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INTERACTION OF POLITICAL, MILITARY
AND
ECONOMIC FACTORS IN ISRAEL

Angelina S. El-Helou

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts in the Department
of Political Studies and Public Administration
of the American University of Beirut

Beirut, Lebanon
June 1967

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PREFACE

Israel, not as a state but as a force, is discussed in the context of this thesis. In its present form as a state, Israel represents then a stage of development in the Zionist national movement. This is what, at least, Zionist and Israeli leadership view it to be. Accordingly it is the Zionist ideological aspiration which determines the dynamics of their national enterprise.

This being the case, the following elements were considered in discussing the interaction of political, military and economic factors in Israel.

1. The Jewish State, Herzl's national document - the point of direction of the Zionist movement.
2. The "proclamation of independence-" another decisive point in the course of the movement.
3. Material accomplishments bridging the two critical points in the life history of the Zionist movement.
4. Factors giving shape to Israel as a state and concurrently affecting its development as a movement.
 - a. Development of the role of the military.
 - b. Emergence of the Histadrut as a class.
 - c. Arab abandoned property - a promotional factor.
 - d. External sources of funds contributing to economic solvency.

Limitations of available up-to-date data have been encountered. Accordingly the text is heavily based on

information up to the end of the year 1964. However, it may be safely said that no drastic changes have been effected, during the years 1965 and 1966, to alter the trend of Israel. As such what is presented in the following pages, is a mode of a national pattern - an example of a force movement, whose structure and continuity, within its general course, is basically dependent on external factors in their varying forms.

High appreciation is due to professor Fayiz A. Sayigh under whose supervision and guidance the subject matter took form.

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American University of Beirut
1966 - 1967

A.S.H.

CHAPTER I

AN IDEOLOGY IN THE PROCESS OF APPLICATION

Israel is a state but I view it, in the setting of this text, as a force - a revolutionary movement taking off its united direction with the publication of Theodor Herzl's political document, "The Jewish State." The movement's development since then, as acknowledged by its leadership, still stands at a historic distance from the ultimate end of its mission.

Two fateful facts distinguish themselves among the events of Israel: the writing of the Jewish State and the proclamation of Independence which represents a narrative of Jewish history. Both facts mark turning-points in the revolutionary movement as a whole, and therefore each merits some lengthy discussion.

Herzl's "The Jewish State"

Herzl proposed a schematic plan for the national consolidation of the Jewish people. The forces he manipulated for the enforcement of this plan may be summarized as follows:

1. The Historic Unity of the Jews. The author of "The Jewish State" declares, "We are a people-

One people." A historic oneness, or at least the belief in such oneness, represents here a force element - a raw material factor - at the disposal of the national scheme.

2. Implication of the Jewish Persecution. "Every thing," says Herzl, "depends on our propelling force. And what is our propelling force? the misery of the Jews." The negative circumstances that gave rise to this force have, in reality, simultaneously produced bonds furthering the unity of the persecuted people, a spirit of rebellion making them highly responsive to change, and a sort of submissiveness allowing the leadership control with little resistance. These resultants serve effectively, each in its own way, a tailored political movement.
3. The effectiveness of an "Idea" - Given the force of the Jewish historic unity and the imported variety of force elements from the people's persecution, the "Idea" of statehood will cause the emergence of instrumental reactions that rally for its fulfillment. "No human being," says Herzl, "is wealthy or powerful enough to transplant a nation from one habitation to another. An idea alone can compass that; and this

idea of a state may have the requisite power to do so."¹

4. Interest of Anti-Semitic Nations - this interest acts in two ways. It ordinarily expresses itself through haphazard waves of oppression; and it foresees the positive economic interest through the establishment of "The Jewish State." In both ways there is the manifestation of the indirect and direct force elements for the promotion of the Jewish national cause. In regard to the positive reaction involved here, Herzl admits that "the movement will not only be inaugurated with absolute conformity to law, but it cannot even be carried out without the friendly intervention of interested governments, who would derive considerable benefits from it."²
5. World Mission - A so called inherent or innate Jewish power. For it is claimed that Jewish peoplehood implies a predestined world mission - a natural force element for the exaltation of the national motive. Herzl proclaims that "The Jewish State is essential to the world, it will therefore be created."

¹Theodor Herzl, The Jewish State (New York: The Maccaboean Publishing Co., 1904), p. 12.

²Ibid., p. 13.

Having inventoried enough efficacious elements on his credit, Herzl presents a formulary for the achievement of Jewish statehood. Here the outstanding component forms are conceived to be

1. Sufficient area of land
2. The available Jewish proletariat
3. A "Gestor" for the Jews
4. A Jewish Company

The "Gestor" for the Jews endeavours for the acquisition of a legal title to the land, and works in cooperation with "The Jewish Company" for the transfer and settlement of the surplus Jews, the Jewish proletariat, on the land so acquired. In this manner the process of restoring Jewish nationhood is initiated.

Hence, according to Herzl, the Jews are a people - a distinctive nation - a nation so kept during periods of wandering and persecution. He says, "no nation on earth has survived such struggle as we have gone through." Nevertheless re-acting external forces, in this case, have worked out unifying elements surpassing, if not counterweighing, the disintegrating elements. Herzl affirms:

"Whatever is unfit to survive can, will, and must be destroyed. But the distinctive nationality of Jews neither can, will, nor must be destroyed. It cannot be destroyed, because external enemies consolidate it. It will not be destroyed: this it has shown during 2000 years of appalling suffering. It must not be destroyed, and that, as successor to numberless Jews who refused to despair, I am trying once more to prove in this pamphlet.

Whole branches of Judaism may wither and fall, but the trunk remains."³

As a nation, so qualified, the Jews witnessed persecution. Jewish persecution, then, is pertinent to the Jewish national character. But the Jews, as held by Herzl, were politically inactive during the period of their dispersion. They lacked "united political leadership." This, he accounts, is the cause of their misfortune. Accordingly Jewish persecution is synonymous with Jewish political lethargy. In other words, Jewish persecution and alienated Jewish nationalism are the two sides of the coin.

The re-establishment of genuine Jewish nationalism is accomplished through the restoration of political leadership - the restoration of the Jewish State. This implies a natural solution to the Jewish problem. Once a Jew regains his national character, he becomes at peace with the world. Thus, as Herzl views it, a plan to restore nationhood, is actually an effort for peace.

"Even under favorable circumstances many years might elapse before the commencement of the foundation of the state. Meantime, Jews in a hundred different places would suffer insults, mortification, abuse, blows, depredation and death. Not so, the initial steps towards the execution of the plan would stop Anti-Semitism

³Ibid., p. 9.

at once and for ever. Ours is a treaty of peace."⁴

The Jewish national revival which is, to Herzl the solution of the Jewish problem, depends on the "will" of the Jews. "The Jews will for a state - they shall have it, and they shall earn it for themselves."⁵ The implied power of determination, in this case, draws from the Jewish historic concept of nationhood, and, the accumulated intensity of the Jewish feelings. (Jews played leading roles in the revolutionary movements of the countries of their dispersion. This served them in providing an outlet for their fiery attitude towards the status quo. Their own revolutionary movement serves them best; for through realizing their own statehood, they realize their genuine Jewishness). There is the "will" and there is also another essential factor for the promotion of the movement - "the material resources."

The Jewish national revolution, though receiving immediate support from the "desperadoes," shall permeate all strata of the Jewish people. Herzl sees no need for "great exertion" to "spur" the movement. He assumes that the "Anti-Semites promote the requisite impetus." "I maintain," he says, "and every man ask himself whether I am not right, that the pressure weighing on us rouses a desire

⁴Ibid., p. 101.

⁵Ibid., Author's preface p. xx

to immigrate even among prosperous strata of society. Now our poorest strata alone would suffice to found a state; for these make the most vigorous conquerors, because a little despair is indispensable to the formation of a great undertaking."⁶

Nevertheless, and despite the fact that the poor and simple Jews will be the first supporters of the movement, they are in need of enlightenment. It is true that these people have "never lost hope of the Promised Land," but they may show reluctance to move from their homes. Herzl realizes that "old prisoners do not willingly leave their cells." Accordingly he urges that "the idea will make its way into the most distant, miserable holes where our people dwell. They will awaken from gloomy brooding, for into their lives will come a new significance. If every man think only of himself, what vast proportions the movement will assume."⁷ The appeal, however, is to all Jews.

"Here it is, fellow-Jews! Neither fable no fraud! Every man may test its reality for himself, for every man will carry with him a portion of the Promised Land - one in his head another in his arms, another in his acquired possessions."⁸

This national utterance Herzl supports with the specified interests to be achieved, by the different Jewish

⁶Ibid., p. 69.

⁷Ibid., p. 101.

⁸Ibid., p.100.

categories, as the national Jewish movement works its development through. For example-

1. The Well-to-do Jews shall experience a relative latitude of relief as the Jewish proletariat emigrate to establish statehood. Experience showed that Jewish population pressure manifested itself in reactions against middle class Jewry. Thus the removal of the poor Jewish sections will create more chances for the rich to pursue a peaceful life if they choose to remain in their native countries.

Emigration of the "surplus" Jews would also reduce two kinds of competition faced by the rich: potential competition that might arise from the self promotion of a section of the Jewish proletariat to a middle class status, and Christian competition. The former will be limited if not prevented as a result of emigration; and the latter will be minimized because Christians experience relief as the Jewish pressure in society is decreased. Accordingly they shall feel less the presence of their Jewish competitors and at the same time expect their number to be on the decrease as the emigration process is under way.

It is no wonder, then, according to Herzl, to find Jewish societies, supported by rich Jews, facilitating the emigration of the Jewish proletariat. However,

Jewish philanthropic undertakings, in this respect, are viewed by him as an aspect of Anti-Semitism. Herzl denounces this charitable endeavor with the following words:

"For these charitable institutions are created not for, but against, persecuted Jews - are created to despatch these poor creatures just as fast and as far as possible, and thus many an apparant friend of the Jews turns out, on careful inspection, to be nothing more than an Anti-Semitic of Jewish origin disguised in the garb of a philanthropist."⁹

2. Jewish Intellectuals and Professionals. To this class Herzl promises new opportunities in the "Jewish State." "Lawyers, doctors, scientists of every description, young traders - in fact, all Jews who are in search of opportunities, who now escape from oppression in their native country to earn a living in foreign lands - will assemble on a soil so full of fair promise."¹⁰

He sees two advantages arising as the intellectuals, especially, emigrate. In its present abode, this group turns to socialism in its majority. Then departure will lessen the struggle of classes and consequently relieve the middle class Jewry of pressures directed

⁹Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 67.

against them due to the socialist activities of their fellow Jews. The socialist immigrants will find a new outlet for their socialist ideology in the new land. Satisfaction will be offered them through statehood - through the application of their labor-
 "For" Herzl acknowledges, "we shall march into the Promised Land carrying the badge of labor."

3. The Common People. As to this Jewish category there is nothing to be lost but a life to be gained. There is also the fulfillment of their religious aspiration i.e., regaining the Promised Land, if Palestine could be secured.

It is for the Jewish masses that Herzl designed the "Jewish State." The higher income Jews could follow later if they wish to do so. According to the plan "the poorest will go first to cultivate the soil...construct roads, bridges, railways, and telegraphs, regulate rivers, and build their own habitations; their labor will create trade, trade will create markets and markets will attract new settlers..."¹¹
 Both, "The Society of the Jews" and "The Jewish Company" will undertake the transfer and settlement

¹¹Ibid., p. 26.

of the Jewish poor masses.

The settlement of the surplus Jewry implies security to them and to the Jews who choose to stay in their native countries. This becomes an omen of peace between the Jews and the world, be the Jew poor or rich. Accordingly the emigration of the common Jewry bears a human message. Thus the departure for restoring their statehood gives the Jewish masses a sense of human purpose - revives their sense as a chosen people - an asset on the side of their national cause.

The promotion of the Jewish national scheme, though bearing significance to all Jews, may conflict with the social set-up of the countries allowing Jewish emigration. Herzl does not deny that social and economic disturbances might be created by an emigration process. However he claims that the emigration of the Jews is a different kind of emigration; it is unique. The Jewish movement brings about necessary social adjustments to non-Jews in the same manner as Jews would be restoring their political set-up, which is their ideal societal structure.

Herzl tries to convince non-Jewish public opinion with the following economic advantages:

1. Jewish emigration will create a process of Christian migration to fill the evacuated positions. "The Jewish

Company," Herzl affirms, "will give every assistance to governments and parliaments in their effort to control and guide the inner migration of Christian citizens." He carries this assistance further when he suggests that in the long run, Jewish officials of "The Jewish Company" will gradually be replaced by Christian officials.

Also at a later stage of the Jewish national Markets consequently become at the disposal of the Christian middle class. Jewish competition, thins out as more middle class Jews become attracted to the market of the developing "Jewish State." In this manner the promotion of the Jewish national idea is directly related to the interest of the Christian middle class in their own markets.

2. Anti-Semitic government may lose taxes as Jews emigrate. But this is not a sizable loss during the initial stage of the movement. This is because the emigrating Jewish masses do not contribute much to the treasuries. Taxes from these poor masses, emigrating first, do not add up to significant sums. As the other categories of the Jewish people become ready to emigrate, taxes from the prospering Christian would have covered the losses from decreased Jewish tax

payments. There shall be also financial resources to cover up what would have otherwise been gained. For example, "The Jewish Company" shall pay duties of different kinds to the governments concerned. It shall also offer governments abandoned Jewish property to be purchased at most favorable prices. (Herzl suggests that "governments will be able to make use of this extensive appropriation of land for the purpose of social experiments and improvements") The increased traffic, due to the emigration of the Jews, will also reap increased revenues.

3. Jewish emigration increases Christian employment opportunities. Migration of Christian labor to occupy the evacuated Jewish positions would make unnecessary the emigration of Christian labor to foreign countries seeking employment. Also the Jewish settlers, especially during the initial stages of their national development, will need both consumers and capital goods which they will demand from European markets. This demand element is to be counted upon for market extension and thus the promotion of further economic opportunities for the Christians. At a later stage of their development the settled Jews may channel their accumulated funds for investment in the countries

they emigrated from. "For," according to Herzl, "Jewish capitalists will be glad to invest their funds where they are familiar with surrounding conditions. And whereas Jewish money is now sent out of countries on account of existing persecution - and is sunk in most distant foreign undertakings, it will flow back again in consequence of this peaceable solution, and will help further to raise the status of the countries which the Jews have left."¹²

4. As to the rulers from whom Herzl expected to get the land for his scheme, he promised financial assistance: "supposing His Majesty the Sultan were to give us Palestine, we could in return pledge ourselves to regulate the whole finances of Turkey."¹³

5. Again to the advantage of Europe, Herzl promises that the "Jewish State" shall represent the European civilization in the East. If Palestine is to be secured, the Jews "should then form portion of the rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism."¹⁴ A standing exhibition serving the promotion of European markets.

Turning to describe the mechanism of his movement, Herzl assumed the Jewish masses, the emigrants, as a dormant

¹²Ibid., p. 96.

¹³Ibid., p. 29.

¹⁴Ibid.

factor. All the power elements on his side, he invested in "The Society of the Jews" and "The Jewish Company." The picture of the Jewish masses thus appeared as driven herds of sheep whose virtue is the spirit of resignation. This assumption covered the background as Herzl starts to describe the practical measures for the fulfillment of his national ideal.

The Jews, as described by Herzl, are in a position where they need a "Gestor" for their affairs. Defining what he means by a gestor, Herzl says: "When the property of an oppressed person is in danger, any man steps forward to save it. This man is the gestor, the director of affairs not strictly his own."¹⁵

Jewish affairs need a society acting as a "gestor." An individual, alone, cannot assume this position. Hence "The Society of the Jews" is introduced.

The initial step of "The Society" is negotiation to secure an area where the Jews should settle, "Our first object is, "says Herzl, "... supremacy assured to us by international law, over a portion of the globe sufficiently large to satisfy our first requirements."¹⁶ (Herzl, in this regard, thought of Palestine and Argentina. He later considered Cyprus, Al-Arish, and Uganda).

¹⁵Ibid., p. 79.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 83.

The actual charge of transferring and settling the emigrants, after the land is secured, Herzl gives to a "Jewish Company." This company acts in cooperation with "The Society of the Jews" and, in fact, represents its practical machinery through which the national idea is implemented. It shall carry its work in accordance with planned procedures covering the movement of the Jews from the points of their departure to an indetermined stage of their progress on the land they settle. There is here a shadow of a regimented way of life weighing over the actuality of the "Jewish State." The assumed sheep-like behaviour of the Jewish masses prepared the way for it; the comprehensive planning of the "Jewish Company" acknowledged its appearance.

Herzl described the method of travel arrangement for emigrants, the type of dwelling proposed for their settlement, the labor exchange centres, the length of the working hours, type of remuneration for work, etc. all to be under the direction and control of "The Jewish Company." Though in this manner, the future way of life in "The Jewish State" expresses a dictated simplicity, there is, however, ambiguity as to its dynamics. The Jews are not allowed enough margin to will; their "Gestor" - "The Society of the Jews" wills for them. Officials of "The Jewish Company," the executives, balance the forces of the daily life.

The Jewish national movement is expected to enjoy aristocratic leadership and aristocratic management. There will be the aristocracy of the policy makers and the aristocracy of the managers. Participation of the masses is reflected, at best, through their conformity. Herzl warns against different ways of ruling the movement. He says that politics must be formulated in the upper strata and work downward. Then he adds: "The Jewish masses should be thankful for the constitution offered to keep order on the land. Should they however, show signs of rebellion they will be promptly crushed. The Society cannot permit the exercise of its functions to be interrupted by short-sighted or ill-disposed individuals."¹⁷

Consequently, Herzl draws a line between Jewish leadership and the public. The Jewish proletariat, for instance, whom he considers an important component part of his formulary, represents here a passive factor moved about as it fits the up-building of the national scheme. He illustrates: "Gangs of workers will thus be systematically drafted from place to place like a body of troops. These men will, of course, not be seated, but will work only a seven-hour day; and, in spite of their change of locality, they will preserve their military organization, work out their term of service, and receive

¹⁷Ibid., p. 88.

commands, promotion and pensions."¹⁸

This division of Herzl reflects a kind of class rigidity which leads to a state of unbalance exhibiting latent chaotic elements. Once the Jewish settlement is under way, the alliance between "The Society of the Jews" and "The Jewish Company" is less apt to remain consolidated as expected. There will emerge two groups facing each other for the leadership of the movement. The masses behind also shall rise gradually to a state achieving different outlets to express themselves. (For example in the State of Israel at present and within the circle of The World Zionist Organization there exist different parties and factions). Internal disintegrating forces are thus created.

What, in a way, then, Herzl has accumulated in the form of positive force elements to work with the forwarding of his practical experiment, have led to the development of a national movement pattern implying enough self destroying forces which lessen its appeal and limit its scope. This speculation is made justifiable by the legacies of Herzl and the development of Israel.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 54.

The Proclamation of Independence

The Jews did not fail Herzl, yet they were not controllable within the limits of his national scheme. To them Palestine is the land of their "State;" no other area could serve as a substitute. The Bible then, as they believe, minimizes the significance of securing a charter for settlement on the Land; for God's promise to "His People" supersedes secular considerations. Emigration to Palestine should not, therefore, await the recognition of a political status as preached by Theodor Herzl.

Supporting the consequences of the "Divine Right" to Palestine was the developing idea which gave predominance to the up-building of an economic foundation in the country. Emigration, accordingly, was to be speeded up in order to colonise the Land and, concurrently provide a sizable base for political recognition.

Thus two major issues occupied the central position during the initial stage of the Jewish revolutionary movement: Palestine is the Land of Israel; and economic colonization is the prerequisite for political recognition.

(The boundaries of the so called Land of Israel are not clearly defined in the Bible. Accordingly, the claim of the Jews to Palestine on Biblical grounds implies a permission for expansion. This permission is complemented by the inherent forces of economic colonization).

In the light of these major developments the tune of the Jewish national movement was turned to a different volume than that set by Herzl. The Jewish masses awaiting a charter to allow the decrease of their pressure in their native countries, transformed themselves into a mass of liberators on the march to regain their "Promised Land" - a Biblical collective action. The socialist zeal added accent to the new tune. Thus the cardinal essence of Socialism, labor, became associated with a "Promised" soil.

The Proclamation of Independence reaffirms the Biblical Jewish right to Palestine, announces the development of the "Yishuv" (economic foundation of the Jewish State)" and expresses the natural continuity of the Jewish revolution. In other words, it pronounces a proclaimed irrevocable right, to the ownership of the acquired area in Palestine - acquired through purchase or conquest. At the same time it reflects the success of synthetic Zionism - a reinforced definition of the Jewish national movement.

Narrowed down to a simple expression, the Proclamation of Independence is a review of the Jewish colonial process - a racial economic revolution. The realized statehood represents, in this line of events, a stage of growth of a colonial organism. Hence within the developed context of "The Jewish State," there are different stages of organic

advancement - i.e., different stages of colonial expansion.

