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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The plan of this study falls into five chapters. In chapter I we make some general remarks on Moore's philosophy, describing its background and placing it in a comprehensible context in preparation for detailed study.

Chapter II is concerned with Moore's ethics, and chapter III deals with his epistemology. Our investigation, in these two chapters, of Moore's actual practice of analysis is then made the subject of comparison with the theoretical views about analysis which Moore himself elsewhere expressed. This forms the subject matter of chapter IV.

In chapter V we draw together the conclusions of our study. But before we do so we will consider some views about Moore which are held by other philosophers. These philosophers fall into two main categories. Firstly, there are those who, more or less, follow Moore's methods and attempt to extend his views beyond the limits to which he took them. Such a category may fairly be represented by philosophers such as Norman Malcolm,
John Wisdom, and Morris Lazerowitz. Secondly, there are those who, more or less, sympathize with Moore's methods, but reject the illegitimate extension or misrepresentations of his views. This category may fairly be represented by philosophers such as J.N. Findlay, G.J. Warnock, and Brand Blanshard.

G.E. Moore was born in Norwood (London) in 1873. His father was a medical doctor who provided a rudimentary education for him. When he was eight, Moore was sent to Dulwich College where he spent ten years concentrating on the classical side of his studies. At Dulwich College Moore was impressed by some of his teachers notably W.T. Lendrum and A.H. Gilkes. Lendrum was a classical scholar whom Moore described as expressing pains to be accurate and get everything right. Moore, no doubt, owed a great deal to him. He expresses his indebtedness thus: "To mention a less important matter, it was undoubtedly mainly due to the very thorough training he gave me for a period of more than two years, that I was able subsequently to win, first, a Major Scholarship at Trinity, then to obtain the highest honours then possible in
the First Part of the Classical Tripos, and finally to win the Craven University Scholarship". (1)

A.H. Gilkes was the headmaster of Dulwich College. He was philosophically-minded, though he was not interested in technical philosophy. He was an admirer of Socrates and his eminence lay in the fact that he had some resemblences to him. Moore was definitely influenced by Gilkes. He reports: "I was nineteen; and I think that his influence on me (as it certainly was on others) must have been in one way or another, enormous". (2)

This Socratic attitude was surely one of Moore's preoccupations; but whether he provided good answers for the questions he asked remains an open question. However, one historian of philosophy described Moore as a good questioner, but a bad answerer. "Though we may call Moore the greatest, acutest, and most skillful questioner of modern philosophy, we must add that he is an extremely weak and unsatisfying

(2) Ibid, p.10.
answerer."(3) The same judgement is also confirmed by a notable philosopher: "Thus the general movement of Moore's thought is away from giving answers towards setting problems. Metz described him as a good questioner but a bad answerer, and Moore pleads guilty to the charge". (4)

In 1892 Moore entered Trinity College at Cambridge. There he came to know Bertrand Russell who was two years his Senior; and under his influence Moore took to philosophy. Both Moore and Russell came under the influence of Mc Taggart, and for a time they were both Hegelian of the Bradlean type. Russell acknowledges that Moore had satisfied, for a time, his ideal of genius (5) and that he (Moore) took the lead in rebellion against idealism while Russell only followed with a sense of emancipation. (6) Thus Russell describes Moore's influence on him as follows: "Moore, like me was influenced by Mc Taggart and was for a short time a Hegelian. But he emerged more quickly than I did, and it was largely his

(3) Rudolf Metz, A Hundred Years of British Philosophy, p. 540.
(4) John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p. 208.
(5) Bertrand Russell, Portraits from Memory and Other Essays, p. 68.
conversation that led me to abandon both Kant and Hegel. Inspite of his being two years younger than me, he greatly influenced my philosophical outlook. (7)

But Moore, with a modesty typical of his philosophical outlook, accorded himself a very inferior position in relation to Russell. He notes in his autobiography: "I do not know that Russell has ever owed to me anything except mistakes; whereas I have owed to his published works ideas which were certainly not mistakes and which I think very important. (8)

Moore acknowledged that he was more influenced by the writings of Bertrand Russell and Henry Sidgwick than by his personal contacts with them. However, in the case of James Ward and J.E. Mc Taggart, two of the last prominent members of the English idealist movement; it was personal contact which was more important. Moore's indebtedness to Mc Taggart was immense. He was very impressed by Mc Taggart's constant insistence on clearness — "on trying to give a precise meaning

(7) Bertrand Russell, Portraits from Memory, and Other Essays, p.68.
for philosophical expressions, on asking the question 'What does this mean?'.

Moore's philosophical life proper began with his publication of his essay 'The Refutation of Idealism' and his book *Principia Ethica* in 1903. In 1911 he took up a lectureship in philosophy at Cambridge, and in 1925 he succeeded James Ward as Professor of Mental Philosophy and Logic. In 1921 Moore succeeded G.F. Stout as editor of 'Mind', and he retained this office till 1948 when in the following year he was succeeded by Gilbert Ryle.

At Cambridge Moore retained his chair of Philosophy till 1939 when he retired and was succeeded by Ludwig Wittgenstein. Moore reported that he was happy that Wittgenstein was his successor. But, though Moore wrote about Wittgenstein's lectures at Cambridge in 1930-33, yet he acknowledged that he did not grasp his method firmly enough to use it himself. "He has made me think that what is required for the solution of philosophical problems which baffle me, is a method quite different from any which I have ever used — a method which

he himself uses successfully, but which I have never been able to understand clearly enough to use it myself. I am glad to think he is my successor in the Professorship at Cambridge."(10)

As we saw Moore came to philosophy by way of Classics and mainly through the influence of Bertrand Russell. "Moore and Russell" — is the conjunction inevitable as Passmore remarked?(11) To some extent, the answer is 'yes'. Both were Hegelians and both revolted against idealism. And, despite Moore's classicism, however, both Moore and Russell had their grounds on the British traditional empiricism. Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Reid are echoed throughout Moore's writings. One might single out Locke's views on perception and Reid's common-sense views as decisive elements in Moore's epistemology.

But, though Moore had his grounds in British empiricism, yet he diverted his own way, especially with regard to what is a concept. According to traditional empiricism a concept

(11) John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p.203.
is an abstraction from sensations and ideas. It is manufactured out of the material supplied by perception. But, for Moore, a concept is not a mental fact; it is what we take in our thinking as our object. Thus, like Meinong and Brentano, a concept for Moore exists independent of our thinking of it.

Was Moore influenced by Meinong and Brentano? The implication of the question may be put quite explicitly: Did Moore have any phenomenological leanings in his writings? No analyst I know of ever mentioned that Moore in particular had such leanings. However, the only expositor of the whole philosophy of G.E. Moore, Alan R. White, mentions a tendency to slide into phenomenology in Moore's treatment of sense-data: "The defect of this method, apart from its tendency to slide into phenomenology and thus excite the just ridicule of psychologists, is that while it is true that the description answer makes a smaller claim than the identification answer, it suggests that these claims are on the same descending scale".

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(13) Metz answers in the affirmative. See his *A Hundred Years of British Philosophy*, p.539.

On the other hand some philosophers noted that Moore did not only have the leanings, but also practised phenomenological analysis. In his book *Contemporary European Philosophy* Bochenski remarks: "what is called analysis by G.E. Moore (b. 1893) is rather closely related to the phenomenological method". (15) Metz, in dealing with Moore on the question of perception, relates the following: "Moore has taken up the problem of perception and especially that of sense-data and their relations on the one side to the knowing mind and on the other side to physical things in many acute and penetrating phenomenological analyses". (16)

In the latest volume of Copleston's *History of Philosophy*, the author speaks of G.E. Moore as a practitioner of phenomenological analysis. Some of his concluding remarks on the chapter on Moore run as follows: "But part at any rate of his activity can better be described as phenomenological analysis than as linguistic analysis". (17)

In the first chapter of *Principia Ethica* Moore says:

"My business is solely with that object or idea, which I hold, rightly or wrongly, that the word is generally used to stand for. What I want to discover is the nature of that object or idea."\(^{(18)}\) But are we justified to infer from this, as Copleston did,\(^{(19)}\) that Moore was concerned with phenomenological analysis rather than with linguistic analysis? What a word is generally used to stand for is what Moore called a concept. Thus the appropriate designation of Moore's method is conceptual analysis; and Copleston would be justified in his inference only if he identified both conceptual and phenomenological analysis. In fact, in his chapter on Moore, Copleston speaks as though phenomenological analysis is something quite known to the reader. Oddly enough, in the previous volume (Vol.VII Part II) he speaks of phenomenological analysis as itself disputable with regard to its nature, particularly in relation to linguistic analysis.

\(^{(18)}\) Moore, *Principia Ethica*, pp. 5-6.

"For example, though the relations between continental phenomenology and the conceptual or 'linguistic' analysis practised in England is one of the main themes which permit a fruitful dialogue between groups of philosophers who in other respects may find it difficult to understand one another, one of the principal issues in such a dialogue is precisely the nature of what is called phenomenological analysis."

How can Moore's thought be characterized? In the first place he was undogmatic and unspeculative. With respect to certain things like common-sense beliefs Moore was very certain that they are true, and he was quite conservative in retaining such beliefs. But, nevertheless, he expressed some sort of scepticism as to the meaning or correct analysis of such beliefs.

Moore's thought was opposed to monism. This can best be shown by the phrase quoted from Bishop Butler and prefixed to Principia Ethica: "Every thing is what it is and not another thing". Moore's antimonism was not exclusively distinctive of him. In that he echoed a general trend of

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British empiricism which was opposed to system-building, and aimed, at best, at comprehensiveness. W.R. Sorley, summarizing such a trend, remarks: "Comprehensiveness rather than system building marked the attitude. Most of the great writers are characterized by the width of their interests; and they did not take a narrow, or rigidly professional, view of the boundaries of philosophy. In this matter, as in so many others, Locke is representative of the national tradition". (21)

Viewed from this vantage Moore's method can best be described as microscopic in contrast to the telescopic method of the Hegelian; (22) a method of attacking problems piecemeal rather than wholesale. It is concerned with the meticulous investigation of issues and the distinction of meanings involved. In this way Moore had a lasting influence on his successors at Cambridge. Passmore sums up the distinctive feature of Moore's style in the following way: "It is the first example of that minute philosophical

(22) See Metz, A Hundred Years of British Philosophy, p.542.
procedure, with its careful distinction of issues, its insistence that this, not that, is the real question — where this and that had ordinarily been regarded as formulations of the same problem — which was to be Moore's distinctive philosophical style, exercising, as such, a notable influence on his successors, particularly at Cambridge". (23)

No doubt Moore's importance lies in his philosophical method. As Metz noted, (24) the content of his doctrine is very meagre compared with his philosophical method. Allan R. White elevates Moore's importance to a high position with regard to contemporary British philosophy. He remarks: "Moore's contribution was that of setting many philosophers off on a new path. Without a knowledge of Moore's views, it is not possible to understand properly what is happening in English speaking philosophy to-day". (25)

A final question. Was Moore a defender of ordinary language philosophy? No doubt, all philosophers agree that

(24) See Metz, *A Hundred Years of British Philosophy*, p.543.
he was a defender of common-sense. What the connection is between ordinary language and common-sense beliefs, is not quite clear. But there are certain things which Moore was not doing. In the first place Moore was not defending the language of the man in the street; secondly, he was not concerned with ordinary language as such for its own sake — that is, ordinary usage is not the bed-rock against which philosophical problems are to be tested. Moreover, Moore did not make clear what he meant by ordinary usage. On the contrary he used the phrase interchangibly with "common usage", 'natural usage' and 'correct usage'.

An important proviso. I am not denying that a thorough study, which I am not going to undertake, of the development of Moore's thought against his historical background and the foreign influences introduced in the British climate of opinion might reveal a tendency towards a preoccupation with words as such. But even if such a tendency could be found, it would leave untouched my thesis that Moore was primarily a defender of common-sense beliefs, and that he may count as a defender of ordinary language, in whatever sense the phrase
is to be taken, only secondarily. That is, he defended ordinary usage only in so far as ordinary usage or ordinary language embodied common-sense beliefs. Passmore's remarks are instructive here: "Those who, like most of his younger critics, have never felt the attraction of idealism, those for whom it has never been a "living option", find it difficult to understand Moore's philosophy; they convert him into a defender, in their own and Wittgenstein's manner, of 'ordinary usage'. But it is ordinary beliefs, not usage as such, that he wants to defend". (26)

Thus viewed, Moore may be considered as representing a transitional period in British philosophy. He had one foot in traditional philosophy and the other foot cleared the way for contemporary British philosophy. His task was that of pouring old wine in new bottles, though, however, the wine was not without undergoing some distillation.

(26) John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p.207.
CHAPTER II

Ethics

Moore's views about ethics are to be found in his two books *Principia Ethica* and *Ethics*, together with some short articles in his other books, and his longer article *A Reply to My Critics* which is a reconsideration of his views in the light of the criticisms offered by other philosophers.

Moore's *Principia Ethica* is primarily an investigation on the nature of 'good'. In fact this is the definition Moore gave to ethics: "The general enquiry into what is good". (1) On the other hand, Moore's smaller book *Ethics* is a study of Utilitarianism which tries to bring to light the peculiarity of ethical predicates and to establish the objectivity of moral judgements made by the use of such ethical predicates.

