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**THE BAGHDAD PACT AND ITS EFFECT ON
THE ARAB STATES**

ELIAS F. HAJJ

1967

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AND ITS EFFECT ON THE ARAB STATES

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR
THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER
OF ARTS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL
STUDIES AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT
BEIRUT , LEBANON
FEBRUARY , 1967

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A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S

The thesis topic was first suggested to me by professor Fayez A. Sayegh, and it was subsequently written under his supervision. I owe him a debt of gratitude for his advice, criticism and patience, which he offered with great generosity. I wish also to extend my deep gratitude to those whom I interviewed, namely : Ex-Iraqi foreign minister, Hashim Jawad, ex-Lebanese president of the Republic, Camille Chamoun, ex-Lebanese premier, Saeb Salam, ex-Lebanese premier, Sami as-Solh, president of the Kataeb (phalanges) Party, Pierre Jumayyel, ex-Lebanese deputy, Mirna Bustan al Khazin, ex-Syrian foreign minister and ex-leader of the Ba'ath Party, Salah Al Deen Al Bitar, and ex-Syria deputy Abdul Kareem Dandashi.

Also I wish to give my thank to Miss Lynda Sadaka and Miss Evelene Zakharyya of the A.U.B. Library for the great help they offered me during my research.

Finally, I would like to add, that I alone am responsible for any shortcomings and defects in this thesis.

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FEBRUARY, 1967

F O R E W O R D

After the second world war, America and the Soviet Union emerged as the two super powers. Yet even these powers, like the secondary powers, such as Britain and France, began to recognize that "interdependence" was a relationship just as necessary for the biggest powers as for the smaller ones. The illusion of self-sufficiency was over. At least considerations of defense in the early 1950's made alliances an absolute necessity.

Traditional British policy had required that the Middle East must never be dominated by a potentially hostile power. This policy applied as much to a power within the area as to an external power. In the Middle and late 1950's, President Nasser of Egypt seemed to play that role. But Britain was no longer able to prevent such a prospect by her own unaided resources. Britain needed allies anywhere, as well as in the Middle East, especially after the Soviet Union's gradual emergence as a Middle Eastern power increased that need in 1955.

To the British, defense always meant, primarily, the defense of trade. The paramount and crucial trade in the Middle East, for Britain, is oil. To the Americans,

defense meant world-wide defense against the global threat to communist aggression.

The Baghdad Pact was intended for a dual purpose: as a military weapon against the Soviet Union and as a political instrument of western (primarily British) and Iraqi power in the Arab World. The effectiveness of its first role has yet to be tested, but its ~~second~~ was seen to be a failure almost before it was signed.

The Baghdad Pact was the first - and only - western defensive alliance to be implemented in the Middle East after the Second World War. It had a profound effect on every level of Arab politics. The pact was concluded on February 24, 1955, in Baghdad. The members of the pact came eventually to be Iraq, Britain, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran; the United States, who became a member of all the committees of the pact, refused to be an official member in its council.

The author has limited the scope of this work to a description of the pact's effect on the Arab States, and on inter-Arab relations. The military aims of the pact and their consequent effects have been excluded from our analysis. In a further effort to limit the scope of this study, the author

has dealt only with the pact's effect on Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq from 1955 to 1958. The remaining Arab States were excluded from this study, mainly because they were not independent at the time of the signature of the pact, or because they were somewhat aloof from the main stream of Arab life.

The purpose of this study is to describe, only, the major and general trends, effects, attitudes, and policies of the Arab States, which had a direct relation to, or were a consequence of, the Baghdad Pact. In order to present a full picture of the pact's effects, it has been necessary to touch briefly and intermitently on Eastern and western policies in relation to the Baghdad Pact controversy. Also, it has been deemed relevant to describe the internal policies and attitudes of certain Arab states which had a major bearing on the position of the pact.

The western powers, mainly Britain, were the sponsors of the Baghdad Pact. Hence, it is necessary to give a brief account of British interests in the Middle East - which Britain aimed to preserve and defend through the Baghdad Pact - as well as British policies towards the Arab area. An account is also given of the American interests and policies

in the Middle East, since ultimately the United States became a member of all the Baghdad Pact committees. At the same time, it was judged necessary to depict the Soviet attitudes and policies towards the Middle East, for it was against the Soviet Union that the pact was initiated. To know the policies of the Arab states towards foreign pacts in general, it is necessary to record the ideology of Arab Nationalism in its two forms: Dynamic Arab Nationalism, which advocates absolute liberation from foreign domination in all its forms, and a neutral or non-aligned policy in the cold war between East and West; and Conservative Arab Nationalism, which advocates participation in the cold war on the side of the west, and accepts to adhere to western alliances to share in the responsibility of defense. All these introductory topics are covered in Chapter I.

Chapter II is concerned with describing the different Middle Eastern Pacts that preceeded the Baghdad Pact. The immediate background and preliminary steps of the Baghdad Pact are covered in Chapter III.

Chapters IV, V and VI are devoted to the description of the profound effect of the Baghdad Pact on the Arab States. Chapter VII is devoted to the political and non-political factors

which led to the decline of the Baghdad Pact. The closing chapter contains some of the author's conclusions.

Hopes that the Baghdad Pact would be a rallying point for other Middle East nations were soon dashed by the creation of the "Southern Tier" military alliance among Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen with the support of Soviet Russia and in direct opposition to the Baghdad Pact. Egypt also played a vigorous and paramount role in discouraging other Arab countries from joining the Baghdad Pact. It succeeded completely in isolating the Iraqi regime which sponsored the pact, and in bringing about its ultimate collapse. On the other hand, Egypt could not rally the majority of the Arab states to its new Arab alliance *as a substitute for* the Baghdad Pact. Hence, Egypt's role was decisive from the negative point of view and not from the positive.

This study has been based on current official documents and secondary sources. Secret documents and other primary sources are still in the secret archives of the governments concerned. Lack of information in certain aspects of this topic due to its contemporary nature, forced the author to rely heavily on the few sources available.

In an effort to supplement the published data, the author has held interviews with some diplomats and political leaders. His overall impression, resulting from these interviews, is that many of those leaders are still unwilling to reveal their information on the Baghdad Pact; in many cases it was apparent that they were giving contradictory statements.

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

To put the Baghdad pact in the right political context of the Middle East it is relevant to give a general survey of the different policies and interests of the western powers who proposed and were interested in the aims of such pacts. The word "west" is used in this context to designate mainly two western powers - namely America and Britain. The interests and policies of France are not surveyed, because she did not play a role in establishing these military pacts in the Middle East - such as the Baghdad pact -. On the contrary she played a negative role when she opposed the initiation of the Baghdad pact to maintain her national interests.

Britain which had well entrenched economic, strategic and political interests in the Middle East, aimed at preserving them by different means in different circumstances. So Britain, in the early 1950's, played a major role in initiating and later becoming a member of the Baghdad pact, as a new means to maintain these interests.

Thus the British interests are surveyed to show the need of the proposed Baghdad pact whose practical aim was to preserve these interests.

The various interests and policies of America which were growing, at the time, are to be surveyed as well, to show to what degree these interests were vital. In the meantime, was it necessary for America to work laboriously, sometimes in collaboration with Britain, to initiate collective military pacts to preserve and enlarge her interests.

On the other side, the different policies and interests of the Soviet Union towards the Middle East are to be surveyed, against whom the Baghdad pact was directed, to prevent her from achieving or implementing these policies and interests.

Since the Baghdad pact aimed at securing Arab allegiance, Arab policies and interests are also surveyed to show, the degree of their compatibility with both the western policies and interests as well as those of the Soviet Union in the Middle East.

A. BRITISH POLICIES AND INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Britain has maintained a position of supremacy in the Middle East for 150 years. During this period she

managed successfully to frustrate all French, German, and Russian efforts to dominate the area. Hence a "cold war" with Russia lasted over one hundred years during which Britain stopped the Russians from achieving their objective of having an access to the 'hot waters' through the Turkish Straits.¹

At the beginning of this century Britain did not separate commercial interests, imperial defense from the problems of internal stability within the Arab area. In other words the British attitude was to adjust the Arab region to the world-wide interests of Britain instead of Britain adapting her policy to the region.²

The British have fought many wars and become deeply involved in the affairs of the Arab regions because of the tremendous national interests that have developed there.³ Why did Britain have so strong an interest in the Middle East ? Does this interest still exist ?

¹George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, (New York: Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 517.

²William Retizel, The Mediterranean; Its Role in American Foreign Policy, (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1948), p. 5-6 .

³Royal Institute of International Affairs, United Kingdom Policy, (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 9 .

British interests can be discussed under two broad headings, economic and politico-strategic. The first covers the degree to which the British economy is dependent on the Middle East. The second covers the political interests and treaties with the strategic factors necessary for its protection.

The paramount British economic interest is oil. The supply of oil from the states on the borders of the Persian Gulf is essential both to the economy of Britain and to her security.⁴ There are other sources of oil which would meet Britain's need, but they could be available only for short periods, and perhaps on conditions which would make their use undesirable.⁵ As compared with Middle Eastern sources of oil supply, they demand dollar expenditures. In a world crisis they might meet Britain's needs up to eighteen months, but at a great cost, otherwise there is no alternative to relying on the Middle East.⁶

⁴John Marlowe, Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism, (London: The Cresset Press, 1961), p.100.

⁵Hoskins L. Halford, "Needed: A strategy for oil", Foreign Affairs, vol. 29, (January, 1951), p. 236.

⁶R.I.I.A., British Interests in the Middle East, (London, Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 26; see also John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p.116, 120.

Moreover, the earnings from the production, transport, and sale of Middle Eastern oil in Europe and elsewhere are an important factor in the British balance of payments and in the gold and dollar earnings of the sterling area. If the sterling area cannot be maintained, the United Kingdom cannot survive. Approximately 600 million dollars come annually to Britain from the Persian Gulf and here lies the vital interest of Great Britain in the area.⁷ The following results of a study give a clear picture of the British oil interests in the Middle East. A study was made by the oil companies to show the profits of the money invested in the oil industry of the Arab world. The results were that the pure profits were 66% on the money invested after the producing governments had taken their shares. The profit had reached 150% as in Qatar, while the profits that were taken from the money invested in the oil industry in Europe did not exceed 6.9%. Another study that was made by American Banks on 2,000 companies that are in different fields of industry in Europe, showed that the average or pure medium

⁷Harry F. Keen, "The Cold War Moves South", Tensions in the Middle East, (ed. William Sands), Middle East Institute, (Washington, D.C., 1956), pp. 2-4.

profit of the money invested in those companies did not exceed 11,5%.⁸

The political position of Britain in the Arab Middle East is much weaker than it used to be, and indeed has been diminishing at the same time as the economic interests have been growing. However, these economic interests may oblige the British to remain politically involved and to try to retain certain political and strategic interests which have grown over the years.

Moreover, Britain has agreements to protect the Sheikhs of the Aden protectorate, and those of Kuwait⁹ in the years (1899 - 1914), Bahrain (1861 and 1892), Qatar (1916), and the Trucial Coast (1892). She also maintains special treaty relations (1891) with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. The contents of these agreements in each case are very much the same. In return for British protection, Arab signatories agree not to enter into any agreements or correspondence with any other power, not to admit agents of any other power, and not to cede, mortgage, sell or

⁸Abdullah Tariqi, "Nationalization of Oil Industry is a National Necessity", Journal of Arab Culture, (Beirut: Arab Cultural Club of Beirut, March 1965), pp. 31-32.

⁹Kuwait became independent in 1961.

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⁸Abdullah Tariki, "Nationalization of Oil Industry is a National Necessity", Journal of Arab Culture, (Beirut: Arab Cultural Club of Beirut, March 1965), pp. 31-32.

⁹Kuwait became independent in 1961.

"otherwise give for occupation" any part of their territories to any power other than Britain , except with British permission. None of these agreements covers interventions in internal affairs, except by invitation.¹⁰

The strategic importance of the Middle East is vital to Britain as well as the west. On October 8, 1951 President Eisenhower (then General) said: "So far as the sheer value of territory is concerned, there is no more strategically important area than the Middle East." The west looks at the geographical location of the Middle East in the light of its proximity to the Soviet Union and having common frontiers with her. Also, the Middle East is a land bridge linking the continents of Europe, Asia and Africa. Its position is also important in the present East-west conflict as a barrier between the two major blocs of the world. Further, it is^a central, where international land, sea and air route pass.¹¹

Thus we recognize that Britain still has a real and deep interest in the security of the whole Middle East from domination by any hostile power. The different factors

¹⁰R.I.I.A., British Interests in the Middle East, p.31.

¹¹Henry A. Byroade, "U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East", The Department of State Bulletin , vol. 27, (December 15, 1952), pp. 931 - 932.

may have shifted, but taken together they still have a compelling force. The difficulty is to develop enough strength - in the British view - in the Middle East to render it secure. The British think that the states which make up the Middle East are weak and of doubtful stability, and hence it is unlikely that they could guarantee their own security. An outside strengthening is necessary. Up to 1956 this had come from the United Kingdom which maintained a strong base on the Suez Canal.¹²

B. THE AMERICAN POLICIES and INTERESTS in the MIDDLE EAST.

The American government until the First World War had neither a policy nor any stand toward the Middle East as well as toward other parts of the world (other than the western hemisphere). America had only cultural interests in the Arab area; and hence its diplomacy was mainly concerned with the protection of American citizens and of their right to preach, to teach, and to trade. Between the two world wars, American interests were mainly concerned with getting oil concessions.¹³ Americans were able to get exclusive

¹²R.I.I.A., British Interests in the Middle East, pp. 52 - 53.

¹³Ephraim A. Speiser, The United States and the Near East, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 240 - 241.

concessions in Bahrein and Saudi Arabia and a share in the oil industry in Iraq and Kuwait. Of course America had in mind the depletion of its oil wells and had to seek foreign wells outside any foreign control. Thus, the United States was gradually becoming more deeply involved in the affairs of the Arab East as private companies expanded their oil holdings.¹⁴

It was the second world war which brought the Middle East into the orbit of American national interests. In 1941, President Roosevelt had declared that "the defense of Turkey was vital to the defense of the United States" and later, in 1943, expressed America's "desire for maintaining the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran". During the second world war the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other government agencies in America became alarmed in 1943 at the drain on America's domestic oil reserves. They proposed a new policy part of which included the buying of privately-held concessions in the Arab East by the government. The Department of State opposed this view stating: "such a step might incline the American government to shape its

¹⁴Zeine, Zeine N., "From Palmerston to Eisenhower", one Hundred years of the Eastern Question, Middle East Forum, (Beirut: July, 1957), pp. 10 - 11; and Ephram Speiser, The United States and the Near East, p. 82, 242.

decisions on Middle East affairs on wrong grounds." However, as a result of the discussions held, a new strategic interest was taken in the oil of the Arab East and came to be considered as a factor in the security of the United States.¹⁵ Perhaps the first indication of any real American interest in the Middle East came with President Roosevelt's meeting with Arab leaders in February 1945.¹⁶

After the second world war, Anglo-American relations -namely in the Middle East - were predominantly characterized by their rivalry, since no joint policies had been worked out beyond the immediate problems of war. So the increase of American interest in the Middle East had, as a consequence, certain frictions with well-established British policies and interests: As in the matter of Jewish immigration into Palestine, in competition for influence in Saudi Arabia, and in the question of oil concessions. But the issues of rivalry became insignificant (in the British and American views) in the face of the increasing Soviet challenge to the vital interests of both powers.¹⁷

¹⁵William Retizel, The Mediterranean; its role in American Foreign Policy, pp. 117 - 118.

¹⁶Ephram A. Speiser, The United States and the Near East, p. 243.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 243.

The Soviet threat to American and British interests in the Middle East really began in the beginning of 1945 when the Soviet Union terminated its treaty of 1925 with Turkey and made material demands for bases on the straits and for certain parts of Turkey's territory. Also, there was the experience of the Soviet troops which ^{were} kept in Iran to support the "democratic national autonomous government in Azerbaijan" in 1945; and which threatened the integrity of Iran as an independent state. Hence, from 1946 on, America began to pursue an increasingly firm stand against Soviet attempts to penetrate the Middle East.¹⁸ In this, she shared the British attempts to stop a Soviet "thrust across the throat" of the British Empire. On the other hand, America's Middle Eastern policy began to be shaped distinctly from British policy within the context of global relations with the Soviet Union - to face Soviet encroachment in Europe, the Far and the Middle East. American firmness against Soviet attempts to penetrate the Middle East was also based on the conviction that Soviet manoeuvring in Greece, Turkey, and Iran was an attempt - as ex-Secretary Acheson said - to penetrate and get control of those countries - and when these countries lose their independence then the

¹⁸. The Secretariat of the Baghdad pact, The Baghdad Pact, (Great Britain: John Wright & Sons Ltd., 1957), p.7

Soviets will push to those that lie beyond. Hence the west should try to keep those three countries out of Soviet hands, or be prepared to accept the subsequent loss of the strategic bases, lines of communications and resources of the Middle East.¹⁹

Another factor which was behind the American attitude, was the progressive decline of British strength in the Arab World which forced America to consider the organization of joint defense. The result was that America began to face a difficulty in reconciling her policies with those of Britain and her traditionally sympathetic attitude towards Middle Eastern Nationalism.²⁰

The approach of America, to the Palestine problem, had differed from that of the British. The primary motive of the British was to safeguard its relations with the Arab World and implement their legal obligations - under the mandate - and their official obligations - Balfour Declaration, November 2, 1917 - to create a National Home for the Jews in Palestine. While the American involvement in the Palestine problem began

¹⁹ John Campbell, Defense of the Middle East, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), p. 12.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 12-13.

with the periodic presidential statements urging the admission of more Jews to Palestine and private aid to immigration. Moreover, when America took part in the numerous commissions on Palestine, she missed all real responsibility. Afterwards, America took a leading role in drafting the partition resolution in the General Assembly in November, 1947, but she refused to contribute any forces to make this resolution applicable.²¹ When the British announced that they were going to withdraw from Palestine, America handed a proposal for an international trusteeship for Palestine. When this proposal failed the American government recognized the establishment, de facto, of the new state of Israel on May 14, 1948, a few minutes after it was proclaimed. Hence she became forever entangled in the complexities of Arab East politics.²²

As a result of the Arab-Jewish War the state of Israel was created much larger than that of the United Nations resolution. In addition, there was the frustration of Arab hopes and a lasting bitter attitude created not only toward Israel but also towards the powers the Arabs held responsible for their "Spoilation", humiliation and defeat ²³ (namely Britain and America).

²¹ Ibid., p. 37.

²² Zeine, Zeine N., "From Palmerston to Eisenhower", p.11

²³ John Campbell, Defense of the Middle East, p. 37.

There is no doubt that the west is still determined - in spite of the illegality of Israel's existence in Arab eyes - to continue to safeguard Israel's existence, to attempt to find a peaceful solution to the Arab - Israeli dispute. It seems that Mr. Dulles and others believed this to be possible, for on February 6, 1956, in reply to a letter from members of the House of Representatives, Mr. Dulles said:

" Let me say that the foreign policy of the United States embraces the preservation of the state of Israel. It also embraces the principle of maintaining our friendship with Israel and the Arab States."²⁴

As a conclusion, we could sum up the western interests and policies - as represented by America and Britain - towards the Middle East. First, the West's most vital interest in the Middle East is to obtain oil under fair commercial conditions; and then to bring it to Europe by the cheapest and safest route.²⁵ Secondly, the west desires and encourages mutual friendship among the states of the area, and in general welcomes any development which would make for social and political

²⁴ Council on Foreign Relations, Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1956 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 273.

²⁵ R.I.I. A., British Interests in the Middle East, p. 35.

stability;²⁶ for a politically explosive Middle East would invite Soviet aggression or interference. The third objective - mainly British - is to keep open trade and other communications to the countries East of Suez.²⁷ Fourthly, the west seeks to maintain and strengthen the democratic pattern and principles, which it advocates. However, it is not necessary to adopt the same pattern as in the west. The Middle Eastern countries may adopt a developed form of western Democracy to suit their needs. A fifth aim of the west is the encouragement of regional defense arrangements, as a check to aggression from the Soviet Union. 29

Thus we see that the west has vital interests in the Middle East and is seeking in various policies and means to achieve and preserve these interests in various circumstances.

²⁶ Henry A. Byroade, "The Middle East in New perspective", The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 30, (April 26, 1954), p.629.

²⁷ British Information Service, London, Reference Division, "Notes on Britain and the Middle East, Quote No. R. 2924. September 17, 1954, p. 1.

²⁸ Henry A. Byroode "The Middle East in New Perspective", p. 629.

²⁹ Sir Charles Webster, et.al., United Kingdom Policy, Foreign, Strategic, Economic, (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950), pp. 52-53

The latest means proposed by the west was a collective defensive military pact - namely the Baghdad Pact - directed against the Soviet Union to prevent her from uprooting western interests or from implementing her interests and policies in the Middle East.

C. SOVIET INTERESTS AND POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The history of Tsarist Russia, since 1552, is marked by consistent efforts to find a warm-water port, particularly on the mediterranean.³⁰ Historically, the strategic aims of Russian interests were the following: control of the Turkish Straits, an expansionist tide toward India and the Persian Gulf region, and establishment of power in the Balkans. Russia was forced by Britain to accept control over the northern and adjacent parts of the Middle East area and prevented from interfering with western influences and interests in the main Arab Zones.³¹ The penetration of the Middle East also stood high on the list of Soviet priorities.

³⁰ Ismail Ege, "The Extent and Significance of Soviet penetration in the Middle East", New LOOK at the Middle East, Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1957, p. 12.

³¹ Colonel S. G. Taxis, "Middle East Responsibility toward Regional and World Security", The Evolution of Public Responsibility in the Middle East, Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1955, p. 35.

Only since the Czechoslovakian-Egyptian arms deal has the Soviet penetration realized.³²

Since the Communist Revolution of 1917, the Soviet aims (and consequently their interests) have followed the dialectics, namely that of constant change involving inconsistency depending on the expediency of circumstances. Aside from this fact, it was certain that there was a broad general line of policy which was concerned with the Middle East.³³

The first period after the Revolution was characterized by the public repudiation of the old Russian imperialism. Also they issued a call for a revolt of the 'Mohammedan toilers of the East' against western imperialist oppressors and local pashas. In 1920, at the same time when the leaders of the Comintern were calling the 'peoples of the East' to a holy proletarian war at the Baku Congress, Lenin and Chicherin were coming to terms with non-communist governments and national movements on the southern frontiers of Soviet Russia. Soon after Mustafa Kemal took over in Turkey, contacts were

³²Carol A. Fisher, Fred Krinsky, Middle East in Crisis, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1959), p. 32.

³³Ibid., pp. 32 - 33.

established with the Soviet government.

The result of their close cooperation culminated in a treaty of friendship in March, 1921.³⁴ On the other hand, the Soviets concluded a treaty with Iran by which they withdrew their forces from northern areas leaving the 'Soviet Republic of Gilan' and the separatist movements in Azerbaijan to be suppressed by the Iranian government.³⁵

Throughout the interwar period the comintern did its best to build up an apparatus of subversion within the countries of the Middle East. In the 1930's, at the same time when communist propaganda was denouncing the anti - communist governments of Ataturk and Reza Shah of Iran along with the 'western imperialists', the official Soviet policy was peaceful coexistence. This policy was followed by treaties with Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan to face the danger of Hitler.³⁶ Meanwhile, certain multilateral regional

³⁴Walter Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959), pp. 25-26.

³⁵The Secretariat of the Baghdad pact, The Baghdad Pact, p.7; for the contradictory views about the end of the Gilan government see Walter Laquer, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, pp. 29-32.

³⁶John Campbell, Defense of the Middle East, pp. 20-21.

defense arrangements were concluded on the initiative of local governments and not including the Soviet Union. These were the Balkan pact of 1934 (Yugoslavia, Rumania, Greece and Turkey) and the Middle East or Sa'adabad pact of 1937 (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan). The Soviets did not object to these pacts since they were preaching Collective Security against the Nazis and the Fascists.³⁷

In the period of the years 1939 - 1941 and after Stalin's conviction of the weakness of Collective Security, he tried to use his bargaining power position as a non-belligerent to check and limit German advance through the Balkans to the Middle East. Moreover, he tried to establish Soviet predominance in Turkey, and to prevent the western powers from using their position in the Middle East for an attack on the Soviet Union.³⁸ Stalin and Molotov showed interest in Hitler's proposal that the area "south of the national territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean" should be Soviet sphere of influence.³⁹

³⁷Ibid., p. 21.

³⁸Alvin Rubinstein, edi, The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, (New York: Random House, 1960), pp. 86-87.

³⁹The Secretariat of the Baghdad Pact, The Baghdad Pact, pp. 7-8.

However, the Soviet Union made a counter-proposal to Germany, because of its fears that if Germany controlled either the Balkans or Turkey then its position in the Middle East or even its security would be endangered. The Soviet counter-proposal specified the conclusion of an alliance between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria and a Soviet land and naval base in the Turkish Straits, in addition to recognition of "the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf as the center of aspirations of the Soviet Union".⁴⁰ Since the clashes of interest were clear the German decision for war against the Soviet Union was not delayed.

Almost immediately following the conclusion of the Second World War the Soviet Union set her previous designs towards the Middle East. This was clear in the demands that Stalin had put forward in his negotiations with his western allies with respect to Turkey and the Straits.⁴¹ However, since Stalin's death, the Soviets have assured Turkey

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 8

⁴¹Robert Rossow, Jr., "The Battle of Azerbaijan, 1946", The Middle East Journal, vol. X, No.1, (Washington, D.C., : Winter, 1946), pp. 17-32.

that they believe the question of defense can be settled on mutually satisfactory terms. They also state that they have no claims on Turkey. The Turks, aroused by Soviet pressure, first looked to the Arab world for support. Iraq and Turkey signed a pact of mutual assistance on the question of maintaining order on March 29, 1946, designed to prevent further communist encroachment.⁴²

The Arab-Israeli wars of 1947 - 1948 provided the Soviets with another opportunity to participate directly in the affairs of the Middle East. Previously, the Soviets had backed Arab claims in Palestine and outwardly denounced the Zionists. When the Jewish State was proclaimed in 1948, the Soviet Union completely reversed its policy and immediately gave recognition to the New state.⁴³ Thus the Soviet attempts to extend its influence in the Middle East began increasing after the Second World War. But in the period of 1935 and 1945 the ground was laid for the great Soviet and communist successes of the Middle fifties. ⁴⁴

⁴²Ephram A. Speiser, The United States and the Near East, p. 118.

⁴³David J., Dallin, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East", p. 337-344, Middle Eastern Affairs, November, 1955, from the Middle East in the Cold War, (ed. Grant S. McClellan), H.W. Wilson Company, New York, 1956.

Generally and in brief, we can say that the Soviet policy in the Middle East is motivated by three main objectives: First, the Soviet Union seeks to hinder any designs aiming at making the Middle East a major base, from which hostile attacks against her may be launched.⁴⁵ Thus the Soviet Union attempts to weaken and impair the western influence in the Middle East. The Soviets also attempt to back local communist movements in various countries, in the hope that such movements will take part in the revolutionary changes that will throw such countries into the communist bloc.⁴⁶ Since the Middle East is a major scene of social change it is one of the best targets for such communist attempts. Secondly, the Soviet Union is interested in denying the oil of the Middle East to the western powers. Thirdly, the Soviet Union has always sought and is still seeking an access to the Indian Ocean and to the Mediterranean Sea.⁴⁷

⁴⁵Jon Kimche, "Russia and the Middle East", The Nineteenth Century and After, vol. 143, (April, 1948), pp. 199-200.

⁴⁶Richard N. Frye, ed., The Near East and the Great Powers, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 39-40.

⁴⁷Jon Kimche, The Nineteenth Century and After, 143: 199-200, April, 1948.

Thus we see that the Soviet Union has real and vital interests in the Middle East which oppose those of the west, creating a state of clashing interests. That is why the Soviet Union fought the Baghdad Pact ferociously which was initiated by the west as a means to hinder and impair the implementation of Soviet interests in the Middle East.

D. ARAB INTERESTS AND THEIR CONCEPT OF SECURITY FOR THE ARAB EAST.

In this section we are going to discuss generally and briefly the Arab points of view and desires as well as their concept of security for the Arab East.

The Arabs have remained under one sort of foreign control or another since their domination by the Ottoman Empire in the early part of the sixteenth century. Even after the end of World War I when the Ottoman power collapsed, foreign influence and rule remained in the newly-created sovereignties. Only since World War II, has any real formal independence been experienced in the greater part of the Arab East. Then, naturally the Arabs have come to cherish this independence and guard against intrusions on it. However, independence has not been gained for all Arab

peoples, as those of the Persian Gulf and the South Arabian Coast are still under British control. Hence, as a matter of principle and sympathy, the Arabs of independent states strongly support the cause of these brother Arabs who remain struggling for freedom and sovereignty.

Thus the principle interest prevailing among the Arabs is to protect and maintain their independence and sovereignty.⁴⁸

Although the Arabs remained 400 years under Ottoman domination, they preserved a sense of community and shared a common past of which they are proud. Arab society and character were developed due to the binding ties of a single language and religious bonds. The Arabs, throughout history, have resisted external pressures and disintegration, because of these factors, and maintained their identity as an Arab nation.⁴⁹ The present political divisions which

⁴⁸ Gamal Abdul Nasser's interview with the British Manchester Guardian in AN Nahar, Beirut, July 20, 1966.

⁴⁹ Cecil, A., Hourani, "The Arab League in perspective", p. 128, Middle East Journal, vol. I, no.2, 1947.

exist in the Arab world should not deceive non-Arabs in the underlying cultural and psychological unity of the area as a whole.

Real attempts and movements working for achieving the unity of the Arab world began by the end of the First World War. The Arab national movement came into being after the First World War. Professor Fayez Sayegh in his book, says that as it came into its own, the Arab National movement was animated by three urges: for emancipation from foreign domination, for socio-economic development, and for political unification. The corresponding ideas of independence, progress, and unity jointly became the principal components of the total concept of Arab Nationalism.⁵⁰

Arab nationalists rarely disagreed on the goals of Arab nationalism while they were in the process of pursuing these goals. Later, opposing factions emerged when parts of these objectives were achieved. As a consequence the "Great Debate" emerged to include the three objectives of the Arab

⁵⁰Fayez, A. Sayegh, Arab Unity, (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1958), pp. 5-7; for similar ideas, Gamal Abdul Nasser, Egypt's Liberation, the philosophy of the Revolution, (Washington, D.C., : Public Affairs Press, 1955), pp. 39-40.

national movement, namely, independence, unity and progress.⁵¹

The Great Debate goes on today between two schools of thought. On the one hand are those who stand for the acceptance of the status quo. These adopt the attitude and belief that since Arab nationalism have somewhat achieved its goals, it must now adopt the path of normal evolution and gradual development. This school of thought is labelled Static Nationalism. The other school which asserts that the "achievements of independence is a starting point in the Arab policies for reform and reorientation" is called Dynamic Nationalism. Dynamic Arab Nationalism "rejects the Status quo and stands for the radical transformation of the Arab national existence". In foreign affairs it calls for "freeing the Arab world from all the ties and relations which have given foreign powers considerable influence in the direction of Arab affairs, on the basis of their incompatibility with independence and Arab interests".⁵² This helps to

⁵¹Fayez A. Sayegh, Arab Unity, pp. 161-162; for the details of the Arab nationalist approaches to social changes see Hazem Zaki Nuseibeh, The Ideas of Arab Nationalism, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1959), pp. 184-187.

⁵²Fayez A. Sayegh, "Arab nationalism, the Latest Phose", Middle East Forum, vol XXXIII (November, 1957), pp. 7-8.

explain Nasser's attitude toward the Baghdad Pact.

Egypt stood for an independent system of defense for the Arabs versus Iraq's position which committed that country to association with foreign powers and put Iraq under their possible influence and domination.⁵³ On the stage of intra-Arab relations Dynamic Arab Nationalism advocates pan-Arab Union. Finally on the domestic plane, it advocates a "radical change of the socio-economic structure of Arab society on the grounds that the development of Arab human and national resources is reversely hindered by the existence of the feudal systems and the corrupt old regimes".⁵⁴

The clash between the two brands of Arab Nationalism reached its climax with the controversy over the Baghdad Pact which was formed in February 24, 1955. Iraq, under the regime of the Monarchy, represented (as will be seen from its policies) the Static brand of Arab Nationalism, while Nasser's Egypt represented the Dynamic brand. This clash between Egypt and Iraq, in which we will be concerned, lasted from 1955 to July 14, 1958, when the whole regime of the Monarchy collapsed,

⁵³T.R. Little, "The Arab League, A Reassessment", Middle East Journal, (Spring, 1956), p. 150.

⁵⁴Fayez, A. Sayegh, "Arab Nationalism, the Latest Phase", Middle East Forum, pp. 7-8.

thus signifying the fall of the main bastions of the Static brand of Arab Nationalism.

In conclusion, we can pin point the Arab's major policies, desires as well as their concept of security for the Arab East. No doubt there are some Arab states whose policies have been and still are not in complete harmony with the majority of these points. In brief, these points of view are summarized as follows:

- (1) Friendly cooperation with East and West.
- (2) Avoiding foreign alliances and entanglements, i.e., concessions that might provoke the hostility of either East or west.
- (3) Adoption of a neutralist foreign policy.
- (4) Developing Arab regional security arrangements; cooperation for defense.
- (5) Strengthening military establishments to ensure adequately for internal security and provide for self-defense.
- (6) Expanding its program of social, economic and political reform.
- (7) Preparation for the eventual struggle with Israel; meanwhile, enforcement of the economic blockade of Israel and working through United Nations to secure legitimate rights of Arabs in Palestine.

- (8) Accepting aid for economic development from both East and West.
- (9) Developing greater strength through regional unities.

Thus we see that Arab interests and policies are in opposition to both those of the Soviet Union and the west. The fact remains that the Arabs, in the mid fifties, and in the course of their struggle to achieve their legal and natural rights from the west,⁵⁵ had collaborated with the Soviet Union whose interests - at that particular stage of Arab national struggle - coincided with those of the Arabs.

⁵⁵The Arabs were dominated and ruled - through the Mandate System - by western powers, namely, Britain and France.

CHAPTER II

THE GROWTH AND FORMATION OF PACTS

IN THE MIDDLE EAST

I. THE SA'DABAD PACT

In this chapter, the writer will trace briefly the development of pacts in the Middle East area since 1935. The Moslem powers of the Middle East aimed at coordinating and regulating their relationships and allying themselves against outside aggression.

The idea of extending a version of the Balkan security pact to the Middle East region came from Turkey, prompted by Mussolini's threat to the Eastern Mediterranean. The primary negotiations for the pact were initiated in Geneva in September 1935, between the Turkish and Persian accredited representatives to the League of Nations; and a draft pact was initialed on October 20, 1935.¹

¹Majid Khadduri, Independent Iraq 1932 - 1958, (London: Oxford University Press, Amen House, 1960), p. 330.

However, it depended on the then two major Middle Eastern states of Turkey and Persia to enlist the co-operation of other states in order to complete the structure of a regional security pact comprising the independent Middle Eastern countries. In January 1936, the Afghan Foreign Minister was entertained by Dr. Rüstü Aras, the Turkish Foreign Minister, at a banquet in Ankara, and the first public reference to a Middle Eastern pact was made. From January to July, negotiations were conducted between Turkey and Persia on the one hand, and Persia and Iraq on the other, to settle certain frontier matters before the pact was signed. The Iraqi-Persian dispute was withdrawn from the League Council and a boundary treaty was finally concluded in Teheran on July 4, 1937.

Four days after the signature of the boundary treaty, the Foreign Ministers of Iraq, Persia, Turkey and Afghanistan signed at Sa'dabad a Four-Power Middle Eastern Pact on July 8, 1937. The Sa'dabad Pact provided for consultation among the four in all disputes that might touch their common interests (Art. III); for regarding their common frontiers as inviolable (Art. II); and for abstaining from interference in the domestic affairs of each other (Arts. I, VII). Article 4 stipulated that the

four powers should not resort, whether singly or jointly, with one or more third powers, to any act of aggression directed against any other of the contracting parties'. It was also agreed to bring any violation of Article IV to the Council of the League of Nations (Art. V). An act of aggression by one of the contracting parties would entitle the others to denounce the pact in respect of the party in question (Art. VI). The pact was to be in force for five years in the first instance, and it was to remain in force for a second of the same length in respect of any of the parties that had not given six month's notice of denunciation before the expiry of the first five years (Art. X). In a separate protocol, which was signed on the same day, the four powers agreed to set up a Permanent Council, which was to meet at least once a year, and a Secretariat of its own. The Council met only once, when the four powers met for considering Persia's application for election to the seat in the Council of the League of Nations.²

The Sa'dabad pact hardly meant anything more than a declaration of good will on the part of its members, since it

²Ibid., p. 331.

failed to provide any solidarity among them.³

When the Second World War broke out, and since the Sa'dabad pact had virtually become a dead letter, it was realized by Turkey, that a closer Union was needed to meet the new world balance of power. The initiative came from Turkey, who sent an invitation to the Regent of Iraq and his premier Nuri as-Sa'id, who were visiting England in July 1954, to visit Turkey. In September, president İnönü of Turkey discussed with the Regent of Iraq and Nuri an informal proposal of forming a Middle Eastern Bloc. The Turks, who could no longer depend on the Balkan states for support against the Soviet Union (since the Balkans, with the exception of Greece, had fallen under Soviet influence), turned to the Arab East instead. The Turks were acting in conformity with the foreign policy of America and Britain, for they had entrenched political, economic, and strategic interests which were threatened by Soviet ambitions in the Middle East. The cooperation between the Arab world and Turkey would complete the Middle Eastern chain begun in Greece for the "containment of the Soviet Union".⁴

³Ibid., p. 332.

⁴Ibid., p. 346.

The initial reaction to Turkey's scheme was quite favourable; for Nuri as-Sa'id had already declared his stand in favour of the West against Russia. But in 1946, when Nuri began his negotiations with Turkey in March, he was no longer in office. He then asked the Suwiadi Government for permission to negotiate such a treaty, but Suwiadi authorized him to sign technical but not political agreements.⁵

Nevertheless, Nuri initialled a treaty of friendship and bon voisinage, and then asked the Government to approve it. It was an embarrassing situation and the Suwiadi Government did not want to take a hostile attitude towards Turkey by denouncing the treaty. To solve the problem, the Suwiadi Government proposed to accept the treaty with a reservation, namely, that its provisions should not contravene Iraq's obligations under the Arab League Pact. The Treaty was in the nature of a regional security pact which provided for mutual consultation in foreign affairs, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, and co-operation in regional matters within the framework of the United Nations Charter. Turkey did not approve the Suwiadi reservation, but the new government formed by Salih

⁵Ibid.

Jabr in March, 1947 accepted the treaty without reservation. However, when the treaty was submitted to parliament for approval it was attacked both in the Senate and in the Chamber of Deputies. The main points of criticism may be summarized as follows: First, the treaty was not negotiated with the free will of Iraq, but was "imposed". Secondly, the treaty might involve Iraq in a conflict with the Soviet Union, which Iraq wished to avoid. Thirdly, the treaty provided that Iraq would recognize the present frontiers of Turkey, which implied recognition of Alexandretta by Turkey without Syria's approval. Nuri as-Sa'id defended the treaty by claiming that it did not contravene Iraq's obligations under the Arab League Pact; that Iraq's obligations in this treaty were the same as those which she accepted in the Sa'dabad Pact; and that Turkey pledged herself to support the Arabs on the Palestine question.⁶

In spite of all opposition, the treaty was approved by the Chamber of Deputies on June 7, 1947, having been opposed by only 13 deputies out of 101 present; and by the Senate on June 12, opposed by only 2 out of 13 senators present.⁷ This shows the difference of the aims and

⁶Ibid., p. 347

⁷Ibid.

policies between the governing body and those of their people.⁷

II. THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

To be able to observe the changing military, political and economic relationships, since the Second World War, in the Middle East region, it is necessary to survey briefly the military, economic and political situation of Britain which was by that time the most dominant power, and whose military, economic and political interests were greatly entrenched in the area.

In reviewing the series of fourteen British Defense White Papers as a whole, it is easy to see a clear British reflection of the evolution of Great-Power relations as they moved from uneasy peace to near-war (1946-53) and back again to deadlock (1954-1959). On the whole, the factors limiting the British Government's freedom of action may be summed up as follows: Firstly, the need for allies; secondly, the need to safeguard the country's economic position; thirdly,

⁷The fact that the parliaments were rigged and hence did not really represent the wishes and policies of the people was emphasized to the author by a former Iraqi official (namely Hashim Jawad), Beirut, April 11, 1965.

as a particular case of both the first two, there was the special but unequal relation with the United States of America; fourthly, there was the influence of international organizations, particularly the United Nations; fifthly, closely related to the last, the emergence on the international scene of new countries; sixthly, the Commonwealth Countries; and seventhly, there was the effect of party politics in Britain, including relations both within and between the two major parties, both inside and outside parliament. All of these factors affected the policy in successive Defense White Papers.⁸ It is not my aim to discuss each white paper, analyzing the military, economic and political policies of Britain each year. I will try to give some ideas of the White Papers which reflect the changing attitude of Britain in the Middle East, and why she began seeking collective security pacts.

In the 1948 White Paper the key ideas were:
The importance of the United Nations and its weaknesses;
the importance of the Commonwealth; the sense of being

⁸C.M. Woodhouse, British Foreign Policy Since the Second World War, (London, Hutchinson and Co., 1961), p. 90 .

still a great power; the economic problem; the danger of aggression. On April 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty has been signed, and the White Paper of 1950 declared that British policy was "... to seek security through the development of collective self-defence, within the framework of the United Nations Charter, in co-operation with the other members of the Commonwealth, the United States of America and other like-minded nations." This was the first mention of the United States of America in a British Defence White Paper.⁹ In the words of Lord Strang:

"The United Kingdom has since 1945 evolved another foreign policy, very different from the old, but suited to our relative decline in terms of power; its main characteristic is the merging of our defences with those of like-minded governments in an intimate community of free peoples bound by mutual engagement.

"In other words, we cannot survive without allies, nor even perhaps without commitments going beyond mere alliances."¹⁰

Within ten years from the outbreak of the Second World War, the once imposing structure of British power in the Middle East had been undermined, weakened, and

⁹Ibid., p. 80.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 93.

destroyed. A number of causes contributed to this contraction and withdrawal of British power. One is the transfer of power in India in 1947, another is the failure to solve the Palestine problem, still another is the economic weakness of Britain herself, and last is "the failure or inability of the makers of policy to recognize, understand and allow for the new forces which were arising in the Arab world and elsewhere, and which would sweep away the supports of British influence and power."¹¹

President Truman had already in March 1947 sought and obtained authority from Congress to give Greece and Turkey the help they needed, and which Britain could no longer supply, in defending their independence and Territorial integrity against the Communist threat from the North. This policy, commonly known as the Truman Doctrine, was soon extended to Persia.¹² At the end of 1949, the United States Government began assuming a still greater role in the Middle East. Mr. George C. McGhee,

¹¹Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 127.

