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Thesis Title

EDUCATION FOR NATIONAL UNITY AND
CITIZENSHIP IN THE SUDAN

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ABSTRACT

The problem at hand, is that education in the Southern part of my country, the Sudan, has been subject to a serious state of instability and chaos ever since the mutiny of the Southern Corps of Sudan Defence Force in August 1955. In other words, education in the Southern Sudan has been suffering greatly since the start of the problem of National Unity which is generally referred to as the 'Problem of the Southern Sudan.'

Several reasons led to this problem. Chief among them are the political, social, educational and administrative factors. The response of the Central Government, educationally speaking, was to initiate a new educational policy for the South completely different from the one that used to prevail before Independence.

Chief among the new educational measures were the take-over of missionary schools by the Government, the emphasis upon Arabic language instead of English, the emphasis upon Islam instead of Christianity and finally the expulsion of the foreign missionaries from the South. These new steps were made by the Government in an attempt to cultivate and develop a sense of national unity and citizenship among the Southern Sudanese and lead ultimately to the solution of the problem of the South.

Nevertheless, the new educational measures affected greatly the educative process in the South and hindered it. At the same time, they did not help in cultivating and developing a sense of national unity and citizenship among the Southern Sudanese. As a result, the problem remained unsolved up to this very moment.

The purpose of this study, is to examine critically every educational measure introduced by the Central Government in the South from 1957 onwards. The reasons that led the Government to initiate these measures and the impact which these educational policies had upon the people of Southern Sudan will receive special attention.

However, since the examination of these educational policies is almost impossible without analyzing fully the background of the problem of the South, the study will examine first the various factors that led to the outbreak of the question of national unity in the Sudan.

Finally, the study will put forward some recommendations or suggestions for a viable and a sound educational policy in Southern Sudan that may render possible the development of a sense of national unity and citizenship among the Southern Sudanese.

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CHAPTER I

THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE

A. Introduction:

The word Sudan stems historically from the Arabic term "Bilad as-Sudan", i.e. the country of the Blacks.¹ In the past, this term "Bilad as-Sudan" had been applied to the central belt of Africa, paralleling and south of the Great Sahara Desert.²

While discussing, "the background of the picture as it is today in the Sudan," Sir Harold MacMichael, a previous Civil Secretary in the Anglo Egyptian Sudan argues:

Two factors require constantly to be borne in mind. First, that the country is vast, with infinite variations, from sandy desert to subtropical forest, and a signal diversity of types inhabiting it; secondly, that until 1821, it had no unified history though in each of its component parts there survived garbled memories of racial wars and tribal quarrels, intrigues and jealousies of petty local dynasts."³

B. Physical Features:

The Sudan extends over a distance of approximately 1400 miles from North to South and about 1,200 miles from East to

¹J.S. Trimmingham, Islam in the Sudan (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1965), p. 1.

²K.M. Barbour, The Republic of the Sudan (London: Univ. of London Press, 1961), p. 13.

³Sir H. MacMichael, The Anglo Egyptian Sudan (London: Faber & Faber, 1934), p. 12.

West with an area of approximately one million square miles.¹ This area is more than double the size of Egypt; or almost one quarter of the area of Europe; or about the size of Britain, France, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, Norway, Sweden and Denmark put together.²

The country is bounded on the North by U.A.R. and Libya, on the East by the Red Sea, Eritrea and Ethiopia; on the South by Kenya, Uganda and Congo (Kinshasa); on the West by the Republic of Chad and the Republic of Central Africa.³

The Sudan lies entirely within the tropical zone - between North latitudes 22° and 3° and between East longitudes 22° and $38\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$. The Nile with its tributaries form the most important feature in the Sudan. It has two main branches, the White Nile and the Blue Nile. The former which originates in Lake Victoria in Central Africa enters the Sudan over rapids and runs through the extensive swamps generally referred to as the Sudd (السُد) (Arabic word meaning block).⁴ These swamps - the Sudd - cause the loss of nearly half the waters of the White Nile. As a result, it does not contribute signi-

¹M. Akrawi, "Educational Planning in a Developing Country," International Review of Education, Vol. VI (Holland: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), p. 257.

²L.A. Fabunmi, The Sudan in Anglo Egyptian Relations 1800-1956 (London: Longmans, 1960), p. 2.

³Republic of the Sudan, Basic Facts About the Southern Provinces of the Sudan (Khartoum: Govt. Press, 1964), p. 1.

⁴Trimmingham, op. cit., p. 1.

ificantly to the economic and agricultural development of the country as does the Blue Nile. The latter which originates in Lake Tana in the Ethiopian plateau is the most important water resource in the country.¹ Nothing can illustrate this statement better than the fact that most of the important agricultural and power projects of the country depend upon its waters. Chief among these schemes is the Gezira agricultural project which is the most significant agricultural scheme in the Sudan.² According to Fabunmi, the Gezira scheme, "... is one of the world's most successful examples of irrigation work and agricultural technique perhaps next to the Tennessee Valley Authority Scheme in the United States!"³ It sets Mekki Abbas, one day its Managing Director, dreaming:

Indeed should the civilizations which arose in the Mesopotamia of Iraq and other parts of the Fertile Crescent have any future parallel in the Sudan, it will be mainly due to the prosperity contributed by this Mesopotamia when its cultivable two million acres are fully developed.⁴

The two main tributaries of the Nile - the Blue and the White join each other at Khartoum - the Capital in a place known as Mogran (مقـرن) (Arabic word meaning connection).

¹B.M. Said, The Sudan - Crossroads of Africa (London: The Bodley Head, 1965), pp. 11-12.

²A. Gaitskel, The Gezira (London: Faber & Faber, 1959) pp. 21-22.

³Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 6.

⁴Ibid., p. 6.

North of Khartoum, the river is referred to as the River Nile and it flows through the desert of Northern Sudan and Egypt up to the Mediterranean.¹

C. Population and Administration:

The population of the Sudan is estimated to be well over 13 millions. About three millions of them live in Southern Sudan.² Administratively, the Sudan is divided into nine provinces. The three provinces, Bahr Elghazal, Upper Nile and Equatoria are conveniently referred to as the South. The remaining six provinces, the Northern, Kassala, Khartoum, Blue Nile, Kordofan and Darfur are simply called the North.³

D. Zones of Description:

For descriptive purposes the Sudan can safely be divided into three main zones, the Northern zone, the Central zone and the Southern zone. The first two are related to the Northern Sudan while the third refers to the South.

1. The Northern Zone:

This zone runs roughly from the Egyptian boundaries, i.e. from Wadi Haifa, through 350 miles-up to Atbara. This

¹Barbour, op. cit., pp. 117-120.

²Said, op. cit., p. 13.

³O.K. Midawi, The Sudan in Western Press (Khartoum: Ministry of Information & Labour Press, 1964), p. 3.

is partly desert and bare hills. The area is only scantily populated except along the banks of the Nile where farmers and peasants live.¹ These farmers who are usually described as peaceful folk, are very much like the Egyptian (fellaheen) peasants; but (unlike the fellaheen) crime is almost unknown among them.²

The more Northern inhabitants of the zone are generally referred to as Nubians. Historical and anthropological evidence shows that they are a mixture of Caucasians who migrated to the Sudan in Ancient times and Negroes who were the original inhabitants. Their claim to be Arab is mainly due to the infusion of a strain of Arab blood when the infiltration of the Arabs from Egypt occurred after the 11th Century A.D., and secondly to the adoption of Islam in the whole region.³

The Nubians speak a language of Hamitic origin and have several dialects but Arabic is the lingua franca and is the only written language. Away from the River Nile in this zone, live some nomadic Arabs who rear cattle, camel and horses and seek pasture from place to place for their herds.⁴

¹Basic Facts, op. cit., p. 1.

²Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 3.

³C.G. Seligman, Some Aspects of the Hamitic Problem in Anglo Egyptian Sudan (London: 1913), pp. 595-610.

⁴Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 3.

It is worthy of mention here that there is a striking similarity between this part of the Sudan and Upper Egypt in physical appearance, general folkways and common geographical features. This fact provides some support to the Egyptian argument that this part of the Sudan shares common cultural and ethnic ties with Egypt. An Egyptian authority argues:

As for Northern Sudan, there is no doubt that its early history and civilization were intimately connected with those of ancient Egypt. Nubia and adjacent Sudanese territories have been throughout the ages, recorded in history and even in prehistoric times as almost inseparable from Egypt.¹

In the Red Sea littorals live the Beja tribes, who are "of the proto Egyptian origin which was more modified in the North by Negroid and Armenoid influences than the south and were akin to riverain peoples of Nubia."² Although a strain of Arab blood had been infused into them, they have preserved their racial characteristics and languages which speak of more Hamitic than Arab origins.

The Banu Amir, a major tribe which lives in the Southern part and extends into Eriteria, although considered Caucasian Hamites, speak Tigre which is a Semitic language; the others use the old Hamitic language 'Tu Bedawie'.³ All the Beja tribes are Moslems and here again Arabic is the lingua franca and is the only written language.⁴

¹Ibid., p. 3.

²Selignan, op. cit., p. 610.

³Trimmingham, op. cit., p. 37.

⁴Barbour, op. cit., p. 80.

2. The Central Zone:

The central zone extends approximately 600 miles - i.e. from Atbara to Malakal. It lies roughly between the 13th and 10th parallels of North latitudes.¹ This zone is the most thickly populated and the most developed part of the country. According to Fabunmi this zone "... is the nerve centre of the country - the most active, the richest and most thickly populated part of the Sudan. It contains the great Gezira cotton area and the gum forests, which together provide most of the country's exports and revenues."² No less than seven eighth of the world's supply of Gum-Arabic come from **this** area and is annually shipped to U.S.A. and U.K.

As the central zone is the most developed part of the country; it is not surprising that the most outstanding towns are to be found in it; Khartoum, the Capital, Omdurman, the national capital, Elobeid, Wad Medani and Kassala.³

Along the river banks, life is rather similar to that of the Northern zone especially in the area north of Khartoum. The condition of people living away from the Nile is determined by the amount of rainfall in each belt.

The manner of life varies from cattle breeding such as common among the Baggara tribes (from Arabic word 'bagar,

¹Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 3.

²Ibid., p. 3.

³Ibid.

meaning cow) who live between 10 and 13th parallels, to sedentary cultivators between 13 and 15 parallels, to the Kababish (Arabic word - Kabsh¹ - meaning ram) and Hawawir who are camel breeders and who are described by Davies as being the "nomads par excellence."²

It is to be noted that the Central Sudan zone with some exceptions in Dar fur Province, the Nuba Mountains and Upper Nile where the inhabitants are mainly of the old stock known as Sudani; is inhabited by Arab tribes chief among them are Kababish and the Baggara to whom we have alluded. Dudley Lampen in his Baggara article in Anglo Egyptian Sudan from within, says: "In spite of their peculiarities, one is always realizing how great are the resemblances between the branches of the great Arab family, so much so that Doughty's Arabia Deserta would be a most valuable introduction to work among the Baggara tribes."³ Sir Douglas Newbold says the Kababish "are akin to the Awlad Ali of the Western desert of Egypt, and descended from Awlad Ugba who crossed from Arabia to Egypt and thence to Tripoli."⁴

¹K.D.D. Henderson, The Making of the Modern Sudan (London: Faber & Faber, 1952), p. 479.

²R. Davies, The Camels Back (London: Butler & Tanner Ltd., 1957), p. 27.

³Sudan Govt, The Anglo Egyptian Sudan From Within (London: 1935), p. 15.

⁴Henderson, op. cit., p. 479.

However, even here the people's claim to have pure Arab blood is often contested by historians and anthropologists. "Everywhere they have intermarried with the indigenous population and even Arabs like the Kababish seem to have mixed freely with Caucasians speaking Hamitic languages and to a lesser extent with Negroids."¹ According to latest population census (1955-56) the Arab constitute 39% of the population, while more than half of the population speak Arabic as their mother tongue. K.M. Barbour argues that in the Northern Sudan, "... the use of Arabic has become general as a lingua franca, though it has not yet become the mother tongue of all of the northern tribes."² He adds that "... it is already well advanced towards becoming the second language in much of the South."³

In this respect Sudan Government argues that:

The cultural ascendancy of the Arabs, however, has so profoundly modified the characteristics of the people amongst whom they settled that culturally they may have a semitic element of from 25-50 per cent. This Arab cultural ascendancy has led to exaggeration of the Arab racial element. The word Arab then is a cultural rather than an ethnic term.⁴

¹The Anglo Egyptian Sudan From Within, p. 24.

²Barbour, op. cit., p. 18.

³Ibid., p. 88.

⁴Basic Facts, op. cit., p. 3.

3. The Southern Zone:

The third zone of the country - the Southern zone extends from Malakal to the Sudan's southern boundary adjoining Kenya, Uganda and Congo (Kinshasa). As this zone is close to the Equator it has a good amount of rainfall ranging from 30 to 50 inches annually. M.O. Bashir states,

Unlike the North, the South lies within the tropics with a mean annual rainfall which varies between 400 mm. near Renk in Upper Nile Province to 1600 mm. on the Nile Congo Divide. In Gilo, in the Imatong mountains for example rainfall is as high as 2,200 mm. Rainfall may fall any time between February and November with a maximum in August."¹

Compared with the North the South is an underdeveloped country and one of the most nagging difficulties is the means of transportation and communication which render most of its products inaccessible and useless.

E. Historical Background:

Since time immorial, there had been relations between the Northern and Southern Sudan. A theory had been advanced that the Sudanese Kingdom of the Funj in the 16th A.D., the capital of which was Sennar, was of Shiluk origin.² In any case, it is a well established fact that both the North and South were unified for the first time³ during the Turko Egyptian rule over the Sudan which began in 1821 when Muhamed Ali

¹M.O. Bashir, The Southern Sudan - Background to Conflict (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1968), p. 12.

²Basic Facts, op. cit., p. 7.

³MacMichael, op. cit., p.12.

Pasha the Viceroy of Egypt conquered the then existing Sudanese Kingdoms of Sennar and Kordofan.¹

The Turko Egyptian rule over the united Sudan lasted for more than 60 years, 1821-1885. These sixty years according to Nigumi are "the darkest and most unhappy period of its history. Nothing of the volumes written about the misery and torture that befell the people during this terrible half of a century could illustrate this better than the fact that its eight million inhabitants were reduced to just over two millions."²

In 1881, however, discontent among the Sudanese at the Egyptian rule was universal and reached its maximum. The people were ready and prepared for revolution. But, "Before, they could rise in a rebellion, they needed a man to lead them, a cause to unite them and a miracle to arm them. All these were to be supplied them by Muhammad Ahmed, the Mahdi."³

The Mahdi started his revolution against the oppressive Turko Egyptian rule in August 1881 and by 1885 he succeeded finally in overthrowing the regime by capturing Khartoum, the capital, and killing General Gordon then the Governor General.⁴

¹R. Hill, Egypt in the Sudan (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959), pp. 7-9.

²M.A. Nigumi, A Great Trusteeship (London: The Cravel Press, 1958), p. XIV.

³A.B. Theobald, The Mahdiya, (London: Longmans Green & Co., 1951), p. 26.

⁴A. Nutting, Gordon: Martyr & Misfit (London: Constable 1966), p. 1.

Thus an independent and a united Sudan emerged. It remained so until it was reconquered by the Anglo Egyptian forces under the leadership of Lord Kitchner between 1896-1899. In 1899, an Anglo Egyptian convention with regard to the future of the Sudan was signed by Lord Cromer H.M. High Commissioner in Egypt and Butrous Ghali the Egyptian foreign minister. According to Professor Fabunmi, "A 'hybrid' form of Government was, therefore, adopted for the Sudan by Cromer; and it was named the 'Condominium' - the Anglo Egyptian Agreement of 1899 which made the Sudan constitutionally a slave with two masters: Britain and Egypt."¹ Sir Harold MacMichael says, "After ^{this} fashion, the New Sudan was born. It was endowed with sufficient strength to support existence."²

With the reconquest it was assumed that the Southern provinces had been regained along with the rest in the battle of Omdurman in 1898, but for a few months this political fact was threatened by the French occupation of Fashoda a village on the White Nile near the present-day town ^{of} Kodok.³ This dispute was settled by diplomatic means in Europe and when in 1899 the Condominium came into effect, the South was politically a part of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

¹Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 53.

²Sir H. MacMichael, The Sudan (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1954), p. 62.

³M. Shibeika, The Independent Sudan (New York: Speller, 1959), Chpts. I, II.

In 1953, however, and after a long struggle against the Condominium powers by the Sudanese, an agreement was signed by the British and Egyptian governments in which the Sudanese were given the chance to elect a Parliament.¹ The Parliament was to elect a national government and decide the future of the Sudan whether it be Independence or Unity with Egypt.

Thus from 1954 to 1956, the Sudan was administered by a transitional Government headed by Sayed Ismail Al-Azhari. The main task of the Government was to liquidate the Condominium and to create the neutral and free atmosphere necessary for self determination.² The final step in self determination came when in December 1955, the parliament unanimously adopted a resolution declaring the independence of Sudan and requesting Egypt and Britain to recognize the declaration. This was followed by a unanimous approval in the Senate three days later. A transitional Constitution was adopted providing for a five man commission to assume the duties of the Governor General.³

On January 1, 1956, with the lowering of the Egyptian and English flags and the raising of one new Sudanese flag, the Republic of the Sudan was born.⁴ Shortly afterwards

¹Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 297.

²B.M. Said, op. cit., p. 18.

³Akrawi, op. cit., p. 259.

⁴J.S. Duncan, The Sudan's Path to Independence (London: W. Blackwood & Sons. 1957), p. 205.

the Sudan joined the Arab League and was admitted as the 77th member of the United Nations.

It is to be noted that the problem of the Southern Sudan or the question of National Unity which is the main topic of this work broke out four months before independence i.e. in August 1955, when the Southern Corps of Sudan Defence Force revolted against the Central Government at Khartoum. This question will receive due consideration in the following chapters.

On November 17, 1958, the Sudanese army led by General Ibrahim Abboud made a coup d'etat and took over power from politicians. General Abboud declared a state of emergency, suspended the constitution and all newspapers, dismissed Parliament and dissolved all political parties. In a public statement General Abboud declared that the country was suffering from the malady of political wrangling and self seeking leaders: "The natural step in such circumstances is for the army to put an end to the corruption and to restore stability and security for all."¹ Ex-Prime Minister Abdallah Khalil declared on November 26th that he knew of the coup in advance and "approved of it." He claimed that it saved the country from a "foreign sponsored move to end Sudanese independence."²

¹Middle East Journal, V. 13, NI., 1959, Chronology, p. 94.

²Ibid., p. 94.

On October 24, 1964 a popular and massive revolution which was initially started by the students of the University of Khartoum broke out following the assassination of one of their fellows 'Ahmed Al-Ghorashi" by military forces.¹ The revolution "resulted in the overthrow of the ruling military junta" and the reign of Abboud which can safely be referred to as the reign of terror for both - Southerners and Northerners, ceased to exist. A new cabinet headed by Sayed Sir-Ekhatim Khalifa was formed. "It was designed to serve in a caretaker capacity until elections could be held for a new national parliament."²

According to M.O. Bashir:

The selection of Sir El Khatim Al'Khalifa, a former assistant director of education in the South, known for his wide knowledge of southern affairs and problems, as Prime Minister, and the appointment of Clement Mboro [an outstanding Southerner and leader of Southern Front] as Minister of interior, in charge of security all over the Sudan was hailed by foreign and internal observers as a sign of good will on the part of the North and a proof of its sincerity towards reaching a peaceful solution.³

The October revolution succeeded, among other things, in re-establishing Parliamentary rule in the Sudan. Since that time, two national Parliaments were elected, one in 1965 and the other in April 1968.

¹K. D. D. Henderson, Sudan Republic (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1965), p. 204.

²Middle East Journal, Vol. 19, No. 3, Summer 1965, p.263.

³M.O. Bashir, op. cit., p. 88.

Having alluded to the historical and political development of the country from 1821 to 1956 when the Sudan became a sovereign state let us now proceed to another important aspect of Sudanese life namely - economy.

F. Economy:

The Sudan's economy is almost entirely based on agriculture. About 80% of the labour force is engaged in farming and the breeding of livestock. These activities contain 59% of the gross domestic product, while industry and mining provide employment for only one tenth.¹

According to Prof. Akrawi "The Sudan is very largely a one-crop country with cotton grown mostly in the Gezira as the main cash and exportable crop. It is followed by gum Arabic, melon seed, sesame and ground nuts. Millet is grown largely for local consumption." He adds, "The considerable though not well exploited animal wealth, consists of an estimated 6.9 million cattle, 6.9 million sheep, 5.7 million goats and 2 million camels."²

The fact that the economy of the Sudan is a one crop economy creates a greivous problem. That is because the whole economy is geared to the fluctuating price of cotton. It was not only the Gezira crop that was involved. It was

¹B.M. Said, op. cit., p. 21.

²Akrawi, op. cit., p. 258.

estimated in 1956 that private pump schemes and water wheels started producing at least half as much long staple cotton as the big irrigation schemes.¹

Thus, "in 1956, for example, cotton and cotton seed exports constituted two-thirds of the value of all Sudanese exports and were largely instrumental in producing a favourable balance of trade to the extent of 20 million Sudanese pounds. Conversely, the 1958 cotton crop remained for a long time largely unsold, a fact which created a great financial crisis and a penury of foreign currency forcing the Government to curtail imports drastically!"²

Economic development in the Southern Sudan, as we have earlier alluded, has been retarded by the long distance from potential markets, lack of good transport and lack of marketing facilities. This being the case, the South lags far behind the North in economic development and most if not all of the Southern budget is being paid annually by the North. M.O. Yassin, the first Sudanese Governor to take over his Province from the British as a result of the process of Sudanisation declared: "The Sudanese of the new Sudan are determined to live as equals in civil and property rights

¹Henderson, Sudan Republic, p. 115.

²Akrawi, op. cit., p. 258.

and that is what really matters. The present Administration allocates £3,000,000 every year as a subsidy and more is to come as capital expenditure in the South."¹

G. Ethnographic Composition:

With regard to the ethnographic, religious and linguistic composition of both the North and the South, we notice the following. The North is inhabited by a mixture of races: Nubians, Arabs, Negroes, and Beja.² The dominant language is Arabic and nearly all the people are Moslems "with a sprinkling of Christians, mainly in towns. The Christians belong to the Oriental churches, mainly Coptic."³ The South, on the other hand, is inhabited by Negroid tribes who "are predominantly pagan with Christian and Moslem minorities." The number of the Christians is estimated to be about 200,000 while that of the Moslems is estimated to be about 50,000. In the South, "The Christians are entirely converts at the hands of Western Catholic and Protestant missionaries and have little in common with the Christians of the North."⁴ There are more than one hundred local languages spoken in the South, the only common language is a form

¹Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 16.

²Midawi, op. cit., p. 3.

³Akrawi, op. cit., p. 258.

⁴Ibid.

of broken Arabic.¹

1. Composition of Population in Northern and Central Sudan:

The ethnographic and tribal divisions of the Northern and Central Sudan were first weakened by the Mahdist revolt against the Turko-Egyptian regime towards the end of the 19th century. With the advent of the Condominium have come conditions favourable to greater unity. These include among other things, the introduction of railways, motor cars, the telegraph ... etc., the spreading of a uniform type of education, the introduction of semi-representative institutions of local and central government.² As a result the different people of the North and central Sudan were quickly being welded into a nation bound together not so much by religious faith or ethnic affinity as by a feeling of common citizenship.

2. Composition of Population in Southern Sudan:

In the Southern Sudan, it should be observed, the inhabitants are divided into three main groups: The Nilotic group, the Nilo Hamitos and the Sudanic tribes. These groups in turn have their sub-divisions.

a. The Nilotes:

The Nilotic group (Shiluk, Dinka and Nuer) who comprise

¹Midawi, op. cit., p. 3.

²Basic Facts, op. cit., p. 3.

the largest majority of the population of the South are generally referred to as Negroes although this is not substantiated by anthropologists. Prof. Evans Pritchard argues that: "It is doubtful whether any peoples in the Sudan can be regarded as true negroes, and their non negroid characters, their pastoral pursuits, and to a certain degree the structure of their languages, are attributed to Hamite admixture and influence."¹

Prof. Seligman maintains that no doubt there is a foreign non negroid element in the Shiluk and adds that though this element is not so obvious in the Dinka and Nuer there can be little question that it exists in them too. He specifies this element as Hamitic Caucasian.²

The Nilotes, it should be noted, speak their own languages. The three main languages Shiluk, Nuer and Dinka are not mutually intelligible and within them there are minor variations of dialect; a form of pidgin Arabic, as we earlier stated, is the lingua franca not only here but throughout the Southern Sudan. The majority of the Nilotic group is pagan; however, there is a certain number of Christians and Muslims.³

¹Evans Pritchard, The Nuer, (London: 1960).

²Seligman, Pagan Tribes of the Nilotic Sudan (London: 1932), Chpt. I.

³John Hyslop in his book, Sudan Story argues that the Ferogeï tribe is predominantly Moslem.

According to Barbour, "All the Nilotes are conspicuous for their absorbing interest in cattle, which enter widely in their customs and traditions. It is probably for this reason that they have not penetrated farther westward into the Ironstone Plateau where tse tse flies abound."¹

b. The Nilo Hamites:

The Nilo-Hamites are by tradition cattle owners. They resemble the Nilotes of Upper Nile in stature but they differ from them in the fact that their language and culture are more Hamitic. The chief tribes of this group are the Bari, Mandari and Latuka.²

The group as a whole is distinguished by cultural features which include the great importance attached to rain making the existence of rain chiefs and the use of rainstones.³ Except among the Latuka, villages are rare; scattered hamlets and even individual homesteads constitute the type of settlement. With this goes the absence of any strong tribal organisation system permanent chiefs, which has in turn made the political task of creating a sense of tribal, regional or national patriotism very difficult.⁴

¹Barbour, op. cit., p. 85.

²Trimmingham, op. cit., p. 35.

³Henderson, The Making of the Modern Sudan, pp. 487-88.

⁴Barbour, op. cit., p. 85.

TRIBAL MAP OF THE SUDAN



KEY

--- NORTH-SOUTH BOUNDARY

..... Sudan's Boundary

c. Sudanic Tribes:

The Sudanic tribes of South-Western Sudan had been classified by Tucker on linguistic grounds as belonging to the eastern Sudanic groups of Africans.¹ They fall into four classes: the Azande, who are a group of tribes of the Ironstone Plateau rather than a single ^{group}, the Ndgo-sere group, the Moru Madi and the Bongo Baka (see map).

These are in complete contrast to the two groups of Nilotes and Nilo Hamites in physical appearance, temperament and culture, being medium headed, of medium stature and copper-coloured. They are essentially agricultural and have no cattle; the region being infested with tse tse flies. However, they are excellent hunters.

The Azande are the last and most powerful group of Sudanic tribes who entered the Sudan in the early 19th century, conquering and assimilating local populations. This process, however, was brought to a halt by the European occupation of Zande territory at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century.²

The description of the ethnographical composition of both the Northern and the Southern Sudan which we have just stated confirms Prof. Trimmingham's remark that:

¹Brian and Tucker, Distribution of the Nilotic and Nilo Hamitic Languages of Africa, (London: 1948).

²Baxter and Butt, The Azande, Ethnographical Survey of Africa, p. 23.

It is rare to find anything approaching a pure racial type among any of the peoples of the Sudan, for this land has suffered from many vents of racial dispersion. All of its people are variations between the pure Caucassian and the pure negro type. So the black skinned peoples of the South are usually referred to as Negroids. The term 'Arab' has significance in a linguistic and cultural, rather than in a racial sense and it is used in reference to the result of the recent admixture of the indigeneous folk and the Arab tribes who settled in the northern and central regions in the Middle Ages.¹

F. Opinions on Ethnological Composition of the Sudan:

Prof. Fabunmi argues that "Ethnologically, opinions vary about the peoples of the Sudan. Three main schools of thought are discernible,"² the Atomistic School, the Amalgamate and Unitarian.

1. The Atomistic School:

To this school belong most of the British administrators who were handling the affairs of the Sudan before the processes of self-determination and Sudanisation. To it belongs also some Arabs and a few Sudanese (particularly Southern Sudanese who are associated with the British). To this school, the Southern Sudan is the home of 'numerous Negroid tribes.' They submit that in the Upper Nile and in the greater part of Bahr Elghazal provinces, the majority of the people as we have earlier mentioned, belong to one

¹Trimmingham, op. cit., p. 5.

²Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 6.

of the three most famous tribes, the Dinka, Nuer and Shiluk who are usually referred to by anthropologists as Nilotes. Carrying this process of atomization ahead, members of this school declare that in Equatoria province alone, "there are not less than forty different tribes."¹ And they conclude that the people of the three Southern provinces because, they "were almost untouched by the impact of civilization whether Arab or European ... are one of the most primitive peoples of the world."² However, at the same time, they maintain that "there is no evidence that the Southern Sudanese is either of inferior intelligence or notoriously lazy."³

2. The 'Amalgamate' or 'Euro-Africanists'

The second school may simply be referred to as the 'Amalgamate' or 'Euro-Africanists.' "To this school" as Fabunmi ventures to suggest belongs Prof. E.E. Pritchard one day a Professor of Sociology at Cairo University and currently at Oxford. Writing for the Anglo Egyptian Administration in the Sudan, Prof. Pritchard argues that two main 'racial types' have contributed to the characters of the Anglo Egyptian Sudanese, namely the Negroid and the

¹Sudan Govt., Report of the Commission of Enquiry on the Southern Disturbances, (Khartoum: 1956), p. 4.

