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AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

INTERNATIONAL DONORS AND URBAN PLANNING
POLICY & PRACTICE:
THE EUROPEAN UNION IN LEBANON

by
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Date of thesis defense: April 22, 2016

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ABSTRACT

Yara Elie Najem   for   Master of Urban Planning and Policy
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Title: <u>International Donors and Urban Planning Policy & Practice: the European Union in Lebanon</u>

Urban planners and scholars have developed an interest in regions as they have significant urban and economic roles. Regional planning is used as a tool to manage regions' growth and development. Regional planning policies evolved in time from being infrastructure- and poverty-oriented to become inclusive of economy, governance, environment and social issues.

Lebanon is an interesting case study to study regional planning as it has elected local and regional governments (Unions of Municipalities). Indeed, since the first post-war municipal elections of 1998, several municipalities and UoMs have been working on strategic urban planning projects. This has mainly been done with the help of international donors rather than the central government. The Lebanese national landuse plan, the SDATL, approved in 2009 calls for investigating means of implementation of its vision at the scale of regions and local authorities.

Since the end of the civil war in Lebanon, development partnerships between local authorities and international donors have been exponentially increasing, especially in the field of promoting decentralization and regional development and planning. In my thesis, I examine the role of the EU's development aid policies in initiating a discourse and a practice of regional planning in Lebanon since 2000. My hypothesis is that the EU's development aid played a key role in consolidating a discourse and a practice of regional planning in Lebanon, and have also contributed to the creation of a network of experts knowledgeable in regional planning. I demonstrate these findings by focusing on two projects developed by the EU during 2000-2015 period: ARLA (2000-2006) and ADELNORD (2009-2015).

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the quest for more sustainable and equitable cities, scholars have identified regionalism as a primordial cornerstone. Cities ought to be addressed relationally to suburbs and territories they are materially and immaterially linked to. Indeed, regions are incorporated from interconnected social and economic networks, thus raising new sets of issues regarding scales of spatial governance. Regionalism is hence key to a more holistic and integrated understanding of planning.

The grouping of provinces, governorates, and municipalities into a region raises question of multi-scalar regional governance, which generate complex networks of diverse stakeholders and decision-makers. According to Parker and Harloe (2015: p365-366), local, national and supra-national authorities are increasingly sharing sovereignties over one same region. National authorities remain the main sovereign power over their territories; however, they have been investing less and less in peripheral and poorer regions of the country (Parker & Harloe, 2015). Supra-national authorities, such as the EU and international donors, intervene in such areas, thus helping restore the development gap between economically driven regions and more peripheral and underdeveloped ones (Awada, 2011). Studies have shown that regional scale planning and regional authorities reduce inequalities in "city-regions," therefore reducing the risk of "social unrest" (Soja, 2015).

Urban planners and scholars have developed an interest in regions as they have significant urban and economic roles (Soja, 2015). New regionalism does not provide a ready-made framework through which to promote cohesive, competitive and sustainable regions. Planners resort to tools of strategic spatial planning or socio-economic

development plans to promote regions. Regional planning also helps achieve more comprehensive transportation plans, as well as environmental plans and social development plans (Soja, 2015). Regional planning is used as a tool to manage regions' growth and development. According to Awada (2011: p1-10) regional planning policies evolved in time from being infrastructure- and poverty-oriented to become inclusive of economy, governance, environment and social issues on a regional scale rather than solely in poverty-ridden areas (Awada, 2011).

Lebanon is an especially interesting country to study with regard to regionalism due to its weak state and relatively small territory that is highly divided administratively, with over 952 municipalities in 2013 (Harb & Atallah, 2015). A first effort of regional planning was conducted in 1983 by French planners with the Directorate General of Urbanism (DGU) for what was called the RMB: Region Metropolitaine de Beyrouth (Metropolitan region of Beirut). This administrative area was created by planners beyond the municipal boundaries of Beirut in order to better plan the city and its suburbs. The RMB stretched from the Damour River in the south to the Nahr el Kalb River in the North, and from the seacoast to a line going down the eastern borders of Broummana and Aley in the West. Although the boundaries of the RMB are debatable, and were heavily contested, ideas about regionalism go introduced to the field of urban planning in Lebanon. Cities in Lebanon have been rapidly urbanized due to wars, conflicts and displacement, and have thus become significantly interlinked and interdependent, which makes it difficult to plan and manage them exclusively within their municipal boundaries which date back to the 1950s and 1960s (Arnaud, 1997; Verdeil et.al., 2007) Indeed, growing city-regions often went beyond the existing administrative local and regional boundaries.

Figure 1- Urbanization phases of Greater Beirut (Verdeil, Faour, & Velut, 2007, pp91-115)

Lebanon is divided into mohafazat and cazas. Verdeil et. al. (2009, pp7-32) discuss how the number of cazas and mohafazat has increased since 1946 to have a better representation of various communities in the country. In 1975 and 2003, three new mohafazat were created: Nabatiyeh, South Lebanon, Akkar, and Baalbak-Hermel. The aim was to reinforce the role of the state in these areas, as well as provide better state services. The number of cazas remained at twenty-six, while the number of mohafazat increased to eight (Verdeil, Faour, & Velut, 2007). Both the mohafazat and cazas mainly carry on administrative roles consisting of executing government laws (Harb & Atallah, 2015). Planning functions are not attributed to neither of those two scales of institutions.

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
Figure 2- Evolution of administrative divisions in Lebanon between 1930 and 2003 (Verdeil, Faour, & Velut, 2007, pp7-32)

Municipalities, working on a smaller scale of governance, have, on the other hand, the prerogatives to work on a wider array of projects of public interest, as per the law on municipalities. Harb and Atallah (2015, pp189-225) remind us that municipalities have both a decision-making and an executive power. Several municipalities thus work on projects that help improve their cities. In addition, in the aim of providing better services to their citizens, municipalities group in Unions of Municipalities (UoMs) to receive more funds, share technical expertise, and have a more comprehensive development.

Since the first post-war municipal elections of 1998, several municipalities and UoMs have been working on strategic urban planning projects. This has mainly been done with the help of international donors rather than the central government. In 2009, the central government, via the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), elaborated and published a landuse plan which was approved by the Parliament as a

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decree: the Schema Directeur d'Amenagement du Territoire Libanais (SDATL), which produced a cohesive landuse planning vision that would also serve as a base for investments (Verdeil, 2004). Developing specific planning interventions under the SDATL is only mandatory for centers of governorates and caza, classified areas, and areas that are selected through a decree by the Minister of Public Works and Transport in accordance with the DGU (Fawaz, NA). Thus, the SDATL's implementation is mainly attributed to ministries and central administrations. The SDATL does however call for investigating means of implementation at the scale of regions and local authorities, as one of its aims is reinforcing metropolitan areas. Given growing city-regions such as Beirut and Tripoli challenge their municipal and even caza boundaries, a planning incoherence is generated, whereby cazas are split into suburbs and hinterlands separately linked to cities in different cazas (DAR-IAURIF, 2004). Although the Lebanese urban planning law (section 2, article 4) mentions the need for the elaboration of master plans on the governorates and cazas levels, it does not provide guidelines for the elaboration and implementation of such regional plans (Urban Planning Law, 1983). Notwithstanding, according to the SDATL's final report (DAR-IAURIF, 2004), the Office of the Minister for Special Administrative Reforms (OMSAR) should promote strategic urban planning at the municipal and regional level. In fact, the SDATL mentions that such a project was launched between the EU and OMSAR, as to encourage adjacent municipalities to work together in elaborating strategic regional plans that conform to the SDATL (DAR-IAURIF, 2004, pp(IV)18-19).

Subsequently, while the SDATL highlighted the necessity for regional planning, it did not elaborate any institutional framework or planning tools for its elaboration,

neither in conjunction with OMSAR nor the DGU. Conversely, international donors, of which the EU, played a key role in promoting the need for strategic planning and local development, both at the regional and local scales.

Since the end of the civil war in Lebanon, development partnerships between local authorities and international donors have been exponentially increasing. These partnerships both include countries from the North and the South. Due to the Lebanese political sectarian system known for its clientelism and corruption, international organizations prefer working with directly elected local authorities that are endowed with more democratic legitimacy than their national counterparts. This aid incorporates a variety of policy sectors such as the economy, environment, humanitarian aid, urban planning and decentralization. The latter have especially been a focus in the past couple of decades with the rise of concepts such as "regionalization", "policy mobilities" and "decentralization" (Bakhos, 2014). Some of the main international donors include the World Bank, United Nations agencies, the European Union, the Agence Française de Development (AFD), and French city-regions (Region Ile-de-France, Aix-en-Provence, Marseille). Aid comes to local authorities either in the form of loans, technical assistance, grants, or capacity building. In terms of planning and decentralization partnerships, international donors mainly focus on reinforcing the municipal institution (i.e. finance, technical training, policies), developing master plans for municipalities or regions, and assisting local development activities. Moreover, twinning partnerships exist, whereby development agreements take place between Lebanese and foreign local authorities. The cities of Aix en Provence (France) and Baalbak are an example of city twinning (Harb & Atallah, 2015).

A. Research Question and Hypothesis

In my thesis, I will examine the role of the EU's development aid policies in initiating a discourse and a practice of regional planning in Lebanon since 2000. My hypothesis is that the EU's development aid played a key role in consolidating a discourse and a practice of regional planning in Lebanon, and have also contributed to the creation of a network of experts knowledgeable in regional planning. Indeed, building on Albrechts' work (2004, pp743-758), the thesis highlights how the EU aid produced a network of agents that can act as policy advocates that can operate and negotiate within existing power relations to promote better planning and development practice.

I demonstrate these findings by focusing on two projects developed by the EU during 2000-2015 period: ARLA (2000-2006) and ADELNORD (2009-2015), one housed within OMSAR and the other housed within the CDR. As I will show, over time, the EU has been supporting the elaboration of a more complex regional governance system in Lebanon through the operationalization of its SDATL.

Spatial planning today cannot be restricted to the administrative boundaries of cities, and needs to incorporate new regionalism understandings that emphasize how territories are relational and interconnected by multiple and diverse economic, environmental, social, political and infrastructural networks. By studying the role of the EU in promoting the discourse and practice of regional planning in Lebanon, my thesis also studies the opportunities and challenges that rescaling planning practice entails. This is particularly relevant in the context of the SDATL's urgent need to be operationalized at the level of regional plans, before being implemented at the local scale.

B. Methods of Research

To identify the role of international donors in regional planning, we researched the websites of all institutions, international donors (mentioned above), local authorities, and government entities involved in development and planning at the scale of the Lebanese territory. We focused our research on *spatial* development plans, i.e. plans that have a territorial dimension and encompass an area that includes at least two municipalities. In terms of central-level institutions, we looked into the Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, the Directorate General of Urban Planning (DGU), the Center for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), and the Economic and Social Fund for Development (ESFD). We also examined the websites of municipalities and municipal unions in Lebanon, and institutions such as the Bureau Technique des Villes Locales- Cites et Gouvernements Locaux Unis (BTVL-CGLU). We then moved on to identify major international donors having published development plans on their websites. This mapping (available in Annex 1) led to completing a first database of regional development plans in Lebanon, organized by donors. In addition we conducted nine interviews with key actors identified through that database (public official, experts, academics…). Those included:

- Sami Feghali, the head of the Land Use Planning department at the CDR, who represented the CDR in most regional planning projects in Lebanon.
- Dima Sader, from the ESFD: an independent institution that reports directly to the director of the CDR, and aims to work on poverty alleviation through community development and job creation.

- Bachir Odeimi, director of the BTVL-CGLU. This office works, since its creation, on establishing networks between international and local cities, as well as helping local authorities in their development.

- Tarek Osseiran, UN-HABITAT Country Program Manager. UN-HABITAT worked on post-war reconstruction in 2006. They then worked on building technical capacities of unions of municipalities and moved towards strategic planning.

- Serge Yazigi, an urban planner who is an expert in local and regional development, including two EU-led projects (ARLA & ADELNORD).

- Ziad Moussa, an urban planner who was on the coordinating committee of the first EU-led regional planning project in Lebanon, and then served as a lead expert on a subsequent project (CIUDAD).

After reviewing the database we examined which development plans qualify as regional. To do that, we identified an intervention as being regional when it incorporates the following four features. First, boundaries that transcend municipal boundaries, even if discontinuous. Second, a regional institution, such as a union of municipality, or a cluster of municipalities. Third, a regional vision or plan, i.e. a document bringing forward a development plan that is often developed by independent experts, and that does not necessarily have a legal function. Fourth, modes of operation that fit the multi-level governance model: ie. a governance scheme made of a network of operations where actors are multiple and multi-scalar (unions/ clusters, local actors, international donors, national actors), negotiations are key, and power structures are ambiguous. We came up with a list of 38 regional development plans, published between 2004 and 2015, and led by a variety of donors.

International donors name plans differently. While the EU names its plans "Simplified Local Development Plans" and "Strategic Sustainable Regional Development Plans", UNHABITAT uses "Towards Strategic Planning", UNDP labels them "Strategic Development Plans", and the World Bank "City Development Strategy". For heuristic reasons, we will refer to all these plans as "regional plans".

My thesis will start by discussing the growth of regionalism and more specifically in the European context. Chapter 2 sheds light on the European Neighborhood Partnership Initiative that promotes decentralized cooperation and regionalism in South East Mediterranean countries and introduces the context of decentralization in this region. In Chapter 3, we explore the administrative structure of Lebanon before identifying the EU as a major contributor to regional planning in Lebanon. We then closely explore the EU regional development aid in Lebanon by detailing two EU funded regional planning projects that were developed in the past decade, ARLA and ADELNORD. We end the thesis in Chapter 4 with a comparison of both projects from which we draw the opportunities and challenges faced by regional planning in Lebanon, and conclude with some urban policy recommendations of relevance to urban policy decision-makers.

CHAPTER II

THE CIRCULATION OF REGIONALISM AS DISCOURSE AND POLICY

A. Regionalism: a View from Europe

1. A Growing Trend

Scholars identify two main scales of regionalism: macro and micro. Macro-regionalism is the large framework whereby different countries cooperate over a specified aim. For instance, countries of Mexico, Canada and the United States came together to form the NAFTA region and promote economic growth. Other examples include the European Union, or the region of the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which was created for development purposes across the Mediterranean. Macro-regionalism also includes regions that are less formally identified such as the "Arab region". On the other hand, micro-regionalism is about the smaller scale of provinces, governorates, departments, regional governments and local governments. An example would be the Catalonia region of Spain, located on the north east of the country and grouping four provinces, including the capital Barcelona. Another example is the Region Ile-de-France, which is centered on Paris and groups eight administrative departments. In the context I will be discussing, unions of municipalities in Lebanon will be considered as institutions operating on a micro-regional scale.

The grouping of provinces, governorates, and municipalities into a region raises question of multi-scalar regional governance, which generate complex networks of

diverse stakeholders and decision-makers. According to Parker and Harloe (2015: p365-366), local, national and supra-national authorities are increasingly sharing sovereignties over one same region. National authorities remain the main sovereign power over their territories; however, they have been investing less and less in peripheral and poorer regions of the country (Parker & Harloe, 2015). Supra-national authorities, such as the EU and international donors, intervene in such areas, thus helping restore the development gap between economically driven regions and more peripheral and underdeveloped ones. Supra-national authorities normally offer development aid, however funding for regional development varies from a country to the other, in relation to the investment capacities of local and central authorities (Awada, 2011).