¹²Royal Institute of International Affairs, ed., Sir Reader Bullard, The Middle East, (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 27 - 28.

then American Assistant Secretary of State, addressed the American diplomats of the area in November 1949; his remarks were summarized by one of those present, the Ambassador to Israel, James G. McDonald, as follows:

" 'The basis of United States policy in the Middle East,' McGhee told us, 'was to aid the development of all resources in the area, in order to lift the standard of living, and with an immediate two-fold purpose: (1) To avert the threat of Communism from inside, and (2) to keep armed the defensible border states (Greece and Turkey) as a defense against any outside Soviet aggression."

" 'First and foremost, consequently, the United States could no longer take a back seat in the affairs of the Middle East. For, with the Communist threat mounting, Britain, hard-pressed by other problems, could no longer maintain full responsibility for the protection of Western interests and civilization in the area. The United States must shoulder an increasing part of the burden. In this respect "complete agreement in principle" had been reached with Great Britain.' "¹³

¹³ Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West, p.128; See also The Daily Star, January 17, 1958, Beirut, Lebanon. Speech of Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, to National Press Club Luncheon (January 16, 1958), stating the United States aims to counter economic threat posed by Soviet Russia against areas of Asia and Africa.

III. ALLIED MIDDLE EAST COMMAND (AMEC)

As early as October, 1949, a general agreement on an Arab collective Security Pact had been reached by the member states of the Arab League and it was approved by the League Council on April 13, 1950. This was the first step of any real significance taken toward achieving an actual regional security for the Arab States.

At about the same time, the Tripartite Declaration of May, 1950 was promulgated.¹⁴ This Joint American, French and British declaration was felt by the west to be necessary to relieve the growing tensions in the Middle East and to prevent an arms race from developing between Israel and the Arab states.¹⁵

The Israelis reacted favorably to the announcement, inasmuch as it seemed to guarantee their present status and borders. The Arab states, however, on June 17, 1950, replied to the declaration stating that they considered themselves responsible for the maintenance of peace in the Middle East,

¹⁴See Appendix A, Tripartite Agreement of May 25, 1950.

¹⁵Ibid., see paragraph 3 and 4, Tripartite Agreement.

felt a profound sense of responsibility for internal security and legitimate self-defense, and did not possess aggressive intentions. They also cautioned the west not to favor Israel in the supply of arms, nor to use pressure to attempt to force a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute.¹⁶

In the fall of 1951 a series of events took place relating to the security of the Arab states and the interests of the western powers in establishing some sort of regional defense arrangements within the area.

Less than a week after the Wafd Government had abrogated the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, on October 13, 1951, a completely new proposal for the Joint defense project was put forward by Britain, France, the United States of America and Turkey. The new proposal was that Egypt should enter the alliance as a founder on a basis of "equality and partnership" and that British bases and facilities on the Canal Zone should be transferred to the alliance, which would be known as the Allied Middle East Command (AMEC).

¹⁶Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1950 - 1952, vol. VIII, p. 10812.

Other Arab countries and Israel had also been informed of the substance of the proposal and other Middle Eastern countries might be included in the new allied command at a later date, if they desired to join, but not as full partners.¹⁷ On October 15, Egypt replied: "The Egyptian government cannot consider these proposals or any other proposals concerning differences outstanding between the United Kingdom and Egypt while there are British forces in occupation of Egypt and the Sudan."¹⁸

Following the Egyptian rejection of the Allied Middle East command proposals and her unilateral abrogation of the 1936 Treaty, these occurred serious disorders and anti-British demonstrations in Port Said and Ismailia, which prompted British authorities to occupy the two towns. Egyptian officials reacted by putting into effect a number of measures, denying facilities to British forces in the Canal Zone and attempting (unsuccessfully) to stop British military shipping through the Canal and at its ports. British troops, in a countermove, took over all public utilities and key

¹⁷George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 498.

¹⁸Keessings Contemporary Archives, 1950 - 1952, vol. VIII, pp. 1173 - 1179.

communication ports, as well as control of all road and rail traffic and port operations at port Said, Suez and Abediya. Strong British reinforcements, naval and military, were moved into the Zone. The situation could not be more seriously inflamed.¹⁹

The United States Department of State announced on October 24, 1951 that, despite Egypt's rejection, the United States would continue to work for the establishment of a Middle East command. This was followed on November 10, 1951, by a joint four-power statement, made by Britain, France, United States and Turkey, announcing a plan to establish a Middle East command and declaring the guiding principles of the proposed organization. The statement declared that the defense of the Middle East was vital to the free world; that defense against aggression could only be achieved by the cooperation of the interested states; and that the achievement of peace and stability would bring social and economic advancement as well. It invited membership on an equal basis, without detriment to the natural sovereignty or independence. It promised assistance and arms support and non - interference in the problems or disputes of the area. But, at the same time, it stated that the Allied Middle

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 11832.

East command in no way affected existing armistice agreements or the principles of the Tripartite Declaration of May, 1950. The broad aim was declared to be the cooperative defense of the region.²⁰

These proposals were unacceptable and unappealing to the Arab States, and especially to Egypt, which made great efforts to influence her sister states to reject them.²¹ Other Arabs, like the Egyptians, regarded the new proposal as merely another way of perpetuating the presence of the British on Arab soil. London, in the meantime, arranged for Australian, New Zealand and South African participation. The predominantly British character of the proposed Allied Middle East command became too obvious to every one, and the attempt failed.²²

IV MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE ORGANIZATION (MEDO).

During the months that followed, one modification after another was made to the original plan in the hope

²⁰ Ibid., see also Halford L. Hoskins, The Middle East, problem Area in World politics, (New York: MacMillan Company, 1954), p. 281.

²¹ H. L. Hoskins, The Middle East, , p. 284.

²² Arslan Humbaraci, Middle East Indictment, (London: Robert Hale Ltd., 1958), p. 183.

that it might be more acceptable to the Arab states, and to Egypt in particular. Nearly a year passed before the American government, realizing the lack of progress, decided to drop the idea of a "command" and substitute for it a defense "organization", limited to acting as a liaison with the states of the area and joint consultations on matters of defense. The British opposed this view and desired a functioning command or headquarters, which they felt might have a better chance of eventually including both Israel and the Arab states. The result was a compromise: MEDO (Middle East Defense Organization), sponsored by the United States, Great Britain, France, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa.²³ It envisaged primarily a military planning committee to deal with the defense problems of the area and the issues which contributed to instability.²⁴ One significant feature of this plan was a tentative British proposal to establish the operating headquarters of the organization on the island of Cyprus. This action, it was

²³ For the details see: R.I.I.A., ed., Denise Folliot, Documents on International Affairs - 1951, (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 427-428; see also John Connell, The Most Important Country, (London: Cassell & Company Ltd., 1957), pp. 28-29.

²⁴ H. L. Hoskins, The Middle East, problem area in world politics, p. 284.

hoped, would bring Arab goodwill and provide some new basis for achieving a cooperative defense organization in the area, on the assumption that the British would give up, some time in the near future, the Suez-Canal base to the Egyptians. But Cyprus would, in reality, not be a suitable alternative to the Suez base for a number of sound military reasons. Britain realized this well.²⁵

V THE "NORTHERN TIER" CONCEPT.

The Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) did not take root in the Arab states. When in May, 1953, Mr. John Foster Dulles (then American Secretary of State) visited the Middle East, he became convinced that Egypt would not join a western-sponsored defense alliance. He then conceived the idea of the "Northern Tier" defense concept.

During Mr. Dulles' visit to the Arab region (May 10-30, 1953), the Arab states presented him with a memorandum concerning the defense of the region, which indicated that the members of the Arab League had decided to defend the area themselves and that a defensive system would be established within the framework of the Arab Collective Security Pact.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 265-266, 268, 270

Further, the Arab states indicated that they would not accept any Middle East defense system drawn by nations not forming a part of the area though would accept assistance, when needed.²⁶

But Washington took the initiative, when after the trip of Mr. John Foster Dulles to Asia and the Middle East, he declared on June 1, 1953:

"Now we think about a Middle East Defence Organization. It's been much talked about, but I think that is a future rather than an immediate possibility. Many of the Arab League countries are so engrossed with their quarrels with Israel and with Great Britain or France that they pay little heed to the Menace of Soviet Communism. However, there is more concern where the Soviet Union is near, and in general the northern tier countries have an awareness of the danger.

There is in the area generally a vague desire to have a collective security system. But no such system can be imposed from without!²⁷

Hence the Northern Tier Entente, the American version of MEDO, was born.

Because previous schemes of both Britain and America had failed to attract the Arab states, Mr. Dulles proposed a new purely American concept for the defense of the Middle East

²⁶Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1950-1952, Vol. IX, p. 12957.

²⁷Arslan Humbaraci, Middle East Indictment, p. 184.

from possible Soviet aggression. Soon after his return from the Middle East Mr. Dulles proposed the "Northern Tier" idea; a defense running through Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. The response was not spontaneous but prolonged negotiations led to, first, a signing of the Turkish-Pakistani Alliance in April, 1954, then the Turco-Iraqi pact of February 24, 1954, which later became expanded into the Baghdad pact with the adherence of Britain and Iran.²⁸ Thus, the west had finally achieved its objective in the Middle East of developing some sort of regional alignment. True, it only included one of the Arab states, but it was one strategically located, Westernly-oriented and reliable.

V THE ARAB LEAGUE TREATY OF JOINT
DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

The failure of the Arab League to save Palestine from Zionist occupation was attributed, at least in part, to the lack of co-operation and harmony among the Arab forces on the military front, as well as to the corresponding disharmony among the Arab governments on the political and diplomatic front.²⁹ Hence, great Arab popular discontent was exerted

²⁸ Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1950-1952, Vol. IX, p. 12957.

²⁹ Fayez A. Sayegh, Arab Unity, (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1958), p. 144.

on Arab officialdom to embark on new steps for reinforcing the structure of the Arab League. The first step that was taken for enhancing the cohesiveness of the Arab League was the conclusion of the Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Co-operation, which was approved by the Council of the Arab League on April 17, 1950. The Arab Collective Security Pact first came into force on August 24, 1952, following its formal ratification by Iraq (August 17, 1952) and Saudi Arabia (August 20, 1952). Its aim was to integrate the defense of the Arab world as well as its economy. In addition to pledging the military assistance of the whole League to the aid of any attacked member nation, the Treaty provided means for enhancing economic and cultural co-operation (Articles II and III respectively). In Article IV the contracting states agreed to "cooperate in consolidating and coordinating their armed forces" and participate, each in accordance with its resources and needs, in the preparation of their individual and collective means of defense for the repulsion of armed aggression. In Articles V and VI the Treaty established a Joint Defense Council and a permanent Military Commission,³⁰ respectively.

At the initial meetings of the Arab supreme Defense

³⁰ See the Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Co-operation Among the States of the Arab League: Muhammad Khalil, ed., The Arab States and the Arab League, Vol. II, pp. 101-105.

Council, composed of foreign ministers and defense ministers of the adherents to the collective security pact, it was decided to abandon ideas of a common defense system in association with western or Balkan defense organizations. They stated that there could be no contact between the Arab Collective Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization because such a relationship would be that between "Master and servant".³¹

However, the Arab Collective Security Pact rarely got beyond the planning stage, and the pact was never capable of being put into force because it did not have more than the verbal support of the participants. The machinery existed within the arrangements of the pact to provide for a regional security for the Arab East areas but was never developed or pursued by the member states. This was due to the inertia and dissension which characterized the behaviour of Arab officialdom of the day. Yemen, for example, made "reservations" and Iraq made a "declaration" qualifying their respective ratifications. A description by the American historian to the Articles of the confederation in 1780's applies to the

³¹ Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1951-1952, Vol. VIII, p. 13710 and p. 13183.

Arab situation in the early 1950's who observed:³²

"The League of friendship seemed to be turning into a League of dissension. Their Congress was sinking into utter contempt. The quarrels among the states were growing positively dangerous."

Consequently, the Arab mind, as professor Fayez Sayegh put it, learned both in official circles and in the public the ancient wisdom, after all efforts had been made to transform the Arab League into a more genuinely united organization, that new wine must not be poured into old bottles. It was not, however, until early 1955, when Iraq took part in founding the Baghdad Pact - inspite of the provisions of Article X of the Arab League Treaty of Joint Defense - that this treaty began to be openly considered as a worthless agreement.³³

Hence, both of the contending Arab States, Egypt and Iraq, recognized with the other Arab States, the real weakness, division and chaos that dominated the Arab League and consequently the implementation of the Arab Collective Security Pact. So, each embarked on a long-run Policy for enforcing and strengthening the military and economic standards of the Arab world.

³² Quoted in Fayez A. Sayegh, Arab Unity, p. 149.

³³ Ibid., p. 150-151.

Unfortunately, Egypt and Iraq chose separate and distinct lines of policy for pursuing the security of the Arabs. In the meantime, each was definitely convinced that her line of policy was the right one for achieving the general Arab security to replace the dissension and quarrels that dominated the Arab League.

The Baghdad Pact, which symbolizes the new policies and steps adopted by Iraq to strengthen the security of the Arabs, is discussed in the following chapter, while the reactions and counter-policies of Egypt and other Arab States to the Baghdād Pact are discussed in chapter IV.

CHAPTER III

THE FORMATION OF THE BAGHDAD PACT

A. THE NURI-MENDERES TALKS IN ISTANBUL (OCTOBER 8, 1954).

The primary negotiations toward the initiation of the Baghdad Pact began in Istanbul from October 8-19, 1954, between the premier of Iraq, Nuri as-Sa'id, and the Premier of Turkey, Adnan Menderes. However, Egypt had opposed all the steps which ultimately led to the initiation of the Baghdad Pact. In this chapter, the author will not describe this opposition and its implications. In the following chapter, the author will survey the initial opposition and interactions during the different stages of the initiation of the Baghdad Pact.

On November 1, 1954 a few days after Nuri's visit to Istanbul, he was interviewed by a correspondent of the Sunday Times. On November 2 the Baghdad press quoted Nuri as having told the correspondent:

"We are not strong enough to be able to assist others, but we are trying to find a means to correlate our foreign policy with the provisions of the Turkish-Pakistani Pact. All that we can do at the present is to organize the defense of Iraq through co-operation with neighbouring states." ¹

¹ Waldemar J. Gallman, Iraq under General Nuri, p. 25.

Mr. Waldemar Gallman says that Nuri as-Sa'id himself generously furnished the (American) Embassy in Baghdad with a summary of the minutes of the talks. The points on which Nuri and Adnan Menderes (the Turkish Premier) had reached agreement were then listed in the minutes and were described as follows:

1. "The security of Turkey and Iraq calls for the establishment of co-operation with their neighbours. The best solution is for all Arab states to join in this, along with Iran and Pakistan.

2. Attempts will be made in discussions which Iraq and Turkey are planning to have with Egypt, to get Egypt to join this grouping too.

3. Iraq and Turkey will keep in constant touch in the hope of arranging talks with Syria, Iran, and Pakistan.

4. Nuri explained that Iraq's role in the scheme of defense would be: (a) to safeguard the eastern passes against enemy land forces; (b) to defend her oil wells from air and atomic attacks; and (c) to facilitate and ensure arrival of aid destined for Turkey via Iraq.

5. Nuri made clear to Menderes that measures should be taken to check communist and Zionist propaganda aimed at preventing rapprochement between Arab countries and Turkey. Menderes not only endorsed this but added that measures already taken against the communists, particularly in Iraq and Egypt, had caused great satisfaction in Turkey.

6. Finally, there was agreement on the need for making mutual assistance in the economic field more effective for implementing the provisions of both the economic and cultural agreements concluded in 1946."²

B. THE NURI-MENDERES TALKS IN BAGHDAD.

The second rounds of talks began on January 6, 1955, when Menderes and his group arrived in Baghdad to continue their talks and plans about the defense of the Middle East.

At the end of the Menderes - Nuri talks on January 13, 1955, in Iraq a communiqué was issued announcing that Turkey and Iraq, in the exercise of the right of self-defense as proclaimed in Article 51 of the United Nations charter,

² Ibid., pp. 26-27, Nuri as-Sa'id claims that before the communiqué was issued he had copies given to all Arab representatives in Ankara. He said: "I heard nothing from my Egyptian brothers nor from any of my other Arab brothers after the publication of the communiqué in Istanbul. I heard no complaint or dissatisfaction, nor did I receive a request for any kind of explanation. October and November passed and when December came, the Arab foreign ministers met in Cairo. But no one asked about the Iraqi-Turkish discussions. In Baghdad, the discussions followed the same lines as in Istanbul. The Turkish mission then went to Damascus and Beirut. In Beirut, a U P correspondent was told that the discussions with Menderes had been fruitful, frank and friendly. Then came the attacks. Iraq, it was charged, had taken the Arab countries by surprise! ; Ibid., p. 45.

had decided to conclude a treaty expanding co-operation for the stability and security of the Middle East in keeping with the principles of the United Nations charter. The necessity for such a treaty, the communiqué continued, had been recognized during the talks that had taken place in Istanbul the previous October. Participation in this treaty was considered necessary and expedient for other states that had shown determination to serve the goals outlined; that were geographically situated to do so; or that had the means at their disposal to help. Consequently, during the short period intervening before the actual drafting of the treaty was undertaken, Turkey and Iraq would keep in close touch with states that expressed a desire to act in concert with them. Turkey and Iraq would hope that such states could sign the treaty along with them. If not, Turkey and Iraq would continue their efforts in the hope of obtaining later signatures.³

On January 14, the next day, Iraqi Acting Foreign Minister Burhanuaddin Bashayan gave the press the following clarification of the communiqué:

³Al - Ahram as cited in the Arab World, January 14, 1954, pp. 1-2, 7; and John Connel, The Most Important Country, pp. 70 - 71 .

"1. Nuri's affirmation, made on previous occasions, that Iraq would not send her forces to fight outside Iraq still holds good and was accepted by Turkey.

"2. Iraq had obtained assistance from the United States without any obligations or commitments, even before any agreement had been reached with Turkey on the maintenance of stability and peace in the Middle East.

"3. The agreement between Turkey and Iraq gives the lie to Zionist propoganda that Iraq has offensive designs.

"4. It is necessary, and it would be beneficial, for all Arab countries to join the agreement, with Egypt taking the lead. Egypt's participation would be welcomed by all peace-loving countries because of her strategic position and capabilities.

"5. The proposed new agreement has no connection with the Turkish-Pakistani Alliance. It is an entirely new arrangement. There is nothing in the way of Pakistan, or for that matter Iran, joining it."⁴

On January 19, 1955, and after a special Iraqi cabinet meeting and two meetings at the palace attended by the King, the Crown prince, and former prime ministers Tawfiq as-Swaidi, Jamil Madfai, Salih Jabr, Nuraddin Mahmud,

⁴Waldemar J. Gallman, Iraq under General Nuri,
p. 34 .

Arshad al-Umari and Fadhil Jamali, a further communiqué was issued in justification of the course Iraq was taking.

The major points in this communiqué were:

"1. Since its establishment as a state, Iraq's foreign policy has been based on the twin principles laid down by King Faisal I, (a) to promote vital Arab aims through the unification of Arab ranks, and (b) to ensure that Iraq remains an independent, sovereign and useful member of the Arab community.

"2. In pursuance of (a) Iraq's endeavours have covered Syria, Lebanon, North Africa, and Palestine. Iraq also participated in the establishment of the Arab League and the Arab States Collective Security Pact. In pursuance of (b) Iraq has continuously sought to organize and consolidate relations with her neighbours and with major powers whose interests are bound with those of Iraq. As a result of this endeavour Iraq has concluded treaties of friendship and good neighbourliness with Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan, and participated in the Sa'dabad Pact. In addition, Iraq entered into a treaty of alliance with the United Kingdom.

"3. Iraq moreover, has never ignored the natural right accruing to any Arab state to take any step in the international field which it found its private circumstances made necessary.

"4. Special circumstances also play a role in Iraq's relations with Turkey. Iraq has a long common frontier with Turkey. There are common resources as well. And Iraq is bound to Turkey by the treaties and agreements of 1926, 1937 and 1942.

"5. Finally, the projected agreement with Turkey is based on Article 51 of the United Nations charter in the same manner as the Arab Collective Security Pact."⁵

5. Ibid., pp. 35-36.

C. THE IRAQI INTERNAL SITUATION: (FEBRUARY - MARCH 1955)

On February 6, the Iraqi chamber of deputies was called to a special session on short notice. Of 135 members; ninety-six responded and adopted the following resolution presented by seven pro-government members:⁶

" This Assembly, cognizant of the government's policy which aims at securing Iraq's strength through co-operation with her neighbours in accordance with its traditional policy, which is in conformity with the Arab Collective Security Pact and with the Arab League charter, and the United Nations charter, fully supports this policy."

The deputies gave Nuri a 96-0 vote of confidence. However, the attitude of most of the Iraqi parties and labour Unions was emphatically against the signature of the ~~Turco~~-Iraqi Pact. On January 21, 1955, the dissolved Iraqi parties and labour unions sent a memorandum to Nuri expressing their opposition to the Turco-Iraqi alliance, condemning it as a challenge to the will of the majority of the Iraqi people, and describing it as an agreement between "governments and not between peoples". They claimed that Iraqi public opinion backs the idea of non-alignment and emphasises closer relations with the other Arab countries. Lastly, they claimed that the people will cancel this agreement when they become the 'masters

⁶Ibid., p. 45.

of themselves'.⁷

D. THE AMERICAN ENCOURAGEMENT

The American attitude was to back Nuri during the hard days in which popular opposition was exerted against signing the Turco-Iraqi Treaty. The view in Washington, as recorded by the then American Ambassador to Iraq, was, briefly, as follows:⁸

"1. America looked with particular favor on any increased collaboration in the Middle East against possible communist aggression.

"2. America thus viewed the Turkish-Iraqi declaration of intention as a constructive step.

"3. America was, moreover, prepared to assist Turkish and Iraqi efforts to achieve a realistic and effective defense arrangement.

"4. America believed the Arab States should welcome this development as an important step contributing to their security".

On January 18, when Mr. Dulles (then American Secretary of State) was asked to comment on the proposed pact, he said that the United States considers this a very constructive

⁷ Mohammed Mahdi Kubba, My memoirs, in the heart of events, (Beirut: Dar at-talia, 1965), pp. 420-423. The parties that sent the memorandum to Nuri as-Sa'id were: The National Democratic party, Independence party, Head of the Iraqi Unions. See also Al-Ahram, January 22, 1955.

⁸ Waldemar Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri, pp. 45-46.

development; and that it is a move toward building up the so-called 'Northern Tier' of which Turkey and Pakistan are already pioneers. And since Iraq and Iran are between Turkey and Pakistan they close the gap between them, thus increasing the security of the area.⁹

E. SIGNING OF THE TURKISH-IRAQI PACT

In the process of preparing the details of the Turco-Iraqi Treaty, Nuri as-Sa'id was laboriously working on an accompanying objective, a new agreement with Britain to replace the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of June 30, 1930 and to open the way for British adherence to the proposed pact.

Mr. Waldemar Gallman says that, on February 23, when the Turkish delegation arrived in Baghdad for signing the Turkish-Iraqi pact, both Washington and London had made their attitude toward the projected pact clear. Both wanted to see it signed. Washington preferred, though, that the pact itself contain no reference to the Palestine question.¹⁰

The Iraqi and Turkish delegates made a strong plea for the early adherence of America to the pact. Their reasoning was that, with the United States in the pact, the attitude

⁹ Ibid., p. 46

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 52.

of the Arab States towards it would be quite different: opposition would be lessened.¹¹

Early on February 24, Mr. Zorlu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, showed the British ambassador, Sir Michel Wright, and Waldemar Gallman, the American Ambassador, the drafts of letters bearing on the Palestine issue which were to accompany the pact and to be exchanged at the time of signing.¹²

Nuri as-Sa'id observed in his letter "that it is 'our' understanding that the pact would enable the two countries to co-operate in resisting any aggression directed against either party and that, in order to ensure peace in the Middle East, the two parties would co-operate to make the United Nations resolutions on Palestine effective"¹³ Menderes, the Turkish premier, in replying, simply stated that he wished to confirm his government's agreement with the contents of Nuri's letter. The Americans wanted no

¹¹Ibid.,

¹²Ibid.

¹³The Arab World, March 3, 1955, p.5, where the official and complete letter of Nuri as-Said to Menderes concerning Palestine and related to the Turco-Iraqi Treaty is presented in full.

reference to the Palestine question in the pact itself, nor close association between the pact and any accompanying documents mentioning Palestine. Ambassador Wright inquired whether there was not still time to change the wording somewhat, but Zorlu took a firm stand. In defending Nuri's stand, Zorlu said:¹⁴

"Nuri could not be induced to accept any changes in wording, or postponement in effecting the exchange, Nuri hoped to appease Arab opinion by linking the letters closely to the pact. Menderes, Zorlu explained, agreed that Nuri needed the letters as worded and needed them right away in order to strengthen his position. Menderes feared, however, that they might cause trouble for his government."

It should be observed that, three years later, when asked if he saw any hope of a solution of the Palestine problem through the Baghdad pact, Dr. Fadhil Jamali gave the following answer:¹⁵

"The Baghdad pact is a defensive instrument against communism. Its role object is to save the Middle East from communism. It is concerned with the Palestine problem only in so far as it spreads dissatisfaction

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 52 - 53.

¹⁵Leila Shaheen, "Interview with Dr. Mohammed Fadhel Jamali, Foreign Minister of Iraq", Middle East Forum, vol. XXXIII, May 1958, p. 13.

and creates a fertile soil for communism. Even then, the Baghdad pact as an organization cannot deal with the problem directly. Those of its members who see the damage caused to peace and stability of the Middle East by the Palestine problem should make their contribution to its settlement through the United Nations."

The pact was signed on February 24, 1955. On February 26 the pact was submitted to the Iraqi parliament for ratification. It was approved by the chamber of deputies by a vote of 112 to 4, and by the Senate by a vote of 26 to 1.¹⁶

During the debate on the pact in the chamber, Nuri again elaborated Iraq's position and obligations under the pact. He reiterated the usual arguments that the Iraqi government advanced in support of the pact.¹⁷

The objections to the pact in the chamber were few but sharp. Those who attacked it did so on the grounds that Turkey's obligations to assist the Arab States against

¹⁶Annex B; The Terms of the Turkish-Iraqi Treaty or the Baghdad pact.

¹⁷For the full details of speeches and arguments, see the official Iraqi Gazette, minutes of the Iraqi Legislative Assembly, (Baghdad: Government Press, 1955), pp. 577 - 595.

Israel were not clearly defined; that the pact had been hastily drawn up and negotiated; and that it was bound to alienate Iraq from other Arab states.¹⁸

In the senate, the only dissenter, Mohammed Ridha al-Shabibi, explained his opposition on the grounds that he favoured "neutralism" for Iraq.¹⁹

On April 4, 1955 a special Agreement was signed between Iraq and Britain. One of its stipulations was that Iraq assumed full responsibility for her own defense. This provision was followed by details on how the two countries would co-operate in the defense of Iraq.²⁰

On April 5, the British instruments of adherence to the Turkish-Iraqi pact of mutual co-operation were deposited at the Iraqi Foreign office, thus formally terminating the 1930 British-Iraqi Treaty, bringing the April 4 Agreement into force, and making Britain the first state to join the Turkish-Iraqi pact.²¹

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰For the text of this agreement see: Jacob Coleman Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, vol. II, (London: Princeton, Van Nostrand Co., 1956), pp. 391 - 395.

²¹Waldemar Gallman, Iraq under General Nuri, p. 63.

On September 23, 1955, the Pakistani ambassador in Baghdad, Qureishi, deposited Pakistan's instruments of adherence to the pact with the Iraqi foreign office. The third and last country to join was Iran. Her adherence became effective on October 25, 1955.²²

The inaugural meeting of the permanent council of the pact of mutual co-operation opened in Baghdad on November 21, 1955.²³

At this first meeting it was decided that in future the pact of mutual co-operation between Turkey and Iraq was to be known as the Baghdad pact. A permanent ministerial council was established. The seat of the pact was Baghdad. Between sessions of the ministerial council the business of the pact was to be carried on by the ambassadors of the member states resident in Baghdad, as deputies. The American ambassador was invited to attend these deputy meetings as an observer.²⁴

²²Ibid.

²³For the account of the preliminaries leading to the signing of this pact and for the text see, J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, vol., II, pp. 390 - 391.

²⁴Waldemar Gallman, Iraq under General Nuri, p. 63.

Later, the United States officially adhered, gradually, to all committees of the Baghdad pact. However, she has refused to join membership of the permanent council of the pact, thus avoiding being legally an official member of the Baghdad pact.

F. THE INITIAL AND IMMEDIATE REACTIONS: EGYPT & ISRAEL.

The reaction of Egypt to the proposed Turkish-Iraqi pact was pained surprise, followed by indignation, as Mr. Patrick Seale recognized from Major Salah Salem, Egypt's minister for National Guidance. Salah Salem, commenting on the proposed Turco-Iraqi pact said the following:²⁵

"It was clear that the battle between our policy and Iraq's would be joined over Syria. The issue was quite simply this: If Iraq and Turkey got Syria on their side, Jordan and Lebanon would soon follow and Egypt would be completely isolated. We therefore immediately summoned all Heads of states from the Arab League countries to a conference in Cairo on 22 January to discuss this important matter...."

And so the Egyptian leaders held strongly to their policy, at the same time trying to hinder and ^{Thwart} the

²⁵Patrick Seale, Struggle For Syria, p. 212.

policies of Iraq and her allies. The reasons behind Egypt's opposition to Iraq's policies are variant but mainly two: (1) ideological^{*} and (2) competition for hegemony in the Arab world. The basis of Egypt's opposition to western-sponsored military pact were previously discussed.

The best document characteristic of the strength of the Egyptian claim to leadership is the 'voice of the Arabs' call on October 19, 1954- the Night of the Evacuation Agreement. The 'voice of the Arabs' called on all the Arab brothers in Jordan, Iraq, South of the Arab Peninsula, North Africa and in Palestine to raise their heads from the imperialists' boots for the era of tyranny was past, and Egypt had started to free herself from imperialist shackles. It called all the Arabs to raise their heads because the sun of freedom was rising over Egypt and they would soon be flooded by its rays. It asked the Arabs to raise their heads and see what was happening in Egypt. In Egypt the Arabs would not find any despotic monarchs, no feudalism, and no weak army. It is Egypt's revolution that has freed

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See Supra, pp. 74

the nation from imperialist forces on the Suez Canal base. Moreover, the 'voice of Arabs' demanded from the Arabs to listen to Egypt when she says that there can be no alliance except with the Arabs. Lastly it declared to the Arab nation:²⁶

".... In Egypt; you will then raise your head in pride and dignity. In Iraq, your Arabism and your Habbaniya will be liberated by the liberation of Egypt. The imperialists will be driven to work for your friendship instead of sniffing at your hostility. Raise your head now, my brother, for victory has been won for you by your Egyptian Arabs."

The only other Government almost equally infuriated by the projected Baghdad pact was that of Israel. The Israeli official observation was that it was "liable to encourage Arab belligerent tendencies, foment aggressive ambitions and undermine the peace and stability of the area" and that it breathed "a hostile intent towards Israel".²⁷ But Sir Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, whose country was the main sponsor of the pact and became a full member of it, tried to allay the fears and anger of Israel

²⁶Ibid., p. 214

²⁷John Connell, The most Important Country, p. 72.

in the debate in the House of Commons on April 4, 1955. He maintained that in the Government's view the northern tier defense system was not directed against Israel; that Israel could only benefit from it; and that it might serve as a prelude to an Arab-Israel settlement.²⁸ This idea was given repeated and vigorous expression at the time. Moreover, on April 28, 1955, Mr. Harold Macmillan, who had succeeded to the Foreign office when Sir Anthony Eden became Prime Minister, wrote to a British journalist who visited Israel at this time, in reply to a letter in which he expressed the sentiments and apprehensions in Israel. Mr. Harold McMillan replied to the journalist saying:²⁹

"..... Let me say first that our policy is to use all our influence to bring about a settlement between Israel and the Arab States, by which both sides will be prepared to abide. It cannot be imposed on either side by force. The Israelis, I know, suffer from a feeling of isolation and they suspect that the Turco-Iraqi pact, our accession to it and our special agreement with Iraq have in some way made their position worse. I am sure that their feeling is mistaken and I think that their original fears have been allayed to some extent.

"Nor can Israel justifiably feel left out of our arrangements. She has the Tripartite Declaration of March (sic) 1950, by which Her Majesty's

²⁸Ibid., p. 72.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 72 - 73.

Government with the United States and French Government guaranteed the existing frontiers and armistice lines. This Declaration was reaffirmed in forthright terms by the present prime minister in the House of Commons on April 4: and, as he said, it would be difficult to devise in a Treaty or any other context anything which carried more extensive obligations than it does."

No doubt such an attitude on the part of Britain towards Israel had created a negative effect on the Arab States other than Iraq. These states thus refused to adhere to the Turco-Iraqi pact considering it as unsatisfactory for their defense against their prime enemy, Israel.

And so the Baghdad pact was formed, with Iraq as the only Arab State. Egypt, the paramount contender to this pact, rose in violent rage and began to ally ^{with} other Arab States to paralyze or freeze the pact, by exerting pressure to achieve this end. On the other hand, Iraq tried to exert pressure on the Arab States to win more Arab membership to the Baghdad pact.

The major lines of the story of the struggle over the Baghdad pact which split the Arab world into two main camps, one under the leadership of Egypt and the other under the leadership of Iraq, plus the consequent Arab cold war is told in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV

I. THE INITIAL ARAB REACTIONS AND OPPOSITION TO THE IDEA OF ESTABLISHING THE PROPOSED BAGHDAD PACT. 1954 to early 1955.

In chapter III the attempt was to describe only the different steps which led ultimately to the establishment of the Baghdad pact without any reference to the opposition that it encountered by Egypt and other states.

In this chapter (IV) the author will try to give a detailed description of the Arab opposition and reactions which faced the Baghdad pact before, during, and after the stages of its establishment as well as the resulting impact on inter-Arab relations.

A - THE POLICIES OF REVOLUTIONARY EGYPT.

Major Salah Salem, then Egyptian Minister for National Guidance, made a tour to the Arab states, begin-

ning with Lebanon on July 1, 1954, as part of an Egyptian plan to review and try to assert a new Arab policy based on the principles of the Egyptian Revolution. The policy of the Egyptian Revolution was composed of two main sections. The first one was concerned with the Moslem world or Moslem policy¹ and the second, with Arab national policy. The basis of this new Arab policy, as pronounced by the different leaders of the Egyptian Revolutionary Council, were generally the following:²

1. Unifying the Foreign policy of the different Arab states.
2. Solidifying and strengthening the Arab League Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Co-operation.
3. Strengthening and unifying - by certain amendements - the pact of the Arab League.
4. Rejection of Foreign Defense proposals and Foreign Pacts as a basis for the defense of the Middle East; and reliance on the Arab Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic co-operation.

¹Egypt's Government as well as that of Saudi Arabia, played a big role in initiating a moslem conference in the months of May and June of 1954.

²These pronouncements were declared over the whole month of July 1954; Al-Ahram, July, 1954.

On July 20, 1954, Nasser (then Premier) told the correspondent of Newsweek that Egypt was planning to formulate the basis of "a united Arab world" when the problem of the Suez Canal base was over.³

At the end of each of Salah Salem's ^{visit} to the Arab states, a communiqué was issued. These communiqués, Al-Ahram implied, showed that there was a general consensus among the Arabs to review and change their political, economic, and military policies, among themselves, and with the outside world, mainly the west.⁴ But a split occurred in the Arab world, when the Arab states began to discuss the practical steps and the degree of relations or alignments with the west. Hence the clash between the conservative brand of Arab nationalism, as symbolized by the Iraqi government of the time, and the dynamic brand, as symbolized by revolutionary Egypt.

On July 27, 1954, the Evacuation Agreement of the Suez Canal base was signed between Egypt and Britain. On July 30, 1954, Nasser and Salah Salem began to denounce

³Ibid., July 21, 1954.

⁴Ibid., July 26, 1954.

vehemently collective Defense with foreign powers: No military experts and no pacts. Immediately, Salah Salem announced that Egypt had two aims to obtain from the Evacuation Agreement with Britain:⁵

"1. Complete Evacuation of foreign troops."

"2. Termination of the Treaty of 1936 between Egypt and Britain."

To Salah Salem, this Evacuation Agreement was devoid of any military pacts or any collective defense; Egypt began to have complete freedom and independence in adopting the proper foreign policy that suits her. In relation to the 'controversial' item of the Evacuation Agreement which says: "If an attack occurs on Turkey....., the British forces would return to the Suez Canal base"; Salem said, and afterwards it was confirmed by Nasser, that "in reality we accepted this point as a tactic, to secure complete British withdrawal from Egyptian territory".⁶

Nasser had pre-conceived ideas about the Middle East after the Evacuation of British forces from Egypt. He said that he was convinced that this 'united Arab world' would be

⁵Al-Gumhuriya, as cited in the Arab world, July 30, 1954.

⁶Ibid.

one of the greatest elements of peace for the world as well as for the Middle East. He also thought that Egypt should embark on this role, of erecting this united Arab world, after the Suez Canal problem is over, giving the opportunity for this world to play its part in progress and civilization. He then continued to say that it is possible to consider the Arab League Treaty of Joint Defense as the basis or nucleus of the proposal of the defense of the Middle East; and that this proposal should be absolutely Arab, allowing only the Arab states to participate in its organization; and should not be forced upon the Arab world.⁷

B - THE SANSANK CONVERSATIONS

As early as April 2, 1954 an Agreement for Friendly Co-operation was signed between Pakistan and Turkey.⁸ On August 4, 1954, when Nuri as-Sa'id returned to power, he announced a program emphasizing Foreign Affairs. No doubt he had been following closely the Turkish-Pakistani Agreement of April 2, 1954, and the preliminary agreement of

⁷Al-Ahram, July 21, 1954.

⁸"Need For A Regional Defense Organization," Baghdad Pact, (Great Britain: , 1957), p. 22

July 27, 1954 between Britain and Egypt on the Suez Canal base. So he looked forward to the replacement of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of June 30, 1930, by a broader alignment of states interested in the defense of the area.⁹

On August 13, 1954, a few days after Nuri as-Sa'id took office, it was announced by the Iraqi Foreign office that Major Salah Salem, Egypt's Minister of National Guidance, would arrive in Baghdad for a five-day visit. Salah Salem met Nuri as-Sa'id and Iraqi officials at Sarsank on August 15 to review inter-Arab relations after the British-Egyptian Evacuation Agreement on Suez, which had been initialed on July 27, 1954. Salah Salem says that the main worry of the Iraqis, they told him at the meeting, was a possible military threat from Soviet Russia since their borders were very close to the Caucasus, only some 400 miles. The Iraqis said that they were concerned about the problem of Palestine and about what could be done there since they were very weak.¹⁰

⁹Waldemar J. Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), pp. 22-23.

¹⁰Patrick Seale, Struggle For Syria, (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 201; and Nasir al Deen An Nashashibi, What Happened in the Middle East, (in Arabic), (Beirut: Trading Center Press, 1962), pp. 402 - 403.

Moreover, Salah Salem says that the Iraqis (mainly Nuri as-Sa'id) congratulated him on the success of the negotiations with the British, and that they would like to do the same with the British as their Treaty with Britain was to expire shortly. They also spoke of their weakness and about how Britain and the west were the normal sources of arms.¹¹

"There is no hope whatsoever of getting more arms and of building up a real army except by concluding a pact with the west as Pakistan and Turkey have done," Nuri told Salah Salem .

Nuri expressed to Salem his fears of Turkey's seizing Mosul, as she had seized Alexandretta from Syria. Hence, it was essential to build up a real position of strength to resist Turkish ambitions. Nuri also spoke of the indirect communist threat through the neighbouring countries and from underground communist activity in Iraq itself. He added that they are a realistic government, unlike the former Egyptian governments of the pashas. They also wished to cooperate with the new government of Egypt. Finally, Nuri ended his statement of their position, saying: "I should like to do

¹¹Muhammed Khalil, edi, "Egyptian Government's Reply to Prime Minister Nuri as-Sa'id's Radio Speech of December 16, 1956", The Arab States and the Arab League, pp. 279 - 281 .-

something for Palestine before I die."¹²

Salah Salem replied that, since Egypt had struggled a long time to achieve real independence, and having secured it, Egypt now believes that it should avoid all foreign ties, particularly with Great powers. Britain, Salem said, had an alliance with Egypt in the 1936 Treaty. In this Treaty, Britain, the powerful partner, had exploited the Treaty to limit the freedom of the weaker partner, Egypt. During the twenty years of alliance, the British never helped the Egyptians to build up a real army fit for war, but helped in creating a force of some 10,000 - 20,000 men, equiped with rifles, and fit only for parades. In the meantime, the military missions which they supposedly sent for training the Egyptian army, became the real commanders, and interfered in Egyptian internal affairs. The British ambassador became the real power in the country; he could dismiss cabinets and appoint prime ministers.¹³

Salah Salem continued to say that the British had, in fact, interfered in every aspect of the Egyptians'

¹²Ibid., pp. 281 - 282; see also Nasir al Deen An-Nashashibi, What Happened in the Middle East, pp. 402 - 403.

¹³Patrick Seale, Struggle For Syria, p. 202.

life. The Egyptians still remembered this interference and knew that it was so because the British were more powerful and had designs on the area. And, in such an alliance, there could be no question of real independence. In conclusion Salah Salem told Nuri as-Sa'id:¹⁴

"That we in Egypt had decided that it would now be far better to have a transitional period free from all foreign obligations during which we could observe how we were treated by Britain and the west. If they treated us as sovereign states, then we might in the future change our minds. But we are resolved at present to refuse all ties with great powers. We aimed at full, unconditional independence."

In reply to Nuri's fears about Turkish designs on Mosul, Salem merely said that if the west gave Turkey its support, there was little that Iraq could do. Conversely, if the West did not want Turkey to acquire Mosul, she would never do so. As for communism, Salem frankly told Nuri that his policy of making pacts with the west was the best way of strengthening the communist underground in Iraq. His policy would not only induce the communists to redouble their activities inside the country, but would also allow them to represent the Government as a puppet in the hands of

¹⁴Ibid.; and Muhammed Khalil, edi, The Arab States and the Arab League, pp. 281 - 282.