²Ibid., p. 4.

³Ibid., p. 7.

Caucasian - or the Black and the White. He argues "We must regard the peoples of the Sudan as variations between the two ideal poles, the pure Caucasian and the pure Negro types."¹

3. The Unitarians:

The third school may safely be called the Unitarians. To this school, the Sudan or any other country can be divided into several geographical units or ethnic groups. They accept the fact that the Northern Sudan itself, by no means homogeneous, is predominantly Arab by orientation and Islamic by religion; whilst the South is on the whole different in vernacular and pagan in religion, though as we have earlier alluded, there are in the South about 200,000 Christians belonging to many denominations and about 50,000 Moslems.² This school entertains the idea that since no nation or a state is ethnically, religiously or culturally homogeneous per se; it is not difficult to administer the whole Sudan - North and South - as one political unit provided, of course, there is a will to do so through the use of such means and instruments as education, communication and administration to promote the concept of oneness, common nationality or citizenship.

¹Fabunmi, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

²Midawi, op. cit., p. 3.

Prof. L.A. Fabunmi, himself a Nigerian in his outstanding work, The Sudan In Anglo Egyptian Relations 1800-1956, argues that "I am myself inclined to agree more with this school of thought [Unitarian] than with that of atomicism; as every one knows Britian and Egypt [the Condominium states who ruled the Sudan from 1899 up to 1956] have each in spite of their respective internal diversities, established and maintained a unitary state."¹ I myself share the conviction of the Unitarians. My reason is to come. The estimated population of the south is about three millions and that of the north is about 9 to 10 millions. This makes the population about 13 millions which is less than half the population of Egypt and about $\frac{1}{5}$ the population of the United Kingdom. Thus if national unity had been achieved in the two Condominium powers Egypt and U.K., leaving aside such outstanding countries as U.S.A., U.S.S.R., China and India each with a population of 200 millions and above, it is not at all difficult or impossible to have it in the Sudan through such means as education and granted that an atmosphere of friendship, mutual understanding, cooperation and collaboration prevails on the part of both the Northerners and the Southerners.

¹Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 8.

On the question of 'backwardness' which the Atomists state, no country is evenly developed absolutely. At any rate, the relative backwardness of the Southern Sudanese is due mostly to the fact which was observed by the Commission of Enquiry that "the Southerner/^{had} simply not had the same opportunity, as other members of the [Sudanese] community."¹ Several forces of cohesion, such as the Mahdia in the 19th century, together with the better means of education and communication in the 20th century have increased advantages of the Northerner over the Southerner.

It is worthy of mention that the admixture of various groups of Africans, Arabs and even Europeans has been going for a long time in the Sudan through marriage and concubinage. This being true, the Sudanese are a blend of all these groups. They may not be anything approximating to what race or tribe enthusiasts call 'pure types.' And as Fabunmi rightly stated "many of/^{the} people commonly referred to as Arabs are in fact Negroid physically, e.g. the Baggara and the Islamic people of Darfur. Also among the 'black skinned' peoples are individuals displaying some Caucasian features: this is so even as far as Northern Nigeria, particularly among the Fulanis."²

¹Southern Disturbances, op. cit., p. 7.

²Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 8.

This brings us finally to a very important aspect in the domestic policies of the Sudan and indeed in most parts of Africa particularly "British Built Africa,"¹ as Prof. Arnold J. Toynbee asserts. This feature is sectional frictions. A Briton, Prof. Harlow, states: "Most African territories south of the Sahara (and north of it) were demarcated by historical accidents - the outcome of the scramble."²

Due to this policy of sectional frictions or of 'Divide and Rule' which was adopted by ^{the} British in the Sudan, a good deal of fear, suspicion and sometimes open hostility between the Northern and Southern Sudanese occurred. These hostilities culminated in the revolt of the South in 1955 against the central government. The revolt led the government among other things, to initiate a new educational policy for the South completely different from the one that existed before. This policy which was adopted by the various national governments since independence was designed to render possible a feeling of national unity and citizenship. This new educational ^{policy} and the reasons that initiated it, together with its results and outcome will receive due consideration throughout this work.

¹A. J. Toynbee, Between Niger and Nile (London: Oxford University Press, 1965).

²Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 8.

It is appropriate here to quote Fabunmi with regard to the policy of sectional frictions or of Divide and rule. He said: "In pursuit of this policy [Divide and rule], several artifices were used, especially an appeal to the memory about slavery, an unpleasant past in the life of mankind; racialism and religion - The Bible and the Flag."¹

G. Conclusion:

It is necessary before ending this chapter to emphasize some of the important points to which we have alluded. The Southern provinces of the Sudan are different from the rest of the country in many ways. In area, the South is less than one third of the total area. In population it has about one fourth of the total population.

While the whole of the Sudan consists of an admixture of peoples and terrain, it can be said generally that the North is mostly desert with people having Arab blood and Arabic orientation living near and depending on the Nile. In the South, again generally speaking, the land is mostly rain grown savannah plains on which pagan African negroes live.

In the north, the Sudanese had had contacts with the 19th Century civilization through Egyptian rule and were

¹Ibid., p. 9.

living along the Nile in a manner similar to the Egyptians. Most of them speak Arabic and are Moslems. In the South difficulties of communication of the river had discouraged the advance of civilization and the people lived as numerous close tribal units speaking a myriad of languages, worshipping equally as many Gods and raiding each other constantly. To the Dinka, Nuer, Shiluk and other tribes their existence depended almost completely on cattle. Cattle provided food, were used as a means of exchange and were the topic of conversation and poetry.

However, inspite of these differences, I think they are not unnatural and extraordinary and they should not hinder the development of national unity and citizenship in the Sudan - North and South. As we have earlier mentioned most of the outstanding countries today such as U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and U.K., do possess countless internal differences and diversities, nevertheless they all succeeded in maintaining unitary states and in developing a strong sense of common citizenship among their natives.

The modern and the proper concept of nationalism does not rely on such factors as race, religion and habits. "Common citizenship rather than race determines nationality."¹

¹Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 13.

Had true citizenship been identified or associated with racial basis, a French Canadian, would not have been elected the Prime Minister of Canada, the majority of which are of British origin. Again, had true citizenship been based on religious grounds, the Indians, the majority of whom are Hindus, would not have chosen, Zakir Hussien, a Moslem, to be the head of their Republic. These and other examples seem to suggest that national unity in the Sudan is not difficult to be achieved. On the contrary it is possible and desirable.

Education as we have earlier stated is one of the major factors that may lead to national unity in the Sudan. This will be the subject of the following chapters.

CHAPTER II

THE OUTBREAK OF THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL UNITY (THE PROBLEM OF THE SOUTHERN SUDAN) AND THE REASONS THAT LED TO IT

A. The Southern Revolt:

Ever since its independence in January 1956, the Sudan has faced many political, social and economic problems which have greatly impeded its development. The chief of them and the most greivous and painful is the problem of the Southern Sudan which burst open in August 1955 before the official declaration of Independence.

The Problem started when the Southern corps of the Sudan Defence force revolted against the central government at Khartoum. The mutiny was described by the chief editor of the London Times of Jan. 3, 1956 as being the first of the two most important events in British Africa in 1955 (the second being the breaking of the industrial colour bar in the Northern Rhodesian copper belt).¹

On August 17, 1955, a mutiny broke out in the Equatoria corps of the Sudan Defence Force particularly in a place known as Torit. A commission of Enquiry was appointed by the Government "to inquire into, and report upon the recent disturbances in Southern Sudan, and their underlying causes,"

¹The Times, London, January 3, 1956.

chaired by Judge Tawfig Cotran - a Syrian and a Christian with Khalifa Mahgoub (a northerner) and Chief Lolok Lado (a Southerner) as members.¹ According to this commission the Southern soldiers "shot their officers and massacred northern men, women and children in Torit, seventy-eight souls in all."²

However, "the events in Torit had touched off similar troubles elsewhere. All over Equatoria Northerners were killed...."³ The mutiny soon spread to the other two provinces of the South namely Bahr Elghazal and Upper Nile.

During the third week of August the mutiny spread into a general rebellion throughout the three provinces. The demonstrations were directed solely against the Northern Sudanese in the area. Murder, arson and looting were common everywhere. Communications were cut, government offices were closed; public services broke down.⁴

On August 20 a state of emergency was proclaimed and Northern Sudanese troops were flown in from Khartoum. On August 23, the rebels agreed to surrender only if British troops would replace the Northern troops in Juba. Azhari

¹Sudan Republic, op. cit., p. 170.

²Southern Disturbances, op. cit., p. 22.

³Ibid.

⁴Duncan, op. cit., pp. 191-194.

then Prime Minister replied that their surrender could only be unconditional.¹

According to the British historian Prof. P.M. Holt, the mutineers were hoping to receive British help and support in establishing an autonomous South linked only with a federation with the north. But Sir Nox Helm, then the British Governor General of the Sudan could only ask the mutineers to lay down their arms.²

Finally on August 27, the rebels agreed to complete surrender, but a large portion of the Southern troops and more than 3000 southern civilians fled across the border to Uganda where the British authorities accepted them as political refugees.³

During the fighting about 336 Northern Sudanese and 75 Southerners lost their lives.⁴ The mutineers were about 1330 officers and men, not to mention the hundreds of Southern tribesmen and civilians who easily found refuge in the jungle.

However, inspite of the announcement of surrender, it seemed that war between the North and the South in the Sudan had only started. From that time and up to now, raids,

¹Middle East Journal, V. 9, N. 3, 1955, Chronology.

²P.M. Holt, A Modern History of the Sudan (London: Weidenfeld & Nicols, 1965), p. 167.

³Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 361.

⁴Southern Disturbances, p. 80.

massacres and attacks between both parties have increased. Thousands of Southerners left their homes and sought refuge in the neighbouring African countries namely Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Congo and Central African Republic. Since that time, the country became subject to political, educational and economic instability.

Among the leading Southerners who left the Sudan were Joseph Oduho and the late William Deng,¹ co-authors of the book, The Problem of the Southern Sudan. To them, the South has been under complete subjection and domination by the North, in politics, education, religion and all other

¹It is indeed a pity, a tragedy and a catastrophe that Mr. W. Deng who had sacrificed his future for the Southern question and who had devoted all his time and efforts to the Southern cause had been shot dead in the South in May of this year 1968 following the great success of his party in 1968 parliamentary elections. Mr. Deng, it should be noted departed from his fellow Oduho after the general amnesty declared by the October 1964 Government right after the collapse of the dictatorial military regime of General Abboud. He came to believe that the best possible solution for the Southern problem would be a form of a federal rule within a united Sudan. He also came to believe that the Southern cause could be solved through peaceful means such as negotiations and discussions with Northern leaders since the military regime ceased to exist and parliamentary rule was reestablished. This being his opinion, he came to the Sudan and was elected in the two parliamentary elections of 1965-66 and 1968. In the 1968 elections, however, his party, the peaceful wing of SANU (SUDAN African National Union) obtained the majority of MPs in most of the Southern constituencies. His assassination in the very day of the announcement of the results of 1968 elections, together with some Northerners from the Umma party is probably the responsibility of the Extremist wing of Sanu or the Anya-Nya terrorist organization both of which believe that the Southern question could only be solved by massacres and bloodshed.

aspects of life. As a result they "... demand nothing short of self determination."¹ To them the only suitable solution to the problem of the South is separation from the North. Northern leaders on the other hand, deny the claims of Oduho and Deng and say that the North has been suffering from the continuous dependence of the South. They claim that the major part of the budget of the South is being paid annually by the North. Northern leaders further reject separation as being the suitable solution to the nagging problem and believe that the idea of separation is created by the imperialists - particularly the British and other Western European powers.²

At a press conference held on September 5, 1955, Ismail Azhari then the Prime Minister Said:

What happened in the South was therefore the inevitable outcome of the relics and plottings planned many years ago. In the course of the few months we have been in Government, we have made the utmost effort to obliterate the traces of the past, to provide equity, between the South and the North by giving the Southerners a share of responsibility on the Governor General's Commission, in the Cabinet and in other posts of Government compatible with their capabilities. Salaries of army men, police men, and wardens were also equalled between Southerners and their comrades in the North. Pay of chiefs and sheikhs in the south doubled and wages of labour were ameliorated. All these aimed at ensuing equity between countrymen of the same land and raising the standard of living in the South.³

¹J. Oduho and W. Deng, The Problem of the Southern Sudan (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 60.

²Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 16.

³Sudan Govt., Ministry of Social Affairs, Sudan Weekly News, No. 54, Khartoum, September 6, 1955.

The chief editor of the paper El Sudan El Gadid - (السودان الجديد) of October 6, 1955 - argued in a leading article captioned 'The Secrets of the Mutiny'

The British policy towards the Southern Sudan was formerly based on the separation of the three provinces to annex them to the Crown colonies, but with the recent political developments in the Sudan, leading eventually to the Parliamentary self-Government, the British Foreign Office thought it would be possible to settle all questions through diplomatic means. The British administrators however, did not accept the latter view and continued their previous policy. Messrs. Duke and de Robeek were the most enthusiastic advocates of the separatist policy. They formed a secret organization with branches in all parts of the Southern Provinces. The movement began to grow and many soldiers from the Equatorial Corps were enrolled.¹

It is worth mentioning here that the Egyptian radio and press, paradoxically enough, greeted and welcomed the Southern mutiny when it broke out in August 1955. The reason for this attitude is not difficult to observe as it is closely associated with the policies of the National Unionist Party (N.U.P).²

The N.U.P. headed by Sayed Ismail Al-Azhari which won the elections in 1953 and formed the first National Government, had shifted its opinion in 1955 from Unity with Egypt and agreed with all other parties on full independence. This attitude on the part of the Sudanese Government deeply

¹Sudan Weekly News, No. 59, Khartoum, October 11, 1955.

²Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 359.

angered the Egyptian ruling military junta. This being the case, the Egyptian doctors, teachers and especially engineers employed in Egyptian Irrigation Department in Southern Sudan, took advantage, notably in 1955, of their position to support Cairo press and radio propaganda (for which the late Major Salah Salem Egyptian Minister for National Guidance and Sudan Affairs was subsequently dismissed) against Azhari's cabinet in Khartoum. "These Egyptians in the Sudan tended to follow the British policy of exploiting the artificial differences between the North and the South as part of the campaign against the Azhari Government which, ... was showing less enthusiasm for Egypt's thesis of the unity of the Nile Valley."¹

Cairo papers tended to describe the mutiny as a nationwide rebellion against Azhari's "dictatorship."² Azhari was referred to as being nothing but a "stooge of British imperialists." The Times in London alleged in an editorial comment that Egypt has tried by bribery to build up "particularly in the Southern Sudan, support for federation with Egypt and the Unification of the Nile Valley."³

¹Ibid.

²Arab World Opinion (Beirut: August 22, 1955), p. 22.

³'The Sudan Future,' editorial in The Times, London: August 11, 1955.

Having described the outbreak of the Southern question and having given the different views and opinions about it we move now to analyze from our point of view the various reasons and factors that led to the problem. The evaluation of the new educational policy in Southern Sudan (1956-68) will be impossible without the careful presentation and analysis of the various factors.

B. The Reasons that led to the Problem:

1. The Separatist Policy of the British:

Several reasons led to the problem of the Southern Sudan. Chief among them is the separatist policy that was adopted by the British who were the actual rulers during the Condominium rule which began in 1899 and to which we have referred in the first chapter. Nothing can show the British supremacy over the Sudan during the Condominium rule and the inferior role of Egypt in administering the country better than this comment given by an Egyptian authority:

There was no actual equality between Great Britain and Egypt in administering the Sudan jointly, as in fact Great Britain supplied not only the successive Governors General but also the major part of the highly responsible civil servants who occupied the more important offices in Government.¹

During the Condominium, 1899-1956, the British motto in the Sudan was 'Divide and Rule'. The policy of the separation

¹Baddour, Sudanese Egyptian Relations (The Hague: Martinus Nijoff, 1960), p. 106.

of the North from the South was officially pronounced on January 25, 1930, by Sir Harold MacMichael then the Civil Secretary in a directive to the Governors of the three Southern Provinces.

This directive reads:

The policy of the Government in Southern Sudan is to build up a series of self contained racial or tribal units with the structure and organization based, to whatever extent the requirements of equity and good government permit, upon indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs.

It is the aim of the Government to encourage, as far as possible, Greek and Syrian traders rather than the Gellaba [Northern traders] type.¹

The directive adds: "Every effort should be made to make English the means of communication among the men themselves to complete the exclusion of Arabic." It also states: "In short, whereas at present Arabic is considered by many natives of the South as the official and, as it were, the fashionable language, the object of all should be to counteract this idea by every practical means."²

The effect of this policy was to make the three Southern provinces Equatoria, Bahr Elghazal and Upper Nile a "Closed Area" with little or no connection with the rest of the country. Practically all Northern officials were transferred out; Moslem Northern traders were refused licenses

¹Appendix 1.

²Ibid.

to trade; Islam was suppressed; and Arabic as a language of instruction was abolished from schools. Even the long loose [Gallabia] جلابية worn by the Northern Sudanese and the Egyptians was banned from the South and any Southerner with an Arabic name was forced to change it. In accordance with the above mentioned policy, a District Commissioner in Bahr Elghazal Province wrote ^{to} the Government: "I have issued orders to the merchants that they are to cease selling Northern type of clothes from the first of January next ... Chiefs will also be gradually discouraged in both their Northern dress and Arabic names."¹

Governor R.O.C. Brock of Bahr Elghazal, one of the enthusiasts of this Southern policy immediately "issued a circular to all his district commissioners telling them that in future no permits were to be issued to merchants for natives of the Northern Sudan to enter the province to act as their agents or employees (including motor drivers) unless the circumstances were very exceptional."²

Thus, "For eighteen years whilst the Northern Sudan progressed in practically every field, much of the time, the energy and the money of the administration in the Southern Sudan was spent on trying to introduce a new lingua franca,

¹B.M. Said, op. cit., p. 32.

²Ibid.

habits, traditions and beliefs."¹

This policy of "closed areas" later crystallized in what is called "Southern Policy." The purpose of this policy, it was said, was to prevent the illegal Slave trading by the Northerners. To quote the Sudan Government itself: "The confidence of these people [the Southerners] could be won only by building up a protective barrier - the so called Southern policy - against those who, whether Northern Sudanese or [Europeans], might try to exploit them."²

Again the Government argues "The educated northerner has dismissed the idea of slavery from his mind (though he still refuses to marry his daughter to a Southerner, however, Islamised) but the Arab tribesman has not."³

Commenting on the "Southern Policy" Mekki Abbas states in his book, The Sudan Question:

This policy, if its sole aim was the protection of the Southerners, was perfectly justified, so long as there was a wish on the part of the Northerners to enslave the Southerners, or so long as public opinion in the North remained sympathetic or indifferent when isolated cases of kidnapping took place. But there can be no justification for a policy of barriers or dismemberment when the danger of slavery has gone forever. The Sudan is not the only place which experienced slavery and

¹Southern Disturbances, op. cit., p. 18.

²Sudan Govt., The Sudan 1899-1953 (London: Central Office of Information, 1953), p. 26.

³Sudan Govt., The Sudan - A Record of Progress (London: 1947), p. 12.

slave trade in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The greatest and most civilized countries of the world today, including Britain, have been guilty of these inhuman practices on a much larger scale.¹

According to Fabunmi, undoubtedly there was slavery. But many Britons often put the whole blame on the Northern slave hunters, the pashas of Egypt and the Egyptian Governors of the Sudan who either permitted or condoned this inhuman - human traffic. But, while many of the slaves were employed internally in the Sudan and Egypt - quite a few passed into European hands, and the Northern Sudanese and Egyptian merchants were merely middle men for European market. Indeed the whole of mankind in a way, must be blamed - including the African kings, chiefs, and middle men who sold their own people for a handful of silver, some drops of gin or a few grains of gunpowder. In fact as every one knows Britain herself not only encouraged the slave trade through seafarers like John Hawkins and his cousin Sir Francis Drake, but actually made treaties with other European nations to carry it on in most parts of Africa - including the whole of the Sudan, North and South where she employed the services of middlemen.²

¹M. Abbas, The Sudan Question (London: Faber and Faber, 1951), pp. 177-78.

²Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 9.

"It was, therefore 'a chapter in the world's history' to quote a British Colonial Office Report 'on which England in common with other nations, now looks back with distaste, only mitigated by memories of earnest efforts made to remedy as far as possible the wrong which has been done.'¹

It must be added here, that the history of the slave trade in the Sudan has been used by different sets of people, each for its particular goal. 'Missionaries (especially in the North-South boundary areas) used the idea as an instrument for easy conversion into Christianity; the British used it as a pretext to preserve a separatist policy; some Southern politicians demanded local autonomy in federation with the North; and party politicians even in the North who competed to gain the Southerners' vote, found the idea of great service in their propaganda.'²

It is evident then from the preceding pages that, the so called "Southern Policy" or the policy of "Closed Areas" does not have any moral basis behind it. The British claim that it was designed to protect the poor and weak Southerners from the brutal Northern slave traders is only a pretext to keep the two parts of the country disunited and dismembered and not to allow a sense of common national feeling and citizenship for this, might lead too soon to a united

¹Ibid., p. 10.

²Ibid., p. 357.

front against them and end their occupation of the country.

And as Fabunmi excellently stated,

There is the British sense of Chivalry, i.e. the desire to protect the 'weak' (the South) from the 'strong' (the North). This may be a genuine human love for the 'underdog'; but is also interwoven with the well known imperial formula of 'divide and rule.' In the Sudan this has become notorious as the Southern Policy. (In Nigeria, by the way, it is the Northern Policy).¹

It will be appropriate to end our discussion about this point by referring to an outstanding Briton who worked in the Sudan. K.D.D. Henderson, one day the Governor of Dar Fur declares:

The real intention of the Government was obviously to cut away the Southern provinces altogether and attach them to Uganda, as was later advocated by the Fabian Colonial Bureau in a pamphlet called The Sudan - the Road Ahead published in 1947.²

2. Different Representative Bodies:

Another factor that led to the problem of the Southern Sudan is the fact that the British as well as other imperialists consider it risky to build up or deliberately support such educational or political programmes as are calculated to foster national consciousness and outlook or a fellow citizenship; for this might lead quickly to a united front against them. This being the case, the British thought of setting up completely different representative bodies in the North and the

¹Ibid., p. 9.

²Sudan Republic, op. cit., p. 164.

South. Thus in January 1944, Sir Douglas Newbold, then the Civil Secretary, announced the Government plan for setting an Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan. In this Council only the Northerners were to be represented; the Southerners were refused that right. Announcing this policy from Radio Omdurman, Sir Douglas Newbold said that the reason for setting an Advisory Council only for the North is:

Simply that the Southern Sudanese have not yet, for historical and natural reasons, reached a degree of enlightenment and cohesion which enables them to send competent representatives to a council of this kind. Nor are there any Northern Sudanese who can fairly claim to be able conscientiously to represent the Southern peoples. We must look facts in the face.¹

Sir James Robertson who succeeded Newbold as Civil Secretary announced that:

The policy of the Sudan Government regarding the Southern Sudan is to act upon the facts that the peoples of the South are distinctly African and Negroid but that geography and economics combine as far as can be seen at the present time, to render them inextricably bound for their future development to the Middle East and the Northern Sudan,....²

It is apparent then, that the British administration in the Sudan tried to emphasize and stress the fact that the South, unlike the North, is distinctly African and negroid. In other words they stressed the racial aspect of the Southern Sudan to find a pretext to their opinion of attaching it to

¹Ibid., pp. 165-166.

²Ibid., p. 168.

the British colonies of East Africa - an opinion to which we have alluded.¹

On this question of race, the British Society for International Understanding asserts that the South is hostile to the North because of the slave trade 'combined with the obvious differences of race and religion which led the British to declare the Southern provinces as 'closed areas.' Fabunmi refutes this claim by saying that the differences of 'group' feeling and of religious attitude do exist in the Sudan as indeed they do in most other parts of the world (including Britain) but they need not be unduly stressed. And as we have stated in the first chapter, race or religion need not by all means be the criterion for national unity and citizenship.²

Fabunmi further asserts that the peoples of the Sudan, North and South, are in varying degrees a blend of Negro, Arab and Caucasian 'tribes' or 'races' and that Khartoum, the capital, can be described as a melting pot. There is no better evidence to refer to here to show this aspect of Khartoum than the Roman Catholic Secondary School (Comboni College) which indeed has an international character. According to the official census of the school in January 1955, there were 396 Sudanese, 115 Egyptians, 59 Syrians, 58 Greeks, 33 Jews,

¹M. Abdel Rahim, The Development of British Policy in the Southern Sudan (Khartoum: Univ. Press, 1968), pp. 6-7.

²Fabunmi, pp. 12-13.

29 Italians, 28 Armenians, 19 Saudi Arabians, 15 Ethiopians, 4 British, 3 Yemenis, 3 Jordanians, 2 Maltese, 2 Pakistanians, 2 Somalis, 1 Dane, 1 Spaniard and 1 Nigerian. They represent ten main religions.¹ It is evident then, that race or nation, race or nationality by itself, does not necessarily lead to antagonism; it is mis_education that often does. The proper perspective seems to have been maintained at the Comboni Secondary School. The School Booklet in 1955 reads:

From the top of the Secondary Building stood out two great flags (the British and the Egyptian) fluttering joyfully together with the other 18 flags representing 18 different nations to which our 800 pupils belong.²

It is really unfortunate that the question of race and nationality of the North and the South became one of the serious points of arguments and disagreement not only between the Northern Sudanese and the British but also in Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the Sudan.

And as Fabunmi rightly mentioned "Whatever the merits of the racial argument, political annexation of the Southern Sudan to British Uganda would not have changed the 'race' of the Southerners; furthermore, it has not been proved, even in this context where the word 'race' is loosely applied, that the peoples of Uganda and those of the Southern Sudan are racially homogeneous. Therefore, at best the race argument is

¹Ibid., p. 13.

²Ibid.

valid only in part. Common citizenship, rather than race determines nationality." And as Hertz Fredrick clearly stated "Most people are ignorant of the fact that each nation is composed of different racial elements and that the composition changes in the course of time."¹

However, inspite of these arguments which, with all certainty, did not escape the attention of the British administration in the Sudan; and despite the objections of most of the Northerners - notably the late Sayed Ali El-mirghni,² the head of the Khatmiyya sect, and despite the objections of the Graduates Congress,³ the British carried out their plan and the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan was established in 1944 thus adding a new difference - a political one - to the already existing ones.

Nevertheless, in 1948, the British themselves came to realize the fact that setting an Advisory Council only for the North was a wrong idea and was not conducive to the betterment of the country North or South - and that there is "a demand for fusion of North and South and for representation of both in the proposed Legislative Assembly"⁴

¹Fabunmi, p. 13.

²The Making of the Modern Sudan, op. cit., p. 360.

³Ibid., pp. 357-58.

⁴Sudan Republic, op. cit., p. 168.

Sir James Robertson, the Civil Secretary in 1948 came to be convinced that separation was no longer practicable; He argues:

I, against quite a lot of local opposition, decided after the Juba Conference to bring Southern members into the Legislative Assembly - on the grounds that the days of Southern separation must be ended and the South must be integrated with the North, with which its economic and political future must combine.¹

But inspite of the attempt to bring about some sort of cohesion and fusion between the two parts of the country, it seems that a wide political and ideological gap was created between the North and the South. The Southerners came to have a political outlook completely alien to that of the Northerners. Thus, when in 1953 the first Sudanese Parliament was elected there was a wide difference of opinion between the Northern parties and the Southern ones with regard to the future of the Sudan. While the Northerners perceived the future of the country as an Independent Sudan or Independent with unity with Egypt; the Southerners (particularly the most outstanding party - the Liberal Party)² came to think of having a federal or a separate form of Government with close attachments with Britain. Nothing can illustrate this latter fact better than the telegram sent by the mutineers in August 1955 to Sir Nox Helm then the

¹Fabunmi, p. 14.

²Sudan Republic, p. 172.

British Governor General. The telegram said:

We all heartily thank you most sincerely, and we are now glad for your return from England to end our trouble. Grateful order Northern troops in Juba evacuate Juba to North or to far-off district before we surrender arms. Otherwise please send British troops immediately to safeguard Southern troops.¹

Fabunmi, states that this telegram and others indicate the mutineers' reliance on British influence to establish their goal - an autonomous South. He concludes that these documents "give ground for the suspicion that some British persons were implicated in the mutiny at Torit in August 1955."²

K.D.D. Henderson - in his book Sudan Republic denies this allegation and declares:

Whatever offences the British may have committed, inciting men you have recently commanded to murder officers you have recently served with, knowing that you can in no circumstances save them from the inevitable consequences of their tragic folly, is not one of them. Obviously, however, the mutineers expected the British to come to their rescue.³

3. The Educational and Cultural Factor:

A third factor is the educational and cultural. This aspect will receive full consideration in the chapter to come. Nonetheless we have to refer to it here as part of the over all picture of the problem of the Southern Sudan.

