UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERVENTION IN LEBANON, 1958

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CHAPTER I

THE BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN

POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

When one speaks of "decisions" in terms of contemporary inter-

national political interaction, he is faced with a myriad of factors,

pressures, and system, which help to explain or justify a decision

which in isolation never would have been made. Not only to decisions

in international relations involve expediency and interest, but principle,

claims and counter-claims, strategies, "arenas" of interaction, and

authoritative decision makers.

Thus it would be incomplete, if not irrelevant to understanding,

to delineate the mechnical process of domestic decision making with

regard to United States action in the Lebanese crisis of 1958, followed

by its logistical aftermath. Rather, it must be pointed out that if

President Eisenhower's decision to send the Marines to Beirut was

articulated and implemented in a matter of hours, the construction and

constitution of that decision have indispensable roots in a confluence of

factors like those mentioned above, over a period of time.

If the United States on July 14, 1958 was a party to a U. N. Charter;

to principles of International Law; to a Cold War; to a struggle for strategic

superiority and command of resources; as well as to numerous particular claims or agreements; and to certain ideological tides--then the decision on Lebanon can only fairly be seen from the United States' viewpoint when the skeleton is fleshed in with these modes of vision and action.

To develop the explanation of a decision within a context, the background of United States concerns in the area of the Middle East must be examined, as well as the way in which Lebanon's particular configuration of interests, pressures and strategies became so organized as to constitute a specific demand on the American foreign policy decision making process.

The landings of U.S. Marines in Lebanon on July 15, 1958 constitute an important watershed in post-war American foreign policy in the Middle East. The at that time almost unavoidable decision made ultimately by President Dwight Eisenhower to dispatch American armed forces to troubled Beirut had its roots in a series of suppositions, decisions and responses made both in the diplomacy and the competitive partisan politics of the United States, especially in the post-World War Two era.

In attempting to "win the peace" after the War, it became increasingly clear to American policy makers that the Cold War

atmosphere was causing changes in the entire dimension of international relations. By the time of John F. Kennedy's presidency facts were making it apparent that the great struggle for influence engaged in by several of the world's great Powers required a new type of "language" and approach. But, while in the early 1960's it had become clear that the great bi-polar contest in the world went beyond violations of borders and direct confrontations of military forces, in the decade or so following World War Two the various means, concepts, and institutions of the Cold War were only just becoming solidified and were beginning to assume their shapes.[1]

If the significance of the U.S. 1958 action in the Middle East may be said to lie in the events provoking and necessitating a rethinking of traditional lines of approach to relations with the Middle East, the framework of pre-1958 U.S. strategic, geopolitical, and international political thinking must be considered. In passing, it may be remarked that at a time when covert or indirect forms of influence and aggression have begun to be of great significance in international affairs, Foreign Office files and diplomatic sources alone hardly paint an accurate picture of "policy." Of necessity, in order to develop a concept of American

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[1] For a fuller description of the growth of a language of subversion and indirect political influence, see Paul W. Blackstock, The Strategy of Subversion (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), pp. 23-31.

foreign policy in the Middle East during this period, strands such as these must be unravelled: (1) strategic considerations; (2) general presuppositions and concerns; (3) responses to given situations.

Strategic Factors in the Middle East: The U.S. View:

Reminiscent of Sir Halford Makinder's "Heartland of the Eurasian-African World-Island" designation of the Middle East, a number of geostrategists began to point out after the Second World War the strategic importance of the Arab world, based on the twin themes of oil and world communications. [1] In fact, to a large extent, it was the strategic significance of the area that had caused the U.S. to be involved there during the War.

The United States had come into World War II greatly afraid that Eurasia in its entirety might somehow come under joint Fascist-Communist control. There was a sudden "awakening" after a history of tremendous concessions to Communism. [2] Before 1945 U.S. involvement in the Middle East had been largely on an unofficial level, some

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[1]
    Muhammad Agwani, The United States and the Arab World (1945-1952)(Aligarh, India: Institute of Islamic Studies, Muslim University, 1955), p. 48.

[2]
    Concessions by the U.S. to Communism had, in fact, set loose a tremendous force: at Turkey 1943, Quebec, 1944, Yalta, Potsdam and San Francisco 1945, and Paris 1946. In 1948 the U.S. even invited all Communist states to join the Marshall Plan. Anthony T. Bouscaren, America Faces World Communism (New York: Vantage Press, 1953), pp. 4-8.

aspects of which the State Department was even wont to discourage.[1]

Schemes for more direct governmental involvement in the area had, in

fact, foundered: several New Deal programs for guaranteed control over

certain American-owned Middle Eastern oil facilities were thwarted both

by lobbies and by the Congress.[2]

While there certainly was an ideological aspect to early postwar

U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East, economic factors were of

tremendous significance. While U. S. policy in the Middle East prior to

World War II, especially with regard to petroleum, was of an unintegrated

nature, confined at times to protests over American business exclusion

from development of certain oil fields (i. e. Mosul), there was a need

after the war for a more integrated U. S. policy in the area freed from

dependence on the other Powers.[3]

The great strains on U. S. oil reserves during the Second World War

showed that, in order for there to be a stable Europe--which was a prime

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[1]
    Some of the pre-1945 U. S. involvements with the Middle East had
included relief for Armenian victims, creation of a Jewish homeland,
petroleum extraction from Arabian deserts, railroad construction, and
reforms in administrative and financial structures. For details see
Hamilton Goss, The Middle East Dilemma and Challenge, in General
Electric's Technical Military Planning Operation Series (Santa Barbara,
Calif.: G. E. Company, 1958), pp. 5-8.

[2]
    William C. Spielman, The United States and the Middle East (A
Study of American Foreign Policy) (New York: Pageant Press Inc.,
1959), p. 49.

[3]
    E. A. Speiser, The United States and the Near East (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1947), pp. 225-9.

U. S. postwar goal--supply lines from the Middle East, which then held 75% of the world's proven oil reserves, to Europe must be kept open.[1] It was seen then that only with great sacrifice could America keep Europe supplied with petroleum during a prolonged crisis. With petroleum salient in its policy planning, the State Department could declare in 1952, "as far as sheer value of territory is concerned, there is no more strategically important area in the world."[2]

As during later times, U. S. immediate postwar policy planning on firming up Middle East-European oil supply lines was not uniform. There was decided feeling in high U. S. policy planning circles that war is better prevented than prepared for. The U. S. military, somewhat in this light, vetoed the projected Trans-Arabian pipeline project because of the fact that it might become a strategic liability, impossible to defend in time of war.[3]

Even though the U. S. investment in petroleum was, by the immediate post-war period, greater than that of England, the United States moved only with reluctance towards the assumption of responsibility in the Arab

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[1] Lebanon benefited from this postwar concern of the U. S. For example, refineries were established in Sidon in addition to one already established at Tripoli.

[2] Department of State Bulletin, vol. 27, December 1, 1952.

[3] Harvey P. Hall and C. H. Voss. "American Interests in the Middle East," Headline Series, No. 22 (November 20, 1948), p. 34.

world, prepared to take responsibility only where interests were of large proportions and in considerable danger.[1] While the British fortified their position with the Arab League and military bases, and concentrated on moving out of Palestine, the Americans seemed on the whole by 1945 merely content with a growing control of the oil business and air communications centers in the area.

Prevalent among post-war military circles in the U.S. was a traditional strategic approach to the Middle East which deserves scrutiny, as it bears much on the early policy of the U.S. towards the area. First was a belief that the Mediterranean must be open and, in fact, strongly controlled for the security of Europe, Africa, and N.A.T.O.'s right flank, necessitating a strong Greece and Turkey.[2] With the Middle East itself highly important as a link between three continents, the military-strategic view took the position that two major terrain features--the Tauras-Zagros Massif and the line of the Caucasus and the Elburz--must be successfully defended. Successful defense of

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[1]
However the U.S. acted in the Palestine issue not because she felt her interests threatened but in support of the Zionists. Albert Hourani, A Vision of History (Beirut: Khayats, 1961), p. 133.

[2]
Statement by Vice-Admiral Ruthven E. Libby, U.S. Navy, in Philip W. Thayer, ed., Tensions in the Middle East. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), p. 33.

the Middle East, which in theory would not involve political domination, would protect the national interests of the United States: (1) insurance of free-world access to resources, strategic positions, and transit rights of the Middle East; (2) denial to the Communists of the same advantages; and (3) establishment of free, independent states in the Middle East friendly to the U. S. and the West.[1]

Later, shortly prior to U. S. action in Lebanon in 1958, other strategists were to challenge the assumption that for more than a decade appeared to dominate U. S. strategic military-political planning in the area--that the main military concern is with the contingency of a major war between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. In 1957 Paul H. Nitze, describing a strategic view that was fast becoming obsolete in view of alleged Soviet penetration of the Middle East by non-military means, said,

> The defense of the area against Communist military
> aggression could therefore be considered as being a
> facet of our over-all general war strategy.[2]

By 1958 some observers, examining obsolete conceptions of war, were remarking that military expertise had seen its heyday; the problems of war now were the problems of politics.[3] The contradictions and

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[1] Ibid., p. 39. There was a feeling that the U. S.S.R. would not mind separating two of the great industrial-economic power groupings (the U. S. and Europe); Russian penetration of Middle East defenses would mean that oil might be used as a lever to effect such a separation.

[2] Statement by Paul H. Nitze in Thayer, Ibid., p. 44.

[3] C. Wright Mills, The Causes of World War III (New York: Ballantine Books, 1958), p 18.

bafflements involved in frontal and non-frontal U. S. views of Soviet penetration of the Middle East in 1957-1958 have definite roots in early post-war thinking on physical Soviet containment.

While in 1946 it did not appear as if the United States would then follow a British pattern of influence in the Middle East, it became increasingly clear to the U. S. policy makers--especially in the light of Soviet expansion--that without help the political and economic structures of the Middle East might not be able to resist outside pressures which the U. S. considered detrimental to its national interests.[1]

What is more, because of the changing face of the Middle East, it appeared that whatever policies the United States should adopt in furtherance of its national interests in the area, no longer would Middle Eastern states be passive and powerless to respond to Western plans for matters of mutual concern.

General Presuppositions and Concerns

The general tenor of U. S. participation in Middle Eastern affairs before World War Two was largely "negative." As has been pointed out, such a posture was characterized by little more than a vague "open door" philosophy, which latter nonetheless carried the U. S. a step beyond

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[1] Agwani, Op. cit., p. 111.

Mandatory monopolistic concessions.[1] With the impetus of the War, however, a rather more positive stance began to emerge of a moral-strategic-political nature, signalized by elements of a foundation: the Atlantic Charter, the Four Freedoms, U.S. strategic commitments of the World War II conferences, participation in the U.N., and the various "doctrines" of the post-war presidents. The humanitarian concerns that had characterized previous U.S. activity in the Middle East continued as an ideological foundation of post-war American dealings in the area, though now with the humanitarian considerations much colored by domestic political desiderata. Sympathy for European Jewry, combined with the campaign politics of the late 1940's, led to erratic and confused successions of positions on the Palestine question and caused the image of the United States among the Arabs to suffer appreciably.[2]

While the location and resources of the Middle East gave it automatically a certain strategic importance in U.S. eyes, it was the overriding fact of a burgeoning Cold War that launched the United States into a sequence of policy stances based on a basic bi-polarity in world politics. The turn of events--especially Communist successes in Czechoslovakia and China, and the Berlin blockade of 1948-1949, as

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[1]   Hall and Voss, Op. cit., p. 13.

[2]   C.V. Crabb, American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 228.

well as the invasion of Korea--crystallized the issue by about 1952 into

one of the "World Family of Democratic Nations" versus the "World Union

of Soviet Socialist Republics."[1] Increased concern by the United States

for the destiny of the Middle East involved that country's becoming a

party to four major conflicts: (1) the Soviet challenge; (2) the conflict of

Western tensions deriving largely from the liquidation of empires; (3)

rivalry among the Arab states for leadership in the Arab world; and (4)

the Arab-Israeli conflict. Presumptions, actions, and mistakes in each

of these spheres on the part of the U. S. made the latter's presence in

Middle Eastern affairs increasingly unappreciated in the area, as will

be seen.

The genuine nature of U. S. concern for Russian aggrandizement is

elicited especially by John Foster Dulles' doctrine of "massive retalia-

tion."[2] The American Secretary of State was convinced that in a show of

strength or a clear defiant stand an aggressor such as the Soviet Union

could be turned away from pursuing a capricious and aggressive policy

with impunity.[3] Dulles, who was at the helm of the State Department in

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[1] Agwani, Op. cit., p. 49.

[2] John Foster Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness," Life, (May 19, 1952), pp. 146-52.

[3] Dulles was convinced that "the willingness to wage war, if necessary, is in fact an assurance of peace." Andrew H. Berding. Dulles on Diplomacy. (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand, 1965), p. 127.

the years leading up to and including the Lebanese crisis, was religiously anti-Communist. There was an element of the spiritual crussader in the Dulles who stated:

> Our foreign policy can't divorce itself from our belief
> that each individual has his origin and destiny in God
> and enjoys a spiritual nature and personal dignity. We
> must therefore oppose those who treat the individual as
> an animated bit of matter to promote the domination of
> the world by atheistic rule.[1]

American thinking on Communist aspiration had received a severe jolt after several decades of sympathy of public opinion for the Communist states; it was not until about 1949 that there began to be a national awareness that Stalin was not interested in coexisting.[2] The "Maginot-line" static containment response to Communism in the 1950's can perhaps be better understood in light of the tremendous shock that America began to feel from Moscow. In fact the almost paranoid Cold War vocabulary of the 1950's, which often labeled progressive or liberal Nationalist reformist groups as "Communist" or "Russophile" is perhaps understood with more sympathy when one realizes how abrupt was the abovementioned jolt. As recently as the earlier Truman-Acheson-Marshall regime, it had been thought liberal and progressive to collaborate with Communists.[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 102.

[2] Bouscaren, Op. cit., p. 8. The era of collective security (e.g. SEATO NATO and OAS) dates to about 1949.

[3] Freda Utley, Will the Middle East go West? (Chicago: Henry Regnery and Co., 1957), p. 50.

The Russian threat to the Middle East from the United States'

point of view was more than a spectre. Secret agreements with the

Germans during the War for a Russian sphere of influence that might

have included most of the Arab world as well as Russian pressures at

Potsdam in favor of a Russian trusteeship in Libya, indicated a serious

desire on the part of Moscow to gain influence in the area.[1] Russia was

definitely dedicated to the principle that any vacuum created by British

withdrawal from the Middle East should not be filled by the United States.

While Soviet policy toward the Middle East had consisted, until about

1954, in a fairly sterile Stalinist posture of alliances with workers' cadres

in all the developing nations of the area, the Khruschev era signalized

an evolution of U.S.S.R. policy towards collaboration with the bourgeois

nationalism of the Nāṣir type.[2]

United States decision makers in 1955-1956 were aware of a shift

in Soviet methods of fighting the West in the Middle East away from

military pressure and towards political maneuvering and economic

competition. In addition it was clearly seen that there was occurring a

shift in the principal arena of the bi-polar struggle: away from the

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[1]

For details about 1940 agreements between Moscow and Berlin for
spheres of influence, see David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy after
Stalin (New York: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1961).

[2]

Ibid., p. 387. See also W. Z. Laqueur in the New Leader
(10 June, 1957).

extremities (Europe and the Far East) and towards the uncommitted,
underdeveloped countries of the "Middle Zone."[1]

In assessing the severe U. S. views on Soviet Communism in the
1950's, it must be remarked that the United States was naively unprepared
for dealing with wartime and postwar determinants of power and influence.
It was the British who, during the war, were aware that the Soviets had
concrete plans for expansion; the U. S. confined its efforts to establishing
an organization for permanent peace and was not sufficiently sober about
questions of territorial power.[2] In order to understand the U. S.
ideological response to the U. S. S. R. 's activities it must be noted that
especially after 1953--the year in which a Russian fusion weapon was
first detonated and in which the Khruschev-Bulganin-Zhukov team began
heavy concentration on intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles--
two new ideological premises were causing the Soviets to think in limited
terms rather than in terms of world overturn: (1) that of surprise attack
in warfare; and (2) the ultimate destructiveness of a third world war.[3]

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[1]
The "Middle Zone" comprised approximately North Africa, across
the Middle East and the Indian Subcontinent to the Indonesian archipelago.
For an examination of shifting Cold War relationships in the Middle East
see Dean Acheson, "To Meet the Shifting Soviet Offensive," New York
Times Magazine (April 15, 1956), 11ff.

[2]
The U. S. had an almost fatalistic postwar conviction that U. S.
forces had to be quickly withdrawn from Eurasia. W. W. Rostow, The U. S.
in the World Arena (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), pp. 142-3.

[3]
Ibid., p. 291.

In addition, while psychological successes were sustained by the Soviets in the matter of satellite launchings, the U.S.S.R. had also achieved successes in its long-range (after 1953) policy objectives of exacerbating potential areas of differences between the developing nations and the West: thus the U.S. had experienced blows directed at the political foundation of its air bases and raw materials supplies.[1]

While the shock of the arms race called forth American commitments to containment and massive retaliation, another force was also markedly shaping the dimension of U.S. foreign policy: this was the emergence from colonial status of a large number of new nations in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Far from being passive entities, these new nations were in fact becoming arbiters in the bipolar Cold War struggle of the great nuclear Powers for influence.

Largely in view of changes in structures of alignment and influence connected with the emerging nations, John Foster Dulles, by 1956, was directing a policy-making organization dedicated to activism; Dulles was convinced that containment, as an ideal, was not sufficient. Effective results could only be achieved by talk and initiative and "liberation."[2] For John Foster Dulles there were two types of change

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[1] Ibid., p. 294.

[2] Blackstock, Op. cit., p. 32.

which, because of their abilities to create or to destroy, deserved

special attention. One was the atom, and the other nationalism.[1]

The attempt by the United States to paralyze Arab nationalism--a

force which, in the West especially, was more often than not considered in

terms of its attempts at eradicating Western influence rather than in

terms of its positive social benefits--was to be exactly at the heart of

the series of gaffes that caused Moscow's influence to appreciate in the

area and that of the U. S. to wane through the 1950's.[2] With regard to

the Arab nationalist movement, which, unlike national self-determination,

tended to be emotionally aggressive, violently anti-colonial, depracatory

and full of blame for others, as well as often expressive of inferiority

feelings, the U. S. took the greatest interest in the external or foreign

relations aspects of Arab nationalism, especially as characterized by

the Egyptian Arab nationalist movement.[3]

Increasingly in the 1950's there was a tendency for the American

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[1] Berding, Op. cit., p. 137.

[2] Since influences in the Middle East were no longer entirely a function of the West, attempted paralysis of Arab nationalism redounded doubly against the U. S., which latter suffered, in the 1950's, setbacks from moral, cultural, economic, and military standpoints. Charles Issawi, "Negotiations from Strength, a Reappraisal of Arab-Western Relations," International Affairs, vol. 35, (Jan. 1959), pp. 1-9.

[3] Note that the U. S. S. R. took more of an interest in Arab nationalism at this same time, when, in 1955 the junta which the Soviets at first had considered bourgeois, finally turned to occupying itself with foreign policy rather than domestic reform. Utley, Op. cit., p. 52.

press and decision makers to equate Nāṣir with anti-Westernism

rather than with a nationalism that tended at times to be anti-Western

in its desire for a break with the colonial past. In western attempts to

isolate or discredit Nāṣir, what were described alternatively as Com-

munist or Egyptian influences were often, rather more out of facile

thinking than out of contrived maliciousness, adduced to be the same

thing.[1] Arab nationalism was often confused in the West with an ex-

clusively Islamic movement and has frequently taken on a connotation

of a malady in need of efficient "cure."[2]

At a time when group thinking was, as always, important in the

Middle East, and when terms and slogans were deserving of more

accurate examination in Washington, the type of men who rose to

prominence in the American military and diplomatic establishments

in the 1940's and early 1950's were often incapable of dealing with problems

and change other than that which was usually to be found in the mature

relationships between European states.[3] Often what was lacking was a

real understanding of complex and swelling social movements.

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[1] Nāṣir pointed out in 1957 that he had been dubbed a dictator be-
cause he was not at the beck and call of the State Department, while
dictators who were closely aligned with Washington were often called
good democrats. Utley, Op. cit., p. 42.

[2] Emile Bustani, Doubts and Dynamite, the Middle East Today
(London: Wingate, 1958), p. 19.

[3] Rostow, Op. cit., p. 213.

Neutralism, like Arab nationalism, suffered from much mis-

understanding. With the American policy-making machine just awakened,

in the early 1950's, to what was then realized to be a serious threat in

Soviet Communism, and with the new head of the State Department a

serious crusader believing in the necessity for "moral" political

decisions, it was perhaps all but inevitable that emphasis should be on

external relations and the "stance" of the emerging and "uncommitted"

nations of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. This emphasis is set in

grave terms by a State Department publication of 1955:

> What we hope therefore is, first, that all the states
> immediately concerned will come to recognize that they are
> in danger from a common cause and that this overriding
> danger arises not from local attacks by their neighbors in
> the area but from a much greater threat which hangs over
> them as well as the rest of the non-Communist world. [1]

Dulles' supposition, judging from his remarks on returning from a

fact-finding expedition to the Middle East in 1953, was that among various

nations differing degrees of awareness of the real danger of the Soviet

threat existed, and that they could be classified in accordance with their

levels of awareness. So, for example, in discussing a possible regional

defense organization, Dulles could say that although the Middle Eastern

governments in general were unwilling to be associated with the West

in any defense organization, the states of the "Northern Tier" of the

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[1]   John D. Jernegan. "Middle East Defense, " U. S. Department of
State Bulletin, vol. 32 (April 4, 1955), 565.

Middle East were the most aware of the Russian threat and would more likely be ready to do something about it.[1] The Secretary of State, while later in his career more capable of seeing the difficult positions of many neutrals, in the first part of his tenure had clearly expressed his belief that neutralism was "immoral."[2]

Significantly, insufficient understanding and divergent views in American policy organs led to conflicting views of neutrality throughout the 1950's. While one day the White House would indicate that certain circumstances justified neutrality,[3] Secretary Dulles within a short time would come out with a statement calling neutrality, again, immoral.[4]

The attraction of Tito to Nāṣir, in spite of former U.S. aid to Tito added to the "Communist" coloring attributed in the West to Nāṣir's neutralism; Nāṣir's "dual personality," which was a way of describing his way of ranting against imperialism to consolidate his position, as well as to attempt to build Egypt with the help of the West, led to some observers' seeing in the broadcasts of Cairo the exact facsimile of

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[1]
    J. C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East (New York: Harper and Bro., 1960), p. 49.

[2]
    Berding, Op. cit., p. 132.

[3]
    Statement issued by the White House on "Neutralism," 7 June 1956, quoted in American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1956. Department of State Publication 6811. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959), Doc. 6, p. 32.

[4]
    Address by J. F. Dulles at Iowa State College; June 9, 1956.

Radio Moscow's transmissions, which latter caused the U.S. view of

the Egyptian leader to be further blackened. In reference to Mr. Dulles'

trepidation, it may be added that neutralism, which seemed to flourish

in the Arab world, did take on some special features in that area and in

many ways was more pronounced than elsewhere. Of the neutrals of the

world, in fact, the Arab neutrals were to have the closest relations with

the Soviet Union.[1]

Along with the philosophy of "awareness" went the belief that the

American commitment to an "aware" nation should be complete and

immediate. Frankly confused by the power of national movements, the

U.S., in seeking to preserve the investments and military bases it had

established in the area, sought often in the Middle East to ally itself with

successions of "Tory" regimes, which were sacrificing the national

character to an extent and to some degree were allied for their lives.

The U.S. in the 1950's, in voting to stay in the Middle East and at the

same time facing a nationalist wave, sought increasingly to strengthen

its intelligence, propaganda, and influence networks to its advantage.[2]

the lessons of U.S. alliances with reactionary regimes had not, by the

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[1] Dallin, Op. cit., p. 389.

[2] John F. Amory, Around the Edge of War (A New Approach to the Problems of American Foreign Policy) (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 1961), p. 33.

early 1950's, been sufficiently learned.

In order to "keep the lid" on the Middle East, the State Department under Mr. Dulles was wont to think in terms of collective security and military deterrent power, as shall be illustrated. The theory of collective defense in U. S. foreign policy, as developed in the 1950's, harks back to the Vandenberg Resolution of 11 June 1948 calling for progressive development of collective defense arrangements. Not only S. E. A. T. O. and N. A. T. O., but the Eisenhower Doctrine as well were built in part on this tradition.[1]

Dulles, with Eisenhower's authorization, was suggesting by the mid-1950's that borders and sovereignties in the Middle East be secured by formal treaty arrangements and through security guarantees sponsored by the United Nations. Dulles' belief was that collective security measures could relieve the Middle East of "acute fears."[2] While Russian policy in the Middle East, especially as enunciated at the Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow (February 1956), was characterized for the bulk of the period 1951-1956 by concentration on extension of power

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[1] U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on S. J. Res. 19 and H. J. Res. 117, Joint Resolutions. Part I, Jan. Feb. 1957. 85th Congress, 1957, p. 6. Refer also to Majid Khadduri's "The Problem of Regional Security in the Middle East: an Appraisal," Middle East Journal, (Winter 1957), 20.

[2] Remarks by John Foster Dulles in foreign policy address before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 26 August 1955, quoted in Tannous Izzat, The Policy That Invited the Soviet Union to the Middle East (New York: Palestine Refugee Office, 1958), p. 6.

by persuasion, the United States view in the same period was largely

drawn in military terms: in fact, the United States in retrospect appears

to have been solidifying its military might against a military threat that

did not then exist.[1]

The difficulties of building a foreign policy in the Middle East on

a number of premises involving regional collective security and opposition

to Communism became readily apparent. If such premises should fail

to address themselves to the problems and movements of the area, the

result very likely could be--as United States policy has subsequently

demonstrated-- (1) conflicting simultaneous policies; (2) seeing "victories"

or "losses" not intrinsically or locally but as such episodes fit into the

sometimes cumbersome or irrelevent schemata created in the West; (3)

political and economic support for regimes that conform to such schemata even

in the face of wholesale domestic opposition.

Policy Responses, Doctrines, and Pacts:

Shortly after the War, by virtue of the U.S. entrance into matters

concerning Greece, Turkey, Iran, Syria and Lebanon, as well as the

Palestine affair, the United States had taken a definite step toward being

a genuine participant and arbiter in matters of importance in the Middle

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[1]

Rostow, Op. cit., p. 326.

East. Much of the U. S. effort at this time, expressed especially clearly in the Truman Doctrine, was built around a more or less crusading zeal that sought to stop the Communits from supplanting the Axis conquerors and from seizing Greece, Turkey, Iran, Albania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. At the time it was felt in Washington that rather than calling for a long-range, gradual policy of U. S. concern for Middle Eastern affairs, the post-war situation in the area required a kind of showdown with the heirs of the Tsars, who had never lost their keen interest in the area.[1]

The Second World War itself was not a watershed for U. S. policy in the Middle East. The feeling prevailed in Washington until quite long after the war's end that the area was still essentially not a peacetime concern of the United States. The U. S. was reluctant to become associated with the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian treaty of alliance of January 1942; had failed subsequently to clarify the status of American troops in Iran. Also, the U. S. had been willing to give Britain a free hand in Turkey and had shown a certain aloofness toward the Arab League.[2]

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[1] Goss, Op. cit., p. 5. Truman wanted to find out whether the Soviets "meant business." Campbell, Op. cit., p. 33.

[2] J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East Dilemmas, The Background of United States Policy (New York: Harper and Bros., 1953), p. 226.

During the war the U.S. had shied away from involvement and after the

war rejected a British proposal for the continuation of the Middle East

Supply Centre. With regard to the Palestine affair, the U.S. had backed

the Anglo-American Commission on Palestine only financially, not dip-

lomatically, and did not seek to fully share the problem.[1]

While the U.S. had formerly allowed the British more or less of a

free hand in their "spheres of influence" in the Middle East, a combination

of new U.S. policy determinants and the decline of British strength in the

area worked to make the United States less dispassionate in its dealings

with Middle Eastern nations. The British, under Bevin, sought immediately

after the War to try to preserve some kind of position in the Arab world.

This would involve, besides potentially establishing a new relationship

with the central countries of the Middle East similar to that she possessed

by treaty with Egypt and Iraq, persuading the United States to take

charge of defending the "marginal countries" (Greece, Turkey, and

Persia).[2]

Successive failures to maintain even an effective holding position,

including the breakdown of the Bevin-Sidqi negotiations, the loosening of

the British hold in the Sudan, British withdrawal from Palestine, the

refusal of Iraq to ratify the Portsmouth Treaty, loss of British rights

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[1] Ibid., p. 227.

[2] Hourani, A Vision of History, Op. cit., p. 134.

in the Anglo-Iranian Petroleum Company, and finally the effects of the

Egyptian treaty abrogation followed by the coup of 1952--all led to severe

setbacks for British hopes and positions.

Strategists in Washington felt the dimension of this change in the

Middle East and, while sensing an ever increasing danger of an ultimate

conflagration, felt that the British might no longer be counted on to put

out "fires."[1] In addition, as time went on, the United States and Great

Britain had a number of disagreements regarding events in the Middle

East. There were, for example, oil company disputes over the Buraimi

Oasis and, later, the U.S. condemnation of the British deportation of

Makarios and associates from Cyprus. The U.S.-British "divorce" in

the Middle East came to a head, especially in the eyes of Eden and the

British, with the Suez events of 1956. Richard Nixon could declare after

the Suez invasion.

> For the first time in history we have shown independence
> of Anglo-French policies towards Asia and Africa which
> seemed to us to reflect the colonial tradition. This dec-
> laration of independence has had an electrifying effect
> throughout the world. [2]

The United States had also opposed Britain and France, less significantly

perhaps, in the matter of the Syrian-Lebanese appeals to the U.N.

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[1] Goss, Op. cit., p. 8; see also Spielman, Op. cit., pp. 26-7.

[2] Address by Richard Nixon; quoted in George E. Kirk, Contemporary Arab Politics A Concise History (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1961), p. 77.

Security Council in 1946.[1]

Clearly the U.S. participation in the Azerbaijan affair in Iran and in the Greek Civil War and troubles in Turkey (the U.S. State Department in 1946 clearly did not want to see the "Black Sea Powers" in joint defensive control of the Dardanelles as Russia had proposed) marked clear cut action in the area to express a policy point of view largely determined by the Cold War and indirectly indicated the U.S. belief that no one else could be counted on to do the job.

In 1946, as a decade later, the United States acquired, at least somewhat, a reputation for objectivity. But the latter reputation was severely damaged by other postures of the United States in the Middle East. U.S. policy with regard to the Palestine question was from the beginning vague and inconsistent. As with the 1958 crisis, American policy-making organs tended to be confused, overlapping, and to some extent independent of one another. The result of different emphases by different sections of the government was a narrow rather than a broad policy towards the problem, which left the United States very much out of favor with the Arabs in general.[2] The role of domestic political considerations in shaping U.S. policies on Palestine was great in the 1940's;

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[1] Hall and Voss, Op. cit., p. 16.

[2] Note that while the State Department stressed good relations with the Arabs, the Defense Department's concern was with available petroleum; the Chief Executive was sympathetic with the Zionists. Campbell, Op. cit., p. 37; also C.V. Crabb, Op. cit., p. 229.

endorsement of Zionist stances by politicians and candidates in elections irritated the Arabs tremendously.[1]

Changes of emphasis in U.S. policy towards the Middle East are reflected in changing patterns of aid to the area. The aid program was America's way of getting involved in the Middle East conservatively. The immediate post-war aid of the Export-Import bank was meager and reflected a disinclination towards involvement.[2] Government aid which had, however, tended to be erratic and inconsistent became more consistent with the advent of the 1950's. Point Four aid had not fostered social revolutions in the Middle East but, rather, to a large extent perpetuated the feudal classes in many of the Arab countries. These groups had been the heirs to the power that was left by the colonial powers to them and not to the masses.

After 1950 there was a burst of stepped-up military aid to the developing nations which the U.S. felt to be menaced by Communism. While military aid had been less than 10% of economic aid in 1950 and under 25% in 1951, by 1953 it amounted to more than 68%.[3] This new pattern of outlays reflected what would be the guidelines of U.S. policy in the next few years--that of extending N.A.T.O. into a containment

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[1] New York Times, October 5, 1946.

[2] Hurewitz, Middle East Dilemmas, Op. cit., p. 237.

[3] Rowtow, Op. cit., p. 257.

pattern of bases and military alliances around the borders of the

Communist bloc.

The Mutual Security Act of 1951, which added much coordination to

U. S. global aid, was responsible during the first two years of its pro-

mulgation, for the substantial underwriting of more than half of the yearly

budgets of the United Nations Relief Works Agency (U. N. R. W. A.).[1]

However, if aid was better coordinated, it was also more tightly controlled

at this time, and limitations on allocations were rampant in Washington.

There were collisions of different types of aid programs for the Middle

East under the Defense and State Departments; and the President was

authorized a maximum allotment for the Middle East. All this, however,

was conditional on the Middle East Command, for the defense of the area,

being formed.[2]

In addition to the complexities of integrating an aid program among

a diversity of Arab States, there was the question of alleged prejudicial

dispersion of Point Four funds. This latter accusation plus the fact that

admittedly stepped up U. S. aid to the area had a number of strings

attached, as noted above, caused the reputation of the U. S. to suffer

more than profit. Many Middle Easterners, for example, had the

impression that, because of the largely military nature of much U. S. aid,

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[1] Hurewitz, Middle East Dilemmas, Op. cit., p. 139.

[2] Spielman, Op. cit., p. 39.

especially to Turkey, the U. S. was far more concerned with its own peculiar interests--being essentially containment--than with schemes designed to build up the area in more efficacious ways.[1] The Mutual Security Program, which might have really been the only workable means of defense against the Soviet encroachment, could not approach doing that because it did not enlist all of the Middle Eastern nations.

Consistent with U. S. foreign policy ideals of the time, including especially those of containment, regional security, and military pacts and aid in the face of possible Communist innundation, the U. S. together with Britain and France attempted and failed in an effort to organize a regional defense organization. The most important general reason for the failure of the so-called "Middle East Defense Organization" of 1950, to which the Arabs did not adhere--and a failure which foreshadows the difficulties of 1957-1958--was in the fact that an attempt had been made to create a military structure with common bases and command, but all without sufficient foundational work in the area of political understanding.[2]

The M. E. D. O. proposals came at a time when Egypt, for example, which was engaged in a dispute with Britain over the 1936 Treaty, could

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[1] Hall and Voss, Op. cit., p. 25.

[2] Campbell, Op. cit., p. 45.

probably have entertained the thought of little more than a bilateral treaty; but certainly not a multilateral defense structure which would bind them more closely to the West. Along with this inaccurate appraisal of Egyptian nationalism--the Egyptians would settle for no less than the withdrawal of British forces--went a misjudgment of the nature of the real forces in the area. That is, simultaneously with its attempt at regional defense organization, the U. S. was attempting to put pressure on the Arabs in the U. N. to lift their economic blockade against Israel; but the fact remained that the problem of Israel--not regional defense against Communism--remained the pressing issue of the day.[1]

American views on collective defense against "engulfment" of the area continued to be both unrealistic about national forces in the area and to a certain extent patronizing; this attitude continued to characterize U. S. responses to crises in the area. Note one State Department official's remarks on collective defense which seems to imply that with sufficient hinting and suggestion, the Arab world would get the idea (and presumably think of it as their own) that the most important problem facing Arabs at the time was innundation of the area by Communism:

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[1] While the U. S. was anxious to have Egypt adhere to any regional defense organization, expecting that someday that country would become the leader of such an organization, the former failed to address itself to the issues of special importance to the Egyptians at the time. Spielman, Op. cit., pp. 27-31.

We in this country have long been convinced that such
cooperation is the only means of insuring ourselves and
our friends against engulfment, but we cannot impose
this belief on others nor can we force others into col-
lective arrangements. They must themselves arrive at
the same belief. (emphasis mine)[1]

Britain and the U. S. were both interested in securing the Middle

East against Soviet penetration. But the powers never seemed able to

harmonize their efforts. After 1952, the United States, by now a full-

fledged interested party in the events transpiring in the Middle East,

largely free of significant trade commitments and colonial responsibility,

was able to strike out more independently (of the British) towards the

elaboration of a policy of containment. But after 1952, as before, American

policy was not consecrated to developing in the evolving nations of the

Middle East organs and attitudes well geared to counter Soviet penetra-

tion in the area.[2] The pattern of military aid, mentioned above, that

was symbolic of a larger reality of evolving U. S. policy--that of

extending the U. S. military alliance system around the Soviet periphery--

had already suffered setbacks directly and indirectly by 1952, such that

a reappraisal of means and objectives in the Middle East by the new

Eisenhower regime was very much called for by 1953. The setbacks

included a worsening anti-Western strain in Egypt with the concomitant

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[1]
    Jernegan, Op. cit., p. 566.
[2]
    Rostow, Op. cit., p. 326.

failure of the M. E. D. O. proposals, and the nationalist wave in Iran in

1951-1952. Furthermore the Truman Administration had ended by

dealing with major international problems on a day to day basis, and a

long-range policy was much requisite.[1]

In 1953-1954 both the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. attempted to solidify

some long-range goals and approaches to their respective policies in

the Middle East. To a large extent, the events leading to and encom-

passing the events of 1958 were the logical developments of these

conclusions and suppositions. For the U. S. the fundamental question

posed itself: in light of fusion weapons and the potential of long-range

missles, what defense arrangements should be made; and, almost as a

corollary, what policies should be selected to deal with the governments

of the emerging countries, including those of the Middle East?[2]

Under Nikita Khruschev the Soviet Union had elected to follow a

policy of peaceful coexistence with capitalism and bourgeois nationalism

of the Nāṣir type, yet relations between the U. S. S. R. and Nāṣir, for

example, remained cool.[3] But by 1955, with Nāṣir suffering a degree of

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[1]
    The Soviets did have considerable long-range strategy for the
Middle East, built immediately around short-run dealings with the
nationalist revolutions of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa in ways
that eventually would loosen and cut ties of the West with these areas.
For a full description of these tactics see Rostow, Op. cit., p. 260.

[2]
    Rostow, Op. cit., p. 281.

[3]
    While in 1954 Nāṣir was suspicious of Russia's intentions, Russia
was irked at Egypt's concessions to the West in the 1954 treaty. Dallin,
Op. cit., pp. 387-90.

ostracism from the West and feeling the effects of the Baghdad Pact

and the Gaza raid, the Russians proceded ahead circumspectly to

capitalize on Egypt's new association with the neutralist camp. By 1956

the Soviet Ambassador, bearing offers of aid to not only Egypt, but

Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Sudan, was "personna gratissima" in

Cairo.[1]

The U.S. had consistently underestimated Soviet strength and means

for expansion in the area. One aspect of United States policy, at least

until 1956, was an attempt to ignore the Soviets, not admitting them to be

an important power in the area.[2]

While after 1953 the more or less official U.S. policy stance in the

Middle East (and especially in the Arab-Israeli area) was one of friendly

impartiality, the new program revealed itself increasingly as one which

stressed military aid as a means of deflating the movement towards

neutrality in some Arab countries.[3] By 1954 Iraq began to take on the

special importance in U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East that

it was to continue to have through the time of the crisis of 1958. It

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[1]
Ibid., p. 397.

[2]
Traces of this type of diplomatic thinking were not absent in 1958
when, in the wake of U.S. intervention in Lebanon, Eisenhower attempted
dramatically to reduce Soviet influence as a "decision maker" for and in
the Middle East. Ibid., p. 400.

[3]
J.C. Hurewitz, quoted in Thayer, ed., Tensions in the Middle
East, Op. cit., p. 27.

could be said that the phase of U.S. policy that was played out beginning

in 1954, after Secretary Dulles' trip to the Middle East, was largely

centered around Iraq.[1] In the context of Dulles' new idea that it was

the "Northern Tier" that had to be built up as a cordon against Communist

penetration of the Middle East, U.S. aid was stepped up to Greece,

Turkey, and Iran, and military assistance was being planned for Pakistan.

Nūrī as-Saʿīd, the Iraqi Prime Minister, was well rewarded for having

risked his neck agreeing to accept American military assistance in 1954

and subsequently by joining the Baghdad Pact.[2] While Nāsir in 1953 had

been unwilling to see a rebirth of the M.E.D.O. idea, Nuri as-Said had

jumped at the opportunity. Iraq's reward for its joining of the Northern

Tier Pact was, for 1954-1955, U.S. economic and military aid amounting

to some $58.6 million.[3]

The United States opted for the Tier defense arrangements partly

because of the intransigence of the Cairo regime in the matters of the

Suez Canal and the M.E.D.O. proposals. Some in Washington were

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[1] Richard Nolte, quoted in Georgiana G. Stevens, ed., The United
States and the Middle East (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc.,
1964), p. 158.

[2] Nūrī took a risk, because he had really violated his word to
consult with other members of the Arab League Collective Security
Pact before arranging any external pacts or agreements. The Iraqi-
Turkish Treaty of January 1955 was made without such consultation.

[3] Nolte, quoted in G. Stevens, Op. cit., p. 159.

beginning to believe sincerely that the best centers for a major billion-dollar base structure--in order to be effective in another world war--must be in southern and eastern Turkey and northern Iraq. Since the memory of the Soviets in Azerbaijan was fresh in the minds of the U.S. policy planners, it seemed as if Iran, and for that matter Iraq, were potential weak points, offering Russia access to the desert heartland and allowing the Soviets the opportunity to drive a wedge between important areas of the "free world."[1]

In this matter of the Northern Tier and the Baghdad Pact, the United States showed itself to be confined in its approach and reluctant to deal with the most pressing internal matters in the Middle East. On a general level, there was a failure on the part of the U.S. to understand that outright pro-Western alignments usually carried especial dangers and problems for those Middle Eastern nations that should decide to be so positioned --particularly where new groupings of intellectuals and military men were struggling with older power configurations that re-volved around landed interests often associated with the West.[2] The expedient Northern Tier concept was designed to circumvent the Palestine problem and the Arab nationalist movement as well as the Suez question,

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[1] Bouscaren, Op. cit., pp. 82-4.

[2] Rostow, Op. cit., p. 355.

if not also Nāṣir himself; it avoided what might perhaps have been a more complicated regional defense scheme.[1] An outside observer would have said that it appeared that this was the start of a gradualist approach to a complete building of an alliance system in the area.

While the U. S. never formally joined the Baghdad Pact, largely out of deference to Britain and King Sa'ūd, American policy remained vitally interested in the Pact organization. The importance of Iraq to the United States as well as to the U. S. S. R. at this time and subsequently cannot be underestimated. For the United States, linking the land bridge between Turkey and Pakistan was a top priority matter after 1953, and Iraq was ready even sooner than Iran to make such a connection possible. From the Soviet viewpoint, Iraq's importance may be seen in the tremendous blow which the Baghdad Pact was considered to be in Moscow. The ring of satellites Stalin had built up around the Soviet Union showed one important gap--at the spot where the Caucasus and Soviet Turkestan border on Turkey and Iran. With Iraq's oil resources and military structure under increased Western domination, the Soviets could not but anticipate an increased weakening of the position of their "exposed" flank.

If anything, however, the Soviets may well have felt their policy dedication, after 1953, to milder forms of aggression and coexistence in

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[1] Campbell, Op. cit., p. 50.

the Middle East was much confirmed and justified by the U.S. ring of alliances, which had sprung up after the Korean war, largely organized in the militant terms of that war, and dedicated to the prevention of a similar outbreak.

It was largely the U.S. commitment to short-run military alliances and aid that brought about the disastrous deterioration in the U.S. position in 1957-1958 that finally called for emergency measures. The Eisenhower Administration, deriving its policies out of the so-called "Great Equation"--or, maximum world security coupled with a cut-back in U.S. spending commitments--found its principal nemesis in its failure to come to grips with nationalist movements. The latter Administration, which had sought to alter to at least a small degree the U.S. blanket support for Israel in order to make some capital with the Arabs succeeded not at all in the latter goal and ended by weakening Tel Aviv's confidence in the U.S.[1]

The Arab nationalist movement, as well as other shades of opinion in the Middle East, could not help but note the many differences between a United States essentially committed to short-run plans for frustration of direct aggression or "innundation" from Soviet Russia

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[1] Rostow, Op. cit., p. 354. See also Crabb, Op. cit., p. 232; and U.S. Department of State, The Middle East, Public No. 5469 in Near and Middle East Series (16) (Washington: 1954).

and the Communist movement, which had taken as standards economic growth, national development, and peace.

The results of the application of the "Great Equation" in the Middle East were twofold. Two parallel pressure systems were created, both of which, from the U. S. standpoint, deteriorated towards explosion from the very beginning. First, within the countries allied to the United States or pro-U. S. , there developed problems: (1) local leaders in aided countries, who assumed a function of distributing U. S. aid, were not always the men best qualified to be leading such countries in programs for economic growth or political and social development; (2) a system of "diplomatic blackmail" grew up in Washington whereby certain Middle Eastern states would request loans or aid to help resist "Communist pressures" of various sorts; (3) the type of military aid which was ultimately sent, fashioned on World War Two models and designed for resisting major onslaughts, was little suited to guerilla or "softer" forms of warfare.[1]

Second, from the standpoints of the countries which were not recipients of extended U. S. aid, the isolation and disregard which U. S.

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[1] Rostow, Op. cit. , p. 327. Also one notes that there was an ambiguity of the type of U. S. military commitment in the areas surrounding the Soviet Union. Dulles had sought no specific troop level commitments in this area, while the opposite was true in Europe. The vagueness of these commitments would have logistical repercussions in 1958.

policy demonstrated towards them resulted in their becoming ever more prone to forces inimical to U. S. interests. Unlike the aided countries, which received aid that was often irrelevant to building in non-military ways or to combatting subversion, the non-aided countries of the Middle East--principally Egypt and Syria--received little that would have helped them toward off future crises.[1] Note that in 1955, for example, only about 15% of the total U. S. aid allotments was available to countries not aligned to the U. S. by military pacts.[2]

The countries which were outside the pale of U. S. military pacts were often strategically quite important, however, as in the case of Egypt, and effective patterns of U. S. aid directed towards substantial domestic development might well have prevented these countries from seizing on alternatives leading to nationalist and international crises somewhat later. The Baghdad Pact, as the Eisenhower Doctrine after it, provoked counterbalancing (of Western influence) operations on the parts of states adversely affected by the irrelevancies or insufficiencies of those agreements.[3] There was no mistaking the fact that the military

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[1] By the time of Adib Shishakli's regime in Syria, the latter country was becoming increasingly disenchanted with the United States; and, almost in consequence, a recurrent theme in the mid-fifties was "better Sovietized than Judaized." See George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 3rd. edition (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 347.

[2] Rostow, Ibid., p. 329.

[3] Lenczowski, Op. cit., p. 347.

pact system ethnically revolved largely around non-Arab populations
and that alignments with Western Great Power groupings at this time
provoked a severe aversion in the hearts of the masses of Arabs.

The shaky nature of the Baghdad Pact, whose obvious weaknesses
would only become finally and dramatically apparent to the United States
in 1958, was described by one commentator in this way:

> Actually the pact was no more than an alliance among Britain,
> Turkey, Pakistan, and a small group of Baghdad politicians who
> felt that their personal fortunes depended upon British support.[1]

Yet the Pact had been described as a cornerstone of Anglo-American
strategic defense in the area.

1956 was not really a watershed or reversal point in American
foreign policy in the Middle East. Several realities that had been
established through Dulles' military pact system persisted. First, it
must be noted that by joining the anti-Nāṣir forces at Suez for the sake of
a few election-year votes, the U.S. would have stood to lose more than
it would have gained in the long run. U.S. policy turned very quickly
after the crisis towards a position of discrediting Nāṣir.[2] This only
continued the see-saw battle that had been established earlier largely
through Egyptian-Syrian counterbalancing measures against Western

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[1] Firaz Kazemzadeh, "The West and the Middle East," World
Politics, April 1959, p. 470.

[2] The U.S. cut off CARE medical supplies, refused to sell Egypt
oil or surplus wheat, and froze Egyptian assets in the U.S. See Nolte,
quoted in Stevens, Op. cit., p. 164. Note that Senator Humphrey was
particularly irked that medical supplies should be used as a political
lever. See Utley, Op. cit., p. 68.

thrusts.[1]

This process of short-term move and countermove made the Middle East vulnerable from within and without: the gap between the Southern and Northern Tiers had ominously widened; Iraq was isolated in the Arab world; there was little regional security or unity among the Baghdad Pact signees who--in the cases of Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan--had joined the Pact primarily in order to get armaments from the United States; and, on the whole, the entire organization of the Northern Tier was militarily weak.[2] The past Western legacy of balkanization in the Middle East, with its inevitable corollary of regionalism, coupled with the split between the Northern and Southern Tiers, which the reaction to the Baghdad Pact had largely wrought, rendered the Northern Tier alignment almost valueless in terms of its goals, since the Soviet Union might have been able to sabotage the Tier from the south.[3]

By 1956 the British-American "divorce" was largely effected. Nor once the U.S. and Russia had entered the torn and confused Middle Eastern arena in 1956 as arbiters would they then again withdraw. They

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[1] Both in the context of diplomatic blackmail, mentioned above, and of counterbalancing actions, the "non-aided" countries, especially Egypt, had returned Western sallies (sale of NATO Mystere jets by France to Israel; revocation of Aswan aid) with countermoves such as the recognition of Red China and the Czech Arms Deal.

[2] Campbell, Op. cit., p. 60ff. The nature of the Pact had really split the Middle East into two regional defense units, one consisting of the Baghdad Pact, the other consisting of Lebanon, Egypt and Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.

[3] Khadduri, Op. cit., p. 21.

would be from this point on "the final courts of appeal in all the conflicts of the Near East."[1] Just prior to Suez there was some sense of competition with Moscow in Cairo on the part of the U.S., that had brought about the abovementioned atmosphere of diplomatic blackmail. It was highly significant that the U.S., in seeking to avoid at all costs any stigma of guilt by being associated with the British and the French, were destined to develop post 1958 an almost unilateral policy approach toward the area.[2]

There was definitely something in the nature of a power vacuum created by the Suez affair which both Russia and the U.S. were anxious to manipulate if not exploit, and in any case to keep the situation from being advantageously exploited by the other. The Soviet Union made much capital out of the attempts by the West to isolate 'Abd al-Nāṣir, taking over a large share of Egyptian trade, developing economic and technical assistance programs in Egypt; by the end of 1958 the U.A.R. had received, in addition to military equipment, some $600 million in longterm credits on attractive terms--which made Point Four aid in

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[1]
    Hourani, A Vision of History, Op. cit., p. 141.

