WILFRED SCAWEN BLUNT AND THE URABI REVOLUTION

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AND SURELY THE LATTER STATE IS
BETTER FOR THEE THAN THE FORMER.

AND SOON WILL THE LORD GIVE TO
THEE SO THAT THOU WILT BE WELL PLEASED.

KORAN 93:4,5

A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S

THE AUTHOR WISHES TO EXPRESS HER GRATITUDE TO PROFESSOR MAHMUD ZAYID FOR HIS ADVICE AND GUIDANCE IN SUPERVISING THE WRITING OF THIS THESIS.

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PREFACE

Wilfred Scawen Blunt's accounts of the 1882 Urabi revolution in Egypt constitute one of the most important sources for historians and political scientists who study Egypt and the growth of nationalism in the late nineteenth-century. Blunt's firsthand narrations of events within Egypt are widely cited by scholars; yet there had not been a complete investigation on Blunt's involvement in the Urabi revolution or on the extent which Blunt's lobbying and counseling effected the outcome of events in 1882. Such a study entails delving into not only Blunt's Secret History series and Diaries but also into the numerous periodicals for which he wrote, Parlimentary Debates, State Papers, memoirs of men involved in politics during the period, and newspapers; the study must also take into account the larger perspective of the political situation as it existed in nineteenth-century Europe, for the exigencies exerted upon England and Egypt by outside powers must be noted and properly weighed when considering Blunt's total accomplishments.

Several biographies of Blunt have been written by family members and other authors. His grandson, Noel Lytton, in Wilfred Scawen Blunt: a memoir by his grandson dwells primarily on Blunt's family life and personal habits; the well written study (The Writings of Wilfred Scawen Blunt) by Sister Mary Joan Reinehr concentrates on Blunt's literary accomplishments and attempts a thorough examination of his

poetic works. Edith Finch's Wilfred Scawen Blunt is the most complete work on Blunt's life, but it, too, focuses mainly on Blunt's work after the Urabi revolution and only cursorily deals with his work in the Middle East. Blunt's vivid personality is best captured by Albert Hourani in his fine article, "the Life and Ideas of Wilfred Scawen Blunt," published in the October, 1962 issue of the Middle East Forum. These works only offer a starting point for further inquiry, for none of them fully treats Blunt's role in the Urabi Revolt, which is the subject of this study.

This work makes use of all of Blunt's published writings with the exception of his articles in the periodical Egypt which was published under Blunt's auspices in 1911-1912; unfortunately the microfilms of these articles did not arrive in time from the Newspaper Office of the British Museum to be consulted here. With this notable exception all of Blunt's published works are noted; there are some unpublished letters and essays in the Cambridge Library, but which these have been closed to the public. Blunt's writing have been supplemented by the Parliamentary Debates, correspondence between Gladstone, Prime Minister in 1882, and Granville, Foreign Minister; and Foreign Office publications which have been opened for scrutiny. The Times and periodicals like the Nineteenth Century and Spectator also contain valuable references to the Urabi revolution and to

Blunt. From these sources one gains a full picture of the climate of opinion within England and how Blunt's crusade for Urabi and the National Party was greeted by Englishmen. Finally, the memoirs of public officials like Cromer, Freycinet, and Colvin, in addition to accounts by lesser known civil servants or soldiers like Scotidis, Vogt, and Ninet which offer invaluable information on the state of affairs in Egypt and England; A.M.Broadley, who acted as Urabi's counsel in his trial and who was engaged by Blunt, gives still more details on the associations of Blunt and Urabi in his book How We Defended Arabi and his Friends. The author with the aid of Dr. Mahmud Zayid also consulted some Arabic sources namely: Al-Rafii's al-Thawra al-Urabiyya wa Ihtilal al-Inglizi and H. M. Darwish's Al-Wasarat al-Misriyya. The above materials are used as the basis for telling the story of Blunt's involvement in the English attempt to secure the prized Ottoman possession - Egypt - and of his alignment with Urabi and the National Party.

I. BLUNT AND EGYPTIAN POLITICS

By 1882, Wilfred Scawen Blunt was thoroughly involved in Egyptian politics; convinced that Islam was undergoing a radical and tremendous renaissance, Blunt wrote, in the summer of 1881, The Future of Islam. This treatise contained most of Blunt's thoughts on the subject of Islamic revival. Blunt hoped that the publication would awaken the English people to the true significance of the Urabi revolt. The book talked optimistically of the Caliphate shifting from its location in stagnant Constantinople to the more vibrant centers of Mecca and Cairo. With the growth of the Egyptian National Party, Blunt looked forward to the day when Cairo would become the seat of the Caliphate.

> Cairo has declared itself as the home of progressive thought in Islam and its university as the once more independent seat of Arabian theology.[1]

Throughout the narrative, Blunt's clear cut allegiance and high personal regard for the Islamic cause was evident, but he concurrently realized that implementing social or political reforms within the Islamic context was not an easy task.

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(1) Wilfred Scawen Blunt, The Future of Islam (London: Kegan Paul, 1882), p. vii.

> The path of orthodox Islam is no macadamised road such as the Catholic church of Christendom has become, but like one of its own Haj routes goes winding on, a labyrinth of separate tracks, some near, some far apart, some clean out of sight of the rest. [2]

In the resuscitation of Islam, the author urged England to offer aid and consolation, not to deride it. "Let her take Islam by the hand and encourage her boldly in the path of virtue." [3] Blunt saw in the Egyptian national movement the machinery whereby Egypt could provide the impetus for this revival. He sincerely believed that the renaissance would shortly be accomplished if European powers in general, and England, in particular, kept out of the matter and did not step in to crush the movement before it was fully grown. [4]

Living in England, Blunt saw the drift of the English foreign policy towards imperialistic goals. Expansion, land, and markets were the overriding concerns of the politicians. The growth of an imperialistic spirit posed a severe threat to the integrity of Egypt; Blunt understood the drive for imperial gains and saw in it the most sinister consequences.

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(2) Ibid., p. 15.
(3) Ibid., p. 213.
(4) Ibid., p. 192.

> My reading of history has taught, and practical experience has confirmed to me the fact that the task undertaken by a nation of ruling other nations against their will is the most certain step for it upon the road to national ruin.[5]

This was a somewhat surprising and intrepid statement for a Victorian aristocrat to make. How was it possible for a man with Blunt's strict English education to come to the point where he fervently adhered to such a principle? This volte face from Victorian ideals did not occur instantaneously, but was an outgrowth of continuous travel and study. Blunt, as he noted facetiously in his book, The Secret History, began "life rather early in an English country house." His was the typical English gentleman's education. He dabbled in the arts, poetry, sculpture, the art of the chase and the hunt, and with diplomacy. All of these interests he managed to master with a fair degree of skill. For a short interlude, he was employed in the diplomatic corps and was stationed in South America where he clashed with Richard Burton who was later to find his life entangled in the Middle East.[6]

Blunt continued in the foreign service and was constantly on the move until he decided to settle down in 1869. In that year, he married Lady Anne Noel, grand daughter of Lord Byron and a somewhat straightlaced, stern personality.

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(5) Ibid., p. x Others like Morley, Cobden and the Little Englanders also agreed with Blunt on this point.

(6) For more on these contrasting personalities see: Thomas Assad, Three Victorian Travelers: Burton, Blunt, Doughty (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964).

Anne was almost a diametric opposite of her gay charming husband;[7] this fact was later to lead to marital difficulties, but the two were happy during the first years of their marriage. Soon after the wedding, Blunt quit the foreign service. After the death of his elder brother, Blunt inherited the family fortune and great estate in Sussex. Freed from the fetters of having to work for his living, Blunt and his wife embarked on a long journey to the Near East, a land to which the two adventurers were often to return.

During this period, Blunt continued to write verse which was rather well received in England. He was later to use this literary talent for furthering the cause of Egyptian independence. His poetry had a freshness too often absent in Victorian poesy; he was not afraid to employ every-day incidents in his works and his language possessed an almost Elizabethan quality.[8] But Blunt lacked the spark of true genius, was never completely dedicated to his writing, and became more mesmerized with the Near East and its struggles for freedom than in the hard discipline required of a writer.

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(7) Story has it that Anne even wore a hat to bed; she was, however, devoted to Wilfred and treated him as her lord and master. See: Neville Lytton, The English Country Gentleman (London: Hurst & Blackett, n.d.), p. 209. Hereafter cited as Lytton: The English Country Gentleman.

(8) M. Lesemann, "Passing Aristocracy," Poetry, XXII (September, 1923), 338.

The Blunts' travels in the East began in 1873 with a tour through Asia Minor. At the time, Blunt was recovering from a serious bout of consumption, the same disease which had so recently killed his brother. It was hoped that the tour would either cure him or be a pleasant last remembrance. It cured him.

In 1875, the couple passed briefly through Egypt, but they did not really see what was happening within this disrupted nation. Their journeys took them into Arabia in 1876, but the trip was marred by their ignorance of the Arabic language; which hindered them from becoming acquainted with the people and their way of life. Because of this unenlightenment, Blunt continued to cling to the traditional English belief that the Egyptians, although good-natured, were hardly fit for self-government. Like his compatriots, Blunt believed that the English were eminently fit for governing less fortunate people; he, too, had succumbed to imperialistic propaganda about the necessity for England to govern commercially successful colonies and the desirability of her beneficent rule in other nations.[9]

> In the year 1876 I too, as I have said, was a believer in England, and I shared the common idea of the beneficence of her rule in the East, and I had no other thought for the Egyptians than that they should share with India, which I had not yet seen, the privilege of our protection. 10

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(9) For examples of typical pro-imperialistic dissertations see either: Edward Dicey, The Story of the Khedivate (London: Revingtons, 1902) or for an account of English colonialism and the creation of little Englands abroad see J.R.Seeley, the Expansion of England (London: Macmillan & Co, 1895), The latter received widespread acclaim within England.
(10) Wilfred Scawen Blunt, Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt: Being a Personal Narrative of Events (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1922), p. 10. Hereafter cited as Blunt: Secret History.

Blunt returned to England in 1878 still supporting English colonialism. While at home he caught up on Britain's latest expansion schemes and prepared the journal Anne had kept during their travels in Iraq for publication. This study was later published under the title Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates. By the fall of 1878, the Blunts were ready to return to the Fertile Crescent in order to learn more about the Arabs and to obtain the Arab horse fillies which were to become the beginning of Blunt's famous Crabbet breed.[11]

On this trip, and the subsequent one to India, Blunt's eyes were opened to the extraordinary undercurrent of unrest that rippled within the Eastern world. These visits convinced Blunt that English rule left much to be desired, yet he stuck tenaciously to the hope that its governing institutions might be improved.

> Though a good Conservative ... I own to being shocked at the Egyptian bondage in which they (the Indians) are held, and my faith in British institutions and the blessings of British rule have received a severe blow. ...
>
> I still believed, but with failing faith, in the good intentions, if no longer good results, of our Eastern rule, and I thought it could be improved and that the people at home would insist upon its being improved if they only knew.[12]

During the course of this trip, Blunt met with many prominent Arab leaders and talked at length with Englishmen residing in the East. In Damascus, Blunt made the fateful acquaintance of

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(11) Ibid., p. 29.
(12) Ibid., pp. 47-48.

Sir Edward Malet, current Secretary in Constantinople, and with whom Blunt was soon to have important and far reaching affiliations.

The Blunts returned to England from this Eastern tour firmly convinced that English colonial government needed reform and with a definite sympathy for the Arabs. They promptly began to study in earnest about Arab customs and language. There has been some dispute over how well the two ever learned the complexities of the Arabic language. His son-in-law swore that Blunt's language knowledge was always perfunctory,[13] but his grandson propounded that although Blunt's knowledge of classical was limited, his accent was perfect, and that he was continually taken for an Arab.[14] Certainly, Anne's classical/Arabic was extremely good; her translations of Arabic poetry, particularly of the Moallakat, are testaments to this fact. Blunt, too, must have had a fairly good grasp of the nuances of the language for his poetic rendition of Anne's translation of the Moallakat is a finely wrought piece which catches the magic of Arabian love poetry.[15] Blunt would have

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(13) Lytton: English Country Gentleman, p.226.
(14) Noel Anthony Scawen Lytton, Wilfred Scawen Blunt (London: MacDonald, 1961), p. 290.
(15) See The Seven Golden Odes of Pagan Arabia, Known also as the Moallakat, trans. Lady Anne Blunt, in verse by W.S. Blunt (London: Chiswick Press, 1903); this is probably the Blunts' most scholarly work. For more on Blunt's views of Arabian poetry see: W. S. Blunt, "Arabian Poetry of the Days of Ignorance," The New Review, XIV (1896), 626-35, and Padraic Colum, "Wilfred Scawen Blunt," Commonweal, XIV (1931), 635-6.

had his peers believe that his knowledge of Arabic was extensive, but he revealed that when speaking with Egyptians in 1881 he was still using interpreters. It seems that, at least at this time, his Arabic was not fluent; on the other hand, it appears likely, in face of his following extensive travels, that his linguistic ability considerably improved.

Returning to England, 1880, in time for the political controversy over the coming elections, Blunt settled down into English social life; his studies continued, however, with his teacher Sabunji, an educated Oriental of Christian origins who served as Blunt's tutor and friend for many years. Blunt returned to Egypt in the autumn of 1880, whereupon he renewed his friendship with Malet, now Consul in Egypt. The former's diaries reveal that he had not yet found a definite mechanism with which the expected revival of Islam could be implemented. He returned back to his homeland in 1881 and spent the summer writing The Future of Islam. After completing the book, Blunt once again sailed for Egypt, this time intending to spend only a short time in the country before embarking on new travels. Hearing from his Arabic teacher and enthusiastic liberal professor of the al-Azhar University, Shaikh Mohammed Khalil, that the al-Azhar was being reformed and that Egypt was following on the same path, Blunt, with some misgivings, detoured to stop in Cairo.[16]

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(16) Blunt: Secret History , pp. 121-2.

He was met at the Kasr el Nil Hotel, not by his old friend Khalil, but by Mohammed Khalil el-Hajrasi, another Shaikh from al-Azhar, who proceded to acquaint Blunt with the activities of the nationalists and of the break between the al-Azharites and the army factions. By November, Blunt was well versed in the movements of the al-Azhar and was enlisted to present to Malet the grievances against the current Shaikh al-Azhar, Mohammed el-Abbasi. This individual was from the Hanefite rite and was an appointee of the Khedive. Due to these two factors, the ulema did not feel el-Abbasi's fetwas were honestly delivered; they preferred to have a Shaikh from the Malekite school. Blunt presented this grievance to Malet, finding the Consul entirely ignorant of the differences between the two schools. Malet readily agreed to allow the al-Azhar shaikhs to replace el-Abbasi. On December fifth, the students ousted el-Abbasi and put in his place al-Embabi, from the Shafeite rite. According to Blunt, this man was an inferior candidate, but the Khedive refused to accept the appointment of the more favored el-Aleysh, a man who had a reputation for high personal courage and outspoken views on the current monarchy.[17]

Up until this time, Blunt still had not been introduced to Urabi. Muhammad Abdu, a Shaikh in al-Azhar and famed

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(17) Ibid., pp. 123-7.

leader of Islamic reform, and el-Hajrasi refused to introduce the two men because of the split between the army officers and the ulema; Blunt was, however, able to meet with Abd al-'Al[18] and Ali Fehmi, two key members of the army faction. Early in December, Urabi returned from Ras-el-Wady; although the division between the two parties had not yet been repaired, Blunt was able to make arrangements to meet Urabi. Accompanied by Abd al-'Al and Sabunji, his interpreter, Blunt went to talk with Urabi on December 12.[19] On this occasion the two men held a long conversation about the growing unrest within Egypt and the attitude of England towards the new national movement. Blunt recorded in his journal that he attempted to reassure Urabi concerning the English government's plans and, more particularly, on the integrity of the English Consul, Malet.[20] The interview was by all measures a success. Blunt left the house distinctly impressed with Urabi and with his ambition to reform Egypt; it is important to note, however, that Blunt had been wholly involved with the movement several months prior to meeting Urabi. The conversation with Urabi only served to reinforce impressions or feelings which Blunt had long since adopted.

Now totally committed to the nationalists' aspirations, Blunt began to work to acquaint the English public with the

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(18) Blunt refers to al-'Al as Eid Diab, Ibid., p. 129.
(19) Ibid.
(20) Ibid., p. 132.

party's aims and accomplishments. Indeed, in the space of a few short years the national movement had undergone a drastic cohesion and growth. To understand the reasons for this unrest it is necessary to look at the situation in Egypt during the latter part of the nineteenth-century, and, further, to trace quickly the conception and maturation of national aspirations within the Egyptian population. From Sa'id's concession for constructing the Suez Canal to Ferdinand de Lesseps until the final abdication of Isma'il, the Egyptian financial situation had steadily worsened; Isma'il had grandiose schemes for modernizing Egypt, but he was forced to depend upon the loans of European governments and banking firms for capital. With the collapse of the artificial cotton price boom at the close of the American Civil War,[21] the Egyptian financial crisis intensified. Not even the sale of the Khedive's remaining Suez Canal shares to the British government (1875) could alleviate the situation. Nor did the consolidation of the tremendous debt in 1877 halt the continuous plunge of the Egyptian economy.[22] Europe, therefore, decided the time for a joint action had come. England and France

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(21) For more on the over speculation which was rampant in Egypt during the American Civil War see: David Saul Landes, Bankers and Pashas: International finance and Economic Imperialism in Egypt (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958).

(22) The Earl of Cromer, Modern Egypt, Vol. I (London: Macmillan & Co., 1908), pp. 34-5. Hereafter cited as Cromer: Modern Egypt.

established a Dual Control for Egyptian finances in 1876; this arrangement was to last for twenty-two months. When the finances failed to show marked improvement, the French and the English persuaded the Khedive to create an International Commission of Inquiry; the Commission began its work in April, 1878 and delivered its report in August. The report recommended that the Khedive accept the role of a constitutional monarch with two Controllers-General in charge of the finances. Further economic measures such as the dismissal of 2,500 army officers led to a public demonstration of army officers on February 18, 1879. This act gave impetus to the idea of deposing Isma'il and placing his son, Tewfik, on the throne; Isma'il was deposed in June, 1879. By November 15, 1879, Khedive Tewfik had appointed two new Controllers-General, Englishman Evelyn Baring (later Lord Cromer) and the Frenchman N. de Blignières.