¹ Fabunmi, p. 361.

² Ibid., p. 367.

³ Sudan Republic, p. 167.

The British administration tried its best to develop two distinctly different systems of education in the North and the South. In the North education was run by the Government and the medium of instruction was Arabic. In the South, education was completely a different thing since it was entirely left to the missionaries. Instead of Arabic which was used in the North, the missionaries stressed foreign languages mostly English. The curriculum of missionary schools operating in the South was entirely different from that of the Government schools operating in the North. In his book, The Sudan, J.S.R. Duncan argues:

The South was given over to mission education and a further consideration led to its being as rather a remote place: the obsinate backwardness of the Southerners themselves. They resisted any attempt to bring in more advanced forms of Government, preferring war among themselves rather than the more sober state of civilized living, ...¹

The late Sir Douglas Newbold stated:

We must have missions of some sort as the Government can't undertake bush schools or the evangelisation and the people can not become civilized without some faith on which to tie morals and paganism is not enough.²

Missionary education in the South lagged behind Government education in the North; hence the educational, cultural and social superiority of the North increased to a very great extent. There is no better evidence to refer to here

¹J.S.R. Duncan, The Sudan - A Record of Achievement (London: W. Blackwood & Sons Ltd., 1952), pp. 215-216.

²The Making of the Modern Sudan, op. cit., p. 363.

than the Southerner himself. A young man from the Shiluk tribe of the South to which we have alluded in the introductory chapter, once reported:

We have been neglected. The North has gone ahead, but we have been retarded. If a few of us are educated we thank the missionaries. It is only in the last few years that the Government has shown real interest in spreading learning among our people.¹

It is worthy of mention here that the British administration in the Sudan itself came to realize the sore fact that education in the South was not as successful as it was in the north. In 1927, the Governor General of the Sudan stated after visiting the three Southern provinces:

On the educational side, something should be done to speed up things by the direct activity of the Government. I am very far from satisfied with the work of the missionaries in this field. They have made no adequate effort to seize their opportunities. They lack vision and are hedged in by pettiness of outlook and by their bias against the matrimonial customs of the people. I am convinced that on their present lines they will not perform the functions we expected of them, and they can only be subsidiary agencies.²

Thus in 1950, the British Administration being aware of the relative failure of the missionary schools and alive to the necessity of cultural and educational unification of the country made a step towards the educational unification of the country. This step towards cultural unification came after many conferences - notably the Sudan Administrative

¹J. Hyslop, Sudan Story (London: The Naldrett Press, 1952), pp. 71-72.

²B.M. Said, op. cit., p. 88.

Conference of 1946 - the Juba Conference at 1947 and finally the establishment of the all Sudan Legislative Assembly in 1948. This step was mainly initiated by Sir James Robertson then the Civil Secretary despite the objections of many of the British staff. This question will be dealt with in more detail in the next chapter. According to Mekki Abbas in 1950 "a decision was made to introduce the teaching of Arabic in all Government schools and all private and mission schools above the elementary level. Southerners qualified for higher education started to go to the Gordon Memorial College in Khartoum rather than to Makerere College in Uganda."¹

It is unfortunate that this step towards cultural and educational unification which took place in 1950, came too late after nearly 50 years of complete cultural and educational separation. Thus, when the Southern revolt broke out in 1955, the step of unification was in its early infancy - only five years old and hence the cultural and educational difference was an important element, that led to the revolt. Had the Condominium Government put this plan into action immediately after the establishment of the Condominium rule in 1899, it would have certainly minimized most of the sources of friction and tension between the North and the South which do exist up to this very moment.

¹M. Abbas, op. cit., p. 20.

4. The Role of the Missionaries:

Another reason that led to the problem of Southern Sudan was the role played by the Christian missionaries. This element will also be dealt with in detail in the next chapter; however, it is necessary to state here a few words about the contribution of the foreign missionaries to the outbreak of the problem.

The foreign missionaries it should be admitted, contributed significantly to the welfare and to the betterment of the life of both Northern and Southern Sudan. They educated the Southerners and exerted efforts to eradicate the unhealthy pagan life. Even in the North, the Missionaries have contributed a great deal to the betterment of the Northern life - by educating people and directing them honestly and magnificently. The contribution of the Roman Catholic Schools - the Comboni Colleges to which we have referred in this chapter - is not difficult to observe.¹

Nevertheless, the Missionaries in Southern Sudan did play a major role in widening the gap between the Northerners and the Southerners. There is no better evidence to state here than the fact that the so called "Southern Policy" to which we have referred earlier was implemented willingly by the missions in their role as educators of the Southerners.

¹Fabunmi, p. 13.

M. Abbas argues: "The missions, not unnaturally, saw in the religion and the language of the North a challenge to their activities. They, therefore, took every opportunity in their teaching of religion and history to keep the memory of slavery alive."¹

The Commission of Enquiry adds that: "added to this grievance [meaning the social aspect] is the fact that Christian Missionaries and British administrators had followed a separatist policy, partly by reviving the memory of slavery against the North. Sayed Daud Abdel Latif former Governor of Bahr Elghazal, [now Member of Parliament - Minister of Information and Labour 1965/66] gave evidence before the Court of Enquiry into Southern Disturbances; he said "The policy of the past administration and that of the Missions was aimed at forbidding the entry of Islam into the Southern Sudan."²

Sayed M.O. Yassin, former Governor of Upper Nile argues:

The British Administrators and missionaries have in the past done much to sow the seeds of dissension and hate between the North and South. But they failed ignominiously to achieve any lasting success. (I wish the missionaries had produced real Christians).³

¹M. Abbas, op. cit., p. 176.

²Southern Disturbances, op. cit., p. 24.

³Fabunmi, p. 16.

One may argue that all those allegations against the foreign Missionaries have been stated by Northerners such as Mekki Abbas, Daud Abdelatif and Mohd. O. Yassin and all of them, at best, represent one side of the coin. This accusation is valid and so I will attempt to provide some views from the other side to give a complete picture and ensure impartiality. My final judgment however, will be based on a neutral and impartial source.

According to Henderson "Northerners believe that the Government and the Missionaries collaborated to convert the South to Christianity and divorce it from the North. 'Collaboration' is hardly the word as it is clear enough from Bishop Gwynne's biography ... they all shared a common suspicion of the Northerner, which was later embodied in Southern policy, but the barons' suspicion had little to do with religion."¹

Richard Hill states that "Enough has been shown of the government missionary relationship to establish that the missionaries, particularly the Protestants, far from regarding themselves as the mouthpieces of the government, were highly critical of the government attitudes and policy." He adds: "The Church Missionary Society's workers in the field, however, paid scant regard to the Establishment [Church of England];

¹Sudan Republic, p. 162.

they looked upon the civil power in the Sudan as unsympathetic and obstructive."¹

Henderson and Hill convey the idea that the missionaries were never in collaboration with the British administration, as Northern spokesmen asserted and that most, if, not all of their effort, was devoted to their holy duties.

Having presented the two opposite views of pro-missionary and anti-missionary with regard to the question of the Southern Sudan it is timely now to present the views of a neutral authority, namely, Prof. L.A. Fabunmi, himself a Nigerian and a Christian. According, to him the idea of the collaboration between the foreign Missionaries and the colonial Administration is not by all means limited to the Sudan. It is shared by all African people under colonial domination. He states; for instance, Dr. F.O. Onipede (a Nigerian) writing on a proposal to build three separate religious chapels at the University College, Ibadan, Nigeria, complained (from Columbia Univ., New York, where he was then a student) that:

The point at stake is that the Christian Missions in Nigeria are trying hard to make Nigeria appear as a Christian nation to the outside world. In doing this they are introducing the intolerance of (Missionary) Christianity into Nigeria. Even in the United States of America, quite a few universities ... have a common religious centre for all faiths.²

¹R. Hill, "Government and Christian Missions in Anglo Egyptian Sudan 1899-1914, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. I, No. 2 (London: January 1965), p. 129.

²Fabunmi, p. 16.

In the Sudan, as in most dependencies, the position of the missionaries is a trying one. Firstly, many unsophisticated 'natives' regard them as benefactors. But to the politically conscious, missionaries and colonial administrators are agents of the same power - the former propagate religion, and the latter administer political imperialism. A missionary may disagree, or even detest, certain aspects of imperial policy; but such clash is seldom, if ever allowed to come into the open. This point together with the fact that the missionary share with the administrator the same absence of skin pigmentation (popularly called "White"), the same general folk (European cultural) ways of behavior, the same social intercourse in territory, makes the difference between the two somewhat unreal to the native.¹

Secondly, the missionary often depends upon the administrator's recommendation to the Government for financial aid for educational endeavours such as building grants, maintenance of teaching staff, etc. In addition the missionary looks up to the administrator for ultimate protection of life, church and personal property.²

The third point which may be influenced by the second, is that administrators often put pressure on the missionary to conform to their political and social programme. A current

¹Fabunmi, p. 17.

²Ibid.

example exists in South Africa, where the state has been using various means to make the church comply with the state's policy of "Apartheid", especially with regard to 'native' education.¹

Fourthly, apart from the religious rivalry among the Protestant denominations, there still exists a sort of cold war between the Protestant Missionaries on the one hand and the Roman Catholic on the other. Writing soon after the reconquest of the Sudan in 1899, Felkin urged the British Government 'to make it impossible for the Catholics and Protestants to plant their Missions in close proximity to each other ... By such a wise provision, a repetition of the discord and bloodshed which have taken place in Uganda may be prevented.' This religious rivalry and separation extend to the native converts.²

In the fifth place, there has been over centuries a strong religious rivalry - amounting almost to cut-throat competition between the followers of the Cross and those of the Crescent. Whenever Islam is already professed, Christian Missionaries find it difficult to propagate the Gospel effectively. Northern Sudan is predominantly Islamic and the missionaries have made many fewer converts there than in the

¹Ibid.

²Fabunmi, pp. 16-17.

South. The Diocese of the Sudan declares its policy in the South: "We must put all our strength and energy into Christianizing the Southern Sudan. The Dinkas, the Baris, the Zandes etc., must be brought to the feet of God. Our evangelical, educational and medical work must be strengthened. This can be done in two ways: (i) by sending out of more and more recruit missionaries, (ii) by co-operation with the various Government services."¹ Thus in their campaign to win the South, missionaries might have contributed to the Southerner's suspicion of the Northerner. Indeed they have been described as regarding the Muslim influence of the Northern Sudanese as a sort of challenge to their own work, or competition in their own trade - religion.²

It is evident from this that the missionaries did contribute - directly or indirectly - intentionally or unintentionally to the friction between the North and the South. To me this was unfortunate in that in addition to the already existing differences between the North and the South, now a further barrier of religion was being created.

It is to be noted here that the Commission of Enquiry to which we have referred was less censorious of the behavior of the Missions in 1955. The Commission remarked that, "although

¹The Church Missionary Society, Introducing the Diocese of the Sudan (London: 1946), p. 67.

²Fabunmi, pp. 17-18.

they [the missions] regarded the take over [by the Northerners as a result of the Sudanization process] as a challenge to their own work and certain allegations had been made, we find on evidence that the real trouble in the South was political, not religious."¹

5. The Social Factor:

A fifth and a very significant factor that led to the problem is a social one. Looking at the Northern Sudan, we notice that it is more urbanized, developed and sophisticated. The Southern Sudan, on the other hand, is underdeveloped and rural. This does not suggest that the North is fully urbanized and well developed but relatively, and compared to the South it appears to be so. People in the South 'are less Europeanized and Arabized; and they are more natural in their disposition.'

In 1955, when the revolt broke out there were 17 secondary schools in the North in addition to the University College at Khartoum, leaving aside those schools that were subsidized by the Egyptian Government. In the South there were only two secondary schools.²

"This difference" according to Fabunmi, "tends to create a superiority complex among most Northerners in their dealings with the Southerners."³ The best example to refer to

¹Southern Disturbances, op. cit., p. 6.

²Sudan Govt., Report of the International Commission on Secondary Education in the Sudan (Khartoum: 1957), pp. 3-4.

³Fabunmi, p. 356.

here is the fact that some of the Northerners - especially those who live close to the Southerners like the Baggara Arabs simply refer to the Southerners as 'Abeed' - slaves. This is a very unfortunate behavior which most of the Northern intelligentsia tend to forget when dealing with the question of the South. It can hardly be denied because it is always there and it is the writer's belief that bad attitudes like this one cannot be eradicated simply by denying them and neglecting them but by facing them and finding the suitable solutions to them. In this respect K.D.D. Henderson argues that, "The important points for future ... are the northern attitude to nakedness; the contempt of north for south and the incorrigible northern habit of referring to Southerners as 'abeed' (slaves....)"¹

A second example to which we can refer here is the fact that it is very difficult for a Southern male to marry a Northern woman while a Northern male can easily marry a Southern beauty.

This appears, on the surface, to contradict the idea of the social superiority complex of the North; but it should be remembered that the Northerner marries the Southern Woman, in the first place because he does dominate the woman and can convert her to his own Muslim religion. As regards the Muslim and Christian convert, each regards the other as being on the wrong road to true religion. Secondly, as in most parts of the world, Sudanese society is patriarchal: ancestry is always through the male line the female line being ignored. The Southern pagan

¹Sudan Republic, p. 178.

is therefore prevented from marrying the Northern Muslim. This is, of course a general Islamic conception. Seen with a dissatisfied Southerner's eyes, it amounts to social exploitation of the South by the North.¹

6. The Administrative Factor:

The above reasons to which we have alluded, are not all the ones that led to the nagging problem of the Southern Sudan - others are still to come. In 1953, the British administrators started to leave the country as a result of the Anglo Egyptian Agreement of February 1953, and in order to give the Sudanese the chance to administer their country in preparation for Independence. Article I of the Agreement reads:

The Egyptian Government and the Government of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland (hereinafter called the 'United Kingdom Government,' firmly believing in the right of the Sudanese people to self-determination and the effective exercise thereof at the proper time and with the necessary safeguards,..."

Have agreed as follows:

In order to enable the Sudanese people to exercise self determination in a free and neutral atmosphere, a transitional period providing full self-government for the Sudanese shall begin on the day specified in Article 9 below.

Article 11 reads:

Egyptian and British military forces shall withdraw from the Sudan immediately upon the Sudanese Parliament adopting a resolution expressing its desire that arrangements for Self-Determination be put in motion. The two contracting Governments undertake to complete the withdrawal of their forces from the Sudan within a period not exceeding three months.²

¹Fabunmi, pp. 356-57.

²Baddour, op. cit., pp. 166-67.

The change over which resulted from the withdrawal of the British forces and administrators caused some disruption in the North, but nothing like it did in the South. For in the North, there were numerous Sudanese serving in Governmental posts who could move up into executive positions. This was not the case in the South where the majority of the administration was staffed by British. Since there were few qualified Southerners to fill these posts, more experienced Northern Sudanese were imported into the area. And while these Northerners were for the most part new to the higher responsibilities of administration, they were "particularly at a disadvantage in dealing with the South, from which they had been virtually excluded until less than ten years previously."¹ They had little knowledge of the South and its problems, and were unfamiliar with the many languages of the area. The result was that even though the Southerners were represented by their politicians in Parliament in Khartoum; this voice was a minority in the ineffectual opposition. The actual immediate hand of Government, the province Governors, the District Commissioners, Administration officials, Police Chiefs and army officers were all Northerners.

¹Holt, op. cit., p. 163.

7. The Sudanization Process and the Rash Promises of the Northern Political Parties to the Southerners:

The fact that the Northerners being more educated, enlightened and experienced, came to replace the British administrators in the South as a result of the Sudanization process, was made worse still by another factor namely the rash promises given by the Northern political parties during the election campaigns of 1953, to the Southerners. The National Unionist Party (N.U.P.) was very rash and very generous in the promises it gave to the Southerners. It was aided in this attitude by the new regime in Egypt particularly the late Major Salah Salim then the Egyptian Minister for National Guidance and Sudan Affairs. The late Salah Salim visited the South during the election campaigns of 1953 in support of the N.U.P. He walked, talked, promised and even danced with the Southern tribes "in his under-pants" as the Daily Telegraph, asserted.¹ His visit became well known and received great attention to the extent that he came to be known as the Dancing Major.² According to the Commission of Enquiry "The leaders of the N.U.P. paid a visit to the Southern Sudan. Major Salem also paid a visit. Rash and irresponsible promises were given to the Southerners by N.U.P. politicians." The Commission adds

¹Daily Telegraph, London, January 28, 1953.

²The Times, London, August 11, 1955.

that Major Salem alone "promised the Southerners forty posts as Governor, D.C. (District Commissioner) and A.D.C. (Assistant District Commissioner) when the British left."¹

When the N.U.P. won the elections of 1953 and formed the first National Government, it found it impossible for her to fulfill the promises it had offered to the Southerners - namely that the Southerners would replace most of the British administrators in the three Southern Provinces. According to Fabunmi:

Many Southern Sudanese had hoped that with the advent of self government they would gain total control over their own affairs. This belief was partly owing to the rash promises by Northern politicians during the 1953 campaigns. But in fact the more educated and experienced Northerners had to replace most of the British administrators in the South. It was therefore easy for the 'mischievous' to make the 'credulous' believe that the Northerners had come as aliens and new imperialists in the South; ...²

8. Other Factors:

The problem of the Southern Sudan was further complicated and made worse still by another factor - namely the successive attempts of both the Northerners and the Southerners to use military means in order to reach a decisive conclusion. This was true especially during the military regime of General Abboud who set aside the constitution and dissolved the parliament and the Supreme Council.

¹ Southern Disturbances, op. cit., p. 113.

² Fabunmi, p. 357.

The military regime of General Abboud thought of solving the problem by the power of guns. Peter Kilner argues that "The military Government's policy in the South has been to make a strong effort to eliminate the recurrent incidents caused by the remainder of the 1955 Southern mutineers by means of strong military measures in the areas bordering on Uganda and Kenya."¹

This being the case, the military Government deported nearly the whole body of the Sudanese army to the South in order to chastise the mutineers and kill them. By so doing, they complicated the problem more than ever, and led eventually, in 1963, to the appearance of the Southern terrorist organization the Anya-Nya similar to the Mau Mau terrorist organization which fought the British in Kenya.²

According to M.O. Bashir "The emergence of Anya-Nya represented a new phase in the Southern problem. The Anya-Nya is composed mainly of ex-soldiers of the Equatoria Corps and those Southerners who were released from prisons on completion of sentence or as a gesture of goodwill by the military regime from time to time."³

¹Peter Kilner, "A Year Of Army Rule in the Sudan," The World Today, V. 15, No. 11, p. 435.

²Sudan Republic, p. 185.

³M.O. Bashir, op. cit., p. 84.

When this terrorist organization first appeared, it declared its aim in the following words:

Our patience has now come to an end and we are convinced that only the use of force will bring a decision ... From today onwards we shall take action. We do not want mercy and we are not prepared to give it.¹

Thus it is clear that the unsound and dictatorial policy of the military regime in the South has put the Southern problem in a very critical and a very unfortunate situation. There is no better authority to quote in this connection in order to show the abuses of military regimes in general than the late Sir Winston Churchill who started his career as an army officer. In his book, The River War, Churchill argues:

There is one form of Centralized Government which is almost entirely unprogressive and beyond all other forms costly and tyrannical - the rule of an army. Such a combination depends not on the good faith and good will of its constituents, but on their discipline and mechanical obedience. Mutual fear, not mutual trust promotes the co-operation of its individual members.²

A final factor that intensified the problem is the intervention of foreign powers particularly - the Europeans to back one side or the other. K.D.D. Henderson - himself a notable British Administrator who worked in the Sudan argues: "To this degree the Sudan Government was suffering from the

¹Ibid., p. 84.

²Sir. W. Churchill, The River War (London: 1899), p. 112.

aftermath of the colonial period and there are outside powers which are only too ready to fish in troubled water without nicety of distinction between Muslim Somalis and anti-Muslim Bantus."¹

¹Sudan Republic, p. 193.

CHAPTER III

EDUCATIONAL POLICIES IN SOUTHERN SUDAN DURING THE CONDOMINIUM (1899-1954)

The analysis of the educational development in the Southern Sudan during the Condominium rule will be done according to three main periods, the first extending from 1900 to 1920's, the second from 1920's to 1946 and the third from 1946 to 1954.

A. The First Phase - 1900-20's.

In this period which started right after the establishment of the Condominium Government, the British administration did not have much interest in educational affairs in Southern Sudan. According to Sir Elkhatim Khalifa, former Assistant Director of education in the South and ex Prime Minister:

The Sudan Government prior to 1927 - did not concern itself with the question of education the Southern Provinces on the pretext that it had to deal with the more urgent problems of law and order which had exhausted its meagre resources. It was therefore content to give a free hand to the Christian missionary societies some of which had been operating in the Southern Provinces since the middle of the 19th century.¹

¹Philosophical Society of the Sudan, Education in the Southern Provinces (Khartoum: Publicans Bureau, 1963), p. 34.

Indeed if we were to look back at the Southern Sudan at the initial stage of the Condominium we would find that it was inhabited by various tribes some of which are akin to the people of Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Congo. The international boundary was nowhere an ethnic one, nor had there been much previous experience of administrative authority. The largest tribes, the Nilotic Dinka, and Nuer inhabited inaccessible land and were pastoralists with great pride but impervious to external influence and there was constant inter tribal warfare and conflicts. There was a large variety of languages. Often the language differed from one District to the other. Distances were vast and communications difficult. Disease was widespread and it was extremely difficult for Europeans to survive.¹

The people who were very primitive and savage according to Sir Douglas Newbold "might be divided into those who ran away at sight of a stranger and those who liquidated him with spears."² Lord Cromer, Her Majesty's Agent and Consul General in Cairo and the effective ruler of Egypt and the Sudan up to 1907, was firmly convinced that the first requirement of what he called "the savages who inhabit this region" was law and order and that this can be best fulfilled

¹The Making of the Modern Sudan, op. cit., p. 106.

²Ibid.

by means of a strong and direct military rule.¹

During this period neither the administrative nor the educational policies in the South were well defined. The policy of the Condominium at the time was to administer as little as possible in the South. Financially speaking the South would be a liability rather than an asset. It could not - as it always had been - support itself financially, and up to 1913 it was subsidised by Egypt.

This being the case and since the Sudan Government as a whole was short of money and dependent on ^{the} Egyptian Treasury for balancing its modest budget, no work of construction could be contemplated or service provided in the South beyond what was necessary for the maintenance of Government personnel and hence law and order.²

However, the fact that the Government needed to administer the riverain tribes led to gradual expansion of centralized authority as skirmishes between the river tribes and their unadministered neighbours gradually involved the Government into further administrative controls. The marshes of ^{the} Upper Nile and Bahr Elghazal were obstacles to pacification and "over many years the tribes were brought under control, but it was not until 1928 that the intractable

¹Abdel-Rahim, op. cit., p. 3.

²Ibid.

Nuer were finally pacified."¹

Thus due to the above stated reasons namely the numerous diseases, the need for law and order and the shortage of money the British administration did not think seriously or concern itself with educational affairs in Southern Sudan and left this affair to be taken up by the missionaries. And as Duncan stated: "The South was left to mission education, and a further consideration led to its being regarded as rather a remote place; the obstinate backwardness of the Southerners themselves. They resisted any attempt to bring in more advanced forms of government, preferring war amongst themselves rather than the more sober state of civilised living, ..." ²

Educational policy at this period was rather negative in character. In 1899, the question which was asked was not concerned with the kind of education that was to be given but whether there could be any education at all in the Southern Sudan. The Government policy, therefore, was to tolerate rather than to encourage education and to see what resulted.³

Missionary societies wanted to establish schools in the Sudan and they were allowed to do so in the South in the

¹Holt, op. cit., p. 114.

²Duncan, The Sudan, op. cit., pp. 215-16.

³L. Sanderson, 'Educational Development in the Southern Sudan 1900-48', Sudan Notes and Records Vol. 48 (Khartoum: 1962), p. 106.

hope that their activities would help in winning the confidence of the inhabitants for the new regime and also prove a civilizing influence. The missionaries, however, had their own plans, and, being ignorant of the great difference between the Sudan and those parts of Africa which are inhabited by non Moslems," wanted to proceed with proselytising the whole country."¹ In a private letter to Lord Lansdowne, Cromer described the situation in the following terms: "I am being vigorously assailed on all sides to allow active proselytism in the Sudan. The Catholics backed by the Austrian Government, the high Church Party, with various influential Bishops behind them, the Church Mission and other societies, all join in the cry." Lord Cromer then concludes: "I have no objection to giving the missionaries a fair field amongst the black pagan population in the equatorial regions, but to let them loose at present amongst the ... Muslems of the Sudan would, in my opinion, be little short of insane."²

This being his attitude and despite the objections of various Missionary Societies, Cromer refused to permit Christian Missions to work in the North and assured the Muslim leaders in Northern Sudan that no proselytism would be allowed

¹Abdel Rahim, op. cit., p. 4.

²Ibid., pp. 4-5.

in Muslim areas.¹

(i) Who were the Christian Missionaries?

The Missionary societies which took part in the educational affairs in the Southern Sudan were the following. The Verona Father's Mission which is an Italian Roman Catholic Mission, the Anglican Church Missionary Society; the American United Presbyterian Mission and the Austrian and New Zealand Sudan United Mission.²

In order to avoid the possibility of rivalry between the various Missions, Wingate divided the South into "spheres" of influence. These spheres had later been subject to some amendment.³ At first the Americans were allotted the Abyssinian border; the Roman Catholics got the Bahr Elghazal Province; and the Church Missionary Society - the Anglican, got Upper Nile. Mongala Province (Equatoria) went to the C.M.S. - except for the western portion of the Zande District based on Wau which was portion of the Roman Catholic sphere.⁴

It should be noted that the Missionaries at the initial stage could only make very slow progress both in the establishment of schools and churches. The reasons for this slow progress are to come.

¹Hill, op. cit., p. 113

²Bashir, op. cit., p. 12.

³Appendix II.

⁴Sir. R. Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan (London: John Murray, 1955), p. 147.

First, vast distances and swamps made communications difficult. As we have earlier alluded, the largest tribes such as the Dinka and the Nuer "were inaccessible and impervious to external influence."

Secondly, the South was economically very backward. Lack of resources made the development of education a difficult, if not an impossible task during the early years.

Thirdly, there was a large variety of languages. The only lingua franca was Arabic in a debased form. The absence of a major local language hindered the development of education.

Fourthly, disease was widespread and climatic conditions very harsh that many Europeans who wished to be teachers preferred to work in East Africa or Northern Sudan.

Fifthly, the migration involved in shifting cultivation, nomadism of the tribes, the sparseness of population, continued absence of men in warfare and hunting, the gulf between men and women, full employment of young children and the suspicion of strangers owing to past experience of slave trading were factors which contributed to the difficulty of the establishment of schools.

Sixthly, there was very little knowledge about the history and life of the different tribes. James Currie the first Director of Education wrote in 1909 that he had been pleading: for the encouragement of anthropological and

sociological study as a necessary antecedent of any national system of education among these parts of the country where the conditions were unknown and where Islam did not obtain. Without such knowledge I have never believed that the foundations of any national system of education could be laid.¹

(ii) Missionary Education In Practice 1900-1920's.

According to M.O. Bashir, the government view with regard to the work of various Missions was "rather of civilising agents rather than an attempt at once to introduce Christianity among the pagan tribes."² L. Sanderson adds that "the Government expected the Missionaries to put the emphasis on the social and the practical education with view to the general well being of the people rather/^{than} proselytism."³

The missions, in addition to the problems that faced them and to which we have referred came to suffer particularly from the suspicions and hostility of the tribes. The elders in the tribe feared that Christian education would produce a generation which would turn away from the tribe and family life and deprive them of their children. The majority of pupils in the first Missionary schools were therefore either children of freed slaves or sons of Chiefs sent to the Missionary school by the Administration as hostages. The school became

¹Bashir, op. cit., p. 30.

²Ibid., p. 31.

³Sanderson, op. cit., p. 106.

associated with these two classes of boys at the early beginning.¹

The learning of the local language was a prerequisite to the establishment of an effective means of instruction. Until that was done either Arabic or English had to be used as a medium of instruction. Pidgin Arabic was the most widespread in the South. In both Bahr Elghazal and Upper Nile Provinces, Arabic was the language of trade. The Dinka and the Shiluk by virtue of their contacts with the Arabic-speaking tribes of the North spoke pidgin Arabic.²

(iii) The Question of Language
English vs Arabic.

The fact that a form of broken or pidgin Arabic was widespread throughout the South was not to please the British Administration. Thus as early as 1904, Sir R. Wingate, the Second Governor General of the Sudan informed the Governor of Bahr El Ghazal that Arabic should not be taught to the non Muslims in Bahr Elghazal because it was not in the first place the language of the tribes there. He informed him that as Arabic contained references to the Prophet and he 'was not at all keen to propagate Mohmedanism in countries in which that religion is not the religion of the inhabitants';

¹Bashir, p. 32.