[2]
    "The Middle East Since Suez," The World Today, Vol. 13, No. 12 (December 1957), 512. Note the Eisenhower adhered strictly to the terms of the U.N. resolution calling for withdrawal of Anglo-French forces from Egypt to the extent of rebuffing Eden in November 1956. See Kirk, Op. cit., p. 81.

the Middle East appear minuscule.[1]

The U. S. suspicions of Nāṣir's pro-Soviet leanings, that had their roots in a neutralism little understood in America--which suspicions and confusions had much to do with the application of the Eisenhower Doctrine to the crisis of 1958--were heightened after Suez. In turning to the Soviet Union for increased economic ties, however, Nāṣir explained quite frankly that the virtual economic blockade imposed on Egypt by the U. S. after Suez, which was almost more lethal than actual military action, had left the Egyptian leader no choice but to turn to Moscow for wheat and petrol, as well as other necessary commodities.[2]

When one excellent course of action after recognizing the strength of the Arab neutralist movement would have been recognition and acceptance of that neutralism with a corresponding attempt to influence Arab energies in positive courses of domestic development, the U. S. had instead turned away from Arab nationalism and neutralism and Egypt in order to concentrate on the building of a military alliance

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[1] Nolte quoted in Stevens, Op. cit., p. 164; see also U. S. Senate, Op. cit., p. 40 for details of Soviet aid to Syria, Egypt and Yemen. Although there were no political "strings" attached to this aid, the scale and distribution of credits suggests--especially because of the large proportion of Communist aid in the form of armaments--that Soviet aid was not unopposed to exacerbating the tensions within the Middle East. Rostow, Op. cit., p. 295.

[2] By 1956 more than 20% of the trade of Egypt was with Communist bloc countries, often in a framework of barter agreements. The scale of Communist bloc credits and technical assistance was impressive also. See Study Prepared by the State Department on the Soviet Economic Aid Campaign in the Middle East and Orient, New York Times, January 4, 1958, p. C4.

system in the Middle East. The attempt to isolate Nāṣir by supporting

alignments of largely non-Arab leadership had succeeded only in causing

Cairo to step up its drive for leadership; this would have important

repercussions in the succeeding two years.[1]

If U.S. post-Suez policy was not geared to striking at the heart of

Arab nationalism, it must be said that its intent was either to neutralize

or to contain that movement. A rough sort of containment policy evolved as the

only alternative to directly opposing or coming to terms with it. To

prevent the spread of Arab nationalism, Egypt and Syria would be more

or less left alone, while good relations would be built up with surrounding

states, including: Libya, Sudan, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and

Lebanon.[2]

At the same time that official U.S. spokesmen were urging Israeli

withdrawal in early 1957, and it appeared that the U.S. wanted to free

itself of the stigma of seemingly over-close contacts with Tel-Aviv, it

was clear from King Saʻūd's visit to Washington that one of President

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[1]
 Rostow, Op. cit., p. 355.

[2]
 Charles Issawi, "Negotiations from Strength", Op. cit., p. 7. In
the U.N. post-Suez it seemed as if the U.S. was experimenting with a
broad new policy line whose aim was to secure a progressive and
"cooperative working relationship" with the twenty-six nation African
bloc. Yet dislike for Nāṣir and or loyalty to the Atlantic alliance kept
cropping up. See G. Barraclough, Survey of International Affairs 1956-
1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 151-154.

Eisenhower's central goals was the creation in the person of Sa'ūd of

a counterpoise to Nāṣir.[1] U.S. glowing praise of Sa'ūd's regime at the

time, reciprocated by Sa'ūd's expressions of "satisfaction" at the

first exposition of the embryonic Middle East Resolution of 1957, together

suggest that the "counterweight" theory was coloring the State Depart-

ment's thinking on the evolution of a new policy for the Middle East: it

was clear that after Suez, Dulles was not going to let Nāṣir advance any

further. The nature of this warmth towards certain Arab nations led one to

believe that the U.S. was anxious to balance Arab friendship with the

extremely important requirement of preserving the Atlantic alliance.

Even the speedy way in which withdrawal was pressed on the Israelis

assured that Nāṣir's influence would not be heightened.

Another source indicated that in fact before 1958 the U.S. had

applied pressure on both Iraq and Saudi Arabia to form a union--

essentially an oil bloc--directed against the prestige of Nāṣir.[2] Deputy

Under-Secretary of State Loy Henderson's visit to the Middle East in

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[1]
    Sherman Adams. Firsthand Report, the Story of the
Eisenhower Administration. (New York: Harper and Bros., 1961), p. 277.

[2]
    Benjamin Shwadran. The Middle East, Oil, and the Great
Powers. (New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press,
1959), p. 283.

August 1957 was said by some not to be for the purposes of assessing

the "Syrian situation," but rather to "engineer the isolation of Syria by

means of economic and practical pressures from its neighbors."[1] It

was but a short time to September, when Egypt and Syria formed a

complete economic union.

The promulgation of the "Eisenhower Doctrine" (House Joint

Resolution 117; Senate Joint Resolution 19) was sparked by President

Eisenhower's belief that the U.S. stance in the Middle East was pre-

carious. In his message to Congress on January 5, 1957, in which he

proposed the Joint Congressional Resolution on the Middle East, the

President said,

> Weakness in the present situation and the increased danger from
> International Communism, convinve me that basic United States
> policy should now find expression in joint action by the Congress and
> the Executive. [2]

It was not clear that the proposed Resolution should apply to any

specific countries; rather, as in the Formosa Strait, the Administration

refused to draw a precise line around areas to be defended. The new

policy was intended in a general way to discourage direct or indirect

aggression in the area of the Middle East. The danger the Administration

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[1]
    Henderson did not even visit Syria in his attempt to assess the
situation in that country and in the Middle East. Barraclough, Op. cit.,
pp. 180-1.

[2]
    Dwight D. Eisenhower. The White House Years, vol. II :
Waging the Peace 1956-61 (London: Heinemann, 1966), p. 180.

remarked was seen in military and strategic terms not unlike those
that had engendered the U. S. extension of N. A. T. O. into the Northern Tier
Alliances. Later, after the March 9 signing of the Middle East Reso-
lution into law, Eisenhower could remark:

> We had effectively obtained the consent of the Congress in
> proclaiming the administration's resolve to block the Soviet
> Union's march to the Mediterranean, to the Suez Canal and
> the pipelines, and to the underground lakes of oil which fuel
> the homes and factories of Western Europe.[1]

The potential innundation of the Middle East by the U. S. S. R. ,
perhaps sparked by a "leftist" Arab nationalist movement, was seen as
a sufficiently grave threat to warrant the President's seeking a firm
congressional Resolution in support of his own powers to commit U. S.
forces. During the combined British-French-Israeli attack on Suez,
the possibility of the entry of Soviet "volunteers" into the situation
had greatly alarmed the U. S.[2]

Whereas President Truman had acted before consulting Con-
gressional leaders in the case of Korea, Eisenhower took special pains

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[1] Ibid., pp. 178, 182.

[2] Thus the Eisenhower Doctrine repeated, by standard expressions
that nonetheless reflected the U. S. concern for a "breach" in the Middle
East, "that" the preservation of the independence and integrity of the
nations of the Middle East" was vital to the U. S. national interest. U. S.
Department of State, United States Policy in the Middle East, Publication
No. 6505, Near and Middle Eastern Series, 25 (Washington: 1957), p. 45.
In light of disagreements between Britain and France and the U. S. in
1956, the U. S. was anxious to make a statement of U. S. intentions to
"sustain Western rights in the region". Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 178.

to get the prior support of Congress both in the formation of his policy

for the Middle East and in its implementation in July 1958.[1] The joint

resolve and firmness expressed by U.S. policy chiefs in the matter of

the Eisenhower Doctrine may be noted in the difference between the

opening sections of the Truman Doctrine (President Truman's statement

at the time of the Greek-Turkish aid bill) and that of the Eisenhower

Doctrine. While the former, which was never legislated by Congress,

begins, "I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support..."

the latter begins in this fashion: "The United States regards as vital to

the national interest..."[2]

The provisions of the Eisenhower Doctrine, giving the President,

among other things, full discretion to use whatever military forces he

might deem necessary to halt communist aggression against the govern-

ment of any of the Middle Eastern countries requesting aid, marked an

apogee in the U.S. retreat from an erstwhile isolationist stance in the

Middle East. Coupled with the intent and stipulations of the Doctrine

was the fact that, unlike twenty years before, there was a tangible U.S.

presence in the area, specifically in the form of the Sixth Fleet in the

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[1] Arthur Krock, "Law and Intervention--an Analysis of Eisenhower Doctrine's Application to United States Landings in Lebanon," New York Times, July 16, 1958.

[2] Ibid.

Mediterranean, radar networks in Turkey, and bases in Turkey, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. The fact was that the Middle East had become an area where limited wars, within the Cold War context, could occur; the U.S. was taking upon itself the role of a limited war arbiter, anxious to keep Russia from imperialistic advances which would ultimately endanger Europe. The Cold War, as it had evolved, had come into a time of military stalemate where secondary methods of policy enforcement, rather than the use of nuclear weapons, were requisite for checkmating actions on small fronts.[1]

The policy-making aims of the framers of the Eisenhower Doctrine were to satisfy as many foreign parties as possible--while of course not sacrificing U.S. interests: (1) there was the hope that Arab nationalists would, after seeing the Eisenhower Doctrine fundamentally committed to supporting the national independence of the Middle Eastern nations, perhaps turn to more moderate policy stances; (2) the Baghdad Pact countries would be as satisfied as if the U.S. had joined the Pact; (3) American trans-Atlantic allies would be reassured that the U.S. would not act automatically on a request for aid, but only when certain conditions were met; also, the U.S. assured U.N. supporters that the new

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[1] The Soviet "secondary means" consisted in the Middle East largely in an association with and support for human tides and popular movements. John Amory, Op. cit., pp. 9, 10.

policy would work within the framework of the Organization.[1]

While the fuller dimension of the Eisenhower Doctrine's importance for and impact on the Middle East is discussed in a later chapter, it must be noted here that the initial response to the Doctrine was far from overwhelmingly favorable. President Eisenhower's Special Envoy James P. Richards, whose mission in early 1957 was officially to "devise effective methods of cooperation with interested nations for the improvement of their security and for their economic progress," and unofficially to drum up support in the area for the proposed Middle East Doctrine, returned to the United States with vague support for the purposes of the Resolution from twelve countries.[2] Ambassador Richards' report to the nation indicated vast support for the significance of the U.S. pledge to battle against International Communism; and the Ambassador indicated as how he had given away "guns, tanks, and things like that" where there appeared to be a special need.[3]

Significantly, Richards was scheduled to visit only Lebanon,

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[1]

Barraclough, Op. cit., p. 164.

[2]

Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 193.

[3]

Radio and Television Address by the President's Special Ambassador to the Middle East (Richards), May 9, 1957. Council on Foreign Relations, Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1957 ed. by Paul E. Zinner (New York: Harper and Bros., 1958), p. 209.

Libya, and Turkey (all peripheral to the centers of Arab nationalism);
but he ultimately went to fifteen Middle Eastern countries, excluding
Syria and Egypt, as well as Jordan.[1] Pakistan, Lebanon, and Iran
alone were favorable to the Doctrine; Syria was outspokenly hostile
to the plan, and Iraq and Saudi Arabia were cautiously critical. One
observer noted that the Eisenhower Doctrine, which depended on the
cooperation of Middle Eastern nations for its success, was "sold" in
the Middle East in a haughty and undiplomatic manner.[2]

There was bound to be a potentially flammable divergence of
opinion among Arabs, where a new American policy appeared at first
glance to generally threaten both the causes of Arab nationalism and
Arab neutralism. With the differences of opinion on the Middle East Re-
solution among the Arab nations came a widening and deepening of a
split that was to provide much of the foundation for the events that
transpired in 1958: new divisions that emerged in the Arab world, and
extensions of old divisions, made the split between Baghdad and Cairo
even greater. Divisions of opinion on the Eisenhower Doctrine ran

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[1]
    Richards did not visit Jordan because of internal crises in
that country. The fifteen countries included Afghanistan, Ethiopia,
Greece, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen.

[2]
    Leila M. T. Meo, Lebanon Improbable Nation. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1965, p. 115.

along the lines largely of those who thought they could use the

Eisenhower Doctrine for their own ends as opposed to those who were

against any type of foreign intervention. Lebanon did not immediately

represent itself in either of these two circles, though its sympathy with

the Eisenhower Doctrine was abundantly clear.[1]

The vague nature of the Middle East Resolution may well have

concealed what policy makers really sought to have it accomplish. One

source noted that,

> The unstated purpose of the Eisenhower Doctrine, beyond
> the warning to Russia, is to isolate Nasser's Egypt and his
> ally Syria from all neighboring countries, and thus to in-
> sulate the centers of Russian penetration, just as the human
> body builds a protective layer around a diseased area.[2]

The Eisenhower Doctrine's vagueness may be noted in the absence

therein of any plan for constructive cooperation among the nations that

skirted Syria and Egypt. The hasty visit of Sa'ūd to the United States in

early 1957 and the travels of Lebanon's pro-Western Foreign Minister

Charles Malik to Cairo, Paris, and London en route to New York,

might be interpreted as features of a blueprint for isolation of Egypt

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[1]
  While Lebanon's _Le Soir_ gave a positive welcome to the
Eisenhower Doctrine, there was some sharp criticism in some of
the Arabic journals, some of which suggested that the U.S. could
best win Arab friendship by ceasing to concentrate on the Communist
menace and by starting to seek a resolution of the Arab-Israeli
situation.

[2]
  New Republic, Vol. 136, No. 3 (January 21, 1957), pp. 3, 4.

and Syria.[1] Many Arabs saw in the attempt to isolate Syria and Egypt and in the attempt to enlist Arab support for the Cold War a violation of neutralism and a recurrence of the old divide and rule philosophy.[2]

Back in mid-December 1956, when the outlines of the proposed Resolution had been sketched out for the benefit of Middle Eastern leaders by American ambassadors in respective capitals, it had appeared that a cardinal feature of the program would be the absence of political "strings." In the sense that "strings" imply reciprocal aid on the parts of the participating states in the event of subjection to aggression, such a feature had in fact been fulfilled. But that the United States expected nothing in return in terms of building a structure geared to its strategic needs in the area is belied by the frustration and anguish in Washington when the firm links with Baghdad were suddenly sundered on July 14, 1958.

In the light of the deterioration of the United States position in the Middle East in 1957-1958, and the general worsening of conditions for peace and security in that area, President Eisenhower's stated purposes pale beside the reality of the Doctrine's effects. His policy

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[1] In Sa'ūd's trip to Washington are early traces of a burgeoning Saudi-Egyptian rivalry. It appeared in Washington that henceforth Sa'ud would be treated as the "representative Arab."

[2] New Republic, Vol. 136, No. 3 (21 January 1957), pp. 3, 4.

aims were expressed in this way:

> We are far more interested in bringing about conditions that will tend to lessen tensions and provide a climate that will bring about the possibility for conciliation even among the Israeli and the Arabs. We stand ready to make considerable sacrifices to bring this about, and in return we want nothing whatsoever... except the confidence that these nations are gradually developing their economic strength and living standards and are achieving the ability to live more happily and peacefully among themselves and with the world.[1]

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[1] Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 180.

CHAPTER II

THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT

OF THE LEBANESE CRISIS OF 1958

Clearly the United States did not answer Lebanon's call for help

on 14 July 1958 out of a desire to protect and perpetuate one man's

rule in that country, but in order to protect an entire complex of U.S.

"positions" that had been developed in the Middle East especially after

World War II. Thus U.S. policy towards and action in Lebanon is

instructive in as much as such policy underlines the points of general

American policy in the area. While specific American involvement with

Lebanon was not the sole motivating framework for the dispatch of U.S.

troops there--Iraq and other areas had much effect on U.S. policy--

Lebanon's involvement with the United States seen from the Lebanese

standpoint, was a crucial factor in the unfolding of the 1958 crisis. It

is therefore particularly significant to examine the evolution of

Lebanese relations with the United States especially in light of the

long-honored Lebanese principles of neutrality in foreign affairs.

From the very beginning of a discussion of Lebanese neutrality

it becomes obvious that the need for external neutrality has as a rule

been closely connected with a need for internal balance and internal

neutrality. The need for the maintenance of a precarious balance of political and other interests was no less real in 1958 than it had been in the nineteenth century.

Attempts at creating homogeneity or managing heterogeneity date to the 1840's when interventions by Egypt's Ibrahim Pasha and then five European Powers caused the Lebanese population to be split into first camps, then districts (qa'im maqamiyah), maintaining precarious sectarian balances.[1] The present-day confessional strain of government in Lebanon has roots in the first Lebanese "legislature" of 1841 and later in the Revised Statute of 1864, which provided for district representation along the lines of confessional allotment of seats. With the growth of the Mountain under the French Mandate, regionalism was added as a further irritant to the Lebanese internal political formula. And as if to further encumber the growth of an enlightened policy, the French imposed the "list" system, which caused confessional lines to be crossed in the electoral process, but which nonetheless left a legacy of the rich and strong dominating in Lebanon as "chiefs" of the lists: whether expressly or inadvertantly, an abiding feudalism was the

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[1] For details on early Lebanese political life and the legacy of external influences on indigenous political structures, see C. G. Hess and H. L. Bodman, Jr., "Confessionalism and Feudality in Lebanese Politics, "The Middle East Journal, Vol. 8 (Winter 1954), pp. 10-26.

political heritage of French influence in Lebanon; and this was coupled with a fragile balance of sectarian, regional, and political interests.

Noteworthy in the period under examination will be a full swing from a time of maximum cooperation between the sects in 1943--to achieve a major unifying goal, that of independence--to a tremendous low point in cooperation in 1958. The history of this change is one whose roots are in an interplay of external pressures, regional developments, Cold War politics, and the internal disruptions of the confessional balance of power.

The period from 1943-1946 marked a time of considerable national unity in support of independence from French control. The emphasis on a sovereign Lebanese nation, to be free in its internal and external affairs, was dramatically articulated during the defiant events following the publication of the amended Constitution in 1943 and leading up to the evacuation of French troops in 1946. Further, guarantees of sovereignty with respect to Lebanon in the Arab world were spelled out in the Alexandria Protocol of October, 1944.[1]

But during these first years of the Lebanese Republic, under the presidency of Bishara al-Khouri, Lebanon followed a line of neutrality and overall friendly relations externally, contracting no treaties of a

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[1] Meo, Op. cit., p. 88.

nature that would cause any abridgement of sovereignty.[1] It must be admitted that it was perhaps easier for Lebanon to maintain such a stance in the absence of pronounced regional or international pressures for her to be otherwise: the Arab nations, at least up until 1952, were preoccupied with attaining complete independence; and the tremendous forces of the Cold War were not immediately unleashed in the Arab world after World War Two. In 1951, when such forces had begun to be felt, Lebanon refused to sign the M. E. D. O. formula.[2] In fact Lebanon and the other Arab states replied to the West's attempt at marshalling them into a Western-oriented alliance by working through the Arab League to produce an Arab Collective Security and Economic Treaty. This "correctness" towards the Arabs extended to opposing Israel, and to being a signatory to the Inter-Arab Joint Defense Alliance in 1950. Also in 1947, Lebanon supported Egypt against Britain in the United Nations, as later in 1956.[3]

Due to intense and lucrative commercial efforts by Lebanese-- as opposed to European immigrants, as in Egypt--Lebanon had not

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[1]
    Ibid., p. 91.

[2]
    Though Lebanon was in many ways closely tied to the West, yet she did not want to express, through adherence to the anti-Soviet M. E. D. O. scheme, a disaffection for the Soviet Union. Ibid., p. 91.

[3]
    Meo, Op. cit., p. 92.

only survived crises (massive emigration after 1860, devaluation of the Lebanese pound tied to the franc, and the loss of the silk industry), but had prompted an unbelievable boom of reconstruction and development in the country after the war. Importantly, the growth of native industry, the profits gained out of the oil boom in the Gulf, and the building up of a solid currency--all hinged upon a lenient even laissez-faire domestic fiscal policy coupled with a like external policy revolving around free controls and well-cultivated world contacts.[1]

Thus, for optimum growth potential, Lebanon has had to maintain economic relations with the world, hinged on political neutrality and liberal attractive terms. With regard to the Middle Eastern hinterland, Lebanon, much of whose GNP is derived from "service sectors," can easily afford to devote itself to trade, finance, and services; but on the basis that good relations with the interior be maintained. It was ever made clear to the Lebanese that Lebanon could not live "free" of the rest of the Arab world but had to maintain decent relations with the surrounding states, whose changing affairs always had their effects in Beirut.[2]

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[1] Charles Issawi, "Economic Development and Liberalism in Lebanon," Middle East Journal, Vol. XVIII, (Summer 1964), pp. 281-5.

[2] The repercussions of governmental changes in Damascus or Cairo were always felt in Lebanon: note how, for example, the ouster of King Farūq helped to precipitate the 1952 disturbances in Lebanon. The breakdown of the Syrian-Lebanese Customs Union (1950) and the merger of Syria and Egypt are other obvious examples. John Christopher, Lebanon Yesterday and Today (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1966), p. 166.

If traditionally the need to be "Arab" has been an integral part of characteristic Lebanese neutrality, nationalism and "protectionism" have been two other important general strains of thought in the evolution of a neutral Lebanon. With regard to the sometimes fierce nationalistic character of Lebanese neutrality, it was the Kata'ib Party under Pierre Jumayyil which, by engineering the protected sovereignty of states clause in the Arab League Charter in 1945, had in fact contributed a fundamental weakness to the unity of the Arab League.[1]

Great suspicions of both the "Greater Syria" and "Fertile Crescent" schemes on the part of nationalistic elements in the population, fiercely anxious to guard "Lebaneseness," led to strong outbursts against any plan or ideology which would tend to swallow up Lebanon. This sentiment, in part, helped to produce the break in the Syrian-Lebanese Customs Union in 1950. One source extends Lebanese "nationalism"--a force which has failed to ask deeper questions and has been merely a tool for brakesman-ship and protection--to the proportions of a force dominated by fear and dislikes of the great currents of Arab nationalism that made themselves felt especially after World War II.[2]

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[1]
Muhammad Majdhūb, Le Liban et L'Orient Arabe 1943-1956 (Aix-en-Provence: La Pensee Universitaire, 1956), p. 180.

[2]
Maurice Harari, "The Dynamics of Lebanese Nationalism," Current History, Vol. 36 (February 1959), p. 97.

Significant with regard to the events of 1958 is the fact that
Lebanese nationalism is really a composite force of various attitudes,
which tend, like the confessional equilibrium itself, to seek consensus
and balance, thus often appearing protective or negative rather than
generally purposeful.[1] The Lebanese sectarian "emulsion," which
appears to have to perpetuate itself in balance in order for the nature
and special character of Lebanon to endure is itself an aggregate not only
of affiliations and persuasions, but maḥsubiyya, or feudal loyalties,
which latter were very much operative in the critical days of 1958.

In fact, characteristically, between the Lebanese dawla, or State,
whose institutions presumably function as in other states, and the
Lebanese waṭan, or national polity, numerous leader (za'im)-client re-
lationships interpose themselves to the detriment of the expression of a
popular national ethos.[2] The result of basing national life to a large
degree on consensus--based on the unwritten National Pact, but not
upon a profound communality of feeling--was that Lebanon, from the

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[1]
Ibid., p. 98.

[2]
Michel Shiha, the Lebanese economist and intellectual, was one
of a genre of thinker in Lebanon who suggested that his country had
nothing to gain from popular uprisings of nationalism and popular feeling.
Lebanese "nationalism" on the other hand had to occupy itself with
the perfect harmonizing of its confessional parts, as if in perfecting a
microcosm of the world. Michel Shiha, Politique Interieure (Beyrouth:
Editions du Trident, 1964), pp. 287, 304.

beginning a non-integrated civil society, revolved politically "around an empty center."[1] The Parliament, ideally the expression of the Lebanese national will, serves largely to negotiate compromise, and many far-reaching decisions are arrived at outside of the Chamber.[2]

As if to add to the thwarting of dialogue between the watan and dawla concepts mentioned above, the political structure of Lebanon itself has exhibited certain inherent weaknesses. Much of the governmental and constitutional structures could be said to not be intrinsically Lebanese; rather they were the legacies of the Mandate period. Bicameralism, provided for in the Constitution of 1926, was suppressed in 1927 by a Constitutional law. Regionalism, which is to a considerable degree an inheritance from the divide and impera nature of the Mandate period, has continued to reveal itself in Lebanon through confessional partition and the list system--both of which practices have allowed feudal elements to impose their candidates and have prevented the electorate from choosing the most competent among the candidates.[3] Also Cabinets, which in any case have often been ephemeral, not allowing time for

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[1]

Leonard Binder. Politics in Lebanon (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), p. 3.

[2]

1958 offers a good example of the evolution of this off-stage politics in Lebanon, where for almost six months there was no significant parliamentary activity. The main figures during this time were the feudal zu'ama' ; internal zu'ama' politics had much to do with the 1957 elections and the events of 1958.

[3]

Majdhūb, Op. cit. , p. 74.

working relationships to be established, are not--according to Article 68 of the Lebanese Constitution--responsible collectively, although individual ministers may be called upon to resign.

The principle of confessional balance, considered by many to have been a crucial matter in 1958, extends into the Executive branch: the Chief Executive, with all the powers accorded him, is not anxious to dissolve the Chamber or abridge the mandate of deputies; rather, his interest is apt to lie in fostering and protecting a docile Chamber which will not fail to vote his projects.[1]

Lebanese institutions are not informed as much by democratic principles as they are bound by the necessity for the preservations of the Lebanese "emulsion," where no one sect or group should ever be allowed to predominate over others.[2] The President, himself a "balancer" rather than a moderator or initiator, has almost dictatorial powers under Article 58. This merely underlies the truth that dissolution of a government is based on a struggle between the Chamber and the President and not between organized political parties and the people. Note also that the "quasi-absolutism" of the Lebanese Chief Executive is a quality which, since it is not admitted, is not disposed

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[1] Ibid., p. 65.

[2] Henri Pharaon, Au Service du Liban et de son Unite (Beirut: n.p., 1959), p. 19.

to take charge of all the responsibilities of power.[1] One Lebanese military man blamed confessionalism as a basic cause of the inequities and failings of the Lebanese government, describing confessionalism "like a puzzle before which the best government finds itself tied hand and foot."[2]

Lebanese politician Kamāl Junblāṭ noted that as a buckler for nationalism, the National Pact was weak, creating in and of itself nothing progressive such as a positive concept of state or nation; rather it was an arrangement for balance which allowed within its bounds both anarchy and accretions of selfish interests.[3] In a governmental structure where the national ethos is characterized by a normally extra-parliamentary "balancing act," the leading characters have tended to be the Lebanese zu'ama' (leaders), acting as intermediaries between citizen and government and contending for influence. These zu'ama', who have for long characterized Lebanese political life, might be classified in different ways: while some are well to do business leaders, others might be described as somewhat sincere political radicals who have had an

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[1] Bahige Tabbarah, "Les Forces Politiques Actuelles Au Liban." (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Grenoble, 1954), p. 96.

[2] S. Naufal, Reflexions d'Un Ancien Serviteur de l'Etat (Beirut: n.p., 1952), p. 144.

[3] Kamal Junblāṭ, Haqīqat al-Thawrah al-Lūbnaniyah (Beirut: Dar el Nashr al-'Arabiyah, 1959), p. 161. Junblāṭ expresses his feeling that his colleagues in opposition (Messrs. Salām, Yāfī, Asad, and Himadeh) were not interested in a change of Lebanese governmental structure; rather they merely wanted to achieve a personal victory over Sham'ūn. p. 37ff.

occasion, especially lately, to encourage the hopes of often underprivileged client groups that have not been the recipients of the fruits of recent development in Lebanon.[1]

One strain of thought which one notes especially in those of the zu'ama' who, like Pierre Gumayyil, saw it as essential that Lebanese national life be preserved from adverse outside influences, was that of "protectionism." In 1842, 1860, and 1920, as well as during the Mandatory days preceeding independence, the French had come to the defense of and supported Christian elements (especially Maronite) in the Lebanese population. The Christians had been able to use the force of European colonialism for both protection and self-aggrandizement. There is no doubt that a sense of reliance on France and, later, the United States for defense of Lebanon's status quo and sovereignty dominated the political thinking of a minority (largely Christian) of the Lebanese. Representative of this feeling, for example, was the newspaper Le Soir, whose editorials in 1956 were supporting France's policy in Algeria, and by so doing ridiculing the Arab League.[2] With an as yet undefined force of Arab nationalism growing rapidly, many Lebanese Christians still

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[1] A leader like Sa'ib Salām for example, made use of the slogans of pan-Arabism in order to win favor in the Muslim community; however, there is reason to believe that some if not most aspects of Nasserism and pan Arabism were not especially attractive to Salām. Arnold Hottinger in Binder, Op. cit., pp. 96, 97.

[2] The Lebanese Government did not allow public demonstrations in favor of Algeria in 1955-56. Majdhūb, Op. cit., p. 189.

had not, by the 1950's, made a complete transition to a feeling of full

citizenship in a national state in the Arab world.[1]

After World War Two, journalist Ghassān Tuwayni noted the

Christian protectionist feeling was still strong and urged Lebanon to

abandon its desire to be "protected" from the Arab world.[2] It is highly

significant that the specter of "Christians in a sea of Muslims" arose in the

1950's in Lebanon, even though Nāṣir and other leaders made it clear that

the independence of Lebanon would be respected; in this context, for

whatever reasons, President Sham'ūn increasingly during the length of

his term posed as a Christian leader and gave the general impression to

his supporters that there was a "Muslim threat."[3]

If there was a certain inherent disease in the spirit of the National

Pact with respect to the realities of the confessional "emulsion," so

were there built in flaws regarding the Pact's attitude toward foreign

relations. Regionalism, chauvinism, protectionist tendencies, and

some aspects of confessionalism already alluded to, could not but

result in Lebanon's complete neutrality in foreign relations being

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[1]
    Fahim I. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington: Middle East
Institute, 1961), p. 29.

[2]
    Al-Nahar, June 16, 1945.

[3]
    Qubain, Op. cit., p. 42.

threatened or at least challenged.[1] Given as a premise a leadership

that was not completely disinterested, nor unaffected by regional,

sectarian, and personal considerations, one is led to surmise that

should the Chief Executive--traditionally a Maronite--be especially

swayed by Sectarian-Christian, traditional feudal, or protectionist-

chauvinist thinking, the requisite neutral nature of Lebanese foreign

policy commensurately would become tendentious, a fact that would be

underscored by the preponderant power of the Chief Executive compared

with other branches of the government in matters of policy making.

Lebanon's neutrality in foreign affairs was eventually sorely

compromised during the regime of President Camille Sham'ūn, as

will be seen. Nonetheless, public opinion in Lebanon continued to

be enthusiastic about various aspects of neutrality. Some advantages of

neutrality that were being pointed out were material growth, gains in

international prestige, and a contribution towards an international

detente.[2] The Nasserite press in Lebanon, predictably, was

highly favorable to the type of positive neutralism being voiced in

Cairo.[3] Contrasted with sympathy shown for positive neutralism, the

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[1]
It must be once again recalled that a main characteristic of the
Lebanese political system is the importance of the dialogue between
zu'ama' themselves and between the zu'ama' and the Government rather
than with the people to any significant degree. cf. supra, pp. 40-2.

[2]
Majdhūb, Op. cit., p. 217. Also M. Sacre in Revue du Liban
(October 29, 1955, p. 28.

[3]
Beirut al-Masa', March 28, 1956; also, al-Musawwar,
December 16, 1955.

favor shown toward a neutral Lebanese stance in the face of the Arab

nationalist movement on the part of Lebanese nationalist groups

seemed to revolve around a rather more "negative" status-quo orienta-

tion. Some of the latter elements were particularly anxious to preserve

by external neutrality an internal equilibrium which had become even

more strained than ever as a result of the incursion of Palestinian

refugees in Lebanon, a large percentage of whom were Moslims and

often anti-U. S. pan-Arabists.[1]

THE DRIFT FROM NEUTRALITY: THE BAGHDAD

PACT AND SUEZ

Lebanon, by the early 1950's was steering into a wind of polariza-

tions in regional Arab politics, armed as before with the trappings of

her precarious neutrality, passing still as the "middleman" and

arbiter of Middle Eastern political imbroglios. Divisions in the Arab

world--especially the growing far-reaching splits between traditional

and revolutionary approaches to government--were becoming hardened,

and increasingly Lebanon appeared unable to maintain a strictly

neutral course. The result, with the great significance it bore from

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[1] Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 264.

both the Lebanese and the U. S. points of view in 1958, was that Lebanon

progressively inclined towards the Iraqi camp.[1] For various reasons,

the Government of Lebanon was to diminish its emphasis on "independence",

which emphasis characterized the late Mandatory and early independence

years, in turning increasingly towards an alliance posture.

Sham'ūn had been elected President of the Republic in 1952 largely

through the efforts of seemingly united opposition elements who were

anxious to see changes in the corrupt administrative patterns established

by Bishara al-Khouri; as would be seen, especially in the example of

Kamāl Junblāt's later disaffection with Sham'ūn, the opposition alliance

was not to remain solid.[2] Under Sa'ib Salām's new Government of 1953

Junblāt's Parti Socialiste Progressiste (P. S. P.) was to become an

outspoken organ of criticism of the Sham'ūn regime, which latter,

according to Junblāt, in reality made no progressive changes or arrange-

ments in Lebanese internal or external political matters.[3]

From before the beginning of his term in office, Sham'ūn declared

himself in favor of an Arab unity which, he said, became disrupted in

the 1950's by misunderstanding and disagreements within the body of

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[1]
    Qubain, Op. cit., p. 39.

[2]
    Philip K. Hitti, Lebanon in History, (London: Macmillan and
Co., Ltd., 1957), p. 506.

[3]
    Majdhūb, Op. cit., pp. 107-112.

the Arabs.[1] As early as 1945 Sham'ūn had been scrupulous about observance of inter-Arab relations: from London he declared himself against signing a treaty with France before signatories of the Protocol of Alexandria had been consulted.[2]

Yet one quickly discerns elements both in Sham'ūn's personal foreign policy orientation and in the foreign policy trends of Lebanon in general in the late 1940's and early 1950's that constitute lacunae in a posture of strict solidarity with Arab causes. From the start, for example, Lebanese policy on Palestine was moderate. While Lebanon dutifully observed boycotts against Israel, at the same time some close observers noticed that the Lebanese were maintaining a kind of Arab solidarity that included avoiding "anything which might exacerbate the situation."[3] Lebanon cooperated fully with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in helping to settle the refugee problem. Far from the more militant Arab stance on the Palestine question, Lebanon was often accused, even by her own opposition leaders, of having tried to betray the Arab cause by seeking to bring about a separate settlement with Israel.[4]

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[1]
Camille Chamoun, Crise au Moyen Orient (Paris: Gaillimard, 1963), pp. 261-3.

[2]
Pharaon, Op. cit., p. 92.

[3]
Statement attributed to General Burns, former Chief of Staff for the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization; quoted in Christopher, Op. cit., p. 165.

[4]
John O'Kearney, Red Mirage (London: Macgibbon and Kee, 1958), p. 199.

There is also evidence in this non-solidarity context that Lebanon made considerable profits out of Egypt's immediate post-revolutionary economic muddle, in which a profitable entrepot trade was carried out with Egypt for indispensable medicines, and the Egyptian pound was forced down to a low of eight shillings.[1]

If French influence had declined through the World War II years, it was clear that the foreign policy of Lebanon during the Sham'ūn regime looked increasingly towards the West, seeking closer ties especially with the United States as the Cold War moved into a more acute phase, rather than looking ahead to any real hope for Arab independence.[2] In this connection Lebanon outlawed Communists and on the whole was not warm in its foreign relations with new Communist regimes in Europe.[3]

While, as was pointed out, internal discontinuities among zu'ama' riddled the internal structure of the Lebanese State with serious potential weakness; externally the Republic was subject to transgressing the foreign policy aspects of the National Pact not only because of protectionism and weighted sectarian considerations on the parts of

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[1] Ibid., p. 202.

[2] Ibid., p. 199.

[3] Lebanon did, however, sign trade agreements with East Germany (December 1953) and the Soviet Union (April 1954), and increased its exports to Yugoslavia (1954).

the President and also Foreign Minister Malik, but necessarily because

of external pressures themselves. The British, who suffered great

setbacks after 1946, had been anxious to work through the Hashemites

to gain influence in Lebanon, and used the vehicles of the Arab League

and the Mandate to achieve this. Britain, receiving few sympathetic

echoes from her attempts to further control and influence the area,

had opted for the Baghdad Pact, showing little enthusiasm for

Washington's adhering to the Pact.[1] Sham'ūn reports that the Americans

were extremely anxious to supplant British influence in Lebanon; in

fact, he says, the U.S. Embassy was at first not especially complimentary

to him because he had British leanings.[2]

President Sham'ūn, furthermore, reports that the U.S. Naval

Attaché was meeting with Lebanese army officers in 1952 in hopes of

engineering a coup that would further American influence in the area,

at the expense of the British.[3]

Alarmed by Soviet activities, the U.S. was after 1953 forging

ahead with its "Great Equation" in Lebanon as elsewhere. The attempts

by the United States to lay a foundation for local adherence to military

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[1] R. Aron, La Revue du Liban, December 3, 1955, p. 26.

[2] Chamoun, Op. cit., p. 253.

[3] Ibid.

defense schemes directed against Communism must be seen from

the Lebanese point of view as severe external pressures. There was

speculation that British and American intelligence services had (1)

offered money to Kamāl Junblāt in 1953 to cease his campaign against

military alliances; and (2) had helped to unseat Bishara al-Khouri in

1952.[1] Junblāt has gone on record as saying that President Sham'ūn

had numerous contacts with Western intelligence operations and was,

in fact, receiving a stipend from the British.[2]

It appeared as if there had been some response to Western

pressures on the part of the Lebanese Government: severe measures

against Communism were being taken for one thing; also, demonstra-

tions against a bilateral U.S. treaty and project for common defense

in 1954 were repressed by the Government to the point that some critics

of Sham'ūn's policy stance wondered whether Western pressures had

come to oppose national movements.[3] Similarly, the offices of

al-Ahad, which was editorializing against the British "orbit," were

ransacked in 1955 allegedly by the Deuxieme Bureau.

The financial arrangements made for aid to Lebanon had been

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[1]

Majdhub, Op. cit., pp. 107-8.

[2]

Author's interview with Kamāl Junblāt, Mukhtara, Lebanon,
August 4, 1968.

[3]

al-Talagraph, March 29, 1954.

oriented in such a way as to compromise Lebanese neutrality with respect to the Cold War and so as to give U. S. authorities considerable privileges of participation and discretionary adjustment in the administration and execution of controls. Notes from the American Ambassador (Hare) to the Lebanese Government in May 1954 expressed dissatisfaction with Lebanese sales of "strategic materials" to Soviet bloc nations.[1] Hare's reminders did not have to recall that U. S. technical assistance accorded to Lebanon fell under the framework of public law 535 of 1950, amended by the Mutual Security Act of 1951-1952; the latter makes continued aid conditional on a country's refraining from exporting strategic materials behind the Iron Curtain.[2] Furthermore, additional economic aid, then being sought by the Lebanese Government, could not be granted by the U. S. unless in conformity with the Battle Act of 1951, wherein Article 103 immediately ends all American aid to a country exporting strategic materials to a Communist country.[3]

Another American tack, taken in the hope of getting some popular support against Communism, was launched under the auspices of the American Friends of the Middle East (A. F. M. E.). In what much

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[1] See Orient Presse for May 1954.

[2] Majdhub, Op. cit., p. 200.

[3] Ibid.

public opinion considered to be a political ploy guised in religious garb, A. F. M. E. organized an Islamo-Christian Conference in Beirut, with a principal goal being the study of the flood of atheism and Communism in the world.[1]

As time wore on in the 1950's it appeared that Lebanese and United States interests in political matters in the area were running in channels that were much similar. Both Lebanon and the United States suffered deteriorations in their relations with Egypt and Syria by the mid-fifties. In addition, the polarizing of Arab politics, galvanized by the new Arab nationalist movement into what was essentially becoming an Egyptian-Iraqi conflict, was bringing both the U. S. and Lebanon to be more closely allied with the politics of Nūrī as-Sa'īd in Baghdad.[2]

Combined with a disintegration of good will between Lebanon and Syria, which was itself a force moving Lebanon away from a strict impartiality and cooperative spirit towards the Arab world, was an improvement in Lebanese-Turkish relations that could not but be welcomed in Washington.[3] There is no question that the issue of Lebanese-Syrian relations, which was of importance to Washington, and which came into the open in 1957-1958, caused splits in Lebanese

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[1]
For editorial comment critical of this plan see Beirut al-Masa' for the period 22-27 April, 1954.

[2]
Qubain, Op. cit., p. 35. Also O'Kearney, Op. cit., p. 202.

[3]
Qubain, Op. cit., p. 35.

public opinion which had important internal repercussions during the insurrection of 1958.[1]

It has been suggested that, far from being opposed to the Western-oriented "anti-Communist" Baghdad Pact, Sham'ūn was disposed to see Lebanon adhere to that agreement, were it not for the local and regional reaction he would have to anticipate.[2] By the time of the Baghdad Pact's signing in 1955, Sham'ūn was already attributing a blatently aggressive orientation to Cairo and was attributing a "liebensraum" and "Mein Kamf" quality to Nāṣir's Philosophy of the Revolution.[3]

President Sham'ūn was much alarmed by Egyptian activity in Jordanian refugee camps and by Ba'ath penetration into Jordanian political and military life, especially after the expulsion of Glubb Pasha in 1956.[4] Among other things it was perhaps fear of these new forces in the Arab world that brought about the conflict that existed between the myth and the reality of Lebanon's position on the Baghdad Pact.

Sham'ūn appeared at the time of the Pact's signing--an event that was to shake the Arab world--to be the traditional Lebanese arbiter between conflicting viewpoints; the President appeared anxious

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[1]
  Ibid.

[2]
  O'Kearney, Op. cit., p. 202.

[3]
  Chamoun, Op. cit., p. 337.

[4]
  Ibid., pp. 325-330.

for a solution that would reconcile differing points of view with a mind to salvaging the Arab League.[1] Put differently, with the Arab League having categorically condemned the Baghdad Pact, Lebanon could not afford to antagonize that organization without running grave risks internally and externally.[2]

Ostensibly Lebanon remained neutral, simultaneously rejecting a new mutual alliance proposed by Egypt and Saudi Arabia. On another level, however, the Pact offered some attractive aspects to the Lebanese regime, not to be too quickly dismissed: (1) military and economic assistance from the West would have been forthcoming; (2) possible assurances from Iraq and other members of the Pact would have given Lebanon some feeling of security with regard to Syria. Such feelings were nurtured by pro-Western elements in Lebanon such as the Kata'ib party. The fact was that Lebanon's reputed neutrality was being subtly compromised with regard to the Pact, for in supporting Iraq's right to conclude such an agreement and not showing herself opposed to an agreement that could not but increase tensions in the area, Lebanon demonstrated a flagging neutral spirit.

Public disaccord with the Baghdad Pact grew in Lebanon while

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[1] Statement by Camille Sham'un in Human Relations Area Files, Inc., Special Warfare Area Handbook for Lebanon, (Washington D. C.: January, 1958), p. 22.

[2] Lenczowski, Op. cit., p. 334.

the Government hesitated for a considerable time in committing itself.[1]

Some public opinion, considering the Palestine question a more pressing

problem than that of alleged Soviet expansionist tendencies, spoke

against fighting a Russian diplomacy which might at least force some

break in a Cold War structure that so far had worked largely to the

benefit of Israel.[2]

Besides neutralist pressures on Sham'ūn to refrain from associat-

ing Lebanon with a Western-oriented Pact, there were distinct forces

being applied on Sham'ūn to actually link Lebanon with the Syrian-

Egyptian Pact. In fact so strong were these pressures that Sham'ūn

appealed to Prime Minister Anthony Eden of England; the Prime Minister

indicated both that he would do all he could to reduce these counter-

pressures and that he was in contact with Secretary Dulles with respect

to the matter.[3]

President Sham'ūn's own brand of thinking at the time of the

Baghdad Pact was a subtle mixture of tendencies. While his growing

concern with the Nasserist wave caused him to worry about Lebanon's

being one day submerged into a united Arab state, at the same time he

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[1]

Raymond Edde in Beirut, Oct. 25, 1955. Also, Op. cit.,
p. 95.

[2]

La Revue du Liban, Feb. 18, 1956, p. 3.

[3]

Sham'ūn indicated that large amounts of Saudi money were
abroad in Lebanon and Iraq helping the Communists; Anthony Eden,
Full Circle (Cambridge, Mass.: Riverside Press, 1960), p. 382.

he urged increased contact of the Arab states with regional and inter-
national powers, Arab and non-Arab alike, in order that the Arab
"horizon" be expanded.[1] In this light, pleading for regional solidarity
rather than rash moves in reaction to the specter of "derogation of
sovereignty" (Nāṣir was threatening to pull out of the Arab Mutual Defense
Pact if Iraq signed the Baghdad Pact), Sham'ūn the "impartial" arbiter
appeared the voice of realism, enumerating the advantages of wide
alliances and frank world contacts. But in Sham'ūn's actions during
the Baghdad Pact deliberation, one discerns two other important strains:
(1) the President himself was not unafraid of derogation of sovereignty
in the case of Lebanon, and for all of his urging of broader lines of
contact among Arabs, refused to be a party to the March 2, 1955 accord
between Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, because such a move would
have entailed a unified Arab military command and prohibited foreign
alliances; and (2) Sham'ūn was no fool and was correctly cool to Adnan
Menderes' urgings that Lebanon join with Turkey in the N. A. T. O.
cornucopeia.[2]

One can only speculate, adding later evidences of President
Sham'ūn's usage and treatment of the Arab League, as to whether he

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[1] Chamoun, Op. cit., p. 269.
[2] Ibid., pp. 267-272.

was interested in strengthening that organ or merely wished to keep it feeble as a guarantee in part for the preservation of the Lebanese personality.

The Lebanese Government finally (December 3, 1955) did publish a communiqué indicating an unwillingness to become linked with the Baghdad Pact. But this reaction had nonetheless not been spontaneous nor had a neutral "response" been automatic. The year 1955 was a sort of turning point in the matter of Lebanese neutrality. To some extent until then Lebanon had kept close post-war links with the United States without drastically compromising its neutrality: there had been visits by the Sixth Fleet and considerable U.S. non-military aid to Lebanon; and Charles Malik, the Lebanese delegate at the U.N., gained a reputation for often defending the smaller developing nations against the larger.[1] But a number of forces converged upon one another in 1955 to pave the way ultimately toward the crisis of 1958: there were growing personal dissatisfactions and internal rivalries in Lebanon; regional frictions including "Nasserism;" and the Cold War conflict with its manifold implications.[2] 1955 also marked the year in which Sham'ūn felt Syria, by virtue of its drowning in external forces, became clearly committed

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[1]
    Christopher, Op. cit., p. 168.
[2]
    Qubain, Op. cit., p. 27.

to its own self-destruction.[1]

Ideologically one could isolate by 1955 a number of general forces
that were exerting pressure on Lebanon: Lebanese nationalism, Greater
Syrianism, and Panarabism. The turn of events in Syria, coupled with
the rising of Nāṣir's star among panarabists, were combining to give
much of the Lebanese Muslim (especially Sunni) rank and file a sense
of loyalty to individuals and places outside Lebanon; for many Lebanese
Muslims felt little fealty to a Lebanese State which, they felt, had been
an artificial creation of the French.[2] Also, with the exodus of many
members of the Parti Populaire Syriene (P.P.S.) from Syria--most of
them conservative and pro-Western Syrians who opposed the Ba'ath--
and their subsequent alliance with Lebanese nationalists against the
threat of Panarabism came (1) an increased polarization of the internal
situation in Lebanon and, in another context, (2) an alliance that could
not be unattractive to the United States.[3]

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[1]

Chamoun, Op. cit., p. 263.

[2]

George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 3rd. ed.,
Ithaca (N. Y.): Cornell University Press, 1962, p. 355.

[3]

Sham'ūn actively cultivated the support of the P.P.S. as early
as 1955; and the Party's ideas on Syria and Egypt were much identical
to his own; Qubain, Op. cit., p. 85. In view of the U.S.' increased
reliance on Baghdad as the cornerstone of the Middle East alliance
system, it should be noted that by 1954 high Iraqi leaders were aware
that the P.P.S. would take orders and help from Iraq in putting various
pressures on the Syrian regime. Ibid., p. 84.

The 1956-1957 period saw the spirit of the National Pact being undermined even more, both in internal and external respects. Significantly, again, as before, there were in the worsening of Lebanese relations with some of its neighbor states and the erosion of Lebanon's neutrality, growing points of accord and mutual interest between Lebanon and the United States. Sham'ūn's stated beliefs in the growing malignancy and Communist coloring of Nasserist "plots," and in the blackmail properties of Cairo's brand of positive neutralism, fitted well with above-mentioned United States opinions on the same subjects, although the Lebanese President went so far as to say that Washington had adapted to this neutralism and was attempting to cultivate it with gifts at the expense of the United States' "friends".[1]

President Sham'ūn's failure to break off diplomatic relations with either Britain or France after the Suez invasion was doubly disastrous inside Lebanon, since the growing pro-Cairo segment of the population, hardening along sectarian lines at least with regard to the pan-Arab question, had registered Nāsir's dealing with the West a victory for the Egyptian President. For this segment of the population, as well as for others critical of Sham'ūn's failures at maintaining Lebanese neutrality, the backdrop to all of Sham'ūn's actions subsequent to the

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[1]

Chamoun, Op. cit., p. 359.

1955-1956 dealings with the Baghdad Pact question, was a basic policy
not of impartiality but of support for the Hashemites in Baghdad and
Amman in their quarrels with 'Abd al-Nāṣir: the distinction between
Lebanon's technical neutrality and her actual predilections in foreign
policy were becoming more patent.

