

T
998

FEDERATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL ADVANCE IN SOUTH ARABIA:
DEVELOPMENT FOR INDEPENDENCE
OR IMPERIAL DESIGN?

by

GEORGE W. PLUMMER

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
of the Degree of Master of Arts
in the Arab Studies Department of the American University of Beirut,

Beirut, Lebanon

1968

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

Thesis Title:

"FEDERATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL ADVANCE IN SOUTH ARABIA: DEVELOPMENT
FOR INDEPENDENCE OF IMPERIAL DESIGN?"

by

GEORGE WALLACE PLUMMER

(Name of Student)

Approved:



PROFESSOR JOSEPH J. MALONE

Advisor



PROFESSOR MAHMUD ZAYID

Member of Committee



PROFESSOR ZEINE N. ZEINE

Member of Committee



PROFESSOR NICOLA A. ZIADEH

Member of Committee

Date of Thesis Presentation: 10 May 1968

PREFACE

Shortly after I set about the study of Middle Eastern affairs in earnest, I became aware of the ubiquitous dynamics of Arab nationalism. My studies led me through the last years of Ottoman hegemony in the Arab Middle East, the controversial mandate period, and finally the post-World War II years when the Arab nations were finally on the threshold of independence. In time my attention was drawn to the major contradiction of this long and ultimately successful period of nationalist struggle - that is, the territory situated at the southernmost reach of the Arabian Peninsula which, until November 1967, was a British colony. It was a British Colony in the best tradition, administered by a hard core of Colonial Office career men, straddling a major line of world trade, and committed to the defense of British imperial obligations. At a time when I was casting about for a suitable subject for a master's thesis, my curiosity overcame my natural caution, and I soon found myself committed to this subject.

When I originally conceived the idea of examining this situation in detail, I was counting on a lengthy visit to the Federation of South Arabia and Aden Colony as a means of broadening and supplementing the more traditional library oriented research. Unfortunately, due to the somewhat volatile level of nationalistic expression reached in South Arabia during the summer and fall of 1967, I had to forego this phase of research. As a result, I have relied heavily on English language sources, especially British Parliamentary records, United Nations

records, and the published memoirs of several of the key figures in this drama. However, through the generous intercession of Mr. John Condon, Labor Attache in the American Embassy, Beirut, I was able to spend a lengthy and most rewarding evening with one prominent South Arabian political figure.

I am particularly indebted to my thesis adviser, Dr. Joseph J. Malone, whose specialized interest in, and knowledge of, affairs in the Arabian Peninsula was most helpful. He not only made available to me materials from his own library, but also provided guidance and moral support which immeasurably facilitated the accomplishment of this endeavor.

I am also indebted to Mrs. Ann Bishop, who not only accomplished the final typing of this effort, but also enthusiastically applied her unusual editing and proofreading talents to this work on my behalf.

Special mention must be made of Dr. Nabih Faris. As Director of the Arab Studies Department while this thesis was being written, he was always ready to offer his time, knowledge, and wisdom to further the progress of this effort.

American University of Beirut
June 1968

GWP

CONTENTS

	Page
PREFACE	iii
CHAPTER	
I. Historical Note	1
II. Historical Background	12
III. Aden and the Protectorate	26
IV. Federation, the Yemen, and Imperialism in South Arabia. . .	47
V. Expansion of the Nationalist Movement in South Arabia . . .	69
VI. Aden Colony Joins the South Arabian Federation.	81
VII. The Failure of Constitutional Advance	97
VIII. Withdrawal.	123
IX. Conclusion.	140
POSTSCRIPT.	145
APPENDICES	
I. The Governmental Structure of the East India Company. . . .	146
II. States of South Arabia.	147
III. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1949(XVIII). . .	149
IV. General Assembly Resolution 2023(XX).	152
V. Protectorate Treaty	155

MAPS	Page
I. Aden Colony	157
II. South Arabia.	158
BIBLIOGRAPHY.	159

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL NOTE

The whole world is interested where . . . the whole world passes . . . there are certain places on this little globe of ours where order and security and a business-like method of government should always prevail. Such a place is Aden, a very important station on the highway of world traffic and navigation.*

In consequence of an outrage committed on the passengers and crew of a buggalow wrecked near Aden, an expedition was despatched against the place by the Government of Bombay.¹

In the latter part of 1837 Sir Robert Grant, the Governor of Bombay, sent Commander Strafford Bettsworth Haines to investigate the situation concerning the buggalow, the Duria Dowlat. It was Grant's recommendation that the British use the incident as an excuse to obtain possession of Aden. The regular monthly steamer run of the East India Company from Suez to Bombay was a determining factor in his recommendation. However, the idea was vetoed at that time by the Governor General of India.²

*Ameen Rihani, Around the Coasts of Arabia (London: Constable & Co. Ltd., 1930), p. 309.

¹Captain F. M. Hunter, An Account of the British Settlement of Aden in Arabia (London: Trubner & Co., 1877), p. 165.

²Thomas E. Marston, Britain's Imperial Role in the Red Sea Area (Hamden, Conn: The Shoe String Press, Inc., 1961), p. 57.

Meanwhile Haines had demanded and obtained restitution in Aden.¹ He then proceeded with an attempt to arrange for the peaceful cession of Aden to the British for the establishment of a coaling station there. Negotiations went ahead smoothly until the Sultan of Lahej refused to consider giving up his authority over his citizens who might continue to reside in Aden after British rule was established.

This deadlock, and the warning that the Sultan was planning to set a trap for him the next time he came ashore, made it clear to Haines that no more was to be gained in the current negotiations, so he returned to Bombay. He carried with him a cautious letter from the Sultan in which he accepted the concept of transferring Aden to the British for a price yet to be agreed upon.

Based on the Sultan's letter and the Bombay Government's increased desire to incorporate Aden into the steamship system as a fueling and repair station, Haines returned to Aden in October 1838 with orders to implement the transfer.² On his return Haines discovered that the amicability of the earlier negotiations had vanished. A deadlock ensued, resulting in the port being blockaded by Haines. In response to a request for additional support, a force consisting of two ships of the Indian Navy, HMS Volage (twenty-eight guns) and Cruizer (ten guns), with 300 European and 400 native troops, arrived

¹Haine's investigation of the wreck of the Duria Dowlat suggested that the ship had probably been wrecked to recover insurance on the cargo. The principals in the plot were the merchant who chartered the vessel and the native authorities at Aden. Marston, op. cit., p. 56.

²Halford L. Hoskins, British Routes to India (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1966), pp. 201-202.

to reinforce Haines in January 1839. This force bombarded and occupied the peninsula.¹ Thus it came about that the British found themselves in sole possession of this South Arabian port. From that early, violent beginning to the present time, there has been no period in the history of the British in Aden and its South Arabian hinterland which has not been marked by some degree of actual or threatened armed conflict.

Haines' occupation of Aden in 1839 was not the first, but rather the last of a long series of British probes in the area. In 1609 Aden was visited by the East India Company's ship, Ascension, commanded by a Captain Sharkey. The next year Admiral Sir Henry Middleton, on a trading voyage for the East India Company, made a second English visit to Aden.²

In 1612 a Captain Saris visited Mocha and was well-received; however, the first real entree made by the English in this South Arabian area was effected in 1618 by a Captain Shilling commanding the Anne Royal who, at the request of Sir Thomas Roe, Ambassador at the Mogul Court, went to Mocha, where he succeeded in obtaining an Ottoman firman permitting the East India Company to establish a coffee factory there. This factory was not permanently staffed, but rather served as a trading post for any English vessels that might touch port at Mocha.³

¹Hunter, op. cit., p. 165. This entire episode and its background is dealt with in detail in Hoskins, op. cit., Chapter 8.

²Hunter, op. cit., p. 163.

³Hunter, op. cit., p. 164 and Marston, op. cit., p. 25. A factory as used here was an establishment where company agents and private merchants carried on business in a foreign country; nothing was necessarily produced in such an establishment.

By the eighteenth century the Dutch, who had dominated the Persian Gulf during most of the preceding century, had sacrificed their earlier interests there for a monopoly of the spice trade in the Far East. This left the British as the primary heirs of the Gulf area. By the end of the Seven Years' War in 1763, French influence was all but removed from India. No other European power seriously challenged Britain's hegemony in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. With the French out of India the British Government was drawn increasingly into a policy of territorial occupation. Eventually a position of British paramount power emerged to replace the empire of the Moguls. Political rule quickly stimulated commercial interest; from this was to emerge Britain's eastern policy designed to secure permanent, uncontested access to India and beyond.

Britain concentrated on maintaining an open cape route and the establishment of British supremacy in the Indian Ocean. This latter objective was ultimately accomplished by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Syria and Mesopotamia were viewed as a barrier rather than a link to her eastern realm. This barrier was made more effective by the Porte's injunction against Christian trade in the Red Sea. It took the French invasion of Egypt to drive home the idea that the Middle Eastern land mass was not a barrier, but rather a bridge to the Indian Ocean.

This re-evaluation of the role of the Middle East as a route to the East was augmented by the development of railway transportation and further emphasized by the advent of the steamship. In 1830 a

successful steam voyage was made up the Red Sea.¹

Several other events must be mentioned before proceeding further. In 1630 the Ottoman Turks were forced out of Yemen, permitting the re-establishment of the rule of the Zeidi Imams. A little more than a hundred years later, in 1735, the Abdali Sultan of Lahej, by then virtually independent of the Yemeni Imam, possessed himself of Aden. And finally, in 1811, Mohammad Ali's Arabian campaign against the Wahhabis was launched.

For over a century Aden seems almost to have been forgotten. It was rediscovered by a private expedition to the Red Sea undertaken and financed by Lord Valentia (then Earl of Mountnorris) in 1802. His expedition is significant because of a report of his findings submitted in 1808 to George Canning, then Foreign Secretary. In this report he observed that Aden, ruled by a friendly sultan, still carried out a limited transshipment trade from Berbera on the Somali coast. He described Aden as occupying the position of greatest importance in the area. "It is the Gibraltar of the East and at trifling expense might be made impregnable."²

At about the same time Sir Home Popham experienced a singular success in Aden. Sent out by the East India Company in 1802 on what was to be an unsuccessful attempt to negotiate a commercial treaty at San'a, he stopped at Aden on his homeward voyage and was accorded a

¹Maybelle K. Chapman, Great Britain and the Bagdad Railway: 1888-1914 (Northampton, Mass: George Banta Publishing Company, 1948), p. 4. Colonel Chesney's Euphrates expedition in the mid-eighteen thirties revealed the impracticability of steamship navigation on the Euphrates River.

²Marston, op. cit., p. 34.

cordial welcome by the Sultan of Lahej. The result of this friendly reception was a 'Treat of Amity and Commerce'. It provided for the port of Aden to be open to goods brought by British ships and established fixed duties. Registered British subjects could claim the protection of the British flag which was to be sacrosanct. Disputes between registered British subjects were to be referred to the British resident; however, disagreements between British subjects and Arabs must be decided by the Islamic law of the Sultanate. The rights of the individual were further specified:

The British nation would be subjected to no indignities, and might ride without molestation horse, mule, ass, or any other beast they might deem proper.¹

This state of amity was to continue until 1827 when the death of the Lahej sultan led to the rise of his nephew, Muhsin Bin Fadhl, who was of 'less savory character' and chose to forget the provisions of his uncle's treaty.²

In 1820, and again in 1835, Aden was visited by Commander Haines. At the time of his second voyage, Commander Haines had been directed by the Government of the Bombay Presidency to seek out suitable coal depots along the Hadhramaut littoral or on the island of Socotra.³ A force of native infantry and artillery was sent out and landed at

¹Harold F. Jacob, Kings of Arabia (London: Mills & Boon Limited, 1923), p. 26.

²Hunter, op. cit., p. 165, describes him as being "inhospitable, deceitful, avaricious, and unscrupulous".

³It has been noted above that a successful steamship voyage had been made up the Red Sea in 1830.

Tamarida. Due to fever, the force was decimated, and early in 1835 it withdrew.¹

Haines' final occupation of Aden in 1839 has already been cited. He became the first Political Agent at Aden which was placed under the administration of the Bombay Presidency. His staff was drawn from men in the Indian Navy, an appropriate move considering the paramount role this force had played in acquiring the port.²

Considering its supporting role to British interests in India, it was to be expected that Aden would be left under the administration of the Government of Bombay (see Appendix I). Aden was administered by residents appointed by the Government of Bombay. They normally had two or more political assistants who were usually officers of subordinate rank in the early years, but whose rank increased as Aden prospered.³

At the time of the British occupation, Aden was little more than a village. Haines observes that:

The little village of Aden is now reduced to the most exigent condition of poverty and neglect. In the reign of Constantine this town possessed unrivalled celebrity for its impenetrable fortifications, its flourishing commerce, and the glorious haven it afforded to vessels from all quarters of the globe. How lamentable is the present contrast.⁴

¹Jacob, op. cit., p. 30.

²Ibid., p. 39. In 1855 on the departure of Haines, he and his staff were replaced by officers of the Indian Army.

³Great Britain: Admiralty, Naval Intelligence Division, Western Arabia and the Red Sea (GHS, B.R. 527, 1946), p. 276 and Hunter, op. cit., p. 129.

⁴Sir Tom Hickenbotham, Aden (London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1958), p. 9. In March 1839 the population consisted of 276 Arab males, 241 Arab females, 357 Jewish males and 301 females, 26 Somali males and 37 females, 4 Egyptians and a floating population of about 150 Somalis - a total of 1296 people. Marston, op. cit., p. 71.

Possibly inspired by the 'present contrast', Haines set out, virtually unsupported by Bombay, to make Aden into an economically sound venture. He had a relatively free hand in the early years of his residency in Aden to shape the administration and organization of the territory as he saw fit. However, he did not depart from the path that he was expected to follow:

Much of the policy in Aden was made by the political agent, Haines, but it was consistent with that of the Government of Bombay, the Government of India, the Court of Directors of the East India Company at home and the British Government as well.¹

The results of his efforts in the economic sphere of activity were not unnoticed, as is shown in a comment from the Military Department of the Bombay Government in 1853:

Government cannot altogether consent to the position that Aden is to be held only as a military post. The Peninsula has been a British possession for thirteen years, and, by encouragement given to trade, a town has risen up which contains more than 20,000 inhabitants.²

When viewed in the larger context of empire and strategic expediency, however, the Bombay Government advised Haines a month later that:

In the opinion of Government the military importance of Aden is to be considered paramount to its commercial improvement, and should be the first object in view.³

British problems in Abyssinia in the 1860's found Aden being employed as an advance base for supplies and communications into the troubled area. It was this factor, at a time when Aden was otherwise

¹Harold Ingrams, The Yemen (London: John Murray, 1963), p. 53.

²Jacob, op. cit., p. 66.

³Ibid., p. 66.

at a low ebb in terms of economic and shipping worth, that maintained its value for the British. It demonstrated to the Indian Government the unique military and naval character of the location.

With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the British evaluation was dramatically underlined when, some six weeks later, Prussian, Dutch, Spanish, French, and Austrian warships were anchored at Aden. The French gunboat, Bruat, and the Austrian ship, Narenta, intended to stay for a year. The local authorities quickly expressed a desire for a British ironclad naval vessel to be permanently stationed at Aden and requested that the shore defenses be reinforced by large caliber guns capable of responding to the fire of warships.¹

Aden had not fulfilled the promise that its geographical position warranted in regard to the development of large scale trade. It was very difficult to divert traffic from its time honored channels in spite of the increased safety provided to the users of Aden's port. Following the opening of the Suez Canal the growth of world shipping passing by Aden resulted in an increasingly growing demand for her services as a coaling station. In spite of the increase in traffic, Aden was still costing the Indian Government roughly 150,000 pounds a year by 1876.² Still, the increase in traffic after 1869 justified dredging the harbor to correspond with the depth of the Suez Canal. By 1901 an area of 163 acres had been dredged to provide six berths with depths of twenty-six feet. By 1910 two deep berths of 33 - 34

¹Marston, op. cit., p. 388.

²Hunter, op. cit., pp. 89-90, 137. At this time the only customs dues levied was a transshipment fee of Rs. 10 per chest of opium.

feet were dredged, and the spoil was used to reclaim fifteen acres of bay area on which various port offices were built.¹

Another service established in Aden during these early years, which was to be of major significance in Aden's role as a link in the imperial communications system, was the establishment there of a telegraph cable terminal point.

In 1858 a company was subsidized to lay telegraph cables along the Red Sea between Suez and Aden and then continue this underwater line to Karachi. The first cable was a failure.²

In 1869 the British Indian Submarine Telegraph Company was formed. Five ships were used to lay a new line. By the end of March 1870 direct traffic was opened between England and India. In 1876 the company, renamed The Eastern Telegraph Company, duplicated the cable line. Aden functioned as a repeating station where all messages from both east and west were read off and passed on. By the mid-twentieth century the whole of the Indian Ocean cable system was connected with the Red Sea cables at Aden.³

¹Western Arabia and the Red Sea, p. 553. After 1914 the need for oiling berths arose. Initial construction requirements were met by 1926.

²Halford L. Hoskins, British Routes to India (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1928), p. 378. The protective wrappings quickly disintegrated in the warm Red Sea water. It also was not understood that slack had to be fed out to allow the cable to adjust to the irregularities of the ocean floor. As a result sections of the cable were subjected to excessive tensions as it lay suspended between ocean floor elevations. This was further aggravated by the accumulation of sea growths, one variety of which apparently found the insulation quite savory, which eventually broke the cable with their accumulated weight.

³Hunter, op. cit., pp. 181-182.

These developments served to enhance Aden's strategic position. Slowly but surely, the importance of the port was insinuated into the consciousness of the India Government. At first unwanted, the port had become a vital link between the British Isles and the Indian sub-continent. One observer aptly comments that the British in the past displayed something akin to genius for 'backing' into Arabia. History shows no British frontal assault, only a hesitant and quite recent encroachment inspired mainly by the forces of politics and economics, to which both Britain and Arabia were victims. It was an 'anti-French protection-of-India' motive that brought England into the area first. Only the port of Aden was finally officially and permanently occupied. No other territorial sovereignty was needed in Arabia to protect India and the trade route, and even in Aden the real desire was for a coaling station.¹ A former governor of Aden summed up the idea nicely when he said:

In point of fact the probabilities are that the reason for our somewhat drastic action was because we wished to control the only good harbour between India and Egypt and use it as a coaling station for our ships.²

¹David Holden, Farewell to Arabia (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), p. 13.

²Hickinbotham, op. cit., p. 12.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

It is not given to administrators, whether in the Colonial Office or in the lands overseas, to see the end of all their work. They move forward, sometimes groping and seeing as in a glass darkly, sometimes with a flash of vision clear as 'the clear shining after rain'.*

Great Britain's initial venture in Aden was restricted to the Peninsula. It soon became evident, however, that a peaceful existence in Aden was dependent on the state of affairs in the hinterland as well. This led to the first negotiations directed by Captain (as he had become) Haines designed to secure amicable relations with Aden's neighbors.

By June 1839 treaties of peace and friendship had been entered into with the surrounding tribes, the Sultan of Lahej even being granted a stipend of 6,000 dollars a year for so long as he should remain faithful.¹ This apparent peace lasted no time at all. Faced with a new power to their south, the Arab tribesmen in the area, accustomed to incessant warfare and bickering, could not be satisfied until they had tried the mettle of this new interloper. By November 1839 the Abdali tribe of Lahej together with the neighboring Fadhlis tried to retake Aden. They were repulsed. Farther abortive attempts were

* Harold Ingrams, Arabia and the Isles (London: John Murray, 1966), p. 386.

¹ Western Arabia and the Red Sea, p. 275. The 'dollar' referred to here was the rial or German Crown, worth about fifteen shillings.

made in 1840 and 1841. To put an end to these attacks and other harassment inflicted on the British settlement, it was finally necessary in 1841 to drive the enemy from Bir Ahmed, destroy the village of Sheikh Othman, and blockade the Fadhli coast. The Elphinstone was ordered to blockade Shuqra and destroy the fishing boats of the Fadhli located there. These boats had been engaged in nocturnal forays against any small fishing and trading boats which they could handle off the coast of Aden. Finally, an uneasy peace was established around Aden which lasted until 1850.¹

In May 1850 the first of a series of attacks directed against individuals of the British post in Aden took place. These attacks were carried out by members of the Fadhli and Aqrabi tribes and constituted a form of harassment rather than any real threat to the British position. By 1856 these attacks had come to an end, due in part to another British blockade of Shuqra which hurt the Fadhli economically. When the Fadhli sued for peace, the Aqrabi were quick to follow.²

The Abdali sultan, Ali, had cooperated with the British and had even assisted them in their attempt to capture the assassins of several members of the garrison. However, when the crisis had been settled, Sultan Ali created a new one of his own. He imposed an exorbitant toll upon the well at Sheikh Othman upon which Aden and its shipping were heavily dependent for water. A state of hostility again existed. In March 1858 the Abdali forcefully occupied Sheikh Othman,

¹Hunter, op. cit., p. 166.

²Ibid., p. 167.

forcing the British to retaliate in strength until once again peace reigned around Aden.

Still unaccustomed to the concept of a lasting peace, the Fadhli tribesmen recommenced raiding in 1865. The British retaliated in force, routing these tribesmen at Bir Said. The British then marched through Fadhli territory in a show of force, and Shuqra was once again attacked from the sea, this time resulting in the destruction of its forts. In May 1867 the Fadhli made a treaty binding them to "abstain from plunder, to maintain peace with their neighbours, and to give a hostage".¹

The rise of a new Abdali sultan in Lahej in 1863 served to improve relations with the English in this quarter as well; in fact, the English-Arab relations were not seriously disturbed again in the vicinity of the peninsula until the middle decades of the twentieth century.²

Sharing as they did common borders with Aden, the Abdali, Fadhli, and Aqrabi tribes all figured predominately in the affairs of the British port in its early years. They controlled one of the port's major sources of water and the flow of certain products from the interior on which Aden was dependent. A single, sustained, concerted effort on their part might well have been the undoing of the British settlement. But their activities were sporadic, far from united, and if the truth were known, they were probably much more interested in the immediate gains of their raids than any real desire to drive the British away. Economically the British presence was profitable to all.

¹Hunter, op. cit., p. 168.

²Western Arabia and the Red Sea, p. 275.

In time hostile relations eventually gave way to friendly diplomacy. In 1869 the peninsula of Little Aden (Jebel Ihsan) was added to the British holdings by purchase from the Aqrabi sheikh. In 1882 the town of Sheikh Othman was formally annexed to Aden when purchased from the Sultan of Lahej. With the sale of this town went some thirty-five square miles of territory. The Aden settlement ultimately came to comprise about eighty square miles of land.¹

The administrators in Aden had not been idle in the South Arabian hinterland either. In 1855 a convention for the suppression of slave trade was concluded with the Lower Aulaqi sheikhs, and in 1880 a similar agreement was made with the Amir of Dhala.² In 1876 the Mahri Sultan of Qishn and Socotra agreed not to give up any of his territory, except to the British. Ten years later he went one step further and accepted a British protectorate treaty. In 1888 protectorate arrangements were established with the Fadhlis, Aqrabis, Lower Aulaqis, Wahidis, and Lower Haura. A similar agreement was also concluded with the Sheikh of Irqa. These were later extended to include the Subeihis in 1889 and the Lower Yafa'is, Haushabis, and Alawis in 1895.³

This system of treaties, begun in the nineteenth century, was extended to include the Sharif of Beihan in 1903, the chiefs of Upper

¹Western Arabia and the Red Sea, p. 276.

²The titles of these various tribal leaders bears no relationship to the actual size or importance of their respective tribes.

³Western Arabia and the Red Sea, p. 276. The Kuria Muria Islands were ceded to the British in 1854 by the Sultan of Muscat and Oman and technically came under the Aden administration. However, due to their remoteness they were placed in the charge of the British resident in the Persian Gulf.

Yafa in 1903, the sheikhs and sultans of the Upper Aulaqis in 1904, and the chiefs of the Audhali confederation in 1914.¹

As a result of these various treaties, the task of the Aden government with respect to its neighbors and hinterland was much simplified with little more being required than a constant watchfulness emphasized by timely arbitration and underlined with occasional financial sanctions.

Perim Island, situated in the Bab al Mandeb between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, should not be overlooked. Captain F. M. Hunter noted with apparent pride that "Perim has never been permanently occupied by any nation save the British". In 1799 the East India Company took possession of the island and had it garrisoned by a force from Bombay. This occupation was a British reaction to the arrival of the French in Egypt, it being thought that by occupying this island, all movement through the Bab al Mandeb could be controlled. It was soon discovered that the straits were too wide to be commanded by the artillery then available, so the force was withdrawn.²

In 1857 Perim was again occupied in order to construct a lighthouse. This was finished in 1861, and arrangements were made for a garrison of fifty Indian troops and one European officer. In time the island became a fairly important coaling station and was administered by an assistant to the British resident in Aden until 1929 when the manager of the Perim Coal Company became the government agent. In 1936 this company closed down, and the Commissioner of Police, Aden,

¹Western Arabia and the Red Sea, p. 308.

²Hunter, op. cit., p. 172.

became the island's administrator. By then the island was again almost deserted, containing only two lighthouse crews, some fishermen, and a detachment of armed police from the Colony Police Force.¹

During the same years that Great Britain was becoming increasingly involved with the tribes around Aden, she was also drawn into closer relationships with the peoples of the Hadhramaut. Again there was reluctance, but time and events acted to replace this reluctance with motives of practical expediency. Always concerned with the desire to maintain an unchallenged route to India, Great Britain was forced to make the decision as to who would hold paramount influence in the Hadhramaut, herself or Ottoman Turkey. When this region first came to Great Britain's notice, it was involved in a continuous series of tribal conflicts which were a constant source of concern to the British, lying, as the region did, adjacent to Aden and along the water route to India. The trouble revolved around the territorial rivalries of three groups: the Kathiris, the Qu'aitis, and the Kasadis. The culmination of these troubles was reached in 1866 when the Kathiris captured Shihr from allies of the Kasadis. An appeal was made to the Qu'aitis, who responded with an armed force that drove the Kathiris out of Shihr. They then held the town for themselves. The Qu'aitis next forced the Kasadi naqib to sell them half of Mukalla. It was at this point that the Bombay Government intervened between these two groups and, in 1876, arranged a two-year truce. Following the truce the Kasadi naqib

¹Western Arabia and the Red Sea, p. 340, and Hickinbotham, op. cit., p. 11. In 1884 a cable station was established on Perim Island linking it with the Aden system discussed in Chapter I. Aden: South Arabian Notes No. 2 (Aden: Department of Antiquities, 1967), pp. 14 - 17.

pressed for British protection, claiming that if the British would not accept his offer, he would give Mukalla to anyone (except the Qu'aitis) who would take it. He mentioned as possible prospects Turkey, France, Italy, and Zanzibar. The British obviously did not like this prospect and, by their support, made it possible for the Qu'aitis to take full possession of Mukalla.

