Dubai: past, present, and future

Robert E. L. Talley

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DUBAI
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

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In the remote reaches of the lower Persian Gulf, a new State is rising—the Sheikdom of Dubai. Indications are that its people, within a few years, may become among the richest on earth. Already international airlines call there daily, and its capital city compares favorably in development and modernity with the best of Middle Eastern cities. Dubai dominates commerce in the region, its trade approaching two hundred millions of dollars a year. Yet few Westerners not directly involved with Middle Eastern affairs are even aware of Dubai's existence.

Part of this is due to Dubai's location, and part to the short time since its emergence, which has taken place only in the past seven or eight years. Even more perhaps, it is due to the lack of information on the Persian Gulf region as a whole. J.B. Kelly alluded to this in 1965, when, in the introduction to S.B. Miles' *The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf*, he mentioned the paucity of material on the area. He cited the Rev. G.P. Badger's *Imams and Seyyids of 'Oman*, published in 1871; J.G. Lorimer's monumental *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia*, published in 1908, and Sir Arnold
Wilson's *The Persian Gulf*, published in 1928, and commented:

Miles, Badger, Lorimer and Wilson, their accumulated writings are almost the sum of what we know about the modern history of the Gulf. They are our only European authorities in this field.\(^1\)

This essay is an attempt, for the first time, to fill this void, at least with respect to Dubai, and to bring together the available information on its history and development.

The preparation of this paper involved piecing together scraps of information through research, interviews, and personal observation in Beirut, Dhahran, Bahrain, Qatar and Sharjah, as well as in Dubai. Most of the published sources are of standard types—books, periodicals and so on; a few are restricted documents which at this time cannot be cited. Interviews were conducted with government officials in Dubai, and elsewhere, and with persons who have held governmental or commercial positions in Dubai

\(^1\)There are others, including Marlowe's *The Persian Gulf in the Twentieth Century* (1962), Harrison's *The Arab at Home* (1924), Hay's *The Persian Gulf States* (1959), and Mann's *Abu Dhabi: Birth of an Oil Sheikhdom* (1964), but even these touch if at all only lightly on Dubai's history, and one still finds himself dependent largely upon those sources mentioned by Kelly.
and are known to be knowledgeable about the area's recent history and present economic, political and social conditions. With few exceptions, those persons interviewed asked that their names not be revealed, either because of their present official positions, or because of their frankness in discussing possibly sensitive subjects. Thus, persons quoted are described only sufficiently to indicate their degree of association with the matters under discussion, and they are not named.

There are without doubt errors in this paper, although every effort has been made to prevent their appearance. Beyond the writer's own mistakes, there are several causes of possible error: the rapid changes occurring in Dubai; the lack of specific information on Dubai, which in certain instances has required applying situations relating either to the whole of the Trucial Coast, or for that matter to the entire Persian Gulf in terms of their importance to Dubai, and finally, the fact that history here has largely been carried down by oral tradition rather than, as in more developed areas, in carefully compiled chronologies. Fortunately it has been necessary to refer little to oral tradition in the development of this history of Dubai, since Lorimer's Gazetteer
and other works were available to cover most of the period.

This study is by no means complete, but it is a beginning. There are many gaps which it is hoped will be filled as new material becomes available.

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R.E.L.T.
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CHAPTER I

THE TRUCIAL COAST

Throughout the thousands of years of its turbulent history this small strip of wasteland that lies scorched and barren along the Arabian shore of the southern Persian Gulf\(^1\) has carried many names.

To the Arabs it has been Sahil Oman (Coast of Oman, thus including it in nearby Oman), al-Sirr al-Oman or simply al-Sirr (presumably for a town of antiquity located near Ras al-Khaimah\(^2\)) and al-Shimal (literally: the north\(^3\)). In the 18th and 19th centuries, to the British who feared with excellent reason for their ships, which were often attacked by marauding Arab seamen, the region was known as the Pirate Coast, and was so registered in English official lists of geographical names. More recently, as Britain forced these

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\(^1\)On the Gulf of Oman, facing the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean is another section of the Trucial Coast, including the sheikhdom of Fujairah, but due to its remoteness from the area under study it will not be discussed here.


\(^3\)Either for its location in reference to Oman, or for its exposure to the often fierce northwest winds that drive down the Persian Gulf. J.G. Lorimer, Geographical and Historical Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia (Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1908), Vol. 2, p. 1427.
seafaring bedouin to put away their suyūf (long-swords), in favor of more peaceful pursuits, the coast came to be known as the Trucial Oman, or more popularly, the Trucial Coast. These are the names commonly in use today. The principalities there are known as the Trucial Sheikhdoms or the Trucial States.

The Geography

The Trucial Coast extends along the wild northeastern edge of the Arabian Peninsula with the look of the blade of a raised Arab dagger whose hilt is formed by Qatar on the west and whose blade then curves northeastward to a point along the craggy reaches of Cape Musandam\(^1\) at the eastern end of the Persian Gulf.

The northern border of the Trucial Coast begins on the west at Khor al-Odaid\(^2\) on the base of Qatar Peninsula and for some three hundred miles follows the southern shore of the Persian Gulf to within a few miles of the tip of Cape Musandam. Along this coast the shores for a distance of some two hundred or more miles consist mainly of low uninhabited

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\(^1\)Arabic: Ru'us al-Jebal, or Peaks of the Mountain.

\(^2\)Literally al-Odaid Inlet. On the Trucial Coast these frequent tidal inlets are called "creeks" even though there is no appreciable flow of water through them, since they may resemble streams or rivers reaching inland for considerable distances. Dubai Creek, for example, is about six miles in length.
beaches and forlorn tidal flats, cut by inlets and broken by hundreds of small low-lying islands and reefs. The Gulf waters are shallow, sometimes to the point that ocean-going ships can approach not closer than three or four miles from shore to unload their cargoes.

Farther east the coastline changes in character, becoming almost straight with sandy beaches and few islands, but still cut by occasional tidal inlets.

An apt description written by L.S. Amery thirty years ago, and one that still applies to the vast majority of the region, states:¹

It is an area of bleak coasts, torrid winds, and pitiless sunshine... Nature is in her fiercest humour and man has done little to improve on her handiwork.

Perhaps due to the underlying bedrock of sedimentary Eocene limestone² along this section of coast only one terrain feature stands out. Its name, Jebal 'Ali, or High Mountain, located some twenty miles southwest of Dubai town, and its minuscule size—only 220 feet in height—give eloquent testimony to the sameness of what has been called "this sterile, flat and monotonous" coast.


EASTERN ABADIAN PENINSULA

GENERALIZED GEOLOGICAL STRUCTURE
EASTERN ARABIAN PENINSULA
GENERALIZED GEOLOGICAL STRUCTURE
Immediately behind the beaches at varying distances begins a belt of low sand dunes and bare, gravelly plains, often colored a grey-brown by deposits of chert. Between the dunes are areas of dikaka or hummocks, created by sand accumulating around plants or scrub brush, and of subkha, often treacherous salt marshes. In the summer when the subkha is dry, it is hard and flat and excellent for travel; wet it is at best dangerous, both for vehicles and animals.

Farther inland the dunes begin to swell and grow in size and height to march in an almost continuous mass to the al-Dhafrah region to the south, eventually blending with the even more desolate Rub' al-Khali (Empty Quarter) of Saudi Arabia, which, with Muscat and Oman in the east, forms the southern border of the Trucial Coast.

Toward the east the topography inland changes drastically. Desert gives way to mountain as the Hajar range rises in a north-south line paralleling the Gulf of Oman and forming the Musandam Peninsula, north-eastern boundary of the Trucial Coast. Here the coastal plain narrows and finally disappears as the mountains plunge sharply into the sea.

**Climate**

If not the worst in the world, the climate of the
Trucial Coast and the southern Persian Gulf is at least notorious for its combination of heat and humidity. Temperatures of mid- and late-Summer may average a high of between 100 and 110°F. (39-44°C.)\(^1\) and on occasion reach a high of 125°F. (52°C.) at midday. Worse than the heat is the accompanying high humidity, which may average 75% or more and can so saturate the air along the coast that it creates a marked haze, severely limiting visibility. This moisture prevents perspiration from evaporating and, as a result, clothing is soaked in a few minutes;\(^2\) a half-mile walk in the sun during peak temperatures can leave a person virtually exhausted. A better indication of the severity of the summer climate here is the claim made by a 15th century Persian who declared that the jewels in his dagger "turned to coal" after a few days in the Gulf heat.\(^3\)

Persons seeking relief from the oppressive temperatures by swimming in the Gulf may find to their dismay that the temperature of the water along the beach may be as high


\(^2\)An oil man sent to the Trucial Coast to negotiate an oil concession reported that a pair of trousers, worn only a few times, was so rotted by the humidity that the seams suddenly fell apart, unfortunately as he was arriving to pay a call on one of the ruling sheikhs.

as 100° F. Nights, too, are hot and humid. Those without air-conditioning who can manage often escape some miles inland where although temperatures may be only slightly lower the humidity drops markedly.

The cool season, from November to April, by contrast is for the most part pleasant. High temperatures during the day may average between 50° and 60° F. (10-16°C.) and nights are cool, often sparkingly clear. Frost is unknown and little hail falls during the occasional thunderstorms. Duststorms, however, are fairly common and can descend from the desert on a few minutes’ notice, darkening the sun with a flying grit that seeps in through the most tightly closed windows to cover everything with a grey-beige dust. During such storms, which may last from a few hours to several days and indeed during any of the frequent periods of strong winds, the Gulf whips itself into a vicious chop. It is said that within an hour’s time waves can reach a height of twenty feet from trough to crest, halting all activity at sea and sending smaller craft scurrying for cover. Earthquakes too, are common and on occasion may be severe in the Gulf and on the Persian side, but seldom do material damage on the Arabian coast.¹

Rainfall, limited exclusively to the winter months, is slight, little more than three inches a year, and may

¹Lorimer, op. cit., p. 2209.
not descend at all in measurable quantities during some years. Most rain falls quickly, crashing down in violent cloud-bursts, flooding the shallow wadis and plains and disappearing a few minutes after it stops. After such rains, however, the desert suddenly blooms with rejuvenated life; grass and desert flowers sprout and blossom seemingly overnight. Only a few such rains are necessary to make the difference between a good or a bad year for the bedouin herdsmen, whose animals continue to graze on this growth long after it has become dry and withered.

Life in this region however, does not depend completely on this local rainfall; much water is obtained from underground flows. In the west and central Trucial Coastal region water travels down from the highlands along the western edge of the Arabian Peninsula; in the eastern region, from the Hajar mountain. Rain falling on the eastern slopes of these mountains is absorbed by the earth and flows through underground aquifers to the east and north to emerge near the surface where it can be reached by shallow wells. At one point, at least near Sharjah, this water gushes out of undersea springs along the floor of the Gulf.¹

¹Such sources have been tapped at Bahrain, providing a major contribution to that island's water supply.
In the interior there are many wells, at least one every ten miles, which tap these underground supplies. Most wells provide water the year round, while a few are intermittent.

Near the shore the people traditionally have used the few springs that provide water only marginally drinkable because of its brackishness. Wells could be used for a time, but as their water levels dropped brackish water intruded and new wells would have to be dug. With more modern techniques, stable supplies of clear water are being developed inland and piped to the coast. There is sufficient water in some places to support major irrigation works, for example, in Ras al-Khaimah and the two major oases of Abu Dhabi. Several studies are attempting to determine whether the water supply is sufficient for agricultural development in other areas.

As might well be imagined, plant and animal life in this region is sparse, but not so much as might be assumed. The underground water, flowing relatively close to the surface in many inland areas provides nourishment to a surprising amount of vegetation, mainly grasses, scrub brush and acacia trees. Along the coast there are occasional mangrove swamps and patches of coarse grass. Game—notably
gazelle and bustard—in the past has been readily available to hunters, who in Arab fashion charged across the desert on horses and camels releasing falcons for the kill. They now charge equally fast across the desert in Land-Rovers, but against game whose numbers have been reduced in recent years. So depleted is the game that wealthier hunters prefer to sail across the Gulf to more fertile grounds in southern Iran.

Population, too, is sparse in the Trucial Coast. Along some three hundred miles of coastline there is but a handful of permanent settlements. These range in size from mere villages, to—in the case of Dubai—a city of between 40,000 and 60,000. Occasional clusters of palm frond huts can be found which are generally occupied only during the winter fishing season. Inland a few oases—notably al-Buraimi, about seventy miles southeast of Dubai, and Liwa, about one hundred miles directly south of Abu Dhabi town—form the largest of the interior population centers.

The total population of the Trucial Coast is probably only about 110,000, although this figure is subject to some conjecture since no reliable census has ever been taken.

The vast majority of the people are centered in the

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towns and villages along the coast; perhaps fewer than 20,000 remain bedouin. Most are Arabs of various segments of the Bani Yas tribe, a loose confederation whose leadership in the past has been located in Abu Dhabi but now has diffused into independent tribal groupings. Perhaps the second most prominent tribe is the Qawasim (Joasme), the leading element in the pirate era, but now only a small ruling family that controls two of the sheikhdoms. Among the other tribal groupings in the area are the Bani Qitab, Naim, Al Bu Shamis, Manasir, and Bani Kaab. Many of these remain bedouin.

The old traditional ways are retained among those who follow a nomadic life in the interior, but as in other areas of the Middle East, there are material changes. Foremost perhaps, is the loss of young men to whom work in the oilfields, jobs in the towns or duty in the armed forces are much more enticing than the pursuits of herding, fishing and date gardening. This has left an unusually large proportion of older people who are too committed to their beliefs and way of life to adapt to a modern environment. Many bedouin are forced to exist on handouts from the sheikhs\(^1\) to whom they have pledged a measure of allegiance.

In some instances, notably in Abu Dhabi, efforts are being made to settle the bedouin into agriculture as a way of helping them to keep pace and to establish themselves in the money economy. But there is strong resistance on the part of the proud bedouin to whom traditionally the freedom of the desert is life itself, and to whom the farmer harnessed to labor on the soil is an object to be pitied. The success of this effort, unfortunately, remains to be seen.

Life in the towns changes rapidly: exposure to the magic of modernity with its contrivances of comfort and convenience has opened a Pandora's box. Refrigerators and air-conditioning become increasingly common among those who can afford them. Television antennas on the skyline of Dubai now compete with the tall Persian wind towers, rising to gather in the weak signals of ARAMCO's Dhahran station, several hundred miles away. Western clothing gains favor among more and more of the people, including women who may wear their black 'abbas with high-heeled shoes. Motion picture theaters, showing mainly Indian films, are a great attraction, as is football (soccer) which is fast becoming a sort of regional sport.

1 Television owners credit the quality of their television reception, which is fairly good in the Summer, to unusual atmospheric conditions that reflect the signals into the Trucial Coast area.
Virtually all of the Arab population is Sunni Moslem, but with an overlay of Wahhabi strictness left by the incursions of the Sandi forces in the 18th and 19th centuries.

Of the native population, only one group—the primitive Hamitic tribes of the Shihuh—vary from the Arab culture patterns. These people, some 3000–4000 in number, live in the Hajar mountains behind Ras al-Khaimah. They make their homes in caves or stone cabins, eke out a marginal existence from fishing and combing the shores for shell-fish, and speak a language which although apparently rooted in Arabic, is generally not understood by Arabic-speakers. They tend to remain to themselves and to discourage outside contacts. As a result they are little known, although the belief is common among the Arabs that these are the descendants of Sindbad the Sailor, about whom legends are rife in this area.

In addition to these peoples, there are groups of relative newcomers to the Trucial Coast. These are Indians, mostly Hindu merchants from the Kutch, Persians, and the Baluchis, from western Pakistan, who have traditionally

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1Soraya, op. cit., p. 17.


worked as laborers, filling a gap that the Arabs would not occupy for cultural reasons. Of these, the Indians and Persians until recently dominated commerce in the southern Persian Gulf; hard-working, attuned to technological advances and generally better educated and more worldly than their Arab hosts, they have been primarily responsible for the region's level of economic growth. So deeply have these new peoples integrated themselves into the society that often it is difficult to distinguish the roots of a particular family—for example whether they are Persian—speaking Arabs or Arabic-speaking Persians.

In recent years the Arabs, who as the traditional ruling class had disdained commerce, have begun to compete with the Persians and Indians. Because of their position close to the centers of power they have begun themselves to dominate important areas of trade.

As has been indicated, national costumes, with the exception of the traditional bedouin dress, have come to mean little in identifying large elements of the population.

Western dress, turbans of various sorts, short skirts topped with modern shirts, and so on, seem to be worn indiscriminately by large numbers of the people with little regard to heritage. Language also may be of slight help, since in the towns one hears besides Arabic, dialects of Persian, Hindi, and English spoken with apparent fluency. Merchants
often seem to have command of all of these, dealing as they do with all levels of society.

On the desert, however, dress has changed little in the past few centuries with one possible exception: the adoption of the Japanese plastic and rubber "flip-flops" in place of the traditional leather sandals. Beyond this concession to modernity, the bedouin still clings to his dress, his ever-present rifle (typically a modern bolt-action military model probably smuggled into the region), and his equally ubiquitous Khunjar, curved dagger, often beautifully inlaid with silver and passed down from generation to generation.¹

Economics in the Trucial States are changing rapidly, the old sources of income ---pearling, fishing, herding and date farming ---are now more and more subordinated to new pursuits. Pearlng was once the main industry of the area, but because of changing world markets and the development of the cultured pearl in the last twenty years it has almost disappeared from the lower Gulf. Now only a minority of the people depend solely on herding and date farming. Particularly in Dubai they are occupied in

¹These daggers are greatly prized by Westerners, and as a result are becoming increasingly expensive. One that ten years ago might have cost $10 to $15 may now bring $75 or $80.
other activities, in trade and smuggling, and in all the other jobs that have grown up around them --- driving taxis, shop-keeping, road construction and so on.

Yet despite these changes in occupation, for the vast majority of the people, villager, townsman or bedouin, life remains largely primitive by western standards. Poverty, malnutrition, disease, although decreased to some extent in recent years, still prevail. Modern education until fifteen years ago was virtually unknown, and even Koranic schools were not widespread. Rice, dates and occasional lamb still form the staples of the diet, although some vegetables are becoming available. Fish, caught regularly, are more often exported or sold for animal feed and fertilizer than consumed locally.

The Sheikhdoms

Since the beginning of history the area of the Trucial Coast has been divided into sheikhdoms, each centered in a community along the shore. The number of these sheikhdoms has varied as a result of shifts of power in the almost continuous raiding and feuding that was a way of life until suppressed by the British in the 1800's. There are at present six, each sovereign and independent, along the Persian Gulf: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain and Ras al-Khaimah.
In each of the Trucial Sheikhdoms, government rests in the hands of the ruling sheikh who gains his authority from hereditary family position. Rule is by decree and with the exception of Dubai, which has a well-established administrative organization, is subject only to the decisions and caprices of the sheikh and his family.

Great Britain over the past 150 years has developed an increasingly close relationship with the Trucial States. Through a series of treaties she has taken over responsibility for the States' foreign affairs, and by tradition and acceptance, she advises and assists rulers in internal matters. Currently, Britain maintains two Political Agents, one/Abu Dhabi, and another in Dubai, the latter dealing with all the Trucial Sheikhdoms with the exception of Abu Dhabi. Both these PA's as they are called, are responsible to the British Political Resident in Bahrain who oversees British interests in the Gulf.

Great Britain's main accomplishment on the Trucial Coast has been the establishment of stability. Since the early 1900's, with the exceptions of minor skirmishes, there has been peace among the sheikhdoms, and the one incursion by a foreign nation— that of Saudi Arabia which laid claim

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1 The history of Great Britain's role in the Trucial States will be dealt with in detail in a later chapter.
to part of al-Buraimi Oasis in the late 1940's and 1950's---
was stopped by British action. The status quo implied
in this British-enforced stability has had the side-effect,
incidentally, of freezing the positions of the ruling families
so firmly in power that all of the sheikhdoms are still ruled
by the descendants of those in power in the 1850's. More
recently, Great Britain has devoted herself to the development
of the Trucial States, and has contributed materially to their
economic and social advancement.

The names of the Trucial States derive from the
communities which serve as their population centers and
capitals. Dubai, for example, draws its name from Dubai town.
This territorial distinction is fairly recent: until the
possibility of oil discoveries in the Trucial States entered
the picture, sovereignty over land, other than rather amorphous grazing lands, had received scant attention from the
ruling sheikhs. Rather, the more traditional Arab concept
of control over tribes, or segments of tribes, had applied.
Since these were for the most part bedouin herdsmen who migrated
over wide areas, the barren, sandy land involved was not a
matter of interest.

When the oil company representatives came in the late
1930's offering hard cash to these relatively impoverished
sheikhs for rights to their territories, land—and borders—suddenly gained supreme importance. Typically each sheikh attempted to claim territory as far-flung as possible. Inevitably this led to conflict and in one case to some shooting between Dubai and Abu Dhabi in the mid- and late-1940's. Even now, despite years of effort on the part of Great Britain and the petroleum companies, there is agreement on only a few of the borders in the region. In attempting to establish just what borders exist, one is shown innumerable maps giving widely divergent opinions. Part of the problem, of course, involves the rights of a particular migratory tribe to a given area, complicated by changing allegiances of these tribes to a particular ruler. If that were not enough, the new ruler does not always adhere to the agreements of his predecessor. The British, in helping to allay friction over this matter, have been working for years to obtain firm agreement, but with little enduring success. Thus the limits of the sheikhdoms are discussed here only in the most general terms.

Abu Dhabi

The westernmost of the sheikhdoms, and by far the largest, is Abu Dhabi which extends along the Gulf coast from Khor al-Ödaïd on the eastern base of the Qatar Peninsula for some 250 miles to Ras Hasain, about thirty miles west of Dubai.
Inland, it reaches into the desert between perhaps one hundred and two hundred miles where its territory meets that of Saudi Arabia. Other than oil company installations established in the last ten years or so, the only permanent settlements are Abu Dhabi town, the Liwa and al-Buraimi oases, and the island of Dalmak off the coast.

Prior to 1960, Abu Dhabi town's population was probably not more than three thousand persons. For the most part it languished unnoticed by the world a barren place of mud and stone on a small island separated from the shore by a shallow creek which could be forded only at low tide.

Oil was discovered there in 1960 and production began after two years, but prior to the summer of 1966 no appreciable development took place—despite the fact that the per capita income rose from a subsistence level to more than $2000, one of the world's highest. The cause lay in the personality of the former ruler, Sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan.\(^1\) Traditional, suspicious, ultra-conservative in his own modest way of life, he could not be convinced that wealth would benefit his people; he believed that if changes were necessary, they should only be undertaken over a span of decades. He was deposed in 1966 by his family and replaced by his brother, the more progressive

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\(^1\)Sheikh Shakhbut is vividly described in Major Clarence Mann, *Abu Dhabi, Birth of an Oil Sheikhdom* (Beirut: Khayats, 1964), a valuable historical portrait of Abu Dhabi.
Sheikh Zaid bin Sultan, who had governed with considerable success the Buraimi Oases for a number of years. In the short time since Zaid became ruler, there has been a flurry of projects which should contribute materially to the development of the sheikhdom and to the improvement of the life of its people.

The two oases generally conceded to be in Abu Dhabi territory, Liwa (al-Jiwa) and Buraimi, lie respectively about a hundred miles south and about eighty miles east of Abu Dhabi town. Liwa is completely under Abu Dhabi's control, but al-Buraimi, which contains some eight villages, is shared by neighboring Muscat and Oman. Liwa is by far the largest, covering an area of about ten-by-fifty miles, while al-Buraimi with a radius of perhaps only ten miles is the more highly developed. Buraimi has an airport, hospital, a school, at least one bank, a central electrical plant and a cable office.\(^1\) Also, a new irrigation system has opened much new land to cultivation. Buraimi's potential for producing oil in the early 1950's precipitated a claim to that district by Saudi Arabia, resulting in a five-year-long confrontation between Great Britain (in its role of protector of the territorial integrity of the Trucial States) and Saudi Arabia. This

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\(^1\)Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd., Economic Review, Middle East Oil and the Saudi Arabian Peninsula, No. 15, October 1963, p. 15.
conflict was never decided conclusively; Saudi Arabia is not currently pressing her claim, nor has she forfeited it. Abu Dhabi continues to control its villages there. ¹

Dubai

Dubai, to the northeast of Abu Dhabi, occupies some fifty miles of coastline and extends inland for perhaps thirty miles giving land area of approximately 1500 square miles. Despite the fact that it has not yet produced oil—although apparently sizeable discoveries have been made off-shore—, Dubai is by far the most highly developed of the Trucial States. Dubai town is a modern city by Middle Eastern standards, with an active port that has become the trading center for both sides of the southern Gulf. Its population of forty to sixty thousand boasts a municipal government, an airport handling jet aircraft, a police force, modern hospitals, an organized customs service and free education.

The town is centered around Dubai Creek, ² which divides it into two parts and is the basis for its title


²See Map No.1.
of "The Venice of the East": Dubai proper on the southwest and Deira on the northeast. Dubai contains most of the government offices, the British Political Agency, banks, post office and shipping agents, together with wholesale and retail bazaars. Daira contains the Municipality, police headquarters and most of the business offices and shops. There is a bridge across the creek, but some distance inland from the city. Persons going from one side to the other usually ride an abra, a small boat which is not unlike the gondola of Venice except that most of them have been converted to power.

There are several other communities around Dubai: including Shandagha, on the point created by the meeting of Dubai creek and the Gulf; Jumairah, with its modern beach houses, and the less developed villages of Bait An-Nayif and Abu Hail.

Sharjah

Continuing to the northeast, only nine miles away by a modern highway, is the Sheikhdom of Sharjah. Its coastal holdings are some twenty miles in length; inland, Sharjah extends about seventy miles to cross the Musandam peninsula. In this eastern section are the village of Kalba, the sizeable oases of Dhaid, and several villages.
Sharjah at one time was a major trading center, but over a period of years the entrance to the creek on which it is situated was filled by silting, cutting off its harbor from the Gulf. As a result, Sharjah has taken on a derelict appearance. Its suq is old and shows little ability to compete with those of nearby Dubai. Some revenue has flowed into the sheikhdoms, however—mainly from the Royal Air Force base there. A few new buildings and a quay reaching out into the Gulf have been built. With this new harbor facility, Sharjah hopes to regain some trade.

Ajman and Umm al-Qaiwain

The two sheikhdoms of Ajman, surrounded on the landward side by Sharjah, and Umm al-Qaiwain, some thirteen miles to the northeast along the coast, consist of little more than villages with a combined population of a few thousand. By far the larger of the two, Umm al-Qaiwain claims territory extending about twenty-five miles inland to the foot of the Hajar mountains. They remain largely primitive.