Although this Control was aimed at helping the situation within Egypt, it was, nonetheless, established for the interest of the bondholders and merely gave a type of sanction for the heavy taxation that continued to fall on the fellahin. [23] The Controllers attempted to improve matters, but they were hampered by poorly qualified personnel and the inherent dualism of their own organization. [24]

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(23) D. Mackenzie Wallace, Egypt and the Egyptian Question (London: Macmillan, 1883), p. 121. Hereafter cited as Wallace: The Egyptian Question.

(24) Ibid., p. 125. For a more favorable analysis of the Control see Cromer: Modern Egypt, pp. 164-74.

They were employed by the vested interests within Europe; as such, they could go only so far in instigating far reaching reforms. Under the Dual Control, Egypt had to devote every spare penny to the sinking fund. Although it appeared fair to Egypt's creditors that she repay her debt as soon as possible, it was not feasible for an agricultural country like Egypt to devote all of her resources to paying off a debt when she had to have fluid capital at hand in order to develop irrigation and water projects upon which her crops depended. To deny her the capital to run these projects was to impair her agricultural produce upon which her entire economy was based. The Dual Control was essentially killing the goose who laid the golden eggs.[25]

By the spring of 1880, a Commission of Liquidation had been formed; they delivered their report in the summer. This report defined the existing state of Egyptian finances. The debt was consolidated at £ 98,376,660 [26] over which the Controllers-General exercised complete powers; in fact, the sovereignty of the Egyptian nation had been negated. European powers were in control not only of

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(25) Wallace: The Egyptian Question, p. 489.
(26) A.E. Crouchley, The Economic Development of Modern Egypt (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1938), p. 124. Croachley has complete data on the Egyptian debt, export and import statistics, and population figures, pp. 255-70.

her financial program, but also over her courts and administrative processes.[27]

Thus by 1879-1880, Egypt needed a complete program of revitalization. Her major problems called for seven developmental projects: separation from oppressive Turkish rule, tribunals rather than arbitrary monarchial rule, a working Chamber of Notables, a reduction of royal expenditures, just taxation, general elevation of the fellahin, and abolition of slavery.[28] The existence of a totalitarian form of government which severely oppressed every sector of its populace, coupled with the constant encroachment of European governments and investors, gave impetus to Egypt's mushrooming discontent. From every sector of the country came cries for reform and for the end of arbitrary government. The most vociferous complaints were initiated by young men with foreign educations, Muslim patriots, and army officers.

The army was a particularly potent and dangerous element of dissent against Khedival rule. There was great

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(27) For a fuller account of this period see Mahmud Zayid, Egypt's Struggle for Independence (Beirut: Khayats, 1965). Hereafter cited as Zayid: Egypt's Struggle.

(28) Edwin de Leon, The Khedive's Egypt or the Old House of Bondage under New Masters (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1878), pp. 410-12. Hereafter cited as de Leon: The Khedives' Egypt. Also see Seymour J. Keay, Spoiling the Egyptians: a Tale of Shame told by the British Blue Books (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1882) for more concerning the state of Egypt during this period. Hereafter cited as Keay: Spoiling the Egyptians.

inequality in the conscription and promotion policies; Turks and Circassians formed the nucleus of the officer class while the fellahin were relegated to lower positions. Conscription was a feared and hated institution among all Egyptians. Low pay scales and long terms of service served to reinforce this traditional mistrust. In 1879, the soldiers were on half pay and had received no arrears for long overdue salaries; this caused widespread alarm. Some observers date the origins of the National Party from this time, but one cannot name the diverse factions which were prevalent among the army cliques a "Party" in any sense of the modern term. These dissenters were merely foreshadows of what was soon to follow.

Secret societies had been cropping up around the Egyptian countryside as early as 1876. It is certain that a secret society of army officers which was to become the nucleus for the National Party existed in 1876, but it was probably formed much earlier. This society was created by 'Ali al-Rubi and was sponsored by Halim Pasha, the last living son of Mehemet 'Ali. [29] The society was fomented by the speeches of al-Afghani [30] and the work of the Masonic

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(29) Jacob M. Landau, Parliaments and Parties in Egypt (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954), pp. 73-83. Hereafter cited as Landau: Parliaments in Egypt.

(30) Ibid.

Lodges; newspapers were still another source for publicizing complaints.[31] The Abu Naddara edited by M. Sanau, who was a friend of Blunt's and exercised wide influence on many supporters of Urabi,[32] was the most popular of a series of satirical papers which flourished in Egypt; for this reason the government halted all its publications, exiled its editor, and, in general, cracked down on freedom of the press.[33]

National discontent became more manifest after the ascension of Tewfik to the Khedive's throne. When the European powers felt that Isma'il was no longer capable of ruling Egypt in the manner which they wished, they persuaded him to abdicate in favor of his son, Tewfik. Tewfik assumed his new responsibilities on June 26, 1789. He was ill prepared for the legacy of foreign intrigue, economic chaos, and personal enmity which his father had bequeathed to him. Tewfik, unlike his brothers, had only an Egyptian education; he spoke English with difficulty

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(31) See M. Hartmann, The Arabic Press of Egypt (London: Luzac, 1899) for an account of newspaper publications during this period.

(32) A finely drawn sketch of Sanau's personality and work is to be found in Irene L. Gendzier, "James Sanau and Egyptian Nationalism, "Middle East Journal, XI (1961), 16-28.

(33) John Ninet, "Origin of the National Party in Egypt", Nineteenth Century, XIII (January, 1883), 127 and Blanchard Jerrold, The Belgium of the East (London: W.H. Allen & Co., 1882), p.38. Hereafter cited as Jerrold: Belgium of the East. Other papers include al-qahiri which continued from Paris and the"Official Gazette."

and was more accustomed to harem skullduggery than to the manipulations of court diplomatists. [34] Isma'il had never favored him and had left him to be brought up by his slave mother. Opinion was unanimous among observers that Tewfik was a weak, indecisive creature. [35] He was even quoted in The London Times as saying, "If Europe insists, I must give way." [36] He was, however, acquainted with the aspirations of the nationalists and had had contact with them when he was Premier of the Cabinet formed in 1879. Indeed, before his accession to the Khedivate, he had been known for his sympathy for the nationalists' cause. [37] But Tewfik lacked the strength of his father for controlling dissident factions; he soon lost control of the situation. Even the moderate Times' correspondent was forced to admit that since the Khedive had chosen to keep the same evil advisors he would be unable to make rapid strides towards improving conditions. [38]

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(34) Khedives and Pashas by One who Knows Them Well (London: Sampson Law, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1884), p. 30. Hereafter cited as Khedives and Pashas.
(35) Keay: Spoiling the Egyptians, p.51. Lt. Col. Harmann Vogt, The Egyptian War of 1882 (London: Kegan Paul, 1883), p. 7. Hereafter cited as Vogt: The Egyptian War.
(36) Times (London), August 20, 1879.
(37) Zayid: Egypt's Struggle, p. 19.
(38) Times, August 20, 1879, p. 4.

Nationalist feelings were fairly well molded by the time Tewfik became Khedive. These were evidenced in the springing up of societies whose members came from every social class. The secret societies have already been mentioned; they were followed by other societies whose aims were made public. One of the more important of these societies was the al-jam'iyya al-khairiyya al-islamiyya founded by al-Nadim in 1879. In the same year the fellahin officers joined in the al-hizb al-watani or National Party. Besides the army officers its membership also included religious leaders and members of the Assembly of Delegates. Three elements, among others, contributed to the growth of these nationistic organizations. The first was al-Afghani's Islamic reform movement; the second was Sherif Pasha's plan for constitutional reform. Sherif was a well known Egyptian government leader, who was charged with the formation of a Cabinet in the spring of 1879. The last force was the army officers' group which urged Egyptian leaders to declare their independence from European domination. The aforementioned National Party, made up of a loosely organized association of army officers and religious leaders, made itself publicly known on April 2, 1879, when it presented to Khedive Isma'il a program, al-la'iha al-wataniyya, which outlined the financial and constitutional problems faced by Egypt.[39]

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(39) For a complete outline on the origins of the National Party see: Landau: Parliaments in Egypt, pp. 84-90.

The investiture of Tewfik pacified the National Party for a time; this period of co-operation was to be short termed. Tewfik's rejection of a projected constitution and dismissal of Sherif from office coupled with his exile of al-Afghani in November caused the National Party to make their grievances known to the Egyptian nation.[40] They issued on November 4, 1879 a "Manifesto of the Egyptian National Party."[41] This long program presented an outline of expected reforms while containing "a bold wish for the achievement of Egyptian autonomy."[42] It also demanded that the Treasury be returned to the Khedive and that a three man commission from the international control to act in harmony with the Egyptian government be formed. This program represented the wishes of a cross section of the Egyptian populace; signatures included names from the civil servants, army officers, who showed rising power, and minority groups. Only the aristocracy which was allied with the Khedive was not represented; Sherif was the single exception to this rule.

Recognizing the growing threat which the army faction of the National Party posed to the government, Tewfik's ministry took steps to crush it before it became too strong . In May 1880, Ahmad Urabi, a lieutenant colonel, and several other officers had drawn up a petition which listed their

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(40) Ibid., p. 84.
(41) Ibid., p. 90
(42) Ibid., p. 91

grievances; they had presented this to the Khedive on the twentieth but had received little encouragement. Urabi was at this time closely associated with the National Party. Rifki, Tewfik's unpopular defense minister, noted Urabi's party affiliations and determined to eliminate him and his associates. Early in 1881, under the pretense of calling the officers to plan a marriage procession for the Khedive's sister, Rifki lured Urabi, Ali Fehmi, and Abd al-'Al, the nucleus of the rebellious clique, to the Kasr el Nil. Rifki's plan was foiled by Mahmoud Sami who had been present when the plot was conceived and who informed the fated officers about the scheme.[43] Knowing what was to befall, the officers kept the appointment, but pre-arranged to have their loyal soldiers rescue them; on the night of February 1, 1881, Rifki's scheme fell through, and Urabi, with his supporters, was able to seize control. From this point on, Urabi was considered the leader of the nationalists.

Urabi, a peasant, had a traditional Muslim education and was best known for his eloquence. Nationalists extolled his honesty, bravery, and intelligent countenance, while

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(43) Wallace: The Egyptian Question, p. 72. Also mentioned in Urabi's personal account of the revolution in "Instructions to my Counsel," Nineteenth Century Review, XII (December, 1882), 969-96. Hereafter cited as Urabi: "Instructions to my Counsel."

imperial interests remarked only that his dreamy eyes indicated "vacuity." [44] Undoubtedly, Urabi was hindered by his lack of ability to speak English, nor was he familar with Western habits or European diplomacy. This latter shortcoming was to severely harm Urabi's cause and to force him to depend on advisers who were not always loyally aligned to the National Party's cause and who sometimes gave misleading counsel. His most redeeming qualities were his native wit and his clear comprehension of what his countrymen desired.

After the failure of Rifki's plan, the National Party led by Urabi forged ahead. Immediately following the attempt on Urabi's life, the Party held a huge meeting for 1500 people. On this occasion, (February 13, 1881), Urabi sat quietly on the speaker's stand while the ever popular al-Nadim and Abdu spoke on the Party's aims. [45] The power of

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(44) For the most colorful uncomplimentary description of Urabi see Edward Dicey, " England's Intervention in Egypt, " Nineteenth Century Review, XII (November, 1882), 96. More objective descriptions may be obtained from Wallace: The Egyptian Question, p. 100 or Khedives and Pashas, p. 67.

(45) Jerrold: Belgium of the East , pp. 167-9.

the nationalists was so strong that Tewfik was forced to dismiss Rifki and accept Mahmud Samial-Barudi another ardent nationalist, as Minister of War. But matters were not yet settled. Trouble continued to brew throughout the spring of 1881, for internal matters were little improved. The country was ripe for insurrection. In July, a soldier was killed in Alexandria. His compatriots took his body to the palace for all to see. For this misdemeanor they were tried and court-martialed.[46] The subsequent appointment of Daoud Pasha Yeghan, the Khedive's brother-in-law, as Minister of War, served to exaggerate an already tense situation.[47]

Malet, the English Consul, had meantime gone off on the vacation which he had planned in April. Constantinople was his destination point. The Times speculated as to the possible ulterior motives Malet's untimely sojourn might have.

> There is a very widespread impression in ordinarily well-informed quarters that the visit of Mr. Malet to Constantinople is not unconnected with an intention on the part of England and France to propose in certain eventualities such temporary occupation in conjunction with Turkey as may be necessary.[48]

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(46) Baron de Kusel, An Englishman's Recollections of Egypt (London: Bodley Head, 1915), p. iii: Hereafter cited as Baron de Kusel: An Englishman's Recollections of Egypt.
(47) Cromer: Modern Egypt, p. 182
(48) Times, September 7, 1881, p.7.

Malet seemed to have been quite ignorant of these contemplations for he noted diplomatically that the trip was uneventful; he even feigned surprise at the swift turn of events which occurred in Egypt while he was "basking in the sun." [49]

Others were not, however, as optimistic as Malet was; they fully expected a full scale demonstation of one kind or another. They did not have to wait long. Trouble broke out when Daoud ordered Urabi to move to Alexandria and al-'Al to Damietta. This was an obvious attempt to split the power of the key National Party leaders. Upon receiving this note, Urabi replied to Daoud that he should be prepared for a staged demonstration in front of the Khedive's palace. At this time, Urabi planned to present a list of demands to the governing officials. True to his word, Urabi, accompanied by his faithful soldiers, surrounded Abdin palace at three o'clock in the afternoon on September 9, 1881. [50] Estimates place the number of soldiers around the palace anywhere from 2,500 [51] to 4,000. [52] The former was the

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(49) Sir Edward Malet, Egypt (1879-1882) (London: John Murray, 1909), p. 140. Hereafter cited as Malet: Egypt.

(50) Arabi, " Instructions to my Counsel," p. 975.

(51) Cookson to Granville, September 10, 1881. British and Foreign State Papers (1873-1900), ed. Augustus H. Oakes (His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1904), p. 1132. Hereafter cited as State Papers.

(52) M. Rifaat Bey, The Awakening of Modern Egypt (London: Longmans, 1947), p.181. Hereafter cited as Rifaat Bey: The Awakening of Modern Egypt.

quess of Mr. Cookson, the British Vice-Consul in Alexandria, and was probably the most accurate.

Urabi himself did not mention the exact number of demonstrators, but the number was adequate to convince Tewfik of the seriousness of the situation. Tewfik, flanked by Colvin, the English Financial Controller, faced the mounted Urabi; he demanded that Urabi dismount and put up his sword. Urabi dismounted and sheathed his sword; [53] he then stated that he had come in the name of the people.

> We come for law and justice; so long as you give us both you are our master; if not, we have your successor ready.[54]

Short upon this, Urabi delivered the following three demands: 1. the Ministry be removed 2. a Parliament be convened 3. the army be increased to 18,000 [55]

If Tewfik had promptly refused to countenance these demands the entire matter might have abated, but the Khedive cowered in front of Urabi's show of arms. He listened to the demands and then escaped to the safety of the palace, leaving Cookson, Malet's Acting Consul, to arrange a settlement./ While he negotiated with an infidel, Urabi could easily rely on the complete support of the army which otherwise might have hesitated to take action

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(53) Cromer; Modern Egypt, p. 185 and Blunt; Secret History, p. 114.
(54) Times, September 12, 1881, p. 5.
(55) Cromer: Modern Egypt, p. 186.

against the Khedive. Cookson warned Urabi of the great risk he was taking and that he should be prepared to meet the combined forces of the Porte and Europe.[56] Urabi remained adamant. After two hours, Cookson submitted to Urabi's demands, which were then presented to the Khedive who also acquiesced.[57]

After Tewfik's capitulation, a new ministry was chosen. Sherif at first demurred from accepting the premiership, but after a petition with 4,000 seals was presented to him, he was persuaded to overcome his uncertainty.[58] Mahmud Sami al-Barudi was reinstated as Minister of War. With the situation well in hand, Urabi went off to his post in Ras-el-Wadi. He received a hero's farewell from Cairo's mobs. Certainly,

> Never since the days of Mohamed Ali ... was there a man in Egypt who had such a firm hold on the country as Urabi, for he had not only the army and police at his disposal and consequently was in a position to terrorize to any extent he chose, but he also enjoyed... the sympathies of nearly every section of the native population.[59]

Europe took due note of these inauspicious developments; the correspondence of Malet and Granville, Secretary of State in England, revealed that the two men were contemplating some form of intervention, or at least a show of power, as early

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(56) Cookson to Granville, September 10, 1882, State Papers, p. 1133.
(57) Ibid.
(58) Urabi, "Instructions to my Counsel," p. 379.
(59) Wallace: The Question of Egypt, p. 379.

as the fall of 1881.[60] Granville discussed with Malet the possibility of having part of the English fleet winter in Alexandria, but the arrival of the Invincible in Alexandria's harbor caused the Porte to object so vehemently that Granville was forced to reconsider his first objective.[61] Malet, however, expressed his hope that the ship would remain since its presence gave him a feeling of security.[62]

During November the course of events appeared to be somewhat smoother, and Europe once again took heart. On November 16, 1881, Malet even announced that the British were against foreign intervention in Egyptian affairs and would aid the current government.[63] Soon after this, it was decided that Urabi should return to Cairo to learn the intricacies accompanying the position of Assistant War Minister. It was after his return to Cairo that Blunt made his acquaintance. The Nationalist's cabinet had been in power just over two months and was riding on a crest of popular support. It had not yet moved towards a revolutionary program which would incure the enmity of the Khedive or his supporters in court. These halcyon days were not, however, to last, and Blunt was soon to find himself deeply enmeshed in the labyrinth of Egyptian-European affairs.

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(60) Granville to Malet, October 10,1881, State Papers, p.1155.
(61) Dufferin to Granville, October 11,1881, State Papers, p.1155.
(62) Malet to Granville, October 24,1881, State Papers, p.1159.
(63) Times, November 16, 1881, p. 5.

