

T
863

A STUDY OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF LEBANON

TOWARDS

THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND IRAQ

1958 - 1961

H. M. ABD-EL-BAKI

A STUDY OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF LEBANON
TOWARDS
THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND IRAQ
FROM
FEBRUARY 1958 TO SEPTEMBER 1961

HUDA MUHAMMAD ABD-EL-BAKI

Submitted in partial fulfillment for the requirements
of the degree of Master of Arts
in the Department of Political Studies and Public Administration
of the
American University of Beirut
Beirut , Lebanon
May , 1967

FOREWORD

With divergent political tendencies tearing at the Lebanese entity from within, Lebanese policy-makers have been pre-eminently faced --since the independence of Lebanon in 1943-- with the problem of preserving its independence and the unity of its people. This makes Lebanese foreign policy peculiar in the sense that its scope, under the strain of divergent internal political orientations, has been limited to the preservation of national unity.

Since 1943, Lebanon's foreign policy was planned according to the unwritten National Covenant of 1943, the only formula accepted by all factions of the population, and therefore the only guarantee of national unity. A deviation from such a course exposes the country to the danger of internal strife which would threaten the independence of Lebanon and the unity of its territory.

The special importance of Lebanese foreign policy towards Cairo and Baghdad does not lie in its being different from Lebanese policy towards the other Arab states, but rather in the fact that Cairo and Baghdad have been the two poles of the general Arab situation, in respect of which the Arab world has constantly tried to balance itself ever since Lebanese independence, and even before. This polarization was to remain all-important until the revolution of 14 July 1958 in Iraq. Since then, Baghdad has lost much of its importance, while the United Arab Republic has preserved its position.

In this study (which will be confined within the Arab context) the role of Cairo is that of a prime mover in Arab politics, with Baghdad's Arab politics gaining weight and importance in reference to changes and developments in Cairo and in reference to their subsequent impact on Lebanese foreign policy.

The concentration on the "Cairo-Baghdad dialogue" is justified not only by the impact of this dialogue upon Lebanese policy towards both, but also by its impact upon Lebanese foreign policy in its entirety. For, without it,

one cannot understand the essence of Lebanese foreign policy, namely, neutrality towards the Arab states in their conflicts with one another, without which, in turn, Lebanese internal unity would be jeopardized.

Lebanon's foreign policy towards Cairo and Baghdad will be studied through the analysis of the direct relationships between the Lebanese government and both the Cairo and Baghdad governments with occasional reference to the activities of the three governments in the League of Arab States. Their relationships on United Nations level will not be explored except when dealing with the 1958 crisis in Lebanon, this case presenting a situation of direct Lebanese-United Arab Republic confrontation brought before the United Nations Security Council for solution.

* * *

A number of political figures were interviewed in connection with the preparation of this work. Some were of great help but preferred to remain anonymous.

Very enlightening interviews were granted by:

- 1) Mr. Abdel Rahman Adra, Lebanon's Ambassador to Iran during the Chamoun and Chehab periods,
- 2) Mr. Joseph Abu Khater, Lebanon's Ambassador to Cairo during the Chehab period,

- 3) Dr. Karim Azqul, Lebanon's Permanent Representative at the United Nations during the Chamoun and Chehab periods,
- 4) Mr. Adel Osseyran, Speaker of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, August 1953 - August 1959,
- 5) Mr. Saeb Salaam (1958 Opposition leader) Prime minister, August 1960 - October 1961,
- 6) Mr. Kazem Solh, Lebanon's Ambassador to Baghdad during the Chamoun and early Chehab periods,
- 7) Dr. Farid Zaineddin (Syrian nationality), United Arab Republic deputy Foreign minister during the unity years.

Mr. Rashīd Karāmē, presently Prime minister, Mr. Philippe Takla, presently Governor of the Bank of Lebanon, and Dr. Hashem Jawād, Iraqi Foreign minister in the Qassem government did not accord the author an audience.

It was not possible to get to ex-President Fuad Chehab, but an interview was granted by a high personality of his entourage who chose to remain anonymous.

Difficulties prevented the author from meeting ex-President Camille Chamoun, former Prime minister Sami

Solh, and Mr. Kamal Junblāt, leader of the Progressive Socialist Party and 1958 Opposition leader. However, the political works written by these three were more than satisfactorily enlightening as to their outlook and evaluation of Lebanon's foreign policy before and during 1958.

In an interview on 16 November 1966, Dr. Charles Malek referred the author, in lieu of verbal information concerning his planning of foreign policy, to his public speeches and statements before and during 1958.

The Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates provided the author with some important unpublished documents.

Finally, it is to be noted that the translations from Arabic and French sources are wholly the author's.

Beirut, May 1967

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

My grateful acknowledgement goes to my advisor, Dr. Fayez Sayegh, whose patient guidance was invaluable in accomplishing this study.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | Page |
|--------------------------|------|
| FOREWORD. | iii |
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. | viii |

Chapter

| | | |
|-----|---|----|
| I. | AN INTRODUCTION: LEBANON v. EGYPT AND IRAQ FROM 1943 TO 1958. | 1 |
| | The Khoury Period: The Fundamentals of the Lebanese Foreign Policy | |
| | The Chamoun Period: Reorientation of the Lebanese Arab Foreign Policy | |
| II. | LEBANESE FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND IRAQ - 1958. | 31 |
| | Lebanese Foreign Policy and Developments in Arab Unity: The Creation of the United Arab Republic and the Arab Federation | |
| | The Chamoun Foreign Policy towards the United Arab Republic and Internal Struggle | |
| | Internal Struggle in Lebanon between the Government and the Opposition | |

| | | |
|--------------|---|-----|
| II (Contn'd) | The Lebanese Government's Accusation of the United Arab Republic | |
| | Deportation of United Arab Republic nationals | |
| | Lebanese complaints against the United Arab Republic to the League of Arab States and the United Nations Security Council | |
| | Efforts at mediation | |
| | The creation of UNOGiL | |
| | The disappointment of the Lebanese government | |
| | | |
| | The Lebanese Government's Request of United States Military Aid | |
| | Local reactions to United States intervention | |
| | The attitude of the United Arab Republic | |
| | The attitude of the Soviet Union | |
| | The Security Council meetings | |
| | Robert Murphy's mission in Lebanon | |
| | The General Assembly emergency special session | |
| | | |
| | The New Political Regime in Lebanon and the Rehabilitation of the United Arab Republic - Lebanese Foreign Relations | |
| | | |
| III. | GENERAL VIEW OF LEBANESE FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS | |
| | THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND IRAQ (September | |
| | 1958 - September 1961). | 124 |
| | The Impact of Iraqi Developments on Lebanese Foreign Policy towards the United Arab Republic | |
| | The Internal Undercurrents of Lebanese Foreign Policy towards the United Arab Republic | |

| | | |
|--------------|---|-----|
| III(Contn'd) | The Two Guidelines of Lebanese Foreign Policy towards the United Arab Republic: The National Covenant and the Chehab-Abdel Nasser joint communiqué Lebanese Foreign Policy towards Iraq | |
| IV. | LEBANESE FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND IRAQ IN APPLICATION (September 1958 - September 1961). . . | 155 |
| | The Economic Relations between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic A Promising Start-1959 The Impact on Lebanon of the 1961 July Laws in the United Arab Republic Lebanon and the United Arab Republic-Iraqi Clash, March-April 1959 The Mosul Uprising The Meeting in Beirut of the Political Committee of the League of Arab States Lebanon and the Growing Concept of the Palestinian Entity The Road to the Shtaura Meeting: Sofar-Casablanca-Cairo The Political Committee Meeting in Shtaura - August 1960 Lebanese Participation in the Conference of Non-Aligned States, September 1961 | |
| V. | LEBANESE FOREIGN POLICY AND THE BREAKUP OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC. | 208 |
| | EPILOGUE. | 215 |
| | APPENDIX. | 222 |
| | BIBLIOGRAPHY. | 227 |

CHAPTER I

AN INTRODUCTION: LEBANON v. EGYPT AND IRAQ

FROM 1943 TO 1958

The Khoury Period

None of the "nations" of the Middle East. . . is a viable political or military entity. Far from being the creatures of their own organic growth or of a sudden urge of inner strength, they are but the artifacts of the aspirations and rivalries of foreign powers. Where in any of these "nations" are the prerequisites of nationhood? What are the historic antecedents which would entitle the present territories of Lebanon or Jordan to house a nation. . . . They cannot exist without an outside power supporting them. . . . Has the United States chosen to succeed France in Lebanon and to support the resumption of Britain's traditional role in Jordan? . . . Then the United States is up against a force before which European colonialism had to retreat. . . . That force is Arab Nationalism, and for it, the artificial boundaries of Arab "nations" are meaningless.¹

This quotation from Professor Morgenthau illuminates the sequence of events in the Arab World, and Lebanese foreign policy towards Egypt -- which later formed with Syria the United Arab Republic -- and Iraq in the late fifties and the early sixties.

Lebanon gained full independence during World War II on 22 November 1943. In 1926, a Lebanese constitution had been promulgated and Lebanon was proclaimed a Republic.

¹Hans Morgenthau, The Impasse of American Foreign Policy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 290 - 291.

However, Lebanon remained under French mandate.

In 1936, Moslem notables in Lebanon met at a conference, known as the Coastal Conference, and expressed their rejection of the Lebanese Republic in its present boundaries; for apart from Mt. Lebanon proper, the territory had been before 1920 Syrian territory.² By 1942, a great change had occurred within the Moslem part of the Lebanese population. At a meeting at the United States consulate in Beirut in 1942, Moslem notables made it clear they would no more hear of the fragmentation of Lebanon.³

French defeat in the war encouraged Lebanese local leaders and Government officials to strive for full independence. A large number of the Maronite part of the population asked for independence, free from all treaties with the mandatory state.⁴ Neighbouring Syria also had, since 1936, encouraged Lebanese independence.⁵

On 9 November 1943, the Lebanese political leadership unilaterally proclaimed the independence of Lebanon. They

²Interview with Messrs. Kazem Solh & Abdel Rahman Adra.

³Interview with Mr. Abdel Rahman Adra.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Interview with Mr. Adra & Dr. Farid Zaineddin.

based the future Lebanese political life on a covenant expressing agreement between and among the various confessions, to the effect that one group would reject French protection and embrace an Arab character, while the other group would give up the desire to secede and rejoin the Syrian State.⁶

Candidate for presidency, Bechara Khoury, met with Mr. Riad Solh on 19 September 1943, two days before the presidential elections, to agree that Khoury will choose Solh to head the new Cabinet, and to set most of the points to be proclaimed in the Government statement of policy. Then on 23 September, a few hours before taking the oath as President of the Lebanese Republic, Khoury expressly visited ex-president Emile Eddé to tell him emphatically that his trip to Cairo in June 1942, and his meetings there with Premiers Nahhas Pasha of Egypt, and Jamil Mardam of Syria, had had but one end: to obtain the support of Egypt and Syria for an independent Lebanon cooperating to the utmost with the Arab States.⁷

⁶Kazem Solh, "Majmūat min Kalimāt" (in Arabic) (unpublished pamphlet, 1961) p. 16. "A Collection of Essays."

⁷Bechara el-Khoury, Hakāik Lubnāniyah (in Arabic) (Harissa: Bassil Brothers Press, 1961), II, 17-18. Lebanese Truths .

The Government statement of policy of 25 September 1943 expressed the government's decision to make independence real, thus ending the Mandate. The same statement embodied also the meanings of what is known as the National Covenant.⁸ Of this covenant, there is no written text.⁹

The National Covenant is a pledge among all Lebanese of all classes and inclinations to secure full independence and sovereignty, and to secure a very close cooperation between Lebanon and all Arab states for the common interest of all and on the basis of equality.¹⁰

The statement of policy of 25 September 1943 affirmed that the geographic location of Lebanon, the language and culture of its people, its history and its economic situation led it to look at its relations with the Arab states as of utmost importance. The statement said:

Lebanon has an Arab face, and savours the good and fruitful from the civilization of the West. . . . Our brethren in Arab lands do not want for Lebanon but what its children want. We do not want it a path for imperialism, we and them, therefore, want it a homeland independant, sovereign and free.¹¹

⁸ Ibid., p. 21.

⁹ Ibrahim al-Ahdab, *al-'Alākāt al-Kharijiyyah* (in Arabic) (Beirut: Publications of the "Cénacle Libanais", 1962), p. 22. Foreign Relations.

¹⁰ Khoury, op. cit., II, 290.

¹¹ Jean Malha, *Majmu'at al-Bayānāt al-Wizariyah al-Lubnaniyah* (in Arabic) (Beirut: Khayat's, 1965), pp. 23 - 24. A Collection of the Lebanese Governments' Statements of Policy.

The National Covenant had internal expressions also. Most prominent were the decisions to keep the presidency of the Republic for the Maronites, as well as the High Command of the army, and the directorship of the General Security. The Sunna part of the Moslems were to hold the Premiership, and the Shi'a part the office of Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies.¹²

The two parts of the population, Christian and Mohammedan, were to be represented in the Chamber at a ratio of 6 to 5.

When France, shortly after, accepted Lebanon's independence, President Khoury and Prime minister Solh refused, on the basis of the National Covenant, to sign any treaty, whether bilateral or regional, with the mandatory state or any other foreign power.¹³ This refusal became one of the fundamentals of Lebanese foreign policy. A second, is the decision to have good relations with all Arab states. This logically meant that Lebanon had to maintain a neutral position in any conflict between them.¹⁴ The third fundamental became

¹²Al-Hayat (Beirut), August 7, 1960.

¹³Fuad Ammun, Lubnān fi Dunya al-'Arab (in Arabic) (Beirut: Publications of the "Cénacle Libanais," 1965), p. 16. Lebanon in the Arab World.

¹⁴Fahim Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1961), p. 34.

Neutrality.¹⁵

This foreign policy became a constitution for every subsequent government and a law to all Lebanese. Prime minister Sami Solh made that clear in the statement of policy of 22 August 1945.¹⁶ Only once during the Khoury period did a prominent personality cause a breach in the National Covenant. Bishop Mubarak, head of the Maronite Church in Lebanon, in 1947, sent a memorandum to the U.N. Special Commission on Palestine in which he demanded the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine, and a Christian national home in Lebanon, criticizing the Moslems bitterly.¹⁷ This behaviour was spiritedly attacked in the Chamber of Deputies by representatives of all groups; Christians, Moslems, and Druzes. The population was outraged.¹⁸

Since the dawn of independence, Lebanon had to face

¹⁵Desmond Stewart, Turmoil in Beirut (London: Allan Wingate, 1958), p. 63.

¹⁶Malha, op. cit., p. 49.

¹⁷Khoury, op. cit., III, 53.

President Khoury mentions that he was told that Camille Chamoun, later to become President of the Republic, had had knowledge of the memorandum and had approved of it. Khoury says he did not have the chance later to discuss this subject with Chamoun. Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 62.

a polarized Arab world, with Egypt at one end, and Iraq at the other. Lebanon's foreign policy towards the Arab world was channelled most often through the League of Arab States, founded in 1945, of which it was a charter member.¹⁹

Egypt recognized the independence of Lebanon before it was recognized by the mandatory state, and Lebanon was grateful and promised brotherly relations, friendship, and cooperation in the interest of the two countries.²⁰ In fact, in the Khoury period, Lebanese relations with Egypt were characterized by understanding and friendship in political, economic and military affairs.²¹ In two governmental statements of policy, dated 14 December 1946 and 7 June 1947, the declaration was made that Lebanon, government and people, fully supported Egypt in its struggle for fulfilling its national aspirations.²²

Towards Iraq -- in spite of the presence of sensitivity among great numbers in Lebanon regarding what is called the "Fertile Crescent" -- there was no special Lebanese policy.²³

¹⁹Al-Ahdab, op. cit., p. 23.

²⁰Malha, op. cit., p. 24.

²¹Interview with Mr. Saeb Salaam.

²²Malha, op. cit., pp. 62, 72.

²³Interview with Mr. Salaam.

The Hashemites, in both Iraq and Jordan, kept trying with the help of the British, to annex Syria and Lebanon, but were faced with an Egypt and a Saudi Arabia which opposed them with all their power in order to maintain the status quo.²⁴ Egypt, for dynastic as well as political reasons, held great opposition to the Greater Syria and the Fertile Crescent plans.²⁵

A deep-rooted but rather camouflaged conflict between Egypt and Iraq pervaded the period under study. The Lebanese planning of policy towards this conflict could be extracted from a conversation between President Khoury and Husni Zaim of Syria on 24 June 1949. President Khoury said: "As for our relations to the sister Arab states, in spite of our knowledge that some of them have designs on us, . . . , we [meaning Lebanon and Syria] have to keep the balance between them, and to act as mediators. . . . We have to strengthen the Arab League, and to oppose within it every project aiming at the fulfillment of Greater Syria or the Fertile Crescent; but we have to be considerate towards the rulers of both Iraq and Transjordan, for it is unwise to challenge them. Our primary duty is to defend ourselves without provoking anyone."²⁶

²⁴Camille Chehab, Le Liban face à l'Ouragan (Beirut, typewritten, [1962]), p. 19.

²⁵See Fadel al-Jamali, Thikrayāt wa 'Ibar (in Arabic) (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Jadid, 1964), p.14 . Souvenirs and Maxims.

²⁶Khoury, op. cit., III, 233.

In fulfillment of the mediatory policy Lebanon had drawn for itself, Riad Solh, then Prime minister, had travelled in early May 1949 to Egypt and Iraq. His trip resulted in an agreement of the Premiers of both governments to hold a meeting in Solh's presence.²⁷ There, the results ended however: for, Syria having undergone a coup d'état in March 1949, Iraq could not refrain from planning for Iraqi-Syrian unity. Lebanon imparted to Egypt its opinion of Iraqi plans and both sides were in full agreement.²⁸

On 25 May 1950, the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France announced their tri-partite declaration concerning Palestine. The Tripartite Declaration came at a time when the Arab states were studying the draft of an Arab treaty of mutual defense and economic cooperation. This treaty was signed on 17 June 1950.²⁹

On 8 October 1951, the Egyptian Premier, Nahhas Pasha, deposited in Parliament four draft decree-laws of which the draft decree-law abrogating the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty, its annexes, and the Condominium agreements of 1899 regarding

²⁷Ibid., p. 221.

²⁸Ibid., p. 263.

²⁹Halim Abu Izzedin, *Siāssat Lubnān al-Khārijīyah* (in Arabic) (Beirut: Dār al-'Ilm lil-Malayeen, 1966), p. 21. Lebanon's Foreign Policy.

the administration of the Sudan, and a draft decree-law providing for the King of Egypt to be titled "King of Egypt and the Sudan". On 16 October 1951, the Egyptian government announced the unilateral abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty and of the treaties relating to the Sudan.³⁰

On 13 October 1951, the four Powers: the United States, Great Britain, France, and Turkey, presented to the Egyptian government two documents containing proposals for the creation of an Allied Middle East Command. The four Powers pointed out that the defense of "Egypt" and "The Middle East", "vital to democratic nations", could only be secured by cooperation between all the Powers interested, and that the United States, Great Britain, France, and Turkey were prepared to participate with others in the establishment of a Middle East Command. They invited Egypt to become a founder member of this command on a basis of equality and partnership. "Great Britain would then agree to the supersession of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and to the withdrawal from Egypt of all British troops not placed under the new command".³¹ The Middle East Command was not to affect the tri-partite declaration of May 1950.³²

³⁰ Egypt, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Records, 1950-51 (Cairo: Société Orientale de Publicité, 1951), pp. 171, 173, 185.

³¹ "Defense Pacts", Survey of International Affairs, 1951, ed. Peter Calvocoressi (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 258.

³² Ibid., p. 260.

On 16 October, Egypt informed the Arab governments of its rejection of this defense project. On 25 October 1951, the Egyptian Ambassador in Washington declared that the four Powers' proposals constituted "an attempt to perpetuate the British occupation of Egypt and to associate other Powers with it."³³

In Iraq, Transjordan's Premier, Toufic Abu'l Huda, said Nuri as-Said was willing to accept the Middle East Command, but was afraid to express his opinion lest the Iraqi population revolt against him.³⁴

In early October 1951, Lebanon had been officially notified of the Middle East Command by the four sponsoring Powers, and of the wish of their governments that Egypt be a founder member in the organization.³⁵ President Khoury and the Lebanese government called the Lebanese politicians and statesmen to a meeting for the end of choosing a policy concerning the newly proposed command. The decision was reached unanimously. Lebanon refused the project and stood by Egypt.³⁶ Also, the Lebanese government officially addressed

³³Ibid., p. 259.

³⁴Khoury, op. cit., III, 430.

³⁵Ibid., p. 419.

³⁶Interview with Mr. Saeb Salaam.

King Farouk as "King of Egypt and the Sudan." Being the first government to use this title, it won great esteem in Egypt.³⁷

Under great internal pressure, President Khoury resigned from office in September of 1952. Mr. Camille Chamoun was elected President.

During the Khoury period, the diverging interests of the Arab states deeply influenced the modern history of the Arab world. The conflicts between Egypt and Iraq, and Egypt and Great Britain gravely worried the Lebanese government; they also influenced Lebanese internal politics. However, since Lebanon and the other Arab states were all oriented in their foreign policies and political dogmas towards the West, i.e. France, Great Britain, and the United States, and since the Eastern camp had not yet imposed a friendly presence in the Arab world, the diverging Arab interests caused local conflicts and harmed the Arabs themselves, but caused no international perturbations.

³⁷Khoury, op. cit., III, 434.

The Chamoun Period

President Camille Chamoun was strongly supported in the early stage of his presidency by the Moslem part of the population on the basis of the belief that he was a Christian Maronite inclined to Arabism. For the same reason, the Christians were wary of him, fearing that he would lead Lebanon into greater intimacy than they desired with the other Arab states, and with the Islamic states. Gradually, his policies clarified, and they appeared to be expressly directed against the Arab states, particularly the "emancipated" ones. Although he was accused of being pro-British, he got closer to United States policy. President Chamoun believed that United States support would greatly strengthen his position and enable him to stay in office.³⁸

From the start, President Chamoun monopolized governmental power.³⁹ Behind the screen of the government, he was the state all in all.⁴⁰

In its statement of policy, the first government in the Chamoun period declared -- as did every subsequent government -- full cooperation with the sister Arab states within

³⁸ Interview with Mr. Saeb Salaam.

³⁹ Iskandar Riachi, Ruassā' Lubnān kama 'Ariftuhum (in Arabic) (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Tijarī lil-Tibā'a, 1961), p. 178. The Presidents of Lebanon as I Knew Them.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 179.

the framework of the Charter of the League and the Treaty of Mutual Defense and Economic Cooperation.⁴¹ To President Chamoun, "cooperation" and "solidarity" with the Arab states were an "ineluctable necessity."⁴² Towards Iraq, he had a personal sympathy, and, in his view, the national interests of both states created strong, friendly ties. He saw in Iraq the "economic extension" of Lebanon.⁴³ "The Iraqi rulers accepted with no enthusiasm the collaboration with Egypt and Syria. They went along with the idea of Arab solidarity in order that Iraqi public opinion might be satisfied. They would have preferred to live in a golden isolationism which had the advantage of the preservation of Iraqi resources for the state's exclusive interests."⁴⁴

Towards Egypt, which in 1952 had gone through a coup d'état, President Chamoun held a supporting hand in its conflict with Great Britain. This was during General Negib's

⁴¹Malha, op. cit., p. 126.

⁴²Camille Chamoun, Crise au Moyen Orient (France: Gallimard, 1963), p. 253.

⁴³Ibid., p. 256.

⁴⁴Ibid.

period.⁴⁵ Then appeared Gamal Abdel Nasser as leader of the new Egypt. To him, the Revolution meant more than changing the head of state; it brought an end to the ancien regime. The Revolution aimed at exterminating imperialism, the formation of a strong national army, and the establishment of a sound democratic way of life.⁴⁶ In 1954, he concluded an agreement with the British for the evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone.⁴⁷

On 13 January 1955, Iraq and Turkey announced their decision to sign a treaty of cooperation and mutual defense. They declared the treaty open to all countries of the Middle East.⁴⁸ This treaty developed into what came to be known as the Baghdad Pact. "The Baghdad Pact was the lineal

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 255.

⁴⁶Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews, 1961 (Cairo: Government Information Department n. d.), p. 131.

⁴⁷Charles Cremeans, The Arabs and the World (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 139.

⁴⁸Chamoun, op.cit., p. 264.

It should be pointed out that article five of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation between Iraq and Turkey signed in Baghdad on February 24, 1955 said: "This pact shall be open for accession to any member of the Arab League or any other state actively concerned with the security and peace in this region and which is fully recognized by both the High Contracting Parties." Text in Muhammad Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League, II (Beirut: Khayats, 1962), 370. This paragraph secured the non-admission of Israel into the Pact; for Iraq, as an Arab state, does not recognize Israel.

descendant of the proposed Middle East Defense Organization and the Middle East Command which had been rejected by the Egyptian government in 1951."⁴⁹ It was Iraq who officially initiated the Pact; Britain was the Western leader; the support was American. The pact linked Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan.⁵⁰ The British aimed at protecting the oil supplies, and enhancing British influence in the Middle East; the United States aimed at fighting International Communism.⁵¹ Iraq, Iran and Pakistan had joined in the hope of getting arms from the United States rather than for the sake of regional security. The United States refrained from membership in the Pact, and the signatory states were greatly disappointed, for the United States' presence would have given the Pact greater moral and material power.⁵²

Iraq's presence in the Baghdad Pact broke up the Arab League's solid resistance to area defense in association with the West.⁵³ Iraq also violated the Arab Treaty of Joint Defense.⁵⁴ When Britain became party to the Pact in mid-1955,

⁴⁹Cremeans, op.cit., p. 140.

⁵⁰W. W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena (New York: Harper and Bros., 1960), p. 324.

⁵¹John Campbell, Defense of the Middle East (New York: Harper and Bros., 1958), p. 58.

⁵²Ibid., p. 61.

⁵³Cremeans, op.cit., p. 141.

⁵⁴Fayez Sayegh, Arab Unity, Hope and Fulfillment (New York: The Devin-Adair Co., 1958), p. 171.

it clearly demonstrated the Pact as a Western-Mid-Eastern alliance.⁵⁵ The Baghdad Pact introduced thus the Cold War in the Middle East, and opened the door for the Soviet Union.⁵⁶

In Lebanon, great resistance was shown by the public to all foreign alliances.⁵⁷ Yet, in April 1955, President Chamoun and Prime minister Sami Solh visited Turkey.⁵⁸ According to the veteran Lebanese foreign minister and deputy Philippe Takla, symptoms of deviationism in Lebanese foreign policy can be traced back to that visit. For, then, Lebanon promised Turkey to enter the Pact, but it had later on to break that promise in deference to pressures from the public opinion in Lebanon and in the Arab states.⁵⁹ Abdel Nasser called the Arab governments, including the Iraqi government, to a meeting in Cairo. The meeting resulted in a negative attitude of the Arab states towards the Pact.⁶⁰ Iraq found itself isolated in the Arab world.⁶¹

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 177.

⁵⁶Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 294.

⁵⁷Kamal Junblāt, Hakīkat al-Thawra al-Lubnaniyah (in Arabic) (Beirut: Dār al-Nashr al-'Arabiyyah, 1959), p. 53. The Truth about the Lebanese Revolution.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 55.

⁵⁹Lebanon Mahader Jalsāt Majliss an-Nuwāb (in Arabic) Ninth Legislative' Session, First Irregular Session, Third Meeting, August 29, 1957, p. 58. Minutes of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies.

⁶⁰Ammun, op. cit., p. 29.

⁶¹Campbell, op. cit., p. 61.

It was expected that Lebanon, having rejected the Baghdad Pact, would restore its traditional position of neutrality vis-à-vis Cairo and Baghdad. But it was rather felt that, from then on, President Chamoun supported the Hashemites in Baghdad and Amman in their quarrels with Egypt.⁶²

Behind the scenes of international politics, said deputy Philippe Takla, the imperialism-minded forces in the West, under the pressures of oil interests and of international Zionism, worked on aggravating the differences and widening the abyss created by the Baghdad Pact among the Arab states; they worked on preventing at any price any agreement between Egypt and Syria on the one side, and the West on the other especially with the United States of America; and these groups succeeded.⁶³ On 28 February 1955, Israel attacked Egyptian military installations in the Gaza strip. The Israeli government, for the first time, officially admitted responsibility for the attack. The Israeli raid exposed the weakness of the Egyptian armed forces.⁶⁴ On 18 April 1955, President Abdel

⁶² Leila Meo, Lebanon: Improbable Nation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), p. 97.

⁶³ Lebanon, Mahader Jalsāt Majliss an-Nuwāb (in Arabic) op. cit., p. 58.

⁶⁴ Cremeans, op. cit., pp. 143-144.

Nasser attended the Bandung Conference, met Chinese Premier Chou En Lai and Indian Premier Nehru, and became a convinced partisan of a neutral policy which he dubbed with the name, "Positive Neutralism."⁶⁵ In September 1955, he concluded a deal for large quantities of arms from the Soviet orbit; by this "one bold stroke, he declared his independence of the West and proclaimed his leadership of the Arabs."⁶⁶ He tore down the armament cordon erected by the West around the Middle East.⁶⁷

Lebanon's attitude towards East-West relations resulted in disagreement with Egypt. Lebanon was maintaining its friendly relations with the West, and did not adopt a policy of neutralism.⁶⁸ Until then, however, Lebanon had still espoused a policy of neutrality in Arab affairs. Prime minister, Sami Solh, in the statement of policy of 9 July 1955, still wanted Lebanon to assume the role of mediator between Cairo and Baghdad.⁶⁹ An Egyptian-Lebanese joint communiqué was issued on 1 September 1955. It was announced at the end of five days talks in Cairo, and dealt with economic, social, cultural and political relations. The political section stressed greatly on cooperation in questions of

⁶⁵Chamoun, op. cit., p. 277.

⁶⁶Campbell, op. cit., p. 73.

⁶⁷Junblāt, op. cit., p. 59.

⁶⁸Ralph Crow, "Religious Sectarianism in the Lebanese Political System, Journal of Politics, XXIV (August, 1962), 507.

⁶⁹Malha, op. cit., p. 175.

defense and international politics.⁷⁰

By the early months of 1956, Nasser's propaganda was having deadly success in Iraq.⁷¹ But the Iraqi government was preparing a secret plan to isolate Egypt from the Eastern sector of the Arab world.⁷² The climax of this plan was to be the forcible annexation of Syria by Iraq.⁷³ Before the plot took its final shape, an agreement was reached with President Chamoun early in 1956. The Iraqi aimed at a military treaty with Lebanon, but the Lebanese policy-makers were reluctant and only agreed to have talks with Iraqi officers.⁷⁴ In October 1956, Iraq promised President Chamoun, "who had no secret funds to spend", to give him all possible financial aid.⁷⁵ The affinity between the two governments resulted from their pro-Western foreign policies, and their belief that they were facing a common danger. Abdel Nasser was the champion of Arab Nationalism which is all-inclu-

⁷⁰Al-Hayāt (Beirut) September 2, 1955

⁷¹Michael Ionides, Divide and Lose (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1960), p. 133.

⁷²Junblāt, op. cit., p. 64.

⁷³Iraq, Ministry of Defense, The Special High Military Tribunal, Mahkamat As-Shaab. (in Arabic)(Iraq: The Government Press, 1959), I, First Case, Forty-fourth Session, November 10, 1958, 359-360. The People's Tribunal.

⁷⁴Ibid., IV, Eleventh Case, Forty-fifth Session, November 13, 1958, 1428.