Ras al-Khaimah

Ras al-Khaimah, northermost of the sheikhdoms, occupies about thirty miles of coastline and extends inland almost across the peninsula. The village of Ras al-Khaimah has few major buildings other than a school, opened in the 1950's,
and a fort in which the ruler resides. Considerable farming of dates, fruits and vegetables is made possible by the use of underground water for irrigation along the foot of the Hajar mountains.
CHAPTER II

THE EARLY YEARS
-1853

The Founding of Dubai

Of the settlement of the district now called Dubai history offers few facts. Tradition tells that a village was first established at Dubai by Bani Yas tribesmen from Abu Dhabi who discovered water along the khor while grazing their herds there. The date cannot be fixed with certainty although it must have been between 1761, when Abu Dhabi was first settled under similar circumstances, and 1799, when Dubai is first mentioned in records of the area.¹

Neither tradition nor history offers a description of Dubai at this time, but a general picture can be drawn if one considers the state of development of the region and the status of Dubai later when descriptions did become available. Probably not too long after it was founded, Dubai gained the appearance of a small village of a few hundred persons, living in a clutter of mud and palm houses on the west side of the khor: There could have been a considerable number of dhows anchored in or moving up and down the creek,

¹Lorimer, op. cit., p. 763.
or lying beached close to the shore. The people lived from raising sheep and goats, fishing and pearling, and perhaps through some trade carried on both by sea and by caravan. Its tribal governmental organization was subserviant to Bani Yas leadership at Abu Dhabi, and would remain so until Dubai gained independence in 1833.

**Forces in Conflict**

The region into which Dubai developed was involved in conflicts which were rapidly coming to a climax. At sea was the rivalry between the Qawasimi pirates of Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah, who for perhaps a thousand years had lived by preying on shipping in nearby seas, and Great Britain, which was now expanding her trade from India into the upper reaches of the Persian Gulf, and whose fat merchant ships were falling easy victims to the fleet and well-manned Arab dhows. On land were the almost constant feuds and fights among the sheikhdoms, conflicts entering around a struggle for supremacy between Abu Dhabi and Sharjah.

The results of these clashes were foreordained: at sea, although they would for a time virtually spell the end of British shipping in the Gulf, the pirates eventually would be crushed by British naval power. On land, Abu Dhabi,
with her masses of bedouin tribesmen strung out from Buraimi to Liwa to the island of Abu Dhabi, would emerge as the strongest of the sheikhdoms and to a great extent would dominate affairs on the coast.

Dubai, by far smaller and weaker than either of her battling neighbors, would during this period play a defensive role, attempting to survive by playing off one stronger neighbor against the other.

The destruction of Piracy

As early as the 9th century the Qawaimi-led tribes on the western coast of the Musandam Peninsula had been known as formidable pirates. From their center at Ras al-Khaimah these Arab seafarers carried on a highly profitable campaign of terror against shipping in the Gulf and in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean beyond. At their peak the Qawasimis and those tribes allied with them are understood to have operated some seventy battle-dhows (up to 350 tons) and as many as 800 smaller craft manned by up to 19,000 men.¹

Their tactics were simple and effective. Travelling

¹Soraya, loc. cit.
in packs, the pirates would station themselves in a continuous line at intervals of several miles and wait. When a likely merchantmen was sighted the nearest boat would give some prearranged signal\(^1\) which would be passed to the other dhows. The pirates would then form into a circle and attempt to trap the victim. If the merchantman was able to break out and flee as was often the case, the ensuing chase might last for days, ending with the merchantman outdistancing the pirates, which happened seldom, or more likely with the victim, still running, being boarded by a horde of screaming Qawasimis.

The dhows carried cannon, which were capable of delivering deadly fire, but the pirates seem to have preferred boarding and close combat to shelling from a distance. To facilitate boarding operations, many dhows carried elevated sterns in the fashion of Spanish galleons, giving excellent platforms from which to board European ships with less freeboard.

That these buccaneers were capable of unspeakable brutality is well known, but lest they be judged too harshly it should be remembered that they probably differed little in this respect from many a celebrated European pirate.

\(^1\)By smoke or fire.
Further, after the coming of Islam, these Arabs were guided by the standards of a strong faith and through their actions runs a harsh but well-developed sense of justice.

The following incident will bear this out: In 1696 a ship commanded by a Captain Sawbridge was captured. When the captain tried to argue with his captors, they told him several times to be quiet. When he refused the pirates—with a sail-needle and twine—sewed his lips together and kept him that way for several hours. Later they burned the ship, put those who had survived ashore on a barren coast, and left them to die. (Practical men as well, the pirates were also known to give forcible doses of sea water to merchants in the event they had, on being attacked, swallowed any jewels or other items of value.1)

In 1795, with the coming of the Wahhabi faith to the Qawasimis, the character of their piracy changed radically. The Wahhabis, in alliance with the Saudi chiefs, had built a religious empire among the bedouin of the interior. Their doctrine demanded a return to classical Islam, stripped of all innovation added since the death of the Prophet. This

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faith they carried throughout the Arabian Peninsula by fire and sword, attacking all who were not of their faith and most of all those Moslems whom they felt had strayed from the path of doctrinal purity. When the Saudi-led Wahhabis invaded the Trucial Coast, the Qawasimis tendered their submission and immediately accepted the tenents of the new sect. Wahhabism fitted easily into their way of life, since it urged a jihad, or holy war on the unbeliever. Piracy then became an obligation and a sacred duty and immediately increased in intensity and viciousness against shipping in the Gulf.

Typical of the treatment given to prisoners after this time are these accounts: On 20 October 1808 the Sylph, a small British vessel of about 78 tons was captured. "The Joasmees [Qawasim], as usual, murdered the crew, twenty-two in number, by cutting their throats over the side of the ship in the name of God."¹ In another instance that same year the Minerva out of Bombay was boarded. All the crew were killed with the exception of the carpenter and the mate, whom the pirates felt might be useful. A female passenger was taken by the pirates, "but in accordance with Arab custom no indignity was offered to her and a few months later she was ransomed."²

¹Miles, op. cit., p. 314.
²Ibid., pp. 202-203.
Although cruel, these pirates were brave men, as shown by the statement of J.R. Wellstead, in which he described the Qawasim: ¹

The most undaunted bravery was certainly theirs. If taken they submitted with resignation to the fate they inflicted on others; and when they fell into the hands of Persians, or any nations by which they were surrounded, they were never spared. After the destruction of one of their forts, and before their wounds were dressed, it was asked what treatment they anticipated. "The same immediate death as we should have inflicted on you, had your fortune been ours," was the stern and characteristic reply.

The increase in piracy seriously threatened England's expanding East India Company trade. Early in 1806 she formed an alliance with the Sultan of Muscat, a determined enemy of the Wahhabis, to halt this piracy. Combining forces, they sent out a fleet, hunted the pirates down, and forced them to sign a treaty declaring that henceforth they would respect the British flag and the property of the Honorable East India Company.

During the next two years East India Company cruisers patrolled constantly in the Gulf and British shipping was not molested. But after that time the patrol was reduced and British efforts to suppress piracy became

¹In Travels in Arabia, 2 vols., 1839, cited by Miles, op. cit., p. 203.
generally ineffective. Further, for fear of incurring the wrath of the Wahhabis, naval commanders were ordered not to act against "these innocent natives of the Gulf." More specifically they carried orders prohibiting them from firing until the Arabs had fired upon them. As a result, the captains did not take action until the pirate boats had come threateningly close, and by then it was too late to prevent capture.¹

By 1809 the situation had become critical:

The height of audacity reached by these Joasmea ruffians, who were as bloodthirsty as they were rapacious, and who within a twelvemonth had attacked no less than eight armed English vessels, had come to be regarded as foreboding the extinction of British trade in the Gulf, and protective measures could no longer be delayed.²

Finally taking action, in September of that year the British attacked the pirate stronghold at Ras al-Khaimah.³ Following the strike it was believed that the pirates had been decimated, but within a year they had regrouped, recruited new men and again "raised their heads in maritime supremacy in the Gulf."⁴ By 1817, when Britain remained indecisive, the

¹Miles, op. cit., p. 315; Belgrave, op. cit., p. 30.
²Miles, op. cit., p. 315.
⁴Miles, op. cit., p. 320.
Qawasim were not only terrorizing the Persian Gulf, but were raiding as far as the Red Sea and the coasts of India.\footnote{Ibid., p. 323.}

The pirates had reached their peak of power, but their downfall was soon to come. Muhammad Ali Pasha, the ruler of Egypt, had become concerned about Wahhabi expansion into his empire on the Arabian west coast, and decided to crush the Wahhabis by striking at their heartland. In 1818, he sent an army into central Arabia, devastating the Wahhabi centers of power, and so weakening them that they were forced to withdraw from their conquered territories, including those portions of the Pirate Coast under their domination.

The fall of the Wahhabis freed Britain from concern about attacking the pirates. In November 1819 a powerful fleet was formed at Bombay. It consisted of nine heavily-armed warships augmented by a land force of 3000 men. Sailing to Muscat, whose ruler had long hated the Wahhabis, the force was joined by three Muscati ships. The fleet attacked the pirate center at Ras al-Khaimah, capturing and levelling the town and seizing some eighty pirate vessels. The destruction rent by this attack and the determination shown by the British ended for all time the Qawasim as a
serious threat on the seas.

The General Treaty of 1820

Of such impact was this show of force by the British that all the sheikhs of the Trucial Coast rushed to tender their submission to the British commander, signing a preliminary treaty calling for the surrender of what pirate ships remained in their hands. Dubai, although still subject to Abu Dhabi, became a party to the treaty. Lorimer relates that it was signed for Dubai by the 9-year-old sheikh, Muhammad bin Hazza, sent to Sharjah for that purpose "by his father's widow, who was in charge of the government of that principality," on January 9, 1820.\(^1\) It is worthy of mention that the Sultan of Muscat had interceded with the British on behalf of the young sheikh, indicating that Dubai had not taken part in the piracy to this time.

When the provisions of the preliminary treaty had been met, the sheikhs then signed the General Treaty, agreeing to cease plunder and piracy both at sea and on land without a prior declaration of war.\(^2\) With this treaty, Britain

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1\(^\text{Un fortunately no further details of what must have been a fascinating situation are available.}\)

2\(^\text{O ther provisions called for an exchange of envoys between the sheikhdoms and the British Residency at Bushire, a prohibition against engaging in the slave trade, and the registration of native craft.}\)
established her position as the leading Power in the southern Gulf.

The general treaty was, however, weak in a number of respects, and would bring great hardship to the peoples of the coast. First, the elimination of piracy cost the Qawasimi sheikhdoms their major source of revenue and forced them to turn for survival to slave trading—which the treaty also was to have prevented. Second, although intertribal attacks at sea were prohibited without a prior declaration of war, this was easily circumvented by declarations after the fact. Third, the treaty called for a cessation of raiding on land, yet Britain was in no way prepared to become involved in preventing land warfare among the sheikhdoms; to have done so would have meant large expenditures in a region in which she had little interest. As a result this provision was meaningless.

Despite the weaknesses of the treaty, some advantages accrued to the sheikhdoms. Pearling and fishing fleets could go to sea with some freedom from attack, and maritime trade could be conducted in an atmosphere of some security. Even these meagre gains were not, however, to last.

The Arabs would not—or could not—adhere to the provisions of this treaty for long. Within ten years Britain had been forced to acknowledge that the Treaty of
1820 had proved totally ineffective, even in protecting her shipping. Although the sheikhs had agreed to stop fighting among themselves, this promise had been honored more in the breach than in the observance. Almost constant warfare sprang up, the result of the loss of power of the maritime Qawasimis, who now were easy prey of land-based Abu Dhabi. The sheikhdoms suffered great economic loss, and inevitably they returned to piracy as an alternate means of income. With reduced British naval power in the area at this time, attacks upon local craft were quickly extended to include British merchantmen.

The Qawasim of course had been among the first to resume piracy, and now, even the Bani Yas of Abu Dhabi and the Al Bu Falasah of Dubai "became a determined set of pirates who rob and plunder all who may come their way." 

The end came in 1835. So bold had the pirates become that a fleet from Abu Dhabi set out with the intention of attacking the two British cruisers patrolling the Gulf. They attempted their usual tactic of boarding, but were

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beaten off by the ships' guns and soundly defeated. In the negotiations that followed, the British found that, far from wanting to continue piracy, the sheikhdoms had in fact been driven to it; they much preferred peace, at least at sea, and the opportunity to pursue their pearling, fishing and trading.

It was with little difficulty then that the Acting Resident, Captain S. Hennell, obtained agreement to what was to be the first of a long series of maritime truces. The sheikhs agreed not to engage under any circumstances in hostilities at sea for a period of six months. The truce began in May, thus including the summer pearling season, and continued into November, with excellent success. In April of 1836, the truce was renewed for a period of eight months, and in the following year for the same length of time. In 1838, the sheikhs agreed to renew the truce again, but this time for the entire year, and each year through 1842–43 similar extensions were signed. Finally, in June of 1843 the sheikhs agreed to a Ten Year Maritime Truce, which would remain in force until the signing of the Perpetual Treaty of Peace in perpetuity in 1853.
Dubai Becomes Independent

Dubai gained independence in a pattern common to monarchies the world over: intra-family dissension and struggle for power; murder, in this case fratricide, and the eventual autonomy of one defecting branch of the family.

It was perhaps unfortunate that the incident involved Sheikh Tahnun, who as ruler of Abu Dhabi from 1818-1833, proved himself one of the most able men in the history of the Trucial Coast. Yet considering the man, it may have been inevitable that Tahnun should have been involved. A warrior of the old Arab school, brave, and thoroughly adept in conspiracy—-that hallmark of Arab statecraft—-, he had grown sufficiently strong that he felt he could violate a principle known to all monarchs: that of keeping rival relatives at a safe distance. Apparently on the request of his father, in 1833 Tahnun permitted two brothers, Khalifa and Sultan, to come to live at Abu Dhabi. Tahnun had long distrusted them, and for good reason, since in April, within a few weeks of their arrival, they murdered Tahnun, one stabbing him while the other shot him.

The two brothers assumed a joint rule over Abu Dhabi, but it was not long before Khalifa became dominant, to the great dissatisfaction of the subjects of Abu Dhabi. So
great was this discontent that in the summer, only a few months after Tahnun's death, eight hundred members of the Al Bu Falasah section of the Bani Yas renounced their loyalty to Khalifa and moved to Dubai.

Arriving after the men of the town had already left for the pearling season, the Al Bu Falasah quickly took over the town. Rule was divided between 'Ubaid Ibn Sa'id, and Maktum Ibn Buti whose descendents still rule the sheikhdom.¹

According to tradition, it was Maktum who managed the conquest by gaining control of a fort which dominated the town: As the story goes, Maktum, rather than assaulting the fort, decided to take it by a ruse. He ordered a ring carved with a seal like that used by the sheikh of Abu Dhabi to identify his correspondence.² This Maktum used to seal a forged letter instructing the ruler of Dubai to turn the fort over to him. When the letter was presented to the governor, it was accepted as legitimate and Maktum and 'Ubaid won Dubai without firing a shot.

A few months later, in September, Maktum and 'Ubaid, became fearful that Khalifa might attempt once again to

¹After 'Ubaid's death in 1836 Maktum ruled alone. Lorimer, op. cit., pp. 782, 1765.

²One version of the story says that Tahnun's ring, stolen from the body at the time of his death was used to seal the letter.
subordinate the Al Bu Falasah. They as a result, entered into the first of many conspiracies designed to protect Dubai's independence. The new rulers joined with Sheikh Sultan of Sharjah, long a rival of Abu Dhabi, and agreed to attack Abu Dhabi and destroy Khalifa, while the men of Abu Dhabi were still at the pearling grounds.

Dubai, showing for the first time the power she was later to wield in the Gulf, called in her pearling craft, and in all gathered some eighty boats manned by seven hundred men. Sharjah contributed twenty-two boats and more than five hundred Qawasimis. The plan was to land a force from the sea close by the town and conduct a surprise attack at daylight. The plot was detected, however, when it was realized that Sharjah's and Dubai's boats were missing from the pearling banks. Khalifa did not have time to call in his pearling fleet, but was able to mass a large force of Bani Yas and Manasir bedouin who had not taken part in pearling.

During the night of September 10th, the invaders landed some distance from the town, planning to strike at dawn. But as light began to touch the beaches, the attackers suddenly discovered that they were not faced by an empty town, but were surrounded by a vastly stronger force. Taking flight, they were shocked again to find that most of their boats had
been left groaned by the ebbing tide. Of the rest of the story history tells us only that the invaders suffered some thirty killed and the loss of sixty-six boats. Whether the tribesmen permitted the men from Dubai and Sharjah to escape with a lesson well learned, or whether the some eleven hundred survivors\textsuperscript{1} simply crowded themselves the remaining thirty-six boats that still floated, fought off their attackers and sailed away will probably remain unknown. (But anyone who has seen how densely Arab boats are packed with people in routine service would not question that in an emergency thirty or more men would crowd themselves onto almost any craft larger than a rowboat.\textsuperscript{2})

Undaunted by their earlier failure, the sheikhs of Dubai and Sharjah joined forces for another attack on Abu Dhabi, this time with the assistance of Lingeh, a port on the southern coast of Iran, and Ajman. In November the combined fleets of the four towns sailed to Abu Dhabi, bombarding it for three days. They were unable, however, to do material damage because the accuracy of the fire from shore kept them at too great a distance. The leaders then decided to blockade Abu Dhabi from the sea. This maneuver, which lasted until Spring,

\textsuperscript{1}Fewer than that if part returned by land, which is doubtful considering the distance involved and the nature of the pursuers.

\textsuperscript{2}It is interesting to note that local historians in Dubai claim this attack as a major victory for Dubai.
resulted in the capture of some thirty Abu Dhabi boats, but was also rendered ineffective by the fact that the land routes to Abu Dhabi remained open. Sharjah attempted to send a ground force to close off the landward accesses, but the Wahhabi governor at Buraimi intruded on the side of Abu Dhabi and drove back the force from Sharjah.

Again the conflict had been indecisive although both those in the town and on the sea had probably suffered considerably from the prolonged operation. As the pearling season approached, all sides agreed to a truce, ending the blockade and returning all the vessels captured by both sides during the two campaigns.

These events, did accomplish one matter of importance: Abu Dhabi formally relinquished all claim to Dubai, and Dubai became independent under the protection of Sharjah.

The First Twenty Years

Within three years after independence Dubai became embroiled in an almost continuous chain of conspiracies and petty wars on land. Few of these conflicts were to have had any material effect either upon the situation in Dubai at that time or upon its future, but all were indicative of the life of those relatively primitive tribes as they engaged
in what one sheikh, regretting the more peaceful days of
the present, recently called "our favorite pastime."

In 1837, Dubai incurred the wrath of Sheikh Khalifa
of Abu Dhabi, when Maktum gave refuge to a group of Qubaisat,
a tribe that had defected from Abu Dhabi, and the following
year, when Dubai's fleet had left for pearling, Khalifa
attacked the town. The Al Bu Falasah immediately returned
from the pearl banks, and with aid from Sharjah drove the
Abu Dhabi force from the area.\(^1\) The following year, Dubai
became involved in a blood-feud with Umm al-Qaiwain, which
was inconclusive but developed a hostility between the two
sheikhdoms that was to last for some years.

In 1840, apparently through the connivance of Sheikh
Maktum of Dubai, a son of the Sheikh of Sharjah attempted
a coup against his father, Sheikh Sultan. In reprisal,
Sultan decided to reduce Dubai and remove the population.
Calling on assistance from Maktum's enemies in Abu Dhabi
and Umm al-Qaiwain, Sultan gathered a force. But just
as the attack was about to begin, Maktum in a masterful
piece of Arab statecraft, offered his submission to Sultan,
accompanied by a sizeable bribe. Sultan immediately withdrew
his forces, leaving his indignant allies to conclude the

\(^1\) Mann, pp. 40-41.
affair as best they could.

Dubai was safe only temporarily. That same year, the sheikhdom was weakened when some five hundred of the town’s population left to escape an epidemic in the area. Sheikh Khalifa of Abu Dhabi, noting the weakened condition of Dubai, launched a surprise attack by land. The town fell quickly and Khalifa’s forces ravaged nearby date groves, plundered the town and destroyed all the provisions of food there. Maktum called upon Sharjah for assistance and Khalifa, after a raid against Sharjah in repayment for Sheikh Sultan’s recent lack of good faith, withdrew to Abu Dhabi, leaving a heavy toll of destruction.

With the truces then currently limiting warfare at sea, Abu Dhabi with its superior ground forces was fast emerging as the major power on the coast. Perhaps acknowledging this strength, Maktum travelled to Abu Dhabi in October, 1842, and initiated a peace settlement. The following March Khalifa paid a return visit to Dubai and the solidarity appeared confirmed.

This alliance was in the succeeding months to stand Dubai in good stead. In November 1843, a group of Ghafalah, a tribe living in the interior but loyal to Sharjah, raided a caravan belonging to Dubai. Sheikh Maktum took revenge by hunting down the Ghafalah, and killing a number of them.¹

¹Maktum was victorious, but suffered an injury that cost him the sight of one eye.
This confrontation with a tribe loyal to Sharjah might well have brought a reaction from Sultan, but as a result of the new alliance between Dubai and Abu Dhabi, he seems to have held back for a more auspicious time.

Meanwhile, in the interior, events were taking place which would long effect Dubai and the remainder of the Trucial Coast. The Wahhabi empire, defeated early in the century by Egypt, was rising again in power under the energetic Saudi Emir Feisal. The sheikhs of the Trucial Coast knew that it would not be long until the House of Saud again sought to dominate Buraimi and the coastal region. They called on the British Political Resident for assistance, but found that Britain was still not prepared to become involved in affairs on shore.

Khalifa decided to act on his own. He moved out of Abu Dhabi with a large force, and gathered the interior tribes together to oppose the Wahhabi invasion. By October, 1843, the British Agent at Sharjah reported that "all the tribes" had entered into agreements with Khalifa and had become "united as one." Yet despite the obvious leadership

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1 Letter from Moolah Moussein, Native Agent at Sharjah, to Capt. S. Hennell, the British Resident, 8 October 1844, in the files of the Bahrain Archives, Book 143, pp. 473-474, quoted in the Memorial of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on Arbitration Concerning Buraimi and the Common Frontier Between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia, 2 vols, 1955.
and power of the Abu Dhabi sheikh, it would have been too much to expect that the tribes, whose loyalties were at best flexible, would long retain their enthusiasm. Early in 1845 when the Wahhabi force arrived in Buraimi, they occupied the area with apparent ease. Many among those who had just expressed their fealty to Khalifa rushed to welcome them.  

In 1846, the entire Trucial Coast, with the possible exception of the sheikhdom of Ras al-Khaimah, was involved in a war by Sharjah's Sheikh Sultan bin Saqr, who resolved to annex Umm al-Qaiwain and Ajman, and to revenge himself for Maktum's victory over the Ghafalah by crippling Dubai. This was to serve the further end of creating a balance to the overwhelming power of Abu Dhabi. Sultan also planned to limit the growth of Dubai by building a number of towns at Abu Hail, on the coast within his territory, but only five miles from Dubai. Maktum resolved to prevent this, and formed an alliance with the Sheikhs of Umm al-Qaiwain and Ajman. Sultan considered the inexperience of the new Sheikh Sa'id, of Abu Dhabi, whom Lorimer says was "unversed

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1 In July 1845 Khalifa was assassinated, and following a series of coups and murders, the Bani Yas selected Sa'id, a son of the former ruler, Tahnun, as sheikh. Sa'id would govern Abu Dhabi until 1855.
in Qawasimi duplicity," and proposed a counter-alliance, to which Sa'id agreed.

Hostilities had just broken out, when the fighting was interrupted by the arrival off Sharjah of a British and Indian naval squadron commanded by Commodore Sir H. Blackwood, R.N., who urged their sheikhs to suspend their hostilities until the matter could be referred to the Political Resident for mediation. Sultan and the other sheikhs agreed, but on the departure of the fleet, Sultan immediately broke his promise and resumed building at Abu Hail. When the Assistant Political Resident, Captain Kemball, arrived in March, 1846 to promote a reconciliation on behalf of the Resident, he found a full-scale war had begun throughout the Coast and his efforts proved futile. In November Sultan of Sharjah suffered the loss of his son Saqr, killed in an attack on Umm al-Qaiwain, and immediately he requested and signed a truce of six months' duration. Sultan again resorted to duplicity, for no sooner had the truce been signed, then he resumed building and instigating against Maktum. The truce, surprisingly, ran its course and when it expired Sultan met with Sa'id again, agreeing to reduce Dubai. There are few details available concerning the events that followed, but it is known that in February or March, Maktum, who could see the inevitability of his
destruction, threw himself into the arms of Sheikh Sultan and concluded a peace with him, while remaining at war with Abu Dhabi. Maktum had chosen to make a settlement with Sultan in the hope that the construction at Abu Hail would be stopped and the towers torn down. This Sultan was not prepared to do, with the result that Sharjah continued this encroachment on the territory of Dubai.

Despite this affront, the area remained quiet until January 1848, when Sharjah made an independent attack upon Ajman. This show of strength by Sultan brought Dubai and the other smaller sheikhdoms in league against Sultan. Abu Dhabi was freed then from concern about Sharjah, and its ruler, Sa'id, turned his attention to ejecting the Wahhabis from Buraimi.

Sa'id had little difficulty in massing a force and driving the Wahhabis from the oasis. The Wahhabi survivors took refuge at Sharjah, their leader immediately setting about to gather support along the coast for an attack on Abu Dhabi. So great was this threat to Sa'id that he sought the intervention of the Sherif of Mecca and willingly gave up his occupation of Buraimi, whereupon the Coast returned to its normal state of tension.¹

¹ Lorimer, op. cit., pp. 707, 713-715.
Prior to this latest incursion, Dubai had never dealt in association with the Wahhabis, but now with the power of the House of Saud firmly established on the Trucial Coast, Maktum established a working relationship with them, and soon joined them in plotting against Abu Dhabi.\(^1\) In November 1849, Maktum and Sultan attempted to weaken Abu Dhabi by encouraging the potentially dissident Qubaisat to migrate once again to Khor al-‘Odaid on the Qatar coast. They convinced the Qubaisat that the Wahhabi Emir Feisal would build them a town so that they could resume their independence. True or not, many of the Qubaisat migrated to their former location. Indicating that Sa'id may have been advancing in statecraft, he immediately imprisoned those Qubaisat who remained in Abu Dhabi. The leaders of the tribe were therefore forced to return to negotiate for the release of their kinsmen. Sa'id welcomed them, but during the night had their boats dismantled. Having no means of escape, they had no recourse but to meet Sa'id's terms, which involved the return of the tribe and penalties which rendered the Qubaisat powerless to cause further trouble.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) There are those in Dubai today who claim that the Al Bu Falasah were never influenced by the Wahhabis and never dealt with them in friendship.

Through 1853 the Trucial Coast, as it now came to be known, remained in relative peace. The sheikhs had reconciled themselves to the de facto occupation of Buraimi by the Saudis,\(^1\) thereby dissipating the main source of friction in the area. This is demonstrated by the fact that when Emir Feisal sent his son Abdullah to Buraimi, to affirm a Saudi suzerainty over the entire coast, Sa'id Ibn Buti, now ruler of Dubai following the death of his brother Maktum,\(^2\) and the other sheikhs immediately expressed their fealty to the Wahhabi leader.

The situation at the time was described as follows:\(^3\)

These States are independent, but acknowledge the feudal supremacy of the Wahhabi ruler whenever his own power or their dissensions place him in a position to exercise it. Their chiefs are expected to afford military aid in his expeditions, and to furnish supplies to his troops when present...