Great powers and, with this argument, win over the nationalists to their side. Moreover, Salem told Nuri that the Iraqi nationalists are much like their Egyptian counterparts: They want complete independence, and are sick of British interference in their internal affairs. The Iraqi problem is how to secure the confidence of the nationalists, because if you lose their confidence you will have lost the battle inside your country. Hence the arms you are seeking from the west may in fact be used by the nationalists against you.¹⁵

Nuri, then, asked Salah Salem how could the Iraqis strengthen their army if they adopted Egyptian policies. In reply, Salah Salem made certain proposals. Salem said:¹⁶

"Let us call all the Arab countries to a conference and together set up a real defense organization. If Cairo and Baghdad agree to this, all the others will follow. If we set up a purely Arab pact in this decisive region of the world, with a combined headquarters, a common defense strategy, and joint plans for training, for building roads, aerodromes, and so on If we then went together, as one unit, to the western powers and said to them:

¹⁵Ibid.; this was confirmed to the author by Mr. Hashim Jawad (ex-Iraqi Foreign Minister), Beirut, April 11, 1965.

¹⁶Patrick Seale, Struggle For Syria, pp. 203 - 204.

Here is a regional organization in accordance with Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter. You have many interests in the area. We want you to help this organization by giving it arms so that it may repel aggression from any quarter. Our people would not be suspicious of a purely Arab organization of this sort. But if, after we had all this, the west refused to give us arms, we should have to think again. But you may be sure that uniting in such a workable organization would give us tremendous power. At present the west is playing us off against each other. But if combine, we shall be in a far stronger position to meet various defense and economic needs. Consider Israel. Our people know that Israel could never have been established without western help. How can we now convince them to join forces with those who allowed Israel to become a source of continuous aggression against us?"

Meanwhile, Nuri as-Sa'id said that it was necessary for Egypt and Iraq to ascertain the views of America and Britain in order to consider the necessary means for strengthening the Arab collective security pact, and that they (Egypt and Iraq) would act on the basis of their advice. Nuri insisted on this, suggesting that the talks be resumed in Cairo, which he would be visiting on his way to London.¹⁷

In Nuri's own account of what happened in Sarsank, he adds that he spoke about his visit to India back in

¹⁷ Muhammed Khalil, ed., The Arab States and the Arab League, p. 282.

March 20, 1954, at the same time when King Faisal II was visiting Pakistan. Nuri discussed with the Premier of India, Pandit Nehru, the possibility of the formation of a strong neutral defensive bloc which would stand between the western and Eastern camps. This neutral defensive bloc would comprise India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey and the Arab countries, and would undertake to guarantee the neutrality of these countries and the repulsion of any aggression against any of them. But Nehru rejected this suggestion, basing his rejection mainly on India's peculiar circumstances, chief among which were India's neighbourhood to the Soviet Union and its wish not to provoke hostility with the communist bloc, and also the weakness of the Indian army to undertake new commitments. When Nuri asked Nehru to advise Iraq as to the means by which she could obtain peace, Nehru replied that it was necessary for Iraq to co-operate with (those of) her neighbours who have international experience which could be drawn upon for guidance.¹⁸ When Nuri came back to Iraq and submitted a detailed report

¹⁸ Khalil Kenneh, Iraq: Its Past and Future, (in Arabic), (Beirut: Dar al-Rihani, 1966), pp. 181 - 182.

to the Government, and sent copies to King Sa'ud and president Chamoun, he intended to send a copy to Nasser; but he was astonished at that time, by the severe attacks which the Egyptian broadcasting stations had started to wage against Iraq, levelling against her many charges. Nuri says that this attack took place when nobody in Iraq, responsible or non-responsible, knew of the reason for these attacks.¹⁹

In the meeting, Salah Salem, expressed his deep regret, Nuri says, for the attacks launched by the Egyptian broadcasts and press against Iraq. Salem said that the reason for those attacks was a misunderstanding of Iraq's attitude. This was related to the fact that, after Egypt had agreed to the Evacuation Agreement with the British, the British Government had for two months put off the signature of the treaty. This coincided with the visit of the King of Iraq to Pakistan at the time. The Egyptians, thus, imagined that there was involved an agreement aiming at the isolation of Egypt.²⁰

Moreover, Nuri emphasized in the Sarsank meeting,

¹⁹Muhammed Khalil, ed., The Arab States and the Arab League, p. 260.

²⁰Ibid., p. 261.

the close relations, economic and social interests, religious creeds, and historical bonds, as well as the old treaties which Iraq had previously concluded with her neighbours, Iran and Turkey, and emphasized that these relations necessitated that Iraq should co-operate with those two neighbours for the safeguarding of her own security as well as of theirs. He also explained at length the fraternal relations which bound Iraq to her sister Arab states, and enumerated the services which Iraq had rendered to Palestine and to the Arab cause, by making Iraq a bastion for Arab nationalism. He also enumerated other things which were previously mentioned by Salem. Then Nuri continued to say that he told Salem, concerning the Suez Evacuation Agreement:²¹

"You should have divided the Anglo-Egyptian treaty into two parts: The first part, relating to the Evacuation of the British forces, should be the subject of an agreement, between you and the British. The second part, concerning the return of the British forces to the Suez Canal base in the event of aggression against the Arab states or Turkey, should have been (the subject of) a general agreement to which all the Arab states concerned as well as Turkey should have acceded. (This is because) the British forces which would be returning to the canal to assist Turkey would have to cross Arab

²¹Ibid., p. 262.

states whose agreement thereto had not been secured or views thereon sought."

During the Sarsank talks Salah Salem had consented that Britain and the United States should be consulted on the nature of the agreement on Middle East Defense. It was later revealed that the following points had been agreed upon:²²

"The two parties have agreed on the necessity of reconsidering the Arab collective security pact, with a view to strengthening it and making it a strong, effective instrument that will enable the Arab countries to face any danger which may threaten them, and to defend their countries powerfully and efficiently. Each party shall, however, study this question and shall make the necessary contacts with the U.S. and Britain in this respect. There will be held in the second half of September a further meeting in Cairo between Egypt and Iraq for reviewing the results of the contacts and to resume contacts. The two parties will then jointly get in touch with the representatives of Britain and the U.S. in order to discuss this subject in preparation for its submission to the other Arab States with a view to reaching a general agreement thereon."

Salah Salem failed to win Nuri over to a purely Arab pact. Indeed, Nuri as-Sa'id maintains, before leaving Baghdad for Cairo after the Sarsank talks, Salem had gone so far as to contact the United States and British chargés d'Affaires—

²²Muhammed Khalil, edi., "Speech by prime minister Nuri as-Sa'id of Iraq, concerning the Baghdad pact", The Arab States and the Arab League, p. 262.

the respective ambassadors being absent from Iraq at the time — to discuss the matter with them and to inform them that he would get in touch with the American and British ambassadors in Cairo.²³ When Salem returned to Cairo, he found that Nasser did not share his satisfaction at the results of his mission. Immediately press reports spread all over the Arab world that a split in the Egyptian junta had occurred concerning the Sarsank conversations. Moreover, Early in September Major Salem was said to have gone 'on leave' only to be recalled to his duties two days later.²⁴ The disagreement in the council of the Egyptian Revolution was apparent and divergence became real, as the Egyptians themselves later admitted in a broadcast:²⁵

"Following the return of Salah Salem to Cairo president Jamal Abd an-Nasir objected to (the principle of) consulting Britain and the United States over a matter which essentially pertains to our sovereignty."

On the 9th of September, president Nasser received Nagib al-Rawi, the Iraqi Ambassador to Egypt. The Ambassador said that "until that time no contact had been made with

²³Ibid.

²⁴L'orient, al-Jareeda, al-Hayat, as cited in the Arab World, September 10, 1954, p. 2 .

²⁵Muhammed Khalil, edi., "Egyptian Government's Reply to prime minister Nuri as-Sa'id's Radio Speech of December 16, 1956", The Arab States and the Arab League, pp. 282 - 283.

Britain and the United States, in accordance with Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id's request, to ascertain their views on the strengthening of the (Arab) collective security pact". He also said "that Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id would not pay Egypt his (proposed) visit, concerning which he had agreed with Mr. Salah Salem, unless contact was made with Britain and the United States, for discussing the strengthening of the collective Security pact."²⁶ Nasser, then made it clear to the Ambassador that

"consulting Britain and the United States would be inconsistent with our independent policy, that it was Iraq we were consulting on this subject, and that the British reply was well-known to us, as the only means they had for strengthening the collective security pact was their participation therein. This they told us before, but we have rejected it ever since 1953."

Then the Iraqi Ambassador answered Nasser saying:²⁷

"Your failure to contact the British and Americans will prevent Nuri as Sa'id from visiting Egypt and consequently prevent the resumption of discussions."

The answer of president Nasser was that

"Nuri as-Sa'id was free to take any decision he might wish but it was in the general interest

²⁶Ibid., p. 283.

²⁷Ibid.

that discussions should be resumed and that Nuri should be present as he had promised, so that the Arab cause might be furthered."²⁸

Salah Salem's mission to Sarsank had failed.

C. THE NURI-NASSER MEETING (CAIRO, September 15, 1954)

On September 15, 1954, the visit of Nuri as-Sa'id to Nasser in Egypt had shattered any remaining illusions of an Iraqi-Egyptian agreement and marked the opening of a more violent phase in the defense debate.

According to Nuri's own account, he says that he gave all his reasons, as before, for the need of strengthening the Arab collective pact by the adhering of Turkey and some of the western powers, and the dangers facing Iraq specially from the Iraqi Kurdish leader al-Mulla Mustafa al-Barazani²⁹ whom the Soviet Union was training in the Caucasus, with his men. Their aim was to form an army which would infiltrate back into Iraq to carry out military opera-

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹This came to be true afterwards when none of the Arab states had helped Iraq against al-Barazani's rebellion except for a short time when the Ba'th party was ruling in Syria and Iraq and military help came from Syria.

tions and to destroy Iraq. After Nuri enumerated all these reasons and factors, he maintains, that Nasser was in complete agreement with him in all his talks, and understood all the problems which he had explained. But Nasser requested Nuri to postpone the discussion of this subject until Egypt had liquidated her own problems, since the Egyptians had no confidence in the British in spite of the initialling of the treaty.³⁰ Nuri, then, inquired of Nasser as to the time that he estimated for waiting. Nasser replied that he could not determine a time for that. Nuri answered that the Iraqi people considered the termination of the 1930 Treaty as a national claim which should be met as soon as possible.³¹ According to the Egyptian version of what took place in the meeting, Nuri had also proposed that Egypt should sign the evacuation agreement with the British, quickly and without raising any new problems. He then said that some of the Arab countries, such as Syria and Lebanon, were not linked to the west in any way, and that these States

³⁰ Muhammed Khalil, ed., The Arab States and the Arab League, pp. 263 - 264; see also Gordon H. Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military, (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1964), pp. 272 - 273.

³¹ Ibid.; see also Khalil Kenneh, Iraq: Its Past and Future, (in Arabic), pp. 184 - 185.

were linked to the other Arab States through the collective security pact. Therefore, (he asserted) Iraq and Egypt should ask the British in order to know their views and (also) the obligations they were asking from these Arab countries. Nuri as-Sa'id also said "that Iraq has no desire to sign a bilateral agreement with the British; but as there was no link connecting the British with the collective security pact, where would the Arabs get their arms from? Accordingly, the collective security pact of the Arab League should be expanded in order to link Syria and Lebanon, (on the one hand), with the western states, (on the other), and thus enable them to obtain arms." Nasser then asked Nuri: "What (you are) asking for, then, is to let Britain join the Arab collective security pact?" Nasser continued: "The British had repeatedly asked us to enter into a pact with them, but we rejected the offer and told them that the Arab Collective Security Pact was the only basis for the organization of the defense of the Arab countries."³²

Nuri as-Sa'id then spoke of the attitude of Turkey towards Iraq, and said that the Turks were aspiring to annex Mosul. He then said that Iraq's need for arms made it

³²Muhammed Khalil, edi, The Arab States and the Arab League, pp. 283 - 284.

necessary to be in agreement with Britain and Turkey. Nasser answered him saying that Iraq had submitted a (draft) agreement to the United States whereby she would supply Iraq with arms. Nasser added that, with regard to letting Turkey and Britain join the Arab Collective Security Pact, Egypt did not agree to the adherence of any state to that pact, other than an Arab State. Nuri as-Sa'id answered that this *might* not be the right time for Egypt to take such a step, but it *might* be possible in the future, hence Nuri considered that it *would* be necessary for Iraq to co-operate with Britain, in one way or another. This co-operation might take the form of a pact that will include Iraq, Turkey, Britain and Pakistan.³³ Moreover, Nuri said that it was essential that Egypt and Iraq ascertain the views of Britain, and that the reply to the question would not commit Egypt to anything. Nasser said that Egypt's plan was to conclude an evacuation agreement. Also the Egyptians think that things would not crystalize before the lapse of two years after the British withdrawal from Egypt; that Egypt would need two years to think of and then decide upon the policy it would follow. Consequently, Nasser told Nuri that he *could not* accept or agree to any of these proposals. Nasser also said that the

³³Ibid., p. 284.

Egyptians wish to feel that they are independent, a matter which requires two years after evacuation.³⁴

Also, according to the Egyptian version Nuri said that Iraq could do nothing that was inconsistent with Egypt's plans for independence; and that Iraq would still be in the Arab Collective Security Pact. Meanwhile, Iraq could not send any forces to Jordan, for example, in the event of an Israeli aggression, that therefore the Arab Collective Security Pact was 'ink on paper' and that another method for defense had to be sought.³⁵

The meeting ended without reaching any definite agreement.

From all the preceding account, it is clear that Nasser, as well as the Egyptian junta, were determined to follow a new independent line in foreign policy from that of the west. They refused to enter any pact with the west, or with any state other than with the Arabs. They believed that Arab Collective Security Pact should be the sole basis for all defense of the Arab Middle East. Nuri as-Sa'id and his government, on the other hand, were convinced and determined

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid.

to follow the traditional foreign policy of cooperation with Britain and the west in general for promoting Arab economic, military advancement and strength.

D. NURI'S ALTERNATIVE PLAN - (EDEN - NURI TALKS IN LONDON FROM SEPTEMBER 18 - OCTOBER 7, 1954).

By this time it was clear that Iraq and Egypt could not agree, but the next move for Iraq was uncertain. Nuri planned his strategy over the next month: first in London, where he spent three weeks immediately after his visit to Cairo on September 15, 1954, and then in Istanbul, where he remained from 8 to 19 October. It was during these talks that Nuri as-Sa'id advanced his alternative plan to the Northern Tier Alliance. The plan, which Eden warmly welcomed, was to strengthen the Arab Collective Security Pact by the inclusion of Turkey and the help of Britain and the United States.

The announcement, in April 4, 1954, that Iraq was to receive United States military aid made it clear that she would soon be joining the Turco-Pakistani Alliance. The first sign of the British opposition to this proposed expansion of the Northern Tier Entente came from the semi official Arab

News Agency. What this British agency suggested as a substitution to the Norther Tier was that Iraq need not join the Turco-Pakistani Pact, but that instead Iran, Turkey and Iraq should form another alliance, which would be more acceptable to, and would have the support of, the Arab states; and such an alliance could later be linked to the Arab Collective Security Pact. This theme was repeated on October 15, by the Diplomatic Correspondent of the Times, and by Nuri as-Sa'id at a press conference in Istanbul on October 19.³⁶

However, eventually the three countries did find themselves allies in the same military organization. But this new pact is a different one, achieved by different means - a British - sponsored pact and not an American one.³⁷ At the end of September 1954, Nuri outlined, in London, his plans to Anthony Eden the then British premier. The final outline, Mr. Arslan Humbaraci maintains, was as follows: A new alliance should be formed on the basis of a Turco-Iraqi partnership. London and Baghdad should persuade Ankara to enter, after which the three would persuade Pakistan. The

³⁶Arslan Humbaraci, Middle East Indictment, p. 186.

³⁷Ibid.

new alliance, having Arab participation - thanks to Nuri - would supersede the United States - sponsored Northern Tier Entente. The next phase would be to strengthen its Arab character by including Syria. Iraq and Turkey could both pull economic and political strings in this country which, it was thought, could be made to join without too much difficulty. Nuri thought he could also guarantee the participation of Egypt, for the junta was not in principle hostile to the idea of a military bloc.

II. THE INITIAL ARAB REACTIONS TO THE
PROJECTED BAGHDAD PACT.
1955 TO EARLY 1956

A. THE SETTING IN SYRIA BEFORE THE RATIFICATION OF THE PACT.

The battle over the Baghdad pact was fought over Syria. This was because Syria has a central and very important status and position in the Arab world. Hence, the fate of the Baghdad pact was decided on the stage of internal Syrian politics.

The Syrian elections of September 1954, held seven months after Shishakli's downfall, "directed and in a sense

drew up the internal battle order for the next four years. One major issue overshadowed the election campaign: whether or not Syria join a western-sponsored Middle East defense pact." The elections were held, in relative conditions of freedom and orderliness.³⁸

The results were the following:

Independents	64
People's party	30
Ba'th party	22
National party	19
P . P . S .	2
Co-operative socialist party	2
Arab Liberation movement	2
Communist party	1
	<hr/>
Total	142

The outstanding features of these results were the emergence of the "Ba'th party, the halving of the

³⁸Gordon H. Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military 1945 - 1958, pp. 260 - 262.

strength of the People's party, Khalid Bagdash's election as the first communist deputy in the Arab world, and the return of a vast floating mass of Independents, outnumbering every organized group."³⁹ The elections also signified the "end of the traditional political forces and their replacement by the left-wing of the Arab Nationalist Movement, as exemplified by the Ba'th party."⁴⁰

The retardation of the People's party (which was the main base for Iraqi policies and aims towards Syria) marked the end of a long phase in Syrian-Iraqi relations. Hence, the Iraqi hope of uniting the Fertile Crescent by a majority vote in the Syrian chamber, had now to be abandoned. So, Iraq and her friends in Syria were driven to revise their strategy. They felt that only force could now decide the issue. Therefore, it was the results of the Syrian elections, as much as the Baghdad pact the following year, that opened a new phase of violent conspiracy.⁴¹

³⁹Patrick Seale, Struggle For Syria, pp. 164, 182.

⁴⁰Gorden H. Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military..., p. 263; and Arslan Humbaraci, Middle East Indictment, pp. 200 - 201.

⁴¹Patrick Seale, Struggle For Syria, pp. 184 - 185.

The elections marked the success of Neutrality in Arab opinion. The men and groups whom the elections revealed as the most powerful and dynamic in Syrian politics were all committed to rejecting treaties, pacts, and indeed any formal tie with the west. This change was ignored in London and Baghdad, but recognized in Cairo and Moscow. On September 25, the morrow of the elections, the Cairo daily al-Ahram carried the headline, "Syria rejects all pacts with the West."⁴² In ^{the} meantime, American opinion "seemed blind to everything except Khalid Bagdash's success; Newsweek, for example, declared in the last week of October 1954 that Syria had become the communist leader of the Arab world."⁴³

There were two broad groups who confronted each other in the new Syrian legislature. On the right stood a loose uneasy coalition of the National and People's parties, together with a group of about ten Independents led by Munir al-Ajlani calling themselves the Liberal Bloc - in all some sixty deputies. The left of the assembly consisted of the Ba'th led by Akram al-Haurani, the 'progressive' millionaire

⁴²Al-Ahram, as cited in the Arab world, September 25, 1954.

⁴³Patrick Seale, Struggle For Syria, p. 185.

Khalid al'Azem and his group of about thirty Independents calling themselves the Democratic Bloc, and the communist Khalid Baqdash - also some fifty to sixty deputies.⁴⁴

Faris al-Khuri formed his cabinet on October 29, 1954, relying on the National and People's parties. The Ba'th and 'Azem refused to take part and denounced the cabinet for 'deliberate and premediated deviation from the popular trend revealed at the elections'. As a consequence, Faris Bey declared his cabinet's opposition to all foreign alliances. Also, he said, in the debate which followed his statement of policy, that he would refuse even to consider a 'pledge, pact or agreement' with a foreign state. This announcement of neutralism did not convince Khuri's apponents in view of his known pro-western sentiments. So, they awaited his first departure from it to bring him down.⁴⁵

Until then Syrian politics did not reflect"much more than the feuds of her Arab neighbours. Syria was the target for poorly repeated Hashimite interventions which were countered and held in check by Saudi Arabia and Egypt: Saudi Arabia, hostile as ever to Hashimite expansionism; and

⁴⁴Gordon H. Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military..., pp. 261 - 262 .

⁴⁵Patrick Seale, Struggle For Syria, p. 215.

Egypt, opposed to an Iraqi-Syrian merger because it would have meant the rise of an Arab power strong enough to challenge her." The regime of Shishakli had given Syria some protection from these external pressures; but on February 25, 1954, by coincidence, as Nasser first ousted General Najib in Egypt, Shishakli fled into exile on the same day. At that time Nasser began to embrace a more coherent and dynamic Arab policy.⁴⁶

While the disputes for local leadership and dominance remained the Arabs' main concern, "wider cold war issues were imposed on them so that inter - Arab conflicts acquired a new ideological colouring. In Syria, the debate over the Baghdad pact provided the political occasion for the neutralist 'left' to seize the initiative and transform into a national policy the gains it had attained at the elections."⁴⁷

B. THE SETTING IN EGYPT BEFORE THE RATIFICATION OF THE PACT.

In this section we are going to discuss the immediate setting in Egypt before the ratification of the Baghdad pact on February 24, 1954; since the political trends under the

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid., the foregoing six paragraphs were based on Patrick Seale, Struggle For Syria.

new revolutionary regime changed from those practiced under the old monarchical rule.

Nasser's regime was fundamentally pro-western; it was also strongly anti-communist⁴⁸ and only 'neutralist' to the extent that it could not envisage joining a western-sponsored alliance while British troops were still on the Egyptian soil⁴⁹. The ex-Egyptian president, Mohammed Neguib, said: "It is only as free peoples capable of defending our freedom that we shall be able and willing to ally ourselves with the west, if the occasion should arise."⁵⁰ Meanwhile the Egyptian junta worked laboriously to conclude the Evacuation Agreement of the Suez Canal Base. The eight main articles of the 'heads of agreement' initialed on July 27, 1954, has been summarized as follows:⁵¹

⁴⁸George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 510.

⁴⁹See Mohammed Neguib, Egypt's Destiny, (London: Victor Gallancz Ltd., 1955), p. 251; see also Al-Ahram, August 31, 1954; November 22, 1954; December 20, 1954, where very similar pronouncements were given by Nasser and Salah Salem.

⁵⁰Mohammed Neguib, Egypt's Destiny, p. 261.

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 251 - 253.

"1. With a view to 'establishing Anglo-Egyptian relations on a basis of mutual understanding and friendship', the Treaty of 1936 shall be supplanted by a new agreement along the following lines:

"2. The Agreement will last for seven years. During the last of these seven years 'the two Governments will consult together to decide what arrangements are necessary upon the termination of the agreement.'

"3. 'parts of the present.... base will be kept in effecient working order.... and capable of immediate use in accordance with the following paragraph.

"4. (a) 'In the event of an armed attack by an outside power' on Egypt, any member of the League of Arab States, or Turkey, 'Egypt will afford to the United Kingdom such facilities as may be necessary' to reactivate the base and place it on a war footing.

" (b) 'In the event of a threat of an attack on any of the above - mentioned countries, there shall be immediate consultation between the United Kingdom and Egypt'.

"5. The base will be reorganized in accordance with Annex one.

"6. 'The United Kingdom will be accorded the right to move any British material into or out of the base at its discretion', but there will be no increase in the quantity of such material without the consent of the Egyptian Government.

"7. 'Her Majesty's forces will be completely withdrawn from Egyptian territory..... within twenty months from the date of signature of this

agreement. The Egyptian Government will afford all necessary facilities for the movement of men and material in this connection.'

"8. This agreement, while recognizing that the Suez Canal 'is an integral part of Egypt', will not affect the convention of 1888, whereby freedom of passage through the canal is guaranteed."

In the meantime, there were several indications that the junta wanted to co-operate with the west, and not with Soviet Russia.⁵² First there was the 'Strategic Note' of February 10, 1953, expressing the view that the security of the Eastern Mediterranean⁵³ rested upon: The evacuation of the Soviet submarine bases on the Albanian Coast of Dalmatia; the success of the Turkish army in defending the Tchankkale Straits; the defense of Egypt and Crete; the destruction of Soviet air bases in the Balkans and the resistance of the eastern and north-eastern Mediterranean countries. This note, which was issued during

⁵²Al-Ahram, December 20, 1954; see also George Lenscowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 510 - 511.

⁵³Nasser asked: In the event of an aggression on Turkey, where would be its source: The Soviet Union of course, Nasser answered Al-Ahram, August 22, 1954; The Moslem Brethern as well as the communists vehemently denounced the Suez Canal base Agreement as binding Egypt to the western defensive plans. The Arab World, August 3, 1954, p.4 .

the negotiations over the Canal base, was clearly anti-Russian. The Russians denounced the Agreement and accused Nasser of having 'betrayed' the Egyptian people. This accusation was followed by an anti-Nasser campaign launched from Radio Moscow. The real proof of Nasser's intentions, however, was his attempt to establish better relations with Turkey. In October 1954 Cairo officials began paving the way for a visit to Ankara by Nasser or Salah Salem. In Turkey, Zafer, the official newspaper, suddenly stopped its virulent attacks on the Egyptian leaders and printed an editorial full of praise to them. Ahmed Remzi, the then new Egyptian Ambassador to Ankara, told Mr. Humbaraci that 'the foundations of a closer co-operation had been laid. Official contacts will start soon.... this union [of Turkey and Egypt] will constitute a source of strength for Egypt and the Arab world'. In Cairo the Egyptians were entertaining a Turkish mission, headed by General Fouad Djebesoy and the Governor of Ankara, to prepare the ground for official negotiations.⁵⁴

Nasser had more than recognized the strategic importance of Turkey in relation to Egypt and the Arab world.

⁵⁴Arslan Humbaraci, Middle East Indictment, p. 193.

A few months before the Baghdad pact was signed on February 24, 1955, Nasser had written the foreward of a book published in Cairo in 1954 dealing with Turkey and the Arab policy from the beginning of the Ottoman Caliphate till the successors of Ataturk. Here are some extracts as quoted in the book of Chamoun.

"Whatever our relations might have been in the past and whatever they might be in the present, Turkey is a piece of ourselves as we are a portion of its being. Our father and its father were, in history, two brothers associated in the joys of life and in its mishaps, in its happiness and in its distress. We have fought side by side on the same battle ground for long centuries for the triumph of superior ideals. And when the forces of aggression rose against us to dispute our position in history, Turkey was the first objective of the aggressors and we were behind it.

".... we will continue to be, in relation to Turkey, what we have been in the past brothers animated by sincere feelings for a sister of the same blood; and if history has separated them, her heart nonetheless continues to express the affection of a true sister and the heart of her brothers returns the same affection.

".... If Turkey, therefore is safe and sound, we are safe and sound. And if we are strong enough to give our enemies something to think about, Turkey is saved.

"We are for it the protecting shield. By its attitude toward the enemy she acts as our shield. Our destinies are United in both cases, and our links of parenthood are formed: Fraternity in happiness and in distress in the present and in

the past as ever in the future."⁵⁵

In this atmosphere the Soviets felt isolated in Cairo. Peter Egorov, the head of the Tass bureau, complained bitterly that he was not allowed a single local assistant and that he was forbidden to distribute Tass news to the Egyptian press. When Daniel Solod, the Soviet Ambassador, requested an interview with Nasser, he had to wait four days for an answer. "Only after he had complained to the Indian Ambassador, who told Nasser that it was not diplomatic to make the representative of the U.S.S.R. queue in this way, was his request granted; even then he got a very cold reception."⁵⁶

This did not mean that Nasser and the Egyptian junta were willing to enter into alliance with the west. On the contrary, Nasser had made many announcements at the end of 1954 and the beginning of 1955 to the effect that the best defense of the Middle East is that which emerges from the states themselves as free strong states capable

⁵⁵Camille Chamoun, Crise au Moyen-Orient, (in French), (France: Gallimard, 1963), pp. 319 - 320; In the meantime the Egyptian Akhbar al Yom, welcomed the report that Turkey wants rapproachment with the Arabs, as cited in the Arab world, November 26, 1954, p. 7

⁵⁶Arslan Humbaraci, Middle East Indictment, pp. 192 - 194.

of defending their freedom. If, ultimately, there is going to be any kind of alliance with the west, it is only after the Arabs became completely free of western domination, and became strong enough that may comprehend entering an alliance.⁵⁷

The honeymoon of Egypt with the west did not last long. Only a year later the Soviet position in Egypt was completely reversed. Egorov had as many assistants as he wanted; Egyptian papers were filled with Soviet propaganda. The paramount factors behind this major shift against the west were the Turco-Iraqi pressure on Egypt to sign the Baghdad pact; the Gaza raid by Israel; the Bandung Conference; and the success of pro-Nasser forces in Syria.

Nasser did in fact link Egypt indirectly with the western alliance by agreeing to allow a reactivation of the base in the event of an attack on Turkey. But Britain and America were anxious to see their projects realized, Nuri pleaded for Arab leadership, and Turkey wanted to see the military alliance concluded. Together they tried to bring pressure to bear on Egypt.

⁵⁷Review Al-Ahram, December 20 - 27, 1954, and January 18 - 21, 1955; and February 25 - 27, 1955.

However, the hasty conclusion of the Baghdad pact showed how little regard Nuri as-Sa'id had for Egyptian opinion - and his desire to make sure of the leadership of the Arabs while Nasser was in a difficult position.⁵⁸ When the Baghdad pact was formed, Cairo described it as a 'stab in the back.'⁵⁹ In the meantime, the conclusion of the Baghdad pact was considered as a calamity from Nasser's point of view. Nasser and his colleagues opposed a defensive alliance with the west because they thought it contrary to the national interest of the Arab world. In addition, such an alliance would split the Arab camp, making it impossible for Nasser to carry out his plans for the unification of the Arab world. Hence the Baghdad pact aroused Cairo's bitter enmity and inclined Nasser to a progressive rapprochement with the Soviet Union in the summer of 1955.⁶⁰

⁵⁸An attempt had been made on Nasser's life and he had just dissolved the powerful Moslem brotherhood, which had been heavily infiltrated by communists. At that time Moscow was backing this religious organization. Nasser, in the meantime, was violently attacked by the voice of National Independence and Peace, the communist station broadcasting in Arabic from Budapest, which accused him of turning the country 'Fascist' by suppressing 'the most powerful nationalist organization in Egypt.' Arslan Humbaraci, Middle East Indictment, p. 195.

⁵⁹Ibid, p. 196.

⁶⁰Walter Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, p. 213 .

The Israeli attack on Gaza of February 28, 1955, which came four days after the conclusion of the Baghdad pact, was intended to 'trap Nasser'. Mr. Humbaraci claims that it was hoped that, if it did not result in the collapse of his regime, then it would certainly force him to seek the security of an alliance with the west; since it was only in this way that Nasser could obtain the arms he needed so badly. This was the point of view of the west, as well as that of the Turks, Israelis and Iraqis. Mr. Humbaraci also claims that since the Israelis had been dismayed by the British withdrawal from the Suez base, they considered it essential for their security that Egypt should join a western alliance, for the west, then, would ensure that any arms received would not be turned against them.⁶¹

Another factor would be added: the increasing anti-western feeling and the growing radicalization of the Arab intelligentsia from the late thirties onwards. So, the idea of closer cooperation with the Soviet Union, even of an arms deal, was not at all new; it had been mentioned before

⁶¹Arslan Humbaraci, Middle East Indictment, pp. 197 - 198. For another point of view or interpretation, see Walter Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, pp. 213 - 214; See also Al-Gumhuryia, as cited in the Arab world, March 3, 1955, p. 6, which gives a similar interpretation to Mr. Humbaraci.

as a very desirable possibility.⁶²

The full significance of the Asian-African conference at Bandung in April 1955 has "passed the west by". It was a turning in the history of Asia and Africa because it gave their peoples a sense of identity and self-confidence. Thus the African and Asian peoples as well as the statesmen began to recognize their own potential power aside from either the west or the East. They also felt that they could embark on new independent policies irrespective of the big powers.⁶³

At Bandung, president Nasser realized that a 'Neutralist' policy was advantageous on all fronts - particularly the home front. Nasser's shift to the right in 1954, when he compromised with London on the evacuation of the canal base⁶⁴, had evoked little popular enthusiasm. But when he returned from Bandung he was given a hero's

⁶²Walter Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, p. 214.

⁶³Egypt's Al Akhbar, cited almost the same ideas as above and added that Egypt is the largest African and Arab nation participating in the conference, thus possessed of leadership in both spheres. Egypt's main concern, according to the paper, is to bring about the downfall of imperialism, (cited in the Arab world, March 18, 1955, p. 7).

⁶⁴Nasser and Salah Salem had announced that the junta accepted the condition of the British to reoccupy the Suez base in case there was an attack on Turkey or any of the Arab League States, as a tactical step on their part to attain British evacuation. Al-Ahram, July 30, 1954.

welcome and his picture placed between Nehru's and Chou En-lai's.⁶⁵

Hence, we can recognize that there is part of truth in each of these arguments, but all of them together, offer a satisfactory explanation as the factors which led Egypt, in the mid-fifties, to adopt a neutral policy as well as closer cooperation with, and increasing reliance on, the Soviet Union.

C. THE ARAB PREMIERS ' CONFERENCE - JANUARY 22, 1955.

It will be recalled that on January 13, 1955, a joint announcement from Baghdad and Istanbul declared the intention of Iraq and Turkey to "extend their mutual co-operation" with the general object of ensuring "the stability and security of the Middle East". What this meant, was that Iraq proposed to take sides in the cold war between East and West, align herself with the Turks, and divorce herself from Arab solidarity. Unity in the Arab world was the over-riding aim to be pursued at any cost, but Iraq was forsaking her responsibilities and

⁶⁵Arslan Humbaraci, Middle East Indictment, p. 199; The foregoing section was based on this source.

allying herself with those powers whose principal aim was to make every independent country a 'bastion against the Soviet Union, especially if it happened to contain oil'.⁶⁶

The trouble with Iraq's action was that it was taken without prior discussion with the remaining Arab States. The advantages offered by a total Arab alignment with Turkey in the sphere of defense would be considerable. But Iraq decided to act individually, without reference to her sister Arab states, and thus worked against the cause of Arab unity.⁶⁷

Egypt's reaction was immediate. Nasser started a violent propaganda attack against Turkey and Iraq and asked for an urgent meeting of the member states of the Arab League. Egypt hoped from this meeting to obtain a vote for a resolution which, by condemning the Iraqi government, would have prevented what was to become the Baghdad pact from being signed.⁶⁸

The Arab premiers conference held its first meeting on Saturday of January 22, 1955, at the Egyptian Foreign

⁶⁶Emile Bustani, Marsh Arabesque, (London: Robert Hale Ltd., 1961), pp. 106 - 107 .

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 107. See also Lebanon's Al-Jarida, Bayraq, Beirut - Massa, and Telegraph, as cited in the Arab world, January 14, 1955, pp. 2 - 3.

⁶⁸Emile Bustani, Marsh Arabesque, p. 107 .

ministry in Cairo. Members in attendance were:⁶⁹

- "Lebanon: Sami al-Solh, premier, Alfred Naccache, Foreign Minister, Fuad Ammoun, Foreign ministry Director General.
- Syria: Faris Khoury, premier, Faidhy Atassi, Foreign minister.
- Jordan: Tawfik Aboul Huda, premier, and the Foreign Minister.
- Egypt: Gamal Abdel Nasser, premier, Mahmoud Fawzi, the Foreign minister.
- Saudi Arabia: Amir Feisal, premier."

Afterwards, the Yemenite representative attended, since he could not make it in time. The Libyan premier, Mr. Mustafa Ben Halim, also came late. The Iraqi premier, Nuri as-Sa'id refused to attend, giving reasons of ill health. But after repeated appeals from the conference, he agreed to send Mr. Fadhel Jamali, a former premier, accompanied by the vice-premier, Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, and the Deputy Foreign Minister, Burham al-Din Bashayan, who arrived in Cairo on January 26, 1955.⁷⁰

The agenda of the conference included the following items.⁷¹

⁶⁹The Arab world, January 24, 1955, p. 4

⁷⁰Camille Chamoun, Crise Au Moyen - Orient, p. 263.

⁷¹Sami al-Solh, Memoirs of Sami Beck al-Solh, (in arabic), (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr Press, 1960), p. 239.

- "1. The International situation
- "2. The principal outlines of the Arab policies.

This included Foreign policies; the Arab League; and the strengthening of relations among the Arab states in economic and military co-operation.

- "3. The discussion of the Turco-Iraqi Agreement".

The resolutions of the Arab Foreign ministers in Cairo, unanimously approved at an ordinary session of the Arab League Council, November 29 - December 12, 1954, were the following:⁷²

"1. The foreign policy of the Arab countries should be based on the Arab League Charter, the inter-Arab Collective Security and Economic Co-operation Pact, and the United Nations Charter. This foreign policy does not admit any other pacts.

"2. Co-operation between Arab States and the west should be subject to two conditions:

(a) Finding a just solution to Arab problems.

(b) Allowing the Arab States to acquire the necessary power for the preservation of their security and integrity from any aggression, without detriment to their sovereignty."

However, it was understood from other sources (in the absence of an official League communiqué), that Iraq made

⁷²Ibid.

'clear and absolute' reservations to this resolution of the Arab Foreign ministers⁷³ claiming that Iraq has the right to conclude treaties to ensure the defense of her independence and integrity. Musa Shabandar, the then Iraqi Foreign minister, went so far as to declare in Damascus on December 22, 1954, that "all the current agitation about Arab-western collaboration did not make sense inasmuch as the Arabs had had, and continued to have, many ties (including the military) with the west."⁷⁴

The resolutions of the Arab Foreign ministers were discussed in the conference of Arab premiers. It was on the basis of these resolutions that Egypt and Saudi Arabia accused Iraq of deviation from Arab policy.

The main arguments that were advanced by the Iraqi delegation during the Arab premiers conference to defend and justify the ratification of the Baghdad pact were, in brief, the following:

It was neither feasible nor moral to keep out of the global cold war which involved the major powers and

⁷³George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, p. 646.

⁷⁴Ibid.

the destiny of civilization.⁷⁵ Iraq had chosen the west and proceeded to build her policy accordingly. In order to face up to the communist threat, it was necessary to obtain armaments and to join in regional organization designed not only to combat communist danger from without, but also to eliminate communist subversion from within.⁷⁶ This was especially important to Iraq in view of her proximity to the Soviet borders. Iraq was asking for the right to co-operate with her neighbours Turkey and Iran in the context of a regional organization. This was nothing unusual or new to Iraq. Since the days of Feisal the First, Iraq consistently co-operated closely with Iran and Turkey. King Feisal the First signed a Treaty of Friendship with Iraq and Turkey in 1922, and Iraq was a party to the Treaty of Sa'ad Abad in 1937 and to the Treaty of Friendship and co-operation with Turkey signed in 1946.⁷⁷ Therefore, the proposed Treaty with Turkey, was simply a

⁷⁵See the report of Dr. Fadhil Jamali to the Iraqi House of Deputies, February 6, 1955. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs (1955), ed., by Noble Frand land(London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 319; See also the Arab world, January 27, 1955, p. 2.

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷The report of Sami al-Solh on the Conference of Cairo: An-Nahar, February 8, 1955.

continuation of the traditional policy of friendship and co-operation between Iraq and her neighbours. The proposed Turkish-Iraqi Treaty was justified under Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter which provided for the right of individual or collective self defense and for regional arrangements related to the maintenance of international peace and security.⁷⁸

The Iraqi delegates were critical of the negative policy of the Arab States which, in their opinion, led to isolation and weakness.⁷⁹ In their opinion, the Arab States could not successfully seek either armaments or assistance from the west without offering something in return.⁸⁰ It was maintained that since the Arabs were not ready to collaborate with the communists, their only source of armament was the west, and Arab-western co-operation was the only feasible way to obtain armaments needed by the Arabs.⁸¹ Moreover, the Iraqi government believed that Arab-western collaboration on the international front would facilitate the use of western diplomacy to alleviate in-

⁷⁸R.I.I.A., Documents on International Affairs (1955), p. 318.

⁷⁹Ibid., pp. 319 - 320.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 319

⁸¹Ibid., p. 319.

justices which the west inflicted on the Arabs in the past.⁸²

The Iraqi delegation believed that a policy of Arab-western co-operation would give adequate protection against Israel, and lead to a solution of the Palestinian problem which would be satisfactory to the Arabs.

Dr. Jamali, having explained the major lines of the policy of Iraq, proceeded to defend Turkey from an Arab point of view. He reminded the delegates that Turkey in 1947 voted against the partition of Palestine and persuaded Greece to withstand western pressure and vote for the Arabs as well.⁸³ He told the conference that Turkey was willing to assist the Arab States against an Israeli aggression and to support the implementation of the U.N. 1947 partition resolution.⁸⁴

In the opinion of the Iraqi government, Iraq under Art. II of the Arab Collective Security Pact, and under Art. VII, and paragraph 2 of Art. IX of the Arab League Charter

⁸²Ibid., p. 319.

⁸³Ibid., p. 320.

⁸⁴An-Nahar , February 8, 1955.

had the right to conclude a special agreement with a neighbouring state.⁸⁵ The Iraqi delegates assured the Arab States that Iraq still considered herself committed to the provisions of the Arab League Charter and other Treaties signed under the auspices of the Arab League.⁸⁶ Moreover, Iraq had to rid itself of the 1930 Anglo Iraqi Treaty and it had to regulate its relations with Britain on a basis of equality and collaboration. A mutual arrangement would be the best way out. The Baghdad pact provided this arrangement.⁸⁷

The Egyptian counter argument ran as follows:

Egypt, contrary to Iraq, did not take a position with regard to the global cold war. It was three months later, in April, 1955, at the conference of Bandung, that Egypt for the first time adopted a policy of non-alignment. At this conference Egypt concerned herself with the problems

⁸⁵R.I.I.A., Documents on International Affairs, (1955), p. 320.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 318. See also Sami al-Solh, Memoirs of Sami al-Solh, pp. 239 - 240.

⁸⁷Dr. Mohammed Fadhel Jamali, Review of Iraq under General Nuri, by Waldemar Gallman, Middle East Forum, (Beirut: Alumni Association of the American University of Beirut, Autumn 1964), pp. 15 - 16.

of the Arab world, primarily with colonialism and the question of Palestine .

Egypt maintained that the Arab States should rely primarily on themselves to provide for the defense as well as for the economic and cultural development of the Arab world.⁸⁸ The Charter of the Arab League, the Arab Collective Security Pact, and other treaties concluded among the Arab States under the auspices of the Arab League provided, from the Egyptian point of view, ample machinery for the attainment of Arab objectives including those related to matters of defense. Therefore, the Egyptian delegation concluded, if the Arab States unified their foreign policy and co-ordinated their defense arrangements within the framework of the Arab League, they could impose themselves on the west and purchase the necessary armaments from western arsenals on their own terms.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Muhammed Khalil, edi., "Egyptian Government's Reply to prime minister Nuri as-Sa'id's Radio Speech of December 16, 1956", The Arab League and the Arab States, pp. 280; See also Al-Ahram, August 31, 1955.