⁷⁵Ibid., Eleventh Case, Twenty-ninth Session, October 4, 1958, 1230.

sive.⁷⁶ He posed as the Arab leader and acted accordingly.⁷⁷ Nuri wanted to safeguard the Iraqi throne; and he had regional expansionist aims besides.⁷⁸ Chamoun built himself up as a "Christian leader, and apparently imbued his followers with the conviction of a Muslim threat;"⁷⁹ he was even accused of supporting the creation of a Christian national home in Lebanon similar to Israel, under the protection of a great foreign power.⁸⁰

On 19 July 1956, the United States withdrew its offer of assistance to Egypt for the construction of the Aswan High Dam. Great Britain and the International Bank acted accordingly. On 26 July, Abdel Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company.⁸¹ It was a necessary act for regaining the prestige of Egypt and for financing its development projects.⁸²

In Egypt, the thought of a large-scale attack was inconceivable; the army was unprepared for it.⁸³ The Israeli-

⁷⁶ Interview with Mr. Kazem Solh.

⁷⁷ Interview with Dr. Farid Zaineddin.

⁷⁸ Interview with Mr. Kazem Solh.

⁷⁹ Qubain, op. cit., p. 42.

⁸⁰ Junblāt, op. cit., p. 122; see also above, n. 17.

⁸¹ Cremeans, op. cit., pp. 148, 149.

⁸² John Badeau "Introduction", Philosophy of the Revolution, ed. R.H. Nolte (Buffalo: Smith, Keynes and Marshall Publishers, 1959), p. 17.

⁸³ Interview with Dr. Zaineddin.

French-British aggression of Egypt began on 29 October 1956. World public opinion was shocked. Solidarity within the British Commonwealth was given a severe blow. The United Nations passed resolutions opposing the aggression, calling for its end, and demanding the withdrawal of troops from Egyptian territory. On 5 November, the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to interfere against the aggressors and sent an ultimatum to both France and Britain. The United States government forced the British and the French to stop. Field military action was thus brought to an end.⁸⁴

Lebanon condemned the aggression publicly.⁸⁵

On 31 October, President Chamoun addressed a call to the Arab Heads of States for an urgent meeting, so that necessary measures might be adopted against the aggression.⁸⁶ The purpose of this conference, as expressed by President Chamoun before extending the invitations, was to enable the Arab states to decide collectively to sever their relations with Britain and France because of their aggression. This, he conveyed officially to the Ambassador of Egypt.⁸⁷

⁸⁴Marlowe, op. cit., p. 145.

⁸⁵Chamoun, op. cit., p. 292.

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷Interview with Mr. Salaam.

The conference of the Arab Heads of States was held in Beirut from 12 to 15 November 1956. The Arab states represented were: Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Syria, Yemen, and Egypt which was represented by its ambassador in Lebanon. The Heads of states were accompanied by ministers in their governments. Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia had already severed their relations with both France and Britain, while Iraq and Jordan had broken relations with France only.⁸⁸

On 13 November, in the meeting of the subcommittee composed of prime ministers and ministers, the Syrian delegate argued that the severance of relations meant the severance of both diplomatic and economic relations while the Iraqi delegate insisted that it meant the severance of diplomatic relations only. The Jordanian delegate expressed the willingness of his country to sever relations with Britain if Arab aid could replace British economic aid to Jordan. Again, the Iraqi delegate argued that if Iraq severed its economic relations with Britain, it would be in need of economic aid like Jordan. The Libyan delegate said that his government could not sever relations with France and Britain because it had concluded a treaty of friendship with Britain according to which Britain was given military bases in return for a sum

⁸⁸ Qubain, op. cit., p. 38.

of money equal to half the budget of Libya. Libya had also concluded an economic treaty with France, and in return France had agreed to evacuate its forces from Libya on 30 November 1956.⁸⁹

Yemen feared that a severance of relations would aggravate the tense situation in Aden and on Yemen's eastern frontiers. As for the Sudan, it had newly won its independence and had not yet settled its financial problems with Britain. Besides, the Sudan did not wish to complicate things with France so as to have no trouble concerning the delimitation of Sudan's western frontiers.⁹⁰

Lebanon refused to take any action.⁹¹ On 13 November 1956, Syria's President, Quwatly, at the meeting of the Heads of States, asked President Chamoun about Lebanon's attitude. Chamoun answered: "In the twenty four hours following the tripartite aggression, I had called for an urgent Arab summit meeting. My goal was to propose, concerning the aggression,

⁸⁹Leila Shihāb, "The Role of the U.N. During the Lebanese Crisis of 1958" (unpublished Master's Thesis, A.U.B., 1963), p. 31.

⁹⁰Chamoun, op. cit., p. 307.

⁹¹Qubain, op. cit., p. 38.

a unified action of the members of the League of Arab States. Since the aggression now is over, I consider the severance of diplomatic relations with France and Great Britain today as having a secondary importance. It should not be concluded that Lebanon does not want to carry its responsibilities; Lebanon is ready to associate itself with any act on the condition that it would be agreed upon unanimously, because unanimity, alone, gives a decision its authority and efficiency."⁹²

Lebanese Prime minister, Yafi, and minister of state, Salaam, threatened to resign if no diplomatic protest was expressed by Lebanon. Their resignations were accepted.⁹³ Through his behaviour, President Chamoun incurred great Arab displeasure.⁹⁴ Since then, Egypt was constrained to fight the Chamoun regime and to incite the Lebanese public against it.⁹⁵ Destructive rumours spread in Lebanon and stirred doubt among the citizens pitting one segment of the population against the other. It was the duty of the Executive -- Deputy Takla said --

⁹²Chamoun, op. cit., pp. 307 - 308.

⁹³Stewart, op. cit., p. 19.

⁹⁴Although Lebanon's attitude at the conference was not milder than that of some Arab states, Chamoun, who through his invitation had given much hope to the Arabs, incurred through his subsequent behaviour great displeasure in Lebanon and in other Arab states. Since then, Egypt fought his regime and incited against it the Lebanese public, a large number of whom already disapproved of it.

⁹⁵Qubain, op. cit., p. 38.

to instill confidence in the citizens, and to unify their ranks; but the Executive acted in a different fashion, thereby activating such rumours.⁹⁶

On 9 March 1957, the United States Congress in joint session passed the joint resolution -- popularly known as the Eisenhower Doctrine -- for the promotion of peace and stability in the Middle East.⁹⁷ The United States declared that "the need of the hour" was to defend the Middle East "against the aggression of states controlled by international communism."⁹⁸

Dr. Charles Malek, the Lebanese minister of Foreign Affairs, had had talks in Cairo in early January 1957 with President Abdel Nasser concerning the Eisenhower Doctrine. In these talks, Dr. Malek explained that as American assistance will be disinterested, Lebanon would accept it. President Abdel Nasser explained Egypt's negative attitude towards the Doctrine.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Lebanon, Mahader Jalsāt Majliss an-Nuwāb (in Arabic) loc. cit., p. 59.

⁹⁷ Meo, op. cit., p. 219.

⁹⁸ Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 6.

⁹⁹ Chamoun, op. cit., p. 351.

In Iraq, Foreign minister Bash A'yan approvingly said of the Eisenhower Doctrine: "If the doctrine ignored the Zionist danger, it did not ignore the Communist danger."¹⁰⁰ But, to the Arab populations, the real danger was the Israeli danger and not the non-evident troops of international communism.¹⁰¹

President Chamoun committed Lebanon to the Middle East Doctrine. On 16 March 1957, a joint Lebanese-American communiqué -- known as the Richards-Malek communiqué -- based on the same doctrine, was issued.¹⁰²

Dr. Malek knew that the government's foreign policy was straining Lebanon's relations with Egypt,¹⁰³ but he believed that Lebanon was called upon to take a courageous stand in foreign policies. The path the government chose brought to Lebanon "a greater number of friendships." Some party "had to be angry," one way or the other.¹⁰⁴ He had forgotten, said Deputy Takla, that Lebanese foreign policy was intrinsically tied to Lebanon's internal composition.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁰ Al-Hayat (Beirut), January 14, 1958.

¹⁰¹ Meo, op. cit., p. 105.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 120.

¹⁰³ Lebanon: Mahader Jalsāt Majliss an-Nuwāb (in Arabic) loc. cit., p. 114.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 108.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 62.

The Malek-Richards communiqué raised a tempest among the population, and opened a rift among the rank and file.¹⁰⁶ The citizens divided into two groups: those with the government or Loyalists, and the Opposition. The latter opposed because the policy enunciated in the communiqué brought Lebanon into the East-West conflict; also, it aligned it with the West which was on very bad terms with Egypt and Syria; Lebanon, subsequently, would side with the West against Egypt and Syria. Therefore, the government was violating the National Pact.¹⁰⁷

To maintain in the future the same policy, the Lebanese government had to secure an acquiescent parliament in the forthcoming parliamentary summer elections. Later, the Constitution would be amended so as to permit President Chamoun to succeed himself to a second term of office.¹⁰⁸

The Iraqi government recognized the import of the Lebanese parliamentary elections, and supported the friends of Iraq in the election campaign.¹⁰⁹ The elections resulted in a crushing victory for the incumbent government and its

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 60.

¹⁰⁷ Qubain, op. cit., pp. 46-47.

¹⁰⁸ Stewart, op. cit., p. 20.

¹⁰⁹ Iraq, Ministry of Defense, The Special High Military Tribunal, op. cit., IV, Eleventh Case, Thirty-second Session, October 7, 1958, 1390.

foreign policy.¹¹⁰ A two-thirds majority, necessary for the amendment of the Constitution, was secured.¹¹¹

President Chamoun had ordered the use of violence to bridle the masses. A new method had to be used by the Opposition to strengthen its position. Arms had to be acquired.¹¹²

In December 1957, a conspiracy against Abdel Nasser, organized by Egyptians in Lebanon, was discovered by Egypt itself.¹¹³ It was charged in Parliament that some of the conspirators had come into Lebanon without passports, with the knowledge of some General-Security officers.¹¹⁴ The government's answer was that the conspiracy was not accompanied by activities such as would draw the attention of the specialized security departments. However, it promised to take care of this matter.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁰ Sami Solh, Muthakkarāt (in Arabic) (Beirut: Maktabat al-Fikr al-'Arabī, 1960), p. 473. Memoirs.

¹¹¹ Pierre Rondot, "The Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy", Politics in Lebanon, ed. Leonard Binder (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), p. 138.

¹¹² Junblāt, op. cit., p. 46.

¹¹³ Lebanon, Mahader Jalsāt Majliss..., op. cit., Ninth Legislative Session, Second Regular Session, Seventeenth Meeting, December 30, 1957, p. 836

¹¹⁴ Ibid., Ninth Legislative Session, Second Irregular Session, Sixth Meeting, January 23, 1958, p. 215.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., Ninth Legislative Session, Second Regular Session, Seventeenth Meeting, December 30, 1957, p. 836.

From that time onwards, the political tension within Lebanon increased at a great speed to be accelerated even more in early 1958 by the birth of a new Arab state, the United Arab Republic.

Lebanon's foreign policy towards the United Arab Republic and Iraq during 1958 is the theme of the next chapter.

CHAPTER II

THE LEBANESE FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND IRAQ-1958

Lebanese Foreign Policy and Developments in Arab Unity

In the winter of 1958, Lebanese foreign policy met with a challenging development in the Arab world. Egypt and Syria united in the United Arab Republic under the leadership of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. The Lebanese foreign policy-makers had been for the preceding three years -- as explained in the Introduction -- moving towards the Iraqi front while professing friendliness to Egypt and Syria. Under normal conditions, this inclination could be camouflaged, but the events which occurred in early 1958 could not but emphasize the deviation in Lebanese foreign policy.

This chapter will analyze the development of this policy towards its dramatic climax, then to its necessary end.

Even after the wave of European withdrawal from the Arab world in the 1940's and 1950's, formidable obstacles to Arab unity remained. Ruling dynasties and oligarchies

had powerful vested interests in the existing separate states.¹ But on 5 July 1956, the Syrian Parliament decided to set up a committee to negotiate with Egypt a federal union of the two countries. On 5 January 1957, the prime minister of Syria announced his Government's decision to appoint a ministerial committee for this purpose.² President Abdel Nasser of Egypt initially resisted unification; he thought that unity needed long preparations and that five more years were still needed.³ However, contacts were made by the two Arab states with both the United States and the Soviet Union to acquaint them with the idea of unification and to ascertain their reactions. There was no discouragement; but no one really believed the plan would be realized.⁴

The work for unity between Egypt and Syria went slowly until the power struggle within Syria threatened to push the Communists and their sympathizers within the ruling coalition into a dominant position.⁵ Then, a number

¹Gabriel Almond, and James Coleman, The Politics of Developing Areas (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 417.

²Sayegh, Arab Unity, op. cit., p. 179.

³Kerr, The Arab Cold War, op. cit., p. 14.

⁴Interview with Dr. Farid Zaineddin.

⁵Meo, Lebanon, Improbable Nation, op. cit., p. 193.

of army officers, getting impatient, went to Cairo and told President Abdel Nasser they wanted unity and left to him the solution of its problems.⁶ The Syrians convinced Abdel Nasser with the argument that if he did not accept the presidency of Syria, Communist elements in the Syrian coalition would turn the State over to the Soviets.⁷ These officers were followed by Syrian leaders of the Ba'ath Party, and by Syrian President, Shukri al-Quwatly, and all asked for unification.⁸

On 1 February 1958, the merger of Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic was formally proclaimed, in Cairo. On 21 February 1958, in country-wide plebiscites, the peoples of the two states in overwhelming majorities approved of the unification and of the naming of Gamal Abdel Nasser as first president of the United Arab Republic. A provisional Constitution for the new republic was promulgated on 5 March 1958.⁹

As in Egypt, political parties were dissolved in

⁶ Interview with Dr. Zaineddin.

⁷ Charles Cremeans, The Arabs and the World, op. cit., p. 161.

⁸ Meo, op. cit., p. 193.

⁹ Sayegh, op. cit., pp. 180, 181.

Syria. Thus the Syrian Communist party was dissolved, and the threat of a Communist takeover in Syria was averted.¹⁰ "That this should have happened while many voices in the West and the Baghdad Pact countries, as well as in Jordan and in Saudi Arabia were warning of a collusion between the Egyptians and the Communists for a take over in Syria is one of the great ironies of the recent history of the Arab East."¹¹

The creation of the United Arab Republic is a turning point in the history of the Middle East. Its proclamation gave a shock to great and small states.¹²

In the Arab countries, the Arab populations as a whole greeted the event joyfully; to them it was a first step toward the long-sought goal of Arab unity.¹³ The governing classes who, from time to time, approved of Abdel Nasser's Arab policy and his role in world affairs "with some degree of hypocrisy" had, most of the time, shown hostility towards him.¹⁴ With the creation of ^{the} United Arab Republic, they became fearful of his obvious elevation in influence and

¹⁰ Meo, op. cit., p. 193.

¹¹ Cremeans, op. cit., p. 161.

¹² Interview with Dr. Zaineddin.

¹³ Dwight Eisenhower, Waging Peace (London: Heinemann, 1966), p. 263.

¹⁴ Cremeans, op. cit., pp. 25-26.

prestige. The state of Yemen acted differently. Its ruler showed enthusiasm and made a trip in the first week of February to discuss a sort of loose federation between his country and the new unitary state.¹⁵

The Lebanese government was "frightened."¹⁶ Its attitude will be discussed in full later. As for Iraq, it found itself ousted from a possible position of Arab leadership. The government of Cairo posed now as the champion of Arab unity.¹⁷ The Iraqi government did not recognize the United Arab Republic, and sought to prevent other states from recognizing it, specially the Baghdad Pact countries and some Arab states. However, those countries did recognize the United Arab Republic sooner or later, but Iraq did not until the Revolution of 14 July 1958.¹⁸ The Iraqi government justified itself by choosing to think that the referendum of 21 February 1958 did not give a true picture of the popularity of the system in Syria.¹⁹

¹⁵ Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 263.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Chehab, Le Liban face à l'Ouragan, op. cit., p.19.

¹⁸ Iraq, Ministry of Defense, The Special High Military Tribunal, op. cit. IV, Eleventh Case, Forty fifth Session, Nov. 13, 1958, 1429.

¹⁹ Ibid., Eleventh Case, Thirty second Session, Oct.7, 1958, 1385.

In obvious response to the creation of the United Arab Republic, Iraq and Jordan decided to form a federation -- with both kings of Iraq and Jordan retaining their respective thrones. The United States State department encouraged the Iraqi step, and on 14 February 1958, the Arab Union was announced.²⁰ Abdel Karim Qassim, a leader of the 14 July Revolution was later to declare: This federation was not a real union aiming at the realization of the interests of the people in the two countries. It was a union for the consolidation of the "corrupt" monarchical system, and for the destruction of the unity of the "emancipated" Arab peoples.²¹

The two new unions, representing two different steps towards Arab unity, perpetuated the struggle between Cairo and Damascus on the one hand, and Baghdad and Amman on the other.²² The Arab East had split into two camps, with Premier Nuri Sa'id of Iraq, Hussein, King of Jordan, and President Chamoun on one side, and President Abdel Nasser on the other. In Iraq, it was said freely that the union between Egypt and Syria was so artificial that it could not last.²³ Both the Iraqi

²⁰ Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 263.

²¹ Muhammad Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League (Beirut: Khayat's, 1962), I, 91 - 92.

²² Lebanon, Mahader Jalsat Majliss ..., op. cit., Ninth Legislative Session, First Regular Session, Second Meeting, March 25, 1958, p. 331.

²³ Ionides, Divide and Lose, op. cit., pp. 238, 241.

and Jordanian governments decided to postpone legal recognition of the United Arab Republic until after the composition of the government of the new Union which, as agreed upon in Amman on 15 February 1958, was to be formed in the coming three months.²⁴

On the other hand, Gamal Abdel Nasser, on the same day the Arab Federation was proclaimed, 14 February 1958, sent King Faisal of Iraq his congratulations, and described the federation - in the same message - as a blessed step to which the Arab nation looked up.²⁵

Iraq, in the spring of 1958, openly accused Abdel Nasser of being a tool of the Soviet Union, and it had high hopes that, with the support of Anglo-American policy and military strength, Syria might be overcome and the dream of the Fertile Crescent might still come true.²⁶

In Lebanon, the creation of the United Arab Republic had strong impact on the people. Within certain Moslem groups, there was a general air of hopeful expectancy that Lebanon

²⁴ Iraq, Ministry of Defense, The Special High Military Tribunal, loc. cit., IV, 1385.

²⁵ Al-Hayat (Beirut), February 15, 1958.

²⁶ Ionides, op. cit., pp. 244 - 45.

would be next to join the union. Most Christian groups felt that the unification should be avoided at all costs, for it would convert them into a minority group within a predominantly "Muslim" state, and, according to them, "would lead to the loss of their rights and privileges."²⁷ Some Lebanese were frightened, suggests Dr. Farid Zaineddin, not of the Egyptians, but of the Syrians themselves who, having accepted unity, would want Lebanon to join. Syrians, said he, have no deep conviction of any frontiers between Syria and Lebanon although they accept them politically; this is the reason for not consenting to the establishment of diplomatic representation between the two states. As for the Egyptians themselves, they looked at Syria and Lebanon as one territorial unit: "Bilad as-Shaam".²⁸

Thousands of Lebanese citizens went to Damascus, capital of Syria, to attend the unity celebrations held there in the presence of President Abdel Nasser himself. But, as deputy Nassim Majdalani, vice-president of the Progressive Socialist Party, said in the Chamber: They did not go there to ask for unity between Lebanon and ^{the} United Arab Republic; they went to congratulate two brotherly peoples who united

²⁷ Meo, op. cit., p. 159.

²⁸ Interview with Dr. Zaineddin.

of their own free will; they went to congratulate an Arab leader who knew what to do, who freed his people from the complex of weakness, and who stood against foreign interference.²⁹

The Lebanese government, on the other hand, took a hesitating, wandering attitude towards the creation of the United Arab Republic. It took a long time to congratulate its makers, and a longer time to recognize it. When the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs questioned Dr. Charles Malek, minister of Foreign Affairs, early in February, why the Government had not yet recognized the United Arab Republic, he answered that Lebanon was waiting for the results of the plebiscite of 21 February 1958.³⁰

Lebanon sent its congratulations to the United Arab Republic on 21 February 1958, and recognized the new state five days later, on 26 February.³¹ By the evening of 25 February, thirty one states (including the United States) had already recognized the United Arab Republic.³² Because of this

²⁹ Lebanon, Mahader Jalsāt Majliss ..., op. cit., Ninth Legislative Session, First Regular Session, Third Meeting, March 26, 1958, p. 386.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 351.

³¹ Ibid., p. 373.

³² Al-Hayat (Beirut), February 26, 1958.

behaviour, Mr. Philippe Takla said in the Chamber, Lebanon lost the opportunity and the chance to wipe out of memory the facts that Lebanon had been aligned in conflicts among the Arab states, and that friendship and cooperation had been missing between Lebanon on the one hand, and Egypt and Syria on the other.³³ Dr. Malek's answer was that, because of the delicate situation in the "East", "caution" became the "essence of wisdom"; therefore, his Government had abandoned the policy of improvisation often followed by past Lebanese governments.³⁴ Dr. Malek described as follows the line to be followed by Lebanon in its foreign policy towards the United Arab Republic: understanding and full agreement with all Arab States, with the United Arab Republic in the lead, and no binding tie with one Arab state more than with the other as this would lead to a loss of Lebanese independence.³⁵ He also warned those who asked for "good relations with the United Arab Republic that the Lebanese government would give due interest to better relations with the United Arab Republic when the United Arab Republic showed similar interest in its relations with the

³³Lebanon, Mahader Jalsāt Majliss..., op. cit., Ninth Legislative Session, First Regular Session, Third Meeting, March 26, 1958, p. 373.

³⁴Ibid., p. 405.

³⁵Ibid., p. 408.

Arab states surrounding it."³⁶ Concerning the danger of breakdown to which the western-oriented Lebanese foreign policy was exposing the national unity, Malek declared in the Chamber of Deputies: "If the present foreign policy divides the ranks and breaks down the national unity, the unifying of ranks is only possible and permissible within the context of the present foreign policy". "To those who say that this unity cannot be on the basis of present foreign policy", he emphasized, "I say firmly: it cannot be but on the basis of such policy."³⁷

It was not until mid-March that the Lebanese government signed two decrees for the appointment of two delegations to visit Cairo and Baghdad to congratulate their governments on their respective steps in unity. On 1 April 1958, they were cancelled for, according to Al-Hayat, while the Iraqi government had responded to the letter from the Lebanese government informing them of the prospective Lebanese delegation, the United Arab Republic had not yet sent an answer. Therefore, the Lebanese government decided not to send any delegations, and contented itself with the congratulations it had already sent.³⁸

³⁶ Ibid., p. 409.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 407.

³⁸ Al-Hayat, (Beirut), April 2, 1958.

The Chamoun Foreign Policy towards the
United Arab Republic and
Internal Struggle

Internal struggle in Lebanon
between the Government
and the Opposition

In the night of 7 to 8 May 1958, Nassib al-Matni, an Opposition man, a Maronite, and editor of the daily, Al-Telegraph, was murdered. The Government and President Chamoun were accused of being behind this murder.³⁹ The Opposition in Lebanon, which had organized itself since the spring of 1957 as the United National Front or the Opposition National Front -- both titles belong to the same body -- joined with other political groups to declare a general strike throughout the country.⁴⁰ The Front declared on 10 May 1958 that the "call for a peaceful strike throughout the Lebanon genuinely expresses the feelings of the Lebanese people who denounce the wave of terror and crime, violations of public freedom, and conspiracy against the Constitution."⁴¹

³⁹ Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, op. cit., p. 69.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ M.S. Agwani, The Lebanese Crisis, 1958 (London: Asia Publishing House, 1965), p. 57.

In the evening of 8 May 1958, Mr. Philippe Takla stood in the Chamber and expressed his astonishment that political struggle should reach the stage of murder. Deputies accused the government of allowing the prevalence in the country of an atmosphere encouraging murder.⁴² The government declared placidly through its minister of Justice that it was no use discussing with the Opposition members in the Chamber for no power on earth could change their minds or stop them from making false accusations.⁴³ Then, the Opposition members of Parliament left the Chamber in denunciation of the government's irresponsible dealing with the internal situation in the country.⁴⁴

The Chamber of Deputies did not meet until 31 July 1958, when agreement was reached outside the Chamber to elect General Fuad Chehab for the Presidency. Prime minister Sami Solh said that the government tried often to call the Chamber to a meeting but with no success for the majority of the deputies were in their electoral districts, some leading the revolution, others defending their men and their property.⁴⁵ Mr. Adel Osseyran, Speaker of the House, said

⁴² Lebanon, Mahader Jalsāt Majliss ..., op. cit., Ninth Legislative Session, First Regular Session, Eleventh Meeting, May 8, 1958, pp. 654, 659, 662, 664.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 656.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 665.

⁴⁵ Solh, Muthakkarāt, op. cit., p. 571.

that parliamentary life during the crisis of 1958 was impaired because the Executive itself "willed" it to be so.⁴⁶

What were the reasons behind a general strike supported by large masses, a strike which turned into a revolution that lasted for more than four months? Matni's murder was the event which triggered the revolution but was not its primary cause. The cause has two features, external and internal, which overlap.

The struggle had really begun in the spring of 1955. The issue at stake was whether the Arab states would join a Western defensive alliance, of which the Baghdad Pact was the spearhead, or whether they would go neutralist on the model of Egypt and Syria.⁴⁷ In November 1956, the Lebanese official attitude towards breaking relations with Great Britain and France marked the first step along the path leading to the 1958 crisis.⁴⁸ Then, the Eisenhower Doctrine made its appearance on the international stage of politics, and the Lebanese government attached the state to the wheel of the West through the Richards-Malek joint communiqué.

⁴⁶ Interview with Mr. Adel Osseyran

⁴⁷ Ionides, op. cit., p. 249.

⁴⁸ "Statement by Prime minister Sami Solh,"/Mahader Jalsāt Majliss..., op. cit., Ninth Legislative Session, First Regular Session, Third Meeting, March 26, 1958, p. 355. Lebanon,

Then came the time in early summer 1957 for new parliamentary elections. The elections of 1957 were of extreme importance, for on the newly elected Chamber would fall the responsibility of electing the next President. The elections were conducted by the existing Solh government: no neutral caretaker government was appointed. Most political leaders of the Opposition lost their seats in the Chamber: the Opposition secured only eight out of sixty six seats.⁴⁹ These elections gave birth to the idea of armed revolution.⁵⁰ Mr. Fuad Ammun, veteran Lebanese statesman, and Maronite Opposition leader, said that "the Lebanese people revolted in 1958 because the rulers governed against the will of the people. The parliamentary elections were enveloped with terror, forgery, exploitation and bribery. The rulers then spread dissension among the various confessions and elements of the people through rumours and intrigues surpassing the intrigues of the Turks and their conspiracies between 1840 and 1860. Thus they stabbed at national unity, and did not protect the rights of the people and their democratic liberties. In foreign affairs, they deviated from pure Lebanese policy: they stood with certain Arab states against other Arab states;

⁴⁹ Agwani, op. cit., p. 3.

⁵⁰ Junblāt, Hakikat al-Thawra al-Lubnaniya, op. cit., p. 85.

and they granted foreign countries privileged positions and permitted them to interfere in Lebanese national questions. They asked the foreigners to support them against the angry people who stood to fight for their liberty and dignity. These offensive acts were to culminate in the criminal plan: to repeat the partition of the year 1842 and to build a Christian homeland which could not endure neither morally, nor politically, nor economically.⁵¹

The roots of the revolution of 1958 in Lebanon grew out of the Government's injustice: injustice in the internal political and social realm, and injustice in the realm of foreign policy. In foreign policy, the Lebanese Executive "most ruthlessly" disregarded the feelings of the Moslems who composed probably sixty per cent of the population.⁵² Internal social and political injustice became a tool of foreign policy. The new Solh Government of August 1957 made an ominous start by securing from the Chamber emergency powers of arrest and censorship.⁵³ Philippe Takla then said: "Can we

⁵¹ Solh, op. cit., p. 483;

See Cremeans, op. cit., p. 163;

"Statement by Opposition Parties, May 15, 1958," Agwani, op. cit., pp. 64-65; Desmond Stewart, Turmoil in Beirut (London: Wingate, 1958), p. 66. Charles Thayer, Diplomat (New York: Harper & Bros., 1959), pp. 2 - 3. Lebanon, Mañader Jalsat Majliss..., op. cit., Ninth Legislative Session, Second Irregular Session, Seventh Meeting, January 28, 1958, p. 221.

⁵² Stewart, op. cit., pp. 110 - 111.

⁵³ Agwani, op. cit., p. 3.

trust for one second that it is a good government, this government which abuses the Constitution and proceeds to establish in this land Inquisition tribunals."⁵⁴

Tension in the Chamber and in the whole country increased when a number of government supporters in the Chamber of Deputies expressed their desire to amend the Constitution so as to allow President Chamoun to succeed himself. President Chamoun did not comment on this demand.⁵⁵ In December 1957, however, he declared that he thought it not advisable to amend the Constitution; but he warned he would reverse his position if a successor who would continue his policy was not secured.⁵⁶

In the meantime, violence and instability spread in the country. Opposition deputy Kamel al-As'ad accused the government of standing idle and crippled in face of such a situation. He accused the state of becoming

⁵⁴Lebanon, Mahader Jalsāt Majliss. . . , op. cit., Ninth Legislative Session, First Irregular Session, Third Meeting, August 29, 1957, p. 55; see Ibid., p. 49; Ibid., Ninth Legislative Session, Second Irregular Session, Sixth Meeting, January 23, 1958, p. 191; Agwani, op. cit., pp. 36, 40.

⁵⁵S. Solh, op. cit., p. 480.

⁵⁶"Policy Statement of the Third Force, Dec. 17, 1957", Agwani, op. cit., p. 39.

"a political party", using armed forces for "private ends",⁵⁷ He also reminded the government that it could not free itself of its responsibilities. "The government is responsible for internal security whatever the cause or source of aggression." Rumours spread, he said, that the Syrian Deuxième Bureau is inciting people to violence; these rumours were spread on "behalf of the government"; the government should declare in this Chamber if the Syrian Deuxième Bureau lies behind present violence in Lebanon.⁵⁸ Prime minister Sami Solh replied to an interpellation -- by deputy Kabalān Issa el-Khoury on the same subject -- that it was not possible for the Lebanese state to put responsibility on the Syrian Deuxième Bureau for acts done by persons having relations with it. He also said that the government did pursue the terrorists, whatever their nationality, and that the Syrian government did not object against these pursuits.⁵⁹

The government was not successful in maintaining order; the internal situation grew worse day after day.

⁵⁷ Lebanon, Mahader Jalsāt..., op. cit., Ninth Legislative Session, Second Regular Session, Tenth Meeting, October 26, 1957, p. 532.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 533.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 577.

Again, Kamel al-As'ad said in the Chamber of Deputies: "We asked the government to enforce its measures against criminals; now logic leads us to believe that the authorities are creating these incidents on purpose to incite mutiny."⁶⁰

On 27 March 1958, eighty two Opposition leaders signed a statement which declared that:

The signatories to this statement, who represent different opinions and trends in Lebanon, . . . call for action to check the present development which may endanger the unity of Lebanon.

They find that the rulers, whose duty is to safeguard the unity of Lebanon, intend to impair the destiny of Lebanon and its independence in the hope of exploiting this to justify their personal policy The signatories resolve to unify their efforts and combine their forces to resist the renewal of the presidential term which constitutes a challenge to the will of the people and endangers the future of the homeland.

The signatories, while announcing their determination to adhere to Lebanon as a sovereign and independent entity, to the National Pact, and to the strengthening of brotherhood with all Arab countries, warn the rulers against the consequence of their excesses. They declare that any attempt to renew the term of the President will justify the people in asserting their will by all the means at their disposal.⁶¹

⁶⁰ Ibid., Ninth Legislative Session, First Regular Session, Third Meeting, March 26, 1958, p. 399; see Ibid. Ninth Legislative Session, First Regular Session, Seventeenth Meeting, April 15, 1958, pp. 526 - 28.