Regional planning is used as a tool to manage regions' growth and development. Urban planners and scholars have developed an interest in regions as they have significant urban and economic roles (Soja, 2015). According to Awada (2011: p1-10) regional planning policies evolved in time from being infrastructure and poverty oriented to become inclusive of economy, governance, environment and social issues on a regional scale rather than in poverty-ridden areas (Awada, 2011).

Initially, regional planning policies focused on inequality reduction through service provision in poorer areas. In the late 1970s, regional planning enlarged its scope to reinforce established businesses and infrastructure (Awada, 2011). In the 1980s, studying regions was the focus of historians and economic geographers who examined large geographical areas from a pre-dominant economic lens (Storper, 1997). With globalization, regional policies linked to the environment, education, culture, etc. grew stronger. Regional decentralization became a key planning principle used to enhance

participative local development supported by central government subsidies (Awada, 2011).

While traditional regional planning was more concerned with national governments, recent regional planning approaches promote multi-level governance and a broader scope of actors that contribute in the development and implementation of regional plans (Beall, Parnell, & Albertyn, 2015). This so-called "new regionalism" invites multidisciplinary scholars to understand regions in terms of sustainability (Storper, 1997; Beall, Parnell, & Albertyn, 2015). Storper encourages us to investigate regions as nests of socio-economic and political networks linked to evolving world systems (Storper, 1997). Building on his work, Soja argues that cohesive regions are strongholds for successful and developing market economies, social growth and political leaderships. They can also foster technological advancements and cultural centers (Soja, 2015, p372-373): "regions are… powerful driving forces in themselves, energizing regional worlds of production, consumption and creativity, while at the same time shaping the globalization of capital, labor and culture"[1]. In fact, "new regionalism" has been especially researched since the mid 1990s, and scholars have adopted several approaches to the topic. I have identified three main approaches to regionalism: economic, planning, and relational-territorial[2].

The economic approach developed by the likes of Walter Isard and John Friedmann (as cited in Wheeler, 2002: p268) focuses on how to decrease economic disparities between city centers and suburbs and mitigate uneven development. Often, a

[1] For a more detailed account on this, see Soja (2015) in the special issue of IJURR on "The Regional Question"- Vol. 39, Issue 2
[2] A fourth approach was also identified, although less prominent. David Harvey and Manuel Castells developed a socio-political approach to regionalism by exploring networks of power and social dynamics (Wheeler, 2002). This fourth approach emphasizes the role of power politics and social relations in regional development. In this trend, regional policies no longer merely alleviate needs but build upon existing opportunities and develop both spatial and non-spatial features (Awada, 2011, pp. 1-10)

wide gap exists between economically driven, competitive and highly developed

regions and more peripheral, marginal and underdeveloped areas within the same

country (Parker & Harloe, 2015). Studies have shown that regional scale planning and

regional authorities can reduce inequalities in "city-regions," and therefore reduce the

risk of "social unrest" (Soja, 2015). Regional planning also helps achieve more

comprehensive infrastructure and transportation policies, as well as better

environmental, social and economic development (Soja, 2015; Awada, 2011). However,

as Awada (2011: pp1-10) points out, regional development projects are not exclusive to

rural areas, and increasingly incorporate urban centers where innovation and

entrepreneurship is often more available (Awada, 2011).

　　　Planning-based regionalism establishes strategies that may (or may not) lead to

the creation of formal institutions. The emphasis here is on the process of developing

institutional frameworks of cooperation, policy reforms and integration for actors from

different geographical areas that would come together and complement each other

(Gallina, 2005). New regionalism does not provide a ready-made framework through

which to promote cohesive, competitive and sustainable regions. Thus, some planners

have resorted to tools of strategic spatial planning or socio-economic development plans

to promote regions. Wheeler invites planners to develop frameworks and tools to

promote well-functioning regions (2002: pp270-278). He particularly calls onto

planners to think of regional governance and understand how regional authorities can

best plan, manage and promote equitable, sustainable, and competitive regions

(Wheeler, 2002). He encourages an investigation of regions in terms of their

specificities, exploring the different forces that produce and shape them, rather than just

studying them as physical, geographical spaces. He underscores that planners should

examine how economic forces have shaped the region's physical, social, political and cultural structures. The planning-based regional approach therefore is multi-disciplinary, multi-scalar and historical. Wheeler also emphasizes the importance of incorporating urban and environmental planners and designers for successful regionalism. He advocates the inclusion of physical design and planning, alongside economic and social policy analysis. Planners should also develop adaptive and flexible mechanisms to mitigate regional challenges. Those would touch upon a wide range such as enhancing public participatory processes, developing regional performance indicators and policy goals, and having transparent and accountable regional institutions (Wheeler, 2002).

The third approach for new regionalism intersects complementary relational and territorial dimensions (Jonas, 2012, pp. 263-272). Here, regions are seen as assemblages of various economic, political and social relationships regardless of their territorial or administrative proximity. This provides with the flexibility of analyzing regional processes both horizontally and vertically. While horizontal assessment is focused on networks of connections among places, vertical assessment leaves more room to explore movements and exchanges among various scales of governance. The relational approach promotes a progressive, bottom-up regionalism process (Jonas, 2012). This allows a better organization of sectoral policies across territories. The elaboration of subnational policies such as regional planning, and development plans can help in this respect (Muller, 1985).

The three approaches discussed above are interlinked and complementary. Regionalism has an economic driver and aims to bridge disparities between unequal regions within national boundaries. Regional plans are tools to promote the economic,

political, and social development of regions. To be the most effective, they should be

relational and territorial simultaneously and take into account existing power dynamics.

2. The Case of EU Regions

The EU is a clear example of an approach to regionalism that is more

economically oriented, and focused on the consolidation of the power of certain regions.

Spolaore (2013: p126) illustrates that European integration started essentially for

economic reasons through the Schuman Declaration of 1950 that called for the creation

of a transnational organization controlling the production of coal notably in the French-

German region (Spolaore, 2013). It is only more than a decade later, in the late 1960s,

that European centralized states started to feel the need for a meso-level of government

to enhance political participation structures as well as levels of service delivery. At that

time, regions emerged through Europe such as the Provence region in France, Galicia in

Spain, and the Azores in Portugal (Piattoni, 2010). The EU pioneered regional

integration by stipulating in its founding treaty of 1957 in Rome that it will help

reducing discrepancies between regions, mainly assisting the development of poorer

regions (Bakhos, 2014; Cameron, 2010). The European Social Fund along with the

General Directorate of the Region (1967), and other consequent funds were established

to achieve these objectives. To maximize the efficient use of those funds, the EU relied

on spatial planning to guide their work (Bakhos, 2014). In 1975, the first European

Regional Development Fund was established to support targeted regions with

development projects. Back then, funds were minimal and were, along with regions'

selection, controlled by respective member states. Regional policies moved on to be

framed within programs rather than individual projects, allowing for more involvement

from the Commission in terms of policy design, region selection, etc. (Hooghe &

Keating, 1994). The EU spatial planning model is a melting pot of several spatial

planning models, most notably the French, German and Dutch models (Bakhos, 2014).

The French planning approach remains to date one of the core approaches of spatial

planning and development in the EU. However, its focus on reinforcing metropolises to

strengthen economic competition is constantly challenged by another approach

developed by German planner Kunzmann. Kunzmann advocates the redistribution of

wealth for more equal growth on the entire EU territory (Bakhos, 2014). Faludi and

Waterhout (2002: pp.IX-XIII) point out to the discord between spatial planning focused

on strategy and land-use. European spatial planning is not concerned with defining

land-use regulations. This falls under the jurisdiction of member states, which raises

what Faludi and Waterhout label as a "competency issue" that is due to an overlap or

transfer of responsibilities between both levels of governance. Therefore, European

spatial planning is strategy-focused rather than master plan-oriented (Faludi &

Waterhout, 2002).

Regionalism gained momentum in Europe in the 1990s (Marks, Nielsen, Ray, &

Salk, 1996). Historically, the EU perceived regional integration as a tool for

compensating the withdrawal of the state from the economic sector, and for creating a

multi-sectoral development approach that sheds light on issues such as environment and

social integration, which are better dealt with on a regional scale (Gallina, 2005).

In other terms, EU policies have reinforced both regionalization and multi-level

governance under the umbrella of EU integration[3] (Bakhos, 2014). EU integration gave

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[3] Drawing on the Consultative Council of Regional and Local Authorities created in 1988, a Committee
of the Regions was created in 1992 through the Maastricht treaty (Bakhos, 2014; Hooghe & Marks,
1996). The Maastricht Treaty gave a boost to the growing wave of regionalism. It focused on
economically driven European integration (Gallina, 2005). Other regional integration agreements across

local authorities the margin to contribute to the elaboration, development and implementation of international policies through subsidiarity and decentralized cooperation[4], creating transnational networks that are independent from central governments (Bakhos, 2014). Those networks include the Committee of the Regions or more specialized networks such as the Covenant of Mayors, which group mayors from across Europe in the aim of empowering local authorities in terms of developing action plans to mitigate climate change as per their slogan "Think globally, act locally".

Cameron (The European Union as a Model for Regional Integration, 2010, pp. 2-5) claims that the relative success and survival of the EU region[5] is based on the core elements of "historical reconciliation", political will and the prioritization of long-term cooperation goals over national and local interests. He emphasizes the fact that integration was made possible by the French-German reconciliation, which was attained through political commitment and cooperation.

Even though Cameron emphasizes the strength and success of the EU region, I will show some of its caveats pointed out by other scholars such as Hooghe (1994, 1996), Keating (1994), Marks (1996) and Bakhos (2014). Although the idea behind regional policies in the EU is the reduction of disparities between regions, Hooghe and Keating (1994: pp373-376) argue that the more regions mobilize, the greater the disparities are. Indeed, economically and politically powerful regions end up having more thorough representation, participation and lobbying than the weaker ones, which need the EU's help the most (Hooghe & Keating, 1994)**.** Regionalization has thus helped reinforce

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the world include the NAFTA, the GAFTA (Great Arab Free Trade Agreement) in the Arab Gulf and Egypt, and the APEC in the Asia Pacific, all established in the 1990s (Gallina, 2005). The Committee of Regions was established as a consultative assembly at the side of the European Commission's Parliament, to institutionally support regions throughout the EU, provide recommendations on regional policies, as well as create an informal network of cooperation and funding (Bakhos, 2014; Hooghe & Marks, 1996).
[4] Decentralized cooperation is further elaborated below in section 2
[5] As opposed to other less successful regional integrations such as the Latin American Mercosul or the Gulf Cooperation Council

certain local authorities hence making them gain autonomy, legitimacy, and representation, at the expense of others (Bakhos, 2014). This is further emphasized by the different authority levels regions hold within the EU itself. Powerful regions that are well funded, have strong political representation both nationally and on the EU level, and are deeply institutionalized. These include the *Communidades Autònomas* of Spain, the Belgian regions, and the Austrian and German *Landers*. Weak regions on the other hand such as the ones in Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Scandinavian countries, usually don't have a say on the EU level. In such countries, mayors often lack the resources to seize the opportunities of the EU political sphere (Hooghe & Marks, 1996).

The EU perceives regions as scales that would promote economic development, efficient management, civic understanding and participation, community mobilization, and adequate governance. Through this conception of regions, the EU created new channels of communications between local authorities and the EU supra-national authority (Bakhos, 2014).

I have so far shown the relevance of regionalism and the importance it has been taking in scholarly as well as policy debates. The EU serves as a core example of macro-regionalism lead by powerful states such as France and Germany. I will show in the following section how this model was exported to a context of weak central South and Eastern Mediterranean states, and the implications of the rise of regionalism in this area.

B. EU Regionalism Exported to the South East Mediterranean

1. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Decentralized Cooperation

The Euro-Mediterranean partnership is a set of projects between Europe and the South East Mediterranean that are based on historical interests (Bakhos, 2014). France

took a very active role in this partnership, as it has historically looked to assert itself in the Mediterranean region. With the help of Spain, it concluded the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in Barcelona in 1995 (Bakhos, 2014), also known as the Barcelona Declaration, which led to the initiation of different types of political, economic, and social partnerships (Gallina, 2005).

One of the main tools used in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is decentralized cooperation. Historically, decentralized cooperation started as twinning initiatives after World War Two between local authorities in different states. With the move towards decentralization in Europe in the 1970s, this twinning movement enlarged its scope to become decentralized cooperation (Hafteck, 2003). In fact, the rise of the European regional policy in the late 1980s reinforced the international nature of decentralized cooperation. This process was further developed in 2004, when United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) was established in order to group cities and local authorities around the Mediterranean region (Bakhos, 2014). Other conferences such as the EuroMed Forum of Cities held in Barcelona in 2005, and the Local and Regional Authorities Forum held in 2008 under the direction of the UCLG, emphasized the key role regional and local authorities should play in developing strategic policies in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (Bergh, 2010).

Decentralized cooperation does not have a clear and precise definition. It generally evokes a partnership between two non-state actors for development purposes. However, in the conclusion of his article introducing decentralized cooperation, Pierre Hafteck (2003: p344) identifies the core of decentralized cooperation as: "to enrich the lives of local communities around the world by raising the awareness of the ones and the living standards of the others" (Hafteck, 2003). Decentralized cooperation between Europe

and other states has most often been operated through development aid (Bakhos, 2014).

Decentralized cooperation values partnerships, lenient mechanisms, and human scales

as opposed to traditional bureaucracy and clientelistic cooperation (Bakhos, 2014). The

EU considers that decentralized cooperation ought to occur among a variety of actors,

provided that those do not include central governments and their respective

administrations, thus depriving them from their gatekeeping role (Piattoni, 2010). It

entails a transfer of power from the central state to any peripheral entity that is not

directly run by the central government, regardless of its form (public, private,

elected…) (Bakhos, 2014). By doing that, organizations hope to represent the public

interest, reinforce mobilization, and foster accountability and transparency (Bergh,

2012; Piattoni, 2010). Regionalism and integration turned the state into a permeable

gatekeeper, whereby policies are greatly influenced by a variety of non-state actors such

as European and regional authorities that work together and bypass central governments

(Piattoni, 2010). The EU focused on the concepts of Europeanization[6], public policy

transfer, and multi-level governance to create new institutional settings and networks of

cooperation that go hand in hand with decentralized cooperation. The new actors of the

EU multi-level governance started appearing in the 1980s, and were perceived as means

to develop more efficient and innovative public policies (Bakhos, 2014). Those new

actors were involved in local, regional, and transnational networks. Decentralized

cooperation reinforces those networks by promoting the creation of partnerships among

various local authorities that go beyond traditional transnational cooperation or

twinning (Bakhos, 2014). The new forms of transnational cooperation are no longer

confined by geographical areas, but rather stretch from community to international

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[6] The "Europeanization" of public policies is an incremental transfer process that created a two way
cooperation between local actors and the European Commission whereby local authorities became more
accessible to the EU, while regional actors became more involved in EU policies (Bakhos, 2014)

levels. To better illustrate these new networks, we can cite the involvement of local authorities on the international European decision-making level, the creation of trans-border regions, and the rise of international committees such as the Council of European Municipalities and Regions or the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (ARLEM), which is an association that groups local and regional authorities from the Union of the Mediterranean member countries[7].

