TRANSFER OF POWER IN BAGHDAD, 1831

by

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PREFACE

The following is a study of the fall of the mameluk regime in 1831 and of the attempt of the Ottoman government at Constantinople to reassert its authority in the Fashaliq of Baghdad. An investigation has been made into the social, economic and political conditions of the Fashaliq during the reign of the last mameluk ruler, Daoud Pasha, and the extent to which these conditions improved or deteriorated at the hand of 'Ali Ridha Pasha, the nominee of Sultan Mahmud II to carry out reforms in Baghdad.

It is concluded that Daoud Pasha was a much more forceful and capable ruler than his successor, 'Ali Ridha. As with the Ottoman Empire itself, the Sultan, or Pasha, established the tone of the government. Either he took the lead in the affairs of his dominions or he retired to the pleasures of oriental monarchy and the country was run by any enterprising persons who could impose their will and for whatever ends they chose. A second conclusion reached involved external factors. Variables such as the wrath of nature and international diplomacy ultimately served to remove the destiny of Baghdad from the hands of those who ruled it.
The source material used in this study consisted of microfilm from the India Office Library London containing letters and reports from Bombay, Tehran, Baghdad, Constantinople and London dealing with the economic and political affairs of the period; travel books and memoirs of the period 1815-1845; and a history of the mamelukes written by the son of one of Daoud's Chief Ministers. Standard histories and other secondary sources were also consulted.

The author wishes to express her appreciation to her advisor, Professor Joseph J. Malone for his encouragement and exhortations across the miles to Baghdad, for his constructive criticism of this paper and for supplying the microfilm which made the study possible. She is also indebted to Richard J. McCarthy, S. J. Rector of Al-Hikma University, Robert J. Cote, Librarian, Al-Hikma University and Mr. Chilmeran for their permission and assistance in using the Yacoub Serkis Library—a collection including almost everything ever written about Iraq in oriental or European languages. These books are rare first editions and the opportunity of handling them was an experience in itself.

The author would also like to thank Mr. and Mrs. Malcolm Campbell for their long hours of conversation about old Baghdad. Mr. Campbell is the third generation of the Lynch family who came to Baghdad in the 1830's, became leading merchants and had the first steamships on the Tigris and Euphrates. Mrs. Campbell is the great-great
granddaughter of Agha Minas, an Armenian dragoman who was a trusted employee of the British Residency from the time of Claudius Rich through the tenure of Major Taylor--nearly thirty years. Through the Campbells--their family souvenirs and anecdotes--the author has caught glimpses of a Baghdad now almost entirely lost from view.
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CHAPTER I

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MAMELUK REGIME

The recurring phenomenon of *mameluk* ascendency in the history of the Arab Near East was a natural consequence of a system of government which depended for support not upon the goodwill of the indigenous population but upon the importation of alien, slave armies.

The word *mameluk* is best translated as "owned" not "slave" as the position of a *mameluk* was never analogous with that of a slave in western society. But unfortunately English lacks a better word to convey this status. The Koran, which recognized the institution of slavery, also enjoined fair treatment of slaves and promised heavenly reward for their manumission. Many slaves gained their freedom through loyal service and rose to positions of respect and esteem. No stigma was attached to their origin provided that they had adopted Islam. The sons of slave girls had equal rights with those of freeborn wives by the same father. Thus, of the three sons of Ḥarun al-Rashīd who succeeded him as Caliph, only 'Amīn was born of an Arab Muslim mother. Ma'mūn was the son of a Persian, and Mu'tasim, the son of a Turkish slave woman.
The essential characteristic of a mameluk regime, therefore, was not its origin in slavery except insofar as this meant the absence of "citizenship"—the creation of a company of adventurers who, having been deprived of a homeland, sought their fate and fortune in the alien land in which they found themselves. As early as the 3rd century A.H. Turkish soldiers imported by Caliph Mu'tasim, 218-227 A.H., to counterbalance the Persian influence established by his brother, had become the dominant force in the Abbasid Empire. For nearly a century they ruled in the shadow of the Caliphate. In Egypt a mameluk regime grew up in 1250 A.D. from the Turkish bodyguard of Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi and persisted in one form or another, oligarchic or dynastic, Turkish or Albanian, until the Egyptian revolution of 1952.

The term mameluk also implied usurpation of power from legitimate authority whether or not an open breach occurred. Ḥasan Pasha, therefore, was not himself a mameluk but he is considered to be the founder of the dynasty. Ḥasan was a son of Mustafā Beg, a sipahi of Murad IV. He was born about 1657 and educated in the Serai schools—the normal avenue to appointments in the palace and Empire. In 1697 he was appointed Vezīr in Konia, then in Aleppo and Urfa. In 1702 he became Valī in Diarbekr and two years later succeeded 'Alī Pasha at Baghdad. Although each Pashalıq had a contingent of imperial janissaries their numbers were generally insufficient and loyalty questionable. Therefore, it was necessary to institute local levies and to
import foreign troops as little help could be expected from Constantinople in a time of crisis. Baghdad was a "far-flung" corner of the Empire—an outpost poised between Persian and Ottoman hegemony which had changed hands several times in the past and which was in constant danger of renewed attack. Very early in his rule Hasan began to import troops from the Caucasus—especially from Georgia. From these recruits sprang the *mameluk* regime of Iraq.

Some idea of the confusion and misery then prevailing in the *Pashalîq* can be conveyed by a single statistic. There were thirty-seven Pashas in the sixty-five years between the reconquest of Baghdad by Sultan Murâd IV in 1639 and the advent of Hasan in 1704.¹ The voice of the Pasha was scarcely heeded inside the city walls, much less in the countryside. Hasan soon proved his talent for administration as well as his ability to force obedience to his will. As a result of continued tribal disturbance in the middle Euphrates, which disrupted life in Basra, he was given authority over that *Pashalîq* in 1709. Shahrizor was added to his domain in 1717.²

The central event of the rule of Hasan Pasha was his Persian campaign begun in 1723 at the behest of Sultan Ahmad III. Peace had prevailed between the two empires since 1639. However in 1722–23 Persia fell to the Afghan

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²Shahrizor—the former name of Kurdistan.
conqueror, Mir Mahmūd, and the Sultan felt this constituted a threat to the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Before his death in 1724 Hasan conquered Karmanshah, Ardalan and Luristan. The war was continued by his son Ahmad I and a short-lived peace concluded in 1727. The considerable territory gained for the Sultan did not remain his for long. The last of the great Asian conquerors Nadir Quli, later Nadir Shah, drove out the Afghans and the Turks and restored the Safavid dynasty with himself as Regent. The Turks withdrew to the frontier established by Murād IV.

Ahmad I continued his father's policy of unifying Mesopotamia under one rule and he held sway over Basra, Shahrizor, Mosul and even Mardin. Nadir Shah sought his revenge on the Ottomans with a siege of Baghdad in 1733 but the city was saved by its own strength and by a relief force from Constantinople led by Topal Uthmān, a former Ottoman Grand Vezīr. A later siege by Nadir Shah was also unsuccessful. Three events occurred in the long reign of Ahmad I, 1724-1747,1 which had great significance for the future of the country: the establishment of the Jalili family in Mosul; of the Baben dynasty in Kurdistan; and the opening of a permanent station of the East India Company in Basra. The forceful rule of Ahmad Pasha--

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1There was a two year lapse in his reign, 1734-1736, when Sultan Mahmūd I tried briefly to break his growing power by transferring him to Urfa, then to Erzerum. The ostensible reason for his move was the Sultan's dissatisfaction over the treaty Ahmad signed with Persia in 1733. The Sultan was forced to sanction Ahmad's return for Baghdad was too important a province to trust to less capable hands.
particular his policy of meeting tribal disorder with crushing force—and the death of Nadir Shah in 1747 allowed Iraq to enjoy a peaceful interlude under Ahmad's successor, Sulaiman Pasha.

Sulaiman, or Abu Lailah as he was also called, was the first of the mameluk pashas. He had been bought as a youth from the Caucasus and had served his master, Ahmad Pasha, in a variety of positions—finally as Kakhya, Chief Minister, in which position he led a succession of tribal campaigns in the south from 1733 to 1747. He married Adilah Khanum, a daughter of Ahmad Pasha, and she became a formidable power during the reign of her husband—which lasted from 1750 to 1762. This was a period of stability and firm leadership. Persia was preoccupied with the substitution of the Qajar for the Zand dynasty and relations with the Porte were outwardly correct. A fermand of investiture arrived yearly from Constantinople but no revenue was sent in return.

The next two pashas—'Ali Pasha, (1762-1764) and 'Umar Pasha, (1765-1775) contributed little historical significance beyond continuing the trend in mameluk leadership, but they were by no measure as capable as their predecessors. The rule of 'Umar was followed by five years of strife among rival mameluks—a seemingly inevitable condition in an oligarchical system of rule which permitted only the strongest to rise above his fellows and to assume authority over them as well as the country.
The man who emerged was Buyûk Sülaîmân Pasha—("The Great"), and his reign, 1780-1802, represents the golden age of mameluk rule in Iraq.

For over 30 years the phenomena of paramount power in the hands of imported Caucasian freed men had been growing in clearness and reality. For fifty years more the rule of Iraq was to lie, with the helpless acquiescence of the Sultan, solely with the Pashas of this alien blood.¹

The Reverend Mr. A. N. Groves, an English missionary resident in Baghdad in 1830 and 1831, wrote that Buyûk Sülaîmân had restored Baghdad to its eminence as a great mercantile center and that since his time the Pashalîq of Baghdad had been more prosperous than the majority of the Ottoman provinces. Sülaîmân also increased the Georgian contingent by importing large numbers of slaves who were freed at his death.² It was during Sülaîmân's time that the Wahhabis began to raid into southern Iraq. They were contemptuous of the kalîf and of all things Turkish. In the guise of deliverers, of harbingers of the truth, they fanned the flames of tribal revolt against Turkish, that is Ottoman, authority and sacked the Shi'a holy shrine at Kerbela—an act which shook the capitals of Constantinople and Tehran. Several unsuccessful campaigns were mounted against the Wahhabis but they continued to threaten shrines and pilgrims until they were defeated by Ibrahîm Pasha of Egypt in 1818.

¹Longrigg, op. cit., p. 198.

²Reverend Mr. A. N. Groves, Journal of a Residence at Baghdad during the Years 1830 and 1831 (London: James Nisbet, 1832), pp. 253-255.
confederation holding the territory just north of Basra. Sa'id was able to defeat the army Abdüllâh led against him and the Pasha was killed in the battle.

Sa'id was an ineffectual ruler. He was very much under the influence of his mother, Walîda Pasha. Stephen Longrigg sums up his reign as follows: "Trade flourished and exactions were rare. The tastes of a voluptuary were unaccompanied by those of a tyrant: his very mildness was a main cause of his fall."\(^1\) He was followed in 1817 by the last of the mameluk pashas—Daoud.

\(^1\)Longrigg, *op. cit.*, p. 235.
CHAPTER II

INTERNATIONAL SETTING

Before proceeding with an account of the Pashalic under Daoud, it is necessary to outline the international situation and the policies of individual nations as they effected Iraq directly or through influence at Constantinople. The confrontation of European interests in the domain of the Sultan became the most important issue of the day—the "Eastern Question." Russia, England and France were the leading protagonists.

Christianity had entered Russia from the Byzantine Empire in the 10th century and had subsequently been adopted as the national religion. With the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453 and the marriage of Sophia, niece of the last Byzantine Emperor, Constantine XIII, to Tsar Ivan III, Russia came to consider herself as the inheritor and leader of the Byzantine Christian civilization—with Moscow as "the Third Rome." There was a sincere concern for the welfare of co-religionists under Turkish Muslim domination. But religious paternalism also became a convenient banner under which to disguise more pragmatic national aspirations.

Peter I, the Great (1682-1725) who set about awakening the sleeping bear, felt that Russia could not be considered a European power without a window on the sea and a strong
navy--thus his campaigns against Sweden for control of the Baltic and against Turkey for the Black Sea and the Dardanelles. Peter's policy was adhered to by subsequent Russian rulers and the whole of the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century bears witness to this drive to the South.\(^1\) Catherine the Great (1762-1796) came very close to realizing her life's goal—that of seeing her grandson, appropriately named Constantine, enthroned in Constantinople. Her death gave the Ottoman Empire a breathing space, as did the Napoleonic wars until the French Ambassador to the Porte, General Horace Sebastiani, persuaded the Sultan that his interests lay with the French\(^2\). This occurred at a time when France appeared to be carrying the day against England and the Sultan's arch enemy, Russia. The resulting conflict cost the Sultan more territory in the Northeast and England very nearly took the Ottoman capital. Napoleon then convinced Russia to act in concert with France against England. This agreement, the Treaty of Tilsit, 1807, envisaged the continuation of the Continental System and an assault on the English position in India.