The central theses of Moore's ethics are that the word 'good', in its adjectival usage, refers to a definite and unique quality, and that this quality is indefinable.

The second of these two theses follows from the fact that what is denoted by the word 'good' is a simple quality, known only by intuition; hence it is unanalyzable, and, in a sense of definition which is identical with analysis, it is indefinable.

From these central theses there follow certain sub-theses which are pillars in Moore's ethics. First, since 'good' denotes a simple, unique, and objective quality, it follows that moral judgements that involve a reference to what is good are objective judgements; that is, they are neither judgements about feelings nor are they judgements about matters of fact. Secondly, since good is indefinable it follows that any attempt to define it is fallacious; that is, it commits what Moore called "The Naturalistic Fallacy".

The Indefinability of 'good':

Traditional ethics, Moore contented, had failed because of the imprecise formulations of the questions peculiar to ethics. It also failed in the analysis of value concepts and in the distinction of the senses of meaning in the questions involved. "It is precisely this clearness as to the meaning of the question asked which has hitherto been almost entirely lacking in ethical speculation." (2)

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Thus the primary method to be used throughout the investigation of ethics seems to be the method of meaning distinction as a preparatory step for the analysis of concepts involved. 'What is good' may have three possible meanings. It may mean what particular things are good, or what sort of things are good, or how good is to be defined. The third meaning is what interested Moore because, he thought, it is absolutely central to ethics. "It is an enquiry to which most special attention should be directed; since this question, how good is to be defined, is the most fundamental question in all ethics."(3)

This question is fundamental because the whole problem of ethical justification rests on the determination of such a question. Thus Moore remarks: "The main object of ethics as a systematic science is to give correct reasons for thinking that this or that is good".(4) Again: "For it is the business of ethics, I must insist, not only to obtain true results but also to find valid reasons for them".(5)

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(3) Ibid, p.5.
Therefore, the concept 'good' is the primary ethical concept while all other concepts are secondary. How is it, then, to be defined?

Moore recognized two kinds of definition: verbal or nominal definition and divisional definition or analysis. The first one is used when one tries to express the meaning of one word or expression in terms of other words or expressions. Such a definition was not relevant to Moore's task, though it is important to a lexicographer or a writer of a dictionary. Moore remarked: "If I wanted that kind of definition I should have to consider in the first place how people generally used the word 'good'; but my business is not with proper usage, as established by custom . . . . . . . .
What I want to discover is the nature of that object or idea, and about this I am extremely anxious to arrive at an agreement". (6)

It is very important here to notice the flat rejection of any appeal to ordinary language. Such an appeal in

(6) Ibid., p.6.
ethics, according to Moore, may not only be irrelevant but is also definitely fallacious. What Moore was looking for was the meaning exhibited by the concept 'good' which was, for him, an objective logical entity. Thus, for Moore, it was not linguistic complexity, but logical complexity which was at issue. Thus Morton White remarked: "It is essential, therefore, to realize the degree to which Moore opposed what might be called a linguistic view of philosophical analysis". (7)

The kind of definition which Moore thought to be relevant in the investigation of ethics is that definition which enumerates the simpler parts constituting the whole referent. "The most important sense of definition is that in which a definition states what are the parts which invariably compose a certain whole. .......... innumerable objects of thought which are themselves incapable of definition." (8)

(7) Morton White, Toward Reunion in Philosophy, p.172.
(8) Moore, Principia Ethica, pp.9-10.
It is important to note here that this notion of definition as analysis or decomposition is to be found in Locke's writings; though the choice of what is simple is different from what Moore took it to be. For example, pleasure and pain are simpler ideas for Locke; they are not capable of further decomposition while ideas like good and evil, love and hatred, joy and sorrow, — all in the final analysis decompose into pleasure and pain. Thus Locke remarks: "The names of simple ideas are not capable of any definition; the names of all complex ideas are. ....... For, if the terms of one definition were still to be defined by another, where at last should we stop? But I shall from the nature of ideas, and the signification of our words, show why some names can, and others cannot be defined; and which they are". (9)

Though simple ideas are known by experience for Locke, yet, for Moore, they are known by intuition. However, both Moore and Locke seem to deny the legitimacy of defining


* I am indebted here to Dr. David Makinson who directed my attention to this fact, as well as to the relevance of Plato's dialogue "Euthyphro".
simple ideas relationally. Locke says: "These [pleasure and pain], like other simple ideas, cannot be described, nor their names defined; the way of knowing them is, as of the simple ideas of the senses, only by experience. For, to define them by the presence of good or evil, is no otherwise to make them known to us than by making us reflect on what we feel in ourselves, upon the several and various operations of good and evil upon our minds, as they are differently applied to or considered by us". (10)

In fact Moore's reluctance to give a relational definition of good may not be conceived as an inheritance from Locke only, but also goes back to Socrates. In the Euthyphro Socrates remarks: "Consequently, Euthyphro, it looks as if you had not given me any answer — as if when you were asked to tell the nature [my italics] of the holy, you did not wish to explain the essence [my italics] of it. You merely tell an attribute of it, namely that it appertains to holiness to be loved by the gods". (11)

(11) Plato, Euthyphro, Universal Pagination, Il. a.
Thus when Moore said that his business was to discover the nature of that object or idea he was really concerned with the essence of it which he found to be irreducible to any relational quality. (12)

It seems to me that definitions are not made once and for all; they depend on contexts and what use we are going to put them to. As G.C. Field remarked, (13) definitions in ethics are not like definitions in geometry or the natural sciences. While definitions in the latter two are the necessary starting point or the necessary basis of investigation, yet in ethics they are only the goal of investigation. A.N. Whitehead also once remarked that clear and distinct ideas are not the starting-point of philosophy, but they are only the goal of philosophy. (14) Thus it seems that the demand for clear and distinct ideas as the necessary starting-point, introduced into modern philosophy by Descartes and taken up in a rather different way by John Locke, found a new formulation in Moore's philosophy as the demand for correct definitions.

(12) See Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p.209.
(14) A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, p.12.
In a symposium on "is good a quality?" A.E. Taylor remarked: "I do not see why the simple need be indefinable or why in Principia Ethica Mr. Moore should have identified definition with the analysis of complex whole into its constituents". (15) I think, rightly, as Taylor put it forward, that one can define a simple term x, however unanalyzable, in terms of another simple term y if one can discern a relation which x and only x has it to y and not to any other term. For example, I can define the number 5 as the number directly succeeding the number 4 in the ordered set of all rational numbers.

But Moore would say that the essence of the number 5 is distinct from its relation of succession to the number 4. Thus Butler's phrase 'Everything is what it is and not another thing' was at the heart of Moore's thinking when he tried to define 'good'. The whole case is put nicely by John Anderson thus: "The point would seem to be that, if we give an "ethical" definition of any ethical term we have what is really no more than an identity ("the worthwhile is worthwhile" say), whereas if we give an unethical definition

of it (if we define it as a "natural object"), we seem to be destroying ethics; hence moralists like Socrates (and Moore) are unwilling to define such terms." (16)

The definability of "the good":

Though 'good' is indefinable in its adjectival use, yet it is definable in its substantive use. 'The good', that to which the whole adjective would apply, has three senses. It may mean the best conceivable, or the best possible, or that which is intrinsically good to a higher degree. Moore, however, was interested in the third sense; and to determine it he says: "In order to arrive at a correct answer on the first part of this question, it is necessary to consider what things are such that, if they existed by themselves, in absolute isolation, we should yet judge their existence to be good". (17)

This technique or method of isolation Moore used to dispense with utilitarian claimants to the position of the ideal. To imagine a universe where the only existent is

(17) Moore, Principia Ethica, p.189.
pleasure one will not will that pleasure exist because
pleasure is meaningless without human beings. However,
Moore did not extend the method of isolation to his own £
claimants for the position of the ideal. (18) He only
stipulates: "No one, probably, who has asked himself the
question, has ever doubted that personal affection and the
appreciation of what is beautiful in Art or nature, are
good in themselves, nor, if we consider strictly what things
are worth having purely for their own sakes, does it appear
probable that any one will think that anything else has
nearly so great a value as the things which are included
under these two heads". (19)

One may doubt the validity of the method of isolation
on practical grounds. But what is more important is: why
is it that the adjectival use which is simple and indefinable,
and the substantative use definable in terms of it, rather
than vice versa? It seems that, often, that when we give a

(18) Miss Loring remarked in this connection: "Now what is
sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, more
especially if the gander has prepared the sauce himself".—
Two Kinds of Value, p.146.

(19) Moore, Principia Ethica, pp.188-189.
definition of a substantative like 'virtue' or 'courage', we are also giving, implicitly a definition of the adjectives "virtuous" and "courageous". A naturalist would say that Moore went the wrong way. Instead of going from the substantative and the investigation of what particular things are good and the abstraction of the intensional characteristics shared by all of them — instead Moore went from the indefinability of the adjective to the definability of the substantative in terms of an indefinable quality. Moreover, a naturalist might charge Moore as implicitly defining good relationally; that is, good is defined relationally in terms of personal affection and what is beautiful in Art or Nature. Nevertheless, Moore might deny that he was giving a definition; he might say that he was only giving a characterization of what is good or a necessary condition for what is good, and no more. He seems to win the battle here; but the question will be raised again later.

The Objectivity of Moral Judgements:

Moral judgements for Moore, are objective. They form a category of their own; they cannot be reduced to judgements
of facts, nor to judgements of feelings. In fact they are not identified with anything else. Moore says: "we are now entitled to the conclusion that, whatever the meanings of these words [right, wrong, good, bad, ought] may be, it is not identical with any assertion whatever about either the feelings or the thoughts of men — neither those of any particular society, nor those of some men or other, nor those of mankind as a whole. To predicate of an action that it is right or wrong is to predicate of it something quite different from the mere fact that any man or set of men have any particular feeling towards, or opinion about, it". (20)

The view that moral judgements are merely judgements about somebody's feeling is untenable for Moore, because this will lead to the view that one and the same action or state of affairs may be right and wrong or good and bad at the same time for different persons; or at different times for the same person. If one person said that it was right for Brutus to stab Caesar, and another person said that it was wrong for Brutus to stab Caesar, they could not be

(20) Moore, Ethics, p.89.
morally disagreeing and the action (Brutus' stabbing Ceasar) would be both right and wrong at the same time. The vital objection for such a view, Moore remarks is "that the question is merely a question of fact; a question as to the actual analysis of our moral judgements — as to what it is that actually happens when we think an action to be right or wrong." (21)

However, Moore later seemed to be doubtful as to the validity of his own views. In *A Reply to my Critics*, he seemed to concede much of Stevenson's claims for the emotive nature of moral judgements. But Moore was still inclined to hold to his own views on the ground that people often denote the same thing when they use the same ethical predicate rather than express their approval or disapproval. It seems that Moore's attack on naturalism opened the way for emotivism; but a rejection of emotivism would not be achieved without a return to some form of naturalism.

Though ethical judgements are objective, yet Moore tends to view judgements involving 'ought' to be somewhat relative

and subjective. That is, moral rules have no certainty attached to them because they lay down duties and duties, for Moore, are determined by consequences. That is, they cannot be more than probably right. "Those who say that certain rules ought absolutely always to be obeyed, whatever the consequences may be, are logically bound to deny this; for by saying 'whatever the consequences may be' they do imply even if the world as a whole were the worse because of our action."(22)

In fact Moore spoke of two kinds of rule: rules dealing with action or rules of duty and rules dealing with feelings or ideal rules. The first tell us what we ought to do and the second tell us what we ought to be. In the first set of rules 'ought' is used in a can-implying sense while in the second set of rules ought cannot be used in this sense. In other words rules of duty are more morally binding than the ideal rules because the former involve the notion of free choice more than the latter do.

(22) Ibid, p.112.
The Naturalistic Fallacy:

Throughout the discussion of the objectivity of moral judgements Moore’s thought was occupied by the notion of logical identity. He once remarked: "But if so, then it follows absolutely that even if wrong actions always are in fact forbidden by some non-human being, yet to say that they are wrong is not identical with saying that they are so forbidden."(23) The same idea is to be found in the Euthyphro where Socrates says: "So in this point, Euthyphro, I will let you off; if you like, the gods shall all consider the act unjust, and they all shall hate it. But suppose that we now correct our definition, and say what the gods all hate is unholy, and what they love is holy.—...... Are you willing that we now define the holy and unholy in this way"?(24) As is made clear in the ensuing discussion with Euthyphro, the implication of Socrates’s question is that these are two distinct concepts which cannot be identified or defined in terms of each other. However the implication was made explicit by Socrates in the Gorgias when he remarked: "Only this, that the good is not the same as the pleasant, my

(23) Ibid, p.95.
friend, nor the evil as the painful. For we cease from the one pair at the same time, but not from the other, because they are distinct.\(^{(25)}\) Thus the *Euthyphro* and the *Gorgias* provide us historically with a rough characterisation of what Moore called the Naturalistic Fallacy.