In 1882 the Qu'aitis agreed not to part with any of their lands except to the British, whose advice they would follow in foreign relations. In 1884 the British further committed themselves by agreeing to support the Qu'aiti ruler if the Kathiris attacked his ports. By 1888 Awadh al Qu'aiti, the ruler of this tribe, had signed a protectorate treaty, and in 1902 he was officially recognized as Sultan.¹

In 1918 the British imposed an agreement between the Qu'aiti and Kathiri sultans whereby the Qu'aitis were recognized as the rulers of the Hadhramaut, but they were to respect the special right of the Kathiris in particular localities.²

By the 1870's the French, who had displayed a renewed interest in the area, were effectively distracted by the Franco-Prussian War. The Egyptians had occupied Berbera on the Somali coast, a major source of Aden's fresh foodstuff, but normal supplies continued to be delivered. The Italians were developing a growing interest in the region and were carrying out tentative ventures in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. However, it was the Ottoman Turks who constituted a real threat to the British presence in Aden as a result of their reoccupation of Yemen and subsequent southward advances.

¹Western Arabia and the Red Sea, pp. 278-279.

²Ibid., p. 309.

The Turks revived the Yemeni Imam's claims to sovereignty over Lahej and its surrounding territories. By 1872 they had encroached on Abdali, Haushabi, and Amiri lands. In 1873 they actually occupied the Amiri capital of Dhala where they were to remain until 1903. In the same year the Turks occupied the fortified house of the Abdali sultan in Lahej. At that point the British sent out a force from Aden while making official complaints to the Porte. As a result the Turkish troops peacefully withdrew.¹

By the turn of the century the border problems between Yemen and the protectorate area had not been settled. Following an incident in 1900 between the Humar tribe in Turkish-controlled territory and the Haushabi, the Porte proposed a demarcation of the frontier. In 1902 it was formally agreed to carry out this proposal arranged between the two major powers concerned. In the same year the Anglo-Turkish Boundary Commission began its work at Sheikh Said, the south-westernmost corner of Arabia. The work was quite arduous due to the difficulty of the terrain and the many boundary disputes which had to be settled as the commission pursued its task. By 1903 Dhala was reached. In 1904 the Boundary Commission was withdrawn, the demarcation having been surveyed as far as the Yemeni town of Qataba.

Due to the lack of effective British or Turkish control beyond that point, the two countries agreed to divide the remainder of the area into respective spheres of influence. This was accomplished by means of a line drawn on their maps at a 45° angle extended into the Rub al Khali until it would turn northward running to the base of the

¹Western Arabia and the Red Sea, p. 275.

Qatar Peninsula. This line, to avoid confusion, was to always be shown as violet in color. The border agreement thus reached was ratified by both governments in 1914 as the Anglo-Turkish Convention.¹

After 1914 Great Britain and Turkey found themselves at war. Turkey constituted a threat to British interests in the Suez Canal, the Persian Gulf, and along the long Red Sea coastline, where she was provided with numerous sheltered bases from which to harass British shipping and maintain contact with dissident elements in Egypt and the Sudan. In Yemen there was a Turkish garrison of two divisions, a force strong enough to threaten Aden.

In June 1915 Turkish troops advanced from Mawiya near the frontier east of Ta'iz and from Hujariya. They were joined by the Sultan of Museimir with his Haushabi tribesmen in their successful assault on Lahej. The Sultan of Lahej undertook to engage the attacking force while simultaneously calling for British assistance. A hastily organized relief force sent out from Aden was overcome by the midday heat of a July day. In the resulting fiasco Lahej was lost, and the Turkish force was able to advance to Sheikh Othman and Little Aden. The British finally mounted an effective counterattack which succeeded in driving the Turks back to Lahej where they remained until the end of the war.²

¹Hickinbotham, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-56. This Convention became the overt bone of contention between the British and Yemen from its inception to the present. The Imams never accepted its validity, contradicting their own historical claim over the area as it did, and having been contracted by two foreign powers of occupation on Yemeni soil.

²Hickinbotham, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-15, and Western Arabia and the Red Sea, pp. 290-291. It is interesting to note that after the initial shock, life settled down to a normal routine. Almost amicable relations were established between the two forces as caravans passed freely in and out of Aden through the British and Turkish lines. When the

While these local events were occurring, the British were taking measures to insure their position in Aden in the post-war settlements. Great Britain made it clear in all her dealings with the Arab leaders that Aden was to be under her sway and should be excluded from the discussions of independence and liberation from Turkish rule then taking place.

In the first hearing of the Arab cause in the Peace Conference at the Quai d'Orsay in February 1919, an earlier statement of Amir Faisal which recognized Aden's position was reiterated:

The Hejaz, which is already a sovereign State, and Aden, which is a British dependency, are excluded from the Arab demand.¹

In the Anglo-Franco-Russian Agreement, better known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, a clause was inserted permitting the British to re-adjust Aden's borders which had been disputed by the Turkish occupation:

The British and French Governments shall agree to abstain from acquiring and to withhold their consent to a third Power acquiring territorial possessions in the Arabian Peninsula. . . . This, however, will not prevent such rectification of the Aden boundary as might be found necessary in view of recent Turkish attack.²

Turkish forces finally came down to the coast to surrender and be shipped home (in British ships), they were accorded a hero's welcome by the citizens of Aden.

¹George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (New York: Capricorn Books, 1965), p. 286. The demand for independent sovereignty under the guarantee of the League of Nations is the demand referred to in the quote.

²Ibid., p. 430. In 1915 Kamaran Island, lying some 200 miles north of Perim Island, was occupied by the British and administered as a quarantine station for Moslem pilgrims going to Mecca. The status of this island was left 'indeterminate' when the Turks renounced their rights over former Ottoman lands in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. The British remained in occupation of, but did not annex, the island. Western Arabia and the Red Sea, pp. 59 and 340.

While the European powers were ready to recognize British primacy in Aden, Yemen was not. After the First World War and the withdrawal of the Turkish forces from Yemen, the Imam refused to be bound by earlier Anglo-Ottoman agreements concerning the Yemen-Aden Protectorate border problems.¹ Throughout the decade of the 1920's the Imam, encouraged by the Italians, continued to threaten encroachment into Protectorate territory. In 1926 the Imam signed a ten-year treaty of friendship and commerce with Italy. Italy formally recognized Yemen's independence; England had not done so. A Yemeni state visit to Italy in 1927 followed by an arms agreement served as a further testimony to Italian interest in the region. An Italy, already in Eritrea, who dominated Yemen, could bring very unpleasant pressure on the British.²

In February 1928 the Yemenis kidnapped two protectorate chiefs. The British used their recently established air arm in Aden to bomb Ta'iz, Qataba, and other border centers. The Yemenis were so shaken that they evacuated almost all the territory they had occupied, resulting in the return of a certain degree of peace and political stability in the area.³

Growing Saudi Arabian interest in regions of Northern Yemen finally convinced the Imam that he would be wise to reach some under-

¹The term 'Protectorate' or 'Aden Protectorate' will be used to indicate the regions occupied by the various sheikhdoms in Southern Arabia around Aden that held or came to hold treaties of protection with the British, even though technically there was no Protectorate until 1937, and the Protectorate ceased to exist with independence in South Arabia in 1967.

²William Spencer, Political Evolution in the Middle East (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1962), p. 325.

³Ingrams, op. cit., p. 67.

standing with the British to the south. Thus Sir Bernard Reilly, British resident in Aden, was well received when he visited Sana in 1933 with a proposal for a treaty to be negotiated,

. . . which was designed to bring peace to the Protectorate-Yemen frontier by stabilising for a number of years the actual situation existing on the frontier on the date when the treaty was signed. . . .¹

This treaty, which did not involve a renunciation of claims held by either side, was signed on February 11, 1934. The frontier line, referred to by Reilly as the status quo frontier line, was to remain in force for forty years and became the basis for Anglo-Yemeni relations in the 1950's.²

It appears that the British felt they had accomplished a major step toward achieving protectorate security. They placed a heavy reliance on the provisions of the Treaty of Sana, as is indicated in Article Six which states that:

This treaty shall be the basis of all subsequent agreements that may be concluded between the high contracting parties now and in the future for the purposes of friendship and amity. The high contracting parties undertake not to assist nor to connive at any action directed against the friendship and concord now sincerely existing between them.³

The third article of the treaty was to cause future problems. It deferred any permanent settlement of the frontier until further negotiations took place sometime in the lifetime of the treaty, which was for forty years. The Yemenis held that the status quo mentioned in the

¹Sir Bernard Reilly, Aden and the Yemen (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1960), p. 18.

²Ibid., pp. 18 and 74.

³Ibid., p. 74.

article referred to the actual internal political situation in the Protectorate, while the British held that it referred to the Yemeni-Protectorate border.

During this same period Reilly had made a visit to the Hadhramaut region. In 1933 he asked for the creation of an advisory post in the Eastern Protectorate and sent Harold Ingrams to report on the economic, social, and political aspects of the area.¹ Reilly's decision was based

. . . on the needs only of the Western Protectorate and said that the objects of political work there were to collect intelligence, co-operate with the Royal Air Force, assist the chiefs to settle disputes and see that the trade routes were kept open, keep an eye on conditions on the Yemeni frontier and help in peaceful development and welfare such as promoting the provision of simple medical treatment.²

Continual feuds and warfare among the tribes in the area made it impossible for Ingrams to carry out his mission, so he set out to rectify the situation by establishing a three-year truce. "All I sought to do was to secure peace by general consent and then try to help the Hadhramaut to run itself without outside interference."³ This truce, concluded in 1937 and known as "Ingrams' Peace", suhl Ingrams, involved

¹Welcome to Aden: A Comprehensive Guidebook (Nairobi: Guides and Handbooks of Africa Publishing Company, 1961), p. 190.

²Harold Ingrams, Arabia and the Isles (London: John Murray, 1966), p. 13. Hereafter, page references to this work will refer to the author's introduction to the third edition in which the pages are numbered in italicized Arabic numerals rather than Roman numbers and run from page five to page 102.

³Ibid., p. 23.

individual negotiations with some 1,400 chiefs. For the first time within memory the local tribes experienced peace.¹

During this same period Ingrams signed five advisory treaties with local rulers in the Eastern Protectorate, obliging them to accept the advice of the Governor of Aden in matters concerning the welfare and development of these territories.²

¹Welcome to Aden: A Comprehensive Guidebook, p. 190.

²Holden, op. cit., p. 37. It was not until Sharif Husain of Beihan signed a similar treaty in 1944 that this principle was applied in the Western Protectorate.

CHAPTER III

ADEN AND THE PROTECTORATE

Through the years much of the spirit of the Indian Empire lingered on in Aden, getting more tattered and thumb-marked through the decades, but satisfied and paternalistic still.*

The former British colony of Aden, situated in the southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula, had an area of less than eighty square miles. In addition, it had two dependencies, Perim Island of about five square miles and the Kuria Muria Islands of some thirty square miles. The Aden Peninsula, of volcanic formation, is high, rocky, and quite barren on its slopes. The modern town of Steamer Point and the harbor are about five miles from the original town of Crater, which, as its name implies, lies in an extinct volcano. Between the two centers sprawls the village of Maalla, which has developed over the years into an industrial and residential area. The Isthmus of Khormaksar, which joins Aden to the mainland, is the site of the air base of the same name. On the mainland is the town of Sheikh Othman and beyond it the Peninsula of Little Aden where the refinery is located.¹

Aden's hinterland is characterized by a narrow coastal plain, varying in depth from four to forty miles and extending along some 740 miles of coast from the Straits of Bab el Mandeb to the border of

*"Aden Between Two Ages," The Economist, Vol. 180, No. 5893 (August 4, 1956), pp. 411-412.

¹Sir Reader Bullard (ed.), The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 106.

Muscat and Oman. Running parallel to and behind this littoral belt is a range of hills 1,000 to 2,000 feet high, which in turn is backed by a 5,000 to 8,000 foot high plateau which merges into the high country of southern Yemen in the south and west, while in the north it falls away to the Rub' al Khali. The whole area is intersected by deep, mostly dry, river valleys, along which are located the principle agricultural areas of the South Arabian states. The total area of this former Aden Protectorate region is some 112,000 square miles.¹ Formerly divided into the Eastern and Western Protectorate, in more recent years nearly all of its western states plus one of the eastern states united to form the South Arabian Federation, which, after 1963, included Aden Colony as well.

Climatically this southern Arabian region is marked by two seasons, the warm season lasting from May to September and coinciding with the southwest monsoon, and the cool season occupying the rest of the year from October to April, the period of the northeast monsoon.²

From a population of a little more than a thousand in 1839, the population of Aden grew to an estimated 200,000 by the early 1960's.³ In 1959 the estimated population of the Protectorate states was estimated at nearly 795,000, of whom 430,000 were in the Western Protector-

¹British Information Services, Aden and South Arabia (London: Reference Division, Central Office of Information, No. R. 5671, January 1965), p. 2, and Bullard, op. cit., p. 113.

²British Information Services, Aden and South Arabia, p. 2.

³Reginald Sorensen, Aden, the Protectorates and the Yemen (London: Devonport Press Ltd., 1961), p. 12. A census taken in 1955 gave the following results: Aden Arabs - 36,910; Protectorate Arabs - 18,881; Yemeni Arabs - 48,088; Somalis - 10,611; Indians - 15,817; British - 3,763; Jews - 831; Others - 3,329. Bullard, op. cit., p. 107.

ate. There were nineteen states in the Western and five states in the Eastern Protectorates, respectively, each ruled by a sultan, amir, or sheikh selected by a variety of means.¹

Until 1932 Aden was governed as a Residency by the Government of Bombay. After nearly one hundred years, the Indian Imperial Government in New Delhi took Aden under its direct control, at which time it became a Chief Commissionship. Finally on April 1, 1937, it was constituted a Crown Colony and came directly under the Colonial Office in London. At the same time the Aden Protectorate was formally recognized.²

After 1937 Aden, as a crown colony, was administered by a governor, assisted by an executive council. The Executive Council of Aden consisted of the officers lawfully discharging the functions of chief secretary, attorney general, financial secretary, and any others appointed on special occasions in accordance with the Royal Instructions for the Colony. If at any time the governor desired the advice of any other person within the colony concerning internal affairs, he could summon that person as an extraordinary member of the council.³

In the Protectorate, on the other hand, there was no direct British administration. Law was administered through Koranic Shari'a courts and tribal courts, which was perfectly acceptable to a traditional all-Arab population, the majority of whom belonged to the Shafi'i sect of Islam. The various states were governed by their own rulers, who in time were provided with British advisory staffs. There

¹Sorensen, op. cit., p. 18.

²Western Arabia and the Red Sea, p. 305.

³Aden: Report for the Years 1955 and 1956 (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1958), p. 76.

were also British agents for the Western and Eastern Protectorates as a whole. The 'Resident Adviser and British Agent' for the West worked out of Aden, while his counterpart in the East was posted in Mukalla.¹

The actual administrative division running between the western and eastern halves of the Protectorate was a matter of convenient necessity, created when a particular British Agent in the western half of the Protectorate of very determined character permitted no encroachment in what he considered his area of responsibility. Unfortunately, he was matched by an equally strong-willed administrator in the Hadhramaut who displayed definite acquisitive tendencies. The line was drawn to prevent a war between these two notables who had to be instructed to thereafter keep within their respective boundaries.²

British officials serving in the Protectorate are there in an advisory capacity and not as administrators, for it has never been the policy of the British Government to introduce any form of direct British administration . . . but to encourage and assist local Arab rulers in the good government of their States and to intervene directly only in times of emergency if there is a breakdown in security or a situation arises in which it becomes the clear duty of the protecting power to assert its authority in the public interest. Such cases are infrequent. When direct British action has been necessary it has usually been in response to an appeal of the rulers for help against external aggression or subversion such as that practised by the Yemen.³

This was the concept of the first governor of Aden Colony after 1937, Sir Bernard Reilly, who also supervised the activities of these advisors and was largely responsible for the nature of the British-South Arabian relationships which evolved out of those years.

¹Welcome to Aden: A Comprehensive Guidebook, pp. 42 and 46.

²Hickinbotham, op. cit., pp. 116-117.

³Sorensen, op. cit., p. 18.

In addition to the thirty-one Treaties of Protection which had been concluded during the years of British hegemony in South Arabia, thirteen advisory treaties were also initiated. The advisory treaties went beyond promises of protection and bound the local ruler concerned to cooperate with and accept the advice of the Governor of Aden in all matters dealing with the welfare and development of his territory.¹ The first of these were concluded in 1937 and 1939 when the Qu'aiti and Kathiri sultans accepted these special arrangements. In 1949 the Wahidi sultan followed suit, while in 1944 and 1945 five rulers in the Western Protectorate accepted similar treaties. Three more western rulers were to adopt advisory treaties in 1952.²

It was these advisory treaties, designed to develop the economy and improve the administrative machinery in the states concerned, which were so disturbing to the Yemeni Imam. In an attempt to legitimize his subversive efforts in South Arabia, he claimed that these treaties violated the status quo of Article Three of the 1934 Sana Treaty; that is, they altered the internal political situation from what it had been in 1934.

The military organization which developed in Aden and the Protectorate was the result of a rather disorganized, haphazard process. Originally the military had been charged with administering Aden, a British officer from the Indian Service being appointed Resident. He was assisted in his task by both military and civilian political assistants. He had at his command several regiments of British and

¹Reilly, *op. cit.*, pp. 16 and 22.

²Aden: Report for the Years 1955 and 1956, pp. 124-125.

Indian troops, several batteries of artillery, and a locally raised cavalry troop of some 100 South Arabian tribesmen. After the First World War responsibility for Aden was transferred from the Army to the Air Force, with the result that much of the former British infantry was no longer available. The forces directly available to defend Aden were further decreased after 1937 when an independent Aden Colony was created no longer connected with the Indian government.

The Governor of Aden had always been faced with two separate problems, the maintenance of law and order in Aden Colony and the maintenance of security in the Protectorate. The British had quickly brought Aden under effective control with internal security being ably maintained by a capable police force. The air officer commanding had an additional body of security troops at his command, as well as the Aden Protectorate Levies who could be used in the Colony in times of emergency.

The Aden Protectorate Levies had been raised in 1928 by Lt. Colonel M. C. Lake when the Royal Air Force assumed responsibility for the defense of Aden. They were created to guard the air base and the landward side of Aden. The Levies, under British and Arab officers, in time came to be concerned with the security of the entire Protectorate.¹

The lack of well-organized administrations in the sheikhdoms, aggravated by intertribal feuds, had resulted in conditions bordering on anarchy in many areas of the Protectorate. The Levies were responsible for the security of the over-all Protectorate area rather than

¹Hickinbotham, op. cit., p. 99, and Welcome to Aden: A Comprehensive Guidebook, pp. 42, 113, and 191.

the internal problems of the various sheikhdoms. To fill this void, the British encouraged the Protectorate rulers to create their own internal security forces for the maintenance of internal law and order. These units, known as Tribal Guards, developed into relatively efficient internal police forces.¹

However, the Tribal Guards were not adequate to deal with all the internal problems of the Western Protectorate and came to be supplemented by the Government Guards. They were created in the late 1930's by a former political officer in Aden, Lord Belhaven. They were under the general direction of the British Agent for the Western Protectorate.²

The Tribal Guards were trained by instructors from the Government Guards, and the two forces together were conceived as functioning as civil and internal security forces, while the Aden Protectorate Levies came to be viewed as a proper regional military force.

The equivalent of the Government Guards in the Eastern Protectorate was the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion. Harold Ingrams conceived the idea of the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion in 1938 after a visit to Jordan. It was to be recruited only from bedouins, to act as a policing force, and to also serve as a vehicle for spreading education, medical help, and a sense of trust between the various sections of the Hadhramaut.³

The various states in the Eastern Protectorate had, through their traditional associations with rulers in India and other eastern

¹Welcome to Aden: A Comprehensive Guidebook, p. 191.

²Hickinbotham, op. cit., p. 98.

³Ingrams, Arabia and the Isles, p. 30.

countries, long since borrowed the idea of an established internal police force. The Qu'aiti sultan, in fact, possessed what can only be described as a small army.

One force of overwhelming significance in the history of the British in Aden was the presence of the Royal Air Force. When Aden became an Air Command in 1928, there ceased to be any infantry in Aden other than the newly created Aden Protectorate Levies. Therefore, the British turned to the use of air as a retaliatory striking force against wayward tribesmen, a tactic that had proven quite successful on the Northwest Frontier in India, as well as in Kurdistan.

The air force was especially suited for the security operations in the area due to the rugged, often nearly impassable terrain, which could place a conventional, landbound, punitive force at the mercy of the tribesmen they were sent out to punish. In addition, the Yemeni and Saudi borders were more effectively patrolled by air or air used in conjunction with fixed ground observation posts. The governors of Aden saw their air arm as an integral part of their security force.

The first duty of all Governors and Administrators is to maintain security in the area under their authority, and in order to enable them to carry out this primary function they are provided with security forces which may take the form of police, armed or unarmed, and troops, regular or irregular, and even aircraft.¹

Much criticism has been leveled against the British in the past for their air strikes against backward tribesmen, but as several past governors have emphasized, it was often the most humane and honorable way of keeping the peace. In Sir Bernard Reilly's words:

¹Hickinbotham, op. cit., p. 81.

A time limit would be imposed for the payment of the fine, and the offenders would be warned that, if it were not paid within the time allowed, they should move themselves . . . from a specified village or group of houses and the surrounding ground as certain buildings would be demolished from the air. . . . This operation . . . would be bloodless, which a ground operation might not have been. . . . It is a form of collective punishment, but that is understood and not resented by tribesmen who, in a country without a regular police, would refuse to surrender an individual culprit.¹

Eventually as the Government and Tribal Guards became more effective, the need for air action became less common. Due to their bloodless character, it was inevitable that in time these air strikes would lose their effectiveness. As a writer in the 1960's put it:

The real disadvantages of the method are that it suffers from diminishing returns on the ground, as the tribesmen realize that a bit of bombing will probably do them little harm, combined with sharply rising criticism nowadays from abroad.²

By 1959 the Aden Protectorate Levies numbered over 3,000 men. With federation in the Protectorate in 1959, this unit was redesignated the Federal Regular Army. However, it continued to remain under the Commander, British Forces Arabian Peninsula, with British and Arab officers. The Government Guards, which had reached a strength of 2,000 men, were redesignated the Federal Guard, but continued to be financially supported by the British Government and were under the direct control of the Governor. The Hadhrami Bedouin Legion continued as it was, under the direct control of the Governor, constituting a force of some 1,165 men. The various rulers in the Eastern and Western Protectorate states continued to maintain their personal internal Tribal

¹Reilly, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

²Holden, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

Guards.¹

Prior to the mid-twentieth century, political activity in Aden and the Protectorate states was practically nonexistent. When the British administrators desired local opinion, they would consult the various community and business leaders, being satisfied that they had taken into consideration the local opinion 'that counted'. In the mid-fifties, however, there arose several political parties representing the full range of public opinion from support for the British to a strong desire for South Arabian independence.

The most conservative of these was the Aden Association, a party which grew, in part, out of an earlier, defunct organization called the Muslim Association which had advocated a Pan-Islamic platform. The Aden Association was a moderate nationalist group advocating home rule for Aden within the Commonwealth. It was essentially the party of the prosperous Aden Colony community which rallied round the slogan of 'Aden for the Adenese'. Its leaders liked to call themselves the 'Queen's Arabs'.²

The South Arabian League was a nationalist party advocating union between the Colony and the Protectorate. It later extended this platform to include Yemen as well. The South Arabian League (SAL) wanted immediate independence and the complete removal of all British influence from South Arabia. This party was to have a long history and

¹Reilly, op. cit., pp. 13-14. There is some disparity in the actual number of men in the several forces among the sources on this subject, but Reilly's figures give a good appreciation of their approximate size during the year cited.

²Ibid., p. 42, and "Aden Between Two Ages," The Economist, Vol. 180, No. 5893 (August 4, 1956), p. 411.

figured in the history of Aden Colony up to the time of independence.¹

The third and most extreme party of significance during these years was the National United Front. This group wanted an independent South Arabia comprising Aden, the Protectorate, Yemen, and Muscat and Oman. Described as an offshoot of the SAL tending more to the left, the National United Front laid emphasis on social as well as political problems. It grew at the expense of the moderates after the Suez crisis in 1956. The Aden Colony governor at the time showed his lack of concern and respect for them when he wrote, "they lack common sense and their leaders are irresponsible demagogues".²

In spite of this rather offhand dismissal of this early manifestation of budding nationalism, another observer on the scene noted that ". . . the urge for political independence is irresistible, and British policy in Aden must, by the nature of things, be a rearguard action".³

In 1944 a Legislative Council for Aden Colony was set up and inaugurated in 1947. The Governor was president, there were four ex officio members, four official members, and not more than eight unofficial members. In 1955, in a move to introduce limited constitutional advance in the Colony, the Council was reconstituted to include four members elected to unofficial seats. At the same time the membership of the Council was enlarged to eighteen members. These elected members,

¹Hickinbotham, op. cit., p. 196.

²Ibid., p. 196-198, and Bullard, op. cit., p. 107.

³"Aden Between Two Ages," op. cit., p. 411.

who were to hold office for three years, were admitted to the Council in January 1956.¹

Three of the four elected seats were won by the Aden Association, which was interpreted as a victory for Aden home rule over the more extreme move for South Arabian unity and independence. The fact that the SAL and the National United Front boycotted this election does not seem to have affected the above opinion.²

The Under-Secretary for Colonial Affairs, Lord Lloyd, visited Aden in May 1956, where he took the opportunity to address the Legislative Council on the subject of constitutional advance in the colony marked by the recent seating of four elected members. In his address he advised the need for slow, tested advance and emphasized his point when he said:

But I should like you to understand that for the foreseeable future it would not be reasonable or sensible, or indeed in the interests of the Colony's inhabitants, for them to aspire to any aim beyond that of a considerable degree of internal self-government. . . .³

During his visit anti-British demonstrations were organized by the National United Front and the SAL. Lord Lloyd passed these incidents off with the comment that,

I would not wish you to think as you may from reading the papers that this was a mass rising of the oppressed people of Aden. It was organized by about 200 people who arrived in charabancs.⁴

¹Welcome to Aden: A Comprehensive Guidebook, p. 192.

²"Aden," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 11 (1957-1958), p. 15296.

³Ibid.

⁴The Arab World, June 15, 1956, p. 6.

Such activity was seen for the portent it was, however, by the moderate Aden Association, which presented Lord Lloyd with proposals for a Legislative Council with a majority of elected members, a ministry responsible to the Council, a reduction in the number of British officers in senior posts, the replacement of English by Arabic as the official language, and greater attention to education.¹

The British apparently took heed of the agitation for increased self-government, even by their favorites in the Aden Association who through polite and patient determination were achieving more at that time than the more extreme nationalist parties. At any rate, Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies, announced in Parliament that a statement of proposals for constitutional development was published in Aden on November 11, 1957, which ". . . will give the people of Aden a real measure of participation in the internal government of the Colony".² While certainly a significant event, it was doubtful if anyone realized that ten years later to the month, these first cautious measures, designed to delegate greater participation in the internal administration of the Colony to local Adenese, would result in the expulsion of the British from South Arabia. Only a year had passed since the British had been internationally embarrassed in the Suez debacle, which might account for their willingness to give the appearance of cooperating with the less extreme demands of the newly awakening nationalist movement in Aden. How much of this awakening was

¹"Aden," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 11 (1957-1958), p. 15296.

²Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 578 (1957-1958), c. 982. The numbering in Hansard volumes is by column rather than page.

natural and how much of it was induced through the administrations of President Nasser of Egypt is not entirely clear. However, it soon became quite evident that once the movement was under way, Nasser, riding the wave of his recent success against the British, was set for another round and prepared to give the South Arabian nationalists any assistance they might desire.