To secure a land route to the sub-continent, Napoleon made overtures to Persia. The later, having lost part of

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\(^1\)Indeed it might be noted that the capture of Kazan in the 16th century marked the beginning of four hundred years of Russian expansion at the expense of the Muslim World. See Ivar Spector, The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, distributed by the University of Washington Press, 1956, p. 1.

the Caucasus to Catherine the Great, was amenable to the designs of the French Emperor until the Treaty of Tilsit became known. The Shah then feared that Napoleon had promised Russia more gains in Persia as a bride price and determined to steer clear of the contest. The Battle of Waterloo and the Congress of Vienna ended Napoleon's dreams of an Eastern empire and put France out of the competition for many years. The leading contenders had narrowed to England and Russia. Russia's aims have been stated but what were England's stakes?

England was the leading maritime power in the world. Her strength and glory depended upon her empire—the most important part of which was India. It has been the pattern of British empire building that government follows trade. The original venture into India was made by a privately owned commercial trading company, the East India Company, formed in 1600. The Company extended and consolidated its interest in the subcontinent and after a long struggle (1744–1763) reduced French influence to a negligible factor.

Although the Company paid nominal salaries, employees were free to, and indeed were expected to, operate in their own interest outside the trade area exclusively reserved to the Company. A great many private fortunes were made but the Company itself did not prosper. Overhead expenses were

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1 The Company monopolized trade between Europe and India. Company servants were free to engage in internal India trade or trade from India to the east.
enormous. By 1700 there were 1200 Englishmen in Bengal alone. The Company was compelled to provide European-style amenities where none previously existed. The Company maintained its own army to repel hostile European interests and to protect employees and trade prerogatives during the chaos which marked the disintegration of the Mogol Empire. An Indian navy protected the Company's ships from native pirates in the Gulf and from European privateers. By 1772 the Company found it necessary to seek a loan of £1,000,000 from the government. This led directly to the passage of the Regula-
tory Act (1773) as a check on the Company's financial arrange-
ments. From this point the British government began to assume gradual control of Indian affairs.

In 1784 Pitt's India Bill set up the dual control system providing for a Court of Directors composed of Company officials having jurisdiction over commerce and patronage and a Board of Control composed of six privy councilors, one of whom was President of the Board and in effect, Secretary of State for Indian Affairs. The Board dealt with all matters pertaining to civil or military government in India as well as revenue. The Secret Committee was comprised of three Directors whom the Board consulted on affairs of a secret or sensitive nature. In 1833 the Company ceased operations as a commercial agency and functioned only as an agent of the Crown. In 1853 patronage was abolished and the Indian Civil

Service introduced. After the Indian Mutiny (1857) the government took over full control and the Company ceased to exist.

As India increased in commercial importance Britain took steps to secure her position by establishing a string of colonies or "occupations for use" along all the proposed routes, land and sea.¹ It was in this connection that the Ottoman Empire acquired more importance in British planning, being astride the shortest route to India. This route traversed Turkish Iraq.

After a century of seasonal visits and false beginnings, a permanent factory was opened in Basra in the early 1720's. The Basra agent was also permitted to visit Baghdad from time to time on Company business but only in 1798 was a Resident, Harford Jones, established there. Between 1798 and 1810 there were Residency establishments in both towns but in 1810 Baghdad became the Political Agency in Turkish Arabia. Basra was made subordinate and later reduced to a native agency. There was also a French Factory in Basra from 1775 and a French Consul in Baghdad. J. S. Buckingharn who visited Baghdad in the summer of 1816 described the French Residency as a "mean establishment" with very few servants—a great contrast to the oriental splendor and ceremony surrounding the British Resident of that time, Claudius James Rich.²

¹Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Aden and eventually Egypt.
In Egypt Muḥammad 'Alī, who had arrived in 1801, had succeeded in playing off various local mameluk factions and emerged as governor with the support of all the leading notables and 'Ulemā. Upon popular appeal to the Sultan he was confirmed in this position. He first proceeded to destroy all remnants of the previous mameluk oligarchy and then settled down to the task of building a strong nation. In 1813 his son defeated the Wahhabis at the behest of the Sultan. Two years later the Sudan was conquered and in 1824 Muḥammad 'Alī reluctantly came to the aid of the Sultan during the Greek War of Independence.

The later event seemed to bring the diverse interests and conflicts manifest in the "Eastern Question" more sharply into focus. In Russia in 1825 Alexander I was succeeded by Tsar Nicholas I. Nicholas was thoroughly Russian with none of the western veneer of his predecessor who could blandly offer membership in the Holy Alliance to the Sultan—Caliph. He made no pretense to be acting for any but Russian interests.

England, anxious to arrive at a solution to the Greek problem, was equally concerned to prevent Russia from acting unilaterally against Turkey. The Duke of Wellington was sent to St. Petersburg to seek agreement on these points and was able to conclude the Protocol of St. Petersburg. By this agreement Russia and England offered mediation to the Porte and proposed as a solution the virtual independence of Greece with only tribute due the Porte. But the Tsar had already
dispatched an ultimatum calling upon the Sultan to evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia and send plenipotentiaries to the Russian frontier. As one of his major reforms, Sultan Maḥmūd had destroyed the rebellious janissaries and had embarked upon a program of military reorganization along Western lines. Without an army, therefore, the Sultan had no choice but to accede to the demands of the Tsar as embodied in the Convention of Åkerman of 1827.

Sultan Maḥmūd refused the mediation of the Powers on the Greek question and the solution was forced on him after the destruction of his fleet at the Battle of Navarino, 1827. This left the Ottoman Empire defenseless in the face of Russia. The Sultan, sensible of Russian troop concentration on the border, became convinced that another Russian attack was imminent. Hoping to catch the Russians off balance, the Sultan broke the Convention of Åkerman and declared a Holy War against the Tsar. The Russian advance in Europe was slow but in the Caucasus there was little resistance. The war ended in the defeat of the Ottomans and with the Treaty of Adrianople (1829) the Sultan ceded his right to all of the Caucasus; autonomy was granted Moldavia and Wallachia under Russian protection and the Porte accepted the Treaty of London originally negotiated in 1827 acknowledging the independence of Greece.

In sum, the Ottoman Empire which Daoud Pasha ostensibly served was confronted by a Russia embarked on a relentless drive to the Straits, determined that she shall inherit the
European dominions of the Sultan. This increased the influence of England, equally determined to frustrate the ascendency of Russia or any other power in the Mediterranean which might endanger British commercial interests. For such reasons England also urged Ottoman reform as a means of appeasing the Powers as well as the minorities, thus reducing the likelihood of further European interference. Nor must France, humiliated by defeat and eager to regain stature as a world power through competition with England in colonial ventures, be overlooked.

Although Sultan Mahmūd II was still determined to force reform on the Empire he had but a miniscule navy and only an embryonic army to support him. Opposition to his policies had increased in Constantinople and after the Greek fiasco it was difficult to envision a European alliance. Most of the Empire's European provinces were lost. In Egypt Muhammad 'Alī held sway; the mountains of the Lebanon were under the control of a Druze, Aḥmīr Beshīr; and Iraq in the firm grasp of the mameluks. Persia had, in the 1820's, a brief spasm of aggressive activity (which took the form of a march on Baghdad) before falling under virtually complete Russian control.
CHAPTER III

DAOUD – CAREER AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

Daoud, the last and most controversial of the mameluk Pashas, was born in Tiflis, the capital of Georgia, in 1767. He was of an Armenian Christian family but was taken into slavery as a youth and sold in Baghdad about 1780.¹ The Caucasus had the geographical misfortune to lie on the frontier of three converging empires--Persian, Ottoman and Russian. The people were of various ethnic origins, of mixed creeds and allegiances. In the third quarter of the 18th century the province of Georgia was under Russian suzerainty but was returned to the Turks with the Treaty of Kutchük Kainardji (1774), on the conditions of better administration and free practice of the Christian religion. From this time until 1801, when George II sought and was granted

¹Daoud never lost interest in his family or the condition of his native country although he had adopted Turkish ways and the Muslim creed. When Robert Ker Porter was presented to Daoud in October of 1818, Daoud questioned him intensely on his travels through Georgia, then under Russian dominion. Porter agreed to take a beautiful sword from Daoud to the Russian commander in Georgia, General Yarmoloff, with the Pasha's greetings and an appeal for special treatment for his family. See Robert Ker Porter, Travels in Georgia, Persia, Armenia, Antient Babylonia, etc. during the Years 1817, 1818, 1819, 1820 (London: Longmans, 1821-22), II, pp. 249-250.
Russian protection, Georgia was open to the Turks and this was the period when Buyük Sülmân greatly increased the Georgian element in Baghdad. Russian assumption of protection over Georgia led to a long war with the Persians, (1804-1813) in which Russia succeeded in extending her sway over part of Azerbaijan as well as Georgia. Only the coastline remained nominally to the Ottomans and even this was ceded in 1829.\(^1\) Thus from the first decade of the 19th century the supply of Georgian recruits dried up.

Daoud served Buyük Sülmân in a number of positions—first as confidential writer, then Keeper of the Keys and later Seal Bearer. He was freed on the death of Sülmân and then married one of Sülmân's daughters. This aroused the suspicions of the next mameluk ruler, 'Alî Pasha, so that for the next few years Daoud studied Muslim theology and became a Mulla in the Mosque of 'Abdul Qader al-Gailani. Upon the accession of Abdullah Agha in 1810, Daoud came out of his judicious exile and took the position of Kâkhyâ, the Pasha's Chief Minister. He served in this capacity and as Defterdâr, treasurer, to his own immediate predecessor, Sa'id Pasha, until he was dismissed by the latter in part through the hostile influence of Sa'id's mother, Walida Pasha.

A lively account of a conversation said to have taken place between Sa'id and his mother prior to Daoud's dismissal is recorded by Sülmân Bey bin Ḥaji Tâlib, whose father

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\(^1\)The Treaty of Adrianople.
later became a Ḳākhyā under Daoud: Walida Pasha: "It should be well known that he (Daoud) must be dismissed forthwith, otherwise I curse my milk and my face too, and you are neither my son nor I am your mother."¹ Sa'id is credited with a few weak protests before acceding to her demands. Sūlaimān Bey deplored the influence of Walida Pasha in the affairs of the Pashalīq and noted that the treasury stood empty with no possibility of further tax collection. A wave of despair had engulfed the country.²

Daoud went into quiet retirement until, under the pretext of a hunting trip, he left Baghdād for Sūlaimāniyyah. There he addressed his protest to the Porte and began to gather support to take the Pashalīq by force. There was, meanwhile, a strong movement to have Sa'id deposed. Ḥalāt Effendi, a high Turkish official, had visited Baghdad and returned to Constantinople determined to effect changes in the administration of the Pashalīq. Other people had also spoken to the Sultan of the deterioration of affairs in Baghdad but according to Sūlaimān Bey the deciding factor was the minting of copper coins with Sa'id's name imprinted instead of the Sultan's tughrā. In this affair Sa'id was completely innocent. It was the plot of a Jewish treasury official named Ezra who was seeking his own advancement and

¹Thabit (Sūlaimān Bey bin Ḥaji Tālib), History of the Formation and Fall of the Mameluk Government in Baghdad (Istanbul, 1875), p. 30.
²Ibid., pp. 30-31.
who was backed by Ḥalāt Effendi. Ezra had the coins minted
and samples despatched to the Porte before the Pasha was
aware of the treachery. Of course the coins were received
in the capital as proof of open defiance of the Sultan's
authority. ¹

Sa'id was deposed but refused to step down. Meanwhile,
Daoud marched toward Baghdad—the Sultan's fermān of inves-
titure in his hand and at his back an army of 12,000 men.
Daoud's advance party was driven away by 15,000 Muntāfiq
tribesmen but insurrection broke out in the city. After five
days of strife, Sa'id's own Georgian slaves rose and drove
him into the citadel. Daoud entered the city the next day
with little opposition. ² Sa'id sought refuge and clemency
but was dragged from his mother's arms and beheaded. ³

Upon assuming authority in 1817, Daoud had a number of
his political opponents, Georgian and otherwise, executed for
such were the methods of the times. However, it is highly
improbable that the number reached anything like the figure
of 1,500 given by George Keppel in his travel account. ⁴

¹Ibid., pp. 31-32 and William Heude, A Voyage up the
Persian Gulf (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme and Brown,
1819), footnotes bottom of pp. 176-177.
³Thabit, op. cit., pp. 35-36.
⁴The Honorable George Keppel, Journey from India to
England by Bussorah, Baghdad, the Ruins of Babylon...in the
Year 1824 (London: Henry Colburn, 1827), I, pp. 222-224.
"Only when the capital had been purged of dangerous persons, the Treasury partially replenished, the troops paid, and the Pasha proclaimed throughout the land, could he address himself to the task of government."¹ Such conditions could not be brought about by a policy of moderation.

