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SOME ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL APPROACHES TOWARD FUTURE
AMERICAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

PAUL R. WINEMAN

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Beirut , Lebanon

PREFACE

In dealing with the formulation of United States policy in the Middle East it had been my original intention to analyze various approaches toward future policy as viewed from (1) Soviet penetration into the area, (2) the Arab-Israeli conflict, (3) Arab Nationalism, (4) oil, and (5) foreign aid. However, it soon became apparent that an undertaking of this nature was too cumbersome for the time available to complete the project.

I found myself, therefore, faced with the decision of how to preserve the basic thesis of my subject while, simultaneously, eliminating a discussion of those American interests that would only be redundant to what had already been established.

I, thus, decided that after establishing the various alternatives open to the United States regarding the Soviet Union in the Middle East, our major foreign policy pre-occupation to-date, I would employ the Arab-Israeli conflict and the pattern of future economic development assistance to attempt to illustrate how the United States might endeavor to shift its Cold War

conformation with the USSR from the political arena to that of the economic in order to attempt to improve the American image in the eyes of the people of the Arab Middle East. In this way the United States might present itself as a nation concerned sincerely with the socio-economic changes occurring in this part of the world and willing to constructively participate in these changes in a way that will benefit the inhabitants of the area.

My particular concern in adopting this view was to attempt to show how, in the future, the United States might realistically accent its dealing with Middle Eastern states on an economic plane in contrast to a political one and carry out foreign aid projects through the means of the private sector, thereby, strengthening trade relations. From this approach it would be hoped that United States concern with Soviet attempts at penetration into the area would be successfully challenged and that the United States could find less reason to have to resort to political recourse in order to protect what she thought were vital American interests in the area.

While doing research during the summer of 1966, I had the opportunity of spending the month of September

in 'Amman, Jordan, living with a Jordanian family of Palestinian origin. During the course of my stay with this family, and in coming into contact with their circle of friends, who were primarily prosperous, upper middle class, ex-Palestinians, I was exposed to the attitudes that they held regarding particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict and what their feelings were regarding the possibilities of ever returning to Palestine and under what circumstances.

Yet, my contacts in Jordan, were not limited only to this class of people but also to a Palestinian class who enjoyed a much lower economic status. In discussing the Israeli-Arab problem with them I received a generally more optimistic view regarding the chances for refugees returning to Palestine. However in general it appeared that the Palestinians in Jordan with whom I came into contact, had the feeling that the possibilities for a return were so remote that it was only worth discussing in terms of "what is right" rather than "what will be." It must be noted, however, that my personal observations did not reach Palestinians in Arab Refugee Camps in Jordan and thus I did not have the benefit of comparing their views with those with whom I had contact.

I have chosen the Soviet Union as the focal, or pivotal point for future American foreign policy moves in the Middle East, over all other factors, for two reasons. First, a study of United States foreign policy moves indicates that the USSR has been the primary concern of the United States in the Middle East since 1945 and consequently, whether rightly or wrongly, the predominance of United States foreign moves in the area have revolved around this pre-occupation. Secondly, in my research, I could find nothing substantial that would indicate that the Soviet Union has altered any of her original long range objectives of (1) penetration into the Middle Eastern area with (2) the goal of neutralizing the West from the area in order to control (3) the politics and economics of Middle Eastern states. Thus, I find no reason to believe that realistically the United States can afford to allow the new Soviet "soft line" to alter its foreign policy movements anymore than it has since 1963 and that future United States policy must take into account, first and foremost, that long range Soviet objectives, in the area, are still specifically aimed at undermining the national interests of the United States.

I wish to acknowledge the assistance of Professor Joseph Malone, my thesis advisor, for his patience in

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Paul R. Wineman

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CHAPTER I

THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY

Creating a foreign policy for the United States is one of the most difficult tasks which faces any presidential administration. Beginning with President Washington, each Chief Executive has had to meet the dual responsibility of maintaining a foreign policy in keeping with the American ideal as interpreted in his time, while simultaneously placating political opposition without his own party. With the present emergence of nationalism in every section of the globe, particularly since the advent of World War II, the task has become immeasurably more difficult.

In the development of foreign policy, the executive position of any democratic nation must somehow represent or reflect the consensus of the electorate. But the electorate is often contradictory and moody. With so many people involved in the creation of a foreign policy, and so many more affected by its direction, it is sometimes to be wondered that any policy can clearly reflect the "will of the people." And yet, if it is to be called democratic then somehow it must.

How then, as a nation, is America preparing to meet the demands of such a foreign policy situation? It is commonplace among writers on the United States to note that, because of the effects of World War II, America has been forced to take on the role of freeworld leadership. But the observation has also been made that the American rise to major world responsibility has been accompanied by a similar rise of an ambitious Soviet Union. The significant question, therefore, is: how capable is America in making the necessary decisions which will not only achieve the maximum national security for its own people but take into consideration the rest of the free world as well.

The root of the problem lies in the relationship between the need for incisive and intelligent decision-making on the part of an informed leadership and a democratic myth that insists that government policy be an expression of the will of the electorate. Thus, the United States finds itself faced with the question of whether the American people can adequately judge the complex and often remote problems of contemporary foreign policy. This question is complicated by the traditional pattern of American abstention from foreign "problems" except in periods of great stress. The pattern of American life finds the average American citizen deeply

involved in private pursuits. He develops views on political matters in direct proportion to their immediate interest and effect upon him.¹ His main interests, politically speaking, lie in such matters as tax laws, social security, and wage and price legislation; in short, domestic issues of a very local basis. It is only on rare occasions that he is aroused to the degree that he forms opinions concerning more remote foreign policy matters. As a result the American political system comes face to face with the dual tasks of how to make the public alert, informed, and active in foreign policy making as well as how to make official leadership responsible to the public.

No less a problem is posed by the perpetual Executive-Congressional struggle over program direction and leadership, which is inherent in the very structure of democratic government, as set up under the Constitution. This struggle has become further complicated over the years by the constant demands of conflicting pressure groups. The average citizen, who wants to form an intelligent opinion about foreign policy, not only needs to know what the Chief Executive and the Congress are striving to achieve but also to recognize what objectives various

¹Carol Fisher and Fred Karinsky, The Middle East in Crisis (Syracus University Press, 1959), p. 63.

pressure and minority groups are actively pursuing.

The average American needs to come more to the realization that, through the execution of his right to vote and his responsible participation in government, he is being called upon today, perhaps more than ever before in the history of his country, to participate in the making of decisions affecting not only his immediate life but also much of Western civilization. Typical of this responsibility is the need for the formulation of a sound Middle Eastern policy.

Walter Lippman has reminded the American people recently that a dynamic nation cannot be an isolationist nation; that to maintain a position, of world prominence a nation must have a clear cut foreign policy; and that a foreign policy cannot be sound unless it brings into balance the nation's foreign commitments with the nation's power to meet them.²

These commitments are founded on interests. The degree to which a nation may be prepared to enter into external commitments must depend, in the final analysis, upon the importance which that nation attaches to its

² Ibid., p. 65

outside interests and to the interests of its internal minorities and pressure groups.

Foreign interests of nations and internal interest groups, large and small, obviously cannot be considered as fixed quantities. They vary with the constantly changing conditions -- political, strategic, economic, and social. The policy designed to protect such interests is thus subject to frequent re-adjustments. Where new interests have sprung up, specific policy has to be devised, consistent with a nation's over all foreign policy. What is not variable, however, is the need for maintaining commitments and policy in harmony. The end result should not be left to chance. Hastily improvised means do not insure the desired ends.

The United States has today varied interests in the Middle East. The foreign policy required to maintain them is still in a process of formation. The interests in question are too recent to have produced at this stage a far-sighted policy, at once self-consistent and mature. But the same interests are also too critical to allow much time for experimentation with policy or for entrusting it to hit-or-miss methods. The crux of the issue is whether the United States is presently taking the most appropriate steps to develop an adequate Middle Eastern policy.

What are the essential interests of the United States in the Middle East? Summarily, they lie in the (1) peace and security of the region which is assumed necessary to (2) combat effectively the spread of Communist-Soviet influence into the area. Since 1948 it has been the policy of the United States Government that (3) preserving the integrity of the State of Israel is a prime factor in combatting the Soviet threat in the Middle East.³ Underlying the concern for peace and security in the Middle East lie the United States interests in (4) Middle Eastern trade, (5) Middle East oil and (6) transportation and communications rights in and through the area. Yet, in the final analysis, it must be remembered that United State's Middle Eastern interests must be fitted into, and be modified by, worldwide security and strategic concerns. "what at times we would like to do in the Middle East may in some way be obstructed by what we must do elsewhere in the world."⁴

Thus, keeping in mind the general interests of the United States in the Middle East as only one area of our

³U. Alexis Johnson, "American Policy in the Near East," U. S. State Department Bulletin, L (10 February 1964), p. 208.

⁴Ibid., p. 210.

overall foreign policy, we must now look at the existing Middle Eastern situation as it relates to United States foreign policy in light of possible contingency approaches that might become a part of future United States policy in the Middle East. In doing this we must consider the realities of the present Middle Eastern situation, and the domestic American political situation, as they affect the United State's interests in the Middle East and then make our judgements accordingly ---- on the basis of what is possible in the context of these situations---- not merely on what we would like to see based on our own individual judgements of what we think is just or unjust. In essence we are evaluating the realities of the past and the present for the sake of our own future.

But in evaluating the contingency bases for a successful future United States foreign policy in the Middle East one must realistically keep in mind from the outset that the national interests of the United States will, or at least should, be the final determinant in regard to any policy move. There is no question that the Government of the United States should continually keep the welfare of the American people paramount in conducting foreign policy in any part of the globe.

No government would deny that its foreign policy moves are geared to maintaining, to the maximum extent possible, the interests of the majority of its people as determined by an elected United States Government. To date, the most overt manifestations of American foreign policy such as foreign aid to developing countries, the challenge to Communist/Soviet Expansionism, the support of stable political institutions, support of ^{the} States of Israel, all have been generally recognized by the United States as being policies that are in the best interests of the American people.

Moreover, in addition to its being representative of United States national interests, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East should normally find acceptability with the inhabitants of the area in order to be compatible with the national interests of the countries of the Middle East themselves. And if in devising a Middle Eastern policy points of conflict arise that seriously endanger the posture of relations between the United States and the majority of Middle Eastern countries then it would be in the interests of the majority of people concerned, both American and Middle Eastern, to try and resolve those points of conflict so as not to endanger the remainder of the United States foreign policy program.

In essence, therefore, we are in effect evaluating possible foreign policy contingencies and in turn the effects of those contingencies upon basic policy. For example, how would the United States support of Arab Unity affect America's pre-occupation with reducing the threat of Communism in the Middle East, while the United States simultaneously attempts to maintain the existence of the State of Israel? Considering the United State's Government's desire to keep Middle East oil flowing uninterruptedly to Western Europe how would a reduction in foreign aid to certain Middle East Socialist regimes affect the oil flow in light of the Soviet position in the area?

United States foreign policy in the Middle East since World War II has been pre-occupied first and foremost with the countering of threatened or actual Soviet penetration into the area. Fear of Soviet penetration appears to continue to be one of the factors considered most important in the formulation of future United States foreign policy. Therefore, contingency approaches to future United States actions will be examined primarily in the areas of the Palestine problem, and United States foreign aid in association with United States foreign policy formation as it is related to calculated Soviet moves in the Middle Eastern area.

Dr. Nabih Amin Faris has described American foreign policy in the Middle East as taking the form of a pyramid in which the threat of Communism rests upon the top, supported at the base by the maintenance of the State of Israel and the continuous flow westward of Middle East oil.⁵ Assuming that today the term "Communism" might be more realistically replaced by the term "Soviet penetration" in regard to the Middle East, it is necessary from the outset to examine to just what extent the Soviet Union has penetrated into the Middle East, in light of the methods that it has employed, and to what degree and how this should basically affect future United States foreign policy formulation.

⁵Lecture given at the American University, Beirut, Lebanon on 22 August 1966.

CHAPTER II

SOVIET UNION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The aim of Soviet leadership in the Middle East, stated in the simplest form, has been to alienate the Middle East from the West and ultimately, to bring it under Russian political and economic control. While Stalin in his last years took no strong initiative to push forward these goals, his successors have made this the main object of their cold-war strategy. They have appraised the Middle East as possibly the softest spot in the whole Western system, and in Western Europe's dependence on Middle Eastern oil they see its Achilles' heel.⁶ With remarkable swiftness they have capitalized on events, at no great cost or risk to themselves, to establish Soviet influence in the area.

Soviet policy in the Middle East has gone through a number of phases since the Revolution of 1917. These phases include combinations of doctrinaire international communism together with calculated requirements of the Soviet state. These have been interspersed with swings

⁶John C. Campbell, *Defense of the Middle East* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961) , p. 161.

of the pendulum between aggressive expansion and cooperation with others for collective security. The record includes dramatic shifts and many inconsistencies, but through it all the continuing Soviet objectives in this region are apparent.

First, Communist doctrine has never been the decisive factor in determining specific policies in the Middle East. This is not to say that the Soviet leaders have not consistently believed in the eventual triumph of communism, in the Middle East as elsewhere. Nor does it mean that they have not been guided by the Lenin-Stalin theory of the natural alliance between the Soviet Union, the exploited colonial peoples of the East and the industrial workers of the West in the struggle to overthrow world capitalism. These considerations are fundamental to their outlook. But their policies have been determined more by the actual course of the contest with other great powers for positions and influence in this strategically located region.⁷ In this contest geography has been more important than ideology.

⁷Ibid., p. 25.

Secondly, despite the renunciation of "imperialist" aims and privileges, Soviet policy continued many of the traditional conceptions of Russian strategic interest held by the Tsarist regime, such as control of the Black Sea and spheres of influence in the Balkans and toward the Persian Gulf. Soviet policy has been dynamic and actively expansionist, however, in the sense of moving in with armed forces or taking an active hand in revolutions, only in extraordinary times -- times of flux and general collapse, or war or the aftermath of war. Even then, Moscow's hand has often been stayed and forces have been withdrawn from territory already taken over, when sufficient pressure was applied by other powers or when the immediate strategic or other gains were outweighed by larger objectives. The Soviet strategy of expansion in the Middle East was not to challenge directly the position of rival powers but rather to take advantage of their temporary weakness, lack of concern or disunity, and to avoid the risk of major armed conflict.

Soviet motivation has been both offensive and defensive in character. The two are not separable. "Defensive" thinking is evident in the intense concern over the danger of attack on the Soviet Union from the south and with "hostile blocs" and foreign bases in the

Middle East. But elimination of rival power is considered but the preliminary to its replacement by Soviet power. For these purposes Soviet leadership has utilized a variety of means; political and propaganda campaigns to turn these countries against other powers; special treaties intended to neutralise them or draw them into a Soviet-sponsored bloc; demands for strategic bases or special rights, or actual attempts to absorb adjacent border areas and create satellite states.⁸ Except during a brief interval in the 1930's, the Soviets have consistently tried to prevent any alliances or blocs in the Middle East not under their own sponsorship or control. They have used both threats and promises to keep the Middle Eastern countries out of such blocs. But the Soviet leaders, much as they have disliked the threats to Soviet security apparent in such alliances or in foreign bases, have not regarded them as intolerable in the sense of automatically requiring military action. Still less have they shown any intention of undertaking a campaign of military conquest to bring the Middle East under their own domination.

⁸Details of these treaties, propaganda, and political movements efforts can be found in Ivar Sector, The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, 1917-1956, p. 112-131.

They have always made a distinction between their immediate neighbors, the "northern tier" of Middle Eastern states, and the rest of the area. In Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan, where their security has been more immediately involved, they have shown greater sensitivity and have resorted to more direct methods whether in the construction of treaty systems or in pressure, intimidation and the use of force. They have paid particular attention to Iran, which because of its geographical location and political weakness has been the state most susceptible to Soviet pressure and most dangerously open to outside influence.⁹

In the Arab states further to the south, the Soviet leaders have relied more on tactics of propaganda, and diplomatic maneuver, doing everything they could at small cost in this traditionally British sphere of influence

⁹ Only in Iran did they insist on a treaty right (1921) to send in Soviet military forces if a third power should intervene militarily in that country. The relevant treaty clause reads as follows: "If a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia, or if such Power should desire to use Persian territory as a base of operations against Russia, or if a Foreign Power should threaten the frontiers of Federal Russia or those of its Allies, and if the Persian Government should not be able to put a stop to such a menace after having been once called upon to do so by Russia, Russia shall have the right to advance her troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operations necessary for its defense. Russia undertakes, however, to withdraw her troops from Persian territory as soon as the danger has been removed." Text in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1956), v.2, pp.90-94.

to make life more difficult for the British and their Western partners.¹⁰

In the new situation of the 1950's the Soviet Union has stood out as a catalyst and a model for the most cherished goals of Arab leadership: independence of the West, and domestic economic strength through industrialization. On the first goal, Russia has been in sympathy with the Arabs and eager to play the role of the catalyst in pushing the West out of the Middle East. Regarding the second Russia has been equally eager to have the less developed countries of Asia and Africa look to it as a model of economic and social modernization through its version of socialism. "Neutralism" in international relations and "socialism" at home have been their guiding principles to Arab leaders. They have not been entirely unsuccessful.

¹⁰ The Soviet role in the Palestine crisis of 1947-48 is an example. Despite its anti-Zionist attitude the Soviet Government voted in the United Nations for partition in 1947 and quickly recognized Israel in 1948. In so doing it made sure of the departure of the British troops and authority from Palestine and of the perpetuation of a Jewish-Arab conflict which for the indefinite future would keep the Middle East in ferment. A similar analogy might be drawn to the present situation in the South Arabian Federation with a yet undetermined amount of Russian support behind the operations of the United Arab Republic. Campbell, op. cit., p. 27.

Until now one of the Soviet Union's greatest gain in the Arab world has been the withdrawal of British influence and the "neutralist" policy of the Arab States in international relations. This began in 1953, upon the death of Stalin, when the Russian leaders turned toward their highly successful policy of supporting movements for independence directed against Western Powers. Without concerning themselves with the problems of Marx and Lenin they have helped anyone - liberals, communists, reactionaries, kings, feudal lords, anyone able to embarrass or weaken the West through nationalist claims or revolutions.

Applied to the Arab world, this policy has enjoyed marked success, particularly from 1955 to 1959. Under this policy the Soviet Union was able to give considerable diplomatic, military, and economic aid to Arab countries, and thus to help weaken the position of the West in the Near East, to win great prestige there, and to gain the diplomatic support of the Arab countries in that part of the cold war that is waged in the roll calls of the United Nations.

CHAPTER III

THE UNITED STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

In order to properly evaluate future policy approaches open to the United States in the Middle East, particularly in light of Soviet goals and methods, a basic understanding of America's role in the area is highly desirable. It is, therefore, the intent of this chapter to provide a review of United States movements in the Middle East so that a basis for comparison and analysis of future actions is established.

During the century preceding the second World War American interests in the Middle East were primarily cultural. American missionaries, having established schools in the area as early as 1820, indirectly had a significant and beneficial influence in bringing Western thought, ideals, and educational methods into the Middle East. But until World War II, as both a government and a nation, the United States took no stand

and had no policy.¹¹ It was a large, rich, and powerful nation which hoped only to maintain its traditional policy of isolation from the political embroilments of Europe and the Middle East. It adhered to the view that cultural and existing economic ties might be protected without political involvement. By as late as 1939 the United States had not arrived at the conviction that the Middle East was vital to its national security¹² and was content to leave diplomatic initiatives to the British.¹³

¹¹Georgiana G. Stevens, The United States and the Middle East (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 152. It is true that President Wilson's twelfth point in 1918 had urged a "secure sovereignty" for the Turks and self-determination for other nationalities in the Ottoman Empire, and that in 1919 the King-Grane Commission had been sent over British, French, and Zionist objections to ascertain the wishes of the Arabs in Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. It is also true that diplomatic efforts were made during the interwar period to secure access for American interests to the new oil fields in Iran and Iraq. But the King-Grane recommendations were never implemented and the discovery of new oil reserves in the United States reduced governmental concern about the Middle East. The rule holds: lacking policy objectives, the United States remained uninvolved.

¹²John DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East 1900-1939 (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1963), pp. 393 - 394.

¹³Stevens, loc. cit. Joint policies between Britain and the United States were not worked out beyond the immediate war problems. Occasional American moves led to friction with well-established British policies and interests. These were in matters of oil concessions, in competition for influence in Saudi Arabia, and later in the question of Jewish immigration into Palestine.

The war itself politically brought the United States into the Middle East. This involvement was exemplified by the establishment of lend-lease agreements, air bases and the stationing of American forces in Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iraq. This involvement led to the beginnings of present-day American policy observable during the war in (1) concern over oil supplies,¹⁴ (2) involvement in the Palestine problem, (3) the maintenance of the air base agreements, and (4) in American support for Lebanese and Syrian independence after 1943.¹⁵

¹⁴George Lencowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 532. During the war military ties with the area were strengthened by several economic measures: aside from lend-lease and supporting the Middle East Supply Center, the United States took an active interest in the interim arrangements concerning oil production. Designed mainly to serve strategic needs in the Far East American responsibilities in this respect grew to such an extent that in 1944 the government appointed James Landis as economic minister to the Middle East while simultaneously creating the post of petroleum attache for the region attached to the United States Embassy in Cairo.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 282. The American delegation in the United Nations on 4 February 1946 moved that the Security Council express its confidence that British and French occupation troops would be evacuated from Syria and Lebanon as soon as practicable and that negotiations to that end would be undertaken without delay. Though this proposal was not adopted because of a Soviet veto France and Great Britain declared that they would abide by the resolution and did so before the end of 1946. A more detailed account is given in N.A. Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon (New York: Praeger, 1957)

After the armistice in Europe and during the dismantling of its war effort in the Middle East, the United States remained initially disposed to leave political matters in the area under British direction as before. But drained by the war and under the pressure of local nationalisms, Britain was no longer equal to the task of maintaining her former position.¹⁶ Because of the lessening of British influence the United States found it necessary to assume her role in the Middle East. At the same time the Soviet Union began probing for weaknesses in the free world along a perimeter stretching from Western Europe through Greece and Turkey to Eastern Asia. In attempting to thwart Soviet moves, the American government was able to contain Russia in Europe but, in doing so, diverted pressures to less defensible areas in the Middle East. Thus, the post-war Middle East quickly became the scene of struggles between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Middle Eastern nations themselves.¹⁷

The Soviet threat in the Middle East first became specific in Greece, Turkey, and Iran. In Greece

¹⁶Richard Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 648.

¹⁷Ibid.

and Turkey Russia tried to gain control of the governments by a program of communist penetration and infiltration. In early 1947 when the British proved unable to provide economic and military assistance to meet the Communist offensive, the United States formulated the Truman Doctrine involving over \$400 million in aid. Meanwhile, in Iran, the Soviet Union had failed to remove its military occupation forces from Azerbaijan and the United States demanded their immediate withdrawal.¹⁸ Therefore, America suddenly found itself a major participant in the affairs of the Middle East due to its response to the Soviet challenge.

¹⁸Campbell, op. cit., p. 32. The experiment of the democratic national autonomous government in Iranian Azerbaijan in 1945 and 1946, sustained by the presence of Soviet troops kept in Iran beyond the evacuation date fixed by treaty, threatened the integrity and the very existence of Iran as an independent state.

Mr. Truman has said on later occasions that he sent an ultimatum to Stalin (New York Times, April 25, 1952: that he had Stalin informed of his orders "to prepare for the movement of our ground, sea and air forces" and that he would "send troops if he (Stalin) did not get out." After three weeks of crisis the Soviets agreed. Truman Speaks (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 71.

However American backing of the establishment and growth of Israel represents the first substantial political involvement of the United States in the Arab part of the Middle East. Certainly it can be said that American policy toward Palestine was a product of a number of currents which produced a variety of political acts and statements.¹⁹ Nonetheless, by the spring of 1948, the United States in the eyes of the Arabs, had become associated with the dismemberment of Palestine, defeat of the Arab forces, and displacement of the Arab population for Jewish refugees. Thus, the image of the United States in the Arab world quickly became one of suspicion and hostility.²⁰

Even as the Palestine affair reached its crisis in the war of 1948 events were moving in another part of the world which resulted in the Korean War in 1950.²¹

¹⁹Campbell, op. cit., p. 37. The State Department stressed the importance of continuing good relations with the Arab world and of cooperation with the British. The Defense Department was concerned about the future availability of Middle Eastern oil. Both were worried about how Soviet leadership might profit from what was going on. The President on the other hand, was sympathetic to the Zionist side by personal conviction and for apparent domestic political reasons. Hence, the instability, the unpredictability and the dramatic reversals that marked our course of conduct in this period.

²⁰Stevens, op. cit., p. 156.