II. THE INTERIM

The new cabinet under Sherif, who had a reputation for moderation and nationalistic leanings, immediately began its work toward reform. It was a liberal body, supported by the Chamber of Notables; because of this the cabinet had an excellent opportunity to implement its programs. The cabinet members were: Mahmud al-Barudi Sami, Minister of War; Ali Haidar Pasha, Minister of Finance; Ismail Ayyub Pasha, Minister of Public Works; Muhammad Zaki Pasha, Minister of Education and Waqf; Qadri Pasha, Minister of Justice; and Fehmi, Minister of Foreign Affairs.[1] There is evidence that Sherif objected to Sami Pasha's appointment since he was, by far, the most extreme nationalist in the cabinet. Not only did Sherif favor a slow steady progressive form of government under an Organic Law, but he also wished to maintain European control over the finances in order to assure Egypt of a sound economy.[2] For this stand, Sherif secured support from Europe and Egypt.

Under Sherif's expert guidance, the Chamber of Notables adopted his constitutional proposal, which clearly

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(1) H. M. Darwish, Al-Wasarat al-Misriyya (Cairo, 1924), p. 76

(2) M. Rifaat Bey: The Awakening of Modern Egypt, p. 185.

defined the broad powers which the Chamber was to possess.[3] The Khedive was reportedly impressed by the modern and moderate tone of the document, but feelings of co-operation faded when the Khedive and the Chamber clashed over the budget. The Notables rightly felt that they should have the prerogative to vote on the budget of their country; on the other hand, the European powers and the weak Tewfik maintained that as long as Egypt remained in deep debt the Dual Control should exercise complete authority over Egyptian finances.

As previously noted, the financial state of Egypt was in a disreputable condition . Glancing only at the total imports and exports gives a misleading picture of the true state of affairs. In 1881, the total exports reached £13,315,000 while the imports totaled £7,115,000;[4] however, these figures do not take into account the colossal debt and the fact that almost all of the exports were concentrated in one product - cotton. Most of this cotton found a market in England. Thus Egypt was not only indebted to England but was also forced to depend upon her for almost all of her export purchases. Working from these factors, the English controller upheld his right to govern Egyptian finances. However, the Notables

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(3) Landau: Parliaments in Egypt, pp. 33-40, had a summary of the Chamber's work and of the projected constitution. He notes also how surprising it was that a Chamber comprised primarily of the landed classes should express such an abiding interest in the fellahin, p. 35. Indeed, the entire proceedings were marked by a liberal slant.

(4) Times, April 6, 1882.

doggedly asserted that they could manage the budget while introducing wide spread reforms in taxation and capitulations, which would enable the nation to repay her debt more efficiently, and at the same time, lighten the burden of the suffering fellahin.[5]

The division between the Khedive and the Chamber came out into the open when the Chamber discussed what portion of the budget was to be allotted for the army. Colvin put the limit at £ 522,000, while Sami Pasha argued that he needed at least £600,000. It appeared that the two parties had reached an impasse.[6] At this time, Blunt was enlisted as an intermediary. In a private letter Malet wrote concerning the matter:

> Wilfred Blunt who is here and who goes about a good deal amongst the natives, tells me he sees no trace of the fanaticism which he had heard sprung up amongst them of late.[7]

Evidently influenced by Blunt's persuasive arguments for the National Party's cause, Malet decided that perhaps some form of compromise could be reached. It seemed logical to him to employ Blunt for this end.

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(5) Keay: Spoiling the Egyptians, p.92. Also refer to Crouchley for more details on the taxation policies of the Egyptian government prior to this time; he has an excellent discussion of the oppressive Moukabala tax which proved to be an important factor in taxation policies after its initiation in 1871.

(6) Wilfred Scawen Blunt, "The Egyptian Revolution: A Personal Narrative," Nineteenth Century Review, XII (September, 1882), pp. 324-46.

(7) Edward Malet: Egypt, p. 206.

> I am going to make use of him to try and induce Urabi to consent to the Controllers' figures. [8]

At this juncture, it is important to note that Urabi was considered by the British authorities in Egypt, and by the Egyptians in general, to be the leader and the true power behind the National Party. For this reason, all matters eventually found their way for final approval or rejection to Urabi, not to Sherif.

At any rate, Blunt was more than happy to try and implement a compromise between the Controllers and Urabi. Blunt felt that both Malet and his French counterpart, Sinkiewicz, were painfully ill-informed as to the true nature of the National Party movement; [9] he was only too pleased to provide them with a more objective view and to act as a negotiator between them and the nationalists. Thus on the nineteenth of December, Blunt was asked by Colvin to intervene on his behalf; Blunt was able to procure an agreement from Urabi and the other officers to accept Colvin's offer of £522,000. With this amount the officers hoped to increase the number of the soldiers to 18,000 men. In his journal, Blunt noted that the officers displayed remarkable patience and were quite willing to work closely with co-operative English officials. [10]

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(8) Ibid., p. 208.
(9) Blunt: Secret History, p. 127
(10) Ibid., p. 135.

At the same time, Blunt, together with Sir William Gregory, an English resident in Egypt and longtime liberal, and the nationalist leaders, decided to send a program of aims to Gladstone and the London Times. Although Malet approved the sending of this program to Gladstone, he rather vehemently disapproved of its publication in the Times.[11] The program differed from the 1879 National Program in that it was obviously directed towards an English audience; both programs expressed a desire to clear up the existing debt, to delay using force, and to adopt internal reforms. The 1881 program, however, also included a clause on the increase of the army size while stressing the political aims of the National Party.[12] Having drawn up the program, Blunt proceeded to forward it, on December twentieth, to Gladstone; [13] at Gregory's behest, he also sent it to the Times.[14]

This latter action on Blunt's part marked a turning point in his relationship with Malet. After this, the formerly rather warm friendship between the two men noticeably cooled. Blunt felt this enmity was due to Malet's conservatism which made the latter dislike the idea of bringing the numerous grievances of the National Party to the attention of the English public at large.[15] Malet, at this point,

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(11) Ibid., p. 133
(12) Landau: Parliaments in Egypt, pp. 92-3.
(13) The full text of this program may be found in Appendix II of Blunt: The Secret History, pp. 383-5.
(14) Ibid., p. 133.
(15) Ibid.

wrote to Granville concerning Blunt; his tone differed from that of the previous letters all of which had mentioned Blunt in favorable terms. He talked only on Blunt's "too fervent espousal of the national cause."[16] Blunt noticed this change in Malet's attitude during his December twenty-eighth meeting with him; this was only two days after Malet's scathing letter to Granville.[17]

In spite of the alteration in the personal relationship between the two men, they both felt, at the turn of the year, that things were going rather well. Indeed, it appeared that the new cabinet might actually accomplish the hoped for reforms. But things were moving in other directions in European capitals. French and English government officials had been upset by the September turmoil; they were worried about the trend in Egypt towards independence, and they determined to nip any trouble in the early stages. On October fourth, Granville wrote to Malet asking for suggestions concerning action the English might take in co-ordination with France.[18] Rumors that the Chamber of Notables planned to oust Sherif and substitute Sami Pasha only heightened British apprehension. Concerning this rumor, Granville wrote to Gladstone on December fifteenth:

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(16) Malet: Egypt, personal letter, December 26, 1881, p. 211.
(17) Blunt: Secret History, p. 136.
(18) Lord Granville to Mr. Gladstone, F. O. October 4, 1881 in The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville (1876-1882), Vol. I, ed. Agatha Ramm (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 298. Hereafter cited as Gladstone, Granville Correspondence.

> ... we shall be in a scrape, if we are not prepared with any policy. I am not prepared to propose anything. The suggestion made is to get troops from India, or the French are sure to anticipate us. We certainly ought not to be the first to break with the French. They will propose joint occupation, which is very awkward.
> I am not sure that it would not be better, hateful as it is, to insist upon Turkish occupation, under strict conditions.[19]

The letter revealed the state of uncertainty and near panic that the English government officials were in over the thorny problem of how to handle the Egyptian crisis.

France, too, was in a quandary concerning what steps to take in the Egyptian issue. She did not want Turkish intervention, for she dreaded that such interference would heighten the troubles in North Africa where she had just finished putting down a troublesome uprising in Tunisia.[20] For this reason, Gambetta, who favored an energetic military measure in Egypt, approached the English on a plan of collaboration. He made this move on December fourteenth through the mediator, Challemel Lacour.[21] Gambetta proposed that the French and English governments, acting in concert, issue a statement to the order that they wished to maintain the status quo within Egypt and would form a united front to

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(19) Granville to Gladstone, December 15, 1881, Gladstone, Granville Correspondence, p. 320.
(20) Wallace: The Egyptian Question, p. 83.
(21) C. de Fréycinet, La Question d'Egypte (Paris: 1904), p. 207. Hereafter cited as Fréycinet: La Question d'Egypte.

preserve this state. For political reasons, and since neither nation was sure how this announcement would be received by other European powers or the Sultan, the French and English governments attempted to keep all negotiations concerning this action absolutely secret. However, hearing about the negotiations, the Times published a long article on them on December twentieth. Dilke, Assistant Foreign Secretary and frequent speaker in Parliament, traveled to Paris on the twenty-seventh of that month and conferred with Gambetta on the following day. [22] On the thirtieth, the British ambassador to France, Lord Lyons, replied that Granville had accepted the idea for joint action.[23] In regard to this, Granville wrote to Gladstone on January second saying:

> I incline to agree to Gambetta's draft-to approve the language held by Malet - to inform Gambetta of what Malet says and our concurrence in it. [24]

Gladstone answered, on the fourth, that he, too, approved Gambetta's draft, but he tempered his endorsement with a frank admission that he was worried lest there be a sincere growth of the national spirit in Egypt.

> But I should regard with utmost apprehension a conflict between the 'Control' and any sentiment truly national, with a persuasion that one way or other we should come to grief in it.

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(22) Blunt: Secret History, p. 140.
(23) Freycinet: La Question d'Egypte, p. 207.
(24) Granville to Gladstone, January 2, 1882, Gladstone, Granville Correspondence, p. 325.

> I am not by any means pained, but I am much surprised at this rapid development of a national sentiment and party in Egypt. ...
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> 'Egypt for the Egyptians' is the sentiment to which I should wish to give scope; and could it prevail it would I think be the best, the only good solution of the 'Egyptian question.' [25]

Banking on this acceptance by Gladstone, Granville signed the note on January 6, 1882. It was delivered to the Khedive in Cairo on January eighth. In short, the Joint Note, as this [illegible] statement was to be called, announced that:

> The two governments are rightfully associated in the resolution to guard against, by their common efforts, all grounds for interior or exterior complications which may come to pass and which menace the established regime in Egypt; do not doubt that this public assurance expresses their formal intention, in this regard, to guard against the perils which the Khedival government may have cause to dread - such perils would above all find England and France united to face them. [26]

The note hit Egypt like a bombshell. Blunt was with Malet soon after the Note was received and reported to him that the nationalists would construe it as a declaration of war. Malet attempted to explain the note as a statement of French and English feelings, and that it was not meant in a hostile sense. [27] Malet then asked Blunt to speak with Urabi and to relate this information to him. Blunt accepted this task. Malet also mentioned that he hoped to be able to add more to the note in order to lessen its severity. [28] Later

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(25) Gladstone to Granville, January 4, 1882, Ibid., p. 326.
(26) Text of the Joint Note (translation from French is given above) State Papers, p. 372. A slightly different wording is found in Freycinet: La Question d'Egypte, p. 210.
(27) Blunt: Secret History, p. 143.
(28) Ibid.

correspondence divulged that Malet and Gladstone both contemplated retracting, or at least revising, the Note, but these ideas never came into fruition. [29]

In an attempt to pacify the National Party, Blunt went, on the ninth, to Kasr el Nil. He found Urabi almost in a rage. "His face was like a thundercloud, and there was a peculiar gleam in his eye."[30] As Blunt had predicted, Urabi saw in the Joint Note a menacing declaration to Egypt. Although Blunt personally agreed with Urabi,[31] he delivered Malet's interpretation of the Note as he had promised; Urabi did not accept the explanation but invited Blunt to return whenever he wished. Blunt, on the other hand, replied that he would return only when he had better news for the leader.[32] He did not see Urabi for three weeks after that.

The total effect of the Note was to fuse both the civil and military elements of the National Party and to make it irreconcilable to any compromise. Even Malet recognized that the Note had caused the Party, the army, and the Chamber of Notables, which heretofore had been badly splintered, to bury their differences and to work together.[33]

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(29) Malet: Egypt, pp. 203, 217 and Gladstone, Granville Correspondence, pp. 327-39.
(30) Blunt: Secret History, p. 144.
(31) Ibid.
(32) Ibid.
(33) Malet: Egypt, p. 227.

Underestimating the movement, France and England felt it was only a matter of showing flags in Egypt and landing, perhaps, a few thousand men; such action, they believed, would halt the spread of the National Party.[34] The Note is an example of how the French and British had totally misjudged the political atmosphere in Egypt; they wrongly assumed that a show of arms would make the Egyptians more pacific. They failed to take into account the strength or extent of the 1881 National Party movement. By January twelfth, they saw that they had seriously erred.[35] But the damage had already been done, and to keep face neither government could retract the Note.

A crisis was rapidly approaching. The Egyptians doubted that France and England could work ensemble; furthermore, they believed that the other European powers would not permit armed action - if the time did come.[36] For this reason, they were more determined than ever, in spite of, or indeed because of the Joint Note, to push through their program of reform and the Organic Law which was designed to delineate the functions of the Chamber. Sherif had drawn up a draft

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(34) Times, January 4, 1882.
(35) See Gladstone, Granville Correspondence from January 12 to January 21, 1882, pp. 327-35.
(36) Wallace: The Egyptian Question, p. 79. Times, January 15, 1882. The Times also wrote on January 10 that the Note was serious in its intent; France and England would indeed occupy Egypt if they deemed it necessary and that the Egyptians should not be deluded otherwise.

of this law without mentioning any right of the Chamber to interfere in financial matters. Obviously, this step was aimed at saving the European Control. But the Notables were in no humor to pacify the Control. They drew up their own version of the Organic Law which included an article subjecting one half of the budget to their power.[37] The Controllers, of course, objected to this arrangement. They held that it was not within the Chambers' power to voice any opinions on the budget. Colvin and Malet asked Blunt to intervene another time on their behalf.

Blunt conferred immediately with Abdu, who wanted a moderate compromise, and who, therefore, arranged for Blunt to meet with the heads of the Party. Blunt's instructions "were to represent to the Members of the Deputation that the existing procedure respecting the Budget was an international affair, which neither Sherif nor the Parliament had any right to touch without gaining the consent of the two controlling Governments."[38] He was authorized by Colvin to say that, although strictly speaking, the budget was to remain completely in the hands of the international control, that they were not adverse to a slight modification of this principle.[39] With the aid of Sabunji, the interpreter, and Abdu, Blunt presented

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(37)Blunt: Secret History, pp. 146-7.
(38) Ibid.
(39) Ibid., p. 148.

his case.[40] Although the leaders were willing to give way on several points, they refused to compromise on the subject of the budget. Blunt was unable to persuade them otherwise and was forced to return to Malet and Colvin empty handed. This was Blunt's last excursion as a mediator between the English diplomats and the nationalists.

Omitting all mention of Blunt's aid in his official correspondence, Malet referred only to the later talks which he himself held with Egyptian leaders. On January 27, 1882, he forwarded a memorandum reiterating the Control's stand to Sherif. According to this note, the Chamber could not vote on the budget without infringing on existing Decrees or without the assent of Britain and France.[41] He wrote to Gladstone concerning his talks with Sherif on the crucial matter, explaining that he had been careful to leave the door open for negotiations.[42] These negotiations never materialized. On February second, Sherif, sensing that he could not hold the nationalists back from their avowed intention of voting on the budget, resigned. He was followed into office by Sami Pasha.

Depressed by the failure of his previous negotiations, Blunt had left Cairo and was not in the capital when Sherif's

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(40) Ibid., p. 148.
(41) Malet to Granville, January 27, 1882, State Papers, p. 374.
(42) Malet to Granville, January 23, 1882, State Papers, p. 377.

cabinet toppled. He had, however, before leaving the city for an isolated provincial spot, written a rigorous defense of the National Party to the Times. Subsequently, he paid a visit to Colvin in order to ascertain the feelings of this important official; he found that Colvin had decided that the nationalists had to be put in their place and that intervention was "necessary and inevitable."[43] Blunt's letter to the Times appeared on February third and excited an editorial to the fact that Blunt and Gregory, who had written a letter at the same time, were entitled to respect and that their views held some grains of truth and wisdom. But the Times stressed England's obligation to fulfill her international agreements and, more importantly, to safeguard the road to India.[44] Here, then, was the true reason for England's intense fear over the growing national feelings within Egypt; from the point of view of her officials, England could not uphold an Egyptian government which might imperil free transit to the East.

Gladstone, however, revealed, in his correspondence with Granville, that he was far from convinced that intervention was the answer.[45] There were too many problems involved in such a decision. First, there was the question of French co-operation; Second, the matter of European opinion, and,

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(43) Blunt: Secret History, p. 151.
(44) Times, February 3, 1882, p. 9.
(45) See Gladstone, Granville Correspondence, January 17, 1882; January 19, 1882; January 31, 1882, pp. 330-7.

third, the prickly problem of Turkish sovereignty. The problem was further complicated after the fall of Gambetta's cabinet on the thirty-first of January. Blunt realized the extent of the predicament but felt that Egypt was saved from foreign occupation in early 1882 only by Gambetta's fall.[46] Blunt took heart when he received a moderate and encouraging letter from Gladstone, in reply to his earlier letter and the National Party's program.[47] In this letter, Gladstone referred to his own article which had been published recently in the Nineteenth Century. The article contained Gladstone's thoughts on the possibility of English intervention in Egypt; he criticized the practicability of the idea and called for non-interference in Egypt; his letter to Blunt reaffirmed this policy. Gladstone's letter was accompanied with a personal note from E.W. Hamilton, Gladstone's secretary and a friend of Blunt's, Through Hamilton Blunt frequently managed to gain the ear of the Prime Minister; since Blunt held no official diplomatic capacity this friendship proved to be of invaluable worth.

