THE MUSLIM LEAGUE
1930-58

(a political and historical study)

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Ghulam Rasul
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Chapter - I

INTRODUCTION

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Statement

This is a study of the largest political organization of Muslims in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent — the Muslim League. The study begins in 1930, when the vague concept of Pakistan was preached by the poet-philosopher, Sir Mohammad Iqbal, from the rostrum of the League meeting at Allahabad, until 1958, when the League was abolished with the enforcement of martial law in Pakistan. Both years, 1930 and 1958, are destined to be landmarks in the history of the subcontinent as well as that of the Muslim League. Muslim nationalism made great advances from 1930 and, within a decade, the Muslim masses became intensely conscious of their political environment. Muslim youth were ready to struggle for the establishment of a free country of their own. The Muslim League party stood at the forefront of the Indian political arena and, under the dynamic leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, achieved victory in 1947; it had brought into existence the largest Islamic State in the world — Pakistan. Apart from the brilliant leadership of Jinnah, the League’s success lay in inculcating the great ideal of Pakistan to Indian Muslims. The ideal of
Pakistan gave enough impetus and courage to the Muslims that they were able to combat two potent forces - the British and the Congress.

But the Muslim League could never seriously face the concrete and detailed problems - geographic, ethnographic, economic, strategic, social, political, and administrative - which would inevitably rise with the creation of a new country. This inaction made a certain amount of sense, for it was important not to plunge into the consideration of delicate future problems, thereby accumulating differences of opinion. With differences of opinion, the unanimous goal and ideal of Pakistan would have possibly been thwarted by its own partisans.

The newborn state inevitably faced serious problems in every field. This was especially true in politics. Intrigues and maneuver by political groupings, parties, and aspiring politicians were incessant. After the death of the first Governor-General of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, in September 1948, the State was to experience a period of domination by unscrupulous men who brought about a long phase of instability and uncertainty instead of consolidation and prosperity. Political parties seemingly produced nothing more desirable than demagoguery, venality and
power-seekers; political loyalty meant loyalty to power; and thus the whole structure of the State was infected by corruption. There came a few men of good will such as Liaquat Ali Khan, Khwaja Nazimuddin, and Abdur Rab Nishtar, but they could not withstand the pressures of the country's multifarious problems. For the most part they were no more than average, lacking strong personalities and political charisma.

Nor would party politics take on some higher meaning before the country had fallen under the control of military dictatorship in 1958. The day to day babel of political parties was stilled. Political intrigues and maneuvers gave way to the potent rule of martial law. The people of Pakistan had feelings of relief, at least for the time being.

The reasons for Pakistan's lamentable plight before 1958 are to be found in the pre-Partition era. In what ways did the Indian Muslims organize themselves to achieve their changing goals? What were their ideas, aspirations, and frustrations before they achieved victory? How stable and firm was the All India Muslim League, and what were its policies toward the Congress Party and the British Government? A study of the early phase of independence must answer further questions. What metamorphosis
did the League undergo with the creation of Pakistan? How much did it contribute to the internal crisis of the country? Answers to the questions such as these is the goal of this thesis.

The study is divided into five chapters. The first chapter is introductory, and presents a sketch of Muslim political history in India from the rise of Islam until the second decade of the twentieth century. Closer attention must be given to some aspects of the period 1857-1930 in which a definite form was given to Muslim attitudes. The second and third chapters deal with the All India Muslim League's development, and its struggle for Pakistan. Chapter four is concerned with the Muslim League's decline and fall in Pakistan. The last chapter contains conclusions. An attempt has been made to evaluate the League's political history, and elaborate its significance.

There is no scarcity of material on the politics of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent before independence. The problem is one of selection in view of the propaganda and emotional writings provoked by such a controversial topic. Preconceived notions or assertions, the plausibility of which are urged by bias, must be avoided. I have based
this study on contemporary documents, various native and foreign newspapers, and periodical material, and have attempted to put aside the "mythology" concerning the Muslim and Hindu leaders. The conclusions of modern historical writers have been considered carefully.

The Background

i. Islam and its penetration into India

To a Muslim, Islam is a religion of God communicated through the Prophet Mohammad to whom the Quran was revealed, superseding all previous revelations. At the age of forty, the Prophet directed his efforts towards preaching the unity of God, submission to His will, and abomination of idolatry, and succeeded within a period of twenty-three years to found a community of believers, Umma, in which Muslims were equally members and brothers regardless to kinship.

This religion was introduced to India within a few years of the proclamation of the Prophet's mission,

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for the Arab traders had settlements on the Indian coast even prior to recorded history. Since every Muslim regarded himself to be a missionary, the penetration of Islam started long before the coming of Muslim rule. However, the first significant chapter in the Islamic history of the Sub-continent was opened with the conquest of Sind and the establishment of Muslim rule in 712-13 A.D. The conquest of Sind paved the way for new and broadened cultural contacts between Hindus and Muslims. Arab rule further attracted the native population through institutions of the mosque and religious schools, established at the very beginning of their domination. Moreover, various Muslim missionaries found no great difficulty in penetrating the country and preaching the religion of Islam. The Arab conquest of Sind indeed transformed this Indian tract into a center of Islamic culture, but the political control of Arabs did not extend beyond Multan. All the rest of India was unaffected.

By the close of the tenth century, fresh invasions began with the raids of Mahmood of Ghazni, extending to

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Kalinjar in the east and Somnath in the south. This Muslim general led seventeen victorious campaigns, but he did not attempt permanent occupation except for the province of Punjab. With the permanent Ghaznavid occupation, Punjab became another Muslim center with the city of Lahore regarded as a seat of Islamic culture and base for Muslim missionary activity.

The conquest of the rest of India began with the campaigns of Mohammad Ghori and his slave-generals. Muslim political control over India was finally established in 1206 under the first Delhi Sultan, Qutb-ud-Din Aibak. Slowly and gradually the Muslim Sultans extended their conquests further to the east and south. They encouraged Muslim immigration into India, and missionary work was also facilitated under their rule. With the establishment of the Sultanate of Delhi, another Muslim Kingdom was founded in Bengal by Bakhtiyar Khalji, which lasted for more than five centuries and greatly assisted the spread of Islam.

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2 I.H. Qureshi, op. cit. p. 54.
3 O.H.K. Spate, op. cit. p. 156.
4 I.H. Qureshi, op. cit. p. 81.
5 Ram Gopal, op. cit. p. 8.
Christian era, the Sultanate of Delhi was disintegrating. When Babur defeated the last Sultan, Ibrahim Lodhi, the remarkable Mughal Empire was founded (1526). The Mughals continued maintaining Islamic law, and thereby facilitating Islamicization until the reign of the Emperor Akbar. Under Akbar, the importance of the canon law as an all-embracing code of life declined, and Islam's onward march was stopped. In view of his shaky belief in Islam, Akbar promulgated his new religion 'Din-i-Ilahi' (Divine Faith), which deified him God's vicegerent on earth, and included the adoration of the sun, fire, and artificial lights. He abolished jizya (poll tax), and granted considerable power to Hindus. Nevertheless, the reigns of his successors—Jehangir, Shah Jahan, and Aurangzeb (1605–1707)—displayed yet again that the Mughal Empire was Muslim, willing to uphold, preserve, and promote the cause of Islam. A high point was reached during the reign of Aurangzeb. He was self-controlled and deeply religious, and attempted to organize the empire in strict accordance with the laws of Islam. But with his death political stagnation and confusion found their way into the Muslim community.

1 Hafeez Malik, *op.cit.* pp. 39, 51.
The Empire began disintegrating into small principalities. At this juncture the English East India Company began its long association with India and by 1758 it had established "a military and political position in India". With the decline of the Muslim political control over India, the proselytization work of Islam was also retarded.

Thus for nearly a thousand years, from the conquest of Sind in 712 until the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, an integrated Muslim community flourished in India, and the main conversion to Islam took place. The relative importance of force or persuasion as factors affecting conversions is beyond the scope of this Thesis, but it should be noted that with the gradual consolidation of Muslim political power in India the religious influence of Islam naturally became more permanent and persistent, easing the conversion process. It could hardly be asserted that all Muslim rulers of the Sub-continent were free from religious bigotry. But in general, modern scholars recognize that the use of force was limited. The distinguished orientalist, Thomas Arnold, reached the general conclusion that "... persuasion rather than force was the instrument for spreading Islam in India". In particular,

3 I. H. Qureshi, op. cit. p. 75.
4 Cited in Ram Gopal, op. cit. p. 4.
he noted that Islam gained "its greatest and most lasting missionary triumphs in times and places in which its political power has been the weakest, as in Southern India and Eastern Bengal.\(^1\) Caste intolerance in Hindu India eased the Muslim proselytizing work among the lower castes; Islam penetrated into these castes as "a knife goes into a melon without much effort".\(^2\)

ii. Decline of the Muslim Community, 1714 - 1857

Aurangzeb, the last of the great Mughal Emperors, died in 1707; only a few years after his death the Mughal Empire began to decline rapidly. Coupled with internal disunity in bringing on disintegration was the increasing momentum of European penetration. The Portuguese, the Dutch, the French, and the British all established trade relations with different parts of India, and all dreamed of territorial expansion. However, the British were to come off victorious in this struggle for supremacy. The imperial and commercial ambitions of the British were not the only challenges to Muslim domination, for the Hindus, dreaming of regaining power from the Muslim intruders, dissipated the power of the State by constant rebellions.\(^3\)

\(^1\) Thomas W. Arnold, *op.cit.* p. 263.
\(^2\) Ram Gopal, *op.cit.* p. 2.
After Aurangzeb's death there was no effective leadership
to deal with such challenges, and the Muslim masses,
although emotionally attached to the Empire, were not able
to grasp the situation. While the Marathas encroached
upon one district after another, the royal court became
the center for intrigue. Among the treacherous Muslim
officials, the Syed Brothers — Abdullah and Husain,
Chief Minister and Commander-in-Chief, were the principal
authors of the decline of the Indian Muslim community
and of the Mughal Empire. At this stage, the invasion
of the King of Persia, Nadir Shah, was a fatal blow to
the Empire. In 1739, Nadir Shah defeated the emperor,
Mohammad Shah, at Karnal, sacked the city of Delhi, and, on
leaving for Persia, carried with him an untold wealth.
He permitted the nominal emperor to remain as ruler in
Delhi, but occupied the provinces of the Empire west of
the Indus.

As the central authority of the Empire weakened,
a number of provinces became practically independent of

1 Aziz Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian
2 A. Aziz, Discovery of Pakistan (Lahore: Sh. Ghulam Ali,
1957) p. 103.
3 V. A. Smith, The Oxford History of India (2nd ed.; Oxford:
Delhi. In Hyderabad, the Mughal Viceroy made himself virtually independent of the Mughal Emperor. The Muslim governors of Oudh and Bengal also ceased to acknowledge the overlordship of the Delhi Emperor.

A broken Muslim India gave way to British imperialism. With Clive’s victory in the battle of Plassey (1757), the English became the virtual masters of Bengal. Soon the nominal Mughal Emperor, Shah Alam II, formally handed over to them the power to collect and administer the revenues of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa. Gradually, English maneuvers succeeded in incorporating virtually all the contending factions of India under the yoke of the Company’s rule. Tipu Sultan, a potent adversary of the Company, was overthrown in 1798, and, a few years later, the Mughal throne came under the British suzerainty. Henceforth, the British were supreme in India.

2 Moreland and Chatterjee, *op. cit.* p. 266.
Leadership in the Muslim community was now transferred to the men of religion, who desperately struggled to liberate Muslim India from the infidel rule. The movement of Syed Ahmad Shaheed is the best example. It emerged with the purpose of Muslim liberation, and worked with great circumspection and capability, acquiring a considerable success in the North-Western part of India. But owing to the perfidy of a few elements from within the movement, and, perhaps, to lack of centralization, it perished with the assassination of its leader in 1831. The Hindus, who had made themselves remarkably adaptable during the six hundred years of Muslim rule, soon came to realize the changed situation and tried to keep pace with it. Raja Rammohun Roy, a famous Hindu leader, founded the Hindu College as early as 1817 where Hindus were to learn English language and European sciences.

Muslim power and wealth was further undermined in 1935 with the replacement of Persian by English as the official language. The Muslim officials gave way to the Hindus, who were favored by the British rulers partly

2 Ram Gopal, op.cit. pp. 17, 28.
3 Aziz Ahmad, op.cit. pp. 263-64.
because they were on the side of the new rulers, made violent
denunciation of Muslim rule, and, in part, because they had
gained a little knowledge of English and had acquired some
familiarity with Western sciences. In this way, Hindus
monopolized all Government services by the year 1844.1 The
Muslim community fully realized that it had been stripped
of the glory and wealth of its scintillating past, and
therefore found itself unable to be reconciled with the
new rulers. The British were not unaware of Muslim
ambitions of regaining a dominant position, and relations
continued to deteriorate.

The eruption came in 1857, when the Indian army
at Meerut mutinied against the British. The military
rebellion spread rapidly, and assumed the character of a
war of Indian independence in which both Hindus and Muslims
took full part.2 The Rebellion ended in the death of one
time and the birth of another. The Indian Muslims reached
the very depths of political decay; they were to suffer the
deprivation of the last vestiges of their Empire.

iii. The Muslim Flight, 1858-1906

The British looked upon the Muslims as real
instigators of the mutiny, for Muslim population was more

1 Ram Gopal, op. cit., p. 20.
dissatisfied with the British rule prior to the rise, the Muslim Emperor (Bahadur Shah Zafar) had become the symbolic head of the resurrection, and the success would have re-established Muslim rule rather than that of the Hindus. Therefore, the British launched a trenchant plan of vengeance against their prime foes. Under the British resentment, the Muslims were reduced to a ruined race, sunk into "the lowest depths of broken pride, black despair and general penury". According to a contemporary Calcutta Persian newspaper, Durbin, all sorts of employment were snatched away from the Muslims and were bestowed upon the Hindus. The limits of the paper's distress and sorrow can be gauged from its remark: "Nobody takes any notice of their (Muslims') helpless condition, and the higher authorities do not deign even to acknowledge their existence". As British influence reached its apogee in India, the Muslim disaster was complete. The anti-Muslim

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1 Bhimrao R. Ambedkar, Thoughts on Pakistan (Bombay: Thackeer, 1941) p. 43.


3 The British takeover had disastrous effect upon the economic, educational, and political life of the Muslim community. "The establishment of British rule crushed them and inflicted such injuries upon them that even after freedom they will take long to recover from them". I.H. Qureshi, "The Impact of the British Rule upon the Muslims", A History of Freedom Movement vol. II, part II, (Karachi: Pak.Historical Society, 1961) pp. 364-65.
prejudice of the English was not allayed until the British historians themselves came to realize that Muslims were not the 'only' and 'principal' authors of the mutiny.¹

Under the sway of Britain, non-Muslim communities, especially the Hindu community which had already established extensive links with the powerful foreigners and had accustomed itself to their ways, cultivated feelings of distaste against their previous rulers. This was in part due to the stimulation of communal instincts by the new ruling power and in part because of the awakening of previously dormant mutual hostilities. Being thus the only group in opposition to the ruling and all other ruled communities, the Muslims were compelled to adopt the policy of isolation. Leading men of the community, therefore, turned to religious piety and Urdu literature, and refused to embrace the Westernization or to collaborate with the Hindu upstarts.² The Ulama (Muslim theologians) who had all-important influence over the Muslim masses withdrew from all association with the infidel rulers.³ No attempts were made to compete with the Hindus in the field of Western

education or in flattering and appeasing the Government. This plaintive situation persisted all through 1960s'. At this moment it was vain indeed to ponder over the revival of the Muslim Empire; instead, the principal problem was to rescue the state of affairs from further deterioration.

The first outstanding leader to sense the nature of the crisis facing the Muslim community in India was Syed Ahmad Khan (1817 – 1898). He brought forth a clear-cut policy of saving the Muslim nation from utter destruction. Pro-British, an uncritical student of the West, and a sincere Muslim, Sir Syed boldly advised his people to accept British sovereignty voluntarily and follow the path of co-operation and reconciliation with the ruling power. He persuaded his coreligionists to recognize and esteem both "the powers and the benefits of British rule", while endeavouring zealously to convince the British about the basic fidelity of the Muslims.\(^1\) He urged the Muslims to cease conceiving rebellious ideas against the Government.\(^2\) He was of the opinion that the political liberation of the Muslim community "must be preceded by profound regeneration of mind and thought in


\(^2\) Ram Gopal, *op. cit.* p. 25.
the light of new changes. To allay the religious prejudice of his coreligionists against Christianity, Sir Syed published several works, pleading that Christianity was "not so foreign to their own (Muslim) sense of values and belief as they imagined." In this way, he tried to justify British rule in India. His incessant struggle proved to be fruitful; many British became convinced of Muslim fidelity. By the middle of eighteen eighties, The Times was able to remark that the stronger race (Muslim) had most heartily acquiesced to British overlordship. The newspaper later recommended "the most sensible and moderate estimate of our (British) policy" for the Muslim subjects in India.

Sir Syed's vision encompassed changed conditions of the country, and he therefore called upon the Muslims to accept modern ideas. He gave more emphasis to educational reform, and founded a "Committee for the Progress of Education among the Muslims". A high school was established

1 A. Aziz, op.cit. p. 272.
2 I. H. Qureshi, op.cit. p. 238.
3 The Times (London), October 11, 1886.
4 ibid. December 28, 1886.
5 Aziz Ahmad, op.cit. p. 59.
6 I. H. Qureshi, op.cit. p. 240.
in Aligarh in 1875, which was soon transformed into the
Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College, subsequently to be
recognized as the major Muslim University in India. The

Apart from his struggle for reconciliation, and
for educational uplift and religious reform, Sir Syed
Ahmad Khan left his remarkable imprint on the social
life and politics of his coreligionists. In the sphere
of politics the Syed pointed to the "path of constitu-
tional safeguards"; upheld the "principle of separate
electorates for Muslims"; stood as a great adversary to
the Indian National Congress; and trained some of those
famous politicians who openly demanded separate electorates
for Muslims in 1906. His opposition to the Congress was
bitter and trenchant. He went so far in opposing the
Congress that, according to him, he would remain firmly
opposed to it even if the Viceroy, the Secretary of State,
and the whole House of Commons were to support the Congress. His opposition to the Congress seems to have been on two

1 I.H. Qureshi, op.cit., pp. 241-42.
2 Aziz Ahmad, "Syed Ahmad Khan, Jamal al-Din and Muslim India"
3 I.H. Qureshi, The Struggle for Pakistan (Karachi: Univer-
5 Aziz Ahmad, "Syed Ahmad Khan....." p. 67.
6 The Times November 12, 1888.
bases: first, he regarded the Muslim participation in active politics as premature, and second, the kaleidoscopic history of India led him to conceive the impossibility of Hindu-Muslim cooperation in the sphere of politics. The Hindu agitation demanding the recognition of Hindi as the second official language had particularly disillusionsed him. He explained his conclusions to the Commissioner of Benares: "Now I am convinced that the two peoples (Hindu and Muslim) will not be able to cooperate sincerely in any venture. This is only the beginning; later, because of the educated classes, this hostility will increase. Those who live long enough will see it grow." Some of the writers, however, claim that Sir Syed's opposition to the Congress was not because of the fact that it was "too Hindu" an organization, but because it was "too disrespectful". This conclusion is unsupportable. Clearly, Syed Ahmad opposed the Congress on the basis of its being a Hindu political organization which stood for the majority's rule. Success of the Congress meant to him the "Hindu domination over the Muslims". In a famous speech in 1887 he stated:

1 Quoted in I.H. Qureshi, The Muslim Community .... p. 247.
2 Wilfred C. Smith, op.cit. p. 25.
3 K.K. Aziz, op.cit. p. 29.
"Suppose that all the English were to leave India, who would be rulers? Is it possible that two nations - the Mohammedan and the Hindu - could sit on the same throne and remain equal in power? Most certainly not. It is necessary that one of them should conquer the other and thrust it down. To hope that both could remain equal is to desire the impossible and the inconceivable."

