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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION  
AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL

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## ABSTRACT

To understand the nature of the relationship between the World Zionist Organization and the State of Israel, it is imperative to study: the growth of the Zionist Movement, the actual role that the World Zionist Organization played in the creation of the State of Israel and the central position accorded to the 'State' in the Zionist solution to the Jewish problem.

Once the aim of establishing 'for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law', was achieved, the structure, purpose and position of the World Zionist Organization altered accordingly. This change is of utmost importance and has to be studied in the light of the needs and aims of the nascent State.

Israel was the fruit of the efforts of the World Zionist Organization. The State put forth the claim to be the sole spokesman and guardian of 'the Jewish people'. No other organization, group or individual entity could assume such a right unless 'authorized' to do so by the State of Israel. On the other hand, the establishment of the State was not viewed as the ultimate achievement of Zionist aims, and the 'State' recognized the necessity of utilizing the Zionist Movement as a recruiter, political activist and financier.

This study endeavors to examine the nature of this relationship and the means by which the World Zionist Organization became an official arm of the State of Israel. The Zionist Movement serves the State of

Israel and promotes its political objectives: Jewish immigration, Jewish loyalty to the State, Jewish financial aid, and Jewish political support for the Government of Israel. Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the State has sought to maintain the public body status of the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency as a means of advancing Zionist political objectives. For this purpose the Israeli Knesset enacted the 'World Zionist Organization - Jewish Agency for Palestine (Status) Law' in November, 1952. A 'Covenant' was made between the Israeli Government and the Zionist Executive in July, 1954, which gave certain governmental functions to the Zionist Executive. A Coordination Board was set up to coordinate the joint activities of the State and the Zionist Executive. These legal agreements will be studied in great detail in an effort to understand the intricate relationship and dependence of the State on the Zionist Movement.

The conclusion attempts to point out the dilemma that confronts the Diaspora Zionists and the members of the World Zionist Organization as a result of the 'State's' contention that a Jew's first duty is to live in his 'national home'.

Research for this study was done only from English sources which restricted the material available. It is difficult to obtain accurate information on the World Zionist Organization and its relationship to the State of Israel because of the veil of secretiveness which surrounds Zionist diplomacy. For example, the World Zionist Congress debates are never published in full, only a pamphlet is printed containing summaries of the major speeches and

resolutions. The meetings of the Coordination Board are so confidential that no record is kept and none of the participants is allowed to say anything concerning these meetings. Personal rivalries and disagreements between the Zionist leaders <sup>are</sup> played down in an effort to display a 'united front' before world Jewry. In the face of these difficulties one has to rely mainly on commentaries by Zionists, on biographies, and on material published by the American Council for Judaism.

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## CHAPTER I

### THE CONCEPTION OF THE ZIONIST IDEA

A description of the background which gave rise to the Zionist movement is necessary in order to understand the motives and aims of the State of Israel and the World Zionist Organization. The conditions of world Jewry in the nineteenth century were crucial in reformulating the idea of the 'return to Zion' from a Messianic prophecy and religious hope into a political endeavor. Before the French Revolution the Jews of Europe who comprised the majority of world Jewry had lived in ghettos for centuries with restrictions and occasional pogroms. The Jews had rationalized their ghetto status "in the concept of Galuth [exile] as a penance to be followed by Geullah [delivery] ." <sup>1</sup> The Jews took this as a curse imposed upon them by Gentile society for their rejection of the true faith. Some day the Messiah would come and deliver them to Zion, but they had to patiently wait. This was the traditional non-political view of the 'return to Zion'.

In the wake of the French Revolution the traditional Jewish doctrine and social order were upset. On September 27, 1791, the French National Assembly adopted a law admitting Jews to equality under the constitution of the new Republic without forcing them to relinquish their religion as the price of emancipation and assimilation. However, Gentile society expected Jews to cease to look upon themselves as a separate nationality and to assimilate into the national culture of the state they were residing in. The ideas of Enlightenment allowed the Jews the right to retain their own religion and faith. The majority of Western Jews accepted their new freedom and by the 1860's most West European states had liberated their Jews.

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<sup>1</sup>Nadav Safran, The United States and Israel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p.16.



Bismark followed suit in 1871. However, the Jews of Eastern Europe remain<sup>-ed</sup> in ghettos and continued their life of former times as a compact group with its own culture and social structure. They were not given the choice of emancipation and assimilation.

Under the spell of the Enlightenment Jewish writers began to examine the spiritual, religious and national qualities of Jewish culture. A huge ideological controversy arose within the Jewish community which produced lines of division within European Jewry. Starting with Moses Mendelssohn in the late eighteenth century, the walls of the ghetto life began to crumble as he and his followers "endeavored to reconcile Judaism with all that was most fashionable in contemporary thought."<sup>1</sup> Other Jews, however, reacted against the Enlightenment because it "implied the loss of their identity as a people."<sup>2</sup> The traditionally oriented Rabbis "feared that emancipation from their life of narrow acquaintance and extinct ambition might finally disperse them by putting them into circumstances where, choked with the cares of the world, they would at long last forget Jerusalem."<sup>3</sup> On the whole Western Jews were for assimilation and Eastern Jews were against it. Thus, the Jewish community of the West was set apart from the Jewish community of the East. Zionism arose in response to the situation characteristic of Eastern and not Western Jewry. It is now necessary to cast a brief look at the conditions of the Western and Eastern Jewish communities, because the differences between the two "directly affected the different manners in which Zionism was received into the consensus of Western and Eastern Jewries."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Cecil Roth, A History of the Jews (rev. ed.; New York: Schocken Books, 1961), p.317.

<sup>2</sup>Alan R. Taylor, Prelude To Israel: An Analysis of Zionist Diplomacy, 1897-1947 (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959), p.1.

<sup>3</sup>Christopher Sykes, Two Studies in Virtue (London: Collins, 1953), p.120.

<sup>4</sup>Ben Halpern, The Idea of the Jewish State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), p.76.

The Jewish communities to the West of the Oder River adjusted their institutions to the new status of civic equality and adopted French, German, or English cultural traditions. Jews entered every branch of commerce and industry, joined the professions and entered public life. Their traditional Jewish faith was confined to the synagogue. The Messianic idea was discarded; reforms in Jewish theology and ritual were adopted to the needs of the modern world.<sup>1</sup> A new movement called Reform Judaism, "introduced into Judaism a measure of denominationalism similar to that of Christendom, breaking the traditional unity of religious practice."<sup>2</sup>

Assimilation itself depicted a number of trends and opinions. For some, assimilation was a conscious process of national identification with the country one lived in. Social and philanthropic committees and organizations were established but no particular political parties. Western Jews were dispersed and tended to forget their Jewish culture and language but retained their religion. For others, assimilation was "a total merger: the abandonment of Jewish religion and culture and the cutting of all ties with Jews,"<sup>3</sup> and some even embraced Christianity. The crucial difference between the Eastern and Western Jewries lay in the fact that "assimilation was not in a position to express itself in a politically organized form."<sup>4</sup>

As the emancipated Jews of Western Europe became more aware of their co-religionists in Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe, they sought

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<sup>1</sup>Sykes, Two Studies in Virtue, p.123.

<sup>2</sup>Halpern, p.9.

<sup>3</sup>Basil J. Vlavianos and Feliks Gross (eds.), Struggle For Tomorrow: Modern Political Ideologies of the Jewish People (New York: Arts Inc., 1954), p.212.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p.214.

"to obtain diplomatic intervention on their behalf in case of persecution, and to fit them for emancipation by means of education."<sup>1</sup> In 1860, the Alliance Israelite Universelle was organized in Paris by a group of philanthropic minded Jews for the purpose of defending Jewish rights whenever they were attacked: it made the first real "attempt from outside to bring something of the spirit of self-help and self-respect to the Jewish communities of Palestine."<sup>2</sup> It was Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Kalisher (1795-1874) who preached these ideas in his book, Seeking Zion. The Redemption, he said, "will begin by awakening support among the philanthropists and by gaining the consent of the nations to the gathering of some of the scattered of Israel into the Holy Land."<sup>3</sup> In the same work, he extolled the virtues of the 'Holiness of Labor on the Land'. His efforts produced some tangible results when he finally moved the Alliance Israelite Universelle to found an agricultural school, Mileven Israel, in Jaffa in 1870. Following the lead of the Alliance, several Jewish organizations and individuals established schools, hospitals and workshops in Palestine in an effort to make the Palestinian Jewish community self-supporting by training young Jews.<sup>4</sup> Sir Moses Montefiore and Baron Edmond de Rothschild of Paris were particularly interested in humanitarian non-political work in Palestine and gave great sums of money. The involvement of Western Jewry with Palestine was entirely different from that of the Eastern Jewry. The Western Jews tended toward philanthropic and humanitarian methods whereas Eastern Jews felt a strong sentimental attachment to the Holy Land and longed

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<sup>1</sup>Roth, p.344.

<sup>2</sup>Horace Mayer Kallen, Zionism and World Politics (London: Heinemann, 1921), pp.100-101.

<sup>3</sup>Arthur Hertzberg (ed.), The Zionist Idea: A Historical Analysis and Reader (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), p.111.

<sup>4</sup>Roth, p.344.

to 'return' there.

The Eastern Jewish communities lay in what is commonly called the 'Pale of Settlement', established by Catherine II and her successors after the Partition of Poland in order to prevent the Jews from entering 'Holy Mother Russia'.<sup>1</sup> During the reign of Alexander II (1855-1881) the restrictions imposed on the Jews of Russia were eased, and it seemed as though it would be only a matter of time before they too would be granted the same privileges as their fellow-countrymen.<sup>2</sup> Among the Eastern Jews there were those who were skeptical and held a "basic hostility to every manifestation of Westernism."<sup>3</sup> Orthodox Judaism with the traditional attachment to the Messianic deliverance was believed by the great masses. In 1862 Moses Hess (1812-1875), reflecting upon this basic sentiment, and evidently impressed by the success of Italian nationalism in uniting Italy, pointed out, in his book Rome and Jerusalem, to "the insubstantiality of the ideal of emancipation as an end in itself; and he suggested that the reconstruction of a political nationality in Palestine was the only solution to the indubitable problems of the Jews."<sup>4</sup> Not until twenty years later did his ideas attract the attention of the Russian Jewish leaders who now were searching for a solution to the Jewish problem along lines Hess had proposed.

With the assassination of Czar Alexander II in March, 1881, a period of intense reaction touched off pogroms against the Russian Jews. In May, 1882, restrictive laws known as the 'May Laws' were inflicted on the Jews, by which those Jews residing in 'villages' of less than ten thousand inhabitants and in rural areas were uprooted

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<sup>1</sup> Sykes, Two Studies in Virtue, p.131.

<sup>2</sup> Roth, p.336.

<sup>3</sup> Halpern, p.64.

<sup>4</sup> Roth, p.369.

from their homes and forced to live in near destitution in the huge ghettos of the cities. With little hope of a secure life or future, thousands of Eastern European Jews migrated Westwards, even as far as the United States, Canada and South Africa. Those Jews who remained in Eastern Europe began to re-evaluate the ideas of the Enlightenment and looked toward their traditional faith for solace.<sup>1</sup>

In 1882, Leo Pinsker (1821-1891), a Jewish physician from Odessa, published a pamphlet entitled Auto-Emancipation, in which he openly rejected the ideas of the emancipation. Pinsker's diagnosis of Jewish malaise ran along the following lines. "The essence of the problem, as we see it, lies in the fact that, in the midst of the nations among whom the Jews reside, they form a distinctive element which cannot be assimilated, which cannot be readily digested by any nation."<sup>2</sup> "Since the Jew is nowhere at home, nowhere regarded as a native," he added; "he remains an alien everywhere."<sup>3</sup> Judaism and anti-Semitism passed for centuries through history as inseparable companions.<sup>4</sup> His prescription was short and clear, "The International Jewish question must receive a national solution."<sup>5</sup> The Jews themselves were to create their national homeland, preferably in Palestine, where their emancipation as a nation among nations would restore their respect as a people even in the Diaspora.<sup>6</sup> Unlike other writers before him, Pinsker had made the most powerful plea so far and tried to carry his ideas into actuality. In November, 1884, Pinsker with the help of Rabbis Mohilever

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp.351 and 354-55.

<sup>2</sup>Hertzberg, p.182.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p.187.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p.185.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p.198.

<sup>6</sup>Roth, p.370.

and Rabinowitz convened a conference at Kattowitz. The conference decided to form a federation of Hoveve Zion (Lovers of Zion) societies to be called the 'Montefiore Association for the Support of the Jewish Colonies in Palestine' and named Pinsker as President with the central office to be in Odessa. In time the Hoveve Zion societies expanded their activities all over Europe and gained wide support. The Association was popularly referred to as the 'Odessa Committee'.<sup>1</sup> In 1891, Pinsker passed away and was succeeded by Abraham Gruenberg. When, in 1896, Menahem Ussishkin (1863-1941), who was to become an active leader in the Russian and World Zionist movements, took over the chairmanship, the days of the Hoveve Zion societies were drawing to a close. The Hoveve Zion movement "had played a very useful, and indeed, essential part in familiarising the Jewish world with the idea of the return to Zion and in recruiting the first bands of pioneers to begin converting the idea into reality."<sup>2</sup>

Ahad Ha'am,<sup>3</sup> the exponent of spiritual Zionism, criticized the methods of the Hoveve Zion societies and rejected their plans "to realize the Jewish national rebirth in Palestine on the ground that they were based on a wrong conception of what was necessary."<sup>4</sup> He was concerned with the spiritual disintegration of Judaism, which he felt could only be revitalized in Palestine. Palestine was to be a cultural or spiritual center whose "influence should radiate throughout the Diaspora, and thus all Jews would again be invigorated and unified."<sup>5</sup> This movement in later years was called 'Spiritual or Cultural Zionism'.

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<sup>1</sup> Israel Cohen, The Zionist Movement (London: Frederick Muller, 1945), pp.60-61.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p.66.

<sup>3</sup> Real name is Asher Ginsberg (1856-1927). Ahad Ha'am was his Hebrew pen name meaning 'one of the people'.

<sup>4</sup> Cohen, The Zionist Movement, p.63.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p.64.

The nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of Zionism as a response to the so called Jewish question. The 'Zionist solution' sought to solve the Jewish problem of the East European Jews along national lines. Thus, it seemed "only natural that with the progress of the Age of nationalism, in the countries where Emancipation was partly stultified by the survival of pre-emancipatory social structures or political ideologies, a Jewish nationalism should develop, though a late-comer among the national movements of Eastern and Central Europe."<sup>1</sup> Even though the first practical steps toward the return were taken by the mid-nineteenth century, the Zionist idea did not catch on because those who spoke for the movement did not make an universal appeal to all Jews everywhere and had limited their efforts. The movement needed the man and the event to galvanize it into action.

Theodor Herzl was the man who founded 'political Zionism'. He succeeded like none of the other writers before him in wedding "the idea of Return to the Jewish problem as it appeared in the nineteenth century and thus responded with an emotional rich formula."<sup>2</sup> In 1891, Herzl was assigned to Paris as a correspondent of the Neue Freie Presse, the leading newspaper in Vienna. In this capacity he attended the trial of Captain Alfred Dreyfus (1859-1935), who was falsely accused of high treason by betraying military secrets to Germany, and was condemned to life imprisonment.<sup>3</sup> This trial which lasted from December, 1894, to January, 1895, so outraged him that it jolted him into thinking about anti-Semitism and 'forced him to address his mind to a solution'<sup>4</sup> for the Jewish problem. In the summer of 1895, Herzl wrote his famous pamphlet Der Judenstaat: Versuch einer Modernen Loesung der Judenfrage (The Jewish State: An Attempt at a Modern Solution of the Jewish Question). He was motivated by a vision of freeing his fellow-Jews from oppression

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<sup>1</sup>Hans Kohn, "Zion and the Jewish National Idea", in Palestine: Collected Papers (Beirut: the Arab Cultural Club, May 15, 1963), p.27.

<sup>2</sup>Safran, p.16.

<sup>3</sup>William R. Polk, David M. Stamler and Edmund Asfour, Backdrop to Tragedy: The Struggle for Palestine (Boston: The Beacon Press 1957), p.148.

<sup>4</sup>Israel Cohen, A Short History of Zionism (London: F. Muller, 1951), p.41. Cited hereafter as Cohen, A Short History ...

and a desire to escape anti-Semitism of the Gentile world. Like many of his Zionist predecessors he tended to look on anti-Semitism as the 'propelling force' behind Zionism, and regarded the 'assimilated philanthropic' Jew "to be nothing more than an Anti-Semite of Jewish origin, disguised in the garb of a philanthropist."<sup>1</sup>

His pamphlet and Diaries contained an elaborate detailed plan for the establishment of a Jewish National Home. Herzl was unaware that Hess or Pinsker had written about the same subject and later said that if he had known of Pinsker's work he would never have written his own.<sup>2</sup> Unlike Pinsker, who had largely confined his efforts to Russia, Herzl approached all Jews although he did not have an intimate knowledge of Eastern Jewry. Herzl's background was different from Pinsker's. He was born in Budapest and raised in Vienna in an assimilationist atmosphere and education. Being an assimilated Jew he had traveled, was well read, and was familiar with the Gentile world. When the Dreyfus affair shook him, he was able to see beyond the confines of his immediate environment. Coupled with a strong personality and diplomatic skill, Herzl was the man of the moment.

The Jewish State was a blueprint for action and practical work. Herzl declared, "We are one people - our enemies have made us one... we are strong enough to form a State, and, indeed, a model State. We possess all human and material resources necessary for the purpose."<sup>3</sup> Therefore, sovereignty should be "granted us over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the rightful requirements of a nation; the rest we shall manage for ourselves."<sup>4</sup> Herzl like Pinsker did not commit himself to a specific territory but said, "Palestine is our ever-

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<sup>1</sup>Theodor Herzl, The Jewish State: An Attempt at a Modern Solution of the Jewish Question, trans. by Sylvie D'Avigdor (London: Rita Searl, 1946), p.19. Cited hereafter as Herzl, The Jewish State.

<sup>2</sup>Israel Cohen, Theodor Herzl: Founder of Political Zionism (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1959), p.80. Cited hereafter as Cohen, Theodor Herzl.

<sup>3</sup>Herzl, The Jewish State, p.27.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p.28.



memorable historic home. The very name of Palestine would attract our people with a force of marvellous potency."<sup>1</sup> Herzl proposed a detailed plan for creating the State which was "simple in design, but complicated in execution, will be carried out by two agencies: The Society of Jews and the Jewish Company."<sup>2</sup> Any Jew who is attracted by the plan for creating the State will join the Society which will be founded first; the Company will be formed later.<sup>3</sup> The task of the Society will be to carry out "preparatory work in the domains of science and politics"<sup>4</sup> and will "thereby be authorized to confer and treat with Governments in the name of our people. The Society will thus be acknowledged in its relations with Governments as a State-creating power. This acknowledgement will practically create the State."<sup>5</sup> It is to be the organ of the national movement, and "it will be the nucleus out of which the public institutions of the Jewish State will later on be developed."<sup>6</sup> "Every modern expedient" is to be investigated and employed to create this State.<sup>7</sup> Afterwards, the Jewish Company will see to the realization of the plan and will exercise authority in colonization and in building up of the Jewish State.<sup>8</sup> Here lies the nascent World Zionist Organization with its basic tasks already outlined by Herzl. Herzl and his followers hoped that the Jewish State not only would be regarded as the spiritual center of Judaism, but also would be regarded as the central pillar for the unity of Diaspora Jewry and would be the mouthpiece for Jews everywhere.

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<sup>1</sup>Herzl, The Jewish State, p.30.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.28.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p.21.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p.28.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p.29.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p.67

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., pp.33-51.

After writing The Jewish State in Paris, Herzl returned in the early part of September, 1895, to Vienna to take up the job as literary editor of the Neue Freie Presse. "The Vienna to which Herzl returned ... was seething with anti-semitism"<sup>1</sup> under the leadership of such men like Georg von Schonerer and Dr. Karl Lueger. Liberalism was retracting under the pressures of the rising nationalist movements in the Austrian Empire. These facts only gave further impetus to Herzl to promulgate his ideas. Before he published his work, Herzl felt he should show the manuscript to some friends and solicit their advice. First, he showed it to a journalistic friend who thought he had gone out of his mind. Next, Max Nordau (1849-1923) read the manuscript and felt that it <sup>should</sup> be published. Nordau was willing to help Herzl implement his plan for a Jewish State. In the years that followed, Nordau was one of Herzl's closest supporters and was a constant source of encouragement. Herzl also felt he needed influential support for his scheme before he made public his pamphlet. He approached Baron Maurice de Hirsch (1831-1896) and interviewed leading members of the Anglo-Jewish community, particularly the Maccabees, a club of professional Jewish men, but none seemed interested in his plan. Despite these setbacks, Herzl's book appeared on the 14th of February, 1896, and shortly thereafter, it was translated into English and French.<sup>2</sup>

On the appearance of The Jewish State a controversy arose among Jews and non-Jews over the merits of Herzl's enterprise. His pamphlet produced more opposition from within Jewry than from without. Orthodox rabbis condemned "his attempt to do the work of the Messiah and Reform rabbis proclaimed their opposition to his negation of the Jewish mission."<sup>3</sup> The German statesmen and the Western Jewish leaders whom Herzl interviewed were not interested in his project.

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<sup>1</sup>Cohen, Theodor Herzl, p.78.

<sup>2</sup>Cohen, The Zionist Movement, p.69.

<sup>3</sup>Polk, p.149.

Since Herzl insisted that rapid and immediate measures be undertaken to solve the Jewish problem, he decided to turn to the Jewish masses for support if their leaders were uninterested. He was growing impatient after one and a half years after the publication of his pamphlet. In the spring of 1897, Herzl resolved to organize a congress of Zionists from all parts of the world. In March, 1897, Herzl wrote in his Diary:

I have waited long enough. In August it will be two years since I first undertook the first practical steps in the Jewish question. I wanted to do it without exciting the masses, from above, with the men who have hitherto been prominent in Zionism. I was not understood nor supported. I had to go forward alone. At the Congress in Munich I shall call upon the masses to proceed to help themselves, since nobody else will help them.<sup>1</sup>

Originally, Munich was chosen as the meeting place, but the local rabbis protested so vehemently that the Congress was moved to Basle. Due to the hostility of so many Jewish newspapers, Herzl felt that his movement needed a mouthpiece through which he could express his own ideas unadulterated by others and with which "he could negotiate with governments just as one Power with another."<sup>2</sup> In June, 1897, Herzl founded, with his own money, a weekly journal called Die Welt (The World) which became the official publication of the movement.<sup>3</sup>

On August 27, 1897, Herzl convened for three days the first Zionist Congress in Basle, Switzerland. A total of 204 delegates from all parts of the world attended. At the conference Herzl and his fellow Western Jews became acquainted with Eastern Jewry. Herzl said, "They possess the inner unity which most European Jews have lost. They feel as national Jews."<sup>4</sup> Herzl dominated the Congress

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<sup>1</sup>Cohen, Theodor Herzl, p.144.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.141

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp.146-47.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p.160.

and attended to every detail. Through his dynamic personality and indefatigable labor, he was able to set the mood and channel the efforts of the delegates behind the endorsement of his detailed political program.<sup>1</sup>

The first Congress formulated the Zionist program and established the Zionist Organization. The Zionist program, commonly called the Basle Program after its birthplace, formed the fundamental ideological orientation of the Zionist movement which was never altered until 1951 following the establishment of the State of Israel. The Basle Program was set forth in the following terms:

The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law.

In order to attain this object the Congress adopts the following means:

1. The systematic promotion of the settlement of Palestine with Jewish agriculturists, artisans, and craftsmen.

2. The organization and federation of all Jewry by means of local and general institutions in conformity with the local laws.

3. The strengthening of Jewish sentiment and national consciousness.

4. Preparatory steps for the procuring of such Government assents<sup>2</sup> as are necessary for achieving the object of Zionism.

In the final draft the word 'home' was substituted for the word 'state' in an attempt "to appease those Jews ... who objected to the concept of Jewish nationality or a Jewish state."<sup>3</sup> Also, Herzl hoped to carry on diplomatic negotiations with the Turks and felt that the use of the word 'home' would least arouse their suspicions of foreign intervention or of new national movements.<sup>4</sup>

The Basle Program heralded a new approach centered on the doctrinal principles of Zionism. Stress was placed upon the creation

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<sup>1</sup>Polk, p.152.

<sup>2</sup>Cohen, The Zionist Movement, p.73.

<sup>3</sup>W.T. Mallison, "The Zionist-Israeli Juridical Claims to Constitute 'The Jewish People' Nationality Entity and To Confer Membership In It: Appraisal in Public International Law," The George Washington Law Review, XXXII, No.5 (June, 1964), 999.

<sup>4</sup>Halpern, p.30.

of 'a home' in Palestine for 'the Jewish people'. From the beginning the Zionists recognized the necessity for reversing the process of Jewish assimilation and reconstructing 'the Jewish people' as a legal-national sovereignty.

"It (the Zionist movement) had to rouse a scattered, dismembered and politically atomized people to a collective effort of a kind which requires a strong national unity; and it had to preach the necessity of a struggle for a Jewish national ideal in the field of international policy, although the Jewish people were neither recognized as possessing national rights nor regarded as a factor in international relations."<sup>1</sup>

The creation of 'a Jewish people' constituency was necessary if the Zionist leaders wanted 'a home in Palestine secured by Public law' (Emphasis added). The term 'the Jewish people' became an indispensable part of all Zionist negotiations and diplomacies. Paragraphs two and three of the Basle Program formulated the method and means by which 'the Jewish people' were to be turned into a legal-national entity. The term 'the Jewish people' was to include and be binding upon all Jews regardless of the country of their citizenship.

The Zionist Organization, the tool for creating the national home, was brought into being by the first Congress with Herzl as President. The Congress was to be the supreme organ of the movement and was to determine the policies and actions of the organization at its annual meetings. A General Council or 'Greater Actions Committee' was to be elected by the Congress and the members were to be in proportion to the elected representatives of the national federations at the annual Congress.<sup>2</sup> From the members of the General Council, a Central Executive or 'Smaller Actions Committee' of five to seven members would be appointed. However, the members

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<sup>1</sup>Joseph Heller, The Zionist Idea (New York: Schocken Books, 1949), p.141. Italics added.

<sup>2</sup>Kallen, p.79.

of the Central Executive had to live in Vienna. This 'Smaller Actions Committee' formed the Central Office and Executive whose duty it was: to carry out administrative affairs, to attend to those issues which needed immediate attention, and to see that a continuous and congruent policy was carried out. In the different countries of the Diaspora a federation of local societies would be established and each federation would be in direct contact with the Central Office. Membership in a local society was contingent upon paying a small annual poll tax called a 'shekel' which in turn was used to provide the Executive with a working fund. Payment of the 'shekel' conferred on one the right to be called a 'Zionist' and to vote for a delegate to the Congress.<sup>1</sup>

With the conclusion of the First Congress, the basic structure of the World Zionist Organization was established, and its aims and the means it was to employ were embodied in the Basle Program. The long arduous task lay before Herzl and his successors in the Zionist Organization of fulfilling their goal. Herzl summed up his work in his Diary on September 3, 1897:

Were I to sum up the Basle Congress in a word - which I shall guard against pronouncing publicly - it would be this: At Basle I founded the Jewish State.

If I said this out loud today, I would be answered by universal laughter. Perhaps in five years, and certainly in fifty, everyone will know it. The foundation of a State lies in the will of the people for a State.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Cohen, A Short History ..., p.47.

<sup>2</sup>Theodor Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, ed. Raphael Patai, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Herzl Press & Thomas Yoseloff, 1960), II, 581. Cited hereafter as Herzl, Diaries.

## CHAPTER II

### THE HISTORICAL GROWTH OF THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT

The period from the crystallization of the Zionist idea at the First Zionist Congress to the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948 saw the growth and expansion of the Zionist movement from a small nucleus into a world-wide and powerful organization. Two world wars intervened which had profound effects upon it. During this period the Zionist Organization gained international recognition and found a sponsor, first Great Britain and then the United States.

Within the organization, points of view developed as to the methods and means to be utilized for implementing the Basle Program. Two main schools grew up, each giving priority to a different aspect of the Basle Program. The 'Political Zionists' emphasized Article IV of the Basle Program and worked for international recognition and for a charter, since the Turks forbade land purchase in Palestine, whereas the 'Practical Zionists' stressed Articles I and II of the Basle Program and strove not only to expand the Zionist Organization on all levels throughout the Diaspora but also to develop the Jewish settlements in Palestine through colonization schemes, for the purpose of using the Palestinian Jewish community as a force of political leverage to obtain a charter. Despite the divergence of views as to the means, the end was always the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, and the creation of the Political entity - 'the Jewish people'.

#### A. The Formative Years

The Zionist Organization from 1897 to 1921 expanded its activities and succeeded in securing international recognition which was embodied in the Balfour Declaration and in the Palestine Mandate Articles. Herzl dominated the Zionist movement from 1897 to his death

in July, 1904. In the space of these few years the basic structure of the future Zionist Organization and its financial instruments and land purchasing fund had been set up. Herzl lived only to see the first Congresses: all of which were held in Basle except for the fourth which was held in London. With each Congress, the Zionist movement grew, gained more support, and increased its membership.

II. Second Congress. - At the Second Zionist Congress held in August, 1898, the Congress founded the Jewish Colonial Trust as a joint stock company to attend to the economic and financial aspects of the Zionist scheme. This was the 'Jewish Company' Herzl had written about in his pamphlet, The Jewish State. It was to be a limited company with its main base in London, then the financial center of the world, and was to be established according to English law and to be under English protection.<sup>1</sup> A nominal capital of £2,000,000 was to be provided by a national subscription raised through £1 shares. The Bank did not begin business operations until 1902, due to the laborious task of floating the bank shares and to the opposition from the wealthier section of Jewry.<sup>2</sup> It took three years to raise £250,000 from 140,000 shareholders in all parts of the world.<sup>3</sup> Herzl had thought the nominal capital would be collected more quickly but was reconciled to the fact that, if the Zionist movement was to succeed, it would someday have to depend upon the Jewish masses for support. Therefore, it was better to build the power base among the masses now, than have to do this later.

At the same time as Herzl was endeavoring to build the structure of the Organization, he was concentrating on obtaining international recognition for the Zionist movement. He realized that Zionism could not be achieved without the consent and co-operation of the dominant political powers, which meant that an approach to the Sultan had to be made. With this view in mind, Herzl interviewed leading statesmen and

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<sup>1</sup>Cohen, Theodor Herzl, p.95.

<sup>2</sup>The wealthy Jews were assimilated into the society of their residence and feared that Zionism might uproot them from their well-established positions.

<sup>3</sup>Cohen, A Short History..., p. 48.



rulers in order to obtain their influential support for his enterprise. He first turned to Germany and tried to secure German protection for a Jewish Chartered Company in Palestine by playing upon the Kaiser's desire to establish German hegemony in the Middle East.<sup>1</sup> He also approached the Grand Duke of Baden and Count Eulenberg; both men tried to interest the Kaiser in Herzl's plans, but the results were disappointing. He contacted several other European statesmen including the King of Italy, the Pope, the French President and the Russian Tsar, but to no avail.

