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THE LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PARTY
OF EGYPT
1922 - 1936

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
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
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
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
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PREFACE

The Liberal Constitutional Party, which was founded in 1922, played a major role in shaping Egypt's history till it was banned with other political parties after the Revolution of 1952. With practically no popular following to speak of, this Party was able to hold or share power for a total of four years out of the fourteen years covered by this study. Its offshoot the Sha'ab Party, founded in 1930, held power for three additional years. In spite of that, the Liberal Constitutional Party has received only passing attention on the part of historians.

The following pages will attempt to analyze the aims and principles of the Liberal Constitutional Party as well as its means of attaining power. In the course of that, it will become apparent that the Party did not adhere to its principles. The factors underlying that will also be analyzed and the Party's subsequent policy described.

I am deeply indebted to my adviser Prof. Joseph J. Malone for his advice, help, and encouragement. I am also grateful to Prof. Mahmoud Y. Zayid for helping me choose the subject and for advising me on some of the sources.

CHAPTER ONE
ORIGINS, FORMATION, AIMS

The Liberal Constitutional Party was formed on October 30, 1922, in the wake of a split in the Egyptian nationalist movement. In considering its formation, one is compelled to go far beyond that date and well into the nineteenth century. For the Party represented the cultural attitude and the political interests of the Egyptian landed aristocracy, as distinct from the extremist nationalist movement grounded in the Egyptian middle class.

As such, the roots of the Liberal Constitutional Party go as far back as the reign of Khedive Isma'il Pasha (1863-1879). In the last years of Isma'il's reign, the landowners came to prominence as members of the Consultative Assembly (Majlis Shourah an-Nuwwab) which the Khedive set up in 1866.¹ They played an important, if indecisive, role in the events preceding the British occupation of Egypt.² In general, they stood for restrictions on the Khedive's absolute authority, limited constitutional reforms, opposition to military and wider public interference in politics, and opposition to the growth of foreign influence.³

¹ The first clear sign of the Assembly's opposition to the Khedive's absolute rule did not appear till 1876. J.M. Landau, Parliaments and Parties in Egypt (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954) pp. 19-21.

² Ibid., pp. 86-91.

³ Ibid., pp. 23-27, 30 ff.
N. Safran, Egypt in Search of a Political Community; an analysis of the intellectual and political evolution of Egypt, 1804-1952 (Harvard Middle Eastern Studies, 5; Harvard Political Studies; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961) pp. 46-48.

As yet, the principles which members of the Assembly stood for were rudimentary and simple. In the following years, they received extensive consideration by a group of young thinkers who were under various degrees of Western influence. A school of thought gradually developed including among its adherents many members of the landowning families. Abdul Aziz Fahmi, Sa'd Zaghloul, Ahmad Lutfi as-Sayyid, Mahmoud Suleiman, Mohammad Mahmoud, Ali Sha'rawi, and Hasan Abdul Raziq were among its leaders. Taha Hussein and Mohammad Hussein Haykal were later, and younger adherents to it. Many of these men were disciples or friends of the great Moslem reformer Sheikh Mohammad Abdo; their ideas exhibited the influence of his thought in his post-revolutionary stage. In particular, they acquired his great dislike of violence and the use of force in political matters. Like him, they were suspicious of revolution as a means of changing government; they believed in the necessity of educating the people and building up their character in order to prepare them to assume their political rights and responsibilities.

Prompted by the growth of the extremist nationalist movement, and encouraged by Lord Cromer,¹ these men founded in 1907 the Umma Party. The newspaper al-Jaridah, which had appeared a few months earlier under the management of Lutfi as-Sayyid, became the organ of their Party. Their principles and aims continued to carry the strong imprint of Mohammad Abdo's ideas. They advocated constitutional government. But they believed that democracy should be attained by the gradual extension of the powers of the Legislative Assembly and local councils. Their emphasis was on the necessity

¹ M.Y. Zayid, Egypt's Struggle for Independence (Beirut: Khayats, 1965) p. 59.

of transforming Egyptian society by means of education. The reform of the school system occupied an important position in their program. They objected to the British occupation in principle, but regarded it as a restraining influence on the Khedive. They believed that by cooperating intelligently with the British authorities, solid reforms could be implemented which would prepare Egypt for eventual independence. The main issues in question in their conflict with Mustapha Kamil's National Party was the latter's militancy, its alliance with Khedive Abbas II, and its reliance on foreign powers in pushing forward the claim for British evacuation.¹

In the decade preceding World War I, the Umma Party failed to win widespread public support. Many Egyptians regarded its leaders as collaborators with the British authorities;² and for a while, the National Party continued to command a greater public. In time, this situation changed. The failure of Lord Cromer's successors to cooperate with the Umma Party estranged the latter from the British authorities. Meanwhile, the National Party had been steadily losing its hold over its followers. Mustapha Kamil's death in 1908 had plunged it into a leadership crisis which was to reduce it to a mere shadow. In the Legislative Assembly elections of 1913, it had to back Sa'd Zaghloul in order to buttress its strength.

¹ On the aims and principles of the Umma Party, see: J.M. Ahmad, The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism (Middle Eastern Monographs, III; London: Oxford University Press, 1960) p. 10. M.Y. Zayid, "Origins of the Liberal Constitutional Party in Egypt" (Unpublished) p. 10. Landau, op. cit., pp. 139-40.

² Zayid, Egypt's Struggle, p. 60.

Zaghloul, although not officially a member of the Umma Party, was strongly affiliated with it.¹ During World War I, the Party dissolved itself, but its members did not remain completely inactive. The developments preceding the war had combined to place them at the head of events. The National Party tried to reassert its independence after the war, but by that time, leadership of the nationalist movement had passed completely into the hands of the moderates.

As World War I drew to an end, several Egyptian nationalists decided to reopen the Egyptian Question and demand complete independence for the country. This decision was the result of many discussions in which members of the Legislative Assembly took part. Zaghloul played a major role from the outset and was recognized as the leader of the movement.² Almost all the founders of the Umma Party joined him. The Prime Minister Hussein Rushdi Pasha and the Minister of Education Adli Yeghen Pasha cooperated, and Sultan Fu'ad gave the nationalists his blessing.

¹ Safran, op. cit., p. 91.

² Zaghloul was actually the most qualified candidate for the leadership of the nationalist movement. He had already distinguished himself as a statesman, had served as the elected wakil of the Legislative Assembly, and had commanded the backing of the two contending political parties. But for some reason, his collaborators tried to avoid promoting him to a position of leadership. However, Mohammad Mahmoud, whose father was a close friend of Zaghloul's, was able by a masterly maneuver to force the other members of the movement to accept Zaghloul's leadership. A.A. Fahmi, Hadhih Hayati (Memoirs) (Kitab al-Hilal; Cairo: Dar al-Hilal, 1963) pp. 83-84.

From that, it may be reasonably induced that Mahmoud was simply trying to ameliorate his position in the movement, relying on his connection with Zaghloul.

The outcome of all this was the creation of the Egyptian Wafd.¹ The plan was that a delegation consisting of Zaghoul and two other members of the Assembly would present the nationalists' terms to the High Commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate. Should that fail, Adli and Rushdi would proceed to London in their official capacity, and make the best possible settlement of the Egyptian Question within the framework of the Protectorate.²

The claims of the Wafd were at first steeped in moderation. In return for independence, it was willing to concede to Britain the right to reoccupy the Canal Zone when necessary, and the right to supervise the Egyptian economy through the agency of the British Financial Adviser.³ The question of the Sudan was not included, probably because the nationalists felt that it would complicate matters and reduce Egypt's chances of obtaining a satis-

¹ On the formation of the Wafd, see:

Ibid., pp. 72-76.

A. Beeli, Adli Basha wa Safhah min Tarikh az-Za'amah bi Misr (Adli Pasha or a Page of the History of Leadership in Egypt) (N.p.: n.p., n.d) pp. 108-13.

A.M. al-Aqqad, Sa'd Zaghoul; Sirah wa Tahiyah (Biography of Sa'd Zaghoul) (Cairo: Matba'at Hijazi, 1936) pp. 191-96, 257-58.

A. Shafiq, Hawliyyat Misr as-Siyasiyyah; Tamhid (Egypt's Political Annals; Introduction) (Cairo: Matba'at Shafiq Basha, 1926-28) I, pp. 144-51.

² Ibid., p. 176.

³ These terms were submitted by Zaghoul and two of his collaborators to Wingate in the famous interview on Nov. 13, 1918. A.R. ar-Rafi'i, Thawrat Sanat 1919; Tarikh Misr al-Qawmi min Sanat 1914 ita Sanat 1921 (The Revolution of 1919; Egypt's National History 1914-1921) (Cairo: Matba'at Nahdat Misr, 1946) pp. 70-72.

factory settlement. Moreover, it does not seem that at this stage the nationalists intended to carry matters as far as the Peace Conference.¹

This plan was put into effect on November 13, 1918, but achieved nothing. The British Government neither considered the Wafd's terms nor permitted Adli and Rushdi to go to London. The result was that Zaghoul adopted a more outspoken attitude. To the original delegation, he added other nationalists. A mandate was obtained from the people by means of a "Charter of Representation" which was circulated around the country for popular endorsement. All Zaghoul's efforts were now calculated to arouse public feelings and attract the attention of the Western governments. On December 6, 1918, he addressed a Memorandum to the foreign representatives in Egypt.² A return to the earlier international control of the Debt Commission was demanded. No mention was made of giving Britain the right of re-entry. Instead, the Memorandum promised to respect the Capitulations and guarantee the freedom of passage through the Suez Canal. In essence, the Memorandum reiterated the National Party's claim that the Egyptian Question belonged to the realm

¹ According to all accounts, when the three-man delegation headed by Zaghoul submitted the nationalists' terms to Wingate on Nov. 13, 1918, they demanded permission to go to London to discuss the Egyptian Question with British politicians, and they assured him that they wished to settle the Question within the scope of Anglo-Egyptian relations.

Ibid.

Fahmi, op. cit., p. 81.

al-Aqqad, op. cit., pp. 199, 201-201.

This remained the case till late Dec., 1918.

² "Memorandum to the Foreign Representatives in Egypt", quoted in: Shafiq, Tamhid, I, pp. 166-70.

of international politics. In January, 1919, Zaghoul made yet another departure from the Wafd's original plan by declaring that what he demanded for Egypt applied also to the Sudan.¹

Public response to this campaign was tremendous. Zaghoul became the confirmed hero of the masses, and the Wafd gained general acclaim. It is doubtful if Adli and his close collaborators approved of these developments. But the actual members of the Wafd tagged dutifully behind Zaghoul. It became all but impossible for the Wafd to return to a negotiable position. The Revolution of 1919, which was touched off by Zaghoul's deportation to Malta, ruled out any possibility of settling the Egyptian Question within the framework of the Protectorate. The unexpected turn of events had completely disrupted the Wafd's early plan. Thus, when Zaghoul was released and permitted freedom of travel with the Wafd, the only course left open to him was to go to Paris and address himself to the Peace Conference.

It is difficult to say how much the Wafd expected to achieve at the Peace Conference. Zaghoul argued that the Protectorate was invalid, and he apparently hoped to administer a blow to it by persuading the Conference to recognize Egypt's independence.² But shortly after the Wafd had arrived in Paris (April 1919) their hopes were shattered. The Conference refused to give them a hearing, and the Powers, one after the other, gave recognition to the status quo in Egypt. In view of this attitude, it was pointless to insist on

¹ Ibid., I, p. 208.

² Zayid, "Origins", p. 18.

the international aspect of the Egyptian Question. A few Wafdists recognized the necessity of returning to the original plan of settling the Question by negotiations with the British Government. Among the first to voice this feeling openly was Isma'il Sidqi,¹ a politician of marked ability who, given the time, could have swayed other members of the Wafd. But Zaghoul was able to overrule this suggestion,² and Sidqi was ousted from the Wafd in July, 1919.

In the meantime, the British Government had recognized the necessity of granting Egypt some form of self-rule. On December 7, 1919, the Milner Commission arrived in Egypt for the purpose of reporting on the causes of the disturbances and recommending a settlement of the Egyptian Question within the framework of the Protectorate.³ Upon his arrival in Egypt, Milner explained his mission in terms which were calculated to appease Egyptian nationalists, but which in reality did not conform to the Commission's original terms of reference.⁴ The leading nationalists who were still in Egypt at that time were Adli, Rushdi, and their close collaborator Abdul Khaliq Tharwat. These three politicians had never lost sight of the Wafd's original

¹ Mahmoud Abul Nasir to Zaghoul, June 30, 1919, quoted in: M. Anis (ed.) Dirasat fi Watha'iq Thawrat 1919 (Studies on the Documents of the Revolution of 1919) I, "al-Murasalat as-Siriyyah Bayn Sa'd Zaghoul wa Abdul Rahman Fahmi" (The Secret Correspondence Between Sa'd Zaghoul and Abdul Rahman Fahmi) (Cairo: Maktabat al-Anglo al-Misriyyah, 1963) pp. 282-86.

² Shafiq, Tamhid, I, pp. 433-34.
M. Abul Fatih, Ma' al-Wafd al-Misri (With the Egyptian Wafd) (N.p.: n.p., n.d.) pp. 147-51.

³ Zayid, Egypt's Struggle, p. 90.

⁴ G. Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer (London: MacMillan and Co., 1933-34) I, pp. 14-15.

plan. In their opinion, the impasse could best be overcome by negotiations between the Wafd and the Commission.¹ They worked for three months to lay the ground for such a meeting.²

However, the trend of previous events had rendered a moderate course of action difficult. Early in 1919, Zaghoul had entrusted Abdul Rahman Fahmi with the formation of a Secret Organization which would act as the Wafd's military arm. In March of the same year, the embryo of a party hierarchy was created in the form of the Wafd Central Committee. Gradually, a Wafdist hierarchy was formed emanating from the Central Committee and the Secret Organization and extending throughout the country.³ All through 1919, the Committee was in charge of the home front. It was entrusted with the task of collecting revenues for the Wafd, transmitting the Wafd's orders to the people, carrying on agitation, and keeping the Wafd in Paris informed about the situation in Egypt. The very dynamic nature of its task imposed upon it the necessity of depending on students and young men of the middle class. By being in close contact with the public, it was intimately aware of the currents underlying public opinion and under strong pressure to give them satisfaction. In short, the Central Committee found itself surrounded by a public which, two decades earlier, would have been more at home with the

¹ Abdul Rahman Fahmi to Zaghoul, Jan. 7, 1920, quoted in: Anis, op. cit., I, pp. 169-73.
al-Aqqad, op. cit., pp. 292-93.

² Shafiq, Tamhid, I, pp. 621-23, 628-32.

³ Zayid, "Origins", p. 20.

National Party; a public that was more irreconcilable to the British Occupation than the designated members of the Wafd.¹

As a result, the Wafd represented at that time the union of two opposite elements: a predominantly moderate leadership and an extremist following. The disparity could best be demonstrated by their respective attitudes to the Milner Commission. By the end of 1920, the majority of the Wafd in Paris were reconciled to the necessity of negotiating with the Commission.² But the Central Committee remained opposed to the idea except if Egypt were given guarantees that the negotiations would result in complete independence.³ Zaghoul's attitude was at first ambiguous, though every now and then he gave indications that he was readily influenced by the Central Committee. However, a semblance of unity was maintained until Adli succeeded in arranging for the Wafd-Milner negotiations.

¹ The influence of Egyptian public opinion often caused the Central Committee to depart from the Wafd's instructions.

The Wafd to Abdul Rahman Fahmi, Report No. 9, n.d., quoted in: Anis, op. cit., I, pp. 97-99.

Abdul Rahman Fahmi to Zaghoul, Feb. 25, 1920, quoted in: Ibid., pp. 191-95.

² Ali Mahir to Abdul Rahman Fahmi, Jan. 28, 1920, quoted in: Ibid., pp. 248-49.

Kamil Salim to Abdul Rahman Fahmi, Ap. 10, 1920, quoted in: Ibid., pp. 272-73.

Fahmi, op. cit., pp. 96-97, 100-101.

al-Aqqad, op. cit., pp. 209-11.

³ The Wafd to Abdul Rahman Fahmi, Report No. 18, Ap. 18, 1920, quoted in: Anis, op. cit., I, pp. 108-11.

Abdul Rahman Fahmi to Zaghoul, Aug. 10, 1919, quoted in: Ibid., pp. 120-23.

Abdul Rahman Fahmi to Zaghoul, Jan. 7, 1920, quoted in: Ibid., pp. 169-73.

The Wafd-Milner negotiations took place in London in July and August 1920. They were informal talks with the purpose of setting down proposals which would serve as the basis of future treaty negotiations. As the talks progressed, a rift between the moderates and the extremists became apparent. Adli, supported by the majority, was in favor of accepting Milner's proposals. Zaghoul and a few other members felt that those did not meet with Egypt's aspirations.¹ To avoid an open rupture, the Wafd dispatched four of its members to Egypt to submit Milner's proposals to the people and sound their reactions. The outcome of this consultation was summed up in thirteen points which the Wafd presented to Milner as "Reservations" on the latter's proposals. Thus ended the first Anglo-Egyptian negotiations.²

At this point the British Government decided to carry the negotiations to the official level. On February 25, 1921, it informed Sultan Fu'ad that the "status of the Protectorate was not a satisfactory relation" and invited him to nominate an official delegation to negotiate an agreement. By declaring that the Protectorate was not satisfactory, the British Government was conceding to Egypt the minimum grounds acceptable for negotiations.

The Sultan entrusted Adli with the task of forming a cabinet and conducting negotiations. This brought matters to a head, deepening the cleavage within the Wafd. A little earlier, the Wafdist majority had suggested to Zaghoul nominating Adli for the formation of a cabinet which would receive

¹ Zayid, Egypt's Struggle, pp. 95-96.

² For the Wafd-Milner negotiations, see: Appendix IV.

the Wafd's backing, but Zaghoul had rejected the idea.¹ Now that Adli formed the cabinet, the Wafd was forced to define its attitude publicly. Renewed attempts to conciliate Adli and Zaghoul met with failure. On April 25, 1921, Zaghoul condemned Adli in a public speech.² Three days later, Ali Sha'rawi Pasha resigned from the Wafd. Zaghoul subsequently expelled five other members, Mohammad Mahmoud, Abdul Latif Makbati, Ahmad Lutfi as-Sayyid, and Hamad al-Basil.³ Added to the earlier resignations, the Wafd had by now lost most of its original members. Those who departed from it gave their support to Adli, while the Central Committee remained loyal to Zaghoul. The Wafd's campaign against Adli and the cabinet was so successful that Adli soon found himself isolated on the popular level.

The Adli-Curzon negotiations lasted intermitently throughout the summer and early fall of 1921. They were destined from the beginning to fail. Adli was under fire from public opinion at home, and consequently was in no position to make substantial concessions to the British demands. He terminated the negotiations on November 15th and returned to Egypt empty-handed.⁴

During his absence, new developments had been taking place in Egypt. A group of Adli's supporters were actively making plans for the formation of a new political party which would embody the ideas of the moderate nationalists.⁵

¹ Shafiq, Tamhid, I, pp. 850-51.

² The relevant passages quoted in: Ibid., II, pp. 61-69.

³ Later, Hamad al-Basil returned to his leading position in the Wafd.

⁴ For the Adli-Curzon negotiations, see: Appendix IV.

⁵ This was what later became the Liberal Constitutional Party.

Chief among them were the former Wafdists Lutfi as-Sayyid and Isma'il Sidqi, and Adli's collaborator Abdul Khaliq Tharwat. One of the aims of the projected party was to coordinate all the anti-Zaghloulist factions. Adli was therefore the person most likely to be chosen as president of the party. Tharwat communicated this point to Adli while the latter was still in London. But Adli postponed a decision upon the matter.¹

By then, the High Commissioner, Lord Allenby, had become convinced that the situation in Egypt would not improve as long as the Protectorate was maintained. Consequently, he advised his government on December 6, 1921, to abolish the Protectorate by a unilateral declaration.² Tharwat, Sidqi, and Adli were to a large extent responsible for Allenby's attitude.³ The British Government did not favor the idea at first. In the meantime, Adli had arrived in Egypt and tendered his resignation. Simultaneously, the British Government deported Zaghloul for the second time, a measure which Prime Minister Lloyd George had hinted at in the course of the Adli-Curzon negotiations.⁴

¹ Shafiq, Tamhid, II, pp. 621-22.

² Allenby to Curzon, Dec. 6, 1921, quoted in: al-Kitab al-Abyad al-Inglizi (The English White Book) tr. Abdul Qadir al-Mazini (Cairo: Matba'at Sa'udi, 1922) p. 9.

³ M.H. Haykal, Tarajim Misriyyah wa Gharbiyyah (Biographies of Egyptian and Western Personages) (Cairo: Matba'at Misr, n.d.) p. 206. Abdul Aziz Fahmi in a public speech, Feb. 27, 1925, quoted in: A. Shafiq, Hawliyyat Misr as-Siyasiyyah (Egypt's Political Annals) (Cairo: Matba'at Shafiq Basha, 1928-31) II, p. 251.

According to Zaghloul, Adli had suggested the idea of a unilateral declaration of independence to Lord Milner as early as Feb., 1920. Zaghloul in a public speech, Dec. 23, 1923, quoted in: Ibid., I, p. 3.

⁴ U.A.R., al-Qadiyyah al-Misriyyah, 1882-1954 (The Egyptian Question) (Cairo: al-Matba'at al-Amiriyyah, 1955) pp. 185-86.

that an appointed committee of homogeneous membership would serve the purpose more adequately.¹ The Wafd and the National Party declined his invitation to take part in the Committee. Consequently, most of the Committee members were appointed from Adli's supporters. In effect, the projected pro-Adli party played the major role in moulding the constitution.

Efforts for the formation of the Liberal Constitutional Party continued throughout the winter, spring, and summer of 1922. After some hesitation, Adli consented to be its president. The Party was formally inaugurated on October 30, 1922. Its newspaper, as-Siyasah, appeared on the same day. It is worth noting that three of the Party's most active architects did not join it. These were Lutfi as-Sayyid, Tharwat, and Isma'il Sidqi. as-Sayyid's decision to remain outside the Party was understandable in view of his eventual withdrawal from active political life. Nevertheless, he continued to identify himself with the Party and contribute to its policy making.² In the case of Tharwat and Sidqi, it appears that Mohammad Mahmoud -- another of the Party's founders -- refused to cooperate with them, and thus forced them to remain outside the Party.³ However, for the rest of his life, Tharwat continued to exercise a great influence on the Party; and Sidqi identified himself so closely with it that he was considered by all to be one of its members.⁴

¹ Tharwat's speech at the opening session of the Committee, quoted in: Shafiq, Tamhid, III, p. 155.

² Lutfi as-Sayyid referred to himself as member of the Party at least on one public occasion, May 13, 1930. Shafiq, Hawliyyat, VII, pp. 627-34.

³ M.H. Haykal, Mudhakkarat fi al-Siyasah al-Misriyyah (Memoirs) (Cairo: Maktabat an-Nahdah al-Misriyyah, 1951-53) p. 145.

⁴ Interview with Ahmad Pasha Abdul Ghaffar (former member of the Liberal Constitutional Party, former member of the Egyptian Parliament, former minister; al-Ma'adi, U.A.R.: March, 1967), Appendix II.

Under those circumstances, Sultan Fu'ad was unable to find a successor to Adli. Tharwat was willing to form the new cabinet provided the British Government conceded two points to Egypt; namely, independence and the reinstatement of the foreign ministry.¹ Allenby pressed his government to accept these terms, and was finally able to obtain their approval. The Declaration of Independence was communicated to Sultan Fu'ad on February 28, 1922. The following day, Tharwat Pasha formed his cabinet.

The Declaration of February 28, recognized Egypt's independence and sovereignty.² However, it stated that pending the conclusion of an agreement, the British Government reserved to itself freedom of action with regard to four points. These were, the defense of Britain's imperial routes, the defense of Egypt against foreign aggression, the protection of the minorities and foreign interests in Egypt, and the Sudan. In effect, Egypt's independence was a legal fiction. But the Declaration had one definite merit. It allowed the Egyptian Government to evolve a constitution and adopt a representative form of government. This eventually helped to restore order to the country since it offered the Wafd a legal channel through which it could conduct its activities.

One of the major points on Tharwat's program was the promulgation of a constitution and an electoral law. In view of the Adli-Zaghloul dispute he decided against calling for the election of a constituent assembly. He felt

¹ Allenby to Curzon, Dec. 12, 1922, quoted in: al-Kitab al-Abyad al-Inglizi, pp. 14-15.

² For the text of the Declaration of Independence, see: Appendix III.

Coming into existence in the events outlined above, the Party was bound to be permanently stamped by them. Its nature and the immediate causes of its formation were political rather than ideological. One could go as far as saying that its aims were in general the same as those of the Wafd. They only differed in matters of tactics, and still more important, in matters of personal interests. It is therefore useless to speak about the principles of the Party without analyzing the motives and attitudes of its members.

The backbone of the Party were former members of the Umma Party and former members of the Legislative Assembly. They were politicians who supported Adli in his dispute against Zaghloul. Many of them were former Wafdists who had withdrawn their support from Zaghloul, feeling that the Wafd had strayed from its original course. Socially, most of them came from important landowning families. In effect, the Party represented a powerful class which had two basic interests; namely, to limit the King's authority, and minimize the influence of the masses on politics. The influence of the masses seemed to be embodied in the Wafd. Therefore, the Liberal Constitutional Party transferred to the Wafd all the hostility which the Umma Party had exhibited against the National Party.

The Party was western-oriented. Its members identified progress with Westernization. This was particularly true of a group of younger members who received their higher education in European universities. A number of those had formed the Democratic Party in 1918 with principles similar to those of the Umma Party. Among them were Taha Hussein, Mahmoud Azmi, Mustapha Abdul Raziq, and Mohammad Hussein Haykal. All of these had at an earlier date been associated with al-Jarida and its managing director,

Lutfi as-Sayyid. After the termination of the Wafd-Milner negotiations, the Democratic Party identified itself with the Adlists. In due course, Lutfi as-Sayyid recommended Haykal for the position of editor-in-chief of as-Siyasah. When Haykal accepted the offer, most of his friends moved along with him and joined the Liberal Constitutional Party. Taha Hussein and Mahmoud Azmi became assistant editors of as-Siyasah and its weekly supplement as-Siyasah al-Usubu'iyah which appeared in 1926. Taha Hussein deserted the Party at a later date, but he never lost touch with as-Siyasah.

Haykal provides a clear picture of some of those younger members. They were idealistic, and they tried to carry their idealism into the realm of politics. They were influenced by the liberal philosophies of the West, and had a great faith in science, reason, and education.¹ They felt that their education entitled them to a special role in leading the masses.²

But in some cases, their understanding of the West was shallow. Many Western precepts were incorporated without due assimilation. In time, this manifested itself in a marked divergence between the Party's declared aims and its actual policy.