But sometimes Moore spoke of the fallacy as a case of wrong inference. Here, Moore had in the back of his mind the Humean dichotomy between fact and value, or the 'is' and the 'ought'. Thus Hume remarked: "In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observation concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, *is* and *is not*, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an *ought*, or an *ought not*. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence.\(^{(26)}\)

Thus the naturalistic fallacy has two forms—an inferential form and a non-inferential one. The first form can be

\(^{(25)}\) *Gorgias*, Universal Pagination, 497 e.
\(^{(26)}\) Hume, *Treatise*, Book II, Part ii, Section i.
seen in the case of the metaphysicians who pass from the investigation of what is good. The non-inferential form may be committed in three different ways. First, by identifying a non-natural object or quality with a natural object or quality. Secondly, by identifying a non-natural object or quality with another non-natural object or quality. Thirdly, by identifying a natural object with another natural object.

The naturalistic fallacy in its non-inferential form was committed by Spencer and Mill for holding that good means what is more evolved or what is desired respectively. "That fallacy, I explained consists in the contention that good means nothing but some simple or complex notion that can be defined in terms of natural qualities. In Mill's case good is thus supposed to mean simply what is desired;* and what is desired is something

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*I quote here two passages where it is maintained that Mill never made the identity claimed by Moore.

a) "The remarkable fact is, however, that neither Sidgwick nor Mill, who were singled out for criticism on this head, ever did make this claim for pleasure, and that throughout the whole of his polemic Moore did not produce one quotation (though he quoted heavily, especially from Mill) which even remotely suggests that they did." — L.M. Loring, Two Kinds of Values, p.135.

b) "A reading of Mill's text shows that at no point does he expressly propose the equation which has led him open to the charge of committing the 'naturalistic fallacy' namely that 'good as an end' is to be defined as what in fact people desire as an end." — R.W. Newell, The Concept of Philosophy, p.131.
which can thus be defined in natural terms." (27)

The argument which Moore advanced against the definability of 'good' is known as the open-question argument. Moore said that it is always possible to ask with significance, in any proposed definition of 'good', whether the complex so defined is after all good. But what force does this argument have?

David Gauthier, in a recent article "Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy" (28) showed that such an argument has no force. He considered definitions of the form: \( \text{good} = \text{def. } x \). Then, according to Moore 'is it good that A is x?' is not equivalent to 'is it x that A is x?' The former is a significant question, while the latter is a mere tautology. But the former question, Gauthier contended, will not arise if x is a plausible definition of good and we are satisfied with the definition. That is, there will be no doubt about it. Thus the significance or insignificance of the questions which Moore considers is not a logical matter, but rather a psychological matter of the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the questioner with the definition offered.

(27) Moore, *Principia Ethica*, p. 73.

Hubert Alexander remarked: "But persons who stress the indefinability of certain ideas usually have one of two things in mind: (1) definitions as noted above, fail to give complete understanding or (2) certain ideas and their symbols are so bound up, with personal feelings and extra connotations that associating them with other terms seems to miss their main character". (29) It seems to me, in Moore's case, it is the second alternative which was open for him. Morton White confirms such a psychological trend in Moore's thought when he says: "The contention that goodness is simple performs a function very much like some of the other statements about platonic entities we have already examined. That is to say, it is intended as some sort of explanation of a meta-linguistic fact: the fact that Moore could not define the word 'good' to his own satisfaction". (30)

A chemist, as Gauthier noted, for his own purposes is satisfied to define salt as sodium chloride. Likewise, a physiologist may speak of certain stimulations of nerve fibres as the defining characteristics of physical pain; and a physicist may speak of light vibrations as the defining characteristics of


(30) Morton White, Toward Reunion in Philosophy, p.177.
colour. But Moore's purpose seemed to be a high one: to define once and for all the word 'good' and that he found not to meet with his own satisfaction.* Though Gauthier have refuted Moore's argument for the indefinability of 'good', and maintained that definitions are not absolute, yet he defended Moore's naturalistic fallacy viewed as a denial of the semantic autonomy of ethical and evaluative terms. That is, definitions can be given as equivalences to the terms to be defined within any one field of discourse; a natural object can be defined in terms of other natural objects and a non-natural object can be defined in terms of other non-natural objects.

In fact, regarding the arguments advanced for the indefinability of 'good', Moore later came to acknowledge their fallaciousness. He remarks: "In Principia I asserted and proposed to prove that 'good' (and I think I sometimes, though perhaps not always was using this word to mean the same as 'worth having for its

* It is interesting to note here that Robert Hartman who tried to read in Moore a scientific system of ethics defends the indefinability of good in the following way: "Thus, it is better for good not to be defined than to be defined falsely. The indefinable nature of 'good' serves Moore as a guard against error, and a guarantee for a more distinct knowledge of Ethics". — "The Definition of Good = Moore's Axiomatic of the Science of Ethics", Aristotelian Society Proceedings, Vol.LXV, 1964--65, p.242.
own sake') was indefinable. But all the supposed proofs were certainly fallacious; they entirely failed to prove that 'worth having for its own sake' is indefinable. And I think perhaps it is definable: I do not know. But I also still think that very likely it is indefinable". (31)

William Frankena’s essay "The Naturalistic Fallacy" (32) is considered to be a land-mark in the literature of such a topic. Frankena contended that the naturalistic fallacy — even in its or assumed inferential form — is a fallacy taken/in advance. Its fallacious character cannot be merely assumed, but requires proof.

Frankena remarked that intuitionists assert three propositions which are really one, since the first of them entails the second, the second entails the third. These propositions are as follows:

a) ethical characteristics are different in kind from non-ethical ones.

b) ethical characteristics are not definable in terms of non-ethical ones.

c) ethical propositions are not deducible from non-ethical ones. (33)

(31) Moore, Philosophical Papers, p.98.
(32) in Theories of Ethics, ed. Philippa Foot.
(33) Some philosophers denied this proposition and tried to refute it. See John R. Searle, "How to derive "ought" from "is"", Philosophical Review, Vol.73 (1964), pp.43-58 also in Theories of Ethics, ed. Philippa Foot.
In the case of Mill who is said to have violated (c), Frankena contended that Mill's argument as it stood was fallacious, not because of violating (c), but because the inference itself was fallacious. "Pleasure is good since it is sought by all men" is fallacious because it is of the form: A is B/ . . . A is C. But Mill's argument is an enthymeme which contains a suppressed premise. When this premise is supplied, the argument reads:

a) What is sought by all men is good (Suppressed premise).

b) Pleasure is sought by all men.

c) Therefore, pleasure is good.

Thus Mill's argument; according to Frankena, is logically valid, and the naturalistic fallacy is not a logical fallacy unless we speak of a kind of valuational logic. (34)

It seems to me that Frankena was right in his conclusion that the Naturalistic fallacy is not a logical fallacy in the straight forward sense of the word "logical". But, nevertheless, he seems to evade the whole issue by doubting the legitimacy of the talk about valuational logic. The whole controversy between

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(34) Nevertheless, in a recent article in Mind Allan Allan Ryan reads in Mill an ethical position a kin to that of R.M. Hare. He said that, for Mill, moral rules are imperatives, and, therefore they cannot be deduced from anything other than principles which are themselves imperatives. — Allan Ryan, "Mill and the Naturalistic Fallacy", Mind Vol.LXXV, No.299, July 1966.
the naturalists and the non-naturalists, I am inclined to believe, rests on the existence or non-existence of such a logic. Whence comes the claim for the autonomy of ethics, the objectivity of moral judgements and the peculiarity of ethical predicates?

Frankena's evasion of the issue might be construed thus: If the naturalistic fallacy is not a logical fallacy what is it then? It must be something else. If it is not to be found in the most strong place, then it must be found in the most vulnerable one. "Yes, it is the definist fallacy"; the non-naturalist would say, "it is not the case that every quality is definable". Then Frankena would respond: "But to say so is to beg the question. You have to show which qualities are definable and which are not, and why, before you go into the controversy".

However, we are not going to pursue further this issue. Let us raise again, instead, the question of the indefinability of "good", this time on the level of philosophical semantics. Semanticists seem to agree that meaning is not constituted wholly by the referent, nor wholly by the mental content. That is, the meaning of a word is the mode of apprehension of the referent to which both the word and meaning refer. (35) "That the word

expresses the mental content (meaning, thought) and names or denotes the referent. The mental content is the speaker's apprehension of the referent". (36)

The definition which Moore wanted was, of course, not a stipulative definition but a real definition which gives the meaning of the concept 'good'. But to give the meaning of a concept is not to give another referent which is identical with the first concept or referent as Moore thought. This conception itself is a logical contradiction because it seeks an identity which excludes all difference between two things. Even if what Moore wanted was another term whose extension is the same as the extension of 'good', this will not insure that they have the same meaning. Evening-star and morning-star have the same extension or denotation, yet they are different in meaning. Likewise are centaurs and unicorns. As Nelson Goodman remarked, synonymy of meanings may not only involve extensional difference but also intensional or connotational differences. Thus he advised us to talk of likeness of meanings rather than synonymity of meanings. "It seems apparent, therefore, that the demands we commonly make upon a criterion of sameness of meaning can be satisfied only if

(36) Ibid., p.38.
we recognize that no two different predicates ever have the same meaning.\(^{(37)}\)

Thus when we ask for a definition of 'good', far from identifying 'good' with anything else, we are only asking for another term or expression which has a likeness of meaning to the meaning of the term 'good'. After all, meanings always change both with respect to their referential and intensional aspects.

Therefore it seems to me that Moore's naturalistic fallacy, in its non-inferential form, is not a fallacy at all.\(^{(38)}\) However, in its inferential form it does involve a fallacy if a moral judgement is taken to follow logically from factual premises. But I think that there is no need to call it a fallacy if the premises are taken as reasons or a justification for holding the moral judgement. R.W. Newell clears up the issue in the naturalist-non-naturalist controversy in ethics as follows: "A naturalist is right in his conclusion that ethical judgements can be justified. A non-naturalist is right in his premise that ethical statements


\(^{(38)}\) I quote here a passage where it is maintained that Moore himself gave up the notion of the Naturalistic Fallacy. "Now Ewing does not actually accuse naturalistic theories of value of committing any fallacy, naturalistic or otherwise as many writers still do, following Moore who has himself given up this accusation". —William Frankena, "Ewing's Case against Natural Theories of Value", Philosophical Review, Vol.57, (1948), p.482.
are not deductively derivable from the reasons given for them. The mistake which they both make is to suppose that the naturalist's conclusion is incompatible with the non-naturalist premise". (39)

Moore's Intuitionism:

As Moore's indefinability of 'good' and the naturalistic fallacy were open to attack, so also was his intuitionism. In a sense, the attack on the indefinability of 'good' is an attack on Moore's intuitionism, or at least an implicit claim that there is something wrong about Moore's intuition that 'good' denotes a simple, unique and unanalyzable quality. John Anderson remarked: "In fact it is impossible to see how Moore's 'intuitions' would work, how an unobservable predicate could be found to attach to one observable subject rather than another, or how we could ever know that it was the same thing that had some natural property and had the non-natural property." (40)

It is however P.F. Strawson's essay 'Ethical Intuitionism' (41) which constitutes a real criticism and claims a burial of intuitionism. Strawson noted that if 'good' and 'right' are known


only by intuition, then, if one claims that he knows the meanings of these words without remembering having an intuition of them, he is stating a contradiction. But there are so many people, like Strawson, who know the meanings of those words without remembering having an intuition of them. That is, the problem of intuitionism is that, if it is true, it should be a truism.\(^{(42)}\)

Intuitionists often claimed that they intuit such predicates from their dependence on other natural characteristics; but, as Strawson noted, they did not make clear whether this dependence is a logical or a casual one. Moreover, intuitionists claim to intuit the predicates 'good' or 'right'; but as Strawson remarked, good-sentences and right-sentences are short hand for ought-sentences. Thus at last the intuitionist seemed to be refuted. But he might retort: "But intuitions are of extra-linguistic entities", and Strawson would seem to be silenced. Each will stay on his own field, but one at least will have the advantage of being able to communicate. The intuitionist might also retort: "Intuitionism is a truism that and its logical truth rests on the fact/when we say that 'good' or 'right' are known only by intuition it is because of the absence of a logical truth to the contrary. That is, when we say

'good' is indefinable we mean that it is self-evidently so. It has absolutely no reason, it lacks a logical reason. But Strawson might answer: If it is self-evidently true that good is definable then it is self-evidently false that good is indefinable. That is, a lack of logical reason works both ways.

One of the last resorts that an intuitionist can go to is to have a faith in what he believes in. In fact this is the ground from which most forms of rationalism start. And, in the case of Moore he might claim that he was going to build a closed system of ethics the primitive axiom of which is the indefinable term 'good'. Only in this way could Moore escape all the objections raised against his central theses in his views about ethics. Until then, it seems to me, Moore pleads guilty of the charges directed against him. But nevertheless Moore was not without a claim for importance and influence in ethical philosophy. This was mainly due to his insistence on asking the right questions, and his careful distinctions between the senses of meaning involved.
CHAPTER III

EPISTEMOLOGY

Moore's views about epistemology are to be found in some scattered articles in those of his books which are not exclusively devoted to ethics. In this sense, if Moore wanted to establish a system (1) or a theory of ethics, he definitely did not have this intention with respect to epistemology. Even with respect to a sub-division such as perception, of which he wrote very much, Moore did not intend to give a philosophical theory. (2)

However, Moore's views on epistemology revolve round his views on perception, and in particular his views on sense-data. Though Moore rejected Locke's representative theory of perception and accepted Reid's common-sense view of direct or immediate perception, yet in the end he reached a position which amalgamated both views. This is not a strange position because Moore's views on epistemology begin with the common-sense views which he took for certain to be true, but whose philosophical justifications are more or less doubtful.