⁸⁹ R.I.I.A., Documents on International Affairs, (1955), p. 323; See also An-Nahar, February 8, 1955.

It was argued that a military alliance between Iraq and Turkey was an expansion of military commitments to all the signatories of the Arab Collective Security Pact.⁹⁰ Therefore, the Egyptian delegation concluded that Iraq had got no right to conclude such an alliance without the prior concurrence of the Arab States.⁹¹ The Egyptian delegation maintained that if Iraq signed an alliance with Turkey without the concurrence of other Arab States, she would be violating her commitments under the Charter of the Arab League, The Arab Collective Security Pact, and the recommendations of the Arab Foreign ministers taken at Cairo in December 1954.⁹² The recommendation stated that the foreign policy of the Arab States prohibited the conclusion of alliances with foreign powers.⁹³

The Egyptian delegation maintained that Turkish

⁹⁰An-Nahar, February 8,

⁹¹R.I.I.A., Documents on International Affairs, (1955), p. 314.

⁹²An-Nahar, February 8, 1955; See also Report by Fadhil Jamali: R.I.I.A., Documents on International Affairs, (1955), p. 314 .

⁹³Sami al-Solh, Memoirs of Sami al-Solh, p. 239; See also The official Lebanese Gazzete, minutes of the Lebanese Legislative Assembly, First ordinary session, 2nd meeting, April 19, 1956, p. 1199.

guarantees against Israeli aggression, and Turkish promises to support the implementation of the U.N. Partition Resolution, were of no value. It was argued that the western powers under the Tripartite Declaration had already given guarantees against Israeli aggression, and that if the western powers failed to deter Israel, Turkey would not be in a position to assist the Arabs.⁹⁴ Similarly, the Egyptians argued, as long as the western powers were not ready to implement the partition Resolution, Turkey's promises of bringing about a just solution to the question of Palestine would not be useful.⁹⁵

The Egyptian Government contended that the proposed Turkish-Iraqi alliance would weaken the solidarity of the Arab States and lead to a new Turkish domination over the Arab world.⁹⁶ Likewise, the Egyptian delegation believed that the linking of the Arab world to the wheels of western alliances would improve the capability of the colonial powers to hold on to their colonial and imperialistic privileges in the Arab world. Above all, the Egyptian delegation contended, Iraq, by advocating an alliance with

94 Ibid.

95 An-Nahar, February 8, 1955.

96 Ibid., for Egypt's propaganda attack on the Turco-Iraqi pact, see Egypt's, Al Gumhuria and Al Akhbar as cited in the Arab World, January 27, 1955, p. 7.; and The Arab World, January 28, 1955, p. 2.

the west, was taking the first step for the liquidation of the problem of Palestine.⁹⁷

Saudi Arabia adopted the same attitude as that of Egypt. These were the main lines of the Iraqi and Egyptian Arguments at the conference of Cairo. Their significance was that they represented two schools in the Arab world: The conservative, pro-western school, advocating that Arab western collaboration would contribute to a just solution of Arab problems; and the dynamic school, advocating that Arab western collaboration would only aggravate Arab problems, and that the only course left for the Arabs was total reliance on their own resources for the alleviation of their grievances.

Each school had its followers in every Arab State, including Lebanon. The followers of the pro-western school were motivated by the tradition of Arab-western relations and by fear of communism as a system and a way of life. Their opponents, of the independent or dynamic school, were motivated by the suspicion of the west which was nurtured by the western colonial record and the heritage of medieval Christian-Islamic rivalry. Both schools stood for Arab rights in Palestine and for the liquidation of colonial controls and privileges in the

⁹⁷ R.I.I.A., Documents on International Affairs, (1955), p. 317, See also Egypt's Al Gumhuria as cited in the Arab world, January 26, 1955, p. 7.

Arab world, but they differed as to the means necessary for the achievement of these goals. The independents or dynamic Arab Nationalism were radical, seeking to force concessions from the west through revolutionary means. The conservative, pro-western Arab Nationalists were moderates, seeking concessions from the west through co-operation.

The conflict between Iraq and Egypt at the Cairo conference was, therefore, more than a traditional conflict of two leading powers in the Arab League. There was a new element which introduced a radical change to the nature of the conflict, an element of approach and outlook which involved currents of public opinion in the Arab world.

Concerning the attitude of the Jordanian delegation, the then Jordanian premier Tawfiq Abul Huda maintained that his delegation embarked on a moderate attitude. It did not encourage the premiers conference to take any measures against Iraq, nor did it support Iraq in her step of allying herself with Turkey.⁹⁸

The Lebanese attitude was somewhat similar to that

⁹⁸An interview with the ex-Lebanese premier, Sami al-Solh, and the then head of the delegation to the Arab premier's conference, Beirut, April 25, 1965.

of the Jordanian. The Lebanese Government, like other Arab Governments, was caught up in the web of the irreconcilable Iraqi-Egyptian dispute. The attitude of Egypt furnished a dilemma to the Arab States who desired to pursue a neutral course and dissociate themselves from the conflict. Egypt was demanding from the Arab states no less than straight alignment against Iraq. Any position falling short of that demand was considered by the Egyptian government as unfriendly. On the other hand compliance with Egyptian demands would have amounted to a clear anti-Iraqi policy. In either case a conflict with either Egypt or Iraq could not be avoided. ⁹⁹

Some of the Arab States participating in the Arab premiers conference scheduled on January 22, 1955, at Cairo, observed that it was unusual. Egypt as the host government had issued invitations to all the Arab States with the exception of Iraq.¹⁰⁰ Egyptian State controlled press and radio media had been daily attacking the Government of Iraq. This behavior created the impression that the Egyptian

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰Sami al-Solh, Memoirs of Sami al-Solh, p. 246.

government was inclined to hold more of a trial for Iraq, rather than a discussion of Iraqi policy.¹⁰¹

A few days before the conference was scheduled to convene, Nuri as-Sa'id sent a special envoy to Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon on a mission to explain the policy of Iraq and to demand of these governments a boycott of the Egyptian sponsored conference.¹⁰² Iraq was evidently seeking to give a blow to Nasser's prestige and bidding for time to sign officially the prospective Turco-Iraqi Alliance. So, when Jamali arrived in Beirut on January 20, after his tour of Jordan and Syria, he was under the impression that if Lebanon agreed to a boycott of the Cairo conference, Jordan and Syria would follow suit.¹⁰³

President Chamoun of the Lebanese Republic was willing to accept the Iraqi suggestion of boycotting the conference, but prime minister Sami al-Solh was not of the same opinion.¹⁰⁴ Premier al-Solh, facing the joint pressure

¹⁰¹An interview with the ex-Lebanese premier and the then head of the delegation to the Arab premiers conference, Beirut; April 25, 1965.

¹⁰²An-Nahar, January 20 and 21, 1955; See also Sami al-Solh, Memoirs of Sami al-Solh, p. 238.

¹⁰³Sami al-Solh, Memoirs of Sami al-Solh, p. 238

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

of the president and the Iraqi diplomats, threatened to hand in his resignation if he was not allowed to attend the conference.¹⁰⁵ The president was thus faced with two alternatives: either create a cabinet crisis, or allow al-Solh to attend the conference. He chose the latter course. With the departure of the Lebanese delegation under Sami al-Solh to Cairo, Jamali realized that his efforts to boycott the conference had failed.

The insistence of premier al-Solh on departure to Cairo was more of an effort to avoid open confrontation with the Egyptian government than a design to oppose the substance of Iraqi policy. But with the polarization of Iraq and Egypt it was almost impossible to make any move without offending one or the other party to the dispute.¹⁰⁶

In the course of the conference at Cairo, the prime minister had many factors to consider. He was aware that President Chamoun was inclined towards Iraq and that by insisting on attending the conference he had already strained the patience of the president to the limits.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵Ibid.

¹⁰⁶An interview with ex-premier Sami al-Solh, Beirut, April 25, 1965.

¹⁰⁷Sami al-Solh, Memoirs of Sami al-Solh, p. 238.

He had also to consider the opinion of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nakkash, who shared President Chamoun's pro-Iraqi inclinations.¹⁰⁸ Likewise, the Premier had to consider the recommendations of the parliamentary committee of Foreign Affairs. The committee had recommended, in traditional Lebanese fashion, that the government should strive to achieve an understanding among the parties to the dispute, and that, in case a compromise could not be achieved, the Lebanese delegation should endeavor to suspend talks until a solution to the dispute could be found.¹⁰⁹

The actual Lebanese policy at Cairo amounted to what had been recommended by the Foreign Affairs committee.¹¹⁰ On arrival, premier al-Solh, together with premier Khoury of Syria, proceeded to prepare the atmosphere for a compromise. They demanded of the Egyptian government the suspension of radio and press campaigns and the extension of an official invitation to Iraq.¹¹¹ The Egyptian government did not extend an invitation, but agreed to the will of the majority of the conferees that premier al-Solh be authorized to extend an

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

¹¹⁰Ibid., p. 242.

¹¹¹Ibid., p. 246.

invitation to Iraq on behalf of the conference.¹¹² Sami al-Solh immediately got in touch with the Iraqi government; and president Chamoun, with the assistance of the British Ambassador in Beirut, undertook to convince Jamali that it was in the best interest of Iraq to be represented at the conference.¹¹³ It was argued that if Iraq absented herself, Egypt would be in a better position to influence the delegations at Cairo.¹¹⁴ Nuri as-Sa'id was ill-disposed to attend, for Egyptian radio and press media had already attacked him personally. He, however, consented reluctantly to send a delegation under the leadership of Fadhil Jamali. The atmosphere, due to Egyptian attacks, was not conducive for a compromise, despite the efforts of the Lebanese and Syrian delegations. Premier al-Solh reported that the voice of the Iraqi delegates could hardly be heard among the shoutings and interruptions of the Egyptian and Saudi delegates.¹¹⁵ Egypt,

¹¹²Ibid.

¹¹³Ibid.

¹¹⁴See Cable No. 9 from Fadhil Jamali to Nuri as-Sa'id, 22/1/1955: The Government of Iraq, The Iraqi Trials (1955), (Baghdad: Government press), p. 1133.

¹¹⁵Sami al-Solh, Memoirs of Sami al-Solh, p. 246.

against the advice of Lebanon, continued to wage a war of words against the Iraqi Government. While the Iraqi delegation was in Cairo, Al-Ahram, a leading Egyptian paper, wrote the following headline: "The conspiracy of Iraq and Turkey on the Arab States." It addressed the premier of Iraq by his first name for derogation.¹¹⁶ Radio Cairo, in a program called "The voice of the Arabs", described Nuri as-Sa'id with such words as "Traitor", "tail of the imperialists", and "servant of Britain."¹¹⁷

Most of the Arab States including, Lebanon agreed, with Egypt in principle, that any defense commitments by Iraq would be tantamount to additional military commitments on the Arab States in view of their military obligations under the Charter of the Arab League and the Arab Collective Security Pact.¹¹⁸ Therefore, it was concluded, Iraq would have to secure the approval of the majority of the Arab States on questions regarding alliances with non Arab States. When

¹¹⁶An-Nahar, January 28, 1955.

¹¹⁷Ibid.

¹¹⁸R.I.I.A., Documents on International Affairs, (1955), p. 235; see also Sami al-Solh, Memoirs of Sami al-Solh, p. 248 .

proposals were submitted to this effect, Iraq refused to accept them. The Lebanese delegation, on instructions from president Chamoun, refused to endorse the proposals on the pretext that further efforts should be made to bridge the gap between Iraq and Egypt.¹¹⁹ In reality Chamoun and al-Solh were opposing the isolation of Iraq.¹²⁰

On the suggestion of the Jordanian Foreign minister, Walid Salah, and in order to break the deadlock at the Cairo Conference, the Arab premiers decided on January 30 to adjourn their meetings for a few days while a four-man delegation visited Nuri as-Sa'id in Baghdad. It consisted of the Lebanese premier, the Jordanian and Syrian Foreign Ministers, and Major Salah Salem. The delegation wished to explain the situation to Nuri as-Sa'id. They hoped that:¹²¹

1 - They would persuade Iraq to postpone signing the Turco-Iraqi Agreement.

2 - In time, some sort of accommodation would have been found between Iraq on the one hand and Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the other.

¹¹⁹R.I.I.A., Documents on International Affairs, (1955), p. 323; also Al-Ahram, February 22, 1955.

¹²⁰Cable from Burhan Eddine Bashayan, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, To Premier as-Sa'id: The Government of Iraq, The Iraqi Trials (1958), vol. IV, (Baghdad: Government press, -), p. 1395.

¹²¹An-Nahar, February 1, 1955.

The late Lebanese deputy, Mr. Emile Bustani, who participated, unofficially, in the talks of the four-man delegation with Nuri as-Sa'id, gave the following version of what happened. After arguing with Nuri, Mr. Bustani obtained no more from him than the 'brusque' declaration that he was not going to seek Egypt's permission to follow policies which he believed to be right. But, meanwhile, Nuri told Bustani that he was prepared to divide the proposed Turco-Iraqi Agreement into two "compartments". The first would cover the joint security of the border region between the two countries, which was a matter for them alone. The second would embrace the far larger question of Middle East defense as a whole. He was, Nuri said, quite willing that the Arab League, rather than Iraq alone, should deal with Turkey on all matters logically falling into compartment two. Then, Bustani told Salah Salem about Nuri's modifications who "brightened enormously when he heard his tidings". "Our difficulties", Salem said, "are as good as over".¹²² Bustani continues:

"But, alas, they were not. Salem - as I came to learn later - was approached separately and secretly by two treacherous Iraqi politicians, each of whom -

¹²²Emile Bustani, Marsh Arabesque, p. 110.

despite the fact that both were members of the official delegation appointed by Nuri to treat with Salem - urged him to oppose Nuri tooth and nail in the forthcoming discussion, on the grounds that the veteran leader would wilt under pressure and retract his proposals for an alliance with Turkey in any shape or form. Salah Salem, granting their protestation much more weight than they merited, proceeded to attack Nuri bitterly and theatrically. Nuri did anything but wilt. The conference degenerated into a slanging match, and the "compartment" device which Nuri had outlined to me was not even mentioned. Deadlock was early achieved in the talks, and steadily maintained".¹²³

During the talks in Baghdad between the four-man delegation and Nuri, the then president of the Lebanese Republic, Camille Chamoun, sent them the following telegram, addressed to the Lebanese premier, in an effort at reconciliation. After Chamoun reminded the premier of the acute crises going through the Arab League and that the present vital Arab interest is to find a compromise solution for the contradictory arguments in favor and against the Turco-Iraqi Treaty, he requested that the premier should submit to the head of the Iraqi government, in case the delegates did not reach a compromise, the following propositions:¹²⁴

"1 - Postponment for four months of the signature of the Turco-Iraqi Treaty. This delay

¹²³Ibid.

¹²⁴Camille Chamoun, Crise Au Moyen-Orient, pp. 263 - 264.

might give occasion for useful contacts between Egypt and the Arab countries on the one hand and the western countries and Turkey on the other hand.

"2 - A meeting in Beirut of the heads of governments of Egypt, Iraq and other Arab countries which would pave the way to the opening of a final conference in Cairo."

Then Camille Chamoun sent Nasser a copy of the proposals he had sent to the four-man delegation conferring with Nuri. The Iraqi government rejected the first point and accepted the second.¹²⁵ Nasser, reluctant on the second point, but finally persuaded by a Lebanese delegate, put forth a condition: that two questions should be sent to Nuri as-Sa'id, whose answers should be the basis upon which Nasser would define his last stand or position. The questions were:¹²⁶

"1 - Is Nuri as-Sa'id willing to discuss the principles of the Turco-Iraqi Pact? Or is he still determined to go on with the pact without accepting any arguments from the other Arab states?"

"2 - Is Nuri willing to accept the majority rule of the Arab states in the proposed meeting in Beirut in case the majority decided that the pact

¹²⁵Ibid.

¹²⁶Ibid., p. 265.

was useless to the Arab States?"

Soon, Nuri as-Sa'id sent his answer to the two questions:¹²⁷

"1 - The Turco-Iraqi Agreement is in conformity with the Arab League Pact.

"2 - The majority rule is against sovereignty which is guaranteed by the pact."

But the Egyptian minister for National guidance has recorded another version of what took place in Baghdad during the talks between the four-man delegation and Nuri as-Sa'id. Salem says that he repeated his argument to Nuri during their first meeting. In the same evening, Salem maintains, he was visited by several Iraqi elder statesmen, such as Tawfiq as-Suwaidi and others. Each of them came separately and spoke against Nuri and his mania for pacts. Apparently, Nuri was informed of these visits; for he summoned Salem to his house where he found all the politicians who had visited him. In this meeting, Nuri, addressed Salem saying:¹²⁸

"I have assembled for you all the ex-premiers and ex-Foreign ministers who are still alive in my country. I want you to ~~here~~ our policy from them."

¹²⁷Ibid.

¹²⁸Patrick Seale, Struggle For Syria, p. 217.

Each of the politicians repeated Nuri's arguments. They never saw Salem again. Nuri's parting words to Salem were: "I am not a soldier in Abdel-Nasser's army. Please tell him that I will never obey his orders."¹²⁹

The mission flew back to Cairo to report to the Arab premiers on their talks with Nuri as-Sa'id.

Meanwhile, Chamoun's policy was that economic, political and military cooperation on a regional basis with neighbouring states such as Turkey, Iran and Pakistan would give the Arabs the power of negotiation and at the same time would get the Arab states out of isolation. Moreover, Chamoun sent a letter on February 8, 1955, to Cairo, through Mr. Nadim Dimashkiah (then Lebanese Ambassador in Cairo) pointing out to Nasser that he disagrees with him over forbidding Arab countries from holding alliances with foreign states. Chamoun then presented his policy in the form of questions and statements to Nasser. Chamoun asked in his letter:¹³⁰

"1 - Is Egypt's threat to withdraw final? and what is the new trend in this case?

"2 - Does Egypt think that the Arab Collective

¹²⁹Ibid.

¹³⁰Camille Chamoun, Crise Au-Moyen-Orient, p. 266.

Security Pact is the only means of defense. Doesn't she think that this pact never had a positive outcome ?

"3 - Does she consider non-alignment a valid principle in international politics ? Doesn't we see that U.S.A., Britain and U.S.S.R. make alliances ?

"4 - If we follow this principle (of non-alignment), the Arab countries would be isolated and deprived of international friendships, and we would be deprived of cultural ties with other states.

"5 - Do you think that an alliance between the Moslem States and Arab countries would endanger the sovereignty of the Arab States ? These alliances, on the contrary, would strengthen these states.

"6 - Isn't Egypt tied to Britain by the Evacuation Treaty of the Suez Canal base? If an additional pact is added to this treaty, wouldn't this increase Egypt's power? Would there be any disadvantage in that ?

"7 - Would there be any harm for Egypt in holding a conference for the Arab States and Turkey, Iran and Pakistan for the purpose of regional defense ? Would not the last word be up to the Arabs, due to the importance of their geographic position and resources. Thus we get out of our isolation with dignity, having preserved our unity and gained additional power".

While the Arab premiers conference was still in progress, Emile Bustani, flew to England early in February,

and did every thing he could to persuade the British government against encouraging the proposed Turco-Iraqi pact in the face of the general Arab condemnation of it.¹³¹ His views were not accepted. But, since a commonwealth conference was then assembled in London, Bustani talked with the then Pakistani premier, Mohammed Ali, who promised to discuss the matter with Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary. The next day Mohammed Ali said that Eden had assured him that he would talk things in detail with Nasser on his way to Karachi for the SEATO meeting.¹³²

Not long afterwards, Bustani saw Eden in Karachi, where he had newly arrived from Cairo and had seen Nasser on February 20. Eden said that he found Nasser 'adamant'. Meanwhile, Anthony Eden had telegraphed Nuri as-Sa'id advising him to sign the Turco-Iraqi Agreement without further delay.¹³³

The Arab premiers' conference broke up on February 6: No decision was reached; nor was a joint statement issued.¹³⁴

¹³¹Emile Bustani, Marsh Arabesque, p. 110.

¹³²Ibid.

¹³³Ibid., p. 111 .

¹³⁴Patrik Seale, Struggle For Syria, p. 217.

"The Arab world [Salah Salem declared at the time] is now standing at a crossroads: it will either form an independent and cohesive unit with its structures and national character or else each country will pursue its own course. The latter would mean the beginning of the downfall of Arab nationhood..."

On the following day, Faris al-Khoury's government fell in Damascus. Egypt had won an early and decisive round.¹³⁵

Lebanon's policy of reconciliation at the Conference of the Arab premiers was dissatisfactory to both parties. Egypt held Lebanon responsible for obstructing her efforts to pass a resolution against Iraq.¹³⁶ Adnan Menderes, the premier of Turkey, who visited Lebanon on January 14, rebuked the Lebanese government for failing to fulfill her promise of extending support to the prospective Turco-Iraqi alliance within the Arab League.¹³⁷ Iraq expressed her dissatisfaction with the attitude of premier Sami al-Solh.¹³⁸ Thus Lebanon emerged from the conference exposed to criticism from both parties.

¹³⁵Ibid.

¹³⁶Al-Ahram, February 3, 1955.

¹³⁷See the statement of Hamid Franjieh in parliament on the discussion between Menderes and the Ambassador of Lebanon in Italy Joseph Abu Khatar: An-Nahar, February 9, 1955.

¹³⁸The report of Burhan Addine Bashayan; dated February 29, 1955, The Government of Iraq, The Iraqi Trials (1958), vol. IV, p. 1395.

III THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARAB REACTION TO THE TURCO-IRAQI
TREATY (BAGHDAD PACT).

A. THE REACTIONS of EGYPT - 1955.

Egypt was very quick to realize the importance of Syria in the battle of the Baghdad Pact. Hence, she gave her support to Khalid al'Azem and his friends at every stage of their ascent to power. In the meantime the Egyptian press and radio campaigned against the outgoing cabinet of the Syrian premier, Faris al-Khoury. The following is a sample broadcast from Cairo on February 9, quoting Al-Ahram.

"The vacillating and hesitant attitude of the Syrian Foreign Minister at the Cairo Conference was one of the principal reasons for the Conference's failure to publish its resolutions denouncing foreign alliances, including the Nuri-Menderes alliance.

"This regrettable attitude caused others to hesitate and retract their earlier agreement to the resolutions. If the reports from Syria are true that the people's party to which the foreign minister belongs, has denounced his attitude and the Foreign Affairs Commission has accused him of departing from Syria's agreed policy, and if the Syrian premier is compelled to abandon the cautious policy which he followed during the conference, this transformation in Syria's attitude will have a powerful effect, and all the Arab governments, except Iraq will agree with Egypt on the Frank and decisive policy declared at the premiers' Conference. Then it would be possible to point out to signs of Egypt's victory in the first round

round of the battle which it entered on behalf of the Arab peoples." ¹³⁹

Not very long afterwards, Mr. Mahmud Riyad, the Egyptian ambassador, arrived in Syria on January 18, 1955, with the express immediate task, as he himself put it, of weaning Syria away from the Baghdad Pact. Mr. Mahmud Riyad maintains that the elder Syrian politicians had a clear tendency to sign the Baghdad Pact. In 1954 Egypt's policy was not yet absolutely clear and hence it was not evident to what extent Egypt could support a government or a country which chose to go against the current set by Iraq and the western powers. At the same time Syria was surrounded by governments all of whom were in favor of the Baghdad Pact such as Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Turkey. The Syrian government, herself, was in a state of flux due in part to the period of plotting and conspiracy which preceded the fall of Shishakli and to the confusion which followed it.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁹Patrick Seale, Struggle For Syria, pp. 220-221; For the details of the criticisms to the attitude of the Syrian delegation in the Arab premiers' Conference, see the official Syrian Gazzette, Minutes of the Syrian Legislative Assembly, (Damascus: Government press: 1955), pp. 854 - 856.

¹⁴⁰Patrick Seale, Struggle For Syria, p. 222.

But by 1955 Egypt's policy became clear and more defined. Egypt stressed, by now, that the Arab world should secure its full independence before concluding any military agreements with foreign powers. The Egyptians recognized their military weakness and knew that in the event of their joining a foreign-sponsored pact would be 'situated at the tail'.¹⁴¹ Lastly, Mr. Riyad announced his mission to Damascus saying:¹⁴²

"My duty in Syria was to explain our policy of Arab solidarity and our dislike for the Baghdad Pact. I got in touch with all political parties, but it was natural that I should find myself on special terms with the Ba'th in view of the similarity of our views on foreign affairs...."

On February 22, 1955, the new Syrian premier, Sabri al-Asali, made his statement of policy in the chamber, condemning the conclusion of all foreign military pacts and wholeheartedly embracing Egypt's foreign policy themes. The government of Syria under premier Asali was going to declare its statement of policy and to be debated on February 24: but on the 23rd the Turkish premier, Adnan Menderes, arrived in Baghdad. Immediately, Cairo radio charged that Turkey had

¹⁴¹Ibid.

¹⁴²Ibid.

sent two divisions to the Syrian frontier to exert pressure on the Syrian chamber.¹⁴³ The Turkish government denied the Egyptian accusation (but not in Arabic until the next day when the Syrian debate was over) and, meanwhile, Premier 'Asali obtained a vote of confidence on the night of February 24, 1955 by 66 votes to 53 with two abstentions.¹⁴⁴ In that same evening Nuri as-Sa'id and Adnan Menderes signed their alliance in Baghdad, while Cairo's radio 'voice of the Arabs' rose in rage denouncing the Baghdad Pact. After it regretted the signature and declaration of the Turco-Iraqi alliance and the Iraqi cabinet's consent to the final draft, Cairo radio said:¹⁴⁵

"... Thus Nuri al-Sa'id, rejecting the unanimous decision of the Arab peoples, concludes an alliance with the Turks, the enemies of Arabism, the friends of Zionism - an alliance which will destroy Iraq's aspirations to freedom, Palestine's hopes of independence, and the Arabs' hopes of unity, integrity and glory. The 'voice of the Arabs', which has resisted this alliance, declares to the entire world that the people of Iraq disown this alliance and that the chains imposed by it on the noble people

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Muhammed Khalil, The Arab League and the Arab States, vol. II, p. 241 - 242, the details of how the Turks exerted pressure on Syria because she refused the Baghdad pact and adhered to the Egyptian-Saudi alliance which resulted in a crisis in relations between Syria and Turkey;; and the Arab World, February 25, 1955, p. 4.

¹⁴⁴The Arab World, February 25, 1955, p.1

¹⁴⁵Patrick Seale, Struggle For Syria, pp. 222 - 223.

of Iraq tie only Nuri al-Sa'id. The people of Iraq are not bound by this alliance; they have not signed it and will not sign it; they curse it and they will destroy this filthy piece of paper, the Nuri-Menderes alliance".

On February 26, 1955, Major Salah Salem arrived in Damascus to consolidate Egyptian gains. He declared, that the Arab Collective Security Pact no longer existed, because Iraq had concluded her Pact with Turkey.¹⁴⁶ Instead Egypt proposed an Arab alliance providing for a joint military command and unified policies on foreign, cultural, and economic affairs.¹⁴⁷ All the Arab States would be invited to join--except Iraq. The plan was that, after Egypt and Syria agree to this proposition of a new military agreement, Salem of Egypt and Khalid 'Azem of Syria would go to Jordan and Lebanon to convince them to enter the new Arab alliance. No difficulties were expected in Saudi Arabia, for she had already opposed the Baghdad Pact.¹⁴⁸ On March 2, 1955, at the end of Salah Salem's visit to Syria, a joint statement was issued which included the points of the new

¹⁴⁶The Arab World, February 27, 1955, p.1

¹⁴⁷Muhammed Khalil, "Communiqué on Talks between Syria and Egypt, March 2, 1955, The Arab States and the Arab League, vol. II, p. 239.

¹⁴⁸The Arab World, March 4, 1955, p.1

alliance. The two major points of agreement were: the non-adhesion to the Turco-Iraqi alliance or any other alliance, and the creation of an Arab defense organization on new bases.¹⁴⁹ But when Salah Salem submitted a draft of his proposal to the Syrian government, it was met with suspicion, particularly from the National Party members of the cabinet. This is how Salem relates subsequent events:¹⁵⁰

"An event of great importance then took place: on February 28, Israel launched an attack on Gaza killing scores of Egyptians and damaging a great deal of property with tanks and aircraft. The Syrians who opposed our policy - and the Pro-Iraqi people's party in particular - attacked me vigorously, saying in effect: 'you have come to help Syria defend herself. Perhaps you had better see to your own defences first', I answered simply that if we were both weak we would be stronger united.

"I used all means to convince them and then, on March 1, the Syrians organized a big meeting in Damascus. The chief of staff Shawkat Shuqayr and his deputy, Adnan al-Maliki, assembled a great many officers and politicians. It was then declared that Syria had agreed to a full alliance with Egypt and to a merger of their two armies. The next day Sabri al-Asali and I signed the agreement..... The key man in these negotiations was not Asali but Khalid al-'Azem. It was 'Azem working together with

¹⁴⁹ For the full text of the Syro-Egyptian alliance see Annex C.

¹⁵⁰ Patrick Seale, Struggle For Syria, p. 223; For the details and negotiations of the Syro-Egyptian alliance, see The Arab World, March 3, 1955, p.1 and March 7, pp. 1-2 and p. 7 .

Shuqayr and Maliki, who pulled off the agreement."

In order to secure the adherence of other Arab governments to their new pact,¹⁵¹ Salah Salem and Al-'Azem then visited Amman on March 3, Riyad on the 4th and 5th, and Beirut on the 6th. The Jordanian and Lebanese Governments expressed great reserve and asked for more time to study the proposals. The Foreign Minister of Lebanon, Mr. Alfred Naccach, said after a Lebanese cabinet meeting on March 3, 1955, that "though Lebanon's policy is to side with the majority, it would never accept, in this particular case, that Iraq should be isolated. It would not even agree to a denunciation of Iraqi policy, and even less to a withdrawal of Egypt from the Arab League".¹⁵² Lebanon intended to stand above the current quarrels. In its quality as a friend of the East and the West, Lebanon could render enormous services to the Arab community.¹⁵³ After Lebanon, Salem and Azem visited Saudi Arabia, which added her signature to the Syro-Egyptian Pact on March 6, 1955.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵¹Al-Gumhuriya, (of Egypt), as cited in the Arab World, March 7, 1955, p.7, quoted the premier of Yemen as saying that Yemen was opposed to the Turco-Iraqi pact, and that it supported the new pact being sponsored by Egypt.

¹⁵²Telegraph, (of Lebanon), as cited in the Arab World, March 4, 1955, p. 2 .

¹⁵³L'Orient, as cited in the Arab World, March 4, 1955, p.2.

¹⁵⁴Muhammed Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League, p. 240; A military pact between Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemmen was signed on April 21, 1956, Ibid., pp. 250 - 252.

On March 7, 1955, Salah Salem returned to Cairo, thinking that his mission of 'freezing' the Baghdad Pact was successful. Later that month Salem presided over a committee to draw up a text of the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Agreement; but although he announced on March 19 that a draft was completed, none was published. However, the draft was submitted to the Syrian and Saudi delegations on March 30, but the conference broke up on April 2, deciding to continue negotiations through diplomatic channels. These continued in the wings of the Bandung Conference, but no final agreement was reached.¹⁵⁵

Mr. Patrick Seale maintains that the Egyptian-Syrian, Egyptian-Saudi Alliance of March 1955 was "never either militarily or economically stimulating. Of course, these are not the criteria by which it should be judged, since it was no more than a diplomatic coup, swiftly conceived and executed, to counter a challenge from Nuri as-Sa'id."¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁵Patrick Seale, Struggle For Syria, p. 224.

¹⁵⁶Ibid.

B. LEBANESE REACTION TO THE BAGHDAD PACT.

For a proper comprehension of the policy of the Lebanese government towards the Baghdad Pact it is useful to describe, briefly, the attitudes of the internal forces in this respect.

A sharp division occurred within Lebanese officialdom and public opinion, creating two major groups, the first favoring, or at least sympathetic to, the Baghdad Pact, and several opposed it .

The first group included the following: the Kataeb party (Lebanese Phalanges) of Pierre Gemayel, with its large maronite membership, favoured co-operation with the west, but directly and not through an alliance with Turkey.¹⁵⁷ The Syrian National party (R.P.S) was inclined to have both Syria and Lebanon join the Baghdad Pact. Its policies and aims were known. The party sought for closer co-operation among the countries of the Fertile Crescent

¹⁵⁷An interview by the author with Pierre Gemayel, president of the Lebanese Kataeb Party, Beirut, January 18, 1966.

which would lead to the unification of the 'Syrian homeland',¹⁵⁸ In the meantime, a large section of Christian public opinion favoured pro-western policies. The National Bloc of Mr. Raymond Edde, officially, remained almost silent on the controversy of the Baghdad Pact. Raymond Edde, himself favouring pro-western policies, did not back the pact.¹⁵⁹ The rank and file of the Bloc were inclined towards the west.

The second group, who opposed the pact, included the following:¹⁶⁰ The Moslem group, who objected to any Lebanese membership in the pact. Also the Ba'ath party, the Najjadah party (with its almost exclusive moslem membership), the communist party, the Arab Nationalists, the progressive socialist party of Kamal Junblat, objected to any Lebanese adherence to the Baghdad pact.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁸ Leila M.T. Meo, Lebanon: Improbable Nation, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), p. 97.

¹⁵⁹ In the Lebanese parliament, Raymond Edde neither supported nor criticized the Baghdad pact.

¹⁶⁰ An interview by the author with ex-Lebanese premier, Mr. Saeb Salam, Beirut, January 19, 1966.

¹⁶¹ After the declaration of the Turco-Iraqi intention on January 13, 1955, to co-operate on the defense of the Middle East, the Lebanese "parties Congress" met in Beirut in the same night and included the Socialist progressive party, the 'National Congress', the popular organization, and al-Najjada. Its main decision was to urge all Arab States to stand in the face of military treaties. For its decisions see An-Nahar, January 14, 1955; This "Lebanese parties congress" represents a small fraction of recognized parties and groups.

However, the activities of the Lebanese president, Camille Chamoun, and his connections¹⁶² with Iraq and pro-western statesmen had raised doubts as to the real intentions of Lebanon as to ^{whether to} adhere or not adhere to the pact. The exchange of visits on March 21, 1955, between Camille Chamoun and his premier Sami al-Solh, on the one hand, and the Turkish president and his premier, on the other, indicated at least official interest in the possibility of Lebanese membership in the Baghdad pact. The Lebanese government refused to adhere, however, and on March 29, 1956, it presented a policy statement to the Chamber of Deputies in which it emphasized its "determination to refrain from joining the Baghdad pact and any other foreign pacts." Lebanon was determined to realise the purposes of the Arab League charter and the revival of the Arab Collective Security pact.¹⁶³

Officially, the rejection of Lebanon to the Baghdad pact placed it in a position of neutrality between Cairo and Baghdad. But in practice, there were many who felt that from then on president Chamoun supported the Hashemites in Baghdad and Amman in their quarrels with Nasser, thus deviating from

¹⁶² Mr. Hameed Franjiah, then head of the parliamentary Foreign Relations Committee, announced in parliament that the Lebanese charge' d'Affaires in Rome, Mr. Joseph Abu Khater, was told by menderes, the Turkish premier, the following: "It is a shame on Lebanon to avoid implementing its promise to us in adhering to the Baghdad pact."

¹⁶³ The official Lebanese Gazzdtte, Minutes of the Lebanese Legislative Assembly 1955-1956, p. 1194.

the traditional neutrality that had served Lebanon so well in its relations with its Arab neighbours.¹⁶⁴

When Iraq announced its intention, on January 13, 1955, to sign the Turco-Iraqi pact, Lebanon's reaction as well as its attitude in the Arab premier's conference was a moderate one. Lebanon tried to stop any measures against Iraq, in its newly proposed policy, and at the same time refused to adhere to the Turco-Iraqi pact; thus preserving Lebanese traditional policy of neutrality towards disputes among the Arab States.¹⁶⁵ In spite of this fact, great pressure was exerted by Saudi Arabia and Egypt on Lebanon, trying to obtain an anti-Iraqi policy concerning the Baghdad pact.¹⁶⁶ At the same time a counter pressure was exerted by Iraq to make Lebanon subscribe to the pact. So, Lebanon asked Iraq for material support to counter the Saudi-Egyptian pressure. Iraq promised to help Lebanon.¹⁶⁷

As the members of the Baghdad pact invited all the other Arab States to adhere to the pact, the members of the

¹⁶⁴ Leila Meo, Lebanon: Improbable Nation, p. 97.

¹⁶⁵ Sami Al-Solh, Memoirs of Sami Al-Solh, pp. 239-246.

¹⁶⁶ Official proceedings of the Higher Military Court, The Baghdad Trials (1958), vol., IV, Iraq, 1958, pp. 1317-1319.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.,

newly established Syro-Egyptian-Saudi Alliance invited the Arab states- except Iraq- to participate in the new pact. Lebanon refused to adhere to the Syro-Egyptian-Saudi Alliance, not because of what it contained of principles and terms nor of what it did not contain, but because it came in an artificial state and as a reaction to the Baghdad pact and aimed at the isolation of Iraq.¹⁶⁸ Hence, Lebanon maintained that the members of the Tripartite alliance (of Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia) should invite Iraq to it. Iraq accepted the principle of invitation to the new pact but Egypt and Saudi Arabia refused to invite her. Moreover, the Lebanese premier announced in parliament that Lebanon is ready to sign the Tripartite alliance "on condition that Iraq be invited to participate in it."¹⁶⁹ If Iraq is not invited to participate in the Tripartite alliance, Lebanon's attitude then would be to refuse adherence to both the Baghdad pact and the Tripartite alliance and to follow a neutral policy between the two Arab blocs.¹⁷⁰

But Saudi Arabia insisted on exerting great pressure on Lebanon the aim of which to make her subscribe to the

¹⁶⁸ The official Lebanese Gazette, Minutes of the Lebanese Legislative Assembly 1955-1956, p. 1435.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 729.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

Tripartite Alliance. On this basis Saudi Arabia apologized for her absence from the economic conference which Lebanon undertook to call for by authorization from the Arab League.¹⁷¹

Egypt, on her part, was not less violent than Saudi Arabia in her pressure on Lebanon to make her abandon her officially neutral policy and adopt a pro-Egyptian line. The then Lebanese president of the Republic, Mr. Camille Chamoun, maintains that Lebanese "refusal to subscribe to the Tripartite accord was the starting point of a campaign of disparagement and insult; Egypt accused Lebanon of being favourable to the Baghdad pact and encouraging it, even of being secretly part of it."¹⁷²

The pressure that was exerted by Egypt on Lebanon as well as on the other Arab States that did not follow her line of policy, during the year 1955-1956, is described by president Camille Chamoun in the following words:¹⁷³

"The months which elapsed between the beginning of the year 1955 and the Suez crisis were a period of preparation and intrigues destined to pave the way to

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p. 749.

¹⁷² Camille Chamoun, Crise Au Moyen-Orient, p.274.

¹⁷³ Ibid., pp. 318-319.

The Nasserite penetration. Nasser had, to attain this, to sap the foundations of the legal power in all Arab countries. Invariably, all were condemned to bend, sooner or later, to the authority of Gamal Abdel Nasser. The problem was to know who would give in first."

C. JORDANIAN REACTION TO THE BAGHDAD PACT.

Jordan received the heaviest impact of the Baghdad pact controversy and the resultant cold war among the Arab States. King Hussein of Jordan describes the year 1955 as the decisive turning point in the past war history of the Arab world. It was the beginning of three dangerous years in which Jordan as a country nearly perished. Several times Jordan was 'saved by nothing short of a miracle'. Almost everything that happened can be traced back to 1955, a year which saw the signing of the Baghdad pact, the arms deal between Nasser and the Soviet bloc, Jordan's discussions on entering the Baghdad pact, and finally the riots that almost split Jordan in two.¹⁷⁴

Indeed King Hussein himself confesses that sometime ago he had put a tentative plan similar to the Baghdad pact to unite the Arab world in the face of mounting communist pressure. But he warned that if any Arab State formed a

¹⁷⁴ King Hussein I, Uneasy Lies The Head, (United States of America: Bernard Geis Associates, 1962), p. 101.

pact with the free world without prior consultation and agreement between sister Arab states, it would be disastrous. Yet this is exactly what happened. When the formation of the Baghdad pact was announced in 1955, the Arab world was shocked.¹⁷⁵ To give a true picture of the Arab reaction, King Hussein, quotes the following paragraph from the book of James Morris called The Market of Seleukia.¹⁷⁶

'The alliance so infuriated the Egyptians that most of the Arab world was roused against it so hostile was public opinion, thanks chiefly to the malignant competence of the Egyptian propagandists, that no other Arab government dared to join'

This is what exactly happened in the case of Jordan, which made her abandon the idea of joining the pact. But the king maintains that at the beginning of 1955 he tried his best to help Iraq and Egypt come to a better understanding. He visited Baghdad, but he found king Faisal II virtually powerless. He then argued with Nuri as-Sa'id, the premier at the time, and found him adamant. Nuri as-Sa'id expressed his attitude to king Hussein in one sentence: "Sir, we are in the Baghdad pact, that's that, and we are certainly not backing out of it."¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 102.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 103; taken from James Morris, The Market of Seleukia, (London: Faber, 1957).

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 105.

The king then visited Nasser and discussed the Baghdad pact with him. Nasser told the king that the hasty way in which the pact had been conceived, involving one Arab country only, was most unwise.¹⁷⁸

An important incident occurred in the Arab world that made the vast majority of the Arab people look at Nasser as their destined leader and savior. On September 25, 1955, president Nasser of Egypt announced his arms deal with the Soviet bloc. From that moment on, and in an instant, everything changed. Hundreds of thousands of Jordanians, listening to the propaganda on Cairo Radio, saw in Nasser a mystical sort of savior and their best man for the future against Israel.¹⁷⁹

On November 2, the Turkish president visited Jordan, where he discussed the possibility of Jordan joining the pact.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., King Hussein in this book as well as Camille Chamoun in his book Crise Au Moyen-Orient, and Fadhel Jamali in his book From the Reality of Iraqi Politics, and Emile Bustani in his book Marsh Arabesque, all believe that if Nasser had been consulted in the preliminary stages of the agreement on the Baghdad pact, the result might have been different. (all of these authors believe in a pro-western policy).

¹⁷⁹ King Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head, p. 107.