Achieving political sovereignty, per se, did not signify the end of the Jewish national movement. For Jewish statehood, in the full meaning of the term, meant the materialization of the movement in its totality. To Herzl, for example, "The Jewish State" was established as the Jews convened in a national assembly (First Zionist Congress at Basle 1897) to initiate their organized national movement. He says: "If I were to sum up the Basle Congress in a single phrase - which I would say in Basle I created the Jewish State." In the same paragraph he adds: "Territory is only the concrete basis, the State even when it has territory is always something abstract. In Basle therefore I created this abstraction which, as such is invisible to the great majority."¹⁹

Since Herzl, the abstraction of statehood has been made tangible through the practical effort to establish Jewish colonies in Palestine. Nevertheless the term is still kept in the realm of abstratedness in the sense of its association with a relatively indefinite economic process. Statehood, then, receives fulfillment simultaneously with the development

¹⁹Theodor Herzl's Diary Notes - Vienna 3rd September, 1897, quoted in The Role and Function of the Zionist Congress (Jerusalem: Keren Haysod, 1951), pp. 1-2.

of the Jewish colonial program.

Actually the practical aspect of the Jewish national revolution has always been its essence. Developments in Zionism after Herzl, have exposed this essence and at the same time manipulated political means not only to reveal it further but also, to assert its assumed de jure and de facto status.

The initial Zionist cry for a charter to an area of land signifies the essential necessity of a foothold to the movement. The charter hence represents a bridge across which the Jews will proceed to make the land Jewish - i.e., to impart their revolutionary effort to its soil. Weighing the significance of the charter vis-a-vis the zeal to convey Jewishness to a land, have led to divisions in the Zionist movement, at an early stage of its development. There were those who did not want to risk their practical endeavours without securing, first, political protection. Herzl was the leader of this group. He said in this regard "Our projects entail investment, and improvements, and I do not want them undertaken as long as the country is not ours." There were, however, the other group, the practical Zionists, who envisaged the necessity of occupying the Land by every means and striving gradually for political concessions. Nossig, a practical Zionist, expressed the views of his group, during the Sixth Zionist Congress, when he said: "As to the two things, settlement

in Palestine or a charter, the president (Herzl) regards the charter as more important. I confess that I belong to those to whom the settlement in Palestine even without a charter appears more important... You will say that we cannot colonize without a charter in any other way but that of small colonization, and that small colonization is a petty bourgeois view point... However, I shall like to stress that there is a small colonization which is political, which is the mass colonization."²⁰

Practical Zionist thought expresses its realism through immediate settlement in Palestine. The alternative to this, if colonization in Palestine proved difficult, was to build up Jewish settlements in the vicinity of Palestine, and then move to the immediate destination, when opportunities permitted. The latter alternative did not stand only as a tactical approach to the colonization movement - i.e., using adjacent areas as stopping - stones - but it also implied the practical Zionist belief in Greater Palestine. Al-Arish project and Herzl's silent ideas about colonizing Cyprus serve as example in this connection. However, especially noted is Davis Trietsch's endeavour for land purchase and the settlement of Jewish immigrants in Cyprus.²¹ Trietsch, while

²⁰Quoted in Oskar Rabinovicz, A Jewish Cyprus Project (New York: Herzl Press, 1962), p. 90.

²¹According to the Talmud the Island of Cyprus was part of Palestine.

endeavouring for the initiation of a colonization process in Cyprus, was fighting at the same time for a Zionist declaration in support of Greater Palestine. "The Basle Program," he said "must contain, the words Great Palestine or Palestine and its neighboring lands - otherwise it is nonsense. You do not get the 10 million Jews into a land of 25,000 Km²"²²

The increased number of emigrating Jewish pioneers to Palestine vindicated the practical Zionist's approach to the national movement. It actually sanctioned the essence of the movement, its practical substance. Pioneering immigrants viewed their labor as a significant charter to the land. Thus the Bible served as one charter where as labor served as another. Ben Gurion expressed this view when, in New York, September 1915, speaking about "earning a home," said: the land of Israel will be ours not when the Turks, the English, or the coming Peace Conference so agree and set their signatures to a treaty to that effect, but rather when we Jews ourselves build it. Indefeasible title we shall never get from others, but by our own labor only, and a country is built up only by Halutzism, by pioneers."²³ He also stressed that "Hehalutz is the creative laboratory of the Jewish

²²Oskar Rabinovicz, A Jewish Cyprus Project op. cit., p. 17.

²³David Ben Gurion, "Earning a Homeland" Rebirth and Destiny of Israel (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954), p.5.

revolution of the conquest of labor, of the national renaissance."²⁴

Thus the spark of the Jewish revolution resulted, in actuality, from the interaction of labor with the Land. The Jewish national movement became infused with the characteristics of a proletarian revolution while its leadership was negotiating for political recognition. (For instance, Dr. Chaim Weizmann was in the process of negotiating for British colonial tutorship in Palestine. In his autobiography, "Trial and Error," he admits his trust in British experience in colonialism. He says: "As colonizers and colonial administrators the British were superior to the French"²⁵ Therefore, he continues, "it was the Jews who gave substance and reality to the idea of a British protectorate - which afterwards took the form of a mandate over Palestine."²⁶

The emphatic role given to labor in the Zionist revolution as well as the Zionist effort for partnership with Britain in colonialism stamped the practical direction of the Jewish national movement. It established the significant function of the labor movement in the process of the Jewish settlement; it also introduced the military aspect to the scene.

²⁴ Arthur Hertzberg, The Zionist Idea (New York: Herzl Press, 1959), p. 614.

²⁵ Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1949), p. 190.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 192.

"In America, David Ben Gurion and Itzhak Ben Zvi... in 1917 they recruited a battation of American Jewish volunteers to serve with the Allied Forces, under Allenby in Egypt and Palestine. In London, Valdimir Jabotinsky, with the support and cooperation of Dr. Weizmann, secured the approval of the British War Office for the recruitment of two battalions in the Royal Fusiliers to serve as Jewish units in Allenby's force... In December 1917 Allenby entered Jerusalem and the South of Palestine was cleared of the enemy. The Jewish Legion entered the country and was joined by a locally recruited battalion."²⁷

The trend of "The Jewish State," shortly after Herzl's death, took a direction giving momentum to labor and military conquest. Perhaps the sheep-like gathering of world surplus Jews did not take place in Palestine, as Herzl viewed the case to be, until the 1930's when the Nazi Jewish victims stumpeded towards the "Yishuv". This flow of European Jewry became the necessitating reason for the Proclamation of Independence. Thus under war circumstances and mass immigration (in a Herzlian manner), a political sovereignty for Israel emerged - But Israel was not fulfilled. Here Ben Gurion in a speech delivered in the Knesseth January 2, 1951, said:

Let us see things as they are, not fool ourselves by using sweet sounding misnomers. First, that the Jewish nation in Israel, our only certain rod and staff, is still a promise and not a fulfillment. Nine tenth of Jewry are without, and, of those within - very many are only in interwoven process of becoming a people,

²⁷S. Tolkowsky, (ed. in chief) "The Zionist Movement," The Israel Year Book 1950-51 (Tel Aviv: Israel Publications Ltd.), p. 26.

and creating its homeland."²⁸

Dr. Nachum Goldman, president of the World Zionist Organization, declared at several occasions: "We are a nation 80% of whose members live outside."

The State of Israel then represents a developing "Yishuv" - a progressing economic base for further national achievement. Leadership effort, under the newly created circumstances, has been uplifted to a different level of performance. In other words practical Zionism has developed in scope in as much as it has received a new impetus. (It is true that the old definition of a practical Zionist has lost its validity with the establishment of the State of Israel, but the content of practical Zionism still prevails. The urgency to speed up the development of settlement, under present conditions, serves security purposes. Colonizing to provide an economic base for political recognition has given way to colonizing for revealed and implied reasons - to fortify what has been already achieved and to create lebensraum for the state organism.)

Under the emerging circumstances, practical Zionist leadership draws force from different sources e.g.:

1. The achieved state of the Israeli economy
2. The Israeli Defense Forces
3. Support and assistance of friendly governments

²⁸David, Ben Gurion. "Civil Defense" Rebirth and Destiny of Israel, op. cit., p. 386.

4. Assistance of world Jewry
5. Potential immigrants

In reality all these sources are made one as they are handled to serve the old established aim of the Jewish national revolution: the Ingathering of the Exiles.

After the Declaration of Independence, Israeli statesmen, ardent practical Zionists, took a challenging position towards World Zionist leaders. "My quarel with the Zionist leaders," said Ben Gurion, "was and is over the content of Zionism. It is a frequent phenomenon in history that concepts and names are stubbornly retained long after they have lost their meaning. It is like a wine bottle that has been drained and refilled with water, but owing to inertia no one has bothered to remove the old label. This is what has happened to the term Zionist in our generation. The word "Zionism" was coined before the establishment of the Zionist organization in 1898, [sic] and its meaning was clear: The longing for Zion and the establishment there of a model people."²⁹

According to Ben Gurion, a true Zionist is the Jew who returns to the State of Israel and participates in its reconstruction. This definition does not imply, in principle, a change from the dogma of practical Zionism as it developed

²⁹Ben Gurion Looks Back - In Talks with Moshe Pearlman (New York: Simons & Schuster, 1965), p. 238.

prior to statehood. The idea expressed here by Ben Gurion reflects the need of the national Jewish revolution for the extension of colonization in Palestine. Statehood therefore receives the same rank on the practical Zionist program as did the charter to the land before. Practical Zionism gives secondary significance to these political aspects - colonization in Palestine started before obtaining a charter; also the realization of statehood does not mean an end to the colonization process. Thus a practical Zionist (Ben Gurion being one) on August 13, 1948, said: I hold the basic determining premise at the heart of all our thought, our whole movement, our policy to be this, that the state is not in itself an aim: it is a means to an end, the end of Zionism."³⁰

The fight of Ben Gurion then is primarily with political Zionists who have visualised an end to their role, as soon as the state was established. This is the old struggle between practical and political Zionism appearing in a new form. Nevertheless, it appears that practical Zionism still spells the content of the movement and endeavours for the continuity of the revolution under the same slogan: Immigration and pioneering labor. The government of Israel made it its lawful duty to gather world Jewry

³⁰David, Ben Gurion, "Freedom and Independence," Rebirth and Destiny of Israel, op. cit., p. 276.

on its assumed land. It solemnly announced its intent in the Proclamation of Independence. The Law of Return was also enacted for the same purpose.³¹

Ingathering of the Exiles is thus made to stand as the governments cardinal goal, the materialization of which depends on the process of economic absorption. This task being beyond the limits of the capacity of the State of Israel, a case of the undisturbed Jewish national revolution comes to view: partnership with the World Zionist Organization for its realization.

Although attachment to the present central Zionist task is confirmed by both the Israeli government and the World Zionist Organization, the former assumes decisive direction of the Zionist movement. The leaders of the World Zionist Organization have been put in a position to declare that the support of the Israeli Government has become an essential condition for the success of their share in building Zionism. In the light of this development Herzl's adopted concept "Negotiorm Gesto" has been realized. The Government of Israel became the "Gestor" of the Jews wherein the World Zionist Organization represents the majority of the "Dominus Negotiorm."

³¹See texts of the proclamation of Independence and Law of Return in Appendix.

Hence the Proclamation of Independence has made the government, the Israelis, and the potential citizens of Israel, as responsible for the consolidation of the revolution. Accordingly Zionist effort, in general has become, relatively, more defined. In such a situation there is a tendency for concordant action; and, at the same time, there is the possibility of chaos. In the case of Israel, external conditions have a great effect on the machinery of the movement.

Though military action introduced the sovereign state, this is a natural outcome of the Zionist philosophy. Herzl, for example, wrote in his diaries (consenting in private to Trietsch's Cyprus Project) "We would rally on Cyprus and one day go over to Eretz Israel and take it by force as it was taken from us long ago."³²

Conquest in Zionism is allied with colonization. In addition to this the Zionists see in their military force a version of a historic revival - a rebirth of an ancient heritage. Chaim Lieberman, a writer on the staff of the Jewish Daily Forward, wrote the following about the Israeli army:

"The army of Israel is different from all other armies in the world. In lineage, tradition, spirit, glory and pride,- What soldier in the world can compare with the soldier of the State of Israel? No one. The army of

³²Quoted in Oskar Rabinowiz, A Jewish Cyprus Project, op. cit., p. 45.

Israel is young and at the same time the oldest of all. The Israeli army does not begin its history with the formation of the State. It goes far, far back. Who do you think was the first commander of the Jewish warriors? Our Rabbi Moses? Or does one need to start with our Father Abraham?

"Father Abraham, Moses our Rabbi, Joshua the son of Nun, Deborah the prophetess, David the King, the Maccabees, Bar Kochba,- These were the Jewish war commanders. Who does not know their names? Even Gentile children in their Gentile cradles (know them). There were famous commanders of war among the Gentiles. Their deeds are recorded in history. Ours are recorded in Tanach (Bible). Their (generals) are famous. Ours, are sanctified. Wherever the Bible is sanctified, then our warriors are sanctified. To belong to such an army is a 'sacred privilege' a Mitzva (a religious deed) in the deepest spiritual sense. A 'commandment of God' which was put down for all eternity in the Torah with the words: 'because God, thy God, goes with the camp to save thee and to give thine enemy to thee. Let thy camp be holy;' etc., etc.

This is the new Torah that now comes from Zion."³³

Hence the force element represents an integral tenet of Zionism. Introducing the state through a war was therefore an essential and not an accidental issue in the movement. If also the State of Israel has always been in a state of war, it is so because Israel is, in reality, a state of war. The developing concept of soldier - settler, for example, is only a representative unit of the total Zionist colonization process

³³Chaim Lieberman, "Rhapsody in Chauvinistic Militarism," Jewish News Letter, Vol. XII, No. 18 (September 17, 1956).

The Ingathering of the Exiles policy is but a call to the multiplicity of soldier - settler units. Levi Eshkol, Prime Minister, addressed members of the General Zionist Council meeting in Jerusalem, in March, 1964 in the following words:

"It behooves us from now to draw up plans for the fourth and fifth million. Whence and when will they come, and what will be the fate of the Jewish people in the Diaspora?... For Israel to continue to fulfil its mission there must be a constant expansion in its population. Now this is not merely a question of three or even five million Jews in the state. Our task does not end here. This is not the end of the Zionist vision... Our historical mission is fulfilled by existence and strength."³⁴

The fulfillment of the "Zionist mission" is thus made conditional to "existence" and "strength"- i.e., settlement and the power of the military - which, in turn, is deemed to be dependent on the rate of immigration.

The Zionist dilemma, the perplexity of the leaders of the movement, resides in the inherent tendency in Zionism to create contradictory forces. Nevertheless things appear on the surface as a sheer problem of security. This is a paradoxical approach to the true nature of the situation. Genuine security in the Zionist context, involves the following considerations:

³⁴On the Threshold of the 26th Zionist Congress- Addresses Delivered at the Sessions of the Zionist General Council (Jerusalem: The Organization Department of the Zionist Executive, April, 1964), pp. 7, 11, 12.

1. Protection of what has already been achieved i.e., the protection of the State of Israel as it is.
2. Neutralization of external forces to promote the process of settlement.
3. Availability of external opportunities.
4. Provision of factors of production with which Jewish labor, as singled out in Zionism, needs to interact.
5. Security in general, which supports the organic expansion of the unified Zionist ideology.

This is the Zionist problem of security in a relatively elucidated form.

To Levi Eshkol, "safe-guarding the existence of the state, both physically and spiritually, consolidating its future and continued existence is a problem uppermost in the minds of Zionists."³⁵ Whereas to Ben Gurion "Israel's security problem is quite unlike that of any other country. This is no problem of borders or sovereignty, but a problem of physical survival, in the literal meaning of the term."³⁶

Ben Gurion also sees the interdependence between the survival of the state and the survival of world Jewry. He adds: "It is no exaggeration to say that the survival of world Jewry depends on and is maintained by the survival of

³⁵ Ibid., p. 9.

³⁶ David, Ben Gurion, "Israel's Security and Her International Position," Israel Government Year Book 1959-60 (Government Printer, 1960), p.22.

the State of Israel, and that the problem of Israel's security is therefore equivalent to the problem of the survival of the entire Jewish people."³⁷ Dr. Rabbi Max Nussbaum, former president of Zionist Organization of America, affirms the significance of the survival of the State of Israel for the preservation of the Jewish people. He says: "The Jewish people were organized to create the Jewish State, so that the Jewish State could be organized to preserve the Jewish people. This is the classic Zionist philosophy."³⁸

Meir Grossman, member of the Executive of the Jewish Agency, stresses the Zionist intention to restore historic borders." He presents, "the truth of Zionism: a revolutionary Jewish liberation movement, which seeks to liquidate a life of exile and bring back Jewish dignity to the Jewish people, and which will fight for the historic borders of Eretz Israel."³⁹ Dr. Shimshon Yunitzman, member of the General Zionist Council, warns that "the Gentiles and the Arabs must know that they cannot make their reckoning without the true owners. They must understand that for us neither

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Session of the Zionist General Council 4th Session after the 25th Zionist Congress-Addresses, Debates, Resolutions (Jerusalem: Organization Department of the Zionist Executive, 1963), p. 82.

³⁹ S.V. Nahon (ed.) Fundamental Issues of Zionism at 23rd Zionist Congress (Jerusalem: Organization Department of the Zionist Executive, 1952), p. 124.

Transjordan nor Jerusalem is an object for commerce or haggling. They belong to us and they will belong to us."⁴⁰

Ben Gurion sees in the need and enterprise of Jewish labor a natural right for development and therefore expansion. "It is just disingenuous window - dressing" he says, "to talk loudly about mass immigration, mass colonization and large-scale Zionism and not take honest and truthful thought in every day practice, in every single thing you do, for the well being of Jewish labor, for its consolidation and expansion to the economic utmost."⁴¹

The dynamics of Zionism in fulfilling its colonial mission is a labor attribute, according to Ben Gurion. The pioneering labor is the leader. The need of the people and the need of the land determine the direction of labor leadership. The need of the Jewish labor is a factor taken for granted since millions are expected still to be gathered in Palestine. The need of the land is viewed in terms of unsettled areas within the boundaries of the State of Israel and in terms of neighbouring region. ("In Eastern Palestine, there are broader and emptier areas, and Jordan is not

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 64.

⁴¹David, Ben Gurion, "Jewish labor: the origin of settlement an address before the Elected Assembly March 2, 1932," Rebirth and Destiny of Israel, op. cit., p. 66.

necessarily the perpetual limit to our immigration and settlement."⁴²

Considering Ben Gurion's thesis that labor constitutes the natural right to ownership, his emphasis on the "expansion of labor to the economic utmost," the general Zionist policy of Ingathering the Exiles, the limited economic absorptive capacity of the State of Israel, the state of want in neighbouring countries for economic development, and lastly the modern Zionist actuality of soldier-settler, it is safe to conclude that Ben Gurion enunciates the realistic trend of Zionism - its organic need for territorial expansion without the definition of limits.⁴³

For instance, when Ben Gurion establishes the labor unit as the pivot of the movement and calls for its "consolidation and expansion" to its "economic utmost," he is concurrently establishing an excessive need for the availability

⁴²David, Ben Gurion, "Zionism - the Hard way and the Easy - opening Debate of the 17th Congress at Basle, June-July, 1931," Rebirth and Destiny of Israel, op. cit., p. 35

⁴³It is of interest to note here that while preparing the draft of the Declaration of Independence, Ben Gurion opposed the specification of borders. He said: "The problem was whether to declare the state without specifying the borders as fixed by the United Nations. I was opposed to specifying the borders," (David, Ben Gurion, Israel: Years of Challenge (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), p. 40.

of the other factors of production. For, to have labor carry the burden of the Zionist movement, it needs to interact with other factors to realize its so-called "economic utmost." Land being the scarce factor in this case, territorial expansion becomes inevitable. What adds more to this analysis is Ben Gurion's "Messianic vision of redemption." Here he asserts "organic bond between Jewish national redemption and general human redemption." Therefore, by virtue of its position in the Jewish national redemption, Jewish labor occupies the same standing as in general human redemption. Thus the need of this labor for land, in the first case, becomes a duty to humanity in the second. Land conquest then, due to the deemed organic relationship between Zionism and human liberation, becomes a human mission. What gives this inference further confirmation is Ben Gurion's judgement that "on the renewal of its national sovereignty the Jewish people would again be a chosen people, showing the way to the world."⁴⁴

Thus the Proclamation of Independence ends up to be a proclamation of a world mission i.e., a world revolutionary movement under the banner of Jewish labor. The Zionist state is identical with pioneering labor; therefore the central

⁴⁴David, Ben Gurion, "Vision and Redemption," The Mission of Israel Jacob Baal - Teshua (ed.), (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1963), p. 228.

position Jewish labor occupies in the realm of human redemption is simultaneously that which is occupied by the Zionist State. It becomes a part of the fateful plan that Jewish labor fulfills its "chosen" mission through the machinery of the State. Herzl's hypothesis is then repeated: "the Jewish State is essential to the world, it will therefore be created."