(1) Hartman himself claims that his new reading of Moore was not in the least known to Moore.

In this chapter, then, we will begin with Moore's refutation of idealism, then his proof of an external world and his defense of common-sense. But before undergoing a detailed discussion of his views about sense-data we will give a summary view of what phenomenology is, which might help us to locate the extent to which Moore can be considered as a phenomenologist. The chapter will conclude with Moore's treatment of internal and external relations, and some summary views about the features of his approach to epistemological problems.

The Refutation of Idealism:

In this essay Moore said that idealists assert that reality is spiritual, a proposition which he took to be important and interesting. He did not set out to refute this idealist conclusion, but only to disprove the argument held for it. "I do not propose to dispute that 'Reality is Spiritual'; I do not deny that there may be reasons for thinking that it is; but I do propose to show that one reason upon which, to the best of my judgement, all other arguments ever used by idealists depend is false." (3)

Moore was particularly concerned with the Berkelean Statement:

(3) Moore, Philosophical Studies, p. 4.
"To be is to be perceived". The refutation of such a premise does not constitute a refutation of idealism, but it would destroy one of its main arguments. But the idealist proposition "Esse is percipio" is highly ambiguous. Moore asked whether 'Esse' is to be taken as synonymous with 'percipio'. If the relation between 'Esse' and 'percipio' is a relation of identity, then the proposition amounts merely to a poor definition and the idealist conclusion does not need a proof. But there is another important sense of "Esse is Percipio". If anything is known to exist then consequently it follows that it is perceived. Thus viewed, the proposition amounts to a necessary synthetic proposition; being and being experienced are necessarily connected.

To refute such a premise, Moore contended that the premise rested on a confusion between awareness and the content of awareness. The awareness is obviously mental, but there is no reason to conclude that the object of awareness is also mental. A sensation of blue and a sensation of green are both alike in being cases of awareness; yet they are different with respect to their contents. To have a sensation of blue or green is just to be aware of something blue or green. This something is independent of my awareness of it, and its status is not reducible to the
awareness of it. This something is what Moore later called sense-content or sense-datum.

Moore's refutation does not seem convincing. He only pointed to a distinction which may not hold in all cases of perception. In fact he later acknowledged that his argument did not even render his conclusion probable and that he was wrong. "And I may say at once that, on this point, I now agree with Mr. Ducasse and Berkeley, and hold that that early paper of mine was wrong."(4) However, there still remains a strong objection to the idealist thesis when Moore remarked: "The question requiring to be asked about material things is thus not: What reason have we for supposing that anything exists corresponding to our sensations? but: what reason have we for supposing that material things do not exist, since their existence have precisely the same evidence as that of our sensations?"(5)

Proof of the External World:

Moore's proof of the external world was designed in part to answer Kant's contention that it was a scandal to philosophy that the existence of things outside us should be accepted merely on faith. Moore treated Kant's expression "things external to us"


as ambiguous and used instead of it the expression "things external to our minds". These can either "be met with in space" or "be presented in space" (two other Kantian terminologies which Kant used as, more or less, synonymous). The first category includes objects of actual as well as possible experience. The second category includes things like bodily pains, after images and double images. Thus a thing can be presented in space without being met with in space.

"To be met with in space" implies that a thing might be perceived, but it does not follow that it is actually perceived. But from the proposition that a plant exists, it follows that there is at least one thing to be met with in space. To say that two dogs exist at the present moment, it follows that there are at least two things to be met with in space. But Moore was not using "to be met with in space" and "external" as synonymous. "Of course if you are using 'external' as a mere synonym for "to be met with in space" no proof will be required that dogs are external objects." (6) Thus "external to our minds" and "to be met with in space" are two different conceptions. That is, from the proposition that there exist some thing it follows that there is something to be met with in space, and from the proposition "there is something to be met

with in space" it follows that there is something external to us. "e.g. from "There is at least one star" there follows not only "There is at least one thing to be met with in space" but also "There is at least one external thing", and similarly in all other cases."(7)

Moore then goes to give a rigorous proof for the existence, of the external world. After the foregoing steps, it seemed for him that there was nothing easier than the proof of the existence of the external world. "I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, "Here is one hand", and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left hand "and here is another".(8)

Moore's proof is very trivial indeed. He had only to show, when he said; "Here is one hand", that there was at least one thing to be met with in space. A proof for Moore should fulfill three conditions. First, the premise should be different from the conclusion. Secondly, the premise should be something known to be true; and thirdly, the conclusion should follow from the

(7) Ibid, p.144.
(8) Ibid, pp.145-146.
premise. Thus, for Moore, his proof of the existence of the external world fulfilled all three conditions. But those who claim that Moore was only begging the question rest their claim on the questionable nature of the premise.\(^{(9)}\) People like Russell would not take a common-sense proposition "Here is one hand" as a premise in an argument. Still others claim that the premise "Here is one hand" already contains an existential premise, and that is precisely where it begs the question. But, nevertheless, Moore was not prepared to engage in a defense of his premise which he knew for certain to be true, but he could not prove it because it is a common-sense proposition.

A Defense of Common-Sense:

In this article Moore gave a list of propositions which he knew for certain to be true. "There exists at present a living human body, which is my body. This body was born at a certain time in the past, and has existed continuously ever since, though not without undergoing changes; ..... etc."\(^{(10)}\)

The proposition "there exists at present a living human

\(^{(9)}\) John Nelson contends that Moore's statement is philosophically pointless though not conceptually absurd. He contends that Moore already gave the evidence he promised to give, that is, he was philosophically begging the question, though not in any other circumstance — Analysis, Vol.24, No.6, June 1964, pp.185-190.

\(^{(10)}\) Moore, Philosophical Papers, p.33.
body" is a type of an unambiguous expression for Moore. There is only one and straightforward sense of such a proposition. The philosophers' expression "if you mean so and so and so and so and so or so and so" does not apply here. However, concerning such a proposition there are two different questions which should not be confused. The first question is whether we understand its meaning; and the second question is whether we know what it means, in the sense that whether we are able to give a correct analysis of its meaning.

Regarding the first question Moore was absolutely sure of the meanings of the whole list of propositions, and that they are true. Philosophers who deny the truth of such propositions cannot consistently do so. A philosopher who denies such propositions knows that they are common-sense propositions, yet he does not admit that they are true. "In other words, he asserts with confidence that these beliefs are beliefs of Common Sense, and seems often not to notice that if they are, they must be true."(11)

Though Moore was sure of the meanings of those propositions, yet he was sceptical as to what is the correct analysis of their meanings. The proposition that material things exist cannot be

(11) Ibid, p.43.
analysed before one analyses simpler propositions like "I am now perceiving a human hand". Such a proposition can be viewed as a deduction from still simpler propositions: (1) "I am now perceiving this" and (2) "this is a human hand".

The nanalysis of the second simpler proposition (which was Moore's premise in his proof of the existence of an external world) was difficult for Moore. To do so will at least include the analysis of the first simpler proposition "I am perceiving this". The analysis of this proposition amounts to the analysis of a sense-content or a sense-datum.

But before we go to the discussion of sense-data let us have a summary view of what phenomenology is.

**Phenomenology:** (12)

Phenomenology, like linguistic philosophy in Anglo-American countries, is held to be the most spread movement in the Continent. The movement is associated with the German Philosopher Edmund Husserl. Ryle (13) described phenomenology as the science of the manifestation of consciousness; and that Husserl used the term

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phenomenology (which might be used as another name for psychology) to denote the root types of mental functioning.

But since the time of Husserl phenomenology has broadened both with respect to subject-matter and method. The objective became the enlarging and deepening of the range of immediate experience. That is why present-day phenomenologists conceive of their task as a protest against the narrowing down of experience in the name of Occam's razor. Occam's principle says that entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity. The phenomenologist will assent to that, but he will add one qualification: "nor are the phenomena to be diminished below what is intuitively given".

From the point of view of aim and method there can be distinguished three kinds of phenomenological approaches. First, pure transcendental phenomenology which is associated with Husserl and his followers. Secondly, descriptive phenomenology which is the common practice of the majority of phenomenologists; and, thirdly, hermeneutic phenomenology which is associated with philosophers like Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.

Pure transcendental phenomenology, sometimes called phenomenological reduction, is the method which was widely used by
Husserl. It is a method of reflection that reveals the intended objects of consciousness. For Husserl, all data, real or unreal, doubtful or undoubtful, have equal rights to be investigated. This can only be done by freeing ourselves from preconceptions and interpretations of them. This is what Husserl called "phenomenological reduction", which is a bracketing of existence — a temporary suspension of belief in the existence of the object of investigation.

Descriptive phenomenology, on the other hand, follows a three-fold method called phenomenological description. The method begins with the intuitive grasp of phenomena, then the analytic examination of them, and ends with their description.

The first step consists in the close concentration on the object without becoming absorbed in it to the point of losing a distance from it and ceasing to be critical. The second step is the analysis of the referents denoted by the linguistic expressions. "By contrast phenomenological analysis is not primarily concerned with linguistic expressions .......... But this misinterpretation overlooked the fact that such analyses of terms were merely preparatory to the study of the referents, i.e. of the phenomena by the expressions. Phenomenological analysis, then, is analysis of
the phenomena themselves, not of the expressions that refer to them. "(14)

The third step which is description is, like all other descriptions, selective. But the main function of phenomenological description is to serve as a guide to the listeners own actual or potential experience of phenomena.

"Phenomena" is a technical term used to designate whatever presents itself. It covers both perceptual and cognitive objects. Thus phenomenologists are concerned with the following list of things:

a) investigating particular phenomena.
b) investigating general essences.
c) apprehending essential relationships among essences.
d) watching modes of appearing.
e) watching constitution of phenomena in consciousness.
f) suspending belief in the existence of phenomena.
g) interpreting the meaning of phenomena.

While the first three items are accepted by nearly all phenomenologists, the following three terms (d,e,f) are characteristically Husserlian. The last item, however, belongs exclusively to hermeneutic phenomenology. Thus this kind of approach aims

at something different and more ambitious than the goal of the ordinary phenomenologist. Its goal is the discovery or unveiling of hidden meanings which are not immediately given to the intuiting, analyzing and the describing of the phenomena.

How is the relation between linguistic analysis and phenomenology to be construed? Since 1959 attempts have been made to draw together phenomenologists and analysts. Many comparisons have been made emerging in certain lines of parallels in approach and method. A.J. Ayer once remarked: "Whatever phenomenologists may think they ought to be doing, what the best of them in fact do is to study concepts at work. They try to discover what is essential to a given concept by seeing what is common to the situations to which it typically applies. But this as Mr. Taylor rightly points out, brings them very close in practice to the linguistic analysts". (15)

Along the same line of thought J.N. Findlay remarks: "Husserl's fundamental contributions are much simpler than they at first appear to be. Thus there is little more to his transcendental epoche and examination of essences than a determination to examine the meaning of common concepts and ordinary beliefs rather than to add factual detail to our knowledge". (16)

But there are others who, like Allan White, distrust the validity of a phenomenological approach and make a point of ridicule out of it. Still there are others who consider it a sophisticated approach to use. Thus Anthony Quinton writes: "The result is a genuinely phenomenological statement about patches of colour of various shapes and sizes arranged in a certain way. The conditions mentioned are chosen for the purpose of phenomenological description because they are visually ideal, are those in which, when they do actually obtain, the danger of visual error is minimized. The phenomenological use of the verb "appears", it should be noticed, is not merely a rather sophisticated one, it is also a development of the more usual, epistemic one". (17)

More particular comparisons were made between phenomenologists and analysts. The outcome of these comparisons was that both phenomenology and analysis are concerned with clarification, and that both try to start from a presuppositionless ground. Though they achieve the task of clarification in different ways, yet the objects of clarification appear to be the same. Phenomenologists call them phenomena, and analysts call them concepts. But what is to be

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(17) British Analytical Philosophy, ed. Bernard Williams and Alan Montefiore, p.73.
further investigated is precisely the status of concepts among phenomenologists and the status of phenomena among the analysts.

**Sense-data:**

In a very long essay, "The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perceptions", Moore laid down his general approach to the problem of perception. What is remarkable about this essay, I think, is that it constitutes a substantial evidence for the claim that Moore was inclined towards a phenomenological approach, especially in his treatment of perception. Moore remarked: "It was necessary, because, as I shall presently show, we do and must also use the word "observation" in a sense in which the assertion "I observe A" by no means includes the assertion "A exists" — in a sense in which it may be true that though I did observe A, yet A did not exist". (18) This is typically the Husserlian bracketing of existence. Moreover, Moore was confident of the validity and expediency of such an approach. He remarked towards the end of the essay: "This being, then, the state of the case, I think I may at least plead that we have grounds for suspense of judgement as to whether what I see does not really exist; grounds, too, for renewed inquiry, more careful than such inquiry has sometimes been in the past". (19)

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(18) Moore, *Philosophical Studies*, p.64.