²¹Campbell, op. cit., p. 38. The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the defection of Tito, and the Berlin blockade were indications that a Communist-Western confrontation was imminent.

As the United States became more involved militarily in the Far East it appeared that the glaring defense weaknesses of the Middle East seemed almost an invitation to further aggression. Britain, wanting to maintain her position in the Middle East, thus attempted with the United States to organize a more solid defense in the area. Between 1950 and 1955 an effort was made by the United States and Great Britain to secure a series of pacts and treaties with Middle Eastern countries.

As a first step the United States and Britain tried to entice the Egyptians into the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) of 1950-51. Though intended to protect all the countries in the region from external aggression the Egyptians uninterested in Korea or Soviet expansion, saw the proposal as "an international gloss on an old British imperialist design."²² Therefore, Egypt rejected the proposal and the other Arab states

²²Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East (London: Chatto and Windus, 1963); p. 174.

followed suit.²³ In the Arab view the United States was not only the champion of Israel but was seen to be fully in league with the hated colonial powers of Europe as well. The Tri-Partite Agreement of June 1950, amounting to a military guarantee of Israeli existence by the United States, Great Britain, and France, tended to reinforce this feeling.

In spite of non-Egyptian support for MEDO the United States did support the new government of General Neguib and Colonel Nasser in Egypt in the summer of 1952, providing \$40 million in Point IV aid. The United States' hope was that, if Egypt were not coerced, its cooperation in Western defense arrangements might eventually be won and its traditional role of leadership could be expected to exert a favorable leverage in other parts of the Arab world. But by

²³Stevens (ed.), op. cit., p. 159. Nasser stated in 1953 that any external defense alliances would be political suicide for the new regime, and for the sponsors, self-defeating. The only real danger he asserted was from Communism inside the region and the only real defense was internal strength and unity. Alliances "divide and rule" would create the opposite.

early 1953 the United States Government realized that the countries constituting the 'northern tier' of the region, ranging from Turkey to Pakistan, were the least inhibited by political considerations from accepting United States economic and military assistance. Therefore, United States aid was concentrated in these countries in order to give them a better chance of maintaining their independence against possible Soviet attempts at subverting their existing non-Communist regimes.²⁴ By the end of 1954 the United States, with pacts of military assistance and economic cooperation, had created a defensive zone along the southern border of the Soviet Union, linking, via Turkey, with NATO in the West and, via Pakistan, with SEATO in the east. To reinforce this the Baghdad Pact, another anti-Soviet defense alliance, which was eventually to include Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, was formed in 1955.²⁵

²⁴George Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 279.

²⁵Stevens, loc. cit. The United States, having sponsored the Pact in the first place, never formally joined it. Ostensibly, this was to avoid offending Arab public opinion in general. However, the United States has been criticized both by opponents of the Pact for supporting it and proponents for not supporting it fully and openly.

To Nasser the Baghdad Pact represented both a betrayal of the nationalist concept of non-Western political intervention and of Anglo-American assurances that Cairo would be the center of any regional system of collective defense.²⁶ Nasser also saw the pact as a challenge to Egypt's primacy in the Arab World. Therefore he openly condemned the pact, and all its participants, and increased efforts to turn as many Arab states against it as possible.

It was at this same time that Nasser, attempting to arm Egypt with arms comparable style and quantity to those of Israel requested arms assistance from the West. Not finding conditions of Western aid acceptable Nasser turned to the Eastern bloc which resulted in the Czech arms deal of 1955.²⁷ Thus did American policies in 1954-55 in supporting the Baghdad Pact and in declining to apply arms on terms acceptable to Nasser, produce

²⁶ Leopold, op. cit., p. 784.

²⁷ Stevens, op. cit., p. 161. The British sent forty tanks but withheld ammunition, the French made aid conditional upon withdrawing support from the Algerian rebels, and the United States would supply arms only on the basis of a Mutual Security agreement or in token amounts for cash in dollars — which Egypt lacked.

precisely the result most feared: the emergence for the first time of Soviet power and influence in the heart of the Middle East.

The United States Government's reaction to the Czech Arms Deal eventually manifested itself in July 1956 in the withdrawing of the United States support in the Aswan High Dam venture.²⁸ What followed was the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt and the British, French, and Israeli invasion of Egypt in November. What started out to be a United States British attempt to incorporate the Arabs into the Western system of defense, beginning with the MEDO proposal, resulted by the end of 1956 with the Soviet Union emerging as the champion of the Arab world. The British and the French were forced to retire in discredit and Nasser himself, surviving military defeat, became the avowed leader of the concept of "positive neutralism" vis-a-vis the east and the west.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 162. There were many reasons for the loan withdrawal. Perhaps the main ones being Nasser's continuous radio slandering of the Baghdad Pact effort and his sudden recognition of Communist China in May. But when the moment came in Mid-July, the withdrawal was made in such a way as to be a deliberate, public, and inescapable insult to the Egyptian president and his people. See Herman Finer, Dulles Over Suez (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964).

However, President Eisenhower's stand in opposition to the British and French attack upon Egypt had come as a gratifying surprise to the Arabs generally and for a brief period it seemed as if the United States might recover some of the respect and influence it had once enjoyed in the Arab world. But Soviet influence was continuing to grow and the United States reacted accordingly by deciding to pursue a policy of attempting to win the support of Middle Eastern states whose leaders distrusted the Egyptian president.²⁹ In this way the United States would indirectly use Nasser to bring other Arab states under Western anti-Soviet influence. The vehicle of the new approach was the Eisenhower Doctrine of January 1957. It authorized the President to extend economic and military assistance, including troops if necessary, to any Middle Eastern nation desiring protection against "overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism."³⁰ Though only Turkey, Iran and

²⁹Ibid., p. 165. These other states ---Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, and even Syria, together with Iraq, were to be made a zone of Western strength in the Arab world. Then it was hoped that Nasser, through isolation, might be induced to join.

³⁰Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 85th Congress, U. 103, Pt. 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 5 January 1957), pp. 224-226.

Iraq openly accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine initially the United States had an opportunity of showing its first act under the Doctrine in regard to Jordan in and rushed units of the Sixth Fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean with the warning that United States paratroopers were ready to protect "the integrity and independence of Jordan."³¹ According to Richard Leopold, "in the eyes of the Arab nationalists the Eisenhower Doctrine in action seemed to fit the Soviet-Egyptian prescription: Gunboats, bribes, puppet regimes."³²

Meanwhile, in Syria, the political influence of the Soviet Union through the Syrian Communist Party was increasing and Syrian nationalist leaders began to fear an eventual Soviet takeover. Therefore, in late

³¹King Hussein had overruled his freely elected but pro-Nasser government at the end of April and imposed martial law, alleging a "communist" plot supported by Egypt and designed to take over the country. Determined to prevent the chaos that Russia hoped to exploit, Eisenhower announced on April 24 that he regarded the independence of Jordan as "vital." The next day the Sixth Fleet sailed hastily from France for the eastern Mediterranean, and this display of support temporarily bolstered Hussein's shaky position. Leopold, op. cit., p. 793.

³²In response to the Doctrine. The professedly neutralist but actually Soviet-aligned governments of Egypt and Syria denounced it as "a plot engineered by the imperialists and fed by Zionism." Ibid., p. 792.

January 1958, they approached Nasser urging full and immediate union. With some reluctance Nasser agreed and formation of the United Arab Republic was announced to enormous Arab acclaim. American response to the United Arab Republic was reflected two weeks later in the creation of the ill-fated rival federation between Jordan and Iraq.³³

Four months later the federation was dissolved by the revolution in Iraq. Convinced that the Iraqi revolution was part of a Nasserite-Soviet plot which might set loose forces that would engulf Lebanon from within the United States made the decision to support the request of the President of Lebanon for American troop support.³⁴ Though Lebanon was a subscriber of the Eisenhower Doctrine the Lebanese situation did not involve a direct confrontation with "a nation controlled by international communism." However, President Eisenhower justified his action as the exercise of the right of collective self-defense under the United Nations Charter and as a response to the appeal of a freely elected government subjected to indirect aggression. He cited the need

³³ Stevens, op. cit., p. 168.

³⁴ Campbell, op. cit., p. 140.

to protect American lives and also that clause of the Doctrine which called the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East vital to the American national interest and to world peace.³⁵ Whatever may have been the justification under existing international law, which did not appear clear,³⁶ the political necessity seemed pressing enough.

As a result of the landing of United States troops in Lebanon in July 1958 the Soviet Union propagandist-wise exploited the move as the American cause of another international crisis. However, troops remained in Lebanon until the passing in the United Nations of an Egyptian resolution formally requesting the withdrawal of United States troops from the area.

By the end of 1958 it appeared that if American policy was designed to keep Soviet influence out of the Arab world, or at least keep it unimportant, it had had in practice the opposite results. Having used to great

³⁵Message to Congress and radio address to the American people, July 15, 1958, Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1958, pp. 304-311.

³⁶Quincy Wright, United States Intervention in the Lebanon, "American Journal of International Law", v.53 (January 1959), pp. 112-125.

advantage every unpopular new turn in Western policy, the Soviet Union had made itself welcome. Russian power and prestige were evident in the form of arms, trade, aid and technical assistance, and cultural missions and the Soviet Union had achieved considerable influence in Middle Eastern affairs as compared to the previous four years. American mistakes had helped make the Soviet effort an easy one.³⁷

However, since the beginning of 1959 the Soviet Union has lost some of its popularity in the Middle East. This has been a consequence of the very successes it had achieved between 1955 and 1958. The massive influx of the Soviet Union at all levels in a multiplicity of ways have allowed the Arabs for the first time to make direct comparisons between Soviet promise and fulfillment. By the end of 1962, on almost every level of performance, in machinery and equipment, trade policy, international relations, economic and technical assistance, in dealings with other nations allied and neutral, and in economic fields, the United States appeared on the balance to be superior.³⁸

³⁷Stevens, op. cit., p. 171.

³⁸Ibid., p. 172.

Since 1959 the United States has also followed, a policy of stepping back from immediate political involvement in the affairs of the Middle East that would lead to immediate political reactions that could possibly jeopardize any of its national interests. Such events as the breakup of the United Arab Republic in 1961 and the continuing factional struggles and military coups in Syria have not concerned the American government as actively as in the past. Even though the revolt in Yemen and the subsequent Egyptian and Saudi Arabian intervention and fighting could have serious repercussions to the Middle East, and on American interests there, the United States pre-occupation is currently with the war in South Viet Nam and this has a great deal to do with present American reserve in regard to political events occurring in this area. Also today cold war issues are not magnified and made more lethal by Cold War intervention as they were in the past. According to Thornburg , commenting upon future American foreign policy in the Middle East, firmness and a practical striving for political and economic impartiality in attempting to further Middle Eastern progress by coming to grips with the social and economic problems of the area, instead of using it as a Cold War political battleground, has been found to be the least reactionary and most conservative

approach to-date in maintaining United States security interests.³⁹

The United States has in the past, and continues in the present day, to consider foreign policy approaches in the Middle East in terms of Soviet foreign policy approaches. To-date United States moves have been contingent upon movements of the Soviet Union. Therefore, in analyzing future Middle Eastern policy approaches in the Middle East, we must initially examine those approaches that are open to us vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and then subsequently determine how the approach arrived at will be affected, positively and negatively, by (1) possible United States future stances in regard to the State of Israel and the Arab-Israeli problem and (2) toward United States orientation of foreign aid.

It is with this purpose in mind that we now take a closer look at the approaches open to United States regarding the Soviet Union in the Middle East.

³⁹Max Thornburg, People and Policy in the Middle East (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1964), pp. 218-225.

CHAPTER IV
ALTERNATE AMERICAN POLICY APPROACHES VIS-A-VIS
THE SOVIET UNION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Introduction

The United States today considers its direct relationship to the Soviet Union fundamental to its overall Middle East Policy. In the past this relationship has partly been a balancing of military power and partly a direct competition in the many facets of the cold war. For the future, beyond these two aspects, lies a third relationship. This relationship concerns negotiation with the Soviet Government. However, it must be kept in mind that where Soviet policy aims at subversion of domination of an area within the reach of Soviet power, the only limits it accepts are the physical and political obstacles that stand in the way. Soviet leaders do not seek compromise with outside powers or non-Soviet neighbors in the interests of international amity and world peace, but only agreements that give recognition to the Soviet Union's "special position" in the area in question. It is true that the Soviet Union may in time be brought to accept a rough balance of power and position which the West can also accept but there is

no basis for believing that this can be negotiated in the near future. Western success can only be arrived at by giving attention to the events which have opened the Middle East to Soviet influence.⁴⁰

For the future willingness to negotiate does not appear to answer the challenge of the Soviet Union to the United States. The real answer to this challenge lies in the United States deciding (1) whether it should tacitly allow the Soviet Union to establish a position in the Middle East similar to its own; (2) whether it should try and bring about a neutralization of the area; (3) or whether it should strive to maintain the dominant role over the Soviet Union in the Middle East politically and/or economically. These three alternate approaches are fundamental alternatives to all other future foreign policy moves in the area. They have been considered so since the end of World War II and there appears to be

⁴⁰According to Walter Laqueur, Soviet Communism is essentially a dynamic movement associated today with Arab nationalistic movements. It does not want to stagnate and cannot afford to. Applied to the Middle East this observation means that Communism cannot be satisfied in the long run with any status quo in the Middle East, where it has to play second fiddle to anything else. Therefore, it can be concluded that negotiation with the West would be of no benefit what-so-ever to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union and the Middle East (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959), p. 344.

no present indication that Soviet penetration into the Middle East area will not continue to be of a most primary concern to the United States. Since the United States' relationship to the Soviet Union is considered fundamental to a future Middle Eastern foreign policy each alternate approach will therefore be examined as to its suitability as a fundamental approach that should be incorporated into future American Middle Eastern policy. Only after determining the most practical stance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union will further hypotheses be examined concerning foreign policy approaches toward Palestine and United States economic assistance in the Middle East.

The Soviet Position Versus The United States In The Middle East

Prior to an evaluation of these three alternative approaches, however, it is important to consider briefly past and present Soviet-United States relationships in light of stated Soviet aims in the area.

"The present aim of Soviet Foreign policy, first and foremost, is to secure peaceful conditions in order to build Socialism and Communism, to strengthen the unity, solidarity, and friendship and fraternity of the Socialist countries, and to support people struggling for liberation. This means creating the most favorable foreign policy conditions for the enhancement of the above.

What unites this effort is the joint struggle against imperialism and their ultimate aim of building socialism and eventual communism. Russia's appeal to developing countries especially those who have served under the tutelage of a colonialist power, is based on support upon which these countries can always rely, for the Soviet Union will help them in their struggle against imperialism."⁴¹

In this struggle it appears that the United States has handed much of the globe----- the Middle East included----- on a silver platter to the Soviet

⁴¹"The Aims of Soviet Foreign Policy, "Survival, October 1965, p. 255. These present day Soviet foreign policy objectives are little different from the concepts of innate antagonism between Capitalism and Socialism, the inevitability of the eventual fall of capitalism, the infallibility of the Kremlin, and the Communist Party as discussed in light of future United States foreign policy in an article entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, July 1947, pp.566 - 582. Though written 20 years ago the suggested approaches toward future United States policy regarding the Soviet Union, such as long-term vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies, its internal struggle to reach an economic level similar to that of the United States which conversely gives the United States an economic advantage regarding foreign economic assistance, are covered. It is interesting to note that the final statement made in the article concerning United States foreign policy suggested that in order for the United States to be successful in foreign policy matters in the future it would have to create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, and which can cope successfully with the responsibilities of a World Power, "holding its own among the major ideological currents of the Time." See also George Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900 - 1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), Part II, for more details regarding these approaches.

Union in her attempt to thwart its penetration into the area. Since World War II, according to George A. Lenin, America has failed to lead the Under-developed countries to independence and freedom lest she alienate the industrial, former colonial countries, (Britain and France) thereby fatally weakening her position in Europe. Reluctantly the United States has become identified with the preservation of the status quo, not necessarily because she approved of it per se at a particular place and time but because she has tried to preserve peace. Supporting the old order, which often was contrary to her own avowed beliefs and ideals, the United States has become identified with imperialism, has lost the initiative, and has given the Communists the advantage they were looking for.⁴²

On the other hand, the Soviet Union, not so much out of design as more capitalizing on the moment, has placed emphasis on giving its open support to the aspirations of the Arab peoples for unity. In doing

⁴²George Alexander Lenin, "Russia and the United States in Asia, The Russian Review, V.24, No. 2, April 1965, p. 89.

so it has chosen to support liberal Arab nationalist movements.⁴³ As an example, Khrushchev, when he was Premier of the Soviet Union, called for "the solidarity of the Arab people" under Nasser's leadership and promised him all the Soviet aid necessary to achieve it.⁴⁴ In return Nasser has endorsed to a degree Soviet foreign policy objectives. Together they have condemned colonialism in all its manifestations, including Western military bases in the Middle East.

At the same time the Soviet Union has continued to exert pressures to defeat or to delay the implementation of the American program for an effective alliance of the Middle Eastern states against communism. For example, it has tried, in particular, to bring about the defection of Iran by means of intimidation and economic pressure. In February 1956 it intensified its propaganda for the

⁴³Soviet Leaders have not hesitated to support radical Arab nationalism because they are convinced that this movement will not be able to build a sound economic and social basis for a strong state that would somehow act as a "barrier to Communism." They anticipate a general breakdown and expect power (political) to pass from the Arab nationalist leader, such as Nasser, into the hands of more radical forces until a Middle Eastern-style Communist regime emerges. Laqueur, op. cit., p. 328.

⁴⁴Campbell, op. cit., p. 21.

"normalization" of Soviet-Turkish relations, in an effort to weaken Turkish adherence to the Baghdad Pact.

There is no question that recent spectacular demonstrations of Soviet progress in science and technology have been impressive to peoples of the Middle East, where Soviet influence and prestige have been increasing. Added to the many advantages over the West which the Soviet Union has enjoyed in its appeal to those peoples is the growing conviction among many of them that America cannot even save the West, that the future lies with the dynamic leaders of socialism. Whether that trend can be reversed will depend in part of what the United States can do to prevent a decisive political shift in favor of the Soviet Union.⁴⁵

The Soviet Union reminds the Arab countries, as all underdeveloped countries, that the Soviet Union in 1918, after taking over private enterprise and repudiating its foreign debts, began to industrialize so rapidly that in forty years it had multiplied its productive capacity thirty-three times. What the Soviet Union did,

⁴⁵Campbell, op. cit., p. 7.

they say, the underdeveloped world today can also do, presumably by similar methods, and more easily.⁴⁶

It is doubtful that Arab leaders have taken such statements at face value; Nevertheless, Soviet scientific achievements, diplomatic victories over the West, and promises of aid continue to be rather uncritically praised or accepted in the Arab press.⁴⁷ For a long time it has been felt in the West that the Arab and Islamic world would resist even the slightest Soviet penetration. However, this has not always been the case, in view of the present day Arab attitude toward the concept of "positive neutralism," or playing off the West against the East for political and economic support.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Monroe Berger, The Arab World Today (New York: Doubleday, 1962), p. 351.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ The Soviet Union's espousal of atheism has been soft-pedaled in order not to offend the Muslims and Christians of the Middle East. Indeed the fact that Soviet Russia avows atheism is in some sense an advantage to it, for Moslems do not fear from it the kind of Christian propaganda that they have resented on the part of Western powers. Ibid., p. 352. However, there are occasions, such as the demonstrations that occurred in Damascus in May 1967 over expressed anti-religious feelings of the leftist Baath Regions that counter to a degree the above proposition. More details on this latter point can be found in The Arab World (Beirut, May 8, 1967), p. 1.

According to H.L. Hoskins "another view openly held at this time in the West was that the postwar world recognized and accepted the continuance of Western hegemony in the Middle East." In his opinion both views have proven to be wrong. "The U.S. in the Middle East," Current History, May 1965, p. 259.

If communism succeeds in the Middle East, aside from its political policies, it will be because it is able to convince Arab nationalist leaders that it can bring about rapid and controlled social change.⁴⁹ By being well-entrenched in the Middle East politically the Soviet Union would be in a better position to do this.

If allowed the Soviet Union will go on until it ultimately dominates the Middle East and turns it into a satellite. In the words of Ismail Ege, writing on Soviet penetration in the Middle East Institute,

The Soviets will continue to penetrate militarily, politically, economically and culturally. Economically, they do attach strings to their military and economic aid. With Soviet aims and projects go scores of specifically trained personnel, technicians, Communist functionaries, propagandists, spies, and agitators, to carry out Soviet penetration. Politically, they penetrate by exerting directions and influence upon the local Communist parties and National Front organizations, exploiting poverty, religious and local political rivalry, and deep-seated anti-Westernism.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ John Badeau, "A Long Term View," New Look At the Middle East, ed. William Sands (Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1957), p. 75.

⁵⁰ Ismail Ege, "Soviet Penetration," Ibid., p. 17.

I. THE ESTABLISHING OF EQUAL POSITIONS

Therefore, we now turn to the first alternative, that of the United States tacitly allowing the Soviet Union to establish a position in the Middle East similar to its own. It must be reasoned, in light of the above, that the susceptibility of developing nations in the Middle East to any appeal that will assist them in bettering their way of life, regardless of what the long term effects will be, possibly negates the advisability of allowing the Soviet Union to place itself in a more favorable, and less challenged position. Tactitly agreeing to an unchallenged Soviet foothold in order to enable it to more easily spread propaganda toward illiterate masses and proffer more effectively economic proposals that only serve to expouse its long term socialist and communist objectives would appear to work decidedly to the detriment of United States interests in this part of the world. This is particularly true in regard to the United State's desire to help developing countries of the Middle East to keep them from falling under the political domination or influence of the Soviet Union.

With the overriding national interest of the United States being its security it must keep in the forefront

of all its calculations and decisions the threat of Soviet power at the service of Soviet policies fundamentally hostile to it.⁵¹ The entrenchment of Soviet power equal to that of the United States in the Middle East would bring a decisive shift in the world balance of power outflanking NATO. Soviet control of Middle Eastern oil, in order to satisfy growing Soviet domestic requirements, would disrupt the economy Western Europe and the free world.⁵²

It must be remembered that since 1955 the Middle East has ceased to be an area of exclusively Western influence. It is not likely to become so again. By revulsion from more than a century and a half of Western influence and domination, by reaction against Western leadership in every significant field of human endeavor, the Arab attitude to the West is now generally hostile. In contrast, the Arab attitude to Russia, not colored by the same previous record of relations, has been more

⁵¹U.S. News and World Report, September 2, 1963 discussed the Soviet Government's softline in regard to the United States Government. The conclusion drawn is that apparent Soviet gestures at "peaceful coexistence" should not be interpreted as any more than a necessary phase prior to the eventual "triumph of Communism." "Back of Russia's Sudden Soft-Line," p. 17.

⁵²George Lenczowski, Oil and State in the Middle East (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 365.

emotionally neutral.⁵³

This being so, in any struggle for positions of political power and influence, with Russia and the West using the same political means, Russia has a great initial psychological advantage. This advantage is reinforced by the familiar and intelligible authoritarian methods and political style of the Russians, as contrasted with the unfamiliar and, to most Arabs, unintelligible democratic processes of the West.⁵⁴

Another View

However, there is another side to the approach that the United States tacitly agree to the Soviet Union maintaining a position in the Middle East similar to its own--a more positive side--that must be considered. As the Soviet Union becomes more actively involved in penetration into the Middle East in support of her avowed objectives of socialism and eventual communism history has shown that

⁵³Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West (London: Weindenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), p. 138.

⁵⁴Ibid.

the Arab and non-Arab countries have, when possible, often reacted adversely to Soviet attempts at political domination. For example, resistance to Russian influence, was not long in developing once the Soviets become deeply involved in the Arab World in 1955. Once the Soviets became active in Syria, so that they appeared aggressive, the Middle East reacted as they are in regard to the West and Russia was forced out of Syria by the forming of the United Arab Republic.

As the Russians today become more involved in the Middle East, they correspondingly lose their initial advantages, and are encountering some of the suspicious, resentments and frustrations familiar to their Western predecessors and counterparts. The interests of the West do not absolutely require the interruptions of this process of reciprocal education.⁵⁵ It was stated earlier that many of the initial Soviet inroads into the Middle East have been based on Western political miscalculations which the Soviet Union has taken advantage of. Therefore, the exploitation of Soviet disenchantment in the eyes of the Arab East by the West, a reversal of previous strategy, might certainly

⁵⁵Ibid., 139.

serve to profit the West if the Soviet Union were to, in fact, establish herself on an equal footing with the United States in the Middle East today.

Conclusion:

In the final analysis, however, the whole trend of Soviet strategy, despite recurrent language threatening in speeches and diplomatic notes, is one of conquest by cold war, economic assistance, and diplomacy.

Should the trend continue, and the Middle East fall into Soviet hands, it would be unfortunate for the United States and the Western world. Due to the oil factor it would hardly be long before Western Europe might be forced to consider accommodation on Soviet terms which would tend to leave the United States isolated.