The declared principles of the Liberal Constitutional Party were:³ to achieve complete independence for Egypt and the evacuation of the British forces; to preserve the Constitution and promote representative government; and to defend Egypt's rights in and sovereignty over the Sudan.

¹ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, p. 170.

² M. Zayid, "Nash'at Hizb al-Ahrar ad-Dusturiyoun fi Misr, 1922-1924" (Rise of the Liberal Constitutional Party in Egypt, 1922-1924) al-Abhath, XVI, 1 (Dec., 1963) p. 38.

³ See the Charter of Principles of the Party in: Appendix I.

The Party believed that independence and evacuation should be obtained solely by negotiations with the British Government. It is true that one of the declared principles was to work for Egypt's admission to the League of Nations. But that was partly to satisfy the Egyptians' national pride, and partly for the sake of the social and cultural benefits which would accrue from belonging to the League. The Party never entertained the idea of having recourse to the League to solve the Egyptian Question; and they did not believe that such an attempt would be fruitful.¹

The Wafd-Milner negotiations had demonstrated that the Liberal Constitutional Party was more conciliatory to Britain than the Wafd. But it is impossible to determine exactly what were the minimum terms acceptable to it. Milner's proposals do not shed much light on this point because they were not binding and were only intended as a basis for further negotiations. In subsequent negotiations, the Wafd set a certain standard of demands which the Liberal Constitutional Party was forced to match. However, from reading as-Siyasah and its weekly supplement as-Siyasah al-Ushbu'iyah, it seems that the Party's main concern was the abolishment of the Capitulations.² In view of that, it is possible that the Party was willing to waive some of the nationalists' demands for the sake of putting a speedy end to the Capitulations.

One of the motives behind the formation of the Liberal Constitutional Party was to help Tharwat introduce and promote the regime which arose from the Unilateral Declaration of Independence. The Party believed that the

¹ "Awd al-Hayat an-Niyabiyyah" (The Return of Parliamentary Life) as-Siyasah al-Ushbu'iyah, I, 15 (June 19, 1926) p. 8.

² Ibid.

Declaration was an important step towards attaining complete independence; they regarded it as a point of departure for the solution of the Egyptian Question.¹ Nevertheless, the Party's Charter did not admit that the Declaration was binding for Egypt.²

The Party hoped that the introduction of representative government in Egypt would tend to regulate the relations among the several political factions and reduce the influence of the masses on politics. The Constitution and the Electoral Law were moulded in such a way that they would tend to consolidate the political power of the oligarchic element. Haykal made it clear that the Electoral Law -- providing as it did for two-stage elections -- was deliberately designed to circumvent the influence of the lower classes on elections;³ and the Party held the optimistic belief that the elections would turn out to their benefit.⁴ They were well aware that Egyptian political parties were still lacking in indoctrination and that they were very faintly differentiated.⁵ They hoped that as a consequence allegiances would be easily transferred, and that the Liberal Constitutional Party would fare all the better for that. The

¹ Adli's speech at the inauguration of the Liberal Constitutional Party, quoted in: as-Siyasah, I, 1 (Oct. 30, 1922) p. 1.

H. ash-Shaykhah, "Ba'd Bayan Hizb al-Ahrar ad-Dusturiyoun" (After the Liberal Constitutional Party's Proclamation) Ibid., I, 3 (Nov. 1, 1922) p. 2.

² Article I, paragraph C of the Charter of Principles.

³ M.H. Haykal, "Mashrou' Lijnat ad-Dustour" (The Constitution Committees Draft) as-Siyasah, I, 16 (Nov. 16, 1922) p. 1.

⁴ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, p. 169.

⁵ Haykal, "Mashrou' Lijnat ad-Dustour", loc. cit.

limitations imposed by the Electoral Law would ensure the election of a homogeneous parliament from the socio-economic aspect. In such case, the Liberals believed, class interests would overcome the differences between them and their adversaries.¹

It should not be inferred that the Party had a purely ulterior interest in the constitution. Many of its members had a deep, if sometimes naive faith in democratic principles. These were mainly the more idealistic members of the Party. The leading articles of *as-Siyasah* reflected these views frequently throughout 1923 and part of 1924. In a typical article, Haykal stated that once the Constitution was implemented and Parliament elected, many of the problems facing Egypt would be quickly solved. So far, he stated, no Egyptian cabinet had rested on a sufficiently strong public support to enable it to take drastic measures concerning national issues. But once a representative cabinet came into power, it would not only be able to solve the problems pending between Egypt and Britain, but would also be able to assume the full responsibilities and privileges which had devolved upon Egypt as a result of its becoming an independent state.²

One of the aims of the Party was to set limitations on the authority of the King. The draft constitution drawn by the Constitution Committee went a long way towards doing that. It introduced the concept of cabinet responsibility and made parliament and the cabinet share most of the King's pre-

¹ "Fi Midan al-Intikhab" (In the Field of Elections) *as-Siyasah*, I, 169 (May 13, 1923) p. 1.

² M.H. Haykal, "Sabab al-Fashal fi al-Madi wa Wasilat at-Tama'aninah fi al-Mustaqbal" (Reason of Failure in the Past and the Way for Ease in the Future) *Ibid.*, I, 58 (Jan. 4, 1923) p. 1.

rogatives. Moreover, the Party seemed to tolerate nothing which would give the King an opportunity to interfere in politics. One such possibility was the King's control over the religious schools and religious endowments. This was a very strong weapon because it enabled the King, whenever he wished, to tip the ulema and students of the religious schools against an undesirable cabinet.¹ Partly for this reason, the Party included provisions in the draft constitution which placed the religious schools and religious endowments under the control of the appropriate ministry.²

Similarly, the Liberal Constitutional Party was determined to frustrate King Fu'ad's attempt to aggrandize himself by obtaining the office of Caliph. When the question arose in 1925, Sheikh Ali Abdul Raziq, whose family was one of the pillars of the Party, published a book in which he shed doubts on the religious foundations of the Caliphate.³ Though the author may not have had ulterior motives behind publishing the book at that time, his thesis expressed the general view of the Party on the matter, and other members of the Party propounded similar views, though in a less provocative manner. Numerous articles appeared in as-Siyasah criticizing the Cairo Conference on

¹ "Harakat al-Azhar: Ghayataha al-Khafiyyah wa Aghradaha al-Haqiqiyah" (Loosely: The Real Cause Behind the Rebellion in al-Azhar) as-Siyasah al-Usubu'iyah, I, 48 (Feb. 5, 1927) p. 16.

A.R. ar-Rafi'i, Fi A'qab ath-Thawrah al-Misriyyah (In the Aftermath of the Egyptian Revolution) (Cairo: Maktabat an-Nahdah al-Misriyyah, 1947-51) I, pp. 179-81.

² Open letter from Abdul Aziz Fahmi Bey to Yahia Ibrahim Pasha, Mar. 16, 1923, quoted in: Shafiq, Tamhid, III, p. 471.

³ A. Abdul Raziq, al-Islam wa Usul al-Hikm (Islam and the Principles of Government) (Cairo: Matba'at Misr, 1925).

the Caliphate,¹ and it was maintained that the King's right to assume the title was subject to parliamentary approval.²

The Party's position on religious matters was not only due to its desire to limit the King's power. Secular tendencies, the desire to revive and modernize Islam and reform the religious schools, were also influential, particularly among younger members of the Party.

Some of those young members were aware of the necessity of restating Islamic doctrine and defining its attitude towards modernization. They believed that that should be attempted by subjecting the bare principles of Islam to a critical, rational study.

Ali Abdul Raziq applied this method in his book on the Caliphate. He attempted to study the principles of government which had been evolved by the Qoran and the practices of the Prophet. His conclusion was that the Qoran and the Prophet's Sira had not evolved any system of government. References to the Caliphate in the Qoran were vague and by no means binding. The political innovations introduced by the Prophet were incidental to his moral Message, and did not occupy an essential position in his function as a religious Prophet. The institution of the Caliphate was not only uncalled for by Islam, but had also proved to be of more harm than good to Islam and the Moslems.

Taha Hussein's book Fi ash-Shi'r al-Jahili (On Pre-Islamic Poetry) published at about the same time, was still more outspoken than Abdul Raziq's.

¹ For example: "Mu'tamar al-Khilafah" (The Caliphate Conference) as-Siyasah al-Ushbu'iyah, I, 11 (May 22, 1926) p. 8.

² as-Siyasah, Feb. 2, 1926, quoted in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, III, p. 107.

Here was a writer who did not content himself with a revision of Islamic precepts and beliefs in the light of reason, but proceeded with unprecedented boldness to flout the very foundations of the faith by stating that reason has the right to question the truthfulness of the Qoran.¹

To reinterpret Islam was not enough. It was also necessary to define Islam's attitude to modern civilization. Such writers were hampered by contradictions inherent in the compulsion to defend Islam and prove that it could serve -- perhaps better than any other religion -- as a spiritual basis for a Westernized society. Moreover, their superficial understanding of Western civilization led them to the belief that it was only necessary to reconcile Islamic principles with the principles of the positive sciences. Some, like Haykal, tried to avoid the issue by denying that religion and the positive sciences were incompatible. Influenced by Comtist theory, he tried to show that each of religion and science had its own sphere which in no way conflicted with the other. Whatever conflict occurred between the two was only a conflict for political power between men of religion and scientists.²

Taha Hussein was more objective in his approach. He recognized that religion and science were incompatible. But he also admitted that both of them were indispensable to the human being. The only solution, in his

¹ Ahmad, op. cit., p. 119.

² M.H. Haykal, "ad-Din wa al-Ilm wa Rijal ad-Din wa Rijal al-Ilm" (Religion and Science; Men of Religion and Scientists) as-Siyasah al-Ushbu'iyah, I, 14 (June 12, 1926) pp. 1, 8; and, I, 17 (July 3, 1926) p. 5.

opinion, was to accept the dichotomy and resolve the tension by excluding one from the sphere of the other.¹

The Party's desire to limit the authority of the King, its belief in the importance of education, and its views on religion, caused it to take an interest in reforming the religious schools, particularly al-Azhar. It is difficult to ascertain the length to which the Party hoped to go, as most of the articles in as-Siyasah about this matter were written by non-members. But if these articles are taken to represent the Party's views, then the projected reforms would have been revolutionary.² The idea was to bring the lower schools into harmony with the public school system either by outright incorporation, or by radical reorientation. With regard to al-Azhar, the Party desired to transform it into a modern theological seminary, with the hope of graduating ulema and preachers who had a more comprehensive and modernistic understanding of Islamic religion. For this purpose, a radical reform of the textbooks and reading materials was suggested. Similarly, a widening of the curriculum was envisaged in order to include such subjects as Greek and Hindu philosophy, international law, and history of non-Moslem nations.

¹ T. Hussein, "al-Ilm wa ad-Din" (Science and Religion) Ibid., I, 19 (July 17, 1926) p. 5.

² For example:
 M. al-Ghamrawi, "Islah al-Azhar: Kaif Yajib an Yakun" (Loosely: How to reform al-Azhar) Ibid., III, 111 (Ap. 21, 1928) pp. 22-23.
 H. al-Idrisi, "Uslub at-Ta'lif fi al-Ulum al-Azhariyyah Yajib an Yatanwaluh Barnamaj al-Islah al-Jadid" (Loosely: Reform Should Include the Method of Writing and Research in al-Azhar) Ibid., III, 143 (Dec. 1, 1928) p. 19.

The Party's policy of educational reform was not limited to the religious schools. One of its declared principles was to promote education in general and abolish illiteracy.¹ This was one of the few non-political principles which the Party tried to fulfill. It found expression in many articles in as-Siyasah and in the interest which some Party members took in the Egyptian University.

Some attention was given to agricultural and professional education.² It was recognized that such schools could enhance agriculture, industry, and local crafts. But on the whole, most of the attention was given to the ordinary school system, and specially to the higher institutions. This could be explained on the ground that those members who interested themselves in educational issues were not experts. They were social reformers who hoped to modernize society by means of education. Their experience of Western educational institutions was in most cases limited to the university. Consequently, they concentrated their efforts on that level.

Some members of the Party, like Mahmoud Azmi, hoped to see the Egyptian University develop into an important center of Oriental studies. Many improvements in the curricula and organization were suggested, mostly on Western lines.³ Others, like Taha Hussein, were more interested in the public administration and the organization of education. Many reforms were

¹ Article VII of the Charter of Principles.

² For example: "at-Ta'lim wa Mawaridana al-Iqtisadiyyah" (Education and Our Economic Resources) as-Siyasah al-Usbu'iyah, III, 121 (June 30, 1928) p.22.

³ For example: M. Azmi, "Dhuruf Insha' al-Jami'ah wa Aghradaha" (Rise of the University and Its Aims) Ibid., I, 51 (Feb. 26, 1927) pp. 17-19.

demanded. But the emphasis was on two points: the necessity of enlisting experts and specialists in autonomous and specialized committees within the Ministry of Education; and the necessity of granting more autonomy to the institutes of higher education.¹

The Party's desire to limit the government's control over education was not an isolated principle. It was an implication of their belief in private initiative.² The same tendency appeared in other matters. The Party's Charter contained some articles pertaining to economic and social matters. But none presented any concrete proposals for a basic change in the country's economic and social structure. Much importance was placed on private enterprise. For instance, although the Party wished to see agricultural co-operatives flourish³ yet it envisaged achievement of that goal by the individual effort of the peasant, without the help of the government or the more wealthy population.⁴

With the deterioration of the economy in the 1920's, as-Siyasah had to take a greater interest in economic matters and the social evils arising from them. Attempts were made to analyze the economic problems and their causes.

¹ For example:

T. Hussein, "Fi Wizarat al-Ma'arif; Tandhim at-Ta'lim" (Loosely: The Ministry of Education and the Organization of Education) as-Siyasah, I, 276 (Sep. 18, 1923) p. 5; and, I, 278 (Sep. 20, 1923) p. 1.

Azmi, loc. cit., p. 19.

² Ahmad Lutfi as-Sayyid in a public speech, May 13, 1930, quoted in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, VII, p. 628.

³ Article XV of the Charter of Principles.

⁴ The agricultural section, as-Siyasah, I, 234 (July 31, 1923) p. 3.

The suggested remedies were conventional. The government was not called upon to intervene except to put an end to the most flagrant irregularities, such as the corruption and inefficiency of the Alexandria Stock Market and the process of marketing cotton. Most of the projected remedies were left for the private initiative of the wealthier classes and the better educated section of society.¹

¹ For example:

"Azmat al-Qitn al-Misri wa Wasa'il Ilajiha al-Jadiyyah" (Loosely: Causes and Remedies of the Egyptian Cotton Crisis) as-Siyasah al-Ushbu'iyah, I, 29 (Oct. 2, 1926) p. 8.

"Hiddat al-Azmah al-Iqtisadiyyah wa Idrakuha" (Loosely: Remedies of the Economic Crisis) Ibid., I, 41 (Dec. 18, 1926) p. 16.

"Shababuna wa al-A'mal al-Hurra; al-Majhud ash-Shab Yatatalab Midanan li al-A'mal" (Loosely: Our Young Men and the Free Professions) Ibid., II, 74 (Aug. 6, 1927) p. 1.

"Ghala' al-Ma'ishah; Darurat Istiqsa' Asbabah" (Loosely: It is Necessary to Investigate the Causes of Inflation) Ibid., I, 36 (Nov. 13, 1926) p. 16.

CHAPTER TWO
THE SEARCH FOR A POLICY

On its formation, the Liberal Constitutional Party was confident of securing a wide sphere of political influence, and a substantial number of seats in Parliament; all of which would enable it to promote a moderate policy coupled with long-term reforms. However, later events were to prove that the Party was too weak to follow an independent course of action. Consequently, it had to rely on the help of some other force. The question was, on whom should it depend, the Wafd, the British authorities, or the Palace. In essence, this amounted to a choice between adhering to the Constitution or resorting to extra-constitutional methods. The Party was never able to resolve this dilemma, and that caused it to slip into the inconsistent path of opportunism.

At the time the Party was formed, Tharwat's cabinet was already running into serious difficulties. King Fu'ad had been alienated by Tharwat's obvious connection with the Constitution Committee and was plotting the cabinet's fall.¹ On the other hand, the relations between the cabinet and Allenby which had at first been cordial, were beginning to deteriorate. The Constitution Committee had included two articles in the draft constitution which, by implication, reasserted Egypt's sovereignty over the Sudan. Allenby wanted Tharwat to remove both articles, but the latter felt that it was unwise to give

¹ Zayid, "Nash'at Hizb" p. 45.

in on such an emotion-laden and popularly watched issue. More serious still, Allenby wanted Tharwat to issue two laws; the first to regulate the retirement of foreign officials who were in the service of the Egyptian Government; the second to validate all actions taken by the British authorities under martial law.¹ Tharwat refused to issue the first law, and only agreed to a very restricted form of the second. He wished to leave both matters to the future negotiations, hoping to use them as levers to extract concessions from the British Government.²

To meet the situation, the Party hoped to effect a policy of rapprochement with the Wafd. This policy was unanimously approved by the Party, even by such members as Isma'il Sidqi and Hafez Afifi³ who later were irreconcilable to the Wafd and quite willing to ally themselves with the British Residency and the Palace. The reason is not difficult to ascertain. The Party was still unaware of its insignificant influence on the masses, and therefore did not realize that, under normal circumstances, an alliance with the Wafd would only relegate it to an ineffective position. The Party's confidence in the extent of its popularity remained unshaken until Zaghloul's return to Egypt.⁴ It believed that its efforts to promulgate the Constitution and protect Egypt's

¹ Martial law had been in force since Nov., 1914.

² "Ta'wid al-Muwazzafin al-Ajanib; Mu'ahadah Dawliyyah Ukhra" (Indemnification of Foreign Officials; Another International Agreement) as-Siyasah, I, 222 (July 15, 1923) p. 1.

I. Sidqi, "Hawl Ta'wid al-Muwazzafin al-Ajanib" (On the Question of Indemnification of Foreign Officials) Ibid., I, 228 (July 22, 1923) p. 1.

³ Interview with Ahmad Pasha Abdul Ghaffar. Appendix II.

⁴ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, p. 169.

rights would receive due recognition from the people.¹ Its early policy was drawn in the light of that illusion.

The early issues of as-Siyasah mirrored this policy and adopted a tone which was conciliatory to the Opposition. But the Wafd turned a deaf ear to them, particularly since Tawfiq Nasim Pasha, President of the Royal Diwan, and Hasan Nash'at Bey, his Deputy, were successfully working for a rapprochement between the Wafd and the Palace.² As a result, many members of the Liberal Constitutional Party insisted, against Adli's wishes, that as-Siyasah should adopt a harsher tone.³ As if to justify this attitude, two members of the Party's Board of Directors were assassinated on November 17, 1922, and on November, 29, Tharwat was forced to resign.⁴ On November 30, Tawfiq Nasim formed a new cabinet. Sure of the Wafd's support, he introduced several changes in the draft constitution which concentrated political power in the hands of the King.⁵

The idea of an alliance with the Wafd was hence given up. However, the Liberal Constitutional Party continued to work for a conciliation with

¹ Interview with Ahmad Pasha Abdul Ghaffar. Appendix II.

² ar-Rafi'i, Fi A'qab ath-Thawrah, I, p. 88.
Shafiq, Tamhid, III, p. 365.

³ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, pp. 150-51.

⁴ On the circumstances of Tharwat's conflict with King Fu'ad and the former's resignation, see: H. ash-Sharif, ar-Rijal Asrar (Loosely: Men Are Enigmatic) (Cairo: Dar Akhbar al-Yom, n.d.) pp. 82-85.

⁵ The changes which Nasim introduced into the draft constitution are enumerated in: ar-Rafi'i, Fi A'qab ath-Thawrah, I, p. 90.

Zaghloul personally and the more moderate members of the Wafd. In the following months, as-Siyasah criticized the Wafd bitterly and accused it of helping Nasim to distort the draft constitution.¹ Yet it drew back from criticizing Zaghloul himself, and tried by subtle indication to draw a line between the Wafd Central Committee and the "real Wafd" which included Zaghloul and his early adherents.²

In the early days of February, 1923, a new chance presented itself for the Liberal Constitutional Party to realize its aims. Yielding to Allenby's pressure, Nasim agreed to strike out the two Sudan articles from the draft constitution. Immediately afterwards, he handed in his resignation and a cabinet crisis ensued. On February 17th, the King invited Adli to form the new cabinet. Adli considered the matter reluctantly, and invited the Opposition parties to join in a coalition cabinet with the explicit purpose of promulgating the draft constitution in its original form.³ The National Party rejected the offer outright. This did not deter the Liberal Constitutional Party. Efforts to win over the moderate Wafdists continued covertly, in spite

¹ For example: T. Hussein, "an-Nas Yatahaddathoun" (People Say) as-Siyasah, I, 71 (Jan. 19, 1923) p. 5.

² For example: "Fi Midan al-Intikhab" (In the Field of Elections) Ibid., I, 169 (May 13, 1923) p. 1.

³ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, p. 160.
 "al-Azmah al-Wizariyyah" (The Cabinet Crisis) as-Siyasah, I, 96 (Feb. 18, 1923) p. 4.
 "Mu'akhadhat Hizb al-Ahrar ad-Dusturiyoun" (Loosely: The Fault of the Liberal Constitutional Party) al-Liwa' al-Misri, II, 313 (Feb. 27, 1923) p. 2.
 Shafiq, Tamhid, III, p. 430.

of Zaghoul's announcement from exile that Nasim enjoyed his confidence.¹ But the Wafd finally rejected the invitation and Adli turned down the premiership. The Board of Directors of the Liberal Constitutional Party then declared that the Party would support any cabinet which tried to promulgate the draft constitution, and which promoted a policy of conciliation among all parties.²

On March 15, 1923, Yahia Ibrahim formed a cabinet which was relatively independent of the Palace and the Wafd. Most of the modifications which the King wished to introduce into the draft constitution were abandoned. Nevertheless, the Constitution which was promulgated on April 19, 1923, granted the King wider prerogatives than the Constitution Committee had envisaged. Aside from the power it gave him vis à vis the cabinet, it restricted the freedom of the Press and limited parliament's right of interrogation and amendment.³

¹ F. Thabit, az-Za'im al-Khalid wa Umm al-Misriyyin fi Manfa Jabal Tariq (Diary of Mme. Zaghoul's lady companion written in Gibraltar at the time when the two ladies were with Zaghoul in his exile) (Cairo: Matba'at ash-Shams al-Hadithah, n.d.) pp. 94-95.

"an-Naba' al-Jadid" (The Latest News) as-Siyasah, I, 92 (Feb. 13, 1923) p. 4.

"Nasim Basha Yastahiq Taqdir al-Watan" (Nasim Pasha Deserves the Appreciation of the Fatherland) al-Liwa' al-Misri, II, 302 (Feb. 14, 1923) p. 2.

² Text of the Proclamation, in: as-Siyasah, I, 102 (Feb. 25, 1923) p. 5.

³ Text of the Egyptian Constitution and Electoral Law of Apr., 1923, in: M.Kh. Sobhi, Tarikh al-Hayat an-Niyabiyyah fi Misr min Ahd Sakin al-Jinan Mohammad Ali Basha (History of Constitutional Life in Egypt from the Era ... Mohammad Ali Pasha) (Cairo: Matba'at Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyyah, 1939-47) V, pp. 517-32, 621-45, respectively.

Text of the Draft constitution and draft electoral law, in: Ibid., pp. 495-513, 581-98, respectively.

With elections at the door-step, the Liberal Constitutional Party deemed it wise not to alienate the cabinet on the question of the Constitution. Therefore, as-Siyasah tried to explain away most of the modifications. In his commentaries, Haykal argued that Parliament could, if it acted wisely, establish constitutional precedents which would circumvent the changes forced on the draft constitution by the King.¹

But this moderate attitude towards the cabinet soon changed into one of hostility. As elections approached, it became apparent that Allenby had come to recognize the necessity of cooperating with the Wafd in order to infuse a greater measure of cordiality into Anglo-Egyptian relations.² This inevitably led the Liberal Constitutional Party to adopt a more critical attitude towards the Residency and use the cabinet's obvious subservience to the British authorities as material for the election campaign. On May 30, 1923, the cabinet issued the Indemnity Law, and on July 18th, it issued the Law of retirement of

¹ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, pp. 164-67.

"Awjuh an-Naqṣ fi ad-Dustour" (The Shortcomings of the Constitution) a series of five articles which appeared on the first pages of as-Siyasah, I, 151-55 (Apr. 22-26, 1923).

"Sadar ad-Dustour fa Yajib Sir'at Nafadhih" (The Constitution Has Been Promulgated; It Should Be Immediately Implemented) Ibid., I, 151 (Apr. 22, 1923) p. 4.

² J. Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800-1953 (London: Cresset Press, 1954) p. 263.

According to Zaghoul, the British Government tried to lure him early in 1923, while still in exile, by offering to appoint him to "the highest position"; but he refused. Thabit, op. cit., pp. 61-62.

But in view of later events, it is hard to believe that there was not at least a desire on Zaghoul's part to establish cordial relations with the British Government. Zaghoul to MacDonald, June 6, 1923, quoted in: Shafiq, Tamhid, III, p. 597.

See also, p. 34, infra.

foreign officials. In both cases it submitted to Allenby's demands. as-Siyasah repudiated both laws and took to reminding its readers that Nasim and Yahia had yielded where Tharwat had been intransigent.¹ At the same time it criticized the Wafd because it did not announce a platform. as-Siyasah denied that the Wafd represented the entire nation, and challenged it to make its aims known to the public. It warned that if the people elected the Wafdists, they would merely be bringing demagogues to power.²

By that time it became clear that Zaghoul was trying to improve his relations with the King and the British Government.³ as-Siyasah chose to shut its eyes to the obvious implications of this, particularly because the extraordinary enthusiasm at Zaghoul's return shook the Party's confidence. As late as September 20, 1923, as-Siyasah offered Zaghoul its complete loyalty

¹ For example:

"Ta'wid al-Muwazzafin al-Ajanib: Mu'ahadah Dawliyyah Ukrah",
loc. cit.

"Siyasat ad-Du'uf wa al-Istislam" (Policy of Weakness and Submission)
as-Siyasah, I, 225 (July 18, 1923) p. 1.

M.H. Haykal, "Fudul al-Hukumah al-Misriyyah fi al-Mu'aqadat
al-Dawliyyah Qabl In'iqad al-Barliman" (The Egyptian Government's Right to
Contract International Agreements Before the Opening of Parliament) Ibid.,
I, 232 (July 29, 1923) p. 1.

"Bawadir ma Kunna Nakhshah; ala Man Taqa' at-Tib'ah" (Signs of
What We Feared; Whose Fault Is It) Ibid., I, 281 (Sep. 24, 1923) p. 4.