King Hussein told the Turkish president that he realized the advantage of the pact, but that in fact Jordan needed economic aid as much as military alliance. Jordan had half a million refugees. Also Jordan needed a revision of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty.¹⁸⁰ The president replied that he understands 'Jordan's difficulties' and suggested that the king write to the British about the additional help Jordan needs. The ex-Jordanian premier Hazza'al-Majali maintains that the factors that made Jordan attempt to adhere to the Baghdad pact were the following:¹⁸¹

"1. Jordan's need to amend the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty and decrease its time limit from 12 years to 4.

"2. To increase the military forces in number and in equipments, and to get modern fighters as well as a constant income for the army.

"3. Economic aid for the industrialization of the country and the establishment of big projects to decrease Jordan's dependence on outside aid."

The immediate response from the Jordanian public who, among other things, had never forgiven Turkey for having recognized the state of Israel, was strong hostility.¹⁸²

¹⁸⁰ Hal Lehrman, "Miscalculations in Jordan", The Reporter, Vol., 14, January 26, 1956, pp. 33-34.

¹⁸¹ Hazza' al-Majali, My Memoirs, (in Arabic), (-:-,1960-, pp. 168-169.

¹⁸² Emile Bustani, Doubts And Dynamite, (London: Allan Wingate, 1958), p. 85.

Afterwards, the ex-Jordanian premier Hazza' al-Majali visited Baghdad as the head of an economic group aiming to get financial aid from Iraq. The negotiations failed because the government put one condition for giving Jordan financial aid: namely, Jordan's adherence to the Baghdad pact. The Jordanian economic group, under Majali, refused any political strings to any financial aid, and they went back to Jordan on December 12, 1955.¹⁸³

A few months before this visit to Iraq, a Syrian delegation under the Syrian premier Saeed Al-Ghazzi reached Jordan and entered into negotiations with the Jordanian government. The aim of the delegation was to conclude a bilateral military agreement, similar to the one between Egypt and Syria which had been recently signed. The Jordanian delegation made the suggestion that this bilateral agreement would endanger Arab solidarity due to the existence of the Arab collective security pact. The Syrian delegation retorted that they were going to Iraq to conclude a similar bilateral agreement, as a sign that Syria did not want to support any Arab bloc against the other and that her interest was in unifying Arab policy. Moreover, the Syrian delegation asked only for Jordan's approval in principle to the proposed

¹⁸³ Hazza'al-Majali, My Memoirs, p. 167.

Syro-Jordanian bilateral Treaty and to issue a communique emphasising the desire of the two parties for absolute co-operation in military matters. All of this was done. The Syrian delegation went back to Syria and never went to Iraq as it promised, nor came back to Jordan to formalize the agreement.¹⁸⁴

On December 13, 1955, General Templer, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, arrived at Jordan, for the purpose of discussing questions 'concerning the defense of Jordan and the Arab Legion'; but during his visit he raised with King Hussein the question of Jordan's joining the Baghdad Pact.¹⁸⁵ King Hussein realized the advantages of the Pact but was resolved upon one thing: That he would enter no alliance without first informing President Nasser and seeking his views. Though Hussein was worried about communist infiltration and the increased threat from Israel, he would do nothing behind Nasser's back. The discussions between Hussein and Templer advanced well. Hence, Hussein sent Nasser a personal message with full details through General (later Field Marshal) Abdul Hakim Amer, who was visiting Jordan at the time. In this note the King pointed

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 164 - 165.

¹⁸⁵ For the complete details of the negotiations of General Templer in Jordan, see Hazza' al-Majali, The Story of my Negotiations with Templer, (-, -, 1955 - 1956?), pp. 7 - 14.

out to the ties with Iraq, the danger from Israel, and the need for arms, and he outlined his conditions for entering the Baghdad Pact. ¹⁸⁶

Afterwards, the Jordanian officials drew an outline of their immediate requirements, should they enter the Pact. These included more arms, economic aid and guarantees of support in case Jordan was subjected to attack, and a definite pledge that Britain would shorten the time of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty and that a new treaty would be signed with improved conditions, including an acceptable plan for the Arabization of Jordan's armed forces. ¹⁸⁷ A copy of this outline was sent to Nasser. Immediately Nasser sent General Amer to discuss the matter with Hussein, and then sent him a message giving the idea his blessing. Hussein maintains that Nasser in his message had echoed specifically the words of his right-hand-man General Amer: 'Any strength for Jordan is a strength for the Arab world. Therefore I can see no objection'. ¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁶ King Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head, pp. 108 - 109.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 109; See also for the details of Jordan's military needs from the pact - as a condition to adhere to it -, Sir John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier With the Arabs, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1957), p. 393.

¹⁸⁸ King Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head, p. 110.

Meanwhile, General Templer had agreed to all the Jordanian government's requests. The negotiators had agreed on the terms. The real issue at stake which remained was whether the Jordanian ministers would have the courage to take a decision which they believed to be for the good of their country, but which might expose them to popular repudiation and strong Egyptian criticism. ¹⁸⁹

Then suddenly, everything changed. Egypt launched a heavy propaganda attack against Jordan. Cairo Radio accused King Hussein, saying to the people of Jordan: 'Hussein is selling out to the British!'; 'Egypt is the only really independent Arab country - thanks to Nasser!' and 'the Baghdad Pact is an imperialist plot! get rid of Hussein the traitor!'. Within a matter of hours, King Hussein claims, Amman was torn by riots, and the people, turned to Nasser, the savior of the Arab world. Cairo Radio persisted on announcing that the Baghdad Pact was a trick and that Israel would be linked with it next. In fact no country could join without the agreement of every existing member. ¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁹John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, p. 396; see also Hazza' al-Majali, My memoirs, pp. 169 - 171.

¹⁹⁰King Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head, pp, 110 - 111.

The Egyptian pressure, through propoganda, on the Jordanian public reflected its effect on the members of the Jordanian Cabinet. On December 13, 1955 the four West Bank members of the Cabinet, under the premiership of Saeed al-Mufti, resigned. Thereupon, Saeed Pasha resigned and the government fell.¹⁹¹ Why the four ministers resigned has not been established. Sir John Bagot Glubb claims that two days before (during the negotiations with General Templer) they had admitted that they could think of nothing else to ask for from Britain. All their objections had been met, all the concessions had been granted. Some people claimed that they had been threatened with assassination, others that they feared the moral force of the Radio of 'voice of the Arabs'. Whatever were the actual motives which caused them to resign, when they were asked for their reasons, they replied, 'Do you

¹⁹¹Ibid. Hazza' al-Majali claimes that one of these ministers called Naeem Abd al Hadi, the minister of public works, felt that 30 deputies were going to withdraw their confidence in him, individually, because of reasons that were related to the running of his ministry. He then resorted to the matter of negotiations to save himself and convinced his three colleagues that if they resigned, they would save Palestine which was going to be frozen by the Baghdad Pact. The day before, the four ministers were in complete accord on the basis of agreement on the Baghdad Pact. Hazza'al-Majali, My memoirs, pp. 170 - 171.

want me to betray my country' ? or 'the salvation of Palestine is more important than imperialist alliances.'¹⁹² One of the most dangerous rumors, at the time (says Hazz'al-Majali) was that the negotiations for Jordan's adherence to the Baghdad Pact would certainly lead to the loss of Palestine.¹⁹³

The King, who was still determined to join the Baghdad Pact (Glubb claims), sent for Hazza'al-Majali, and asked him to form a new government. When he eventually formed his cabinet, Majali stated openly that he had come to office to sign the Baghdad Pact. Some of the politicians, however, advised premier Majali to make a contrary announcement, and allow the agitation to settle down. "After that, they said, "you can sign the Pact without trouble." But al-Majali preferred to adopt the democratic procedure in adhering to the Pact. But, alas, al-Majali himself was confused about the adaptability of this democratic procedure, since he admits that the parliament of the day had been riggedly elected, and thus, did not really represent the wishes of the people. Also, al-Majali says that if the

¹⁹²John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier With The Arabs, pp. 396 - 397.

¹⁹³Hazza'al-Majali, My memoirs, p. 171.

parliament really represented the people, many of the riots and demonstrations would not have occurred, because the 'deputies would have either accepted or rejected the Baghdad Pact through the democratic process. By now, the Egyptians and Saudis had redoubled their efforts. The "voice of the Arabs" described Hazza' al-Majali, the then premier, as the tool of the imperialists, who was selling Palestine to the Jews. Huge riots, demonstrations and barricades appeared in the streets on December 16, 1955. The whole city of Amman was closed down, crowds filled the streets, the police stood aside. The "voice of the Arabs" screamed out strong appeals to the people of Jordan to rise in rebellion.¹⁹⁴

In Jerusalem, the crowds attacked the French, British, American and Turkish consulates. Glubb pasha, as well as al-Majali, claimed that the Egyptian and Saudi Embassies in Amman and their consulates in Jerusalem were behind the organizing and financing of the riots.¹⁹⁵ In the vanguard of the Jordanians who were demonstrating and rioting were the Ba'ath party¹⁹⁶ (the Jordan branch).

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 172-174.

¹⁹⁵ John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier With the Arabs, p.400.

¹⁹⁶ King Hussien, Uneasy Lies. The Head, p. 111

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THE BAGHADAD PACT
AND ITS EFFECT ON THE ARAB STATES

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR
THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER
OF ARTS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL
STUDIES AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT
BEIRUT, LEBANON
FEBRUARY, 1967

In the face of such a public opposition and pressure against the Baghdad pact, King Hussein and his premier Hazza' al-Majali admitted (privately) that they were helpless, but still they wished to hold on. On December 19, 1955, the minister of the Interior and two others of al-Majali's government resigned. Al-Majali tried to find replacements but in vain. Practically, al-Majali's government was forced to resign and the king promised to dissolve the parliament. Two cabinets had fallen in one week.¹⁹⁷

To implement his promise, King Hussein issued a decree dissolving the parliament. Some of the deputies claimed the illegality of this act. The law proved them right, for the decree dissolving parliament lacked a sufficient number of signatures, so the Jordanian High Court, and the old deputies had to be reinstated.¹⁹⁸

In the meantime the majority of the Jordanian public were determined to oppose even through violent means the desire or attempt of their government to adhere to the Baghdad pact. The government thought that/^{the}pact would promote the general interest (militarily and economically) of the Jordanians and specially to strengthen Jordan against Israel, while the

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., pp. 111-112.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 112.

majority of the people thought the opposite, that this pact would not benefit much and would freeze the problem of Palestine. So, new riots violently broke out, and this time some groups started burning government offices, private houses, foreign properties. The army was called and a ten-day curfew was imposed on the country.¹⁹⁹

At this stage of opposition, the king became concerned about the incidents and "communist infiltration." Hence, he invited all Arab States to a conference in Amman, but this plan was foredoomed to failure. Lebanon and Iraq agreed to attend. Saudi Arabia almost agreed, but was influenced against accepting by Egypt. In the meantime, Egypt bluntly refused to attend unless each state publically repudiated the Baghdad pact. Of course, this was something Iraq could not do and so the conference died out in the bud.²⁰⁰

Internally, the king had to form a new government in such a troubled political atmosphere. So, the king asked Ibrahim Hashim, after the resignation of al-Majali, to form a caretaker government pending the new general election in four months. But since parliament was not dissolved, and there were to be no elections, Ibrahim Hashim resigned.

199 Ibid.

200 Ibid., p. 113.

His cabinet lasted for 17 days.²⁰¹ Mr. Sameer Rifai formed the new cabinet and announced on January 14, 1956, that Jordan would not join any regional groupings. Only after this declaration was order restored and riots calmed down.²⁰²

Other than the Jordanian cabinet, the second target in Jordan of the forceful Egyptian propaganda was, John Bagot Glubb. This propaganda attack lasted, almost wholly directed against Glubb, throughout February 1956. The Syrian regime, which was by this time an ally to the Egyptian regime, followed the Egyptian pattern in using the mass media of propaganda against Glubb. On March 1, 1956, King Hussein dismissed his commander-in-chief, Sir John Bagot Glubb, after twenty-six years of service in Jordan. The king maintains that his main motive in dismissing Glubb was because they disagreed on two issues: the role of Arab officers in the Jordan army and strategy in the defense of Jordan. The king also claims that he had contemplated Glubb's dismissal a year before, when he discussed the matter with the British Foreign Office. Hussein also claims that his action did not necessarily mean that Jordan's friendship with Britain,

²⁰¹ For the details of riots and demonstrations against Ibrahim Hashim's government, see Sir John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, pp. 406-408.

²⁰² Ibid.

and possibly even its alignment with the free world, had ended. The dismissal of General Glubb was a strictly Jordanian affair, since Glubb was the commander-in-chief of its army, employed by the Jordan government. The British government was infuriated by Glubb's dismissal and asked Hussein to delay his decision, but the king was adamant.²⁰³

²⁰³ King Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head, pp. 129-130.

CHAPTER V

THE PHASE OF 1956-1957.

A. THE SUEZ WAR - Its effect on the Arab States -

Other than the violent opposition that was exerted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the majority of Arab public opinion to freeze and paralyze the Baghdad pact, another blow came to the pact, when Israel in collusion with Britain and France invaded Egypt in October 1956. The resistance in the primary stage to the Baghdad pact was based on a major fact: that the pact is western sponsored, and hence the adherence to it would amount indirectly to an alliance with Israel, which was created by the help of the west. But in spite of this apparent fact, the collusion lacked material proof. The time was short when this material proof became evident. It was provided by the 1956 Suez invasion. As a result, not only the Baghdad pact, but in fact any defensive pact or treaty with the west defeated its purposes before it was born. Hence, the real and factual death of the Baghdad pact began with the Suez war.

Britain and the United States, towards the end of 1955, started discussions with each other and with Egypt for the financing of the High Dam project.¹ In February 1956 a provisional agreement was announced.

¹ George LencZowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, p. 512.

On the local stage the tide was moving in the Arab countries in favor of Nasser. Already he had Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen on his side. The incidents in Jordan were working quickly in favor of Egypt: the success of Egypt's 'positive neutrality' policy had resulted in the dismissal of Glubb, the termination of the treaty with Britain in 1956, the consequent cessation of the British military grant-in-aid to Jordan; and national elections brought a pro-Egyptian majority in the autumn 1956.²

In July Nasser met Nehru and Tito at a conference in Yugoslavia at which all three reaffirmed their faith in 'neutrality.' On his return to Cairo Nasser learned that the United States had withdrawn her offer of aid for the dam on the ground that Egypt's financial position had deteriorated since the provisional offer was made. Britain withdrew her offer the next day. The International Bank then withdrew its offer which had been dependent on the proposed Anglo-American loan.

On July 26, 1956, Nasser, in a violent anti-west speech announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. He said that the profits from the Canal would finance the High

² Sir Reader Bullard, ed., The Middle East, (London: Oxford University press, 1961), pp. 203-204.

Dam. On July 30 Eden told the House of Commons that Britain was strengthening her military and other forces in the eastern Mediterranean as a precautionary measure.³

On October 29, 1956, Israel attacked Egypt. On October 30 the British and French governments delivered a joint ultimatum to Israel and Egypt demanding that both belligerents cease all military actions and withdraw their forces to a distance of 10 miles from the Suez Canal. (Israel's advance unit was still 30 miles from the canal). Additionally, Egypt was asked to allow British and French troops to "temporarily" occupy the Canal Zone in order to separate the belligerents and guarantee freedom of Navigation through the canal. Egypt and Israel had 12 hours in which to answer. If one or both parties did not agree, then British and French forces would intervene to insure compliance.⁴

Regardless of Egypt's reply, Britain and France were determined to occupy the Canal Zone. Israel accepted the Ultimatum, but Nasser flatly rejected it, stating that it "can under no circumstances be accepted, and that it constitutes an aggression against the rights of Egypt and her dignity, and is a flagrant violation of the United Nations charter".⁵ Then the British and French forces began

³ Ibid., p. 204.

⁴ United States Department of State, U.S. policy in the Middle East, p. 139.

⁵ The Arab World, October 31, 1956, p. 2

to occupy the Canal Zone where they met resistance from the Egyptians, and the war was on.

The memoirs of Major - General Moshe Dayan, the Israeli chief of staff, give some light on the contacts and collaboration that occurred between Britain, France and Israel before the aggression on Egypt. The assessment of Moshe Dayan to the situation in the Arab East four days before the invasion clearly implies the close contacts and collaborations between France and Britain on one hand and Israel on the other. Their aim was to defeat the growing power and influence of Nasser, the main opponent of the Baghdad pact. Dayan assessed the situation in four points. Two points were related with the military details of the operation. The other two were the following:⁶

"1. The decision on the ~~campaign~~ and its planning are based on the assumption that British and French forces are about to take action against Egypt.

"2. According to information in our possession, the Anglo-French forces propose to launch their operation on October 31. Their aim is to secure control of the Suez Canal Zone, and for this they will need to effect a sea landing or an air drop, no doubt, with suitable air cover."

During the planing for aggression against Egypt, Britain, insisted that she would be "France's ally, and

⁶ _____, Review of Secrets of the Eve of Suez, by Moshe Dayan, The Sunday telegraph, (November 7, 1965), p. 6.

both should appear to be 'reacting' to an Israeli-Egyptian war, as opposed to being part of it"⁷ But ultimately, the British agreed to collaborate and concert their plans with the French and Israelis. But, ultimately, the British agreed to collaborate and concert their plans of attack with the French and Israelis.⁸ Hence, an agreement was signed between Israel, France and Britain to the effect of their practical collaboration in their aggression - although Britain obstinately refused to appear as a collaborator or supporter-. Mr. Pineau, the then French Foreign minister said: 'when we received Eden's approval of text (of the agreement) it was incorporated into a formal document signed that afternoon by Patrick Dean for Britain, Ben-Gurion for Israel, and myself for France. I believe three copies were made, one for each government, and we decided that the agreement should never be published.'⁹

The position of the United States was emphatically against the use of military force upon Egypt. At almost the same hour as the French and British were delivering their ultimatum to Egypt and Israel, the Security Council began debating the United States resolution for a cessation

⁷ Terence Robertson, Crisis: The Inside Story of the Suez conspiracy, (New York: Murray, 1965), pp. 161 & 163.

⁸ Ibid., p. 162

⁹ Ibid., p. 163.

of hostilities and the return of Israeli forces to their own positions before the attack. The resolution was vetoed by Britain and France¹⁰. On October 31, 1956, president Eisenhower of U.S.A. addressed the nation on the events in Egypt. In his address, he summed the American position as follows:¹¹

" The United States was not consulted in any way about any phase of these actions. Nor were we informed of them in advance ... We believe these actions to have been taken in error The actions taken can scarcely be reconciled with the principles and purposes of the United Nations to which we have all subscribed. And beyond this, we are forced to doubt even if resort to war will for long serve the permanent interests of the attacking nations There can be no peace without law. And there can be no law if we were to invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose us and another for our friends."

On November 1, 1956, the United States brought the matter before the United Nations General Assembly, where no veto can be applied. On November 7, the General Assembly adopted the United States resolution calling for an immediate cease - fire and withdrawal of all troops.¹² But on November 3, the three attacking nations rejected the resolution.¹³

¹⁰ The New York Times, October 31, 1956.

¹¹ U.S. Department of State, U.S. Policy in the Middle East, pp. 148-151.

¹² U.S. Department of State, U.S. Policy in the Middle East, pp. 157-158; see also John Connell, The Most Important Country, p. 185.

¹³ The New York Times, November 4, 1956.

The next day, on November 4, the Soviet Union delivered a note of protest to Great Britain, placing the responsibility for the possible consequences of the Suez war upon the governments of Britain and France. In the United Nations, the United States supported a resolution for the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force.¹⁴ On November 5, Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov sent a cable to the United Nations offering "the air and naval forces necessary to defend Egypt and repulse the aggressors."¹⁵ In the meantime, Eisenhower received a note from Soviet premier Bulganin, proposing "joint and immediate" action by the two nations to end the aggression committed by Britain, France and Israel.¹⁶ At the same time, Britain France and Israel received Soviet notes threatening them with the use of force if hostilities were not ended.¹⁷ On its part the United States warned the Soviets that she would oppose any Soviet use of force in the Middle East.¹⁸

¹⁴ U.S. Department of State, U.S. Policy in the Middle East, p. 178.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 178-180.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 180-181.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 183-188.

¹⁸ George LencZwoski, The Middle East in World Affairs,

In mid-November the first units of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) arrived in Egypt, and the phase of the Anglo-French gradual evacuation began. By December 22 the British and French troops had fully withdrawn from Egyptian territory.¹⁹

As a consequence of Britain's collusion with Israel to attack an Arab country, Iraqi officialdom at the time, had lost any logic of defense as to the right of their membership in the Baghdad Pact. Even worse, after the Tripartite invasion of Egypt, Iraq not only refused to withdraw from the Baghdad Pact, but refused even to withdraw her ambassador from Britain.

In the meantime, Britain and France no more considered the danger of communism; they were obsessed by the danger of Nasser and his leadership of dynamic Nationalism. To Britain, Nasser, more than communism, threatened her vitally entrenched interests in the Arab East. To France, Nasser, was the main supporter to the Arabs in Algeria, fighting against French colonial rule at the time. This is besides the hidden and declared Israeli aggressive designs on the Arab world; since Israel's own establishment was based on military aggression and displacement of the population of Palestine.

The Suez war definitely confirmed president Nasser

¹⁹ Ibid.

in his role as an all-Arab leader. Actually he had begun , to assume such role in early 1955, when launching a vigorous offensive against the Baghdad Pact. His subsequent trip to Bandung, his arms deal with the Soviets, and the nationalization of the canal constituted further steps on the road to the leadership and spread of dynamic or liberal Arab Nationalism. By the end of 1956 Nasser's pan-Arab and neutralist policy was fully crystallized. According to Nasser, his regime (and that of the Ba'ath-dominated Syria in 1957) represented the "Arab liberation policy," progressive, revolutionary, and committed to the uprooting of Zionism, imperialism, and feudalism. The Hashemite regimes of Iraq and Jordan constituted the most natural targets of his hostility. Egyptian propaganda did not limit the attack to these two kingdoms but often broadened them to include monarchies in general. This led Saudi Arabia to reappraise her traditional policy and embark subsequently on a rapproachment with Iraq, fearful of the revolutionary dynamism of Cairo.

B. ARAB REACTIONS TO THE TRIPARTITE INVASION.

from 1956 to early 1957

1. THE ARAB HEADS' OF STATE CONFERENCE IN LEBANON.

In the years that followed the controversy over the Baghdad Pact, two events served to worsen relations between Cairo and Beirut and, consequently, to heat the fire of the Lebanese crisis of 1958. The first was the crisis over Lebanon's nonseverance of diplomatic relations with Britain and France following the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in October-November 1956. The second event was Lebanon's endorsement of the American Middle East policy known as the Eisenhower Doctrine.

The then president of Lebanon, Camille Chamoun, called all the member states of the Arab League to an Arab Summit Conference in Beirut to embark on a concerted action in face of the Tripartite aggression on Egypt. The first meeting of the Conference began on November 12, 1956. The attitude of the delegates inside the conference was a reflection of the attitudes and alignments of the Arab countries towards each other and towards the cold war.²⁰

²⁰Al-Hayat, as cited in the Arab World, November 13, 1956, p. 1-2, 7.

Syria and Saudi Arabia had severed relations with Britain and France in the first 48 hours of aggression.²¹ Egypt was in de-facto war with Britain and France. It was not the same with the other countries.

Iraq, the only Arab state member of the Baghdad Pact, had severed diplomatic relations with France,²² but could not adopt the same attitude toward Britain unless she denounced the treaties which defined their reciprocal relations. Jordan, bound also by a treaty with Britain, did the same.

The attitude of the Sudan, Camille Chamoun says, was against severing relations, first because she had just obtained her independence and had not yet solved her financial and economic problems. Secondly, because she wanted to avoid complications with France which would compromise the delimitations of Sudan's western frontiers.²³

Yemen, feared that the break would aggravate a situation already very tense in Aden and on the eastern frontiers.²⁴

²¹Ibid., November 15, 1956, p. 1-2.

²²Ibid.

²³Camille Chamoun, Crise Au Moyen-Orient, p. 290.

²⁴Ibid.

Camille Chamoun maintains that Lybia, represented by her premier, Moustafa Ben Halim, found itself in almost similar conditions like Yemen and the Sudan. Hence, Lybia did not take any action against the aggressors and did not favor the severing of relations with Britain and France.

After two hours of deliberations, the discussions reached a stand still. The Conference was threatened by failure.²⁵

Inside the commission dealing with the problem of relations with Britain and France, a violent controversy erupted, between the Syrian delegate (who wanted to sever relations with both Britain and France) and the Iraqi delegate, who refused to break relations with Britain. This almost divided the commission into two camps. Lebanon, Camille Chamoun says, while publicly condemning the aggression and while emphasizing to the French, British and American representatives its solidarity with Egypt, had imitated the gesture of neither of the two Arab groups. On this point, Chamoun continues, because of the pressures which were starting to be exercised from outside, the public opinion (of Lebanon) was divided into two contradictory currents. A very important part of the population considered the severing

²⁵Ibid.

of diplomatic relations with France and Britain as an act with no consequence,²⁶ which could only harm Lebanon without benefiting Egypt; on the contrary, it was better to maintain a certain contact with the powers concerned and be able to influence their decisions. Personally, Chamoun had no faith in the effectiveness of isolated acts and was convinced that only the adoption of an unanimous attitude on the part of all the Arab countries could have a tangible effect.²⁷ But there are contradictory stories about the severing of diplomatic relations between Lebanon on one hand and Britain and France on the other one version claims that Chamoun had extended the invitations to the conference through premier Abdallah al-Yafi, and through him relayed the promise that Lebanon would sever diplomatic relations with Britain and France as an expression of solidarity with Egypt. It was specifically on such a promise, the story goes,

²⁶Before the Arab Heads' of State Conference, a split has occurred in the Lebanese cabinet on the matter of severing relations with Britain and France. The Foreign Minister, Selim Lahoud, besides the president was against severing relations, while the premier Yafi was for it. Beirut, Al Dyar, Le Jour, as cited in the Arab World, November 8, 1956, p.8.

²⁷Camille Chamoun, Crise-Au Moyen-Orient, p. 291, meanwhile, president Chamoun has addressed a strong message of support to Nasser, saying Lebanon is now looking at the 'second phase of the struggle' which is just beginning, The Arab World, November 8, 1956, p. 8.

that the other Arab governments accepted Chamoun's invitation to the conference. When the delegation met, however, Chamoun considered their joint censure of the aggressor states as fulfilling Lebanese obligations and refused to sever diplomatic relations with Britain and France. When both his prime minister, Yafi, and minister of State,²⁸ Saeb Salam, asked him at least to withdraw his ambassadors from London and Paris, he turned down this suggestion. Both men then resigned in protest. It is further claimed that Chamoun had acted contrary to Lebanon's obligations under the Collective Security Pact of the Arab League (of 1951), and had thus broken Arab solidarity in the face of the aggressors.²⁹

In an interview with the author on March 1, 1966, Camille Chamoun denied that he had promised to sever diplomatic relations with Britain and France.

"Speaking of severing diplomatic relations between Lebanon and France and Lebanon and Britain," he said, "there was never any kind of promise from, nor intention on the part of my government to cut off these relations.

²⁸In the Arab countries, they refer to the minister without portfolio, as the minister of State.

²⁹An interview by the author with Saeb Salam, ex-Lebanese premier; in Beirut, January 19, 1966, also see Al Sharq, as cited in the Arab World, November 16, 1956, p.9; Also the Arab World, November 19, 1956, p.1.

Even more, three days before the cease-fire I received a visit from an emissary who, after having flown for nine hours from Cairo Via Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Damascus, reached Beirut at nine o'clock in the evening. Accompanied by a member of parliament, Mr. Emile Bustani, he called on the presidency, bringing the salaams of Nasser and asking me to intervene with the British and the French for a quick cease-fire. The name of the messenger was Mustapha Amin. I did what I could and was able, in less than forty-eight hours, to give him good news about the cease-fire. Well, this is the proof that it has never been either in Nasser's mind or in my mind that diplomatic relations would be cut off. Otherwise, how could you cut off diplomatic relations and still intervene with these two nations?" 30

Private sources in Beirut have confirmed part of Chamoun's story and added their own explanations. Before president Chamoun received the verbal message from Cairo, they said, he had at least been considering withdrawing his ambassadors from Paris and London. Both Saeb Salam and Abdallah al-Yafi knew of the message, but ignored it when they quarreled with the president, attributing this dispute and their resignation from the cabinet to his refusal to sever diplomatic relations with Britain and France. The true cause of the dispute, these sources continued, was the fact that the government was functioning poorly because of

³⁰Interview with ex-president Camille Chamoun, at his residence in Sa'diyat, March 1, 1966.

friction among its members over economic questions. ³¹

On November 15, 1956, the Arab Kings and Presidents issued a communiqué on the Suez Canal crisis at the end of their Summit Conference in Beirut. The participants, the communiqué mentioned, had agreed unanimously on the necessity of the implementation of the measures adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on November 2, 4 and 7, 1956 which called for the cessation of hostilities and for the immediate withdrawal of the aggressor forces immediately and unconditionally from Egyptian territory. The communiqué continued:

"Should Israel violate the United Nations Resolutions and fail to withdraw unconditionally her forces behind the Armistice lines; or should the attitude of either Britain, France or Israel lead to new tensions that might result in the resumption of military operations, Britain, France and Israel should be held jointly responsible for prolonging the aggression. In that event, all the States represented at this conference should proceed immediately, each for its part and in pursuance of the legitimate right of self-defense, to implement Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, as well as to take effective measures within the limits of their utmost capacity, in conformity with their commitments under Article 2 of the Arab Joint Defense Treaty." ³²

³¹This was confirmed to the author by ex-Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, Mr. Adel Osseiran, and ex-Lebanese deputy, Miss Mirna Bustani, the daughter of the late Emile Bustani, in Beirut, January 21, 1966.

³²For the text of the whole communiqué see, Muhammed Khalil, edi, "communiqué by the Arab Kings and Presidents on the Suez crisis", The Arab States and the Arab League, vol.II, pp. 818-820.

2. THE REACTIONS IN LEBANON.

On the popular level and during the Tripartite aggression on Egypt, president Camille Chamoun invited on November 2, 1956, the leaders representing Lebanese sectarian and political groups to discuss the situation in the Middle East. 'We must face the present situation united,' president Chamoun told the leaders in a prepared speech. Other leaders spoke in support of Egypt and denounced the Tripartite aggression on Egypt. At the end of the meeting, the conferees issued a short statement declaring their indignation at the 'joint aggression on Egypt', and called upon the Lebanese chamber to take such measures as may be necessary to serve Lebanon's interest and support Egypt and Arab States.³³ On Saturday, November 3, the Lebanese chamber held a session and discussed the situation. At the end of the discussions the chamber adopted a motion calling upon the Government to take measures 'as dictated by Arab fraternity, U.N. charter, Arab League charter and the Arab Collective Security Pact.'³⁴ In the meantime, Chamoun "dictated" a message to the British premier, Anthony Eden, through his ambassador in Beirut. In the message, Chamoun told Eden that his country's continued

³³ The Arab World, November 5, 1956, p. 5

³⁴ Ibid.

aggression upon Egypt and her overt support for Israel shall *inevitably* lead to Britain's ousting from the Arab East. Among other things, the president demanded the "immediate cessation of the hostilities, or else, he warned, Britain stood to be driven out of the whole of the Arab East."³⁵

During the Suez war, president Chamoun and his government embarked on extensive political activity to stop the aggression on Egypt through peaceful means. In an effort to attain this end, Chamoun, asked Dr. Charles Malek to carry a personal message to president Eisenhower.³⁶ In the message, Chamoun told Eisenhower that he alone can save peace in the Middle East, and in the world at large. He alone can save what remained of the confidence enjoyed in the Middle East by the west. "Very rightly, the peoples of the Arab world are losing their faith in the west," Chamoun said.³⁷ In the meantime, Lebanon's foreign minister, Selim Lahoud, asked the Canadian minister in Lebanon to convey its gratitude to Canada's permanent representative in the U.N., for his honourable stand in denouncing the aggression.³⁸

³⁵ Ibid., p.8; The Lebanese parliament voted LL 1,000,000 in aid of the Egyptian Red-Crescent, and an additional credit of LL 1,500,000 for the Ministry of Defense; The Arab World, November 7, 1956, p.3.

p. 8. ³⁶ Al Hayat, as cited in the Arab world, November 6, 1956,

³⁷ Al Dayar, Ibid., p. 9.

³⁸ The Arab World, November 6, 1966, p. 9.

Egypt, on her side, had sent an official appeal to the government of Lebanon and all the Governments of the world, asking them for help in weapons and volunteers. Immediately, the Lebanese Defense Ministry had issued an official communique announcing that applications for volunteer work with the defense forces of Lebanon would be accepted, and outlined the conditions of acceptance.³⁹ Moreover, president Nasser replied to president Chamoun's telegram of support thanking him and paying tribute to the patriotism of all the Lebanese.

But, alas, the question of severing relations with Britain and France caused an official and popular split in Lebanon. Mainly, the Lebanese Moslem section had pressed for severing relations and adopting an attitude similar to that of Saudi Arabia and Syria; while another important Lebanese section refused to sever relations, contenting itself with the diplomatic and moral support as well as the financial support for Egypt. Consequently, and on November 21, 1956, the Lebanese Ministry of Information issued an official communique to the press, announcing the seizure by the military police of smuggled arms in a Beirut suburb,⁴⁰ which was followed by many arrests among which were non-Lebanese students and a number of Palestine Arab refugees. These

³⁹ Ibid., November 7, p.2.

⁴⁰ Ibid., November 21, 1956, p.1.

smuggled arms were a sign of the determination of a certain section of the Lebanese (pro-Egypt and Syria) to impose by force on Lebanon a foreign policy in accordance with that of Egypt and Syria.

3. THE REACTIONS IN IRAQ

The Iraqi government under Nuri as-Sa'id, at the time of the Suez war, had two attitudes towards Egypt: official and practical. The official attitude of Iraq was clear in its solidarity with the Arab States in condemning the Tripartite aggression. At the same time this official attitude was incomplete, since Iraq refused in the Arab Summit Conference in Beirut to sever diplomatic relations with Britain, her ally in the Baghdad Pact and a partner in the aggression. Because of the pressure and resentment shown by the majority of Iraq parties, pressure groups and national leaders,⁴¹ Nuri as-Sa'id resorted to deceive the Arab public opinion by asking for the exclusion of Britain from the Baghdad pact meeting of January 1957.

Practically, on the other hand, the Iraqi government under Nuri as-Sa'id refused to broadcast the U.N. speeches

⁴¹ Al Dayar of Lebanon says that the Iraqi leader of the opposition sent a message to the King saying: "the Iraqi government has so far stood out against the trends of world opinion. Iraqi protests against Anglo-French aggression, he said, were 'vague', as cited in the Arab World, November 6, 1966, p.8.

of Dr. Fadhil Jamali condemning the aggressors. Jamali cabled his government from the U.N. saying : "if I do not represent, in the speeches, the policy of the Iraqi government in the United Nations, why should I remain then in New York ? and if I represent it, then why did not the government broadcast my speeches?" Jamali did not receive an answer. In the United Nations, and in the course of his speeches condemning the Tripartite aggression against Egypt, Jamali said: "concerning Israel, our words represent Nasser and all the Arab States are Egypt."⁴² Meanwhile, an Iraqi delegation headed by prince Abdul Ilah, reached the United States and met Mr. Dulles. They explained to him the importance and danger of the Palestine problem. Then they urged that America should take all forceful measures to oblige Israel to withdraw her forces from Egyptian territory and the Gaza strip.⁴³

The Suez war shook Nuri as-Sa'id and made him more than ever before worn out and preoccupied. Nuri professed to the then American ambassador to Baghdad, on November 1, 1956, that he had not known in advance the real nature or

⁴²Fadhil Jamali, Memoirs and Lessons, (in Arabic), pp. 79 - 80 .

⁴³Ibid.

extent of the British action. Nuri told the ambassador, that he 'had thought there was only to be some kind of restraining action by the British against Israel.' "Nuri thought that the aggressor was to be punished." Consequently the turn of events had shaken Nuri so badly and he was at a loss as how to deal with the increasingly strong anti-British feeling. Nuri as-Sa'id and Iraq's membership in the Baghdad Pact were subjected to the heaviest attacks of all, both inside and outside the country, between the Pact's council meeting in Tehran and the next meeting in Karachi in June, 1957.⁴⁴

The Suez crisis did not pass without any consequences on Nuri's cabinet. Burhan Addeen Bashayan, a member of the Iraqi cabinet, claims that he advanced to Nuri as-Sa'id three suggestions for healing the situation after the Suez crisis. In this, he was backed by another minister, Ahmad Mukhtar Baban. The three suggestions were the following:⁴⁵

"1. That Britain should withdraw from membership in the Baghdad Pact and that the Pact should remain exclusively of Islamic members.

⁴⁴ Waldemar Gallman, Iraq under General Nuri, pp. 74 - 75.

⁴⁵ Official proceedings of the Higher Military Court In Baghdad, vol. IV, (Iraq: Government publications, 1958), pp. 1318 - 1319.

"2. Or that the Iraqi government in cooperation with the other three Islamic members of the Baghdad Pact should exert pressure upon Britain and America to solve the Palestine and Algerian problems or at least the Palestine problem in a quick manner ensuring Arab interests.

"3. Or that Iraq withdraw from the Baghdad pact."

Wishing to avoid the discussion of such proposals, Nuri as-Sa'id asked Bashayan and Baban to postpone their proposals to the end of the meeting of the Islamic members of the Baghdad Pact. These proposals were not discussed also in the second meeting of the Islamic members of the Baghdad Pact in Ankara in January 1957. They were postponed for the second time pending the arrival of the Iraqi delegation from America who discussed them with the U.S. officials. Again Bashayan and Baban requested Nuri to re-consider their three proposals. Nuri surprised them by submitting the resignation of his cabinet in June 1957. ⁴⁶

To meet the new situation created by the Suez war, the Baghdad Pact Moslem members held their first meeting in Tehran on November 3, 1956. The details of the Tehran conference were given by Nuri as-Sa'id to the American ambassador in Baghdad. On November 10, following the

⁴⁶Ibid.

meetings, the government of Iraq issued a statement. With the backing of her moslem friends, Iraq was able to announce that Britain was to be excluded from the deliberations of the Baghdad Pact. "In view of current circumstances", the statement explained, "Iraqi attendance at the Pact meetings was to be confined to meetings with the three other Islamic states". During the meetings of the Pact members in Baghdad, it was felt that Soviet intervention in the Suez crisis could not be ruled out. Also there was a consensus about the joining of America to the Baghdad Pact to strengthen it.⁴⁷

In order to face the violent reactions on the popular level, the Iraqi government decreed and approved on November 1, 1956, martial law. Huge demonstrations of students and the public spread in the streets of Baghdad in support of Egypt. Public sentiment against Britain was mounting. The reason, the American ambassador says, was a wide spread conviction that the joint British-French action was a part of a plan prearranged with Israel to eliminate Nasser. They proved to be right, as Moshe Dayan lately confessed. The subordinate government officials began asking whether this was not a good time

⁴⁷ Waldemare Gallman, Iraq under General Nuri, p. 76.

to get rid of Iraq's pro-British government. The senior officials, "while not unhappy over Nasser's predicament, were concerned over the difficult position in which Iraq had been placed." Their feeling was that the British had "let the Arab world down badly, and Iraq was being forced into a position of opposition to the British."⁴⁸

Demonstrations and messages of protest to the governments are the best means in the hands of the opposition, either official or popular, against a certain policy. These two means were exploited by the Iraqis, to the maximum, under the fire of the Iraqi police which killed and injured many of them. The opposition demonstrated violently against the continuous membership of Iraq in the Baghdad pact, as a partner to Britain, one of the aggressors on Egypt. On November 4, 1956, violent demonstrations were staged in Baghdad and the police clashed and opened fire on the demonstrators. 'When some of the people took refuge in the Egyptian Embassy, the police broke into the Embassy grounds and attacked the Egyptian officials. The Iraqi Government had to make an official apology to the Egyptian Government later.'⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 74-75.

⁴⁹ Syria's Al Rai Al Aam, as cited in the Arab world, November 6, 1956, p. 6.

Few days before the conference of the Arab Chiefs of State began in Beirut on November 13, 1956, huge demonstrations in Iraq began shouting slogans of protest against the Tripartite aggression on Egypt and were 'hailing Egypt and Syria.' During these demonstrations, many were injured in their clash with the police. The Ba'ath party in Syria then received 'important documents' indicating that the people of Iraq 'were stepping up their campaigns against the Baghdad pact.' The Ba'ath circles in Syria continued to say that: 'Iraqi leaders have called on the chiefs of the liberation movement in Syria to capitalize on the conference of Arab rulers in efforts to get Iraq out of the imperialist Baghdad Pact.'⁵⁰ Also the Syrian leftist paper Al Rai Al Aam followed suit when it told the Arab chiefs of state: 'King Faisal (of Iraq) and his aides should be told openly that Iraq must quit the colonialist Baghdad Pact and must also end its treaty with Britain.'⁵¹

During the conference of the Arab Chiefs of State, and due to Arab popular pressure, Iraq, which had been advocating a peace with Israel based on the resolutions of the United Nations, had shifted its position and came to the conclusion that no peace could ever be reached with Israel. The only way to res-

⁵⁰ Syria's (left-wing) Al Nasr, as cited in the Arab World, November 13, 1956, p.5.

⁵¹ Al Rai Al Aam, as cited in the Arab World, November 13, 1956, p. 5.

tore peace, in the Iraqi Government's new position, was to wipe out Israel. In a note to diplomatic representatives in Baghdad and to the Iraqi permanent delegate in the United Nations, the Iraqi government declared that her purpose now was to rid the Middle East of the Israeli danger in the interest of peace and security.⁵²

In the meantime, popular agitation for the resignation of Nuri continued throughout November and December and into the next year. During November there were serious riots in Baghdad, Najaf, and Mosul, and ones of lesser violence in Kut, Samawa, and Kirkuk, in most cases by students inspired by Ba'athist, Arab nationalist and communist propaganda.⁵³ These rioters were encouraged by the ceaseless radio broadcasts of Cairo and Damascus. The deaths and bloodshed were mainly the results of clashes between the police and the armed rioters. In Mosul and Najaf, however, the army had to be called in to reinforce the police.⁵⁴ The number of persons killed in these riots was officially stated to be twenty-five. The actual figure was generally believed to have been higher.⁵⁵ The full picture

⁵² Lebanon's L'Orient, Daily Star, as cited in the Arab World, November 14, 1956, p.3.

⁵³ Waldemar Gallman, Iraq under General Nuri, p. 76.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 77.