This is clear evidence that he regarded the Indian Muslims a separate nation and, therefore, urged them to keep away from the Congress’ majority in order to preserve their national character. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan built the ‘two-nations theory’ after close observation of the Hindu and Muslim mentalities, and based it "not upon geography but upon religion and all that flows from it". In this way, Sir Syed laid down a firm political foundation on which future Muslim leaders could erect a separate edifice for the Muslim community.

A contemporary who rendered remarkable service to the Muslim case was Syed Ameer Ali, historian and scholar. Ameer Ali revived Muslim thought by publishing his standard works, The Spirit of Islam and A Short History of the Saracens. His books went into many editions, and the Muslims who were under the stress of

1Quoted in Richard Symonds, *op.cit.* p. 31.

both the foreign power and non-Muslim missionary attacks acquired confidence in their history. Ameer Ali's activities expanded from the academic sphere. He founded the National Mohammadan Associan as early as 1877 in Calcutta for the political training and organizational activity of the Muslims. His association extended its activities to Karachi in the west and Bangalore in the south with fifty-three branches in Bengal, Madras, Punjab, the United Provinces, and Bihar. By 1880 it had become the principal Muslim organization presenting the Muslim case to the British authorities. Although Sir Syed did not agree to the methods and views of Ameer Ali and achieved more fame and popularity, the latter's services towards the Muslim community were highly meritorious.

After the death of Sir Syed in 1898, the Muslim leadership went to Nawab Wiqar al-Mulk and Ismaili community's Imam (spiritual leader), Aga Khan III. Under the new leadership, Aligarh College prospered, and was later transformed into a Muslim University. The Muslim estrangement from the Congress became more pronounced after the Hindu-Muslim riots resulting from the Hindu agitation over the

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1 Wilfred C. Smith, *op. cit.* p. 25.
partition of Bengal in the early years of the twentieth century.

Fear of the Hindu majority and the impetus given by the Indian Councils Act of 1892, which had introduced the principles of representation and election in India, led the successors of Sir Syed to draw "a plan of separate electorates for their community." The plan was coupled with an important demand that "the number of seats allotted to Muslims should be in excess of their ratio to general population", and was presented to the Viceroy, Lord Minto, in an address by a thirty-five men deputation led by the Aga Khan on the 1st of October, 1906. The deputation stated the Muslim determination to have a voice in the constitutional developments, and pleaded that the "Muslims of India should not be regarded as a mere minority, but as a nation within a nation whose rights and obligations should be guaranteed by statute.

The Viceroy, in a prepared reply, accepted the main demands with a conspicuous remark: "I am firmly convinced


that any electoral representation in India would be
doomed to mischievous failure which aimed at granting a
personal enfranchisement regardless of the beliefs and
traditions of the communities composing the population of
this Continent. The Simla Deputation (as it is commonly
known) holds a high place in the modern political history
of Muslim India. Whatever it may have been called by the
nationalists, the Muslim leaders had now made it clear
that on the constitutional and legal matters, they could
not rely upon the Hindu majority. It was obvious that a
distinct Muslim state was the goal envisioned. The next
step was to organize the All India Muslim League, founded
on December 30, 1906, at Dacca. It was the logical move;
separate electoral lists bespoke the need of a political
party to represent the Muslim community and safeguard its
interests.

iv. Muslim Politics, 1906 – 1930

The All India Muslim League was formed with the
following specific objects:

"(a) To promote among the Mussalmans of India
feelings of loyalty to the British

1Ram Gopal, op. cit. p. 338. Full text of the address to

2The nationalist leaders called the Simla Deputation’s
victory as success of aristocrats, and 'the most
mischievous': Ram Gopal, op. cit. pp. 100, 104.
Government and to remove any misconceptions that may arise as to the intentions of Government with regard to any of its measures;

"(b) to protect and advance the political rights and interests of Mussalmans of India and respectfully to represent their needs and aspirations to Government;

"(c) to prevent the rise among the Mussalmans of India of any feeling of hostility towards other communities without prejudice to the aforementioned objects of League".

The foundation of the Muslim League is a great landmark in the modern history of Muslim India. From this time onward the Muslims were an organized party in Indian politics. Hindus and Muslims now stood as the "two phenomena of opposite drifts"; and it became vainest of vain dreams to hope for "a united India, an India conscious of a unity of purpose and destiny". The Muslim League was not a mass organization, nor was it possible to achieve a large membership in a few years without extraordinarily capable leadership. But it was, above all, the only political organization of the Indian Muslims at that time.

The Muslim community experienced a period of relative calm from 1906 to 1911. Demands for separate

electorates were finally met in the Indian Councils Act of 1909, and the partition of Bengal remained in force. But the Act left the Hindus embittered. The Congress regarded it "a breach of democratic principle", and launched a campaign of criticism and opposition. With a change in the British authorities, the Government bowed before the Congress, and annulled the partition of Bengal in 1912. The Muslim community responded with fury and bitterness. The reversal shook their faith in British pledges. The Nawab of Dacca, presiding over the sixth session of the Muslim League, plainly condemned the Government's action. He said that the annulment of the partition had put a premium on sedition and disloyalty, and discredited British rule. The Muslim League further adopted "the attainment of the system of self-government suitable to India" as its goal. For the first time in its short history, the Muslim League stood identified as an anti-British organization.

In the meanwhile, Maulana Mohammad Ali (1878–1930)

2Ram Gopal, op.cit. p. 112.
3Quoted in Richard Symonds, op.cit. p. 42.
and Abul Kalam Azad (1888–1958) took Muslim India by storm with their writings and speeches. They directed the attention of Indian Muslims to the Italo-Turkish war of 1912, the Balkan wars, and to the "apparent gradual extinction of Islamic culture in Europe and the Middle East at the hands of Western imperialism". They tried to dispel "the Muslim fears about the British retaliation", and succeeded in infusing courage and intrepidity in their hearts. Thus was strengthened the nationalist tendency among the Muslims.

With the outbreak of the World War I, however, the Muslims as well as Hindus stood firmly with the British and the Allied cause. Mohammad Ali wrote in his unequivocal style to espouse the British cause:

"Whatever our grievances, whatever reforms we desire, everything must wait for a more reasonable occasion. ... Concessions are asked for and accepted in peace. We are not Russian Poles. We need no bribes".

But Turkey's alliance with Germany placed the Indian Muslims in an awkward position; their loyal feelings to the British Crown clashed with their religious obligations to the Caliphate. The Muslim League noticed in this issue

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3 Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 28.
"a sore point", but its practical loyalty remained with the British, and it could only expostulate that, after the Allied victory, Muslim countries should be treated "in such a way that their dignity will not be compromised". Indian Muslims could not be expected to tolerate the outright annihilation of the Turkish Empire, for Turkey was considered the bastion of Islam. They worked to strengthen the Allied Forces with what was perhaps an inner confidence in British fairness.

The wartime situation brought the Congress and the Muslim League closer, and there emerged a tendency, however slight, toward joint action in order to obtain further reforms. The tendency was strengthened by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, an ardent supporter of the Congress at that time. The Congress and the League came to conclude the famous Lucknow Pact, the first and the only agreement between the two parties, in 1916. The Pact provided that the Muslims would join the Hindus in demanding self-government, while the Hindus agreed that the Muslims should have separate electorates.

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The spirit of unity between the two communities reached at its height with the formation of the Khilafat Movement. By the end of the World War I, the Indian Muslims had organized the All India Khilafat Conference to exert pressure on the British to fulfill their promises, and respect Turkish sovereignty. Mohammad Ali, who was a dynamic leader of the Khilafat Committee, led a deputation to London to press the British Government to let the Caliph retain his "pre-war frontiers, especially his custody of the Hijaz and Palestine". But the Deputation was met with a disappointing remark of the British Prime Minister: "He (Mohammad Ali) claims justice (for Turkey), and justice she will get. Austria has had justice, Germany has had justice - pretty terrible justice. Why should Turkey escape?" After the terms of the Treaty of Severs were announced in 1920, Muslim bitterness was further exacerbated, and the Khilafat Movement became a powerful mass agitation. At this juncture, Gandhi observed the

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1 To allay the Indian Muslims, Lloyd George had declared during the war that religious instincts of the Muslims, on the occasion of victory, will be respected, and that the Caliph’s dignity and sovereignty will not be prejudiced; Richard Symonds, *op.cit.* p. 47.


Indian situation to be congenial for sole Hindu leadership.¹ He supported the Khilafat cause; and the exclusively Muslim movement fell under his leadership.² These years (1919-22) witnessed the closest "Hindu-Muslim political solidarity in the entire history of the sub-continent".³ But unity was short-lived. Communal disturbances and riots shattered the dreams of unity. The riots broke out over a larger part of the Patna district, and were only suppressed after an area of about forty square miles had passed into the hands of Hindu mobs. This was followed by the monstrous rising of the Mepla tribes in Malabar, where fanatic Muslims crushed their Hindu neighbours.⁴ Although the Khilafatists and some of the Hindu leaders attempted to maintain unity in the higher circles of the two communities, they could not restrain the hatred of the Hindu and Muslim masses for each other. The final break of the Hindu-Muslim alliance came with the collapse of the Khilafat Movement, after the abolition of the Khilafat in 1924.⁵

¹Sir Percival Griffiths, op.cit. p. 81.  
²A.B. Rajput, op.cit. pp. 31-32.  
³Aziz Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Culture..... p. 268.  
⁴Theodore Morison, op.cit. p. 98.  
⁵Aziz Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Culture..... p. 268.
The All India Muslim League was completely obscured by the rise of the Khilafat Movement. It could not even hold its annual sessions regularly; there was no annual session in 1922, and the attendance at 1923 session was so poor that the open session had to be abandoned.\(^1\) By the end of the Khilafat Movement in 1924, the League had been utterly inactive, and was in a "state of coma".\(^2\) It now tried to regain its former self. A session was called by Mohammad Ali Jinnah\(^3\) in May 1924 at Lahore, but it concluded with the vague apology: "The League is not in any way going to adopt a policy which will, in the least degree, .... be antagonistic to the Indian National Congress, the Khilafat Organization or the Jamiat-ul-Ulama".\(^4\) During the following three years the Muslim League met annually and attempted "to give clarity and coherence to the Muslim viewpoint in regard to future constitutional changes".\(^5\) In 1927, on the question of

\(^1\) Ram Gopal, _op.cit._ p. 162.


\(^3\) Jinnah had resigned from the Congress Party in December, 1920; Jamail-ud-Din Ahmad, "Why the Quaid Left the Congress" in _The Pakistan Times_ (Lahore), November 28, 1966.

\(^4\) Quoted in Sharif al-Mujahid, _op.cit._ p. 303.

\(^5\) Ibid.
cooperation with the all-white Simon Commission, the fragile body of the League split into two groups. Sir Mohammad Shafi with a group of Leaguers in Lahore expressed their unflinching loyalty to Britain and accepted to cooperate with the Commission, while Jinnah with another group in Calcutta determined to boycott the Commission as the Congress was going to do. The disagreement between the Shafi and Jinnah Leagues continued until 1930, when unity was restored by the Aga Khan.

Hindu-Muslim hostility grew with an unprecedented speed and scope. The former organized the Shuddhi Movement to proselyte those Hindus who had gone over to Islam, and formed the Sangathan program which was designed to infuse courage and manliness among the Hindus. Hindu revolutionary leaders openly demonstrated their ambition to achieve Hindu rule all over India and conquer the Muslims. Har Dayal, for instance, stated in the columns of The Times of India that "the future of the Hindu race, (and) of Hindustan ... rests on these four pillars: (1) Hindu Sangathan; (2) Hindu

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1 Wilfred C. Smith, op.cit. p. 248.
2 Ibid.
4 A.B. Rajput, op.cit. p. 38.
Raj; (3) Shuddhi of Muslims; and (4) Conquest and Shuddhi of Afghanistan and frontiers. Another prominent Hindu leader, Lajpat Rai, expressed his conviction plainly that the Hindu-Muslim unity was "neither possible nor practicable." The Muslims were no more somnolent. They replied to the Hindus with the Tabligh (preaching) and Tanzim (organizing) movements, and strengthened their belief in political realism and self-reliance. Mohammad Ali who had once hailed Gandhi as a "rare being, a visionary, who is at the same time a thoroughly practical person, the most large-hearted man in the world today, and one who is also among the topmost men of world in intellectual greatness," made, in the course of a stormy speech in 1924 the remark that "However pure Mr. Gandhi's character may be, he must appear to me from the point of view of religion inferior to any Mussalman." Another Muslim leader and scholar, Khuda Bakhsh, defined the Lucknow Pact as sublime folly,

1 Quoted in Ram Gopal, op. cit. p. 124.
2 Ibid. p. 164.
3 I.H. Qureshi, The Struggle ..... p. 53.
4 Sharif al-Mujahid, op. cit. p. 305.
5 Quoted in A.B. Rajput, op. cit. p. 31.
6 Quoted in Ram Gopal, op. cit. p. 166.
and denounced the Congress as a "wanderer in rapturous dreams of unreality".\(^1\) In this way, the animosities and recriminations between the two communities grew rapidly and hope of rapprochement faded.

The final blow to such hopes came from the Nehru Report. The All Parties Conference, called by the Congress at the occasion of Simon Commission's inquiry, entrusted a Committee headed by Motilal Nehru to prepare a constitution for India.\(^2\) The Report of this Committee, generally known as the Nehru Report, recommended the abolition of separate Muslim electorates. It further rejected the federal system of government, and espoused the principle of a unitary government.\(^3\) Since the Committee's recommendations were an obvious violation of the Congress-League Lucknow Pact, and were in accordance with the aspirations for majority domination over the Muslims, the Muslims of all shades of opinion, except a few close disciples of Gandhi, became united on an absolute rejection of the Nehru Report. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who was still trying to retain his title of 'the Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity',\(^4\) advanced

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\(^1\) Ram Gopal, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

\(^2\) The Committee contained five Hindus, one Sikh, and two Muslims, with a Hindu chairman.


\(^4\) When the Congress-League Lucknow Pact was concluded in 1916, Jinnah was hailed as the Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity: Hector Bolitho, *op. cit.*, p. 66.
some modifications in the Report before the National Convention of December 1928, in a very polite and persuasive way. He urged the Hindu majority to "march together until our objective is achieved". He pressed for the Hindu-Muslim reconciliation and unity because, according to him, "their interests are common and they are marching together for a common goal". But an overwhelming majority of the Convention rejected the proposed modifications. The Muslim leaders were now ready to respond the Congress-made constitution with full vigour and persistence. Defying the Congress, Mohammad Ali said in his outspoken tone:

"I cannot give up my religious beliefs to please the Hindus. ... What the Congress aims through the Nehru Report today is merely this 'The people belong to God, the country to the Viceroy or the Parliament, but the edict is of and from the Mahasbha Bahadur (Hindus)'."3

The Congress was henceforth regarded as the prime obstacle to Muslim claims and ambitions.

The final action against the Nehru Report was taken by the All India Muslim Conference which met in Delhi in 1929 under the Aga Khan's presidency and which

1 quoted in Ram Gopal, op.cit., p. 215.
2 Sharif al-Majahid, op.cit., p. 309.
3 quoted in ibid.
laid down the demands of Muslim India in the clearest possible way. The Conference's resolution rejected unitary form of government, recommending a federal system with complete autonomy and residuary power vested in the provinces, and continuation of separate electorates for the Muslims. It concluded with the declaration that "no Constitution, by whomever proposed or devised, will be acceptable to Indian Musalmans unless it conforms with the principles embodied in this resolution."¹

Hindu-Muslim antagonism had now reached its highest pitch. While the Muslims reserved their judgement on the Simon Report, the Congress had rejected it outright and had insisted upon the enactment of the Nehru Report's draft constitution. In April, 1930 the Civil Disobedience movement was launched by Gandhi, but without Muslim participation². While the Muslims joined other groups in attending the first session of the Round Table Conference in November 1930, the Congress boycotted the Conference. A period of intense hostility between the two main communities of India was about to begin. Rapprochement between them was, as one writer has aptly remarked, "among the few things in this world to which the word 'impossible' could be applied."³

¹Gwyer and Appadorai, op.cit. pp. 244-45.
³K.K. Aqiz, op.cit. p. 89.
Chapter II

DEVELOPMENT OF THE MUSLIM LEAGUE
1930 – 40

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"The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India is ... perfectly justified. ..... I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India". 1

Sir Mohammad Iqbal
December 29, 1930.

Re-emergence of the Muslim League:

Muslim politics in India after the publication of the Nehru Report in 1928 appears to be based largely on the fear of Hindu domination. The Muslim League, in spite of all its weaknesses, stood apart from both the British Government and the Congress Party, appealing to each to acknowledge the special interests of the Muslim community. Growing support for this viewpoint permitted the re-emergence of the League as a powerful and well-organized body, ready to assume Muslim leadership. It finally led the Muslims

1Shamloo (pseud.), Speeches and Statements of Iqbal (Lahore: Almanar Academy, 1948), p. 12.
to the formal demand of an independent Muslim State, Pakistan, in 1940.

In 1930, the Muslim community lacked a central organization which could draw up a common platform. The numerous groupings included the Muslim Conference, Muslim League, Ahrars, Khudai Khidmatgars, Unionists, Khaksars, Jamiat-ul-Ulama, Mominis and Nationalists. None could claim a large following among the Muslim masses.\(^1\) The Muslim League could not hold a disciplined annual session after 1930, until Mohammad Ali Jinnah assumed its permanent leadership in 1934.\(^2\) On the question of election of the League's sessional President in 1931, it was divided into two sections, and each section was further subdivided into many contending factions.\(^3\) It was reduced to loose organization of "some wealthy Zamindars (landowners) and a few discontented intellectuals" who were bereft of the sense of mission.\(^4\) To consolidate the ranks of the community, leading Muslims could only suggest merging the moribund League into a comparatively stronger

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\(^2\) A description of disturbances and disorderly scenes in the League sessions in The Times (London), December 31, 1931; March 6, 1933.

\(^3\) S. Noor Ahmad, Martial Law sai Martial Law tak: 1919 - 1958 (Lahore: S. Noor Ahmad, 1966), pp. 141-44.