Decentralized cooperation in the Mediterranean context has especially focused on empowering local and regional authorities and consequently reinforcing decentralization. The Euro-Med Forum of Cities held in Barcelona in 2005 issued a joint declaration stipulating the importance of regional and local authorities in the European Mediterranean partnership, and the key role they should play in developing strategic policies. To further reinforce this subnational dimension, a Local and Regional Authorities Forum was held in 2008 under the direction of the UCGL (United Cities, and Local Governments) (Bergh, 2010). However, decentralized cooperation did not yield the results it aimed for. Bergh (2010: pp253-258) shows that the decentralized cooperation efforts have merely led to an "upgrade of authoritarianism" in South Eastern Mediterranean countries, as opposed to reinforcing autonomous local authorities and local democracy. In what follows, I discuss these issues with regard to EU regionalization policies vis-à-vis Turkey.

2. Case Study: Turkey's constructed regionalization

Massicard (2008: pp.171-203) illustrates the struggles of regionalization and decentralization in Turkey by studying the southeast region. During the *Tanzimat* era in

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[7] EU, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Monaco and Montenegro.

the Ottoman Empire (1839-1876), political administration became increasingly centralized, and discrepancies grew between different areas of the Empire. This was further exacerbated with the formation of the Turkish state after World War I. The southeastern region of the Turkish state was especially overlooked in the state's policies excluding Kurdish populations. Turkey reluctantly attributed the region to the Kurds, and did not provide them with adequate services, nor did it encourage investments and political representation. The Southeast was designated as *bolge* (Turkish word for region), to avoid referring to it as the Kurdish area. However, via EU regional policies and international donors, local elected officials in the southeast promoted their regional identities, which endorsed by several decentralized cooperation projects. This regional social construct was against Turkish nationalist principles, and was not driven by economic or developmental factors (Massicard, 2008). In the early 2000s, in its efforts of adhering to the EU, Turkey started working on administrative reforms to empower local authorities and reduce centralization of power. However, the EU criteria pertaining to regionalism are vague and lack clear structural and institutional configurations (Massicard, 2008). This led to a Turkish discourse on decentralization, leading to the creation of regional commissions and territorial units for socio-economic analysis (NUTS), however these ideas did not materialize effectively into regional planning (Massicard, 2008).

In sum, the EU has had a substantive impact on South Mediterranean countries, in terms of policy mobilities and the transmission of frameworks of regionalization and decentralization, namely through the tools of decentralized cooperation. Regionalization requires the creation and/or reinforcement of local and regional authorities that need to cooperate to improve regional development and reinforce decentralization. In the next

section, I will discuss the governance mechanisms upon which regionalization relies, by focusing on the EU and the southeastern Mediterranean context.

3. ***Multi-Level Governance and Urban Policy-Making in the Southeast Mediterranean***

There is no single governance model in the EU, but rather a diversity of models, paired with different political systems and conceptions of their territorial organization (Hooghe & Marks, 1996). By the mid-1990s, scholars sought new ways of conceptualizing the EU modes of operation away from state-centric approaches in order to better represent the levels of mutual influence of the EU supra-national power and subnational actors. Multi-level governance means that different levels of government have intersecting competencies, and consequently, that a multiplicity of political actors spanning across those levels have different interactions with each other (Gaudin, 1995). The European Union incorporates a wide variety of actors ranging from local to state led institutions, which all play a role in intergovernmental decision-making. This has created what Marks et. al. (1996; pp164-192) refer to as "overarching multi-level policy networks" that characterize the EU polity and cohesion policy (Piattoni, 2010). Accordingly, political control varies from a policy area to the other, whereby the political actors could include subnational, national, and/or supranational actors. As national authorities have lost some of their authority to both subnational and supranational actors, greater interactions are occurring between the two latter levels of governance (Marks, Nielsen, Ray, & Salk, 1996; Piattoni, 2010).

Hyden et al. (2004, p16) provide a more political definition of governance whereby it is "the formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules that regulate the public realm, the arena in which state as well as economic and societal actors interact to

make decisions". As for multi-level governance, Piattoni (2010, pp. 60-90) depicts it as complex structures requiring an array of coordination, arrangements, and negotiations[8] to manage changing intricate relations linking independent but functionally symbiotic actors towards achieving a shared goal. Multi-level governance acknowledges "the existence of overlapping competencies among multiple levels of governments and the interaction of political actors across those levels" (Marks, Nielsen, Ray, & Salk, 1996, p. 167).

Consequently, multi-level governance is turning the focus from the central government scale of governance to more regional and local scales. These scales are increasingly gaining importance in the post-colonial southern Mediterranean context. I will now explore these processes of rescaling and their subsequent impacts on urban policy making, in a context of uncertainty and violence.

C. Decentralization in the Southeastern Mediterranean Countries

Decentralization is a policy that entails changing scales of governance, as it shifts responsibilities from national authorities to lower echelons of governance such as local and regional authorities (Bergh, 2012; Harb & Atallah, 2015). The multiplicity of actors should create a more democratic and participatory system as a whole (Harb & Atallah, 2015). Decentralization relies on regional governance and planning to achieve social

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[8] According to Gaudin (1995: pp31-56), negotiation is a process that creates norms out of conflict. The key issue is identifying the effect of political belongings and interests (personal, political, and/or professional) of the decision makers. As for negotiations between local and national authorities, it is worth noting that it is no longer a unidirectional road of leadership as local authorities have gained substantial power through international cooperation (Gaudin, 1995).

and economic development. Harb & Atallah (2015: p2) show that decentralization makes room for more effective service provision and political representation.

Decentralization is not widely spread in southeastern Mediterranean countries, as only a few of those countries hold local elections. In their study of decentralization in six Arab states (Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Yemen and Lebanon), Harb & Atallah (2015: pp2-10), show that these post-colonial states are not really engaged in decentralization, and have rather used it as a tool to achieve more centralization. By exploring four dimensions (politics and rules, urban management and service delivery, fiscal structures, and experiences), they demonstrate how states are paying lip service to decentralization, to better control economic and political life. Because decentralization efforts are not backed up by substantive legal or fiscal reforms, international donors' aid to decentralized cooperation is not always effective. Actually, Harb & Atallah (2015, p. 7) show that international donors can contribute indirectly to achieving the opposite of what they had aimed for.

Bergh (2010) further emphasizes that international donors or actors such as the EU mainly promote decentralization or more specifically local development and municipal operations. She argues that the rise in decentralization in the South Mediterranean context is about what Heydemann (2007, pp. 1-30) calls "upgrading authoritarianism" rather than achieving independent and local authorities, and local democracy (Bergh, 2010: p253). She shows that central governments are using decentralization reforms to market their image to international partners. Thus, central governments are still powerful, centralized and dominating (Bergh, 2010). Countries who receive aid have very different resources, traditions, and organizational structures, making for an environment where transferred policies are not easily replicable or implementable. Thus

governments adopt development plans that do not conform to their realities, generating incoherencies in terms of local practices and needs, and organizational structure (Bergh, 2012). She further argues that the potential success of transparent and accountable local development is contingent on the "initial situation of local governments, and the quality of local leadership" (Bergh, 2012: p306-307)

Despite multiple constraints, decentralization efforts have led with time to the reinforcement of local authorities. In fact, municipal elections helped local authorities gain in political representation. Local leaders are sometimes able to make use of resources and opportunities to perform better. In their work, Harb and Atallah (2015: p233) identify

> "the features that explain the noteworthy performance of some local and regional governments, their abilities to negotiate their ways through the hurdles to deliver better services, think holistically about development projects, and establish various partnerships for spatial planning. Such features include: Leadership, networks, civil society dynamics, political competition, governance, and territoriality. Innovative experiences are not to be romanticized and do not exclude contestations, inefficiencies, and inequalities. They demonstrate, however that when particular conditions converge (i.e. in the presence of strong leadership, active networks, vibrant civil society dynamics, healthy political competition, good governance, and territoriality attributes) decentralization policies can open up avenues for improved service delivery and urban management, and for social and political change, albeit timid and contained."

A two-way dependency characterizing municipalities and international aid agencies can be identified in the southeastern Mediterranean region. On the one hand, municipalities need the resources provided by international aid agencies that are intervening and shaping urban policy making. They are also attracted by these mobile policies as: 1) they stem from what they see as prestigious institutions, 2) they have set frameworks, thus decreasing potential contestations and discussions, and 3) they

suppose an equity relation between the two parts of the exchange (Temenos & McCann, 2011, pp. 1392-1395). On the other hand, international donors need local authorities more than national governments because they believe local authorities are more legitimate and more efficient. This is especially true in the case of EU international aid, hence the importance of analyzing the circulation of policy ideas under the framework of policy mobilities.

While studying urban policy-making, it is important to understand the processes of elaboration of these policies and especially their mobilities, which are reshaping regional and local politics and geographies (McCann & Ward, 2012). This implies examining institutions, networks, infrastructures, and technologies that contribute to shaping those urban policies (McCann & Ward, 2012). As discussed previously, urban policy-making is taking place in contexts of multi-level governance. This has led authors to argue that cities have become an assemblage of ideas, policies, resources, and practices (McCann & Ward, 2012). Policies are increasingly elaborated in "policy networks", "policy communities" or "advocacy coalitions", which involve knowledge transfer, mobilities and transformations of ideas (Healey P. , 2007).

In creating policies it is important to take into account past policies or policy history in a specific context and place, as well as environmental factors (culture, economy, demographics, social…), and financing (Theodoulou, 1995). In the case of a mobile policy, it is also important to trace through the places a policy has travelled. This includes interrogating how this certain policy has come to be, and how it got transformed or mutated along the way (McCann & Ward, 2012). According to McCann & Ward (2012: pp42-51) policies are constructed and mobilized, then mutated by moving from a place to the other by "being assembled, disassembled and reassembled

along the way". With transnational flows of ideas, policy makers and scholars should explore the design, techniques, contexts, outcomes, cause-effect relations and assumptions related to these ideas.

Expertise in developing countries has become somewhat of a market of competing technical knowledge; therefore making it hard to assess which expertise will be the most helpful. The lack of municipal funds drives municipalities to rely on familiar networks such as the EU, thus restraining the range and depth of knowledge that arrives to their localities, and the adaptability or relevance of these policies to the local context. Globalization has made communities more open to new and innovative approaches. This has made them eager to adapt new policies, often without taking the time to experiment, question, learn more, and hybridize those policies to adapt to their context. Therefore, the risk of regressive failure is high because work is not focused on catering local contingencies. This gives room to the penetration of new hegemonies and geo-political and economic patterns (Healey P. , 2013).

In terms of regionalization, international donors are bringing in their own understanding of regional planning in southeastern Mediterranean countries such as Lebanon. For example, agencies such as the World Bank and the UN agencies promote a more economically driven approach to regional planning, which emphasizes infrastructure and technological services. While on the other hand, the EU has a more spatial understanding of regional planning and focuses its aid on participatory projects pertaining to public spaces. This will be further elaborated in the next chapter.

In this chapter, I elaborated a framework to identify the process through which ideas about regionalism are being debated. Discourse and practice of regionalism are being shaped by a multitude of stakeholders through the circulation of regionalism

ideas, mainly coming from Europe. In the next chapter, I will explore the emergence of that idea in Lebanon through regional planning. Regionalism is reshuffling the way planning is happening in Lebanon, thus opening up new scales of development in a context where state institutions are unable to plan.

CHAPTER III

REGIONALISM IN LEBANON AND THE KEY ROLE OF THE EU

A. Brief Overview of Decentralization and Rescaling in Lebanon

In this section, I give a brief introduction of the administrative structure of Lebanon, building on the work of Harb and Atallah (2015: pp187-225). In Box 1 below, I define the four different levels of service provision on the regional, sub-regional and local level. Those include qada, mohafazat, unions of municipalities and municipalities. The first three administrative levels are illustrated in Figure 3 below. I will end the section with an overview of the two central institutions concerned with urban planning in Lebanon: the Directorate General of Urban Planning, and the Council for Development and Reconstruction.

Figure 3- Lebanon's Administrative Structure. Source: UN-HABITAT, 2012, adapted by Najem, 2016

"**The administrative system of service provision** in Lebanon is quite centralized. Lebanon's contemporary administrative structure is based on a four-tier system (shown in Figure 4): The central level, the regional level (muhafazat, led by a muhafiz), the sub-regional level (qada, led by a qaimaqam), and the local level of municipalities (baladiyyat, led by the mayor). Muhafazat and qadas represent levels of deconcentration in Lebanon, whereas municipalities are considered to be the only autonomous elected body, as defined by law. The Lebanese territory is divided into eight muhafazat (Beirut, Mount Lebanon, North Lebanon, Akkar, Baalbak-Hermel, Beqaa, South Lebanon, and Nabatiyyeh). Each muhafaza, with the exception of Beirut, is in turn subdivided into separate qadas. The twenty-six qadas are composed of 1,108 baladiyyat, to date. All these levels are currently regulated under the authority of the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MOIM).


Figure 4- Government Tiers (LCPS, 2015)

1- The muhafaza does not enjoy any legal personality or independent authority. The duties of the governor of the muhafaza, or muhafiz, are primarily administrative and involve local implementation of policies established by the central government and the coordination among central government offices and officials within the muhafaza.

2- The qada is the second level of geographical subdivision and enjoys neither legal personality nor financial autonomy. The qadas are [usually] administered by a qaimaqam. [Both the muhafiz and qaimaqam are] civil servants, appointed by the Council of Ministers upon the recommendation of the minister of interior and municipalities. In many ways, the responsibilities of the qaimaqam replicate those of the muhafiz.

3- Municipalities have an elected municipal council and enjoy a relatively good margin of financial and administrative autonomy. In 1963, a new law was issued and which remained in

force until 1977 when it was replaced by Decree-Law 118 of 1977, whose provisions still govern the municipal system in Lebanon. The law defines the municipality as a 'local administration that enjoys within its geographical boundaries the power delegated to it by law. It enjoys moral personality and administrative and financial autonomy within the limits defined by law' (art.1). Its purview of responsibilities includes 'all actions of a public nature or with a public interest within the municipal boundary' (Article 47). The law also stated that municipal council decisions are enforceable by themselves and immediately applicable upon issuance. Municipalities are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, which is responsible for planning, budgeting, and spending municipalities' revenues as well as providing technical and financial support to municipalities when needed. Additionally, through its chief controller, the MOIM exercises its control over

Figure 5- Municipalities' Sources of Revenue (LCPS, 2015)

the municipality's budget and its adjustments, expenditure contracts, revenues, financial operations and transactions, infringements or violations, inquisitions of a financial character, and settlement of accounts of the budget.

Municipal revenues come from three sources as per Figure 5.