Speaking before the Congress on 5 January 1957 President Eisenhower stated that Soviet control of the Middle East "would have the most adverse, if not disastrous, effect upon our own nation's economic life and political prospects."⁵⁶

⁵⁶"Proposed Economic Assistance Programs," Agency For International Development (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 135.

Therefore, even in regard to the harm the Soviet Union could possibly do to herself in becoming as involved in the Middle East as the United States has been to-date there appears to be no given reason, at this particular point in time, for the West to give tacitly its formal blessing to an unchallenged Soviet position in the Middle East. There appears to be little sound basis for the argument that the Soviet Union should not be denied equal rights to allies and bases in the Middle East, such as the United States now has, given the purpose of Soviet expansion into this area.

II. POLITICAL NEUTRALISM OF THE MIDDLE EAST

Before considering the second alternative, that of politically attempting to neutralize the Middle East of Russian and United States activity, it must be kept in mind that among the Arab peoples today there is a growing recognition of the fact that small independent nations are in a precarious position, that their independence is qualified by the need to veer in more than one direction for political and economic support.

Many educated and politically conscious Arabs are espousing the cause of Arab unity or Arab federation, as the only effective means of terminating the endless intrigue of divide-and rule tactics. From Arab unity, they look for greater stability in the Middle East and for an opportunity to cope with the economic, social, and political problems that override artificial political boundaries carved out by Western powers, some of them after World War I. The impression is given that the Arab peoples are sick and tired of foreign tutelage in any form, even in the guise of United Nations "observers."⁵⁷

With this in mind we come to the second of the three stated alternatives regarding the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in the Middle East-- that of politically neutralizing the Middle East either by common consent or or by automatically neutralizing the area by a concentrated balancing of political or economic efforts.

Because of the values of self-government and self-determination originally introduced into the Middle East by Western missionaries and encouraged by Western governments ideologically the countries of the area,

⁵⁷ Lenin, loc. cit.

since the end of the World War II, have at last been able to realize a taste of the independence and self-determination expressed in these original concepts. In the face of the Cold War they have become more and more reluctant to align themselves with either the East or the West as long as their domestic economic needs can be satisfied by the playing off of one side against the other for purposes of political or economic ends. From this has sprung the concept of "positive neutralism" which has amounted to little more than underdeveloped countries seizing upon the bi-polar Cold War situation to extract necessary aid from both sides.⁵⁸

Political Neutrality As Viewed From The Middle East

Therefore, an Arab today logically asks why the Arab world should be necessarily "with" the West in the ideological battle for power which divides the

⁵⁸H. L. Hoskins suggests that increased willingness of the United States to accept the "positive neutrality" of various countries of the area since the late 1950's has tended to improve the image of this country in the Middle East. "The U.S. in the Middle East, Current History, July 1965, p. 261.

earth. He can even present a rather convincing argument to show that the West can hardly be said to have been "with" the Arab World in its battle for freedom. Arab opinion is still charged with mistrust of Western intentions and no more so than when veiled in defense proposals to transform Middle East countries into Cold War battlegrounds.

On the other hand, there is equally no reason for the Arab world being "with" the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Arabs are instinctive opponents of a political call for alignment. The obvious stand for many Arab countries then in their own eyes, is "positive neutrality".⁵⁹ After all, the Arabs reason, whether justly or not, the Cold War was not of their making. Why became involved in a struggle that is just splitting the world. Many feel they have enough to worry about without becoming embroiled in a peactime struggle between two powers or between two ideologies where they don't really have to.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Harry Ellis maintains that from the Arab point of view Soviet aid falls into the same category as help from the West provided that both forms of aid are without political strings. Challenge in the Middle East (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 220.

⁶⁰ Emile Bustani, March Arabesque (London: Robert Hale Limited, 1963), p. 135.

In dealing with this Arab feeling regarding foreign powers, Max Thornburg, writing in People and Policy in the Middle East illustrates the basic stand behind a policy of standoff neutrality in the Middle East.

This does not mean alignment with the West - it just means non-alignment with the East. Because the United States, associated with the "colonial" West, has an image in the eyes of the people of the Middle East of a country representing that part of the world that holds the Middle East under its thumb for so long the scales are not loaded in our favor but in the favor of the East. Therefore, the alternative must not again be presented to the Middle East to join either the East or the West -- until at least prejudices and memories have been erased by contemporary remedial action. Therefore, the choice of non-alignment must be left open to the countries of the Middle East -- the United States asking only that all countries accept and defend the right of self-determination, the right to choose neutrality which is fundamentally opposed to the Communist doctrine. The inclusion of the principle of self-determination as a right of all people would be the most powerful resistance to Communism that could be engendered in Middle Eastern minds. ⁶¹

The clearest formulation of this emerging attitude within the United States government took place during the Administration of the late President Kennedy.

⁶¹Thornburg, op. cit., p. 255.

President Kennedy then stated:

If neutrality is the result of a concentration on internal problems, raising the standard of living of the people, particularly in underdeveloped areas, I would accept that. Neutralism is part of our own history for over a hundred years. We should look with friendship upon those people who want to beat the problems that overwhelm them, and wish to concentrate their energies on doing that, and do not want to become associated as the tail of our kite.⁶²

Political Neutrality By Consent:

However, politically neutralizing the Middle East by common consent appears more easily accomplishable in theory than it does in the realities of the present situation. What the Soviet Union would term "neutralization" would conceivably not be a stand-off neutralization by the consent of both powers but a neutralization that would further work to completely eliminate the United States from the sphere of the Middle East while the Soviet Union took advantage of the situation to further penetrate into the area.

Proposals to politically neutralize the Middle East also raise a number of other difficulties. First a part of this area is and probably will remain

⁶²R.K. Ramazani, "Changing United States Policy," Virginia Quarterly Review, 1964, p. 376.

neutral, in the sense that some states will choose not to in fact align themselves with either side. Therefore, any great power agreement to "neutralize" the Middle East covering fixed arms levels and the forewearing of bases and military alliances would mean the dismantlement of the Western military position, including the United States military effort in Turkey.⁶³ It is entirely probable that the peoples of the Middle East would take this as the capitulation of the West, as proof that the future lay with "the world of socialism."⁶⁴

Secondly, a "hands off" neutral policy, decided between the United States and Russia would be extremely difficult to enforce and could place the United States

⁶³ Senator Hubert H. Humphrey proposed the creation of demilitarized zones (not defined) and an internationally supervised inspection system. Control and Reduction of Armaments: Disarmament and Security in the Middle East, U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Staff Study no. 6, 85th Congress, 1st session (Washington: GPO, 1957), p. 4.

⁶⁴ According to Charles Cremeans "neutralism for the strongest power of the free world can only mean retreat." In order to fight communism American responsibility and the effect of American policy must extend everywhere. "The withdrawal of the American commitment to confront Soviet power and pressures in the Middle East would not be in the interests of the Arabs or the Middle East or the United States." The Arabs and the World (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1963), p. 313.

at a disadvantage in attempting to maintain her vital interests plus her previously made commitments in the area.⁶⁵ Thus, strict neutralization could very likely lead to even greater evils for United States interests than a policy of active political intervention in the Middle East regardless of current Arab public opinion.

Thirdly, If in fact, a policy of neutralization by mutual consent were agreed upon, factors such as the prevention or suppression of overt aggression by or against any state or states within the area would bring both the United States and Russia actively back in the area --more than likely as protagonists.⁶⁶ Also the United States would want to be in a position to maintain Western oil interest and the continuation of the flow of Middle East oil to Western markets and well as be able to counter any Soviet move if the Soviet Union found themselves in a position where they found

⁶⁵Strict political neutralization would place the United States at an economic disadvantage in regard to economic commitments made to countries such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia in order to enhance political considerations. "Failure of the United States to give aid of this nature would mean America's abdication of a legitimate self-interest in the Middle East, with the resulting advancement of Soviet interests in the area" due to their non-adherence to a neutralizing agreement if, in fact, one were ever made. Ellis, op. cit., p. 131.

⁶⁶Any conflict arising around Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and even Lebanon might compel U.S. intervention in order to protect previously established U.S. interests in those areas. The United States desire to keep the peace of the Middle East, maintain oil interests, maintain air and sea transit rights, and maintain commercial markets all would have an effect. Polk, op. cit., p. 288-289.

it in their own national interests to break the neutral agreement.⁶⁷

Finally the United States would want to maintain her transportation and communications access through the Middle East. In the event of neutralization these same rights would either have to be dismantled or would have to also be afforded to the Soviet Union in order to have strict neutrality.

Thus, it appears that if strict neutrality is ever to be achieved in the Middle East between the United States and the Soviet Union it will be more realistically achieved by a balancing off of the two powers in their efforts to maintain in the area what they feel to be their own respective national interests. In order to have this balancing effect both the United

⁶⁷American oil companies in the area have investments amounting to billions of dollars. American interests own 100% of the producing company in Saudi Arabia; 50% of the Kuwait Oil Company, 23.75% of production in Iraq; 100% of the Bahrein Petroleum Company; 23.75% of production in Qatar; and 40% of the international Consortium in Iraq. Overriding even this in importance is the fact that the main burden of supplying Europe's essential oil needs would fall on the United States if Middle Eastern supplies were cut off. For more complete discussion of this question see George Lenczowski, Oil and State in the Middle East pp. 351-360.

States and the Soviet Union would have to strive to assume strictly the dominant role, either economically or politically, in an effort to neutralize each other, from the area.

III. MAINTAINING THE DOMINANT POSITION

Thus, by elimination of these previously discussed two alternatives as practically unfeasible at the present time, the United States finds itself left with the third alternative of attempting to maintain the dominant role in the Middle East over the Soviet Union. Washington therefore, by adopting this position, for the future would find itself confronted with the task of considering what moves to make in regard to its present foreign policy that would enable it to continue to maintain this position.

Though all United States interests in the Middle East would have to be taken into consideration in order to completely analyze and answer the question of how the United States might maintain its dominant position it will be the intent of the following chapters to

illustrate by two specific examples how this position might be maintained. Thus, it will be examined how future United States policy actions in regard to (1) the State of Israel, the largest single political commitment the United States has in the Middle East and the one to which the Arabs are most antagonistic, might possibly be designed to conform, to a lesser degree than previously discussed, with the precepts of political neutrality in order to (2) economically carry out a more effective assistance program by means of the commercial sector aimed at improving the United States image in the eyes of the people of the Middle East and, thus, hoping to insure the continuation of the dominant position in the area over the Soviet Union, given Russia's previously cited aims.

From a Political Point of View:

In other words the United States might consider placing more and more emphasis on promoting the economic and social welfare development of the area in the future and de-emphasizing any political moves it finds necessary to make.⁶⁸ If the United States desires to

⁶⁸ Lenin, op. cit., p. 90.

maintain a dominant position in the Middle East vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, events since 1955 indicate that Soviet inroads into the area have been via Western contradictions over priorities of national political interest⁶⁹ and that further political contradictions might eventually give the Soviet Union the more dominant position.

Certainly it is to be realized that there are inherent contradictions in the approach advocating that the United States adopt not complete neutrality but, as realistically as possible, a politically neutral policy toward the Middle East, in order to give advantage to its foreign aid program so as to remain dominant over the Soviet Union. Therefore it goes without saying that the United States, in its foreign policy implementation, would have to make clear to the governments of the

⁶⁹"The United States may have to recognize that political and economic development in the Arab area is unlikely to proceed along the lines of Western democracy. Business enterprises, particularly the concessionary oil companies, may have to be placed on a basis of increased Arab participation and management control. "Even then the trend toward the future is non-alignment. Powerful as the United States will be, economically or politically, it will not have the capability of stopping or diverting such trends. Therefore, the case for cooperation with the Arabs in the future rests with the proposition that the United States has more to gain by maintaining good relations through economics, than by trying to keep alive dying institutions, more political in nature." Cremeans, op. cit., p. 315.

Middle East that the United State's pursuit of dominance over the Soviet Union, is compatible with the region's pursuit of "positive neutrality" due to Russia's avowed objectives in the area. Although on the surface there is no reason to believe that the Arabs would discriminate, between the Russians and the Americans in their desire to have both out of the Middle Eastern area, Cremeans believes that Western-oriented Arab and non-Arab leaders would not like to see the United States completely follow a neutral policy in the area "if it meant less prospects for economic assistance and withdrawal of the American commitment to confront Soviet power and pressures with countervailing force."⁷⁰

From an Economic Point of View:

The United States has a most impressive set of economic credentials to show any country of the world, and they are particularly impressive to countries of the Middle East when applied specifically toward their needs. In this respect the United States has an

⁷⁰Ibid.

economic advantage over the Soviets.⁷¹ Therefore, the United States attempting to shift Eastern-Western confrontation from the political sphere, where the Soviet Union has repeatedly capitalized from Western contradictions, to the economic field where the United States is decidedly stronger, may well prove a foreign policy move that will better the image of the United States in the Middle East.⁷² As George Kennan has emphasized in Realities of American Foreign Policy developing countries are looking to the United States not to be taught how to combat communism however much we may think they need to learn about it but rather for positive and imaginative suggestions as to how the peaceful future of the world might be shaped and how the United States' vast economic strength in particular

⁷¹A.J. Meyer, Middle Eastern Capitalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 134.

⁷²Richard Nolte and William Polk, state that "The United States should not try to prevent the Arabs from profiting from the help of the Soviet Union. Instead of opposing Soviet aid for Arab economic development, and thereby seeming to oppose the development itself American policy should encourage the Arabs to get all they can while setting high standards by its own aid which the Soviets may have trouble in matching. It would also reduce the pressures on the U.S. to bid against the USSR in the political realm." "Toward a Policy for the Middle East," Foreign Affairs, July 1958, p. 657.

might be so adjusted to the lives of other peoples as to permit a mutually profitable inter change without leading to relationships of political dependence and coercion.⁷³

This is not to imply, however, that the United States would not exercise political pressures on Middle Eastern states if and when it was necessary in regard to the Soviet Union or any country that might threaten the political and economic security of the area. The United States would announce its acceptance of neutralism in principle, but would not hesitate to disagree with the self-declared neutralist states when their application of neutralist foreign policy was prejudicial to American or Western interests or to the requirement of a just international order.⁷⁴ But, basically, the United States would try to move from a political "defensive" position and go on an economic "offensive" program, which the Soviet Union would be forced to follow in order to compete with the United States, and which should place the United States in a dominant economic position over the Soviet Union due

⁷³George Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), p. 100.

⁷⁴Cremeans, op. cit., 317.

to her economic superiority in a then more politically neutral environment.

Approach

In an attempt to determine the feasibility of this hypothesis from the political point of view, the true test that must be made is the one regarding the United States' stance relative to the State of Israel and the Arab-Israeli problem. Perhaps no one single United States interest in the Middle East has been as profound in its effects on all other policy considerations, political and economic, as the Palestine problem and the United States support of Israel.⁷⁵ Therefore, the United States' position today in regard to Israel

⁷⁵It is doubtful that any genuinely friendly regard for the United States can be expected from the Arab countries as long as no formula has been found for a fundamental improvement in Arab-Israeli relations. The Kennedy-Johnson administrations have made no more progress towards a solution of this problem than did their predecessors. In the Arab view, the United States bears the principle responsibility for the existence of the problem. Under such circumstances, the United States cannot deal without apparent prejudice either with the Arab states or with Israel. The United States sponsorship of Israel enters into every phase of United States relations with the nations of the Arab Middle East. Hoskins, op. cit., p. 262.

will be examined as the most critical of United States political interests in the Middle East, in an effort to determine whether if, in fact, the United States can realistically adopt a more politically neutral stance regarding Israel's existence.

CHAPTER V
THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

No aspect of American Middle Eastern policy has produced as much Arab hostility toward the United States as its relations with the State of Israel. To most Arabs it has seemed that the Palestine disaster has demonstrated the United State's rejection of their cause by its decision to support the establishment of a colony in the midst of the Arab lands.⁷⁶

It has been discussed that from the end of World War II to the present time the United State's overriding concern in the Middle East has been to combat the spread of Communism, for purposes of national security, while simultaneously attempting to maintain equal relations with both the Arabs and the Israelis.⁷⁷ It has also been

⁷⁶Cremeans, op. cit., p. 131.

⁷⁷Alfred Lillienthal, There Goes the Middle East (New York: Devin-Adair, 1959), p. 111.

noted that United States preoccupation with stemming the spread of Soviet infiltration into the Middle East has indirectly contributed to the present antagonistic feeling of the Arab States toward America's overall foreign policy. The United States Government, feeling that stability is a pre-requisite in stemming the flow of Communism into the Middle East, has adopted a hard stand policy of maintaining the political and territorial integrity of Israel in order to keep the Middle East from erupting into a more unstable political situation which Communism could take advantage of. There are also, of course, political reasons inherent to the present political atmosphere existing in the United States.⁷⁸

Hence, beginning with the Tripartite Agreement of 1950, the United States agreed to maintain a so-called "balance of power" with Britain and France over Israel. By supporting the existance of 1.7 million people (covering 7800 square miles) in opposition to seven Arab countries

⁷⁸For more details than are contained in this chapter see Nadav Safran, "The United States and Israel" (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 278. An analysis of this will be dealt with later in this chapter.

(containing 70 million people and covering 2½ million square miles) the United States has endeavored to preserve the political stability of the area and has not veered from the policy of continued support of the State of Israel.⁷⁹

The Soviet Union and Israel

The Russians, conversely, have taken advantage of the discontent which has resulted among the Arabs from this approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the United State's continuing support of the State of Israel, and used it propaganda-wise to force Arab public opinion against the United States.

This can be seen historically as far back as 1948, with the Soviet Union's voting in favor of the partition of Palestine in order to drive the British

⁷⁹Lilienthal, loc. cit.

out.⁸⁰ Russia's next move was to see to it that Czechoslovakia provided arms to Israel to keep the Arab-Israeli conflict alive. After the United States came to the open support of Israel, diplomatically, military, and economically, Russia capitalized upon the ensuing Arab discontent caused, particularly over the Tripartite Agreement of 1950 and the anti-colonial feelings raised against the West, and supplied arms to Nasser in the Czech Arms Agreement of 1955. For to the Soviet Union it really has made little difference who emerges the victor in the Holy Land struggle. By continuing to supply arms and economic aid to the United Arab Republic, Syria, and Iraq, primarily, she endears herself to the Arabs as helping to fight the United State's "colony" (Israel) in the Middle East. If Israel were to

⁸⁰ Laqueur points out in The Soviet Union and the Middle East that because most of the Arab countries were pro-British Russia was eager to see Great Britain leave the area. But he adds, "it should be remembered that the Palestine problem was for the Soviet Union a secondary issue to which nobody in Moscow paid much attention or attributed much importance. There is, in effect, some doubt whether the decision to support the establishment of a Jewish state was taken at top level; in view of subsequent developments it is at least possible that this course of action was recommended by some Foreign Ministry advisers and approved by Stalin in a fit of absent-mindedness." p. 146-47.

make territorial gains toward Egypt or Syria or Jordan it would merely create more trouble which the Soviet Union could "brand" the United States with and, therefore, increase the success of her efforts toward neutralizing the Middle East from the West.⁸¹

Arab Reaction to the United States Support of Israel

Reaction of the Arabs to the United States support of Israel can be viewed both historically and contemporarily.

Historically, as has been noted, the actions of the United States, in support of Israel since 1948, have caused Arab bitterness previously directed against Britain to turn, with added force, against the United States.⁸² This feeling is still prevalent today and the problem of Palestine has become a symbol of American immaturity and bad faith in international relations.⁸³ In addition to

⁸¹Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 111.

⁸²Salem, op. cit., p. 19.

⁸³Paris, op. cit., p. 7.

this it further appears to the Arab World that the United States has compromised its avowed and open stand on freedom and self-determination, partly out of deference to its traditional European allies and partly out of oil politics.⁸⁴

Contemporarily, the United States has attempted, in the words of the United States State Department, "to carry out an 'impartial' foreign policy directed toward both the Arabs and the Jews."⁸⁵ In the eyes of the preponderance of the people of the Middle East this has been "impartial" but rather has been antagonistic to all Arabs. They have noted, for example, United States politicians in the American press making resounding attacks against Arab countries but have seen very few attacks against Israel. Middle Eastern countries have also noted that since 1948 Israel has received more economic aid, both government and private, than all economic support to the Arab countries

⁸⁴ Salem, loc. cit.

⁸⁵ Johnson, op. cit., p. 208. "What makes America's Middle Eastern policy hazardous is the attempt to be friendly both with Israel and the United Arab Republic, or any nationalist, socialist, Arab state. Such dual friendships can be made at a minimum tolerable so long as neither side moves militarily against the other, and so long as Zionist influence in the U.S. does not produce Congressional action damaging to any one, or more, Arab states." Ellis, Challenge in the Middle East, p. 213.

together. (See Chapter VI). They, therefore, have failed to believe that there has been "impartiality" in United States foreign policy between Israel and the Arab states of the Middle East and have repeatedly urged the United States to take a much more "bi-partisian" stand regarding the Arab-Israel conflict.⁸⁶

Although Government administrations past and present has spoken of maintaining United States "friendship with Israel and the Arab States" it appears highly unlikely to the

⁸⁶ Mohammad Mehdi, "Of Lions Chained," exemplifies an Arab nationalist feeling toward United States foreign policy when he states "that U.S. troubles in the Middle East are fundamentally economic in origin inasmuch as the United States tries to buy friendship and political support of the Arabs. Presenting the right thing at the wrong time the U.S. stresses economic aid forgetting the first-things-first principle. American economic development proposals and aid by themselves, without first recognizing Arab political aspirations of non-political intervention, will not yield the expected economic results of winning over the Arabs.

What the Arab World would like to see is the U.S. recognize, if only that, the Arabs rights and freedom in Palestine. The Arab demand today is for political freedom and the recognition of what they feel to be their political rights. If the United States would acknowledge these political rights, the primary being Palestine, the Arab acceptance of U.S. economic aid would be with gratitude instead of with suspicion as to some underlying political motive." (San Francisco; New World Press, 1962), p. 142.

Arabs that, since the preservation and support of Israel has constituted a cardinal principal of our Middle Eastern policy to-date, the United States really is sincerely concerned with maintaining their friendship.⁸⁷ It appears to the thousands of Palestinians, in every Middle Eastern country that the United States is not concerned about rectifying the situation of 1948 imposed by the creation of the State of Israel and the expulsion of the Palestinians from their homeland even though the United States appears to be the guiding support behind UNRWA.

One major reason for the Arab's political stand is that Israel to the Arabs represents a kind of international conspiracy directed at the Arab heartland.⁸⁸ That is why they fear Israel so and are antagonistic toward the United States who supports it. The Arab views Israel as part of a vast imperialistic conspiracy, a world Zionist plot--which is being encouraged and supported by the United States against the Arab heartland at exactly the time when Arab nationalism, and self-determinism are at their emotional height of acceptance in the Arab countries. What is feared by the Arabs is expansion and the power that Zionism gives the State of

⁸⁷ Salem, loc. cit.

⁸⁸ Don Peretz, "Report on UAR-Israeli Relations," Middle East Report, (1959) p. 32.

Israel.

Charles Malik, former Ambassador to the United States from Lebanon and President of the United Nations wrote in the Foreign Affairs Quarterly, January 1952 the situation as it appeared from the Arab point of view there. "If the present arrogance, and defiance, are to persist, and if Israel is to be again and again confirmed in her feeling that she is to be favored--just because the United States, owing to the position of the Jews in the United States and to certain well known peculiarities in the American political and social systems, and to widespread ignorance in the United States of real conditions in the Near East and also to a certain genuine well-meaning goodness of heart on the part of the American people, will at a crucial point always side decisively with Israel against her immediate world--then I am afraid there will never be peace in the Near East and the United States cannot be altogether innocent of responsibility for that situation."⁸⁹

Ten years later, November 1962, President Abdel Nasser wrote a similar point of view to President Kennedy indicating the incompatibility, as judged by the Arabs, of United States support of Israel vis-a-vis Arab Nationalism

⁸⁹Charles Malik, "The Near East: The Search For Truth." Foreign Affairs Quarterly, (January 1952) p. 293.

and the United State's desire to limit Soviet expansion in the area.

My aim is to explain to you that the right of the Palestinian refugee is connected with the rights of the Palestinian homeland and that the other Arab countries cannot possibly isolate themselves from the aggression which fell upon one of them for one clear reason: In addition to Arab solidarity, this aggression constitutes a threat to the other Arab countries, the same danger, the same fate.

The time has come for the United States to open its eyes and view the development of events in our region on the basis of a purely American outlook not affected by internal American political considerations or by calculations on election votes.

There is much in the history of the American nation to attract us to many of the American principles and to what the American Revolution has given to the human heritage of great experience and heroic men. The attitude of your country toward us at the time of the aggression (Suez) uphold the principles. We have always praised it, and we will always be grateful for it, no matter how are relations develop.