After his audience with Daoud in October of 1818, Robert Ker Porter described his manner as pleasing and his countenance, urbane. "The state he assumed was perfectly that of a sovereign prince."² Keppel spoke of Daoud as a pious mendicant at the Palace gate who, having earned enough money to buy the Pashalig, threw off the robes of an ascetic and set about executing hundreds of people. But he too remarked Daoud's prepossessing manner.³ Daoud's personality as seen through his policies as well as descriptive encounters appears as a collage. He was proud but vain, intelligent but often petty and vindictive. He dealt ruthlessly with his opposition and at times showed considerable courage. Yet fear could lead him to act against his better judgment.

The limits of the Pashalig at this time were: the Euphrates to the West; the Nejd desert to the south; Kuzistan and the Zagros on the east; the Pashalig of Diarbekr on the northwest and to the north Armenia and Kurdistan. The almost universal reaction of European travelers to Baghdad was one

¹ Longrigg, op. cit., p. 240.
² Porter, op. cit., II, p. 249.
³ Keppel, op. cit., I, pp. 222-224.
of disappointment. They came expecting to witness the glory of Ḥarūn al-Rashīd despite the devastating conquests of the intervening centuries. Therefore, their descriptions must be interpreted in the light of disillusionment if they are to assume a proper perspective. It must also be said that a serious conflict of personalities developed between Daoud Pasha and the British Resident, Claudius James Rich, who not only painted a dismal picture himself but impressed his views on others.

Claudius Rich was a brilliant but supercilious Englishman who at twenty-one had become the representative of the East India Company in Mesopotamia. He was no less proud and vain than the Pasha and was regarded as the second most powerful man in the Pashalıq—largely due to his appreciation of the equation of pomp with importance in an oriental society. James Buckingham said of the establishment in 1816:

... and everything belonging to the Residency was calculated to impress ideas of great respect on the minds of the inhabitants, who were witnesses of the manner in which it was supported and conducted. The fact is, indeed, that Mr. Rich was universally considered to be the most powerful man in Baghdad, next to the Pasha; and some even questioned whether the Pasha himself would not at any time shape his conduct according to Mr. Rich's suggestion and advice, rather than as his own council might wish.¹

This relationship might have accorded with the mild temperament of Sa'id Pasha but Daoud soon fell out with Rich. The position of the latter required him to protest invasions of European rights (as established by the Capitulations),

¹Buckingham, op. cit., p. 390.
hindrance of European trade or deflation of coinage. But Rich also took it upon himself to give asylum to those incurring the wrath of the Pasha. The recipients of his protection were not only Christians or Jews but often a disaffected tribal leader or a rival political aspirant. In this he certainly exceeded his authority. In 1820 Daoud was provoked to declare that "no European rights existed in Baghdad." Customs duties were doubled and a certain amount of harassment was suffered by Rich and his dependents. Rich determined to close the Residency and leave Baghdad. Daoud, realizing the implications of this in Constantinople where Sultan Mahmud was seeking to rally European support to buttress the Empire, attempted to prevent his departure. The Residency was surrounded by troops and only after strong protest from the Porte and the British Government in India was Rich allowed to leave in May of 1821.

In July of 1819 Rich had described the state of the Pashalig to the Bombay Government.

The Affairs of the Government are rapidly falling into a state of confusion, principally from the imprudence and want of integrity of the Pasha and his Ministers. His highness ... gives up his own judgment to any who will save him the trouble of thinking, shuts his eyes to the exactions and violence of the Mameluks and

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1Ja' id Pasha was temporarily under Rich's protection during the reign of his predecessor, Abdullah Agha.


3On his journey to India, Rich halted in Bushire to await further instructions from Bombay. He sought relief from the heat by crossing the mountains to Shiraz where he became a victim of cholera and died on October 5, 1821.
seems solely intent on the hasty acquisition of money by any means. The domestic state of the country is in equally bad condition as its foreign politics. In the city all business is at a standstill, the police almost null and void. In the country the exactions and tyranny on the peasantry are without parallel, even in the annals of this wretched Government.\textsuperscript{1}

This passage was written during the period of Daoud’s preoccupation with consolidating his position and filling the treasury. The burdens of taxation and tyranny were certainly as Rich described them but it is to be doubted that Daoud shut his eyes to the violence and exaction—or that he gave over decision-making to his ministers. He doubtless gave his blessing to any measure which would accomplish his objectives—POWER and the money with which to buttress that power. Claudius Rich, however gifted in Eastern languages, had little sympathy with oriental character. He, like so many others, judged the actions of an oriental government by an unbending code of western ethics.

The Pashalîq was organized as follows. Baghdad was the seat of the central government while the sanjaks of Kirkuk, Basra and Mardin were governorships subordinate to Baghdad. The principal officers of the Baghdad government were the Kâkhyas, several Muşâhibs, including the Bab al-Arab,\textsuperscript{2} and the members of the Divan: The Defterdâr, Chief Chamberlain, Secretary of the Divan, Master of Ceremonies,


\textsuperscript{2} Spokesman for the Arab tribes.
Chief Equerry, Head of the Bailiffs and the Warden of the Private Apartments. There was also a hierarchy of Aghas of the Interior and personal attendants.¹

There were many and diverse sources of revenue but its collection depended on ruthless enforcement by the Pasha and his officials, there was no equity in the system. The accessible and the weak were heavily taxed—the strong and inaccessible escaped entirely. Daoud established monopolies on virtually every article of consumption.² Peasants and craftsmen first paid, usually in kind, the Zakāt, which was approximately ten percent, depending on the nature of the product and the means of production.³ The government then bought the remainder of the production at a low price for resale to retail merchants at a considerable profit. Other sources of revenue were the djizya, the tax on Christians and Jews; the tax on pilgrims; on caravans; and on goods in transit.

In lieu of paying salaries and to award favorites, large tracts of land were assigned by the Pasha to various

¹Buckingham, op. cit., pp. 383-384. This description dates from 1816, the last year of Sa'id's rule. William Heude gives the same structure in 1817 but he was in Baghdad during the transition from Sa'id to Daoud. One presumes the basic organization did not change much from one regime to the next. Heude, op. cit., pp. 183-185.

²Groves, op. cit., p. 263.

³This institution as originally adopted by Muhammad was a religious obligation—a charity to support poor believers but even in his lifetime the money was used for military campaigns and to buy political support. See J. Schacht, "Zakāt," The Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam, eds. H. A. R. Gibb and J. H. Kramers (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1961), pp. 654-656.
individuals. This system, *temlîk*, cost the regime much potential revenue. By the time an assortment of palms were crossed with silver the rent actually paid was far less than what otherwise would have been yielded directly to the government. Hilleh, a very rich area, was leased in 1824 to an officer of the Pasha for 260,000 piasters. In addition to rent the officer paid a stipulated sum to the Kâkhyâ and other principal officers of the Pashalîq. This increased the burden of taxation on the peasants as well as diverting revenue from the government's coffers.  

In this way Daoud lost some of his most productive areas. Direct rule by the Pasha of Baghdad over districts far beyond the capital had long since been abandoned. No *mameluk* officials were found on the Euphrates below Hilleh. The appointed shaikhs were primarily regarded as tax farmers and when no revenue was forthcoming the Pasha organized a punitive expedition against the offending shaikh, who often was displaced by a rival on the basis of an undertaking to pay a still larger sum to the central government. This system was a guarantee of persistent turmoil. Only the fellahin who worked the rivers and canals near Baghdad were responsible to no-Arab officials. Three *mameluks* supervised this area. 

One economy measure practiced by a *Defterdâr* in Daoud's

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1 Keppel, op. cit., I, 182.

time was the substitution of tobacco for the army's salaries. Their pay was the equivalent of two English shillings a month and the tobacco was worth one half of that amount.\(^1\) If these actions failed to produce the needed revenue then the coinage was summarily devalued.\(^2\) Revenue in 1831 was estimated at twelve and one half million dollars.\(^3\)

Expenditure was limited almost entirely to the capital. The Pasha’s establishment was costly to maintain and the loyalty of his troops and political supporters had to be purchased by regular payments.\(^4\) There were Kurdish and Arab allegiances to be bought. The Shaikh of Muntafigs received a large "gift" before coming to the assistance of Daoud in the siege of 1831.\(^5\) Ottoman officials visiting Baghdad were customarily bribed to take good reports back to the Porte. A fixed revenue obligation to the Sultan was recorded in the book of accounts F. R. Chesney saw in 1831, but it was not

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1Keppel, op. cit., I, 232.

2Ibid., I, 227. In 1824 the currency was halfed. Groves wrote in 1830 that the currency was changed at least once a month. Groves, op. cit., p. 15.

3Francis R. Chesney, The Expedition for the Survey of the Rivers Euphrates and Tigris, 1835, 1836, and 1837 (London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1850), I, 110. Chesney made a preliminary survey in 1830-1831 from which he gathered information for his testimony to the Steam Committee of the House of Commons in 1834. The survey of 1835-1837 was an officially sponsored venture as a result of his and others' evidence. Notes on revenue and expenditure in 1831 Chesney obtained from a European in charge of the books. Footnote #2, p. 110.

4Ibid., I, p. 110, footnote #3.

5Ibid., p. 110.
paid with any regularity.

Almost all of the private wealth was concentrated in the hands of the merchants. Although the most flourishing commercial period in mameluk history was during the reign of Buyük Sülayman it could be said of Baghdad in late 1830, "It still, however, maintains its rank as the most considerable place of trade in this portion of Asia ... "¹ Captain Chesney wrote the following in a report to Stratford Canning in 1832:

Baghdad was the center of a considerable commerce previous to the late disturbances, (the plague, flood and siege of 1831), when it sent annually even as far as Erzeroum, 2,000 mule loads of pearls, silk, cotton, shawls, coffee, gallnuts, indigo, etc. and still more to Mosul, Diarbekr, Orfa and to Aleppo even at this moment from 3 to 6,000 animals yearly but 80 years ago this number was said to be 50,000.²

Trade with Persia had declined but the import of Indian goods was increasing. Groves remarked in June of 1830, "So great is the commercial relation between this place and India become, that the number who wish to learn English of me, is much greater than I can possibly take charge of, as this is not with me a primary object."³

Although trade was fairly brisk the state of agriculture was very dismal. The ancient network of irrigation canals, the foundations of past prosperity, had been blocked

¹J. R. Wellsted, Travels to the City of the Caliphs (London: Henry Colburn, 1840), p. 254.


³Groves, op. cit., p. 5.
for centuries. Dikes and control systems crumbled away and much land was permeated with salinity from lack of drainage. Many peasants were driven off the land, into the desert or, more often, into Baghdad by excessive taxation. Their being settled on the land made them easily accessible to tax collectors. This decreased food supplies and, conversely, increased the burden of feeding an expanding city population.

According to Robert Porter:

From some sad warp in the present government; hardly a year elapses without making an apparent necessity, under the plea of apprehended scarcity and consequent tumults, for driving some hundreds of poor inhabitants from within the walls, to seek their bread on chance, beyond them.¹

Only three alternatives seemed open to these unfortunates—to return to the city, to seek to join one of the tribes (as it was impossible to exist alone in such violent times) or to fall in with one of the gangs of robbers who menaced the main roads to Baghdad.

During the first years of his reign Daoud was pre-occupied with the Persian wars (1821-1823) and with strengthening his own base of support regardless of the conditions of the Pashalig. In the mid-twenties he began to take positive steps to improve those conditions. One major improvement was made with respect to flood control and health. The ancient Isa canal, which joined the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers, originally entered the latter north of Baghdad.