For the first—and last—time in recorded history the sheikhdoms of the Trucial Coast became united under one leadership.

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\(^1\) Lorimer, *op. cit.*, p. 708.

\(^2\) Maktum had died in 1852. The new ruler Sa'id Ibn Buti should not be confused with the then current ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sa'id Ibn Tahnun.

The Perpetual Treaty of 1853

With the establishment of the aggressive Wahhabis on the Trucial Coast, Britain feared, and with good reason, a resumption of piracy and resumed threats to her shipping. But the Wahhabis showed no interest in confronting British naval power, and as for the Trucial sheikhs, they had learned over the previous decade the advantages of peace at sea.

When in May of 1853 the Ten Year Maritime Truce was about to expire, the new Political Resident, Captain Kemball, had little difficulty in convincing the Trucial Coast rulers to agree to a Treaty of Peace in Perpetuity. Signed for Dubai by Sheikh Sa'id, the treaty stipulated that the sheikhdoms observe a cessation of hostilities at sea "for evermore," that in the event of an act of aggression at sea the rulers were to punish the perpetrators and to afford full redress, and that the sheikhs would not retaliate in the event of aggression but would turn the matter over to the British for disposition. The final provision, which provided that Britain would watch over and enforce the peace at sea, constituted the first formal declaration by Britain of her assumption of direct responsibility for the sheikhdoms.

And thus did Great Britain, after more than forty years of effort, bring about peace in the waters of the
Persian Gulf, a peace that has lasted with few violations until today.
CHAPTER III

PEACE, PEARLS, PROSPERITY
1843 - 1906

During the latter half of the 19th century important changes took place in the lives of Dubai and the Trucial Coast. In contrast with earlier years, which had seen continuous conspiracy, raiding and warfare among the sheikhdoms, outbreaks of violence during this period were relatively few. The peace that reigned, particularly at sea, permitted the pearling industry to flourish and to double and triple in productivity, bringing heretofore unknown prosperity to the region. Britain, omnipresent, established firm control over the coast, suppressing the traditional traffic in slaves and arms and resisting the advances of an assertive Persia and a dying but momentarily revived Ottoman Empire.

The Wahhabis, while they remained, proved a positive force for peace. At sea, they did not attempt in the face of obvious British naval superiority to resume their holy war, and on land, their position solidified, they took pains to prevent fighting among the sheikhdoms. Britain at this time, although still resisting involvement ashore, appears to have been satisfied with this Wahhabi policy and to have supported it. The sheikhdoms on their part, seem
to have been grateful for quiet after the hardships of
the previous turbulent twenty-five years, and at least
while the Wahhabis remained dominant, largely withheld
themselves from intrigue. In 1869, however, the Wahhabis
were driven from the coast and for a time the sheikhdoms
took up again their pattern of raid and reprisal.

Two factors contributed to the instability of the
area following the defeat of the Wahhabis: the overwhelming
power and determined militancy of Abu Dhabi, and the breakup
of Sharjah's control over the Qawasimi sheikhdoms of Ajman,
Umm al-Qaiwain and Ras al-Khaimah. Sheikh Sultan of Sharjah
had died in 1866, leaving each of his subject principalities
to a descendant; rivalries sprang up immediately between
these sheikhdoms and weakened any possible opposition they
might have offered to Abu Dhabi's aggressiveness. Abu Dhabi
was now ruled by Sheikh Zaid Ibn Khalifa, who would, with
the breakup of Qawasimi unity, begin raiding along the coast
in a campaign that was to last intermittently until 1879,
when an atmosphere of general exhaustion settled upon the
coast.

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1In that year, the Wahhabi leaders, having been
frustrated previously in adding Muscat to their domain,
attempted once more to conquer that area, but were defeated
by a combined Muscati-bedouin force. This ended Wahhabi
influence on the Trucial Coast for nearly a hundred years.

2Mann, op. cit., p. 64. Zaid, who came to power in
1855, made his pilgrimage to Mecca in 1880, and from that time
until his death in 1909, worked diligently to maintain peace
on the coast.
Dubai, despite more than a quarter-century of warfare going on around her, managed for the most part to remain on good terms with Abu Dhabi, participating in conflicts only when forced to do so, and apparently cooperating in reaching settlements. With this long respite from warfare, Dubai would begin to focus on commerce, and though not as strong militarily as Abu Dhabi, would thrust herself into the twentieth century as the most important of the Trucial Coast sheikhdoms.

Rise of the Pearling Industry

Along the northeast coast of the Arabian Peninsula, between Dubai and Kuwait, lies one of the largest natural pearl fisheries in the world. The lovely satin pearls gathered up from these beds by Arab divers for centuries had graced the throats of fashionable women from India to Europe, and provided a major share of the livelihood of the people of these coasts.

Prior to the truces of the 1830's and 40's the full potential of the industry had never been realized. Pearling had traditionally been carried out in an atmosphere of hostility and fear. Feuds ashore often rode with the fleets to sea, resulting in raids back and forth among the
pearling boats. Too, strong fleets on occasion either prevented weaker ones from taking part in the pearling, or simply had destroyed them; in either case, ruin followed quickly to the weaker home port in terms of lost boats, investments and manpower.

With the British-enforced peace at sea and developing markets in Europe and the United States, pearling rapidly increased in productivity. Lorimer indicates that the registered exports from the Trucial Coast in 1873 were only Rs 118,000, while in 1903-04, the value reached Rs 9,000,000.\(^1\) By 1900 some 35,000 men from the sheikhdoms earned their living at sea from pearling, and this figure did not include the families of these men, nor the native financiers and merchants, large and small with their dependents, who lived largely on returns from the industry.\(^2\) Although there are no precise figures available, Dubai is known at the turn of the century to have operated some 335 boats\(^3\) manned by nearly 7000 men, the majority of these engaged in pearling.\(^4\)

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\(^1\)These figures are in Indian Rupees, the medium of exchange at the time. At present exchange rates, whose consideration is at best of limited value, Rs 9,000,000 would equal about $900,000. A small additional income came from the oyster shells, sold in bulk for mother-of-pearl.

\(^2\)Lorimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 2220, 2252.

\(^3\)One source gives a figure of 500 as the number of boats sent out of Dubai to the pearling banks in 1900.

\(^4\)Lorimer, *op. cit.*, p. 2256.
So much a part of life was pearling in Dubai and the Trucial Coast that it demands description here.

Each Spring along the Trucial Coast the towns would begin to increase their pace of activity as the diving community made ready for the pearling season which would follow in the Summer. Boats were cleaned, repaired and outfitted, mounting the huge oars that would maneuver them over the pearl banks. The captains (nakhodas) consulted with their merchant-sponsors, to whom they were usually in debt from previous years, concerning the financing required for the current season. Although the nakhodas generally owned their own boats, the merchants generally controlled the nakhodas, through loaning money at high interest rates (up to 25% for a season). In turn each nakhoda usually had a string of divers—often bedouin who came to the coast each year for the pearling—who were obliged to dive for him because of debts from previous diving seasons. As the date of departure approached, these men, plus the slave-divers, who did much of the actual diving during earlier years, would begin arriving. Food, largely rice, dates, coffee, sugar and a few spices would be put aboard and the water tanks filled.

On the appointed day, usually early in May, began
the Ghaus al-Kabir, literally the "big diving," and the dhows would start moving out. The departure of the fleet was an event of great promise and took on the air of a celebration, despite the fact that for the next 130 days or so those men on the boats would know little beyond discomfort, hardship and perhaps death. In an excellent description of a large pearling boat moving out from Dubai in the early 1920's, Paul W. Harrison writes:

The great boat moved majestically down the lagoon and out to sea. There were fifteen to twenty enormous oars on each side and each oar was manned by two divers. The oarsmen swung down the lagoon with a stateliness that I have never seen surpassed, the men chanting as they worked...in a rhythm that had all the swing of a regiment off to war or a football team on its way to a game. There was a splendid silk flag flying at the stern, and the great ship went out to sea with every small boy in Dibai (sic.) wishing he was on board. I felt the thrill of it myself and the Baluch boy that I had with me as a medical assistant had hard work to keep both his feet on the ground. "Oh Sahib," he said, "it makes me want to go with them."

Once beyond the harbor and into the open sea, the nakhoda would point the bow of his boat toward a pearl bank that he hoped might be productive that year. The banks begin a few miles west of Dubai and continue up the coast past Bahrain, between twenty and seventy miles off-shore.

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1 In The Arabs at Home (New York: Crowell, 1924), p. 73. The average pearling craft carried only about sixteen men.

2 Pearl-bearing oysters often are found near shore, but the best tend up be farther out, unfortunately for the divers, in deep water.
The nakhoda, assuming he had reasonable experience, probably could steer directly to any number of individual banks, using sun, stars, compass, bearings on land, the color and depth of the sea and the nature of the bottom.

Once over the chosen bank, the hard and dangerous work of pearling began. The crew would fasten the great oars, which had been shipped during the sail to the banks, in place extending horizontally out over the water. To each oar the men would attach a rope, at the end of which hung a lead weight, or more often, a heavy stone. Later the diver would stand on this weight as he was lowered quickly to the bottom by his "hauler."¹

Each diver prepared himself by stripping off his clothing (unless there were jellyfish around, in which case he would wear a long white shirt-like garment), putting on a nose-clip and plugging his ears with bees' wax or cotton. Just prior to entering the water he would slip on a set of finger-guards as protection against the sharp oyster shells, hang a bag of coir matting around his neck or waist for the shells he would gather, and attach a second rope, by which he would be hauled to the surface, around his waist.

¹Arabic: Saib.
Lowering himself into the water, the diver would stand on the weight, and he lowered swiftly to the bottom. He might have been going as deep as 95 feet, but usually only to between fifty and seventy feet, the maximum depth that normally could be endured for long. In excess of this, the hardship would increase greatly, and at much over eighty feet the strain would become so great that the men often drowned.

Once on the bottom, the diver moved typically with one hand and one foot on the bottom, propelling himself with the other arm and leg. Finding oysters, the diver would gather them into his bag, and out of breath after between forty seconds and a minute, would signal to his hauler to bring him to the surface. He might have gathered only three shells in that dive, or if oysters were plentiful perhaps up to twenty; these he would be empty out onto the deck. After resting a few moments, during which time he might take a puff or two on a water-pipe, the diver would descend again. Generally divers made about fifty dives in one day, but if the water were cold few could stand more than ten to twenty.

The physical toll on these divers was terrible. The constant exposure to the relentless sun and salt water,
the sparse diet, the exertions of the diving, and the
effects of prolonged periods at depth imposed a severe
hardship. Moreover there were stinging jellyfish to be
contended with and the everpresent danger of sharks lurking
in the often muddy waters. During 1900, some thirty divers
were attacked by sharks; such was the danger of pearling
that the value of a diver was not measured by his physical
stamina so much as by his daring.

Work continued until sunset, when evening prayers
were said, then, since the divers had eaten at most a few
dates all day (the Arabs believed diving could be accomp-
lished only on a near-empty stomach) they ate a heavy meal,
usually of fish, rice and dates. After a few cups of Arabic
coffee and a pipe or two, the day ended.

The following morning at sunrise the crew came
awake to pray. Then came the opening of the previous day's
catch of oysters. Typically the men sat along the sides of
the boat in two rows, a small pile of shells in front of
each one. Under the eye of the captain who placed himself
high in the stern, the men would cut open the shells, search-
ing all the spots that might conceal pearls. When a pearl

\[1\text{For an excellent description of the hardships of}
pearling, see Allan Villiers, \textit{Sons of Sindbad} (London: H\ö dder
and Stoughton), 1940.\]
was found, if it was small as most were, it was wiped off on a big toe of the diver, where it would adhere because of its dampness. After a while some men might have rows of tiny white pearls lined up along the length of their big toes. When the work was done or if a particularly good pearl was found, the captain would collect all the pearls into a red cloth for safekeeping.

This completed, the divers might eat a few dates, take a sip of coffee and begin the day's diving, continuing until 1:30 or 2 p.m. when an hour was taken for prayers, coffee and rest. And so it would go throughout the season, barring bad weather and illness.¹

There were few treatments available to anyone who became ill other than a few herbs and cauterizing with a hot iron, perhaps on the back of the neck for a headache and on the back of the hand for certain other ailments.

There were distractions which relieved the harsh life aboard. When several boats from friendly areas were working the same banks, as they often did, occasionally the crews would pay calls back and forth in the evenings,

¹ Work also stopped during the month of Ramadan when it occurred during the pearling season.
sharing coffee, sweets and tobacco in the fashion of Arab hospitality ashore. During diving, if a diver discovered a particularly good tabrah, or mound of shells, he was often treated with a gift of clothing by the nakhoda, the rest of the crew receiving smaller presents. The man who found a pearl of high value was also rewarded.¹ And each few weeks the boats put into some port for water and food.

As the end of the season approached, the nakhoda who had been designated by his home port as admiral of the fleet, began to consider the day of return. His decision was based primarily upon the temperature of the water. As September wore on and the water approached being too cold for diving to be feasible, the admiral would announce the date on which the season would end. Had each captain been permitted to determine the date of returning to port for himself, there would have been chaos and perhaps mutiny, for the premature departure of even one boat was sufficient to cause a strike by all the remaining divers who heard of it. In this way, everyone returned on the same day and the possibility of friction was alleviated.²

¹Lorimer, op. cit., pp. 2231-32.
²Ibid. Some regions participated in an extension of the season, the Ghaus al-Raddah, which ran for about three weeks following the regular season.
Once in port the serious business of selling the pearls began. If a nakhoda were fortunate enough to be out of debt, he might sell his pearls to the highest bidder. If, on the other hand, he had been financed by a merchant, the chances were that he would have to accept the price that worthy offered him, one generally lower than the going market. In this case, unless his catch were particularly good the nakhoda might fall even more in debt the following year.

Until the turn of the century most pearls were taken to Lingeh for sale, but after a customs station was established there by the Persian Government, buyers—mostly Persians and Indians—came directly into the sheikhdoms. Bombay became a major center for the Eastern pearl trade, so much so that French firms maintained establishments there throughout the year, and during the periods of selling, sent representatives into the Gulf. Locally, much of the trade was taken over by Indian and Persian merchants, who gradually gained control of the local markets, to the great disadvantage of the nakhodas and crews.

No matter to whom the pearls were sold, prices were subject to wild fluctuation. They rose and fell with the whims of fashion in Paris, London and New York, and with the success or failure of often outrageous speculations.
among the pearl traders. Prices could double or halve between seasons with obvious effects upon those involved.

On selling his pearls, the nakhoda had to distribute shares. Each diver and helper received a certain percentage after the cost of their food and the amount of any previous loans had been deducted. The nakhoda also had to pay taxes and shares to the ruler for various costs involved in administering and defending the sheikhdom as well as a percentage of the sale price of any pearl above a certain value.

Despite the weight of the payments to crew and ruler, a nakhoda if fortunate enough to remain out of debt himself and to bring in good catches, could become wealthy and begin financing other boats as well as operate his own. As to the pearlers and helpers, unless they were very lucky, their lives—and on occasion those of their sons—were mortgaged and they had no choice but to return each year to the banks. The domination thus gained by the nakhoda over his divers served to his advantage, but not totally so. While the diver was obligated to dive for him, the nakhoda was equally obligated to loan his divers enough to maintain themselves after their money ran out, frequently having to go into debt himself to provide the money. Occasionally
in dealing with the illiterate divers, nakhdas overcharged outrageously, but these instances were curbed to some extent by the fact that divers could take such grievances before their sheikhs for justice. And if a sheikh felt that a diver had been mistreated, he would simply write "paid" across the debtor's ledger page.

Pearling was to continue virtually unchanged throughout the period under study here and until the 1930's when the cultured pearl developed by Japan, plus economic changes in the West, brought rapid decline to the pearling industry on the Trucial Coast.

Britain's Changing Role on the Trucial Coast

In the latter part of the 19th century Britain took an increasingly active role in affairs of the Trucial Coast. More and more regularly Britain interfered in the economics and relations between the sheikhdoms, settling disagreements, protecting the local pearling industry, warding off intrusions by foreign Powers, suppressing the slave and arms trades, and finally establishing her control

1 Sir Charles Belgrave tells the story of a diver whom he asked about the origin of pearls. This man said, "When it rains the oysters come up to the surface. They open their shells and receive drops of rain. These drops become pearls." Personal Column, cited in Samy H. Abboud, "Fishing for Pearls," Middle East Forum, Vol. 38, No. 7, Summer 1962, p. 69.
Protection of the Pearling Industry

Britain, ultimately to the great advantage of Dubai and the Trucial Coast, interceded in two matters relating to the pearling industry: the control of debts and the protection of the pearl banks.

As has been indicated, relatively large obligations were accumulated in the financing of the pearl trade, and not all were paid. Through the late 19th century an increasing number of debtors absconded from their home sheikhdoms, leaving their debts behind and seeking refuge elsewhere along the coast. Tension over this practice very nearly erupted into fighting on several occasions, notably in 1871, when a crewman from Dubai abandoned his debts and fled to Abu Dhabi.

The British, concerned at the possible repercussions of widespread absconding in generating hostilities among the sheikhdoms, were impelled toward intervention. In 1879 the Political Resident called the sheikhs together to sign a Mutual Agreement to work together to prevent the escape of debtors. In this document the sheikhs agreed to restore runaways to their lawful rulers and to pay a fine and all
claims against any runaway harbored by them. In the event of dispute the rulers were to hold a mejlis to settle the matter, the majority vote at this meeting to be binding upon the sheikh concerned. This agreement proved to be the solution to the debtor problem.

The other subject about which the British concerned themselves, was that of repelling attempts by foreign elements to encroach upon the pearling banks. As the productivity of pearling and world demand for pearls increased, so did interest on the part of promoters, largely European, who began as early as 1857 to attempt penetration of this traditionally tribal industry, and exploitation of the pearl banks by using modern procedures and technology.

These intrusions ran directly counter to the desires of the British by many of whom the Gulf was now considered a British lake, and of the majority of the sheikhs, who understood well that their ultimate benefit would only be served by continuing the pearling industry as it was. From the British standpoint, foreign interests in the Gulf could have led to instability and a dilution of Britain's influence. To the tribesmen of the Gulf, all these pearling beds had been considered communal property, with few exceptions open to craft from any sheikhdom without payment.
Further, Britain knew that the introduction of modern diving and dredging equipment would fast deplete what had been for centuries a sufficiency of oyster beds serving the needs of a large population. As a result of these considerations, in what Sir Percy Cox called "one of the most worthy of Great Britain's self-imposed tasks," Britain dug in to protect the pearl beds for the Arab divers.

There were a number of efforts to invade the pearl banks but perhaps the most formidable was that in 1872 by the energetic and forceful Midhat Pasha, Wali of Baghdad, who sought the assistance of an English diving company to work the shores of the Ottoman Empire's holdings in the Gulf. The British, who had no basis for more than a protest, astutely volunteered the information to Midhat Pasha that should the Porte bring in a foreign company, or itself use modern equipment, the British would not be able to provide protection from whatever action the tribesmen might choose to take. Perhaps recalling the fierceness of these Arabs as pirates, the Porte finally dropped the matter.

But in 1903, after a number of other encroachments the entire problem came to a head. The rights of the Arabs

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1 In "Gulf Memories," op. cit.
to exclusive use of the pearl beds, lying as they were in international waters, was challenged, and the matter was referred to the Law Officers of the Crown for a decision. The ruling that resulted declared that, within waters considered territorial, the tribes were in fact entitled to exclusive rights to the pearl fisheries; that pearl banks outside these waters were also the exclusive property of the tribes, and that these rights should be protected by the Crown. Thus the matter was settled at least to the satisfaction of Great Britain and the people of the Gulf, if not to foreign interests. The importance of this decision was indicated in these prophetic words of Lorimer, who, speaking before trade and oil became important to the Gulf: "Were the supply of pearls to fail...the ports of the Trucial Oman, which have no other resources, would practically cease to exist."¹

In other areas as well British influence came to be felt along the coast. There is evidence for example that she began providing co-operative sheikhs with annual "gifts" to supplement their incomes, adding bonus payments for

¹op. cit., p. 2220.
especially good efforts, and continued to oversee the punishment of the occasional violators of the prohibitions against raiding at sea.

Britain Becomes the Most Favored Nation

In May 1871, the Ottoman Empire extended its holdings down the Gulf to include Qatar. The Bombay Government\(^1\) found itself confronting a powerful rival at the western border of the Trucial Coast. After some hesitation, however, it sent a British warship into the region of Khor al-Odai to discourage the ever-dissident Qubaisat, who had again broken with Abu Dhabi and settled at Khor al-Odai, from aligning themselves with the Turks. With this show of force, the Qubaisat fled to Doha, then under the domination of the Ottoman Empire. They later returned contrite to Abu Dhabi, leaving an empty buffer zone between Qatar and Abu Dhabi and lessening momentarily concern about Ottoman influence on the Trucial Coast.

Six years later, a threat came from another quarter. Persia (in 1877) attempted to gain a foothold on the coast by building an alliance with Dubai and Abu Dhabi. This plan,

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\(^1\)Which assumed the functions of the East India Company in 1858, when the latter organization was dismembered.
combined with the presence of the Turks in Doha, brought Great Britain to the realization that if she was to maintain control on the Trucial Coast, she would have to obtain a positive commitment to her position from the sheikhs.

The first step came when the Political Resident obtained written agreements from the rulers of the Trucial Coast that they would not enter into agreements with foreign nations other than Great Britain.¹

Following this preliminary move in 1892 Britain set about reinforcing her position by gaining acknowledgement of her favored position in the area.

This came directly on the heels of an attempt on the part of the French to entice the Sheikh of Umm al-Qaiwain into a relationship by offering him the right to fly French flags on his dhows. Had the Sheikh placed his boats under French registry they would have been freed from the anti-slavery agreements, which had been signed earlier by the sheikhs,² and from what often may have seemed bothersome

¹Lorimer, _op. cit._, pp 737-738. The States are still bound by this concession, the British handling their foreign relations, issuing visas, etc.
²See succeeding pages.
restrictions placed on his activities at sea by the British. Although the Political Resident received assurances of disinterest from Umm al-Qaiwain, the Government of India felt he should obtain a written agreement acknowledging Britain's pre-eminent position.

This agreement, still in force, is a model of one-sidedness. Its first provision states that the sheikhs will "on no account enter into any agreement or correspondence with any Power other than the British Government." The second provision obligates the sheikhs to prohibit, without the prior consent of the British Government, the residence within their territories of agents of foreign governments. The third declares that they will not "cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part of [their territories], save to the British Government."¹

Although it would be inconceivable in our own time for a sovereign Government to sign such a document, considering the status of the sheikhdoms, such action was quite logical. Under the tribal system, lesser sheikhs traditionally had found it advantageous to bind themselves

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¹Lorimer, op. cit., p. 741. The agreement was signed for Dubai by Sheikh Rashid Ibn Maktum, March, 1892.
to more powerful rulers, both for protection from other tribes and to prevent the stronger group from forcing this allegiance from them. Certainly to these sheikhs with their tiny principalities Great Britain must have loomed huge and omnipotent, and although they must often have been puzzled by the strange values of their mentor they at the same time saw obvious benefits to the association.

The relationship between the sheikhs and the British is perhaps no better illustrated than by the occasion in 1903 of a visit by Lord Curzon, then Viceroy of India, to the Trucial Coast. Lord Curzon, who was making tour of the Persian Gulf stopped at Sharjah on November 21 to meet with the sheikhs and to renew assurances and engagements. Among the sheikhs coming aboard the Curzon's ship, the Argonaut, was the Ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Maktum Ibn Hashar\(^1\) accompanied by one of his sons. Lord Curzon, who must have represented to these unsophisticated men the symbol of unimaginable power, spoke to them pointedly. He reminded them that a hundred years before there had been

constant trouble and fighting in the Gulf; almost every man...a marauder and a pirate; kidnapping and slave-trading flourished;

\(^1\)Who became ruler in 1894 on the death of Hashar Ibn Maktum.
fighting and bloodshed went on without stint or respite; no ship could put out to sea without fear of attack; the pearl fishing was the scene of armed conflict; and security of trade or peace there was none. Then it was that the British intervened...

Commenting that eleven years had passed since the last disturbance of peace, he asked, "Why should Great Britain continue to exercise her authority over your sheikdoms?"

The history of your families, and the present condition of the Gulf, are the answer. We were here before any other Power, in modern times, had shown its face in these waters. It was our commerce as well as your security that was threatened and called for protection. At every port along these coasts the subjects of the King of England still reside and trade. The great Empire of India, which it is our duty to defend, lies almost at your gates. We saved you from extinction at the hands of your neighbours. We opened these seas to the ships of all nations, and enabled their flags to fly in peace. We have not seized your territory. We have not destroyed your independence but have preserved it. We are not going to throw away this century of costly and triumphant enterprise; we shall not wipe out the most unselfish page in history. The peace of these waters must still be maintained; your independence will continue to be upheld; and the influence of the British Government must remain supreme.

Turning to conditions within the sheikdoms, Lord Curzon said:

The British Government have no desire to interfere, and have never interfered, in your internal affairs, provided that the Chiefs govern their territories with justice, and
respect the rights of foreign traders residing therein. If any internal disputes occur, you will always find a friend in the Political Resident, who will use his influence, as he has frequently done in the past, to prevent these dissensions from coming to a head, and to maintain the status quo, for we could not approve of one independent Chief attacking another Chief by land, simply because he was not permitted to do it by sea, and thus evading the spirit of his legal obligation. 1

Suppression of the Arms Trade

To the men of the Trucial Coast, with their heritage of constant inter-tribal strife, rifles were—and are—prized possessions. Ownership of a rifle was a symbol of manhood and status, and as money became available from pearling, a lively trade grew up in arms. Rifles manufactured in Europe found their way to the East African port of Zanzibar, where they were bought by local Arab traders and resold to merchants in the dhow trade between Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Rifles destined for the Trucial Oman were generally carried by dhow to Muscat, where they were resold and transported by caravan to Dubai or Ajman, the two centers of Trucial Coast trade. There they would be sold to tribes of the interior, or more often, smuggled

1 Extracts of Lord Curzon's speech, from Lorimer, op. cit., pp. 2637-2639.
in bales of goods to Persia and India.

The trade grew to huge proportions. An indication of its size is given by the number of rifles imported into Muscat. In 1895, as this commerce reached a peak, Muscat received 4350 rifles and some 604,000 rounds of ammunition; in 1896–97, the number increased to 20,000 rifles, accompanied by a proportionate number of cartridges.¹

Both the British and the Trucial Sheikhs opposed the arms trade. The British, who in 1897 were faced with a revolt of the border tribes of India, became concerned when they realized the extent that smugglers on the Trucial Coast were providing arms to the Indians. The sheikhs, for their part, were always concerned about the spread of arms to rivals, either within or outside their sheikhdoms.

In 1902, the sheikhs, led by Rashid Ibn Maktum of Dubai, and the Political Resident combined to halt arms trade but by then it was for all intents and purposes too late. Having reached its peak in 1896–97, the trade a year later began to die rapidly. The Government of India had begun to prohibit imports into India, and the local markets, and presumably those of Persia as well, had simply become glutted. Nevertheless an agreement was signed in November 1902,

¹Lorimer, op. cit., p. 2558.
under which the sheikhs promised "to absolutely prohibit the importation of arms into our respective territories, or the exportation therefrom." To service the small demand that remained, merchants turned to smuggling, and so the trade continues today. Its extent is reduced of course, but even now one of the major missions of the British Navy in the Gulf is to intercept dhows running arms into various ports of the Persian Gulf.