I honestly assure you that my attitude and view toward the Palestine question is not controlled by my being the President of the United Arab Republic but my attitude and view as an Arab Nationalist and as one of millions of Arab Nationalists.⁹⁰

Why United States Support of Israel?

In the face of past and present Arab animosity toward the United States in the Middle East over its

⁹⁰ "Nasser's letter to Kennedy" (Middle Eastern Affairs, November, 1962), p. 276.

support of the State of Israel, and in the face of apparent Soviet inroads into countries of the Middle East due to the United States stand on the Israel issue, why does the United States Government feel that it is in the national interest of the American people to support 2½ - million people in Israel in the face of antagonizing a present day Arab-population of 90-100 million?

Middle Eastern experts cite numerous reasons ranging from the possibly overrated Jewish Zionist propagandist pressure⁹¹ upon the Executive and Congressional branches of the United States Government to the sympathy of the American people for the atrocities committed toward the Jews during World War II. Christian guilt feeling for the treatment of the Jews has molded unyielding support for

⁹¹Zionists in their propaganda, have asserted that a State of Israel will raise the economic well-being and therefore presumably win the goodwill of the surrounding Arab population; that it will serve as a haven of Western democracy in an Arab world of feudal states; that in case of a clash with Russia, it will serve as a sure foothold; that after the General Assembly's recommendation of partition in November 1947, the successful establishment of a Zionist State became essential for the preservation of the United Nations; and finally, that in view of Zionist determination, the creation of an independent Israel is an unavoidable prerequisite to the peaceful development of the Middle East. H.P. Hall, American Interests in the Middle East (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1948), p. 47.

Israel--which knows no comparison. As one leading Zionist conceded with perhaps not too much overstatement: "If Herzl was the Marxist theoretician of Zionism, Hitler was the Leninist prime mover of the Jewish State."⁹²

Same E. Salem, author of several books on the Middle East, writing in The Middle East Forum, June 1962, stated that politicians eager to win votes and the sympathy of the majority of the American people have no political recourse but to either support Israel overtly or say nothing about it at all.⁹³

As an example of this Harry S. Truman, during his first year as President of the United States, is reputed to have told a group of United States State Department Diplomats reporting to him on the deteriorating American position in the Middle East in 1948, "I'm sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism; I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents."⁹⁴

⁹²Samuel Halperin, The Political World of American Zionism (Detroit: Wayne State University, 1961), p. 313.

⁹³Sam E. Salem, "Bridging the Arab-American Gemmo Gap," Middle East Forum, (May 1964), p. 19.

⁹⁴Colonel William Eddy, FDR Meets Ibn Sa'ud, (New York: American Friends of the Middle East, 1954), p. 117.

Furthermore, Harry Ellis, writing in The Middle East Forum, states that the United States acted upon "narrow internal domestic political considerations during the time of President Truman's reputed statement and proved to be wrong. "It has cost us the friendship of the Arabs."⁹⁵

Certainly the propaganda machine of the Zionist movement in the United States is not to be underestimated using literature and show business vehicles. Investigations of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee in August 1963 showed that more than \$5 million tax deductible American dollars donated by the American people to the United Jewish Appeal from 1955 to 1962 were used for pressure and propaganda of behalf of Israel "and to meddle in United States Middle Eastern Policy."⁹⁶

Nadav Safran, makes a most complete analysis of this phase of American-Israeli relations and stresses particularly the intrinsic bonds that underlay relations today between the people of the United States and Israel.

⁹⁵Harry B. Ellis. "The U.S. and the Arab World," Middle East Forum, (1960), p. 22.

⁹⁶Salem, op. cit., p. 17.

(1) Sympathy of the United States in general for peoples striving to attain sovereign nationhood and for persecuted peoples in particular which was likely to bring forth a friendly attitude toward the aspirations of Jewish nationalism.

(2) United States tendency to give emphasis to Jewish Nationalism because of its connection with the Bible over the Arab cause about which it knows very little, even today.

(3) The struggle of principles between "free" and "totalitarian" states places Israel in the camp of the "forces of light" led by the United States.

(4) Appreciation of the pioneering spirit that has built Israel---reminiscent of the youthful days of America.

Safran also suggests that American Jews have been influenced in their voting behavior by the attitudes taken by political candidates on matters relating to Israel, and the candidates have frequently taken a stand on such matters with a eye to this fact. Jews, though a minority, are concentrated in four cities whose states draw a total electoral vote of 132. (New York, Chicago, Los Angeles,

and Philadelphia).⁹⁷

From the stand point of an American it appears that the voice of a minority is an integral part of the voice of democracy in the United States today. Minorities, on the other hand, believe that their causes are in the best interests of the United States so they claim that they are working in the best interests of the country. Therefore, through their own interests in Israel and through the operation of supply and demand in the political field as well as in the world of the media of communications, the American Jews have created a climate in which American sympathies toward Israel have been enhanced to the utmost and have been made to yield as many practical results as possible. This has led to a generally friendly and helpful attitude toward Israel from the United States.

W. W. Rostow in "The United States in the World Arena," insists that the United State's supreme interest is not only to protect the national territory but also the basic humanistic democratic values of American society. This means the United States is striving to prevent any potentially hostile power, or combination

⁹⁷Safran, op. cit., p. 278.

of powers, from dominating the Eurasian land mass---or a sufficient portion of it---to threaten the United States or any coalition she can build and sustain. Rostow view view asserts that protection of the humanistic democratic values of American society requires that Eurasia should not be coalesced under totalitarian dictatorships which would threaten the survival of democracy both in the United States and elsewhere. "Viewed in this context Israel's adoption of democratic values similar to those of the United States possibly becomes of real importance for the American national interest, especially since her achievements in many fields of endeavor could provide for many emerging nations a rare example of a successful democracy in a new state."⁹⁸

On the other hand, according to Salem, it is doubtful that the average American has any desire to see the foreign policy of the United States shaped disproportionately by ethnic and religious minority groups within the country or see United States foreign policy in any part of the world become the instrument of minorities. Yet, today, so convinced are the intelligentsia of the Middle East that United States foreign policy in

⁹⁸W.W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 173.

the Middle East is shaped to a large degree by the Jewish element of the American people that Senator William Fulbright has described America's pro-Israeli policy as "the greatest single burden which American diplomacy has had to carry in the Middle East."⁹⁹

Approaches to the Situation:

Keeping in mind United States pre-occupation with the desire to maintain the dominant position over the Soviet Union in the Middle East what approaches are open to the United States to try and maintain the State of Israel, a course which, realistically, the United States is not in a position to veer markedly from in the foreseeable future given United States world commitments and its present internal political system. At the same time how can the United States maintain its interests in the Arab Middle East and still not provide the degree of anti-American Soviet propaganda material that it has in the past?

⁹⁹Salem, op. cit., p. 18.

I CONTINUANCE OF "FAVORED" IMPARTIALITY?

Experience has shown that it has been impossible for the United States to try and follow a foreign policy aimed at attempting to satisfy both parties in this key issue of Middle Eastern--American relations, and retain a favorable foreign policy image in the Arab World. The Eisenhower Administration tried to maintain a high level of friendship with the Arabs but not at the expense of Israel and to hold favor with Israel but not at the expense of the Arabs.

For example President Eisenhower states in his autobiography, "Waging Peace," that "from the beginning of my administration I had sought means of ameliorating the mutual prejudices and hatreds between the Arabs and Israelis in the hope of bringing about a modus vivendi out of which genuine cooperation might develop. Working together, the nations of the region I believed, could form a sturdy and permanent bulwark against Communist encroachment; but if they spent their time, effort, and substance fighting each other, the over-all effect would be to make the Middle East nothing but a happy hunting ground for Communist

oppression---with disastrous results for the Free World."¹⁰⁰

Yet, with the exception of referring the matter on numerous occasions to the United Nations, as had been the practice of his predecessor, Eisenhower did not initiate, perhaps purposely, any concrete action on the part of the United States that would assist specifically in the alleviation of the Palestine problem. His numerous utterances of impartiality failed to be backed by notable action in the eyes of the Arabs.

When in 1954 Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade set out American policy along the lines of impartiality he was highly criticized by the Jews for showing a proper lack of support for the support of the State of Israel and by the Arabs for stating a policy which they interpret to actually favor the Jews due to past United States support.

"To the Israelis I say that you should come to truly look upon yourselves as Middle Easterners and see your own future in that context rather than as a head-quarters, or nucleus so to speak, or world-wide groupings of peoples or a particular religious faith who must have special rights within and obligations to the Israeli state. You should drop the attitude of a conqueror and the conviction that force and a policy of retaliatory killings is the only policy that your neighbors will understand. You should make your deeds correspond to your frequent utterances of the desire for peace.

¹⁰⁰ Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace 1956 - 1960, (London; Heinemann, 1966), p. 115.

To the Arabs I say you should accept this state of Israel as an accomplished fact. I say further that you are deliberately attempting to maintain a state of affairs delicately suspended between peace and war, while at present desiring neither. This is a most dangerous policy and one which world opinion will increasingly condemn if you continue to resist any move to obtain at least a less dangerous modus vivendi with your neighbor."¹⁰¹

The problem for the United States has been, and continues to be, one of supporting its utterances of impartiality toward the Arab-Israeli problem by actions that support its words.

This tact of trying to appease both sides in the problem might have been more acceptable to the Arabs if the United States Government had been starting all over again from 1945. But under Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson any favorable move made by the administration toward the Arabs has been viewed with alarm by the Israelis and not a sufficient enough gesture by the Arabs.¹⁰²

President Kennedy believed strongly in America's moral commitment to Israeli security and took steps to strengthen Israel's ability to resist aggression.

¹⁰¹ Polk, op. cit., p. 266.

¹⁰² Peretz, op. cit., p. 32.

However, he did wish to establish a repoire with Nasser in order to try and work more closely with the modernizing forces in the Arab world.¹⁰³

Other approaches to the situation, however, such as the Johnston Plan for the Jordan River, have not been enough to lead to any type of political settlement due to mistrust on both sides.

Thus, it appears that the United States has been paying a high price, from the point of view of its image in the Arab World by pursuing what Washington, D. C. terms an "impartial" policy of supporting both the Arab States (as 76% of the Middle East) and the State of Israel (the avowed enemy of that 76%.) At the same time the Soviet Union has capitalized on the furor aroused over United States support of Israel,

¹⁰³ Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days (London: A. Deutsch, 1965), p. 115 states that this particular approach did show some signs of encouragement, which might be noted for the future, for in June 1961, when Nasser wrote Kennedy expressing his appreciation for the PL 480 aid Egypt had received he agreed with the President that, though the United Arab Republic and the United States of America had their differences they could still cooperate. "This tacit acceptance of the American acceptance of a free Israel marked momentarily a considerable advance in mutual understanding."

to reinforce the Arabs unfavorable view of the United States Government, and thus furthers the disarming of the United States in the Middle East by the very nature of America's own actions.

On the other hand it can be hypothesized that an approach of trying to appease both sides on the part of the United States might produce more positive results in regard to American policy objectives. As an example, by the United States adoption of the previously discussed approach the Arab world to-date has become bitterly aroused toward "imperialist" moves from any area of the world, East or West, and this keeps the Middle East conscious of any moves on the part of the Soviet Union as well as the West to dominate in any form. In essence then United States support of the State of Israel maintains the status quo in the Middle East in regard to any hostile outside intervention on the part of the Soviet Union or any

Communist country.¹⁰⁴

It is also true that the United States possibly fears that the Arab countries, without the existence of Israel, might more easily unite geographically and thus, as an whole, be more susceptible to eventual alliance, either economic or political, with a Communist or Socialist force. Today, with the presence of Israel in the midst of the Arab world, it acts not only as a catalyst for Arab nationalist fervor but also as a block to unification as its very presence keeps Middle Eastern Arab countries divided over the unity of approach necessary to eliminate it.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴Safran, op. cit., p. 263. In examining this hypothesis from a positive point of view regarding future American policy whatever unity Nasser can muster in the Arab World, under the banner of Arab Nationalism, can possibly constitute strength against Communism inasmuch as Arab Nationalism is characterized by neutralism from both the East and the West. On the other hand this unity is a potential destroyer of Israel if it were ever to organize itself to the action rather than the talking stage. Therefore, if the United States felt that Nasser's anti-foreign intervention stance were a good bulwark to the spread of Soviet influence throughout the Middle East she should not try to force a conciliation between Nasser and Israel, or any Arab leader and Israel, for any Arab leader attempting to sue for peace with Israel will bring about his own downfall (Bustani, op. cit., p. 145) and thus will no longer be in the position to generate anti-foreign intervention propaganda which is making it difficult for the Soviet Union to operate in the Middle East today. On the other hand, if the United States were to back Nasser too closely he might be branded a "western lackey" on the part of his enemies and this close affiliation with the United States might eventually bring about his downfall also.

¹⁰⁵In the aftermath of the Israeli attack on Jordan in November, 1961 Arab countries found themselves taking sides against each other instead of against Israel in their individual desire to retaliate. New York Times Nov. 12&13, 1966, p.1.

Therefore, by a combination of these two hypotheses, it appears that any attempt at penetration or subversion by an outside power today toward one country of the Middle East will engender upon itself suspicion and hostility from other Middle Eastern countries due to the lack of cohesiveness existing in the Arab World.¹⁰⁶

Thus, lack of Arab unification caused in part by the Arab states lack of unity of approach vis-a-vis the elimination of Israel, makes them appear impossible to dominate as a whole which is what the Soviet Union would like to do from the point of view of bringing all underdeveloped countries under the Soviet system of Socialism. It must be noted, too, that all the while the United States continues to deal with both sides freely while the Soviet Union does not have the same latitude in regard to Israel.

However, negatively, it must be concluded that the image of the United States in the Arab Middle East has been badly damaged by the United State's claim to impartiality when, in essence, this impartiality has meant more assistance to Israel than to all the Arab

¹⁰⁶ It should be noted that in August 1957, when the Henderson Commission came to the Middle East to rally Arab governments against the pro-Soviet leaning Syrian Government Syrian nationalist leaders became concerned over the apparent Soviet take over of their country and for this, and other reasons, requested union with Egypt in February 1958. "Therefore, American moves pre-cipitated a chain of events in Syria which resulted in its merger with Egypt." Safran, op. cit., p. 250.

countries combined.¹⁰⁷ In general, as a result, it cannot be avoided that "the United States will remain under intolerable handicaps in its relations with the Arab world unless it puts itself in a position of willingness to recognize that injustice has been done to the Arabs of Palestine and that some measure of rectification is in order."¹⁰⁸

II TRUER IMPARTIALITY

We have already dealt with the major humanitarian, political, and strategic reasons which realistically negate the rationality of a complete United States

¹⁰⁷ See Safran, op. cit., p. 306 and Ellis, op. cit., p. 96.

¹⁰⁸ Campbell, op. cit., p. 183.

withdrawal from support of Israel.¹⁰⁹ Since relations between Israel and the United States today are characterized by a pattern of close consultation leading to an understanding of United States concern for Israel's defense (manifested by the United States providing arms to Israel) how can the United States maintain this position vis-a-vis Israel and still participate

¹⁰⁹ Proponents of a complete United States withdrawal from support of Israel are quick to point out that there have been political and strategic instances in the past, such as the United States condemnatory resolution of Israel in the United Nations following the Suez invasion of November 1956 when the United States openly opposed Israel. They also call attention to the fact that the United States joined other members of the United Nations in voting sanctions against Israel unless she withdrew from positions she had occupied in the course of the campaign. They question why this cannot be done again by the United States. Safran points out that this was during a war-time period and that since 1958 the United States government has been anxious to preserve the balance of political power that has emerged in the Middle East and is attempting to forestall any attack on the part of Israel, in order not to turn the Middle East into an international battleground, by close cooperation with that country. Safran, op. cit., p. 280.

In addition to these there is a school of thought that foresees that withdrawal of support from the State of Israel would stimulate Arab preparations for a new war against Israel, encouraging the Arab states to increase their arms acquisitions from the Soviet Union; it would undermine the existing regime in Jordan and instability in that country could lead to a Nasserite takeover, which would mean an Israel surrounded by aggressive forces on all frontiers; it would strengthen sentiment and pressure for preventive war in Israel itself, because of heightened fear of an effective Arab alliance. For more details see "The United States Commitment in the Near East," Near East Report (Washington: Near East Report Inc., September 1966), p. C-10 to C-11.

creatively in the development of the Arab World that will be viewed by the Arabs as a gesture of friendship instead of one of hostility with underlying motives contrary to the best interests of the Arab world?

Richard Nolte and William Polk, writing in Foreign Affairs, July 1958, suggest that if the United States were to make clear its intent in maintaining peace in the area from the point of view of helping both the Jews and the Arabs together defend themselves from external aggression, from a communist power for example, the United States would stand as a bulwark for a peaceful Middle East and not just for a peaceful Israel against the Arabs. "The key to the Arabs is equal treatment, fairness, one law."¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ Richard Nolte and William Polk, "Toward a Policy for the Middle East," (Foreign Affairs, July 1958), p. 658. Nolte uses Jordan as an example of how difficult this sometimes proves to be for the United States today. The U.S. continues to support the monarchy of King Hussein against the forces of Arab Nationalism as wielded by President Nasser in order to reassure Israel that there will be no serious threat from immediately east of the Jordan River and to make Jordan less susceptible to being overthrown by the "nationalistic" forces of Nasser. The Israelis state that they will try to occupy the West Bank of Jordan, which they appear capable of doing, if a disruption in Jordan should come about. A possible result of all this would be war with Egypt, if the United States did not openly support the

Thus, the approach of a truer impartiality might well be considered an acceptable alternative to the United States present policy of supporting the State of Israel in the face of relation resentment from all other Arab countries. If, for example, the United States, in the future, were to at least acknowledge the fact that a problem exists from the Arab as well as from the Israeli point of view, and further ensure that United Nations negotiations for its solution were kept active even though they should last for many more years, and even fail in the end, this move on the part of the United States for the Arab stand over Palestine might do more to re-establish the American image in all countries, particularly the Arab, toward the basic principles

present Jordanian regime. Thus, the situation in reality comes down to the fact that the United States either continues to support the status quo in regard to Israel and Jordan, which is contrary to the precepts of Arab Unity, or it withdraws support for the sake of the principle of non-political intervention, Jordanian self-determination, and Arab approval which is in direct support of the principles underlying Arab Nationalism but which would inevitably lead to war between two Arab countries and between Israel and at least one Arab country. If a conflict did occur the United States would have to make the choice as to which side it would support, the Arab side or the Israeli, which it does not want to put itself in the position of having to do. In this particular instance the United States is attempting to keep Jordan from becoming the occasion for renewed fighting between Arab States and Israel and is trying to be impartial between Israel and the Arab countries involved in order to avoid what might eventually become a international confrontation of powers. Richard Nolte. "United States Policy and the Middle East," The United States and the Middle East (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 180-181.

of the American "image" than any amount of aid has or will accomplish in the future.¹¹¹

The possible resulting foreign policy move would have the United States attempting to show the people of the Middle East that it is honestly and sincerely interested in the peace, security, and economic well-being of all the people of the Middle East and that it is not necessarily interested in supporting a minority faction at the expense of the majority in the Middle East. If the United States chose this approach it would have to divorce itself from the propaganda war that is taking place in the Middle East today between the Jews and the Arabs and exert its influence positively, not in driving the two sides farther apart but, conversely, adopting a truly moderate stance beneficial to the majority concerned. By the adoption of such a stance the United States would have to cease giving economic and diplomatic priority support to Israel and treat it as just another country of the Middle East without preferential treatment over other Western-oriented countries.¹¹² This

¹¹¹Emile Bustani, March Arabesque (London: Robert Hale Limited, 1961), p. 151.

¹¹²American aid today is concentrated with states that generally assist them in assuming a dominant role over the Soviet Union in the area. Cremeans, op. cit., p. 313.

could set the stage for the improvement of the American image in the Middle East, and set the tone for future foreign policy that would be more equitable to the best interests of the majority of the people of the Middle East which could reinforce the bulwark (West) against the encroachment of Soviet penetration in the area.

Therefore, in regard to the United States stance vis-a-vis the State of Israel how can the United States realistically, given the present day world political environment begin to adopt a more impartial position in regard to the State of Israel that will better America's image in the Middle East while, simultaneously, not jeopardizing any of its national interests there?

III. ARAB REFUGEES AND THE UNITED NATIONS

With the exception of a more equitable balance of economic support, the subject of which will be dealt with in the following chapter, the failure of the West and the United Nations to alleviate the plight of the Arab refugees will continue to be first and foremost, one of the major factors that will haunt future American

foreign policy in the Middle East. If, as Alfred Lilienthal suggests, the United States, as a first step toward a new foreign policy, were to present a solution to the policy approach of the Arab refugee problem publically--that would be evaluated to both sides of the question--both Jewish and Arab--and then if the United States would overtly attempt to ensure that Israel and the Arab States adhere to this solution it would be a start to also giving the Arabs the moral backing to continue solving the specifics of the Arab-Israeli problem themselves, seeing that the United States is acting impartially in the matter.¹¹³ It can be deduced that only the Government of the United States has the combination of economic power, political influence in the area, position in the United Nations, incentive and skill to take the lead in beginning to move the Arab-Israeli conflict toward resolvment by beginning with a resettling of Palestine refugees and by giving them the choice as to where they want to live--in Israel or in an Arab country. UNRWA would then take over the job of insuring its accomplishment.¹¹⁴

¹¹³Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 116.

¹¹⁴Johnson, loc. cit.

In essence this approach would have the United States continuing to support UNRWA as a temporary measure while using its influence in the United Nations, perhaps more actively than in recent years, to insure that negotiations resume for (1) the return of Arab refugees to Palestine or (2) for compensation to be paid by the Israeli government to Arab refugees for their property in Israel, not necessarily for either political reasons alone, but for the same moral reasons that they supported Germany payment of compensation to Jewish victims of Nazism.¹¹⁵ From a political point of view it will not solve the basic Arab-Israeli problem but it would show the Arabs that the United States is trying to be impartial, which has been discussed as a basic consideration for a successful future American foreign policy in the Middle East.

¹¹⁵ More direct pressures brought to bear by the United States on the Jews and the Arabs might very well result in an open conflict which the United States and Russia could become involved in. At the same time the United States would be drastically altering her approach toward the maintenance of the State of Israel which, handled in such an abrupt manner, might not prove politically feasible within the political structure of the United States or in the interests of the American people as a result of possible political consequences.

Up to now United States policy in regard to settlement of the refugee problem has been to try and placate the Arabs and the Jews without being able to arrive at a definite solution. The United States has tacitly backed the United Nations Resolution granting the refugees return to their homeland but has not pressured Israel to make any overt move to act in support of this resolution. Therefore, no real action has been taken by Israel to put the resolution into effect. Furthermore America tacitly has supported the other United Nations resolutions passed by the General Assembly concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict (yielding excess territory not allowed by the original partition plan and the surrender of the Jewish section of Jerusalem to United Nations authority) but has done nothing to encourage Israel to abide by these resolutions. Therefore, they have gone virtually ignored by the State of Israel.

One reason given for Israel's and, thus, America's reluctance to support the United Nations Resolution calling for the resettlement of Palestinian Arabs in Israel's fear that a massive migration of Arabs returning to their

original homeland will flood Israel with a hostile Arab element that will only work to topple the Jewish state now established there. Personal interviews with Palestinians from various strata of society, now citizens of Jordan, disclosed that, if given the chance, three out of four Palestinians would not return to their homeland but would take offered compensation instead.¹¹⁶ And of those who did return many would not stay for any longer period thus it would take for them to learn what their life would be like living in a Jewish dominated state. Assuming, this is true the United States might consider this factor extremely important in its future foreign policy formulation toward the Arab countries and Israel in order to help clarify the actual situation not only for the two parties concerned but for itself in order to arrive at a just and equitable ultimate policy directed at all concerned.

Therefore, in support of the possible adoption of this approach, the United States would have to consider the active promotion in the United Nations of the adherence to all United Nations resolutions pertaining

¹¹⁶ Ellis, op. cit., p. 215. Also has information bearing on this factor.

to the Israeli-Arab conflict to-date by both the Arab States and the State of Israel. Among the most important of these are:

The implementation of United Nations resolutions with regard to the refugees breaks down into three sub heads:-¹¹⁷

- a) Repatriation - Repatriation is promised by the United Nations resolutions even through the return to Israel of any considerable number of Arabs must be an economic impossibility. Nevertheless the opportunity should be given to the refugees to choose whether they would return to Israel or accept resettlement elsewhere. Those who chose to return would have to agree to accept the living conditions which would be imposed upon them by Israel and would have to agree to live where room for them could be made. It might even be required that at the end of a period of a year they would have to consider the acceptance of Israeli citizenship.