⁶¹ Agwani, op. cit., p. 41.

President Chamoun kept silence concerning the coming presidential elections. Loyalist deputies in the Chamber kept talking about the amendment of the Constitution.

There was danger that the internal dissension would degenerate into a religious war, for the broad division between Loyalists and Opposition took more or less a sectarian basis. President Chamoun was supported largely by a majority of the Maronites, the Christian Phalanges Party of Pierre Jemayyel, and the semi-fascist Parti Populaire Syrien (PPS) which shared with the President his opposition to Abdel Nasser. The Opposition, whose majority was composed of Moslems and Druze, included eminent Christian personalities among whom the Maronite Patriarch, Msgr. Paul Pierre Ma'ūshi. The Opposition was impelled to lean on the United Arab Republic for moral and material support. The Lebanese government branded them as "Nasser's agents" and "traitors."⁶² The Opposition leaders had warmly greeted the creation of the United Arab Republic. Opposition leader in Tripoli, Rashīd Karāmē, -- also former Prime minister -- upon meeting President Abdel Nasser, on 27 February 1959, said:

⁶²Ibid., p. 4.

We in the Lebanon believe that Lebanon is of the Arabs and for the Arabs. The Lebanese people, Mr. President, believe in your principles and mission and are following your footsteps and example. . . . You can rest assured . . . that when the hour strikes we will all leap as one man to hoist the banner to which all the Arabs will rally . . .⁶³

Such words clearly express a Lebanese desire to march into Arab unity. Yet, as disclosed in a speech given on 16 May 1958, President Abdel Nasser took a tempered attitude towards this inclination of some Lebanese groups. When, during unity celebrations, the United States Ambassador to Lebanon asked him whether he would annex Lebanon to the United Arab Republic, Abdel Nasser answered that the United Arab Republic did not plan to annex any country and would never accept to unite with an Arab country which did not unanimously wish for union.⁶⁴ Moreover, in a letter addressed to Patriarch Ma'ūshi, President Abdel Nasser said: "Lebanon in its present status is a structure with complete sovereignty and independence which will not be touched." The letter also said that the people of the United Arab Republic wanted only one thing from Lebanon: not to be a centre for plots and intrigues against them.⁶⁵

⁶³Ibid., pp. 44-45;
See the statement by Adel Osseyran, Ibid., p. 53.

⁶⁴Khalil, op. cit., II, 937.

⁶⁵"Statement by Maronite Patriarch Paul Peter Ma'ūshi, March 9, 1958" Agwani, op. cit., pp. 47-48.

The Lebanese Government's
accusation of the
United Arab Republic

When the Opposition called for a general strike, the Lebanese government declared that the Opposition action was in compliance with orders given them by the United Arab Republic, with the aim of completing a unity between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic.⁶⁶

On 10 May 1958, the United States Ambassador in Beirut visited Lebanese Foreign minister, Charles Malek. Dr. Malek told him that "Syria" had sent the night before a "horde" of soldiers across the frontiers to aid the rebels. Malek urgently requested that the United States Sixth Fleet be ordered to stand by, ready to land in case the Lebanese government troops were "overwhelmed."⁶⁷

Also on 10 May, President Chamoun declared to the United States Ambassador that President Abdel Nasser was undertaking a "massive attempt to overthrow him." The United States, President Chamoun argued, "must either promise to support him or else watch his and every other pro-Western regime in the Middle East, including Iraq and Jordan, fall like ninepins to the Egyptian."⁶⁸

⁶⁶S. Solh, op. cit., p. 482.

⁶⁷Thayer, op. cit., p. 8.

⁶⁸Ibid.

On 13 May 1958, Malek informed the American, British, and French Ambassadors in Beirut that his Government expected military assistance when needed. At the same time, it was announced in Washington that the United States was already supplying Lebanon with small arms and anti-riot weapons.⁶⁹ President Eisenhower directed the Secretary of State to send President Chamoun a reply which said that under the circumstances the United States will respond favorably and strongly but on certain conditions: first, the United States should not send troops to Lebanon for the purpose of achieving an additional term for the President; second, the request should have the concurrence of some other Arab "nation" ; third, the mission of United States troops in Lebanon would be twofold: protection of the life and property of Americans, and assistance to the legal Lebanese government.⁷⁰ Having made this decision, President Eisenhower, sometime in May, warned the United States Congress leaders that he "might have to run the risk of war by

⁶⁹ R. F. Wall, "The Middle East", Survey of International Affairs, 1956-58, ed. G. Barraclough (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 369;

See Thayer, op. cit., pp. 13-14;

Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 266;

Chamoun, op. cit., pp. 414-15.

⁷⁰ Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 267.

intervening with military force in Lebanon without prior discussion in Congress."⁷¹

The Soviet Union, watching the Lebanese political scene, declared, according to the Tass statement of 17 May, that the United States or other Western intervention in the Lebanese crisis could have serious consequences not only for the future of the Lebanese state, but also for the peace in the Middle East.⁷² An article in Pravda issued a warning that the Soviet Union could not stand idle if the United States decided to intervene in the Near and Middle East in direct proximity to the Soviet Union's southern borders.⁷³

Already the Lebanese crisis had reached an international level, but the Opposition in Lebanon kept declaring that their movement was an internal one and had to be solved by the Lebanese themselves.

On the same day Malek asked for help from the three Western Powers, i.e. 13 May 1958, he made a statement to the

⁷¹ Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report (New York: Harper and Bros., 1961), p. 290.

⁷² Agwani, op. cit., p. 105.

⁷³ Wall, loc. cit., p. 370.

Press accusing the United Arab Republic of intervention in Lebanese internal affairs. He added that his Government had protested on the same day too to the government of the United Arab Republic. The Press correspondants asked him whether the government had requested the withdrawal of the United Arab Republic's Ambassador to Lebanon. He answered that he could not reply to that question. Then, he declined to reply to a question on whether relations with the United Arab Republic would be severed.⁷⁴ The last question was answered by President Chamoun on 21 May 1958 at a press conference for foreign correspondants. He explained that Lebanon would not break diplomatic relations with the United Arab Republic, for Lebanon cared to keep the best possible relations with all the Arab countries, specially the United Arab Republic.⁷⁵

In fact, Malek had wired instructions to the Lebanese Embassy in Cairo to present a memorandum of protest to the Foreign ministry of the United Arab Republic against the United Arab Republic instigations of rebellion in Lebanon. In the same memorandum, the Lebanese Government asked the United Arab Republic to stop such actions.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Agwani, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-60.

⁷⁵ Files of the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates .

⁷⁶ Al-Hayat (Beirut), May 14, 1958.

On 14 May, while the United Arab Republic Ambassador, Ghaleb, was protesting to the Lebanese Foreign ministry against Malek's statements,⁷⁷ Ghaleb Turk, Chargé d'Affaires in the Lebanese Embassy in Cairo was presenting the Lebanese Government's memorandum to assistant-secretary Fahmi of the Foreign ministry of the United Arab Republic. Fahmi refused the memorandum on the ground that its contents were pure abuse and calumny against the United Arab Republic.⁷⁸ The memorandum contained accusations of interference in Lebanese internal affairs, such as the Cairo and Damascus radio broadcasts and the incident of the Belgian Consul in Damascus, de San.⁷⁹

On 16 May 1958, President Abdel Nasser, back from a state visit to the Soviet Union, gave a speech in which he said that, when the internal conflict occurred in Lebanon, the "rulers" of Lebanon accused the United Arab Republic of lying behind the struggle. This is "calumny", this is "untruth", he said; the United Arab Republic has nothing whatsoever to do with those events. "We confirm the independence of Lebanon. . . . We shall not accept to unite with an Arab state where there is no unanimous agreement

⁷⁷ Ibid., May 18, 1958.

⁷⁸ Ibid., May 15, 1958.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

on unity." The rulers of Lebanon, President Abdel Nasser continued, "allege" that the United Arab Republic is interfering in Lebanon; they want to transform the internal problem into an international one, therefore they accuse the United Arab Republic of interference to have an excuse for asking the aid of "foreign countries" against such an intervention.⁸⁰

On 17 May, the United Arab Republic Embassy in Lebanon issued a statement refuting categorically the Lebanese government's allegations, and expressing the United Arab Republic's interest in safeguarding the security and independence of Lebanon.⁸¹

The United Arab Republic Foreign ministry called Ghaleb Turk on 15 May 1958 to present to him a memorandum of protest against the ill-treatment in Beirut, by men of the Lebanese security forces, of the United Arab Republic Consul and of an employee in the United Arab Republic cul-

⁸⁰ Majmu'at Khitab wa Bayānāt al-Raīs Abdel Nasser, 1958-1960 (in Arabic) (Cairo: Government Information Department, n.d.), pp. 127-28. A Collection of Speeches and Statements by President Abdel Nasser, 1958-1960.

Ibid., See Abdel Nasser's statement of June 29, 1958, p. 136.

We shall refer to the accusations later in this study.

⁸¹ Al-Hayat (Beirut), May 18, 1958.

tural Attache's office in Beirut.⁸² This memorandum was returned on 16 May to the United Arab Republic Foreign ministry on the ground that events mentioned in it were "contrary to the facts".⁸³

Deportation of the United Arab Republic nationals.--

Of great importance too, was the decision taken by the Lebanese Council of Ministers on the evening of 14 May 1958 to enforce controls over "foreigners" in Lebanon, and check the reasons for their presence in Lebanon. On 15 May a great number of Syrian were expelled from Lebanon.⁸⁴ A Lebanese official source stated on 20 May that the number of Syrians "expelled" had reached the total of three thousand.⁸⁵ President Abdel Nasser said in a speech on 29 June 1958 that out of the seventy thousand Syrians living in Lebanon, twenty five thousand were expelled; such treatment did not befall the Egyptians due to their small number in Lebanon.⁸⁶ On 15 May 1958, Ambassador Ghaleb protested verbally against this treatment to the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁸² Al-Hayat (Beirut), May 16, 1958.

⁸³ Ibid., May 17, 1958.

⁸⁴ Ibid., May 16, 1958.

⁸⁵ Ibid., May 21, 1958.

⁸⁶ Majmū'at Khitab... Abdel Nasser, 1958-1960, op. cit., p. 137.

The Lebanese reply was that such action was within the laws which permit expelling "foreigners" who have no identity cards, whose address is unknown, and whose kind of work is not needed by Lebanon.⁸⁷

In the meantime, the Opposition National Front held a press conference on 14 May 1958 and Opposition leader, Saeb Salaam, declared that the general strike would continue until President Chamoun relinquished the presidency and his regime vanished. He reasserted that the Opposition movement was purely Lebanese, and that it aimed at preserving the structure and unity of Lebanon.⁸⁸ On 15 May, the Front sent the United States Ambassador in Beirut a note expressing disapproval of United States readiness to support the Lebanese government against the people, and explaining the nature of the struggle which, the Front presumed, he knew.⁸⁹

On 16 May, the Lebanese government issued a public statement accusing the United Arab Republic of intervention. The statement mentioned such proofs as: the captured boats

⁸⁷Al-Hayat (Beirut), May 16, 1958.

⁸⁸Agwani, op. cit., pp. 60-61.

See "Opposition Parties Statement, May 17, 1958",
Ibid., p. 71.

⁸⁹Ibid., pp. 63-64.

carrying Palestinians and Egyptians, armed and loaded with money; the incident of the Belgian Consul-General in Damascus carrying arms to Lebanon in his car; the attack by insurgents on the customs post at Masna'; and the United Arab Republic broadcasts and press campaigns calling upon the Lebanese people to oppose the present regime. The government asserted that a large number of Syrian mutineers and subversive elements had infiltrated into Lebanon.⁹⁰

The Opposition already had explained in a statement on 14 May 1958 that the boats were carrying smugglers of narcotics; and that the Consul's incident, even if the charge proved true, was to be considered as "another of the incidents taking place everyday, for Government supporters have persisted in smuggling and distributing arms."⁹¹

On 21 May 1958, President Chamoun issued a statement intended for foreign correspondents. It said: "The United Arab Republic keeps interfering strongly in our internal affairs with the aim of creating a radical change in our basic national policy. . . . The United Arab Republic

⁹⁰ Agwani, op. cit., pp. 67, 69-70.

⁹¹ Ibid., pp. 62-63.

wants our national policy to meet with its own policy. This we cannot do. . . . We have decided not to be subservient to its policy or to its fundamental orientation."⁹² The foreign correspondents then asked him a series of questions to which he replied with the following statements:

We shall complain to the Security Council. . . . The present Government shall stay in power for it cannot be held responsible for recent events. . . . I have never encouraged, in the past or in the present, the initiative of renewing my mandate, and I have never taken it myself. I don't remember ever saying that I will put my candidacy to the Presidency of the Republic, as I also have never said the contrary. The amendment of the Constitution is but a fallacious pretext for creating trouble. . . . In great measure, the responsibility for the acts of sabotage and terrorism falls on the United Arab Republic. . . . Among the arrested persons, around a hundred are agents of the Syrian army. . . . The Lebanese Army has full freedom not to fight the rebels in certain regions, and I believe the reason is to avoid the effusion of blood. . . . I have observed that each communist in Lebanon has participated in the acts of violence. . . . I don't think at all that confessionalism has any relation to the Lebanese events. . . . I categorically deny the news that the Government has distributed arms to members of the PPS and the Kataeb.⁹³

To the question whether the United States would come to help the Lebanese government in application of the Eisenhower doctrine, President Chamoun answered: I believe the Free World would come to our aid; and, to the

⁹²Ibid., p. 75.

⁹³Files of the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates.

question concerning what he thought of the demands of the Opposition asking him to resign, he declared: I represent the highest constitutional and legal authority in this country, and I am not ready to sacrifice legality, the laws, and the Constitution to satisfy certain elements.⁹⁴

On 25 June 1958, President Chamoun contended in a press conference that the Egyptians and the Syrians among the rebels made up twenty five to thirty percent of their numbers, and that the rebels were receiving their orders from outside Lebanon, "from Cairo and Damascus."⁹⁵

Richard D. Robinson, staff member of the Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies, who wrote the chapter, "What is Nasser like", in The Philosophy of the Revolution, said: The mere evidence that the Lebanese rebels received some assistance from the United Arab Republic does not transform the Lebanese unrest from civil war into aggression; this, aside from the fact that no evidence had been presented of massive United Arab Republic aid to the Lebanese rebels.⁹⁶ The extent to which the United Arab Republic provided

⁹⁴Ibid.

⁹⁵S. Solh, op. cit., p. 626.

⁹⁶The Philosophy of the Revolution, op. cit., p.95.

practical support for the Opposition was difficult to gauge. Allegations by the Lebanese government were probably exaggerated with the intention of providing a basis for outside aid, should the government need it.⁹⁷ Concerning "United Arab Republic terrorists" in Lebanon, it should be noted that, except in one case, none was known to be convicted by Lebanese courts; and after United Nations Observers questioned two government prisoners, the Lebanese government refused to allow the Observers to make any further investigations into such cases.⁹⁸

In the meantime, the Opposition was still resisting the government, declaring that the conflict was internal and purely Lebanese, and explaining that "a peaceful solution to the crisis can be achieved only by the resignation of an irresponsible and ambitious President,"⁹⁹ or, in gentler language, "by the President's taking a trip abroad."¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷Wall, loc. cit., p. 370.

⁹⁸Qubain, op. cit., p. 143.

⁹⁹"Statement by Nassim Majdalany, May 26, 1958", Stewart, op. cit., p. 67.

¹⁰⁰"Press Conference by Maronite Patriarch Ma'ūshi," Al-Hayat (Beirut), May 31, 1958.

In the meantime, the Lebanese army could have intervened in the struggle and imposed obedience to the Government, but, for certain reasons, it did not. On 10 April 1958, clashes had taken place in the Shūf area. Opposition leaders Rashīd Karāmē, Husayn Oueini, Fuad 'Ammun, and Henri Pharaon told General Chehab, then Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, that these clashes were of a political nature the cause of which was the unfolded scheme for the amendment of the Constitution; they requested of him that the army be kept out of the controversy.¹⁰¹ In fact, General Chehab refrained from involving the army in a political quarrel because the Government enjoyed only partial support from the Lebanese people,¹⁰² and because he viewed the crisis as an internal problem necessitating a political solution not a military one.¹⁰³ It is to be noted that the Lebanese Army is the strongest organized element in Lebanon, and enjoys full autonomy.¹⁰⁴ Thus, when President Chamoun gave orders to General Chehab to suppress the rebellion and the army commander ignored orders, nothing could be done about it.

¹⁰¹Qubain, op. cit., pp. 67-68.

¹⁰²Wall, loc. cit., p. 370.

¹⁰³Riachi, Ruassā' Lubnān kama 'Ariftuhum, op. cit., p. 192.

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

No one appointed in Chehab's place could have controlled the army effectively.¹⁰⁵

At this point, one might presume that, if orders had been given Chehab to control all Lebanon and not only the Opposition-controlled part of it, the General would have sent his army to the field to restore order, instead of using the army only as an instrument to contain the Opposition within its territorial limits. For, throughout this period, the government had been arming its partisans with much of the airlifted United States military equipment destined to the Lebanese Armed Forces.¹⁰⁶ In addition to the security forces at its command, the government fell back on civilian loyalists composed of part of the Maronites and other Christians, of the Kataeb, and the PPS.¹⁰⁷ On 25 May 1958, President Chamoun signed the decree No. 19653 creating a militia of national volunteers without pay.¹⁰⁸ It was an attempt to give legal character

¹⁰⁵Malcolm Kerr, "Political Decision Making in a Confessional Democracy". Paper read at the conference on Lebanese democracy, University of Chicago, May, 1963.

¹⁰⁶J.C. Hurewitz, "Lebanese Democracy in its International Setting," Politics in Lebanon, op. cit., p. 232. See Thayer, op. cit., p. 19.

¹⁰⁷Qubain, op. cit., p. 83;
See Ibid., pp. 84-85.

¹⁰⁸Al-Hayat (Beirut), May 27, 1958.

to the distribution of arms among his followers.¹⁰⁹ The government was receiving arms from the United States, Turkey, Iraq, and Jordan. British and French planes cooperated in the transport of these arms.¹¹⁰ Iraqi and Jordanian war-planes were landing at the airport.¹¹¹ Boxes of Turkish origin were captured by the Opposition.¹¹² On 26 May 1958, the Opposition sent a message to General Chehab denouncing the unloading of such ammunitions on Lebanese territory and their distribution to civilian partisans of the government instead of their being delivered to the Army, asking him to deal urgently with the matter to prevent unpleasant occurrences.¹¹³ On 27 May, the National Front sent notes to the United States, British, and French Ambassadors in protest against their intervention in Lebanese internal affairs.¹¹⁴ On the same day, the United States Ambassador threatened to recommend a halt of American arms shipments

¹⁰⁹Qubain, op. cit., p. 135.

¹¹⁰Stewart, op. cit., p. 67.

¹¹¹Iraq, Ministry of Defense, The Special High Military Tribunal, op. cit., I, First Case, Sixth Session, August 23, 1958, 265.

¹¹²Qubain, op. cit., p. 114.

¹¹³Agwani, op. cit., pp. 80-81.

¹¹⁴Ibid., p. 81.

to Lebanon if the Lebanese government handed over American weapons to unofficial partisan bands. Later, he told newsmen that the Lebanese authorities gave him assurances that American arms were being used only by regular security forces.¹¹⁵

Lebanese complaints against the United Arab Republic.--

The Lebanese government appealed for aid to the League of Arab States, and to the United Nations Security Council, on the charge that President Abdel Nasser was plotting to overthrow President Chamoun and bring Lebanon into an alliance with the United Arab Republic.¹¹⁶ On 21 May 1958, the Lebanese Embassy in Cairo sent to the Secretariat of the League of Arab States a memorandum which said that the Lebanese government -- in conformity with article 6 of the Pact of the League -- had decided to submit a complaint against the United Arab Republic, because of "activities" and "unfriendly intervention" carried on by United Arab Republic officials, threatening the independence of Lebanon, the integrity of its territories, and the legally constituted regime. In conclusion, the Lebanese government asked the

¹¹⁵ Stewart, op. cit., p. 70.

¹¹⁶ Adams, op. cit., p. 290.

Secretariat of the League to call urgently the Council of the League to an extraordinary session on a "high level" to be held either in the Sudan or in Libya.¹¹⁷

On 22 May 1958, the Lebanese Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs held a meeting. Foreign minister Malek told its members that the government had decided to appeal for aid to the United Nations Security Council for the "only reason" that "we are under great pressure and intervention threatening our existence and liberty, and we want to rid Lebanon of this pressure."¹¹⁸ On the same day, Lebanon submitted its complaint to the United Nations Security Council calling for an urgent meeting to consider the situation "arising from the intervention of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."¹¹⁹ The Opposition in Lebanon issued a statement on the same day (22 May 1958) criticizing the government for taking this step and thus inviting foreign forces to Lebanon and plunging the country in the Cold War.¹²⁰ On 25 May, it sent a cablegram to the

¹¹⁷ Files of the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs...

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ The United Nations, Security Council: Official Records (Thirteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1958, S/4007, May 22, 1958) p. 33.

¹²⁰ Agwani, op. cit., p. 76.

United Nations Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, condemning the government's complaint to the Security Council, and explaining to him the causes of the dispute between the Lebanese people and their Government. ¹²¹

Efforts at mediation.-- Before proceeding to study the Lebanese complaint at the Council of the League of Arab States and at the United Nations Security Council, we should pause to discuss certain efforts for mediation involving both the United States and the United Arab Republic.

President Abdel Nasser, in an interview with the Indian journalist, Karanjia, pointed out that he proposed to the United States Ambassador in Cairo that the United States and the United Arab Republic mutually strive towards a compromise solution for the Lebanese crisis. President Abdel Nasser's suggestion was that a personality trusted by all parties should take the lead in Lebanon, and he proposed the name of General Fuad Chehab. His attempt, President Abdel Nasser said, did not find a "listening ear" from the American Government.¹²² The Cairo daily, Al-Ahrām, disclosed on 17 June 1958 the following facts about this

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 121.

¹²² Majmū'at Khitab . . . Abdel Nasser, op. cit., p. 173.

joint mediation. It said that on 20 May 1958, the United States Ambassador in Cairo, Raymond Hare, called on President Abdel Nasser, and asked him whether he could use his personal influence to persuade the Lebanese Opposition to end the crisis. The President answered him that the United States government imagined wrong if it thought that there was a studied plan binding the Opposition and the United Arab Republic. Then he said: "Had the Lebanese government not accused me, I would have tried to propose my mediation. . . . The only solution I can imagine now is for us both, the United States and the United Arab Republic, to try and undertake a joint approach with President Chamoun and the Opposition." Thereupon, the Ambassador left to contact his Government about this new prospect.¹²³

On 27 May 1958, Prime minister Sami Solh gave a statement which he had planned to read in the Chamber. (The Chamber having not met, he delivered the statement in a radio broadcast instead). In this statement, Sami Solh declared that the government was not going to propose to the Chamber any draft law for the amendment of the Constitution, and that the government had never sought such an amendment.¹²⁴

¹²³ Al-Ahrām (Cairo), June 17, 1958.

¹²⁴ Al-Hayat (Beirut), May 28, 1958.

On 30 May 1958, Ambassador Hare again visited President Abdel Nasser and told him that, since things had changed in Lebanon and President Chamoun was not going to run for the next elections, President Abdel Nasser might try to persuade the Opposition to stop its resistance. President Abdel Nasser replied that his presentation of facts did not show an understanding of the Lebanese situation. Then on 7 June 1958, he told Hare, "I am not a party to a conflict with Mr. Chamoun."¹²⁵

As for the government's statement, Patriarch Ma'ūshi told foreign correspondents on 30 May 1958, it had no value -- specially since the Prime minister was not able to deliver it at the Chamber of Deputies (thus giving it a binding quality), and because the President of the Republic could at any moment dismiss the government and appoint another one (thus doing away with the late government's promises).¹²⁶

On 18 June 1958, a spokesman for the United States State Department said that the accounts of the meetings between Ambassador Hare and President Abdel Nasser in

¹²⁵Al-Ahrām (Cairo), June 17, 1958.

¹²⁶Al-Hayat (Beirut), May 31, 1958.

Al-Ahrām were "inaccurate".¹²⁷ Later, in his memoirs, President Eisenhower described these contacts in a different manner. He mentioned them as taking place in the period during which the United Nations Security Council was in session for the study of the Lebanese complaint. He wrote that President Abdel Nasser contacted the United States government and offered to attempt using his own influence to end the troubles in Lebanon. "His conditions were not wholly unreasonable," said President Eisenhower; "they were that President Chamoun should finish out his term, that General Chehab. . . should succeed him, and that the rebels within Lebanon should be accorded amnesty. The message was passed on to President Chamoun. . . making certain he understood that our government was only a messenger in this regard and that we were not joining hands with the United Arab Republic against him. Apparently mistrusting President Nasser's motives, President Chamoun did nothing to follow up this lead."¹²⁸ Camille Chamoun mentioned none of these efforts in his memoirs.

¹²⁷"Lebanon: Chronology, April 1 - June 30, 1958", The Middle East Journal, XII (Summer 1958), 310.

¹²⁸Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 268.

Failure of the Council of the Arab League.-- The Council of the League of Arab States held an extraordinary session at Benghazi, Libya, to study the Lebanese complaint. The session lasted from 28 May to 6 June 1958. The Lebanese delegation's attitude at Benghazi was that the Council should either adopt a resolution confirming the complaint, affirming United Arab Republic intervention in Lebanese internal affairs, and ordering a cease fire in Lebanon, or refute the charge of United Arab Republic intervention.¹²⁹ This, one might observe, did not leave much room for compromise. From all indications, the Lebanese government was not seriously interested in solving the problem at the Arab League level. Charles Malek did not attend the Benghazi meetings.¹³⁰ He travelled to New York to attend the Security Council meetings. He reached the United States on 31 May 1958 and declared to the press that he was confident that the Security Council will find a solution to the problem.¹³¹

In Benghazi, Libya, on 1 June 1958, in the second meeting of the extraordinary session of the Council of the

¹²⁹S. Solh, op. cit., p. 510.

¹³⁰Qubain, op. cit., p. 91.

¹³¹Al-Hayat (Beirut), June 1, 1958.

League, Dr. Nofal, Assistant Secretary-General of the League, read a memorandum dated 28 May 1958 issued by the Foreign ministry of the United Arab Republic to all ambassadors and heads of diplomatic missions. The memorandum rejecting the Lebanese accusation of the United Arab Republic included these main points: that the Lebanese revolt was an internal one; that the leaders of the Opposition were distinguished personalities; that imperialistic forces were supplying the Lebanese government with arms and equipment; that the Lebanese government with the help of imperialistic forces wanted to transform the internal problem into an international one; and that the United Arab Republic accused the Lebanese government of permitting Lebanon to become a center of conspiracies against the United Arab Republic, and of deporting without any reason nine thousand United Arab Republic nationals from Lebanon.¹³²

In the same meeting, Bashīr A'war, minister of Justice and head of the Lebanese delegation at Benghazi, presented the Lebanese complaint against the United Arab Republic. The Lebanese government, he said, accuses the United Arab Republic of intervention in Lebanese internal

¹³² Leila Shihāb, "The Role of the United Nations During the Lebanese Crisis of 1958", op. cit., pp. 70-71.

affairs. This intervention appears clearly through: incitement of the Lebanese people through the radio and the press, and through the continuous activities of the agents of official organs in both Egyptian and Syrian regions leading to bloody events in Lebanon. A'war then read a list of bloody events which happened in Lebanon, and ended his speech by expressing the hope of Lebanon that the Council of the League would be able to take appropriate measures to end this intervention mainly by stopping subversive publicity in the United Arab Republic radio and press, and by preventing the infiltration of arms and terrorists into Lebanon. In conclusion, Mr. A'war said, "Lebanon's last wish is not to find itself forced to look for its safety. . . outside the League of Arab States. . ." ¹³³

The United Arab Republic delegate to the extraordinary session at Benghazi, Sayed Fahmi, replied to A'war in this same meeting. He described the Lebanese accusations as a series of allegations. He stressed the point that the government of the United Arab Republic respected Lebanon's integrity and independence. He doubted the purpose of the reference of the Lebanese complaint to

¹³³Files of the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates.

the Arab League and the Security Council at the same time, and asked whether the Lebanese government meant its call to the Arab League to be a measure of formal correctness only.

Fahmi then said that his Government had not received any advance notice of the facts, statements and information regarding the Lebanese complaint which the League had asked the Lebanese government to provide, and requested enough time to study them and prepare a reply. A'war requested of the Arab delegations not to allow an opportunity for procrastination. Mr. Fahmi protested against the word procrastination. Mr. Mahjoub of the Republic of the Sudan asked Mr. A'war to present proofs of what he had said. Then, it was decided that A'war should ask his Government to postpone the consideration of its complaint at the Security Council in order to give the Council of the League a chance to fulfill its mission.¹³⁴

On 3 June 1958, at the third meeting of the Council of the League, Sayed Fahmi, United Arab Republic delegate, gave his Government's reply to the Lebanese accusations. In his statement, he first criticized the concluding sentence of A'war's statement;¹³⁵ he said that this sentence

¹³⁴Shihāb, op. cit., pp. 73-75.

¹³⁵See above, p. 75, n. 133.

meant that the Lebanese government was not serious in referring its complaint to the League. Then he presented his Government's point of view that the Lebanese crisis was internal.¹³⁶ He made it clear that the United Arab Republic did not want Lebanon to become "another Korea".¹³⁷

As for the United Arab Republic press and radio, Fahmi said, until 16 May 1958, they were communicating what the international information agencies had published. There, he accused the Lebanese government of permitting several secret broadcasting stations throughout Lebanon to attack the United Arab Republic in the aim of sowing dissension within the newly united Republic.

The Lebanese government, Fahmi said, could not present documentary evidence to substantiate its complaint. He mentioned that when the Lebanese Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs pointed to Dr. Malek that the Lebanese complaint did not fulfill certain conditions to be accepted by the Security Council, he answered that the Lebanese government wanted to present Lebanon's problem to world opinion and did not aim at condemning the United Arab Republic. It is, then, a question of propoganda, Fahmi

¹³⁶ Shihāb, op. cit., p. 75.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 77.

concluded.

Sayed Fahmi replied to the Lebanese accusations one by one. Then, he said that judicial inquiry by Lebanese security police proved that members of these forces were themselves throwing bombs, besides the fact that Lebanese authorities had established centers -- he mentioned the names of five such centers -- to train the conspirators against the United Arab Republic. In the end, he accused the Lebanese authorities of making up incidents so as to show the United Arab Republic as an aggressor, thus justifying "foreign" intervention in the affairs of Lebanon and the coming of "foreign" forces so as to subject the Lebanese people to the Authorities' wishes.¹³⁸

Edouard Honein, deputy in the Chamber, and member of the Lebanese delegation at Benghazi, proceeded in the same meeting of 3 June 1958 to reply, on behalf of his Government, to the United Arab Republic delegation. He said that the United Arab Republic memorandum of 28 May to all diplomatic missions, and the United Arab Republic delegate's statements in the Council of the League were not an answer to Lebanon's complaint against the United Arab Republic; they constituted a complaint not submitted

¹³⁸ Shihāb, op. cit., pp. 78-80.

officially by the United Arab Republic. Therefore, it was the Lebanese delegation's right to neglect answering the memorandum and the statements.¹³⁹

The Lebanese government, said Honein, sought aid in both the League of Arab States and the United Nations Security Council because it believed it is its right and duty to apply to them both since Lebanon is bound by the two Charters of the League and the United Nations, and that there was nothing to wander about in this behaviour. The Lebanese government, he said, affirms to the League, in Dr. Malek's words, that it shall not permit for this complaint to harm in any way the fundamental interests of Arab brethren, specially those of the United Arab Republic. Honein quoted Malek's statement which also said: "The instant I sense that our complaint might lead in its development to more than the defense of our international status and its confirmation, . . . , i.e., might lead to any harm to the fundamental interests of the United Arab Republic, I will immediately join the United Arab Republic in defense of its interests." Honein then told the United Arab Republic delegation that it was up to them to prevent the Lebanese

¹³⁹Files of the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates.

step at the League from becoming merely a procedural measure. As for the foreign aid received by the Lebanese government, he asked the United Arab Republic delegate whether his government wanted Lebanon to remain unarmed against the enemy-Israel.