The new constitution became effective in November 1958. It provided for an enlarged Executive Council consisting of five British ex officio members and five elected or nominated Adeni members of the Legislative Council, not less than three of whom would be elected members, selected and appointed by the Governor. The Adeni ministers would be responsible for education, public works, communications, labor and social welfare, and medical services.

The Legislative Council was to consist of twelve elected members, six members nominated by the Governor and five ex officio members. The Council would be presided over by a speaker, appointed by the Governor, who would have no vote.¹

Elections for the twelve Adeni members of the Legislative Council were held in January 1959. The election was boycotted by the Aden Trades Union Congress which by this time had become the leading voice of nationalist aspirations in the Colony. Thus all twelve of the members were moderates, and it was not to be expected that the Governor would follow this up by appointing opposition members when he selected the six nominated members.

¹Aden: Report for the Years 1957 and 1958 (London: HMSO, 1961), p. 85.

The Governor of Aden in 1960 seemed quite confident when he said:

In its constitutional development I am satisfied that the Colony is taking the right road and at the right pace. There are many critics . . . who will not accept this statement, but some of them at any rate are little concerned with retaining the individuality of this unique port and territory and prefer to put other interests above the interests of Aden. Their opposition will not prevent Her Majesty's Government and this Government from continuing by gradual and ordered steps along the road to more fully responsible self-government.¹

A less involved observer had this to say:

The seeds of democracy that are being planted on the colony's barren soil will have more chance of survival if they are cultivated by all the people living there. Representative government there may succeed as an Arab institution, but the chances of success are small if it comes to be regarded merely as a British imposition.²

Having traced the course of constitutional advancement in the Colony, one other development of this period must now be examined. Trade unions were introduced to the Colony, as they had been elsewhere in the Empire, by the British after the Second World War.³ The first trade union formed in Aden was a group of European employees, the Aden Port Pilots, formed in 1952.⁴ In 1953 two more unions were formed. One of these was the Forces Civilian Employees' Association which

¹"Aden Colony: Speech by His Excellency the Governor and Commander-in-Chief at the Opening of the Second Session of the Legislative Council, January 25, 1960," Unnumbered publication attached to Administrative Survey 1949, for Aden Colony (GPA/8541/14c/1-60).

²"Limited Democracy," The Economist, Vol. 190, No. 6020 (January 10, 1959), p. 117.

³On behalf of the British TUC, Mr. James Young, Mr. Albert Lewis, Mr. Andrew Dalglish, and also Special Adviser, Mr. T. E. Fallows, have given considerable service in helping to organize and advise trade unions in Aden. Sorensen, op. cit., p. 13.

⁴D. C. Watt, "Labor Relations and Trades Unionism in Aden, 1952-1960," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Autumn 1962), p. 443.

linked together the local employees of the British forces in Aden, one of the largest employers of local labor in South Arabia. A rapid expansion of the Trades Union movement in 1956 was accompanied by a serious outbreak of labor disputes. In that year there were some seventy strikes, accounting for the loss of nearly 210,000 workingman days, involving around 18,000 men in all and the loss of around £100,000 in wages.¹

A Commission of Inquiry set up by the Colonial Government to include a local Arab trade unionist, two Arab members of the Legislative Council, and one British ex-trade unionist of the Colonial Office Labor Advisory Committee reported that the main cause of these strikes

. . . lay in the presence of a good deal of genuine grievance and a lack of, or lack of confidence in, or lack of experience in working, the normal machinery for ventilating grievances and discussing them with employers or their representatives common in Western countries.²

This commission identified four categories of workers' grievances: working hours and conditions of employment, fringe benefits, legislation, and immigration.³ The commission also noted that the National United Front Party had tried to intervene in the labor disputes, this being particularly suspicious considering that some of the union officials were also officials in the National United Front and

¹Watt, op. cit., p. 446, and Aden: Report for the Years 1955 and 1956, p. 13.

²Watt, op. cit., p. 447.

³Among other things the serang system was in effect. Contract labor was recruited on a clan basis from the Protectorate and sub-contracted to employers in gangs. The contractor was paid directly on a per capita basis for the gang; he then deducted from their wages their living costs, etc., resulting in exploitation of the employers by misrepresentation and the workers who were at the individual contractor's mercy. Watt, op. cit., p. 447.

might have been using the labor connections as a political tool. Sir Tom Hickinbotham denied the labor leaders even these political motives and claimed that:

. . . their leaders often behaved in an ill-mannered and provocative manner and conducted themselves generally like people with an inferiority complex rather out of their depth, which is precisely what they were.¹

He goes on to accuse them of trying out the new labor tool of protest, the strike, in the same manner that children with a new toy cannot wait to wind it up to see what will happen. While this judgment appears a little harsh and there obviously were many legitimate grievances, the strikes called during these early years often appeared hasty and excessive in number.

One result of the 1956 strikes was the formation of an Aden Trades Union Congress which affiliated with both the ICFTU and the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions (ICATU). Its leading figure was Abdallah Abd al-Majid al-Asnag (hereafter referred to as al-Asnag). Secretary of the Aden Airways Employees Union, he became the secretary of the Aden Trades Union Congress (ATUC) as well. In the absence of an experienced body of labor leaders in Aden, leadership for the ATUC was drawn from white collar workers associated with the Arab nationalist movement rather than from among the blue collar workers themselves. Their relationship to the workers was that of a patron to his client - most meaningful to those who have been only recently or partially detribalized.²

To facilitate the development of the ATUC, the Colonial Govern-

¹Hickinbotham, op. cit., p. 186.

²Watt, op. cit., pp. 448-449.

ment of Aden formed a Labor Advisory Board, and in 1957, a Joint Consultative Committee was proposed with labor representation, but the ATUC refused to participate with either of these governmental attempts to create a negotiating agency.

Strikes continued to occur throughout 1957 and into 1958. In April 1958 a twenty-four hour strike was held in protest against the Government's immigration policy. As early as the late 1940's the Colonial Government had been warned that trouble would ensue if priority of employment was not given to the local labor force. Over the years the idea had become fixed that if one wanted skilled labor, he looked to the Indian rather than to the indigenous labor market.¹ As the Arabs began to acquire some education and technical skills, they came to resent a veritable army of Indian clerks and artisans in their midst doing work which they felt should rightfully be their own. In the past the Government had implemented some restrictions on immigration, but they were not nearly as stringent as they should have been.²

In theory, a prospective immigrant had to have an entry visa applied for by a prospective employer, who had determined that there were no suitable persons already in Aden qualified for the employment in question. In fact, the regulations were not adhered to. The ATUC proposed setting up a Commission of Inquiry to scrutinize all entry permits issued during the five years preceding 1958. At the same time an early extension of training facilities for locally born people was urged.

¹See f.n., page 27 above.

²Watt, op. cit., p. 450, and Hickinbotham, op. cit., pp. 44, 45, and 183.

A basic problem facing the Government in this issue was that of determining who were Adenese and who were immigrants. The ATUC claimed that the large bloc of Yemeni Arabs working in Aden should be treated as citizens for the simple reason that they were Arabs, not to mention that they constituted the backbone of the organized labor movement in the Colony. The Government, on the other hand, saw them as refugees from the economic and social conditions current in Yemen and a potential source of Arab nationalist agitation in the Colony. The Indians, Somalis, and Pakistanis, to whom the ATUC so violently objected, were, in the eyes of the British, fully entitled to migrate to the Colony due to their Commonwealth association.¹

Cairo's Voice of the Arabs reported on April 28, 1959, that al-Asnag had asked the ICATU to protect Arab elements in Aden against the immigration of Commonwealth citizens. A British spokesman put this down as ". . . merely a mischievous attempt to manufacture a grievance where none exists . . ." ² While many of their grievances concerning working conditions, wages, and racial discrimination were valid, the ATUC was capable of overstepping the bounds and using labor pressure devices for purely political matters. On October 31, 1958, disturbances broke out in Crater following the conviction by the Aden Supreme Court of two Aden journalists cited for contempt of court. On the second of November a general strike was called by the ATUC in protest against the convictions. Mr. Lennox-Boyd, Colonial Secretary, said that:

¹Nevill Barbour, "Aden and the Arab South," The World Today, Vol. 15, No. 8 (August 1959), pp. 306-307.

²The Arab World, May 5, 1959, p. 9.

The one-hour strike had no industrial objectives and no political objective. Its sole objective was intimidation of court proceedings and an attempt to bring pressure to bear so that defendants in court proceedings would be dealt with leniently. This is the sort of thing which cannot be tolerated, and I entirely uphold the action which was taken.¹

The action taken was the arrest of some 560 men and the deportation of 240 Yemenis. Again Mr. Lennox-Boyd had something to say on this point:

Although the strike was called by the Aden TUC, the rioters were mainly Yemeni immigrant workers, and the Aden population as a whole clearly did not sympathize.²

Another instance of labor activity in the sphere of political affairs was the already mentioned ATUC boycott of the elections for the Legislative Council. There is no doubt that they did have some justification. Out of a total population of some 180,000, the number of registered voters was only 21,554. Particularly galling to Adeni Arabs was the fact that the Indians, Pakistanis, and Somalis could become eligible to vote by virtue of their Commonwealth membership.

A series of labor incidents in 1959 served to drive individual employers into a state of angry militancy. Both sides rejected the procedures of conciliation and arbitration. Tired of seeing production and operations halted while the local labor organizations played out their political role, the Colony employers demanded action. In 1960 Mr. Fallowes, a member of Parliament and former British trade union official, went to Aden to study the situation. He concluded that the trade union movement was abusing its freedom to combine and using its immunity at law to coerce and undermine the Government. He stated:

¹Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 594 (1958-1959), c. 613.

²Ibid.

I am convinced that steps must be taken to prevent by suitable restrictive legislation the present easy access by the trade unions to the strike weapon.¹

The result of all this was the Industrial Disputes and Compulsory Arbitration Ordinance of 1960 which was passed by the Legislative Council of Aden on August 15, 1960. The main element in the ordinance was the establishment of an Industrial Court to which labor disputes were to be referred. Although the ATUC attempted to boycott the ordinance and the court, it was forced to negotiate with the employers rather than forcing them to yield by the immediate application of the strike weapon which had become their sole modus operandi by that time.²

The ATUC claimed that this ordinance made all strikes illegal. It was supported in its claim by the ICFTU. However, Mr. Iain Macleod, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, saw it in a different light:

There is no doubt whatever that all strikes are not illegal. They are not illegal where wage councils have been created; they are not illegal where a collective agreement has been concluded and a certificate issued by the President of the Court; they are not illegal where the Crown is not prepared to accept Arbitration, and they are not illegal where, in the opinion of the Industrial Court, an employer or association has not acted in good faith. . . . I have . . . looked at the point of view of the representations, particularly in relation to our obligations under the I.L.O. Convention, and I am satisfied that they do not conflict.³

¹Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 660 (1961-1962), c. 403.

²Watt, op. cit., pp. 453-454, and Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol 630 (1960-1961), c. 184-185.

³Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 630 (1960-1961), c. 185.

CHAPTER IV

FEDERATION, THE YEMEN, AND IMPERIALISM IN SOUTH ARABIA

Aden was now mostly staffed by officers with African experience, and Aden Colony and Protectorate made no sense to minds accustomed to 'Colonies and Protectorates' such as the Gold Coast, Nigeria and Kenya. . . . It was unfortunate that, at the time the policy of Federation was adopted, it was thought to be the best thing for Central Africa. It was an accident of history that the author of the plan came from that region and that, with the dissolution of the Middle East Division of the Colonial Office, the affairs of Aden were being handled by the Central African Department. It would have been remarkable indeed if these things had not influenced the course of affairs.*

The independence movement in Aden was marked by a stubborn British reluctance to face the inevitable, a stout nationalist resolve to accept no substitute for independence on its own terms, and an unfortunately large amount of violence. The British administrators claimed that they were introducing constitutional reforms designed to lead to full independence as quickly as was practical, while the nationalists claimed that the British moves were no more than delaying tactics designed to extend and, if possible, perpetuate exclusive United Kingdom influence in South Arabia.

Aden's nationalists refused to have anything to do with constitutional advances toward internal self-government in the absolute conviction that to cooperate would be tantamount to capitulation to the aims of the colonialists. Those moderates who did cooperate were dismissed as 'lackeys' of imperialism.

* Ingrams, Arabia and the Isles, p. 60.

The events in Aden Colony were only an adjunct to the larger scheme introduced to South Arabia in the fifties. This was the plan for a federation of Protectorate states, linked with Aden, and an integral part of what has become known as Britain's 'East of Suez' policy. The early concern for the peninsular coaling station of 1839 eventually gave way to elaborate involvement with the hinterland designed to protect the original enclave:

We had but newly arrived in Aden and secured a foothold on the shore of Arabia and, following the practice which we had found to be so successful in India, . . . were anxious to surround our new possession and its valuable harbour with friendly States which would act as a buffer between our property and any potential enemy from the landward side. Our motives were entirely selfish and our conduct remained so until this present century. . . .¹

The main object of the Treaties was protection, protection from the Yemen as far as the tribes were concerned, and protection from the Yemen and the tribes themselves as far as we were concerned.²

As the years passed and this buffer grew in complexity and size, the degree of British involvement continually increased. Nowhere, however, did this lead to any really significant degree of political or economic development with the possible exception of the Abyan Scheme.³ This lack of progress was particularly evident when the condition of

¹Hickinbotham, op. cit., p. 63.

²Ibid., p. 64.

³The Abyan Scheme, begun in 1949 in Fadhli Sultanate, converted an arid desert area into a highly productive agricultural region where today some of the world's best long-staple Egyptian cotton is grown. In only six years the value of the crop was £2,400,000. The population of the region, over ten times what it was before the project was initiated, enjoys a standard of living higher than anywhere else in the Western Protectorate region. Particularly notable is the fact that the scheme was from the beginning managed by an Arab Board. Bullard, op. cit., p. 117.

the Protectorate states was compared with that of Aden Colony. Each small state stood alone, many of them hardly viable economically, and nearly all to some degree dependent on British financial support. It was becoming progressively clearer to the sheikhs and sultans that progress in the Protectorate was hampered by the lack of a structure which would encourage the various states to cooperate for their mutual benefit.

At a conference of tribal sheikhs in 1930, the idea of a defensive alliance on the lines of the Jirga system then existing in Baluchistan was presented. The various states would form a unit capable of concerted action in frontier defense, collective negotiation, and settlement of local differences by arbitration. At that time a simple agreement expressing these ideas was drafted and signed by some nineteen local rulers. This was a far cry from the concept of a federation. An observer of that time noted that:

To assemble on a basis of friendly relationship all the tribes of the Protectorate is in itself an important achievement. It will take many years before the process is complete of fostering the consciousness of unity in transforming the collection of tribes into something like a Federal State. When that comes about the aim of the Aden Government will be to make Aden the cultural capital of the Protectorate, thus substituting service for administration.¹

Whatever binding effect the above agreement might have had was considerably lessened by the fact that such matters were normally handled by British advisors assigned to the various Protectorate states. The problem of what to do with the Protectorate without either endangering Britain's position in South Arabia or decreasing Aden's position of importance remained.

¹The Times (London), March 17, 1931, p. 13.

It is obvious . . . that the present political structure is rapidly becoming out-of-date and cannot continue in this rapidly changing world without danger to the peace and security of the whole area. . . . The question is how to weld the States together in a powerful, essentially democratic, political and economic entity without disturbing more than necessary the traditional ties between the people and their Rulers and ourselves and both. . . . In my view the only answer to this difficult problem was, and is federation or the gradual joining together of the States into a compact whole, due consideration being given to unequal development in individual States.¹

That was the opinion of Sir Tom Hickinbotham, the Governor of Aden, who actually initiated positive action toward establishing a federation in South Arabia. Mr. G. K. N. Trevaskis, at the time Adviser for the Western Protectorate, was actually the first to draft a scheme for federation.² In January 1954 Hickinbotham submitted the idea to London as a definite proposal. It was accepted.

The plan envisioned two separate federal structures, one in the west and one in the east. This was designed to take into account the fact that the standard of administration in the east was far more advanced than that in the west and that the eastern states had traditionally remained apart from those in the west. The head of both federal structures would be the High Commissioner for the Protectorate, who was also the Governor of Aden. Each federation would have executive and legislative councils which would be nominated initially, but later, provisions would be made to elect the members of the legislative

¹Hickinbotham, op. cit., p. 164.

²Trevaskis entered the Colonial Service in 1938 as an administrative cadet in Northern Rhodesia. From 1941 to 1950 he held various posts with the British Administration in Eritrea. After a short time back in Northern Rhodesia in 1950-51, he moved to the Western Aden Protectorate where he quickly advanced from Political Officer to Adviser and British Agent by 1954.

councils. These federal authorities would be responsible for customs, communications, education, and public health. They would not interfere with the independent internal authority of the various states.¹

Britain had obviously embarked on a policy which, although intended to improve the social and economic conditions in the Protectorates, also revealed her increasing dominance in political affairs there.²

At a conference held in Aden in January 1955, the rulers of nine Western Protectorate states agreed in principle to the formation of a federation. In March 1956, meeting at the invitation of the Governor of Aden, the Protectorate chiefs indicated their belief that ". . . the development and progress of our countries in the future depends on closer association and co-operation between them. . . ." ³

While accepting the idea in principle, there was a noticeable lack of enthusiasm in practice. Many of the rulers saw federation as a two-edged sword. On the one hand they stood to strengthen their individual prospects of survival in the face of newly emerging nationalism and traditional Yemeni claims while extracting increased financial subsidies from the British sponsors of such a scheme. However, they also saw federation as a restriction on their sovereignty. One South Arabian has been quoted on this point:

After we had been getting closer to each other with the growing peace, we were frightened by federation. We knew it was good in principle, but when we began to look round

¹Hickinbotham, op. cit., pp. 165-166.

²Manfred W. Wenner, Modern Yemen: 1918-1966 (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 175.

³British Information Services, Aden and South Arabia (London: Reference Division, Central Office of Information, Quote No. R 5671, January 1965), p. 10.

we could look at each other and say: 'He is going to be more important than me', and so on. You have always been kind and friendly with us, but we know what you are when you are running things. You will be running us before long.¹

By the end of 1956 little more had been done toward achieving federation than the convening of several conferences. In the Yemen the proposal met with a much more definite reaction.

The acceptance of the proposal to form a federation in January 1955 by the Protectorate chiefs resulted in a serious deterioration in British-Yemeni relations. The 1934 and 1951 Treaties between the two countries both proved inadequate to overcome their differences, stemming, as they did, from diametrically opposed territorial claims.

Renewed border incidents in 1949 in Beihan, as well as a dispute over the district of Shabwa where the Imam believed the British had found oil, had resulted in an Anglo-Yemeni Conference in London held during the summer of 1950.² The modus vivendi finally approved in January 1951 provided for: the establishment of a joint commission to demarcate on the ground all disputed areas, the use of a third party to settle points of disagreement, the maintenance of the status quo until a proposed commission could make final decisions, the understanding that acceptance of the commission's recommendations did not preju-

¹Harold Ingrams, "The Outlook in South-West Arabia," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. 43, Parts III & IV (July-October 1956), pp. 179-180.

²Al-Ayyam in a dispatch from Sana said: "Oil is behind the present plot against Yemen. . . . This plot started more than four years ago when the British used to send their emissaries to some Sheiks in Yemen with luring offers. At the same time, the British were prospecting for oil. When they made sure oil existed there, the British stepped up their campaign. But when the Yemeni leaders refused to compromise with the British, the British aggression on Yemen started." The Arab World, February 13, 1957, p. 7.

dice any claims either government might hold in regard to an eventual final settlement, the establishment of normal diplomatic relations, and the withdrawal of British forces from the disputed border.¹ The provisions of the agreement were not carried out.

From 1952 onwards the record of incidents had shown that a state of constant guerilla warfare in certain parts of the Protectorate had been kept alive by the deliberate policy of the Yemen Government to provide shelter, arms, ammunition and money to rebels against lawfully established Protectorate rulers.²

Once the proposal for a federation became known, there was a noticeable increase in the incidence of border clashes between Yemen and the Protectorate. The most severe of these were concentrated in the Dhala and Beihan Amirates.³ There is little doubt that the Yemenis were successful in their campaign of subversion. Many of the Protectorate rulers linked to the British by treaties of protection now looked to see how far the commitment would be honored:

In their own small world they are intelligent and perceptive men. Once such rulers begin to doubt the policy of a protecting power they start reconsidering their own policies. A protector who does not protect, or who may not continue to do so is not likely to be regarded with enthusiasm.⁴

The Sherif of Beihan, one of Britain's strongest supporters and a valiant enemy of Yemen's attempted encroachments, told Lord Lloyd during his 1956 visit to Aden that unless British policy became more forthright in the defense of the region, he might make up his quarrel

¹Reilly, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

²Reilly, op. cit., p. 38.

³"Aden-Yemen," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 11 (1957-1958), p. 15502.

⁴Cyril Falls, "A Window on the World," The Illustrated London News, Vol. 232 (May 10, 1958), p. 768.

with the Imam.¹

A basic question which arises at this point is just how it was possible for the South Arabia Shafi'i tribesmen, leading a relatively autonomous existence in the Protectorate, to be subverted by the Zeidi Yemeni activities. The answer quite simply was that many sectors of the Protectorate had never been effectively brought under the British sphere of active influence. Because a group of tribesmen accepted arms and ammunition from Yemen was no reason to assume that they had any particular grievance against the British. Most of the mountain tribesmen were utterly unsophisticated. Their concern was their immediate district where a quarrel with a neighbor, a long-standing (even traditional) grievance with the ruler, or plain hunger would make it worthwhile to undertake a trip north to Yemen or Saudi Arabia for a weapon and some food or money.²

At any rate, the government in Aden did vigorously carry out its military obligations. Protectorate forces supported by British land and air forces took up the challenge, and by mid-1958 relative calm was re-established in the area.

However, Yemen's attack was not only confined to the realm of military activity. In October 1954 Mr. Tawfik Chamandi, Yemeni delegate to the United Nations, formally protested against the 'anomalous' situation existing in the 'so-called' Aden Colony and Protectorates.

¹"Gathering Clouds," The New Statesman and Nation, Vol. 52, No. 1322 (July 14, 1956), p. 31.

²"Extremists on the March," Spectator, Vol. 196, No. 6675 (June 1, 1956), p. 749. During these years the Saudis were also giving arms to the dissident tribesmen, ". . . and curiously enough, collaborating in doing so with the Yemenis, whom they can hardly be said in the ordinary course of events to love very much." Harold Ingrams, "The Outlook in South-West Arabia," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. 43, Parts III & IV (July-October 1956), p. 177.

He complained of Britain's continuous disregard of Yemen's rights by keeping the area under domination and placing it in the category of Non-Self-Governing Territories, despite the fact that it was an integral part of the Kingdom of Yemen. He claimed that the British controlled South Arabia only by virtue of "vague arguments imposed by threats, intimidations and force". Finally Mr. Chamandi accused the United Kingdom of trying to tighten its hold on and extend its domination over that part of occupied Yemen by imposing a system of federation over the Protectorate states, which was no more than a new system of colonialism.¹

The Yemeni delegate to the United Nations continued to deliver this same protest every year from 1954 to 1960. Yemen was obviously seeking world support for a claim that she was unable to realize by force of arms. Her efforts did not go unrewarded. The Council of the Arab League adopted a resolution in April 1954 appealing to the rulers of the Protectorate states to refuse to commit themselves to any plan which was contradictory to the Arab national spirit and which might separate them from their Arab colleagues.²

Egypt also condemned the federation scheme and warned the South Arabians of the danger of enslavement to British colonialism. In January 1957 the Yemeni Minister in Cairo, Abou Talib, announced that 12,000 Egyptians had volunteered to fight in the Yemen.³ Not to be

¹United Nations General Assembly, Ninth Session, Fourth Committee, 410th Meeting (A/C.4/SR 410, October 20, 1954), p. 85

²"Aden Protectorate-Yemen," Keessing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 10 (1955-1956), p. 14004.

³The Arab World, January 23, 1957, p. 9.

outdone, Yemen intensified her propaganda attack against the United Kingdom at a time when the British were striking back at the Yemeni aggression in earnest:

Recently the Government of the Yemen have adopted a policy of accusing British forces in the Protectorate of aggression in the Yemen and of attacks on Yemeni towns. These charges are untrue and have been repeatedly denied by Her Majesty's Government: they are deliberate distortions of the defensive measures in the Protectorate which Yemeni aggression and subversion have compelled us to take to protect friendly Rulers and tribes-people.¹

Even in the gravest crisis there are moments of levity. When the British denied their aggression and accused the Yemenis of being the sole aggressors, Hassan Ibrahim, Director General of the Yemeni Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was reported in Damascus to have ". . . dismissed as 'untrue' British 'allegations' that Yemen was the aggressor.

'Yemen,' he said, 'does not have the means to wage aggression'."²

As has been several times dramatically demonstrated in the mid-twentieth century, aggression in the form of subversive activities can be waged on a very small budget. A Governor of Aden during this period understood the Imam's aims when he wrote:

The Imam has seen our withdrawal from India, Burma, Ceylon and the Sudan and he is convinced that we will leave Arabia with our task uncompleted and the declaration to the contrary which I made to him personally in Taiz in 1954, which had been made before and has since been made by Ministers of the Crown in London and Aden, did nothing to alter this conviction. Provided, therefore, he can keep the Protectorate undeveloped, economically and socially, and disintegrated politically he feels that he will have no difficulty in stepping into our shoes when the time comes.³

¹Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 563 (1956-1957), c. 30.

²The Arab World, March 7, 1957, p. 7.

³Hickinbotham, op. cit., p. 176.

In 1957 the British made another effort to come to a peaceful settlement with Yemen. A proposal to commence talks on February 23, 1957, or any other early date at Mukairas or Sana for the purpose of arranging to carry out the provisions of the 1951 conference was preferred. This offer was ignored at the time. However, by the end of 1957 the Imam felt that the British might be ready to consider his claims. He proposed that Prince Badr visit London. The British interpreted this move as an indication that the Imam was ready to accept their concept of the status quo. No agreement was reached, and Prince Badr went on to visit Moscow, Warsaw, Prague, and Peking. His return home was accompanied by increased quantities of arms, technical material, and aid.¹

The final outcome of this struggle between Britain and Yemen for predominance in South Arabia was Yemen's decision in March 1958 to join the United Arab Republic (UAR). Sir William Luce, then Governor of Aden, saw the linking of Yemen with the UAR and the supplying of Soviet arms to Yemen as an indication that:

We now have on our doorstep two powerful influences - both hostile; and we must assume that both Russia and Egypt will support and exploit the long-standing ambition of the Imam to secure Yemeni domination of both the Aden Protectorate and Colony. We have begun to see the effects of Russian arms and the nature of frontier disturbances has changed from skirmishing by tribesmen with rifles to attacks across the frontier by artillery, mortars, and heavy automatic weapons.²

¹Ingrams, The Yemen, p. 100. The success of Prince Badr's tour is exemplified by Chou-en-lai's statement that: "The Chinese Government and people support the position of the Yemen in the case of Aden and the southern part of the Yemen known as 'Protectorates', and fully sympathize with and resolutely support the people of the Yemen in their just struggle." Sorensen, op. cit., p. 10.

²"Aden," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 12 (1959-1960), p. L6586.

Non-republican Yemen's final decision to join the UAR might well be interpreted as a defensive-offensive measure against increased British 'colonialism' in South Arabia as manifested by the federation proposal.