²Ibid.

English should be the language of instruction.¹

The Government policy was therefore 'to instruct the natives through the medium of their own language and teaching them a certain amount of English. This policy, however, did not lead to the complete disappearance of Arabic or the immediate spread of English as a medium of instruction in all schools. Arabic remained the medium of Communication among the lower levels of administration and of the traders. The Army Battalion Schools in the South, attended by a few Southern children, helped to spread Arabic. The majority of the Roman Catholic Missionaries whose mission was the biggest were Italians and Germans, none of whom, in the opinion of the Governor General of Bahr Elghazal, was 'capable of teaching English.'²

Richard Hill, himself a notable pro-missionary Briton maintains that "The language question in the Southern Sudan seems from the first to have been associated with the missionary question."³ Late in 1910 Bishop Geyer of the Roman Catholic Mission and Bishop Gywnne of the Anglican Missionary Society and the Rev. A. Shaw "conferred on the matter." They concluded that unless English speaking natives were given priority over Arabic speaking natives, neither the

¹Letter From Wingate to Governor Bahr Elghazal (March 2, 1904) quoted by Bashir, p. 36.

²Letter From Governor Bahr Elghazal to Wingate (March 30, 1904) quoted by Bashir, p. 36.

³R. Hill, op. cit., p. 130.

Missionaries nor the boys would have an incentive to learn English. Gwynne, in relaying the conclusions of the three Clerics to Wingate said:

If the Government would as far as possible encourage the use of English as the medium through which business with the natives could be transmitted, it would be an inducement on the part of the natives to learn our language and would give Christian Missionaries some slight chance [against the overwhelming advantages which Islam seems to have at present in the Southern Sudan]¹

Wingate, however, needed no pushing. He was a devout Christian and was already in favour of making English the lingua franca of the South. He immediately sent a copy of Gwynne's letter to Bahr Elghazal's Governor with his own commentary "I need not recapitulate the reasons which induced me to suggest in the first instance that Arabic should not be taught ... in the mission schools and my opinion in this respect is unchanged." Wingate went on to say "My own view, is that if the new system i.e. the teaching of English is started very quickly and tentatively - without any fuss and without putting the dots on the i's too prominently - the desideratum may become a fait accompli almost before anyone has realized that a change has taken place. It is very much easier to deal with an accomplished fact should opposition be eventually raised."²

¹Letter From Bishop Gwynne to Wingate, (Khartoum: Dec. 26, 1910) quoted by Bashir, p. 36.

²Hill, op. cit., pp. 130-131.

[] Italics are mine.

As evident, English as a lingua franca in the South, has become the official policy of the Government and Arabic the language of the other six provinces of the Sudan came to be suppressed. R. Hill maintains that "the linguistic segregation of Southern provinces from the North was a short-sighted act of policy, the child of [good enough intentions at the time] but disastrous for the future."¹

Wingate, argues M.O. Bashir, might not have held any ideas on the merits of Arabic as a language, or might have held that English was the easier of the two languages, but the missionaries fear of the spread of Islam through the Southern Sudan into Africa, which was high on the agenda of all missionary conferences in Africa during this period, had certainly contributed to the decision to suppress Arabic. At the world Missionary Conference in Edinburgh in 1910, it was suggested that ^{the} race against Islam in Africa should be given priority over any other missionary problem.²

It would not be wrong if we summarize the general frame of the Condominium educational policy with regard to this question of language, in the following words of R. Hill. He said "In Khartoum the official solution of the problem of language seemed so simple and so rational at the time: let Islam retain the North and Christianity have the South; let

¹Ibid., p. 132

²Bashir, p. 38.

[] Italics are mine.

Arabic prevail in the North and English in the South. Nobody in authority seemed to consider the long-term political consequences of cultural segregation."¹

Thus, it is clear that the missionary work in Southern Sudan from its early beginning was unfortunately associated with the British colonial policy. It cannot be denied that the various Missionary representatives - particularly Bishop Gywnne of the Anglican Church had done their best and with the utmost cooperation of R. Wingate the Governor General to stop the spread of Arabic and encourage English as a substitute. It cannot be easily refuted that the Missionaries collaborated with the colonial administration to limit the spread of Islam in Southern Sudan " whose pagan tribesmen were regarded by Missionaries and administrators alike as potential converts."² An excellent evidence would be the following statement stated by Governor Owen of Mongalla Province. In 1911, he suggested that steps should be taken in the South to form "a large Christian population which would eventually link up with Uganda and form a substantial buffer or check to the spread of a faith, such as the Muslim."³

¹Hill, p. 132.

²Bashir, p. 38.

³Ibid., p. 39.

This clear and definite statement stated by an administrator of high rank, Owen, substantiates the allegations of Northern Sudanese intelligentsia that Missionaries and colonial administration are agents of the same power. The one propagate religion and the other administer the country. And as R. Hill declared, "The fact that English was the language selected by the Government, recommended by the Protestant Missions and accepted by the Roman Catholic missions was to give a later generation of Northern Sudanese the impression, . . . , that the missions were in some way partners in a British colonial domination." R. Hill adds: "Had Arabic been selected as the language of the missions and the schools from the beginning, Christian missionary work would have been conducted in Arabic in direct competition with the preachers of Islam. It probably never occurred to Wingate and Gwynne that Arabic was one of the historic languages if not a liturgical language of Christendom. Its imposition on the South would not have been as fantastic as it might seem at first sight to a Christian missionary, though it would have weighed heavily against those Protestant missionaries who, unlike the Catholics, had no great reserve of Arabic-speaking Christians to draw upon."¹

¹Hill, p. 132.

(iv) Kinds of Instruction provided by
Missionary Schools in the South

Having alluded to the initial establishment of missionary education in the Southern Sudan and having stated and analyzed the question of language, let us now give a brief account of missionary instruction during this stage - 1900-20's.

The division of the Southern provinces in 'spheres' of influence which was done by Wingate so as to reduce the possibilities of conflicts between them, meant that in each area there would be one mission and one pattern of education.

The pattern of education depended upon the financial resources and the educational philosophy and policy of each mission.¹

The Roman Catholics who entered the Sudan fifty years before the Condominium and whose financial resources were greater were able to provide more churches and schools. Their educational philosophy was based on the principle that "if a native wishes to read he must first be baptised."² Technical and industrial training were emphasized in their schools. Their priests, nuns and lay brothers who came mainly from Austria, Italy and Germany were able to put this into effect and develop technical education in their schools.

¹Sanderson, op. cit., pp. 106-107

²Bashir, p. 31

It will be ^{of} use here, to mention that the Roman Catholic Mission was first established by Mgr. Knoblecher at Gondokoro in 1849. However, the founder of its modern society was Daniele Comboni who went to Santa Croce in 1858. Father Comboni realized that official sponsorship was required if missionary work was to develop and he returned to Europe for this purpose. In 1867, he succeeded in gaining official recognition and subsidies. The Mission was to work not only in the Sudan but also in Uganda and Egypt.¹

It is to be noted here that the work of the Roman Catholic mission received a serious setback due to the outbreak of the First World War. As many of the fathers of the Roman Catholic Mission were of German and Austrian nationality, the Government feared that they might become a focus for native and other anti-British activities in the North and the South. The Governor General appointed a Committee to consider the problem. The committee reported that it was not desirable to retain Austrian and German Missionaries in the South. As a result, the Committee recommended their expulsion from the South and many of their schools were closed. However, they were readmitted and allowed to continue their work after the end of World War I.²

¹Sanderson, p. 107.

²Bashir, p. 35.

✓ It needs to be emphasized here that the technical education emphasized by the Roman Catholic Missions was a characteristic feature of Roman Catholic Missions not only in the Sudan but also in East Africa, springing from the desire to be nearly self supporting. They recruited and supported regular orders of lay brothers for secular tasks.

Following his visit to the Roman Catholic School at Wau in 1904, Wingate, then the Governor General stated that what the South needed most was the development of technical education. He addressed the Church Missionary Society that the Roman Catholic's Work was open to wise imitation as they were "being keen to get into close terms with the people by their life and industries."¹

Protestant Missionaries, on the other hand, stressed literary education; they relied on salaried priests and had no European artisans. It was only later that they turned to industrial and technical education. They used to emphasize the need for reading and writing as pre requisites to baptism. Due to the infusion of the lower middle class in them and "unlike the spiritually more obtuse soldier Governors they were men and women who felt strongly and emotionally on religious and moral questions. They possessed the reformed truth; they yearned with a passionate longing to impart this truth into others."²

¹Ibid., p. 31.

²Hill, p. 115.

(v) Types of Schools:

The types of schools provided by Missionary Societies in the South, were the village schools (often referred to as Bush Schools), elementary, intermediate and trade schools. As soon as the general Missionary work had commenced a boy's school would begin to which girls were sometimes admitted. However, if there was a reasonable number of girls wishing to attend they usually worked separately in a simple enclosure until a permanent building could be provided. By 1926, there were 22 boy's elementary schools, 9 girls elementary schools, 2 boys intermediate and 1 boy's trade school in the South. In addition, there were numerous village schools which were for the most part co-educational.¹

a. The Bush Schools

Bush schools were often far from the Mission stations. They varied in size and educational standard. The best ones aimed at teaching the first two year syllabus of elementary school course followed, by an examination for entry in the third class of elementary school. These schools were similar to the Northern type of subgrade schools but the media of instruction were the various vernaculars. Some of them depended on visiting Missionaries and were little more than centers of instruction in reading and copying the Bible in the vernacular and for some little rudimentary health education.

¹Sanderson, p. 107.

Every pupil in a bush school could, if qualified enter an elementary school, which was not possible for subgrade pupils in Northern Sudan.¹

(b) Elementary Schools:

Elementary schools provided a four-year course similar to that in the North but English was usually the medium of instruction at least in the higher classes. The curricula, syllabuses, sometimes teaching methods varied from one mission to the other. Sometimes the standard of English and Arithmetic was higher than that of Arabic and Arithmetic of many Northern schools but the extent of general knowledge appreciably less. A considerable amount of time was devoted to the teaching of Christian faith.²

(c) Intermediate Schools:

The intermediate school for boys was of six years duration and the medium of instruction was English for all subjects except religion which was taught in the vernacular. Sometime was also devoted to composition in the pupils' vernacular.³

There was no teacher training in the South, during this early stage of the Condominium. Pupils from elementary and intermediate taught in bush and elementary schools. How-

¹Bashir, p. 34.

²Sanderson, p. 108.

³The Anglo Egyptian Sudan From Within, op. cit., p. 354.

ever, some training was given by the Roman Catholic Missions. Some teachers from Uganda were also engaged in teaching in the Southern Sudan.

(d) Girls Education:

As there was little demand for girls' education during this period (1900-20's), there were only village and elementary schools for girls. Girls' elementary schools as were most of the boys' schools.- were boarding schools. The reasons for this is the fact that distances between their scattered homes was very great. This gave the missionaries the chance to teach them hygiene, health education and domestic studies. The following table shows when the first nine schools for girls began:

TABLE I

GIRLS SCHOOLS, LOCATION AND
DATE OF ESTABLISHMENT

Mission	Date when work started	Province	Name	Date of Permanent building
Verona Fathers' Mission	1901	Upper Nile	Detwok	1934
Verona Fathers' Mission	1901	Upper Nile	Lul	1935
Verona Fathers' Mission	1905	Bahr El-ghazal	Wau	1938
Verona Fathers' Mission	1905	Bahr El-ghazal	Kayango	1949
Verona Fathers' Mission	1905	Bahr El-ghazal	Kwajok	1949
Verona Fathers' Mission	1905	Bahr El-ghazal	Mbili	1946
Verona Fathers' Mission	1913	Equatoria	Mupoi	1934
Church Missionary Soc.	1905	Equatoria	Yambis	1920's
Church Missionary Soc.	1905	Equatoria	Maridi	1921

¹Sanderson, p. 108.

²Ibid., p. 109.

To conclude this period (1900-1920's) we need to reiterate that the Government did not show much interest in educational matters in the South and left this significant affair to be taken by the various Christian Missions. The approach of the missions was fairly realistic. In girls education they taught needle work and house craft. By so doing, they aimed at improving the standard of living in a practical way. By teaching the boys elementary carpentry, bricklaying and tailoring they were teaching crafts which could be of use to the people at that time. The Government showed benevolent tolerance towards this approach of education as it wanted the Missionaries to improve the general conditions of life.¹

B. The Second Phase 1920's-1946.

From the 1920's onwards the Government started to take an active role in educational affairs in the South which led gradually to direct intervention by means of financial subsidies and later on by provision of government schools and educational inspectors. At first the change was very slow and experimental as the Government was uncertain of the form that its intervention should take.

¹Ibid., p. 108.

(i) The Reasons that led to Government Intervention in Education:

The reasons that led to this change in educational policy are many. It is sufficient here to refer to the three main ones.

(a) The Milner Commission:

This Commission was asked in 1919, following the Egyptian Revolution against the British domination, to revise the British policy in Egypt. Similarly, the Sudan Government found it advisable to revise its policy with regard to the administration of the country - North and South-and asked the same Commission to do the job. According to M. Abdel Rahim "two issues were directly connected with the memoranda submitted to the Milner Mission." One of these explained that "the Government policy has been to keep the Southern Sudan as free as possible of Mohamedan influence. Black Mamurs are employed: where it has been necessary to send Egyptian clerks, copts are, if possible, selected. Sunday is observed as a day of rest instead of Friday as in the North and missionary enterprises encouraged." The Memorandum goes on to say: "The possibility of the Southern (black) portion of the Sudan being eventually cut off from the Northern (Arab) area and linked up with some central African system is born in mind."¹

¹M. Abdel Rahim, op. cit., p. 6.

Another Memorandum was more definite and explicit in tone. "It discussed "Decentralization of Sudan Government with a view to the separation of the Negroid from the Arab territories." Having made the realistic observation that "It would be very difficult to make a clear cut between the races," it nevertheless, suggested that "a line from east to west following the Baro, the Sobat, the White Nile and Bahr el-Gebel rivers" might be a suitable frontier between the two.

A third memorandum was even more definite. "The Government of the Sudan," it said "would have eventually to be assimilated to the Government of other African possessions, such as Uganda and East Africa, as far as Negroids are concerned. The Arab provinces would require different treatment. Therefore, consider the question of a Central African Federation under British control, and lop the Negroids off the Sudan Government - in time of course."¹

The Milner Commission, however, did not make any formal recommendations about the South as such. But the policy of decentralization which it recommended "with a view to the separation of the Negroid from Arab territories "as noted above, naturally tended in this direction."²

The commission reported that "although it is absolutely necessary for the present to maintain a single supreme authority

¹Ibid., p. 7.

²Ibid.

over the whole Sudan, it is not desirable that the government of that country should be highly centralized. Having regard to its vast extent and the varied character of its inhabitants the administration of its different parts should be left as far as possible in the hands of natural authorities, whenever they exist, under British supervision. A centralized bureaucracy is wholly unsuitable for the Sudan. Care should be taken in education not to repeat the mistake that has been made in Egypt of introducing a system which fits pupils for little else than employment in clerical and in minor administrative posts and creates an over grown body of aspirants to government employment.¹

Following the Milner report which emphasized Decentralization and being convinced that measures should be taken immediately to separate for good the Northern (Arab) part of the country from the Southern (Negroid) part and being alive to the major role that education can play in such a policy of dismemberment, the department of education started to take action and put this policy in practice. It was evident that the Government was not sure enough that the missionaries could fulfill this policy all alone and as a result it decided to take an active role by herself.

Thus in accordance with the instructions of the Director of Education in November 1921, Mr. Hillelson of the

¹MacMichael, The A.E. Sudan, p. 140.

Education Department and Dr. Seligman the anthropologist visited Mongalla Province (Equatoria) to report on the existing schools. Mr. Hillelson reported unfavourably and was dissatisfied with the achievement of the Missions as to the policy of dismemberment. He stressed among other things that "It was obvious that in the North, Arab and Muslim traditions provided a useful basis for educational development but in the South there was no homogeneity of culture and no older civilization on which to build. It was therefore desirable to study the educational systems of other (African) European colonies. Missionaries should visit Uganda to report on results there. Over the staffing problem he thought that the Copts from the North might be employed with success."¹

Mr. Hillelson also stressed that the Government should institute a regular system of grant-in-aid to mission schools dependent upon satisfactory educational standards. He stressed that a representative of the education department should visit the schools regularly. This implied the appointment of a Resident Representative of the Education Department in the Southern Sudan.²

¹Sanderson, p. 111.

²Ibid., p. 112.

(b) The Role of the "Southern Policy" - or the Policy of "Closed Districts."

A second factor that led to the serious intervention of the Government in educational matters in the South from the 1920's onwards is the so called "Southern policy" of Sir Harold MacMichael. MacMichael, it should be mentioned became Civil Secretary in 1926.

"From 1926 when Sir Harold MacMichael became Civil Secretary," argues L. Sanderson, "the government took increased responsibility for education in the South."¹ In the same year the government appointed a Resident Inspector for Southern Provinces and initiated a regular system of government subsidies to Missionary schools and became directly concerned ^{with} the form and content of education. In 1927, a second Inspector of Education was appointed. Subsidies were subject to the following conditions:

1. A European must exercise an uninterrupted supervision over the school and be withdrawn from the station only in case of sickness and home leave;

2. The syllabus as laid down, must be followed;

3. The Resident Inspector must be satisfied with the progress and efficiency of the school;

4. If any of the conditions were unfulfilled the Resident Inspector might reduce or withdraw the grant for the following year.²

¹ Ibid.

² The A.E. Sudan From Within, op. cit., p. 353.

On January 25, 1930, Sir Harold MacMichael announced the Southern policy to which we have earlier referred. His memorandum calls, among other things, for "building up a series of self-contained racial or tribal units with the structure and organization based, to whatever extent the requirements of equity and good government permit, upon indigenous customs, traditions and beliefs." It stressed that "Every effort should be made to make English the means of communication among the men themselves to the complete exclusion of Arabic." It declared that "The missions must retain a certain number of the local boys (Southerners) for their Elementary Schools which are an integral part of the educational system."¹

Thus as evident from MacMichael's Southern Policy, the British administration wanted to take the major role in educational affairs in the South. The Government ceased to be indifferent towards educational affairs in Southern Sudan and began to indulge seriously and actively in education so as to achieve its goals and put the policy of 'Divide and Rule' expressed in MacMichael's Memorandum into action. To leave the Missions alone, the Government believed, would not lead quickly and surely to the most desirable results. The best educational policy, as the Government itself

¹See Appendix I.

declared, would be a "happy combination of missionary enterprise on the one hand and of government on the other to afford sure ground and opportunity for the development of these negroid and pagan peoples."¹

(c) The Rise of Sudanese Nationalism:

A third and a major factor that led to the intervention of the Government in the educational affairs of the South can be said to be the rise of Sudanese Nationalism. The Sudanese National movement may be regarded as an offshoot of the Egyptian national movement which broke out after the first World War. However, according to P.M. Holt, "It would be wrong to depict the Sudanese malcontents of this period as mere deluded instruments of Egyptian nationalist ambitions. As the 'Urabist' revolution in Egypt had synchronized with the spontaneous Mahdist movement in the Sudan, so the revival of militant Egyptian nationalism after the First World War coincided with and stimulated, the beginning of Sudanese Nationalism." This national movement found its leader in Ali Abdel Latif, a young man from the Dinka tribe of the South who was then an army officer. He and his fellow officers formed the "White Flag Society" with the aim of uniting the Nile Valley - Egypt and the Sudan as one single state under the Egyptian Crown.²

¹Bashir, p. 43.

²Holt, op. cit., p. 127.

The fact that the rise of Sudanese Nationalism in 1924, was led by an army officer and other officers of the Military College in Omdurman and the fact that the leader was a Southerner - a Dinka - together with the fact that the movement allied itself with the Egyptian National movement and called for Unity of Egypt and Sudan under the Egyptian Crown, was a serious shock to the British administration. "The Sudan's political status," argues M.O. Bashir "became linked with the Egyptian problem. Official policy was to discourage a future link between Egypt and the Sudan, hence its encouragement of the groups and tribal leaders who sought a separate status from Egypt. Under no circumstances was it prepared to link the future of the South with that of the North."¹

Thus, the British administration found it necessary and vital for their continuous domination of the Sudan - to intervene seriously in the educational affairs in the South. Education was used as a major tool to stop or hinder the development of national unity.

These and other factors led the British administration to engage in the educational affairs in the South. This fact makes the second phase - 1920's-46 - completely different from the first phase. The first phase was characterized by an

¹Bashir, p. 40.

attitude of indifference and disinterest on the part of Government towards education in the Southern Sudan. In the second phase, the Government showed deep concern and great interest obviously to achieve its goal and separate the future of the North from that of the South and lead ultimately to the dismemberment and fragmentation of the country.

(ii) The Rejaf Language Conference of 1928:

Having expressed its new policy with regard to the education in the South, the Government then started to put its new policy in practice. In January 1927, a meeting was held in Mongalla (Equatoria) Province to discuss educational matters. This meeting was attended by the Director of Education of Uganda as well as members of Missionary societies and of Government. It was decided that the Governor of Mongalla province should hold annual meetings to discuss educational matters. To these, the missions should be invited to send representatives.¹

One of the major problems that continued to disturb the Government and hinder its policy with regard to cultural and language segregation was the continuous presence of Arabic language despite the strong measures taken to push it out and adopt English instead. In June 1927, the Governor General reported with bitterness that:

¹Sanderson, p. 113.

Wherever I penetrated, whether to the top of the Inatong Mountain or to the Belgian Congo border, I found Arabic in ready use by the local spokesmen of the people. In the face of this fait accompli we shall have to consider very carefully how far it is worth effort and money to aim at the complete suppression of Arabic. Indeed, we shall have to consider whether Arabic after all, in spite of its risks, must not be our instrument.¹

The careful consideration against Arabic referred to by the Governor General was to be made at the Rejaf Language Conference of April 1928. The aims of the Conference were:

1. To draw up a classified list of languages and dialects spoken in the Southern Sudan;
2. To make recommendations as to whether a system of group languages should be adopted for educational purposes, and if so which/^{of} these languages should be, for various areas;
3. To consider and report as to the adoption of a unified system of orthography;
4. To make proposals for co-operation in the production of text books and for adoption of skeleton grammars, reading books and primers for general use.²

The conference was attended by the Director of Education of Uganda, the Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province, Uganda, a representative of the Belgian Congo Administration and "many representatives of the mission schools in the Sudan, the Belgian Congo and Uganda" as well as Professor Westermann of the International Institute of African Languages and

¹Bashir, p. 44.

²Sanderson, pp. 113-114.

cultures.¹

The Conference decided that Prof. Westermann should draw a list of languages as the preparation of textbooks for vernacular elementary schools was urgent. The following languages were suggested: Dinka, Shiluk, Nuer, Bari, Latuka, Zande. A certain alphabet was to be used uniformly. A textbook committee was set up and its report was to be adopted for the planned co-operation of missions and government in the production of textbooks. This led to the appointment of Dr. Tucker of University College, London, who worked in the Southern Sudan on the preparation of textbooks from 1929 to 1931.² According to MacMichael, "The debased 'pidgin' Arabic, known as 'mongallese' was rejected and English was agreed upon as the language of official work."³

In 1932 Mr. K. Hunter became Director of education and he made further attempts to integrate missionary work more closely into the general policy of the government. "Thus equipped with money and expert advice," maintains M. Abdel Rahin, "the Missionaries, under the direct supervision of the Government, proceeded with the work" and many schools came to be established. "In the meantime, Islam and the Arabic language were not only totally excluded from the schools, but were also being systematically erased throughout the

¹Abdel-Rahim, op. cit., p. 16.

²Sanderson, p. 114.

³MacMichael, The Sudan, op. cit., p. 129.

Southern Provinces."¹

During this period and since secondary education was in its early development in the South, Southerners eligible for secondary education were sent annually by the Government and the Missionary Societies to the Makerere College in Uganda. This was done inspite of the fact that there was the Gordon Memorial College in Khartoum - (now University of Khartoum) which was more developed than that of Uganda. But, the British administration and the Missions discarded the idea of sending boys to Khartoum and preferred Uganda so as to prevent any possible integration among the educated people of the North and the South.

In 1937, the De La Warr Commission which was asked to report on education in the Sudan as well as some other British colonies in Africa, published its report.² It included some recommendations for education in the South. It recommended the development of education within the existing system but expressed that mission teachers should be trained at the London Institute of Education.³ This unreasonable recommendation was made despite the fact that there was a well developed branch of teacher training in the Gordon Memorial College at Khartoum and despite the fact the well known Educational Institute of Bakht El Ruda was already functioning

¹Abdel Rahim, p. 17.

²The Making of The Modern Sudan, op. cit., pp. 80-81.

³Sanderson, p. 114.

actively and successfully in teacher training. This is another example of the educational policy adopted by the British and aiming basically at the fragmentation of the country.

By the 1940's education in the South developed fairly well. The successful and 'happy cooperation and combination' of the Missions and the Government rendered this possible. Table 2 will help in giving an idea about the expansion in Boys Education.¹

TABLE 2

EXPANSION OF BOYS EDUCATION
BETWEEN 1928 AND 1948

	No. of Schools in 1928	Attendance in 1928	No. of Schools in 1948	Attendance in 1948
Elementary	27	1,420	45	5,328
Intermediate	3	130	3	359

¹Ibid., p. 115.

C. The Third Phase: 1946-54.

In 1946 the British administration in the Sudan came to realize the sore fact that the so-called Southern policy is not at all conducive to the development of the country. The administration came to be convinced that the idea of cultural and administrative separation was a wrong one and that the idea of linguistic segregation was a big fault.

Blame for this tragic policy of separation, in the writer's opinion, lies on the British administration and the foreign missionaries. However, the blame particularly lies on Sir Harold MacMichael the architect of the policy of 'Divide and Rule.' He, more than anyone else, contributed to the idea of linguistic, cultural and administrative separation and fragmentation of the country, which were among the major pillars that led to the dilemma of the Southern Sudan.

Up to 1945, his outstanding memorandum was still in action and was subject only to minor changes. For twenty years the Sudan was actually two countries - it was one country only in name - the "Anglo-Egyptian Sudan." From 1926-46, the policy in the South as ordained by MacMichael - was to build up a series of self-contained racial or tribal units based on indigeneous customs, traditional usage and beliefs. A firm barrier to Arabization was created. Every-

body, administrator and missionary, acted upon the policy that the peoples of the Southern provinces were distinctly African and Negroid. Progress along Northern lines was considered unsuitable for the South. It was the expressed policy of the Government to encourage Greek and Syrian traders rather than Northerners in the South. Every effort was made to make English the means of communication among the Southerner to the complete exclusion of Arabic. Southern boys eligible for secondary education were to continue their education - southward in Uganda and not at Khartoum. Deficiency in teachers - if needed to be fulfilled from the North, was to be fulfilled by the Copts and not by Northerners. In other instances teachers were to come from Uganda. Southern teacher training was to be done at London and not at Bakht-El Roda and the Gordon Memorial College at Khartoum. Moslems among Southern officials were dismissed, the Arabic names which some Southerners gave themselves were not recognized and the wearing of Northern dress was discouraged. The memories of hostilities were revived and kept alive. Southerners were brought up in ^{an} atmosphere completely different from that of the Northerners and they were taught to fear the Northerners and mistrust them. These and many other things were the offshoots of Sir Harold MacMichael's policy of "Divide and Rule."

However, if we were to blame and criticize a Senior British administrator like Sir Harold MacMichael, the Civil Secretary in 1926, we have to give credit to another Briton

Sir James Robertson, the Civil Secretary in 1946. It was he who played the major role in trying to reunite the North and the South after 20 or more years of disunity. It was he who planned to unify the Sudan culturally, linguistically and administratively. According to B.M. Sa'id: "In the face of a very strong and unfair opposition from many weighty quarters, he went ahead with his policy. For that the Sudan must indeed be grateful."¹

Sir James himself states in 1957 that:

I, against quite a lot of local opposition decided after the Juba Conference to bring Southern members into the proposed Legislative Assembly - on the grounds that the days of Southern separation must be ended and that the South must be integrated with the North, with which its economic and political future must continue.²

(i) Reasons for the Revision of MacMichael's Southern Policy of 'Divide and Rule'.

Several reasons led the British administration in the Sudan in 1940's to review Sir H. MacMichael's southern policy of the Closed Districts. Chief among them are the following:

In the first place, the majority of the members of the Advisory Council of 1944 who can generally be classified as pro British intellectuals and tribal Chieftains - had expressed their opinion to the British authorities that the Advisory Council of Northern Sudan should be expanded to include

¹B.M. Said, op. cit., p. 150.

²Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 14

as well members from the three Southern Provinces.¹ The Advisory Council, as we have earlier mentioned was boycotted by Sayed Ali Al-Mirghani, head of the powerful Khatmiyya sect and by the Graduates Congress,² on the basis that it was an attempt by the British to endanger the National unity of the country.

The British administration having been told by their friends that the policy of separation was not conducive to the betterment and the development of the country, North and South, and having been informed that there was a demand for the fusion of both the North and the South and their representation in the proposed Legislative Assembly, thought seriously of abandoning the previous policy of 'Divide and Rule' and adopting a new one instead.