III. Third Congress. - In Herzl's opening speech at the Third Congress in 1899, he announced that his next ambition was to secure a Charter for Palestine from the Sultan.<sup>2</sup> Since no government was anxious to antagonize the Sultan, Herzl decided to directly approach the Sultan himself. Two years passed before Herzl could even start negotiations with the Sultan. On May 18, 1901, Herzl had his first interview with the Sultan, to whom he advanced several projects for alleviating the Ottoman debt in return for securing a Charter. His proposals were considered, and in 1902, he went twice to Constantinople for talks but succeeded in seeing only some members of the Imperial entourage. The Turks were not to be deceived by Herzl's financial promises and realized that he did not command the resources that he said he did. The Sultan feared Jewish settlement in Palestine. On February 18, 1902, the Sultan gave Herzl a protocol setting forth his terms, which Herzl summarized in his Diaries in the following words:

The Sultan is willing to open his Empire to all Jews who become Turkish subjects, but the regions to be settled are to be decided each time by the government, and Palestine is to be excluded. The 'Comp. Otto.-Juive' (Ottoman Colonization Co.) is to be allowed to colonize in Mesopotamia, Syria, Anatolia, anywhere at all, with the sole exception of Palestine.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>An excellent analysis of Herzl's diplomacy with the Kaiser which is based on the Bavarian State Archives can be found in Norman Bentwich, "The First Years of Political Zionism," History Today, XIII (April, 1963), 260-266.

<sup>2</sup>Cohen, Theodor Herzl, p.214.

<sup>3</sup>Herzl, Diaries, III, 1222.

Herzl declined the Sultan's offer and wrote in his Diary, "A Charter without Palestine! I refused at once."<sup>1</sup> Negotiations with the Turks dragged on after this, but Herzl was already beginning to look toward England.

IV. Fourth Congress. - The Fourth Congress was held in London during August, 1900, in order to make the Zionist movement "better known in the English-speaking world and arousing the interest of the British public."<sup>2</sup> Herzl had spoken of England as one of the last places of refuge from anti-Semitism and as the power which would help the Jews. Great Britain would be "the Archimedean point where the lever could be applied."<sup>3</sup> As far back as July 1, 1898, Herzl had written in his Diary that the Zionists could settle in colonies in the neighborhood of Palestine, and there bide their time until Palestine was available for them to colonize.<sup>4</sup> In this period Great Britain controlled Cyprus, Egypt, Sinai, and the Suez Canal. On October 22, 1902, Herzl proposed to the British Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, that the Jews be allowed to colonize Cyprus. Chamberlain refused, fearing the opposition of the Turks and Greeks to Jewish settlement. Herzl next suggested el-Arish and Sinai. These, Chamberlain said, were in the hands of the Foreign Office; he referred Herzl to Lord Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary, whom Herzl met the following day. As a result of these discussions a Zionist Commission, under Leopold J. Greenberg (1860-1931), was sent to investigate el-Arish and reported that colonization would be possible only if adequate water could be taken from the Nile.<sup>5</sup> On March 25, 1903, Herzl had an interview in Cairo with Lord Cromer, the British Proconsul, who rejected the scheme, after consulting the 'Egyptian

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<sup>1</sup>Herzl, Diaries, III, 1222.

<sup>2</sup>Cohen, A Short History . . ., p.49.

<sup>3</sup>Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 1961), p.18.

<sup>4</sup>Herzl, Diaries, II, 644.

<sup>5</sup>Cohen, Theodor Herzl, pp.287-89 and Nevill Barbour, Nisi Dominus: A Survey of the Palestine Controversy (London: George Harrap and Co., 1946), p.50.

Government', on the grounds that not enough water could be spared from the Nile for irrigation of the el-Arish area.<sup>1</sup>

V. Fifth Congress. - At the Fifth Congress in 1901, the Jewish National Fund (Keren Kayemeth) was established for the purpose of acquiring land for colonies in Palestine, "as the inalienable possession of the Jewish people as a whole" and ~~based~~ also claimed ~~traditions re~~ that the land has "only fallen into disuse since the Jews left the Holy Land."<sup>2</sup> Land acquired through the fund could never be resold, and had to be developed by Jews for Jewish colonization. The reason for the Keren Kayemeth's foundation was the fact that Herzl realized that the Jewish state was not going to be created in one stroke. The Keren Kayemeth was to secure piecemeal the land of Palestine. The Congress adopted a new constitution which changed the Congress meetings from being annual to biannual because it was too strenuous and expensive for the Congress to meet annually. The Anglo-Palestine Company, later called the Anglo-Palestine Bank, was founded to handle the financial affairs of the Zionist movement. Into this Company went the nominal capital Herzl had worked to raise over the last three years. A small group of Russian Zionists who called themselves the 'Democratic-Zionist Faction' opposed Herzl's purely political approach and wanted greater attention given to Jewish national culture. This group soon dissolved, but its significance was that it was the first party to arise within the Zionist movement.<sup>3</sup>

Events in Russia gave added impetus to Herzl's endeavors to secure a 'temporary' shelter for the Jews. Before the news of the new wave of pogroms in April, 1903, Chamberlain had suggested the Guas Ngishu plateau near Nairobi, commonly miscalled the 'Uganda Territory'.

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<sup>1</sup>Cohen, The Zionist Movement, p.79.

<sup>2</sup>Halpern, p.83.

<sup>3</sup>For details of the Fifth Congress see Cohen, A Short History . . . ., pp.49-50 and Esco Foundation for Palestine, Inc., Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab, and British Policies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), I,45-46. Cited hereafter as Esco Foundation.

Under the circumstances, Herzl was now willing to consider the idea; besides, there was the promise of autonomy under a Jewish governor. In an effort to obtain the cancellation of the secret decree forbidding all Zionist meetings and fund raising activities, Herzl travelled to St. Petersburg. Herzl also hoped while he was in Russia to persuade the Russian government and, particularly the Tsar, to intervene with the Sultan. All Herzl's efforts were in vain.<sup>1</sup> Although Herzl never tired of trying to procure an audience with the Tsar in order to gain his support, the Tsar was sceptical about Herzl's plans.<sup>2</sup>

VI. Sixth Congress. - At the Sixth Congress, which met at the end of August, 1903, the British offer dominated the proceedings. The mere fact that Herzl even considered a territory other than Palestine was met with a storm of criticism from the Russian and the East European delegates, who at one point walked out of the Congress hall in protest.<sup>3</sup> Despite a lengthy and stormy debate, a resolution was passed, authorizing the Actions Committee to send a commission to investigate the Nairobi plateau. After the Congress, many of the Russian Jews felt so strongly about the East African proposal that they convened a conference at Kharkov and sent an ultimatum to Herzl to abandon the 'Uganda' offer or the Russian Jews would secede from the Zionist movement. He refused to comply. Herzl next went to Rome and had an audience with the King of Italy and Pope Pius X, but neither was willing to render assistance to the Zionist movement.<sup>4</sup>

Herzl died on July 3, 1904. He had accomplished much in nine years through his intensive industry and perseverance. He had founded the World Zionist Organization and laid down its basic foundations and

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<sup>1</sup>Cohen, The Zionist Movement, pp.79-80.

<sup>2</sup>For further information on Herzl's negotiations with the Tsar see, Bentwich, History Today, XIII, 265.

<sup>3</sup>Cohen, Theodor Herzl, pp.236 and 331.

<sup>4</sup>Cohen, The Zionist Movement, pp.80-81 and Esco Foundation, I, 48-49.

had negotiated with statesmen and rulers in an attempt to persuade them to influence the Sultan. By his efforts a precedent was set in England. "It was of great political importance to receive a formal offer of territory from the British Government".<sup>1</sup> As Chaim Weizmann, the first President of Israel, worded it:

This was the first time in the exilic history of Jewry that a great government had officially negotiated with the elected representatives of the Jewish people. The identity, the legal personality of the Jewish people, had been re-established.<sup>2</sup>

The Zionist movement was shaken by Herzl's death. From 1905 to 1914, the young organization groped along with Herzl's spirit to guide it. Many problems arose and continued to confront each Congress, but the determination of those convinced Zionists held the movement together and built the foundations in Palestine upon which the organization was to build after the war.

During these years, a new faction arose out of the seemingly hopeless situation created by the failure of Herzl's negotiations to obtain a Charter. The adherents of the new movement were referred to as the 'Practical Zionists', because they sought to initiate a "program of specific experiments and projects of actual colonization, under whatever legal conditions they could obtain at the time."<sup>3</sup> In other words, they wanted de facto colonization with the idea of building the Palestine community into a sizeable colony which could then be used as a political lever to obtain international recognition.

The 'practical' school was strongly supported by the members of the Second Aliya, a wave of immigrants who came to Palestine following the Russian pogroms from October, 1905, to July, 1906. Among those that came were David Ben-Gurion, a future Prime Minister of Israel, and Itzhak Ben-Zvi, a future President of Israel. Members of the Second

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<sup>1</sup>Cohen, A Short History . . ., p.52.

<sup>2</sup>Chaim Weizmann, Trail and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1949), p.111.

<sup>3</sup>Halpern, p.29.

Aliya were more militant in their aims to establish a Jewish state than their predecessors.

Since they had come from Russia, which was seething with revolutionary socialist doctrines, they were influenced by the general atmosphere and advocated the setting up of a socialist-democratic society in Palestine. Due to their efforts, a prototype of the Jewish farmer-worker was molded whose ideal was to work in a co-operative settlement. Later, some members of the Second Aliya formed trade unions and a watchmen's organization called the Hashomer to guard the Jewish agricultural settlements. The Hashomer was the forerunner of the underground Jewish armed forces organization, the Haganah, which was established after the First World War and played an important part in establishing the Jewish State. In 1948, the Haganah was absorbed into the Israeli Army. In 1920, the Mapai (its English name is the Palestine Labour Party) was formed, and it became the largest political party with its off-shoot, the Histadruth (General Federation of Jewish Labour). Both Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi belonged to and led the Mapai during the Mandate years. Beginning with the Seventh Congress, the 'practical' Zionists began to influence the decisions and policies of the Congress and started gradually to infiltrate into the important positions in the organization with a view to taking it over. From 1911 onwards, these "ideas and practices... were to influence the whole mode of life of the country and the attitudes of its future inhabitants."<sup>1</sup>

VII. Seventh Congress. - The Seventh Congress assembled in Basle in the summer of 1905 and elected David Wolffsohn (1856-1914), a 'political' Zionist and a lifelong friend of Herzl, as the head of the seven-member executive committee. The committee included three representatives from the 'politicals' and three from the 'practicals', with Wolffsohn as the head. (Wolffsohn remained in the Presidency from 1905 to 1911, when the 'practicals' took over.) The Central

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<sup>1</sup>Polk, p.157.

Office was moved from Vienna to Cologne. The most important event of the Congress was the rejection of the Africa scheme by the Russian majority who refused to consider any alternatives to Palestine.<sup>1</sup> Another group, under the leadership of Israel Zangwill, Dr. Nachman Syrkin and Dr. Mandelstamm believed that "the Zionist movement should support Jewish autonomous settlement anywhere in the world," and seceded from the Zionist Organization and founded the Jewish Territorial Organization (I.T.O.)<sup>2</sup> Their attempts to establish various settlements around the world, particularly in Argentina, failed, and, by the end of World War I, the I.T.O. disintegrated.

VIII. Eighth Congress. - By the Eighth Congress, held in The Hague in 1907, two significant concessions were made to the 'practical' Zionists. First, a Palestine Office of the Zionist Organization was established in Jaffa in 1908, under the directorship of Dr. Arthur Ruppin (1876-1943), and was charged with the task of co-ordinating plans and supervising colonization and settlement projects. Second, the Palestine Land Development Company was formed to help finance the land purchases of the Palestine Office. An annual sum of 25% was received by the Palestine Office from the Central Office. The Executive elected at the Congress consisted of only three persons -- Wolffsohn, Jacobus Kann, and Otto Warburg, a 'practical'. Wolffsohn maintained that a three-member Executive could function better than a seven-member executive scattered all over Europe. The Congress passed a resolution making Hebrew the official language of the movement.<sup>3</sup>

By 1908, two separate parties had developed within the Zionist Organization: the 'Mizrachi', a rightist party,<sup>4</sup> and the 'Poale Zion' (Workers of Zion), a leftist-socialist party. Parties following a definite social, religious or political principle were allowed within the Zionist Congress if their membership was over 3,000 Shekel-payers

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<sup>1</sup> Cohen, The Zionist Movement, p.85 and Esco Foundation, I,49.

<sup>2</sup> Polk, p.155.

<sup>3</sup> For fuller details of the Eighth Congress see Weizmann, pp.165-66 and Cohen, The Zionist Movement, p.91.

<sup>4</sup> An orthodox group of Jews, mostly from Russia, who emphasized the importance of Jewish religious law and tradition as the basis for Zionism.

and were referred to as Separate Unions.<sup>1</sup>

IX. Ninth Congress. - At the Ninth Congress, held in Hamburg in 1909, Wolffsohn, the President, tried to appease the Young Turks by declaring that Zionism was completely compatible with the Ottoman Empire. Despite all their efforts and prominent friends that assumed power after the 1908 Revolution in Constantinople, the Zionists could not prevail on the Young Turks to concede to their demands in Palestine.<sup>2</sup> The 'practicals' tried to seize power but failed, and Wolffsohn was re-elected, to their dismay. However, the 'practicals' did persuade the Congress to inaugurate an experiment in co-operative colonization at Merhavia.<sup>3</sup>

X. Tenth Congress. - The 'practicals' won the day at the Tenth Congress, which convened in Basle in the summer of 1911. An executive was elected which belonged entirely to the 'practical' school. Wolffsohn was replaced by Professor Otto Warburg (1859-1938), who had served on the Executive since 1905. The 'practicals', in order to secure their position, made a structural change whereby "the Congress did not elect the President, but left it to the Executive to choose its chairman."<sup>4</sup> The Central Office was moved from Cologne to Berlin. The significance of the 'practical' takeover was a shift in emphasis towards creating a nationalist culture and towards expanding and organizing colonization efforts. Hebrew was stressed in all mediums including literature, education, and discussions at the Zionist Congresses. In 1913, following a teachers' strike at the German Technikum School in Haifa, Hebrew was made the language of instruction at all Jewish schools in Palestine.<sup>5</sup> For the first time, at the Tenth

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<sup>1</sup>Cohen, The Zionist Movement, p.86. In 1921, at the Twelfth Congress the number of Shekel-payers was raised to 20,000 in order to constitute a Separate Union. See Ibid., p.131.

<sup>2</sup>For details on the Zionist relationships with the Young Turks see Neville Mandel, "Turks, Arabs and Jewish Immigration into Palestine: 1882-1914," Middle Eastern Affairs (London: St. Antony's Papers, No.17, Oxford University Press, 1965), pp.77-108.

<sup>3</sup>For further details of the Ninth Congress see Cohen, The Zionist Movement, p.90 and Esco Foundation, I, 354.

<sup>4</sup>Cohen, The Zionist Movement, p.91.

<sup>5</sup>Weizmann, p.184.



Congress an entire session was devoted to a discussion in Hebrew on cultural matters. This was due to the influence of Ahad Ha'am, who attended a Congress for the second time since 1897. He came only because "control of the movement had passed into the hands of men in general sympathy with his views."<sup>1</sup> The orthodox rabbis objected to the secularization of Jewish culture and formed the anti-Zionist orthodox movement, the Agudath Israel, in May, 1912. Its purpose was to promote "Jewish interests on a religious basis to the exclusion of all political tendencies."<sup>2</sup>

XI. Eleventh Congress. - The Eleventh Congress, held in Vienna in 1913 (September 2nd to 9th), re-elected the same Executive, with Warburg as Chairman. Cultural affairs were again emphasized and discussed in Hebrew. A Commission was appointed to study the project of establishing a Hebrew University in Palestine.<sup>3</sup>

From 1904 to 1914 the Zionist Organization weathered various problems, such as the withdrawal of those who favored Jewish settlement anywhere, the controversy between the 'political' and the 'practical' Zionists, and the conflict over the religious attitude the movement was to adopt. Due to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, the Zionist Congress was unable to meet until 1921. The events of the war were to produce a situation where Herzl's aim of political recognition could be realized. When Turkey entered the war on the side of the Central Powers in November, 1914, the Zionist Executive, fearing <sup>for</sup> the position of the Jews in Palestine and in Central Europe, established a Zionist Bureau in neutral Copenhagen, but kept the Central Office in Berlin. The Copenhagen Bureau was to work closely with the Berlin Executive.<sup>4</sup> The Executive felt it could better keep contact with all the national and local Zionist federations

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<sup>1</sup>Cohen, A Short History ..., p.161.

<sup>2</sup>See Vlavianos, pp.200-206 for further information on the Agudath Israel movement.

<sup>3</sup>Cohen, The Zionist Movement, p.92.

<sup>4</sup>For further details see Stein, pp.100-101. As the war progressed, the Central Office in Berlin ceased to function, and the publication of Die Welt, the official Zionist newspaper, was suspended.

by not taking sides in the war and by locating a Bureau in a neutral country. There were other Zionists residing in Great Britain and the United States who felt neutrality should not be observed and unequivocally supported England in the war effort. It could be maintained that if neutrality had been preserved by the <sup>British</sup> Zionists, there would have been no Balfour Declaration.

During the First World War, the Zionists obtained the Balfour Declaration (November, 1917) and, at the Peace Conference, Great Britain was appointed as the Mandatory for Palestine with the task of implementing the Balfour Declaration. The Balfour Declaration and the Mandate formed the legal basis for the 'Jewish National Home' policy in Palestine. At the beginning of the war the Zionist movement was weak diplomatically. During the war, the Zionist movement gained adherents in Great Britain and the United States. As the Allied position went from bad to worse, the Zionist idea took hold among British statesmen who, for a variety of reasons, such as a strong attachment to the Biblical prophecies or concern for strategic or imperial interests, came to back the Zionist cause. Short-range Zionist diplomacy aimed at developing personal contacts between Zionist spokesmen and members of the British government. Through these contacts the Zionists were able to gather intelligence and to pressure others in sensitive posts. Long-range objectives of Zionism in England aimed at an Allied victory, and at the establishment of a British Protectorate in Palestine which would ultimately realize Jewish aspirations for an autonomous state.<sup>1</sup>

Chaim Weizmann (1874-1953)<sup>2</sup> and Nahum Sokolow (1861-1936)<sup>3</sup> were the primary Zionist spokesmen in Great Britain during the war years. When the war began, Weizmann took over the Zionist leadership in England without the approval of the Central Zionist Executive.

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<sup>1</sup>Taylor, p.12.

<sup>2</sup>Chaim Weizmann was a Jew of Russian origin who migrated to Great Britain in 1904 and became a lecturer in Chemistry at Manchester University. In September, 1915, he was appointed to the Ministry of Munitions as Chemical Advisor on acetone and conducted experiments in the production of acetone.

<sup>3</sup>Nahum Sokolow was born in Russian Poland and wrote for several Hebrew journals in Poland and Germany. In 1897, he became a Zionist. Under Wolffsohn he was editor of Die Welt and later served on the Zionist Executive for many years.

Sokolow, who was a member of the Zionist Executive, arrived in London in late 1914 and worked with Weizmann for a declaration. The whole English Zionist Federation was at their disposal, and "Sokolow was in a position to legitimise Weizmann's free-lance activities."<sup>1</sup> Only in 1917, was Weizmann elected to the Presidency of the English Zionist Federation. Weizmann insisted on British patronage "because only under the British form of Imperialism was there a constant tendency to independent growth."<sup>2</sup> Therefore, Weizmann started seeking British support for an international declaration and once claimed that it took him two thousand interviews to pave the way for the Balfour Declaration.<sup>3</sup>

The turning point for Weizmann's diplomatic endeavors and for the Zionist movement came when he met Charles Preswick Scott, the editor of the Manchester Guardian, in September, 1914. Scott expressed his sympathy for Zionism and was willing to help the movement. He had access to highly placed officials because of his position as editor of an influential newspaper. There were many times when Scott was to help Weizmann, when the latter was in an awkward spot, and to keep him informed of Cabinet discussions. Through Scott, Weizmann was introduced to David Lloyd George and Herbert Samuel, and reintroduced to Arthur Balfour.<sup>4</sup> In early December, 1914, Weizmann had a series of useful interviews with senior British officials which were to bear fruit later in the issuance of the Balfour Declaration. On December 25th, a meeting was called at Samuel's house between Herbert Samuel, the first Jewish member of a British Cabinet, Moses Gaster, the Chief Rabbi of the Sephardi community in England, and Weizmann. Samuel urged Weizmann and Gaster to "try to create a representative instrument which would be sufficiently strong to negotiate when the time came."<sup>5</sup> During 1915 and 1916, Weizmann, Sokolow, Gaster and others labored to build

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<sup>1</sup>Stein, p.169, Also see Sykes, Two Studies in Virtue, pp.169-170 and Oscar Rabinowicz, Fifty Years of Zionism: A Historical Analysis of Dr. Weizmann's 'Trail and Error' (London: Ascombe, 1950), p.70.

<sup>2</sup>Sykes, Two Studies in Virtue, p.204.

<sup>3</sup>Stein, p.125.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., pp.131-36 and Sykes, Two Studies in Virtue, pp.170-71.

<sup>5</sup>Stein, p.139.

up the nucleus of the Zionist Organization in England, to create an effective propaganda machine, and to win over more British officials to the Zionist cause. Outside England, in the Allied countries, their campaign was designed to gain the support of the leaders of national or local Jewish communities in order to create the impression that the majority of world Jewry backed the Zionist cause and to use these converts to pressure their respective governments for the Zionist idea. In this manner, Weizmann hoped to create the image of 'the Jewish people' who all backed the Zionist scheme for 'a home'.

The traditional rivalry and conflicting interests between France and Great Britain are not unrelated to the Balfour Declaration. The Zionists fully realized that their aspirations must coincide with the British government's primary aim "to win the war and to safeguard British interests in the post-war settlement."<sup>1</sup> In January and again in March, 1915, Samuel had submitted memorandums to the Cabinet centering on his arguments on strategic considerations based on a latent fear that France, which had traditional claims in the Eastern Mediterranean, might not always be so friendly to England and might pose, "a continual and formidable menace to the essential lines of communication of the British Empire."<sup>2</sup> He proposed that a British Protectorate should be established in Palestine which would allow the Jewish inhabitants to develop into a majority of the population and attain a degree of self-government. The war situation put the relationship between France and England in a precarious position in the Near East. The French were apprehensive of the English Army in the Levant, and the English feared the Entente would be in danger. As a result the Asquith government began negotiations in confidence with the French in December, 1915, for the purpose of dividing the Near East into their respective spheres of influence. The outcome of these talks was the super-secret Sykes-Picot Agreement in the spring of 1916. According

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p.126.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.109.

to the agreement most of Palestine was to be internationalized which ran counter to Zionist desires. The Zionists did not learn of the Sykes-Picot Agreement until April, 1917, when Scott informed Weizmann of its existence. At the Peace Conference following the war Britain used the Sykes-Picot Agreement along with the Balfour Declaration to assert her claim to Palestine as the guarantor of a 'Jewish National Home.'

In October, 1916, Mark Sykes, a member of the 'Garden Cabinet', submitted a petition to the Cabinet on behalf of the Zionists requesting the use of British communications facilities abroad. This innocent proposal was granted in the hope that the Zionists, in spreading their doctrine to all parts of the globe, would win world Jewry over to the Allied war effort, particularly in America.<sup>1</sup> The Zionists, in order to carry out their promise to deliver world Jewish support, advanced their claims further to speak on behalf of 'the Jewish people' as a national entity. In the same month, the Zionists presented a carefully prepared draft of Zionist demands to the Cabinet as a basis for negotiation. This so-called 'October Program' foreshadowed the Balfour Declaration, and its ideas helped produce attitudes favorable to Zionist aims.<sup>2</sup>

A cabinet crisis occurred in December, 1916. The tide now turned in favor of the Zionists. Asquith was replaced by David Lloyd George as Prime Minister, and Arthur Balfour became head of the Foreign Office. Both were pro-Zionist and desired an official statement. Mark Sykes was empowered by the new coalition cabinet to start official negotiations with the Zionists.<sup>3</sup> On the 7th of February, a meeting was held at Dr. Gaster's house between Sykes in an 'unofficial' capacity and the Zionist leaders. The main purpose of the gathering was to coordinate the activities of the Zionist Organization and

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<sup>1</sup>Joseph Jeffries, Palestine: The Reality (London: Longmans, Green, 1939), pp.135-36.

<sup>2</sup>For the 'October Program' see Jeffries, pp.128-29 and Esco Foundation, I, 88-89.

<sup>3</sup>Taylor, p.18.

those of the British Cabinet for obtaining official recognition of a Jewish National Home and for securing Palestine under British protection after the war.<sup>1</sup>

Events crystallized the British Government's commitment to Zionism. The Russian revolution occurred in March, the war situation changed, and Palestine became important. In April, 1917, the British government issued a statement of war aims in the Near East in an effort to rally American Jewish opinion behind the Allied war effort. It was hoped that American Jewry would influence President Wilson to enter the War. America did enter the war in April, but it was not due to Jewish pressure. The British statement was based on the 'October Program' which had first been issued as a basis for discussion, but "the basis had crept up by now and had become the main structure of the Government's Statement of Policy."<sup>2</sup> At this same time Weizmann learned of the Sykes-Picot Agreement from C.P. Scott who had heard about the terms of the agreement while he was in Paris. Weizmann, in an interview with Lord Cecil, the Assistant Secretary of State, hinted that he knew the terms of the Agreement, and in 'guarded language' said that the Jews would object to any international zone in Palestine.<sup>3</sup> By the end of May, the British Government had committed itself to the Zionist cause. Weizmann's statement before the Conference of the English Zionist Federation that, "His Majesty's Government is ready to support our plans,"<sup>4</sup> made it practically impossible for the British Government to change its mind. The anti-Zionist Conjoint Foreign Committee,<sup>5</sup> formed earlier, objected to Weizmann's statement, but their campaign was too late and too unorganized; however, they were able to force a compromise formula in

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<sup>1</sup>Sykes, Two Studies in Virtue, pp.194-96.

<sup>2</sup>Jeffries, p.143, for complete statement see p.142.

<sup>3</sup>Sykes, Two Studies in Virtue, p.204.

<sup>4</sup>Jeffries, p.150.

<sup>5</sup>The Conjoint Foreign Committee was formed, to coordinate the non-Zionist approach to matters affecting Jews in other countries, between the Board of Deputies of British Jews, founded in 1706, and between the Anglo-Jewish Association, founded in 1871.

the final declaration.<sup>1</sup> The Zionists had laid a firm groundwork with a constructive campaign backed by a positive faith. In July, the London Bureau of the Zionist Organization was established, and a Political Committee was formed to draft tentative statements for the Cabinet and to supervise the progress toward the declaration. During the summer of 1917, drafts went back and forth between the Political Committee, the Foreign Office, and America with additions and subtractions taking place each time.<sup>2</sup> In late October, Edwin Montagu, an anti-Zionist Jew and former minister under Asquith and now Secretary for India, who had addressed the Lloyd George Cabinet several times on the evils of Zionism, left for India. Lord Curzon's reservations could not overcome the Zionist momentum,<sup>3</sup> and the way was now clear for a Zionist declaration.

On November 2nd, the famous Balfour Declaration appeared in the form of a letter addressed to Lord Edmond de Rothschild from Lord Balfour. The pertinent passage read as follows:

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Sykes, Two Studies in Virtue, pp.215-16.

<sup>2</sup>Jeffries, pp.163-67 and 172 and Cohen, A Short History..., p.84.

<sup>3</sup>Sykes, Two Studies in Virtue, p.223. Lord Curzon sent a long note to the Foreign Secretary on October 26th arguing against a Zionist declaration, but it was conveniently buried there. This note can be found in David Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties (London: Gollancz, 1939), pp.1122-32.

<sup>4</sup>Jewish Agency for Palestine, Documents Relating to the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate (London: Jewish Agency for Palestine, May, 1939), p.7. Cited hereafter as Jewish Agency, Documents.

The sixty-seven word statement emerged after months of discussion and compromise. Closest attention was paid to the legal significance of the language. Any vagueness in phraseology was intentional. The Zionists felt that as long as Jewish colonization in Palestine still remained in the initial stages, it was considered "inopportune officially to proclaim the re-establishment of the Jewish state as the ultimate political end of Zionism," and concealed their objective in the term 'a national home for the Jewish people'.<sup>1</sup> The use of the phrase 'the Jewish people' was intentionally employed in order to create, before the statesmen of the world, the Zionist concept of the Jews as a legal-political sovereignty possessing national rights and obligations.

Shortly, after the Balfour's Declaration was issued, it was adopted, in principle, by the major Western powers. President Wilson had approved of the Balfour Declaration before it was promulgated. Likewise, the French government, the Italian government and the Vatican had been consulted during the negotiations. In the first half of 1918, the French and Italian governments conditionally accepted the Declaration.<sup>2</sup> In 1924, the British and American governments signed what has come to be known as the Anglo-American Convention of 1924. It meant that the United States Government backed the entire Balfour Declaration and recognized the 'public body' status of the World Zionist Organization, which included the political entity -- 'the Jewish people'. Thus, Zionism 'achieved' its international legal status among the large Western nations which had been initiated with the Basle Program.

The importance of the Balfour Declaration lay in the fact that it became the backbone of British policy in Palestine and was attached to the Mandate Articles. During the Mandate years divergences between the Zionist Organization and the British Government were to develop

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<sup>1</sup>Heller, p.168.

<sup>2</sup>Stein, pp.394-421. For the stipulations attached to the French and Italian acceptances see Jeffries, p.184.



over the interpretation of the Balfour Declaration.

Following the promulgation of the Balfour Declaration, the Zionist endeavors were directed at the coming Peace Conference. Great Britain was wanted as the Mandatory by the Zionists because the British Government had already committed itself to the establishment of a 'Jewish National Home'. The Zionists opposed any plan aimed at the internationalization of Palestine as envisaged by the Sykes-Picot Agreement and did not desire a French Condominium. For the Zionists the most important task was to win over to their side the treaty-makers and the persons representing the great powers at the Peace Conference.<sup>1</sup> The Arabs were considered to be of secondary importance.

The Peace Conference met from January through the spring of 1919. It was confronted with reconciling the demands of the great powers and with the many declarations of self-determination by the smaller nations. The upshot was the signing of the Treaty of Versailles on June 28th, and the establishment of the League of Nations which embodied the Mandates system. At the Conference both the Arab and the Jewish (i.e. Zionist and non-Zionist) sides were heard. On February 3rd, the Zionists submitted their memorandum to the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference. On February 27th, Zionist spokesmen presented their case before the Allied Council and reiterated the points in their memorandum asking that Great Britain be the Mandatory "on the ground that this is the wish of the Jews of the world", and that "the Jewish Council shall be recognized as a legal entity and shall have power: (a)... to act as the representative of the Jewish people."<sup>2</sup> In essence, the Memorandum was all part of a well developed plan dealing with boundaries, Land Commission, immigration and other aspects of governmental activities. The Zionists were well rewarded for their efforts. By the time of the signing of the Treaty of

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<sup>1</sup>Jeffries, p.242.

<sup>2</sup>For the Zionist Memorandum see Jacob Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East (Princeton: Van Nostrand Co., 1956), II, 45.

Versailles, the terms of a Jewish Palestine had been outlined, and verbal pledges had been given. "The British delegation opened formal discussions with the Zionists on the matter of drafting what was to be the official mandate for Palestine."<sup>1</sup>

Behind the scenes the Zionists had cleverly manoeuvred<sup>S</sup> around and argued their case with the various delegations. Before the Peace Conference the Zionists had elected their spokesmen at separate conventions in America and in Europe. Weizmann and Sokolow were appointed by a conference of Palestinian Jews in October, 1918, to represent the Jewish community in Palestine at the Peace Conference.<sup>2</sup> To those assembled at the Conference the Zionists tried to convey the impression that their cause commanded broad and extended Jewish sympathy and support.