¹¹⁷ Stephen B. L. Penrose, "The Palestine Problem-- Retrospect and Prospect," Speech delivered to the World Council of Churches Conference, Beirut, Lebanon, May 1951, p. 7-9.

Under these conditions, it is almost certain that many would decide not to return at all and many who might return would decide once more to leave. However, they would then be leaving of their own free will and would be moving out with the idea of accepting resettlement elsewhere. There is a difference between this attitude and that of the refugee who feels that he has been expelled through forces over which he had no control.

- b) Indemnification - The resolutions of the United Nations state that those refugees who are not repatriated are entitled to indemnification for the loss of their property and that those who are will be entitled to damage on their original property. Although the total holdings of Arabs in Palestine reach a staggering figure, almost no one expects that there will be a repayment in full. In most cases a substantial token payment would be accepted as evidence of good faith and would enable many of the refugees to start life in a new country with a small but essential stake.

- c) The internationalization of Jerusalem - This proposal is also reflected in the United Nations resolutions, and it needs to be implemented almost as badly as the previous two. Jerusalem, the city which is sacred to three faiths, is as effectively divided by the Israeli boundary line as New York City would be if it were to have an international boundary established across Forty Second Street. This city is not a city: The Jews are excluded from most of their holy places while the Christians do not have access to some of theirs.

The Arabs, Christian or Moslem, are excluded from the residential areas they formerly owned. Normal life is impossible. It makes no difference that Jordan for one reason, and Israel for another, both oppose the internationalization of the Jerusalem area. A city divided against itself cannot stand, and it is essential to the faith of Christian, Moslem and Jew that Jerusalem should stand as a respectable and accessible unit.

A more active support of the implementation of these three United Nations resolutions might convince the Arabs that the United States and United Nations at long last mean business. Until determined efforts are made at implementation it must be assumed that the Arabs will inevitably continue to believe that the United Nations, with strong United States backing, is subservient to Israel and that they pay only lip service to the principles of humanitarianism and justice which they have so often and so loudly professed.

- d) Resettlement of some Arab refugees after Israeli compensation: With the implementation of the United Nations resolutions, it may then become possible to persuade some of the neighboring states to accept for resettlement the Arab refugees who do not choose to be repatriated in Israel, but who have been compensated. As had been pointed out before, the antipathy of the Arab states to resettlement is based upon their feeling that it means an acceptance of the status quo. Real

action on the part of the United Nations would persuade them that the status quo no longer existed, that repatriation or compensation had been effected, and they would consequently be able to change their attitude without serious loss of face. The United Nations would have to be prepared to continue its financial support until new settlements were well established, new industrial skills acquired and the refugee camps emptied.

Thus, if the United States were to adopt such an approach as suggested it would put the Israeli problem in the context -- of the United Nations -- and further United States actions, if required, regarding the conflict, would be in support of United Nations. This action ought not only strengthen the image of the United States in the Arab countries but could very well lead to a more fertile, common ground, between the United States and the Middle East from the point of view of cooperative economic and political endeavors that would be to the mutual benefit of both sides concerned.

The withdrawal of United States support of one side in the Arab-Israeli conflict in favor of another should considerably lessen the mounting tensions between the two antagonists and allow the United Nations solely to work out the difficulties existing between the Arabs and the Jews.¹¹⁸ The drawbacks to this alternative, viewed in the realistic terms of the Middle East today, accept the basic premise that no negotiated peace can be/at all between the Arabs and the Jews until Israel acknowledges at least the principles of the United Nations resolutions cited above.¹¹⁹ However, what if, as some critics have pointed out, Israel does not want peace because with American money it can sustain a state of half war and half peace better than any of the Arab States while taking in "sympathetic" money from Jews all over the world.¹²⁰ Why, for instance,

¹¹⁸Bustani, op. cit., 134.

¹¹⁹Ellis, op. cit., p. 214

¹²⁰Elmer Berger, Who Knows Better Must Say So (New York: American Council for Judaism, 1955) p. 105.

in October 1959 when Nasser declared, in an interview with American newspaper correspondants, that he was willing to allow Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal, which is something which would aid Israel's financial situation immensely, if Israel adhered to other United Nations resolutions detailing with the rights of the Arabs of Palestine, did Israel fail to respond? Possibly because the state of perpetual antagonism between the Arabs and the Jews means more economically to Israel from support all over the world than would benefits derived from its use of the Suez Canal but with less support from the world scene due to an apparent approachment between the Arabs and the Jews.¹²¹

Another factor to be considered, if the above approach were actively adopted, would be just how far the United States could use its power and/or influence to motivate either the Jews or the Arabs to accept all the passed United Nations resolutions pertaining to the situation. Neither the Jews or the Arabs want complete adherence to the United Nations resolutions

¹²¹ Ellis, op. cit., p. 215

because, although they do favor the Arabs, they are a compromise from what both sides fully want out of the situation. Certainly Israel isn't going to give up something she has already acquired willingly and the Arabs do not want to return to their Palestine under any terms other than their own political control over the country. Also, if the United States were to adopt sincerely an active promotion of the United Nations resolutions cited, as opposed to the passive promotion that it now gives them, in the United Nations it would have to consider the use of force if it were to carry through on what it was promoting and certainly the United States is not prepared to undulate such an overt move in regard to a situation which presently does not call for such a reactionary move which could, conservatively turn the Middle East into another Southeast Asia.

Therefore, though basically and theoretically, more active promotion of the United Nations resolutions on Palestine might ultimately benefit the majority of the people of the Middle East

the intransigence of Israel plus United States commitments in other parts of the world indicate that any means to achieve the end (in this case the forced adherence of one side or the other to the United Nations Palestine Resolutions) might lead to an international incident before that end was ever reached.

IV DISENGAGEMENT

Thus, using the Arab refugee problem as a concrete beginning to a reappraisal of the entire Arab-Israeli conflict, it is conceivable that the United States should consider the disengagement of itself, completely in the future, from the Palestine situation---not only to save the situation for those who should be directly involved in a solution---the Arabs and the Jews---- but also to save its own image and prestige in the Middle East.

Under this alternative the United States would adopt a policy for the future which would do nothing to aggravate or complicate any further an already multiplex, complicated problem. This means, in

essence the United States disengaging to every extent realistically possible from the Arab-Israeli conflict except where America, by influence, now or in the future, could work to bring the two sides into accord over their own eventual solving of the problem for themselves if the United States determined that this support would result in the interests of the United States. The proper area for the Palestine problem would again be strictly the United Nations. It is here, with United States support, that the individual problems of the conflict could be aired and discussed. It is assumed that the best interests of not only the Arabs and the Jews but also the United States would be satisfied by an impartial eventual solution to the problem found here.

This principle was enunciated by President Eisenhower, during the Suez Crisis of 1956 in regard to Israel's invasion of Egypt and then subsequent refusal to withdraw her troops, when he stated "I believe that the United Nations has no choice but to exert pressure upon Israel and we hope that the Israelis will see that their best immediate and long term interests will be served by trusting in the world organization."¹²²

¹²²Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 188.

Later, speaking before the United Nations General Assembly in 1958 Eisenhower advocated that the United States propose that the nations concerned in the 1948 conflict (Israel on the one hand, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt on the other) call for a United Nations study and possibly a permanent United Nations body to control the flow of heavy armaments to the region.¹²³

Furthermore, and most importantly for the United States it could negate a lot of suspicion that now exists between the Arab countries and the United States and could mean that the Western allies could safely eschew their policy, followed for so many years of trying "to hunt with the hounds of Zionism and run with the hare of Arab Nationalism simultaneously."¹²⁴ Palestine would become an international problem and not one associated with only the United States. It would then be the primary problem of settlement between the Arabs and the Jews in the international setting of the United Nations with the United States no longer appearing as the number one protagonist. It must be

¹²³Ibid., p. 287.

¹²⁴Bustaini, op. cit., p. 134.

realized that all this would have to be implemented over a considerable period of time---in the long run time alone will be the determinant as to whether the Arab-Israeli conflict can ever be resolved.¹²⁵ It can be reasoned that given enough time in the United Nations, in the absence of the degree of United States arms support presently going to countries of the Middle East, (See Chapter VI) the Jews and the Arabs may be able to concentrate their full energies at negotiation so that, even if they led eventually no where, they would keep their energies channeled at least constructively in a controlled arena and not destructively among themselves.

Thus, using the United Nations as the international body through which the problem could be aired the United States should be able to disengage itself, after the initial moves outlined in this chapter, from the situation unless it is through the United Nations that it makes further recommendations. By this action the United States hopefully could place itself in a more favorable position by actually supporting the United

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Ibid.

Nation's resolution on Palestine, better its image with the Arabs,¹²⁶ and continue to maintain the dominant position over the Soviet Union in the Middle East.

* * * * *

Up to this point we have been primarily concerned with examining political areas of interest in Middle Eastern policy that will have an influence on future United States policy formulation in this part of the world. Economic factors, however, explain much of what is happening today in the Middle East, a region notable for the wealth of its oil resources and the poverty of its people. The problems are of such magnitude--relentless population pressure on limited resources in some areas, dependence on a single-crop economy in some, need for land reform, limited possibilities for industrialization---that local governments, despite brave words, are nearly all beyond their depth in their attempts to cope with them. Our concern here is with the bearing of economics on international relations and on the objectives of American

¹²⁶ Don Peretz, "The Arab Refugees: Changing Problem" (Foreign Affairs, April 1963), p. 469.

policy. Economic factors, if not properly considered in light of the overall Middle Eastern scene, can work to the detriment of any state attempting to derive foreign policy formulation for a particular area of the world. Therefore, the following two chapters will deal with United States foreign aid to the economic development of Middle Eastern states in an attempt to evaluate the different approaches that the United States can take in the future regarding economic assistance that will best support what has previously been determined to be the pivotal focus of United States foreign policy in the Middle East----United States dominance over the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER VI

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING NATIONS

From the outset it must be realized that foreign aid has been a political force abroad, irrespective of its successes and failures. Since the end of World War II its purposes and its achievements, its origins and its operations, its giving and its receiving, all have involved conflicts of ideology and power.¹²⁷ In the course of this chapter consideration will be given to ways in which political aspects of past foreign aid can be realistically minimized for the future.

¹²⁷ John Montgomery asserts that aid programs are instruments of a general political strategy, though often ill-defined at best, and hypothesizes that foreign aid as a political instrument of United States policy is here to stay because of its usefulness and flexibility. "The Politics of Foreign Aid (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1962), pp. 3-9. See also Robert Feis, Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), Chapter 13 for an account of past conflicts between economic assistance and political ideology. George Liska states that foreign aid will remain for some time an instrument of political power and recipients of this aid will treat it as such---- with composure when they are politically mature and self-assured; with resentment when they are not, or have other axes to grind and needs to meet. "Some Arabs may stigmatize the political aspects of American aid, but they are the first to play the most un economical politics with both foreign aid and Arab oil." They apparently know and if necessary state what Mossadegh While Prime Minister of Iran said in reply to a newly appointed director of the Point Four Program in Iran: "... if it weren't for our neighbor to the north you would not be here." Liska suggests that aid is and ought to be political in regard to countries who are similarly oriented. The New Statecraft (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 14.

Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy

U. Alexis Johnson, while Deputy UnderSecretary of State for Political Affairs, stated in regard to United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East and, foreign economic assistance, that "as a contribution to world peace, and the eventual security of the American people, the United States is concerned, through the use of foreign aid, with helping to create political stability, advance economic development, and to modernize social systems both for the sake of the peoples of the Middle East and for strengthening the Free World against expansion by those hostile to it."¹²⁸

In pursuit of these objectives the United States, beginning with the Truman Doctrine of 1947, has implemented a foreign aid program to developing nations with the avowed purpose of assisting them in developing economically, socially, and politically in order to bring about stability and peace. Thus, foreign aid has been an arm of United States foreign policy in the Middle East in attempting to strengthen Middle Eastern countries against their

¹²⁸Johnson, op. cit., p. 209.

vulnerability to Soviet penetration into the area.

Present hopes regarding the political benefits from the employment of foreign aid rest on one or both of two expectations. One is that if the United States and its associates continue to increase and display their combined power, (economic and political) the Cold War will be won; the Communist countries will either break up or quarrel among themselves. The other is that even if this does not come about, the Communist bloc---convinced that it cannot defeat the West, will eventually adopt, or be forced to adopt, a position more acceptable to the national interests of the United States in the Middle East.

These are the ultimate aims which most Americans would like their foreign aid serve. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, when discussing the then proposed Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 with the Senate Committee on

¹²⁹ For a breakdown of United States military and economic aid given to Middle Eastern countries from 1 July 1945 to 30 June 1962 see Time, "Report on aid" March 29, 1963. For total United States aid to developing countries from 1956 to 1965 see Development Assistance Efforts and Policies Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1966, p. 147.

Foreign Relations, stated:

(Our commitment) is basically the structure that is outlined in the opening portions of the United Nations Charter--a world society of independent states, freely cooperating across national frontiers in pursuit of common interests upon which they are agreed. So that if one was to ask us what our primary target is in the international scene, (in relations to foreign aid) I would say a family of independent states in a cooperative relations with each other.¹³⁰

Opposition to Foreign Aid

Critics of United States foreign aid¹³¹ toward Middle Eastern countries challenge the justification of past economic assistance for what appears to have been

¹³⁰Hearings, April 5, 1962, pp. 25-26.

¹³¹The Citizens Foreign Aid Committee, a conservative businessman's organization and principal lobbyist against aid, describes the entire Mutual Security Act as "one of the greatest pieces of pork barrel" legislation ever conceived and considers it "illegal" and used "for palpably un-American purposes and projects." The New York Times, April 26, 1960 and June 11, 1961. Books like James W. Wiggins and Helmut Shoeck, eds, Foreign Aid Reexamined (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1958), and Eugene W. Castle, The Great Giveaway (Chicago: Regnery, 1957), testify to the vigor of the opposition.

minimal results. They advocate that money used could have been spent more productively for the United States in other ways with a far greater return, such as on domestic projects within the United States, and support a drastic foreign aid withdrawal from the Middle East -- at least from countries who do not appear to be sympathetic toward American interests in the Middle East today.¹³²

Such a withdrawal, would mean that Middle Eastern countries not now receiving Soviet support would be forced to request such support as foreign support is almost essential in most Middle Eastern countries today due to a lack of foreign exchange with which to develop internally. Therefore, the very backbone of United States foreign policy in the Middle East todate, would be broken and Soviet domination over the area would continue to

¹³²A recent change has come about in foreign aid spending. Up until 1963 a substantial part of foreign aid was used to buy products made in other countries. Now for example in 1960 \$129 million worth of iron and steel products were bought for the foreign aid program. Of this less than \$14 million, or 11%, was spent in the United States. In 1963, on the other hand, out of a total of \$181 million, 88% was spent in the United States. For further details see an address by Dean Rusk, "Your Stake in Foreign Aid," Department of State Bulletin, V. 50, No. 1291, March 23, 1964, p. 437.

grow.¹³³

Soviet Economic Assistance Relations with Middle Eastern Countries:

The possibility of the Soviet Union replacing the United States in the Middle East, in the event that a United States reduction of foreign economic assistance to the area did take place is reinforced by the impressive economic relations that have developed between countries of the Middle East and the Soviet Union, particularly from 1955 - 1959.¹³⁴ However, for the moment, it should

¹³³ Alfred Neal states that a financial and technical aid program to underdeveloped countries is extremely necessary in regard to the United State's foreign policy stand vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. He cites that for each 1% of gross national product which the United States devotes to aid, the Soviet Union would have to devote 2-3% of theirs. Not only in addition to participating in the development of underdeveloped countries putting economic pressure on the Communist bloc "through raising their ante of the aid game will tighten the rules of the East-West trade game" the development of which foreign aid plays a major role. "New Economic Policies For the West, Foreign Affairs, January 1961, p. 250.

¹³⁴ United States official sources give the following totals for Soviet bloc credits, including military aid, through June 1959: Egypt, \$658 million; Syria, \$304 million; Iraq, \$257 million. See United States State Department, Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program (Washington, G.P.O. 1960), p. 113. For a review of Sino-Soviet Economic Assistance to less developed countries up to 1963 see The Flow of Financial Resources to Less-Developed Countries 1956 - 1963, Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1964, pp. 54 - 56.

be noted that some of these Middle Eastern countries have been disappointed and frustrated in their economic relations with the Soviet area, disturbed over the techniques employed and over the heavy dependence which is developing, and have become increasingly sensitive to the political implications of the trade.¹³⁵

Soviet economic objectives have previously been touched upon in Chapter 2 and 5 of this thesis. However, it will be useful to briefly examine the relationship between the economic capabilities and priorities of the Soviet bloc in supplying the arms and economic development needs to countries of the Middle East.

From the outset it must be remembered that although the Soviet Union is a powerful industrial country capable of making quantities of arms, machinery, and equipment available to the Middle East she, like the United States, faces many commitments in order to maintain

A summary of aid (military as well as economic) to Middle Eastern states from 1963 to 20 May 1966, including a \$200 million industrial complex to Turkey, a squadron of MIG-21s and two tank battalions to Algeria, three squadrons of MIG-21s to Iraq, \$150 million to Syria for a start on a Euphrates River dam, plus rebuilding railways and prospecting for oil, and four MIG squadrons, six submarines and a school of destroyers to Nasser, can be found in "The Price of Penury," Time, May 20, 1966, p. 36.

¹³⁵See Robert Allen, Soviet Economic Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960), pp. 213-218 for details on how the Soviet Union has practiced reselling Middle Eastern commodities to Eastern bloc countries at a profit, repayment demands on Soviet bloc credits (in order to gain complete state control over an economy), slow delivery practices,

present growth and military prowess. Secondly, Russia is committed to Eastern Europe and now to the war effort in Southeast Asia.¹³⁶ Thirdly, the Soviets are in the process of trying to detach third world countries from Western influence. Therefore, this order to priority implies that the Middle East will receive a high priority only when there is a definite possibility of bringing some country under Soviet influence. The full capability of the Soviet bloc cannot be brought to bear year and year upon situations in which the calculation indicates only a chance of success.¹³⁷

Perhaps more important than economic capability is the question of economic basis for large-scale trade between the Middle East and the Soviet bloc. It is an important part of the dogma of Communism that the Soviet state, and now the Soviet bloc, be independent of foreign sources of supply. In recent years this concept has been interpreted less rigidly, but there is no evidence to suggest that the Soviet Union will develop economic

inferiority of goods over similar Western commodities, rebates and "kick-backs" from Middle Eastern merchants, and often inadequate preparation prior to starting projects.

¹³⁶ Roger Moris, "Russias State in Vietnam," The New Republic February 13, 1965, p. 13.

¹³⁷ "Soviet Russia and the Under developed Countries: Trade and Aid," The World Today Vol. 13 5 May 1957, p. 216.

ties to the point where it must depend upon supplies not under its control. All lines of production, in agriculture, in extractive industries, are advancing in the Soviet Union according to plans which are aimed at self-sufficiency.¹³⁸

A current example of this is oil---the principle export of the Middle East. The rapid growth of this industry in the Soviet Union has permitted enlarged exports and a substantial reduction of imports. Presently the Soviet Union exports more than five times its imports of crude oil and more than three times its imports of petroleum products.¹³⁹ Small compared to Middle Eastern exports, Soviet oil shipments are nonetheless growing rapidly, and may increasingly become a competitive threat to the Middle East in the West European markets, as

¹³⁸ Allen, op. cit., p. 218.

¹³⁹ As of 1965 Soviet reserves of oil, along with Eastern Europe and China, were 9.4% of the world oil reserves. In 1965 Russia produced 15.5% of the total world crude (in tons) and consumed almost that same amount. Since exports are in excess of imports and Russia's rate of consumption rose 9% over the past six years it stands to reason that Russia will have to increase her own oil production in order to satisfy the growth of internal oil consumption (which many experts say will be costly or will have to be purchased by Russia from outside Middle Eastern national oil companies.) "Statistical Review of the World Oil Industry 1965," The British Petroleum Company (London: Britannic March 1965)

costs of all production with Russia decrease.¹⁴⁰ It is not inconceivable that oil someday may be removed from the world of commerce and transformed more into a political weapon for use in the struggle between nations.

Though economic relations between the Middle East and the Communist world stem less from the economic motives than from Soviet political decisions and objectives. Soviet economic inroads into the Middle East have had a substantial impact on the public mind and the commercial community. First the Soviet economic impact has resulted in the commitment of large quantities of Middle Eastern exports to Communist markets for many years to come; secondly in the psychological impact that has been spoken of previously regarding the impression that the

¹⁴⁰ Conversely it is true that the Soviet Union, though its oil reserves are large, due to internal costs of extracting Soviet crude, may become a purchaser of Middle Eastern crude and gas as exemplified by the recent Iranian-Russian agreement for natural gas, reference The Middle East Basic Oil Laws and Concessions Contracts-Supplement #14 (New York: Petroleum Legislation, 1966), pp. A-0 to A-6.

If the Soviet Union did pursue this course of action in the future it would be with Middle Eastern national oil companies, such as NIOC, which would be in direct competition with Western oil companies currently operating in the Middle East. This practice would be of assistance to the Soviets in attempting to economically dominate over the West in the area of Middle Eastern oil and would bear out a theory expounded in the Soviet publication International Affairs, July 1960, p.76 which stated: "It should be borne in mind that the oil concessions represent as it were the foundation of the entire edifice of Western political influence in the Middle East, of all military bases and aggressive blocs. If this foundation cracks, the entire edifice may begin to totter, and then come tumbling down."

accelerated progress of the Soviet Union since World War II has made on leaders of some Middle Eastern countries. (see Chapter 4).

However, politically, the impact has perhaps been the most apparent. By siding with the nationalistic Arab Middle East against the United States and Israel, the Soviet Union has begun to develop at least a short-run political alliance that appears to Middle Easterns to be in their own favor. This is due to the Soviet and Czechoslovakian sales of arms to the Middle East, apparent similarity (positive neutrality) of positions in the United Nations, and official statements commending the policies of Middle Eastern nations have all tended to foster a political relationship which can be attributed at least in part, to the vigorous Soviet economic warfare in the area.

As has been discussed already present Soviet policy in the Middle East is essentially a tactical maneuver designed to enhance the Soviet power position and to damage the Western position in the area. Most Middle Eastern leaders realize this but are at present willing to exploit the apparent temporary harmony of interests in order to achieve their own goals which include the destruction of Israel and

the elimination of the remnants of "colonialism" in the area.¹⁴¹

The Middle East at present is not yet so intimately bound to Communist countries economically that it could not extricate itself from its obligations. However, this can be accomplished only with the assistance of Western nations. In the meantime it does not seem likely that Russia will abandon its long-run goal; it may dissemble and equivocate for a long period of time but eventually the Soviet Union will attempt to take over the Middle East by subversion, aggression, or through economic influence.¹⁴²

From the Middle Eastern point of view, the Soviet bloc proves most useful to the extent that each country in the area can interpret Soviet actions as being (1) exclusively directed at Israel and the West and (2) to the extent that Soviet material assistance comes in significant volume. In the absence of a strong economic basis for trade, as

¹⁴¹Allen, op. cit., p. 217.

¹⁴²Joseph S. Berliner, Soviet Economic Aid (New York: Praeger, 1958), p. 17.

compared to the United States,¹⁴³ it appears that the Soviet Union will try to continue to exploit the Arab-Israeli dispute, the crushing poverty, the struggle for markets, and inter-Arab rivalries by strategically placed economic moves to further Russian influence in the Middle Eastern area.

THE UNITED STATES RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE:

As suggested by John Campbell the United States response to the Soviet economic offensive should not be a response at all but a series of policies which stand on their own feet in terms of the Middle East's needs and aspirations and United States national interests. In the economic field there is every opportunity for initiative and very little reason to try to outdo or copy the Soviets. The challenge will be met if the United States and other nations can develop sound continuing economic policies and programs which offer to Middle Eastern nations an attractive alternative to economic ties with the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³"Soviet Russian Economic Penetration in the Middle East," Free World Forum, September-October 1959, p. 38.

¹⁴⁴Campbell, op. cit., p. 276.

George Liska offers some fairly simple methods of dealing with the Soviet offensive, suggesting that the United States always try and match or outdo Soviet offers and to call upon the Soviets to match United States efforts. Since the United States is economically stronger Soviet compliance would overstrain Soviet resources; their refusal to cooperate would show them to be still an economically second-class power which constitutes no real alternative to American aid. United States control in regard to recipients might increase as a result. The drawback to this approach would be that the United States would also transfer some control over American foreign aid policy to the Soviet Union, since its serious or not so serious offers would automatically have to be matched by the United States.¹⁴⁵

Another simple solution would concern the recipients of Soviet aid. In the more drastic approach the United States would withhold aid from countries accepting Soviet aid offers, especially if matched by American offers; or, less vindictively, the United States would deduct Soviet credits from the quota of American aid based on estimated total needs of the recipient country.