CHAPTER II

MATERIAL ACHIEVEMENTS OF ZIONISM

Zionist Platform: 1897

"The society of the Jews" took its first form as the Zionists convened at Basle in 1897. This congress, the First Zionist Congress, under the leadership of Herzl, gave shape to the blueprint of the Jewish national movement. The guiding policy, then formulated for implementing the Zionist idea in Palestine, read as follows:

"The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a publicly legally assured home in Palestine.

"In order to attain this the Congress adopts the following means:

1. "To promote the settlement in Palestine of Jewish agriculturalists, handicraftsmen, industrialists, and those following professions.
2. "The centralization of the entire Jewish people by means of general institutions, agreeably to the laws of the land.
3. "To strengthen Jewish sentiment and national self consciousness.
4. "To obtain sanction of governments to the carrying out of the objects of Zionism."⁴⁵

The concrete aim of the Zionists, as referred to in their first political statement, is the establishment of a

⁴⁵Theodor Herzl, The Jewish State, op. cit., Editor's Preface, p. x.

"home" in Palestine - a home for the "Jewish people." Here two implications are involved.

1. The concept of a "home" rather than a state.
2. The qualification of a racial home - a home "for the Jewish people."

In the first instance, there is an implied defeat to Herzl's notion, "The Jewish State" - defeat in magnitude of fulfillment rather than in principle. For example when Herzl envisaged the establishment of the Jewish State he had in mind the solution of the Jewish problem. In other words, to Herzl "The Jewish State" represented an end in itself: the creation of the Jewish State was the solution for the persecution of the Jews. Such a state did not mean to Herzl a process through which an end to "Galut" would be effected. As such it may be said that he (as we can conclude from his writings) did not expect all Jews to be citizens of the Jewish State. (Actually Herzl emphasized that the establishment of the Jewish State shall solve the problem not only of the Jews who shall form its population but also of those who shall remain in their native countries). Accordingly, Herzl exhibited in his theory a state with more or less limited size of population and therefore limited area. Whereas the adopted concept of Jewish home instituted instead a self perpetuating concept of statehood.

In actual practice this principle manifests its typical duality: the liquidation of the "Diaspora," and the up-building of the Jewish home. Dualism here indicates:

1. The intractability of the practical aspect of the Zionist program.
2. The innate protraction.
3. The subjection of the possibilities of limits, as to area or number of people, to objective circumstances rather than to subjective willingness.
4. A state of ambiguity involving the display of different forces in the process of national up-building.

Thus the schematic simplicity, introduced by Herzl, as to the formation of the Jewish State, was replaced by frantic endeavours unlikely to experience relative degrees of satisfaction at any stage of material achievement.

The racial qualification - i.e., the idea of creating a home "for the Jewish people" wherein Jewish individuality and thus Jewish culture develops - negates the presence in the Jewish national framework, of "Gentile" elements. Jewish self development is here understood to be a free development - free in the sense of emancipating itself from the strings of "Exile."

Accordingly once the Jews are allowed self-expression in Palestine - i.e., once, in their Zionist contextual understanding, they are set to achieve complete freedom - it

becomes their national duty to eliminate the alien elements which react on the Jewish purity of their home-building process. This duty, carried further in a Zionist logic, is also nothing less than a Holy Ordainment.

It is the right of the Jew to be a Jew in as much as it is his duty to be a Jew. It follows that it is the right of a Jew to establish a Jewish home in as much as it is his duty to build up this "home." The elimination of alien elements is then a right and a duty, because the Jewish people claim to be unique - their national movement, as such, is also unique.

Louis Dembitz Brandeis says: "It is not a right merely but a duty of the Jewish nationality to survive and develop."⁴⁶ Whereas Rabbi Abraham Isaac pronounces: "We are not only different from all the nations set apart by a historical experience that is unique and unparalleled, but we are also of a much higher and greater spiritual order. Really to know ourselves, we must be conscious of our greatness. Else we shall fall very low."⁴⁷

Ben Gurion describes the Jewish national up-building - the Jewish revolution - in the following manner:

⁴⁶ Arthur, Hertzberg, The Zionist Idea, op. cit., p. 517.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 427.

"The Jewish revolution is not the first or only one in the history of the world, but it is perhaps the most difficult... All other revolts, both past and future, were uprisings against a system, against a political, social or economic structure. Our revolution is directed not only against a system but against destiny, against the unique destiny of a unique people."⁴⁸

Speaking of the doctrine of the revolution, he adds: "we must master our fate; we must take our destiny into our own hands! This is the doctrine of the Jewish revolution - not non surrender to Galut but making an end of it."⁴⁹

Thus the nature of the case under discussion, namely the creation of a home for the Jewish people, represents the making of Jewish history, which is the fulfillment of the Jewish individuality through its rebirth in a genuine Jewish atmosphere. But individual rebirth is made subject to national rebirth and vice versa. Accordingly a totalitarian principle is involved - the liberation of the individual is made inseparable from the liberation of the whole. There is the involvement of total action for self-emancipation - national emancipation, the conviction in the ordained destiny of the Jewish element, the prerequisite act of isolation from non-Jewish factors - an act of a destined revolt; and there is, underlying all, the concept of Jewish superiority. All

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 607.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 609.

these elements induce action-eccentric action, with no reservations. And an act against destiny, by virtue of its nature, is an act of unlimited violence. Thus what Herzl proposed to be a means for peace becomes an open threat to peace.

The means adopted by the assembled Zionists, during their First Congress, for the achievement of their aim obscure the clarity of Herzl's. In other words, Herzl's well defined steps for the realization of the Jewish national aim are being covered by a description of the general tasks. Nevertheless some light is shed on the relatively concrete prospect of a proposed means-." the centralization of the entire Jewish people by means of general institutions agreeably to the laws of the land." Here a starting point could be placed for a general follow-up of the material achievements of Zionism. For it is the united action of the Jews which is the main credit in the capital account of the Jewish national movement.

The Jewish National Fund

Affirming their policy of united action, the Zionists established in 1901 Keren Kayemeth Leisrael (the Jewish National Fund) for the purpose of land acquisition in Palestine. The Fund's guiding principles were basically two:

1. Land acquisition by the Fund as the collective property of the Jewish people.
2. Nationalization of Jewish labor.

Accordingly land purchased by Keren Kayemeth Leisrael becomes the inalienable property right of world Jewry. This right has been established by Zionism and translated into action by its representing institution - the Jewish National Fund. In principle, then, the economic doctrine of the Jewish national revolution is based on common rather than private property. Arguments in Zionism justifying this economic policy could be presented as follows:

1. Private property is the antithesis of Jewish national unity. The Jews are claimed to be one people - one nation owning one property. Private property obstructs this theme of oneness.
2. Private property is allied with segmentation. Thus the principle of collective ownership serves the solidarity of the Jewish masses - their national solidarity. So, absence of a collective bond may lead the movement to partial rather than total realization.
3. Private property, with its characteristic institution of profit motivation, may tempt a Jew to sell his property to a non-Jew; and this is detrimental to the

national process of home-building. It opens a way to the infiltration of "Galut" - to elements which influence the Jewish self-development and thus the realization of Jewish freedom.

4. A corollary to the above statement is the Zionist reasoning that a private Jewish owner may be also tempted to employ non-Jewish labor. A private owner, being motivated by private gain, prefers to employ cheaper labor to earn more profit. This is a defeat to the nationalization of the Jewish labor force. It is in opposition to the general doctrine of the Jewish national movement. Employment of a non-Jew, at the same time, limits the home-coming potential of the Jewish masses. The process of ingathering i.e., national reconstruction - is thus undermined.
5. A Zionist views the tiller of the land as the direct factor in its development. A Jewish tiller, for example, makes the land Jewish -- whereas a non-Jewish tiller negates its Jewish national character. Hence the alliance of Jewish labor to the acquired national land represents a wholesome picture of the process of Jewish nationalization.

Functioning in Palestine in the light of the above basic principles, the non-Jewish element is the Arab element. In a booklet published by the Head Office of the Jewish National Fund during the early twenties the following is stated:

"If only Jewish towns, industries, etc., were established, and if the workers on the land were but Arabs, the only result would be that a new "Diaspora" would be created. The country, including the towns, would, in course of time, become completely Arabised, and the Jews would have again to take up the wanderer's staff.

"The great national work can succeed only if the Jews actually get rooted in the soil. Only a class of Jewish agricultural peasants can lay a permanent foundation for a nationally and materially secured settlement with a normal economic system."⁵⁰

In another instance the Fund authorities exhibit their fear of Arab labor in delaying, if not disrupting, the up-building of their national system.

"The mere Jewish ownership of the land with the predominance of Arab labor, would only provide the opportunity of settlement for a few thousand Jews, but would be of no importance for the real position of the Jewish masses, and would open no new possibilities for the same."⁵¹

⁵⁰ Adolf Böhm, The Jewish National Fund (The Hague: The Head Office of the Jewish National Fund), pp. 24-25.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 26.

Thus in Palestine the Jewish National Fund, in addition to its major role in acquiring land for the realization of the national aim, undertook the subsidiary role of convincing Jews already there to convert their private property to public property and also to abstain from employing Arab labor. In its statements of policies regarding the extension of credit and technical assistance, the Fund made it clear to the beneficiaries that preferential terms are offered to the Jewish farmer who employs only Jewish labor on his land.

The Jewish community in Palestine, therefore, was to be indoctrinated with Zionism to fortify the initial practical foundation of the movement. Due to this ideological reason and, also, due to the fact during the first two decades of its national program the Zionist Organization did not have specialized machinery for the implementation of Zionist policies, the Jewish National Fund was entrusted with the purchase of land, absorption of immigrants, education and other functions needed for the settlement of immigrants on the purchased land. For example, in 1917 the Fund's budget was divided in the following manner: 17% on land purchase; 50% on settlement; and 26% on grants and education."⁵²

⁵²Report on the Activities of Jewish National Fund September 1946 - August 1951 submitted to the 23rd Zionist Congress (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Post Press, 1951), p. 10.

A question may arise at this point in regard to the Jewish community in Palestine, which provided the field of work for the Zionist national institutions. A general survey as to the nature and composition of this community gives an idea about how zionism initiated its position within it. It may also throw some light on the self adjusting endeavour of this national movement among the Jews in general.

During 1882 a rough estimate of the number of Jews living in Palestine was about 24,000 inhabitants.⁵³ Immigrants arriving in the country to add to this number, were not all Zionists; such institutions to help the absorption of immigrants in Palestine existed before the practical Zionist endeavour. For example in 1860 the Alliance Israelite Universelle was founded. It propounded the idea of a global unity of the Jewish people and practical help to all those who suffered because of their Jewishness. The Alliance sent delegates to Palestine to study conditions there and find means to improve the state of Palestinian Jews. The president of the Alliance, Mr. Crimieux, succeeded in 1868 in procuring

⁵³The Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel 1958-59 (Jerusalem: The Government Printer, 1959), p. 7.

from the Sultan a firman granting the Alliance a 99 year leasehold of 2600 dunums near Jaffa, to establish an agricultural school. The institution was built in 1870. The principle behind building the school was to provide a training centre for the potential immigrants who will gradually settle in Palestine due to persecution elsewhere - "who today or tomorrow, must flee from their dwelling places because their Gentile neighbours hate them." Thus the agricultural school provided a kind of institution to help the economic absorption of the expected but unknown, settlers.

In 1871, Rabbi Jehuda Shelome Hai Alkalai founded a society for colonization in Jerusalem. Rabbi Alkalai was motivated by "the goal of redeeming Israel from Galut." His idea of Jewish settlement in Palestine is explained as "the only way indicated by our sacred literature for the attainment of the Messianic era." He understood "Teshubah" (repentance) as meaning not only return to God but also return to the Land.

Rabbi Alkalai, however, was defeated by the strong opposition of the "Halukka" - a large section of the Jews already settled in Palestine. This group represented Jews who were sent to Palestine by religious organizations and those who came on their own for the same religious purpose. Their mission was to devote themselves to pious studies and to pray for all Jews who remained in exile. Their opposition to Rabbi

Alkalai was based on two principles: First, if world Jewry gives attention to land settlement, the "Halukka" would be neglected and many families in Palestine would be endangered; second, work on the land would distract "the people of Israel from the study of the Torah, which must be their main concern."

East European Jewry had its own interpretation of Jewish nationalism. Jewish youth organizations in Russia, especially "Lovers of Zion," worked for the return to Palestine before Herzl had made his scheme known to the Jews. Leo Pinsker, a leader of "Lovers of Zion," expressed his nationalistic appeal in his famous manifesto, "Auto-emancipation." He said:

"Grant us the happiness of independence, allow us to be sole masters of our fate, give us a bit of land, grant us only what you granted the Servians and Roumanians, the advantage of a free national existence, and then dare to pass a slighting judgment upon us, to reproach us with a lack of men of genius. At present we still live under oppression of the evils you have inflicted upon us. What we lack is not genius, but self respect, and the consciousness of human dignity of which you have robbed us."⁵⁴

The development of the Jewish national sentiment in East Europe i.e., the formation of a concept of a nation especially by Leo Pinsker and members of "Lovers of Zion," had

⁵⁴Leo Pinsker, Auto Emancipation (London: Federation of Zionist Youth), p. 25.

a direct bearing on the success of Herzl's call for systematic colonization. The Jews who responded most to the attending of the Zionist Congresses were the East European Jewish national leaders. Thus, in reality, the fermentation of the national idea in the East contributed to the initial application of Zionism in two ways: First it opened the way to youth emigration to Palestine; second, it made the establishment of the World Zionist Organization possible.

Between 1883 and 1903, 25,000 Jews from Russia and East European countries entered Palestine. This number of immigrants is not attributed to the effort of the Zionist Organization-- which was not yet three years old, and which had not yet embarked on its own colonization programs, but was still (under Herzl's leadership) opposed to immigration before a charter was obtained. It is true also that the cause of this wave of immigration is not only due to the national ideals of East European Jewry, but also to Jewish persecution at that time.

Support to the immigrants from the East, i.e., financial means for the establishment of their settlement on the land, came from Western Jews. Noted here is Baron Edmund de Rothschild, who contributed such considerable financial assistance that by 1900, 22 Jewish villeges had been founded in Palestine.

Between 1904 and 1914, 40,000 Jews emigrated to Palestine. The majority, again, came from East Europe and especially from Russia. Here also this number cannot be the result solely of Zionist effort. Fourteen additional villages were established. The labor movement, during this period, started to gather momentum, culminating in the organization of the Histadrut. Again it may be said that if enough assistance and guidance was offered by the Zionist institutions, the need for organized labor would not have been felt. In other words it is not risky to speculate that the shortcomings of the Zionist machinery, at the beginning, led to the formation of the Jewish labor movement. Also it is rather clear that the socialist concepts carried by the East European immigrants challenged the total application of Western Zionism—Herzl's concept of the Jewish National Home.

Thus Keren Kayemeth Leisrael, the instrument of applying Zionism, took a position amidst differing Jewish forces:— the "Halukka" group, philanthropic endeavour, ideologies of East European Jewry, and Jewish immigrants seeking improved conditions and private gain. To what extent the National Fund was responsible for the channelling of these forces to the promotion of the Jewish national revolution, is not easy to assess. This is because it is not possible to

diagnose what force elements then, the Fund being one, contributed most to the development of the Jewish community. There was a kind of total effort; and each individual, group, and institution worked its way consciously and unconsciously towards expanding the economic absorptive capacity of the community to receive more settlers.

The situation being as described above, the achievements of the Jewish National Fund could be safely judged from the increase of land purchase during the differing periods the "Yishuv" passed through until the proclamation of its independence. (The unusual way of acquiring property later on by the Jewish National Fund and the Israeli Government will be discussed in the following chapter).

From its inception until 1908, Keren Kayemeth purchased a total of 8700 dunums of land in Palestine (2000 dunums in Hittin and 6500 dunums in Jordan Valley). Added to this area were small spots located in different parts of the country. The total area was mainly purchased from individual Jews. Thus land acquisition during the period was more or less an attempt to consolidate the Zionist principle of collective property.

By 1911 the Fund had started to purchase land from Arab owners. This way another expression to the Zionist ideology was given - i.e., to regain the Promised Land from

the Gentiles. Areas purchased until 1920 gave a total of 22362 dunums of land as the national property.

The consequences of World War I provided international promotion to the establishment of the Jewish national home. The Jewish National Fund, accordingly, came to be in a more powerful position to purchase land in Palestine. The nature of this promotion is expressed at its best, in the Balfour Declaration of November of 1917 and the Palestine Mandate of 1922.

The Balfour Declaration was in the form of a letter sent by Mr. Balfour, then British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Lord Rothschild. It read as follows:

"I have much pleasure in conveying to you on behalf of His Majesty's Government the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspiration, which has been submitted to and approved by the cabinet.

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavour to facilitate the achievement of the object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, as the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

"I shall be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation."⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Palestine Royal Commission Report (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1937), p. 22.

The issuance of this statement of British policy took place on the day on which Allenby's invasion of Palestine started - i.e., on November 2, 1917. It was approved by President Wilson of the United States before it was published. Also, in February and May 1918, it was publicly endorsed by the French and the Italian Governments.

Sympathy with the Jews, in this manner, was partly due to its war value. Mr. Lloyd George, for example said:

"The Zionist Leaders gave us definite promise that if the Allies committed themselves to giving facilities for the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine, they would do their best to rally Jewish sentiment and support throughout the world to the Allied cause. They kept their word.⁵⁶

President Wilson, expressing the sympathy of the Allied Nations with the Jewish national cause, said on the 3rd of March, 1919: "I am persuaded that the Allied Nations, with the fullest concurrence of our own government and people are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundation of a Jewish commonwealth."⁵⁷

Three years after the Balfour Declaration the British civil administration over Palestine replaced the military administration. This was prior to the conclusion of peace

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 23.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 24.

treaty with Turkey and to the approval by the council of the League of Nations of the terms of the Mandate under which Britain was to administer Palestine. The first British Administrator was Sir Herbert Samuel, a British Jew who had shown great sympathy to the Zionist idea and who was recommended for the post by Dr. Weizmann.

In 1922 the Mandate was finally enacted by the League of Nations. The terms of the Mandate gave recognition to the Balfour Declaration and to the historical connection claimed for the Jewish people with Palestine. It thus provided for a commitment to promote the up-building of the Jewish nation which was then developing in the form of a Jewish community.

The Mandate specifically provided for a Jewish Agency to advise and assist the British Government in relation to the process of the Jewish National development and its needs. It empowered this agency as well to undertake public projects the nature of which gave it the status of an over-all public body operating along with the British administration.

The relevant articles of the Mandate are quoted below:

Article Four

"An appropriate Jewish Agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the administration of Palestine in such economic,

social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interest of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country.

"The Zionist organization, so long as its organization and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognized as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the cooperation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home."⁵⁸

Article Six

"The administration of Palestine, while ensuring the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in cooperation with the Jewish Agency referred to in Article Four close settlement by Jews on the land, including state land and waste lands not required for public purposes."⁵⁹

Article Eleven

"...The administration may arrange with the Jewish Agency mentioned in Article Four to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the administration."⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 35.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

These political developments - the Balfour Declaration, the British Civil Administration over Palestine, and the recognition of the Zionist Organization as a partner in that administration - jointly implied one basic outcome: the emergence, in the background, of a Zionist governmental framework. Accordingly, the Jewish National Fund became one instrument among many other instruments at the service of the Jewish Agency - which is the Zionist Organization, the emerging governing force. Nevertheless the task of the Jewish National Fund permeates all the Jewish national activities. For it is the laying of the national ground which makes the application of Zionism possible. Hence our study of the land acquisition process is, in fact, a study of the basic Zionist material accomplishment.

As against the total of 22,362 dunums purchased in previous years, 25,000 dunums of land in Nuris and 19,000 dunums in Mahalul passed into the ownership of Keren Kayemeth during 1921. (Private Jewish companies and individuals bought land in the same area, but this private property was converted later to the Jewish national ownership). Gradually, however, a total of 190,000 dunums from the Jezreel Valley passed to the possession of the National Fund.

During subsequent years and until the late thirties, 34,000 dunums in Emek Zevuvun were purchased. In the Jordan

Valley and Beth Shaan Valley, 32,000 dunums were bought. The areas acquired in Wadi Hawarith, Emek Hapher, Sharon and in the region stretching from Gedra to Beer Sheba were 31,000, 50,000, 30,000, and 5,000 dunums respectively.

Though the national land acquisition policy was confined to the valley districts, due to their economic and strategic advantages, small areas were bought along the hill sides. So a rough estimate of the total area purchased by the National Fund during the period 1920-1936 was about 387,000 dunums. This, added to the total acquired between 1902 and 1920 (22,362), give the sum of 409,362 dunums accumulated for the national cause.