The Supreme Council of the Allied Peace Conference meeting at San Remo on April 25, 1920, 'assigned' the Mandate for Palestine to Great Britain. In actual fact, Great Britain was not formally awarded the Mandate by the League until September 23, 1923. The Balfour Declaration was incorporated into Article XCV of the Treaty of Sevres<sup>3</sup> which Turkey signed in August, 1920, but was never ratified by the Turkish government. Nevertheless, this unapproved treaty was significant, in that, the Peace Conference abided by the contents of Article XCV as a de facto agreement. The League Council tentatively confirmed the final draft of the Mandate on July 22, 1922, but held back the formal announcement until the French Mandate for Syria and Lebanon was ready to be published.<sup>4</sup>

The text of the Mandate upheld the basic program of Zionism.

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<sup>1</sup>Taylor, p.27.

<sup>2</sup>Cohen, The Zionist Movement, pp.117-18.

<sup>3</sup>For Article XCV see Hurewitz, II, 81.

<sup>4</sup>Royal Institute for International Affairs, Great Britain and Palestine: 1915-1945 (London: Information Papers No. 20, Oxford University Press, 1946), pp.13-14. Cited hereafter as Great Britain and Palestine. For terms of the Mandate see pp.151-55.

In the Preamble the principal Allied Powers agreed that Great Britain should be responsible for putting the Balfour Declaration into effect and favored "the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people," with the provision that "the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine" were not to be prejudiced. After the two safeguard clauses there followed what Weizmann felt was "the most important part of the Mandate."<sup>1</sup> Paragraph three of the Mandate read:

recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstructing their national home in that country.

Later, Weizmann commented on the reason he placed so high a value on paragraph three. "The value of the Mandate, apart from being a great success of Zionism, consists in the recognition of the Jewish people."<sup>2</sup> In Zionist eyes the Mandate's importance was its repetition of 'the Jewish people' concept and its possible future use in Zionist negotiations in claiming the legal-political rights of 'the Jewish people'.

Articles II, IV, VI, XI, XXII and XXIII of the Mandate related to 'the national home'. Of these Article IV was the most important in the earlier years of the Mandate. It provided that:

An appropriate Jewish Agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish National Home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country.

The Zionist organization, so long as its organization and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognized as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.

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<sup>1</sup>Weizmann, p.348.

<sup>2</sup>Paul Goodman (ed.), Chaim Weizmann: A Tribute on His Seventieth Birthday (London: Gollancz, 1945), p.179.

This Jewish Agency was the Jewish council previously mentioned in the Zionist memorandum of February, 1919. Now, the Jewish council had developed into an organization called the Jewish Agency, charged with governmental activities and duties. Article IV gave a 'public body' form to the World Zionist Organization which was to act as the Jewish Agency.

The Mandatory was also committed in Article VI to facilitate Jewish immigration and colonization -- the two means by which the Zionists hoped to eventually gain Palestine as their own.

Article XI granted wide powers to the 'Jewish Agency' to assist in public works, services, and utilities, and to help develop the natural resources of Palestine.

Articles XXII and XXIII called for Hebrew to be recognized as one of the three 'official languages' and for certain 'holy days' to be regarded as 'legal days of rest for the members of such communities.'

Political Zionism had succeeded with all its pressures, petitions and cables in having the ~~Mandate awarded to Great Britain with the assigned task of implementing the Balfour Declaration~~ <sup>included</sup> as part of the Mandatory's policy. Zionism had fulfilled the first step of the Basle Program. It had its international charter with an international guarantee and had Great Britain as the Gentile nation to carry out and back the establishment of the Jewish state. Preferential treatment was to be given to the Jewish community. The Arab population of Palestine which included both Moslem and Christian Arabs was referred to in the Balfour Declaration and Mandate as the 'non-Jewish communities in Palestine.'

With the Balfour Declaration's inclusion in the Mandate the center of the Jewish problem shifted from pressuring the British Government to recognize the Jewish National Home to constructing the Jewish National Home in Palestine. Weizmann shifted his tactics. Underlying these tactics lay the primary aim of Zionism that "Palestine shall be just as Jewish as America is American and England is English," declared Weizmann.<sup>1</sup> From the time of Allenby's advance into Palestine in 1917, until June, 1920, Palestine had been under the British military

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<sup>1</sup>Jeffries, p.266.

administration as occupied enemy territory (O.E.T.A.), and the British exercised de facto authority. Lord Allenby had refused to publish the Balfour Declaration in Palestine for military considerations.<sup>1</sup> Since the Balfour Declaration could not be published in Palestine, other means of installing the 'National Home' were found. The British Government authorized a Zionist Commission composed of representatives from the Zionist bodies in the Allied countries to go to Palestine

to represent the Zionist Organization in Palestine and act as an advisory body to the British authorities there in all matters relating to Jews or which may affect the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people, in accordance with the Declaration of His Majesty's Government.<sup>2</sup>

The Zionist Commission under the chairmanship of Weizmann arrived in Palestine in April, 1919, and took over the work of the Palestine Office of the World Zionist Organization. It was given a free hand to engage in political activities to which the military authorities strenuously objected but in vain.<sup>3</sup> The Commission felt itself a public body and immediately concerned itself with doing relief work, with preparing for and creating a 'Jewish Constituent Assembly', and with laying the foundation stone of the Hebrew University. All these activities according to the Commission were in the name of 'the Jewish people'. The Commission acted as if it owned Palestine with complete disregard for the Arab inhabitants and with utter contempt for the military administration.<sup>4</sup> Elections were held for a 'Constituent Assembly' without reference to the Chief British Administrator; however, the Assembly did not meet until October 7, 1920, when the Vaad Leumi (National Council) was elected as the official representative of Palestinian Jewry.<sup>5</sup> In October, 1919, the Palestine

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p.219.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.221.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p.309. The military authorities made constant protests to London about the Commission's activities, but Zionist influence in Whitehall was too great, and the Commission was allowed to do what it wished.

<sup>4</sup>For further details of the Commission's activities see Ibid., pp.223, 310-313 and 357 and Esco Foundation, I, 130.

<sup>5</sup>Cohen, The Zionist Movement, p.118.

Office was amalgamated with the Commission and enlarged. The Commission's structure resembled that of a Cabinet whose composition kept changing. Ussishkin was appointed head of the newly enlarged Commission with Dr. Eder as head of the Political Department.<sup>1</sup> The primary function of the Commission was a political liaison between the British Administrators and the Palestinian Jews. In September, 1921, at the Twelfth Congress, the name of the Commission was changed to the Zionist Executive in Palestine.<sup>2</sup> The secondary function of the Commission was to create an administration within an administration, with departments in <sup>the</sup> Zionist administration corresponding to departments in the British administration.<sup>3</sup> The long-term aims of the Zionists were to develop their administration and their local councils to the point where they could easily step in and take over once the Mandatory left.

On July 1, 1920, the military administration was replaced by a civil administration with Sir Herbert Samuel, a Zionist Jew, as first High Commissioner for Palestine. Samuel's appointment was of great importance and significance to the Zionists, for it meant England wished to implement the Balfour Declaration. The First Immigration Ordinance was authorized by Samuel in September, and the first year's quota was to be 16,500 immigrants.<sup>4</sup>

Samuel's presence and the Immigration Ordinance made the Arabs uneasy about the British Mandate which sponsored the Balfour Declaration. They demanded independence which had been promised them in several wartime declarations ~~and~~ culminating in the Anglo-French Declaration on November 7, 1918. The British Government could not endorse a Jewish policy without expecting the Arabs to object. Riots occurred in 1920 and in 1921. Samuel suspended Jewish immigration for a while. A Commission of Inquiry called the Haycraft Commission was sent to Palestine to investigate Arab grievances, and the Commission

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<sup>1</sup>Jeffries, pp.309-10.

<sup>2</sup>Cohen, The Zionist Movement, p.117.

<sup>3</sup>Jeffries, p.309.

<sup>4</sup>Great Britain and Palestine, p.39.

Report concluded:

... in our opinion the Commission's [Zionist Commission] conception of its duties and functions has exercised an exacerbating rather than a conciliatory influence on the Arab population of Palestine, and thus been a contributory cause of<sup>1</sup> the disturbances which are the subject of our enquiry.

The British Government disturbed by the findings of the Haycraft Report, issued what is known as the Churchill White Paper in 1922, in an attempt to define what England had meant by a 'Jewish National Home'. The Churchill White Paper simply gave an interpretation of the Balfour Declaration that:

... the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, ... is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride.... This community [in Palestine] ... should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance."<sup>2</sup>

Immigration was declared to be necessary for the attainment of this policy, but "this immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals." In fact the Churchill White Paper only postponed the decisions on the questions raised by the Arabs. It introduced the 'economic absorptive capacity' clause. The Zionists felt that each Jew coming to Palestine brought some 'economic absorptive capacity' with him through his skill and capital. In September, Transjordan became an independent Emirate much to the Zionists' dismay, but they had no choice but to consent if they did not wish to arouse the ire of the British Government who was sponsoring them.

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<sup>1</sup>Jeffries, p.422. Italics added.

<sup>2</sup>Jewish Agency, Documents, p.22. Italics added.

As the Mandate policy became clearer to more of the Arabs a disquieting calm prevailed over Palestine. British assurances fell on deaf ears among the Arabs. The 1921 disturbances were only a prelude for the disturbances of 1929, 1933, 1936 and 1937. Each riot brought a commission of inquiry to Palestine, and each report attributed the disturbances to the Zionists. Following the 1929 Commission and its report the procedure became more complicated for the British. A commission would go to Palestine to investigate the troubles and return to London and issue its report. At the same time as the report was issued, a White Paper would be announced. The Zionists would object to the contents of the report and the White Paper. A subsidiary commission would be sent to Palestine to re-investigate the circumstances of the troubles and would return and issue a report of its findings. Again, a White Paper would be issued to which the Zionists would bring all the pressure they could muster against the British Government to change the White Paper. Then, with variations, a letter or a statement would be made by the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary, to the effect that Britain planned to uphold her commitments to the Jews. As time went on this familiar sequel of events increased in occurrence and frequency. Each White Paper was an attempt to further define the loose phraseology of the Balfour Declaration. Gradually, Zionist interests no longer coincided with Great Britain's in the Levant. The Zionists were not willing to admit publically the inherent contradictions in their aims and continuously blamed the Mandatory for the situation which they had themselves brought about. In 1939, with another world war looming on the horizon, Great Britain put aside the Balfour Declaration for the time being.



B. The Coming of Age

Following the Balfour Declaration the Zionists set about reorganizing themselves for the task of carrying out the expanded operations of the movement. Zionist leaders shifted their tactics to confront world Jewry with the task of colonization and with their so-called duties and obligations to 'the Jewish people' concept. Weizmann stated his job involved travelling, "Jerusalem-London-New York became the focal points: at each point there were varying fortunes and complications."<sup>1</sup> Plans were made to organize a World Zionist Congress which had been unable to meet since 1913. In February, 1919, the first postwar meeting of the Actions Committee took place in London, where the Committee decided to establish the Central Office of the Zionist Organization. Weizmann was elected to the Committee. When the Committee met again in June, 1919, it became apparent that a divergence of opinion on policy had developed between the European and the American Zionists. The crux of the disagreement stemmed from the financial situation created after the Russian revolution when money was not allowed out of Russia. America became the only other country where large sums of money were available. Zionism was dependent upon large sums of money. As the American contributions increased, the American Zionists began to insist on a greater voice not only in the policies and decisions of the World Zionist Organization but also in the manner in which their money was spent.<sup>2</sup> The Americans, led by Justice Brandeis and Judge Mack, felt that the political offensive of the Basle Program along with the rigid centralization of the Zionist Executive could be put aside now that the Zionist movement had the Balfour Declaration and was about to have Great Britain assigned as Mandatory. Once the Zionist movement lost its political

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<sup>1</sup>Weizmann, p.315.

<sup>2</sup>Horace B. Samuel, Unholy Memoirs of the Holy Land (Cleveland: The Hogarth Press, 1930), p.120.

character, the American Zionists reasoned that many non-Zionists would be willing to support Zionist projects. They felt that the work could now be carried out by strong national federations not subordinate to the Zionist Organization and that the economic construction of Palestine was the most important task facing Zionism. Fiscal funds should be used for non-returnable expenditures like health and immigration, and not for industrial or commercial enterprises which could draw interest, and therefore, should be left to private investors. Education should be left to local resources. Brandeis wanted a definite economic policy adopted for Palestine, and stressed efficiency and expertness in administering financial matters. The Americans had previously drawn up an economic plan called the 'Pittsburgh Program' at their national convention in July, 1918.<sup>1</sup>

The first large gathering of Zionists occurred at the London Conference<sup>2</sup> held from July 7th to 23rd, 1920. It was at this conference that the conflict between Weizmann and Brandeis developed. Originally, their disagreement centered on the application and the functions that the newly proposed financial fund, the Keren Hayesod or the Palestine Foundation Fund,<sup>3</sup> would perform. Weizmann and other European Zionist leaders wanted this new Fund to open branches all over the world, but all the branches would be under the direction of the Fund's central executive. As in the case of the other fiscal institutions like the Keren Kayemeth, the Zionist Executive controlled

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<sup>1</sup>Kallen, p.192.

<sup>2</sup>Conferences were called either when it was impossible to summon a Congress or when it was an off year between the biannual Congresses of the World Zionist Organization. In this case transportation and communication difficulties still existed from the war.

<sup>3</sup>The Keren Hayesod was to replace the temporary Palestine Restoration Fund which had been set up in July, 1917 as the Preparation Fund to finance the Zionist activities in London and Paris in regard to the Peace Conference. Later, its name was changed to the Palestine Restoration Fund when it financed the activities of the Zionist Commission in Palestine. See Cohen, The Zionist Movement, p.126.

the fund through a 51% control over the voting power and thus ensured de facto the appointment of a director approved by the Inner Actions Committee.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, Weizmann felt that the fund should cover all purposes like immigration, colonization, public services, economic enterprises as well as political uses, since he still saw the need for political negotiations and other needs. The money was to be raised by a tithe levied on individual Jewish capital and income. From the amount collected over 20% was to go to the Jewish National Fund, and no more than a third was to be spent on current expenditures like social welfare and education, "While at least two-thirds were to be 'invested in permanent national institutions or economic undertakings'."<sup>2</sup> Brandeis opposed Weizmann's plan on the ground that the two-thirds clause was too vague and left room for the misuse of funds by the Zionist Executive as he had found in the administration of the temporary Palestine Restoration Fund. Therefore, Brandeis felt that the individual Zionist federations could better handle their own funds and spend these funds on whatever expenditures like health, afforestation, immigration that that federation desired. Preferably, each Zionist federation would undertake a specific task with the Zionist Executive coordinating the work. Weizmann wanted all funds under the direct supervision of the Zionist Executive or else the whole World Zionist Organization would be reduced "to the status of a technical bureau with doubtful authority."<sup>3</sup>

The real crux of the disagreement at the 1920 Conference lay in the political 'work' of the Executive. Brandeis had correctly come to know the real aim of political Zionism. Weizmann and his colleagues were committed to keeping the Zionist Organization as a

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<sup>1</sup>Kallen, p.282 and Esco Foundation, I, 339.

<sup>2</sup>Cohen, The Zionist Movement, p.126.

<sup>3</sup>Weizmann, pp.335-36.

central body to discipline and control the various branches. They were convinced that their 'political work was far from finished' and thought in terms of creating 'some kind of Jewish council' or agency to accommodate the non-Zionist.<sup>1</sup> The whole purpose of this political work was "to establish, in international law, the concept of all Jews -- 'the Jewish people' -- as a body politic possessing national rights in, and national obligations to, the 'national home'. The Zionist Organization, in this commitment, was to act as the 'public body', not for a colonisation plan for Palestine, ... but for the building of a world-wide 'Jewish' nation."<sup>2</sup>

Weizmann's arguments won more of the delegates, and the Conference voted to establish the Keren Hayesod as an all-purpose fund. The Conference also established a Central Immigration Office in Palestine to regulate Jewish immigration, and offices were to be opened in countries where young emigrants with specific skills might be persuaded to go to Palestine. The delegates elected Brandeis as Honorary President and Weizmann as President of the Organization with Sokolow as Chairman of the Executive and with Ussishkin as Head of the Zionist Executive in Palestine. Weizmann noted, "I acquired, for the first time, some formal authority. During the greater part of the negotiations in London I had had none whatsoever."<sup>3</sup> The Conference ended by specifying that the newly elected Inner Actions Committee was to reorganize and appoint a Reorganization Commission from among its members to correct and strengthen their activities in London and Jerusalem. A Congress was to be convened not later than the summer of 1921.

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<sup>1</sup>Weizmann, pp.326-27.

<sup>2</sup>Elmer Berger, "Disenchantment of a Zionist," Middle East Forum, XXXVIII, No.4 (April, 1962), 21.

<sup>3</sup>Weizmann, p.328.

The final showdown between Weizmann and Brandeis was only postponed. Weizmann was now in a position of power as head of the Zionist Organization to enforce his policies. He only needed time to consolidate and plan his strategy against the dissentients.

In the spring of 1921, Weizmann made a trip to the United States with a threefold purpose in mind. First, he wanted to awaken American interest in a Hebrew university in Jerusalem. Second, he wished to formally announce the opening of the Keren Hayesod in America for the embarrassment of Brandeis and his colleagues. The Keren Hayesod had been incorporated under English law in March, 1921, and registered under the title 'The Eretz Israel (Palestine) Foundation Fund Keren Hayesod, Limited'. Third, he took soundings about the prospects of founding some sort of Jewish Agency which would include non-Zionists who would co-operate with some of the Jewish organizations engaged in public welfare work.<sup>1</sup> The idea of the Jewish Agency was to develop in the late 1920's after Weizmann had secured the American Zionist Organization under the control of the Zionist Executive. Weizmann's primary reason for going to America was to discredit Brandeis and bring about the election of a new Executive of the American Zionist Organization which would follow the World Zionist Executive's orders and be subservient to Weizmann.

The Brandeis group which had the support of the Zionist Organization of America's Executive Committee presented the main points of their program to Weizmann on his arrival in the United States. These proposals suggested that the World Zionist Organization be replaced by strong national federations with a co-ordinating board and emphasized private investment and individual project methods. Weizmann ignored Brandeis' proposals because he was determined to get his way even if he had to split the American Zionist movement. The Executive Committee of the American Zionist Organization called a convention in Cleveland, Ohio,

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<sup>1</sup>Weizmann, pp.327-36 passim.

June 5th to 8th, 1921, to decide the issue.

Before the convention convened in July, Weizmann decided to make a fait accompli by unilaterally announcing 'the opening of the Keren Hayesod for America' on April 17, 1921. From the time of the Keren Hayesod pronouncement to the convention, Weizmann toured the United States ostensibly to raise large funds for the Keren Hayesod, but in reality to win American Jews over to his side in the controversy with Brandeis.<sup>1</sup>

At the convention Weizmann brought about the resignation of Brandeis, Judge Mack and the rest of the American Executive through a motion to reject Judge Mack's Presidential report. The delegates' rejection of the report was considered equivalent to a vote of no confidence. Thereupon, Judge Mack resigned, followed by the rest of Brandeis' supporters.<sup>2</sup> The convention elected supporters of Weizmann's policies to fill the vacant positions, and made the Keren Hayesod their central fund; however, it would be under the control of the World Zionist Executive.<sup>3</sup>

The Cleveland convention clarified the position of the American Zionist Organization as one of subservience to the World Zionist Organization. The establishment of the Keren Hayesod was a major triumph for Weizmann and meant he would now have the funds to carry out a policy of systematic colonization of Palestine. Weizmann had his way and had imposed organizational discipline on the American branch. By eliminating the American opposition Weizmann had secured his position in the Diaspora as President of the World Zionist Organization. Now he could feel free to call the first postwar Congress and to carry out his program of 'moderate Zionism' or as he called it 'organic Zionism'. He liked to compare the building of the National Home with a plant which

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp.335-38.

<sup>2</sup>The Brandeis-Mack group seceded later from the World Zionist Organization and founded their own corporations in Palestine.

<sup>3</sup>Elmer Berger, The Jewish Dilemma (New York: The Devin-Adair Co., 1946), pp.144-45.

"had to be watered and nursed, if it was to reach maturity."<sup>1</sup> By moderate Zionism Weizmann also included the extension of the 'Jewish people' concept.

XII. Twelfth Congress. - The first postwar Zionist Congress was held in Carlsbad in September, 1921, and laid the foundations for Zionist activities for the next decade. The British Ambassador to Prague, Sir George Clerk, attended the opening session to extend greetings from the British Government and to reaffirm the Balfour Declaration.<sup>2</sup> Most of the decisions taken at the London Conference in 1920, were confirmed including the Keren Hayesod, the Jewish National Fund, etc. Weizmann's belief that agricultural colonization was the backbone of Zionist work in Palestine carried the day at the Twelfth Congress. A special colonization department under a member of the Executive was set up and was to work jointly with the Central Immigration Office in Palestine. The name of the Anglo-Palestine Company was changed to the Anglo-Palestine Bank, and its capital was raised to £1,000,000. An ambitious budget was passed on the estimated income of the Keren Hayesod which later had to be trimmed back.

Three important matters faced the Congress: the proposed constitution of the World Zionist Organization, the election of a new Executive and the political situation in Palestine. A new constitution became necessary due to the growth of the movement. The 1921 Constitution had a significant effect on the national branches because it determined and defined the legal relationship between the World Zionist Organization and its national federations or branches. All branches were to conduct their affairs in accordance with the provisions of the Zionist Executive. In other words, there were to be no more acts of 'insubordination' by branches like the American Zionist Organization.<sup>3</sup>

A new Executive of thirteen was elected with Weizmann as

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<sup>1</sup>Weizmann, pp.333-36 and Kallen, p.284.

<sup>2</sup>A British representative attended the inaugural session of all subsequent Congresses until 1937.

<sup>3</sup>Details of the 1921 Constitution are discussed in Chapter III, Part I, dealing with the structure of the World Zionist Organization.

President of the Organization and Sokolow as President of the Executive. The Executive was to be split with six members in London and with six members making up the Palestine Executive in Jerusalem. Ussishkin was to be head of the Palestine Executive replacing the old Zionist Commission. The Central Office was to be located in London for the purpose of maintaining political relations with the Colonial Office and supervising Zionist activities in the Diaspora. A close liaison was to be kept between the Jerusalem and London Offices to co-ordinate operations and to pass on information.

The political situation in Palestine called for serious review of Zionist-Arab relations in view of the Arab riots. Weizmann stated in his opening address on the subject of Jewish-Arab relations:

We intend to abate no jot of the rights guaranteed to us by the Balfour Declaration, and recognition of that fact by the Arabs is an essential preliminary to the establishment of satisfactory relations between Jew and Arab. Their temporary refusal to recognize that fact compels us to give thought to the means by which we can best safeguard our Yishuv against aggression... We look forward to a future in which Jew and Arab will live side by side in Palestine.<sup>1</sup>

The Zionists outlined their Arab policy for the next decade; one of 'quietly' betaking themselves to Palestine by the thousands and still 'preaching' peace and good-will with their Arab neighbors until the Palestinian Jewish population should be large enough to form an autonomous state. At the Twelfth Congress Weizmann's moderate Zionism was endorsed.<sup>2</sup>

Moderate Zionism continued to be maintained through the late 1920's and early 1930's with emphasis placed on Jewish immigration. It kept repeating that there could be parity between the Arabs and Jews with neither dominating the other. During this period the Zionists built up their agricultural settlements and increased their capital and

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<sup>1</sup>Esco Foundation, I, 415-16.

<sup>2</sup>For further details of the Twelfth Congress see Cohen, The Zionist Movement, pp.127-33.



economic enterprises. As time passed some Palestinian Jews felt the national home was not progressing fast enough, and opposition slowly developed to Weizmann's moderate Zionism.

In Palestine Weizmann began his program of 'moderate' Zionism and in November, 1922, brought Colonel Frederick Kisch (1888-1943)<sup>1</sup> with him to Palestine. In January, 1923, Kisch took over as head of the Political Department of the Palestine Executive replacing Eder. In August, 1923, the Thirteenth Congress appointed Kisch as Director of the Political Department and as Chairman of the Palestine Executive replacing Ussishkin who was retired to the Chairmanship of the Board of Directors of the Jewish National Fund until his death in 1941. Weizmann put a man in charge of the Palestine Executive who would favor his policies and endorse his programs. Kisch remained as head of the Palestine Executive until August, 1931, when Chaim Arlosoroff, the Labour leader, took over the Palestine Executive.

Weizmann realized that non-Zionist as well as Zionist support (mostly financial) was necessary if the National Home was to become a reality. In August-September, 1922, at the Annual Conference of the General Council in Carlsbad, the meeting passed a resolution that "the Jewish Agency shall represent the whole Jewish people" and authorized "the Executive, as the organ of the Jewish Agency, ... to take the preparatory steps towards bringing it about."<sup>2</sup> In February, 1923, the Executive realized that such a program would take time and decided that the best method for constituting such an Agency was to start negotiations with representatives from leading Jewish organizations and communities with the idea of obtaining their participation in the Agency. The approach was to have Jewish organizations, not individuals, join this Agency, which was already a legal body mentioned in the Mandate.

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<sup>1</sup>Kisch was a former military intelligence officer chosen by Weizmann for the job because his origins were Central European and his upbringing was English. Intelligence training was the key to Zionist diplomacy. Taylor, p.42, Weizmann, pp.367-68 and Norman Bentwich and Michael Kisch, Brigadier Frederick Kisch: Soldier and Zionist (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 1966), pp.59-60, 62 and 71-72.

<sup>2</sup>Cohen, The Zionist Movement, p.170.

American Jewry was the chief target. From 1923 to 1929, Weizmann worked hard to constitute such an Agency which would include non-Zionist elements. The question of the extension of the Jewish Agency raised a bitter controversy at the Zionist Congresses between 1923 and 1929.

XIII. Thirteenth Congress. - At the Thirteenth Congress, held in Carlsbad in August, 1923, there was a great deal of criticism of Weizmann's acceptance of the 1922 White Paper and of the separation of Transjordan. Weizmann prevailed upon the Congress to accept the White Paper because it affirmed the Mandate, and the Mandate recognized 'the Jewish people' as a legal entity. A resolution was adopted authorizing an extended or enlarged Jewish Agency and empowering the Zionist Executive to form a Council to be composed of representatives of various Jewish organizations, provided that the non-Zionists will "not be more than half its total membership."<sup>1</sup>

The most important task ahead of Weizmann was to obtain the support of American Jewry, the real paymaster of the Zionist experiment. On February 17, 1924, a preliminary 'non-partisan' conference was held in New York under the chairmanship of Louis Marshall (1856-1929) and with Weizmann in attendance. Marshall, as President of the American Jewish Committee, was the leader of American Jewry. Again, on March 1, 1925, another 'non-partisan' conference was held in New York with Marshall as Chairman and Weizmann as the representative of the World Zionist Organization. The conference elected a committee "to bring about the creation and recognition of a Jewish Agency"<sup>2</sup> in which both the Zionists and non-Zionists shall each hold 50% of the seats on the Council and on the Executive Committee of the Agency. From among the non-Zionist members on the Council 40% were to be from American Jewry.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The resolution can be found in The New Palestine, September 7, 1923.

<sup>3</sup>Cohen, The Zionist Movement, pp.171-72.

<sup>2</sup>See pages 36-37. The Mandate had spoken of a Jewish Agency which was to be recognized as a public body to cooperate with the British Administration in Palestine. In 1925, Weizmann began to set up his formula and structure for the Jewish Agency in which he wanted to also include the non-Zionists.

XIV. Fourteenth Congress. - In August, 1925, the Fourteenth Zionist Congress met in Vienna. The proposed Jewish Agency was one of the principal subjects of discussion, and reports of the negotiations in New York and elsewhere were submitted for approval to the Congress which ratified the fifty-fifty principle of representation in the Enlarged Jewish Agency. The program of the Agency was to be based on the Mandate, and the Agency must follow certain 'inviolable principles' like increasing immigration, redeeming land, supporting agricultural colonization, and advocating Hebrew and Hebrew culture. These became known as the Vienna Resolutions. The Congress forwarded the Vienna Resolutions on the proposed extension of the Jewish Agency to the Colonial Office, and all subsequent Congresses also forwarded their resolutions to the Colonial Office.<sup>1</sup>

By 1925, the various opposition parties to the moderate General Zionists, of which Weizmann was a member, began to voice their demands. Dissatisfaction was strongest among the Mizrachi and Labour parties. Mizrachi complained that the Executive discouraged middle-class immigration and condemned the Executive's agricultural colonization policy. Ben-Gurion, speaking on behalf of the Labour Party in Palestine at the Fourteenth Congress, severely criticized Weizmann's policies and said that the building of the Jewish state was "only possible on the basis of a maximum number of workers and if you cannot comprehend that, woe to your Zionism!"<sup>2</sup> For the first time the newly formed extremist 'revisionist' Party under the leadership of Vladimir Jabotinsky<sup>3</sup> emerged to protest against the enlargement of the Jewish Agency. He advocated the return to Herzl's original conception of a Jewish state and always declared that the aim of Zionism was a Jewish

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<sup>1</sup>For further details on the Fourteenth Congress see Cohen, The Zionist Movement, pp.172-73 and Esco Foundation, I, 420-21.

<sup>2</sup>Barnet Litvinoff, Ben-Gurion of Israel (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954), p.93.

<sup>3</sup>Jabotinsky had resigned from the Executive in January, 1923, primarily because of his opposition to the Churchill White Paper of 1922.

state. All activity should be concentrated on attaining statehood in the shortest possible time. He also advocated that the Jewish state should stretch from the Nile to the Euphrates. He clamored for the formation of a Jewish armed force and wanted the Mandatory to promote Jewish immigration and colonization. Until 1929, Jabotinsky and his followers could be called extremists. After 1929, with the world economic depression and Hitler's Jewish policies, his party's "spirit became an integral part of Zionism in action: not a decisively influential part by any means, but a real part nonetheless," despite the fact that he was exiled from Palestine in 1929.<sup>1</sup> He refused to co-operate with the Arabs until the Jews were masters of Palestine.

Opposition to the Jewish Agency from the American Joint Distribution Committee delayed Weizmann's plan for another eighteen months until he himself went to the United States in October, 1926. The excuse Weizmann gave for the trip was a conference called to raise a large sum of money for Palestinian investment and was to be financed by Zionists and non-Zionists. The conference formed the Palestine Economic Corporation. It was hoped that many non-Zionists would contribute since the Corporation was for economic enterprise and not 'political' work.<sup>2</sup> While in America Weizmann negotiated an agreement with Marshall on January 17, 1927. Out of this agreement emerged the Joint Palestine Survey Commission to inspect and draw up a report on the economic resources and possibilities of Palestine with a view toward a long range plan to be carried out by the Jewish Agency.<sup>3</sup>

XV. Fifteenth Congress. - In August-September of 1927, in Basle, the Fifteenth Zionist Congress reaffirmed the Vienna Resolutions of

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<sup>1</sup>Christopher Sykes, Crossroads To Israel (Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., 1965), p.122. Cited hereafter as Sykes, Crossroads....

<sup>2</sup>Esco Foundation, I, 345-46.

<sup>3</sup>Cohen, The Zionist Movement, pp.173-74.