Added to this factor was the role played by the Graduates Congress. This Congress was established in 1938 by the Graduates of the Gordon Memorial College. The Congress was dominated by those intellectuals who can generally be classified as anti British and pro Egyptian young men. Among its outstanding members was Sayed Ismail Al-Azhari,³ then the leader of the Ashigga (الإشيقا) - The Blood Brothers - party which later changed its name to N.U.P. (National Unionist Party) - calling for unity with Egypt.

¹Bashir, op. cit., p. 65.

²Henderson, The Making of the Modern Sudan, op. cit., pp. 357-360.

³Ibid., p. 552.

In 1942, and while the battles of World War II were being waged along the Sudanese-Ethiopian border between the Italian and British armies and while Sudanese battalions were fighting with great courage on the side of the allies, the Congress took the chance and sent a Memorandum to the Government. In this Memorandum the Graduates demanded inter alia "the abolition of ordinances on 'closed Districts' and the lifting of restrictions placed on trade and the movements of the Sudanese within the Sudan" and "the unification of syllabuses in the Northern and Southern Sudan."¹

Thus both sides of the Sudanese-British friends and enemies - expressed their opposition to MacMichael's Southern policy and called for a fresh policy. Both parties expressed their belief in the administrative and cultural unification of the country. This being the case, the British administration thought that the revision of the old policy of separation was inevitable and that a new policy of integration was both necessary and vital.

Thirdly, as K.D.D. Henderson, himself a previous Governor of Dar Fur Province stated: "The real intention of the Government [behind MacMichael's Southern Policy] was obviously to cut away the Southern Provinces altogether and attach them to Uganda,"² By the 1940's, however, it be-

¹Abdel Rahim, op. cit., p. 17.

²Henderson, Sudan Republic, p. 164.

came evident that such a policy was no longer practicable for political, economic and tribal reasons. M. Abdel-Rahim states: "East Africa's plans regarding better communications with the Southern Sudan have been found to be nebulous."¹

As the original motive behind the policy of separating the North from the South, i.e. adding the South to East Africa, appeared to be difficult if not impossible to achieve - the British administration found that a new policy of unification of the Sudan was inevitable. That is due to the fact that the South cannot stand by itself; it has to be attached to some place; if not to Uganda then to Northern Sudan.

Finally comes the role of Sir James Robertson. The architect of Southern policy, Sir H. MacMichael is definitely one of those ex-British administrators in the Sudan who adhere to the Atomistic School. Atomists, as we have stated earlier, believe that Southern Sudan is very different and very distinct from the North. Unlike the North which is Arabic and Islamic in **orientation**, the South "is the home of numerous primitive and negroid tribes."² This being the case, they contend that the two parts of the country should be separated from one another.

Sir James Robertson, I venture to state, belongs to the Unitarian school which "entertains the idea that since

¹Abdel Rahim, p. 18.

²Southern Disturbances, op. cit., p. 4.

no nation or a state is ethnically, religiously or culturally homogeneous per se; it is not difficult to administer the whole Sudan - North and South as one political unit provided, of course, there is a will to do so through ... such means as education and communication ..."¹

This being his attitude and unlike Sir. H. Mac-Michael, Sir James Robertson, became a great advocate of the policy of unification, fusion and integration in the Sudan. Thus, according to Mekki Abbas, in 1950 "a decision was made to introduce the teaching of Arabic in all Government schools above the elementary level. Southerners qualified for higher education started to go to the Gordon Memorial College in Khartoum rather than to Makerere College in Uganda."²

From 1946, onwards the Government led by Sir James Robertson began to intervene in the educational affairs in the South; but this time the intervention was for the establishment of a good and constructive aspect of education - i.e. for building up a sense of National unity and citizenship in the South. Northern teachers and inspectors were transferred to the South to work in Southern education together with the Missionary schools. "The result was that by 1948 the Education Department (in the South) was represented by 14 senior officials. There were 52 missionary educationists

¹Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 7.

²M. Abbas, op. cit., p. 20.

✓and 311 trained Sudanese teachers. Over 11,500 pupils were in village schools, 6,600 in elementary schools and there were 549 pupils attending intermediate and secondary schools. Moreover 347 were undergoing teacher training."¹

As a summary we may repeat that education in the South during the Condominium Government can be divided into three main phases, each of which was characterized by an educational policy on the part of the Government completely different from the other. In the first phase 1900-1920's the Government policy was one of indifference and disinterest and education was left to the Missionaries. In the second phase (1920's-1946) the Government intervened seriously in educational matters in the South in order to put into action the policy of the separation of the South from the North and to prevent, by all means the development of a sense of national unity and citizenship among the southerners. In the third phase 1946-54, the Government became alive to the necessity of cultural and linguistic unification and came to believe that the policy of educational separation is not conducive to the betterment and the development of both the Southerners and the Northerners and started to put this new policy in action. Measures were taken to eradicate the traces of the policy of Divide and Rule.

Unfortunately, this new policy of unification which was initiated by Sir James Robertson came too late - after

¹Sanderson, op. cit., p. 117.

about fifty years of complete cultural and educational segregation between the North and the South carried out efficiently and competently by both the Missionaries and the early British administrators. Thus when the revolt of the South began in 1955, the policy of educational unification was only 5 or 6 years old, and the effects of the previous policy of segregation were still dominant.

CHAPTER IV

EDUCATIONAL POLICIES IN THE SOUTHERN SUDAN AFTER INDEPENDENCE AND THE REASONS BEHIND THEM

A. Introduction

In the last part of Chapter III reference has been made to the step towards educational, cultural and administrative unification of the Sudan initiated by Sir James Robertson in 1946. However, before we proceed to our analysis of the educational policies in the South that were adopted by the various national Governments in the Sudan since 1957 we need to make some elucidation to the policy of educational integration during the period 1946-1956. Particular emphasis would be made on the Sudan Administrative Conference of June 1946, the Juba Conference of 1947, the all Sudan Legislative Assembly of 1948 and the reaction of the Missionaries, notably Prof. J.S. Trimmingham, one day the Secretary of the Church Missionary Society in the Sudan, currently at the History Department of the American University of Beirut, towards the step of educational unification.

(i) The Sudan Administrative Conference 1946.

In June 1946 the Sudan Administrative Conference was set up so as to deal with the question of associating the South with the central and local Government. The Conference recommended that the South should be represented in the pro-

posed Legislative Assembly.¹ When passing their recommendations to the Government, the members of the Conference stated that they were:

Of opinion that the future of the Sudan depends on welding together the people of the whole country ... through the representation of the Southern Provinces in a Legislative Assembly responsible to the whole country the unification of the Sudanese peoples will more quickly be achieved and it is on this that the welfare of all Sudanese ultimately depends.²

Members of the Conference further added:

The unification of the Sudanese people would be greatly assisted by the addition of the Permits to Trade Order, 1928, the abolition of one educational policy for the North and the South, the teaching of Arabic in the Schools of the South, the improvement of communication between the two parts,... and the unification of the system of establishment.³

The recommendations of the Conference became known and the old Southern Policy had to be revised. In his revision of the old Southern Policy of Sir Harold MacMichael, Sir James Robertson addressed the Senior British Officials in the Sudan on Dec. 1946, in the following words:

It is the Sudanese, northern and southern, who will live their lives and direct their affairs in future generations in this country: and our efforts must therefore be concentrated on initiating a policy which is not only sound in itself, but which can be acceptable to northern and southern alike.⁴

¹Said, op. cit., pp. 48-49.

²Bashir, op. cit., p. 65.

³Ibid.

⁴Appendix III.

"In Education," Sir James went on to say "I believe that while the South may hope to have a secondary school, it cannot hope to support post-secondary education, and I believe that Southerners should get this at the Gordon Memorial Collage - Arabic is not essential there, but I think should be taught to Southerners as a subject from intermediate school level upwards."¹

(ii) The Juba Conference 1947

However, the recommendations of the Sudan Administrative Conference were not to please many of the British administrators in the South who were against the idea of cultural and administrative unification. Fourteen of them protested in a letter directed to Sir James Robertson. "Their main contention was that the future of the South was 'discussed by the wrong men in the wrong milieu'".² They suggested that a separate Advisory Council for the South be established instead of representing it in Legislative Assembly together with the North.

In order to allay the fears of these administrators Sir James decided to hold a Conference at Juba in June 1947, to discuss the New Southern Policy. The Conference met at the specified date and it consisted of six British officials, six Northern Sudanese and fifteen Southerners.³

¹Ibid.

²Bashir, p. 65.

³Sudan Republic, op. cit., p. 168.

The British officials did a great deal to make the Southerners support their idea of a separate Advisory Council for the South; the Northern members particularly the late Mohmed Saleh Shingeiti fought hard to have the approval of the Southerners on the proposed Legislative Assembly for both the North and the South.¹ The Northern call for unity found acceptance and the All Sudan Legislative Assembly was established in Dec. 1948 having 13 Southern members. According to its Constitution, three Sudanese Ministers were to be elected; one for education, one for Health and one for Agriculture.²

(iii) The Legislative Assembly 1948.

Sayed Abdel-Rahman Ali Taha, the first Sudanese Minister of Education informed the members of the Legislative Assembly in 1948 that "as the Sudan is one country sharing one set of political institutions, it is of great importance that there should be one language which is understood by all its citizens. That language could only be Arabic, and Arabic must therefore be taught in all our schools."³

In another statement, A. Ali Taha declared that his policy "is to weld the system of education hitherto in use in the Northern and Southern Provinces respectively into one

¹Abdel-Rahim, p. 22.

²J. Hyslop, op. cit., p. 96.

³Sudan Government, Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly (Khartoum: November 1, 1949).

harmonious whole designed to meet the needs of pupils in all parts of the Sudan."¹ He added that the Government would continue to give full support to the existing missionary schools, and where necessary to upgrade them, while future expansion and development of education would be the responsibility of the Government. In the Government schools religious instruction would be guaranteed for the different Christian groups, but pagans, who would not be excluded from attending the Government schools, would be guaranteed freedom to abstain from classes where religious teaching was conducted. Thus for the first time, pagans in the Southern Sudan were given the opportunity to attend schools without being compelled to be Christians.²

In 1951, the Legislative Assembly approved a five year plan (1951-56) for education in the South. The capital expenditure was estimated at £665.200 in 1956. The institute of Bakht Er Ruda was held responsible for teacher training in the South. A publication Bureau, the purpose of which was to prepare suitable Arabic material for the Southern Schools and to assist in the conduct of mass literary work was established at Juba.³

¹ Sudan Government, Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly (Khartoum: November 20, 1949).

² Bashir, p. 68.

³ Ibid.

(iv) The Reaction of the Church Missionary Society (C.M.S.) 1949.

Nevertheless, this development towards administrative and educational unification angered the Missionary Societies. No less a man than J.S. Trimmingham, the Secretary of the Church Missionary Society in the Sudan, criticized it severely and openly in his book, The Christian Church in Post-War Sudan. According to Prof. Trimmingham: "We know that the slogan of 'One Sudan,' voiced by the Northern intelligentsia, has no foundation. It is but the accident of Western rule that has brought peoples so completely different under one rule."¹ He looked upon the Legislative Assembly for both parts of the Sudan as an appeasement by British officials to Northern (effendia) intellectuals and a gross breach of the British trusteeship.²

With regard to the transfer of Northern teachers to work in Southern Schools, Trimmingham dismissed the idea and maintained that the Northerners were "so obviously unsuitable for work in the South, not only on grounds of language, health, standards of pay and housing, but above all because they were lacking in the right background for the understanding of the Southerners."³

In the writer's opinion, these statements put forward by Prof. Trimmingham can hardly be substantiated by historical

¹J.S. Trimmingham, The Christian Church in Postwar Sudan (London: World Dominion Press, 1949), p. 32.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 14.

and anthropological evidence. On the contrary, both history and anthropology tend to refute them. To say that the slogan of 'One Sudan' has no foundation and that it is the accident of Western rule is not doing justice to history. As we earlier stated, a theory had been advanced by the Scottish traveller, James Bruce, who visited Sennar in 1772, that the well known Islamic Sultanate of the Funj (1504-1821) was of Shiluk origin.¹ The Shiluk tribe as we have said in Chapter one is one of the dominant tribes in Southern Sudan. Prof. Trimmingham himself, provides us with the following information in his outstanding work, Islam in the Sudan, "Bruce says 'at the establishing of this monarchy [the Funj] the King and the whole nation of Shillook, were pagans. They were soon after converted to Mahometism, for the sake of trading with Cairo, and took the name of Funji, which they interpret sometimes lords or conquerors, and other times, free citizens.'"²

History tells us also that the Turko Egyptian rule over the Sudan which succeeded that of the Funj in 1821 and continued up to the capture of Khartoum by the Mahdi in 1885 - had dominated all the territory of the present day Sudan and even territories beyond that particularly along the Southern and Eastern borders.

We know that Khedive Ismail (1863-79) had succeeded in capturing the present day Southern provinces of Bahr El-

¹Holt, p. 92.

²Trimmingham, Islam in the Sudan, p. 86.

ghazal and Equatoria and appointed Governors over each province. These Governors were directed by the 'Hikimdar' at the capital, Khartoum. Prof. Trimmingham himself tells us that the Khedive appointed European Governors over Equatoria namely Samuel Baker (1870-1873) and Gordon (1874-79).¹ We also know that Khedive Ismail did not limit his territory to the present day boundaries of Southern Sudan and that he went as far as conquering the lakes region and that he was planning to capture the whole of equatorial Africa.

We are told that, the Mahdist state which succeeded in overthrowing the Turko Egyptian Government in 1885 had ruled over the territory of the present day Sudan including the three Southern provinces and continued to do so up to the reconquest of the Sudan by the Anglo Egyptian forces in 1898. We know that the well known Fashoda Conflict of 1898 between French forces led by Marchand and British forces led by Lord Kitchner would not have happened had it not been for the British deep conviction that the Southern Sudan was an integral part of the whole Sudan and as that was the case, the British would accept nothing short of the French withdrawal.²

All these arguments demonstrate that the slogan of 'One Sudan' is not the accident of Western rule and that it

¹Ibid., p. 92.

²Fabunmi, p. 50.

is not an appeasement by British Officials to Northern Effendia. On the contrary this slogan goes back to the year 1504 - when the Funj Sultanate was established - i.e. almost 400 years before the advent of Western rule to the Sudan.

With regard to the C.M.S., Secretary General statement on the incompetence of Northerners in dealing with Southerners on the grounds of their lack of the proper understanding of Southerners background and on the grounds of language, health, etc., the writer's contention is that the close ties that existed between both parts certainly give the Northerners priority over any other people particularly Europeans. With regard to the question of language by which the General Secretary meant English language and the Southern vernaculars, the writer believes that the emphasis upon English in the South was from the very beginning a wrong policy. The missionaries should have practised proselytism in Arabic instead of English. We quote here again R. Hill's argument in support of this view. Mr. Hill himself, it should be mentioned, is a pro Missionary Briton; he explained: "It probably never occurred to Wingate and Gwynne that Arabic was one of the historic languages if not a liturgical language of Christendom. Its imposition on the South would not have been as fantastic as it might seem at first sight to a Christian Missionary,"¹

¹Hill, op. cit., p. 132.

Also we can mention here the argument of the International Commission: "In fact, Arabic speaking teachers from the North will be more capable of teaching Arabic to the young children of the South than Italians, for instance in teaching English and they will be as good as English teachers are in teaching English."¹

As to the Southern vernaculars the International Commission also noted: "It would be a waste of energy to teach the children of the South in their own vernacular, in which they will not be able to pursue reading after they leave the School."²

The opposition of missionary societies to a single united Sudan arose from their conviction that the Northerners would insist on recognizing Islam as the religion of the country, curtail the religious freedom of the country and bring education in the South under state control.³

It is very unfortunate that the Church Missionary Society in the person of its Secretary General had committed itself openly and deeply in politics and declared its opposition to the measures of unification of the country initiated by Sir James Robertson, the Civil Secretary. By so doing the

¹Report of the International Commission on Sec. Educ., op. cit., p. 51.

²Ibid., p. 52.

³Bashir, p. 67.

C.M.S. associated itself with those British administrators who opposed Sir James' new policy of unification and integration. One of these went as far as accusing the Civil Secretary of "Sacrificing his conscience."¹ By claiming that the Northerners were incapable of dealing with the Southerners, Trimmingham, intentionally or unintentionally, associated himself with a British Administrator like T.R. Owen who reacted against the new measures of Sir James and addressed him in the following words: "That they [Northerners] could run Omdurman I believe. That they will soon be fit to govern the Rezeigat and Hadendowa is possible. That they will in the next two decades be fit to be entrusted with the Zande and the Dinka is not even thinkable."²

These statements of Trimmingham and other responsible missionaries were to substantiate and affirm the allegation so frequently repeated by the Northern intelligentsia that the Missionaries and Colonial Administration were agents of the same power. In his criticism of Missionary activities as being closely associated with the Colonial administration B.M. Said argued that "The record of the Roman Catholic Church in Angola and Mozambique speaks for itself."³ Obviously he is

¹Sudan Republic, p. 171.

²Said, p. 40.

³Ibid., p. 106.

referring to the accusation of the Roman Catholic Church by African nationalists that the Church supported the Portuguese forces against the African Nationalists seeking to free these colonies from Portuguese domination and colonization.

B. The Mutiny of 1955 and the Mistrust in Missionaries.

As we have earlier stated, in August 1955 a mutiny broke out in the Equatoria Corps of Sudan Defence Force - before the declaration of independence. The country was deeply shocked and the Northerners received with great pain the massacres and atrocities that befell the Northern civilians, women and children. The Government quickly appointed a Commission of Enquiry headed by the Syrian Judge T. Coutran to investigate into the reasons that led to the mutiny.

However, public opinion in the North, particularly the intelligentsia, the politicians and journalists began to accuse the British administrators and the Foreign Missionaries as being the major factors behind the mutiny. M.O. Yassin himself the first Sudanese Governor to take his province in the South argued: "The British administrators and missionaries have in the past done much to sow the seeds of dissention and hate between the North and South. But/failed ^{they} ignominiously to achieve any lasting success. (I wish the Missionaries had produced real Christians)."¹

¹Fabunmi, p. 16.

B.M. Sa'id declared: "When in 1955 the Southern Corps of the Sudanese army mutinied, they [the missionaries] did nothing to deplore the wholesale butchering of Northerners. Never had they told their audience in Church, school or market that it was wrong to kill Northerners."¹

The fact that the general attitude in the South towards the Europeans and the Missionaries at the time of the mutiny was a friendly one, aroused the Northern suspicion. The Times correspondent, writing from Uganda, on August 25, 1955 reported that the attitude towards the Europeans of any nationality, whether officials, traders or missionaries was extremely friendly and that they did not seem to be in any direct danger in that area.²

People in the North started to grow more and more suspicious of the Foreign Missionaries as well as the British administrators. In November 1955, a few British subjects, missionaries of the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church, were accused of conspiring with the mutineers to overthrow the Government. Some were found not guilty, but a Protestant missionary in Maridi area, and a Catholic Father were sentenced. On appeal, their convictions were quashed by the Chief justice.³

¹Said, p. 107.

²The Times, London, August 25, 1955.

³Observer, November 27, 1955.

C. Evaluation of Missionary Education by the Commission of Enquiry.

In October 1956, the Report of the Commission of Enquiry was published. The report traced the development of Southern policy since establishment of the Condominium. The Commission drew the attention to the failure of missionary education to produce a reasonable standard of clerical and administrative efficiency in Southern staff. The Commission believed that the Government should have played the major role in education in the South and should not have left such an important undertaking to be made - for decades - by the missionaries since "the missionaries' primary duty is the spreading of religion, and with a few exceptions they are not qualified to teach in as much as their educational training and general outlook are limited to that of promoting Christianity."¹

The report adds that:

What we have concluded from our investigations in connection with promotions resultant of the Sudanization of the Civil Service was this: that when the missionaries were in almost exclusive control of education in the Southern Sudan from 1927-46 they have, with very few but notable exceptions, failed to produce Southern staff able or trained to assume executive or administrative positions ... A Ministry of Education official who gave evidence before the commission said that during the past regime there was practically no regular inspection or control on missionary teachers or instructors, and ability and experience in teaching was sometimes, completely lacking.²

¹Southern Disturbances, p. 6.

²Ibid., pp. 6-7.

The report went on to say: "This perhaps explains the low standard achieved. There is no evidence that the Southern Sudanese is either of inferior intelligence or notoriously lazy. He has simply not had the same opportunity as other members of the community; nor is it fair to accuse, as some Southerners often do, that the fault is that of the Northerners, ..." ¹

With regard to the role of the foreign missionaries in the revolt, the Commission of Enquiry noted that 'although the Missionaries regarded the take over [by the Northerners as a result of the Sudanization process] as a challenge, to their own work and certain allegations had been made:

"We find on evidence that the real trouble in the South is political and not religious; neither the slave trade nor the differences in religion played a part in the disturbances that took place in Equatoria ... Christians, pagans, as well as Muslims took part: in fact some of the leaders of anti-Northern propaganda are Southern Muslims." ²

The Commission however observed the following "Another point that clearly emerged from our enquiry is that there is too much mutual suspicion and mistrust between the administration (Northerners) and the missions in the Southern Sudan, which is widening ... the cleavage between Northern and Southern Sudanese." ³

¹Ibid., pp. 6-7.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

The preceding pages particularly those parts quoted from the Report of the Commission of Enquiry are meant to give a background of the general atmosphere that prevailed in the Sudan after the 1955 Southern Revolt and before the new educational measures adopted by the national Governments. It should be noted here that the impartiality of the Report of the Commission had never been questioned by the various contending parties - the Government, the missionaries and Southern Christian intelligentsia. K.D.D. Henderson, himself a devout supporter of the missionaries' case in the Sudan says in his book, Sudan Republic: "Since the impartiality of the proceedings and findings of this Commission has never been questioned relevant extracts are quoted in vabatim ..."¹ Joseph Oduho and William Deng in their book The Problem of the Southern Sudan, supported their arguments every time and then by evidence from the Report of the Commission. Sudan Government in its various publications followed suit.

The Commission as we have just seen, alluded to the failure of missionary education to 'produce Southern staff able and trained to assume executive or administrative posts.' However, as we have described in Chapter III, Missionary education was practical in character. They emphasized crafts and manual skills such as carpentry, brickbuilding, tailoring and so on.

¹Sudan Republic, p. 130.

Thus it can be safely concluded that missionary education was successful as far as practical and technical education were concerned. But unfortunately this was at the expense of academic education. Had the missionaries tried to give due concern to both kinds of instruction there would have been qualified Southerners to assume senior governmental posts at the time of independence.

The Commission of Enquiry also observed the atmosphere of uneasiness between the missionaries and Northern Administration and the mutual suspicion and mistrust between both sides. This was certainly among the factors behind the new educational policies in Southern Sudan. These policies will be examined in the remainder of this chapter and the following one.

D. Educational Policies in Southern Sudan 1957-1968.

The educational policy in the South adopted by the national governments ever since 1957 include among other things, the take over of the missionary schools by the Government, emphasis on Arabic language and Islamic religion, the expulsion of foreign missionaries, the alienation of Southern Christian intelligentsia and the change of Southern curriculum to fit with that of the North. As evident all these steps were directed against the foreign missionaries and the English language occupying a prominent place. R. Hill argues "From the founda-

tion of the Anglo Egyptian Condominium in 1899 to this day relations between governments and Christian missionary bodies in the Sudan have been ambiguous and since 1956 tragic."¹ K.D. Henderson states that the new educational policy "appeared to lie in taking a leaf from the book of the old Government and putting Southern policy into reverse, as it were."²

(i) The Take Over Of Missionary Schools in the South by the Government.

In 1957, two years after the mutiny and after a period full of suspicion and mistrust between the Northerners (Government and opposition) on one side and the Southerners and the foreign Missionaries on the other side, it seemed to have been generally accepted in the north that the confidence of the Southern intelligentsia had been lost. It could only be recovered by concessions which the north was not ready to make.³

The Southern members of parliament and the Southern intelligentsia - particularly the most outstanding Liberal Party called strongly for a separate or a federal form of Government. The North refused this demand and called for a United Sudan. The Liberal Party it should be noted, won 40 seats out of the 46 allocated to the South in the 1958 elections. Its leader, Father Saturnino Lohoure, was the speaker of the party in a parliamentary debate on Constitution. He

¹Hill, op. cit., p. 113.

²Sudan Republic, p. 183.

³Ibid.

said: "The South has no intention of separating from the North, for had that been the case nothing on earth would have prevented the demand for separation. The South claims to federate with the north, a right that the South undoubtedly possess as a consequence of the principle of self determination"¹

The Government accused the Southern Liberal Party of being instigated and supported by the foreign missionaries. The fact that Father Saturnino was the President of the Liberal party aroused great suspicion. The Government became alive to the fact that the confidence of the Southern intelligentsia is very difficult to obtain and thought that the influence of these intellectuals could be weakened by cutting away its feeder system of mission schools from which it was recruited. Substitute a system of education uniform with that of the North and within a decade or two you will have new leaders in the South.²

Thus, in February 1957 Sayed Ziada Arbab, then Minister of Education, invited the heads of all missions to a meeting to be held at Khartoum. Addressing the meeting, the Minister said that, it was the considered policy of his Government "to take direct and full charge of education in the Southern Provinces." "This policy," he said, "had been dictated

¹Oduho and Deng, op. cit., p. 36.

²Sudan Republic, p. 183;

by our highest national interests and it is therefore, the determined intention of the Government to see it through."¹

The Minister went on to say "The Policy which I am now declaring is consistent with the right of every sovereign state to educate its children and thus its execution is considered to be in the best interests of our national good."²

Having finished his address, the Minister then gave the chance to the Missionaries to raise their comments and questions. Among those who commented on the new policy was Bishop Baroni of the Roman Catholic Church. Bishop Baroni thanked the Minister for his address and promised all possible co-operation in seeing the declared policy through.³ Dr. Anderson of the American Mission said that "he could understand that policy very well, as it was the sort of thing which happened everywhere. It happened in his own country, he said, and he had been expecting it in the Sudan."⁴ Mr. De Saram of the C.M.S. felt that the missions' main contribution would be in the field of religion and asked whether it would be possible to allow Bishop Gwynne's College at Muridi to function as a centre for training teachers of religion in intermediate and elementary schools.

Finally, all the missionary representatives expressed their agreement and willingness to support the Government plan.

¹Appendix IV.

²Ibid.

³Sa'id., p. 94.

⁴Ibid., p. 94.

The two main points raised in the discussion concerned the teaching of Christianity and the transfer of the teachers to the Government cadre of payment. When assured on these two points the missionary representatives showed unqualified support.¹

However, despite the initial approval of Bishop Baroni of the Roman Catholics which we have quoted above, the Representatives of the Roman Catholic Mission put forward 13 proposals in the second meeting. These included among other things the following: "The Management and administration of Catholic schools in the South (but not their property) could be transferred to the Government Education Authority, by agreement with the Holy See, under suitable Education guarantees, through an act of the Sudan Parliament."

"A reasonable rent should be paid from year to year by the Government Education Authority to the Church Authority for the School buildings of the transferred schools.

"Priority should be given in the transferred schools to Catholics and only the Catholic religion should be taught.

"The time set apart for religious instruction, for religious services and for school holidays should not be less than that already set apart for these purposes."²

¹Bashir, p. 76.

²Sa'id, pp. 100-104.

These and the other 9 demands put forward by the Roman Catholic Church showed quite clearly that "the Roman Catholic Church while paying lip service to the Government's new policy was in fact trying to continue to control educational policy and practice in the Southern Sudan."¹ The acceptance of these demands, argues M.O. Bashir, would certainly have negated the original intentions of the Government and created a privileged position for the Catholic Church. Some of the proposals infringed upon the Sovereignty of the Sudan, its independence and the right to conduct its internal affairs. As a result most of the proposals were rejected by the government as "a matter of principle" however "some were ammended in such a way as to leave the final power in the hands of the Ministry of Education."²

The take over of the schools by the Government deeply angered the missionary bodies inside and outside the Sudan. The missionaries saw in it a hostile act on the part of the Northerners. Bishop Ferraro of the Comboni fathers, in an interview with B.M. Sa'id at Mupoi in 1957 described the Government's decision as 'Communist-motivated.'³ A short time later, a Roman Catholic publication in the United States came out with the same allegation.⁴ The Messenger, a Roman

¹Bashir, p. 77.

²Ibid.

³Sa'id, p. 108.

⁴Ibid.

Catholic Newspaper published in the Southern Sudan stated on February 15, 1957: "Our Catholic schools have been founded at the cost of great sacrifice to give these children a good Catholic education. Parents are under a grave obligation to send their children to Catholic schools, and the law of the Church insists that they may not send them to non Catholic schools without permission from the Bishop."¹

Another Catholic newspaper, Furiso of Italy, stated on May 12, 1957, that "The Pope has given his orders to resist the Sudanese Government, guilty of grave offence against the Church and the 3 million Africans in the South of the Sudan."²

However, despite the various objections the Government carried out its new plan and the decision was later approved by the majority of deputies. The Supreme Commission of five including its Southern and Christian member, Sayed Siricio Ire approved this measure of nationalization of all the missionary schools unanimously.³

(ii) Emphasis on Arabic Language and Islamic Religion.