Moore was also aware of the Husserlian watching of the constitution of phenomena in consciousness. Moore says: "But I am also using observation in a sense in which we can be said actually to observe a movement. ... I am using it in a sense in which we do perceive such a complex object as a white patch moving towards a red one on a green field; but I am not using it in any sense in which we could be said to 'perceive' or 'observe' that what we saw moving was a billiard-ball". (20)

Moore was also aware of the purpose of phenomenological description as a suggestion or a guide to the listener's own actual or potential experience of phenomena. In his essay "The Refutation of Idealism", Moore remarked: "Yet it can be distinguished if we look attentively enough, and if we know that there is something to look for. My main object in this paragraph has been to try to make the reader see it; but I fear I shall have succeeded very ill". (21)

Thus, bearing in mind that Moore's essay displays his general approach to the problem of perception, we have a good evidence to assert that Moore was a phenomenologist of the Husserlian type particularly in his treatment of perception.

(20) Ibid., pp.68-69.
(21) Ibid., p.25.
In a review of Austin's "Sense and Sensibilia" Lazerowitz relates: "Moore told this reviewer that what he enjoyed doing most in philosophy, what he was most keen on, was sense-datum theory, and in this he was not alone". (22) In fact, nearly every article in epistemology implicitly or explicitly refers to sense-data. That is why Moore's views about the relation of sense-data to physical objects and to the perceiver changed with the change of his other views.

In an article entitled "Sense-data" Moore tells us what he meant by sense-data. Speaking about an envelope in his hands Moore says: "These things: this patch of a whitish colour, and its size and shape I did actually see. And I propose to call these things, the colour and size and shape, Sense-data, things given or presented by the senses". (23)

Moore used the term sense-data in place of the old term "sensations". But 'sensation' is ambiguous, because it has two senses. It is used to denote a content (eg. a colour, a sound); and it is also used to denote the experience of such a content (eg. seeing, hearing). Moore used sense-data in the first sense of the word sensation, i.e. to denote a content.

(23) Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy, p.30.
In his earlier years Moore held that a sense datum (visual sense-datum) is part of the surface of a material object. That is, the nanalysis of the proposition "This is a human hand" includes the analysis of a proposition of the form: "This is part of the surface of a human hand". "In other words, although I don't perceive my hand directly, I do directly perceive part of its surface; that the sense-data itself is this part of its surface and not merely something which (in a sense yet to be determined) represents this part of the surface."(24)

Though Moore held with the early Russell that we do not directly perceive material objects, yet he rejected, on the one hand, the view that sense-data are representations or manifestations of material objects. On the other hand, by his identification of sense-data with parts of the surfaces of material objects he implicitly rejected the Russellian view that material objects are logical constructions out of sense-data.

However, in his later years Moore's views about sense-data underwent some change, or at least became sceptical. In fact the analysis of sense-data created very many difficulties which Moore tried hard to overcome. There are two relations that have to be

(24) Moore, Philosophical Papers, p.56.
dealt with: the relation of sense-data to human persons on one hand and to material objects on the other. The first relation seemed to be comparatively easy to tackle. Moore appealed to the Berkelean error of "To be is to be perceived". He asserted that there was no reason to conclude that a sense-datum exists only when it is perceived. But at the same time Moore was not quite sure whether it did exist unperceived. "But I am by no means sure that the sense-datum — that very same patch of whitish colour which I saw — is not still existing and still there. I do not say for certain that it is: I think very likely it is not. But I have a strong inclination to believe that it is."(25)

This was due to the fact that Moore was ready to admit that some sense-data do not exist unperceived; for example, a sense-datum of a toothache or a headache. But to admit on the other hand that all sense-data exist only when perceived will destroy all the objectivity towards which Moore's thought was oriented.

Although Moore was inclined to think that sense-data are public and not private qualities on the basis that there should be a distinction between the sense-data which we perceive and

our perceiving of them, yet he sometimes spoke of them in a way that implied privacy — that is, they exist only when perceived. Moore defined\(^{(26)}\) sense-data (as contrasted to material object qualities) as being directly apprehended. "And in all these cases, so far as I can see, what I mean by direct apprehension, namely the act of consciousness is exactly the same in quality."\(^{(27)}\)

Speaking about the envelope Moore said that, regarding the colour, shape and size, no one could say that they are exactly the same as those of the material object (the envelope). That is, though the sense-data are qualitatively the same as the material object, yet they are numerically different. But, nevertheless, Moore maintained that there is a necessary connection between the two. In "A Reply to My Critics" Moore says: "In other words, that the sense in which we use 'see' when we say that we see a thing which is a physical object, is such that the seeing of a physical object necessarily involves the seeing of a sense-datum."\(^{(28)}\) Again he says: "It still would be a contradiction, even in my usage, to say this, if what I meant by 'direct apprehension' was such that

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\(^{(26)}\) In his *A Reply to my Critics* Moore says that he is only giving a sufficient condition though he didn't mention what the necessary condition is.

\(^{(27)}\) Moore, *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*, p. 47.

the function 'x is directly apprehended' entails 'x is not a physical reality'. (29)

Moore acknowledged that the relation between sense-data and material objects is difficult to specify; that it is even paradoxical. (30) However, he tried to get himself out of the difficulty by addressing himself to a new question: what else do we see besides the sense-data when we perceive a material object? He felt that there was something. "The seeing of sense-data consists in directly apprehending them. But the seeing of a material object does not consist in directly apprehending it. It consists, partly in directly apprehending certain sense-data, but partly also in knowing, besides and at the same time, that there exists something other than these sense-data." (31) That is, besides the direct apprehension of sense-data, one will indirectly come to know that he is also seeing a material object. That is, one will come to know a proposition corresponding to the fact that there is a material object.

Thus Moore arrived at last at a peculiar position. He wanted to acknowledge the common-sense view that material objects are

(29) Ibid., p. 643.
(30) Ibid., p. 637.
(31) Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy, p. 51.
directly apprehended or directly perceived, but he was afraid of
loosing his initial ground of sense-data. He also wanted to ad-
mit the Lockean doctrine of the representative theory of percep-
tion or the Russellian view that physical objects are logical
constructions, but he found it difficult which way to choose.
However, choosing a common factor between the two seemed the best
course to steer: that sense-data and material objects are necessa-
ry connected, but whether this connection is causal or logical,
Moore was very reluctant to specify.

The sense-datum theory, as K.T. Gallagher noted, is going
out of favour. There is a marked trend towards direct or presenta-
tional realism. The sense-datum theory was in fact open to
criticism from many quarters. J.L. Austin devoted a whole book
"Sense and Sensibilia" to the criticism of the version of the theo-
ry as held by H.H. Price and A.J. Ayer. Anthony Quinton in his
essay "The Problem of Perception" refuted the arguments held for
the sense-datum theory, and remarked that the theory was under-
taking a futile job by searching for perfect standard conditions
or secure foundations for our knowledge.

(32) A good defense of presentational realism is to be found in
Charles A. Baylis essay "Foundations For a Presentative Theory
(33) Ayer contends that sense-datum language is preferable to material
object language. See also the criticism of sense-datum language
in Max Black's "The Language of Sense-Data" in Problems of
Analysis, pp.58-79. See also G.A. Paul "Is There a Problem about
Sense-Data" in Logic & Language (First Series)ed. Anthony Flew,
It has always been claimed that sense-datum theorists have a certain similarity with phenomenologists. But does the dying out of sense-datum theory imply a corresponding break up in the relation between phenomenologists and Anglo-American analysts? Not necessarily so; because there was also a difference as there was a similarity. Gallagher remarked: "The fact is that the sense-datum theorists seem sometimes to have a notion of pure consciousness in very straitened circumstances, opening not upon the rich spectacle of the phenomenologist, but upon the rather starving sense-data". (34)

Internal and External Relations:

In this essay Moore was dealing with the question whether all relations are internal. Idealists like Bradley and others claimed that all relations are internal. Thus they remarked: "Every relation essentially penetrates the being of its terms", "all relations qualify or modify or make a difference to their terms".

First, Moore was concerned in clearing up the ground by distinguishing the senses of meaning involved. He was concerned

with what philosophers could have meant by those assertions. He had to find what propositions are meant or implied by those assertions and distinguish them from other propositions with which they might easily be confused.

Whatever formulations of the dogma of internal relations are given, Moore contended that there is a certain proposition which is always implied.

Moore acknowledged that there is a trivial sense in which all relations can be considered as internal. This is true if what is meant is that the analysis of relational facts does not simply consist in the terms together with the relation. To say, for example, that Edward VII was father of George V does not simply consist in Edward, George and the relation of fatherhood. There is much more involved, namely the relation relating the two terms in the precise manner as given by the facts. Thus, in this sense, all relations can be said to be internal.

But this is not the sense in which the advocates of internal relations took their proposition to mean. They definitely held to the proposition that relations modify or make a difference to their terms. But in what sense is "modify" to be taken? The most natural and most intelligible sense, Moore contended, is the sense
in which we say a thing actually undergoes some change. For example, a piece of sealing wax put into a flame is modified by its relation to that flame. But Moore dispensed with/sense of 'modify' for the reason that not all relations modify their terms in this manner. He said that advocates of internal relation did not mean this causal sense of "modify". (35)

Therefore, "modify", Moore contended, must have been used in some metaphorical sense. If a thing 'A' had the property 'P', then anything which had not had the property 'P' would necessarily have been different from 'A'. This is the sense in which, Moore believed, "P modifies A" is used by the advocates of internal relations. That is, there is a relation of entailment or "following from" between any proposition to the effect that "B" has not got the property "P" which 'A' has and the necessity of "B" being different from "A". Thus "modifies", Moore believed, can be construed by reference to the sense of

(35) A.C. Ewing distinguishes ten senses in which relations can be considered to be internal. However, the most important senses, he maintained, are the causal senses. In fact he tried to prove that causation includes, part at least, logical entailment. Idealism: a critical Survey, pp.117-194.

Brand Blanshard also tried to defend infernal relations from the notion of causation. For him a farmer in Iowa is infer- nally related to a ballet dancer in Moscow. See The Review of Metaphysics, Vol.XXI, No.2, Dec. 1967, pp.227-236.
"follows from" when we say that a thing is red it follows that it is coloured.

After removing the ambiguity in the meaning of the term "modifies", Moore then went to clear up an equivocation on the logical term "follows from". One meaning of "follows from" as it was used by Russell and Whitehead is the notion of material implication. The other sense of "follows from" is logical entailment, and the difference between the two senses is that 'entailment' exhibits a necessity which is not to be found in material implication.

Thus, at last, the problem boils down to the following proposition: whether 'A' having the relational property 'P' entails that the absence of 'P' from B materially implies B is other than A, or else "A" having the relational property 'P' materially implies that the absence of this property in the case of B entails that B is other than A. Schematically considered it is put as follows:

(1) p entails (q materially implies r) or

(2) p materially implies (q entails r).

Advocates of internal relations contended that both propositions are true and that (2) follows from (1). But Moore
held that proposition (1) is true of some relations and wrong of others. When it is true relations are internal, and when it is wrong relations are external. But as to proposition (2) it is definitely false. This can be shown if we give values to the variables \((p, q, r)\). Let \(p\) be all books on this shelf are blue, \(q\) = my copy of Principia is on this shelf, \(r\) = my copy of Principia is blue.

Thus Moore's conclusion was that not all relations are internal; some are internal and some are external. The proposition "all relations are internal" is not a necessary proposition. It expresses a generalization from matters of fact and not a logical truth.

Moore's article on internal and external relations can be considered the best of his articles on epistemology. However, its treatment at the end of this chapter is primarily for the purpose of stressing the logically oriented procedure of Moore, in his philosophy in general and epistemology in particular. As Morton White remarked, (36) Moore was one of the most logically-minded philosophers of his time, and thus his whole effort can be construed as a logical search for philosophical justifications of his views.

Thus we saw that in epistemology, as well as in ethics, Moore used the method of meaning analysis — the distinction of the different senses of meaning involved. As Moore relied, in ethics, on an ultimate indefinable at which further analysis stops, so also in epistemology Moore tried to rely on an ultimate indefinable * at which further analysis cannot be carried on.

However, there are certain differences. Whereas in ethics Moore denied common usage and common-sense beliefs, yet in epistemology they formed the starting-point of his analysis.

Although Moore's primary concern was with the problem of philosophical justification which he pursued through analysis, yet his justification assumed two different forms. In ethics in analysis was pinned down to definition and in epistemology it was extended to proof. Furthermore, definition was identified with divisional definition while proof was identified with demonstration or deductive proof.

But despite his logically oriented approach Moore felt that he was sometimes in doubt. In ethics his doubts were implicit while in epistemology they were made explicit. But as Moore said:

* in the sense of unanalyzable into simpler parts.
"My doubt is a philosophic doubt, and, like other philosophic doubts, certainly cannot be set at rest by any empirical observation". (37) That is, there is only one course open besides going on doubting; and that is to go on thinking about it. (38)

Thus the appalling conclusion reveals itself. Moore's rationalism, at last, triumphs over his empiricism.

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(38) Ibid., p. 638.
CHAPTER IV

Analysis

Summary of Previous Investigation:

Our investigation of Moore's ethics and epistemology showed us that Moore's distinctive feature of method was his constant insistence on the distinction of the meanings involved. In ethics he distinguished the meanings involved in the questions - What is a definition? What is good? What is the ideal? In epistemology Moore insisted on the distinctions between a content and an act of consciousness, between what is presented in space and what is to be met with in space, and between the understanding of meaning of a proposition and what it means.