1925 and urged the Executive to continue its negotiations for an enlarged Jewish Agency. The Congress unconditionally laid down the principle that the President of the World Zionist Organization has to be President of the Enlarged Jewish Agency. In essence, it meant that he who controlled the World Zionist Organization controlled the Jewish Agency. The composition of the delegates indicated a weakening of the General Zionists and a strengthening of the Labourites. A change was made in the composition of the Palestine Executive by eliminating the Labour and Mizrahi parties and confining the Executive to three General Zionists - Frederick Kisch, Harry Sacher, and Henrietta Szold. Ostensibly, this structural change was made in an attempt to limit the expenditures of the Executive brought about by the economic depression in Palestine. It is more likely that Weizmann saw his opportunity to consolidate his power and limit the growing political power of the parties in Palestine, particularly the Labour Party. Ben-Gurion who was one of the chief Labour spokesmen was very critical of Weizmann's policies. Ben-Gurion wanted settlement, colonization, road-building etc., to continue no matter what the financial situation of the Zionist treasury was.<sup>1</sup>

During 1928, the Jewish Agency was constituted in its final form. In June, 1928, the Joint Palestine Survey Commission's long report was published which criticized the Palestine Administration for not facilitating Jewish immigration and colonization. It suggested that the Agricultural Department of the Zionist Executive should be reviewed and placed on sound economic principles under the direction of the Jewish Agency. In essence, this meant that the non-Zionists participating in the Jewish Agency would be backing the political program of the Zionists for the close agricultural colonization of the land. It recommended the strengthening of the existing Zionist funds in the interim period before the Jewish Agency could be established, which

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp.174-75, Litvinoff, pp.98-99 and Esco Foundation, I, 422-24.

meant the previously established Zionist funds would dominate the field of activities. The report was approved by the General Council of the Zionist Organization at its meeting in Berlin in July, 1928, but stipulated that five principles must form the basic tenets of the Agency's activities: (1) all lands acquired must adhere to the principles of the Jewish National Fund; (2) settlers should be free to choose their own form of settlement; (3) Jewish immigration should be furthered; (4) the principle of Jewish labor must be followed in all the Agency's works; and (5) Hebrew language and culture should be developed. These five principles amounted to a disguised endorsement of the over-all Zionist program. In October, Marshall convened a conference of some of the leaders of the American Jewish community. They accepted the Commission's report "as a basis for common action between the American Jewish community and the Zionist Organization." A committee was formed to appoint the forty-four American non-Zionist members to the Council and to adjust any differences with the Zionist Executive. The General Council concurred with the agreements made with the American non-Zionists and authorized the Executive to establish the Agency at the earliest possible moment following the Sixteenth Congress.<sup>1</sup>

XVI. Sixteenth Congress. - The Sixteenth Congress met in Zurich in the summer of 1929, and ratified the agreements and provisions for an extended Jewish Agency after a heated debate by the Radicals and the Revisionists. Labour representation under Chaim Arlosoroff increased and shifted its support in favor of Weizmann's policies. The General Zionist position showed a decrease in the number of delegates. The Congress elected the officers of the Zionist Executive with Weizmann as President of the Organization, and then adjourned.<sup>2</sup>

Immediately after the Sixteenth Congress Weizmann opened the

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<sup>1</sup>Cohen, The Zionist Movement, pp.175-77.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.177 and Esco Foundation, I, 424-25.

Constituent Assembly of the Jewish Agency amidst great fanfare. The Protocol creating the Agency was signed the same day as the Congress ended, August 11th. The final agreement, later called the Zurich Accord, was signed on the 14th of August between the Zionists and the non-Zionists. In the future it became the practice to convene a meeting of the Council of the Jewish Agency immediately after each Zionist Congress which then considered the resolutions and decisions of the Zionist Congress.<sup>1</sup>

The structure of the Jewish Agency resembled that of the World Zionist Organization. The constitution of the Agency reaffirmed the five principles which had been approved by the Zionist General Council in July, 1928. In reality, these five principles were just another way of restating Zionist policies of immigration, Hebrew, agricultural colonization and the acquisition of land under the name of the Jewish National Fund. The Keren Hayesod which was already Zionist controlled was to be the main financial instrument for the Jewish Agency to cover its expenditures. The constitution also stipulated that the Agency was to have three governing bodies and on each the membership was to be split half and half between the Zionists and the non-Zionists. The Council was to have 200 members and the Administrative Committee forty, while the Executive was to be small with four members. The head office of the Agency was to be in Jerusalem with a branch in London; however, the London office was under the direction of the President who also was President of the Zionist Organization. The President of the Zionist Organization was to be President of the Jewish Agency unless three-fourths of the Council objected; this stipulation was to allay non-Zionist fears but, in reality, could never occur since the Zionists would have voted as one body of 100 votes. Weizmann was elected President of the Jewish Agency with Louis Marshall as Chairman of the Council, Lord Melchett (1868-1930) as Associate-Chairman, and Felix Warburg (1871-1937) as

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<sup>1</sup>Cohen, The Zionist Movement, pp.177-78.

Chairman of the Administrative Committee. On August 6, 1930, the Colonial Office notified the Executive of the World Zionist Organization of its formal recognition of the Jewish Agency.<sup>1</sup>

The achievement of establishing a Jewish Agency was to a large extent illusory. Marshall and Weizmann were the principal negotiators. The <sup>'non-Zionist'</sup> organizations which the Zionists claimed had joined, never held referendums. Weizmann and his colleagues had no intention of allowing the non-Zionists to run or even influence their Zionist policies and saw to it that Zionists held the key positions. Among the top four officers the only non-Zionist was Marshall, the mainstay of the non-Zionist participation in the Agency, who died on September 11, 1929, thus leaving no strong non-Zionist to take his place.<sup>2</sup> The structure of the Agency so closely resembled that of the Zionist Organization that it was easy for the Zionists to step in and take over from their corresponding positions in the Zionist structure. As the non-Zionists resigned or died off, Weizmann as President of the Agency arranged it so that Zionists posing under the guise of non-Zionists filled these posts.<sup>3</sup>

The purpose of creating the Jewish Agency was for those Jews who objected to the political platform of Zionism to join with their co-religionists in non-political and cultural activities involving Palestine. Supposedly, the Zionist Organization transferred "its right to undertake any political action, ... to the Jewish Agency which henceforth became the only political factor in respect of Palestine, as defined in Article 4 of the Mandate."<sup>4</sup> The Zionists had even obtained a guarantee from the British Government that "should the partnership between the Zionists and non-Zionists dissolve, the

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp.179-80, Sykes, Crossroads..., p.104 and Esco Foundation, I, 426.

<sup>2</sup>Felix Warburg was considered to be a non-Zionist member of the Jewish Agency. In actual fact, he had been converted to Zionism following a trip to Palestine. In 1930, he resigned with Weizmann. See Taylor, p.46.

<sup>3</sup>Berger, The Jewish Dilemma, p.157.

<sup>4</sup>Rabinowcz, p.41.



Zionist Organization alone would be recognized as the Jewish Agency."<sup>1</sup> The Jewish Agency, now fortified in its claims to speak for all Jews, became a facade for the Zionist Organization. The Jewish Agency was a function of the world-wide Zionist Organization; it maintained an elaborate and costly administrative apparatus to serve as a link with the Diaspora and to act as a Jewish Government within Palestine. Generally, the Agency became the instrument for handling immigration, settlement schemes, and economic projects, but its main task was to raise money for the Jewish National Fund (Keren Kayemeth) and for the Palestine Foundation Fund (Keren Hayesod). The non-Zionists had committed themselves to the Zurich Accord without making the distribution of functions clear-cut and had deceived themselves into thinking that these funds were for non-political purposes when, in actual fact, these funds and their projects were part of an overall and well-thought out plan for a Jewish state. The vast sums of money that Zionists had hoped to raise did not materialize. From 1930 to 1938, only \$12,137,000 were raised in America which was "less than the sums collected by these funds in the nine years preceding the establishment of the Agency."<sup>2</sup> Part of this was due to the 'great economic depression', and part was due to the Agency's decline <sup>in popularity</sup> because of the Zionist takeover and subsequent misuse of the term non-Zionist. Ten years after the creation of the Jewish Agency, non-Zionist participation had lost its equal position and after the outbreak of the Second World War, the Joint Council was inactive. The World Zionist Organization continued to speak in the name of the Jewish Agency and by implication involved the non-Zionists in their activities.<sup>3</sup>

The disturbances of 1929, which started with a Jewish religious

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<sup>1</sup>Taylor, p.47.

<sup>2</sup>Samuel Halperin, The Political World of American Zionism, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1961), p.195.

<sup>3</sup>For Further information on the Jewish Agency see Cohen, The Zionist Movement, pp.177-81 and Sykes, Crossroads..., pp.102-105.

screen placed before the Wailing Wall in August, 1928, and led to the White Paper of 1930, which in turn led to the MacDonald 'Black Paper', signified deeper troubles than the British would admit. Sir Herbert Samuel served as High Commissioner from July, 1920 to June, 1925, and Lord Plumer held office from 1925 to July, 1928. Sir John Chancellor, the third High Commissioner, served from November, 1928 to July, 1931. The troubles of 1928 and 1929 brought to Palestine a Commission of Inquiry under the Chairmanship of Sir Walter Shaw to investigate only the troubles but not to extend its inquiries to questions of major policy. The Commission sat as a public Court of Enquiry. It soon became evident to the members of the Shaw Commission that the riots were caused by an apprehensive feeling on the part of the Arabs over Zionist economic and immigration policies and over Jewish political aspirations; besides, the consistent refusal of the Zionists to discuss a parliamentary government<sup>or Legislative Council for Palestine.</sup> On March 31, 1930, the Shaw Commission Report was promulgated and recommended "that the British Government should issue a clear statement of policy," defining the rights of the non-Jewish communities; that it should strengthen its control over Jewish immigration; that all eviction of tenants should be checked until a land survey could be made; that the armed forces and police should be kept at appropriate strength; and that,

... as regards the Zionist Organization the Government should reaffirm the statement made in 1922 that the Organization's special position did not entitle it to share in any degree in the Government of Palestine. That the Government should if possible lay down some precise definition of the meaning of Article 4 of the Palestine Mandate.<sup>1</sup>

On April 3, 1930, Ramsay MacDonald, the Prime Minister, made a statement of policy in the House of Commons as a result of Zionist pressure in which he said, "His Majesty's Government will continue to administer Palestine in accordance with the terms of the Mandate as approved by the League of Nations. That is an international obligation

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<sup>1</sup>For the Shaw Commission's recommendations see Great Britain and Palestine, p.47.

from which there can be no receding."<sup>1</sup> In May, 1930, Sir John Hope Simpson was appointed as Government Commissioner to go to Palestine and inquire into land settlement, immigration and development. Until his report was ready, all Jewish immigration was temporarily suspended. In October, 1930, simultaneously with a Government Statement of Policy known as the Passfield White Paper, the Simpson Report was published. The Passfield White Paper stressed 'equality of obligation':

Attempts have been made to argue in support of Zionist claims that the principal feature of the Mandate is the passage regarding the Jewish National Home and that the passages designed to safeguard the rights of the non-Jewish community are merely secondary considerations qualifying to some extent what is claimed to be the primary object for which the Mandatory had been framed. This is a conception which His Majesty's Government have always regarded as totally erroneous.<sup>2</sup>

To both documents the Jews objected. Weizmann decided to bring all the pressures he could against the Passfield White Paper, and he announced his formal resignation from the Presidency of the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency in protest over the White Paper. Later, other colleagues of Weizmann's resigned. So great was the outcry from Zionists everywhere and members of the Opposition in Parliament that on February 13, 1931, the Prime Minister felt obliged to write a letter (known as the 'Black Letter')<sup>3</sup> to Weizmann repudiating any intentions of the British Government going back on its Mandatory obligations. Weizmann declared that "this statement of policy... has, in my opinion, re-established the basis for that co-operation with the Mandatory Power on which our policy is founded."<sup>4</sup> After this period the relations between the Jews and the Arabs deteriorated. Each side was extremely suspicious of the other. On the Zionist side a calculated and totally one-sided propaganda took over which was aimed at establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. The extremists were beginning to influence the policies and decisions of the Zionist

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<sup>1</sup> Cohen, The Zionist Movement, pp.190-91.

<sup>2</sup> Sykes, Crossroads..., p.116.

<sup>3</sup> The Arabs referred to the MacDonald Letter as the 'Black Letter'.

<sup>4</sup> Great Britain and Palestine, p. 83.

Organization, and Weizmann was discredited in their eyes for accepting the MacDonald Letter instead of a White Paper.

XVII. Seventeenth Congress. - At the Seventeenth Congress, held in Basle from June 30th to July 15th, 1931, witnessed the growing strength and opposition of the extremist groups to Weizmann's policies. The extremists consisted of the Radicals, the Revisionists and some of the Labour leaders, like Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi. The Shaw and Simpson Reports as well as the MacDonald Letter were the main basis of discussion at the Congress. Weizmann and his supporters were severely criticized for their so-called conciliatory position towards Great Britain because Weizmann had accepted Prime Minister MacDonald's Letter instead of a White Paper. Weizmann was also criticized for bringing the non-Zionists into the task of reconstructing the National Home when the non-Zionists had failed to raise the large sums of money Weizmann had promised. Weizmann defended his position and policy of moderate Zionism despite the attacks of his opponents.<sup>1</sup>

The tide had turned against Weizmann's leadership. Although Weizmann in protest against the Passfield White Paper had tendered his formal resignation in October, 1930, the General Council of the Jewish Agency had requested him to continue in his duties until the next Congress. The Revisionists with Mizrahi support had a resolution of no confidence brought before the Congress. Weizmann resigned after receiving a vote of no confidence from the delegates. The Congress elected Sokolow, one of Weizmann's closest associates, as the President along with a coalition Executive. The shift in the Presidency from Weizmann to Sokolow did not mean a change in policy, and Weizmann was still at the helm although he had been defeated.<sup>2</sup> Frederick Kisch who was Chairman of the Palestine Executive since 1923 resigned because he felt that, "the opportunities for effective cooperation between the Agency and the Government in the application of the Mandate had been very much reduced"<sup>3</sup> during the last year. Chaim Arlosoroff was elected Chairman and Director of the Political Department of the Palestine Executive.

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<sup>1</sup>Cohen, The Zionist Movement, pp.199-200 and Esco Foundation, II, 742-49.

<sup>2</sup>This was a tactic employed by Weizmann not only to signify his protest against the Passfield White Paper but also to ride out the growing extremist opinion within the Zionist ranks, until the time was opportune for him to be elected to the Presidency.

<sup>3</sup>Frederick H. Kisch, Palestine Diary (London: Victor Gollencz, Ltd., 1938), p. 434.

XVIII. Eighteenth Congress. - The Eighteenth Congress was held in Prague at the end of the summer of 1933, and was concerned with the anti-Semitic policies of Hitler, the growing extremist strength, and the economic depression in the world. The Congress appealed to Great Britain to save German Jewry by opening the gates of Palestine to Jewish immigration. This plea was to increase in fervor as Hitler's policies became more apparent. The Zionists developed their plea into a matter of instilling into the British officials and public a feeling of moral guilt for not securing European Jewry a safe homeland. In an effort to check the unauthorized activities of the Revisionists, the Congress passed "a resolution affirming that in all Zionist questions membership of the Zionist Organization entailed a duty of discipline in regard to its constitution and regulations, which took precedence over any duty of discipline in relation to any other body."<sup>1</sup> The growing extremist strength alarmed the General Zionists and Labour leaders. The Revisionists who had forty-five delegates wanted a representative on the Zionist Executive. However, the General Zionists preferred to work with the Labour Party<sup>2</sup> because under Arlosoroff's guidance the Labour Party had backed Weizmann's policies since 1929. The Labour Party had the largest representation at the Congress numbering 138 delegates out of 318 and secured 40% of the seats on the Zionist Executive. Sokolow was re-elected President of the Zionist Organization. Due to the world depression the Palestine budget was reduced to £ 175,000, the lowest budget in years.<sup>3</sup>

Between 1933 and the next Congress in 1935, several events happened which directly or indirectly affected the Zionist Organization. In 1933, an Arab rising occurred which was directed against the British; an event which foreshadowed greater disturbances to come in 1936 and 1938.

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<sup>1</sup> Cohen, The Zionist Movement, p. 200.

<sup>2</sup> Chaim Arlosoroff was the leader of the Labour Party and editor of Achdut Haavodah, in which he had severely criticized the Revisionists and had earned their wrath. At the 1931 Congress he had been elected to the Zionist Executive and was given the Chairmanship of the Palestine Executive along with the political portfolio in the Palestine Executive. In the summer of 1933, just before the Eighteenth Congress, Arlosoroff was assassinated. The Revisionists were blamed for the murder. As a direct result of his murder friction developed between the Revisionists on one hand and the Labour movement and Histadrut on the other. Moshe Shertok succeeded Arlosoroff as head of the Labour Party in 1933.

<sup>3</sup> For further details of the Eighteenth Congress see Cohen, The Zionist Movement, pp. 199-200 and Esco Foundation, II, 769-70.

In April, 1935, Jabotinsky and his supporters withdrew from the Zionist Organization in protest against a brief clause printed on each Shekel by the Executive in an attempt to impose greater discipline on its members. The Revisionists boycotted the Nineteenth Congress and shortly after formed their own rival organization called the 'The New Zionist Organization'.

XIX. Nineteenth Congress. - Chaim Weizmann was re-elected President of the Zionist Organization at the Nineteenth Congress which convened in Lucerne from August 20 to September 3, 1935. Ben-Gurion was appointed as President of the Palestine Executive and/or the Palestinian Jewish Agency, which made him the practical leader of the movement in Palestine, with Weizmann conducting relations with the Mandatory and with Diaspora Jewry. Weizmann urged the delegates not to adopt extreme resolutions which might embarrass the British Government because "We do not have too many friends, and the British government is the only one that has enabled us to develop Palestine."<sup>1</sup> A strong appeal was made to the Mandatory for "close settlement of the Jews on the land, for greatly increased immigration schedules, and for the extension in the number of Jewish workers in public and municipal works and in the Government service". The budget was double that of the preceding Congress. A resolution was passed condemning the idea of a Legislative Council <sup>for Palestine</sup> /as "contrary to the spirit of the Mandate" but, in actual fact, the Jews opposed the Legislative Council because it meant the imposition of the status quo and the cessation of Jewish immigration. Before the Congress adjourned, Sokolow was made Honorary President of the Zionist Organization in recognition of his valuable services. In 1936, Sokolow passed away.<sup>2</sup>

The years from 1935 to 1939 saw the decline of Great Britain's influence in Palestine. A second world war was clearly emerging in Europe, and Hitler's anti-Semitic policies were a constant source of

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<sup>1</sup>Litvinoff, p.115.

<sup>2</sup>Cohen, The Zionist Movement, pp.201-203 and Sykes, Crossroads..., p.144.

pressure on the British Government from Zionists. Parliamentary criticism made it difficult for the Palestine Administration to deal with extensive illegal immigration and with the Jewish community. Twice a year a survey had to be made of the Jewish labour class, and certificates were issued based on the maximum number of immigrants it appeared could be maintained for the next six months. This meant that every six months the Jewish Agency criticized and rejected the Palestine Administration's facts and used its pressure in Parliament to increase the immigration schedules.<sup>1</sup> The Administration's position was exasperating because it was bound to accept the Jewish Agency's co-operation and was tied to the Colonial Office's instructions. Whitehall was not in Palestine trying to keep law and order. By now the Zionists had declared an unofficial policy of non-cooperation with the Mandatory in all fields save when it was politically expedient for them to participate with the Palestine Administration or with the forthcoming Royal Commission in 1936. Likewise, the Zionist press had condemned "a policy of conciliating the Arab leaders at the expense of the Jewish National Home",<sup>2</sup> which in their minds meant the reduction of immigration, the control over land sales, and the creation of a Legislative Council <sup>for Palestine.</sup> The Arabs were increasingly becoming restless because Zionist influence in Whitehall had negated the recommendations made in the Commission Reports of 1921 and 1930. Elsewhere in the Middle East, Arab Governments were emerging from mandated territories. Jewish immigration was highest in 1935. As a result Arab anxiety intensified, and a growing fear developed over the possible subordination of Arab language, culture and population. A feeling of frustration and helplessness to prevent the Zionists from purchasing Palestine piece by piece through the Jewish National Fund increased. In the fall of 1935, what started as a strike by Arab dock-workers in Jaffa against the importation of illegal Jewish arms spread to a full-scale revolt in 1936. A Royal Commission under the leadership of Lord Peel was sent to visit

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<sup>1</sup>Barbour, p.152 and Sykes, Crossroads..., pp.146-47.

<sup>2</sup>Barbour, p.160.

Palestine in the fall of 1936; its report (popularly known as the Peel Report) was published along with a White Paper on July 7, 1937. The Arabs had refused to cooperate with the Commission until the last week because they regarded it as an affront. The Report accused Zionist activities as being the underlying causes for the disorders and recommended the tripartite division of Palestine; it went as far as suggesting frontiers.<sup>1</sup> In the White Paper of 1937 the Government declared that it was satisfied with the partition scheme and hoped it offered a solution for the present deadlock. At the Twentieth Congress (1937) the Zionists agreed to the partition proposal as the best method of eventually achieving a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine, but the Arabs rejected it. For the first time the Report acknowledged that the Mandate could be interpreted as intended to prepare for the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine, an interpretation which the Arabs had maintained all along. The British Government, tiring of the Palestine situation, accepted the Royal Commission's conclusions that the Mandate was impracticable as a basis for administration.<sup>2</sup> The 1936 disorders had only resulted in the favor of the Zionists who had been officially armed as supernumerary police and who had obtained permission to construct a Jewish port at Tel-Aviv.

XX. Twentieth Congress. - At the Twentieth Congress, which convened in Zurich in August, 1937, the Peel Commission's Report was discussed in detail, and finally the Congress agreed to accept the partition plan in principle but found the partition scheme put forward by the Royal Commission unacceptable. The Executive was to enter into negotiations with His Majesty's Government to secure more favorable terms "for the proposed establishment of a Jewish State." No final decision was to be taken by the Executive without the consent of a newly elected Congress. Weizmann made this maneuver to conditionally accept the Peel Report so that negotiations would continue while he

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<sup>1</sup>For details of the Peel Report see Great Britain and Palestine, pp.98-99 and Sykes, Crossroads..., pp.167-69.

<sup>2</sup>Barbour, pp.175-78.



strengthened the Zionist position.<sup>1</sup> Ussishkin led the opposition to the partition plan and wanted a Jewish state in the whole of Palestine not in a part of it. Ben-Gurion commenting later on the Congress resolution said, "The debate has not been for or against the indivisibility of Eretz Israel. No Zionist can forgo the smallest portion of Eretz Israel. The debate was over which of two routes would lead quicker to the common goal."<sup>2</sup> The Congress felt that the Mandate was workable, since the Mandatory had assisted them so far in their plans, and appealed to the British Government not to fix limitations on Jewish immigration. Since partition had been suggested and might eventually occur, it was decided to systematically purchase strategic locations so as to gain more land. Meanwhile, until this land purchasing policy was carried out, the Zionists would refuse to consent to partition in any form. Weizmann and the Executive were re-elected.<sup>3</sup>

The intervening years between the Twentieth and Twenty-first Congresses marked a change in British policy toward Palestine due to Arab resistance. By the end of September, 1937, the period following the Peel Report was over. Arab resistance again flared up, but this time the armed rebellion was widespread and continued until 1939. The Palestine Administration began a policy of coercion against the Arab Higher Committee and the Muslim Supreme Council by arresting their members and deporting them to the Seychelles with the exception of Haj Amin el-Husseini, the leader of the Muslim Supreme Council, who escaped to Lebanon. As a result of these policies all responsible political leadership of the Arabs was destroyed. Sir Arthur Wauchope, the High Commissioner resigned after serving from November, 1931, and Sir Harold MacMichael who was appointed High Commissioner in his place assumed his duties on March 2, 1938. A technical commission under the chairmanship of Sir John Woodhead was sent to Palestine in the spring of 1938 to work out a detailed partition plan on the basis of the Peel

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<sup>1</sup>Sykes, Crossroads..., p.173.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.174.

<sup>3</sup>For information on the Twentieth Congress see Cohen, The Zionist Movement, pp.213-15 and Esco Foundation, II, 853-56.

Report but with the liberty to suggest modifications in boundaries. In November, the Woodhead Report concluded that it could not suggest a practical partition plan which would not do injustice to either Jews or Arabs and therefore rejected the idea of partition. The White Paper issued at the same time discarded the idea of partition due to the financial and political problems and declared the intention of inviting representatives of the Jewish and Arab communities without the Mufti to a conference in London. At the London Round Table Conference in February and March, 1939, the British seemed to be working for a compromise between the Jews and the Arabs. Their actual aim was to maintain peace and British rule in Palestine by making their *raison d'etre* apparent; namely, that a compromise between the two communities was not in sight. A policy of 'appeasement' towards the rebellious Arabs in Palestine was necessitated by the unambiguous signs of the coming war in Europe.<sup>1</sup>

### C. The Road to Statehood

1939 proved to be an eventful year for the World Zionist Organization. It was not so much the outbreak of World War II which affected the Zionist Organization, but the White Paper issued by the British Government on May 17, 1939, which came like an exploding shell over a relationship already creaking at the seams. Consequently, the World Zionist Organization had to re-evaluate its political program and aims. Organizational changes were initiated which would further the political objectives of the Zionist movement. In essence, the White Paper declared that Palestine should not become a Jewish or an Arab state nor was it to be partitioned. Within ten years, the British Government hoped to establish an 'independent Palestine State'. During the transitional period Jewish immigration would be limited to 75,000 for five years, after which no more immigration was to be allowed without Arab consent. The White Paper put aside the establishment

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<sup>1</sup>Sykes, Crossroads..., pp.179-200 passim and Cohen, The Zionist Movement, pp.217-22.

of the National Home for the time being and determined British policy for the remaining Mandate years. The Zionists were outraged by the White Paper because they claimed Great Britain had promised 'a national home for the Jewish people' in Palestine, which they understood to mean a Jewish majority and a Jewish state in Palestine; an impression irrevocably confirmed by the Peel Commission's Partition Plan.<sup>1</sup>

XXI. Twenty-first Congress. - In August, 1939, the Twenty-first Zionist Congress convened in Geneva. It was clear to most delegates that the second world war was approaching and that the White Paper was unacceptable. Weizmann announced in his inaugural speech to the Congress that:

In this solemn hour I am reluctantly compelled to say that the British Government has gone back on its promise. ...We have not deserved this treatment... An international obligation to the Jews in regard to a sacred land, undertaken before the whole civilised world, cannot be unilaterally destroyed, least of all by a nation like Great Britain. ... Yet, in its new policy the present British Government has taken upon itself not only to go back upon its promise of support, but actually to try to bring to a standstill the great historic process of the return of Israel and rebuilding of Palestine, which began long before the country came under British rule, ... We must and shall defend our lives, our rights, our work, with all the strength at our disposal.<sup>2</sup>

Weizmann did not believe the Zionist Organization and the British Government had parted ways and felt there was still room for negotiation. A vocal number of the delegates felt otherwise. On the subject of future Zionist policy Ben-Gurion declared, "For us the White Paper neither exists nor can exist. We must behave as if we were the State in Palestine until we actually become the State in Palestine."<sup>3</sup> This speech signaled a switch in Zionist thinking in the Diaspora from

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<sup>1</sup>After the issuance of the Peel Report Weizmann declared, "Instead of being a minority in Palestine we would be a majority in our own State." See Weizmann, p.475.

<sup>2</sup>Cohen, The Zionist Movement, p.224.

<sup>3</sup>Barbour, p.206.

seeking the support of Great Britain as the Gentile nation to back the Jewish National Home to pressuring the United States as the other large Western power for that support. The Zionist Congress set up an 'Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs' in New York City which if the war situation deteriorated could "be called upon to assume full authority and functions of Zionist leadership"; later, the word 'American' was prefixed to the title.<sup>1</sup> The Congress rejected the 1939 White Paper and welcomed the decision of the Mandates Commission that "the White Paper was not in accordance with the Mandate."<sup>2</sup> Weizmann was re-elected to the Presidency of the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency. Ben-Gurion remained as head of the Jewish Agency in Palestine i.e. he headed the Executive of the World Zionist Organization in Palestine. By 1939, the Jewish Agency had been converted to an exclusively Zionist body. The next Congress was not to meet again until after the war in 1946. Ben-Gurion's position in Palestine meant that he would be running the show in Palestine against the British.<sup>3</sup>

Following the 1939 White Paper, a reorientation in Zionist policy took place, led by members of the Palestine Executive. Weizmann, who represented the older breed of European Jews seeking moderation, was discredited for basing his whole political program upon Jewish-British cooperation. Ben-Gurion represented the impatient and militant younger generation of Palestinian Jews. According to Ben-Gurion differences between Weizmann and himself were greatest after the 1939 White Paper.<sup>4</sup>

Ben-Gurion played a leading role in reformulating Zionist

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<sup>1</sup> Halperin, p.268.

<sup>2</sup> Cohen, The Zionist Movement, p.225.

<sup>3</sup> For further details of the Twenty-first Congress see Ibid., pp.223-26 and Esco Foundation, II, 928-31.

<sup>4</sup> Moshe Pearlman, Ben-Gurion Looks Back (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), p.64 and Esco Foundation, II, 1014 and 1080.

policy vis-a vis the great powers. The first step was to change their center of political concentration from England to America. It seemed that the imperial power of Britain was on the decline. If the United States entered the war, it was possible she might emerge as the leader of the West with her huge financial resources.<sup>1</sup> In 1939, the 'Emergency Committee For Zionist Affairs' was established in New York under the leadership of Rabbis Stephan Wise and Abba Hillel Silver, followers of Ben-Gurion, to coordinate fund raising and to promote 'the National Home'. Its name was soon changed to the 'American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs', and later its name was again changed to the 'American Zionist Emergency Council'. This Council became the instrument of the Jewish Agency for propagandizing Ben-Gurion's more militant Zionist cause in America. In 1941, Weizmann made a trip to America to stir up Zionist and non-Zionist feeling against the White Paper and to stimulate the raising of large funds. Although Weizmann commanded the respect of American Jews, his diplomacy was not as successful as Ben-Gurion's. Weizmann still preached a policy of moderation, but the war time situation was not conducive to moderation. The American Zionist Emergency Council had been so constructed that it appeared that American Jews were the center and sponsors of Zionist policy (i.e. Ben-Gurion's policy). Due to the war an international Zionist Congress could not be immediately called to decide on the policies and issues at hand. For this purpose the American Zionist Emergency Council called for an 'extraordinary conference of American, European and Palestinian Zionists' which assembled at the Biltmore Hotel in New York City in May, 1942.<sup>2</sup>

At the conference, commonly called the Biltmore Conference after the name of the hotel where the delegates gathered, the three leading Zionists -- Weizmann, Ben-Gurion and Nahum Goldmann -- addressed

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<sup>1</sup>Taylor, p.77.

<sup>2</sup>Sykes, Crossroads ..., pp.235-37.

the representatives. Weizmann urged a continuation of negotiations with the British Government for the cessation of the White Paper, for the gradual immigration of Jewish refugees, and for the creation of a Jewish army. Nahum Goldmann stressed the international implications and wanted to bring Russian Jewry into the Zionist program. Ben-Gurion argued for an abrupt change in Zionist policy bringing in thousands of Jewish refugees immediately and forcing England to acquiesce to the Zionist plans for a Jewish state in all of Palestine. At the conference Ben-Gurion cleverly won the delegates over to his policy. The Biltmore Program which embodied the final resolutions of the conference called for the repudiation of the 1939 White Paper, the creation of a Jewish army, the abolition of restrictions on land sales, and the investiture of the Jewish Agency "with control on immigration into Palestine and with the necessary authority for upbuilding the country,... and that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated in the structure of the new democratic world."<sup>1</sup> A Jewish Commonwealth was another way of saying that the Zionists wanted a Jewish state; however, there "was an implicit assertion that Transjordan should not have been excluded from the scope of Jewish development."<sup>2</sup> The Mandatory was simply to keep order during the interim period while the Jewish Agency rapidly developed the 'Commonwealth'. From now on the Zionist aim was clearly and publically spelled out. The struggle for statehood was to be pursued at all costs.