¹Porter, op. cit., II, pp. 266-267.
Daoud had the course of the canal diverted south of the city thereby reducing the magnitude of the spring flood waters which yearly threatened destruction and disease.¹ Sülaimān Bey credits Daoud with a number of dredged rivers and their tributaries and with bringing experts in woolen, linen and cotton textiles to give instruction in their trades in Baghdad. He built new mosques with schools attached and renovated several other mosques.² A handsome arched bazaar, which Chesney praised as one of the finest in the east, was built under his direction.³

One of the most concentrated efforts made by Daoud was in the military sphere. Porter, in 1818, describes the walls and round towers of Baghdad as surpassing in thickness and height any fortifications he saw in Persia. The circumference of the walls, on both sides of the river, was five miles and there were six gates. It is indicative of Baghdad's position as a frontier town that there were 117 towers on the eastern wall facing Persia and only 13 to the west.⁴

Rarely could a Pasha of Baghdad expect assistance from the Porte in times of crisis for Russia was always a constant

¹Chesney, op. cit., I, pp. 54-55.

²Thabit Sülaimān Bey bin Hāji Tālib, op. cit., pp. 37-38. The author has identified and seen one of these mosques. It stands near the present Ministry of Defense.

³Chesney, op. cit., I, p. 31. Part of this is extant but in shabby condition.

⁴Porter, op. cit., II, p. 265.
and immediate threat to the Sultan. Moreover, Sultan Maḥmūd II could hardly be expected to watch the mameluk regime with a benevolent eye. Daoud was patently aware that his defensive position depended entirely on his own efforts. He maintained three regiments of mamelukes—approximately three thousand men, and in 1824 he had requested military equipment for one thousand of these from the British. This request, as well as a request for the services of a British doctor, was refused.

When the fermān arrived in 1826 from Constantinople calling for the conversion or destruction of provincial janissary regiments, Daoud assembled the eighteen Baghdad regiments in the Serai courtyard, surrounded by loyal mameluk guards and read out the imperial decree. Without a shot being fired the janissaries donned the caps of the new army, the Nidhamiyyah, and the issue was brought to a peaceful resolution. Daoud again applied for British arms and for officers whom he agreed to finance. This request was denied by the Bengal Government. At the time (1828) England was at odds with the Sultan over the question of Greek independence and the Bengal Government feared that should hostilities develop a modernized fighting force would hamper possible efforts to secure British interests in Iraq. The Secret Committee of the East India Company, however, urged

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1There were exceptions of course as with the relief force led by Topal ʿUthmān during the reign of Ahmad Pasha (1724–1747).

2Longrigg, op. cit., p. 261.
that the question be reopened because of the improvement of relations between Britain and the Porte. It was felt that the benefits of information and influence to be gained by the presence of intelligent officers in Iraq outweighed other considerations:

We are desirous of having British officers in the Pasha's service, but we are still more desirous that the officers of no other European power should be employed in disciplining the Pasha's Troops.¹

The Secret Committee then approved extending purchasing privileges at Bombay to Daoud but disapproved his request for armed ships on the Shat al-Arab.² This correspondence dates from December, 1828 and the dispatch of officers had not been accomplished by the time Daoud broke openly with the Sultan in the autumn of 1830.

The organization of Daoud's new army proceeded, however, under the direction of a Frenchman, M. Dovè, who had served as a lieutenant in Napoleon's army and then as an advisor to Abbás Mirza, Prince Royal of Persia.³ George Keppel has provided a marvelous description of this man:

He was a tall thin man, about sixty years of age; his weather-beaten face had been bronzed by long exposure to the Eastern sun; formidable white moustaches graced his


²Ibid.

³M. Dovè was in the service of Abbás Mirza in the Ottoman-Persian war of 1821 and no doubt contributed significantly to the Persian success. He began his service to the Pasha of Baghdad in 1824. See Clement Huart, Histoire de Baghdad dans le temps Moderne (Paris: Leroux, 1901), p. 175 footnote.
upper lip; and over his eyes was a pair of ferociously bushy eyebrows, the peculiar elevation of which infallibly stamped him a Frenchman.

The variety of his dress marked the true Soldado: the buttons of his coat were adorned with the imperial crown and initial of Napoleon; from the button hole was suspended a croix of Louis the Desired; and a flaming pair of capacious Turkish trousers bespoke his present service. The top of this gaunt figure was crowned with a small hat, which rested on his left ear.¹

By 1831 the number of troops organized on a European model was five thousand.² Major Taylor, the British Resident, provided advice on military matters, even overseeing the training of a guards brigade. His son had spent his leave from the Indian Army organizing a new cavalry regiment.³ After Daoud's break with the Sultan, Major Taylor was ordered to desist from such activities.⁴ In addition to this hard core of disciplined forces, Daoud could assemble mercenaries from the Lewand and Ugal and invoke the aid of Kurdish and tribal levies. His entire army would number 150,000 and a change in the government of Iraq seemed completely unlikely.

¹Keppel, op. cit., I, pp. 142-143.
²Chesney, op. cit., I, p. 110.
⁴IOLM/2/222: Secret Committee to Governor General in Council, Bengal, 1 July 1831 contains a sharp reprimand of Major Taylor's conduct. The Committee considered that Major Taylor had misinterpreted his position and consequent duties at Baghdad. He must not involve himself in local disputes or consider himself as Plenipotentiary at the court of a sovereign and independent prince. At all times he was to remember that the Pasha was a subject of the Porte with whom England must maintain good relations.
⁵Wellsted, op. cit., pp. 251-252.
CHAPTER IV

DAOUD - ARABS, KURDS, AND PERSIANS

The main occupation of any army in Baghdad was the "chastisement" of the Arab tribes:

The tedious succession of tribal contumacy and punishment-exaggerated in all times of stress--may be less interesting to a later age than the deeds of the famous, but it is far more characteristic of Iraq annals and the weary task of its governors.1

The most powerful tribes in the first half of the 19th century were: the Muntafiq, the Bani Lam, the Zubaid, the Khazā'il, the Dulaim, the Shammar al-Tōgah, the Shammar al-Jarbā', the Ubaid and the Anieza. 2 They were the predominant cause of instability in the Pashaliq and a festering thorn in the side of each Pasha. They fought among themselves for water and grazing rights, for influence and special privilege in Baghdad, menaced travelers, caravans and messengers. If a Pasha was weak, he controlled only the capital. A strong Pasha sent successful expeditions against

1Longrigg, op. cit., p. 155.

2For the distribution of these tribes see the tribal map at the conclusion of this work. The Anieza are not indicated as they are presently confined to the Syrian desert. John Lewis Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and the Wahabys (London, 1831), gives the main branches of the tribes, their patterns of migration and means of livelihood. He considered the Anieza the only true Bedu and the others "degenerate and semi-settled."

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them; collected revenue and made the roads and rivers safe for travelers and commerce. The first step toward political stability, security, and economic prosperity was tribal pacification.

It was generally the policy of a Pasha to enlist the support of one major tribe who, in return for special privileges, would back the Pasha in internal, tribal or foreign conflicts. At the beginning of the 19th century the tribe occupying this position was the Shammar al-Jarbā' from the Jezira. They were employed against the revolting Ubaid and against the Wahhabis in the latter's raids of 1803 and 1805. When Sa'id became Pasha in 1813 he owed his position to the backing of the Muntafiq with whom he had taken refuge and who had enabled him to defeat the forces of Abdullah Agha Pasha. The Muntafiq, therefore, replaced the Shammar as the privileged tribe in Baghdad. From 1814-1815 the Shammar retaliated, plundering the Euphrates from Hilleh to Dīwāniya. Sa'id enlisted the support of the Muntafiq and the Zafir who combined to defeat the Shammar.¹

Daoud, as Kākhyā of Abdullah Agha and Sa'id, had had much experience in such punitive expeditions and immediately upon his own accession began a series of tribal campaigns. During the autumn and winter of 1817 he visited the Shammar, the Abu Musa, Bani Umair and the Ghurair. There were easy victories followed by a loot of livestock, changes of shaikhs

and short periods of good behavior. In 1818 he campaigned against the Shammar al-Tōghah, Shammar al-Jarbā' and the Yazars.\(^1\)

The year 1818 history seemed on the point of repeating itself. Sadiq Bey, the eldest surviving son of Büyük Süladmān, fled to the Zubaid. Another fugitive, Jasim al-Shawi, was with the Khazā'il. These two joined forces and attracted other dissidents. There was fear in Baghdad that a second son of Büyük Süladmān would rise to power with tribal backing. Daoud deposed the Zubaid Shaikh, Shafullah, and made conciliatory gestures to Sadiq. The back of the revolt was broken and it took only a small number of troops to quell the remaining rebels. The same year Muhammad Agha, Kākhyā, succeeded in trapping twelve rebel leaders who were sent to Baghdad. The middle Euphrates became inflamed. Loyal tribes were employed and the area was eventually pacified with heavy fines being levied.\(^2\)

The chief foray of 1819 was against the Dulaim, north of Baghdad. Revenue was everywhere collected and loyal shaikhs given robes of investiture. Pacification did not extend as far as Basra and Mosul, however. Protected by distance, tribal elements still held sway. On the road from Mosul to Mardin Tarter messengers and caravans were looted.\(^3\)

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\(^{1}\) Longrigg, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

\(^{2}\) Ibid., pp. 240-241.

\(^{3}\) Ibid.
Of the Bani Lam, straddling the Tigris north of Basra, Captain Robert Mignon, an English traveler wrote, "The only occupation of this tribe is to stop the Baghdad boats, to drain the purses of their owners, and to oppress the poor villages around them with taxes."¹

During the Persian invasions of 1821-1822 Shaikh Sufūk al-Paris, the new Shammar leader, led a force of eight hundred men in what modern strategists would describe as guerrilla warfare--burning crops along the Persian line of march, killing scouts and employing decoy-ambush tactics.² It is indicative of the independence and fickleness of tribal leaders that Sufūk could render this valued assistance in 1822 and by 1828 be the source of such difficulty to the Pashalig that he was described by one 'Abdul Salām Effendi as being, with plague and locusts, one of God's punishments.³

Daoud's Kākhvā, Muḥammad Agha, had gone over to the Persians after a disastrous defeat in the winter of 1821. In 1824 the rebel Kākhvā led a revolt of the Muntefīq in the middle Euphrates. The country was demoralized by the Persian invasions and by heavy taxes levied by Daoud.⁴ Many discontented elements gathered in the vicinity of Hilleh, Najf and


²Longrigg, *op. cit.*, p. 246.


⁴Thabit Ṣulāmān Bey bin Ḥāji Tālib mentions the imposition of very heavy taxes, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
Kerbela. Daoud mustered a strong force under his vigorous new Kākhvā, Ḥaji Tālib Agha, which with the help of numerous enemy desertions, carried the day. ¹

In 1825 Daoud replaced Ḥamūd al-Thamer, Shaikh of the Muntafiq, with a relative, 'Ajīl. The former had not met his revenue obligations for years. Ḥamūd attempted to resist his deposition by calling upon the Cha'ab tribe for help and sending a message to the Sultan of Muscat who responded by dispatching his fleet to the Shat al-Arab. Ḥamūd led his forces to the walls of Basra. However, the Mutasallim of Basra was able to buy off the Sultan's fleet and the followers of Ḥamūd soon realized the folly of resistance. They began to rally around 'Ajīl. The Master of the Horse in Baghdad, Mir Akhor, arrived just in time to be handed a victory. ²

The tribes were relatively quiet the last five years of Daoud's rule. He had demonstrated the price which must be paid for disobedience. Wellsted claimed that by his policies of bribing one, instigating a second to attack a third "... he reduced the whole to a more complete obedience than they had paid for many reigns before or have done since." ³

The Kurds presented the Pashas of Baghdad with another set of threats and intrigue. They, too, had the power to

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¹According to Longrigg, Ḥaji Tālib Agha was the father of Sulaimān Bey bin Ḥaji Tālib; who wrote on Baghdad under the mameluks., op. cit., p. 246.

²Longrigg, op. cit., p. 248.

³Wellsted, op. cit., p. 251.
influence the succession of the rulers of Baghdad. In 1810 Sultan Mahmûd united the Jalilis of Mosul and 'Abdul Rahmân Baban Pasha, a Kurdish chieftain, against Kutchûk Sûlaimân, Pasha of Baghdad. 1 Abdullah Agha, who replaced Sûlaimân, had Kurdish support as did Daoud in his struggle to overthrow Sâ'id Pasha in 1817. Of more importance to subsequent events, however, was the Kurds’ location in a mountainous border region disputed by two rival empires.