\(^4\) Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study (London: Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1958), p. 34.
organization of the All India Muslim Conference, which had been developed after 1929. The Aga Khan thus urged the Indian Muslims, in his letter addressed to The Times, to amalgamate the Muslim League with the Muslim Conference. A joint Executive Board under the chairmanship of Mohammad Iqbal thereby decided upon amalgamation, but a group of the Leaguers was loath to see the identity of the League merged into a stronger organization. No decision could be reached, and the individuality of the League was thereby saved.

Both the Congress Party and the British Government were aware of the League's feebleness, and both bypassed it. The League was not officially represented in the Round Table Conference, although some of its leaders attended the Conference; and the Congress did not respond to its call for the separate electorates. Some active Muslim politicians were determined not to be the tools of the Congress, and urged the Muslims to abstain from the Congress' Civil Disobedience movement, but they could do

1 The Times, December 18, 1931.
2 Ibid. March 6, 1933.
4 Various Muslim professions against the Congress' policies in The Times, January 1, 20, 1930; March 11, 21, 28, 1931; July 14, 16, 1931; November 8, 1932.
nothing positive. The crisis in the Muslim ranks was intensified by the absence of prominent leaders from the Indian political scene. Maulana Mohammad Ali and Sir Mohammad Shafi died in 1930 and 1932 respectively; Mohammad Ali Jinnah retired to London in 1930; and the Aga Khan was not ready to give up the health resorts of France and Switzerland.

After the failure of numerous attempts for rapprochement between the contending Muslim League factions, Jinnah was beseeched by the Muslim leaders of various provinces to "return to India, assume charge of the League and restore it to its original status and influence".\(^1\)

Liaquat Ali Khan, an emerging Muslim leader, had already convinced Jinnah in London that he was needed in India.\(^2\)

Mohammad Ali Jinnah arrived in early 1934, and the leaders of the contending sections of the Muslim League accepted him as President.\(^3\) Jinnah's prime ambition was to improve the Muslim League, to make it "the only organization which could guard the interests of the Muslims".\(^4\) He invited

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\(^3\)The Times, February 17, 1934.

\(^4\)Sharif al-Mujahid, op.cit. p. 311.
various important Muslim groups to the forthcoming meeting of the League Council in 1934, where he sought agreement on a common political platform. There, the various sections agreed to accept the British Government's Communal Award so far as it goes until a substitute is agreed upon by the various communities and parties to secure such future constitution for India as would be acceptable to the country. After cultivating a harmonious Muslim opinion over the Award, Jinnah brought the Muslim Conference to an agreement with the League. His program now was to make the status of the Muslims co-equal with that of the Hindus, and to achieve independence through the mutual Hindu-Muslim cooperation. He urged the Muslims to organize themselves separately from the Hindus, "for no one would they (Hindus and Muslims) be able to appreciate each other's aspirations better and come to a genuine understanding."

Under Jinnah's driving leadership, the All India

1 Communal Award summarized below on page 51.
2 The Times, April 3, 7, 1934.
3 Ibid., August 14, 15, 1934.
Muslim League made constant progress. He made significant changes in the League's program to make it "a more democratic and living organization". The League now took a definite position on the various constitutional problems. The Government of India Act, 1935 came under heavy criticism from the Muslim League. The League condemned the Federal scheme of the Act to be "most


2The Government of India Act, 1935 was a lengthy and complicated Statute. The Act contained fourteen parts and ten schedules. In summary, the Act provided for an All India Federation, but made the provinces separate legal entities. Every province was given a Council of Ministers whose advice was binding on the Governor except in so far as he acted "in his discretion". Provincial franchise was enlarged by lowering property qualifications. Sind was separated from Bombay and given the status of a separate province. Due safeguards for the minorities were provided. The Indian Council of the Secretary of State for India was abolished. The Secretary of State was given advisers who may or may not be followed. The whole of the Act came into operation on April 1, 1937 except Part II which dealt with the All India Federation. Part II could not operate until a specific number of princely states acceded to the Federation. As no state had done so till the outbreak of World War II the federal part of the Act never came into operation: Extracts from the Government of India Act, 1935 in Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai, Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution: 1921-47 Vol. I (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 323-376; C.H. Philips, R.L. Singh, and B.N. Pandey, The Evolution of India and Pakistan; 1858 to 1947: Select Documents (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 320-335. See also Abdul Hamid, "The Government of India Act, 1935" in A History of the Freedom Movement Vol. III, Part II, (Karachi: Pak. Historical Society, 1965), pp. 317-349.
reactionary, retrograde, injurious and fatal", and accepted the Provincial scheme reluctantly.\(^1\)

Contesting the 1937 general elections was an enormous task for the Muslim League, for it had not yet become a mass organization, and its provincial branches were far from being well-organized.\(^2\) Factions within the League were united under Jinnah's leadership, but factions in the Muslim community remained. In Punjab, Sir Fazal-i-Husain's Unionist Party was completely against the idea that Jinnah should speak for the whole of Muslim India.\(^3\) The Krishak Proja (farmers) Party functioned in Bengal under the leadership of Fazlul Haq, and was not friendly to the League.\(^4\) The Red Shirts in the Frontier Province, Abdullah Haroon in Sind, and Abdul Aziz in Bihar all

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\(^3\) Fazal-i-Husain's contention to Jinnah can easily be gauged from the fact that in the first session of the Round Table Conference he had arranged Dr. Shafan Ahmad's nomination in order to defy Jinnah's views in the Conference with the frank pronouncement that "it is not the Indian Muslims' view". : Azim Husain, *Fazal-i-Husain: A Political Biography* (Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd., 1946), p. 251.

refused to join hands with the League. Meager finances and lack of effective election machinery were additional deficiencies. The only help in the League's election campaign came from Sir Mohammad Iqbal in Punjab, and the Muslim Unity Board in the United Provinces.

With whatever support he could get from his relatively few followers, Jinnah, as a President of the Central Election Board of the League, led a vigorous election campaign. For the first time, the League President developed extensive contacts with the Public, in speeches, condemning the League's adversaries. But all his vigorous canvassing brought discouraging results. Only a small minority of Muslim League candidates were returned to the provincial assemblies. In the major Muslim provinces of Punjab and Bengal, the League fared very badly. While it was able to capture forty out of one hundred nineteen Muslim seats in Bengal, it won only two out of eighty-six Muslim seats in Punjab. It was

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1 Mohammed Noeman, Muslim India: Rise and Growth of the All India Muslim League (Allahabad: Kitabistan, 1942), pp. 329, 331.

2 Sharif al-Mujahid, op.cit. p. 315.


4 S. Noor Ahmad, op.cit. p. 177.

5 See, for instance, his speech in The Times January 5, 1937.

completely wiped out at the polls in North West Frontier Province, and returned empty-handed in Sind.\(^1\) In other words, "less than 4\(\frac{1}{2}\)% of the Muslim electorate was persuaded to vote for the League."\(^2\)

Nevertheless, the Muslim League was the only Muslim organization on an all-India basis. In spite of its crushing defeat in various Muslim majority provinces, the League achieved an encouraging success in the Hindu majority provinces, especially in the United Provinces. In sum, the League was able to secure one hundred and two seats.\(^3\) Since no other Muslim party in India had so many seats, and the Congress had won only twenty-six Muslim seats, the Muslim League could lay claim to being the largest organization representing Muslim India.

Formation of Congress ministries over the greater part of the country, and the Congress attitude towards the League gave the Muslim community a general belief that the

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\(^1\) Ibid. p. 247.
\(^2\) Wilfred C. Smith, *op.cit.* p. 239.
\(^4\) Ibid.
Hindu Raj had come. While forming the ministries, the Congress refused to share power with the League in the Muslim minority provinces. The Muslim community was therefore profoundly disturbed from one end of India to the other. The Congress Governments made the Muslims feel what it was to be a minority. ¹ The Muslim Mass Contact program of the Congress further increased the Muslim apprehension that the vast organization of the Congress would possibly "extend its sway even over the Muslim majority provinces, and the whole country would become a vast prison-house for them."² This fear helped in consolidating political opinion among the Muslims and, with the first attack made against the Congress by Jinnah in 1937, they rallied behind the Muslim League. The Muslim League now emerged as a staunch critic of what it described as the anti-Muslim policy of the Congress, and insisted on becoming the sole organization of the Muslims.³ The Muslim premiers of Punjab, Bengal, and Sind came to terms with the League, agreeing to abide by the policy of the League in all-India matters. By early

¹I.H. Qureshi, op.cit. p. 92.
³The Muslim League refused to come to any agreement with the Congress unless the latter dropped the Muslim Mass Contact Program, and recognized the League as the only representative and authoritative body of the Muslims: The Times June 6, 1938.
⁴A.H. Albirdini, op.cit. p. 216.
1939, it formed its own corps of paid volunteers under the name of 'Muslim National Guard' on an all-India basis.\textsuperscript{1} In this way, the Muslim League proved to be the third party of India (first two being the British and the Congress), and, under the "masterful leadership" of Jinnah, it came to exert a decisive influence upon the future of the Sub-continent.\textsuperscript{2}

The Muslim League evolved a dynamic and positive ideology. It combated democracy, as defined by the Congress, and stood for Muslim nationalism. No longer was the League prepared to regard the Muslims of India a minority community; they were a nation. By October 1938, the Sind Muslim League put forward its demand "to review the entire question of what should be a suitable constitution for India, which will secure an honourable and legitimate status due to the Muslims, and further devise a scheme of constitution under which, the Muslims may attain full independence."\textsuperscript{3}

The Pakistan National Movement had existed since 1933, but was not taken seriously.\textsuperscript{4} Iqbal had spoken of a

\textsuperscript{1} The Times, April 10, 1939.
\textsuperscript{3} Quoted in A.B. Niazi, Muslim League: Yesterday & Today (Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, 1948), p. 70.
separate Muslim State as early as 1930, and had later inculcated in Jinnah's mind that the only solution for the Muslim problems was the creation of "a Muslim State distinct from the Hindu State". The time was ripe for a revolutionary move, and the Muslim League promptly adopted the famous Pakistan Resolution at its annual session in March 1940. The fragile body of the Muslim League which could not give any weight to the proposal of Iqbal in 1930, was now able to give meaningful support. All the efforts of the League henceforth centered upon the establishment of a separate Muslim State - Pakistan.

To understand fully the rapid development of the Muslim League in the nineteen-thirties, it seems necessary to analyse various stages of its relations with the two main organs of contemporary India, the British Government, and the Indian National Congress. League and the British:

The Muslim League's demands in 1930 may be summarized as (a) continuation of the free exercise of Muslims' civil and religious rights, (b) a share of

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1 Azim Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 385.

public offices, and (c) free and unfettered election of true representatives of their (Muslim) faith to the legislatures. More important still was the Muslim League's insistence on its unwillingness to accept an inferior position to Hindus.

Although the British Government never negated the demands, the Muslim leaders were not sure of the firmness of the British stand. They complained about the vacillating and wavering policies of the Viceroy and Secretaries of State towards the Muslims, and described the Muslim position to be baffled and unsure as to "where or how to turn". Some of the Leaguers, however, complacently accepted the British explanation of inaction, of not granting political concessions to India unless there was "a fair measure of agreement between the two major communities, the Hindus and the Muslims". It may well be looked upon as a clever British tactic to prolong their rule over India; it had nevertheless given a considerable strength to the Muslims, and they professed not to tolerate

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1Originally these were the demands of the All India Muslim Conference, held on January 1, 1929, with which the Muslim League was in complete accordance: Gwyer and Appadorai, op.cit., pp. 244-45.
2Dr. Suhrawardy wrote this in a letter to the Viceroy: The Times, April 2, 1930.
the substitution of British domination by a "Brahminical
tyranny of the majority". The Muslim League therefore
refused to join hands with the Congress in the latter's
resolution of independence and the Civil Disobedience
movement.

But the British Government was not willing to
placate the feeble organization of the Muslim League at
the expense of alienating the militant Congress. Persuad-
ing the Congress to participate in the Round Table
Conference, the British Government concluded the Gandhi-
Irwin Pact in 1931. The Muslim League was much disturbed
at the Gandhi-Irwin meeting, and was hostile to the
agreement, for, in its opinion, the Government had given
an unduly respectful regard to a Hindu leader in settling
the affairs of India. The Muslim leaders concluded that
Britain was more interested in her adversaries than in the

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1 *The Times*, January 1, 1930.
3 Sir R. Coupland, *The Indian Problem: Report on the
Constitutional Problem in India Part I*
(London: Oxford University Press, 1944),
p. 111.
4 By this Pact, the Congress pledged to participate in the
Round Table Conference and to renounce the Civil Disobedience
movement, while the Government withdrew certain charges
against the Congress and released various Congressites
undergoing sentences of imprisonment for their activities
during the disturbances: *The Times*, March 6, 1931;
P. Sitaramayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress*
5 *The Times*, February 27, 1931.
Muslims who were, unlike the Congress Hindus, "generally quiet, orderly and respectful".\(^1\)

The British Government took another tack in 1932, appeasing the Muslim League through the promulgation of the Communal Award. In summary, the Muslims were given the majority of seats in Punjab but not in Bengal, weightage in minority provinces was conceded, and the separate electorates were maintained.\(^2\) The Muslim League did not obtain all it had demanded, but its earlier disillusionment with the Government faded away. The Council of the Muslim League expressed its tacit acceptance of the Award, and reserved the right to press for the acceptance of all its demands.\(^3\)

Mohammad Ali Jinnah's leadership after 1934 animated a new and nationalistic spirit in the Muslim League. The League was no more a "respectful" body. Jinnah believed firmly that British imperialism would not be willing to concede anything to a respectful slave. He said, "only those succeed with the British people who possess

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\(^3\)*The Times*, April 3, 1934.
force and power and who are in a position to bully them.\footnote{1}

As noted earlier, the League heavily criticized the Government of India Act, 1935, although it was "acceptable to the Conservative Muslims", for it had granted separate electorates to the minority communities.\footnote{2} The League resolution launched an "emphatic protest against forcing a constitution upon the people of India... against their will", but did not reject it absolutely. The League accepted the provincial part of the Act reluctantly, although it contained what the resolution described as "the most objectionable feature" which rendered "the real control, responsibility of Ministry and Legislature over the entire field of Government and administration nugatory."\footnote{3}

In accepting tacitly the provincial scheme of the Act, the League thought to take advantage of whatever opportunity it was given. It was hardly as conciliatory on the federal scheme of the Act. Jinnah foresaw the establishment of a Federal Government as domination by the Hindu majority which would be in a position "to muzzle the four or five

\footnote{1}{Quoted in Hector Bolitho, 	extit{Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan} (London: John Murray, 1954), p. 118.}

\footnote{2}{K.P. Bhagat, 	extit{A Decade of Indo-British Relations: 1937-47} (Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1959), p. 23.}

force and power and who are in a position to bully them.\textsuperscript{1}

As noted earlier, the League heavily criticized the Government of India Act, 1935, although it was "acceptable to the Conservative Muslims", for it had granted separate electorates to the minority communities.\textsuperscript{2} The League resolution launched an "emphatic protest against forcing a constitution upon the people of India... against their will", but did not reject it absolutely. The League accepted the provincial part of the Act reluctantly, although it contained what the resolution described as "the most objectionable feature" which rendered "the real control, responsibility of Ministry and Legislature over the entire field of Government and administration nugatory".\textsuperscript{3}

In accepting tacitly the provincial scheme of the Act, the League thought to take advantage of whatever opportunity it was given. It was hardly as conciliatory on the federal scheme of the Act. Jinnah foresaw the establishment of a Federal Government as domination by the Hindu majority which would be in a position "to muzzle the four or five

\textsuperscript{1} Quoted in Hector Bolitho, Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan (London: John Murray, 1954), p. 118.


Muslim provinces into complete subordination. The British Government was nevertheless bent upon implementing the federal scheme. The Viceroy reaffirmed in early 1939 that he would do his best to bring about the inauguration of an all-India Federation, and later reiterated that the Federation scheme outlined in the Government of India Act, 1935 afforded what he claimed to be "the only possible solution of the numerous problems of India." This stand invited extensive criticism from the Muslim League, which continued to urge that the British should realize that the Congress did not represent the Indian Muslims, and that the Muslim community would not accept any settlement whatsoever that would establish majority rule in India.

While the League and Congress were engrossed in fighting the constitutional battle, World War II broke out. The Viceroy sought cooperation and assistance from all groups and political parties in India. The Federation scheme of the 1935 Act was suspended, but it remained the

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objective of the British Government. The League was pleased by the suspension of the scheme, but continued to call for its complete abandonment. Expressing its "deep sympathy with Great Britain, France, and Poland", the Muslim League demanded that the British Government review and revise India's future constitution de novo, and asked for an assurance that no declaration regarding the question of constitutional advance would be made without the consent and approval of the League. In the correspondence and meetings between the League President and the Viceroy, the latter gave vague assurances of the kind that the Government was "fully alive" to the necessity for safeguarding the legitimate interests of the minorities, that the Muslim community's position would not be underrated, and that there were possibilities for examining any part either of the 1935 Act or of the policy upon which it was based.

The Muslim League was not satisfied with vague pledges; it wanted definite assurances regarding the future.

1The Viceroy announced, "... we have no choice but to hold in suspense work in connection with preparation for Federation while retaining Federation as our objective". N.N. Mitra (ed.), The Indian Annual Register, 1939 Vol.II, (Bombay: Padma Publications, 1939), p. 99.

2The Times, September 20, 1939.

3Ibid., February 8, 1940.

of the Muslim community. Hence the League remained critical of the British attitude, but did not place any practical impediments in the way of the war.

Thus one can easily infer that the Muslim League was not satisfied to the British Government's attitude towards the Muslim community. Apart from this basic reason, the League's opposition to the Government was based on the nature of the latter's dealings with the Congress Party. It was keen to secure independence from the British, but it was unwilling to accept Hindu political domination which was an inevitable consequence of democracy in India in view of the numerical supremacy of the Hindus.

It may be said in conclusion that the League had an interest only in Muslim independence and not in British imperialism; except insofar as it sought to obtain complete independence for the Muslim community before the collapse of British authority.

League and Congress:

In the years before World War II, the Muslim League was hardly the equal of the potent organization of the Congress. The Congress, under the unofficial leadership

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1See, for instance, the League's resolution in Gwyer and Appadorai, op.cit. p. 508.
of Mohandas Gandhi, had resolved in favour of independence, refused to attend the Round Table Conference, boycotted the Legislatures, and had decided that its demand for independence would be the sole basis of future Congress program.\textsuperscript{1} The Muslim League was still divided into Shafi and Jinnah groups, and was a party bereft of any sold program. Although the League was united by the end of February 1930,\textsuperscript{2} it again split in 1931, and achieved no lasting unity until Jinnah assumed its leadership in 1934.