In November, 1942, the Biltmore Program was endorsed by the Zionist General Council in Jerusalem which in effect meant that the Biltmore Program became the official policy of Zionism. As a result of the Biltmore Program there occurred in the United States a great increase in Zionist activity designed to create a political power base from which the Zionists hoped to secure their objectives. First, the

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<sup>1</sup>For the Biltmore Program see Esco Foundation, II, 1084-85. For the discussions which took place at the Conference see Ibid., pp.1080-1088.

<sup>2</sup>Halpern, p.46.

Zionists directed their activity toward collecting and uniting as many Jewish organizations in America, which the Zionists had infiltrated, in order to secure mass support for a maximum Zionist program. In 1943, the American Zionist Emergency Council called a conference in Pittsburgh because it believed that 'closer' organization of American Jewry would greatly benefit the Zionist cause. The American Jewish Assembly or Conference was created by the Pittsburgh Conference which would claim in the future to speak for all American Jewry - by virtue of the 'membership organizations'. Second, Zionists sought to obtain the official support of the American Government. In 1943, a political bureau was opened in Washington by the Zionist Executive for the purpose of influencing the American Congress and President.<sup>1</sup> Many state legislatures passed pro-Zionist resolutions. An attempt to pass a resolution in both Houses of Congress in February, 1944, was unsuccessful. President Roosevelt made a public statement favorable to Zionist aspirations. In December, 1946, a resolution was adopted by Congress which committed the United States to a definite policy supporting Zionist aims. Roosevelt passed away, and Vice-President Truman assumed the Presidency. Truman was more sympathetic to Zionist aims and approached the British Government on Jewish immigration into Palestine.<sup>3</sup> The Executive of the World Zionist Organization kept a close watch on the developments in America, and particularly, on their efforts to dominate organized American Jewish life and to speak on behalf of 'the Jewish people' as a political legal entity.

Zionist policy in Palestine took on a much more militant aspect under the guidance of the Palestine Executive of the Jewish

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<sup>1</sup>Cohen, The Zionist Movement, p.273.

<sup>2</sup>Richard P. Stevens, American Zionism and U.S. Foreign Policy: 1942-1947 (New York: Pageant Press, 1962), passim.

<sup>3</sup>For details of these approaches and the Grady-Morrison Partition Plan see Sykes, Crossroads..., pp.264-311. passim.

Agency/World Zionist Organization. Throughout World War II there existed an uneasy and constant tension between the British police and the Zionists. No longer were the Zionists willing to cooperate with the Mandatory; they had decided to become a government unto themselves. Ben-Gurion had announced early in the war what his Zionist policy in Palestine would be, "We shall fight with Great Britain in this war as if there was no White Paper, and we shall fight the White Paper as if there was no war,"<sup>1</sup> The Palestinian Zionists wanted a Jewish armed force ostensibly to fight Hitler and in doing so hoped to persuade the British Government to nullify the 1939 White Paper. Once the war was over the Jewish Agency would have a trained fighting force to turn against the British or the Arabs in an attempt to establish by military means the Jewish National Home. Terrorist activity conducted particularly by the Stern Gang and the Irgum Zvai Leumi sought to compel the British to acceded to the Biltmore Program. Ben-Gurion stated that the importance of the Haganah was not only to meet physical danger but also "to give us greater freedom and independence in our settlement and development programme," that is, we could settle where we wanted and not where the British told us. The Haganah gave Jews a feeling of self-reliance.<sup>2</sup> In desperation at the Jewish situation in Europe Zionists everywhere were determined to bring in scores of illegal immigrants, contrary to the 1939 White Paper's policy. To accomplish this end, the Zionists did their best to embarrass the British Government internationally before her Allies in order to publically shame her into admitting more Jewish immigrants than the legal quota permitted. In this endeavor they succeeded, as well as smuggling other Jews into Palestine. However, "the fight against the White Paper could not fail to arouse British misgivings about the use to which the Jewish Agency would put a Jewish fighting force, and without British goodwill it was literally impossible to establish the

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p.204.

<sup>2</sup>Pearlman, p.58.



force."<sup>1</sup> In September, 1944, the British War Office decided to create a token Jewish Brigade Group to take part in the war. The Jewish Agency used the Brigade as a propaganda device and a special flag and insignia were designed.<sup>2</sup>

In the beginning of August, 1945, (1st to 13th), one week after the new Labour Government came to power in Great Britain, a World Zionist Conference met. The Conference condemned the 1939 White Paper, insisted on 100,000 Jewish immigration certificates immediately, and demanded an 'undivided and undiminished' Jewish State in Palestine, 'in accordance with the Balfour Declaration'. The Jewish Agency was to be allowed to bring in as many Jews as it saw fit and to develop the country.<sup>3</sup> These resolutions were endorsed at the Twenty-second Zionist Congress in 1946.

Between the 1945 Zionist Conference and the 1946 Zionist Congress, the American and British Governments agreed on certain unified policies in Palestine; namely, the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry and the Grady-Morrison Partition Plan, which were sympathetic to Zionist aims and needs. However, the Jewish Agency Executive condemned the Grady-Morrison Plan and decided not to participate in any conference in London concerning partition unless the British Government was willing to discuss the possibility of "a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine."<sup>4</sup>

XXII. Twenty-second Congress. - In December, 1946, the Twenty-second Zionist Congress, the first postwar Congress, assembled in Basle from the 9th to the 24th. Weizmann's policy of moderation was lost amidst the clamor of the new activists led by Ben-Gurion and backed by American Zionist leadership. The Congress rejected the Grady-Morrison Partition Plan and demanded a Jewish State in all of Palestine. The Congress decided not to participate in the forthcoming

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<sup>1</sup>Sykes, Crossroads..., p.228.

<sup>2</sup>Esco Foundation, II, 1934-35.

<sup>3</sup>Cohen, A Short History..., p.184 and John Marlowe, Rebellion in Palestine (London: The Cresset Press, 1946), pp.248-52.

<sup>4</sup>Cohen, A Short History..., p.190.

London Conference, but if the situation changed, the General Council could reconsider attendance. Weizmann had wanted the Zionist Organization to attend the London Conference, and now his policy was defeated. At the opening of the Congress Weizmann was re-elected President of the Congress, but at the end he was not re-elected to the Presidency of the Zionist Organization, "though out of respect for him the post was left vacant."<sup>1</sup> Ben-Gurion was re-elected as head of the Zionist Executive in Palestine; a position which made him effectual head and leader of the Zionist movement as well as being the leader of the largest political party in Palestine, the Mapai. Ben-Gurion did not want anyone elected as President of the World Zionist Organization who might interfere with his plans for establishing a Jewish State, so the position was left vacant. Abba Silver was appointed as head of the New York Bureau. Weizmann was ousted by a united front of the Mapai and the American delegates, who were led by Abba Silver. The task was easier since Weizmann was getting old, his eye sight was failing, and his stronghold had been among the East European delegates who were missing.<sup>2</sup>

Between 1946 and 1948 Ben-Gurion led the Zionist movement from Palestine. He formed a Jewish shadow cabinet which could step in and take over once the Mandatory left. International Zionist pressure was brought to bear on President Truman and on Prime Minister Attlee for Jewish Statehood. Terrorist activities and illegal immigration were well organized and sponsored 'unofficially' by the Zionist Organization. The fighting in Palestine backed by mass Zionist public opinion and support had a demoralizing effect on the Labour Government which in desperation submitted the Palestine issue to the United Nations. It is

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<sup>1</sup>Sykes, Crossroads..., p.307.

<sup>2</sup>For fuller details of the Twenty-second Congress see Ibid., pp.305-307, Weizmann, pp.543-44, and Cohen, A Short History..., pp.190-91.

beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in detail the United Nations decisions. A Special Committee on Palestine (U.N.S.C.O.P.) was appointed, and it recommended partition. On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations voted to partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. The Zionists wanted partition not only as a means to obtain a nucleus for their Jewish state but also as a means to obtain international status regardless of the territorial size. The Arabs objected vigorously to partition. Starting in the winter of 1947 and going through 1948, fighting took place between both sides. While the fighting was taking place, the Zionists slowly took over the social and administrative life along with the vacated British garrison posts. The British Mandate ended on May, 14, 1948, after thirty years of rule. A few hours later Ben-Gurion, as head of the Provisional Government, against the UN resolution stipulations, declared an independent State of Israel. The declaration of the State of Israel concerning Israel's relationship with the Diaspora read:

WE APPEAL to the Jewish people throughout the Diaspora to rally round the Jews of Eretz-Israel in the tasks of immigration and upbuilding and to stand by them in the great struggle for<sup>1</sup> the realization of the age-old dream -- the redemption of Israel.

Emphasis was placed on the phrase 'the Jewish people' in an effort to create a dual nationality status among Diaspora Jews, that is, those Jews not residing within the newly proclaimed State of Israel. Two major tasks confronted 'the Jewish people' who were expected to encourage immigration and to support the State both politically and financially. This unique relationship between Diaspora Jewry and the State with the World Zionist Organization serving as the link will be the subject of investigation in the next chapter.

The Proclamation of Israel's independence embodied part of the Biltmore Program which "was the first official declaration of Jewish statehood as Zionism's post-war aim."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Joseph Badi, Fundamental Laws of the State of Israel (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1961), p.10.

<sup>2</sup>Pearlman, p.112.

Zionism had thus succeeded in fifty-one years in establishing a Jewish State in Palestine. It had created a comprehensive program for the building up of the Nation. Hitler's anti-Semitism had only hastened the process toward the setting up of the State. Great Britain had been the Gentile nation that sponsored the establishment of the Jewish state, and, in the last years of the Mandate, United States pressure had been utilized to pressure the British Government and the United Nations General Assembly. On May 11, 1949, the State of Israel was admitted into the United Nations, thus fulfilling Herzl's desire that the Jews should take their place among the nations of the world.

### CHAPTER III

#### THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL

The relationship between the World Zionist Organization and the Government of the State of Israel is complicated and intricate. The Government of the State of Israel does not want the World Zionist Organization to appear as its arm and tool. In actual fact, the World Zionist Organization is subordinate to the State. The State wants the Zionist Organization to retain its 'public body' status which it had during the Mandate years. On independence this 'public body' status was legally terminated. If the 'public body' status is recognized, then the Zionist movement can continue to speak in the name of 'the Jewish people' as it attempted to do prior to the establishment of the State. The underlying reason for this is that the State is dependent upon Diaspora Jewry for its political and financial support. The State wants the World Zionist Organization to accomplish 'what it neither can nor may' outside of the limits of public international law and of formal diplomatic channels. In other words, the Zionist Organization is specifically designed and maintained by the State, to make all Jews agents of the State serving Israeli national interests - fiscal, political and public relations. 'The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel' declared that the 'ingathering of exiles' or the recruitment of Jewish immigrants is the mission of the State. Israeli legislation

has designated the Zionist Organization as its agent to implement this fundamental national policy through its branches and educational propaganda. This Declaration only states in part the national aims of the State which foremost include the right of speaking on behalf of 'the Jewish people' everywhere.

Israel is also in need of more financial backing than the members of the World Zionist Organization can raise. Therefore, in order to attract non-Zionist funds and financial support the State of Israel does not want the Zionist movement to appear as an arm of the Government. To achieve this end, a complicated and complex structure of interlocking directorates has been created so as to ~~confuse~~ the mind of the average Jew (Zionist and non-Zionist). This study will examine the Zionist Organization's structure, the relationship between the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency, and the Status Law (1952) and the Covenant. This chapter will endeavor to prove that the World Zionist Organization is, in actual fact, an arm of the Government of the State of Israel and serves to support that Government. Louis Lipsky, one of the leaders of American Zionism has said,

"Parties in Israel control their counterparts in the Diaspora. There are controls in the Jewish Agency which dominate the parties in the Diaspora. There are controls in the Government of Israel that fetter the Jewish Agency in the Diaspora as well as in Israel. It is an interlocking chain of controls to the last outpost of influence. One looks in vain to find provision for the freedom of the local group, or the individual, or the unattached, or the territorial division, in matters that directly concern them, where they live, where their Zionist life should be concentrated."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Elmer Berger, "The New Jew, The New Zionist, The Old Ten Percenter," Council News, XI, No. 9 (September, 1957), pp. 1-2. Cited hereafter as Berger, "The New Jew, ...".

### A. The Structure of the World Zionist Organization

The World Zionist Organization has an elaborate structure performing some of the functions of a state. It has three branches: an Executive, a Legislative, and a Judiciary; however, these do not have separate and independent functions. The central purpose of achieving Zionist aims pervades the entire structure, and the branches of the movement are set up accordingly. In 1897, Herzl laid down the basic structure of the Zionist movement, and changes were made in the Constitution in 1901, and again in 1921.<sup>1</sup> Following independence, a new constitution was proposed at the Twenty-third Zionist Congress (1951) but was rejected by the majority of the delegates. In 1959, a new constitution was adopted.<sup>2</sup>

The World Zionist Organization has always been reluctant to divulge any information on its structure. A study will be made here of the Organization's structure prior to 1948 in order to see the functions it performed towards establishing the State. After 1948, the relationship changed, but the appearance of the World Zionist Organization remained the same.

The basic structure of the World Zionist Organization is the World Zionist Congress which consists of Territorial Federations and Separate Unions. Territorial Federations are located in those countries

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<sup>1</sup>For the 1921 Constitution see Moses Lasky, Between Truth and Repose (The American Council for Judaism, 1956), pp. 6-10.

<sup>2</sup>For the 1959 Constitution see Reports of the Executive of the Zionist Organization and the Executive of the Jewish Agency, January 1956 - March 1960, Submitted to the Twenty-fifth Zionist Congress in Jerusalem - December, 1960 (Jerusalem, The Jewish Agency, December, 1960), pp. 601-625. Cited hereafter as Reports ... December, 1960.

with large Jewish populations, and moderate Zionists, called General Zionists, are usually members of such a Federation. In 1950, there were twenty-nine Zionist Federations located throughout the world; fourteen in Europe, nine in the Americas, five in Africa, and one for Australia and New Zealand.<sup>1</sup> Separate Unions are special supra-national groups organized on factional lines and subscribing to a definite social, religious or political principle within the Zionist movement. Examples of Separate Unions include: The Palestine Labour Party (Mapai), the Mizrachi, the Poele Zion, Hashomer Hatzair, the Jewish State Party, the Mapam. In 1921, the necessary membership in order to constitute a Separate Union was raised from 3,000 to 20,000.<sup>2</sup> These political parties reflect the diversity of opinion in the Jewish world. They influence the decisions at the Zionist Congresses and hence, influence the policies of the World Zionist Organization.

A proportional representation system is followed at the Congresses, and seats on the General Council are allocated according to the number of delegates from each party, including the General Zionists. Elections to the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament, are also based on a proportional representation system, thus carrying over the tradition started by the early Zionists who came from Eastern Europe, the Balkans and Germany where such a system was the fashion.

In those countries with substantial Jewish populations, what is called a United Territorial Federation is supreme organizationally over the

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<sup>1</sup>Cohen, A Short History..., p. 263.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.91.



Territorial Federation and Separate Unions. It is the "Primary organization which comprises all Zionists, controls all local Zionist institutions and funds, and carries out all Zionist work in the country."<sup>1</sup> In 1935, the Congress called for the creation of United Territorial Federations, but it was not until the London Conference in 1945, with the resolutions to expand and strengthen the Zionist Organization,<sup>2</sup> that work commenced to create these United Federations. The largest United Federation is the Zionist Organization of America (Z.O.A.) which by its very name is a multi-party organization. In countries or neighborhoods where there is a small Jewish population, local societies have been set up according to the stipulations of the World Zionist Constitution and are affiliated with the Territorial Organization. Beside the Territorial Federations and Separate Unions there are other affiliated bodies with the Zionist Organization like the Women's International Zionist Organization (W.I.Z.O.), which in America is called Hadassah.<sup>3</sup>

The constitutions of all the United Territorial Federations are in accord with the World Zionist Organization's constitution, and hence are all working toward fulfilling the goals of the Basle Program. Every member of a local society or Territorial Federation is automatically a member of the World Zionist Organization because he pays the shekel which makes him eligible to vote for a delegate to the World Zionist Congress.

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<sup>1</sup>Sophie A. Udin (ed.), The Palestine Year Book 5706-7, Vol. II: Review of Events: July 1945 to September 25, 1946 (New York: Zionist Organization of America, 1946), p.417.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Cohen, A Short History..., pp. 88-94 and 263-66 and Lasky, p.7.

All Territorial Federations are branches of the parent organization but operate in various countries as a supra-national organization.<sup>1</sup> With all these 'national' organizations the Central Office, which is run by the Executive of the World Zionist Organization, maintains contact and control, and periodic visits are paid by members of the Executive for fund-raising campaigns and for coordinating activities between the Central Office and the branch organization.

The World Zionist Congress is the supreme legislative body and authority in the Zionist movement. It receives and considers reports from the Executive, the Jewish Agency, and all other Zionist institutions. On the basis of these reports the Congress issues recommendations and decides on questions of policy. Proposals submitted by the Executive and by the General Council are also considered, and decisions are taken by the Congress. The Congress is empowered to lay down the program of work, to elect the General Council and Judicial branches, and to approve the budget until the next Congress. Upon examination of the final resolutions of each Congress, it is possible to determine the current political or charitable work which the Zionist movement is stressing. Delegates are elected directly to the Congress on the basis of the number of Shekel-payers. The Shekel is the annual payment of dues which confers on the payer, who must be over 18 years old, membership in the World Zionist Organization and the right to vote for a delegate to the Congress. The Shekel amounts to two shillings or its equivalent. The number of Shekel payers needed to send a delegate to the Congress had increased over the years. In 1921, the number was changed from

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<sup>1</sup>Lasky, p.7.

200 to 2,500 Shekel payers needed to send one delegate from the Diaspora. Palestinian Jewry only needed half this number for a delegate.<sup>1</sup> In 1946, the number was raised again to 8,000 from the Diaspora and 4,000 from Palestine.<sup>2</sup>

At the Twelfth Congress in 1921, the general seating plan of the delegates was formalized with the General Zionists occupying the center of the meeting hall and the Mizrahi facing the right side of the President and the platform, and the Labour delegates on the left side. After 1923, various other factions arose within these three major groups and were seated according to their political leanings.<sup>3</sup>

Meetings of the Congress have been held fairly regularly over a seventy year period. At first, the Congresses met annually from 1897 to 1901. In 1901, the Congress adopted a new constitution which changed the Congress meetings from being annual to biannual. The Congress convened biannually until 1913, and again from 1921 to 1939. During the two world wars no Congresses were held, nor were they held from 1947 to 1951. In 1951, the Congress changed its meetings to triannually. This change is extremely significant. The 'democratic' control of the Congress had been weakened during the war years (1939-1946) and again during the disturbances and fighting that tookplace in Palestine over the years 1946-1950. This change marked the decline of Congress rule to that of a deliberative body.

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<sup>1</sup>Cohen, A Short History..., p.91.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.265.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p.89.

The 1959 Constitution specifies that the Congress must convene every four years. However, the Executive or General Council can extend these meetings only under exceptional circumstances.

The General Council which was called the Actions Committee until 1921, is elected by the Congress. It is a large deliberative body and is supreme between Congresses. Members include representatives from each of the following: the Jewish Colonial Trust, the Keren Hayesod, and the Keren Kayemeth. It meets at least twice a year, but more usually meets every three months between Congresses to decide on administrative procedures and to dictate action on resolutions passed by the Congress. It has supervisory power over all Zionist institutions and Executive bodies. The number of members on the General Council has varied from time to time: in 1897, there were twenty-three members; in 1921, there were twenty-five members; in 1937, there were seventy members; and in 1946, there were seventy-seven members besides twenty-one veteran members chosen in recognition of long service. The number of members from each party or Separate Union on the General Council is in proportion to the number of delegates representing a party in the Congress. In the years when no Congress convenes, a Conference is sometimes held between members of the General Council and representatives from the Federations, the Separate Unions, and the financial institutions.<sup>1</sup>

The Executive or Inner Actions Committee is elected by the Congress, but on occasion, when there was a deadlock, the General Council elected the Executive from among its members. The Executive is charged with the execution of the decisions of the Congress and General Council as well as

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p.265 and Lasky, pp. 9-10.

handling current affairs. It is responsible to those bodies and must submit reports of its work to the Congress and to the General Council. Day-to-day business is transacted by the Executive. The Executive represents the Zionist Organization to outside institutions and governments. It can conclude agreements in the name of the World Zionist Organization.<sup>1</sup> The Congress fixes the number of members on the Executive which started out with five members in 1897, with thirteen in 1921, and with nineteen in 1946. In 1908, a Palestine Office was opened under the directorship of a member of the Executive. At the Twelfth Congress in 1921, the Executive was enlarged to thirteen and split with six of its members in Palestine, and the other seven either in London or in other branch offices maintained by the Executive. Meetings of the Executive can take place at any time and at any place.

The organization of the Executive both in London and Palestine is divided into separate departments according to the work or program at hand. In 1921, the Central Office was reorganized into five departments: Political Affairs, Organization, Finance, Immigration and Publicity.<sup>2</sup> The Palestine Executive likewise had its own departments. Before 1917, it had devoted most of its work to assisting agricultural colonization. From 1918 to 1921, the Zionist Commission took over the work of the Palestine Office and expanded its departments to parallel those departments in the British

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<sup>1</sup>For Articles XL-KLV of the World Zionist Organization's Constitution (1959) which pertain to the duties of the Executive see Reports ... December, 1966, p. 616.

<sup>2</sup>Cohen, A Short History ..., p. 88.

Administration.<sup>1</sup> The Twelfth Congress assigned six members of the Central Executive to Palestine. The Head of the Executive in Palestine coordinated the practical work of the departments in Palestine. In 1929, departments existed for Political Affairs, Immigration, Labour, Agricultural Colonization, Trade and Industry, and several minor departments. Until 1932, education and public health departments existed but were transferred to the Vaad Leumi.<sup>2</sup> In 1943, the Jerusalem Executive consisted of twelve departments.<sup>3</sup>

The Central Office of the World Zionist Organization was located in Vienna and Cologne before World War I and in Berlin during part of World War I. London became the location of the Central Office in 1919, and remained so until 1948, when Jerusalem became the Head Office. Hebrew is the official language of the Zionist movement, and all correspondence is originally in Hebrew, and a translation is made only if necessary.<sup>4</sup>

The duties of the Chairman of the Executive include coordinating and supervising the work of the various members of the Executive and speaking on behalf of the World Zionist Organization. Directly underneath the Chairman is the President of the Executive whose duties are similar to those of the Chairman and who acts as a sort of aide-de-camp to the Chairman.

In actual practice the Executive has tended to become a small oligarchy. This came about due to the lack of factual debate in the Zionist Congress because it used to meet every two years. After 1939, the power of

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<sup>1</sup>Sir Lewis Bols' Report submitted on April 21, 1920, Public Record Office, Foreign Office Papers, 141/803.

<sup>2</sup>Cohen, A Short History..., p.110 and Esco Foundation, I, 336.

<sup>3</sup>Lasky, p.54.

<sup>4</sup>Horace Samuel, p.135.

the Congresses declined because it met only once between 1939 and 1951. The real power of the Zionist movement has come to reside in the hands of the Inner Executive, and those members of the Secretariat, heads of the Central Committees and financial institutions who are appointed by the Executive.<sup>1</sup> The Chairman was and still is in a position to dictate decisions on questions of policy. Chaim Weizmann who held the position of Chairman from 1921 to 1930, and from 1935 to 1946, ran the Zionist Organization in a dictatorial manner. In 1933, when Ben-Gurion became Head of the Palestine Executive, he gradually assumed a position of leadership and ran his Palestine Department as his own private domain and after 1939, often refused to take orders from Weizmann who was Chairman of the Executive.

The Congress also elects the Judicial arm of the Zionist movement. The Constitution of the World Zionist Organization presupposes subordination to its laws and resolutions by its branches and members and demands discipline in regard to all Zionist questions. A Congress Court of eight lawyers and a chairman settles disputes between Zionist bodies and individuals as well as deciding the validity of elections. A Court of Honour of ten lawyers and a chairman settles differences between individual Zionists and serves as a disciplinary court on all members and on all Zionist bodies. A Congress Attorney along with two deputies represents the World Zionist Organization at these court proceedings.<sup>2</sup>

The financial instruments of the Zionist Organization are the most complicated of all the Zionist Organization's agencies because the

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<sup>1</sup> Safran, p.118.

<sup>2</sup> Cohen, A Short History ..., p.265 and Lasky, pp. 8-10.

Zionists do not always want to appear to be raising funds for political action or programs. At the Second Congress in 1898, the Jewish Colonial Trust was set up as a joint stock company to finance the political aims of Zionism, and its capital was raised through £1 shares. In 1901, the Anglo-Palestine Co. (later Bank) was established. In 1901, the Jewish National Fund (Keren Kayemeth) was formed at the Fifth Congress for the purpose of acquiring land for colonists in Palestine, particularly for colonies of agricultural development and settlement. The London Conference of 1920 authorized the formation of a new all-purpose fund, the Keren Hayesod, to finance the political, social, and cultural activities of the Executive and to co-operate with the Jewish National Fund, its sister fund, in agricultural colonization by providing all the money necessary for everything except the purchase of land.<sup>1</sup> In 1929, the Keren Hayesod became the financial instrument of the newly created Jewish Agency. In essence, the Jewish National Fund (Keren Kayemeth) became the land purchasing arm of the Jewish Agency because all lands acquired by the Jewish Agency were to be subject to the Jewish National Fund's principles which specified that all land purchased by the Jewish National Fund became the property of the Jewish people and only Jewish Labor could be employed on that land.

It is necessary to look at the American scene to see how these various Zionist funds have been utilized to raise the vast sums of money they did and <sup>still</sup> continue to raise, and how the American Zionists have cleverly kept the true nature of those funds from the average American Jew who does

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<sup>1</sup>Cohen, A Short History ..., p.117.



not realize the political nature of these funds.

America is the real paymaster of the Zionist 'experiment'. Since 1921, with the creation of the Palestine Foundation Fund (Keren Hayesod) by Weizmann, a proliferation of fiscal organizations arose in America. American Zionists have been repeatedly told to raise more funds. When these funds did not materialize, the Zionists would resort to a new form of fund-raising for the sake of expediency. Consequently, the American fiscal agencies and organizations are deliberately complicated with interlocking directorates to conceal the true nature for which the money was and is still raised. Until 1929, the Keren Kayemeth and Keren Hayesod were the primary Zionist financial institutions; however, they had failed to attract the large sums of money the Zionists desired.

From 1927 to 1941, there were several attempts by the Zionists to combine fund-raising efforts of the World Zionist Organization and of the philanthropic non-Zionist Jewish organizations like the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Inc. (known as J.D.C.). In 1927, the Zionists founded the United Palestine Appeal (U.P.A.) in an effort to federate a number of Zionist funds into one agency. The Palestine Foundation Fund (Keren Hayesod) was the largest beneficiary of the United Palestine Appeal. The fund-raising efforts of the Zionists and non-Zionists assumed a 'checkered pattern of joint drives.'

"For example, in 1930 the cause of Palestine (United Palestine Appeal) and the predominantly European needs of the J.D.C. were combined, but thereafter the two interests went their separate ways. In 1934 and 1935 there were again united appeals followed, in 1936 and 1937, by independent drives. The year 1938 saw individual campaigns except for communities in which a Welfare Fund existed; there an initial sixty-forty ratio governed the distribution of funds gathered collectively. In 1939 and 1940, the JDC and UPA combined once again into a United Jewish Appeal; but

in 1941, ... fund-raising unity was once again disrupted."<sup>1</sup>

In 1935, the United Jewish Appeal was incorporated in New York by the Joint Distribution Committee and the American Palestine Campaign for the Jewish Agency for Palestine, which was joined with the Palestine Foundation Fund in 1937.<sup>2</sup> When there was no joint campaign between the Joint Distribution Committee and the United Palestine Appeal, the United Jewish Appeal remained inactive. In 1941, the United Jewish Appeal was revitalized and has been reactivated every year since by an agreement between the Joint Distribution Committee and the United Palestine Appeal.<sup>3</sup> After reorganizing the fiscal agencies, it was clear that these funds would be used to achieve political hegemony in Palestine.

The United Jewish Appeal has remained the major fund-raising machine in the United States and distributes a large share of its funds through various channels to the World Zionist Organization and hence to Israel. It also gives a small percentage of the funds to local Jewish causes or agencies.<sup>4</sup> The Twenty-third Congress in 1951 proclaimed that the Keren Hayesod was:

"the sole Fund of the World Zionist Organization for the purpose of engaging in fund-raising campaigns in the Diaspora... as the financial instrument of the Zionist (Jewish Agency) Executive shall direct, from Jerusalem, all the activities connected with such campaigns.

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<sup>1</sup>Halperin, pp. 201-202.

<sup>2</sup>Lasky, p.17.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p.18.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p.29.

2. All funds collected by the Keren Hayesod by means of fund-raising campaigns shall serve the requirements of the World Zionist Organization's Budget as laid down by the Zionist Congress or Zionist General Council."<sup>1</sup>

The United Jewish Appeal which is a unified fund drive is required to give most of its funds to the United Palestine Appeal which, in turn, is nothing more than an arm of the Keren Hayesod. In the final analysis, the World Zionist Organization receives most of the funds raised in the United States.

The United Palestine Appeal was made chief beneficiary of the United Jewish Appeal funds in 1951, and in 1953, it changed its name to the United Israel Appeal, Inc. This fund also collects money on behalf of various Zionist fiscal agencies and transmits the funds to these agencies: The Palestine Foundation Fund, Hadassah (The Women's Zionist Organization), Jewish National Fund, Inc. and other branches.<sup>2</sup> It is also obliged to give "a certain amount to a number of Zionist factional groups as compensation to prevent independent drives," like the Mizrachi, the General Zionists, the Agudath Israel, the Poale Agudath Israel, and the United Revisionists.<sup>3</sup> These factional groups are political parties.<sup>4</sup>

The Palestine Foundation Fund (Keren Hayesod) which is also the financial fund of the Jewish Agency, controls the United Israel Appeal because 60% of the executive committee according to the By-laws must

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p.71. Italics added.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.19.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p.29.

<sup>4</sup>In 1960, the U.S. Department of Justice told the Jewish Agency that tax-deductible American contributions could no longer be given to political parties in Israel.

be from the Palestine Foundation Fund, and this 60<sup>0</sup>/o must vote as a bloc. It should be remembered that the directors of the Palestine Foundation Fund are appointed by the Executive of the World Zionist Organization.<sup>1</sup>

In summary, regardless of how complicated the fiscal arrangements and complex the interlocking directorates, the World Zionist Organization and the State of Israel are the major recipients of the funds. Although these funds may be raised on behalf of or under the slogan of humanitarianism, general development, immigration, Jewish culture, or any other program, a major portion goes for political work which is sponsored by the State.<sup>2</sup> The former Director General of Israel's Foreign Ministry, Walter Eytan, went as far as to declare:

"The Foreign Ministry probably brings more money into the public chest than any other ministry, except the tax-collecting Ministry of Finance. No computation has ever been made of the value, in terms of money, of Israel's representatives abroad. They are constantly engaged in the campaigns for voluntary funds contributed by Jews all over the world, in popularizing Israel bond issues, in securing official loans (as from the American Export-Import Bank) and grants-in-aid, in negotiating commercial agreements and stimulating trade in general, and in a variety of other revenue-producing activities. If it were not for them, there would be a heavy slump in Israel's income."<sup>3</sup>

#### B. The Relationship Between the Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organization

The Jewish Agency for Palestine was established in 1929, after protracted negotiations between Zionists and non-Zionists. Article IV of

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<sup>1</sup> Lasky, pp. 18-22.