Concerning Lebanon's becoming a center of conspiracies against the United Arab Republic, Honein declared: " The Lebanese delegation confess now that they were not aware of this fact... but... do you level such ugly charges against Lebanon because it gives refuge to all the oppressed on earth?... It is in the interest of this Arab East, and in the interest of the whole world, that Lebanon be this refuge.... This is one of the justifications of its being." ¹⁴⁰

As for the "Syrians" deported out of Lebanon, Honein said, they were of the "type" who came to Lebanon to sow anarchy and throw bombs. He then declared that the United Arab Republic's description of the Lebanese situation as an internal dispute was a clever act which meant to lead Lebanon into a discussion of its internal affairs where they should not be discussed, or to camouflage the intervention of which Lebanon complained. The Lebanese delegation, he said, will not discuss, in the council, Lebanese internal problems for they belong to the Lebanese

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

alone; they will only discuss problems pertaining to the Council. Then, he exhibited documents and other proofs in support of the Lebanese complaint.¹⁴¹ Honein ended his statement, like A'war before him, by informing the Council of the League that, if it failed in its mission, the Lebanese government would resort to another solution.¹⁴²

Concerning the recording from radio broadcasts which Honein presented to the Council of the League, the United Arab Republic delegate said that the recording did not come from any of the three stations of the United Arab Republic and that the voice was rather confused.¹⁴³ As for two samples of clips carrying the Egyptian and Syrian armies stamps, Fahmi said that such weapons were not manufactured in Egypt, and that Egypt had no arms factories in 1949, the date stamped on the weapons.¹⁴⁴

In the morning of 4 June 1958, the Arab delegations, minus the delegations of the two disputing parties, met informally to discuss the draft resolution presented to

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Shihāb, op. cit., p. 83.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 84.

the Council earlier that same day by the Sudanese delegation.¹⁴⁵
In the afternoon of 4 June, the Council of the League held its fifth meeting, and Mr. Mahjoub, of the Sudan, presented the final Sudanese draft resolution which had won that morning the approval of the above-mentioned Arab delegations.¹⁴⁶
Fahmi, of the United Arab Republic, asked for the reinclusion of a phrase which had been a part of the original draft resolution and which said: "... after observing in both parties the spirit of mutual respect and the true intention of not interfering in the internal affairs of each other." A'war, of Lebanon, said that if the United Arab Republic amendment was accepted, the Lebanese delegation would have many objections. The Arab delegations, except that of Yemen, objected to Fahmi's amendment and he was surprised at their attitude. Then, A'war suggested the reinclusion of the phrase mentioned by Fahmi plus the addition of the following paragraph: "The Council of the League of Arab States would call upon each member not to interfere in the internal affairs of any other member." Fahmi objected on the ground that this meaning was already stated in the Pact of the League.

¹⁴⁵Shihāb, op. cit., p. 85; see S. Solh, op. cit., p. 517

¹⁴⁶for full text see Appendix I, p. 222.

Sayed Fahmi proposed to the Libyan President of the session, to include in the minutes of the fifth meeting of the Council the affirmation of the Arab delegations of the following: that the United Arab Republic "respected the independence and integrity of Lebanon and did not interfere in its internal affairs." For, he said, if all the delegates approved of the fact, then it should be mentioned.¹⁴⁷ Edouard Honein, of the Lebanese delegation, told Miss Leila Shihāb that none of the Arab delegations supported the Lebanese claim that United Arab Republic intervention in Lebanese affairs had taken place. The reason could be, he added, that they did not wish to provoke the United Arab Republic.¹⁴⁸ At this point the head of the Lebanese delegation asked for permission to refer to his government.¹⁴⁹

The Lebanese government received on 5 June 1958 the Council's final Sudanese draft resolution. This resolution stated that the Council had resolved that all activities disturbing the cordial atmosphere among the members of the League should cease, that the government

¹⁴⁷ Shihāb, op. cit., pp. 86-88.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 90.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 88.

of Lebanon should withdraw its complaint from the United Nations Security Council, that an appeal be addressed to the various Lebanese factions for stopping disturbances and for working towards the settlement of internal conflicts through constitutional and peaceful means, and that a commission appointed by the Council of the League from amongst its members be dispatched to Lebanon in order to calm sentiments and implement the resolution of the Council.¹⁵⁰

The Lebanese government rejected this draft resolution because it did not affirm United Arab Republic intervention in Lebanon, and because the proposed committee would have no official executive power, therefore its activities would be but a "waste of time."¹⁵¹ The official Lebanese answer, dated 5 June 1958, said: "The Arab League is evading the adoption of a resolution concerning interference and contents itself with substituting a resolution calling for reaching an understanding although the Lebanese government and its delegation insist on a resolution on the substance of the complaint."¹⁵² As observed before, the Lebanese government seemed not to care for compromise but for a

¹⁵⁰ Khalil, op. cit., II, 291.

¹⁵¹ S.Solh, op. cit., p. 518

¹⁵² Khalil, op. cit., II, 191.

resolution accusing the United Arab Republic of intervention or denying intervention.¹⁵³

On 6 June 1958, the Council of the League held its sixth meeting at Benghazi, Libya. The Lebanese delegate presented the reply of his government. He said that the Lebanese government did not accept the draft resolution which offered only a mediation effort, and that such a resolution would not lead to the withdrawal of the Lebanese complaint from the Security Council, only to its suspension while waiting for the result of that recommendation or mediation.¹⁵⁴

Upon the Lebanese rejection of the draft resolution, the delegations of Iraq and Jordan withdrew their support of it.¹⁵⁵ Honein told Miss Shihāb that the delegations of Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia greatly encouraged the Lebanese delegation to insist on its complaint. The Lebanese delegation understood that the Iraqi and Jordanian delegations had received orders from their respective governments to support the Lebanese delegation under all

¹⁵³ see above, p. 73.

¹⁵⁴ Shihāb, op. cit., p. 88.

¹⁵⁵ S. Solh, op. cit., p. 520; see Chamoun, op. cit., p. 415.

circumstances.¹⁵⁶ It would be pertinent to note here a statement by Dr. Fādel Jamāli, then Iraqi minister and representative at the Security Council, made at that Council's meeting of 6 June 1958. Jamāli said:

I wish to state that I have information from my government that the Arab League was not able to reach an agreed solution. . . . We had hoped that the Arab League might have saved us the time and trouble of discussing the whole issue here. . . .¹⁵⁷

In the Council of the League, on 6 June, the Lebanese government and other Arab delegations having rejected the Sudanese draft resolution, the resolution was considered "as if it had never existed;"¹⁵⁸ the United Arab Republic delegate said that from the beginning he had warned that the Lebanese government was not serious in referring its complaint to the Council of the League and did not want to reach a solution there.¹⁵⁹

The creation of UNOGiL.-- The United Nations Security Council began dealing with the Lebanese complaint on 6 June 1958. The complaint was about the United Arab

¹⁵⁶ Shihāb, op. cit., pp. 89-90.

¹⁵⁷ S/PV. 823, June 6, 1958, p. 33.

¹⁵⁸ Shihāb, op. cit., p. 89.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 90.

Republic intervention which consisted of: infiltration of armed bands from Syria into Lebanon; participation of United Arab Republic nationals in acts of terrorism and rebellion against the established authorities in Lebanon; supply of arms from Syria to individuals and bands in Lebanon rebelling against these authorities; and waging of a violent radio and press campaign in the United Arab Republic calling for the overthrow of the established authorities in Lebanon. The complaint brought to the attention of the Security Council that the continuance of such situation and dispute would be likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.¹⁶⁰

The Security Council postponed three times the consideration of this item in order to permit the Arab League to complete its consideration of the matter.¹⁶¹ Dr. Malek, Lebanese Foreign minister and head of the Lebanese delegation at the United Nations, addressed the

¹⁶⁰The United Nations, Security Council: Official Records (Thirteenth year, Supplement for April, May, and June 1958, S/4007, May 22, 1958) p. 33; for full text see Appendix II, p. 223.

¹⁶¹"Questions Concerning the Middle East", Yearbook of the U.N., 1958 (New York: United Nations Office of Public Information, 1959), p. 36.

Council on 6 June with a long statement. He mentioned that the Arab League had taken no decision on the Lebanese complaint. In consequence thereof, the Government of Lebanon was bound, "much to its regret", to press the issue before the Security Council.¹⁶²

Charles Malek made three claims in his statement: first, that there has been, and there still is, massive, illegal and unprovoked intervention by the United Arab Republic in the affairs of Lebanon; second, that this intervention aimed at undermining, and in fact threatened, the independence of Lebanon; and, third, that this situation, if it continued, was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. The United Arab Republic intervention, Malek said, was proved by six sets of facts: (a) the supply of arms on a large scale from the United Arab Republic to subversive elements in Lebanon; (b) the training of Lebanese in subversion on the territory of the United Arab Republic, and sending them back to Lebanon for subverting the Government; (c) the participation of the United Arab Republic civilian nationals, residing in or passing into Lebanon, in subversive and terrorist activities in Lebanon; (d) the participation of

¹⁶²S/PV. 823, op. cit., p. 1.

United Arab Republic government elements in subversive and terrorist activities and their direction of rebellion in Lebanon; (e) the violent and utterly unprecedented press campaign conducted by the United Arab Republic against the Government of Lebanon; and (f) the violent and utterly unprecedented radio campaign conducted by the United Arab Republic inciting the people of Lebanon to overthrow the legally constituted government.¹⁶³

The unmistakable aim of this campaign, Dr. Malek said, "was to overthrow the present regime in Lebanon and to replace it with one that would be more subservient to the will of the United Arab Republic. . . . The only sin of Lebanon in the eyes of the United Arab Republic is not that it has really done or is likely to do any harm to any country, let alone any Arab country, but that it is independent and follows a policy of friendship towards and cooperation with the Western World."¹⁶⁴ Malek said that the Lebanese government wanted only that the United Arab Republic intervention, in all its aspects, should stop. He asked the Security Council to help Lebanon achieve its wish, and depended on the Council's "wisdom" to choose the necessary method.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 20.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 22.

Mr. 'Umar Lutfi, the United Arab Republic delegate, replied on 6 June and on 10 June 1958. The United Arab Republic evaluation of the Lebanese question was summed up in these two statements.

In his first statement, Lutfi declared that the Government of Lebanon had striven to give an international aspect to what is a purely domestic problem so as to divert the attention of its own public opinion and that of the world from the prevailing internal situation.¹⁶⁶ He said that the Lebanese representative to the Security Council had based his accusations against the United Arab Republic on isolated facts and individual statements, the "justice" or "merits" of which it would be "very difficult for the Council to assess;"¹⁶⁷ that the majority of the events cited by Malek were based on reports prepared by the Lebanese police or by the Deuxième Bureau which "no court in any of our countries" takes into account unless they are corroborated by conclusive evidence, which is "by no means the case here."¹⁶⁸ As for the "alleged" radio and

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 23.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 24.

¹⁶⁸ S/PV. 824, June 10, 1958, p. 2.

press campaign, "even if there were any grounds for this allegation", said 'Umar Lutfi, the United Arab Republic considered this had no effect on the development of events in Lebanon. Moreover, from the "juridical" point of view, this aspect of the problem was in no likelihood "to threaten international peace and security," and consequently was not "within the jurisdiction of the Council."¹⁶⁹

Lutfi told the Security Council on 10 June 1958 that the Government of Lebanon had subjected the diplomatic personnel of the United Arab Republic to treatment contrary to the rules of international law. He gave a list of arrests of United Arab Republic diplomatic personnel and their search as of 14 May 1958, and reported that the United Arab Republic Embassy in Beirut had protested vigorously.¹⁷⁰ He brought to the Council's attention the fact that the Lebanese government had been engaging in a mass expulsion of United Arab Republic citizens from Lebanese territory without explanation and without "even any kind of supervisory commission as prescribed by international law."¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁹S/PV. 823, op. cit., p. 30.

¹⁷⁰S/PV. 824, op. cit., p. 12.

¹⁷¹S/PV. 823, op. cit., p. 31.

'Umar Lutfi did mention that plotting against the United Arab Republic had been carried on in Lebanon for sometime, the "chief instigators" being the "Syrian nationalists", who had been convicted in 1949 in Lebanon of high treason and who were pardoned "wholesale" under the then present regime.¹⁷² In short, the United Arab Republic delegate at the Security Council declared that it was clear "that it has not been established that the United Arab Republic has intervened in the domestic affairs of Lebanon," and that this Lebanese "domestic" problem "is not and could not be a threat to international peace." "The present situation is the result of political differences which divide the Lebanese themselves and it is for them alone to find the solution."¹⁷³

Charles Malek again addressed the Council on 10 June 1958, and said that his Government had instructed him to inform the Security Council that the situation in Lebanon was becoming very serious. He requested the Council to sit in "continuous session" until it reached "some decision about this important matter."¹⁷⁴

¹⁷²S/PV. 824, op. cit., p. 12.

¹⁷³S/PV. 823, op. cit., p. 32.

¹⁷⁴S/PV. 824, op. cit., p. 13.

The most important point to be extracted from Malek's speech of 10 June is his explanation concerning the expulsion of United Arab Republic nationals from Lebanon. He said, "In general, it was a reaction against the subversive activities of some of them, and many of them had been suspected of having taken part in these subversive activities for a long time. Many of them, again, were people who were without identity cards."¹⁷⁵

The United States delegate at the United Nations, Mr. Cabot Lodge, supported the Lebanese point of view. On 10 June 1958, he said:

The conclusion is clear that there has been outside interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Lebanon, that this interference has been designed to promote civil strife and to impede the efforts of the constituted authorities to restore order and tranquillity, and that the interference has occurred from the territory, and via the facilities of the United Arab Republic.¹⁷⁶

The delegate of the Soviet Union at the Security Council, Mr. Sobolev, said:

The Soviet delegation considers that there are no grounds for intervention in the domestic affairs of Lebanon by any country or by the Security Council, and such intervention is

¹⁷⁵Ibid., p. 20.

¹⁷⁶Ibid., p. 47.

inadmissible. It is, on the contrary, the duty of the Security Council to rebuff any attempts at external interference in the domestic affairs of the Arab States. This point must be emphasized, since numerous facts show that certain Western Powers are attempting to use the events in Lebanon for the purpose of intervening in its domestic affairs and of exerting further pressure on the Arab States. ¹⁷⁷

At this point, an impasse was reached.

On 10 June 1958, the Lebanese government received a cable from Dr. Malek informing them that the Swedish delegate at the Security Council contacted him and the President of the Security Council, and suggested proposing a draft resolution appointing an international commission to go immediately to Lebanon and investigate the matter of intervention. The Lebanese Council of Ministers met that day and saw that this proposed draft resolution was somehow similar to the Sudanese draft resolution which Lebanon had rejected on 5 June 1958. The Lebanese government decided not to accept any resolution which did not contain an accusation of the United Arab Republic. ¹⁷⁸ However, the Swedish delegate submitted the draft resolution and it was adopted in the Security Council on 11 June

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 29.

¹⁷⁸ Al-Hayat (Beirut), June 11, 1958.

1958 by ten affirmative votes, with the Soviet Union abstaining. The Swedish draft resolution called for "urgently" appointing an observation group which would proceed to Lebanon "so as to ensure that there was no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other matériel across the Lebanese borders."¹⁷⁹ The United Nations Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, was put in charge of the implementation of this resolution. He appointed the observer group which was given the official name of United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon, (UNOGiL). The role of UNOGiL was limited to the external aspects of the political situation, notably the "infiltrations." Although composed of military men, it was assigned the role of an organ of information.¹⁸⁰ However, the Security Council expected from the Observer Group more than simple information. It expected that the Observers' presence would act as a "deterrent" to the Opposition in Lebanon, thus preventing any illegal infiltration of arms

¹⁷⁹ The United Nations, Security Council: Official Records (Thirteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1958, S/4023, June 11, 1958) p. 47.

¹⁸⁰ René - Jean Dupuy, "L'Affaire Libanaise," (extracted article from Annuaire Francais de Droit International, 1959, ed. Mme Paul Bestid [Paris: Imprimerie Louis-Jean-G.A.P., 1960]), p. 24.

or personnel across the frontiers.¹⁸¹ UNOGiL thus proceeded on the basis that it had no right to interfere in the internal affairs of Lebanon and its people.¹⁸²

The United Arab Republic did not object to the Security Council decision, and Lebanon accepted it too for, as Dr. Azqul explained, Lebanon came to the Security Council with no set resolution and hence had no better proposition to make.¹⁸³

The disappointment of the Lebanese government.--

The United Nations' observers began reaching Beirut, but the Lebanese government -- on receiving a report from Malek concerning his talks in Washington on the morning of 13 June -- met on the evening of the same day and reached the decision that the Security Council should be called to restudy the Lebanese complaint. Malek cabled his Government on 15 June that Hammarskjold had decided to visit Beirut in the hope of getting more information and a better view of the situation, and that his contacts will be with UNOGiL and Lebanese officials only.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸¹ Interview with Dr. Karim Azqul.

¹⁸² "Tass Statement, June 24, 1958", Agwani, op. cit., p.111.

¹⁸³ Interview with Dr. Karim Azqul.

¹⁸⁴ Al-Hayat (Beirut), June 17, 1958.

It seems that President Chamoun did not foresee a successful end to the Observers' mission -- for, on 16 June 1958, in the meeting of the Council of Ministers at the Presidential mansion, the Lebanese government signed a document giving President Chamoun the authority to request foreign military aid when he deemed it necessary.¹⁸⁵

Dag Hammarskjold reached Beirut on 19 June 1958. He believed, according to Dr. Azqul, that the Lebanese crisis "in more than its two thirds" was an internal affair, and therefore, the more it was publicized, the more it would grow and have regrettable after-effects.¹⁸⁶

Charles Malek cabled President Chamoun from New York on 19 June 1958 saying: "I have serious reasons to believe that Hammarskjold is preparing a new Munich for Lebanon. This is the secret of his actual voyage and I cannot warn you enough against this danger. Most probably he was d'accord with Abdel Nasser before leaving New York."¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁵ Chamoun, op. cit., pp. 420 - 21.

¹⁸⁶ Interview with Dr. Karim Azqul.

¹⁸⁷ Chamoun, op. cit., p. 417.

Hammarskjold visited Beirut, Amman, Jerusalem, and Cairo. By 24 June he was back in Beirut, and he conferred with President Chamoun again. Chamoun and his Government were disappointed in him.¹⁸⁸ On 25 June 1958, President Chamoun declared in a press conference that the Observer Group had failed in its mission.¹⁸⁹ He also said that an international police force was the right type of instrument to prevent intervention; that the Lebanese crisis affected peace and stability in the Middle East and it was not fair that Lebanon alone bear the responsibility; and that when need arose Lebanon would make use of the provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.¹⁹⁰ President Chamoun had sent word to the United States Ambassador in Beirut that the time for American intervention had come.¹⁹¹ Then again, on another occasion, the President demanded that the Sixth Fleet "be ordered to Beirut at full steam." The Ambassador's reply

¹⁸⁸S. Solh, op. cit., p. 602;
see Chamoun, op. cit., pp. 416-17.

¹⁸⁹Agwani, op. cit., p. 205.

¹⁹⁰Ibid.

¹⁹¹Thayer, op. cit., p. 24.

was not in the positive, but "unknown to Chamoun", at the Ambassador's request, "two destroyers were dispatched from the Sixth Fleet and were cruising about just over the horizons from Beirut."¹⁹²

UNOGiL was not able until 15 July 1958 to obtain full freedom of access to all areas in Lebanon. Then, the Observer Group, for various reasons, among them the landing of American troops, was unable to take advantage of this permission until the end of the period covered by its third report, i.e. the period 15 July - 15 August 1958. By then, the internal part of the crisis was essentially over.¹⁹³

Although the Observers were unable to inspect all areas as mentioned above, their first report covering the period 12 June - 1 July held illuminating bits of information. It stated:

It was learned that of the total land frontiers with Syria, of some three hundred twenty four kilometers in length, only eighteen, lying on either side of the main Beirut-Damascus road, remained under the control of the Government forces . . .¹⁹⁴

¹⁹² Ibid., p. 25.

¹⁹³ Qubain, op. cit., pp. 149-50.

¹⁹⁴ The United Nations, Security Council: Official Records (Thirteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1958, S/4040, July 1, 1958), p. 4;

See Murphy, op. cit., p. 488.

Concerning the nature of the people living along the border region, it said:

The peoples of these areas have traditionally borne arms, and habits of mutual assistance in peaceful as well as in troubled times have been regarded as a normal expression of tribal solidarity. There are some other areas also where the border is not clearly demarcated or recognized. . .

and

Throughout the country the possession of arms is common practice.¹⁹⁵

In conclusion, the report stated:

Nor was it possible to establish if any of the armed men observed had infiltrated from outside; there is little doubt, however, that the vast majority were in any case Lebanese.¹⁹⁶

President Chamoun was not pleased with the report. He told Scott Gibbons, Daily Mail correspondent, on 6 July 1958 that he was deeply disappointed both in the Observers and the Secretary-General, who had said after visiting Lebanon that there was no foundation for the charge of "massive interference" by the United Arab Republic. The Observer Group, said President Chamoun, gave in their report "carte blanche to Colonel Nasser to step up infiltra-

¹⁹⁵Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁹⁶Ibid., p. 9.

tion into Lebanon", and the "go ahead" signal to the United Arab Republic to take over the Middle East without fear of any objection by the United Nations.¹⁹⁷ On 8 July 1958, the Lebanese government sent to the Secretary-General its official comments on the first report of UNOGiL. The report said that the positive conclusions drawn by UNOGiL were either "inconclusive", "misleading", or "unwarranted".¹⁹⁸ Then it made clear that the three claims which Lebanon made on 6 June 1958 before the Security Council concerning the massive intervention of the United Arab Republic in its internal affairs were in no way "impaired" or "invalidated" by the UNOGiL report of 1 July 1958. Therefore, the responsibility of the Security Council in this respect remained "undiminished and intact."¹⁹⁹

In New York, the emissaries of London, Paris, and Washington implied that their own sources were more reliable than the Observer Group.²⁰⁰ President Eisenhower recorded in his memoirs: "Some of our own observers definitely doubted the competence of the team."²⁰¹

¹⁹⁷ Agwani, op. cit., p. 215.

¹⁹⁸ The United Nations, Security Council: Official Records (Thirteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1958, S/4043, July 8, 1958) p. 18.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., pp. 26-27.

²⁰⁰ Stewart, op. cit., p. 113.

²⁰¹ Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 272.

In the meantime, on 2 July 1958, the Lebanese government issued a statement declaring there were new proofs of the United Arab Republic interference in Lebanese domestic affairs.²⁰² On 4 July, the government expelled from Lebanon six members of the United Arab Republic Embassy staff in Beirut and an Egyptian teacher on charges of having contacts with the rebels and carrying activities "prejudicial" to Lebanon. The allegations were denied by Ambassador Ghaleb.²⁰³

In spite of all these developments, President Chamoun declared to press correspondent William Ryan on 9 July 1958 that he definitely intended to relinquish the Presidency when his term of office ended on 23 September 1958.²⁰⁴ However, Opposition leader Saeb Salaam declared emphatically in an interview on 10 July that the Opposition was not ready to live with the President for another day.²⁰⁵

²⁰² Agwani, op. cit., p. 93.

²⁰³ "Lebanese Criticisms of U.N. Report," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, XI (July 19-26, 1958), p.16297.

²⁰⁴ Al-Hayat (Beirut) July 10, 1958.

²⁰⁵ "The Lebanese Political Situation," Keesing's Contemporary . . ., op. cit., p. 16293.

The Lebanese Government's request
of United States military aid

How would the Lebanese question have developed had external events not changed the course of history? It is not easy to know. The revolution which broke out at dawn in Iraq on 14 July 1958 brought great changes to the Lebanese situation. President Chamoun had in early July sent a message to the government of the Kingdom of Iraq asking that an Iraqi armoured brigade be dispatched to the Iraqi-Syrian frontier as a diversion.²⁰⁶ The Iraqi government gave orders to an Iraqi brigade to move to Jordan and from there "to march into Syria on 3 August in support of President Chamoun."²⁰⁷ The brigade instead of marching towards Jordan, moved into the capital, Baghdad.²⁰⁸ The Government was overthrown, and the royal family exterminated. The Revolution had been carried out by Brigadier 'Abdel Karim Qassem, and Colonel 'Abdel Salaam 'Aref, who "appeared to be the real organizer of the coup."²⁰⁹ Bulletin number one, issued by the Commander-in-Chief, Iraqi National Armed Forces, read:

²⁰⁶ Marlowe, Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism, op. cit., p. 172.

²⁰⁷ Wall, loc. cit., p. 373.
See Stewart, op. cit., p. 115.

²⁰⁸ Marlowe, op. cit., p. 172.

²⁰⁹ Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 278.

We have undertaken to liberate our dear country from the domination of the corrupt clique installed by imperialism to rule over the people and to play with its destiny for the rulers' personal interests and advantages. . . . The rule must be entrusted to a government emanating from the people and inspired by them. This cannot be achieved except by the formation of a popular republic adhering to complete Iraqi unity and linked by brotherly ties with the Arab and Moslem states. The Republic will act in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the principles of the Bandung Conference and will abide by all pledges and pacts consistent with the interests of the country.²¹⁰

It should be noted that this history-making proclamation, which pointed to Iraq's brotherly ties with Arab as well as Moslem states, did not mention the League of Arab States or Iraq's adherence to its Pact.

The new Iraqi government recognized the United Arab Republic, declared the withdrawal of Iraq from the "forged" Hashemite Federation,²¹¹ and, on 16 July 1958, it announced its decision to leave the Baghdad Pact.²¹²

President Chamoun heard the news about Iraq early in the morning of 14 July. At 8:30 a.m., his decision

²¹⁰The Iraqi Revolution, 1958-1959, ed. by The 14th July Celebrations Committee (Baghdad: The Times Press, n.d.), p. 7.

²¹¹Ibid., p. 102.

²¹²Al-Hayat (Beirut), July 18, 1958.

was made--" to save the country from an invasion, and from a disastrous civil war, at the price of a foreign intervention." This act, he thought, would be justified by article 51 of the United Nations Charter.²¹³ He told the Ambassadors of the United States, France, and Great Britain that the revolution in Iraq threatened not only Lebanon but all the Middle East, and asked them to respect their engagements based on the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, and the Eisenhower Doctrine; he said that he told the United States' Ambassador he expected a positive answer in action within twenty four hours.²¹⁴ Thayer said President Chamoun told the Ambassadors that unless intervention was forthcoming within forty eight hours, he was a dead man with Lebanon becoming a "Nasser satellite."²¹⁵

Many Powers thought that the Iraqi Revolution was either engineered by Abdel Nasser or was the result of his influence. They thought that its success "was likely to set off a surge of Arab nationalist revolutionary

²¹³Chamoun , op. cit., p. 423.

²¹⁴Ibid., pp. 423-24.

²¹⁵Thayer, op. cit., p. 28;
Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 270.

enthusiasm which might topple Chamoun in Beirut and King Hussein in Amman." ²¹⁶ President Eisenhower wrote that on 14 July the purposes of the Iraqi revolution were still unknown, but the United States government realized that the Iraqi government had the capability of "sudden military action" against Jordan or Kuwait. ²¹⁷ He called the United States Congressmen to a meeting and put before them the decision which faced him -- military intervention in Lebanon. ²¹⁸ President Eisenhower believed that without "vigorous" response from the United States, events could result in a complete elimination of Western influence in the Middle East. ²¹⁹ British Premier Macmillan, on 14 July, called President Eisenhower on the telephone and told him he had received a request of aid from King Hussein of Jordan; he asked President Eisenhower for confirmation that they were in this question together "all the way"; President Eisenhower assured him of that. ²²⁰

²¹⁶ Cremeans, op. cit., p. 165;
See Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 270.

²¹⁷ Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 278.

²¹⁸ Adams, op. cit., p. 291.

²¹⁹ Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 269;
See Chamoun, op. cit., pp. 424-25.

²²⁰ Ibid., p. 273.

Washington had "now come into line with London."²²¹

On 14 July 1958, the United States Ambassador in Beirut gave President Chamoun the answer of his government. The United States Sixth Fleet was on its way to the Lebanese coast.²²² On 15 July at noon, as the United States marines were landing, the United States Ambassador, McClintock, at President Chamoun's request, went to General Fuad Chehab and told him of the arrival of the Fleet. General Chehab -- who had no earlier knowledge of Chamoun's request -- told him that "an armed foreign intervention ... might well provoke his troops to join the rebels and resist the landing with force."²²³ General Chehab threatened the United States Sixth Fleet, but in the end, after various contacts and meetings, he was imposed upon to accept the fait accompli.²²⁴

With the Sixth Fleet in Lebanese waters, President Eisenhower decided to send a personal emissary to Lebanon and to other states of the Middle East. He chose Robert

²²¹Marlowe, op. cit., p. 173.

²²²Chamoun, op. cit., p. 424.

²²³Thayer, op. cit., p. 29.

²²⁴for more description see Ibid., p. 33.

Murphy.

Six aspects of the Lebanese affair after 14 July will be studied in the following pages. They are:

- 1) Local reactions to United States intervention;
- 2) The attitude of the United Arab Republic;
- 3) The attitude of the Soviet Union;
- 4) The Security Council meetings;
- 5) The Murphy commission in Lebanon;
- 6) The General Assembly emergency special session.

In Lebanon, government supporters believed that United States troops came to bolster the Chamoun regime.²²⁵ The Opposition protested that the United States intervention was a violation of Lebanese sovereignty. The speaker of the House, Adel Osseyran, declared on 17 July that article 51 of the United Nations Charter did not permit the interference of one state in the affairs of another outside the scope of the United Nations; that the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 could not be invoked as it concerned the protection of Israel, and the events in Lebanon constituted no violation of the frontiers or the armistice lines; and that the Eisenhower Doctrine too did not apply, as there was no armed

²²⁵ Qubain, op. cit., p. 119.

communist aggression on Lebanon.²²⁶

President Abdel Nasser was in Brioni, Yugoslavia, when the Iraqi Revolution broke out. On the same day, 14 July, he sailed back home. On 15 July, as his convoy was sailing through the Adriatic Sea, two messages from Yugoslavia's President, Tito, warned him of great many dangers in the Mediterranean. In the second message, it was reported that Premier Khrushchev, through the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia wished Abdel Nasser not to move into the area. In the meantime, news had reached Abdel Nasser about the landing of the Sixth Fleet in Lebanon, and of British paratroops in Jordan, about Turkish troops moving towards Mosul, Iraq, and about the declaration of a state of emergency for the Israeli forces. Abdel Nasser sailed back to Brioni, and decided to go to Moscow and meet Chairman Khrushchev, and discuss with him the new developments in the Middle East and the means of stopping aggression against the Arab states. He reached Moscow on 17 July and had a lengthy talk with Khrushchev. Khrushchev agreed that the situation in the Middle East was extremely critical, and said that Western

226

"Landings of United States Marines, "Keesing's Contemporary Archives, XI, (July 26 - August 2, 1958), p. 16308. Interview with Mr. Adel Osseyran.

activities in the area reflected panic. The fall of the Baghdad Pact, Khrushchev continued, dealt a terrible blow to Western interests and western influence. Nevertheless, Khrushchev frankly said that the Soviet Union was "not ready to enter into an armed conflict with the West, a conflict with unpredictable results." Abdel Nasser said: "I don't ask you to go into armed conflict with the West. I want to know to what extent the Soviet Union is ready to help." Khrushchev answered: "We shall support you politically with all means. We believe it is possible to avoid an armed conflict. We can activate tremendous world pressure against any possibility of Western aggression against the Arab states. Also, we can start large-scale military maneuvers along the Soviet Union's southern frontiers, on the borders of Iran and Turkey. I don't mind the West imagining we are preparing for more action; however, I care that you realize the truth of it all."²²⁷

Abdel Nasser left Moscow on 18 July 1958 and flew back to the United Arab Republic, to Damascus.