In fact this distinction procedure was not only a methodological standpoint for Moore, but it was also a contention dictated upon him by his anti-monistic or pluralistic attitude. And, although it was necessary and useful in his procedure, yet he was sometimes contented with giving such distinctions as constituting his arguments. However, though this was in fact the distinctive practice of Moore, particularly in ethics, yet he did not acknowledge such a practice as analysis. The aim of such distinctions is clarification of thought. But Moore
contended that the justification of analysis does not rest on such an aim. "If I'm right, the chief use of analysis in the way of clearness, is only clearness which it produces when you're doing philos. itself."(1) Again: "Here too I think it's only philosophical puzzles that it helps to remove, and here again chiefly I think by distinguishing senses of words or forms of expression rather than strictly by analysis".(2)

In ethics, one could generally say, Moore did not practise analysis as he conceived of it. The most apparent reason one could give for that is the disappearance of his famous distinction between what a proposition means and whether we are able to give a correct analysis of its meaning. Though this distinction might have been implied in ethics, yet it was not made explicit as it was the case in epistemology. Furthermore, in ethics the central concept was reached from the very beginning and the impropriety of analysis with regard to that concept was declared at the same time. On the other hand, the central concept in epistemology was arrived at after many hints and analyses. Thus analysis as theoretically conceived by Moore and partly practised

(2) Ibid., p.169.
in his writings can rightly be identified with epistemology. Thus A.E. Murphy writes: "What is offered, however, is not an indication of the perceptual evidence which supports such propositions, but an analysis of them. What then is "analysis"? Professor Moore does not attempt to tell us in any general way, but the examples given are sufficient to show that in fact it is epistemology, as we have already become acquainted with it in Professor Broad's Theory". (3)

Theoretical Conception of Analysis:

Moore's writings about analysis are to be found in his two posthumous books: Common Place Book and Lectures on Philosophy together with his a Reply to my Critics. However, his articles about analysis are very few and very short and mostly written in notes form. Indeed it is very puzzling to find that Moore wrote very little on a topic in which he was mostly interested. Judging from Moore's remarks written in his personal copies of the Aristotelian Society Proceedings and Supplementary volumes, (4) we


(4) It is fortunate to note that the AUB library comes to possess G.E. Moore's personal copies of the Aristotelian Society Proceedings (Vol.I, 1900-1901 — Vol.NV, 1954-1955) and the Supplementary volumes (1918-1938). It can be noted that Moore's interest lay in a wide variety of topics with the exception, apparently, of topics on aesthetics and the philosophy of history. It can also be noted that Moore expressed an interest in the topics of the supplementary volumes more than the topics of the proceedings. It is also worthy to note that Moore's careful reading is indicated not only by marginal notes but also by the correction of every misprint & by his referential note to a previous page if the writer expressed an inconsistency.
can say that Moore was very interested in analysis as well as in other topics like knowledge, perception, sense-data and universals.

In a symposium: "Does Philosophy analyse Common Sense?" A.E. Duncan-Jones writes: "A quite general definition of analysis is easily given. An expression, $y$, is an analysis of an expression, $x$, if (1) $y$ is substitutable for $x$, and (2) $y$ is symbolically more complex than $x$". (5) It is interesting to note Moore's reaction to such a definition. A big "No!" with an exclamation mark is written in the right hand margin, the word "expression" is underlined and the expression "is an analysis of" is struck with an undulating line by Moore's pencil.

This gives us the first and most important conception held by Moore about analysis. In "A Reply to My Critics" Moore makes such a conception clearer. "It must be emphasized, first of all, that, in my usage, both analytically and analytically must be concepts or propositions, not mere verbal expressions." (6) But though analysis is of concepts yet Moore did not rule out the importance of words or expressions in the performance of analysis. "The two


plain facts about the matter which it seems to me one must hold fast to are these: That if in making a given statement one is to be properly said to be "giving an analysis" of a concept, then (a) both *analysandum* and *analysans* must be concepts, and if the analysis is a correct one, must, in some sense, be the same concept, and (b) that the expression used for the *analysandum* must be a different expression from that used for the *analysans*."(7)

Concepts and Propositions:

Moore distinguished concepts and propositions from the words or expressions expressing or denoting them. But on the other hand he did not try to make clear the difference between concepts and propositions and sometimes spoke of them as synonymous. However, in an earlier article "The Nature of Judgement", Moore made this difference: "The difference between a concept and a proposition, in virtue of which the latter alone can be called true or false, would seem to lie merely in the simplicity of the former. A proposition is/synthesis of concepts, and, just as concepts are themselves immutably what they are, so they stand in infinite relations to one another equally immutable."(8)

Concepts for Moore are possible objects of thought. They exist even if no body thought of them. In fact concepts for Moore are like the Platonic Ideas which are the real constituents of the Universe. Thus Moore speaks of them: "It seems necessary, then, to regard the world as formed of concepts. These are the only objects of knowledge. They cannot be regarded fundamentally as abstractions either from things or from ideas; since both alike can, if anything is to be true of them, be composed of nothing but concepts". (9)

Thus a concept is a simple objective entity and a proposition is a complex concept. So when Moore spoke of analysis as analysis of concepts he definitely meant analysis of propositions. For, the sense of definition in which he was interested was the resolving of a complex entity into its simpler constituents. Thus he writes: "To define a concept is the same as to give an analysis of it; but to define a word is neither the same thing as to give an analysis of that word, nor the same thing as to give an analysis of any concept". (10)

However, it seems as if Moore had in mind, when he spoke about analysis, two kinds of analysis. John Wisdom (11) has

(9) Ibid., p.182.
introduced the distinction between same-level analysis and new-level analysis, the latter being the task of critical philosophy or philosophical analysis proper. The former kind tends to make meanings sharper or clearer by giving another identical concept to the analysandum. The latter kind or New-level analysis is what is called reductive analysis, a transformation from one level of discourse to another level of discourse eg. transforming propositions about nations to propositions about individuals.

Though Moore did not make such a distinction yet he seemed wholly to agree with it in practice. And, in the case of same-level analysis Moore seemed not only to have practised it but also to have conceived of it. Thus he says: "Suppose I say: The concept "being a brother" is identical with the concept "being a male sibling". I should say that, in making this assertion, I am "giving an analysis" of the concept "being a brother"; and, if my assertion is true, then I am giving a correct analysis of this concept." (12)

The Paradox of Analysis:

Moore's concept of analysis has been found to be paradoxical. If analysis (same-level analysis) consists in giving an identical concept to the analysandum, then analysis is trivial. If the analysandum and the analysans are not identical then the analysis is incorrect. This paradox was pointed out by C.H. Langford when he said: "Even if all analysis is, as we are now supposing, logical analysis, the difficulty being that if the analysandum and the analysans have the same meaning, the analysis will apparently be trivial". (13) But though Moore admitted the existence of the paradoxical situation and his inability to find a solution for it, yet he tried to find a way to overcome the difficulty. Thus he failingly says: "That the expression used for the analysandum must not only be different from that used for the analysans, but that they must differ in this way, namely, that the expression used for the analysans must explicitly mention concepts which are not explicitly mentioned by the expression used for the analysandum". (14)

But Moore was making this allowance at the expense of his identity theory of concepts. "The concept is not a mental fact, nor any part of a mental fact. Identity of content is presupposed


in any reasoning; and to explain the identity of content between two facts by supposing that content to be a part of the content of some third fact, must involve a vicious circle." (15) But if every concept is identical with itself, changeless and immutable, how can we tell that the content of one concept is not explicitly clear as the content of another concept, let alone speaking about the identity of two concepts? The problem with Moore is that the meaning of a concept, for him, is like a copy or a picture of the concept itself received by the knowing mind without contributing anything to it. By calling back to mind the semanticists' definition of meaning as the mode of apprehension of a concept Moore's paradox can be resolved. As Alonzo Church noted (16) the paradox admits of an easy solution if we pay attention to the Fregean distinction between sense and denotation. If we write $2 + 2 = 4$, then the left-hand and the right-hand symbols denote an identical number, yet they have different senses. Likewise "brother" and "male sibling" denote an identical concept, yet they have different senses. For example, to say "this is my brother" is not at all like saying "this is my male sibling".


While the latter expression mentions only a formal relation, the former says in addition that this person is related to me by blood ties and I have certain positive attitudes towards him.

The paradox of analysis is very similar in style to a very much older paradox, the paradox of deduction. This paradox goes like this: If the conclusion of an argument is already contained in the premises of that argument, then the deduction is trivial. If on the other hand the conclusion is not already contained in the premises, then the argument is invalid. Thus every deductive argument, like analysis, is either trivial or else invalid or incorrect.

Therefore, another solution of the paradox of analysis is the solution of the paradox of deduction. This solution is unsophisticated and proceeds from a much more common-sense point of view. Triviality is not a logical concept, but a psychological one. To say that a certain move is trivial is to say that any one who knows anything about it could do it without much difficulty. But a deduction may well be valid and the conclusion may well be "contained" in the premises, and yet be quite surprising or

* I am indebted here to Dr. David Makinson who draw my attention to this similarity and to the common-sense answer offered here.
quite difficult to do. That is, it is far from trivial. Similarly an analysis may come as a shock, a surprise * or a real clarification of the analysandum, and may have been quite difficult to perform. But this solution, simple though as it is, is nevertheless parasitic on Moore's theory of concepts. That is, it would still leave certain difficulties for Moore's theory of concept. For, what is to be explained is precisely how one concept comes as a shock or a real clarification to one person rather than another. More generally, the problem for Moore's theory of concept and the theory of analysis which forms part of it, or indeed for any similar Platonistically-inclined theory, is that of describing the manner in which the mind apprehends immutable concepts. Moore, in particular, did not tackle this problem.

Theory and Practice Contrasted:

As we saw one method which Moore practised to a great extent, but which he nevertheless denied the name of analysis, was in perfect agreement with what he said about it. That is the method of distinction, which we already termed meaning-analysis, was most successful from the point of clarification and resolution of philosophical puzzles. Thus this method for Moore was only a

* See also Alan R. White, G.E. Moore, p.109.
preparatory step for analysis and cannot be considered as one sort of analysis. Moore writes: "I've said this bec. I don't want you to be misled by people's talking of analysing the concept "number" etc.; into thinking you ever will be doing this. You'll only be analysing one of a number of concepts; or of course you may try to analyse severals. That is, giving the different senses of the word 'number' is by the method of distinction which is not analysis, and taking any one sense of these and try to give another identical concept to it is proper conceptual analysis.

Thus the parts of Moore's method which he practised as analysis proper are same-level analysis and new-level analysis. But compared to the latter the former could hardly be said to have been practised. In ethics, it might 'be considered that the definition of 'the good' or 'the ideal' was a practice of same-level analysis. But as regard the central concept of all ethics, the possibility of giving it a same-level analysis was not raised at all and the sort of definition which was denied of it is much akin to new-level analysis. That is, "good"

(17) G.E. Moore, Lectures on Philosophy, p.160.
cannot be further decomposed, nor can the concept expressed by it 
be expressed in any other level of discourse. Likewise in episte-
mology same-level analysis was hardly ever practised. Thus here 
we see a polarity between Moore's conception of analysis and his 
actual practice of it.

We saw that Moore's practice, especially in epistemology was 
a kind of new-level analysis or reductive analysis. All proposi-
tions about material objects reduce in the final analysis to pro-
positions about sense-data. In fact this practice was already to 
be found in the work of the British Empiricists. It has also been 
confirmed by Russell's logical atomism and the reduction of all 
sentences to protocol-sentences by the logical positivists. Though 
Moore was neither a logical atomist nor a logical positivist yet his 
practice of analysis was in line with theirs. Thus J.O. Urmson 
writes: "The actual practice of analysis went on always while the 
justification and characterization of it changed. Moore, after all, 
was neither a positivist nor an atomist, yet he practised the same 
sort of analysis as they did and was even regarded as the leading 
exponent of the technique".(18)

Thus here again we see another polarity between theory and 
practice. One could safely say that Moore never spoke in theory 

(18) J.O. Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, p.115.
of such a conception of analysis as Russell and the logical positivist did. Russell for example said that one can get down in theory, if not in practice, to ultimate simples out of which the world is built. But Moore's devotion to Butler's phrase "everything is what it is and not another thing" seemed to pull him back from such a conception. However, in practice, following Russell's theory of Definite Descriptions of which he was very fond, Moore seemed to perform reductive analysis. Thus when Moore tried to analyse the proposition "I am perceiving a human hand" he seemed to reduce it to a proposition about sense-data where the concept "human hand" no longer existed. For his concentration on the proposition "I am perceiving this" and his claim that the analysis of the proposition "This is a human hand" involves the analysis of a proposition of the former type — this in itself is a tacit claim that the proposition "This is a human hand" should be eliminated. In fact Moore spoke of the sense-datum as the subject or the ultimate subject\(^{(19)}\) of the proposition "This is a human hand". That is, the word "this" in "this is a human hand" stands for a short definite description of "the object I am seeing" or "the sense-datum".*


Thus Moore's theory and practice coincided in that part of his method which he denied the name 'analysis'. On the other hand one conception of analysis was hardly practised by him and one practice of analysis was never conceived in theory by him. Thus we have a peculiar sort of diversity in these two kinds of analysis. Thus our obvious conclusion reveals itself. That Moore was successful in the kind of method which he both thought in mind and carried out in practice even if he denied it the proper name. On the other hand Moore failed in two kinds of analysis where the one was a theory without a corresponding adequate practice and the other was an adequate practice without a corresponding theory. The one generated the famous paradox of analysis, and the other generated Moore's scepticism. Thus A.E. Murphy writes: "For an epistemology might well be defined as a theory which attempts to persuade us that in order to know something which we know quite well, we must also be knowing something which seems actually, and after the most careful inspection, to be very doubtful indeed". (20)

Though Moore was considered, together with Bertrand Russell, as the originator of the analytic method, he nevertheless denied


that his whole philosophical endeavour consisted in analysis.\(^{(21)}\)

That is, philosophy for him should not be identified with analysis. Thus Moore's importance and influence should not be sought only in analysis. In our case we found that his contribution was very poor in that part of his method. But we still appreciate the other part of his method, namely the distinction method, which he considered to be a preparatory step for analysis.