<sup>2</sup> This point was made clear in the (Fulbright) Hearings, U.S. Senate, in May and August of 1963.

<sup>3</sup> Walter Eytan, The First Ten Years: A Diplomatic History of Israel (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1958), pp. 192-193.

the League of Nations' Mandate for Palestine 'legally' created the Jewish Agency as a 'public body.' The Jewish Agency was established as:

"a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country."<sup>1</sup>

The Zionist Organization was 'recognized as such<sup>an</sup> agency,' and was "to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home."<sup>2</sup> It is important to note that the Jewish Agency was designated as a 'public body.' The Zionist Organization was to serve in this capacity as a 'public body' for the purpose of creating a national-political entity in Palestine. The Zionist Organization working as a 'public body' was to enlist the support of all Jews willing to help in the upbuilding of the 'Jewish national home.'

In the beginning the Zionist Organization identified itself as the Jewish Agency, but later on the identity was deliberately blurred.<sup>3</sup> Weizmann realized that non-Zionist financial support, particularly American, was necessary if the Zionist scheme was to be achieved. In 1921, before the Mandate was officially promulgated, Weizmann stounded out American non-Zionists as to the prospects of their cooperating and helping to rebuild Palestine. The 'Jewish Agency' clause in Article IV fitted Weizmann's intentions of securing the cooperation of all Jews. The word 'agency' was

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<sup>1</sup>Great Britain and Palestine, p.151.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.152.

<sup>3</sup>Lasky, p.12.

converted into a proper noun.<sup>1</sup> Between 1923 and 1929, Zionist Congresses debated the merits or demerits of the Jewish Agency and made certain stipulations prerequisites for negotiations. Weizmann made several trips to America between 1924 and 1927, and attended 'non-partisan' conferences under the chairmanship of Louis Marshall, the leader of the American non-Zionists. On January 17, 1927, an agreement was reached between Marshall and Weizmann. From this agreement emerged the Joint Palestine Survey Commission to inspect and make a report on the economic resources and possibilities of Palestine with the view to having the Jewish Agency finance various projects which might be suggested by the Commission.<sup>2</sup> During 1928, the Jewish Agency was constituted. Directly following the Sixteenth Zionist Congress in August, 1929, the Zionist and non-Zionist representatives met and framed the constitution of the Jewish Agency which is often referred to as the Zurich Accord. Hereafter, the Jewish Agency was to meet every two years after each World Zionist Congress, until 1937.

On the surface the Constitution of the Jewish Agency appeared to give equal power and responsibility to the non-Zionists. An elaborate administrative apparatus was set up; the Jewish Agency structure resembled that of the Zionist Organization except membership in the various bodies was to be split half and half. The 'Council of the Jewish Agency' which corresponded with the Zionist Congress was to have 200 members of which 100 were to be non-Zionist. An Administrative Committee resembling the Zionist General Council was to have forty members - twenty were to be non-Zionists.

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Cohen, The Zionist Movement, pp. 123-24.

The Executive Committee like the Zionist Executive was to be the officiating body. However, the President of the Zionist Organization was to be President of the Jewish Agency. This form of dual presidency gave predominance from the start to the Zionist Organization. "While a machinery was provided to assure the World Zionist Organization its representation, no such machinery was given to the non-Zionists; and any vacancies not filled by the non-Zionists were to be filled by the Zionist Organization."<sup>1</sup> The Zionist members of the Council were appointed or elected by the Zionist Congress, and in turn the Zionist members of the Council appointed the Zionist members to the Committee and to the Executive. It is significant that there was no body or organization to supervise the appointment of non-Zionists to the Jewish Agency.<sup>2</sup> Essentially, the Jewish Agency's Constitution was worked out between the Zionist Organization, on one hand, and individual non-Zionists on the other. The non-Zionists were too unorganized to form an opposition body when the Zionists started carrying out their projected plan of take-over.<sup>3</sup> The Keren Hayesod, which was the major financial arm of the Zionist Organization, was transferred to the Jewish Agency along with the Keren Kayemeth which was to purchase all lands with Jewish Agency money; however, the legal relations that the Keren Hayesod and the Keren Kayemeth had with the Zionist Organization were left intact.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Lasky, p.13.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>The means the Zionists employed to take-over the Jewish Agency is discussed in detail in Chapter II of this paper. For Weizmann's comments on the deficiencies of the Jewish Agency see Lasky, pp. 13-14.

<sup>4</sup>Cohen, The Zionist Movement, p.129.

The death of Louis Marshall, the main support of non-Zionist participation less than a month after the signing of the Zurich Accord, meant the non-Zionists no longer had their chief spokesman or organizer and were without leadership. According to the Jewish Agency Constitution, the Executive was to consist of twelve persons - eight Zionists and four non-Zionists - until September 30, 1929. This was to be the transitional period in which the Zionist members were to 'help' the non-Zionist members set up the administrative apparatus of the Agency. With the death of Marshall on September 11, the Zionists were fairly free to take-over the Jewish Agency. Since the Zionists formed a majority of the Executive until the thirtieth of September, they filled certain key posts with their adherents.<sup>1</sup> From here on the Zionists gradually took-over the Jewish Agency.

Before the Zurich Accord was signed, the Zionists had planned that the Jewish Agency would be Zionist with a front of non-Zionism to make it acceptable to Americans of Jewish faith and particularly to the American Joint Distribution Committee which was to provide the majority of the non-Zionists for the Jewish Agency.<sup>2</sup> Non-Zionist support was encouraged as long as they gave money but did not actively participate in the affairs of the Jewish Agency. The Zionists wanted to ensure their take-over plans. In a letter dated September 16, 1929, the Zionist Executive notified the Colonial Office of the 'reformed' Agency and asked that in case the partnership between the Zionists and non-Zionists should dissolve would the British Government recognize the World Zionist Organization as the Jewish Agency.

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p.179.

<sup>2</sup>Weizmann, pp. 376 and 380-81.



On August 6, 1930, the Colonial Office replied that it would "recognize the Zionist Organization as the Jewish Agency for the purpose of Article IV of the Mandate for Palestine, and the Organization shall in that event be deemed to have reverted in all respects to the status which it possessed before the enlargement of the Agency."<sup>1</sup>

The Palestine Royal Commission Report issued in 1937, stated that the Jewish Agency, "In the course of time ... had created a complete administrative apparatus. This powerful and efficient organization amounts, in fact, to a Government existing side by side with the Mandatory Government."<sup>2</sup> In other words, by 1937, the Jewish Agency had become synonymous with the Zionist Organization because Jewish Agency functions mentioned above corresponded exactly to those of the Zionist Organization. If one examines the composition of the Jewish Agency Council in 1937, one can see the disproportionate strength of the Zionists.<sup>3</sup> Of the members on the Council 107 were Zionists, and 105 were 'non-Zionists', but of the 473 deputy members - 319 were Zionists and 154 were 'non-Zionist.' It is little wonder that the last meeting of the Jewish Agency Council and Administrative Committee were held in 1938.<sup>4</sup>

American financial support was now cut off by the world economic depression, and thus the *raison d'être* for creating the Jewish Agency was

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<sup>1</sup>Cohen, The Zionist Movement, pp. 180-181.

<sup>2</sup>Palestine Royal Commission Report Cmd. 5479 of 1937. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1937), p.174.

<sup>3</sup>For an authoritative account of Zionists in non-Zionist positions see footnote in Lasky, p.14.

<sup>4</sup>Cohen, The Zionist Movement, p.266.

removed. The vast sums of money the Zionists had hoped to raise from the American non-Zionist 'big givers' by involving them in the rebuilding of Palestine had failed.<sup>1</sup> By 1939, the Jewish Agency was defunct as an individual organization.

The Zionists in the World Zionist Organization maintained the skeleton structure and name of the Jewish Agency for ulterior purposes. Their main objective was to use the Jewish Agency name as a facade to involve non-Zionists by implication in the political activities of the Zionist movement and to further Zionist pretensions to speak on behalf of 'the Jewish people'. Therefore, the Jewish Agency was to serve the immediate political and financial aims of the World Zionist Organization. Non-Zionists found themselves responsible for policies and actions for which they had no sympathy.

In 1943, the Jewish Agency officially admitted that it was the World Zionist Organization in the Registration Statement submitted in compliance with the American Foreign Agent's Registration Act (1938). The interests of the Jewish Agency were "to obtain support for the political program of the Zionist Movement."<sup>2</sup> In the first supplemental registration in 1944, the Jewish Agency implied that its membership included Zionists as well as non-Zionists residing everywhere in the world. Despite these legal pronouncements the World Zionist Organization continued to control

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<sup>1</sup>For further details of 'the millionaire approach' in America and the reasons why it failed see Halperin, pp. 190-195.

<sup>2</sup>Lasky, pp. 14 and 54.

the Jewish Agency and to alter its structure.<sup>1</sup> Various departments were added to the Palestinian branch of the Jewish Agency which were, in actual fact, integral departments within the Zionist Organization. In 1946, under this guise twenty-five departments were maintained of which the seven most important were: Political Department, Immigration Department, Economic Department, Financial Department, Organization Department, Department of Trade and Industry and General Secretariat. The lesser departments were: Agricultural Experiment Station at Rehovot, Bialik Foundation, Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews, Department for Agricultural Settlement, Department of Labour, Department of Middle Class Settlement, Department of Post-War Settlement of Soldiers, Department of Statistics, Department for Youth and Child Immigration, Economic Research Institute, Immigration Section for the Absorption of Immigrants, Information Office, Maritime Office, Press Office, Search Bureau for Missing Relatives, Small Trades and Artisans Department, Supply Department and Technical Department.<sup>2</sup> The Organization Department maintained contact with Zionists and non-Zionists in the Diaspora. The Political Department was subdivided into two sections: Administrative Section and Political Section. In 1932, the Departments of Health and Education were transferred to the Vaad Leumi.

The creation of the Jewish Agency meant that the Zionist Organization only broadened its activities. By 1939, the Executive of the Jewish

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p.15.

<sup>2</sup> Udin, II, 396-97.

Agency was the Executive arm of the World Zionist Organization. Only in November, 1954, in a supplemental foreign agent's registration to the U.S. Attorney-General, did the Jewish Agency Executive declare it "is the executive arm of the World Zionist Organization which represents Jews from all over the world."<sup>1</sup> The Zionist Organization was and still is virtually synonymous with the Jewish Agency.

C. The Relationship Between the World Zionist Organization and the State of Israel

The State of Israel was proclaimed by Ben-Gurion on May 15, 1948. With the establishment of the State the Mandate terminated which meant that the legal basis for the continuation of the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency no longer existed. Although the World Zionist Organization was a party to the establishment of the State, the Government of Israel began to develop its own government and to take over the responsibilities that the Zionist Organization had undertaken and carried out before the declaration of the State. Gradually, the degrees of authority became blurred, and a reorganization of the entire Zionist Movement's structure became necessary. The Twenty-third Zionist Congress demanded clarification of the World Zionist Organization's functions and status. This was accomplished within the legal framework of the 'Status Law' (1952) and the Covenant (1954).

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<sup>1</sup>Lasky, p.16.

### 'The Jewish People' Concept

The World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency did not surrender its 'public body' character. The Declaration of the State of Israel showed no diminution of the Zionist attempts to constitute 'the Jewish people' nationality entity and to confer membership in it.

"WE APPEAL to the Jewish people throughout the Diaspora to rally round the Jews of Eretz-Israel in the tasks of immigration and upbuilding and to stand by them in the great struggle for the realization of the age-old dream - the redemption of Israel."<sup>1</sup>

In other words, the State of Israel was created for the entire Jewish people rather than for only its own nationals. The term 'the Jewish people' has been interpreted to mean any individual, who is identified as a Jew, unless he has specifically rejected the Jewish faith for another religion. In Zionist-Israeli terminology 'the Jewish people' constitute a legal and separate nationality, and membership in 'the Jewish people' is considered equivalent to Israeli nationality but with certain reservations.<sup>2</sup>

Any Jew is a member of 'the Jewish people' and by virtue of this membership possesses a supra-national identity or dual nationality regardless of his legal nationality or citizenship. Two Israeli laws, the Law of Return and the Nationality Law, demonstrate the coercive and involuntary character attached to the concept of 'the Jewish people'. Neither of these laws were designed for domestic legislation within Israel.

The Law of the Return<sup>3</sup> constitutes legal action affecting Jews

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<sup>1</sup>Badi, p.10.

<sup>2</sup>Members of 'the Jewish people' are not liable for military service whereas Israeli nationals must serve in the Israeli armed forces.

<sup>3</sup>Badi, p.156.

everywhere, and particularly, Jews living in the Diaspora. The Knesset, by passing this law, legally effectuated the clause in the 1948 Declaration of the State of Israel giving 'every Jew' the 'right to come' to Israel 'as an oleh' (a Jew immigrating to Israel), and 'to settle in Israel' if he desires. The Minister of Immigration may refuse an applicant if he 'is acting against the Jewish people' or 'is likely to endanger public health or the security of the State.' The clause 'acting against the Jewish people' means acting in such a manner as to jeopardize the Zionist-Israeli attempts to legally constitute an internationally recognized 'public body' of 'the Jewish people.'

The Nationality Law<sup>1</sup> enacted by the Knesset in 1952 demonstrates the determination of the State to constitute 'the Jewish people' as a legally recognized international body politic. Any Jew possesses the inherent right to enter Israel, and Israeli citizenship is automatically conferred on him. In the Nationality Law the precise steps a Jew must take to avoid the automatic application of his so-called right to immigrate is carefully outlined.

These two laws directly affect Jews living outside Israel. Any Jew visiting or immigrating to Israel is considered to be returning to his own state. According to the Israeli Prime Minister, Ben-Gurion, the Law of the Return (and presumably the Nationality Law) is derived out:

"of the continuity of Jewish history. It codifies the redemptive principle out of which the State was born. It proclaims that it is not the State that gives the Jew from abroad the right to settle in Israel; the right inheres

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p.254.

in him as a Jew."<sup>1</sup>

This right and legal status to Israeli nationality is inferred from membership in 'the Jewish people'. The Israeli Government claims the right to speak on behalf of 'the Jewish people' and to interfere in the affairs of Jews in the Diaspora because it in itself represents the embodiment of 'the Jewish people'. To further this claimed right, the Israeli Government engages in diplomatic intervention on behalf of 'the Jewish people', and interferes in the domestic affairs of Jews residing outside Israel. Former Director-General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Walter Eytan, stated:

"It is a commonplace of our Foreign Service that every Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Israel has a dual function. He is Minister Plenipotentiary to the country to which he is accredited - and Envoy Extraordinary to its Jews."<sup>2</sup>

Ben-Gurion, following "independence" began to make fund-raising trips to the United States. During these trips Ben-Gurion insisted on his right as the Israeli Prime Minister to speak on behalf of 'the Jewish people' and demanded that all Jews should immigrate to Israel and, particularly, Jewish youth must come "to help us achieve this big mission. ... we will bring the youth to Israel, but I hope this will not be necessary."<sup>3</sup> American Zionists and especially the big donors in America who were mostly non-Zionists objected to Ben-Gurion's statements and argued that while

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<sup>1</sup>Israel Government Year Book, 1961-62 (Jerusalem: Government Printer, January, 1962), p.XLIX,

<sup>2</sup>Eytan, p.179.

<sup>3</sup>Elmer Berger, Judaism or Jewish Nationalism: The Alternative to Zionism (New York: Bookman Associates, 1957), p.48.

remaining loyal American citizens, they could support Israel without immigrating themselves, without sending their children and without having Ben-Gurion speaking on their behalf. According to a large majority of the American Zionists the future relations between Diaspora Jewry and the State should be based on mutual respect for each other's communities and institutions.<sup>1</sup> Another faction of American Zionists, led by Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, felt that Israeli affairs were world Zionist problems. Ben-Gurion resisted all criticism of his policies and pronouncements. He continued to demand large scale immigration and non-interference in Israel's internal affairs by non-Israelis.<sup>2</sup>

#### Reorganization and Clarification

After the proclamation of the State of Israel Zionists everywhere began to campaign for the formulation of agreements to clarify the questions of function and authority between the State and the World Zionist Organization. The initiation for the demands for legal contractual agreements came from the Zionist Organization, particularly, the Zionist Organization of America whose members were alarmed at Ben-Gurion's statements that the State and the Zionist movement are one and that "this Jewish nation is scattered over all the countries of the world ... And we, ...who are residents of the State of Israel ... must not disregard the situation of those Jews who are not among us."<sup>3</sup>

Ben-Gurion and his fellow-supporters did not consider the work of the Zionist movement complete. As early as April, 1950, the relationship

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<sup>1</sup>Jacob Blaustein, Honorary President of the American Jewish Committee, spoke to Ben-Gurion about his statements reflecting the loyalties of American Jews. Ben-Gurion solemnly promised to Mr. Blaustein to refrain in the future from speaking for the Jews in other countries. See New York Times, April 30, 1950, p. 26 and September 10, 1950, p.36.

<sup>2</sup>The dispute between Ben-Gurion and Rabbi Silver over the relationship which had developed between the Zionist movement and the Government of Israel continued for several years. Rabbi Silver wanted Diaspora Zionists to have a say in Israeli affairs and policies, particularly, those decisions which affected non-Israeli Jews. He warned that the Zionist movement might be charged with "being a tool of a foreign government." See Berger, Judaism or Jewish Nationalism, p.100. Also refer to: New York Times, November 7, 1949, p.1; May 17, 1951, p.17; July 8, 1951, p.17; and August 14, 1951, p.6. Jerusalem Post, August 17, 1951, p. 5.



and functions of the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency and the State of Israel were discussed at a meeting of the Zionist General Council. American Zionists on the Council felt that there was less enthusiasm for Israel after the establishment of the State and suggested that "the Zionist movement was needed to link the State of Israel with the Jews abroad."<sup>1</sup> In April and May, 1950, the Zionist General Council decided:

"to form a Joint Board of Development and Co-ordination with the government of Israel which would consist of four Agency members, four cabinet members, and one Jewish National Fund director. It also decided to co-ordinate the planning and execution of immigration absorption and housing schemes and to supervise agricultural development. The budgets were to be co-ordinated and streamlined. The Joint Board was to decide on the division of functions between government and Agency."<sup>2</sup>

The stage was set for the Twenty-third World Zionist Congress which advanced the clarification of the relationship when it adopted a 'Programme of Work'. The month preceding the Congress Ben-Gurion's Mapai Party had won the elections for the Second Knesset. Thus, Ben-Gurion stood in a strong position to dictate his ideas and proposed policies to the assembled Congress.

XXIII. Twenty-third Congress. - The Twenty-third Congress was held in Jerusalem from August 14-29, 1951. Two essential questions confronted the Congress delegates. First, the aim and functions Zionism was to undertake now that Statehood had been attained. Second, the relationship between the World Zionist Organization and the State needed to be

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<sup>1</sup>American Jewish Yearbook, Vol. LII (1951), p.372.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

defined.

After two weeks of heated debate it was impossible for the delegates to reach an agreement on the redefinition of aims. Ben-Gurion wanted his so-called Jerusalem Program to become the aim and program of Zionism. Since no such agreement could be reached, the old Basle Program remained. A definition of the 'Task of Zionism' and a 'Programme of Work' were agreed upon and promulgated:

#### The Task of Zionism

The task of Zionism is:

THE STRENGTHENING OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL; THE INGATHERING OF THE EXILIES IN ERETZ-ISRAEL; AND THE FOSTERING OF THE UNITY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE.

#### Programme of Work of World Zionist Organization

The programme of work of the World Zionist Organization is:

(a) Encouragement, absorption and integration of immigrants and youth 'Aliya', the stimulation of agricultural settlement and economic development of the country; acquisition and development of land as the property of the people.

(b) Intensive work for chalutzit (pioneering) and hachshara (training for chalutzit).

(c) A large-scale effort to mobilize the means for carrying out the tasks of Zionism.

(d) Encouragement of private capital investment.

(e) Fostering of Jewish consciousness by propagating the Zionist idea and strengthening the Zionist Movement; imparting the values of Judaism, Hebrew education and spreading knowledge of the Hebrew language.

(f) Mobilization of world public opinion for Israel.

(g) Participation in efforts to organize and intensify Jewish life on a democratic basis; maintenance and defence of Jewish rights.<sup>1</sup>

The 'Task of Zionism' dictates the orientation of the Zionist movement. Zionism's task is to strengthen the State of Israel. Embodied in the 'Task' is the implicit premise that all Jews living outside Israel, whether under free conditions or oppressed, are living in exile. Therefore, the second 'task' involves 'the ingathering of exiles' to 'the national home'. This 'ingathering' is an integral part of the national interests of the State to settle immigrants on the land as a security factor. The third 'task' seeks to foster Jewish unity among Diaspora Jewry by developing a Jewish consciousness. Jewish unity is to serve and strengthen the State not Judaism. Therefore, all these three major activities or tasks are to take place in countries other than Israel.

The 'Programme of Work' for the World Zionist Organization only elaborated and outlined further the manner in which the three major tasks were to be accomplished. Private capital investment was to be encouraged but, as not stated, in only certain fields of economic activity. Direct political pressure was to be mobilized among Diaspora Jewry and brought to bear upon governments for Israel's benefit. 'By Jewish rights' it is meant the 'rights' of 'the Jewish people' collectively not individually to 'a home' to be 'secured by public law' according to the Basle Program. Cultural and educational activities and institutions were to be encouraged in order that they might provide 'links between the State of Israel and the Diaspora' and help develop a feeling of Jewish consciousness and further

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<sup>1</sup>Fundamental Issues of Zionism at the 23rd Zionist Congress Edited by S. U. Nahon. (Jerusalem: The Organization Department of the Zionist Executive, 1952), p.135.

the process of Kibbutz Galuyot.<sup>1</sup>

The status and function of the World Zionist Organization was the other major issue facing the Twenty-third Congress. It adopted the:

Status for the Zionist Organization

(a) The Congress declared that the practical work of the World Zionist Organisation and its various bodies for the fulfilment of its historic tasks in Eretz Israel calls for the fullest degree of co-operation and co-ordination on its part with the State of Israel and its Government, in accordance with the laws of the land.

(b) The Congress considers it essential that the State of Israel shall grant, through appropriate legislative act, status to the World Zionist Organisation as the representative of the Jewish people in all matters relating to organized participation of the Jews of the Diaspora in the development and upbuilding of the country and the rapid absorption of the immigrants.

(c) In relation to all activities conducted in the interests of the State of Israel within Jewish communities in the Diaspora it is essential that the Government of the State of Israel shall act in consultation and co-ordination with the World Zionist Organization.

(d) In all matters regarding legislation by the State of Israel touching upon the activities of the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency, their property and liabilities, it is essential that there shall be prior consultation between the Government and the Executive of the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency.

(e) (1) On the basis of the status to be granted to the World Zionist Organization, the Executive of the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency shall be empowered to work within the spheres defined from time to time by special agreement with the Israel Government.

(2) The following spheres of activity shall be fixed among others, for the forthcoming period:

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p.137.

- (a) The organization of immigration, the transfer of immigrants and their property to Eretz Israel;
- (b) Participation in the absorption of immigrants;
- (c) Youth Aliyah;
- (d) Development of agricultural settlement;
- (e) Acquisition and amelioration of land by the Jewish National Fund;
- (f) Participation in development projects.

(3) The Co-ordinating Body of the Israel Government and the Executive of the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency shall co-ordinate the above-mentioned spheres of activity. <sup>1</sup>

There were to be six spheres of joint activity which are the type of activities usually assigned to a sovereign government. Before the World Zionist Organization could act as a legitimate 'public body' to help or undertake these obligations on behalf of <sup>the State of Israel,</sup> a law needed to be enacted granting status to the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency.

The Twenty-third Congress changed its meetings from being bi-annual to triannual, but this change only made more evident the fact that the control the Congress exercised over the policies and program of the Zionist movement was weak.<sup>2</sup> Israeli officials after consulting members of the Zionist General Council formulated the policy of the World Zionist Organization.

Negotiations between the Government of the State of Israel and the Executive of the World Zionist Organization continued from the conclusion of the Twenty-third Congress in August, 1951, until March, 1952, when the Zionist Executive notified the Prime Minister of Israel that it had adopted 'in principle' a proposed draft of the 'Bill of Status'. On

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., pp. 135-36. (Emphasis supplied)

<sup>2</sup> Norman Bentwich, Israel (London: Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1952), p.196.

August 12, 1952, the first and second readings of the proposed bill took place in the Knesset and were adopted. When the third reading occurred the next day, Ben-Gurion acting for the Government withdrew the bill. If it had been adopted on the third reading, the 'Bill of Status' would have become law. By withdrawing the 'Bill' Ben-Gurion ended a huge controversy which had arisen between members in the Knesset and Government officials over the description of the World Zionist Organization. The Knesset preferred to call the Zionist Organization, "the representative organization of all the Jewish people", whereas the Government wanted to call the World Zionist Organization, "the authorized agency" of "the Jewish people". The former clause gave some form of independence to the Zionist Organization, but the latter clause subordinated the Zionist Organization to the Government of the State of Israel. Ben-Gurion insisted that the State be the authorizing agent in order to avoid any independent actions or unauthorized policies by the Zionist Executive or any of its various branches.<sup>1</sup> The State was to be firmly in control of the Zionist Organization and no repetition of the 1920 Brandeis 'rebellion' with the Zionist Organization of America was to take place again.

On November 24, 1952, the second Knesset enacted 'The World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency for Palestine (Status) Law'. The 'Status Law' consists of twelve paragraphs. The first six paragraphs define the relationship between the World Zionist Organization and the Government of

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<sup>1</sup>Elmer Berger, "Now It's Official: Israeli Law Defines 'Central Task' of Zionism and State as Mass Immigration", Council News, VII, No. 2 (February, 1953), p.7.

the State of Israel and also the specific functions allotted to the Zionist Organization by the Israeli Government. The last six paragraphs outline the procedural methods for implementation of the 'Status Law' in order to make it binding on both parties.

World Zionist Organisation Jewish  
Agency (Status) Law  
5713-1952

1. The State of Israel regards itself as the creation of the entire Jewish people, and its gates are open, in accordance with its laws, to every Jew wishing to immigrate to it.
2. The World Zionist Organisation, from its foundation five decades ago, headed the movement and efforts of the Jewish people to realise the age-old vision of the return to its homeland and, with the assistance of other Jewish circles and bodies, carried the main responsibility for establishing the State of Israel.
3. The World Zionist Organisation, which is also the Jewish Agency, takes care as before of immigration and directs absorption and settlement projects in the State.
4. The State of Israel recognises the World Zionist Organisation as the authorised agency which will continue to operate in the State of Israel for the development and settlement of the country, the absorption of immigrants from the Diaspora and the coordination of the activities in Israel of Jewish institutions and organisations active in those fields.
5. The mission of gathering in the exiles, which is the central task of the State of Israel and the Zionist Movement in our days, requires constant efforts by the Jewish people in the Diaspora; the State of Israel, therefore, expects the cooperation of all Jews, as individuals and groups, in building up the State and assisting the immigration to it of the masses of the people, and regards the unity of all sections of Jewry as necessary for this purpose.
6. The State of Israel expects efforts on the part of the World Zionist Organisation for achieving this unity; if to this end, the Zionist Organisation, with the consent of the Government and the approval of the Knesset, should decide to broaden its basis, the enlarged body will enjoy the status conferred upon the World Zionist Organisation in the State of Israel.

7. Details of the status of the World Zionist Organisation whose representation is the Zionist Executive, also known as the Executive of the Jewish Agency - and the form of its cooperation with the Government shall be determined by a Covenant to be made in Israel between the Government and the Zionist Executive.

8. The Covenant shall be based on the declaration of the 23rd Zionist Congress in Jerusalem that the practical work of the World Zionist Organisation and its various bodies for the fulfilment of their historic tasks in Eretz-Israel requires full cooperation and coordination on its part with the State of Israel and its Government, in accordance with the laws of the State.

9. There shall be set up a committee for the coordination of the activities of the Government and Executive in the spheres in which the Executive will operate according to the Covenant; the tasks of the Committee shall be determined by the Covenant.

10. The Covenant and any variation or amendment thereof made with the consent of the two parties shall be published in Reshumot and shall come into force on the day of publication, unless they provide for an earlier or later day for this purpose.

11. The Executive is a juristic body and may enter into contracts, acquire, hold and relinquish property and be a party to any legal or other proceeding.

12. The Executive and its funds and other institutions shall be exempt from taxes and other compulsory Government charges, subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be laid down by the Covenant; the exemption shall come into force on the coming into force of the Covenant.<sup>1</sup>

An analysis of the 'Status Law' reveals that the Government of the State of Israel "recognizes the World Zionist Organization as the authorised agency which will continue to operate in the State of Israel" and in the Diaspora. Throughout the 'Status Law' is the implied premise that the Zionist Organization is subordinate to the State as Ben-Gurion wished the Zionist Movement to be.

In the first paragraph of the 'Status Law' the State "considers

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<sup>1</sup>Badi, pp. 285-86.



itself the creation of the entire Jewish people", not just for its own regular nationals. This is a fundamental precept of Zionist nationalism and its political objectives to further the legal claims in international law of its 'Jewish people' concept.

Paragraphs two, three and four recognize that the Zionist Organization, which is also officially admitted as the Jewish Agency, had with non-Zionist assistance, "carried the main responsibility for establishing the State of Israel," and that it will continue to carry out some but not all of the functions it did preceding independence. The Zionist Organization's governmental structure and functions will now be limited to encouraging immigration, to directing settlement and development projects, and to coordinating the above activities with the Government. Yet, section four seeks the continuance of the Zionist Organization's pre-independence 'public body' status.

In paragraph five, 'the Ingathering of Exiles' is to be the central task of the State and the World Zionist Organization working together. All Jews are expected to cooperate in the Government's efforts for the up-building of the State and for assisting mass immigration to the State. To accomplish this task, the State needs the political unity of all Jewish communities and individuals. Paragraph six is more explicit. The State expects the Zionist Movement to achieve this political unification among Diaspora Jewry which, in essence, is a governmental function. If the Zionist Organization needs to enlarge its framework in order to fulfill this purpose, the approval of the Government and Knesset are necessary. Again, the Zionist Organization is made subordinate to the State.

Paragraph seven refers to a Covenant which shall be made in Israel between the Zionist Executive and the Israeli Government. In this Covenant the form of cooperation and specific functions the Zionist Movement will undertake on behalf of the State will be outlined. According to paragraph eight "the Covenant shall be based on the declaration of the 23rd Zionist Congress", which specified that all practical work conducted by the Zionist Movement shall be in compliance with the laws of the Israeli Government.

In paragraph nine an administrative Committee for co-ordinating the activities between the State and the Zionist Organization shall be set up, and its tasks will be outlined in the forthcoming Covenant.

The amendment process is dealt with in paragraph ten.

Paragraphs eleven and twelve state that the functions of the Zionist Executive shall be that of a juristic body which may enter into legal contracts and may acquire and dispose of property. The Executive and its funds will be exempt from Israeli taxes once the Covenant is made.<sup>1</sup>

In summary, the 'Status Law' made the State supreme in dealing with the question of sovereignty for 'the Jewish people' and in all acts pertaining to 'the Jewish people'. The 'Status Law' was an enabling legislation which would serve as the basis for the Covenant. The Second Knesset authorized the Zionist Executive to enter into a legal agreement or Covenant with the Government of the State of Israel. The Prime Minister, Ben-Gurion, referred to the 'Status Law' as "one of the foremost basic laws".<sup>2</sup> He went on to declare:

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<sup>1</sup>For a more complete analysis of the 'Status Law' see Mallison, pp. 1040-42.