In a speech delivered on 18 July 1958, President Abdel Nasser said:

²²⁷ Muhammad Hassanein Haikal, "Bi Sarāhat, "Al-Ahrām, (Cairo), January 22, 1965.
Italics mine.

The occupation of the Lebanon by American forces constitutes a danger to peace in the Middle East, a grave violation of the United Nations Charter, and a flagrant threat to the Arab countries. ... It is obvious that the American government has taken the Lebanese revolt ... as a pretext for the occupation of the Lebanon and for threatening the independent countries of the Middle East. ... As to the situation in Iraq ... the government of the United Arab Republic declares that [in] any aggression against the Arab Republic of Iraq ... the United Arab Republic will carry out all its obligations towards Iraq, in accordance with the provisions of the Arab Collective Security Pact.²²⁸

On 17 July, the United States had warned President Abdel Nasser that it held the United Arab Republic responsible for the security of United States troops in Lebanon. The United Arab Republic viewed this warning as an ultimatum.²²⁹ President Abdel Nasser declared on 18 July, "I cannot understand; they come to Lebanon invading it and hold us responsible for the protection of this invasion."²³⁰

In the meantime, the Soviet Union was reacting to the United States intervention with intensified political and propaganda measures, but without taking commitments or without significant military moves.

²²⁸ Khalil, op. cit., II, 196.

²²⁹ Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 277.

²³⁰ Majmū'at Khitab ... Abdel Nasser, op. cit., p. 141.

Soviet actions, despite polemics and some damage to the United States Embassy in Moscow, "remained cautious and negative". The Soviet Union staged extensive military maneuvers in the South of Russia, but confined the external moves to the diplomatic.²³¹

At the request of the United States Ambassador at the United Nations, the Security Council met on 15 July to study the Lebanese question in its new context. When they took their seats, the Security Council members found on their desks copies of an interim report from UNOGIL stating that "on 15 July 1958 it had completed the task of obtaining full freedom of access to all sections of the Lebanese frontier."²³² But the Lebanese problem had practically become a matter to be decided by the two super-powers.

On 15 July 1958, the United States proposed a draft resolution providing for United Nations contingents

²³¹ Eisenhower, op. cit., pp. 277, 282.

²³² The United Nations, Security Council: Official Records (Thirteenth Year, Supplement for July, August, September 1958, S/ 4051, July 15, 1958) p. 33.

"to protect the territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon",²³³ and the Soviet Union proposed another draft resolution accusing the United States of intervention in Lebanon, and calling upon it to cease armed intervention in the domestic affairs of the Arab states and to remove its troops.²³⁴ On 16 July, Cabot Lodge defended the United States draft resolution, and Sobolev rejected it.²³⁵

The Swedish delegate considered that the action carried by the United States in Lebanon was not in accordance with article 51 of the Charter since there had been neither an armed attack nor an international conflict within the terms of that article. He submitted to the Security Council a draft resolution, dated 17 July 1958, declaring that the United States action had "substantially" altered the conditions of the observation activities in Lebanon, and requesting the Secretary-General to suspend the activities of the Observers until further notice.²³⁶

²³³Ibid., (S/4050, July 15, 1958) p. 31.

²³⁴S/IV. 827, July 15, 1958, p. 22.

²³⁵S/PV. 829, July 16, 1958, p. 11.

²³⁶The United Nations, Security Council: Official Records (Thirteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1958, S/4054, July 17, 1958) p. 38.

On 17 July, too, Sobolev, presented to the Security Council a revised form of the draft resolution S/4047 emphasizing the immediate withdrawal of United States and British troops from both Lebanon and Jordan.²³⁷

In the Security Council, a stalemate was reached. It induced Chairman Khrushchev to launch a diplomatic campaign for holding a summit conference for the discussion of the Middle East. He sent letters to that effect on 19 July to President Eisenhower, British Premier Macmillan, French President de Gaulle, and Indian Prime minister Nehru. While Nehru promptly agreed to attend the proposed conference, the rest of the correspondents entered into a lengthy argument over the "purpose", "form", and "desirability" of holding a summit conference.²³⁸

Early in August, Khrushchev sent Eisenhower a message in which he said the United States government was responsible for the summit meeting not being held; therefore, he said, "he was calling for a special session

²³⁷ S/PV. 831, July 17, 1958, p. 17.

²³⁸ Agwani, op. cit., p. 299.

of the United Nations General Assembly."²³⁹ On 7 August 1958, at the request of both the United States and the Soviet Union, each presenting a draft resolution, the Security Council agreed to convoke a special session of the General Assembly.²⁴⁰

In the meantime, on 17 July 1958, Robert Murphy, President Eisenhower's personal emissary, had reached Beirut. He was quick to realize that "compromise" and not "victory" was necessary "if Lebanon were to continue to have an independent existence."²⁴¹ Murphy wrote that the United States military and diplomatic staffs in Beirut came to the conclusion that "much of the conflict concerned personalities and rivalries of a domestic nature, with no relation to international issues. Communism was playing no direct or substantial part in the insurrection... The outside influences came mostly from Egypt and Syria." From talks with Chamoun, McClintock, and others, Murphy estimated best that "arrangements ... be made for an immediate election of a new President."²⁴² The American

²³⁹Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 285.

²⁴⁰S/PV. 838, August 7, 1958.

²⁴¹Marlowe, op. cit., p. 174.

²⁴²Murphy, op. cit., p. 492.

pressure on Chamoun was such that Admiral Holloway, commander of the Sixth Fleet, "threatened to retire his forces if the vote did not take place on 30 July 1958."²⁴³ Robert Murphy made direct and indirect contacts with the Opposition leaders and assured them that United States intervention in Lebanon was not to support President Chamoun.²⁴⁴ On 29 July 1958, the Opposition deputies and leaders issued a statement in which they stated their conditions for attending the Chamber's meeting scheduled for 31 July 1958 for the election of a new president. The conditions were embodied in a socio-political program which the future President should adopt. It included: evacuation of foreign troops, a foreign policy based on neutrality, collaboration with other Arab countries, a democratic revision of the Constitution, a general amnesty for the insurgents, and the immediate resignation of President Chamoun and the formation of a new government.²⁴⁵

The Chamber of Deputies met on 31 July 1958, and General Fuad Chehab was elected President of the Lebanese

²⁴³Chamoun, op. cit., p. 428.

²⁴⁴Murphy, op. cit., pp. 493, 494.

²⁴⁵Agwani, op. cit., pp. 374-75

Republic. Since then, the UNOGiL report of 14 August 1958 pointed out, a virtual nationwide truce covered the country with only occasional firing in some areas.²⁴⁶

The solution of the Lebanese question inside Lebanon did not stop the United States and the Soviet Union from calling the General Assembly to an emergency special session. The internal aspect of the question had been settled, but not the international aspect.

The General Assembly held its third extraordinary session, which extended from 8 to 21 August, to study the questions considered by the Security Council on 7 August 1958. President Eisenhower delivered to the Assembly on 13 August 1958 a speech defending the United States military action in Lebanon, and promising that United States troops would be withdrawn at the request of the government of Lebanon, or whenever "through action by the United Nations, or otherwise, Lebanon is no longer exposed to the original danger."²⁴⁷

The Soviet representative, Mr. Gromyko, said it

²⁴⁶The United Nations, Security Council: Official Records (Thirteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1958, S/4085, August 14, 1958) p. 127.

²⁴⁷A/PV. 733, August 13, 1958, p. 8.

was necessary "to withdraw foreign troops from Lebanon and Jordan," and pointed out that his delegation had submitted a draft resolution on the immediate withdrawal of United States troops from Lebanon and of British troops from Jordan, to be considered at the emergency special session of the General Assembly.²⁴⁸

A stalemate was taking hold of the General Assembly too. Towards a solution of the problem, seven member states submitted a draft resolution on 18 August 1958.²⁴⁹ The Arab states' delegates, in a private conference held on 20 August, agreed on the desirability of an Arab sponsored draft resolution.²⁵⁰

Dr. Karim Azqul said that the ten Arab states' draft resolution was submitted in an atmosphere different from that at Benghazi. Besides, it was proposed in the General Assembly which was not in session for studying the Lebanese complaint against the United Arab Republic. The Arab draft resolution, he said, did not include a

²⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 14-15.

²⁴⁹ The United Nations, General Assembly: Official Records (Third Emergency Special Session, Annexes, A/3878, August 18, 1958) p. 2.

²⁵⁰ Qubain, op. cit., p. 106.

solution for the critical relations between the United Arab Republic and Lebanon; it was a proclamation that the Arab states were brothers and that they could solve their disputes amongst themselves.²⁵¹ Karim Azqul also said that he had talked to 'Umar Lutfi, the United Arab Republic permanent representative at the United Nations, and proposed to him to convince the United Arab Republic head of delegation and Foreign minister, Mahmud Fawzi, not to mention the Lebanese complaint, while he himself would convince Charles Malek to keep the complaint out of the picture.²⁵²

It should be noted that the ten Arab states' draft resolution contained no condemnation of the Anglo-American intervention and no suggestion of a date for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and Jordan.²⁵³

On 21 August 1958, the General Assembly adopted unanimously the Arab draft resolution introduced by the Sudan on behalf of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco,

²⁵¹ Interview with Dr. Karim Azqul; see Mr. Mahjub's speech, A/PV. 746, August 21, 1958, p. 169.

²⁵² Interview with Dr. Karim Azqul.

²⁵³ Wall, loc. cit., p. 391.

Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic, and Yemen. Most meaningful in it are the undertakings made by the Arab states to observe the provision of article 8 of the Pact of the League of Arab states which confirms the respect of each member state for systems of government established in other member states.²⁵⁴

The New Political Regime in Lebanon and
the Rehabilitation of United Arab - Lebanese
Foreign Relations

On 23 September 1958, Fuad Chehab succeeded Camille Chamoun to the Presidency. In his inaugural address, President Chehab declared that it was of greatest urgency that Lebanon should sincerely and fully cooperate with its sister Arab states, and end the tension in its relations with some Arab states, specially the United Arab Republic; and that Lebanon should ensure the speedy withdrawal of foreign troops from its land.²⁵⁵

Rashīd Karāmē, Opposition leader from Tripoli, formed a new government, excluding from it former Loyalists.

²⁵⁴Yearbook of the United Nation, 1958, p. 46.
For the full text of the draft resolution see Appendix III,
PP. 224-25.

²⁵⁵Lebanon, Mahader Jalsāt Majliss..., op. cit.,
Ninth Legislative Session, Special meeting, September 23,
1958, pp. 672, 673.

In protest, the Kataēb, the PPS, and other supporters of the previous regime launched a counter-Revolution which was rapidly ended with an agreement that policy would be based on the principle of "no victor, no vanquished."²⁵⁶ Life soon went back to normal in Lebanon.

The United States announced on 8 October the withdrawal of its troops from Lebanon before the end of the month according to an agreement with the Lebanese government.²⁵⁷ By 25 October, all United States troops had left.²⁵⁸

On 14 November, UNOGil reported that since organized Opposition forces had ceased to exist, and the government was in "the process of extending its authority over the whole country," and the withdrawal of foreign troops was completed, UNOGil's task may be regarded as completed, and its withdrawal from Lebanon "should be undertaken."²⁵⁹

²⁵⁶ Agwani, op. cit., p. 373.

²⁵⁷ "United States Announces Withdrawal of Forces from Lebanon," The Department of State Bulletin, XXXIX (October 27, 1958), 650

²⁵⁸ Wall, loc. cit., p. 394

²⁵⁹ The United Nations, Security Council: Official Records (Thirteenth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1958, S/4114, November 14, 1958) pp. 8, 11, 12.

On 9 December 1958, the last United Nations military observer left Beirut, and UNOGiL officially ceased operations.²⁶⁰

On 16 November 1958, the Foreign minister of Lebanon, Hussein Oueini, informed the President of the Security Council by letter that "cordial" and "close" relations between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic had resumed their normal course. "For this reason," said the letter, "and in order to dispel any misunderstanding which might hamper the development of such relations, the Lebanese Government requests the Security Council to be good enough to delete from the list of matters before it the Lebanese complaint submitted to it on 22 May 1958..."²⁶¹

To bring back Lebanese foreign policy within its frontiers, to end all tension between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic, and to wipe out all external reminders of the 1958 crisis, the new Lebanese government

²⁶⁰ Wall, loc. cit., p. 394.

See the United Nations, Security Council: Official Records (Thirteenth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1958, S/ 4116, November 20, 1958) p. 15.

²⁶¹ The United Nations, Security Council: Official Records (Thirteenth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1958, S/4113, November 16, 1958) pp. 6-7.

renounced the Eisenhower Doctrine which had "counterposed" Lebanon against Egypt and Syria, later forming the United Arab Republic.²⁶² Prime minister, Rashīd Karāmē, told the Lebanese Press on 10 December 1958 that in the audience he granted William Rountree, United States Assistant Secretary of State, on 9 December 1958, he made it clear that Lebanese foreign policy was a policy of neutrality and non-alignment, with no room for a "privileged position" for any "foreign" state, or for membership in pacts. Karāmē told Rountree: "The United States government had declared the Eisenhower Doctrine to be a unilateral declaration; we declare that we are not bound by this Doctrine." When asked by the Press about the Richards-Malek joint communiqué, Karāmē answered, "It is the subject matter of the Eisenhower Doctrine and this Doctrine is no longer under discussion."²⁶³

Thus ended the first phase of Lebanese foreign policy towards the United Arab Republic and Iraq.

²⁶² Meo, op. cit., p. 186

²⁶³ Al-Hayat (Beirut), December 11, 1958

CHAPTER III

A GENERAL VIEW OF LEBANESE FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND IRAQ (September 1958 - September 1961)

The 1958 crisis proved clearly that Lebanese foreign policy was intrinsically knit with the inner composition of the Lebanese structure. Guided by this principle, Lebanese policy-makers showed great awareness of the demands imposed upon foreign policy by the internal political build-up of the state. To control the internal currents and to safeguard the state from their effect, the Lebanese government adopted towards the Arab states a policy of minimum engagements. This policy did not permit a dynamic friendship with any Arab state, whatever the circumstances, as it did not permit any animosity against another Arab state, even if there was reason for it. In each situation, too cordial relations with the one state, while they would have satisfied some Lebanese elements, would have provoked others. Internal cohesion was more important than taking sides. The new regime was, therefore, keen on preserving the

state and the unity of its people, and carefully designed its foreign policy accordingly.

It has been said that it became the Lebanese Republic's "policy to give active support to the Arab nationalist cause outside Lebanon, short of projects of Arab union" with precautions taken at the same time to guard the sovereignty and "peculiar interests" of Lebanon.¹ The meaning of such a proposition is given expression in the following exposé: Official Lebanon gave Arabism outside Lebanon a meagre share, and made seeming concessions to it, so as to protect itself from it, secure internal stability, and acquire through its appeasing external demonstrations the permanent potential to stifle Arabism in Lebanon (a field belonging to internal affairs), and to safeguard the prevailing Lebanese political and economic structures. From the standpoint of Arabism, this policy was essentially an isolationist attitude which could have only one negative

¹Kamāl Salīby, "Lebanon under Fuad Chehab" (unpublished paper, Beirut, December, 1964), pp. 16-17

By Arab nationalism is meant Abdel Nasser's policy.

benefit to Arab Nationalism: that Lebanon would not outside its own borders harm Arabism. Nevertheless, Lebanese isolationism was seen as characterized by a hope and a special care that the evils of Arab reality would continue to be-- a preliminary step towards the creation of a non-Arab Lebanon, both internally and externally. As a result of this isolationism, the Arabism of Lebanon became simply a slogan in its foreign policy towards the Arab states. Isolationism was practiced before September 1958 through direct opposition to nationalist and popular movements; in the post-1958 period, it continued to be enacted, but through indirect methods.²

Leonard Binder in his article "Political Change in Lebanon" denied the authenticity of the post-1958 Arab policy of Lebanon on the Executive level. He said that, unlike Chamoun, who thought he could cut Lebanon adrift from Abdel Nasser's foreign policy and "attach it firmly to the West," Chehab "found it most expedient, perhaps even the bulwark of his regime, to maintain the assertion

²Munah Solh, "Al-In'izaliyyah al-Jadidah fi Lubnān" (in Arabic) Lecture given at the Arab Cultural Club, Beirut, Lebanon, November 25, 1966. "The New Isolationism in Lebanon."

that Lebanon would support Arab goals and the goal of pan-Arab unification."³

These analyses underline the presence of divergent dynamic internal under currents within the Lebanese democracy on both the popular and the governmental levels. However, on the official level, the Lebanese government was successful in exhibiting a neutral and cordial foreign policy towards the United Arab Republic and Iraq. This policy was -- as we have said -- necessary to safeguard national unity. Moreover, the general situation in the Arab East, mainly the developments in United Arab-Iraqi relations, usually helped reconcile Lebanese interests with United Arab politics; whenever the circumstances were not helpful, however, Lebanon reverted to its classical policy of neutrality.

The Impact of Iraqi Developments on Lebanese Foreign Policy towards the United Arab Republic

Lebanon, after the crisis of 1958, restated its foreign policy towards the United Arab Republic in terms of traditional principles; and the new United Arab Republic-Iraqi relations supported Lebanon's positive

³Politics in Lebanon, op. cit., p. 311.

attitude. The balance of power that the Arab East was to know kept a stable pattern until the fall of 1961. There was a major change in the Arab world; Cairo retained its seat of leadership in the movement of Arab nationalism, and Iraq lost its leading role in the Arab world.⁴ In other words, Iraq, by losing its position as a pole in Arab politics, permitted the United Arab Republic to remain the only leader with internal stability, stature and strength to be reckoned with. This dual change in the Arab balance of power carried many implications for Lebanese policy-making, and it explains one facet of Lebanon's friendly attitude towards the United Arab Republic.

Of equal importance is the fact that Iraq, although it lost much of its influence in the Arab world, nevertheless kept the United Arab Republic government uneasy for the greater part of the period under examination.⁵ The Iraqi Revolution, while it toppled the Hashemite regime, did not produce harmony with the United Arab Republic. Political rivalry between Baghdad and Cairo

⁴ Interview with Mr. Kazem Solh.

⁵ J. S. H. Major, "The Middle East," Survey of International Affairs, 1959-1960, ed. G. Barraclough (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 338.

was to continue, in spite of the fact that Qassem's government had suspended Iraq's membership in the Baghdad Pact and had dissolved the Arab Federation.⁶ Qassem's policy appeared to some observers to be a "continuation of Nuri's in all but its pro-Western aspects," an isolationist policy in the sense that it aimed at maintaining Iraq as an independent force in the Arab world.⁷ With the Eastern camp, the Iraqi government built good relations. It restored its diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and recognized the government of the Chinese People's Republic. With the Western camp, it kept good relations but not on the unequal terms existing under the late regime.⁸ Very early after the revolution, it had been recognized by both the United States and Great Britain. The British government even decided later to resume the delivery of military equipment ordered by the previous Iraqi regime.⁹

⁶Wall, "The Middle East," Survey of International Affairs, 1956-1958, op. cit., p. 397.

⁷Major, loc. cit., p. 339; see above, Chapter I, p. 14.

⁸The Iraqi Revolution, 1958-1959, op. cit., p.103.

⁹Wall, loc. cit.

On the level of inter-Arab relations, Prime minister Qassem took an attitude to which he kept attached throughout his premiership. He told President Eisenhower's personal emissary, Robert Murphy, in August 1958, that "he and his associates had not risked their lives in order to make Iraq subservient to Egypt."¹⁰ He aimed at competing with President Abdel Nasser for leadership, and refused to let Iraqi general policy move in a parallel line with United Arab Republic policy.¹¹

Since the dawn of revolution, a violent struggle had broken out between the Arab nationalist camp (inclined to the United Arab Republic, and represented by Abdel Salaam 'Aref) and the Iraqi provincialist camp, represented by Qassem.¹² 'Aref aimed at unity with the United Arab Republic while Qassem demanded at best a decentralized federation. Iraqi Ambassador in Cairo, Faik Samarrāi, said in his letter of resignation, dated 26 March 1959, that

¹⁰Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, op. cit., p.504.

¹¹Qassem's self-idolization was a symptom of his "leadership" complex and his rivalry with Abdel Nasser.

¹²Al-Hurriya (Beirut), January 11, 1960.

when he was appointed to his post straight after the revolution he was told by his Government that his stay in Cairo would be of two to three months, because Iraq would soon join the United Arab Republic in either a union or federation.¹³ Instead of unity what followed were violent acts and polemics about the advantages and disadvantages of both federation and unity. The struggle between the two wings of the Iraqi Revolution ended with the failure of the Iraqi revolution itself: it had been a movement inspired by Arab nationalism, but it dealt a blow to the same.¹⁴ 'Aref and the Arab nationalists lost out and the Iraqi communists gained extensive power and influence.¹⁵ Qassem cooperated with the Iraqi communists because they appeared to him to be "his only trustworthy allies against the pro-Nasser elements in the army and the public."¹⁶ A publication by the Iraqi government said:

The path of the Revolution was not free from trouble, . . . and the al-Ba'ath Party began to call for an immediate merger with the United Arab Republic . This call was adopted by Abdul

¹³ Al-Hayat (Beirut), March 28, 1959.

¹⁴ Interview with Dr. Farid Zaineddin.

¹⁵ Kerr, The Arab Cold War, op. cit., p. 22.

¹⁶ Cremeans, The Arabs and the World, op. cit.,

Salaam 'Arif, and he began to tour Iraq propagating the idea. Abdul Karim Qassim realised that such a merger was not the wish of the people and that they preferred instead a decentralized federation. . . and abhorred the idea of being dominated by anybody. At the end, Abdul Karim Qassim was forced to detain those calling for an unqualified merger.¹⁷

By the end of September 1958, 'Aref was removed from his posts of Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, deputy Prime minister, and minister of the Interior.¹⁸ Later, he was put under arrest after an unsuccessful coup against the government carried by a small group of army officers who sympathized with his cause.¹⁹

The relations between the United Arab Republic and Iraq began to deteriorate as early as September 1958. The Iraqi government -- already under communist influence-- accused the United Arab Republic of interfering in the internal affairs of Iraq and of trying to achieve a merger.²⁰ President Abdel Nasser, on the other hand, denounced

¹⁷The Iraqi Revolution, . . ., p. 19.

¹⁸Note the coincidence between this date and the date of the United States government's decision to withdraw its troops from Lebanon: 8 October 1958.

¹⁹Cremeans, op. cit., p. 167.

²⁰The Iraqi Revolution . . ., p. 102.

Qassem and Communists. In a speech on 22 March 1959, he said that they encouraged polemics about federation and unification (they themselves championing federation and attacking unification) not only to prevent an Iraqi-United Arab Republic unification, but also to disrupt the Syrian-Egyptian unity.²¹

The Cairo-Baghdad struggle was to culminate on 8 March 1959 in a short-lived military revolt in favour of Abdel Nasser. The revolt was crushed, and the Iraqi communists triumphed.²²

The outcome of the Iraqi revolution, which had been expected by some to serve the cause of Arab nationalism and the realization of Arab unity, was that it failed its purpose; centrifugal tendencies won the day. To those who viewed Abdel Nasser's leadership as serving his, and Egyptian, ends, it seemed that the prospect of a "Nasserite hegemony" over the Arab world "receded" into the background.²³

²¹ Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League, op. cit., II, 971; see Ibid., pp. 979-80.

The Syrian communist leader, Khāled Bakdāsh, seemed to entertain the plan of Syrian secession from the United Arab Republic and its union with Iraq. (Wall, loc. cit. p. 339)

²² Major, loc. cit., p. 340.

The Mosul uprising will be covered in Chapter IV.

²³ Marlowe, Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism, op. cit., p. 209.

It is important to note that by autumn, 1958, the United States had launched new friendly relations with the United Arab Republic. It might have been that the United States State Department took a "pessimistic view" about the "menace of communism in Iraq," and reappraised its relations with Abdel Nasser.²⁴ The attitude of President Abdel Nasser, also, seemed to President Eisenhower to have become "progressively less aggressive."²⁵ The new United States attitude was manifested in United States financial assistance to the United Arab Republic, and in negotiations for a World Bank loan to the United Arab Republic to finance capital improvements in the Suez Canal.²⁶

The Iraqi developments left a deep but constructive impact on Lebanese foreign policy towards the United Arab Republic. It is fitting at this stage to recapitulate and extract the factors activating Lebanese foreign policy towards the United Arab Republic.

First, the United Arab Republic remained, after the Iraqi Revolution, a strong, if not the strongest, Arab

²⁴Ibid., p. 187.

²⁵Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 288.

²⁶Marlowe, op. cit., p. 187.

state whose President was looked upon as a leader. To this must be added the fact that the unification of Egypt and Syria had brought President Abdel Nasser's regime to the door-steps of Lebanon: the United Arab Republic bordered Lebanon along more than half its frontiers.

Second, Iraq lost its privileged leading position in the Arab world.

Third, the union of Iraq and the United Arab Republic did not materialize. Arab unity was thus confined in its march to the political frontiers of the United Arab Republic. Even more, Iraq began attacking the United Arab Republic and its very concept of unity. However, Qassem's blows to the United Arab Republic had for effect "not to strengthen the attractive power of Iraq vis-à-vis the United Arab Republic, but rather to discourage elements in those [Arab] countries which had been looking towards Qassem as an offset to the influence of Abdul-Nasser."²⁷ The reason mainly lay in the chaotic, insecure, and violent character which shrouded Iraq during Qassem's rule, and his close cooperation with the communists. The negative aspects

²⁷Marlowe, op. cit., p. 185.

of Qassem's rule thus led to the confirmation of United Arab Republic preponderance in the Arab world.

Fourth, Abdel Nasser applied his positive neutralism in his attacks on Communism and communists.²⁸

Fifth, friendly relations were renewed between the United Arab Republic and the United States.

The Lebanese government could not but launch relaxedly a policy of mutual friendship and cooperation with the United Arab Republic -- keeping in mind the neighborliness of the United Arab Republic, its strength, the marginal position of Iraq, a Westerly inclination of Abdel Nasser which pleased many Lebanese policy-makers, and most significant the failure of unity between Iraq and the United Arab Republic which guaranteed to many the continued independence of Lebanon. The result was that both United Arab Republic-inclined Lebanese elements and anti-United Arab Republic elements joined hands in reviving and renewing friendly relations with the United Arab Republic which had been interrupted and severely strained in the preceding years.

²⁸ A violent and public attack extended in time from December 1958 till late Spring 1959.

The Internal Undercurrents of Lebanese
Foreign Policy towards the
United Arab Republic

Within Lebanon, some elements (on the popular level, and sometimes on the official level too) challenged the resumption of Lebanese-United Arab Republic friendship. The Lebanese population had not yet healed from the repercussions of the 1958 crisis; unity and cohesion between the different Lebanese sectors were still precarious.

The crisis shook the Lebanese society to the roots, and "distances among individuals and confessions widened."²⁹ Confessionalism, said deputy Kamel al-As'ad, became "like a mission and came to permeate all aspects of Lebanese life."³⁰ The growth of confessionalism had its roots in the growth of political divergences. According to former Lebanese Ambassador and deputy, Kazem Solh, the reasons for such a socio-political situation were: "The competition of Foreign influences within Lebanon and the struggle among their supporters," "the multiplicity

²⁹ Kazem Solh, *Al-Hāla fi Lubnān Sayyia* (in Arabic) (Beirut: al-Majaliss Press, 1960), p. 8. The Situation in Lebanon is Bad.

³⁰ Lebanon, *Mahāder Jalsāt Majliss an-Nuwwāb* (in Arabic), *op. cit.* Tenth Legislative Session, First Regular Session, Fifteenth Meeting, May 30, 1961, p.1644.

of ideals within Lebanon and their antagonisms towards each other," and "the anxiety and frustration experienced by the different parties as a result of their inability to realize their ideals."³¹

The United Arab Republic enthusiasts in Lebanon and the anti-United Arab Republic elements frequently clashed with each other. During the unity celebrations both in 1960 and 1961 large Lebanese groups went to Damascus to participate in the festivities. They were attacked on the way by antagonistic Lebanese groups.³² Deputy Ma'arouf Sa'ad denounced these attacks saying: "Those Lebanese going to Syria are not traitors, but Lebanese Arabs who believe in Lebanon."³³ Deputy Edward Honein retorted: "The telegram of congratulations sent by President Chehab to President Abdel Nasser [on 22 February 1960] satisfactorily expressed the feelings of all Lebanese; the Lebanese need not go beyond these congratulations. Some chose their own means to express their joy thus challenging others who attacked them. This

³¹K. Solh, Al-Hāla fi Lubnān. . . , op. cit., p.27.

³²Lebanese dailies of the respective periods.

³³Lebanon, Mahāder Jalsāt Majliss. . . , op. cit., Ninth Legislative Session, Second Irregular Session, First Meeting, February 23, 1960, p. 920.

caused that, and when there is this there ought to be that."³⁴

In October 1960, the Lebanese Finance minister and Phalanges (Kataēb) Party leader, Pierre Jemayyel, issued a statement (which he later denied) attacking the situation in the Syrian region of the United Arab Republic and the leadership of Abdel Nasser. This act threatened solidarity within the government. Deputy Prime minister Nassim Majdalany declared on 15 October 1960: "This aggressive statement is contrary to the policy of the government and of the regime,"³⁵ and announced to the Chamber on 25 October 1960 that:

The government is taking great care to secure good relations with the United Arab Republic, and renews its affirmation of following a friendly policy towards the sister state [the United Arab Republic], and aims to clear the relations between the two countries from what may have clung to them due to ill-intentioned rumours spread by a false statement attributed to a minister, and it expresses its attachment to directions resulting from the historic meeting of 25 March 1959.³⁶

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 922.
Italics mine.

³⁵ *As-Syassa* (Beirut), October 16, 1960.

³⁶ Lebanon, Mahāder Jalsāt Majliss. . . , *op. cit.*
Tenth Legislative Session, Second Regular Session,
Second Meeting, October 25, 1960, p. 223.

The study of the meeting of 25 March 1959 follows below.

Deputy Adnan Hakim said on 2 May 1961:

The truth finally is that, in Lebanon, conspiracy against the United Arab Republic has turned into incitement operations, into efforts to create dissension within the United Arab Republic. The interference in the internal affairs of the United Arab Republic reaches the level of responsible ministers. The present minister of Finance [Pierre Jemayyel] continuously directs challenges to the United Arab Republic in a number of declarations. He interferes in the affairs of the United Arab Republic through demanding a plebiscite in the United Arab Republic to confirm the leadership of its President, thus disseminating doubt in this leadership and inviting the people in the Northern Region of the United Arab Republic to revolt.³⁷

Finally, President Abdel Nasser publicly denounced the Lebanese elements antagonistic to the Unity. In a speech on 22 February 1961, he said:

Today I was reading one of the papers of the imperialists which appears in Arabic in Beirut and it claimed that the United Arab Republic followed a contradictory policy for while Egypt is interested in Africa, Syria is not;³⁸

and on 23 February:

Who are the elements dreaming of the extermination of this Union? Among them is the Social Nationalist

³⁷ Ibid., Tenth Legislative Session, First Regular Session, Eleventh Meeting, May 2, 1961, p. 1456.

