*.

Cochrane, F. (2007). “Irish-America, the end of the IRA's armed struggle and the utility of ‘soft power'”. *Journal of Peace Research, 44*(2), 215-231.

Collins, C. (1974). “Imperialism and revolution in Libya”. *MERIP Reports, 27*(27), 3-22.

Contra war in Nicaragua-Noam Chomsky. (2006, September 6). *Libcom*; available from https://libcom.org/history/1970-1987-the-contra-war-in-nicaragua; Internet; accessed on February 9, 2016.

Counter revolution of 1965. (2012, December 6). *The Algerian Story*; available from https://sites.google.com/a/oxy.edu/the-algerian-story/post-revolution-algeria/the-counter-revolution-of-1965; Internet; accessed on February 9, 2016.

Dagher, S. (2014, July 16). “Civil war strains Syrian ally Hezbollah”. *Wall Street Journal.*

Dagher. N. (2008, January). “Hezbollah: between ideology and political pragmatism”. *Lebanese National Defense*. (63); available from http://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/en/content/hezbollah-between-ideology-and-political-pragmatism; Internet; accessed June 23, 2016.

Deadly experience; Hizbullah's learning curve. (2015). *Economist, 416*(8952), 40.

Deeb, M. (1988). “Shia movements in Lebanon: Their formation, ideology, social basis, and links with Iran and Syria”. *Third World Quarterly, 10*(2), 683-698.

Deeb, M. (2003). *Syria’s terrorist wars on Lebanon and the peace process*. Houndmills, Basingstake, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillian.

DeVore, M., & Stähli, A. (2015). “Explaining Hezbollah's effectiveness: Internal and external determinants of the rise of violent non-state actors”. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 27*(2), 331-357.

Early, B. (2006). “‘Larger than a party, yet smaller than a state’: Locating Hezbollah's place within Lebanon's state and society”. *World Affairs, 168*(3), 115-128.

El-Khazen, F. (1987). “The rise and fall of the PLO”. *The National Interest,* 10, 39-47.

El-Hokayem, E. (2007). “Hizballah and Syria: Outgrowing the proxy relationship”. *The Washington Quarterly, 30*(2), 35-52.

El-Husseini, R. (2010). “Hezbollah and the axis of refusal: Hamas, Iran and Syria”. *Third World Quarterly, 31*(5), 803-815.

Fanack Chronicle (2016). Share of religious groups according to 1932 census [map]; available from https://chronicle.fanack.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/5/2014/10/french-mandate_Lebanon_census1932_02.jpg; Internet; accessed on January 20, 2016.

Fidel Castro: People and Events; Cuban exiles in America. (2004, December 12). *PBS*; available from http://www.pbs.org/wbh/amex/castro/peopleevents/e_moderates.html; Internet; accessed on February 9, 2016.

Fidel Castro: Political leader of Cuba. (2015, October 19). *Encyclopedia Britannica*; available from http://www.britannica.com/biography/Fidel-Castro#ref157340; Internet; accessed on February 9, 2016.

Friedman, T. (1985, January 20). “Israel’s dilemma/living with a dirty war”. *New York Times.*

Gabrielsen, I. (2014). “The evolution of Hezbollah's strategy and military performance, 1982-2006”. *Small Wars and Insurgencies, 25*(2), 257-283.

Gabrielsen, I. (2013). “Hezbollah’s strategy and tactics in the security zone from 1985 to 2000”. *Small Wars Journal*.

Hajjar, S., & Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute. (2002). *Hizballah: Terrorism, national liberation, or menace?* [Carlisle Barracks, PA]: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.

Hamzeh, A. (2004). *In the path of Hizbullah*. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University.

Harik, J. (2004). *Hezbollah: The changing face of terrorism*. London, England: I.B. Tauris.

Harnden, T. (2011, April 4). “Libyan arms helped the IRA wage war”. *Telegraph.*

Hazran, Y. (2009, June). “The Shiite community in Lebanon: From marginalization to ascendency”. *Middle East Brief*, 37.

Helmer, D. (2006, July-August). “Hezbollah’s employment of suicide bombing during the 1980s: The theological, political, and operational development of a new tactic”. *Military Review*. 71-82.

Hizbullah: The party of God. (1998). *Levant*; available from http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/warn/introduction.html; Internet; accessed on March 8, 2016.

Honig, D. (1997). Israel's "little Vietnam". *Harvard International Review, 19*(3), 60.