<sup>2</sup>Israel Government Year Book, 1953-54 (Jerusalem: Government Printer, November, 1953), p. 57.

"This law completes the Law of the Return in determining the Zionist character of the State of Israel. The Law of the Return established the right of every Jew to settle in Israel, and the new law established the bond between the State of Israel and the entire Jewish people and its authorized institutions in matters of immigration into and settlement in Israel."<sup>1</sup>

On July 26, 1954, the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency and the Government of the State of Israel entered into a Covenant.<sup>2</sup> The signing of the Covenant took place during the fifth session, seventh meeting, of the Zionist General Council and was followed by a formal exchange of letters between the Prime Minister and the Chairman of the Zionist Executive. The substance of the 'Status Law' was reiterated in the Covenant which made the 'Status Law', in essence, binding upon the State and the Zionist Movement. The Covenant juridically united the Zionist Executive and the Government of Israel.

The Covenant<sup>3</sup> allocated certain specific functions to the Zionist Organization to undertake:

"The organizing of immigration abroad and the transfer of immigrants and their property to Israel; co-operation in the absorption of immigrants in Israel; youth immigration; agricultural settlement in Israel; the acquisition and amelioration of land in Israel ...; participation in the establishment and the expansion of development enterprises in Israel; the encouragement of private capital investments in Israel; assistance to cultural enterprises and institutions of higher learning in Israel; the mobilization of resources

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> The full text of the Covenant can be found in Session of the Zionist General Council, Fifth Session after the 23rd Congress, Jerusalem, July 21-29, 1954, Addresses, Debates, Resolutions (Jerusalem: The Organization Department of the Zionist Executive), pp. 106-109.

<sup>3</sup> At the beginning of the Covenant, it is explained that the Government of Israel will be hereafter called the Government and that the Zionist Executive called also the Executive of the Jewish Agency will be referred to hereafter as the Executive. Ibid., p.106.

for financing these activities; the co-ordination of the activities in Israel of Jewish institutions and organizations acting within limits of these functions by means of public funds."<sup>1</sup>

In summary, the major functions were and still are, essentially, the three tasks mentioned in the 'Task of Zionism' at the Twenty-third Congress. These included: the strengthening of the State, the ingathering of exiles, and the fostering of unity among the Jewish people. To these functions the 'Status Law' and Covenant added: the encouragement of private capital investment and the co-ordination of activities between Jewish institutions and organizations.

According to section two any of these activities, if carried out in Israel, will be subject to Israeli laws and to "the regulations and administrative instructions ... which govern the activities of the governmental authorities."<sup>2</sup> In section five the Zionist Executive is given the right to transfer any of its functions to any other existing institution or to establish an institution in Israel for that purpose provided that the Government is notified. In section six the Executive is held responsible for the mobilization of financial and material resources. In section seven the Government will consult the Executive if any legislation "impinging on the functions of the Executive ... is submitted to the Knesset."<sup>3</sup>

Sections eight and nine officially establish the Co-ordinating Board, commonly called the Board to facilitate the implementation of all spheres of joint activity undertaken between the Government and the Executive.

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p.107.

"The Board shall be composed of an even number of members, not fewer than four, half of whom shall be members of the Government appointed by it, and half of whom shall be members of the Executive appointed by it. ...

The Board shall meet at least once a month. It may appoint subcommittees consisting of members of the Board and also of non-members. The Board shall from time to time submit to the Government and the Executive reports of its deliberations and recommendations. Except as stated above, the Board shall itself determine the arrangements for its sessions and deliberations."<sup>1</sup>

The creation of the Co-ordinating Board is extremely important because it binds legally and officially the Executive of the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency to the Government of the State of Israel by enumerating and delineating the authority for the execution of the basic program or tasks of Zionism.

In section ten the Government must provide the Executive and its institutions with the correct permits and facilities so that the Executive can carry out its assigned functions.

According to sections twelve and thirteen any proposal for an amendment or alteration or addition to the Covenant must be made in writing.

"Any notification to be sent to the Government shall be sent to the Prime Minister, and any notification to be sent to the Executive shall be sent to the Chairman of the Executive in Jerusalem."<sup>2</sup>

To the end of the Covenant are annexed three letters dated July 26, 1954, dealing with an alteration and an addition to the Covenant. The first is a letter from the Prime Minister to the Chairman informing the Chairman that "any administrative order ... in regard to investigations, searches

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.108.

and detentions in Government offices shall apply also to the Executive and its institutions."<sup>1</sup> In other words, all activities of the Zionist Movement within the territory of Israel must meet Governmental approval and is therefore subservient to the Government. The second letter is also from the Prime Minister to the Chairman informing the Chairman of "the Government's decision that in the order of precedence at official ceremonies the Chairman of the Zionist Executive and the Chairman of the Zionist General Council will immediately follow the Members of the Government; Members of the Zionist Executive will be equal in precedence to Members of the Knesset, and ... will immediately follow Members of the Knesset."<sup>2</sup> The third letter is from the Chairman of the Executive to the Prime Minister acknowledging the receipt of the first letter and "agreed not to maintain in Israel judicial or criminal investigative machinery of its own, unless approved by the Government."<sup>3</sup>

It is clear that in law the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency is an organ of the Israeli Government. The State and Diaspora Jewry were two branches of one nation - 'the Jewish people' - with the Zionist Organization performing certain assigned governmental tasks or functions on behalf of the State. The recognition accorded to the World Zionist Organization in the 'Status Law' and Covenant is equivalent to the status granted to a subordinate arm or department within the Government of Israel and subject to Israeli law. Ben-Gurion was most explicit when he explained

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p.109.

the reasons for all these legal maneuvers:

"The State cannot interfere in the domestic affairs of the Jewish communities in the Diaspora, cannot give them instructions or make demands upon them. For all the dedication that marks the State on its path to resurrection, and in the tasks laid upon it, it must still behave as does every state, and its power outside its frontiers is scant. It is just there that the Zionist Organization, founded upon free-will association and voluntary effort, has the occasion and ability to do what the State neither can nor may."<sup>1</sup>

Emphasis should be given to the phrase "to do what the State neither can nor may." Israeli leaders want the Zionist Movement to operate in foreign countries as an integral arm of the Government but wish to convey the impression that the Zionist Organization works under the principle of a 'free-will association and voluntary effort' image. On the surface the World Zionist Organization does not appear to support the political program of a sovereign state.

By initiating these legal maneuvers, the Zionists hoped to attract non-Zionist financial resources. The Israeli leaders felt that the destiny of the State depended upon the political and especially financial support of world Jewry. Ben-Gurion's campaigns in the United States were directed at the 'big donors' who were mostly non-Zionist.

Besides attracting large sums of money, the Zionist Organization was to perform another function. It was to foster the unity of 'the Jewish people' whether Zionists, non-Zionists or anti-Zionists. The Zionist Movement could better achieve this goal if it appeared to be a spontaneous and

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<sup>1</sup>David Ben-Gurion, Rebirth and Destiny of Israel Edited and Trans. by Morekhai Nurock. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954), pp. 505-506. A paraphrase of this quotation by Ben-Gurion can be found in Israel Government Year-Book, 5713 (1952), p.38-39.

voluntary association not an arm of the Government of Israel. Nahum Goldmann, currently President of the Zionist Executive, stated that the purpose of the Covenant was two-fold. First, the Covenant was to provide practical "co-operation between various departments of the Jewish Agency and Government Ministries, between Government officials, Ministers of State and the heads of various departments of the Jewish Agency."<sup>1</sup> Second, Goldmann stressed the importance of the special status granted by the State to the Zionist Organization which "is the instrument for the fulfillment of the historical task ... [but] it depends on the Jewish people."<sup>2</sup>

Reorganization within the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency was made in order to put the Zionist apparatus more in line with the program or tasks it was to carry out. Seven major departments were created out of the pre-independence twenty-five departments of the Palestine Executive. These included: an Economic Department, Public Relations, Latin American Department, Youth Department, Immigration Department, Research Department, Cultural Department and "miscellaneous activities relating to colonization work and the absorption of immigrants; the purchase of supplies and materials; the financing of the program of the Jewish Agency in Israel by means of loans and fund raising activities."<sup>3</sup> The Twenty-

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<sup>1</sup>Nahum Goldmann, "The State of the Zionist Organization and Its Standing in Israel and the World Today," in Report, 9th Meeting of the Fourth Session of the Zionist General Council After the 25th Zionist Congress, March 18-26, 1963, in Jerusalem, Addresses, Debates, Resolutions (Jerusalem: The Organization Department of the Zionist Executive, n.d. (ca. 1963), p.30.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.31. Italics added.

<sup>3</sup>Lasky, p.33. This list was filed in a Supplemental Registration Statement of the Jewish Agency for Palestine to the Attorney-General of the United States on February 20, 1950.



third Congress stressed the need to develop cultural and educational links between the State and Diaspora Jewry as a means of instilling and furthering Jewish immigration, particularly youth aliyah to Israel. In 1952, a Torah Culture and Education Department was added to the Zionist Organization "to foster the study of Israel problems and Zionism in religious schools and rabbinical seminaries."<sup>1</sup>

The Zionists wanted to form an association of all American Jewish organizations in order to create a facade which would 'speak for American Jewry'. It was not to be a formal organization like the Jewish Agency but would constitute an informal gathering of Jewish leaders under Zionist auspices. In December, 1953, American Jewish leaders met in Jerusalem and agreed to form an American Council for Israel to serve as a body to co-ordinate and plan large-scale activities to aid Israel. The American Jewish Committee refused to participate. On October 16, 1954, a meeting of the Presidents of sixteen<sup>2</sup> (later seventeen) major American Jewish Organizations was convened by Goldmann. This meeting was referred to as the 'cabinet of Presidents' and was led by Philip Klutznick, the President of B'nai B'rith. The participants in this so-called 'non-Zionist' body agreed to meet periodically to consult on matters of common concern to Israel and American Jewry. Between October, 1954, and February, 1957, the 'Cabinet of Seventeen Presidents' which later assumed the name of the 'Presidents Conference' met at least six times. Meetings were sometimes held in the Jewish Agency offices in New York and always

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p.34. In a Supplemental Registration Statement filed on June 16, 1952.

<sup>2</sup> For a list of the Sixteen Organizations represented see Elmer Berger, "An Appeal to Non-Zionist Jews," Issues, XVI, No. 7 (Winter, 1962-1963), p.58.

with Nahum Goldmann, President of the Zionist Organization, there. This so-called 'President's Conference' continues to meet until the present, but its success in aiding Israel by attracting non-Zionist help has been limited.<sup>1</sup>

The major reorganization and clarification of work was laid down. The stage was set for another World Zionist Congress where the success or failure of the reorganization and legal maneuvers would be aired.

#### Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces

From 1955 to 1960, Zionists, particularly Israeli Government officials, tried to consolidate the Zionist Organization into a more practical and pliable arm of the State. Despite the 'Status Law' and Covenant which outlined the new functions and the new relationship of the Zionist Movement to the Government, the Israeli Zionists were not satisfied. They felt that the officials in the World Zionist Organization were not undertaking their new tasks of the 'ingathering of exiles' and the fostering of Jewish unity with much enthusiasm. The efforts of the Zionist Organization had not brought the expected numbers of Western Jewish immigrants. According to Ben-Gurion and other Israeli officials, manpower is the greatest problem facing Israel. "We needed manpower to build houses for the new immigrants, roads, hospitals, schools, ports, ... to open up the Negev desert and establish farm settlements all over the country to grow food. Yet none of this development would be of any value if it were not protected"<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Berger, "The New Jew, ...," p.6.

<sup>2</sup>Pearlman, p.141.

by the armed forces.

During this period a great controversy arose over the extent and amount of participation in Israeli life that was expected from 'the Jewish people'. The officials of the Zionist Organization led by Nahum Goldmann felt that Diaspora Jewry, so long as it supported the Zionist 'experiment' financially and politically, should also be able to have a say in the practical aspects of Zionism. However, the Government of Israel was firmly opposed to 'the Jewish people' represented by their spokesman in the Zionist Organization from having any say in Israeli domestic affairs. Ben-Gurion repeated there was no Zionism without 'aliyah' (immigration). Ben-Gurion continued to speak on behalf of the 'Jewish people' and to scorn them for not immigrating to the 'historic homeland'.

XXIV Twenty-fourth Congress. - In April, 1956, the Twenty-fourth Congress was held in Jerusalem.<sup>1</sup> This Congress concentrated its attention on debating the methods and pressures needed to bring Western Jews to Israel.<sup>2</sup> Whereas the previous Zionist Congress had discussed the principle of the 'ingathering of exiles', the major speakers spoke of the increasing dangers of assimilation among Western Jewry and urged the Congress to find ways to remedy this deplorable situation.

Nahum Goldmann, Chairman of the Zionist Executive, declared that

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<sup>1</sup>Originally, the Congress was to meet in February. Nahum Goldmann, the President of the Zionist Executive, changed the date to April because he wanted the American Zionists to be completely free to campaign and pressure Congressmen in Washington. A U.S.-Israel mutual security pact was due to come before the American Congress in February. See "World Zionist Congress," Council News, X, No. 1 (January, 1956), p.15.

<sup>2</sup>"Let's Avoid Being Normal: Some Vignettes from the World Zionist Congress," Council News, X, No. 6 (June, 1956), p.5.

without the State of Israel the survival of 'the Jewish people' would be in danger, and the task of Zionism today, "is how to utilize this source [Israel], how to link the Diaspora to Israel, both communal life and the individual life of every Jew in the Diaspora."<sup>1</sup> Goldmann went on to remind Israel that:

"while Zionism was in no way attempting to interfere with the State, Israel was forgetting that its existence was not the culmination of Herzl's vision, but only one step towards his goal."<sup>2</sup>

Goldmann, often called the Prime Minister of Diaspora Jewry, repeatedly reminded Israel that she was dependent upon the Diaspora and could not completely ignore the criticisms of Jews living outside her territorial borders. Diaspora Jewry desired to participate in the practical programs of Zionism and was not going to be written out of the upbuilding of the State.<sup>3</sup> Zionists could continue to call themselves Zionists even though they had no intention of immigrating to Israel.

Ben-Gurion continuously repeated that there could be no Zionism without immigration to Israel. Any Jew who wished to call himself a Zionist must come to Israel. He declared that his first loyalty was to 'the Jewish people'. Ben-Gurion agreed with Goldmann that all national Zionist Organizations had a "collective obligation ... to aid the Jewish State under all circumstances and conditions even if such an attitude clashes with their respective national authorities."<sup>4</sup> Zionists everywhere

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid. Italics added.

<sup>2</sup>Polk, p.213.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Hedley Cooke, Israel: A Blessing and A Curse (London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 1960), p.273.

were urged to disregard their 'dual loyalty' inhibitions and to support the State of Israel.

The Congress considered the merger of the Jewish National Fund (the Keren Kayemeth) and the Palestine Foundation Fund (the Keren Hayesod) because many of their activities overlapped, and the same key officials sat on the boards of both funds.<sup>1</sup>

A resolution was passed authorizing the Zionist General Council to draw up and adopt a new Constitution for the World Zionist Organization in view of its new activities and status since the establishment of the State. The Congress elected Nahum Goldmann as President of the Zionist Organization and Berl Locker as Chairman of the Zionist Executive Council.

The controversy over the unity of 'the Jewish people' and over their participation in the practical programs of the State persisted following the Twenty-fourth Congress in April, 1956. This argument had hampered the practical programs of the Zionist Organization. In the summer of 1957, an Ideological Conference was held in Jerusalem in order to thrash out this dispute between Ben-Gurion, the Prime Minister of the State, and Nahum Goldmann, the President of the World Zionist Organization. Representatives of all Territorial Unions and Zionist societies gathered to hear and decide the issue between the two contestants.<sup>2</sup>

Also involved in this dispute were the representatives of the non-Zionist American Jewish Committee who were extremely disturbed at the attempts

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<sup>1</sup>Marver Bernstein, The Politics of Israel: The First Decade of Statehood (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p.151.

<sup>2</sup>Norman Bentwich, Israel Resurgent (rev. and enl. ed., London: Benn, 1960), p.219.

of Ben-Gurion and other Zionists to speak in the name of 'the Jewish people' and to insist that their children should immigrate to Israel.<sup>1</sup>

Ben-Gurion opened the Conference and suggested that there existed an essential unity between Israel and the rest of Jewry. It was left to Goldmann to outline the vital relationship between the State and the Diaspora:

"The relation between the Yishuv living here and the part of the people not living in Israel has to be one of the fullest cooperation and partnership, not one of builders who are citizens of Israel and helpers who are friends of Israel. On this partnership, on this greatest common effort of our and future Jewish generations will depend, in my judgement, both the destiny of Israel and the destiny of the Jewish people as a whole."<sup>2</sup>

According to Goldmann, it is up to the Diaspora to create this organic partnership. He called for a re-orientation by Jews living in Western countries, "Diaspora Jewry must have the courage to proclaim and defend its relationship of partnership and responsibility vis-a-vis Israel."<sup>3</sup> The fear of double loyalty must be overcome by Diaspora Jewry.

The most important result of the Ideological Conference was the formulation of a fresh cultural demand - all Jews must now know or be taught Hebrew. It was hoped that the furtherance of Hebrew would create a common bond between Israel and all Jews living outside Israel. Moshe Sharett summed up the new Zionist-Israeli policy and confessed that other

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<sup>1</sup>Eytan, p.183.

<sup>2</sup>Forum for the Problems of Zionism, Jewry, and the State of Israel; Vol. IV: Proceedings of the Jerusalem Ideological Conference (Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization, Spring, 1959), p.125. Cited hereafter as Forum for the Problems of Zionism....

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p.131.

means would have to be utilized in order to induce Western Jewry to immigrate. He suggested that Diaspora Jewry would have to be educated by the Zionists to the dangers of assimilation and integration and declared that "the spiritual attraction of life in Zion liberated and reconstructed" would have to be stressed.<sup>1</sup>

The newest task for the Zionist Organization is to enter the educational field. While teaching the Hebrew language in Jewish schools and synagogues, the Zionist instructor was to impart a subtle propaganda urging Jewish students to immigrate to their 'homeland' in Israel. From this new propaganda technique it was hoped that a fresh cultural bond between the State and Western Jewry would be created in the knowledge of Hebrew as the traditional Jewish tongue.

The non-Zionists were disappointed at the outcome of the Ideological Conference because it failed to resolve the dilemma of Zionists living in free societies.

Israeli officials led by Ben-Gurion insisted on their right to speak on behalf of 'the Jewish people' in spite of protests from the non-Zionists and from other Jews in the Diaspora. The 'Status Law' and Covenant had defined the relationship between the State and the Zionist Movement and had defined the tasks the Zionist Organization was to perform on behalf of the State. One of these tasks was to speak for 'the Jewish people'. Ben-Gurion and other Israeli officials disregarded the 'Status Law' provisions and the diminution of their authority to speak for 'the Jewish people'.

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<sup>1</sup>Moshe Sharett, "Israel's Obligations to the Diaspora," in Forum for the Problems of Zionism..., p.224.

To counter their critics and to legalize their claim to speak for 'the Jewish people', a bill was presented to the Knesset which was designed to legally secure their claims and to invest them with the authority to speak for 'the Jewish people'.

On December 19, 1959, the Knesset passed an enactment not only granting continued validity to the 'Status Law' and Covenant but also spelling out the aims of the Israeli Government through its support for the Zionist Movement. The enactment was as follows:

"In accordance with the World Zionist Organization Status Law and the Covenant between the Government and the Zionist Executive, the Government will give its loyal support to the Zionist Movement - stressing the demand for: personal fulfillment of Zionist aims and increased voluntary financial aid; the propagation of the Hebrew language; the fostering of the pioneering movement; immigration of children and youth; the expansion of immigration and settlement and the flow of capital to Israel; the attraction of Jewish youth from all countries to obtain secondary and higher education on Israel; support for Israel in its struggle for its rights and international position; deepening of Jewish consciousness and unity among the Jews of the Diaspora, and the fight against all signs of assimilation and denial of Jewish peoplehood."<sup>1</sup>

Emphasis should be placed on the phrases, "support for Israel in its struggle for its rights and international position; and deepening of Jewish consciousness and unity among the Jews of the Diaspora."<sup>2</sup> By these two phrases the Israeli Knesset sought to legally confirm and invest the Government with the authority to speak on behalf of all Jews. In Zionist-Israeli semantics Israel's 'rights and international position' mean the right of the State to safeguard her international standing by speaking for 'the Jewish people'. The State was authorized to fight

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<sup>1</sup> Israel Government Year-Book, 1959-60 (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1960), p.94.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. Italics added.



any "denial of Jewish peoplehood". By implication it meant extending Israeli sovereignty outside Israeli territory because 'the Jewish people' lived all over the world. The tasks Diaspora Jewry were to perform for the State through the World Zionist Organization were explicitly reiterated. The newest tasks passed by the Ideological Conference of 1957 were included - "the propagation of the Hebrew language" and "the fight against all signs of assimilation."

Following the Knesset enactment the Zionist General Council adopted a new constitution for the World Zionist Organization during the last week of December, 1959.<sup>1</sup> The new Constitution kept the same structural organization of the Zionist Movement with minor changes. The basic aim and policy of the World Zionist Organization remained and was reconfirmed in the Basle Program. The 'Task of Zionism' resolution which was passed by the Twenty-third Congress (1951) was incorporated into the new Constitution.

The World Zionist Organization was made the central body of the Zionist Movement which meant that no insubordination would be tolerated. Article IV firmly stated that:

"The World Zionist Organization is the central body authorized by its Members to act for and in behalf of the whole of the Movement and of all the Members in the implementation of the Zionist Programme."<sup>2</sup>

Articles V and VII declared that all Territorial Unions must accept the Zionist Program, the new Constitution and the direction of the Zionist

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<sup>1</sup>The 1959 Constitution can be found in Reports ... December, 1960, pp. 601-25. The Twenty-fourth Congress (1956) had authorized the General Council to draw up a new constitution.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.602.

Executive.<sup>1</sup>

According to Article XIII the Zionist Congress was to convene every three years, but meetings could be postponed by the General Council in accordance with Article XVI. A 75<sup>0</sup>/o vote of a majority of members on the General Council was necessary to postpone a Congress meeting, but a new date must be decided upon at the time of postponement.<sup>2</sup>

Article XIV confirmed that 'Institutions of the World Zionist Organization' meant the Keren Kayemeth and the Keren Hayesod - United Jewish Appeal and other such institutions. Thus, the new Constitution declared that these institutions or agencies were official extensions of the Zionist Movement. However, the Zionist Organization was not ready to officially promulgate its relationship with these institutions or agencies, particularly in America, for fear of losing the 'free voluntary association' appeal image that had been carefully nurtured over the years.<sup>3</sup>

In Article XVII the percentage of delegates each country would be allowed was precisely allocated with the view that Israel would have the largest representation at the Congress. The number of delegates allocated was as follows: Israel would have 38<sup>0</sup>/o; the United States would have 29<sup>0</sup>/o; and the rest of the countries would have 33<sup>0</sup>/o to divide between themselves according to shekel-payers. The Israeli delegation will always be able to outvote the American delegates who form the largest body of critics of Israeli and Ben-Gurion's policies. It seems improbable

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p.603.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 604-606.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p.605.

that the rest of Diaspora Jewry could join forces to outvote the Israeli Zionists unless under highly exceptional circumstances where the whole of Diaspora Jewry would stand against the State.<sup>1</sup>

According to Articles XXI and XXII the price of the Shekel was to be determined by an Area Shekel Board by a two-thirds vote. Previously, the Zionist Organization had determined the price of the Shekel. A Shekel purchaser had to be eighteen years old and had to be twenty-one in order to become a delegate.<sup>2</sup>

Membership on the General Council was raised to ninety-six in Article XXIII. The Congress was to elect members of the General Council according to the relative strength of the groupings or factional parties at the Congress. Article XXXIV stipulated that the General Council must hold a session at least once a year.<sup>3</sup>

According to Article XXXIX the President of the World Zionist Organization was to act as 'head and chief representative' of the Zionist Organization and preside over Executive meetings. In the case a vacancy in the Presidency should occur, the Chairman of the Executive would take over.<sup>4</sup>

Articles XL-XLV defined the duties of the Executive of the World Zionist Organization which did not differ from the previous constitution.<sup>5</sup>

Articles XLVI-LVIII dealt with the position and duties of the Judicial Bodies of the Zionist Organization which also did not differ from

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 606-607.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 608.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 612.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 614.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 616-618.

the previous constitution.

To amend the Constitution a majority of Congress delegates is needed along with two-thirds of those voting according to Article LXIV.<sup>1</sup>

Between the promulgation of the 1959 Knesset Enactment and the Twenty-fifth Zionist Congress in December, 1960, Israeli officials tried to establish their 'right' as granted in the 1959 Enactment to speak on behalf of 'the Jewish people'. Ben-Gurion constantly repeated Israel's right to speak for all Jewry and insisted as he always had that all Jews who call themselves Zionists must immigrate to Israel. When American or British Jews objected, they were met with curt retorts from Ben-Gurion and Golda Meir, the Foreign Minister. In April, 1960, at a London gathering Golda Meir stated in precise words the aim of the Government:

"Israel is determined not to yield the right to speak on any Jewish subject. If there are Jews abroad who find themselves embarrassed by this attitude, let them be embarrassed."<sup>2</sup>

In other words, the Government of Israel was willing to write off Diaspora Jewry's criticisms in order to achieve her objective of speaking for all Jews.

Nahum Goldmann, the President of the Zionist Organization, differed with the Israeli officials. He had realized long before that the Israeli official attitude which was nothing more than Ben-Gurion's old policy of contempt for Zionists who did not immigrate, would estrange the sympathy of American and British Jews. Goldmann wanted Israel and the Zionist Organization to work as partners among Diaspora Jewry instead of fighting each other over

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p.624.

<sup>2</sup>Clarence L. Coleman, "Aspirations of U.S. Jews: The Spirit of Independence," Issues, XVI, No. 7 (Winter, 1962-63), p.23.

their 'rights' to speak for all Jews and over their respective tasks each was to perform. In November, 1960, Goldmann stated, before the Twenty-fifth Zionist Congress convened that:

"all Israel diplomats are to remain in permanent contact with Zionist organizations of the countries to which they are assigned, and it is incumbent on visiting Israel Government officials to work with local Zionist organizations in contacts with local Jewish communities, to assure maximum benefits to<sup>1</sup> the local community and Zionist movement from their visits."

Goldmann was directly informing the Israeli officials that it was in their best interests to cooperate with the Zionist Movement and to listen to some of the criticisms of Diaspora Jewry.

XXV. Twenty-fifth Congress. - The Twenty-fifth Zionist Congress was held from the 30th of December, 1959 through the first week of January, 1960. It is commonly referred to as the 'Congress of Aliyah' (Immigration) because every speaker before the Congress called for the immigration of all Diaspora Jews to Israel. According to Ben-Gurion, "The problem of aliyah is the central problem of the State of Israel and the entire Jewish people."<sup>2</sup>

Throughout the Congress meetings, the means to stimulate aliyah were discussed in great detail and at great length. Education for aliyah was thought to be "The key to mass emigration of western Jews,"<sup>3</sup> particularly, youth immigration. American Jewry was the prime target. According to a member of the Zionist Executive Zionists felt that European sources of

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<sup>1</sup>Joseph Roucek, "Political Limits of Cultural Pluralism," Issues, XVI, No. 2 (Spring, 1962), p.25.

<sup>2</sup>Leonard R. Sussman, Zionism's 4-Year Plan: The 25th World Zionist Congress (New York: The American Council for Judaism, February, 1961), p.5.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p.2.

immigration had dried up, and America had the only remaining pool of European Jews which was untapped. The only other source left were the Oriental Jews who were a burden to the State because they were illiterate, impoverished and backward.<sup>1</sup>

Many non-Zionist organizations and community leaders<sup>2</sup> were invited to attend the 1960 Congress as Associate Members or Fraternal Delegates or Observers. Goldman had long urged the inclusion of non-Zionists at Zionist Congress meetings in order to help "in our endeavors to implement our new policy of enlarging the framework of our Organization, and of bringing about closer cooperation with all Jewish groups that are ready to cooperate with Israel."<sup>3</sup>

The resolutions adopted by the Congress present a clear view of the major aim and policy of the Zionist Movement. All activities of the Zionist Organization were to be concentrated on 'Jewish and Zionist education of youth in the Diaspora'. Members of the World Zionist Organization were:

"to mobilize their best spiritual forces and material means for the consolidation, extension and intensification of Jewish national education based on Jewish tradition, the Hebrew language and the personal ties with the State of Israel. The Congress considers the ingathering of the exiles as a national mission towards which the education of the present generation should be oriented."<sup>4</sup>

Various methods and programs were to be initiated and encouraged to promote youth aliyah. These included: the study of the Hebrew language,

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<sup>1</sup> A statement made by Elishu Dobkin, Head of the World Zionist Organization's Department of Immigration. See Litvinoff, pp. 15-16.

<sup>2</sup> These included the American Jewish Congress, B'nai B'rith and others. See Sussman, p.27.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p.8.

Fund Drives, World Jewish Youth Organization, Special emissaries sent from Israel, all-day Jewish schools, youth study programs in Israel, training of teachers for work in the Diaspora, Bible study, women's groups, provision of 'proper' textbooks on recent Jewish history, World Jewish Teachers' Organization, World Convention on Jewish education and World Hebrew Union.<sup>1</sup> All these programs were designed to secure a decisive influence over Diaspora Jewry and to instruct Jewish students in the principles of Zionism and aliyah. Israeli Hebrew was to be taught in lieu of Biblical Hebrew.

Immigration of all Jews was to be encouraged and special branches were to be set up for middle class immigration, free professions immigration and capitalist immigration.<sup>2</sup> Every Jew was to be told that he or she had national responsibilities towards Israel and could never hope to live a full Jewish life outside Israel.

The Congress voted to establish a 'Bureau for Jewish Communities and Organizations', under the direction of the Jewish Agency's Organization Department. It was charged with the task of "strengthening ties with Jewish communities and organizations not affiliated or associated with Zionist organizations."<sup>3</sup> This Bureau was to stimulate immigration from America, Great Britain and the Latin American countries to Israel by "implementing programs such as 'visits by delegations of community and organization key workers; visits by youth groups to Israel and the holding of seminars in

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 16-19.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.8.

<sup>3</sup>Benjamin Matovu, "Between Two Governments - Zionist Congress' Dilemma," Issues, XIX, No. 1 (Spring, 1965), p.4.

Israel; study days in the Diaspora countries; supply of informational material; dispatch lecturers; attendance at conferences; research work, etc."<sup>1</sup>

The delegates approved the unification of the National Committees of the Jewish National Fund and the Palestine Foundation Fund (Keren Hayesod) in Israel. The General Council had accomplished this task following a resolution of the Twenty-fourth Congress (1956) asking the General Council to see about the possibility of uniting these agencies.<sup>2</sup> This was part of a move to reorganize and centralize the Zionist structure into a more efficient organization.

The Amplification of Israeli Claims to Speak  
on Behalf of 'the Jewish People'.

The Israeli Government seems to be determined to advance its 'historic legal claims' to speak on behalf of 'the Jewish people.' These claims have been put forward since the time of Theodor Herzl and the Basle Program. Zionists claim that the Balfour Declaration, the Mandate Articles and the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel further their claims to speak for all Jews. The entire governmental prestige and authority of the State is committed to these policies and legal claims and to their implementation and effectuation into law. The Knesset incorporated into law the State's claim of 'the Jewish people' in the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law (1950), the Law of Return (1950), the

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 4-5.