Land purchase policy between 1936 and 1948 was carried out in the light of the rising political factors. First, there was the Arab resolution to prevent the sale of Arab land to Jews; second, the British policy of prohibiting and restricting transfer of property titles to Jews in certain areas of the country after 1939; and third, the Second World War, influencing the market value of land, i.e., causing its increase to a relatively high level.

However, what mattered most to the Zionists was the policy of the British Government. In a letter to the High Commissioner for Palestine, David Ben Gurion, then chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem, wrote:

"The new land policy strikes at the heart of the Jewish national home by depriving the Jews of the right to settle on the land outside a small pale of settlement, and compels them - as in the Diaspora - to be town dwellers. This attempt to frustrate the age-long aspiration of the Jewish people to become rooted again in the soil of their ancient homeland is made at a time when millions of Jews are being mercilessly persecuted by a cruel enemy. And this blow is being inflicted by the government of the great nation which undertook to restore the Jewish people to their national home. The Jewish people will not submit to the conversion of the Jewish national home into a Ghetto; nor can it believe that Great Britain would consciously be responsible for such a travesty of its international reputation."⁶¹

Keren Kayemeth Leisrael, under the prevailing political circumstances, set for itself a policy of buying land from small landholders and creditors. The Fund set up a country-wide network in five large zones: the North, Haifa, the Sharon, the South (to which was annexed the Negev), and the Jerusalem area. Its workers devoted themselves to investigating the conditions for land purchase in the country and gave particular attention to the question of the relations of the land owners with government and with Arab leaders.

However, big land purchase was not entirely given up. The Fund authorities reported: "we were especially

⁶¹Quoted by M. Shertok - Jewish Agency for Palestine in "Palestine and the Jews," a letter to the Editor of the Times February 29, 1940 (The Times March 4, 1940) in Documents and Correspondence Relating to Palestine August 1939-March 1940 (London: Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1940), p. 28.

successful in acquiring the land subject to mortgages being held up to public auctions." Wadi Kabbani was bought during this period of political pressure. 16,000 dunums were acquired in Western, Eastern, and upper Galilee. In the Jordan hills and the lowlands, total land acquisition amounted to 25,000 dunums. South of these hills, the Fund's possessions increased from 9,000 to 150,000 dunums. In Northern Negev, 40,000 dunums were transferred to Keren Kayemeth; in Sharon, 70,000 dunums were also acquired. All in all, a total of 576,000 dunums were purchased between 1936 and 1948.

A grand total of 985,362 dunums, which represented 51.5% of total Jewish ownership in Palestine, was thus accumulated for the formation of the Jewish national home between 1902 and 1948.

Total Jewish ownership by 1948 was roughly 1,971,014 dunums. This, compared to the total area of Palestine - 27,027,023 dunums (including water area of 704,000 dunums)- reflected the ratio of Jewish ownership ^{to} the total area of the land, viz., 7.6%. The national property i.e., the possession of the Jewish National Fund included only 3.9% of the total area of the country.⁶²

⁶²The above data have been compiled from Zionist sources. However statistics of Mandatory Government (Village Statistics, March 1945) show that the share of Jews of land distribution was 1,491,700.- dunums. Out of this share 175,000.- dunums represented long term land leases by the government. Thus Jewish ownership, in actuality, was then 1,316,700.- dunums. Consideration should also be given to 100,928.- dunums which were bought by Jews by that date but not registered. Thus the figure of Jewish land ownership rises to 1,417,628.- Yusif Sayigh, The Israeli Economy (Beirut: Research Centre - Palestine Liberation Organization, 1966), pp. 74-77.

Immigrants and Settlement

Besides acquiring a land base for their national home, the Zionists were in need of people to settle on the land. This need was made more pressing in the light of the fact that the purchased land needed to be used for settlement as quickly as possible in order to guarantee its permanent title to the Jews. Also quick settlement was needed for security or military purposes.

The Zionists estimated that 2,500,000-3,000,000 dunums of land have a carrying capacity 20,000-50,000 Jewish families. According to this estimate, and using the maximum in the given ranges, the acquired national property by 1948 had a carrying power of 16,423 families. If we consider an average of five people per family, the total number of Jews who could be absorbed on 985,362 dunum of land is 82,115 individuals. (162,604 Jews who could be absorbed by total Jewish property).

As against this rough calculation, how many Jews did arrive in Palestine between 1902 and 1948 ?

It was mentioned previously that, in 1882 approximately 24,000 Jews were in Palestine. In addition to this number, 25,000 immigrants entered the country between 1883 and 1903; and 40,000 came between 1904 and 1914. However, considering the number of emigrating Jews and natural factors as well

the Jewish community, in Palestine, by 1918, numbered 56,671.⁶³

From 1919 to 1923, the number of immigrants averaged 9,000 per year, giving a total of 36,000. They were mainly "Chalutzim" from Eastern Europe affected by the post-war revolutions, the Russian pogroms, restriction of entry to the United States, and the promises of the Balfour Declaration.

Middle class and Capitalist Jews, 84,000 "Olim" came to Palestine between 1924 and 1931 as a result of the economic crisis in Poland. Between 1932 and 1939, 265,000 immigrants came from Central Europe and Germany. Illegal immigration started during the period to counteract the British Government measures in restricting immigration. This enhanced the power of the Jewish defense movement - the Haganah and other existing para-military groups. During the subsequent years and until May 14, 1948, 130,165 Jews were received in Palestine by the Zionist authorities.

Accordingly, the number of Jews in the country as of May 15, 1948 (considering the natural factors and Jewish emigration also) was 649,633.⁶⁴ Grouping this number in

⁶³The Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel 1958-59 (Jerusalem: The Government Printer, 1959), p. 7.

⁶⁴Ibid.

families of five each, we get the figure of 129,927 (rounded figure) families. Jewish national property, as mentioned before, provided for 16,423 families. Total Jewish property by 1948 provided for 162,604 individual Jews or 32,521 Jewish families.

How could the Zionists interpret this discrepancy ?

There is an excess of 97,406 families over what their property was supposed to absorb according to their own calculations. There were also significant factors which aggravated this tight position. For example, the fact that not all Jewish property was available for cultivation purposes; a part of it was utilized for houses and other building constructions. Accordingly the area needed for sustenance was less than what the Jews owned. Also, further land purchase was not likely to take place on a large scale, due to Arab hostility. Thus potential increase in Jewish land ownership to accommodate the natural increase of the Jewish population in the country and, in addition, to provide accommodation for future immigrants, was not encouraging.

There is only one interpretation and that is that the Zionists did not account for the limited area of the Jewish property as the base for their national scheme. Their primary concern, and therefore primary assessed need, was to increase the number of immigrants, i.e., to build up enough

force as a mean for acquiring the essential living space. (The Zionist War operations and their terrorist action in Palestine during 1948 serve as an example of manipulating the Zionist force element for land acquisition).

To give a general idea about the settlement of the Jews in Palestine, we are here faced with a complicated process. Complication is involved in the setting up of the Jewish social framework. The nature of the undertaking implied work from initial stages. The Jewish old society in Palestine was viewed by the Zionists as that kind of social structure the transformation of which is essential before it can be regarded as a part of the proper base for the national home. Hence due to the need for horizontal expansion- in as much as to the extensive need for vertical input in the formation of the Zionist society, the construction of the Jewish national home created a situation whereby emphasis was put on what ought to be done rather than on what has been done. In its turn, this situation created a kind of pressure which mechanized the human element at the varying stages of the Jewish societal development. An estranged social process resulted - estranged from standard social and human norms.

At surface value, the settlement program proceeded as follows:

The Jewish National Fund, up to the outbreak of World War I, was responsible for Zionist settlement work in Palestine. Especially noted during this period was the establishment of a Zionist office in Jaffa to direct Jewish settlement in the country. The land purchased by Keren Kayemeth made the establishment of this office feasible. The principle of the Office was to lease an area of the Jewish National Fund's property to the settler and enable him to reclaim it and prepare it for cultivation; it was to provide him with the necessary investments in housing, livestock and farm equipment. The area allotted to each settler was limited to the area which he and his family could till, with no other help. "No hired labor shall be used in the tilling of the land" - served as the cardinal principle of the settlement office.

During the period 44 villages were established with a population of 12,000 Jews. The Fund also established training farms and experimental stations, undertook workers housing schemes, provided plantation loans, carried afforestation program, took major steps in land improvement and reclamation, and provided for urban development facilities. The total investment made by the Fund between 1908 and 1914

amounted to 612,000 pounds Sterling. Out of this total, an estimated amount of 68,310 Sterling was spent on land purchase, and the remaining 543,690 Sterling were disbursed on the various settlement project activities.

The Jewish Agency, upon taking office in Palestine, took over the settlement work from the Jewish National Fund. Another Fund, Keren Hayesod - The Palestine Foundation Fund - was established in 1921 to finance the budget of the Jewish Agency. The Agency, in its constitution, provided the following relevant article -

"Unless and until otherwise determined by the council (for the Jewish Agency), the Palestine Foundation Fund (Keren Hayesod) shall be the main financial instrument of the Agency for the purpose of covering its budget."⁶⁵

Between 1921 and 1939 the following amounts of money were invested by the Jewish Agency and Keren Hayesod in the different fields of social settlement:

1. Immigration and Training	1,069,431.00 L.P.
2. Agricultural Settlement	2,723,160.00
3. Labor and Housing	894,243.00
4. Trade, Industry, Investment	337,514.00
5. Education and Culture	5,367,694.00
6. Health and Social Service	1,655,801.00

⁶⁵A. Ulitzur, Two Decades of Keren Hayesod - A Survey in Facts and Figures 1921-1940 (Jerusalem: Keren Hayesod, 1940), p. 11.

7.	National Organization and Emergency Aid	374,823.00 L.P.
8.	Administration & Miscellaneous	<u>580,650.00</u>
	Grand Total	13,003,316.00 L.P. ⁶⁶
		=====

Another phase of the expenditure and investment of the Jewish Agency and Keren Hayesod in social settlement is also reflected by the following figures expressing the expenditure effected, in the different fields of settlement, activities, between 1940 and 1945:

1.	Immigration and Training Aid to Immigrants	2,496,578.00 L.P.
2.	Agricultural Settlement	2,904,869.00
3.	Labor and Housing	994,013.00
4.	Trade, Industry, Investment	616,747.00
5.	Education and Culture	552,336.00
6.	Health and Social Welfare	44,525.00
7.	National Organization, Security and Emergency Aid.	2,519,807.00
8.	General Administration and Miscellaneous	<u>306,916.00</u>
	Grand Total	10,435,791.00 L.P. ⁶⁷
		=====

A comparison of average expenditure between that of the 1921-1939 period and that of the 1940-1945 gives an idea about the development of the Jewish society through its increased capacity for absorbing investment in the particular fields of action:

⁶⁶Ibid., pp. 26-27.

⁶⁷Keren Hayesod Report to the Head Office April 1939-
June 1946 to the XXII rd Zionist Congress at Basle December
1946 (Jerusalem: Keren Hayesod), p. 30.

<u>Fields of Expenditure</u>	<u>1921-1939 Averages In L.P.</u>	<u>1940-1945 Averages In L.P.</u>	<u>Amount of Increase In Annual Average In L.P.</u>	<u>Percentage of Increase In Annual Average</u>
. Immigration & Training	59,413	499,316	439,903	740%
. Agricultural Settlement	162,398	580,973	418,575	251%
. Labor & Housing	49,680	198,802	149,122	300%
. Industry, Trade, Invest- ment.	18,751	123,350	104,599	557%
. Education & Culture	298,205	110,467	-187,738	-63%
. Health & Social Services	91,989	8,905	- 83,084	-89%
. National Organization & Emergency Aid.	20,824	503,962	483,138	2320%
. Administration & Miscellan- eous.	32,258	61,358	29,100	90%

The high percentage of financial input in the development of the Jewish national home between 1902 and 1948 is assumed to be that channelled by the Jewish National Fund and the Jewish Agency. Thus the projection of the total invested figure by these national institutions and the relation of this sum to the total immigrants in the country as of 1948, shows another aspect of the material accomplishment of Zionism.

1. Investments of the Jewish National Fund in land purchase between 1902 and 1947.

8,375,577.00 L.P.⁶⁸

⁶⁸This figure has been based on the range of prices given in Zionist sources. Their land purchase cost as follows: 3-6 L.P./dunum when large areas were bought; 10-15 L.P./dunum when small areas were purchased. The Median of the former range is 4½; Median of the second range is 12½. The average of the two medians equals 8½ L.P. - the price used above to calculate the total cost of 985,362 dunums in the possession of Keren Kayemeth by end of 1947.

2.	Keren Kayemeth Investment in settlement projects until 1914.		543,690.00 L.P.
3.	Keren Kayemeth expenditure on the fortification of the Negev - 1947.		2,800,000.00
4.	Jewish Agency & Keren Hayesod:		
	A. Expenditure 1921-1939	13,003,316.00	
	B. Expenditure 1940-1945	<u>10,435,791.00</u>	<u>23,439,107.00</u>
			35,158,374.00 L.P.
5.	Other additions:		
	A. Expenditure of Zionist Executive in Palestine 1918-1921.		983,237.00 ⁶⁹
	B. Expenditure of Jewish Agency and Keren Hayesod 1945-1947.		<u>4,254,266.00</u> ⁷⁰
	Grand estimated Total		40,395,877.00 L.P. =====

The above grand total if divided by the number of the Jews present in Palestine as of May 15, 1948, gives the result of 62.18 L.P. per person. In other words 62.18 L.P. of the national funds had been the share of each individual to provide him a position in the structure of societal up-building. Before any conclusion is made in this regard the following points need attention:

⁶⁹A. Ulitzur, Two Decades of Keren Hayesod- A Survey in Facts and Figures 1921-1940, op. cit., p. 18.

⁷⁰Calculations estimated on the basis of 1945 expenditure.

1. The figure of 40,395,877.00 L.P. does not represent an accurate amount of the total investment made by the Zionists in Palestine between 1902 and 1948. However, it is safe to say that it does not represent more than 60% of the exact total figure of expenditure. Thus the amount of 62.18 L.P. per individual rises to that of 103,46 L.P.
2. Many immigrants carried with them their personal savings and had private capital for investment. This resulted in the following discrepancies in the oneness of Jewish national movement.
 - A. No, or partial, dependence on the financial support from the national institutions - i.e., independence in settlement and social participation.
 - B. As a result of the above state of affairs different groups emerged, each carrying its own interpreted ideology of national reconstruction. Hence the collective concept in Zionism had been impaired. Example the development of "Moshavot," in varying individualistic ranges, vis-a-vis the development of the "Kibbutzim;" the development of different parties and groups each carrying its own project in the process of social formation; and the growth of the "Histadruth," the Jewish labor movement, which, though in principle advocating collectivism, in practice, through its policy of protecting its members, reinforced the tendencies of the individual group projects.
3. Although they occupied a central position in the development of the "Yishuv," the Zionist national institutions were not totally responsible for this development.

- A. The over-all sovereign machinery of the Turks, and then the British should be credited with provision of protection and order needed for the pursuit of economic activities - (Particularly is this true of the British in view of their commitment to promote the Jewish national home).
- B. The predominant societal structure of the Arabs provided, in addition to markets needed for the development of business transactions, sufficient overhead capital investment. Accordingly, the role of the Zionist Jew was not entirely that of pioneering but a secondary role taking off from the societal bases that had already been established in the country.
- C. The different Zionist parties and groups who only partially depended on the sources provided by the national Zionist institutions, should receive credit for the role they played in the development of the Jewish community in Palestine.
- D. Credit should be given also to the non-Zionist Jews who were present in the country or assisting in the Jewish community development for religious or other non Zionist purposes. To start with, it may be said that this type of Jewry prepared the way for the Zionist practical endeavour and actually formed a good part of a needed protective element all through.

Considering the above factors (and elaborating more, in the footnote below, in regard to the implication of the quota of a Jew from Zionist national expenditure during the period 1902-1948), the following conclusion is safely made: Zionist practical accomplishment through the national institutions has not been and could not be responsible for the development of the Jewish national home during the

period under discussion.⁷¹

The above conclusion leads to its complement - that is, Zionism, in the process of its practical accomplishment, is dependent, to a great extent, on opportunist behaviour. Such behaviour, as it is allied with the pressing need, inherent in applied Zionism, for rapid social settlement, creates a type of Jewish society - a sample of a developing national home which lacks the stability and binding elements

⁷¹Present Zionist estimates as to the total cost of a family absorption in the economic life of Israel is 5,000 Sterling - i.e. 1,000 Sterling/individual. This is the case under modern conditions, whereby a great deal of social benefits are supplied by the government and other institutions, thus minimizing the unit cost of the absorption process, and where the land of the Arab refugees has been requisitioned and placed at the service of the absorption process free of charge.

Compared with this stands the total investment of 40,395,877 L.P. during the period 1902-1948 - i.e. an average of 878,171.23 L.P. per year - against a total population of 649,633 - However if we consider generously that Jewish population in Palestine by 1903 were already established or absorbed (45,000 in number) the number of 604,633 remains as that needing assistance for absorption. (individual expenditure and operation of the natural factors are being considered as constant). Dividing this number by the number of years between 1903 and 1948 - we get an average population quota of 11,214 per year. 878,171.23 L.P. distributed against the population annual average - results in the share of 78.3 L.P. per Jew. Considering a Jewish family of five individuals - the family cost would be 391.5 L.P. i.e. about 7.7% of what is actually spent at present (5,000 Sterling - considering L.P. & the Sterling of the same value).

resulting from social ideals and human values. (Further discussion on this appears in the following chapters).

The outcome is a mode of conduct, a kind of synthesis, manifesting itself capriciously in ranges outside its own limits: a repulsion from the internal realities - i.e., an unconscious repulsion from the typical interplay of forces within the movement. The resulting emphasis on external expression - expansionist attitude if we may call it - is counterbalanced, at the same time, by a process of creating inward gaps, responsible, in the long run, for the collapse of the whole scheme.

CHAPTER III

A MILITARY STATE

Partition Plan November 1947

The United Nations General Assembly resolution to divide Palestine into an Arab State, a Jewish State and an international corpus separation around Jerusalem, adopted on November 29, 1947, enabled the Zionist movement to adopt a definable mode of action. If the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate over Palestine served as a political factor of cohesion for the Jewish national movement, the United Nations Partition Plan gave rise to the consolidation of its military aspect. Since then, the military have been serving as the dominant factor behind the practical fulfillment of the Zionist goals.

The United Nations' partition plan of 1947, in fact, introduced "The Jewish State" against a background of forces which were on the verge of explosion. General conditions in Palestine were not then in that state of stability which promotes the feasibility of such a plan. The explosiveness of the general Palestinian situation was a function of the following elements:

1. A state of Jewish rebellion against the pressure of British power had been in effect for a few years.

As factors underlying this rebellion, the following may be cited:

- a. The stage of development in the Jewish community exhibited self-generated needs for autonomy - i.e., autonomous self-direction. In the eyes of the Jewish community, the British administration was not only superfluous, but also a fetter inhibiting the free growth of the Jewish national movement.
- b. British policies during the Second World War, and in particular the policies of restricting Jewish immigration in accordance with the White Papers of 1939, resulted in the activities of an underground Jewish apparatus whose function was to bring in immigrants through illegal procedures - i.e., to defy and to defeat the policies of the Mandatory Power with respect to the restriction of immigration. (Notable here is the endeavour of the para military troops - the Haganah).
- c. British policies to safeguard some Arab rights made Britain appear to the Zionists as a protector of the Arabs and thus as a hindrance to Zionist confrontation with the immediate enemy. Hence British withdrawal from Palestine became a necessary condition for a fateful encounter with the Arab population, who formed the genuine threat to the existence of the Jewish national home as well as the obstacle to its expansion.
- d. In Zionist eyes, the British had been guilty of refusing to honor their undertaking under the Balfour Declaration as well as their obligations under the Mandate. Therefore rebellion by the Zionists was viewed as but a punitive act aimed at promoting international justice by safeguarding the sanctity of national commitments and international agreements.

In fact the rebellion of the Zionists against the British administration in Palestine manifested their

determination for the continuance of the application of their doctrine - i.e., for the continuance of the process of land acquisition, immigration and settlement, and, thereby, the restoration of their concept of Jewish civilization.

Addressing the Mandatory Power, Menachem Begin, leader of Irgun, said:

"You will learn that what you have come up against is steel, steel tempered by the fire of love and hatred - love of the Homeland, hatred for the oppressor and invader. It is burning steel, you will not break it, you will destroy your hands."⁷²

2. The prevailing psychology of war victims who, not knowing how to compensate and to achieve a relative sense of security and peace, were not qualified for a privilege such as statehood.
 - a. Violence served as their direct outlet for exposing their suffering - i.e., by causing others to suffer. This reaction was not likely to be subdued within a limited period of time, especially because of the presence of Jewish reserves in European camps awaiting openings for emigration. Prompt or delayed acts of violence were thus expected to occur as more war victims entered the country.
 - b. The nature of their violence, being fed by the fascist repercussion and the fascist aspiration, implied acts of violence not for violence's sake only but also for the installation of a typical fascist movement.