Emile Bustani attributed to Sham'ūn the statement that the latter
wished to break off diplomatic ties with France and Great Britain.[1] But
the facts are compelling: at the end of a spectrum which included Saudi
Arabia and Syria having severed relations with both France and Great
Britain; and Iraq and Jordan having parted with France only; stood
Lebanon with that nation's ties maintained as before. The record
further shows that Sham'ūn was precipitous in his firing of Premier
Abdullah Yāfī and Foreign Minister Sa'ib Salām, both of whom had been
outspoken in the autumn of 1956 in demanding that relations be severed
with Britain and France. Salām at the time, perhaps bolstered some-
what by Cairo's recent "independent" actions, was definitely showing
a cooling attitude toward the West--as shown by his hard line with
regard to the Iraq Petroleum Company's transit rights.[2] Salām, whose
dismissal caused anger, recrimination and pressure in and from Cairo,
was replaced by Charles Malik, of whose Western sympathies few were
in doubt.

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[1] George Kirk, Op. cit., pp. 119-120.

[2] Ibid.

The external picture of Lebanon's role in the Suez affair could, in a simplified picture, be construed as neutral. In fact, it appears that not only was Lebanon's role in the crisis partisan and studied, but it paralleled to some extent the position of the United States toward the entire matter (especially on the question of withdrawal). The mood of the meeting called by Sham'ūn in Beirut in November 1956 was one of sympathy for and solidarity with Nāṣir. President Quwatly of Syria praised President Sham'ūn for having "brought together the Arabs and undertaking the task of uniting them around a common goal."[1] As later in 1958, when Lebanon invoked the solidarity of the League to deal with a problem which affected Lebanon as well as all the Arab world, the 1956 Beirut meeting of the Arab States failed to arrive at any unanimous decisions, especially about the breaking off of diplomatic ties. There is evidence, however, that compels one to think that Sham'ūn called upon a fragile Arab solidarity, figuring rightly that there would be no agreement on a common policy; and Lebanon would thus be free to pursue whatever course of action it wished.[2] This, of course, would amount to a certain abuse of the section of the National Pact which dealt with Lebanon's relations with the Arab world.

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[1] Chamoun, Op. cit., p. 313.

[2] Andrew Tully, CIA The Inside Story (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1962), p. 85.

Sham'ūn's own explanation was that he had hoped for unanimity early in the conflict, but that since such an expression had not been forthcoming, either during or after the combat, time had rendered the efficacy of a diplomatic break virtually nil, and that dedication at the time should not center around secondary questions but on that of withdrawal of forces from Egypt.[1] Referring to the question of diplomatic severence, Sham'ūn, appearing to hug the breast of Arab solidarity while leaving aside the spirit of individual national sovereignty which Lebanon had supported consistently, noted in retrospect:

> Personally I had no faith in the efficacity of isolated acts and remained convinced that only the taking of a unanimous position by the Arab countries could lead to a tangible result.[2]

President Sham'ūn further justified his actions in the crisis by saying that "a very important segment of the population" considered that a rupture with Britain and France would work to no one's benefit, and would, in fact, prevent Lebanon from acting as an impartial arbiter keeping in touch if need be with the Western Powers.[3] In a Middle Eastern context which Sham'ūn described as a choice between solidarity with Cairo or adherence to international convention and order, Sham'ūn

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[1] Chamoun, Op. cit., p. 307. The emphasis was on the Lebanese "non-parochial" approach--especially in the new Foreign Ministry-- toward settling the problem. Ibid., p. 315.

[2] Ibid., p. 292.

[3] Ibid., p. 292.

appeared not to consider as "very important" a large part if not a majority of the Lebanese population who, even if they did not so view the arrangement of foreign policy alternatives, nonetheless felt that diplomatic breaks as an expression of Arab solidarity were called for. As with any problem deeply affecting Lebanon, sectarian differences and expressions naturally let their presences be felt in political matters, to make the overall situation in Lebanon in 1956 already extremely acute. Typically, disequilibrium in foreign affairs was having its effect on internal balances.[1]

It is possible that the Lebanese Government, by emphasizing or even exaggerating its neutrality after Suez, might have stopped some dangerous internal trends. Such was not the case. And as the Suez issue died down the growing internal unrest in Lebanon was further exacerbated by a further derogation of neutrality combined with the highly controversial issue of Presidential succession.

LEBANON AND THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE

1957, a year which saw a wholesale deterioration of the U. S. position in the Middle East, was a year in which the final backdrop to internal disintegration and external strain in Lebanon was created: the two events characterizing this period were (1) the acceptance of the

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[1]

Meo, Op. cit., p. 217.

Eisenhower Doctrine by the Government of Lebanon; and (2) the Lebanese national elections of 1957. It was the effects wrought by these events that made the 1958 crisis so different from the situation in 1949, when Bishara al-Khouri was seeking to succeed himself as President.

Significantly, the United States' special envoy James P. Richards, who was to sound out the feelings of support for the proposed Middle East Resolution in January 1957, was scheduled to visit only Lebanon, Libya, and Turkey, although he eventually did go to fifteen countries.[1] What enthusiasm that was generated by Richards' visit was expressed largely in the capitals of Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran, in addition to Lebanon, putting the latter country into the singular position of being the only Arab state to openly express support for the new American policy. One source, referring to Richards as a "salesman-Congress-man," expressed a belief that Richards had "oversold his product in Beirut and not sold it at all elsewhere."[2] President Sham'ūn isolated the principal element of Richards' mission as being the guarantee of the United States that the Middle East Resolution did not entail any entangling mutual assistance clauses and that the U.S. wanted to act strictly within the bounds of the U.N. Charter.[3]

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[1] See p. 51n.

[2] Charles W. Thayer, Diplomat (New York: Harper and Bros., 1959), p. 2.

[3] Chamoun, Op. cit., p. 360.

There is no doubt that the aspects Sham'ūn emphasized with regard

to the Eisenhower Doctrine were those features which were creating

for the Lebanese President--whose term in office had nearly expired--

a potential lever for American support should the difficulties he ex-

perienced with Cairo get out of hand.[1] While Lebanese neutrality was

still being ostensibly preserved, and Lebanon refused outwardly to join

either the Egyptian-Syrian or the Iraqi camps, Sham'ūn's statements

in early 1957 to the effect that Lebanon would not have its policy dictated

by any nation (referring indirectly to Egypt) can be taken as something

of an indication that a potential counter-poise to Nāṣir in Lebanese

foreign policy would not be unwelcome to the Lebanese President.

In line with this desire of Sham'ūn's to have some practical leverage

if need be, the President emphasized that Cairo was becoming more and

more Communist prone; in the same breath he shrugged off opposition

in Lebanon to the Eisenhower Doctrine as Cairo-inspired and ordered,

thereby by implication, affixing on the "opposition" a slight stain of

allegedly pro-Communist, pro-authoritarian, anti-U. N. Charter

sentiment.[2] Charles Malik proceeded, at the time when Lebanon

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[1]

Meo, Op. cit., p. 127.

[2]

For Sham'ūn's feelings on the Communist "menace" in the
Middle East, see Chamoun, Op. cit., pp. 360-364. Sham'ūn saw the
Communist-inspired leaders in Syria as also being blindly submissive to
Nāṣir (a simultaneous loyalty which was also to be quite comprehensible
to many American policy makers in 1958). Ibid., p. 354.

accepted the principles of the Eisenhower Doctrine, to find the "threat of international Communism" increasing in the Middle East.[1] The emphasis on Communism of course underlined Lebanon's recognition of the fact that the Eisenhower Doctrine was primarily an anti-Communist vehicle which carried with it certain other secondary advantages and provisions. Politicians such as Hamid Franjieh wondered if the possibility or actuality of American intervention in Lebanon, in order to meet a threat of Communism, would in fact not stimulate its growth.[2]

In favor of the belief that Sham'ūn had personal or local hopes for utilizing the provisions of the Eisenhower Doctrine, as opposed to a more general belief in allowing the Doctrine to further eventual communications among the Arab states, aided by Lebanon's good offices, was the fact that within twenty-four hours of Eisenhower's delivery of his plan for the Middle East, Lebanon had accepted it--as one Lebanese politician put it, "even before we had any notion what it was all about."[3] In view of the conditions Sham'ūn had created, impelling the Lebanese Government to adhere to the formal enunciation of a United States "doctrine" on the Middle East, the President's precuationary aside to Foreign Minister Malik seems nothing more

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[1]
O'Kearney, Op. cit., p. 197.

[2]
Ibid., p. 215.

[3]
Ibid., p. 197.

than a token stipulation: on January 6, 1957 Sham'ūn advised Malik "to
the extent that the American aid is disinterested, Lebanon could accept
it. "[1]

The President was not unaware that both the nature of Eisenhower's
Middle East scheme and the haste with which it was accepted in Lebanon
had caused serious doubts in old and new political quarters. Some
observers explained the haste of Sham'ūn's acceptance of the Doctrine
in terms of his desire to "throw confusion" into the opposition elements
in anticipation of the coming June elections. [2] Other critics of the
Government's action saw in the construction by the Sham'ūn regime of
a bi-polarity in the Middle East between "Nasserite machinations"
(Sham'ūn's expression) and the saving anti-Communist forces of the
West a perhaps artificial fabrication that could more easily introduce
the Cold War into the Arab world. For example, Henri Pharaon, one
of the most moderate of the Government critics, noted that the
acceptance of the Doctrine by Lebanon was tantamount to an admission
that the tensions in the area were grounded in Communist influences,
especially since no allusion was made to the Palestine problem[3]

Another objection that reflected moderate thinking on the optimum

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[1] Chamoun, Op. cit., p. 350.

[2] Ibid., p. 53.

[3] Pharaon, Op. cit., p. 53.

functioning of government in Lebanon was that the speed with which

the Middle East Resolution had been welcomed in Lebanon--even

before it had been ratified by the U.S. Senate--suggested a policy

not well-grounded in the Lebanese nation itself: it was not in the long-

term interest of either of the signatories of the Lebanese-American

Communiqué of 16 March 1957 (which amounted to Lebanon's formal

acceptance of the Doctrine) that the latter document remain an object

of suspicion to a large part of the Lebanese nation.[1] Longer considera-

tion with more common accord would, some argued, have provided

more latitude for amendment or clarification especially with reference

to Section II, rather than let it be assumed in some quarters of both

Lebanon and the Arab world that the Eisenhower Doctrine was merely

an extension of the Baghdad Pact, which Lebanon had never joined, to

the latter country.[2]

Much of the moderate opposition to the Doctrine, which was

often labeled anti-Western by the Government, was merely interested

in the preservation of a neutrality that was essential to Lebanon for

some of the following reasons: (1) Economic survival was nearly

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[1]

Ibid., p. 51.

[2]

Section II related to mutual guarantees between the signatories
for the safeguarding of one another's political and territorial integrity.
There was some sentiment in favor of clarifying these guarantees and
interpreting them to cover challenges to sovereignty from any quarter,
Communist or otherwise.

impossible--and would have been more impossible after the 1958

U.A.R. formation--with an anti-Syrian policy; (2) the U.S. might well

someday turn on its "allies" as at Suez, leaving Lebanon in an

embarrassing position; (3) the power of Cairo to disrupt Arab countries

was becoming more apparent, and it thus seemed imperative that

lines with Cairo not be stretched to the breaking point.[1]

Charles Malik could perhaps argue effectively that the Communiqué

had not given the U.S. any political or military concessions in Lebanon,

but his postulations that the spirit of the National Pact had been little

violated seem in somewhat bad faith. While, for example, the Foreign

Minister argued that Lebanon had and always would consult the Arab

League on major foreign policy matters, there could be no question in

any Lebanese mind of what would be the effects of Lebanon's unilateral

acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine on certain of the member states

of the Arab League. The lesson of Iraq and the Baghdad Pact was

recorded history. Some other opposition elements in Lebanon sug-

gested as how the most important issue raised by the question of the

Eisenhower Doctrine was whether Egypt might eventually be isolated

or compelled to give up its policy of positive neutralism--with great

long-range repercussions in the entire Arab world.[2]

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[1]
Bushrod Howard, "Lebanon: Firm Allies who Fade Away,"
New Republic, June 30, 1958, p. 1.

[2]
Meo, Op. cit., p. 127.

These doubts by opposition elements might have found subs-
tantiation in Washington and further corroboration in the Lebanese

Executive branch; Sham'ūn's views on the "cancer" of Nasserism were

patently clear, and it seems that, like Washington, the Lebanese

President was putting his faith in counterpoises to Nāṣir, as evidenced

by his warm welcoming of the treaty between King Sa'ūd and the United

States in February 1957.[1]

The results of the Eisenhower Doctrine's acceptance in Lebanon

were to bring that country out of the backwater and into the middle of

a fast-moving tide of internal, external, and Cold War politics. Before

the foreign policy changes inherent in subscription to the U.S. Middle

East Resolution crystallized into actual election issues in the spring of

1957, it was obvious that turbulent currents of opinion were flowing

together and building momentum.

Both zu'ama' and masses in the Sunni community, who, as mentioned

above, heard and felt that the real essence of the Eisenhower Doctrine

was a Western (and now Western-Sham'ūnist) attempt at hamstringing

'Abd al-Nāṣir, saw in Eisenhower's almost arbitrary "anti-Communist"

powers a threat to their sympathy with Syria, which might at some

point be "declared" a Communist-controlled base, bringing it to pass

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[1] Chamoun, Op. cit., pp. 356-7.

that Americans might someday be fighting Syrians. The confessional tenor of the growing opposition, acting as a catalyst to the heat of the argument, called upon past associations of the Christian community with France as analogous to a similar ploy by the Christians to use the United States in support of their present position.[1]

The formation or solidification of two hostile camps was the anxious end product of the Eisenhower Doctrine in Lebanon itself. It was, in fact, that Doctrine which was instrumental in hardening a more "normal"--in terms of channels of operation--opposition into a "United National Front" by April of 1957.[2] Not only a large segment of the Lebanese population, if not a majority, but probably a majority of the influential leaders from both major faiths came to oppose the Administration, which was from the beginning largely supported by Maronites, the Kata'ib, and the P.P.S.[3]

Externally, Lebanon's acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine for all intents and purposes brought Lebanon openly into the Cold War on the side of the West. Regionally, Cairo and Damascus, feeling

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[1] Meo, Op. cit., p. 129.

[2] Qubain, Op. cit., p. 47.

[3] Ibid., p. 46. If the P.P.S. and the Kata'ib parties were not of a like mind on all points, they found common cause in supporting Sham'un in his pro-Western orientation against Cairo-oriented Arab nationalism and Communism.

Lebanon now a party to a movement for the destruction or at least

isolation of Syria and Egypt under their present regimes, began to seek

to undermine Lebanon in whatever ways possible.[1] The propaganda war

which ensued through the mass media was to be of considerable importance

as a focal point for U. N. and extra-U. N. debate over the justification

for the U. S. intervention in Lebanon in July of 1958. For Egypt and

Syria, Lebanon's new attachment to Washington merely confirmed the

belief in the former two countries that Lebanon's failure to several

diplomatic ties with the West in 1956 had been a studied move; and that

there was all the more reason never to forgive the Sham'ūn regime for

this dereliction. By September of 1957, Syrian Foreign Minister Bitar

could accuse Lebanon of having aligned itself so closely with the West

as to be "completely unable to contribute positively towards settling

Arab questions."[2]

With regard to its effects within the country, the issue of the

Eisenhower Doctrine can only be said to have had egregious con-

sequences for Lebanon. Its acceptance was effected in the nature of

a fait accompli and was not allowed to be framed by a national

discussion. Thus it was that Cairo and Damascus later could

distinguish between the Lebanese people and the Sham'ūn Government.

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[1] George Kirk, Op. cit., p. 121.

[2] O'Kearney, Op. cit., p. 82.

The real issues at stake--Lebanon's national and international

character--were left untouched by the hazy dialectic of Sham'ūn and his

supporters. Emile Bustani, for example, argued that Lebanon, which

had always been favorable to Arab nationalism, had accepted the

Eisenhower Doctrine as a means of strengthening ties with the Arab

world, as well as with the West.[1]

The Arab world appeared to be little in sympathy with Lebanon's

attempts at ameliorating regional solidarity through bilateral pacts with

Washington; nor was the illusion of a rampant Communism, the

penetration of which myth was an important lever on U.S. support,

one which struck much response in most Arab capitals.[2] Much of the

Lebanese opposition to the Eisenhower Doctrine addressed itself

objectively to the question of a hastily concluded international commitment,

whose economic and military benefits might have been forthcoming

outside of the limitations imposed by this particular Pact with its

possibly dangerous anti-Communist stipulations.[3] The charges of

anti-Westernism leveled at the opposition were meaningless: the only

anti-Westernism of such leaders as Patriarch Ma'ūshi, Henri Pharaon,

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[1]
    Bustani, Op. cit., p. 70.

[2]
    O'Kearney, Op. cit., p. 198.

[3]
    Meo, Op. cit., p. 129.

Hamid Franjieh, Bishara al-Khouri, and Fu'ad 'Ammoun consisted in their firm belief that Lebanese survival depended on genuine Lebanese neutrality.[1]

It became even clearer, especially at the time of the resignation of seven Opposition deputies in early April 1957 that the attractive gloss with which the Sham'ūn regime had covered the Eisenhower Doctrine covered over the fact that there was a highly personal aspect to President Sham'ūn's accepting the U. S. policy as an integral factor of Lebanese foreign policy. Whether or not President Sham'ūn sought largely to use the Eisenhower Doctrine as a vehicle for self-aggrandize-ment or self-preservation, clearly many Opposition deputies felt that it was not simply the issue of the Government's foreign policy that was in question but in fact the question of the complex of personal and other motivations with which Cammile Sham'ūn inspired Lebanese policy.[2]

DETERIORATION IN LEBANON

The deflation of the neutral spirit in Lebanese policy making, which had led to perhaps predictably disastrous internal consequences

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[1]
    Bushrod Howard, Op. cit.
[2]
    Meo, Op. cit., p. 129.

had worked superficially to the advantage of the United States as Secretary Dulles viewed the situation. The Lebanese-American Communiqué of March 16, 1957, in terms of Dulles' "Great Equation" applied to the Middle East, could have been seen as a point scored against an indeterminate entity, "Nasserism-Communism." President Eisenhower was quick to praise the "pro-Western" personalities in Lebanon, namely Sham'ūn, Malik, and Prime Minister Sāmī as-Sulḥ.

The United States had followed President Sham'ūn's activities with more than concern. It has been suggested and charged that United States Intelligence services had much to do with Mr. Sham'ūn's accession to office in 1952, and that close contacts were maintained between the President and the C. I. A. through the 1958 crisis.[1] By mid-1957, after the June elections in Lebanon, in which many Opposition deputies were not returned to office, Secretary Dulles was striking a note of alarm; he "expressed concern that the elections had gone so completely our way as to create internal tension."[2] As shall be seen in a later chapter, since 1957 was a year in which the United States wished to act in a particularly delicate fashion in the Middle East, an explosive

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[1] Kamāl Junblāt alleges Sham'ūn was in the pay of the British intelligence services and worked closely with the CIA as well; author's interview with Kamāl Junblāt, Op. cit.; also see Harry Ellis, Challenge in the Middle East (Ronald Press Co., 1960), p. 68.

[2] Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 265.

situation in Lebanon could not but be unnerving to Washington. In order that the American response to the crisis of 1958 be seen in the proper context--that is against the background of a spectrum of U.S. relations with Middle Eastern nations ranging from neutral to non-neutral "danger zone" shades, which relationships were the fruits not of the year 1958 but of a decade--it is necessary that the ramifications of the final internally critical pro-American posture of the Sham'ūn Government be mentioned. Since personal inter-zu'ama' struggles played their role in the 1958 insurrection, it is perhaps a half-truth to say, as did one observer, that "Secretary Dulles' mania for firm allies in the Middle East rather than friendly States is the direct cause of the present civil war in Lebanon."[1]

Yet without doubt the reverberations stimulated in Lebanon by the issue of the Eisenhower Doctrine, followed to their logical conclusions, are the outcome of a foreign posture in the absence of which a Civil War might have been averted or arrested. Aware of the facts in the case, the United States took no decisive action to arrest the inevitable consequences of its close ties with Sham'ūn until, with the advent of the Iraqi coup of 14 July 1958, the rift in its position in the Middle East was nearly terminal. The crisis widened to breaking point.

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[1] Howard, Op. cit., p. 1.

Growth of the Opposition at Election Time

While the Eisenhower Doctrine was a principal topic for debate

in the spring of 1957, the issue of the enlargement of the Chamber was

of great parallel significance. The Opposition, in one momentous step

at this crucial political juncture, had set the stage for their own eclipse.

In the middle of an electoral law battle, seven key Opposition figures

resigned largely because of a vote of confidence that the Government had

received on its domestic and foreign policies on April 5.[1] In terms of

their own political futures the significance of their resignation lay in

the fact that their presence could not be felt in the debates then being

carried on with regard to reapportionment and redistricting; the roots

of the--for them--disastrous results of the June elections can be

traced to this point in time, where the Government had a freer hand

to see constituencies redrawn to its satisfaction, if not gerrymandered

for its survival. Some gerrymandering on the part of the Government

clearly cut across the traditional territories of Kamāl Junblāt and

Sa'ib Salām.[2]

The process leading toward the isolation and solidification of an

Opposition, now beginning to grow in an extra-Parliamentary fashion,

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[1]   Meo, Op. cit., p. 132. The men in question were, Rashīd Karāmī,
Hamīd Franjieh, Abdullah al-Yāfī, Kamāl al-Asād, Sabri Hamāde, and
Abdullah al-Hajj.

[2]   Hottinger, "Zu'ama and Parties," Op. cit., p. 131.

evolved to a further stage. The statement issued on April 6 by

twenty-three leaders of diverse political factions to the Lebanese

President showed this very concern, that the structure of the State

was working without some of its constituent elements and that there

should be some pause in this process: notable in their statement was

a call for (1) no new foreign pacts until a new Chamber should be elected;

(2) increased membership in the Chamber from 66 to 88; and the insti-

tution of a neutral cabinet at once for the purpose of supervising the

parliamentary elections.[1]

Personal antipathy to Sham'ūn also colored the Opposition highly,

and it is perhaps a mistake to envision Sham'ūn's critics operating in

a rarefied ideological atmosphere. Sham'ūn himself sometimes breaks

down in his characterization of the Opposition as Cairo-oriented long

enough to note that the Opposition figures like Junblāt were as feudal

and as interested in pork barreling as they were in "liberal" thinking.[2]

Demonstrations connected with the Opposition demands were dealt

with by the Government in a heavy-handed way and only served to

further alienate the dissidents from the formal political process and

to toughen their growing platform, which called, principally, for a

disinterested foreign policy.

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[1] Mideast Mirror, April 7, 1957, p. 4.

[2] Chamoun, Op. cit., p. 392.

The myths, clouded language, and unjust "polarities" of personalities created by the Sham'ūn regime, alluded to above, obscured the fact that, while "Nasserism" was inspiring some degree of opposition feeling among the masses, Opposition leaders were far less interested in instituting a "Nasserist" regime in Lebanon than in countering the ill-working Sham'ūn Government; and Cairo's encouragement of Opposition elements cannot be said fairly to have been directed, as Sham'ūn was to charge repeatedly, at the sovereignty and integrity of Lebanon, but rather at Sham'ūn's own reign. Sham'ūn's unmitigated stream of concern with derogation of sovereignty and intervention would in the next year be put in a questionable light when the President rejected a compromise solution by six Arab states, later rebuffed the Arab League, and effectively paved the way for what many argue ultimately to have been an undue breach of sovereignty by United States forces.[1] The Opposition argued from the beginning for a local solution to a local problem.[2]

In the final analysis, "intervention," "sovereignty," and "territorial integrity" are terms of an international legal character.

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[1] U. N. Document S/PV823, June 6, 1958, p. 52.

[2] This is not to say that the Opposition rejected outside help in their struggle, but that on the whole the Opposition's view of Lebanese "sovereignty" seemed to be stricter than that of Mr. Sham'ūn. Thayer, Diplomat, Op. cit., p. 13.

Especially as the possibility of Sham'ūn's desire to renew his political

mandate became worthy of attention, as rumors wore on in 1957, one

could well have observed that "Chamoun and Malik were perhaps too

inclined to identify the independence and integrity of Lebanon with their

personal retention of power."[1] Another source noted that President

Sham'ūn was the one man who "from the outset has insisted on turning

Lebanon's internal troubles into an international crisis."[2]

It might be said that in many ways the June 1957 parliamentary

elections constituted the drop that caused the glass to turn over. There

was nothing like a return to normalcy in the events following the

elections, and the final ignition of the then strained and brittle lines

of power and political communication in the country was less than a

year later.

Perhaps if one would not go so far as to allege flagrant tampering

with the elections on the part of the incumbent regime, the atmosphere

which surrounded the voting was far from disinterested nor were

sizeable pressures absent. Working in favor of the Government--and

thus for a largely pro-Western anti-Cairo alignment--before the

elections were even held were several points: (1) the 66-deputy rather

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[1]

Kirk, Op. cit., p. 131.

[2]

Bushrod Howard, Op. cit.

than the 88-deputy Chamber; (2) the gerrymandering in certain areas;

(3) the continuation of the "small-list" system. There is no doubt

that massive amounts of money--presumably on behalf of Egypt on

the one hand, and the C. I. A. on the other--were allowed to have

their effects on the election machinery. It was openly stated in Beirut

that about 680,000 Egyptian pounds had been distributed to Sa'ib Salām

and his followers.[1] Iraq for its part further contributed to divisions

in the country by distributing money estimated at between 50,000 and

500,000 Sterling pounds.[2] A source close to Salām also indicated that

Sham'ūnist elements resorted to intimidation tactics of various types

at polling places.[3] It is relevant to note that several days before the

start of elections, American warships anchored off of Beirut; and

before the end of elections, the U. S. made a substantial arms delivery

to Lebanon.

Further pressures were brought to bear on candidates themselves,

some of whom were already suffering politically because of the April

redrawing of constituencies. The worthy opponent of Charles Malik

in the elections, for example, Fu'ād al-Ghusn, was persuaded to

withdraw from the race after two lengthy meetings with President

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[1] Barraclough, Op. cit., p. 175. See also Sunday Times for June 2, 1957.

[2] O'Kearney, Op. cit., p. 203.

[3] Author's interview with Dr. Walīd al-Khalidī, April 1967, American University of Beirut.

Sham'ūn.[1] More significant, perhaps, were the resignations of the two

"neutral ministers" who had been added to the Cabinet in order to

supervise the elections. The men, Yūsuf Hittī and Muḥammad Bayhūm,

resigned because they could not continue to "tolerate the general

atmosphere, " suggesting that considerable pressures had been exercised

on the voters.[2]

The results of the elections were certainly a blow to the Opposition,

and to the elements that had in any way supported the Opposition, such

as Cairo.[3] A number of Opposition leaders, veterans in Parliament

and zu'ama' whose extra-Parliamentary influences in Lebanon could

not be questioned, were not returned to their seats; at a blow, the corpus

of the Opposition had been severed with nearly a finality from the

parliamentary machinery of the State. Leading Opposition personalities

who lost in the elections were al-Yāfī, Salām, Aḥmad al-Asaad, and

Junblāt. Among Opposition candidates who won were Shi'ite Sabrī

Himādeh, Maronite Hamīd Franjīeh, and Sunni Rashīd Karāmī. One

pro-Government candidate who was returned was Phalangist chief

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[1]
Qubain, Op. cit., p. 57.

[2]
Ibid.

[3]
For the Opposition platform in the June elections see Mideast
Mirror, June 2, 1957. The Lebanese elections of 1957, coupled with
the later "defection" of Sa'ūd, were among the reasons Egypt had for
merging with Syria; Kirk, Op. cit., p. 101.

Pierre Jumayyil. When asked whether he felt the new Parliament of

66 members was representative of the Lebanese polity, Jumayyil replied:

> The Parliament which has just been given to us rep-
> resents, in my opinion, only ten per cent of the popula-
> tion of the country--at the moment the real parliament
> is in the street.[1]

The consensus of opinion was that Sham'ūn had obtained a pliable

Parliament which would give him his two-thirds majority for reelection.[2]

Sham'ūn's pro-Western foreign policy subsequently received a firm vote

of confidence in Parliament.

As time went on, it became ever clearer that while the events and

policies of the Sham'ūn regime had caused sectarian unrest--inevitable

in a society where confessional relationships are tenuous and bear upon

one another closely--the Opposition or "National Front" fell neither

along strict sectarian lines nor categorically into pro-Western or anti-

Western; or pro-Cairo or anti-Cairo classifications. Opposition news-

papers had pointed out that the Government had, by describing

Opposition candidates as stooges of Nāṣir, turned some Christian voters

against Opposition candidates in the elections.[3] There were throughout

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[1] Le Soir, July 15, 1957; quoted in Qubain, Op. cit., p. 57.

[2] Meo, Op. cit., p. 147.

[3] "Chronology," Middle East Journal, vol. 12 (Winter 1958), p. 74.

the period of the civil crisis in Lebanon many Greek Orthodox Christians who sided with the Sunni Muslim opponents of the status quo, thinking that more was to be gained by going with the Muslim tide than against it. And there was a minority group in the Maronite community which felt that some type of loose federal ties with Egypt (and later the U. A. R.) might be called for.[1]

Looked at across the board from more of an American frame of reference, the outcome of the elections was coupled with other important events. Potentially pan-Arab, therefore, the Government alleged, presumably "Communist-prone" elements had been maneuvered out of the Lebanese Government structure. As was mentioned above, Washington was aware of the dangers inherent in so decisive a move. In addition, King Sa'ūd, to whom Sham'ūn paid a visit and with whom the Lebanese President was now in sympathy, had grown closer to Hussein after the latter's troubles with Cairo-abetted insurrections in April 1957.[2] After a meeting of Sa'ūd and Hussein in Amman in June 1957, it could be observed that the Cairo-Damascus Axis had been to an extent outflanked and even somewhat isolated by the appearance of a new focus of power in

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[1] Ray Allan, "Buildup to a Breakdown," The Reporter, vol. 18, No. 11, pp. 11-12.

[2] Barraclough, Op. cit., p. 176.

the Middle East in King Sa'ūd. That the United States was to make an alliance with Sa'ūd a new cornerstone of its policy in the area was apparent to Sham'ūn, who welcomed the arrangement.[1]

Post-Election Tensions

In Lebanon one could say in retrospect that the flood had been let loose and that it was only a matter of time before it found its destructive path. The post-election tension that persisted was capped off by the Egyptian-Syrian merger of February 1958. Thousands of Lebanese sympathetic to Nāṣir poured across the U.A.R. border to Damascus in order to congratulate the new U.A.R. President. The Sham'ūn regime was irked by statements of Opposition leaders regarding the U.A.R. Sa'ib Salām, for example, reminded Nāṣir in a message of 25 February 1958 that the U.A.R. President was responsible for all Arab people, including the citizens of Lebanon.[2] Sham'ūn felt that the union was not justified in terms of Arab unity, but rather had been precipitous and a result of internal mismanagement; the union had immediately made, he said, a "fifth column" of the Opposition in Lebanon.[3] Pro-Sham'ūn forces were particularly glad (1) that an "Arab Union" between Jordan

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[1] Chamoun, Op. cit., p. 378. U.S. assurances were also forthcoming for Hussein.

[2] Qubain, Op. cit., p. 62.

[3] Chamoun, Op. cit., p. 396.

and Iraq had been formed almost immediately on the heels of the U. A. R. merger; and (2) that Iraq and Saudi Arabia were not going to join Nāṣir. The Shamunists, probably emphasizing the value of the growing counter-weight to Nāṣir, were in continuous consultation with the British, American, and French Embassies.[1]

The issue of Sham'ūn's own reelection, which would require an amendment to the Constitution, came more squarely into consideration in early 1958. The President had, incidentally, some years before declared himself against the principle of reelection of the Lebanese President.[2] The so-called Third Force, a neutral group that came together in order to find a compromise solution to the growing crisis in Lebanon, became fully convinced after an interview with Sham'ūn on 27 January 1958 that the latter was definitely determined to run for another term of office.[3]

The President never made his position clear on the question at a time when silence or a "popular-draft" status was likely to be mis-interpreted. By the time the Lebanese Prime Minister, on 29 May 1958, made the announcement that his Government did not intend to

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[1] Harrari, Op. cit., p. 100.

[2] Pharaon, Op. cit., p. 41.

[3] Qubain, Op. cit., p. 65.

submit a bill amending the Constitution, Opposition demands had
swelled to a point where only Sham'ūn's resignation--not his assurances--
would be satisfactory. Prime Minister Sami as-Sulḥ, ever true to
Sham'ūn, notes in his memoirs that the issue of Sham'ūn's reelection
was of secondary importance behind the question of UAR interference
and subversion;[1] in terms of the popular feeling at the time, however,
such a statement is far from justified.

To allude to the scheme mentioned above (p. 1), interests, claims
and counter-claims, strategies and authoritative decision makers as
well as arenas of inter-action--all intertwined and overlapped in
post-election Lebanon to create a sense of infinite confusion. For many
Christians, moved by "protectionist" feelings, loyalty to the West or
Sham'ūn himself, and perhaps affected by the inaccuracies rehersed
during the elections, the Lebanese President was emerging as the
"za'im of the Christians and the symbol of Lebanese rights and integrity."
Some Lebanese Christians were emphasizing Lebanon's "Mediterranean
vocation," having more in common with Greece than with Yemen and
Egypt.[3]

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[1]
    Sāmī as-Sulḥ, Mudhakkarāt Sāmī as-Sulḥ, (Beirut: Maktaba
al-Fikr al-'Arabi, 1960), p. 477.

[2]
    Meo, Op. cit., p. 152.

[3]
    Allan, "Buildup to a Breakdown," Op. cit., p. 12.

Although the new as-Sulḥ Cabinet reiterated that the Eisenhower

Doctrine did not derogate from Lebanese sovereignty, the Opposition

stepped up their arguments that it did. But there is much to indicate that

repudiation of the ties with Washington, perhaps even coupled with a

promise by Sham'un to step down after his term, would not quiet the

Opposition: some of the most virulent attacks on Sham'ūn's foreign policy,

in fact, were coming from alienated political figures who by now had

become personal enemies of the President.[1] Moderate Henri Pharaon

had urged even before the elections that candidates stop campaigning

excessively on doctrinal arguments "which camouflaged but did not

eliminate these interests, and which only served to divide the nation

against itself."[2] Personal interests were rife in the Maronite camp:

Fu'ād 'Amūn, who aspired to the presidency, was in opposition to

Sham'un as was Franjieh; and the partisans of ex-President Bishara

al-Khouri, who were already hostile to Sham'ūn. The Patriarch was

among the latter group.[3]

Other personal emnities played their parts in alignments with

or against the Opposition. For example, Majīd Arslān and Na'īm

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[1]

Meo, Op. cit., p. 152.

[2]

Ibid., p. 131. Pharaon had been willing to compromise on the issue of American aid in return for the adoption of an 88-seat Chamber, demonstrating a marked "internal" concern on his part. Chamoun, Op. cit., p. 381.

[3]

Salibi, "The Lebanese Crisis in Perspective," The World Today, vol. 14, No. 9, pp. 369-380.

Mughabghab were both--at least at first--enemies of Junblāṭ's. There

was some competition between Ṣa'ib Salām and the Najjādah (the Muslim

counterpart of the Kata'ib), both of which leadership blocs reputedly

looked toward Cairo for direction, for constituents. Constituent

elements of the pro-Government forces more often than not were sup-

porting Sham'ūn for personal or local reasons rather than out of

ideological persuasion: (1) both the Kata'ib and the P.P.S. were hostile

to Egypt's brand of pan-Arabism; (2) the Armenian community, which

on the whole supported the Sham'ūn regime, did so largely out of

expediency in supporting whatever government was in power.[1] As for

Maronite leaders of the Lebanese business community like Pierre and

Raymond Edde, the Sham'ūn regime provided something in the nature

of a guarantee that a state structure (including business, banking,

police, and government) would be preserved to their ultimate advantage.[2]

If the Communists supported the Opposition more or less out of

ideological persuasion, their influence was negligible and their presence

if anything embarrassing to the Opposition.

Pharaon's Third Force reemphasized, without dwelling on

foreign policy, the need for a less controversial president. The zu'ama'

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[1]
   Meo, Op. cit., p. 170.
[2]
   Hottinger, Op. cit., p. 135.

of the various regional, ideological and or sectarian groupings, it
should be pointed out, could rely on the loyalties of clients or con-
stituents because of feudal, personal ties and almost in spite of ideological
persuation on the part of the leaders. The whole fabric of personal
political rivalries, and relationships between zu'ama' with interests
and their President, who appeared ready to change the very Constitution
in order to perpetuate a reign that had already caused nearly irreparable
damage, belied Charles Malik's hypothesis that although the principle
of international politics is power, "Lebanon's power is reason, truth,
love, suffering, being."[1]

Against a backdrop of endemic politicking, an observer of the
growing Lebanese crisis is faced with an allegation that the root of
the crisis lay in Cairo's intervention in sovereign Lebanese affairs.
While the validity of Sham'ūn's repeated charges of massive intervention
by the U. A. R. are examined in a later section of this paper, suffice it
here to reiterate the fact that in the picture Sham'ūn had for some time
been painting, the forces of "Lebanon" were arrayed against the insidious
forces of Nasserism. Such a view leaves little room for discussion of
the internal battles on the "Lebanon" side which doubtless had the most
to do with the precipitation of a crisis prone to later abetment from

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[1]

Malik, "Near East: the Search for the Truth," Op. cit., p. 240.

Cairo. That there is much area for discussion of the question of

Sham'ūn's Presidency itself, as a separate and highly relevant issue,

is made clear by the tenor of the Opposition after the elections and on

into 1958: a number of critics who had been ready to compromise on

points of the Government's domestic and foreign policy before the

elections, later had turned to an unyielding conviction that they, foreign

policy organs, and the whole Lebanese political framework--all were

being manipulated by a Sham'ūn who had accepted the Eisenhower

Doctrine in order to assure the perpetuation of his own reign.[1] As if

in further refutation of Sham'ūn's declaring the troubles a battle between

loyal Lebanese and Nasserites, many of the Sunni Opposition leaders

were in fact much less loyal to Nāṣir or to the ideal of Arab unity, re-

latively, than they were interested in their own particularly Lebanese

political futures, with a "rotating premiership" always alotted to one

of their group. Yet the nature of the crisis and of their mass followers

made it imperative that these leaders pubically declare their loyalty to

Nasserism.

By May of 1958 Lebanon was experiencing a real insurrection,

sparked in this final stage by the assasination of Nassīb al-Matni, a

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[1]
    Author's interview with Kamāl Junblāt, Op. cit. See also Kamāl
Junblāt, Haqiqat al-Thawrat al-Lubnaniyyah, Beirut: Dar al-Nashr
al-'Arabiyah, 1959), pp. 72-76.

left-wing newspaper editor. It would be perhaps inappropriate to label
as a revolution what was an insurrection; Rene Habachi has pointed out in
this connection that a revolutionary confrontation between ruling and
ruled in Lebanon is highly unlikely because of the mosaic of communities
which makes such confrontations almost impossible.[1] Parliamentary
action and tactics had seen their day; it was now left to action in the
streets for a resolution of pending issues.

The United National Front appeared not so much to emphasize
foreign policy matters as to be explosively critical of what its members
considered the selfish ambition and inappropriate actions of President
Sham'ūn.[2] The Opposition did not neglect foreign policy matters
altogether; notably, some Government supporters joined them in decrying
American aid, saying it was much like the aid which the U.S.S.R. was
giving to Syria and Egypt.[3]

Malik and Sham'ūn were emphasizing massive intervention of the
U.A.R., and by May 27th this belief on their parts had been lodged as
a formal charge at the United Nations Security Council and the Arab
League Council (May 21).[4] With Sham'ūn and Nāṣir appearing as gods in

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[1] Daily Star, May 19, 1958; Meo, Op. cit., p. 182.

[2] Pharaon, Op. cit., pp. 97, 106.

[3] Barraclough, Op. cit., p. 369.

[4] Lenczwoski, Op. cit., p. 336. Yet the common man fighting in
the streets of Lebanon fought not for Sa'ib Salām or Abdullah al-Yāfī
but for the image and promise of Nāṣir. See Qubain, Op. cit., p. 41.

their respective camps and devils among their opponents, Sham'ūn

allowed the polarization that was splitting the country to widen consider-

ably both by persisting in not renouncing claims to the Presidency and

by increasingly internationalizing the crisis.

As time passed, as the United States became increasingly hopeful,

as shall be seen, that the crisis could be resolved internally. Not only

had Secretary Hammarskjold and the Special U. N. Observation Group

in Lebanon (the latter was dispatched to Lebanon in June 1958 to examine

Lebanon's claims in the Security Council of massive intervention in

Lebanon's affairs by the U. A. R.) became convinced by mid-June that

Sham'ūn's charges were much exaggerated,[1] but it became increasingly

clear as July 14 approached that the situation was definitely coming

under control, partly because of these reasons: (1) U. N. observers in

Lebanon had succeeded in substantially reducing whatever intervention

there was across the Lebanese-Syrian borders; (2) General Shihab, the

Lebanese Commander-in-Chief whose army had played a neutral role

in the insurrection, was preparing the way for a compromise that

eventually would terminate hostilities and see him made President;

and (3) the United States had been showing itself gradually less anxious

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[1] Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 268.

to come to Sham'ūn's aid.[1] The neutral role of the Lebanese army in

the insurrection was in itself something of a testimony against the

President's claims of massive intervention from outside.

In spite of what appeared to some as an increased possibility of

detente in the situation, President Sham'ūn further hardened his faith in

the necessity of external intervention. The President was emphasizing

his belief that the terms of the Eisenhower Doctrine applied "not only

to an armed attack from without, but also by subversion provoked from

the outside."[2] President Sham'ūn became progressively more panicked by

his belief that the U. S. was following the line and recommendations of

a U. N. that had not by any means substantiated his accusations against

Cairo.[3] The Lebanese President, in early June, rejected as untrust-

worthy Egyptian President Nāṣir's offer (made to the U. S. Government)

to use his influence to end the trouble. Nāṣir's not unreasonable con-

ditions for settling the Lebanese conflict were (1) that Sham'ūn finish out

his term; (2) that Shihāb succeed Sham'ūn; and (3) that there be an

amnesty for the rebels.[4]

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[1]
Manfred Halpern, The Morality and Politics of Intervention
(New York: Council on Religion and International Affairs, 1963), p. 13.
[2]
Chamoun, Op. cit., p. 414.
[3]
Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 268.
[4]
Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 268.

The stiffening of the Lebanese Government went in the direction

of opening up channels of possible foreign intervention. On June 16 the

Cabinet decided to give Sham'ūn the right to call for intervention under any

treaty or agreement which would make it possible for Lebanon to receive

aid from abroad. Public opinion in Lebanon was imagining such aid in

various possible forms including intervention by an armed international

police force or direct military intervention by either England or America,

or both, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the Eisenhower

Doctrine, or the Tripartite Declaration.[1] Many were those who noted

the implications of Lebanon's appealing for outside help in the solution

of its problems. Ghassan Tuwaynī editorialized in al-Nahār on July 1:

> What kind of independence is this which cannot survive
> without foreign "aid", not to say protection; and what self-
> government lasts for an hour whose regime depends on
> foreign troops to solve the crisis.[2]

Sham'ūn, in meeting with the American Ambassador subsequent

to the opening shooting rounds of the insurrections on 9 May, noted that

U.S. support must be forthcoming if his and other pro-Western regimes

in the area were not to crumble.[3] While the Lebanese President

indicated in late May that he was resolved not to call for outside help

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[1]

Barraclough, Op. cit., p. 371.

[2]

al-Nahar, July 1, 1958. Other elements of public opinion felt
that Washington had no right to interfere in Lebanon while the case was
still pending before the Security Council.

[3]

Thayer, Diplomat, Op. cit., p. 8.

except at the last minute, when such would be the only measure capable

of "saving the country from anarchy and civil war, and to preserve its

sovereignty!"[1] U. S. diplomatic sources indicate that Sham'ūn wanted to

use his American "blank check" twice before July 14, although the

American Ambassador discouraged the Lebanese President.[2]

The Iraqi coup of 14 July provoked Sham'ūn to state that, in the face

of what he described as militant Nasserism, his Government could not

last more than two days without U. S. military help.[3] The President did

not appeal first to the United Nations; nor did he consult the Lebanese

Cabinet in making his final call for American succor. Yet, it is clear

that even if one would not consider the President's failure to consult

his Government at this important juncture illegal or immoral, clearly

the Cabinet had voted earlier to give Sham'ūn authority to call for outside

intervention if he should deem it necessary at any particular moment.[4]

Apparently in answer to Sham'ūn's call, American Marine forces

landed outside Beirut on the afternoon of July 15, with the stated purpose

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[1]
Chamoun, Op. cit., p. 414.

[2]
Robert McClintock, "The U. S. Intervention in Lebanon," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXXVIII, No. 10 (October 1962), p. 67.

[3]
"Its Nasser's War: Interview with Chamoun," Newsweek, July 14, 1958, p. 35.

[4]
"Chronology," Middle East Journal, vol. 12 (Summer 1958), p. 309.

of restoring order in Lebanon. To many of Sham'ūn's partisans, the

landings came as a great blessing. To much of the Opposition, however,

as well as to a large number of "neutrals," the presence of U. S. armed

forces in Lebanon was merely the engendering of all that had animated

them for more than a year.

One might isolate some of the following elements as having played

an important overall role in the reaction of the Opposition to the

American intervention: Muslim demands going back to 1954 for govern-

mental changes; political emnities aroused especially in 1957; clashes of

embryonic ideological movements; demands for adherence to the spirit

of the National Pact and anger over a series of breaches in neutrality,

alluded to, which favored the Baghdad-Amman Entente; sectarian

loyalties; zu'ama' politicking, and anger at the apparent desire of

President Sham'ūn to succeed himself. Whether justifiably so or not,

most of the Opposition's grievances and frustrations had come to center

upon one man, President Sham'ūn.

In retrospect, Sham'ūn has been criticized for having been

unwilling to try to effect a "new bargain" in response to the changing

tides and movements in Lebanon, and for seeking to invoke the full

power of the Eisenhower Doctrine--with all of its potentially ill reper-

cussions--in order to make up in foreign support what he lacked in

domestic strength.[1]

One is left, in summation, with a picture of an administration that, for a period of five years--years of tremendous importance to the Middle East--had caused tremendous resentment in moderate and militant, Christian and Muslim circles. The nuances in the question of whether Sham'ūn's intention was to be the impetus and buckler of anti-Nasserism-- Nasserism was a force which the President genuinely felt to menace Lebanon's place in a balanced Arab nationalism respectful of national differences--or to perpetuate "Shamunism" in order to assume to personal mandate for the preservation of Maronite-weighted Lebanon, rest un- answered in the balance. It would be impossible of course to attribute merely to Sham'ūn's presidency the loyalties of thousands of Sunni Muslims to Cairo rather than Lebanon, nor the panic which such extra- national fealty caused in the Christian camp.

If the criticism of some that Sham'ūn appeared to be playing in an erstwhile "age of protectorates and Crusades" is perhaps harsh, it is also clear that President Sham'ūn's approach to a shattering problem that gripped Lebanon could be said, because of its vagueness and lack of vision or encompassing understanding of the way in which recent pressures had affected the confessional mosaic, to have failed to address

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[1] Halpern, Intervention, Op. cit., p. 12.

itself to the most important avenues of approach to solving the long-term nature of the problem. Given the history of the immediately preceding events in Lebanon, it was obvious that no non-authoritarian regime in Lebanon could afford to alienate large sections of public opinion by displacing political and feudal leadership and by carrying on a running dispute with Cairo.[1]

Rather for a period of months, the Sham'ūn regime had demonstrated a lack of confidence in its own dialogue with the Lebanese polity, a weakness which Washington also sensed, as was pointed out. The landing of the U.S. Marines merely underlined this shakiness and resultant external recourse to internal problems.

In a situation where the question of the justification for the landing of American troops, supposedly based on the Sham'ūn regime's descriptions of the pressures bearing upon it from outside lies unanswered, a substantial share of the evidence that might weigh in the balance for or against President Sham'ūn's justification in the recourse he chose may lie with the view of the United States as to the roots and nature of the 1958 crisis in the Middle East and the forces impelling America to take action at that time.

A view of United States motivations for action may provide

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[1] Meo, Op. cit., p. 124.

important clues as to whether Lebanon, by 1958, was in fact an externally "undermined" state (which would establish a strong moral claim for U. S. action); or whether the reality of the situation was more than political structures and political reality in Lebanon were in great disjunction, indicating a narrow and jealously guarded power base and a widespread social struggle.

CHAPTER III

DETERIORATION IN THE AMERICAN POSITION

1957-1958

The events of July 14, 1958--being the day of Brigadier Qassim's coup in Baghdad--do not themselves constitute the Middle East "crisis" to which the United States responded. Nor could the "crisis" in Lebanon be said to have been most highly concentrated and at its most explosive in the short time immediately preceding the landing of U.S. troops.

The issue that bears scrutiny at this point is the nature of a malignant crisis in the United States' stance in the Middle East, having roots in Washington's policies and indigenous Middle Eastern responses to those policies, which grew during the post-war period until by 1958 the problem was of acute dimensions. While the preceeding two chapters examined the foundational premises and context of American policy and how embodiments of those points of policy had a definite impact on events in the Middle East in general and on the Sham'ūn tenure of office in Lebanon in particular; the present section seeks to examine, from an American standpoint, the significant deteriorations in the United States' position in the Middle East in 1957-8, with an emphasis on the policy-making in Washington that exacerbated, accompanied, and reacted to the crisis that evolved.

For a meaningful view of the events of 1958, one is constrained to look at the way in which the Eisenhower Doctrine failed to provide a meaningful, constructive formula for U. S. policy in the Middle East in this period, hardly managing to fulfill its own premises. The inapplicability of the Eisenhower Doctrine is directly linked with the insurrection in Lebanon and the coup in Baghdad, especially if one accepts Professor Walter Rostow's hypothesis that, "the outbreak of a brushfire war in the Free World is a prima facie evidence of a prior failure in civil policy."[1]

The Eisenhower Doctrine failed to prevent the development of conditions that would have made such an outbreak likely. As indicated in Chapter I, the United States' requirements for a new policy in the Middle East after the Suez affair were conditioned on several decisive factors: (1) the desire to fulfill the security requirements of Dulles' "Great Equation"; (2) the evolution in American Cold War policy planning which now embraced limited war concepts as well as earlier theories of "massive retaliation"; (3) the belief that "Communist-prone" elements in the area--specifically 'Abd al-Nāṣir--must be isolated. Even within the limited bounds of those necessities, the

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[1] Rowtow, Op. cit., p. 323.