In 1958, one year after the take over of the schools the army led by General Ibrahim Abboud made a coup d'etat and seized power. As we have earlier mentioned, the military Government of Abboud is responsible more than any other govern-

¹Bashir, p. 77.

²Ibid.

³Henderson, Sudan Republic, p. 179.

ment for the intensification of the Southern problem and putting it in a new and a very critical phase. According to M.O. Bashir:

The existence of a parliamentary system and political parties had acted as a restraint on those in the North who advocated the use of force to suppress those who called for federation or separation. When the parliamentary system disappeared and political parties were suppressed, the advocates of compulsion and integration of the North and South by force of arms had the upper hand.¹

As far as education in the South is concerned the military government thought the suitable solution lies in the spread of Arabic and Islam, even by force, in the belief that this was the only way to achieve national unity in future. A number of Koranic schools were established in different districts.²

The Government founded six Islamic Intermediate Schools, in Juba, Kadok, Wau, Meridi, Yei and Raga. A secondary Islamic Institute was opened in Juba and centres for preaching and religious instruction were also established.³ The military governors and administrators were ordered to devote much of their time and energies to the spreading of Islam and Arabic and the suppression of any opposition to this policy.

At the same time, the Government tried to enforce its policy of Arabisation and Islamisation on the Missionary schools.

¹Bashir, p. 80.

²Ibid., p. 81

³Basic Facts, p. 79.

The missionaries objected to this policy. According to Henderson, "Naturally they would object to the teaching of Islam in the schools they had founded. Try they never so hard to be co-operative, they could not help resenting the change."¹

The opposition of the Missionaries to this second aspect of educational policy was inevitable. This ultimately led to the third aspect which is the expulsion of the foreign Missionaries out of the Southern Sudan.

(iii) The Expulsion of the Foreign Missionaries.

Having found much opposition to its policy of Arabization and Islamization of the South from the Missionaries, the military government considered that the expulsion of the missionaries was inevitable.

Thus in 1961, missionary activities were further restricted and all religious instruction outside the churches was forbidden. Individual missionaries going on furlough had been liable for some years to find themselves refused a re-entry permit. In 1962, a new missionary Act prohibited all proselytising except under carefully restricted licence.²

On February 27, 1962, the Minister of Interior announced the expulsion of all Christian missionaries in the Southern

¹Henderson, p. 183.

²Ibid., p. 187.

Sudan. At the time of the expulsion, there were 617 Christian Missionaries working in the Sudan. They were divided as follows.¹

TABLE 3

NUMBER OF MISSIONARIES WORKING
IN THE SUDAN IN 1962

TYPE	Missionaries working in N. Sudan	Missionaries working in S. Sudan	Total
Roman Catholic Church (Verona & Mil Hill Fathers)	231	272	503
Church Missionary Society	16	15	31
American Presbyterian Mission	24	14	38
African Inland Mission	-	10	10
Sudan Interior Mission	11	24	35
Total	282	335	617
Catholics	231	272	503
Protestants	51	61	114

¹Bashir, p. 82.

The expulsion however applied to those working in the Southern Sudan only. 272 Verona Fathers and 28 Protestants were expelled. Those working in the North were allowed to continue their educational and other activities.¹

In his address to the Central Council at Khartoum regarding the expulsion of the Foreign Missionaries, the Minister of Interior, then General Mohamed A. Irwa said:

"I am sure, Mr. Speaker, that the distinguished members of this assembly are aware of the circumstances which compelled the Government to make these decisions.

"I am also sure that you will fully agree with me that the integrity of the country, the sovereignty and the rule of law and stability are fundamentals to which the Government should give due attention."²

"We have been observing for a long time and with unflinching patience the activities of these foreigners in those areas. Sometimes we forgive and other times we find ourselves compelled to warn, but unfortunately they mistook our tolerance for weakness, our forgiveness for hesitation and our leniency for cowardice."³

The Minister went on to accuse the missionaries of activities which threatened the unity of the Sudan and he cited

¹Ibid.

²Appendix V.

³Ibid.

a number of incidents. He also denounced them as contributing to the deterioration of the parliamentary system because of the pressures they exerted on the political activities of the Southern Liberal Party.

The Military Government had further argued that the Missionaries had: "gone beyond the limits of their sacred mission. They persistently worked inside and outside the Sudan against the stability and internal security of the country ... They also exploited the name of religion to impart hatred and implant fear and animosity in the minds of the Southerners against their fellow countrymen in the North"¹

The expulsion of the Foreign Missionaries by the military Government was severely criticized by Western countries and condemned by the Vatican. On March 20th 1964, two Italian Papers, Il Popolo and Il Quotidiano carried a story under the heading, 'Manifestation of Solidarity with the Missionaries expelled from the Sudan,' which argued: "A big manifestation of solidarity with the Combonian missionaries expelled from the Sudan was held this evening (March 19, 1964) in the Cathedral of Verona, where the clergy, the authorities of Verona and the people gathered around the Fathers and Nuns, to show their sympathy and affection, to pray with them, ask-

¹Bashir, p. 82.

ing the Lord to help and comfort the African population deprived of spiritual assistance."¹ Il Quotidiano, quoted the speech of Father Ferraro, Apostolic Prefect of Mupoi Equatoria, who was among the Missionaries expelled, in which he said that the reason for their removal from the Sudan was that the Government did not want to have evidence to the measures of violent repression and retaliation which the Arab Police and soldiers had already started against the innocent population of the 'closed districts.'²

The London monthly publication known as Africa stated in 1964, that the Catholics and in particular the Verona Fathers had stuck out their necks politically and publicly. Back in April 1963, the Magazine of the Verona Fathers accused the Northern Arabs of the Sudan of 'attempting to destroy the Church, the unwanted witness of the effort to re-establish slavery of the body and spirit among 4 million non Arab-Sudanese sufferers;'³

Leading British papers which condemned the deportation of the foreign Missionaries started to publish wide and sometimes exaggerated information about the Southern refugees who fled away from the Sudan as a result of the expulsion of their protectors, the missionaries, and who as the

¹Sa'id, p. 105.

²Ibid.

³Bashir, pp. 82-83.

British Papers stated, "were afraid of being executed by the Northern troops." The Observer, of May 3, 1964, noted that Sudanese Southern refugees in Ethiopia left hurriedly for Kenya on learning that the Ethiopian Government had completed an extradition treaty.¹ The Guardian, May 4, reported a new influx into Uganda, bringing the total arrivals during 'the last few months' up to 11,000.² The Correspondant of the Glasgow Herald on 6 May estimated the total number of Sudanese refugees in Uganda at 60,000, of whom 7,000 had crossed the border in the last few days.³ The Daily Telegraph on May 12 reported that Sudanese refugees in Uganda were 50,000 and in Ethiopia 25,000.⁴ The Times of May 28, 1964 said that a Commission of the U.N.O. had asked Uganda to keep the frontier with the Sudan open so as to allow the passing of the refugees.⁵ These were some of the news published in a few Western papers. Some of these news were true; others were greatly exaggerated and they were meant to arouse the Christian nations against the Sudan.

It is to be noted here that some of the people in the North sympathized with the Government's decision of the expul-

¹Observer (London: May 3, 1964)

²The Guardian (May 4, 1964).

³Glasgow Herald (May 6, 1964).

⁴Daily Telegraph (May 12, 1964).

⁵The Times (May 28, 1964).

sion of missionaries. Undoubtedly, the reason lied in the association of the missionaries with the colonial administration - an allegation which is stated by Northern intelligentsia but denied totally by missionaries and their supporters. Henderson for example states that "Northerners believe that the Government and the missionaries collaborated to convert the South to Christianity and divorce it from the North. 'Collaboration' is hardly the word,..."¹ Hill maintains that the the missionaries were far from regarding themselves as the mouthpieces of the government and that they were highly critical of the government attitudes and policy.²

This being the attitude of Northern intelligentsia, it would be useful to refer to some papers at the time.

(الثورة) The Revolution dated 28 February 1964, regarded the expulsion as being the actual evacuation of the colonizers. It added that although the troops of the imperialists left the Sudan in 1955, there were some other troops left behind - these were the foreign Missionaries. These latter troops were finally expelled in February 1964, the paper asserted.³ (الايام) AL'AYAM, said that let the Foreign Missionaries go to paradise; but let them go out of the Sudan since they proved to work against the national unity of the country.⁴ (الرأى العام) - Al'Ray

¹Henderson, Sudan Republic, p. 162.

²Hill, op. cit., p. 129.

³(الثورة), Al'Thawrah, (Khartoum: February 28, 1964).

⁴(الايام), Al'AYAM, (Khartoum, Feb. 28, 1964).

Al'Am - went further and accused the missionaries as being responsible for every bit of blood of any Northerner or Southerner since the mutiny of 1955. The paper concluded that their expulsion was a right and just decision and they really deserved it.¹ (الصحافة) Al'Sahafa of February 29, 1964 regarded the decision as the most honorable and outstanding decision made by the Government since 1958.²

(السودان الجديد) , El-Soudan El-Gadid regarded the decision as being made for the sake of national unity and national pride and so that the catastrophe of 1955 should not reoccur.³

(الرأى العام) , Al'Ray Al'Am of March 4, 1964 in a leading article entitled "If Religion was their Aim," stated that if religion was the real aim of the missionaries, they would not have Christianized only a few thousands though they had been working in the South for almost a hundred years. Certainly they did have another objective - namely - endangering the national unity.⁴

Some of these statements by Northern newspapers as is the case with some European statements were far fetched. But there is enough truth in them to show the attitude of the Northern intelligentsia towards the foreign missionaries. The

¹ (الرأى العام) , Al-Ray Al-Am (Khartoum: Feb. 28, 1964).

² (الصحافة) , Al-Sahafa (Khartoum, Feb. 29, 1964).

³ (السودان الجديد) , Al-Soudan Al-Gadid (Khartoum: Feb. 29, 1964).

⁴ (الرأى العام) , AL-RAY AL-AM (Khartoum: March 4, 1964).

reader may argue that these statements or articles were written at a time when the Sudan was governed by a military and dictatorial government and at a time in which there was no freedom for the press and that the papers could not but support the government decision. To refute this, one may cite some statements or documents from the period before and after the military rule which continued from 1958 to 1964. Early in 1952, M. Abbas wrote, "The Missionaries, not unnaturally, saw in the religion and the language of the North a challenge to their activities. They, therefore, took every opportunity of their teaching of religion and history to keep the memory of slavery alive."¹

B.M. Sa'id, himself the President of Sudanese Journalists Association stated in 1965 "The missionaries gave the policy of "divide and rule" their full support and blessing. As Government agents responsible for education, they were indeed the tools on which British policy in the Sudan relied for its execution. Then things changed; but the missionaries failed to inhale the fresh air brought about by the wind of change."² M.O. Bashir wrote in this year, 1968, that the expulsion of the missionaries was a logical result arising from their hostility.³

¹M. Abbas, op. cit., p. 176.

²B.M. Sa'id, p. 112.

³M.O. Bashir, p. 83.

These and other statements will give the reader a feeling of the mistrust between the Northerners and the foreign missionaries - a fact that has been observed by the Commission of Enquiry in 1956.

(iv) Alienation of Southern Christian Intelligentsia.

The military Government of Abboud, having curtailed the activity of all political parties including the most powerful Southern Party - The Liberal Party - led by Father Saturnino Lohore and other intellectuals, and having decided to solve the Southern problem through the use of power, and having planned to enforce Arabic language and Islamic religion, by every means, and having put into action its decision of the expulsion of the foreign missionaries, was sure to find itself into open conflict and clash with the Southern Christian intelligentsia.

It should be stated here that though the pagans constitute the majority of the Southern population and though "only a quarter of a million of the three million Southerners are thought to be Christians,"¹ still the fact remains that most if not all of the Southern intellectuals and leaders are Christians. These could not shake hands with the military government and, by all means, they could not be friendly with Abboud and his military junta. Their reasons are not difficult

¹Henderson, p. 183.

to observe. These men were in the first place, the leaders, the spokesmen and the deputies who used to speak the Southern case in Parliament, organizations and conferences. Their activity was checked by the dictatorial regime of Abboud.

Secondly, most of these, were devout Christians who were educated at Missionary schools and they were affected by the new measures taken by the Government and felt deeply with the Missionaries who used to be their teachers and spiritual fathers. Thus their conflict with the military junta was inevitable.

According to M. O. Bashir, "during the military take over, the Southern intellectuals, were completely alienated and left the country."¹ K.D.D. Henderson maintained that, in 1960, the year in which the Sunday holiday was abolished, something in the nature of a large scale migration began out of Equatoria into Uganda and Congo. He adds, "Leading Southern intellectuals, including students in the University of Khartoum, also went into exile. One of these was William Deng, A.D.C. at Torit and the co-author of The Problem of the Southern Sudan."²

Those Southern intellectuals who fled away came to establish organizations in the neighbouring countries to fight for their cause. Chief among them were Sudan Christian Associa-

¹ Ibid., p. 81.

² Henderson, p. 186.

tion and the Sudan African Closed Districts National Union (SACDNU). Among the outstanding members of SACDNU were J. Oduho (President) ex member of Parliament; W. Deng - (Secretary) former Assistant District Commissioner; Marko Rume (Vice President); Aggrey Jadin (Deputy Secretary); Father Saturnino Lohure (ex. M.P. and President of Liberal Party); Ferdinand Adyang ex M.P.¹

The establishment of such a powerful organization SACDNU - by the leading Southern intellectuals was the result of the stupidity and narrow mindedness of the military regime. Indeed, the alienation of the Southern Christian intelligentsia put the problem in a very tragic and a critical position. No more was it an internal affair; it became an international one. The moment, it was established, SACDNU addressed the U.N. in a petition that "its policy was independence for the Southern Sudan. Independence was demanded, according to this petition, because they failed to obtain federation."²

It should be noted here that SACDNU, changed its name in 1963 to SANU., (Sudan African National Union) however, its aims were not changed. The party kept its call for an independent Southern Sudan.³

¹ Bashir, p. 83.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

With the collapse of the military regime measures were immediately taken to abolish the policy of alienation and extermination. On November 1964, the new Prime Minister, Sir Ekhatim El Khalifa, in one of his statements to the nation declared that 'the Southern problem was receiving urgent attention and that his Government was convinced that violence and armed measures would not solve the problem.'¹ He appealed for peace and negotiations. A general amnesty was declared. It included all Sudanese who had fled from the country since January 1955, and those who were tried in absentia or wanted for trial on any political charge.² A round table conference was suggested to deal with the question of the South.

This round table conference was held in the period between 16th and 25th of March 1965, in the presence of official observers from Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ghana, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic. All parties and groups attended including W. Deng and his group - the peaceful wing of SANU.³ Other outstanding intellectuals of SANU - like J. Oduho (The President) and Aggry Gadin (Deputy Secretary) and others, unfortunately boycotted the conference and rejected any peaceful measures to solve the problem. To them the solution lied in war and bloodshed. Strenuous efforts were made to convince them but they were too obstinate to be convinced. In

¹Ibid., p. 89.

²Henderson, p. 207.

³Appendix VI.

these efforts Mr. F.K. Onama, the Uganda Minister of Interior, took the lion's share but all his efforts went astray. This being the case, Mr. Onama addressed the Parliament at Kampala on March 3, 1965, condemning the extremist side of SANU and accused them as being under foreign influence. To quote the Minister's own words: 'We know, Mr. Speaker, that these people who claim themselves to be refugees, spend much more money than any of us, including the Backbench Members ... Here is a person who ran away probably without a coat and now he drives a car, he lives in a beautiful house, sometimes he spends the whole year in the hotels, he claims to be the leader of his people who are living in the bush and he is not prepared to sacrifice his time to go and talk. Even his life. This is an example of the encouragement of external agents to disrupt the peace of Africa.'¹

The attitude of these Southern persons was indeed a pityful one and was among the major factors that hindered the success of the Round Table Conference.

E. Conclusion.

In this chapter we have alluded to the various educational measures adopted by the national governments since self rule. **These** included the take over of the Missionary schools by the government, the expulsion of the foreign mis-

¹Appendix VII.

sionaries, emphasis upon Arabic instead of English and on Islam instead of Christianity, and finally the alienation of the Southern Christian intelligentsia.

However, before we proceed to the final chapter we wish to restate and emphasize here some of the reasons that led the national Governments since 1957 to initiate such a change in educational policies in the South. With regards to the take over of the schools, the Minister of Education who took the step argues that:

A major objective is to iron out all big differences in the existing system of education in the Southern Provinces, weld it into its northern counterpart so that there may be one unified system of education for the whole Sudan.¹

The Minister also maintained that the Condominium Government itself had intervened in education in the South and since the 1930's it adopted a system of supervising Mission schools and started creating and developing its own educational set up from the elementary level to the secondary. "The trend of the Government's policy," continues Sayed Z. Arbab, the Minister of Education in 1957, "has been clear and all the implications pointed to a controlled national system of education to replace the existing mixed one."²

Thus, the Minister was suggesting that the new educational policy - the takeover of the schools in the South,

¹See Appendix IV.

²Ibid.

was nothing but the continuation or the completion of the policy of cultural and educational integration which was initiated by Sir James Robertson eleven years earlier.

It is noteworthy that the policy of aiming at national unity was recommended by an authoritative and an independent body. This body is the International Commission which was asked in 1954 (before the outbreak of the rebellion) to report on secondary education in the Sudan. The Commission was headed by K.G. Saiyidian of the Ministry of Education of India and had as members some notable British and Egyptian educators including two outstanding Egyptian educators, Farid Abu Hadid and Abd Elaziz Elsayed. None of its members was a Sudanese. The Commission argues:

It seems for a variety of reasons that the authorities of the Sudan attach particular importance, in their plans to national education and to the aim of the production of a good number of highly educated men to meet the growing needs of the country.¹

Another authority is Dr. Matta Akrawi, who went to the Sudan in 1958 as a Unesco expert "to assist in devising a scheme for the reorganization of the educational system and in drawing up a five-year plan for education." He said:

The Sudan, being composed of many ethnic groups, speaking a large variety of languages and going back for the most part to different tribal backgrounds, has a pressing need to develop through its education and by other means, a sense of nationality among its population, an allegiance to the whole country and state that goes beyond the family, the tribe or the particular section of the country in which the individual happens to be living.²

¹Report of the International Commission on Sec. Educ. in the Sudan, op. cit., p. 23.

²M. Akrawi, op. cit., pp. 264-65.

It should be stated here, that though the International Commission and Dr. Akrawi called for a system of education that might lead to the development of a feeling of national unity and citizenship, they did not call for the prohibition of private education. Both private and public schools could work together ^{for} the common good.

With regards to the question of language, the International Commission stated that:

It seems, therefore, that there can be little argument in favour of English being particularly suitable as the medium of instruction in the South. In fact, Arabic speaking teachers from the North will be more capable of teaching Arabic to the young children of the South, than Italians, for instance in teaching English and they will be as good as English teachers are in teaching English.¹

The Commission goes on to say:

It would be a waste of energy to teach the children of the South in their own vernacular, in which they will not be able to pursue reading after they leave the school.²

Dr. Akrawi, on the other hand, states:

Education [in the Sudan] also should be instrumental in the introduction of a common language of communication among all citizens in order to cement ... national unity.³

Thus, it is evident from these statements that the policy of introducing Arabic in the South is not a bad and

¹ Report on the International Commission, op. cit., p.51.

² Ibid., p. 52.

³ Akrawi, op. cit., p. 265.

improper one as Oduho and Deng asserted.¹ On the contrary, it had good and sound reasons behind it. However, the manner in which it was introduced during the military rule disturbed the good picture.

With this discussion we end this chapter on educational policies in Southern Sudan since self rule. We now move to our final chapter in which we will evaluate these policies and see whether they helped or hindered the development of a sense of national unity and citizenship in the Sudan. We will also attempt to provide some recommendations for a viable educational policy which may pave the way for the development of national unity in the Sudan.

¹Oduho and Deng, op. cit., p. 48.

CHAPTER V

EVALUATION OF THE EDUCATIONAL POLICY IN THE SOUTH SINCE INDEPENDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A VIABLE ONE

A. Evaluation of the Educational Policy Since 1957.

Is the educational policy in the Southern Sudan that was adopted by the various national Governments since self rule a viable and a sound one? Did it contribute to the development of a sense of national unity and citizenship among the Southern Sudanese? Did it lead to the stability and the betterment of the educative process in the South? Would this policy render possible the development and the encouragement of a sense of national feeling among the Southern Sudanese in the near and far future?

In the writer's opinion, the verdict is in the negative. The new educational measures disrupted the process of education in the South more than in anytime in its history. Education in the Southern Sudan came to suffer from a chronic state of instability and chaos which does exist up to this very moment. Thousands of the schoolboys in the South, particularly the senior ones, left their schools and joined the rebels in the jungle. Most of the schools in the South were closed and Northern schoolmasters who became subject to continuous attacks by the mutineers were deported to the North. According to Henderson the fact that the senior Southern boys left their

schools and joined the rebels - particularly between 1955 and 1960, was inevitable. That is because:

Their education and progress had already been interfered with by the closing of schools [Mission Schools]. The switch from English to Arabic as medium of instruction hit them the hardest of all. The installation of northern schoolmasters in the compound was a religious challenge. The change from Sunday to Friday as the weekly day of rest, to conform to practice in the rest of the country increased their resentment, although time was allowed off for attending church.¹

Secondly, the attempt to solve the question of national unity through military means, particularly during the rule of General Abboud, was a ridiculous and a shortsighted policy. The use of military means might have been justified at the initial stage of the problem when the Southern Corps of the Sudan Defence Force revolted against the Central Government. That is because it is the duty and the responsibility of the Government - any Government to stop disorder and disobedience within its regular army. But to continue using military means as the only suitable solution after the surrender of the mutineers and their being put to trial was sure to intensify the nagging problem and hinder the way leading to national unity. This improper measure increased the prejudices of the Southerners that Northerners had come to the South only to replace the British Administration and become the new rulers and Governors of the Southern territory. In other words, Northerners had come to the South not as brothers but as masters who

¹Henderson, op. cit., pp. 181-182.

want to enslave the poor Southerners and exploit their resources. This harsh and dictatorial policy led ultimately to the establishment of the various Southern terrorist organizations - in particular - the Anya Nya. This was inevitable and as Henderson rightly explained:

Repression is the opposite of mercy. It curseth him that gives and him that takes. Whether it be directed against the I.R.A. or the Mau Mau or the Anya Nya (Southern terrorists) it leads to increased callousness in reprisal.¹

Thirdly, the alienation of the Southern Christian intelligentsia and regarding them as rebels and traitors was another shortsighted approach which hindered the development of a sense of national unity and citizenship. This policy led unfortunately in some bitter and acute circumstances to the execution and assassination of many educated Southerners. According to M.O. Bashir:

The two incidents at Juba on July 8, 1965, and at Wau on August 11, 1965, where a number of Southerners were killed as a result of army and police activities against the rebels and their sympathizers, left behind them an increased bitterness among the Southern educated class. The background and details of these two events are not fully known, but the inescapable fact remains that a number of educated Southerners lost their lives and many escaped to Uganda.²

This harsh and aggressive policy against Southern Christian intelligentsia was based, as we have already mentioned, on the fact that they were educated by the Christian

¹Ibid., p. 185.

²Bashir, op. cit., p. 100.

Missionaries and that their loyalty to the United Sudan, the majority of which is Muslim, cannot be easily expected. In the writer's opinion such an attitude is naive and improper. As we have earlier shown the proper concept of nationality does not rely upon such factors as religion or race. The example of Zakir Hussien, himself a Muslim and at the same-time the Head of the Indian Republic, the absolute majority of which is Hindu - is not difficult to see. And as Prof. Fabunmi rightly stated nationality is determined by common citizenship - not by race or religion.¹ Commenting on the improper attitude of the alienation of and mistrust in Southern Christian intelligentsia, Henderson remarks:

The copt has not shown himself to be a disloyal Egyptian and the Syrian Christian has always been in the vanguard of Arab nationalism. Nor did the old Turkish Government have any qualms about giving the missionaries a free hand in the South.²

Indeed if we were to trace the origin of Arab nationalism or the so-called Arab awakening we find that it was started on the premises of this University/^(A.U.B.) by outstanding Christians such as Faris Nimir Pasha, Ibrahim Al-Yazigi and others. Also, if we refer to the modern history of Egypt we would find such figures as the late Makram Obeid Pasha, a Copt who was equally devoted to the cause of Egyptian Nationalism as the other Egyptians, if not more than many of

¹Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 13.

²Henderson, op. cit., p. 182.

the Egyptian politicians of his time. At the present time, the figure of Dr. Constantine Zurayk ranks first among those who believe in and call for Arab Nationalism. Similarly, the Christian Southern Sudanese, could be devoted to Sudanese Nationalism as any other Muslim Sudanese from the North.

It is worthy of mention here that not all the Northerners share the same belief that the Christian Southern intellectuals are disloyal and rebels. A large portion of the Northern intellectuals criticize this attitude. Chief among them is Sayed Saddig Al-Mahdi, a young man who graduated from Oxford University and who was once the Prime Minister of the country and later on the Leader of the Opposition. Saddig Al-Mahdi wrote a book in Arabic with the title 'Masa'lat Janub El Soudan' (مسألة جنوب السودان) in which he put forward constructive suggestions to deal with the problem.¹

Delivering a speech in Beirut on January 13, 1968, Saddig Al-Mahdi said that the massacres of the Southern Christian intelligentsia were the most inappropriate attitude and that if the problem is ever to be solved, the Northerners should listen to the Southern intellectuals, know their case and try to reach a common understanding with them. To be aggressive and offensive with them would lead definitely to further complications in the already complicated problem of national unity.²

¹S. Al-Mahdi, 'Masa'lat Janub El Sudan (Khartoum: 1964).

²S. Al-Mahdi, A Lecture delivered at the Office of the Sudanese Cultural Attache in Beirut, January 13, 1968.

Saddig Al-Mahdi, himself the leader of the wellknown Umma Party has formed since last year a successful coalition with the outstanding wing of S.A.N.U. led by the late William Deng which won the majority of the Southern constituencies in the 1968 parliamentary elections. This was an excellent example of North-South co-operation. It should be noted here that Mr. Al-Mahdi's realistic and promising view of the Southern question is gaining support increasingly amongst Northern intellectuals.

Fourthly, we come to the take over of missionary schools by the Government. This attitude was a serious shock to the process of education in the South. The writer maintains that it is the duty of the Government to initiate and support a system of national education that makes possible the development of "a sense of national unity among its population, an allegiance to the whole country and state that goes beyond the family, the tribe or the particular section of the country in which the individual happens to be living." In other words, the writer calls strongly for the development of Government education in the South and that the Government should take the main responsibility for such a vital and a significant undertaking. Gone are the days in which Governments are passive or indifferent to native education. The development of national education, as we earlier referred, had been suggested by two authoritative and independent commissions, the International Commission of 1955 and Prof. Akrawi's Commission of 1958-1959.

However, the growth of national or Government education need not necessarily lead to the detriment or disappearance of missionary or private education. The two are not mutually exclusive. Both Government and missionary schools can work together for the common good. The Southern Sudan is really one of the most primitive and backward areas of the world. It needs a very great and hard effort to eradicate the unhealthy pagan life and remove the countless diseases, vices and superstitions. This can only be attained by the successful co-operation and collaboration of Government schools, missionary schools and other private schools.

In the first chapter of this work, reference has been made to the success of the Roman Catholic Education in the North; particularly the Comboni schools. The work of missionaries in the Southern part of Kordofan Province - one of the largest Provinces of the North - inhabited by the Pagan Nuba tribes who are by no means different from the Pagans of the South, received wide and great respect. As this is the case in the Nuba Mountains, why not let the missionary schools follow suit among the Southerners.

Nevertheless, there is a very important remark which we should refer to here. Missionary schools may be allowed to continue their work provided that the Missionaries bear in mind that they are working within a United Sudan. They have to know that the Sudan of Sir Harold MacMichael has gone for ever. They should aim at cultivating among their students

a sense of national unity and an allegiance to a whole Sudan.

Fifthly, we come to the question of language. The writer is of opinion that the policy of introducing Arabic language as such was a good and sound policy. Unfortunately it was introduced in a very awkward manner which distorted the good picture. The attempt to emphasize Arabic language by forcing it suddenly upon the foreign missionaries and by the establishment of the various Koranic schools created a serious dilemma particularly to the older boys. This was inevitable. As Henderson stated:

Their younger brothers, intent on winning admission to schools, found the best qualification to be a smattering of Arabic to be acquired at one of the new Koran schools. So they saw a gulf developing between them and the younger generation and their feelings were further exacerbated by somewhat inept northern propaganda in which the Arab boy was featured as holding out a helping hand to his down-trodden Southern brother. Nobody enjoys being regarded as a charity boy, still less being asked to play the part in a speech-day drama.¹

Such an attempt was done during the military rule and it was indeed a very ridiculous one. Nevertheless, the fact remains that there is a pressing need to develop a national language in the Southern Sudan. That language can only be Arabic since it is spoken by almost all the people in the North, at the same time a form of pidgin Arabic can be considered as the lingua franca in all the Southern Provinces.