⁵⁵ Al Ahram, November 2-6, 1956; and November 15-18, 1956; and December 3-7, 1956.

of the Iraqi internal situation and the measures taken by Nuri's government after the Suez war was given by the American ambassador to Iraq. He said:⁵⁶

"When the Suez crisis broke, Nuri had been in office for two years, and had developed a system of control based on management of the police, army, press and, to a large measure, of the political life of the country. It was well designed to resist mob pressures. At the start of the disorders he had the colleges and secondary schools closed indefinitely. Martial law was stringently applied, including military censorship of the press. Parliament was suspended. A number of known leftist and ultra-nationalists were arrested and temporarily detained. Nuri's firmness and courage helped maintain the morale of the less confident members of the government. His political rivals had no wish to assume the responsibilities of government under such unsettled conditions."

At the end of November 1956 the Iraqi Crown prince Abdul-Illah told Gallman about the pressures on the palace to dismiss Nuri as-Sa'id. But, Abdul-Illah said, "as a 'change of policy' was out of the question, a change of government would mean no more than a 'change of faces'. It seemed best, therefore, to 'stick with Nuri'".⁵⁷

In the face of Iraq's diplomatic defeat, Nuri as-Sa'id resorted to his last measures in a mood of despair. In October, the Iraqi government sent arms to her partisans in Syria to

⁵⁶ Waldemar Gallman, Iraq under General Nuri, p. 79.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

enable them to "overthrow and supersede the government."⁵⁸ This created a growing tension between Syria and Iraq. According to Al Ayyam, the Syrian government submitted to the Iraqi government through the Syrian envoy in Baghdad a 'vigorously worded' note about what the paper called 'the mean plot of the Government of Nuri as-Sa'id against Syria.'⁵⁹ The plot was discovered in time, and the pro-Iraqi People's Party - which until then had been the ruling party in parliament - then fell under the grave accusation of treason. Rashad Barmada, one of the leading members of the People's Party, denounced "the plot to stab Arab nationalism," according to Syria's populist Al Shaab and other papers. Then Barmada gave a statement to Egypt's Middle East News Agency, in which he said that the military alliances in which the Iraqi Government of Nuri as-Sa'id participated 'were aimed to stab the Arab Liberation movement and to back Israel.' He went on to say: 'The confiscation of the dangerous arms smuggled into Syria meant to stab the Arab nationalism and not Syria alone Syria will remain one United front and will strive to destroy the last imperialist stronghold in the Arab World.'⁶⁰ This declaration did not protect some

⁵⁸ Walter Z. Laqueur, ed., The Middle East in Transition, (London: Routledge & Keganpaul, 1958), p. 349.

⁵⁹ Al Ayyam of Syria, as cited in the Arab World, November 30, 1956, p. 4.

⁶⁰ The Arab World, November 30, 1956, pp. 4-5.

of the influential members of the people's party from prison, while others fled to Lebanon or Turkey. Thus the Syrian anti-Iraqi bloc emerged in greater strength, and embarked on a more violent anti-Iraqi policy.⁶¹ This obliged the people's party, in order to survive as a political force, to denounce officially and publicly to sever its connections with Iraq, even more to compete in the anti-Iraq campaign. The party had already - as stated above - in an official declaration, violently denounced the Baghdad Pact and Nuri as-Sa'id in person.

4. THE REACTIONS IN JORDAN.

The attempt by Jordan to adhere to the Baghdad pact divided the country and brought her almost to the verge of collapse after the fall of the four subsequent cabinets. It was only on January 19, 1956, when Samir Rifai became premier and announced that Jordan would join no regional grouping, that the country returned to calm. But the Anglo-French intervention, which appeared to Jordanians as a deliberate move to assist Israel, greatly intensified anti-west feelings.

The reaction was prompt but did not satisfy the Syro-

⁶¹ Walter Z. Laqueur, The Middle East in Transition, p. 349; see also Gordon H. Torrey, Syrian politics and the military, p. 323, for the details of the plot.

Egyptian-Saudi camp. Immediately diplomatic relations with France were severed and an embargo was placed on French products. Relations with Britain were not severed, but the use of Jordanian bases for the Suez operations was forbidden.⁶² During the Suez war, King Hussein asked the Jordanian government under Suliaman Nabulsi to open immediately a battle with Israel on the Jordanian front for the help of the Egyptians. But the Jordanian government stood helpless and could not take a definite attitude. Some of the cabinet members declared that, opening a battle with Israel would be a gambling with the western Bank and subjecting it to falling into Israeli's hands. Some declared the necessity of contacting Syria and Iraq to agree on a United position. In the meantime Syria advised Jordan to contact Iraq and ask for Iraqi forces into Jordan. Consequently, an Iraqi delegation came to Jordan to put into effect a United military plan with Jordan. While the negotiations were still proceeding, an Iraqi Brigade entered Jordanian territory and camped in Al Mafrag, in violation of the terms of the Iraqi-Jordanian military Agreement which stated that the armies of either party have no right to enter the territory of the other without the prior approval of both governments. Nevertheless, the negotiations proceeded. Ultimately it was agreed that Ali al Hiari, a Jordanian officer, would take command of the

⁶² Sir Reader Bullard, The Middle East, p. 331.

joint Forces in Jordanian territory. At the same time it was announced that Britain and France had accepted the Security Council's decision to stop aggression against Egypt. Meanwhile, the negotiating Jordanian delegation, as well as the cabinet, reminded the Iraqi delegation of the military bialateral agreement with Egypt. The Iraqi delegation retorted that Iraq was not bound by this agreement, and that it was negotiating on the basis of the Iraqi-Jordanian Treaty. The negotiations with the Iraqis failed, but their forces remained in Jordan.⁶³

The Suez invasion inflamed the Jordanian's nationalist feeling against the west. Then it became imperative that the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty should be abrogated if Jordan was to avoid internal crisis or rebellion. On March 13, 1957, Britain and Jordan exchanged notes bringing the pact to an end the following day and allowing for the departure of all British forces within six months.⁶⁴

After the Suez war the Saudi-Syro-Egyptian bloc increased its pressure and propaganda war on Jordan. Consequently, violent demonstrations and riots broke out in Jordan in support of Egypt.

⁶³ Hazza' al Majali, My Memoirs, (in Arabic) (- : - ,) May 1960), pp. 205-206.

⁶⁴ Emile Bustani, Marsh Arabesque, p. 112.

This relentless campaign against Jordan revived the anti- , monarchist and anti-western feelings which had been reduced for some time by the dismissal of General Glubb, in March 1956. Even these 'victories' failed to satisfy the Jordan government of the day, which was made up of extreme nationalists, under the premiership of Suliaman Nabulsi.⁶⁵

The Nabulsi Government now brought Jordan nearer and nearer to the Syro-Egyptian-Saudi line. This foreign policy of Nabulsi was unfavorable to King Hussein. On January 19, 1957, Egypt-Saudi Arabia, and Syria signed with Jordan the Arab Solidarity Agreement by which they agreed to pay Jordan £E 12.5 million annually for at least ten years to replace the British subsidy. Also the Government of Nabulsi declared its opposition to the Eisenhower Doctrine, thereby foregoing American aid for which it had asked in January. Moreover, the ~~departure~~ of the Iraqi (but not Syrian) troops which had entered during the Suez crisis, was secured by arguing that since Jordan was a member of the Tripartite Defense Agreement of October 25, 1956, (constituting Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia) all troops in Jordan ought to be under the Supreme Commander, an Egyptian. In internal affairs the Government, while discharging officials considered to be pro-west, gave a free hand to anti-west and pro-Soviet as well as Arab nationalist

⁶⁵ Hazza' al Majali, My Memoirs, pp. 210-211.

element and pro-Syro-Egyptian blocs and parties.⁶⁶ Hence, the King entered on a struggle with Nabulsi, whose policy threatened both the throne and the independence of Jordan. That was so, because Nabulsi was pro-Nasser and with the non-aligned states, and the King was pro-west, but not always publicly against Nasser.

At the time it was expected that the Nabulsi government would resign, The pro-Bath major General Ali Abu Nuwar (chief of staff) sent premier Nabulsi a call from Damascus, asking him to postpone the resignation of his government. During his stay in Damascus, Abu Nuwar met the Soviet ambassador.⁶⁷ When he came back to Jordan, the Jordanian cabinet was quickly summoned and took the decision of accepting the exchange of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The internal struggle between the King and his premier reflected the higher struggles on two levels. On the first level, the struggle was between the two Arab blocs; each supporting one group against the other. On the second, it reflected the East-west struggle.

On April 10, 1957, King Hussein, counting on the

⁶⁶R.I.I.A., Survey of International Affairs 1956 - 1958, (London: Oxford University Press, 1962) , p. 171.

⁶⁷Hazza'al-Majali, My memoirs, pp. 210 - 211.

loyalty of the bulk of the army of the bedouin tribesmen, dismissed Nabulsi from office. Consequently, the so-called 'liberal officers' under the leadership of Jordan chief of staff Ali Abu Nuwar, attempted a coup d'etat at as-Zarqa army quarters, the aim of which was, primarily, to hinder attempts to form a new cabinet to replace the Nabulsi government and to exert pressure on the King to bring back the Nabulsi cabinet.⁶⁸ The as-Zarqa coup failed and the chief of staff, Ali Abu Nuwar, was permitted to go on April 14, 1957, outside Jordan; he went to Syria. The Dr. Hussein Fakhri Al Khalidi cabinet who came after the Nabulsi cabinet, appointed another chief of staff, Ali-al Hiari. After a few days, Ali-al Hiari, fled to Damascus on April 20, 1957. Thereupon a series of demonstrations occurred in Amman and in the Palestinian towns of Nablus and Ramallah in which the King was presented with demands for the resignation of the Khalidi cabinet, the removal of certain Palace officials, and the suspension of recently instituted enquiries among army officers. The King's reaction or reply was that he ordered the troops to surround Amman and Jerusalem, and on April 24, he declared martial law.⁶⁹

⁶⁸Sir Reader Bullard, ed., The Middle East, p. 333.

⁶⁹R.I.I.A., Survey of International Affairs 1956 - 1958, p. 172. see also A.G. Mezerick, ed., International Review Service, p. 17.

Afterwards, a rupture followed between Jordan and both Syria and Egypt, who made the change of government in Amman (namely the Nabulsi government which favored pro-Egyptian policies) a "pretext for failing to honour their undertaking of financial aid." With only Saudi Arabia's share of the "promised subsidy forthcoming, Jordan, could not hope to exist as an independent state without outside support, and turned once more to the west (America), whence it received aid."⁷⁰

The aim of all these incidents was to exert pressure on, and consequently oblige, the King to adopt a pro-Egyptian-Syrian policy, rather than be officially neutral in the controversy between Iraq and Egypt.

The Khalidi cabinet could not resist popular opposition and pressure from the demonstrators; ultimately, Khalidi resigned. The cabinet of Ibrahim Hashim was formed. It immediately declared Marshal law and enforced order, stopping the chaos and riots which were agitating in favor of a pro-Egyptian cabinet.⁷¹

On April 26, 1957, the United States stood in the

⁷⁰ Emile Bustani, Marsh Arabesque, p. 113.

⁷¹ Hazza' Al-Majjali, My Memoirs, p. 221.

Security Council with Egypt and secured the Council's acknowledgement that there was to be a wholly national Egyptian control over the Suez water way. On April 24, however, the Sixth Fleet had been sent by Washington to the Mediterranean to 'buttress' against Egypt and Syria the independence and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Jordan.⁷² But under the Eisenhower Doctrine, Middle Eastern countries were to be protected from overt-communist aggression rather than indirect aggression or pan-Arab intrigue and pressure. It is ideas that were the only invaders and these cannot be repelled by weapons.⁷³ Although ideas were the menace to Jordan, her independence was declared vital to the national interest of the United States; in fact it was the effect and pressure of the Arab nationalist forces inside Jordan acting at their maximum strength on April 27, 1957, that constituted the danger to the whole Jordanian Monarchy.⁷⁴ The Sixth fleet had then an airlift ready to deposit troops in Jordan. Consequently, pressure on King Hussein from Cairo and Damascus relaxed. "Thus, too, had Britain's place in the Middle East been taken over."⁷⁵

⁷²Lionel Gelber, America in Britain's place, (New York: Fredrich A. Praeger, 1961), p. 274.

⁷³John Bagot Glubb, Britain and the Arabs, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1959), p. 341.

⁷⁴Lionel Gelber, America in Britain's place, p. 275.

⁷⁵Ibid.

5. THE REACTIONS IN SYRIA.

On October 25, 1956, four days before the Tripartite aggression on Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia signed a military agreement placing an Egyptian in command of their armies in case of war with Israel. Egypt's minister of defense, General Abdul Hakim Amer, was appointed commander.⁸⁰ Immediately, during the Suez war, the Syrians ordered part of the army to enter Jordan, to reinforce the Syrian brigades that were already stationed there. Moreover, Afif Al-Bizri, the Syrian Chief of Staff (pro-communist) cabled president stating that Syria was prepared to invade Israel who was already attacking Egypt. Nasser's answer was: "I think that the plan (of the aggressors) is of a wider scope than the mere aggression or attack on the Suez Canal, and thus may expose Jordan and Syria to the danger of war."⁸¹ In the meantime and on October 29, 1956, on the first day of the Tripartite aggression on Egypt, a Syrian delegation composed of the president Shukri Al Kuwaitli and his foreign minister Salah Al Deen Al Bitar

⁸⁰George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, p. 465.

⁸¹Salah Al Deen Al Bitar says that Nasser's calculations were that it was more of a political crisis than a military one; that is why he asked the Syrians not to intervene. An interview with ex-Syrian foreign minister Salah Al Deen Al Bitar, Beirut, November 10, 1966.

and some others embarked on a visit to the Soviet Union.⁸²

During the meeting of the Soviet and Syrian delegates in the Soviet Union, Shukri Al Kuwatli, received a cable from King Hussein of Jordan in which he asked and empowered him to speak on behalf of Jordan. A similar cable was received from Nasser in which he described the Tripartite aggression on Egypt and empowered Al Kuwatli to ask for help. Consequently, and in the course of the meeting (between the Soviet and Syrian delegates) Shukri Al Kuwatli handed the cables to the Soviet delegation telling them that he is representing and talking on behalf of Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. Then, Al Kuwatli, asked for Soviet help to face the Tripartite aggression. The Soviets answered that they were ready for "complete and unlimited political support" and they will give any other help "within their policy of preserving international peace." Afterwards, the Syrian delegation asked for arms and volunteers. The Soviets said that they were ready to give arms without any delay, but refused, frankly, to send any volunteers. The reasons, it was assumed, was their know-

⁸²Ibid., The Syrian parliamentary Foreign Relations Committee, which was composed mainly of the traditional pro-western conservative parties, tried to hinder the mission so that it would not make any contacts with the Soviet Union.

ledge of the American strong opposition to such a step of sending volunteers to the Middle East. In spite of this fact, the Soviets said that they were ready to send Soviet military experts. Then Shukri Al Kuwatli said:⁸³

"You (Soviets) are before two choices; either to give all political and military aid to Egypt and Syria or to lose the friendship of all the Arabs."

But the Soviet side was reserved in the matter of partnership in resisting the Tripartite military aggression by military means; because their assumption or premise was that they should act within the boundaries of the policy of preserving world peace.⁸⁴

Another immediate Syrian reaction in support of Egypt, was that the Ba'athist officers in the Syrian army gave the orders to their men to dislodge and blow up the oil pipe lines without the knowledge of the then Syrian government or premier and even without the knowledge of the president, Al Kuwatli. Meanwhile, the popular demonstrations spread all over Syria condemning the aggression and the west⁸⁵

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵America was excluded from this condemnation because it opposed military aggression.

who collaborated and backed the aggressive designs of Israel. ⁸⁶

The successful march of the pro-Egyptian factions in Syria in the year before Suez had been bitterly opposed at home and abroad. The more their hold on the machinery of government, the more their opposition were driven to think that only an armed rebellion could dislodge them and set Syria on a different path. While the Soviet-Egyptian advance was the dominant theme of Syrian history in 1956, preparations for a counter-attack by opposition groups in Syria and exiles outside the country, in cooperation with Iraq, Britain and the United States, were steadily continuing. ⁸⁷

Although the unsuccessful pro-Iraqi plot in Syria in October 1956 was overshadowed by the parallel crisis of Suez, it was instructive about the shifting relationships between the Middle East and the western powers. The need to resort to such desperate methods marked the "inability of the western powers, in the mid-1950's, to establish a working

⁸⁶An interview with Salah Al Deen Al Bitar, Beirut, November 10, 1966.

⁸⁷Ibid.

relationship with the new generation of nationalist leaders".⁸⁸

The aim of the October 1956 pro-Iraqi plot in Syria was the control of Syria and the isolation of the center of opposition in Egypt. But Nasser had "turned the tables on the Baghdad Pact" and had secured Syria's allegiance, establishing a strong base there with the Ba'ath party.⁸⁹

On November 23, 1956, Abdul Hamid Sarraj, head of the Syrian Deuxième Bureau, announced the uncovering of the plot over Damascus radio:⁹⁰

"At a time when the Anglo-French-Israeli forces of iniquity and aggression were attacking Egypt, our courageous brother country; at a time when all units of the Syrian army were mobilized, proud to play their part in the battle of national honour; The Syrian military authorities discovered large quantities of military weapons which were being smuggled into Syria from a neighbouring country, that country was Iraq.... It is with a heavy heart that we reveal that this was a Government we hoped to see at our sides on the day of battle, even though it had taken the wrong road of imperialist pacts.

"As for.... the Government of Nuri as-Sa'id in Iraq, which instigated these wretches to plot against us for the benefit of the enemy and of Israel, we are certain that the wronged and gallant people will settle their account.... the hour of revenge has come".

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Patrick Seale, Struggle For Syria, p. 278.

Later on, Abdul Hamid Sarraj, who was interviewed by Patrick Seale, interpreted the coup in a broader strategy; he said:⁹¹

"The 1956 plot against Syria seemed specifically aimed at preventing us from intervening in the Suez war and swinging Syria into the orbit of the Baghdad Pact in the confusion which would follow the attack on Egypt".

The conspirators shared together their pro-Iraqi sympathies, their leanings towards the west, their conservatism, their distaste for the extremes of Nationalism.⁹²

As a consequence, the failure of the plot strongly reinforced the pro-Egyptian factions in Syria by eliminating from the scene their most dangerous opponents. Meanwhile, the communists and Ba'athists in Syria began daily increasing in power and influence. Thus, the collapse of the western-Iraqi counter attack decisively altered the balance of forces inside the country, leaving Syria still more exposed to the violent pressures of 1957.⁹³

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²An interview with Salah Al Deen Al Bitar, Beirut, November 10, 1966.

⁹³Ibid.

CHAPTER VI

THE PHASE OF 1957 - 1958

A. KING SAUD'S VISIT TO AMERICA IN 1957 - A Shift in Saud's Policy .

By the visit of King Saud of Saudi Arabia to Washington on January 30, 1957, a major change occurred in the shift of the balance of power between the two Arab camps, in their rivalry over the leadership of the Arab world. Saudi Arabia, fighting on the side of Egypt since the end of 1954, moved to the side of Iraq. The shift created new groups; two camps emerged, one composing Egypt and Syria, and the other composing Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia. The first camp officially favoured non-commitment to either East or West, but, practically, worked and cooperated with the Soviet Union; while the second camp (officially, Iraq; and, semi-officially, Saudi Arabia) committed themselves to the west. Jordan was not tied officially to the west by Pacts or treaties, but practically was on the side of the west against the communist bloc. On March, 1957, when Lebanon accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine, it became officially on the western side, although practically, Lebanese policy

had been pro-western for a long time.

After the Suez war, the Cairo regime launched a violent political offensive in the Arab world. Besides, Nasser could always count on the local supporters of ardent sympathizers in Beirut, Baghdad, Amman, Damascus, and other Arab capitals. Especially he could rely on students and, more particularly, on the Ba'ath party, whose objectives coincided with his own. The Ba'ath influence grew in Jordan and Syria in 1956 - 1957, and for a time the foreign ministers of Syria and Jordan were members of the Ba'ath.¹ The offensive propaganda of Nasser was directed to the Hashemite regimes of Iraq and Jordan. This attack, however, was not limited to these two kingdoms but was broadened to include monarchies in general. This led Saudi Arabia to reappraise her traditional policy and embark, consequently, on a rapprochement with Baghdad, fearful of the revolutionary dynamism of Cairo.²

The ex-American president, Dwight Eisenhower, maintains that his invitation to King Saud in 1957 had

¹George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, p. 523.

²Ibid.

serious and important objectives which he was determined to pursue. The first aim was related to the fact of seeking means to lessen the mutual prejudices and hatreds between the Arabs and Israel. Eisenhower's hope was to bring about a Modus Vivendi out of which genuine cooperation might develop. He believed that, if the nations of the Middle East work together, they could form a permanent bulwark against communist encroachment. But if the states of the Middle East spend their time and effort fighting each other, they would be a "hunting ground for communist oppression with disastrous results for the Free World. The second aim is related to another issue. Eisenhower also believed that, at the time, as the Suez experience showed, Nasser was not only trying to improve his position by working with the Soviets, he was striving to get himself recognized in the Arab world as its political leader - the virtual head of an enormous Moslem confederation which, he hoped, would unite behind him to "achieve his further ambitions." Consequently, America was determined to check Nasser's movement in this direction. Hence, they wanted to explore the possibilities of "building up King Saud as a counter weight to Nasser. The King was a logical choice in this regard; he at least professed anti-communism, and he enjoyed, on religious grounds, a

high standing among all Arab nations."³

During the talks between Saud and Eisenhower, Saud touched on several topics, the most important of which was his demand for arms to Saudi Arabia in case of an aggression by Israel or British aggression in Bur'aimi. Eisenhower suggested to Saud that the best military policy for any nation that had critical problems of economic development, was to "seek only such arms as would assure the maintenance of internal order and freedom from subversive activities, together with a small reserve that would give it reasonable protection against raiding attacks against its borders". Then he argued that, a nation to meet a major military threat, should depend largely upon its alliance with other free nations of the world . Eisenhower also maintained that the United Nations was set up to preserve weak nations from unjustified aggression and that Saudi Arabia could always depend on help in such a case.⁴

The talk of Eisenhower to Saud shows that, by the beginning of 1957, the United States and the west as a whole,

³Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, (London: Heineman, 1966), pp. 115 - 116.

⁴Ibid.

no more considered communism as the direct and imminent threat to the Middle East; but it was another danger, that of liberal Arab Nationalism and its ideology under the leadership of Nasser's Egypt . Arab Nationalism became the main threat to western interests in the Middle East. Hence the United States and the west embarked on means of curbing and isolating the increasingly emerging influence and power of Arab Nationalism under Nasser's leadership which was destined to replace western dominance in the Arab Middle East.

Although Camille Chamoun, by that time, had seen eye to eye with Eisenhower and the west, regarding the growing influence and consequently the danger of Arabism, he gives an account of the talks between Saud and Eisenhower while focuses on a secondary issue in the talks. Chamoun maintains that the closer the relations between Moscow and Nasser became, the more did Saud tend to lay the foundation of a solid friendship with the United States, to which he hoped to invite all the Arab countries. Before his departure to Washington, he was already convinced of the wisdom of this policy. At his return, he became its apostle and its defender.⁵

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⁵Camille Chamoun, Crise Au Moyen-Orient, (in French), p. 357.

However, Saud himself told Eisenhower what he said in his meeting with other Arab leaders at Cairo. Saud told them: "I am with you in Arab cooperation and in opposition to Israel, but I will not go one step with you in working with the Soviet Union - I shall have nothing to do with the Soviets".⁶

During an interview that Saud accorded to the Lebanese ambassador in Cairo, on February 26, 1957, he expressed his point of view with frankness. Saud said that he returned from America animated with a feeling of gratefulness towards Dulles and Eisenhower for the elucidation and assurances they gave him. When, upon his return, he met with his Jordanian, Egyptian and Syrian brothers, he told them frankly that he held towards America a great friendship based on mutual affection and respect.⁷ Saud also said:

"I am an Arab Moslem King concerned with the preservation of the principles of religion and the defense of the Arab interests at the cost of my blood, and that of my people. As a guardian of Holy Lands, I consider communism, with its destructive ideology, as our enemy. I will fight it as

⁶Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 119, also an interview with Salah Al Deen Al Bitar, Beirut, November 10, 1966.

⁷Camille Chamoun, Crise Au Moyen Orient, p. 357.

well as those who are its partisans."⁸

Then Saud continued to tell the Lebanese ambassador what he told Eisenhower. He said that he enumerated the faults or gaps in American policy; namely the refusal of America to arm Egypt while it supplied Israel with the arms it needed. This obliged Nasser to turn to the communists. Also, the withdrawal of the offer to the Aswan High Dam. Last but not least America had frozen \$ 40 million for Egypt after the nationalization of the Suez Canal company, and refused to buy cotton from Egypt as well as to provide her with the necessary wheat for the consumption of the Egyptian people. King Saud added:⁹

"I informed Eisenhower of these complaints and I have reasons to think that America is ready to dissipate them, if it is certain about the future of its relations with Egypt. Concerning the attitude of president Nasser in relation to the Eisenhower Doctrine, you can tell president Chamoun that Egypt has neither accepted nor rejected the Doctrine and that it will decide its position if its demands are met, first among which is the retreat of the Israeli troops from the territories they occupy in Egypt."

Then Saud, unexpectedly changing his subject and

⁸Ibid. and an interview with Salah Al Deen Al Bitar, Beirut, November 10, 1966.

⁹Camille Chamoun, Crise Au Moyen Orient, p. 358.

his tone, said: during the meeting (held between Nasser, Hussein, Chukri Al-Kuwatli and Saud, after the latter's visit to America) in Cairo, some of the persons present wanted to make a statement in the joint communique which was to be issued the second day, about our unanimous accord over foreign policy. Saud opposed this formally, saying: "My brothers, our ways are different; you are going to the East and I am going to the west; I have given my word to America and I will not go back on the promise"¹⁰

On February 8, 1957, after the negotiations which lasted a week with president Eisenhower and his Secretary of State Dulles, a communiqué was dispatched to the press. It contained the accord reached between the two countries.¹¹

From 11th to 17th May, 1957, King Saud paid a state visit to Baghdad to work a reconciliation between the two dynasties. At the end of his talks in Iraq, a joint communiqué was issued, in which the opinion was expressed that no Arab country should interfere in the affairs of any other.

¹⁰Ibid., also an interview with Salah Al Deen Al Bitar, Beirut, November 10, 1966.

¹¹For the communiqué between the two countries see Muhammed Khalil, edi., The Arab States and the Arab League, pp. 919 - 920 .

This phase was generally interpreted as a reference to Egypt's efforts to stir up civil disorders in the other Arab countries.¹²

Thus a new phase opened in Saudi Arabia's Arab policy. This new phase was a rapprochement with the Hashemite monarchies of Iraq and Jordan, during which an informal bloc, called the 'King's Alliance' came into being.¹³

B . THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE.

After the Suez war, America and the Soviet Union found themselves facing each other in the Middle East. A decade earlier America had been called upon to back up ¹⁴ Greece and Turkey against Soviet pressure. By 1957 she found herself the sole champion of western interests in the Middle East. In the meantime, the Soviet Union had managed her way into the area, in the same period, by recognizing and enlisting Arab nationalism as an ally against the west. "Both powers now sought,

¹²John Bagot Glubb, Britain And the Arabs, p. 341.

¹³George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, p. 567 .

¹⁴That policy was called the Truman Doctrine in 1947.

in similar manners, to consolidate and legitimize their new positions of strength."¹⁵

The American approach was the Eisenhower Doctrine, which gave notice to the world that the United States had assumed new responsibilities. The reason behind the Doctrine was the Soviet goals. Eisenhower maintains that the Soviet objective, was, in plain fact, "power politics: to seize the oil, to cut the canal and pipelines of the Middle East, and thus seriously to weaken western civilization."¹⁶ But if the Doctrine branded International communism as the sole enemy, the policy of America was sometimes hard to put in practice, since it was difficult "to indentify this animal in the jungle of Arab politics".¹⁷ Indeed, the Soviet-American confrontation did not remain for a long time on a two-power basis. Other contemporary factors were acting at the sametime and hence mingled and determined the stage on which the confrontation was to be fought. Of all these factors, Egypt's bid for Arab hegemony under its new brand of Arab Nationalism was perhaps the most important.

¹⁵Patrick Seale, Struggle For Syria, p. 283.

¹⁶Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 177-178.

¹⁷Patrick Seale, Struggle For Syria, p. 284.

After the Suez war in October 1956, the influence of the Baghdad Pact collapsed creating a "vacuum" as anticipated by Eisenhower. Thus the Eisenhower Doctrine came to strengthen the Baghdad Pact and to fill that "vacuum"¹⁸. Although the doctrine was formally addressed to the whole of the Middle East, this declaration was aimed at the Arab World due to Soviet infiltration.¹⁹

On January 5, 1957, president Eisenhower announced before a joint session of congress an unprecedented pre-state of the Union speech.

As Eisenhower pointed, America's basic objective in international affairs remained peace, but the risk to peace was dangerously felt in the Middle East; the risk being the possibility of communist aggression, direct and indirect.²⁰ Actually, the president proposed, and sought the authorization of Congress for, three types of action:²¹

¹⁸Adnan Menderes "Opening Statement", The Baghdad Pact, public records of the Ankara Conference Series, January, 1958, p. 15.

¹⁹George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, p. 676.

²⁰United States Department of State, United States Policy in the Middle East, August 1957, p. 224.

²¹For the full text of the Eisenhower Doctrine see Muhammed Khalil, edi., The Arab League and the Arab States, pp. 909-915.

"1- To assist the Middle East to develop its economic strength.

2- To undertake programs of military assistance; and

3- 'To include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism'. 'The proposed legislation', said the declaration in a later paragraph, 'is primarily designed to deal with the possibility of communist aggression, direct and indirect.'

The purpose of the Eisenhower Doctrine did not deal directly with the problems of the Middle East; but was mainly directed towards the threat of communist infiltration which would aggravate these problems. The problems were such as Palestine, relations with Israel and the Arab States, the future of the Arab refugees. Hence, Eisenhower maintained that "the United Nations is actively concerning itself with these matters and the United States is supporting the United Nations."²²

Of all the Arab countries that were expected to adhere to the new American policy, Lebanon was the only one that accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine. So, Lebanon subjected

²²United States Department of State, United States Policy in the Middle East, August 1957, p. 224.

itself to the storm of Arab protest that raged around the doctrine. Already quarrelling with Nasser's Egypt over its diplomatic relations with Britain and France, Lebanon found itself severely shaken when the Egyptian president overwhelmingly attacked the Doctrine.

The Eisenhower Doctrine was debated two months before its adoption by the press and radio of the Arab world. The major lines or trends of the public opinion towards the Doctrine were overwhelmingly against it.²³

Iraq, like other Baghdad Pact members in the Middle East, had backed the Doctrine. The British-oriented Nuri as-Sa'id, did not attempt to adhere to the Doctrine. Such an attitude did not worry Washington, however, since Iraq was considered a pro-western state that would be willing to cooperate in any move against international communism in case of need.

Syria and Egypt stood against the Doctrine and had won over to their side Jordan. Their common anti-Docctrine stand had been formalized in the communiques of January 19

²³Arskan Humbaraci, Middle East Indictment, p. 243.

and February 25, 1957, which committed them to a neutralist policy.²⁴ The factors behind this common front were not at all the same. Egypt and Syria had come to the conclusion that if solution was to be found to the Palestine problem and if Israel was to be deterred from expanding into Arab territory, the Arab states must not align themselves with the western bloc. They must follow an independent neutralist policy seeking support where they could find it.

Ultimately, King Saud did not adopt the Eisenhower Doctrine, although he supported the principles behind it in practice. This was due to the national sentiment in Saudi Arabia which was running with the tide of Arab Nationalism, now fully under the leadership of Nasser.²⁵

As for King Hussein, he personally favored the Eisenhower Doctrine, but he was in a difficult situation. The reason was that he was met with strong opposition at home as well as the opposition felt by Syria and Egypt to the Doctrine. The underlying factor for Hussein's hardships at

²⁴Muhammed Khalil, ed., "Treaty of Solidarity between Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt", The Arab States and the Arab League, vol. II, pp. 287-288. It seems that the policy of Saudi Arabia was in a state of flux.

²⁵Arslan Humbaraci, Middle East Indictment,

home was that two-thirds of his 1,600,000 subjects were Palestinians, some 600,000 of whom were refugees. These refugees - blaming the west and Israel for their miseries - carried bitter memories. Hence, they listened eagerly and approvingly to the propaganda broadcasts of Cairo and Damascus. Consequently, King Hussein found himself early in 1957 limited by the neutralist sentiments of his Palestinian subjects as well as by the Nationalist left-wing government of his premier Suleiman Nabulsi. Nabulsi had rejected the "vacuum theory" based upon the Eisenhower Doctrine. Hussein had no choice. His answer had to be no.

There was only one Arab government left in the Middle^{East} to welcome and subscribe to the Eisenhower Doctrine - that of Lebanon. When Lebanon hailed the Doctrine, long before it had become law, it created a debate about its merits and the advisability of Lebanese adherence. Many voices were raised against it among the home opposition and Moslem leadership. At the same time, there were voices raised in its defense.²⁶ And from outside the country, the Syro-

²⁶ An interview with vice-Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, Adeb Firzli, Beirut, November 15, 1966. Mr. Firzli himself violently attacked, in Parliament, the Baghdad Pact due to its close ties with the west, had voted for the Doctrine because of its loose ties.

Egyptian campaign against the Doctrine was gathering momentum.²⁷ But Chamoun still, making his calculations, decided to commit his country to the new policy. Chamoun, himself narrates the story of his acceptance of the Doctrine in the following lines. The arrival of James Richard, the representative of the president of the U.S., was preceded by an exchange of messages and diplomatic conversations which aimed at probing the views of the American Administration, mainly about two principal points. These points the Lebanese government asked to be cleared up, as much for its own sake as to prevent the attacks of its opponents were the following:²⁸

"1 - Economic help, military assistance and the guarantee of the U.S. in case of aggression against Lebanon: their extent and the circumstances which would make them applicable,

"2 - Whether the help or guarantee were unconditional or whether they submitted to conditions incompatible with its aims, sovereignty and bonds with Arab countries."

The results were conclusive. The relations which were to be established between Lebanon and America, asserted the State Department, would not involve any obligations of

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Camille Chamoun, Crise Au Moyen-Orient, p. 361.

assisting America in case of war with another country, nor the engagement of Lebanon to take line with America in the solution of problems concerning the Middle East. They will be solely based on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and on the desire of America to see the peoples of this area maintaining their independence against any aggression, whether direct or indirect.²⁹

Camille Chamoun continues to say that there was left a double unknown: the real attitude of Nasser vis-à-vis the doctrine of Eisenhower and that of the Lebanese public opinion. Chamoun maintains that although Nasser did not influence the Lebanese decision in the final analysis, yet he preferred, that since he was concerned about avoiding a breach with Egypt, to probe into the attitude of Nasser in case Lebanon subscribed to the Doctrine. The relations between Lebanon and Egypt were passing through a new period of difficulty. In an article in the weekly Al Hawadith, issued in Beirut, Chamoun had expressed the opinion that, given the war between East and West ideologies, the Arab countries should make their choice; that they could not remain neutral in face of communist aggressive ideology or

²⁹Ibid.

would succumb to it and that Lebanon, not being communist and not wanting to ever become, had already chosen its way . The "Megalomania of Nasser" could not ignore an opinion so different from his, nor be content by analyzing it or refuting it. However, on February 20, 1957, Chamoun received the Egyptian ambassador, who after commenting on the announcement of his policy relative to the orientation of the Lebanese policy towards the west and underlining the fact that our two countries were going to follow different paths, finally defined the position of Egypt vis-á-vis Eisenhower Doctrine. Nasser, the Egyptian ambassador said, would be disposed to receive the representative of the U.S. president (Richards) under condition that the Israeli troops would have been already evacuated from the sector of Gaza and the positions of Aqaba.³⁰

These same words were almost at the same date reported by King Saud to the Lebanese ambassador in Cairo. Hence, Chamoun became almost sure that Nasser would accept the visit of Richards and would discuss with him the terms of a possible accord. The position of the American administration toward the retreat of the Israeli troops was known. However, the attitude of the Egyptian press remained hostile

³⁰Ibid. , p. 362.

to any possibility of accord with the United States; the future, Chamoun says, was to prove that the condition of the retreat of Israeli troops was just a pretext.³¹

Chamoun continues saying that, on the other hand, Lebanese public opinion was divided. Some, blindly obeying the Egyptian injunctions, were opposed to the Eisenhower Doctrine. In their ranks were, apart from a corrupt press, the ex-prime minister and minister and ministers victims of the November 1956 crisis and their friends - embittered politicians like Hamid Franjeh, Sheikh Beshrah el-Khoury supported by the surviving members of the Constitutional Party. These exposed the good deeds of Nasser's regime for they saw in it a force capable of satisfying their ambitions. The other camp was formed of the majority of the Lebanese. For these, American help constituted a new contribution to the Lebanese economy; the guarantee of the United States against aggression, whether direct or indirect, was an assurance capable of shielding Lebanon against the dangers of communism and Nasserism.³²

On March 16, 1957, on the occasion of Mr. Richard's

³¹Ibid., p. 363.

³²Ibid., p. 264.

visit to Beirut, a joint Lebanese-American communiqué based on the Eisenhower Doctrine was issued. It called for the extension of American economic and military aid to Lebanon to fortify it against the advances of international communism; it authorized Lebanon to request the assistance of American armed forces to repel a communist aggression. However the assistance would not be automatic. For, in accordance with section 2 of the doctrine,³³ it would be up to the President of the United States to determine whether or not Lebanon was really being threatened by armed aggression from a country controlled by international communism, and to decide on the use or withholding of American armed forces in accordance with this determination.³⁴

Nasser was convinced that the Eisenhower Doctrine was nothing but an extension of the Baghdad Pact. The only difference is that the Doctrine does not have close ties among the members, but nevertheless it was designed to enlist the Arab States into a military alliance with the west.

³³Salah Al Deen Al Bitar says that this section of the Doctrine was the worst of all, Beirut, November 10, 1966.

³⁴Muhammed Khalil, "U.S. Lebanese joint communiqué Regarding ambassador James P. Richards mission to the Middle East", The Arab League and the Arab States, p. 922.

Moreover, he saw Lebanon's acceptance of the Doctrine as strengthening the position of Iraq under Nuri's leadership. If Nuri could extend his hegemony over Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, he would effectively isolate Egypt from the Arab world. This, thought Nasser, was also the objective of the western powers. Hence, Nasser decided that Lebanon must abandon the Eisenhower Doctrine.³⁵

But, although Lebanon was the only Arab country to accept the Doctrine, there were other Arab countries who in practice encouraged it and followed its paths. In February, 1957, at the same time of Saud's visit to America, Abdul-Illah visited the United States - on a decision from the moslem members of the Baghdad Pact in November 1956 - where he met the Saudi monarch. As a result of their meeting a rapprochement was engineered between the Saudi and Hashemite dynasties, under American auspices.³⁶ The aim was to enlist them for the new show of American policy in the Middle East symbolized by the Eisenhower Doctrine. Immediately, after Saud's visit to Washington, he began to

³⁵An interview with Salah Al Deen Al Bitar, Beirut, November 10, 1966.

³⁶Waldemar Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri, p. 152-153.

show concern and sensitivity to communism and to the leftist trend in Syria and the role Egypt was playing. It seems that by 1957, Liberal Arab Nationalism under Nasser's leadership had become the imminent and major threat to the Saudi regime, which was the most conservative and autocratic, as well as the main threat to western influence and interests in the Arab world. Hence, hostility to the Baghdad Pact by the Saudis had turned, by now, to mere indifference. In this mood, Saud agreed not to attack the pact publicly any more. On the other hand, Nuri as-Sa'id, was determined to "break up the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi joint command". This process, he thought, can only be done gradually by getting Saudi Arabia into a more or less formal pro-Eisenhower Doctrine alignment or backing.³⁷

On May, 1957 King Saud made a visit to Iraq. At the end of the talks between Saud and the Iraqi officials, a communiqué was issued on May 19, 1957. The communiqué showed accord and full agreement on the problem of Palestine, the interests of the Arab-Moslem world, the moslem rights in the Gulf of Aqaba which was described as a "closed Arab Gulf connected with the Holy places of Islam". Finally, the dangers

³⁷Ibid.

threatening the "Arab Nation" were identified as "Zionism" subversive principles and imperialism"³⁸

Nuri as-Sa'id wanted to mention communism as one of the dangers threatening the Arab Nation. This was blocked by the pro-Egyptian, anti-Iraqi foreign minister of King Saud, Yusif Yasin. The most Iraq could get was the single statement of 'subversive principles'.³⁹

A similar communiqué was issued after King Saud's visit to Jordan on April 29, 1957. The two Kings, Saud and Hussein of Jordan, agreed that 'No Arab state should interfere in the internal affairs of any other Arab state'. The significance of these agreement or communiqués was their support of a policy of non-interference in internal affairs. This was a sign which had the appearance that it was directed against Egypt.⁴¹

Relations continued to worsen between the two Arab

³⁸The Arab World, May 20, 1957, pp. 1-2, 7.

³⁹Waldemar Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri, pp. 153-154.

⁴⁰R.I.I.A., Survey of International Affairs, (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 175. By mid-June 1957, Egypt's military attache's had been expelled from Tunisia, Libya, Ethiopia, Iraq and Lebanon. In the meantime, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Sudan had protested at Cairo Press and radio criticism.

camps. Another meeting was engineered between King Saud and King Hussein in early June 1957. The communique issued on June 13, 1957, strangely enough, merely reaffirmed the two Kings' "belief in positive neutralism and their determination to abide by the terms of the Arab League charter and the Arab solidarity agreement, and condemned all foreign pacts no matter what their forms or sources may be". Nevertheless, two opposite reactions were noted to this communique. Some regarded it as a setback to American policy; but in Egypt and Syria, the conclusion was the very opposite. Although the wording of the communiqué was similar to those used by the Arab liberation front, yet it was immediately denounced as a deliberate attempt to 'deceive' Arab opinion and the two kings as the 'tools of America'. The result was that the Saudi ambassador was withdrawn from Damascus; Egypt and Syria declined to pay Jordan their contribution under the Arab Solidarity Agreement.⁴¹ The result was that the Arab public opinion clearly recognized the 'tacit breakdown of the Arab front that occurred in the Jordan crisis'.⁴²

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 176-177.

⁴²Ibid., p. 177.

C. THE SITUATION INSIDE SYRIA (IN MID-1957)

President Nasser was eager to exploit the political triumph in the Suez war throughout the Arab world. Hence, he could not agree to ally the Arab states against a power which had been his main support since 1955 arms deal. Also, Nasser could not accept American dominance such as was implicit in the Eisenhower Doctrine. In particular, he could not accept American pressure on Syria, which might weaken his own hold on that country. "Had Syria then slipped from Abd al-Nasser's grasp, Suez would have been a defeat."⁴³

By 1957 Syria became once more the central point for rivalries between the great powers and at the sametime the arena of Egypt's struggle for local supremacy.