¹⁴⁵Liska, op. cit., pp. 185-186.

However, for the United States to insist on a monopoly of aid-giving would lend substance to charges of economic imperialism while presenting the Soviets gratuitously with the role of spurned generosity. Therefore participation by the Soviet Union and its satellites in the trade of the Middle East, or in its economic development, should be no cause of undue concern to the West. The danger lies in situations which allow the Soviet Union to acquire positions of excessive influence, by well-termed bargains or offers, or by building up a dominating position as a provider of capital or technical help in view of United States foreign policy proves that are viewed by the Middle East as generally compromising the area politically. The best insurance against that danger lies in keeping open all the channels for the Middle Eastern nations to trade with the Free World, in averting serious payment problems which force them to turn to the Soviet bloc, and in seeing that their basic economies develop from non-communist sources.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁶ Speiser, *op. cit.*, p. 277. It should also be kept in mind that the "democratic process" utilized by the United States in giving foreign aid, such as debates in Congress, House and Senate committees and sub-committees, most of which are openly aired by the press and other communications media, is an unfamiliar process to most people of the world. They generally find it less complicated to obtain initial assistance from the Soviet Union or the Soviet bloc inasmuch as there are not as many agencies overtly participating in the decision as to what aid shall be placed where. Therefore, for this and other reasons that will be discussed, it is important for the United States to attempt to develop close trade relations from its foreign aid movements in the Middle East.

Thus, trade and economic aid go hand in hand.

It was mentioned earlier that if the United States could move the confrontation between herself and the Soviet Union from the predominantly political realm to the economic realm the United States would have the upper hand due to her far greater economic resources. If the United States could limit her activities in the political field, which carries such dominant "colonialist" and "imperialist" overtones and move the challenge to the Soviet Union in the context of economic support it might find that much of the hostility previously directed toward United States foreign aid as a "tool of imperialism" would disappear.

Yet merely moving the Soviet confrontation to the economic field would not appear to be enough. Having determined the usefulness of foreign aid in regard to United States policy, and having considered the Soviet economic offensive in the Middle East, it has yet to be determined the future political involvement of United States aid based on experiences of the past. What has been the dominant philosophy behind the United States aid program in the Middle East?

Richard Nolte cites two distinct philosophies of motivation behind foreign aid.

1. To help defend the United States directly in the Cold War by either overt or covert political strings attached to aid agreements made with the United Arab Republic.
2. To help raise the standard of living, provide new jobs, foster development which will in turn stabilize local politics, give local populations an interest in the political status quo, and hopefully a friendly resulting association with the United States.¹⁴⁷

IN SEARCH OF A PHILOSOPHY: CASE STUDY OF UNITED STATES
AID TO A MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRY:

From a close examination of United States foreign aid to the United Arab Republic since 1959, a key Middle East recipient of foreign aid it would appear that the

¹⁴⁷Richard Nolte, "United States policy and the Middle East," New Look At The Middle East, ed. William Sands (Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1957), p. 158.

criteria behind its aid programs have more closely coincided with the factors listed under (1) above rather than (2). If we return momentarily to 1959 we find that the United States stepped up economic support to the United Arab Republic primarily because she began to be aware of the successes of the Soviet Union's active economic aid program to the United Arab Republic and because it was apparent that Nasser was in a commanding position to wield political influence throughout a significant part of the Middle East. The United States also saw in economic support to Nasser the political opportunity of opposing the Communist-supported Kassem in Iraq in his bid for more political control over the Middle East. Thus, the United States found in Nasser, for the moment, the best way to oppose Communism in the Middle East and still achieve a degree of political stability in that area.¹⁴⁸

When, in 1960, the "Cleopatra" affair occurred¹⁴⁹ the

¹⁴⁸ "Nasser Prestige Seen Stronger Than Ever, " New York Times, March 8, 1959, p. 7.

¹⁴⁹ The Cleopatra affair occurred on May 1, 1960 when New York dock workers refused to unload the Egyptian freighter "Cleopatra" as a means of protesting the Arab blacklisting of American ships that dealt with Israel. In return Egyptian port workers immediately launched a boycott of American shipping in reprisal with Jordan and Syria shortly following suit.

United States Senate reacted immediately by passing a "politically loaded" amendment to the pending Foreign Aid Bill giving the President power to withhold economic aid to the United Arab Republic over political actions and attitudes of that country "not in the national interests of the United States." This action quite clearly implied that the American non-military aid to Egypt was being given with political strings attached and that the United Arab Republic was expected to "line up" with the United States over certain political matters.¹⁵⁰

Again, in 1961, with the collapse of the United Arab Republic and with Nasser's turning inwardly to the strengthening of internal Egyptian affairs, the United States again saw an opportunity of drawing Nasser closer to the Western camp and enlisting his support in combatting Communism. For these reasons, United States aid was stepped up aid to Egypt.¹⁵¹

¹⁵⁰For more details see "House of Representatives Seeks Aid Amendment," New York Times, May 3, 1960, p.20; op. cit., May 5, 1960, p. 34; "Nasser Scores United States Senate Action, op. cit., May 8, 1960, p. 26; and The London Times, May 2, 1960, p. 12a.

¹⁵¹Editorial, New York Times, May 19, 1962, p. 26.

But, in the Spring of 1963, criticism directed at the United Arab Republic again broke out in the United States Senate over Nasser's political activities¹⁵² and again a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives to cut off all aid to Nasser on the grounds that such aid allowed Nasser to devote his own country's resources toward an aggressive role against another Middle Eastern state. Factions in Congress urged complete refusal of aid to the United Arab Republic, or any country, for reasons of purely political origins and with a minimum of regard to economic aid purely for the sake of economic aid to the United Arab Republic. There appears to have been little thought given without the need or requirement for political qualifications to be attached to that aid as a necessary prerogative for its continuation, let alone completion of already existing agreements.

This policy was clearly enunciated in October 1963 when the United States Government informed Nasser that

¹⁵²This criticism was particularly leveled at (1) Nasser's reoccurring verbal attacks upon Israel, (2) fears from pro-Zionist elements in the United States that the balance of power had swung in Nasser's favor over Israel, (3) jealousies shared by Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan over Nasser's growth to power, (4) the Yemen Affair beginning in September 1962, (5) reports that Nasser had

future American aid to the United Arab Republic depended on his progress of troop withdrawals from Yemen.¹⁵³ When, following this delcaration, the United States Senate adopted a resolution to end aid to the United Arab Republic it was the President of the United States himself who openly stated that he did not feel that political threats from Capitol Hill "will bring the results which are frequently hoped for."¹⁵⁴

When, after close to a year of Congressional political agitation towards Egypt's foreign policy in the Middle East, and toward the United States, President Nasser openly challenged the United State's delay in acting upon a six month requested extension to the already existing aid agreement and declared that the

assembled a staff of former Nazi officers and technicians in order to establish a nuclear program, as well as (6) a general Arab nationalist movement toward a union with Egypt and more frequent demonstrations against anti-Nasser governments within the Middle East. "U.S. Senate Scores U.S. Aid to U.A.R., New York Times, May 1, 1963, p. 1.

¹⁵³"U.S. Senate Votes To Disqualify U.A.R. From Further U.S. Aid," New York Times, November 8, 1963, p. 1.

¹⁵⁴"President Kennedy Opposes Curb," New York Times, November 15, 1963, p. 18.

Egyptian people were ready to cut their rations and do without aid rather than let the United States dictate Egyptian policy, ("the United States wants to give us aid and dominate our policy")¹⁵⁵ the days of liberal and long term United States economic aid to the United Arab Republic came to an end. Though the President of the United States retained a free hand in determining to what degree continued aid to the United Arab Republic, if it were to be continued, would be in the "national interest" of the United States a gradual decline in the amounts and terms of aid to the United Arab Republic resulted.

Thus, by the early Spring of 1966, with Nasser's military campaign in Yemen still not completely abandoned, and with United States military and aid commitments in Southeast Asia growing steadily greater and more costly, the United States began to realize that certain rather sharp adjustments were going to have to be made in regard to certain economic aid recipient countries, such as Egypt,

¹⁵⁵"U.S. Studies Continuance of U.A.R. Aid," New York Times, December 13, 1964, p. 24.

who have practiced a policy of unabated "positive neutralism" but whose internal nation building programs have remained secondary to their primary political goals. The United States Department of State, in examining the effects of the "Food For Peace" Program in Egypt and other "neutral" countries receiving United States economic aid, noted that the free grain and surplus commodities provided since 1955 (to Egypt since 1959) had depressed foreign markets, discouraged their farmers, and had caused these countries to become victims of "food imperialism."¹⁵⁶ In effect the Food For Peace Program appeared geared to let the United States get rid of mounting food surpluses, first and foremost, and was designed to help receiving nations only as a secondary consideration. As a result Egypt had accomplished very little in developing an internal self-supporting agricultural system but rather had released funds, freed by the Food For Peace Program, for more politically oriented projects. Therefore, the Administration's new \$6.6 billion Food For Freedom Bill, passed in 1966 by the Congress, requires receiving countries to build up their own agricultural output through self-help while receiving United States

¹⁵⁶"The Struggle To End Hunger," Time, August 12, 1966, p. 43.

PL 480 assistance.¹⁵⁷ However, since the United States Government has not renewed its major aid agreement to Egypt, which expired on June 30, 1966, and has declined to open negotiations with the Nasser regime on any new aid requests, it appears that political, as well as economic, dissatisfaction with the Nasser regime will continue to dominate the United States foreign economic aid policy to Egypt.

"Because we expressed our view on Israel and nuclear development, Saudi Arabia, and China as we feel the American Government has decided there is to be no aid to the United Arab Republic unless there is a certain American national interest,"¹⁵⁸ is the statement President Nasser has expressed as the prevailing feeling within the

¹⁵⁷Ibid. Public Law 89-808, 89th Congress, H.R. 1429, November 11, 1966, Section 2 states that "The Congress hereby declared it to be the policy of the United States to expand international trade; to develop and expand export markets for U.S. agricultural commodities; to use the abundant agricultural productivity of the United States to combat hunger and malnutrition and to encourage economic development in the developing countries, with particular emphasis on assistance to those countries that are determined to improve their own agricultural production;

Section 109 (a): The President shall consider the extent to which the recipient country is undertaking wherever practicable self-help measures to increase per capita production.

¹⁵⁸"Nasser Says that U.S. Stalls On Aid Because It Opposes Cairo Views," New York Times, July 22, 1966, p.2.

United Arab Republic today over the economic aid program of the United States toward the United Arab Republic. This feeling was re-emphasized on 3 January 1967 with the United Arab Republic's conclusion of an agreement with the Soviet Union for 650,000 tons of wheat. The agreement stipulated that Russia will be repaid in Egyptian goods. The news of the agreement came less than two weeks after Nasser had accused the United States of waging a political "war of famine" against his country.¹⁵⁹

It, therefore, appears that political considerations have predominated over more economic values aimed, first and foremost, at the people of a key Middle East country who the United States was supporting with economic aid. "Positive neutralism" arose in the Middle East as a result of Cold War Powers using the Middle East for its own Cold War advantages with little regard to the aspirations of the people who were being used as the dispensable quotient. The aid programs to countries of the Middle East in the past has been portrayed as a means of only accomplishing United States objectives

¹⁵⁹Nolte, op. cit., p. 159.

in the Cold War for the explicit advantage of the United States and not primarily for the benefit of the peoples of the recipient countries.¹⁶⁰ Aid has been given with the anticipation only that it would automatically win and or obligate receiving countries to openly support the political, anti-Communist, objectives of the United States. When this obligation failed to materialize as the United States has assumed it would in the case of Egypt, the United States forced Nasser into the position overtly where he had to openly choose support for United States foreign policy objectives or avowedly choose to accept the objectives of "neutralism" which had been the key source to his own personal success in both Egypt and the Middle East. As can be expected he chose the latter.

Foreign aid in the Middle East since 1945, as elsewhere in the world, has been directed toward stifling the spread of Communism principally for the security of the United States. Certainly this in itself is not wrong. It is in the national interest of the people of the United

¹⁶⁰ "Soviet Wheat For U.A.R. in Barter Deal,"
New York Times, January 3, 1967, p. 1.

States and the interests of the American people must always come first in foreign policy. But, where the United States has failed is in its overt lack of concern for the goals, drives, aspirations, hopes, and dreams of the people of the Middle East and their attitudes. In short, the United States has employed foreign aid as a means to an end that appears to have recognized only what was good for the American people alone without taking into consideration what the people of the Middle East also felt was important and then trying to arrive at an approach which would be suited to the goals of all concerned.¹⁶¹

¹⁶¹Montgomery states that much of the activity of American aid is performed not for the benefit of the present host government, but for that of its successors. Therefore he feels that many times people tend to misinterpret what U.S. foreign aid is really intended on doing given enough time. What may seem momentarily unimportant or unpalatable to the current regime may nevertheless have to remain high on the American list of priorities. Concern for the "next governments" represents an important element in American aid operations even though the aid programs as a whole tend to support existing regimes. For further details see Chapter VI. *op. cit.*, p. 249. Also relevant is "The Operational Aspects of United States Foreign Policy," a study prepared at the request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, in United States Foreign Policy Doc. No. 24, 87th Cong. 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 1961), pp. 31-40.

Thus is a growing school of thought that postulates that unless the United States changes the orientation of its foreign aid program, so that it does not appear to be working against the best interests of the American people, or the aspiring objectives of the people of the Middle East, it is questionable whether continued aid, given in the context in which it has been given, will do more harm than good, not only to the peoples of receiving countries but toward the potential good, throughout the world, that could be stimulated by the United States of America.¹⁶²

On the other hand, from a realistic point of view, the United States will undoubtedly use aid to further any political objectives in the Middle East that it may choose to pursue. However, the point here lies in the fact that political considerations do not necessarily have to be the backbone of the United States foreign aid program in the Middle East--the primary motivator in deciding what countries will receive from the standpoint of economic assistance.

In this brief review of the United States Foreign Aid Program to the United Arab Republic, a Middle East

¹⁶²Nancy Balfour, "A Generation of U.S. Aid," The World Today (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, July 1964), p. 304.

country having felt the effects of the political aspects of United States economic assistance, it is understandable why Congress in the past has fixed riders to foreign aid bills, designed to fix detailed conditions for the receipt of aid. This has been due to the United States using aid as an arm of United States foreign policy primarily to stop the spread of Communism. It has, therefore, been natural for Congress to resent it when recipients of aid have voted against the United States in the United Nations or insist on remaining neutral in the argument with the Communist World-- or even dealing with them. Yet, if (according to Secretary Johnson) aid is supposed to build up political stability with resulting independence this must be expected.¹⁶³

As Nancy Balfour suggests one future foreign policy approach is a change in United States foreign aid orientation. Elements of the American society appear to be getting tired of giving money away for aid while being told that the United States is doing so to fight Communism and then watch the pro-Communist activities of aid recipients. Though the intent of foreign aid would remain the

¹⁶³Ibid., p. 302.

same the spirit in which it would be given might change. Increased emphasis could be placed in the areas of administration and in using economic assistance to stimulate future trade agreements.

GENERAL GUIDELINES OF FOREIGN AID DEVELOPMENT:

To begin with, in the conviction that aid for development should be a continuing part of the foreign policy of the United States not only to maintain a dominant position over the Soviet Union but to participate actively in the economic and social change occurring in the Middle East, three basic guidelines for the future can be made regarding the use of such aid.

- (1) The fact that the United States is committed to the goal of the independence of the Middle East should not cause it to confuse the ideal with its actual attainment. A truly independent Middle East would seem to offer the best promise of stability in the region, and would thus contribute to the peace and stability of the world.

But by encouraging in Middle Eastern states an inflated sense of self-importance the United States is indirectly retarding the desired achievement. Foreign aid, which is so urgently needed, may be belittled and even declined if the prospective recipient is pampered into the erroneous belief that such assistance is really without responsibility on his part. United States policy should be a realistic one and strive neither to overplay nor to underestimate the current state of a nation's development. A level appraisal of the situation cannot but prove advantageous, in the final analysis, to both sides.¹⁶⁴

For example, before carrying out various types of foreign aid projects in supplying the capital, technicians, and specialists and commodities and materials, the United States must first be concerned with the degree of literacy existing within the areas in which these projects would be initiated. This is so that the projects to be built will be able to be operated by the host countries.

¹⁶⁴Speiser, op. cit., p. 234.

Education projects should therefore be considered as some of the earliest to be established.

It must also be kept in mind that a change in one cultural item will affect other elements in the society; therefore, before the implementation of a technical program those responsible must be acquainted with the whole gamut of social relations to be aware of the far-reaching implications of any change that may be introduced. Expected reactions of the natives must be appraised toward that innovation and the possible disorganization that might offset the advantage of the new cultural item.¹⁶⁵ (as an example the use of the radio initially being condemned until it started broadcasting the Koran).

Since receiving countries will be contributing manpower and labor to United States aid projects a clear and purposeful view on the part of the receiving peoples as to what a United States development project actually involves would be highly

¹⁶⁵Hamady, op. cit., p. 232.

desirable.¹⁶⁶ Economic assistance toward development will not work if it is viewed by the people as coming automatically with the escape from colonialism or provided by a strong world power politically in order to gain the upper hand in the cold war between East and West. It would have to be recognized as coming from one people who believe in the goals and aspirations of another.

- (2) The program of economic and technological development selected should be based on criteria that are primarily economic rather than military or political—although military and political benefits may flow from it in due course. Furthermore, economic aid could be based to help alleviate certain long standing political problems such as providing needed technical skills training to Arab Refugees to help eliminate the Arab Refugee problem.¹⁶⁷ But the

¹⁶⁶ See John K. Galbraith, "A Positive Approach to Foreign Aid," Foreign Affairs, XXXIX, April, 1961, p. 230.

¹⁶⁷ According to Nadav Safran another approach to the Arab Refugees approaches the problem indirectly. If the United States were to promote to a greater extent than now the economic development of Jordan, where most of the refugees dwell, forces of the market might be likely to induce many of the younger refugees

guiding purpose should be to foster sound and steady economic development based on the best available estimates of what is absolutely required for the total population in each country and in the region as a whole.

In America's prescription for the improvement of other countries it has a tendency to advocate what exists in the United States with no critical view of its appropriateness to the situation or stage of development of the other country. As a result there is a measure of incoherence, dis-

to give up living on the dole of relief agencies and try to reconstruct their lives. The greater the economic development and the higher the standard of living outside the refugee camps, the more refugees would be induced to take advantage of the new opportunities. However, no attempt would be made to press the reluctant; nobody would be asked to renounce formally any political rights or claims against Israel. The program would be explicitly one of economic development of Jordan, not of refugee resettlement as such. "Yet, after another ten years, or maybe twenty, the bulk of the refugee problem might be on its way to solution as a result." Safran, op. cit., p. 290. However, this approach is challenged by Ellis in Challenge in the Middle East by his statement that "the Arabs are in no mood to compromise with the Jewish State. This evidence is centered on the attitude of the young Palestinian refugees. The younger generation of refugees, increasingly taking over leadership of the refugee groups, is beginning to demand a harder policy toward Israel than the Arab Governments have been employing. This attitude is based on the general Arab confidence that time is working on the Arab side; that the Arab case is becoming better understood in the West; that Jews in the U.S. are bound to grow weary of the financial effort to keep Israel afloat." pp.114-115.

continuity, dispersal of scarce energies and, inevitably, of waste. These will improve only when the United States begins seriously to ask what is needed--when targets are established and attention becomes focused on what is required to reach them.¹⁶⁸

The targets selected would be primarily economic but designed primarily to

- (1) make a specified gain in national income.
- (2) make a specified improvement in its distribution.
- (3) make a specified advance in literacy
- (4) make a specified improvement in education.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁸ Galbraith, op. cit., p. 231. Channeling future aid projects through the auspices of private American enterprise, working in partnership with Middle Eastern business, might put the finger of blame more specifically on those responsible for failure, resulting in the non-payment of services rendered until the specifications of a project had been satisfactorily met. This approach will be discussed later in this chapter.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 234.

In selecting targets, evaluations should take place concerning such questions as (1) why should the project be done at all? (2) why should it be done in this way? (3) why now? (4) why all of it? (5) will other supporting projects be necessary.¹⁷⁰

By this method of targets there will be a way of measuring outlay and adherence to schedules. Failures will be explained and responsibility pinpointed. Every project would be designed to try and catch the imagination of the receiving country and attract the energies of that country. Education should be accelerated at the same pace as economic projects--of a sufficient long-range and permanent nature. From this should evolve social reform.

A country must want to have this type of assistance. It cannot be forced. It must be remembered that the awareness of mistrust among Arabs makes it hard for them to believe others easily and produces in them a certain defensive attitude. "No one can scratch my back but my own two fingers" and "In adversities one has no brother

¹⁷⁰Thornburg, op. cit., p. 239.

and no friend" reveal a resultant rejection of accepting aid from others and an adjustment to his lack of belief in others by a denial of his need for them.¹⁷¹ Yet under such a system the United States could begin to measure the results of its foreign aid and make necessary corrections for the future.¹⁷² not all entirely politically oriented.

(3) A third guideline is impartiality. A basic purpose of foreign economic aid is to strengthen the Middle East generally; that the United States wishes to see progress rather than stagnation and unrest in all states of the area-allies and neutrals. The aim is to support a program that reaches and serves the peoples of the Middle East, not necessarily over the heads of their governments but, insofar as possible and reasonable, without regard to the political views of governments. However, it is recognized that the application of this principle will vary from country to country and will not always be able to be applied to every situation that the United States faces in the Middle East.

¹⁷¹Hamady, op. cit., p. 102.

¹⁷²Galbraith, op. cit., p. 236.

Yet, a striving for impartiality is an important consideration for in the final analysis, no matter what the United States says its actions speak louder than its words. When the United States or its allies, with its approval, arms Israel with the avowed purpose of making the two and one-half million Jews there stronger than the close to 100 million Arabs surrounding that country, America is not presenting the picture of an impartial country, no matter what it claims. When America provides West Germany with heavy arms and authorizes her to transfer one hundred million dollars worth of these arms to Israel it does not appear to be strengthening its bonds of friendship with both Israel and the Arabs but with Israel alone.¹⁷³

The United States should not profess impartiality if it is obvious from its actions that impartiality is not its intent.

¹⁷³Total official U.S. military and economic aid to Israel from 1945 to 1962 totalled two-thirds of U.S. military and economic aid given to Arab Middle Eastern countries. This calculation does not take in Turkey, Iran, Greece, and Pakistan, nor private source donations. Time, March 29, 1963.

HOW TO CHANGE: THE INITIAL STEP

Thus, keeping in mind the basic objectives of foreign aid and general guidelines outlined, particularly United States claims of impartiality, a beginning to an overall change in United States foreign aid might begin with the United States "Food For Peace" Program. Public law 480 surplus food programs could be substantially replaced by the very recent agreement of industrial countries of the world, under the Kennedy Round of Trade Negotiations, to provide a food-aid program of wheat and other grains multi-laterally. This agreement of major industrial importers and exporters linked a food-aid program to an accord regulating international trade in grains. In participating in this program the United States Government will share the burden in the future of getting food to nations requiring assistance while having, simultaneously, gains from importing nations buying more wheat from the United States to help in the providing of this assistance. By major industrial countries agreeing on both a new international minimum wheat price and a joint-multi-lateral program of food-aid United States agriculture is expected to benefit as the

United States is expected to shoulder 42% of the 4.5 million ton program in the future. At the same time the United States will be participating in a multi-lateral program of consumable commodity assistance and will not be as susceptible as in the past to future charges of using its "Food For Peace" program for strictly political ends.¹⁷⁴

The United States stockpile of surplus food--particularly wheat, coarse grains, butter, cheese, skim milk, tobacco, and cotton, is estimated to cost nearly 1,000,000 per annum to hold.¹⁷⁵ These commodities, if needed by other parts of the world, should be provided them but through a multi-lateral means. This will continue to allow United States farmers to produce and will not cause the United States Government to have to increase payments to the farmer for non-production. It has been estimated that unless the world learns to feed itself there will be world famine in less than 20 years.¹⁷⁶ Until now free food

¹⁷⁴"Tariff Talks Near End As Agreements Are Set on Food Aid and Grains," New York Times, May 15, 1967, p.1.
"Kennedy Round Past Deadline," New York Times, May 16, 1967. p. 1.

¹⁷⁵Balfour, op. cit., p. 302.

¹⁷⁶Time, op. cit., pp. 42-43.

generally given under the "Food For Peace" Program--Public Law 480, has depressed foreign markets, discouraged their farmers, and in essence has made nations receiving support under this program victims of "food imperialism". In effect the Food For Peace program was so explicitly designed to let the United States get rid of its surpluses that it neglected to encourage foreign agriculture.¹⁷⁷

Thus, by shifting the emphasis of foreign aid from intangible, consumable, "here today gone tomorrow" assistance to more tangible lasting projects which will be accomplished directly under the joint supervision and control of joint United States--Middle Eastern agencies, the United States will be taking a major step in trying to divorce economic aid from the politics of a country and will appear to be putting forth aid for the sake of economic assistance alone and not as a means of political manipulation.