CHAPTER V

Conclusion

Before giving our final concluding remarks we would like to consider some views about Moore which are held by other philosophers.

First, let us consider the views of the Mooreans. But before we do so two general remarks are in order. First, nearly none of the Mooreans have ever defended Moore's ethical views. Their writings are mainly based on Moore's views about epistemology, in particular his article "A Defence of Common Sense".\(^{(1)}\) In fact this article is claimed by the Mooreans to be Moore's most important contribution to philosophy. Thus Norman Malcolm writes: "If Moore is to be remembered in the history of philosophy it will be his "Defence of Common Sense"."\(^{(2)}\) Secondly, a major feature of the Moorean views is that they try to bring Moore very close to Wittgenstein. Thus the orientation is made even against Moore's own claims. John Wisdom writes: "Moore himself exaggerates the difference between himself and Wittgenstein when he says that Wittgenstein used a method quite different from any that he, Moore, had ever used".\(^{(3)}\) But the orientation

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\(^{(1)}\) See the contributions of Wisdom, Malcolm and Lazerowitz to "The Philosophy of G.E. Moore", ed. Schilpp.


\(^{(3)}\) John Wisdom, "Mace, Moore, and Wittgenstein", in Paradox and Discovery, p.156.
is made complete when it is put in a form of a dramatic anecdote. When Moore was awarded the Order of Merit he went to Buckingham Palace to receive the medal which was to be presented by King George VI in a private audience. When the ceremony was over Moore came out of the Palace. "He re-entered the cab and, leaning over excitedly, said to Mrs. Moore: 'Do you know that the king had never heard of Wittgenstein!'"(4) But this anecdote, amusing as it is, needs a philosophical interpretation. It is not a mere sign of naiveté on the part of Moore to issue such a remark, but a sign of complete preoccupation with philosophy. "Here is philosophy, the most exciting thing in the world; here is Wittgenstein, the most exciting figure in philosophy; and here is the king, who had not even heard of Wittgenstein"!(5)

John Wisdom:

Wisdom's philosophical endeavour hinges around the relevance of psychoanalytic techniques in solving philosophical problems. The use of language is symptomatic of deeply inhibited desires or motives. Thus only by examining the linguistic usages or the linguistic facts are the metalinguistic innovations made clear. But though this is

(5) Ibid., p.167.
the basic stand of wisdom, yet he did not interpret Moore along these lines. He often would say that Moore would resist such extensions of his views and deny that he was primarily concerned with words. "We know too that, though Moore would sometimes put a question as to whether one expression has the same meaning as another or as to whether in certain circumstances we would or would not use a certain expression, he would have denied that he was primarily concerned with questions about words". (6)

Wisdom is very much impressed by Moore's undivided attention to the views of others; by Moore's admittance that the false views of other philosophers might be true in some sense which Moore had not understood or that there might be reasons for them which Moore did not consider.

However, what Wisdom takes to be a characteristic of Moore is what he calls "the move to the concrete". This move was expressed by Moore in his treatment of propositions like "Time is unreal", "Matter does not exist", etc. Thus Moore remarked: "Time is unreal"? What would most people mean by this proposition? ... But if you try to translate the proposition into the concrete, and to ask what it implies, there is, I think, very little doubt as to

the sort of thing it implies". (7) This move to the concrete, Wisdom takes to be distinctive not only of Moore but also of Wittgenstein. That is why the conjunction of the two seemed inevitable for Wisdom. Thus he remarks: "It is well known that this move to the concrete was characteristic of Moore's philosophical thinking. But I believe it is still worth considering why this sort of move is so valuable. Isn't it a sort of move which Wittgenstein carried further, much further"? (8)

Morris Lazerowitz:

Lazerowitz follows the basic stand of Wisdom. He even goes farther than Wisdom does. Though he lacks the lucidity and amusing character of Wisdom's style, yet he surpasses Wisdom in the use of words suggestive of the subconscious drives and motivations in philosophy. Thus, unlike Wisdom, Lazerowitz did not feel impaired in interpreting Moore along the lines of his own thought. (9)

Summing up Moore's philosophy he remarks: "What Moore is telling us is that philosophy should be done within the confines of

(7) Moore, Philosophical Studies, p. 209.
(9) It is interesting to note how Lazerowitz interprets Descartes' "I think, therefore I am" and Hume's concept of causation. Descartes inference is designed to call attention to a connection between a first person pronoun and having a demonstrative use. Hume's analysis draws attention to the fact that 'cause' applies to occurrences to which "constantly conjoined" applies, and that the term "necessary connection" has no use. See pages 61 and 205 in Studies in Meta-Philosophy.
ordinary language, and should not be done with the subterranean purpose of changing it". (10)

Lazerowitz too is fond of Moore's move to the concrete. But such a move is inadequate unless it is interpreted along a Wittgenstein's line of thought. Because Moore seemed, for Lazerowitz, to suspect that his translations were meant to do more than to expose empirically false views, Lazerowitz finds it legitimate to get the benefit of the doubt. "Moore's translations give every appearance of being designed to expose two logically different kinds of mistake, one empirical and the other linguistic." (11) Thus the benefit goes in favour of the second class.

After all philosophical analysis is not concerned with empirical facts. "Analysis is used to make a linguistic alteration, it is used to justify a manoeuvre with terminology. It is a linguistic conversion which in every instance creates the semantic illusion that a theory about phenomena is being stated." (12) That being the case, Moore was no exception to the theory. His intentions are to be interpreted in the light of his usage of the language, despite the fact that Moore voiced out his intentions

(10) Morris Lazerowitz, Studies in Meta-Philosophy, p.213.
(11) Ibid., p.186.
to the contrary of the interpretation. Thus Lazerowitz remarks:
"But the way he expresses himself carries the suggestion that
knowing the analysis of the meaning of a word comes to something
more than knowing explicitly the criteria for its use. His lan-
guage suggests that something more than linguistic fact is thrown
into clearer light, that hidden facts about things are revealed".\(^{(13)}\)
That is, Moore proved to be a Wittgensteinian who doesn't ask for
the meaning but for the use. The extra-linguistic element has
simply to be deleted as a semantic illusion if not a metaphysical
fog.

**Norman Malcolm:**

Norman Malcolm is held to be the first to interpret Moore
along linguistic lines of thought. He is notoriously known as
making a fetish of ordinary language. In his contribution to "The
Philosophy of G.E. Moore", Malcolm held that the essence of Moore's
technique of refuting statements of other philosophers lies in
pointing out that those statements go against ordinary language.\(^{(14)}\)
Thus he remarks: "What Moore's reply reminds us of is that situa-
tions constantly occur which ordinary language allows us to describe
by uttering sentences of the sort "I see my pen", "I see a cat", etc.

\(^{(14)}\) Norman Malcolm, "Moore and Ordinary Language", *The Philosophy
and which it would be outrageously incorrect to describe by saying "I see a part of my brain." (15) But this seems to admit both empirical facts and linguistic usage. For, a philosopher may be right about the facts, but only misusing language. To incorporate empirical facts as part of the linguistic facts a further move is needed, a move in the direction of Wittgenstein. Thus Malcolm later remarks: "When he said, against the sceptics such a thing as 'I now see that door' it did not matter whether he was actually looking at a door. He did not have to produce an example of a true perceptual statement. In order to refute the claim that there is an absurdity in the concept of seeing a body, Moore did not have to present a paradigm of seeing a body, as I once thought. He only had to remind his listeners and readers that the sentence 'I see a door over there' has a correct use and, therefore, can express a true statement." (16)

Though Malcolm's first interpretation of Moore was attacked by other philosophers he nevertheless kept to it. But how could he justify his second move? It seemed natural to attribute to Moore the same confusion that he once experienced in his first

(15) Ibid., p.351.
(16) Norman Malcolm, Knowledge and Certainty, p.179.
interpretation. Thus the move can easily be justified: "I believe that Moore himself was confused about what he was doing, as is often so when one makes a philosophical advance". (17)

Before discussing the views of the other set of philosophers certain other remarks are in order. First, these philosophers are not closely acquainted with Moore like the previous ones. Moreover, two of these philosophers, namely Findlay and Warnock can generally be considered as falling within the contemporary movement of Anglo-American philosophy, while the third, Blanshard, is wholly outside the movement. Secondly, the sympathies of these philosophers towards Moore lie not in Moore’s results or doctrines, but in his sincere efforts of doing philosophy. Thirdly, all of these philosophers were vehemently against the misinterpretation of Moore, especially the interpretation of Malcolm. Thus G.J. Warnock remarks: "That much philosophy has consisted in 'more or less' subtly repudiating ordinary language is a theory about philosophical theories, to which Moore has at least never committed himself". (18) So also Findlay remarks: "Malcolm has of course admitted that his whole interpretation was a 'theory' based, it seems clear, on a conflation of Moore with Wittgenstein". (19) But nevertheless these philosophers

(17) Ibid., p.179.
(18) G.J. Warnock, English Philosophy Since 1900, p.22.
are quite astonished by the fact that Moore did not repudiate Malcolm's account of his views; why didn't Moore object to the linguistic-use interpretations of his views by other philosophers? Thus Blanshard remarks: "But at this point Moore's followers — with how much of his own approval I do not know — gave to his doctrine an interpretation that they believed would make it tenable". [20] Likewise Findlay says: "Why did Moore permit all this? I leave it to those better acquainted with Moore to provide a full answer". [21]

J.N. Findlay:

Findlay marks an unsteady line of thought within the contemporary movement in British philosophy. Perhaps this is due to an appreciation of some views in Continental philosophy which is generally lacking among British philosophers. He sees in Moore a great philosopher, very much akin to Socrates and in whose philosophy British as well as Continental trends are fairly represented. Thus he remarks about Moore: "Moore like Socrates, was a great philosophical watershed. Socrates produced Cynics, Cyrenaics and Logic-chopping Megarians as well as the great synthetic thought of Plato. Moore likewise has been the

father of much triviality and of much valuable thought. Of the advent of his Plato, however, there is yet no sign". (22)

Nevertheless, Findlay sees that Moore's results were a failure in all aspects of his philosophy because of his reductive analysis and "his determination to chop everything up into little bits". (23) Thus Findlay sees that Moore's brilliant works, like those of Russell, were his writings prior to 1925. Moore's later writings were not only poor but also absorbed with the investigation of expressions. This led "to the monumental misinterpretation of Moore by Malcolm — a misinterpretation whose interest I do not deny — which made Moore refute philosophical errors merely by showing them to be stated in bad English". (24) But nevertheless Moore's engagement with the expressions of ordinary language was a kind of concept trapping, a kind of Platonic procedure which starts with the routines of ordinary usage and ends with thought and language utterly transformed. Thus Findlay remarks: "The role of ordinary language is to ensure that we have a genuine notion before us for analysis, that we are not merely playing with words and saying nothing at all." (25)

(22) Ibid., p. 247.
(23) Ibid., p. 247.
(24) Ibid., p. 234.
(25) Ibid., p. 239.
G.J. Warnock:

Warnock is one of the critical exponents of contemporary British movement. He sees in Moore, and mainly through his practice, a turning point in British philosophy of the present century. Thus he remarks: "The way in which an influential philosopher may undermine the empire of his predecessors consists, one may say, chiefly in his providing his contemporaries with other interests. In the present case the old spells were broken, and a new spell was cast, chiefly by reason of the character of G.E. Moore". (26) But the new spell or the new interest should not be attributed to Moore as originally intended by him, especially if he himself denounced it. That is, though Malcolm's interpretation may be in line with what Moore had said, yet Moore's intentions definitely disclaim such an interpretation as his own view. Thus Warnock says: "Now this interpretation of Moore's intention makes sense of much that he said, and attributes to him a species of an argument that is, within certain definable limits, both salutary and entirely sound. But I do not think one can say that Moore actually had any such intentions". (27) That is Malcolm's interpretation is sound only to the extent

(27) Ibid., pp.21-22.
that ordinary language embody common-sense propositions. For Moore was concerned only with these propositions and he set out to defend them. So Warnock remarks: "What he defends is always the truth of certain very common propositions, and not the propriety of the language in which they are expressed". (28)

Brand Blanshard:

Blanshard is an American Idealist who is definitely against the present British movement. He labels all linguistic philosophers as positivist and describes their method of doing philosophy as the method of "milking stones".