The End of the Slave Trade

From time immemorial the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula had carried on an active and wide-ranging slave trade. Even before the rise of Islam and the beginning of the great wave of Arab conquests in the 7th century, Arab traders from the Peninsula had long been established along a chain of slaving posts on the East African coast. A line of export, in Arab hands from beginning to end, ran from Central Africa to the shore of the Indian Ocean, and from there to the Red Sea, Oman, Persia, Iraq and the coasts of India. Along these routes were channeled a steady stream of slaves. In southern Iraq alone as early as the ninth century there were already several hundred thousands of African slaves.
Slavery was traditionally considered as a natural and necessary part of Arab life. It was profitable economically, both from the standpoint of trade and service, and it was sanctioned by the Koran as a lawful institution. Under Islam slaves had a well-defined legal status: masters could not mistreat them, were required to feed and clothe them and care for them, to provide a wife for each male slave, and to care for the slaves' children. Further, the status of a slave was not one of degradation. There are frequent incidents in which slaves, having embraced Islam, rose to high positions in governments and in royal households.¹

Most slaves who came into Arab hands were captured by armed parties which went out among the Negro villages of Africa, raiding and burning, and forcing into slavery those who survived the attacks. These unfortunates were passed along a chain of stations to the coast, and from there by dhow to the coastal slave markets of Zanzibar, Kilwa, and other centers. From there they were shipped as

¹That this still holds true is shown by the fact that within the last five years in a sheikhdom adjacent to the Trucial Coast, a sheikh's son, jealous at the position of power gained by one of his father's slaves, murdered the slave with a machinegun.
cargo throughout the Arab world.

The conditions under which the slaves were shipped along the coast of Africa to the trading centers were described by a Captain Moresley, of a British anti-slavery patrol ship. Commenting that the slave dhows were large open boats without decking, he added:

The Negroes are... stowed, in the literal sense of the word, first along the floor of the vessel, two adults side by side, with a boy or girl resting between or on them, until the tier is complete. Over them the first platform is laid, supported an inch or so clear of their bodies, when a second tier is stowed, and so on until they reach above the gunnals of the vessel. The voyage, they expect, will not exceed twenty-four or forty-eight hours; but it often happens that a calm or unexpected land breeze delays their progress. In this case a few hours are sufficient to decide the fate of the cargo. Those in the lower portion of the cargo that die cannot be removed. They remain until the upper part are dead and thrown over. And from a cargo of from 200 to 400 stowed in this way, it has been known that at the expiration of ten days not a dozen have reached Zanzibar.¹

Conditions on the dhows travelling on the long voyage from East Africa to Arabia and the Gulf were not so inhumane. Captain Colomb, commander of the British ship H.M.S. Dyrad, in 1873 described the treatment of slaves aboard the dhows:

¹Coupland, op. cit., p. 197.
Except that they are more crowded, I have not perceived that the conditions of the slave, in transit across the Arabian Sea, is very different from that of his master. The Englishman would probably succumb to the privations of the journey, but I have often heard it said on the spot, that no one should talk of the cruelty of the Arab to his slaves on the northern voyage, unless he were acquainted with the conditions under which he and his family performed the voyage of business or pleasure from Arabia to Zanzibar.

Captain Colomb stated that the crowded conditions aboard the dhows were obviously "an evil," yet he had seen cargoes of slaves, "plump, well-favoured, and not unhappy." But, he added, "if disease, want and crowding come together, then, God help the wretched items in that crowd."

In an aside whose reception in the hallowed halls of the Foreign Office can only be guessed, Captain Colomb said:

Yet again, I have to say that I could not choose off-hand whether I would rather spend a fortnight in the conditions of a slave in an Arab dhow not overcrowded, or in the conditions of a peasant in some cabins I have seen in the south of Ireland, whose masters were said to possess a considerable balance at their bankers...1

Of this aspect of the commerce in slaves, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf wrote in 1844:

1 Quoted in Wilson, op. cit., p. 226.
The treatment of the African slaves is at no time either severe or cruel. During the sea voyage they are not bound, or kept under particular restraint. Rice, dates, and fish, in sufficient quantities form their food, and a coarse cloth round the middle of the body constitutes their only clothing.\footnote{Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, No. 24, New Series, the Persian Gulf (Bombay, 1856), No. 24, New Series, the Persian Gulf, p. 635; cited by Wilson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 226. In contrast to this statement however, is the fact that one of the criteria for establishing a boat as participating in the slave trade was the presence of shackles and handcuffs aboard.}

While the Arabs may have treated the slaves humanely under normal conditions, should smallpox or other disease break out among them, those infected would summarily be thrown overboard. For the most part, however, their plight during the passage was no worse than those taken for granted by the Arabs, and once bought into a household, or for that matter even into pearling, their life was that of valued property and if health and economic aspects only are considered, certainly an improvement over that known to them in the African wilds.

Britain's opposition to the slave trade began to grow in the early 19th century following the publication in England of reports by travellers into the primitive African and Middle Eastern areas. As well, Rousseau's concepts of the "ideal state of nature" and of "the noble
savage" gradually created an aversion to the concept of man enslaved to man and a horror at the conditions under which the slave trade was being conducted. In 1772, slavery in the British Isles was abolished, and in 1807 and 1811, laws were passed barring the traffic in British possessions. In 1833, the owning of slaves in British dominions was ended.

In the Trucial Oman, Britain had registered a token resistance to slavery through the Treaty of 1820, but would not be able materially to affect the slave trade for some thirty-five years. Article nine of the treaty had classed the slave trade with piracy and, although they signed with obvious reservations the sheikhs had agreed that "friendly Arabs shall do nothing of this nature." The slave trade of course went on unabated following the Treaty.

In 1837, the Government of India agreed that although the slave trade was an evil, it could not press for the abolition completely. There were two reasons: 1) so much a part of life was the slavery among the Arabs that any ruler who agreed to its abolition would probably not have retained his seat through the night, probably losing his life in the process and 2), Britain was in no way ready to support the economies of the sheikhdoms should the income from this trade be lost or, for that matter to reimburse
owners for the hundreds of slaves that would be released. In either event, Britain saw that too aggressive a policy would result in upsetting the stability of the area, which apparently was more important at the time than effective action against the evils of the slave trade.

In 1838, however, Britain began to act. In those years, agreements were obtained from the sheikhs that their dhows might be detained and searched if suspected of carrying slaves outside a line crossing the Arabian Sea from Gwadar Head in what is now Pakistan, to the vicinity of the island of Socotra. Slaves found aboard were to be confiscated, and taken to Bombay. But so great did the size of this African slave colony in India become — and of such a disruptive force — that the freed slaves were later returned to East Africa.

In 1847 and 1856, in an effort to curb the forwarding of slaves into other regions, the sheikhs were required to sign a paper in which they agreed 1) to prohibit any export of slaves on their vessels, 2) to turn over to the British any slave shown to have been brought into their territories, and 3) to turn over to Britain any ship used in the commission of a slaving offense.

Despite these agreements and those signed by rulers in other areas of the Gulf, the trade continued almost
unabated. In 1856–57, an estimated 12,000 slaves were smuggled into the Gulf, while only 15 were captured and released.¹ As late as 1884, British officials at Dubai discovered that a cargo of fifty-four "freshly-run" slaves had been unloaded. Sheikh Sa'id Ibn Buti of Dubai, disregarding a protest by the British, permitted them to be sold, whereupon the Agent demanded the surrender of all recently captured slaves in the Trucial Oman. Shortly thereafter, the H.M.S. Dragoon visited the area with the Assistant Political Resident aboard, and recovered twenty-one slaves from the delivery at Dubai, and the sheikh himself produced four others. For each slave not recovered the sheikh had to pay a fine.²

With increasing British pressure, the slave trade finally slowed and changed in character. In 1896, with the British firmly in control of the routes to East Africa, and intercepting more and more shipments, the Arabs obtained slaves from the Wudam region of Baluchistan in Pakistan. Some are known to have been sold in Dubai, and presumably in other ports of the Trucial Coast. This new source was not to be available for long, however, because of constant

¹Lorimer, op. cit., p. 2493.
²Lorimer, op. cit., p. 2504.
interference by Britain.

By 1899, the Trucial Sheikhs could deny with some truth charges of transporting slaves by sea, although a few continued to filter into the region by land from Oman. The British, despite tremendous obstacles, had been successful in markedly reducing the traffic in Africans, although it was yet too soon to attempt to end slavery as an institution, as will be seen in a succeeding chapter.

Dubai at the Turn of the Century

As the 20th century opened Dubai was fast becoming established as the most important town on the Trucial Coast and as a major trading center for the southern Gulf.

There were several reasons for this growth. First was the enlightened rule of Sheikh Maktum Ibn Hasher, who ruled from 1894 to 1906. Unfortunately the available records tell little of this man or of his administration, beyond the important fact that he maintained Dubai as a free port, and encouraged the development of trade. Second was the location of Dubai on a navigable knor, which provided a protected harbor for the Arab dhows engaged in trade along the coast, with Iran, and along the Indian and East African coasts. Third was the establishment about 1900 of a customs station at the Persian port of Lingeh, which
had been for centuries a major trading center of the lower Gulf. The Persian Government applied its customs regulations stringently at Lingeh, and many Indian and Persian merchants migrated from there between 1900 and 1903, the lion's share coming to Dubai where trade was relatively unrestricted.

Following the arrival of these skilled traders, Dubai's importance grew rapidly, as shown by the number of ships calling there. In the early 1890's steamers seldom visited Dubai, but in the Winter of 1905-06 some thirty-four ships anchored off its shores to deliver cargo. Dubai at the turn of the century had become a regular port of call for steamers of the British India and of the Bombay and Persia steam navigating companies, the vessels of the former calling once each two weeks and of the latter as cargoes demanded.¹

As is the case today, the majority of goods received from the steamers was re-exported by dhow to other ports on the Gulf and by caravan to the interior, notably to Buraimi, which though controlled by Abu Dhabi and Muscat, lay closer to Dubai. Typically these ships unloaded dates

¹Lorimer, op. cit., p. 1440.
from Iraq (Dubai's production was small due to lack of irrigation), rice, wheat, cloth, spices, metals, rope and timber, chiefly from India. The only goods of local origin exported by Dubai were pearls, mother-of-pearl and dried fish.

Dubai town was growing as well. From at most a few hundred persons in 1833, the settled non-bedouin population had increased to 10,000 or more. The town was divided into three districts. The largest was Daira on the northeast side of the khor, which had some 1600 houses belonging to Arabs, Persians and Baluchis, a main bazaar of 350 shops, and a date grove a mile long. Shendagha, on the southwest side near the sea, had some 250 houses. Dubai proper, slightly inland from Shendagha, and populated mostly by Indians, had some 200 houses, fifty shops and the principal mosque. Ferry boats carried passengers between Dubai and Daira for a small fee which, incidentally, was not charged on Fridays to persons going to the mosque to pray. Five thirty-foot deep wells provided water for the town.

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1 Bedouin population aligned with Dubai numbered some 8000. Lorimer, op. cit., p. 1437.

2 Ibid., pp. 455-56. In typical—and much appreciated—detail, Lorimer also lists the livestock present: 1650 camels, 45 horses, 380 donkeys, 430 cattle and 960 goats.
Commercial facilities along the khor included a small quay for unloading of boats and 200 warehouses for storage of items for re-export. Merchants also operated dhows for handling the loading and unloading of the ocean-going ships that anchored offshore, and for Dubai's own export trade and pearling, there were some 400 craft based there,¹ some of them as large as 500 tons.

¹Lorimer, op. cit., p. 2320.
CHAPTER IV
SURVEY OF HISTORICAL EVENTS IN THE 20TH CENTURY
1906 - 1967

The next sixty-one years in the history of Dubai, from 1906 to 1967, were of momentous importance. During this period the sheikhdom would awaken to the modern world, engage in two wars-in-miniature, undergo extreme economic hardship, and finally, under able, progressive leadership would emerge as it is today, a flourishing up-to-date city state.

In this chapter only the major historical events leading to and paralleling the transformation of Dubai will be dealt with; the changing role of Great Britain, the development of trade, and the building of a new Dubai will be discussed in succeeding chapters.

The Rule of Dubai Prior to Modernization

Between 1906 and the late 1950's when Dubai began its startling program of modernization, it was ruled by Sheikh Buti Ibn Suhail, from 1906 to 1912, and Sa'id Ibn
Maktum, from 1912 to 1958. Of Buti little is known, and of his successor, Sa'id, hardly more. Although he was successful enough to retain power for forty-six years, he appears to have accomplished little other than modest encouragement to trade, the maintenance of reasonable law and order, and the operation of a small customs organization. A British official who knew Sa'id in the early 1950's, described him as a "benevolent old gentleman, but not very strong."

Under Sa'id, political organization followed the traditional pattern, although with increased British support and larger revenues from trade duties, the authority of the ruler began to harden. Tribal democracy gave way to a controlled autocracy, one until recently harrassed by intra-family jealousies, numerous attempts to assassinate the rulers, and finally, just prior to World War II, a minor revolution. Many of these troubles came as a result of Sa'id's conservatism in refusing to modernize his sheikhdom, and to put its finance on a sound footing.

Another possible cause of dissension was Sa'id's wife, Sheikha Hussa Bint al-Murr, who, by virtue of her

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1Sa'id to some extent turned the reins of government over to his eldest son, Rashid, in 1938. This will be discussed in detail in the last section of this chapter.

strong personality, gained great power and influence. She is said to have been active in public affairs, to have held public mejlises, and to have invested widely in Dubai businesses.¹

The net result of Sa'id's rule was that, until the late 1950's, Dubai would remain much as it had in the 19th century, a growing seaside town whose roots still lay deep in medieval Arab social, political and economic orders. Although the influx of merchants from Persia early in the century had infused greater vigor into trade, it had little effect on the character of Dubai itself, and did not contribute to the awakening of its people. Raiding and intermittent wars, slavery, poverty, illiteracy, disease and hardship continued as an integral part of everyday life.

¹She is also said to have taken up arms in tribal fighting, but this is strenuously denied by local historians.
Disaster Strikes Dubai's Economy

World War I touched Dubai and the Trucial States only lightly, but immediately following the cessation of hostilities and the resumption of normal world economic life, three situations arose outside the Persian Gulf that almost crippled Dubai and the other sheikhdoms. First was the large-scale adoption of oil power by coastal craft and steamers which occurred shortly after the war. Previous to this time, the Arab sailing dhows had been able to compete on favorable terms with European merchant ships for the carrying trade. They even had an advantage, in that not only were they as fast as the large European sailing vessels, but they could enter many areas that were closed to the larger ships; they could sail directly into the shallow coastal areas along the Gulf, whereas the European

1 The Ottoman Empire had, after the turn of the century, become closely aligned with Germany. Since the Ottomans controlled what is now Iraq and some territory extending down into the Persian Gulf, Britain feared, once the war began, that Germany might try to establish a base in the Gulf from whence to threaten British interests in India. As it turned out, although the Ottoman Empire eventually entered the war on the side of Germany, neither attempted to exploit this situation. Herbert J. Liebesny, "Administrative and Legal Developments in Arabia: The Persian Gulf Principalities," Middle East Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1, Winter, 1956, p. 34.
ships had to stand off at anchor and send their goods ashore by lighter. The widespread adoption of motive power by these ships gave them a speed and efficiency that in spite of their disadvantages, made them far superior to the Arab dhows. Merchants began sending their goods by steamer, and the Arab sailors, who for thousands of years had been equal to anyone on the high seas, found their business dwindling. In former times, faced with such an economic crisis, they might well have turned to slave-trading or to piracy. But times had changed, Britain's influence was too great, and the same technology which made the European ships superior eliminated any consideration of this course. As it was, they were left with poor cargoes—dates, timber, low-cost bulk items—and to smuggling.

The second and third blows that fell on Dubai's economy, and indeed on these throughout the Gulf, related to pearling. Of such impact were these that the pearling industry would never recover, and for many thousands of people along the Gulf, life would never be the same. Today, few would mourn the loss, but at the time the death of this hard, even cruel, way of life was an economic disaster.

Death of the Pearling Industry

The first event that struck the pearling industry
occurred in 1926 when cultured pearls from Japan entered world markets. At a time when sales were at a peak, when nations were riding the crest of the prosperity of the 1920's, and when there were those who could pay astronomical prices for the pleasure of rare pearls, suddenly pearls of near-perfect quality could be bought for relatively low prices. These pearls, as genuine as those developed naturally, differed only in that the particle which caused the pearl to form was implanted in the oyster artificially, rather than occurring by accident. Even an expert could hope to tell the difference only through the use of X-ray or by destroying the pearl. As might be expected, the natural pearl markets, which had always fluctuated widely, suddenly collapsed. Only the very rich and those who scorned "artificial" pearls gave it any support.

With the depression of 1929, the centers of wealth in Europe and the United States no longer had money to devote to such luxuries, and even that market declined. As the Western world began to recover, World War II struck.

Although these events wrote the end of the natural pearl industry, it was slow to die. The structure of the organization that backed it was too rigid, too many intertwined obligations were involved, too much investment had been made, and the people engaged in it were too conservative
for pearling to stop suddenly. One writer who toured the Gulf by dhow in 1939 described pearling as still active and still following its traditional methods and organization. But gradually as acknowledgement of market conditions became wider-spread, merchants and *nakhodas* entered other activities, as did their crews. In Dubai particularly, trade in other goods occupied the merchants; *nakhodas* and their crews turned to fishing and commerce, while the newly-developing enterprises that grew up around this trade—and later, the oil fields—offered a livelihood to others.

That the region suffered there is no doubt, but today pearling is looked down upon in Dubai. As one banker commented in early 1967, "Why would anyone here want to go pearling? Too many other jobs are available that are more profitable, and certainly easier."

Air Travel Comes to Dubai

In the late 1920's, Great Britain considered expanding its military and civil air traffic between the 

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1Alan Villars, *op. cit.*
United Kingdom and India. Routes were to follow the Persian Gulf from Iraq south-east and on to Karachi and India.\footnote{As they do today, depending upon over-flight authorizations.} The initial plan, adopted in 1928, called for the military route to follow the Arabian shore and commercial one the Persian coast, but due to difficulties with both the Persian Government and the Trucial Sheikhs, both routes eventually followed the Arab coast.

The establishment of landing facilities somewhere along the Trucial Coast became necessary, due to the limited range of the aircraft of that day. In 1927, when the idea was first broached, the rulers had been asked to accept petroleum storage facilities for the Royal Air Force on their land; all had refused, and the matter was dropped. Later, in 1931 or 1932, Britain sought permission to establish an air base at Ras al-Khaimah, and again was refused. The British then turned to Sheikh Sa'id of Dubai but he was not interested. Finally, the RAF reached an agreement with Sharjah, and although the original compact was to cover a period of only eleven years, the RAF base is still operational there, and being expanded.

In 1937, Great Britain approached Sa'id to accept
an agreement for the establishment of a seaplane landing base on Dubai creek. Perhaps regretting the importance and revenue he lost by refusing the RAF offer, Sa'id agreed readily. The arrangement provided for the landing of Imperial Airways aircraft and to the construction and operation of necessary support facilities. Sa'id was to receive Rs. 440 ($88) per month, plus a landing fee of Rs. 5 ($1) for each plane that landed. The following year the agreement was extended for five years at a rental of Rs. 940 ($188).\footnote{This period in Dubai and Sharjah is covered in some detail in Raymond O'Shea, \textit{The Sand Kings of Oman} (London: 1947). One must wonder in the light of its pious claims that it always gave the sheikhs a square deal, how HMG justified the low rentals paid for these landing rights, compared to that it would have had to pay the Persian Government for similar rights.}

With the coming of World War II, Dubai agreed to the construction of an airfield and military camp, and presumably profited materially from the arrangement. At the end of the war, the RAF withdrew, and with seaplanes no longer in fashion, its marine landing base was closed.

\textbf{Insurrection and a Final War with Sharjah}

The rule of Sheikh Sa'id was marred during the years 1929 to 1953 by a constant chain of insurrections
by dissident elements of the ruling family, one of which finally led to a fruitless war with Sharjah.

This type of problem is endemic to families in power on the Trucial Coast, yet two factors seem to have precipitated it: Sa'id's already-mentioned lack of forcefulness, and the changing status of rulers in general. Under the traditional system, ruling sheikhs, who were little better off than those who followed them, gained honor by being poor, their poverty clear evidence of their generosity and the degree to which they cared for their tribesmen. In earlier times as well, had there been serious objection to the sheikh's decisions, had he proved autocratic beyond the limits earned by the degree of respect in which he was held, or had another sheikh gained greater popularity, the ruler simply would have been deposed.

The British presence altered these functions and relationships, and tended to harden the position of the ruling sheikhs. Financial support, through which meaningful amounts of money came into the hands of rulers, raised them above the status of their former subject-peers, and increased their powers far beyond that possible under the traditional power structure. As a result, elements with and without the ruling families, who otherwise would have desposed a ruler they felt inappropriate, found themselves
restricted in their ability to act. The situation was further aggravated by the rulers becoming more autocratic as they grew in strength. The democratic bedouin system of leadership by respected elders evolved, then, into rule by power—although it must be emphasized that despite the new means available to a ruler to maintain himself in power, the people of necessity still had a voice, and within certain broad limits the people's will still had to be done.

Insurrections by cousins of Sheikh Sa'id took place five times between 1929 and 1940. The chief rival to Sa'id, and his regent Rashid, was Sheikh Mani' Ibn Rashid, a pearl merchant and modernist who gained wide popular support, particularly in Diera, for his progressive views. Mani' demanded reforms, including rule through a mejlis, or council of advisors, and curbs on the authority of the ruler and his supporters. ¹ Mani' and his supporters eventually gained control over Diera.

Sa'id and Rashid controlled the Dubai side of the creek. They enjoyed wide support, despite the fact that Sa'id allowed the sheikhdom's financial situation to become

¹Typical of the grievances was that concerning the ruler's slaves, who being immune to prosecution simply took what they wanted from shops as they passed through the souks.
so weak that he had to sell the customs revenues—a major source of income—to a Persian merchant, and is said also to have had to dispose of some of his household effects to obtain ready cash.

Hostilities broke out—some say in 1939, others 1940—out between the two factions, but ended momentarily when Sa'id agreed, through British mediation, to establish rule through the demanded mejlis and to implement certain fiscal reforms. These differences were, however, far from settled.

Rashid, in his role as regent, soon found a means of regaining control over the entire town. Whether this was planned or simply fortuitous is not known, but Rashid arranged to marry a daughter of Mani' living in Deira. In calling regularly on his prospective wife, Rashid crossed the creek to Deira, accompanied by a sizeable guard. At first Mani' and his followers were concerned about the presence of Rashid and an armed force, but as time passed, their suspicions waned. At this point, on one of his visits, Rashid carried out a surprise attack on Mani's house. There are many stories, unconfirmed, about how the women of the house held off the attackers until their men could escape. But in any event, those who were not killed, or—as one version of the story goes—blinded with kibab sticks, escaped to Sharjah where they
took refuge. With this threat ended, the 
mejlis was soon abolished.

The immediate tensions that arose between Rashid and the ruler of Sharjah would have precipitated war between the two sheikhdoms had not the Political Officer intervened. The ruler of Sharjah agreed to send most of the refugees away, and calm returned.

The next year, however, Sa'id's refugee cousins, having raised a body of followers, raided Dubai. They were defeated, apparently quickly, and once more sought haven in Sharjah. Rashid immediately declared war on Sharjah, but before hostilities arose, the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah intervened and arranged a truce, settling the affair.

Since those days there have been numerous attempts on the life of both Sa'id and Rashid, but with the exception of one plot against Rashid in 1951, all apparently have been instigated for reasons more doctrinally political than dynastic.

The 1945-1948 War with Abu Dhabi

The outsider, should his attention be caught by the tempests that brew up in this tiny teapot called the Trucial
Coast, might regard them as miniscule—and not without their humorous aspects—but to those involved they are as earth-shaking as global conflict.

The 1945–48 war between Dubai and Abu Dhabi, which amounted in fact to hardly more than a prolonged series of raids, has been the most important warfare on the Coast in the twentieth century. Its direct cause was oil, or the promise of it. With the end of World War II, the sheikhdoms waited impatiently for the return of the oil companies, which they felt would surely make the desert bloom with fields of oil derricks pumping up unimaginable quantities of Rupees. Since the borders among the sheikhdoms were not settled this was a propitious time for staking claims, establishing *faits accomplis* that would stand in good stead as bargaining points at the conference tables, when settlements were to be reached. Since these claims often involved territory over which others felt they claimed title, conflict was foreordained.

Such was the case between Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Since the matter of specific border points in the desert wastes between the two capital towns had arisen, there had been disagreement. Sheikh Rashid of Dubai contended that his territory began thirty-five miles southwest at khor Ghanadhah, while Sheikh Shakhbut unilaterally
established his border at Jubail, some eighteen miles closer to Dubai. Although causes of the fighting are not clear, it is known that Shakhbut attempted to enforce his claim by calling on the Manasir tribes of the interior to join him against Dubai, and small-scale raiding commenced.

Rashid acted immediately to establish his claim by sending a force by dhow down the coast to Khor Ghanadhah, where it landed. Unfortunately for Rashid this act constituted a breach of the Maritime Truce, and he was ordered to withdraw his force. He complied, and raiding and counter raiding followed, largely among tribes of the interior whose services as warriors had been obtained by the two rulers.¹

In 1946 the Political Agent applied sanctions against Rashid in an attempt to halt the fighting, and to force him to return some looted camels and to pay compensation for damage involved in the raiding. His subjects were denied travel facilities, and mail steamers were refused permission to call at Dubai. Rashid met the demands and the sanctions were lifted, but no final settlement was reached and intermittent hostilities continued.² In 1947,

² Including at least one battle which involved cannon fire, since some of the stories about this war include incidents where both sides fired cannon balls at each other during daylight, and at night retrieved them so that they could be fired again the next day.
similar sanctions were applied against the ruler of Abu Dhabi who refused to return some camels looted by men fighting on his side.

The fighting came to an abrupt end when a force of Manasir, detected preparing a raid against Dubai, were almost annihilated, losing some fifty-four killed. In April of next year, the ruler of Abu Dhabi formally accepted responsibility for preventing further hostilities and for containing the Manasir, and peace was restored. Three months later Dubai made a separate peace with the Manasir. Relations between the two rulers remained strained, however, until 1952, when they were reconciled at the bedside of Sheikh Zaid, brother of Shakhbut and now ruler of Abu Dhabi, who was in a Dubai hospital recuperating from measles.

Oil: The Hope for Wealth

The story of the quest for oil in Dubai and the Trucial Coast area has been one of intense frustration for rulers and oil companies alike. On their part, the rulers had to wait until 1935, twenty-three years after oil was first produced in the Gulf area¹ before even the

¹By British-owned Anglo-Persian Oil Co. at Musjid al-Sulaiman in 1912.
first concession was requested from them, and thirty-eight years until the first drill bit cut into the sands of the Trucial Coast. As for the oil companies, once they began operations in the sheikhdoms they had to devote some seven years and as many "dry holes" before the first oil would begin to flow. For Dubai, this period has been particularly frustrating, especially since neighboring Abu Dhabi has been growing wealthy from its oil since 1962, and even now it is still not certain that Dubai will ever produce oil in commercial quantities.