¹⁷⁷Ibid.

Following this, on a more strict basis than in the past, the United States, in order to show that the Americans accept foreign aid as something desirable from the standpoint of a country who has gone through her period of economic growth and who is now willing to help other countries going through the same development that she went through, would provide money, materials, and technical supervision for public welfare works that will overtly be for the general and overall use of all the peoples of the countries in which they are being established, such as dams, public schools, hydro-electric projects, universities,¹⁷⁸ agricultural projects confined to a specific area of a country, like a TVA project, and not scattered all over a country so that it will appear to all that the United States has contributed in a particular place along a particular specific line. (An example of this is the Near East Foundation Project in Iran centered entirely in a small area in the southwestern part of the

¹⁷⁸For an Arab view on U.S. "soft good" foreign aid as opposed to more permanent lasting projects see "The Uselessness of American Aid," Arab World, September 23, 1954, p. 6.

country.) Nothing specific need be asked from these projects--the manner and spirit in which they are done would be all that is necessary to show countries of the Middle East that the United States has no "imperialistic" aim in the Middle East but that it is interested first and foremost in attempting to help the people of the area attain their objectives, goals, and their aspirations. The red flag of Communism need not be continually waved in the face of these people and they need not be coerced into taking sides in an East-West battle line.¹⁷⁹

MODUS OPERANDI: COOPERATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS

To-date even though one of the main objectives of United States foreign aid has been to relieve the poverty and promote the economic well-being of the Arab countries to render them less vulnerable to communist infiltration there are certain limitations that have

¹⁷⁹Balfour, op. cit., p. 304.

been set by the inherent nature of the American economic system itself.

One of these has been that the percentage of profit in investment possibilities abroad has not been of sufficient strength to encourage private American capital spending. Egypt and Iran, as examples, have been too risky for the amount of profit available.¹⁸⁰ In an effort to utilize the private sector more effectively in an aim of foreign aid in the future the United States might adopt the following:

- (1) Embark upon a policy of underwriting business investments abroad that invest or venture into an area with a service or product deemed by the United States Government to be vitally necessary for the economic development of a particular country or area. The stipulation would be made, that said business would go into partnership with a Middle Eastern firm so that business experience would be derived from the United States firm and the local economy would become a recipient in profits shared,

¹⁸⁰ M.S. Agwani, The United States and the Arab World. Aligarh: Muslim University, 1955, p. 110.

primarily in the form of future investment by the local Middle Eastern firm.¹⁸¹

- (2) Open bids to private American firms for the construction of United States foreign aid projects abroad. Not only would this open up a wider avenue for United States business internationally but it would put the burden of responsibility upon a particular American company, though working in conjunction with local Middle Eastern firms, as target dates, errors in non-compliance with

¹⁸¹ Commerce Department offices around the country ask businessmen in their areas what they'd like to see abroad. Meanwhile reports from abroad show what products are needed where. A trade mission is organized composed of 5-6 American business men and two men from the Department of Commerce. Mission members must be expert in a specific business area; have experience in foreign trade; give promise of being good ambassadors. After several briefings they fly to the host country where United States Embassy officials have been lining up businessmen with proposals they want to discuss.

Members of the mission must do business for themselves and their competitors in the U.S.A. An exchange of technical information is effected and often joint ventures between U.S. companies and companies in the host countries result. Technical and business problems can often jointly be solved and businessmen from both countries can broaden their knowledge and learn to understand each other. "A Government Business Team That Works," Readers Digest, December 1963, pp. 111-114.

specifications, exceeding budgets. Max Thornburg has stated that one big problem with overseas economic projects in the past is that there has been no definite chain of responsibility established the conduct of these projects to pinpoint where something or somebody has erred¹⁸². Under a bid contracting system a United States firm awarded a contract for a overseas United States aid project would be required by the very nature of the contract he bid upon to meet the demands of said contract, with the owness of responsibility falling directly to him if specifications were not met.

- (3) Establish training programs for foreign nations engaged in operating completed projects in their respective countries upon the withdrawal of the American contractor. Therefore, during the course of work on a particular project on-the-job training programs could be conducted by the American contractor, in cooperation with his Middle Eastern partner,

¹⁸²Thornburg, op. cit., p. 238-239.

preparing personnel to be able to carry on with the operation of a particular project in the future.¹⁸³

Using the approach of an American firm working in partnership with a Middle Eastern firm, on a 50-50 profit share basis regarding a particular foreign aid project, might show the people of the Middle East that the United States is making an effort to work at the level of the people through private business and not on a government to government basis or on a business and Middle Eastern government basis.¹⁸⁴ If effective it would be more different to make the charge that United States business had allied itself with feudal and reactionary regimes in the Middle East in order to exploit their peoples

¹⁸³"In the past U.S. planning missions have offered detailed instruction as to what should be done and then often left the host country with the far more difficult task of execution being left with the host country. Therefore, U.S. presence in the country in charge of a project until its completion, is a more feasible approach. Simultaneously personnel from that country would be trained for future operation." Qalbraith, op. cit., p. 234.

¹⁸⁴David Bell, Director of the Agency For International Development in discussing foreign aid to developing countries stresses the United States strong support of the private sector in developing countries. In stressing this the U.S. Government is learning to draw more effectively in resources available in the private sector of the United States. "Continually searching for better ways in which

and prevent economic and social progress. To the charge that United States business is exploiting a particular country any United States firm working on a United States government aid project could always point to its Middle Eastern partner, working together on a 50-50 profit-share basis, to show that exploitation was not its purpose in being in the Middle East. Under this system, as has been mentioned, the United States firm would have to be underwritten by the United States Government in the event that a political situation caused or forced cancellation of a certain aid project from which the specifications were not able to be satisfied through no fault of the contractor.

In essence, what the United States wants from a long-range economic program is results: economic, social, and with luck political. It does not want the headaches

to utilize the support and assistance of U.S. business abroad." For a list of some U.S. government----U.S. private sector projects in foreign countries see pp. 824-825, "Major Objectives of the Foreign Aid Program," U.S. State Department Bulletin, V. 51, No.1328, December 7, 1964.

and special responsibilities involved with identification with specific projects that may turn out badly--from the point of view of United States Government assistance per se. But if a private business partnership (American and Middle Eastern) could be used to propagate selected projects, and then later international agencies assume some of the share of necessary financial aid for extremely large projects, such as the World Bank, both sides in the recent Cold War might become satisfied and antagonisms in the Middle Eastern countries might be greatly decreased. "Political strings"--a creative so well capitalized upon and used against the United States should be eliminated, whenever possible, from long-term aid. Future aid should be given for short-terms only, renewable, with continuous appraisals of existing aid projects constantly in progress.

A SHIFT IN EMPHASIS FROM GOVERNMENT TO COMMERCE

Under such an approach, involving the American private sector into the mechanics of distributing foreign aid through contract agreements in conjunction with the

Middle Eastern private sector, opportunities for establishing closer trade ties should arise as a result.

During 1960 the total exports of the less developed areas amounted to 31 billion while the flow of financial assistance from the industrial nations amounted to 8 billion.¹⁸⁵ Therefore, trade has proven a prime factor in developing a country. Since the United States foreign economic policy is basically one of supporting the sound development and growth of less developed areas one of the most important steps it can take is supporting and promoting the growth of trade between industrial and less-developed areas. Egypt, as our case study example, with a single money crop, can never progress economically without markets and these have not been amply available in the West particularly since the United States has become a strong cotton competitor in the world market and has depressed the international price of cotton by taking a significant lead in the export of cotton. If Egypt was to progress at the ambitious rate desired by Nasser she would also have required economic aid in amounts that the West was

¹⁸⁵William Butler, "Trade and Less Developed Areas," Foreign Affairs (XXXIX, January 1963), p. 378.

not likely to provide. Therefore, Nasser's concept of "positive neutrality" was to balance the two great power blocs against each other, and to encourage rivalry between them in support of Egypt's development.

Nasser's concept seemed valid and initial indications were that it would work. But he overplayed his hand by undertaking an anti-Western campaign. He was not content with concentrating his energies on the enormous task of Egypt's internal development. While he played the game of international politics he alienated the West and thereby destroyed the hoped-for rivalry of economic competition between East and West.¹⁸⁶

As a result of this, and other similar situations that have occurred, it has been discussed that the Economic Development Program of the United States Government, in the future, to a large degree be taken out of the realm of governmental operating agencies, to reduce political conflicts, and placed in the hands of United States private

¹⁸⁶ Charles E. Zimmer, "United States Foreign Policy Toward Egypt, 1955-1960," Unpublished Masters Thesis (University Library, American University of Beirut, Lebanon), p. 132.

industry. United States private industry, working closely with foreign private industry, does not make the government the indispensable force that it is becoming in all fields of the Middle East. In taking this approach, from the point of view of trade relations, the United States government basically would be following a more commercial approach toward foreign economic development by seeking:

- (1) To orient commodity agreements to expand world trade. An objective would be to facilitate the adjustments required by free markets rather than to replace free markets with rigid controls and high prices,
- (2) To compensate less developed nations for sharp reductions in exchange earnings due to a drop in the price or export volume of commodities. The real objective is to maintain the ability of these nations to import, and thus support their domestic development. It may be better to lend them the money directly to minimize the impact of fluctuating export earnings than to go into the indirect and exceedingly difficult process of

stabilizing commodity prices.¹⁸⁷

- (3) To stand to maintain the reduction of United States tariffs and quotas on a number of primary products which the United States subsidizes internally within the United States which, if exported from under developed countries, would result in increased earnings for that area.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁷Butler, loc. cit.

¹⁸⁸If the United States is to be a leader in reducing tariffs to the extent required it would have to give up the "no damage" rule in making tariff adjustments. This means that it would have to have machinery available, as the Common Market countries now have, for dealing with internal problems of distress resulting from import competition in some areas. According to Neal inasmuch as the United States needs this machinery anyway for dealing with much larger domestic problems of technological change, changes in demand and shifts in industrial location, the special provision dealing with change due to import competition could probably be incorporated into a general measure dealing with distressed areas and displaced workers. Neal, op. cit., p. 250.

The Johnson Administration does not appear to be concerned over the resulting employment that could come as a result of tariff reductions for, as a result of the Kennedy Round of Tariff Negotiations, tariffs in the United States have been reduced by an average of 30% over the 1967 - 1972 period. Thousands of tariffs have been cut in half and others eliminated entirely. Thus, smaller industrial countries will be able to more readily market their products in the United States. New York Times, May 15, 1967, p. 3.

The inevitable result of these recommendations would be that the less developed nations will increasingly become able to sell more and more manufactured products to the United States and other industrial nations on a very competitive basis. Thus, a move toward stronger trade ties.

Another school of thought considers that "one way free trade" to underdeveloped areas would provide necessary stimulation economically to developing nations.¹⁸⁹ The United States would accept without tariff or other restrictions both the primary and industrial products offered by the developing nations, at the same time allowing them to set up tariffs and other devices to protect their infant industries. This is just a more controlled way of expending foreign aid. Countries on the receiving end would have to agree to:

1. Not flooding any one industrial country with any one type of good.

¹⁸⁹ Neal, op. cit., p. 252.

2. Allowing infant industries to grow as fast as possible so that the tariff could quickly be reduced and healthy competition transpire.

Conversely, the greater the export earnings of the less developed nations the more likely they are to buy from the United States as an industrial nation and one which has the most and varied technological and consumer products and close economic ties with them. In this way the United States can advance its own needs (not have to subsidize certain products anymore) while providing support needed to enable less developed nations to achieve self-sustaining economic growth. World trade is a very good way to support the economic development of both industrial and developing nations in order to achieve the broad objectives which the free world seeks.

In time, with a sufficiently large and successful aid program conducted by the West and the United States on a multilateral basis the Soviets could come under pressure to modify its own program, preferably in the direction of joining multilateral institutions. Therefore, while the United States still has complete freedom

of action, it might well consider developing multilateral aid arrangements on a basis that will promote a liberal and open trade and payments system.

The object of the foregoing proposals is to strengthen the industrial countries of the West, to hasten economic growth in the underdeveloped countries while drawing them into the economic trade system of the West, and to close off as many opportunities as possible for the Soviet Union to make trouble. In suggesting that the United States might well consider adopting a national agricultural program that would permit world prices to be effective domestically, Neal sums up current world pricing by stating that

To subsidize foreign producers by means of United States domestic prices and then to subsidize foreign buyers by cut-rate price sales in the world market, as the United States has done with cotton, seems not only to be bad foreign economic policy but slow suicide for both domestic users and producers. ¹⁹⁰

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE:

In a discussion of foreign aid to developing Middle Eastern nations the question of arms support must be considered along with other facets of economic support due to past and present Soviet arms support to Middle Eastern countries beginning with the Czech Arms Deal of 1956.

The United States Government has in the past contributed arms through various types of foreign aid programs to various Middle Eastern Governments and there are going to be unquestionably times in the future when the United States Government will determine that it is in the best interests of the American people to supply military arms and support to certain Middle Eastern Governments in the face of certain developing political situations.

WHY MILITARY AID?

In giving military aid to other countries, the objective of the United States has been to promote its short-range and long-range security within the evolving structure of international politics and to help preserve

recipient countries from other than peaceful change.¹⁹¹ To this end the United States is anxious not only to retain control over its foreign aid policy but also to influence the political behavior and international alignment of the recipient. Therefore, by the very nature of the military assistance, the United States finds itself involved in domestic and international politics of receiving countries.

Because of the ambiguity of definition between categories of United States aid (military assistance versus defense support)¹⁹² there has been no assured way to distinguish clearly between economic and military aid or to determine and control the right proportion between the two kinds of aid. Thus, it is all the more important to develop policy criteria for who gets aid and for what purposes.

The first, a relatively indiscriminate way, would be to give aid to whoever applies for it and accepts nominal terms. The second, a restrictive way, would be to give aid only to countries aligning themselves politically with the giver in an unmistakable fashion. And the third, somewhere in between if closer to the first way, would seek

¹⁹¹ Lisk, op. cit., p. 68.

¹⁹² Ibid., p. 66.

to be selective in terms of criteria having to do with achievement, performance, or situation.

In the past, on the face of it, United States foreign aid policy fits clearly none of these categories. The policy claims to be selective and impartial, but in fact relatively indiscriminate offers of aid--expressly made or implicit in past practice of wide-open access to aid--have tended to result in an aid relationship whenever a government has accepted the terms of the mutual security legislation.¹⁹³

There appears to be no foolproof criterion of the "right" proportion of economic to military aid with respect to either the defense needs of a country or its capacity to sustain a military establishment. The answer depends on subjective estimates of the nature of the Communist and Soviet threat, both locally and in general. And even if it were possible to determine a right proportion between economic and military aid it would be difficult for the aid-giving country to control the ratio. Members of Congress criticized the fact that military assistance and defense support constituted two-thirds---and pure military aid little less than one-half---of total aid under the

¹⁹³ Mutual Security Act of 1958, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 85 Congress, 2 sess., pp. 156, 159.

Mutual Security Act of 1958. In his reply Secretary Dulles did not hesitate to place the blame on the recipient countries stating that it is they who tend to over-emphasize the military component; they want both visible security in the form of an effective military establishment and visible prestige in the form of modern weapons.¹⁹⁴

The United State's fears today that if it reduces arms supplies to developing countries the Soviet Union will step in and provide the necessary arms, such as occurred with Egypt in 1956, and the United States will have lost a potential ally. Furthermore the United States cannot very

¹⁹⁴An example of this can be found in the writings of Emile Bustani. Speaking from the Arab point of view Bustani explains that the Arab countries don't understand how they, the descendants of an all-conquering race, should be limited in armaments to the level achieved by the usurpers (Israel) who, with Western complexity, established a homeland in Arab territory. (op. cit.), p. 138

"The Arabs, for better or for worse, suffer from a permanent inferiority complex in relation to the arms issue. They are fully convinced that there is a general Western conspiracy to keep them weaker than the Israelis rather than on a defensive par with them." Bustani's suggestion, realizing that the Arab nations do not need to build up a large defense force at the present, is that the United States should stop supplying arms not only to the Arabs but to Israel and channel that money into more constructive things. "If the Arab countries and Israel go to the USSR then Russia will find herself in the Middle such as the United States has done." "Postscript to the West," Middle East Forum, V. 59, July, 1959, p. 45.

well renig on previous arms agreements that it has made with countries such as Turkey, Iran, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.

ARMS SUPPORT TO THE ARABS AND THE JEWS

By far one of the biggest sources of irritation to the Arab countries today is the United States arms support to the State of Israel. The United States today is the primary stimulus for the arms race between the Arabs and the Jews which, in the words of Alfred Lilienthal, "neither side can afford."¹⁹⁵ The United States claims to give arms in order to prevent an arms imbalance, and thus discourage aggression by either side.¹⁹⁶ While this arms buildup presumably makes renewal of hostilities catastrophic for both sides it has not deterred Israel, as was made clearly evident in the Suez Crisis of 1956 when Israel, disregarding the appeals of President Eisenhower invaded the Sinai Peninsula and Eastern part of Egypt. Israel also made clear in 1966 that she was ready to use her arms actively

¹⁹⁵Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 113.

¹⁹⁶Safran hypothesizes that the longer the present non-violent stalemate continues, the better chances are that the Arabs may reconcile themselves to her existence. Therefore, the United States maintains an arms balance to discourage aggression on either side and this maintains the status quo. See also Chapter 15 for details on the attempts at maintaining a balance between the Arabs and the Israelis. (op. cit., p. 269).

against Arab countries when a brigade-sized retaliatory Israeli Army attack was made against a Jordanian village over Arab guerrilla raids into Israel.¹⁹⁷

The United States Government's concept of supplying one side and then the other with arms in quantities to keep a balance and thus both sides fearful of each other may work in theory but it does not appear to solve the existing problems.

On the contrary it appears to make the situation more critical as Israel, feeling that she has the far better military capability, continues to make numerous ground attacks each which could become an international affair directly affecting the United States and the Soviet Union. On the other hand a continual arms supply goads the extreme Arab nationalists into launching border forays, or even provoking an eventual war, which in itself could turn into an international incident. The Arabs have the numbers but the Jews have the highly organized and trained Israeli military machine which, as experience has shown in 1948 and 1956 could probably overwhelm the Arab forces if the problem did not first become an international affair.

¹⁹⁷New York Times, November 13, 1966, p. 1.

The United States active participation/^{as}a key supplier of arms in the Middle East arms race can easily be viewed as a dangerous thing.

Also sooner or later it is possible that the enormous human and material potential of the Arab world will overtake a society in which the physical accomplishments even now do not surpass those of the neighboring Arab countries. The race, by sheer force of numbers and land area, is unequal and even if no moralities were involved, wise statemanship in Israel and the United States would recognize the closing gap. For if that gap is closed while the present bitterness is built into the emergent, new character of the rest of the Middle East, then Israel's only hope will be the active intercession of a great power.¹⁹⁸ And certainly no one wants to advocate American military intervention on behalf of Israel sometime in the future against the Arab World and any allies that it may have at that time.

APPROACH FOR THE FUTURE:

Though the United States does not look favorably upon the Soviet Union supplying arms to the Middle Eastern

¹⁹⁸Berger, op. cit., p. 101.

countries the United States continuance of this practice certainly will not deter the Soviet Union from any arms supplying that it might want to engage in no matter how many arms the United States feels obligated to supply. But there is room for positive conjecture that the United States might be somewhat more utilitarian in the future on arms deals that it would make with various countries of the Middle East just for the sake of an arms balance. Moreover the United States has bi-lateral agreements with several Middle Eastern countries which promise immediate American military intercession if these countries are attacked by an outside source.¹⁹⁹ As an alternate to

¹⁹⁹As an example, the United States signed on March 5, 1959 at Ankara, Turkey, with the Governments of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan bi-lateral Agreements of Cooperation. These agreements were developed pursuant to the declaration signed on July 28, 1958 by the Governments participating in the Baghdad Pact Ministerial Council session at London. The final paragraph of that declaration stated: "Article I of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955 provides that the parties will cooperate for their security and defense and will promptly enter into agreements designed to give effect to this cooperation." Paul E. Zimmer (ed.), Documents on American Foreign Relations 1959, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), pp. 396-397. See also Department of State Bulletin, V. 40 (March 23, 1959), pp. 416-417 and Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1957, pp. 206-207.

supplying costly quantities of arms to other Middle Eastern states the United States could make it absolutely clear that, if requested by the recognized government of a particular country, it will come to the assistance of any Middle Eastern state which is subjected to planned all-out aggression by another external state in the event that the United Nations is unable to move on the situation. This assistance would remain in effect until the United Nations was able to step in and permit the United States to channel any further support through the auspices of that organization.²⁰⁰

What the United States can do military wise, in the future, through programs of Counter-Insurgency and Civic Action, is to provide the necessary military

²⁰⁰This mutual defense assurance would not have to take the form of a Tri-Partite Agreement or an Eisenhower Doctrine but a diplomatic agreement similar to the ones listed above. This would help the United States, in the words of Elmer Berger, to deal with the State of Israel as more like another state of the Middle East. The United States can overtly adopt a more impartial stance toward countries of the Middle East if "the United States would not address Israel as if it were something particularly special in the Middle East to be differentiated from her surrounding neighbors." op. cit., p. 71.

advisory stimulus and funds for developing peacetime, nation building, economic programs utilizing the large military manpower forces of various Middle Eastern nations. The United States Government has already embarked upon programs of Counter-Insurgency training for specialized military units in some Middle Eastern countries assisting them in developing their own programs of utilizing conscript and regular army units to conduct civic action projects throughout the various regions of their respective countries. Working on a "grass Roots" basis in villages throughout countries of the Middle East, (Iran as an example) this tremendous pool of young manpower can effectively work to help the people of Middle Eastern countries to help themselves and thereby help build political solidification of diverse elements of populations toward the central governments of these Middle Eastern states. Army personnel, working with village and tribal elements in developing for the peasant class, basic skills of production and economic growth, will also assist in the unifying of various segments of the populations of Middle Eastern states toward their respective governments which will lead to more of a degree of political, economic, and social stability which, in effect, is one of the

long-range goals of the United States in the Middle East, for her own security against the spread of Communism, if not for the security also of the inhabitants of the Middle East.

CONCLUSION:

In concluding this discussion of the value of the political approach versus the purely economic approach to foreign aid in the Middle East it has been established that the United States as a nation must participate in the economic and social development of countries of the area in order to contribute to political stability which, in turn, will create less of a fertile ground for the development of Soviet objectives in the area. Theoretically, this is undoubtedly true and perhaps this is by far the best policy for the United States to follow in view of long-term objectives of Middle Eastern economic, social, and political stability. But for the moment we must avoid an easy equation of socio-economic development equalling political stability in the Middle East. In the fifties the United States believed that military assistance and alignment were the only answers for political stability. America found that this concept was not

realistically attainable. Now, according to R.K. Ramazani, it is possible that the United States will expose itself to fresh disillusionment if it assumes that socio-economic development will automatically lead to a kind of political stability conducive to the maintenance of United States interests in the Middle East.

"The processes of industrialization, urbanization, rapid communications, and education may assist the closing of the gap between the few "haves" and the many "have nots" by giving rise to a middle class. By this it is hoped that more stable regimes will be eventually encouraged by the opportunity of an ever-growing participation of the people in their government. But in the near future all of our attempts at assisting these countries in their modernization efforts most probably will tend more frequently to aggravate instability than to insure stability. Our aid accelerates the tempo of change, gives rise to new groups, creates new desires and aspirations, and increases demands on the existing regimes which they are not always capable of meeting. This situation is compounded by the deep-seated internal problems of the Middle East itself, such as the adjustments between Islam and the Twentieth Century "West." The outward manifestations of such conflicts take the form of political and/or military strife."²⁰¹

For this reason the United States will always need to find some recourse in trying to deal with political, social, and economic change occurring as a

²⁰¹R. K. Ramazani, "Changing United States Policy," Virginia Quarterly Review, 1964, p. 375.

result of its and the Soviet Union's efforts in the Middle East to achieve their respective goals, in support of their own national interests, by the use of economic support leading to social readjustments which, in turn, is supposed to eventually lead to political stability. Therefore, the United States finds itself, today and in the future, forced to consider the use and handling of a part of its foreign aid program in response to a political move on the part of a Middle Eastern country that the United States considers in direct conflict not only to the national interests of the American people but in direct conflict to the interests of a large body of the populace of the Middle East. The crux of this particular point does not lie in each of the individual foreign aid responses to political factors existing within countries of the Middle East but rather in the danger that our entire foreign aid program could become nothing more than a reactionary force built around United States response to political situations occurring in the future that were not entirely complementary to the goals of the United States. This would place the United States on the defensive and would not allow it to exercise its economic potential "positively" in order to create economic situations over a long period of time that would not

foster political situations not in the interests of the United States.