Municipalities are permitted to directly collect 16 different types of tariffs and fees, of which only three are considered financially significant: fees on rental value of built real estate, construction permits, and sewerage and pavement maintenance. The second major source of revenue is collected by public, or semi-public, or private institutions on behalf of

particular municipalities. The municipalities have no means of knowing the amount of money they ought to receive from the public agencies. [The third source of revenue is] the Independent Municipal Fund (IMF), an intergovernmental grant system, [that] transfers resources such as taxes and fees from central to local governments. The Ministry of Finance collects eleven taxes and fees and deposits them into the IMF for distribution to municipalities. The central government distributes the funds, as follows: 60% is based on registered population and 40% is based on the actual direct revenues collected during the two years prior. Once the expenditures for salaries, wages, compensation as well as supplies, public works, and services for staff outside the cadre of the Municipal and Village Affairs department are deducted, the remaining amount is distributed to municipalities and municipal unions.

4- Unions of municipalities are defined as being 'formed of several municipalities', and having 'a moral personality with an administrative and financial autonomy within the limits defined by the law' (Article 114). The purpose of a union is to promote inter-municipal cooperation for projects of public interest and/or to implement large-scale technical projects that benefit all municipalities, promoting economies of scale. The size of municipal unions range from three municipalities in the Fayhaa union to fifty-two municipalities in Sour and in Kesruwan Futouh. Municipalities have been eager to group into unions as they get financial, developmental, political, and economic incentives out of this cooperation.

Planning in Lebanon
Urban planning in Lebanon is under the jurisdiction of two state institutions: The Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) and the Directorate General of Urbanism (DGU) in the Ministry of Public Works.

The DGU is in charge of setting up master plans (mukhattatat tawjihiyye) for managing the growth of cities and towns within Lebanese territory. It is also in charge of implementing the 1983 Urbanism Law which includes a rather effective set of urban planning tools to improve cities and towns (such as land subdivision, expropriation, public agencies, and real estate companies) (Fawaz 2005). However, the DGU is poorly staffed and its employees are unable to address such demanding tasks, such as the fact that a large percentage of Lebanese territory has not been subject to cadastral mapping (Verdeil

2007). Thus, the DGU contracts urban planners and urban planning firms to propose master plans for selected groups of cities and towns. Most often, the process is long, tedious, and extremely bureaucratic, and adopts a planning approach that has become quite obsolete.

The CDR was created in 1977 to replace the Ministry of Planning and to devise a master plan for all of Lebanon. It is an institution that reports directly to the prime minister and was provided with extraordinary prerogatives, allowing it to bypass all ministries, with the aim of allowing it to operate effectively and avoid red tape and bureaucracy. Its primary functions were hosting studies for some urban planning initiatives at the scale of metropolitan Beirut (cf. the IAURIF's Region Metropolitaine de Beyrouth proposal of 1984), supervising bids and the execution of infrastructure projects, and coordinating donors' funds pledged to Lebanon for various reconstruction projects. In 2004, after several years of studies, the CDR submitted to the Lebanese government the Schema Directeur de l'Aménagement du Territoire Libanais (SDATL), a land use plan that devised general spatial development guidelines for Lebanese regions and sub-regions, including major cities, specifying geographic hierarchies, inter-relationships, and functions. The plan was the result of cooperation between Lebanese and French experts, and financed by the IAURIF. It was approved by the Lebanese government in 2009 and serves today as a main reference for national spatial development in public agencies, and regional and local governments, although it remains too generic in many of its recommendations and lacks implementation mechanisms at the regional and local levels.

Generally, both the CDR and the DGU do not prioritize the inclusion of municipalities and municipal unions in the urban management and planning process. These locally elected institutions are often seen as biased in favor of their constituencies' so-called parochial interests, and unable to plan and protect their built and natural environments, and more generally public interest. The DGU is not mandated to coordinate its master planning with municipalities and only requested to inform them of the plan. The municipalities' opinion of the plan is not binding and is just recorded in the process. The CDR is, by definition, a supra-ministry that bypasses all central institutions and is thus quite disconnected from municipalities in its work."

Box 1- A Brief Overview of Decentralization ad Planning in Lebanon (Harb & Atallah, 2015)

B. Regional Planning in Lebanon and International Donors: The EU as a Prominent Player

This section will briefly show the evolution of the idea of regional planning in Lebanon, while identifying the different approaches followed by different international donors to promote its implementation, and the prevalence of the EU in the field of regional planning.

Since the end of the civil war in Lebanon, partnerships between national actors, such as the central government or local authorities, and international donors have been exponentially increasing. Due to a heavily politicized system with administrative complexities and corruption, international organizations favor offering aid to local authorities as they think they may operate more effectively than national institutions. Moreover, international donors perceive local authorities such as municipalities and unions of municipalities as being reliable partners (Boustani, 2014). This aid incorporates a variety of policy sectors such as the economic reform, environment, local development and decentralization. The latter has especially been a focus since the 2000s with the rise of the paradigms of "regionalization"[9], "policy mobilities" and "decentralization", which are believed to foster democratization and efficiency (Bakhos, 2014). In the past fifteen years, thirty-five of the existing fifty-one (69%) Unions of Municipalities (UoMs) were established in Lebanon, grouping two third of Lebanese municipalities. In fact, UoMs started to emerge in the late 1970s but their growth curve came to a halt from the late 1980s to the early 2000s (Atallah, 2012). As Harb and Atallah (2015: pp203-204) put it, referring to Atallah (2012: p1-8):

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[9] As mentioned in chapter one, regionalization gained momentum in Europe in the 1990s. This was being echoed in Lebanon through international donors.

"Although some unions have been able to provide services and undertake development projects, their work is constrained by weak administrative capabilities, excessive procedures to hire municipal staff, and low fiscal resources to undertake developmental projects. The lack of clear delineation of responsibilities, between municipalities on the one hand and municipal unions on the other is becoming a source of conflict between them. In the absence of a proper assignment and mechanisms to address the issue, as well as problems related to sectarian politics and geography, some unions have become paralyzed as a result of this tension. Moreover, the problems of municipal unions are compounded by serious geographical constraints. Not only do most unions not have exclusive control of the territories, half of the unions are non-contiguous, which prevents them from undertaking development or spatial planning across a unified territory. In addition to the fact that unions are not territorially linked, eleven of them are made up of three or more separate geographical entities, which makes planning unfeasible [Figure 3]. The extreme case is the union of Byblos which is made up of six disjointed units (Atallah 2012)."

However, unions multiplied in recent years both to attract the attention of international donors and to get additional funds from the central government. Donors' regional projects are coming to complement the existing development of municipal federations in the country. According to Harb & Atallah (2015: pp191) "International donors have been a key force encouraging local governments to modify their short-term projects to incorporate more sustainable and effective planning and developmental goals." Consequently, internationally funded regional planning projects started to emerge in Lebanon starting 2002. The 2006 Lebanese Israeli war changed the target of international funds. However, the regional development momentum regained importance in 2011, as shown in Figure 6.

Some of the main international donors funding regional development projects include the World Bank, UNHABITAT, UNDP, the European Union, the Agence Française de Development, and French city-regions through decentralized cooperation partnerships (Region Ile-de-France, Aix-en-Provence, Marseille). Aid comes to local authorities either in the form of loans, technical assistance, grants, or capacity building. In terms of planning and decentralization partnerships, international donors mainly focus on reinforcing the municipal institutions (i.e. finance, technical training, policies), developing master plans for municipalities or regions, and assisting local development activities. Moreover, aid occurs via twinning partnerships, whereby development agreements take place between Lebanese and foreign local authorities. The cities of Aix

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[10] Graph was calculated according to published regional plans we could find up to 2015. Those were either found on the Internet or collected in hard copies during fieldwork. NB: the dates we will attribute to regional plans in this thesis are based on the year of publication of those plans as opposed to the dates where the regional planning initiative or project started.

en Provence (France) and Baalbek are an example of city twinning (Harb & Atallah, 2015).

The EU stands out as being a major donor commissioning regional strategic plans in Lebanon. More than 70% of the 38 regional plans (27 plans) were developed through EU-funded projects (Figure 7), between 2004 and 2015. Accordingly, we will focus in this thesis on the EU role in consolidating a regional approach to planning in Lebanon, and more specifically on two of its projects: ARLA and ADELNORD.

Figure 7- Regional Plans by International Donor (2004 to 2015). Source: Najem, 2016.

1. *International Donors' Approaches to Regional Planning*

Before discussing the role of the European Union in local development, urban planning and participatory projects, we will briefly note the role of two international organizations that also contributed to the promotion of local and regional planning ideas. One is UN-HABITAT, which used Regional Technical Offices to work on supporting post-war reconstruction emergency efforts in 2006. The other is the World

Bank, which worked on City Development Strategies that prioritize economic linkages and competitiveness at the regional level.

a. The World Bank: an economics-based approach

While UN-HABITAT mainly works on reinforcing the technical capacities of local and regional governments in Lebanon, the World Bank follows an economics-driven approach. The Bank focuses its aid on urban centers and large cities, with the rationale that the city and its economic linkages to its peripheries via investments in land and infrastructure, will improve economic growth and competitiveness[11]. The main regional project financed by the World Bank in Lebanon was that of City Development Strategies. A CDS was developed for the union of municipalities of Al Fayhaa Tripoli (project developed between 2008 and 2011). The strategy was developed in parallel with other City Development Strategies funded by the World Bank in Middle Eastern cities such as Sfax and Ramallah. However the Fayhaa strategy was very short-lived. The Bank also led a mission to issue preliminary City Development Strategies studies for ten cities across Lebanon that was not followed through. Another project of strategic planning funded by the World Bank was the Cultural Heritage and Urban Development (CHUD); this project mainly targeted old city centers and was very specific to cultural heritage buildings.

b. UNHABITAT's emergency response

In the aftermath of the July 2006 war, UN-HABITAT established three Regional Technical Offices (RTOs) in the unions of municipalities of Tyr, Bint Jbeil and Jabal Amel. According to Boustani (2014: pp1-7), in light of growing crisis, Regional

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[11] Interview with Mona Harb, 2016

Technical Offices help empower unions of municipalities by equipping them with the necessary tools to be involved and coordinate an immediate response. UN-HABITAT trains members of the Regional Technical Offices on technical skills and data collection. RTOs are like urban observatories where data about the larger territories of a municipal union is collected and treated through GIS mapping. The RTOs usually include one or two architects or engineers. In fact, RTOs serve as the basic units through which strategic plans can be developed. The Unions of Jabal Amel, Tyr, and Bint Jbeil have produced strategic assessments in 2010 entitled "Towards Strategic Planning: Challenges and Assets Analysis […]". However, RTOs are constrained in their mandate as they end up responding to short-term demands of mayors, and thus cannot really focus on a long-term vision and plan (Boustani, 2014). UN-HABITAT's intervention is a response to moments of political instability and war, conversely to the EU, which significantly decreased its intervention in the 2006 to 2009 post war period, as shown in Figure 8. This is also prevalent in 2013, when UNHABITAT, as a response to the Syrian refugees crisis in Lebanon, created two additional Regional Technical Offices (Sahel el Zahrani and Iqlim al Kharoub).

According to Tarek Osseiran[12], UN-Habitat Country Program Manager, "up till now strategic planning is not being territorial at all, it consists of sectoral analyses that lack coherence". UN-HABITAT's planning approach focused on strategic planning, without favoring spatial analysis. It mainly focused on SWOT analysis developed through participative approaches and general qualitative data, followed by the selection of small-scale projects. Produced strategic plans are not binding by law, as they are not tools that DGU or the CDR recognize as official regulations.

After the launch of the SDATL in 2009, the realization of the necessity of a regional scale of planning started to emerge. This coincided with the multiplication of municipal unions. After their strategic planning and RTOs experience post-2006 war, the UN-HABITAT worked very with the DGU and the CDR to initiate a regional framework that will facilitate the implementation of the SDATL and promote planning

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[12] Interview with Tarek Osseiran, 2013

practice[13]. The produced document is titled: "Local Strategic Planning at the Level of Municipalities and Unions of Municipalities in Lebanon" (UN-HABITAT, 2012). It is a guidebook presenting "one of the proposed approaches to strategic planning focusing on the two dimensions, i.e. spatial and local, when applying the concept of urban planning, which take into consideration the specificity of Municipalities and Unions of Municipalities in Lebanon." The Ministry of Interior and Municipalities adopted the guidebook. The guidebook's contribution is mainly a four steps process that should be followed to develop strategic planning at the municipal level. The guidebook devises a working tool that could be used for developing an urban strategy regardless of its main sectors of intervention or scales of intervention (municipalities, groups of municipalities, and unions of municipalities). However, although the proposed guidelines are well informed by the SDATL, they are not binding by law, and hence do not change much in terms of rescaling planning at the regional and local levels.

As shown in this section, a few international donors have contributed to the creation of a discourse of regional planning in Lebanon. While the World Bank and UN-HABITAT were more oriented towards City Development Strategies and strategic planning, the EU has mostly focused on the promotion of the idea of regional planning and the creation of a regional scale of development. We will now develop how the EU led these efforts.

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[13] Interview with Tarek Osseiran, op. cit.

C. EU Development Aid and the Consolidation of Regionalism in Planning

The EU has funded three main regional planning projects in the country since 2002[14] (Figure 9). The first project tackling the idea of regional planning in Lebanon was ARLA (Assistance to the Rehabilitation of the Lebanese Administration), which led to the publication of twelve Sustainable Local Development Plans in 2004-2006. In 2009, EU Brussels commissioned the CIUDAD (Cooperation in Urban Development and Dialogue) project whereby four other Sustainable Local Development Plans were developed. Around the same time, the EU delegation in Lebanon initiated a culminating regional planning project spanning across the Northern caza. That project was called ADELNORD (Appui au Développement Local dans le Nord du Liban).


Figure 9- Timeline of EU Planning Projects (2000-2015). Source: Najem, 2016.

EU interventions come into two types. First are EU interventions directly stemming from the commission's headquarters in Brussels. Those are macro-regional

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[14] Those interventions resulted in the creation of a total of 27 EU funded regional plan by 2015

level projects answering to the Barcelona convention, and usually intervening in more than a country at a time. Such initiatives include projects under the ENPI[15] such as SUDeP[16], and MEDPACT[17]. Those projects are implemented through competitive calls for proposal answered by large international consortiums. In such cases, local agencies or local authorities are invited by foreign entities, to join the consortium. Italian, French, and Spanish local authorities usually partner up with Lebanese local authorities they have previously met through international conferences and networks such as the BTVL-CGLU. The second type of interventions are the most prominent, as those are controlled by the delegation's local office. In fact, every few years the EU delegation produces a "National Indicative Figure" document of the country[18]. According to Moussa "the EU delegation meets with inter-ministerial committees to agree on the priority areas of intervention in the country"[19]. An example of macro-regional projects is the CIUDAD project, which was commissioned by the EU's offices in Brussels and therefore, was not led by local actors or the EU delegation in Lebanon. In 2013, through the EU funded project Cooperation in Urban Development and Dialogue (CIUDAD), and with the support of the Provincia di Torino, four Simplified Local Development Plans were produced in Hermel, Zgharta, Chouf al Aala, and Bent Jbeil. Those four regions had previously developed Simplified Local Development Plans through the ARLA project. As mentioned previously, EU Brussels launched this project, and therefore it was subject to a call for proposal. The city of Torino was part of the winning

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[15] European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) www.enpi-info.eu
[16] Sustainable Urban Demonstration Projects (SUDeP) is an EU funded project promoting local authorities to implement "sustainable urban development"
[17] Local Authorities Partnership in the Mediterranean Programme (MED-PACT) is an EU funded project aiming at creating partnership between European and South Mediterranean countries
[18] The National Indicative Figure comes along an action plan for the same duration. The last action plan for Lebanon was published for the 2013-2015 time period. One of the 13 identified priorities in that action plan was "Enhancing environmental protection and advancing sustainable regional development through greater decentralization and empowerment of municipalities and local authorities" (EU, 2013)
[19] Interview with Moussa, 2015

consortium. According to Moussa, the mayor of Torino, having previously met the

presidents of the four unions at a CGLU conference in Barcelona, built ties with them

and included them in his proposal. Subsequently, they worked through the Partenariat

pour les Projets de Recuperation Urbaine en vue du development economique des

territoires (PPRU) to produce the four updated plans[20]. I will not explore this project

further as CIUDAD is not a project that focuses on local development but rather aims at

creating partnerships of decentralized cooperation (Geiken, Moussa, & et.al., NA).