Three factors delayed interest in the Trucial Coast's potential for oil. First, this area lies near the south-east end of what has been termed the Oil Province of the Persian Gulf Basin,¹ which extends from the Tigris-Euphrates valley in Iraq to the Rub' al-Khali in Saudi Arabia, a distance of some 1800 miles. Since oil was first discovered near the northern terminus, the oil companies were concerned with first exploiting that area, rather than branching out into new untested regions. Second, world markets were depressed during the 1930's, and the oil companies, while willing to take leases that might prove valuable in the future, were not prepared to make

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impressive investments in exploration. Third, World War II interrupted what exploration had been under way, as oil interests devoted themselves to immediate expansion to meet the demands of the war. Unfortunately for the sheikdoms of the Trucial Coast, this could be accomplished more rapidly by speeding up the productivity of existing fields rather than by going through the laborious process of developing new ones.

Dubai granted its first concession—the first agreed to by any ruler on the Trucial Coast—on May 22, 1937. First given to Petroleum Concessions Ltd., it was later transferred to the Petroleum Development Co. (Trucial Coast). This lease included the territory of the State of Dubai, and all its island and territorial waters. Since Dubai's territory was in no way defined at this time, the leasing company agreed to accept whatever boundaries were eventually established as marking the area in which it held rights. Annual payment was Rs. 30,000 for exploration rights.

Longrigg, who himself negotiated leases in this region, offers an interesting commentary on this period

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1Hereafter called PDTC.

2About $6,000.
and on the status of the sheikhdoms:

The half-dozen ruling sheikhs of the coast were visited in 1936 by a Company's representative...and were offered agreements...for the exploration and development of their oil resources should those exist.

The Rulers, living in abject poverty, and governing by the simplest form of patriarchal absolutism, knew nothing of boundary lines across their sand-covered wastes and could guarantee little security; but by patient negotiation and a slow victory over suspicion and avarice, it was possible in 1937 to reach agreement for modest immediate payments and annual rents in return for concessions over the lands of Dubai and Sharjah.

The great tracks of salt marsh and sandy desert, which form the Trucial Coast, from the base of Qatar to the Oman ranges, were unvisited by oil-seekers throughout the war. The sheikhs of the seaside village kingdoms lived on their annual payments from the concessionaire company,...pursued their normal domestic and neighborly quarrels, and advanced no step nearer to the establishment of territorial boundaries.¹

The impact of these relatively small sums is discussed by Longrigg in what may well be a controversial statement:

The sheikhs of the coast...found themselves prosperous to an extent without precedent as they collected their annual rentals, paid some of their debts, rode in their new cars, and filled their hospitable coffee-pots; but their people could at this stage benefit

little or nothing from the exchange of documents between their ruler and the Company until field-work should begin.  

Although some preliminary surveys were made along the Trucial Coast in the winter of 1938-1939 work did not begin in earnest until post-war demands for oil once more accelerated exploration. In 1948, a team from PDTC began exploring Abu Dhabi, but Dubai, not considered as favorable geologically, was not surveyed until later.

The Continental Shelf Concept

During the post-war period a new concept evolved relating to rights of nations to off-shore areas beyond their territorial limits. For Dubai, the application of this concept was to have momentous results.

In 1945 the United States established a world-wide legal precedent by claiming rights to the continental shelf extending from its coasts. Since this shelf reached

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1Ibid.


3Prior to this announcement, nations were recognized to have authority only over seas extending out three miles from their coasts. Waters beyond this line were considered international, and open to unrestricted use by any nation. This claim departed from this precedent and opened the door to an entirely new concept of territoriality at sea.
far beyond the three-mile limit, the claim was revolu-
tionary and its repercussions were to be felt around the
world as nation after nation laid claim to large offshore
areas.

This development generated considerable interest
on the Trucial Coast. Gulf waters, except for a deep trench
running between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula, are quite
shallow and favor off-shore drilling. By claiming rights
to this shallow undersea area, the rulers could increase
their potential oil-producing holdings materially. In
1949, at the suggestion of the British Government, the
Trucial Sheikhs along the Gulf shore proclaimed their rights
to the sea-bed and subsoil contiguous to their territorial
waters. This action once more raised the question of
boundaries, since the limits of the new off-shore areas
would of necessity be based on the sheikhdoms' land borders.
Iran entered the picture as well at this time, having made
similar claims. A beginning toward defining the boundaries
was reached with the agreement that a median line should
be established between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula and
that the area to be divided among the Trucial States should
be determined by the median line. Another step was taken
when the concept was accepted that the limits of the
sheikhdoms' claims at sea should be based on lines running
perpendicular to the coastline from their land boundaries. Although these points indicate attempts at agreement, neither the location of the median line, nor all of the boundaries of the Trucial States have been satisfactorily defined. This has not, however, held up oil operations materially, and the oil companies seem to be working on the basis that the eventual settlement will approximate the claims now being pressed.

When in June, 1949, Sheikh Rashid declared his jurisdiction over the sea-bed, a dispute arose with PDTC, which had held rights to the land areas of Dubai, its islands and territorial waters since prior to World War II. Rashid declared his intention to grant a separate concession for the regions. PDTC contested this action and the matter was settled by arbitration eventually in Rashid's favor. On April 24, 1950, he granted a concession to his marine areas to the Superior Oil Company, an American concern, on payment of Rs. 100,000\(^1\) and an annual payment in the same amount. Royalty on oil was fixed at one-fifth of sales.

Superior, apparently feeling the lease had little value, in 1952 gave notice of termination. Rashid offered it to PDTC and it was accepted in a 60-year agreement

\(^1\)About $20,000.
signed August 7th, 1952. This lease called for a down payment of £15,400, and an annual payment of £4,000 until oil should be produced commercially, and a royalty after that of 4s 6d per ton.

The first well was drilled in Dubai in 1964,\(^2\) at Jebal Ali, a knoll about twenty miles southwest of Dubai town. The location of this point, whether in Dubai or Abu Dhabi, was subject to some question, until it was ruled as Dubai's by the British Government. Unfortunately from the economic standpoint, but perhaps fortunate from that of peace in the region, the well proved dry and was abandoned at a depth of 12,350 feet.

The pace of activity slowed after this well was closed. PDTC, perhaps due to its growing interest in Abu Dhabi, relinquished its off-shore holdings, and in 1954, the ruler granted a concession to Dubai Marine Areas Ltd., owned jointly by British Petroleum and Compagnie Francaise des Petroles, for some 1200 square miles of Dubai's claims.

Drilling began once more in 1964, when the Dubai Petroleum Company, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Continental

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\(^1\)The first on the Trucial Coast was at Ras Sadr, in the desert southwest of Abu Dhabi town. It was abandoned in 1951 after a year of drilling.
Oil Co., bought thirty-five per cent of Dubai's shelf claims. In that year, two wells were drilled: Qamer, twenty-seven miles south-south-west of Dubai, and the other, Faez, off-shore some twenty-five miles due west of Dubai. Qamer, closed at a depth of 15,400 feet, was dry, while Faez, which reached 12,670 feet, resulted in slight shows of oil. A third well, Remah I, begun in the Fall of 1964 and closed in the Spring of 1965, reached 10,200 feet before being determined unproductive.

The first real discovery came in August 1966. Oil was reached with the Fateh A-I well, located fifty-nine miles north-north-west of Dubai, at a depth of 12,120 feet. In February 1967, a confirmation well, Fateh B-I, was being drilled and reports were wide-spread that Dubai finally had struck it rich. As it happened, on the day this writer was leaving Dubai to return to Beirut, an acquaintance closely involved in the drilling operation confirmed that, as a result of this well, production was assured. Dubai Petroleum was not quite so ready to indicate its optimism. In answer to a note of congratulations, Hal F. Nabors, president of DPC, replied on March 14, 1967:

Thank you for your congratulations, and I do wish they were in order. We have had quite a bit of unjustifiable publicity recently about our drilling activities, perhaps the day will come when we may have information that justifies these reports.
In conversation earlier, Nabors had stated that future operations of his company involved "trying to limit the field" and attempting to determine the "size and caliber of the reservoir," but that consideration of the future was a matter of "sheer speculation."

There is, without question, oil under Dubai's sea-bed, but how much, whether it can be recovered profitably, and whether there will be a demand for it in world markets in the near future, will have to be determined. In any event, Dubai will have to continue for some years without large oil revenues; officials estimate that from three to five years will be required to go into production if the decision to do so is made. The underwater topography of the region would force the construction of both extensive and complex off-shore facilities, even perhaps including underwater storage tanks. This means the earliest that Dubai could begin production—assuming these estimates are correct—would be 1970.

Modernization and the Rule of Sheikh Rashid

In 1938, Sheikh Sa'id to a large extent turned over the reins of government to his eldest son, Rashid, who governed as regent until after his father's death on
September 10, 1938. The quality of vigorous leadership Rashid was to impart to his still-primitive sheikhdom has already been indicated, but this is only a portion of the story.

In the early 1950's Dubai's trade began to flourish, and a few years later, using the increased revenues that accrued from this commerce, as well as liberal assistance from Great Britain and other States, Rashid began an intensive modernization program that resulted in Dubai's transformation from a modest coastal town to a modern metropolitan city. Rashid—dynamic, fearless, progressive, penetratively statute and a consummate politician—has been able to adapt to this change and to lead his sheikhdom successfully through the difficult transition.

That Rashid has been able to accomplish this change with such obvious success is particularly remarkable in view of his origins. Rashid was born in about 1914 at Shendagha, on the peninsula that juts out from the Dubai side of the creek. His early life was that of the son of a city-dwelling bedouin sheikh, his education mainly the traditional Koranic schooling, in which both language and

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1Whether this act came as a result of advancing age (Sa'id was born in 1882), or pressure from progressive elements in Dubai, or for other reasons is not known.
culture are taught through the medium of the Koran. His training otherwise was directed to bedouin-type leadership and to the conduct of desert warfare. In both he has excelled. In the limited fighting that took place between Dubai and Sharjah in the early 1940's, and between Dubai and Abu Dhabi during the years 1945-1947, Rashid personally led his people in camel raids and in battles among the sand dunes. Yet when Dubai began its sudden entry into the 20th century, Rashid was able not only to keep up, but to gain a wide reputation for his astuteness in business, and his grasp of the complexities of modern government, being at ease with everything from blueprints of construction projects to currency reforms. A former British official who knew Rashid well, said:

He is a man who not too long ago, as a tribal sheikh, had to mount a camel and go out with a dozen men across the desert to catch kidnappers who had stolen women from his coastal area. He has also lain in the sand shooting at opposing tribesmen. Yet he has adapted fully to the new way of life.

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1Rashid has travelled extensively. In addition to frequent trips to Iran, Rashid has been to Europe at least twice. In June 1959 he paid a State visit to England, calling upon the Prime Minister and Queen Elizabeth, returning with stops in France, Holland, Austria, Switzerland, Italy and a number of Arab countries. He paid a second visit to the United Kingdom in late 1966.
An engineer who has had some dealings with Rashid added this insight:

If I had something to hide, I think Rashid would dig it out. When you present a plan to him, if you have some area you are attempting to play down, he will ferret it out. He is an astute prober.

Despite the temptations of increasing wealth—almost all State funds accrue directly to him—Rashid is frugal in his personal life. He still wears the traditional dress, and in comparison to other sheikhs in the area, lives modestly. He has a new palace, Za'abil, built in 1966 at the insistence of his advisors who felt that their ruler should have a suitable place for entertaining State visitors. Although his palace is imposing on the outside, it is said to be quite plain inside and most of its rooms are used only for State occasions. Rashid owns a number of large automobiles, but normally travels in a medium-priced American sedan not unlike many of the taxis operating in Dubai. Formality and pomp impress him not at all. Instead, for example, of using a personal launch to cross the creek, or driving the long distance around by way of the bridge, Rashid frequently simply walks alone from his offices to the public abra landing, and rides across on

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1He tends to dismiss the subject with statements such as "Ana ma aheb il-fakhfakha"—"I don't like pomp."
one of the small water taxis. His entertainment consists primarily of hunting, and visiting his gardens in Ras al-Khaimah.

Unlike many rulers in this region, Rashid does not support a large ruling family, including cousins and uncles. The only ruling family in Dubai is Rashid's immediate family: his wife, daughter, and sons. With the exception of the daughter Sheikha Miryam, married to the ruler of Qatar, all are active in the life of Dubai. His wife, Sheikha Latifa, daughter of Hamdan Ibn Zaid, a former ruler of Abu Dhabi, is greatly respected for the active role she takes in welfare work and she is reported to be widely read and to be learning English. There are four sons: Sheikh Maktum, about 24, who is chief of Land Registration; Sheikh Hamdan, about 21, chairman of the Dubai Municipality; Sheikh Muhammad, about 20, currently studying in the United Kingdom, and Sheikh Ahmad, about 12, who is in school in Dubai.

Rashid works hard and efficiently. Each workday morning he is driven from his palace outside the city to his offices in the Customs Building on the Dubai side of the creek. He sweeps briskly up the stairs, greeting the

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1Friday, the Moslem sabbath, is observed in Dubai, the weekend being Thursday and Friday.
people who are waiting to do business with him. His movements are quick and he radiates enthusiasm. One is immediately struck by the fact that except for his clipped beard and the flowing Arab robes that Rashid would resemble a great many successful political leaders in any Western nation.

There are two mejlis halls at the Customs Building. One follows the traditional mode, furnished with carpets rather than chairs; it is here that normal business is handled, and it is this room that Rashid prefers. The other room is ultra-modern, panelled, with expensive black leather furnishings and a huge modernistic desk; it is here that visitors from "outside" are met.

The following description of this writer's interview with Rashid may add prospective:

Then the appointment with Sheikh Rashid was due, I waited in the busy hallways of the Customs Building with Rashid's financial expert, William Duff. Rashid came out of the old mejlis hall, still talking to a group of men. That completed, he turned with a flourish, and when introduced, the smile and interest were obviously real, the handshake—as between people who do not know each other well—was light.

Quickly Rashid ushered us into the visitor's mejlis,
sat down at one end of a sofa, and motioned for me to sit beside him. Rashid sat back, slipped his feet out of his sandals and hooked his toes on a rung of the coffee table, and took out a small Arab pipe, put in a pinch of tobacco, lit it and took the one or two puffs that it offered. Then the talk commenced.

Rashid spoke rapidly and concisely in Arabic, and although he apparently understands some English, does not speak it. When questions were directed to him, he devoted himself fully to them, answering in a degree of detail that demonstrated his grasp of the mechanisms of running a modern trading city. He spoke in a conversational manner, but with obvious pride in what he was doing. When questions were passed to one of his advisors, Rashid would take out a note pad and write a series of brief memos, which were passed to runners outside. He was being neither impolite nor brusque, simply, in a busy schedule, taking advantage of available moments.

Rashid obviously is aware of where both he and his sheikhdom are headed, and while he talks of problems and needs on the part of his people, he speaks as readily of the solutions, which are to him only a matter of time.

Until recently, Rashid attempted to talk to everyone who came to see him. Now with the increased pace of
Dubai, its rapid modernization and developing complexity, this is no longer possible. More and more his time is taken up by the details of government. Just as the mayor of any sizeable city finds his time limited and his ability to meet with his people curtailed, so Rashid is restricted. This is not to say that he is not accessible to those whose business must be conducted personally with him, but the personal relationships that are basic to the system of tribal rule are not much in evidence.

Rashid may be cut off to some extent from intimate daily contact with his people, but he still knows what is going on every minute of the day. Not only does he maintain a strong personal interest in every happening of note, but he operates what one official called "a tremendous spy system." Two examples will illustrate this: Recently when engineers were putting in pilings to build a new wharf on the creek, they changed at one stage from twenty-foot to twelve-foot lengths. Within minutes a man from the sheikh's offices was down at the construction site inquiring on behalf of the ruler why the change had been made. In another instance, when this writer was conducting interviews in Dubai, several people in discussing Sheikh Rashid volunteered the information that he probably knew where I was at that minute, whom I was talking to and
why, this in a city of more than forty thousand persons.

Rashid has been described as "a born administrator and a shrewd businessman," with "an exceptional grasp of running a modern trading town, a capacity for inspiring devotion among his senior officials and an unusual readiness to listen to advice." 1 Few would argue with this, and certainly not his advisors. The respect and loyalty given to Rashid by his associates, both Arab and British, are readily apparent. In discussing anything related to official business, policy or ideas concerning projects, statements are often prefaced with "Sheikh Rashid says," or "Sheikh Rashid feels." Rashid's British advisors—who are his employes, not the British Government's—use "we" when discussing projects they are involved in on behalf of Dubai, and their emotional identification and involvement with Rashid and his burgeoning principality are obviously strong.

This does not mean that Rashid is always easy to work with; his personal decision-making process is often a source of frustration to those around him. He can be extremely deliberate about making up his mind, perhaps

1Ali Ajjaj, op. cit., pp. 75-76.
letting a particularly knotty problem hang for a year or more while others involved simply wait. Another source of frustration is the fact that Rashid takes care to prevent anyone around him from gaining too much specialized knowledge and thus becoming indispensable. For example, rather than dealing only with the person responsible for a specific project, Rashid may well call in officials not even remotely connected with it for their views, thus involving them in the project and limiting the authority and influence of the person directly in charge. These points are, however, relatively minor, and, as one official said, follow the practice of traditional mechanisms for protection of power. "You must remember," he added, "that for the first forty years of his life, Rashid lived as a bedouin sheikh." Despite whatever small frustrations there may be in dealing with Rashid, no one questions the quality of his results.

Just as Rashid is frugal in his personal life, so is he in his administration. When considering public expenditures, he tries not to dip into his own limited capital, but to obtain grants or loans or to organize the programs to be self-supporting. When, to cite one instance which involves both aspects, the creek required dredging in the mid-1950's, Rashid arranged a grant from
the ruler of Qatar to begin the program, and finally made money on the project from the sale of land reclaimed by the deepening of the harbor. On occasion funds must be allocated, but Rashid attempts to hold down the costs: A few years ago, he wanted to widen a number of streets in older parts of the city, and to do so it was necessary to destroy a number of houses and displace their owners. Rather than compensate these people in cash Rashid laid out plots outside the city—larger than those which had been expropriated—put in water mains, streets and a bus service, and gave this land to those who had been displaced.

While attempting to husband his sheikhdom's limited funds, Rashid meanwhile has gone to great lengths to encourage business and trade, the main source of income, through developing facilities for the handling of trade, by low tariffs and by providing a commercial environment in which trade can flourish.

Customs duties in Dubai—which form the main source of State revenue—are very low. Duty on imported goods, some eighty per cent of which are re-exported, is only 4.625 per cent. Items destined for transshipment to other Trucial States, Muscat and Qatar are charged only two per cent. Business licenses and taxes on land occupied by businesses are small as well.
Dubai encourages foreign commercial interests.

An official publication of the Government of Dubai says, "Outside investment is welcomed and restrictions are few." \(^1\)

Another publication designed to interest investors states:

The merchant community is cosmopolitan and merchants of many nationalities trade freely on equal terms with Arabs. Regulation of trading is kept to the minimum necessary to ensure commercial order and security, and disputes are very seldom brought to court but are settled by commercial tribunals appointed by H.H. the Ruler from various panels of merchants chosen, regardless of nationality, for their knowledge of the subject. \(^2\)

Another less often announced policy is that of open immigration, which Dubai has maintained almost as a tradition. It worked to Dubai's advantage in the early 1900's when merchants at Lingeh, in Persia, suddenly confronted with strict customs controls, came to Dubai for its freedom of trade, and increased Dubai's commerce as a result. It benefitted the sheikhdom again in the early 1950's, when, with the nationalization of Iran's oil industry and the subsequent breaking of relations with Great Britain, a depression set in Iran and other merchants

\(^{1}\) Central Accounts Section, Government of Dubai, Dubai (Dubai, 1966), p. 2.

\(^{2}\) Government of Dubai, "Discovery of Oil Helps the Rapid Development of the State of Dubai" (Dubai, 1966), p. 3.
as well as unemployed workers migrated to Dubai. At the present time, this policy is retained to insure the presence of a labor force large enough to prevent inflation of wages, particularly among unskilled laborers. This policy is understood to have no great effect upon the Arab population, since few Arabs work at this level. It does, however, encourage the immigration of Pakistanis and Iranians who are willing to work for low pay, and does provide as intended, a cheap labor force.

In other areas as well Rashid is quite pragmatic. Although fiercely independent, he has maintained excellent relations with the British Government and its representatives.\(^1\) Rashid understands well the feeling that the key to his State's progress may be dependent in large measure upon the British presence and British support. Without the stability, the counsel and the financial assistance that Great Britain has provided, since it belatedly accepted responsibility for assisting the region, Dubai would not have developed to the extent that it has. Further, without British protection in the forms of political influence and military force, Dubai might not long remain under his rule. As one respected official commented: "Sheikhs will not

\(^1\) Except during the 1945-1948 war with Abu Dhabi, when he strenuously resisted British efforts to curb his fighting.
outlast the departure of the British."

There are those, however, who would argue with this position at least as it relates to Rashid. One British army officer, who knows the Dubai ruler well, and spoke of his position in the light of a British withdrawal, said: "This is a man in every sense. He is no degenerate Sheikh ...¹ He istough. If he is ever tested he will be really tough."

¹Referring to another ruler on the Gulf, known for his profligacy.
CHAPTER V

GREAT BRITAIN'S NEW ROLE: TOTAL INVOLVEMENT

Before World War II, Great Britain stayed aloof from the internal affairs of the Trucial States, and remained content to keep the peace at sea, prevent the intrusion of other Powers, and pursue her self-imposed burden of suppressing slavery.¹

Suddenly in the late 1940's Britain reversed her policy: There occurred a nearly complete volte-face. Within a few years Great Britain had entered directly into virtually every aspect of life on the Coast, through such means as sponsoring reforms and promoting economic and social development, the formation of a gendarmerie (the beginning of the renowned Trucial Oman Scouts), assuming responsibility for law and order, and through the establishment of the Trucial States Council. All of these changes were directed, in their various ways, to building political maturity and viability among the sheikhdoms.

¹Which had, mutatis mutandis, extended to attempts to control gun-running.
A New British Policy Appears

A number of factors encourage Britain to take a more active part in affairs on the Trucial Coast. One was her developing commitment ashore, begun with the construction of the RAF base at Sharjah and the civil air facility at Dubai in the decade before World War II. The possibility of the Coast becoming an oil-producing area was another. Trade was also a factor, as Dubai and Sharjah grew into commercial centers valuable as outlets for British manufactured goods.

There were negative aspects as well which had their impact on Britain's position. Slave raids and attacks by tribesmen continued to disrupt the peace of the area. The people of the Coast were beginning to be caught up in the postwar world; they were changing, and Britain found herself forced either to guide and prepare them for the new life that was to come, or to stand by and watch while it developed along possibly hostile lines. Other States, notably Saudi Arabia, began to compete with Britain for influence among the sheikhdoms. And finally, Great Britain — by accepting responsibility for the external affairs of the sheikhdoms — was liable to answer for them internationally; from that point of view it was
to Britain's interest to insure that the sheikhdoms' houses were put into good order. As a result of these factors then, Britain turned from a mildly attentive observer to become the leading participant in a game of tug-of-war with the Trucial States, attempting to pull them forward economically, socially and politically. That this was to be a game in which she wrote most of the rules seems immaterial in the light of the great progress that, however belatedly, developed out of her new interest.

Although Britain remained detached until the late 1940's, as early as 1939 there were indications of a changing relationship with the Trucial States. An example is a statement made in that year by Sir Trenchard Fowler, who served some seven years as Political Resident: ¹

Our "rule" over the Arab States of the Gulf rests on the goodwill of the Rulers and their peoples...This goodwill depends on three main factors. First—the fact that as far as possible we let the Rulers and their peoples, under our guidance and advice, manage their own affairs in their own way. Second—the fact that in our various negotiations with the Rulers, in which of course their peoples are interested, on the subject of oil, air facilities and so forth, we give them a patient hearing and a square deal. Third—and most important—the Rulers and their peoples realize that it is only HMG who protect them from absorption from their stronger neighbors.

¹This statement included Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar as well as the Trucial States.
In 1948, after taking over full responsibility for the Gulf States from the Government of India the previous year, the British Government had to decide what approach it would take in its relations with these sheikhdoms. The choices considered demonstrate the trend toward increasing involvement: one, "to continue the policy of not intervening except when compelled; two, "to introduce a policy of more direct administration approaching the colonial model," or three, to introduce "colonial methods to intensify the rulers' efforts to promote good administration, social progress, and economic development" utilizing the existing rulers and their administrative machinery, augmented by British advisors and technicians in the service of the rulers.

The third course was chosen. The colonial methods to be employed---according to a policy statement issued to the Political Resident in 1951---were not to limit the freedom of the sheikhdoms, or to control them beyond certain confined limits. Rather, the statement declared:

The internal independence of the sheikhdoms should be fostered to the greatest possible extent. Although the goal of complete independence may not be obtainable in the near future it should not be lost sight of as the ultimate purpose.

This did not mean that Britain would not interfere in internal affairs when necessary:
It is undesirable to attempt to bring the sheikdoms more closely under the control of HMG, but HMG being responsible for the relations of the sheikdoms have both the right to intervene to prevent serious maladministration and to insure that their internal commitments are carried out, and the obligation to assist generally in the development of their administrative systems.

During the next two years several further statements of policy modified and expanded upon those issued previously. In 1952, for example, HMG advised the Political Resident that responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs—a foundation stone of the British-Sheikhly relationship—should be given when possible to local administrations "as they become capable of taking it." Britain would, however, continue to make the rules for foreign affairs and preserve her own pre-eminent position as shown in 1953, when the Political Resident was instructed to "exert sufficient influence in the sheikdoms to insure that there is no conflict between the policies of the Rulers and their own policies." Internal affairs were a different matter; immediately following the instructions above was a comment that "where appropriate HMG will advance the internal independence of the sheikdoms."

Once these policies were adopted, for Dubai and the Trucial Coast the results were immediate and startling. Suddenly a flurry of advisors, developmental projects,
funds and proposals for reforms rained down on the heads of the rulers. Prior to this time, the extent of Britain's contribution on land, other than certain support to accommodating rulers, had been the opening in 1939, by the Government of India, of a dispensary in Dubai. But now the Trucial States Council and the Trucial Oman Scouts were formed, assistance was offered to build schools in Dubai and Sharjah, water surveys were undertaken and medical facilities improved.¹

**Administration of the Trucial Coast**

Since the early 19th century, the British Government had administered affairs concerning the Trucial Sheikhdoms and other protected areas in the Gulf through the office of the Political Resident, located first at Bushire, and after 1946 at Bahrain.