What is meant by this is that the United States can create more good for herself and for the people of the Middle East by a basically positive, more realistically impartial political approach toward the handling of foreign aid, placing it where it will be the most useful at a given point in time, to the greatest number of people in keeping with her policy of making the various areas of the Middle East less fertile to Soviet penetration. The President's 1960 report to Congress concluded that many forms of United States economic aid "must continue for as long as the Communist threat exists, and certainly until greater economic progress has been made in underdeveloped nations."²⁰² This statement suggests that if the communist threat subsides before progress is made that it will be the latter that provides the motivation for continued aid. If this statement proves to be true it, in itself, will show the peoples of the Middle East that the United States does have more than a hard-line political view toward economic assistance and that it is, in fact, attempting to participate creatively in the development of economic and social institutions in the Middle East today.

²⁰² Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program for the Second Half of Fiscal Year 1959, Department of State Publication 6926 (Washington: GPO), p. 7.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS

From this cursory discussion of some political and economic approaches to future American Foreign policy in the Middle East it perhaps has become clear to the reader that basically the crisis today arises not from a quarrel between states but from a clash between civilizations, manifested by political discord between nations. Civilizations can have no foreign policy but governments must, and in the Middle East the United States faces compelling problems. "The problem of polygamy doesn't lie in the ability of one man to keep four wives happy. The trouble is that everytime you fight with one wife the other three jump in and you must handle all four together."²⁰³ This is the United States's problem in the Middle East. If it could isolate the situations which it faces and deal with them one by one it is probable that some kind of a conclusion could be

²⁰³John Badeau, op. cit., p. 71.

reached. But because all countries insist on fighting together it is found to be extremely difficult and confusing to unravel the situation.

What follows are a series of propositions, which seem to the author to be the essential features of the present situation in the Arab lands, a compilation of general, mainly political, and economic factors, and considerations/^{that} could be determinants in the formulation of future United States policy.

GENERAL PROPOSITIONS:

Since 1955 the Middle East has ceased to be an area of exclusive Western influence. It is not likely to become so again.

By revulsion from more than a century and a half of Western influence and domination, by reaction against Western leadership in every significant field of human endeavour, the Arab attitude to the West is generally hostile. In contrast, the Arab attitude to Russia, not colored by any previous record of relations, is more emotionally neutral.

This being so, in any struggle for positions of power and influence, with Russia and the United States using the same political and economic means, Russia has a great initial advantage psychologically.

This advantage is reinforced by the familiar and intelligible authoritarian methods and political style of the Russians, as contrasted with the unfamiliar and, to most Arabs, unintelligible democratic processes of the United States.

However, as the Russians become involved in the Middle East, they are losing their initial advantages, and are encountering some of the suspicions, resentments and frustrations familiar to their Western predecessors and counterparts.

The Arab countries are going through a profound crisis in their history, causing a period of economic, social, and political instability. This crisis, though it may be exploited by communists, is not caused by them.

In Arab eyes, this crisis is caused by the West. The Middle East is just now beginning to develop. The leaders of the Middle East themselves are dealing with

a new Middle East just now actively and successfully aware of its own ways and means for self - determination and political independence. The people are becoming aware that a new way of life is available to them if their government will pursue the courses of action that will bring it to them. There is a stirring of a new demand on the part of common people against their own governments for a way of life vitally different from that of the past. Since the West has materially what the people of the Middle East would like to have they feel that they are being exploited by the West, in view of recent history, in order for the West to maintain its economically superior position over the developing countries of the world.

There are signs that the crisis of anti-Western hostility may be passing its peak.²⁰⁴ Special care is needed not to provoke a relapse.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Viewed from a political stand point it is proposed that the United States, in the future, employ the following

²⁰⁴Lewis, op. cit., p. 138.

approaches in developing basic American policy in the Middle East.

First, as a necessary preliminary to the solution of the Arab crisis, the interests of both the people of the United States and the Middle East, call for a political neutralization of the great powers from the Middle East. This would mean, as much as is feasibly possible in view of the national security of the United States, an attempt at great power political neutralization from the countries of the Middle East by an intensive means of United States program of economic support through the means of private enterprise. As long as the Cold War continues, the West must safeguard certain minimum positions in and near the Arab world, and must be faithful to military and political agreements previously made with Arab and non-Arab countries of the Middle East. However, future political alining agreements should be kept to the absolute minimum possible and, on an agreed definition, should be treated as the combined interests previously established by Western countries who are members of Western defense agreements. Apart from this the United States should, inasmuch as is realistically possible disengage from Arab politics,

and in particular from inter-Arab politics. This need not harm and might help normal commercial relations, which on the whole are as important to the Arabs as to the West. Only when the United States has remained aloof from the Middle Eastern political arena has her prestige been high in the Middle East.²⁰⁵ This prestige has been further enhanced by philanthropic endeavors such as schools and education. The United States must attempt by all possible means to shy away from political situations in which it finds itself the middle man.

On the other hand, it would be naive to think that the United States, in the future, would not lend its weight to a political move in the Middle East if that particular political move, on the part of a particular Middle East country, were in the best interests of the people of the United States by helping to further a basic United States interest in the Middle East. Reasonably so, the United States continually must keep in mind what any one of the Middle Eastern states would do if the "shoe was on the other foot" and the United

²⁰⁵ Nabih Amin Faris, *The Image of America in the Near East* (Beirut: American University, 1961), p.6.

States was in the position of a developing nation vis-a-vis a Middle Eastern great world power.

With the adaption of a less politically oriented policy the United States would not necessarily find itself in a position where it was continually supporting the status quo, or the more conservative regimes, in the face of the more liberal if the more liberal were not violating the national interests of the United States in the Middle East. Recent willingness of the United States to accept the "positive neutrality" of various countries of the area at face value has tended to improve the image of the United States in this area of the World, while simultaneously, Soviet political maneuvering in the Middle East, particularly since 1955, coupled with her oil offensive into Western Europe, has cut into the Soviet image in the Middle East.²⁰⁶

Also this self-imposed neutralization approach would end the sterile and relatively unsuccessful political opposition to the Soviet Union which has formed the basis of United States actions in the Middle East since World War II, as if the Russians and the Israelis were

²⁰⁶ Hoskins, op. cit., p. 285.

the only people who really mattered. It would allow the cold war confrontation between the United States and Russia in the Middle East to move to the economic arena where the United States has a decidedly upper-hand provided that her economic assistance program is properly oriented and executed. In essence this means, to the maximum extent possible under the realistic determinants of a constantly evolving Middle Eastern political situation, an impartial responsiveness to extend economic and technical assistance, under clear-cut conditions, with a de-emphasis on political strings. This would overtly signify, to the Arabs particularly, that the United States recognizes the Arabs achievement of independence and that, as a result, they themselves have become one of the most important ends of United States policy in the Arab world.

Also in adapting an approach of political neutralization the United States would be heading, more than ever before, on a clear and independent foreign policy tact independent of Great Britain and other former European colonialist powers.

George Lenczowski sums up this argument in "The Middle East in World Affairs" by saying that "the

United States should not subscribe to the outmoded notions of the previous colonialist powers such as Britain and France. One may well ask whether the American ideals of democracy and self-determination have not too often been subordinated to the expediency of maintaining the 'Western Alliance,' thus robbing American policy of the moral advantage that it once possessed and that it might well try to regain itself by these ideals in the present revolutionary era in the Middle East."²⁰⁷

Since the late 1950's the United States has become more independent from such former imperialistic manifestations as military bases, pacts and treaties, ownership of canals and overt continuation of American oil companies per se.²⁰⁸ Encouraging the avoidance of foreign entanglements of any kind politically allows the people of the Middle East to feel that they are pursuing for themselves political and social justice without the coercion of foreign pressures. The United States meanwhile might well be able to exert the pressures necessary, and create the climate necessary,

²⁰⁷Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 536.

²⁰⁸Stevens, op. cit., p. 150.

to help repel the threat of Communism-Soviet penetration by its economic program centered around private enterprise. However, it is vitally important that the social structure of the Middle East, as derived from Islam, be understood by United States policy makers in order to know exactly when and how to promote private enterprise and when to promote large Point IV Government deals. As the Middle East changes in a rapidly developing society the United States must take advantage of situations occurring in order to be able to capitalize on the moment.

Secondly, though the United States should become more economically than politically involved in the Middle East in the future, it must not become so "dollar and cents" conscious that it overlooks the ideology aspects of the American way of life. Charles Malik, speaking at the American University of Beirut, Lebanon on 28 July 1966 stated that the United States is often too concerned with social and economic considerations, such as the raising of the GNP of a country and education entirely. "The United States acts as if man lives by bread alone and doesn't push United States ideology enough along with foreign aid." As a result the "Middle East borrows the

'shell' of the West without the 'kernel'. It borrows constitutions of the West without the humanist values. Soviet ideology is more defined in the Middle East than that of the West."

In attempting to put Malik's ideas into constructive action the United States must realize that its democratic process must be somewhat revised for the different inherent problems of the present-day Middle Eastern countries. It must support adjustments to the basic democratic theory of government for each Middle East government in order to counter the dictatorship of the proletariat idea and anti-imperialism. In actuality if the United States encourages Middle Eastern governments with which it has great influence to turn American to democratic ideas, which they are unprepared to implement, and which are repugnant to the majority of their populations, it will be the fault of the United States seeking to perpetuate conditions that no group can tolerate indefinitely. The United States should attempt to facilitate changes in the region as consistent as possible with not only the ideals of the United States democratic system but put as importantly the requirements and needs of the people of the Middle East.

Thirdly, from the point of view of Arab nationalism, it would be a good thing if the United States could come to terms with this powerful force. However, it cannot be achieved, with any permanency, by coming to terms with individual national leaders, who, by the very act of coming to terms, are in danger of losing their following. It is difficult to obtain precise terms from a movement which represents a mood more than a programme. Yet, Americans must remember, and this is a factor to their advantage, that the dominant force in the world today is not Communism but nationalism as a force against Communism. Alert as Americans must remain to the very real dangers of Communism it must not be paralyzed by hypnotism into a dogmatic policy but should be ever watchful, every ready to take advantage of the opportunities that are bound to present themselves through support of a popular Arab Nationalist sentiment at a particular given point in time that does not violate any of the national interests of the United States in the area. If the United States can illustrate openly, propaganda-wise if through no other means, that the Arab nationalistic drive for political independence and unity, economic growth, and social reform are not incompatible

with United States objectives but are directed toward achieving that precisely free, strong, stable, peaceable society the United States is seeking everywhere to foster it will be enough. Independence is obviously what the Soviet Union does not have in mind for the Arab World and if the United States at least vocally would support Arab Nationalist expressions for independence in the Middle East, when they do not openly conflict with United States interests in the area, the image of the United States in the Middle East might decidedly improve.

Finally, before leaving the area of future political foreign policy considerations we must deal with perhaps the most significant and meaningful issue of all in the eyes of the inhabitants of the Middle East. That, of course, is the Palestine problem. Israel is now almost twenty years old and is generally recognized. Its continued existence, like that of any other sovereign state, has become an axiom of the present system of world politics. Though no general solution of the problem of Arab-Israel relations is in sight, it would be brought nearer if the problem could be disengaged from the conflicts of the great powers. Because in the

Arab view the United States bears the responsibility for the Arab-Israeli problem there will be no genuine friendly regard for the United States, no matter what it does, until the problem is settled or until the United States disengages itself from all support of the State of Israel. Under the circumstances the United States cannot for ever deal with both the Israelis and the Arabs without apparent prejudice either with the Arab states or with Israel. Thus, United States diplomatic and economic support of Israel can be maintained only at a price.²⁰⁹

From the Arab point of view to the Palestine problem patience is considered the most powerful weapon the Arab has in life to triumph over hardships and miseries. "In course of time the rope will cut the rock."²¹⁰ However, it is relevant to point out that the Arab is primarily a person of words rather than of actions. Much is promised and superficially planned

²⁰⁹Hoskins, op. cit., p. 262.

²¹⁰Hamady, op. cit., p. 181.

but little is carried out. The enthusiasm of the Arab for an enterprise that he launches is disproportionate to his readiness and ability to effectuate it. In regard to Palestine there is far more talk than positive action and sustaining a course of work.²¹¹ The Arabs have found an external cause for their frustrations in regard to Palestine and that cause has been the United States and the West. Thus, they place the blame for the current situation upon the United States. However, it is doubtful in the near future that the Arabs will be able to display the persistent cooperation and effective cohesion necessary to rid themselves of the Jews in Palestine by any effective means of force.

On the other hand the present degree of United States support for the State of Israel, governmental and from private United States sources, does not assist the United States in winning Arab support to other facts of foreign policy interests in the Middle East and is a continual source of propaganda material to the Soviet Union in their effort to neutralize the overall presence of the United States in the Middle East, not only from a political point of view but, more importantly, from

²¹¹Ibid., p. 215.

an economic assistance point of view to certain strategic Middle Eastern countries. There appears to be no hope on earth that the problem will be settled overnight by American leadership or any other immediately available leadership. Yet, the continued United States support of the State of Israel does not bespeak "friendship with the Arabs," regardless how many times the phrase is repeated by State Department people.

When it is asserted that the support of Israel is basic to American foreign policy it is not convincing to add that the United States also desires to maintain friendship with the Arab States, certainly not so long as the United States fails to bring about the stimulus for repatriation of the million Arabs driven out of their homes to make room for Israel.

So far as the United States is concerned there is no good reason to keep the Arabs divided and weak, or to plant a menace in their midst. America's stake in the Arab World is best protected by friendship and mutual confidence. Fear and distrust generate a threat to American interests--not security. Colonial methods are a thing of the past. Resorting to them in this day and

age will only enhance communist influence.

Nadav Safran sums up the argument by stating, "Let us remember that the United States is engaged in a gigantic struggle for the minds of men, which cannot be won with guns. The United States is presently dealing with an ideology, and no one has yet been able to destroy an ideology with a gun. An ideology can be conquered only by a better ideology. But preaching alone is not enough. It must practice what it preaches to be convincing."²¹²

The Arabs know that it is to their interest to keep Western lines of Communications open and Arab oil flowing to the West. The United Arab Republic is today deriving a substantial income from the operation of the Suez Canal, and most of this income is paid by Western shipping. Likewise the Arabs derive substantial income from Western airlines which use their airports. Surely, it is not in their interest (except in self-defense) to close the Suez Canal to Western shipping or the airports to Western air traffic.

²¹² Safran, op. cit., p. 34.

Likewise, the Arabs know that the West offers the only market for their oil. Russia is an exporter of oil, and is not yet a purchaser of theirs.

Clearly, therefore, to safeguard our interests in the Arab States, as well as those of our allies, the United States need only be fair to them. It need not resort to force. Mutual respect for mutual interests is sufficient. There is no conflict between Western and Arab interests what-so-ever. The conflict today is over Israel.

As a result the United States should seek to reduce Arab-Israeli tensions by its non-participation as a prime supplier of arms in the perpetual Arab-Israeli arms race. It should further seek practical implementation of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 as to repatriation, resettlement, and compensation. By this is meant that the United States should use its good offices to ensure that negotiations for a solution are kept in train by the United Nations even though they should last for years and even though they should prove unavailing at length.

If this approach appears to be incomplete it is because perhaps in essence it is. However, what is done is done; history cannot be relived and any wrongs, miscalculations, righted at this stage. The ultimate solution to the Palestine problem lies with the participants themselves, the Arabs and the Jews. The United States, at this point, can only participate in an approach which will help alleviate tensions as much as possible between the two parties and place the problem in the arena of the United Nations where it can be openly debated and a solution sought in an international forum.

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

Having generally discussed the overall political approaches open to the United States in a Middle Eastern policy formulation we must now turn to a final discussion of the economic alternatives best suited to future foreign policy in the area.

In general it will be far more advantageous for the United States, vis-a-vis its cold war confrontation with the Soviet Union, within the bounds of the Middle East,

to bring to bear its full energies in the economic area as opposed to the political. The reason is that, from an economic point-of-view, the United States is in a far better position to influence and assist developing countries through this means than any other available.

Russia has stated that it values trade for political reasons, not for economic reasons. If it can accomplish its objective by unorthodox means it will.

Trade by Russia with countries of the world is not necessarily bad or dangerous to United States interests or to the interests of free nations. Trade, however, which results in political domination by the Russians or the Chinese is obviously contrary to the interests of the free world.

The United States must not permit countries of the free world to fall under the political domination of the Russians through a great deal of trade. Therefore, it may be necessary to plan and participate in a more tariff free world system of marketing to the extent of removing dependence of countries upon Russia and thus lessen Russia's political influence over Third World countries.²¹³

²¹³ Kenneth Iverson, "Priorities of Action for Survival," Middle East Report, 1959, p. 116.

Since Russia has no private enterprise and no private business the concept proposed is that Middle Eastern governments and Middle Eastern private enterprises may find it extremely profitable to go into partnership with American private enterprise involved in the execution of carrying out United States government foreign aid projects.

Having established this premise two disturbing trends in our economic aid in the past have been the growth of an excessive pre-occupation with the direct introduction of measures for social improvement and a consequent neglect of the bases for economic development on which such social improvements must fundamentally depend. The increasing introduction of governmental activity and control into fields of economic activity, which could be more productively pressed by private initiative when undertaken by governments divert their limited administrative and financial resources from social development programs.²¹⁴

When aid is given on a government-to-government basis there are understandable administrative and political

²¹⁴Emilo G. Collado, "Economic Development Through Private Enterprise," Foreign Affairs, V. 41, (July 1963), p. 708.

pressures for the large "showcase" project. On the other hand when the assistance is provided to private projects economic and political pressures help to assure that economically productive projects are chosen. The use of small private local firms in a country working in conjunction with a United States firm can accomplish the myriad of small development programs that will complement the big-scale projects and stimulate the economy to a great extent.

Private enterprise can be both a prime agent of productive change and a beneficiary of more liberal opportunity. Competition among private firms with their many different approaches can be a mighty engine for change and development and it can stimulate the necessary free competition spirit that will act as a "check and balance" on countries of the Middle East going toward the Russian socialist path.

The United States government, using private American industry as a vehicle for implementing foreign aid projects within Middle Eastern countries, can start to show governments in this area that private enterprise can successfully contribute to economic and social programs through projects aimed specifically at community

needs for education, technical training, and physical facilities. American business groups must be prepared to advise government and aid agencies on development programs under contract.

At the same time the United States should promote between the United States and countries of the Middle East reductions in the restraint on trade. Reciprocal reductions should encompass both those trade barriers which in the less developed lands distort economic activity, raise the costs of production and lower the standards of life and those barriers in the developed nations which particularly discriminate against the products of developing nations.²¹⁵ If the United States reduces or eliminates in some cases tariffs on goods from the Middle East, developed in conjunction with private enterprise from the United States, they will almost assuredly accelerate industrially at a much higher rate. However, this internal economic growth must begin. It needs a stimulus. The stimulus suggested here is the participation of American business operating in cooperation with tariff reductions on certain commodity goods inherent to the Middle East which the United States can afford to relax on. In turn

²¹⁵Ibid., p. 716.

active participation of American private enterprise abroad will lead to a favorable balance of payments position for the overall United States economy due to the high expected return on overseas investment over the long run.²¹⁶ The important point here is the United States participation in creating opportunities for the citizens in developing countries to apply their own skills and resources productively without unjustifiable interference and restraint by governments. By using this technique to build viable economic bases to Middle Eastern societies the Soviet Union will have much less chance of finding the necessary criteria to woo developing states into the Soviet socialist web. Building strong economic relations between the United States and the Middle East on a private sector basis will certainly provide these countries with some form of eventually economic autonomy which will certainly act as a deterrent to Soviet socialist penetration.

²¹⁶ Galvin B. Hoover, "Foreshortening History," Virginia Quarterly Review, V. 39, 1963, p. 384. Reference also The New York Times, 15 May, 1967, on the Kennedy Round of Trade Negotiations.

In addition it must be noted that most of the leaders of Arab countries reject today the theory of a power vacuum in the area and insist that the Arab states are capable of defending their region from aggression. Though this feeling may be extremely optimistic the reality of a nuclear stalemate and the disinclination on the part of Russia to engage in a large scale war causes the statement to appear more rational. The Arab states, if not pressed for future alliances by the United States, might maintain their independence of Russia. Prodded for military agreements and bases they appear to turn to the Soviet Union for aid.²¹⁷ Therefore military alliances are no longer practical and should play no future part in the foreign policy of the United States in the Middle East. Present military commitments should be honored but future efforts to bring additional states into a Middle East alliance should be given up and military aid to the countries of the Middle East should receive relative less attention from the United States and pure economic assistance relatively more. Priority to economic and social development rather than to local military defense should be given to foreign policy formation.

²¹⁷ Paul Hanna, "America in the Middle East" Middle Eastern Affairs, V. 10, (May 1959), p. 186.

Economically speaking then, the most fruitful approach for the United States is to encourage and support feasible and promising projects, on a regional basis, if possible, executed by American and Middle Eastern private business working in cooperation, under the auspices of a United States Government Middle East Developmental Agency and, in the future, with the added financial support of international banking and developmental agencies. Inter-Arab development projects with sufficient international backing should serve as desirable alternatives, in Arab eyes, to development with Soviet loans on Soviet terms.

Miracles should not be expected from United States economic and technical aid to the Middle East. It can contribute to eventual stability, or rather to controlled change, by helping to raise living standards or to prevent their decline. It can offer new hope to the people through projects that increase the arable land or wipe out disease. If provided in ways that satisfy the recipients it can build some good will. Still economic policies and aid for development do not of themselves provide us with the master key to success in the Middle East.²¹⁸

²¹⁸Campbell, op. cit., p. 279.

In the last analysis it can be concluded that the Arab nations in the future will look after their own national interests first and foremost, just as the United States places high priority on her own in developing a foreign policy, and will not particularly side with either the East or the West unless it favorably affects their own national interests. However, due to the close cultural and economic ties between the Middle East and the West, as opposed to the Soviet Union and China, through particularly language and economic ties, the United States has the advantage of perhaps establishing even stronger economic ties with resultant political cooperation in the future. Therefore, the United States should deal with the Arab nations on a strictly business to business basis--treating the states as equals in both government and business.

Basically the Soviet Union's political approach in the future toward the Middle East is to (1) neutralize the area of the West entirely (2) turn the countries then into socialist states and (3) take them over one by one and bring them directly under political domination of Moscow when the opportune moment appears. If allowed the Soviet Union will go on until it ultimately conquers

and destroys the Middle East and turns it into a satellite.

The difficulties caused in the Arab World by the connection between the Soviet Union and international communism should continue to impede the Soviet Union, ultimate aims in the Middle East. Short of the advent of outright Communist regimes, the earlier adulation of the Soviet Union in the Arab world is not likely to return.²¹⁹ Russian influence will remain for the country is too powerful to be excluded from areas it considers vital to its interests, and the greater power it has the more such areas there are. But the Arab countries seems to be setting down to a more stable and moderate relationship with the Soviet Union in which they will strive to keep on good terms and obtain aid but will not again willingly swing so close to the Soviet orbit as to be almost pulled in. The Soviet Union in its turn will continue to exert pressure upon Arabs toward "neutralism" in foreign affairs and "socialism" in the effort to promote economic development and social welfare-- and to weaken Arab ties with the West.

To date the United States has had various individual policies in the Middle East but has lacked a single

²¹⁹ Monroe Berger, op. cit., p. 356.

comprehensive policy towards the region as a whole.²²⁰
A policy, that is, carefully considered and duly integrated, based on a thorough analysis and full understanding of its own interests, the local interests, and the competing foreign interests. One, moreover, which would be representative of the United States Government as a body, instead of reflecting the wishes of this or that department or agency--not to speak of the sympathies of the legislative or executive branch of the government. Any considered United States policy in the Middle East should form an integral part of the country's general foreign policy.

Approaching the Middle East in the future the United States must take into account the far-reaching interdependence of the local states and territories and approach the entire region as a unit. To deal with one local state is to invite the intimate participation of the rest. And to pursue an economic objective in one part of the region is to be involved in the political life of the whole Middle East. The modern Middle East is much like an air mattress; you cannot punch it in one spot without causing it to bulge out in several other

²²⁰Fisher and Karinsky, op. cit. ., p. 242.

places. Hence, any future foreign policy in the Middle East which is not a comprehensive regional policy is an invitation to bankruptcy.²²¹

The people of the United States, according to Dr. Nabih Faris, must remember that the people of the Middle East are groping to duplicate the same dream which has made America "the last best hope on earth. The champion of Democracy must create and defend the spirit of freedom in the Middle East for the United States must depend upon these people in order to perpetuate her own democracy and way of life."²²²

²²¹Ibid., p. 244.

²²²Faris, op. cit., p. 15.

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