Moreover, its outputs in Lebanon are a mere updates of plans produced by the ARLA

project.

1. *Geographic areas of intervention*

The EU therefore intervened through three regional projects in Lebanon since

2002. While the types of interventions vary, EU projects seem to have a common

methodology in selecting areas of intervention.

It is noteworthy that the EU avoids working in large and medium city centers,

and chooses instead to intervene in regions where other international donors are scarce,

and where development needs are acute. The EU is also keen on working in several

territories across Lebanon to maintain sectarian balance. As Moussa confirms "selected

areas of intervention are also most often peripheral"[21] (as seen in Figure 10 below). In

addition, Serge Yazigi, urban planning expert who worked on ARLA (2004-2006) and

ADELNORD (2012-2014), adds:

> "the EU tends to select regions of intervention with relative high population
> densities, regions with previously established UoM, and/or local authorities with
> active leaders. Moreover, they try to maintain a religious and political balance

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[20] Interview with Moussa, ibid
[21] Interview with Ziad Moussa, op.cit.

while selecting which regions to intervene in. This is why regional projects have been carried out throughout the Lebanese territory"[22].

In the next map (Figure 10), this is clearly indicated through the geographic coverage of ARLA and CIUDAD. The choice of ADELNORD will be further explained later.

Figure 10- Geographic Distribution of EU Planning Projects (2000-2015).
Source: ARLA, CIUDAD, ADELNORD adapted by Najem, 2016.

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[22] Interview with Serge Yazigi, 2015

2. *The Case of ARLA (2002-2006)*

The EU started its first regional planning interventions in Lebanon in 2002 through the ARLA project, whereby it launched the development of Simplified Local Development Plans (SLDPs) in twelve clusters of municipalities in Lebanon.

a. <u>Conception</u>

According to Bachir Odeimi[23], the idea of regional planning which is at the base of the ARLA project first came to Lebanon through the BTVL-CGLU[24]. Bachir Odeimi established the BTVL-CGLU (Bureau Technique des Villes Locales) office in Lebanon in 1997. The work of this office is very much inspired by examples set by the network of cities of the CGLU, more precisely in terms of strategic planning, local governance, and community development. Through its extensive network of cities, the BTVL-CGLU office in Lebanon identified the growing trend of local planning abroad and shared it during a conference held at the Lebanese American University in 2002. The conference grouped Lebanese mayors and key donors to share a "Municipal Plan of Local Development" project (Karageozian, 2006). The conference drew awareness to the importance of local development and planning. The EU delegation, whose ambassador used to be a close friend of Odeimi, "understood the importance of working with the network of cities of the BTVL"[25] and requested from Odeimi to work with a team to draft the ToR of ARLA to integrate those concepts. According to Sami Feghali[26] "the EU's main aim was to increase territorial coherence, stimulate cooperation among municipalities/villages, and promote local authorities to set medium

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[23] Interview with Bachir Odeimi, op.cit.
[24] At the time, the CGLU was still under the name of FMCU (Fédération Mondiale des Cités Unies). In 2004, the FMCU merged with the IULA (International Union of Local Authorities) to form the CGLU.
[25] Interview with Bachir Odeimi, ibid
[26] Interview with Sami Feghli, 2015

and long-term visions to guide their work". The ToR for ARLA, finalized in 2003, included a proposition on the creation of Local Development Offices, and the selection of 12 clusters[27] (Karageozian, 2006). Once the ToR was finalized, the EU launched a call for proposal that Louis Berger won [28], which was represented by Paul Cazalonga[29] as the project's team leader[30]. Moreover, at the request of the EU delegation, the BTVL arranged decentralized cooperation partnerships between all 12 clusters and respective European city counterparts, of which: the Region Ile de France with High Matn, the Conseil General des Evelynes with Kesserouan, and the Italian cooperation with Hermel (Odeimi, 2013). The ties between those local authorities are for most part still existing. ARLA's main national partner was the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative reform[31] (OMSAR). According to Moussa, OMSAR was the selected national agency because

> "it was a new ministry at the time, and was more responsive than others. However, the CDR and the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities were on the project's steering committee. Moreover, regular meetings were held with the DGU and the CDR. The aim was to have the work conform to the SDATL to ensure its operationalization and avoid having local development plans that are not cohesive with each other "[32].

b. Outputs and expertise

ARLA was developed in three main phases. First, multi-disciplinary teams composed of both scholars (from different universities) and practitioners (urban planners, economists, and sociologists) drafted Simplified Local Development Plans (SLDP) for each cluster. The selected teams of national experts included young

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[27] Interview with Bachir Odeimi, ibid
[28] Interviews with Serge Yazigi & Bachir Odeimi, op.cit.
[29] Paul Cazalonga had extensive regional planning experience in the MENA region
[30] An in depth analysis of expertise networks will be developed in the next chapter
[31] OMSAR is the main body responsible for the preparations and follow up of the project (Bazzi & Al Zein, 2005)
[32] Interview with Ziad Moussa, op.cit.

professionals as well as established university professors and consultants who worked collaboratively on developing the SLDP, which at that time, was the first approach of its kind in the country. Experts were well guided by a clear participatory methodology[33] set by Paul Cazalonga, the lead expert who had previous experience in local development projects in South Mediterranean countries, in coordination with national experts such as Ziad Moussa.[34]. Moreover, local experts from each cluster worked in very close coordination with national experts. The local experts were consequently key drivers of those projects. The teams of national experts adopted a participative approach through consulting platforms. The assigned local expert worked with the municipality to establish those platforms that validated the SLDP.

Second, the consultative platforms, selected with the help of the experts, a few of the pre-identified priority projects in the SLDP for implementation. OMSAR contributed to prepare tenders for the implementation of those projects. New experts were selected for the implementation phase. National experts did not work on the same cluster for all phases of the project, but circulated between different phases to better respond to their areas of specialty. They were also selected according to the area's specificities (ex: an agricultural engineer was included, if the area was agricultural)[35].

The SLDP is mostly a study of the dynamics of development of the area in terms of setting strategic guidelines[36]. However, as per Yazigi,

> "the whole approach was inspired by strategic plans and quite innovative in terms of elaborating dynamic plans, with an adaptive flexible methodology. The plans were a first go in Lebanon at a local territorial approach to planning,

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[33] The methodology used for ARLA was selected as best practice in European Development Days. The methodology was reused in Argentina, Kosovo, etc.. (Interview with Moussa, 2015)
[34] Interviews with Ziad Moussa, ibid, and Serge Yazigi, op.cit.
[35] Interview with Serge Yazigi, op.cit.
[36] Through an analysis of the SLDPs of Bint Jbel, Hermel, High chouf, and High Matn, we can say that SLDPs are mostly descriptive in terms of analyzing the area's characteristics (geography, demography, economy, etc…) and describing its potentials, drawbacks, and constraints to its development.

developed following a rather qualitative approach through SWOT analysis and the identification of priority projects. The identified actions were small in scale and impact and were scattered across the territory of the cluster"[37].

Feghali notes that although ARLA was a good pilot for the elaboration of local development plans, it faced constraints such as the lack of time for implementing properly the participative approach for the development of the Simplified Local Development Plans[38], and the fact that national experts weren't necessarily familiar with the areas they were assigned to work with[39].

c. Clusters: a new scale of intervention

Around half of the selected ARLA clusters were already formed municipal unions. The rest were composed of individual villages that expressed the will to participate to this project. At the time, in 2002, most of the UoMs were not formed yet, thus explaining the grouping of municipalities into clusters[40]. When the project started, municipalities were asked to present an application to join. Based on their interest and request to join, municipalities were then gathered into clusters. According to Moussa[41]:

> "The creation of clusters was the precursor to the establishment of some UoMs as it was the first time those municipalities worked together back then. Municipalities and villages were put together according to interests, willingness to be grouped, and while trying to maintain homogeneity in terms of geography and sectarian and political affiliations."[42]

In order to have relatively equal clusters in terms of size (Figure 11), some clusters excluded villages that wanted to participate. Some of the exclusions didn't

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[37] Interview with Serge Yazigi, op.cit..
[38] Interview with Sami Feghali, ibid
[39] Also confirmed by interview with Serge Yazigi
[40] Interviews with Serge Yazigi, op.cit. & Bachir Odeimi, op.cit.
[41] Interview with Ziad Moussa, op.cit.
[42] Also confirmed by Interview with Serge Yazigi, op.cit.

really make sense geographically such as in the case of Halba (Karageozian, 2006). According to Karageozian's interview (2006, p10) with Piazza d'Olmo[43], a representative of the EU delegation in Lebanon at the time, although the resort to cluster development is not exclusive to Lebanon, it does have the specificity of being driven by political reasons, in addition to technical ones.

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[43] Piazza d'Olmo was a very close friend of Bachir Odeimi. They worked in close coordination, therefore emphasizing the role of the BTVL-CGLU at that time. Piazza D'Olmo was succeeded by Bruno Montariol, with whom Bachir Odeimi could not see eye to eye. The position that was held by D'Olmo and Montariol has now been divided into two different positions.

Legend:
- Akkar
- Hermel
- Zgharta
- Kesserouane
- High Matn
- Aley
- Sahl
- Chouf Soueijani
- High Chouf
- Jezzine
- Iklim al Touffah
- Bent Jbeil

Figure 11- Geographic Distribution of EU-ARLA Project Clusters. Source: Bazzi & Al Zein, 2005, adapted by Najem, 2016.

3. *The Case of ADELNORD (2009-2015)*

A few years later, in 2009, in the aim of providing aid to the neglected region of Akkar, the EU funded the 18million euros ADELNORD project[44]. Odeimi notes that the new assigned EU ambassador in Lebanon preferred investing in one larger region rather than multiple smaller ones like in the case of his predecessor in ARLA[45]. Several factors affected the selection of the Akkar area. First, the war of Nahr el Bared in 2007 was key in prioritizing the Akkar area. In fact, Feghali clearly states that "following the October 2007 Nahr el Bared war, many funders invested in the reconstruction of Nahr el Bared and its peripheries. Due to Akkar's proximity to the war zone, the government and international funders who previously neglected Akkar identified the need to invest in the area"[46]. Second, the country's concentration in Akkar of "Poverty Pockets" identified by the ESFD in Lebanon emphasized the dire needs of Akkar[47]. Third, the SDATL mentions the creation of a natural park between Jroud el Hermel, Jroud Akkar, and Denniye. This park is included in the region identified by the EU for investment, which encompasses the Governorate (mohafaza) of Akkar, Upper Hermel and Upper Minieh-Donniyeh[48]. Through the ADELNORD project, the European Commission funded in 2009 the development of a Strategic Sustainable Regional Development Plan (SSRDP) in the North of Lebanon as well as Local Development Plans for ten clusters to be managed by the ESFD. The region included various administrative divisions: a governorate, seven unions of municipalities, and ten clusters (see Figure 12 below). The plan was closely developed with the CDR, which sees it as a pilot study for implementing the SDATL at the regional scale.

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[44] Interview with Sami Feghali, op.cit.
[45] Interview with Odeimi, op.cit.
[46] Interview with Sami Feghali, ibid
[47] Interview with Dima Sader, 2015 and (Charplin & Bassil, 2010)
[48] Interview with Sami Feghali, ibid

a. Conception

Building on the ARLA experience, Feghali thought to have a different

methodology for ADELNORD. Feghali also mentions building on the planning

methodology of UN-HABITAT's "Local Strategic Planning at the Level of

Municipalities and Unions of Municipalities in Lebanon" guidebook[49].

> "Municipalities are fed up producing studies that lead nowhere. In order not to
> lose credibility with locals, the ADELNORD project was designed to start with
> implementing urgent projects, in parallel with the development of a territorial
> strategic planning study, even though its subsequently identified projects won't
> be executed. Those identified projects would form a basis to discuss funding
> with different donors that would be later solicited."[50]

Thus, the CDR privileged a short-term project based intervention in Akkar, in

parallel to the regional planning exercise. These were done through the ten local

development plans that I will further explain below.

b. A new regional methodology: SSRDP

Out of a will for regionalizing the SDATL through strategic plans, the CDR

commissioned Fouad Awada, an expert from IAURIF in France who previously worked

on the SDATL, to develop a regional planning methodology, in cooperation with the

DGU and the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities[51]. His final report was titled

"Definition of the form and content of a Strategic Sustainable Regional Development

Plan adapted to the Lebanese needs and context" (Awada, 2011, pp. 1-90). This

methodology was developed in close coordination with various international donors

such as the AFD, UNDP, UN-HABITAT, the World Bank, and the Italian Cooperation.

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[49] Interview with Sami Feghali, op.cit.
[50] Interview with Sami Feghali, ibid
[51] Interview with Sami Feghali, ibid

The SSRDP methodology mentions the need for national level management of regional development, the need to create an inter-ministerial coordination body (as per decree 2366 of 20/06/09 in the SDATL), and the need for a coordinator between the national and regional levels, through the Mohafez, a Regional Development Agency, or other. The proposed methodology aims at the creation of plans that enhance a region's economic performance, environment, social development, resources use, and local governance. According to this document, the SSRDP will consist of document with seven main components: 1) an introduction of the territory, 2) a SWOT analysis showing the existing mechanisms and needed changes, 3) a description of a vision and potential objectives, 4) an action plan (including timeline, budgets, and funding sources, 5) Territory map that show the reality on the ground as well as proposed projects, 6) an EIA, 7) GIS database (if possible). Those components support a territorial approach to regional planning, which was not seen in previous regional plans. According to Yazigi, "strategic regional plans can be seen as a tool to overcome institutional bottlenecks"[52].

c. A large scale project with three separate components

The ADELNORD project was conceived according to three different and unrelated components: agricultural infrastructure, community development and environmental projects (Table 1 below)

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[52] Interview with Serge Yazigi, op.cit.