On the Trucial Coast, the Political Resident has since about 1823 maintained at least one local official, through whom he dealt with the ruling sheikhs when he could not be present personally. Prior to 1934 the Political Resident was represented on the Trucial Coast as on Bahrain

¹These last three projects arose in 1953, as a counter to Saudi attempts to gain influence in the Trucial Coast by offers of economic aid, which have since been accepted.
by a series of Arab Residency Agents, located at Sharjah. Their appointments, although generally more formal, at least on one occasion passed down from father to son, the latter holding the post for some seventeen years.

The reputation of these men was high in British eyes; they are considered to have been of ability, influence and courage and to have, according to one official source, "served the purpose of the Government of India," which was the maintaining of relations with the Trucial Sheikhdoms with a minimum of expenditure and trouble."

In 1934, as a result of progressively complex British activities in the Trucial States, the Political Residency found itself unable to continue to deal directly with the Trucial Coast sheikhdoms and still maintain adequate contact and control. Responsibility for this area was passed to the Political Agent at Bahrain, who dealt with the sheikhdoms for five years.

In 1939 the Government of India agreed to the appointment of a British Political Officer at Sharjah, still the leading town on the coast. This assignment had been made with considerable reluctance on the part of the Indian Government as it was felt that a British resident official, despite the presence of an RAF base, would be
in constant danger. Once made, however, the appointment proved valuable, and a British official manned the post until 1948 for most of the year, leaving the post in the hands of the Arab Residency Agent only during the hot Summer months. After that time, the Political Officer resided the year round on the Coast, and the post of Arab Agent was abolished.

In 1952 the post at Sharjah was placed under the direct control of the Political Residency at Bahrain, and the following year was raised to the level of a Political Agency, equal to that at Bahrain. Two years later, indicating the decline of Sharjah and the ascendancy of Dubai, the Political Agency was moved to a new headquarters at Dubai.

The "PA," as he is called, has responsibility for affairs of all the Trucial Sheikdoms with the exception of Abu Dhabi, which has a "PA" permanently assigned there. His duties are numerous, complex and require the utmost in adaptability, flexibility and diplomacy. According to Foreign Office requirements the "PA" at Dubai must be an officer in Grade Four, one step under ambassadorial level,²

¹This proved to be the case, and one of the reasons for the formation of the Trucial Oman Scouts twelve years later was to protect British officials travelling on the coast.
²The Political Resident is an ambassadorial post.
and must speak the Arabic language. According to his assignment, he is a Consular Officer and judge of the British court handling cases involving foreigners in the area over whom Britain retains jurisdiction. This definition, however, does not approach the actual functions he performs. He may be called upon one day by a ruler with a grievance against another and be expected to evolve a solution; he may be called out to intervene personally in a tribal matter before the shooting starts; he is increasingly called upon to deal with the many dubious merchants and contractors who flood into his area now that there is promise of wealth, and he is expected to give good advice on financial matters within the local governments. On one occasion he had to intervene not long ago when three foreign correspondents, accused of some indiscretion in one of the sheikhdoms were about to be flogged.

Although Great Britain carries a big stick among these tiny sheikhdoms, force or the threat of it is seldom used except to prevent inter-village or inter-tribal shooting wars or to conduct an arrest. Rather the tools of the Political Agent are patience and persuasiveness. Traditionally, these men have, through their own force of character, and their own integrity gained effectiveness.
From what one gathers in conversation with people in Dubai, the "PA" and his staff are well respected, and have made genuine contributions to the region.

Political Pressure and a One-Sided Courtship

During the past twenty years, the Trucial States have been confronted by a number of threats, either to their stability or to their territory. Iran, with centuries-old claims on the Coast, has tried at various times to assert a measure of sovereignty there. Saudi Arabia, with similar claims, attempted unsuccessfully to establish physical domination of parts of Buraimi Oases and western Abu Dhabi. But the greatest threat to the Coast, and one that exists today, has been that of Arab nationalism, and its attempts to weaken the positions of the conservative ruling elements. Great Britain, while largely ignoring Iran's claim as at least temporarily irrelevant, has opposed these other intrusions vigorously; Saudi Arabia's soldiers at Buraimi were driven out by force of arms, and Arab nationalist agitators, rabble-rousers and terrorists active on the Coast have been rendered for the most part impotent through British-led action.

Dubai—until now—has been relatively unaffected
by these threats. Saudi Arabia occupied land belonging to Abu Dhabi, not Dubai, and Sheikh Rashid, by virtue of contacts built through trade, has maintained excellent relations with the House of Saud, even during the conflict over Buraimi. Except for incidents on the nuisance level Iran has not posed a threat; and seems in fact to be preparing for the day when Britain evacuates the Trucial Coast, by recently carrying on an active courtship of Dubai. Arab nationalism does offer a real threat to Dubai. Evidence indicates a growing response among poorer Arabs to the appeals and promises sent out by Radio Cairo, but with Dubai's rapid social and economic progress and its popular leadership, few activities seemed to have been developed within the sheikhdom. In the first phases of Cairo's attack, Dubai has gone relatively unscathed. How successful Rashid will be in the future in providing realities to take the wind out of Nasser's promises will probably determine whether Dubai will continue stable and prosperous or become another Aden.

Iran: Claims and Courtship

Iran over a period of years has indicated a modest claim to suzerainty over the Trucial Coast, based on
tribute paid by the sheikhs of the area centuries ago, and because of the large Persian population resident there. ¹ This claim, however, has not been pressed vigorously. In 1928, for example, Persia sent a customs inspector to Dubai, but when Sheikh Sa'id ordered him to leave, he did so. Since that time there has been no attempt to interfere in affairs on the mainland. On occasion nakhdas sailing out of the Trucial Coast have complained that their dhows and cargoes were seized by the Persians, but these incidents probably related more to the extensive smuggling taking place between the Trucial Coast and Iran than to any attempt by the Persians at controlling the sheikhdoms' trade.

Relations between Iran and Dubai are excellent despite Iran's claims - which are largely ignored - and the fact that Iran is one of Dubai's largest recipients of smuggled goods. So amicable is their relationship that it constitutes a one-sided courtship on the part of Iran. Sheikh Rashid, a frequent visitor to Iran for hunting, in 1959 was flown to Persia in an Iranian Air Force plane, where he was entertained by the Shah and received Iran's

¹Alex Melamid, op. cit., pp. 204-205.
highest decoration, the "Humayun." Further, citizens of Dubai are treated as Iranian nationals in Iran, and go and come between the two countries without the usual passport formalities. Either one or both of two causes may prompt this: There are several thousand persons in Dubai of Persian ancestry, whose status as Arab-speaking Persians or Persian-speaking Arabs is seriously in doubt, and to require people in this status to produce passports of either nationality might prove a hardship. Also, with indications that Britain may not long remain in the Persian Gulf, Iran may be paving the way to extending its claims to Dubai. After all, the argument could go, residents of Dubai have been Iranian nationals for years, does this not make Dubai a part of Iran? There is little doubt at present that should Britain depart the Trucial Coast, Iran would be among the first to try to fill a political vacuum there. But what of the acquiescence of Rashid in this matter? He seems to tolerate his subjects holding a dual status, and by continuing his vacations in Iran and in other ways to promote the present relationship. Does this indicate that he would favor an affiliation with

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1Gulf Daily Times, Bahrain, September 25, 1959.
Iran over an association with Saudi Arabia, the other Power likely to enter on Britain's departure? These questions may well remain unanswered for some time.

Saudi Arabia Re-enters the Trucial Coast

During the early part of the century, the House of Saud expressed little interest in the Trucial Coast. As late as 1925, after Ibn Saud had spread his control over the Hijaz, he signed the Treaty of Jiddah with Great Britain. In this document he agreed to recognize the special position of HMG in the Gulf, and undertook to "maintain friendly and peaceful relations with the ... Sheikhs of Qatar and the Oman Coast," whom he acknowledged as having "special treaty relations" with the British Government.¹

With the growing promise of oil on the Trucial Coast after World War II, the Saudi attitude changed. In 1949, Saudi Arabia began a six-year campaign to lay claim to a part of Buraimi Oasis, attempting to establish a presence there before the borders were solidified.

This action may have threatened the British and

Abu Dhabi, but not Dubai, whose relations with the Saudis, long extensive and profitable, remained cordial. A British official of the time complained that although Sheikhs Sa'id and Rashid had been "outwardly correct" and ostensibly had complied with requests made to them by the British authorities, they were believed to have felt considerable sympathy for the Saudis and to have assisted with money and food when the Saudi forces were blockaded in Buraimi. ¹

Since the Saudi forces were driven out of Buraimi in October 1955, with the exceptions of occasions when oil company survey parties operating out of Saudi Arabia have encroached on Trucial Coast territory, relations between the sheikhdoms and their neighbor have been amicable. Saudi Arabia has proved cooperative in assisting in development on the Trucial Coast, even to the extent of working through the British-sponsored Trucial Coast Development Fund, ² rather than directly with individual sheikhdoms.

¹Additionally, four Shari'a judges from Dubai were said to have visited the Saudi Commander at Buraimi, one of them remaining with him in an official capacity. For details of the Buraimi crisis, see Kelly, op. cit.

²This fund, which is managed jointly by the rulers, will be discussed later in this chapter.
The Threat of Arab Socialism

The last of the three major threats that have faced Dubai, and one very much present today, is that of the Arab nationalists. Their violent denunciations of "Western imperialism"; demands for social, economic and political revolution; calls for Arab Unity, the destruction of Israel, and a return to the nobility and greatness of the Arab Empire, and its promises of lives undreamed of under "reactionary" governments run directly counter to the needs and goals of Dubai. The leaders, and certainly a majority of the people of Dubai, are closely linked with an "imperialist" nation; they need and want political and economic stability, and for the most part they see little to gain in becoming involved in the problems of distant nations with whom they have had almost no contact. Further, while the propaganda of Radio Cairo and the Voice of the Arabs, continue, the assault now has broadened into a campaign of subversion and violence. Political activists, terrorists, saboteurs and rabble-rousers have been imported into the Trucial Coast to foment unrest and upheaval. Great Britain, with the cooperation of the rulers, has been able to counter these attacks, but with growing popular identification with President Nasser and his concepts, the task is becoming increasingly difficult.
The first indications that the Arab nationalists were turning their attention to the Trucial Coast came in 1954, when the Arab League suggested that the sheikhdoms disregard political considerations and work to establish closer cultural relations with the "progressive" Arab States. Although the thousands of transistor radios on the Trucial Coast could hear the Voice of the Arabs clearly, the response was negligible. So isolated had these people been from the mainstreams of Arab thought that to them Egypt and the other countries facing the Mediterranean were as foreign as Greece or Italy. Particularly in Dubai, with its large regional trade, Iran and Pakistan, if not India, were better understood and more closely identified with than those Arab countries who asked them to become involved in causes about which they were only dimly aware.

During the following nine years, however, the propaganda of Cairo took effect. The promises of Arab Socialism appealed to those groups in any society who respond to panaceas and militant causes: the poor and uneducated who saw no future for themselves under the present system, the educated but under-employed who sought a meaningful cause to support, and those who had grievances, in this case against either their rulers or the British. Even if these people composed only a small part of the population, their numbers,
by 1963, had become meaningful. British officials in Dubai at the time recall that when Cairo began a particularly virulent attack on the rulers of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iran, in Dubai banners echoing the Nasserist line were unfurled and demonstrations immediately flared up with sufficient violence than one man who spoke up against the demonstrators was killed.

After 1963, the Arab League attempted to establish relations with the Trucial States. In November 1964 a delegation from the Arab League visited the Coast, offering a program of direct aid. Britain opposed this venture, insisting that assistance from outside be channeled through the Development Fund, rather than being given directly to the sheikhdoms. Soon thereafter, the League approached the ruler of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah for permission to establish offices in these areas. The ruler of Sharjah received these overtures with interest, but the matter was blocked by actions of the British and the rulers of Dubai and Abu Dhabi. In 1965 the League offered to build a power on the Coast, but the proposal was rejected.

That the Arab nationalist impact in Dubai is very much present today was demonstrated in February 1967, on

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1 Whether because of this or for other reasons, he was deposed the following year.
Kuwait National Day. Although Kuwait is at least con-
servative in its Government, a merchant in Dubai took this
occasion to break out with the Dubai and Kuwait flags—
several Egyptian flags, and to post pictures of President
Nasser on the front of his shop.

Sheikh Rashid¹ has stated emphatically that he is
not concerned about an Arab nationalist threat to Dubai.
"Here," he said, dismissing the subject, "the people and
the Government are together." Whether one agrees with
his first statement or not, the second undoubtedly—and
to a surprising extent—is true. Talking to taxi drivers,
who listen to their radios incessantly, and to the small
merchants, one gains the impression quickly that these
people have few complaints against their ruler. Rather
they respect him and take great pride in the progress thus
far and the promise for the future. Even laboring men,
who in other societies may feel estranged from their
Governments, often have presented problems to the ruler
themselves, or indicate that they would not hesitate to
do so with an expectation of an honest hearing. In addition,
many of the people have emotional ties outside the Arab
world and do not identify with Arab causes. The Persians,

¹In conversation with the writer.
Indians and Pakistanis seem to have little interest in politics; they enjoy the stability and opportunity Dubai offers and devote themselves to work and business rather than to carrying banners. Many of these people – Arabs, Persians, Pakistanis alike – understand what Great Britain has done for them, and realize the benefits of continuing British influence. As one Arab cab driver said, "Everything comes from God and the British." What can Nasser do for us?"

Despite Rashid's confidence, the British Government is greatly concerned about future Arab nationalist activities in Dubai and the other sheikhdoms. Strong if small minority nationalist organizations are increasingly active. Arms, explosives and other equipment for revolutionaries and saboteurs are continually being smuggled into the area. Incidents involving political organizers and terrorists are increasing. Great Britain fears that President Nasser's influence, now solidified in coastal Yemen and in Aden, will spread around the foot of the Arabian Peninsula to engulf the Trucial Coast, turning it into another Aden.

The British, through assistance and development within the sheikhdoms, as well as by a determined war against

1 Kul shi min Allah wa al-Ingleez.
subversion, are attempting to blunt these attacks, and preserve the stability the people so badly need. They are also fighting for their own survival in the area. One British official pointed out: "If we don't win this one, you can forget the British in the Persian Gulf."

Slavery: A Dying Institution

Despite determined British efforts to end the slave trade, beginning in the early nineteenth century and continuing into the 1950's, and intermittent pressure on slave-ownership since then, the institution in Dubai and other areas of the Trucial States has refused to die. Rather, it lingers on, constantly diminishing in extent, more because of changing social conditions and a lack of a fresh supply of slaves than because of a concerted program to wipe it out. Two factors permit the continuation of slavery: the lack of a strong ethical argument among the people for its elimination, and the fact that Great Britain, while able to attack directly the trade in slaves, has had to walk lightly when approaching the matter of slavery itself.

Few statistics are available to indicate the size of the trade in slaves at any time in this century; one
would hardly expect this. But incidents throughout the period indicate that the traffic, although not continuing on the scale of the earlier period, still persisted as a regular trade until after 1950. In these later years Dubai, as a growing entrepôt port for legitimate commerce and smuggling, is known to have played, through its mercantile community—and even for a time, through certain dissident members of the ruling family—a prominent role as a base for agents of slave dealers in Hamasah, a village in Buraimi Oasis, and Saudi Arabia. No longer were Negro slaves imported from Africa, nor, apparently, did many Baluchis come in from Persia as they had during later years of the nineteenth century. Instead, local Arabs living in towns and among tribes along the coast, provided the source. Slave raiders, striking in the night, captured these unfortunates—mostly women and children—and spirited them off, either into the desert or to waiting boats. A few were sold by their families, a situation not unheard of throughout the history of the Arabs. Whatever their origins, these slaves were passed into the hands of slave dealers and eventually found themselves inside the mud walls of some wealthy man's establishment. To cite one

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1Apparently without approval or involvement of the rulers.
period, that of the winter of 1947-1948, some forty-eight persons were delivered into slavery, two of them apparently sold by their families, since only forty-six are said to have handed over involuntarily.

These abductions were among the considerations which resulted in the British taking over responsibility for law and order on the Trucial Coast in 1951. In that year, with the cooperation of the rulers, Britain sponsored the formation of a gendarmerie,\(^1\) led by British Army officers and manned by a mixture of foreign mercenaries and local Arabs. So completely were the slave-raiders intimidated that in 1951 not a single abduction occurred. Since then there have been only rare instances either of abduction or of trading in imported slaves.\(^2\)

British action against slavery itself has been minimal. On many occasions, beginning in the nineteenth century, British officials sought to issue manumission papers to slaves who requested them. This the sheikhs opposed, for among other reasons, they would have been required to recompense owners for the value of the slaves

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\(^1\) Trucial Oman Scouts, discussed in the next section of this chapter.

\(^2\) One such instance was in 1953 when a Dubai launch loaded with slaves evaded capture and sailed from the coast. A cousin of Sheikh Sa'id was exiled for his complicity in the venture.
released. In 1953, British officials again encouraged to sheikhs to end slavery, pointing out that the ruler of Qatar had just done so. Again the sheikhs opposed the move, both by defending the institution and on grounds that compensation would be beyond their means. They did, however, as a result of this pressure, issue decrees prohibiting the traffic in slaves, and agreed that slavery should gradually disappear.

And so it has. In Dubai household servants are still owned, as are some laborers, but increasingly the question of their status becomes academic. Social conditions have changed particularly along the coast to the point that it would be difficult to retain slaves by force; as a result, there are few who consider themselves slaves in the nineteenth century meaning of the term. A British official explained that while family retainers still exist, as slaves or as valued adjuncts to the families they serve, "The line between slave and family retainer is pretty slim." To put it another way, he asked the question: What is the difference between a slave whose family for generations has served the same "owner family," who with his wife and children are well cared

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1 See, for example, Lorimer, op. cit., p. 2513.
for and whose situation is secure, and the "free servant," who is content with his job, is equally well cared for, who considers the family he works for as his rightful sponsor if not his kin, and who would not consider leaving? This situation, it would appear, is directly parallel to that found in the United States after the abolition of slavery: many slave families chose to remain with their former masters on the same basis as before manumission. Some slaves, if widely-circulated reports are true, also work outside the households, for oil companies and other concerns, sharing their salaries with their masters. Should this seem strange or unjust, it might be considered that such a slave's family probably lives in the master's house, is fed and cared for there, and that the portion of the salary turned over to the master take this, and perhaps other debts, into account. This is in no way an attempt to justify the institution of slavery, but to point out that there may well be economic and emotional benefits involved, not all of them accruing to the slave owner.

For a time, the Political Agents issued manumission papers to slaves who demanded them, although this right has not been specifically recognized in agreements with the rulers.¹ Now, with the decline in the number of persons considered slaves, even this practice has been terminated.

¹Neither apparently, has it been called into question by them.
This information has not, however, filtered down to all of the people, particularly the retainers. Some, who still consider themselves slaves, react to a rumor which evolved out of the Political Resident's visit in 1899, and which is still current: that those who seek refuge at the British flag will be given freedom.

Thus, it is not uncommon for the Political Agent at Dubai, whose residence is in the same compound as the Agency building, to be awakened in the middle of the night by a wailing in the vicinity of the flagpole. Knowing full well what is going on, he gets up, goes outside and finds, as he expected, someone—usually a woman—arms and legs wrapped in a death grip around the flagpole, pleading at the top of her lungs for her freedom. The PA then patiently explains that in fact she is free, and eventually she goes away happy—and probably back to her former "master."

The Trucial Oman Scouts

It would be difficult to imagine anywhere in the world today a military force as fascinating as the Trucial Oman Scouts. A mixture of British military professionalism and bedouin sagacity, it keeps the peace against almost insurmountable odds over an expanse of wild desert and
half-tamed villages, many of whose peoples still hold raiding and warfare as man's rightful vocation. Yet so effective as this force been that as of February 1967 it had not had to fire a shot in anger for eleven years. It is so well respected on the Coast that the occasion of four TOS soldiers casually dropping by a warring village for coffee has been enough to bring fighting to an immediate halt. Stories about the Scouts are often colorful.

One example will bear this out. A few years ago the TOS received a call that two tribes were dug in to fight on a ridge in the hinterland. A squadron¹ was called out, and went into position on lower ground facing the flanks of the tribes' lines. Additional machine gun and mortar units arrived shortly to support it. Immediately, one of the two tribes withdrew, but the other, resenting the intrusion, turned on the TOS unit, but did not attack.

The situation remained static for some time, the two forces facing each other but neither willing to begin the fighting. Then one evening, the sheikh of the tribe came down to have coffee with the TOS squadron commander. After the customary hospitalities, the commander invited the sheikh to view the machine guns and mortars. He agreed,

¹Roughly equivalent to a company of infantry.
and as they approached the machine gun positions, the sheikh asked about the strange weapons. The commander explained their function and rate of fire, but did not mention the huge supplies of ammunition behind each gun. The sheikh then asked if all those rounds were for the machine guns and the commander acknowledged that this was the case. The sheikh was visibly impressed. The same thing occurred when the sheikh saw the mortars, and even more impressed, he returned to his own lines.

The next evening he returned for coffee, and received a complete tour of the TOS positions, including each man's firing point, but before he left, the commander told him, "Now sheikh, I have shown you all my weapons and my positions. It would hardly be fair if you did not do the same for me."

The sheikh agreed that this was true, and it was arranged that the next morning the commander would fly over the tribe's position in a reconnaissance aircraft. When the TOS commander, flying low, approached the tribe's lines, every one of the sheikh's men was standing by his firing position, looking up and rendering a military salute to the aircraft. Shortly thereafter the tribe left the area and the matter was ended.
The history of the Trucial Oman Scouts began in the late 1940's. In those years, abductions into slavery, attacks on travellers, inter-tribal warfare, and the fact that British officials could hardly leave the towns in which they were stationed without being shot at by tribesmen, all created problems. In 1949, the Political Residency, undoubtedly aided by the Political Agent at Sharjah who himself was a prime target, proposed the raising of a force of one hundred levies to maintain law and order on the Coast. The move was approved by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that year and in 1950 the Treasury agreed to finance a force of seventy men, their cost to be borne by the Foreign Office.

The act of establishing the Trucial Oman Levies, as the unit was first called, constituted a major departure from the former British policy of nonintervention and noninvolvement on the Coast. Now, Great Britain assumed active responsibility for the maintenance of order in the region. There was no precedent for such an act, no agreement or treaty empowering Great Britain to take such a role. Yet, in September of 1950 when the rulers were informed of the plan all but one welcomed it. The ruler of Dubai was said to have opposed formation of the Levies, not because it might limit his sovereignty, but—or so said some British officials
at the time—because it might "interfere with nefarious trading activities."

The first units were organized in February 1951. The initial cadre consisted of several British and two Arab officers, as well as thirty-two non-commissioned officers, all from the Arab Legion in Jordan. The remainder of personnel were to be recruited locally. The force was to occupy vacant RAF facilities at Sharjah.

Through the next year organization continued. By March the unit had been sufficiently well trained that patrols were sent out to visit all the sheikhdoms but Abu Dhabi, and were well received.\(^1\) Despite this early success, the road to organization was not altogether smooth; in May a mutiny occurred among personnel seconded from the Arab Legion and a number had to be sent back to Jordan. This seems to be the only real trouble that developed internally, and by the end of 1951 the rosters showed fifty local recruits, of whom thirty had enlisted from bedouin tribes. No abductions into slavery were reported that year, and raids on travellers decreased.

In 1952, continuing the Wahhabi–Saudi claims on parts of Buraimi Oasis, a Saudi force occupied Hamasah,

\(^1\)Not to Abu Dhabi, presumably because of the distance rather than political considerations.
one of the villages there. An immediate buildup began. The Levies' strength was increased to one hundred and a post was established at a village in Buraimi, al-Ain.

The next year it was decided to increase the strength of the Levies to five hundred. Meanwhile, until the new men could be recruited and trained, members of the Aden Protectorate Levies were brought in. At the same time recruitment for the Trucial Oman force was conducted in Aden. By late summer, the required strength was reached, and the Aden units released. A setback was suffered in November when officers attempted to arrest offenders involved in a serious breach of discipline in one of the Adeni-manned TOL squadrons. Two British officers and a Jordanian warrant officer were murdered. As a result, the entire unit was sent back to Aden and disbanded. The TOL did not regain its full authorized strength of five hundred again until 1955.

At this time, there were three squadrons, each consisting of some sixty officers and men. These three units were stationed at Buraimi, at Tarif and Murfa (the latter some sixty miles west of Abu Dhabi on the coast). In addition to its internal security role, the TOL also sent units with oil company seismographic survey parties when they operated near the Saudi border.
In 1956 the force was expanded from three to five rifle squadrons, the strength it now maintains. Added to these firing units have been a Headquarters Squadron, still at Sharjah within the RAF compound, in smart low whitewashed buildings; a supply and Transportation Squadron; medical unit, which also serves civilians in need; workshops, and a Signal Squadron. At Manama, some fifty miles south of Ras al-Khaimah, is an administrative center consisting of a training depot and a support group, in addition to a rifle squadron stationed there. Rifle units also are posted at Sharjah; Misafi, about twenty miles east of Manama in the Oman Mountains; Mirfa, and Fort Jahali in Buraimi. The Scouts also maintain intelligence officers stationed at key villages throughout the region to report on conditions and possible flareups of trouble.

The mission of the Scouts has undergone a number of alterations over the years. Originally the intention had been to form a gendarmerie to provide local security against tribal warfare and raiding. With the incursion of Saudi Arabia into Buraimi, the Tos became an army, and throughout the years of this confrontation, carried

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1This figure has changed on occasion with reorganizations too complex to deal with here.
out the role of an external defense force. Although this capability remains, the Scouts once more operate as an internal security force, but now the emphasis is different. Although inter-tribal and inter-village disputes still occupy much of the time and energy of its units, the Scouts increasingly are concerned with Arab nationalist agents and terrorists. Thus at least in the more developed areas, the coastal towns and villages the TOS functions more and more in a counter-espionage role, ferreting out and capturing agents sent into the region to stir up feeling against the British and the rulers, and terrorists intent on murder and destruction as a means of weakening the position of leadership of these two elements. In all of its operations, the Scouts work closely with the Political Agents at Dubai and Abu Dhabi.

Dubai has had few occasions to utilize the Scouts. In early 1951, the TOS received word that a band of Al Bu Falah from Buraimi, in good tribal fashion had decided to conduct

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1Units have been conducted at least one amphibious landing. In 1954, augmented by naval landing craft from Bahrain, the Scouts landed in western Abu Dhabi to discourage an ARAMCO survey party, operating there under the protection of Saudi troops.
a raid on Dubai as payment for some grievance, and was riding toward the town. The TOS informed the Political Agent, who rode out into the desert in a car, met the tribesmen, and told them: "You are not allowed to raid here. Go back to Buraimi." According to the story, the tribesmen wheeled their camels around and trotted away, the matter having been settled. The last time the Scouts had to intervene in Dubai---as of this writing---was in December 1955, when they were called in to quell a minor squabble. Officers, who are not prone to expansive praise, credit this fact to Sheikh Rashid's influence and to the favorable conditions created in Dubai by Rashid and his father before him.