The most prominent Kurdish family, the Babans, had their ancient seat in the village of Darishmana in Pizhder. This was given “in perpetuity” to one Mir Mahmûd for his services to the Sultan against the Shah. 2 During the later half of the 17th century Baba Sûlaimân, great great-grandson of Mir Mahmûd, began to carve out another sphere of authority but was defeated by the Persians. He then went to Stambul where he was awarded the Sanjak of Baban in the Pashalîq of Kirkuk. His capital was Qara Cholan, on the river of the same name, just slightly north and east of Sûlaimâniyyah. In 1785 Ibrahîm Pasha Baban moved the capital to Sûlaimâniyyah and there it remained until the fall of the dynasty. 3

‘Abdul Rahmân Baban died in 1813. He was succeeded by Mahmûd Pasha Baban who ruled intermittently until 1834. Mahmûd

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1 The Jalili family ruled the Mosul Pashalîq for over a century: Abdul Jalili, 1726, to Yahya Jalili, 1834.

2 For a legend of Kurdish chivalry associated with the name of Mir Mahmûd see Claudioius J. Rich, Travels in Kurdistan (London: James Duncan, 1836), I, pp. 291-296.

3 Ibid., pp. 291-297.
had given Daoud refuge in Sülaimaniyyah and had led his Kurdish warriors to secure Daoud's investiture. However, their friendship soon deteriorated to an open breach. In Sülaimaniyyah there was talk of Daoud's intrigues against Mahmud and in Baghdaad the Kurdish Pasha was condemned for making overtures to the Persians. In 1818 Daoud deposed Mahmud and dispatched troops to back up his orders. In command of the expedition was Abdullah Baban, the uncle of Mahmud and his chief rival to the throne. As his rival advanced with Turkish support Mahmud appealed to Muhammed 'Ali Mirza of Kermanshah, son of Fath 'Ali Shah, who sent 10,000 Persian troops across the border to Sülaimaniyyah. Abdullah found all the valleys east of Kirkuk in Persian hands and had no choice but to retire. Daoud was forced to acquiesce temporarily in Mahmud's reinstatement.

It was after this event but before the Persian invasion of 1821 that Claudius Rich, the British Resident, visited Kurdistan. He spent long hours in conversation with members of the Baban family, other prominent tribesmen, storytellers, and village elders to piece together the history of the Babans as well as their present circumstances. He collected manuscripts and recorded dress and manners. Mahmud Pasha summed up his position for Rich:

He spoke of the state of the country; exposed the difficulties with which he had to contend, in being placed on the frontiers of two rival powers one of which never ceased persecuting him for contributions, -the other, his natural sovereigns, that is the Turks,
insisted that he should neither serve nor pay Persia; and yet Turkey was neither able nor willing to defend him, when the Shahzadeh of Kermanshah carried on his exactions by force. He pointed out the pernicious way in which this combination operated on the prosperity of the country, in a modest and sensible manner; and expressed his wish of adhering with fidelity to the cause of the Pasha of Baghdad. I believe, in fact, that personally he is well inclined to the Turks from religious prejudices; but it is easy to see that their cause is not very popular, and that the generality here have neither respect nor confidence in the Ottomans; nor do they deserve it. Their political conduct is blind, arrogant, and treacherous. With a little prudence and conciliation, and by a skillful application to the Sunnite feelings of the bigoted Koords, who detest the Persian sect, they might have attached firmly to them a brave and numerous people—who possess the most important lines of their frontier—and who, at particular moments, might turn the scale in favour of the power whose cause they espoused.¹

An unnamed person remarked to Rich:

The jealousy of our princes is their ruin. Neither the Turks nor the Persians would ever be able to do anything against us, but by availing themselves of our divisions, and the family jealousies of our chiefs. We are aware of this, and yet, somehow or other, the Turks always succeed and get the better of us. We are certainly Koords with thick understandings.²

The Ottoman-Persian war of 1821 was touched off by the Turkish Pasha of Erzerum's extension of protection to two nomadic tribes claimed by Persia. Urged on by Russian emissaries, Abbas Mirza, governor of Azerbaijan and heir apparent to the Persian throne, invaded eastern Turkey. Muhammad 'Alī Mirza, using Baban rivalries as a pretext, crossed the border at Khaniqin. To these moves Path 'Alī Shah gave his full endorsement. He had contemplated invading

²Ibid., p. 90.
Iraq many times, notably after the sack of Kerbala, but he had been dissuaded by foreign diplomatic pressure and by the largess of the Pasha of Baghdad.\(^1\) As the Persians moved westward on two fronts, Sultan Maḥmūd II declared war and urged the strongest resistance on his Pashas. Baghdad was to be fortified and troops sent out to meet the enemy’s advance. Daoud’s Kākhyā, Muḥammad Agha, led a force past Kirkuk toward Sūlaimaniyyāh. However, he met 5,000 Persian troops coming from the opposite direction. These were commanded by Abdullāh Baban who had decided his prospects were brighter on the Persian side when Daoud had been forced to accept Maḥmūd. In the battle that ensued the mameluk forces were roundly defeated and Muḥammad Agha fled to the other side.\(^2\) The Persian army advanced on Baghdad.

Daoud was well prepared for a siege. His treasury was full, his stores adequate and there was little sympathy for the Persians inside the city. Moreover, it required many fewer troops to defend a walled city than to besiege it. Muḥammad 'Alī Mirza, doubtful of a successful outcome, halted at Ba'qūbah. His troops were being ravaged by cholera and he himself was ill. After a few weeks he sent a Shi'i 'alim to Daoud to negotiate terms. Abdullāh Baban was given Sūlaimānīyyah, the Persians allowed to keep their booty but

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1. The British Ambassador, John McDonald, sought to prevent renewed hostilities. Longrigg., op. cit., p. 243, footnote #1.

2. As mentioned above, Muḥammad Agha later led the tribal revolt of the middle Euphrates (1824).
were to evacuate Ottoman territory.¹

Muhammad 'Ali Mirza died soon after concluding the agreement. The war still continued in the north with the army of Abbās Mirza forcing the troops of the Pashas of Mosul, Diarbekr and Baghdad to retreat. As the Persians advanced, they suffered increasing tribal harassment and once again cholera broke out in the ranks. Disease, rather than the military prowess of the Sultan's vessels, compelled Abbās Mirza to retire.²

The death of Muhammad 'Ali Mirza caused the renewal of Baban dynastic strife. Maḥmūd Pasha drove Abdullāh from Sūlaimāniyyah and again assumed control. The issue was temporarily settled by the Treaty of Ezerum (1823), which conferred Sūlaimāniyyah on Maḥmūd Baban and Keui on Abdullāh. The nebulous frontier as established by Sultan Murād was reaffirmed. From then on the Baban struggles were between Maḥmūd and his younger brother, Sūlaimān. However, the fortunes of the Babans were in decline. A Persian garrison remained there until the death of Fath 'Ali Shah in 1834. The Babans retained very little of their former independence or power. In the same year James Baillie Frazer described it as "a small state--the prey of an accumulation of

¹Longrigg, op. cit., p. 245. A Persian garrison remained at Sūlaimāniyyah.

²Ibid., pp. 245-246.
misfortunes which have reduced it to extreme misery."

In 1826 Russia claimed the Persian territory of Gokcha. War ensued in which the Russians penetrated into Azerbaijan and took Tabriz. Hostilities were ended by the Treaty of Turkomanchai of 1828. The terms of the treaty were not exorbitant as Russia was distracted by war with Turkey, but this treaty marked a new era in Persian history. Russian influence became predominant and the threat which Persia then posed to the Ottoman Empire, Iraq, and British interests in India was that of a pawn of the Russian bear.

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CHAPTER V

THE FALL OF BAGHDAD

To the criticism of the last phase of the Mameluk regime that it was static, even reactionary, so much defense could be offered; signs of material progress, modern arms, hope of improved transport, increasing consequence of European representatives. The door to progress was not wholly shut: rather it was opened fitfully and slammed capriciously.¹

In this analysis the present writer largely concurs. But the analogy of the door might be replaced by that of shutters, opened to allow light in some areas but keeping others in total darkness.

This point can be illustrated by considering Sultan Mahmūd II's attempted reforms and measuring Daoud's performance in the same spheres. Mahmūd's first major reform was the destruction of the janissaries. Daoud was able to break their power without bloodshed. He also followed the Sultan's example in building up a Europeanized military force and in opening up the country to western influence. In June of 1830 Reverend Mr. Groves remarked:

... in fact, everything is tending to the establishment of a European influence, ... This tendency to adopt European manners and improvements, is not only manifested in the military department, but in others more important.

¹Longrigg, op. cit., p. 261.
The Pasha has a great desire to introduce steam navigation on these two beautiful rivers.¹

And again:

Colonization appears to have entered into the contemplation of those engaged in steam navigation, and the planting of indigo and sugar. To this end the Pasha has granted them thirty miles of land on the banks of the river.²

Daoud, like the Sultan, met with reactionary opposition to his reforms:

We have heard today (June 26, 1830) that the Mohammedans, inhabitants of the town, are much dissatisfied with the Sultan and with the Pasha for introducing European customs. They say they are already Christians, and one of them asked Mr. Swoboda, if it was true that the old mosque or mosque near us was to become again a Christian church, and whether the beating of the drums every evening after the European manner at the seroy or palace, did not mean that the Pasha was becoming a Christian—All these things will clearly tend to one of these two results—either to the overthrow of Mohammedanism by the introduction of European manners and intelligence, or to a tremendous crisis in endeavouring to throw off the burden which the great mass of the lower and bigoted Mohammedans abhor.³

In dealing with other of the Sultan’s proposed reforms Daoud was less compliant. Mahmūd had recalled feudal grants and was seeking to end the abuse of this medieval system. Daoud continued granting land to his favorites. Mahmūd’s decision to put down petty “Valley Beys” in each Pashalıq was not implemented by Daoud. At the time of Daoud’s fall from power the Babans had declined but the Bey of Ruwanduz was gaining strength rapidly. Mahmūd sought to ease the

¹Groves, op. cit., p. 3.
²Ibid., pp. 19-20.
³Ibid., pp. 8-9.
burdens of taxation. Daoud was content with the inequities of the past, indeed he imposed heavier taxes and worsened the situation by his frequent currency evaluation changes.

Most importantly, Maḥmūd sought to limit provincial governorships to three years. The existence of a regime which had successfully defied Ottoman authority for more than a century was an anathema to a man like Sultan Maḥmūd. Moreover the mameluks had failed to protect the Shi'a holy places from Wahhabi raids, thereby further exacerbating relations with Persia. When hostility took the form of a major invasion the mameluks had not prevented Persian penetration of Ottoman domains. Nor had they submitted regular revenue payments to the capital. This was particularly galling in the war with Russia of 1828 when the very existence of the Empire seemed threatened. Sultan Maḥmūd was determined to end the mameluk regime and to this end he sent an official, Kapîcî, named Sâdiq Effendi with a fermân for Daoud's deposition. The Pasha's final act of defiance was the murder of the Sultan's envoy.

In August of 1830 Groves noted:

There are symptoms of great fear on the part of the Pasha, that a struggle is actually going on among those around him for superseding him in his Pashalic, in which they have apparently much probability of success as the Porte has been greatly injured by his unwillingness to meet her necessities and afford her pecuniary help.¹

In September Daoud learned of the approach of Sâdiq Effendi with an undisclosed fermân from the Sultan.

¹Tbid., p. 31.
Although the Pasha feared the worst he sent one of his closest friends, Mohammad Effendi, with four carriages of fruit and other gifts to meet the Kapıcı at a place forty hours march from Baghdad. Sadiq Effendi rebuffed this reception and continued marching to Baghdad. It was customary for an important dignitary to halt for the night at Adhamiyah, one hour north of Baghdad. The next morning he would enter the city with great fanfare followed by a reception and interview with the Pasha at the palace. Sadiq Effendi observed none of the niceties of custom and proceeded directly into Baghdad. This effrontery was a clear indication to Daoud and the officials of his government that the fermān provided for his deposal. After two meetings with Daoud the Kapıcı disclosed his purpose and the Pasha, seized with fright, resolved to murder him before the deposition could become public knowledge and undermine his support in the Pashalīq.¹

A statement was issued asserting that the envoy had been taken ill and died but no one was deceived. Sadiq Effendi had left messengers at Mosul and Diarbekr to take news of his mission back to Constantinople. All Baghdad now awaited the wrath of the Sultan, and, as was customary at times of crisis, the people began buying grain against the probability of a siege. It was believed that Daoud would seek help from Abbās Mirza in the coming confrontation and that Baghdad might again fall to the Persians.²

¹Thabit/Sülaîmân Bey bin Ḥaji Tālib, op. cit., pp. 39-40.
²Groves, op. cit., p. 65.
Sultan Maḥmūd offered the Pashalîq of Baghdad to Muḥammad 'Alî Rıdha, a Vezîr with a good record. He was appointed Pasha of Aleppo and of all of Iraq except Mosul. It remained for him to conquer his dominion and he began his march in the winter of 1830.