With this letter, Blunt returned to Cairo and visited Urabi; at this time, he offered the leader distinct

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(46) Blunt: Secret History, p. 145.
(47) Ibid, p. 154. The full text of these letters may be found in Appendix II, pp. 385-6. The "recent" article referred to by Gladstone might have been "The Country and the Government," Nineteenth Century, VI (August, 1879), pp. 201-27, but it was more likely, "Aggression in Egypt and Freedom in the Far East," Nineteenth Century, II (August, 1877), 149-366.

encouragement. This encouragement was, of course, based upon Gladstone's letter. Blunt once again became discouraged about the eventual outcome of the nationalists' endeavor when the rumor that Sherif had been forced out of office by armed pressure became widespread. According to this rumor, Sultan Pasha, president of the Chamber, had been literally ousted by the army; Sultan Pasha denied the charge, emphatically stressing that he and Urabi were friends. Having heard this, Blunt went directly to Malet with the information. Malet refused to countenance Blunt's side of the story, preferring to believe the rumor.[48] This obstinacy of Malet's angered Blunt who realized that Malet had definitely decided that the nationalist cause endangered England's standing in Egypt. Blunt sensed the danger the obdurate positions of Colvin and Malet posed to the National Party's aims. He, therefore, decided to hasten his departure for England in order to lobby for the Party in the halls, parlors, and newspapers of England. Before going, he talked with many members of al-Azhar concerning the situation and also discussed with Gregory the actions the two would take. It was decided that Gregory would continue to write to the main English newspapers on the true nature of events in Egypt. Finally, on February twenty-seventh, Blunt paid a last call on Urabi.

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(48) Ibid., pp. 155-6. Theodore Rothstien, Egypt's Ruin, A Financial and Administrative Record (London: 1910) concurs on Blunt's account of this.

Prior to his departure, Blunt also invested in a piece of property outside of Cairo. This was to be known as(Shaikh) Obeyd Garden, a property of about forty acres, located about ten miles outside of the capital.[49] The purchase demonstrated not only Blunt's attachment for Egypt and his innate faith in the Egyptian independence movement but also his eye for a bargain since the property, which included some of the best fruits of Egypt, cost him only £1,500. By 1904 it was worth some two hundred pounds an acre.[50] It was to this "beautiful retired place on the desert edge"[51] that Blunt and his family were to retire many times in the future. The house itself was built around a Lubbak Tree[52] and was surrounded by foliage of all varieties. In the course of time, Egyptians from all walks of life were to be entertained there; Abdu even came to live in a small house on one corner of the property.[53] While on the grounds, Blunt, and his family dressed in Arab garb;[54] Blunt reputedly

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(49) Wilfred Scawen Blunt, My Diaries: Being a Personal Narrative of Events (1888-1914), Vol. 1 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1923), p. 11. Hereafter cited as Blunt: My Diaries. Spelling of the garden which is given is Blunt's.
(50) Blunt: Secret History, p. 158.
(51) Blunt: My Diaries, p. 11.
(52) For a complete description of the property and a picture of the house, see Edith Finch, Wilfred Scawen Blunt (London: Jonathan Cape, 1938), p. 272.
(53) Blunt: My Diaries, p. 138.
(54) Noel Anthony Scawen Bytton, Wilfred Scawen Blunt: A Memoir (London: MacDonald, 1961), pp. 55-8.

ran the household "like a satrap. He clapped his hands, and his quaking slaves would prostrate themselves before him. He was, in fact, a superb example of a tyrant."[55] This characterization was drawn by Blunt's son-in-law with whom Blunt clashed several times;[56] nevertheless, it reveals Blunt's relationships with the Egyptian servants in a somewhat less kindly light than other personal estimations of him. Although Blunt had a reputation for being a charming suave gentleman, there is no doubt that he was difficult to live with for long periods of time; he was entirely too energetic and ran from one hobby to another with the speed of a confused bird.[57] Brought up in English aristocracy, he was apt to be short tempered with Egyptian servants, considering that their only duty was to serve him properly.

At any rate, regardless of his personal relations with the fellahin and lower class Egyptians, Blunt's fervor for the Egyptian nationalist cause was sincere; he believed

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(55) Lytton: The English Country Gentleman, p. 231.
(56) Lytton eventually divorced Blunt's daughter Judith, and Blunt became estranged from both of them; indeed, the quarrel between Judith and Blunt was never settled.
(57) For more on Blunt's personality see Albert Hourani, "The Life Ideas of Wilfred Scawen Blunt," Middle East Forum (October-November, 1962), pp.21-7.

in it wholeheartedly and threw all of his many energies and talents into championing the Egyptian nationalists. Armed with firsthand knowledge of the Party's leaders and aims, Blunt sailed for England in February, 1882. He was ready to inform the English population of the true nature of the revolution and to use all of his connections with influential government officials and policy makers, in order to persuade Whitehall not to occupy Egypt.

III. LOBBYING IN LONDON

Blunt arrived in England on March 6, 1882, and immediately began to talk with his most prominent friends concerning the state of affairs in Egypt. His first stop was 10 Downing Street where he met with his old companion Hamilton, who promised that he would arrange for a private session with the Prime Minister and would try to keep Blunt informed about the events in Egypt. Much encouraged, Blunt dropped by to see the influential Algernon Bourke, nicknamed Button, who was connected with powerful parliamentary officials and who served as a correspondent for the London Times; he was also Blunt's cousin. Button was to introduce Blunt to the most important Lords and Commoners and to infuse him into political circles[1]. Indeed, Blunt accredited Button with supplying him with fully two thirds of his interviews and publicity in the English press. During the ensuing weeks, Blunt dined, talked with, and cajoled leading personalities as Parliament members Dilwyn, Bryce, Stanley and Chesson. He also met with Irish representatives who were eager to espouse the Egyptian cause in order to embarrass further the government.

It should be emphasized that the Irish cause occupied the majority of the government's debate; as Blunt pointed

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(1) See Blunt; Secret History, Chapter X for a complete account of his busy schedule during this month.

out in his narrative of events, the English were directing most of their efforts towards working out a compromise or settlement for the thorny Irish problem. They earnestly desired the Egyptian enigma to be solved peacefully, quietly, and quickly.[2]

Blunt did not, however, direct all of his attention towards those who were prone to support non-imperialistic causes nor to those who wished to take up the cause for ulterior motives; he also talked with avowed supporters of an intervention policy such as Dilke, with whom he met on March 9. He could not persuade him to change his mind, nor could he enlighten Morley, the leading writer for the widely circulated Pall Mall Gazette, the only paper Gladstone was reputed to have read faithfully.[3] This paper, throughout the development of the Egyptian revolution, pushed for English intervention; since the paper had an overwhelming effect upon Parliament members, Blunt was naturally anxious to neutralize its position. He was unable to accomplish this. Blunt also spoke with Goschen, who had formerly represented the bondholders' interests; Goschen was eager to disspell the talk that the bondholders were pushing for occupation. Having discussed this matter at some length with Button, Blunt came to believe that it was the bondholders who were definitely urging a final settlement of

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(2) Ibid. Also see Gladstone, Granville Correspondence and the Parliamentary Debates, both of which include long discussions and debates on the Irish question.
(3) Blunt: Secret History, p. 167.

the Egyptian matter.[4]

In the same month, Blunt saw Sir Garnet Wolseley, who in a few short months was to play a major role in the Egyptian occupation; Wolseley had already been approached concerning the occupation as early as March.[5] Having purused the climate of opinion within England, Blunt determined to write to Gladstone about Colvin and Malet and their misconstrued opinions on the nationalists. He did this on March 20, 1882,[6] concluding in his remarks that England should permit the National Party to run Egypt by themselves for a time in order to judge whether or not they could manage the nation's affairs. With Sabunji's aid, Blunt wrote to Urabi telling him of his interviews, giving him encouragement and advocating moderation.

Finally, on March 22, 1882, Blunt met with Gladstone and had a long interview centering around the events in Egypt. Gladstone was quite friendly with Blunt and was intent upon hearing his viewpoint. He had received some unfavorable reports about Blunt from both Malet and Granville,[7] but his mind was still not made up as to the best plan for the

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(4) Ibid., p. 170.
(5) Ibid., p. 172.
(6) Ibid., p. 174; the full text of this letter is contained in the narrative.
(7) Granville to Gladstone, March 8, 1882, remarked that: "I am afraid Blunt has been a good deal humbugged by Urabi Bey." Gladstone, Granville Correspondence, p. 348.

English to adopt in Egypt. Blunt related to the Prime Minister the National Party's goals; upon leaving he asked if he might write to the nationalists for Gladstone and give them some encouragement. Gladstone refused this request but replied that Blunt was at liberty to relate publicaly what had transpired during their interview.[8] Blunt came away from the talk much encouraged; he promptly wrote to Cairo about the good news of Gladstone's sympathy for their cause. On April 5, the Times published another letter of Blunt's on the National Party and remarked editorially that they hoped Blunt was correct in his estimation of the Party, but they feared that the nationalists were not what they were purported to be.[9]

Gregory, Blunt's comrade in arms, was also a persistent writer to the Times during this period. As early as December, he had written concerning the good work of the nationalists; he wrote again on March 16, when the Times editor remarked that Gregory's views deserved to be considered but that his case was overstated. But Gregory's views were becoming modified, for in this letter Gregory regretted that the Party had become involved with the financial aspects of the Egyptian problem.[10] By the end of March, Gregory had become thoroughly disillusioned with the National Party; he left Egypt on March

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(8) Blunt; Secret History, p. 180.
(9) Times, April 5, 1882.
(10) Times, Gregory letter to the Editor. March 16, 1882.

31, 1882, saying that he would write no more in their defense. He felt that the government could not last but still advised England to remain out of the affair. The Times heartily agreed with Gregory's apology for ever having defended Urabi.[11] Blunt refused to be so easily defeated; he kept on with his defense and was constantly harassing members of Parliament.

By this time, matters were moving away from his control. The enemies of his cause, particularly Granville and Malet, both of whom had official recourse to Gladstone and the dynamism behind the government, soundly berated Blunt's opinions. Malet and Granville were vehement in their criticism of Blunt. In this context Granville wrote to Malet:

> Blunt, who acts here almost as an agent for Urabi Bey, is strong against Colvin.12

Malet replied:

> Blunt's estimate of Colvin is on a par with his estimate of other affairs and other people in this country, shallow and prejudiced. Colvin speaks Arabic sufficiently to hold a long conversation, and he understands the substance of what passes in Council ... Blunt himself is always obliged to use an interpreter.[13]

Malet had expressed detailed objections on Blunt early in February.

> Wilfred Blunt continues in his optimism and declared that if Egypt is only left alone all will come right. But of course he considers that 'right' means among other things the exclusion as far as possible of European public servants. He had arrived at the

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(11) Times, Gregory Letter to the Editor. April 12, 1882.
(12) Granville to Malet, April 14, 1882, Malet: Egypt, p. 281.
(13) Malet to Granville, April 25, 1882, Ibid., p. 283.

> conviction that the pure Egyptians are quite capable of governing and administering the country. I do not share this view, and fear that we are gradually going from bad to worse, though I do not at all say that the system should not be given a fair trial.[14]

Unfortunately, far too many powerful personalities agreed with Malet's summary of the matter; all were concerned about the course that Egyptian politics was following. Egypt represented to the English the clear road to India - a road which had to be protected at all costs.

> ... her Majesty's Government cannot be indifferent to events which might plunge Egypt into anarchy, and destroy the results of the efforts which have been successfully made during the last few years to improve the condition of the country.[15]

For this reason, Granville, on February 6, 1882, proposed that the French and the English confer with the other major European powers to discover what their feelings were on the matter and to see if some form of working arrangement might be developed in concert.[16] On February eleventh this note was sent out to Vienna, Rome, St. Petersburg, and Berlin.[17] Returns from all of these capitals indicated that Europe wanted to retain the status quo in Egypt, but Germany and Austria were, at the same time, not totally adverse to English and French forces main-

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(14) Malet to Granville, February 20, 1882, Ibid., p. 266.
(15) Granville to Dufferin (English representative in Constantinople), January 26, 1882, State Papers, p. 373.
(16) Granville to Lyons, February 6, 1882, Ibid., p. 380
(17) Granville to Major Representatives in Berlin, Vienna, Rome and St. Petersburg, February 11,1882. The note said: "The reports at present received from Egypt are not of a nature to excite apprehension of early disorder ... but we are in presence of a crisis which may give rise to an encroachment upon the order." Ibid., p. 384.

taining this status quo if it was threatened by a native nationalistic movement.[18]

Judging from this correspondence, one may see that Whitehall officials had already determined that forceful action was a probability; Blunt's lobbying could do little to change this feeling but could and did cause sections of the Parliament, both Lords & Commoners, to ask embarrassing questions about the Government's policy in Egypt and to demand a full explanation of the Liberals' policy regarding Egypt - a policy which was still in flux and not fully developed.[19] This situation prompted Granville to write Malet that "it is awkward that Parliament should be meeting at this moment, when we want time to look around us."[20]

Despite these developments, Blunt remained optimistic concerning English policy toward the Egyptian question. On April first, Urabi had written Blunt concerning the National Party's progress in Egypt and thanking him for his intervention on their behalf;[21] Blunt forwarded a translation of the

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(18) See State Papers for the representatives' replies to the note. p. 386.
(19) See Parliamentary Debates, February 13 through 24,1882, for Bourke's and De La Warr's persistent questioning of Dilke on the Egyptian matter and for Dilke's consistent hedging on the question. Blunt had been in conference with De La Warr on the Egyptian subject.
(20) Granville to Malet, February 3, 1882, Malet: Egypt, p. 258.
(21) The full text of this letter is found in Blunt: Secret History, pp. 186-8.

letter to Gladstone. Things appeared to be going smoothly until the news of the Circassian plot broke into print. On April twelfth, Urabi arrested sixteen Circassian officers on the grounds of conspiring against him and his Party.[22] These officers were accused of trying to murder Abd al-'Al and Urabi. The plot was discovered and subsequently reported to Urabi. By April 17, there were thirty officers in prison for complicity in this scheme. These men, tried in camera without counsel, were sentenced to the Sudan, a place from which few exiles ever returned. Ex-Khedive Isma'il and Ratib Pasha were generally considered to be the masterminds behind this abortive attempt on Urabi's life.[23]

The plot served to indicate the chasm between the older priviledged Circassians, the Khedive, and the nationalists led by Urabi. The Khedive chose this moment to direct a blow to Urabi's stature as a nationalist leader. Urabi knew that sending the officers to the Sudan meant, in essence, their death;[24] the officers, according to Urabi, petitioned the Khedive for their return to their native country, but the Khedive replied that only the Sultan could issue such an order.[25] Malet reported that the Khedive had asked his advice on what course to take, and that he had advised the Khedive to pardon the officers, but Tewfik had

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(22) Times, April 12,1882. The paper remarked that they were not surprised at this turn of events since unrest had been prevelant in Egypt.
(23) Blunt: Secret History, p. 190. Malet to Granville, May 2, 1882, State Papers, p. 398.
(24) Arabi: "Instructions to my Counsel," p. 977.
(25) Ibid.

procrastinated before taking definite action.[26] After this delay, the Khedive finally issued a commutation of the sentences on May ninth. This move caused a lasting break between the Khedive and his ministers.[27] The situation was judged serious enough to warrant a French and British conference, which resulted in an agreement to send battleships to Alexandria in order to demonstrate to the Egyptians that the European powers were against the nationalists' government. According to this agreement, the two governments were to send six battleships, invite the Porte to act, consult other European powers, support Tewfik, and to debark soldiers if necessary.[28]

Malet was informed of this action on May eleventh; he, of course, was in favor of the military move. The ships arrived on May 19, but their presence was severely questioned since no Turkish ships accompanied the fleet. The arrival of British and French ships in Alexandria threw Egypt even more strongly into the hands and control of Urabi.[29] Meanwhile, Blunt was still badgering government officials for an adoption of a more

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(26) Malet: Egypt, pp. 293-8. Blunt blamed Malet for this advice and felt that it was directly responsible for the mushrooming of the problem to the proportions where the British and French felt obliged to send in battleships. Blunt: Secret History, p. 194.
(27) Malet to Granville, May 10, 1882, State Papers, p. 400.
(28) Freycinet: La Question d'Egypte, pp. 257-9.
(29) M. Rifaat Bey: The Awakening of Modern Egypt, p. 196.

favorable attitude towards Egypt. On May fifteenth, the Egyptian question was debated in Parliament. Blunt had hoped that a more moderate stand would be evidenced at this discussion; instead, Dilke, in a long speech, reviewed England's actions since the Joint Note and noted that the divergences between France and England were "wholly at an end,"[30] and that due to the critical situation in Egypt the two nations had determined to send ships into Alexandria. He refused to answer whether or not any plans for a joint landing had been designated. Blunt was present at this session and was thrown into a "great anger"[31] by Dilke's speech.