² For example:

"Irtibak al-Wafd" (The Wafd's Embarassment) Ibid., I, 177 (May 23,
1923) p. 4.

"Hiriyyah wa Istibdad" (Liberty and Despotism) Ibid., I, 181 (May
28, 1923) p. 1.

"ash-Shawrah wa al-Istibdad" (Consultation and Despotism) Ibid., I,
187, (June 4, 1923) p. 1.

³ "Fi Intizar Khatat Sa'd" (In Expectation of Sa'd's Plan) Ibid., I, 278
(Sep. 20, 1923) p. 4.

on behalf of the Liberal Constitutional Party provided he maintained an attitude of complete impartiality towards all the contending parties.¹

Zaghloul refused all these overtures. Following his return to Egypt on September 17, 1923, he made several speeches which indicated his new policy beyond any doubt. He still described Tharwat as a "villain", Adli and Sidqi as "traitors". But he described the British as "honest opponents" with whom one could safely engage in negotiations with the aim of concluding a friendly agreement.²

Any hope which the Liberal Constitutional Party had of reconciliation with Zaghloul was thus temporarily thwarted. as-Siyasah for the first time mounted a campaign against Zaghloul personally. It accused him of being an opportunist who enticed the ignorant masses to civil disobedience by his provoking speeches.³ It pointed out that he allied himself with some men who had collaborated with the British authorities in 1919.⁴ It went further and repeated certain rumours to the effect that Zaghloul had had a secret under-

¹ Ibid.

² Shafiq, Tamhid, III, p. 677.

³ For example:

"Aqwal Sa'd Tathir Ruh al-Ijram" (Sa'd's Speeches Awakens the Spirit of Crime) as-Siyasah, II, 318 (Nov. 6, 1923) p. 1.

"al-Muhami Sa'd Yurashshih Nasim li Awal Wizarah fi al-Barluman" (Sa'd Nominates Nasim for the First Parliamentary Cabinet) Ibid., II, 328 (Nov. 18, 1923) p. 4.

⁴ For example: "al-Aja'ib fi Misr; Arba'ah Yastafihum Sa'd" (Wonders in Egypt; Four Men Befriended by Sa'd) Ibid., I, 284 (Sep. 27, 1923) p. 1.

standing with the British Government, and that he had been allowed to return to Egypt on the strength of that understanding.¹

as-Siyasah's campaign was very well planned and quite brilliantly executed. However, it was never able to match the Wafd's tremendous and far-reaching organization. It never caught up with the Wafdist "yellow newspapers" in attracting the masses. As a propaganda sheet, it was attractive to a select few only. The fact that the Liberal Constitutional Party included four of the ablest politicians that Egypt possessed at the time -- Adli, Tharwat, Sidqi, and Mohammad Mahmoud -- did not further its cause. For, although Sidqi and Mahmoud were recognized as masters of intrigue, and all four distinguished themselves at one time or another as prime ministers, none showed any inclination to reach down to the popular level and organize a party machine which would challenge the Wafd's hold over the electorate. In the last analysis, the Liberal Constitutional Party depended on family ties and feudal influence² which proved to be completely inadequate. On January 12, 1924, the final elections for the Chamber of Deputies took place. The Wafd returned 195 seats against 19 for all non-Wafdists combined together. Two weeks later, Zaghoul formed his first cabinet.

Following this staggering defeat, the Liberal Constitutional Party went through a period of demoralization. More than one member considered the

¹ "Limadha Ad Sa'd" (Why Sa'd Has Returned) Ibid., I, 301 (Oct. 17, 1923) p. 4.

² ar-Rafi'i, Fi A'qab ath-Thawrah, I, p. 131.
Shafiq, Hawliyyat, I, p. 2.

idea of dissolving the Party.¹ This mood soon gave way to a period of inaction during which the Party reconsidered its policy. The immediate result was that Adli lost the support of some members who believed that the Party could not improve its relations with Zaghoul as long as Adli was its President.² There is some evidence that this view was held by Mohammad Mahmoud and his supporters, as it was believed that Zaghoul trusted Mahmoud more than the rest of the Liberal Constitutional Party.³

Mahmoud thus attempted to challenge the hegemony which so far had been exercised by Sidqi, Tharwat, and Adli over the Party. His efforts proved pre-mature for, although Adli resigned from the Party as a result of the electoral débauche, Tharwat and Sidqi continued to enjoy the confidence of numerous members. They also continued to control as-Siyasah through Hafez Afifi who had acted from the beginning as a liaison officer between the Party and its newspaper.⁴ When the Party was faced with the thorny problem of choosing a new

¹ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, pp. 177-78.

² Ibid., pp. 194-95.

³ At the root of this belief was the fact that Mohammad Mahmoud's father, Mahmoud Suleiman, was a very close friend of Zaghoul; and that Hafni Mahmoud, Mohammad's brother, remained loyal to Zaghoul throughout the latter's life, and often acted as a liaison between Mohammad Mahmoud and the Wafd. M. Amin, Amaliqah wa Aqzam (Giants and Dwarfs) (Cairo: Dar Akhbar al-Yom, n.d.) pp. 23-24.

It must be remembered that Mohammad Mahmoud had been responsible for Zaghoul's accession to the Wafd's leadership, and that he had been less involved than the other leaders of the Liberal Constitutional Party in intrigue against, or dispute with Zaghoul.

⁴ Interview with Ahmad Pasha Abdul Ghaffar. Appendix II.

President, Adli and Tharwat recommended Abdul Aziz Fahmi. Sidqi and Lutfi as-Sayyid approved of the recommendation.¹ Mohammad Mahmoud did not conceal his ill-feelings towards the Party's choice, but nevertheless had to acquiesce.²

Fahmi Pasha was a judge by profession. He dabbled in politics only occasionally and had not been present on the political scene since 1921. His choice as new head of the Party was merely a choice of convenience. He had been a member of the three-man delegation which submitted the Wafd's demands to Wingate in November, 1918, and therefore could claim a certain prominence in the nationalist movement. Moreover, he was not allied to any group within the Liberal Constitutional Party, and as a result was the least objectionable to its members. When Fahmi was offered the presidency, it was made clear to him that the Party only wished "to use" his name and expected no initiative on his part.³ He was formally elected President of the Party in January, 1925.

There was no unanimity as to the policy which the Party should eventually adopt. Haykal and some of his friends were of the opinion that the Party should adhere to strict constitutional principles.⁴ They hoped that the Party could augment its following by leading the Parliamentary Opposition. They favored the idea of accumulating responsibilities in Zaghoul's hands so that

¹ Interview with Ahmad Pasha Abdul Ghaffar. Appendix II.

² Interview with Ahmad Pasha Abdul Ghaffar. Appendix II.

³ Fahmi, op. cit., p. 149.

⁴ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, p. 178.

they could, in turn, discredit him by exposing the shortcomings of his cabinet. Therefore, immediately after the elections, as-Siyasah went on record as being in favor of the Wafd assuming full power without being hampered by interference from the Palace.¹

It is difficult to imagine how Haykal hoped to bring about such a change in the fortunes of the Party. In the absence of fundamental differences between the two parties, the Liberal Constitutional Party could hardly serve as a substitute for the Wafd. Moreover, although it might have been possible to discredit Zaghoul in the eyes of the enlightened, it was unlikely that a rapid transfer of allegiance could occur among the masses. And the Party watched with misgivings as Zaghoul introduced through Parliament a new electoral law providing for one-stage elections.² A more serious menace was Zaghoul's policy of staffing the administration with his own supporters.³ The ensuing mood in the Liberal Constitutional Party was that Zaghoul should be dislodged even if resort had to be made to extra-constitutional methods. Neither Haykal, nor any of his helpers in as-Siyasah possessed the personal stature to resist the tide.

Following the failure of the Sa'd MacDonald negotiations in September, 1924, Zaghoul's position became untenable. Having refused to sign a treaty,

¹ Ibid., pp. 179-80.

² The new Electoral Law was promulgated on July 29, 1924. The text, in: Sobhi, op. cit., V, pp. 646-54.

³ Shafiq, Hawliyyat, I, pp. 51-52.
Zaghoul's policy was to become the practice of all subsequent cabinets.

the Wafd was of no more use to the British Government.¹ The King immediately took the cue and started plotting Zaghoul's fall. His hand appeared when he students of al-Azhar demonstrated against the cabinet in October and November. At the same time, Anglo-Egyptian rivalry in the Sudan was taking a serious turn, and the British Government proceeded to assert its sole influence there.² As Zaghoul faltered in the face of those difficulties, as-Siyasah intensified its attack upon him. It repeatedly demanded a full statement of the policy he proposed to follow, and his attitude on the Sudan issue.³

The ultimatum presented by Allenby to the Egyptian Government on November 22, 1924, following the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, brought matters to a head.⁴ The more damaging part of the ultimatum demanded the withdrawal of the Egyptian army from the Sudan and the right for the Sudan Government to increase the irrigated land in the Gezira indefinitely. Rather than submit to these terms, Zaghoul resigned on November 24th. It is quite possible that some members of the Liberal Constitutional Party were willing to

¹ For the Sa'd - MacDonald negotiations, see: Appendix IV.

² For the Anglo-Egyptian rivalry over the Sudan at this period, see: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1936 (Information Department Papers, No. 19; London: The Institute, 1936) p. 16.

³ For example:
 "Siyasat al-Amani wa Khataruha ala al-Qadiyyah al-Misriyyah"
 (Loosely: The Danger of Wishful Thinking on the Egyptian Question" as-Siyasah, II, 609 (Oct. 15, 1924) p. 4.

"Khitbat Sa'd Basha; la Yazal al-Mawqif Mubham" (Sa'd Pasha's Speech; the Situation Is Still Vague) Ibid., II, 615 (Oct. 22, 1924) p. 4.

"Bayan li al-Ummah" (A Proclamation to the Nation) Ibid., II, 620 (Oct. 27, 1924) p. 5.

⁴ The relevant passages of the ultimatum, quoted in: R.I.I.A., op. cit., p.17.

join the cabinet which succeeded Zaghoul's.¹ But Haykal and as-Siyasah's editors were of the opinion that the Party should avoid taking any responsibility in the crisis.² Thus, they were relieved when Ahmad Ziwari, with at least Allenby's willingness,³ formed a cabinet in which the Wafd occupied two seats. However, a few days later, Ziwari accepted the damaging part of the ultimatum and the Wafdist ministers resigned on the issue. Not wishing to see a return to autocracy, Allenby pressed Ziwari to include members of the Liberal Constitutional Party in his cabinet.⁴ Of all the leading members of the Party, only Sidqi was willing to join the cabinet at this juncture.⁵ On December 9, 1924, he took charge of the Ministry of the Interior, and from that time on became the real power in the Cabinet. It was no secret that Sidqi's promotion was a step towards dissolving the Chamber and conducting new elections under his iron hand.⁶ Two weeks later, the Chamber was dissolved.

¹ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, pp. 210-11.

² Ibid.

³ ar-Rafi'i states it as his firm belief that Ziwari's cabinet was prepared by the King in complicity with Allenby sometime before Zaghoul's resignation. ar-Rafi'i, Fi A'qab ath-Thawrah, I, p. 197.

George Lloyd does not admit that the Residency was involved, though he states that Ziwari was "determined to work in friendly co-operation with His Majesty's Government...". Lloyd, op. cit., II, p. 109.

⁴ Marlowe, op. cit., p. 272.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ ar-Rafi'i, Fi A'qab ath-Thawrah, I, pp. 208-209.

Most members of the Liberal Constitutional Party rejoiced at Sidqi's entry into the cabinet¹ for they regarded it, rightly, as a prelude to their return to power. Yet Haykal and the editors of as-Siyasah continued to entertain misgivings about the situation. They feared that the Party would become involved in the decision to withdraw from the Sudan; let alone become open to the accusation that they had opposed the Wafd simply for the sake of obtaining power.² It is possible that Mohammad Mahmoud shared Haykal's attitude, but for reasons entirely of his own. Later events proved that Mahmoud was at the time interested in effecting a rapprochement between the Wafd and the Liberal Constitutional Party. However, as the date of the new elections approached, Allenby gave an official assurance that Zaghoul would never be allowed to return to power.³ This was too precious a chance for the Liberal Constitutional Party to miss, and many of its leading members were of the opinion that the Party should take advantage of the situation to destroy the Wafd. Sidqi was determined to add a semblance of legitimacy to the effort. He used all the means at his disposal to influence the elections and prevent the Wafd from returning a majority. In the meantime, the pro-Palace Ittihad Party was formed, and it ran for the elections in conjunction with the Liberal Constitutional Party.

¹ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, p. 214.

² Ibid., p. 211.

³ Lloyd, op. cit., II, p. 162.

The result of the elections as proclaimed by the cabinet was a defeat for the Wafd.¹ But many deputies of doubtful allegiance had entered the Chamber as Independents, and it was these who held the balance.² It was a common knowledge to the Cairo Press that the Independents would in all probabilities side with the Wafd.³ Nevertheless, Ziwar decided to face Parliament with a coalition of Ittihadists, Liberal Constitutionalists, and Independents. But still none of the leading Liberal Constitutionalists -- with the exception of Sidqi -- were willing to take part in the new cabinet. Ziwar invited Abdul Aziz Fahmi to enter the cabinet, and in an obvious maneuver to contain the opposition within the Party, invited Mohammad Mahmoud as well. Both refused;⁴ but Adli, Tharwat, and Sidqi prevailed on Fahmi to accept.⁵ Mahmoud refused to change his mind, and shortly afterwards left Egypt for Europe.

The cabinet was reshuffled on March 13, 1925, one day after the election results had been announced. Ziwar admitted three members from the Liberal Constitutional Party, namely, Abdul Aziz Fahmi as Minister of Justice, Tawfiq Doce Pasha as Minister of Agriculture, and Mohammad Ali Alluba Pasha as Minister of Waqf. From the Ittihad Party, he admitted Yahia Ibrahim Pasha,

¹ ar-Rafi'i, Fi A'qab ath-Thawrah, I, p. 215.

² "Intikhabat Muhaya'ah; Shakhsiyyat la Mabadi'" (Rigged Elections; Personalities Rather than Doctrines) an article by Arthur Ransome, The Manchester Guardian's correspondent, tr. by: as-Siyasah, III, 723 (Feb. 25, 1925) pp. 1-2.

³ The Press quotation in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, II, pp. 294-98.

⁴ "Khitbat Hadrat Sahib as-Sa'adah Abdul Aziz Fahmi Basha" (Speech of H.E. Abdul Aziz Fahmi Pasha) as-Siyasah, IV, 934 (Oct. 31, 1925) p. 1.

⁵ Fahmi, op. cit., p. 150.

President of the Party, and two other ministers. Sidqi, who still called himself an Independent, continued to hold the Ministry of the Interior.

A lot depended on how far the Chamber would be intimidated by the dangers inherent in Zaghoul's return to power. On March 17, 1925, as-Siyasah threw all pretense aside and warned the "Independent" deputies of dire consequences should they side with the Wafd.¹ Yet, in spite of all the adverse conditions surrounding the elections, and in spite of the psychological pressure resulting from Allenby's determination to prevent Zaghoul from returning to power, the elections of the Chamber Speaker revealed that the Wafd commanded almost two-thirds of the deputies.² So compelling was the Wafd's victory that the Liberal Constitutional Party was forced to scrap its democratic principles and consent to the first drastic violation of the Constitution. On March 23, 1925, the Chamber was dissolved for the second time,³ and three days later, a decree was issued which suspended the preparations for new elections pending the promulgation of a new electoral law.

The situation was one of great embarrassment for the Liberal Constitutional Party. Within two years of its formation, it had violated one of its cardinal principles and thus produced discontent among its own ranks, as there were undoubtedly many members who sincerely believed in constitutional principles. By this action, it was also paving the way for a return of autocracy,

¹ "Ayuha an-Nuwwab al-Mutaraddidun Ihdharu al-Awaqib" (O Reluctant Deputies Beware the Consequences) as-Siyasah, III, 740 (Mar. 17, 1925) p. 1.

² On Mar. 23, 1925, Parliament convened and Zaghoul was elected Speaker by 123 votes against 85 for Tharwat who was backed by the cabinet.

³ Article 88 of the Egyptian Constitution stated that the cabinet may not dissolve two Chambers in succession for the same reason.

a contingency which could never fail to arouse a wider discontent in the Party. The issues, however, were partly obliterated by the graveness of the conflict between Zaghoul and the Residency. as-Siyasah justified the cabinet's action on the ground that Egypt was passing through "exceptional conditions".¹ While to the majority of the members this justification might have been a mere pretext, it contained an element of truth which prevented dissention. Moreover, the Party hoped to restore parliamentary life as soon as measures had been taken to prevent the Wafd from returning to power. For that reason, it was now inclined in favor of more restricted suffrage.² A committee headed by Sidqi and formed predominantly of Liberal Constitutionalists, drew up a new Electoral Law which rendered elections a tool of the government.³

The new Electoral Law was admittedly a two-edged weapon. But as long as Sidqi held the Ministry of the Interior the Liberal Constitutional Party entertained no apprehensions with regards to its application. It was not long, how-

¹ "Hal Majlis an-Nuwwab; ala Man Taqa' at-Tib'ah" (Dissolution of the Chamber; Who Is to Blame) as-Siyasah, III, 746 (Mar. 24, 1925) p. 4.

² To prepare the ground for the projected electoral law, as-Siyasah propounded the theory that the aim of a parliamentary system was not to provide for a "quantitative representation" of the whole population, but rather to represent the "vital forces" in the country, i.e., the active forces which carried the blunt of progress. For example: "ad-Dustour wa Qanoun al-Intikhab; al-Haq wa Wasilat at-Tamattu' Bih" (The Constitution and the Electoral Law; the Privilege and the Means of Enjoying It) as-Siyasah, III, 751 (Mar. 30, 1925) p. 4.

³ Marlowe, op. cit., p. 276.

Ziwar in an interview with the Cairene French language newspaper, La Réforme, Dec., 1925, quoted in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, II, p. 1002.

The law was promulgated on Dec. 8, 1925. The text, in: Sobhi, op. cit., V, pp. 664-90.

ever, before the pact between the Liberal Constitutional Party and the Palace began to show signs of strain. A month had hardly lapsed after the dissolution of the Chamber when the Opposition Press began to allude to disagreement between the two parties in the cabinet.¹ Notwithstanding that, Sidqi was able to postpone a showdown through sheer strength of character, and Allenby's disapproval of autocracy prevented the King from over-stepping his limits. Once these props were removed, the pact could not survive for long. Allenby resigned in June, 1925; thus his restraining hand disappeared. Shortly afterwards, Sidqi was sent to Italy on a diplomatic mission.² Prime Minister Ziwar and all the leading Liberal Constitutionalists left for Europe as they were accustomed to do every summer. Yahia Ibrahim, President of the Ittihad Party, became acting Prime Minister. The field was then free for King Fu'ad to reassert autocratic power at the expense of his allies. The government machinery started promoting the interests of the Ittihad Party in the provinces and the interests of the Liberal Constitutional Party suffered correspondingly.³

¹ Shafiq, Hawliyyat, II, pp. 407, 504.

² In the summer of 1925, Sidqi took charge of negotiating with the Italian Government an agreement respecting the delimitation of the Egyptian-Libyan frontier.

³ Ibid., pp. 793-94.
 "al-Ahrar ad-Dustouriyoun fi al-Wizarah; Mujmal li Tarikh Sitat Ashhur" (The Liberal Constitutionalists in the Cabinet; the Story of Six Months) as-Siyasah, III, 892 (Sep. 13, 1925) p. 4.
 "Tasfiyat Hisab Bayn al-Ahrar ad-Dustouriyoun wa Hizb al-Ittihad" (Squaring Matters Between the Liberal Constitutionalists and the Ittihad Party) Ibid., III, 899 (Sep. 21, 1925) p. 4.
 "Muwwazafoun fi Hukumah aw Du'at li Hizb Jadid Siyasi?" (Government Officials or Protagonists of a New Political Party?) Ibid., III, 916 (Oct. 11, 1925) p. 4.

By mid-summer, the Liberal Constitutional Party had begun to show signs of restiveness, and many of its members demanded its withdrawal from the cabinet.¹

Their eagerness to withdraw was equalled by that of the King. Taking matters in his own hands, he incited the ulema of al-Azhar against the publication of Ali Abdul Raziq's book, Islam wa Usul al-Hikm. The ulema demanded the dismissal of the author from his position as judge in the religious courts. Fahmi Pasha, who was at the time Minister of Justice, refused to submit to the ulema's demands, and Yahia Ibrahim used that as a pretext to oust him from the cabinet.² The crisis brought the pact to an end and had serious repercussions on the Liberal Constitutional Party. Tawfiq Doce and Mohammad Ali Alluba, the Party's other two ministers, gave no sign of wishing to resign after their President's dismissal. Although the members of the Party who were in favor of withdrawing from the cabinet constituted a majority, there was no unanimity on the issue.³ It was with some difficulty that Haykal induced the Party's Board of Directors to meet on September 8, 1925, and pass a majority decision compelling the two ministers to resign.⁴ Both ministers submitted to the decision and Sidqi cabled his solidary resignation from Europe.

¹ "al-Ahrar ad-Dustouriyoun fi al-Wizarah", loc. cit.

² ar-Rafi'i, Fi A'qab ath-Thawrah, I, p. 226.
Lloyd, op. cit., II, p. 114.
Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, pp. 231-34.

³ For the details of this matter, see: Ibid., pp. 234-37.

⁴ Text of the decision, in: as-Siyasah, III, 888 (Sep. 9, 1925) p. 4.

At this point, the Liberal Constitutional Party was faced with the arduous task of reconsidering its policy. The lack of unanimity among its members made it difficult to elaborate a new course of action, and the return of the two rivals, Mahmoud and Sidqi, from Europe sharpened this difficulty. Sidqi thought it unwise and fruitless to go against the wishes of acting High Commissioner Neville Henderson who was trying to patch up the pact.¹ Mahmoud, on the other hand, still hoped to effect a rapprochement between the Wafd and his own Party.² As a compromise, the Liberal Constitutional Party declared that it did not object to a reconciliation with the Ittihad Party, provided the latter -- then in control of the cabinet -- respected the Constitution and refrained from acquiring administrative support.³ In a way, this declaration was conciliatory to the Wafd who had been clamouring for the restoration of parliamentary life. At the same time, it demonstrated that the Liberal Constitutional Party still maintained an open mind with respect to the cabinet.

However, the Liberal Constitutional Party was moving on an inescapable trend towards a rapprochement with the Wafd. The events that followed Zaghloul's resignation in November, 1924, had created two elemental factors which made it advantageous to both parties to effect a reconciliation. The first factor was constituted by the Residency's opposition to the return of a

¹ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, pp. 241-42, 244.

² Ibid., pp. 250-51.

³ "Hadith Ma' Wakil al-Hizb fi ma Jad min al-Shu'oun" (Interview with the Vice President of the Party on New Developments) as-Siyasah, III, 911 (Oct. 5, 1925) p. 5.

Text of Decision by the Board of Directors, Oct. 20, 1925, in: Ibid., III, 925 (Oct. 21, 1925) p. 5.

Zaghloulist cabinet. The Wafd could have access to power only through the Liberal Constitutional Party. The second factor was constituted by the King's disinclination to share power with the Liberal Constitutional Party. As a result, the latter was in need of the popular support which it could derive from an alliance with the Wafd.

Zaghloul had actually approached his old collaborator Rushdi as early as March, 1925, but his overtures had been turned down.¹ However, Hafni Mahmoud, Mohammad Mahmoud's brother, kept up a contact of sorts between the two parties,² and in September, 1925, the Wafd renewed its overtures with the explicit purpose of restricting the Palace's authority.³ The idea of an alliance with the Wafd gained adherents in the Liberal Constitutional Party as the prospects of reconciliation with the Palace dwindled. Lord George Lloyd, the new High Commissioner, had no intention of reviving the pact between the Palace and the Liberal Constitutional Party. His immediate concern was to force the Egyptian Government to conclude a frontiers agreement with the Italian Government.⁴ Ziwar's cabinet, weak and isolated, was admirably fitted for

¹ "Rushdi-Sa'd; Hakun at-Tafsil" (Rushdi-Sa'd; a Complete Account) Ibid., III, 895 (Sep. 16, 1925) p. 5.

² M.I. al-Juzairi, Sa'd Zaghloul; Dhukrayat Tarikhiyyah Tarifah (Sa'd Zaghloul; Delightful Historical Reminiscences) (Cairo: Dar Akhbar al-Yom, n.d.) p. 158.

³ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, pp. 243-44.

⁴ Sidqi's negotiations with the Italian Government in the summer of 1925 over the Egyptian-Libyan frontier had been unsuccessful. Sidqi had rejected the Italian claim that the Oasis of Jaghboub, just inside the Egyptian border, formed part of Libyan territory. In the fall of 1925, the British Government feared that Italy might resort to arms to impose a frontier settlement; in which case Britain -- under the terms of the 1922 Declaration --

his purpose. Lloyd continued to support the cabinet till December 6, 1925, when the Egyptian-Italian Agreement was concluded.

In the meantime, the Alliance (I'tilaf) of the Opposition parties had begun to materialize. Adli, Tharwat, and even Sidqi had finally approved of the Alliance due, mainly, to the efforts of Mohammad Mahmoud and some Wafdists like Zaghoul's nephew, Fathalla Barakat Pasha.¹ On December 28, 1925, Hafni Mahmoud arranged for a private meeting between Adli and Zaghoul.² After that, Zaghoul, Adli, and Tharwat seemed to have re-established their former relationship. Zaghoul talked freely of the necessity of re-uniting the Wafd and the Liberal Constitutional Party.³

The main weakness of the Alliance was that the close cooperation which characterized the relations among the leaders did not extend to the rank and file of the two parties.⁴ Many Wafdists, including the influential Makram Ubeid and his henchman Mustapha Nahhas, were opposed to the Alliance.⁵ Personal ambitions and jealousies played such a role that when it came to the

would have to rise to Egypt's defense. Rather than be involved in such a war, the British Government hoped to induce Egypt to give in to Italy's demands. Lloyd, op. cit., II, pp. 149-50.

¹ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, pp. 250-51.
al-Juzairi, op. cit., p. 157.

² Ibid., p. 163.

³ Interview with Ahmad Pasha Abdul Ghaffar. Appendix II.
Ahmad Mohammad Khashabah (a member of the Wafd in 1925) in an interview with the Egyptian French language newspaper, La Bourse, n.d., quoted in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, V, p. 941.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Interview with Ahmad Pasha Abdul Ghaffar. Appendix II.

division of electoral constituencies, the Alliance seemed to reach the point of collapse.¹ The basic disparity, however, resided in the interpretation of the functional aspect of the Alliance. To the Liberal Constitutional Party, the aim of the Alliance was to solve the Egyptian Question. For that purpose, they demanded that party considerations be overruled even in such matters as choosing cabinet ministers.² By this they implied that the Liberal Constitutional Party should have a weight equal to that of the Wafd in policy making. Few Wafdists could agree with that contention; for they conceived of the Wafd as a senior partner in the Alliance.