The Kataeb Party organ, Al-'Amal, carries Jemayyel's concepts and declarations.

³⁸ Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews, 1961, op. cit., p. 42.

Party [PPS]. . . . As for the Kata'ib Party, it attempted to interfere in our affairs since the very beginning of the merger, and adopted a hostile attitude towards it. ³⁹

On 26 February 1961, Abdel Nasser declared that he was silent in the past about such Lebanese elements in order to preserve the national unity within Lebanon, but that he had been forced to denounce them in order to preserve the national unity in the United Arab Republic. ⁴⁰

Yet, with all these agitations, the antagonistic attitudes towards the United Arab Republic, and the presence within Lebanon of dynamically diverging political attitudes, the situation in Lebanon did not reach, as in 1958, drastic results either internally or on the level of United Arab Republic-Lebanese relations. The Lebanese government refused to become a party to these divergences, and officially followed the dicta of the National Covenant, thus enforcing internal cohesion and national unity. Moreover, each of the Lebanese and the United Arab Republic governments showed consideration and understanding of the other's position, guided in that by the agreements reached by Chehab and Abdel Nasser on 25 March 1959.

³⁹Ibid., pp. 49-50.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 61.

The two Guidelines of Lebanese Foreign
Policy towards the United Arab Republic

The first guideline of Lebanese foreign policy towards the United Arab Republic during the Chehab regime lay in the National Covenant of 1943. In his inaugural address on 23 September 1958, President Fuad Chehab declared that Lebanon would be faithful to its National Pact. Lebanon, he said, should have friendly and sincere relations with the Arab states, and should deal with the other states on the basis of friendship, freedom and equality. President Chehab pledged to end all tension between Lebanon and the Arab states, especially the United Arab Republic.⁴¹

The policy statement of the Karāmē government (October 1958 - May 1960) stated:

The National Covenant is our path, and national unity our symbol. The government shall protect the sovereignty of Lebanon and its independence; Lebanon shall be for us all, in its present status, an Arab state, independent, dignified, and free.⁴²

⁴¹Lebanon, Mahāder Jalsāt Majliss. . . , op. cit., Ninth Legislative Session, Special Meeting, September 23, 1958, pp. 672-73.

⁴²Malha, Majmū'at al-Bayānāt. . . (in Arabic), op. cit., pp. 239-240.

After a short-lived caretaker government during the 1960 parliamentary elections, a new government came to office. The 1958 Opposition leader, Saeb Salaam, was appointed Prime minister. Salaam headed two consecutive governments lasting from August 1960 to May 1961, and from May 1961 to October 1961. In both governments' statements of policy, the National Covenant was the backbone of all government planning. The two governments pledged to safeguard the independence of Lebanon, its sovereignty and its constitution, to keep brotherly relations with the Arab states, and to carry the message of peace and love among them; also, to keep the relations of Lebanon with all other states on basis of friendship and mutual respect, free from all bonds. The statements declared that Lebanon shall remain an Arab and independent state.⁴³

Lebanese foreign policy, as derived from the National Covenant and these statements of policy, was to serve mainly to safeguard the national unity, the sovereignty, and the independence of Lebanon, as well as its Arab character, and to maintain brotherly and friendly relations with the Arab states.

⁴³ Ibid., pp. 246-47, 257.

The second guideline of Lebanese foreign policy towards the United Arab Republic came to being during the Chehab regime. It is embodied in the Chehab - Nasser joint communiqué of 25 March 1959.

Prime minister Karāmē, in his capacity as minister of the National Economy, was to head the Lebanese delegation to the meetings of the Economic Council of the League of Arab states which were to be held in Cairo, beginning on 5 January 1959. The Lebanese Council of Ministers asked Karāmē to discuss with President Abdel Nasser and high United Arab Republic officials the pending problems between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic.⁴⁴ During his visit to the Egyptian region from 3 to 16 January 1959, Karāmē studied with Abdel Nasser, besides the extremely important economic problems between Lebanon and the Syrian region, the problem of restoring back to a friendly normal level the political relations between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic.⁴⁵ Karāmē was

⁴⁴ Al-Jaryda (Beirut), January 1, 1959.

⁴⁵ Al-Hayāt (Beirut), January 6, 1959;
see Al-Jaryda (Beirut), January 9, 1959.

The economic problems between Lebanon and the Syrian region are covered by Chapter IV.

pleased with the talks.⁴⁶

It was sometime in early 1959, in a meeting at the Kubbah Palace in Cairo between Ali Sabri, the United Arab Republic minister of Presidential Affairs, and Joseph Abu Khater, Lebanese Ambassador to the United Arab Republic, that Ambassador Abu Khater suggested to Ali Sabri that a meeting of the two Presidents, Chehab and Abdel Nasser, take place, and that such a meeting would "enhance the traditional friendship between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic." The Lebanese Ambassador spoke "according" to what he knew could be "desired" by President Chehab. Ali Sabri reacted in an encouraging manner, and shared in the opinion expressed by Abu Khater. The Lebanese Ambassador wired President Chehab informing him of the results of the meeting, and came to Beirut for personal talks with him; President Chehab agreed to the idea.⁴⁷

On 6 March 1959, the Lebanese government decided that an official delegation be sent to Damascus to congratulate President Abdel Nasser (who was then in Damascus) on the occasion of the unity celebrations.

⁴⁶ Al-Jaryda, loc. cit.,
see other Lebanese dailies of the period.

⁴⁷ Interview with Mr. Joseph Abu Khater.

The delegation would be serving three ends: The official Lebanese participation in the Unity congratulations, the inquiry about the fate of the still pending economic questions between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic, and the preparation for a meeting between the two Presidents, Chehab and Abdel Nasser. On 7 March, an official delegation headed by Foreign minister Oueini congratulated Abdel Nasser in Damascus.⁴⁸ On 17 March 1959, a United Arab Republic delegation headed by Dr. Nūr ed-Din Kahhaleh, President of the Executive Council, returned the Lebanese official visit.⁴⁹ The United Arab Republic delegation held talks on 18 March with Prime minister Karāmē and Foreign minister Oueini, together, concerning the meeting of the two Presidents. The United Arab Republic delegation carried an unwritten message from Abdel Nasser to Chehab warmly welcoming the idea of the meeting. Dr. Kahhaleh was given power to make the necessary arrangements with the Lebanese government.⁵⁰

On 20 March 1959, the Lebanese government unanimously agreed on the advisability of the meeting between the two Presidents, and left to President Chehab the

⁴⁸ Al-Hayat (Beirut), March 8, 1959.

⁴⁹ Ibid., March 19, 1959.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

choice of the subjects for discussion, the time and place of the meeting, and the members of the delegation to accompany him.⁵¹ Preparations for the meeting were made with complete secrecy.⁵²

At 8:00 a.m., on 25 March 1959, President Chehab announced to the urgently called Council of Ministers that he was going to the Lebanese-Syrian frontiers, to a spot on the road leading to Damascus, to meet at 11:00 a.m. that same day President Abdel Nasser. He urged the ministers to keep the news secret until later.⁵³

Great security measures were taken in Lebanon and in the Syrian region of the United Arab Republic, all along the roads leading to the place of the meeting and on the site of the meeting itself. The meeting was held in a wooden room built in the early morning for that purpose. One photographer accompanied each party.⁵⁴

⁵¹Ibid., March 21, 1959.

⁵²All Lebanese dailies of the period.

It should be remembered that by then the Mosul Revolt had taken place, and the conflict was at its bitterest between Cairo and Baghdad.

⁵³Al-Hayat (Beirut), March 26, 1959.

⁵⁴Ibid.

The meeting between President Chehab and President Abdel Nasser lasted from 11:00 a.m. till 2:30 p.m. President Chehab was accompanied by one Lebanese official, Foreign minister Oueini. President Abdel Nasser was accompanied by few United Arab Republic officials.

According to an informed Lebanese source, the talks of the two Presidents did not follow a set agenda; Chehab and Abdel Nasser discussed with much frankness the subjects of concern to both governments: the pending economic problems between the two states, their political relations, and the critical Arab and international situations; they, then, agreed to reach the utmost harmony in their policies in all fields.⁵⁵

Although it was suggested that President Abdel Nasser wished to obtain Lebanese support in the dispute between Iraq and the United Arab Republic,⁵⁶ the main object of the meeting was to improve the relations between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic.⁵⁷ Former United Arab Republic deputy Foreign minister, Dr. Farid Zaineddin

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ "Meeting between Presidents Chehab and Abdel Nasser," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, XII, (April 4-11, 1959), p. 16739.

⁵⁷ Ibid.; Interviews with Dr. Farid Zaineddin and Mr. Joseph Abu Khater

said: The meeting between the two Presidents Chehab and Abdel Nasser was meant to clear out the past. President Abdel Nasser wanted to assure Lebanon that the United Arab Republic did not intend to take forcible measures against it, and so he did. President Chehab was pleased and showed deep understanding of the United Arab Republic position, and of its political attitude towards Lebanon. The policy agreed upon at the meeting was a policy of the two countries dealing with one another as equals. President Chehab promised that Lebanon would not interfere in the affairs of the United Arab Republic, and President Abdel Nasser promised that the United Arab Republic would not interfere in Lebanese conditions.⁵⁸

The Presidents' meeting, said Ambassador Abu Khater, erased the sad recollections of the 1958 Lebanese crisis and the deterioration of political relations between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic; it also brought the thoughts and points of view of both Presidents -- concerning national and Arab problems -- to a meeting point. As for the economic questions, all outstanding questions -- they were many, most of them relating to the Syrian region, and all of vital

⁵⁸ Interview with Dr. Farid Zaineddin.

importance -- were discussed, and President Abdel Nasser gave great consideration to the Lebanese point of view, and agreed to meet with Lebanese demands.⁵⁹ Besides the political values of the meeting, most important was the decision reached to solve the problems of transit between Lebanon and the Syrian region.⁶⁰

After the meeting, a joint communiqué was issued in Beirut, Cairo and Damascus simultaneously. It declared that, as a result of their discussions, the two Heads of State agreed on affirming the following principles:

- 1) Their eagerness to strengthen the bonds of brotherhood and to foster mutual and fruitful cooperation between the two sister Republics in all matters that would lead to the consolidation of their independence, sovereignty and very existence within the framework of the Pact of the League of Arab states and Charter of the United Nations.
- 2) Their belief in the necessity of consolidating Arab solidarity and fully supporting Arab causes.
- 3) Their sincere desire to seek positive solutions as soon as possible to the economic questions outstanding between the two countries, on the basis of equality and the preservation of mutual interests, with a view to assuring the welfare and prosperity of their peoples.

To this end, the two presidents have instructed their respective Governments to maintain their efforts and to resume their discussions, without delay, in the same spirit of cordiality and understanding which prevailed during the meeting of

⁵⁹ Interview with Mr. Joseph Abu Khater

⁶⁰ Interview with Dr. Farid Zaineddin

the two presidents and (with the same) sincere and brotherly feeling cherished by the two brotherly peoples.⁶¹

It is a fact that, since 25 March 1959, relations between Cairo and Beirut entered into a new period which continues until the present day.⁶² The Chehab-Abdel Nasser meeting inaugurated a period which resumed the friendly relationship which pervaded Lebanese-Egyptian relations during the forties and the very early fifties. The meeting, then, brought the relations back to their previous course. As for the joint communiqué which was in total conformity with the National Covenant, it was special in one thing besides its economic resolutions: its implication. The United Arab Republic became the only Arab state who, outside the Charter of the Arab League, confirmed what Lebanon had been striving for since independence: securing the status of Lebanon as it is, its sovereignty and independence.

Apart from the Chehab-Abdel Nasser meeting and the joint communiqué issuing from it, Lebanon continued to channel its foreign policy towards the United Arab

⁶¹"Nasser-Chehab joint Communiqué, March 25, 1959," Khalil, op. cit., II, 290-91. See Appendix IV, p.226.

⁶²Interview with Mr. Joseph Abu Khater

Republic, Iraq, and other Arab states, mainly, through the Arab League. This is the reason leading us to study two important political events through the activities of the Political committee of the League.

Before ending this part of the study, it should be emphasized that all through the period under examination the United Arab Republic had no definite foreign policy, i.e. plan of action, towards Lebanon. Its attitude. . . harmonized well with Lebanese foreign policy whose form is not clear and definite.⁶³ The Lebanese Arab foreign policy (including the United Arab Republic) was passive: watching and observing events happening in the surrounding states. Lebanon, also, did not act as "moderator" or "mediator" between the Arab states, and the Arab states did not come to Lebanon for moderation or mediation.⁶⁴ The Lebanese attitude safeguarded the national unity and Lebanese interests, and suited the Arab states much better than an activist policy would have.⁶⁵

⁶³Interview with Dr. Farid Zaineddin

⁶⁴Interviews with both Mr. Joseph Abu Khater and Dr. Farid Zaineddin

It should be noted that Lebanese dailies often mislead through their frequent usage of the expression, "Lebanese mediation," or "moderation."

⁶⁵Interview with Mr. Joseph Abu Khater

Lebanese Foreign Policy towards
Iraq

A harmonious policy towards the United Arab Republic did not mean tense Lebanese-Iraqi relations. Towards Iraq, Lebanon followed its traditional principles of friendship, non-interference, and neutrality. It was a more than satisfactory policy, especially that within Lebanon no significant portion of the population was inspired by Qassem's regime. Therefore, the Lebanese government was not imposed upon, either from within or from without, to develop stronger ties with Iraq. Former Ambassador to Iraq, Kazem Solh, said: Towards Iraq there was no important foreign policy. There couldn't have been a long-term and studied Lebanese foreign policy during the whole period under examination, for instability characterized the regime of Qassem. The Lebanese government adopted towards Iraq a policy of expediency: waiting for events in Iraq, then formulating a response to them.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Interview with Mr. Kazem Solh.

This description fits in with the above-mentioned statements by Zaineddin and Abu Khater concerning Lebanese foreign policy in general.

In conclusion, it should be remarked that Lebanon's foreign policy towards the United Arab Republic and Iraq served the Lebanese national interests, (which may be summarized as the preservation of national unity), and satisfied both the United Arab Republic and Iraq, as will be observed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV

LEBANESE FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS

THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

AND IRAQ IN APPLICATION

(September 1958 - September 1961)

The events studied in the following pages are the outstanding ones which presented Lebanese foreign policy towards the United Arab Republic and Iraq with substance to express itself. Each of these events, or situations, is particular in that it permits the study of Lebanese foreign policy from a different angle, and provides a new setting through which that policy can be evaluated. However, one important event of the period, namely, the Kuwaiti incident of July 1961, is omitted from this study for the following reasons:

First, Iraq's claim over Kuwait did not cause a split among the Arab states other than Iraq. The Iraqi move was a subject of pan-Arab interest, and therefore it was not a cause of a United Arab Republic-Iraqi conflict in the precise sense of the term or in the traditional picture of Cairo - Baghdad rivalry: instead, it grouped all the Arab states together in

one common confrontation with Iraq. For these reasons, the event under consideration did not constrain Lebanon to invoke its traditional neutrality and avoid taking sides lest it endanger its internal national unity.

Secondly, this was a situation where the principle of state sovereignty was jeopardized. The issue at stake was not one of political primacy or prestige for one Arab state or another: it was rather the very existence of a new, small Arab state as such -- an issue of particular sensitivity to Lebanon. Lebanon could not remain neutral towards such a question -- for, as should be clear by now, the animating spirit of Lebanese foreign policy is precisely the determination to maintain its independence among the Arab states.

The Economic Relations between Lebanon
and the United Arab Republic

A promising start - 1959

The importance of economic relations between Lebanon and Egypt, before 1958, gained new and vast dimensions with the creation of the United Arab Republic, inasmuch as the Syrian region of the United Arab Republic bordered Lebanon on more than half its frontiers, and economic relations between Lebanon and Syria

had been a persistent cause of concern to the Lebanese governments ever since the early fifties.

Prime minister Karāmē, in his capacity as minister of National Economy, headed the Lebanese delegation to the meetings of the Economic Council of the League of Arab States which began in Cairo on 5 January 1959. Karāmē was asked by his government to make contacts with President Abdel Nasser with a view to solving the outstanding economic questions between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic.¹ As explained by Foreign minister Queini before the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, on 6 January 1959, some of the most important of these economic questions, especially with the Syrian region -- which had been awaiting solution since 1950--, were: the questions relating to transit of traffic; problems of aviation; oil problems; the permission to Lebanese nationals to acquire property in Syria; and the free passage of, and annulment of tariffs on, Syrian visitors to Lebanon.² Lebanon asked for general free passage into its territory from both the Syrian

¹Al-Jaryda (Beirut), January 1, 1959.

²Ibid., January 7, 1959.

and Egyptian regions, for the United Arab Republic had put restrictions on such travel during the 1958 crisis.³

On 7 January 1959, Prime minister Karāmē met President Abdel Nasser and put forward the Lebanese demands. The meeting was friendly and promised to be fruitful.⁴ On 29 January, Karāmē (back in Beirut) received Ambassador Ghaleb, of the United Arab Republic, who confirmed the readiness of Cairo to fulfill the promises given to Karāmē in early January, especially those concerning the lowering of tariffs on Syrian visitors to Lebanon and the payment of debts -- amounting to four million Lebanese pounds -- due to Lebanon from both Syrian and Egyptian regions.⁵

Although the good will was there, economic questions had to be discussed in fuller detail. On 30 January 1959, a United Arab Republic delegation headed by the United Arab Republic minister of Economy, Dr. Kaisouny, reached Beirut to stay until 3 February

³Ibid., January 9, 1959.

⁴Lebanese dailies of the period

⁵Al-Jaryda (Beirut), January 30, 1959;
see other Lebanese dailies.

and discuss those questions with the Lebanese government.⁶ The Lebanese delegation, headed by Premier Karāmē, had a new point to discuss with the United Arab Republic delegation: the amendment by Decree No. 6, issued by the Syrian authorities, of Decree No. 151, issued in Syria in 1952. This amendment had the effect of preventing Lebanese nationals from carrying on any commercial transactions in partnership with Syrians. Prior to the amendment, a Lebanese could do business in Syria as long as he had a Syrian partner; the amendment annulled this possibility.⁷ Also, it specified a period (ranging from two months to five years) within which non-Syrian traders and commercial agents must leave their work in Syria.⁸

The economic discussions in Beirut resulted in agreements on the questions of the railway -- between Lebanon and the Syrian region --, oil, the selling of tickets for the Lebanese and Syrian national sweepstakes, and the United Arab debts to Lebanon. There was disagreement concerning the abolition of tariffs on Syrians

⁶Al-Hayat (Beirut), February 1, 1959.

⁷Al-Jaryda (Beirut), January 31, 1959.

⁸Al-Hayat (Beirut), March 27, 1959.

entering Lebanon; also discussion^{of}/the most vital question of transit of traffic was postponed, to be resumed later at a four-party meeting in Damascus including Lebanon, the United Arab Republic, Iraq and Jordan.⁹

The talks in Beirut ended on 3 February 1959, and a joint communiqué was issued. It stated in its Preamble: In order to agree on solutions for various economic problems pending between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic, talks had been held in Cairo, then in Beirut, and would be continued in Damascus on 14 February 1959.¹⁰

Meetings were held in Damascus, between 14 and 17 February 1959, at the level of experts and high officials and not of ministers of economy, as formerly expected. Lebanon, the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Saudi Arabia participated. Iraq abstained from attending the meetings; political friction between the

⁹Al-Jaryda (Beirut), February 3, 1959.

The presence of Iraq and Jordan is necessary in discussions of transit of traffic since the traffic from Lebanon to Iraq and Jordan, or vice-versa, crosses the Syrian Region.

¹⁰Ibid., February 4, 1959.

governments of Iraq and the United Arab Republic was at that stage gaining great momentum.¹¹ A general agreement on the principle of the freedom of transit traffic was reached.¹² However, obstacles arose during the discussion of details. The Syrian region insisted on imposing transit fares. The meetings ended on this uneasy note.¹³

On 25 March 1959, as stated in the preceding chapter, Presidents Chehab and Abdel Nasser met on the Lebano-Syrian borders. The joint communiqué issued after the meeting expressed the two Presidents' resolution to find a solution for the pending economic questions between the two states. In fulfillment of article three of the joint communiqué,¹⁴ Abdel Wahāb Haumad, minister of Finance for the Syrian region, accompanied by a United Arab Republic high official,

¹¹Al-Jaryda (Beirut), February 18, 1959.

The Iraqi-United Arab Republic struggle will be discussed below.

¹²"Arab States- Conference on Transit Traffic," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, XII (March 7-14, 1959), p. 16689.

¹³Al-Jaryda, loc. cit.

¹⁴See above, pp. 150-51

reached Beirut on 26 March 1959. He held talks with Lebanese Foreign minister Hussein Oueini concerning mainly Decree 151 as amended by Decree No. 6.¹⁵ After these talks, new measures were taken towards the Lebanese businessmen in the Syrian region: the provision related to those Lebanese administering institutions or with jobs based on independent personal capital was overlooked, and the minimum period given to Lebanese agents of foreign industries to leave their jobs was extended to two years.¹⁶

In spite of all the previous meetings and discussions, the most vital economic questions between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic -- mainly transit -- remained pending and unsolved. In early April 1959, the Lebanese government renewed its contacts with the United Arab Republic for the discussion of those questions.¹⁷ In early May 1959, Lebanese Ambassador in Cairo, Abu Khater, suggested to his government to get in touch with the local Syrian authorities.¹⁸

¹⁵Al-Hayat (Beirut), March 27, 1959.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid., April 22, 1959.

¹⁸Ibid., May 5, 1959.

Ambassador Abu Khater made various efforts in the field of United Arab Republic-Lebanese economic relations. Official talks were held in late May 1959 between him and United Arab Republic ministers, Kais-souny and Kallās.¹⁹ The negotiations culminated in a set of agreements, and Prime minister Karāmē announced to the Press, on 3 June 1959, that the economic agreement between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic was ready for signature. The transit problems, he said, because they involved many Arab states, would be solved afterwards.²⁰ On 6 June 1959, Premier Karāmē, who was also minister of National Economy, reached Cairo, and signed with the United Arab Republic minister of Economy, Kaissouny, an economic agreement between the two states. A joint statement declared that the two governments had agreed to: the lowering of fees imposed by the Syrian local authorities on persons and private cars crossing the Syrian borders to half their value; (concerning the amended Decree No. 151) the granting by the United Arab Republic to the Lebanese commercial agents the maximum period, consisting of five years, for liquidating their activities in the Syrian region; the permission by the United Arab Republic government for the profits of and interests on Lebanese private property in the Egyptian region to

¹⁹Ibid., May 30, 1959.

²⁰Ibid., June 4, 1959.

continue to be transferred to Lebanon.²¹

The new agreement did not help improve economic relations between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic mainly the Syrian part of it. This led deputy Fawzi Hoss to say in the Chamber, on 23 February 1960, that economic negotiations and agreements did not give adequate results because the two questions concerning the travel of persons and transfer of capital, and the transit of traffic, were not given a solution, and these are "the two most important pending economic problems."²² Again in the Chamber, on 16 November 1961, deputy Mahmūd Ammār observed that, instead of improving during the period of Egyptian-Syrian unity, economic relations with the United Arab Republic had in fact deteriorated owing to the tightening of control on the passage of individuals and capital and the obstruction of solutions for the questions of transit.²³

The absence of formal transit agreements binding on both the Lebanese and United Arab Republic governments

²¹Ibid., June 9, 1959.

²²Lebanon, Mahāder Jalsāt Majliss an-Nuwwāb (in Arabic), op. cit., Ninth Legislative Session, Second Irregular Session, First Meeting, February 23, 1960, p.917.

²³Ibid., Tenth Legislative Session, Second Regular Session, Third Meeting, November 16, 1961, p.105.

left the Lebanese government with a number of economic difficulties. The United Arab Republic common frontiers with Iraq and Jordan were closed whenever there was political tension between the respective governments, and the Lebanese economy suffered from this situation. Lebanon's trade with both Iraq and Jordan and Lebanon's touristic seasons were greatly affected. The adverse effect of the lack of economic agreements with the United Arab Republic was deeply felt by the Lebanese. As the relations between the United Arab Republic and Iraq represented virtually one protracted stalemate punctuated by successive episodes of continued confrontation, Lebanon found itself constantly compelled to reckon, not only with the political, but also with the economic aspects of the struggle.

Although both the Lebanese and the United Arab Republic governments wished each other well, the agreements reached on the Central executive level, specifically those concerning Lebanon and Syria, were not carried out.²⁴ There was no doubt that the two Presidents sincerely wished for the concretization of the articles of the joint communiqué of 25 March

²⁴ Interview with Dr. Farid Zaineddin

1959, and that they gave orders to that effect; but their wish did not materialize.²⁵ From the economic point of view, the 25 March 1959 meeting was exceptional because of the decision reached to solve out matters of transit. This decision did not bear fruit once the agreements were finally reached between the Lebanese and United Arab Republic governments. The failure was due to "negligence" and "mischief-making."²⁶ Ambassador Abu Khater said that Cairo took great care to follow up the proper execution of the agreements; there were, however, certain obstacles to their execution due to the "dawdling" in Damascus. The Syrian region, he said, acted autonomously in its local economic matters; moreover, it had a special attitude towards economic relations with Lebanon.²⁷ Its motives were essentially political in nature; and they hindered the measures taken by the Central Executive, in Cairo, towards

²⁵ Lebanon, Mahāder Jalsāt Majliss. . . ,
op. cit., Ninth Legislative Session, Second Irregular
Session, First Meeting, February 23, 1960, pp. 917-18.

²⁶ Interview with Dr. Farid Zaineddin.

²⁷ Interview with Mr. Joseph Abu Khater

better economic relations with Lebanon.

The impact on Lebanon of the 1961
July Laws in the United Arab Republic

President Abdel Nasser announced on 22 February 1961 that, for the welfare of the people of the United Arab Republic, the government was adopting a policy of planned economy.²⁸ The basic reform of the economic system took place in July 1961. On 19 and 20 July, the government of the United Arab Republic presented the people with a set of laws and decrees regulating the national economy and ushering the process of socialism, which was then proclaimed as the socio-economic system of the state. It announced the nationalization of banks, and insurance companies in its two regions, and of some other companies too.²⁹ The new laws provided that the profits of all types of companies in both regions of the United Arab Republic shall be distributed in the proportion of 75 per cent for the shareholders, and 25 per cent for employees and workers. The tax rates

²⁸Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews, 1961,
p. 38.

²⁹"Economic and Social Affairs," Arab Political
Encyclopaedia, Documents and Notes, 10th year, (Cairo:
Government Information Department, 1961, ~~XXX~~) p. 39.

on general income were raised.³⁰

In the Egyptian region, the July reforms were generally well received, for a great number of the nationalized banks and companies belonged to non-Arabs and non-Egyptians. In the Syrian region, however, they were not so well received because the institutions belonged to the Syrians themselves. Lebanese property in the United Arab Republic was affected, but the property was not great.³¹ The capital of Lebanese banks and insurance companies in the United Arab Republic did not exceed twenty million Lebanese pounds.³² The new socialistic system launched by the July laws affected, amongst others, the United Arab Republic nationals of Lebanese origin who had settled in Egypt. But, there was no running away from such results; nor was it plausible to charge that the measures were aimed specifically at the Lebanese or ex-Lebanese -- for the same fate had befallen all foreign communities in the United Arab Republic as well as purely Egyptian groups.³³

³⁰ Ibid., p. 33

³¹ Interview with Dr. Farid Zaineddin

³² Al-'Amal (Beirut), July 30, 1961.

³³ Interview with Mr. Joseph Abu Khater.

At the request of the Lebanese government, Ambassador Abu Khater carried on lengthy negotiations with the United Arab Republic authorities concerning compensations to be paid for the nationalized or sequestrated Lebanese property -- both of Lebanese nationals and of Lebanese residents in the United Arab Republic. It took him a few years to reach a satisfactory agreement-- full compensation being impracticable. In the early summer of 1966, this agreement was put into execution.³⁴

The official relations between the United Arab Republic and Lebanon were not affected by the 1961 July laws. These laws did not alter the substance of the two countries' basic foreign policies towards each other,³⁵ even if they did cause some concern in some Lebanese circles. If the Arab states were to start adopting a socialistic economic system, Lebanon would have to comply, one day or the other, with their system, for the simple reason that a small state would find it extremely difficult to maintain indefinitely an economic system radically

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid.

different from that of its neighbours, on whom its economy depends to a very significant degree.³⁶

The July reforms in the United Arab Republic caused some uneasiness within the Lebanese government, and among the Lebanese population,³⁷ in spite of the fact that Lebanon was destined to reap instantaneous, though indirect, benefit from them -- for all foreign clients of United Arab Republic banks were to transfer their deposits to banks in Lebanon.³⁸

As the new economic measures in the United Arab Republic were not directed at or intended against Lebanon, the Lebanese government could not but maintain good relations with the United Arab Republic. It could only seek satisfactory compensation for Lebanese nationalized or sequestrated property.

Lebanon and the United Arab-Iraqi Clash,
March - April 1959

The Mosul uprising

On 8 March 1959, an incident in Mosul, in northern Iraq, transformed the breach between President Abdel Nasser

³⁶ Interview with Dr. Farid Zaineddin.

³⁷ Refer to various Lebanese dailies of the period.

³⁸ Al-'Amal (Beirut), August 2, 1961.

and Prime minister Qassem into a bitter feud which dominated Arab affairs for many months. Qassem, to sustain his rule, had depended totally on the Iraqi communists in an effort to eliminate from leadership all elements loyal to Abdel Nasser;³⁹ and throughout the winter of 1959, the United Arab Republic and Iraq launched bitter attacks against each other through the press and radio, and in popular demonstrations.⁴⁰

In early March 1959, a contingent of the communist-controlled Iraqi civilian Popular Resistance Force, which was sent to Mosul in anticipation of anti-regime demonstrations, attacked Arab nationalist groups, triggering an army revolt, already planned, but set for a later date.⁴¹ The revolt was led by Colonel Shawwāf, a great enthusiast of Arab nationalism. It was meant to spread throughout Iraq, but because its planning was not kept secret, and it was started before the set date, and mainly because Shawwāf was killed at the start of the

³⁹Cremeans, The Arabs and the World, op. cit., p. 167.

⁴⁰Refer to Lebanese dailies of the period.

⁴¹Cremeans, op. cit., p. 168.

fight, the movement was "barbarously" crushed by Qassem.⁴² On 17 March 1959, the Iraqi Foreign minister, Hashem Jawād, declared that the United Arab Republic had organized the "conspiracy" in northern Iraq, and that the Iraqi government had documents proving that the "rebels" received light weapons from the Syrian region.⁴³ The revolutionaries' broadcasting station from Mosul had from the start announced that their leaders would follow the policy of Abdel Nasser concerning Arab unity.⁴⁴ On 10 March, after the outbreak of the revolt, Qassem ousted the United Arab Republic diplomatic staff from Iraq. The United Arab Republic, however, chose not to break diplomatic relations with Iraq.⁴⁵

The Mosul uprising and the United Arab Republic-Iraqi struggle moved the Lebanese population, each group according to its tendencies. The government faced the situation internally by forbidding demonstrations of any

⁴² Interview with Mr. Kazem Solh;
See Al-Hayat (Beirut), March 13, 1959.

⁴³ Al-Hayat (Beirut), March 18, 1959.

⁴⁴ Ibid., March 11, 1959.