So, as unconscious or conscious fascists, in their own way, the war victims and Zionists

⁷²Menachem Begin, The Revolt: Story of the Irgun (New York: Henry Schuman, 1951), p. 42.

and Jews influenced by them set up a special machinery for national agitation and the promotion of a fascist state organism.

3. The accumulating revolutionary momentum of the majority population, the Arabs, receiving increasing impetus from the Balfour Declaration, the Mandate, the threatening development of the Jewish community, the influx of Jewish immigrants during the Second World War, and the Jewish terrorist campaign.
4. The reluctance and hesitancy of the central power, the British administration, to exercise complete control in times of need. By referring the Palestinian case to the United Nations, the British Government publicly exposed its inability to handle the situation. In the light of this, a U.N. decision, such as the partition resolution, promoted the British attitude of resignation which in turn encouraged the Zionist war operation and terrorist activities.

It was against this explosive background that the Partition Plan of the United Nations recommended the territorial division of Palestine. The distribution of land and people, according to the plan, was as follows:

1. Distribution of land:

The Jewish State	56.47% of total area
The Arab State	42.88%

City of Jerusalem 0.65% ⁷³

2. Distribution of population:

	<u>Jews</u>	<u>Arabs & Others</u>	<u>Total</u>
The Jewish State	498,000	407,000	905,000
The Arab State	10,000	725,000	735,000
City of Jerusalem	100,000	105,000	205,000

("In addition there will be in the Jewish State about 90,000 Beduins, cultivators and stock owners who seek grazing further afield in dry seasons."⁷⁴)

The three proposed divisions were to be linked by an economic union, the function of which was to provide for joint economic development plans, common customs tariff, joint currency, common operation of communication, posts, ports and airports and access to water and power facilities.

The following points come to view from the above simple statement of the United Nations Partition Plan.

1. Its application, in general, under the existing conditions in Palestine, implied the use of a special kind of force and coercion, the exercise of which was left to a non-identified power. The Mandatory Power had handed its responsibility to

⁷³The League of Arab States-Secretariat General, Report on Sale of Arab Refugee Property by Israeli Custodian Submitted by the Palestine Arab Refugee Office to the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Cairo: The Arab League Press & Information Department, 1955), p. 12.

⁷⁴Report to the General Assembly by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1947), p. 83.

the United Nations; but the U.N. machinery was not in a position to take decisive measures for the implementation of its resolutions. Accordingly, the ground was prepared for the Zionist force to assume a "Gestor's" role to put the Partition Plan into effect.

2. The area of the proposed Jewish State was 56.47% of the total area of Palestine. Compared with the landholdings of the Jews at the time of the adoption of the Partition Plan - i.e., with 5.67% (according to U.N. statistics which is based on the Mandatory Government figure - 1,491,700.- dunums, referred to in footnote 62, as related to total area of Palestine excluding the area of water surface) - an increase 50.80% of the total land area of Palestine was granted to the Jews.
3. The distribution of Jewish population among the Jewish State, Arab State, and the city of Jerusalem implied the mobility of the Jews in the three subdivisions of the country - a fact which provided for a potential absorptive factor for further Jewish immigration. In this manner the Partition Plan served as a preliminary step to settling Jewish immigrants all over the country - i.e., a preliminary step for a future emergence of the "Eretz Israel" commonwealth.
4. Moreover, to supplement the implied dynamics of the

previous point, the distribution of the Jewish population among the three divided parts of Palestine was in contradiction with the Zionist ideology. In reference to Zionist arguments presented in Chapter II, this distribution meant that the Plan would be no solution to the problem of the "Galut" (the state of Jewish exile). Thus, acting under the joint impact of the Zionist principles of bringing in immigrants to "Eretz Israel-" "ingathering of the exiles" and Jewish liberation from "Galut," the Jewish population in the three parts proposed by the Partition Plan would exhibit a state of constant struggle and strife.

"The partition of the homeland is illegal. It will never be recognized. The signature by institutions and individuals of the partition agreement is invalid. It will not bind the Jewish people. Jerusalem was and will for ever be our capital. Eretz Israel will be restored to the people of Israel. All of it. And for ever."⁷⁵

In brief, the United Nations Partition Plan of November 1947, gave the signal for the full utilization of Zionist military forces. It at the same time provided these forces with a "publicly" recognized map serving the purpose of land acquisition. The Zionists did not let this historic opportunity pass them by - an opportunity where the force media, rather than monetary transactions, are used for the

⁷⁵Menachem Begin, The Revolt: Story of the Irgun, op. cit., p. 335.

acquisition of land. Involving the military aspect of Zionism in such a task as land acquisition enabled the Zionist army to capture and dominate the developmental process of the Jewish national revolution.

Economic Role of the Zionist Military

Whereas the Jewish National Fund had during the 45 years of its existence until 1947, secured a mere 3.9% of the area of Palestine in the form of national property, the Haganah, Stern Gang and Irgun Zvai Levmi captured within a period of less than a year, an additional 76.58% of the total area of the country. Nationalization i.e., "Judaization" of captured land took, first, the form of land sale by the government of Israel to the Jewish National Fund. Gradually, however, the government declared itself as the sole holder of the acquired area: It now possesses about 90% of the total land area of the state.

The capture of a relatively extensive land base was concurrent with the transformation of the Zionist movement into a political structure - i.e., a state - whether this kind of achievement will prove detrimental to the continuity of the Jewish national revolution or not only the future can tell. However the following points come to view in this regard:

1. The establishment of statehood was accomplished by force. Accordingly, the maintenance of this type of political entity is entirely dependent on an expanding military structure. In other words, what has been acquired through force is under the constant threat of being lost through force. Thus to the State of Israel, the military means existence. Levi Eshkol, Prime Minister, expressed this critical fact when he said:

"Our enemies are not making time by any means. We must have the strength and power to deter and to repel them, not only as they are today but as they are likely to be in five, six or ten years' time, when they may feel sufficiently strong - by their own effort or with the assistance of others - to repeat their dastardly attempts to obliterate Israel from the face of the earth."⁷⁶

To satisfy their essential need for military power for maintaining the existence of their state, the Zionists have always been pressuring world Jewry for more immigrants - more soldiers. Meir Crossman, a former member of the Zionist Executive, has pronounced:

"Time flies: the dangers are great because we are two millions against 40 million Arabs. One must have masses flowing to this country and this can be brought about only by Zionist dynamics."⁷⁷

⁷⁶On the Threshold of the 26th Zionist Congress - Addresses Delivered at the Session of the Zionist General Council
op. cit., p. 10

⁷⁷Session of the Zionist General Council 4th Session after the 25th Zionist Congress Addresses, Debates, Resolution,
op. cit., p. 132

Thus the traditional, ideological Zionist aim of "ingathering" of the "exiles" has been supplemented by the need of the state for military power. In other words, the Zionist call for Jewish immigration has come to be justified in terms of the urgency of security needs of the Zionist state more than in terms of sheer salvation from "exile." The call for immigration is openly based on the need for reinforcing the military power of Israel.

2. The frontiers of the State of Israel are not settled boundaries. Accordingly, the Israeli state is not as yet a state in the full implication of the term. The provisional "Armistic Demarcation Lines, for example, are merely an expression of a state of suspended hostilities, between Israel and the Arab countries and not a result of a final peace settlement. This may imply the following:

- a. To the Zionists, the real boundaries of their state are the boundaries of Eretz Israel. As such, the unsettled condition of the boundaries of this state serves their interest.
- b. Israel, as a state, is an expression of a state of war. Hence the general Armistic Agreements between Israel and Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt, existing for the last eighteen years, reflect the insecure position of Israel and its constant preparation for war. Every aspect of the state has become geared for war purposes.

- c. As a relative unit of force located in a hostile environment, Israel suffers from being deprived of the pursuit of healthy ways of economic sustenance and thus catching up with normal trends of economic growth. Under such circumstances, external assistance is indispensable for Israel's survival.

Thus a state of unsettled boundaries is an exposition of the State of Israel as it is: an organism enfolding itself in a temporary stage of growth - an organism which is, due to the surrounding state of danger, building its own typical self-reinforcement, giving occasional signs of its presence, and extending hands to outside sources for its own nourishment.

The Zionist military by providing the land base for a formative state in the Zionist movement - i.e., by being an initiator and a promoter for the establishment and development of the State of Israel have given rise to conditions whereby the basic economic structure of this state has become militaristic.

Tracing the association of the Zionist military element, in general, with the process of agricultural settlement, reflects the trend of this type of economic militarization. (It shall be noted throughout the discussion that the involvement of the Zionist military in this respect is basically reflected through its attitude towards land

acquisition - a predominant attitude which serves as a cause and effect for the role of the Zionist soldier as a farmer).

During the first stage of its application, the Zionist movement gave rise to the formation of a body of Jewish guardsmen, known as "Hashomer." The aim of Hashomer was to protect the already existing agricultural settlements and, at the same time assist in the establishment of new ones. Ben Gurion, for example, was a member of this group.

"Ben Gurion, together with his comrades of those early days, travelled the hard road of Zionism with one hand on the plough and the other on the gun."⁷⁸

After the Balfour Declaration, however, the task of defending the settlements ceased to be the responsibility of a volunteer group and was handed over to the whole community - i.e., to a defense movement in which all able-bodied Palestinian Jews would serve. The movement was given the name, "Haganah," the Hebrew word for "Defense." The principle of "Haganah" was to inspire each new settler with the Jewish pioneering spirit. During its initial stage of formation it adopted the following slogan.

"Let us retaliate not by aggression of personal violence but by giving an additional spurt to our development. For every one of our comrades who falls, let us build a new agricultural settlement. Far from evacuating

⁷⁸ Moshe Pearlman, The Army of Israel (New York: Philosophical Library, 1950), p. 22.

our villages, let us reclaim more desert and swamps and build new villages."⁷⁹

During the thirties, "Haganah" members distinguished themselves in peopling the land with "illegal" immigrants. Organizing its work between Europe and Palestine, "Haganah" became the motive factor in promoting the flow of illegal Jewish immigration.

During the same period, two illegal para military groups were formed, "Irgun Zvai Leumi" and "Stern Group," which distinguished themselves in their terrorist acts for the promotion of the Jewish colonization process. At a later date, their calculated massacre served as the direct cause of the flight of the Arabs from their land and property.

As a prelude, however, to the joint war effort of Haganah, Irgun Zvai Leumi and Stern Gang, during 1948, Haganah adopted a new retaliation policy. This policy is described by Jon and David Kimche in their book "Clash of Destinies" in the following account:

"... Safad in Palestine was troublesome to the British authorities because of continuous sniping between the Jews and Arabs. There were also more frequent incidents in the Huleh valley. This led the Haganah to practice a new form of retaliation in order to impress and intimidate the Arab villages by demonstrating to them that the Haganah's

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 31.

long arm could reach out even into the remotest Arab districts and hit back. But before this was fully developed it was preceded by the now customary theoretical debate. During the first phase of these actions, retaliation was directed only against "guilty" Arabs, against proven perpetrators of outrages against Jews, demonstrating as it were the long arm of the Haganah's justice... The Jews, it was argued, should do nothing that would spread the fire. Indiscriminate retaliation, it was thought, would have just that result... But there was increasing pressure from the field commanders, and also from Ben Gurion and Galili, against the limitation on the retaliatory actions. They argued that the fears and scruples of the supporters of restricted retaliation were both unreal. It was becoming increasingly difficult, if not altogether impossible to pin-point the "guilty" Arabs. It was putting a degree of risk on the already over burdened Palmach which was no longer justified. Retaliation had become a national issue; it was no longer a purely personal matter. Its purpose now, was rather to warn and intimidate rather than punish. Typical of the new policy was the raid on Sassa on February 15, 1948, an almost inaccessible village in central Galili, some 12 miles from the nearest Jewish settlement. If any Arab village was known to feel safe in the heart of Palestine Arab territory it was Sassa. But on that night a Palmach column of sixty under Moshe Kelman moved across the country through the gluey Galilean winter mud, reached Sassa, blew up twenty houses, and withdrew again 12 miles through 'enemy territory.' It was meant to demonstrate that no Arab village was beyond the long arm of Haganah and to make doubly sure, a number of other operations of the same kind were executed that night against Arab villages and road bridges according to a carefully calculated scheme - It did convince many of the Arab villagers if not their leaders."⁸⁰

⁸⁰Jon and David Kimche, A Clash of Destinies (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), pp. 83-84.

The development of the Jewish settlement process, prior to statehood had necessitated the development of a defense movement which conceived its existence as inseparable from the agricultural settlement structure. It was the need of the Zionist agrarian movement for a "living space" to absorb more immigrants that translated itself in the terrorist action of the Irgun Zvai Leumi and Stern Gang, and in the development of the retaliation policies of the Haganah. It was also this need that unified the Haganah and its dissident members (Irgun Zvai Leumi and Stern Gang group) into one fighting force which in 1948 captured the present land base of the State of Israel. However this need which was self-generated is also self perpetuating. As long as Zionism rests on the principle of "ingathering of the exiles," it will always imply the need for an ever-larger "living space-" i.e., the need for more land for expanding the agricultural settlement process. Accordingly, the need for the development of the defense movement - the need to defend the undertaking of agricultural projects, and the need to acquire more land for the development and promotion of the chain projects involved in the application of the Zionist doctrine - is always present.

With the establishment of statehood the defense

movement of Zionism became known as the Israel Defense Forces. The Defense Services Law provides that "the period of national service is $2\frac{1}{2}$ years for men between the ages of 18 and 26; two years for men aged 27-29, who have not been called up earlier for one reason or another; and two years for unmarried women aged 18-26."⁸¹

The Defense Service Law also provides that the first twelve months of the regular service of a male person and the twelve months of the regular service of a female person shall, after basic military training, be devoted mainly to agricultural training, as shall be prescribed by regulations; provided that the Minister of Defense may in respect of a person of military age who has stated his desire to serve and has been accepted for service, in the Air Force or the Navy, direct that the period of service of such person assigned for agricultural training shall be devoted, wholly or in part to service in the Air Force or the Navy, as the case may be. The branches of farming, the training in which shall be considered as agricultural training, and the order and regime of agricultural training, shall be prescribed by regulations."⁸²

⁸¹Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Facts About Israel 1963 (Jerusalem: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Division, 1963), p. 73.

⁸²Joseph Badi (ed.) Fundamental Laws of the State of Israel (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1961), pp. 92-93.

In principle, the Defense Service Law was not new to the Jewish community in Palestine. Conscription for national defense existed in different organizations as for instance the presence of Haganah witnessed. The association of the defense movement with agricultural settlement has also been the natural course of the Zionist colonization process since its inception. What the new defense law reflected, however, was a new stage of development in the overall organization of the Zionist defense movement and therefore a development in the type and scope of the military task.

With the establishment of the state the following factors moulded the military attitude towards the agricultural settlement process:

1. The acquisition of areas and property through military conquest.
2. Suspension of armed hostilities with the Arab states.
3. The influx of masses of immigrants during the first few years of statehood.
4. Need of the military element to consolidate the achieved stage of the Zionist experiment as an economic unit.

Accordingly, the Zionist army was backed by enough reasons

and supported by vital justifications to capture, to more extensive and intensive degrees, the process of agricultural settlement. And, by so doing, the Zionist military elements have, in actuality, subjected Israel, as an economic unit, to a process of militarization.

Once they acquired land through force, the military elements in Zionism set the precedent for further land acquisition through the same medium - i.e., military conquest. Though this may be considered, in Zionism, as natural - i.e., an inherent factor for the application of the doctrine - nevertheless once put into effect it gives rise to new forces - to multiple effects, which push the development of this tendency.

For example, the Israeli Defense Army, since the establishment of the state, has been undertaking different kinds of operations to acquire more property; and, at the same time, committing itself to planning for large-scale war operations whereby the process of land acquisition, on a large scale, would repeat itself.

Inside Israel, the Arab Beduins were driven from their pasture land either to cross the borders (especially to Sinai) or to move to more arid land which does not - for the time being - fall within the agricultural settlement scheme.

"The fact that over 7,000 Bedouins had been driven from their lands in Israel since the signing of the General Armistic Agreement was a matter of U.N.T.S.O. record."⁸³

Furthermore, the Israeli military attacks, in their varying scales, launched on the different Arab borders since the establishment of the state, if they did not imply direct acquisition of land, reflected the practice of retaliation and intimidation preceding the execution of well-studied plans for land acquisition which depended for their execution on the rise of opportunities, as the past history of Zionist military operations has shown.⁸⁴

An idea as to the number of these attacks (Violation of Armistic lines) is given in the following tables:

Attacks on Jordanian Frontier

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Attacks</u>
1957	401
1958	901
1959	210
1960	483
1961	345
1962	<u>171</u>
	<u><u>2511</u></u>

85

⁸³E.H. Hutchison, Violent Truce (New York: The Devin-Asair Company, 1958), p. 76.

⁸⁴The United Nations Partition Plan of 1947, for example, gave the opportunity of the war operations of 1948. At a later date the Anglo-French attack on the Suez Canal gave the opportunity to the Israeli army to occupy the Sinai peninsula.

⁸⁵Sayed Nofal, Israel Crime Record (Cairo: Information Department, 1963), p. 38.

Attacks on the Egyptian Frontiers

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Attacks</u>
1949	16
1950	44
1951	87
1952	155
1953	174
1954	259
1955	276
1956	324
1957	42
1958	65
1959	63
1960	60
1961	70
	<u>1635</u> 86
	=====

Attacks on Lebanese Frontiers

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Attacks</u>
1958	22
1959	14
1960	9
1961	8
1962	44
	<u>97</u> 87
	=====

Attacks on the Syrian Frontiers

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Attacks</u>
1955	1146
1956	1026
1957	1130
1958	3104
1959	824
1960	1701

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 37.

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 38

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Attacks</u>
1961	3469
1962	<u>4597</u> 88
	<u>16,997</u>
	=====

Total Attacks on Arab Frontiers
1949-1962

<u>Frontier</u>	<u>Total Attacks</u>
Egyptian	1635
Jordanian	2511
Lebanese	97
Syrian	<u>16997</u>
Grand Total	<u>21240</u>
	=====

A large scale military operation [compared with these attacks] has been the Sinai campaign of 1956. Plans for operations of this type are not likely to be within the reach of the publication media. Nevertheless, some secret documents of the Israeli general military staff were published in November 1957 in Bombay (India) by M. Karandja, the editor of the weekly news paper "Blitz," under the title, "The Dagger of Israel." The State Publication Department of Political Literature in Moscow recognized the correctness of these published documents in a book entitled The State of Israel: Its Position and Policies written by

⁸⁸Ibid., 37.

K. Ivanov and Z. Sheinis and published by the said department in 1958.

The secret plans showed the Israeli intention and preparation for large-scale land acquisitions whenever opportunities permitted. In fact the Sinai campaign was one proof of this. The following quotations appear in the abridged copy of the secret documents of the Israeli general military staff printed in K. Ivanov and Z. Sheinis' book - The State of Israel: Its Positions and Policies.

"The national task of the State of Israel in relation to Jews living in "Diaspora" (that is, scattered, outside of Israel) requires an uninterrupted immigration at least for the lifetime of one generation. The state must guarantee normal living conditions to the immigrants... Our task is to occupy the Arab territories, to establish control over them to utilize the material riches of these territories to satisfy the needs of the Jewish population and national minorities of Israel."⁸⁹

"Negev, Tiran and Sanafir, Sinai Peninsula, Suez area... The occupation of these areas will bring us unlimited possibilities for the use of the gulf of Aqaba and the port of Elath. The occupation of these territories will put at our disposal oil wells from which we can extract 70 thousand tons of oil per year, and also trade profits resulting from the possession

⁸⁹K. Ivanov and Z. Shainis, The State of Israel: Its Position and Policies (Moscow: State Publications of Political Literature, 1958), pp. 44-45.

of the Suez Canal. The Suez Canal will bring us from 10 to 20 million dollars per year. The port of Elath also will bring us 10 million dollars per year..."

"According to our assumptions, a war lasting no more than three months, will suffice to the economic, political and strategic needs of Israel. Israeli Army must work out a campaign plan according to which Israel could win the war in this delay."⁹⁰

What basically supports the Israeli military intention apart from the ideological factor of conquering all of "Eretz Israel," is the meager resources of the State of Israel weighed against the Zionist aim of "ingathering of the exiles." In addition, there is also the military fever, caught during 1948, which affected the Israeli military element not only by giving it a constant feeling of hunger for land-conquest but also by making it directly or indirectly manipulate the economic development of the state, through its agricultural sector, in such a way as to keep nourishing this feeling of want.