American response, seen over this two-year period (1957-1958) was disjointed, characterized by differing views especially in the Executive branch as to the nature and extent of the crisis that was faced and suitable measures to deal with such a crisis.[1]

There was not a unanimous or harmonious view in Washington as to what constituted the current Soviet threat. The Cummunist take-overs of the late 1940's were not being replayed; rather, the U. S. was having in 1957-1958 to face the growing belief that the U. S. S. R. was going to achieve a certain primacy in weaponry and space research and that the concomitant political challenge was not engendered in losses of Free World territories but rather in a "progressive decline of cohesion in the Free World" that might ultimately serve Communist aspirations.[2]

While by 1958 the U. S. was no less apprehensive about Soviet Cold War strategies, policy makers had not yet sorted out the best and most unified way to deal with the threat. Although within the scope of the "gap-plugging" operation in the containment context, to which Dulles had been consecrated after 1953, American involvement with several of the Baghdad Pact committees and the promulgation of the Eisenhower Doctrine served to promote the U. S. "massive retaliatory"

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[1] Ibid., p. 381.

[2] Rowtow, Op. cit., p. 381.

position--at least as seen in terms of tacks on a map--it could not
be said that American strategic concerns of a limited-war nature had
been equally well served.[1] Splits of opinion and thinking in Washington
indicated that Defense and State Department planning was not completely
in terms of "massive retaliation" but that the conservative aspects of
the "Great Equation"--which called for increased dependence on the
military forces of Eurasian allies coupled with mobile American "brush-
fire" units--were significant in urging limited-war modes of thought on
policy planners:

> But the nation did not fully face up to the requirements
> for and the implications of an instrument to deter, and if
> necessary to prosecute, limited war; and it did not link its
> diplomacy and economic foreign policy to the problem of
> deterring such wars.[2]

Lack of a consistent approach to the policy needs of the Middle
East on the parts of legislators, executive personnel, interested parties
and lobbies, field personnel and intelligence services, and implementors
of policy, was in great part responsible for the deterioration of the
American "position" in the area climaxed by the "brush-fire" wars of
1957-1958 in Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon; and it also serves to help
explain the deep extent of the panic and shock which all these areas

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[1]
    C. J. V. Murphy, "The Eisenhower Shift," _Fortune_, March
1956, pp. 111-2.

[2]
    Rostow, _Op. cit._, p. 323.

of policy making alike--now united for the moment by a mutual response--

sustained at the time of the Qassim coup in Baghdad.

Conflicts in the Creation of the
Eisenhower Doctrine

The drawing up of the Middle East Resolution as a comprehensive

U.S. policy for the area of the Middle East was not accomplished

without considerable divergent, often heated, opinion. Much of the

opposition to various provisions of the Resolution--a Resolution which,

as was pointed out in the preceding chapter, in many ways was in-

applicable to the real endemic needs of the Middle East--highlights the

aforementioned fact of a lack of unanimity and consistency in U.S.

foreign policy in the area at this time. The very acuteness of

criticism points up the often simplistic or at least incomplete rationale

that boiled up in the State Department and in the Executive branch as a

whole, which thinking had much to do with the embarrassments and

disasters of 1957-1958.

Domestic criticism of the Middle East Resolution centered on

these important points: (1) the irrelevancy of the Resolution's scope;

(2) the meaninglessness and danger of a vague military threat attempting

to fill a Middle Eastern "vacuum"; and (3) the inappropriateness of

unilateralism.

Irrelevancy of Scope

As to the first point, some critics noted that the United States

would merely be repeating the mistakes of the British and the French if the

former country adopted "anti-Communism" as a sufficient policy; nor would

isolation and destruction of Nāṣir resolve the pressing issues in the area.

The Americans for Democratic Action, in testimony before the Senate

Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, stated their belief

that military gurantees were futile without immediate, concurrent

action to act upon the real long-range problems of the area.[1]

While criticism of the proposed Middle East Resolution often

deteriorated, on the part of the Democratic Opposition, to the level of

personal invective against Secretary Dulles, allegations were often

pertinent and addressed squarely to weak points in the Doctrine: it was

argued not only that the policy would contribute to an arms race but that

it ignored the basic issues of the area--imperialism (embodied for the

Arabs in the Suez affair) and the Palestine problem.[2]

Yet so vehement was the opposition to Secretary Dulles that

Senators like Humphrey (Minn.) and Mansfield (Mont.) were unable to

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[1]
U. S. Senate (85th Congress), Committee on Foreign Relations
and Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on S. J. Res. 19 and
H. J. Res. 117, Joint Resolutions. Part I (Jan. 14, 15, 24, 25, 28, 29,
30; Feb. 1 and 4, 1957. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office,
1957)), p. 519.

[2]
For Senator Humphrey's cross-examination of Secretary Dulles
on the matter of "issues" in the Middle East, see U. S. Senate, Op. cit.,
p. 80; also the testimony of Hon. Joseph C. Creem, former U. S. Am-
bassador to Jordan; also New Republic, vol. 136, No. 8, (Feb. 25, 1957), p. 5.

keep legislative attention focused on constructive Democratic proposals

for policy in the Middle East.[1] The London Times had, with naturally

different emphases than the U.S., isolated the central problems of the

Middle East as being rivalries between the Arab states; the Arab-Israeli

problem; the future of the oil companies; and the future course of

'Abd al-Nāṣir.[2]

Criticisms that the Middle East Resolution did not deal with the

issues of the area in a period of a few months were to be echoed in the

Lebanese Parliamentary Opposition's position that Lebanese acceptance

of the Eisenhower Doctrine, with the concomitant ignoring of the Israeli

question, was tantamount to acquiescing to the status quo in the Middle

East.[3] In addition, Senator Wayne Morse argued that military aid sent

to serve the needs of anti-communism might well be used to exacerbate

Arab-Israeli tensions, to the ultimate detriment of long-term U.S.

policy goals.[4]

Meaninglessness of a Vague Military Threat

With regard to the second classification of criticism--concerning

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[1] New Republic, vol. 136, No. 8 (Feb. 25, 1957), p. 5.

[2] Times (London), Jan. 7, 1957; Kirk, Op. cit., p. 87.

[3] Meo, Op. cit., p. 127.

[4] U.S. Senate, Op. cit., p. 276.

the nature of a vague military threat--much Opposition thinking was

of the opinion that the President should not be given a "blank check" to

act in the Middle East. A significant question, posed by Senator William

Fulbright (Ark.), was how the President should decide on whether a

state was or was not dominated by international Communism, since the

terms of the Eisenhower Doctrine made U. S. military intervention in the

Middle East contingent on there being a case of armed aggression ema-

nating from a country controlled by international Communism. The

concept of retaliation in U. S. foreign policy still constituted an important

premise of thought, but Senators Fulbright and Morse, for example, were

anxious that the conditions under which retaliation would be carried out

should be clearly described in advance.

The Secretary of State was unable to satisfy his questioner on

this point, stating simply that the phrase "dominated by international

Communism" had a more or less universally comprehensible "Legislative

history," and that no "mathematical rule of thumb" could be invoked

for such an identification.[1] Senator Fulbright felt that vague definitions

in foreign policy might cause the U. S. to respond automatically when

conditions abroad "seemed" to constitute an agreed upon schema for

action. Fulbright's belief that intentions could be made clear--which

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[1]
U. S. Senate, Op. cit., p. 29.

was something that the President also professed to believe in--without

entangling limitations and restrictions that could lead to misunderstanding

abroad, led the Senator to suggest that the following wording constitute

the entirety of the proposed Middle East Resolution:

> The United States regards as vital to her interests the
> preservation of the independence and integrity of the
> states of the Middle East and, if necessary, will use
> her Armed Force to that end.[1]

A seasoned U. S. diplomatic officer, former Ambassador to Egypt

Jefferson Caffery, was convinced that the proposed Middle East Resolu-

tion should be firmly addressed to the fundamental threat of Communism;

yet it was also his feeling that it was a mistake to make as an initial

premise of the Eisenhower plan for Middle East policy the concept of

a power vacuum that must be filled by outside interests. The Ambassador

argued,

> The vacuum is there, all right, and we must help the people
> there to fill it themselves. And that can be done by helping
> them to live like men.[2]

Even the American Legion could argue that, by bypassing the U. N. in

stressing the military aspects of needs in the Middle East, the U. S.

was merely instituting forces and emphases that might easily be used

by forces inimical to the U. S.[3]

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[1]
   Ibid., p. 723.

[2]
   Ibid., p. 771.

[3]
   Ibid., p. 512.

Much domestic criticism dwelled on the constitutional question

of "extending" the powers of the Chief Executive. While many critics,

both inside and outside Congress, felt the President already possessed

all the emergency powers he might need, others argued that a warning

to the Russians against Communist aggression in the Middle East would

not require an advance grant of power to the President "to employ the

armed forces of the United States as he deems necessary."[1] Giving the

President a "blank check, " felt former Congressman Hamilton Fish,

would be tantamount to setting war machinery in motion without the

consent of the people. Fish based this criticism on precedent: he noted

that Dulles and Admiral Radford, as well as Eisenhower, had agreed to

militarily bail the French out at Dien Bien Phu, without the consent

of Congress.[2]

C. Wright Mills, who assigns great power and influence in

Washington to--among other lobbies--oil interests, noted that petroleum

entered into the picture of the Middle East Resolution question more

than is discernable at first glance. This is consistent with his view

of the prominence corporation men have come to enjoy in an enlarged

"Executive" government, which maintains what is described as "a

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[1]
    New Republic, vol. 136, No. 3 (January 21, 1957), pp. 3, 4.

[2]
    Only Winston Churchill had prevented this being carried out,
Fish charged. U.S. Senate, Op. cit., p. 493.

political economy intricately linked with a military order central to
politics and crucial to money making."[1] Mills emphasizes the importance
of a document which Senator Estes Kefauver revealed in the Senate a week
or so before the Eisenhower Doctrine was promulgated.[2] The document
records that on August 13, 1956, a meeting was held of the Foreign
Petroleum Supply Committee at which were present representatives
of major oil companies as well as officials of various governmental
agencies. With regard to oil company fears on nationalization, Secretary
Dulles, who was present at the meeting, was recorded as saying that
any "properties impressed with international interests" could not be
nationalized, and that any such nationalization attempt would call for
"international intervention."

Senator Kefauver felt that this document indirectly pointed out
the shaky grounding which the Middle East Resolution would possess;
he felt that the "granting" of extra powers to the President, in the form
of a special mandate, would further remove government--in its foreign
policy aspects, from the hands of the American people and their rep-
resentatives.[3] That is, in deference to an increasingly complex,

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[1]
    C. Wright Mills, The Causes of World War Three (New York:
Ballantine Books, 1958), p. 36.
[2]
    The document is the text of a memorandum written by an oil
company official describing what had transpired at an August 13, 1956
meeting. The text is in the Congressional Record, Senate, March 1,
1957, pp. 2, 55 off.
[3]
    Mills, Op. cit., p. 75.

sometimes inscrutable Executive "structure," Congress would pre-

sumably be giving up its right to debate questions of whether the U. S.

national interest--as defined at any given moment--might call for

intervention of American troops in the case of reverses suffered by

Middle Eastern holdings of large U. S. oil companies. Other aspects

of American motivation in taking specific military action in the Middle

East would as well, argued Kefauver, be removed from Congressional

scrutiny.

Kefauver's emphasis on U. S. oil interests as an important

underpinning of the new "anti-Communist" policy slant in the Middle

East is upheld to some degree by some "political" presuppositions of

the Eisenhower Doctrine. What to the United States were to be

"independent" bastions or check-points against Nāṣir's outward expansion--

notably Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Lebanon--were to Nāṣir four

stumbling blocks preventing his putting additional pressure on the Gulf

with its oil resources.[1] In the obvious fray of tensions that would

result from the U. S.' supporting older political groupings in "indepen-

dent" countries rather than growing popular forces within and without

these countries, where the boundaries between U. S. political,

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[1] Rostow, Op. cit., p. 361.

geopolitical, and strategic interests would likely be mixed together in any crisis; Kefauver's plea that Congress retain the power of debate and clarification with regard to U. S. actions in the Middle East represents a far-reaching and important area of criticism of the proposed Resolution.

The Inappropriateness of Unilateralism

The question of unilateralism poses more important long-range questions, many of which would crop up as points of justification or motivation in the wake of U. S. military operations in Lebanon in 1958. One is forced to look, as did Opposition legislators, behind the external picture of the United States' perennially correct posture with regard to United Nations operations, and toward the reality that a facade of what was dubbed "collective security" really covered a basic American unilateralism and dedication to national interest.

The United Nations was not consulted at all with regard to what amounted to a threat (to Moscow) by the United States to resort to force under certain circumstances in the Middle East.[1] The Opposition stressed multilateral thinking, in contrast to the Administration's view. Presidential Aide Sherman Adams noted that considerable

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[1] Finer, Op. cit., p. 500.

Oppositionist thinking was centered around having the U.N., or at least Britain and France, participate in the creation of a new Middle East policy, in order to keep the Western alliance system trim and the authority of the U.N. undimmed.[1] This unilateralism may, in one respect, be explained by the United States' desire to undercut any possibilities for amelioration of the Russian position in the Middle East. Early in 1957, the United States, along with Britain and France, turned down Russian proposals for a four-power declaration against the use of force in the Middle East.[2] It was not irrelevant in this matter that Britain, France, and the United States could respectively envision future difficulties in Algeria, Oman, Yemen, and within the Baghdad Pact--any of which eventual situations might have called for the use of force.

Dulles, replying to Senator Kefauver's question as to why Europe had not been formally consulted on the matter of the Middle East Resolution, said that the U.S. was not undertaking a new policy line for the benefit of Western Europe but, from a slightly different slant, was "really undertaking it for the benefit of the United States--because

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[1] Adams, Op. cit., p. 273.

[2] "Exchange of Notes with the Soviet Union, Soviet Note, Feb. 11, 1957," Council on Foreign Relations, Documents (1957), Op. cit., p. 220.

our interest in this respect coincides with that of Western Europe."[1]

Thus, at a time when a certain reconciliation with Britain and France

was called for, the thrust of U. S. "containment" planning was not

organized so as to specifically include them in the construction of the

Middle East Resolution.

Inconsistencies and Lacunae in the Administration's Position on the Middle East Resolution

If the final vote on the Eisenhower Doctrine was a decisive one

(72-19 passage in the Senate), the overall passage of the program was

not easy. Debate lasted for two months. If one is to assess the

Eisenhower Doctrine as a backdrop to the events of 1958, it is well to

consider the Administration-State Department views on the policy needs

in the Middle East, especially since these were the views that prevailed

over the objections that have been detailed above. For convenience,

The substantive premises of the Administration's view may be analyzed

under much the same schema as that used to consider the Opposition

positions--that is, the scope of the Resolution; its capacity as a

military threat or "presence" filling a vacuum; and its unilateral

nature.

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[1]
     Senate, Op. cit., p. 99.

Scope

It is a contention of this paper that the policy-making tenure of

J. F. Dulles as Secretary of State was one which was (1) highly per-

sonalized and centralized; and (2) based squarely on certain moral

and geopolitical suppositions. First it could be noted that at a time

when maximum contact with and understanding of political and social

forces in the Middle East was requisite, field officials were insufficiently

consulted.[1] Dulles' mark in the Administration's foreign policy was

predominant and unmistakable. It is his conceptions of the Middle

East which, vindicated by the Congressional vote in favor of the

Middle East Resolution, must be examined, not as views, but as major

lines of U.S. foreign policy. Through all the fabric of Dulles' policy

views runs a strong seam which is very much present in the 1957-1958

discussions of U.S.-Middle Eastern relations: that of the need for a

continual demonstration, on the part of the U.S., of a clear overall

superiority in the world.[2]

From Dulles' viewpoint, the scope of the Middle East Resolution

would be all encompassing; since it answered to a danger presumably

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[1]
    This fact would be of great significance in the events of
July 14-16, especially, in Lebanon. U.S. Senate, Hearings, Op. cit.,
p. 717.

[2]
    This view had a clear precedent in the recently past Korean
settlement where, while Eisenhower had wanted to concentrate on
peace, Secretary Dulles was anxious that the U.S. show its clear super-
iority by giving China a bad beating. Hughes, Op. cit., p. 105.

shared by all the Arab countries, it could not but meet with a warm reception. Perhaps naively, perhaps as a sop to the Congress, Dulles indicated his belief in the universal applicability of the Resolution, to the point where he said even Egypt and Syria would welcome it after consideration.[1]

Yet it is more than likely that Dulles, in spite of statements on the Middle East Resolution's universality, was clearly not immediately thinking of the Middle East as a whole with regard to the scope of the Resolution. Massive Soviet penetration especially in Syria and Egypt had stunned the State Department Chief, and simultaneously with the outlining of the Middle East Resolution's provisions went the beginnings of construction of a tenuous new line of allies in the "Southern Tier."[2]

This vantage point of the Eisenhower Doctrine leads one to believe that Dulles' view was less comprehensive than might be thought; and that the immediate large-scale Arab dismissal of the Resolution as a complete non-sequitur--as opposed to Ambassador Richards' description of an overall welcome--corroborates the narrowness and irrelevance of the scope. The general impression one gets from Dulles' testimony before the Foreign Relations and Armed Services

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[1] U.S., Congress, House, Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearings on H.J. Resolution 117, 85th Congress, 1st session, 1957, p. 9.

[2] Stevens, Op. cit., p. 165.

Committees in early 1957 is that, for divers purposes, Dulles narrowed

the scope of the Doctrine to encompass a certain group of countries, con-

sistent with U.S. strategic goals.

There seemed to be in Dulles a certain urgency about "wiring"

the substantial energy and resources of the Middle East Doctrine into

relatively "free" countries. Yet freedom was seen again in terms of

anti-Communism, lack of inclination to neutralism; and occasionally

Dulles would make a reference to the paraphernalia of democracy,

"elections and so forth, "[1]

To be adequate, Dulles argued, any program for the Middle East

must be able to meet all the principal "dangers" to that area--subversion,

overt aggression, and worsening economic conditions (which could create

proneness to Communism).[2] Did such a view of U.S. policy needs in

the Middle East address itself to what the Arabs considered to be the

dangers of the area? While the Opposition had felt the answer to this

question to be in the negative, Dulles' view clearly was that in order

for there to be solutions to endemic problems such as the Arab-Israeli

confrontation, the greatest obstacle to the solution of those problems--

a "mischievous" Soviet influence--had to be eliminated; the Arabs

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[1] U.S. Senate, Op. cit., pp. 113, 155.

[2] U.S., House, Op. cit., p. 3.

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[1]
    U. S. Senate, Op. cit., pp. 113, 155.

[2]
    U. S., House, Op. cit., p. 3.

would then presumably be able to clean up local matters.[1]

In contrast to the Opposition thinking on the proposed Middle East Resolution, which emphasized relevancy, comprehensiveness, and avoidance of confusion and misunderstanding in the Middle East as a result of ill-defined policies, Dulles' view--which eventually won the day--underlined external strategic factors perhaps at the expense of overall relevancy, as shall be seen.

Dulles adduced some of the following facts in open sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations-Armed Services hearings as pertinent: (1) Should the Soviets split the Baghdad Pact and the N. A. T. O. flank, not only would allied control of the eastern Mediterranean but of the Persian Gulf region be decimated; (2) European petroleum imports from the Middle East must be assured; (3) both the U. S. and Western Europe had crucial economic interests in the area.[2]

Severe critics of Dulles have indicated a belief that what he failed to say, at least publically, may have indicated more than in what he said, a pronounced economic coloring in the Secretary of State's motivations at the time of the Middle East Resolution. Stripping Dulles'

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[1]
U. S. Senate, Op. cit., p. 68.

[2]
Western Europe supplied 58% of imports of the Middle East and was purchasing 57% of that area's exports. The United States had a book value of over $1 billion invested in Middle East oil, while supplying about 18% of total imports in the area. Ibid., pp. 31-36.

dialogue of anathema against Communist atheism, one source noted

that what remained were certain essentially unspoken fears on the

part of the Secretary of State: (1) on the tremendous growth in the

U.S.S.R.'s productive capacity; (2) that advantageous interest rates

and financial positions might disintegrate unless the U.S.' despotic "friends"

were sustained in the area; and even that (3) eventual exorcism of the

fear of Communism would have disastrous effects on an American economy

much attuned to the production of the materials of defense and war.[1]

This is reminiscent of Senator Kefauver's remarks on the State

Department's contacts with powerful business interests (see above

p. 134).

Power Vacuum

The Republican Eisenhower Administration advanced the theory

that the Middle East Resolution was intended to fill a power vacuum by

some type of military presence or threat. It must be kept in mind that

a particular power vacuum could only be isolated or defined in terms

of international power movements and relations: regarding the newly

proposed U.S. policy for the Middle East, Dulles could note that,

> the principle involved is very much broader than this
> particular area. It relates to the whole kind of a world
> that we are now trying to build.[2]

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[1] O'Kearney, Op. cit., pp. 220, 221.

[2] U.S. Senate, Op. cit., p. 263.

The Administration belief was that the American voice had to be heard

clearly, loudly, perhaps not without some elements of Cold War bluff,

but certainly in the best tradition of brinkmanship. Eisenhower could

state the central purpose of the Resolution was "to leave no possibility

of miscalculation in the minds of potential Communist or Communist-

controlled aggressors as to the results of aggressive action on their

part."[1]

Dulles, who felt that the Soviets were guided by such factors as

(a) relative power capabilities; (b) temptation; and (c) "lack of moral

scruples;" inadvertantly makes something of a mockery of the question

of "issues" involved in U. S. Middle Eastern foreign policy, if thereby

clarifying the effective substance of the Eisenhower program for the

area by saying,

> The issue is: Are these people really convinced that we mean
> business? And I mean, what do the Russians think, do we
> mean business? And what do the people in the area who are
> endangered think, do we mean business?[2]

This suggested business-like deterrent, presumably directed against

all types of Soviet aggression, subversive penetration, and absorption,

points out some of the vague elements of the Eisenhower Doctrine

that were later to bear unpleasant fruits. The military aspects of

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[1]

Council on Foreign Relations, Documents (1958), Op. cit., p. 292.
Dulles also noted that in his opinion none of the governments of the
Middle Eastern nations was under the domination of international
Communism. U. S. Senate, Op. cit., p. 40.

[2]

U. S. Senate, Op. cit., pp. 4, 21.

the "shield," or reinforcement of U. N. collective security principles,

were emphasized by the very nature of the language of the Eisenhower

Doctrine, while the Eisenhower Administration apparently was meeting

a general Soviet threat in the area.   Dulles' statements along these

lines revealed a lack of subtlety that would only be embarrassing when

American troops should land in Lebanon somewhat more than a year

later:

> Therefore we would not, in my opinion, be entitled con-
> sistently with our existing treaty obligations to invade a
> country with armed forces which itself had not engaged
> in an armed attack.[1]

At another time Dulles indicated also,

> In my opinion preventive war is debarred by the United
> Nations Charter, by practically every mutual security
> treaty we have made, and by the terms of the resolution.[2]

One might infer that the Administration already repented of some

of the vaguer military aspects of the Eisenhower Doctrine from a

statement by the President in July, 1957.   The message indicated that

while the Middle East Resolution allowed the President latitude to

determine what action should be taken by the United States in any

given circumstances, nonetheless "the resolution does not carry with

it any advance commitment by the United States to take any particular

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[1]
   Ibid., p. 48.

[2]
   U. S. Senate, Op. cit., p. 272.

course of action. "[1]

However, as has been pointed out, the comprehensive Middle

East Resolution, much as it was a threat or policy statement of inter-

national proportions, also was directed for various reasons towards

certain more "independent" states in the Middle East.   Lebanon was

one state among these which, because of the internal dimensions of

its own particular problems, was to interpret what was later explained

to be Presidential latitude or discretion as being an advance commit-

ment that could be invoked if suitable circumstances could be shown

to exist. [2]

Unilateral Aspects

Regarding the largely unilateral nature of the Eisenhower

Doctrine, the Administration appears to have paid little more than

lipservice to the U. N. or Western European Powers.   From the very

beginning of discussion on the Middle East Resolution, the President

indicated that the system envisioned by the Resolution would constitute

merely a "reinforcement" of the collective security system of the

United Nations. [3]   But there was no hiding the uneasiness with which

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[1]
Council on Foreign Relations, Documents (1957), Op. cit., p. 213.

[2]
Recall President Sham'ūn's readiness, described in Chapter II,
to call into operation those provisions of the Eisenhower Doctrine that
would have caused the dispatch of American troops to Lebanon.

[3]
Message of the President on the Middle East, Jan. 5, 1957.
House Document 46, 85th Congress, 1st sess.; Council on Foreign
Relations, Documents (1957), Op. cit., p. 200.

the Administration viewed the possibilities of U. N. steps in the Middle
East which might further or secure American interests in that area.
Dulles felt that the U. N., the Charter of which he had helped to draw
up, could easily be a "death trap" had there not been provisions such
as Article 51 for action in protecting a nation's vital interests when a
veto deadlocked the U. N. organization.[1]

Convinced that the U. N. as it then existed could not defend the
Middle East against Soviet aggression of the type demonstrated in the
Hungarian uprising of 1956, the Secretary of State expressed his belief
that the United States must itself assume some of the basic roles of
the U. N.:

> If there is any so-called power vacuum there it must be
> filled by our helping strengthen the countries themselves
> under the shield of precisely the kind of protection which
> the U. N. Charter was designed to give them.[2]

In short, in a Middle Eastern situation where, Dulles felt, a
nation could either "keep" or "lose" its "freedom", the United Nations
alone could not hope to insure the necessary conditions for freedom:
(1) protection from open, armed attack; (2) strong internal forces;
and (3) a satisfactory economic situation.[3]

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[1]

   U. S. House, Op. cit., pp. 12, 13.

[2]

   Ibid., p. 10.

[3]

   U. S. Senate, Op. cit., p. 9. President Sham'ūn echoed a
similar view, stating his desire for firm and practical guarantees in
the face of a U. N. that was much weakened by the veto. Sham'ūn,
Op. cit., p. 366.

In assessing the failings, the excesses, the misunderstandings, and irrelevancies of the Eisenhower Doctrine, one cannot but help be led to the conclusion that it was constructed on a tenuous basis both in the Arab world and in the camp of the West and the United Nations. The Doctrine's internal paradoxes and lacunae rendered it a cumbersome instrument in a Middle East that was ready--in varying degrees in different places--to exaggerate and distend what was already vague; the immediate upshot in the Arab world, as shown in Chapter I, was lack of broad response to a foreign policy which depended for its effectiveness on just such response.

The Arab world was hardly understanding of a policy based on a "moral" essence, which was coupled with a continuation of older U.S. stances in the Middle East that the Arabs, generally, found reprehensible. This ice was made thinner: even King Sa'ūd, upon whom the U.S. was anxious to construct its new line of influence and counterweight to Nāṣir, joined Hussein, al-Qūwatlī, and Nāṣir in rejecting the American vacuum theory--and this even after the Sa'ūdi Monarch's visit to Washington in early 1957.[1]

The issues or avoidances of issues that were uppermost in the minds of U.S. policy makers, in as much as they were not always,

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[1]

Meo, Op. cit., p. 115.

if at all, the matters of most concern to the peoples of the Middle

East, prescribed that American influence in the area post 1957 was

bound to be shaky and fragile, subject to embarrassments and rever-

sals, setting back more than furthering its own interests. The

differences and tensions created by the circumstances of the Doctrine

in the Middle East had much to do with the drastic deterioration in

the American position that constituted the prelude to intervention by

U.S. troops to shore up a crisis whose proportions were of infinitely

greater magnitude than the Lebanese insurrection itself.

The Crises of 1957

By the end of 1957 Jordan, even with the extensive support of

the United States, was hardly the bulwark against the forces of

Communism and Arab nationalism that Washington had hoped it

would be. King Hussein's successes in repelling attempted insur-

rections in Jordan in 1957 scarcely papered over the cracks in the

counterweight system which policy planners had tried to construct.

It will be a contention of this paper that the April (1957) crisis in

Jordan and the August troubles with Syria forced U.S. hopes even

more on an Iraqi regime, whose fall on July 14, 1958 was deemed to

bear unusually dire consequences for United States interests in the area.

Jordan had not opted for the Eisenhower Doctrine, even though that country was accepting extensive U.S. military aid and in spite of the fact--if not because of it--that relations with Cairo and Damascus were not warm. But as 1957 wore on, Jordan was virtually allowing itself to be included in the so-called "kings' alliance," which was a formal name for the conservative alignment of Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia against Nasserism, which had been put together in Washington in early 1957.[1] But even upon receipt of American aid to help him in the April 1957 turmoil, Hussein was outwardly extremely wary of associating himself or even the aid he had received with the Eisenhower Doctrine.[2]

One could observe that the response of the United States to what was largely an internal problem in Jordan was in terms of the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Cold War "dialogue." The net result was a fortification of feudal elements in that country and an opening up of the United States "moral" position to increased propaganda and ill will from outside.

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[1] With Nāsir making inroads everywhere, Washington felt that an indigenous alliance system rather than simply a passive or "neutral" stance on the parts of those states inimical to Cairo should be encouraged. Lenczowski, Op. cit., p. 296. In addition, with Egypt possibly anxious for a second round in the Palestine issue, it was likely that the U.S. was especially anxious to preserve Jordan as a buffer. Kirk, Op. cit., p. 111.

[2] Meo, Op. cit., p. 190.

The nature of the April crisis was generally internal, and specifically one between more or less revolutionary leaders of the emergent middle class and "counter revolutionary spokesmen" of the established semi-feudal order.[1] King Hussein, suspicious of the leftist tendencies of the entrenched National Socialist Party, called in April for the resignation of a cabinet led by the latter party's boss, Nabulsi. President Eisenhower's view of the situation was one shot through with allusions to "Communist instigation" and "pro-Soviet" personalities.[2] King Hussein himself, his throne meanced, pulled out all the stops of Cold War language, squarely implicating Communism in the troubles he was experiencing, and indirectly accusing the Cairo government of being Communist dominated.[3]

The formal U.S. statement of concern with events in Jordan, phrased in Middle East Resolution-type language, was joined by the movement of the Sixth Fleet into the Eastern Mediterranean. In spite of Hussein's disinclination to be seen by his neighbors to have invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine, the fact was that, to all visible intents and purposes, the presence of the Eisenhower Doctrine in its Cold War

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[1]
 H. A. R. Philby, "Letter," New Republic, vol. 137, No. 12 (Sept. 9, 1957), p. 15.

[2]
 Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 194. Also, Adams, Op. cit., p. 289.

[3]
 Kirk, Op. cit., p. 110.

context was felt in this crisis. The United States had immediately

dispatched military goods and services amounting to $10 million to

Jordan, and an additional $10 million in economic assistance was also

granted.[1]

The United States' action in the crisis could perhaps be termed a

victory only in that conservative elements in Hussein's camp and in

that of Lebanon's Sham'ūn were reassured. More realistically, however,

this first experiment with the Eisenhower Doctrine revealed some of

its structural weaknesses and served to corroborate some of the

points of view held by opposition elements in the U.S. with regard to

the Doctrine, outlined above. First, regarding the mechanism of

the Middle East Resolution, the "moral" premises of the Eisenhower

Doctrine, with its tacit lack of sympathy with neutralist positions and

lack of understanding of social forces and of basic issues, made it

impossible for Hussein to deal with or invoke the Doctrine in its own

terms. In fact, as was mentioned, he nearly disavowed it.

Furthermore, the corollary of the Middle East Resolution--

being the further introduction of the Cold War into the Middle East--

was stimulating rather than eliminating disputes, thus causing

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[1]
    Department of State Bulletin, vol. 37 (July 22, 1957),
pp. 146, 232.

increases in military expenditure; this in turn was eroding the economic

stability of, for example, Jordan, where the share of the defense

budget in the overall budget was, by 1957, L14.5 million out of L28

million, not including the abovementioned U.S. military aid valued

at $10 million. [1]

Of equal importance was the matter of popular feeling--an issue

which the United States would have the chance to much underrate in

the following year. There was little in the events of April 1957 in

Jordan to hide the fact that what the King had accomplished, by way

of strengthening his own hand, had been brought about in the face of

public opinion. [2] Any victory in the crisis was not won primarily over

foreign agents; it was a personal victory, largely belonging to Hussein

triumphing over personal antagonists. The fruit of this victory was

the perpetuation of a semi-feudal class which could only cause

resentment among Arab nationalists, many Palestinians, and dis-

gruntled elements of the population. [3] No doubt, such ill-feeling on

the part of the Arab nationalists would work to Moscow's more than

to Washington's long-term interests. On a local level, many Israelis

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[1]
    Barraclough, Op. cit., p. 364.

[2]
    "The Middle East since Suez," The World Today, vol. 13,
No. 12 (December 1957), p. 511.

[3]
    Philby, Op. cit., p. 15.

could not but note with satisfaction the strange scene of the United
States supporting the last vestiges of Arab reactionism and tradi-
tionalism.[1]

The vagueness of American policy in the area, embodied in the
Eisenhower Doctrine, was remarked by a number of U.S. Congressmen,
who took mild issue with U.S. moves in response to the Jordanian
crisis. In criticisms reminiscent of Senator Fulbright's remarks
three months earlier, these legislators argued that it was their im-
pression that the Eisenhower Doctrine was to constitute merely a moral
and psychological stand which would not be likely to involve the United
States in any potentially serious confrontations.[2]

It was not in doubt that there had been outside pressures from
Cairo, Damascus, and Moscow to exploit the frictions in Jordan. But
the fact of both Jordan's and the U.S.' invoking "international
Communism" as the cause of the troubles in Jordan merely pointed
up how quickly giant influences could be brought to bear on matters
of greatly varying regional or international importance. By the early
summer of 1957, both Moscow and Washington were again attempting
to further their lines of influence in the Middle East by using the
potential and repercussions of the Jordanian crisis for their respective

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[1]
    Utley, Op. cit., p. 37.

[2]
    Kirk, Op. cit., p. 110.

propaganda purposes, rather than to exercise any new influence on the possible solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.[1]

The U. S. Position in Syria

Events of late summer and early autumn in Syria eventuated in further reversals of American prestige in that country. The American reaction to Syrian activity at this time was, in fact, to contribute substantially to the Egyptian-Syrian attempt at "Arab Unity" in early 1958.

On August 13, 1957, Syrian Radio announced an "American plot" against Syria had been uncovered. Three U. S. Embassy and Attaché officials were to be expelled from Syria for alleged subversive activities. The feeling in the White House was that "the Communists had taken control of the government."[2] Since Chapter V deals in detail with the nature of this alleged plot, discussion here will center around the American policy reaction to the accusations and the way in which the spirit of the Eisenhower Doctrine further alienated the United States from Syrian affairs.

From the beginning of 1957 Washington was growing more panicky about a Syria which had first rejected the Middle East Resolution, then, in March, contracted with Czechoslovakia for military equipment; and

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[1]
Barraclough, Op. cit., p. 174.

[2]
Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 196.

in August, amid cries about the alleged American plot, came a large

credit for Damascus from the Kremlin to be used in developmental

projects. The U.S. had interpreted the June resignations of a number

of Popular Party deputies as a protest against Communist domination

of Syria, although, in reality, it would have been more accurate to

have described the event as a Populist demand for more changes in the

Cabinet to suit the Populist's extreme right-wing disposition.[1] Reflecting

on the inadequate grasp of the situation which Washington seemed to

have, former Foreign Minister Salāh al-Bitār of Syria noted the paradox

of the U.S. belief that Syria was slipping into the Communist orbit:

Syria had always been by nature capitalist, disinclined towards govern-

ment meddling in private business, importing vast amounts of products

from the West, and was in many ways dominated politically by rentiers

and liberals (in the European sense) characterized by the still dominant

People's Party.[2] Yet, Bitar indicated, the U.S. invoked the "Communist"

label in an attempt to maintain the status quo of basic problems, as in

Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, or Saudi Arabia.

The U.S. seemed to feel that Syria was more prone to Communist

domination than was Egypt. Syria, without a single strong man like

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[1] O'Kearney, Op. cit., p. 206.

[2] Ibid., p. 56.

Nāsir, was not able to deal as "safely" with the Communists; and in

Syria, thought the U.S., the Communists were dealing much more

directly with the army, foreign ministry, and political parties.[1] It

perhaps should have been less surprising to Washington that Syria had

turned to the Soviet bloc for arms and trade agreements, when the West

had imposed a virtual economic blockade of Syria after Suez.[2] In June

1957, Minister of the Economy Kallas had complained bitterly of an

American effort to strangle Syrian trade by dumping and covert boycott

operations.

There was some hazy U.S. thinking regarding the nature and

threat of Syria's pro-Moscow or pro-Communist stand. The Communiqué

of the Baghdad Pact meeting in Karachi, in June of 1957, indicated that

the dangers to Middle Eastern nations from the Communist side of

the Cold War were still very great.[3] Eisenhower was aware of the

analyses of such close observers as King Sa'ūd: the King saw in the

"troublemakers" in Damascus over-ambitious army officers rather

than Communists.[4] Yet Washington hardly demonstrated a working

cognizance of the manifold forces in Syria in 1957; and the U.S. policy

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[1]

Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 197.

[2]

"The Struggle for the Middle East," New Statesman, vol. 54, (July 6, 1957), p. 21.

[3]

Council on Foreign Relations, Documents (1957), Op. cit., p. 254.

[4]

Adams, Op. cit., p. 289.

of isolating Syria had not served to further understanding in this regard.

There is no doubt that Syria, increasingly after Husni Za'im's

energetic but short-lived anti-Communist stance in 1949 had looked

increasingly to Moscow for succor; however, to say that Syria was

becoming Communist in the same measure was an exaggeration. By

1957 the Communists in Syria were not anywhere near the key political

positions in the country: those positions were held by Ba'athists and

Pan-Arabists.[1]

The biggest Communist figure in Syria, Khālid Baqdash, in

actuality was receiving most of his support from his Kurdish connections,

while his name and prestige were upheld by virtue of his being a

Communist.[2] One would have reasoned that if the Communist Party

in Syria was gaining the preponderant influence which Washington

believed to be the case, then it would have been likely that Baqdash

would have been made privy to the Government's plans to send a mission

to Moscow. Such was not the case; the Communist leader was not

informed of this.[3] 'Afīf Bizri, a Syrian Communist and military officer,

was another individual in whom the West saw a strong Communist

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[1]
    Remarks by Prof. Walid al-Khālidī, American University of
Beirut, April 17, 1967.

[2]
    The view of the London Times of August 21, 1957, that Khālid
Baqdash was "the most dominating personality in Syrian politics in
spite of lack of office" deserves much skepticism.

[3]
    O'Kearney, Op. cit., p. 78.

influence; Bizrī's power, however, lay in his being supported by the Ba'ath, not in his being a Communist.

In addition, much of the antipathy felt in Washington to Foreign Minister al-'Azm, who encouraged closer Russo-Syrian relations, is mitigated when one considers al-'Azm was originally much motivated in his stance by American policy toward Syria: a recurrent theme of the day in Damascus, which reflected on overall U.S. policy in the Middle East, was "Better Sovietized than Judaized."[1] Ironically, the very grouping that the U.S. looked upon favorably, the rightest People's Party--which Communist Baqdash denounced as fascist--was not completely opposed to the new Soviet orientation for these reasons: (1) possibilities and terms for trade seemed favorable; (2) Soviet arms would help prevent Israeli expansion; and (3) Eastern bids on construction work were lower, as were interest rates.[2] Some older nationalists, such as President Shukrī al-Qūwatlī, made use of Western pressures for their own local political purposes: often feeling their own support slipping away, the veteran nationalists concentrated on the negative aspects of the West in order to fill a policy void by means of propaganda.[3]

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[1] Lenczowski, Op. cit., p. 347.

[2] O'Kearney, Op. cit., p. 76.

[3] "Syria on the Move," World Today, vol. 13, (January 1957), p. 25.

Leftist labels for Syria were abundant in the United States in 1957. Salāh al-Dīn al-Bitār notes that, in haste to a static approach to international questions, the U.S. had misnamed as "leftism" what was actually a process of modernization very much like that America had undergone, involving the same variable factors such as landlords, monarchists, republicans, and labor.[1] The fuzzy thinking that led Eisenhower to conclude Syria "ripe to be plucked at any time" by Moscow, due to alleged Communist penetration especially of extra-parliamentary groups can only have been the result of imagining Ba'ath and Communist strength in Syria to have been virtually one in the same thing. In reality, although the Communist movement enjoyed some support among the professional classes, it was hardly able to compete in this period with the Ba'ath in the most significant extra-parliamentary pressure groups--the army and Syrian students.[2] The vision of the Ba'ath Party, which increasingly included 'Abd al-Nāsir as the moment of union approached, was different from Communist ideology in important respects by late 1957 the Ba'ath and the Communists, as constituent elements of the Left in Syria, were anathema to one another--a distinction which

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[1] O'Kearney, Op. cit., p. 60.

[2] Walter Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East, (New York: Praeger, 1956), p. 158. The Communists did enjoy growing support in the army especially after 1954 among some officers who had originally been involved in the Hawrani wing of the Socialists. See "Syria on the Move," Op. cit., p. 22.

was vague in Washington.[1]

Other nuances of the Syrian scene significantly escaped official Washington's purview: Khālid al-'Azm, who was taken as a renegade for having engineered the Syrian aid-trade agreement with the U.S.S.R. was drawing his strength not from the left, but from the parliamentary representatives of the Syrian bourgeoise. To an outside observer, the significance of Khālid al-'Azm lay more in the latter's own rather opportunistic rise to and aspiration for power than in his pro-Moscow leanings.[2]

Whether on the basis of a misapprehension of the scene in Syria-- and a failure to see that U.S. policy itself had much to do with developing pressures that came to a boil in late 1957--or out of deliberate, selective, two-dimensional views that were grounded in the premises of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the top policy makers in Washington saw Damascus' "Soviet-dominated regime" teetering towards Moscow and at the same time spreading influences (presumably Communist) through infiltrators and subversion into Lebanon in order to topple that ally of the West.[3] In any case, what happened after the alleged American coup

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[1]
U.S. Army Handbook for Syria 1965, Prepared for the Department of the Army by Foreign Area Studies Division, Special Operations Research Office (Washington: American University, 1965), p. 173.

[2]
Ibid., p. 173.

[3]
Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 201.

of August 1957 was not a Communist coup in Syria; nor did what amounted to a shift in the relative positions of strength of the major parties have much to do with the ideological concepts of Communism, free enterprise, or democracy.[1]

The American reaction to events in Syria appears exaggerated and insensitive; ultimately the U. S. response worked to the detriment of the American position in the area and put more heat on the factors that would constitute the 1958 "crisis". President Eisenhower, suggesting that the Eisenhower Doctrine would not apply to the situation and resolving on taking some other action, dispatched Loy Henderson to Istanbul and Beirut. It appears that Henderson was sent to encourage Syria's neighbors in their belief that military action would be necessary "before Syria was recognized officially as a Communist satellite."[2] In brief, Eisenhower thought that Iraqi operations from the East could be facilitated by the massing of troops on the Syrian borders by the following countries: Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey.[3]

The field architect for the scheme, Loy Henderson, started off this new U. S. diplomatic phase with a strike against him: he had a reputation of being the coup-maker who had supported General Zahedi's overthrow of Musaddeq in Iraq in 1953.[4]

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[1] Times (London), August 25, 1957,

[2] Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 197.

[3] Ibid., p. 198.

[4] Stevens, Op. cit., p. 167.

It appeared as if the plan envisaged the U. S.' being a referee in a "fair fight". Accordingly the Sixth Fleet moved into the Eastern Mediterranean and U. S. aircraft were dispatched from Western Europe to the U. S. base at Adana, Turkey. The scene was set up presumably for a major action: the United Press quoted on August 28th a "senior Western official" in Istanbul as saying that the West had clear proof that Syria had begun a terror campaign against Jordan and Lebanon.[1]

The results of this preparation and diplomatic activity did not go much farther than dramatic arms shipments to Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia and the massing of Turkish troops on the Syrian borders.[2] The implication in U. S. statements and actions that the tiny Syrian army was threatening neighboring countries was patently absurd.[3] Yet the White House drafted a note to Turkey's President Menderes and his neighbors giving assurances that,

> if Syria's Moslem neighbors felt it necessary to take action
> against aggression by the Syrian government, the United
> States would undertake to expedite shipments of arms already
> committed to the Middle Eastern countries and, further,
> would replace losses as quickly as possible.[4]

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[1] O'Kearney, Op. cit., p. 79.

[2] For Russian intelligence reports on the nature of troop movements in Turkey at this time see Letter from the Head of the Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations (Gromyko) to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Hammarskjold). October 16, 1957. U. N. Doc. A/3700, dated October 17, 1957.

[3] For Example, note that by 1957 Turkey (population 23 million) had one of the strongest field forces in N. A. T. O. Syria (population 4 million) had a relatively small and untrained army.

[4] Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 199.

The Iraqis were well aware that Syria's imposed isolation was making the Cairo-Damascus axis all the stronger, and that bad relations or belligerency with Syria would cause losses in oil revenues.[1] Furthermore, the U. S. move to involve Turkey in the pressure tactics on Syria were only causing resentments that could not be measured on the scale of international Communism but rather in terms of age-old Arab-Turkish differences.

By mid-September 1957, nearly all the relevant Arab governments--with the exception of Lebanon--had given up the idea of collective action. The American actions with regard to isolating or possibly upsetting Syria seemed to confirm in many Arab eyes the truth of the prior charge by Syria and the U. S. S. R. that there had been an American plot being hatched against Damascus.

The Syrians made use of the increasingly embarrassing position in which the United States was finding itself. In early September, Damascus transmitted letters to Arab capitals asking whether it was appropriate for Arab to attack Arab.[2] The response was immediate and chipped away the American position: on September 10, Jordan's Foreign Minister Rifā'ī stated that Jordan, whose chief enemy remained Israel,

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[1] The experience of 1956 had showed Iraq that a stoppage of oil transit across Syria from Kirkuk would cost Iraq in the neighborhood of $700,000/day in losses.

[2] O'Kearney, Op. cit., p. 83.

had no urgent need for Washington's dramatic arms consignments for
protection against Syria. Even a firm U. S. friend like Sa'ūd was con-
strained to admit, at a summit meeting in Damascus (which included the
Iraqi premier) that he would deplore any aggression against Syria.[1]
Sa'ūd also let Washington know that he thought its reaction to events in
Syria had been excessive. Hussein, too, made statements of solidarity
with Syria after Sa'ūd had engineered an uneasy working peace between
Syria and Jordan.[2]

One of the paradoxes inherent in the Eisenhower Doctrine--that of
its addressing itself to the people of the Middle East and their "problems, "
without dealing with the deep social currents of the area--rears its
head. In the last analysis those Arab governments that were allied with
the United States had to take into consideration public opinion in declaring
support for a fellow Arab nation.

The State Department spent much of October 1957 declaring
solidarity with Turkey and in refuting charges especially from the
Kremlin that Loy Henderson had special instructions and that the U. S.
was pushing Turkey into a war with Syria.[3] Dulles seemed anxious to
emphasize that the matter was one with which the Arabs would deal

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[1]
Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 202.

[2]
Barraclough, Op. cit., p. 182.

[3]
Department of State Bulletin, vol. 37 (October 28, 1957), p. 674.

themselves and on a regional basis.[1]

One could deduce from events on the Moscow side that in some respects Washington could count the Syrian affair a Cold War victory, in as much as Syria had not become a satellite to the extent some sources believed Moscow wanted. Whether to end an unsuccessful attempt at garnering Syria, by exaggerating allegations of an American plot, or simply to clear the air diplomatically, Khruschev ended direct U.S.S.R. pressure on the situation by his suddenly appearing at a Turkish Embassy reception in Moscow.[2] Two days later, Syria further calmed the situation by announcing to the U.N. that she was willing to have her dispute with Turkey come to an end.

If a war of words was over, with neither of the Great Powers in the Cold War having built a dramatic victory, U.S. prestige had suffered considerably in the Arab world; and to an extent the U.S. had undermined its own position. First, the pathological U.S. reaction to Soviet arms and aid to Syria had only strengthened the latter country in its desire to counter the dictates of the U.S. with recognition of legitimate Soviet interests.[3] Such a frame of mind in Syria allowed Communists and pro-Communists into a position which, though not of

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[1] Ibid., p. 712. See also pp. 777-782.

[2] Dallin, Op. cit., p. 471.

[3] Meo, Op. cit., p. 193.

predominance, was sufficient to provoke Ba'athi leaders to flee to Cairo

seeking a union which was perhaps premature, in February 1958.

President Eisenhower indicated at the moment of the Syrian-Egyptian

merger into a United Arab Republic as how Nāṣir's "exact political

leanings were something of a mystery" and that the White House was

unsure of,

> whether this union was prompted by Communist influence
> or whether the Communists were merely going along with
> Nasser's ambition eventually to unify the Arab world.[1]

In retrospect, the United States appears to have been extremely

unaware of the forces that finally prompted the union that was so dis-

tasteful to Washington. Not only had the U. S. policy of isolating Syria

left its mark in dividing the country and exacerbating internal dif-

ferences, but U. S. understanding of the nature of the Communism that

had evolved in that country was apparently lacking. The fact was that

the Ba'athi officers who fled to Cairo to urge union on an unwilling

President Nāṣir were less afraid of a growing Communism in Syria

than of a possible counter-coup from the Right, which might have soon

happened if loud but uninfluential Communist elements continued to be

vociferous.[2] While leftist fears and labels were in abundance in

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[1]
    Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 292.

[2]
    Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1965), p. 317.

Washington at the time of the U. A. R. merger, it is noteworthy that the first political act of significance in the new union was the abolition of all political parties.[1]

One could say that, because of the tools and means the United States chose to isolate Syria and Egypt especially after 1956, American foreign policy had paved the way for Egypt to pose as the architect of Arab unity, an eventuality probably remote from Secretary Dulles' prior speculations.

The United States was to suffer another serious disappointment the month following the U. A. R. merger. King Sa'ūd, who to Washington's satisfaction was not in favor of the U. A. R., became involved in such an infamous and callous series of financial intrigues against the U. A. R. leaders that he suffered a great loss of support in his own country when these activities were exposed by the U. A. R.'s Interior Minister for Syria, Abdul Hamīd Sarrāj.[2] With the presence of some pro-Nāṣir feeling in Saudi Arabia, and lacking the loyalty of his brothers, the United States' biggest ally in the southern Arab world virtually abdicated on March 24, 1958. The U. S. had lost the man they had cultivated since early 1957 as a makeweight for Nasserism and a man

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[1]
    Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War 1958-1964 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 14.
[2]
    Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 264.

who for a year at least had "manfully persisted in his anti-Communism."[1]

By the summer of 1958, official Washington was taking note of some of the following things: the U. S. position in Saudi Arabia was unsure with Faiṣal in power; Nūrī as-Saʻīd, on a shaky popular base, was greatly troubled by the creation of the U. A. R.; the U. A. R. itself seemed a potential breeding ground for Soviet influence and Communism, and Syria was apparently "lost" forever; judging from reports of Syrian infiltrators in Lebanon, the U. A. R. was already demonstrating itself a malignant influence in the area and particularly with regard to what "friends" the U. S. could count on in the Middle East; and the Arab Union which Jordan and Iraq had formed in response to the Syrian-Egyptian merger, appeared tennous. As the situation in Lebanon deteriorated further, with "Nasserism" increasingly threatening that state's existence--according to the Shamʻūn regime and the United States--without warning the Iraqi branch of the Hashemite dynasty was smashed in a sudden coup led by Brigadier ʻAbdul Karīm Qāssim. The effect of this latest blow to American prestige and policy in the area was momentous in Washington.