Syria was, in fact, the first Middle East state to attack the Eisenhower Doctrine. On January 10, less than a week after Eisenhower's message to Congress, the Syrian Government issued a statement rejecting the theory of the "vacuum". At the same time it disputed the view that economic interests gave any power a right to intervene in the

⁴³Patrick Seale, Struggle For Syria, p. 285.

area, and denied that communism presented any immediate threat to the Arab world. The Syrians claimed that "Zionism and communism were the main dangers to which the Arabs remained exposed."⁴⁴

To Syria and Egypt, the Eisenhower Doctrine appeared as an American means to interfere in Arab Affairs in the name of anti-communism, hence threatening to compete with Syria and Egypt in taking from them the initiative in local Arab affairs for which they had fought since 1955.

Moreover, events inside Syria were increasing the apprehensions of America. Since the Syrian elections of 1954, the Ba'athist-leftist elements in the army were mounting in power and influence. By 1957 the Ba'athist and some communist officers had dominated the army; the Government, consequently was controlled by these leftist elements.⁴⁵

Three events, other than the general trend in Syria, in quick succession precipitated the crisis and gave Syria a colouring of becoming communist-dominated satellite. On

⁴⁴For the full text of the Syrian's government announcement see the Arab World, January 11, 1957, p.1 .

⁴⁵Walter Z. Laqueur, The Middle East in Transition, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), pp. 326-330.

August 6, 1957, the Syrian Defense minister, Khalid al'Azem, signed a wide ranging economic and technical agreement with the Soviet Union in Moscow.⁴⁶ On August 13, 1957, Damascus Radio suddenly announced that it had uncovered a plot by the United States to overthrow the Syrian government and replace it with a pro-western regime.⁴⁷ This was followed by the retirement of the moderate commander-in-chief, Nizam al-Din, and his replacement on August 17, 1957, by Afif al-Bizri, an officer of suspected Soviet sympathies. A dozen other officers were purged at the sametime.⁴⁸ But Abdul-Hamid Sarraj, the most influential officer at the time said:⁴⁹

"Bizri's appointment had nothing to do with his supposed communist leanings (which in any case only emerged later) nor with Khalid al Azem's visit to Moscow. It was simply that

⁴⁶R.I.I.A., Sir Reader Bullard, ed., The Middle East, (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 466.

⁴⁷An interview with ex-Syrian deputy Abdul Kareem Dandashi, Beirut, December 15, 1965. Dandashi confessed to the author that he was the only civilian who acted as a liaison between the American Embassy in Damascus and the plotting Syrian pro-western army officers.

⁴⁸Gordon H. Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military, (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1964), pp. 361-362. Most of these officers were right-wing pro-western officers.

⁴⁹Patrick Seale, Struggle For Syria, p. 295.

we had demanded from Nizam al-Din the dismissal of a number of senior officers implicated in Ibrahim al-Husayn's attempted coup (American plot). Nizam al-Din refused. We then engineered his dismissal and his replacement by Bizri who seemed a non-controversial figure; he had no personal following in the army and was connected with none of the major factions then feuding inside the general staff. His appointment was therefore acceptable to everyone".

Hence, it was both a contest between rival groups of officers, involving at the same time, an ideological struggle between the left-wing officers (mainly the Baathists and some communists) and the right-wing officers (pro-western elements). This implies that the American apprehensions about Syria as increasingly becoming a communist satellite were largely untrue.

On August 19, 1957 it was reported that Mr. Dulles had held "crisis talks with Eisenhower and the British ambassador". It was thought that a new satellite (Syria) had emerged in the Middle East. But in such a situation the Americans could not apply the Eisenhower Doctrine short of perpetrating an armed aggression. So, it remained for Syria's neighbours to assess the situation and determine their policy. The New York Times said on August 22, that "it is legitimate diplomacy for the United States to encourage all the anti-communist countries in the Middle East to use

what pressure they can to restrain Syria".⁵⁰

But Nuri as-Sa'id, fearful of the Ba'athist-communist trend dominating Syria, recognized that a 'solution' could only come from the 'outside' and that it should come soon. On February 13, 1957 Nuri-as-Sa'id bluntly told the then American ambassador in Iraq that,⁵¹

"If the green light were given him by us (America) and the British he could 'clean up' the situation quickly and effectively. 'This would not be aggression for we (Arabs) are all brothers. We Iraqis would simply be liberating friendly and responsible elements in Syria.'"

In Syria, Khalid al-Azem declared that Syria's policy, "in spite of American provocations, would still be based on positive neutrality". But he went on, 'we are at the outer edge of that policy; do not force us to go beyond it.' Washington was not deterred by this warning, it continued to press ahead with its efforts to "mobilize Syria's neighbours against the menace in their midst."⁵²

D LOY HENDERSON'S MISSION

On August 24, 1957, Mr. Loy W. Henderson, deputy under-Secretary, of State left Washington for Turkey to mobilize the

⁵⁰ quoted in Ibid.

⁵¹ Waldemar Gallman, Iraq under General Nuri, p. 165.

⁵² Patrick Seale, Struggle For Syria, p. 296.

efforts of Syria's neighbours against the contemplated menace from Syria. In Ankara he conferred with the prime Minister, Menderes, and with the Kings of Jordan and Iraq who had journeyed there to meet him. Henderson then flew to Lebanon to see president Chamoun before returning to Turkey for further talks with Menderes, Crown prince Abdull-Allah of Iraq, and the Iraqi Chief of Staff. He did not go to Syria or make contact with the Syrian authorities.⁵³

The movements of Henderson aroused a great storm of indignation and bitter comments. Moscow charged that the United States was preparing the grounds for direct intervention against Syria. Cairo accused Henderson - an 'expert in coups d'etat' - of planning the isolation and siege of Syria. After America failed to 'subvert' Syria from inside (through the American plot), "she was now inciting Syria's neighbours against her. The plan, Cairo alleged, was to provoke a clash which would justify the application of the Eisenhower Doctrine."⁵⁴

Concerning Arab interference in Syria, Eisenhower maintains that Whereas "early information had indicated the possibility of prompt Iraqi military action, with the Turks

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Gordon H. Torrey, Syrian politics and the Military, p. 363.

Abstaining, there were now hints of a reversal of this arrangement". The deterrent to Iraqi action was the threat to her oil income that would result from Syrian interruption of the pipelines crossing the country.⁵⁵ King Hussein, Eisenhower continues to say, unexpectedly left on vacation to Italy, thus giving a clear indication that Jordan, "contrary to what the Americans had been led to believe a few days earlier, did not want to join in a move against Syria". The Americans were next astonished to find that King Saud, rather than addressing himself to the dangers of a "communist Syria" in the Middle East, was still preoccupied with "Israel, the Gulf of Agaba, and the slowness of American arms deliveries to his government." Saud's attitude was given to Eisenhower in a message from president Chamoun where he said that Saud was afraid of Radio Cairo which, if it attacked him, could easily provoke trouble and might even stir up a revolution.⁵⁶

Loy Henderson, himself, reported back in Washington on September 4, 1957; a presidential press release expressed the alarm of Syria's neighbours regarding the 'apparently growing Soviet-communist domination of Syria and the large build-up of Soviet Bloc arms' there. As a consequence,

⁵⁵ Dwight Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 200.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 201.

Eisenhower authorized an arms airlift to Jordan and Iraq.⁵⁷ Moreover, Henderson reported a surprising amount of rivalry among the Arabs. All-in-all, Henderson concluded, "the capability and the readiness of the Arabs to take military action in the event of broader difficulties with Syria seemed to be slight."⁵⁸ In the meantime, Syria sent a formal question to all the Arab States asking them if they felt any danger from her. The response of all the Arab States, including the Iraqi, was no.⁵⁹ Even the "unpredictable King Saud," after the Arab Summit meeting held in Damascus by mid-September 1957 (between King Saud, Iraqi premier, Ali Jawdat, and Syrian president Kuwatly), declared publicly that he would "deplore any aggression against any Arab country, including Syria."⁶⁰

E - THE SYRIAN-TURKISH CRISIS (OF SEPTEMBER 1957).

The Turkish attitude had been indeed provocative, so that what had been a direct Syrian- American contest took

⁵⁷ Gordon Torrey, Syrian politics and the Military, p.364

⁵⁸ This report, by Henderson, was given to the American State Department. Dwight Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 202.

⁵⁹ Official Proceedings of the Higher Military Court in Baghdad, 1958, vol. I, p. 61.

⁶⁰ Dwight Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 202.

on the form of a more localized Syrian-Turkish one, with the Soviet union and the United States each backing one of the contestants.

Apparently, it was thought, that a show of military strength along the Syrian border would strengthen anti-communist Syrian elements and force the Syrian regime to diminish their anti-western propaganda. Consequently, the Turkish army held manoeuvres in mid-September.⁶¹ Immediately, Bulganin, the Soviet premier, accused Turkey on September 13, 1957, of "concentrating troops on Syria's borders" for what he called a "United States - planned attack."⁶² Bulganin warned, "that an armed conflict over Syria, would not not be limited to that area alone." Dulles (American Secretary of State) retorted in the United Nations General Assembly on September 19, with the charge that it was Turkey who was in danger-threatened in the North by Soviet Military Power and in the South by the "Major build-up of Soviet arms in Syria".⁶³ In the meantime, Loy Henderson, after his visit to Turkey had reported to Eisenhower that "Turkey was still determined to

⁶¹ An interview with Salah Al-Deen Al-Bitar, Beirut, November 10, 1966. (Al-Bitar was Syria's Foreign Minister at the time of the crisis).

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ United Nations General Assembly Officials Records, Twelfth Session, Plenary Meeting (New York: 1957), p. 21

eliminate the Syrian regime." "Menderes was disposed to act even if this meant that he might be going counter to U.S. advice and objectives." ⁶⁴ The Soviet army news paper, Red Star, of September 10, 1957, claimed to 'unveil a diabolical American plot' to invade Syria. It was, the paper affirmed, a five-stage operation whereby the Americans prepared to re-enact the Anglo-French aggression against Egypt:

"1- Israel would make provocative troop movements on her frontiers with Syria;

"2- Turkey would then concentrate forces on Syria's northern border evoking the possibility of a Syrian - Israeli clash;

"3- Iraq would in turn concentrate troops on the pretext of coming to Syria's aid;

"4- Iraqi and Turkish aircraft would raid Syrian frontier posts claiming that Syria had violated their frontiers;

"5- These two powers would then march in on Syria, appealing at the same time for American help to repel Syrian aggression." ⁶⁵

On October 20, the Saudi Arabian and Lebanese radios announced that Saud had offered to mediate the dispute between Syria and Turkey and that the two countries had accepted the proffer. Damascus Radio immediately declared that Syria had not accepted mediation. Then the General Assembly

⁶⁴ Dwight Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 202.

⁶⁵ Patrick Seale, Struggle For Syria, p. 302.

suspended debate on the Syrian-Turkish crisis and awaited the outcome of Saud's efforts. On October 23, a Syrian spokesman stated that there was no need for mediation since all that was necessary to solve the problem was for Turkey to withdraw her troops from the vicinity of the Syrian border.⁶⁶

Meanwhile, King Saud attempted, in his diplomatic efforts, at getting those Arab countries most hostile to Syria and moderating their views. First he began his campaign by a visit to president Chamoun of Lebanon on September 7, 1957, attempting to heal the breach between Lebanon and Syria. Soon on September 10, Jordan rallied to Saud's policy where her premier, Samir al-Rifa'i, gave assurances that his country had no intentions of interfering in Syria; Syria, he said, 'is independent and entitled to do what she likes in her own interests!! on the 21st, the Saudi Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs said in Cairo that his government did not believe that Syria represented a threat to any of her Arab neighbours or to Turkey. On the 25th King Saud himself arrived in Damascus where he denounced any attempt at aggression against Syria and emphasized the solidarity of the Arab peoples. Even Ali

⁶⁶ Gordon Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military, pp. 366-367.

Jawdat al-Ayubi, the Iraqi premier, announced on the 26th, after his talks with president Kuwatli, that Syria and Iraq had arrived at 'complete understanding.'⁶⁷

By early October King Saud had emerged as the leader of a movement of holding the Arabs together against all outside attractions. By this time Washington herself was beginning to question the wisdom of her panic concerning Syria. After a meeting in New York between the Syrian Foreign Minister and Mr. Dulles, president Eisenhower declared on October 3, 1957, that the Syrian situation 'seems to be solidifying to some extent'. Then he added that the 'original alarm of countries like Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq and, to some extent Saudi Arabia, seems to have been quietened by what they have learned.'⁶⁸

All of Saud's manoeuvres had, in fact, been designed to seize the initiative from Nasser and isolate him. During Saud's mediation between Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Washington, Egypt had not been consulted and had taken no part. But Nasser is not to tolerate any challenge to his Arab Leadership whether from a big power or an Arab rival.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Patrick Seale, Struggle For Syria, pp. 302-303.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 304.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

Hence, on September 9, the Egyptian government stated publicly that it would give Syria 'unconditional unlimited support'.⁷⁰ On September 13 Egyptian troops landed unannounced at Latakia to "take up battle positions in northern Syria side by side with their Syrian brothers."⁷¹ By this move Nasser had broken the isolation with which Saud threatened, demonstrating that "no crisis in the Middle East could be settled without him."⁷²

In short, Patrick Seale maintains that the net effect of America's harsh intervention in the Arab world in 1957 was to confirm the Soviet Union and Egypt as Syria's twin protectors in the face of western hostility. This had been the role since the battle over the Baghdad pact in 1955, but in the years following the Suez war they secured something like official status in Syrian public life.⁷³

F- THE CHANGE OF THE STATUS-QUO IN THE ARAB EAST.

At the last meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council in

⁷⁰ Gordon Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military, p.363.

⁷¹ Patrick Seale, Struggle For Syria, p. 305.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 306.

its last session in Ankara on January 27, 1958, reports were received that Syria and Egypt were to unite. The Iraqi delegation naturally showed particular concern, and "no member of the delegation was more visibly disturbed than Nuri as-Sa'id".⁷⁴

On February 1, 1958, the formal declaration of the United Arab Republic was announced. It was composed of Syria as the northern region and Egypt as the southern region. The immediate response of Jordan and Iraq, in obvious mistrust and to counter weight the United Arab Republic under Nasser's leadership, was to join together in a Federation on February 14, 1958, named the Arab Union. The Treaty of Federation stipulated that neither partner would be committed by the other's prior alliances nor would the Union abrogate alliances of either partner.⁷⁵

G- THE LEBANESE CRISIS OF 1958

To understand the Lebanese crisis of 1958 and its relation to the Baghdad Pact controversy, it is relevant to describe the Lebanese internal politico-confessional social structure. This structure mainly determines the general lines of Lebanese policies.

⁷⁴ Waldemar Gallman, Iraq under General Nuri, p.84

⁷⁵ Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. IX, (March, 1958), pp. 111-113.

The confessional system in Lebanese politics is generally traced back to the establishment of the Mutasarrifiyya (governorate), under the Turkish rule in 1861.⁷⁶

Socially, two major politico-confessional groups make up the Lebanese society. The christians (Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Catholics, Protestants, and other minor sects) constitute the First group. The Moslems (Sunnites, Shia'ites, Druzes) constitute the Second group.

There are considerable differences in the politics, culture, and the religions or sects of these two groups. Hence, each group maintained different policies and attitudes towards the issues which faced Lebanon.

Under the French mandate, each of these two groups sought a different foreign policy. However, in order to attain Lebanese independence the Christians and Moslems joined their ranks and efforts. This christian-moslem cooperation came to be called (Al-Mithaq Al-Watani) or the National Pact of 1943.

The principles of the National Pact were agreed upon between the christian president, Bishara al-Khuri, (Maronite)

⁷⁶Leila Meo, Improbable Nation, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), p. 21.

and his moslem (Sunnite) premier, Riyad as-Solh, with of the consent of the christian and moslem leadership. The two communities committed themselves to the following principles:⁷⁷

"1 - First, the christians gave up the idea of an isolated Lebanon and accepted an independent and sovereign Lebanon within the Arab world. The Moslems in return, gave up the idea of giving back to Syria the territories which had been annexed to Lebanon; and also the aim of uniting Lebanon with the Arab World.

"2 - Secondly, the christians gave up the idea of foreign protection, either by way of occupation, military outposts or the concluding of treaties with the western powers.... In return, the moslems agreed to stop working to make the Lebanon submit to Syrian influence or Arab influence."

This Pact did not help to avoid future differences and misunderstanding between the two groups. Hence, a complex of fear in each group was created that the other had accepted independence for a transitional period. The First group (the christians) were afraid that some day when the Arab states become stronger, the Second group (the moslems) might resort to their previous policies and attitudes, namely to seek the Union of Lebanon with the Arab states. The

⁷⁷Bisharah al-Khoury, Lebanese Facts, (in Arabic), (Beirut: The Jesuit Press, 1961), p. 21. See also George Dib, "Riadh Solh's Speech in the Lebanese Assembly: Oct. 1943", Middle East Forum, vol. XXXIV, (No. 1, 1959), p. 6

Second group (moslems) were afraid that some day the First group might seek western help and alliance. But the Charter of the Arab League and the Arab Collective Security Pact (of which Lebanon is a member) acted as a guarantee for Lebanese integrity and independence against Arab and foreign states.⁷⁸

The Palestine catastrophe and the subsequent decline of the Arab League, created a vacuum among the Lebanese, which made some seek foreign alliances and some seek collaboration and alliance with one of the feuding Arab blocs.⁷⁹

H - THE CAUSES OF THE LEBANESE CRISIS

The crisis was not the result of a single set of factors. It was generated by a multiplicity of factors. All of these factors emanated from one major and fundamental cause. The cause had been the differences in cultural and political orientation that exist among various segments of Lebanese society. The evidence available indicated that the claim of the opposition that the causes of the crisis were internal and the counter-claim by the Chamoun administration

⁷⁸An interview with Pierre Jumayyil, President of the Kataeb (Phalanges) party and ex-minister. Beirut, December 11, 1965.

⁷⁹Ibid.

that the causes were external, are both, in a sense, true. However, for the purposes of this research, the writer will enumerate only the general and basic factors that ultimately led to the armed clash in the Lebanon.

The direct causes of the crisis can be divided into three: internal, regional and international. This division is intended only for purposes of identification. In actual practice, these factors were inter-related and interdependent.

1 - INTERNAL CAUSES.

The internal causes can be reduced into three basic elements: 1- moslem dissatisfaction, 2- the 1957 Lebanese elections, and 3- the attempt of president Chamoun to succeed himself.

a - The Moslem Dissatisfaction.

The moslems in Lebanon complain and claim that their grievances include the whole field of political, social and economic life. Thus the moslems, for instance, would like to see the constitution amended to provide for an increase in the powers of the premier and a corresponding decrease in the powers of the president. Also, the moslems complained that the best and most influential positions in the civil service and the army are in the hands of the christians. They

also complain about the educational opportunities open to their children. The moslems want a vast expansion in state school facilities, to equalize opportunities for their children, particularly in moslem rural areas.

These inequalities are not of recent origin, but have existed for many years. However, they were aggravated and brought to the forefront under the Chamoun administration.

b - The 1957 Lebanese Elections

The term of the sitting chamber was due to expire in June, 1957. On May 12, 1957 the election campaign started. The United National Front (the opposition) first appeared on the political scene in April 1957. Twenty-three political leaders⁸⁰ (mainly moslems) had on April 1 submitted a memorandum to president Chamoun which called for the following:⁸¹

"1. The next chamber should consist of eighty-eight members, not sixty-six as the president was reported to want .

"2. The present cabinet should resign in favor of a "neutral cabinet to supervise the forthcoming

⁸⁰Seven deputies of them had already resigned in April because the government accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine on March 16, 1957. These deputies were: Hamid Franjiyah, Sabri Hamadah, Rashid Karami, Abdallah Yafi, Ahmad and his son Kamil al-As'ad, and Abdallah al-Hajj.

⁸¹Fahim Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, (Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1961), p. 49.

parliamentary elections (due in June).

"3. The immediate cancelling of the state of emergency and of press censorship, both imposed in November 1956 during the Suez crisis.

"4. The present cabinet should not enter into agreements with any foreign power until after the election of the new chamber."

The memorandum warned that if the president did not comply with these demands, the signatories would "feel compelled to take 'practical steps' as dictated by the interests of the country."⁸²

The policies and aims of the United National Front (opposition) were clear from the platform they submitted to the people. The platform included the following main points:⁸³

"1. The constitution should not be amended to enable president Chamoun to stand for re-election.

"2. Lebanon should be neutral in any dispute between foreign powers.

"3. Lebanon should refuse to house foreign military bases or to join foreign military pacts, such as the Baghdad Pact.

"4. Any aid tending to restrict Lebanon's sovereignty or to influence her foreign policy should be rejected.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Ibid., pp. 53-54.

"5. Lebanon should pursue a policy of close, impartial and effective cooperation with other Arab states.

"6. The existing government should make way for a caretaker government to supervise the elections."

There were many riots and demonstrations by the opposition to fulfill their demands which reached their climax on May 30, 1957. Many persons were wounded among the demonstrators (opposition) and few were killed.⁸⁴

The elections were held on four successive Sundays, beginning on June 9. The results were a sweeping victory for the government. Its candidates won over two-thirds of the seats of the new chamber, while the opposition came out with only eight seats.⁸⁵

The opposition claim that they have some evidences which show that the elections were rigged.⁸⁶ Although this was not a new phenomenon in the elections, yet one of its

⁸⁴Ibid., pp. 54-55.

⁸⁵An interview with Saèb Salam, ex-premier of Lebanon and one of the opposition leaders, Beirut, 19-1-66.

⁸⁶Saèb Salam (who failed in this election) told the author of some instances in which irregularities occurred in the election which resulted in the failure of the opposition.

results was that the major political figures in the country failed to enter parliament.⁸⁷ Those who failed had from then on to express their ideas and policies through extra-parliamentary means, because they were ousted from position of power. It was not far when circumstances were prepared for the opposition to regain by force what they think that Chamoun had taken from them in the elections. Pierre Jumayyil, a government supporter, who himself was elected, in reply to the question "Does your party believe in the legality of the parliament of 66 and its representative character?" he said: "... the parliament which has just been given to us, represents in my opinion, only ten percent of the population of the country - at the moment the real parliament is in the street."⁸⁸ As a consequence, the United National Front refused to recognize the election results, and demanded that new elections should be held.⁸⁹ Immediately following the elections, there was some relaxation of tension. But this relaxation was for a very short period of time. Soon, bombings, clan feuds, sabotage, gun-running and clashes between armed bands and

⁸⁷Most of the deputies who resigned from the previous parliament failed in the new elections.

⁸⁸Fahim Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, p. 58.

⁸⁹An interview with Saeb Salam, Beirut, 19-1-66.

gendarmes in mountain areas began to occur. This increased as well as its damage to life and property. This state of affairs continued until the crisis began on a large scale in May 1958.⁹⁰

It is necessary to remember that during these months when terrorism and arms smuggling were increasing in Lebanon, tension was increasing inside Syria. Syria was going through a series of "plots" culminating in the "American plot" and the crisis of Turkish troop concentration.

At the same time relations between Syria and Lebanon were bad. Syria regarded that the Lebanese government was "sold out" to the west. Also the Syrians believed that Beirut became the main base for all conspiracies against their security and independence. Conversely, the Lebanese authorities believed that Syria was behind the spread of terrorism due to the activities of its Deuxième Bureau.⁹¹

c - Presidential Succession

The Lebanese constitution specifically prohibits

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹An interview with Salah Al Deen Al-Bitar, Beirut, November 10, 1966. Al-Bitar confessed that the smuggling of arms, money, and some of the troubles were instigated by individual officers of the Syrian army probably without the knowledge of the Syrian government.

a president from succeeding himself. The United National Front feared that Chamoun might succeed himself. This fear had existed before the 1957 parliamentary elections. Although this question was not discussed openly, yet it was one of the main background issues in the campaign.⁹²

President Chamoun never explicitly stated in public that he would amend the constitution and run for the presidency another time. However, the sources of western ambassadors in Beirut "claim that they were informed by Chamoun himself of his determination to amend the constitution to make possible his re-election."⁹³

In the beginning of the year 1958, the rumor that Chamoun was working for the amendment of the constitution to succeed himself, had become widespread.

However, in January 1958 the Third Force⁹⁴ decided to meet and interview Chamoun to clarify the issue of his attempt to succeed himself. After the interview, the delega-

⁹²An interview with Saeb Salam, Beirut, 19-1-66.

⁹³Fahim Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, p. 65.

⁹⁴The Third Force was a neutral political power formed in Lebanon as a middle of the road between the policies of the government and those of the opposition.

tion of the Third Force held a press conference on January 27, 1958, where they announced "that they were now fully convinced that the president was determined to run for another term in contravention of the constitution." After the statement of the Third Force, the "battle of renewal came out into the open."⁹⁵

On March 27, 1958, some 85 leading political personalities and public figures met at the home of Henri Far'un in Beirut, organized themselves into a congress, and elected Far'un as president, Abdallah Yafi as vice-president, and Kamal Junblát as secretary. They made several resolutions and issued a manifesto in which they affirmed their dedication to the continued existence of Lebanon as an independent state and to the National Pact. Out of many accusations and warnings they told Chamoun that if he made any attempt to amend the constitution to enable him to renew his term of office, this "will justify the people in imposing their will by all means at their disposal".⁹⁶

On April 10, the suspicions of the opposition were confirmed. On that day, George 'Aql - a deputy and an ardent

⁹⁵Fahim Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, p. 65.

⁹⁶M.S. Agwani, ed., The Lebanese Crisis, 1958, (London: Asia publishing House, 1965), p. 41.

supporter of Chamoun - announced that he would soon propose an amendment to the constitution in the chamber to enable Chamoun to stand for re-election.⁹⁷

On the same day, April 10, some 300 moslem leaders, including prime ministers, speakers of the chamber, opposition deputies, and religious leaders, attended a Ramadan dinner party given by the Mufti of Lebanon. They did not invite, as the practice used to be, any moslem member of the government. After the party they issued a statement in which they declared their opposition to any attempt to amend the constitution. The statement said that the "rulers had spread disension among the Lebanese people and stimulated hateful feuds to carry out their plan to amend the constitution so as to allow the re-election of the president."⁹⁸

On April 24, George 'Aql announced again that he would introduce the motion for amending the constitution the following week.⁹⁹

By the end of April the acts of violence and

⁹⁷An-Nahar, April 10, 11, 1957.

⁹⁸Leila Meo, Improbable Nation, pp. 133-134.

⁹⁹An-Nahar, April 24, 27 and May 2, 1957.

sabotage had become increasingly violent as well as a daily occurrence. However, the first minor clashes occurred from April 10, between the followers of the Druze leader, Kamal Junblat, and the gendarmes in the Shūf area. As a consequence, four opposition leaders told General Chehāb (then army commander), "that the clash was a political event resulting from the governments intention to change the constitution to enable Chamoun to run again. They emphasized that the army should be kept out of the controversy. This indicates that the decision for armed action had been taken by the opposition."¹⁰⁰

2 - REGIONAL CAUSES

The rise of the revolutionary Egyptian junta of 1952, with its new ideology, brought a new element into inter-Arab relations. This created tension on two levels: on the first level, it created tension among the inter-Arab relations in view of their foreign and defense policies. On the second, it created tensions and splits among the populations of each country in view of the foreign, political, social and economic policies and issues.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., see also Fahim Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, pp. 67-68.

a - Islamic Policy of Egypt.

When Egypt, in 1952, embarked on an islamic as well as an Arab policy,¹⁰¹ she created confusion and fear in the minds of a section of the Lebanese namely the First group (christians). This was due to the interaction and interrelation between the Arab and Islamic policies.¹⁰² Emile Bustani maintains that since Egypt is trying to lead the Islamic peoples, the attempts of the Second group (moslems) to force Lebanon to maintain a pro-Egyptian policy, meant the subservience of the christians to a control and direction of a moslem nature. No doubt, the christians resist such a situation by all means. Egypt - in their view - is a foreigner in relation to Lebanese internal issues, as much as America or Britain are foreigners. If the Second group (moslems) felt justified to seek help from Egypt or Syria for example - on internal issues - The first group felt that according to this interpretation, it has the right to seek help from the west to re-adjust the internal situation.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Gamal Abdul Nasser, Egypt's Liberation, The philosophy of the Revolution, (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1955), p. 49.

¹⁰² Egypt had changed her attitude towards its Islamic Policy since 1955.

¹⁰³ Emile Bustani, Lebanon and the Future, (in Arabic), A Pamphlet, (-, n.p., August 27, 1958), p. 27.

b - The Baghdad Pact

With the signature of the Baghdad Pact on February 24, 1955, a new element of controversy was injected into the Arab East which exerted great pressure and impact on the internal situation of each of the Arab states.

Although Lebanon formally and finally rejected the Baghdad Pact, there was a period of indecision. This period reflected the official and public division on the pact.¹⁰⁴

Since 1943 Lebanon began to follow - according to its National Pact - a policy of cooperation and neutrality among the Arab states. By 1955 Egypt and Iraq were deeply divided against each other. Hence, the Lebanese government wondered which to follow. Nevertheless, it became evident to the Chamoun regime that Egypt, with the support of Saudi Arabia, was trying to isolate Iraq from the Arab world or to force it to renounce the Baghdad Pact. The Chamoun regime did not wish to see Iraq isolated, for its isolation would upset the balance of power inside Lebanon. Consequently, this would

¹⁰⁴An interview with ex-Lebanese president, Camille Chamoun, at the time of the issue, At Sa'adyat, October 28, 1966.

subject Lebanon to the dictates of Cairo.¹⁰⁵

No doubt that the great discrepancy between the two politico-confessional groups, was the factor behind the Lebanese policy in officially and nominally rejecting the Baghdad Pact - to please the moslem group - and in practically supporting the Iraqi bloc - to please the christian group.

The other development which sharpened the conflict between Egypt and the other Arab countries, namely Lebanon, was over the foreign policy they were to pursue. In the spring of 1955 Nasser embarked on his policy of neutralism or non-alignment with either of the communist or western Blocs. By the Fall of that year Nasser received the Czech arms deal. This meant, of course, that the west no longer held a veto over the supply of arms to the Middle East. It also meant that the Soviet Union had now entered on the scene of the Middle East politics. Hence, it became increasingly by urgent to Iraq and the west to get Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon to join the Baghdad Pact. They increased their campaign to achieve this end. Egypt responded by pressing on all three a policy of positive neutralism,¹⁰⁶ thus creating

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Emile Bustani, Lebanon and the Future, p. 34.

a division of loyalty in the official and popular level in all the Arab countries.

c - The Policy of Dynamic Arab Nationalism

When Nasser assumed the leadership of dynamic Arab Nationalism the First group of Lebanese began to acquire a negative attitude towards Egypt. This form of nationalism, by definition, had the characteristic of disrupting the Arab status - quo, trying to impose - through its aggressive propaganda - its form of Arab Nationalism. With the emergence of the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) in 1958, and when Nasser became nearer to the Lebanese borders, and when the second group (moslems) showed great enthusiasm towards Nasser and the U.A.R.; the fear of the First group on the Lebanese sovereignty and independence, reached its climax. The more the Second group increased its enthusiasm and disposition towards Nasser, the more the First group increased its isolationism and its negative attitude, thus becoming more attached to its western friendships.¹⁰⁷

d - The Eisenhower Doctrine

Although Lebanon rejected the Baghdad Pact,

¹⁰⁷An interview with Pierre Jumayyil, Beirut, December 11, 1965.

yet made the mistake of subscribing to the Eisenhower Doctrine (which Nasser described as the continuation or replacement of the Baghdad Pact after its final collapse after the Suez war) and the consequent principle "American protection of Lebanon" individually. The American protection was against possible communist aggression. Since Syria and Egypt were cooperating with the Soviet Union, and since America, at the time, was against Syria and Egypt, Lebanon found itself in quarrel with them. Hence, the Second group (mainly moslems) thought that Lebanon had diverted from the National Pact and accepted foreign protection. Thus they felt justified to divert from the National Pact and seek a closer allegiance with the Syro-Egyptian policies.¹⁰⁸

3 - THE INTERNATIONAL CAUSES

The international factors for the Lebanese crisis lie in the triangular rivalry between the west, the East, and Arab Nationalism under Nasser's leadership for predominance in the Arab world. Hence, in a sense, the Lebanese crisis of 1958 reflected the struggle of two blocs on an Arab level and another two blocs on an international level.

¹⁰⁸An interview with Sàeb Salam, Beirut, 19-1-1966.

Lebanon, by the summer of 1958, became the real armed stage for clashes on the upper level as the one between the U.A.R. and Iraq. Since the U.A.R. was supporting the Lebanese opposition in arms, men, and money, the pro-government forces sought the help of Iraq in the shape of money and arms. Each of the Arab blocs was showing its forces politically in supporting one of the fighting groups in Lebanon. Thus the scene as a whole being as follows: the Lebanese opposition was backed and nourished by the U.A.R.; the latter was backed by the communists and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the pro-government group were backed by Iraq and the Baghdad Pact powers, and these in turn were backed by the west. Hence, a complexity of local, regional and international forces, policies and factors were interacting at the same time which ultimately led to the armed clash in the Lebanon.

So, the success or failure of one of the warring groups in Lebanon implied the success or failure of the struggling blocs on the Arab and international levels. After nearly six months the warring groups stopped fighting declaring the result as "No winner, No loser". And so ended the crisis in September 1958, by the election of General Fuad Chehab acceptable to all groups.

CHAPTER VII

DECLINE OF THE BAGHDAD PACT

On July 14, 1958, the government of Iraq was overthrown, and a Republican government was installed, under the leadership of Brigadier Abdul Kareem Kassem. The Baghdad Pact headquarters were sealed and occupied by Kassem's troops. Nuri as-Sa'id, Abdul Illah, King Faisal and most of his royal family were killed. Thus ended, practically, the membership of Iraq in the Baghdad Pact. Officially, it was not until mid March, 1959, that Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact, after which it was re-named, the Central Treaty Organization (cento) whose permanent seat is in Ankara.

On July 28, 1958, at the 5th ministerial council session of the Baghdad Pact in London, - Iraq was not present - a declaration, subsequently known as the London declaration, was made. In this declaration, the members of the Baghdad Pact affirmed their determination to maintain their collective security and to resist aggression, direct and indirect.¹

¹The Baghdad Pact Secretariat, The Baghdad Pact Organization, (Ankara: Baghdad Pact Public Relations Division, March 5, 1959), p. 3

The remaining members of the Baghdad Pact, after the revolution of Iraq in July 14, 1958, felt it useless if America does not back their Pact to strengthen it. Thus America signed separate bilateral agreements in Ankara on March 5, 1959, between the United States on one hand and Iran, Pakistan and Turkey on the other. These agreements brought America into firm association with the Baghdad Pact members; but still remained without being, officially, a member in it.²

A. THE CAUSES OF THE DECLINE OF THE BAGHDAD PACT.

In the following sections an attempt will be made to reproduce what the Iraqis thought about their pre-1958 regime; not the opinion of the very rich nor of the very poor, but the opinion of the middle class only. Although in certain incidents, the case has not been the same as the middle class Iraqis thought about it, the fact remains, that it is very important to consider what they have thought about their regime and their ruling group.

In another section an attempt will be made to give major examples of each of the various factors that collaborated

²Ibid.

for the final destruction of the monarchy. Both, what the middle class Iraqis thought about their regime, and the various and major factors that occurred in Iraq, constitute the overall cause for the ultimate collapse of the regime as well as the Baghdad Pact.

1. Their opinion of the monarchy.

The Iraqi monarchy was often called "feudal", an accusation that has been brought against various monarchies.³ In such systems, the king exists with the support and alliance of a landed oligarchy which in turn takes advantage of the poor and miserable peasantry. The oligarches do not, however develop the wealth of the land beyond the satisfaction of their own personal needs. The Hashemite dynasty had indeed no indigenous roots in Iraq. They were brought (by the British) from the Hijaz, and given Iraq as consolation prize. Hence the Iraqis felt that their own monarchy was alien and imported.⁴ The Regent prince Abdul-illah, who came to the fore after the death of King Ghazi, the son of King Faisal I, dominated Iraqi history and the history of his family for two decades - not by strength of his character, but by

³Caractacus, Revolution In Iraq, (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1959), p. 17.

⁴Ibid., p. 2

virtue of his position and his ambitions.⁵ To the people he seemed to be totally without concern or thought for public welfare, unscrupulous and ambitious for himself and the fortunes of his family, subject to no law, whether of political or of private behaviour. This man was the "friend" of Britain, associated with western and especially with British life.⁶

Politically, it was Abdul-Illah who made the police state of Nuri as-Sa'id possible. When he was frightened by the revolt of Rashid Ali in 1941, he built up the monarchy into a strong machine which made every new government under his control. It was he who handed the direct control increasingly to Nuri, and reshuffled the cabinets to suit him. He bore full responsibility for what Nuri did, but Nuri as-Sa'id, however hated, was never despised as Abdul-Illah was.⁷ Ultimately, it was Abdul-Illah's ambition to be king in Damascus, an ambition with which Nuri had full sympathy, that brought them both down.⁸

The young King Faisal II was dominated by his uncle, the Regent, and inexperienced in government; people became

⁵An interview with Mr. Hashim Jawad, ex-Iraqi foreign ministry, Beirut, 11-4-65.

⁶Caractacus, Revolution in Iraq, p. 24.

⁷An interview with Salah Al Deen Al Bitar, November 10, 1966.

⁸An interview with Mr. Hashim Jawad, Beirut, 11-4-1965.

indifferent to him.⁹

Meanwhile the royal domains were spreading, land around Baghdad, in particular, was constantly annexed to increase the wealth of the royal family. These lands were given out of government holdings; those in Harthiyah, on the outskirts of Baghdad, alone represent a "calculated value of sixty million pounds".¹⁰

This then was how the Iraqi monarchy appeared to its subjects:¹¹

"Alien in its origin, established by British power and copying British manner, but constitutional in the British sense only to those who see in legal eyes that were closed to the realities of power politics.... The constitutional pretence made the constitutional change inevitable".

2. Their Opinion of the Regime

To the Iraqis, their state seemed to be a police state. Above this police state, a regime of corruption was upheld.¹² The corruption seemed to begin at the royal family.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Caractacus, Revolution in Iraq, p. 29.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Brigader Abdul Kareem Kassem, The principles of the 14th July, 1958 Revolution in the Speeches of the Leader (Za'eem), (Iraq: Government publications, 1958), pp. 12, 17, 28, 34.

The ministers and their sons and a few business men of exceptional wealth, who controlled more patronage than some of the ministers, were also included as part of the corrupt regime. The line of corruption included or passed through the members of parliament and some officials to all the lower echelons.¹³

Besides corruption, there was unequal distribution of wealth, which no attempt was made to remedy. The Development Board was set up to spend the money accruing to the State, (the Board was financed in the main from 70 per cent of the oil royalties) in whatever ways would best increase the natural wealth of the country.¹⁴

In fact this Development Board did good work, particularly in the construction of various damming projects. Yet it was never trusted, because the increase of wealth seemed to benefit chiefly or only the rich. There was no creation of industry on a scale sufficient to employ large numbers of the poor people. The Board did good negative work

¹³For a full picture of the nature of corruption, see Caractacus, Revolution in Iraq, pp. 30-35, also Fadhel Jamali, From the Reality of Iraqi politics, (in Arabic), p. 98.

¹⁴Caractacus, Revolution in Iraq, p. 35.

in stopping the floods, but it did not work for the victims of the country's changing structure. Worst of all, in Iraqi eyes, was the failure of the Board to promote industry. The money was not spent either on large-scale industrial projects or on the mechanization of agriculture. The money that was spent on health schemes and social services was not very large.¹⁵

Politically the regime was based upon a parliament chosen by a complicated voting system which made it easy to rig elections. The constituencies were "shared, it was said, between the outgoing cabinet, the Palace, and the British Embassy for the new parliament. Most constituencies returned their Member unopposed. The nomination of the members was left to either the Palace or cabinet to consent it". That is why in reviewing the political development of Iraq since independence, the government is characterized by the lack of stability.¹⁶ The various government changes made in order to achieve reform were perhaps natural and some of them necessary. Yet, these changes have not been produced by peaceful methods as provided by the constitution. These changes were engineered

¹⁵Ibid., p.36. The foregoing eight sections were based on Ibid.

¹⁶Majid Khadduri, Independent Iraq 1932 - 1958, 2nd ed, (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 360-364; and Hashim Jawad, Beirut, 11-4-65.

by local forces and practices which were not compatible with a democratic system of government. According to the constitution cabinets change either as a result of defeat in a general election or by a vote of lack of confidence in parliament. However, in practice, parliament never voted against any cabinet which caused its fall. While the control of the elections always assured the victory of the cabinets. As a result undesirable cabinets have been forced to resign either by dismissal (mainly by an expression of the sovereign's displeasure) or by manoeuvres, threats and rebellions engineered by an opposition group or groups.¹⁷ In the fifty-odd cabinets formed since 1921, not a single one was changed by truly constitutional change. The exceptions were when the premier resigned in consequence of a conflict arising within his cabinet. The unconstitutional (or extra-constitutional) methods¹⁸ that have been used to change Governments in Iraq

¹⁷Interview with Mr. Hashim Jawad, Beirut, 11-4-1965. For a complete picture of the failure, misuses, handicaps and behaviour of the parliamentary system in the Arab world, see Hazaa' Al-Majali, My memoirs, (in Arabic), pp. 190 - 191, and Nasir al-Deen An-Nashashibi, What Happened in the Middle East, pp. 406 - 407, 414.

¹⁸For the details of the Iraqi Executive and its dominations, direction, and misuse and undermining of the supremacy of the constitution, see Mohammed Mahdi Kubba, My Memoirs About the care of Events, (Beirut: Dar At-tabia', 1965), pp. 168-173; pp. 251-254.

were as follows:¹⁹

"1. Political manoeuvres in which one or more opposition groups tried to embarrass the cabinet by certain tactical assaults such as agitation in the press, Palace intrigue, or an incident which caused dissension within the cabinet and forced the premier to resign. The five governmental changes from 1932 to 1934 were in the main produced by these methods.

"2. Tribal uprising incited by the opposition in areas where there were tribal shaykhs unfriendly to the cabinet. Three governmental changes were thus made during 1934 - 5.

"3. Military coups d'état which were produced by the attempt of the opposition to alienate the loyalty of leading army officers from the Government and threatened to raise (or actually raised) a rebellion which forced the cabinet to resign. Seven governments were overthrown by military coups from 1936 to 1941, and one in 1958.

"4. Popular uprisings produced by strikes and street demonstrations. A strike may suddenly begin by a trifling incident, but when the students and mob, incited by opposition parties, rushed to the street the demonstrations became exceedingly difficult to control. The Government, shouted down by familiar slogans, had to choose between a bloody battle with the mob and resignation. Three popular uprisings have taken place: two of them caused the fall of two cabinets in 1948 and 1952, and one proved to be abortive in 1956."