Nevertheless, there was no serious move for Hindu-Muslim unity either on the part of the League or the Congress. Hindu-Muslim fraternity, artificially created during the Khilafat and Non-cooperation days, had long since deteriorated. However moribund, the League made known its disapproval of the Congress' independence resolution, regarding it detrimental to the Muslim community.\textsuperscript{3} The League was not against independence, but wanted first to settle the communal differences with the Congress. The prominent Leaguers were keen to urge the Congress to concentrate on obtaining unity between the two

\textsuperscript{1}The Times, January 1, 1930.
\textsuperscript{2}Ibid. March 1, 1930.
\textsuperscript{3}Ibid. January 20, 1930.
parties "instead of tilting at a windmill"¹, and wanted to devise ways and means to secure at least those safeguards without which the very existence of the Muslim community was in danger.² Since the Nehru Report had refused to concede separate electorates for Muslims, they concluded that a transference of power to the Hindu majority would make this demand of the Muslims unobtainable.³

But the Congress was not willing to give any weight whatever to the communal question. It took "an insulting and negative attitude towards the League"⁴. Gandhi rejected the idea of separate electorates for the Muslim community, arguing that the communal issue should be tackled later after India had achieved independence.⁵

In July 1931, the Working Committee of the Congress adopted the so-called Bombay Formula based on joint electorates, which aroused a storm of condemnation from the Muslim League leaders.⁶

¹_The Times_, March 21, 1930.
²_Ibid_. March 28, 1930.
³Dr. Suhravardy expressed this view in a letter addressed to the Viceroy: _Ibid_. April 2, 1930.
⁶_The Times_, July 6, 1931.
The prospects of the Congress-League settlement became momentarily bright after Jinnah had assumed the League's leadership in 1934. Jinnah was generally admitted to be the true nationalist who genuinely wanted to collaborate with the Congress in order to achieve independence. Initially, he succeeded in decreasing Hindu-Muslim animosity, and there was much more consistency in his views than in those of the Congress Party. The League's election manifesto for the 1937 general elections displayed a close resemblance to that of the Congress, and Jinnah declared that there was no substantial cleavage between the Congress and the League. He also offered his cooperation in the "constructive programme of the Congress".

But this dream of Jinnah was never to be realized. Shortly after the 1937 elections, Jawaharlal Nehru declared that there were "only two parties in the country - Congress and the British". Jinnah was prompt to reply:

"I refuse to line up with the Congress. There is a third party in this country, the Moslems. We

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4 Hector Bolitho, *op.cit.* p. 113.
are not going to be dictated to by anybody. ... We are not going to be camp followers of any party".¹

Jawaharlal Nehru could not accept the League's idea of being an equal partner, and hence the Congress Party ignored the League's claim.

The point of the crisis came with the formation of provincial ministries in the Muslim minority provinces and initiation of the Muslim Mass Contact program. It was mentioned in the Simon Commission Report and in the discussions of the Round Table Conference that the Muslim community would be represented in the provincial ministries.² In the United Provinces, there was a general understanding between the Congress and the League before the elections that, in case of victory, two seats would be allotted to the Muslim League in the joint ministry.³ But in the first flush of victory, the Congress put "Hindu symbols on display".⁴ The Congress High Command refused to sanction Congress-League coalition ministries, and

¹The Times, January 5, 1937.
²E. C. Majumdar, op. cit., p. 564.
³Ibid., p. 562.
invited the Muslim League representatives to join the ministry at the expressed condition that "they became members of the Congress Party and that the Muslim League ceased to exist".

Following are the terms on which the Congress Party was prepared to let the Muslim League enter the provincial government of the United Provinces:

"The Moslem League group in the United Provinces Legislature shall cease to function as a separate group.

"The existing members of the Moslem League Party in the United Provinces Assembly shall become part of the Congress Party, and will fully share with other members of the Party their privileges and obligations as members of the Congress Party. They will similarly be empowered to participate in the deliberations of the Party. They will likewise be subject to the control and discipline of the Congress Party in an equal measure with other members, and the decisions of the Congress Party as regards work in the legislature and general behaviour of its members shall be binding on them. All matters shall be decided by a majority vote of the Party; each individual member having one vote.

"The policy laid down by the Congress Working Committee for their members in the legislatures along with the instructions issued by the competent Congress bodies pertaining to their work in such legislatures shall be faithfully carried out by all members of the Congress Party including these members.

"The Muslim League Parliamentary Board in

the United Provinces will be dissolved, and no candidates will thereafter be set up by the said Board at any by-election. All members of the Party shall actively support any candidate that may be nominated by the Congress to fill up a vacancy occurring hereafter.

"All members of the Congress Party shall abide by the rules of the Congress Party and offer their full and genuine co-operation with a view to promoting the interests and prestige of the Congress.

"In the event of the Congress Party deciding on resignation from the Ministry or from the legislature the members of the above-mentioned group will also be bound by that decision". 1

It is obvious that the Congress Party wanted to abolish the very identity of the Muslim League. But it failed. Most of the Leaguers flatly refused to accept the Congress offer for ministerial posts, referring to it as a "death warrant". 2 It is described as "a grave tactical blunder"; 3 and "extremely unwise". 4 Not only the League but the Muslim community at large realized that the Muslims had no future under Congress rule, and that their cultural and religious existence was not safe in any political order in


4 R.C. Majumdar, op. cit. p. 563.
which the Hindu majority dominated.  

Further exacerbation of relations came with the Congress' Muslim Mass Contact program. It was designed to bring the Muslim masses into the Congress fold, in order to complete the destruction of the League. It was clear to Muslims already fearing Hindu domination, they could not gain anything unless they had joined the Party which represented a predominant Hindu majority. Moreover, the Muslim minority in Bihar and the United Provinces complained that their interests under the Congress Governments were sacrificed and that they suffered oppression in various forms. In Madras and the Central Provinces, the Muslims claimed similar grievances against the Congress Ministries. It was felt that a Hindu Raj had materialized in the Muslim minority provinces, and anxiety reached new heights.

The Muslim League was fully aware that the Congress

2 The Congress program of Muslim Mass Contact is in Gwyer and Appadorai, *op.cit.* pp. 424–25.
4 Ibid.
now threatened its very existence. Iqbal was furious, and wrote urging Jinnah (March, 1937) to give an effective reply to the Congress plans, and to "re-state as clearly and as strongly as possible the political objective of the Indian Muslims, as a distinct political unit in the country". Jinnah, already alarmed, took up the challenge with a great vigor and denounced the anti-Muslim attitude of the Congress condemning it as a "Hindu body" which showed "no slackening of its determination to destroy all other parties". He campaigned to organize a united Muslim front against the Congress. The League reminded the Muslims that "all the economic bosses, the bloated usurers, industrial magnates and capitalists in the country are all Hindus", and asserted the need for emancipation from economic slavery under the Hindus.

The Hindu-Muslim split was now complete.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah now stood as the leader of the united Muslim community, and "an arch-enemy of the Hindu Congress".

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1 Quoted in V.D. Mahajan and S. Mahajan, op.cit. p. 443.
2 The Times, April 18, 1938.
3 Quoted in Wilfred C. Smith, op.cit. p. 264.
4 R.C. Majumdar, op.cit. pp. 567-68.
The Muslim community saw "the greatest menace to the political and cultural life of Islam" in Congress domination, and flocked behind the League for the preservation of "Muslim rights and privileges". The League hoisted its green flag against the Congress tricolor repudiating the Congress Party's claim that their flag was the national flag. It was now transformed into the Muslim mass organization. By the end of 1937, over one hundred and seventy new branches of the League had been established, and no less than 100,000 new League members were enlisted in the United Provinces alone. Between 1938 and 1942, the Muslim League won forty-six out of forty-six by-elections in the Muslim constituencies.

During the years 1938-40, the Muslim League was a vigorous and well-organized body, and was in no mood to negotiate with the Congress unless the latter recognized it as "the authoritative and representative organization

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2The Times, June 7, 1938.
3Sir R. Coupland, The Indian Problem, Part II, pp. 182-83.
of the Mussalmans of India\textsuperscript{1}, while the Congress dogmatically insisted that it spoke for the whole of India. Subhas Chandra Bose, the Congress President in 1938, explained to Jinnah that the Congress Working Committee was against the recognition of the Muslim League as the sole representative of the Muslims, and added that it was not only impossible but improper to accept the League as the authoritative Muslim body.\textsuperscript{2} Jinnah's plea was that in the Lucknow Pact of 1916, the League was taken as the sole and authoritative representative of the Muslims, and the Congress should now acknowledge its position as such.\textsuperscript{3} In this way, the door was barred on further Congress-League negotiations.

Animosities increased with League recitals of alleged offences to the Muslim community by the Congress Governments. In March 1938, the Muslim League appointed a Committee under the Raja of Pirpur's chairmanship to inquire into Muslim grievances in the Congress provinces. The Committee's report, generally known as the Pirpur Report,

\textsuperscript{1} The Times, June 6, 1938.
\textsuperscript{2} Gwyer and Appadorai, op.cit. pp. 430–31.
\textsuperscript{3} S.M. Ikram, op.cit. p. 260.
\textsuperscript{4} Gwyer and Appadorai, op.cit. p. 410.
contained a long list of charges against the Congress
governments. It stated that the Congress had failed to
inspire the confidence in the minorities, and narrated
Muslim objections to the Wardha Scheme of education,
Vidya Mandir Scheme, and the official status of the Bande
Matram song. The Report concluded that "no tyranny can be
as great as the tyranny of the (Hindu) majority", and that
"only that state can be stable which gives equal rights
and opportunities to all communities no matter how small".

The Congress Party refused to admit the charges, characteri-
zizing them as "absolutely false". Whether authentic or
false, it is essential to note that most of the Muslims
throughout the Sub-continent regarded the allegations to be
true. Faizul Haq issued a pamphlet entitled 'Muslim
Sufferings under Congress Rule', and similar writings of
various Muslim organizations inflamed Muslim passions.

There was no serious move for the Congress-League

1 The Muslims regarded the Congress-inspired Wardha Scheme
of education, Vidya Mandir Scheme, and the Bande Matram
song which the Congress had adopted as national anthem,
detrimental to Muslim religion and culture: Ram Gopal,
_op._cit., pp. 255-56.

2 Gysier and Appadorai, _op._cit., pp. 410-16.

p. 22.


5 T.C. Majumdar, _op._cit., p. 571.
rapprochement during this crisis. A few letters were exchanged between Gandhi, Nehru, and Jinnah, but they did not bespeak a mood of conciliation. Nehru insisted (in his letter to Jinnah) upon regarding the Muslim League as a communal organization and to deal with it as such. Later he reiterated that the Congress was "wholly unable" to consider the League as the sole organization representing the Muslims. Jinnah demanded (in his reply to Nehru) "a footing of complete equality" for any settlement, and was angered by the Congress leader's display of "arrogance and militant spirit". The correspondence only widened the gulf. When the Congress Ministries resigned in October 1939, as a protest at the Viceroy's declaration of war without consulting the Assemblies, Jinnah declared December 22nd to be a "Day of Deliverance and Thanksgiving, as a mark of relief that the Congress Governments have at last ceased to function". This was enthusiastically celebrated by Muslims throughout the subcontinent, and a general resolution was passed at a number of Muslim League meetings.

3Hector Bolitho, op.cit. p. 117.
4The Times, December 9, 1939.
denouncing the Congress Ministries and urging the respective provincial Governors to inquire into the wrongs done to the Muslims by the Congress regime.¹

The historic culmination of this period was the League's adoption of the Resolution of Pakistan in March 1940, inviting even greater and more vigorous Congress hostility. Clearly, the League's relations with the British Government were always affected by the latter's contacts with the Congress Party, and the main cause for the League's demand for Pakistan was the deterioration of relations with the Congress.

In summary, the first and the foremost reason for Congress-League tension may be traced to the palpable differences in the religious and social feelings of the Hindus and the Muslims. The two communities had entirely different religious traditions, and historical backgrounds. To Islam, the world is God's creation, man is God's servant, responsible for his deeds, and expecting God's reward; while in Hinduism, this world is unreal and is "a factor in the process of transmigration .... just as man himself".²

Even while living in one village, one town, or one district, the Hindus and Muslims were "two separate nations more distinct and spiritually farther asunder than two European nations". Hindus revered the memory of Pirthi Raj, Partap, and Shivji, who fought against the Muslim invaders, while the Muslims looked upon Mahmood of Ghazni and Mohammad bin Qasim, who invaded India, as their national heroes. Contradictory ideologies and religious views made the Hindus and Muslims two nations.

The Hindu caste-system further alienated the Muslims. Upper class Hindus considered themselves superior to any other community or nation, and refrained from social contacts with other groups. This touch-me-not attitude naturally angered the Muslim who looked upon themselves as the conquerors of India, and were not ready to accept an inferior place to Hindus. They were sincerely afraid of the numerical and economic superiority of the Hindus, and, therefore, resolved to work out their own salvation. They applied a proverbial exclusiveness to their language, culture, social customs, and even to their etiquette. Thus Hindu-Muslim unity was in fact impossible.

2 V.D. Mahajan and S. Mahajan, op. cit. p. 443.
Sir Syed Ahmad Khan had realized this soon after the British formally took over India in 1858, and Mohandas Gandhi admitted this fact before the end of the nineteenth century.¹

The sickening riots over the religious performances of the two communities, and especially over cow-slaughter by the Muslims, and the playing of music before mosques by the Hindus, only confirmed the impossibility of Hindu-Muslim unity. These religious and social differences were later expressed from the Congress and Muslim League platforms. The two political bodies were manifestly influenced by religious passions at almost all stages, and prospects of a concrete settlement were thereby barred.

¹Gandhi writes in his autobiography that while he was in South Africa, he believed that there was "no genuine friendship between the Hindus and the Musalmans". M.K. Gandhi, Gandhi's Autobiography (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1948), p. 539.
Chapter III

THE MUSLIM LEAGUE's STRUGGLE FOR PAKISTAN

1940 - 47

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"..... it is a considered view of this session of the All India Muslim League that no constitutional scheme would be workable in this country or acceptable to Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principle, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in majority, as in the northwestern and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute independent States in which the Constituent unit shall be autonomous and sovereign". ¹

Muslim League Resolution
Lahore Session, March 23, 1940.

The Idea of Pakistan

Long before the Muslim League adopted the historic Lahore Resolution in 1940, the idea of the establishment of a separate Muslim State was advocated by various public figures. Choudhary Rahmat Ali claims that

he had put forward such an idea as early as 1915. In 1917, Dr. A.J. Kheiri and his brother A.S. Kheiri suggested a plan for the partition of the subcontinent. Lala L. Rai, a prominent member of the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha, suggested the partition of India in 1924, in order to end the ceaseless Hindu–Muslim bickering and jealousies.

However, Iqbal was the first important public figure to propound the idea of Muslim separatism, as he did from the rostrum of the Muslim League in 1930. Although the idea did not generate immediate enthusiasm, its important consequence was to stimulate detailed discussion and thought on the subject of a separate Muslim State.

Chaudhary Rahmat Ali, a student at Cambridge, definitely formulated the idea, and coined the name of Pakistan for the areas of Punjab, North West Frontier Province (also called Afghanistan), Kashmir, Sind, and Baluchistan, by taking the initials of the first four and the last part (tan) of the fifth. He founded the Pakistan

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National Movement, and installed himself as its Founder-President.¹ His movement disapproved any constitution for India, whether federal or unitary, which condemned 80,000,000 Muslims to the status of a minority community.² Rahmat Ali was staunchly opposed to what he called the "soul-killing cult of Indianism". The fundamental creed of his movement was to transform the cult of Indianism into the creed of Islamism. He declared that the Indian Muslim community was "Moslem, not Hindu, Pakistani, not Hindoostani; and Asian, not Indian"³. He suggested that the Muslims should have nothing to do with India, and that while the north-west India should be christened as Pakistan, Bengal and Assam should form another Muslim State of Bang-i-Islam, and that Nizam's State of Hyderabad must be another independent Muslim State of Usmanistan. His theory was that the Hindus and Muslims were fundamentally two distinct nations: "Our religion, culture, history, tradition, literature, economic system, laws of inheritance, succession and marriage (he wrote) are fundamentally different from those of the Hindus". He

²Ibid.
rejected Indian nationhood, for its acceptance was "a
treachery against our posterity, a betrayal of our history
and a crime against humanity". He urged the Muslims to "cut
themselves adrift from Indianism and consolidate themselves
as a nation in their respective national domains". But his
preachings attracted very little notice at that time. His
plan was regarded by the various Muslim delegates participat-
ing in the Round Table Conference as "a student scheme",
"chimerical", and "impracticable". Iqbal was the only man
of good position in India who continued to espouse the
idea of an independent Muslim State. He felt that without
the creation of such a state salvation of the Indian
Muslims was not possible. His greater achievement is that
he got Jinnah seriously interested in this idea. In a
letter to Jinnah on May 28, 1937, he advised Jinnah that
"the enforcement and development of the Shari'as of Islam
is impossible in this country without a free Moslem state
or states. This has been my honest conviction for many
years and I still believe this to be the only way to solve
the problem of bread for Moslems as well as to secure:

1Khan A. Ahmad, The Founder of Pakistan (Cambridge: W.
Heffer and Sons, 1942), pp. 3-6.

2K.C. Kajumdar, op.cit., p. 574.
a peaceful India". In the course of time the scheme of Rahmat Ali and Iqbal was adopted with some modifications as the prime goal of Muslim India.

The Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League was vague, and did not carry even the word of Pakistan. Soon after the resolution was passed, the League President elaborated it in an interview which he gave to the Associated Press of America. The proposed independent State of the Muslim League was to be a democratic federal State comprising the provinces of the North West Frontier, Baluchistan, Sind, and Punjab in the west, and Bengal and Assam in the east.

With its resolution of Pakistan, the Muslim League became undoubtedly the strongest and the most authoritative body of the Muslims. During the seven years that followed the Resolution, the League leader, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, displayed his true greatness. The League under his leadership resisted all opposition and constraining forces, whether from the Congress Party, British Government,
or certain Muslim groups, to settle for anything less than Pakistan. He was hailed by his followers to the epithet of Quaid-i-Azam (the Great Leader). All the League's activities between 1940 and 1947 revolved absolutely around its goal of Pakistan. These years were undoubtedly the most problematic and difficult period in the history of British India. The Muslim League's role was so intertwined with that of the Congress and the British Government that it is difficult to understand it except by making a chronological analysis of the events.

The study of the League's struggle for Pakistan may well be divided into two phases: I. from 1940 until the end of the World War II, and II. from 1945 until the establishment of Pakistan.

I. The Muslim League 1940 – 45:

The Muslim League's demand for separate State brought a great storm of criticism and opposition from all political circles in India. British, Hindus, and Sikhs almost without exception dreaded this idea. The British strongly opposed a concept, the implications of which were the creation of "innumerable Ulsters" and the end of the unity of India.\(^1\) The Times inveighed against

\(^1\)The Times, April 1, 3, 1940.
the League's proposal as being "manifestly unacceptable", arguing that the acceptance of its demand would perpetuate Indian divisions, would destroy "the promising scheme of an All India Federation", and would give the Muslim community "a permanent veto on Indian constitutional progress". The Manchester Guardian accused Jinnah of re-establishing "the reign of chaos in Indian politics", and condemned the resolution as being against the spirit of Indian Nationalism. The Secretary of State for India, Lord Zetland, denounced the League's demand as being not far short of "a counsel of despair", and added that its acceptance was tantamount to accepting "the failure of the devoted labours of Indians and Englishmen alike over a long period of long concentrated effort". The Congress press reaction was violent. It argued the impracticability of dividing India into communal homelands, and deplored the scheme as aiming to lead India to chaos and fresh problems. The leaders of the Congress Party, while rejecting the League's resolution, reiterated their own

1 The Times, April 18, 1940.
3 The Times, April 19, 1940.
4 Cited in ibid. March 28, 1940.
demand for the formation of a Constituent Assembly as being
"the only remedy for all political discord and discontent".¹
Spokesmen of the Hindu Mahasabha (an orthodox Hindu
organization) were more bitter in their rejection of the
partition scheme; they pledged to resist all attempts to
subdivide India into communal areas.² Gandhi's pen was
rather more vigorous. On June 15, 1940, he declared:

"The Congress which professes to speak for
India and wants unadulterated Independence,
cannot strike a common measure of agreement
with those who do not. ... It is an
illusion created by ourselves that we must
come to an agreement with all parties before
we can make any progress".