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[1]
Ibid., p. 191.

United States Foreign Policy and
Intervention in Lebanon
1958

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CHAPTER IV

POLICY MAKING IN THE DISPATCH OF

U. S. FORCES TO LEBANON

The Nature of the Policy Making Structure

A day after the landing of U. S. troops in Lebanon, a leading

American journalist remarked that the military intervention in the

Middle East represented a salvage operation for a wrecked American

policy in the area.[1] This critic noted that the landings were the only

alternative after massive errors in diplomacy and politics which had

preceded the present crisis. Preceding chapters have suggested areas

and ways in which American diplomacy--or at least "policy in the

field"--suffered from inconsistencies, irrelevancies, and lacunae due

to U. S. policy premises, interests, and because of internal pressures

on policy organs both from political and lobbyist quarters. Having dis-

cussed aspects of the diplomatic evolution of the Middle East "crisis"

of 1958, it is worthwhile to turn to an examination of the mechanics of

policy making and implementation, with particular regard to the

landings in Lebanon. The nature of the formulation of policy in

Washington, the way in which such policy is articulated, and the way

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[1]

Arthur Krock, "Procedure as a Substitute for Policy," New
York Times (July 16, 1958).

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in which diplomatic and military channels interpret and implement policy--all cast light upon the ultimate confrontation of policy with the environment and people upon which it is applied.

Foreign policy in the United States is not the sole prerogative of the Department of State; however, it has been suggested above that the influence of Secretary of State Dulles was considerable. But in an American which was no longer isolationist, and upon which the Cold War was making considerable demands on the levels of defense, politics, economics, intelligence, and diplomacy, there were bound to be, by 1958, numerous "dialogues" between the various departments responsible for particular aspects of United States interests overseas. For example, one is led to infer, on the basis of the Congressional involvement with the 1957 Middle East Resolution, and more particularly by virtue of Secretary Dulles' sharp encounters with legislative leaders during the hearings on the Eisenhower Doctrine, that Congressional opinion--particularly in the form of respected spokesmen and leaders in Congress--may exercise considerable influence on the State Department.[1] So too the defense establishment and intelligence agencies, among others, were intentionally and inadvertantly putting pressures

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Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (London: Collins, 1964), p. 546.

on the mechanism of U. S. foreign policy creation. An aim of this
analysis is to point out the deleterious effects of manifold, often unco-
ordinated influences on American foreign policy from different quarters
in an era when the United States had barely emerged onto the world
scene as a major participant in international affairs.

One Arab diplomat characterized the American policy-making
"machine" as having become, by 1958, "fossilized" into a structure
dominated by formalistic thinking-- Dulles as a lawyer liked the con-
tractual approach--and reduced to a purveyor of quick cures and
panaceas for major international crises.[1] Such a criticism, if true,
falls doubly hard on an Administration that was, perhaps, more aware
of the pulse of the Middle East than any before it: contingency plans
coupled with Presidential "discretion" regarding the Middle East had
never been greater; the U. S. military base structure and Sixth Fleet
presence in the area also were a silent testimony to a new postwar
sense of urgency for making fast decisions in a volatile part of the
world.[2] If one is to argue finally that the American response to events
in 1958 was in fact "fossilized" and desperate, in spite of the above-
mentioned awareness, then it would be meaningful to consider ways in

[1]
O'Kearney, Op. cit., p. 73.
[2]
Goss, Op. cit., pp. 11-13.

which the American policy-making channels in 1958 might have been clogged or "wasteful" ðñ possibly wrongly directing its energies.

In order for a nation's foreign policy in general to be at least consistent, and at best articulate and energetic, there must exist a degree of internal and inter-harmony within and between the three main branches of policy making: (1) the Executive-Department of State unit; (2) a military establishment capable of logistical support for policies; and (3) intelligence services, able to give intelligence "support" for overt and covert operations of policy. There is much evidence that during the Eisenhower tenure, there were significant discontinuities of communication within and between these branches.

The Eisenhower Administrations had a reputation for a business orientation which was justified. While the Administration made use of the rhetoric of the liberal and more imaginative wing of the Republican party, the fact is that the Eisenhower years were far more colored by the influences of the midwest Republican group, typefied by Senator Robert Taft, and tinged with perhaps the last vestiges of isolationism.[1] The immediate result of a wholesale infusion of businessmen into the Eisenhower team--notably in the person of Defense Secretary Wilson (formerly General Motors head), but also Messrs. Humphrey, Dodge,

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[1]
Rostow, Op. cit., pp. 301-303.

and Weeks--was a tremendous budget-mindedness that expressed itself
in the "Great Equation": that is, the increase in American military
and Cold-War strength at lessened cost. Treasury Secretary Humphrey's
views on Communism, during Eisenhower's first term, indicate the
large extent to which an economic yardstick was being applied to foreign
affairs: the Secretary felt, after the U.S. had abetted Communism in
the world by its own irresolution, some not too costly show of force
would change matters greatly.[1] The ultimate effects of conservative-
budgetary thinking predominating in key posts of military and foreign
policy planning were these: (1) imbroglios in the defense sphere; (2)
an overall failure of innovation at a time when such was critically needed.

It was not until 1957-8 that the U.S. military structure, which had
been hampered by budgetary limitations and a civilian command that
seemed unable to organize any overall comprehensive plan for the
military, began to think sufficiently in terms of limited or "brushfire"
engagements.[2] The mobile "reserve" conception of Admiral Radford,
necessitated by a nuclear war context that called for limitations in
terms of terrain, weapons, and objectives, was stymied long enough

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[1]
Emmet John Hughes, The Ordeal of Power, A Political Memoir
of the Eisenhower Years (New York: Atheneum, 1963), p. 66.

[2]
Rostow, Op. cit., p. 322.

so that by July 1958 a political philosophy capable of developing an effective and relevant process of American intervention was still lacking. While innovation was much needed in the military sphere, on many levels, inter-service rivalries increased; notably Secretary Wilson's plans to retune the Defense Department and reduce such rivalries did not result in a decisive fight in Washington until Eisenhower's "Special Message on Defense Department Reorganization" of April 3, 1958, only several months before operations in Lebanon.[1]

If the Eisenhower Administration's response to needs for radical military changes was slow, its response to similar requirements for innovation with regard to the United States' relations with the developing nations was, by 1958, "sluggish".[2] A slightly military-like system of departmental organization--with strong sectional chiefs--added to the Administration's continued reliance of the Republican Right wing, helped to reduce the possibilities for imagination and innovation in the political process.

While developments in the Middle East had by 1958 demonstrated that the United States would do well to come to terms with, or at least seek more understanding of, popular, social, and nationalist movements

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[1] Hughes, Op. cit., p. 75.

[2] Rostow, Op. cit., p. 384.

in the Middle East, at the helm of the State Department was a man who

had kept the prognostication of Stalin in mind: that the Communist

victory over the West would come with the rising nationalism among the

peoples of Asia and Africa.[1] Eisenhower believed in the Communist

threat echoed by Dulles, but one source close to the President indicated

that there frequently were significant differences between the two men.[2]

There was a certain "schizophrenia" in councils close to the President,

as exemplified in the fundamental policy differences of the two men

closest to Eisenhower, Humphrey and Dulles. Eisenhower clearly felt

Dulles to be capable in his role, but it is also true that the Secretary

of State did not exactly meet the President's specifications for a "Chief

of Staff, " or as one who could coordinate various departments and

instruments dealing with America's role in the world. The fact that

Dulles, according to the President, had a limited view of the political

role of Secretary of State and concentrated on being a trouble-shooter,

lawyer, and Chief Ambassador abroad, meant that whatever vacuum

existed by virtue of Dulles' political "absence, " was filled by Cabinet

members.[3] It is clear that there were bound to be frictions between

Dulles, whose approach has been likened to Theodore Roosevelt's

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[1]   Adams, Op. cit., p. 293.

[2]   Rostow, Op. cit., pp. 343-4.

[3]   Rostow, Op. cit., p. 390.

resoluteness, and Eisenhower, who was perhaps less pessimistic about peaceful solutions to disputes and the workability of the U. N.[1] These differences, and those between the President and the Congress, added to the unprogressive structure of the Eisenhower Administration, meant that there were significant weaknesses in the foreign policy making organism, seen as a whole. As an Eisenhower aid put it,

> A foreign policy beset by such inner contradictions could attain results of only one kind: the negative or the passive... but a national policy so nearly schizophrenic was powerless to create a positive political design.[2]

The Role of Intelligence

Intelligence services during the postwar period, as the Cold War was getting fully launched, were playing increasingly more important parts in decision taking and making. It should again be emphasized that in a bi-polar power structure where both Russia and the United States were anxious to avoid a final confrontation, increasingly goals had to be sought in more "covert" ways. United States policy makers believed that initiatives must be taken to either screen out or build influences against Soviet indirect penetration. On a high level, a form

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[1] Berding, Op. cit., pp. 127-129.

[2] Hughes, Op. cit., p. 344; also U. S. President, 1952-60 (Eisenhower). "The Situation in the Middle East; Radio and Television Address to the American People." Feb. 20, 1957. Department of State Publication 6461.

of political warfare had developed by the 1950's, involving an intense "cooperation" between the Great Powers and their potential or virtual "friends" especially among the developing nations. Several years before the Lebanese landings, CIA Director Allen Dulles explained that the United States was using various techniques to "encourage" its friends in countering Communist subversion.[1]

It is not the purpose to examine whether especially the CIA branch of the intelligence community was serving, in the pejorative usage of its detractors, as an "invisible government," shaping policy autono- mously. It is sufficient to note that, by 1958, the intelligence com- munity was not altogether smoothly integrated into the policy making establishment; and that a reason for this was a degree of autonomous "field" behavior resulting from a combination of crusading anti-Com- munist zeal and tremendous security field cover.[2] As each of the policy-making branches mentioned above possessed its own intelligence units, there were problems, during the Eisenhower Administration, arising out of differing views and emphases on the parts of these various organs; service loyalties and bureaucratic rivalries further obstructed

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[1]

Blackstock, Op. cit., p. 32.

[2]

Ibid., p. 116ff. Further references to the intelligence community will be to the CIA, as the one (out of nine) intelligence unit that had achieved real predominance, especially after Army G-2 was discredited in 1955.

accurate and consistent treatments of pending matters.

President Eisenhower, in an effort to further centralized intelligence lines in policy making, was in the habit of beginning National Security Council meetings with a briefing on the world situation by the Director of the CIA.[1]

The CIA had been active in the Middle East, in Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, and Jordan especially. It is important to note that in 1956 the CIA and the State Department had had a major falling-out over the question of the "Allen Mission" to Cairo.[2] It has already been suggested that the CIA played a certain role in the election of President Sham'ūn and later in the national elections of 1957. During the May strikes that initiated the final denouncement of the 1958 crisis, it appeared that a CIA agent in Beirut gave President Sham'ūn briefings on the plans of Sa'ib Salām of the Opposition including information on the extent of Nasserist support Salām's effort could expect to command.[2] As will be seen, the CIA was also active in Jordan only a short time prior to the fall of Hashemite Iraq.

The picture that is suggested thus far of the role of the CIA in U. S. Middle Eastern policy in 1958 falls along these lines: (1) the CIA

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[1]
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., The Real CIA (New York: Macmillan Co., 1968), p. 260.

[2]
Blackstock, Op. cit., 116ff.

[3]
Tulley, Op. cit., p. 86.

had a certain prominence in higher Executive policy councils because
of Eisenhower's belief in the importance of intelligence; (2) the strains
that existed in the 1950's between Congress and the CIA make one think
that an ordered intelligence process had not yet been fully integrated
into the legislative and policy-making machine;[1] and (3) judging from
events other than the Iraqi coup of July 1958, the CIA was often not
only highly informed on Middle Eastern affairs, but in some instances
acting in the field in a semi-autonomous fashion.[2]

The link that is missing as an important influence on the shaping
of U.S. foreign policy, which is at best indeterminate, is the person
of the CIA Director himself in the light of his close connection with
his brother, the Secretary of State. Five months before the U.S.
landings in Lebanon, Allen Dulles underlined his own convictions on
intelligence:

> The National Security Act of 1947 has given Intelligence
> a more influential position in our government than Intelligence
> enjoys in any other government of the world.[3]

Allen Dulles, who professed surprise at the Iraqi coup on July 14, was
notified at dawn of that day. Eisenhower did not receive word of the

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[1]
Kirkpatrick, Op. cit., p. 269.

[2]
David Wise and Thomas Ross, The Invisible Government
(New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 5-10.

[3]
Address by Allen W. Dulles, Yale University, February 3, 1958.

events that had transpired in Iraq until 7:30 a.m.[1] Before the all

important meeting of top officials with the President, starting at 8:15,

Allen and John Foster Dulles had met privately with a number of military

officials and had decided that conditions in the Middle East were a

threat to world peace.[2] It has been suggested that Allen Dulles had

considerable influence on the Secretary of State that morning, in con-

vincing his brother of the dangers involved.

In the light of a highly adverse world reaction to the landings in

Lebanon--which much of the world felt to be unjustified by the circum-

stances--some critics have gone so far as to suggest that it was a

certain "overzealous" quality on Allen Dulles' part that caused the

United States to panic and over-react.[3] Another source indicates that

a major reason for the entry of U.S. troops into Lebanon was the belief

of the CIA that the Lebanese civil war, which had thus far been

relatively "gentle," might, under the new pressures evolving out of

Qassim's rise to power in Iraq, become ultimately dangerous to the

Western world.[4]

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[1]
    Tulley, Op. cit., p. 84.

[2]
    Ibid.

[3]
    Norman Cole, CIA Stranger than Fiction, (Delhi: Nav Yug
Publishers, 1963), p. 160.

[4]
    Tulley, Op. cit., p. 84.

In going on to consider official Washington's policy immediately
prior to the dispatch of troops, as well as the better-publicized reac-
tions of policy makers to the situation created by the events of July 14,
it is well to remember that the CIA view of the immediate crisis carried
no small weight in the hammering out of a final decision for action.

U. S. Policy Immediately Prior to Intervention

Secretary Dulles indicated to a news conference on September 10,
1957 that the machinery of the Eisenhower Doctrine's section on inter-
vention could only be put into operation under certain specific cir-
cumstances. Required for action were: (1) a finding by the President
that a country was dominated by international Communism; (2) the
commiting of aggression by such country; and (3) an appeal by "the
country attacked" for aid.[1] Official Washington could not have been
displeased with this underlining of the necessity for the confluence
of the above factors before action, for they provided a safety mechanism
for the unleashing of U. S. power.

Evidently, as the situation deteriorated in the Middle East,
Dulles, still in a "legal" frame of reference, sought to advance some
new exegesis for the Eisenhower Doctrine that would allow the extended

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[1] Council on Foreign Relations, Documents (1957), Op. cit., p. 235.

mandate of the President to remain unbridged in view of the changing

realities--or perhaps a sharper recognition in Washington of old reali-

ties--in the Middle East. Dulles systematically proceeded to widen

the scope of the Middle East Resolution. On May 20, 1958, the Secretary

of State said that he did not at that time expect that there would be an

attack in the Middle East by a country controlled by international

Communism. He went on to say,

> That doesn't mean, however, that there is nothing that
> can be done. There is the provision of the Middle East
> resolution which says that the independence of these countries
> is vital to peace and the national interest of the United States.
> That is certainly a mandate to do something if we think our
> peace and vital interests are endangered from any quarter.[1]

This stand for increased latitude on Dulles' part went along with the

latter's tendency to concur with Lebanese charges against the U.A.R.,

while not formally absolving the Communists from unrest in the Middle

East.

By June of 1958 it seemed as if Dulles was embarrassed either by

a potential misconstruing of the Middle East Resolution's provisions in

Beirut or by the feeling that proper manipulation of the legal stipula-

tions and conditions in that document could force the hand of the U.S.

prematurely. At another news conference on June 17, 1958, the

Secretary of State deemphasized intervention: he pointed out that while

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[1] Council on Foreign Relations, Documents (1958), Op. cit., p. 296.

the U.S. watched with concern the situation in Lebanon, "through" the

Middle East Resolution, "at the moment the disturbance assumes, in

part at least, the character of a civil disturbance."[1] At a time when

U.N. observers were being dispatched to Lebanon, Dulles was anxious

to emphasize the U.N.'s role in a possible solution of the crisis.

However, given Secretary Dulles' skepticism about the power of

the United Nations, it would be fair to ask whether his invoking of the

General Assembly resolution of 1949 on indirect aggression as "covering"

the situation in Lebanon was not really more of a lever into a further

reshuffling of the Eisenhower Doctrine to the advantage--in Dulles'

eyes--of the American position. Regarding the belligerency stipula-

tion of the Doctrine, Dulles read more scope into the U.S. position on

the strength of the abovementioned U.N. resolution:

> We do not think that the words 'armed attack' preclude
> treating as such an armed revolution which is fomented
> abroad, aided and assisted from abroad. [2]

While by July Dulles, along with Washington in general, had cooled on

the idea of intervention, the State Department Chief continued to insist

that the presence of foreign troops in Lebanon would be "thoroughly

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[1]
    Ibid., p. 299.
[2]
    Ibid., p. 300.

justifiable from a legal and international law standpoint."[1]

As President Sham'ūn began earnestly to ask for help in May and June of 1958, the United States attitude became increasingly aloof. Along with other members of the Security Council, the U. S. had been quite impressed with Lebanon's charges of U. A. R. intervention.[2] But simultaneously, the feeling existed--as seen in the cautious remarks by Dulles above--that events in Lebanon were not in the way of an externally-fomented revolution so much as a civil war. The confusion of President Eisenhower--in May he often excused himself from discussing the Lebanese situation at press conferences--as to the interrelations between the lines of the Middle East Resolution and the realities in the Middle East only foreshadowed the difficulties Congressmen would have on July 14 in differentiating between the application of the Eisenhower Doctrine and interference in a purely internal civil uprising.

With regard to the purely civil nature of the disturbance, Washington could not but take note of some of the following facts: (1) traditional sectarian competition was playing a large role in the disturbance; (2) Lebanon had been slow in submitting its accusations to the U. N.;

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[1]
New York Times, July 2, 1958, p. 2.

[2]
The U. S. S. R. delegate to the Security Council was not impressed by the evidence. United Nations, Security Council. Official Records. XIII, 823rd. meeting, pp. 21, 35-6.

(3) Nāṣir had made no objection to the U. N. Observation Group's dispatch to Lebanon; and (4) the Lebanese army had remained neutral. The last point, which was particularly telling in the face of allegations of U. A. R. interference, was explained rather too simplistically by President Sham'ūn, who placed the onus of guilt on Commander in Chief Fu'ād Shihāb, explaining that the latter was competent but was "afflicted by an irresolute character and by a mental laziness which rendered him incapable of sustained efforts."[1]

The U. S. , which originally had favored a second term for Sham'ūn, was well aware that Sham'ūn's alleged bid for reelection had done much to stir up the disturbances in Lebanon. Eisenhower himself was convinced that Sham'ūn had made a major blunder in not dispelling rumors, if the Lebanese President's desire was not to amend the Constitution; but Eisenhower could quickly enough shelve the specifically internal and personal aspects of the Sham'ūn admiministration:

> Behind everything was our deep-seated conviction that
> the Communists were principally responsible for the trouble,
> and that President Chamoun was motivated only by a strong
> feeling of patriotism. [2]

Be this as it may, the American President was enough persuaded of the difficulties Sham'ūn himself had created to direct Dulles to explain

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[1]
    Chamoun, Op. cit., p. 409.

[2]
    Eisenhower, Op. cit., pp. 265-6.

to Sham'ūn that no dispatch of U.S. troops would be made to Lebanon

for the purpose of achieving an additional term for the President.[1]

Regional and International Concerns

Ambassador McClintock in Beirut added his own comments to

wires he sent to Washington in May 1958 dealing with President Sham'ūn's

urgent appeals for aid. First he noted that Sham'un and Malik were

exaggerating. Second, the Ambassador informed Washington that

American prestige was in any case at stake, and that the United States

should be prepared to join Sham'ūn in resisting "subversion" or else

learn to live with Nāsir.[2] The last point is incisive, for it in fact

reflects regional policy considerations that would make the U.S. even

more averse to wholeheartedly rallying to Lebanon's aid.

The previous chapter pointed out the failings in United States

efforts to rally certain Middle Eastern states into a counterforce to

'Abd al-Nāsir. Finding the isolation-counterpoise approach ineffective,

the U.S., in late 1957 and early 1958, began gradually to work its way

back toward "living" with Nāsir. Not only had the U.S. eased economic

pressures on Egypt, but throughout the Lebanese rebellion the State

Department had tried to lean over backwards in giving President Nāsir

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[1] Ibid., p. 267.

[2] Charles W. Thayer, Diplomat (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 8.

the benefit of the doubt on the question of U. A. R. intervention; and Dulles refrained from the type of verbal criticism of the Egyptian leader to which he resorted during the Suez crisis.[1]

The "isolation-of-Nāṣir" concept had been a logical consequent of the "counterpoise" idea; that is, Washington's goal was not the elimination of Nāṣir altogether, for the U. S. had definitely recognized Nāṣir's genuine popularity and hesitated to risk a showdown. It was in this very atmosphere of attempted balance of influences and avoidance of final showdowns that the Iraqi 14 July coup came off.[2] Most certainly the step of branding Nāṣir a Communist--which would have greatly facilitated the application of the Eisenhower Doctrine against Nāṣir-supported Lebanese rebels--was not taken officially by the State Department, though on an unofficial level the Egyptian Chief of State was often linked with Moscow.[3]

Regional concerns on the part of Washington could be seen in the latter's fears of possible aftereffects in the Arab world of an American armed intervention in Lebanon. At a meeting on May 13, Dulles indicated that U. S. action might cause so much resentment in the Middle East that members of the carefully constructed "counterpoise"

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[1]
New York Times, July 15, 1958, p. 4.
[2]
Time Magazine, July 28, 1958, p. 20.
[3]
Barraclough, Op. cit., p. 370.

group would be endangered and rendered impotent.[1] Jordan and Iraq,

for example, might find close cooperation impossible.[2]

There was considerable Cold War thinking in the days closing

to July 14. Lebanon had already formally internationalized the "situa-

tion" in the Middle East by taking its claims to the United Nations. By

mid-June the Secretary-General was in Lebanon with the UNOGIL team,

which fact caused the U.S. to adopt even more a wait-and-see attitude.

In fact the degree of concord and cooperation between the United States

and the United Nations during the last month before the landings caused

Sham'ūn considerable trepidation.[3] If the U.S. delegation to the U.N.,

operating in the world arena towards some solution of the problem, was

a force of restraint on U.S. unilateral thinking, so too was the Pentagon.

The latter was, especially in light of Cold War tactical considerations,

not particularly enthusiastic over Dulles' virtual promises to the

Sham'ūn regime in May regarding any dispatch of U.S. forces.[4]

Another Cold War factor in America's increased reluctance to

apply the Middle East Resolution to Lebanon was a decrease in

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[1] Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 266.

[2] For the significance of this possibility, see Ch. V.

[3] Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 268.

[4] Joseph Alsop, "Dulles Not Backed on Lebanon Plan," New York Herald Tribune, July 6, 1958.

strength of the U. S. bargaining position with Moscow. It was reported that U.S. Ambassador Thompson in Moscow was instructed to call on Foreign Minister Gromyko and inform him that the United States was prepared to use force if necessary to protect Lebanon's independence.[1] Russia, with its influence well entrenched in Syria, was in a position to call the bluff of Washington, suggesting that Russian "volunteers" could also intervene in the Middle East. It was at this point in May that the White House, getting increasingly cold feet, instructed Ambassador McClintock in Beirut to urge President Sham'ūn not to call on the United States for aid under the Eisenhower Doctrine except in case of dire emergency. Even then, American forces would serve only to evacuate American citizens, and it was forseen that Turkish and Iraqi troops would be flown in to battle the Arab rebels.[2]

The American policy position by July 14 could be summed up in this way: the U. S., which was enjoying relatively improved relations with Cairo, had come increasingly to think of the Lebanese unsurrection as a domestic crisis, although American suspicions of the role of Arab nationalism both within and surrounding the crisis were little alleviated. In respect of the latter point, Dulles made it clear on

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[1] Drew Pearson, "Ike, Dulles Get Cold Feet on Lebanon Intervention," Charleston (W. Va.) Gazette, July 1, 1958.

[2] Ibid.

May 20 that the independence of the countries of the Middle East was considered vital to the U.S. Theoretically, with the provisions of the Eisenhower Doctrine stretched maximally--to where the U.S. was ready to move in even against non-Communist attack, presumably from Syria--the U.S. was ready to counter any eventuality. Practically speaking, not many Americans in prominent policy-making positions were expecting the eventuality of American action.[1] Sham'ūn had announced he would retire upon the expiration of his term in office; and neutral groups in the Lebanese crisis, days before July 14, were putting intense pressures on both sides to end the disturbances wracking Lebanon.[2] When the news arrived from Iraq, the American policy operation with regard to the Middle East was simmering.

Events of July 14: Decision for Intervention

The news of the Iraqi coup was a tremendous shock to Washington. The CIA, on admission of its director, was caught completely off guard.[3] American intelligence had expected the possibility of trouble in Jordan, but not Iraq. Immediate reports in Washington indicated that Crown

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[1] R. P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1960. (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 201.

[2] Barraclough, Op. cit., p. 377.

[3] Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 155.

Prince 'Abdul Ilah had been murdered and that the fates of King Faisal and Premier Nūrī as-Sa'īd were unknown. The U.S. wait-and-see attitude had suddenly changed. Eisenhower remarked, "overnight our objective changed from quieting a troubled situation to facing up to a crisis of formidable proportions."[1] If the scene had changed totally in Baghdad, the weekend in Lebanon was quite the opposite; in fact nothing had occurred in Beirut in the few days preceding July 14 to warrant the radical shift in policy effected by Washington at that time. Nothing in Lebanon itself would indicate that the U.S.' latest goal of installing the head of Lebanon's "neutral" army as a successor to Sham'ūn had been jeopardized.[2]

At a glance, what seemed at stake to Washington were not only the Baghdad Pact and Arab Union, which appeared to have been "breached" by Nasserism, but also the U.S. alliance chain system that had been carefully constructed around the U.S.S.R. On the analogy of Cairo's allegedly strong influence on an attempted coup in Jordan only a short time before the events in Baghdad, the U.S., even before more complete intelligence reports could be utilized, took for granted the studied participation in the Iraqi coup by "inveterate instigator" 'Abd al-Nāsir.[3] Feelings on the parts of Eisenhower and other top

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[1] Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 269.

[2] The Economist, Vol. 188 (July 19, 1958), p. 206.

[3] Time Magazine, 28 July, 1958, p. 20.

policy makers as to a definite trend toward chaos set in motion by

Nāṣir existed automatically as suspicions, almost in spite of the pre-

liminary intelligence reports which gave no evidence that Nāṣir was

behind the coup. These reports indicated that the elements of the Iraqi

army which had executed the coup were pro-Nāṣir and that a large

number of pro-West army officers had been arrested by the newly

organized Republican government.[1] The wording in the official press

release of July 15, which described the events in Iraq as having been

framed by "a ruthlessness of aggressive purpose," indicated Washington's

commitment to a belief that events in Iraq were hardly isolated from

tides in the area.[2] John Foster Dulles, whose influence on policy was

considerable, felt that while complete evidence was lacking to implicate

President Nāṣir in the Iraqi coup, there was every reason to believe

that he was behind it.[3]

Middle East specialists emphasized that the Iraqi coup had

smashed a delicate balance of power that pro-Western Arabs, with

U. S. and British support, had been able to maintain against neutralist

forces. Some high officials appeared to concentrate on the malignant

aspects of the alleged movement "behind" the uprising in Iraq, fearing

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[1] Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 270.

[2] U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 39, August 4, 1958), p. 182.

[3] New York Times, 15 July 1958, p. 2.

that the gathering momentum of an unsalutory Arab nationalist movement
threatened a beleagured Sham'ūn, a weakened Hussein, and an already
infiltrated Sa'ūdi regime.[1]

Further premises and opinions of policy makers on July 14,
contrasted with opposition thinking, and supplemented by public opinion
on the matter, bear examination. The President conducted meetings
throughout much of the day, starting with an intelligence briefing
followed by a meeting with the National Security Council and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and largely ending with the President's meeting with
Democratic and Republican members of Congress at 2:30 p.m. Following
on the intelligence reports of Nasserite influences in Iraq. Eisenhower
expressed his belief that the United States was clearly called upon to
make a definitive show of support for "its friends," in order that there
not be heavy, irreparable losses in the area.[2] The President's
advisers did not forsee a danger of armed opposition to an American
show of force in the Middle East if Lebanon should be the arena for
this. President Sham'ūn, according to just arrived cables from
Ambassador McClintock in Beirut, was urgently requesting the immediate
dispatch of American forces to Lebanon.

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[1] Ibid., p. 1.

[2] Murphy, Op. cit., p. 485.

John Foster Dulles, who believed the U.S. was morally committed to Lebanon in these new circumstances, felt that Russia would not take countermeasures if the U.S. acted in Lebanon.[1] But discouraging the possibility of the U.S.' taking any action in Iraq to support Loyalist forces was a disconcerting amount of Soviet saber rattling near the northern Iranian borders; in the event of counteraction, if the Russians could seal off northern Iran, they would have a clear corridor to Iraq, bypassing the potentially more dangerous Turkish frontier.[2] Eisenhower was aware of the great resentment that would be the issue of American troop landings in Lebanon and be also realized that there would definitely be risks of a general war with the Soviet Union; but the feeling that predominated with the President and his councils was that the worst thing under the circumstances would be to do nothing. Perhaps it was a military sense that impressed upon the President the belief that early action might eliminate the possibility for later major involvement.

Since the Lebanese "crisis" had become, in a matter of speaking, the Iraqi crisis, it was clear to Eisenhower that action in Lebanon largely in respect of matters in Iraq would require a maximum amount of "legal" justification and explanation so that such action would not

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[1]
Dulles foresaw unpleasant responses in the Arab world that might result in damage to oil and ship transit facilities among other things. Sa'ūd would be of little help. Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 271.

[2]
U.S. News and World Report, July 25, 1958, p. 33.

appear a <u>non sequitur</u>, a naked provocation in the Cold War, or in-
consistent with recognized principles of international law. So it was
that the Administration emphasized from the beginning the fact that
action in Lebanon would be different in principle from the British-
French intervention in Egypt, since the United States would be res-
ponding to a "popular request" from a legally constituted government. [1]
The question of the applicability of the Eisenhower Doctrine was much
mooted; but clearly the close relations which the Lebanese-American
Communiqué had presumably established between Washington and the
government of Lebanon gave Eisenhower a more comfortable feeling
about action than he might otherwise have had. Furthermore, after
Dulles' exposition of the collective self-defense sections of the U. N.
Charter, the President was convinced that U. S. action could be
justified on the basis of the latter instrument. [2]

Consistent with Eisenhower's desire to have the U. S. take action
in Lebanon only if at least seemingly in harmony with "international
morality," the President appeared, in statements to the press and the
nation, to want to whitewash many of the civil aspects of the Lebanese
crisis in order to accentuate external features that were certainly

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[1] Eisenhower, <u>Op. cit.</u>, p. 271. Dulles warned, though, that
many people might not get this distinction.

[2] <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 272.

easier to "work with" in a framework of collective selfdefense. For

example, in a speech following the dispatch of U. S. troops to Lebanon,

he explained that the 1957 elections in Lebanon had been "held in an

atmosphere of total calm."[1] Regarding President Sham'ūn's role in the

crisis, Eisenhower merely indicated that the Lebanese leader did not

seek reelection. Eisenhower emphasized that Lebanon had been the

victim for some time of indirect aggression, which the special United

Nations task force had somewhat but not completely reduced. The

"aggressive prupose" demonstrated in the Iraqi coup made it clear,

Eisenhower said, that Lebanon would no longer be able to hold its own

in the struggle against indirect aggression without some evidence of

support. But the President's "legal" points become hazy by that fact

that, after drawing parallels between the indirect aggression in

Lebanon and that which existed in Europe after World War two,

Eisenhower made no strong denunciation of Moscow or Cairo but

merely asserted vaguely that "Lebanon was selected to become a vicim."[2]

From the Administration's point of view, the ostensible reason

for sending American forces to Lebanon would be for the purposes (1) of

protecting American lives; and (2) by their presence assisting the

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[1]
    Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The Crisis in Lebanon," Vital Speeches, Vol. 24, (August 1, 1958), p. 612.

[2]
    Ibid., p. 613.

Government of Lebanon in the maintenance of its territorial integrity and political independence.[1] Furthermore, the White House was anxious that close channels of communication be kept open with the U. N. Security Council, which latter would be informed in the event of U. S. action that Washington had acted under the inherent right of collective self-defense as defined in the United Nations Charter.

The aura of vagueness that lurked between U. S. ostensible and actual policy objectives in dealing with the question of sending forces to Lebanon only gave rise to further simplistic thinking in the United States regarding the Cold War dimensions of the Lebanese crisis and of 'Abd al-Nāsir. Because much of recent U. S. policy thinking had put the Middle East into a Cold War context, it was comfortable if not natural to attach Communist or Free world labels to regimes or institutions as they appeared to fit--if sometimes imperfectly--into such a context. One commentator suggested that President Eisenhower saw the entire Lebanese insurrection as the handiwork of International Communism, to the point where he almost dismissed suggestions that current Middle Eastern problems might in fact be the fruits of authetic civil struggles.[1] Richard Nixon, with a slightly different

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[1] U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 39 (August 4, 1958) p. 184.

[2] Economist, Vol. 188 (July 19, 1958), p. 206.

approach, declared that even if the Lebanese crisis did constitute a civil war situation, the United States was becoming involved only because civil wars had become instruments for the carrying out of the Soviet imperialistic design.[1]

One reason for the link-up in U. S. thinking with Communism and the Lebanese crisis was, of course, the substantial Soviet aid to the U. A. R., alluded to earlier. Equally tangible perhaps, and well substantiated, was the Communist "coloring" detectable in the provocative broadcasts of Radio Cairo. In reality this coloring was more the product of the adoption of Moscow's anti-imperialist clichés than the result of active Communist infiltration in Egypt.[2] Such a belief in the U. S., however, gave rise to a steady stream of misrepresentation of Egyptian influences in the Middle East as being Communist influences and vice versa.

Nāṣir had long since acquired the proportions of a dictator in the United States. One source, describing the Iraqi coup as a victory for Russia's Cold War effort, spotlighted the operative in this victory as having been something called the "Nasser-Khruschev Axis."[3] Because of his alleged expansionist aims, Nāṣir was also linked with

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[1]
R. M. Nixon, "Events in the Middle East," Vital Speeches, Vol. 24 (August 1, 1958), p. 615.

[2]
Utley, Op. cit., p. 33.

[3]
U. S. News and World Report, July 25, 1958, p. 23.

figures such as Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin, whose careers have shown

that "dictators, given an inch, grab all the territory they can unless

stopped by force of arms."[1] The Nūrī as-Saʿīd regime in Iraq was often

described favorably, as even being somewhat progressive, vis à vis

the inflamatory hate-mongering Egyptian leader. One American scholar

simplified the American view of Nasserism ever farther by saying

that since Nāṣir's movement is revolutionary, "therefore, it has close

affinities with Communism."[2] The use of subversion--which Nāṣir had

definitely employed to some extent--was another process which some

quarters of American public opinion felt was common to Nasserism

and Communism, and thus at times vaguely indicative of a mutual

presence of the latter two political patterns of thought.

The point to be made is that while the U. S. had every reason to

be angered at and disrespect Nāṣir's political orientation, an excessive

invocation of Communism in its relations to Nāṣir and to the troubles

in the Middle East in general did little to clarify the real issues at

stake in the 1958 crisis and the legal and international political rela-

tionships which framed those issues. Of the fact that Nasserist

subversion had worked in Iraq prior to the July 14 coup, as well as in

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[1]

    Ibid., p. 42.

[2]

    Robert Strausz-Hupe in U. S. News and World Report, July 25,
1958, p. 65.

Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Sudan, there is no doubt.[1] Nor

is there a question as to whether the U. A. R. and the U. S. S. R. shared

many similar general goals, which they were wont to express.[2] When

Eisenhower on July 15 addressed the nation on the crisis in Lebanon,

he drew a parallel between the situation there and the conditions in

Greece in 1947, as well as events in Czechoslovakia in 1948.[3] Such

thinking was again with the result that Nasserism could be thought of

at least as a half-brother of Communism. Two realities were clear at

the time of the Iraqi coup: (1) Communism in Lebanon itself had

attracted no appreciable interest, though the party had been usually

free to operate, and the Lebanese President was very little concerned

with the danger of Communism or Communist subversion;[4] and (2)

though Nāṣir's immediate reaction after the coup was to fly to Moscow

for consultations, he was not anxious for a Russian counter-Inter-

vention in the Middle East.[5] Nāṣir was probably interested in assuring

himself of Russian support especially in case U. S. moves threatened

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[1]
    Time Magazine, July 28, 1958, p. 19.

[2]
    "Joint Statement on Talks Held between the President of the
United Arab Republic (Nasser) and the Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the U. S. S. R. (Khruschev), Moscow, May 15, 1958,"
Council on Foreign Relations, Documents, Op. cit., pp. 380-82.

[3]
    Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 274.

[4]
    Meo, Op. cit., p. 123.

[5]
    Time Magazine, July 28, 1958, p. 20. Also, Stebbins, Op. cit.,
p. 204.

more of the Middle East than simply Lebanon. To think of the fall of

the Iraqi monarchy as a blow struck for and by the "Moscow-Cairo

axis" is inaccurate.

Neither the Administration or its critics seemed convinced that

the Eisenhower Doctrine should be specifically invoked or that it had

been contravened, while all were unanimous in feeling that the prestige

of the United States had been dealt a severe blow. In view of the

Doctrine's inapplicability in many respects--especially by a strict

reading of the text--Eisenhower's statement on its place in policy

making regarding the crisis appears unsure:

> The government was moving in accord with the provisions
> of the Middle East Resolution, but if the conflict expanded
> into something that the Resolution did not cover, I would, given
> time, go to the Congress for additional authorization. [1]

In sessions on July 14 and 15, in which the President consulted with

Congressional leaders of both parties, the support that was mustered

for the taking of American action in Lebanon was expressed in vague

terms that appeared to help the Eisenhower Doctrine seem more

applicable. Senator Javits felt that if the letter of the Eisenhower

Doctrine were not pertinent to the possibility of landings in Lebanon,

the spirit was, since Nāsir could never have run the risks he had,

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[1]

Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 273.

"to the great damage of the free world," without the backing of the

Soviet Union.[1] Sen. Glenn Beall (R) Md., felt that this situation pre-

sented a good opportunity for the U.S. to take a firm stand against

Communism; while Sen. Bridges saw the force that needed checking to

be a malignant Nasserism that ressembled the march of Nazism before

World War II. In an argument that begs its own question and reveals

a certain insensitive view of the area in question, Sen. R.L. Neuberger,

(D) Ore., noted that the United States would have no friends in the

Middle East if it did not protect them against "intrigue from within and

Nasser's Arab assaults from without."[2]

There was considerable sentiment against taking action in Lebanon,

although much of this was finally weakened by bipartisanship and

"patriotism." Senator William Fulbright was a major skeptic during

the White House conferences. He seriously doubted whether the current

Middle Eastern crisis was Communist-inspired and felt that Secretary-

General Hammarskjold's previous lack of success in substantiating

Sham'ūn's charges of massive intervention should preclude the U.S.'

moving.[3] Senator Mansfield, the assistant Democratic leader in the

Senate, expressed his feeling that the U.N. Security Council should be

[1]
Near East Report, vol. 2 no. 5 (August 1, 1958), p. 117.

[2]
Ibid.

[3]
Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 272.

asked to expand its police force in order to stabilize conditions both in Lebanon and Iraq, which action would make U.S. unilateral inter-vention unnecessary.[1]

The failure of the CIA to accurately forecast the Iraqi coup deepened the skepticism of some Congressmen that, as Secretary Dulles said on the morning of the fourteenth, the U.S. intelligence services had ample documented proof of international Communist inspiration and aid to the revolt in Lebanon.[2] Some congressional leaders as well wondered how Dulles could reconcile Nāṣir's visit to Tito immediately prior to the July 14th coup with the alleged promotion of Kremlin interests in the Middle East. Dulles suggested the move had been a blind by Nāṣir.

Opinion was almost unanimous that the "loss" of Iraq would be a serious blow to the U.S. position in the area. One avenue of discussion was that of intervention in Iraq rather than in Lebanon, perhaps in collaboration with the British, who were greatly concerned about the Gulf. In fact, in the agitated emergency atmosphere that prevailed on July 14, rife as it was with vague sentiments, questionable commitments, and seemingly unreliable intelligence, some congressmen thought it equally logical to send troops to Iraq--to serve important U.S. policy

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[1] New York Times, July 15, 1958, p. 2.

[2] Ibid., July 16, 1958.

objectives--as to send them to quell a civil uprising in Lebanon.[1]

A highly significant aspect of the discussions of possible U. S. intervention was the fact that debate was much limited by what one observer called a "peculiar form of patriotism."[2] Most Pentagon and congressional leaders came to feel that action in Lebanon constituted the only possible recourse under the circumstances, and that the President should be supported on all sides should such action be taken. For example, House Speaker Sam Rayburn, who at first seriously questioned Dulles and the President on the civil aspects of the Lebanese crisis, later cut off debate in the House of Representatives when a Representative suggested that Arab nationalism might be better recognized than fought to the death.[3] Rayburn called for national unity in a time of crisis. Even the strongest critics of Administration policy made it clear that they would not obstruct the course to which the President was somehow inexorably committed. Eisenhower explains the temporary unanimity slightly differently, saying that all recognized that the authority for such an operation as Lebanese intervention clearly lay within the responsibility of the Executive.[4]

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[1]
    Adams, Op. cit., p. 290.

[2]
    Manfred Halpern, The Morality and Politics of Intervention (New York: Council on Religion and International Affairs, 1963), p. 19.

[3]
    The Economist, vol. 188 (July 19, 1958), p. 206.

[4]
    Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 272.

In any case, one cannot help but feel that the effect of the nation's legislators on the final decision to act was a token, if not nil. The British Parliament, by way of contrast, had debated at length the question of the 1956 invasion of Suez. In the face of the legislative mandate the Congress had given the President in the form of the Middle East Resolution, Congressional leaders seemed almost powerless to contest the application of the spirit of that resolution--rather than its letter--from being applied to an adverse set of political circumstances in the Middle East.

U. S. Policy in the Field: the Sending of Troops

In earlier sections of this paper it has been suggested that certain discontinuities and misapprehensions in the channels of U. S. foreign policy making had contributed to the creation of a brittle American position in the Middle East, the answer to the apparent crumbling of which could only be a hasty, ill-debated, stopgap military emergency measure. The present discussion focuses not on the logistics of those military measures but on the way in which intervention, as an extension of U. S. policy by other means, was integrated into the whole of the American policy making machinery.[1]

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[1] For details on the military operations in Lebanon, see especially Marine Corps Historical Branch. Marines in Lebanon 1958. Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, 1966.

Eisenhower had directed that the landing operation he had finally decided upon should take place at 3:00 p.m. Beirut time (9:00 a.m. E.D.T.). This directive was in spite of large-scale trepidation among the services, who had for an operation in Lebanon, especially with the recent experience of the French in Algeria fresh in mind.[1] It should be noted that the military was not entering blindly upon its operation in the Middle East. A directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1957 had advised Admiral James L. Holloway, Commander in Chief Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CinCNELM), that there were possibilities of an overthrow of the Jordanian government and a coup in Lebanon.[2] Under a special command that was set up, the Specified Command Middle East (SPECOMME), officered by Admiral Holloway, contingency plans were worked out based on intelligence information gathered by a Marine officer who had travelled to Beirut incognito and toured the beaches.[3]

The extent of immediate contingency planning in connection with the Lebanon operation--known as Operation Bluebat-- indicated how widespread Washington felt the threat in the Middle East to be. Note, for example, the fact that a Marine batallion landing team (BLT 3/3) on

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[1] Hughes, Op. cit., p. 8.

[2] Marine Corps Historical Branch, Op. cit., p. 7.

[3] Robert McClintock, "The American Landing in Lebanon," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. LXXXVIII (Oct. 62), p. 66.

Okinawa was ordered on July 14 to load on board an amphibious squadron
and sail into the Persian Gulf and to be ready to land in Iran or Saudi
Arabia in the event that the crisis spread.[1] The immediate military
objective of Operation Bluebat was to support the legal Lebanese Govern-
ment against any foreign invasion, specifically against the Syrian First
Army located between Damascus and the Israeli border, only several
hours march from Beirut.

While there was little actual demonstration of opposition to the
American landing, substantial elements of the population were dis-
gruntled by the operation. The extent of hostile encounters went no
farther than several exchanges of small arms fire between rebels and
U.S. forces.[2] Other forms of opposition which Washington was quick
to feel were these: (1) the outspoken opposition of 'Adil 'Usayrān,
Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, who gathered together thirty out
of sixty-six members of Parliament to protest the U.S. intervention;
(2) Sa'ib Salām's rabid calling to arms of his men in the Basta; (3) the
refusal of the U.N. to recognize U.S. action; and (4) the initial
opposition of General Shihāb and his army.[3] President Sham'ūn,

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[1]
    Marine Corps Historical Division, Op. cit., p. 24.
[2]
    Time Magazine, July 28, 1958, p. 16.
[3]
    Ibid., and Tulley, Op. cit., p. 86.

however, who was more than once assured that the American troops

had not landed in order to perpetuate him in office, was reassured

enough by the American landings to talk of issuing a peremptory order

to General Shihāb to attack the rebels, although, according to

Ambassador McClintock, such talk had been abundant for several

months.[1] The Lebanese President, dismissing Speaker 'Usayrān's

opposition summarily as a personal matter, expressed his joy to

President Eisenhower at finding Lebanon side by side with the U.S.

defending Lebanese "integrity and independence against direct aggression"

(emphasis mine).[2]

In Beirut, where some Marines admittedly were having a hard

time telling a rebel from a "good guy" (sic), three possible explanations

on the eventual intent of U.S. operations in Lebanon came to the surface:

(1) the U.S. might seek to seal off the Lebanese borders until an

international police force could be formed; (2) the U.S. might try to

set up bases for eventual action in Jordan or even Iraq itself; (3) some

suggested that the U.S. had acted on impulse and was confused as to

how to proceed.[3] The U.S. President himself indicated that the

decision not to attempt any kind of clean-up of the Lebanese rebels was

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[1]

Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 280.

[2]

Ibid.

[3]

The Economist, vol. 88, (19 July, 1958), p. 218.

a political one. Even over the recommendations of some military leaders, Eisenhower decided that only the airfield and the capital should be occupied; this was because the Lebanese army's failure to deal with the rebels effectively demonstrated a lack of popular support for the Lebanese Government that the U.S. was backing up.[1]

Depending on whether one were to consider the American extension of policy by military means in Lebanon a success or a failure, the relative coordination of State Department, White House, and military organs might be considered to have been either adequate or abysmally wanting. Even in the most objective light, one may isolate a number of discontinuities in this field implementation of American foreign policy.

The most notable of these perhaps was the lack of communication as well as the unclear line of authority that existed between the State Department in the field--in his case the American Embassy in Beirut-- and the military. It has been pointed out earlier that in a time where Cold War and limited war thinking had come to play a predominant role in U.S. policy planning, the place of the military in U.S. foreign policy had become somewhat confused. Another extremely important matter is that of chain of command: in times where political implemen- tation of policy in an indirect fashion had come to play a role perhaps

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[1] Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 275.

equal in importance to military field "implementation," the military line of authority for forces operating in the field bypassed diplomatic machinery. Where there are U.S. military forces in the field, the military line of authority does not pass through the Ambassador or military attachés in the area; but rather the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs to the field commander. In brief, the Chief of a U.S. diplomatic mission is not in the line of military command.[1]

This fact is dramatically exemplified by the confrontations between Ambassador McClintock and the commanding officers of the landing operation. Events that transpired only several hours before the H-hour on July 15 had convinced the Ambassador that landings would be unwise or at least risky if carried out in the wrong way. McClintock had visited General Shihāb only one and one-half hours before the landings, after seeing President Sham'ūn, and found the Lebanese Commander-in-Chief highly upset.[2] Shihāb disclosed to the Ambassador that some Lebanese army officers had that morning proposed a coup to him, in order to prevent a landing, and he had refused. The army was highly restive in some quarters, and the

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[1]
    Blackstock, Op. cit., p. 99.
[2]
    Message of Ambassador McClintock to the Department of State, July 14, 1958, quoted in Marine Corps Historical Branch, Op. cit., p.12.

General expressed his conviction that a U.S. intervention might cause the army to fall apart, further forestalling any settlement of the insurrection.[1] According to McClintock's communications to Washington, Shihab had suggested an alternative to landing en masse: with the Marines remaining on board, the ships of the Sixth Fleet could enter Beirut harbor and unload two or three tanks and some heavy equipment. The Ambassador, realizing the situation would become drastic if the Lebanese Commander were to resign in favor of the anti-intervention elements in the army, agreed to transmit McClintock's concerns to the American amphibious forces.[2]

The American Ambassador, who was not informed where the U.S. forces would be landing exactly, and unable to raise the Sixth Fleet on the radio, sought to head off the squadron by sending Naval Attaché Cmmdr. Howard J. Baker in a boat toward the assault force's advanced units.[3] The reply to McClintock, which came from Captain McCrea on board the Taconic, reached the Ambassador after the landings were nearly completed, and indicated that the operation

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[1]
     Message from U.S. Army Attache, to Department of State Army, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, and CNO, (July 15, 1958), in Dispatches Relative to U.S. Landings, Lebanon (Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Division).

[2]
     McClintock, "Message to State Department" (14/7/58), Op. cit.