	Agricultural Infrastructure	Community Development	Environment
Budget	13.07 million EUR	3 million EUR including 200-300,000EUR per project	2 million EUR
Area of intervention	3 Caza- in Akroum, Danniye, Dreib, Hermel, Joume, Jurd, Kaithe, Qobayat, Wadi Khaled	Clusters	Region of Caza Akkar, Upper Hermel, Upper Minnieh-Donnieh
Components	Infrastructural projects (irrgation channels, agri. roads...)	10 village profiles 10 Local Development Plans 1 pilot project for each cluster	SSRDP Legal framework for park creation Study of Akkar forest management
Institution	CDR in collaboration with municipalities	ESFD	CDR, MoA

Table 1- ADELNORD's Three Components. Sources: ADELNORD, 2015; Charplin & Bassil, 2010; ESFD, 2012, adapted by Najem, 2016

The first component: agricultural infrastructure consists of 28 projects identified by a mission conducted between November 2009 and June 2010) by the Danish Agricultural Advisory Service International, through two experts: Paolo Scalia (team leader) and Najah Chamoun (Local development expert). The projects mainly focus on irrigation and agricultural roads (Danish Agricultural Advisory Service, 2010). The CDR in collaboration with municipalities then implemented the projects. This component alone was awarded more than half of the project's grant. It materialized Feghali's vision of providing immediate gains to people and to municipalities. It was conceived to promote their buy-in in the SSRDP.

Second, ten Local Development plans were developed by the ESFD[53] (Economic and

Social Fund for Development) for clusters which were defined by a mission appointed

by the CDR, independently from the ESFD. Three experts, Anna Charpin, Paul

Cazalonga[54] (the previous ARLA team leader) and Najwa Bassil (sociologist who

worked on CHUD and ARLA), carried out a six months study under the supervision of

the CDR that led to the identification and selection of the ten clusters in December 2010

(Charplin & Bassil, 2010). The selected clusters had to be constrained to the North of

Lebanon, and more specifically to the regions of High Akkar, High Denniye, High

Hermel, Qobayyat, Akroum, Wadi Khaled, Halba and Joumet (Charplin & Bassil,

2010). According to Feghali, "clusters were not selected to conform to unions of

municipalities because the latter were often too large for such local plans, or lacked

territorial coherence". In fact, the final report of the mission shows that clusters were

selected according to basic criteria

> "related to territorial unity, continuity and social cohesion. [Those include]
> geographical factors that define a territorial unity; socio-economical factors that
> define a common needs and priorities; social ties, common historical or
> diachronic factors, land and water use rights and practices that define social
> cohesion; [and] administrative ("governance") factors that define capacities"
> (Charplin & Bassil, 2010, p. 10).

The final selection of clusters was contested by the ESFD who thought that the

selection criteria were not well founded[55]. However, the EU imposed the selection due

to lack of time[56]. Clusters selected were not consistent in terms of the number of

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[53] The ESFD is an institution created by the EU in coordination with the Lebanese government in 2000.
The institution was created under the CDR, but given full independence and autonomy. The ESFD reports
directly to the director of the CDR and therefore is not subject to the CDR's bureaucracy and politically
divided board. The ESFD has two main objectives: job creation (poverty alleviation), and community
development.
[54] According to interview with Dima Sader, the ESFD did not get along with Paul Cazalonga and this
resulted in his withdrawal from the mission.
[55] Interviews with Sami Feghali and Dima Sader, op.cit.
[56] Interview with Sami Feghali, op.cit.

municipalities within them. Some clusters such as Fneideq were composed of one large

village, while others such as South Hermel included 13 villages[57]. According to my

interviews with Feghali and Sader, the main challenge faced in working with clusters

was to be able to group villages that would benefit from common projects[58]. The ESFD

first worked on developing Village Profiles[59] as the first step to accomplish a

participatory approach, and create an adequate integrated development strategy for the

cluster that would help put forward relevant projects that respond to the cluster's need.

Those Village Profiles were developed in close cooperation with the local population[60].

Through meetings and dialogue committees, the need for having a development strategy

and thus elaborating the LDP in cooperation with all stakeholders grew.

Finally, three projects were devised under the environmental components. First

and foremost, Fouad Awada developed the SSRDP methodology and experts selected

by the German consulting firm GFA elaborated the Akkar SSRDP. Second, teams

(under the guidance of ELARD[61]) worked on a legal framework for creating parks in

Lebanon. And last, a study was conducted for the management of two forests in Akkar.

This study was entrusted to the Ministry of Agriculture.

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[57] the 10 clusters selected were: Akkar al Atiqa, Beit Younes, Donnieh, Eastern Wadi Khaled, Fneideq, Hrar, Mashat Hassan, North Hermel, South Hermel, Western Wadi Kahled. They included 31 villages from Caza Hermel, 39 villages from Caza Akkar, and 7 villages from Caza Donnieh (ESFD, 2012)
[58] In many instances, villages did not have the willingness to work together, and could not agree on common goals
[59] Village Profiles were developed between May and November 2011. They include: general information about the cluster, demographics, and sections on the following sectors: economy, agriculture, education, health, environment, infrastructure. It also identifies all stakeholders in the cluster. (ESFD, 2011)
[60] Interview with Dima Sader, op.cit.
[61] Earth Link & Advanced Resources Development (ELARD) is a regional environmental consultancy firm based in Lebanon http://www.elard-group.com/

d. Outputs and expertise

While looking at the deliverables of the ADELNORD project, several published
outputs appear. The most notable are: 1) Ten ESFD-led Local Development Plans for
Clusters published in 2011-2012 for various clusters in the Caza of Akkar in the North
of Lebanon; 2) The CDR-led Strategic Sustainable Regional Development Plan
methodology published in in 2011, and 3) the CDR-led SSRDP published in 2014 for
the Caza of Akkar, Upper Minnieh Dennieh, and Upper Hermel. The area of this study
includes all ten ESFD clusters[62]. This new approach from the EU is innovative in terms
of the scale of the plans elaborated, as well as in terms of linking three development
plans involving different levels of governance. In fact, EU projects previously financed
the development of a multitude of independent and scattered regional urban plans. With
the ADELNORD project, ten development plans were elaborated for regions that are
geographically connected or in close proximity to each other and within the same caza.

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[62] Although two of those clusters: North Hermel and South Hermel, are only partly included in the region.

Legend:

Unions of Municipalities of:

Hermel	Wassat wa Sahl Kaytaa
Dreb el Awsat	Jerd el Kaytaa
Akkar	Denniye
Al Shafat	Jouma Akkar

Clusters:

South Hermel	North Hermel
Donnieh	Akkar Atika Dawra
Beit Younes	Mashta Hassan
Fneideq	Wadi Khaled West
Hrar	Wadi Khaled East

SSRDP region

Figure 12- ADELNORD's Areas of Intervention. Source: ADELNORD, 2015 & ESFD, 2012, adapted by Najem, 2016.

While the SSRDP was finalized in 2014, the plan was not endorsed by the

community and therefore still hasn't been officially published. Anecdotal evidence

shows that a parliament member from the area mobilized a number of mayors and key

stakeholders to boycott the final meeting where the plan was to be validated. It seems he

is a prominent political leader who did not identify with the project's vision or see in it

an interest for his political power advancement. It is not very clear what are the exact

reasons behind this blockage, and I was not able to research this further. However, as

Salman (2014, pp. 1-146) shows in her work in Chouf, sectarian conflicts and private

interests often have a significant impact on blocking development plans in Lebanon. In

addition, it seems that ADELNORD did not succeed in mobilizing local human

resources and expertise, who would have engaged in the project and build a sense of

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ownership over it, perhaps because of the region's weak human capacities, or because of the large scale of intervention.

4. *The Case of MuFin (2012-ongoing)*

Before turning to comparing ARLA and ADELNORD and highlighting their contribution to regional planning advancement in Lebanon, I mention the latest EU contribution in Lebanon targeting the paradigms of decentralization and local governance promotion. The MuFin program, "Support to Municipal Finance Reform" was launched in July 2012. The EU seems to have shifted its focus to capacity building and fiscality. This is a 20 million Euro grant that

> "aims to contribute towards more balanced socio-economic development through modernized municipal administration and effective central support to the local administration. Its specific aims are to improve the municipal finance framework, enhance the capacities of municipal sector to assume its mandate, and provide financial support to local development initiatives and projects" (European Union, 2012).

Among other activities, this project will support strategic planning at both the municipality and Union of municipalities' levels. Several unions of municipalities such as the unions of municipalities of Koura (2015), West Baalbeck (2014), and Al Jurd Al Aala- Bhamdoun (2014) have signed memorandums of understanding with the Capacity Building Component team of the project for the development of strategic plans (European Union, 2012).

According to my interview with Ziad Moussa, the MuFin program didn't initially have this aim.

> "The project originally consisted of a budget of 1 to 1.5million EUR per UoM for conducted a "ring sensing" assessment for Unions of Municipalities (weak, medium, strong). Accordingly, a ranking of Unions of municipalities would have been developed and the type of intervention would have been selected

following the ranking bracket. The Ministry of Interior and Municipalities did not see the relevance of the project and preferred to have the money allocated to projects that would be implemented directly. Angelina Echorst, the EU ambassador, did not comply to the request of the Ministry and changed the project."[63]

In what follows, I will assess the EU's contribution to the discourse of regional planning in Lebanon. To do so, I will compare the ARLA and ADELNORD projects and assess the opportunities they have created as well as the challenges faced by regional planning in Lebanon.

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[63] Interview with Ziad Moussa, op.cit.

CHAPTER 4

EU'S REGIONAL PLANNING INTERVENTIONS IN LEBANON: WHAT OUTPUTS?

In chapter 2, we described the EU's intervention in regional planning in Lebanon. Based on the paradigms of decentralization, local governance, and planning, the EU funded three regional planning projects in Lebanon (ARLA, CIUDAD, ADELNORD), which resulted in the production of 27 regional plans. The upcoming MuFin project will also contribute to the development of at least three additional regional plans at the level of unions of municipalities. The detailed description of the ARLA and ADELONORD projects in the previous chapter underscored the innovative approaches that were used in the development of those EU funded regional plans. It also showed that both projects were quite different in scope, methodology, and contributions. In this chapter, we will analyze the EU's intervention in promoting the discourse and tools of regional planning in Lebanon in the light of the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2. To do so, we will assess the two case studies we presented in Chapter 3 using two sets of components. The first component is the projects' institutional setup through which we will examine institutional building, objectives, as well as planning tools and approach. Second, we will look into the different scales of intervention privileged by each project.

After this discussion, the chapter will investigate how the regional discourse and tools brought forth by the EU mobilized a network of experts circulating now across various groups of actors, locally, nationally, and transnationally. We will conclude with a critical discussion of the regional plans' outputs, highlighting their constraints as well as the opportunities they are bringing to the planning scene in Lebanon.

A. Comparing ARLA & ADELNORD: Institutional Setup & Scale

		ARLA	ADELNORD	
Institutional Setup	**Institutional Building**	• Consultative platforms • UoMs & Clusters • Local & National Experts • OMSAR	*Local Dev. Plans* • Local Committees • Clusters/villages/ municipalities • ESFD • CDR	*SSRDP* • Periodic Town Meetings/ workshops • Region beyond Caza • National Experts • CDR

	Objectives	• 1 Focus:
		  o Regional development
			• 3 tier Focus:
			  o Infrastructure
			  o Community Development
			  o Environmental Protection	

	Planning Tools	• Participatory • Strategic Local Development Plans • Spatial approach	*Local Dev. Plans* • PRA • Village Profiles & Local Development Plans • Community Based Approach	*SSRDP* • Weak participation • Strategic Sustainable Regional Development Plan • Spatial Approach
	Scale	• 12 Clusters • Across national territory	• 10 Clusters + 1 region • Focus on North region • Large fragmented area	

Table 2- ARLA and ADELNORD Compared by Institutional Setup and Scale. Source: Najem, 2016.

1. *Institutional Setup*

a. <u>Institutional Building</u>

ARLA operated through a partnership between the OMSAR and municipalities or unions of municipalities. The project's consultants formed consultative platforms in each cluster, in discussion with local actors, and selected local experts that would work closely with them. The project team of national experts strongly relied on local experts to get a better insight on the region.

ADELNORD operated through two disjointed mechanisms. In terms of elaborating local development plans for clusters, the ESFD partnered up with villages and municipalities to form sectoral local committees for each cluster. This was done under the umbrella of the CDR, but without its direct intervention. On the other hand, the Sustainable Strategic Development Plan of Akkar was developed in partnership with the CDR, by a group of national experts commissioned by the Gfa. Those experts worked with the Caza of Akkar, unions of municipalities, and municipalities through periodic stakeholders' meetings.

While the institutional setup of ARLA allowed for a more balanced power distribution than ADELNORD, The ESFD component of ADELNORD was also able to achieve, through their sectoral committees, a bottom up approach. However, in both cases, nothing was done to ensure the durability and institutionalization of these local committees that were established. As Gaudin (1995, pp. 31-56) argues, such committees would have acted as advocacy and lobby groups that can hold local and regional governments accountable especially with regard to the implementation of the approved development plans.

b.   Objectives

ARLA had one main specific objective of producing development plans for regions (clusters) that seek to economically revitalize them, leading to the identification of strategic projects to be implemented. ARLA also had related objectives, namely working on building capacities of local and regional governments through participatory methodologies such as the establishment of consultative platforms, and through trainings on planning and development with the inclusion of local experts. On the other hand, ADELNORD aimed at three distinguished objectives: enhancing living conditions in poor and underdeveloped regions via the ESFD plans and infrastructure development; strategic planning via the SSRDP; and the protection of the environment also via the SSRDP (ADELNORD, 2015) Each objective was piloted by an institution as discussed above.

The multi-tier objectives of ADELNORD, each led by a different institution, did not allow it to be as focused in its policy output as ARLA which had a more specific aim.

c.   Planning Tools and Approach

The ESFD plans were spatially blind, and mostly socio-economic community based studies, lacking a territorial approach to planning. According to Muller, such sectoral policies often tend to substitute local identities with professional ones, privileging an a-territorial growth (1985, pp. 165-189). Conversely, the SSRDP was more regional and

spatial in its approach, and thus if it were to be implemented, its impacts should have more positive regional development outcomes.

ARLA relied on broad qualitative data to create strategic directives through a participative approach and the identification of actions with very close repercussions on locals. Multidisciplinary teams of experts including urban planners, sociologists and environmental experts, developed the SLDPs, which was translated through integrated and spatially-aware Simplified Local Development Plans.

In ADELNORD, the ESFD plans and the SSRDP had very different methodologies. While the ESFD plans focused on a bottom up approach, working closely with community-based organizations, experts developing the SSRDP relied on a top down approach. The ESFD formed local sectoral committees they trained on "Participatory Rural Appraisal". They worked with focus groups, including vulnerable and marginal sections of the population, with a focus on women. Contrariwise, SSRDP's experts worked without the involvement of local experts from the region, which were said to be "missing" from the region as per one CDR decision-maker. They only held validation workshops, where they informed stakeholders and local actors about progress and suggested interventions. The CDR justified this lack of participation by referring to the unfavorable political conditions in Akkar[64].

Multi-level governance processes entail a horizontal distribution of power, as Piattoni argues (2010, pp. 88-95). Interrelationships between local groups, municipalities, unions of municipalities, experts and government entities, should defy existing hierarchies by forming non-hierarchical networks. Through establishing

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[64] He noted that the government had long neglected the Akkar area, and never delivered on its promises for numerous projects such as the Arab highway, waste water treatment plan in Abdeh, water projects, road intersections etc... which made people angry at the government which the CDR represented, and unwilling to cooperate.

consultative platforms and sectoral local committees, ARLA and the ESFD managed to establish such non-hierarchical networks of coordination, which led to a multi-level governance process. Albrechts also emphasizes the need for stakeholders' involvement, including civil society, throughout the whole planning process in order to ensure an integrated plan that fosters empowerment and development; he adds that the planning process can only gain legitimacy if it operates within the existing power plays, underscoring how planning "cannot change the power relations" per se, but can help empower agents of change (2004, pp. 752-755).