After pondering these inauspicious developments, Blunt boldly decided to telegraph Urabi and his followers, telling them about the English movement against them. In these telegrams he urged all sections of the National Party to stay together. " Si vous vous laissez desunir de l'annee, l'Europe vous annexera."[32] All in all, Blunt sent eight of these telegrams to leading Egyptians, knowing full well that in so doing he was bound to alienate Gladstone and other Parliament members. In reply to these telegrams, Blunt received

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(30) Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. Third Series, Vol. CCLXIX, May 15, 1882, Dilke's speech, p. 670. Hereafter cited as Parliamentary Debates.
(31) Blunt, Secret History. p. 206.
(32) Ibid., p. 207.

notes reporting that all disunity between the various Egyptian factions had been corrected. Blunt hastened with this news to 10 Downing Street, where, according to his narrative, he was met by Hamilton. On the afternoon of the seventeenth, the London papers hearing about Blunt's telegrams severely censured him for what they considered to be an unpatriotic gesture. Blunt was, however, probably right in his estimation that the English were about to attack Egypt and that if the National Party in Egypt wished to prevent such a move they should present a strong, united front. After this, Blunt's opinions were received with little favor from governing circles; although he continued to call sporadically on the Prime Minister, his visits "became inevitably on a less and less intimate footing."[33]

Events were quickly moving against the National Party. On May 15, 1882, Granville wrote to Malet telling him to inform Urabi that if order was disturbed, Europe would be forced to move against him.[34] Then on May 20, the Minister told Malet that France and Great Britain would intervene to maintain the status quo and advised the Khedive that when the ships arrived he was to ask for the resignations of the current Cabinet and to form a new Cabinet under Sherif. "When once this change of Ministry has been effected, we will occupy ourselves with detailed measures to secure our

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(33) Ibid., p. 209.
(34) Malet: Egypt, p. 329.

interests for the future."[35] This ultimatum was presented in Cairo on May 25; Barudi's Cabinet resigned on the twenty-seventh. Due to unrest in Cairo and the soldiers' refusal to accept the resignations, the entire Ministry was reinstated on May twenty-eighth. Urabi served as Minister of War in this Cabinet.[36]

This was a bleak period for Blunt whose lobbying was securing little support and who had finally realized that Gregory had definitely deserted the cause. No amount of persuasion could convince him to change his mind. Blunt's spirits rallied after Barudi's Ministry was reinstated; he even contemplated going to Cairo to patch up relations between the nationalists and the British; he wrote to Hamilton about the idea,[37] but the English government firmly refused the plan. Blunt was forced to concede that his presence in Cairo might well prove to be a great embarrassment for the nationalists and the British. But he did send his faithful aide Sabunji to keep him informed on events.[38]

The question of Egypt had reached crisis proportions; Blunt alone could not stem the tide as it swept over him. From this point on, he was forced to sit back and take note of affairs as a mere observer upon the stage. For the time

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(35) Granville to Malet, May 20, 1882, State Papers, p. 413.
(36) Blunt: Secret History, p. 217.
(37) Ibid., pp. 221-2 for the full text of the note.
(38) Ibid., p. 227.

being, his active role was finished. Matters were now fully controlled by the leading English and Egyptian officials. By the first of June, the presence of the Fleet in Alexandria had been admitted to have failed in its object. Granville's correspondence with Gladstone showed that the two men were contemplating an armed action but wanted French support and European assent.[39] Thus on June 2, 1882, Granville again sent a joint letter to all the major European capitals, this time informing them that all hope had been abandoned for a pacific solution and that he proposed a conference to discuss the matter.[40] Fréycinet, Gambetta's successor, believed that if the conference had met promptly the crisis could have been averted, but the divergence of views between the French and the British over the Turkish role, coupled with the administrative problems of gathering a European meeting, caused the delay of the conference.[41] As it was the conference was not to be convened until June 23, by which time the situation in Egypt had seriously deteriorated. These developments convinced the British that armed action was necessary.

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(39) Gladstone, Granville Correspondence, May 28, 1882 - July 1, 1882, pp. 374-82.
(40) Malet: Egypt, p. 386.
(41) Fréycinet: La Question d'Egypte, p. 270.

They were, however, desirous that the conference approve their plans. On June 25, the conference consented to a self-denying protocol which said that the major powers held a policy of disinterestedness in regard to Egyptian affairs and would not intervene except in a case of a force majeure.[42] The conference then diverged over the question of the Ottoman's participation in an armed intervention. The other powers especially France wanted to keep the Ottomans completely out of the military action. Italy wanted the Turks to assume full responsibility for the intervention; the problem was further complicated by the fact that Egypt was technically a province of the Ottoman empire. No European power desired to declare war, at this moment, on the Ottomans, but they wondered if an armed intervention in Egypt constituted a declaration of war against the Ottomans. For this reason, Britain wanted the Sultan to censure the Urabi government. This, the Sultan was reluctant to do; he had had some correspondence with Urabi and had not found the latter to be a rebel against the Ottomans.[43] Then, too, the Sultan was against Britain, or any other European power, moving into part of his domain. Thus the Sultan wisely and cleverly refrained

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(42) M. Rifaat Bey. The Awakening of Modern Egypt.

(43) This subject is beyond the scope of this paper, but it should be noted there was an exchange of ideas between Arabi and the Sultan. See Arabi: "Instructions to my Counsel," and Blunt: Secret History, pp. 195-200 for more complete details on the exchange. The letters indicate that the Sultan was hesitant to oppose Arabi and tried as long as possible to adopt a favorable position to Urabi's policies.

from making any definite promises on the Egyptian problem.

The English foreign office was reflecting upon these factors and by July 1, 1882 still had not reached a definite conclusion.

> If neither Sultan, nor Conference, nor France, will act - and if the Khedive, really or ostensibly, settles his affairs with Urabi - and if we have no difficulty in dealing separately with the question of reparation - are we then, on our own sole account, to undertake a military intervention to put Urabi down?
> But this question had not yet, as it seems to me, arrived.[44]

By July third, the English had finally decided to act alone. The French had declared their unwillingness to attack Egypt, but the English leaders determined that if fortifications in Egypt continued to be strengthened they would allow their fleet to open fire. Blunt had lost his battle to save the Egyptians from a British military intervention.

Blunt had been unable to convince the English officials that the nationalists could administer their own government; with his continued loud denunciation of English policy he managed to alienate many higher administrators. He, indeed, gained the reputation of being one of those individuals who delighted in "utilizing their ability in the service of any

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(44) Gladstone to Granville, July 1, 1882, Gladstone, Granville Correspondence, p. 383.

country but their own."[45] His side was an unpopular one, his battle an uphill fight, which, with the rapid snowballing of events within England and Egypt, was doomed to fail.

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(45) E. W. Polson Newman, Great Britain in Egypt (London: Cassell, 1928), p. 71. Also see Cromer! Modern Egypt, p.200 and E. Dicey. "England in Egypt," Nineteenth-Century. (November, 1882), p. 811 or E. Dicey, The Story of the Khedivate (London: Rivingtons, 1902), pp. 259, 269 for further descriptions of contemporary views of Blunt's attempts to convince the English to stay out of Egypt. His work was seen as troublesome and irksome; it was, in most circles, not welcome and considered to be entirely unpatriotic.

IV. ENGLAND'S INTERVENTION

As emotions within England moved to a fever pitch over the Egyptian crisis, Egyptian nationalists continued to assert their independence. The events of June twelfth in Alexandria revealed the growing instability in Egypt; on the twelfth, full scale riots broke out throughout the cosmopolitan city. These riots were largely to be expected since Alexandria was composed of wide varieties of people, many of whom were Europeans who controlled most of the city's wealth and means of production. It is believed that the riots began when a Maltese started a fight with a donkey boy in the Arab quarter; people, seeing the commotion, joined the fracus. The fray spread until the entire city was a huge mass of seething hatred and confusion.[1] Calm was finally restored by the Egyptian troops in the early evening,[2] but not before 53 Christians and eleven Arabs had been killed and about 71 wounded.[3] Among those wounded were the British Consul-General in Alexandria, Cookson; the Italian Vice-consul, Rosvatovski; and the Greek Vice-consul, Scotidis; these men foolishly went out in the midst of the terror in an attempt to quell the panic. Instead they had been caught up in the crowd and swept along with the rioters.

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(1) The Illustrated London News, LXXXI, See July 15-25, 1882.
(2) Freycinet: La Question d'Egypte, p. 271.
(3) N. Scotidis, L'Egypte contemporaine et Arabi Pasha (Paris: Marpon & Flammarion, 1888), p. 112. Hereafter cited as Scotidis: Arabi Pasha.

News of the disturbance caught England by a storm; reasons for the violence were fabricated on every side. Questions began to fly over why the police had taken so long to disperse the crowds, and how the entire affair had begun. Many quarters, of course, blamed Urabi for the riots. However, facts indicate that Umar Pasha Loutfi, mayor of Alexandria, had recognized the danger brought about by groups of Europeans daily interacting with Egyptians; he had taken safety measures to prevent difficulties,[4] but he could not hope to control every quarter of the city. Others blamed Kandil Bey, Alexandria's gendarme and later Commander of the Sixth Egyptian regiment, for purposely delaying orders for the troops to smash the riot. Malet believed that Kandil Bey plotted the riots for revenge.[5] Upon hearing of the riots, Urabi immediately gave orders for calm to be restored promptly to the city.[6] He, of course, recognized that a massacre of Europeans would bring quick European reprisal.

The tumult impelled a large scale exodus of Europeans from the city; this also roused a large section of the British who were not pleased to see English citizens maligned

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(4) Ibid., p. 87.
(5) Ibid., p. 96.
(6) Malet: Egypt, pp. 99-100. Scotidis; Arabi Pasha, p. 96.

in any manner. Blunt was not sure the riots would harm Urabi, but he soon discovered that the riots were extremely detrimental to Urabi's public image in England.[7] During this period, Blunt continued to meet and dine with a variety of English officials, several of whom were later to bring up the Alexandrian riots in Parliament when questioning the wisdom of England's foreign policy in Egypt. De la Warr,[8] in particular, was vehement in denouncing English strategy; he largely blamed the presence of the English fleet in Alexandria's harbor for exciting the passions which flamed out during the riots.[9] This attack was vigorously denied by Granville who threw the blame on Urabi.[10]

Throughout June, Blunt steadily received reports from Sabunji on the National Party's growing influence in Egypt; Sabunji reported that the Party was widely supported by all segments of the population and that the nationalists were preparing to fight European intervention - should it arrive - with every ounce of their strength.[11] Blunt attempted to

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(7) Blunt: Secret History, pp. 251-54.
(8) Ibid., p. 255. Blunt was in constant contact with Hamilton during this crucial time, but he was asked not to make public appearances at 10 Downing Street as they caused considerable comment. p. 256.
(9) Great Britain, 3 Parliamentary Debates (Lords), CCLXXIII (August 3, 1882), De La Warr speech, 578.
(10) Ibid., Granville speech.
(11) For the full text of this correspondence see Blunt: Secret History, pp. 257-63.

bring this point to the attention of the Foreign Office in London, but he was unable to persuade the Foreign Office that the Egyptians were serious in their intent to be independent. Blunt could not decide when Gladstone definitely changed his mind concerning intervention within Egypt, but he believed it to have been between "the twentieth of June and the end of the month."[12] Blunt blamed this change on Parliamentary pressures and a dip in the current stock exchange prices.[13] Fearing this new approach, Blunt wrote an open letter to Gladstone on June 21, 1882; it appeared in The Times two days later. In this letter, Blunt reiterated the strength of the nationalists and ended with a fervent plea that:

> The Suez Canal cannot be better protected for England, as for the rest of the world, than by the admission of the Egyptian people into the comity of nations. Only let the hand of friendship be held out to them freely and at once, and we shall still earn their gratitude.[14]

But things had already developed beyond the point where the English could refuse to intervene. On June 15, in Parliament, Granville announced:

> The Admiral has a descretionary power to act; and I beg to say that I believe he will act in the way which may be most judicious.[15]

Gladstone was still hedging on the Foreign Office's Egyptian policy and refused to commit himself as to whether the

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(12) Ibid., p. 263.
(13) Ibid.,
(14) Ibid., p. 269. Times, June 23, 1882.
(15) Great Britain, 3 Parliamentary Debates (Lords), CCLXX (June 15, 1882), Granville speech, 1221.

English would intervene or not.[16] But on June 17, 1882, Malet was told by Granville that Britain would demand "full reparation and satisfaction for the outrages committed during the recent disorders at Alexandria."[17] Dilke, Under-secretary of Foreign Affairs, in Parliament softened this instruction for public consumption by saying that although Malet had indeed been given such instructions, no definite demands were to be made at that time.[18] It appears that the English were not certain what caused the riots and wished to know more about them before they definitely committed themselves to an action which they might seriously regret later. Up until this time Gladstone had still not made up his mind whether or not the English should intervence in Egypt.

He obviously was hesitant to take action without the concord of France and the other European powers. It is necessary to remember that the conference of powers was still in session; it was difficult for the English to act along while the conference was discussing the Egyptian matter. For this reason Gladstone wrote on June 21 that he was unprepared" to take any measure with regard to the Suez Canal single handed, or in union with France, apart from

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(16) Great Britain, 3 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CCLXX (June 14, 1882), Gladstone speech, 1147.
(17) Granville to Malet, June 17, 1882, State Papers, 448.
(18) Great Britain, 3 Parliamentary Debates, (Commons), CCLXX (June 20, 1882), Dilke Speech, 1256.

any reference to the authority of Europe,"[19] but at the same time he stressed that he was committed to re-establishing security within Egypt.[20]

Then, too, Gladstone never decided what the exact causes of the Alexandrian riots had been; as late as July 24 he was saying:

> I believe it (the riots) owed its origin to accident; but there is evidence, which appears to us to be trustworthy that the massacre had been to some extent prepared and encouraged by the leaders of the military faction.[21]

The English suspected Urabi of complicity in the riots but were unable to back up their suspicions with sound evidence and therefore could not base the reason for their armed intervention upon the riots.

While England hesitated, Urabi and the Egyptian army continued to strengthen the battlements around Alexandria and, in general, to prepare for battle. As early as July 4, Blunt noted in his diary that rumors were widespread that Seymour would open fire on Alexandria if the war preparations did not promptly cease.[22] However, Whitehall still procrastinated, waiting for the conference to come to

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(19) Gladstone to Granville, June 21, 1882, Gladstone-Granville Correspondence, p. 380.
(20) Ibid.
(21) Great Britain, 3 Parliamentary Debates (Lords), CCLXXII (June 20, 1882), Dilke speech, 1256.
(22) Blunt: Secret History, p. 275.

a decision or for the Sultan to take action.[23] From the beginning of the trouble in Egypt, Dufferin, the English representative in Constantinople, had been urging the Sultan to declare Urabi a rebel. The Sultan had consistently refused to adopt any decisive measure against Urabi; as long as the Sultan did not take steps to crush Urabi and the Egyptian nationalist movement, England hesitated to eliminate Urabi herself.

Meanwhile, Urabi, who felt that the presence of the fleets in Alexandria demanded the reinforcement of the forts in the harbor,[24] refused to accept Seymour's July ninth ultimatum which demanded that all military preparations halt at once. After receiving this note, Urabi met with his cabinet on the morning of July 10; the cabinet supported his decision to say "no" to Seymour's demand.[25] The battle was about to begin.

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(23) During the month of June the Sultan's envoy, the Dervish Pasha, visited Egypt in an attempt to reach some form of agreement with the nationalists and the Khedive. He invited Urabi to go with him to Constantinople, as old trick which was used to lure the patriot to prison, but Urabi politely refused the invitation.
Arabi: "Instructions to my Counsel," p. 980. In this way the Sultan had hoped to stop peacefully the growing storm in which he was caught in the middle. But by June 19, it was fairly obvious that the mission had failed. See The Times for the daily account of the Dervish's mission, also see Malet: Egypt.

(24) Arabi: "Instructions to my Counsel," p. 980.

(25) Ibid.

As early as July ninth, Cartwright, Consul in Alexandria, had telegraphed Granville informing him that "the Admiral cannot pass over this act of hostility (the reinforcement of the forts), and he has decided to open fire at daybreak on Tuesday morning, the 11th instant."[26] From this telegraph it is obvious that the Admiral never expected Urabi to accept the terms of his ultimatum. As expected, Urabi declined the terms offered by Seymour on July 10. On the morning of July 11, the English fleet opened fire on Alexandria. Seymour was acting upon orders sent from the Foreign Office on July 3, in which he was told:

> Prevent any attempt to bar channel into port. If work is resumed on earthworks or fresh guns mounted, inform Military Committee that you have orders to prevent it; and, if not immediately discontinued, destroy earthworks and silence batteries if they open fire, having given sufficient notice to population, shipping, and foreign men-of-war.[27]

Fire opened up at seven o'clock on the eleventh with a shot to Pharos fort from the Alexandra; the Egyptians returned the shell and the bombardment continued throughout the day.[28]

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(26) Cartwright to Granville, July 9, 1882, State Papers, p. 486.
(27) Granville to Seymour, July 3, 1882, State Papers, p. 477.
(28) For a full account of the military aspect of the bombardment which will not be dealt with in this study see: The Times during the period in question and Scotidis: Arabi Pasha, pp. 169-72, and Lt. Col. Hermann Vogt, The Egyptian War of 1882 (London: Kegan Paul, 1883). Hereafter cited as Vogt: The Egyptian War.

The Khedive was at this time in Ramleh Palace where he chose to remain during the severe bombardment. Urabi met with his cabinet soon after the bombardment began; it was decided that the war should continue, but that they would hoist a flag of truce in order to prevent further damage to the city. The Khedive agreed to the decision and said he, too, would fight;[29] this was a cunning maneuver for he had already assured the English of his support. By this time, Tewfik had definitely ceased to support the nationalists; his loyalties were entirely aligned with the English. Indeed, after his consultation with the English Consul on July 13, there was no longer any doubt as to the Khedive's stand. Subsequent to this meeting, Tewfik completely supported England's actions. Following the council's decision, the truce flags went up on July 12, but the firing continued for a few more rounds before ceasing entirely. Urabi then regrouped his army and decided to move out of the city; the nationalists did not, however, agree to surrender. They held that the Khedive had no right to surrender a territory of the Ottoman empire to a foreign power; they then sent a communiqué to Constantinople in order to find out what the Sultan desired.[30] This stratagem provided a convenient stall for time.

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(29) Arabi: "Instructions to my Counsel," p. 983.
(30) Ibid., p. 984.

Under the protection of the white flag, Urabi moved his troops to Ezbet Korshid on July twelfth and thirteenth. He was coming back from a conference with the Khedive when he noted a mass exodus of the city's population; they feared an English invasion and the violent pillaging that was underway in the city. After the Egyptian soldiers departed there was no force to keep order; thieves, bedu, and brigands had taken advantage of this golden opportunity to rob and loot vacant or closed shops and homes.[31] By the twelfth, fire had also begun to spread throughout the city. Urabi blamed the fire on the bedu whom he believed to have set indiscriminate[32] fires while looting. However, the English were inclined to blame Urabi for setting the fire. Even Blunt believed that Urabi had set the fire and lauded the action.

> I say he ordered it, and was right to do so. This is the policy of the Russians at Moscow ... I cannot think it will do any harm in the long run, and it will get more completely rid of the Greeks and Italians.[33]

After Blunt realized that Urabi was to be held responsible for the fire and that it was to be one of the primary charges against Urabi's regime, he modified his earlier rash statement, saying that he could not make up his mind as to who was the true culprit. In spite of Urabi's persistent denials that he had had anything to do with

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(31) Ibid., 985.
(32) Ibid.
(33) Blunt: Secret History, p. 282.

setting the fire, Blunt continued to feel that the incident had been a fortunate one, as it had provided cover for the Egyptian troops to evacuate the city.[34] Others believed that the fire was caused by looters or by the bombardment.[35] Actually, it is now known that the order to burn Alexandria was given by the Commander of the Sixth Egyptian regiment who had meant to stop the British from occupying the city. The order was given without Urabi's knowledge.[36] Because of the poorly constructed homes and the newly installed gas lights,[37] which provided plenty of combustible material, the fire soon spread throughout the city and readily grew out of control. However, certainty of who ordered the setting of the fire remained a mystery to the English; even after Urabi's trial, Englishmen were still wondering who had been responsible for the deed.