Meanwhile, rumors of plague and cholera in Tabriz had reached Baghdad. It was then reported in Sülaimâniyyah and Kirkuk. In his diary entry for September 10, 1830 the Reverend Mr. Groves noted:

The Pasha has just sent to the factory to say, that the cholera has extended its ravages to Kirkook, and to ask for advice, and what is to be done should it reach this place with its epidemic violence. Mr. M____ to instruct and Major Taylor to have translated.¹

and on September 16, 1830:

Nothing can show the stupid carelessness of these people more than that, although they are frightened out of their reason almost at the prospect of the plague and cholera, yet they have actually allowed a whole caravan from Tabriz to come into the city without quarantine, or any kind of precaution.²

Throughout the winter reports of plague continued but cold weather prevented an outbreak in Baghdad until spring. On February 21, 1831 the city heard that the Sultan had

¹Ibid., p. 40. Groves kept a day by day account of the events in Baghdad during his residence there (1830-1831). He lost his wife and a daughter to the plague.

²Ibid., p. 49. An interesting contrast in the reaction to plague on the part of Muslims and Christians is recorded by W. Kinglake in Eothen. Kinglake visited Cairo during an epidemic and described the Muslims as going about their normal business with faith in "the will of God"--"inshallah." The Christians had isolated themselves going through elaborate purification rites, scorning their best friends as "contami-nated." The author claimed that many Christians died of fright and apprehension. W. Kinglake, Eothen (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1893), pp. 253-59.
declared Daoud a rebel. Three days later word was received that 'Ali Ridha had left Aleppo a month before on his way to attack Daoud.\(^1\) On March 18 two tribes brought up by the Pasha to help in the coming conflict came to blows. Their firing, "... caused much alarm and may be but a precursor to general confusion and greater trials."\(^2\) The Groves diary entry for March 28, 1831 read:

The plague has now absolutely, we believe, entered this unhappy city... All you see passing have a little bunch of herbs or a rose or an onion to smell to, and yet as to real measures of precaution there has been not one step taken.\(^3\)

Through early April reports of deaths from plague increased daily. The British Resident, Major Taylor, left for Basra with his family. By April 16 the waters of the Tigris began to rise. Of an estimated population of over 80,000 at least half had fled the city but many were trapped or driven back by the rising water. Mortality was estimated at 2,000 per day in a population of 40,000. Five days later Groves recorded that "... the river has burst into the cellars of the Residency and is within a foot of inundating the whole city."\(^4\)

As the month of April pursued its grim course, Groves noted that:

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\(^1\) Groves, op. cit., p. 77.
\(^2\) Ibid., p. 94.
\(^3\) Ibid., pp. 97, 114.
\(^4\) Ibid., p. 116.
The business of death is now come to that height, that people seem to take their nearest relations, and bring them for interment with as much indifference as they would transact the most ordinary business.¹

Daoud had lost nearly all of his soldiers, and his mameluk regiments. "It is certain that should the plague cease tomorrow, the city is in such a state that no resistance could be made for one moment to any enemy."² On April 27, a part of the city wall collapsed and allowed further flooding. The Jewish quarter was inundated—two hundred houses and part of the citadel were in ruins.

And, in fact, such is the structure of the houses, that if the water remains near the foundations long the city must become a mass of ruins. The mortar they use in the building is very like plaster of Paris, which sets very hard, and does very well when all is dry; but as soon as ever water is applied, it all crumbles to powder; and in buildings four or five feet thick, they have only an outside casing of brick work thus cemented, and within it is filled up with dust and rubbish, so that what seems strong enough to bear anything, soon moulders away, and by its own weight accelerates its ruin.³

J. R. Wellsted, an English traveler then in Baghdad, was asleep on his roof the night the flood broke the bund, or dike, and swept through the streets. As it was still dark

¹Ibid., p. 117. April 22.
³Ibid., p. 124. The use of concrete mortar signifies a post-1900 structure to today's students of Iraqi architecture. Largely for the reasons described above very little remains of old Baghdad. Besides several medieval monuments only a few mosques, one gate, a French convent, part of the bazaar and three or four private homes survive which are even a century old. Of course "progress"—widening streets, etc. has also contributed to the demise of old Baghdad.
he remained where he was. At the first light of dawn he saw that the water had subsided and went down into the street. A moment later his house collapsed.¹ By April 28, 7,000 houses had been swept away burying the healthy, the sick and the dead in a single grave.²

Bodies accumulated in the streets, plunder was rife inside and outside the city. The harvest had been destroyed for thirty miles around. On April 30 Daoud, who was also ill from plague opened his stores of grain to relieve the hunger and misery of the people. The palace was in ruin, his horses ran wild in the streets and he had only a handful of servants left. Groves estimated that two-thirds of the population had been wiped out.³

By May 7 the plague and the water had subsided and news came of 'Alī Ridha's arrival at Mosul.⁴ The apprehension of the people grew greater day by day. By the first week of June, it was decided to put Daoud under house arrest and invite 'Alī Ridha's Qa'immacam, Qāsim Pasha, into the city. This would avoid a siege and general massacre of a "rebellious" population. Qāsim Pasha had advanced ahead of the main body


²Groves, op. cit., p. 126. Mr. Swoboda, a German merchant, estimated 15,000 deaths the night the flood broke into the city.

³Ibid., pp. 127-36.

⁴Ibid., p. 136.
of 'Alī Ridḥa's army. He entered the city accompanied by Sufuk of the Shammar al-Jarbā who, noting the weakness of Baghdad, espoused the cause of 'Alī Ridḥa. The leading citizens made statements of allegiance and welcome.¹

Qasim Pasha, however, had his own ambitions and decided to prevent the entrance of 'Alī Ridḥa. He first sought to kill Daoud and his remaining supporters but his plot became known and Qasim Pasha was overthrown. His fate is not recorded but he was presumably murdered. Daoud continued in "honorable retirement" at the house of Ṣaleh Bey, a prominent Baghdadi who became Qa'immagīn after the downfall of Qasim Pasha.²

For ten weeks 'Alī Ridḥa remained outside the walls of Baghdad. He had not enough men to besiege the city, but realized that only patience was required until the city, stricken by disease and flooding, fell to him. Fate handed him a city which would otherwise have defied him. Only a few days before his entry into the city, 'Alī Ridḥa received a message from the Sultan ordering that he give up his vigil if he had not yet taken the city. However, 'Alī Ridḥa realized that only the lure of plunder in Baghdad kept his army together and he did not disclose the order.³

On September 12 Groves reported that the city was in

¹Thabit Šūlaimān Bey bin Ḥāji Šālib, op. cit., p. 57.
²Ibid., pp. 57-64.
such misery that if 'Ajīl of the Muntafiq did not soon arrive
with help it had been decided to surrender Daoud's and Şâle
Bey's heads to 'Alî Ridha Pasha. Three days later the gates
were opened and 'Alî Ridha's Kâkhyâ entered. Daoud fled into
the citadel but was taken prisoner. 'Alî Ridha himself
remained outside the city and on the next day received Daoud
with the fullest display of respect.\(^1\)

Daoud was subsequently sent to Constantinople with his
family and a request for full pardon. He was appointed to
important positions elsewhere in the Empire, spending the
last years of his life as guardian of the Holy Shrine at
Medina. In 1851 he died "... lamented by the great and the
good in the death place of the Prophet."\(^2\) The rest of the
Georgian mameluks were not so fortunate. On October 11, 1831
most of those who remained in Baghdad were put to death by
'Alî Ridha. Others were pursued in the provinces and only a
few escaped. Thus ended Georgian slave government in Iraq.

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\(^1\)Groves, op. cit., p. 25.
\(^2\)Longrigg, op. cit., p. 274.
CHAPTER VI

ALI RIDHA PASHA

On September 15, 1831 the Pashalic of Baghdad once again became an integral part of the Ottoman Empire subject to the will of the Sultan. Tribute and revenue, at least in the early years of 'Ali Ridha's regime, were sent more or less punctually to Constantinople. Positions, military and civilian, could still be purchased but none could be retained in the face of opposition from the Porte. But in fact, there was little practical difference. The Sultan, content with the return of Iraq to the fold, remained as remote as ever from involvement in its internal affairs. The Pashalic caught his attention only when it was endangered by a hostile power or when, by policy or action, it caused repercussions on the international scene. As a result of the catastrophes of Spring, 1831, Baghdad was weaker and the avariciousness of its neighbors greater. The man in whose hands the Sultan now placed the fate of Iraq was a weaker, less able man than the one the Sultan had deposed.

Muhammad 'Ali Ridha was given a ferma for Baghdad, Aleppo, Mosul and Diarbekr but his writ in fact did not extend beyond the modern boundaries of Iraq. The initial reaction of Baghdad to 'Ali Ridha was one of relief. The
long months of misery and blockade were over, 'Alī Ridha showed no vindictiveness toward the population and slowly the routine of normal life returned to the city. In a dispatch to the Bombay Government dated 4 December 1831, Major Taylor commented on the continued "prudent and comparatively mild demeanor of the Pasha." He commended the absence of useless pomp and the removal of injurious subordinate agencies standing between the Pasha and his conduct of affairs. The necessities of life had increased in quantity and decreased in price. There was greater safety on public roads and a growing confidence in the Pasha:

These are all undoubtedly signs of an amended and happier state of public relations than has long been felt by the people of these Countries. May it be progressive with equal or greater felicity.\(^2\)

It was not. Trouble soon broke out in Basra. The tribe (semi-settled Zobeir), dominating that city was in turmoil over possible reconciliation of the Muntafiq and Cha'ab tribes, their enemies of long standing, with the Pasha of Baghdad. As 'Alī Ridha had sent no confirmation of the special privileges previously enjoyed by the Basra Arabs, they feared he meant to oust them with the help of their tribal rivals.\(^3\) Instead, Baghdad's relations with the Cha'ab soured

\(^1\)IOLM/2/222: Major Taylor to Charles Norris, Chief Secretary, Bombay Government. No. 71 of 1831, Bussorah 4 December 1831.

\(^2\)Ibid.

\(^3\)IOLM/2/222: Major Taylor to Charles Norris, Chief Secretary, Bombay Government, No. 72 of 1831, Bussorah 4 December 1831.
and 'Alī Ridha dispatched troops against them. The Arab party in Basra was therefore left in control, appropriating funds for their own use in the name of the Pasha.

In April, 1832, the Bey of Ruwanduz advanced on villages near Mosul. Those which refused to surrender were burned to the ground. Baghdad was unable to act effectively. The Georgian ex-Mutasallim of Basra, Ozair Agha, took refuge with Abbās Mirza and gathered other dissidents for a march on Baghdad. The financial status of the Pashaliq was so bad that the Pasha was forced to sell his personal property at auction to meet the strictest necessities. Taylor declared that the intentions of the Pasha were good but that he was betrayed on all sides and personally utterly ignorant of the Pashaliq under his jurisdiction.

Meanwhile the plague had broken out again (in the spring of 1832) and the Tigris rose to flood level. According to J. R. Wellsted who revisited the city that spring, two-thirds of the buildings were in ruins and the population diminished.

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1 The major conflict with the Cha'ab did not develop until 1837 when 'Alī Ridha sacked Muhammarah and the Persians demanded compensation.

2 IOLM/2/222: Major Taylor to Charles Norris, Chief Secretary, Bombay Government, No. 6 of 1832, Bussorah, 10 January 1832.

3 Ozair Agha was later betrayed by Abbās and handed over to Alī Ridha.

4 IOLM/2/222: Major Taylor to Charles Norris, Chief Secretary, Bombay Government, No. 29 of 1832, 26 April 1832.
to 20,000. Five hundred people died daily of plague and other diseases spread by decomposing bodies. Basra and the lower Euphrates were especially hard hit by the plague of 1832. Hilleh was nearly deserted.