He proceeded even further:

"There is only one democratic, elected
political organization, i.e. the Congress.
All others are self-appointed or elected on
a sectional basis. Thus for the present
purpose there are only two parties — the
Congress and those who side with the Congress,
and the parties who do not. Between these two
there is no meeting ground without the one
or the other surrendering its purposes".³

This grave opposition and the authoritarian view-
point of Gandhi naturally created a sense of fear in the

¹R.C. Majumdar, op.cit. p. 576.
²The Times, March 28, 1940.
³Sir R. Coupland, The Indian Problem: Report on the Constitu-
tutional Problem in India Part II, (London: Oxford University Press, 1944),
p. 242;
Muslim community at large, and this apprehension automatically resulted into more disciplined unity in the Muslim League. The Muslim League stood more emphatically on the two-nation theory and its logical fulfillment by the establishment of Pakistan. Jinnah was free to enjoy absolute authority over the Muslim League. He was recognized by the League to be the only negotiator with the Viceroy and the Congress Party, and Leaguers were urged not to serve on the war committees pending his instructions.\(^1\)

Jinnah now hardened his tone in dealings with the British Government. On July 1, 1940, he laid down before the Viceroy the Muslim League’s terms for cooperation with the Government. The substance of his terms was that the Government should not make any decision which militate against the Pakistan scheme, that the Government should give the Muslims a definite assurance that no interim or final scheme of constitution would be adopted without the prior approval and consent of the Muslims, and that the Muslim leadership must be fully trusted as equals and should have an equal share in the authority and control

\(^1\)\textit{Resolutions of the All Indian Muslim League from April 1940 to April 1941} (Delhi: All India Muslim League, n.d.), pp. 1-5.
of the Central and Provincial Governments. The Viceroy expressed his views on Jinnah's terms for agreement in his letter of July 6, and rejected all the conditions.

But the British Government was faced with a huge task in wartime India which could only be efficiently carried out in conditions of internal peace and confidence. It was therefore anxious to obtain the cooperation of the Congress and the League. In order to placate both the parties, the Government issued on August 8, 1940, what came to be popularly known as the August Offer. It conceded the Congress demand of a Constituent Assembly composed of principal elements in India's national life to enact a constitution, but it was to meet after the war was over. At the same time it accepted the League's demand by stating that the British Government would not accept any system of government "whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life. Nor could they (British Government) be parties to the coercion of such elements into submission to such a Government". It also proposed an immediate


2 Ibid., pp. 503-504.
expansion of the Viceroy's Executive Council, and the establishment of a War Advisory Council.¹

The Congress Party was exasperated over the offer and rejected it.² The Muslim League expressed its discontentment over some of the clauses of the offer, but accepted it.³ Due to rejection of the Congress, the August Offer brought no practical result. Nevertheless, there was a palpable gain in it for the Muslim League, because the Government had recognized the need for satisfying Muslim India in any interim or final constitutional arrangement.

The Congress had failed to get a declaration of independence from the British Government. The August Offer was extremely objectionable in the Congress view. This led Gandhi to outline his program of Satyagrah (passive resistance) in October to coerce the Government to grant independence and form a full national government.⁴ The selected Satyagrahis, on the behest of Gandhi, appeared in the streets, shouted anti-war slogans, made speeches opposing India's participation into the war, and were duly arrested.⁵

²R.C. Majumdar, op. cit. p. 606.
³Resolutions of the All India Muslim League, pp. 10-11.
⁴The Times, October 15, 1940.
⁵Richard Symonds, op. cit. p. 63.
In December 1940, the movement was suspended, but it was again resumed on January 5, 1941, and continued through the middle of that year.\footnote{1}{R.C. Majumdar, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 608.}

The Muslim League did not look with favor on the Congress movement. It regarded the Congress struggle as being an effort compelling Britain to recognize it as the only authoritative organization of the people of India. According to Jinnah, the Congress move was merely "a process of blackmail".\footnote{2}{Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad (ed.), \textit{Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah Vol. II} (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1952), p. 200.} In responding to the tenor of Jinnah's speeches and statements on the Satyagrah movement, various resolutions of the League indicate the same tenacity in opposing the movement. The League Council pointed out, in its resolution of February, 1941, the objectionable intentions of the Congress in regard to the Muslims, and warned the Government not to concede anything to the Congress which "adversely affects or militates against the Muslim demands".\footnote{3}{Resolutions of the All India Muslim League \ldots\ldots, pp. 32-34.} In its annual session in April 1941 at Madras, the Muslim League reaffirmed that the Satyagrah movement of Gandhi was launched to obtain
sovereign power from the British Government for the Hindus and thus aimed at relegating one hundred million Muslims and other minorities to the rank of "mere subjects of Hindu Raj throughout the country". The League reiterated its warning to the British Government that the Muslims would resist any decision of the British Government or that of the Viceroy which was detrimental to the Muslim interests "with all the power they can command". At the end of the movement when the Government released the civil disobedience prisoners, Jinnah opposed the softening of British policy towards the Congress. In this way, the Muslim League disapproved an independence that aimed to establish majority rule, and thereby kept aloft the banner of Muslim nationalism.

The year 1942 added a new and more important chapter in the history of British India. In March 1942, Sir Stafford Cripps visited India with a "Draft Declaration" containing specific proposals of the British Government for political settlement in India. The object of the Declaration, as it stated in the preamble, was the "creation of a new Indian Union which shall constitute a Dominion, associated

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1 Ibid., pp. 43-44.
with the United Kingdom and the other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to them in every respect. The Declaration further maintained that as soon as the war ended, a constitution-making body composed of all the lower houses of all provincial legislatures and representatives of the Indian Princely States would be set up to frame a constitution. The Government pledged to accept such a constitution, on the condition that any province of British India would be free to make its own decision to join or keep itself out of the proposed Union. A non-acceding province was to be given a separate constitution on a par with the Indian Union Constitution.¹

Both the Congress Party and the Muslim League rejected the Draft Declaration for different reasons. The Congress was against the proposals, because they were severe blow to the Congress conception of Indian unity, and did not give adequate immediate responsibility into Indian hands.² Gandhi ridiculed the Declaration as being a post-dated cheque on a tottering bank.³ The Muslim League

¹Anil C. Banerjee, op.cit. pp. 27-29.
rejected it because it did not announce an unequivocal acceptance of Pakistan. The Working Committee of the League complained that the proposals did not explicitly recognize the Pakistan scheme, laid no procedure down as to how the verdict of a province was to be obtained in favor or against accession to the one Union, and were inflexible. It concluded by asserting that unless the principle of Pakistan was unequivocally accepted and the right of the Muslims to self-determination was conceded, it would not be possible for the League to accept any proposal regarding the future constitution of India.\(^1\) Jinnah regarded the Cripps document as "a bare skeleton of the proposals", and contended that the proposals had roused the deepest anxieties and gravest apprehensions with reference to Pakistan scheme which was a matter of life and death for Muslim India.\(^2\)

The Cripps mission was, however, in one way gratifying for the League, in that it brought about a further increase in the League's influence and strength. Although the Declaration did not contain a specific approval for the Pakistan scheme, it kept the door open for separation, and thereby conceded the League's demand in principle. It was

\(^1\)Resolutions of the All India Muslim League from April 1942 to May 1943 (Delhi: All India Muslim League, n.d.), pp. 1-7; Gwyer and Appadorai, op.cit. pp. 526-28.

\(^2\)The Times, April 6, 1942.
a solid achievement, for within two years the League had popularized its idea to such an extent. It became clear that the British Government was prepared at least to consider the Pakistan scheme as a solution to communal deadlock. Jinnah's attitude towards the Cripps mission was therefore less inimical than that of Gandhi. He was pleased and optimistic, saying that the recognition given to the principle of partition was very much appreciated by Muslim India.

Soon after the failure of the Cripps mission the stormy era of the Quit India movement began. Noting grave setbacks received by Britain in the war, Gandhi proclaimed through the columns of Harijan that the time had come "during the war, not after it, for the British and the Indians to be reconciled to complete separation from each other". To the question that to whom Britain should entrust the administration, Gandhi's reply was:

"Leave India in God's hands, in modern parlance, to anarchy, and that anarchy may lead to internecine warfare for a time or to unresisted dacoities".

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1 Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, op.cit. p. 416.
2 Quoted in K.P. Bhagat, op.cit. p. 192.
3 Quoted in Sir R. Coupland, op.cit. p. 290.
A student of political history may regard this view as being far from realities and principles of statesmanship. The Working Committee of the Congress Party, however, wholeheartedly endorsed his opinion in the Quit India resolution of July, 1942. As far the Hindu-Muslim tangle was concerned, the resolution said that it was only after ending foreign domination that this issue could be faced and solved on a mutual and agreed basis. The resolution of the Working Committee was finally approved by the All India Congress Committee in the following month.

Britain reacted strongly to this threat of open rebellion at the height of war. As a result, the Congress Party was outlawed, and eminent leaders including Gandhi himself were arrested. In the absence of guidance, the movement gradually ended in an utter failure.

The Muslim League adopted a very careful attitude towards the Quit India movement. From the language of the Congress resolutions it was obvious that

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1 R.C. Majumdar, op.cit., p. 640.
2 Gwyer and Appadorai, op.cit., pp. 541-54; Anil C. Banerjee, op.cit., pp. 71-76.
3 R.C. Majumdar, op.cit., p. 645.
4 Ibid.
the Congress Party had given no importance to the communal question. The Congress had not even referred to or consulted with the League and various other sections of Indian population. It was therefore manifest that in the event of the Congress victory, an undiluted Congress rule would be established in India in which there would be no place for a scheme like that of Pakistan. Thus the Muslim League, as observed by The New York Times, heard behind the noble words of independence and freedom uttered by Gandhi "the roar of mobs and the rattle of chains, and not British chains either".\(^1\) Moreover, the League, being a party of the minority community, did not want a complete break with the British Government, nor did it seem to be in haste to achieve independence. It was opposed to the continuation of the British rule, but before it would commit itself to a drastic action it was keen to know what would replace the British. This consideration led the League adopt a double negative policy - "against the Congress before being against the British".\(^2\) It was so because the League preferred British

\(^1\)The New York Times, August 11, 1942.

to Hindu rule. On the other hand, the League was not willing to plunge into communal riots and widespread violence by practically opposing the Congress movement. Thus it acted with a considerable circumspection. The League resolution deplored the Congress decision of launching an open rebellion, which was directed not only to coerce the British Government into handing over power to "a Hindu oligarchy", but also to force the Muslims "to submit and surrender to the Congress terms and dictation". It called upon the Muslims to abstain from participation in the movement, and to "continue to pursue their normal peaceful life". Jinnah's criticism of the Congress move was no less onerous. He condemned the Congress Party for forcing its demands "at the point of bayonet .... and internecine civil war". Commenting on Gandhi's thesis that the Hindu-Muslim settlement could come only after the independence, Jinnah was glad to note that Gandhi had thrown off the cloak of hypocrisy. He inferred that

4 Jaail-ud-Din Ahmad, op.cit. pp. 443-45.
Gandhi wanted to settle the Hindu–Muslim question on his own terms of Hindu domination, and that his bid for independence was to instal “self-styled, self-titled” Congress in power and authority. Jinnah also approved of the firm measures of the Government to quell the movement. In this way the League stood firmly against the Congress move of achieving power, and thereby contributed much to the failure of the movement.

The failure of the Quit India movement and arrest of the Congress leaders paved the way for a considerable increase in the power and influence of the Muslim League. For nearly three years the Congress leaders remained in prison, and both the All India and provincial Congress organizations were cut off from the mainstream of political activities. It was a golden opportunity for the Muslim League to improve its organization, and increase its prestige as an unchallenged political body. The League took full advantage of the situation, and grew rapidly in numbers and influence. It opened its branches in remote areas and even in some villages, and popularized the Pakistan scheme by giving wide publicity, holding

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1 The Times, July 23, 1942.
2 Sir R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 299.
frequent political meetings, and establishing new student organizations. Jinnah's power and control over the party were greatly enlarged. His ideas were propagated far and wide, and various resolutions of the Muslim meetings singled him out as the only representative entitled to speak on behalf of the Muslim community.

As a counterpart of the Congress Quit India, Jinnah coined a new slogan 'Divide and Quit' as the only honest way out for the British Government. When Lord Wavell, who succeeded Linlithgow as Viceroy, opposed the League's demand by stating that India was one natural unit, and that two communities or two nations could live together, the League was prompt in defying the Viceroy's viewpoint. The League spokesman's remark was that reliance upon geography, without reference to history and

3 A resolution of the Muslim meeting in Calcutta in 1942 says, "This meeting emphatically declares the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, President of the All India Muslim League, alone represents and is entitled to speak on behalf of the Muslim nation". Norman Brown, "India's Pakistan Issue" in Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 91, 1947, p. 176.
4 The Times, December 28, 1943.
5 Gwyer and Appadorai, op.cit. p. 557;
psychology was "a poor compliment to Lord Wavell's gift of statesmanship". Thus the League did not soften its tone against the British Government, and kept pushing for Indian independence and establishment of Pakistan. Jinnah urged the Government to discontinue its "wait and see policy", and accede to Indian independence on the principle of Pakistan. He reproached the Government for its negative policy, and demanded "action, not dispatches". He criticized vehemently the Government's urge for Indian unity. He charged that the demand for a unity which the Government knew to be impossible was "merely a device for maintaining its imperialistic stronghold in India". Thus the League signalized its readiness to combat both the British and the Congress to achieve its end.

In 1943, an erstwhile Congress leader, Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, prepared what came to be commonly known as the C.R. Formula for the Congress-League settlement on the basis of the Pakistan scheme. Once before, in May 1942, he

2 The Times, November 10, 1942.
3 Ibid. April 26, 1943.
4 Ibid. April 24, 1943.
had urged the Congress to recognize the League's claim to separation, but he was not heard, and had thereby resigned from the Congress.\(^1\) His present formula accepted the principle of partition under the condition of the League's support for the Indian demand of independence, and its cooperation in the formation of a provisional interim government. As far the boundaries of Pakistan, a commission was to be appointed after the war to demarcate contiguous districts in the north-west and east of India, where the Muslim population was in absolute majority.\(^2\) Gandhi, who had given up the Quit India demand and had thereby been released from prison in 1944, agreed to the 'C.R. Formula'. He wrote to Jinnah on July 17 suggesting a meeting on the basis of the Formula, to which the latter agreed.\(^3\)

But the Formula was not consistent to the League's stand. The first clause which stipulated League's endorsement of Indian demand for freedom obviously implied that the League was not anxious to win freedom. Jinnah objected to this clause. The Pakistan offered by the Formula was, according to Jinnah, "a shadow and a husk, a maimed,

\(^1\)The Times, May 4, 1942.

\(^2\)Text of the Formula in G. Rajagopalacharia, "Reconciliation in India" in Foreign Affairs Vol. 23, 1944-45, p. 428; The Times, July 10, 1944.

\(^3\)The Times, July 29, 1944.
mutilated, and moth-eaten Pakistan". The only merit he saw in it was that Gandhi had "in his personal capacity accepted the principle of Pakistan". The Muslim community at large also could not conceal satisfaction that Gandhi had been brought to concede the idea of Pakistan.

Thus began the famous Gandhi-Jinnah talks in September 1944 at Jinnah's residence at Bombay. The conversations commenced on September 9th, and continued till the 27th, when the two leaders announced that they had been unable to reach at an agreement. There is no record of their discussions. However, important points of the mutual discussions can be found in their correspondence during that period which consists of not less than twenty-one letters. From a study of these documents one may note Gandhi's insistence on the impossibility of settlement in the presence of the British in India. In his letter of September 13th addressed to Jinnah, he emphasized the achievement of independence because the presence of the British was a great hindrance in the way of Hindu-Muslim settlement. On September 13th he wrote:

1 Jamiil-ud-Din Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 135-37.
2 The Times, July 21, 1944.
"I do hold that unless we oust the third party (i.e. the British) we shall not be able to live at peace with one another." Again on September 24th, his pledge was that a separate state (of Pakistan) will be formed as soon as possible "after India is free from foreign domination." He reiterated his stand later in a press conference, stating that the presence of the British hindered a solution. Moreover, he was not ready to accept the two-nation theory of Jinnah. He refused to recognize "a body of converts and their descendants claiming to be a nation", and argued that "If India was one nation before the advent of Islam, it must remain one in spite of a change of the faith of a very large body of her children."

Jinnah did not accept Gandhi's plea of forming Pakistan after the British withdrawal. He was insistent on reversing Gandhi's order of things, and put separation before independence. The proper way, according to him, was to come to a complete settlement on the communal issue first and then to make a united demand to the British to

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1 Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, *op. cit.* p. 167.
4 Ibid. p. 320.
hand over power. Moreover, he was determined to prove that the Indian Muslims were a nation. According to him, they had their own "distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of value and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions," and were therefore a nation by all canons of international law.\footnote{Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, \textit{op.cit.} pp. 179-80.} In his letter of September 25th, Jinnah wrote to Gandhi with a tone of finality that the Muslims proposed to come to a complete settlement first and then to do anything possible to secure the freedom and independence of the people of India on the basis of Pakistan and Hindustan.\footnote{Philips, Singh, and Pandey, \textit{op.cit.} pp. 356-60; Anil C. Banerjee, \textit{op.cit.} pp. 89-91.} This was the central point on which the conversations broke down.

However indecisive, the Gandhi-Jinnah conversations proved to be salutary for the Muslim League's cause. Gandhi's discussions with Jinnah were on the basis of the partition of India. For the first time, the supreme guide of the Congress Party had agreed to the principle of Pakistan. This was the victory of the League, and it further enhanced the position of Jinnah. Moreover, it became crystal clear...
from the failure of the unity talks that the solution of the communal problem was not an easy one, and that it was a real issue pressing for an immediate settlement.

After the defeat of Germany in the spring of 1945, the Congress leaders were released, and the Viceroy called a conference of political leaders at Simla. He proposed to Indianize his Executive Council completely except for the Commander-in-Chief, and asked each party to nominate representatives to it. The Council was to function as an Interim Government until the Japanese war was over and an agreement was reached on the ultimate constitution.¹ But the Conference failed to come to an agreement. Both Gandhi and Jinnah were critical of the so-called Wavell Plan. However, the main cause of its failure was Jinnah's insistence that only the League should have the right to nominate the Muslim members to the Council.² Neither the Viceroy nor the Congress were prepared to accede to the League's demand, and thus ended the last effort to reach a settlement before the end of the World War II.