⁴⁵ Ibid., March 12, 1959.

kind, thus putting the people in the neutralist camp.⁴⁶
The Lebanese Ambassador in Iraq advised his Government to act very carefully as there were thousands of Lebanese nationals in Iraq whose lives were threatened in the "wholesale, barbarous slaughter" which followed the uprising.⁴⁷ On 18 March, Prime minister Karāmē told the Press that the government had not taken yet any decision concerning the United Arab Republic-Iraqi struggle, and that it was watching developments.⁴⁸

The meeting in Beirut of the Political Committee of the League of Arab States

At the meetings of the Political Committee of the Arab League, in Cairo, an attitude pervaded that some positive action should be taken about the United Arab Republic-Iraqi struggle. The Sudan proposed that the League members, as a whole, act as mediator, and was supported by the other members.⁴⁹ On 24 March 1959, the Political Committee decided to hold an emergency session within a week, in a neutral Arab state.⁵⁰ The meeting was to be held on the

⁴⁶ Ibid., March 13, 1959.

⁴⁷ Interview with Mr. Kazem Solh.

⁴⁸ Al-Hayat (Beirut), March 19, 1959.

⁴⁹ Ibid., March 22, 1959.

⁵⁰ Marlowe, Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism, op. cit., p. 191.

Foreign ministers' level. The subject of discussion was: the dangers threatening the solidarity of the Arab ranks and the peace of the Arab states, due to a tension in the relations between the United Arab Republic and Iraq.⁵¹

On 26 March, Premier Karāmē made a statement denying the rumours that there was a Lebanese mediation between the United Arab Republic and Iraq.⁵² Lebanon, following its neutral policy, refrained from any initiative concerning steps or measures to be taken. Lebanon did not propose mediation. The Lebanese policy-makers thought it better -- for Lebanese as well as general Arab interests -- not to intervene while the struggle was at its peak.⁵³ However, they welcomed the idea of the Political Committee meeting in Beirut, as Lebanon had always encouraged collective Arab action.⁵⁴

⁵¹Al-Hayat (Beirut), March 25, 1959.

On the same day, Qassem announced the withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact. His decision did not alter the course of the United Arab Republic-Iraqi struggle.

⁵²Ibid., March 27, 1959.

⁵³Interview with Mr. Joseph Abu Khater.

⁵⁴Ibid.

The special meeting of the Political Committee of the League of Arab states, scheduled to be held on 31 March, was postponed to 2 April 1959. It was hoped that, in the meantime, Iraq, Jordan and Tunisia would be convinced to attend the meeting.⁵⁵ Jordan and Tunisia refused to send their representatives to Beirut. (Libya, which had originally accepted the invitation, later declined to attend.)⁵⁶

Iraq refused to participate in the conference. According to a spokesman for the Iraqi Foreign ministry, the Secretary-General of the League had ignored the Iraqi request to exhibit, in the Committee's meetings, documents proving the participation of the United Arab Republic in the Mosul revolt.⁵⁷ On the other hand, the United Arab Republic delegate to the Political Committee meetings demanded that a committee investigate the massacres committed in Iraq by the communists.⁵⁸

⁵⁵Al-Hayat (Beirut), March 29, 1959.

⁵⁶Refer to Lebanese dailies of the period.

⁵⁷Al-Hayat (Beirut), April 2, 4, 1959.

⁵⁸Ibid., April 3, 1959.

The Political Committee held its meetings in Beirut from 2 to 7 April 1959. The absence of Iraq did not prevent the meetings taking place. The Arab states were keen on finding a solution to the United Arab Republic-Iraq struggle. The United Arab Republic was represented by Dr. Farid Zaineddin, deputy Foreign minister (originally of Syrian nationality), and not by its Foreign minister as expected. Lebanon, the host state, was represented by Foreign minister Oueini, who presided over the meetings. The Committee held seven formal meetings, only two of which were public. Besides the formal meetings, five informal ones were held at the Hotel St. Georges, in the apartments of Prince Faisal, Saudi Prime minister and Foreign minister.⁵⁹ These unofficial meetings were decisive. The results reached by the Political Committee were decided there.⁶⁰

On 3 April 1959, Dr. Zaineddin made a statement explaining to the Political Committee the situation in Iraq, and United Arab-Iraqi relations since the 14 July Revolution, and emphasized the fact that the communists

⁵⁹ Ibid., April 8, 1959.

⁶⁰ Interview with Dr. Farid Zaineddin

had the upper hand in Iraq, thus posing a threat to the whole Arab world.⁶¹ He attempted to secure the Committee's condemnation of the Iraqi regime "root and branch." Opposition to this idea was led by Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.⁶²

Dr. Zaineddin's presentation led the Committee members to a discussion as to whether there was a dispute between the United Arab Republic and Iraq, or a general danger threatening the Arab countries. If the second was the case, the situation did not require "mediation," and the meeting in Beirut had no purpose.⁶³ On 3 April, Zaineddin declared to the Press: There is no dispute between the United Arab Republic and Iraq, and such an item could not be put on the agenda of the Committee. If there was any dispute, there would have been a complaint; but no one had come with a complaint.⁶⁴

The Lebanese government instructed its delegation to maintain absolute neutrality and to agree to whatever decision was unanimously approved by the members present at the conference.⁶⁵ By 5 April, the Committee

⁶¹Al-Hayat (Beirut), April 4 & 5, 1959.

⁶²Marlowe, op. cit., p. 191.

⁶³Al-Hayat (Beirut), April 5, 1959.

⁶⁴Ibid., April 4, 1959.

⁶⁵Ibid., April 5, 1959.

had been divided into three parties: the Sudan and Morocco demanding mediation between the United Arab Republic and Iraq; the United Arab Republic and Yemen demanding the condemnation of the Iraqi government; and Lebanon and Saudi Arabia taking a neutral stand.⁶⁶

The United Arab Republic relentlessly objected to every proposal bearing the implication of the words "conflict" and "mediation."⁶⁷ The situation reached an impasse. It was speculated that the Committee's failure might lead to the disintegration of the Arab League.⁶⁸ At that point, on 6 April 1959, the Lebanese delegation presented to the members of the Committee, in an unofficial meeting at the Hotel St. Georges, in Beirut, a draft resolution.⁶⁹ According to the Lebanese Foreign ministry, this draft resolution reconciled the divergent points of view. It declared: 1) the necessity of a unanimous stand of the Arab states against Communism whose principles clash with Arab traditions and the "heavenly religions," and the necessity for

⁶⁶Ibid., April 7, 1959.

⁶⁷Al-Jaryda (Beirut) April 8, 1959.

⁶⁸See the Lebanese dailies of the period.

⁶⁹Al-Jaryda (Beirut) April 7, 1959.

the Arab states to adopt neutrality and non-alignment in international political problems; 2) the consideration of whatever harms one Arab country as harming all Arab countries, on the basis that they form an indivisible unity; and the demand that all attacks by one Arab country against another should cease; 3) a request to keep open the meetings of the Political Committee, or that the Committee be ready to meet soon again, in the presence of the then-absent Arab states, to proceed with the execution of the principles agreed upon. The draft resolution proposed the setting up of a committee which would travel to Baghdad and Cairo in an effort to bring to an end their radio and press campaigns against each other.⁷⁰

Lengthy discussions took place between Lebanese Prime minister Karāmē, Dr. Farīd Zaineddin, and Prince Faisal of Saūdi Arabia. Thereupon, a plan for common Arab action was drawn and agreed upon.⁷¹ On 7 April, the last touches to the draft resolution were put at a meeting between Faisal, Oueini and Karāmē.⁷² The resolution was adopted, for while it condemned communism, it adopted

⁷⁰Al-Hayat (Beirut), April 7, 1959.

⁷¹Interview with Dr. Farid Zaineddin.
See Al-Jaryda (Beirut), April 7, 1959.

⁷²Al-Jaryda (Beirut), April 8, 1959.

a careful neutrality between the United Arab Republic and Iraq.⁷³ Of the Arab states represented at the meetings, only the Sudan made some reservations concerning the draft resolution, mainly because it did not mention the "mediation" proposal because of which the Committee was called to meet.⁷⁴ The draft resolution also did not mention the conflict between the United Arab Republic and Iraq.⁷⁵ It stated: The Political Committee, having heard the statements made by the delegations of the states represented at the session, agrees upon the necessity for the Arab states to adhere to the policy of non-alignment and non-subservience, which safeguards their independence and sovereignty. It also expresses eagerness for strengthening the national bonds which bind the Arabs together and which enjoin solidarity and the unity of Arab ranks in harmony with the principles of the Pact of the League of Arab States; and condemns external influences which aim at the division of the Arabs and the by-passing of their rights to self-determination. Article 4 of the resolution said:

⁷³Marlowe, op. cit., p. 191.

⁷⁴Al-Jaryda (Beirut), April 8, 1959.

⁷⁵Ibid.

The Committee appeals to the Iraqi Government to act in harmony with the Arab states by adhering to the decisions adopted at this meeting in deference to cooperation and solidarity among all the Arabs and for the sake of their higher interests. 76

Prime minister Karāmē declared to the Press on 10 April that the Lebanese Foreign minister had followed in the meetings the Lebanese neutralist policy as dictated by the National Covenant.⁷⁷ Dr. Zaineddin praised Lebanese officials for their gigantic efforts to make the meetings of the Political Committee successful,⁷⁸ and said that Lebanon, all along, stood firmly by the side of the United Arab Republic "as well as the other Arab members present at the meetings."⁷⁹

If Lebanon, morally, stood by the United Arab Republic in its conflict with Iraq, it did not deviate from its orthodox policy. Lebanon stood against communist control in Iraq, thus siding with the United Arab Republic; but it neutralized this policy and kept its

⁷⁶ Khalil, op. cit., II, 204.

⁷⁷ Al-Hayat (Beirut), April 11, 1959.

⁷⁸ Ibid., April 10 & 12, 1959.

⁷⁹ Interview with Dr. Farid Zaineddin.
See Al-Jaryda (Beirut), April 7, 1959.

friendly relations with both states by proposing a soothing draft resolution with no condemnation of the Iraqi government. It is to be noted said Farid Zaineddin that Lebanon generally proposed to the Arab delegations solutions or resolutions already agreed upon by a number of the Arab representatives.⁸⁰

A committee composed of Lebanon, Libya and Morocco, was appointed to visit Baghdad and Cairo in an effort to stop their radio and press campaigns against each other.⁸¹ The committee, made up of the three states' Ambassadors to the United Arab Republic, sent a message, from Cairo, to the Iraqi government informing it of their plan to visit Baghdad. No reply came.⁸²

Shortly after, the United Arab Republic-Iraq struggle lost much of its bitterness, but not as a direct result of the Committee's resolution of 7 April 1959. By early July 1959, Qassem, having changed his attitude towards Iraq's communists, came out openly against them.

⁸⁰ Interview with Dr. Farid Zaineddin.

⁸¹ Al-Hayat (Beirut), May 21, 1959.

⁸² Ibid., June 9 & 12, 1959.

His action, however, had no Arab nationalist significance-- Qassem was pursuing independence for its own sake.⁸³

Qassem, due to the communist advent in Iraq and the barbarous slaughter after the Mosul uprising, lost his chance to develop a coherent and consistent policy in the Arab world to attract opponents of Cairo to Baghdad.⁸⁴ Cairo remained the one pole in the Arab balance of power. As for Lebanon, due to its cautious neutrality, it was safe from attacks as supporting one Arab state and not another.

Lebanon and the Growing Concept of the Palestinian Entity

The road to the Shtaoura meeting:
Sofar - Casablanca - Cairo

Since the year 1945, the policy of the Arab states towards the Palestine Problem has been formulated within the League of Arab States. It was within the League also that the policy of the Arab states towards Israel has been coordinated since 1948.

⁸³Major, loc. cit., p. 341.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 348.

Until the Palestine question is solved, many sub-problems of the question face the Arabs, of which the most acutely human is the fate of the million Palestinian refugees.

It is with great effort that the Arab governments maintained the appearance of agreement on their Palestine policy, for, in fact, they were in constant rivalry on this subject.⁸⁵ Thus, many years passed since the creation of the state of Israel, with the Palestine question languishing through United Nations sessions and Arab League meetings. However, new factors were to arouse the interest of the Arab governments. Since early 1959, large-scale Jewish immigrations to Israel from Eastern Europe were going on; a hundred thousand new arrivals were expected in that year.⁸⁶ Moreover, the mandate of U.N.R.W.A., the United Nations agency for the Palestine refugees in the Near East, was to expire on 30 June 1960. The United Nations General Assembly, while directing the agency to pursue its program for the refugees, commissioned Secretary-General Hammarskjold to provide a plan securing the future of the agency.⁸⁷ On 15 June 1959,

⁸⁵Cremeans, op. cit., p. 197.

⁸⁶Major, loc. cit., p. 345.

⁸⁷A/PV. 788, December 12, 1958, p. 557.

Hammarskjold submitted to the General Assembly his proposals for the continuation of United Nations assistance to the Palestinian refugees. Although he did not omit pointing out the political and psychological human aspects of the refugee question, he viewed the solution of the problem in terms of the "reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Near East."⁸⁸

Lebanese deputy Adib Firzly said: The Hammarskjold plan, all Arabs agree, aims at assimilating the refugees where they are, and the Arabs agree that this plan should never be given a chance for discussion.⁸⁹

Lebanon vigorously opposed the Hammarskjold solution for the absorption of the refugees by the Arab states in which they had sought refuge. Besides the positive reasons for Lebanon's attitude -- sympathy for the national aspirations of the refugees, and solidarity

⁸⁸The United Nations, General Assembly: Official Records (Fourteenth Session, Document A/4121, Annex (XIV) 27, June 15, 1959) p. 1.

⁸⁹Lebanon, Mahader Jalsāt Majliss. . . , op. cit., Ninth Legislative Session, First Irregular Session, Eleventh Meeting, August 13, 1959, p. 1244.

with the other Arab states --, it was suggested that there was also the apprehension lest the delicate confessional balance in Lebanon be upset by the absorption of the one hundred thousand or so mainly Moslem refugees living in Lebanon.⁹⁰

In August 1959, Lebanon welcomed the committee of Arab experts who met in Sofar to reply to the proposals of Secretary-General Hammarskjold. The committee issued its recommendations on 17 August 1959, affirming "the rejection by the Arab governments and their peoples, as well as the rejection by the Palestine Arabs, of resettlement in any form, as well as of any plan that aims, directly or indirectly, at the settlement of the refugees outside their country."⁹¹

We shall resume in a moment our survey of collective Arab action on this question; for the time being, however, we must interrupt to discuss another development, relevant to the subject, which erupted in Baghdad.

⁹⁰ Marlowe, op. cit., p. 194.

⁹¹ "Recommendations by the Committee of Arab Experts in Reply to the Proposals of the U.N. Secretary-General Regarding the Continuation of U.N. Assistance to the Palestine Refugees," Khalil, op. cit., II, 654.

All of a sudden, Iraq appeared to be not so much on the verge of communism, as in the grip of an effervescent nationalism which was partly dictated by the necessity of diverting attention from Iraq's domestic problems.⁹² However, the new policy was carefully devised to protect Iraq's sovereignty.⁹³ When asked about the possibility of cooperation with the United Arab Republic, Qassem answered that the Arab peoples and the Arab states always work together in their common struggle against the imperialist and the exploiter.⁹⁴

Qassem chose to channel his Arabism in a question of utmost concern to the Arabs: the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁹⁵ Qassem's interest in the Palestinian question basically was meant to help him stabilize his regime in Iraq and acquire prestige outside it,⁹⁶ and he

⁹²Marlowe, op. cit., p. 184.

⁹³Cremeans, op. cit., p. 170.

⁹⁴Abdel Karim Qassem, Mabādi' Thawrat 14 Tammūz (in Arabic) (Iraq: The Government Press, 1961) III, 209. The Principles of the 14 July Revolution. (A Collection of Speeches). These good intentions could not be believed easily. Qassem continuously expressed his hope that "before long the eternal Syrian Republic, which had been stifled, shall come out again to the world of liberty and light." Ibid., p. 47.

⁹⁵Campbell, Defense of the Middle East, op. cit., p. 200.

⁹⁶Interview with Mr. Kazem Solh.

generously set aside for this question large sums of money. He aimed, too, at competing with the United Arab Republic for leadership in the Arab world, and meant to annoy Jordan.⁹⁷ Yet, when the Council of the Arab League met in Casablanca from 1 to 8 September 1959, Iraq was not present. Nor was Tunisia. Both had bitter feelings against Abdel Nasser.⁹⁸

The Arab delegations to Casablanca discussed Hammarskjold's solution for the refugees' problem, and unanimously rejected it,⁹⁹ and adopted the recommendations issued in Sofar by the committee of Arab experts.¹⁰⁰

The United Arab Republic presented the Council with a memorandum on the Palestinian question proposing the creation, in all Arab states, of a special organization to be entrusted with the preparation of "Arab Forces for Palestine."¹⁰¹ The basic idea was to organize politically all Arabs of Palestinian origin, thus constituting

⁹⁷Interview with Dr. Farid Zaineddin.

The final phrase will become clearer with the development of this study.

⁹⁸L'Orient (Beirut), September 9, 1959.

⁹⁹Marlowe, op. cit., p. 194.

¹⁰⁰L'Orient (Beirut), September 5, 1959.

¹⁰¹Ibid., September 4, 1959.

an independent factor which would claim the right to all former Palestinian territory, and play an active part in the conquest of the part of Palestine usurped by Israel. For the latter purpose a Palestinian army would be organized.¹⁰² Jordan reacted to that proposal violently,¹⁰³ for it assumed that the Palestinians in Jordan were already integrated, de facto, in Jordanian life.¹⁰⁴ A violent dispute broke out between the United Arab Republic and Jordan concerning the Palestine question, and the League Council adjourned while the dispute was at its bitterest.¹⁰⁵ It was decided, however, that a special conference of the Foreign ministers of the Arab states be held in the winter of 1960 for the study of the Palestine question.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰²"The Palestinian Entity" Middle East Record (London: G. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961), I, 132.

¹⁰³During the Arab-Israeli hostilities of 1948, the Arab Legion of Trans-jordan occupied portions of Palestine along the western bank of the River Jordan. Under the Armistice Agreement of 1949, Trans-jordan was to control and administer that territory. Soon thereafter, it annexed the territory and merged it into the "Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan."

¹⁰⁴L'Orient (Beirut), September 5, 1959.

¹⁰⁵Al-Hayat (Beirut), August 21, 1960.

¹⁰⁶L'Orient (Beirut), September 8, 1959.

While the conflict was growing sharper between the United Arab Republic and Jordan, Qassem, in his Arab nationalist fervour, proposed a "Palestinian Republic": a state on the Palestinian territory not occupied by Israel, designed to be the basis for an enlarged Arab Palestine.¹⁰⁷ It would include, at first, the West Bank territories of Jordan and the Gaza strip, and would be headed by a provisional government. After the establishment of the Republic, a Palestinian army would be built up to take part in the conquest of Israel.¹⁰⁸ With his proposal, Qassem meant to challenge not only Jordan's claims to the West Bank, but also the United Arab Republic presence in Gaza, as well as Abdel Nasser's "claim to represent the Palestinian Arabs."¹⁰⁹ Yet, Iraq once again absented itself when the Council of the Arab League met in Cairo, from 8 to 15 February 1960, to study the Palestinian question. As at Casablanca, all Arab states were represented at the Cairo meetings except Tunisia and Iraq. The reason for Iraq's absence, as expressed in a

¹⁰⁷Cremeans, op. cit., p. 197.

¹⁰⁸"The Palestinian Entity," op. cit., p. 132.

¹⁰⁹Cremeans, loc. cit.

memorandum from the Iraqi government to the President of the session, Lebanese Foreign minister Oueini, was its decision not to participate in the meetings of the League as long as they were held in Cairo.¹¹⁰

Abdel Nasser replied to Qassem in a speech he delivered on 16 February 1960. He said: Qassem announced his collection of eleven thousand dinārs to liberate Palestine. If he really intends to liberate Palestine let him send Iraqi troops to rebuke with the United Arab Republic troops the Israeli aggression.¹¹¹ This retort, however, did not inhibit Qassem from announcing the creation in Iraq of "the nucleus of the Palestine Army."¹¹² On 27 March 1960, he proclaimed the organization of the "Liberation Army " from Palestinian Arabs to fight for the establishment of the Palestine Republic, and called on all Palestinians to join Iraqi military courses and form the nucleus of this army.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ Al-Ahrām (Cairo), February 11, 1960.

¹¹¹ Ibid., February 17, 1960.

Just before the Arab League Council met, there was a serious outbreak of fighting in the demilitarized zone between Israel and the Syrian province through which the Israelis had planned to extend their pipelines to divert the course of the Jordan waters.

¹¹² Al-Hayat (Beirut), March 30, 1960.

¹¹³ Ibid.

The United Arab Republic-Iraqi dialogue was of secondary importance compared to the real issue, which lay between the United Arab Republic and Jordan. The United Arab Republic proposal regarding the Palestine question was that each Arab state should enable the Palestinians living on its territory to establish a popular representative organization. These would be merged into one main body attached to the League, and at the same time a Palestinian army would be organized in host countries.¹¹⁴ These two goals were wrecked, as at Casablanca, by the refusal of Jordan to relinquish its Palestinian territory.¹¹⁵ Jordan opposed the proposals of both the United Arab Republic and Iraq. It regarded them as an attempt to dismember the Kingdom of Jordan, most of whose inhabitants are Palestinians.¹¹⁶

What role did Lebanon play in these developments? Lebanon's Arab friendships were not permitted to influence the essence of its foreign policy: neutrality.

¹¹⁴"The Palestinian Entity," op. cit., p. 132.

¹¹⁵Major, loc. cit., p. 347.

¹¹⁶"The Palestinian Entity," loc. cit.;
Al-Hayat (Beirut), February 21, 1960.

Whether the Iraqi regime was pro-communist, pro-West, independent-Arab, friendly and correct relations with it were to be maintained; and whether the United Arab Republic proposed a plan for the Palestine question suitable to Lebanon or not -- as in that case it was -- Lebanon would express no reaction, whether in words or deeds. However, Lebanon succeeded in personal diplomacy. In Cairo, Foreign minister Oueini's presence, in his capacity of President of the session, had a soothing effect on the discussions.¹¹⁷ Oueini, as well as other heads of delegations, refrained from taking sides. According to the Beirut daily, Al-Hayat, Lebanon played in the League its traditional friendly role; and when it came to voting, it abstained until unanimity was reached.¹¹⁸ Finally, it was decided that the discussions concerning the Palestinian entity be postponed until further study was made. A committee of three states was appointed to visit the West Bank and the host Arab states, and to prepare a report on the possibilities concerning the creation of a Palestinian entity.¹¹⁹ This committee never came into being.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷Al-Ahrām (Cairo), February 10 and 11, 1960.

¹¹⁸Al-Hayat (Beirut), February 25, 1960.

¹¹⁹Al-Ahrām (Cairo), February 15, 1960.

¹²⁰Al-Hayat (Beirut), August 18, 1960.

The Political Committee meeting in
Schtaura - August, 1960

Lebanon welcomed the idea that the Political Committee of the League -- and later on, the Council of the League itself -- hold their meetings in the Lebanese summer resort, Schtaura to continue their study of Palestinian problems as well as other Arab matters. While tension was growing between Cairo and Amman, the atmosphere was clearing between Cairo and Baghdad. On 16 August 1960, Lebanese Prime minister Salaam announced -- with unconcealed pleasure -- that Foreign ministers, Dr. Mahmud Fawzi of the United Arab Republic and Dr. Hashem Jawād of Iraq, will represent their countries at the meetings in Schtaura.¹²¹ The Lebanese government had sent a special message to the United Arab Republic government requesting a possible postponement of the discussion of the Palestinian entity until it was well studied, and stressing the necessity of the presence of the United Arab Republic Foreign minister at the meetings of the Political Committee. Lebanon expressed the fear that if the United Arab Republic was not represented by its foreign minister, other Arab states would act in a similar manner, and the conference

¹²¹Ibid., August 17, 1960.

would lose the executive character.¹²²

The Political Committee of the League of Arab States held its meetings in Sghtaura, at the level of Foreign ministers, from 22 to 28 August 1960. The third item on its agenda was, "Certain Aspects of the Palestine Question." It comprised the reorganization of the Palestine people and their presentation as an entity, and the creation of a Palestine army in the host Arab countries.¹²³ The Palestine question was discussed from 26 to 28 August in a very tense atmosphere. Harmony characterized the United Arab Republic-Iraqi relations. The proposals of the two countries complemented one another. The Iraqi delegate stressed the necessity of creating a Palestinian military force; the United Arab Republic delegate -- praising the Iraqi efforts in this regard -- emphasized that a military nucleus should be supported by a political entity, internationally re-

¹²²Ibid., August 10, 1960.

The United Arab Republic was represented at the Beirut meetings in 1959 and at the Cairo meetings in 1960 by its deputy Foreign minister, Dr. Farid Zaineddin, a Syrian.

¹²³Ibid., August 23, 1960.

cognized.¹²⁴ Thus, there was no problem facing Lebanon. Iraq and the United Arab Republic were on friendly terms and there was no need to take sides between them. But there was a problem concerning Jordan. The Jordanian Foreign minister replied to Dr. Fawzi's statement by asserting that Jordan, with its two banks, had accepted the de facto situation, and would not accept unrealistic talk which would destroy what was already in being.¹²⁵

It was observed that Lebanon, in the evening discussions, stood in "the camp" consisting of Jordan and the Sudan facing "the camp" consisting of the United Arab Republic, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia until a draft resolution was agreed upon which the Arab Foreign ministers sent to their governments for approval.¹²⁶ The final resolution, adopted on 28 August, expressed the separate personality of the Palestinian Arabs, their rights in Palestine and to the whole of the territory of former

¹²⁴Ibid., August 27, 1960.

¹²⁵Ibid.

¹²⁶Ibid., August 28, 1960.

Lebanon, in spite of its approval of the United Arab Republic plan and its good relations with Cairo, was anxious to maintain unity within the League. The League is Lebanon's Arab guarantee of independence and sovereignty.

Palestine, and their right to self-determination. The Arab states were requested to permit and help the Palestinian people serve their cause, and to prevent the liquidation of the Palestinian personality. The resolution provided for the creation of a Palestinian army in the host Arab states.¹²⁷ A clause in the minutes of the meetings provided for continued Jordanian government over the West Bank until the time when the Palestinian people was able to exercise its rights.¹²⁸ Yet, by the end of the period covered by our study (1961), the Palestinian entity had remained a matter of inter-Arab controversy, and no joint action had been taken by the Arab states to put any of the various proposals into practice.¹²⁹

The Shtaura meeting ended and the Arab delegates expressed their satisfaction with the results.¹³⁰ Accord-

¹²⁷ Adli Hasshād, Sha'ab Philasteen fi Tarīk al-'Audah (in Arabic) (Cairo: Al-Dar al-Qaumiyyah lil-Tibā'a wal-Nashr, 1964) p. 106. The People of Palestine on the Way Back .

¹²⁸ As-Syassa (Beirut), August 30, 1960.

¹²⁹ "The Palestinian Entity," op. cit., p. 132.

¹³⁰ L'Orient (Beirut), August 29, 1960.

ding to the daily, L'Orient, the conference was a triumph for Lebanese diplomacy.¹³¹ Prime minister Salaam said: While appreciating the attitudes and acts of all the delegates to the meeting, I stress upon the wise and perseverant efforts of Foreign minister Philippe Takla who, following President Chehab's instructions, continually sought for the tightening of the bonds of Arab brotherhood.¹³²

This brief study of the growth of the concept of the Palestinian entity during its infancy in the period under examination serves to show the essence of Lebanese foreign policy towards the United Arab Republic and Iraq, as well as towards the other Arab states. Lebanon's part was to watch every Arab struggle find its own solution, with a possible exercise of Lebanese personal diplomacy when developments permitted.¹³³ To safeguard its national unity, Lebanon, whether the Arab states were in a state of conflict or at peace with each other, was compelled to follow one course of action: friendliness to all. The

¹³¹Ibid., August 30, 1960.

¹³²Ibid.

¹³³Interview with Mr. Joseph Abu Khater.

explosive internal Lebanese situation could be activated by any act by the government in favour of one Arab state and against the other. The United Arab Republic understood this situation and did not expect from Lebanon more than what was possible.¹³⁴

Lebanese Participation in the Conference
of Non-Aligned States,
September 1961

Until now, Lebanon's foreign policy towards the United Arab Republic and Iraq has been studied through the observation of direct contacts between the respective governments and of meetings of the Political Committee of the Arab League. In the following pages, Lebanon's foreign policy will be studied through its participation in the conference of non-aligned states held in Belgrade, in 1961. The fact that this was an international conference does not denude the Lebanese step from its Arab content. Lebanon participated in this conference as an Arab state and together with all the Arab states. The United Arab Republic was one of the initiators of the concept of a conference of non-aligned states, and one of

¹³⁴ See Chehab-Abdel Nasser meeting, Chapter III.

its co-sponsors. Iraq was present at the preparatory conference of non-aligned states held in Cairo (June 1961) from which Lebanon was excluded. Iraq had declared its non-alignment in international politics. Lebanon was to follow suit.

The concept of a new conference of non-aligned states had its birth in the autumn of 1960 when Presidents Abdel Nasser, Nkrumah (of Ghana), Sukarno (of Indonesia), Tito (of Yugoslavia), and Premier Nehru (of India), met at the United Nations.¹³⁵ Later, during an official visit by President Tito to the United Arab Republic in mid-April 1961, an announcement was made proposing such a conference. A joint communiqué issued on the occasion of this visit declared that the two Presidents, Tito and Abdel Nasser, held the view that consultations between the non-aligned countries were indispensable for the purpose of consolidating world peace, safeguarding the independence of all nations, and eliminating the danger of intervention in their affairs.¹³⁶ The proposed joint action by non-aligned nations aimed at increasing their power at the United Nations and in world politics in general; limiting the

¹³⁵ Al-Ahrām (Cairo), October 2, 1964.

¹³⁶ Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews, 1961,
p. 106.

weight of the Soviet bloc and the West; minimizing tensions and reducing armaments; and directing resources spent on arms into the development of the less advanced nations.¹³⁷ As Abdel Nasser said in a speech on 22 July 1961, this effort was not meant to constitute a bloc but to "represent the conscience of the world which resists colonialism, domination, nuclear weapons and armaments."¹³⁸

A preparatory conference composed of the non-aligned states was held in Cairo, from 5 to 12 June 1961. Twenty-two states were present. Lebanon was not there. The Iraqi delegate proposed on 6 June that Lebanon be invited to the summit conference, and was seconded by Saudi Arabia and Cambodia.¹³⁹

A problem faced the preparatory conference. It arose from the need of defining non-alignment. On the basis of such a definition, new states would or would not be invited to participate in the summit conference. The Indian delegation had presented a memorandum desiring the adoption of a definition allowing for a greater number

¹³⁷ Créméans, op. cit., p. 263.

¹³⁸ Nasser's Speeches. . . , 1961, p. 160.

¹³⁹ Al-Ahrām (Cairo) June 7, 1961.

of states to participate.¹⁴⁰ Most delegations, however, stood for the Indonesian definition: that each non-aligned state should declare its following, in fact, the policy of non-alignment; that it should be free, in fact, from military pacts; and that it should not permit the building of foreign military bases on its territory.¹⁴¹ The debate concerning the definition lasted throughout the preparatory conference. It was on 11 June that the following definition, consisting of five criteria, was adopted for the participation of new states in the conference which was to be held at Belgrade: (1) the state policy should be independent, and based on principles of peaceful co-existence and non-alignment, or a policy friendly to these principles; (2) the state policy must support movements of national liberation; (3) the state should not be a member of any collective military pact making it a party to the struggle between the great Powers; (4) the state should not be a party to any bilateral pact with a big power; (5) the state should not have permitted a foreign state to build military bases on its territory.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., June 6, 1961.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., June 8, 1961.

¹⁴² Ibid., June 12, 1961.