¹⁹ Majid Khadduri, Independent Iraq 1932-1958, pp. 364 - 365., The foregoing section was based on Ibid.

The principal governmental changes that have been produced by violent means since 1932 were those of 1934, 1936, 1938, 1940-1, 1948, 1952, and 1958. It is to be noted that these coups have recurred in a cyclical form, each cycle maturing in a two - or four - year period.²⁰ After each coup a Government was formed. "The discredited elements of the previous cabinet would soon reappear, gather momentum, and, making use of certain favourable circumstances or resorting to the usual unconstitutional methods, return to power."²¹ In the 1958 revolution the former regime completely collapsed.

The bulk of the parliament consisted of the "sheikhs; a caricature of a landed gentry, these were the "feudalists" so hated by the middle class". One scandal of which people spoke was the use of the Kut Barrage waters. It was said that a work which had cost millions of pounds was wanted to benefit the estates of three men, one of whom boasted that his personal estate was the size of Switzerland. Townspeople

²⁰Ibid., The Tribal and military coups d'état before the Second World War recurred in a two-year cycle; those after the war in a four-year cycle. The military coup d'état of 1958 took place two years after the abortive coup of 1956.

²¹Ibid., p. 365 .

²²Caractacus, Revolution in Iraq, p. 36.

believed that primitive conditions were deliberately preserved in the countryside. For example, "Tribal law", as opposed to the "Baghdad penal code", obtained in the desert. Moreover the chief creation of the British, and the "last achievement of the mandate, was the Land Settlement Law, by which, at the discretion of Land court officials, Land which had formerly belonged jointly to the tribe, could now be registered as the private property of the sheikhs". At the same time, the landlords were given the right to imprison tenants for debt. Thus the sheikhs rapidly founded a "quasi-feudalism that had never before existed." Their vast possessions ensured for them an "adequate income to absentee landlords drinking Whisky in Baghdad hotels". The same process drove the peasants also to emigrate to Baghdad, for the opposite reason, their poverty. In every unbuilt-up corner of Baghdad these miserable people lived in mud huts, called sarifahs. These unfortunate creatures were the constituents of the famous "Baghdad nob". In 1958 a very slight rise in "the standard of living could be observed, but still the miserable slum conditions in which nearly all lived remained practically unchanged!"²³

²³Caractacus, Revolution In Iraq, p. 37; see also Waldemar Gallman, Iraq under General Nuri, pp. 113-118.

3. The Police State.

The man upon whom this whole system depended was Nuri as-Sa'id. Formerly a Turkish officer, he seemed, like so many Arab politicians of the older generation, to belong to the ottoman age and Empire. Nuri, himself, was not thought to be corrupt. It was claimed that, unlike his colleagues, he was not a rich man. He was the corruptor rather than the corrupted. It was in power that he was most interested, and he enjoyed to play the political game for its own sake. He liked to manipulate the fates of Nations, but not to plan the government of his own country.²⁴

Nuri as-Sa'id never deviated from his traditional policy, of friendship to Britain, in any Arab or non-Arab matter. He was deeply convinced - not only because of his self interest, but more out of conviction and exertion of his judgment and mind - that the existence of Iraq as an independent rich state, depends solely on the friendship of Britain.²⁵ What is known about Nuri as-Sa'id, is that whenever he assumed power, he concentrated most of his efforts on certain specific

²⁴Interview with Hashim Jawad, Beirut, 11-4-1965.

²⁵Nasir Al-Deen An-Nashashibi, What Happened in the Middle East, pp. 46-47.

internal matters such as making new elections, building a dam for water, debating the budget of the Development Board, or debating the possibility of amending the Law of Elections, or struggling a political opposition neglecting Foreign Affairs. But whenever he resigned from government, he would go to London, Constantinople, Karachi etc.... for sketching plans or embarking on secret negotiations; acting or behaving as if he were the real premier of the Iraqi government. It was when Nuri as-Sa'id was outside government, that he drew the nucleus of the Baghdad Pact, that he negotiated with the oil companies, that he wrote to the officials in Britain and America about his proposals for solving the Palestine problem, that he accompanied the then Iraqi premier, Salih Jaber, and participated with him, in the negotiations of the Treaty of Portsmouth.²⁶

Nuri as-Sa'id believed that the existence of Iraq depended upon British protection; but he did not know that the British did not back the Iraqi claim, that Mosul and Kirkuk should remain Iraqi, because of their love to Iraq, but because of their desire that Iraqi oil should remain in their hands. Nuri, also, did not know the nature of the twentieth century,

²⁶Ibid.

and the nature of wars and the periods thereafter, that had inspired the British to amend their Treaty with Iraq, not because of their love to Iraq, but in consonance with the new circumstances.²⁷

Nuri as-Sa'id did not know, in spite of his genius, these facts. But may be he did not wish to know about them; since he lived all his life in one political line beginning in Baghdad and ending in London, and he could not or did not want to change that line in the remaining few years of his life. He built his fame on British backing; who can secure for him fame other than the British?²⁸ He knew the keys to British politics; who can help him to know other keys than of British politics? That is why when Dynamic Arab Nationalism began its offensive on the remnants of British influence and domination in the Arab world, the British in collaboration with Nuri as-Sa'id established the Baghdad Pact as a means, mainly, to stop and hinder that tide in pursuance of preserving British influence, and as a consequence, of Nuri's, in the Arab East. The struggle was fierce, but it ended in the killing of the strong pro-British leader, and the withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact.

²⁷Ibid., p. 60.

²⁸Ibid., p. 61.

Nuri as-Sa'id, like any Arab nationalist, saw the Arab world as one and real, and its divisions as mere political conveniences; but he saw still in terms of the old Turkish empire, inhabited solely by princes and their viziers. His power over his ministers was so strong to the degree of making them accept any policy he decides upon.²⁹ Even Abdul-Illah Backer, one of the main supports of the regime, said that the policy of Iraq was decided between Nuri as-Sa'id and Abdul-Illah, a policy which the other prime ministers did not dare to deviate from.³⁰ Other ministers assured the Baghdad Revolutionary Court that documents written out by them in their own hands were entirely Nuri's composition. When he was in the room they seem to have had no will of their own, although in his absence they might criticize him and even decide on some quite different course of action.³¹

It is no exaggeration to say of Nuri that, while he worked with zeal in the field of international relations, he had nothing but contempt for his own people. Simply, Nuri as-

²⁹Ibid., and Caractacus, Revolution in Iraq, p. 43.

³⁰Official proceedings of the Higher Military Court in Baghdad, volume IV, 1958, p. 1292.

³¹Nasir Al Deen An-Nashashibi, What Happened in the Middle East, pp. 61-62.

Sa'id was not of the twentieth century.³² This is shown by his failure to understand the appeal of Nasser. To the end he believed that only a few hundred students and eccentrics opposed him. He had no idea that public opinion could be significant, or that, even in the quarter-century that he dominated Iraq, the public reaction had become much wider, stronger and more important. He would have been at home in the "Turkey of Abdul Hamid to which his own education tied him; and the roots of that Turkey went back to days when it did not occur to sultans that their subjects held opinions."³³

The Iraqi army had by 1954 become the main bulwark of the government in office against seizure of power by the opposition." Nuri no doubt had a lot to do with this relationship between army and government. The American Embassy in Iraq prepared a study of the Iraqi army's role and position. The result had been that while the army played little part in politics, its officers and men shared the opinions and emotions of the civilian population from which they were drawn. They, too, were Arab nationalists, anti-Israel, and anti-British. The Dislike of the Americans was somewhat mitigated by their arms aid. The American Embassy, consequently, concluded that

³²Caractacus, Revolution in Iraq, p. 43.

³³Ibid., pp. 44-45.

a "situation which stirred deeply any of these emotions might cause the army, like any other group, to react so violently, that even loyalty to the crown would be abandoned." This was proven correct when Kassem's coup destroyed the monarchy.³⁴

The regime under the Iraqi monarchy refused to differentiate between the communist opposition, agitation and the Iraqi Arab nationalists who opposed the regime purely because of the internal and Foreign policies it followed. In the eyes of the regime almost all varieties of opposition were denounced as communist; even if they were students demonstrating against the 1956 Tripartite aggression on Egypt, workers striking for higher salaries, deputies who failed in elections, national leaders asking for reforms.³⁵ Instead of combating the demands of opposition by embarking on quick reforms in the social, economic, and political spheres, the old regime under the monarchy labelled these demands as communist agitation, and attempted to solve these problems not by offering nation wide planning for quick development to wipe out the miseries of the people, but by strengthening the arms equipment of the police to stop such agitations.

³⁴Waldemar Gallman, Iraq under General Nuri, pp. 91-92.

³⁵Abed Ar-Rahman Al Bazzaz, Pages of the Recent Past, (in Arabic), (Beirut: Dar Al Elem Lelmalyeen, 1960), p. 16.

Nuri as-Sa'id himself, after the Suez crisis and in the beginning of 1957, put a plea to the American Ambassador to equip the Iraqi police with the best and most modern arms. He maintained that the police had done a commendable job in containing demonstrations and maintaining public order during the tense weeks of the (Suez) crisis. They managed somehow to do this in spite of their inadequate equipment. Nuri continued to say that next time things might not turn so well. To be on the safe side the police should have more modern radio equipment, transport equipment, and small arms. He hoped that the United States would "foot the bill". That was not asking too much. After all, Nuri shrewdly pointed out, it had been in the interests of the United States that internal order had been maintained during the Suez crisis. A similar situation might well recur."³⁶

Usually in the case of students, teachers and junior government officials the price for having engaged in "communist and peace partisan" activities was expulsion from school and loss of jobs. The extent of police and court action was revealed by the government from time to time by the publication of lists of those involved.³⁷

³⁶Waldemar Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri, p. 95.

³⁷Ibid., p. 93., The foregoing three sections were based on Ibid.

When Nuri as-Sa'id returned to office in 1954, one of the conditions under which he had agreed to return to power was that he be given a free hand by the palace to revoke press licenses³⁸, since, in the months that preceded his return, the newspapers were characterized by an increasingly critical attitude towards the regime. Through the press ordinance he was given the means to act. At the time Nuri took office, about seventy newspapers were being published. Nuri, resorted to drastic suppression of the press, and he re-licensed half a dozen of these newspapers, on the understanding that they would exercise self-control. But the power to act at any time remained in his hands, and this eventually shocked the liberally-inclined, even among his supporters. A deputy from Erbil, Jamal Omar Madhmi, who was regarded as a Nuri man, had in early January, 1956 criticized the press ordinance before the financial Affairs Committee of the Chamber. He charged that, by retaining the powers of this decree in his hands,

³⁸Shiek Mohammed Rida As-Shabibi, ex-opposition leader, told the Higher Military Court in 1958, that these measures were adopted by Nuri to be able to suppress the public opposition and ratify the Baghdad Pact with his clique against the will of the majority of the Iraqi public opinion that was represented in the parties, pressure groups, and who expressed their ideas in the Newspapers; see the official proceedings of the Higher Military Court in Baghdad, volume III, 1958, p. 1035.

Nuri as-Sa'id would be "exercising a constant veiled censorship. Not only should it be revoked but the prohibition of the importation of various foreign periodicals should also be lifted."³⁹

Nuri's answer, given before the same committee, was that the ordinance had been issued to meet growing complaints of the public against the "confusion" that prevailed in the press. The press had been penetrated by elements which used it as a tool for propagating subversive ideas aimed especially at the younger generation. There were also certain persons who converted the press into means for extracting money through blackmail. The previous legislation was inadequate for curbing these practices. The authority to act under the press ordinance was extended beyond newspapers to leaflets. On February 8, 1956, twelve persons were arrested for having distributed leaflets attributed to the "Liberation Party" in such widely separated cities as Baghdad, Mosul and Basra. The leaflets were strongly critical of the Baghdad Pact and also urged internal reform based on "the principles of Islam".⁴⁰

On June 21, 1957, about 10 days after the resigna-

³⁹Waldemar Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri, p. 98.

⁴⁰Ibid.

tion of Nuri's cabinet and the accession of Ali Jawdat to the premiership, all newspapers, as if acting on prearranged signal, broke out with criticism and advice. The general line was that

"all papers pleaded for greater freedom in the political life at home. All expressed the wish that something be done to restore Arab Unity abroad. The independent Al-Bilad newspaper of Baghdad had the sharpest tones; while it readily encouraged Jawdat's proposed efforts to improve inter-Arab relations, it showed a pessimistic attitude about the chances of improving things internally. It wrote: "Deterioration at home is attributed to the absence of a democratic way of life. At present it is impossible to exercise the major civil rights guaranteed by the constitution. One of the most important of these is the freedom to organize political parties." 41

By the time Nuri as-Sa'id was out of office, the familiar pattern was repeated. His successors would remove the restraint; this would be followed by an ever freer expression, and then a return to repression.⁴²

B. SPECIFIC CASES THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE DOWNFALL OF THE REGIME.

In the following section, the author will trace specific major incidents, factors and situations which worked together for the downfall of the regime and finally the

⁴¹Ibid., p. 99, The foregoing four sections were based on Ibid., see also Brigadier Abdul Kareem Kassem, Principles of the 14th July, 1958, Revolution in the Speeches of the Za'im (leader), (in Arabic), 1958, pp. 20-21.

⁴²Ibid.

withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact.

In reality the Revolution of July 14th, 1958, was "an indigenous Iraqi movement, with roots extending deep into Iraqi soil, fed by discontents and grievances that existed long before president Nasser or the spread of communism and Ba'athism." We will try to examine these roots very briefly .

From reviewing history from ancient times, we recognize that it is very rare for a ruling class to survive defeat in war, because the weaknesses and corruptions are "laid bare by defeat, leading to the loss of whatever loyalty it had previously among the ruled."⁴³

Mr. Khaldun al-Husry maintains that the Iraqi people had suffered defeat not in one, but in three wars - the Anglo-Iraqi war of 1941, the Palestine war of 1948, and the Suez war of 1956. In two of these wars, that of 1941 and 1956, their rulers were openly on the side of their enemies.⁴⁴ In order to understand the Revolution of July 1958, it is

⁴³Khaldun S. al-Husry, "The Iraqi Revolution of July 14, 1958", Middle East Forum, Late Autumn 1964, p. 25.

⁴⁴Ibid.; also For details of description how the Iraqi parties and people viewed that their rulers sided with their enemies and against their population, see Mohammed Mahdi Kubba, My Memoirs about the Core of Events, pp. 417-419.

essential to know these facts as well as the Baghdad Pact and its effects as a final cause for the collapse of the regime.

The Anglo-Iraqi war of 1941 left the deepest wounds in the hearts and minds of the people. This war was simply an "Iraqi bid for Independence". To the Iraqi people that war was "indeed their war of independence, since they believed that siding with and backing Germany would save Palestine from being lost to the Jews under the guidance of the British." Abdul-Iliah and Nuri as-Sa'id were to fight this war on the side of the British and to enter Baghdad after the collapse of Iraqi armed resistance "protected by British bayonets."⁴⁵ That war was to be followed by what is generally known in Iraq as "the second British occupation", the first being that of 1917. The Iraqi people were deeply touched by that war and by "the second British occupation" that followed. Following the defeat of 1941, concentration camps in Iraq were filled with those who supported "that war against the British and their Iraqi protegés, the one great corporate action of modern Iraq".⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Mohammed Mahdi Kubba, My Memoirs About the Core of Events, pp. 97-99; also see John Bagot Glubb, Britain And The Arabs, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1959), p. 368.

⁴⁶ Stewart, Desmond and Haylock, John, New Babylon, A Portrait of Iraq, (London: Collins, 1956), p. 77.

The Iraqi public opinion had with great enthusiasm supported the cause of the Arabs of Palestine since the twenties. (For example, the visit to Baghdad in 1928 of Sir Alfred Monde, a leader of British Zionism, caused violent anti-Zionist demonstrations in which 20,000 people took part.)⁴⁷ In fact one of the main causes of the war of 1948 had been the disagreement with British policy in Palestine.⁴⁸ The Iraqi people considered the then ruling class as responsible for the humiliation in Palestine.

Nuri as-Sa'id believed that the end justifies the means.⁴⁹ On this basis he faced the Palestine problem. "He was in favor of the Arabs accepting the 1939 White Paper. When they rejected it he thought that they had lost an opportunity. Later he felt that the Arabs should have accepted the Bevin plan or the minority plan of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry which advised cantonization of Palestine. Having missed that chance also, he took the stand, accepted by the Arab League and the Bandung Conference, namely, that

⁴⁷Abdul Razzak al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, (in Arabic), (Saidon: Irfan, 1953), vol. II, pp. 140-141.

⁴⁸Majid Khadduri, Independent Iraq, A Study in Iraqi politics from 1932 - 1938, p. 235.

⁴⁹Lord Bird Wood, Nuri as-Sa'id, A Study In Arab Leadership, (London: Cassell, 1959), p. 252.

the U.N. resolutions on Palestine should be implemented. To him politics meant realism and the art of the possible."⁵⁰

In spite of all the harm to the Arab National cause that the British and the west had done since 1916, Nuri never wavered in his belief in, and friendship to, the west. On the first of October 1956, Nuri was interviewed by the Times of London. Lord Birdwood, the close friend of Nuri as-Sa'id, had summarized and interpreted the gist of the interview in the following:⁵¹

"We are with you, west (especially Britain). But you must do something about Israel, and do it quick, or the initiative Nuri has managed to snatch over Nasser in the last few weeks (which has United Iraq behind him) will vanish and then anything way happen. Nuri is the only living Arab who hold Iraq and the others to the west and if you want to get relations on a sound basis you must do it while he is in the saddle. You have your chance. If you take it, then our genuine common interests with you over oil and the Canal and Nasser can be put on firm basis. If you don't, if you leave Nuri beating the air, the outlook is black indeed".

Nuri as-Sa'id was too good hearted; he did not realize that the British and the west who created Israel are not ready even to restore part of the Arab rights in

⁵⁰Mohammed Fadhel Jamali, Review of Iraq Under General Nuri, by Waldemar Gallman, Middle East Forum, Autumn 1964, p. 22

⁵¹Lord Bird wood, Nuri as-Sa'id...., p. 241.

Palestine. Worse than this, only 28 days after this interview of Nuri, Britain, France, and Israel collaborated to destroy one of the Arab states - Egypt.

1. The Baghdad Pact.

In between the Palestine war and the Suez war of 1956, the adherence of Iraq to the Baghdad Pact on February 24, 1955, against the will of the majority of the Iraqis, was one of the main factors for the 1958 revolution.

Nuri as-Sa'id, in an address to the Iraqi Senate in 1955, announced that "99.75 per cent" of the Iraqi people supported the Baghdad Pact. In fact, however, the overwhelming majority of Iraqis were clearly and bitterly opposed to it. The American Ambassador to Iraq, himself in favor of the pact, admits that "the pact did not have the backing of the Iraqi people".⁵² The people resented the fact that the Baghdad Pact isolated and estranged Iraq from the rest of the Arab world⁵³ and aligned it with non-Arab powers that had never been popular with Iraqis. Turkey, the ex-overlord, was not liked; its aggressive intentions, an example of which

⁵²Waldemar Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri, pp. 85, 86.

⁵³Emile Bustani, Marsh Arabesque, pp. 106-107.

was the claim it "advocated for Mosul⁵⁴ after the first world war, were suspect; and its annexation of Alexandretta was strongly resented". An earlier attempt by Nuri as-Sa'id in 1946, to conclude a treaty of friendship with Turkey had run into considerable opposition. Gallman himself tells us of eggs thrown at the Turkish delegation when it arrived in Iraq to negotiate the Baghdad Pact and of street demonstrations in the holy city of Najaf that forced the government to cancel the Turkish president's visit there.⁵⁵

Iraq's relations with Iran had always been strained by the dispute over the Shatt al-Arab water way and by frequent frontier incidents. The attitude of Pakistan over Palestine was fully appreciated. However, the Iraqis reserved their admiration for non-aligned India, for its great leader Nehru, and for the ideology or policy of the Bandung Conference.

The politically conscious Iraqis criticized the Baghdad Pact, furthermore, for involving Iraq in the power struggles of the two world blocs and for preventing her from

⁵⁴This same argument was used by Nuri as-Sa'id to justify the conclusion of the treaty with Turkey on the basis that, as a partner, Turkey would have no more aggressive designs on the Arabs but on the contrary would help them.

⁵⁵Waldemar Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri, pp. 32, 56.

pursuing a truly independent foreign policy based exclusively on Iraq's national interest. It was also feared that the pact diverted Iraq's eyes from the real enemy - Israel. That there were some grounds for this fear cannot be denied. As Anthony Nutting was to write: "Ambassador Abba Eban (Israeli Ambassador) admitted to me two years ago at the U.N. , that the Baghdad Pact is in no sense a threat to Isral, rather the contrary, in so far as it averts the Arab gaze from the struggles within the Middle East and directs it towards the far greater menace from without."⁵⁶

Nuri as-Sa'id always argued that the danger of "International Communism" was greater than that of Zionism,⁵⁷ but, finally, he had to admit it was difficult to sell this idea to the people. Jamali made a fantastic attempt to correlate Zionism and communism. Thus he was to declare in parliament: "we must not differentiate between the two,

⁵⁶Anthony Nutting, I Saw For Myself, (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 39.

⁵⁷Waldemar Gallman says that "Nuri's private observations on Israel usually were based on the premise that he accepted the permanency of the State of Israel. There was never any talk of 'uprooting it'" Waldemar Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri, p. 168. But Fadhel Jamali dismisses this idea as a misunderstanding and misjudgment of Nuri. Nuri was like any other Arab Nationalist, anti-Israeli, Mohammed Fadhel Jamali, Review of Iraq Under General Nuri, by Waldemar Gallman, Middle East Forum, Autumn 1964, p. 22.

because Zionism is the daughter of communism and communism is the mother of Zionism."⁵⁸ It was also argued that the Baghdad Pact gained friends for the Arab point of view on Israel. This, however, was not convincing, as Britain dissociated herself from the Iraqi-Turkish exchange of letters on the implementation of the U.N. resolutions concerning Palestine,⁵⁹ while Turkey itself continued its cordial relations with Israel. Ultimately, even Fadhel Jamali admitted that

"In fact it was proven that the Baghdad Pact did not deserve all that importance and attention that it was accorded; specially when it became clear that the Big powers may help the non-members of the pact more than the members. An example would be the American aid to Egypt and India, which was much greater than the aid given to Iraq and Pakistan, the members of the Baghdad Pact. Hence, there remained no distinct features for the Baghdad Pact."⁶⁰

2. The Suez Crisis

When Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company, Nuri as-Sa'id and the Iraqi ruling class found in this act

⁵⁸Speech delivered in January, 1956, in Fadhel Jamali, From The Reality of Iraqi Politics, (in Arabic), p. 64.

⁵⁹Lord Birdwood, Nuri as-Sa'id...., pp. 251-252.

⁶⁰Fadhel Jamali, Memoirs And Lessons, (in Arabic), pp. 64-65.

their golden opportunity and urged the immediate bringing down of Nasser. On July 26, 1956, when news of nationalization was brought to Eden, King Faisal, Crown Prince Abdullah, and Nuri as-Sa'id were dining with Eden. Eden writes: "I told guests (the news). They saw clearly that here was an event which changed all perspectives, and understood at once how much would depend upon the resolution with which the act of defiance was met"⁶¹ Lord Birdwood, Nuri's friend and admiring biographer, is even more explicit. He writes:

"On the evening of 26th July, he (the King) and the Pasha took dinner with the Prime Minister and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, and learnt of Colonel Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal; it may be assumed that their views and the terms in which they were expressed were not very different from those of their hosts. Certainly the Pasha in the following days left no room for doubt in the minds of his friends in London....

"In many interests it is wise to refrain from moralizing and keep silence on many aspects of a desperate occasion. It is, however, legitimate to infer this much. Within the Foreign Office there had been a growing recognition that somehow and at sometime Nasser would have to be restricted, isolated and brought down, perhaps by his own people through his own follies. More particularly after his personal reaction to the Baghdad Pact did a mere understanding become a set policy. It seems only sensible to assume that Iraq's Prime Minister would have been kept informed of each development and intention as it emerged." ⁶²

⁶¹Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden, (full circle), (London: Cassell, 1960), p. 424.

⁶²Lord Birdwood, Nuri as-Sa'id...., p. 240.

attacked. And what about Jamali himself ? Was he also surprised? Jamali tells us in the same book that in August 1956, Nuri told him in Rome of Britain's intentions to attack Egypt and asked him to return to Baghdad for discussions of problems that might arise inside Iraq when that attack was mounted; he says that he had in fact returned to Baghdad when he received an urgent cable from Nuri and found that Tawfik al Swaidi had also been recalled by Nuri from London to take part in the same discussions.⁶⁶

Regarding the role that Israel was or was not to play in any British attack on Egypt, we can not yet determine Nuri's ideas on this matter. Those persons who were Nuri's friends, and who admit his knowledge beforehand of the attack on Egypt, when it came, tell that he was really shocked by Israel's participation. Lord Birdwood states that Nuri categorically advised the British against the involvement of Israel in any attack on Egypt.⁶⁷ But Eden tells us that early in 1956 Nuri "suggested that 'we should make it clear to Egypt that, if she persisted (in opposing

⁶⁶Fadhel Jamali, Memoirs and Lessons, (in Arabic), pp. 77-78.

⁶⁷Lord Birdwood, Nuri as-Sa'id...., pp. 240-241.

the Baghdad Pact), we should no longer consider the protection offered by the Tripartite Declaration as applying to Egypt."⁶⁸ At present we do not know more than that.

In brief, the conception of the majority of the politically oriented Iraqis, that the regime was a puppet to the west and mainly Britain; the corruption and despotism of the ruling oligarchy; the pseudo-democracy; the slow economic progress; the loss of the three wars of 1941, 1958, and 1956; and the isolation of Iraq from the Arab States through the adherence to the Baghdad Pact: these then were the main internal factors that collectively interacted and worked for the final collapse of the monarchy and the final withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact.

No doubt, Nasser's propaganda for his "new form" of Arab nationalism was one of the main factors that helped and encouraged, at least morally, the potentially internal factors to gather momentum for exploding the regime. This is not to blame Cairo Radio for the 1958 Revolution in Iraq.

⁶⁸Anthony Eden, Memoirs, p. 345. The Paranthesis in this quotation are Eden's.

Cairo simply said aloud what the majority of the Iraqis could only say in private, among friends in whom they had confidence.

Another outside factor which could be recalled, as a subsidiary, in morally encouraging the internal revolutionary forces in Iraq, was the success of Soviet propaganda in the Middle East, because it appeared to identify its aims with those of the Arab world. Since the 1950's, the Soviet Union began to support the claims of the Arabs for complete independence and sovereignty. The paramount aim of the Arabs was to oust the established western rule and influence from the Arab world. This aim coincided with that of the Soviet Union. Hence, the Soviets began to help and support (politically, military, and economically) the Arabs in their struggle to achieve full and complete independence from western domination.

CONCLUSIONS AND EVALUATIONS

The Baghdad Pact failed because its need was seen only through the eyes of the west, and it was planned according to western concepts without regard to the concepts, needs, aims and sensibilities of the Middle East itself.

To the majority of Arabs, the most serious shortcoming of the pact lay in its avowed purpose of stopping only Soviet aggression. The Arab people had never experienced Soviet aggression, and knew the "bad things" about communism only from western sources. They had, however, known recurring aggression by western Imperialism; the establishment of Israel being the latest example. The enemy of the Arabs was Israel, not the Soviet Union. In effect, the west was asking the Arabs to fight the West's enemy - the Soviet Union; but it was unwilling to fight the Arabs' enemy - Israel.

The threat of the Soviet Union and International Communism had become so great in the minds of western officials (mainly American) that all other issues appeared insignificant. The security of the "Free World" had become uppermost in the minds of western policy-makers and found expression in the grand alliances and military pacts of the

Western Allies. Especially after the Korean war had started, military pacts became the ultimate means of halting Soviet advances. The opposition to the Soviet Union, however, was neither a sufficient guide nor a basis for a coherent foreign policy, especially in the Middle East, where Zionism and not communism was the enemy.

One of the negative results that the Baghdad Pact had created is the entrance of the Soviet Union into Middle Eastern politics when it was the aim of the pact to prevent such a situation. Thus, as a result of the Baghdad Pact and the western follies that followed, the Soviet Union gained influence and prestige in the Middle East while the West's influence (mainly Britain and France) decreased considerably .

The Soviet Union succeeded in infiltrating into the western sphere of influence (Arab Middle East) because the west made the mistake of trying to oppose a non-military threat by military means. The Soviet Union penetrated the Middle East not by soldiers or military pacts, but by statesmen, economists, diplomats, sociologists, agents and skilful propagandists. It was a "cold war" not a "hot war" between the East and West. Above all, the Soviets had a policy. In contrast, the west (mainly America) had too many or none in

certain cases, hence lacking a coherent policy. By a careful assessment of the direction and strength of Arab nationalism, the Soviets were able to establish common causes with it. The west could not find common causes with Arab nationalism in its dynamic form and thus embarked on fighting it, probably because the west was determined to back and preserve the state of Israel - the Arabs' enemy - which it created in the heart of the Arab world.

It is mainly fear of Israel and the policy of liberation which has made Nasser a hero and which admitted the Soviet Union to the Middle East. The Arab despair of western help in restraining Israeli expansion has driven many Arabs to accept the leadership of Nasser and to collaborate with the Soviet Union, in spite of the general Arab distaste for communism.

The first step to halt the crumbling down of the western defensive projects is for the west to define its wants and its objectives in the world instead of just stopping the Soviet Union or China from getting what they want. The west must change her focus on anti-communism, to positive actions, and must look positively for common interests and objectives in the Middle East. If the needs are for Unity

and the trend, socially and politically, is Dynamic Arab Nationalism, then the west and specially the United States should work with it, not against it.

The Baghdad Pact was similar to many of the policies of the west in that it attacked the symptoms, not the disease; but the Baghdad Pact, in doing so, emphasized not only the existence but the danger of the disease.

The west failed to realize that, while she might have been dealing with only one Arab government (Iraq), the results of any action would be felt throughout the entire Arab world.

The Baghdad Pact had a great and deep effect on the Arab states. It created a "cold war" among the Arab States which was waged by Egypt and its allies against Iraq and the remaining members of the pact. It was a violent "cold war" which shook the Arab area. It ended on July 14, 1958 with the collapse of the Iraqi regime and the rejection, by the new Iraqi revolutionary government, of the Baghdad Pact. In other words, the Unity of the Arab League was seriously disrupted by the Baghdad Pact creating double allegiance among the Arab peoples. One group favored the Baghdad Pact and the governments that defended and justified it, and the

other group opposed it, expressing loyalty to Egypt's Nasser and his ideology of Dynamic Arab Nationalism..

The Baghdad Pact proved to be one of the most fateful agreements ever entered upon by an Arab State. It proved fateful indeed for its main author, Nuri as-Sa'id, who virtually signed his own death warrant when he put his signature to it on behalf of Iraq. In isolating or segregating Iraq from the rest of the Arab world, the pact spelled turmoil within that world and ultimately in the Kingdom itself. The climax of this turmoil resulted in the final collapse of the whole monarchical regime as well as the Baghdad Pact itself. This is not to say that the pact had failed to benefit its members, but the fact remained that it had no kind of future in the Arab world. It was not a product of Arab Unity, but rather an outcome of Arab disunity, and as such could not capture genuine Arab support. Time showed that it had no future in Iraq, where a high level of arrogance, corruption, despotism, pseudo-democracy, and failure to estimate the strength of public opinion, on the part of the régime, led to a sudden revolt in which the King and the Regent were publicly murdered and the Pact's original author done to death in the street.

APPENDIX I

TRIPARTITE DECLARATION REGARDING

SECURITY IN THE NEAR EAST

(May 25, 1950)

The Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, having had occasion during the recent Foreign ministers meeting in London to review certain questions affecting the peace and stability of the Arab states and of Israel, and particularly that of the supply of arms and war material to these states, have resolved to make the following statements.

1. The three Governments recognize that the Arab states and Israel all need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring their internal security and their legitimate self-defense and to permit them to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole. All applications for arms or war material for these countries will be considered in the light of these principles. In this connection the three Governments wish to recall and reaffirm the terms of the statements made by their representatives on the Security Council on August 4, 1949, in which they declared their opposition to the development of an arms race between the Arab states and Israel.

2. The three Governments declare that assurances have been received from all the states in question, to which they permit arms to be supplied from their countries, that the purchasing state does not intend to undertake any act of aggression against any other state. Similar assurances will be requested from any other state in the area to which they permit arms to be supplied in the future.

3. The three Governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest in and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in

the area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in the area. The three Governments, should they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation.

APPENDIX II

THE BAGHDAD PACT

Pact of Mutual Co-operation Between Iraq And Turkey.

Whereas the friendly and brotherly relations existing between Iraq and Turkey are in constant progress, and in order to complement the contents of the Treaty of Friendship and good neighbourhood concluded between His majesty the King of Iraq and His Excellency the president of the Turkish Republic signed in Ankara on the 29th of March, 1946, which recognized the fact that peace and security between the two countries is an integral part of the peace and security of all the Nations of the world and in particular the Nations of the Middle East, and that it is the basis for their foreign policies;

Whereas Article 11 of the Treaty of Joint and Economic Co-operation between the Arab League states provides that no provision of that Treaty shall in any way affect, or is designed to affect any of the rights and obligations accruing to the contracting parties from the United Nations Charter;

And having realized the great responsibilities borne by them in their capacity as members of the United Nations concerned with the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East region which necessitate taking the required measures in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter;

They have been fully convinced of the necessity of concluding a pact fulfilling these aims and for that purpose have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

HIS MAJESTY KING FAISAL II KING OF IRAQ.

HIS EXCELLENCY AL FARIK NURI AS-SA'ID Prime Minister.

HIS EXCELLENCY BURHANUDDIN BASH-AYAN Acting Minister
for Foreign Affairs.

HIS EXCELLENCY GELAL BAYAR President of the Turkish
Republic.

HIS EXCELLENCY ADNAN MENDERES Prime Minister.

HIS EXCELLENCY PROFESSOR FUAT KOPRULU Minister
of Foreign Affairs.

Who having communicated their full powers, found to
be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter the High Contracting parties will co-operate for
their security and defense. Such measures as they agree to
take to give effect to this co-operation may form the
subject of special agreements with each other.

Article 2

In order to ensure the realization and effect
application of the co-operation provided for in Article I
above, the competent authorities of the High Contracting
Parties will determine the measures to be taken as soon as
the present pact enters into force. These measures will
become operative as soon as they have been approved by
the Governments of the High Contracting Parties.

Article 3

The High Contracting parties undertake to refrain
from any interference whatsoever in each other's internal
affairs. They will settle any dispute between themselves
in a peaceful way in accordance with the United Nations
Charter.

Article 4

The High Contracting Parties declare that the dispositions of the present pact are not in contradiction with any of the international obligations contracted by either of them with any third state or states. They do not derogate from, and cannot be interpreted as derogating from, the said international obligations. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter any international obligations incompatible with the present pact.

Article 5

This pact shall be open for accession to any member state of the Arab League or any other state actively concerned with the security and peace in this region and which is fully recognized by both of the High Contracting Parties. Accession shall come into force from the date of which the instrument of accession of the state concerned is deposited with the ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq.

Any acceding state party to the present Pact may conclude special agreements, in accordance with Article I, with one or more states parties to the present pact. The Competent authority of any acceding state may determine measures in accordance with Article 2. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the parties concerned.

Article 6

A permanent council at ministerial level will be set up to function within the framework of the purposes of this pact when at least four powers become parties to the pact.

The council will draw up its own rules of procedure.

Article 7

This pact remains in force for a period of five-year periods. Any contracting party may withdraw from the pact

by notifying the other parties in writing of its desire to do so, six months before the expiration of any of the above - mentioned periods, in which case the pact remains valid for the other parties.

Article 8

This pact shall be ratified by the Contracting Parties and ratifications shall be exchanged at Ankara as soon as possible. Thereafter it shall come into force from the date of the exchange of ratifications.

In Witness whereof, the said plenipotentiaries have signed the present pact in Arabic, Turkish and English all three texts being equally authentic except in the case of doubt when the English text shall prevail.

Done in duplicate of Baghdad this second day of Rajab 1374 Hijri corresponding to the twenty-fourth day of February 1955.

NURI AS-SA'ID

For His Majesty the King of Iraq.

BURHANUDDIN BASH-AYAN

For His Majesty the King of Iraq.

ADNAN MENDERES

For the President of the Turkish Republic.

FUAT KÖPRÜLÜ

For the President of the Turkish Republic.

APPENDIX III

EGYPTIAN-SYRIAN MUTUAL DEFENSE PACT

(October 20, 1955)

Article 1

The two contracting countries affirm their keen desire for lasting security and peace and their determination to settle all their international differences by peaceful methods.

Article 2

The two contracting countries consider any armed attack on the territory or forces of one of them as an attack on them both. Consequently, and in exercise of the right of individual and collective self-defense, they undertake to extend speedy assistance to the attacked country and to take immediately all measures and use all means at their disposal, including armed force, to repel the attack and restore security and peace.

In accordance with Article 6 of the Arab League Charter and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the League Council and the Security Council shall be immediately informed of the attack and the measures taken to deal with it.

The two contracting countries pledge that neither of them shall conclude a unilateral peace settlement or any kind of agreement with the aggressor without the consent of that country.

Article 3

The two contracting countries shall, at the request of either, consult with each other whenever serious tensions develop in international relations in a manner affecting the security of the Arab area in the Middle East, or the territorial integrity or independence or security of any or either country. In the event of an imminent threat of war or a sudden international emergency of a menacing nature, the two contracting

countries shall immediately take the preventive and defensive measure required by the situation.

Article 4

In the event of a sudden attack on the borders or the forces of either of the contracting countries, they shall immediately determine the measures needed to put the provisions of this agreement into effect in addition to the military measures taken to meet such an attack.

Article 5

For the fulfillment of the purposes of this agreement, the two contracting countries have agreed to establish the following organizational machinery: A supreme council - a war council - a joint command.

Article 6

(a) The Supreme Council shall be composed of the Foreign and War Ministers of the two contracting countries.

(b) It shall be the official authority from which the commander-in-chief of the Joint Command shall receive all directives relating to military policy. It shall have the power to appoint or dismiss the commander-in-chief.

(c) At the suggestion of the War Council, it shall organize the Joint Command, define its terms of reference and its duties and make any amendments therein upon the recommendation of the war council. The Supreme Council shall have the right to set up any committees or subsidiary or provisional councils whenever such a step is deemed necessary.

(d) The Council shall be empowered to examine the recommendations and decisions of the war council on matters outside the jurisdiction of the chiefs of staff.

(e) The council shall issue rules of procedures for its meetings and for the functions of the War Council.

Article 7

(a) The War Council shall be composed of the chiefs of staff of the two contracting countries.

(b) It shall serve as the Supreme Council's advisory body. It shall submit recommendations and directives in connection with military planning and all the duties assigned to the joint command.

(c) The War Council shall make recommendations on war industries and on communications facilities required for military purposes, including their coordination for the benefit of the Armed Forces in the contracting countries.

(d) It shall prepare statistical and other data on the military, natural, industrial, agricultural, and other resources and potentialities of the two contracting countries and on everything related to their joint war effort. It shall submit to the Supreme Council proposals for the exploitation of these resources and potentialities for the benefit of the war effort.

(e) The War Council shall study the programs drawn up by the joint command for training, organizing, arming, and equipping the forces at its disposal. It shall also study the possibilities of applying them to the armies of the two contracting countries and shall take the necessary steps to carry them out. It shall submit its findings to the Supreme Council for endorsement.

(f) This Council shall have a permanent military body to make all preparatory studies on the questions coming up before it. The Council shall organize the functions of this body by drawing up procedural rules for this purpose. It shall also draw up its budget.

Article 8

(a) The Joint Command shall consist of:

- (1) The Commander-in-chief.
- (2) The General Staff
- (3) The Units detached for the security of the command and the conduct of its activities.

This command shall be permanent, functioning in peacetime and wartime.

(b) The commander-in-chief shall command the forces put at his disposal. He shall be responsible to the Supreme Council. His duties shall be:

(1) To draw up and implement the programs for training, organizing, arming, and equipping the forces placed at his disposal by the two contracting countries so that they may become a dependable unified force; and to submit these programs to the War Council for examination or to the Supreme Council for endorsement.

(2) To prepare and carry out joint defense plans to meet all eventualities arising from any possible armed attack on one of the two countries or on their forces. For the preservation of these plans, he shall rely on the decisions and the directives of the Supreme Council .

(3) To deploy the forces put at his disposal by the two contracting countries in peacetime and wartime in accordance with joint defense plans.

(4) To draw up the budget of the joint command and to submit it to the War Council for consideration prior to final endorsement by the Supreme Council.

(c) The appointment or dismissal of the chief Aides of the Commander-in-chief shall be undertaken by the War Council in agreement with the commander-in-chief. As for the rest of the command staff, appointments and dismissals shall be undertaken by the commander-in-chief in agreement with the chief of staff of the Army concerned.

Article 9

(a) The two contracting parties will place at the disposal of the joint command in, peace and wartime, all striking units including the troops concentrated on the Palestine borders. The War Council, in conjunction with the commander-in-chief, will fix the number of troops to be entrusted with each of the two tasks, the recommendations of the Council to be considered as final immediately on being approved by the Supreme Council.

(b) The War Council, on the recommendation of the commander-in-chief, shall make a precise list of the installations and bases necessary for the carrying out of plans and will decide on priority.

Article 10

(a) A joint fund in which the two contracting parties will participate shall be established for the achievement of the following objectives:

(1) All expenditures incurred by the Joint Command shall be equally shared by the two contracting parties.

(2) With regard to the expenses for the maintenance of military installations mentioned in Article 9, paragraph (b), they shall be borne in the proportion of 65% by the Egyptian Republic and 35% by the Syrian Republic.

(b) Each of the two contracting states shall pay all salaries and indemnities for the military and civil personnel to be seconded for duty by it with the Joint Command, the War Council, and other committees in conformity with the financial regulations of each of them.

Article 11

None of the provisions of this pact shall in any way affect or be intended to affect the rights and obligations which may result from or which may accrue in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter or with the responsibilities borne by the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of world peace and security.

Article 12

This treaty shall be for a term of 10 years automatically renewable for further terms of 5 years. Each of the two contracting parties may terminate the pact by notifying the other party at least one year before the expiration of any of the above terms.

Article 13

This treaty shall be approved in conformity with the constitutional rules in force in each of the two countries, the instruments of ratification to be exchanged at the Syrian Foreign Ministry in Damascus within a period not exceeding 30 days from the date of the signing of the pact which will come into force immediately on the exchange of documents.

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