Human Rights Watch. (1996, May). *Civilian Pawns*; available from https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Israel.htm; Internet; accessed on June 5, 2016.

Jacobs, B. (1995). *Operations peace for Galilee: Operational brilliance-strategic failure*. 1-36; available from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a293847.pdf; Internet; accessed on June 5, 2016.

Karam, J. (2015, May 17). "Hezbollah's vulnerability in Syria: Open exposure to many enemies". Al-Arabiya TV.

Khashan, H. (2013). "Hezbollah's plans for Lebanon". *Middle East Quarterly, 20*(2), 81.

Knio, K. (2013). "Structure, agency and Hezbollah: A morphogenetic view". *Third World Quarterly, 34*(5), 856-872.

Lebanon's Hizbollah Turns Eastward to Syria (2014, May 27). *International Crisis Group*; available from http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Lebanon/153-lebanon-s-hizbollah-turns-eastward-to-syria.pdf; Internet; accessed on June 6, 2016.

Lewis, W. (1966). "The decline of Algeria's FLN". *Middle East Journal, 20*(2), 161-172.

Levitt, M. (2014). "Hezbollah's Syrian quagmire". *Prism: A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations, 5*(1), 100.

Lob, Eric (2014, March). "Is Hezbollah confronting a crisis of popular legitimacy? *Middle East Brief*. (78)"; available from http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB78.pdf; Internet; accessed on June 6, 2016.

Long haul - Hizbullah's involvement in the Syrian civil war (2015). *IHS Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Monitor, 15*(2).

Lynfield, B. (2015 January 28). "Hezbollah convoy attack: Israel considers its response after missiles kill two soldiers on border with Lebanon [map]". *Independent*.

Majed, Z. (2010, November). "Hezbollah and the Shiite community: From political confessionalizaton to confessional specialization". Aspen institute.

Mamouri, A. (2015, October 28). "Is Iraq's Dawa party on verge of division"? Almonitor.

Mansour, I. (2010). “Washington and Hezbollah: A rare convergence of interests”. *Middle East Policy*, 17(2), 82-104.

McCutchen, A. (2014). *The Sudan revolutionary front: Its formation and development.* Geneva, Switzerland: Small Arms Survey.

McKittrick, D. (2009, September 7). “Analysis: Links between Libya and the IRA. *Independent;* available from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/analysis-the-links-between-libya-and-the-ira-1783333.html; Internet; accessed on February 9, 2016.

Mouzahem, H. (2015). “The Shia in Lebanon: A short history”. *Levant News*; available from http://the-levant.com/shias-lebanon-history/; Internet; accessed on March 9, 2016.

Mohns, E., & Bank, A. (2012). “Syrian revolt fallout: End of the resistance axis”? *Middle East Policy, 19*(3), 25-35.

Nakash, Y. (2006). *Reaching for power: The Shi'a in the modern Arab world*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Norton, A. (2007a). *Hezbollah: A short history*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Norton, A. (2007b). “The role of Hezbollah in Lebanese domestic politics”. *The International Spectator, 42*(4), 475-491.

Norton, A. (2006). “Hizballah through the fog of the Lebanon war”. *Journal of Palestine Studies, 36*(1), 54-70.

Norton, A. (2000). “Hizballah and the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon”. *Journal of Palestine Studies, 30*(1), 22-35.

Norton, A. (1998). “Walking between raindrops: Hizballah in Lebanon”. *Mediterranean Politics, 3*(1), 81-102.

Norton, A. (1987). *Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the soul of Lebanon*. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press.

Norton, A. (1984). *Harakat Amal and the political mobilization of the Shia in Lebanon* (Doctor of Philosophy Dissertation, The University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois).

Open Letter: The Hizballah Program (1988, January, 1). *Council on Foreign Relations*; available from http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/open-letter-hizballah-program/p30967; Internet; accessed on April 17, 2016.

Operation Peace for Galilee (n.d.) *In project Gutenberg self-publishing press*; available from: http://gutenberg.us/articles/operation_peace_for_galilee#cite_note-101; Internet; accessed on June 6, 2016.

Osman, K. (2009, September). The origins and birth of the Hizbullah and the Islamic resistance in Lebanon. *Crescent International*; available from http://www.crescent-online.net/2009/09/the-origins-and-birth-of-the-hizbullah-and-the-islamic-resistance-in-lebanon-1768-articles.html; Internet; accessed on June 5, 2016.