In the absence of such a multi-level governance process in SSRDP, it comes as no surprise that regional planning would not be strongly endorsed in Akkar and would be blocked, especially given Akkar's complex tribal and family politics and hegemonies which were not at all accounted for in the SSRDP's planning process.

2. *Scale*

In its selection of local authorities, ARLA mainly focused on existing unions of municipalities (UoMs), which were still newly established, but not only as it also incorporated territories that were not part of the UoMs but had similar ecological characteristics, or socio-economic linkages and ties. Thus, through ARLA, planning practice shifted its scale of intervention from the national level to the regional and local levels. ARLA tackled, for the first time, a group of localities characterized by common geographic and spatial features, beyond strict administrative boundaries. This scalar shift could be identified as micro-regionalism, and hence represents a novelty in approaching development and planning, which is more integrated and potentially more

sustainable and competitive, as we have seen in chapter 1 with Awada (2011), Soja (2015), and Storper (1997). ARLA produced 12 regional development plans for clusters, across the Lebanese territory.

On the other hand, the ADELNORD project worked on two different regional scales of planning: clusters and region, which also did not conform to the existing regional boundaries of UoMs. ADELNORD is the first project that operated on a *real* regional scale. The boundaries of the region extended beyond the existing administrative boundaries of the northern Caza, taking into consideration environmental factors[65]. However, ADELNORD also divided parts of the region into ten clusters, leaving zones outside of the planning exercise. A couple of clusters also extend beyond the boundaries of the region. Moreover, the clusters do not conform to boundaries of UoMs. This leads to a project that lacks in clarity, coherence and integration.

Through its institutional and scalar setups, ARLA and ADELNORD both contributed to promoting a discourse and practice of regional planning. They also initiated the making of a network of urban planning experts that circulated regional development ideas and tools through several other internationally funded projects, and Lebanese institutions. We turn now to discussing this network.

B. The Mobilization of a Network of Planners and the Circulation of Regional Planning Ideas and Practices

As mentioned above, ARLA's team was composed of multi-disciplinary experts informed by both research and practice. Each cluster had a different team of experts,

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[65] The SDATL mentions the creation of a natural reserve in the area, between the Caza of Akkar, Upper Hermel, and Minnieh Donnieh.

which had to report back to the project's coordinator and team leader. Therefore, although the project included many of them, they were well coordinated and guided, by a common methodology. National experts also worked closely with local experts. When ARLA closed off, local experts either stayed employed in municipalities or moved on to different jobs where they capitalized on the expertise they had acquired. On the other hand, the experts involved in the ADELNORD project lacked coordination. The SSRDP was not related to the Local Development Plans that were elaborated before it started, as "those were considered to be too detailed and cover small areas"[66]. The ESFD and the CDR did not cooperate during the project but rather followed a silos-approach[67]. The SSRDP was only linked to SDATL[68]. Therefore, experts working on different projects in ADELNORD did not cooperate and were even unaware of each other's work. Experts and only focused on their sector of expertise which increased their disconnect from the social groups they were supposed to be serving through their plans.

During our data collection, and while reviewing the various regional plans that were produced within the past 15 years, we identified many links between experts, donors and planning institutions (Figure 13). This section will explore how regional planning ideas and policies have generated networks of experts, which can be distinguished according to their educational and professional trajectories.

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[66] Interview with Sami Feghali, op.cit.
[67] Interview with Dima Sader, op.cit.
[68] Interview with Sami Feghali, op.cit.

Figure 13- Networks of Planning Expertise in Lebanon. Source: Najem, 2016.

The Louis Berger firm was the "catalyst" of ARLA's new regional planning methodology[69]. Under the supervision of Paul Cazalonga, a team of experts was selected and closely guided throughout the process. The project's coordinators included Ziad Moussa and Bachir Osmat. Experts included Serge Yazigi, Habib Debs, Leon Telvizian, Mona Harb, Mona Fawaz, Ali Moussawi…. who came from the American University of Beirut (AUB), the Academy Libanaise des Beaux Arts (ALBA), and the Lebanese University (LU), bringing in different planning approaches and tools to the project. According to Ziad Moussa, "experts invested in those projects even though they

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[69] Interview with Sami Feghali, op.cit.

were not well compensated as they saw the merit of putting forward an innovative approach"[70]. This project also worked as a cornerstone in the career of some of those experts in terms of working on internationally funded planning projects in Lebanon. In fact, according to Yazigi "Most of the time, the same experts are hired over and over again on different EU projects to compensate for the lack of institutionalization (such as Ziad Moussa and himself)"[71]. Moreover, those experts often end up collaborating together on regional planning projects.

One of the examples is the career journey of Serge Yazigi:

"I met Paul Cazalonga when I got hired to work on the first phase of ARLA. As we worked together, Cazalonga passed on to me a lot of his experience on regional planning in the MENA. Cazalonga liked working with me so he kick-started my planning career. He hired me for the remaining phases of ARLA[72]."

Yazigi also formed close ties with Ziad Moussa and Bachir Osmat through ARLA. After their cooperation in ARLA, Moussa and Osmat opened their own consulting practice Development Management International. Along with Yazigi, the three experts built on their ARLA experience to propose a project to the Hariri foundation, which included several large-scale projects inspired by those developed for ARLA[73]. Therefore, experts learned from their ARLA experience, and applied it elsewhere. Moreover, those experts became a reference for future EU funded projects in Lebanon. In fact, Ziad Moussa was later hired as the team leader of the CIUDAD project in Lebanon and Serge Yazigi as the team leader of the ADELNORD project[74].

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[70] Interview with Ziad Moussa, op.cit.
[71] Interview with Serge Yazigi, op.cit.
[72] Interview with Serge Yazigi, op.cit.
[73] ibid
[74] Both experts were hired to work on a variety of EU funded projects after ARLA. Those projects focus on a local scale, and thus won't be discussed in this thesis. Projects include: MED-PACT, Medina 2030, and CES-MED.

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While Moussa and Yazigi mostly worked on EU-funded projects, experts such as Mosbah Rajab and Leon Telvizian from the Lebanese University, used their experience in ARLA to work as consultants on projects led by UN-HABITAT. According to Tarek Osseiran[75], Leon Telvizian provides technical skills training for municipalities on behalf of UN-HABITAT. Both worked alongside Mosbah Rajab to develop the "Local Strategic Planning at the Level of Municipalities and Unions of Municipalities in Lebanon" guidebook.

Moreover, it is worth noting the ties of the EU commission with national institutions. The EU has also funded the creation of the ESFD apex institution (active in 2002) that reports directly to the director of the CDR (ESFD, 2012). While in the early 2000s the EU worked with the OMSAR, it has since moved on to the CDR as its main partner, for reasons that need investigation beyond the scope of this thesis. Sami Feghali is the main contact person between the CDR and the EU commission. He was on the steering committee of the ARLA project, as well as the national counterpart for the SDATL, ADELNORD, and Sour SSRDP projects.

Another interesting expert's network example is the one of Habib Debs who, while working on the ARLA project, was contributing to the making of the SDATL in cooperation with established experts such as economists Kamal Hamdan and Charbel Nahas,. The SDATL was piloted by the IAURIF's mission led by planner Fouad Awada—the same person who was involved in the development of the RMB plan in 1984 (mentioned in Chapter 1). We find again Hamdan and Debs in the SSRDP for Sour, elaborated in 2015, based on the methodology developed by Fouad Awada. It is

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[75] Interview with Tarek Osseiran, op.cit.

worth noting that all those experts have developed a close professional relationship over the years, and appreciate working together.

Figure 13 attempts to identify sub-groups of experts among these networks, distinguishing them in terms of professional and educational trajectories, as well as type of international donors. The figure shows that the EU-led projects have not only generated a new discourse and a new practice of regional planning, but also initiated a network of national experts, trained in participatory planning methodologies, strategic planning, local development and regional planning policies.

* * *

In sum, via decentralized cooperation and EU-led policies, municipalities have learned how to become more actively involved in development and planning, and several of the ones that benefited from ARLA have become quite active, such as Jezzine, Sour and Baakline. Through the networks of decentralized cooperation, ARLA created a platform for municipalities and unions of municipalities to learn how to access additional expertise and funding for local and regional development. This led to the CIUDAD project among others, which resulted in the update of four Simplified Local Development Plans that were drafted through the ARLA project. The idea of regionalism grew progressively stronger over time and continues today to gain in maturity, especially though the multiplication of strategic plans in unions of municipalities across Lebanon, not necessarily funded by the EU. In addition, ARLA introduced new tools and methodologies for elaborating and implementing local and regional development plans, grounded in participatory and consultative approaches, as well as multidisciplinary teams of experts.

ADELNORD's contribution to regional planning is noteworthy as it produced a framework and methodology for operationalizing the SDATL at the regional scale. This framework, authored by Fouad Awada, privileges a sustainability approach to regional development, which was first, implemented in Akkar. Political challenges prevented the endorsement of the plan. However, the SSRDP was continued in Sour more successfully, perhaps because in Sour, the receptivity to local and regional planning was more pronounced as the municipality had been playing an active role in local and regional development for a longer period of time—but that's another story that we do not have sufficient data on to develop here.

In the conclusion of this thesis, we discuss the opportunities and constraints of EU-led aid that has consolidated a regional planning discourse and practice in Lebanon.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This thesis discussed how international donors' policies consolidate local and regional governments and promote the discourse and practice of regional planning. In Chapter 2, we discussed how regionalism may act as a key driver of economic growth, bridging disparities within the national territory through creating linkages. Regional planning is the key tool to promote more inclusive regionalism. We also discussed how the European Union is a major player promoting the idea of decentralization and regionalism through its integration policy. Through tools of decentralized cooperation and multi-scalar governance, the EU exported the regionalism model to many Southern Mediterranean countries. However, building on the Turkish, Moroccan and Lebanese cases, decentralized cooperation also runs the risk of "upgrading authoritarianism" (Heydemann, 2007) and "paying lip service" to decentralization (Harb & Atallah, 2015).

In Chapter 3, we explored the emergence of regional planning in Lebanon. We started by describing the Lebanese administrative structure, which is characterized by more de-concentration than decentralization. Local authorities have a large scope of action but limited administrative and financial resources, therefore often relying on international donors for funds. These partnerships have been exponentially increasing, as donors perceive local and regional authorities to be more reliable and effective than the central government. Donors have been focusing on the paradigms of regionalism and decentralization thus promoting the elaboration and implementation of regional planning and development, in coordination with existing unions of municipalities.

Several donors have contributed to the consolidation of the regional planning discourse and practice in Lebanon, while approaching it from different perspectives. While the World Bank prioritizes an economics-based approach, UN-HABITAT is keener on a relief and recovery response. The EU distinguishes itself from the lot, as it is a major contributor to promoting regional planning policies. We observed this clearly by analyzing all donors' projects over a thirteen years lapse. Two EU-funded regional planning projects stand out in this mapping: ARLA and ADELNORD. In ARLA, the EU intervened throughout the Lebanese territory introducing a new scale of spatial intervention—that of clusters. ARLA yielded twelve Simplified Local Development Plans, conceived by multi-disciplinary teams of experts, in close cooperation with local experts and consultative platforms. Conversely, ADELNORD was implemented only in the North of Lebanon. The three-tier focus of ADELNORD incorporated various scales of intervention, including a mix of ten Local Development Plans for village clusters and a regional plan that exceeds the boundaries of the Northern Caza. Most notably, ADELNORD commissioned a study to operationalize the SDATL at a regional level, prioritizing sustainable development, which led to the drafting of the SSRDP methodology, which could be the basis of future regional plans across Lebanese regions. Currently, the EU has initiated new projects to strengthen decentralization and local governance, focusing on reforming municipal finance.

Chapter 4 discusses the EU's contribution to the discourse of regional planning in Lebanon by comparing the ARLA and ADELNORD projects. Both projects followed different methodologies in terms of institutional setup and scale. ARLA had one objective--promoting local governance through regional planning. This was just one of the three-tier aims of ADELNORD. In terms of institutional building, while ARLA

established consultative platforms and trained local experts to work within the clusters which remained operational for a good deal of time, ADELNORD created local committees in the clusters, and held town meetings on the larger scale, which did not have the same participatory impact. ARLA's Local Development Plans were spatially informed, unlike those of ADELNORD—except of course for the SSRDP. In terms of scale, ARLA introduced a new scale of planning to urban practice, which went beyond municipal boundaries, and was related to the regional scale of unions of municipalities. ADELNORD further contributed to promoting this new scale of planning, as it involved an even larger scale of intervention that went beyond the boundaries of a caza, to ensure geographical and environmental coherence. In addition to consolidating the discourse and practice of regional planning, we also showed how both ARLA and ADELNORD contributed to the formation of a network of planning experts, trained on different tools of planning, and on intervening across scales of intervention, who circulate various planning ideas and models locally, nationally and transnationally. ARLA established the platform from which this network grew, mainly through fostering decentralized cooperation partnerships, which also helped municipalities and unions of municipalities expand their own networks of expertise and consolidate a practice of local and regional planning.

A. Contributions of EU Regional Policies

In sum, the thesis demonstrates that EU policies in Lebanon brought forward several opportunities to the promotion and consolidation of local and regional planning discourse and practice. Through its discourses of regional planning and decentralized cooperation, the EU policies brought forward a new scale of planning and contributed to the establishment of a methodology that operationalizes its practice—namely the

SSRDP. Although the SSRDP lacks legislative backing, it proposes a framework for regional development that could be standardized across the Lebanese territory. Moreover, unlike the SDATL, the SSRDP operates on a micro-regional scale that suggests the involvement of local and regional authorities, which are politically representative as they are directly elected. Throughout the past fifteen years, local and regional authorities have been learning with international donors how to enhance service delivery, local development, and economic growth of localities and regions in Lebanon. Therefore, both donors and local authorities are bypassing the central government to ensure more effective planning. With the current Syrian refugee crisis, the regional and spatial approach to development and planning is gaining grounds[76]. In brief, the discourse of regional planning in Lebanon has been accompanied by comprehensive, integrated, and participatory planning tools that can help empower local and regional authorities, and enhance service delivery and economic linkages. Albeit the positive outcomes, regional planning faces however several constraints.

B. Constraints of Regional Planning in Lebanon

In what follows, we categorized three sets of constraints that pose serious impediments to the implementation of an effective regional planning practice in Lebanon: the fragmented and non-contextual interventions of donors; limited administrative decentralization in Lebanon due to sectarian politics; weak municipal resources. We follow their characterization with brief policy recommendations.

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[76] City Debates conference, Day 2 on Refugee Policies.

1. *Non-contextual and fragmented donors' interventions*

International donors' interventions in Lebanon have shown to lack coordination and to be too generic, ignoring context specificities. Multiple donors intervene on the same terrain, using the same generic paradigms of local governance, decentralization, regionalization, and humanitarian aid, but do not coordinate well their interventions, resulting in duplication and/or irrelevance. This is also the fault of the central government which does not coordinate among them[77]. More recently, in light of the Syrian crisis, international donors are holding periodic coordination meetings, but these are more about sharing information rather than actual policy coordination[78]. This is all the more exacerbated by the different agendas that donors bring to the table. As shown in Chapter 3, each donor has its own approach. For example, in terms of regional development, the World Bank promotes economic development, while the EU wants local governance, and UN-HABITAT prefers strategic planning. And donors' aid is often non-context specific, or as Yazigiputs it "not adapted to our situation," [79] using generic models tested elsewhere and parachuted to a different context.