<sup>2</sup>Reports, ... December, 1960, p.21 and 469.



Nationality Law (1950), the 'Status' Law (1952) and the 1959 Enactment. The Executive led by the Prime Minister have always added direct comment and interpretation to 'the Jewish people' claims. It was left for the Judiciary to articulate these 'historic legal claims' in the context of international law.

The Zionists found their chance to further their claims to 'the Jewish people' with their kidnapping of Adolph Eichmann on Argentinian soil in 1960 and secretly flying Eichmann to Israel in order to try him before an Israeli court. 'The bringing to justice' of one of the major Nazi leaders was only one of the ends the State sought at the trial. The State defended its jurisdictional right to judge Eichmann on the grounds that it spoke for 'the Jewish people' "who were victims of Eichmann's offenses and did not recognize any universality of jurisdiction."<sup>1</sup> Some legal apologists have argued that although the State of Israel was not in existence when Eichmann's crimes were committed elsewhere, Israel is "legally continuous with the Jewish community of Palestine' which reached back to the Balfour Declaration and which was therefore already in being when Eichmann's offenses were committed."<sup>2</sup> Israel accused Eichmann not of crimes against humanity or individual Jews but of crimes against 'the Jewish people'.

The Israeli claims to speak for 'the Jewish people' are contained in the Eichmann Trial Judgment. The Trial itself was used as a platform to advance these so-called 'historic legal claims' in as many ways as

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<sup>1</sup>Oscar Handlin, "The Ethics of the Eichmann Case," Issues, XV, No. 1 (Winter, 1961), p.3.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.4.

possible. The Israeli Court assumed and based its arguments on the fact that the State is the legally recognized sovereign agent of 'the Jewish people', when action or international representation are needed. By constant repetition of this same basic claim in as many different contexts as possible, the Eichmann Trial Judgment tried to build a record of association and agreement with other countries in international law. The same old claims are restated and extended, and new claims are added to the old ones. Therefore, the Trial Judgment sought to create a whole system of national rights and obligations binding 'the Jewish people' to the State of Israel, since the establishment of the State had bestowed 'certain rights' upon all Jews as a collectivity. The Trial Judgment stated:

"In the light of the recognition by the United Nations of the right of the Jewish people to establish their State, and in the light of the recognition of the established Jewish state by the family of nations, the connection between the Jewish people and the State of Israel constitutes an integral part of the law of nations."<sup>1</sup>

The claim of a juridical connection between the State and 'the Jewish people' is stated, "as though it were already established as 'an integral part of the law of nations'."<sup>2</sup>

This alleged legal connection between the State and 'the Jewish people' was declared to be self-evident. Therefore, 'the Jewish people' were a recognized body politic. Every Jew owed national obligations to Israel regardless of whether these obligations to participate in Zionist activities ran counter to the laws of the country of their citizenship. The objective of the Eichmann Trial Judgment was to demonstrate that "only

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<sup>1</sup>Mallison, p.1045.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.1046.

the Zionist State of Israel seeks to protect the Jewish victims of the Nazis."<sup>1</sup> The international legal recognition of the collective rights of 'the Jewish people' enabled the State to undertake international action on behalf of 'the Jewish people' which would be impossible for individual Jews living in other countries.

The Zionists in the process of amplifying their claims to speak for 'the Jewish people' also extended their structural organization for fulfilling Israeli-Zionist aims. In expanding their operations, the Zionists brought themselves under the scrutiny of American law. As early as 1959, the Under Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Fred Scribner, told a gathering of representatives of various organizations that the American Government and the Internal Revenue Service were concerned about the operations of domestic organizations working overseas which he termed 'conduit organizations'.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Gottlieb Hammer, the Chairman of the Jewish Agency for Israel, Inc. had attended this meeting and realized the implications that the Jewish Agency and its multiple affiliates might lose their tax deductible privileges and that the Jewish Agency for Israel's affiliates might have to register with the U.S. Department of Justice under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938. The Jewish Agency-American Section had been registered with the U.S. Department of Justice since 1943 as the representative of the Jewish Agency for Israel, Jerusalem. Likewise, the Jewish Agency for Israel, Inc. was registered with the Department of Justice as the representative of the Jewish

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<sup>1</sup>"Activities of Non-Diplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the United States," Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Eighth Congress, First Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), Part IX, p.1235. Cited hereafter as Hearings.

Agency for Israel, Jerusalem. The two major subsidiary branches of the Jewish Agency for Israel, Jerusalem - the American Zionist Council and the United Jewish Appeal - had never been registered nor did the Zionists intend to register them.

The Zionists decided to reorganize their total Jewish Agency structure in America in order to buttress their position in regard to the Internal Revenue Service and to enhance their 'free-will association and voluntary effort' image before the American Jewish public. On April 1, 1960, the reorganization took place. The Jewish Agency - American Section transferred some of its political and educational functions to the American Zionist Council,<sup>1</sup> an affiliate of the Jewish Agency/World Zionist Organization structure, which was not registered. The American Zionist Council was acting as the co-ordinating agency of all Zionist organizations operating in the United States. The Jewish Agency for Israel, Inc. was also reorganized as an American controlled corporation which, in theory, was to act independently of the Jewish Agency for Israel, Jerusalem in the allocation of American raised funds overseas.<sup>2</sup> The newly reorganized board of the Jewish Agency for Israel, Inc. had the United Israel Appeal<sup>3</sup> holding fourteen or two-thirds of the seats and the Jewish

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<sup>1</sup>Matovu, p.3.

<sup>2</sup>Hearings, Part IX, 1229-31 and 1235.

<sup>3</sup>The United Israel Appeal is a fund-raising body for the Zionist structure and is controlled by the Zionist Organization through the Keren Hayesod, the official fiscal arm of the World Zionist Organization which holds 60% of the seats on the Executive Committee of the United Israel Appeal, see Lasky, pp. 19-20.

Agency-American Section holding seven or one-third of the seats.<sup>1</sup> As a result of the reorganization of the Jewish Agency for Israel, Inc., the Zionists felt its Foreign Agents Registration could be dropped.<sup>2</sup>

These maneuvers ran afoul of American law. In 1960, the U.S. Department of Treasury compelled the United Jewish Appeal, an affiliate in the Zionist structure, to "stop direct subventions by the Jewish Agency to political parties in Israel".<sup>3</sup> In 1962, Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, decided to investigate the methods and techniques employed by nine various organizations operating as foreign agents in the United States. The Jewish Agency and all its subsidiary branches were examined as one of the nine organizations chosen.

On May 23, and again on August 1, 1963, Senator Fulbright conducted his investigations before the Senate Committee on U.S. Foreign Relations. The Committee sought to find the means by which the United Jewish Appeal funds found their way to Israel and then back to the United States for use as propaganda funds. The Committee investigated the two largest items of expenditures the Jewish Agency-American Section had listed in its Registration Statements. These expenditures were put as 'Grants and subventions' and 'Payments to affiliates'. Due to the Department of Justice's failure to require that these expenditures be itemized, the Committee felt that the American public was unaware of the public relations activities the Jewish Agency structure conducted in the United States on behalf of Israel

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<sup>1</sup> ~~Notes~~ Hearings, Part IX, pp. 1230-31.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., pp. 1218 and 1237.

<sup>3</sup> Clarence L. Coleman, "US Rejects The 'Jewish People' Concept," Issues, XVIII, No. 6 (Fall-Winter, 1964), p.47.

and was also unaware of the political and financial support rendered to various 'front' organizations and groups which acted as 'conduits' for these funds.

The Committee found that the Jewish Agency-American Section used the American Zionist Council as a 'conduit' organization for Jewish Agency funds destined for other groups, organizations or individuals.<sup>1</sup> An examination of the structure of the American Zionist Council revealed a well-knit and highly financial mechanism geared to the promulgation of Zionist-Israeli policies in the United States. The nine departments of the American Zionist Council bore similar names and functions to those in the Jewish Agency for Israel, Jerusalem.<sup>2</sup> It was found that the budget of the American Zionist Council was financed by United Jewish Appeal funds through the approval of the Jewish Agency for Israel, Inc.<sup>3</sup> These United Jewish Appeal funds go on paper via the Jewish Agency for Israel, Inc. to the Jewish Agency for Israel, Jerusalem. In turn, the Jewish Agency for Israel, Jerusalem transmits about 80<sup>0</sup>/<sub>o</sub> of the United Jewish Appeal funds back to America through the Jewish Agency-American Section which then hands these funds over to the American Zionist Council.<sup>4</sup> In a last minute effort to try and avoid being disclosed as a foreign agent, the American Zionist Council resolved not to take any more funds from the Jewish Agency-American

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<sup>1</sup>Hearings, Part IX, p. 1315 and 1320.

<sup>2</sup>For a list of the American Zionist Council's Departments and their functions, see Ibid., pp. 1238-41.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 1241 and 1249.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., pp. 1320-21 and 1333-37.

Section and transferred four departments to the Jewish Agency-American Section on January 22, 1963.<sup>1</sup> These transfers and refusal of funds took place only theoretically as the Committee discovered. To blur the legal distinctions between various bodies, the technique of using almost identical names for the Jewish Agency was deliberate. The interlocking of directorates enabled the Jewish Agency-American Section to use the American Zionist Council, the United Jewish Appeal and other affiliates as conduit organizations.

As a result of the Senate Hearings the Justice Department requested the American Zionist Council to either register as a foreign agent of the Jewish Agency for Israel, Jerusalem, or to give up the Zionist program and funds from the Jewish Agency structure. The American Zionist Council decided to register as a Foreign Agent. However, the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem refused to allow such a registration, since it would involve the loss of the principle of 'free-will association and voluntary effort' image. The Jewish Agency Executive made it clear that it was not going to reorganize the American Zionist Council nor the American Jewish community. This reorganization would have to be carried out by American Zionists because it was feared that the American Government would not allow any organization connected with the Jewish Agency to function in the United States without registering.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p.1364.

<sup>2</sup>Matovu, pp. 3-4.

The investigations by the U.S. Senate had repercussions on the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency maneuvers. The Zionists were determined to continue their attempts to encourage the mass immigration of Western Jewry, particularly of American Jewry, to Israel. Since the establishment of the Bureau for Jewish Communities and Organizations at the Twenty-fifth Congress (1960), annual immigration through 1963 to Israel from the United States and Great Britain doubled and from Latin America had more than trebled.<sup>1</sup> The 'success' of the Bureau gave the Zionists confidence in their policy to encourage immigration.

On March 15, 1964, a joint meeting of the Israeli Cabinet and the entire Executive of the World Zionist Organization took place in Jerusalem to examine the problems facing Diaspora Jewry. This meeting was, in actual fact, a meeting of the Coordination Board which the Status Law had called for and the Covenant made operative. It coordinates at the highest levels the policies and programs of the Zionist-Israeli sovereignty.<sup>2</sup> On the following day a Joint Communique was issued which demonstrated further the integral juridical relationship between the State and the World Zionist Organization which the Status Law of 1952 established. The Joint Communique expressed the concern for "the preservation of the identity and unity of Jewish people in all the lands of the Dispersion and the strengthening of its emotional and material ties with the State of Israel."<sup>3</sup> The Government

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<sup>1</sup>Reports of the Executive of the Zionist Organization and the Executive of the Jewish Agency, Submitted to the Twenty-Sixth Zionist Congress in Jerusalem - December, 1964. (Jerusalem: The Jewish Agency, November, 1964), pp. 88-90.

<sup>2</sup>Elmer Berger, "... And Nothing But The Truth," Issues, XX, No. 1 (Spring, 1966), p.48.

<sup>3</sup>Text of the Joint Communique can be found in Jerusalem Post, March 16, 1964, p.8.



according to the Communique pledged itself to support "the Zionist Executive's plan of action in the Diaspora" and offered to lend its "full assistance to its realization."<sup>1</sup>

The importance of this meeting cannot be underestimated. A sovereign government and a world political organization, which are bound together through a formal covenant (1954), met and agreed on their future policies and responsibilities. The Joint Communique shows the continuing Zionist-Israeli efforts to implement Zionist nationalism in public law.<sup>2</sup>

Following the issuance of the Joint Communique on March 15th, a Zionist General Council meeting was called with 140 delegates from all over the world attending from March 16-23, 1964. The purpose of the gathering was to discuss the platform of the forthcoming World Zionist Congress in view of the Joint Communique. On March 23, 1964, Levi Eshkol, the Prime Minister, addressed the General Council and listed Israel's priorities. The first priority was "safeguarding the existence of the state", and the second priority required "a constant expansion of population ... for the 4th and 5th million."<sup>3</sup> Eshkol referred to the Joint Communique and pledged that:

"The Government will give its fullest moral and political support and if by any chance the efforts of the movement and of the people will not suffice in order to carry the material burden, the Government will lend a shoulder to the wheel if it should be required, and to the best of its abilities. The goal is a common one and effort to reach it will be made jointly."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Mallison, p.1049.

<sup>3</sup> Matovu, p.5.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p.6.

Eshkol promised financial aid to the Zionist Movement which in other words meant that the Israeli Government would subsidize these Zionist activities directly without the use of 'conduit' organizations.<sup>1</sup> In a resolution, the General Council acknowledged the Israeli Government's pledge given by Eshkol and confirmed the Zionist Organization's "efforts for the consolidation and development of the State of Israel and the educational and practical direction of the Jewish masses in the Diaspora, and especially the young generation, to Aliyah."<sup>2</sup>

The Zionist-Israeli claim that all Jews regardless of their nationality status were members of 'the Jewish people' had raised concern in certain American governmental circles. In international law silence or the failure to respond to a legal claim such as Israel's claim of sovereignty for 'the Jewish people' can be regarded as legal acquiescence. On April 20, 1964, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Phillips Talbot, wrote a letter to Elmer Berger, Executive Vice-President of the American Council for Judaism in reply to a letter from Rabbi Berger. In this letter Talbot rejected the legal-political relationship of 'the Jewish people' to the State of Israel. The second paragraph read:

"The Department of State recognizes the State of Israel as a sovereign State and citizenship of the State of Israel. It recognizes no other sovereignty or citizenship in connection therewith. It does not recognize a legal-political relationship based upon the religious identification of American citizens. It does not in any way discriminate among American citizens upon the basis of their religion."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Coleman, "US Rejects the 'Jewish People' Concept," p.49.

<sup>2</sup>Matovu, p.6.

<sup>3</sup>Text of the Talbot Letter can be found in Issues, XVIII, No. 6 (Fall-Winter, 1964), p. 2, or in Mallison, p.1075.

The Department of State rejected the Zionist-Israeli claims consistently advanced which bestowed upon every Jew an involuntary second nationality and an obligation and national responsibility to the State of Israel. The last two "sentences reflect juridical obligations of the United States Government which are binding upon it in United States constitutional law as well as in public international law."<sup>1</sup>

The third paragraph was the most important:

"Accordingly, it should be clear that the Department of State does not regard the 'Jewish people' concept as a concept of international law."<sup>2</sup>

This clear declaration is of considerable significance. The United States, which is a sovereign state, rejected 'the Jewish people' concept on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the established and recognized individual rights of its citizens of Jewish faith. It represented a check on the juridical incursions Zionism and the State had developed to involve every Jew with Israel. These included the following 'rights'. Every Jew had the 'legislated right' to enter Israel and acquire Israeli nationality. The Zionist Organization had the 'legislated right' to mobilize the support of all Jews for Israel's national interests. The Zionist-Israeli claim that 'the Jewish people' concept is an internationally recognized political and ethnical entity was challenged and rejected. Therefore, the context of the letter might suggest that the Zionist structure operating on the basis of Israeli law and a formal agreement or covenant derived from 'the Jewish people' concept was illegal.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Mallison, p.1066.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.1075.

<sup>3</sup>Berger, "... And Nothing But The Truth," p.53.

XXVI. Twenty-sixth Congress. - The Twenty-sixth Zionist Congress was held in Jerusalem from December 30, 1964 to January 10, 1965. The slogan for the Congress called for 'Accent on the Diaspora, recognition that the Zionist Organization must insure the national survival of the Jewish people.'<sup>1</sup> Levi Eshkol, the Prime Minister, stressed the principle of joint responsibility of the State and the World Zionist Organization which was essentially a reiteration of the Joint Communique of March, 1964.<sup>2</sup> The Congress concentrated on the 'Ingathering of Exiles' and, particularly, on attracting the young, skilled, Western Jews. For the first time non-Zionist observers were admitted in an 'advisory capacity' to attend the deliberations.<sup>3</sup> Eshkol expressed concern for "a critical stage in our immigration efforts. ... [which] are liable, before the next Zionist Congress, to exhaust the springs of immigration that now exist."<sup>4</sup>

The major controversy at the Congress involved the American Government's reaction to 'the Jewish people' concept and the disclosures of the Zionist network by the Senatorial Committee. Delegates and Israeli officials tried to analyse the ills of American Zionism which they said had shown "signs of organizational 'hardening of the arteries'."<sup>5</sup> American Zionist leaders requested "the Jewish Agency Executive 'to organize the communities along lines pursued by Chaim Weizmann ... when establishing the

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<sup>1</sup>Matovu, p.6.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.2.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p.8.

<sup>4</sup>Henry Moyer, "Refugees Become Manpower," Issues, XIX, No. 3 (Autumn, 1965), p. 22. Italics added.

<sup>5</sup>Matovu, p.3.

Keren Hayesod."<sup>1</sup> At least officially, the Israeli leaders refused to step in because they were afraid of losing the 'free-will association and voluntary effort' image so carefully nurtured over the years, and also they feared another American Congressional investigation which might prove more embarrassing. The Zionists were exploring for other means to overcome American legal difficulties.<sup>2</sup>

In a resolution passed unanimously by the delegates the Bureau for Jewish Communities and Organizations emerged as the solution for achieving Zionist objectives.<sup>3</sup> The Bureau's duties were extended, and it was to be identified organizationally as a 'non-Zionist' body. By viewing the 'success' of the Bureau among 'non-Zionist' organizations, it seemed better to employ that term for achieving Zionist immigration aims. Front groups or 'conduit' organizations were to be used even more than before."<sup>4</sup>

#### The Coordination Board

The Coordination Board operating at the highest levels in the Israeli Government and the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency Executive has, since its establishment in 1954, played an important role in coordinating Zionist-Israeli policies. Most of the activities of this Board are unknown and are kept top secret. The State of Israel does not wish to be officially

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Maurice Boukstein, the legal adviser and architect of the Jewish Agency and its corporate affiliates in the United States, participated in the final deliberations of the Congress, Ibid., p.7.

<sup>3</sup>For resolution see Ibid., p.8.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., pp. 7-8.

involved in the affairs of the Jewish Agency. Sometime in 1958, "the Coordination Board 'appointed a Committee composed of the Minister of Health, the Minister of Labour and the Heads of the Immigration and Absorption Departments ...' to revise the regulations for immigration... [which] are now 'binding on all those engaged in immigration and absorption work'."<sup>1</sup> All applications for immigration made to "an Israeli Consulate are automatically referred to the Immigration Department of the Jewish Agency which makes its recommendations in each case."<sup>2</sup>

The Israeli leaders were most concerned about encouraging Western Jewish immigration, since these Jews have the educational and technical skills required for the security and industry of the State. The largest untapped reservoir of Jews between the ages of twenty and forty was in the United States. Accordingly, the Coordination Board "set up a sub-committee, on the absorption of immigration from the U.S.A., containing Cabinet Ministers and members of the Jewish Agency Executive."<sup>3</sup> The mere fact that the Coordination Board established a secret committee to coordinate activities regarding American Jewish aliyah indicated the importance Israeli leaders attached to American Zionism. American Jewry were marked as the primary target for Israeli-Zionist activities. In line with this policy of mass American immigration, the Twenty-fifth Zionist Congress (1960) called for Western Jewish aliyah and set up the Bureau for Jewish Communities and Organizations which was designed to interfere in the lives of British,

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<sup>1</sup> Berger, "... And Nothing But The Truth," p.48. Italics added.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

American, and Latin American Jews and bring about their aliyah. During 1962, a 'Manpower Council' was formed, as a 'joint body of the Ministry of Labour' ... and 'the Immigration Department of the Jewish Agency', to locate and interview Jews possessing skilled and technical knowledge vital to Israeli industry and security.<sup>1</sup> If possible, those interviewed would be persuaded to immigrate to Israel or else urged to come for a few years with the hope that they might permanently remain.

The Joint Communique issued on March 16, 1964, was a direct result of a meeting of the Coordination Board. However, no news report explicitly said this was a Coordination Board declaration. The Israeli Cabinet and 'the entire Jewish Agency Executive' sought to further integrate their joint activities, "of which the primary aim is the preservation of the identity and unity of the Jewish people ... and the strengthening of its emotional and material ties with the State of Israel."<sup>2</sup> The Executive of the Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency was "to concentrate and invigorate its efforts in the Diaspora in the fields of the education of children and the youth, as well as by active participation in the activities of Jewish communities and Jewish international organizations."<sup>3</sup> Eshkol, the Prime Minister, in commenting on the Joint Communique cautioned that, "Zionists must not draw a distinction between the two complementary sections: the State and the people."<sup>4</sup> Here Eshkol spoke of the well-knit partnership between the State

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Mallison, p.1047.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p.1049.

and 'the Jewish people' as represented by the Zionist Organization and feared, that if the distinction were stressed, 'the Jewish people' nationality concept would suffer. The State of Israel is dependent upon 'the Jewish people' for immigration and for political and financial support.

In the spring of 1965, the Coordination Board established a 'Board for Cultural Activities in the Diaspora' which was to be an arm of the Coordination Board and was to "stimulate, strengthen and deepen educational, cultural and youth activities in the Diaspora."<sup>1</sup> Dr. Haim Yahil, a former senior member of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, is head of this newly created Board along with two Cabinet Ministers and two members of the Jewish Agency Executive. The Israeli Government and the Jewish Agency each provide about a million pounds to the new Board's annual budget. In turn, the Board makes grants to various other organizations or agencies like the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture which was founded in May, 1965.

The Coordination Board established what is called, 'The Immigration and Absorption Authority' in March, 1967. This Authority is to address itself to the "problems connected with Jewish immigrants to Israel and their successful absorption."<sup>2</sup> The management committee is headed by a Labour Ministry official and includes representatives from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Housing, the Ministry of Social Welfare and three Jewish Agency officials.<sup>3</sup>

The purpose of this new Board is to extend moral and financial aid

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<sup>1</sup>Berger, "... And Nothing But The Truth," p.50.

<sup>2</sup>Jewish Chronicle, March 17, 1967, p.21.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.



to its institutions and to coordinate planning between the various institutions while injecting a new impetus into cultural and educational activities "among the youth and students in order to train the requisite reserve of manpower."<sup>1</sup>

In summary, Moshe Sharett, former Chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency, Jerusalem, praised the efficiency and expertise of the Coordination Board. He referred to the close liaison and keen interest taken by the Prime Minister and the Israeli Cabinet in the activities and problems confronting the Board. In carrying out its duties, "a network of sub-committees of the Coordinating Committee has proliferated dealing with all sorts of questions."<sup>2</sup> The Coordination Board tries to keep its activities and sub-committees secret. Therefore, it is most difficult to obtain information on this high level coordinating mechanism which directs the activities and coordinates the programs of the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency with the requirements of the Government of the State of Israel.

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<sup>1</sup>This was written in an article by Mr. Yahlil of which part is reproduced in Berger, "... And Nothing But The Truth," pp. 50-51.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.51.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE CONCLUSION

The nature of the relationship between the State of Israel and the World Zionist Organization reflects the overwhelming importance attached to the 'State' in the Zionist solution to the Jewish problem. The preponderance of the State stems from the nature of Zionist aims, and the role the 'State' was designed to fulfill in the accomplishment of these aims. Political Zionism must be viewed in its historic perspective. The three basic tasks laid down in the Basle Program in 1897 remain. These three tasks were and still continue to be: the need to emphasize the building up of the Jewish national home, the need to foster unity among world Jewry, and the need to enlist the political support of Gentile nations, particularly, the leading Western countries. According to Herzl Zionism was to be the only solution to anti-Semitism, and the Jewish question was to become a national question. A Jewish nationality for 'all the Jewish people in a Jewish State' was to be the goal of political Zionism.

Ever since the First Zionist Congress in 1897, Zionist leaders sought to reconstruct the Jews as a nation and to create a basic national commitment and body polity on the part of 'the Jewish people'. Once the concept of 'the Jewish people' as a separate national entity and as a people having national rights and obligations was recognized, they could pursue a policy designed to obtain public law status for 'the Jewish people'. The

Zionist Organization entered into informal negotiations with various European states. On November 2, 1917, the British Government promulgated the Balfour Declaration and thus entered into formal international association with the World Zionist Organization. This international recognition of the Zionist Organization was a unilateral British act. Under these circumstances, the Zionists endeavored to obtain wider recognition of the Balfour Declaration and 'the Jewish people' concept. Other nations were approached and encouraged to endorse the Balfour Declaration. The Balfour Declaration became the first of a series of legal international agreements between some of the sovereign states of the world, like France, Italy, the United States and the World Zionist Organization and was incorporated into the British Mandate for Palestine. These agreements altered the status of the Zionist Organization from a private body to a public body.

From 1917 to 1948, the World Zionist Organization concentrated her efforts towards the establishment of the 'Jewish National Home' in Palestine. Gradually, the center of gravity within the Zionist Movement shifted to the 'Palestine Executive' and to the 'Yishuv' (Palestinian Jewry). However, it was not until the Proclamation of the State of Israel in 1948, that a new and final stratification of power and relationships within the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency emerged.

The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel (1948) specified the 'right' of 'the Jewish people' to be a nation 'in its own sovereign state', and 'the Zionist movement of the world' was to help the State.<sup>1</sup> The State of Israel was to be the central pillar for the unity of

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<sup>1</sup>Badi, p.11.

all Jews living in all parts of the world. Following this argument, the State claimed that it alone was competent to speak on behalf of 'the Jewish people' as a national entity and was the only political instrument through which Jews may express themselves. A Jew no matter where he dwelt was not simply a member of a religious group but possessed a national Jewish consciousness which automatically involved him in a supra-national and legal link to the State of Israel. In this manner the concept of dual loyalty or nationality was established in what Israel today claims is public international law.

Under normal conditions the establishment of the State would have been considered the fulfillment of the Basle Program, and the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency structure having accomplished its primary function, should have become defunct. Ben-Gurion and other Israeli leaders considered that the State and the Zionist Movement must cooperate and work together because Zionism is bound up with the State. The establishment of the State represented only the first step in the 'national redemption'. The Zionist leaders felt the Zionist Organization could serve as a link between the State and Diaspora Jewry and envisaged its new functions among Diaspora Jewry as raising money, urging immigration, fostering the unity of 'the Jewish people' and acting as a pressure group in the various countries of residence in favor of Israeli interests and policies.

The continuing need for the World Zionist Organization brought about the problem of the Zionist Movement's relationship to the State. As the State developed its own government and took over the functions of the Zionist Movement, the degrees of authority between the Government and the Zionist Organization became blurred. Officials of the Zionist Organization

and Israeli cabinet officers met to discuss the new relationship and functions between the Government and the World Zionist Organization and decided to co-ordinate fund-raising, immigration appeals, and budget planning. If these functions were to be carried out with ease, the relationship between the World Zionist Organization and the State needed to be formalized.

At the Twenty-third Congress in August, 1951, a 'Programme of Work' was adopted which clarified to some extent the relationship. The Zionist Organization's main tasks were to strengthen the State of Israel, to encourage the ingathering of exiles and to foster unity among 'the Jewish people'. It can be seen that all these 'tasks' are organized and directed as an integral part of the national interests of the State of Israel. The Twenty-third Congress also passed a resolution calling for an "appropriate legislative act" to be passed which would "grant status to the World Zionist Organization as the Representative of the Jewish people in all matters that relate to the organized participation of Jews the world over in the development and upbuilding of the land and the rapid absorption of its newcomers".<sup>1</sup>

On November 24, 1952, the Knesset enacted the 'World Zionist Organization - Jewish Agency for Palestine (Status) Law' which outlined the organic and legal relationship between the Zionist Organization and the State of Israel. In other words, all Jews whether living in Israel or not, possessed a bond and loyalty to the State of Israel.

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<sup>1</sup>Fundamental Issues of Zionism at the 23rd Zionist Congress, pp. 135-36.

On July 26, 1954, the State and the World Zionist Organization entered into a 'Covenant' by formally exchanging letters between their respective heads. The substance of the 'Status Law' was reiterated and certain procedural matters were specified in the 'Covenant'. The Chairman of the Zionist Organization was given precedence over heads or ambassadors of other countries at official ceremonies which clearly indicated an official position.

The net effect of the 'Status Law' and 'Covenant' was to bind legally the World Zionist Organization to the Israeli Government for the fulfillment of the remaining goals of Zionism. This relationship led Rabbi Berger to conclude that:

"Zionism is centered in Israel, dedicated to Israeli interests and designed to serve Israeli purposes. It is also unmistakably clear that the whole basis of the 'Law' and the 'Convention' is the assumption all Jews have a common national destiny and common national rights in Israel (immigration) as well as common national obligations to Israel."<sup>1</sup>

The 1959 Enactment was another legislative act intended to bind the Israeli Government and the World Zionist Organization into a single sovereign entity. The Prime Minister or any other member of the Israeli Cabinet, when calling for aliyah or speaking for 'the Jewish people', would now simply be fulfilling a loyal obligation to the Knesset as stated in the 1959 Enactment. The Zionist Movement is regarded by the Cabinet as an integral part of the mechanism used by the State in 'her struggle for her rights and international position'. The Coordination Board which the 'Status Law' mentioned, was established for the purpose of integrating the joint activities of the State and the Zionist Organization and its components.

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<sup>1</sup>Berger, Judaism or Jewish Nationalism..., p.97.

Thus, the World Zionist Organization is bound by legislation, judicial decisions and administrative actions by the State of Israel to serve the State.

The Jewish Agency has served as a convenient front organization for the World Zionist Organization and the State of Israel because it was created as a 'public body' in relation to the Mandate and was ostensibly to have non-Zionists participation. Due to the Jewish Agency's past image, the impression was conveyed that it was dedicated to humanitarian and charitable purposes like a private voluntary agency or body. It was made to appear separate and independent of the World Zionist Organization. Instead, the Jewish Agency is a vast financial empire and is a shareholder in most aspects of Israeli life.<sup>1</sup> It is an integral part of the Israeli economy and serves to promote that economy and all its political objectives.

The World Zionist Organization is to help achieve Israeli political objectives and is to do 'what the State neither can nor may' do in other countries where Jews live. Assimilation is regarded by Israeli officials as an evil which must be countered, or Zionism will lose its vitality, and Israel will become only an 'historical experiment' that failed because 'the Jewish people' did not adequately support it and immigrate to it.

In spite of all the benefits that Israel had reaped from utilizing the efforts of the World Zionist Organization to its advantage, it would be erroneous to assume that the relationship between these political entities has been one of complete harmony and mutual understanding. Israel's claim to the right of directing Jewish affairs all over the world pre-

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<sup>1</sup>"Jewish Agency as Entrepreneur---Farming, Housing, Water, Airline, Shipping," Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, (July 6, 1962), p.14.

precipitated a counter Diaspora Zionist claim to the right to have a say in Israeli politics. This has, no doubt, caused a great deal of in-fighting, ~~and~~ the details of which are still obscure. Israel needs the World Zionist Organization as a recruiter, political activist and financier. Yet, by pressing too hard for aliyah from Western countries and by describing life in the Diaspora as 'sinful' now that the State has been established, Israel had confronted Diaspora Jewry with the basic contemporary Jewish dilemma either of becoming a citizen of Israel or of renouncing any conscious claim to separate nationhood.

The dilemma persists.



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