It will have been evident that the Yemeni threat only existed as a reaction to the British 'forward policy' and that the Imam would have been glad to end his war if the British had stopped their activities: no one seems to have perceived that the 'threat' was really a myth, and it became the raison d'être of the federation.¹

It is quite possible that if the Imam had not joined the UAR he would have achieved his goal of dissuading the chieftains from considering the federal idea. By adhering to this union he created a new threat, driving the Protectorate leaders to look once again toward federation, this time with a less jaundiced eye.

Five of the rulers approached the British for definite action leading to federation. This approach was extremely welcome to the British for it served to lessen the stigma of British inspiration surrounding the federation proposals at the very time when some sort of federation was becoming more than ever essential to Britain's overall security needs in South Arabia and Aden.

Britain must deflate emotions grossly inflated by fierce propaganda by re-emphasising that the inhabitants of Aden Colony and the Protectorates can freely decide their political destiny, for good or ill. It must be made abundantly clear that the Federation is not an imposed institution, and that though it has potential political, economic and social value the rulers and peoples are free to decide whether to enter it or not and whether to be independent to both Britain and the Yemen or associated with either, provided the decision is genuinely representative.²

¹Ingrans, The Yemen, p. 106.

²Sorensen, op. cit., p. 24.

The federation discussed at this time, late 1958 and early 1959, was more in the nature of a confederation, although the term federation continued to be used. The various states would be able to retain considerable autonomy, the idea of complete political unity being considerably modified. This fear of loss of identity extended to the British as well as neighboring states:

Those who favor federation do not want the British government as a sponsor. The Government could help but never interfere. If the federation became a reality, the British government should help it to enter the United Nations as a free state.¹

During negotiations in London in February 1959, the rulers, having previously warned the British against attempting to implement any form of direct interference in the proposed federation, now

. . . made it clear while they were in London that, if they were to pursue the idea of federation, they wanted certain guarantees from the British Government. These included security and protection and economic aid, not merely now but for the foreseeable future. Bribery and other forms of subversion by Yemen were, in the words of the Sharif [of Beihan], 'creating hell' in the Aden Protectorate, and without assistance for defense and economic aid to counteract financial pressure, federation would be worthless and the rulers would not pursue the idea.²

The inauguration of the Federation on February 11, 1959, exasperated the Imam who saw this as conclusive evidence that Britain would never concede the validity of his claim to the 'occupied south'.

Britain is pursuing her aims by promises, pressures and money to force the rulers into a form of federation in order to sever finally the southern parts from Yemen, and establish the British domination there. . . .³

¹The Arab World, March 28, 1958, p. 10.

²The Times (London), February 4, 1959, p. 8.

³Sorensen, op. cit., p. 10.

On the occasion of the inauguration of the new Federation, Mr.

Lennox-Boyd said:

This Federation poses a threat to no one and no country. It has come into existence by the will of the people acting through their traditional tribal leaders, and it has come into existence so that, together, the Amirates of this territory can give expression to their desire to pool their resources, to live without fear of subversion or attack, and to give their people greater security and prosperity.¹

This was to be the officially expressed British position.

The Federation initially consisted of six states: Amirate of Beihan, Audhali Sultanate, Amirate of Dhala, Upper Aulaqi Sheikdom, Fadhli Sultanate, and the Lower Yafa Sultanate. They were shortly joined by the states of Lahej, Lower Aulaqi, Dathina, and Aqrabi. The name was changed from the Federation of Arab Amirates of the South to the South Arabian Federation when a non-amirate state was incorporated.²

The Federation was ruled by a Supreme Council which combined the functions of head of state with those of a cabinet. Initially it consisted of six ministers elected by the Federal Council, the legislative body in which each member state was represented by six members.³ The number of ministers as well as the membership in the Legislative

¹The Times (London), February 12, 1959, p. 8.

²Welcome to Aden: A Comprehensive Guidebook, p. 45. It was unlikely that the major Hadhramaut states would ever come into the Federation due to their greater autonomy, more advanced economic and political status, and their ever present hope of oil discoveries, the revenue from which, if found, they did not want to be obligated to have to share. In recent years the Qu'aiti and Kathiri states have considered the possibility of a union between themselves. Only the much smaller Wahidi state bordering the Western Protectorate finally came into the Federation. Its rulers were reasonably certain that no oil was to be discovered in their territory.

³The number of ministerial posts in the Supreme Council was directly related to the number of states in the Federation, thus providing a portfolio in the Supreme Council for each ruler who brought his

Council was proportionately increased with each new member state. The government was seated in the new town built for that purpose, Al-Ittihad, located on land leased from the Aqrabi state.¹

The first order of business for the new Federation was the signing of a Treaty of Friendship and Protection with the British. By this one act all the British claims of laissez-faire in the Federation and all the Federal insistence on autonomy from British meddling were revealed to be no more than hollow concessions to public opinion designed to deflect the criticisms of the critics of the Federation scheme.

Article I of this Treaty of Friendship and Protection states that "there shall be perpetual peace and friendship and full and loyal co-operation between the United Kingdom and the Federation".²

In rather more specific terms Article IV(2) states that:

The Federation shall receive such advisory and technical staff as the United Kingdom, with the agreement of the Federation, may provide for the assistance of the Federation and the Federation shall provide all necessary facilities for such staff.³

If the implications of the above Article were not specific enough

state into the union. How great an influence this had on persuading reluctant rulers to join the Federation cannot be measured, but it can be assumed that the promise of becoming a federal minister held a certain attraction for these highly individualistic chiefs. The question always arises, in retrospect, as to how much more effective the Federation might have been if the sheikhs and sultans had remained in their respective states, keeping order at home, while membership in the Federal Government was delegated to representatives of the various rulers.

¹Welcome to Aden: A Comprehensive Guidebook, p. 45, and Reilly, op. cit., p. 60.

²Great Britain, British and Foreign State Papers (HMSO, Vol. 164, 1959-1960), p. 33.

³Ibid., p. 34.

to clearly delineate Britain's role in the Federation, Article V(1) was sufficiently clear to allay any remaining doubt:

The Federation shall accept and implement in all respects any advice given by the United Kingdom in any matter connected with the good government of the Federation; provided that before such advice is given the Federation shall have the opportunity to express its views to the United Kingdom.¹

The Federation bound itself not to enter into any treaty, agreement, correspondence, or other relations with any foreign state, government, or international organization without the knowledge and consent of the British Government. The Governor of Aden Colony was established as the official channel of communications between the United Kingdom and the Federation. In return for these many concessions the United Kingdom undertook to provide financial and military aid, which only served to further subject the Federation to total domination by the British:

The Federation shall permit Her Majesty's Forces to be based in and to move freely within and to and from the Federation together with their equipment and stores and to fly their aircraft over the Federation and to carry out such other operations as may be necessary. The Federation shall grant any Forces that may be in the Federation in pursuance of this Section such facilities and take such other steps to assist them as may be necessary.²

Thus, behind what appears to be real advances in constitutional development and progress toward eventual regional autonomy in both Aden Colony and South Arabia, the restraining hand of the United Kingdom may be discerned in word or deed, and in many cases both. There is manifest an underlying reluctance to allow regional political development to proceed beyond a certain point of close control. The question

¹Great Britain, British and Foreign State Papers, p. 34.

²Ibid., p. 36.

must be raised - just what were the British aims and motives in her South Arabian venture?

Following the loss of Suez and the evacuation of the Royal Air Force fields in Jordan and Iraq, Aden, with its associated chain of airfields at Riyan, Salalah, and Masirah along the South Arabian coast, suddenly acquired an enhanced importance in the eyes of the British. Its role as a staging post on the route to the Far East was now much wanted. At the same time the British had become quite sensitive to their dependence on Persian Gulf oil, the flow of which the Suez crisis had temporarily interrupted. United Kingdom defense policy came to be

. . . based on the assumption that Persian Gulf oil, which no-one would deny is of vital strategic and commercial importance to the United Kingdom and many other countries in the Western world, must be protected at all costs, if necessary by force.¹

On the occasion of Lord Lloyd's 1956 visit to Aden Colony to mark constitutional advance there, he felt constrained to add, following his congratulatory statement, that:

Her Majesty's Government wish to make it clear that the importance of Aden both strategically and economically within the Commonwealth is such that they cannot foresee the possibility of any fundamental relaxation of their responsibilities for the Colony.²

On November 8, 1957, Mr. Duncan Sandys, then British Minister of Defense, announced that, as it was clear that the British forces in Arabia and East Africa could be better controlled from London than from Cyprus, the Government had decided to create a separate integrated

¹Gillian King, Imperial Outpost - Aden (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 9.

²Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 553 (1955-1956), c. 66.

command at Aden responsible directly to London. This command would control all British land and air forces in the Arabian Peninsula and British Somaliland, as well as the naval forces allotted to the Persian Gulf.

On 1st April, 1958, the Aden Protectorate, formerly under G.H.Q. Middle East Land Forces, became part of the new 'British Forces Arabian Peninsula' Command. Events indicated that this was a necessary step as trouble in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula had been developing for some time necessitating military strategy there to be reshaped. The main threat came from the Yemen, and also to some extent from Saudi Arabia, but the hand of Nasser could plainly be seen behind it all.¹

Part of Egypt's response to the 1956 Suez invasion was to set about carving out a political base in Yemen from which to undermine the British position in the Arabian Peninsula. Britain's reaction to this policy was to push for the creation of a federation in the Protectorates designed to contain Yemeni-Egyptian aggression and buttress British military strength in and around Aden Colony. The 1959 Treaty certainly provided for the latter goal. British policy in relation to the Egyptian-Yemeni entente was derived from the premise that Egypt was inherently a menace to the peace of the area. Ironically, as long as that premise was accepted it proved true.²

. . . The British purpose in the Western Protectorate is necessarily a negative one: it is not really to increase production, . . . nor to fuse the states into unity nor to establish more direct rule; but simply to prevent other people gaining control there. The British presence fills a

¹E. O'Ballance, "Yemen-Shadow Over Aden," The Army Quarterly and Defense Journal, Vol. 77, No. 1 (October 1958), p. 51, and "United Kingdom-Army," Keessing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 11 (1957-1958), p. 16089. Air Vice-Marshal M. L. Heath was the first commander of this new command.

²Neville Brown, "Miniature Vietnam in Aden?" New Statesman, Vol. 70, No. 1803 (October 1, 1965), p. 471.

vacuum, and provides the port of Aden with a relatively innocuous backyard.¹

Negative though it may have appeared to the rest of the world, to the British it was seen as a basic factor of her economic well-being so long as she wished to maintain her source of oil free from hostile interference.

There is the need to preserve Aden Colony itself as a military base so long as it remains necessary to support the British position in the Persian Gulf, whence comes by far the greater volume of the sterling oil supplies on which Britain's domestic economy so greatly relies. Aden Colony by itself would not be much use for this purpose. The twenty-three states of the Western and Eastern Protectorate which form its hinterland are also an integral part of the defense system. Nobody can tell how long it may be necessary to maintain this system.²

Assuming that it might be necessary to maintain the system for a number of years to come, a federation was advocated and finally achieved. The good that a Federation might do for South Arabia itself was essentially a secondary consideration to the primary goal of British self-interest, resulting in a good deal of apparent confusion among the implementors of the scheme as to just how far they intended to allow it to develop.

One experienced observer of the region noted that,

It is difficult to see how a federation organized in this way could ever look anything but a disguised colony in a world which no longer likes colonialism. In any case foreign rule of an Arab country has never yet succeeded in the long run

¹"Midget Thrones and Dreams of Oil," The Economist, Vol. 180, No. 5895 (August 18, 1956), p. 570.

²The Times (London), February 4, 1959, p. 11. Sir Bernard Reilly summed the situation up in light of its international context when he described Aden as ". . . one of the points round which a political contest for influence and control is being waged between the rival competing forces of the modern world". Hickinbotham, op. cit., p. ix.

and recent experience shows only too clearly that the aftermath is almost certain to be unsatisfactory and bitter.¹

It is interesting to note how similar were the criticisms of this British policy of colonial consolidation in South Arabia as expressed by both English and non-English critics of the scheme. The differences were largely in vocabulary and terminology, representative of the social system from which they emanated.

The Iraqi newspaper, Al-Hurriyah, carried under the headline "A Comedy in Aden" this comment:

Britain's endeavours to conclude this lame federation are not a novelty. Ever since national consciousness among the Arabs began to ascend, Britain set about to consolidate the foothold of her imperialism by enlisting the help of her agents. Federation . . . is a necessity on which no two can disagree. But here it was no more than an imperialistic trick reminiscent of the union devised by the corrupt monarchy between Iraq and Jordan. By comparing the circumstances in both cases we can see that imperialism is not going to fare better in the southern federation than it did in the Hashemite union.²

The same basic ideas are expressed in this excerpt from an article in the Soviet International Affairs by a V. Fuzeyev:

The British colonialists want to create favourable conditions for building military bases in the area, equipped with atomic weapons. According to the South Arabia League mission in Cairo, an agreement was concluded between Lennox-Boyd and the shaykhs who joined the 'Federation' envisaging the stationing of 70,000 troops, 1,000 aircraft, 500 tanks and other military equipment, including atomic weapons. . . . The entire territory of the southern part of the peninsula is being transformed into a key base in the Middle East for aggression against the peace-loving countries and the national liberation movement of the peoples of Africa and Asia.³

¹Ingrams, Arabia and the Isles, p. 60.

²The Arab World, February 17, 1959, p. 7.

³The Mizen Newsletter, Central Asian Research Center with St. Anthony's College (Oxford), Soviet Affairs Study Group, Vol. 1, No. 10 (October 1959), p. 6.

Due to a multitude of factors and considerations - political, economic, national and international - Aden Colony was chosen by the British Government to be the seat of HMG's British Forces Arabian Peninsula Command, Great Britain's last nucleus of military power linking the Island Kingdom and her furthestmost fortress at Singapore. Once the decision had been made to secure this area 'for the foreseeable future' as a vital defensive link and a guarantee against interference in England's oil supply line, the consolidation of Aden Colony's hinterland became imperative. The fact that this policy had completely failed to take into consideration or had ignored the wishes of the indigenous population in respect to their own nationalist desires seems to have mattered little and counted for even less in the eyes of the policy makers.

. . . By 1959, when the South Arabian Federation of shaikhdoms was born, the development of British policy there was already out of phase with the post-war surge of nationalism and anti-colonialism and there was probably not a great deal to be done about it, save to accept the burdens of the past and soldier on. Undoubtedly, by then, the greatest of these burdens was the enormous disparity between the shaikhdoms and the Colony in every field of economic, social and political development.¹

In spite of this recognized disparity the next step visualized was the eventual union of the federated Protectorate and Aden Colony. The boundary between the two areas was arbitrary and artificial. Economically the two were mutually interdependent, and neither area could really hope for a viable independence without the other. Ignored by the sponsors of this next step was the extreme political disparity between the two. The Federation was ruled by traditional tribal sheikhs not interested in any major internal political reforms, while

¹Holden, op. cit., p. 50.

affairs in Aden Colony were slowly coming under the influence of a politically active, vocal, and increasingly competent nationalist element.

If full federation of colony and Protectorate were eventually carried into effect, there would be a grave danger of losing Aden itself. Consolidation would have to be pursued in an atmosphere of increasing hostile nationalism.¹

¹Ingrams, Arabia and the Isles, p. 61.

CHAPTER V

EXPANSION OF THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN SOUTH ARABIA

Nationalism is to many Britons much the same as rebellion. They don't understand it and they treat Nationalists as they would treat people suffering from some disagreeable contagious disease. They feel that they are a danger to their fellows and therefore must be restrained if they cannot be cured. . . . We were last invaded nine hundred years ago and have long forgotten what it is like to be subordinate to a foreign power.*

Increased British involvement in South Arabia, particularly in Aden Colony, brought with it further internal progress and development in the region itself. By 1956 Aden was possibly the most politically advanced territory in the Arabian Peninsula. British rule had developed an effective corps of local civil service employees vital to the operations of the port facilities and the air base. A relatively free press existed representing various points of view. An Adenese civil court system was actively meting out justice according to the best traditions of British law in spite of occasional manifestations of opposition. While insufficient, a school system was being developed, augmented by a limited foreign scholarship program for promising students. And finally, there was the trade union movement, the success of which has already been discussed. The final effect of all of these benefits and internal advances was the growth and development of a strong nationalist movement.

*Hickinbotham, op. cit., p. 198.

For . . . it was part of the paradox of nationalism in Aden - as elsewhere in the British Empire - that it was very much a British creation. It was not only a local reaction to the arrogance and complacency of some of the British, but also a natural result of the breakdown of tribalism in the successful urban environment that the British had created; and it was fostered by just those democratic institutions and orderly administration with which the British like to justify their colonial record.¹

Lord Lloyd's visit to Aden Colony in May 1956 (supra) had the effect of unleashing this nationalist movement which had reached the point where it only awaited the single spark needed to crystallize its efforts into the drive towards its final objective, realized in November 1967. In his rational, honest, cautionary advice to the Adenese to the effect that the local nationalists should not aspire beyond a limited degree of internal self-government for the foreseeable future, Lord Lloyd provided that awaited spark.

Add to this the successful emergence of Nasser from the 1956 Suez crisis, augmented by the Zeidi Imam's ubiquitous claims - and efforts to support these claims - against the British in South Arabia, and suddenly Aden's nationalists had available to them the resources necessary to undertake the realization of their goals.

From 1839 through the first fifty years of the twentieth century, the British colonial administrators in South Arabia were very much in control whenever they chose to become involved in local affairs. Furthermore, this involvement was usually well received, especially in Aden Colony where the local leaders were largely British selected and groomed. That the British were the effective rulers of the Colony was not challenged, and any areas of the hinterland which proved trouble-

¹Holden, op. cit., p. 25.

some were soon pacified with minimum effort. Relative tranquillity reigned, disturbed only by the sporadic eruptions of Zeidi instigated agitations to the north and west.

Then, in the 1950's, nationalism disrupted Great Britain's South Arabian idyll and brought on the second phase of Britain's hegemony in South Arabia. Much shorter than the first, this period was far more significant. Many aspects of this second phase have already been discussed. The emergence of the first real political parties, the introduction of limited institutions of self-government, the beginning of the concentration of world opinion, crystallized through the United Nations, against the last vestiges of colonial rule, and the effective rise of nationalism were characteristic of the time. The United Kingdom was still the supreme power in the area; she could still push through her programs, but now with ever diminishing returns. Each new piece of legislation successfully enacted only served to further develop the growing nationalist resistance to her rule. While still in control politically and militarily, the colonial administration no longer had its fingers on the pulse of the people.

To the stalwart British community of the Colony, one felt, the Empire was still the old Empire, and the Royal Navy - God bless it - was still the biggest in the world.¹

The complacency of Britain's colonial administrators to the newly awakened force of nationalism in Aden was not entirely universal. One old retainer of British colonialism, Sir Muhammad Abdul Qadar Mackawwi [died: 1953] observed that:

Arabia is asleep and had been for hundreds of years, but the awakening is near and that is really why I am afraid. I am

¹Holden, op. cit., p. 21.

afraid of what will happen to the Arabs if they wake up too suddenly, because to be startled from sleep is dangerous and men can do strange things between sleeping and waking. I am afraid that we Arabs may not know our enemies from our friends and do ourselves much harm acting too hastily.¹

Act hastily they did. From modest beginnings in the mid-fifties, the South Arabian nationalists were largely in control of many sectors of the society by the mid-sixties. The last significant act of domination the British were able to implement was the merger of Aden with the South Arabian Federation. This marked the end of the second period of Britain's presence, during which she exercised control, but had lost real contact with the people.

In the third and final phase the administrators lacked both contact with the people and control over the situation. From this point onward affairs were dictated by the local nationalists. The British found themselves in the new role of reacting to, rather than determining, the course of events.

By the mid-fifties there were three basic bodies of political opinion in Aden Colony. The constitutionalists were represented by the Adeni ministers in office. They were largely native-born Arabs advocating Aden for the Adenese and self-government within the Commonwealth. They maintained power through their control of the electorate system and the political immaturity of their opponents. Opposed to this group were the extreme Arab Nationalists. Generally young, this group favored Nasser, some form of union with the UAR and/or Yemen, and re-

¹Hickinbotham, op. cit., p. 20. Hickinbotham's book, which deals primarily with the author's term as governor at Aden in the mid-fifties, is one of the best examples of this attitude of complacency and absolute faith in the traditional British modus operandi in colonial affairs.

ferred to South Arabia as Southern Yemen. They did not hesitate to resort to unconstitutional methods to achieve their aims with the trade union movement being one of their most powerful tools. The third group was that great bulk of the politically uncommitted population. They remained, uncomprehending, standing aloof and apart while the struggle for South Arabia's future unfolded around them.¹

Into the midst of this struggle walked Lord Lloyd in May 1956. The result of his speech was to increase the hostility of the anti-British groups while cutting the ground out from under the program of the pro-British Aden Association. The South Arabian League was able to take advantage of this Aden Association setback to advance its own standing in the South Arabian political arena. The SAL was managed from Lahej by Muhammad Ali al-Jifri.

At a time when the majority of the Protectorate rulers were drawing ever closer to British protection in the face of the growing nationalist movements in the Arab world, the Sultan of Lahej was observed to be drifting toward Nasser's camp. Ali Abdul Karim, Sultan of Lahej, was closely associated with al-Jifri who proved himself a good tutor. The Sultan criticized both the British and the Imam, declared himself against the federation scheme, in which he, as the senior ruler of the Western Protectorate, would stand to lose a large measure of prestige, and finally, in 1958, let it be known that he was considering abrogating his treaty relationship with the British in order to join the UAR.²

¹A. P. Cumming-Bruce, "The Emergence of Aden Since 1956," Royal Central Asian Journal, Vol. 49, Parts III & IV (July-October, 1962), pp. 310-311.

²Sorensen, op. cit., p. 11, and "Trouble in Aden," The New Republic, Vol. 138, No. 18 (May 5, 1958), p. 7.

At this point the Colonial Government reacted. Britain's military presence was reinforced with troops from Kenya while an order for the arrest of al-Jifri and his two brothers, Abdulla and Alawi, was issued. Abdulla was arrested, Alawi escaped into Upper Aulaqi country, and Muhammad Ali al-Jifri fled to Yemen.¹ Commenting on the incident Mr. Lennox-Boyd, Secretary of State for Colonies at that time, said:

. . . The removal or departure of the Jifris has in itself led to an improvement in the situation. I am also glad to state that the Lahej Regular Army and general population are co-operating in a friendly manner with Government Guards now in the area. . . .²

The uniformity of British opinion on the Jifri brothers is clearly seen in the comment of a former governor of Aden who also apparently had some dealings with them:

They have always been difficult and resentful and have never really co-operated in the setting up of the Aulaki [their home state] administration and have not used their influence in the right direction in the Council Chamber. Political interests in the neighborhood of Aden and in the Colony itself and the acquisition of agricultural land in the rich cotton areas have been their pursuits. Nasser of Egypt is their idol and independence is their goal.³

While the British appeared to be unanimous in their satisfaction with ridding themselves of the Jifris, the Sultan of Lahej was not. He flew to London in order to protest this action and argue his case with Mr. Lennox-Boyd. While he was in London in June 1958, a third of the

¹Reilly, op. cit., p. 53. On being questioned in Parliament on the acceptability of a security system in which one of the Jifri brothers was able to escape by driving straight down the main road and across the frontier into Yemen, Mr. Lennox-Boyd replied that: "The important thing is that he has left British protected territory." Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 587 (1957-1958), c. 1403.

²Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 587 (1957-1958), c. 1403.

³Hickinbotham, op. cit., p. 122.

Lahej armed guard deserted to Yemen taking with them 10,000 pounds from the state treasury. On July 10, 1958, the House of Commons was informed that official recognition had been withdrawn from the Sultan who was forbidden to return to the Sultanate of Lahej where he had been replaced by his cousin, Fadhli bin Ali.¹ Ex-Sultan Ali was next heard from in Cairo, where he went to seek the support of " . . . our brother President Nasser".² It was reported that he also visited the Imam, but encountered serious differences of opinion, not being willing to admit the Imam's claim to the Aden Protectorate.

The Lahej affair marks the first major advance of Arab Nationalism in any of the Protectorate states and ultimately had the effect of accelerating the move toward federation among the remaining states.

The ex-sultan had one final word on this subject:

The entire population of Lahej opposes the joining to the federation, and as rightful Sultan I do not recognise this step. It is now obvious that in order to prepare for this, the British prevented my return to Lahej.³

The lack of success of the nationalist movement in the Protectorate states at that time was offset by affairs in Aden Colony. By 1960 the ATUC had developed its own political wing, the People's Socialist Party (PSP). The PSP soon replaced the SAL as the recognized leader of the nationalist movement in Aden.⁴ Had the PSP been able to win a majority of the elective seats in the Aden Legislative Council, it would have been in a strong position to demand independence. But

¹"Aden," Keessing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 12 (1959-1960), p. 16586.

²Ibid., p. 16586.

³The Arab World, October 7, 1959, p. 9.

⁴Holden, op. cit., p. 51.

the majority of the party's membership and support was made up of immigrant Yemeni laborers. Lacking the opportunity to express themselves through the constitutional structure of the Colony from which they were largely disenfranchised, the PSP resorted to the tools most readily available to them by virtue of their labor union association, the strike and the boycott.

One example of the use of this labor weapon was the ATUC boycott of the 1959 elections in Aden Colony. This and other related activities led to the 1960 Industrial Relations Ordinance, an attempt to restrict the use of the strike weapon for political purposes in the Colony. The individual unions could legally recover the right to strike only by accepting the validity of the ordinance and complying with its provisions. The ATUC refused to do either, occasioning the comment that:

. . . The leaders of the ATUC had made it more than plain that their object in seeking to regain use of the strike weapon was political and not industrial.¹

Throughout 1961 and 1962 the ATUC continued to protest against the Ordinance and called frequent strikes which, in May 1962, resulted in a parliamentary debate on the subject in London. Mr. Reginald Maudling, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, defended the Ordinance on the grounds that it had been passed in 1960 by the Legislative Council, and, in response to complaints by the ICFTU, the ILO examined the provisions of the Ordinance and found that they were not incompatible with the international labor convention on the right to organize collective bargaining. Mr. Maudling said that:

¹Charles H. Johnston, The View From Steamer Point (London: Collins, 1964), p. 83.

. . . I think that the due process of law has been gone through and the Ordinance itself is satisfactory and working well. . . . It is promoting the successful settlement of disputes by agreement, which is what we want.¹

During the debate, Mr. Robert Edwards challenged the entire concept of Britain's labor policy in Aden:

Here is a very large concentration of industrial workers, and there is a state of tremendous industrial unrest among them. They are strongly organized in trade unions. These are not Communist unions. They are trade unions affiliated to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, to which the British Trades Union Congress is affiliated. Yet these trade unionists are denied the right to withhold their labour to defend their own day-to-day interests.²

Commenting on the political ramifications of arresting labor leaders who persisted in calling strikes in Aden, Mr. Edwards said:

Who knows better than we do that all history . . . has proved that when men become martyrs, they become leaders, that ideals cannot be destroyed by suppressive measures, that the status of a leader is not lowered by putting him in gaol? This stupid method of destroying a movement has been tried all over the world and all over the old British Empire and has failed. Do we not learn any lessons from the past?³

Finally, Mr. Edwards, in an eloquent plea for the maintenance of democratic principles in the Colony said:

If there is one principle which separates us from totalitarian countries, it is that we believe that working men and

¹Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 659 (1961-1962), c. 194. It is interesting to note that in January 1962, Sir Charles Johnston, in stressing the effectiveness of the ordinance in reducing labor friction, admitted that most of the ninety-nine labor disputes successfully ended by conciliation and negotiation "were settled in favour of the workers, who obtained part or all of their claims". "Militants Against the Military," The Economist, Vol. 203, No. 6195 (May 19, 1962), p. 684.

²Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 660 (1961-1962), c. 397.

³Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 660 (1961-1962), c. 400.

women should, if their negotiations reach deadlock, have the right to withhold their labour. When industrial workers are denied the right to withhold their labour, . . . they are denied elementary freedom. That means that they are living under a dictatorship, and democracy becomes a farce.¹

It cannot be denied that the ATUC did use its organized power in the pursuance of the goals of its political wing, the PSP. It is also true, however, that this large sector of the Aden Colony population was denied a representative voice in a government which represented itself as being the vehicle of constitutional reform designed to give a greater voice in the management of local affairs to the local population. It is rather curious, therefore, to note the opinion of the Governor of Aden in January 1960 when he said:

I regard it as something of a weakness that at the stage which has been reached here there is still no sign of the early emergence of an effective party system. Such a system is fundamental to the kind of parliamentary democracy which it is hoped to establish in Aden, and it is difficult to see how the next stage in constitutional evolution can be approached until responsible parties are formed. . . .²

Quite obviously, the kind of political parties that the colonial administrators wished to see emerge should include in their platforms the maintenance of an effective British presence and influence in South Arabia. The program of the PSP did not fit the desired definition of 'an effective party system'. Complete independence and union with Yemen were openly advocated by the PSP. It was just these goals, most feared by the British, which accounted for their extreme unwilling-

¹Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 660 (1961-1962), c. 398.

²Aden Colony: Speech by His Excellency the Governor and Commander-in-Chief at the Opening of the Second Session of the Legislative Council, 25th January, 1960," unnumbered publication attached to Administrative Survey 1959, for Aden Colony (GPA/8541/14c/1-60), p. 2.

ness to extend the franchise to the Yemeni immigrants in the Colony. Therefore, it must have been with great chagrin that the colonial officials learned of the September 1962 republican revolution in Yemen.

The Yemeni revolution had the effect in South Arabia of erasing the subtler lines of conflict between Aden nationalists, moderates, and Federal sheikhs. The political conflict was openly revealed as a contest between Aden nationalists, Yemen revolutionaries, and President Nasser on the one hand and the British and the Federal rulers on the other. The tribal leaders in the Federation, recognizing the implied threat of a successful republican regime, were quick to support, and encourage the British to support, Muhammad al-Badr, the new Imam.¹

The revolution aroused intense enthusiasm among the Yemeni community in Aden. Thousands returned to Yemen until this large influx further embarrassed an already chronic unemployment problem, forcing the new regime to finally broadcast appeals to young Yemenis in Aden to refrain from returning for the time being.²

In June 1963 Abdullah Sallal, then President of Yemen, visited Iraq, Syria, and Egypt where he issued similar joint statements with each country of which the following excerpt from the Iraqi-Yemeni declaration is representative:

Both sides support the liberation movement in Occupied South Yemen. They are determined to combine their efforts to provide it with material and moral support. They denounce imperialistic plans that aim at establishing the so-called South Arabian Federation and affirm their solidarity with the Arab people in Occupied South Yemen in their struggle

¹Holden, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

²"Yemen," *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Vol. 14 (1963-1964), p. 19298.

to liberate themselves from imperialism and to achieve unity with the liberated North.¹

It was in this environment of growing nationalism that the British made their final move to consolidate their hold over South Arabia. Plans for the merger of Aden Colony with the South Arabian Federation, which had been beset by difficulties, were now accelerated.

¹Walid Khalidi and Yusuf Ibish (eds.), "Joint Communique on Yemeni-Iraqi Talks (June 16, 1963)," Arab Political Documents: 1963 (Beirut: Slim Press, 1964), p. 296.

CHAPTER VI

ADEN COLONY JOINS THE SOUTH ARABIAN FEDERATION

So far, the outstanding achievement of the Sandys plan has been to unite nearly all political opinion in the Colony against the Federation; it has done nothing to convince the Aden Arabs that the United Kingdom has a policy for the future of the Protectorate that is in their own interests as well as in the interests of the protecting power.*

People blame us for saying that we do not want to go under the Yemen while there is an imam there; but this Federation means going under eleven imams at once.**

Following the inauguration of the South Arabian Federation in 1959, Britain's policy makers next set out to bring about the inclusion of Aden Colony into this Federation. Sir Charles Johnston, the governor of Aden who figured so predominately in the negotiations leading to Aden's membership in the Federation, saw this as a logical move:

. . . Aden and the Federation were absolutely complementary. The natural capital needed its hinterland, and vice versa. Existing in administrative separation, they were like a head and body cut off from each other.

In this situation it was only possible to conclude that the best solution for all concerned would be a merger of the Colony and the Federation into a single unit, having a special relationship with Britain which would ensure us the retention of our strategic facilities for as long as we needed them.¹

* Gillian King, Imperial Outpost - Aden (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 71.

** Mr. Abdullah al-Asnag as quoted by Mr. Denis Healey in Parliament. Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 667, No. 11 (November 13, 1962), c. 263.

¹ Johnston, op. cit., p. 36.

This was an extremely simplified statement of the situation. It did not take into consideration a host of difficulties which policy makers appeared to choose to ignore.

To begin with, there was a great disparity in the relative economic situations in the two entities. Aden Colony was wealthy and regularly showed a profit, while Her Majesty's Government was expected to produce the greater part of the Federation budget. Furthermore, there was little potential for the development of any extensive money-making projects in the hinterland. Inter-tribal suspicions continued after federation and were possibly even enhanced. Whereas the Colony grew and developed as a result of expanding economic activity in an orderly society, what progress that had taken place in the federal states came about largely as a result of the British enforcement of relative peace. The traditional British role in the sheikhdoms had been to build up the local rulers' authority to a level sufficient for the creation of administrations capable of running basic governmental services.¹

A major and widely-recognized problem should Aden join the Federation was that of preserving Aden's relatively advanced political and social institutions. This problem was made more sensitive by the fact that the federal leaders were concerned that any further constitutional advance in Aden might very well lead to an independent and hostile Aden Government which would cut off the Federation's access to

¹A. P. Cumming-Bruce, "The Emergence of Aden Since 1956," Royal Central Asian Journal, Vol. 49, Parts III & IV (July-October 1962), pp. 311-313.

its natural port and market.¹

Governor Johnston noted that:

. . . It was evident that both in view of the British base in Aden, and in order to safeguard the relatively high standard of economic and social development there, some special status must be devised for the Colony inside the Federation.²

While recognizing this problem, Britain's real aim was to maintain adequate security for her South Arabian military bases.

The official White Paper on Defense published in 1962 stated that it was the British Government's intention to station troops in Aden 'permanently'. The reasons behind this requirement are threefold: first global strategy; . . . secondly, oil strategy; . . . and, thirdly, local strategy. . . . It is . . . unlikely that all three requirements will disappear simultaneously for some time.³

Thus the British saw it logical to keep the union weighted in favor of the trusted sheikhs and to maintain a limited franchise of moderates inside Aden. Britain's policy makers set out on a project which they attempted to justify by two incompatible rationalizations. The argument for the natural unity of the region and the special status to be accorded Aden was opposed by the intention to keep Aden under British control as a vital strategic link.⁴

From August 1961 to May 1962 discussions on the accession of Aden to the Federation took place between ministers of Aden's government, the Governor of Aden, and ministers of the Federation. These talks culminated with the signing of a preliminary agreement on May 17, 1962, in Aden between the Federation of South Arabia and Aden Colony. This

¹Johnston, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-37.

²*Ibid.*, p. 38.

³*Ibid.*, p. 194.

⁴Holden, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

agreement represented a merger scheme which was a compromise between the demands and expectations of the ministers of the two South Arabian entities. The intent was to be able to present to London an acceptable plan for merger supported by all the official parties in the matter.¹

One incident did occur which seriously disturbed the attempt to present a solid front of support for the scheme. On the day that the agreement was concluded, Mr. Abdullah Sa'idi resigned his post as a minister in Aden Government after refusing to sign the agreement. The Governor claimed that Sa'idi had "lost touch with the majority of Adenese opinion" which knew of, understood, and supported the move for merger.²

Opponents of the plan claimed that Sa'idi had been forced to resign his post by the Governor when he refused to sign the agreement. Mr. Sa'idi claimed that he objected on the grounds that, while Aden was developing into a democratic society, in the Federation there was

. . . pure autocracy under the whip of the British agent and his political staff. . . . In Aden we are opposed to Yemen because it is feudal, but there is only one Imam there. There will be 26 Imams in the Federation.³

A constitutional conference was held in London in July 1962, and attended by English and South Arabian officials. On August 16, 1962, they signed a draft treaty.⁴ Two major problems had to be dealt with

¹Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 662 (1961-1962), c. 1126.

²Johnston, op. cit., p. 104. It is interesting to note that the Governor felt constrained to point out that the majority 'knew of' the plan inasmuch as an attempt had been made to keep the details of the preliminary planning secret.

³The Times (London), August 22, 1962, p. 6.

⁴A British White Paper, Command 1914, was published which covered the three main points of the July-August London negotiations: a draft

in order to carry out the merger. There was the obvious necessity of revising the Federal Constitution in order to accommodate the entry of Aden, as well as the necessity of completing the movement toward internal self-government in the Colony, not yet accomplished.

It had been assumed that constitutional advance in Aden would precede the actual merger in the preliminary talks, but at London the question was raised as to whether the Aden Executive Council as it would be composed after constitutional advance, *i.e.*, with Adeni ministers replacing the present four ex officio English members, should have the right to vote on the final merger plan. This would be the last official action required by the respective Federal and Aden Governments before the merger was carried out.

The Federal ministers were fearful of this situation, seeing the possibility of Aden obtaining its constitutional demands and then refusing to agree to merger. To eliminate this block it was decided to synchronize constitutional advance in Aden with the merger. This would eliminate the transitional stage and preclude the need for, or possibility of, a second vote in Aden on joining the Federation. It was decided that the Legislative Council would elect four new Adeni ministers to sit beside the four ex officio members until merger was accomplished. At the same time the tenure of the Legislative Council would be extended for another year to January 1964 in order to allow for the revision of the franchise.¹

treaty providing for the accession of Aden to the Federation, a revised Federal Constitution, and a scheme for constitutional advance in Aden.

¹Johnston, op. cit., p. 114.

Having insured that Aden Colony would perform as expected, the members at the London conference then conceded that Aden had political and social institutions different from the rest of the Federal states and did occupy a position of outstanding commercial importance. Therefore it was considered that Aden would be entitled to special treatment to include a larger representation in the Federal Government than that granted to the existing members.

It was decided that the Federal Council would have ninety-four members: six members to each state except the Aqrabi Sheikhdum with one member, the Sheikhdum of Sha'ib with three members, and Aden with twenty-four members. In the Supreme Council each state was entitled to one ministerial post for every six members seated in the Federal Council. This gave Aden three posts.¹

In spite of the various constitutional adjustments proposed to implement the merger, one aspect of the South Arabian administrative organization which was not to change was Great Britain's position vis-a-vis the Colony. While becoming a state in the Federation, Aden was to remain under British sovereignty. The terms of the draft treaty provided that the Colony should become a state of the Federation by March 1, 1963, but Britain's hegemony over Aden would remain.

Within Aden the executive and legislative authority of the Governor would prevail over that of the Federation on matters of defense, external affairs, and internal security. The Privy Council would be the final court of appeal in most cases affecting Aden. One reservation favorable to Aden was that the Constitution of the Federation

¹Aden and South Arabia, p. 12.

would be subject to the code of fundamental human rights established by the Constitution of Aden.

Finally, Aden, which was not a party to the 1959 Treaty of Protection and Friendship between the United Kingdom and the new Federation, would now automatically be subject to its provisions as well.

As drastic as the reservations were, the clearest indication of Britain's attitude toward her position in South Arabia was in the reservation of the right to withdraw at any time a part of Aden Colony from the Federation for purposes of defense or strategic considerations. Aden thus not only stood to lose a large measure of its sovereignty to the Federal Government, but it was subject to dismemberment at any time by the United Kingdom - without agreement of or even prior consultations with the local government.¹

The undisguised self-interest of the above reservations was surpassed only by self-deception. This may be illustrated by a statement made by the Governor of Aden at the time:

It is not for nothing that London has existed so long as a great imperial capital. The technique of negotiation on colonial matters is practiced with an unconscious, intuitive certainty of touch. The solutions found to our problems had that deceptive look of simplicity and common sense which is the real trademark of the master negotiator.²

On returning to Aden, the conferees set out to convince the local opposition that merger was in everyone's best interest. In spite of these efforts, when the final debate on the proposed merger treaty

¹Gillian King, "The Problem of Aden," The World Today, Vol. 18, No. 12 (December 1962), p. 500, and "Aden: The People Against Federation," Venture, Vol. 14, No. 10 (November 1962). Reviewed in extracted form, page number in volume not shown.

²Johnston, op. cit., p. 115.

opened in the Legislative Council on September 24, 1962, riots and strikes broke out which paralyzed the Colony and closed the airport and harbor.

On September 26th, a vote was taken in the Legislative Council on an opposition amendment moving to reject the federation proposals for Aden. It was defeated by a vote of sixteen to seven. The seven exponents of this amendment walked out of the Council followed by a government supporter who felt that the Council had been made a joke of as a result of insults bandied about by the council members. The motion to approve the London agreement was then voted on and was passed unanimously by the fifteen remaining council members.¹

There was great opposition to the accession of Aden Colony to the Federation. Aden nationalists and British government opposition members alike were loud in their objections. The sponsors of the plan, well aware of the opposition facing them, had conducted their planning conferences in secret. Finally the whole matter came up for debate in Parliament when the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Duncan Sandys, presented the draft treaty for approval. The merger plan had been his scheme from beginning to end. Many people saw it as a desperate attempt to get his revenge on the Arab nationalists for the humiliating defeat inflicted on the British in the 1956 Suez Crisis.

In the Parliamentary debate the Conservative Government backed the Sandys plan, while the Labor party expressed strong opposition.

¹Johnston, *op. cit.*, p. 115, and *The Arab World*, September 27, 1962, p. 4.

It objected on the grounds that the Aden Government was not truly representative - a major objection expressed by all the opponents of the plan. The government in office in Aden had been elected in 1959, at which time the possibility of merger had not been a consideration in the election. Now a group of officials had approved a scheme to completely revise the identity of the Colony without a general mandate authorizing or implying authorization for such action from the Adenese electorate. On this point Mr. Sandys argued that:

The main issue is no longer whether or not there should be elections before merger. The central issue now is whether Aden and the Federation should, by union with one another, be strengthened and consolidated in the face of open incitement to rebellion. The alternative is to yield to intimidation from within and without and to postpone the merger . . . and thereby dispirit and discourage all who believe in ordered progress in partnership with Britain. This is a course which we are not prepared to take.¹

Mr. Denis Healey, Minister of Defense in the Shadow Cabinet, chose to challenge Sandys' statement, declaring:

I honestly cannot accept the Secretary of State's argument that we cannot have an election before the franchise is changed and we cannot wait till the franchise is changed before the Federation is set up. If the readiness of the Emirates in the Protectorates to accept union with Aden is so fragile and delicately poised that a delay of three, four or six months would wither their enthusiasm for union with the Colony, then there is not very much ground for believing that this Federation has any reality in it whatever.²

Sandys argued that the Adeni opposition wanted elections before the merger, believing that if they were victorious they could get better terms for Aden in the Federation. He feared that the Federal Government which had already made important concessions would be unwilling

¹Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 667, No. 11 (November 13, 1962), c. 253.

²Ibid., c. 256.

to re-open negotiations.

The Parliamentary Labor opposition was not confined to the matter of representation. They pointed out that the military base for the Middle East situated in Aden, about which Mr. Sandys was so concerned, was using all its energy just to maintain itself there, in Aden.

The Parliamentary opposition also attacked the wisdom of placing Aden in a subordinate political and economic position to the less sophisticated federal rulers. Sandys' reply was that Aden's interest had been protected in the case of political subordination to the federal rulers by article ten of the draft treaty. This article provided for a trial period of six years after which, if she chose, Aden could present a complaint to the British Government that her legitimate interests had been prejudiced through federation. Britain would then ask the Federal Government to take corrective action. Failing that, Aden could then be withdrawn completely from the Federation at the discretion of the British Government. Sandys noted that complaints had been made that Aden was being handed over to medieval potentates, but he was of the opinion "that anyone who . . . has met the Ministers of the Federation will know that they are every bit as enlightened as the political leaders in Aden Colony".¹

With regard to the threat of economic submersion in the Federation, Sandys did not believe that Aden's economy was firmly based in the first place. He saw its old entrepot trade on the decline and its economy largely dependent on oil with two-thirds of the working population being employed directly or indirectly in oil or bunkering instal-

¹Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 667, No. 11 (November 13, 1962), c. 246.

lations or at the British military installations.

It is therefore difficult to see how Aden could hope on its own to become politically independent and remain in the long-term, economically viable.¹

According to Sandys, the best place for Aden Colony was within the British sphere of influence and control, thus guaranteeing her future prosperity through revenues gleaned from the military and shipping.

In spite of the controversy which took place in Parliament, the overall debate was relatively uneventful and interest in the proceedings was limited to a few members. Harold Ingrams who was observing Parliament that day comments:

It was not long . . . before I had the sensation that I might have been listening to a debate on the affairs of Mars with the advantage of a few space-travellers thrown in. . . . At no time could I count more than twenty-nine members . . . present. . . . When the division bell rang, the party hosts moved in, and the fate of distant people was decided by strangers who did not know a thing about them.²

While this debate was in progress, Muhammad Said Husseiny, Aden Minister of Education and Information, arrived in London where he advocated - to no avail - a postponement of the merger until after elections could be held in the Colony. On November 13, 1962, the House of Commons passed the bill. The next day Mr. Husseiny resigned from the Executive Council.³

The Sandys Plan to enlarge the Federation of South Arabia by including the colony of Aden along with the twelve sultan-

¹Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 667 No. 11 (November 13, 1962), c. 245.

²Ingrams, Arabia and the Isles, p. 79.

³"Aden-Federation of South Arabia," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 14 (1963-1964), p. 19436, and King, "The Problem of Aden," The World Today, p. 499.

ates is an obvious attempt to buy time for British strategic interests in the port, base and refinery. Mr. Sandys has made his 'agreement' after a farcical conference in which he was negotiating a previously arranged plan with a few sheikhs and unrepresentative delegates from Aden. No shadow of democratic representation has yet fallen on the sultanates and the sheikhs will continue to nominate their members to the federal legislature. . . . In order to force the plan through, the Aden elections due at the end of the year have been formed before they take place. This attempt to submerge nationalism under the sea of feudal Arab conservatism is calculated to stimulate the nationalists who have shown their power in a general strike last month.¹

Vocal opposition to the scheme could hardly be expected to be restricted to the British. The SAL, ATUC, and PSP quickly and emphatically declared against Aden's merger. They organized dozens of strikes and hundreds of protest meetings and demonstrations throughout 1961 and 1962. Their opposition to the merger was as much motivated by reasons of self-interest as was the British support for the union.

Any plan to join Aden to the Federation is opposed by the ATUC because it would block its own hopes to gain control of the colony, to achieve constitutional advance before Federation comes about, and to take Aden out of the Commonwealth.²

The only support in Aden for the scheme came from the National Union Party, the party in office. Its leader, Hassan Ali Bayoomi, Minister of Labor, was one of the London signatories in July 1962 and was expected to become Aden's chief minister after accession.³

The real issue in Aden throughout these events was the question of self-determination. Britain's goal was to keep the forces of Arab

¹"Aden and the Federation of South Arabia," Commonwealth Affairs, No. 106 (October 1962). Reviewed in extracted form, page number in volume not shown.

²The Times (London), July 27, 1962, p. 10.

³Peter Duval Smith, "The Phoney Federation," New Statesman, Vol. 64, No. 1644 (September 14, 1962), p. 307.

nationalism at bay a little longer, thereby gaining a few more years in Aden.

While spouting about decolonialization, the British were in reality aiming to dissolve the more highly developed Aden's striving for genuine freedom by immersing it in a solution of backward feudal sheikhdoms and sultanates and thereby to preserve their control over it.¹

It was for this reason that so much of the opposition effort was concentrated on the question of free elections before the merger plan should be carried out. Thus, while Duncan Sandys was saying:

I cannot . . . believe that any substantial section of opinion in Aden can genuinely want union with the Yemen under present conditions. One must regard this cry as no more than an emotional expression of Arab nationalism by people who know that there is no risk of Britain agreeing to their demand.²

Mr. Healey declared that:

It seems to me that . . . there is an overwhelming case to test public opinion in Aden by a vote. Otherwise, we are rushing headlong into a disaster in which British interests . . . would be the first to suffer.³

An interested observer summed up the situation when he wrote:

London seems to have realized that there could be no hope of preserving Aden as an ordinary colony and therefore devised an elaborate manoeuvre. It decided to set up a puppet Federation of South Arabia incorporating the small backward principalities of the Western and Eastern protectorates and the colony of Aden. This was a typical neocolonialist scheme based on the new 'unite and rule' principle.⁴

The Federal ministers and the British policy makers were dis-

¹V. Bodyansky, "The Events in Aden," New Times (Moscow), No. 2 (January 15, 1964), p. 19.

²Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 667, No. 11 (November 13, 1962), c. 251.

³Ibid., c. 258.

⁴Bodyansky, "The Events in Aden," New Times, p. 18.

turbed by the republican revolution of September 1962 in Yemen which presented an unexpected alternative to merger to the South Arabian nationalists opposed to the scheme. The immediate result was a flurry of activity on the part of Mr. Sandys and Company to obtain approval of the draft treaty by the various legislative bodies concerned, followed by a decision to update the union from March to January 1963.

On January 18, 1963, Aden acceded to the Federation of South Arabia in accordance with the London agreement of August 1962. The accession was carried out following the adoption of the necessary amendments to the Federal Constitution by the Federal Council in December 1962 and the signing of the accession treaty by Britain and the Federation on January 16, 1963.¹ The treaty of accession was signed in Al-Ittihad by Sir Charles Johnston, redesignated High Commissioner for Aden, on behalf of the British Government and by Sultan Salih bin Hussain al-Audhali, Federal Minister for Internal Security and Chairman of the Federal Supreme Council, on behalf of the Federation. On the following day an Order in Council was issued applying the amended Federal Constitution to Aden effective from January 18, on which date Aden became the twelfth member of the Federation.²

Under the terms of the accession treaty, Johnston nominated twenty-four Adeni members to the Federal Council. On January 28, 1963, four of them entered the Federal Supreme Council where they were assigned the ministerial posts of State, Finance, Education, and Aviation

¹"Aden-Federation of South Arabia," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 14 (1963-1964), p. 19435.

²Ibid., p. 19435. Perim and Kuria Muria Islands were excluded from Aden's accession to the Federation. Aden and South Arabia, p. 11.

and Communications.¹

On December 17, 1962, the Aden Legislative Council elected its required four new members to replace the four ex officio members who were to retire on the date of Aden's accession to the Federation. On January 12, 1963, Mr. Hassan Ali Bayoomi was nominated by the High Commissioner to form the first government under the new order. Five days later he announced his cabinet. This executive Council was henceforth to be called the Council of Ministers. The Council consisted of eight ministers, all of whom were Adeni except for the Attorney-General, the only remaining British ex officio member.²

On the day that Aden acceded to the Federation, Crater, the Arab heart of the city, went into mourning. Police were occupied all day removing black flags from buildings and balconies.³ A statement was issued by the PSP rebutting the laudatory inaugural address of the High Commissioner which stated inter alia:

His excellency began by saying that the change in his position is just one of the major constitutional changes effected. Our reply to this is that his duties as High Commissioner are identical with those he performed as Governor. It is only a difference in words.⁴

The statement held that the constitutional changes were a confusion of words without meaning. "We have a Minister of Foreign Affairs but he

¹"Aden-Federation of South Arabia," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 14 (1963-1964), p. 19436.

²Ibid., p. 19436. Mr. Bayoomi also held the post of Minister of State in the Federal Supreme Council.

³The Times (London), January 19, 1963, p. 7.

⁴Walid Khalidi and Yusuf Ibish (eds.), "The People's Socialist Party's Answer to the British High Commissioner's Address . . .," Arab Political Documents: 1963 (Beirut: Slim Press, 1964), p. 300.

has no Ministry because foreign affairs . . . are Britain's prerogative." The four new members of the Council of Ministers were selected by the Legislative Council, an unrepresentative body. The policy of the Aden ministers continued to be the policy of the British and not an expression of Adeni will.¹

His Excellency says that 'the Adeni ship of state' has an Adeni crew and is steered by an Adeni. We should like to ask: Who owns this ship? Its crew are employees, they do not own it. What kind of fuel does it consume? Is it Arab, or English fuel? We do not doubt that there are 24 representatives of Aden now sitting in the Federal Council and that four of them are Federal ministers, but we do disagree with His Excellency on his use of the words 'representative'. We say they are appointed.²

Upon his return from a visit to South Arabia in May 1964, Mr. Sandys told Parliament that he was optimistic on all counts and the Federation appeared to be in good order.

It was not to be expected that the union between Aden and the Federation could be accomplished without strains and anxieties. I was, however, encouraged to find that nobody expressed any desire to see Aden separated from the Federation. It now seems generally accepted that the people of Aden and of the rest of South Arabia belong together and that the well-being of all depends upon close and effective co-operation.³

¹Walid Khalidi and Yusuf Ibish (eds.), "The People's Socialist Party's Answer to the British High Commissioner's Address . . .," Arab Political Documents: 1963 (Beirut: Slim Press, 1964), p. 300-301.

²Ibid., p. 301.

³Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 695, No. 110 (May 14, 1964), c. 612.

CHAPTER VII

THE FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADVANCE

With the irritant of Britain's presence and the benefit of her example, nationalism in southern Arabia would be far weaker than it is and factionalism and tribalism far stronger. Nowhere else in Arabia . . . does the victory of modern nationalism seem as imminent now as in Aden and the Federation, because nowhere else has a colonial power been at work with anything like true colonial authority to act as the catalyst of nationhood.*

The accession of Aden Colony to the South Arabian Federation marked the end of effective British rule in South Arabia. The British were able to bring two more states into the Federation in March 1963, raising the total membership to fourteen, and they arranged for the abolition of all customs barriers within the Federation on April 1, 1963.¹ Little else of a positive nature was accomplished.

Events inside the Colony and the Federation began to move at an accelerated pace. There was a widespread demand for firm British guarantees of complete independence in the near future. With the merger of Aden completed, there were no more interim steps obstructing the path to this final goal.

*Holden, op. cit., p. 67.

¹"Aden-Federation of South Arabia," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 14 (1963-1964), p. 19436. In addition to the two new states of the Haushabi Sultanate and the Shaibi Sheikhdome, the following states belonged to the Federation: the Sultanates of Lahej, Aūdhalī, Lower Aūlaqī, Fadhli, Lower Yafa and Wahidi; the Amirates of Dhala and Beihan; the Sheikhdoms of Aqrabi and Upper Aūlaqī; the State of Dathina; and Aden Colony (see Appendix II).