On July 14, the British landed marines in Alexandria and Seymour ordered that they try and halt the spreading of the fire in the city.[38] The Americans, who had a small force

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(34) Ibid., p. 295.
(35) London Illustrated News, LXXXI (July 22, 1882), p. 82. Their correspondents blamed the deserting soldiers and bedus for the fire; Ninet also supported this view point.
(36) A. Al-Rafii, Al-Thawra al-Urabiyya wa al-Ihtilal al-Inglizi (2nd ed., Cairo, 1949), p. 364.
(37) Vogt: The Egyptian War, p. 20.
(38) Cartwright to Granville, July 14, 1882, State Papers, p. 516.

of marines in Alexandria, but who had declared their neutrality in the intervention, helped the English to patrol the streets;[39] thus a semblance of order was re-established in the ruined city. At this time Urabi was trying to regroup his soldiers and cabinet. He was alone in this task for the Khedive had gone over to the English. On July 25 the "Egyptian Gazette" printed an order from the Khedive dismissing Urabi from his position as Minister of War; the reason given for this order was that Urabi had deserted his post and the city of Alexandria, and had continued military preparations after the Khedive had ordered them to halt.[40] However, Urabi held the machinery of government; the Khedive was little more than a figurehead. Subsequently, Urabi met with five hundred persons of note who resolved to appoint him leader of a provisional government which was given powers to continue the fight against the English.[41]

The English, having committed themselves in a military fashion, became frightened that the action would bring speedy reprisal from Europe. For this reason they did not seek to consolidate their gains or to liquidate Urabi's government. In bombarding Alexandria, the English had been forced to act alone, for the French believed military action amounted

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(39) Ibid.
(40) Order of Suspension addressed to Ahmed Pasha Urabi (July 20,1882), Extract from "Egyptian Gazette" (July 25,1882) State Papers, 564.
(41) Arabi: "Instructions to my Counsel," p. 988.

to a declaration of war upon Egypt. Therefore, after the bombardment, the English made a last effort to bring the French in league with them. Indeed, Gladstone was still anxious for a dual program.[42] The Foreign Office was in a concilitory mood during the remainder of July and the first part of August. There followed a series of exchanges between Granville and Lyons in an attempt to persuade the French to join the English intervention. The main focus of attention was, of course, the Suez Canal.[43] Thus on July 22, at Granville's suggestion, the French and the English agreed to the joint protection of the Canal;[44] this suggestion was to be implemented with troops from both nations. Each respective Parliament was duly asked to assent to providing the credit for which to pay the troops.

The French, however, were proceeding with circumspection; the committee voted against the measures that had been proposed on July 27; in public discussion within the Chamber, the proposal was rejected. This was done in spite of the fact that Gladstone, on July 24, had served notice that the English desired co-operation, but if they did not receive

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(42) Gladstone to Granville, July 13, 1882, Gladstone-Granville Correspondence, p. 394.
(43) See correspondence of Granville to Lyons, State Papers, pp. 531-40.
(44) Fréycinet: La Question d'Egypte, p. 229.

it were nonetheless determined to act alone.[45] However, Freycinet could not persuade the French deputies that occupation was advisable.

Having been rebuked by the French, the English were forced to rely solely on the final outcome of the Conference's deliberations. The dilatory conference delayed coming to any decision through July; nor was Dufferin able to convince the Sultan to declare Urabi a rebel.[46] On August 8, Dufferin was finally able to write Granville that the Porte was about to declare Urabi a rebel,[47] but the Porte in actuality did not make a decisive move in that direction until the British occupation was well on its way; he finally made the declaration on September 6.

The Foreign Office refused to be stalled by the French or the Turks and continued its military preparations. In their correspondence, Granville and Gladstone discussed the possibilities concerning the military strategy and the calling up of Indian troops.[48] Finally on July 24, a motion was put before the House of Lords to vote for sending the necessary supplies and troops to Egypt to restore the former position of the Khedive. Following Viscount Enfield's presentation of this motion, Granville delivered a ministerial address

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(45) Ibid., p. 307.
(46) See The Times during July and August for a daily account of Dufferin's long suffering mission.
(47) Dufferin to Granville, August 8, 1882, State Papers, p. 569.
(48) Granville to Gladstone, July 15,1882; Granville to Gladstone, July 23,1882; Gladstone to Granville, July 23,1882, Gladstone-Granville Correspondence, pp. 396, 403-4.

reviewing the entire situation in Egypt and justifying the English bombardment.

> As to the bombardment, I believe there never was a more legitimate act than the attempt on the part of the English Fleet to destroy that which endangered every day more and more the safety of our ships and the lives of those who occupied them.[49]

This chauvinistic speech was followed by a request for credit to finance the expedition. The Lords approved the measure. On the following day the House of Commons followed suit. Thus on August 4, the War Office authorized General G. Wolseley to act as Commander of the Egyptian expedition which was to total 14,794 non-commissioned men and three Indian regiments.[50]

Gladstone did not, however, get this approval without several skirmishes on the floor of the Commons. Blunt could not wield any personal influence during this period, for he had been unofficially declared _personna non grata_ at 10 Downing Street. Much to his chagrin he was unable to meet or discuss with any high officials. He passed the busy summer at Crabbet, his English estate, where he wrote:

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(49) Great Britain, 3 _Parliamentary Debates_, (Lords), CCLXXII (July 24, 1882), Granville speech, 1489.

(50) Mr. Childers to General C. Wolseley, August 4, 1882, _State Papers_, p. 568.

> My sympathies were, of course, still all with the Egyptians, but I was cut off from every means of communication with them, and the war fever was running too strongly during the first weeks of the fighting for further words of mine to be of any avail.[51]

But Blunt's followers made his presence felt in the halls of Parliament. Blunt's work was so well known that the Liberal Party was asked several times about his official capacity. During these embarrassing questions, the Liberals depicted Blunt as one who often had intentions of "regrettable nature."[52] Finally Granville was forced to make a public statement in the House of Lords to the effect that Blunt had been in the foreign service, was a man of ability, knew much about Egypt, but whose views differed from his own and Malet's.[53]

This explanation satisfied those disgruntled Lords who desired more active measures to be taken in Egypt, but the Opposition continued to insist that the Government produce the State Papers on Egypt and publicly state its aims in that country. Such debates became particularly vociferous when the bombardment was imminent. The Opposition led by the Irish homerulers desired to know if war would be declared and, if so, how the legal loophole concerning the

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(51) Blunt: Secret History, p. 323.
(52) Great Britain, 3 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CCLXIX (June 1, 1882), Dilke speech, 1786.
(53) Great Britain, 3 Parliamentary Debates (Lords), CCLXXI (June 26, 1882, July 3, 1882), Granville Speech, 374, 1213.

governing of Egypt by the Ottoman's would be skirted. Rebutting this attack, Gladstone, speaking to the Commons, replied that bombardment did not constitute an attack but was a purely defensive measure.[54] This feeble response hardly satisfied the Opposition which considered the attack as an "act of assassination upon a large scale."[55] Debate continued back and forth with the Opposition consistently asking Gladstone if he intended to occupy Egypt, declare war, or remain neutral.[56] As late as August 10, Gladstone was still publicly stating that England was not going to occupy Egypt, but in the same speech he also rebuked members of the Commons for questioning England's wisdom in trying to crush the "oppressors" at a time when the nation was assured it had taken the right path by intervening.[57]

In this speech, Gladstone glossed over the actual movements of the English who on August 5 landed troops in Egypt.[58] The actual military land campaign had begun.

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(54) Great Britain, 3 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CCLXXII (July 12,1882), Gladstone Speech, 175.
(55) Great Britain, 3 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CCLXXII (July 12, 1882), O'Kelly speech, 182.
(56) See the particularly bitter debate of July 24,1882, Parliamentary Debates (Lords), CCLXXII, 1484-1519.
(57) Great Britain, 3 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CCLXXIII (August 10, 1882), Gladstone speech, 1390-4.
(58) Illustrated London News, LXXXI (August 5, 1882), p. 134.

The strategy itself was fairly simple; Wolseley directed the fleet to head East on August 18; he accompanied them as far as Abukir and then headed southwards. He pretended to be going East so that his real plans would not be revealed.[59] After consolidating his lines, he moved to take Mahsamah on August 25; on August 26 the Suez Canal was occupied.[60]

Urabi had by this time been proclaimed a rebel by the Khedive. This proclaimation was made public on August 7; the order threatened punishment to all those who aided Urabi and also deprived him and his children of all rank, pay, pensions, or honorary distinctions.[61] The order was ignored by the majority of the populace; Urabi and the nationalists continued their battle against the English forces. Urabi grouped his army in Tel-el-Kebir, the point to which Wolseley then directed his energies. After a preliminary skirmish at Kassassin, Wolseley prepared to attack Tel-el-Kebir, an advantageous position from which to stage a defense. Recognizing this factor, Wolseley decided to lead his men on a surprise attack on the Egyptians in the dawn of September 12.

The British soldiers rushed in; Urabi's men promptly

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(59) Vogt: The Egyptian War, p. 128. This fully describes the military battles.
(60) Ibid., p. 137.
(61) Proclaimation declaring Urabi a rebel (August 7,1882) "Egyptian Gazette" (August 9, 1882), State Papers, p. 575.

fled and the English were left as the undisputed victors. Urabi was reputed to have had about 20,000 men at this battle, 2,500 cavalry and 5,000 bedu; the English had 11,000 bayonets, and 2,000 sabres[62] and the distinct advantage in disciplined troops. Urabi's soldiers ran away in the thousands, leaving their weapons and materials behind them.[63] By the end of the battle some 2,000 Egyptians had been killed or wounded; 84 Englishmen were killed and only 342 wounded.[64] The victory was the decisive one. Urabi's army was completely shattered; he left the battle ground and went directly to Cairo. The English followed close behind, easily taking control of the Zagaziq and Benha roads to the capital. By September 15, they were in full control of the city; recognizing defeat, Urabi surrendered on the same day. The English ruled Egypt.

Lauding the victory, Malet wrote,

> "Had her Majesty's Government held back and allowed Urabi to gain the upper hand in Egypt, the country would have been thrown back 100 years, and the lives of Christians in all Mussulman States would have been in danger.[65]

The Times summed up the matter thus:

> the collapse of the Urabi bubble exceeds; indeed, even the wildest dreams of those who have contested the theory of Mr. Wilfred Blunt and Sir William Gregory.[66]

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(62) Times, September 14, 1882.
(63) Vogt: The Egyptian War, p. 189. For more on the battle see: E.B.Hamley, "The Second Division at Tel-el-Kebir," Nineteenth Century Review, XXI (December, 1882), 861-70.
(64) Vogt: The Egyptian War, p. 199.
(65) Malet: Egypt, p. 455.
(66) Times, September 18, 1882.

But Blunt did not forsake Urabi when he met with defeat; he continued to work more strenuously than ever for Urabi's fair treatment. Urabi's role in Egyptian affairs did not end with his defeat at Tel-el-Kebir, nor was Blunt's wholehearted support withdrawn. Even during the bleak month of August when Blunt could do little to help Urabi, he was preparing an Apologia in defense of the Egyptian nationalist. After Urabi's defeat, Blunt was fully prepared to defend him; the battle was not quite at an end.

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V. URABI'S TRIAL

Following the debacle at Tel-el-Kebir, Urabi returned to Cairo where he met with his council; they decided that further opposition was useless. This opinion was reinforced by General Drury Lowe's entrance into Abbassiyeh.[1] Thus on September 19, 1882, Urabi accompanied by Toulba Bey went to the Abbassiyeh Barracks[2] with the Prefect of the Police and surrendered his sword to General Lowe.[3] Urabi relinquished his command into the hands of the English and appealed for their clemency; he did not surrender to the Khedive or his court. After capitulating he attempted to launch a speech in Arabic to General Drury who refused to listen saying that he had no power to decide Urabi's case.[4] Urabi then asked to see General Wolseley, but he too declined to interview him.[5]

Toulba and Urabi were put together in the same prison cell. Meanwhile, most of Urabi's closest compatriots had also been arrested and imprisoned. Mahmoud Fehmi had been captured on August 24, when leaving Tel-el-Kebir for Kassassin. He had been taken directly to Wolseley; the latter questioned him

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(1) Blunt: Secret History, p. 320.
(2) Times, September 21, 1882.
(3) Great Britain, 3 Parliamentary Debates, (Commons), CCLXXIV (November 9, 1882), Dilke Speech, 1102.
(4) Times, loc. cit.
(5) Ibid.

but was unable to secure much information from the Egyptian leader. Since this time Fehmi had been confined in Ras-el-tin Palace.[6] Ali Fehmi, Abd al-'Al, Yacoub Sami, and Mahmud Sami Barudi were all in jail by the end of September. The prisons were also filled with nationalists like Muhammad Abdu and Ahmed Bey Rifat;[7] indeed, nineteen nationalists were finally tried along with Urabi. Thus the military and political leadership of the National Party was totally disintegrated. England remained in complete control.[8] She was now faced with the problem of what to do about Urabi and the Egyptian government.

England had gone into Egypt without the overt consent of the European powers. The conference of Constantinople was still in session and Turkey had not actually supported armed intervention, nor had France deigned to aid in the occupation. England stood alone. The Foreign Office was also bothered by the technical difficulty posed by the fact that Egypt was a province of the Ottoman empire which - up until this time - England had painfully supported. Therefore, England felt that she had to move prudently. She still claimed that the occupation would not be permanent but would last only so long as the

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(6) For more on Mahmoud Fehmi's capture and treatment during his imprisonment see Scotidis: Arabi Pasha, p. 258, and Vogt: The Egyptian War, p. 161.
(7) Scotidis: Arabi Pasha, p. 286.
(8) Ibid., p. 288.

instability remained. As soon as this situation was remedied, she planned to evacuate.

There was also the problem of how to deal with Urabi and the rest of the National Party. Obviously, England could not allow the Party or its power to remain intact. Gladstone desired for England to take over the machinery of the government and to destroy the last vestiges of nationalistic fervor within Egypt.

> I think we are quite agreed that, by hook or by crook, the first head ought to be British by arrangement with the Khedive.[9]

The Foreign Office was not, however, absolutely certain what form the English government should take; the Cabinet was still meeting concerning the matter in the last part of September.[10] By the same token, the top English officials could not ascertain what course would be best to follow in destroying the National Party; they wished to eliminate the Party's leaders without creating any martyrs or ill feeling in Europe or Egypt.

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(9) Gladstone to Granville, September 19, 1882, Gladstone, Granville Correspondence, p. 423.

(10) See Granville to Gladstone, September 19,1882, Ibid., p. 425, for a complete account of this cabinet meeting; also see Gladstone to Granville, September 19,1882, pp. 423-4, for a resume of the various plans submitted on English government in Egypt. This correspondence shows that Gladstone desired a form of permanent occupation in Egypt that would not alienate foreign powers.

Blunt realized that official opinion would run strongly against Urabi and his followers. For this reason he immediately talked with Button in order to discover exactly what position the Foreign Office was planning to adopt in regard to Urabi. Receiving disquieting news from the latter,[11] Blunt proceeded on September 19 to write directly to Gladstone. In this letter he pleaded Urabi's case and urged that the nationalists be given a fair trial according to English justice.[12] Blunt sent this letter off on the same day, but he was later informed by Hamilton that the letter was not received by the Prime Minister since he had been out of town. Hamilton suggested that Blunt write to Malet for further information. Following Hamilton's advice, Blunt wrote to Malet, and also to Urabi on September 22.[13] On the same day, he received notice that Gladstone had finally received his letter of the nineteenth instant but had not acted favorably upon it.[14]

Blunt was correct in his analysis of English official opinion regarding Urabi. As Gladstone's correspondence with Granville revealed, the two men were not adverse to hanging the "rebel" leader. The Khedive was also in favor of executing

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(11) Blunt: Secret History, p. 327.
(12) For the full text of the letter see Ibid., pp. 328-30.
(13) Ibid., p. 331.
(14) Ibid., p. 333. Gladstone wrote on Blunt's letter to Granville on October 21, 1882 noting that he had not given Blunt any encouragement, Gladstone, Granville Correspondence, p. 427.

the National Party's leaders; Granville for his part was:

> Inclined either to hold my tongue, or to say that we do not wish to interfere with the Khedive, as long as there is a fair trial, and there are not many executions.[15]

Gladstone felt that no harm would come with the death of Urabi and, indeed, was rather inclined to support the idea.

> The Queen and the Khedive are in the same sense about Urabi. I shall be very glad if he can be hung without real inclemency. If we were the actual Governors, I should wish to take no life except for crime. But he will probably prove to be a criminal; and again his case is peculiar and if the Khedive, a mild man, without his being a criminal, thinks fit to put him to death as a concocter of rebellion and a traitor to Egypt, with a view to public security, I agree with you and do not see that we need interpose a negative.[16]

Most of the English public opinion seems to have concurred with this idea.[17]

However, Blunt refused to be daunted by the seemingly insurmountable odds. On the nineteenth of September, A. M. Broadley, barrister of law, received a note from Button which urged him to go to Egypt in order to defend Urabi. Blunt and Broadley met on the same day to discuss the possibility of Broadley journeying directly to Egypt. Broadley favored returning to Tunis, a country in which he had just spent a great deal of time and where he had earned a reputation as a

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(15) Granville to Gladstone, September 21, 1882, Ibid., p. 428.
(16) Gladstone to Granville, September 22, 1882, Ibid., p. 429.
(17) See the Times, particularly Sir Samuel Baker's letter to the Editor, September 19, 1882 which can serve easily as a paratype. This letter urged that severe measures be taken against Urabi.

defender of nationalists. In returning to Tunis, Broadley wished to survey the situation in Egypt to see what was going to happen there before accepting the job of defending Urabi.[18] Broadley's judgement won; he went directly to Tunis where he awaited further instructions from Blunt concerning Urabi's impending trial. Blunt wrote to Urabi concerning the plans for his defense in his letter of the twenty-second. This letter never reached its destination because it was intercepted by Malet who was particularly upset over Blunt's avowed intention to come to Egypt to aid Urabi's cause.[19].