If one complaint has been made against the Scouts it is that the organization is a mercenary force of "outsiders." Among the officers, most---including the TOS commander and the squadron commanders---are British. The remainder are Arab, from the Trucial States and Muscat. Of the latter, all are commissioned originally by the TOS commander, and the most promising provided seven months' training in the United Kingdom, at the conclusion of which they receive Queen's commissions and return to the Scouts with ranks equivalent to those of British officers. By 1966,
Arab officers had reached the rank of captain, and were serving as seconds-in-command of squadrons. Among the enlisted ranks, some are British, serving in various posts at the headquarters at Sharjah, and the remainder are Arab, but not generally from the Trucial Coast. Of a total strength of 1500 men, some five hundred are from Dhufar, part of the Sultinate of Muscat (where the first language is not Arabic but Dhufari) and some 270 are Baluchis. The largest native group in the TOS, some 225 men, comes from the Bani Ka'ab tribe, whose allegiance is not to one of the Trucial Sheikhs but to the Sultan of Muscat. Of the remaining one-third of the soldiers, most are from Aden, areas of Iran other than Baluchistan, Muscat, and Oman. This mixture of backgrounds, as well as the soldiers' genealogical and emotional detachment from affairs of the Trucial States has unquestionable contributed to the effectiveness of the Scouts in dealing with the sort of problems existing there, but it does not give the feeling among the people---of Dubai at least---that the TOS is "our army." Some men from the Trucial States do serve in the Scouts, but as one officer put it, "Usually only long enough to buy a rifle and pay a dowry. Then they want to leave the Scouts and return to their tribes."

Perhaps no better indication of the effectiveness
of the Scouts could be given than was supposed to have been rendered by Sheikh Zaid of Abu Dhabi. As the story goes, he complained to a Scout officer, while discussing the peace the Scouts had brought, "You people have destroyed our greatest sport. We don't play football [soccer] as you do. Now we have no means of entertaining ourselves."

The Trucial States Council

Of the early efforts of Great Britain to improve conditions on the Trucial Coast, perhaps none has been as important or will have as far-reaching effects as the establishment in 1952 of the Trucial States Council. Great Britain had long been concerned about the political viability of the Trucial Sheikhdoms, and hoped that this Council might become the medium through which a federation of the sheikhdoms would materialize. Only now, after some fifteen years does it appear that this hope might be realized.

As originally conceived the Council was to be initially under the chairmanship of the Political Officer (now Political Agent), who would prepare the agendas and take a leading role in the conduct of meetings. In time,
when the sheikhs had learned to put aside their still-
strong rivalries to the point that they could work
together effectively, the Political Officer would hand
over his functions to the rulers and serve only as an
advisor. Meetings were to be held every three months
or so.

In 1952, the sheikhs held their first two meetings,
discussing domestic slavery, development programs, travel
documents, nationality laws and anti-locust measures, among other subjects. In these early meetings, only the
ruler of Sharjah was reported to have taken any real
interest, although the ruler of Abu Dhabi did agree to
contribute four per cent of any future income from the
sale of oil, this money to be used for the benefit of
the Trucial States as a whole. The Council agreed to
administer this fund.

Since this inauspicious beginning, the Council
has expanded into a well-organized, functioning legislative
body. It has its own meeting hall in Dubai; there is a
permanent Secretary-General, trained both in modern civil

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1It is interesting to note that in 1943 a British
anti-locust team, attempting to wipe out this plague on
the Coast, met with great hostility from the Hadouin, for
whom these insects provided a welcome variety in an
otherwise plain diet. Alexander Melamid, op. cit., pp. 194-
206.
and Shari'a law, and a Deliberative Committee which meets approximately every two weeks, making preliminary studies on behalf of the Council. The Deliberative Committee is made up of representatives of each of the Trucial States. By agreement, so that its actions can be as unbiased as possible, members are selected from outside the ruling families. Since March 1966, when the Political Agent resigned from the Council, the chairman has been elected by the Council from its membership.

The Council's manner of functioning is deliberately informal. There are, for example, no written constitution or by-laws. These are developing by practice, as one official of the Council said, "bit by bit, piece by piece." All measures promulgated by the Council thus far have had to have received a unanimous vote, however there are indications of a trend that could well lead eventually to areas where a majority vote will suffice and become binding on all members. Additionally, over a period of time the Council has gone beyond merely agreeing upon measures to be taken individually within each sheikhdom, as was the decision in 1953 to issue decrees prohibiting the slave trade. In the past two years the Council has passed a number of measures that are law throughout the Trucial States. Among them are an Agricultural Pesticides Control
Ordnance, passed after a number of persons died from the misuse of insect sprays; a workman's compensation act, and an ordinance dealing with the issuance of bad checks. The Council has also established a High Court for the Trucial States; at present its jurisdiction is limited by the Trucial States Actions Ordnance to civil cases such as employers' and contract disputes. Later as additional experience is gained jurisdiction is expected to widen.¹

In addition to its legislative functions the Council has branched out into development of the Trucial States. The first projects were undertaken in 1955² when the British Government established the Trucial States Development Scheme, and continued under this title until 1965, when the Trucial States Development Fund was formed.

The Development Scheme was financed by an annual British grant of £200,000, and administered by the Trucial States Council. It began such projects as trade schools

¹Among other measures passed by the Council are the adoption of the metric system for use on the Trucial Coast, and a decision to change from the British pattern of driving on the left side of the road to the more widely-used system of driving on the right side. At 5 a.m. on 1 September 1966, this latter ruling was put into effect without a single accident occurring because of it.

at Dubai and Sharjah, aided health work at al-Maktum Hospital in Dubai and through medical clinics it operated along the Coast, and opened an agricultural experiment station and school.

From Dubai's standpoint the most important of the projects begun under the Development Scheme was the trade school, although some benefit may be gained from the agricultural school and from the activities of the experiment station. Developed and expanded during the last two years, the school is financed jointly by Dubai and the now-current Development Fund. Some fifty students there study Arabic, English, mathematics, social studies, general science and physical education, in addition to technical subjects. Plans call for an increase by 1968 to ninety pupils, not including those who will study in a new commercial wing, or those exceptional students who will train to take over as teachers.

In 1965 the Council's ability to contribute to the Trucial States was expanded materially with the founding of the Development Fund. The £200,000 provided by Great Britain had been beneficial, but not sufficient for major programs that would meet the needs of an area as need-filled as the Trucial Coast. In June of that year the British
established the Development Fund, contributing an initial grant of £1 million. This was added to by Abu Dhabi, now drawing huge revenues from oil, in the amount of £200,000; 1 Qatar, £250,000, and Bahrain, £40,000. Great Britain was to continue its annual grant of £200,000. 2 The Trucial States Development Office was opened, separate from that of the Council, to administer the various programs undertaken by the Council. In 1965-66, it was served by a full- and part-time senior staff including an Acting Director and Superintending Engineer (both British) who comprised the Secretariat; a Headmaster, who managed the various schools sponsored by the Fund; an agricultural staff composed of a British supervisor and two Arab assistants, and a health section, with six doctors, five of whom were listed as "touring doctors," since they travel throughout the region, and a Hospital Matron and Hospital Secretary, both of whom serve at al-Maktum Hospital. 3 The Council retains the engineering firm of Sir William Halcrow, Ltd., long engineering advisors to Sheikh Rashid, as consultant.


2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., p. 18.
At the Council's meeting on June 30, 1965, the rulers agreed upon the First Program of Major Capital Works. Among the projects contained in this plan were the Dubai–Sharjah and Sharjah–Ras al-Khaimah highways, water systems for four of the poorer sheikhdoms, a Water Resources Survey, electrical systems for three towns, the development of town plans for Ajman and Umm al-Qaiwain, a jetty for Ras al-Khaimah, and the initiation of a study of the feasibility of a road to link the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea sheikhdoms. A number of the projects were to be financed jointly by the Fund and the sheikhdoms involved; others, particularly those crucial to poorer sheikhdoms, were to be undertaken as grants. In other cases, the Council allocated funds to assist projects already under way within the sheikhdoms.

Dubai, already far ahead of the other sheikhdoms in development, profited little in the initial programs. Only the Dubai–Sharjah highway, begun in December 1965 and completed in December of the next year at a cost of £1,500,000, has been of direct benefit. This road, eight and one-half miles of wide, two-lane asphalt, has ended the once tedious and sometimes hazardous trip to nearby Sharjah, over treacherous Subkha, or salt marsh, and
sand. Not only has this highway opened travel for those having dealings in Sharjah, but it has opened the extensive markets of Dubai to persons living in the areas to the northeast. Of the remaining programs, the Water Resources Survey may discover additional water supplies that could be used for irrigation, and the completion of the Sharjah-Ras al-Khaimah road may well increasingly focus trade on Dubai.

Under the Second Program of Capital Works, adopted in November 1965, Dubai is to receive funds to build staff housing for al-Maktum Hospital, and the commercial wing of the trade school, as well as participate in an economic survey of the entire Trucial Coast.  

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1 For a discussion of driving conditions in this region as late as 1963, but before the highway was built, see Society for Exploration, University College of Wales, Aberystwyth to Abu Dhabi, unpublished manuscript, 1964.

CHAPTER VI

THE SUDDEN GROWTH OF TRADE

Following World War II, a number of factors conspired to create a boom in Dubai's trade. This rapid expansion continued to the point that Dubai now dominates trade in the southern Persian Gulf. Much of this commerce involves smuggling and Dubai is now known as one of the major contraband capitals of the world.

Dubai has long had the potential for becoming a major trading center. Its favorable location at the hub of the Trucial Coast, its easy access to neighboring Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iran, India and Pakistan, its relatively good harbor, and its freedom from heavy customs duties are contributing factors. Yet, until the mid-1940's Dubai had not had an opportunity to exploit this potential, and remained largely in the shadow of a more active and more developed Sharjah. Then, four new factors came into play, and thrust Dubai into the forefront: the entry of the Arabs into commerce, the silting up of Sharjah's creek, the discovery of oil in Kuwait, and the post-war expansion of economies all along the coast.
Arab Participation in Trade

Prior to the 1940's, the trade of Dubai remained almost exclusively in the hands of Persian settlers, many of whose families had been located in Dubai for generations. Prominent Arabs who might well have led in commerce looked on themselves as members of the ruling class, and preferred the traditional activities of hunting and sitting in a mejlis to the commercialism of the Persians. That they were economically poorer than these merchants meant little to them: family heritage, generosity, and piety were the standards by which the elites were judged. Then, with the increasing development of a money economy and the availability of modern consumer goods, coupled with the realization of the potentials of a new way of life, the Arabs entered into trade in the expanding markets of the Persian Gulf.

Once their interest was aroused, they were generally quite successful. One former British official in Dubai, in discussing this point, commented:

After all, this was their /the Arabs'/ country, completely, and even though the Persians may have been there for centuries, they were still marginal people. The Arab merchants had the ear of the Ruler and received support, and the Arab population was more receptive to buying from "their people" than from the Persians.
There are any number of success stories about Arabs of Dubai who began to trade at this time and rose to riches within a few years. Perhaps the two best known are of the man who began trading with a "bum-boat," taking trade goods out to the ships that called offshore, and of the prominent merchant who began his career by selling kerosene from a cart. Both are now millionaires, and leaders in the life of the city.¹

Sharjah Declines as a Trading Town

Throughout the early history of Dubai, Sharjah had led in commerce and development. Then, in the late 1940's, the creek on which Sharjah was built, and which served as a harbor for native craft, began to fill with sand.² Its entrance closed so that even shallow-draft dhows could not enter. Trade necessarily went elsewhere, and Dubai received most of it.

¹A third owns a country estate in England where he spends part of each year.

²Generally the term used for the build-up of sand across the mouths of the creeks along the Trucial Coast is "silting," a parallel drawn from the action of flowing streams which deposit silt at their mouths. According to engineers in the area, what actually happens is that the currents within the Gulf, flowing north-east, move sand constantly along the beaches. When this sand builds up across the mouth of a creek, it can create a new beach, the former creek then becoming a tidal pool, closed off from the sea.
The Post-War Boom

The world-wide economic boom following World War II reached into the Trucial Coast to diversify and speed the pace of trade in Dubai. Traditionally, the trade that had passed through Sharjah and Dubai had been in basic items, filling the simple needs of the region for rice, tea, sugar, cloth, charcoal, timber and tobacco. But as increasing quantities of money became available throughout the region, the people began to demand the full range of modern consumer goods—everything from watches to stockings to after-shave lotion. This took place of course just as the nations of Europe and American were rebuilding production and were attempting to thrust their products into markets everywhere, including the Persian Gulf. So it was that as the merchants built new shelves in their shops and stocked them with new consumer items, there stood customers ready and waiting to buy.

This increased trade fostered increased development. Suddenly, heavy items such as concrete and structural steel, machinery—pumps and generators, among others—were added to the trade in consumer goods, thus beginning a self-perpetuating and self-expanding process which continues today.
Oil and the Gold Trade

The development of oil in other regions of the Gulf, such as Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar also had a marked effect on trade in Dubai. When sizeable revenues from oil brought instant prosperity to the peoples of these sheikdoms, their participation in such ventures as fishing and trade, particularly that involving smuggling gold into India, Iran and Pakistan, declined. This abdication left a vacuum which Dubai was well prepared to fill. Fish has become the main locally produced export of Dubai,¹ but this industry is minor in comparison to the revenues brought in from the gold trade.

If one single enterprise triggered the sudden economic boom in Dubai, it was the gold trade. When gold was first shipped out of Dubai to be smuggled into India and Pakistan is not known, but in about 1950 this trade suddenly began to flourish. Merchants in Dubai, already well acquainted with traders in these countries and accustomed to operating there, began to take over much of the commerce. The trade in gold developed rapidly and the profits that came from it provided the initial capital

¹Shipped mostly to Ceylon for use as fertilizer.
which set off Dubai's economic surge.

In Dubai, the gold trade is completely legal. There are no restrictions or customs duties on precious metals, on either the gold which is exported or the silver in which payment is frequently made. Gold is obtained from the markets of London, Switzerland and Lebanon, among others, usually by local banks, which take in shipments of gold on consignment. The banks sell this gold to merchants or cartels formed for the purpose of the trade; individuals with limited funds can also invest by depositing money with the merchants involved, receiving in return scraps of paper as receipts, which are said to be redeemable in almost any bank in the Middle East. The gold is shipped out of Dubai on launches, usually dhows powered by diesel engines.¹

This trade becomes illegal only when the gold enters the territorial waters of the country to which it is shipped. In Dubai merchants and bankers alike talk freely about the gold trade up to the point of the gold's entry into India or Pakistan. Then conversations generally halt, it being acknowledged that it is not Dubai's concern how the gold gets by the customs authorities of those countries.²

¹Their speed is probably not more than fourteen knots.

²Sources outside Dubai say that much of it is dropped overboard at pre-arranged points along the coasts of Iran, Pakistan and India and retrieved later by agents in those countries, while a smaller amount is taken ashore hidden in special pockets in the clothing of the crew members.
India and Pakistan, although they have opposed this trade for years because of its effects on their foreign exchange positions, have not been able to stop it. For one thing these governments have not been able to curb the demand, so entrenched is the desire for gold among the people. Most gold that goes into these countries is said to be bought by families who feel more confident keeping their savings in gold than in currency, and by prospective grooms who by tradition pay the bride-price in gold.

When the gold is delivered, it is paid for either in rupees—discounted because of the need to convert them later into hard currencies for use in buying more gold—in dollars or pounds sterling. Of late some payments have been made in silver.¹

The quantities of gold involved in this trade are huge. In 1966, Dubai and Sharjah combined were estimated to have exported more than three million ounces of gold, worth more than one hundred million dollars.² Profits also

¹In late February 1967, a BOAC jet liner bound for London from Dubai was delayed in departing by the receipt of an unscheduled cargo of four tons of raw silver, the payment from a gold transaction.

²Mocatta and Goldsmith's Annual Circular, London, 1966. This gold dealer's publication did not list separate statistics for Dubai, but it is generally conceded that Sharjah's shipments are a good deal smaller than Dubai's.
during some periods have been huge. On some shipments profits have reached as high as forty per cent of the gold shipped.\textsuperscript{1} Considering that merchants were making as many as five shipments a year, the profits became astronomical, even though occasionally shipments would be caught by coastal patrols or confiscated within the receiving country. Peak profits were reached between 1960 and 1962; more recently they have declined. According to one banker, profits on shipments at the end of 1966 were only about two to three per cent, while by February of 1967 they had increased to about seven per cent. That sizeable returns are still possible is shown by the fact that one Dubai businessman said that the one thousand dollars he had invested in June 1966 had, by February 1967, grown to one thousand six hundred dollars.

\textbf{Trade Begins to Expand}

Although the decline in profits from gold trading after 1962 cost the sheikhdoms much in income, it did provide other benefits. During the periods of high profits,

\textsuperscript{1}Divided between the invester (23\%) and the shipper (17\%) according to one banker.
merchants and other investors had plowed their money back into buying more and more gold for shipment. But with decreasing profits, they sought other more advantageous uses for their capital, and branched out into other fields, into construction, land speculation and the added import of consumer goods.

By this time too, the gold trade, augmented by the general increased in business activity following World War II, had introduced a good deal of capital into the economy. Much of this, by 1962, had been put to use by business people and the government, which undertook extensive modernization programs.

While Dubai's economy was accelerating from the influx of gold money, other events made their contributions. In nearby Doha a recession set in and merchants there, overstocked and looking for cash, began to open branches of their firms in Dubai. Kuwaiti merchants, interested in expansion into the lower Gulf, chose Dubai, as did firms in Bahrain and Lebanon. As living conditions improved, more and more merchants came, settling permanently. Their need for houses, servants and consumer goods expanded the work force and increased the low of money within the economy. With the beginning of oil exploration and production in Abu Dhabi, trans-shipments to that area
multiplied. And when Continental Oil Co. began drilling in 1964, the economic activity of Dubai took on an aspect of frenzy. With the tremendous optimism of the people, who were certain that the first spade would bring oil gushing to the surface, land prices shot up, new businesses were formed almost daily and existing ones expanded. Dubai's economy began to snowball, and the end is not yet in view.

Statistics dealing with Dubai's imports demonstrate clearly the phenomenal rise in trade. According to the first available figures, those for 1956, at that time Dubai's imports were only eight million dollars.\(^1\) In 1966, they reached upwards of sixty-two millions, not including precious metals or oil drilling equipment, which are not taxed.

The following chart indicates the growth in trade from 1959 to 1966:

\(^1\)Antonius Soraya, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 28.
# TRADE STATISTICS

## IMPORTS

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Rupees</th>
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<th>Approximate % Increase</th>
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<td>1959</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>24.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>204.71</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>78.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>239.98</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>312.50</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
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</table>

## EXPORTS (Locally Produced)

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</tr>
</thead>
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<td>3.09</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## RE-EXPORTS

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<th>Dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>3.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>6.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. These statistics were developed from Government of Dubai, "Dubai," p. 2, except for figures from 1966 which are from State of Dubai, Port and Customs Department.
The growth in Dubai's imports is readily apparent from these statistics, as is the fact that in a period of only eight years, Dubai's imports rose 477%, and over a span of eleven years, 782%. Considering that imports constitute the main source of revenue for Dubai, these figures take on great importance.

Dubai in recent years has imported from at least sixty-five different nations. In 1965, the largest amounts came from the United Kingdom ($8,000,000), Japan ($6,000,000), Switzerland ($5,000,000), India ($4,500,000), Pakistan ($3,000,000) and the United States ($2,600,000).

Exports have been much much more localized, including only eleven regions in addition to the other Trucial States. Largest customer in 1965 was Ceylon, which purchased nearly $1 million from Dubai, mainly in dried fish. Saudi Arabia took some $300,000 in goods. The remainder, in smaller amounts went to such places as Muscat, Khor Fakan (on the Batinah Coast), Socotra and the Maldives Islands.

As with many statistics, these may well be deceiving. If one compares imports with re-exports, he would assume that in 1964, for example, Dubai retained all but eight per cent of its imports, and in 1965, all but thirteen per cent. This is not the case, since these figures do not
include those items which were introduced into the local market and sold through its various outlets. Since there is no restriction on exports, figures for this type of trade are not available, but officials estimate that about eighty per cent of imports are re-exported, much of them smuggled into neighboring countries.

Items traded through Dubai cover the entire spectrum of modern goods. Dubai is said to be one of the world's largest importers of Swiss watch movements and complete watches; the movements are understood to be destined for Hong Kong, where "Swiss made" watches are manufactured, while the complete watches are sold throughout the range of Dubai's customers. Cloth for saris is another large item. It is said to be cheaper to smuggle the material into India where the saris are sewn together, smuggle the completed saris out and then into Pakistan than it is for Pakistanis to buy them direct from India. Iran, which has high import duties, is a major customer for virtually all consumer goods shipped into Dubai.

This increase in trade is clearly visible in the number of ships anchored off Dubai. In 1956, a British Government brochure on the region stated with apparent satisfaction that at that time British India Steam Navigating Company mail steamers made "regular fortnightly
calls" at Dubai on their runs along the Coast, adding:

Several merchants vessels [also] call at Dubai each month. Dubai is the main centre of supply for the whole of the Trucial Coast and its hinterland, and there is trade by country craft with Persia. There are a few local products and Dubai depends for its existence on its entrepot trade and pearl diving.¹

Contrast that statement with the fact that in 1964, during one period of twenty-seven days, a ship each day was scheduled to call.²

Not all of this increase in trade involved shipping. Many merchandising firms, both Arab and Western, opened branches in Dubai during this period and other substantial concerns either came to Dubai or were started there. The British Bank of the Middle East³ had opened a branch in Dubai in 1946, in 1961 expanded into a new branch in Diera, and in 1967 had a third branch under consideration. In 1963, Dubai offered only one class B and one class C hotel; by early 1967 there were three first-class hotels there.

¹The emphasis on the role of pearl diving in Dubai's economy at this time may have been excessive. Central Office of Information, The Arab States of the Persian Gulf, Pamphlet 3387, London, August 1956.

²Government of Dubai, Gazette, No. 25, June 1964.

³Under the name of the Imperial Bank of Persia. It became the British Bank of the Middle East in 1950.
In 1964, the First National City Bank of New York opened a branch, bringing the number of banks in Dubai to four.\footnote{Including the National Bank of Dubai, which will be discussed in a later section.} By early 1967, the city boasted three soft drink bottling companies, two theaters (showing mostly films from India), and an industrial gas plant.
CHAPTER VII
DUBAI: A MIRACLE OF TRANSFORMATION

The modernization of Dubai, by any standard, occurred overnight. In five years, beginning in 1958, Dubai was transformed from an active but nevertheless primitive coastal town without public water or electricity—much less paved streets—into a modern city whose comfort and ease of life compared favorably with those of the most cosmopolitan of Middle Eastern cities.

That this metamorphosis should have come at this particular time, and should have been accomplished so successfully, was due to three influences: the impetus of Great Britain, the sudden increases in trade and Government revenues, and the leadership of Sheikh Rashid. Britain's policy of enlightened self-interest, adopted in the early 1950's, sparked the flame, and its encouragement and assistance nurtured it, while the rapid gains in trade, particularly after 1958, provided the financial means. These two forces, to use another analogy, only put the ball on the playing field; it was Sheikh Rashid, backed by the merchant community, who picked up the ball and ran with it. That much of the credit must go to Rashid is evident in the fact that other sheikhdoms have had equal
opportunity for development, and much larger revenues to work with, but for years made no material progress.

The Growth of Government Income

The total revenues that accrue to Sheikh Rashid as State funds are not announced. Only the amount of funds obtained from customs duties can be computed, based on the overall volume of trade and the customs duties charged. Thus any figures relating to government income must be incomplete because payments are also received from oil leases, the sale of reclaimed land and rentals of Government-built facilities. Other income, such as local and business and vehicle licences are paid directly to the Baladiya or Municipality of the City of Dubai.

The following chart shows an approximation of the income received from customs duties, which, with the exception of money paid for purchase of reclaimed land, probably constitutes the major portion of the State's income.
GOVERNMENT RECEIPTS FROM CUSTOMS DUTIES¹
(In Millions of Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1962</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.634</td>
<td>.790</td>
<td>.867</td>
<td>1.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.135</td>
<td>1.950</td>
<td>2.268</td>
<td>3.042</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other funds have come from the sheikhdoms of Kuwait and Qatar, which have contributed large sums to assist in the development of Dubai. Kuwait has established a State Development Office in Dubai, through which it channels funds and technical assistance and co-ordinates its educational programs. Much of Kuwait's assistance has taken the form of loans. In 1966 for example the Government of Kuwait provided two capital loans of 400,000 Dinars (approximately $1.12 millions each) to Dubai.²

¹Figures for the years 1959-1961 and 1966 are taken from published customs statistics in pounds sterling, converted on the basis of $2.80 per sterling pound. The remaining years are taken from the same source, but from figures quoted in Indian rupees. Conversion rate used: one Rupee = $.2098.

²Government of Kuwait, Nasharat Ghurfa Tijari wa Sina'i al-Kuwait (Directory of the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce), Kuwait, June 1966.
The Beginning of Development

In the mid-1950's Dubai's entire economy was threatened by the same fate that had struck down that of Sharjah. Dubai's creek was beginning to fill rapidly, and Rashid and the merchant community were well aware of the consequences should it close to the point that it could not longer be used.

Rashid called on the firm of Sir William Halcrow and thus began a mutually profitable relationship which has continued until the present. Halcrow's operations with Rashid are unorthodox but effective. In discussing this aspect of the company's relationship, one company official stated:

We operate very informally with Sheikh Rashid. For example, we commit large amounts of money on projects on the basis of a simple verbal request. We know how short of money he is in relation to what he is trying to do, and in designing projects we try to produce solutions that are economical, that can be begun with funds that are available at the time, and that can be extended as additional money becomes available.

Studies were soon started with a view to dredging the harbor and improving the unloading facilities---in short to build a functional, modern port. Funds were still in extremely short supply, but with a loan of
£400,000 from Kuwait, dredging was started in 1958. At that time, the entrance to the harbor was only eighteen inches deep at low tide, and about six and one-half feet at high tide, barely enough for the shallowest native craft. Lighters bringing cargoes to shore from ships were often delayed in entering the creek, having to wait until high tide. Occasionally when rough seas built up, these barges were washed ashore and they and their cargoes destroyed.

As the project progressed, the creek was dredged to a depth of eight feet at low tide (thirteen feet at high tide). To halt the deposit of sand across the mouth of the creek—and to stop the extensive erosion taking place on the beach at Shendagha---groynes, low walls extending out into the water, were built along the shore to the southwest and on either side of the harbor entrance. These slowed the current and caused the sand it carried to be deposited along the beach in front of Shendagha, and off-shore away from the creek entrance. By early 1967, Shendagha, whose seaside houses had been threatened often by storms, was safely separated from the Gulf by a solid beach, more than wide enough for the street that now runs between the houses and the sea.

The dredging of the creek has brought other
benefits. The sand and soil brought up from the bottom were deposited along the sides of the creek, resulting in the reclamation of a half-million square yards of land.\(^1\) This property now has great value, and a Halcrow official estimated that the $5 million initial cost of the project, plus much future development, will be paid by the sale and leasing of this land. But not all will be leased or sold. Much of it has been used for the construction of new port facilities. What formerly had been waste marshland has become lengths of new wharves and docking spaces. Some five hundred feet of new wharves have been added to the south side of the harbor, with an equal amount under development. On the Diera side, about three thousand feet of new wharves have been built. Also on this reclaimed land now are boat building facilities, a new library, one of Dubai’s two first-class hotels, and many commercial facilities.