The Simla Conference made it clear that without

¹ Gwyer and Appadorai, op.cit. pp. 557-60; Philips, Singh, and Pandey, op.cit. pp. 376-78.
² Gwyer and Appadorai, op.cit. p. 563.
the consent of the Muslim League there could be no constitutional progress in India. The supremacy of the League was confirmed over all other Muslim organizations.

Soon after the failure of the Simla Conference, the Japanese war ended, and the Labour Party came into power in England. Then began the second phase, short but very important, of the League's struggle for Pakistan.

II. The Muslim League, 1945–47:

World War II brought a metamorphosis of British power. Britain lost her position as a world power of the first rank, and could not expect to recover her old strength and prestige. Churchill's Government was replaced by the Labour Government with Clement Attlee as Prime Minister, and the prospects of Indian independence became manifest. Events of the subsequent two years demonstrated that the British Government was anxious to grant freedom as soon as the Hindu-Muslim disagreement was resolved. Thus the communal problem, and not British imperialistic interests, was the crux of the whole Indian deadlock. The principal combatants in the battle for India's freedom were the Hindus and the Muslims, or more correctly the Congress and the Muslim League, and the role of the British Government was that of a powerful mediator.
between the two disputants.

One of the first actions of the Labour Government was to hold elections both for the Central and Provincial Assemblies in India. It was announced simultaneously that a constitution-making body would be convened as soon as possible after the elections. The Prime Minister broadcast a speech urging the Indians to make a united effort to evolve a constitution which would be accepted by all parties in India.

The political field was open to the Muslim League to confront the Congress Party, and vindicate its claim of alone representing Muslim India. It made elaborate preparations for contesting the elections. The most important issue on which the League fought the elections was that of Pakistan. Jinnah toured all over Muslim India, and made innumerable speeches. The essence of his canvassing was that the Muslims of India were a nation, and that Pakistan was the only honest solution of the Indian problem.

The Congress Party made great efforts in opposing

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1 Gwyer and Appadorai, op. cit. pp. 567-68.
2 V.P. Menon, op. cit. pp. 219-20.
3 Most of Jinnah's important elections speeches are reproduced in Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, op. cit. pp. 282-90, 292-305, 307-55.
the League in the elections. It painted the League as being a coterie of capitalists and Government pensioners, and maintained its contacts with the non-League Muslim groups, such as Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind, the Ahrar Party, the Unionist Party, the Momin Group, to strengthen them.

i. Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind: Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind was a religio-political movement organized in 1919 by politically articulate Muslim religious leaders. The movement was considerably influenced by Abul Kalam Azad who was an eminent leader of the Congress Party. Throughout the struggle for Indian independence, therefore, it espoused the cause of the Congress. Emphasizing an active Hindu-Muslim cooperation, the Jamiat vehemently opposed the Muslim League and the idea of Pakistan.


ii. The Ahrar Party: A pro-Congress Muslim group, the Ahrar came into existence as provincial political party of Punjab in 1928. During 1930 and 1932, the Ahrar Party worked side by side with the Congress in the Civil Disobedience movement. Again in 1940, it resolved to join the Satyagrah campaign of the Congress. It stood firmly opposed to the Pakistan scheme.


iii. The Unionist Party: The Unionist Party represented all communities in the province of Punjab in nineteen thirties. It won the 1937 elections with a sizable majority, but most of the Muslim unionists joined the League after they had been elected. In 1946, it was revived with the support of the Congress to oppose the League.


iv. The Momin Group: The Momin Group was originally formed in 1923 to represent low class Muslims. It was revived in 1942 with the Congress support as an anti-Muslim League group.

in the opposition of the League. The Muslim religious leaders of Jamiat-ul-Ulama were particularly against Jinnah’s Pakistan, for they were given to believe that the western-minded Jinnah would build a state on the secular principles of Kamalist Turkey.

Jinnah on the other hand charged the Congress Party with planning to crush the Muslims with British bayonets. His untiring election campaign together with the widespread organization of the League and “Pakistan fever” among the Muslim bourgeoisie were the great forces brought the League through to victory in the elections. In the Central Assembly, the League won every Muslim seat, and captured four hundred and forty-six out of a total of four hundred and ninety-five Muslim seats in the Provincial Assemblies. The elections proved to be a triumphant vindication of the League’s claim to alone represent Muslim India.

After achieving victory, the Muslim League

1 A.B. Rajput, op. cit. p. 97.
3 The Times, October 18, 1945.
continued to press vigorously towards the ultimate goal. Jinnah called a convention of all the League-elected members of the Central and Provincial Assemblies. About five hundred members gathered in Delhi in what was considered to be a "Muslim Constituent Assembly". The hysterical enthusiasm of the Convention for the demand of Pakistan can easily be gauged from the following quotation by a League member:

"If the Hindus give us Pakistan and freedom, then the Hindus are our best friends. If the British give it to us, then the British are our best friends. But if neither will give it to us then Russia is our best friend."

The League Convention finally resolved that the Muslim nation would never submit to any constitution for a united India, and urged that two separate constitution-making bodies represented by the peoples of Pakistan and Hindustan be set up for the purpose of framing the constitutions of their respective countries. The resolution made it clear to the British Government that the acceptance of the Pakistan demand and its implementation without delay were "the sine qua non for the Muslim League co-operation and

1 A.A. Ravoof, Meet Mr. Jinnah (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1945), p. 186.

participation in the formation of an interim government in the centre.\textsuperscript{1} Moreover, every member took an oath, according to which he was ready to undergo any danger, trial or sacrifice for the salvation of Muslim India which was possible only by the achievement of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{2} In this way, Jinnah created an air of complete homogeneity and consistency in the ranks of the Muslim League, and made them united and strictly disciplined for the achievement of the common goal.

Once the Congress\textsuperscript{3} and the League had proved their strength as the successors of British authority, urgency was given to the need for independence. In March 1946, the British Government sent out three of the Cabinet members – Lord Pethick Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps, and A.V. Alexander – to assist the Viceroy in securing full agreement to the method of framing a constitution, to set up a constitution-making body, and to form an Executive Council with support of the main Indian parties.\textsuperscript{4} A detailed account of

\textsuperscript{1} Gwyer and Appadorai, \textit{op.cit.} p. 571. Full text of the resolution covers pp. 569-71.

\textsuperscript{2} Text of the pledge is reproduced in I.H. Qureshi, \textit{op.cit.} p. 247.

\textsuperscript{3} The Congress had secured complete victory in the elections in the non-Muslim constituencies: Michael Edwardes, \textit{The Last Years of British India} (London: Cassell & Co., 1963), p. 100.

\textsuperscript{4} Gwyer and Appadorai, \textit{op.cit.} pp. 571-72.
the numerous interviews, meetings, and correspondence which the Cabinet Mission exchanged with the Indian leaders of various shades of opinion is beyond the purpose of this Thesis. To summarize the stand taken by the principal parties, it can be point out that the Congress stood for a united India, and Gandhi, who gave his personal views to the Mission, was insistent on rejecting the two-nation theory of Jinnah on the oft-repeated basis that the Indian Muslims, save for a microscopic minority, were descendants of the Indian. Likewise, Jinnah stood firmly on the principle of Pakistan, and enthusiastically reaffirmed his two-nation theory. According to him, there were in India two totally different and deeply rooted civilizations, and the only solution left therefore was "to have two steel frames, one in Hindustan and one in Pakistan".

It was inevitable, in view of the contradictory stands of the Congress and the League, that no agreement could be reached. The Cabinet Mission thereupon framed


its own detailed plan on May 16, 1946. In essence, the plan suggested that a Constituent Assembly for the Union of India should be elected by the Provincial Assemblies on the basis of separate electorates of the religious communities. After a preliminary session of the Constituent Assembly, the provincial representatives should meet in three groups: A – Madras, Bombay, United Provinces, Bihar, Orissa, Central Provinces; B – Punjab, North West Frontier Province, Sind; and C – Bengal, Assam. The three groups should work out provincial constitutions for the provinces in the group, and decide whether certain power not reserved for the center should be delegated to a group government. Thus India was to be partitioned, and there was to remain one Central Government to deal with Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Communications. An interim government represented by the major parties was to be formed by the Viceroy to carry out administration meanwhile.\(^1\)

The plan in no way gave Pakistan to the Muslim League. The Congress was overjoyed at its publication. Nehru's daily, The National Herald wrote triumphantly:
Pakistan, the Pakistan of Mr. Jinnah's conception, receives a state burial in the document submitted by the Cabinet.

\(^1\) Gwyer and Appadorai, *op. cit.* pp. 577–84; Anil C. Banerjee, *op. cit.* pp. 137–50.
Mission.\textsuperscript{1} But the Muslim League accepted the plan, and agreed to join the Interim Government in the hope that it would ultimately lead to the establishment of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{2} For the first time since it raised the cry for Pakistan, the League had agreed on something less.

But the kaleidoscopic circumstances of the Indian politics soon persuaded Jinnah to abrogate his decision and take more stern stand on the issue of Pakistan. Jinnah had been assured by the Viceroy that the League would get parity to the Congress in the Interim Government.\textsuperscript{3} But the Viceroy could not keep his word, for the Congress refused to accept the parity.\textsuperscript{4} On June 16, the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy issued their new proposal, according to which the Interim Government was to have six Congressmen and five Muslim League members. The new proposal also made it clear that "In the event of the two major parties or either of them proving unwilling to join in the setting up of a Coalition Government on the above lines, it is the intention of the Viceroy to proceed with the formation of the Interim Government which will be as representative as possible of

\textsuperscript{1}Quoted in I.H. Qureshi, \textit{op.cit.} p. 263.
\textsuperscript{2}Gwyer and Appadorai, \textit{op.cit.} pp. 600–602.
\textsuperscript{3}Anil C. Banerjee, \textit{op.cit.} p. 204.
\textsuperscript{4}K.P. Bhagat, \textit{op.cit.} p. 360.
those willing to accept the statement of May 16th (the Cabinet Mission Plan)". The Congress Party refused to join the Interim Government, while the League decided in favour of joining. Jinnah urged the Viceroy to form the Government consisting of the nominees of the Muslim League and of any other parties which had accepted to join it. Wavell did not agree to this proposal, and postponed the formation of the Interim Government rather than forming one without the Congress. A Caretaker Government of civil servants was formed. This was obviously a breach of pledge, which Jinnah deeply resented. He charged the Viceroy with having chosen "to go back upon your pledged word, by postponing the formation of the Interim Government". The League considered that it had been hoodwinked by the Viceroy, and Muslim journalists called it the "British betrayal".

Jawaharlal Nehru's expressions in the Press

1 Anil C. Banerjee, op.cit. p. 191.
3 Gwyer and Appadorai, op.cit. p. 610.
4 Anil C. Banerjee, op.cit. p. 220.
5 Gwyer and Appadorai, op.cit. pp. 611-12.
6 Ibid. p. 617.
7 The Times, July 30, 1946.
8 Hector Bolitho, op.cit. p. 164.
Conference on July 10th created further doubts among the Muslims. After he had been elected Congress President, Nehru declared that the Congress acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan was limited only to the extent of agreeing to go into the Constituent Assembly, and "to nothing else". He maintained that the Congress was entirely and absolutely free to determine in the Assembly, and said that the "big probability is there will be no grouping". Nehru earned heavy criticism for his declaration. Abul Kalam Azad characterized Nehru's press conference as "one of those unfortunate events which change the course of history", and stated that "it was not correct to say that Congress was free to modify the Plan as it pleased". Nehru's admiring biographer calls his expressions "the most fiery and provocative statements in his forty years of public life". According to Leonard Mosley, his remarks showed that "once in power the Congress would use its strength at the Centre to alter the Cabinet Mission Plan as it thought fit". He calls them "a direct act of sabotage". To Majumdar, Nehru's

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observations were "very injudicious and impolitic, to say the least of it."\(^1\)

The Viceroy's attitude and Nehru's statements really changed the course of history. Disappointed by the Viceroy's attitude, Jinnah deduced from Nehru's expressions that the Congress was determined not to work the Cabinet Mission Plan in the proper spirit. He held that if the Congress could change its motives while the British were still in power, it would certainly forget its pledges after the British had left India.\(^2\) Haunted by these fears, he called a Muslim League Council meeting at Bombay on July 27, 1946. Jinnah, "like an army leader who has come in for armistice discussions under a flag of truce and finds himself looking down the barrel of a cocked revolver"\(^3\), attacked both the Congress Party and the British Government.\(^4\) The Council then resolved to reject the Cabinet Mission Plan, and to resort to 'Direct Action' for the achievement of Pakistan in order to "get rid of the present British

\(^1\) R.C. Majumdar, *op. cit.* p. 771.


\(^3\) Leonard Mosley, *op. cit.* p. 28.

slavery and the contemplated future caste-Hindu domination.\footnote{Gwyer and Appadorai, \textit{op.cit.} p. 621; The Times, July 30, 1946.}

In this way, the Muslim League took a revolutionary turn in its policy, and attained more enthusiastic support from the Muslim population. Its acquiescence to the Cabinet Mission Plan, thereby sacrificing its demand of Pakistan, had brought no advantage. It was clear that Congress acceptance of the Plan was for tactical purposes. The only way left to Jinnah, as he himself stated was to depart from the constitutional methods hitherto pursued by the League.\footnote{Anil C. Banerjee, \textit{op.cit.} p. 265.}

The revolutionary stand of the League, and the unprecedented communal rioting on the 'Direct Action Day' of the League and thereafter\footnote{Hector Bolitho, \textit{op.cit.} pp. 169-70.} made it clear to the British Government that a civil war was inevitable in a "united" India. From that moment, Pakistan became the most critical issue in Indian politics.

states that since the League was not willing to enter the Interim Government, the Viceroy had written to the British Government suggesting the postponement of the Congress' swearing in until the League was persuaded to join the Government, but the British Prime Minister overruled him by calling for a Government formed by the Congress. When the League was ready to participate in the Government, the Viceroy had not allowed it to do so in the absence of the Congress, but when the situation was reversed with the willingness of the Congress and opposition by the League, the Viceroy did not hesitate to allow the Congress to form the Interim Government. The traditional pro-Congress policy of the Labour Party was thus asserted at a most critical juncture.

Jinnah realized that the Muslims would continue to suffer from lack of representation in the Central Government. To safeguard Muslim interests and conduct the battle for Pakistan the League, he decided, must enter the Interim Government. After long negotiations, this took place on October 25, 1946. The Congress Party did not welcome the League's entry, nor did the League members come in

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1 Leonard Mosley, _op.cit._ pp. 48-49.
2 Correspondence between Jinnah, Nehru and Wavell in Gwyer and Appadorai, _op.cit._ pp. 648-54.
3 Ibid. pp. 654-55.
4 I.H. Qureshi, _op.cit._ p. 283.
it to obey the orders of the Hindu Vice-President. Thus the formation of the Coalition Government brought no agreement among the contending parties. The League, however, obtained some advantage by working for the Pakistan scheme from within the Government.

Shortly after the League had joined the Interim Government, a crisis arose over the summoning of the Constituent Assembly elected in accordance to the Cabinet Mission Plan. The Muslim League fiercely attacked the Viceroy's move. Jinnah asserted that the Viceroy was blind to the realities facing him, and that he was "entirely playing into the hands of the Congress". He urged the League representatives not to attend the Constituent Assembly. The Assembly met on December 9th, but the League boycotted it and denounced its resolutions as "ultra vires, invalid and illegal".

Thus the political impasse remained. The London Conference of the Indian leaders and the British Government also failed to break the deadlock. Differences between the

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1 V.P. Menon, op.cit. p. 319.
2 Gwyer and Appadorai, op.cit. p. 567; The Times, November 22, 1946.
3 V.D. Mahajan and S. Mahajan, op.cit. p. 447.
4 Gwyer and Appadorai, op.cit. p. 660; The Times, December 7, 1946.
Congress and League members inside the Government increased. In February 1947, the Congress asked the Viceroy to obtain the resignations of League members from the Government.\(^1\)

With civil war impending, Prime Minister Attlee made the declaration on February 20, 1947 that His Majesty's Government would grant full self-government to India by June, 1948, at the latest. It was also announced simultaneously that Viceroy Wavell would be replaced by Lord Mountbatten.\(^2\) The 'time-limit' speech of Attlee was welcomed by the Congress Party,\(^3\) but the League did not make any favorable response to it. Jinnah refused to commit himself, but reaffirmed that his party would not yield an inch in its demand of Pakistan.\(^4\)

Mountbatten took up his duties on March 24, 1947. A decisive and practical man, he realized that there were two nations in India and therefore partition was inevitable.\(^5\) Nevertheless, he worked hard to obtain League agreement to the Cabinet Mission Plan, but Jinnah refused flatly to

\(^1\)V.P. Menon, *op. cit.* p. 319.


\(^3\)Ibid. pp. 669-70.


withdraw the League’s rejection. Finally, on June 3rd, the plan for the transfer of power to India and the principle of partition was accepted by the British Government and the major political parties of India, and in this way, the Muslim League achieved its cherished goal of Pakistan on August 14, 1947.

It appears from the study of these seven years of Indian politics that until June 3rd, 1947, neither the British Government nor the Congress Party acceded manifestly to the League’s principle of Pakistan. Nor could the achievement of Pakistan be predicted while the Labor Government was in power. The last two years of the British rule were a great ordeal for the Muslim League and for its principle of Pakistan. Despite of all the tribulations, the League emerged victorious.

What were the principal causes of the League’s success?

1) The very idea of Pakistan was the greatest single incentive rallying the support of the Muslim masses behind the League. It proved to be "political magic" for the

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League. To religious-minded Muslims, Pakistan was something like an Islamic theocratic state; to the western-minded, it was a progressive democratic state, and a nation; to the masses, it promised to resuscitate the memory of the great Mughal Empire; to peace-loving Muslims, it was a government without communal problems; and to ambitious persons, it promised a share in government offices. The idea of a State to the Muslim bourgeoisie was indeed the great attraction, for in such a State "they and not the Hindus would be rich men and hold all best posts in Government service, industry and commerce." In short, it was a panacea for the Muslim community. Before 1940, the Muslims had no such goal before them, and were haggling over concessions, safeguards, and provincial autonomy at the most, while the Hindus had the clear ideal of self-government (Swaraj). The Muslim fear of Hindu domination could only be relieved by the achievement of Pakistan. In the latter years of the struggle, the fervor of the masses reached a dangerously high pitch. Had the Muslim League leaders compromised on something less than Pakistan, the Muslim people would not have agreed to such a decision. This can be clearly seen

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in the palpable Muslim discontent over the League's acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan in June 1946.\textsuperscript{1}

Thus the League's victory seems to be largely indebted to the compelling appeal of Pakistan itself.

ii) The second main cause of the League's victory is to be found in the brilliant leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. There is widespread agreement concerning his dynamic political character and personality. His honesty, keen legal mind, debating power, persistence and perseverance cannot be minimized. He remained in the forefront of the political campaign all through the years of the Indian struggle for independence. In 1915, he had pursued his dream of Hindu-Muslim unity and was successful. From 1921 when he left the Congress Party until 1934 when he assumed the permanent leadership of the Muslim League, Jinnah had no important political following. But during all this period, save for about two years, he remained active in politics. His talents as an organizer and parliamentarian soon made him the undisputed head of the Muslim League. From this position, Jinnah brought a new strategy to Muslim politics in India. He exploited Congress mistakes skilfully, and his adroit leadership developed the Muslim League into

\textsuperscript{1}I.H. Qureshi, op.cit. p. 266.
a powerful, well-knit organization, the most authoritative and representative possessed by the Indian Muslim community.