It has been noted that the moderate forces in Aden had been superceded. The PSP worked full time now in its quest for independence. Out of a population of some 220,000, the 80,000 native Adenis and the 100,000 Yemenis living in Aden looked to independence and eventual union with the Republic of Yemen as the next logical goals to be realized. This quest for independence had the backing of President Nasser and the Yemen Republic.¹

The leadership of the PSP, derived from the ATUC, was young and vigorous. Abdullah al-Asnag, barely thirty years old in 1963, was a fine example of this leadership. The driving force of the ATUC practically from its conception, he later turned his talents to leading the PSP. His own natural aptitude was enhanced by the lessons learned in Cairo where he spent much time in his capacity of Assistant General-Secretary of the Confederation of Arab Trade Unions. In spite of the PSP's Egyptian contacts, it was considered by some as being too moderate. Some extremists, advocating a total identification with Nasser's nationalism, even described the party as being pro-Ba'th.² A ranking ATUC official commenting on this subject said:

We are for Aden. . . . We should not like to come under anybody else's rule and Nasser knows our views. If we united with Yemen it would be under certain conditions and if we remained in the Federation it would be only with proper elections. We know how the British feel about the petroleum and

¹Arnold Beichman, "Britain's Guantanamo," Spectator, Vol. 211, No. 7048 (July 26, 1963), p. 102.

²Ibid., p. 102. This latter accusation is not without foundation in the light of the many visits made by PSP (later OLOS and then FLOSY) leaders to Damascus, the number of supporting declarations issued from Damascus in support of al-Asnag and his companions, and the Syrian declaration of support for FLOSY in November 1967 when it was evident that it would not inherit the leadership of South Arabia on the eve of independence.

the base. But is there not a British base still in Cyprus? . . . We are trying to keep out those elements who are too tied up with the UAR and we have succeeded thus far. In a few months, if nothing changes, we will have to surrender the leadership because we have failed and tell others to take over or we ourselves will have to change our policies.¹

Relatively speaking, the PSP was moderate. Throughout the next four years it continually expressed its desire to reach a mutually acceptable independence agreement with the British in the face of the conviction of the more extreme nationalist groups that such an agreement was unattainable. The United Kingdom refused to heed this plea for rational compromise.

On the occasion of the visit of an Aden Trades Union delegation to Moscow in August 1963, Trud wrote of the difficulties under which the trade union movement worked in Aden:

The Aden authorities hinder normal activity by the Aden TUC in every conceivable way. The trade unions are denied the right to organize strikes, demonstrations or mass meetings and the right to publish their own newspaper. . . . Trade union activities as a whole are banned in the two Protectorates. . . . Nevertheless, the influence of the trade unions spreads over the whole country.²

One legitimate recourse open to the entire body of Adeni nationalists was that of petitions and pleas for non-British arbitration. The recipient of these requests, the United Nations, did not turn a deaf ear. The United Nations Special Committee of Twenty-Four for Non-Self-Governing Territories adopted a resolution on May 8, 1963, providing for a subcommittee to visit Aden and the Federation in order to

¹Beichman, op. cit., p. 102.

²The Mizan Newsletter, Vol. 5, No. 8 (September 1963), p. 13. Actually this statement is somewhat exaggerated and misleading because the ATUC in fact did continue to issue newspapers as well as hold frequent strikes, demonstrations, and mass meetings.

make recommendations for the speedy granting of independence to this region. Despite strong United Kingdom warnings that the proposal was unacceptable to Her Majesty's Government, it was approved on the eighth of May by a vote of eighteen to five with one member absent. The proposal expressed deep concern with the situation prevailing in South Arabia as a result of the denial of political rights.¹

A five man subcommittee from the Committee of Twenty-Four went to the Middle East in May 1963 to conduct on-the-spot inquiries. The British refused to allow them entry into South Arabia. Determined to carry out their mission, the subcommittee convened in Cairo. On July 3, 1963, the subcommittee submitted a report on its findings in which it recommended that: the people of South Arabia be allowed elections as soon as possible based on universal adult suffrage; Britain release all political prisoners, allow the return of political exiles, and repeal all laws restricting public freedom; Britain dissolve the existing legislative bodies and replace them by a representative body for the entire territory of the South derived from general elections; the United Nations arrange for United Nations supervision of the recommended elections; and that, following these elections, Britain and the new government establish an agreed upon date for independence and arrange to transfer administrative responsibilities.²

The United Kingdom ignored the recommendations of the subcommittee. After considering the report of the Committee of Twenty-Four on

¹"Aden-Federation of South Arabia," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 14 (1963-1964), p. 19437.

²"South Arabian Protection," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 14 (1963-1964), p. 19993.

Aden, the General Assembly adopted, on December 11, 1963, Resolution 1949(XVIII) which embodied the recommendations of the five man subcommittee [Appendix III].¹

In April 1964 the Committee of Twenty-Four adopted a draft resolution which reaffirmed Resolution 1949(XVIII), recommended the early removal of the military base from Aden which it considered prejudicial to the security of the region, and established a permanent subcommittee on Aden consisting of five members who would: study and keep under review the situation in Aden; establish contact with the administrative power to implement resolutions 1514(XV) and 1949(XVIII); arrange for a visit to the territory; and make any other visits deemed necessary. The United Kingdom representative again expressed his disagreement with the resolution, particularly denouncing the intent to send the subcommittee to Aden, a point to which the British Government objected in principle for any of the territories under its administration.²

Since no Arab state has yet succeeded in maintaining Western-pattern democratic government, it is very unlikely that any educated Arab believes that such a system could work in tribal, least of all nomadic, territory. When therefore the Iraqi representative on the committee of twenty-four, in November 1964, proposed a resolution calling on Britain to implement the General Assembly Resolution No. 1949 without delay, it is not unreasonable to dismiss it as wilfully mischievous. He must have known that the beduins of South Arabia were no more likely to work, "one man, one vote" than

¹United Nations General Assembly, Official Records: Eighteenth Session, Supplement No. 15 (A/5515), Resolutions: 17 September - 17 December 1963, p. 6.

²"Special Committee of 24: Question of Aden," UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. 1, No. 1 (May 1964), pp. 27-28. General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV) of December 1960 was a general resolution calling on all powers administering non-self-governing territories to take measures implementing their advancement toward independence.

those of Iraq.¹

In May 1963 major demonstrations took place in Aden in protest against the United Kingdom's refusal to allow the United Nations five man subcommittee to enter Aden. The British administrators responded by issuing new laws designed to tighten their control over the region. New prison sentences were imposed for participating in demonstrations, insulting Adeni officials, or serving in the Yemeni Armed Forces. On June 10, 1963, a decree was issued suspending the Supreme Council of the PSP. The party dodged this maneuver by forming a committee of three entrusted with the powers of the suspended Council to make decisions while al-Asnag set about soliciting support from Moscow and Cairo.²

In June 1963 it was announced that Sir Charles Johnston was to be replaced as High Commissioner by his senior deputy, Mr. G. K. N. Trevaskis. Mr. Trevaskis had a long history in South Arabia, including service as British Adviser to the Western Protectorate. There were many who accused him of open bias in favor of the Federation's sultans and sheikhs among whom he so long served. This belief could not be expected to endear him to Aden's nationalists who, only six months after merger with the Federation, were openly discussing union with Yemen.³

¹Ingrams, Arabia and the Isles, pp. 71-72.

²Chronology of Arab Politics, Vol. 1, No. 2 (April-June 1963), pp. 93-96, and Chronology of Arab Politics, Vol. 1, No. 3 (July-September 1963), pp. 182-184.

³"Base in Jeopardy," The Economist, Vol. 210, No. 6281 (January 11, 1964), p. 102, and "South Arabian Federation," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 14 (1963-1964), p. 19514.

Later in the same month Mr. Hassan Ali Bayoomi, Chief Minister of Aden, died of a heart attack in London. He was succeeded by Mr. Zain Abdul Baharoon, at the time Minister of Finance. Mr. Baharoon came into office a political moderate willing to cooperate with the British.¹

The end of the year witnessed the crystallization of conflict between the nationalists and the United Kingdom. Following the departure of the United Nations five man subcommittee from the Middle East, there was an apparent hiatus in South Arabian affairs. There were outbreaks of tribal revolts in the hinterland, but these were attributed to Republican Yemeni and Egyptian instigation. The major events in Aden have been cited. Talks were taking place concerning the coming elections scheduled for January 1964. In October 1963 an Adenese Commission of Inquiry established by Aden's Chief Minister recommended that the current Legislative Council be extended for an additional six months, to July 1964, to implement its recommended changes to the Elections Ordinance of 1955.

Under the new Aden Franchise Bill, which was to become law in March 1964, voting rights were granted to all males over twenty-one resident in Aden who were native born or naturalized or whose fathers had been born in Aden. Eligible voters must be able to speak and understand Arabic and not owe allegiance to any foreign power or hold a foreign passport. Quite obviously this still excluded the majority of the Yemeni migrant labor force in Aden.²

¹"South Arabian Federation," Keessing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 14 (1963-1964), p. 19514.

²Aden and South Arabia, p. 14.

The uneasy calm in Aden was abruptly shattered on December 10, 1963, when a hand grenade was thrown at a group of ministers and officials at Aden Airport. In the group was Sir Kennedy Trevaskis, about to leave for London, who was only slightly injured. One of his assistants, Mr. George Henderson, was mortally wounded while shielding the High Commissioner from the blast.¹

The administration's reaction was swift and decisive. The Federal Supreme Council declared a state of emergency throughout the Federation on the same day and closed the frontier with Yemen. All aliens were required to register and obtain registration documents. Two hundred and thirty-four Yemenis accused of involvement in subversive activities were deported while the top PSP and ATUC leaders were arrested. For lack of other evidence, Abdullah al-Asnag and two ATUC officials were convicted of having conspired to produce a seditious publication glorifying the riots of September 24, 1962.²

On December 13, 1964, the United Nations General Assembly Trusteeship Committee adopted a resolution calling on Britain to release the arrested leaders of the PSP and the ATUC. Three members of the ATUC met with the High Commissioner to protest the arrest of union members. On leaving the meeting one of the three members, Mr. Amin Thabet, Secretary-General of the Port Workers Union, was also arrested.³

¹"South Arabian Protection," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 14 (1963-1964), pp. 19993-19994.

²Ibid., pp. 19993-19994, and Chronology of Arab Politics, Vol. 1, No. 4 (October-December 1963), p. 307. The state of emergency was not lifted until November 26, 1967, just prior to the final British withdrawal from South Arabia.

³Chronology of Arab Politics, Vol. 1, No. 4 (October-December

An article in The Economist described Mr. Sandys' behavior during this period as a blind drive for revenge and a determination to keep the military base in Aden at all costs. One news reporter, subtly advising a little more discretion of action, wrote:

When one recalls that colonial goals are often a staging post towards future power, even prime ministership, the manner of detaining Mr. Asnag and his comrades ought to be a full British responsibility - if only as extra insurance for the safety of the British base.¹

The majority of the detainees were released in staged groups between December 27, 1963, and February 19, 1964. Mr. al-Asnag, originally sentenced to twelve months imprisonment, had his sentence reduced to eight months, while the other two ATUC officials convicted with him were given sentences of six and three months, respectively.²

At the time that Sir Kennedy Trevaskis was the target of a grenade at Aden Airport, he was on his way to London to discuss a proposed constitutional conference designed to consider the next step toward regional independence. The British still deluded themselves into believing that they could proceed by controlled stages to independence in South Arabia, all the while maintaining and protecting the future

1963), pp. 307-308. In a personal interview one ATUC leader said that during these years ATUC leaders were constantly being called to the offices of various security and administrative officials, never knowing whether they were going to be questioned or detained - the latter occurring as frequently as the former.

¹"Prisoners' Base," The Economist, Vol. 109, No. 6279 (December 28, 1963), p. 1325.

²The Middle East and North Africa: 1966-1967, Thirteenth Edition (London: Europa Publication Limited, 1966), p. 102, and "Aden-Federation of South Arabia," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 14 (1963-1964), p. 19436. Mr. al-Asnag was actually released from prison in February 1964.

of their military and strategic posture there. However, following the grenade incident, the originally proposed conference was cancelled.

In May 1964 Mr. Nigel Fisher, Under-Secretary for the Colonies, went to Aden to prepare again for a proposed constitutional conference, this time to be held in London in June. The PSP announced that they intended to boycott the conference since they were not to be allowed to be directly represented in London. On June 4, 1964, thirteen Federation sultans accompanied by Mr. Fisher, the High Commissioner, and several of his assistants departed for London.¹

The conference, which lasted from the ninth of June to the fourth of July, was faced with several basic problems: the need to establish a date for granting independence; the necessity of strengthening the federal executive body; the requirement to widen the franchise in the Federation; and the need for a more democratic form of political life in the federal states. The Adeni ministers were particularly concerned about achieving greater autonomy within Aden to include control over internal security, the abolition of the state of emergency, determining who would be the eventual recipients of the Aden military base rents in the future, and the differences between Aden's level of governmental sophistication and the political institutions existing in the rest of the Federation.²

Aden's Chief Minister, Mr. Baharoon, said:

Aden's position . . . must be brought forward politically to the immediate attainment of self-rule. At the same time

¹Chronology of Arab Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2 (April-June 1964), pp. 116-117.

²The Middle East and North Africa: 1966-1967, p. 102.

. . . we are also very keen to see the creation of democratic institutions in our sister states.¹

Sultan Ahmad Abdullah al-Fadhli, Chairman of the Federal Supreme Council, stressed the importance of achieving an autonomous, independent Arab state capable of standing with its brother Arab nations.

We are determined to achieve this autonomy in a manner which will serve the interests of our people in South Arabia. We are conscious of the needs of our people and our country and the heavy responsibility which we bear. What we want is what the people of South Arabia want. . . . It is obvious that there can be no true Arab government either for Aden or for the Federation as a whole so long as Aden is in name a state of the Federation but in hard constitutional fact a British colony.²

Sultan al-Fadhli was speaking for those who wanted greater Federal control over Aden Colony. Britain's objective in the conference was to ensure the continuation of her military presence in the area.

The results of the conference were published in a White Paper, Command 2414, dated July 1964. The delegates agreed that the Federation should reshape its constitution on more democratic lines with a view to proceeding to early independence. In line with this a legislature consisting of a National Assembly and a Council of States was envisioned. The National Assembly would hold the real legislative powers of the government while the Council of States would have the power to delay for a limited period the enactment of laws passed by the National Assembly. There should be a president whose major responsibility would be the appointment of a prime minister. The delegates expressed the desire that the constitutional status of Aden be

¹The Times (London), June 10, 1964, p. 10.

²Ibid., p. 10.

raised to that of the rest of the states of the Federation. They requested that British sovereignty be renounced as soon as practicable, "subject to the continued exercise by the British Government of such powers as may be necessary for the defense of the Federation and the fulfilment of Britain's world-wide responsibilities." The British Secretary of State indicated that his Government was prepared to comply with this request. The date for this transfer of sovereignty was to be agreed on by the British, Federal, and Aden Governments. It was agreed that as soon as possible the British Government would convene a conference for the purpose of setting a date for independence, not later than 1968, and drawing up a defense agreement under which the British would retain the military base in Aden.¹

Following the conclusion of the conference, Sultan al-Fadhli accused the British of perfidy and greed in their attempt to preserve their own interests before all else.

As President of the South Arabian Federation, I would like to inform you that I strongly condemn the recent London Conference which has turned out to be no more than a conspiracy aimed at destroying the nationalist elements in Southern Arabia. . . . I therefore declare the secession of the Fadli Emirate from the South Arabian Federation. I deeply regret this course of action because I personally participated in establishing this Federation which I had hoped would lead to independence within five years. Six years have now passed and no steps have been taken in that direction.²

The Sultan was barred from returning to South Arabia and not permitted to carry out his secession. Just a week before the above conference convened in London, Mr. Peter Thorneycroft, Secretary of State for

¹Great Britain, Federation of South Arabia: Conference Report, Command 2414 (July 1964), pp. 1-4.

²"Press Conference Held in Rome by Sultan Ahmad Abdullah al-Fadhli . . . ," Arab Political Documents: 1964, p. 260.

Defence, said in Parliament that:

For the foreseeable future Aden will be necessary to our strategy, and our absence from it would both render us unable to discharge our direct obligations to our friends, and would set in train events harmful to the course of peace. It is therefore our purpose and intention to stay there, and our military plans, dispositions and actions will be shaped to this end.¹

Six months later a new Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Denis Healey, said in a similar vein that:

Her Majesty's Government's policy is to retain the base, in agreement with the Government of the Federation of South Arabia, for so long as it is required to serve the interests which we have in common.²

What were the vital international interests of the United Kingdom that she should claim such heavy reliance on the Aden base? A large percentage of the troops stationed in Aden were becoming increasingly committed to the immediate task of preserving the security of the Aden military installations in which they were quartered. At that time it cost the British Government some twenty million pounds a year just to maintain the military force at Aden.³

Officers of the RAF agreed that the base at Aden would be useless with a hostile labor force. The army still thought that it could quell disturbances by arresting the top leaders ". . . and is happy

¹Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 695, No. 113 (June 3, 1964), c. 164. (Underlined column references refer to 'Written Answers' as opposed to Oral Debate and are distinguished by italicized numerals in Hansard.) From April 1964 the British Minister of Defence was thereafter referred to as the Secretary of State for Defence in Hansard.

²Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 703, No. 23 (November 30, 1964), c. 10.

³Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 703, No. 23 (November 30, 1964), c. 1.

about having been able to recapture Northwest Frontier training conditions.¹

Many believed that the force in South Arabia was there simply to protect British oil interests. Khrushchev, on the occasion of a visit to the UAR in May 1964, said:

Take Aden. Is it Aden that the British are interested in? Like hell they are! They are interested in oil. That is what interests them. Now in Aden there is also an Aden representative who is connected with the colonialists by some agreement. Consequently the colonialists say 'We are here by agreement, we are people who respect agreements.' And this agreement with a colonialist is like an agreement between a hanged man and the rope on which he dangles.²

But the English had already displayed their ability to respond militarily during the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis with a force sufficient to meet the immediate military threat of an aggressive force indigenous to the Middle East which might affect their oil supply. However, this successful maneuver was in part due to the convenient proximity of the British aircraft carrier, Bulwark. To maintain this capability, therefore, some Indian Ocean port is essential to the British.

Another theory was that Aden was essential as a staging post for its Far East commitments - supporting its base at Singapore. If this were the case, a base with an exposed, vulnerable, and active hinterland would not do nearly so well as an island base.

The real purpose for maintaining a base at Aden was not a function of positive strategic considerations, but rather a manifestation of a negative policy designed to secure the Middle East against pene-

¹"Remnants of Empire," The New Republic, Vol. 150, No. 24 (June 13, 1964), c. 6.

²The Mizan Newsletter, Vol. 6, No. 5 (May 1964), p. 62.

tration by any other potentially hostile power. In spite of this policy, the Middle East had been open to potentially hostile powers for quite some time, and, ironically, the British had not really suffered materially. The canal in Egyptian hands was open to the United Kingdom on an equal footing with all other user nations. Middle East oil was available to all interested customers, control of its distribution being effected not by military might, but by the producing companies' management, in which the British were well represented. One suspects that a major factor in Britain's intention to stay in Aden was the personal persuasion of certain of her top policy makers who were still fighting a battle already lost, Mr. Sandys being the epitome of this type.

From the autumn of 1964 onward there was a sharp increase in terrorist activities in Aden. Many civilians, both Arab and English, were killed, including Sir Arthur Charles, the British Speaker of the Aden Legislative Council. He was shot dead on September 1, 1965. Mr. Anthony Greenwood, Secretary of State for the Colonies, announced in Parliament on October 28, 1965, that since October 1, 1964, there had been 255 terrorist incidents in Aden resulting in twenty-nine killed and 201 injured.¹

In a parliamentary discussion on the terrorist situation in Aden, Mr. Fisher commented to Mr. Greenwood that:

It seems rather extraordinary that we cannot give adequate protection to the citizens of a British Colony which is also a British military base.²

¹Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 718, No. 172 (October 28, 1965), c. 335.

²Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 709, No. 90 (April 1, 1965), c. 1836.

Fisher demanded to know what action Greenwood intended to take to oppose the "Egyptian-financed, Egyptian-organized, and Egyptian-armed terrorist activities". Greenwood replied that security patrols had been increased, a curfew had been imposed on the nights of March 31 and April 1, 1965, the situation was kept under constant review, and that meetings of five or more persons required a permit from the Federal Minister of Internal Security who delegated his authority in Aden to the Aden Commissioner of Police.¹

In spite of this concern over the situation in Aden and the measures taken to bring order and internal security to the area, terrorist activity continued. By the end of 1964 the British had come to realize that the leading agency of subversion and terrorism in South Arabia was not the PSP but the National Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South, more commonly known as the National Liberation Front, or the NLF.²

The NLF first achieved widespread notice in the summer of 1964 when it held its first conference at the Arab League headquarters in Cairo. In a matter of weeks an NLF spokesman, Mr. Qahtan Shaabi, was proclaiming his organization's responsibility for raids carried out against British forces in Radfan and Dhala. An NLF office was opened

¹Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 709, No. 90 (April 1, 1965), cols. 1836-1838.

²The NLF claimed that it consisted of ten nationalist groups: the Arab Nationalist Movement for the Occupied South, the Nasserite Front, the Revolutionary Organization for Occupied South, the Nationalist Front, the Free Officers and Soldiers in the Federal Army, the Secret Liberal organization of Occupied South Yemen, the Tribal Organization, the Reform Front of Yafeh, the Revolution Vanguard, and the Youth Organization of the Mahrah District. The Arab World (Beirut), April 16, 1965, p. 5.

in Cairo which set out to solicit support within the Arab world in its fight against the British. During the next three years the NLF carried out its warfare against the British throughout the South Arabian Federation.

Mr. Qahtan Shaabi, formerly an agricultural officer in Lahej, quickly emerged as the leading spokesman for the party. On July 4, 1965, a year after the party announced itself, Shaabi was appointed General-Secretary of the NLF.¹

Just as the central dynamism of the nationalist movement had previously passed from the SAL to the PSP, so now the NLF tended to replace the PSP as the leading activist agency against the British. This represented not only a switch of nationalist leadership from one organization to another, but a switch of the seat of nationalist power from the Adeni labor force to a Federation-wide base of nationalists.

Al-Asnag continued to maintain that ultimately more could be gained from negotiating with the British than from unbridled violence. He protested against the NLF claim that it had become the sole representative of the nationalist struggle in South Arabia. In response to the challenge of the NLF, he formed a united front of groups supporting the PSP and his aims, the Organization for the Liberation of the Occupied South (OLOS). This organization never achieved the strength or influence of the PSP or the NLF and became a dead letter with the creation of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY)

¹Chronology of Arab Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3 (July-September, 1965), p. 217.

in January 1966.¹

Qahtan Shaabi, who replaced al-Asnag as the Cairo favorite, also enjoyed the support of the Yemeni Republican nationalists with whom he claimed a natural affinity. In July 1964 his organization issued a statement rejecting political action as a means of struggle against British imperialism. Armed revolt was justified on the basis that " . . . war remains the only means used by imperialism to consolidate its existence . . . ".²

The National Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen . . . has waged war against British imperialism in the belief that imperialism could never forsake its strategic and economic interests in the South nor abandon its position there merely as a result of political negotiations and secondary battles that have little to do with the basic problem. An immediate armed movement of liberation had to commence throughout the South.³

Once initiated in the summer of 1964, the NLF terrorist campaign continued without respite until the last British soldier left Aden in November, 1967. According to the South Arabian Federal Minister of Internal Security in 1966, Sultan Saleh bin Hussein al-Audhali, Egyptian intelligence personnel were giving arms, training, and monthly salaries to members of the NLF. The NLF had an operational headquarters in Taiz, Yemen, with supply centers at Qataba, Harib, and other Yemeni towns. Its initial area of activity was in Radfan, Dhala,

¹"Socialists Don't Vote," The Economist, Vol. 213, No. 6324 October 17, 1964), p. 246, and Chronology of Arab Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2 (April-June 1965), p. 106.

²Walid Khalidi and Yusuf Ibish (eds.), "Statement by the National Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen . . .," Arab Political Documents: 1964 (Beirut: S.I.E.L. Press, 1965), p. 257.

³Ibid., p. 254.

Lahej, Beihan and Audhali states, but later it extended its efforts to Aden and the rest of the Federation.¹

During an NLF conference held in June 1965, a list of resolutions and recommendations was issued. It was affirmed that the NLF was the sole representative of the people in the South, and any agreements or solutions entered into by the British with any other political organizations including the Federal and Aden Governments would not stand in the way of NLF objectives. It affirmed that the people should reject and combat all imperialist schemes in the region while condemning the 'so-called' Federal and Aden Governments as bogus assemblies created by imperialism in the hope of allaying popular discontent and perverting the will of the masses. The NLF declared OLOS to be an anti-revolutionary body representing opportunistic interests. The party condemned the British Colonial Secretary's attempt to send a constitutional committee to South Arabia, this act being interpreted as an indication of Britain's determination not to recognize the rights and objectives of the people. The party affirmed the " . . . unity of the Yemeni Revolution, both in the North and South . . . " and declared that " . . . the National Front shall combat all reactionary and imperialist attempts to conspire against the single revolution of our people". The party saluted President Nasser, admired his stand in supporting nationalist independence aims in South Arabia, and reaffirmed its pledge to him to " . . . march by his side and under his leadership

¹"Aden-Federation of South Arabia," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 15 (1965-1966), p. 21291.

guided by the revolutionary objectives of freedom, unity and socialism".¹

In May of the same year the NLF had issued a statement concerning the new objectives of nationalists in South Arabia based on its conviction that the United Nations resolution of December 11, 1963 (1949-XVIII), was outdated and that its measures would automatically be realized with independence at any rate. These objectives were: complete liberation from political and economic imperialism for all areas of South Arabia, liquidation of all British military bases in the region, destruction of the reactionary regimes of sultans, the recovery of all usurped lands and robbed wealth and their restoration to the people, and the unification of the Arabs of the 'Yemeni region' preparatory to Pan-Arab unity.²

In the face of this determined, organized opposition to their presence, Great Britain's colonial administrators continued in their measured tread on the path to eventual independence. On October 16, 1964, a general election was held in Aden to elect sixteen members to the Legislative Council. The previous Legislative Council, elected in 1959, was finally dissolved on July 25, 1964, after its term had been extended for six months in January 1964.

Mr. Zain Abdul Baharoon, Chief Minister in the outgoing government, was asked by the High Commissioner to form a cabinet and again

¹Khalidi and Ibish (eds.), "Resolutions of the First Congress of the National Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen Held Between June 22-25, 1965," Arab Political Documents: 1965 (Beirut: S.I.E.L. Press, 1966), pp. 244-245.

²Khalidi and Ibish (eds.), "Statement Issued by the National Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen," Arab Political Documents: 1965, p. 210.

became the Chief Minister. Ten of the sixteen newly elected members supported the appointment of Mr. Khalifa Abdullah Khalifa as Chief Minister against Baharoon. In January 1964 Khalifa had been accused by the British authorities of killing George Henderson during the December 1963 airport bombing incident involving the British High Commissioner, Sir Kennedy Trevaskis. Khalifa, still in detention, had been elected to the Legislative Council along with several other members of the PSP. The new government requested his release, which was finally authorized by the Federal Government.¹

During this same period a new High Commissioner for Aden was selected to succeed Trevaskis. On December 21, 1964, Sir Richard Turnbull's appointment was announced by the British Colonial Office.