In all, along the creek have been developed more than three thousand feet of customs wharves, designated as to imports, such as bagged cargo, cement and timber.\(^2\)

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\(^2\) Additionally, one hundred thousand square feet of warehousing and nearly one-half million square feet of open storage are available.
Goods are brought to the wharves by a fleet of thirty steel lighters, with a total capacity of about four thousand tons, towed by nine modern tugs.\textsuperscript{1} These barges are served by eight mobile cranes varying in capacity from three to thirty tons.

Plans currently are under study to build a deep-water port capable of handling ships of drafts up to thirty feet. Such craft now have to anchor a mile or more off the shore to unload. According to the design (see map 2), two breakwaters are to be built out into the Gulf, the sea bottom between them dredged, and wharves built along the south-west side. Initially the capacity is expected to be four ships, with additional construction providing berths for up to ten. The present entrance to the creek would be closed, and a new entrance built through Shendagha. But in terms of present funds available, this is a major project, and engineers estimate that its realization is ultimately dependent upon oil production. Its cost would simply be too great for the scale of revenues available from trade.\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{1}Government of Dubai, "Discovery of Oil....", p.1. At present the creek is limited to "country craft" and coastal steamers up to eight hundred tons displacement.

\textsuperscript{2}There is another reason for deliberation on this project. Shendagha, the traditional home of the rulers of Dubai, and Rashid's birthplace, would be altered materially by the construction of such a port. There is some feeling that Rashid may regret this, and for that reason hesitate to implement the project.
Dubai Builds a Modern Government

In 1957, Sheikh Rashid, with the assistance of British advisors, began to build a modern government. Departments were formed during the next five years to deal with education, police, health, immigration, water supply, laws, and land registration. In addition, there was established a Baladiya, or municipality, to manage the affairs of the city. Directors of the departments report directly to Sheikh Rashid, as does the Ra'ees al-Baladiya, or City Manager. Some departments are headed by British employees, most by Arab officials.

The Baladiya

In 1957, looking toward realizing the dream of a modern city, Rashid appointed a department head to manage the affairs of the city of Dubai. This proved insufficient, and in 1960, a British-trained expert in city government was borrowed from the Government of Sudan to act as city manager and to build a city government. The following year, in 1961, a Municipal Council, consisting of sixteen members representing various interests in Dubai was formed. Members, who are appointed by Sheikh Rashid, serve two-year terms.
It is empowered—subject to final approval by Sheikh Rashid—to pass Local Orders or ordinances concerning a wide range of matters including zoning, business licenses, regulation of parking, construction of roads within the city, impounding of animals, fire regulations and public health.\(^1\)

The Baladiya maintains a permanent staff including a Director, who is responsible for the day-to-day functioning of the city, an Assistant Director, a public health officer, tax collectors, an engineer and staff of surveyors, a draftsman, a number of accountants and clerks, some fifteen truck drivers and more than one hundred and fifty street sweepers, among other employees.\(^2\)

Revenues for use by the Municipality have been drawn from a wide range of sources. Until recently taxes were levied on rents of shops (10%) and houses (5%), on shops occupied by their owners (ten rupees per month for shops with two doors and five for those with only one), from houses built of cement block (three rupees), and for houses built of palm fronds (two rupees). Now the system has

\(^1\)The Council maintains a number of standing committees to deal with these programs.

been changed to provide for taxation on the buildings' potential rental value whether rented or not. Revenues also come from business licenses, building permits, slaughtering and marketing fees, vehicle registrations, entertainment taxes, liquor taxes,¹ and when required, from the ruler.²

The Legal System

Although changes are planned, and are sure to come, for the citizens of Dubai, legal processes still follow traditional patterns.³ Both civil and criminal cases are generally handled by the ruler or a member of his family,⁴ or if a judgement cannot be given, then by a qadhi, one learned in the Moslem Shari'a law. Appeal

¹Liquor is available only to non-Moslem foreigners, in bulk through the British Political Agency, by the drink at hotel bars.

²Municipal Council, op. cit., p. 11.

³Great Britain maintains jurisdiction over all British subjects and most foreigners within the Trucial States. Cases involving these persons are tried either by the Political Agents, as judges of the Court of the Individual Territory, or by the Political Resident and his legal staff at Bahrain. Cases involving both foreign nationals and citizens of the Trucial States are tried by a mixed court made up of the Political Agent and either the ruler concerned or his representative. See Liebesney, op. cit., p. 36.

⁴Practice generally follows the Maliki and Shafi'i schools of Islamic law. Antonius Saroya, op. cit., p. 28.
is available through a qadhi in one of the other Trucial States. Commercial cases are usually handled, as has been mentioned, by a tribunal of prominent merchants, who either settle questions brought before them or failing in this, refer to the ruler. If Rashid cannot reach a settlement he feels just, he may wish to refer to a qadhi.\(^1\) In the handling of all these matters, the emphasis is on arbitration and an amicable settlement consistent with custom and Shari'a law.

Increasing modernization and complexity are forcing changes in this system. No matter how excellent the Shari'a code may be in handling civil law of a personal nature, it does not provide for such things as traffic regulations, insurance laws and sanitation regulations. The course of action to be followed here is to adopt the necessary laws, basing them on modern codes, but only to the extent that they do not violate the principles of related Moslem law.

The first steps toward modernizing the legal system are being taken at this time. New laws are being passed regularly, to be applied by traditional trial methods until a modern system of courts is developed.

\(^1\) Liebesney, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
Dubai already has a customs law, a bad checks law and a workman's compensation law.\textsuperscript{1} Drafts for other laws have been prepared, including one for a labor act dealing with wages, hours and child labor.\textsuperscript{2} "Inhumane" punishments in the modern sense are no longer used in Dubai. There is no stoning or flogging, for example, most penalties involving fines, or in extreme cases, jail sentences.\textsuperscript{3}

There is some resistance to the adoption of a modern system of courts. One official high in the Government commented: "Why complicate life? We have democracy---anyone can go to the Sheikh, or to a mejlis and find justice. Why do we need courts?" There may well be a strong justification for this feeling. After all, who can say that participants in a civil disagreement,

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{1}] Indicating Dubai's increased identification with the outside world, a recent law established an economic boycott of Southern Rhodesia.
\item[\textsuperscript{2}] In addition a penal code and traffic law are being prepared for the Trucial States Council. These will be applicable to Dubai.
\item[\textsuperscript{3}] As early as 1962, it was reported that even in cases of murder, the death penalty was meted out only if the offended family demanded it. Otherwise the offender was required to pay compensation to the deceased's relatives. Saroya, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 28.
\end{itemize}
or for that matter a person changed with a crime, do not in fact receive a more personal justice from their known and respected leaders than may be given to them in the detached, impersonal atmosphere of a more closely-regulated courtroom?

The Modern Police Force

During this period as well, Dubai was building an up-to-date police force. From time immemorial the town had maintained watchmen, in the early days as both police and as guards against attack from hostile neighbors. As the town developed, the watchmen were able to devote themselves more to the normal police role, and in 1957 a regular police force was organized, through British assistance. Initially an officer from the Trucial Oman Scouts was put in charge, and late that year, a police officer from Britain was brought to Dubai on contract to direct the force. In 1960 police number some eighty men, and by 1965 the strength was more than one hundred and eighty. At present there are some three hundred men serving and plans call for increasing this figure to five hundred.¹

¹The British Government's contribution now is minimal. The vast percentage of police funds are provided by Sheikh Rashid.
Commandant of Police now is a retired British army officer. He is assisted by a deputy, also British, and a staff of British and Arab assistants, who direct the force's seven sections: traffic, immigration, prisons, internal discipline, crime, police academy and band. There is also a "special branch" which is concerned with matters of internal security. Although most recruiting is done in Dubai, few of the police are Arabs; most are either of Persian or Baluchi origin and require, because of their lack of contact with the modern environment, extensive training.

Education

In 1957 and 1958, with the assistance of the Government of Kuwait, Dubai began a concerted program to improve its children's education.

Prior to this time, Dubai had operated small Koranic schools, but in the late 1950's established modern

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1 An indication of the capability of this force is the fact that the traffic division operates seven mobile radio units.
schools for boys with a capacity of 1397 students. By 1960, there were a total of nine schools and 2395 boys enrolled. In 1959, a girls' school had been opened, but with only nine applicants; soon, however, the idea of providing education for girls caught on, and by 1962, 490 girls were attending the school.  

By 1966, date of the last published statistics, 2621 boys were enrolled in three elementary, two primary, and one secondary school, and a school for Islamic instruction. Education for girls included two elementary and one primary schools, with nearly one thousand girls enrolled.  

Support for education in Dubai has expanded also. Kuwait still provides the major share of support, including teachers (46 male and 21 female), as well as texts and administration, but the United Arab Republic and Qatar also provide teachers (thirty-seven and sixteen, respectively). Under a program in which it encourages its own people to work in education, Dubai provides twenty-three teachers and has sent a number out of the country for training.

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1 Saroya, op. cit.


3 Ibid. There are also private Persian, Indian and English-speaking schools. In the last, about half the students are European or American, one-quarter Arab or Persian and the remainder Indian or Pakistani.
Medical Services

The medical needs of the people of Dubai have received considerable attention under recent development programs. In 1939, the Government of India opened a small dispensary in Dubai, and in 1941, the British Government contributed Rs. 5000 (about £370 at present exchange rates) toward the cost of building a hospital, the remaining required Rs. 8000 to be raised by local subscription. It was ten years, however, before the hospital, the first on the Trucial Coast, was opened. Named the al-Maktum for Dubai's ruling family, its original capacity was thirty-eight beds. Since the late 1950's it has been expanded to eighty-two. Two operating theaters provide for surgical cases, and there are nine doctors in residence. Medical care is provided either without charge or at modest fees, depending upon the ability of the patient to pay.

Kuwait has also assisted Dubai in the medical field. The Government of Kuwait operates a fifty-bed hospital and several clinics in Dubai. Yet despite these efforts the standards of health, although improving, are still poor.
Other Government Services

By 1963, Government services had reached the point that Dubai offered its people a publicly subscribed automatic telephone system (installed in 1960), a publicly owned electric company\(^1\) and a public water system, the last begun through the assistance of the Ruler of Qatar, and expanded subsequently through internal financing.\(^2\) There were street lights, a limited but functional bus service and a State post office.\(^3\) And by 1967, Government services included modern fire and sanitation departments, zoo, marketing facilities for local and imported meats and produce, and a modern slaughter house. The Government also had adopted in 1966 a new currency, the Qatar-Dubai Riyal.\(^4\)

\(^1\)Producing 6400 kws. Two additional 3000 kw generators have been ordered for installation in 1967 and 1968.

\(^2\)This system now produces some 700,000 gallons per day; a new pumping station being installed will increase this figure to one million. A further plan under study will increase available water to three million gallons per day.

\(^3\)Opened early in the century by the Government of India, and taken over by Dubai in 1963.

\(^4\)Worth 1/6d, or $0.092, and printed in notes of one, five, ten, twenty-five and one hundred riyals; coins are five, ten, twenty-five and fifty riyals.
Other Development Projects

Beyond providing basic services to its people, the Government of Dubai has reached out into other areas, including airport construction, bridging of the creek, and the establishment of a national bank. These and other works were based on a Town Plan co-ordinated by the Halcrow organization and adopted in the late 1950's.

Dubai's New Airport

Until 1960, and following the departure of the flying boat service early in World War II, Dubai had been without scheduled airline service. As a rising capital of trade for its region, Dubai needed a major airport. In 1959, construction was started on a packed-sand airfield suitable for medium-sized transports. Completed in 1960, it proved only marginally useful, and with the increased use by airlines of huge jet aircraft, by 1965 it had become patently inadequate. In that year the airport was extended to its present 9200-foot length, and paved, making it suitable for all but the most heavily-laden jet airliners. By 1967 five airlines offered fifteen passenger flights a week to such destinations as Europe,
the United Kingdom, Pakistan, India and Iran, in addition to local runs to Abu Dhabi, Qatar and Bahrain.

The Creek is Finally Bridged

Until the completion of the bridge on the khor, people and their goods either had to be transported across the creek by water taxi, or had to go by land around the creek, a rough trip of perhaps fifteen miles.

The Town Plan had included a bridge, located just inland from the centers of Dubai and Diera. At this point the creek is perhaps two hundred meters wide. Sheikh Rashid, determined that a bridge should be built, but extremely short of funds, instructed the Halcrow organization to plan the bridge to be built at least cost. About two miles inland the creek narrows to about one hundred meters, and here the bridge, completed in 1963, was located.

This bridge, although it has received favorable comments from at least one international engineering publication, has created problems. Its location far

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1"Composite Construction of a Bridge in the Middle East," Concrete and Constructional Engineering, May 1964, p. 194.
inland requires persons desiring to cross the creek by automobile to drive a considerable distance from either Dubai or Diera to do so, and the low height of the span effectively blocks off perhaps three to four miles of the interior portion of the creek to anything but small craft. The creek, for most of its six- or seven-mile length is capable of being dredged for navigation, and the demand for land is such that the remainder of the creek needs to be dredged to provide access to this land.

To correct this situation, a canal has been proposed to bypass the bridge and open the interior of the creek; to provide a convenient crossing point near the centers of Diera and Dubai, a vehicular tunnel under the creek has been considered. The first of these two projects is expected to cost not more than £250,000, and may be undertaken shortly, on the assumption that its cost will be more than recovered by the increased value of the land behind it. Completion of the tunnel, however, most assuredly remains contingent upon large oil revenues.

The National Bank of Dubai and Other Projects

The Government of Dubai has accomplished other
projects, less spectacular but nonetheless valuable.
In 1963, in cooperation with the National Bank of Kuwait
and the Midland Bank,\(^1\) the National Bank of Dubai was
formed, with an initial capital of £1 million. Twenty
per cent of the capital was provided by Kuwait and eighty
per cent by the people of Dubai.

In 1965, the Government had completed the widening
and paving of some thirty-six miles of streets and roads
within Dubai, and was at work on a number of other projects,
including one for the construction of public sanitation
facilities to be located throughout the city.

The net result of all of these developments was
to establish Dubai, as it is today, a surprisingly
attractive, comfortable city—despite the climate—and one whose American and European residents find
thoroughly liveable. A British foreign service officer
stationed in Dubai during the period of its intense
development described life in the city at that time:

Even as early as 1963, the life in Dubai
was comparable to that in the relatively
highly developed, sophisticated city of
Beirut. Everything in Beirut was available
in Dubai... As a matter of fact, one could
live more comfortably in Dubai than in
Beirut. And the mechanics of living,
partly because Dubai is smaller, were

\(^1\)Economist Intelligence United Ltd., Economic
Review, Middle East Oil and the Saudi Arabian Peninsula,
much easier.

Between 1961 and 1963, there were only two failures in electrical service, once when a boat's anchor caught in an underwater cable and broke it, and the other, whose cause I don't know, was for only ten minutes. There never was a water failure.¹

¹It should be noted that Beirut, despite its many desirable points, is notorious for water and electrical failures.
CHAPTER VIII

DUBAI TODAY -- AND TOMORROW

Flying south-eastward toward Dubai from Qatar there is haze in the air, yet the waters of the Gulf below are a deep cobalt blue, glistening faintly. Occasional black dots, their wakes making white arrowheads behind them, mark the small native craft plying these waters, touching at the seaside towns, or perhaps on their way to smuggle radios into Iran or silks and rayons into Pakistan, or gold into India. Few show their sails, because diesel power has come to the Gulf and the huge lateens now unfurl only for the most favorable winds.

Suddenly ahead the color of the water lightens, along the line between the deeps and the shallows, and just beyond, almost indistinct because of the clear water, begins the beige of the coast. The plane has been letting down to land at Dubai's international airport. As it passes over the beach, out the window to the right can be seen the black and brown squares that are the houses of Diera, the tiny question marks that are palm trees, and beyond, the taller buildings, outlined against the blue and green of the khor. On the far bank of the khor is
the town of Dubai, and after that, reaching out along the coast, the black ribbon of highway to Jabal Ali. Inland along the khor, the palace compound of the Ruler of Qatar is a lacework of green and white behind high walls; next to it, the bridge across the khor, with its access roads and the traffic circles at either end.

But the plane begins to turn onto final approach. Civilization passes out of sight, having made no real impact on the limitless expanses of desert that now come into view. On departing the plane, passengers enter the small terminal building which though modern is not air conditioned. But no matter. This is February and the day is cool. Customs officials stamp the passports quickly, and porters carry the luggage to waiting taxis that speed into town on the new asphalt highway.

Approaching by sea is quite different. This description by Maureen Tweedy is apt today:

As the steamer approaches the roadstead, the outline of Dubai resolves itself into a row of flat-topped towers, resembling toy forts. These are the badgirs, or wind towers of the houses which can catch the breeze from any of the four quarters and draw the cool air downwards into the sitting-room immediately beneath. Two or three miles from the coast, the ship drops anchor, and the passenger must get ashore by launch or motor-dhow.
according to the class he is travelling. The shallow seas are scooped into waves by the lightest wind and it does not need to blow much in order to make disembarkation uncomfortable. If it blows hard the captain will prohibit disembarkation altogether and the patient traveller can then only pray for smoother seas at the next port of call, whether that be Muscat or Bahrain. But given fair conditions the bright bundles of personal belongings tied in striped rugs or blankets, baskets of tomatoes or oranges, crates of chickens, birds in cages, umbrellas with gaudy plastic handles and tin trunks decorated with painted flowers will be lowered over the side, followed by their motley but agile owners. Presently the assorted craft will be heading for the thin line of foam showing on the bar at the mouth of the creek.1

Unloading a cargo is a still more highly skilled performance. Everything has to go over the side into iron lighters towed by the local craft fitted with engines. The whole system has a crazy, happy-go-lucky air, from the motor tyres slung round the barges to act as fend-offs to the crowd of gabbling scampering Arabs hitching up their long gowns and shinning up and down the ropes. The men chant monotonously, and not unmusically, a rhythm that goes dee-da-deeay, dee-da-deeay. In rough weather the skill and balance of these sailors is something to marvel at, as their small craft with slippery heaving decks, and no hold or hand rail of any kind, rise and fall ten to fifteen feet against the steamer's side.

Rice from Resht or Bangkok, wheat from Abyssinia, and barley from Iraq, flour and tinned fruits from Australia, coffee from Yemen, piece goods from India and motor cars from the United Kingdom all are landed by this primitive method.2

1Tweedy, op. cit., p. 47. This was written in about 1952, before the harbor was dredged.

2Ibid., pp. 47-48.
A passenger riding ashore in a native craft finds himself standing on the deck of a boat that might have come out of the pages of Sindbad, but for the diesel engine thumping amidships. By modern motor-boat standards, this is a primitive craft, its bow still decorated with stempost designs passed down from antiquity, its decking rough where it has not been worn smooth by the bare feet of its native crew, and its steering still done by the simple but efficient tiller instead of a modern wheel. A woven palm or rattan awning shades the deck from the sun. The other passengers talk either animatedly or quietly, depending upon their mood, or simply sit grimly, in the way of landsmen unused to the sea, pitting the stability of their stomachs against the weaving motions of the boat.

Entering the harbor, one is struck by the sights and sounds of a city vibrant with life. Everywhere there is activity. On the water the little powered rowboats, the famous abras that taxi people across the creek, scurry back and forth with the wild abandon of Lebanese taxi drivers, giving way only reluctantly to larger craft at the last instant before disaster. Dhows motor in more stately fashion up and down the harbor, carrying on the
trade that gives the city life. An occasional barge
towed by a tug moves slowly into the port area, loaded
with piles of structural steel, or automobile tires, or
sacks of grain or cement. A small centerboard sloop
slips by; one of its two passengers, an attractive
British girl, wearing a brief bathing suit, momentarily
draws all eyes.

Along the shore are hundreds of native craft,
lined up three and four abreast, some sitting idle, others
filled to overflowing with Iranians or Pakistanis waiting
for the trip to Bundar Abbas or Karachi that may begin
today, or tomorrow, or next month, depending upon the
whim of the nakhoda. At the customs wharves on the Dubai
side, chains of laborers trot down gangplanks, backs bent
under hundred pound sacks as they unload the barges tied
along side.

Behind the wharves, one's eyes are filled with
scenes out of a 20th century Arabian Nights. On the
Dubai side traditional multi-level mud adobe buildings
crowd together, their barred and grilled windows black
against the whiteness of their walls. Wind towers, some
of them topped with spindly television antennas, dominate
the skyline, square and flat-topped, their vents, tall
enough for a man to stand in, decorated with lovely patterns of Arabic grillwork. Interspersed in the crowded business district are modern glass and concrete buildings—the banks, customs building, warehouses. American and British-made automobiles thread their way from one narrow street to another, as saronged and turbaned pedestrians grudgingly give way and move to the sides. Streets here are lines with souks and stalls selling all manner of goods for use by everyone from bedouin to British and Arab ladies.

The waterfront on the Diera side is different, most of it built on reclaimed land in the past few years. Here rise the tall eight and ten story hotel and apartment buildings, the new library, and the Baladiya, city hall, painted in the red and white national colors. Here too are the largest souks, which with their bustle and rush, the variety of their goods, their enticing odors, are the match of those of Damascus and Aleppo.

Inland perhaps a mile on either side of the creek, the buildings begin to thin out. Modern boulevards reach back here to the British Political Agency, the palace of the ruler of Qatar, and the new bridge. Beyond, with the exception of a Catholic church and Sheikh Rashid's palace, there is slim evidence of civilization in a sea of sand
and subkha. Here the desert rules and few men travel.

But the desert is not Dubai. Dubai is trade, turbans, robed men drinking coffee in small bare offices while they negotiate deals involving millions. It is laborers, taxis and construction and the hope of oil. It is Rashid, thoughtfully smoking his pipe; it is the loyal hard-working British and Arab officials who every day guide Dubai in taking one more sure step toward realizing its potential. It is cocktail and movie parties in the houses of the Westerners. It is the polite Indian and Persian merchants behind their counters. It is poverty, and it is the small wafers of gold, packed in yard-goods or skins, deep in the hold of a launch passing out through the creek on the way to some midnight rendezvous across the Gulf. This is Dubai today.

But what of the future?

Economically the future is bright. Dubai's income so far has grown from the enterprise of its people, and should continue to expand. Abu Dhabi and Sharjah are both making attempts to compete with Dubai's trade, but neither has the location, or facilities at the present time, to do so, and it will be some time before even Abu Dhabi, with its great oil wealth, will be able to build a port capable
of competing with Dubai's. Abu Dhabi is not nearly so well located from the standpoint of trade on land as Dubai. In the meantime, as these two sheikhdoms, and the others on the Trucial Coast, continue to grow, Dubai will continue to prosper from their needs. Should oil come in the expected quantities, there is no reason why Dubai should not become even more developed and progressive than Kuwait. This feeling was echoed by a prominent businessman in Dubai, who said:

If Dubai does have oil, it should do much better than Kuwait. It's the mentality of the people here. There are no restrictions from the people on modernization—they are much more progressive than the Kuwaitis. If there is no oil, it would definitely be discouraging, but our trade is sufficient to maintain the growth of the economy, perhaps not at the present rate, but a substantial one nevertheless.

Assuming the economic situation continues to improve, Dubai will pursue its development. Sheikh Rashid wants to improve conditions in education, raising the standards and training citizens of Dubai to teach and administer the schools. He is working to improve the health of his people, not only through better medical care, but through education as well. There are the projects for harbor development, the dream of a vehicle tunnel under the creek, surveys for water whose preliminary results
indicate there may just possibly be a surplus sufficient to support some agriculture, and a plan for sewage and drainage to cope with the needs of a modern city.

Politically, storm clouds already are moving above the horizon. The growing identification with Arab nationalist movements, the response to the siren song of Radio Cairo, are making many of the poorer people uncertain that the present government is in fact the means of achieving their best interest. Some feel that even the fast-moving economic and social programs are not moving rapidly enough. But even of greater importance is the fear that Dubai, through a British withdrawal from the Gulf, will become another Aden.

One hears this concern expressed often. Dubai by any standards is weak, and so too are all the sheikhdoms on the Coast. The Trucial Coast would be totally incapable of defending itself against the pressures of its stronger neighbors who seem to be waiting in the wings for Britain to leave the stage.

There is talk that should Britain abdicate its position of eminence in the Gulf, the entire region might explode: Iran reasserting her claims to Bahrain and the Trucial Coast; Iraq moving against Kuwait and possibly
Saudi Arabia; Saudi Arabia resisting Iran and Iraq while reestablishing a claim to Buraimi Oasis, if not extending it to include the entire Trucial Coast. Granted these thoughts are highly speculative, but as fears they are very real. They continue, despite reassurances that Britain 1) is not going to leave the Gulf in the foreseeable future, and 2) that such a departure would not be made before another nation had filled the vacuum. These promises come as slim consolation to a people who daily hear of the turmoil to be left by Great Britain in Aden.

In the meantime, however, Dubai remains optimistic, with the view that if this is not really the best of all possible worlds, it is, for the time being at least, reasonably satisfying, one in which the leaders can test their statecraft, and the people---merchants and laborers alike---can reap many of the benefits of Dubai's entry into the 20th century.
APPENDIX I

TABLE OF DUBAI'S RULERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ruler</th>
<th>Reign</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maktum Ibn Buti</td>
<td>1833 – 1852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa'id Ibn Buti</td>
<td>1852 – 1859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasher Ibn Maktum</td>
<td>1859 – 1886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashid Ibn Maktum</td>
<td>1886 – 1894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maktum Ibn Hasher Buti</td>
<td>1894 – 1906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buti Ibn Suhail</td>
<td>1906 – 1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa'id Ibn Maktum</td>
<td>1912 – 1958(^1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashid Ibn Sa'id</td>
<td>1958 –</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\)Sa'id relinquished partial control in 1938 when he named Rashid regent.
APPENDIX II

PARTIAL GENEALOGY OF THE AL BU FALASAH
SECTION OF THE BANI YAS

NOTE: This chart is drawn largely from Lorimer, and, with the exception of the addition of Rashid Ibn Sa'id, is current only as of 1910. Symbols: "b" indicates date of birth; "d" date of death.
* indicates rulers of Dubai.
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MAP II
PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT
OF DUBAI HARBOR

LEGEND:

- EXISTING CHANNEL TO BE FILLED
- PRESENT KHOR AND SHORELINE
- PROPOSED NEW CHANNEL
- COASTLINE TO BE ALTERED
- 35' HARBOR DEPTH (GIVEN IN FEET)
MAP II

PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT OF DUBAI HARBOR

Legend:

- Existing channel to be filled
- Present khor and shoreline
- Proposed new channel
- Coastline to be altered
- 35' Harbour depth (given in feet)
TRIBAL AREAS OF THE DUBAI REGION

LEGEND:
- TRIBAL AREA (TENTATIVE)
- TRIBAL AREA (APPROXIMATE)
- FORT

MAP IV
[MAP IV OVERLAY TO MAP III - THE DUBAI REGION]
TRIBAL AREAS
OF THE
DUBAI REGION

LEGEND:
TRIP AREA (APPROXIMATE)
GEOGRAPHICAL NAME
FACT