The inability to cooperate smoothly with the Wafd drove the Liberal Constitutional Party, as it was bound to do, to seek Lloyd's help. Members of the Party became frequent visitors of the Residency and were more than willing "to discuss the situation frankly" with the High Commissioner.³ As elections approached, Lloyd made it clear that he would not tolerate a cabinet formed by Zaghloul, although he would allow a coalition cabinet under Adli Yeghen or some other moderate.⁴ Whether this stipulation was a result of the frank discussions or whether it was merely a reiteration of Allenby's attitude is impossible to determine with certainty. In any case, it gave the Liberal Constitutional Party the power to assert itself over the Wafd and play a role far greater than its actual strength would have permitted. After the elections (May 22, 1926) it was the Wafdist deputies, forming a majority in the Chamber,

¹ Shafiq, Hawliyyat, III, pp. 154-55.

² "al-Intikhabat wa Natijatuhā" (The Elections and Their Results) as-Siyasah al-Ushbu'iyah, I, 12 (May 29, 1926) p. 8.

³ Lloyd, op. cit., II, p. 154.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 161-64.

who prevailed on Zaghoul to step aside and allow Adli to form the cabinet.¹

Adli's cabinet was formed on June 7, 1926. In addition to the premiership, Adli took the Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was entrusted to Tharwat, and the Ministry of Communications to Mohammad Mahmoud. The other ministers, seven in number, were Wafdists.

That the Alliance was an alliance of leaders became clear in the weeks which followed. al-Ittihad, organ of the Ittihad Party described the cabinet as a juxtaposition of two groups, the first being composed of Adli, Tharwat, and an under-secretary called Abdul Hameed Badawi, and the second being composed of the other ministers.² al-Ittihad could have added Zaghoul's name to Adli's group; for in all important matters, political decision was made after consultations in which Zaghoul, Adli, and Tharwat played a conspicuous role.³

The close cooperation among the three veteran politicians afforded the two parties a rare chance to disseminate the ideals which they stood for to the far reaches of Egyptian society. Unfortunately, the basic disagreement between the two parties as to the interpretation of the Alliance led in the long

¹ Ibid., pp. 166-67.

² al-Ittihad, July 26, 1926, quoted in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, III, p. 399.

³ The fact that Zaghoul, Adli, and Tharwat formed a sort of supra-party group, was best demonstrated at times when the conflict between the two parties came to the surface. One of these frequent disputes took place on the issue of Taha Hussein's book Fi ash-Shi'r al-Jahili. This book, infringing as it did on some traditional beliefs, had raised a storm at an earlier date. But the matter had been hushed up. In Sep., 1926, some Wafdist deputies tried to reopen the question and proposed taking legal steps against the author. The Liberal Constitutional Party opposed this measure, and Adli denied that it fell within the competence of the Chamber. A crisis began to develop, but the matter was finally resolved after Adli, Rushdi, Tharwat, and Mohammad Mahmoud held prolonged talks with Zaghoul. Ibid., IV, pp. 526 ff.

run to its collapse. In the short run, the Liberal Constitutional Party seemed to be more interested in resolving the Egyptian Question than in long-term reform projects. To prepare the atmosphere for the eventual negotiations, the Party wished to avoid any issue which might complicate Anglo-Egyptian relations. as-Siyasah propagated a policy of "good-will" by which it meant that Egypt should avoid disagreements with Britain over minor issues. But the Wafdist Press did not show an inclination to carry the policy of good will very far.¹

In the fall of 1926, Tharwat visited London where he held confidential preliminary talks with Foreign Minister Sir Austen Chamberlain. Back in Egypt, he continued to prepare the ground for the proposed talks. He planned to return to London in the following summer to carry on official negotiations. Zaghoul himself was in favor of the proposed negotiations, and was even willing to permit Tharwat to conduct them confidentially.² In spite of that, the Chamber submitted Tharwat to critical questions about the matter.³

A serious menace to the negotiations arose early in 1927 on an issue connected with the army. Certain military reforms which the Wafdist Minister of War Khashaba Pasha wanted to introduce, convinced Lloyd that the Wafd was trying to spread its influence over the army.⁴ He objected to the reforms, but Khashaba Pasha, who was under pressure of the Wafdist

¹ See Press comments, cited by: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, III, pp. 644 ff.

² Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, pp. 276-77.

³ Shafiq, Hawliyyat, III, pp. 654-55.

⁴ Lloyd, op. cit., II, pp. 200-205.

For a concise account of the crisis, see: Marlowe, op. cit., pp. 278-79.

extremists, did not retreat.¹ Adli appealed to Zaghloul, but the latter was unable to restrain his own extremist wing. This placed the cabinet in a precarious situation because Lloyd intended, in case of a deadlock, to force a showdown, and either procure from the cabinet a recognition of the Unilateral Declaration or impose on the Egyptian Government a comprehensive treaty.²

In desperation, Adli resigned.³ His resignation took Zaghloul and the Wafd by utter surprise, and the Alliance itself seemed to be threatened. However, that eventuality was averted when Tharwat agreed -- after extracting promises from the Wafd that it would shelve the army reforms -- to form a new cabinet.⁴ The new cabinet was almost identical with its predecessor. But to appease Lloyd, Khashaba Pasha returned as Minister of Communications.⁵

The army crisis was reminiscent of the crisis which followed the Sirdar's assassination in that it demonstrated the untenability of the constitutional regime in Egypt as long as the four Reservations remained unsettled. as-Siyasah was quick to point that out and urged the cabinet to reopen

¹ Ibid., p. 199.

² Ibid., pp. 219-20.

³ Ibid., p. 199.

⁴ Ibid.

Although the Wafd agreed to shelve the army reforms, the issue was revived in May, 1927. Even the resolute Tharwat was driven to the point of resignation. The army issue became for the second time the subject of lengthy discussion among Tharwat, Adli, and Zaghloul. Finally, the cabinet submitted to Lloyd's demands on the matter, and thus the crisis blew over.

Shafiq, Hawliyyat, IV, pp. 162-65, 181-86.

ar-Rafi'i, Fi A'qab ath-Thawrah, I, pp. 271 ff.

⁵ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, p. 275.

negotiations with the British Government immediately.¹ But there were many obstacles to that. King Fu'ad, who felt that the existence of the Alliance increased the chances of successful negotiations, was conspicuously opposed to them because the presence of the British forces in Egypt gave him a certain amount of security.² On the other hand, Lloyd believed in adopting a rigid attitude towards the Egyptian nationalists, and feared that any attempt to seek accomodation with Egypt on the treaty question would be interpreted as a sign of weakness and would lead to loss of prestige.³

Tharwat's main fear, however, seemed to stem from the hostility of the Wafdist deputies. He therefore insisted on conducting the negotiations in London under utmost secrecy. The talks started in June, 1927, and continued intermitently for about ten months. Only Zaghoul and Adli were informed of their contents,⁴ and even they may not have known the full details.⁵

Zaghoul's sudden death on August 23, 1927, was a severe blow to all who hoped that the negotiations could be brought to a successful end. Tharwat returned to Egypt in haste to sound the situation and was advised by his

¹ as-Siyasah, June 3, 1927, quoted in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, IV, pp. 222-23.

² Ibid., pp. 300-301.

Interview with Ahmad Pasha Abdul Ghaffar. Appendix II.
C.S. Jarvis, Desert and Delta (London: John Murray, 1947) p. 58.

³ Lloyd, op. cit., II, pp. 224-25.

⁴ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, pp. 276-77.

⁵ The Wafdist organ al-Balagh stated on Aug. 16, 1927, that Tharwat never informed Zaghoul of the details; quoted in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, IV, p.369.

adherents to abandon the endeavour.¹ But the Wafd, distracted as it were by the struggle for succession, and still weighed down by Lloyd's hostility, was in no position to take any step which might endanger the Alliance. The Wafdist leaders assured Tharwat of their good intentions² -- or perhaps they only meant to impart to him that impression -- and he returned to England to continue the negotiations. as-Siyasah and its weekly counterpart commented that the Alliance was going to survive Zaghoul's death.³

That was at best a wishful thought. The election of Mustapha Nahhas as President of the Wafd (September 22, 1927) and of Makram Ubeid as its Secretary, put an end to these hopes. The Liberal Constitutional Party immediately felt that the forces working against the continuation of the Alliance were no more under control,⁴ and by the end of November as-Siyasah had begun to complain, though in subdued tones.⁵ The Alliance had in fact ended with Zaghoul's death, though many of the leaders, each for his own reasons, wished to postpone the final breakup. Hafez Afifi counselled moderation to as-Siyasah with the intention of letting the Wafd take the first overt step against

¹ "Tatawurat as-Siyasah al-Misriyyah fi al-Ushbu'ayn al-Akhirayn; Bayn Bayan Tharwat wa Bayan al-Wizarah al-Jadidah" (Political Developments in the Last Two Weeks; from Tharwat's Proclamation to the New Cabinet's Proclamation) as-Siyasah al-Ushbu'iyyah, III, 107 (Mar. 24, 1928) p. 14.

² Ibid.

³ "Wafat al-Faqid al-Azim Tad'am Arkan al-I'tilaf" (Loosely: Zaghoul's Death Cements the Alliance) Ibid., II, 78 (Sep. 3, 1927) p. 14. as-Siyasah, n.d., quoted in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, IV, pp. 452-53.

⁴ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, pp. 279-80.

⁵ For example: "ad-Dawrah al-Barlmaniyyah al-Jadidah" (The New Parliamentary Session) as-Siyasah al-Ushbu'iyyah, II, 90 (Nov. 26, 1927) p. 14.

the Alliance.¹ Mohammad Mahmoud was eager to give a new lease of life to the Alliance² and apparently hoped to be chosen as Tharwat's successor.³

In November, Tharwat returned to Egypt but still refused to disclose the results of the negotiations,⁴ hoping to extract further concessions from the British Government. However, his position was rapidly becoming untenable. Nahhas and Ubeid were actively intriguing his fall, and the Wafdist Press were becoming outspokenly critical of the negotiations.⁵ Moreover, Tharwat could count no more on the support of the Liberal Constitutional Party. Mahmoud was so obviously trying to appease the Wafd, that Sidqi -- with the intention of bringing Mahmoud's efforts to naught -- was compelled to take steps which would precipitate a crisis and bring the Alliance to an end.⁶ The month of

¹ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, p. 280.

² Ibid., p. 281.

³ It appears that Mohammad Mahmoud was among the politicians who were engaged in intrigues that finally brought Tharwat's cabinet down.

Nahhas in a public speech, July 7, 1928, quoted in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, V, pp. 766-67.

Haykal, article in as-Siyasah, Sep. 8, 1929, quoted in; Ibid., VI, p. 872.

⁴ al-Balagh, n.d., cited by: Ibid., IV, pp. 626-27.

⁵ S. Habib, "Ifilas az-Za'amah fi Misr; al-Wafd wa al-Marhum Tharwat Basha" (The Bankruptcy of Leadership in Egypt; the Wafd and ... Tharwat Pasha) al-Muqattam, XLIII, 12815 (Apr. 16, 1931) p. 1.

⁶ On Dec. 20, 1927, and with the encouragement of Sidqi, Afifi, and Mahmoud Abdul Raziq, Haykal published an article in as-Siyasah denouncing Ubeid and Nahhas for their antagonistic attitude towards Tharwat and the Liberal Constitutional Party. This article immediately produced an uproar. Mohammad Mahmoud wanted Haykal to publish a retraction in as-Siyasah. The latter, again with the consent of Afifi, Sidqi, and Abdul Raziq, refused. Mohammad Mahmoud then published an article in al-Ahram in which he stated that Haykal's article did not express the views of the Liberal Constitutional

January, 1928, found the cabinet torn by discord.¹ Nahhas, who still did not feel very secure in his new position of leadership, was under compulsion to make a display of intransigence. He informed Lloyd that he was not willing to tolerate a treaty which did not provide for the complete withdrawal of British troops from Egypt, including Sinai and the Canal Zone.² Towards the end of February, 1928, Tharwat divulged the results of the negotiations to his colleagues. They were in the form of a draft agreement submitted by Foreign Minister Chamberlain, which Tharwat recommended as a basis for further negotiations.³ The cabinet -- as expected -- rejected the draft, and Tharwat resigned on March 4, 1928.

By this time, the atmosphere of tension had reasserted itself in the relationship between the Wafd and the Residency. The British Government had already planned what action to take should the treaty be rejected.⁴ On March 4, Lloyd presented a note to the Egyptian Government protesting against certain legislative proposals which the Egyptian Parliament intended to carry through, and reserved the freedom of action with respect to them.⁵ The

Party. Haykal retaliated by recounting the entire episode in as-Siyasah and mentioning the names of those who supported him. The storm finally subsided and the Alliance lingered on. Nothing came out of these exchanges except the fact that the Liberal Constitutional Party was divided into two factions. Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, pp. 282-83.

¹ Shafiq, Hawliyyat, V, pp. 48 ff.

² Lloyd, op. cit., II, p. 258.

³ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, pp. 283-84.

⁴ A. Toynbee, et. al. (eds.) Survey of International Affairs (1920-61) (London: Oxford University Press, 1925-65) 1928, pp. 268-69.

⁵ Ibid., p. 269.

Egyptian Government received the note when the cabinet had already resigned.¹ In the circumstances, it fell upon Tharwat's successor to reply to it.

The result of these developments was to keep the Wafd in a position of dependence on the Liberal Constitutional Party. When King Fu'ad entrusted Nahhas with the formation of the new cabinet (March 16, 1928) the latter invited his allies to take part in it. Mohammad Mahmoud was determined to accept the invitation. But he had to contend with a strong opposition within the Liberal Constitutional Party. Haykal, Sidqi, Afifi, and Abdul Raziq were against joining a cabinet headed by Nahhas. They argued that to serve under a Wafdist prime minister would reduce the Party to a state of dependence similar to that they had experienced when they had participated in Ziwari's cabinet three years earlier.² However, the real issue was much more intricate than that. The Wafd seemed in all appearances to be drifting head-on into another clash with the Residency. Many members of the Liberal Constitutional Party considered the possibilities of the situation and wondered whether it would not be wise to change colours. The Party's Board of Directors met on March 14th to consider the matter.³ Haykal argued that the Party should remain outside the cabinet in order to "circumvent" any crisis which might

¹ Ibid., p. 270.

² Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, pp. 284-85.

³ Minutes of the Board meeting as published by al-Ahram, quoted in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, V, pp. 174 ff.

The deliberations took place in a closed meeting. That they leaked out to al-Ahram could only mean that one of the members had divulged their content. The most likely person to have done that was Mohammad Mahmoud. He had been the only member of the Party to express his views at times through that newspaper. Moreover, he was the only person who stood to benefit from disclosing the reasons which caused Sidqi and his supporters to refuse to join the cabinet.

occur in Anglo-Egyptian relations. Mohammad Mahmoud's supporters objected to Haykal's argument as it implied that they would have to "run to the British" for help. After a stormy meeting in which a great deal of ill-feeling was expanded, the Board decided by a majority of seventeen against fourteen to join the cabinet.¹

Mohammad Mahmoud's object of joining the cabinet remains obscure. It could be that he had no motive other than the desire to maintain his ministerial position. Yet, in view of some of the evidence, it is quite possible that he was simply using Nahhas as a stepping stone to the premiership.²

The Liberal Constitutional Party's decision to join the cabinet was due to a great extent to Mahmoud's weight.³ Many members acquiesced to his wish not out of conviction but because they did not want to alienate him. In reality, the Alliance had ended; the Liberal Constitutional Party never supported Nahhas's cabinet as it had supported Tharwat's; and as-Siyasah continued to speak for the faction led by Sidqi rather than the faction led by Mahmoud.⁴

¹ "Tatawurat as-Siyasah al-Misriyyah", loc. cit.

Haykal states in his memoirs that it was only a majority of one which voted for the entry into the cabinet. Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, p. 285.

² See, pp. 69 ff., infra.

³ Interview with Ahmad Pasha Abdul Ghaffar. Appendix II.

⁴ Interview with Ahmad Pasha Abdul Ghaffar. Appendix II.

CHAPTER THREE

THE NEW PHASE

By the time Tharwat's cabinet fell in 1928, the Liberal Constitutional Party had undergone a profound political reorientation which forced it to alter its initial strategy and adopt a new one that contradicted with its declared aims and principles. The Party was formed at a time when the post-war Egyptian situation had not yet settled into a recognizable pattern. The architects of the Party, therefore, laid down its principles with one glance at the past and another at a future in which they hoped to play the dominant role that had been accorded to the Umma Party during the first two decades of the century. The first parliamentary elections dealt them a severe blow: descendants of the most distinguished families in Egypt were defeated at the polls by complete nonentities whose only source of strength was that they belonged to the Wafd. The Party was not slow to learn its lesson, and a year later it had a hand in the first drastic violation of the Constitution. However, the threat of autocracy, the restraining influence of Tharwat and Adli, and the presence in Sa'd Zaghloul of a national hero who could transcend party rivalries when he wanted; all these factors combined to bring the Party back to its original strategy. Still, there was no escaping the fact that the Party merely played on the fringes of the political triangle formed by the Wafd, the Palace, and the Residency.

The accession of Nahhas's first cabinet to power marks the beginning of a period during which the leadership of the Liberal Constitutional Party passed into the hands of Mohammad Mahmoud and Isma'il Sidqi. Early in March, 1926, Abdul Aziz Fahmi had resigned from the Presidency of the Party, ostensibly because he was tired of politics, but possibly because the Party had

decided that he was not fit for the role.¹ Adli and Tharwat maintained their hegemony till 1928. In September of that year, Tharwat died unexpectedly, and about the same time, Adli began to show a lack of interest in the Party. This change of attitude on Adli's part was neither sudden nor strange. It was perhaps hastened by Zaghoul's death and the transfer of Wafdist leadership into the hands of individuals whom he probably thought of as opportunists.² He therefore withdrew from active politics and reappeared on the political scene only once, as head of a caretaker's cabinet in 1929.

The disappearance of Adli and Tharwat from the political scene affected the Liberal Constitutional Party in two ways. It deprived the Party of a unified leadership, and brought to its head two men who were much more disposed to use drastic measures than Tharwat and Adli had been. Coinciding as it did with Zaghoul's death, this change of leadership was a turning point in the history of the Party. There was no more a question of union, or even an alliance, with the Wafd. Nahhas never consented to deal with the Liberal Constitutional Party on terms of equality. Mahmoud and Sidqi were therefore faced with one of two alternatives: to acquiesce to a Wafdist supremacy or to resort to nonconstitutional methods to undermine it.

The second method was chosen. To justify that, the Liberal Constitutional Party used an argument which had already been expounded in 1924

¹ Compare the Wafdist, Kawkab ash-Sharq, Mar. 5, 1926, with the Ittihadist, al-Ittihad, Mar. 7, 1926, both quoted in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, III, pp. 123-24.

² See, for example, the account of a conversation which Haykal had with Adli in Jan., 1932, in: Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, pp. 340-41.

after Zaghloul's fall. It was claimed that the Wafd, taking advantage of its parliamentary majority, had abused democratic principles by daily violation of the Constitution, by encouraging civil strife, and by suppressing the anti-Wafdist parties. It was therefore necessary to have a respite of Wafdist rule during which time a truly good and efficient government would purge the country of all vestiges of Wafdist corruption and lay the ground for a real democracy.¹

The justification could not mitigate the irony of the situation. The fact remained that the fathers of the Constitution had finally abandoned their child. The factors which account for this reversal were born of two major flaws inherent in the Liberal Constitutional Party itself.

On the one hand, the Party's early faith in the applicability of representative institutions to Egypt was not well founded. The type of democracy that it tried to impose on the country was borrowed from Western Europe. The Party's belief that this type of democracy was applicable to Egypt rested on its faith in education and the possibility of assimilating Western civilization by a process of learning. The basic drawback to this belief was that it presupposed the possibility of reconciling the long-standing indigenous institutions to an alien system of government and to the civilization from which that system of government stemmed.

On the other hand, the members of the Party themselves, who had been at the outset such fervent protagonists of constitutionalism, had not assimilated

¹ For example:
as-Siyasah, July 11, 1928, quoted in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, V,
 pp. 800-804.
 Cabinet Memorandum, July 18, 1928, quoted in: Ibid., pp. 816-20.
 Mohammad Mahmoud in a public speech, Nov. 11, 1928, quoted in:
Ibid., pp. 1276-84.

the system of beliefs which is so essential to democratic practices. Moreover, they had not given sufficient thought to the full implications of democracy, and consequently were not prepared for the eventuality of their incurring a political defeat when the representative institutions that they had fostered started functioning.

The failure of the Alliance to provide a permanent arrangement through which the Liberal Constitutional Party could secure itself a portion of political power, imposed upon the Party the necessity of choosing between two alternatives: it could either adopt a policy of stark opportunism, or reformulate its principles and evolve a new system of beliefs which would stem from Egypt's realities and be more suitable as a basis for government in the country and as a framework for its progress. The second alternative required a hard core of intellectuals who would be capable of formulating the new system of beliefs and disseminating them to the rest of the country. That the Party fell upon the first alternative was largely due to its failure to assemble together a group of intellectuals capable of such an endeavor. In fact, it had lost some of the promising intellectuals who had adhered to it at the outset, the first and greatest of these being Dr. Taha Hussein.

Of the intellectuals who remained in the Party, the most outstanding were Lutfi as-Sayyid, Ali Abdul Raziq, and Mohammad Hussein Haykal. But the first of these had by the late 'twenties passed the period of his great intellectual creativity, and for some unexplained reason failed to rise to the challenge. The second, Ali Abdul Raziq, limited his intellectual pursuits almost exclusively to an investigation of the judiciary system, and therefore could produce nothing of direct relevance to the Party.

The third, Haykal, who as editor-in-chief of as-Siyasah, was in an excellent position to act as the Party's theoretician, proved incapable of the task. He lacked the intellectual integrity and the consistent rational perceptiveness which such a task required. At the outset of his political career, Haykal had been a confirmed democrat and an admirer of Western culture and civilization. By 1926, he had begun to entertain some doubts about the viability of democratic principles.¹ By 1928, he had forsaken democratic principles.² At the same time, he had undergone a complete intellectual re-orientation. He no more sought inspiration in Western civilization, but turned his attention, first to the remote pharoanic past, and then to Islamic history. However, his attempt to reinterpret Islam in the light of modern reason proved his limitations. His thoughts were in some places confused, while in other places he showed a tendency to use inconsistent and even contradictory standards of judgement.³ With time, he turned into a political cynic. He was known to remark that there could be no reforms in Egypt in the presence of British authority and the Monarchy.⁴ Consequently, his whole political efforts

¹ M.H. Haykal, "ad-Dimuqratiyyah, Hal Aflasat?" (Has Democracy Gone Bankrupt?) as-Siyasah al-Ushbu'iyah, I, 2 (Mar. 20, 1926) p. 4.

² See, p. 72, infra.

³ Haykal's limitations appear in his book Hayat Mohammad (The Life of Mohammad) first published in 1935. In this biography of the Prophet, the author tried to apply the "scientific method" of modern research. He wrote the book with the hope that it could, with other similar studies, demonstrate that Islam could serve as a basis for a modernized rational life in which science occupies an important position. For an analysis of the book, see: Safran, op. cit., pp. 169 ff.

⁴ M. Sabri, Qisat Malik wa 4 Wizarat (The Story of a King and Four Cabinets) (Cairo: Dar al-Qalam, n.d.) pp. 10-11.

were devoted to the conciliation of the various factions within the Party, as well as to intrigue against other parties.

The absence of a strong intellectual element caused the Liberal Constitutional Party to be distracted by immediate political considerations, and to lose sight of any long-term ideological message which it could deliver to the nation. To the majority of the members, the question was simply that of practical politics: how to defeat the Wafd without giving undue power to the King. Mohammad Mahmoud and Isma'il Sidqi each tried in turn to find an answer to the question. Their ultimate failure was largely due to the inability of either of them to count on the support of the other.

Mohammad Mahmoud and Isma'il Sidqi were personal foes. In the words of Ahmad Pasha Abdul Ghaffar, it was enough that one of them should espouse a policy for the other to oppose it. It is something of a puzzle why they should have felt that way about each other. Perhaps their strength of character and autocratic natures made it impossible for either of them to find a place for the other in his respective political scheme.

The discord between them appeared immediately after Nahhas took office. as-Siyasah, which was controlled by Sidqi through Hafez Afifi, was openly hostile to the cabinet.¹ More serious still were Sidqi's personal intrigues to topple the cabinet. Nahhas had taken office in a situation which

¹ For example:
as-Siyasah, May, 1928, quoted in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, V, pp. 446-49.
Ibid., p. 438.

"anNahhas Basha Yashkur al-Hukumah al-Baritaniyyah ala Balaghiha al-Akhir" (Nahhas Thanks the British Government on Its Recent Proclamation) as-Siyasah al-Usubu'iyah, III, 115 (May 19, 1928) p. 14.

"Ta'dil al-La'ihah ad-Dakhiliyyah li Majlis an-Nuwwab" (Amending the Chamber's By-Laws) Ibid., III, 119 (June 16, 1928) p. 14.

had all the earmarks of a crisis. Lloyd's note of March 4, 1928, was followed by an ultimatum on April 29th, requesting the withdrawal from the Senate of an Assembly Bill which sought to replace the existing law of public meetings.¹ Lloyd was intent on destroying Nahhas, and wanted to force the issue to an extent which would compell Nahhas to resign.² Isma'il Sidqi took the opportunity to present himself at the Residency³ as a possible substitute.

It is quite possible that at that time Mahmoud was already plotting Nahhas's fall. But it was hardly conducive to his interest that Sidqi should succeed in his endeavor. Therefore, he advised Nahhas to submit to Lloyd's ultimatum,⁴ and possibly went as far as making his attitude clear to the Residency.⁵ But Nahhas was unwilling to let his first action upon assuming office be a submission to a humiliating British demand. He consented to postpone the Assembly Bill to the next Parliamentary session but refused to

¹ Lloyd, op. cit., II, pp. 271-72.

² Disclosed by Henderson to the British House of Commons, July 26, 1929, in: Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, 230 H.C. Deb. 5 s., 1642.

The sole object behind the ultimatum was to brow-beat the new Wafdist leadership into timidity. The Bill had been due to pass before the rejection of the Tharwat-Henderson draft treaty and it had arrived at the final stage without raising any objections on the part of the British Government. But due to a technical error in the text, the Bill had to be passed a second time through the Senate. Toynbee, Survey for 1928, pp. 270-71.

³ Disclosed by Nahhas in a public speech, July 7, 1928, quoted in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, V, p. 764.