[3]
     Captain H.J. Baker, U.S.N., Comments on Draft Manuscript, Dec. 13, 1965 (Lebanon Comment File), quoted in Marine Corps Historical Branch, Op. cit., p. 12.

was being carried out under direct orders from the Sixth Fleet
Commander, who in turn was operating under direct orders from the
President.

Poor communications persisted between the military and the U.S.
Embassy. While all sides were perhaps equally anxious for a meeting
that would clear up some misunderstandings, neither military nor
Ambassadorial staffs could leave their respective posts, and it was not
until after 6:00 p.m. that higher military officers were able, in separate
visits to the Embassy, to discuss matters with the Ambassador. An
overabundance of protocol and an inflexibility on the part of the Navy
demonstrated what one student described as a military view that the
real job is to win the war and "let the diplomats pick up the pieces."[1]
These lapses appear doubly serious when one considers the extent of
close communications that were required in a developing crisis,
especially in the first two days.[2]

Ambassador McClintock, at last on the 16th in the same room
with his military colleagues, averted a potential catastrophe by
reconciling the still intrasigent American task force chiefs with a
Lebanese army placed in an embarrassing position. Shihāb, not nearly

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[1]   Thayer, Diplomat, Op. cit., p. 32.

[2]   July 16 was more or less the climax of the whole operation;
this was followed by a holding action.

so enthusiastic for the entrance of U.S. troops into Beirut as was

Sham'ūn, had gone far as to set up a roadblock of tanks blocking the

route of American forces into the capital.[1] General Wade, insisting

that time was important, had refused even Shihāb's suggestion that the

Marines take a route into the city different from the one they had planned

to use; the Marine leader was anxious that his mission should be

completed as ordered. McClintock, realizing that the routing would

be important, convinced the U.S. military that the Basta should be

avoided. In addition, combined units of Lebanese and American soldiers

were set up for the final entrance into Beirut, again at the behest of

the Ambassador, anxious to save the face of the Lebanese military.[2]

If these were lapses in field harmony sufficient to cloud the type

of vision Washington should have had at such a delicate time, there

were other factors within the State Department structure itself which

served equally to undermine the most effective field implementation

of policy.

Robert Murphy's dispatch to the crisis area close on the heels

of the Marines, with an assignment from the President to try to solve

the Lebanese "problem," may be said to have been fully within

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[1] Kirk, Op. cit., p. 132.

[2] U.S. Marine Corps Historical Branch, Op. cit., p. 20.

Secretary Dulles' "trouble-shooter" habit of thinking. The practice of sending a senior troubleshooter to solve a crisis has definite draw-backs, as evidenced by the example of Lebanon in 1958. The presence of a personal envoy from Washington on the one hand lowers the prestige of the resident Ambassador, and also an outside arbitrator seldom has adequate opportunity to study all of the background and the people involved in a conflict of interests.[1] While Ambassador McClintock was not an Arab specialist in the Department of State, he had nonetheless made wide contacts with Lebanese leaders and with knowledgeable correspondents; he had, in addition made close contacts among Opposition personalities and, especially early in the crisis, these leaders had considerable trust in the Ambassador.[2] Murphy, who, as will be seen, did help stabilize the situation, added somewhat to the abuse of the Ambassador's local reputation and perhaps strength already injured by the "hard-nosed" military operation.

In passing, it is worthwhile to mention the criticism of Dulles current in Washington at the time, that he carried U.S. foreign policy under his hat.[3] Hans Morgenthau has suggested that Dulles, by assuming his role to be the travelling Number One Diplomat greatly

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[1]

Thayer, Diplomat, Op. cit., p. 36.

[2]

Ibid., pp. 12-17.

[3]

Norman A. Graebner, An Uncertain Tradition. American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century (New York: McGraw Hill, 1961), p. 304.

reduced the activities of lower State Department officials for both initiating and implementing policy.[1] In this same sense, Dulles often made decisions without regard to information and initiatives from within Department or other agencies operative in the policy-making process; nor did he often prepare the latter for future policy lines. Thus it was, for example, that many high officials of the State Department were taken by the same surprise as the general public when the decision was made to intervene in Lebanon.[2] In the sending of troubleshooter Murphy to Lebanon, then, must be seen in part the legacy of a highly personalised line of policy in the Middle East, built and sustained in many cases more by the Secretary of State's presuppositions than by an accurate and constructive line of communications between informed field operatives and central policy machinery in Washington.

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[1] Hans J. Morgenthau, as quoted in Graebner, Op. cit., p. 304.

[2] Ibid., p. 305.

CHAPTER V

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE IRAQI COUP

AND JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERVENTION

Implications of the Coup

It has been suggested that, as far as the United States was
concerned, the Lebanese Crisis of 1958 was a crisis in the whole of
the Middle East; American action to bolster the legal government of
Lebanon was triggered by, if not directly a result of, the fall of the
Hashemites in Iraq. It remains to be shown how Iraq had come to play
a fairly important role in U.S. foreign policy, in order to more fully
describe the place the loss of Iraq had in the motivation of policy
makers toward military action in Lebanon. The questionable nature
of the arguments adduced to justify U.S. action following the coup,
as will be seen, themselves testify--by the very nature of the legal
and political risks the U.S. was subsequently ready to take--to the
significance of the events in Iraq.

Generally, Iraq was important to U.S. policy planning in a
number of ways. After 1954, when Dulles was working to link SEATO
through the Northern Tier arrangements, Iraq incurred grave risks
in the Arab world by in effect bypassing Nāsir and subscribing to an

anti-Communist foreign policy framework that was worth millions

of dollars in U.S. military assistance.[1] This new relationship with

Washington was perhaps mutually beneficial: Iraq, for its part, felt

that Western aid would help it play a leading role in the Arab world.

More specifically, by 1954 the old idea of Fertile Crescent Unity was

being revived by Prime Minister Fādhil Jamālī.[2] Such unity would

presumably begin with a federation of Iraq with Syria and Jordan. The

U.S., because of other policy commitments, especially in Tel Aviv,

was not desirous of fostering this unity; yet the precedent of Iraqi-U.S.

contacts on this issue is significant with regard to later developments.

Washington's recognition of the important place Iraq occupied in

U.S. defense and policy planning was nonetheless accompanied by a

vague and ill-defined sort of support from Washington that former

U.S. Ambassador Gallman characterized as having been, between

1954 and 1958, "essentially a story of failure."[3] Two key obstacles

to closer and more substantial support from Washington were (1) U.S.

deference to a British policy primacy in Iraq; and (2) Washington's

reluctance, because of its own conflicting policy aims in the Middle

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[1] Stevens, Op. cit., p. 159.

[2] Campbell, Op. cit., p. 52.

[3] Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1964), p. 196.

East, to become securely cemented into the Baghdad Pact. Economic

pressures on Washington as well had the net effect of diswaying the

U. S. from "putting all its eggs in the one basket of Iraq and the Baghdad

Pact."[1]

Washington's aid to Iraq was inconsistent. It was not clear from

the nature of U. S. military assistance whether Washington was anxious

to give the Iraqi Government a capability for "external" military con-

frontations, or for internal order, or merely for political "show" value.

Directives from the State Department to the Government in Baghdad

were often conflicting on this point, and even in the matter of providing

the Nūrī as-Sa'īd regime with sufficient quality "show" equipment, the

State Department often finished by being hung up on "deference"

requirements that arms be purchased through the British.[2] Confusions

of appropriations and overlappings of fiscal years further frustrated

smooth lines of military assistance to Iraq.

The quantity of military assistance cannot be said to have been

impressive. From 1950-1959, Iraq received $50 million in military

assistance, as compared with figures of $1,875 million and $464

million for Turkey and Iran respectively.[3] By the same token, this

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[1] "Western Oil Interests Get Caught in the Crossfire," Business Week, April 21, 1956, p. 160.

[2] British equipment was often not modern enough and was usually slow in arrival; Gallman, Op. cit., p. 194.

[3] U. S. Department of Defense, Office of Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, The Military Assistance Program, Programs and Deliveries by Area and Country, Fiscal Years 1950-1960 (Table Released February 1960).

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amount was about four times the amount Jordan received for the same period, and about six times the assistance granted to Lebanon. The fact that Iraq, while continually receiving less aid than Turkey for example, became a regular recipient of substantial U.S. military aid after 1954 especially would indicate U.S. recognition of Iraq's place in the Northern Tier.

Deliveries were delayed often, and requests for technicians were usually slow to be met. Nūrī as-Saʿīd had felt, for example, that four squadrons of aircraft would be requisite to protect the northern oil-fields against possible Soviet attack; the United States managed to deliver only six jets (F86-F) just before the Qassim coup.[1] The American Ambassador in Baghdad in 1958 noted that the inefficient and ill-defined nature of the U.S. assistance program in Iraq, while it reflected U.S. interest in that country, nonetheless failed sufficiently to strengthen Nūrī as-Saʿīd's hand; worst of all, the approach reflected Secretary Dulles' characteristic crisis approach to foreign policy.[2] The Ambassador's suggestion is that the State Department even though desirous of strengthening allies in the Middle East, tended toward a cure rather than prevention approach which unavoidably sabotaged consistent and meaningful aid programs.

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[1] Gallman, Op. cit., p. 189.

[2] Gallman, Op. cit., p. 198.

Iraq was of importance to the U.S. economically. By 1958, most

U.S. capital investment in Iraq ($60 million in 1957) was tied up in

petroleum. In Iraq, which in 1957 was the world's eighth largest oil

producer, two U.S. firms held a 23.75 per cent share in the Iraq

Petroleum Company.[1] The very contingency plans for the invasion of

Iraq in the wake of the coup bore the stipulation that the British and

Americans would not move on Baghdad unless the new Republican

government "failed to respect Western oil interests."[2] Unlike

Lebanon or Jordan, Iraq had tremendous natural resources, which in

the wrong hands could put teeth into anti-Western movements.

In addition, the U.S. was aware that the coup in Iraq was immediate-

ly a cause of great rejoicing in Moscow. Since the extinction of Syria

as a sovereign state in February 1958, the Soviets had lost much

footing in the Arab world. The Iraqi "revolution" promised to

reopen channels of the Left in that country and to cause severe

weakenings in the Baghdad Pact anti-Communist posture.[3] Washington

had long known of Russia's desire to bring an "independent" Kurdistan

under Soviet sway, in order to make a land link between the Soviet

Caucasus and Iraq.

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[1] U.S. News and World Report, July 25, 1958, p. 48.

[2] C. Wright Mills, Op. cit., p. 75.

[3] Dallin, Op. cit., p. 473.

Washington also knew that the news of Iraq would have important

effects in Lebanon and Israel, among other countries in the Middle

East. Celebrations in Beirut in praise of Qassim's action suggested

the Iraqi coup would have serious repercussions in Lebanon.[1] Faced

with the possibility of a unified Arab nation, stretching to the Persian

Gulf, Israel might well feel impelled to take some type of counter action.

Nūrī as-Sa'īd, the dominant figure in Iraqi politics for years, was

ideologically quite attuned to the basic outlook of the United States in

the Middle East; as such, his loss was nearly irreparable for the U.S.

While Nūrī had always been moderate on the Palestine question--much

to Washington's liking--he was violently set against the Soviet threat

to Iraq, internally and externally.[2] The United States cannot have

been disappointed that Iraq's delegate to the U.N., Dr. Fādhil Jamālī,

persisted, during the consideration of Lebanon's complaint against the

United Arab Republic, in equating President Nāṣir's tactics with

Communist means of subversion. Jamālī, who was Charles Malik's

staunchest supporter in the June U.N. debates, tried to paint behind

the troubled events in the Middle East a broad Soviet plan for

acquiring eventual control of the area, using the U.A.R. as an

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[1]
New York Times, July 15, 1958, p. 1. Success of the Iraqi
revolt might set Lebanese rebels against any compromise.
[2]
Gallman, Op. cit., p. 221.

instrument.[1] Nūrī's presence in the councils of the Baghdad Pact made

it further possible for the activities, meetings, and communiques of

that body to take the form of strong Cold War "threats" to the intentions

of the Soviet Union.[2]

A price which the United States had to pay for the outspoken

loyalty of Nūrī as-Sa'īd--which cost was only fully appreciated on

July 14--was a growing dichotomy between Nūrī's regime and disgruntled

elements of the population. Practically-minded, and dedicated to

preserving Iraq's own sovereign character, the Prime Minister once

remarked, "history would curse me if I appealed to the emotions of

the masses at the expense of the national security."[3] Washington had

hoped that Nūrī's police force and developmental plans would be able to

generate stability in the face of internal dissensions. But social

pressures had been boiling for some time: the gulf between rich and

poor had not diminished appreciably; Nūrī and his "party" of wealthy

Arab skeikhs and Kurdish Aghas were universally hated; and there

was discontent over the Government's handling of the 50-50 oil

agreement with the I.P.C.[4] In short, what was apparent in the

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[1]
    U.N. Security Council, Official Records, 13th year, 824th
meeting, June 10, 1958, pp. 35-44.

[2]
    Baghdad Pact Meeting (Jan. 27-30, 1958), Final Communique;
Council on Foreign Relations, Documents (1958), Op. cit., pp. 372-373.

[3]
    Time Magazine, July 28, 1958, p. 23.

[4]
    David Horowitz, From Yalta to Vietnam. American Foreign Policy
in the Cold War (Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin Books, 1965), p. 188.

rubble of the July 14 "Revolution" were many broken vestiges of a
police state.

The long-range implications of the coup--forseeable after the
initial reaction of shock--pointed at the foundations of support for the
U.S. by feudal instruments in the Middle East, if not elsewhere. The
populace of Iraq, long relegated to the shadows of Washington's dealings
with Nūrī as-Sa'īd, was now ambiguously at center stage. What had
transpired, at least to all intents and purposes for the future, had been
a revolution that was and would be characterized by an "ill-defined
Arabism" that threatened to undermine the bulk of U.S. policy in the
Middle East.[1] It is possible that Washington had underestimated the
effect of the Egyptian revolution on the mass of the Iraqis. The shock
felt in the U.S. was not because of a sudden realization that there
existed popular social movements in Iraq, for opposition had not been
entirely silenced in Iraq.[2] Rather it was simply a final shock at the
collapse of the ramshackle bridge between Washington and Nūrī as-Sa'īd's
Iraq. This fact, with the implications it carried for future American
policy in the area, led columnist Joseph Alsop to declare after the
dispatch of the Marines to Beirut, "Iraq is everything, the Lebanon
nothing."[3]

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[1] The Economist, vol. 188 (July 19, 1958), p. 184.

[2] Note statements made in 1957 by Ṣiddīq Shanshal, Secretary General
of the suppressed Istiqlal Party; O'Kearney, Op. cit., p. 133.

[3] Time Magazine, July 28, 1958, p. 14.

Iraq's Special Role vis-a-vis Syria: Operation "X".

It may be contended that the demise of Iraq was more than the

loss of an "ally" from the U. S. point of view. In terms of "operatives"

among American allies in the Middle East in 1958, perhaps none was

as immediately capable of being a counterpoise to Nāṣir as was Iraq.[1]

Such an ally, for a United States that had opted less for a strong

isolation of Nāṣir after Suez than before and which by 1958 was becoming

wary of direct involvement in the Middle East, was a valuable asset.

Theoretically, that is, Iraq would have been in a position to act in the

Middle East to Washington's satisfaction upon indirect suggestions or

influences from the American capital. Such a modus operandi would

have been best for the U. S., then anxious to let some of the excesses

of 1957 in the Middle East simmer to compromise or termination.

By 1957, the Syrian regime had become no less of a bete noire

for the Iraqi leaders than for policy makers in Washington, though for

slightly different reasons. It was this mutual desire to bring pressure

to bear upon Syria that was to bring Iraq increasingly into U. S.

confidences.

From at least 1954 the Iraqi regime had been desirous of seeing

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[1]
  Turkey, though militarily stronger than Iraq, could scarcely
be called upon to play a role of political counterpoise in an Arab context.

the government in Syria changed. Outspoken critics of Nūrī as-Sa'īd's regime were welcomed in Syria and Egypt after 1954.[1] After the Gaza raid and the Baghdad Pact incidents, any rapprochement between Iraq and Syria seemed impossible. The period 1954-1956 was one in which pro-Iraqi political elements in Syria--notably the conservative People's Party--suffered increasing eclipse.[2] With pro-Egyptian, pro-Moscow, and Baathist military officers dominant in the power structure of Syria by 1956, elements of the Syrian populace opposed to these in-fluences sought amelioration of the situation through conspiracy. In the summer of 1956, certain largely Rightist groups began holding meetings in Beirut and in Syria in hopes of finding a solution. While it is difficult to assess the total extent of Iraqi participation or sub-vention in these Syrian subversive elements, on December 22, 1956, forty-seven leading Syrian politicians were put on trial for alleged collusion in what was termed an "Iraqi Plot."[3]

There is evidence that top Iraqi policy makers and military staff chiefs had been contemplating an actual invasion of Syria from 1954. The plan, known as "Plan X", envisaged a three-pronged attack on

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[1]
  Kirk, Op. cit., p. 143.

[2]
  Lenczowski, Op. cit., pp. 359-363.

[3]
  Ibid., p. 366.

Syria in collaboration with discontented groups in Syria.[1] There were further indications that Nūrī as-Sa'īd and Regent 'Abdul Ilah had asked the United States and Britain in 1956 for aid in fomenting a plot in Syria; the two governments were apparently anxious to help Iraq in some way, and allegedly had already sought to subsidize some dissident groups in Syria.[2]

Plan X was put off and was less seriously considered until the latter part of 1956 and early 1957, at which time Nūrī as-Sa'īd appears to have become unusually anxious to proceed with his plans against Syria. The Iraqi Prime Minister indicated merely that he was awaiting a green light from Washington in order to go ahead with his "liberation" of friendly and responsible elements in Syria.[3] In taking note of an increasingly responsive feeling in top U.S. policy circles towards the Iraqi plans vis-a-vis Syria, it is well to remember that by 1956 Secretary Dulles had largely come to believe that containment of Russia was not enough: results in the Cold War favorable to the U.S. could only be achieved by initiative and talk, keeping alive the "hope of

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[1] Iraq, Ministry of Defense, Trials of the Special High Military Court (1958) (Baghdad: 1959), vol. I, p. 271ff. "Discontented" groups would probably have included the Alawites, Druzes, the P.P.S., the Shishaklians, the People's Party, and a fraction of the Nationalist Party, as well as other splinter groups.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Gallman, Op. cit., p. 163.

liberation."[1]

Iraq and the United States remained in close contact on the
question of the elimination of a Syrian "threat" that appeared to be
mutual. In March of 1957, only several months before Damascus
announced the "American Plot" referred to above, Iraqi Regent 'Abdul
Ilah and Foreign Minister Faḍhil Jamāli met with Secretary Dulles in
Washington.[2] The Iraqi representatives explained that Syria had become
a center for the Communist movement and threatened Iraq's livelihood
by virtue of its leverage on oil pipelines. Jamāli specifically asked
for American help in the matter.

The visit of special emissary Loy Henderson to Istanbul and
Beirut in order to consult with Syria's neighbors, adds to the evidence
that the United States was anxious to encourage--albeit as indirectly
as possible--the thus-far dormant anti-Syrian scheme in Baghdad.
Although the Iraqi Prime Minister frequently was irked by the unpre-
dictability of the U.S. position on the action required in the Syrian
matter, it appeared as if the Henderson mission--following as it did
in the wake of the 1957 U.S. setbacks in the area--might be a sober
showdown attempt by Washington to put the anti-Syrian machinery into

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[1] Blackstock, Op. cit., p. 31.

[2] Iraq, Trials, Op. cit., vol. III, p. 1132.

operation. The summer of 1957 saw a great acceleration in this machinery, only to be followed by an abrupt cease in the fall.

That the U.S. tried to set up a diplomatic situation in which Iraq and Syria's other "Moslem neighbors" would be in a position to act against Syria, and failed in that attempt through misjudgement and heavy-handed diplomacy has been shown above to have been the case. It remains, in the context of this chapter, to examine the particular channels of diplomatic communication that existed at the time between Baghdad and Washington, for the sake of limning a contact between those two countries that bears considerably on the U.S. response to the 1958 crisis.

Although Washington was painfully aware of the inapplicability of the Eisenhower Doctrine to the Syrian situation, Dulles had made it clear earlier in 1957 during hearings on the Middle East Resolution that even if a country "went Communist" and did not ask for U.S. assistance, "there are many influences that can be brought to play to bring such a country to desist in that course of conduct, or if it adopts it, to reverse it."[1] It was clear that the U.S. role in invocating such "influences" was intended to be highly indirect, for the day after Henderson's departure to the Middle East correspondents in the Middle

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[1] U.S. Senate, Hearings, Op. cit., p. 57.

East were told that there was nothing the U.S. could do about Syria, but that measures could be taken "within the framework of inter-Arab relations."[1]

Henderson had come to Istanbul to lay out the American position on Syria after the State Department had received numbers of cables from the U.S. Embassies in Amman, Beirut, and Baghdad expressing concern of local governments over events in Syria. Henderson, at the August 24 meeting with Turkish, Jordanian, and Iraqi officials, indicated that he did not seek to urge any particular country to adopt any position or plan, but that he merely sought to express his views and to indicate possible areas of cooperation between the U.S. and the states represented at the meeting.[2] From the testimony of the Iraqi Chief of Staff, Rafīq 'Ārif, however, it appears that the U.S. attached special importance to Iraq in the matter: Jordan stated to Henderson that it was not prepared for action against Syria; as to Turkey, Henderson indicated to those assembled regarding the possible operation, "if anything should happen to delay success, you can call on Turkey to assist"[3] (emphasis mine). Henderson indicated that Turkish troops would be on the borders ready to act if there were "extreme necessity."

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[1] O'Kearney, Op. cit., p. 79.

[2] Iraq, Trials, Op. cit., vol. IV, p. 1517.

[3] Ibid., p. 1518.

In view of Iraq's close connections with certain groups in Syria as well the fact that Turkey had never been on good terms with Syria, it appears an inescapable conclusion that the U.S. was relying on Iraq for a studied initiative in the affair.

Such a conclusion is furthered by the nature of U.S. goals in the Syrian situation. Henderson had indicated that Washington was anxious (1) that any action be justified by good reasons so that it might be defended at the U.N.; and (2) that King Sa'ūd be assured that a Hashemite hegemony was not being established over Syria.[1] If the justification were to be Syrian "aggression," it would appear unlikely that Turkey-- with its enormous military force--would be an object of "attack" by Syria; in addition Iraq, with its smaller military power, had been actively fomenting subversion inside Syria for several years. With regard to the second point--assurances to Sa'ūd--Regent 'Abdul Ilah stated that he was ready to go to Saudi Arabia to make it clear to the Saudi King that Iraq only wished to see created an independent govern-ment in Damascus.[2] Henderson did not go to Baghdad, because, as he himself stated, he did not wish to convey the impression that the U.S. was a motivator of Iraq under the circumstances; Henderson did

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

encourage the other Arab states--presumably he included Turkey--to visit the Iraqi capital. Henderson also refered to the necessity for secrecy in the affair; the U. S. government did not want any "leaks" to the outside about its hand in the matter.

The move on Syria, of course, did not come off. As was shown in Chapter III, Syria, if anything, profited from the clumsy diplomacy that surrounded the affair. By September all the Arab governments, perhaps with the exception of Lebanon, had given up any ideas of collective action. By September, Nūrī as-Sa'īd had become cautious again; the American Ambassador in Baghdad felt that the two events of the creations of the U. A. R. and the A. U. "temporarily froze" Nūrī's Fertile Crescent scheme.[1]

Operation Hawk

If regional circumstances precluded action in the autumn of 1957, contacts between Washington and Baghdad over the Syrian question continued on into 1958.

Following upon the formation of the U. A. R., Iraq went on the offensive from February 1958 onwards. In March Nūrī as-Sa'īd replaced Sayyid 'Abdul Wahāb Mirjān as Prime Minister of Iraq and subsequently

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[1] Gallman, Op. cit., p. 164.

reorganized the Iraqi government to a degree of anti-Egyptian orientation such that "indeed, many saw the return of Nūrī as-Sa'īd as a move equivalent to the mobilization of front-line troops for an impending battle."[1] Immediately interested in the undermining of the U.A.R., Nūrī pushed ahead with plans for a counter union that would eventually include Kuwait; the inclusion of Kuwait would have meant tremendous leverage on Syria for Nūrī's Union. Although the first step of the counter plan was soon effected in the Federation of Iraq and Jordan, a further important step--which would have been London's declaring the independence of Kuwait--was blocked. London would not satisfy the Iraqi Prime Minister.[2] Washington appeared to take the British lead in not appearing much disposed to the Kuwait scheme.

Iraqi leaders in Washington kept in touch with the Department of State regarding the growing danger of Nasserism in the Middle East. Records of some of these meetings indicate that Iraq, operating now out of a fairly militant stance, felt that the question of Lebanon's staying in or out of the Nasserist camp was a crucial one; and that President Sham'ūn was being far too docile in his confrontation of the menace.[3]

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[1] Barraclough, Op. cit., p. 368.

[2] Ibid., p. 373. Characteristically London has opposed any link-up of Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil money; it has been suggested that this persistent feeling led Britain to subsidize the 1963 putsch that dispensed with Qassim. See L'Express, February 21, 1963.

[3] Cable from Fāḍhil Jamāli to Iraqi Government, June 25, 1958; Iraq, Trials, vol. III, Op. cit., pp. 1146-47.

Evidently Baghdad considered Lebanon valuable as a staging area against the U.A.R.

Moreover, the erstwhile "Plan X," dating back as far as 1954, was being revived. Evidence shows that on February 5, high Iraqi military staff members drew up a detailed new plan for the invasion of Syria.[1] Operation Hawk, as it was called, centered around the following basic plan: (1) the pretext for Iraqi intervention in Syria would presumably come through pro-Iraqi elements in Syria staging an uprising against the Syrian authorities; (2) Iraqi and Jordanian troops would move into Syria from two main areas--Jordan in the south and Singar district in the northeast; (3) leading the attack from the south would be an Iraqi detachment stationed in Mafraq, Jordan; and (4) some troops would be transported to northern Lebanon, whence they would proceed to northern Syria.

Judging from various pieces of evidence, Operation Hawk was in its final stages of readiness by July 14. On July 8, it was reported that the Islamic member states of the Baghdad Pact were making preparations for action; they had scheduled a meeting in Istanbul for July 15 for the purposes of discussing the situation in Lebanon and the Middle East.[2] Significantly, at the same time the Government of Iraq declared the

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[1] The full text of the plan is found in Iraq, Trials, vol. II, Op. cit., pp. 439-440.

[2] al-Nahār, July 8, 1958.

border area around the Singar district off bounds to civilians to a depth of one hundred kilometers.[1] While Dr. Jamālī was making stern warnings with regard to the independence of Lebanon, reports appeared in the Lebanese press that a Syrian newspaper, al-Manār, had recently stated there was existent a plan for an Iraqi invasion of Syria from the region of Abū-Kamāl.[2] The attention of the Syrian troops was to be diverted by Turkey and Israel, according to the account of this plan, while the Western Powers were to remain outside the conflict, ready to check any attempted Soviet intervention.[3]

The Lebanese Government, in the meantime, was giving serious consideration to an Iraqi request that the entry of Iraqi troops into Lebanon be permitted.[4] Due to severe opposition to this idea, especially on the part of Christian elements in Lebanon, no action toward admitting the Iraqi units had been taken by July 14.

It seems as if the Government of Iraq was about to take another step in the final execution of Operation Hawk on July 14. Orders had been issued--as well as live ammunition--to Brigadier General 'Abdul Karīm Qassim to lead two armored units of the 20th Brigade to

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[1]
    al-Nahār, July 10, 1958.

[2]
    Abū Kamāl is the area on the Syrian border just across from the Singar district on the Iraqi side--the point at which Iraqi troops were to enter Syria according to Operation Hawk.

[3]
    al-Nahār, July 10, 1958.

[4]
    Fū'ād 'Ammūn, The Foreign Policy of Lebanon (Beirut: Arab Publishing House, 1959), p. 68.

Mafraq, which was the Jordanian staging point referred to in the
blueprint for Operation Hawk. Qassim and his subordinate, 'Abd al-Salām
'Arif instead turned back to Baghdad, and in a few hours they had
eliminated the Hashemite Monarchy in Iraq.

The Loss of Hashemite Iraq: Washington's Point of View

To calculate how much of a loss Washington felt the Iraqi Monarchy
to have been, it is necessary to interpret the events to a great extent
in terms of Secretary Dulles' concept of alliances in the 1950's. It
must be remembered that Dulles, committed as he was to the "Great
Equation" in Cold War strategy, believed that not only were "friends"
necessary in coping with the Soviet threat; but the Secretary of State
had become increasingly convinced of the importance of Eurasian
allies that would themselves actively shoulder much of the anti-
Communist offensive, while the United States would limit its participa-
tion to initiative, organization, subvention, and indirect control.

While U.S. relations with Hashemite Iraq, within the limits
of the above type of formula, had at times resulted in embarrassments
and gauche patterns of diplomacy, nevertheless the facts suggest that
Nūrī as-Sa'īd's Iraq had become perhaps the nation in the Middle East
which was best meeting the needs and objectives of this latest phase of
U.S. thinking on alliances. Not only the Iraqi regime's stance on

Nasserism, but its continuous line of planning for operations first against a Syria that Washington saw as nearly a satellite of Moscow and then against the northern section of the United Arab Republic was for the United States an active force working for common interests: (1) the over-all solidarity and anti-Communist posture of the Baghdad Pact; (2) the "independence" of Syria; and the preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon.[1]

It is impossible to say--and certainly doubtful--that high U.S. planning circles were actively counting on a favorable outcome of what appeared to be the last stages of Operation Hawk in July 1958. Had the U.S. been actually working with Baghdad on the final denouement of the plan against Syria, it appears likely that intelligence resources would have been more abundant, and Qassim's coup would more likely have been forseen and perhaps averted. One source noted that, while the CIA was probably anxious to play a limited role in Syrian internal affairs, nevertheless had its participation in the Iraqi operation been prodigious--with all of the network of communications necessary being

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[1] Nūrī was contemplating the possibility of Iraqi military action on behalf of Lebanon, but was disappointed that the U.S. would not specifically "guarantee" his action; Gallman, Op. cit., p. 165. Also, much of the support for the pro-Sham'ūn P. P. S. forces came from the Iraqi Government. Iraq and the P. P. S. shared many views, including that of the necessity of overthrowing the Syrian regime. Qubain, Op. cit., p. 84.

employed--it would appear unlikely that there would have been no avenue for a tip off to Washington on Qassim's plans.[1]

On the contrary, the U.S. intelligence operations at the time seemed, if anything, mismanaged. Less than one week before the Qassim coup, the U.S. Embassy and the CIA had helped King Hussein to thwart a plot against the Jordanian Monarch.[2] Although the CIA passed along a tip, gleaned from some of the captured Jordanian plotters, that a similar plot was soon to be carried out in Iraq, U.S. intelligence did not apparently press too hard for details in this matter, for Iraq was still considered a preserve of British intelligence to a large extent. Closer to Washington, the CIA Director Allen Dulles indicated that several tips on the imminence of a coup in Iraq had gotten bogged down at the desk level at CIA headquarters in Washington.[3]

The extent to which American intelligence was in fact cooperating with the Baghdad regime before the Qassim coup is difficult to analyze because of limited available information. The Qassim regime, however, which had quickly given considerable rein to Communists, soon after the coup was making the CIA itself a target of invective and attack: it was said that American intelligence had been prominent in the maze of espionage and counterespionage that had characterized the period

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[1] Tulley, Op. cit., p. 82.

[2] Tulley, Op. cit., p. 75.

[3] Allen Dulles, Op. cit., p. 84.

immediately prior to the revolt.[1] Sherman Adams argued that a plot
such as Qassim's could well be kept within a handful of people; and the
President did not finally hold Allen Dulles responsible for the lack of
advance warning on the coup.[2] Ambassador Gallman corroborates
Adams' type of view--which would tend to absolve intelligence even if
its role had been substantial in Hashemite Iraq--by reiterating that
what had transpired in Iraq was not a popular uprising, but rather a
seizure of power by a small group of men, who used agitators to make
the "revolution" appear more popular than was the case.[3]

There are a number of reasons why the U.S. would not have been
likely to have been actively behind the July operations that appeared to
correspond to Operation Hawk's blueprint. It has been mentioned that
starting in 1957, Washington seemed less anxious to isolate Nāṣir than
before. In addition U.S. policy was, by mid-1958, calling for a go-slow
approach on a Lebanese situation that seemed to be nearing a possible
solution. In an effort to show support for Iraq, yet at the same time
honoring relations with the British, and Saudi Arabia, and trying to
maintain the current policy line of indirect involvement, the United

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[1]
    Tulley, Op. cit., p. 78. One of the Americans killed on the
day of the coup, Eugene Burns, who had founded an organization
called the American Friends of the Far East, was accused by the
Qassim regime of being a CIA agent.

[2]
    Sherman Adams, Op. cit., p. 292.

[3]
    Gallman, Op. cit., p. 205.

States appears to have demonstrated a considerable disparity between its enthusiasm for Iraq's activism and its willingness to clearly back that activism. The erratic nature of U.S. military assistance was sufficient to demonstrate this. Perhaps lack of subsidy for a full Iraqi operation against Syria might be explained by a U.S. fear that, since popular support for the Hashemite regime in Iraq was lacking, a plan like Operation Hawk might backfire--to the ultimate aggrandizement of 'Abd al-Nāṣir.

Because of changing conditions and goals for the U.S. in the Middle East, it seems incorrect to say that the extent to which Washington felt the demise of Hashemite Iraq could be measured in terms of the U.S. hope that Iraq was going to bell the cat in Syria. Yet the very nature of the more than close communications that had existed between Baghdad and Washington after 1954 themselves testify to the strong U.S. hope that Iraq would take the lead within the context of inter-Arab relations in putting the brakes on "revolutionary" patterns in the Middle East that threatened to get out of hand. Turkey, which if only by virtue of its size and strength might have been able to play a similar stabilizing role in the Middle East, was by the summer of 1958 in grave financial circumstances.[1] Forced to bail out Turkey financially at this time,

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[1] Lenczowski, Op. cit., p. 164.

and faced with what it considered the possibility of large-scale Soviet penetration in the Middle East, Washington was especially in need of Iraq's active presence in the area. In these terms, the sudden shift in Iraq from a centralized Monarchy to a vague, inauspicious "people's republicanism" can be seen for the great blow it was to American foreign policy. It bears reiteration that the "Lebanese Crisis," to which United States forces replied on July 15, was to a great extent a misnomer for the crisis in Iraq. Later in the morning of July 14, top Iraqi leaders were to have left for Istanbul and a meeting of the Baghdad Pact: the main item on the agenda for consideration at that meeting was the situation in Lebanon.[1]

Justification for American Intervention

Preceding sections have examined various aspects and levels of motivation in the action finally taken by the American policy-making "machine" on July 14-15, 1958. Decisions made on the basis of such serious blows to the U.S. position as the Iraqi coup were not made lightly: the United States, in spite of its probable power predominance, nonetheless was constrained to take into account the fact that there was at least an embryonic world order to which it was a party. As was pointed out earlier, decisions in international relations are

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[1] Time Magazine, July 21, 1958, p. 17.

many-faceted; and while some facets reflect strategic thinking or

claims, others, equally integrated into the whole of the decision making

process, reflect principle.

The landings in Beirut, then, reflect decisions both of a decidedly

political and of a "legal" nature. Thus far consideration has been of

political categories. The relevent "political" questions being asked in

Washington in anticipation of intervention, were generally these: (1) what

would be the long and short range consequences of intervention; would

the consequences of non-intervention or of alternative action be more

favorable? (2) What would be the effects on U. S. prestige and allies

in the Middle East? (3) Would intervention abet Communist efforts in

the area or damage U. S. economic interests there? (4) Would action

further U. S. policy objectives in the area with regard to popular

movements and strategic positions?

"Legal" thinking in the 1958 Middle East crisis reflects a common

realization among nations that consensus and approval of actions are

usually more readily forthcoming when resort is made to patterns of

political behavior sanctioned by international law. The fact that at

times in history international law has been invoked out of expediency

leads one to think that, in considering the American action in the

Middle East in 1958, it would be extremely difficult to separate the legal

process in decision making from the political process. If motivation thus far has been emphasized, it bears mentioning that justification is the reverse side of the coin.

The Administration's Position

The Eisenhower Doctrine was employed in the 1958 Middle East crisis--if it was used at all--in a way different from the terms Dulles had used to sell and reassure Congress on that Doctrine. Chapter IV above pointed out that whereas in 1957 Dulles explained how three "findings" had to be substantiated by the President before the Doctrine could be invoked; by 1958, the Secretary of State had broadened the scope of the Middle East Resolution to where he could anticipate U. S. action consistent with the sections referring not to armed attack but to the U. S. belief that the independence of the countries of the Middle East was vital to the peace and national interest of the United States.[1] If the decision to act was hurried, and on questionable legal ground, especially since the U. N. was already on the scene in Lebanon, Dulles had tried to prepare the ground for such a rapid move by expanding the possibilities for action under the Middle East Resolution.

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[1]
This section of the Doctrine was referred to as the Mansfield Amendment. The international "legal" nature of this section would appear to have similarities with the Monroe Doctrine.

The case which Eisenhower finally presented to the American
people did not appear to emphasize the "legal" aspects of the Eisenhower
Doctrine except in as much as the "principles stated in the Middle East
Doctrine" appeared somehow on the same level as or at least supporting
the legal case for America's intervening in response to a proper request
from a legally constituted government.[1]

Whether by design, disuse, or the turn of events, then, the
section of the Joint Resolution that would have been operative under the
circumstances--section two--was not much invoked in the President's
justification of the U.S. action. Instead Washington sought to emphasize
other aspects.

Examining the President's message to Congress on July 15, 1958,
one is driven to the conclusion that Eisenhower sought as much as
possible to indicate that the insurrection in Lebanon, which he noted
had broken out particularly severely along the Syrian border, was
supported from outside by arms and propaganda; the avowed aim of
these activities, he said, "was to overthrow the legally constituted
Government of Lebanon and to install by violence a government which
would subordinate the independence of Lebanon to the policies of the
United Arab Republic."[2] The stage was set for Washington to offer

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[1]
    Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 271.

[2]
    U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, vol. 39 (August 4, 1958),
p. 182.

justifications that would have probably been much less feasible--if at all--under conditions in Lebanon of internal insurrection, whose roots were more in Lebanon than in the U. A. R.

As a further measure toward setting the stage for U. S. justification, the President indicated his belief that, in the wake of the Iraqi coup, the United Nations' action in Lebanon would not be sufficient. In view of the ominous nature of the Iraqi coup, the President said the U. S. was not assured by the U. N. presence that American commitments to its own citizens there and to the Lebanese Government would be honored.[1] Vice President Nixon said that the U. N. was not asked to take more extensive action in view of the new circumstances because of a belief by American intelligence that immediate action was required to save Lebanon from going "the way of Iraq."[2]

The initial justification by the Administration was that forces had been sent to Lebanon,

> to protect American lives and by their presence to assist the Government of Lebanon in the preservation of Lebanon's territorial integrity and independence, which have been deemed vital to United States national interests and world peace.[3]

The United Nations Charter was mentioned at the same time as justifying the American action: The President indicated that the U. S. had acted

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Richard Nixon, "Events in the Middle East," Op. cit., p. 616.

[3] U. S. Department of State, Bulletin, vol. 39 (August 4, 1958), p.182.

under the inherent right of collective self-defense, as defined in the

Charter.[1] Article 51 was invoked as well, and Eisenhower asserted

the right of the United States to intervene under this Article in cases

of "indirect aggression."[2]

There are indications that the Administration was taking Article

51, from the beginning, in less than its strict legal intent, especially

since the Article deals with individual or collective self-defense against

armed attack (emphasis mine). Dulles had always taken something of

an expedient view of Article 51, skeptical as he was about the ability

of the U. N. machinery to react promptly to crises. Eisenhower, too,

paid more attention to the timing aspects of Article 51, stating that it

"permitted a country to act on an emergency basis pending the first

opportunity to turn the problem over as soon as the United Nations

was able to act."[3]

The Administration, then, was on thin ice in these ways: (1)

There had been no "armed attack," to legally trigger either the

Eisenhower Doctrine or Article 51; (2) in any international legal context,

the Middle East Resolution was at best a statement of national interest;

(3) the presence of the U. N. Observer team in Lebanon made U. S.

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[1] Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 274.

[2] U. S. Department of State, Bulletin, vol. 39, Op. cit., pp. 183-5.

[3] Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 272.

emergency action under Article 51 on behalf of the U.N. somewhat incongruous. A further difficulty hinged on the nature of the "insurrection" in Lebanon; questions with legal implications could be raised as to the "internal" or "external" nature of the disturbances, and as to the competence of the Government to request assistance.

Under these circumstances, the Administration's tack was to heavily underline subversion and "indirect aggression." Perhaps if sufficient gravity could be attached to the presence of these forces in the crisis, then possibly a certain legal plausibility could be induced that would plaster over flaws in the justification arguments. The American news media provided a suitable backdrop for this approach, suggesting that Lebanon had been saved from the same type of "subversion" Iraq had succumbed to and to which Jordan was a prey.[1] Washington, choosing to isolate subversion and indirect aggression as the malefic forces at work in Lebanon, had selected terms at once strong and difficult of identification. Subversion, with its logical extensions of defection and treason, implies a transfer of loyalties to an aggressor.[2] Perhaps working to Washington's ultimate advantage

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[1]
Time Magazine, July 28, 1958, p. 7.

[2]
Blackstock, Strategy of Subversion, Op. cit., pp. 56-9. An official definition of "indirect aggression," found in the Department of State Bulletin, vol. 38, (August 1958), p. 182, is as follows: "efforts under the cover of a fomented strife to put into domestic control those whose real loyalty is to the aggressor."

in the matter was the fact that the problem of determining what actions or items constitute sedition or subversion is an enormous one. An emphasis on subversion by the U.S. required a deemphasis of the civil aspects of the crisis.[1]

Eisenhower, in support of his statement that the U.S. was justified in intervening in cases of indirect aggression, referred to General Assembly resolutions dealing with the subject in 1949 and 1950.[2] The President also made analogies to other situations where indirect aggression had taken place: Greece (1947), Czechoslovakia (1948), China (1949), Korea and Indochina (1950).

It could be noted in passing that other possible "legal" instruments, to which the U.S. was a party in the Middle East, did not apply to the Lebanese situation. The Three-Power Declaration of 1951, in which Britain, France, and the United States had expressed their determination to preserve the status quo in the Middle East, had been inoperative since 1956, although it was still in effect.[3] The Baghdad Pact was specifically geared to raise defenses against Soviet aggression; in addition, the U.S. was not a member of the Pact, but rather belonged

[1]

Chapter IV above pointed out the paradox of Eisenhower's whitewashing the civil aspects of the Lebanese crisis after July 14, 1958, while before that time, for some months, official Washington had been coming to feel the crisis to be increasingly a domestic matter.

[2]

State Department Bulletin, vol. 39, (August 1958), pp. 183-5.

[3]

New York Times, July 15, 1958, p. 4.

only to the military, economic, and anti-subversion committees.

Though perhaps the U. S. acted along more political than legal

lines in dispatching troops to Lebanon, it has been suggested that a

country only exists by virtue of its being defined and constituted both

politically and legally. Further examination of the validity of the

American legal case in the Lebanese affair then may well shed light

on the interaction of legal and political desiderata in the U. S. decision-

making process.

Competence of the Lebanese Government

The foregoing consideration pointed out these avenues for possible

justification, at different times and in varied measures used by the U. S.

in connection with the Lebanese crisis of 1958: (1) the right of collective

self-defense; (2) intervention on invitation; (3) Article 51 of the U. N.

Charter; (4) the Mansfield Amendment to the Joint Middle East Resolution

of 1957. One legal authority regards the intervention by invitation

argument as the "most plausible" justification.[1] The most relevant

question to follow logically is whether or not the Lebanese Government

was competent to invite outside intervention, in view of the circumstances

of the insurrection. In part, the analysis of this latter question will

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[1] P. B. Potter, 52 A. J. I. L. 727 (1958).

hinge on the issue of the nature of the disturbances in Lebanon: were they internal in origin, as the Opposition alleged, or externally fomented as the Government asserted? But, leaving for a moment the examination of the legal implications of the roots of the crisis, there are significant points that can be brought forth regarding the legal framework in which the invitation-intervention sequence stands.

At the outset, it should be noted that one of the few exceptions to the forbidding of armed intervention, in terms of international law, is that characterized by the invitation by a state for such intervention.[1] Further, precedent indicates that international law takes a grave view of intervention; one of the cardinal restrictions imposed by international law upon a state is that which states that, "failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary," a state may not exercise its power in any form in the sovereign territory of another state.[2] Following on the seriousness with which the concept of intervention is taken, then one must assume that the legal nature of an invitation must likewise be strictly defined, with a view to precluding the triggering of intervention by vague determinants.

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[1]
Other permissible situations are (1) when intervention is necessary for defense against an "armed attack"; and (2) if authorized by the United Nations when there exists a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression". Quincy Wright, "Subversive Intervention," American Journal of International Law, LIV, no. 3, (July, 1960), p. 529.

[2]
Lotus Case, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10, p. 18; 2 World Court Reports 35.

The Lebanese state, as a sovereign entity in the body of nations, had the right to make treaties of collective self-defense, and to ask for military aid in times of emergency.[1] Traditionally security or collective defense treaties have provided for military help only in the event of external aggression. But by the mid-1950's, Lebanon, as well as several other states, had requested outside assistance on the basis of what was sometimes referred to as "indirect aggression." Especially in such cases, where "aggression" in a context of subversion is more difficult to isolate or pinpoint among confused domestic or quasi-seditious forces, the crucial determinant in assessing the legitimacy of military assistance will rest on the question of the competence of the requesting government.

One important commonly accepted criterion for a legitimate invitation for outside assistance is that the inviting government be in uncontested control of the state when the invitation is given.[2] One would have to ask whether the Sham'ūn Government was in such control of Lebanon. International law appears to take two quite different views on the question of loss of control on the part of a government of a part or all of its territory, depending on whether such loss is due to external aggression or internal revolt. While in international law the de facto

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[1] Quincy Wright, "United States Intervention in the Lebanon," American Journal of International Law, vol. 53, (1959), p. 119.

[2] Wright, "Subversive Intervention," Op. cit., p. 529ff.

situation is usually taken to overrule the de jure in judging the "firm
control" of a state by a given government, yet there has been considerable
opinion in favor of the de jure government's continued title to its territory--
even if possession or firm control has been eliminated--if the de jure
government was displaced by a de facto government through aggression.[1]

If, however, the de jure government loses possession of all or
part of its territory through internal insurrection, international law
takes a very different view. International law does not forbid revolu-
tions, and it looks favorably upon national self-determination.[2] Both
for the sake of expediency and justice, the predominant opinion in
international legal thinking has held that neither faction in an internal
disturbance the outcome of which is uncertain is competent to speak in
the name of the state.[3] Consequently, if it can be shown that the Sham'ūn
regime was less of a de jure government losing ground to outside
aggressors than a party to an internal dispute of serious dimensions,

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[1]

Wright, "U. S. Intervention," Op. cit., p. 120.

[2]

Note for example the U. N. General Assembly's refusal to urge
the non-recognition of Communist China, because of the Assembly's
belief that the creation of that government was primarily due to internal
revolt. U. N. Yearbook, 1948-9, p. 296.

[3]

William E. Hall, A Treatise on International Law, sec. 94, p. 347
(8th ed. Oxford, 1924). If such competence were admitted, outside
agencies, supporting different sides in the manner of the Spanish Civil
War, would likely cause tensions in a limited arena that could have
international repercussions.

then some doubt may well be shed on the legitimacy of the invitation
given by the Sham'ūn Government to the U.S.

Fahim Qubain points out that President Sham'ūn was acting within
his constitutional rights in asking the U.S. for aid in the crisis, although
"morally" the Lebanese President might have done well to consult the
Chamber on such an ultimately important question as foreign intervention.[1]
If the "aggression" against Lebanon was indeed an external phenomenon,
then Sham'ūn, in addition to being within his constitutional rights, was
also within his rights of necessity: the American intervention then
would have been seen in light of the President's responsibility for
internal security and the defense of the country against aggression.

Within Lebanon's legal framework, it cannot be gainsaid that the
Lebanese Cabinet had voted to give Sham'ūn discretionary authority
to call for outside military assistance.[2] But the Lebanese President's
internal rights would appear to have significance in terms of inter-
national law only in the way in which the exercise of those rights
reflected on the relative position of his Government in insurrection-
torn Lebanon. If Sham'ūn's actions, or lack of actions, merely
increased tensions among substantial segments of the Lebanese
population, rather than rallying these same and other Lebanese elements

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[1] Qubain, Op. cit., p. 122.

[2] "Chronology," Middle East Journal, col. 12 Summer 1958, p. 309.

to a struggle against outside aggression; then one would be led to infer that in a situation where the outcome of civil disturbances was unclear, the President did not have the right under international law--although he was constitutionally correct--to request foreign intervention. The internal-external aspects of the Lebanese crisis bear scrutiny.

Indirect Aggression or Internal Insurrection?

By the very fact that Lebanon had introduced its case regarding alleged U. A. R. intervention into the United Nations, the issues involved had taken on the characteristics and involved the language of international matters. Because of uniquely Lebanese factors in the roots of the crisis of 1958--factors which in an international setting perhaps received less attention than might have been justified; and because there were outside pressures and influences brought to bear on the two sides in the Lebanese insurrection; one is hard pressed, in view of the evidence available, to isolate as the major malignant element in the crisis the causal relation-ship between explicit U. A. R. intervention in Lebanon and the alleged systematic "undermining" of national life. Nor is one to say that, at a time when much of the Lebanese population was responding--if in a nebulous sort of way--to the "message" of 'Abd al-Nāsir, Cairo had no effect upon what was clearly a domestic uprising.

Further, one is faced with basic questions on just how terms like "subversion," "incitement to rebellion," or "indirect aggression" apply to a country where a great percentage of its population (largely Sunni Muslim) felt that the very borders of Lebanon were artificial creations of the Western powers. In adducing evidence for or against externality, the very difficulties of proving "illegal" subversion merely remind one that international political thinking was in evidence at this time as much if not more than subservience to legal forms; and often it would seem to have been the case that the political and legal approaches to a given matter have worked together to bear up one another's inadequacies.