¹Henderson, op. cit., p. 182.

The writer maintains that the old policy which aimed at emphasizing English in the South and Arabic in the North was a wrong one. Obviously it aimed at the dismemberment and the fragmentation of the country. Since, the old policy ceased to exist and as the days of Southern separation collapsed, missionary schools in the South as well as Government schools should practice instruction in Arabic.

However, this should not suggest that the writer is against the adoption of one or more foreign language in Sudanese Education or that he is undermining the significance of foreign languages particularly European. On the contrary, the writer believes strongly in the necessity of foreign languages. Indeed, English language is indispensable and it should be taught in Southern schools in the intermediate level after the students had gained sufficient knowledge of Arabic in their elementary level. This procedure is adopted in Northern schools and it proved to be successful. In fact, the writer agrees fully with the following suggestion of Prof. Akrawi on the question of English language in Sudanese Education:

The change from English to Arabic need not necessarily weaken the teaching of English, especially if one subject is taught through the medium of English, the subject being varied from one year to the next. As a further means of strengthening the teaching of English, it is suggested that it should start in the fourth instead of the fifth grade as at present.¹

Sixthly, the question of religion. The writer believes that the attempt to solve the question of national unity in the

¹Akrawi, op. cit., p. 274.

Southern Sudan through the emphasis upon Islamic religion and the suppression of Christianity was again an improper policy. By so doing, the Government was repeating the mistake of the British Administration which on the contrary encouraged Christianity and prohibited Islam. In other words, the Government put the old Southern policy of Sir H. MacMichael "in the reverse, as it were."

In the previous chapters reference has been made every now and then to the shortcomings of the old Southern policy. We have provided statements by Northern Ministers and intellectuals in which they criticized severely that policy. Particular emphasis was made by Sudanese Ministers on the policy of the suppression of Arabic language and Islamic religion in the Southern Sudan as shown in MacMichael's outstanding Memorandum. It is unfortunate that Northerners came to repeat the same mistake. But instead of suppressing Islam and Arabic they suppressed Christianity and English. In the writer's opinion this approach is equally wrong and unsound and would not help the growth of a sense of national unity. On the contrary it hinders its development.

It is the writer's belief that both Islam and Christianity be given equal and fair chances to win converts among the many thousands of Southern Pagans. It is the writer's conviction that the Sudan should be a secular country with a secular constitution which gives due weight and respect to both Islam and Christianity and to any other belief including

Paganism. It is the writer's opinion that the best solution for the religious dilemma lies in separating religion from state and that the motto should be "rendering to Ceaser the things that are Ceaser's and to God, the things that are Gods."

It should be noted here that the policy of suppressing Christian religion and stressing Islam even by force - which was prevalent during the military take over led to a drastic difference and a big discrepancy between the younger Southern boys and the older ones. The older ones were taught at the Missionary schools and were mostly Christians. The younger ones came to be taught in Arabic and were motivated to read Koran and thus became Muslims. Commenting on this sudden and improper approach, K.D. Henderson states;

It should be remembered that while a reasonably devout Western Christian is no longer convinced that a convert to Islam is a lost soul, the African enjoys no such comfortable consolation. His brother is not only cut from him in this world but in the next.¹

The best policy would be to allow each child have proper religious instruction in school in his own religion - whether Muslim or Christian. Pagans, however, should be guaranteed freedom to abstain from classes where religious teaching is conducted. This policy was adopted by the Legislative Assembly in 1948, notably Sayed A. Ali Taha the first Sudanese

¹Henderson, op. cit., p. 182.

Minister of Education. In this connection it will be of interest to quote Prof. Akrawi's Committee of 1958-59. The Committee said:

At the same time religious education should be conducted to imbue the child with a spirit of tolerance towards other religions and beliefs. The ideal should be: regard to fellow Sudanese citizens no matter what their religious beliefs.¹

Seventhly, we come to ^{the} question of the expulsion of the foreign missionaries from the Southern Sudan. This aspect of educational policy as we have earlier seen, received a wide national and international attention. Indeed the expulsion of foreign missionaries complicated and intensified the nagging problem and created an atmosphere of uneasiness between the Sudan, the Vatican, U.S.A., Italy and other leading Christian countries.

The writer is of opinion that the missionaries, intentionally or unintentionally, have contributed to the problem of the Southern Sudan. However, the inescapable fact remains that they were not the major factor behind the Southern mutiny. The Commission of Enquiry as we have seen, remarked that "we find on evidence that the real trouble in the South was political and not religious."²

This being the case, the military Government should not have so hurriedly asked the foreign missionaries to leave

¹Republic Of Sudan - Report On The Re-Organization Of Education And On A Recommended Five Year Plan For Education In The Sudan (Khartoum: June 1959), pp. 16-17.

²Southern Disturbances, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

the South. In my opinion, the Government should have warned the missionaries that the policy of the old British Administration which gave them countless chances and privileges in the South and which encouraged them and suppressed Islamic religion and Arabic language, ceased to exist. They should have been notified clearly and openly that the slogan of One Sudan has become a reality. They should have been told that the Sudan must have a national language to cement its national unity, and that this language can only be Arabic in which both proselytism and instruction must be done. They should have been informed that they would have the same chances and opportunities given to the "Sheikhs" of Islam working to gain Muslim converts in the South. All these facts must have been put before them and be allowed to work according to the new prescribed policy. There is room to believe that they would have accepted the new policy but the military Government was very anxious to expel them out obviously for their association with the Southern intellectuals whom as we have said were mostly graduates of Missionary schools. To show the readiness and willingness of the foreign missionaries to co-operate with the government, Henderson provides us with the following information. He stated that in the Church Missionary Society News Letter No. 231, dated October, 1960, the General Secretary, Canon Max Warren, quoted a passage from Sir Frederick Eckstein's farewell speech after twenty years as Chairman of the Syndicate, in which he argued:

Were I asked to define the policy to be pursued by my successor, I would reply - cultivate to the utmost a loyal and harmonious working, in letter and spirit, with the government in Khartoum, and show every consideration to the native population of the Sudan.

'That was spoken in 1927' Warren continued:

It might well serve to define how in 1960 the C.M.S. Missionaries in the Sudan view their relationship to the land of adoption. The ideal may not always be easy to realize, but in pursuing it with sincerity they best serve the interests of the Christian church of the land.¹

Thus as evident there was a desire on the part of the foreign Missionaries to co-operate-at least the C.M.S. which is clear from the above statement but the nature of the dictatorial regime of Abboud as military regimes everywhere could accept nothing short of the complete withdrawal of foreign missionaries from the South. The military junta, as we have stated, thought that the solution to the problem lies in military power, hence, it is not unnatural that it resorted to such a harsh and dictatorial measure like the deportation of all the foreign missionaries in Southern Sudan.

B. Suggestions and Recommendations.

In the previous pages, we have analyzed the reasons that led to the problem of the Southern Sudan. Then we showed how education was used by the British administration during the Condominium rule (1899-1956) to endanger national unity. After that we discussed the various educational measures adopted by

¹Henderson, op. cit., p. 189.

the national Governments since 1957 in the Southern Sudan and showed from our point of view that these educational steps did not help, in the least sense, the development of a sense of national unity among the Southern Sudanese.

It is the writer's belief that the problem of national unity in the Sudan is a real challenge not only to the Republic of the Sudan but also to all the Arab States and the neighbouring African countries all of which belong to the so-called developing nations. The problem can be easily solved by peaceful means such as negotiations similar to the Round Table Conference of 1965 and by understanding and trusting each other. But the use of military power or of any other dictatorial means as the execution and alienation of Southern Christian intelligentsia will not solve the problem at all. Instead it will be more intensified and complicated. Below I will attempt to give some recommendations that may help the development of a sense of national unity among the Southern Sudanese.

In the first place we have to direct our attention to the Sudanese Constitution. The permanent Constitution of the Sudan is now in the making. The Parliament has appointed a Committee from deputies belonging to the various parties to draw the draft of the Constitution. In the writer's opinion, the Sudan should be a Secular State with a secular Constitution. There should be separation between Religion and State. The principle of "rendering to Ceaser the things that are

Ceaser's and to God the things that are God's" seems indis-
pensable. In this connection it is of much interest to re-
call the words of Dr. Howard Bliss, President of the Syrian
Protestant College (now American University of Beirut) in
the statement which he made before the Paris Peace Conference
on January 13, 1919 when he said:

Unless in this State or States (in the Near East)
there shall be an absolute separation between Religion
and the State, most serious results must inevitably
arise. The Government, on the one hand, Religion on
the other, can best pursue their majestic tasks apart.
Surely Oriental history, if not all history, is making
this abundantly clear.¹

As evident from Dr. H. Bliss's excellent statement,
the failure to observe the principle of Secularism in the
various Near Eastern countries, is apt to lead to very serious
and tragic results. In the Sudan, the proposal so frequently
expressed by some Northern political parties - notably the
Islamic Charter Front (Muslim Brothers) and the Umma Party -
that the Sudan should have an Islamic Constitution, is one
of the major obstacles hindering the development of a sense
of national unity. This proposal is rejected entirely by
the Southern Christian intelligentsia. In the writer's opinion
they have every right in doing so, since nobody enjoys being
regarded as a second class citizen in his home land. This im-
proper proposal, it must be noted, was among the major factors
that led to the collapse of the Round Table Conference of March

¹Z.N. Zeine, The Struggle for Arab Independence (Beirut:
Khayats, 1960), p. 239.

1965. M.O. Bashir, himself the Secretary of the Conference states:

The declaration of the Islamic Charter Front that their ultimate goal is an Islamic Republic in the Sudan and a Constitution based on Islamic principles and teachings, coupled with similar declarations from some of the leaders of the three major Northern political parties inside and outside Parliament, was certainly no help in allaying the fears of the Southerners that the North intends to Islamize the South.¹

Thus if national unity is ever to be achieved such a declaration should cease to exist. Another one should be adopted in its place; this should define the Sudan as a secular state that gives equal weight and respect to both Christianity and Islam and that all citizens whether they be Muslims, Christians or Pagans enjoy the same rights and privileges.

Secondly, with regard to education it is vital that the major objective should be directed towards the attainment of National Unity and citizenship. As Prof. Akrawi explains:

The Sudan, being composed of many ethnic groups, speaking a variety of languages and going back for the most part to different tribal backgrounds needs to develop through its education ... a sense of nationality among its population, an allegiance to the whole country and state ..."²

If this aim has been put into practice, both the Northerners and the Southerners will cease identifying themselves as being Ja'alien, Danagla, Nuer or Shiluk; instead

¹Bashir, op. cit., p. 100.

²Akrawi, op. cit., pp. 264-65.

they will identify themselves as being Sudanese. Then and only then a sense of national unity between the North and the South could have a chance of being achieved.

Thirdly, educators in the Sudan - North and South should teach for "democracy which is based on the respect of the life, personality, ideas and beliefs of the individual and his desire for free movement, free expression and for a better life, so long as this does not encroach upon the lives, freedom and advancement of others."¹ Particular emphasis should be given to "the right of equal educational opportunity for all children (Southerners or Northerners) regardless of race, colour, creed, sex and economic status."²

If this aim has been observed, the feeling of fear, mistrust, tension and suspicion that dominated North-South relations, for quite a long time, will gradually vanish. Southerners will eventually discard the idea they have been keeping for years - that they have ^{been} neglected and retarded while the Northerners have gone far ahead. At the same time, their perception of the Northerners as being aggressive and oppressive - a perception that was prevalent during the military rule - will slowly cease to exist. This will certainly help the continuity and the development of the educative process in the Southern Sudan:

¹Report On the Reorganization of Education in Sudan,
op. cit., p. 12.

²Ibid.

Fourthly, the curriculum of the Southern schools should be reset. It should try "the renovation of the traditional cultures without losing their essence."¹ Rather than importing the culture and the tradition of the North which is Arabic and Islamic and emphasize them in the curriculum of the Southern schools, the Government should attempt to emphasize in the Southern curriculum things pertaining to the tradition of the South which is mainly Negroid and African. If this step is done, Southerners will stop thinking of the Government schools in the South as being instruments of indoctrination trying mainly to enforce the tradition and culture of the Islamic North on the poor Southerners. They will stop thinking of what Oduho and Deng called "Educational Subjection."²

Fifthly, as far as foreign missionaries are concerned, I believe that they may be permitted to work in the South and have their private schools, provided of course, they realize that the days of Southern separation had gone forever and granted that they work for a One and a United Sudan. Having accepted these together with Arabic as a language of instruction and proselytism their schools could work side by side with the state schools and other private schools to educate the backward and pagan Southerner. As Henderson argues: "... the retention of mission schools side by side with the new

¹Ibid.,

²Oduho and Deng, op. cit., pp. 45-48.

state schools need not have a disruptive influence especially as the former could have been in no position to compete."¹

Sixthly, considering the question of language, Northern intellectuals should try to negotiate and discuss with the Southern leaders the necessity of having a national language. They should try to convince them that there is no use of having two national languages one for the North and the other for the South. Northern intellectuals should describe in a friendly manner the richness, value and importance of Arabic language. They should tell them that Arabic forms the history, the heritage and the culture of the majority of the Sudanese - Northerners or Southerners and I am sure that Southern leaders will not object to that. In fact many of them have agreed already to accept Arabic as the National language. The teaching of Arabic as we have earlier shown should start in the first class in the elementary; the teaching of English, on the other hand, starts in the intermediate level.

These and other peaceful measures might form the basis for a proper educational policy that might render possible the development of a sense of national unity in Southern Sudan. The use of military power and various dictatorial means would lead definitely to very serious and tragic results. Before I end this work I would like to remind the Northerners of what the famous British historian Arnold J. Toynbee had said in his

¹Henderson, op. cit., p. 182.

book Between Niger and Nile, "Northern Sudanese Nationalists please take note; please forbear to alienate your Southern neighbours. If you did provoke them into launching a nationwide resistance movement, the Southern patriots would have the Sadd (السدد) on their side."¹

¹A.J. Toynbee, Between Niger and Nile (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 33.

APPENDIX I

1930 MEMORANDUM ON SOUTHERN POLICY

Civil Secretary's Office
Khartoum, January 25, 1930

The Governor, Upper Nile Province, Malakal
" " Mongalla Province, Mongalla
" " Bahr al Ghazal Province, Wau

His Excellency the Governor General directs that the main features of the approved policy of the Government for the administration of the Southern Provinces should be re-stated in simple terms.

In the strictly confidential memorandum which accompanies this letter an attempt has been made to do this, though it will of course be seen that innumerable points of detail arising are not dealt with seriatim.

2. Your attention is directed to Part II of the memorandum, and I should be obliged if you would forward, as soon as possible, your comments on the criteria suggested and any suggestions you may wish to make for additions to the list.

3. The carrying out of the policy as described may lead from time to time to various financial implications or commitments

though it is hoped that these will not be great. It will be convenient that any such foreseen should be notified to the relevant authority without delay for consideration.

4. Application of the policy will obviously vary in detail and in intensity according to locality. It is essential however, that the ultimate aim should be made clear to all who are responsible for the execution of the policy, and the memorandum should therefore be circulated to and studied by all your District Commissioners. Sufficient copies for this purpose are sent herewith. Copies are also being sent to such Heads of Departments in Khartoum as are concerned.

CIVIL SECRETARY

CS/I.C.I.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum
Part I

The policy of the Government in the Southern Sudan is to build up a series of self contained racial or tribal units with structure and organisation based, to whatever extent the requirements of equity and good government permit, upon indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs.

The measures already taken or to be taken to promote the above policy are re-stated below.

A. PROVISION OF NON-ARABIC-SPEAKING STAFF (ADMINISTRATIVE, CLERICAL AND TECHNICAL).

a.) Administrative Staff

The gradual elimination of the Mamur, whether Arab or black, this has already begun, and it is intended that the process of reduction shall continue as opportunity offers.

b.) Clerical

It has been the recognised policy for some years that locally recruited staff should take the place of clerks and accountants drawn from the North and that the language of Government offices should be English.

In the Bahr al Ghazal Province the change to English has already been made and a large number of local boys are employed.

The process has to be gradual. It is recognized that local boys are not fit at present to fill the higher posts in Government offices, and the supply of educated English-speaking boys depends on the speed with which the two missionary Intermediate schools in Mongalla Province and the Intermediate and Stack Schools at Wau can produce them. The missions must retain a certain number of these boys as teachers for their Elementary schools (which are an integral part of the educational system) but since the employment of local boys in Government offices is a vital feature of the general policy every encouragement should be given to those in charge of mission

schools to cooperate in that policy by sending boys into Government service. Province officials must aim at maintaining a steady supply of boys for the Elementary Vernacular schools which feed the Intermediate schools.

c.) Technical

Generally speaking, the considerations mentioned above apply also to the supply of boys for the technical departments - Agriculture, Medical, Public Works, etc.; but in certain cases it may not be essential that boys going to these departments should complete the Intermediate school course.

B. CONTROL OF IMMIGRANT TRADERS FROM THE NORTH

It is the aim of the Government to encourage, as far as possible, Greek and Syrian traders rather than the Gellaba type. Permits to the latter should be decreased unobtrusively but progressively, and only the best type of Gellaba, whose interests are purely commercial and pursued in a legitimate manner should be admitted. The limitation of Gellaba trade to towns or established routes is essential.

C. FUNDAMENTAL NECESSITY FOR BRITISH STAFF TO FAMILIARISE THEMSELVES WITH THE BELIEFS AND CUSTOMS AND THE LANGUAGES OF THE TRIBES THEY ADMINISTER

a.) Beliefs and Customs

The policy of Government requires that officials in the South, especially administrative officials, should be fully informed as to the social structure, beliefs, customs and mental process of pagan tribes. Study on these lines is of vital importance to the solution of administrative problems, and it

is with this fact in view that a highly qualified expert has been detailed to work in the South.

b.) Language

The Rejaf Language Conference recommended the adoption of certain 'group languages' for use in schools. It is clearly impossible to develop all the languages and dialects of the Southern Sudan and the development of a limited number of them may tend to cause the smaller languages one by one to disappear, and be supplanted by 'group languages'.

It is, of course, true that the adoption of this system carries with it the implication of the gradual adoption of a new, or partly new, language by the population of the areas in which the 'smaller languages' are used at present. Such a result is, indeed, inevitable in the course of time, for 'smaller languages' must always tend to disappear.

It is also recognized that in such places as Wau itself, Arabic is so commonly used that the local languages have been almost completely excluded. Special concessions may be necessary in these places.

The Rejaf Conference did not regard these factors as seriously affecting the policy of 'group languages', and it was held to be a matter of first importance that books for the study of the 'group languages' should be available for missionaries and officials and that a specialist should

be appointed to study the question. A linguistic expert, Dr. Tucker, has therefore been appointed for a period of two years, and his chief function will be to advise as to the production of suitable books. The Secretary for Education and Health has already circulated a memorandum on his duties.

The production of grammars and vocabularies will facilitate the study of the local vernaculars. But this will take time and meanwhile it is the duty of our officers to further the policy of the Government without delay. It cannot be stressed too strongly that to speak the natural language of the people whom he controls is the first duty of the administrator. Arabic is not that language, and indeed to the bulk of the population of the South it is a new, or partly new, tongue. Officials should avoid the error of thinking that by speaking Arabic they are in some way conforming to the principle that the administrator should converse with his people in their own language.

D. THE USE OF ENGLISH WHERE COMMUNICATION IN THE LOCAL VERNACULAR IS IMPOSSIBLE.

The time has not yet come for the adoption of a general lingua franca for the Southern Sudan, and it is impossible to foretell what, if ever that time comes, the language would be.

At the same time there are, without doubt, occasions when the use of a local vernacular is impossible, as, for instance in the case of heterogeneous groupings such as the

Sudan Defence Force or the Police.

The recent introduction of English words of command in the Equatoria Corps of the Sudan Defence and their use in the Police Forces in the Provinces concerned is a step in the right direction, but more is required. Every effort should be made to make English the means of communication among the men themselves to the complete exclusion of Arabic. This will entail in ~~the~~ various units the opening of classes in which the men would receive instruction in English, and a concentrated effort on the part of those in authority to ensure that English is used by the men when local vernaculars cannot be. It is believed that in a comparatively short time men of these forces could learn as much English as they now know of Arabic.

It is hoped that those in charge of mission schools will assist in providing instructors for the classes referred to above.

Similarly, an official unable to speak the local vernacular should try to use English when speaking to Government employees and servants, and even, if in any way possible, to chiefs and natives. In any case, the use of an interpreter is preferable to the use of Arabic, until the local language can be used.

The initial difficulties are not minimised. Inability to converse freely at first will no doubt result in some loss of efficiency, and the dislike of almost every Englishman to using

his own language in conversing with natives is fully recognised; but difficulties and dislikes must be subordinated to the main policy.

Apart from the fact that the restriction of Arabic is an essential feature of the general scheme it must not be forgotten that Arabic, being neither the language of the governing nor the governed, will progressively deteriorate. The type of Arabic at present spoken provides signal proof of this. It cannot be used as a means of communication on anything but the most simple matters, and only if it were first unlearned and then relearned in a less crude form and adopted as the language of instruction in the schools could it fulfil the growing requirements of the future. The local vernaculars and English, on the other hand, will in every case be the language of one of the two parties conversing and one party will therefore always be improving the other.

Incidentally it may be argued that if a District Commissioner serving in the South is transferred to the North, a knowledge of Nilotic Arabic is more of a hindrance than a help to him in learning the Arabic of the Northern Sudan.

In short, whereas at present Arabic is considered by many natives of the South as the official and, as it were, the fashionable language, the object of all should be to counteract this idea by every practical means.

Part II

PROGRESS OF POLICY

His Excellency the High Commissioner in approving this policy

has suggested the need for criteria by which progress may be measured.

With this end in view it is intended to tabulate various important features of the policy and to set down the progress made at stated intervals.

It is suggested that the matters to be included in the table should be the following:

- a.) The number of non-Mohammedans in relation to the total Government staff under headings of administrative, clerical, and technical, with a report on the use of English by Government employees of non-British origin.
- b.) The number of British officials who have qualified in the local languages.
- c.) Number of immigrant traders of various nationalities from the North.
- d.) Number of Mission schools, elementary, intermediate and technical respectively.
- e.) Number of Government schools.
- f.) The amount spent on education including:
Subsidies to mission schools;
cost of Government schools;
cost of supervisory educational staff.
- g.) Introduction of English words of command in military or police forces, with a report as to the extent to which Arabic is disappearing as the language in use among the men of these forces.

h.) Notes on the progress of the use of English instead of Arabic where communication in the vernacular is impossible.

i.) Progress made in the production of text-books in the group languages for use in the schools, and grammars and vocabularies for use of missionaries and officials.

It is proposed to give information in the Annual Report under these heads for the years 1924, 1927 and 1930 and for each subsequent year.

Civil Secretary's Office,
Khartoum, January 25, 1930.

APPENDIX II

THE LEGAL LIMITS OF MISSIONARY WORK IN THE SUDAN

Chapter XVIII of the Administrative Regulations initiated by the British Administration in the Sudan, defining the legal limits of missionary work in the Sudan, reads as follows:

I. MISSION SPHERES

- (a) No mission station may be formed north of the 10th Parallel of North Latitude in any part of the Sudan which is recognized by the Government as Moslem.
- (b) South of the 10th Parallel of North Latitude definite spheres of work are allotted as follows:
 - (i) British Missionary Societies Sphere

WESTERN BOUNDARY

A line drawn from Ghabat el Arab (Wankai) on the Bahr el Ghazal river up that river to Meshra el Rek and thence direct to the junction of the frontiers of the Belgian Congo, French Equatorial Africa and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

NORTHERN BOUNDARY

From Ghabat el Arab (Wankai) down the Bahr el Ghazal and the White Nile to a point on the White Nile about half-way between the mouths of the Bahr el Zeraf and the Bahr el Gebel; thence southwards to Abwong, thence in a south-easterly direction to Kabaij, and thence east to the Abyssinian frontier.

EASTERN BOUNDARY

From the point where the northern boundary meets the Abyssinian frontier along that frontier to the point of its intersection by the 5th Parallel of North Latitude.

SOUTHERN BOUNDARY

From the point where the 5th Parallel of North Latitude intersects the Abyssinian frontier due west along that parallel to the White Nile. Thence southwards up the White Nile to the Uganda Boundary, and then westwards along the Sudan-Belgian Congo frontier to the point where the western boundary of the sphere meets the latter frontier.

(ii) Roman Catholic Mission Sphere

That portion of the Bahr el Ghazal Province lying west of the western boundary of the British Missionary Societies' sphere, and in addition, the left banks of the Bahr el Ghazal and the White Nile between Ghabat el Arab (Wankai) and the 10th Parallel of North Latitude.

The Roman Catholic Mission also has a station at Detwok in the Upper Nile Province.

(iii) American Mission Sphere

WESTERN AND SOUTHERN BOUNDARY

The boundary of the British Missionary Societies sphere.

NORTHERN BOUNDARY

The valley of the Sobat to its mouth and thence westwards to the right bank of the White Nile as far as the British Missionary Societies sphere.

EASTERN BOUNDARY

The Abyssinian frontier between the northern and southern boundaries of the sphere.

(iv) Open Sphere

That portion of Mongalla Province which lies south of the 5th Parallel of North Latitude, north of the Sudan - Uganda frontier, west of the Abyssinian frontier, and east of the White Nile, is an open sphere.

(v) Sudan United Mission Spheres

The boundaries allotted to the Sudan United Mission in Kordofan Province are the following:

NORTHERN BOUNDARY

Beiban to Keilak.

WESTERN BOUNDARY

From Keilak due south to the northern boundary of the Roman Catholic Mission sphere.

SOUTHERN BOUNDARY

The northern boundary of the Roman Catholic Mission sphere.

EASTERN BOUNDARY

A line drawn from Heiban in the direction of Tonj, to the river. (Talodi and Eliri, which are Mohammedan areas, are excluded from the sphere.)

The Sudan United Mission also have isolated stations at Abri in Kordofan Province and at Melut and Rom in the Upper Nile Province.

II. REGULATIONS AND CONDITIONS UNDER
WHICH WORK IS PERMITTED:

General

- (a) Every Mission must be a separate body under the sole control of its local head resident in the country.
- (b) Members of Missions are unreservedly subject to all the laws and regulations of the Government.
- (c) The heads and all the members of Missions will act only with the approval and permission of the Governor-General and with the concurrences of the local authorities of the Government in the stations and province in which they work.
- (d) Missionaries are not permitted to act as intermediaries between natives and the Government. Complaints, etc, requiring action by the Government must be taken by the complainant direct to the nearest Government post in the ordinary way, and Missionaries must avoid any suggestion of being concerned in such cases.

Trading

- (e) (i) Trading is forbidden in any form. Missionaries may possess such trade goods as are necessary with which to purchase by exchange articles for their own use or with which to pay tribesmen who are labouring for them.
- (ii) Bartering for personal necessities only is not included in the prohibition of trading, but it must be distinctly understood that this permission does not authorize any transaction effected with the object of selling at a

profit whatever has been obtained by such barter.

- (f) On occasions of famine, Missionaries should at once inform the nearest Government official, who will make all necessary arrangements for the supply of grain to the famine district.

Opening of Schools

- (g) The regulations and conditions governing the opening of schools by Missionary Societies, etc, are contained in the Education (non-Government Schools) Ordinance 1927, and the Regulations thereunder, published in Sudan Government Gazette No 494 of 15 August 1927.

III. LEASES OF LAND

Missionary Societies may be permitted to occupy land for the purpose of a Mission Station on the following terms:

- (i) A lease will be granted for eighty years at a nominal annual rental of P.T. 10 and will be renewable at the option of the lessees and determinable on breach of the Government withdrawing the permission for the missionary work to be carried on in the district or place concerned. In the event of renewal of a lease the annual rental shall be reassessed.
- (ii) The Lease further provides that the land shall be used solely for the purpose of carrying on the authorized missionary work, and that the lessees may not part with any portion thereof except with the previous consent in writing

of the Government.

IV. PROCEDURE ON RECEIPT OF APPLICATIONS

(a) When applications are received from Heads of Missions or any religious bodies for:

- (i) grants of land or money;
 - (ii) permission to open Mission stations, or premises for the sale of religious literature, etc;
 - (iii) permission to erect buildings intended for religious services or other purposes connected with the Mission or religious body concerned;
 - (iv) any proposals other than the above, involving the granting of special privileges to the applicants;
- they will be forwarded to the Secretary for Education and Health, with the Governor's remarks and recommendations, for the consideration of the Governor-General before any other action can be taken.

V. REDUCED RAILWAY AND STEAMER RATES

(a) Every bona fide Missionary, not of Asiatic or African origin, who is working in the Sudan may, on production of a certificate to that effect from the Head of his Mission, or other competent authority, be granted for himself and his wife, a reduction of 57 per cent on the ordinary railway and steamer passenger fares, and a reduction of 20 per cent on the ordinary charges for meals when travelling on Sudan Government steamers.