⁴ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, p. 287.

⁵ According to a public speech by Makram Ubeid, Sep. 7, 1929, quoted in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, VI, p. 850.

make any further concessions. The British cabinet, overruling Lloyd, was satisfied with this temporary palliative, and let it leak out to the Egyptian Minister in London that they were not forcing the issue.¹

A marked difference of opinion divided Lloyd from his government with respect to the policy which Britain should adopt in Egypt.² Lloyd was extremely concerned about Britain's economic interests in Egypt, and for that reason was interested in maintaining as much control over the country as possible. In contrast, the British Foreign Office was mainly interested in the military aspect, and was willing to give Egypt many concessions provided adequate arrangements were made for Britain's military interests. It is certain that this attitude did not escape Egyptian politicians, for many of them had direct contact with British politicians. At any rate, Nahhas seemed to act on the assumption that he could win the Foreign Office's confidence and induce them to reverse Lloyd's policy in Egypt. In April and May, 1928, he made several conciliatory gestures towards the British cabinet and towards Chamberlain personally.³

¹ Ibid.

² Marlowe, op. cit., pp. 283-84.

The difference of opinion between Lloyd and the British Foreign Office appeared for the first time when Lloyd vetoed Zaghoul's accession to the premiership in 1926. On that occasion, the Foreign Office did not agree that Zaghoul's return to power would be as much a threat to Britain's interests and prestige as Lloyd imagined. The difference appeared again on the army issue in 1926-27. Lloyd exaggerated the dangers inherent in the Egyptian army, but his warnings were not taken seriously by the permanent officials of the Foreign Office. In both cases, Lloyd was able to convince the Foreign Minister of his views, but not the permanent officials.

Lloyd, op. cit., II, pp. 162, 203-207, 213-14, 219-20.

Henderson to the House of Commons, July 26, 1929, in: Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, 230 H.C. Deb. 5 s., 1641-42.

³ For example:

as-Siyasah, May 8, 1928, cited by: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, V, pp. 829-30.

as-Siyasah, n.d., cited by: Ibid., pp. 448-49.

Cabinet proclamation, May, 1928, quoted in: Ibid., pp. 457-58.

This was a very ominous sign for the Liberal Constitutional Party. If Nahhas could ingratiate himself with the Foreign Office, then he would be able to oust the Liberal Constitutionalist minister and rule with a purely Wafdist cabinet. Wafdist deputies were already behaving as if the Alliance had ended. In May, notwithstanding the bitter protests of the Liberal Constitutionalist deputies, they amended the Chamber's by-laws in a way which the Liberal Constitutionalists felt to be repressive towards the minority parties.¹

Mohammad Mahmoud and Isma'il Sidqi were thus driven to cooperate for the last time. They struck a bargain with the Palace whereby they would take the first chance to topple the cabinet.² It is impossible to state exactly at what time this agreement was concluded and what was Lloyd's attitude to it.³ But early in June, the Wafdist Press was already aware that a plot was

¹ "Ta'dil al-La'ihah ad-Dakhiliyyah li Majlis an-Nuwwab" (Amending the By-Laws of the Chamber) as-Siyasah al-Ushbu'iyah, III, 119 (June, 16, 1928) p. 14.

² Marlowe, op. cit., p. 282.
Interview with Ahmad Pasha Abdul Ghaffar. Appendix II.

³ Lloyd states that following Tharwat's fall in 1928, Mahmoud and Sidqi were both "busy pulling strings, and no one could quite tell what would be the result of their manipulations". Lloyd, op. cit., II, p. 270.

Ahmad Pasha Abdul Ghaffar stated that the possibility could not be ruled out that Mahmoud was already in collusion with the King when he entered Nahhas's cabinet.

Lloyd's role in the plot is not very clear. Permanent officials of the Foreign Office believed that he was directly involved in it. Marlowe, op. cit., p. 283.

He himself does not admit an active role. But he does not hide the fact that he approved of the coup. Lloyd, op. cit., II, pp. 276-78.

But it is definite that both Lloyd and Foreign Minister Chamberlain knew of the coup before hand. Chamberlain, cited by: Toynbee, Survey for 1928, pp. 278-79.

However, although the evidence is lacking, it is difficult to believe that such a serious affair could have taken place without receiving the encouragement of at least the Residency.

brewing.¹ Sidqi was the focus of all the rumours;² indeed, the original plot envisaged him rather than Mahmoud as Nahhas's successor. His plan was to abrogate the Constitution and promulgate a new one which would place authority almost entirely in the hands of the executive.³ A few days before the fall of Nahhas, Sidqi began consultations with his supporters regarding the formation of the new cabinet.⁴ At the last minute, however, the King decided to entrust Mahmoud with the formation of the new cabinet. Rumours had it later that Tawfiq Nasim, President of the Royal Diwan, had placed a veto on Sidqi.⁵ But it is more likely that the change of person was due to a change of plan. It must be that King Fu'ad had decided for some reason that the time was inappropriate for radical constitutional changes, and had consequently chosen Mahmoud rather than Sidqi.

Chance played against the Wafd. Certain documents which cast shadows on Nahhas's integrity fell into the King's hands, thus giving him a chance to discredit the Prime Minister. On June 17, 1928, Mahmoud resigned from the

¹ Shafiq, Hawliyyat, V, p. 575.

² Ibid., p. 602.

³ Isma'il Sidqi to al-Muqattam, quoted in: "Akhir Anba' al-Mawqif as-Siyasi al-Hadir; Tasrih li Dawlat Sidqi Basha" (Latest News of the Political Situation; Declaration by Sidqi Pasha) al-Muqattam, XLII, 12672 (Oct. 24, 1930) p. 4.

⁴ Interview with Ahmad Pasha Abdul Ghaffar. Appendix II.

⁵ "Hawl Tawfiq Nasim Basha; al-Masa'i al-Mabdhulah" (On Tawfiq Nasim Pasha) as-Sarkhah, II, 37 (Apr. 26, 1931) p. 10.

cabinet. Two days later, the incriminating documents found their way to the Press and three other ministers resigned. No plausible reason was offered for the resignation, but the public was given to believe that they were caused by the scandal surrounding Nahhas. On June 25, 1928, the King dismissed the cabinet on the ground that the Alliance had collapsed. On the same day, Mohammad Mahmoud was asked to form the new cabinet. Three days later, Parliament was suspended.

The attitude of the Party to these developments is significant because it influenced the outcome of the coup as well as Mahmoud's policy. At least four prominent members opposed the coup; namely, Ahmad Abdul Ghaffar, Mahmoud Abdul Raziq, Mahmoud Azmi, a co-editor of as-Siyasah, and Mahmoud Tawfiq Diab, a former co-editor of as-Siyasah. When Mohammad Mahmoud accepted the King's invitation to form the new cabinet, he was submitted to a violent attack from Abdul Ghaffar, Azmi, and Abdul Raziq. Their point of contention was that a coup of this sort would place the Party at the mercy of the Palace.¹ This argument is interesting because the Liberal Constitutional Party could only become dependent on the Palace by losing the support of the Residency. However, it is unlikely that Lloyd himself was opposed to the coup; many politicians in Cairo and in the British Foreign Office believed that he was actively involved in it.² Therefore, any change of British attitude could only originate from the Foreign Office. At the time of the coup, Hafez Afifi was in London, and was recalled to Cairo to occupy the Foreign Ministry. It is quite possible that he brought with him some disquieting news.

¹ Interview with Ahmad Pasha Abdul Ghaffar. Appendix II.

² Marlowe, op. cit., p. 283.
ar-Rafi'i, Fi A'qab ath-Thawrah, II, p. 45.

Haykal's attitude was ambiguous. In his memoirs he claims that he approved of the coup.¹ But his actions indicate that he did not wish to become involved conspicuously. He steadfastly refused all pleas to remain in Cairo to direct the campaign of as-Siyasah at that crucial moment.² He persistently advised his friend Mahmoud Abdul Raziq to refuse the office of Minister of the Interior which Mohammad Mahmoud was urging him to accept.³ Subsequently, he left for Europe and spent the summer there. Upon his return, he expressed his disapproval of some measures taken by the cabinet, and refused to defend these measures in as-Siyasah.⁴

Mohammad Mahmoud, with Sidqi's support, was able to quiet down the opposition within the Party. This was achieved by reassuring those members that the cabinet did not intend to violate the Constitution.⁵ But after approximately three weeks of deliberations, Mahmoud was forced to retract his promise. On July 19, 1928, he obtained a Royal Rescript dissolving both Houses of Parliament and suspending the articles of the Constitution which provided for new elections and for the freedom of the Press. This arrangement was scheduled to continue for a term of three years subject to prolongation.

¹ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, pp. 288-89.

² Ibid., p. 291.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., p. 298.

⁵ Interview with Ahmad Pasha Abdul Ghaffar. Appendix II. M. Azmi in al-Ahram, July 21, 1928, quoted in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, V, pp. 840-41.

The Rescript of July 19th, renewed the rebellion within the Liberal Constitutional Party. Mahmoud Azmi and Mohammad Tawfiq Diab resigned from the Party immediately. Abdul Ghaffar and Abdul Raziq were at the point of doing the same, but were persuaded by Lutfi as-Sayyid to change their minds.¹

Thus, Mohammad Mahmoud was in a difficult position. While having to fight the Wafdist Opposition with one hand and push the King with the other, he had at the same time to appease the British Foreign Office and silence the opposition within his own Party. The Wafd was the least of his worries.² Bent on placating the Foreign Office, Nahhas refrained from inciting the populace against the government. The Opposition, therefore, took a classical form: the defunct Parliament met on July 28th, and passed a vote of censure against the cabinet.³ It met again on November 17th, and elected its officials.⁴ The Opposition could do little else, short of rebellion, to embarrass the cabinet. Mahmoud managed by vigorous retaliation to suppress the more violent Press attacks;⁵ and he issued the necessary laws to keep the Wafd's activities under control.⁶ Moreover, government officials of doubtful loyalties were discharged,

¹ Interview with Ahmad Pasha Abdul Ghaffar. Appendix II.

² Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, p. 299.

³ ar-Rafi'i, Fi A'qab ath-Thawrah, II, pp. 63, 66.

⁴ Ibid., p. 73.

⁵ Shafiq, Hawliyyat, VI, pp. 16-18, 263-64.

⁶ On Mar. 20, 1929, the cabinet issued a law which imposed a fine or a prison sentence on anyone who incited against the regime. On the same day, it amended the Assembly Law and added to it some stringent rules. Text of the decrees, quoted in: Ibid., pp. 196-99.

and more reliable men appointed in their places.¹ To discredit Nahhas personally, the cabinet had him summoned with his accomplices by the Lawyer's Disciplinary Tribunal for unethical conduct.²

Mahmoud's relations with the Liberal Constitutional Party were much more intricate. Enjoying Sidqi's temporary support, he was able to promote himself to the presidency of the Party. Yet he could neither count on the Party's continued acquiescence nor on Sidqi's disinterested support. He had taken this factor into consideration from the beginning and had tried to anticipate trouble with the Party by having all factions represented in the cabinet. Between June 25 and July 19, 1928, he had tried -- without success -- to tempt Mahmoud Abdul Raziq to accept the Ministry of the Interior. He had included in his cabinet Lutfi as-Sayyid and Hafez Afifi, both of whom supported Sidqi as a rule. Simultaneously, he had pressed King Fu'ad to create the position of Auditor-General and give it to Sidqi.³

While this last measure was designed to secure Sidqi's continued support to the regime, it would have also tended to strengthen the cabinet at the expense of the King.⁴ It was not unnatural, then, that King Fu'ad refused to consent to the appointment. Indeed, the struggle for power between the King and the Prime Minister had started immediately after the latter had taken office, and had manifested itself, as it was bound to do, in a scheme to resuffle the pro-

¹ Ibid., p. 266.

² The Court returned a sentence of not guilty on Feb. 17, 1929. ar-Rafi'i, Fi A'qab ath-Thawrah, II, pp. 75-76. Shafiq, Hawliyyat, VI, pp. 78-79.

³ Lloyd, op. cit., II, p. 280.

⁴ Ibid.

vincial administration.³ Finally, Mahmoud dropped Sidqi's candidature to the position of Auditor-General, and it was generally believed that he paid that price for securing some of the high provincial offices for his own supporters.²

Thus, in the last analysis, Mahmoud had failed to enlist Sidqi's services, and therefore could not presume on the latter's continued support. Coupled with the King's hostility, this tended to force Mahmoud into greater reliance on the Residency. Lloyd took advantage of the situation in order to negotiate with the cabinet some of the issues pending between Great Britain and Egypt. In February, 1929, a preliminary agreement was reached with respect to Egypt's share of the Ottoman Debt. On May 7, 1929, another agreement concerning the administration of the Nile Waters was concluded. Both agreements received their due share of Wafdist criticism.³ But of the two, the latter received greater amount of discredit. For one thing, it was based on the report of the Nile Commission established as a result of the ultimatum of 1924. Furthermore, it was contrary to the view commonly held in Egypt concerning the Nile Waters. It gave Egypt less control over the Nile than had always been demanded, and it gave the Sudan Government the right to use a greater amount of water in the irrigation of the Gezira.⁴

For a while, Mahmoud seemed to be well established in power. He ruled the country with a measure of efficiency, and his term in office compared

¹ Ibid., pp. 279, 286.

² Ibid., p. 286.

³ Press comments quoted in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, VI, pp. 143 ff., 292 ff.

⁴ The Wafd's proclamation, May 16, 1929, quoted in: Ibid., pp. 305 ff.

favorably with those of his predecessors. Moreover, the cabinet launched a number of construction projects which might have won some prestige in the long run. But Mahmoud could not overlook the inherent weakness of his position. There was nothing to guarantee continued British toleration, the absence of which would undermine the cabinet's power and make it subject to a possible alliance between Sidqi and the King. For that reason, Mahmoud was forced to think more and more in terms of achieving a major political breakthrough which would justify his coup, enhance his prestige, and consolidate his hold over the Liberal Constitutional Party.

Such a breakthrough could only be achieved within the realm of Anglo-Egyptian relations, namely, the negotiation of an agreement on the four Reservations. Yet Mahmoud did not entertain such an idea;¹ and indeed, he could not. The British contention had always been that an agreement of that nature would have to be ratified by parliament. For that reason, Mahmoud tried to tackle the question of the Capitulations without going into the other issues covered by the four Reservations. Of all the factors restricting Egypt's independence, the Capitulations were of primary importance to the Liberal Constitutional Party. These extra-territorial rights, assumed by foreign Powers and defended by Britain, were becoming more and more difficult to apply. In addition to the inequitable legal situations they often created, they exempted foreign nationals living and doing business in Egypt from several taxes. This was detrimental to the interests of Egyptian businessmen, and consequently was considered an obstruction to the economic development of the country. Mahmoud hoped to modify the most glaring injustices of the Capitulations with Britain's help. Finding Lloyd's attitude unfavorable, he

¹ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, p. 301.

sent Hafez Afifi to London in March, 1929, to discuss the matter directly with the Foreign Office.¹ It turned out that the British Government held a much more amenable view of the matter than the High Commissioner,² and Mahmoud finally proceeded to London to conclude the talks himself.

His trip coincided with the British General Elections of 1929 and the return of Labour to power. As a result, Mahmoud found himself confronted with a British cabinet which listened more readily to the permanent officials of the Foreign Office. The immediate outcome of Labour's attitude was that Lloyd was abruptly and unceremoniously forced to resign.³ The new Foreign Secretary, Arthur Henderson, then proceeded to draw Mahmoud into general negotiations with the purpose of setting down "proposals" for an Anglo-Egyptian treaty.⁴ Furthermore, Henderson left no doubt that he expected the proposals to be submitted for parliamentary consideration.⁵ Mahmoud was thus cornered: to accept the British invitation would entail a return to parliamentary life in Egypt. To refuse the invitation would cause the British Government to inform King Fu'ad formally of their desire to negotiate. Acting upon Haykal's advice, who was also in London, Mahmoud accepted the in-

¹ as-Siyasah, Mar. 19, 1929, quoted in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, VI, p. 218. Lloyd, op. cit., II, p. 291.

² Zayid, Egypt's Struggle, p. 130.

³ Henderson to the House of Commons, July 26, 1929, in: Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, 230 H.C. Deb. 5 s., 1641-42.

⁴ Mohammad Mahmoud in a public speech, Aug. 24, 1929, quoted in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, VI, p. 713.

⁵ M. Sh. Ghorbal, Tarikh al-Mufawadat al-Misriyyah al-B̄ritaniyyah (History of Anglo-Egyptian Negotiations) (Cairo: Maktabat an-Nahdah al-Misriyyah, 1952) I, p. 713.

Zayid, Egypt's Struggle, p. 132.

vitation.¹ But he knew that the fate of his cabinet was sealed. He had already come to realize that he could no longer rely on King Fu'ad's support.² Certain officials connected with the Egyptian Court were already discussing the necessity of abandoning Mahmoud's regime and putting Sidqi's plan into effect. King Fu'ad was touring Europe at the time and was expected shortly afterwards in London. Hafez Afifi, who had accompanied the King through most of his tour, arrived in London ahead of the royal visit, and held a confidential meeting with Mahmoud. The latter then proceeded to Paris on July 19th, ostensibly to inform the King of the progress of the negotiations,³ but the real cause must have been to discuss the proposed constitutional changes. When he returned to London two days later, he discussed the changes with Haykal. The latter opposed the idea, and Mahmoud himself did not seem enthusiastic about it.⁴ Afifi, who must have reflected Sidqi's opinion, was clearly for it and tried in vain to convince Mahmoud and Haykal to accept it.⁵ Finally, Mahmoud had to reject King Fu'ad's request for constitutional changes,⁶ partly because he thought they went too far, and partly because Henderson would have objected to them at that particular moment. This alienated King Fu'ad further, and by the time Mahmoud had returned to Egypt, it was clear that he had completely lost the King's support.⁷

¹ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, p. 301.

² Ghorbal, op. cit., I, pp. 207-208.

³ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, pp. 303-304.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 304-306. ⁵ Ibid., p. 305.

⁶ as-Siyasah, Oct. 24, 1930, quoted in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, VII, pp. 1242-43.

⁷ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, pp. 308-309.

The Mahmoud-Henderson negotiations ended on August 3, 1929. The resulting proposals were the best that had been negotiated so far.¹ They were accepted by the Ittihad Party and the Liberal Constitutional Party.² The Wafd refused to disclose its opinion officially except within parliament; but its Press, as well as public statements made by its leaders left no room for doubt that they too approved of the proposals.³ Thus, when the new High Commissioner Sir Percy Loraine arrived in Egypt on September 2, 1929, he found Mahmoud haggling with the Wafd on the question of elections. Mahmoud insisted on conducting the elections himself on the basis of the 1923 Electoral Law.⁴ Later, he clutched at a suggestion advanced by some independent politicians of reviving the Wafd-Liberal Alliance.⁵ But the Wafd refused to revive the Alliance, and insisted on elections run by an independent cabinet on the basis of the 1924 Electoral Law.⁶ Loraine supported the Wafd's claim⁷ and Mahmoud had to resign. He was succeeded by Adli Pasha at the head of a caretaker's cabinet.

¹ For the results of the negotiations, see: Appendix IV.

² Shafiq, Hawliyyat, VI, pp. 807-808.
 Liberal Constitutional Party, proclamation, in: as-Siyasah al-Ushbu'iyah, III, 190 (Oct. 26, 1929) p. 6.

³ For example:
 M. Ubeid in a public speech, Sep. 7, 1929, quoted in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, VI, p. 859.
al-Balagh, Sep. 25, 1929, quoted in: Ibid., pp. 893-94.
 Nahhas in an interview with the Daily Express, Oct., 1929, Arabic translation, quoted in: Ibid., p. 967.

⁴ ar-Rafi'i, Fi A'qab ath-Thawrah, II, p. 95.

⁵ Shafiq, Hawliyyat, VI, p. 785.

⁶ Nahhas in a public speech, Sep., 1929, quoted in: Ibid., pp. 757 ff.
 The 1924 Electoral Law had been introduced by the Wafd and promulgated by the first Egyptian Parliament. It provided for one-stage elections.

⁷ ar-Rafi'i, Fi A'qab ath-Thawrah, II, pp. 95-96.

In a last desperate attempt to prevent the Wafd from returning to power, the Liberal Constitutional Party decided to boycott the elections. Had the other opposition parties followed suit, the ground would have been laid down to the claim that the new Parliament was not representative. But both the National and the Ittihad parties decided to run for the elections. Its scheme frustrated, the Liberal Constitutional Party still would not give up. After the elections of December, 1929, which resulted in a major Wafdist victory, as-Siyasah claimed that the new Parliament was not properly representative because the ratio of Wafdist deputies was far out of proportion with the number of votes that they had actually acquired.¹ Coinciding with the King's hostility to Nahhas, this argument carried a special significance, and a battle ensued between the Wafdist Press and as-Siyasah.² Yet, in the current mood of the Foreign Office, as-Siyasah could hardly hope to score a point on that argument. Nahhas formed a cabinet on January 1, 1930, and proceeded to re-open negotiations with Henderson without being bothered by the mathematical aspect of his parliamentary majority.

There was a widespread belief that the new cabinet, backed by a majority in the Chamber, would be able to conclude a treaty with Britain. But the negotiations which started in London on March 31, 1930, ended in failure. Despite Nahhas's desire to conclude the treaty, he was unable to accept the terms which the Wafd had previously prevented Mahmoud from realizing. He tried in vain to acquire more concessions on the Sudan question.³ Henderson refused

¹ For example: as-Siyasah, Dec. 23, 1929, quoted in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, VI, pp. 1478 ff.

² The Press comments quoted in: Ibid., pp. 1478 ff.

³ See, Appendix IV.

to modify his earlier proposals except for some trifling points. The negotiations were therefore terminated on May 8, 1930, and Nahhas returned to Cairo empty handed.

As usual, the stage was set for a change of government. The British Residency lost interest in the Wafdist cabinet, and the King had already made his plans. The Liberal Constitutional Party entertained the hope that the King would call on them to succeed Nahhas. They had prepared the ground during the preceding months by contineously complaining of Wafdist misgovernment.¹ On May 26, 1930, following Nahhas's return from London, the Liberal Constitutional Party decided to bring these grievances to the King's attention.² The petition which they submitted the following day, was considered by many to be a sign that the King and the Liberal Constitutional Party were in collusion against the Wafd.³ In a sense, they were. But there was a great deal of confusion as to what each side expected from the other. The Party believed that the King would call on Mohammad Mahmoud to pick up where he had left off. But the King, while counting on the Party's support, had no intention of putting up with Mahmoud's half measures any longer. His choice now rested on Sidqi, who was known as willing to go to greater extremes than Mahmoud.⁴

The expected collision between the King and Nahhas was finally triggered off by the latter. Being aware that a new constitutional coup was in the offing,

¹ For example:
as-Siyasah, Feb. 9, 1930, quoted in: Ibid, VII, pp. 371 ff.
as-Siyasah, June 4, quoted in: Ibid., pp. 676 ff.

² Minutes of the meeting of the Party's Board of Directors, quoted in: Ibid., pp. 639-42.

³ ar-Rafi'i, Fi A'qab ath-Thawrah, II, p. 107.

⁴ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, p. 314.

the cabinet guided through Parliament a bill which set down penalties to be imposed on any minister who violated the Constitution.¹ The King refused to sign the bill, and Nahhas resigned on June 17, 1930. Two days later, Sidqi was invited to form the new cabinet.

This took the Liberal Constitutional Party by surprise. Mahmoud refused to allow any member of the Party to join the cabinet on the basis that the King had deliberately bypassed them by choosing Sidqi.² In that, he was only trying to confuse the issues. The King had chosen Sidqi simply because the latter was willing to change the Constitution, and had the efficiency and the strength of character to see the change through. Sidqi himself did his best to induce some members of the Party to join his cabinet. Only Hafez Afifi and Lutfi as-Sayyid dared to accept, thereby losing their membership in the Party for defying Mahmoud's wishes. On June 20, 1930, as-Siyasah made it clear that the cabinet was an independent one, and that the Party was not committed to supporting it.³

The attitude of the Liberal Constitutional Party should be examined more closely. In his memoirs, Haykal admits that he realized that Sidqi's accession to the premiership had a hidden significance.⁴ One could assume that both Haykal and Mahmoud knew exactly what the significance was. In view of what had transpired in London the previous summer, they would have had to be less astute than they were not to realize what was afoot. Therefore, the minute

¹ Text of the bill, in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, VII, pp. 757 ff.

² Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, p. 314.

³ as-Siyasah, June 20, 1930, quoted in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, VII, pp. 714 ff.

⁴ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, p. 314.

Sidqi accepted office, the Party was faced with the necessity of choosing between the Constitution of 1923 and a new constitution which would presumably give more power to the executive.

By this time, the Liberal Constitutional Party had come to recognize the necessity of amending the Constitution¹ and introducing a new electoral law.² It appears, however, that the constitutional changes they envisaged aimed at restricting the sovereignty of the people without giving undue power to the executive. This could hardly satisfy Sidqi whose ambitions ran much higher than that. He hoped to found a regime which would give him a virtual dictatorship over the country and yet carry all the trappings of a constitutional government to please the British Foreign Office.

This divergence of ideas placed the Liberal Constitutional Party in a delicate position. On the one hand, they feared that a dictatorship would only pave the way for a return to autocracy. On the other, it was very important to them to have friendly relations with the government. Nahhas had purged the administration of many of their supporters,³ and Sidqi was now in a position to remedy that harmful situation.⁴ That was particularly important to the land magnates whose power and prestige in the provinces had to be continuously nurtured. In the last analysis, the loss of government connection was more disagreeable to the landowners than the threat of a return to autocracy. Mahmoud

¹ See, p. 88, *infra*.

² M.H. Haykal et. al., *as-Siyasah al-Misriyyah wa al-Inqilab ad-Dustouri* (Egyptian Politics and the Constitutional Coup) (Cairo: Matba'at as-Siyasah, 1931) p. 16.

³ Shafiq, *Hawliyyat*, VI, pp. 63 ff, 400 ff.

⁴ Haykal, *Mudhakkarat*, I, p. 315.

was aware of that, and he knew that most members of the Party -- irrespective of their attitude to the Constitution -- would desert him as soon as he broke away from the cabinet.¹

For that reason, Mahmoud was forced to support Sidqi, at least until such a time that the Party's demands in the way of public appointments had been satisfied. He hoped in that way to make the final showdown less detrimental to the Party's interests.² In the meantime, he reconstituted the Board of Directors of the Party by appointing his own adherents to it.³ The Party rallied around Mahmoud: even those who would later sacrifice the Constitution to remain on the good side of the government still hoped at this stage to induce Sidqi to change his mind.