The Case for the Government

The relative composition of the Opposition was discussed in Chapter II. However it bears reemphasizing that, though to a certain extent the Lebanese insurrection was polarized by feudal, traditional rivalries and loyalties, the effect of the "external" phenomenon of Nasserism on the Opposition mass was considerable. The various dimensions of pro-Cairo propaganda directed towards Lebanon were most successful in the Sunni Muslim community.[1] Yet in assessing the "delictual" qualities of Nasserist propaganda in Lebanon--that is,

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[1]

Qubain, Op. cit., p. 41.

regarding its subversive elements--one is faced with a dilemma of deciding whether Lebanese Muslims, already pan-Arabist in their thinking, merely looked to Nāṣir as a symbol for their already existent aspirations; or whether Nāṣir himself could be said to have been responsible for "winning away" the loyalties of Lebanese Sunni Muslims from their state.

Several arguments used by the Opposition to demonstrate the internal nature of the insurrection, as well as perhaps to justify the unconstitutional approach taken by the Opposition in the struggle, showed certain weaknesses. First, while the Opposition had made a major issue out of the allegedly "fraudulent" elections of 1957, no substantial evidence was adduced to show that the elections had been procedurally faulty. Some gerrymandering had probably taken place; but both sides were actively engaged in buying votes.[1] That the elections were not completely manipulated by the Government is demonstrated by the fact that Opposition candidates had consistently won in areas with a Sunni majority. To a certain extent gerrymandering and charges of rigged elections on the parts of dethroned traditional leaders have always been characteristic of the Lebanese political system. The implication of the Opposition-provoked insurrection--that the Government violated the

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[1]
Ghassan Tuaynī, "The Peak of the Tragedy," al-Nahār, June 25, 1957.

law in the elections, thereby justifying an "illegal" revolution--is not completely justified on the basis of the elections alone.

Second, the Presidential succession issue, from which the Opposition gathered so much ammunition, if put into perspective gives some additional substance to pro-Government arguments. It has been indicated earlier that President Sham'ūn's failure to clarify his position on reelection did much to provoke Opposition elements into hardening their stand against the Government. Yet this issue was not the sole nor major issue of the insurrection. Prime Minister Sāmī as-Sulḥ's reminder that violent and subversive acts--some perpetrated by Syrians--had begun as early as the fall of 1956 leads one to think that the Opposition may have been somewhat inclined to exaggerate the issue of Sham'ūn's succession in order to avoid implicating evidence of the externality of the crisis.[1]

Furthermore, arguments accusing the Government of violating the National Pact were not completely justified. The Opposition appeared anxious--probably again in order to justify an unconstitutional insurrection--to show that the Government had violated constitutional or fundamental principles. It would have been difficult for the Opposition to assert that, by accepting the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Government

[1] al-Jarīda, May 28, 1958.

of Lebanon was violating the anti-imperialistic spirit that had informed
the Pact in 1943. For under the Middle East Resolution, the United
States gained neither rights to maintain military installations on Lebanese
territory nor treaty privileges that infringed on Lebanese sovereignty.[1]

For the purposes of this analysis, the most significant area of
consideration in the Lebanese Government's case is that of alleged
U. A. R. intervention in the domestic affairs of Lebanon. The questions
essential to be asked are (1) was there any such intervention; and (2)
if so, may it be said to have been "massive" as the Lebanese Government
contended?

On June 6, 1958, Dr. Charles Malik made the following charges
before the Security Council relative to alleged U. A. R. intervention in
Lebanon: (1) that the U. A. R. Government had both supplied arms to
and trained subversive elements in Lebanon; (2) that both U. A. R.
civilian nationals and "governmental elements" had participated in or
abetted subversive, terrorist activities in Lebanon; (3) that press and
radio campaigns conducted by the U. A. R. were inciting the Lebanese
populace to overthrow their government.[2]

Before considering briefly some of the evidence adduced by the
Lebanese Government in support of its charges, it is pertinent to
consider several general points. For one thing, it was a commonly

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[1]
 Address by Sāmī as-Sulḥ, July 12, 1958; Agwani, Op. cit., p. 97.

[2]
 Speech by Dr. Charles Malik before the Security Council, June 6,
1958, Security Council Official Records, 823rd Meeting, (S/PV 823);
pp. 2-50.

accepted fact during the insurrection that the Egyptian Ambassador in

Beirut, 'Abd al-Ḥamīd Ghālib, was in close contact with leaders of the

Opposition; in addition, clearly both the Egyptian and Syrian Governments

were critical of the Sham'ūn regime and sympathetic with the Opposition.[1]

Also important in assessing infiltration from the U. A. R. is the fact

that Government forces in Lebanon through most of the rebellion were

in control of merely eighteen kilometers out of the 324 kilometers making

up the Syrian-Lebanese border.[2]

Reports from a number of sources on evidences of U. A. R.

infiltration or subversive activity in Lebanon lead one to conclude that

there was at least an element of truth in Dr. Malik's accusations.[3]

American intelligence reports substantiated Malik's claims in the U. N.,

indicating, for example, that General Shawkat Shuqayr, former Syrian

army chief, was directing Kamāl Junblāṭ's military operations; and that

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[1]

Qubain, Op. cit., p. 55.

[2]

Mule-pack trains bearing arms and equipment for the rebels
could and did penetrate Lebanon regularly from Syria through these
unguarded areas. Lenczowski, Op. cit., pp. 338, 339.

[3]

For Dr. Malik's own detailed proofs and citations of intervention
see Speech by Dr. Charles Malik before the Security Council, June 6,
1958, Security Council Official Records, 823rd Meeting (S/PV. 823),
pp. 2-50. For the reply of the U. A. R. Ambassador (Lūtfī) to the
charges see pp. 50-66. Reports received by the U. S. Government are
reproduced in U. S. Congress, Senate, "A List of Reports Received by
the United States Government Bearing on U. A. R. Intervention in Lebanon,
May, June 1958," 85th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record, vol. 104,
pp. 13937-40. The first through fourth reports of the United Nations
Observation Group in Lebanon appear in the following U. N. documents:
S/4040 (3 July 1958); S/4051 (16 July 1958); S/4052 (17 July 1958); S/4069
(30 July 1958); S/4085 (14 Aug. 1958); and S/4100 (29 Sept. 1958).

at least fifty arms-carrying caravans from Syria, and three boatloads

of guns from Gaza were captured in the first days of the revolt.[1] From

the beginning, at the time of the first strikes on May 11, 1958, the log-

book of the U. S. Embassy in Beirut reported that German missionaries

had seen 300 armed Syrians crossing the frontier into Lebanon.[2] Other

American intelligence channels stated that large numbers of Palestinian

commandos had been released from the U. A. R. First Army (Syria) for

service in Lebanon, and even that many U. A. R. First Army Officers

serving on the Israeli front were critical of U. A. R. intervention in

Lebanon.

Malik cited other examples of U. A. R. material aid or abetting

of the Lebanese insurrection: numbers of boats were intercepted at

sea off the Lebanese coast bearing weapons and Egyptian currency in

May. A force of Syrians allegedly occupied Shab'a, a Lebanese village,

and later advanced on Hasbayya, whence they were repulsed by Lebanese

police. Also a training unit in Syria called the "Maghāwīr Unit" was

actively training Lebanese and non-Lebanese commandos in terrorism

and espionage.[3] In addition, Robert Murphy, who was sent by Washington

as a special emissary late in the crisis, noted that American Marines,

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[1]
Time Magazine, July 28, 1958, p. 19.

[2]
Thayer, Diplomat, Op. cit., p. 11.

[3]
Speech by Dr. Charles Malik before the Security Council, June 6,
1958, Op. cit., pp. 2-50. For court proceedings against several
infiltrators alleged to be Syrian Army officers, see al-Nahār, June 1, 1958.

having tapped the telephone line between Damascus and the Basta, proved "conclusively" that the U. A. R. was supporting the Basta rebels.[1]

An examination of Cairo radio and press statements and editorial opinion on the Lebanese crisis leads to the conclusion that this area of Malik's charges was also justified.[2] Although the U. A. R. representative at the Security Council, Mr. 'Umar Lūtfī, pointed out that U. A. R. radio had simply reported what Lebanese newspapers were printing, his attempt to absolve the U. A. R. in this matter appears unsuccessful. Mr. Lūtfī failed to explain, for example, why it was that the U. A. R. was broadcasting only commentary from the Lebanese Opposition newspapers, or the fact that some hostile broadcasts from Cairo were written and originated in Cairo rather than in the Lebanese press.[3]

The Lebanese Government's position on U. A. R. intervention is further strengthened by the fact that the U. A. R. Government took no measures to curtail hostile broadcasts originating in its territory nor any action to end transportation of arms across its borders into Lebanon.[4]

1

    Murphy, Op. cit., p. 490.

2

    For a number of sample press and radio attacks on the Lebanese Government, see Appendix III, Qubain, Op. cit., pp. 220-224.

3

    Speech by Mr. 'Umar Lūtfī before the Security Council, June 10, 1958. Security Council Official Records, 824th meeting (S/PV.824), pp. 3-26.

4

    The U. A. R. representative had argued that gun running across the Lebanese borders was simply a normal phenomenon and that the U. A. R. need claim no responsibility in the matter. Ibid.

Also it could be noted that these charges against the U.A.R. came
after Cairo had been indicated in more than one Arab nation for subversive
activities.

The Case for the Opposition

The Opposition had every reason to want to emphasize arguments
against the external dimensions of the revolt, since they were decidedly
against Great Power or U.N. intervention to solve the crisis; the more
"internality" could be substantiated, the fewer trump cards--based on
U.A.R. subversion--would be available for, presumably, the U.S. or
the U.N. to use in justifying intervention. Opposition leader Kamāl
Junblāt has said that, had U.S. intervention not come when it did,
Opposition forces would have taken complete control of Lebanon within
about two weeks after the date the Marines landed.[1] The truth of
Junblāt's statement is not so important a question as is its reflection
of the Opposition's desire to prevent intervention; this desire was
strong enough, as has been shown, to cause some weaknesses in the
anti-Government arguments for internality. Opposition leaders on the
whole were so anxious to absolve the U.A.R. from subversive activities
in Lebanon, that the U.A.R. delegate to the U.N. armed himself with
Lebanese Opposition statements in his rebuttals to Dr. Malik in the

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[1]   Author's interview with Kamāl Junblāt, Mukhtara, Lebanon,
August 4, 1958.

Security Council. Note, for example, this citation in the U. N. by

Mr. Lūtfī of a statement made by Sa'ib Salām in Beirut on May 23:

> The present Government endeavors to slander the
> Lebanese patriots and accuses them of receiving assistance
> from the United Arab Republic; and this has nothing to do
> with the present crisis. The allegation that Communism
> and the United Arab Republic are the cause of the situation
> is truly incredible, and it is clear that President Chamoun
> has no respect for the people of Lebanon.[1]

In spite of the weakness of some Opposition arguments and the

possible charges of unconstitutionality that might be brought to bear on

the rebels, there was much truth in the stand taken simultaneously by

the U. A. R. and the Opposition that the crisis had undeniable and sub-

stantial domestic origins.

First it is essential to ask what were Cairo's aspirations, if not

goals, for the denouement of the Lebanese crisis? Nāṣir, for his part,

had often repeated his respect for the sovereignty and independence of

Lebanon.[2] Again, to judge from his statements, President Nāṣir seemed

agreeable to the UNOGIL presence in Lebanon in as much as that action

furthered possibilities for at least a temporary solution of the crisis;

and Nāṣir contacted the U. S. Government in June and offered to attempt

to use his influence to end the trouble.[3]

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[1] Statement by Sa'ib Salām at a press conference in Beirut, May 23, 1958; cited in Speech by 'Umar Lūtfī before the Security Council, June 6, 1958, Op. cit., pp. 50-66.

[2] Mideast Mirror, vol. 10, no. 20, p. 18.

[3] Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 268.

From a pragmatic viewpoint, Nāṣir, who had been reluctant to
join forces with Syria in the U. A. R. merger, was probably far from
anxious to "annex" a Lebanon composed of even more divisions, parties,
and confessions, than Syria; the latter country, which probably was not
as solidly behind Nāṣir as polls showed, had many dissident minority
elements that had been encouraged at various times from both Lebanon
and Iraq in a subversive way.[1] Nāṣir's animosity to the Eisenhower
Doctrine and the Fertile Crescent do not alone seem to justify the
contention that the virtual annexation of Lebanon would have helped
a satisfactory solution of Nāṣir's larger political concerns or would
have helped the Egyptian President to consolidate his power over dis-
sident factions in Syria. Taking stock of the potential enemies of
the U. A. R. regime, if Lebanon were annexed forcibly to the latter,
the burden of logic would seem to lie with the belief that a friendly,
independent Lebanon would have appeared to Nāṣir a better alternative--
given a change of regime in Beirut--than Lebanon's conversion into a
U. A. R. province.[2]

In addition, one is forced to concede, on the basis of the nature
of the press and radio statements, the extent of material intervention,

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[1] For a description of the dissident elements in Syria, again refer
to the text of Operation Hawk; Iraq, Trials, III, Op. cit., pp. 439-440.

[2] With a half-year of existence behind the U. A. R., it had become
increasingly clear that the foundation of union was not the legal fact of
merger; but rather the complex of administrative, social, and economic
functions that undergird such a product, with accompanying difficulties.
Qubain, Op. cit., pp. 42-43.

and by the loyalties and nature of the Lebanese Opposition, that the
U.A.R. encouraged pro-Nāṣir elements in Lebanon and stimulated
opposition to Sham'ūn; but these facts do not seem to reveal a determined
and callous effort on the part of Cairo to subvert the integrity of Lebanon.
Rather, Cairo's effects seemed bent on the ouster of Sham'ūn as
President of Lebanon and on finding a replacement less hostile to Cairo.[1]

Another argument which would support the domestic dimension of
the crisis is that of the very nature of the Opposition. It was established
above that, as much or even more than ideology, personal political
emnities and issues entered the scene of the Lebanese crisis of 1958.
Druze and Shi'a elements of the Opposition, for example, were fighting
more for the sake of their traditional leadership than the goal of Arab
unity. The Opposition, drawing some support from Christian elements,
principally enemies of Sham'ūn, could pose as a non-denominational,
national movement having no special ties to Cairo. The main elements
of the Opposition argument, asserted in an effort to whitewash
externality, were the alleged fraudulent elections of 1957, the devia-
tionist foreign policy of the Sham'ūn regime, and the issue of
presidential succession--all highly endemic matters.

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[1] An examination of Mideast Mirror for May and June 1958 seems
to corroborate such a conclusion. Also, it has not been revealed
whether President Nāṣir authorized limited intervention in Lebanon or
whether he allowed some perhaps more emotional Syrian elements to
take the initiative. Lenczowski, Op. cit., p. 339.

For a student of the 1958 crisis, the Government's allegations that U. A. R. intervened to help the rebels are soberly balanced by the realization that--as in the Spanish Civil War--Loyalist forces were receiving a great deal of outside help. The Opposition, for example, could well question how it was that one of the principal fighting bulwarks of the Loyalist side was a former Syrian political party which had no license to operate in Lebanon--the P. P. S.[1] Furthermore, arms were being shipped, with the approval of the Government, to the Shamunists from Turkey, Iraq, and the United States.[2] Interference in the elections of 1957 on the parts of outsiders supporting Sham'ūn has been referred to as has possible active support for Sham'ūn in Lebanon by foreign intelligence agencies throughout his tenure. Also, various conversations with individuals present in 1958 have led this student to believe that Iraqi irregular forces and possibly aircraft were used by the Loyalist side. There was no question of firm Iraqi support for the P. P. S. ; funds and arms had been channeled to the latter group since 1955.[3] Opposition sopokesmen could point to the fact that the Government was actually arming civilian groups loyal to it.

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[1]
    One of Sham'ūn's last acts in office, on September 18, 1958, was to grant the P. P. S. a license to operate in Lebanon. Qubain, Op. cit., p. 134.

[2]
    The following telegrams from military intelligence in Baghdad to the Iraqi Military Attache in Beirut reveal the type of help being rendered the Loyalists by the Arab Federal State: No. 322, dated April 17, 1958; No. 327, dated April 20, 1958; No. 367, dated April 5, 1958; No. 393, dated August 5, 1958. See Iraq, Trials, II, Op. cit., pp. 490-93; 520-21.

[3]
    Qubain, Op. cit., p. 135.

One is naturally led to wonder at the implications of the Army's non-participation. On the face of it, General Shihāb's reluctance to enter the fray appears to argue for the basic internal nature of the conflict; one would suppose that had Lebanon been genuinely attacked from the outside, that the army would have taken counteraction. The somewhat weak argugments advanced by Shihāb for limitation of the army's role to something of a holding operation have suggested to some observers that the Commander-in-Chief was anxious to secure the Presidency for himself and thus wanted to keep in the good graces of the Opposition.[1] This argument itself, coupled with the fact that Shihāb was not relieved of his command by Sham'ūn, further highlight the internal roots of the crisis.

One wonders what effect would have been sustained by the Shamunist apologetics of indirect aggression if the Opposition were able to substantiate that allies of the Sham'ūn regime were carrying out "indirect aggression" against Lebanon. By 1958 the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had established a series of clandestine radio stations in the Middle East, and just outside the Middle East, to counteract the effects of Cairo's "Voice of the Arabs."[2] Even if one assumed that such broadcasts,

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[1] Kamāl Salībī, "The Lebanese Crisis in Perspective," World Today, XIV (September, 1958), p. 379.

[2] Wise and Ross, The Invisible Government, Op. cit., pp. 316-17. Eisenhower indirectly admitted in a speech before the U.N. General Assembly on August 13, 1958, that the U.S. had been conducting clandestine radio operations in the Middle East. Ibid., p. 315.

in countering Cairo's "propaganda," urged support for "loyalist" or
constitutional regimes in Lebanon and other Arab states important to
the West, it could well be asked, nonetheless, whether such broadcasts
did not intrinsically constitute indirect interference in the internal
affairs of these countries?

The work of neutral or third parties to settle the crisis further
suggest the internality of the crisis: the so-called Third Force led by
Henri Pharaon, seeking to end the insurrection by installing a less
controversial president in office, did not appear to emphasize foreign
or external matters in their approach to the chief elements of the
problem; rather, the Third Force traced the difficulties to the elections
of 1957 and the debate over the question of presidential succession.[1]

Shifts in loyalties being instructive, it is noteworthy that the
Speaker of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, 'Adil 'Usayrān, who had
started out the period of the crisis as a Sham'ūn supporter and had
subsequently stayed neutral, was against the way in which the Lebanese
President had in effect circumvented the Chamber of Deputies in
requesting an American intervention 'Usayrān opposed.[2] This shift

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[1]
Meo, Op. cit., pp. 172-4.

[2]
For the text of a letter from 'Usayrān to Eisenhower, in which the
Speaker indicated that 30/66 members of Parliament opposed interven-
tion, see Mideast Mirror, July 20, 1958, p. 17.

may be interpreted best, perhaps, as a commentary on the workings of the Lebanese Government in the crisis, and hardly as an indictment of the U. A. R.

An examination of the reports of the UNOGIL team in Lebanon to the U. N. Secretary-General suggests that--at least after mid-June when the force arrived in Lebanon--"massive" U. A. R. intervention could not be substantiated.[1] In the face of an angry reaction from the Lebanese Government, which believed the methods and capability of the force to be inadequate for the job at hand, UNOGIL reported that it had been unable to detect the presence of "persons who have indubitably entered from across the border for the purpose of fighting."[2] Also interesting was the Group's remark that little evidence could be found of much coordination or centralized military planning in the Opposition ranks.

It must be added that, in fact, the UNOGIL group was handicapped in some ways, and this would reflect on the Group's virtual absolving of large-scale outside elements. The team did not have complete access to certain, especially Opposition-held, areas. In addition, it was not until after the election of the new President, on July 31, that the U. N. Group was sufficiently established with equipment and channels of

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[1] See p. 185, note 2 for a listing of UNOGIL reports.

[2] Second Report of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon, July 30, 1958. U. N. Doc. S/4069.

operation to be fully effective.[1] President Eisenhower rightly commented, too, that the UNOGIL could hardly eliminate what arms and equipment might already have been transported into Lebanon by mid-June.

There is little evidence to substantiate the charge of "massive intervention." Washington was increasingly inclined to discount the "massive" description of the interference, while, on the basis of intelligence reports and information supplied by independent foreign observers, not abandoning its belief in some degree of infiltration from outside.[2] The U.S. Ambassador in Lebanon himself admitted that outside aid largely took a financial form, though he was aware that considerable amounts of small arms had also been brought into the country.[3] The Opposition used hardly any artillery. If intervention was "massive" as charged--implying large-scale arms deliveries, organized and sizeable infiltration of trained men, and overall logistical coordination--and given the relative passivity of the army, one wonders that Lebanon did not quickly succumb to the Opposition.

Judging from the above evidence, from the fact of a basic loyalty on the parts of Opposition leaders to Lebanon and the National Pact,

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[1] Qubain, Op. cit., p.150. But it could also be noted that the Lebanese Government often thwarted the UNOGIL, forbidding them on occasion to interrogate alleged infiltrators imprisoned in Lebanese jails. See the Second Report of the United Nations Observation Team in Lebanon, July 30, 1958, Op. cit., Doc. S/4069, par. 12ff.

[2] Meo, Op. cit., p. 196.

[3] Robert McClintock, "The American Landing in Lebanon," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXXVIII, No. 10 (October 1962), p. 66.

and from an assessment of 'Abd al-Nāṣir's position, it seems highly improbable that the main objective of the Opposition was to institute a "Nasserist" Government in Lebanon. If infiltration was substantiated to a degree, one is still left with the problem of isolating just who in the U. A. R. was supporting the infiltration. And is one to put the burden of blame for the revolt more on inconsistent forces of support in the U. A. R. than on an Opposition in Lebanon that actively sought outside aid?

If Sham'ūn is not to be severely scored for merely seeking to perpetuate his regime or his "system" in Lebanon, by requesting outside intervention, then it must be asked why did the Lebanese President not accept the compromise resolution sponsored by Libya, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen on June 6.[1] This resolution, which was even mildly supported by the U. A. R., would have allowed neutral Arab forces--mainly Libyans and Sudanese-- to enter Lebanon in order to end the infiltration alleged by Sham'ūn. It appears in the final analysis that the Opposition had many valid grievances of a domestic nature. Had Sham'un genuinely sought the elimination of these difficulties, then perhaps the Opposition, its vision "cleared", would have been in a better position to see the alleged reality of massive U. A. R. intervention.

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[1] U. N. Document S/PV 823, June 6, 1958, pp. 52-3.

In sum, it appears that the Lebanese crisis of 1957-1958 was largely an internal insurrection and that, all things considered, the external dimension was more adventitious than substantive in actually defining the real nature of the troubles.

Analysis of the U. S. Legal Position on Justification

Were it only a question of external aggression in Lebanon, the capacity of the de jure government in Lebanon to request aid by invitation, for collective self-defense, would probably have been unassailable from the standpoint of international law, other things being equal. The preceding section, however, has raised the point that the Lebanese crisis (1) had predominantly the character of an internal insurrection with relative external "characteristics"; and (2) that, on the basis of such things as the army's passive "holding" role and President Sham'ūn's repeated requests for help prior to July 14, the outcome of the internal revolt in Lebanon was by no means clear. As was pointed out, if the latter were true, the competence of the Lebanese Government to request outside aid would be questionable legally. Were the U. A. R. 's conduct proven delictual in the matter of aggression against Lebanon, a vast amount of precedent, legislation, and opinion would have supported the case of whomever intervened, on Lebanon's invitation, in

support of the latter country.[1] If armed aggression would be difficult

to prove against the U. A. R., what about indirect aggression?

While intervention by use or threat of force apart from self-defense

is illegal under the U. N. Charter--and this of course applies equally to

the U. S. intervention as to the alleged interference of the U. A. R. --

clearly intervention by indirect or subversive means represents an area

open to some speculation. Normally it is held as the duty of states to

suppress activities of private persons or agencies within its territory

from damaging the political independence of a friendly state, if such

activities involved armed expeditions. But the Anglo-American legal

view would tend to deny any such duty where the activities do not

specifically involve armed hostility.[2]

Regarding the question of spreading propaganda, some legal

authorities have felt that there is not sufficient opinion and practice to

support a customary duty of states not to spread propaganda in a non-

belligerent country hostile to the latter's government.[3]

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[1]
    Article 5 of the Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of
States is clear: "No state has the right to interfere in the internal or
external affairs of another state." U. N. Document A/CN. 4/2,
December 15, 1948. The I. C. J. stated its opinion that, "Respect for
territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international
relations." I. C. J. Reports, 1949, p. 35.

[2]
    See Lauterpacht, "Revolutionary Activities by Private Persons
against Foreign States," American Journal of International Law, vol. 22
(1928), p. 126. Also, Oppenheim, International Law, 8th edition, vol. I,
pp. 292-3.

[3]
    Julius Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict (London:
Stevens and Sons, 1959), p. 319. The matter of propaganda, a relative
newcomer to international legal consideration, is still lacking in defini-
tion and certainty. One very relevant area of questioning is whether
the truth can be considered propaganda.

Furthermore, in determining when such normal freedoms of speech, press, trade, and travel may be considered to be seditious, the general consensus has been that only when such actions were likely to achieve an illegal objective should they be prohibited by law. Thus it has been the practice to exercise military action in collective or individual self-defense only in the event of "armed attack."[1] Without the presence of an armed attack, then, it seems that a state may resort only to non-military means of combatting internal "sedition."[2] But a state responding to a non-military request for collective self-defense in the face of "non-armed" sedition still must ask itself whether the difficulties of the requesting government are the product of domestic revolt or external subversion. The competence of the Lebanese Government, under circumstances where domestic grievances prevailed to a large extent in the crisis of 1958, would have been, therefore, questionable in a request even for "peaceful" aid in solving its problems of subversion.

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[1]
    Quincy Wright, "United States Intervention," Op. cit., p. 124.
Wright adds, "Clearly if states were permitted to seek remedy for such imperfectly defined offenses by military self-help, in view of the prevalence of hostile propaganda in the present world situation, the barriers against war erected by the Charter would be largely eliminated."
Ibid.

[2]
    Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 269, 797 (1951).

It has been established that an American justification based on intervention by invitation was severely weakened by the questionable competence of the Government of Lebanon to make such a request when the results of an internal rebellion were uncertain. It remains to be seen what place individual or collective self-defense have to play in the U. S. justification.

The legal requirements for self-defense must be emphasized. D. W. Bowett has noted that,

> The purpose of self-defense is to protect certain essential legal rights; its aim is preventive and non-retributive, and, it is this characteristic which distinguishes self-defense from reprisals.[1]

Lebanon's invoking collective or individual self-defense in order to meet the threat allegedly posed by the United Arab Republic should have been conditional on the existence of these traditional conditions: (1) the reality of the threat to the essential rights of the state; (2) the immediacy of the danger; and (3) lack of other means of protection. Again, in view of the opinions of both the U. S. and the U. N. as to the negligible extent of infiltration, it would appear that these conditions were not completely fulfilled.

Furthermore, a delict is necessary to make the concept of self-defense operative. As more or less of a "liberty," justifying conduct

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[1]

D. W. Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law (New York: Praeger, 1958), p. 20.

otherwise illegal, self-defense can only be exercised in the event of an illegal action against certain established rights. The rights commonly agreed upon as being pertinent to the exercise of self-defense are these: (1) the right of territorial integrity; (2) the right of political independence; and (3) the right of protection of nationals.[1] Hans Kelsen emphasizes that an infringement of these rights must be through a specific violation of the law accompanied by "the illegal use of force" "--and not other violations of the law--in order to permit the invocation of self-defense.[2]

The United States siezed upon the right of protection of nationals to explain in part the use of the principle of individual self-defense in the Lebanese crisis. This involves a liberal interpretation of the word "self," as it is found in its context of "self-defense" in Article 51, to apply not only to national territory, but to agencies and citizens in foreign countries.[3] The U. S. has a long history of what is known as "interposition"--a concept of some conjecture in international law-- in order to "defend" its citizens living abroad. If the right of inter- position, or individual self-defense in favor of nationals abroad, is taken as legal--and Article 2, paragraph 4 of the U. N. Charter seems

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[1] Ibid., p. 29.

[2] Hans Kelsen, American Journal of International Law, vol. 42 (1948), p. 784.

[3] Wright, "U. S. Intervention," Op. cit., p. 117.

to consider it illegal--then, the threat to American agencies or citizens must be shown to be immediate.[1] Such could not be said to have been the case in Lebanon, for not only were there no reported American non-military deaths, but it appears that the Opposition forces were especially scrupulous in avoiding any such eventuality.

Since Article 51 refers to collective as well as individual self-defense--and clearly the U.S. sought to make a case on the basis of the collective principle--the subject bears examination. Several difficulties immediately make themselves felt: first, a traditionally strict interpretation of Article 51's reference to "armed attack," and an equally strict view of the legal character of indirect aggression are in counter-distinction to Secretary Dulles' "expedient" view of Article 51 (described above) and the U.S. view that the latter Article clearly covered indirect aggression.[2] In addition the concept of collective self-defense raises issues in common with intervention by invitation: the competency of the requesting government to call for assistance is of cardinal importance.[3] Barring a clear case of external aggression against a de jure government whose competence

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[1] Ibid., p. 118. The situation in Lebanon might have had analogies to the British action in Suez (1956). While the British claimed to have acted in self-defense, it was unlikely that such a claim would be supported legally if the Canal could not be shown to have been in immediate danger. Bowett, Op. cit., pp. 14-15.

[2] For a strict reading of Article 51, see Hans Kelsen's Law of the United Nations (1951), p. 269.

[3] If the presence of the conditions necessary for operation of collective security pacts were to be judged by the assisting power rather than the competent government requesting aid, "the way would be open to unlimited aggression." Wright, "U.S. Intervention," Op. cit., p. 118.

would be presumed; in the case of aggression during circumstances of severe internal uprising, that government's capacity to request aid would again have to be measured in terms of the uncertainty of the outcome in the insurrection. Thus the very basis for collective self-defense--the request of a competent government for assistance--is challenged again by the peculiar position of the Sham'ūn Government within Lebanon.

The United States would have encountered legal obstacles to the justification of its action by either the Eisenhower Doctrine or by U. S. unilateral declarations which indicated that the independence of Lebanon was "vital" to the American "national interest." Quincy Wright points out that such unilateral declarations of foreign policy do not legally make up a part of the "self" of the state, and only justify intervention "insofar as they are declaratory of the justifications recognized by international law."[1]

Thus, in the U.S. position of answering a call for help from a legal government to assist the latter, on the basis of the rights of both individual and collective self-defense as authorized by the U. N. Charter, there are numerous flaws. Assuming that certain relevant legal concepts were still vague or ill-defined, as pointed out above, the United States would have had to show some of the following items to

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[1] Wright, "U.S. Intervention," Op. cit., p. 117.

have been the case in order to present a better than patchy legal
argument for justification: (1) American citizens should have been
clearly endangered; (2) the Lebanese Government should have been
clearly competent to make a request for aid, meaning that the outcome
of the troubles in Lebanon were not uncertain; (3) external stimulii to
the troubles in Lebanon should have been clearly proven to have been
the operative elements in creating the crisis, thus justifying charges
of indirect aggression; (4) the threat of armed attack, which most legal
opinion still supports as the only legal grounds for intervention, should
have been established. It would have been difficult to establish these
points.

Prime Minister Eden of Great Britain bolstered the view that
unshakeable cases could probably not be made for any of the aspects
of the U.S. justification by noting that the Anglo-American interventions
in Lebanon and Jordan of July 1958 were

> unquestionably against the terms of the Charter as interpreted
> at the time of our intervention at Port Said. Since the United
> Nations observers were already on the spot and proclaiming
> that the motives for Anglo-American intervention did not exist,
> it was rather more heinous. [1]

As was suggested, it hardly does to construct the legal case for
or against U.S. intervention in Lebanon without realizing that political

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[1] Anthony Eden, Full Circle, Op. cit., p. 647.

practice not only is judged in the light of international law but that it

does much to create international law. If one is to say that the U.S.'

mode of operation in Lebanon was illegal, it was at least not alegal.

The substance of the decisions taken for action is, of course, to be

found in American strategic interests, as the section on Iraq describes.

It was not, specifically speaking, legal thinking that caused official

Washington to realize that the consequences of not intervening at that

time were "likely to be more harmful to their strategic political and

economic interests than the consequences of intervening."[1] The decision

to act had its roots in years of both legal and policy relations between

the U.S. and the Middle East, such that the decision could not, by

virtue of its background, be called specifically either a political or

a "legal" action.

Critics of the decision have remarked a stale kind of "morality"

on the part of the U.S., which sought to disguise in clichés--about

democratically-elected regimes threatened from outside--basic Great

Power political motivations.[2] And in this light, the very configurations of

international legal practice, to which the American action either conforms

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[1]
Economist, vol. 188, (19 July, 1958), p. 183.

[2]
Manfred Halpern, The Morality and Politics of Intervention
(New York: Council on Religion and International Affairs, 1963), p. 11.

or fails to conform in different respects, reveal by their juxtaposition with the political aspects, the way in which political processes and the stabilizing force of law run on parallel and simultaneous if not always congruent courses.

CHAPTER VI

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE AMERICAN

INTERVENTION

American public opinion was quick to note some paradoxes in Washington's attempt at "stabilizing" the Middle East and in the justifications brought forward for the use of "Marine diplomacy." It was reasonable to ask how a stabilizing function could be attributed to the U. S. forces in Lebanon when some of the following were realities: first, world opinion--especially in the "Third World," and with the not surprising exceptions of countries like Turkey and Sudan--was clearly negative on the American landings.[1] Second, there would be reason to believe that significant elements in both Iraq and Lebanon would be greatly agitated, rather than relieved, at the American presence; and of course the reception given the U. S. troops in Lebanon itself, while not hostile, was certainly not favorable on the whole.

While the huge deficiencies in American logistical efficiency and capability in the operation were not realized until postmortem examinations some time later, it was at least certainly clear initially that the U. S. had extended a limited-war operation--still relatively a fledgling

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[1] Time Magazine, July 28, 1958, p. 26; Economist, October 25, 1958, pp. 301-2.

military procedure--over 7,000 miles from home to a point less than 1,000 miles from Soviet Russia. These facts seemed to indicate that stability was hardly what the U.S. was prompting in the area or in the world.

U.S. editorial opinion in newspapers such as the Los Angeles Times, the Saint Louis Post-Dispatch, and the San Francisco Chronicle revolved around different aspects of what all considered to be a basic U.S. failure in the Lebanese intervention: it was repeatedly suggested that in justifying a flagrant abuse of world law by vague resorts to clichés, the United States was merely covering the reality that Russia's 1956 action in Hungary had scarcely been different.[1] But from the viewpoint of those quarters of American public opinion that believed in or hoped for a stabilizing outcome of the U.S. action, now that the "fat was in the fire" for better or worse, it remains to examine the results of U.S. intervention to see whether such a hope achieved any realization and what lessons were learned in the process. The following analysis will be confined to the immediate outcomes of post-July 14 events in Lebanon and Iraq especially; in the United Nations and the Cold War "Arena;" and in Washington, where some account must be taken, in conclusion, of the effect and implications of the intervention on the whole of the American policy making machine.

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[1]

"Summary of editorial opinion in U.S. newspapers;" Time Magazine, July 28, 1958, p. 14.

The Situation in Iraq

Following upon what Washington considered a disaster in Iraq,
it has been suggested that the possibility existed in the minds of U.S.
policy planners of going so far as to move militarily on Iraq. That the
U.S. should have entertained such a potentially dangerous contingency
plan can only have been based on the following fears: (1) that Qassim's
new government would covertly or forcibly further spread Cairo's brand
of Arab nationalism in the Middle East; (2) that Leftist elements in the
new regime would facilitate Soviet expansion in the area; (3) that Western
financial interests in the area would be undermined.[1]

Presumably, two main variables would have influenced the U.S.'
taking some type of direct action towards Iraq: the extent to which the
new regime should fall in line with Nāsir's ambitions and the degree to
which internal anti-Qassim elements would rally within Iraq to oppose
the new regime.[2] It would be the rather negligible dimensions of these
variables that would cause Washington to take a more passive--if not

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[1]
President Eisenhower indicated immediately after the coup,
when the intentions of the new regime were still unknown, that Iraq
might be tempted to take military action against Jordan or Kuwait and
might precipitate or take advantage of a coup in Saudi Arabia. Eisenhower,
Op. cit., p. 277.

[2]
It is worthy of note that Turkey itself, several days after the
Iraqi coup, was expressing to Washington its desire to move on Iraq.
Such action would have been applauded by Saudi Arabia's Sa'ūd,
although not by Prince Feisal. Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 277.

somewhat positive--stance towards the new regime. A number of
contradictory internal forces, whose seeds were latent and nearly un-
discernable at first, worked together to render Washington's initial
fears increasingly less as time passed.

Earliest reports to the U.S. capital indicated that in the new Iraqi
leadership there were to be found not only a sizeable number of Rightist,
pro-Arab unity, former Istiqlāl members, but also a number of Com-
munists. The U.S. CIA urged caution in trusting Qassim, since the
latter had several avowed Communists among his immediate advisors.[1]
In the early demonstrations, the U.S. Ambassador reported that pro-
Nāṣir, largely Ba'athist agitators freely mixed with the Communist
street leaders.[2] Washington also noted that one of Qassim's top right
hand men, Muḥammad Maḥdi Kubah, had been much behind the pro-Nazi
coup of 1941 and was considered fanatically anti-Western.

By perhaps July 18, it had become apparent to Washington that,
with little evidence of internal resistance to Qassim, there was nothing
to invoke logically as a pretext for "saving" Iraq. In consequence, the
Western presence in Jordan and Lebanon became more of a holding

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[1]

Perhaps the most prominent Communists were Lūtfī Ṭaher
(Government Censor); Salīm Fakhry (head of the radio and T.V. stations);
and Fadhil Maḥdawi (President of the "People's Court"). Tulley,
CIA The Inside Story, Op. cit., p. 79. For Washington's immediate
impressions see New York Times, July 15, 1958, p. 4.

[2]

Gallman, Op. cit., p. 206.

operation. Beginning from this early point, it appears that the U.S. sought, for several reasons, to woo rather than continue to oppose the Qassim government.

The vague Arab nationalist-Communist atmosphere that seemed at first to Washington to have characterized the coup began to burn off with the advent of some new realities. First it became apparent that while some unionist tendencies were present among the controlling Iraqi officers--notably in strongly pro-U. A. R. Col. 'Abdul Salām 'Arif-- a strong nationalist feeling also colored the constituent elements of the new regime.[1] Also, even if somewhat out of expedience, Qassim made every effort to assure the West of his good intentions regarding oil agreements and other contracts. By July 20, the Iraq Petroleum Company and the Iraq government had come to reassuring conclusions about existing petroleum operations.[2] In addition 300 foreign experts and technicians working with the Development Board would be asked to

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[1]

U.S. intelligence reports indicated that the following important officers could probably be considered more pro-Iraqi than anything else: Gen. Najīb al-Raba'ī, Col. Nāji Ṭālib, Col. Khālid Nagshāband, and Gen. Ahmad Sālih al-'Abdī; as well as Qassim himself. U. S. News and World Report, July 25, 1958, p. 33. It is doubtful, also, whether many Iraqi military officers were anxious to lose positions and prestige by being incorporated into a larger state dominated by Cairo; Lenczowski, Op. cit., p. 300.

[2]

David Hirst, Oil and Public Opinion in the Middle East (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1966), p. 79. The Iraqi government did state that it wished to modify the existing 50-50 agreement; but Nūrī Sa'īd had wanted to do the same.

remain to work out a new development policy.

Within ten days of the coup, it seemed that the Iraqi army was administering the country efficiently and with courtesy to Western elements or institutions that had suffered insults and abuse during the revolt itself. Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy, fresh from fruitful mediation in the Lebanese crisis, reported back to Washington on meetings in the first days of August with General Qassim, stating that the new regime was highly nationalistic and was fully aware of the Soviet "danger;" Qassim had indicated his unwillingness to sacrifice any of Iraq's newly won autonomy to either Cairo or Moscow.[1] The end result of growing reassurances, Washington's decision to live with Iraq, and the latter country's strong desire for recognition by the U.S.; was the extension of American diplomatic recognition with "good wishes" on July 30, 1958. So interested did Eisenhower seem in cultivating Qassim that he stated he thought early (August) withdrawal of U.S. forces from Lebanon would have an important effect in reassuring the Iraqi leader about American intentions.[2]

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[1] Robert Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, Op. cit., p. 504. Also, R.D. Stebbins, The U.S. in World Affairs, Op. cit., p. 209. (One notes in Murphy's visit to Iraq elements of the "troubleshooter" problem alluded to in Chapter IV. Ambassador Gallman, closely in touch with personalities in Iraq, was not enthusiastic about Murphy's visit to Baghdad. In the record of Murphy's conversations with Qassim, one sometimes detects a patronizing and insensitive approach: Murphy asked Qassim to "figure out one good reason why Eisenhower would want to send American troops to invade the God forsaken stretches of Iraq.") Murphy, Op. cit., pp. 501-503.

[2] Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 286. Questions about continuation of U.S. military and technical aid agreements and compensations to the families of the three Americans killed by mob action on July 14 were still pending. Gallman, Op. cit., p. 210.

In time, the latent internal contradictions existing especially in Qassim's simultaneous reliance on Communists and Arab Nationalist elements in Iraq turned into open conflicts which, in the end analysis, could only reassure the U.S. that its original fears on July 14 had perhaps been excessive. But there were no illusions in Washington, as the Communists and Arab Nationalists in Iraq increasingly came to loggerheads, that Gen. Qassim was walking a narrow, dangerous tightrope. By September, the Arab nationalism that had caused such panic in Washington two months earlier, was plainly suffering severe setbacks at the hands of Communist elements in Iraq.[1] 'Abd al-Salām 'Arif, Brigadier Qassim's chief lieutenant, who had long been outspokenly pro-Egyptian, was relieved of his duties as Deputy Prime Minister on September 30.

While Qassim had avoided even publically denouncing the landing of the Marines in Lebanon in order to keep on salutory terms with the West, 'Arif was hardly cordial in his dealing with the Western press. What was more, 'Arif's strong advocacy of merger with the U.A.R. had played into the hands of the Communists; the latter group was finding support among Sh'ite and Kurdish groups who were scarcely anxious

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[1] Stebbins, Op. cit., p. 222; Barraclough, Op. cit., p. 397.

to be absorbed into a United Arab Republic.[1] In 'Arif's arrest, and

simultaneous activities of an extreme Left that was rapidly emerging as

Iraq's defense against alleged Egyptian designs and dictatorship, one

could see the emergence in the Iraqi leader of a definite challenge to

Nasserite influence in the Middle East.[2] By late 1958, Qassim and

Nāṣir were mutually reviling one another: Nāṣir, increasingly antipa-

thetical to Communism, not only in Iraq but in the U.A.R., blamed

Qassim for betraying the Arab cause; Qassim accused Nāṣir of inter-

ference in the internal affairs of Iraq.[3]

The Communists had not merely caused Nāṣir's photos in public

to be replaced by those of Qassim. The fact was that by the proper

marshalling of dissident elements in the north and south of Iraq, the

extreme Leftists could virtually threaten Iraq with paralysis. This

fact, no less than the alternative of an Arab-nationalist or Nasserist

framework, eroded Washington's position in the country in 1958 into a

nervous hope that Iraq could stay neutral and not fall wholly into the

Communist camp.[4]

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[1]
    Kirk, Contemporary Arab Politics, Op. cit., p. 145.

[2]
    Along with 'Arif, a number of Ba'athi army officers as well as
Rashid 'Ali al-Gilāni were arrested and accused of plotting a pro-
Egyptian coup.

[3]
    J.C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East, Op. cit., p. 150.

[4]
    Stebbins, Op. cit., p. 228. Nāṣir's changing view of Communism
was certainly somewhat reassuring to Washington. Nonetheless the
Communist vitality and underground capability, vis à vis Arab nationalist
abilities, were alarming. See Kirk, Op. cit., p. 147.

The United States was somewhat heartened by events in 1959 that reduced the influence of Communist groups and increased nationalist influence. For in 1959, General Qassim to some extent realized that the Communists' power was endangering his own survival and started to curtail activities of Communist organizations. Washington was further encouraged by the fact that the Communist movement in Iraq was split between a revolutionary, pro-Soviet faction--itself divided internally--and a grouping more loyal to Iraqi nationalism.[1] Moscow was apparently trying to repair the breach, urging a unified Communist alliance with Qassim instead of the changeable, often highly critical stand Communist groups were taking towards the Iraqi leader.[2]

Washington, at least content that its worst fears for Iraq in 1958 had not materialized, and hoping for further stabilization, plunged into the details of salvaging what remained of the Baghdad Pact. At a Pact meeting in late July held in London, Secretary Dulles spelled out terms for new Northern Tier arrangements. Washington was willing to strengthen the remaining members of the Pact by negotiating bilateral agreements that would merely restate in a new context the commitments the U. S. had already made through the Mutual Security legislation and

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[1]

Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle and North Africa (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 169.

[2]

Campbell, Op. cit., pp. 149-152.

the Eisenhower Doctrine.[1] While the loss of Iraq to the Pact was of

great proportions, there is evidence that the new bilateral arrangements

concluded in 1959 may have increased what Soviet Russia believed to

be the threat to its security.[2]

All in all, if American leverage and influence in the Arab world

through the old Pact of Nūrī's day had been reduced substantially, there

was nonetheless cause for Washington to hope that its containment

requirements would not suffer appreciably and that Iraq might evolve out

of internal excesses into an independent and responsible nation with

which the United States Government could cooperate more fully.

Solution to the Crisis in Lebanon

Setting the State for Elections

Restraint characterized the post-landing U.S. "holding" operation

in Lebanon, especially in view of the fact that by about July 18 no

American action outside of Lebanon was seriously planned. A major

clash had been avoided through the tense discussions between General

Shihab, the American Ambassador, and U.S. military personnel on the

road to Beirut. Many rebel leaders, vehemently protested the U.S.

intervention, including Sa'ib Salām, who regarded the American

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[1]

Stebbins, Op. cit., p. 209. For the nature of these agreements, see Department of State Bulletin, vol. 40 (March 23, 1959), pp. 416-18.

[2]

Barraclough, Op. cit., p. 398.

military operation as an act of aggression against Lebanon and urged the rebels to resist.[1] Even the normally pro-Western journal L'Orient was fearful of the possible effects of the American intervention in Lebanese internal affairs. And the least radical of the opponents of Sham'ūn could not but feel a simple resentment at the picture of the U.S. Ambassador's Cadillac leading the armored column into the center of Beirut.

With such resentment and opposition, added to the fact that an often unidentifiable, armed, rebel force, operating out of various motivations, was at large, everything pointed to there being a clash. That there were, in fact, no armed encounters between Lebanese and American forces may be explained, first, simply by the overwhelming fact that the U.S. "garrison" by July 25 numbered 10,600 men and thus constituted a force larger than the entire Lebanese army.[2] More important was the belief, which came increasingly to prevail in Lebanon, that U.S. forces had not landed simply to quash the Opposition cause out of support for Sham'ūn.[3] In preparing the way for an election that

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[1]
Philip N. Pierce, "Show of Force: Lebanon," Leatherneck, XLV, No. 9 (September 1962), p. 36; Agwani, Op. cit., pp. 293-4.

[2]
Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, Op. cit., p. 486. There were three deaths among U.S. forces. Two were accidental shootings by fellow soldiers; the third was by a rebel bullet. Peak U.S. strength was 14,357 men on August 8. Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 286.

[3]
In this respect, American forces tried to be scrupulous in according Sham'ūn personally lower military "priorities" than those concerned with securing order in the country. Marine Corps Historical Branch, Marines in Lebanon 1958, Op. cit., p. 32.

would presumably resolve the crisis, Deputy Under Secretary of State

(and political advisor to CinCSPECOMME) Robert Murphy sought, on

the scene, to convince skeptical elements opposed to the U.S. action

that the United States had moved into Lebanon for the preservation of

Lebanese sovereignty and an end to the crisis.

Significantly, Murphy realized that his task could best be realized

by addressing himself to key personalities. Admiral Holloway and

Murphy had initially agreed that a great deal of the Lebanese internal

conflict could be seen in terms of personalities; the two likewise agreed

that international issues and "Communism" had very little relation to

the crisis.[1] Pursuant to this, Murphy contacted rebel leaders Junblāt,

Karāmī, and Salām, taking a hard line against their contemplating any

counteraction against U.S. forces; but alternatively taking pains to

convince them that the U.S. wanted no more than early elections for a

new president, as end to the hostilities, and the "stabilization" of a

sovereign Lebanon.[2]

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[1]

Ibid., p. 33; also Murphy, Op. cit., p. 404.

[2]

Murphy, Op. cit., pp. 491-494; also Marine Corps Historical
Branch, Op. cit., p. 33. Murphy's meeting with Junblāt convinced
the U.S. mediator that a political error had been made in ousting
Junblāt in the 1957 elections. Murphy continued, "and this was of a
piece with various bits of other information I had picked up to the effect
that Chamoun was trying to stay in office at the expense of his friends
as well as his rivals. "Murphy, Op. cit., p. 494.

With some reassurances to rebel leaders, and slight but con-
sistent cooperation between the Lebanese Army and the American
forces as well as a yielding attitude on the part of Sham'ūn in favor of
General Shihāb's candidacy for the presidency, the main elements were
in place for the finalizing of some sort of compromise settlement.
Sham'ūn supporters, soberly aware that, had outside help not been
forthcoming, their cause might have been ultimately hopeless, were
themselves in a frame of mind more inclined to give ground to the
Opposition.

Murphy's suggestion--one that had been offered earlier by Raymond
Eddeh and rejected by the Opposition--was that the Chamber of Deputies
should meet in order to elect a president to replace Sham'ūn on the
expiration of the latter's term in September.[1] Murphy met with a
number of possible candidates for the office, who included among
others Bishāra al-Khouri and Raymond Eddeh, and Fu'ād Shihāb.
Meanwhile the future choice of General Shihāb for president was
increasingly assured from various quarters: first, Opposition parties
and factions, after discussing Shihāb's program with him, agreed to
nominate him.[2] Second was the matter of Sham'ūn's withdrawing his

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[1]
Murphy, Op. cit., pp. 490-96.

[2]
Barraclough, Op. cit., p. 377.

personal support from Eddeh's candidacy. Sham'ūn still controlled a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, and clearly this implied that Raymond Eddeh, the President's own choice as a successor, would more than likely be elected. But the Opposition, aware that Loyalists even controlling the Parliament could not hope to control Lebanon without Opposition cooperation, indicated that they would not take part in the election unless they were assured that General Shihāb would be elected.[1] This position led to an important counterstep by Sham'ūn, who indicated to Murphy that he would back Shihāb, thereby withdrawing his support for Eddeh.[2] Murphy considered this a significant turning point, and Sham'ūn's decision in favor of Shihāb cannot have been without considerable American pressure in that direction. On July 31, 56 out of 66 deputies convened to elect General Shihāb President elect on the second ballot.