The central government can play a major role coordinating the various donors' interventions to avoid fragmentation and maximize returns. This is however quite complicated by the political sectarian system in Lebanon, which makes different donors ally with different public agencies for the implementation of their policies: the World Bank seems to prefer allying with the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, the UNDP with the Ministry of Social Affairs, the UN-Habitat with the DGU, and the EU with OMSAR and CDR. The wishful policy recommendation is to centralize all foreign

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[77] Interview with Dima Sader, op.cit.
[78] Interviews with Dima Sader and Bachir Odeimi, op.cit.
[79] Interview with Yazigi, op.cit.

aid relevant to spatial planning in one agency, which would be able to channel it to the relevant national, regional and local planning institutions..

2. *Limited decentralization in a sectarian political system*

Decentralization is still weak in Lebanon as it is mostly about deconcentration, rather than being about rescaling the political process at lower echelons of power. Central governments still plays a central role in controlling municipalities and unions of municipalities. Although international donors are promoting the discourse of decentralization, local governance, and regionalism, none of the produced outcomes of those projects are binding or enforceable without a decentralization policy that would ensure an institutionalized and regulated cohesive regional plan across the Lebanese territory[80]. This is worsened by the deadlock of the sectarian political system that has been paralyzing public institutions, public financing, processes of political representation, and mechanisms of service provision for years now. Limited decentralization within such polarized politics is further exacerbated by the prevalent geopolitical instability in the Middle East. International aid and local authorities are too often forced to prioritize emergency response rather than development agenda[81].

Our recommendation here is to initiate new regional-scale institutions that could generate new multi-scalar governance dynamics. As Awada reminds us, we need to have organized coordination between a structure at the national level and a structure at the regional level (Awada, 2011). This structure should be "the Committee for Regional Development, an interministerial body created by the SDATL decree in 2009" (Awada, 2011, p9), which was never implemented. In addition, the EU approach explored in

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[80] Interview with Ramzi Naaman, 2015
[81] The 2006 Israeli war was followed by political unrest, the Nahr el Bared war in 2007, the May events of 2008, and the Syrian war starting 2011 which brought 1.5M refugees to Lebanon.

Chapter 3 highlights the need to establish Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) across the national territory, that should initiate and implement regional plans, provide institutional support to regions, as well as act as a network of cooperation and funding among sub-regions. Lagendijk (2009) identifies three key elements for the effective functioning of RDAs: "1) Drafting, discussion and implementation of regional development strategies and plans; 2) attracting foreign investment; and 3) expanding and aligning the provision of business services". The RDAs, which are also advocated by the SDATL, ought to include representatives from all regions and levels of governance. This would help overcome the overlap of jurisdictions between regional and national authorities (Faludi & Waterhout, 2002). RDAs need to be established throughout Lebanon, according to a careful study of development needs in line with the SDATL recommendations.

3. *Weak municipal resources*

As discussed in Chapter 3, municipalities and UoMs lack essential financial, administrative, human and technical resources. They also suffer from regulatory limitations, like being able to set their own tax base. These constraints surely do not facilitate the rescaling of planning and the endowment of local and regional authorities with key planning responsibilities.

Another weakness in local and regional authorities is access to reliable information about their territories, spatial and statistical. The Central Administration of Statistics does not provide disaggregated data at the locality level. Municipalities and UoMs do not have means to conduct their own surveys and/or to map results in GIS maps. The establishment of Regional Development Agencies would be especially useful to

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compensate the lack of fiscal, administrative, human and technical resources of municipalities in Lebanon.

Looking at the case study of Durban, studied by Beal, Parnell & Albertyn (Elite compacts in Africa: The role of area-based management in the new governmentality of the Durban city-region, 2015, pp. 390-406), we can derive many lessons and propose recommendations accordingly. Similarly to Lebanon, the South African state is weak, and does not have a comprehensive decentralization policy. The case of Durban is similar to Akkar as the region is characterized by poor infrastructure equipment, high levels of poverty, and tribal control, in addition to weak. Horizontal cooperation and coordination among local and regional authorities is thus quite difficult. An EU-funded project introduced to Durban Area-Based Development Management in 2003. The intervention was a success as it respected the power configuration whereby lead figures retained their control over the area, giving key political and tribal figures a central role in decision-making, breaking down the distrust between local tribal leaders and experts, emphasizing work in traditionally underserviced areas, establishing collaboration platforms, building upon existing rural traditions to accommodate competing and divergent interests of various elites, and last but not least, ensuring the plan is economically feasible for local authorities to adopt it.

We thus recommend initiating comparable participatory planning mechanisms and processes within the regions identified for the Lebanese territory, where local experts would be identified and trained—similarly to the ARLA's project. This will help having better insights about the region, and to capacity building. This participatory approach should sensitize local stakeholders and key political figures to the importance of

regional planning and its benefits. Regional and local authorities would then be able to own the regional planning process and claim it.

Such participatory regional planning mechanisms need to be regulated into a specific legal planning tool that can operationalize SDATL, which could be the SSRDP. Then, the SSRDP needs to be endorsed as a legal tool by the appropriate planning institution, namely the DGU.

<p style="text-align:center">* * *</p>

In conclusion, the thesis underscored a set of gains and opportunities related to the new discourse and practice of regional planning in Lebanon, brought forth by EU-led policies. Local and regional authorities got consolidated as planning institutions, as well as a regional planning methodology; networks of expertise pushing forward regional planning in were mobilized; ideas on regional planning practice are circulating. However, several constraints serve as challenges for effective regional development, and necessitate short and medium-term policy interventions.

One, better coordinated intervention between international donors is required on the short-term (given the acute Syrian refugee crisis which places major pressure on local and regional governments), as well as less generic developmental solutions—for this, the central role of the state as a regulator needs to be re-established. Second, in the medium-term, RDAs need to be established across the Lebanese territory, using a participatory regional planning approach, in respect of SDTAL recommendations for balanced regional development. Third, RDAs should be able to legally issue their regional plans, according to the SSRDP methodology at least in the medium term—

given it is already in place and being implemented successful in one Lebanese region (Sour).

The question that remains to be answered is how to regionally subdivide the Lebanese territory? According to which administrative units? Should we follow governorates, groups of cazas? Or should be create completely new regions, and on what basis? In his report, Awada recommends the establishment of three RDAs across Lebanon—in Zahle, Tripoli, and Nabatiyeh, but also identifies four "project regions": Northern Lebanon, Beirut-Mont Liban, Bekaa, and South-Saida (Awada, 2011, pp31-32). Given the different geographies, politics, socio-economics, and sectarian polarization in Lebanon, can planning be really rescaled? Can regional planning serve as a technical tool to promote such a rescaling? Such questions necessitate further investigation, which we hope will be undertaken by future studies.

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Municipal Union	Governorate	Caza	Project	Date	Donor	International partners	Local Partner	Planning expert
Akkar	North Lebanon	Akkar	Simplified Plan for Local Development	2005	EU- ARLA project		OMSAR	
Baalbeck	Bekaa	Baalbeck	Plan strategique de developpement local de la federation des municipalites de Baalbeck	2013 - 2015	France, Departement Herault	Communaute de l'Herault	MoFA, BTVL/ CGLU	ARCH
			Simplified Plan for Local Development	2005	EU- ARLA project		OMSAR	Mostafa Fawaz, Ziad Moussa
			Towards Strategic Planning	2010	UN-HABITAT, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, The Netherlands, Cyprus Aid			Nasser Yassin
Bint Jbeil	Nabatieh	Bint Jbeil	Simplified Plan for Local Development- update	2013	EU- PPRU/ CIUDAD	CICU, Turin, Milan (FPMCI), ACEL, Jerash municipality		
			Plan Simplifie de Development Local de la Federation du Haut Chouf	Feb-05	EU - ARLA Project		OMSAR, ACS, CDR, MoSA	Shadi Hamadeh, Leon Televisian, Annie Tohme Tabet, Marwan Husseiki
Chouf aala	Mount Lebanon	Chouf	Plan Simplifie de Development Local de la Federation du Haut Chouf- update	2013	EU- PPRU/ CIUDAD	CICU, Turin, Milan (FPMCI), ACEL, Jerash municipality		
				2009		French Cooperation, EU, World Bank	NGOs - LU	Union head planning firm
Chouf Souayjani	Mount Lebanon	Chouf	Simplified Plan for Local Development	2005	EU- ARLA project		OMSAR	Mostafa Fawaz, Ziad Moussa
Dannieh	North Lebanon	Minieh	Territorial strategic Development Plan	2012	UNDP/ArtGold, Italian cooperation		Consulation and Research Institute (CRI), CDR, NGOs	Kamal Hamdan
Eklim al Toufah	Nabatieh	Nabatieh	Simplified Plan for Local Development	2005	EU- ARLA project		OMSAR	Mostafa Fawaz, Ziad Moussa
Fayhaa	North Lebanon	Tripoli	Sustainable development strategy- CDS	2008-2011	Cities Alliance- IBRD	MedCities, World Bank, UNEP, AFD, Marseille, Barcelona, UNHABITAT	Local consultants Dr. Moustafa Adib (CESMO), eng. Diran Harmandian	AFSDS (Al Fayhaa Sustainable Development Strategy)- Mosbah Rajab, Maha Kayal, Rami Semaan, Chantal Reliquet
Jabal Amel	Nabatieh	Marjaayoun	Towards Strategic Planning	2010	UN-HABITAT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, The Netherlands, Cyrus Aid		Nasser Yassin
Jerd al kaytaa	North Lebanon	Akkar	Un Plan Stratégique de Développement Local pour l'Union des municipalités de Jord el Qayté				BTVL/CGLU	Bechir Odeimi

Location	Region	District	Plan	Date	Funder	Partners	Technical partners	Consultant	Team
			Strategic Development Plan	Feb-12	UNDP	Region PACA (France), Italian Cooperation, EU, World Bank, USAID	Antoine Nasrallah Law Firm, CUB Engineering	MORES sarl (Management of Resources & Environmental Solutions)	
Jezzine	South Lebanon	Jezzine	**Simplified Plan for Local Development**	2004	EU- ARLA project	OMSAR			Mostafa Fawaz, Ziad Moussa
Joummeh	North Lebanon	Akkar	**Simplified Plan for Local Development**	2005	EU- ARLA project	OMSAR			Mostafa Fawaz, Ziad Moussa
			Towards Strategic Plan	2010	UN-HABITAT, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, The Netherlands, Cyrus Aid				Nasser Yassin
Sour	South Lebanon	Sour	**Strategic Sustainable Regional Development Plan (SSRDP)**	Mar-15	AFD	Region PACA (France), United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG)	CRI, Habib Debs, ECODIT, IAURIF, CDR, UMoT		Habib Debs, Sami Feghali, Ali Ezzeddine, Hassan Dbouk
			Charte de Territoire durable du Haut Metn	2013	Region Ile de France	Institu D'Amenagement de d'Urbanisme de la Region Ile de France (IAU)	BTVL/CGLU, EDESSA, MADA, ECOMED		
Matn Aala	Mount Lebanon	Baabda	**Simplified Plan for Local Development**	2005	EU- ARLA project	OMSAR			Mostafa Fawaz, Ziad Moussa
Shafat	North Lebanon	Akkar	**Simplified Plan for Local Development**	Mar-10	US-AID Baladiayt Program	Relief International	Consultation and Research Institute		Dr. Ali al-Moussawi, Kamal Hamdan
			Plan Simplifie de Development du regroupement de Zgharta	Juin 2005	EU - Arla project	OMSAR			Samira Baghdadi, Nazih-Joseph el Kai, Adel Raidi
Zgharta	North Lebanon	Zgharta	**Plan Simplifie de Development du regroupement de Zgharta- update**	2013	EU- PPRU/ CIUDAD	CICU, Turin, Milan (FPMCI), ACEL, Jerash municipality			Elianne Jabbour, Saad el Khoury, Alessandro Marino
			Simplified Plan for Local Development	2005	EU- ARLA project	OMSAR			Mostafa Fawaz, Ziad Moussa
Hermel	North Lebanon	Akkar	**Simplified Plan for Local Development- update existing plan**	2013	EU- PPRU/ CIUDAD	CICU, Turin, Milan (FPMCI), ACEL, Jerash municipality	Planning and development Agency, Jihad Al Binaa		
Kesserouane	Mount Lebanon	Kesserouane	**Simplified Plan for Local Development**	2006	EU- ARLA project	OMSAR			Mostafa Fawaz, Ziad Moussa
Aley	Mount Lebanon	Aley	**Simplified Plan for Local Development**	2007	EU- ARLA project	OMSAR			Mostafa Fawaz, Ziad Moussa
Governorate of Akkar + Upper Minnieh-Dennieh + Upper Hermel	North Lebanon	Akkar	**Strategic Sustainable Regional Developent Plan**	2014	EU- ADELNORD	ESFD, OMSAR	CDR, MoI, MoE, MoA		GFA, ElArd, Christian Rake, Serge Yazigi, Rana Zbeidy, Roula Haidar,

Akkar Al Atiqa- Daoura	North Lebanon	Akkar	**Local Development Plan for the Cluster of Akkar Al Atiqa- Daoura**	Dec-11	EU- ADELNORD	CDR	ESFD
Dannieh	North Lebanon	Akkar	**Local Development Plan for the Cluster of Dannieh**	Mar-12	EU- ADELNORD	CDR	ESFD
Beit Younes (+Michmich, Al Krayat, Beit Ayyoub, Al Qorneh)	North Lebanon	Akkar	**Local Development Plan for the Cluster of Beit Younes**	Jan-12	EU- ADELNORD	CDR	ESFD
Fneideq	North Lebanon	Akkar	**Local Development Plan for the Cluster of Fneideq**	Mar-12	EU- ADELNORD	CDR	ESFD
Hrar (+Al Howaich, Qaba'it, Chan, Habchit, Khraibet el Jurd)	North Lebanon	Akkar	**Local Development Plan for the Cluster of Hrar**	Mar-12	EU- ADELNORD	CDR	ESFD
Mashta Hassan	North Lebanon	Akkar	**Local Development Plan for the Cluster of Mashta Hassan**	Mar-12	EU- ADELNORD	CDR	ESFD
South Hermel	North Lebanon	Akkar	**Local Development Plan for the Cluster of South Hermel**	Mar-12	EU- ADELNORD	CDR	ESFD
North Hermel	North Lebanon	Akkar	**Local Development Plan for the Cluster of North Hermel**	Mar-12	EU- ADELNORD	CDR	ESFD
Eastern Wadi Khaled	North Lebanon	Akkar	**Local Development Plan for the Cluster of Easter Wadi Khaled**	Mar-12	EU- ADELNORD	CDR	ESFD
Western Wadi Khaled	North Lebanon	Akkar	**Local Development Plan for the Cluster of Western Wadi Khaled**	Mar-12	EU- ADELNORD	CDR	ESFD