Affairs would have degenerated even more quickly but for the concentration of the reins of government in the hands of Haji Muhammad Najib Aghlie Effendi who became Kāhīyā and Defterdār. He also took charge of the Pasha's relations with the Porte. Taylor, still in Basra, quoted from a Baghdad source of intelligence as follows: "... from what I hear and see I think the affairs of Ali Pasha would go on badly indeed but for Hajee Effendi - he seems the mover of all - for the city it is a great mercy that there is one who understands and will act for it has suffered so much that but for this it must entirely go to ruin." Unfortunately, Haji Muhammad Effendi was doomed by the pettiness of those around him.

On April 16, 1832, Taylor wrote to J. Mandeville, H.M. Consul General in Constantinople, describing the situation surrounding his demise. He said that since the departure of Daoud and the destruction of the mameluks affairs had remained unsettled in the Pashalîq. The

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1J. R. Wellsted, op. cit., p. 294.

2Groves describes Haji Muhammad Effendi as a man capable of anything but friendly to the British as he owed his life to the British Resident.

3IOLM/2/222: Major Taylor to Charles Norris, Chief Secretary, Bombay Government, No. 2 of 1832, 10 January 1832, containing an intelligence extract dated 28 November 1831.
administration was subject to "a quick and generally injudicious change of Ministers to all of whom in succession the Pasha delivered himself up with unreserved confidence." Most of his Ministers were Aleppines and as ignorant of the Pashalıq as he. Little was accomplished until the rise of Haji Muhammed Effendi, a man of talent and industry, who began to reconstruct the social and economic life of the city. He had only just begun his arduous task when he was falsely implicated in a plot of treason and beheaded by 'Alî Ridha on the advice of his Aleppine sycophants. "Ali is a good hearted but a weak man; and quite incompetent to control this ___ and agitated Pashalıq." So what had been at first taken for liberality and generosity on the part of the Pasha was in fact weakness and incapacity for leadership.

The Arabs by whom his territory is bounded in at least half of its extent; and the Coords and the Persians to the North East and East are to a man against him; they consume his revenue; shelter the Georgian fugitives; animate pretenders to power.

'Alî Ridha was aware of the situation but powerless to act. He requested his own removal from office and suggested two successors. However, the Porte was preoccupied with other matters and was content to have 'Alî Ridha remain until

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1 IOLM/2/222: Major Taylor to J. Mandeville, H.M. Consul General, Stamhbul, 16 April 1832, No. 26 of 1832.
2 ibid.
3 ibid.
4 ibid.
major objections to his practices brought about his removal in 1842.

By nature 'Alī Ridḥa was an affable, pleasant man. He was accessible to foreigners and receptive to their ideas and proposals. Before the fall of the city he had sent word by his Italian physician that his troops had strict orders that all "Franks" were to go unmolested when the city changed hands. Almost immediately upon assuming the Pashalîq he confirmed foreign privileges and stated his interest in continuing studies of the Euphrates with a view of establishing steam communication. 'Alī Ridḥa also renewed Daoud's request for British officers. In a letter to the Governor General in Council at Fort William in Bengal, the Secret Committee of the East India Company wrote:

Although we could not, consistently with our national engagements, have continued our aid and countenance to Daoud Pacha after he had fallen under the displeasure of the Sultan, we are fully sensible of the importance of maintaining a friendly intercourse with the local authority at Baghdad . . . .

Therefore 'Alī Ridḥa was to be provided with British officers under the same terms as agreed to by Daoud. The Pasha was later given credits for the purchase of supplies through Bombay as the route to Constantinople was blocked by Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt. He also received a grant from the Sultan to meet the costs of constructing an arsenal, barracks and other

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1IOLM/2/222: Secret Committee to the Governor General in Council, Ft. William, Bengal, 28 April 1832.

2Ibid.
public buildings. But affairs had gotten out of his control in the Pashalic.

As a ruler he was a complete failure. In dealing with the tribes he followed the same tactics as Daoud—instigating one tribe against another, deposing shaikhs and conferring privileges. However, 'Alī Ridha lacked the strength or the will to force obedience to this action and he only served to exacerbate an already deteriorating situation.

It will be recalled that 'Alī Ridha had come to power with the aid of the Shammar al-Jarba.' Upon assuming the position of Pasha he refused to reward the Shammar saying that they had behaved badly in the siege. The Shammar rose in revolt and blocked all land communications with Baghdad during the winter of 1831-1832. 'Alī Ridha then appointed a cousin of Shaikh Sufūk, Shaikh Shelash, as head of the Shammar and enlisted the Anieza tribe against the Shammar who had remained faithful to Sufūk. The Shammar were driven away from Baghdad but the Anieza were so troublesome that the Shammar were invited to return the next autumn.¹ Their return was not peaceful.

Taylor, in a dispatch dated October 24, 1833, wrote of a suspected confederation against 'Alī Ridha involving the Pasha of Mosul, Sūlaimān of Kurdistan and Shaikh Sufūk. The latter had established a circle of positions around Baghdad at a distance of from twenty to thirty miles and had taken possession of all supplies and information coming into the

¹IOLM/2/222: Major Taylor to the Secret Committee, Baghdad, 14 May 1833, Secret Department No. 5.
city. Little by little the circle had been constricted until soldiers manning Turkish outposts were driven back to the city walls. The whole of the Turkish army was mustered to fight Sufūk but whenever the army was employed it only succeeded in generating more popular hostility against the government by destroying crops, plundering villages and driving more people from their homes to join the discontented elements within the city. Taylor also reported a new mode of intimidation adopted by the Turks—the seizure of the harems of all suspected of being disloyal. He noted that:

Most assuredly no set of men can have laid more certain claims to the deepest disgust and hatred of the people of this Country, or more unerringly and completely secured this result than those now in power here.  

Sufūk retreated from the Turkish army but was not suppressed. He was eventually captured and sent to Constantinople by Rashid Pasha, the Sar'askar, in 1836, but he returned to dominate Iraq from Mardin to Baghdad. Meanwhile, the Anieza refused to leave Baghdad and the city was subjected to a bitter tribal conflict between them and their arch enemies, the Shammar, lasting into 1834.

The Turks, like the mameluks before them, never showed the tribesmen an alternative way of life—never attempted to

1IOLM/2/222: Major Taylor to Charles Norris, Chief Secretary, Bombay Government, Political Department No. 83, Baghdad, 24 October 1833.


3The continuation of an ancient tribal feud which had its origins in the Nefud Desert of what is now Saudi Arabia.
settle them on the land, to give them some form of security
nor to tax them lightly or justly. There were periodic
efforts to crush them by force of arms but they always
revived and continued the only way of life they knew—that
opposed to organized government and dictated by the codes of
the desert. Daoud was at least able to keep the tribes at
bay through incessant campaigns. During the era of 'Alī
Ridha, "tribe smashing" was attempted with too few troops
and without consistency. This only served further to inflame
the tribal population and to minimize 'Alī Ridha's control
over the Pashalıq.

Weak as this government is, and rebellious as are
the Arabs, yet their continued changes and a lingering
respect for the Turkish authority still preserves the
integrity of the Pacha's power; yet every concussion
brings it nearer its fall and how long it can be
supported in its declensions and feebleness and wretched
administration, it is difficult to say.¹

The fortunes of the valley beys of Kurdistan waxed and
waned with little or no relation to the policies of Baghdad.
After the rise to power of Mir Muḥammad, the Bey of Ruwanduz,
and his conquest of the districts near Mosul, 'Alī Ridha was
forced to recognize him and even bestow upon him the rank of
Pasha. His ambitions were only checked following upon the
appearance of Rashid Pasha with an imperial army. The Bey
was captured and sent to Constantinople where he "disappeared."²

¹IOLM/2/222: Major Taylor to the Secret Committee, Poli-
tical Department No. 8, Baghdad, 10 November 1834.
²Longrigg, op. cit., pp. 278-79.
The Babans, under Persian dominance, still caused friction between the two empires until the end of the dynasty in 1850.

In Mosul the last Jalili Pasha fell from power in 1834. Muhammad Pasha, "Injah Bairaqdar," was appointed Pasha and ruled Mosul until 1843. He destroyed Kurdish power in that area and gave Mosul more security and better administration than it had known for many years.¹

As to the reform measures issuing forth from the Porte, nothing in the way of spirit or edict filtered down to Baghdad. The Reverend Mr. Horatio Southgate visited Baghdad in 1836 and made the following observation:

... with regard to Baghdad, there is little appearance of those reforms which have drawn so much attention to Turkey of late years, and have awakened so many hopes in her behalf.²

He also noted the deplorable state of learning but was impressed by the state of the bazaars and commended the equitable treatment of the large Jewish minority.³ According to Longrigg, "Of the body of Reforms there was no sign in Baghdad and none in Mosul until the age of Najeb Pasha from 1842."⁴

The deteriorating state of affairs in the Pashalig of

¹Ibid., pp. 282-283.


³Ibid., pp. 165-183.

⁴Longrigg, op. cit., p. 231.
Baghdad had a direct bearing on the international situation. Three powers—Egypt, Russia and Persia cast greedy eyes on the faltering dependency of a distracted Sultan. Only England sought to prevent it from falling into other hands.

In November of 1831 Ibrāhīm Pasha, son of Muhammad 'Alī Pasha of Egypt, invaded Palestine with a force variously estimated at from between 10,000 to 35,000 men. Only Acre, with its medieval fortifications, was able to withstand his onslaught and after a siege of six months it also fell. In May of 1832 Sultan Maḥmūd declared Muḥammad 'Alī an outlaw and sent an army against his forces. In June Damascus fell to Ibrāhīm and he continued his advance north of Aleppo where he met and defeated the Sultan’s army. Ibrāhīm crossed the Taurus Mountains, defeated a second army dispatched by the Sultan and marched to Kütahya in December, 1832. There he halted but threatened to occupy Brusa, the early capital of the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan frantically appealed to the European powers for help.

In March of 1832 James Farren, British Consul in Damascus, wrote to Major Taylor to warn him of Muḥammad 'Alī’s designs on Baghdad as well as Damascus.¹ Taylor replied in a similar vain:

[... it must naturally be expected that by the means of Spies bribery and intrigue he would do all he could to produce an interest and means of success at this Court; and certainly at no period of its history was Mesopotamia so depressed, impoverished and divided and the population]

¹IOLM/2/222: Farren to Taylor at Basra, 5 March 1832.
so estranged from patriotic views: or the designs of external ambition so easily attainable as at this moment. Any change of leaders too would lead to an improved state of affairs both to our interests and to those of this people, so absolutely weak, vicious and inadequate is its present administration.¹

In a dispatch dated Baghdad, April 29, 1832, Taylor wrote the Bombay government that there was much rejoicing in the city over the victories of Ibrahîm Pasha. Muslims expected that he would restore ancient Islamic practices and throw out the foreign innovations of Sultan Mahmûd.² Five days later he remarked:

There is little doubt that the emissaries of Mohamet Ali in Baghdad have so well succeeded in promoting their master’s interests - aided by the unpopularity of the Pasha there, and the evils which that country has so lately endured - that Mesopotamia will prove an easy conquest to Ibrahim when he shall be free to undertake it.³

Farren wrote to the Secret Committee on August 7, 1832, after the fall of Damascus, the defeat of Hussein Pasha and the surrender of Aleppo: "Syria and Egypt may be considered as lost to the Sultan and with Mesopotamia, in all probability, will become the territory of a new Eastern monarchy."⁴

¹IOLM/2/222: Taylor to Farren, Basra, No. 25 of 1832, 16 April 1832.

²IOLM/2/222: Taylor to Charles Norris, Bombay Government No. 31 of 1832, 29 April 1832.

³IOLM/2/222: Taylor to Charles Norris, Bombay Government No. 35 of 1832, 2 May 1832.