Thus while the Israeli Defense Army is possessed by the fever of land-acquisition - with the fever of the Zionist colonization process - it at the same time, guides and controls the development of the agricultural settlements

⁹⁰Ibid., pp. 46-47.

in the country. In other words, it regulates the pattern of agricultural development so as to prepare the ground and create the need for further expansion and further establishment of agrarian settlements.

During the first few years of statehood, that is between 1948 and 1953, about 370 agricultural settlements were established. The layout of these settlements was based on the principle of military strategy - which involved the establishment of border settlements and the quick utilization of Arab abandoned property. (350 settlements of the 370 were founded on Arab refugee property).⁹¹

In fact, the progress in establishing agricultural settlements meant to the State of Israel progress in securing the means of defending itself. Ben Gurion said: "Upper Galilee and the expansion of the South and the Negev are the country's weak points, and so no military force can assure us of their continued possession unless we settle them as speedily and closely as possible."⁹²

Thus strategic needs and the need for that kind of military efficiency made the agricultural settlements of

⁹¹Don Peretz. Israel and the Palestine Arabs (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute), p. 143.

⁹²David Ben Gurion, "Israel's Security and her International Position," op. cit., p.23.

the State of Israel - the structure of its agrarian sector patterned in the shape of military camps. Aiding the army in this process, other organized groups were created - such as Nahal, "Pioneering Fighting Youth," and "Gadna."

After a few months of intensive military training, Nahal groups are assigned to agricultural settlement for nearly a year. There, still under army discipline, they receive training and practical experience in farming. Thereafter, the group joins frontier settlement or sets up new settlements of its own "often in areas as yet too dangerous or difficult for normal civilian settlement."⁹³

The youth corps, "Gadna," includes boys and girls, 14 to 18 years of age. These groups are organized along scout lines to help new immigrants settle down in frontier villages and help the pioneer fighters, Nahal, reclaim the desert land.

The military set-up for the promotion of agricultural settlement - i.e., the promotion of a security program - depends primarily on the number of settlers who become soldiers at the same time. The direct promotional relationship between the increase in the number of immigrants and

⁹³Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Facts about Israel, 1963, op. cit., p. 72.

the increase in military power is reflected here. In this manner, other factors being equal, immigration is made synonymous with national conscription.

Apparently the population factor in the Zionist movement has the same fate as the land factor. The conditions of both become favourable for the movement only as a result of abnormal events, revolutions and wars. It was, for example the pogroms of Eastern Europe, World War I, the Russian Socialist Revolution, the rise of Hitler, World War II, the Israeli-Arab War of 1948, and the Sinai Campaign which promoted the flow of immigrants to Israel. As such peopling the land, as well as acquiring the land on which to receive the people, is dependent on military operations. Does this mean that the Zionists may provoke disturbances and wars in various parts of the world in order to achieve their aim - the "ingathering of the exiles"? Perhaps. What is more certain, however, is that the people who emigrate to Israel under such circumstances, other conditions being equal, are more likely to be soldiers than settlers. In other words, they are prepared to be in a position wherein they can express their "rebellion against destiny." And this spirit makes a great deal of difference in the utilization of land for agricultural purposes, as will be mentioned later on.

It seems then that the military, in Zionism, is destined for securing the land and for controlling the process of settling the people on the land it acquires - i.e., for running the machinery of agricultural settlements. The military being entrusted with this complex role, it seeks simplifications. In other words, it seeks to subject the process of agricultural settlement to military discipline and strategy. However, by doing so it screens the shortcomings which impede genuine economic growth and development.

Yet the agricultural organizational system makes up the foundation and framework of the Zionist colonization process. What are the possible consequences of the militarization of this system? The following outline suggest the elements of an answer.

1. Border settlements stand as a symbol of provoking war - a spring-board for future aggression.
2. Border settlements serve two major economic purposes:
 - a. As a base for further land acquisition.
 - b. As a source of a tense security situation, which enables the Israeli authorities to raise more funds (and, by so doing, promote the development of the defense army and concurrently agricultural settlement).
3. Settler - soldier settlements, due to their operative nature, provide a kind of potential absorptive

capacity to receiving immigrants. Though this kind of agricultural unit can hardly reach a state of self-sufficiency, it is this gap of insufficiency which provides the absorptive depth for more immigrants.

- a. State of insufficiency, due to the fact that self-sufficiency was not a significant objective from the very beginning is not a hindrance to receiving more immigrants in a settlement unit;
 - b. a settler-soldier-by virtue of his dual duty, is subject to a degree of non-attachment to the land. This creates a need for a reserve of manpower to be used whenever a soldier-settler moves away;
 - c. agricultural settlements are the suppliers of food for the Israeli population. But their militaristic nature - i.e., the tense conditions under which they operate - require more men for food production than is the case under normal condition; and
 - d. the high costs of running the agricultural settlements, under the military-oriented atmosphere, indirectly lead to over-populating the settlements in order to justify the high level of expenditure involved.
4. Burdening the agricultural sector with the role of assisting political sovereignty and the de facto existence of the state and, at the same time, entrusting this sector with security needs, indicate that-
- a. Israel, as it is being consolidated in the form of a state, does not maintain pure economic aims as separate from those needed for the promotion of the political and military goals. Thus agriculture, infused with non-economic motivations,

is deprived of mutual normal links, normal relationships, enjoyed with the other sectors of an economy under normal conditions. Therefore, agriculture in the State of Israel forms an economy of its own, with an inherent permanent need for external subsidies in the form of money and manpower;

- b. other sectors of the economy are shaped into their own typical rigid framework. Accordingly they are also in a constant state of need to be promoted by factors such as government control and the Histadrut initiative. Again the industrial sector, for example, is not operating in a way which indicates a state of wholesome industrial enterprise. There is here also a constant need for pouring funds and recruiting manpower to keep the industrial machinery going. A state of a transitory stage in industrial development is thus reflected - awaiting changes beyond its own realm in order to be promoted to a level of genuine industrial growth. But affecting these changes means, in reality, the negation of the results of applied Zionism. For example:

- i. agricultural development to be left to its own normal laws of economic growth;
- ii. provision for accessibility to sources of raw material;
- iii. provisions for accessibility to free labor;
- iv. provisions for accessibility to markets;

To fulfil the first aim, Zionism needs to abandon its agrarian ideology, which is its inherent ideology. It would follow that the need for the soldier on the land must be abandoned - Thus Zionism as an ideology and Zionism as a power would retire. This is very unlikely to be accepted by the Zionists and the military leaders of the State of Israel, because it

it implies changing the modes of agricultural institutions which basically nourish the development of their national movement.

As to accessibility to genuine labor force, the problem here is the process of "ingathering" Jews from different national and social backgrounds. It is a chronic problem in Zionism as long as the "ingathering of the exiles" remains its mission.

Providing for sources of raw material and for markets for finished goods, however, is related to the position of the State of Israel among the Arab countries. Being in a state of political and economic isolation, the State of Israel is cut off from economic advantages which, in actuality, represent its own basic roots in the area. But in Zionism the attainment of these advantages means dominance - i.e. the "Judaization" of the Arab territories. Hence there is one way to approaching the matter: military operations. But this may lead to the following:

1. Preparation for war accentuates the division between the agricultural sector and the other sectors of the economy. The position of agricultural settlements receives further magnification with further stress on its military element.
2. Though collecting external funds under the pretext of security purposes, once the Israeli expansionist aims are made public, public opinion would hinder the channelling of these funds to Israel.

3. Preparation for war discourages private capital investment; therefore, it hinders as well the process of immigration. The zeal to come to Israel diminishes as does the eagerness to stay in the country. And this certainly checks the civilian element and further enhances the status of the military element.
4. The exposition of the Israeli war aims not only accentuates divisions in Israeli society, but also accentuates divisions between Israelis and non-Israeli Zionists, and among the Jews in general. And this process becomes more and more effective as pressure from world public opinion begins to be felt. The final result is the strengthening of the militant spirit in the State of Israel with all the consequences of weakening social and normal values. For example, in his book, Soldiering For Peace, General Carl Von Horn: commander of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine from 1958 to 1963, gives a clear description of the general moral set-up of the Israelis. Commenting on the State of Israel in general, he describes it as a -

"...country which had espionage in its bones, and which understood the twin elements of corruption and blackmail to a degree which was probably the envy of any country in the world."⁹⁴

Describing his experience at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and referring to Mr. Eytan, Director General, he says:

"And the gist of his advice to assist me in my task was that I should refrain from sticking to the rules of Armistic Agreement... Once out of his office, I was almost glad to discover myself in the charge of Yosef Tekoah, who has so far spoken very little. But as soon as we were settled in his own room, I discovered that I had stepped from the frying pan into the fire..."⁹⁵

⁹⁴Carl Von Horn, Soldiering For Peace (London: Cassell and Company Ltd., 1966), pp. 98-99.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 75.

The different ministries in general he describes in the following words:

"Each ministry was honeycombed with personal and factional rivalries and each was divided against the other; every service was plagued with those fierce, jealous antagonisms which seem endemic in the Jewish character."⁹⁶

Then General Von Horn speaks about the changing attitude of the U.N. Mission members towards the State of Israel. He says:

"Never in my life have I encountered a nation with such an infinite talent for turning good will into disillusion and so often disgust. It seemed as though the State were possessed of some demon with a capacity to turn potential friends into enemies..."

"What went wrong? I always had a talk with staff members who were leaving the Mission. Invariably it was the same story. Nearly all of them had arrived with the honest intention to help both parties to the Armistic Agreement, but with a conscious sympathy for the people of 'poor little Israel': yet, after two or three years in daily contact with officials, soldiers and private individuals on both sides, there had been a remarkable change in their attitude. I found it sad but very significant that when I asked them what their most negative experience had been during their service with U.N.T.S.O. the reply was almost invariably: 'the consistant cheating and deception of the Israelis.'⁹⁷

The militirization of agricultural settlements is not likely to prepare the ground for a unified economic and social system in the State of Israel. It deprives the state

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 103.

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 282.

of the ability to acquire an autonomous economic base which, in fact, is necessary for enhancing the military potential of the country.

Under normal conditions, the military strength of a state is closely connected with the strength of its economy. But this is not the case with Israel. It is true that the process of militarization in the development of agricultural settlements has had its effect on the general trend of the movement, but basically the Zionist doctrine did not provide for a unified economic system which is necessary for a state of social coherence. (Further discussion of this problem is presented in the following chapter). However, the Zionist experiment has shown so far that a mixed economic system is the most suitable system for the achievement of its purpose. In other words, any type of institution may be manipulated for the achievement of the Zionist goals. This might provide quicker benefits and at the same time imply a certain degree of expediency for the achievement of results; nevertheless, it also manifests the emergence of separate trends which affect the unity of the whole Zionist movement.

For example the purely communist way of life in the Israeli Kibbutz, the cooperative methods of the Moshavs,

government ownership of business and land, and the enterprises of the Histadrut, all reflect, in addition to existing free private ownership, the manipulation in Zionism of differing institutional means to the achievement of one purpose - the "ingathering of the exiles." This is justifiable in the course of life of a movement - but not in the course of life of a nation state. A movement, for instance, is a process of expansion; and an institutional medium that promotes the continuity of its course of development may fit itself within its scope. However, the case is different when a nation state is concerned. Her consolidation and unity represent the essential base for the state's existence.

But the State of Israel, as mentioned previously, is not conceived in Zionism as a nation state. It is a state of development in the history of the Zionist movement. Accordingly, when the military element in Zionism captured an adequate land base, having been given the opportunity to do so, through the United Nations Partition Plan, such behaviour was not intended to consolidate the movement into a political or economic unity. It was an effort to provide a temporary institutional form for the protection of what had been acquired - the institutional form of a state.

Accordingly if the militarization of Zionist agricultural development produced disunity in the basic economic structure of the state, by doing so it was only translating the Zionist ideology. As such the significance of an economic potential for the support of the army and of the state becomes a merely relative value.

Zionism, in practice, therefore, proves that its success depends on the use of the force media, on the manipulation of different institutional forms, and - strange enough - on its own defects. The Zionist army, so far, has secured a sufficient area of land - an essential Zionist goal; the use of different forms of institutions expedited the process of absorbing immigrants; and the defects of the Zionist experiment machinery served as a factor in attracting external help and assistance, particularly the flow of funds to the State of Israel.

Zionism, however, is not operating in a vacuum. As it used force for the implementation of its experiment, it gave rise to the development of forces against the very existence of this experiment. The development of the Arab military forces, in general, and the emergence of the Palestine Liberation Army, in particular, serve as an example.

The existence of the mixed economic system in Israel, which is providing enough depth for receiving and

absorbing more immigrants, is at the same time detrimental to the existence of Israel as a state. For it is not allowing the State of Israel to achieve a state of sound economic independence. It follows that it is detrimental to the practical existence of Zionism itself inasmuch as this doctrine is currently identified with its political entity, the State of Israel. This would be the case if Zionism did not undertake a similar experiment, as that applied in Palestine in a different part of the world.

However, to solve this problem - i.e., to provide for a unified economic system - would limit the potential for absorbing immigrants. It would serve the interest of the Israeli citizen best, but it would not serve Zionism. It may, in other words, provide the State of Israel with a relative degree of normal economic and thus social growth despite the meagreness of its natural resources - i.e., it would provide the state with the intention of practicing its being a nation-state for its own citizens. But this does not conform with the Zionist doctrine. Rabbi Dr. Max Mussbaum, former president of the Zionist Organization of America, for example, addresses the Zionists, after quoting the following statement from Isaiah the prophet:

"Ye that are the Lords' remembrances,
take ye no rest and give Him no rest that
He establish and till He make Jerusalem a
pawm in the earth."

by saying:

"Do not allow yourself any rest:
Do not give the communities any pause -
till Zionism is rebuilt, the unity of the
Jewish people assured, and till Jerusalem
has become, indeed, the symbol of the
Jewish oneness and the glory of the earth."⁹⁸

Thus strife rather than rest is what fulfills the Zionist philosophy - Rest is not likely to be experienced in Zionism even after all the "exiles" have been "ingathered" because, according to the Zionist leaders, their mission is also a world mission. The emancipation of a Jew, to a Zionist, is linked with the emancipation of humanity. If the former type of emancipation has been established through the military element, there is no doubt that Zionism may use its armed forces for the emancipation of humanity also. Accordingly, Israel as a movement - a world movement, as its aims qualify it to be - does not involve what is commonly known as "stability."

Instability in the dynamics of the Zionist movement, parallelism in and duplication of efforts within the movement to achieve Zionist goals, the increasing predominance of the military super-structure - though these complex factors

⁹⁸Session of the Zionist General Council 4th Session after the 25th Zionist Congress Addresses, Debates, Resolution, op. cit., p. 86.

expose the defects of Zionism, they at the same time exhibit the factors for its continuity:

1. Instability in itself is in Zionism the expression of continuity: It represents the vitality of the movement.
2. Due to its complex tasks, Zionism requires total rather than single efforts. Though high costs are involved, mainly due to duplication in work done, the distribution of Zionist tasks among numerous groups, individuals, and institutions will create a sense of great value for the fulfillment of the movement in its totality.
3. The process of militarization helps increase the dependence of the Zionist experiment on the support of world Jewry and other sources of external help. Thus, by preventing the realization of self-sufficiency in the State of Israel, the military element in Zionism is serving the interest of the movement as it maintains it as a movement rather than promote its consolidation into a national state.

Nevertheless, though the Zionist movement experiences success - that is, a sense of continuity through what are normally considered defects, it may gradually witness

failure as a result of its consciousness of superiority.

In other words by discriminating itself as a racial movement - a movement serving "chosen" and thus superior people, Zionism is a failure.

1. The manipulation of different means for the achievement of the end - end of Zionism - implies the defects of the movement.
2. Continuity through the manipulation of its own defects - reflects the insecure course of the movement.
3. Inasmuch as the isolation of a Jew from society led to his persecution, the isolation of the Zionist movement - i.e., its separation as the movement of the "chosen people," is not safe from a world upheaval against its course of development.

Thus it is very likely that if, during its initial stages of development, Zionism achieved success through international sanctions and opportunities, it may at a later stage, due to the exposition of its realities, be blocked with international impediments. As a result of this, what Herzl proposed as a solution for the Jewish problem turns out to be a method for the development of the problem.

CHAPTER IV

AN ECONOMIC ENTERPRISE

Zionist Economic System

In the previous chapter, one aspect of the economy of the State of Israel was discussed-- viz., the process of its militarization. For further evaluation of the significance of this aspect and, at the same time, for forecasting its possible future effect upon the development of the Zionist movement, a general survey of the nature of the Israeli economy is required.

Does the State of Israel have an economic system - a monolithic system? Israel has an economic philosophy, as a Zionist state; but it does not as yet have a monolithic economic system.

Even a brief review of the economic philosophy of Herzl must emphasize the following points:

1. Herzl did not concentrate on an economic system for "The Jewish State." His main concern was with the steps needed for the formation of "The Jewish State."
2. Though not envisaging an economic system, per se, Herzl indicated with varying emphasis the following notions -

- a. The significance of labor in the building up of "The Jewish State;" "We shall march into the Promised Land carrying the badge of labor."⁹⁹
- b. Control of the labor force - i.e. its disciplining during the process of constructing "The Jewish State." (An aspect of Herzl's theory in this regard was mentioned in Chapter I, when he was quoted to describe the labor force in terms of "gangs of workers" being subjected to military discipline).
- c. National construction meant:
 - i. a process through which the Jewish floating proletariat would become stationary" - that is a process of liquidating the universal socialist concepts in the minds of the Jewish working classes.
 - ii. the difficult stages of national up-building require collective work and concurrently a way of disciplining the labor force. "We shall only work collectively when the immense difficulties of the task demand common action; we shall, whenever possible, scrupulously respect the rights of the individual. Private property, which is the economic basis of independence, will also be encouraged to develop freely."¹⁰⁰
- d. A special economic system, which fits the transitory stage, of the process of national reconstruction, was described. In this way Herzl regarded this system, in its varying stages, to be a means to an end - the end being the realization of statehood. This has the following implications:
 - i. Economic collectivism and private enterprise may be allied with one another.
 - ii. A proper economic system could only be drafted when the process of national up-building is nearing its end. And the best system shall be the system of private property. "Our unskilled

⁹⁹Theodor Herzl, The Jewish State, op. cit., p. 91.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 53.

laborers even will work their way up to private proprietorship."¹⁰¹

- e. Herzl made indirect provision for the establishment of socialist ideas in Palestine. One of Herzl's major methods of convincing the ruling powers of Europe to support his national scheme was that, through the implementation of such a scheme, the Jewish socialists will depart for "The Jewish State" and thus reduce the pressure of the revolutionary movements in the countries of Europe.

Definitely these socialists were not to adopt a new philosophy of life as soon as they landed in Palestine. They proved later on, however, to be able to formulate a special type of socialism whereby both their socialist aspiration and the nationalistic content of Zionism were served. Nor was this contrary to what Herzl thought as necessary for the realization of the Zionist scheme. For:

- i. Through making room for the socialists (the "mediocre intellectuals" as he called them), he, in actuality, envisaged their support to the Jewish national movement.
- ii. By providing for the necessity of collective work, he gave a primary role to the socialist immigrants.
- iii. By emphasizing the significance of labor in the process of national construction, Herzl also gave recognition to the cardinal socialist concept - "the value of labor."
- iv. And by his concept of "public subscription" as a mean for the realization of "The Jewish State," Herzl led the way to the latter Zionist principle of government land ownership - collective property. (While discussing methods to finance the process of Jewish emigration, Herzl proposed three ways. (1) "through la haute finance; (2) through small private banks; (3) through public subscription."¹⁰² The third method was adopted.

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 53.

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 56.

What, in reality, has taken place in the practice of Zionism, since the death of Herzl, has not deviated from the broad lines of his thought:

1. The State of Israel, admitted by the Zionist leaders to be only a stage in the national construction process could not be, therefore, identified with Herzl's "Jewish State." Being still short of the wholesome national entity, the State of Israel is then, according to the Zionist dogma, still short of a wholesome economic system.
2. During the last fifty years of the Zionist experiment, the following notions of Herzl have received a relative degrees of emphasis, development and realization.
 - a. The significance of the labor concept manifested itself in the development of a labor movement which, in fact, undertook to regulate the Jewish community in Palestine, as it developed, until statehood was established.
 Labor also received significance from the special position given to it in the Zionist movement. Jewish Labor, for instance, according to Ben Gurion's theory of human redemption, is entrusted not only with the fulfillment of the national Jewish revolution but also with the redemption of humanity.
 - b. Collectivization of the labor force and its disciplining resulted as a trend from within the labor movement. Accordingly, typical institutional organizations evolved to give form to the economic structure of the developing Zionist experiment - e.g. the Histadrut and the Kibbutz system of colonization.

c. A different type of collective action emerged to cope with what Herzl recognized as difficult moments in the up-building of "The Jewish State." This action is described by the initiative of the different institutions, groups and individuals in the total mechanism of the movement. For example:

- i. The initiative of the Jewish Agency.
- ii. The initiative of the Israeli Government.
- iii. The initiative of the Histadrut.
- iv. The initiative of the different political parties.
- v. The initiative of other groups and organizations.
- vi. And the initiative of private individuals.