At the beginning, Sidqi was hardly in a position to be more exacting in his attitude towards the Liberal Constitutional Party. After taking office, he found himself in an embarrassing position and quite in need of all the support he could get from them. Loraine had given Sidqi his support rather reluctantly, and that only after being harassed by the British financial community in

¹ Ibid., p. 318.

² Ibid., p. 316, 318.

³ Dr. Mahmoud Abdul Raziq Bey (not to be confused with Mahmoud Pasha Abdul Raziq) wrote a letter to Mohammad Mahmoud, Oct. 25, 1930, in which he complained about the reorganization of the Board, and requested the convocation of the General Assembly of the Party to elect a new Board. When Mohammad Mahmoud refused to comply with this demand, Abdul Raziq Bey submitted his resignation from the Party. The text of both letters, in: "Istiqalat al-Daktor Mahmoud Abdul Raziq Bey" (The Resignation of Dr. Mahmoud Abdul Raziq Bey) al-Muqattam, XLII, 12962 (Nov. 16, 1930) p. 5.

This was the only reference which the author has been able to find to a General Assembly of the Party. Ahmad Pasha Abdul Ghaffar stated explicitly that the Board was appointed by a process of consultation among the leading members. In view of that, Abdul Raziq's complaint could only be due to the fact that Mohammad Mahmoud had reconstituted the Board in a way to include his own adherents in it.

Egypt.¹ The British Foreign Office was uneasy about the Egyptian situation despite the fact that they did not seem to cherish a Wafdist return to power.² On the domestic scene, a revolutionary situation began to develop. Isolated riots broke out in July and threatened to spread as the Wafd carried an active campaign against the cabinet. On July 16th, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald declared in the House of Commons that the British Government wished to adopt a neutral attitude, but would hold Sidqi and Nahhas responsible for the lives and property of foreigners in Egypt.³ On July 17th, Loraine transmitted the warning to the parties concerned, to the accompaniment of naval demonstrations off Alexandria, Port Sa'id, and Suez. This had the effect of forcing the Wafd to desist from further agitation. As for Sidqi, the message was clear: the Foreign Office was willing to support his regime provided he could restore order in the country. The Wafd had unwittingly acted to Sidqi's advantage.

By the end of the summer, Sidqi had restored order in the country, and was in a position to introduce his constitutional changes. Early in September, he revealed his full intentions to the Liberal Constitutional Party for the first time.⁴ The objections which his suggestions aroused were not totally unex-

¹ Haykal, as-Siyasah al-Misriyyah, p. 10.

The fact that Loraine supported Sidqi's regime could be inferred from the praise which Sidqi lavished on the former in the course of the Sidqi-Simon talks. al-Qadiyyah al-Misriyyah, pp. 446-50.

² This was reflected by the semi-official London Times. For example: "The Disturbances in Egypt", The Times, 45567 (July 17, 1930) p. 15. "Tension in Egypt; the Wafdist Campaign", Ibid., p. 13.

³ MacDonald to the House of Commons, July 16, 1930, in: Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, 241 H.C. Deb. 5 s., 1284-85.

⁴ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, p. 320.

pected to him. Indeed, he had secretly started to form a new party, ultimately called the Sha'ab (People's) Party.¹ Mohammad Mahmoud, in a last attempt to prevent a split seemed willing to accept some of Sidqi's suggestions. But Haykal and Mahmoud Abdul Raziq were more adamant, and Mohammad Mahmoud had to condone their attitude.²

The new Constitution was promulgated on October 22, 1930.³ Two days later, the Liberal Constitutional Party joined the Opposition. Eight members of its Board of Directors resigned promptly, and ultimately joined the Sha'ab Party.⁴ Many members did not resign so rapidly, but stopped frequenting the Party headquarters and drifted gradually into the ranks of the government. Mahmoud had failed to establish a firm control over the Party. Most of the rich landowners deserted it and rallied to Sidqi.⁵ The remainder were mostly middle class intellectuals who counted little at the poll boxes. The Party thus lost whatever effectiveness it had commanded. In the words of the Wafdist newspapers, it became a one-man party, that man being Mohammad Mahmoud.

¹ Haykal, as-Siyasah al-Misriyyah, pp. 17-18.

² Sidqi to al-Muqattam, n.d., quoted in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, VII pp. 1502-1503.

³ Text of the 1930 Constitution, in: Sobhi, op. cit., V, pp. 795 ff.

⁴ "Egyptian Liberals; a Party Split", The Times, 45653 (Oct. 25, 1930) p. 11.

⁵ Zayid, Egypt's Struggle, p. 139.

CHAPTER FOUR
IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SCHISM

The cleavage in the Liberal Constitutional Party deprived it of most of its leading members. Of the remaining few, Mohammad Mahmoud was the only politician left who possessed the shrewdness and ability necessary to rebuild the strength of the Party and increase its membership in the future. For this reason, his hold over the Party grew and he became its most outstanding members. All the others seemed to fade into the background and leave decision making to him.

Weakened by the schism, the Liberal Constitutional Party was forced to seek the help of the Wafd. On October 23, 1930 -- one day following the promulgation of the new Constitution -- Mahmoud sent emissaries to the Wafd with proposals for cooperation. He had no intention of suggesting an alliance;¹ a wide gulf separated the two parties on several issues and rendered close cooperation between them difficult. The element of confidence between Mahmoud and Nahhas had long since disappeared. Moreover, Nahhas and his followers in the Wafd were not willing to share power with any outsider. They insisted on the restoration of the 1923 Constitution and the implementation of an authentic constitutional regime whereby the party commanding a majority in Parliament would assume office.² The Liberal Constitutional Party could not agree to these terms as they would invariably cause a return of the Wafd to government. The

¹ "Hawl Ma'idat Wakil al-Wafd al-Misri: Ta'awun la I'tilaf" (Loosely: Cooperation, Not an Alliance) as-Sarkhah, I, 24 (Jan. 27, 1931) p. 10.

² Ibid.
M. at-Tabi'i, "Ta'awun la I'tilaf" (Cooperation, Not an Alliance) Ibid., I, 17 (Dec. 9, 1930) p. 5.

Party insisted on amending the 1923 Constitution -- with the stipulation that its "spirit" would be preserved -- and asserted the executive's right of modifying the Electoral Law.¹ There is no indication to what extent the Liberal Constitutional Party intended to amend the Constitution and the Electoral Law. But it seems that they hoped to devise a constitutional formula which would limit the power of the electorate without placing the executive at the mercy of the Palace.

In view of this disparity, it was not conceivable for either party to seek an alliance on the lines of that of 1925. In the following years, Mahmoud hoped for such an alliance only at times when he thought that it might be encouraged by the Residency. But for the time being, his immediate concern was to prevent Sidqi from consolidating his regime and swerving any of the remaining members of the Liberal Constitutional Party to his side. Mahmoud could achieve both ends by cooperating with the Wafd. On the one hand, it was necessary to get the Wafd to boycott the elections which Sidqi intended to hold. On the other, the semblance of power achieved by a Wafd connection would tend to lure any vacillating member to remain in the Party.

Mustapha Nahhas and Makram Ubeid rejected the Liberal Constitutional Party's offer. But pressed by a majority of the Wafd's Executive Committee led by Fathalla Barakat, they finally consented to a limited amount of cooperation.² A Liaison Committee was formed on November 6, 1930, with the aim of coordinating the activities of the two parties. On the same day, the two parties declared their intention to boycott the elections. The decision was

¹ "Hawl Ma'idat Wakil al-Wafd al-Misri", loc. cit.

² "Egyptian Liberals; a Party Split", loc. cit.
 M. at-Tabi'i, "Bayn al-Wafdiyyin wa al-Ahrar ad-Dustouriyin"
 (Between the Wafdists and the Liberal Constitutionalists) as-Sarkhah, I, 13
 (Nov. 11, 1930) p. 5.

taken with the chief aim of depriving the forthcoming Parliament of any semblance of representation.¹ But it was also motivated by the fear of members of either party getting elected and being thereby induced to support Sidqi for reasons of personal interest.²

With the agreement to boycott the elections, the Liberal Constitutional Party had achieved its main object. Thence, it became difficult to find further ground for cooperation with the Wafd. Yet, with the impending elections, it was imperative for the Opposition to have a greater appearance of solidarity. A pact was concluded on March 31, 1931, embodying the Wafdist point of view. According to the terms of the pact, the two parties pledged to oppose the government until authentic constitutional life was restored. Furthermore, they agreed not to recognize any treaty negotiated under Sidqi's regime. As a concession to the Liberal Constitutional Party, it was also stated that the 1924 Electoral Law would, in due time, be amended.³

Evidently, the pact was of little interest to the Liberal Constitutional Party except as a temporary measure. It resulted in no concrete benefits to them aside from the fact that it placed Mohammad Mahmoud beside Nahhas in the conspicuous center of the Opposition. In all probability, Mahmoud intended to adhere to the pact only as long as it was necessary for the attainment of the specific benefits which he could derive from it for himself and for his Party. It is no wonder then that an atmosphere of suspicion permeated the relations

¹ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, p. 343.
as-Siyasah, Nov. 25, 1930, quoted in: Shafiq, Hawliyyat, VII, pp. 1415-19.

² Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, p. 343.

³ Text of the pact, in: ar-Rafi'i, Fi A'qab ath-Thawrah, II, pp. 144-45. The Electoral Law referred to by the pact was the one which the Wafd had promoted in 1924. It provided for one-stage elections.

between the two parties after the conclusion of the pact. The latent hostility continued to assert itself and never failed to come to the fore in their respective newspapers and magazines.¹ In effect, the two parties were unable to cooperate except in public functions and in launching an anti-elections campaign.

The boycott of the elections was so widespread as to prevent Sidqi from producing the representative Parliament which was so necessary to ensure continued British support.² Even before the elections had started, the Times had made it clear that the forthcoming Parliament would not be of a character which would justify negotiations.³ If Sidqi had any doubts regarding the exact meaning of this hint, they were soon allayed when he met Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Minister, in September, 1932. The only outcome of the talks held on that occasion was to indicate that the British Government wished to retract some of the military concessions made in the Nahhas-Henderson negotiations of 1930.⁴

In other matters, Sidqi was hardly affected by the Opposition. His efficient administration as well as the sound measures he took to meet the grave economic situation made a tremendous impression on the financial circles

¹ M. at-Tabi'i, "Ba'd as-Suhuf" (Some Newspapers) as-Sarkhah, I, 13 (Nov. 11, 1930) p. 5.

M. at-Tabi'i, "Kalimah" (A Word) Ibid., I, 16 (Dec. 2, 1930) p. 5.

² Sidqi's elections took place in June, 1931.

³ "Elections in Egypt", The Times, 45822 (Apr. 14, 1931) p. 15.

⁴ For the Sidqi-Simon talks, see: Appendix IV.

and the landed magnates.¹ That caused many of Sidqi's opponents to assume a mid-way position, paying lip service to the Opposition without severing their relations with the government completely.² Thus, the retributive measures taken by the Prime Minister against the renewed agitation in the months preceding the elections, forced the Opposition to lapse into political inactivity. It was clear that there was no hope of dislodging Sidqi as long as he enjoyed the support of the King and the confidence of the British Government.

A good opportunity seemed to present itself to the Opposition when Loraine hinted in January, 1932, that the British Government was willing to conclude the Nahhas-Henderson draft treaty should a national cabinet be formed under an independent politician like Adli. He went further to indicate that his government was willing to advise the restoration of the 1923 Constitution should a treaty be successfully concluded.³

Many members of the Liberal Constitutional Party and the Wafd tended to suspect Loraine's intentions. They felt that he was simply maneuvering to break up the Opposition.⁴ Nevertheless, the Liberal Constitutional Party endorsed the idea, for it was a chance to mete out a blow to the Sha'ab Party and regain the dissident Liberal Constitutionalists. But whereas Fathalla Barakat

¹ "Lean Times in Egypt; Sidky Pasha's Policy", The Times, 45746 (Feb. 13, 1931) p. 13.

"State Finance in Egypt; Coping with the Crisis", Ibid., 46206 (Aug. 8, 1932) p. 9.

² Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, pp. 321, 350.

S. Habib, "al-Mu'aradah wa Sidqi Basha" (The Opposition and Sidqi Pasha) al-Muqattam, XLIII, 13040 (Dec. 31, 1931) p. 5.

³ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, p. 337.
ar-Rafi'i, Fi A'qab ath-Thawrah, II, pp. 171-73.

⁴ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, p. 338.

and the majority of the Wafd's Executive consented to the idea, Nahhas and Ubeid, supported by a minority of the Executive, rejected it.¹ After some haggling, the Wafdist minority modified its attitude to the extent of consenting to a provisional national cabinet which would restore the 1923 Constitution and run the elections. But they insisted that following the elections, the majority party would form a new cabinet and conduct the treaty negotiations.²

No amount of persuasion could dissuade Nahhas and Ubeid to modify their intransigent attitude. Being supported by the Wafdist organization, they felt strong enough to resist the pressure exerted on them by Fathalla Barakat and his majority. In the meantime, the Wafdist majority and the Liberal Constitutional Party had kept in touch with the Residency.³ From the ensuing talks, they learned that Loraine envisaged the inclusion of Sidqi and the Sha'ab Party in the projected cabinet. Neither the Wafdist majority nor the Liberal Constitutional Party could agree to that, and as a result, Loraine gave up the entire plan.⁴ Meanwhile, it transpired that Adli would not agree to become

¹ Ibid., p. 338.

² "Bayn A'da' al-Wafd al-Misri: Asl al-Khilaf wa Mihwaruh al-An" (Loosely: Causes of the Dispute in the Wafd) al-Muqattam, XLIV, 13063 (Jan. 27, 1932) p. 4.

³ Revealed in a letter from Nahhas to Ali ash-Shamsi (a member of the Wafdist majority) published in: Ibid, XLIV, 13326 (Nov. 29, 1932) p. 1.

⁴ "Asrar al-Wizarah al-Qawmiyyah" (Secrets of the National Cabinet) al-Musawwar, 426 (Dec. 9, 1932) p. 5.

Lorraine's aim of suggesting the idea of a national cabinet is obscure. The suggestion was made to Adli Pasha, but it is not clear in what context. It was possibly just an idea which Loraine brought up casually at one of the social occasions at which he met Adli. It is hard to believe that Loraine was acting on his government's instructions: subsequent events indicated that the British Government was disinclined to allow the restoration of the 1923 Constitution. It is also curious that Adli, who was the main candidate for the cabinet, remained so remote from the controversy. Nor does it seem that the Residency tried hard to press the idea. For all these reasons, it is likely that the idea was not

head of a national cabinet unless Nahhas and Ubeid supported it.¹

Having thus failed to get the Residency to enforce a national cabinet, Mahmoud deemed it wiser to withdraw from the pact. Around the middle of February, 1932, as-Siyasah published an article which summed up the new attitude of the Liberal Constitutional Party. It stated that no constitution could become viable in Egypt as long as Anglo-Egyptian relations remained unsettled. It justified that assertion on the basis that, with the existence of the four Reservations, the British Government could continue to take arbitrary measures with respect to the Egyptian Government, and would therefore undermine constitutional life in the country. For that reason, it was necessary to settle the Egyptian Question before the restoration of the Constitution.²

This attitude was similar in essence to the idea of a national cabinet which Loraine had submitted during the previous month. Should negotiations take place before the restoration of the Constitution, only a national cabinet would be in a position to conclude a treaty. Mahmoud's transparent motive was to secure a seat for his Party in the forthcoming negotiations. Actually, from that time onwards, Mahmoud became the most ardent protagonist of a national cabinet. That was contrary to the terms of the pact, but it did not lead to an immediate break between the Liberal Constitutional Party and the Wafd. The Liaison Committee still met at intervals, and Mahmoud seems to have kept in

suggested in all seriousness, or else it was suggested with the sole object of breaking up the pact. For more details, see:

Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, pp. 337-41.

ar-Rafi'i, Fi A'qab ath-Thawrah, II, pp. 171-73.

¹ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, pp. 339-41.

² as-Siyasah, Feb., 1932, cited by: S. Habib, "al-Ahrar ad-Dustour-iyoun wa an-Nazam al-Hadir" (The Liberal Constitutionalists and the Present Regime) al-Muqattam, XLIV, 13402 (Feb. 26, 1932) p. 5.

touch with the Wafdist majority.¹ But at the same time, he was careful to dissociate himself from the anti-British campaigns which Nahhas propagated at times.² All his efforts were directed towards the feat of keeping himself in the center of the moderate Opposition. But his position was soon to be severely weakened. The dispute in the Wafd Executive Committee, which had recurred several times in the past, broke out again in October, 1932, on a relatively minor issue. It was hardly to Mahmoud's interest that there should be a schism in the Wafd at that time. With the possible exception of Fathalla Barakat, none of the Wafdist majority commanded a personal following of any weight. Consequently, they could be of more benefit to Mahmoud inside the Wafd than outside it. That is why Mahmoud made several attempts to conciliate the two Wafdist groups.³ All his efforts failed and, by the end of October, 1932, Nahhas had ousted his opponents.⁴

¹ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, pp. 341-42.

² "State Finance in Egypt; Coping with the Crisis", loc. cit.
 "Ijtima' al-Wafd al-Misri" (The Egyptian Wafd's Meeting) al-Muqattam, XLIV, 13136 (Apr. 23, 1932) p. 4.

³ "Dawlat Mohammad Mahmoud Basha fi Bayt al-Ummah" (H.E. Mohammad Mahmoud Pasha in Bayt al-Ummah) Ibid., XLIV, 13299 (Oct. 28, 1932) p. 4.

⁴ The dispute in the Wafd dated as far back as 1927. Its basic cause was the struggle for hegemony between the majority of the Executive Committee led by Barakat, and the minority led by Nahhas and Ubeid. The minority could always assert its authority because it was backed by the Wafdist organization. That reduced the majority into a state of discontent and finally to rebellion.

S. Habib, "Ifilas az-Za'amah fi Misr: az-Zu'ama' Mukhtalifoun" (The Bankruptcy of Leadership in Egypt: the Leaders Are in Disagreement) Ibid., XLIII, 12790 (Mar. 17, 1931) pp. 1-2.

"Fi al-Wafd al-Misri" (In the Egyptian Wafd) Ibid., XLIV, 13068 (Feb. 2, 1932) p. 5.

"Bayn A'da' al-Wafd al-Misri", loc. cit.

The Liberal Constitutional Party allied itself with the Wafdist dissidents.¹ But Barakat's death a few weeks after the schism, deprived this group of any popular following. Consequently, the Liberal Constitutional Party became completely isolated. For a while, Mahmoud seemed to entertain the idea of breaking through the isolation by means of a rapprochement with Sidqi. The time was very appropriate for a reconciliation between the two rivals as King Fu'ad had for some time been vying for power and Sidqi was beginning to lose ground.² Early in 1933, there were rumours that Loraine was in favor of bolstering up the cabinet by including Mahmoud in it.³ The rumours received some credence when Adli succeeded in reconciling Sidqi with Mahmoud in May, 1933.⁴ But

¹ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, p. 342.

² King Fu'ad -- working through Comptroller of the Royal Domains -- began attempts to establish autocracy as soon as Sidqi had formed his cabinet. But the latter was able to hold his own partly because of his efficiency and strength of character, and partly because the economic crisis made his services indispensable. The King got his chance after Sidqi's health had become impaired as a result of a mild paralytic stroke in Jan., 1933.

"Fi Klob Mohammad Ali" (In the Mohammad Ali Club) al-Musawwar, 534 (Jan. 4, 1935) p. 6.

"Muqabalat Sidqi Basha wa Mohammad Mahmoud fi Nadi Mohammad Ali" (The Meeting of Sidqi Pasha and Mohammad Mahmoud in the Mohammad Ali Club) as-Sarih, II, 14 (May 18, 1933) p. 9.

"Leadership in Egypt; Effect of Sidki Pasha's Breakdown", The Times, 46366 (Feb. 11, 1933) p. 9.

"Sidki Pasha in Paris", Ibid., 46449 (May 20, 1933) p. 13.

"Changes in Egypt", Ibid., 46585 (Oct. 26, 1933) p. 13.

³ "Ara' Jami' al-Ahzab fi al-Mawqif al-Hadir" (Attitude of all Parties to the Present Situation) as-Sarih, II, 2 (Feb. 23, 1933) p. 8.

"Hal Yu'ayyan Dawlat Mohammad Mahmoud Basha Na'ib li Ra'iss al-Wizarah al-Haliyyah?" (Loosely: Will Mahmoud Be Appointed Deputy Prime Minister?) Ibid., II, 4 (Mar. 9, 1933) p. 5.

"Akhir Sa'ah" (Loosely: Latest News) Ibid., II, 3 (Mar. 2, 1933) p. 5.

"as-Sir fi at-Ta'dil" (Loosely: The Motive Behind the Cabinet Reshuffle) Ibid., II, 5 (Mar. 16, 1933) p. 4.

⁴ "Kayf Tam as-Silh Bayn Mohammad Mahmoud Basha wa Sidqi Basha" (How Reconciliation Took Place Between Mohammad Mahmoud Pasha and Sidqi Pasha) Rose al-Youssif, VIII, 275 (May 22, 1933) p. 10.

Mahmoud seems to have taken this step against the wishes of his Party, thus arousing a storm of protest from Mahmoud Abdul Raziq who opposed any form of cooperation with Sidqi.¹ In the following months, a polarization took place in the Liberal Constitutional Party with Abdul Raziq heading a group which was beginning to express discontent with Mahmoud's policy.² Because of that, Mahmoud could not establish closer cooperation with Sidqi without running the risk of a new schism in the Party.

In the three years which followed the schism in the Wafd, the Liberal Constitutional Party did not play any significant role in politics. However, during those years, developments of great consequence took place, which ultimately enabled it to regain much of its former strength.

In the summer of 1933, the British Government appointed a new High Commissioner to Egypt, Sir Miles Lampson, with instructions to prepare the ground for treaty negotiations.³ On September 31, 1933, Sidqi fell from power and was compelled to resign from the Presidency of the Sha'ab Party. The new cabinet was formed by Abdul Fattah Yahia, a puppet of the King, who also succeeded Sidqi as President of the Sha'ab Party. With Yahia's advent to the premiership, political power passed into the hands of King Fu'ad, and then -- as the King's health broke down -- into the hands of Court functionaries headed by Comptroller of Royad Domains Zaki al-Abrashi.⁴ Now that Sidqi was out of

¹ Ibid.
"Mahmoud Abdul Raziq Basha", al-Musawwar, 546 (Mar. 29, 1935) p. 9.

² Ibid.
"Tandhif" (Cleaning) Rose al-Youssif, VIII, 278 (June 12, 1933) p. 5.

³ Jarvis, op. cit., p. 14.

⁴ R.I.I.A., op. cit., pp. 42-43.

the way, Abdul Fattah Yahia hoped to gain the support of the Liberal Constitutional Party. But repeated contacts with the Party only served to disappoint him.¹

Under Abrashi's tutelage, government began to deteriorate into a state of corruption which was unacceptable even according to the standards of that day.² All politicians outside the Palace clique tended to gravitate to the side of the Opposition. Even the Sha'ab Party, which formed the majority in Parliament and was supposed to be the mainstay of the cabinet, found its interests ignored as Abrashi assumed direct control of the government.³

As the dissatisfaction with the regime mounted, the moderate element in the Opposition became enriched with new recruits. This factor gave Mahmoud a breathing space, and early in the spring of 1934, he began successful efforts to reinforce the Liberal Constitutional Party with new members.⁴ At the same time, he kept in close contact with the British authorities. His frequent visits to the Residency became the subject of copious comments on the part of the Wafdist Press. It was rumoured on several occasions that Mahmoud was trying to convince the High Commissioner to foster a coalition composed of

¹ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, pp. 355-56.

² Marlowe, op. cit., pp. 293, 299n.

³ "Dhahirah Jadidah fi Ijtima' Hizb ash-Sha'ab" (A New Phenomenon at the Sha'ab Party Meeting) al-Muqattam, XLVI, 13797 (June 6, 1934) p. 6.

⁴ This aspect of Mahmoud's activities is not clear. In the spring of 1934, his trips to the villages and provincial towns of the Delta became conspicuously frequent. The fact that the Liberal Constitutional Party started regaining its strength became apparent a year and a half later. When some independent politicians tried to effect an electoral agreement for the division of seats for the elections of 1936, they proposed the following distribution: Liberal Constitutional Party, 16 seats; Sha'ab Party, 14; dissident Wafdist, 9; National Party, 6. "Egyptian Elections", The Times, 47330 (Mar. 23, 1936) p. 11.

the non-Wafdist parties, and that some high officials in the Residency were not totally opposed to the idea.¹ Whereas these rumours seem unfounded in view of later British policy, it is quite possible that the Liberal Constitutional Party had a hand in spreading some of them.² At that time it was to the Party's advantage that its connection with the Residency should be exaggerated for this could help it to gain new members.

In September, 1934, the Residency took the first decisive step to bring the Palace regime to an end. It imposed on King Fu'ad a change in the Court personnel which had the effect of curtailing Abrashi's power.³ Abdul Fattah Yahia soon found himself torn between the Palace and the Residency. Being too weak to resist either, he resigned in November, 1934.⁴ The King invited Nasim Pasha to form the new cabinet. The latter accepted the offer with the stipulation that he would be allowed to revoke the 1930 Constitution and dissolve Parliament.⁵ These two measures were implemented on November 30, two weeks after Nasim had taken office.

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- ¹ For example:
 "al-Wizarah al-Qawmiyyah" (The National Cabinet) al-Mitraqah, X, 68 (Nov. 27, 1933) p. 4.
 W. Bassili, "Wa an-Nabi Eh?" (What) Ibid., XI, 85 (Apr. 2, 1934) p. 6.
 W. Bassili, "Nasim Basha", Ibid., XI, 89 (Apr. 23, 1934) p. 10.
 "Mufawadat" (Negotiations) Ibid., XI, 91 (May 7, 1934) p. 7.
 "Ijtima'" (Meeting) as-Sarih, III, 41 (Apr. 26, 1934) p. 4.
 "Bayn al-Ikhwan" (Among Brothers) Ibid., III, 46 (May 3, 1934) p. 4.
- ² "al-Wizarah al-Qawmiyyah" (The National Cabinet) Ibid., II, 37 (Nov. 16, 1933) p. 4.
 W. Bassili, "Wa Min Tani?" (And Who Else?) al-Mitraqah, X, 93 (May 21, 1934) p. 7.
- ³ Marlowe, op. cit., p. 293.
- ⁴ ar-Rafi'i, Fi A'qab ath-Thawrah, II, pp. 189-90.
- ⁵ "The Egyptian Premiership", The Times, 46909 (Nov. 12, 1934) p. 13.