The question of whether Shihāb exploited the American presence to further any aspirations he may have entertained for the presidency is a moot point. It could be argued that the nature of the General's role in the insurrection, added to his defiant "stand" in the face of freshly landed American troops, put him in a position to be somehow "incorporated" into whatever arrangements should be made to resolve the

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[1]

al-Nahār, July 28, 1958.

[2]

Murphy, Op. cit., pp. 495-6.

crisis. Robert Murphy was convinced that Shihāb did not actively seek
the presidency.[1] Yet, on the other hand, one could also note that once
the landings were a fact, Shihāb seemed much less anxious for U.S.
troops--whose very presence constituted a political factor--to leave
than he had been at first.

Murphy, who absented himself from Lebanon during election time
in order to anticipate charges of American interference, made a visit
to Nāṣir to explain the U.S. position on the intervention to the Egyptian
leader. The latter, at least partly convinced that U.S. military operations
would be confined to Lebanon, was apparently pleased with Shihāb's
replacement of Sham'ūn and indicated he would support the independence
of Lebanon now that the Sham'ūn regime was ended.[2]

One thing that seemed apparent during the period of mediation
and election was that the U.S. had not simply sought to install a puppet
regime that would parrot Sham'ūn's type of enthusiasm for the Eisenhower
Doctrine. Shihāb's election appeared acceptable to nearly all factions
in the crisis. And with the reemphasis of the National Pact that
characterized this time of resolution, it seemed logical and probable
that the new government would diminish any alignments with the West
that might be construed as excessive.[3] That the U.S. had promoted

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[1] Ibid., p. 496.

[2] Ibid., p. 499.

[3] Lenczowski, Op. cit., p. 341.

neutralism at the expense of a former pro-Washington stance in official Lebanon is probably best attested to by Sham'ūn and his supporters, who bitterly felt that the American mediation efforts had merely constituted concessions to Nāṣir and an invitation to a potentially dangerous neutralism.[1]

The election of Shihāb put a damper on the crisis and by and large Lebanese national life returned back to a nearly normal state. The rebels, however, would not allow Lebanese security forces into their areas until the new President was actually inaugurated on September 24. The formula unofficially adopted to characterize the return to normalcy was "ni vainqueur, ni vainqu," although for some time after the crisis former Opposition leaders irked others by referring to the achievements of the Lebanese "revolution."[2]

The last few weeks of the presence of American forces in Lebanon-- all U.S. troops had departed by October 25, 1958--were not without incident. The three weeks that followed Shihāb's installation were characterized by what has been called the "Christian counter-revolution." In this period, marked by religious overtones, strikes, extremism, and assassinations, former Sham'ūn factions opposed the new Cabinet set

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[1] Chamoun, Crise au Moyen Orient, Op. cit., pp. 430-1; also, Meo, Op. cit., p. 201.

[2] For an example of this "revolutionary" type of thinking, see the description of the counter-revolution in Karāmī, Nadia and Nawaf, Wāqi al-Thawrah al-Lubnaniyah, (Beirut, 1959), pp. 312-313.

up by former Opposition leader Rashid Karāmī.[1] U.S. troops did not

become involved in the fighting that existed at this time, especially

since the Lebanese Army made an excellent showing in ending the new

hostilities. But the United States Ambassador did play a role in the

counter-revolution. After several weeks of attempted mediation between

Pierre Jumayyil, the Kata'ib Party leader, and Prime Minister delegate

Karāmī, the Ambassador managed to bring these two pivitol personali-

ties together on October 10.[2] An important step followed when sub-

sequently, on October 14, Karāmī announced the formation of a four-man

Cabinet that could hardly be called a "rebel Cabinet," since it consisted

of two men from each side.[3] By late October, with the new, nearly

universally acceptable Government functioning, former Opposition

military units dissolving, and American troops having departed, there

appeared to be a genuine return to normalcy.

There could be no other conclusion from the nature of the resolu-

tion of the crisis in Lebanon than that the U.S. was going to find it

necessary to reevaluate its policy approach to that country. The final

abandoning of the Eisenhower Doctrine, mutually by the U.S. and

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[1] For details of the counter-revolution see Qubain, Op. cit., pp. 156-161.

[2] Kirk, Op. cit., p. 134.

[3] The new Cabinet consisted of Karāmī, Hūsayn 'Uwaynī, Pierre Jumayyil, and Raymond Eddeh.

Lebanon, took place on December 10, 1958, when the Lebanese Prime Minister made an official communication on the subject to Assistant Secretary of State William Rountree.[1] As a sign of friendship, the U.S. offered $10 million to help the economy to right itself; after this emergency grant period, American aid to Lebanon tapered off in the early 1960's to be supplanted by Kuwaiti loans.[2] Relations between the two countries promised to be friendly, with Washington too showing itself quite favorable to the Shihāb policy line.

It remains to be asked what were the implications and results of the termination of the crisis in the election of Shihāb in terms of the overall nature of Lebanese political life, especially since, as was suggested in Chapter II, the very internal structure of Lebanese politics had much to do with the evolution of the crisis to which the United States responded in 1958. Personal emnities, constitutional imperfections, and confessionalism hardly disappeared with the demise of Camille Sham'ūn. Divisiveness and discontinuities seemed liable to continue rather than to abate: for example, although numbers of Opposition leaders had been sufficiently affected by the crisis to realize they had an important stake in the preservation of an independent Lebanon, it appeared as if they would go on making use of "Nasserism" as a

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[1] Meo, Op. cit., p. 186.

[2] Christopher, Lebanon, Op. cit., p. 170.

political lever and tool for maintaining the support of their constituents.[1]

There were few reasons to hope that the electoral excesses, the conflicting loyalties, abuses of the Lebanese polity by "feudal" intermediaries that had characterized the 1958 crisis, did not have every chance of continuing. Editorial opinion on the Lebanese crisis often seems to reflect a retention in various "camps" of the same types of thinking that had causes initial polarities: when asked what was the most significant event of the crisis, Beirut al-Masa'--with clear Cairo leanings--asserted it was the "liberation" of Iraq.[2] Kesrouan Labaki of Le Soir--which was favorable to Sham'ūn's "protectionist," Christian views--indicated his belief that it had been the landings of the Marines that constituted the most important event of the crisis.[3]

On the other hand, one very important fruit of the crisis was to be found in whatever stimulus it gave the Lebanese people for critical thinking about Lebanon and its system of government. Ghassan Tuwaynī, owner-publisher of al-Nahār, suggested that the 1958 crisis had perhaps given birth to a more critical spirit in Lebanon which would not be content to talk merely in terms of popular or unpopular presidents, or

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[1]
Lenczowski, Op. cit., pp. 342-3.

[2]
"A Survey of Editorial Opinion in the Lebanese Crisis," Middle East Forum, vol. 33, (November-December 1958), pp. 14-15.

[3]
Ibid.

a static balanced confessionalism symbolized by the provisions of the National Pact.[1] Even during the crisis, Tuwaynī had indicated that the chief problem posed by the Lebanese crisis--that of "deciding the future of a country which we have made a state, but which we have not yet known how to make into a nation"--would present itself after the resolution of the crisis.[2]

Tuwaynī was not alone, after the crisis, in urging that a new, critical spirit provide a means for a revision of the entire system of Lebanese government in order that there be created a fundamental stability in the country. Kamāl Junblāṭ suggested after the insurrection that the spirit of "ni vainqueur ni vainqu," of confessionalism, and of the National Pact was largely signalized by a mediocrity that was not seeking anything positive for Lebanon. Junblāṭ, who went so far as to suggest that his fellow Opposition leaders in 1958--particularly Salām, Hamādeh, Yāfī, and As'ad--had not sought any fundamental changes in Lebanon but merely a rejuggling of the power structure, said that the crisis demonstrated a need not for a return to "balance" in Lebanon but for an initiation of a new era of progressive leadership.[3]

Michel Asmar, founder of the Cenacle Libanais, wrote that the

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[1]
Ibid.
[2]
Editorial in al-Nahār, June 10, 1958.
[3]
Kamāl Junblāṭ, Haqīqat al-Thawrah al-Lubnaniyya (Beirut: Dar al-Nashr al-'Arabiyah, 1959), p. 153.

1958 crisis had brought up the question of "the entire mentality of a people" and argued that no confessional balance or romantic notions of Lebanon as an arbiter or "crossroads" could be a substitute for what was really called for: an education of the national conscience to make Lebanon capable of accepting the complex responsibilities facing it.[1] Henri Pharaon of the "Third Force," looking back on the events of 1958, suggested that Lebanon must do some soul searching at home in order that another time the Lebanese political structure's weaknesses would not make it the case that only external intervention could accomplish what was better worked out at home.[2]

Another noted Lebanese thinker tried to describe how he thought recent events had affected the new generation--or future leaders--in Lebanon: there was a growing feeling on the part of some young thinkers that extreme confessionalism could only undermine Lebanese national life and that ideology should gradually replace sectarianism.[3] Further lessons of the crisis, according to Habachi, were the needs for (1) a social justice not based on patronage; (2) a state structure compounded

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[1]
Michel Asmar, Ba'd al-Miḥnah wa Qablha (Beirut: al-Nadwa al-Lubnāniyah, 1959), pp. 23-6.

[2]
Henri Pharaon, Au Service du Liban et de Son Unité, Op. cit., p. 32.

[3]
Rene Habachi, "Charte pour une Jeunesse Libanaise," Notre Civilisation au Tournant (Publication of the Cenacle Libanais), December 1958, pp. 43-61.

of reason, specialization, and method; and (3) an end to zu'ama'
leadership based on birthright and gratuitous prestige unearned by merit.

The termination of the 1958 crisis, if it stimulated thought in
some of the above matters, by no means ended all of these ills in
Lebanese society. Yet such seminal institutions as zu'ama' leadership,
for example, did not emerge completely unscathed from the insurrection
and its aftermath. The zu'ama', especially in the absence of army
participation in the conflict, had shown their great strength vis à vis
the government. But factors could also be seen that indicated some
weakening in the zu'ama' structure. First, doctrinaire and semi-
doctrinaire political parties had played some role in the crisis, besides
the more non-doctrinaire za'im-led "parties." In addition, the immediate
internal policies of President Shihāb sought to work against the zu'ama'
predominance by starting to impose bureaucratic, governmental rela-
tions between the government and the citizens in place of the za'im-
client-government pattern.[1]

The fact that for a number of Lebanese intellectuals the 1958
crisis represented not a watershed in political realities in their country
but a tremendous stimulus toward reevaluation and challenge leads to
the conclusion that perhaps the most significant lesson learned from

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[1] Leonard Binder, Politics in Lebanon (New York: John Wiley,
1966), pp. 99-101.

the solution of the crisis was more than the often repeated formula
that Lebanon's traditional character requires a complete balance among
its elements in order not to overturn. If it is soberly admitted that in
balance may lurk, at the least, mediocrity; and that cacaphony of
dialogue does not always imply anarchy or lack of unified aspiration,
then one may pose more meaningful questions about the significance of
Lebanon's 1958 experience. Rene Habachi suggests that, for a nation,
a "revolution" in its broadest sense--meaning more nearly evolution--
embraces smaller revolutions; the slow evolution of a state towards
self-realization is a process punctuated with small shocks that con-
stitute new needs pressing against a resistant state structure.[1] If
then revolution may be thought of in terms of a revolutionary attitude
of change, then indeed the revolt of 1958, in as much as it inspired
some significant new thinking, may be said to have had some revolu-
tionary aspects.

U. S. Intervention in a U. N. -Cold War Context

By July 15, 1958 the United States was in an awkward position
regarding its intervention in Lebanon. Eisenhower had earlier told
Lebanon's President Sham'ūn that America would find it difficult to

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[1] Habachi, "Charte," Op. cit., pp. 36-9.

act in Lebanon with force "unless the United Nations should confess

failure in preserving the peace."[1] Not only had no such confession

been forthcoming from the United Nations to support the American

case for intervention, but U. N. Secretary-General Hammarskjold

was convinced, just prior to July 14, that " of all the crises confronting

the United Nations, Lebanon's least lends itself to an international

solution."[2] With the U. S. having acted in many ways contrary to

international law (cf. Ch. V), at a time when U. N. observers were

present in Lebanon where the revolt appeared to be mitigated sub-

stantially, and with considerable world opinion against the intervention,

one could view the U. S. presentation of its case in the United Nations

as something of a Cold War "salvage" operation.[3] In view of Secretary

Dulles' great skepticism about the abilities of the United Nations, one

is reminded of one characterization of the U. N. by Dr. Charles Malik

as "a handy mechanism for disengagement or disembarrassment" of

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[1]
    Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 264. President Eisenhower also
indicated, however, that in a crisis the U.S. "would not require the
concurrence or the recommendations of the Security Council before
providing military assistance." Ibid.

[2]
    "A Threat Behind the Gospel," Newsweek, July 14, 1958, p. 32.
Also, Time Magazine, June 30, 1958, p. 20.

[3]
    Secretary Dulles indicated to Congressmen on July 14 that the
U. S. was going to have to halt the deterioration of the American
position in the Middle East "if the United States was going to salvage
anything out of that part of the world." Sherman Adams, Firsthand
Report, Op. cit., p. 291.

the Great Powers if they chose temporary releases from their menacing confrontation. [1]

The U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Henry Cabot Lodge, explaining the American position to the Security Council on July 15, said that the U.S. action was not in violation of international law: small nations, Lodge stated, could not be allowed to have their governments subverted and replaced by "outside forces" seeking to extend their power "in defiance of the principles of the Charter."[2] Lodge also alluded to the insufficient role of UNOGIL in ending outside intervention in Lebanon.

Through Lodge's protracted references to the blood bath in Iraq, to the supposedly analogous situations in Greece and Czechoslovakia in the late 1940's, and his restraint in being specific about the U.A.R. itself, one detects a certain frustration in the U.S. attempts to try to define indirect aggression as it applied to the situation in Lebanon. Ambassador Lodge attempted to distinguish between the "normal aspirations of nationalism", which are "healthy", and "the subversion of the independence of small countries on the other hand."[3] The

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[1]
Lincoln P. Bloomfield, The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1960), p. 121.

[2]
Henry C. Lodge, "Lebanon Asks for Help," (Speech delivered at the 614th meeting of the Security Council, July 15, 1958), Vital Speeches, vol. 24 (August 1, 1958), p. 614.

[3]
New York Herald Tribune, July 17, 1958; Bloomfield, Op. cit., p. 84.

difficulty in Lodge's attempting to apply recent parallels of subversion--especially that of Czechoslovakia--to the Lebanese situation was that there had been much popular sentiment in both Iraq and Lebanon demonstrating a loyalty to Arabism that might have been hard to explain merely as subverted national loyalties.

The Security Council meetings, which constituted the first stage of the international treatment of the U.S. landings in Lebanon, resulted in a deadlock, and from the United States' viewpoint produced little more than an indictment of its actions. Secretary-General Hammarskjold, by making a forceful argument in favor of the complete adequacy of the Observer Group to meet the requirements of the Lebanese crisis, set the stage for Soviet Delegate Sobolev to deliver a logical and articulate rebuttal to Mr. Lodge's earlier justifications for U.S. action. Sobolev argued that the U.S. move was in violation of the U.N. Charter; he also made special references to the paradox of America's on the one hand supporting UNOGIL while on the other hand disregarding the latter group's reports.[1] At the same time, Sweden's delegation noted that the U.S. action neither fell under the jurisdiction of the United Nations nor could the landings be justified on any legal principles.[2]

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[1]
Sobolev's remarks may be found in Security Council, Official Records, 830th Meeting (July 16, 1958), pp. 12-15; Hammarskjold's remarks are in Security Council, Official Records, 829th meeting (July 16, 1958).

[2]
U.N. Security Council, Official Records, 830th Meeting, July 16, 1958, (U.N. Doc. S/PV, 830), p. 21.

By July 22, the Council was completely stymied, with none of the resolutions proposed as possible ways out of the dilemma having passed successfully. Ranged with the United States in the case were Canada, China, France, and the United Kingdom. England especially, which at the same time was taking pains to oppose the acceptance of the credentials borne by the new Iraqi delegate to the U. N., strongly opposed Russian accusations, stating that not only had the Soviets disregarded the question of outside (U. A. R.) intervention in the matter but that Mr. Sobolev had branded as aggression steps taken by the U. S. "to supplement the efforts of the United Nations."[1]

The U. A. R. adduced as evidence against the American arguments for the legal plausibility of the intervention the text of a verbal note given to the U. A. R. Acting Foreign Minister by the United States Ambassador in Cairo, in which the American Ambassador reportedly said,

> "These troops do not have hostile intentions. The need to
> lend assistance to Lebanon is brought about by the change
> of Government in Iraq."[2]

While U. S. draft resolutions called for an enlarged U. N. operation in the Middle East, the suggested Soviet resolutions dwelled on an

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[1]
U. N. Security Council, Official Records, 832nd Meeting, July 17, 1958, (U. N. Doc. S/PV. 832), p. 17.

[2]
U. N. Security Council, Official Records, 833rd Meeting, July 18, 1958, (U. N. Doc. S/PV. 833), p. 16.

outright condemnation of the United States under sections of the Charter.
The Revised Draft Resolution submitted by the U.S. delegation on July
17 included references to former General Assembly resolutions con-
demning direct or indirect intervention of a state in the internal affairs
of another state.[1]

It is significant to note that the U.S., rather than attributing any
conclusiveness to UNOGIL, preferred to reiterate the Lebanese Delegate's
charges of intervention; and (2) that the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. were in
fact both making nearly identical charges of intervention, though against
different parties, and though the U.S.S.R. invoked Article 2(7), which
prohibits intervention in matters that are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state.[2]

Academic points, legal nuances, modes of debate, and invective,
inflating or deflating the very meanings of words--all did their share
during the fruitless debates to cover the reality of a Cold War fait
accompli.[3] The Cold War "fact" was that even a sensible resolution
like that of the Japanese, acceptable to all members of the Security

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[1]
United States of America: Revised Draft Resolution,
17 July, 1958, (U.N. Doc. S/4050/Rev. 1).

[2]
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Revised Draft Resolution,
July 17, 1958, (U.N. Doc. S/4047/Rev. 1).

[3]
Note the Lebanese Delegate's (Azkül) lengthy exposition of the
"fictitious distinction" between direct armed attack and indirect armed
attack. U.N. Security Council, Official Records, 833rd Meeting,
July 18, 1958, (U.N. Doc. S/PV. 833), p. 6.

Council except Russia--and acceptable even to Lebanon--was shattered by a Soviet veto. The Cold War substratum which underlay the Security Council deadlock began to come more to the surface in the ensuing contacts between Moscow and Washington with regards to a "Great Power" solution to the conflict.

President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles had reason to believe that the Kremlin was astonished by the United States' display of determination in Lebanon, which fact would appear to be corroborated by the diminishing of the Soviet threatening tone and an increase in the spirit of conciliation and negotiation as diplomatic interchanges proceeded.[1] In any case, initially the Russians reacted with alarm to the U.S. intervention by dispatching a sizeable airborne force to Bulgaria under the guise of "maneuvers."[2] Extensive demonstrations were organized behind the Iron Curtain, and Soviet troops were making their presence felt on the Turkish and Iranian borders. To add to Soviet "embarrassment tactics," the Kremlin announced that Nāṣir's visit to Moscow was for the purpose of securing help against "American aggressors."[3] There was also, at first, considerable rocket rattling

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[1] Sherman Adams, Op. cit., p. 293.

[2] New Republic, August 4, 1958, pp. 3-7. Pravda had said as early as May 1958 that the U.S.S.R. would not stand idly by if the U.S. decided to intervene in the Near East. Barraclough, Op. cit., p. 370.

[3] In reality Nāṣir was probably far from anxious for Soviet intervention. Time Magazine, July 28, 1958, pp. 15-16.

on Chairman Khruschev's part.

Khruschev, in letters dated July 20, and addressed to Dag
Hammarskjold, Eisenhower, Macmillan, de Gaulle, and Nehru,
continued to verbally parade Soviet military prowess and urged that a
meeting of the 5 heads of state, in addition to the Secretary-General,
be held, in order to "without delay adopt measures for the cessation of
the military conflict which has begun."[1] Khruschev's most optimistic
hope would have been to bring Britain and the United States into inter-
national scorn for being opponents of nationalism; and the Russian
leader hoped at least by his "summit" tactic to aggrandize Russia's
position as a "power" in the Middle East.

The U.S. produced a reply after several days of careful study,
during which time Washington indicated it did not wish to "undercut"
the work of the U.N.--which in view of U.S. unilateralism and the
unfavorable response to its action in the Security Council seemed like
lip service to many.[2] Secretary Dulles, a chief architect of the U.N.
Charter, came up with a legal point around which the U.S. based its
reply: Khruschev, as a chief of state, could himself sit on the Security
Council. Consequently, Eisenhower's return letter stressed that in

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[1]
    Letter Dated 20 July from the Representative of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics Addressed to the Secretary-General,
(U.N. Doc. 4059), July 20, 1958.

[2]
    Barraclough, Op. cit., p. 379.

order that the U. N. not merely become a rubber stamp for the Great Powers, a "summit" meeting should be held in the context of the U. N. Security Council, where heads of government could represent their countries if such were desirable.[1] There was no question but that the U. S. was looking for as much U. N. "cover" as possible.

In light of the fact that the U. S. was probably not at all desirous of a summit conference whether inside or outside the U. N., Khruschev's favorable reply came as something of a shock. The Russian note of July 23 was characterized by a cooperative tone showing Moscow at least apparently anxious to reach an agreement rather than to prolong polemics. One reason why Washington was hoping for a Soviet rejection of the Security Council "summit" proposal was the fact that behind-the-scenes diplomacy, aimed at improving the U. S. position in the U. N., had convinced Secretary Dulles that if the Lebanon issue were to be transferred into the General Assembly that the U. S. might just about pull together a two-thirds majority.[2] An Assembly solution would probably tend to be a "quieter" solution; whatever legal loose ends existed in the American position would have stood a better chance to be "submerged" in the Assembly than in the Security Council, where the Soviet Union wielded considerable influence. In this connection,

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[1]
Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 283-4.
[2]
Barraclough, Op. cit., p. 379. U. S. memories of other "summits" involving the Soviet Union--Yalta, Potsdam, and the 1955 Big Four meeting at Geneva--may have made the U. S. wary of this type of diplomatic encounter with Russia.

one detects in President Eisenhower's continuing correspondence with Khruschev a constant emphasis on the importance of the "voice of the smaller nations."[1]

Clearly Soviet Russia demonstrated an urgency that did not characterize U. S. responses. This may have been at first out of fear that the U. S. would entrench itself militarily as time went on. It has been suggested that the Kremlin's desire to talk as soon as possible, so as to eliminate and chances of war or a fait accompli in the Middle East may have led it to make a trial baloon out of the à cinq proposals: if the plan had been accepted, that is, the Soviet Government would have been ready for a Security Council "summit." If not, then presumably Moscow would be content to settle for broader talks.[2]

Following on a visit to Mao Tse-Tung in China, Khruschev decided to end his demands for a summit meeting and to call instead for a special session of the U. N. General Assembly. The Chairman accused the U. S. of having sabotaged any possibilities for such a meeting.[3] It

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[1]
Letter Dated 1 August 1958 From the President of the United States Addressed to the Secretary-General, August 1, 1958, (U. N. Doc. S/4074), p. 9. There was considerable opinion in Britain and even in the U. S. that the Eisenhower-Dulles desire to avoid a "summit" was irresponsible. Barraclough, Op. cit., p. 384.

[2]
Barraclough, Op. cit., p. 387.

[3]
Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 285. In seeking a General Assembly meeting, Russia sought to use procedures that had been hitherto considered repugnant--i. e. the provisions for emergency sessions of the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution; Bloomfield, Op. cit., p. 76.

is possible that Peking had exerted pressures on Khruschev to make some headway in the matter of the American intervention in Lebanon. After Mr. Sobolev's formal request, the Security Council voted unanimously on August 7 to convoke a special session of the General Assembly. From one observer's point of view this move away from the "summit" gave the United States an important moment of "tactical respite."[1]

The General Assembly's Treatment of the Crisis

The General Assembly emergency sessions, held from August 8-21, were more successful in working out a solution. Of course, to an extent, the crisis was subsiding of its own weight. The first of the new round of meetings saw a continuation of the oratorical battle between Lodge and Sobolev, with other states essentially playing the role of spectators. Lodge accused Russia of having no real interest in the independence of Lebanon and of desiring the special session merely to attack the United States.[2] Secretary-General Hammarskjold, however, helped to reduce polemics by calling for dramatic action toward the alleviation of the Middle East's long-term problems, suggesting among other things, the creation of financial institutions. This approach set

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[1]
    W. Rostow, U.S. in the World Arena, Op. cit., p. 362.
[2]
    General Assembly, Official Records, 3rd Emergency Special Session, 732nd Plenary Meeting (Opening Meeting), August 8, 1958.

the stage for President Eisenhower, who asked permission to address the Assembly on August 13 for the purposes, according to the American President, of establishing a "constructive atmosphere conducive to real results."[1] Eisenhower's speech bears some scrutiny, as it appears to represent a U.S. first attempt at rebuilding a collapsed policy structure in the Middle East.

In the sometimes vague usages in Eisenhower's speech, it was clear that American "interest" in the Middle East would continue in more than a passing way. From the continued blurry references to the legitimacy of the U.S. action under the principle of collective self-defense in the Middle East, it further appeared as if U.S. wholesale political interests and modes of operation were likely to prevail over legal modes. For example, while a superficial glance at Eisenhower's statements on self-determination might lead to a belief that the "new" U.S. policy sought a more realistic view of Arab nationalism, it might be recalled that the President also made it clear that change reflecting the will of the people must be orderly and that "other nations should not interfere so long as this expression is found in ways compatible with international peace and security."[2]

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[1]

Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 287.

[2]

General Assembly, Official Records, 3rd Emergency Special Session, 733rd Plenary Meeting, Wednesday August 13, 1958.

There was no mistaking the fact, judging from what constituted
an increased realism in favor of the U.S. accomodating the regimes of
the Middle East--especially Nāṣir and Qassim--that America wanted to
take a slightly different position toward the political forces in the area.
However, this did not mean that in either Washington or London there
was a greatly lessened phobia about dictatorship in the area.[1] Eisenhower's
references to "peaceful" self-determination still left the way open for
the U.S. to look to Arab nationalism's external "aggressive" aspects,
should U.S. intervention in the Middle East ever again require justifi-
cation.

The bulk of Eisenhower's suggested plan for the Middle East con-
cerned a comprehensive developmental program which would raise
the living standard of the area in order that, finally, the nations of the
area "intellectually and emotionally will no longer feel the need to seek
national security through spiralling military build-ups, " and that there
would be provided "a setting of political order in response to the rights
of the people in each nation."[2] The link-up of economic growth with
political order again seems indirectly to indicate that Washington would
not be tolerant of political disorder in the Middle East.

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[1]

Barraclough, Op. cit., p. 383.

[2]

General Assembly, Official Records, 3rd Emergency Special
Session, 733rd Plenary Meeting, August 13, 1958.

The Soviet Union accused the United States of seeking to divert the world's attention from the legal and political issues involved in the U.S. intervention by outlining this American development Plan.[1] The Soviet delegate argued that the net result of the bulk of U.S. speeches in the U.N. was the fabrication of a myth of "indirect aggression" gripping the world and emanating from all sides but the West. But the Russian suggestion for a Great-Power guarantee for the peace of the Middle East, indicating a Russian desire to solidify its leverage and influence in the area, was hardly a more subtle vehicle than that suggested by the U.S. for the retaining of power positions in the Middle East.

The new American policy for the Middle East, expressed in Eisenhower's August 13 speech, sought--in perhaps a more creative way than before--to truncate Arab nationalism as it then existed in some of the following ways: (1) a proposed U.N. stand-by force would protect sovereignties and be an alternative to British-U.S. efforts to block Nāṣir's acquisition of influence; (2) a proposed arms moratorium would frustrate Moscow's arms-deal strategies that had worked to Cairo's benefit; and (3) Western aid for the abovementioned development program would presumably be forthcoming only in as much as Arab

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[1] Ibid., p. 15.

nationalism was prepared to divert attention from political excesses and into constructive programs.[1] To opponents of the U.S. intervention, the new U.S. plan merely demonstrated the failure of the "Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine" and was the perpetuation of a bankrupt line of policy.[2] In this light it would be perhaps too fair to the U.S. to say that it sought to "build up Arab neutrality under United Nations auspices."[3]

In speeches by "Third World" delegates, the impression is often conveyed of a basic frustration at the way the essential issues under debate had been clouded over by large power politics.[4] Some of these delegates urged that the basic issues of (1) evacuation of troops and (2) long-term programs for solution of the problems facing the Middle East, be dealt within separate resolutions.[5]

In spite of numerous demands in the Assembly that American

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[1]

Rostow, Op. cit., p. 362.

[2]

General Assembly, Official Records, 3rd Emergency Special Session, 743rd Plenary Meeting, August 20, 1958, p. 127.

[3]

Barraclough, Op. cit., p. 390.

[4]

Note U Thant's statement--obviously directed at the system of U.N. "alliances" and blocs--that,"there is, unfortunately, a very pronounced school of thought that still believes that a nation which does not choose sides and join irrevocably with one or the other camp in the heavily armed uneasy truce that exists in the world today lacks courage and conviction." General Assembly, Official Records, 3rd Emergency Special Session, 740th Plenary Meeting, August 19, 1958, p. 96.

[5]

Remarks by the Delegate from Afghanistan to the U.N., General Assembly, Official Records, 3rd Emergency Special Session, 739th Plenary Meeting, August 18, 1958, p. 82. Indonesia also took a "first things first" attitude, suggesting that the first issue of discussion should be the elimination of foreign troops, after which the "noble sentiments" of Eisenhower's blueprint could be mooted. Ibid., p. 76.

troops be withdrawn, the political fact was that U.S. and British forces were not going to pull out until Lebanon and Jordan were secure and stabilized. Meanwhile, the Lebanese Government was giving some thought to internationalizing Lebanon.[1] Lobbying at the U.N., in addition, had strengthened the sentiment in favor of enlarging the U.N. presence in Lebanon in some form.

U.A.R. interests and those of Arab nationalism would probably have been little advanced by the internationalization of Lebanon or even by a fairly permanent U.N. presence there. Probably for this reason, and also because he had achieved a partial victory in the demise of the pro-Western policies of Camille Sham'ūn, Nāṣir began to press for a compromise solution.[2] Lebanon also appeared anxious for a compromise; and it was notable that that country--now facing the reality of having to live harmoniously with its neighbors--was no longer invoking the Great Powers, but the Arab League and "sister Arab" states for a final solution.[3]

The final compromise solution came as a Joint Draft Resolution submitted by ten Arab member-states to the General Assembly on

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[1]

This plan would have given Lebanon the neutral status of a country like Switzerland, guaranteed by the U.N. For a description of the possibility of internationalization see Michael Abu Jawdeh, "Towards the Internationalization of Lebanon," al-Nahār, August 12, 1958.

[2]

Campbell, Op. cit., p. 143.

[4]

General Assembly, Official Records, 3rd Emergency Special Session, 740th Meeting, August 19, 1958, p. 89.

August 21. The proposed resolution, which was passed on August 21, pledged non-interference among the Arab states in each other's affairs.[1] The resolution called upon the Secretary-General to help in making practical arrangements which would facilitate the withdrawal of troops from Lebanon and Jordan and uphold the principles of the U. N. Charter.

Secretary Dulles appeared pleased at the regional nature of the solution.[2] Not only was the U. S. a firm believer in regional organization; but certainly the compromise resolution by the Arabs themselves to some extent pacified the Cold War altercation which thus far had characterized the U. N. search for a solution. The Russians appeared somewhat gratified that the final U. N. solution had constructed, they said, a vindication of their original purpose in calling for an Emergency Special Session of the U. N. --that the U. N. should use its influence to urge a prompt withdrawal of U. S. and U. N. forces.[3]

The resolution did not immediately end all disturbances in Lebanon, as has been seen.[4] But U. S. troops were withdrawn by October 25, and a state of near normalcy was reported. On November 16, the Lebanese

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[1]

Resolution 1237 (ES-III); General Assembly, Official Records, 3rd Emergency Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/3905), p. 1.

[2]

General Assembly, Official Records, 3rd Emergency Special Session, 746th Plenary Meeting, August 21, 1958.

[3]

Ibid., p. 173.

[4]

Report of the Secretary-General (Hammarskjold), September 29, 1958, (U. N. Doc. A/3934) dated September 29, 1958.

Foreign Minister addressed a letter to the President of the Security

Council in which he remarked that cordial relations between Lebanon

and the U.A.R. had been reestablished in the spirit of U.N. Resolution

1237 (ES-III). The letter requested the deletion of the original Lebanese

complaint, submitted on May 22, 1958, from the list of matters before

the Security Council.[1]

Conclusions on the American Intervention in Lebanon

In considering whether or to what extent the U.S. action in Lebanon

was a success or a failure, one is faced with a number of levels of

analysis. In the main, these may be broken down into the following

modes: (1) logistical; (2) political; and (3) legal-moral.

Logistically there were significant failings in the Lebanon opera-

tion, although Eisenhower spoke of it as a great triumph for U.S.

forces in the meeting of "brush-fire" situations.[2] With regard to

the very process of war, the 1950's was a period in which numbers of

variables, new concepts, and new military realities were mixed

together in confusion; along with the fledgling concept of limited

"brushfire" war, policy makers and military planners were wont to

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[1]

Letter Dated 16 November 1958 from the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Lebanon Addressed to the President of the Security Council.
(U.N. Doc. S/4113), November 17, 1958.

[2]

Eisenhower, Op. cit., p. 290.

keep in mind such various things as the "massive retaliation" concept,
the idea of a large-scale confrontation with Russia, "containment" and
collective security," the economizing of the "Great Equation," and
the very real threat of Soviet technological gap-closing.

Clearly the concept of limited war was only emerging by 1958.
In the early 1950's the assumption had been, regarding the Middle East,
that since Russia had no satellite bases--unlike in Europe--any military
aggression would have to come from Russia herself.[1] But especially
after the lessons of Indochina, Korea, Greece, and the Philippines, it
was increasingly obvious that war was becoming limited in terms of
weapons, objectives, and geography. The United States, which had
not elected to unanimously follow the "massive retaliation" concept
to all its logical conclusions, had not by 1958 put together a mobile
reserve that would be capable of dealing with brushfire operations, and
which would justify a disengagement of U.S. land forces in Eurasia.[2]
Nuclear weapons were more or less irrelevant to brushfire wars. What
was required was a gearing of U.S. foreign policy to deal with the
various social, economic, and political issues that created such wars
to work in conjunction with a mobile reserve. Walter Rostow explains,

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[1]

Thayer, Tensions in the Middle East, Op. cit., p. 44.

[2]

Rostow, Op. cit., p. 323.

The nation did not fully face up to the requirements
for and the implications of an instrument to deter and if
necessary to prosecute, limited war; and it did not link
its diplomacy and economic foreign policy to the problem
of deterring such wars. This fact continued to affect the
whole cast of national policy in Asia, the Middle East, and
Africa.[1]

There was little doubt that many military aspects of the compre-

hensive limited-war orientation, as specifically applied to Lebanon,

were faulty. It was based partly on an uneasy sense of weakness, much

evident during the Lebanese landings, that the Senate Appropriations

Committee provided $1.2 billion more than the President had requested

for the defense expenditures of the next twelve months, criticizing the

optimism of the Administration.[2]

There was, in fact, little evidence to support the optimism

expressed by Secretary of Defense McElroy on the subject of the

Lebanese landings. The post-intervention reports revealed especially

U.S. weaknesses in transport and service mobility. One should first

note that as in the Quemoy operation, the U.S. was lucky at the time of

the Lebanese action to have nearby friendly bases, minor requirements

for forces, fairly ample warning time, and no ground fighting. The

Sixth Fleet, suffering some of the Navy's overall problems of obsolescent

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Hanson W. Baldwin, "Concern Over Defense--Weakness in
Landings in Lebanon and Senate Unit's Alarm Cited," New York Times,
July 27, 1958.

equipment, took fully two days to accumulate its full strength off Lebanon. The first 1,800 Marines to land, whose objective was Beirut's international airport, and who fortunately were unopposed, landed without the presence of assault helicopters or preliminary air cover.[1]

The Air Force encountered considerable difficulties in ferrying its Composite Air Strike Force from South Carolina to Adana Turkey, especially with regard to refueling. For lack of air transport, the Army's "brushfire" Strategic Army Corps of four divisions, was never utilized. Rather elements of the U.S.' normal five-division strength in Europe were transported to Lebanon. Bottlenecks in Beirut and Adana prevented the Army from arriving in strength until July 19; and the Army's tanks and most of its vehicles were not brought ashore in Lebanon until August 5.[2]

There were also political problems involved which had perhaps not been forseen: Israel refused to allow U.S. overflights of its territory. And both Italy and Greece made restrictions concerning the use of their airfields to U.S. military aircraft. The shortages of supply ships constituted another problem.

The rather shattering truth of the matter was that while the United States was having difficulty lifting one battle group from Germany and in

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[1] Peter Braestrup, "Limited Wars and the Lessons of Lebanon," The Reporter, vol. 20 (April 30, 1959), p. 26.

[2] Ibid.

supporting it, the U.S.S.R. was simultaneously staging a much larger airlift of forces from Odessa to Bulgaria.[1]

The relative inefficiency of the U.S. operation in Lebanon had important long-range implications for the United States: the economizing of the Eisenhower Administration, which had increasingly come to rely on nuclear weapons for a maximum destructive deterrent at the least cost, was resulting in a situation where there was relatively little alternative between nuclear war and doing nothing.[2] The question posed by the Lebanon intervention was whether American military-foreign policy could further afford to overlook the requirements of limited war in emphasizing other strategies.

The Lebanese crisis had showed a basic lack of cooperation between many sections of the American policy-making and policy-implementing machine. As seen above, military inter-service and inter-service intelligence rivalries cut down on the original clarity and definition of presented situations requiring action, and correspondingly slowed that action. The hiatus in communication between State Department field personnel in Lebanon and the military operations commanders sent with the landing forces reflected a gross abuse of

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[1]

    Ibid. The U.S.S.R. was transporting units of its 100,000 man Soviet airborne army, which had its own transport aircraft in excess of 500 planes.

[2]

    Ibid.

a cardinal requirement for the prosecution of limited war--that sensitive intelligence and political-economic operatives be permitted to coordinate their "inner dealings" in an unfolding crisis with the application of military measures.

Sufficient communication or creative adjustment of policy to changing patterns of foreign political life, social realities, and "subversion" were not modes of thought which J. F. Dulles' tenure as Secretary of State promoted. It has been suggested that Dulles, the pact maker, was more of an advocate than a Foreign Minister: the former argues for a position, while the latter must be able to reconcile opposing interests or at least to understand, if not respect, opposing beliefs.[1] Dulles' foreign policy, which changed little from that of his predecessors in furthering containment and a European status quo, was not sufficiently creative to meet new world needs and a subtly changing Soviet policy line. The intense care the Secretary paid to his domestic position on policies was probably a further cause of the brittleness and stagnation of U.S. policy abroad during these years.

It has been established that the U.S. was in an extremely awkward legal position regarding its intervention in Lebanon; but also that

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[1]

N. A. Graebner (ed.), An Uncertain Tradition on: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century (New York: McGraw Hill, 1961), p. 308.

international law has grown out of the practice of states. This implies an awesome responsibility for a Great Power, since the latter is ultimately and realistically answerable for its acts only to an equally strong state or balance of power. The faults of inadequate diplomacy and inappropriate extensions of power thus become doubly egregious since to some extent the exercise of politics is responsible for law if not always to it.

Thus the relative success or failure of the U.S. intervention in Lebanon should not be judged on a legal touchstone only, but rather in terms of a deeper kind of political morality. Perhaps it could be argued that morally the U.S. had the necessity, or perhaps right, of bailing out an ally threatened from outside by Nasserism and or Communism.

Professor Manfred Halpern has argued that the morality of an intervention is dependent on the "knowledge" connected to that intervention.[1]

Knowledge presumably does not imply principles, which remain more or less fixed--as did many American policy premises (cf. Ch. I)-- in the face of changing situation, but rather a grasp of vast movements of social change in the world. Marine diplomacy, lack of discussion

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[1] Manfred Halpern, The Morality and Politics of Intervention, Op. cit., p. 15.

(cf.Ch.IV), a short-term "case approach" to crises, functional power--
these are both the symptoms and the results of an approach to foreign
policy lacking in knowledge.

This is all to say that even if the U.S. was somehow "justified"
in taking action in the face of necessity on July 14, 1958, that the range
of choices for action--had they been based on a real attempt at under-
standing the forces of transformation both in Lebanon and the Arab world--
would have been infinitely greater; there were many times before July 14,
when decisions based on something other than final necessity might have
been made.[1]

The whole complex of political relationships that have been the
substance of this discussion themselves have emphasized the question
of when does normal intercourse become interference or intervention.
In this context, it would not be irrelevant to ask if the Eisenhower
Doctrine--judged in terms of its effects--did not itself constitute
intervention. In light of Halpern's scheme it appears as if one is left
to ask whether any particular international interaction is grounded in
knowledge and a fair appraisal of the situation in order to know if--
without disregarding national interest--such interaction is "moral"
or not.

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[1] Ibid., p. 27.

That American involvement in the Middle East and knowledge of the area was much greater after World War II than before is certain. Previous chapters, however, pointed out that even this new concern with the Middle East did not reflect as much an understanding of the forces at work there as a recognition on the part of many policy planners that the Arab world's actions did not usually conform with the premises and "principles" of Cold War exigencies. The inflexibility of such instruments as M.E.D.O., the Baghdad Pact, and the Eisenhower Doctrine, which indicated their foundations lay more in formulated premises than in applied conclusions, may, by their very inapplicability to the forces in the area, have given rise to these consequences: on the one hand, 'Abd al-Nāṣir was able to exploit these policies in a way that brought out some of the least productive aspects of Arab nationalism. On the other hand, President Sham'ūn of Lebanon, in deep personal political trouble, exploited nothing less than the most dangerous and extreme sections of the Eisenhower Doctrine for reasons that may have been-- judging from the evidence adduced above--neither in the best interests of Lebanon or the United States.

In a Lebanon where a basic underlying social reality concerned the increasingly tenuous power position of Christian elements in Lebanon in light of population growth and regional geopolitics, it is a tribute to

American misunderstanding of the "dissident" forces in that country that Sham'ūn and Malik should have--for American benefit--"seen" Communism on the increase in the early part of the crisis.

The Eisenhower Doctrine, in short, represented an attempt to divide the Middle East into Cold War camps that did not naturally exist; this only led to the policy's being "cashed in" and disposed of instead of its having laid a foundation for the avoidance of the type of crisis that occurred. The fact that Nāṣir too could have "cashed in" on American policies in the matter of the Aswan Dam construction had he not made the Czech Arms Deal, leads one to ask if Washington's habit of dangling carrots in front of potential friends could not be called less an act of long-term understanding and intent than simply one of short-term expediency. That the latter is probably most nearly the case is attested to by the events of the 1958 crisis, where the United States reacted with shock to events that hardly would have been surprising had under- standing existed and consequent provisions been made--the extinction of Nūrī as-Sa'īd's regime; the embarrassments caused by King Sa'ūd; the uprisings in Jordan; and the formation of the U. A. R.

The area in which American misjudgement seems to have been at its worst in 1958 was in the matter of seeing instability both in Lebanon and in the Arab world as being a direct function of the unleashing of popular forces. Subversion, or indirect aggression,

which was still lacking a firm definition by the end of the crisis appears
to have been seen in Washington not merely as a non-frontal line of
action by Moscow or Cairo, but as a kind of unhealthy undermining of
stability. One wonders first whether the kind of stability demonstrated
by Nūrī as-Sa'īd, Sham'ūn, or Hussein--where security forces often
choked off much popular expression against these leaders--was not in
fact as fleeting an entity as the "indirect aggression" which the U.S.
sought so hard to execrate. It was suggested earlier in this chapter
that, in the case of Lebanon, stability and balance did not always imply
either harmony or progress; perhaps this pursuit of order qua order
on the part of the U.S. is another factor that would condemn an American
intervention in Lebanon seeking order as "immoral" in the above
context, and thus make it unsuccessful in the latter terms.

One of the U.S. demands at the U.N. sessions had been for a
resolution against and international means to deal with indirect
aggression, the bugaboo of world order. Secretary of State Dulles,
however, slowed down on his requests for such a resolution when he
realized that the United States might be as vulnerable as anyone to
charges of subversion.[1] This preoccupation with indirect intervention,
in the broad context of which the U.S. could not see its own partisan

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[1]

Ibid.

aid programs, radio broadcasts, and military aid, can only have made such phenomena as mass appeal for Nāṣir in parts of Lebanon into a manifestation of an inflated Cold War concept called subversion.

One difficulty which the experience of 1958 seems to point up is that not only were U. S. premises and policy manifestations declarative and inflexible and often irrelevant; but the policy making machine itself was incapable of searching reappraisal and adaptation to new forces that would have rendered old axioms obsolescent in a timely way. The centralized nature of Dulles' State Department; the semi-autonomous role of the intelligence services; the way in which creative thinking was often bogged down at desk level; the way "patriotism" and bi-partisanship often snuffed out healthy debate; simplistic journalistic logic; contradictory and powerful lobbying; and a crisis-minded President--all have been alluded to earlier as factors in the drowning out of a healthy dialogue between a responsible United States and emerging forces of social change in the Middle East.

The U. S. reaction out of final necessity to the Lebanese crisis was not a product of long-range policy thinking. One scholar has suggested that if the U. S. had considered the long-term, positive aspects of such objects of anathema to Dulles as Arab neutralism, the discovery might have been made that the latter philosophy desired much in common with U. S. stated interests: peace, free national

governments, continued oil sales to the West, and open communications

between Europe, Africa, and Asia.[1]

The admission that the U. S. intervened in Lebanon in 1958 for

want of better means to deal with the crisis does not indict America

for having taken a move to "show Moscow" in a Cold War context that

to some extent had its own rules and requirements. In the same sense,

Washington showed Nāṣir the U. S. "meant business" which some con-

strued as a basic success in the crisis. But the U. S. must be brought

to the bar for not having used diplomatic, behind-the-scenes approaches

to impending Middle East crises, in order to seek in local rather than

U. S. terms, and with local implementation, a mutually acceptable

framework for avoiding conflagration and for positive action. Marine

"diplomacy" was hardly a substitute.

The results in Lebanon, described above, hardly affirm the

"morality" of the U. S. intervention. While to some extent, the crisis

and intervention had triggered some outspoken criticisms of Lebanese

political life; and, as was suggested, "Shihabism" appeared to be

making some initial attempts at reducing zu'ama' influence; nonetheless,

the overwhelming reality was that shifts at the top and a juggling of

power positions had merely changed the hand but not the deck of cards

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[1] Meo, Op. cit., p. 202.

that constituted the political system in Lebanon.

In the final analysis one might be cautiously justified in calling

the intervention to some degree "moral" or successful, if it produced

a positive reorientation of American policy along the lines just suggested.

There were definite changes in the U.S.' view of the Middle East in

the wake of the 1958 crisis. Nāṣir, who had begun to rebuild his bridges

in the Arab world, began to receive considerable favorable publicity

in the United States.[1] This led to the extension of an increased amount

of aid and favor being accorded Nāṣir by the United States starting in

1959. On many levels in Washington there appeared post-July 1958

the realization that previous modes of thinking and policy planning were

unacceptable and needed revamping. State Department officials in

Washington were struck by the conclusion that continued resistance to

neutralism--which no longer seemed a synonym for Communism--was

not likely to be a fruitful diplomatic stance for the U.S.[2] Official

Washington began to credit Arab neutralists with a much greater

resistance to Soviet domination than had been thought at first.

Added to these positive factors were the stated intentions of

President Eisenhower at the U.N., alluded to above, in favor of

developing new patterns of economic assistance to countries willing to

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[1]

Campbell, Op. cit., p. 156.

[2]

Crabb, Op. cit., p. 241.

focus their vigorous nationalism on the amelioration of their societies. This appeared, for the first time in American foreign aid patterns, to involve potential long-range aid thinking. The last years of the Eisenhower Administration also saw a replacement of many of the early budget-minded planners, mentioned above (cf. Ch. IV) in connection with the Great Equation, by individuals prepared not only for larger outlays in defense spending--which was promising for improvements in limited war techniques--but for larger appropriations for nations not necessarily joined to the U.S. in military pacts.[1]

These changes should not, however, be exaggerated. It was suggested that Eisenhower's U.N. speech calling for a new policy in the Middle East seemed to seek, albeit subtly, to keep effective future dampers on Arab nationalism. Certainly suspicions of Nasserism did not disappear overnight in Washington. And there is no doubt that to some extent the improved relations with Cairo were partly a result of U.S. fears about Qassim's Leftist leanings.[2] As to personnel changes in the Eisenhower Administration, it must be noted that the real center of the Executive establishment seemed not a great deal affected by some of the changing views of new subordinates. The President continued to move in response to events, his planning short-range, and his

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[1] Rostow, Op. cit., p. 382.

[2] Campbell, Op. cit., p. 157.

approach lacking in vigor, articulation, and direction.[1]

Behind some of the ostensible changes in U.S. orientation toward the Middle East lay the fundamental political reality that the U.S., after a "successful" demonstration in Lebanon, in Cold War terms, was not going to abandon whatever positions of strength it had left in the area in the face of the Soviet threat.

Depending on the context one chooses to use, the American intervention may be seen as a success or a failure. In the vast conglomeration of interests, policies, strategies, arenas, and principles which played roles in the build-up to and resolution of the "Lebanese crisis" of 1958, perhaps the very designations "success" or "failure" are meaningless. In as much as the intervention was not grounded in suitable knowledge and responsible policy coordination and operation, and abusive to law by the very nature of the fairly specious justifications adduced for the action, it may be possible to call the landings "immoral." In a more final, pragmatic sense--and perhaps the only real way in which to eventually judge the full dimension of the U.S. intervention-- the ultimate worth of the latter could only be reckoned by the way in which each party involved, including international law and principle, should incorporate the lessons learned into more fruitful, unencumbered modes of political interaction in the future.

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[1] Rostow, Op. cit., p. 382.

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