This type of collective action reflects the lack of centralization in the economic set-up of the movement. It may be said that the advantages which Herzl envisaged in collective efforts have been replaced by increasing chaos and dissonance. Nevertheless, the total impression is that the machinery is geared for national fulfillment despite the economic waste due to lack of centralized planning, direction, and control.

d. Herzl's notion of a special economic system suitable for the periods of growth, and his admission of the possibility of development of socialist ideologies in Palestine, are reflected in the present economic set-up of the State of Israel. A special economic system has been formulated - a synthesis of socialism, racialism, and nationalism. I shall call it "racial socialism."

In fact socialism, as introduced into Palestine by Jewish immigrants, adapted itself to the tasks of the fulfillment of Zionism. For example the Jewish labor movement saw in the concept of Jewish labor the principle of its dynamics. Thus labor, as a universal element, as viewed in socialism, has been reduced to fit the goals of Jewish nationalism - has become, in other words, national labor. Thus what actually Herzl meant by the

stabilization of the proletariat - i.e. making it "stationary" has been fulfilled. The Jewish worker, in addition to finding stability through settling in Palestine, also experienced a different kind of stability by stabilizing, if not eliminating the universal socialist concept in his mind. However, the development of the Histadrut in the Jewish community provided the institution which promoted this type of stabilization.

Perhaps some discussion of this labor institution, the Histadrut, will shed some light on the special economic system evolving within the framework of applied Zionism.

In socialism, the role of social reconstruction is given to a special class, the proletariat. In applied Zionism (racial socialism), this role seems to have been given to the Histadrut. The Histadrut, a special class by itself, has emerged as the backbone of the economy of the Zionist movement - The vanguard of Zionist construction.

Ben Gurion defines the Histadrut in the following words:

"The Histadrut is not a trade union, it is not a political party, it is not a cooperative nor a mutual aid society, although it is active in all these fields; it is more than all that. The Histadrut is a union of people who are building up a new home, a new state, a new people, new enterprise and settlements and a new culture; it is a union of social reformers which is not rooted in its own membership book, but in the common destiny and tasks of all its members - in death or life."¹⁰²

The Histadrut then represents the basic element in the emerging economic system of the Zionist state. It represents the class which provides the structural framework for that system. More than that, it exhibits the element

¹⁰³Quoted in Walter Preuss, The Labor Movement in Israel (Jerusalem: Rubin Mass, 1965), p. 183.

of power which dominates Israel now and might govern "The Jewish State" if such a state is ever fully realized.

1. The Histadrut performed some of the functions of the state before the State of Israel was formed.
2. It has provided the political leadership of the State of Israel since its establishment.
3. The autonomous tendencies within the Histadrut, its position of leadership, its links with world Jewry, its control over the other institutions of the state (including the government) all portend a significant socialist tendency - a process of socialist governing. This tendency serves both the socialist and the Zionist ideology.
 - a. A social process of self government without the need for a government machinery is the ultimate aim of socialism. The Kibbutz system, the growing cooperative movement, and the over all machinery of the Histadrut exhibit this tendency.
 - b. Zionism in its formative stages does not favor centralization. Since the ultimate aim is the Ingathering of Exiles, the following constitute essential principles of the movement.
 - i. multiplicity of efforts for the "ingathering" and absorption of immigrants;
 - ii. Zionism being a process of colonization, the existence of separate colonization units takes precedence over the consolidation of over-all power in the form of a centralized state machinery.

- iii. the self-government of those colonial units provides greater absorptive capacity for further immigrants than would be provided by rational planning and central control;
- iv. what Zionism basically needs is a popular army which allies itself with the agencies of colonial construction (as is the case with the Israeli Defense Forces). The existence of this type of military establishment does not necessarily need to attach itself to government machinery. In other words, it does not need to subjugate itself to a government authority.

The government, then, occupies a secondary position within the context of the emerging Zionist economic system. It appears as an instrument - a necessary instrument, indeed, at a certain stage of the Socialist - Zionist process of development. More than that, it prepares the ground for the Jewish labor to find its way for conquest and thus self fulfillment. Accordingly, instead of bringing into power a totalitarian state machinery, as is the case under socialism, to implement a social and economic doctrine, Zionism has produced the Histadrut to undertake this role.

In principle, then, the Histadrut needs the government; but at the same time, it reveals the government's secondary position in the social structure of the Zionist experiment. This implies that the government's existence might not be necessary at a latter stage of Zionist fulfillment.

Zionism accordingly is advancing towards expressing itself in the form of a class-nation. The basic characteristics

of the economic system of such a class-nation appear to be as follows:

1. It is based on the leadership and organization of a class of pioneers.
2. It is indoctrinated with the destined role of Jewish labor; and
3. The military element is indispensable to it.

Did Herzl clearly foresee this type of development ? What repercussion does it have on the future development of the Zionist movement ? At what stage in the development of the national scheme did Herzl conceive a system of private property or private enterprise as necessary for independence and the realization of freedom ?

These questions may be briefly answered as follows:

1. Though there is no evidence that Herzl foresaw the development of the Histadrut and the nature of the economic system developing therefrom, yet the foundation for this type of development was laid down by Herzl.
2. The Histadrut is the only leveller and unifying institution in the total Zionist movement. It is, in actuality, the Zionist experiment.
3. Though Herzl expressed his preference for private enterprise, he did not specify the stage at which

the operation of this economic principle would become feasible. The Zionists can maintain that since full independence and freedom has not yet been realized, the popularization of the concept of free enterprise is not yet appropriate. Independence and freedom are synonymous with the full realization of the Jewish Commonwealth. It is not until then that private enjoyment of the fruits of labor becomes practicable. Carried to a further point in the Zionist analysis, this would mean also that the realization or establishment of the concept of free enterprise is contingent not only upon the liberation of the Jewish labor but also upon the liberation of humanity as a whole - since, according to Zionism, the redemption of Jewish labor is allied with the redemption of humanity.

Viewing the position of the Histadrut in the State of Israel from a different angle will also provide an answer to the above questions.

The Histadrut does not exercise complete control over all economic activity in the present State of Israel. Competing with it, in varying degrees, are the private and government sectors of the Israeli economy. However, in this regard, the following comments come to view:

1. The Histadrut directly and indirectly affects the private sector of the Israeli economy, especially through its control over the wage policy. Wages and salaries are frequently adjusted by the Histadrut in the light of the cost of living index. For example, between 1964 and 1965 a wage rise of 14% and a 25% increase in salaries were effected.¹⁰⁴ They were followed by a 5-10% increase in wages for 1966, and a 5% expected increase in 1967. Due to the Histadrut wage policy, returns on private investment become relatively meager; and, accordingly, private investment is discouraged. But this serves the purpose of Zionism in the following manner:
 - a. The process of staffing the model Zionist institutions is kept continuous. By maintaining a policy of high wages, regardless of productivity increase, the Histadrut makes it very difficult, if not impossible, for a small capitalist to be on his own. He accordingly finds himself compelled to join a Kibbutz or some other form of Zionist settlement.
 - b. More people joining the settlements means more money from external sources for Zionist expenditure - i.e., more money for the expansion and consolidation of the Zionist experiment.

¹⁰⁴"Sapir: Drop in Economic Growth to Continue in '66," Jerusalem Post, January 19, 1966, pp. 1-8.

¹⁰⁵"Alignment Wage Policy: 5-10% this year; 5% in '67," Jerusalem Post, February 10, 1966, p. 6.

- c. With this process is always associated the need for the expansion of the defense element - the popular Zionist army.

Thus the Histadrut, through maintaining an effective wage policy, discourages the development of private enterprise; and, while so doing, it also serves the colonization aims of the Zionist movement.

2. Government businesses are not, in principle, operated under the profit incentive. This being the case, the Histadrut wage policy operates in the government sector directly for the promotion of the Zionist movement. The gap created here between the input and output of public enterprise is manipulated for the purpose of fund-raising for the expansion of the government sector, which is, in a way, allied with that of the Histadrut.

Therefore, the dynamics of the Zionist principle underlying the Histadrut wage - policy operates as follows: High wages are maintained to provide an adequate standard of living; an increase in the rate of remuneration creates a demand for funds; inflow of funds in the economy creates inflationary tendencies which lead to price increases, to higher cost of living, and to further increase in the wage level; and thus the spiral movement resumes its way. The ultimate effect is the perpetual turnover of what I would

call parasitic population - wage and salary earners whose income does not match their labor input. Payment is not made in relation to productivity. There is here an implied long run effect on the mentality of the income - receivers - a decrease in their zeal for constructive efforts. This, in turn, accentuates the militant spirit of the masses - i.e., it serves the development of the military spirit of the worker which is translated at best in the zeal for conquest. Thus a sort of an anxiety is created within the labor force - an anxiety to get more and to work less - an anxiety to obtain what others have earned.

As for the Histadrut's actual participation in the economic life of Israel, the following figures give a general idea:

Proportion of Gross National Product Contributed
by Labor - Controlled Enterprise

	<u>1959</u>	<u>1961</u>
Agriculture	56.1%	53. %
Industry	21.4	24.8
Building	41.4	44.4
Transportation	38.1	39.4
Services	18.	16.5 106

These figures clearly indicate the significant role of the Histadrut in the vital field of Zionist economic

¹⁰⁶Walter Preuss, The Labor Movement, op. cit., p. 184

activity -- viz., agriculture and the construction industry.

Histadrut members employed in agriculture represented 56.6% of the total, whereas employment in the building industry represented during the same period, 28.84% of total employment. The significance of the latter percentage lies in the fact that the Histadrut 28.8% employment figure contributed about 42% of the Gross National Product of the constructive industry. (The Histadrut well known enterprise in this connection, the Solel Boneh - public utility building company and its subsidiary enterprise Koor, for example, during the peak years of immigrant settlements 1949-1952, built between 30,000 and 50,000 houses a year and employed between 25,000 and 30,000 workers).¹⁰⁷

Opposing the Histadrut policies are the advocates of the private system of enterprise - the political parties of the right, such as the Herut party, General Zionists, Progressives, Agudat Israel, Mafdal and certain religious groups. (Its supporters are the leftist parties: Mapai, Achdut Haa voda, Mapam and others). However, the Mapai, the Histadrut political arm, has been the dominant party in every cabinet since the establishment of the State of Israel. This party, in other words, supported by other leftist parties, has been

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 205.

occupying the position of leadership in governing the state. Present tendencies indicate an increase in the power of the rightists. The table below, showing the power of the left and the right in successive Israeli elections, indicates the power position of the Histadrut and that of its oponents:

	<u>Mapai & Main Supporters</u> <u>(% of Voting Power)</u>	<u>Herut & Main Supporters</u> <u>(% of Voting Power)</u>
First Knesset (25/1/1949)	35.7+14.7 = 50.4	11.5+21.5 = 33
Second Knesset (30/7/1951)	37.3+12.7 = 50	6.6+31.3 = 37.9
Third Knesset (26/7/1955)	32.2+15.5 = 47.7	12.6+28.4 = 41
Fourth Knesset (31/11/1950)	38.2+13.2 = 51.4	13.5+25.4 = 38.9
Fifth Knesset (15/8/1961)	34.7+14.1 = 48.8	13.8+27 = 40.8
Sixth Knesset (2/11/1965)	36.74+11 = 47.74	21.29+14.07 = 35.36

The above table shows that the opposition to the Histadrut is strong. Accordingly, the position of the Histadrut as a formative skeleton for a Zionist economic system is precarious.

Allied with Mapai rule and the system of Histadrut control are the following Zionist principles:

1. Public property
2. Pioneering (Halutziut)
3. Labor (Avodah)
4. Settlement (Hityashuut)

Does a change in party rule - that is, the emergence of the rule of the rightists - mean a change in these principles? And if it does, what effect will that have on the Zionist movement?

The Herut party, for instance, favours private enterprise and muscular patriotism to regain the "historic boundaries" of Israel. If this party comes to power, what will the consequences be? Perhaps the following:

1. Aggressive attack for capture of more land;
2. Gradual liquidation of the labor movement - the Histadrut and the Kibbutz system;
3. Establishment of a private property system.

But these measures would represent a great risk to the Zionist movement.

1. What guarantees are there that a military attack, launched by Herut policy supporters, would be victorious? To the State of Israel, total defeat means non-existence.

2. The gradual liquidation of the labor movement would imply more than a mere counter revolution within Zionism: it would actually mean the liquidation of Zionism.

Even so, the significant point is the presence within the Zionist movement of such a group - an opposition which, though in principle it adheres to the doctrines and espouses the aims of the movement, supports in reality philosophies that may be detrimental to the continuity of the Zionist enterprise. For example, and as viewed by Herzl, collective effort rather than private initiative is required for the promotion of the Zionist colonization process during the early stages of its development. Emphasis on laissez faire policies prior to the realization of complete Zionism implies, then, satisfaction with an initial stage of development or frantic endeavour for the realization of the Zionist mission in its totality. Both attitudes, however, represent forces which affect the wholesome development of the movement and perhaps aggravate the danger against the existence of the Zionist enterprise.

An Aspect of Economic Solvency

The above discussion has briefly touched upon the likelihood of the emergence of a typically Zionist economic system in the State of Israel. Due to the centrality of the state in the Zionist movement, the trends which give some shape or structure to this centre occupy a crucial position which vitally affects the movement as a whole - unless the World Zionist leaders decide to seek experimental Zionism in different parts of the world, instead of (or in addition to) Israel.

Assuming the continuance of the State of Israel as the only Zionist centre, at least for the present, and having discussed the nature of the formative Zionist system in that country - our next task is to investigate the conditions which are likely to promote the growth and solvency of such a system, primarily the financial conditions.

Reference was made previously to the Zionist effort to build an economic base for their political demands. An illustrative survey of the Zionist material accomplishments, until the realization of statehood, was given in Chapter II. In Chapter III mention was made of the acquisition of land, a basic economic factor, through the force of arms and the media of terror.

Considering, however, at this point, the Zionist

material achievements, prior to statehood, as the preliminary base of the Zionist economic system, the following factors played essential roles in the consolidation and promotion of this base - and concurrently its allied economic system:

- A. Abandoned Arab property - the following statement appears in Don Peretz' book, Israel and the Palestine Arabs:

"Abandoned property was one of the greatest contributions toward making Israel a viable state. The extent of its area and the fact that most of the regions along the border consisted of absentee property made it strategically significant. Of the 370 new Jewish settlements established between 1948 and the beginning of 1953, 350 were on absentee property. In 1954, more than one third of Israel's Jewish population lived on absentee property and nearly a third of the new immigrants (250,000 people) settled in urban areas abandoned by Arabs. They left whole cities like Jaffa, Acre, Lydda, Ramleh, Baysan, Majdah, 388 towns and villages and large parts of 94 other cities and towns, containing nearly a quarter of all the buildings in Israel. Ten thousand shops, businesses and stores were left in Jewish hands. At the end of the Mandate, citrus holdings in the area of Israel totaled about 240,000 dunums of which half were Arab owned. Most of the Arab groves were taken over by the Israel Custodian of Absentee property. But only 34,000 dunums were cultivated by the end of 1953. By 1956 73,000 dunums were either cultivated or fit for cultivation. In 1951-52, former Arab groves produced one and a quarter

million boxes of fruit, of which 400,000 were exported. Arab fruit sent abroad provided nearly 10% of the country's foreign currency earnings from exports in 1951. In 1949 the olive produced from abandoned Arab groves was Israel's third largest export, ranking after citrus and diamonds."¹⁰⁸

A conservative attempt of the monetary value to Arab abandoned property is however, presented at best in Dr. Yusif Sayigh's book - The Israeli Economy:

The author projects a comprehensive picture about the magnitude of economic loss immediately related to the emigration of the Palestinian Arabs. And certainly what is an economic loss in this case has been an economic gain to the Israeli economy.

The consequences of the Palestinian emigration process implied the following categories of economic losses:

A. Loss of privately owned property.

1. Residential buildings
2. Factory buildings, office buildings, stores and hotel buildings.
3. Factory and workshop equipment-including repair shops and handicraft establishments.
4. Transportation and communication facilities.
5. Furniture and personal belongings.
6. Animals and poultry for both private consumption and commercial use.
7. Bank accounts and safe deposits.
8. Land property.
9. Commercial stock and inventories.
10. Office supplies.

¹⁰⁸ Don Peretz, Israel & The Arabs, op. cit., p. 143.

B. Loss of share in public property

1. Government building
2. Roads, railroads, seaports, and airports.
3. Public service institutions e.g., public hospitals and schools.
4. Irrigation networks
5. Furniture, equipment, and supplies belonging to 1,2,3,4.
6. Forests, pasture land, and public domain.
7. Negev and other land areas claimed as the property of the Mandate Government.
8. Water and mineral resources.

C. Loss of income—as Arab emigrants left a going concern to seek means of livelihood somewhere else.

This is of special significance in relation to the professionals and skilled workers.

D. Loss to the Arab countries in general manifesting itself in:

1. Their direct assistance to the Palestinian Arab refugees.
2. The decrease of employment opportunities to their nationals due to the increase of supply in the labor market.
3. The disruption of economic links and the thus of economic interaction with Palestine.¹⁰⁹

Assessing the monetary value of the above five categories of losses is not an easy task. As such it is not possible within the range of the available and accessible data to show the value of total gain to the Israeli economy. But a breakdown of the estimated value of privately owned

¹⁰⁹Yusif Sayigh, The Israeli Economy (Beirut: Research Centre - Palestine Liberation Organization, 1966), pp.104-105.

abandoned Arab property would give an idea as to one aspect of this gain.

1. Value of Residential buildings	181,000,000 £
(Here Dr. Sayigh estimated the number of housing units to be 150,000 - i.e. a unit for every five emigrants. ¹¹⁰ 90,000 units located in rural areas @ 250.- Sterling - total value	22,500,000
and 60,000 units located in urban areas @ 2500 Sterling - total value	<u>150,000,000</u>
	<u>172,500,000</u>

To this should be added the value of churches and mosques estimated to number 1500 @ 3000

4,500,000

The value of certain facilities such as water wells in rural areas and garages in urban areas of an estimated value

4,000,000

Total in Sterling 181,000,000
=====

2. Value of factory buildings, office buildings, stores, and Hotel buildings.	59,800,000
(Factory buildings estimated to number 1500 units @ 5000.- Sterling =	7,500,000
Workshops 5000 units @ 1000.- =	5,000,000
Office buildings - mostly in cities= numbering 5000 @ 3000.- =	15,000,000
Store buildings of different sizes - an average of one store/150 individuals. An estimate of 2000 located in rural areas @ 400.- =	800,000
and 3000 located in urban areas @ 2500.- =	7,500,000
Hotel buildings estimated to number 1000 located in the cities @ 15,000.- =	15,000,000
Restaurants, cafes, clubs in cities & villages 2000 units @ 2,000.- =	4,000,000

¹¹⁰Number of refugees estimated as 750,000 by the end of 1948.

Buildings in groves 2000 @ 2500	<u>5,000,000</u>
Total	<u>59,800,000</u> =====
3. Value of factory and workshop equipment including repair shops and handicraft establishments	15,000,000 ¹¹¹
4. Value of transportation and communication facilities (private cars excluded—An estimate of 1000 cars, busses and trucks).	15,000,000 ¹¹²
5. Value of furniture and personal belongings (an estimate of 25.-/individual in rural areas and 200.-/individual in urban districts	12,500,000
	<u>50,000,000</u>
	<u>62,500,000</u> =====
6. Value of animals and poultry for both private consumption and commercial use.	10,000,000
7. Value of bank accounts and safe deposits	2,000,000

¹¹¹Calculated by the use of the accumulated capital/Net earnings coefficient - 4:1, as considered in National Income Accounts.

¹¹²Ibid.

8.	Value of land property	403,400,000
	(citrus groves 132,000.- dunums	
	of 136,800.- total Arab property	
	@ 600.-	79,200,000
	Other planted areas 384,000.-	
	dunums of 1,040,000 total	
	Arab property @ 300.-	= 115,200,000
	Irrigated land 41,000 dunums	
	of 51,500.- total Arab property	
	@ 100.-	= 4,100,000
	Cultivable land-cereals	
	4,400,000.- dunums of	
	6,600,000 total Arab property	
	@ 48	= 176,000,000
	Marginal land, 1,600,000	
	dunums of 4,800,000 total	
	Arab property @ 10	16,000,000
	Land for construction purposes-	
	20,000 dunums in rural areas	
	of 36,000 dunums total Arab	
	property @ 60	1,200,000
	29,250 dunums of 60,800 dunums	
	of total Arab property @	
	400	= <u>11,700,000</u>
		<u>403,400,000</u>
		=====

9.	Value of commercial stock and inventories	5,000,000
10.	Value of office supplies	<u>3,000,000</u>
	General total	756,700,000 ¹¹³
To this total should be added:		
1.	Estimated total of increase in prices between 1948-1964	319,900,000 ¹¹⁴
2.	Estimated total of net capital investment between 1948-1964	156,750,000 ¹¹⁵
3.	Estimated total of accumulated income between 1948-1964	<u>1,089,450,000</u> ¹¹⁶
		<u>2,322,800,000</u> ±

The significance of the above evaluation lies in the fact that it reflects a picture of the accumulative nature

¹¹³Yusif Sayigh, The Israeli Economy, op. cit., pp. 107-110.