Nowithstanding Nasim's declaration to the contrary, all political parties believed that he was going to play the part of the caretaker.¹ The Wafd went into action and held a convention on January 8-9, 1935. It reasserted its attitude with respect to the Constitution, and declared that it was ready to reopen negotiations with Britain after the restoration of constitutional life.² In the following months, the Wafd backed Nasim on the tacit understanding that his cabinet was transitional to the restoration of the old order. The Liberal Constitutional Party was uneasy about this development. It distrusted Nasim because of his connection with the Wafd. Moreover, it still persisted in its former attitude, namely, that a treaty should be negotiated before the restoration of the Constitution. Yet, not wishing to cast itself in the role of opposers to constitutionalism, it gave the cabinet its grudging support.³

The new situation was slow in becoming well defined and moments of confusion and uncertainty came to pass. The British Government wished Nasim to introduce modifications in the 1923 Constitution before bringing it back to life.⁴ Unable to do so without alienating the Wafd, Nasim faltered, and the

¹ "Tasrihat li Dawlat Nasim Basha" (Declarations by H.E. Nasim Pasha) al-Muqattam, XLVI, 13940 (Nov. 16, 1934) p. 7.

² Text of Nahhas's speech at the convention, Jan. 8, 1935, in: Ibid., XLVII, 13990 (Jan. 8, 1935) pp. 7-8.

³ Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, p. 370.

⁴ The British Foreign Minister claimed later that the British Government only "advised" Nasim to introduce the modifications in the Constitution, and that such an advice did not constitute an order. See, pp. 103 ff, infra.

The former High Commissioner George Lloyd has the following to say about the nature and effectiveness of British advice: "It was not necessary for the High Commissioner to step out into the arena: he could sit at home in the Residency, secure in the knowledge that his advice would be spontaneously sought, and his intervention behind the scenes invited And after all, it would have been the merest humbug to act as if the British Army of occupation

situation reached an impasse. Matters grew worse due to the developments in the international situation. The Abyssinian crisis, which became acute during the last months of 1934, underlined the value of the freedom of action which Britain had maintained under the four Reservations. For a while, British policy seemed to be torn between two alternatives: the desirability of maintaining Britain's freedom of action in Egypt by refraining from concluding a treaty; and the equally attractive alternative of ensuring Egypt's willing cooperation by concluding the treaty and restoring the Constitution of 1923.¹ In any case, the situation was propitious to the minority parties and quite favorable to Mahmoud's efforts to strengthen the Liberal Constitutional Party. Should the British Foreign Office decide against a treaty, then the Residency would be forced to promote a new dictatorship based upon a minority cabinet. On the other hand, should the Foreign Office continue to favor a treaty, then it would still be advisable to seek negotiations with a national cabinet. A revision of the military clauses of the Nahhas-Henderson treaty was becoming increasingly necessary due to the escalation of tension in East Africa, and it was out of the question that the Wafd, by itself, would be willing to bear responsibility for such a revision.

Under the circumstances, it was still possible for Mahmoud to hope that the Liberal Constitutional Party would be invited to take a seat in the cabinet which would succeed Nasim's. For that reason, he continued to canvass the

did not exist.... It was useless to argue that we had no intention of using our resources of power. No Egyptian could so far disbelieve the evidence of his senses as to accept such a statement for a moment". Lloyd, op. cit., II, p. 156.

¹ Toynbee, Survey for 1936, pp. 671-72.

non-Wafdist parties for an alliance.¹ His strongest asset was the Wafd's intransigence on the constitutional issue, and both Nahhas and Ubeid realized that. Therefore, they continued, in spite of the pressure exerted upon them by their own left wing followers, to support Nasim for fear that his fall should herald another spell of dictatorship under Mahmoud.²

Presently, another factor made itself felt and soon overshadowed that contingency. For some time, the politically conscious section of the population was becoming alive to the shortcomings and corruption of its leaders, and the spring of 1935 witnessed increasing signs of restiveness among the public. With hindsight, some historians have seen in that development the first evidence of strain on the old political and socio-economic order in Egypt.³ At the time, though, few intellectuals and certainly none of the politicians had enough far-sight to recognize the symptoms for what they were.⁴ It is not strange that Egyptian leaders should have been so out of touch with the fermentation of public

¹ "al-Ahrar ad-Dustouriyoun" (The Liberal Constitutionalists) al-Musawwar, 546 (Mar. 29, 1935) p. 8.

² Zayid, Egypt's Struggle, p. 147.
 "Party Moves in Egypt", The Times, 47034 (Apr. 9, 1935) p. 15.
 "Stability in Egypt", Ibid., 47103 (June 29, 1935) p. 13.
 "Egypt and Britain", Ibid., 47183 (Oct. 1, 1935) p. 13.
 "Mufawadat" (Negotiations) Rose al-Youssif, X, 382 (June 17, 1935) p. 6.

³ Zayid, Egypt's Struggle, pp. 142-43.
 C. Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century; an Economic Survey (Published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs; London: Oxford University Press, 1954) p. 261.

⁴ Zayid, Egypt's Struggle, p. 142.
 As far as the author knows, the only contemporary comprehensive and objective study of the drawbacks of Egypt's politics and public administration at that time, is: M.B. Ghali, The Policy of Tomorrow, tr. Isma'il R. el Faruqi (Washington: American Council of Learned Societies, 1953). The first Arabic edition of the book appeared in 1938.

opinion. The fundamental political and socio-economic factors were relegated into the background by the immediate political considerations confronting the nation. Indeed, public feeling expressed itself primarily on the constitutional issue and on the danger arising from the Abyssinian crisis. The latter was a source of worry to Egyptians not because they expected their country to become involved in a general conflagration, but rather because they feared that Britain, pressed by military exigencies, should take measures which would be contrary to Egypt's national interests.¹

In the circumstances, the task of forming a cabinet without Wafdist support became a thankless job. Aside from the decision which such a cabinet would have had to take on the constitutional issue, it would also have had to cover up for the movement of British troops. The most obvious way out of the impasse was for all political parties to unite their efforts. In the summer of 1935, some independent politicians, notably Lutfi as-Sayyid and Ahmad Mahir, began working on the idea of a united front.² By the end of summer, the idea had acquired acceptance among all parties except the Wafd.³ Thus, Mahmoud's and Sidqi's efforts to establish cooperation among the minority parties had borne fruit. The key to the final solution of the problem was the Wafd. As a gesture to change the Wafd's attitude, Sidqi made an appeal to the Egyptian

¹ On the effect of the Abyssinian crisis on the political situation in Egypt, see: Toynbee, Survey for 1936, pp. 669-73.

² Zayid, Egypt's Struggle, p. 149.
M. Azmi, al-Ayyam al-Mi'ah (The Hundred Days) (Cairo: Dar an-Nahdah al-Misriyyah, n.d.) pp. 31-32.

³ Zayid, Egypt's Struggle, p. 154.
A. R. ar-Rafi'i, Mudhakarati, 1889-1951 (Memoirs) (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal, 1952) p. 86.

parties (October 12, 1935) urging them to unite their efforts for the purpose of concluding a treaty with Great Britain. He reiterated his appeal on November 1, 1935.¹ On November 7th, Mahmoud took the stand with a similar appeal at a public rally which was attended by huge crowds.² Both politicians coached their speeches in veiled terms which hinted of hostility to Britain and disapproval of Nasim's cabinet. In the case of Mahmoud, the audience included some of the Wafd's extremist leaders as well as student elements.³ More than ever, Mahmoud represented a great danger to Nahhas by seeming to gather around him the extremist as well as the moderate elements in the country.

The situation was critical, and tension had been building up over the months. It only needed a spark to trigger off public disorders. This was provided by a speech which Sir Samuel Hoare, the British Foreign Secretary, made on November 9, 1935.⁴ He declared that the British Government had "advised" Nasim against the restoration of the 1923 Constitution, but that such an advice had not constituted an order. As soon as news of this speech reached Egypt, Cairo became the scene of wide demonstrations in which the students, for the first time in more than a decade, took part without seemingly being incited by the Wafd. Nahhas and Ubeid were no more able to control the Wafdist extremists. On November 12th, the Wafd denounced the British Government for interfering in Egypt's affairs and announced the withdrawal of support from Nasim.⁵

¹ Zayid, Egypt's Struggle, p. 152.

² "British policy in Egypt", The Times, 47216 (Nov. 8, 1935) p. 14.

³ "British Policy in Egypt", Ibid., 47216 (Nov. 8, 1935) p. 14.
 "British Policy in Egypt", Ibid., 47220 (Nov. 13, 1935) p. 12.

⁴ The relevant passages, quoted in: Zayid, Egypt's Struggle, p. 153.

⁵ Ibid.

The public demonstrations continued, with the students, as usual, in the vanguard. Yet, these demonstrations were not spurred by a common motive. Whereas some manifestations seemed to have been motivated by sympathy for the Wafd, others were staged by non-Wafdist leaders, and still others were effected in criticism of the political parties and leaders at large.¹ The general mood of the students, however, seemed to be in favor of a united front.² Mahmoud seized this opportunity to issue a manifesto on November 23, 1935, reiterating his appeal for a united front.³ This time he added a proposition to the effect that all parties should proclaim their acceptance of the Nahhas-Henderson proposals and suggest to the British Government to do the same, with the stipulation that the Sudan question would be settled by later negotiations. Should the British Government accept these terms, the 1923 Constitution would be restored, elections held, and the treaty ratified. Before issuing his manifesto, Mahmoud had secured the adherence to it of the other non-Wafdist parties and the most outstanding independent politicians.⁴ But the Wafd still rejected the idea of a united front and insisted on the restoration of the Constitution prior to treaty negotiations.⁵

In an attempt to exonerate himself, Nasim had in the meantime made a public statement putting the blame for the delay in restoring the Constitution on the

¹ Zayid, Egypt's Struggle, p. 154-55.
Toynbee, Survey for 1936, pp. 674-75, 679.

² Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, p. 384.

³ "Egypt and Britain", The Times, 47233 (Nov. 28, 1935) p. 13.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ ar-Rafi'i, Mudhakkarati, pp. 86-87.
"al-I'tilaf al-Mustahil" (The Impossible Alliance) al-Musawwar, 581 (Nov. 29, 1935) p. 7.

British Government.¹ This served to increase anti-British feeling without making Nasim more popular. The situation was practically brought to the point of revolt when Hoare refuted Nasim's statement in a speech delivered to the House of Commons on December 5, 1935.² Another part of the speech, however, had even more serious repercussions among Egyptian political circles. Referring to the proposed negotiations, Hoare indicated that his government had no objections to the idea, but he added in what could be interpreted as a threat, that Britain was not prepared to allow another round of abortive negotiations.³

This declaration, coupled with the pressure exerted by the students, forced the Wafd to change its attitude. By December 9th, the parties had decided in principle to form the United Front.⁴ On December 10th, the leaders of all political parties as well as some prominent independent politicians, met to put the final touches to the new pact.

The terms of the United Front constituted a victory for the Wafd. Two documents were drawn up and signed by the leaders. The first was a petition to King Fu'ad to restore the 1923 Constitution. The second was a Note to the Residency stating the Front's willingness to negotiate a treaty which would embody the Nahhas-Henderson proposals.⁵ Mohammad Mahmoud and the other

¹ Nasim's statement, cited by: Toynbee, Survey for 1936, pp. 674-75.

² Hoare to the House of Commons, Dec. 5, 1935, in: Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, 307 H.C. Deb. 5 s., 338-41.

³ The effect of this threat and of a similar threat by Anthony Eden, Hoare's successor, is demonstrated by the fact that the United Front demanded assurances, before entering into negotiations, to the effect that the failure of negotiations would not lead to a change in the status quo in Anglo-Egyptian relations. Zayid, Egypt's Struggle, p. 161.

⁴ ar-Rafi'i, Mudhakkarati, p. 88.

⁵ Zayid, Egypt's Struggle, p. 156.

non-Wafdist leaders must have entered rather hastily into this pact because neither document contained any provisions to the effect that the Wafd would share power with any other party. At any rate, the contents of the United Front agreement would have made little difference on that score. By the time the petition had been submitted to the King, Nasim, having received Lampson's assent, had already procured a Royal Rescript restoring the Constitution.¹

The worst moments of the crisis were thus over, and the Wafd withdrew its student rioters from the streets. Despite this step, public order was not restored. The Wafd had lost its monopoly over the student elements² and the minority parties continued to agitate as they sensed that the Wafd did not intend to share power with them.³ The appointed date for the elections drew nearer, and the Front began to show signs of cracking. Mohammad Mahmoud, in a concerted effort with Sidqi, tried to force Nahhas to change his attitude. They kept the students in the streets and continued to foment more riots.⁴ They complained that the Wafd was using unorthodox methods in its elections campaign, accused Nasim of showing the Wafd marked favors, and demanded his removal from office.⁵

¹ Toynbee, Survey for 1936, p. 679.

² Jarvis, op. cit., p. 65.

³ Six days after the restoration of the Constitution, Nahhas informed the Times correspondent that he did not intend to give the non-Wafdist parties any seats neither in the cabinet nor on the official delegation to the negotiations. He suggested that the minority parties should form a "friendly" opposition in the forthcoming parliament, and intimated that otherwise, he would withdraw from the Front. "Anglo-Egyptian Relations", The Times, 47251 (Dec. 19, 1935) p. 12.

⁴ Zayid, Egypt's Struggle, pp. 157-58.
"Consultations in Cairo", The Times, 47262 (Jan. 3, 1936) p. 12.

⁵ "Party Rivalry in Egypt", ibid., 47268 (Jan. 10, 1936) p. 11.

The United Front was saved from disintegration by Lampson's initiative. From the start he had carried out preliminary talks with all the leaders of the Front concerning the projected negotiations,¹ thus contriving to impress upon them that his government favored the delegation to include representatives from all the parties. When the Front reached the point of dissolution early in 1936, he insisted that its unity should be preserved as a prerequisite for negotiations.² This prompted the parties to rally together and appoint a committee to deal with the problem of distributing the electoral constituencies.³

Shortly afterwards, King Fu'ad, acting on the advice of Ali Mahir, President of the Royal Diwan, dismissed Nasim and invited Nahhas to form a national cabinet.⁴ But no amount of pressure could induce Nahhas to share authority with another party. Mahir finally convinced him to include the minority parties in the delegation to the negotiations.⁵

The Liberal Constitutional Party thus achieved part of its objectives. The Front subsequently consented to the choice of Ali Mahir at the head of a cabinet which excluded all parties from its membership. The new cabinet was entrusted with the task of running elections and reintroducing parliamentary life. Mahir duly formed his cabinet on January 30, 1936, and two weeks later, a royal decree appointed the official delegation to the negotiations.

¹ "Consultations in Cairo", loc. cit.

² "Great Britain and Egypt", The Times, 47278 (Jan. 22, 1936) p. 9.

³ "Coming Parliament in Egypt", Ibid., 47276 (Jan. 20, 1936) p. 11.

⁴ Toynbee, Survey for 1936, p. 681.

⁵ "Britain and Egypt", The Times, 47279 (Jan. 23, 1936) p. 9.

The elections took place on May 2nd and 7th, a few days after King Fu'ad's death. The Wafd returned a majority of 73 percent, a far cry from the 90 percent majority it had obtained in the first elections twelve years earlier. The Liberal Constitutional Party could console itself with this fact and with the knowledge that in spite of the trials of the previous years, it had emerged as the strongest minority party in the country. Yet, in the course of those years, the Party had done little for which it could claim credit. It had violated its principles, forfeited its message, and lent a hand in impeding constitutional government in Egypt. It had committed all the vices of a privileged oligarchic class, without providing the services of an enlightened leadership.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

PRINCIPLES OF THE LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PARTY¹

Article I

A. Continuation of efforts for the achievement of Egypt's full and authentic independence.

B. Termination of the British occupation of Egypt.

C. Caution in the coming negotiations that any agreement concerning Great Britain's Reservations should in no way and under no circumstances affect Egypt's independence adversely.

D. Insistence on non-separation of the Sudan from Egypt, the preservation of Egypt's sovereignty over and rights in the Sudan, and Egypt's direct supervision of its vital interests there.

Article II

Egypt's admission into the League of Nations as an independent and sovereign state.

Article III

Fostering the constitutional regime and safeguarding the sovereignty of the people and the rights of the Monarchy.

¹ Translated from the Arabic text published in: as-Siyasah, I, 1 (Oct. 30, 1922) p. 1.

Article IV

Endeavors for the promotion of local representative institutions such as mudiriyya and municipal councils, and the development of this system to fulfill to the utmost the needs of various local affairs.

Article V

Continuous defense of the individual's rights and development of means for the realization of his potential, so that his liberty would not be restricted except when unavoidable for the sake of a public interest.

Article VI

Endeavors to provide adequate means of defense of the country against foreign aggression.

Article VII

Combatting illiteracy in the country and guidance of all the potentialities of the nation and the state to put an end to it by making primary education compulsory and free, and expanding efforts for the sake of enabling boys and girls to pursue education to their desire in all branches and at all levels; laying down educational plans in a way which would allow boys and girls to attain their potential; attempting to make Arabic the medium of instruction in all public educational institutions in Egypt by such means as translating the standard works into Arabic, increasing educational missions to Europe and the United States of America, and other ways of transferring knowledge to our language and country, always giving special attention to the maintenance of

Egypt's connection with the educational, cultural, and scientific progress in the world.

Article VIII

Endeavors to ameliorate public health and sanitation in the country.

Article IX

Endeavors to introduce measures which would preserve the confidence in the financial situation in Egypt.

Article X

Endeavors to levy taxes on a fair basis.

Article XI

Adherence to the open-door policy regarding customs agreements and non-discrimination in customs dues on imports, while giving due attention to the protection of Egyptian industry.

Article XII

Endeavors for the amelioration of agricultural procedures by all possible means, giving primary importance to the reform of the irrigation system; and endeavors to get the government to distribute arable public lands to individuals.

Article XIII

Endeavors to encourage and improve all branches of industry.

Article XIV

Endeavors to facilitate means of transportation between Egypt and other countries.

Article XV

Endeavors to spread and improve cooperative societies and make them accessible to a wider public.

Article XVI

Endeavors to encourage Egyptian firms and widen their field of action so as to enable them to undertake much of the public works which are fit to constitute free enterprises assumed by individuals and firms.

Article XVII

Taking effective measures to exploit natural resources in Egypt, such as mines and others, for the benefit of Egyptians.

Article XVIII

Endeavors to regulate relations in factories and business between employers and employees on a just basis so as to avoid social ills arising from the domination of the one by the other.

مبادئ حزب الاحرار الدستوريين^١

أولاً: -

- أ - الاستمرار في العمل لاستكمال استقلال مصر استقلالاً فعلياً تاماً .
- ب - انتهاء الاحتلال البريطاني لمصر .
- ج - الحرص فيما يختص بالمفاوضات المقبلة على أن الامور التي احتفظت بها بريطانيا العظمى لا يوءدى الاتفاق على شيء منها الى المساس بأى حال من الاحوال باستقلال مصر او تعطيل اى مظهر من مظاهره .
- د - التمسك بعدم فصل السودان عن مصر وحفظ سيادتها وحقوقها عليه وبرعايتها بنفسها منافعها الحيوية فيه .

ثانياً: -

- ادخال مصر في جمعية الامم دولة مستقلة ذات سيادة .

ثالثاً: -

- تأييد النظام الدستوري والمحافظة على سلطة الامة وحقوق العرش .

رابعاً: -

- السعي في ترقية شأن الهيئات النيابية المحلية كمجالس المدريات والمجالس البلدية واستكمال هذا النظام النيابي حتى يقوم بالشؤون المحلية المختلفة حق القيام .

^١ السياسة ، السنة الاولى ، العدد الاول ، (٣٠ تشرين الاول ١٩٢٢) ص ١ .

خامسا: -

الدفاع المستمر عن حقوق الفرد وتنمية اسباب قدرته وعمله فلا تقيد الا في مصلحة عامة لا صارف عنها .

سادسا: -

السعي في اعداد وسائل الدفاع عن البلاد ضد كل اعتداء خارجي .

سابعا: -

محاوية الامة في البلاد وتوجيه قوى الامة والحكومة جميعا للقضاء عليها بأن يجعل التعليم الاولي اجباريا ومجانيا وصرف العناية في تمكين البنين والبنات من الحصول على ما يريدون من أنواع التعليم بكافة درجاته ووضع خطط التعليم على وجه يمكن كلا الفريقين من أن يرقى الى كماله الخاص والسعي في جعل اللغة العربية لغة التعليم في جميع المعاهد العلمية العمومية في مصر باعداد الوسائل لذلك من نقل أمهات المؤلفات العلمية الى اللغة العربية والتزيد من البعثات المدرسية الى اوربا وأميركا الى غير ذلك من طرائق نقل العلم الى لغتنا وبلادنا مع الحرص دائما على اتصال مصر بالحركة العلمية في العالم .

ثامنا: -

السعي في تحسين حال البلاد الصحية .

تاسعا: -

السعي في اتخاذ الوسائل المؤدية الى دوام انتشار الثقة بالحالة المالية في مصر .

عاشرًا: -

السعي في توزيع الضرائب توزيعا عادلا .

الحادى عشر : -

الجرى على قاعدة الباب المفتوح في الاتفاقات الجمركية والمساواة في الرسوم على الواردات مع مراعاة حماية المصنوعات المصرية .

الثاني عشر : -

العمل لترقية الوسائل الزراعية بكافة الطرق والتذرع الى اصلاح وسائل الري والصرف والسعي في تخلي الحكومة عما تحت يدها من الاطيان للافراد .

الثالث عشر : -

العمل لترقية صنوف الصناعة على العموم .

الرابع عشر : -

السعي في تسهيل وسائل النقل الخارجية بين مصريين البلاد الاخرى .

الخامس عشر : -

السعي في تعميم شركات التعاون بأنواعها وترقية شأنها .

السادس عشر : -

السعي في تشجيع الشركات المصرية وتنمية اطماعها المشروعة حتى تستطيع أن تأخذ على عواتقها كثيرا من الاعمال العامة التي من شأنها أن تكون أعمالا حرة في يد الافراد والشركات .

السابع عشر : -

اتخاذ الوسائل الفعالة لتنمية الموارد الطبيعية في القطر المصري من مناجم وغيرها وانتفاع المصريين بها .

الثامن عشر : -

السعي في تنظيم العلاقات في المصانع والمتاجر بين العمال وارباب العمل على قاعدة العدل انقاء للامراض الاجتماعية الناشئة عن تحكم أحد الفريقين .

APPENDIX II

INTERVIEW WITH AHMAD PASHA ABDUL GHAFFAR

The following is the text of the interview which Ahmad Pasha Abdul Ghaffar granted to the author on March 24-27, 1967, at the former's residence in al-Ma'adi, U.A.R.

The interview was conducted in the form of a conversation. The result was that there were some digressions into minor matters. Moreover, the conversation did not always conform to the chronological order of events, and in some cases it was necessary to go over the same territory twice. For that reason, the author took the liberty, a few days after the interview, of striking out the unnecessary repetitions and rearranging the passages to conform more closely to the order of events. Grammatic errors were also corrected, and in some places punctuations and connecting words were added so as to make for more comprehensible reading. Otherwise, no changes were introduced into the original notes.

Origins of the Liberal Constitutional Party.

The Liberal Constitutional Party had roots in the era of Isma'il Pasha. In the elections of 1879, heads of noble families entered Parliament. These people stood for three things:

1. Opposition to the Khedive's absolute power.
2. Opposition to the interference of the military in politics.
3. Opposition to the growth of foreign influence in Egypt.

Members of the 1879 Parliament had a tacit agreement with Urabi that he would not meddle in politics. They feared that should Urabi revolt, foreign Powers would interfere.

When Urabi violated his agreement with the notables, they turned against him. They were headed by Sultan Pasha. Urabi Pasha got in contact with

them through Mohammad Ubeid, and forced them to sign a note dethroning the Khedive. Sultan Pasha and a few others, including Ahmad Pasha Abdul Ghaffar's grandfather, refused to comply.

Members of the 1879 Parliament or their sons, returned in the elections of 1881. Those or their descendents formed the Umma Party. And members of the Umma Party or their sons formed the Liberal Constitutional Party.

Organization of the Liberal Constitutional Party.

The Board of Directors of the Liberal Constitutional Party was not elected in the ordinary sense of the word, but was rather chosen by means amounting to lobbying. Usually, those from the most important families were appointed to the Board.

The Paris Peace Conference, 1919.

In 1919, the Wafd shifted their struggle to the international level. This step was spontaneous, and was designed to embarrass the British authorities. No member of the Wafd, and none of its friends, opposed this step. Adli, Tharwat, Rushdi, Sidqi, all approved of this step.

Formation of the Liberal Constitutional Party.

The obvious association between the Liberal Constitutional Party and the projected constitution, made King Fu'ad oppose the formation of the Party.

Therefore, such politicians as Tharwat and Sidqi preferred to stay outside the Party so as to maintain as good relations with the Palace as possible.¹ But to all practical purposes, Tharwat and Sidqi were regarded as members of the Party, and each had a very strong following within it.

Adli Pasha was appointed President of the Party because that was the natural thing to do. He had been the focus of all anti-Zaghloulists. Adli, Tharwat, Sidqi, Abdul Aziz Fahmi, and Rushdi, were the spiritual fathers of the Party. They led the opposition against Zaghloul in the Wafd in 1920-21. But Adli was not fit to be President of the Party. He was not dynamic and not a fighter.

At first, the Party had high hopes concerning popularity. They believed that their efforts to promulgate a constitution would bring them public support. When they discovered that their efforts did not mean anything to the people, they were disappointed. Gradually, the idea that the people were not fit for constitutional government gained ground in the Party.

This disappointment caused Adli to resign from the Party.² When this happened, Abdul Ghaffar was infuriated. He considered Adli's resignation something of a treason. He criticized Adli publicly and very severely. This quarrel caused a sensation in the Party. Sidqi, Tharwat, and others did not wish Abdul Ghaffar to criticize Adli so bitterly, and at least not publicly.

¹ Haykal suggests that Tharwat and Sidqi remained outside the Party because Mohammad Mahmoud refused to cooperate with them, and particularly with Sidqi. Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, p. 145.

² Adli resigned from the Party in the spring of 1924.

Mohammad Mahmoud had been on good terms with Adli. He did not intrigue to bring about Adli's resignation from the Party. But it is quite possible that he was secretly glad that Adli resigned.

After resigning from the Party, Adli had no more relations with it, and he lost touch with politics in general.

Tharwat and Allenby, 1922.

When Tharwat quarreled with the King because of the draft constitution,¹ Allenby tried to take advantage of the situation.² He was willing to support Tharwat, but wanted in return many concessions from Tharwat. The latter refused to pay such a price, so he resigned. The Party approved of Tharwat's policy.

Abdul Aziz Fahmi.

After Adli's resignation from the presidency of the Party, the majority of the members wanted Abdul Aziz Fahmi as president. Most eager for that were Tharwat, Lutfi as-Sayyid, and Sidqi. But Abdul Aziz Fahmi did not wish to become president of the Liberal Constitutional Party because he did not want

¹ The summer of 1922.