Malet wrote to Granville on September 30 about Blunt's letter; he inquired if the letter to Urabi ought to be delivered and stated categorically that Blunt would be arrested if he attempted to land on Egyptian soil. In the same letter he also noted that the trial of Urabi Pasha would be conducted under the command of the Egyptian government in Arabic and that there would be no "defence in any other language."[20] This, of course, indicated that the Egyptian government under the rule of the Khedive was to be the sole jurist; it meant also that Urabi and his followers would certainly receive the death penalty for being traitors. Granville agreed with Malet that Blunt's letter to Urabi, which informed him

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(18) A.M. Broadley, How We Defended Arabi & His Friends. London: Chapman & Hall, 1884, pp. 2-8. Hereafter cited as Broadley: How We Defended Arabi.

(19) Blunt: Secret History, p. 332 also Ibid., p. 9 for full text of letter.

(20) Malet: to Granville, September 30, 1882, Malet: Egypt, p.461.

of the fight being waged for his fair trial, should not be delivered.[21]

Blunt did not sit idly waiting for the final answer about Urabi's trial to be delivered from Downing Street; he wrote Gladstone again on September 27, 1882 urgently requesting an immediate reply on the type of trial which Urabi was to be granted. This letter never reached Gladstone, but it was forwarded to Granville whose secretary, Pauncefote,[22] curtly replied that the Foreign Minister could not enter into a correspondence with Blunt on the subject of Urabi's trial.[23] This letter was a decisive factor for it incited Blunt, working in conjunction with Button and De la Warr, to exert pressure on the Times to support the hew and cry for a fair trial. Button was able to convince Chenery, the editer of the paper, to carry the battle into print.[24]

Events were now crowding in on the policy makers. On the first of the month, the Queen communicated to Granville that she desired the "speedy trial of prisoners, every hold on Egypt short of annexation - continued occupation by the

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(21) Granville to Malet, October 3, 1882, Ibid. Broadley notes that this letter never reached Urabi, having gone "diplomatically astray." Broadley: How We Defended Arabi, p. 9.
(22) Pauncefote was the new Under Secretary for Granville; he was appointed October 1, 1882.
(23) Blunt: Secret History, p. 336.
(24) Ibid.

whole army."[25] But at the same time, Granville was worried that Malet could no longer impose the Queen's will on the Egyptians or the Khedive; officials within England were also dubious about Malet's qualifications to represent England during the time of crisis.[26] Gladstone was also concerned about opinion within Parliament, for the Times had fully discussed the matter of the upcoming trial and broadly hinted that the forthcoming Parliamentary sessions would be devoted to discussion of Urabi's trial. Gladstone had hoped that such debate would not reach the floor of the Parliament.[27]

Meanwhile, Blunt and Button had engaged Mark Napier as counsel for Urabi. The son of an Ambassador, Napier was well known within English circles, had an excellent command of French (the diplomatic language of the Egyptian court), and was held in wide repute among Englishmen. Napier arrived in Cairo on October 6, 1882. By this time Broadley had also been instructed to go to Cairo, but he was delayed by poor steamer connections and failed to reach Egypt until the eighteenth.[28] Haste was essential since the trial date was prearranged. The danger was quite real that Urabi might

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(25) Granville to Gladstone, October 1, 1882, Gladstone, Granville Correspondence, p. 436.
(26) Ibid.
(27) Gladstone to Granville, September 29, 1882, Ibid., p.434.
(28) Broadley: How We Defended Arabi, pp. 18-23. Also see Times, October 1-20, 1882.

be sentenced before any counsel for his defense arrived in Cairo or was admitted to see him.

Upon De la Warr's insistence, Blunt agreed not to press his demand to go to Egypt. Both men recognized the extreme ill feeling with which Blunt was held at Downing Street; therefore, De la Warr and Button took charge of lobbying for Urabi's fair trial. The trial had been set for October 14. It was commonly known that Broadley, who was traveling from Tunis, could not be expected to arrive in time for the trial. Napier's arrival was unknown to the Egyptian government officials and to Malet. These men had hoped to sentence Urabi before a counsel for his defense appeared. As Blunt remarked, "Nothing but Napier's unexpected appearance at the English Agency disarranged the concerted plan."[29]

On October 5, 1882, one day before Napier's October sixth arrival, Urabi and a group of other prisoners were moved from their old prisons to the Khedival stronghold in Garde Meubles; here the examination of the prisoners commenced.[30] Fortunately, Napier's arrival somewhat abated the zeal of the Khedival officials for a speedy trial and execution of Urabi. Napier immediately talked with Charles Wilson and Malet concerning Urabi's trial;[31] things were far from settled because on

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(29) Blunt: Secret History, p. 339.
(30) Times, October 6, 1882.
(31) Broadley: How We Defended Arabi, pp. 30-4.

October 12, Blunt heard from De la Warr that the trial would go off as expected unless positive steps were taken to halt it. Blunt promptly wrote a scathing denuciation of the Gladstone government to the Times.[32]

This bitter criticism undoubtedly further unsettled Gladstone; he began to doubt the wisdom of pre-emptory action against Urabi. His firm frame at mind had already been somewhat shaken by the appeals of Henry Bright,[33] author and merchant noted for his wide circle of friends, who had been writing to the Prime Minister calling for a fair trial.[34] Thus on October fourteenth, the Foreign Office, due to outstanding public pressure which threatened to upset the operation of its policy in Parliament and to degrade the Cabinet before the electorate, was forced to repent from its former support of Urabi's execution. On this date, Granville wrote that he disagreed with much of what Bright had to say, but that he sympathized with the view that Urabi should not be executed.[35] The opinion became the official one when Sir Charles Wilson told Napier on October 14, that English counsel was to be admitted and would be permitted to see the accused.[36]

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(32) Times, October 13, 1882.
(33) Bright was a friend of Blunt, and the two held similar opinions on the Egyptian question.
(34) Gladstone to Granville, October 12, 1882, Gladstone, Granville Correspondence, p. 445, refers to these letters and to Bright's opinions.
(35) Granville to Gladstone, October 13, 1882, Ibid., p.446.
(36) Broadley: How We Defended Arabi, p. 35.

Riad Pasha attempted to block the barristers from seeing Urabi, but, at Malet's insistence, he was forced to submit to the counsels' demands. Malet was acting under Granville's orders of October 13, which advised that Urabi should be allowed to consult with whomever he wished.[37]

The subject of the free and fair trial of Urabi was not yet, however, completely settled; Granville, on October 18, instructed Malet that the prisoners should be allowed counsel only if the Egyptian government accepted the idea. In the same communiqué, Gladstone told Malet that only National counsels were to address the court, that no arguments of political nature were to be permitted during the trial, and that any counsel not fitting the preceeding regulations was not to be permitted to sit in on the case.[38] For this reason, Broadley and Napier engaged Borelli Bey, legal adviser at the Ministry of the Interior and a man well versed in legal procedures, to act as a link between themselves and the Egyptian government. After a long tangled chain of events, matters were finally worked out to the point where the two counsels were allowed to speak with Urabi. The first meeting took place on October 22.

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(37) Malet: Egypt, p. 466.
(38) Granville to Malet, October 18, 1882, Malet: Egypt, p. 482.

Urabi and the others had been accused under Ottoman Penal Code for violating the sanctity of the white flag, inciting rebellion, continuing the war during peace, and carrying massacre into Egyptian territory.[39] These crimes were punishable by death. However, after talking with Urabi and with many influential Englishmen in Egypt, the counsels for the defense began to feel more optimistic about the possibility of saving Urabi.[40]

Indeed, by October 18, opinion within England was obviously shifting - the cries for Urabi's execution were fewer and fainter. On the eighteenth, the Times punlished an account of the forthcoming trial in which the correspondent stated that:

> for my own part I consider that even if Arabi be undoubtedly guilty of the worst crimes ... his simple deportation without trial would be less fraught with evils to the country than the interference of English counsel in a native court.[41]

Higher officials were afraid of the poor publicity a trial would create with Egypt and Europe; then, too, England's legal stand in Egypt was not strong. A full length trial led by English lawyers would surely reveal the inherent weakness of the English position.

Granville and Gladstone both recognized this fact and

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(39) Broadley: How We Defended Arabi, p. 51.
(40) Blunt: Secret History, p. 342.
(41) Times, October 18, 1882.

therefore desired that a prominent and efficient official be in charge of the Egyptian government during this period. After a long series of maneuvers they decided to send Dufferin[42] to Egypt to back up the weaker Malet.[43] His appointment as special commissioner was approved in October; he arrived in Cairo on November 7. Blunt believed Dufferin's presence in Egypt was a valuable aid for the nationalists' cause since Dufferin's had a reputation for sagacity and moderation.[44] Malet, too, was anxious for the trial to be brought to a hasty conclusion.[45] Broadley had told him that Urabi should be exiled or that the lawyers would make the situation extremely uncomfortable for the English and would prolong the trial for months. Frightened by this statement, Malet hurriedly wrote:

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(42) See Gladstone, Granville Correspondence, letters 826, 834, 835, 847, 850, 853, and 855 for the details of the negotiations and discussions which were undertaken before Dufferin's commission was approved.

(43) Granville described Malet as being "omnipotent, and at the same time personna gratissima." Granville to Gladstone, September 21, 1882, Ibid., p. 427.

(44) Blunt: Secret History, p. 345.

(45) Malet had personal reasons as well as patriotic ones for wishing the trial to end; he wrote: "I suspect I shall be eventually wrecked on the Urabi rock, for he is as great a difficulty as a prisoner as he was as a Minister." Private letter, October 17, 1882, Malet: Egypt, pp. 487-88.

> Now, neither the government nor the Khedive fear any disclosures. But they are justly most anxious about the indefinite protraction of the trial because it is producing a very bad effect.[46]

Meanwhile, Broadley had recovered Urabi's papers and was well on his way to prepare a strong case in the leader's defense;[47] he was also working for the defense of Urabi's compatriots who were to be tried. The dossier was readied in the first weeks of November. Blunt aided in this task by supplying nearly £ 500 to cover expenses. He and Lady Anne also sent reams of newspaper clippings on the mushrooming English antipathy to the trial to the lawyers.[48] After Dufferin's arrival the two counsels continued to interview the prisoners and to collect material for the trial;[49] however, the real settlement of the nationalists'fate rested with Dufferin. The latter, who embodied a "wonderful power of combination and conciliation,"[50] patiently listened to all sides of the question and read all the material which the counsels had so tediously prepared. Dufferin deserved

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(46) Ibid., p. 516.
(47) Broadley got the papers on October 24, Broadley: How We Defended Arabi, pp. 165-78. They were fully translated by the first of November. The pages noted above contain the text of most of the papers; the majority were concerned with Urabi's correspondence with Turkish officials. Also see the Times for October 25, which reported the recovery of the papers and added that Urabi would accept a sentence of exile.
(48) Broadley: How We Defended Arabi, p. 158.
(49) Ibid., pp. 143-289. Collecting the data and forming the defense was a complicated process which Broadley describes in some detail.
(50) Ibid., p. 312

full credit for devising the invention whereby Urabi and the others pleaded guilty to the charges placed against them; the court, then, changed the sentence to exile.[51] As early as November 16, Dufferin had concluded that the rebels should be exiled, not to London where they would be feted by Blunt, but to some far out of the way place. In the same correspondence, he added that he could find no proof of Urabi's complicity in setting the Alexandrian fire.[52]

Dufferin's communique, coupled with the virulent attacks by certain Parliament members, made Gladstone and Granville pause to reconsider the wisdom of treating Urabi severely. Certainly the effect of the Parliamentary attacks by members with whom Blunt had been in contact greatly influenced the Foreign Office's ultimate decision. These criticisms made by the Opposition were calculated to malign the government's policy in Egypt, if not, in some cases, to make it appear totally ridiculous. The attack was led by Churchill, Wolff, Gorst, Lawson, Labouchere and several Irish members.[53] The Opposition dwelt at length upon the method of trial and what procedures were to be followed during the trial. After much debate, it was decided that the nationalists were being

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(51) Ibid.
(52) Malet: Egypt, p. 517.
(53) Blunt: Secret History, p. 348.

arraigned under Ottoman Code, but since there was no copy of the Code in the Parliamentary Library, none of the members were able to ascertain just what this entailed.[54] Finally, Dilke was forced to admit that "Arabi Pasha is being tried under special conditions which are to be found in no Code whatever."[55] This prompted Gorst to ask:

> Will the honorable Gentleman state, if Arabi Pasha is not being tried under any existing Code, what law he is accused of having broken?[56]

Debates such as this one threw the Liberal's policy in Egypt into a bad light - a thing they could ill afford since the ever worsening Irish situation was constantly tormenting them. Gladstone valiantly attempted to justify England's position by saying that she was not in Egypt as a conqueror but only as an aid to the legal government.[57] These platitudes sounded hollow in the face of continued attacks in Parliament and in the press over England's ill advised occupation and unfair treatment of Urabi.

Gladstone publicly continued to deny that the English had erred in their treatment of Urabi, or that they intended to accept any responsibility for the payment of his trial;

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(54) Great Britain, 3 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CCLXXIV (November 9, 1882), Bourke Speech, 1114.
(55) Ibid., Dilke Speech, 1116.
(56) Ibid., (November 10, 1882), Gorst Speech, 1196.
(57) Ibid., (November 6, 1882), Gladstone speech, 862.

he also criticized Blunt for his work to save Urabi.

> Her Majesty's Government have not in anyway entered into or been responsible for, nor do they intend to make themselves responsible for, any of the proceedings of Mr. Blunt in regard to Egyptian affairs and the operations in Egypt, and they have no intention to defray any part of the expenses of the proceedings taken for the defence of Arabi, and those who, in common with him, are arraigned in Egypt, either for an act of rebellion or otherwise.[58]

Privately, however, he was beginning to believe that Urabi should be banished. He felt everyone would be happier with Urabi in an inaccessible location, not in the Turkish empire where he might constitute a threat to the status quo;[59] Gladstone was not afraid of Urabi being sent to England but was inclined to let Dufferin take the initative in deciding Urabi's ultimate fate.[60]

In Cairo, Broadley and Napier were busily conferring with Dufferin; on November 27, the final compromise solution was submitted. Before it was accepted the counsel forwarded it to Blunt for his approval. In short, the compromise stated that the prisoners were to be arraigned by a Court Martial where they would plead guilty. They were to be sentenced to death, but this was to be immediately commuted

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(58) Ibid., CCLXXV (November 28, 1882), Gladstone speech, 226.
(59) Gladstone to Granville, November 14,1882, November 15, 1882, Gladstone, Granville Correspondence, pp. 451-52.
(60) Ibid., November 19, 1882, p. 455.

to exile. They were to forfeit their property, but the English government would underwrite the expenses of their exile and provide them with a minimum pension.[61] Blunt was reluctant to accept these terms, feeling that better could be obtained, but after reconsideration he decided that the chances were too great to refuse the proposal.[62] There was some wrangling about the place of exile. Places from the Cape of Good Hope to Gibralter were mentioned and discarded.[63] After much talk, Ceylon was selected as the most favorable to all those concerned.[64] The outcome having been settled, the trial could now proceed.

Early Sunday morning, December 3, the courtroom opened for Urabi's trial.[65] Raouf Pasha sat as president of the Tribunal; he had been aligned with Urabi at one time but had changed sides just prior to Urabi's defeat.[66] Nine other judges sat on the board. Clad in their best military uniforms, the participants of the trial heard the brief defense from the counsels. Correspondants wrote ferverishly while about forty onlookers scanned the courtroom. The session

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(61) See Broadley: How We Defended Arabi, pp. 313-28 for more details.
(62) Blunt: Secret History, p. 360.
(63) Ibid., p. 355-60 for texts of letters exchanged between Napier, Broadley, and Blunt on the subject. Also see letter 893 in Gladstone, Granville Correspondence.
(64) Blunt: Secret History, p. 361.
(65) For a dramatic description of the scene see Broadley: How We Defended Arabi, pp. 329-45.
(66) London Illustrated News, LXXXI (December 23, 1882), p.654.

itself was short; by the afternoon, the entire affair was over. Urabi was declared guilty and sentenced to death. After a moment, the Clerk rose and in the Khedive's name commuted the sentence to exile.[67] The trial was over. On December Seventh, Sami Barudi, Mahmoud Fehmi, Abd al-'Al, and Toulba Bey appeared in the same court, and received the same sentences which were also commuted.

Urabi then began to prepare for his departure. While still in prison he wrote letters thanking the English government and others involved in the trial, particularly Blunt who had been responsible for seeing that he secured a fair trial under English judicial auspices.[68] On December 24, the old nationalist leaders were publicly degraded from Cairo's mosques. The next day, in great secrecy, they were conveyed out of Cairo and set on their way to permanent exile in Ceylon which Urabi called the birth place of Adam.[69]

Urabi was thus disposed of with a minimum of embarrassment for all those concerned. The English and Egyptian governments were satisfied with the results. Indeed, only the Queen voiced an objection to the exile of the "infidel rebels," but Gladstone and Granville chose to ignore her feminine

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(67) Broadley: How We Defended Arabi, pp. 341-42.
(68) The texts of these letters are given in Broadley: How We Defended Arabi, pp. 384-55.
(69) Times, December 26, 1882.

protests.[70] The trial itself had fooled no one. It was variously labeled a "novel judicial procedure,"[71] and " a farce."[72]

Voicing his opinion on the trial, Blunt poignantly bemoaned the fact that things had not gone more prosperously for the National Party, in which he still attached much belief, but he was glad that he had been able to play a small part in assuring Urabi's fair trial. The trial was fairly expensive for Blunt who had agreed to be financially responsible for all of the costly defense, and who had instructed the counsels not to spare the expenses.[73] To help defray the expenses, Blunt had organized the Egyptian Prisoners' Defense Fund; subscribers included Charles 'Chinese' Gordon, Lord Elcho, and A.W. Kinglake,[74] but the donations did not go far in covering the bill of over £3,000.[75] Blunt paid the bulk of this from his own pocket. He did not regret his help to the prisoners. Indeed, he kept up his correspondence and friendship with Urabi even when the cause was completely lost, the English government firmly entrenched in Egypt and after the English people's minds were far afield from the bitter battles of 1882.