On 27 July 1961, it was announced in Belgrade that Lebanon had been officially invited to participate in the conference of non-aligned states to be held on 1 September 1961. Yugoslavia, the host country, was extending the invitations in the name of the co-sponsors of the Conference: Indonesia, the United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia.¹⁴³

Saeb Salaam explained the situation in Lebanon in the following manner: There was "hesitancy" in Lebanon concerning participation in the conference at Belgrade. Many political figures had hoped that the subject of participation would not be brought up. They wished that Lebanon would not be invited to the conference, thus averting the need for a decision. "I was Prime minister, then," he said, "and I saw that it was in Lebanon's interest -- with its traditional policy of neutrality -- to show up among the non-aligned states."¹⁴⁴ He called the United Arab Republic Ambassador, Ghaleb, and asked him to inform President Abdel Nasser of this wish. Ambassador Ghaleb replied that President Abdel Nasser, desiring not to embarrass the Lebanese government,

¹⁴³ Al-'Amal (Beirut), July 28, 1961.

¹⁴⁴ Interview with Mr. Saeb Salaam.

had refrained from addressing an invitation to Lebanon. Salaam assured Ghaleb that such an invitation would cause no embarrassment to the Lebanese government, and that to participate in the conference would be in Lebanon's interest, confirming its policy of neutrality and non-alignment.¹⁴⁵

In Cairo, the basis of invitations to the conference were widened, as mentioned above, and Lebanon was invited to Belgrade. Lebanon responded positively to the invitation. Foreign minister Philippe Takla explained to the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, on 18 September 1961, that it was difficult for Lebanon not to participate in a conference representing a large part of the Afro-Asian world; Lebanon's absence would "have been interpreted" as a declaration of Lebanese alignment.¹⁴⁶

It had been made known from the start that President Chehab would not be able to leave the country. Prime minister Salaam headed the Lebanese delegation to Belgrade.¹⁴⁷ The Arab governments present at the

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Al-'Amal (Beirut), September 19, 1961.

¹⁴⁷ Al-Nahar (Beirut), July 22, 1961.

Conference were the Provisional Government of Algeria and the governments of Iraq, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic, and Yemen. The Lebanese delegation reached Belgrade on 30 August 1961. On 31 August, Prime minister Salaam and the Lebanese delegation -- including Foreign minister Takla -- met President Abdel Nasser and visited the other heads of Arab delegations.¹⁴⁸ On 2 September, an official spokesman of the Lebanese delegation confirmed that Salaam was in permanent contact with Abdel Nasser and the other Arab delegations in view of adopting a unified position concerning the items on the agenda of the conference.¹⁴⁹

The conference was officially opened by President Tito on 1 September 1961. It lasted for six days, and was attended by delegates from twenty five countries and by observers from three.¹⁵⁰ On 2 September, Prime minister Salaam delivered a speech in which he declared that

¹⁴⁸ L'Orient (Beirut), September 2, 1961.

It should be noted that the Lebanese dailies put great emphasis on the presence of all the Lebanese delegation with Premier Salaam during his visits, and on their visiting together all Arab heads of delegations equally.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., September 3, 1961.

¹⁵⁰ Richard Gott, "The Decline of Neutralism," Survey of International Affairs, 1961, ed. D.C. Watt (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 380.

Lebanon prized in its foreign policy the principles of neutrality, and of non-alignment between the two world blocs, and that this policy had great implications for the unity of its people and their independence.¹⁵¹

The conference went its regular course; President Abdel Nasser proposed that the conference arrange for the two world blocs to start negotiations,¹⁵² and on 6 September 1961, the conference called upon the United States and the Soviet Union to suspend immediately their recent war preparations and approaches, and resume negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the outstanding differences between them.¹⁵³ Among the resolutions adopted by the Belgrade Conference, of particular interest to the Arab world, was the condemnation by the participants of the imperialist policies pursued in the Middle East, and their support of full restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine in conformity with the Charter and the resolutions of the United Nations.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵¹ Al-'Amal (Beirut), September 3, 1961.

¹⁵² Nasser's Speeches. . . . 1961, p. 239.

¹⁵³ Gott, loc. cit., p. 383.

¹⁵⁴ The Belgrade Conference-Documents (Cairo: The National Publications House, n.d.), p. 10.

Nothing outstanding resulted from Lebanon's participation in the conference of non-aligned states. The meaningful event was simply its presence there. This step was different from other, rather formless, Lebanese foreign policy measures, and was encouraged by the march of the Arab states into non-alignment.

CHAPTER V
LEBANESE FOREIGN POLICY AND THE BREAKUP
OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

At dawn, on 28 September 1961, a small group of Syrian army officers staged a coup d'état in Damascus and announced the separation of Syria from the United Arab Republic. Serious efforts were made during the daylight hours of 28 September to save the union, but by evening the point of no return had been reached; the unity broke down.¹ Abdel Nasser, who had initially given orders for military operations in the Syrian region, cancelled before midnight of 28 September all these operations.² The new regime in Damascus announced the rebirth of the Arab Syrian Republic. The Syrian coup brought to a close an era

¹Interview with Dr. Farid Zaineddin.

²"Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser to the Nation, September 29, 1961," Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews, 1961, op. cit., pp. 261, 267.

in which many Arabs had come to believe that Arab unity and the creation of a great Arab state were just around the corner.³

Iraq may have played a small part in the Syrian separation -- but only an insignificant part, compared to the efforts exerted by other Arab states.⁴ While Jordan recognized the new Syrian regime on 29 September, Qassem only declared: "We have to collaborate with all the Arab states and Syria."⁵ It was on 10 October that he recognized the new Syrian Republic.⁶ Friendly exchanges between the new Syrian government and Qassem followed.⁷ Some time later, Qassem held talks with Syrian President Kouddsi concerning union between Syria and Iraq, but the talks led nowhere -- a sign of how bare were the threads linking Qassem to the Syrian coup of September 1961.⁸

³Cremeans, The Arabs and the World, op.cit., p.179.

⁴Interview with Dr. Farid Zaineddin.

The state of Jordan is the one mainly implied in the Syrian coup of 1961.

⁵L'Orient (Beirut), September 30, 1961.

⁶As-Syassa (Beirut), October 11, 1961.

⁷Cremeans, op. cit., p. 174.

⁸Interview with Dr. Farid Zaineddin.

The Lebanese government experienced a very tense atmosphere from the moment the Syrian secession was declared. Relaxation returned only when relations between Cairo and Damascus began to follow a somewhat normal course.⁹ Lebanon had played no role in the creation of the United Arab Republic; similarly, it took no part in its breakdown.¹⁰ Being a non-participant in the Syrian coup, and following its own regular policy of non-intervention, Lebanon might have watched events in next-door Syria with no more than the normal concern of a non-involved neighbour. Moreover, inasmuch as what was then at stake was not an open conflict between the United Arab Republic and some other Arab state -- whether Iraq or another -- Lebanon was not faced with the familiar spectacle of Arab polarity, calling for it to gravitate towards one pole or the other. Abdel Nasser had succeeded in keeping the Syrian separation an internal matter, to be dealt with by peaceful methods. Iraq, like the other Arab states did not hastily recognize the new Syrian regime. Only Jordan

⁹Interview with Mr. Joseph Abu Khater.

¹⁰Interviews with Mr. Joseph Abu Khater and Dr. Farid Zaineddin.

had acted precipitately in granting recognition; but Jordan had no capacity to impose such a recognition on Lebanon.

The new Syrian government itself, however, sent an emissary to Beirut, on 30 September 1961, asking for Lebanese recognition. The question of recognition caused the Lebanese government much embarrassment.¹¹ Great efforts were made by Lebanese officials to satisfy at the same time both Cairo and Damascus. A reliable source, said the Beirut daily L'Orient, disclosed that the Lebanese government succeeded both in convincing Damascus of the necessity of avoiding any move concerning the recognition of the new Syrian regime, and in convincing Cairo of the necessity of establishing friendly relations with Syria.¹² The Syrian pressure diminished, and the Lebanese ministers agreed to await new events, thus avoiding making any political move for as long as possible.¹³ At the beginning, the problem was complicated by the fact that Cairo had threatened to break relations with states

¹¹As-Syassa (Beirut), October 1, 1961.

¹²L'Orient (Beirut), October 3, 1961.

¹³Ibid.; see As-Syassa (Beirut), October 4, 1961.

recognizing the separatist government.¹⁴ However, this difficulty was soon removed -- when President Abdel Nasser declared in a radio address on 5 October 1961 that he would not put obstacles to Syria's accession to international life, its membership in the United Nations and in the Arab League,¹⁵ and would not oppose the recognition of Syria by other states.¹⁶

On 13 October 1961, normal political relations were resumed between Syria and Lebanon. The Director of the office of the Premier carried the notification of Lebanese official recognition to the Syrian government.¹⁷

* * *

When the Syrian separation was proclaimed, Egyptians in Syria returned to the United Arab Republic

¹⁴Ibid., October 4, 1961.

Cairo had already broken relations with Turkey who had recognized on 29 September the new Syrian regime.

¹⁵As-Syassa (Beirut), October 7, 1961.

¹⁶L'Orient (Beirut), October 6, 1961.

¹⁷Lebanon, Mahader Jalsāt Majliss an-Nuwāb, op. cit., Tenth Legislative Session, Second Regular Session, Third meeting, November 16, 1961, p. 128.

(As Egypt continued to be called after the secession).
A great number of Egyptians had to cross Lebanese territory. The Lebanese authorities and citizens treated them with much friendliness. This left the Cairo government with a deep sense of gratitude and appreciation. In his speech of 5 October 1961, President Abdel Nasser declared: "I wish to express my deep thanks and those of the people of the United Arab Republic for the noble feelings which were shown by the people and the Government of Lebanon towards the citizens of the United Arab Republic who were expelled from Syria."¹⁸ He granted the Lebanese Ambassador in Cairo an audience and expressed his gratitude towards Lebanon.¹⁹

* * *

The Syrian separation did not alter the fundamental principles that had shaped Lebanese foreign policy towards the United Arab Republic since September 1958 -- the same fundamental principles which emanated

¹⁸Nasser's Speeches. . . , 1961, p. 295.

¹⁹Interview with Mr. Joseph Abu Khater.

from the 1943 National Covenant, and which had been reinforced by the cordial understanding reached at the meeting of 25 March 1959 between Chehab and Abdel Nasser. These bases were not destroyed by the breakup of the unity, for the United Arab Republic remained a strong Arab power and a symbol of Arab unity.

Towards Iraq, Lebanon followed the same friendly though placid policy, which was not altered by the subsequent basic changes in the Iraqi regime when Qassem disappeared from the stage of history.

EPILOGUE

The foregoing survey of Lebanese foreign policy may have left the reader somewhat perplexed at the seeming "colorlessness" of Lebanese policy towards the United Arab Republic and Iraq, and indeed towards the remaining Arab states as well. It is hoped, however, that our analysis may have helped explain why, "colorless" or otherwise, such a policy was nevertheless unavoidable. It was the only policy-course open for Lebanon.

For, on the one hand, the primary concern of Lebanese governments -- any Lebanese government-- has always been the maintenance and consolidation of internal unity. Official Lebanon, therefore, always finds itself compelled to adhere to such a foreign policy as would least endanger that unity -- and will continue so to find itself until national unity can be maintained by forces and means other than foreign policy, or until national unity has reached such a degree of firmness

as to cease to be ever-precarious and vulnerable to external pressures or to divergent reactions thereto.

On the other hand, Lebanon is an Arab state, one of many Arab states, all members of one family. The fact of being one member of a family -- and, indeed, one of the smallest members -- makes obvious the need for, and the advantages of, treating all the other members of the family in a brotherly manner all the time.

These two factors -- the internal and the external -- jointly urge Lebanon to conduct itself in Arab affairs with a minimum of initiative-taking and a maximum of caution. The "highest common factor" among the conflicting tendencies of various Lebanese forces as well as among the divergent interests and orientations of several Arab states is, by the nature of the case, the smallest initiative in foreign policy-making; and it constantly counsels Lebanon to avoid scrupulously showing either special affection or animosity to any Arab state. Only by remaining friendly to all Arab states, and by shunning special ties with any individual Arab state; only by following Arab consensus, and eschewing alike the role of leader or deviator in the Arab community -- only thus can

as to cease to be ever-precarious and vulnerable to external pressures or to divergent reactions thereto.

On the other hand, Lebanon is an Arab state, one of many Arab states, all members of one family. The fact of being one member of a family -- and, indeed, one of the smallest members -- makes obvious the need for, and the advantages of, treating all the other members of the family in a brotherly manner all the time.

These two factors -- the internal and the external -- jointly urge Lebanon to conduct itself in Arab affairs with a minimum of initiative-taking and a maximum of caution. The "highest common factor" among the conflicting tendencies of various Lebanese forces as well as among the divergent interests and orientations of several Arab states is, by the nature of the case, the smallest initiative in foreign policy-making; and it constantly counsels Lebanon to avoid scrupulously showing either special affection or animosity to any Arab state. Only by remaining friendly to all Arab states, and by shunning special ties with any individual Arab state; only by following Arab consensus, and eschewing alike the role of leader or deviator in the Arab community -- only thus can

a Lebanese policy satisfy all factions inside Lebanon.

To be sure, at any moment one segment of Lebanese will be found which desires that a stronger tie between Lebanon and some Arab state be established, while another segment will also be found which desires lesser friendship towards that state or greater friendship towards its adversary. But, by yielding to the one wish or to the other, a Lebanese government is always certain to heighten internal discord. Only by avoiding equally all such courses and turning a deaf ear to all such counsels can the government of Lebanon ensure the (at least passive) satisfaction of all segments of Lebanese and escape the active dissatisfaction of some.

Similarly, with respect to any controversial Arab issue, some Lebanese groups will always be found that will urge a more positive and active attitude upon their government, while others will press for moving in the opposite direction. Nothing is more certain than that compliance with either demand will generate internal unrest -- and the more extensive the compliance, the more explosive the unrest ! Only by carefully refusing to take the lead in any direction, and by associating

itself with the attitude of the moderate majority of Arab states, can the Lebanese government succeed in gaining the support (or at least the acquiescence) of the majority of the Lebanese, while antagonizing only the smallest number and giving little cause for active dissent on the part of any.

From these premises, two pairs of corollaries follow. Lebanese political fortunes, internal and Arab, prosper during periods (alas, only too rare and too brief) of total Arab harmony, or of peaceful co-existence among the Arab states. Furthermore, Lebanese governments have their best chance of causing little or no internal discord when they are concerned with Arab issues which are least controversial, or on which all the Arab states (however divergent otherwise their respective policies might be) manifest a high degree of consensus. The obverse is also true. Periods of intense polarization and inter-Arab friction are invariably occasions of internal polarity, anxiety, and potentially explosive tension within Lebanon. And, furthermore, controversial Arab issues demand of the Lebanese government full vigilance, prudence, and tight-rope walking, placing a special premium on the "virtue"

of taking as little initiative as possible. Even the lure of mediation, tempting as it may be, is as a rule resisted -- specially when inter-Arab frictions are sharp and the prospects of finding a middle course acceptable to all parties are dim.

This is the chief lesson of Lebanese foreign policy since independence -- a lesson equally driven home by the experiences of Lebanon when the lesson was heeded (as in the relatively long periods preceding 1955 and following 1958) as when it was ignored (from early 1955 to mid-1958).

The period from 1958 to 1961, which was the subject of this study, provided an excellent test-case for the foregoing principles, premises and corollaries of Lebanese foreign policy, and confronted Lebanese statesmanship with grave challenges. For, internally, the period came in the wake of violent strife which had been caused, at least in part, by official Lebanese involvement in a growing Arab polarization at the expense of traditional Lebanese neutrality. And, on the Arab stage, the period witnessed the escalation of former Arab polarities to new plateaus, on which new and unfamiliar patterns of inter-Arab relations emerged. One principal Arab pole

(Cairo) rose to new heights of self-expression at the opening of the period, and eventually suffered a severe but not crippling setback at the close of the period. The other pole (Baghdad) also entered the period by giving its policies extreme expression; but it soon collapsed; and when it re-emerged, it was with drastically diminished stature and reduced importance that it re-asserted itself as an actor on the Arab stage. In all these vicissitudes, -- in its familiar patterns as in its unfamiliar innovations --, the period under study provided Lebanese statesmanship with opportunities to demonstrate the continued relevance and validity of traditional Lebanese neutrality as well as its adaptability to new circumstances. It has been our purpose in this study to describe the new issues which arose, and the manner in which Lebanon sought to meet them with a re-adapted form of neutrality.

It is our submission that, what the casual observer may view as "colorlessness" -- and what may at one time or another outrage many a Lebanese partisan, whether of one persuasion or the other -- is in fact nothing less than the price realistically and consciously

paid by official Lebanon for the maintenance of internal national unity and self-preservation. Close to a quarter-century of independence has clearly demonstrated -- by the diverse results of long periods of observance and a brief period of disregard -- that, in Lebanese policy-making, the deliberate pursuit of "the line of least initiative, least conflict with any Arab state, special ties with none, and friendship to all" is the very beginning of wisdom.

APPENDIX I

DRAFT RESOLUTION OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

4 June 1958

"Having heard the statements of the delegations of the Lebanese Republic and the United Arab Republic; having noted the wish of both parties to settle their differences in a peaceful manner within the League of Arab states; in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the Pact of the League of Arab States, and desirous of removing anything which disturbs the atmosphere of calm among the brotherly Arab states;

The Council decides:

1. To do all in its power to put an end to anything which may disturb the atmosphere of calm among member states;
2. To request the Government of Lebanon to withdraw the complaint it had placed before the Security Council;
3. To appeal to the various Lebanese groups to end the disturbances and to take the necessary measures to settle the domestic dispute by peaceful and constitutional means;
4. To send a committee selected from among the members of the Council to ease the situation and to give effect to the decision of the Council."¹

¹S/PV. 823, June 6, 1958, p. 24.

APPENDIX II

DOCUMENT S/4007

Letter dated 22 May 1958 from the representative of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council ¹

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request you, in your capacity as President of the Security Council, to call an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the following question:

"Complaint by Lebanon in respect of a situation arising from the intervention of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."

The said intervention consists, inter alia, of the following acts: the infiltration of armed bands from Syria into Lebanon, the destruction of Lebanese life and property by such bands, the participations of United Arab Republic nationals in acts of terrorism and rebellion against the established authorities in Lebanon, the supply of arms from Syria to individuals and bands in Lebanon rebelling against the established authorities, and the waging of a violent radio and press campaign in the United Arab Republic calling for strikes, demonstrations and the overthrow of the established authorities in Lebanon, and through other provocative acts.

(Signed) Karim Azkoul
Permanent Representative
of Lebanon to the United
Nations.

¹The United Nations, Security Council: Official Records (Thirteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1958) p. 33.

APPENDIX III

Draft Resolution Submitted by the Arab Member States, and unanimously adopted by the General Assembly, 21 August 1958¹

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item entitled "Questions considered by the Security Council at its 838th meeting on 7 August 1958"

Noting the Charter aim that States should practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours,

Noting that the Arab States have agreed, in the Pact of the League of Arab States, to strengthen the close relations and numerous ties which link the Arab States, and to support and stabilize these ties upon a basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of these States, and to direct their efforts toward the common good of all the Arab countries, the improvement of their status, the security of their future and the realization of their aspirations and hopes,

Desiring to relieve international tension,

I

1. Welcomes the renewed assurances given by the Arab States to observe the provision of article 8 of the Pact of the League of Arab States that each member state shall respect the systems of government established in the other member States and regard them as exclusive concerns of these states, and that each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government;

¹The United Nations, General Assembly: Official Records (Third Emergency Special Session, Annexes, Resolution 1237 (ES-111), August 21, 1958) p. 3.

2. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations to act strictly in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, of non-aggression, of strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and of equal and mutual benefit, and to ensure that their conduct by word and deed conforms to these principles;

II

Requests the Secretary-General to make forthwith, in consultation with the Governments concerned and in accordance with the Charter, and having in mind section I of this resolution, such practical arrangements as would adequately help in upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter in relation to Lebanon and Jordan in the present circumstances, and thereby facilitate the early withdrawal of the foreign troops from the two countries;

III

Invites the Secretary-General to continue his studies now under way and in this context to consult as appropriate with the Arab countries of the Near East with a view to possible assistance regarding an Arab development institution designed to further economic growth in these countries;

IV

1. Requests Member States to co-operate fully in carrying out this resolution
2. Invites the Secretary-General to report hereunder, as appropriate, the first such report to be made not later than 30 September 1958.

APPENDIX IV

CHEHAB-ABDEL NASSER JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ,

25 March 1959

"On the 25th of March 1959, a meeting was held on the Lebanese-United Arab Republic borders between President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir, President of the United Arab Republic, and his Excellency General Fu'ad Shihab, President of the Lebanese Republic, to discuss various matters of direct interest to the two sister countries, and to exchange views on Arab and international questions. As a result of their discussions they agreed on affirming the following principles.

First: Their eagerness to strengthen the bonds of brotherhood and to foster mutual and fruitful cooperation between the two sister Republics in all matters that would lead to the consolidation of their independence, sovereignty and very existence within the framework of the Pact of the League of Arab States and Charter of the United Nations.

Second: Their belief in the necessity of consolidating Arab solidarity and fully supporting Arab causes.

Third: Their sincere desire to seek positive solutions as soon as possible to the economic questions outstanding between the two countries, on the basis of equality and the preservation of mutual interests, with a view to assuring the welfare and prosperity of their peoples.

To this end, the two presidents have instructed their respective Governments to maintain their efforts and to resume their discussions, without delay, in the same spirit of cordiality and understanding which prevailed during the meeting of the two Presidents and (with the same) sincere and brotherly feelings cherished by the two brotherly peoples." ¹

¹ Muhammad Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League, II, 290 - 291

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books and Documents

Arabic Books and Documents

- Abdel Nasser, Gamal. Majmū'at Khitab wa Bayānāt al-Raīs Gamal Abdel Nasser, 1958 - 1960 (A Collection of Speeches and Statements by President Gamal Abdel Nasser). Cairo: Information Department, n.d.
- Abu-Izzedin, Halim. Siassat Lubnān al-Kharijiyah (Lebanon's Foreign Policy). Beirut: Dar al 'Ilm lil-Malayeen, 1966.
- Al-Ahdab, Ibrahim. Al-Alākāt al-Kharijiyah (Foreign Relations). Beirut: Publications of the "Cénacle Libanais," 1962.
- Al-Jamāli, Fadel. Thikrayāt wa 'Ibar (Souvenirs and Maxims). Beirut: Dar al-Kitāb al-Jadid, 1964.
- Ammūn, Fuad. Lubnān fi Dunya al-'Arab (Lebanon in the Arab world). Beirut: Publications of the "Cénacle Libanais," 1965.
- El-Khoury, Bechara. Hakāik Lubnaniyah; Vols II, III (Lebanese Truths). Harissa: Bassil Bros. Press, 1961.
- Hasshād, Adly. Sha'ab Philasteen fi Tarīk al-'Audah (The People of Palestine on the Way Back). Cairo: Al-Dār al-Qaumiyyah lil Tibā'a wal-Nashr, 1964.
- Iraq. Ministry of Defense, The High Military Tribunal, Mahkamat as-Sha'ab Vols. I, IV. (The People's Tribunal). Baghdad: The Government Press, 1959.

- Junblāt, Kamāl. Hakikat al-Thawra al-Lubnaniyah (The Truth about the Lebanese Revolution). Beirut: Dār al-Nashr al-'Arabiyyah, 1959.
- Lebanon. Mahader Jalsāt Majliss an-Nuwwāb August 1957-January 1962 (Minutes of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies).
- Malha, Jean. Majmū'at al-Bayānāt al-Wizariyyah al-Lubnaniyah (A Collection of the Lebanese Governments' Statements of Policy). Beirut: Khayat's, 1965.
- Qassem, Abdel Karim. Mabādi' Thawrat 14 Tammūz. 4 Vols. (The Principles of the 14 July Revolution - A Collection of Speeches). Iraq: The Government Press, 1959 - 1962.
- Riachi, Iskandar. Ruassa' Lubnān kama 'Ariftuhum (The Presidents of Lebanon as I Knew Them). Beirut: Al-Maktab al-Tijārī lil Tibā'a wal-Tawzī' wal-Nashr, 1961.
- Solh, Kazem. Al-Hāla fi Lubnān Sayyia (The Situation in Lebanon is Bad). Beirut: Al-Majaliss Press, 1960.
- Solh, Sami. Muthakkarāt (Memoirs). Beirut: Maktabat al-Fikr al-'Arabī, 1960.

English and French Books and Documents

- Abdel Nasser, Gamal. Speeches and Press Interviews, 1961. Cairo: Government Information Department.
- . The Philosophy of the Revolution. Buffalo: Smith, Keynes and Marshall Publishers, 1959.
- Adams, Sherman. Firsthand Report. New York: Harper and Bros., 1961.
- Agwani, M. S. The Lebanese Crisis, 1958. A Documentary Record. London: Asia Publishing House, 1965.
- Almond, Gabriel, and Coleman, James (eds.). The Politics of the Developing Areas. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960.

Arab Political Encyclopaedia, Documents and Notes, 10th Year.
Cairo: Information Department, 1961.

Barraclough, G. (ed.) Survey of International Affairs 1956 - 1958. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.
London: Oxford University Press, 1962.

Survey of International Affairs, 1959-1960. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. London: Oxford University Press, 1964.

Bastid, Mme Paul (ed.). Annuaire Français de Droit International, 1959. Paris: Imprimerie Louis-Jean-G.A.P., 1960.

Binder, Leonard (ed.). Politics in Lebanon. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966.

Calvocoressi, Peter (ed.). Survey of International Affairs, 1951. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. London: Oxford University Press, 1954.

Campbell, John. Defense of the Middle East. New York: Harper and Bros., 1958.

Chamoun, Camille. Crise au Moyen-Orient. France: Gallimard, 1963.

Chehab, Camille. Le Liban face à l'Ouragan. Beirut: —, [1962].

Cremeans, Charles. The Arabs and the World. New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1963.

Egypt. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Records, 1950-51. Cairo: Société Orientale de Publicité, 1951.

Eisenhower, Dwight. Waging Peace. London: Heinemann Ltd., 1966.

Ionides, Michael. Divide and Lose. London: Geoffrey Bles, 1960.

Iraq. The 14th July Celebration Committee. The Iraqi Revolution, 1958 - 1959. Baghdad: The Times Press.

Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1957 - 1958. XI, 16293, 16297, 16308. London: Keesing's Publications Ltd.

_____. 1959 - 1960. XII, 16739. London: Keesing's Publications Ltd.

Khalil, Muhammad. The Arab States and the Arab League. A Documentary Record. Vols. I, II. Beirut: Khayat's, 1962.

Kerr, Malcolm. The Arab Cold War, 1958-1964. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.

Marlowe, John. Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism. London: The Cresset Press, 1961.

Meo, Leila. Lebanon: Improbable Nation. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965.

Middle East Record. Vol. I, 1960. Published for the Israel Oriental Society, the Reuven Shiloah Research Center. London: G. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961.

Morgenthau, Hans J. The Impasse of American Foreign Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962.

Murphy, Robert. Diplomat among Warriors. London: Collin's, 1964.

Qubain, Fahim. Crisis in Lebanon. Washington D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1961.

Rostow, W. W. The United States in the World Arena. New York: Harper and Bros., 1960.

Sayegh, Fayez A. Arab Unity, Hope and Fulfillment. New York: The Devin-Adair Co., 1958.

Stewart, Desmond. Turmoil in Beirut. London: Allan Wingate, 1958.

Thayer, Charles W. Diplomat. New York: Harper and Bros., 1959.

The Belgrade Conference, Documents. Cairo: Information Department, [1961].

Watt, D. C. Survey of International Affairs, 1961.
Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute
of International Affairs. London: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1965.

Periodical Articles and Bulletins

Crow, Ralph. "Religious Sectarianism in the Lebanese
Political System," Journal of Politics, XXIV
(August, 1962), 507.

"Lebanon: Chronology, April 1 - June 30, 1958," The
Middle East Journal, XII (Summer 1958), 310.

"United States Announces Withdrawal of Forces from Lebanon,"
Department of State Bulletin, XXXIX (October 27,
1958), 650.

Official Records of the United Nations

The United Nations. General Assembly Third Emergency
Special Session.

Plenary Meetings: A/PV. 732, August 8, 1958 -
A/PV. 746, August 21, 1958.
Annexes: A/3878, August 18, 1958.

The United Nations. General Assembly: Official Records.
Thirteenth Session, Plenary Meetings: A/PV. 788,
December 12, 1958.
Fourteenth Session, Annexes: A/4121, June 15, 1959.

The United Nations. Security Council: Official Records.
Thirteenth Year, Plenary Meetings: S/PV. 823,
June 6, 1958 - S/PV. 838, August 7, 1958. Thirteenth
Year, Supplements for April, May and June 1958; July
August and September 1958; October, November and Decem-
ber 1958: S/4007, May 22, 1958; S/4023, June 11, 1958;
S/4040, July 1, 1958; S/4043, July 8, 1958; S/4050,
July 15, 1958; S/4051, July 15, 1958; S/4054, July 17,
1958; S/4085, August 14, 1958; S/4114, November 14,

1958; S/4113, November 16, 1958; S/4116,
November 20, 1958.

The Yearbook of the United Nations, 1958. New York:
U.N. Office of Public Information, 1959.

Newspapers

Arabic Newspapers

Al-'Amal. (Beirut) (Organ of the Kataeb Party),
July - October, 1961.

Al-Ahrām. (Cairo),
May - June 1958; January 1959; February 1960;
June 1961; October 2, 1964.
Haikal, Muhammad Hassanein. "Bi-Sarāhat,"
January 22, 1965.

Al-Hayāt. (Beirut),
September 2, 1955; 1958 - 1960.

Al-Hurriya. (Beirut) (Arab Nationalist), 1960-1961.

Al-Jaryda. (Beirut),
January - March, 1959.

Al-Nahār. (Beirut),
July - September 1961.

As-Syassa. (Beirut),
August, 1960; October 1960; October 1961.

French Newspapers

L'Orient. (Beirut),
September 1959; August 1960; September 1961;
October 1961.

Reports and Unpublished Material

Arabic Material

Documents from the files of the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates.

Solh, Kazem. "Majmu'at min Kalimāt (A Collection of Essays). Unpublished pamphlet, Beirut, 1961.

Solh, Munah. "Al - In'izaliyyah al-Jadidah fi Lubnān" (The New Isolationism in Lebanon). Lecture given at the Arab Cultural Club, Beirut, Lebanon, November 25, 1966.

English Material

Kerr, Malcolm. "Political Decision - Making in a Confessional Democracy." Paper read at the Conference on Lebanese Democracy, the University of Chicago, May 28 - 31, 1963.

Salīby, Kamāl. "Lebanon Under Fuad Chehab." Unpublished paper, Beirut, December 1964.

Shihāb, Leila. "The Role of the United Nations During the Lebanese Crisis of 1958." Unpublished Master's thesis, American University of Beirut, June 1963.

Interviews

Personal Interview with Mr. Abdel Rahman Adra, Lebanese Ambassador. December 27, 1966, Beirut.

Personal Interview with Mr. Joseph Abu Khater, Lebanese Ambassador. January 14, 1967, Beirut.

Personal Interview with Dr. Karim Azqūl, former Representative of Lebanon at the United Nations. December 3, 1966, Beirut.

Personal Interview with Mr. Adel Osseyran, former Speaker of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies. November 25, 1966, Beirut.

Personal Interview with Mr. Saeb Salaam, former Lebanese Prime Minister. November 12, 1966, Beirut.

Personal Interview with Mr. Kazem Solh, former Lebanese Ambassador. December 21, 1966, Beirut.

Personal Interview with Dr. Farid Zaineddin, former United Arab Republic Deputy Foreign Minister. December 24, 1966, Beirut.