² This is Abdul Ghaffar's opinion. Nevertheless, the opposite seems to be more plausible: when the relations between Tharwat and Allenby deteriorated, King Fu'ad tried to take advantage of the situation.

to get involved in politics. It took time to convince him. That is why it took long to elect a successor to Adli.¹

Tawfiq Nasim's Resignation, 1923.

When Nasim's cabinet resigned² there was much discontent of Nasim and the King. The main cause of the discontent was the constitution and the Sudan. The state of mind in the country was such that the King had to appoint a prime minister of the caliber of Tharwat or Adli. Of the two, the King preferred Adli to Tharwat because Adli was a relative of the King, and because he did not play a direct role in formulating the constitution.

The Two Factions in the Liberal Constitutional Party.

Down to 1930, there were two factions in the Party, one headed by Isma'il Sidqi, the other headed by Mohammad Mahmoud. The two were personal enemies and could rarely agree on a policy.

Sidqi and Tharwat were great friends, and were supported by Lutfi as-Sayyid, Mahmoud Abdul Raziq, Abdul Ghaffar, and Abdul Aziz Fahmi. When the Party was looking for a successor to Adli, Sidqi, Tharwat, and Lutfi were in favor of Abdul Aziz Fahmi. Because of this, they came under

¹ From this it would be inferred that Fahmi was approached by the Party immediately after Adli's resignation. But according to Fahmi's own account he was not approached till Jan., 1925, and it did not take long to convince him. Fahmi, op. cit., p. 149.

² Feb. 5, 1923.

strong attack from Mohammad Mahmoud. But at that time, the Party was under the influence of Tharwat and Sidqi. Therefore, Mahmoud had to acquiesce.

At the time when Tharwat, Adli, and Sidqi controlled the Party, Dr. Hafez Afifi played a central role. He was delegated by the Party to represent it in as-Siyasah. In effect, he controlled as-Siyasah and was the strongest man in the Party.¹

Afifi's strong ties with Sidqi, Tharwat, and others of Sidqi's friends, caused Mohammad Mahmoud to become Afifi's enemy. Even when Mahmoud became Prime Minister, as-Siyasah used to express Afifi's opinion rather than Mahmoud's. The enmity between Mahmoud and Afifi continued till the latter was forced to resign from the Party.

Afifi's strong position in the Party caused the King to fear him. Otherwise, there was no cause of enmity between them.²

Tawfiq Doce's Resignation, 1925.

Tawfiq Doce did not wish to resign from Ziwar's cabinet. The Party Board of Directors threatened to oust him should he insist on staying in the cabinet. He was thereby forced to resign from the cabinet, feeling that should the Party oust him, he would lose prestige. But he decided to resign from the

¹ The statement that Afifi was the strongest man in the Party is an obvious exaggeration, and contradictory with previous statements.

² Tharwat intended to take Afifi into his cabinet of Ap. 26, 1927, as Minister of Defense. For some unexplained reason, King Fu'ad objected, and Tharwat gave in to the King's wish because he was trying to improve his relations with the Palace. Haykal, Mudhakkarat, I, p. 275.

Party so as to regain his freedom of action.

By resisting the Board on the question of resigning from the cabinet; Doce got in bad with the Party, and specially Mohammad Mahmoud. The Party wanted to get rid of Doce. But they did not want him to resign from the Party immediately after resigning from the cabinet, because that would expose the lack of unanimity within the Party on the question of withdrawing from Ziwari's cabinet.¹

There was no questions about Doce's behaviour with respect to the Party funds, and no suspicions that he had embezzled any money from the Party.

The Alliance of 1926.

The aim of the Alliance was to put a limit on the King's power.

The idea of calling for a meeting of the defunct Parliament was born among deputies from different parties. Ahmad Abdul Ghaffar was one of the deputies who thought of this idea. Zaghloul played no direct role in promoting the idea; but after the idea gained acceptance among the deputies, Zaghloul was called upon to preside over the meeting.

¹ This account is unconvincing. Doce resigned from the Party because he had real grievances against it. Moreover, he had at least the passive sympathy of some members of the Board of Directors. He listed his grievances in a letter to Abdul Aziz Fahmi. "Tawfiq Doce Basha", as-Siyasah, III, 902 (Sep. 24, 1925) p. 4.

The Board appointed a special committee to discuss the contents of the letter with Doce. "Tawfiq Doce Basha", as-Siyasah, III, 904 (Sep. 27, 1925) p. 4.

as-Siyasah never revealed the contents of the letter, but it did reveal that the committee found that Doce's grievances were just and should be redressed. Proclamation of the Board of Directors, Oct. 3, 1925, in: Ibid., III, 910 (Oct. 4, 1924) p. 4.

The meeting of the Parliament at the Continental Hotel was the beginning of I'tilaf¹. Following it, Abdul Aziz Fahmi resigned from the presidency of the Party.

To Zaghoul, the Alliance was necessary because he felt that he needed talents like Tharwat and Sidqi. Zaghoul did not want merely an Alliance, but also re-union of the Wafd and the Liberal Constitutional Party. The Liberals were in favor of Alliance and even re-union. Opposed to the idea of Alliance and re-union were Makram Ubeid and Mustapha Nahhas from the Wafd.

Mustapha Nahhas was of no importance as far as Zaghoul was concerned. He was only Makram's henchman. But Makram had a great influence over Zaghoul.

The re-union was coming to fruition. But Zaghoul's death put an end to it. Nahhas and Makram immediately turned against the Alliance after Zaghoul's death. Although Mohammad Mahmoud agreed to join Nahhas's cabinet, one could say that the Alliance ended with Zaghoul's death. At least it ended as far as the majority of the Liberal Constitutional Party were concerned, e.g., Tharwat, Sidqi, Afifi, Haykal, Abdul Ghaffar, etc.

Adli's Second Cabinet, June, 1926 - April, 1927.

Adli resigned because of an adverse vote in the Chamber. His colleagues pledged not to return in the next cabinet so as to please him.

¹ The meeting took place on Nov. 21, 1925.

Ahmad Pasha Abdul Ghaffar and the Palace Budget.

In 1926, Abdul Ghaffar delivered a speech in the Chamber criticizing the excesses of the Palace Budget.¹ He delivered the speech on his own initiative and not on behalf of the Party.

It all started when Abdul Ghaffar exchanged some acid remarks with Zaghoul in the Chamber. The subject of these remarks was the appointment of three ulema, known for their pro-Palace inclination, as members of the Senate. Abdul Ghaffar criticized this appointment in the Chamber; but Zaghoul did not feel that the subject was worth making an issue of. So he tried to silence Abdul Ghaffar.² This caused the quarrel between the two.

Hafez Afifi talked later with Abdul Ghaffar about this event. Afifi was of the opinion that Abdul Ghaffar should have avoided an open clash with Zaghoul. He was afraid that the Wafd would suspect that Abdul Ghaffar had been prompted by the Liberal Constitutional Party to criticize Zaghoul. Abdul Ghaffar finally agreed to appologize to Zaghoul.

When Abdul Ghaffar went to see Zaghoul in his office and appologize, the latter demanded a public appology. Abdul Ghaffar consented on condition that they argue things out in public. Zaghoul subsequently agreed to forgo a public appology.

¹ The speech was delivered in the Chamber at the time when Adli was head of the Alliance cabinet.

² Zaghoul was at that time Speaker of the Chamber.

During this interview, Zaghoul invited Abdul Ghaffar to deliver a speech in the Chamber questioning the Palace Budget. But he asked Abdul Ghaffar not to tell anyone that he -- Zaghoul -- had prompted him to make the speech. Zaghoul promised to back Abdul Ghaffar if the latter got into trouble on account of the speech. Later on, Abdul Ghaffar showed text of the speech to Zaghoul and obtained his approval of it.

When Tharwat (who was a relative of Abdul Ghaffar) got to know about the projected speech, he tried to convince Abdul Ghaffar not to deliver it. Tharwat was afraid that the speech would embarrass Adli, who was then the Prime Minister. Mohammad Ali Alluba wanted Abdul Ghaffar to submit the speech for consideration by the Party. Hafez Afifi was willing to let Abdul Ghaffar to deliver the speech provided it did not touch on the King personally. Finally, Tharwat asked Abdul Ghaffar to show the speech to Adli before delivering it to the Chamber.

Abdul Ghaffar went to see Adli about the speech. The latter showed that he did not care in the least. This careless attitude offended Abdul Ghaffar.

The speech created a sensation in the Chamber. From that time on, Abdul Ghaffar was recognized as a parliamentarian to be feared. He was feared for his bluntness and courage.

After delivering the speech, Abdul Ghaffar discovered that Ahmad Mahir (from the Wafd) had wanted to talk about the same subject, and that Zaghoul had prevented him.¹

¹ Abdul Ghaffar's whole point here is to show that Zaghoul used him as a paw in the political game against the King.

The Tharwat-Chamberlain Negotiations.

Had Zaghoul lived, Tharwat would have succeeded in concluding a treaty with Great Britain. When Tharwat was in England for the negotiations, he remained in contact with Zaghoul, and kept him informed about all that was taking place. Every time Tharwat agreed with Chamberlain on an article, he let Zaghoul know about it. Zaghoul approved of all the articles which were negotiated before his death.

Mohammad Mahmoud Pasha.

Mohammad Mahmoud never had an open quarrel with Haykal.¹

He joined Nahhas's first cabinet against the wishes of the Liberal Constitutional Party. Yet, the Party did not oust him because his family was extremely wealthy and influential.

It is impossible to state whether Mahmoud was already in league with the King when he joined Nahhas's cabinet. But the possibility cannot be ruled out completely. However, when he resigned, he already had had his agreement with the King. But the idea was that Sidqi would form the new cabinet. Even before Mahmoud resigned, Sidqi started consultations for the new cabinet. So far, no one had felt what was about to happen. When Sidqi approached Abdul Ghaffar about joining the projected cabinet, it was the first time that Abdul Ghaffar got an idea of what was going to happen.

¹ See, p. 57n, supra.

Sidqi told Abdul Ghaffar that the idea was to suspend the Constitution. Yet, Abdul Ghaffar was willing to join a cabinet under Sidqi.

Then all of a sudden, Mohammad Mahmoud was charged with the formation of the cabinet. The reasons are still unknown. All the same, Sidqi gave his support to the cabinet.

When Mohammad Mahmoud was in the process of forming the new cabinet, the Party convened in Mahmoud Abdul Raziq's house. Mohammad Mahmoud was denounced by Ahmad Abdul Ghaffar, Mahmoud Abdul Raziq, and Mahmoud Azmi. Abdul Raziq said that if Mohammad Mahmoud suspended the Constitution, he would end up by being dependent on the King. In this meeting, Sidqi backed Mohammad Mahmoud.

Abdul Ghaffar was of the opinion that the best policy to adopt was to stay in the opposition long enough to allow the Wafd to discredit itself. Meanwhile, The Liberal Constitutional Party would carry on propaganda against the Wafd in as-Siyasah and by contact with the people in their constituencies.

When Mohammad Mahmoud dissolved Parliament and suspended the Constitution, Abdul Ghaffar and Mahmoud Azmi quarreled with him again and threatened to resign. Lutfi as-Sayyid convinced Abdul Ghaffar not to resign. Finally, Hussein Abdul Raziq was able to reconcile Abdul Ghaffar and Mahmoud Abdul Raziq with Mohammad Mahmoud. Mahmoud Azmi refused to be reconciled with Mohammad Mahmoud, and resigned from the Party.

At the time when Mohammad Mahmoud was in Nahhas's cabinet, and later when he was Prime Minister, as-Siyasah wrote according to Afifi's opinion and not according to Mahmoud's opinion.

Mohammad Mahmoud had to achieve something in order to justify his coup in the eyes of the Party. So he went to London for negotiations.

King Fu'ad was not in favor of negotiations because the British presence in Egypt gave him security. Thus, Mahmoud's desire to negotiate was the beginning of the dispute between him and the King. When the King was in England during the negotiations, he showed his dissatisfaction of Mahmoud. But the British Government backed Mahmoud at that time because they were interested in concluding an agreement. When the draft treaty was not accepted in Egypt, Mahmoud lost Britain's support.

The Elections of 1928.

The Liberal Constitutional Party refused to contest the elections because they were sure of Wafdist victory.

Isma'il Sidqi's Regime.

The cause of the quarrel between Sidqi Pasha and the Liberal Constitutional Party was his intention to change the Constitution. He wanted to abolish ministerial responsibility and the right of Parliament to control the budget. Ahmad Abdul Ghaffar complained that that would infringe on the essence of parliamentary regime. Other members of the Party also opposed Sidqi. The result was that the Party split.

During Sidqi's regime, the Party was very weak because it opposed the Government as well as the Wafd. Therefore, the Party was rather inactive.

The Liberal Constitutional Party and the Students.

The Party was in general against the interference of students in politics. But Mohammad Mahmoud at one time used to make efforts to promote the Party among students. A group of students started coming to the Party headquarters. This infuriated Ahmad Abdul Ghaffar, who threatened to resign if Mahmoud did not stop bringing the students to the Party headquarters. Lutfi as-Sayyid also protested and threatened to resign. From that time on, the Party no more had direct relations with the students. But Mohammad Mahmoud kept in contact with them in his personal capacity.

The King and Tawfiq Nassim.

The reason for the deterioration of relations between the Palace and Tawfiq Nasim was that the latter succeeded in keeping on good terms with the Wafd.

Nasim Pasha was never completely sane. After 1930 his condition deteriorated rapidly.

The United Front, 1935.

It is not true that the idea of the United Front started with Hafez Ramadan and Abdul Rahman ar-Rafi'i.¹ The idea started among the students

¹ ar-Rafi'i claims that the National Party was one of the first to promote the idea. ar-Rafi'i, Mudhakkarat, p. 86.

of the University of Fu'ad I. The United Front was realized under pressure from the students. It was a weak alliance because the politicians did not enter into it willingly.

The Negotiations of 1936.

The British were prompted to solve the Egyptian Question by their fear of the Italians who had occupied Abyssinia.

The Egyptians were not afraid of the Italian occupation of Abyssinia. On the contrary, they welcomed it as a way to illicit more concessions from Britain.

APPENDIX III

THE DECLARATION OF EGYPT'S INDEPENDENCE¹

1. Allenby's Communication to Sultan Fu'ad, 28 February 1922.

I have the honour to bring to your Highness's notice that certain passages of the explanatory note which I addressed to you on the 3rd December, 1921, were interpreted, to my great disappointment, in a manner not in accordance with intention and policy of His Majesty's Government.

2. Judging by many comments which have been published on the subject of this note, it would appear that many Egyptians were under the impression that Great Britain was about to abandon her liberal and favourable attitude towards Egyptian aspirations and to make use of her special position in Egypt in order to maintain a political and administrative régime incompatible with the freedom she had offered.

3. Such an interpretation of the intentions of His Majesty's Government was quite mistaken. On the contrary, the explanatory note emphasised the dominating principle that the guarantees claimed by Great Britain are not designed to involve the continuance of an actual or virtual protectorate. Great Britain, as it is stated therein, sincerely desires to see "an Egypt enjoying the national prerogatives and the international position of a sovereign state.

¹ Communication to the Sultan and declaration to Egypt from Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1922, Egypt No. 1, Cmd. 1592, quoted in: J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East; A Documentary Record: 1914-1956 (London: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1956) II, pp. 101-102.

4. If Egyptians have regarded these guarantees as being out of keeping with the position of a free country they have, on the other hand, lost sight of the fact that Great Britain has been obliged to claim them out of consideration for her own security in face of a situation which demands great prudence on her part, particularly in the matter of disposition of her troops. Present world condition, however, and the state of effervescence which has prevailed in Egypt since the armistice are not permanent factors, and it is to be hoped that while, on the one hand, the former will eventually improve, on the other hand, the time will come when, in the language of that note, Egypt's record will give confidence in her own guarantees.

5. As to any desire to interfere in the internal administration of Egypt, His Majesty's Government have sufficiently stated, and repeat, that their most ardent desire is to place in Egyptian hands the conduct of their own affairs. The draft agreement proposed by Great Britain did not depart from this idea, and in making provision for the presence of two British officials in the Ministries of Finance and Justice, it was not her intention to use these two officials for the purpose of intervening in Egyptian affairs, but solely in order to preserve the contact requisite for protecting foreign interests.

6. Such is the sole bearing of the guarantees that were demanded by Great Britain. They were claimed without any desire to impede Egyptians enjoying the full rights of a national Government.

7. Animated as she is by these intentions, it will be understood that it is repugnant to Great Britain on the one hand to see Egyptians delay by their own acts the realisation of an ideal aimed at by both parties, and on the other to be compelled herself to intervene to re-establish order when it is threatened in such a way as to arouse the fears of foreigners and to involve the interests

of foreign Powers. It would be much to be regretted if Egyptians should see in the exceptional measures which have recently been taken any prejudice to the ideal to which they aspire or an intention on the part of His Majesty's Government to alter the policy I have indicated. In taking these measures, the sole desire of His Majesty's Government has been to put an end to a harmful agitation which, by arousing popular passions, might have such consequences as to jeopardise the whole result of the efforts of the Egyptian nation. These measures were taken primarily in the interest of the Egyptian cause, which has everything to gain by being studied in an atmosphere of calm and friendly discussion.

8. Now that tranquility seems to be re-establishing itself, thanks to the wise spirit which is the root of the Egyptian character and asserts itself in times of crisis, I am happy to be able to announce to your Highness and His Majesty's Government are prepared to recommend the accompanying declaration for the approval of Parliament. This will, I am confident, establish a régime of mutual confidence and lay the foundation for a satisfactory and final solution of the Egyptian problem.

9. There is no obstacle to the re-establishment forthwith of an Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs which will prepare the way for the creation of the diplomatic and consular representation of Egypt.

10. The creation of a Parliament with a right to control the policy and administration of a constitutionally responsible Government is a matter for your Highness and the Egyptian people to determine. Should circumstances arise to delay the coming into force of the Act of Indemnity with application to all inhabitants of Egypt mentioned in the declaration accompanying this note, I desire to inform your Highness that I shall be prepared,

pending the repeal of the proclamation of the 2nd November, 1914, to suspend the application of martial law in respect of all matters affecting the free exercise of the political rights of Egyptians.

11. It is now for Egypt to respond, and it is to be hoped she will justly appreciate the good intentions of Great Britain, and that reflection and not passion will guide her attitude.

2. Allenby's Declaration to Egypt, 28 February, 1922.

Whereas His Majesty's Government, in accordance with their declared intentions, desire forthwith to recognise Egypt as an independent sovereign state; and

Whereas the relations between His Majesty's Government and Egypt are of vital interest to the British Government;

The following principles are hereby declared:-

1. The British Protectorate over Egypt is terminated, and Egypt is declared to be an independent sovereign State

2. So soon as the Government of his Highness shall pass an Act of Indemnity with application to all inhabitants of Egypt, martial law as proclaimed on the 2nd November, 1914, shall be withdrawn.

3. The following matters are absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty's Government until such time as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accomodation on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt:-

- (a.) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt;
- (b.) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference,
direct or indirect;
- (c.) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of
minorities;
- (d.) The Soudan.

Pending the conclusion of such agreements, the status quo in all these matters shall remain intact.

APPENDIX IV
THE NEGOTIATIONS, 1920-1936.¹

The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 was the culmination of seven attempts at negotiations covering a period of sixteen years.

The first attempt was the Wafd-Milner negotiations of 1920, the aim of which was to set down proposals which the Milner Commission could recommend to the British Government for the solution of the Egyptian Question. These negotiations were of extreme importance although they ended in failure. They became the pattern for the later negotiations, and they succeeded in devising a formula for the future Anglo-Egyptian relations. It was agreed that the Protectorate would be abolished, and that the relations between the two countries would be governed by a treaty of alliance. From that time on, the aim of all attempts at settling the Egyptian Question was to conclude such a treaty.

The final proposals submitted by the Milner Commission to the Wafd provided for the following: upon the conclusion of the treaty, Egypt would become an independent state with a foreign ministry and the right of representation abroad. Britain would help Egypt obtain a modification of the

¹ The following is largely a summary of the documents published in: al-Qadiyyah al-Misriyyah, pp. 93-489. Whenever use is made of other works, due reference would be given. There will be no attempt at a detailed account of the negotiations and the resulting proposals. The concentration will rather be on the progress towards the solution of the Egyptian Question in the successive negotiations.

Capitulatory regime; but the protection of foreigners and foreign interests in Egypt would then have to be assumed partly by the British Representative, and partly by a Judicial Adviser. The Judicial Adviser would be appointed by the Egyptian Government in concurrence with the British Government. His function would be to supervise the administration of justice to foreigners. Britain would maintain in Egypt a military force which would be stationed in localities determined by the official negotiations. Britain would undertake to defend Egypt, and in return, Egypt would accord Britain in time of war full transport and communications facilities on its territories, in its territorial waters, and its air space. Egypt would retain a Financial Adviser appointed in concurrence with the British Government who would assume the functions of the Debt Commission. In matters of foreign policy, Egypt was not to take actions contrary to the terms of the treaty or to Britain's interests. The Sudan was left out of the proposals.¹

The result of the Adli-Curzon negotiations of 1921 was less satisfactory from the Egyptian point of view than the result of the Wafd-Milner negotiations. The British Government was not officially bound by the Milner proposals, and Curzon was less disposed to make concessions than Milner. The draft treaty which he submitted to the Egyptian Delegation proposed that there should be no limitations on the localities in which British troops would be stationed. In return to that, Curzon was not willing to make any substantial concessions which Milner had not been willing to make. The draft treaty envisaged the maintenance of the status quo in the Sudan.

¹ Zayid, Egypt's Struggle, pp. 96-97.

The Zaghloul-MacDonald negotiations of September, 1924, could hardly be considered negotiations. Zaghloul demanded the complete independence of Egypt; the evacuation of all British forces and the unity of the Nile Valley; the complete liberation of the Egyptian Government of British control and the removal of restrictions on Egypt's foreign policy; the abolishment of the positions of the Financial and Judicial Advisers and the withdrawal of the British claim to protect foreigners and minorities in Egypt; the withdrawal of the British claim to take part in the defense of the Suez Canal; and finally, the reduction of the status of High Commissioner to that of ambassador.¹

MacDonald rejected these demands, and Zaghloul went home without attempting a compromise.

The Tharwat-Chamberlain negotiations of 1927-28, represented the first step forward since 1920. In the final British draft, the following concessions were added to Milner's proposals: the British Government would help Egypt enter the League of Nations. British troops in Egypt would be stationed in localities determined by further negotiations ten years after the ratification of the treaty; and should these projected negotiations fail, the issue would be referred to the League, and might continue to be brought up at five year intervals until the League passed a decision acceptable to Egypt. Later on, Tharwat Pasha obtained further concessions:² the British Government agreed to transform the British officer group in the Egyptian army into

¹ R.I.I.A., op. cit., pp. 14-15.
Zayid, Egypt's Struggle, p. 120.

² R.I.I.A., op. cit., p. 25.

a military advisory mission. It also agreed that failing agreement on the Capitulatory regime within a period of five years, the question might be brought up before the League Council.

The Mahmoud-Henderson negotiations of 1929 resulted in still further concessions on Britain's part. The draft treaty which both sides accepted, and which was to serve as "proposals" for a settlement of the Egyptian Question, provided for the following: British troops were to be withdrawn to the Canal Zone. The Sudan was to revert to the status quo ante 1924.¹ Britain undertook to help Egypt abolish the Capitulations, and agreed to transfer the responsibility of protecting foreigners and foreign interests to the Egyptian Government.

The Nahhas-Henderson negotiations resulted in a very insignificant modification of the Mahmoud-Henderson proposals of the previous year. Nahhas tried to obtain some further concessions on the Sudan issue, particularly regarding the immigration of Egyptians into the Sudan. Failing that, he broke off the negotiations and returned to Egypt.

In September, 1932, Sidqi Pasha, then the Prime Minister, met Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, in Geneva. Anglo-Egyptian relations were discussed in the course of the meeting, but the talks did not develop into negotiations even though Sidqi submitted a memorandum to Simon explaining the necessity of negotiations. In these talks, Simon indicated that his Government wished to retract some of the concessions it made in the

¹ Certain changes had been introduced into the status of the Sudan as a result of Allenby's ultimatum to Zaghoul's cabinet in 1924.

previous negotiations on the questions of the Sudan and the localities in which British troops would be stationed. But he also said that in return, the British Government would make concessions on other points.

Negotiations for the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance of 1936 began in Cairo on March 2, 1936. The Treaty was initialled on August 12, 1936, and was signed in London on August 26.¹

The Treaty provided for a defensive and an offensive alliance. In times of crisis, the two governments would remain in contact with each other regarding the diplomatic steps to be taken to avert the situation. Should one of the two signatories become involved in a war, the other would come to its help; Britain was committed to defend Egypt, but Egypt's commitment was limited to according Britain full transport and communications facilities, and any other possible help on Egyptian land, in its territorial waters, and in its air space. Neither signatory might at any time adopt a foreign policy contrary to the terms of the Treaty. It was further stipulated that the Alliance would continue irrespective of any Treaty revision.

In time of peace, British troops in Egypt were to be restricted to the Canal Zone and were to be limited to a number specified by the Treaty. These restrictions would go into effect as soon as accommodations had been built for the troops in the Canal Zone, and not later than a period of eight years. Egypt was to bear three-fourths of the construction and maintenance cost of these accommodations. In times of war or acute international crisis, the number of

¹ Zayid, Egypt's Struggle, pp. 163 ff. has been of great help in preparing the following.

British troops would be increased indefinitely and the restrictions on their location would be lifted.

Egypt's sovereignty over the Canal was recognized. But it was agreed that the two signatories would assume joint responsibility for its defense. This part of the Treaty was to be effective for twenty years. Should any differences arise with regard to the defense of the Canal, the issue would be referred -- after the lapse of the twenty-year period -- to the League Council or to any other arbiter which the two signatories might chose.

The Sudan articles of the Treaty reestablished the status quo ante 1924, and the Egyptians were allowed unrestricted immigration to that Country.

The British Government pledged to use its diplomatic influence to help Egypt induce the Powers to the abolition of the Capitulations. It was stipulated that the abolition of the Capitulations would become effective after a transitional period during which the Mixed Courts would continue to function, and would, in addition to their original function, assume the function of the Consular Courts. This part of the Treaty was realized by the Montreux Convention of 1937; and in October, 1949, the last vestiges of the Capitulations disappeared.

It was stipulated that after a period of ten years from the conclusion of the Treaty, negotiations for its revision might be opened provided both signatories consented. After the lapse of a twenty-year period beginning with the ratification of the Treaty, negotiations for the revision of the Treaty might be opened upon the demand of either signatory. Should there be any disagreement regarding the revision, the issue would be referred to the League Council or to any other arbiter which the two signatories might chose.

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