- (b) Every other bona fide Missionary, and every clerical, or member of a religious body who works in the Sudan may, on production of a certificate to that effect from the Head of his Mission, or other competent authority, be granted for himself and his wife a reduction of 50 per cent on the ordinary passenger fares when travelling on Sudan railways and steamers. The privileges are limited to Missionaries, clericals and members of religious bodies and their wives only, and does not extend to other members of their families, except in cases where such members are actually engaged in missionary work in the Sudan.
- (c) Each Missionary entitled to the reduction may also be allowed it for one servant accompanying him.
- (d) Members of a religious body who may not be actually stationed in the Sudan, but are passing through in transit to a station beyond, may be granted the same privileges on the following conditions:
- (i) That the application must in the first instance be made to the Civil Secretary by the recognized Head of the religious body.
 - (ii) That their ultimate destination outside the Sudan must be stated in the application, and it must be certified that they are actively employed there under the auspices of the same body to which specific privileges have already been granted as above.

(e) The following reduced rates are granted on all stores and materials imported via Port Sudan, Suakin or Wadi Halfa on account of Mission work in or beyond the Sudan, on application to the General Manager, Sudan Railways:

(i) By Rail. For quantities of 1,000 kilos and over, sent in one consignment 6th Class rate. Also, quantities weighing less than 1,000 kilogrammes sent in one consignment 6th Class rate on a weight of 1,000 kilos when this is to be for the benefit of the consignor.

(ii) By Steamer. For stores and materials intended for Missionaries, clericals, and members of religious bodies stationed south of Khartoum,

Up to 1,000 kilometres, 20 per cent on the whole distance,
Over 1,000 kilometres, 25 per cent on the whole distance,
with the proviso that no distance over 1,000 kilometres shall be charged at less than the total charge for 1,000 kilometres.

These reduced rates will only be granted when accommodation is available for the whole journey and when the transport of the stores, etc, will not interfere with the carriage of other goods on which full ordinary rates are collected.

APPENDIX III

REVISION OF SOUTHERN POLICY

CS/SCR/I.C.I.

Civil Secretary's Office.
Khartoum, 16th. December 1946.

Secret	(2)
Financial Secretary	(2)
Legal Secretary	(2)
Kaid	(3)
Director of Agriculture & Forests	(3)
Director of Economics & Trade	(2)
Director of Education	(3)
Director of Medical Service	(3)
General Manager, Sudan Railways	(2)
Director, Veterinary Service	(2)
Governor, Equatoria Province	(12)
Governor, Upper Nile Province	(10)

Will you please refer to Khartoum Secret Despatch No. 89 of 4th August, 1945, of which copies were sent to you (or to your predecessors in office) personally under this number.

2. You will see that in paragraph 2 of the despatch there are contemplated three possible political futures for the Southern Sudan. The crucial sentence is:

'It is only by economic and educational development that these people can be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future, whether their lot be eventually case with the Northern Sudan or with East Africa (or partly with each.)'

3. Since the despatch was written, and since the decisions on policy which it records were taken not only have further decisions on policy for the South been taken (of which a list is attached but great changes have taken place in the political outlook for the country as a whole. Whatever may be the final effect, inside the Sudan, of the present treaty negotiations, it is certain that the advance of the Northern Sudan to self-government, involving the progressive reduction of British executive authority, and public canvassing of the Southern Sudan question, will be accelerated. It is therefore essential that policy for the Southern Sudan should be crystallised in a form which can be publicly explained and supported and which should therefore be based on sound and constructive social and economic principles. These principles must not only bear defence against factious opposition, but must also command the support of Northern Sudanese who are prepared to take logical and liberal points of view; while the relief of doubts now in the minds of British political and departmental staff who have the interests of the South at heart is also pressing and important.

4. You will see from the foregoing paragraph that I do not suggest that the future of the two million inhabitants of the South should be influenced by appeasement of the as yet immature and ill-informed politicians of the Northern Sudan. But it is the Sudanese, northern and southern, who will live their lives and direct their affairs in future generations in this country; and our efforts must therefore now be concentrated on initiating a policy which is not only sound in itself, but which can be made acceptable to northern and southern alike.

5. Apart from the recent rapid political development in the North the following conclusions have further emerged since His Excellency's 1945 despatch and enclosures were written:

- (a) With reference to Appendix I to the despatch, Section 7 last sentence of penultimate paragraph, East Africa's plans regarding better communications with the Southern Sudan have been found to be nebulous, and contingent on the Lake Albert Dam. Whatever the possibilities, we have no reason to hesitate between development of trade between the South and East Africa and development of trade between the Southern and the Northern Sudan. Our chance of succeeding depends I think upon confining ourselves to the one aim of developing trade to the South, and between the north and the south.
- (b) In Education I believe that while the South may hope to have a secondary school, it cannot hope to support

post-secondary education, and I believe that Southerners should get this at the Gordon Memorial College. Arabic is not essential there, but should I think be taught to Southerners as a subject from intermediate school level upwards.

- (c) The distinctions in rates of pay and other conditions of government service, the artificial rules about employment of Southerners in the north, attempts at economic separation, and all similar distinctions are becoming more and more anomalous as **the** growing demand for Northerners to be employed in Southern Development Schemes, the rapidly growing communication and travel between north and south, and the very application of the policy of pushing forward in the south, break down the previous isolation of the Southern Provinces and strain these distinctions further.

6. The preceding paragraphs are an attempt to indicate briefly the reasons which have led me to think that an important decision on Southern policy must now be taken. The biennial report to His Majesty's Government is due early next year. Subject to your comments on this letter, I propose to advise His Excellency that in His Excellency's next report he asks His Britannic Majesty's Government to **approve** that two of the alternatives mentioned in paragraph 2 above be ruled out as practical politics at the present time. It may in the future be proved that it would be to the advantage of certain of the most southerly

tribes, e.g. of Opari or Kajo, to join up with their relatives in Uganda. It may be that the feeling which now exists among a few of the wisest Northern Sudanese, that they should not, when self-governing, be asked to shoulder the financial and communal burden which they believe the South will always prove to be, may become an important political policy among them. But we should now work on the assumption that the Sudan, as at present constituted, with possibly minor boundary adjustments, will remain one; and we should therefore restate our Southern policy and do so publicly, as follows:

'The policy of the Sudan Government regarding the Southern Sudan is to act upon the facts that the peoples of the Southern Sudan are distinctively African and Negroid, but that geography and economics combine (so far as can be foreseen at the present time) to render them inextricably bound for future development to the middle-eastern and arabicised Northern Sudan: and therefore to ensure that they shall, by educational and economic development, be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future as socially and economically the equals of their partners of the Northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future.'

7. Certain changes of detail in each sphere of Government activity in the South, would I think have to follow the approval and publication of a policy so defined. You will wish to suggest briefly the major points.

8. Will you please consider this matter carefully, consult the senior members of your staffs upon it (particularly of course those who have experience of the South), and let me have your views as briefly as possible. Those of any individual member of your staff which you wish to forward separately with your comments will also be welcome.

The views of senior Sudanese in whose judgement and discretion you have confidence may also be asked for.

Finally I ask you to read again the late Sir Douglas Newbold's note to Council No. CS/SCR/1,C.14 of 3.4.44, reproduced as Appendix 'B'(1) to the despatch, and to bear in mind that urgency is the essence of the problem. We no longer have time to aim at the ideal: we must aim at doing what is the best for the Southern peoples in the present circumstances.

(Sgd.) J. W. ROBERTSON.

Civil Secretary.

Two Copies:

Governors: Blue Nile. Darfur; Kassala; Khartoum; Kordofan; Northern; Sudan Agent, Cairo; Sudan Agent, London.

APPENDIX IV

THE DECISION TO TAKE OVER SCHOOLS

Text of the Minister of Education's speech at the conference in Khartoum in February 1957.

Your Lordships, Gentlemen.

I have the honour to welcome you here on behalf of the Director and the staff of the Ministry of Education. I am glad that you have been able to attend this meeting despite your many duties and I hope that no great inconvenience has been caused to any one of you.

I thought that this would be a suitable time to invite you to this meeting in order to acquaint you with my Ministry's policy and the steps which we have to take during the coming years for the implementation of the Government's declared policy to take full charge of education in the South. I have had a good chance of visiting the three Southern provinces during the last six months and I, therefore, feel that I am acquainted with the set-up of Southern education and with its peculiarities and problems.

During my visit to Equatoria, Bahr-el-Ghazal and Upper Nile I was fortunate to meet some of you and your staff and to discuss their work and their difficulties with them on the spot. I should like to take this opportunity and express, on behalf

of the Government, our gratitude for the good and devoted work which you have done in the field of Southern education since the beginning of this century. I sincerely hope that you will continue to show the same spirit of co-operation during the coming two or three years in which the Government's policy for taking full charge of education may be implemented smoothly and without upsetting the existing system.

My predecessor and myself have given you an assurance to take into full consideration your point of view before introducing any big changes in the existing system of education. Some of you have put their views in writing in plain words, and, to be exact, in strong words. I have, during my tours of the Southern provinces, acquainted myself fully with your views and I assure you that I have given those views full and very serious consideration and I have discussed them at length with the Ministry's staff in Juba, Wau, Malakal and in Khartoum. I am therefore satisfied that our plans for the coming years have been formulated in the full knowledge of the whole situation and of the implications of the steps which are contemplated. I now declare that these plans have now become Government policy and I hope that you would cooperate with the Ministry's staff in carrying it out so that the maximum good may be achieved. The Permanent Under-Secretary of the Interior and the Governors of the three provinces who have contributed a great deal to the discussions lead-

ing to the formation of this policy will, I am sure, continue to give their valuable assistance, which will be continuously needed for its successful implementation.

Your Lordships, Gentlemen.

I think that you are aware that it is the Government's considered policy to take direct and full charge of education in the Southern provinces. This policy has been dictated by our highest national interests and it is, therefore, the determined intention of the Government to see it through. I should like to take this opportunity and assure you that this new policy does not in any way imply that the Mission system of education is under suspicion by Government for being disruptive of our national harmony. On the contrary the Government is fully appreciating the good work which you have done and for which it has expressed its gratitude and admiration on several occasions. The Government now wishes to shoulder its full responsibility and I feel sure that you will co-operate with it so that it may carry out its task smoothly.

It is my decided policy to take immediate steps as from the beginning of the present academic year for taking full charge of all Village Schools in the three provinces. I expect that your Education Secretaries will very soon agree with the Ministry's staff in Juba, Wau and Malakal on the best ways and means for the transfer of all Village Schools to the Government as from the 1st April, 1957. I believe that this can

take place easily and in a short space of time if you instruct all your staff to co-operate. I am convinced that this line of action is in the right direction because it would at least give the local people a chance to take a real part in the administration of the schools which provide education for their children during their first two or three years of schooling.

It is also my decided policy to take immediate steps as from this year so that Government may ultimately be fully and solely in charge of Boys' Elementary education. I should therefore like your Education Secretaries to agree with the Ministry of Education's staff in Juba, Wau and Malakal on a plan for the transfer of Mission Boys' Elementary Schools to Government as from this year. I am confident that with your co-operation and that of your staff the take-over of existing schools by Government can be effected easily and smoothly.

With regard to Girls' Elementary Schools it is the Government's intention to be ultimately in charge of them. I fully realize the difficulties which attend girls' education in the Southern provinces, particularly the staffing problems. The Ministry will therefore follow a gradual plan in taking over girls' schools and I think that there is ample scope for fruitful co-operation between the Ministry and the Missions for the advancement of girls' education. I also hope that you would co-operate to the utmost with the education authorities

in overcoming the staffing difficulties in girls' schools. In the circumstances, the date of the taking over shall be fixed and declared later.

The six Mission Vernacular Teacher Training Centres also come under the proposed plan for the taking over of schools by Government though the future of each of these centres is being studied independently. It seems that the majority of these centres have become redundant and they should therefore be put to other educational uses. I am sure that your Education Secretaries with the Juba Education Office would agree on a satisfactory plan for making the best use of these centres provided that the delivery should be completed within this year.

My Ministry's policy is to allow the three Mission Intermediate Schools to continue until such a time as it would be practicable for the Government to take them over. I hope that this would be possible within the coming one or two years.

The three Technical Schools at Torit, Lainya and Wau have been the subject of thorough and careful consideration. Steps have been taken only recently to re-organize the programme of work at Torit and Wau schools in order to bring them in line with Northern Technical Intermediate Schools. The position of Lainya School has been the subject of discussion with a view of converting it to some sort of artisan school. In view of these facts I feel that it would be wiser to allow the Missions to continue running these schools as they are being

run now for the coming one or two years, when the staff of the Khartoum Technical Institute will find time to visit and examine the said schools and report as to the best means of taking them over. Until this step is taken, this remains another field in which the Government and Missions could cooperate for the good of the people.

What I have said so far gives a clear idea of what the Government intends to do with regard to taking full charge of education in the three Southern provinces. I should like to add that all future expansion in post-elementary education in the Southern provinces will be restricted to the Government. My Ministry will review the position very carefully and will plan increasing the facilities for post-elementary education according to the needs of the country. I have however, decided that three Intermediate Schools shall be opened by the Government in the South henceforth.

I should like to assure you that in all these plans we have always been very appreciative of your past efforts and very mindful of your point of view. The policy which I am now declaring is consistent with the right of every sovereign State to educate its children, and thus its execution is considered to be in the best interest of our national goal. I sincerely hope that you will realize our point of view and cooperate with us.

Your primary objective is, of course, to bring the light of your religion to the people in the Southern Sudan. In the

achievement of this object you can rest assured that you will get relative protection from the Government in accordance with Section 5(i) of the Constitution, which reads as follows:

'All persons shall enjoy freedom of conscience, and the right freely to profess their religion, subject only to such conditions relating to morality, public order or health as may be imposed by law.'

Every facility will be given in all schools for religious instruction according to the boys' and girls' beliefs and the Church will continue, in agreement with headmasters and province Education Officers, to advise for the spiritual needs of boys and girls in schools. In other words the taking over of schools by Government has nothing to do with the Missions' efforts in the field of religion.

Your Lordships, Gentlemen.

We are all working for one single purpose and that is the service of the people. All those steps which we contemplate taking are considered by the Government of the country to be in the best interest of the people in the Southern provinces and the Sudan as a whole. The Government is determined to carry out its plans and I hope that you will not fail to cooperate so that things may go smoothly.

Your Lordships, Gentlemen.

Before I conclude I wish to make it clear that as a result

of this resolution the number of boys to be taken in the 3rd and 4th years Elementary shall be doubled. This increase in the Elementary is in addition to the three Intermediate Schools previously mentioned.

All the present Sudanese schoolmasters with the Church shall have the chance of enrolment into the Government service subject only to the Personnel Regulations.

I wish also to declare that the taking over of schools shall neither discontinue the normal expansion of education nor shall it change the settled policy of the Government regarding the underdeveloped areas of our country.

Now I invite you to raise any point for clarification which I would be only too glad to deal with.

I thank you again for coming to this meeting and I hope that with the help of God we shall co-operate to serve the people.

Ministry of Education
Khartoum

13 February 1957

/NH

APPENDIX V

THE EXPULSION OF THE MISSIONARIES

The Minister of the Interior, General Mohammed Ahmed Irwa, made the following statement to the Central Council, on 19 March 1964, regarding the expulsion of foreign priests and missionaries from the Southern provinces of the Sudan.^x

It is a source of profound satisfaction for me to address this august assembly about the recent decisions taken by the Government in the last few days regarding the expulsion of foreign missionaries from the Southern Provinces of the Sudan; and limitation of the trading concerns of foreigners in the capitals of the provinces and districts away from the bush and villages.

I am sure, Mr. Speaker, that the distinguished members of this assembly are aware of the circumstances which compelled the Government to take these decisions.

I am also sure that you will fully agree with me that the integrity of the country, the sovereignty of the rule of law and stability are fundamentals to which the Government should give due attention.

We have been observing for a long time and with unflinching patience the activities of these foreigners in those areas. Sometimes we forgive and other times we find ourselves compelled

^xProceedings of the Sudan Central Council, 19 March 1964.

to warn, but unfortunately they mistook our tolerance for weakness, our forgiveness for hesitation and our leniency for cowardice. We have waited and waited; but there was no hope that they would resort to reason until it has become very obvious that their destructive activities might threaten the integrity and stability of the country. It is sad to say that these people were not grateful and did not appreciate the generous treatment and the good opportunities made available to them by this country, which, if valued by all standards, will be more than expected. These unlawful activities and the deliberate persistence to challenge the law have compelled the Government to take these serious measures after patience has been exhausted.

It has been clearly proved that these foreigners have been committing offences against the state and breaking its laws and regulations with the objective of inciting the people in the Southern Provinces to make sabotage so that anarchy and instability will come about.

Mr Speaker, it was my keen wish to seek your indulgence in order to state in detail all the incidents and offences which have been proved beyond doubt to have been committed by these people. But time is short, and so I will be contented to refer to a few incidents as an example:

It has been brought to the notice of the authorities that Father John Terevello instigated some people and facilitated their escape from the country on the presumption that chaos

would soon set in, and that violent measures would be taken which would be detrimental to their lives and property. It has also been proved that the church in Yoro gives offenders who challenge the law of the land all facilities to leave the country. It happened that one of the cars belonging to that church has met with an accident and that some of the travellers died and others were injured. It has also been discovered that among the travellers was a prison warder. After inquiry it has been quite clear that the car was on its way to cross the border. It has also been established that the Catholic priest Andria Troki and the secretary of Wau Church make all transport arrangements for those who wish to escape the country. The church cars take them from Wau to Yoro and from there to Deim Zubeir where they spend the night and then continue their journey on foot. It has also been proved beyond doubt that the staff of the church act as liaison between the Headquarters of the offenders abroad and their accomplices inside the country. In Tambura Priest Peter assisted by three Italian sisters instigated the schoolgirls to go on strike which they actually did and resulted in the end in the injury of one of the teachers. Priest Angelo Convallesi went stealthily to Wau Technical School and met with the students, who after being instigated by him, went on strike the next day.

These foreigners have not only been contented with their destructive activities inside the country, but also embarked

on a campaign of slander disseminating lies and distorted facts in the papers and magazines that belong or fall under the influence of the Church in some foreign countries.

It is enough, Mr Speaker, to bring before you some of the pamphlets and magazines which will prove their guilt; after seeing them there will be no need for me to go any further to state in detail the subversive activities such as the one made by the priest Charles Gordon and his colleague Steward who have recently been expelled, after conviction. Those two priests are now staying across our border in order to persuade some tribesmen from the Nuer to escape the country. So also are the activities of Priest Hamilton who stays in that part and works hand in hand with Priest Maclore whose job is to look after the property of those offenders.

This is just a part of the sad story which we have been tolerating for a long time, until the situation was about to go out of hand and consequently it was inevitable to take these measures promptly and urgently in order to meet this serious situation. It would have been more desirable that this Council should have been in session at that time so that we would be able to bring to your attention these decisions before announcing them to the public.

I should like, Mr. Speaker, to assure this Assembly, as I did in some other occasions, that the Government is very keen to maintain the freedom of worship in all parts of the country and that every citizen has the full right to perform

his religious duties without any interference or discrimination. This is a natural right which we sincerely respect and honestly recognize. This we do, because we faithfully believe that religion is a social necessity which people cannot dispense with and in the light of its teachings people inspire their principles and morals. But at the same time we fully realize that religion as desired by God is a source of strength, fraternity and love and not for enmity and hatred.

It is supposed to reform the individual and act as a fundamental factor to build the nation, and not do for its disintegration and destruction; nor help for its backwardness and degeneration.

Distinguished Members, the freedom of worship as provided by the laws of this land and fully recognized by our great traditions and which the Government pledges to maintain, does not mean the exploitation of simple-minded citizens in the underdeveloped parts of this country in order to create disunity and hatred and open the door for anarchy and disrespect of the rule of law so that instability may prevail and the sovereignty of the state will be at stake. It does not also mean that the Government will be oblivious and negligent to its fundamental responsibilities. Mr Speaker, I should like to declare from this rostrum that the Government will take all the necessary measures which will make it possible for our countrymen in the Southern provinces to qualify in order to take over all the duties which those foreigners used to

perform in the field of religion so that a vacuum which might injure the religious sentiments of some of the citizens in this country, should not come about.

Our countrymen in the south should feel very confident about that and should pursue their private and public affairs without paying the least attention the rumours of saboteurs or the misguidance of evildoers. They should devote their time and concentrate their energies in the channels that bring happiness and prosperity to them and to their country.

At the same time the foreigners whether in the south or in other parts of this country should rest assured that this country should continue to give them the same generous and good treatment as it used to do in the past without any prejudice or discrimination as long as they abide by its laws ✓ and in no way do anything that threatens its sovereignty nor injures its dignity.

I pray for God, Mr Speaker, to bless our people, give them guidance and ascertain their goals and hopes in life.

Thank you.

APPENDIX VI

DELEGATES AND OBSERVERS AT THE
ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE ON THE SOUTH,
KHARTOUM, MARCH 16-25, 1965

1.) DELEGATES

SANU

Sayed Elia Lupe

- " Laurence Wol
- " George Akumbek Kwanai
- " Oliver Albino
- " George Lomoro
- " William Deng
- " Hillary Ucalla Akuono
- " Nikanora M. Aguer
- " Elia Duang

UMMA PARTY

Sayed Sadik El Mahdi

- " Mohed. Dawood El Khalifa
- " Dr. Abbas Hamad Nasr

SOUTHERN FRONT

Sayed Gordon Nortat

- " Abel Alier
- " Gordon Abiei
- " Othwonh Dak
- " Othwonh Buogo
- " Natale Olwak
- " Lubari Lamba
- " Bona Malwal
- " Romano Hassan

PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Sayed Ali Abdel Rahman

- " El Hadi Abdoun
- " El Fatih Aboud

SUDAN COMMUNIST PARTY

Sayed Abdel Khalig Mahgoub
 " Mohed. Ibrahim Nugud
 " Dr. El Tahir Abdel Basit

ISLAMIC CHARTER FRONT

Dr. Hassan El Turabi
 Sayed Mohed. Yousif Mohed.
 " Osman Khalid

PROFESSIONAL FRONT

Sayed Mekkawi Mustafa
 " Sayed Abdulla El Sayed
 " Ibrahim Mohayad

NATIONAL UNIONIST PARTY

Sayed Ismail El Azhari
 " Mohed. Ahmed El Mardi
 " Mohed. Osman Yassin

Others

Sayed Philemon Majok, ex-M.P., Bahr al Ghazal
 " Ring Lual, Sultan, Bahr al Ghazal
 " James Bol Kalmal, Branch Manager, Sudan Tobacco Co.,
 Upper Nile
 " Edward Amum, Sultan, Upper Nile Province
 " Gordon Soro, Town Clerk, Equatoria
 " Charles Ali Bilal, ex-M.P., Equatoria
 " Yousif Diku, Sultan, Equatoria

2.) OBSERVERS FROM AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Uganda Delegation

Mr. F.K. Onama, Minister for Home Affairs
 Mr. E. Lakidi, MP
 Mr. L.S. Oyaka, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Mr. Ouma, Ministry of Justice

Kenya Delegation

Mr. R.S. Matano, Deputy Foreign Minister

Nigeria Delegation

Alhaji The Hon. Yusuf Maitqma Sule, Minister of Mines and Power

Mr. Richard Akinjide, Member of the Federal Parliament and Secretary of the Democratic Party of Western Nigeria

UAR Delegation

Sayed Fathi El Deeb, Minister of State & Director of Arab Affairs in the Arab Socialist Union

Sayed Tahir Shash

Ghana Delegation

Mr. Welbeck, Minister of Information

Mr. K. Edusei, Minister of Agriculture

Mr. Pediako-Poku, Ambassador in Uganda

Mr. S.J. Obianim, Ambassador in Sudan

Tanzania Delegation

Mr. P.C. Walwa, MP

Mr. A.P. Leyki, Assistant Foreign Minister

Algeria Delegation

Sayed Abdel Rahman El Sherif, Cabinet Affairs Minister and Member of Central Committee of Algerian Liberation Front

Sayed Soweih El Hawari, Member of Central Committee of Algerian Liberation Front and MP

Dr. Haddam, Minister & Member of Central Committee of Algerian Liberation Front

3.) OFFICERS

Chairman

Professor El-Nazeer Dafalla, Vice-Chancellor, University of Khartoum

Secretary-General

Mohamed Omer Beshir, Academic Secretary, University of Khartoum.

APPENDIX VII

EXTRACTS FROM THE SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE
UGANDA PARLIAMENT BY THE HON. F.K. ONAMA,
MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS,
UGANDA, JANUARY 3, 1965

Of course we have heard the change of Government in the Republic of the Sudan; we have heard the statements from the Prime Minister of that Government, and the Government of Uganda held talks with the Government of the Republic of the Sudan. We have had delegations from the Republic of the Sudan coming here to try to solve the problem or to find ways and means of solving their bitter problem in the South. We have made conditions which they have accepted; we have made proposals which they accepted, but what is happening today? Our own people, for whom we have spent so much time and wasted all our valuable office time, many of them are not willing to take this opportunity to solve their problem in the South peacefully. I have information, Mr. Speaker, to say that this is a positive action from certain nations to frustrate, not only the genuine desire of the Government of the Republic of the Sudan, but also to frustrate Uganda, in its attempts to bring the two factions in the Republic of the Sudan together. We know, Mr. Speaker, that these people who claim themselves to be refugees, spend much more money than anyone of us, including the Backbench Members. We know some who stay in a hotel for twelve months in the year, which

many of us cannot afford, and when opportunity arises so that they can go to the Sudan and try to save the thousands of people who are now living in fear, in the bush, they will not go, because for themselves everything is OK. All members in the House do know how big the problem is to us, Uganda. We feel that the question of the Southern Sudan is not a question for the Republic of the Sudan alone; it is a problem for us in Uganda. Uganda is the country that has received the largest population of refugees from the Southern Sudan, and it is because of this, Mr. Speaker, that this Government had to do everything in its power to try to find ways and means of bringing the Southerners and their Northern brothers to talk. As soon as the present Prime Minister of the Republic of the Sudan took office, he declared publicly that they did realise that the South, geographically, is different from the North; that the South culturally is different from the North, and he said there were atrocities committed in the South but that his Government was not responsible for these atrocities, and indeed it is true. Today all big people in that Government have been rounded up and a Commission of Inquiry is being set up to investigate the extent of the atrocities committed in the South. Here is a Government admitting everything that has happened because they were not responsible for it and now are willing to come forward to talk with the Southerners who are operating from Uganda, Kenya and some other places, and these people say

'We do not want to come together.' Our own brothers from the Sudan said 'We do not want to talk,' 'If you want to talk come to Kampala, if you want to talk come to Nairobi,' Now, we cannot see the reason why this happens. The Southerners here fear that their lives are in danger. We made an agreement with the Sudanese Government that we would not accept the Governments of the Sudan and Uganda alone to sign this agreement, that we wanted other nations to be brought in. The Sudan Government said OK. We suggested Ghana, Tanzania, Cameroon, and Kenya to observe, and we have signed the agreement with the Sudan Government, a copy of which is deposited with the Organization for African Unity, but because of outside interference, our brothers will not go. Now, to what extent are we going to subject ourselves to such useless effort?...

... We have almost done everything for our brothers who are taking refuge here to talk with their brothers from the North, and for some very queer reasons they are now retreating and remaining quiet. But I am glad to note that there are some people who are old enough to declare themselves ready to co-operate and that a good number of them are now ✓ in Khartoum to have preliminary talks. I myself met every political leader in the Republic of the Sudan, from the North and from the South. I have told them the position of Uganda. We are spending the little money we have got for feeding and ✓ clothing some of the refugees who are living under very difficult conditions. We should use this money for our own

people, but are we going to allow these people who keep on obstructing a peaceful solution to operate from Uganda? If so, for how long?...

... The present Government of the Sudan has changed a whole lot of laws that were supposed to have been prosecuting the Southerners. Freedom of religion has been restored; Sunday is a public holiday. Action is being taken to try to bring Southern Civil Servants to the South. It is almost impossible to believe that a person would refuse to try to sit round the table and discuss. Of course, there is fear that they might be arrested, but here again the Prime Minister declared a general amnesty that in respect of any crime committed before December 10, 1964, no person will be tried for it, irrespective of the kind of crime....

.... The person who would be giving orders to the police (The Minister of the Interior) is from the South; the Minister for Communications is from the South, and there is another Minister, I understand but I am not sure, also from the South, but one of the heads of the Council of State is from the South. I met all these people, but I think there is a confusing agent inside Uganda--operating from Uganda - obstructing these people from going

... I do not want to spend all the time on the Sudan, but you can really see how outside forces can act. Here is a person who ran away probably without a coat and now he drives a car, he lives in a beautiful house, sometimes he spends the

whole year in the hotels, he claims to be the leader of his people who are living in the bush, and he is not prepared to sacrifice his time to go and talk. Even his life. This is an example of the encouragement of external agents to disrupt the peace of Africa. We should not try to take lightly what is happening in the Sudan or in the Congo. We have lived peacefully, but I think the time is coming when we will be the subject of these sufferings....

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