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(70) Gladstone to Granville, December 8, 1882, Gladstone, Granville Correspondence, p. 465.
(71) Malortie, "Egypt for the Egyptians," Fortnightly, XL, (1883), p. 330.
(72) Baron de Kusel: An Englishman's Recollection of Egypt, p. 230.
(73) Broadley: How We Defended Arabi, p. 48.
(74) Times, December 5, 1882.
(75) Blunt: Secret History, p. 361.

With Urabi out of sight, the English government turned its attention to define its position in Egypt and in setting up an efficient governmental structure. Representing the typical imperialistic viewpoint, Dicey wrote that England should at all costs remain in Egypt. He urged the British to create a stable government which would ensure England free access to the Canal and the East.[76] Because England had destroyed all vestiges of power within Egypt, this task posed almost insurmountable difficulties. Egypt was a power vacuum in which no party could secure enough support to wield effectively the governing apperatus.[77] Coming to the rescue, Dufferin supplied a thoughtful program for the reorganization of Egypt. This program, presented on February 6, 1883, bore a striking resemblance to Urabi's memorandum on Egyptian reform of November 25, 1882.[78] This program formed the basis for the Organic Law which was promulgated on May 1, 1883; the law provided for a provisional constitution, a legislative counsel of thirty, and General Assembly.

The English army, or the majority of it, had departed from Egypt before this time. Wolseley received his home orders on October 15; he left on the twenty-first. Most

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(76) Edward Dicey, "England's Intervention in Egypt, "Nineteenth Century Review, XII (August, 1882), 161-74; "England in Egypt, "Nineteenth Century Review, XII (November, 1882), 804-20; also see his The Khedive's Egypt.

(77) A. Beaman, "The Restoration in Egypt, "Fortnightly, XL (1883), p. 627. Baron de Kusel: An Englishman's Recolection, of Egypt. p.225. Wallace:The Egyption Question, pp.410-14.

(78) For a comparison of the two programs see Broadley: How We Defended Arabi, pp. 444-50.

of his soldiers followed. Only a vanguard of soldiers remained to ensure the peace. Things remained quiet within Egypt during the months immediately following Urabi's exile; all vestiges of the National Party had been destroyed, and it took some time for nationalistic Egyptians to resume fighting for independence.[79]

Malet stayed as Consul in Egypt until June 1, 1883;[80] Evelyn Baring, later the Earl of Cromer, took his place on September 11. Malet had accepted the fact that the English would be in Egypt for some time and did his best in the short interregnum before his welcomed departure to ensure Egypt's tranquillity.[81] After Cromer's appointment as Agent, Blunt took heart for at that time Cromer had a reputation "for large mindedness."[82] At this time, Blunt wrote his diatribe, "The Wind and the Whirlwind," a poetic rendition of the Urabi revolution which was published in 1883. The poem attracted widespread attraction, but Blunt wished to take an even more active part in campaigning for the nationalists and their defeated cause.

He therefore resolved to go to Ceylon to visit Urabi and his friends; on the way he planned to stop for a short

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(79) For an account of the interlude after Urabi's defeat and before the resumption of the National Party's activities see Landau: Parliaments in Egypt, pp. 104-7.
(80) Cromer: Egypt, p. 345.
(81) Letter to Lady Malet, February 26, 1883, Malet: Egypt, p.531.
(82) Wilfred Scawen Blunt, Gordon at Khartoum: Being a Personal Narrative (London: Stephen Swift & Co., 1911), p. 38. Hereafter cited as Blunt: Gordon at Khartoum.

stay in Egypt. On September 22 Blunt and Sabunji arrived in Port Said. Four days later Blunt met with Cromer in Cairo and discussed with him the problems facing the Egyptian nation. The conversation although a heated one was not unfriendly, but Blunt was unable to convince Cromer that the National Party members ought to be reinstated in the Cabinet.[83] After spending a few days talking with other British officials and members of the Party of Liberty, the new name of the National Party, Blunt became convinced of the futility of fighting the English occupation from Egypt and left for Ceylon and India in early October.

Almost immediately after Blunt's departure Cromer wrote to the Foreign Office asking if Blunt might not be forbidden to enter Egypt because his presence had a disrupting effect on the precarious political situation in Egypt.[84] The Foreign Office agreed with Cromer's estimation; thus on December 31, 1883, Cromer wrote to Blunt that Sherif Pasha, acting on instructions from the Khedive, had forbidden Blunt to enter Egypt. The receipt of this letter infuriated Blunt; he vocally expressed his indignation in letters to Cromer, Hamilton, the Times, and later to Gladstone himself. On January 30, 1884, while still in India, he wrote to Hamilton:

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(83) Ibid., pp. 55-60.
(84) Baring to Granville, October 13, 1883, State Papers, p. 1083.

> What, in the name of all that is blunder-headed, does Baring mean by sending me in official form and without explanation a threat of the late Sherif Pasha's that he would prevent my landing in Egypt?[85]

Hamilton replied that he knew nothing of Cromer's action, but that he could do nothing to change the order; he further advised Blunt that for his own safety he should not:

> act in the matter of the order of the Egyptian Government in such a way as to bring yourself into trouble.[86]

Blunt continued to object to the order which barred him from Egypt, but to no avail. After visiting with Urabi and getting the latter's life history, Blunt left India on March first, and traveled directly to England. Once in England, he resumed his attacks on Gladstone and the current Government, but his letters to the Foreign Office were tactfully ignored. Nor was Blunt again allowed entry into Egypt until the English were certain that they had a firm hold on the nation and that Blunt could not stir up any trouble.

In 1884, Blunt journeyed to Constantinople to meet with leading Ottoman officials; he spoke with them about England's imperial aims and about the prospects for the Turkish empire. Of course, he attempted of convince the Ottoman leaders to fight for Egyptian independence, but in all of these negotiations he acted only as a personal

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(85) Blunt to Hamilton, January 30, 1884, Blunt: Gordon at Khartoum, p. 581.
(86) Hamilton to Blunt, February 28, 1884, Ibid., p. 583.

envoy. He had no role in molding English foreign policy.[87] Throughout the rest of the decade he continued to take a lively interest in Egyptian and Sudanese affairs. Letters from Blunt periodically appeared in the Times. Their tone was always the same. Blunt wanted the English to get out of Egypt and to allow the nationalists to run their own government.[88]

When the English became involved in the Sudan, Blunt went so far as to suggest that Urabi be sent to the Sudan to negotiate a settlement.[89] His suggestion was disregarded. Blunt's Crabbet Farm continued to be haven for all former nationalists who found their way to England; there they gathered for talks about old times and for idle discussion on the current trends in Egypt,[90] but the days in which they could effectively influence events were gone.

By the end of the decade, Blunt was again permitted to return to his estate outside Cairo; upon his arrival he met with Cromer and pleaded that Urabi be allowed to return. Cromer could not be convinced for he still feared that Urabi would be able to reawaken the National Party. In his usual

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(87) Ibid., pp. 302-33.
(88) Times, March 5, 1883; April 10, 1884; June 6, 1884; July 7, 1884.
(89) Blunt presented this idea to the Times, December 23,1884; in this letter he also suggested that he would accept a call to go. Curiously, Gregory also proposed the idea in his article, "Egypt and the Sudan," Nineteenth Century Review, XVII (March, 1884), 433.
(90) Blunt: Gordon at Khartoum, p.270. Blunt: The Diaries, pp. 90, 214, and Vol. 11, 150, 152, 350 refer to visits by Abdu and other prominent nationalists like Kemal.

tradition, Blunt continued to rail against all the English programs in Egypt and particularly against Cromer's work. Blunt was especially vehement when he denounced the English for failing to grant the nationalist governing power in 1893. He still wanted the English to evacuate Egypt.

> A hundred years of the present regime will not advance us a step in that direction. If ... we can be content with having reorganized the finances and administration and given Egypt a fair start, and if an absence of those dangers from without and within which we came to Egypt to overcome, if harmony and good feeling between all classes of the population ... are sufficient evidence of a normal condition then in truth and sincerity we need not wait a day.[91]

But Blunt's complaints had no effect upon the continued English occupation.

As the English government became entrenched in Egypt, the Foreign Office began to feel more secure and was inclined to look more favorably upon pleas that Urabi be allowed to go back to Egypt. After the Duke of York visited the exiled leader in Colombo and went back to England fighting for the end of Urabi's exile, the Foreign Office permitted Urabi to return. At the turn of the century after an absence of almost twenty years, Urabi returned to his home. His homecoming was small for he no longer commanded popular attention. He lived quietly,, if almost unrecognized in his native land,

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(91) Wilfred Scawen Blunt, "The Khedive and Lord Cromer," Nineteenth Century Review, XXXV (February, 1894), p. 187.

and his death in 1911 passed almost unnoticed.[92]

After Abdu's death in the same year, most of Blunt's connections with the Egyptian National Party were servered; although he did publish a pamphlet Atrocities of Justice under British Rule in Egypt in 1906 after the infamous Denshawai Affair. The pamphlet was republished several times and was widely read. For all practical purposes the publication of latter work marked the end of Blunt's work for the Egyptian independence movement. After this, Blunt ceased to direct most of his energies towards publicizing the nationalists' cause; later years found him championing the Irish rebels, the independence movement in India, and fighting English imperial efforts. His battle to keep the English out of Egypt had failed. Indeed, the British were in full control of Egypt long after Blunt ceased to take an interest in Egyptian affairs, and they were to remain there many years after his death.

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(92) Blunt: The Diaries, Vol. II, 13-4, 44, 362.

CONCLUSION

Wilfred Scawen Blunt was a man who struggled against overwhelming odds to help the National Party and its leaders with Egyptian independence. The struggle was waged against England who wanted, above all, to assure an open road to India; Egypt with the Suez Canal was a vital part of the route to the East. In England's eyes Egypt had to be kept pro-British at any cost - even at the price of a military occupation. Blunt, on the other hand, believed that the Egyptians had the right to rule their own destinies. He thought that the National Party led by Urabi was strong enough to oppose the British and could implement much needed reforms in the Egyptian government and economy.

The National Party as it emerged in 1882 was composed of a combination of men who represented army officers, intellectuals influenced by al-Afghani's Islamic reform program, and constitutionalists.[1] Its members were from the educated classes, landlords, and the army. Through a program aimed at crushing the Khedive's regime, the prevention of foreign intervention, and lightening the financial burden, the Party gathered widespread support. Hearing that the Party had promised to cancel all their debts and banish usurers, the fellahin flocked to uphold

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(1) Landau: Parliaments in Egypt, pp. 86-7.

it.[2]

Although Blunt encouraged the leadership of the National Party to initiate reforms and assured them that England would not intervene, the nationalists had neither the firm control of the government in Egypt, nor enough power to surmount English opposition. Nor was England, despite Blunt's assurances to the contrary, content to let the Egyptian nationalists run Egypt as they wished.

England tried to stay out of Egypt as long as possible, but she was finally forced to admit the fact that the National Party was not going to disappear and that matters had gone too far, too quickly to be quietly erased. But the English hesitated to act alone; they wanted French and Turkish aid. Blunt counted on other European powers' objections to English intervention to be loud enough to frighten the English into allowing Egypt to remain independent. In so doing, he entirely miscalculated how much importance England attached to control of the Suez Canal and secondly, to the tenor of the European political situation. With the growing combustibility of political events in Egypt, England became more anxious than ever to find a solution. She tried to work in co-ordination with France, but the latter declined to act militarily. At the conference of Constantinople, it was revealed that Germany

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(2) Wallace: The Egyptian Question, pp. 86-7, 104-5. Also see Gabriel Baer, A History of Landownership in Modern Egypt, 1800-1950 (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 26-7.for a fuller discussion of this point. Baer also noted that Urabi was a landowner and that most of the key nationalists, i.e. Sami Barudi and Mahmoud Fehmi were highly respected men and were in positions to command local admiration and support.

and Austria would not object to English occupation of Egypt.[3] The other European powers, although not happy at the prospect of an English controlled Egypt, did not threaten to use military or economic sanctions against England if she occupied Egypt. Thus reassured, the English, frigthened by the outbreak of riots in Alexandria, decided the time for military action had arrived. The Foreign Office made one last effort to bring France into the action; when this effort failed, England moved alone. In July she bombarded Alexandria, in August occupied the country, and in September completely defeated the "rebels."

Wilfred Blunt was one of a small minority who dared to object to the English occupation of Egypt. By himself, Blunt stood little chance to stem the tide of imperialistic fervor which was sweeping England in the latter half of the nineteenth-century. Within England his position was a nebulous one; being a man of means, a well known writer, and of high social standing, Blunt had earned a certain amount of renown, but he never commanded a position of governmental authority. Blunt's circle of friends, acquaintances, and contacts was amazingly large. He knew most of the really influential Englishmen of the day. Unfortunately, he lacked the power to go along with his

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(3) See Zayid: Egypt's Struggle for Independence, pp. 25-28. Also Dufferin's correspondence to Granville on the conferences procedures in State Papers.

social position. He was not in the diplomatic corps or Parliament or in banking. Thus he could not command votes or means to coerce the government into adopting his views. The most Blunt could have hoped to accomplish through his lobbying and writing for the Egyptian independence cause was to awaken the English public to the true nature of the nationalist movement in Egypt and to make things uncomfortable for the Liberals. However, he was never able to secure enough support within the Parliament or the public at large to threaten Gladstone's majority.

In encouraging the National Party, particularly Urabi, Blunt over-estimated both his own influence and the strength the nationalist possessed to resist English intervention. Blunt's greatest weakness lay in his egotism; he had tremendous energy and vitality, but he always tended to exaggerate his own capabilities. Then, too, his attitude towards the East and Egypt, in particular, remained essentially a romantic one. He foresaw a rebirth of Islam and of the Eastern peoples - a rebirth which would eclipse the West.[4] In the end, he was to become disillusioned with the romantic vision he had once seen, but he always held true to his basic tenet that imperialism was wrong. Throughout his lifetime, Blunt warned of imperialism's dangers and ill effects, both upon the colonies and upon the protectorates.

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(4) This romanticism is apparent throughout Blunt's The Future of Islam.

Motivated by these factors, Blunt was moved to encourage and champion the National Party.

His primary contribution in aiding the Urabi revolution was his publicizing of the National Party's goals and Urabi's desire for progressive government. After the English occupied Egypt, Blunt was responsible for saving Urabi and his compatriots from pre-emptory action against them by the Khedive and England. Because of Blunt's vociferous insistence, the English government was forced to accept Blunt's demands and to grant Urabi a pardon. Blunt was able to accomplish this because he exposed the weakness of the English position in Egypt; to prevent further embarrassment both in Parliament and in Europe, the Foreign Office under Gladstone and Granville was forced to accept Blunt's demands that the nationalists have a fair trial and be sentenced only to exile. The exile of the nationalists also aided Britain in that it prevented the creation of martrys from the National Party with whom the fellahin could identify and other nationalists use as symbols in their fight against the English.

Blunt realized, as few other Englishmen did, that the Urabi revolution had nationalistic characteristics and that, if encouraged, could have merged all facets of the Egyptian social structure the Eguptian government would then have been able to work for better conditions and a sounder financial policy. The English preferred to remain loyal to

the Khedive on whom they placed their traditional trust. Knowing that the Khedive lacked popular support, the English tended to back him because he was totally dependent upon them for his office. Blunt tried to explain that the English could work just as easily with the moderate nationalists, but his advice went unheeded.

At the same time, Blunt incited the National Party to fight the English and to refuse to surrender. The National Party leaders, who lacked knowledge of European diplomatic strategy went along with what Blunt said and believed him when he told them he would prevent the British from occupying their country. Before the publication of the Joint Note, Blunt had even been able to act as a mediator between the English and the nationalists; after the Joint Note the nationalists refused to compromise. Blunt agreed with this decision of the nationalists; although he was no longer able to negotiate for both sides, he continued to be closely aligned with the Egyptians. Indeed, he became more and more alienated from the English government officials. In the end, Blunt was working entirely for the National Party against the English; He may, in fact, have gone entirely too far in encouraging Urabi to contest England's stand.

Blunt admitted this fact after Urabi's disastrous defeat at tel-el-Kebir, but he tempered this admission by

lauding the fact that the nationalists had taken action against English encroachment.

> Looking back at my action in Egypt during that perid, with its early successes and its final failure to obtain for the National Government fair treatment at English hands, I cannot wholly regret the course I took. I made, of course, many mistakes, and I feel that I am in considerable measure reponsible for the determination the Nationalist came to risk their country's fortune on the die of battle. But I still think their fate would have been a worse one if they had not fought, tamely surrendering to European pressure. They at least thus got a hearing from the world at large, and if any attention since has been paid to fellah grievances it had been won wholly by Arabi's persistence, which I encouraged, in accepting the logic of their political principles even to the point of war.[5]

Blunt's interpretation may contain more than a grain of truth, for through the publicity of the military encounter and the fierce debates that went on in Parliament, all the world heard of the English action in Egypt and, simultaneously, became acquainted with the National Party and its goals. Thus when the British did take over Egypt, they, too, were forced to recognize that the Urabi revolt had been a nationalist one and not a purely military revolt. Blunt called this point to the attention of all and made the English governing officials take cognizance of the fact. The Urabi revolution revealed that the English occupation had been an imperial one, to which masses of the Egyptian people objected. Unfortunately, the National Party's roots

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Blunt: Secret History, p. 362.

were not deeply enough embedded within the Egyptian society for the Party to survive the exile of all its leaders. With their departure, the National Party withered away; Egypt was forced to endure a long period of foreign government before she again generated a new national party to fight for independence.

To Blunt, one must pay the respect due an individual who fights for what he believes to be a just cause. But his total accomplishments should not be overestimated, for he was just one man fighting an entire nation and trend. He overstated his potentialities and misled the nationalist leaders; then, too, his motivation for championing the cause was to a great extent egotistical. On the other hand, he remained true to the cause and continued to fight for it. Blunt's diaries and writings remain as invaluable narratives on the growth of the nationalistic movement in Egypt and of its battle against the English. For this alone, his work has proven to have been of some merit - even though his original cause was defeated.

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