His rigid position on the demand for Pakistan through all these hectic years was remarkable. He attacked without fear or favor anyone—Hindu, Muslim, or British—who opposed this demand. Thus he was the guiding spirit, theorist, interpreter, preserver, and the defender of the theory of Pakistan. To all suggestions of compromise on this issue he turned a deaf ear. Sir Evelyn Wrench remarked on his devotion for Pakistan: "Mr. Jinnah is a man without hobbies, or rather Pakistan has been his only hobby as well his work."\(^1\) Pakistan was a reality for him, and at last he achieved this reality by his superb patience, untiring efforts, integrity, and incorruptibility.

Liaqat Ali Khan was perhaps the most important of Jinnah's colleagues. Liaqat Ali adopted the role of a brilliant and loyal subordinate to Jinnah. With great skill he managed the affairs and finances of the League, as its honorary General Secretary, thereby earning Jinnah's absolute trust. This mutual confidence and sincere cooperation accomplished much in the struggle for Pakistan.

iii) The propaganda machinery of the Muslim League

was also one of the important causes of its victory. For the first time in modern Muslim India, the League made serious effort to publicize its stand and the ideal of Pakistan. Its propaganda was prolific, and achieved remarkable success. A committee of writers of the League was constituted with Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad of the Aligarh Muslim University as Convener. Innumerable pamphlets were written and published by Sheikh Mohammad Ashraf of Lahore under the collective title of 'Pakistan Literature Series'. They exposed to the Muslims the urgency of the Pakistan movement and dire necessity for unity and discipline, and explained to the non-Muslims the historical and political justification for the demand.\(^1\) Wide publicity was given to the resolutions of the League. Such materials were customarily sent to all the heads of the United Nations delegations.\(^2\) The role of the Muslim press was no less effective in publicizing the League's demand. With the Pakistan Resolution of 1940, *Dawn* (Delhi), *The Morning News* (Calcutta), *The Muslim Voice* (Karachi), *The Eastern Times* and *Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore) all supported the campaign.\(^3\) Muslim

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\(^1\)I.H. Qureshi, *op.cit.* pp. 139–40.

\(^2\)*The Times*, August 21, 1942.

publicists were by and large successful in cultivating unity among their community.

iv) The British Government and the Congress Party also provided some opportunities for the Muslim League to consolidate its ranks and take a stern position on its objective. The Cripps Mission in 1942 brought considerable strength to the Muslim League by acceding to the principle of partition. The League, unlike the militant Congress, was not in favor of a complete break with the British Government. Its organization was therefore never outlawed, and was enabled to maintain an incessant campaign until independence. Some writers have thereupon described the League as a tool of the British policy of divide et empera. The most cursory study of contemporary documents and of the events of the year 1946 provides a repudiation of this allegation. Indeed, British policy during the last two years of the Raj was particularly inimical to the cause of the Muslim League.

The contribution of the Congress to the League's victory is obvious enough. The idea that the Muslims had a potent enemy in the Congress Party provided a powerful stimulus in consolidating the overwhelming majority of the Muslims under the banner of the Muslim League. And, had
Nehru not exposed the future ambitions of the Congress in 1946, the achievement of Pakistan would have been long delayed. This act transformed the situation, and the League thereafter persistently refused to surrender on the issue of Pakistan. To be sure, long before the struggle for Pakistan began, the Congress had initiated the militant drive for independence; and by weakening the Government's hold over India, it automatically benefitted all other Indian parties.
Chapter IV

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE MUSLIM LEAGUE

1947 – 58

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The Muslim League's decline began immediately after it had reached the highest stage of its prestige and influence. In 1947 the cherished goal of Pakistan was achieved through the untiring struggle of the League. How should Pakistan be run? This was a question which the party had never seriously considered. The League's leadership had no previous experience of operating an efficient government. The unique circumstances of a country, born out of the fear of Hindu domination and divided into two parts, naturally hampered the organization of the Muslim League as well as the pace of the country's progress. Yet the fate of the Muslim League and the disruption of political life could not have been predicted in 1947. Throughout the eleven years under review, the Muslim League moved rapidly towards disintegration, and at last succumbed with the Army coup of 1958. However, the first six years, from 1947 until the dismissal of the Nazimuddin Cabinet in 1953, were not as
disastrous for the League as the rest of the period. The two phases of the history of the League's decline can therefore be studied separately.

I. The Muslim League, 1947–53:

With the establishment of Pakistan, the President of the Muslim League, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, became the first Governor-General of the country and the President of the Constituent Assembly. His Prime Minister was the General Secretary of the League, Liaqat Ali Khan. The new-born Government of the League faced gigantic problems. There was no effective administration throughout the country; and a severe burden upon the country's over-strained economy was added by the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees.1 Diverse and conflicting interests rapidly developed, and the unity of the nation was seem to be threatened.2 Its disintegration was anticipated to be imminent.3 Leading Hindu politicians and businessmen,4

1 Ian Stephens, Pakistan (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1963), pp. 184, 223.
3 James A. Michener, "Pakistan: Divided it Stands" in Readers' Digest, Vol. 65, November, 1956, p. 136;
including Jawaharlal Nehru, had said the new Muslim State would inevitably collapse.

But Pakistan was saved from disintegration. It was the well-knit organization of the Muslim League and more particularly the personal prestige of its President which sustained and kept the country united.

According to the British parliamentary pattern, a Governor-General of a Dominion was supposed to be a constitutional head, and the executive power was to be exercised by the Prime Minister and cabinet. But this was not the case in Pakistan. Jinnah, as the "Father of the Nation", controlled the Premier and the cabinet.

Even about a month ahead of the establishment of Pakistan, the Muslim League's newspaper, Dawn, had claimed that no legal or formal limitation on the powers of Governor-General could apply in the case of Jinnah. "His people will not be content to have him as merely the titular head of the Government, they would wish him to be their friend, philosopher, guide and ruler, irrespective of what the constitution of a Dominion of the British Commonwealth may

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contain.\(^1\) The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan immediately adopted a resolution, making official the use of the term "Quaid-i-Azam" (the Great Leader) when making reference to Jinnah.\(^2\) Accordingly he was recognized a figure possessing an absolute authority. By his own order he could amend the existing constitution and amend laws. He took initiative to formulate the State policies, and presided over the regular meetings of the Cabinet as well as over the meetings of its Emergency Committee, of which he was the Chairman. His was the office which corresponded "most closely to that of the Viceroy who had been the real head of the Government of British India."\(^3\) To the masses, his name had become a legend.\(^4\) To them, "no one else, he was Pakistan", and they devoted to him an "adulation amounting almost to worship".\(^5\)

His party, the Muslim League, was also duly

\(^1\)Dawn (Karachi), July 13, 1947.


\(^3\)George M.T. Kahin, op.cit. p. 433.


honored in Pakistan. It had an overwhelming majority in
the Constituent Assembly and all the four Provincial
Assemblies.\(^1\) It was the party of Pakistan, and no other
organization could challenge its authority; all its
domestic foes submitted to its authority.\(^2\) However, the
struggle for power within the Muslim League was an
issue to which little attention was given.

The Council of the All India Muslim League held
its last meeting in December 1947 under Jinnah's presi-
dentship, and decided to transform the All India body
into Pakistan and Hindustan Muslim Leagues. The Pakistan
Muslim League's Council was to be composed of former
members of the All India League Council now resident in
Pakistan.\(^3\) The new constitution of the Pakistan Muslim
League was approved by the League Council in its meeting
in February 1948 with Jinnah presiding.\(^4\) The important
feature of the 1948 League constitution was that it
separated the party and the government. It stipulated
that no member would be eligible to hold an office in
the League if he were a member of either the central or

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\(^1\)George M.T. Kahin, *op.cit.* p. 475.

\(^2\)Ibid. p. 476.

\(^3\)Dawn, December 15, 16, 1947.

\(^4\)Ibid. February 27, 1948.
provincial cabinets. Accordingly, the Governor-General and the Prime Minister resigned from their offices, and Choudhry Khaliquzzaman became Chief Organizer and then President of the League.

Both the appointment of the new head of the League and the party-government separation clause of the constitution proved to be factors weakening the Muslim League. Under Jinnah, the office of the League President was principal source of its strength and importance. This was not the case with the new incumbent. Khaliquzzaman lacked a public personality as well as the gifts of leadership. The office lost its importance and prestige. Likewise, the prohibition against ministers holding League offices created problems. It was difficult for a head of government to carry out the resolutions of the party which was not under his direct control. The problem was also reflected at provincial level. The Punjab League President, M.M. Khan Daultana, was not on good terms with the Chief Minister of Punjab, also a Leaguer. He therefore launched a campaign to break the ministry through various

1Dawn, February 27, 1948.

various means, while the Chief Minister sought to oust his rival from the League presidency. The wranglings between the two Leaguers poisoned the political atmosphere in Punjab, and ultimately resulted in a breakdown of cabinet government and imposition of Governor's rule in January 1949.\(^1\) In Sind, also, the League President and the Chief Minister quarreled, creating a situation similar to that of Punjab.\(^2\)

In the meanwhile Jinnah died in September 1948, and the Chief Minister of East Pakistan, Khwaja Nazimuddin, was commissioned to become the second Governor-General of Pakistan. By the death of Jinnah the nation had lost its Great Leader, the one whose order was obeyed unquestioningly by all. His successors failed to reconcile the contending factions in the provincial Leagues.

In the provinces of North West Frontier and East Pakistan the situation was different, but no less problematic for the League. The Chief Minister of its Frontier Province was accused by an eminent Leaguer, Pir of Manki Sharif, of having monopolized all the League affairs in the province. When he was not heard in the

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\(^2\) Ibid., pp. 378-80.
central League organization, the Pir formed his separate party under the name of 'Awami Muslim League'. The Awami Muslim League was the first opposition party formed by a prominent Muslim Leaguer. In East Pakistan, the younger elements in the League reacted sharply against Choudhry Khaliquzzaman who wanted to perpetuate the old leadership they were anxious to replace. A former President of the Assam Muslim League, Maulana Bhashani, fostered these sentiments by condemning the League for having lost the touch with the people.

Finally, after all the provincial Leagues had been shaken by intrigue and disunity, the League President resigned (August, 1950). Liaqat Ali Khan removed the constitutional barrier, and assumed the presidency of the League. The combination of the premiership with the League presidency made Liaqat Ali a dynamic leader. His decisions were readily approved by the League parliamentary party and the Constituent Assembly. He worked to improve the morale and atmosphere of the League. Suleri's remark that "Liaqat Ali was all in all but the League was nothing"

1. S. Noor Ahmad, op.cit. p. 383.
2. Keith Callard, op.cit. p. 68.
4. Ibid. October 9, 1950.
5. Z.A. Suleri, op.cit. p. 30.
is not based in fact, for Liaqat Ali never ignored the importance of the League. He declared his conviction openly that the existence and strength of the Muslim League was the equivalent of the existence and strength of Pakistan. He affirmed that he had always considered himself as the Premier of the Muslim League, and asserted that "The day I will come to know that the League has no faith and confidence in me, that very day you will not find Liaqat Ali the Prime Minister of Pakistan". He went too far in his support for the League. He developed a firm conviction that opposition to the League was equivalent to treason against Pakistan. Convinced that Pakistan could be sustained only if it was governed by the Muslim League, he made no attempt to remove intriguing Leaguers from provincial offices. The result was inevitable. The central League organization became stable under his leadership, but the provincial machinery became progressively weaker.

A source of grave national conflict was Liaqat Ali's failure to provide the foundation of a constitution for the country. Various factors in Pakistan also hindered his program. There was the religious-political movement of

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1 *Dawn*, October 9, 1950.
Maudoodi which demanded that the Muslims of Pakistan should
be compelled by constitutional provisions to live in
accordance with the teachings of Islam.\(^1\) The League contin-
gent in the Constituent Assembly included several prominent
religious leaders,\(^2\) who had more or less the same view.
Liaqat Ali did not want to go to the extent of religious
compulsion, but neither could he ignore the enthusiasm of
the Islamic divines and their influence over the people.
He was therefore moving slowly to this direction. To
silence the religious-minded he saw through the Constituent
Assembly what came to be known as the Objectives Resolution.
The Resolution begins:

"Whereas sovereignty over the entire Universe
belongs to Allah Almighty alone, and the
authority which He has delegated to the
State of Pakistan through its people for
being exercised within the limits prescribed
by Him is a sacred trust".\(^3\)

The Resolution was accepted without reservation by the
Muslim community. The Constituent Assembly thereupon
appointed a Basic Principles Committee to report on the

\(^1\)S.M. Ikram, *Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan*

\(^2\)Karl von Vorys, *Political Development in Pakistan* (Princeto-

\(^3\)Quoted in Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*
fundamentals of the future constitution. The Committee prepared its report by September 1950, after Liaqat Ali invited suggestions from the public. The suggestions were accumulated by January 1951, and a Sub-Committee appointed to examine them.\(^1\) The leisurely pace which Liaqat Ali had imposed was shattered by his assassination, in October, 1951. The murderer, Syed Akbar, was an Afghan living as a political refugee in Pakistan, and his motive has never been clearly established.

After the assassination of Liaqat Ali, Khwaja Nazimuddin stepped down to take on the Prime Ministership; and the Finance Minister, Ghulam Mohammad, was elevated to the office of Governor-General. Most of other members of the cabinet retained their offices, and a former civil servant, Choudhry Mohammad Ali, was promoted to the Finance portfolio. That the Prime Minister ought to be the President of the Muslim League was now so much taken for granted that Nazimuddin almost automatically became the President of the League.

In the history of the Muslim League's decline, the seventeen months of Nazimuddin's presidency marked the

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first steep fall. An old lieutenant of Jinnah, respected for his piety and integrity, Nazimuddin could not provide the answer to the crisis of leadership created by the death of Liaqat Ali. He lacked a forceful personality and the essential gift for effective leadership. As a President of the Muslim League and head of the Government he was an utter failure. His hold on the Muslim League was as loose as was his control ineffective on the administration. His premiership is shrewdly called to be the "advisers' regime". He was so negligent toward the affairs of the Muslim League that throughout his term of office he did not nominate the League Working Committee. The absence of the League's executive committee further reduced the party's effectiveness. The inactivity of the League was clearly recognized in its Dacca session (October, 1952) where it was resolved that elections to party offices were to be held triennially instead of annually.  

The situation in the provinces was more difficult. Unity of purpose at provincial level was undercut by the President's inability to take prompt decisions. In the

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1 Z.A. Suleri, _op.cit._ pp. 45-46.

2 Ibid. p. 46.

3 Ibid. p. 48.
Frontier Province, conflict arose between the Chief Minister and the Central Parliamentary Board of the League over the provincial elections. The League candidates nominated by the Board were not approved of by the Chief Minister. Repudiating the Board's decision, he nominated his own candidates, and by applying various pressures got them through. The League President expressed no reservations concerning such manipulations. The same process was repeated in the Sind Provincial League, where the Sind League President rebelled against the Central Board's decision, and supported his own nominees in the elections. When Nazimuddin called upon the Sind Provincial Executive Officer to give up his office, his ruling was ignored. In a legal proceeding, a case against the President in the court was based on the claim that Nazimuddin was not constitutionally elected League President and therefore had no jurisdiction over the affairs of the Sind Muslim League. Such wranglings threatened the prestige of the League President and the organization in general.

The language problem in East Pakistan was a great challenge to the Nazimuddin administration. Government

1. S. Noor Ahmad, *op. cit.* p. 400.
2. Ibid., pp. 408-409.
policy from the creation of Pakistan had called for the establishment of Urdu as Pakistan's national language.\textsuperscript{1} East Pakistanis insisted upon the inclusion of Bengali as co-equal to Urdu. This led, in February 1952, to serious rioting, firing by the police and several casualties among student rioters.\textsuperscript{2} The ruling party was considered by the public to be responsible for all the trouble, and it had to pay the price in the coming provincial elections.

\textbf{Worse was to follow in Punjab.} The Mullah's movement 'Khatm-e-Nabuwat' (Finality of Prophethood) stimulated sectarian hostility against the Ahmadis, a heterodox sect in Islam. The Mullahs demanded that the Ahmadis be declared to be a separate non-Muslim community, like the Christians or Parsis. The Nazimuddin Government refused to face the developing crisis until virtual mob rule existed in Punjab;\textsuperscript{3} Only then the Prime Minister agreed to the immediate imposition of martial law in Lahore, and to the dismissal of the provincial Chief Minister.\textsuperscript{4}

The insignificant efforts of the Nazimuddin

\textsuperscript{1}Ian Stephens, \textit{op. cit.} p. 236.
\textsuperscript{2}Karl von Vorys, \textit{op. cit.} p. 76.
\textsuperscript{3}"The Mad Mullahs", \textit{Time}, March 30, 1953, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{4}Dawn, March 9, 1953.
administration in the field of constitution-making could not be expected to restore the prestige of the League Government. The Basic Principles Committee appointed during Liaqat Ali's regime prepared a report for which Nazimuddin obtained approval from the Constituent Assembly. The BPC Report envisaged legislative parity between East and West Pakistan. Neither wing was pleased. The proposal was attacked in East Pakistan as being an insufficient recognition of her importance in terms of her population. In certain sections of West Pakistan, legislative parity was felt to be too generous for East Pakistan. Only the Premier was content over his accomplishment saying that "The greatest crisis facing the country has been overcome".

The air of uncertainty and crisis throughout Pakistan gave an opportunity to the ambitious Governor-General, Ghulam Mohammad, to display his power by ousting the Premier. In a Press communiqué issued on April 17, 1953, Ghulam Mohammad accused the Nazimuddin Government of


being entirely inadequate to grapple with the difficulties, and stated that it was incumbent upon him to "ask the cabinet to relinquish office so that a new cabinet better fitted to discharge its obligations toward Pakistan may be formed". The unconstitutional action of the Governor-General proved to be disastrous for the country's stability as well as for the Muslim League. It is true that the Nazimuddin administration was not able to overcome all of the many problems which it encountered. Nevertheless, Nazimuddin was in command of the Muslim League, and had the backing of the Parliament. He was therefore entitled to remain in office. The Governor-General in disregarding the constitutional limits, thereby thwarted the constitutional role of the Parliament.