⁴IOLM/2/222: Farren to the Secret Committee, 7 August 1832.
It was not only the designs of Muhammad 'Alī himself that disturbed British officials but the fact that French influence was predominant in his administration.¹ His army and navy were trained by French officers and engineers. There was also the impact of the French savants brought by Napoleon and evidence of their studies in all phases of Egyptian life. Farren reported that a French officer of the corps of engineers made a survey of the Lebanon mountain passes before Ibrahīm attempted to cross and take Damascus.² The Egyptian Pasha was also in frequent contact with the French ambassador to Cairo, Baron de Bois. According to an intelligence extract from Syria, dated August 8, 1833, Muḥammad 'Alī had expressed his desire to take Baghdad and had been told by Ambassador de Bois that the British would never allow it and that France would be forced to back Britain.³

After the defeat of his first army in July of 1832, Sultan Mahmūd appealed to the councils of Europe for aid. Only Russia responded, but the Sultan was patently aware of Russia's motives and was afraid to accept unilateral Russian assistance. When Ibrahīm Pasha advanced to Kutahya the Sultan had no alternative. During the winter and spring of

¹The French invasion of Algeria in 1830 was ample proof of renewed French interest in the East.
²IOLM/2/222: Farren to the Secret Committee, 28 April 1832.
³IOLM/2/222: Taylor to Bombay Government, Political Department No. 67, 5 September 1833.
1833, two Russian naval squadrons and three contingents of troops landed at the Turkish capitol. The Treaty of Unkia-Skelessi, marking the zenith of Russian influence in the Ottoman Empire, was signed in July of the same year.

The British government had failed to heed the entreaties of her eastern envoys and only awoke to the Russian threat when Russian supremacy was already \textit{\`a fait accompli}. Lord Palmerston, British Foreign Secretary, belatedly resolved to frustrate the aims of the treaty. The extreme gravity of the situation can easily be seen by recalling that by the Treaty of Turkomanchi (1828) Russia had also obtained a dominating position in Persia and through Persia, an influence in Kurdistan. The Ottoman Empire was, for all intents and purposes, divided between Muhammed \textquoteleft{}Ali of Egypt and Tsar Nicholas. Iraq was the only prize left and the contest to win it became increasingly intense.

In February of 1833 Taylor reported with considerable alarm that the Russians had advanced through the mountains of Armenia and that they could with little effort build rafts and float their heaviest guns as well as troops down the Euphrates on the crest of the spring flood.\footnote{IOLM/2/222: Taylor to Bombay Government, Baghdad, No. 11 of 1833, 15 February 1833. Mr. Malcolm Campbell of Baghdad has recounted to the present writer details of the sinking of one of the two ships of the Chesney Expedition which were under the direction of his great uncle, H. B. Lynch. The ships were built on the upper Euphrates, all parts having been carried across the desert. It was planned to float the ships over the rapids in the spring flood but
Russians preferred to have a pretext for taking Baghdad and therefore exerted most of their pressure through Persia.

Also in February an envoy from Abbās Mirza arrived at 'Alī Ridha's Court demanding the establishment of a permanent Persian Resident to protect the interests of Persian pilgrims. If the Pasha of Baghdad should refuse, the envoy threatened certain political and military moves on the frontier which could only prove disastrous to the Turks. Of this move Taylor wrote, "The Persians really appear determined to seek a quarrel with the Pachalic." ¹

In July of 1833 Taylor relayed to Bombay a letter from the British Minister at Constantinople on the supremacy of Russian influence there and the inimical effect on British interests. Taylor added, "Turkey and Persia are now in general, little more than convenient instruments of Russian aggrandizement." ² Although the populace of the Pashaliq continued to give expression to their desire to be governed by Muḥammad 'Alī, Russian influence was growing at the Baghdad Court.

The people of these countries are certainly not aware of their real enemies; for even the Pacha in his remarks on European powers appears jealous of France.

the floods came early and the "Tigris" was not yet finished. It was floated anyway, without covering on the portholes, and in a storm the ship filled up with water and sank. Another of Mr. Campbell's great uncles was drowned in the disaster.

¹IOLM/2/222: Taylor to the Bombay Government, No. 13 of 1833, 15 February 1833.

²IOLM/2/222: Taylor to the Bombay Government, Baghdad, No. 57 of 1833, 29 July 1833.
and England, while to Russia alone he attributes sentiments of loyalty to Turkey.\(^1\)

Early in 1834 Captain Campbell, Locum Tenens, British Ambassador in Persia, wrote to Taylor:

The Russians are extremely desirous for a pretext to interfere in the affairs of your Pachalic, and they declare that they possess a right to do so, if it be threatened by Muhammad Ali, owing to the late Treaty between the Emperor and the Porte.\(^2\)

Campbell urged Taylor to impress upon the British government the danger of Russian troops in Iraq. There was at this time in England a very great interest in promoting a faster overland route to India which would utilize railways and steam navigation. The two competing routes were from the Mediterranean overland across Egypt to the Red Sea; or by rail from Selucia to Jaber Castle on the Euphrates, thence by steamer to Basra and the Gulf.\(^3\) At this time studies indicated that the Euphrates route to be ten days shorter.\(^4\) Therefore, Britain had a high stake in preserving Iraq to the Sultan.

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\(^1\)Ibid.

\(^2\)IOLM/2/222: Campbell to Taylor, 28 January 1834.


\(^4\)Groves, *op. cit.*, pp. 9, 13. From conversations with Mr. James Taylor (brother of the Resident--later to be killed by Arab brigands), who was engaged in a survey of the Red Sea Route but who concluded that the Euphrates Route was the faster of the two.
In March of 1834 an agent of Muḥammad 'Alī appeared in the Gulf with letters from the Egyptian Pasha to the Cha'ab and Muntafiq shaikhs, among others, claiming that the Sultan had ceded the Pashalıq of Baghdad to Egypt. A few days later Taylor wrote of the imminent arrival of a Russian agent at the court. "I know of not a fitter object for deceptive art than 'Alī Pasha, independently of his being as I have already reported biased in favor of that power." Taylor proposed the introduction of British officers to bolster the defenses of the Pashalıq and the appointment of a new Pasha more competent than 'Alī Rıdha. The alternative to these moves, as Taylor saw the situation, was a complete takeover by England or Muḥammad 'Alī, and assumed that the latter would result in a major access of French influence in Iraq.

Lord Palmerston was no longer deaf to the advice and pleas of his envoys. He bent the full force of British imperial power behind his efforts to preserve the Ottoman Empire and to prevent it from being divided by powers whose chief aim was assumed to be an assault on the British position in India. Muḥammad 'Alī and Russia were both restrained diplomatically from extending their influence by the mid-30's. The opportunity for England to completely change the spheres of influence came in 1839 with Sultan Maḥmūd's premature

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\(^{1}\) IOLM/2/222: Taylor to the Bombay Government, Political Department, No. 22, 10 March 1834.

\(^{2}\) IOLM/2/222: Taylor to the Secret Committee, No. 3 of 1834, 14 March 1834.
attempt to reconquer Syria. The Sultan was again defeated but the architect of the settlement was Great Britain. By virtue of the Treaty of London, 1841, Muḥammad ʿAlī was restricted to hereditary control of Egypt and lifetime rule of Syria. The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi was torn up and the Russian bear pushed back from the Mediterranean. France was to a small extent mollified by last minute inclusion in the settlement, having been forced by a judicious Palmerstonian combination of firmness and tact to accept the situation. But she was discredited in Egypt for not coming the Muḥammad ʿAlī's aid. Thus by a master stroke of diplomacy Palmerston had preserved the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. His arrangements stood for another four decades and when changes came, they served to increase rather than diminish the already considerable British influence in the Ottoman domains.

ʿAlī Rıdha's stewardship of Ottoman interests in Baghdad did nothing, as has been indicated, to realize the Porte's objectives in displacing the mameluks from authority in Iraq. Had not the twin challenges of Russia and Egypt beset Sultan Maḥmūd even as the transfer of power was accomplished in Baghdad, steps might have been taken to consolidate the Sultan's victory and incorporate the Pashaliq fully into the Ottoman administrative system. Yet it seems more likely that changes in Ottoman fortunes and such permanent factors as tribalism, Persian irredentism, Kurdish turbulence and remoteness from the seat of imperial government would have rendered such improvements ephemeral.
CONCLUSION

Two broad conclusions emerge from the detail of historical narrative presented above. The first is that within the Pashalıq conditions varied according to the strength of weakness of a single man—the Pasha. There were a given set of perennial problems: the Kurds, the Arab tribes, the Persians and a disputed frontier, religious minorities, political intrigue, corruption, and ineffective land utilization—many of which are present in the Iraq of 1967. The extent to which these problems receded or were exacerbated depended upon the talent, industry and indeed, brute force exhibited by the Pasha. No Pasha could have resolved them all. Political intrigue and corruption were taken for granted. If Daoud made no attempt to settle the tribes, he at least kept them at bay and gave Baghdad greater stability and security than was ever reached under 'Ali Ridha. Daoud dredged rivers and canals, built mosques and bazaars. His army, modeled on European lines, was certainly capable of defending Baghdad against siege, be it Persian or Ottoman. Food was plentiful and the treasury adequate to demands. Above all, Daoud had a stake in the Pashalıq. As with the rest of the Georgians, it was his life—not one of a series
of imperial appointments. If it prospered he also prospered which made personal effort worthwhile. When the Ottoman Empire was weak and distraught, the mameluke preserved their easternmost province from Persian domination. They made it strong enough to withstand the ambitions of its neighbors.

And yet fate flaunts the will and industry of man. Nothing short of the natural disasters of plague and flood which afflicted Baghdad would have served to remove Daoud at the height of his power. Even with natural disasters working in his favor, 'Ali Ridha very nearly decided upon abandoning the siege.

With the end of mameluk rule came a new variety of authority-officials who were almost entirely ignorant of the intricate problems of the Pashalig and who, moreover, regarded their stay in Baghdad as temporary. It was a foreign service—indeed an occupation force—devoid of local commitments and bent upon accumulating as much personal gain as could be had in the time available. 'Ali Ridha was not himself a self-seeking man but "... of such weak and feeble judgment ... and so irresolute of purpose that neither his promises nor commands can be safely deemed binding for an hour together."1 'Ali Ridha was content to let his numerous ministers administer the Pashalig as they saw fit. Baghdad in its extreme weakness and agitation became the object of

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prey of three expanding powers, Russian, Persian and Egyptian—if not four in view of the rapacity of the imperial Ottoman officials.

Once again external forces combined to work their will on the Pashalîq. Baghdad was preserved for the Ottoman Empire and 'Alî Ridha continued to be its Pasha because the concert of Europe determined that it should be so. Left alone in the jungle of empire-building, 'Alî Ridha would have been forced to surrender the Pashalîq to the first determined bidder. At no time was its condition more miserable.

In concluding that the internal condition of the Pashalîq was responsive to the capacity of its Pasha we must also conclude that its ultimate destiny lay with forces beyond its own control.
APPENDIX

GLOSSARY OF FOREIGN WORDS

'alim - (pl 'Ulemā) - a learned person especially in Islamic religious law and lore.

ayalat - a province - largest administrative unit in the Ottoman Empire.

Bey - a Turkish title.

Defterdar - accountant, chief revenue and treasury official in a province.

djizya - Islamic tax on Christians and Jews.

ferman - letter-patent issued by the Sultan.

Kâkhyâ - chief Minister in a provincial government under a Pasha.

Kâlif - secular administrator of Islam.

Kapici - "doorkeeper" - imperial messenger.

Muṣḥhib - courtiers

Mütesarrif - governor of a Sanjak or liwa.

Mütesallim - deputy governor of a Sanjak or liwa.

Nidhamiyyah - the new system of military training introduced by Sultan Mahmud II.

Pasha - ruler of a pashaliq.

pashaliq - synonymous with ayalat. The Ayalat of Baghdad or the Pashaliq of Baghdad.
Qa'immaqam - deputy governor or deputy in general application.

sanjak - a subprovince of a ayalat or pashaliq.

Sar'askar - Commander-in-Chief.

shaikh - a tribal leader.

sipahi - a horse soldier; Sipahis - regular corps of imperial cavalry.

tughra - imperial signature.

temlik - private property.

Wali - (Vâli - Turkish) - governor.

Wazir - (Vezir - Turkish) - a minister.

Zakat - Islamic tithe.

TRANSLITERATION KEY

' - Arabic, glottal stop.

h - Arabic, strongly whispered h.

I ū ā - Arabic, long vowels.

ḍ ṣ ţ - Arabic, velarized consonants.

k - Turkish, as English k; in Arabic the sound resembles a guttural English Q.

i - Turkish, hard i.

ü - Turkish, as in German.
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The present writer had the period from Sa'id Pasha through Daoud Pasha translated (1813-1831). This is the most important period as Sūlāimān Bey was a Georgian and the son of a Kākhyā of Daoud and therefore an eye witness to this period.

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