However, he has a special regard for Moore. But this regard does not at all spring from an appreciation of Moore's doctrines, but only from an appreciation of his efforts in doing philosophy. Thus he writes about him: "Moore's influence was due more to his example than to his precepts, more to his strenuously self-critical effort to think clearly than to any theory of his own about what he was doing". (29)

As well as being opposed to Moore's principal views, Blanshard is equally furious against the illegitimate extension of Moore's views as particularly done by Malcolm. He holds that

(28) Ibid., p. 22.
(29) Brand Blanshard, Reason and Analysis, p. 311.
Moore was interested in ordinary usage only in a subordinate sense. His main preoccupation was the thoughts and meanings. Thus he writes: "It was the thought expressed through language, and this alone, that interested Moore, and if he attended as closely as he did to words, it was because he thought that differences in expression were the most useful keys with which to unlock the subtle and manifold differences in meaning". (30)

Conclusions:

Before we draw our final conclusions let us substantiate somewhat more the claim that Moore was not primarily concerned with ordinary language. As we noted earlier Moore did not consider ordinary language as the touchstone for philosophical views. He himself confessed that he used words in different senses which are not found in common usage. Thus he says: "The use of either word [property, characteristic] in the sense in which I have been using them is, so far as I can see, an equally great departure from any use which they have in common speech; but the use of both in this sense seems to me to be pretty well established in philosophy". (31)

That is, established usage, whether ordinary or technical ensures

(30) Ibid., p.311.
for us the presence of genuine concepts with which we are going to deal. It is a matter of concepts; their truth or falsity is at the stake, and not the propriety or impropriety of the linguistic usage. Thus undermining correct usage Moore says: "This, however, is only a point about the correct usage of a word. There is another point, as to which I agree with him, which is of much more importance".(32)[my italics].

But what about Malcolm's and Lazerowitz's interpretations? It is difficult to give conclusive answers, because though Moore did not tacitly accept them in his " A reply to my Critics", yet he did not try to repudiate them in other later writings. Thus speaking about Malcolm's, Lazerowitz's and other philosophers' contributions Moore says: "But I think that, fortunately, the greater part of this material does not call for any reply. It does not call for any reply because for the most part, the writers are not concerned with trying to show that anything which I have said in my writings is false, but only with raising questions of a quite different sort about my work. And it is fortunate that it does not call for a reply, because my time is now very limited and I could not possibly discuss in it the new questions which they raise — questions about which nothing [my italics] at all has

(32) Ibid., p.624.
been said in my published writings". (33) Again commenting on Lazerowitz's conclusion Moore says: "Mr. Lazerowitz concludes that when, for instance, I tried to show that Time is not unreal, all that I was doing was to recommend that we should not use certain expressions in a different way from that in which we do! If this is all I was doing, I was certainly making a huge mistake, for I certainly did not think it was all. And I do not think so now". (34)

Now we are in a position to draw our conclusions. First, Moore was not at all concerned with ordinary language in any primary sense. He was only concerned with common sense beliefs and he was interested in ordinary usage only in so far as this usage provides a reliable preparatory step, for the study of common sense beliefs or concepts. Secondly, since Moore was primarily interested in concepts and not in the expressions that denote them, his concept of analysis was very different from modern linguistic analysis. But though his analysis can be termed conceptual analysis, this does not entitle us to describe it, as Copleston does, as phenomenological analysis. It is true (and this is our third major conclusion) that at times Moore conceived and practised, in a rudimentary form, phenomenological analysis of the Husserlian kind. This is so, for

(33) Ibid., pp.667-8.
(34) Ibid., p.675.
example, in his treatment of perception. But simply to identify Moore's conceptual analysis with phenomenological analysis is an oversimplification.

Our fourth conclusion like the third one, is equally appalling. Despite the fact that Moore's thought was deeply rooted in British empiricism, he proved, in the last outcome, to be more of a rationalist than an empiricist. As we have seen previously, Moore's doubts could not be settled by empirical considerations, but only by thinking about these doubts. This might be due to the fact that Moore was not able to shake off completely the influence of idealism on him. In fact many philosophers contend that Moore's, and Russell's, contributions to philosophy are in the main due to the influence of idealism on them rather than to their empiricism.*

Our fifth conclusion is that Moore's analysis, though different from modern linguistic analysis, was nevertheless a failure. This was partly due to his theory of concepts and meanings. It was also partly due to the divergence between his conception and practice of analysis. As we noted also in the last chapter, Moore practised a kind of analysis which he never conceived in theory,

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* See, for example, Morton White, Toward Reunion in Philosophy, p.9, also Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, pp.207-216.
and conceived another kind of analysis which he hardly practised.

Our sixth conclusion is very closely related to the previous one. Though Moore failed in his method of analysis, and consequently in the results of his investigations, yet he was more than successful in his preparatory method, the method of distinction. This was shown by his insistence on enumerating the set of meanings involved in any one single question or statement before picking up the sense in which he was interested. This leads us to our last conclusion which is also closely related to the foregoing two.

We noted that Moore addressed himself to many questions, most often in the right manner, but he nevertheless reached unsatisfactory solutions. This, as we previously noted, was due to the problems of meaning and analysis. But it might be generally construed as a peculiar contrast between a pluralistic attitude in asking questions and a reductive, sometimes monistic, claim in practice for arriving at conclusions. Thus we may call back to mind Metz's remark to which Moore replies as follows: "And my second comment is that I think Dr. Metz was quite right in saying that I am an "unsatisfactory answerer". I did want to answer questions, to give solutions to problems, and I think it is a just charge against me that I have been able to solve so few of the problems
I wished to solve. I think probably the reason is partly sheer lack of ability and partly that I have not gone about the business of trying to solve them in the right way". (35)
APPENDIX

The material of this appendix does not have any direct bearing upon the problems already discussed in the text. It is intended as a supplement, whose purpose is merely to give a preliminary account of some aspects of G.E. Moore's philosophical interests and inclinations as they are indicated in his marginal annotations on the articles of himself and others.

Some remarks on our sources are in order. The Jafet Library of the American University of Beirut has in its possession a collection of Proceedings and Supplementary Volumes of the Aristotelian Society from 1918 to 1957, and according to an inscription in the first of these volumes, for 1918, the whole set belonged to G.E. Moore.

Our investigations cover the whole of the set of Supplementary volumes, in which the annotations are considerably more frequent than in the regular volumes. Unfortunately, due to lack of time we have not been able to make a complete analysis of the regular volumes.

Our study of the Supplementary volumes attributed to Moore indicates that those for the years from 1918 to 1938 (with the exception of the volumes for 1920, 1921, 1922 and 1930, which are missing) really did belong to Moore. However it appears
that none of the volumes after 1938 (with the exception of 1946) belonged to him. For, in the first place, the name of G.E. Moore is not written on the front page, as is the case with the earlier volumes. And in the second place, there is not a single comment or correction of a misprint in any of the volumes after 1938, in contrast to the frequent annotations of the previous years.

In the volumes to 1938, Moore went over all of his own articles and made corrections, especially rectifications of misprints but also at times question marks. He also made extensive marginal notes on the works of others.

However, since Moore's notes are often in the form of rather cryptic crosses, question marks, exclamation marks, and wavy lines, certain problems of decipherment arise. We shall begin by listing and interpreting the major notations which Moore used. Our interpretations do not claim any finality, and should be taken only as probable readings suggested by the typical instances of their use and a general knowledge of Moore's views. We shall then present tables which show those topics and authors occurring in the Supplementary Volumes on which Moore always, never, or only sometimes commented. Finally, on the basis of the information in these tables, we shall suggest a few general
conclusions about Moore's interests and inclinations in philosophy.

Moore sometimes made complete statements in the tops, bottoms, and margins of the pages, but more frequently used only single words such as why? which? how? yes, no, meaning?, nonsense. Most common of all, however, are the notations $x$, $?$, $!!$, $\\?$, and other similar symbols.

The Notation $x$ as I interpret it is used by Moore to mean an important proposition which he may be inclined to accept but which, by all means, he is not against. Thus when G.F. Stout writes:

"As Brentano puts it, an astronomer can notice in memory details of the appearance of a star which escaped him while he was actually observing". (1)

Or when J.W.B. Joseph writes:

"The distinction of particular and universal is not that of substance and attribute". (2)

Moore is probably inclined to accept these propositions, and certainly does not wish to reject them. Indeed when he wants to indicate that an idea is important but should nevertheless be rejected, he uses the notation (NoX). Thus when A.J. Ayer writes:

"It is a mistake [the view that analysis shows us how English-speaking people use words] because it suggests that an analysis is valid only for the language in which it is expressed; so that if we succeeded in analysing "the book is on the table" we should still have to go on to analyse "le livre est sur la table" and "das Buch ist auf dem Tisch". Whereas, in fact, an analysis of any one of these would serve for all, which is the reason why we say that we analyse, not sentences, but propositions". (3)

Sometimes Moore uses the notation (NoXX) to mean the same as the above. Thus when G.F. Stout writes:

"The only answer I can find to this question is that the shape is a particular place having a certain uniform or approximately uniform colour. ..." (4)

But most often Moore would use No! and Yes to indicate propositions which he rejects or accepts respectively. Thus when G.A. Paul writes:

"It is an equally good answer to say 'it only seemed to me as if there was a round penny which looked alliptical. I was really not seeing anything at all'". (5)

Or when H.H. Price writes:

"We can still maintain that Sensing is other than immediate knowing". (5)

With respect to the notation (?) Moore uses it in two different ways. Sometimes he uses it to indicate a vague idea or proposition; and sometimes he uses it to point to a questionable idea or proposition. Thus Moore uses it in the latter sense when C.D. Broad writes:

"It is admitted that the Critical Realists mean by an "essence" a universal and not a particular". (6)

Sometimes, however, Moore uses the notation (X?) in the same sense of the above notation (?). Thus G.C. Field writes:

"Aristotle tells us that the former [Participation] was his regular word for the relations of Forms and particulars in the final stage of his thought". (7)

In the former sense of (?), as a vague idea or proposition, Moore uses the notation when G. Dawes Hicks writes:

"Belief or judgement, on the other hand, involves that in some way that private world has been transcended, and the individual judging is able to contrast". (8)

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But when the proposition is hopelessly unclear Moore used the word "Meaning?". Thus he uses it when John MacMurray writes:

"Originally the "self" would be little else than a relatively enduring centre of feeling". (9)

or when J.W.B. Joseph writes:

"For what goes to the being of that which is intrinsically good goes to its goodness". (10)

When an astonishing idea is expressed Moore uses the notation !!! (Sometimes two, sometimes four exclamation marks). Thus he uses it when W.R. Inge writes:

"Of course the universe contains every kind of evolution and involution, the two processes balancing each other". (11)

Or when H.H. Price writes:

"A sensum has, so to speak, no private nature of its own, but is entirely dependent on the bounty of other things". (12)

The Notation (\\\\) is very difficult to interpret. But it seems to me that Moore uses it as a synonym for the notation (X). This interpretation is suggested by his annotation of an article by C.J. Shebbeare:

"The object may be imaginary. I may see stars because I am struck. But surely what I see is a star, or several stars, not

mere yellowness and evanescence and brightness". (13)

Or again when C.E. M. Joad writes:

"And in saying that he sees it as an end in itself — I mean that he sees it as a combination of significant forms". (14)

However what most inclines me to interpret the notation (\(\mathbb{W}\)) as the same as the notation (X) is that all the complexes into which (X) enters, (\(\mathbb{W}\)) also enters. Thus we find (X? — X No! — X Yes) as well as (\(\mathbb{W}\)? — \(\mathbb{W}\)No! — \(\mathbb{W}\)Yes).

Before I draw my conclusions of this study I would like to give two statistical tables which are drawn from all the material in the Supplementary Volumes which really belong to Moore i.e. from the volumes on which Moore actually commented.

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With the help of these tables and according to our readings of Moore's notation we can notice the followings:–

1. Moore was not interested in topics dealing with pure scientific concepts, such as the concepts of physics psychology or biology.

2. Moore was also disinterested in topics about God, religion or theology. Consequently he was also disinterested in any metaphysics of the sort.

3. Moore was also disinterested in all topics that try to link or relate the subject-matter of ethics to any other fields such as anthropology or psychology.
(4) It is noticeable to see the degree to which Moore was disinterested in the writings of some eminent philosophers of his time like A.N. Whitehead, Wildon Carr, F.C.S. Schiller and R.G. Collingwood.

(5) It can be said that the general style of Moore's comments is somewhat mild. But there are times when it is dogmatic and aggressive. This can be seen in the case of his comments on G.F. Stout, G. Dawes Hicks and John Macmurray where a number of "No"s and "Nonsense"s appears. On the other hand, the most sympathetic style appears in his comments upon philosophers such as C.D. Broad, L.S. Stebbing, J.W. Joseph and John Wisdom.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

(Stars indicate that these works are found to be the most useful or the most relevant to the present study).

I. Moore's writings:

A. Books:


B. Articles:


II. Writings About Moore:

A. Historical:


IV. Critical Expositions:


III. General Works:

A. Analytic:


B. Phenomenological:


C. Philosophical Semantics:


IV. Ethics:


V. Epistemology:


VI. Analysis:


**VII. Miscellaneous:**