The decline of the Muslim League which had begun soon after the creation of Pakistan now entered a phase of rapid disintegration. The political instability that plagued the provinces was now reproduced at the center. Having permitted its President to be dismissed from the Government without the consent of Parliament, the

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1Quoted in Ian Stephens, op.cit. p. 238.
League henceforth became the tool of the administration.

ii. The Muslim League, 1953-58:

After the dismissal of Nazimuddin, the Governor-General immediately installed a new cabinet with Mohammad Ali Bogra as Prime Minister. For five months the Constituent Assembly was not permitted to meet to express its views over the new situation, by which time the new government was well established in office. When at last the Assembly met, "the change of ministry was ancient history, and was not considered worthy of a debate."¹

 Nazimuddin was ousted from the Premiership, but he was still President of the League, and showed his intention of continuing in that capacity.² But he was not supported by other leaders of the League. Six of his ex-cabinet Ministers joined the new Government,³ and three out of four League Chief Ministers of the provinces refused cooperation.⁴ The East Pakistan Muslim League Council pledged its support to the new Prime Minister.⁵ Nazimuddin had no

¹Keith Callard, op.cit. p. 137.
²Dawn, June 15, 1953.
⁴Leonard Binder, op.cit. p. 309.
⁵Ibid. p. 308.
alternative but to resign the presidency of the League. The League Council accepted his resignation, and elected Prime Minister Bogra as the League President by a large majority of votes. Thus the Muslim League accepted the humiliation of its highest officer.

Bogra was the President of the Muslim League by virtue of his being the Prime Minister rather than vice versa. The ruling party was therefore unable to control the policies of the Government. Obviously the League members of the Constituent Assembly supported the Premier under considerations of power politics. The League's central organization became absolutely incapable of regulating its activities. It was almost completely paralysed. This was clearly manifested in the provincial elections in East Pakistan in March, 1954.

The opposition parties of H.S. Suhrawardy and Fazlul Haq (Awami League and Krishak Sramik) together with other small provincial groups organized in East Pakistan what was called the United Front. The Front's raison d'etre was the negative aim of defeating the Muslim League in the elections. The demagogic slogan

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1 The votes were 256 to 36: Dawn, October 21, 1953.
of "Bengal for the Bengalis" was flaunted. The Muslim League, basing a false confidence on its founding role in the Pakistani State, was not worried by the signs of unity among its opponents. As a result of the elections, the League was nearly eliminated from the parliamentary life of East Pakistan. Its share of the 309-member legislature dwindled to only ten seats. The Muslim League's Chief Minister was defeated by a young student candidate. Such a massive rout in a province containing more than half the national population was an irreparable loss to the weak body of the Muslim League.

Reacting to the challenge of organized opposition, the Muslim League moved to resuscitate its organization. In the Constituent Assembly, where it still had an overwhelming majority, the League showed some sign in asserting its rights and powers vis-a-vis the Executive. It repealed the so-called PRODA (Public and Representative Offices Disqualifying Act), and removed the Governor-General's right to dismiss a Prime Minister even though he had the

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1 Ardath W. Burks, *op. cit.* p. 544.
2 Karl von Vorys, *op. cit.* p. 103.
3 S. Noor Ahmad, *op. cit.* p. 414.
4 PRODA was adopted in 1949, and since then it had served as a handle to the Executive to disqualify from public office ministers or politicians.
confidence of the Constituent Assembly. But this move recoiled on the League. Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad favored the ruthless elimination of his opponents, and therefore dissolved the Constituent Assembly (October, 1954). He proclaimed a state of Emergency throughout the country, and asked Bogra to form a new cabinet. By this act Ghulam Mohammad opened "the Pandora's box in which Jinnah had sealed up selfish and corrupt forces". Bogra, the League President and the Premier, became so subservient to the will of the Governor-General that he approved of the dissolution of an Assembly in which his party had overwhelming majority. It was then claimed that the changes were made on the advice of the Premier. He later spoke in support of the Governor-General's action: "The destiny of the country could no longer be left to the caprice of an Assembly .... which was becoming increasingly subject to internal bickerings". Accordingly, he formed a new cabinet representing the major political groups, the business

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2 Dawn, October 24, 25, 1954.
5 Dawn, November 9, 1954.
community, the armed forces, and the civil service. The Muslim League was completely eclipsed.

Bogra's rule can be described as calamitous for the Muslim League. After two and a quarter years of office, the longest tenure except for Liaqat Ali, the country was no nearer a constitution than ever. By any standard, Bogra was nothing more than a puppet of the Governor-General. He was responsible to and removable by the Governor-General, and the League was reduced to a negligible factor in the country's politics.

On November 8, 1954, the President of the dissolved Constituent Assembly, Tamizuddin Khan, filed a petition before the Sind Chief Court at Karachi alleging that the Governor-General's proclamation was ultra vires and void. In its judgment the court unanimously held that the dissolution of the Assembly was a nullity in law. The Governor-General then appealed to the Federal Court. The Federal Court validated the Governor-General's proclamation, but asked that there should be no delay in

1 The Prime Minister described his new cabinet the "Ministry of talent": Dawn, October 31, 1954.
calling the second Constituent Assembly.¹

In pursuance of the Federal Court decision the Governor-General issued a new order which set up the second Constituent Assembly. The Assembly was to have eighty members; of these forty were to be elected by the East Pakistan Provincial Assembly and other forty by the Provincial Assemblies of West Pakistan.²

The Muslim League lost its absolute majority in the second Constituent Assembly; although with twenty-six members in the house of eighty, it was still the largest single party. The initial party composition of the Assembly was as follows:³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim League</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krishak Sramik</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awami League</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress Party</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Party</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheduled caste federation</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some of the figures who had dominated the first Assembly and who took leading parts in the League's movement for

³S. Noor Ahmad, *op. cit.* pp. 432-33.
Pakistan such as Nazimuddin, Abdur Rab Nishter, Qayum Khan, and Akram Khan were not elected to the new Assembly. Choudhry Mohammad Ali was elected as the leader of what remained of the Muslim League in the second Constituent Assembly (August, 1955).  

In the meanwhile, the mental stability of the Governor-General, Ghulam Mohammad, became a matter for speculation. On August 7, 1955, he was compelled to take two months leave for reasons of health, and Iskandar Mirza became Acting Governor-General. Ghulam Mohammad was never to return to his office, and in due course Iskandar Mirza took over as Governor-General. Mohammad Ali Boga ceased to be Prime Minister, and resigned the presidency of the Muslim League; Choudhry Mohammad Ali was commissioned to form a Coalition Government of the Muslim League with Fazlul Haq's Krishak Sramik party (August 11, 1955). Choudhry Mohammad Ali was not a politician by experience or inclination. He did not attach much importance to public opinion. "Skilful in the art of negotiation at the conference table, he found himself a complete stranger on the public platform." Therefore, he

1 Dawna, August 8, 1955.
2 S. Noor Ahmad, op.cit. pp. 434, 436.
4 Mushtaq Ahmad, op.cit. p. 52.
escrowed to assume the office of the President of the Muslim League. The office remained vacant until January 1956, when Abdur Rab Nishtar was elected to it.\(^1\)

The Prime Minister attached an overriding importance to the constitution. His program was simply that "After the Constitution is framed, other tasks will be taken up".\(^2\) The Assembly was kept in almost continuous sessions for six months, and its functions were limited to the making of constitution.\(^3\) Ultimately, his efforts bore fruit. The Constitution was passed on February 29, 1956, and came into force on March 23, 1956.\(^4\) The country was proclaimed to be the "Islamic Republic of Pakistan", and the last Governor-General, Iskandar Mirza, became the first President of the Republic of Pakistan, being elected by the Constituent Assembly.\(^5\)

The country as a whole breathed a sigh of relief that the difficult task of constitution-making had at last

3S. Noor Ahmad, \textit{op. cit.} pp. 437-43.
4Keith Callard, \textit{op. cit.} p. 32.
5George M.T. Kabin, \textit{op. cit.} p. 450.
been completed. But this did not bring a period of tranquility. Nor was the Muslim League credited with the accomplishment.

In the new unit of West Pakistan, cleavage arose between the Muslim League and the Provincial Government. The League had an absolute majority in the Provincial Assembly, but the Chief Ministership had been assigned to Dr. Khan Saheb who was not only a non-Leaguer but was unwilling to become even an associate of the League. The Muslim League formed a provincial parliamentary party, with Sardar Bahadur Khan as leader, to oust the Chief Minister. Khan Saheb countered this move by forming his own Republican Party. By using the powers of his office, Khan Saheb won many Muslim Leaguers over his side. Moreover, the Muslim League Premier at the national level, Choudhry Mohammad Ali, did not seem perturbed by this further evidence of the disintegration of the Muslim League. The Working Committee of the League thereupon urged him to intervene in provincial politics on behalf ...

1 All the nine units in West Pakistan were merged into a single province of West Pakistan (March, 1955): G.W. Choudhury, *op.cit.* pp. 159–60.
3 S. Noor Ahmad, *op.cit.* p. 449.
of the League and recall the West Pakistan Governor for not having appointed the League leader as Chief Minister. He reacted sharply against the Working Committee's demand, making his position clear that as Prime Minister he was not bound by a resolution of any political party. He asserted: "I have to do what I consider to be right under the constitution, and for that I am responsible to the cabinet and to the Parliament." In addition, the Prime Minister's stepmotherly attitude towards his own organization was emphasized by his endorsement of the Khan Saheb Ministry against the League. Obviously, the Muslim League would have been in a better position if its Prime Minister had thrown his weight on the side of his own party. It is alleged that the Prime Minister could not do so, for the Khan Ministry had the covert blessing of President Mirza. Whatever the situation, the Muslim League was weakened previously during the premiership of Choudhry Mohammad Ali.

Choudhry Mohammad Ali's unreadiness to support

1 *Dawn*, April 24, 1956.
2 Quoted in George M.T. Kahin, *op.cit.* p. 479.
the League duly cost him his premiership. The Muslim League, which had retained some life under the presidency of Abdur Rab Nishtar, decided to withdraw its support from the Choudhry Government. Iskandar Mirza urged the Premier to join any other party and retain his office, but Choudhry Mohammad Ali did not agree. He resigned from the premiership and from the membership of the League, accusing the party of undermining his authority.

With the departure of Choudhry Mohammad Ali, a new era of intrigue began in the politics of the nation. H.S. Suhrawardy of the Awami League became Prime Minister (September, 1956). His was the first non-Muslim League Government at the center. In East Pakistan, Ataur Rehman became the Chief Minister of the Awami League Ministry, and the Republicans continued to rule in West Pakistan. The Muslim League, which had enjoyed the monopoly of office in all the provinces until 1954 and dominated the national scene until 1956, was now deprived of both the Central and Provincial Governments.

The Muslim League's history from the time of Suhrawardy's premiership until the imposition of martial law

1 S. Noor Ahmad, op.cit. p. 458.
2 Dawn, September 9, 1956.
(autumn of 1958) is a sorry tale. Its President, Nishtar, was ailing, and could not improve the organization. The League had no say in the Government, nor had it prospects of regaining power. But due to the blessing of President Mirza, it had still one chance to form a Government in the pre-martial law period. Iskandar Mirza, firmly established in his office, constantly experimented with the several political parties, in order to strengthen his own position. At his behest Suhrawardy resigned in October, 1957, and the titular leader of the Muslim League in the Assembly, I.I. Chundrigar, found himself appointed Prime Minister. Mirza remained satisfied with the Chundrigar administration for a period of less than two months, after which the last Government of the Muslim League relinquished office (December, 1957) in favor of the Republicans.¹

On February 14, 1958, the ailing President, Abdur Rab Nishtar, died. The League Council met in March, and selected as successor Miss Fatima Jinnah (sister of the founder of Pakistan, M.A. Jinnah), but she refused to accept the office.² The Council then chose Abdul Qayum Khan as the League President. Qayum Khan proved to be an active

¹S. Noor Ahmad, op.cit. pp. 485-88.
²Ibid. p. 511.
politician. In his frequent press statements, Qayum Khan blamed Mirza for the political corruption and decay. In public speeches Mirza was the target of his criticism. His activities brought a brief recovery of energy in the dying body of the League, but he did not have a chance to go far with his program. Within six months the Muslim League was abolished together with all other political parties by the proclamation of martial law (October, 1958).

The principal causes of the League's constant decline in Pakistan may be seen as follows:

i. The prime cause of the Muslim League's decline can be traced back to the very day of its emergence in 1906. It was a communal organization created to safeguard Muslim interests, and it preserved its communal character until the creation of Pakistan. When Pakistan was achieved the communal instincts of the Leaguers became narrower. The non-League Muslims were condemned as apostates and quislings, and opposition parties were utterly disorganized. The absence of a healthy opposition party created a sort of suffocating sameness in the political atmosphere. The result was that political loyalty gave way to individual

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1 See for instance his speech in *Dawn*, April 14, 1958.
maneuver, and regional and provincial bickerings began to be manifested. The East Pakistanis felt themselves to be neglected and dominated by West Pakistan. Their dissatisfaction in turn produced unfriendly feelings in West Pakistan. This divided the League into contending factions. The ambitious heads of the State took full advantage of the situation, erecting a form of dictatorship in the absence of a well-organized political body. The League was reduced to be the handmaiden of the Government, and the political stability of the country was sabotaged. Thus the communal emphasis upon which the League was based from the time of its creation and which had strengthened it in its struggle for Pakistan, ultimately destroyed the organization.

The lack of an effective leadership was another problem for the Muslim League in the era of Pakistan. Only three months after the creation of Pakistan, control of the League passed from Jinnah's hands to those of Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, who lacked the essential qualities of leadership. Liaquat Ali Khan was the recognized leader of the country, but he gave prime attention to stifling the opposition rather than developing the League's contacts with the masses. The third Muslim League President, Nazimuddin, although a man of integrity and good will lacked
strength, firmness, and force of character. Mohammad Ali Bagra was thrust upon the League by the head of the State, and he was not interested in improving the League's organization. Choudhry Mohammad Ali proved to be fatal for the League; he was content to watch the destruction of his party in West Pakistan. By the time Abdur Rab Nishtar assumed the presidency of the League, the organization had already reached the depth of decay. Moreover, he was aging, ill, and soon he died. The demagogic tactics of Qayum Khan were quickly frustrated by the imposition of martial law. In the absence of effective leadership, the Muslim League was destined to disintegrate.

iii. The electorate of Pakistan, predominantly illiterate, proved to be a major cause for the League's disintegration and the political crisis in Pakistan. The landowners and religious leaders exercised vast political influence over such an electorate, and a palpable obstacle was thereby created to intelligent voting. Thus most of the public representatives were elected on the basis of monetary, religious, or personal influence rather than on principle or the efficacy of the party program. Such a representative in turn was desirous to be always on the winning side in order to fulfill his interests. His
loyalty changed with the change of leadership. The two heads of the State (Ghulam Mohammad and Iskandar Mirza) monopolized power, and made and unmade governments, while the majority of public representatives busied themselves in intrigues.

The conclusion is inevitable. No political party in Pakistan can retain a strong organization until illiteracy is eliminated, unless it has the blessing of the ruler of the State. The Muslim League failed for it had neither attempted to train the people politically, nor had it gained the favor of Ghulam Mohammad and Iskandar Mirza.
Chapter V

CONCLUSION

.....

The Muslim League came into existence as a result of the Islamic influence which had reached the shores of India as early as the seventh century of Christian era and prevailed over its one or the other part for no less than one thousand years. Gradually Muslim rule withered, and by the second half of the nineteenth century it was abolished. After 1857 the Indian Muslims were distrusted by the British rulers for having played a predominant role in the mutiny, and were looked down upon by the Hindus as fallen tyrants. The future looked bleak for, minority community, outnumbered three to one by the Hindus. The Muslim intelligentsia realized the threat, and initiated the first organized political move with the establishment of the Muslim League in December, 1906.

The Muslim League was a communal organization. It did not appreciate the nationalist enthusiasm of the
Indian National Congress which was overwhelmingly a Hindu body. The League distrusted the Congress claim to be working toward secular equality among the Indians. It argued that the nationalist theory of the Congress Party was bound to bestow advantages on the majority community, i.e. the Hindus. Gradually the negative attitude of League was supplant by ideas of Muslim nationalism. The Muslim League then began working for recognition of the special claims of the Islamic community. These ideas inevitably led to the demand for the establishment of an Islamic State.

In the critical seven years before independence, the talent and genius of the League's leadership were at their highest stages. The Muslim masses rallied behind the League's program with such ardor that the League President was virtually given a blank check. No other Muslim group could supplant the League, nor could any other Muslim political party produce a leader to supersede Jinnah. With such strong backing, the Muslim League refused to recognize the authority of either the British Government or the Congress Party to determine the future of the Muslims. Through its obdurate stand the Muslim League made the vision of
Muslim State into a reality.

After the creation of Pakistan, the Muslim League underwent a metamorphosis. In pre-partition India, the League was a party of the minority community fighting with the Congress and the British over its demand for Pakistan. In Pakistan, the Muslim League was the logical organization to take up the reins of the State. Its supremacy was practically undisputed. To oppose the League was considered tantamount to opposition to Pakistan and therefore an act of treason. In such an air of tranquility, the Muslim League lived on its past record instead of developing its contacts with the masses. This trend in time destroyed the League organization.

Significance of the Muslim League

The Muslim League's significance lay in its following major achievements:

i. The greatest achievement of the Muslim League is that it provided the Indian Muslim community the clear concept of nationality. It inculcated in the Muslim mind that the Muslim minority of India was a separate nation co-existing with the Hindu domination. The ideology was
first put forward by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, but it attracted little attention until the League was formed as a parallel organization to the Congress. No nationalist ideology can afford to permit a religious minority to claim status as a separate nation. The Muslim League was unique in that it held up the banner of Muslim nationalism within Indian nationalism. The best that could be offered to the Muslims in an independent secular state of united India would have been the status of a mere religious minority. It would be inevitable for such a state to evolve a predominantly Hindu cultural sense and tradition in view of their numerical majority. Indian national unity would thus have gradually eliminated the legacy of one thousand years of Muslim rule in India. Thus the real significance of the Muslim League lay in its propagation of two-nation theory through which it created the largest Muslim State in the world.

ii. The Muslim League contributed considerably to the cause of Indian independence and democracy. As early as 1913, the League had self-rule for India as its goal. Under Jinnah's leadership, the League always pressured the British to grant full independence to India
with prior settlement of the Hindu-Muslim problem. During 1942–45, when the Congress Party was outlawed and its leaders imprisoned, the League continued the struggle for independence. It was at that time that Jinnah coined his new watchword 'Divide and Quit' for the British. Thus it paved the way for an early independence of India. Moreover, by opposing the Congress Party, the Muslim League created an atmosphere of political activism and democratic practice in the subcontinent. Before the Muslim League returned as strong political party against the Congress, the Indian political situation tended toward the one-party system.

iii. The last, but not the least, meritorious achievement of the League is that it sustained the new-made State of Pakistan despite its chaotic beginnings. To sustain Pakistan in the early days was not an easy task. Pakistan was a fragile entity. All the centers of government and trade in British India were inherited by the new Dominion of India. The Dominion of Pakistan got almost all the weaknesses of the division; it was weak in resources and industrial installations. Its boundaries were an invitation to
disaster. The riots in Punjab at the time of partition, and the influx of millions of refugees almost destroyed Pakistan's infant economy and created a great crisis. There was no organized nucleus in the new-born State around which a government could be built. Even ordinary but most essential items such as telephones, typewriters, files, and paper were not available. The Government had to bring order out of utter politico-economic chaos, religious strife, and civil disorder. In such a disturbed situation, nothing less than a party with elevated faith, unity, and discipline could sustain the State. This was the Muslim League. With its unshakeable faith in Pakistan, the League held Pakistan together in the fateful early months.
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