Parsa, M. (2011). "Ideology and political action in the Iranian revolution". *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 31*(1), 53-68.

Prevost, G. (2012). "Fidel Castro and the Cuban revolution". *Headwaters: The Faculty Journal of the College of Saint Benedict and Saint John's University,* 24(4), 1-33.

Qassem, N. (2005). *Hizbullah: The story from within*. London: Saqi Books.

Rais, R. (1993). "Afghanistan and the regional powers". *Asian Survey, 33*(9), 905-922.

Ranstorp, M. (1998). "The strategy and tactics of Hizballah's current 'Lebanonization process'". *Mediterranean Politics, 3*(1), 103-134.

Reagan endorses CIA support of Nicaraguan contras. (2013, November 11). *Finding Dulcinea*; available from http: //www.findingdulcinea.com/news/on-this-day/November/Reagan-Endorses-CIA-Support-of-Nicaraguan-Contras.html ; ; Internet; accessed on February 2, 2016.

Rodrigo, N. (2015, September 22). "Gaddafi and the IRA's explosive relationship". *NewArab.*

Rowley, S. (1996, April 21). "Israeli offensive seen as 'great victory' for Hezbollah". *Chicago Tribune*.

Saab, B. (2008). "Rethinking Hezbollah's disarmament". *Middle East Policy, 15*(3), 93-106.

Salem, P. (2012, June 19). "Can Hezbollah weather the Arab Spring"? *Project Syndicate*; available from https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/can-hezbollah-weather-the-arab-spring?barrier=true; Internet; accessed on June 5, 2016.

Salem, P. (2008). "The after-effects of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war". *Contemporary Arab Affairs, 1*(1), 15-24.

Savage, S. (2016, March 13). "Does the Syrian civil war make Hezbollah less or more of a threat to Israel? *The American Israelite.*

Schleifer, R. (2006). “Psychological operations: A new variation on an old art: Hezbollah versus Israel”. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29*(1), 1-19.

Sial, S. (2013, June). “Pakistan's role and strategic priorities in Afghanistan since 1980”. *Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre,* 1-10.

Simbar, R., & Zibaei, M. (2011). “Political Islam: Moderation or radicalism”? *Journal of International and Area Studies, 18*(1), 65-86.

Shanahan, R. (2008). “A pyrrhic victory? Hezbollah's complex post-war environment”. *Democracy and Security, 4*(1), 34-47

Shanahan, R. (2005). *The Shi'a of Lebanon: Clans, parties and clerics*. London, England: Tauris Academic.

Siklawi, R. (2012). “The dynamics of the AMAL movement in Lebanon 1975-90”. *Arab Studies Quarterly*, *34*(1), 4–26.

Slee, C. (2008). *Cuba: How the workers and peasants made the revolution*. Chippendale, Australia: Resistance Books.

Slim, R. (2014). “Hezbollah and Syria: From regime proxy to regime savior”. *Insight Turkey, 16*(3), 61.

Slim, R. (2013, May 28). “Hezbollah’s plunge into the Syrian abyss”. *Foreign Policy*.

St. John, B. (2008). “Redefining the Libyan revolution: The changing ideology of Muammar al-Qaddafi”. *The Journal of North African Studies, 13*(1), 91-106.

Stuck in the Lebanese 'mud': Israel's withdrawal from south Lebanon. (2000). *Strategic Comments, 6*(3), 1-2.

Szekely, O. (2012). “Hezbollah's survival: Resources and relationships”. *Middle East Policy Council, 19*(4), 110-126.

Talbot, B., & Harriman, H. (2008). “Disarming Hezbollah”. *Mediterranean Quarterly, 19*(4), 29-53.

Thomas, H. (1963). “The origins of the Cuban revolution”. *World Today, 19*(10), 448-460.

Usher, G. (1997). “Hizballah, Syria, and the Lebanese elections”. *Journal of Palestine Studies, 26*(2), 59-67.

Verhoeven, H. (2013). “The rise and fall of Sudan's Al-Ingaz revolution: The transition from militarised Islamism to economic salvation and the comprehensive peace agreement”. *Civil Wars, 15*(2), 118-140.

Wiegand, K. (2009). “Reformation of a terrorist group: Hezbollah as a Lebanese political party”. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32*(8), 669-680.

Wolf, A. (2014). “Peacemaking and political survival in Sadat's Egypt”. *Middle East Policy, 21*(2), 127-139.