¹¹⁴Dr. Sayigh estimates price increase to be 2%/year.

¹¹⁵Share of Arab emigrants from Arab National Income by 1948 estimated by Dr. Sayigh as 2/3 of total- i.e. 46 million - Annual rate of capital investment estimated to be 16% of national income. However the above figures allows 10% for depreciation.

¹¹⁶Accumulated income calculated on the basis of 4% of national income - The use of compound interest method.

of the Arab loss which is a reflection of the accumulative nature of the Israeli gain from Arab abandoned property.

(Special attention is due here to the significance of the Arab abandoned land property in the establishment of the Zionists. During a period of 45 years and when conditions were favourable for land purchase especially under the protection of the Mandate government, the Zionist institutions were enabled to purchase 985,362 dunums. If conditions remained the same they would have needed 300 years to purchase the area of 6,606,250 dunums which is the area of Arab abandoned land property excluding the Negev area and the Arab land share of public domain currently used by the state of Israel).

B. External financial resources. Once in possession of Arab abandoned property, Zionists' effort to conduct their enterprise received a different impetus: it concentrated particularly on securing funds.

A relatively comprehensive picture of the varying financial resources which served the development of the state of Israel and its growth is also given, at best, in Dr. Yusif Sayigh's book, the Israeli Economy. The following table of financial resources drew upon Dr. Sayigh's prepared

Israeli balance of payments 1950-1964.¹¹⁷

<u>Source</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Amount in Dollars</u>
Technical Assistance	1952-1964	9,100,000
American Aid	1951-1964	294,200,000
German Reparation		
Payments to the State of Israel	1953-1964	764,300,000
German Payments for individual losses	1954-1964	847,000,000
Private money transfers	1950-1964	500,400,000
Transfers through national institutions ¹¹⁸	1950-1964	1,034,900,000
Transfers in kind	1952-1964	257,300,000
Long-term & Intermediate term loans	1950-1964	1,226,400,000
Sale of Israeli bonds	1951-1964	449,900,000
Export-Import bank loans	1950-1958	127,900,000
U.S. Government loans	1955-1962	251,700,000
Other Governments' commitments	1951-1958	67,100,000
Private capital investment	1952-1962	316,800,000
Other loans	1961-1962	73,200,000
Short-term capital movement	1950-1962	482,400,000
Unclassified capital movement	1963-1964	<u>257,900,000</u>
	Total	<u>6,960,500,000</u> =====

At this point a general view of the approximate credit balances in the capital account of the Zionist enterprise reflects the following:

A. Value of Arab abandoned property (an aspect of it namely privately owned property 2,322,800,000.- Sterling converted into dollars at the rate of \$2.8/Sterling	\$6,503,840,000
B. External Funds	<u>6,960,500,000</u>
	<u>\$13,464,340,000</u> =====

¹¹⁷See Appendix for a detailed copy of this balance of payment.

¹¹⁸For example transfers through the Jewish Agency.

A population range of 1,370,100 (1950) to 2,531,700 (1964)¹¹⁹ enjoyed the utilization of the above total credit (\$13,464,340,000.-). This certainly allows provision for a relatively high standard of living. The important thing here is that the Israeli citizen enjoyed such a standard without being the earner of the total value received. This is the fiction-like accomplishment of the Zionist enterprise.

Compared with the total of the ordinary and extraordinary government budgets of the State of Israel (1948-1964)- i.e. with \$9,547,212,778.- (17,184,983,000.- L.P. converted to dollars at the 1958 official rate of 1.8 to the dollar) the above total credit of \$13,464,340,000.- would be, approximately 1.4 times as much as the total budgets. This indicates that, ever since the Declaration of Independence, the Government of Israel has been operating against a high level of financial safety. Accordingly, optimism in regard to receiving immigrants and absorbing the immigrants has already been established. In other words, the first two decades in the history of statehood indicate that the achievement of the Zionist aim - the Ingathering of the Exiles - is practicable. The problem that may arise is that of securing

¹¹⁹The Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel 1965, op. cit., p. 20.

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¹¹⁹The Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel 1965, op. cit., p. 20.

enough land. The Zionist army has been intensively prepared for the purpose of taking care of this matter whenever the opportunity arises - i.e., for capturing more land through military conquest. Thus the two basic factors that keep the Zionist enterprise solvent are: External sources of capital and military power, and their mutual interdependence.

Nevertheless, sources of credit to promote the growth of the Zionist enterprise may not be indefinitely guaranteed for the future. "German reparation payments," for example, have already expired. Availability of loans depends on the interest and goodwill of the creditors. Contributions from world Jewry depend, at least in part, on the policies of the native countries; but the basic form of credit (namely, captured property) depends on the power of the Israeli military forces. Faced with these realities, the Israelis seek to expand and reinforce their military establishment. As an evidence of this, the following tables show that the army consumes a higher percentage (viz., 10.7%) of the Gross National Product in Israel than in any other country in the world:

<u>Nato Countries</u>	<u>Army Concuption as a % of G.N.P.</u>
Belgium	3.2
Canada	3.7
Denmark	2.9
France	5.1

<u>Nato Countries</u>	<u>Army Consumption as a % of G.N.P.</u>	
Germany	5.	
Greece	3.9	
Italy	3.3	
Luxemburg	1.3	
Netherlands	4.4	
Norway	3.6	
Portugal	6.2	
Turkey	3.5	
United Kingdom	6.7	
U.S.A.	8.9	
 <u>Warsaw Pact</u>		
Bulgaria	2.4	
Czechoslovakia	3.9	
East Germany	2.5	
Hungary	2.8	
Poland	3.5	
Rumania	2.7	
U.S.S.R.	5.7	
 <u>SEATO</u>		
Australia	3.4	
New Zealand	2.	
Pakistan	3.2	
Philippines	1.8	
Thailand	2.5	
 <u>Other Countries</u>		
India	4.7	
Indonesia	3.9	
Iran	4.1	
<u>Israel</u>	<u>10.7</u>	
Japan	1.1	
South Korea	5.8	
Spain	3.3	
Swedan	5.2	
Switzerland	2.5	
U.A.R.	8.6	
Yugoslavia	6.	120

¹²⁰The Military Balance 1965-66 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1965), p. 43.

Thus the apparent financial security of the State of Israel, due to the availability of the different sources of credit prepared the way for the development of the Israeli army. But this result may be related to an over-all optimistic spirit as to the realization of the Zionist aim in its totality, or to a state of fear - fear of the contingent nature of the financial resources for the fulfillment of the Zionist mission. However, both factors prevail simultaneously in the process of the Zionist enterprise. As such the Israeli army is being prepared to promote the process of Zionist colonization at times when financial resources encourage expansion and when the shortage of these resources makes expansion inevitable. This tight situation leaves no room for normal economic growth and development. If the flow of funds is assured - i.e. Zionist spirit of optimism is nourished with the availability of financial resources, the optimistic policy of Ingathering the Exiles tightens conditions for wholesome economic growth. As a result of this, resort is made to the army - to militaristic measures. Also the likelihood of decrease in financial resources automatically allows the army a stronger grip of control. This being the case - the development of Israel as an economic enterprise is no less than its development as a military venture.

EPILOGUE

Israel is a movement in the course of development, not a static state.

The interaction of political, military and economic factors within this movement portray its nature, describing its inception, its present stage of growth, and the probable courses it may follow in the future.

The Israeli State represents a period of mobilization-mobilization of material resources and manpower for the complete Ingathering of the Exiles.

As a national revolution, however, Zionism allies itself with a world revolution, i.e. a world mission. Thus the complete task of Zionism is more than the complete Ingathering of the Exiles: it is the complete realization of a special type of human civilization, a process of Zionist domination.

How the interaction of the political, military and economic factors can best serve that Zionist end is the immediate concern of Israel. In other words, the extent to which this interaction can maintain what has already been achieved and promote future expansion and growth, is the chief Zionist preoccupation.

Nevertheless the guiding theme is that of "Chosenness"-- i.e., the awakening and the rebirth of the "Chosen People."

The uniqueness of this national rebirth is its essence: its efforts for colonization, its endeavour for the "reestablishment" of the "promised land" and the re-establishment of a human civilization by Jewish labor.

"The Holy One, blessed be He, measured all countries, and He could not find any country worthy to be given to Israel except the Land of Israel," says Rabbi J.L. Maimon quoting the ancient Legend Vayikra Rabba, XIII. Thus a "Chosen People" with a "Chosen Land" find themselves justifiably with a right and a duty to promote their assumed destined chosenness, their assumed human mission.

But the reborn Jew-- the Zionist -- is the fighter. National reconstruction, national rebirth, is then a process of strife.

Menachem Begin says: "The fighting Jew, that Jew, whom the world considered dead and buried never to rise again, has arisen."

APPENDIX

DECLARATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL

"Eretz-Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here they first attained to statehood, created cultural values of national and universal significance and gave to the world the eternal Book of Books.

After being forcibly exiled from their land, the people kept faith with it throughout their Dispersion and never ceased to pray and hope for their return to it and for the restoration in it of their political freedom.

Impelled by this historic and traditional attachment, Jews strove in every successive generation to re-establish themselves in their ancient homeland. In recent decades they returned in their masses. Pioneers, ma'pilim and defenders, they made deserts bloom, revived the Hebrew language, built villages and towns, and created a thriving community, controlling its own economy and culture, loving peace but knowing how to defend itself, bringing the blessings of progress to all the country's inhabitants, and aspiring towards independent nationhood.

In the year 5657 (1897), at the summons of the spiritual father of the Jewish State, Theodor Herzl, the

First Zionist Congress convened and proclaimed the right of the Jewish people to national rebirth in its own country.

This right was recognized in the Balfour Declaration of the 2nd November, 1917, and re-affirmed in the Mandate of the League of Nations which, in particular, gave international sanction to the historic connection between the Jewish people and Eretz-Israel and to the right of the Jewish people to rebuild its National Home.

The catastrophe which recently befell the Jewish-people—the massacre of millions of Jews in Europe—was another clear demonstration of the urgency of solving the problem of its homelessness by re-establishing in Eretz-Israel the Jewish State, which would open the gates of the homeland wide to every Jew and confer upon the Jewish people the status of a fully-privileged member of the comity of nations.

Survivors of the Nazi holocaust in Europe, as well as Jews from other parts of the world, continued to migrate to Eretz-Israel, undaunted by difficulties, restrictions and dangers, and never ceased to assert their right to a life of dignity, freedom and honest toil in their national homeland.

In the Second World War, the Jewish community of

this country contributed its full share to the struggle of the freedom- and peace- loving nations against the forces of Nazi wickedness and, by the blood of its soldiers and its war effort, gained the right to be reckoned among the people who founded the United Nations.

On the 29th November, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz-Israel; the General Assembly required the inhabitants of Eretz-Israel to take such steps as were necessary on their part for the implementation of that resolution. This recognition by the United Nations of the right of the Jewish people to establish their State is irrevocable.

This right is the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign State.

Accordingly We, Members of the People's Council, Representatives of the Jewish Community of Eretz-Israel and of the Zionist Movement, Are Here Assembled on the Day of the Termination of the British Mandate Over Eretz-Israel and, by Virtue of Our Natural and Historic Right and on the Strength of the Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, Hereby Declare the Establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz-Israel, to Be Known as the State of Israel.

We Declare that, with effect from the moment of the termination of the Mandate, being tonight, the eve of

Sabbath, the 6th Iyar 5708 (15th May, 1948), until the establishment of the elected, regular authorities of the State in accordance with the Constitution which shall be adopted by the Elected Constituent Assembly not later than the 1st October, 1948, the People's Council shall act as a Provisional Council of State, and its executive organ, the People's Administration, shall be the Provisional Government of the Jewish State, to be called "Israel."

The State of Israel will be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles; it will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The State of Israel is prepared to cooperate with the agencies and representatives of the United Nations in implementing the resolution of the General Assembly of the 29th November, 1947, and will take steps to bring about the

economic union of the whole of Eretz-Israel.

We Appeal to the United Nations to assist the Jewish people in the building-up of its State and to receive the State of Israel into the comity of nations.

We Appeal-in the very midst of the onslaught launched against us now for months- to the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve peace and participate in the upbuilding of the State on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its provisional and permanent institutions.

We Extend our hand to all neighbouring states and their peoples in an offer of peace and good neighbourliness, and appeal to them to establish bonds of cooperation and mutual help with the sovereign Jewish people settled in its own land. The State of Israel is prepared to do its share in common effort for the advancement of the entire Middle East.

We Appeal to the Jewish people throughout the Diaspora to rally round the Jews of Eretz-Israel in the tasks of immigration and upbuilding and to stand by them in the great struggle for the realization of the age-old dream-the redemption of Israel.

Placing Our Trust in the Almighty, We Affix Our Signatures to This Proclamation at This Session of the Provisional Council of State, on the Soil of the Homeland, in the City of Tel-Aviv, on This Sabbath Eve, the 5th Day of Iyar, 5708 (14th May, 1948)."

DAVID BEN-GURION

DANIEL AUSTER
 MORDEKHAI BENTOV
 YITZCHAK BEN-ZVI
 ELIYAHU BERLIGNE
 FRITZ BERNSTEIN
 RABBI WOLF GOLD
 MEIR GRABOVSKY
 YITZCHAK GRUENBAUM
 DR. ABRAHAM
 GRANOVSKY
 ELIYAHU DOBKIN
 MEIR WILNER-KOVNER
 ZERACH WAHRHAFTIG
 HERZL VARDI
 RACHEL COHEN
 RABBI KALMAN KAHANA
 SAADIA KOBASHI
 RABBI YITZCHAK
 MEIR LEVIN

MEIR DAVID LOEWENSTEIN
 ZVI LURIA
 GOLDA MYERSON
 NACHUM NIR
 ZVI SEGAL
 RABBI YEHUDA LEIB
 HACHOEN FISHMAN
 DAVID ZVI PINKAS
 AHARON ZISLING
 MOSHE KOLODNY
 ELIEZER KAPLAN
 ABRAHAM KATZNELSON
 FELIX ROSENBLUETH
 DAVID REMEZ
 BERL REPETUR
 MORDEKHAI SHATTNER
 BEN-ZION STERNBERG
 BEKHOR SHITREET
 MOSHE SHAPIRA
 MOSHE SHERTOK

LAW OF RETURN,
5710-1950

1. "Every Jew has the right to come to this country as an oleh.

2. (a) Aliyah shall be by oleh's visa.

(b) An oleh's visa shall be granted to every Jew who has expressed his desire to settle in Israel, unless the Minister of Immigration is satisfied that the applicant-

(1) is engaged in an activity directed against the Jewish people; or

(2) is likely to endanger public health or the security of the State.

3. (a) A Jew who has come to Israel and subsequent to his arrival has expressed his desire to settle in Israel, while still in Israel, receive an oleh's certificate.

(b) The restrictions specified in section 2(b) shall apply also to the grant of an oleh's certificate, but a person shall not be regarded as endangering public health on account of an illness contracted after his arrival in Israel.

4. Every Jew who has immigrated into this country before the coming into force of this Law, and every Jew who was born in this country, whether before or after the coming

into force of this Law, shall be deemed to be a person who has come to this country as an oleh under this Law.

5. The Minister of Immigration is charged with the implementation of this Law and may make regulations as to any matter relating to such implementation and also as to the grant of oleh's visas and oleh's certificates to minors up to the age of 18 years."

SUPPLEMENTARY SCHEDULE NO. 7

ISRAELI BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 1950 - 1964
(In Million Dollars)

	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964
A. IMPORT BALANCE															
1. Import of Goods and Services	327,6	426,1	393,3	365,2	373,2	426,6	534,5	557,2	572,1	603,6	693,6	822,5	957,8	981,2	1141,8
2. Export of Goods and Services	45,8	66,6	86,4	102,3	135,2	143,9	177,9	222,0	238,7	287,4	352,2	420,9	503,2	576,8	613,8
3. Import Balance	281,8	359,5	306,8	262,9	238,0	282,7	356,6	335,2	333,4	316,2	341,4	401,6	454,6	404,4	528,0
B. FINANCING THE IMPORT BALANCE															
1. Receipts from Grants	89,6	136,8	191,1	172,8	260,6	210,4	240,5	245,4	251,0	251,0	299,5	346,3	330,7	346,6	334,9
- Technical Assistance (1)	2,3	2,6	1,8	0,4	0,4	0,4	0,3	0,3	0,2	0,1	-	0,1	0,2
- American Aid	-	14,0	84,0	44,7	37,2	20,5	6,8	24,1	11,2	9,5	9,7	10,4	8,0	5,9	8,2
- German Reparation Payments	-	-	-	40,9	82,3	87,5	79,2	77,9	69,7	66,4	79,7	88,3	47,0	28,5	16,9
- German Payment for Personal Losses	-	-	-	-	6,1	18,8	25,7	45,0	65,4	70,7	97,8	110,5	133,9	138,9	134,2
- Private Money Transfers	19,6(2)	38,8(2)	6,9	8,1	14,8	24,3	25,5	21,2	25,3	21,8	28,3	36,6	57,8	82,2	89,2
- Transfers Through National Institutions	70,0(2)	84,0(3)	46,2	47,3	87,2	43,1	87,6	55,7	60,8	65,5	69,8	86,4	71,8	82,7	76,8
- Transfers in Kind	(4)	(4)	51,7(5)	29,2(5)	31,2(5)	15,8	15,3	21,1	18,3	16,8	14,0	14,0	12,2	18,3	9,4
2. Net Receipts from Capital Movement	106,4	115,6	116,4	75,3	1,0	76,4	100,4	78,6	68,6	54,7	45,8	63,4	98,4	72,7(6)	185,2(7)
- Long and Intermediate Term Loans	44,4	87,6	114,9	69,6	71,2	76,3	78,4	69,4	93,6	81,2	101,4	135,3	203,1		
- Sale of Israeli Bonds	-	50,4	46,3	36,1	29,2	32,2	47,4	44,7	33,7	35,3	29,1	32,1	33,4		
- Export-Import Bank loans	(44,4)	(27,7)	(27,5)	(4,4)	(1,8)	(2,1-	(2,1-	(11,4-	(6,5-						
- U.S. Government Loans (Decree law # 480)	(-	(-	(-	(-	(-	(25,4	(32,6	(20,4	(43,9	(32,9	31,3	29,8	35,4		
- Other Governments' Credits	(..	(9,5	(11,2	(7,2	(21,2	(8,7	(5,8-	(1,3	(2,2-	(
- Private Capital Investment	29,9	21,9	19,0	12,1	6,3	14,4	24,7	13,0	41,0	52,2	82,3		
- Other Loans	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21,2	52,0		
- Short Term Capital Movement	62,0	28,0	1,5	5,7	70,2-	0,1	22,0	9,2	25,0-	26,5-	55,6-	71,9-	104,7-		
3. Errors and Omissions	85,8	107,1	0,7-	14,8	23,6-	4,1-	15,7	11,2	13,8	10,5	3,9-	8,1-	25,5	14,9-	7,9
4. Total Credit Financing the Import Balance- (1+2+3)	281,8	359,5	306,8	262,9	238,0	282,7	356,6	335,2	333,4	316,2	341,4	401,6	454,6	404,4	528,0
C. FOREIGN EXCHANGE (6)	0,357	0,357	0,856	1,206	1,543	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	(1,800	3,000	3,000
													(3,000		

NOTE:

1. For the years 1952-1954 technical assistance offered by the United States and that offered by the United Nations appeared under the title "Technical Assistance," However for the following years it appeared under the separate titles: "American Aid" and "Technical Assistance"-
2. The figure includes private donations and transfers in kind.
3. The figure includes donations from institutions and transfers in kind.
4. This figure is included in "private money transfers" and "transfers through national institutions."
5. Includes emigrant remittances.
6. For the years 1950, 1951, 1955-1964 on the basis of the official price. For the years 1952-1954 on the basis of the estimated mean of the different official prices with due adjustments and for the year 1962 on the basis of the maximum current official price up to 9/2/62- Thereafter on the basis of minimum current official price.

.../...

7. Classification of capital movement for the two years 1963, 1964 was not uniform. As such it was difficult to put the details which facilitate comparison. The sum totals instead were put under number 1, 2, 3 as classified under B.

General observation, the sign (..) means that the figure is not available, and the sign (-) means that the figure is Zero or is too negligible for indication.

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