In spite of the 1964 failure to successfully conduct a constitutional conference, the British were determined to try again. In November 1964 Anthony Greenwood visited South Arabia to carry out initial preparations for the conference. This conference was to be held in London on March 2, 1965. However, in the latter weeks of February 1965, a controversy arose in South Arabia which served to prevent the scheduled meeting. The Federal Government wanted the full participation of the three main eastern non-federated states: Qu'aiti, Kathiri, and Mahra. They, on the other hand, preferred to only observe the proceedings without being included as committed participants. Aden State also wanted these three states to participate and submitted a statement to the High Commissioner asking him to have them included. It appears

¹Chronology of Arab Politics, Vol. 2, No. 1 (January-March 1964), p. 14, and Vol. 2, No. 4 (October-December 1964), p. 342. Also, "Aden-Federation of South Arabia," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 15 (1965-1966), p. 21292.

that each side, i.e., the Federal Government and the Aden Government, visualized the presence of these three states as working to their particular advantage against the interest of the other. At the same time, Baharoon called for a supervisory body to carry out the decisions to be made at the forthcoming conference concerning the creation of a unitary state. This was in opposition to the Federal Government's wishes.

On February 23, 1965, following Sir Richard Turnbull's refusal to publish the Aden Government statement on these points, the Adeni cabinet resigned. Baharoon in his resignation pointed out that two years had passed since the Aden-Federation merger, and during that time the constitutional arrangements had proven unsatisfactory. He did not see the coming conference as it was then conceived as holding any hope for improvement.¹

We now fear that recent developments which prevented the holding of such a conference will continue to fetter Aden with a constitution which no one supports. Consequently I and my Government see no use in continuing in power, and therefore I submit my resignation with deep regret.²

In London it was decided that it would be best to set aside discussions on a new date for the conference, so greatly desired by the British, until the leaders in South Arabia had time to forget their immediate differences over the current controversy and once again come to an appreciation of the need of such a meeting.

On March 3, 1965, the High Commissioner asked Mr. Abdul Qawee Mackawee, a businessman and leading opposition member in Aden politics, to form a new government for Aden State. Al-Akhbar in Cairo said that

¹The Times (London), February 22, 1965, p. 8; February 24, 1965, p. 12; and February 25, 1965, p. 10.

²The Times (London), February 25, 1965, p. 10.

the appointment of Mackawee was designed to give the new Chief Minister the character of an opposition leader and so deceive the people.

The new Aden government is just another imperialist maneuver to wriggle out of the difficult position British policy is in in South Arabia, and an attempt at holding the London Conference.¹

Mackawee appointed a seven man cabinet on March 7, 1965, which included Khalifa Abdullah Khalifa as Minister of Finance. On assuming office Mr. Mackawee undertook a strongly anti-British policy line which included speeches hostile to British interests in the Legislative Assembly, the submission of resolutions for the removal of British bases, and the full implementation of the December 1963 United Nations resolution on Aden.²

The constitutional conference which had been reset for June 1965 was again postponed when the Aden Government and the major Adeni political parties refused to participate. The British then resorted to the creation of a Constitutional Commission which would travel to South Arabia to study the problem. Mr. Greenwood told Parliament:

I regard the appointment of the Constitutional Commission for South Arabia as the surest way of bringing Aden and the rest of the area to early independence. It is essential for the leaders and peoples of the territory itself now to face up to the numerous and difficult practical questions posed by the quest for unity in South Arabia. The Commission will therefore need the fullest co-operation from all concerned with the future of the area in framing a constitution which satisfies the people's wishes, reconciles divergent interests, and so lays the foundations for a stable democratic state.³

¹The Arab World, March 11, 1965, p. 8.

²"Aden-Federation of South Arabia," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 15 (1965-1966), p. 21292.

³Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 716, No. 154 (July 15, 1965), c. 93.

On July 18, 1965, it was announced that fourteen Aden representatives on the South Arabian Federal Council had resigned in protest against the proposed Commission. On July 20, 1965, Mackawee called for the abrogation of the Treaty of Friendship and Protection between Britain and the Federation since the treaty was unacceptable to the Adeni people. On the same day he announced that members of the Commission were considered persona non grata in Aden.¹

This Commission was to have prepared the way for a constitutional conference to be held in December 1965. The Cairo newspaper, Al-Gunhouria, saw the hoped for London conference as:

. . . the last political card which Britain has thrown with the aim of gaining time or to create a conflict between Arabs in the occupied South. . . . Britain has lost this card and now there remains not a single person who could reach agreement with Britain on grounds other than the resolutions of the United Nations stipulating for the right of self-determination to South Arabian people.²

Mr. Mackawee saw no chance for the resumption of constitutional talks inasmuch as the British were unwilling to accept the December 1963 United Nations resolution calling for self-determination based on full adult suffrage, release of all political prisoners, a United Nations presence before and during elections, and removal of the British bases. "The British Government was not prepared to accept this resolution as it stood."³

While Aden's nationalists pursued their course of strong opposition to British rule in the local government, the terrorist activities

¹Chronology of Arab Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3 (July-September 1965), p. 218.

²The Arab World, August 10, 1965, p. 8.

³The Arab World, August 9, 1965, p. 2.

continued without respite throughout South Arabia. On September 1, 1965, Sir Arthur Charles, the English Speaker of the Aden Legislative Council, was killed by an unknown assailant. Mackawee and the members of the Legislative Council refused to express public condemnation of this act and, in fact, made it the opportunity to abuse the British for their inability to implement effective security measures in the region. Due to the rapid deterioration of law and order within Aden State, a British Order in Council suspended the Aden Constitution, dismissed the local government, and directed Sir Richard Turnbull to assume direct control over the affairs of the Colony.¹

The High Commissioner issued the following statement on September 25:

The High Commissioner told Mr. Mackawee and his colleagues that H. M. Government had been compelled to take this action by the rapid deterioration in the security situation in Aden in recent weeks. This has been brought to a critical point not only by terrorist attacks on children and civilians but also by the refusal of Aden Ministers to condemn terrorism and by their public support of the so-called National Liberation Front, the externally-controlled instrument of the terrorist campaign.²

Mr. Mackawee stated his position before the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on October 14, 1965, where he said:

The nationalist elements in South Arabia opposed the present structure of the Federation and the so-called independence promised by the United Kingdom, on the following grounds: first, the Federation had been designed essentially to safeguard United Kingdom interests; secondly, the Federation was undemocratic, autocratic, politically explosive and morally reprehensible, since any sultans and shiekhs who opposed the United Kingdom views were deposed and little attempt had been

¹"Aden-Federation of South Arabia," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 15 (1965-1966), p. 21292.

²Ibid., p. 21292.

made to prepare the chiefs and their tribesmen for a changing world and a better future; thirdly, the United Kingdom's promises with regard to independence had not been made in good faith. . . .¹

¹United Nations General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Fourth Committee, 1528th Meeting (A/C.4/SR 1528, October 14, 1965), September 22-December 20, 1965, p. 65.

CHAPTER VIII

WITHDRAWAL

There isn't a drop of military power from Suez to the Persian Gulf capable of forcing a British retreat. And despite long agitation by Adenis for independence, Aden will not become an Algeria.*

Because we agreed with the British that Nasser should stay out of here we have had to bear the brunt of his propaganda attacks and terrorism. Now that we have gone too far to turn back, the British are going to let us face the music on our own. How can they do that to us?***

The assumption of direct rule by the office of the High Commissioner in Aden in no way lessened the character or intensity of terrorist activities; if anything, it added impetus to the terrorist movement. By March 1966 the Special Branch of the Adeni Police Force, a plainclothes unit charged with ferreting out the terrorist activities, had been wiped out as a result of a deliberate plan of assassination.¹

It was reported in Parliament that there had been sixty-four terrorist incidents in 1964, 279 in 1965, 480 in 1966, and 265 in the first two months of 1967 alone. One reason contributing to the continued violence was the failure of the British to make their intentions

*Arnold Beichmen, "Britain's Guantanamo," Spectator, Vol. 211, No. 7043 (July 26, 1963), p. 102.

**"Will Britain's Loss Be Nasser's Gain?", US News & World Report, Vol. 60, No. 13 (March 28, 1966), p. 91. The article is quoting a 'local official'. While credit is not shown, the article would appear to have been written by the magazine's regional correspondent, John Law.

¹Beichman, "Britain's Guantanamo," op. cit., p. 92.

in South Arabia absolutely clear. This was aggravated by the February 22, 1966, announcement by the British Labor Government, in a white paper reviewing the British defense policy, that the military base in Aden would be abandoned when South Arabia became independent, no later than 1968.¹

This announcement resulted in an increased scrambling on the part of the various nationalist groups to place themselves in the most advantageous position from which to grab the reins of power once the British finally left. A key participant in this move was Mr. Abdul Qawi Mackawee who, relieved of his position as Chief Minister of the former Aden Government, openly associated himself with al-Asnag in OLOS. He and al-Asnag set out soliciting the support of Egypt, the rest of the Arab countries, and the United Nations.

During October 1965 the Aden question was debated in the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. Statements were made by many South Arabian nationalist leaders to include Mackawee for OLOS, Shaabi for NLF, and Alhabshi for the SAL, which still commanded a following in Aden. Mr. Mackawee claimed that from the time he and his ministers had taken office in March 1965 until the suspension of the Aden Government, they had been met with obstruction from the High Commissioner. They had tried to persuade the United Kingdom to comply with the provisions of United Nations Resolution 1949(XVIII) to

¹Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 748, No. 213 (June 19, 1967), c. 1146, and United Nations General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Agenda Item 23, Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: Chapter VI, Aden (A/6300/Add. 4), October 21, 1966. Hereafter referred to as: UNGA, Twenty-first Session Agenda Item 23 (A/6300/Add. 4), October 21, 1966.

no avail. The recent British Constitutional Commission was no more than an attempt to divert the people from their just demands. He said that after contacts with the ministers of the Labor Government in London, he felt that they, like the Conservative Government before them, were determined to preserve England's traditional military and economic interests in the area.¹

. . . If the United Kingdom sincerely wanted to give the Territory independence, it should begin by restoring a free and democratic climate throughout the area. The United Kingdom's aim was clearly to weaken the progressive elements and strengthen the reactionary forces in the Territory.²

Mackawee assured the Fourth Committee that the civil service, as it was then constituted in South Arabia, would have been able to do everything that was required to run the government even if independence had been granted immediately. He pointed out that there were some 400 college graduates in South Arabia, as well as the experienced public servants, with sufficient technical and administrative knowledge to run the government as efficiently as it was then being operated.³

The comments of the various Committee members displayed an overwhelming sympathy for the nationalist cause. Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus, in introducing a draft resolution on Aden to the Fourth Committee, was of the opinion that the reports of the subcommittee on Aden, as well as the statements of the representatives and petitioners in the Fourth

¹United Nations General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Fourth Committee, 1528th Meeting (A/C.4/SR.1528, October 14, 1965), September 22 - December 20, 1965, p. 64.

²Mr. Mackawee speaking before the United Nations General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Fourth Committee, 1529th Meeting (A/C.4/SR.1529, October 15, 1965), September 22 - December 20, 1965, p. 72.

³Ibid., p. 74.

Committees:

. . . demonstrated clearly that the case of Aden constituted a classical form of colonialism, in which the oppressed people were driven to extreme measures in their struggle for freedom and independence. The administering Power was making every effort to retain control in the Territory mainly for economic and military reasons, and the result had been increased tension and a threat to the peace and security of the whole region.¹

The resulting United Nations Resolution 2023(XX), November 5, 1965, (Appendix IV), again censored United Kingdom policy in paragraph number four which reads:

Further deplores the attempts of the administering Power to set up an unrepresentative regime in the Territory, with a view to granting it independence contrary to General Assembly resolutions 1514(XV) and 1949(XVIII), and appeals to all States not to recognize any independence which is not based on the wishes of the people of the Territory freely expressed through elections held under universal adult suffrage.²

In spite of its many setbacks, the British Government was still looking for a mutually acceptable constitutional solution to the South Arabian problem. In September 1965 the Federal Government asked two British constitutional advisors, Sir Ralph Hone and Sir Gawain Bell, to consider and recommend suitable amendments to the Federal Constitution, keeping in mind that such an amended constitution should: be appropriate to the whole of South Arabia; prove acceptable as far as possible to the interests and aspirations of all major interests in South Arabia; and assume that sovereignty over Aden by the British is withdrawn.³

¹United Nations General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Fourth Committee, 1545th Meeting (A/C.4/SR.1545, November 2, 1965), September 22 - December 20, 1965, p. 169.

²UNGA, Twenty-first Session, Agenda Item 23 (A/6300/Add. 4), October 21, 1966, p. 4.

³Ibid., p. 7.

The report of these two men was submitted to the Federal Supreme Council on January 28, 1966, and included inter alia the following points: the Federation should be an Islamic Republic with a president, an elected assembly, a cabinet and a premier; the president should have limited power - his chief function being the selection of the premier; an upper house, the Council of State Rulers, would review legislation, but have no power of veto; state rulers could not be central government ministers unless they delegated their own head of state role; all ministries would be moved from Al-Ittihad to Aden which would become the capital; state governments would have limited internal powers; and there should be a separate minister for Adeni Affairs.¹

While the United Nations and Great Britain were busily seeking solutions to the problem in their own particular fashions, South Arabia's nationalists had been actively engaged in advancing their own cause. On January 14, 1966, leaders of the NLF and the OLOS, Ali al-Salami and Abdullah al-Asnag, respectively, issued a communique stating that their two organizations had agreed to merge into "one revolutionary, national organization called the Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South Yemen" (FLOSY).²

In early March 1966, Mr. Abdul Qawi Mackawee, now the Secretary-General of FLOSY, announced that a twenty man revolutionary council would be established with its headquarters situated in Taiz. Any organization wishing to join FLOSY must: dissolve itself and transfer

¹The Arab World, February 14, 1966, pp. 2-3.

²UNGA, Twenty-first Session, Agenda Item 23(A/6300/Add.4), October 21, 1966, pp. 8-9.

all of its property to FLOSY; approve of and actively participate in the armed struggle; reject all British constitutional proposals and refuse to participate in any governmental machinery then in existence; and declare adherence to the United Nations resolution issued in November 1965. It was a basic tenet of FLOSY that the only basis for ending the struggle between the South Arabian people and the British authorities could be through Britain's compliance with the provisions of this United Nations resolution.

FLOSY will fight against any independence granted to the area which does not include the transfer of authority directly to the people of the South and the implementation of all the measures mentioned in the United Nations resolution adopted last November.¹

FLOSY's Revolutionary Council held its first meeting at its headquarters in Taiz on April 16, 1966. As this meeting progressed, an open split occurred between the FLOSY leadership and certain of the former NLF membership. Saif Ahmed Saleh al-Dhalai, speaking for the NLF, said that his organization refused to accept the authority of the council. It was later claimed that they objected to Nasser's attempt to dominate FLOSY through the men who represented its leadership. It is true that the NLF, which up to this time had enjoyed Egyptian patronage, was now replaced by FLOSY as Cairo's apparent favorite. While many individuals formerly in the NLF remained in FLOSY, the NLF re-emerged as an independent organization with Qahtan Shaabi still at its head, pursuing its traditional policy of uncompromising terrorism until the time when the British should leave South Arabia.²

¹UNGA, Twenty-first Session, Agenda Item 23 (A/6300/Add.4), October 21, 1966, pp. 8-9, and The Arab World, March 3, 1966, p. 3.

²The Arab World, July 1, 1966, p. 5, and The Daily Star (Beirut), November 14, 1967, p. 1. Another group was formed in April 1966

In the April meeting the Revolutionary Council of FLOSY formed four committees: one to draw up a plan of action; the second to draw up a charter; the third to prepare for elections to a National Council; and the last to handle military affairs. By June FLOSY announced the establishment of a regular army whose mission was to guarantee the liberation of all parts of South Arabia after the British were "thrown out". It was also announced that FLOSY had, like the NLF, adopted assassination as a legal revolutionary method. FLOSY set out on a vigorous campaign to convince the world and the British that it was the one true voice of nationalism in South Arabia. This inevitably brought it into conflict with the NLF which was to last, with disastrous results for FLOSY, up to the time of eventual independence.¹

Although her role has not been stressed, Egypt's support for the nationalist movement in South Arabia was a significant factor throughout this struggle. In the nineteen-fifties it was the Voice of the Arabs which lent its weight to the cause. By the middle of the nineteen sixties, it was Egyptian-supplied arms, funds, and advice which made so much of the nationalist effort possible. Egypt's support was not only material, but also moral. The various nationalist groups maintained headquarters in Egypt whence they could repair, away from the hostile eyes of the British Security Forces, to organize and plan

calling itself the Command of Nationalist Forces in South Arabia (CONFISA). This body, consisting of the SAL, moderate independent politicians, and some former members of OLOS, criticized FLOSY as an unrepresentative organization. UNGA, Twenty-first Session, Agenda Item 23 (A/6300/Add.4), October 21, 1966, p. 10.

¹UNGA, Twenty-first Session, Agenda Item 23 (A/6300/Add.4), October 21, 1966, p. 9, and The Arab World, June 21, 1966, p. 8.

their movements and operations. After the September 1962 Yemeni revolution, Egypt was able to move her base of support for Adeni nationalism to Yemen. From this source the NLF was able to maintain its operations, and, when Egypt declared her support for FLOSY, that organization set up its headquarters in Cairo and Taiz. Egypt's interest in South Arabia was essentially the same as her goals throughout the Arab world, to eradicate all signs of foreign colonialism and in the process establish herself as the political leader of the region.

In August 1965 Egypt and Saudi Arabia reached an agreement at Jidda to convene a meeting of Royalist and Republican Yemeni representatives at Harad in November. The object of this meeting would be the creation of a provisional compromise regime designed to bring the hostilities in the Yemen to an end. It was intended that this regime would organize a plebiscite dealing with Yemen's future to be held within the coming year. Meanwhile a joint Egyptian-Saudi team would supervise a truce. At Harad the two Yemeni groups were unable to agree on several basic points, and it was finally decided to adjourn until February 20, 1966. The talks were never resumed. Some placed blame for the failure of these talks on the Yemenis, others accused the Egyptians and/or the Saudis of wanting a brief respite from the fighting. But Egypt could well have been tempted to remain in Yemen by the ill-timed declaration of the British Defense Ministry in February 1966 that Britain would evacuate her military bases in Aden by 1968. Only a few hours after Mr. Healey's announcement, Nasser delivered a speech in which he said that he would not withdraw his troops from Yemen until the revolution could defend itself against the conspiracies of imperialism and reactionaries. Some interpreted this to

mean until after the British had left South Arabia.¹

Some ten years after the British conceded the first measure of constitutional advance in Aden, they finally set a time for their withdrawal from South Arabia. This had been brought about largely through the untiring efforts of South Arabia's nationalists aided by a readjustment of Great Britain's military role in the world, a new concept of her East of Suez responsibilities, increasing economic pressures at home, and a change of Government unburdened by the need to support archaic decisions or justify past actions. Once it became evident that independence must come, England's policy makers tried to find a way of ensuring that a friendly regime, amenable to the continuing presence of a British military base, would be left in power. The nationalists, particularly the NLF, were rightly suspicious of England's reluctance to simply pull out of the area, leaving it in the hands of whoever could most quickly grab and consolidate power. The Federal Government, conversely, was growing increasingly fearful that the British would do just that.

In 1964 the British were still speaking of a permanent military base in Aden for the foreseeable future, although dissenting voices had been raised. In 1965 they were speaking of the need for creating a constitution which would provide for effective self-government when they should eventually withdraw. In 1966 the task of the British Government was described as the need to hand over control of a " . . . disputatious Arab territory to as representative a government as pos-

¹Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War 1958-1967 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 142-145, and Lawrence Mosher, "Nasser's Drive for South Arabia," The Reporter, Vol. 36, No. 3 (February 9, 1967), pp. 24-25.

sible at the minimum cost in blood and cash".¹

The new Labor Government, unlike its Conservative predecessor, was unburdened by pledges from the past. For several years they had, in their opposition role, protested against the Conservative Government's continued attempt to ignore the rising demands of Aden's nationalists and persistence in pushing on as usual. In March 1966 Prime Minister Harold Wilson reiterated in Parliament what his fellow party members had been saying for quite some time:

. . . We have surely learned our lesson over the years, that bases cannot be held against the wishes of the local government and the local population.²

A year later, in June 1967, Mr. George Brown, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said:

Our policy in South Arabia as now established has two objectives, which can be summarized in one sentence. We intend to withdraw our military forces in an orderly way and to establish an independent South Arabia in January 1968.³

The problem for the British Government had finally become how to get out of South Arabia, not how to stay in. Policy makers were now more attracted by the promised cuts in defense spending which the elimination of Aden would provide. They understood that alternate defense sites could be resorted to if necessary. In June 1966 the Middle East Command Headquarters announced that no more British families would accompany their husbands assigned to Aden. In May 1966 it was learned

¹Peter Kilner, "Britain, the U.N., and South Arabia," The World Today, Vol. 22, No. 7 (July 1966), p. 269.

²Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 725, No. 63 (March 8, 1966), c. 1906.

³Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 748, No. 213 (June 19, 1967), c. 1143.

that the Foreign Office had been made responsible for the administration of Aden. The switch was explained on the basis that the situation in Aden was so affected by external relations that it was considered appropriate for the Foreign Office to take charge of the entire problem.¹

There was some criticism of the Labor Government's open announcement of its intention to withdraw from South Arabia by 1968, made in the Spring of 1966. Several reasons were suggested: the desire to cut expenses without regard for the consequences, the belief that a shock announcement might mobilize and crystallize nationalist forces into a common effort toward a negotiated independence as had been the case in India, hope of improving relations with the UAR, or the belief that the United Nations could fill the vacuum created by Britain's withdrawal. The most obvious reason, not suggested, was that this move was a logical measure agreed upon by the Labor Party well before it took office.²

There was a strong cry of protest following this announcement, the federal sheikhs vying with former Conservative ministers for first place among the ranks of the protesters. The federal leaders felt that they were being deserted in their hour of greatest need, and people like Mr. Sandys, who had invested so much of their personal effort and reputation in the creation of the Federal system in South Arabia, agreed. Sandys argued that:

¹Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 727, No. 14 (May 5, 1966), c. 1359.

²Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 748, No. 213 (June 19, 1967), c. 1148.

. . . The Federal Ministers . . . made it clear that, if the British Government insisted that independence involved the abrogation of the existing Treaty of 1959 and the withdrawal of British military protection, the Federal Government were not, in those circumstances, prepared to agree to independence. . . . It would be a cruel farce to receive independence without the means of defending it against external attack. They emphasized that the people of South Arabia have no wish merely to substitute Egyptian for British rule.¹

Mr. George Brown's response was that:

The 1959 Treaty between the United Kingdom and the Federation was a treaty between the United Kingdom and a dependent territory. It could not, by its nature, survive as the basis of relationship between two independent States. It had to be either replaced or allowed to lapse.²

The controversy then proceeded on two planes. The federal rulers and Mr. Sandys argued that Great Britain must leave the South Arabian Government in a defensive posture adequate to resist foreign aggression, specifically Egyptian-Yemeni aggression, as well as internal disorders. At the same time the Labor Government agreed that some sort of temporary defense arrangement would be made with South Arabia after independence, but it did not specify that it would be with the Federal Government.

In November 1966 Sir Richard Turnbull publicly announced that:

We shall leave the Federation with a strong army comprising ten Divisions fully equipped with arms and air force. . . . It is enough to hold back aggression for sufficient time to mobilize the U.N. and world public opinion.³

Mr. George Brown announced in Parliament in June 1967 that the United Kingdom had decided to spend over five million pounds to trans-

¹Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 743, No. 167 (March 20, 1967), c. 1067.

²Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 748, No. 213 (June 19, 1967), c. 1129.

³The Arab World, November 16, 1966, p. 5.

form and re-equip the South Arabian Army and to supply its Air Force with eight jet fighters as well as transport aircraft and pilots.¹ Another thirty-one million pounds was to be contributed over the subsequent three years, through 1971, to meet the recurrent costs of this military establishment. Grants totaling nine million pounds would be made to support the budget of the South Arabian Government, and interest free loans would be available. Finally he announced that:

We recognize that the South Arabian Government will face a difficult period immediately after independence. . . . The South Arabian Government will wish to make reconciliation and public order its first preoccupation. But we recognise that there is some danger that an attempt might be made to disrupt this by military aggression from outside the country. . . . Her Majesty's Government . . . have, therefore, decided to station a strong naval force in South Arabian waters for the critical first six months after independence. It will include an attack carrier. . . . If military aggression against the independent State should occur, the aircraft in that force would be committed to the repulse of that aggression.²

By the summer of 1967 the Labor Government had made it clear that it was forging ahead toward an early independence regardless of the internal state of affairs in the South. In the absence of a clear-cut political group who could speak for South Arabia as a whole, the British had resorted to bolstering the army. In April a United Nations mission had tried to reach a settlement in Aden, but had met with opposition from every side. The United Nations insisted on conducting its official dealings with the British whom they considered the real rulers of South Arabia. The British insisted that the Federal Government should

¹It was made clear that these would not be RAF pilots.

²Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 748, No. 213 (June 19, 1967), c. 1136.

be dealt with as the legitimate government of the region. The United Nations mission refused to accept this and, as a result, was snubbed by the Federal Government. To mark the mission's arrival in Aden, FLOSY and NLF, who refused to cooperate with anybody, called a three day strike in order to disrupt its efforts.¹

After this fiasco the three man United Nations mission established itself in Geneva on August 11, where it announced that it would be available to meet with any interested parties.

In June all British forces had withdrawn from the hinterland, providing the nationalists with the opportunity for a field day within the Federal states. By the first week in September only one member of the Federal Government was in situ, all the rest being either kidnapped, in London, or talking with the United Nations mission in Geneva.²

As the summer of 1967 drew to a close the Labor Government was apparently no closer to realizing the creation of a truly representative government in South Arabia than had been their Conservative predecessors. In June Mr. George Brown lamented that:

. . . When our Conservative predecessors in office decided to aim at ending the dependent relationship of South Arabia with Great Britain, they also aimed to leave a united ter-

¹The Arab World, April 7, 1967, p. 3; Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 744, No. 171 (April 4, 1967), c. 33; and Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 744, No. 175 (April 10, 1967), cols. 744-745. The UN mission finally left in anger, accusing everyone of refusing to cooperate, when the locally run radio station refused to broadcast a statement delivered to it by the mission and the British refused to intercede, claiming that they had no control over the operation of the station.

²The Economist, Vol. 224, No. 6467 (August 5, 1967), p. 471, and The Economist, Vol. 224, No. 6471 (September 2, 1967), p. 780.

ritory behind and to seek to avoid fragmentation. But the process of unification was only started in 1958, and by 1964 Ministers of the day declared that there should be independence by 1968. That left precious little time in which to create a sense of unity, particularly when we consider the ages of disunity which had preceded 1958 and the primitive conditions of much of the territory.¹

Earlier in the year Brown had declared that he was in favor of incorporating the local nationalists in any government which finally assumed control in South Arabia, even those nationalists who had left the country. But he was later forced to comment that:

. . . The last remaining hope of stability in South Arabia lies in an early and orderly handover of responsibility for internal security in Aden to the Federal forces.²

In September the last remnants of the Federal Government asked the Army to take over the government. The Army refused, because by this time it had become vitally interested in observing, and to some degree refereeing, the open final struggle which was taking place between FLOSY and the NLF. Many observers had considered that FLOSY would be the organization most likely to inherit the South once the British had departed. But neither they, nor FLOSY, had taken into account the determination nor the latterly revealed organization of the NLF. Following the British withdrawal from the hinterland in June, the NLF began to reveal the extent of its clandestine network throughout the South as it emerged as the dominate power in the area. Before FLOSY could effectively react, the NLF had most of the federal states under its control, and Aden, FLOSY's stronghold, was about to be won

¹Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 748, No. 213 (June 19, 1967), cols. 1126-1127.

²Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 742, No. 154 (March 1, 1967), c. 511.

over as well.

On November 2, 1967, Mr. Brown announced in Parliament that the British would completely pull out of South Arabia by November thirtieth. At the same time he announced that the naval-air task force formerly promised to guarantee the new state's independence was being canceled since the Egyptian threat from the north had been removed with the departure of the Egyptian army from Yemen.¹

On November 7th, the South Arabian Army Command announced its recognition of the NLF as the only South Arabian political party.² The Army Command asked the NLF to conduct negotiations with Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, British High Commissioner in Aden, for final independence.³ Following this announcement the NLF called a halt to negotiations then being held in Cairo with FLOSY which had been designed to create a joint government following the British withdrawal. FLOSY, seeing that it had lost all hope of participating in the government of the new state, resorted to attacks on the NLF accusing it of secretly cooperating with the British, still in search of a friendly puppet government.⁴

Talks were immediately initiated in Geneva between Qahtan Shaabi and Lord Shackleton, special British envoy appointed for this task. Satisfied that the NLF could assume responsibility for the government

¹The Daily Star, November 3, 1967, p. 1.

²The political triumph of the NLF over FLOSY meant not only the end of FLOSY as a political movement, but also the end, temporarily at least, of one of the most advanced and progressive labor movements outside of the Western world.

³Sir Humphrey Trevelyan replaced Sir Richard Turnbull on May 21, 1967.

⁴The Daily Star, November 7, 1967, p. 1.

of South Arabia, the British held to their deadline of November 30, 1967, for complete withdrawal from the South.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

Alice looked round her in great surprise. "Why, I do believe we've been under this tree the whole time! Everything's just as it was!"

"Of course it is," said the Queen, "What would you have it?"

"Well, in our country," said Alice, . . . "you'd generally get to somewhere else - if you ran very fast for a long time as we've been doing."*

On November 25, 1967, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan lifted the state of emergency which had been in effect since December 1963. On November thirtieth the last British troops left Aden and the People's Republic of Southern Yemen came into existence. Some one hundred and twenty-eight years after Commander Haines vindicated British honor for an outrage perpetrated against her subjects on board the Doria Dowlat, Great Britain once again redressed her honor as she stepped aside to grant a people the privilege of determining the course of their destiny in their own particular fashion.

A few minor problems remained, but with time they could be solved. The new state felt that it should receive somewhat more than the sixty million pounds which England had originally decided to bestow upon her at independence. It was argued that the British had a certain responsibility to finance the establishment of schools and the development of certain internal works which had been neglected in the past. There was

*Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass (London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1953), pp. 42-43.

disagreement over the final disposition of Perim Island, claimed by the South Yemenis as an integral part of their domain. Great Britain had hoped to see this island placed under permanent United Nations control to forestall any government from using it as a base from which to deny entrance into the Red Sea to any other country in the future. At the last moment it was agreed to allow it to be incorporated into the new state.

Such was not the case with the Kuria Muria Islands over which the NLF also claimed hegemony. The British held that these islands, lying off the Dhufar coast of South Arabia, rightfully belonged to the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. In the past they had been administered from Aden as a service to this sultanate which once again assumed direct responsibility for the islands in November 1967. The few inhabitants of the islands elected to assume Muscati citizenship, and the British Government considered the matter closed. To date, the People's Republic of Southern Yemen lays claim to these islands, but it is not likely that they will press the issue beyond the point of verbal agitation.

When Britain first acquired Aden, she was primarily concerned with a coaling station to augment the expansion and development of her steamship traffic to India. As time passed, the commercial importance of the port grew until it became apparent that some measures would have to be taken to ensure it against the disruptive effects of a restless hinterland. Slowly at first, the British began a policy of pacification through peaceful negotiation. Eventually all of South Arabia was tied to Britain through Protectorate Treaties. This situation continued for some time, until changing world sentiment toward colonialism

and Great Britain's diminished role as a world power made it clear that a new policy would have to be implemented in the Aden Protectorate.

Belatedly the British began to deal with internal development directed toward eventual self-government. After the Second World War the British concluded that this area should be retained indefinitely to provide a link with, and to protect, their East of Suez commercial and political commitments. By this time, however, nationalism had reared its head in the region, and the race between these two incompatible persuasions was on. Britain, on the one hand, was attempting to create a local political system which would be amenable to her own designs for keeping a major military base in Aden, while the nationalists, on the other hand, were pressing for the same self-determination that was being realized on all sides by the multitude of small national groups throughout the world.

The British effort was too late, and too little. Believing that South Arabia could be brought to independence by means of a neat timetable, they set out to create those institutions which they considered necessary for eventual independence in the Protectorate and Colony. The South Arabian Federation was created in 1959. Four years later Aden Colony was incorporated into this union. Occasional consideration was given to the need to create a constitution for the future state. The matter of a revised franchise was brought up from time to time, but these and other matters were handled in the most leisurely fashion. At a much faster rate the military base had been expanded and reinforced with troops and equipment from East Africa and Cyprus in accordance with the British intention to maintain a permanent base in Aden.

Until too late, the British never fully acknowledged the validity

and vigor of the nationalist movement in Aden and the Federation. When it finally was acknowledged that this was a force that had to be contended with, an attempt was made to bolster the Federation, it being felt that a strong Federal Government could absorb and control a less stable Aden. At a time in the late fifties and early sixties when a reasonable, moderate group of nationalists existed, willing to negotiate for autonomy within the Commonwealth, the British spurned their advances. In 1967 Mr. Michael Foot was to accuse the former Conservative Government responsible for the policy of those years of having:

. . . refused to make concessions to the moderates, and they have therefore found the extremists in control. They have converted those who were pressing for a reasonable settlement in Aden into extremists. . . .¹

Much of this blind persistence in refusing to deal with Aden's nationalists was attributed by the Labor members of Parliament, both before and after they took over the government, to the Conservative Government's vendetta against President Nasser and Arab nationalism set off by the Suez Crisis of 1956. On March 20, 1967, the House of Commons heard a quote from a letter published in The Times, and by Mr. William Yates, a former M.P. He stated, inter alia:

The crisis in Aden arises from the Conservative policy of Mr. Duncan Sandys, M.P., who deliberately forced the protesting colony of Aden into a federation, designed by Britain to give the federal tribal rulers autocratic power over Aden. The agreed objective was for Britain to smash the Aden Nationalists as a political force before granting independence to the Federation. . . . This policy is as vicious as it is strategically foolish because the paramount British interest in South-West Arabia is the security of Aden and the good will of the Adenis and Yemenis who work in the British oil

¹Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 743, No. 167 (March 20, 1967), c. 1074.

refinery and in the greatest oil bunkering port in the world.¹

With her advanced economic status, greater foreign contacts, controlling position in the region, and hard core of enlightened young nationalists, it was inevitable that Aden must emerge as the dominant center of the area.

In the last few years events moved at a greatly accelerated rate in South Arabia. The United Kingdom, beset with economic problems of her own, finally realized that she could not afford the luxury of a large military base which expended much of its time, money, and energy in merely maintaining the security of its physical presence. A new government, seeking solutions to the immediate problems at home, had no emotional ties with this last lingering vestige of earlier days of grandeur. The forces of nationalism in South Arabia, seeing the end of their struggle in sight, doubled their efforts.

Time, history, and world opinion were against the British. In the end they threw up their hands and got out. Forgotten were the noble sentiments of yesteryear for gradual colonial development eventually culminating in full nationhood.

¹Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 743, No. 167 (March 20, 1967), c. 1121.


POSTSCRIPT

One day somebody with the necessary knowledge should write up the history of Britain's retreat from South Arabia. He would probably have to secrete the manuscript in an iron safe until the law of libel and the hand of revenge could no longer touch him, but the exercise might make interesting reading for our children.*

*The Economist, Vol. 224, No. 6472 (September 9, 1967), p. 874.

APPENDIX I

The Governmental Structure of the East India Company (later India Office)



Marston, op. cit., p. xii.

APPENDIX II

States of South Arabia

<u>Tribal Name</u>	<u>Full Name of State</u>	<u>Date of Accession to Federation (as of January 1965)</u>
Abdali	The Sultanate of Lahej	1959
Alawi	The Alawi Sheikhdome	1965
Amiri	The Amirate of Dhala	1959
Aqrabi	The Aqrabi Sheikhdome	1960
Audhali	The Audhali Sultanate	1959
Aulaqi	Upper Aulaqi Sultanate	1965
	Upper Aulaqi Sheikhdome	1959
	Lower Aulaqi Sultanate	1960
Beihan	The Habili Hashimi Amirate of Beihan	1959
Dathini	The State of Dathini	1960
Fadhli	The Fadhli Sultanate	1959
Haushabi	The Haushabi Sultanate	1963
Muflahi	The Muflahi Sheikhdome	1965
Sha'ib	The Sha'ibi Sheikhdome	1963
Yafa'	The Lower Yafa' Sultanate	1959
	The Upper Yafa' Sultanate	Non-member
Balhaf	The Wahidi Sultanate	1962
Kathiri	The Kathiri Sultanate	Non-member
Mahra	The Sultanate of Qishn and Socotra	Non-member

<u>Tribal Name</u>	<u>Full Name of State</u>	<u>Date of Accession to Federation (as of January 1965)</u>
Qu'aiti	The Sultanate of Shihr and Mukalla	Non-member
Aden Colony	-----	January 1963

Aden and South Arabia (Prepared by Reference Division, Central Office of Information, Quote No. R. 5671, for British Information Services), London: January 1965, p. 31.

APPENDIX III

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1949(XVIII), December 11, 1963:

The General Assembly,

Having considered the part of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territory of Aden,

Recalling its resolutions 1514(XV) of 14 December 1960, 1654(XVI) of 27 November 1961 and 1810(XVII) of 17 December 1962,

Bearing in mind the unanimous desire, expressed to the Sub-Committee on Aden, for an early end of colonial domination,

Considering the strong desire of the population for the unity of the Territory,

Deeply concerned at the deteriorating situation in the Territory, the continuation of which is likely to lead to serious unrest and to threaten international peace and security,

Convinced of the necessity of consulting the people of the Territory at the earliest possible time,

1. Approves the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and endorses the conclusions and recommendations of the Sub-Committee on Aden;

2. Expresses deep regret at the refusal of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to co-operate with the Sub-Committee on Aden, particularly its refusal to allow the Sub-Committee to go to the Territory in pursuance of the tasks entrusted to it by the Special Committee;

3. Endorses the resolutions adopted by the Special Committee on 3 May and 19 July 1963;

4. Reaffirms the right of the people of the Territory to self-determination and freedom from colonial rule in accordance with the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples;

5. Considers that the maintenance of the military base in Aden is prejudicial to the security of the region and that its early removal is therefore desirable;

6. Recommends that the people of Aden and the Aden Protectorate should be allowed to exercise their right to self-determination with regard to their future, the exercise of that right to take the form of a consultation of the whole population, to be held as soon as possible on the basis of universal adult suffrage;

7. Calls upon the administrating Power:

(a) To repeal all the laws which restrict public freedoms;

(b) To release all political prisoners and detainees and those who have been sentenced following actions of political significance;

(c) To allow the return of those people who have been exiled or forbidden to reside in the Territory because of political activities;

(d) To cease forthwith all repressive action against the people of the Territory, in particular military expeditions and the bombing of villages;

8. Further calls upon the administering Power to make the necessary constitutional changes with a view to establishing a representative organ and setting up a provisional government for the whole of the Territory in accordance with the wishes of the population, such legislative organ and government to be constituted following general elections to be held on the basis of universal adult suffrage and with full respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms;

9. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Committee and the administering Power, to arrange for an effective United Nations presence before and during the elections referred to in paragraph 8 above;

10. Recommends that these elections should be held before the attainment of independence, which will be granted in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the inhabitants;

11. Recommends that conversations should be opened without delay between the government resulting from the elections mentioned above and the administering Power, for the purpose of fixing the date for the granting of independence and the arrangements for the transfer of power;

12. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the present resolution to the administering Power and to report to the Special Committee on its implementation;

13. Requests the Special Committee to examine again the situation in Aden and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session.

APPENDIX IV

General Assembly Resolution 2023(XX), November 5, 1965:

The General Assembly,

Having considered the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territory of Aden, which includes, in addition to Aden, the Eastern and Western Aden Protectorates as well as the Islands of Perim, Kuria Muria, Kamaran and other off-shore islands,

Recalling its resolutions 1514(XV) of 14 December 1960 and 1949 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963, and the resolutions adopted by the Special Committee on 9 April 1964, 11 May 1964 and 17 May 1965,

Having heard the statements of the petitioners,

Having taken note of the declarations of the representative of the administering Power,

Deeply concerned at the critical and explosive situation which is threatening peace and security in the area, arising from the policies pursued by the administering Power in the Territory,

1. Approves the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territory of Aden and endorses the conclusions and recommendations of the Sub-Committee on Aden;
2. Endorses the resolutions adopted by the Special Committee on 9 April 1964, 11 May 1964 and 17 May 1965;
3. Deplores the refusal of the administering Power to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee;
4. Further deplores the attempts of the administering Power to set up an unrepresentative regime in the Territory, with a view to granting it independence contrary to General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949(XVIII), and appeals to all States not to recognize any independence which is not based on the wishes of the people of the Territory freely expressed through elections held under universal adult suffrage;

5. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of the Territory to self-determination and to freedom from colonial rule and recognizes the legitimacy of their efforts to achieve the rights laid down in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;

6. Considers that the maintenance of the military bases in the Territory constitutes a major obstacle to the liberation of the people and is prejudicial to the peace and security of the region, and that the immediate and complete removal of these bases is therefore essential;

7. Notes with deep concern that military operations against the people of the Territory are still being carried out by the administering Power;

8. Urges the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland immediately to:

(a) Abolish the state of emergency;

(b) Repeal all laws restricting public freedom;

(c) Cease all repressive actions against the people of the Territory, in particular military operations;

(d) Release all political detainees and allow the return of those people who have been exiled or forbidden to reside in the Territory because of political activities;

9. Reaffirms paragraphs 6 and 11 of resolution 1949(XVIII) and urges the administering Power to implement them immediately;

10. Appeals to all Member States to render all possible assistance to the people of the Territory in their efforts to attain freedom and independence;

11. Draws the attention of the Security Council to the dangerous situation prevailing in the area as a result of British military action against the people of the Territory;

12. Requests the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies and the international relief organizations to offer all possible assistance to the people who are suffering as a result of the military operations in the Territory;

13. Requests the Secretary-General to take such actions as he may deem expedient to ensure the implementation of the present resolution, and to report thereon to the Special Committee;

14. Requests the Special Committee to examine again the

situation in the Territory and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session;

15. Decides to maintain this item on its agenda.

APPENDIX V

PROTECTORATE TREATY

Following is the text of the Protectorate Treaty between Britain and the Sharif of Beihan, in the Aden Protectorate, concluded in 1903. It is typical of the Protectorate Treaties negotiated by Britain in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with the various rulers of the Aden Protectorate states:

Text Begins: The British Government and Sharif Ahmad-am-Mohsin of Behan-al-Kasab being desirous of maintaining and strengthening the relations of peace and friendship existing between them:

The British Government have named and appointed Major-General Pelham James Maitland, C.B., Political Resident at Aden, to conclude a treaty for this purpose.

The said Major-General Pelham James Maitland, C.B., and Sharif Ahmad-am-Mohsin aforesaid have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:

I

In compliance with the wish of the aforesaid Sharif Ahmad-am-Mohsin the British Government hereby undertakes to extend to the territory of Behan-al-Kasab and its dependencies, being under the authority and jurisdiction of the said Sharif, the gracious favour and protection of His Majesty the King-Emperor.

II

The said Sharif Ahmad-am-Mohsin hereby agrees, on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors, and of the people of Behan-al-Kasab under his jurisdiction, to refrain from entering into any correspondence, agreement or treaty, with any foreign nation or power; and further promises to give immediate notice to the Resident at Aden or other British officer, of the attempt of any Power to interfere with the territory of Behan-al-Kasab or its dependencies.

III


The said Sharif Ahmad-am-Mohsin of Behan-al-Kasab hereby binds himself, his heirs and successors, for ever, that they will not cede, sell, mortgage, lease, hire, or give, or otherwise dispose of, the

territory of Behan-al-Kasab, or its dependencies under his jurisdiction, or any part of the same, at any time, to any Power other than the British Government.

IV

The above treaty shall have effect from this date, in witness thereof the undersigned have affixed their signatures or seals at Aden this twenty-ninth day of December one thousand nine hundred and three.

ADEN COLONY



ADEN COLONY AND PROTECTORATE

RUB' ALKHALI

MUSCAT
AND
OMAN

SAUDI ARABIA

PROTECTORATE

YEMEN

EASTERN

WESTERN

GULF OF ADEN

ADEN COLONY

PERIM ISLAND

FR. SOMALILAND

Qishn

Mukalla

Beihan

Dhala

Lahej

Aden

Kamaran Island

Sana

Hodeida

Mocha

RED SEA

Ethiopia



(The South Arabian Federation indicated by the shaded area)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Aden and South Arabia (Prepared by: Reference Division, Central Office of Information, Quote No. R. 5671, for British Information Services), London: January 1965.
- Aden: Report for the Years 1955 and 1956. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1958.
- Aden: Report for the Years 1957 and 1958. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1961.
- Aden: South Arabian Notes. Aden: Department of Antiquities, 1966.
- Aden: South Arabian Notes No. 2. Aden: Department of Antiquities, 1967.
- Antonius, George. The Arab Awakening. New York: Capricorn Books, 1965.
- Belhaven, Lord. The Uneven Road. London: John Murray, 1955.
- Britain's Tortuous Policy in Aden and Occupied South. Cairo: Dar El-Hana Printing House, July 1967.
Issued by FLOSY; while author not shown, it has been acknowledged that Abdullah al-Asnag is the author.
- Bullard, Sir Reader (ed). The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.
- Chapman, Maybelle K. Great Britain and the Bagdad Railroad: 1888-1914. Northampton: George Banta Publishing Company, 1948.
- Cole, Brigadier D. H. Imperial Military Geography. London: Sifton Praed & Co. Ltd., 1956.
- Doe, D. B. Aden in History. Aden: Government Printer, 1965.
- Great Britain. Western Arabia and the Red Sea. Admiralty, Naval Intelligence Division. Geographical Handbook Series, B.R. 527, June 1946.
- Hickinbotham, Sir Tom. Aden. London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1958.

- Holden, David. Farewell to Arabia. London: Faber and Faber, 1966.
- Hoskins, Halford L. British Routes to India. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1966.
- Hunter, Captain F. M. An Account of the British Settlement of Aden in Arabia. London: Trubner & Co., 1877.
- Ingrams, Harold. Arabia and the Isles. London: John Murray, 1966.
- _____. The Yemen. London: John Murray, 1963.
- Jacob, Harold F. Kings of Arabia. London: Mills & Boon Limited, 1923.
- Johnston, Charles Hepburn. The View from Steamer Point. London: Collins, 1964.
- Kerr, Malcolm. The Arab Cold War: 1958-1967. London: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- King, Gillian. Imperial Outpost--Aden. London: Oxford University Press, 1964.
- Lunt, James. The Barren Rocks of Aden. London: Herbert Jenkins Ltd., 1966.
- Marston, Thomas E. Britain's Imperial Role in the Red Sea Area. Hamden (Conn.): The Shoe String Press Inc., 1961.
- Monroe, Elizabeth. Britain's Moment in the Middle East: 1914-1956. London: Chatto & Windus, 1963.
- Reilly, Sir Bernard. Aden and the Yemen (Colonial No. 343). London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1960.
- Rihani, Ameen. Around the Coasts of Arabia. London: Constable & Co. Ltd., 1930.
- Sorensen, Reginald. Aden, the Protectorates and the Yemen (Fabian International and Commonwealth Bureaux: Fabian Tract 332). London: Devonport Press Ltd., 1961.
- Spencer, William. Political Evolution in the Middle East. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1962.
- The Middle East and North Africa: 1966-1967. Thirteenth Edition. London: Europa Publications Limited, 1966.
- Welcome to Aden: A Comprehensive Guidebook. Nairobi: Guides and Handbooks of Africa Publishing Company, 1961.
- Wenner, Manfred W. Modern Yemen: 1918-1966. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1967.

Wright, Arnold. Early English Adventurers in the East. London: Andrew Melrose Ltd., 1917.

Reports and Public Documents

"Aden Colony: Speech by His Excellency the Governor and Commander-in-Chief at the Opening of the Second Session of the Legislative Council, 25th January, 1960." Unnumbered publication attached to Administrative Survey 1959 for Aden Colony (GPA/8541/14c/1-60).

Chronology of Arab Politics. Beirut: Political Studies and Public Administration Department, American University, Beirut, Lebanon. Vols. 1 - 4 (January 1963-September 1966).

David, Lawrence P. British Administration in the Aden Colony and the Western Aden Protectorate. Beirut: Unpublished M.A. Thesis at the American University of Beirut, 1960.

Great Britain. British and Foreign State Papers. Vol. 164 (1959-1960).

Great Britain. Federation of South Arabia: Conference Report. Cmnd 2414 (July 1964).

Great Britain. Parliamentary Debates (Commons). Vols. 553-754 (1955-1967).

Khalidi, Walid and Ibish, Yusuf (eds.). Arab Political Documents: 1963. Beirut: Slim Press, 1964.

_____. Arab Political Documents: 1964. Beirut: S.I.E.L. Press, 1965.

_____. Arab Political Documents: 1965. Beirut: S.I.E.L. Press, 1966.

United Nations General Assembly, Ninth Session, Fourth Committee, 410th Meeting (A/C.4/SR.410, October 20, 1954), September 22-December 13, 1954, pp. 83-89.

United Nations General Assembly, Tenth Session, Fourth Committee, 472nd Meeting (A/C.4/SR. 472, October 6, 1955), September 21-December 13, 1955, pp. 13-14.

United Nations General Assembly, Official Records: Eighteenth Session, Supplement No. 15 (A/5515), Resolutions: 17 September-17 December 1963, p. 6.

- United Nations General Assembly, Official Records: Twentieth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/6014), Resolution: 21 September-22 December 1965, p. 55.
- United Nations General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Fourth Committee, 1528th Meeting (A/C.4/SR.1528, October 14, 1965), September 22-December 20, 1965, pp. 63-69.
- United Nations General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Fourth Committee, 1529th Meeting (A/C.4/SR.1529, October 15, 1965), September 22-December 20, 1965, pp. 71-75.
- United Nations General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Fourth Committee, 1530th Meeting (A/C.4/SR.1530, October 18, 1965), September 22-December 20, 1965, pp. 77-83.
- United Nations General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Fourth Committee, 1545th Meeting (A/C.4/SR.1545, November 2, 1965), September 22-December 20, 1965, pp. 169-170.
- United Nations General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Agenda Item 23, Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: Chapter VI, Aden (A/6300/Add.4), October 21, 1966.
- United Nations General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Fourth Committee, 1626th Meeting (A/C.4/SR.1626, November 7, 1966), September-December, 1966, pp. 177-181.
- Wells, Macon Wesson. International Rivalries and Strategic Interests in the Red Sea Area: 1918-1939. Beirut: Unpublished M.A. Thesis at the American University of Beirut.

Periodicals

- "Aden," Deadline Data on World Affairs, issued May 26, 1967.
- "Aden and the Federation of South Arabia," Commonwealth Affairs, No. 106 (October 1962), reviewed in extracted form, page numbers in volume not shown.
- "Aden: General Assembly Adopts Resolution," UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. 2, No. 11 (December 1965), 57-62.
- "Aden: The People Against Federation," Venture, Vol. 14, No. 10 (November 1962), reviewed in extracted form, page number in volume not shown.
- "Arabia Felix and the Indian Ocean," Round Table, Vol. 54, No. 216 (September 1964), 343-351.

- Asian Recorder, Vols. 1-13, Regd. No. D-727 (1955-1967).
- "Back to Colonialism," Time (The Weekly Newsmagazine of New York), Vol. 15, No. 8 (October 8, 1965), 37.
- Barbour, Nevill. "Aden and the Arab South," The World Today, Vol. 15, No. 8 (August 1959), 302-310.
- Beichman, Arnold. "Britain's Guantanamo," Spectator, Vol. 211, No. 7048 (July 26, 1963), 102-103.
- Bochkaryov, Yuri. "The Events in Aden," New Times (Moscow), No. 40 (October 6, 1965), 9-11.
- Bodyansky, V. "The Events in Aden," New Times (Moscow), No. 2 (January 15, 1964), 18-19.
- Brown, Neville. "Miniature Vietnam in Aden?" New Statesman, Vol. 70, No. 1803 (October 1, 1965), 471-472.
- Brown, William R. "The Yemeni Dilemma," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Autumn 1963), 349-367.
- Contini, Jeanne. "The Winds of Change in the Garden of Aden," The Reporter, Vol. 29, No. 1 (July 4, 1963), 28-30.
- "Courting Trouble in Aden," Venture, Vol. 14, No. 8 (September 1962), reviewed in extracted form, page number in volume not shown.
- Cumming-Bruce, A. P. "The Emergence of Aden Since 1956," Royal Central Asian Journal, Vol. 49, Parts 3 & 4 (July-October 1962), 307-316.
- "Extremists on the March," Spectator, Vol. 196, No. 6675 (June 1, 1956), 749.
- Falls, Cyril. "A Window on the World," The Illustrated London News, Vol. 232 (May 10, 1958), 768.
- "Foreign Reports: The Indian Ocean," The New Republic, Vol. 148, No. 2 (January 12, 1963), 6-7.
- Gerasimov, O. "Aden Background," New Times (Moscow), No. 34 (August 26, 1964), 18-21.
- Hodson, H. V. "Middle East & West," Encounter, Vol. 23, No. 1 (July 1964), 41-44.
- Ingrams, Harold. "The Outlook in South-West Arabia," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. 43, Parts 3 & 4 (July-October 1956), 176-186.
- Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vols. 10-15 (1955-1966).

- Kilner, Peter. "Britain, the U.N., and South Arabia," *The World Today*, Vol. 22, No. 7 (July 1966), 269-272.
- _____. "The Future of South Arabia," *The World Today*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (April 1965), 131-135.
- King, Gillian. "The Problem of Aden," *The World Today*, Vol. 18, No. 12 (December 1962), 498-503.
- Law, John. "From a Small Revolt, Big Trouble," *US News & World Report*, Vol. 53, No. 16 (October 15, 1962), 90.
- _____. "New War in the Middle East," *US News & World Report*, Vol. 44, No. 19 (May 9, 1958), 35-36.
- Leapman, Michael. "Aden: A Time for Frankness," *New Statesman*, Vol. 71, No. 1832 (April 22, 1966), 566-568.
- _____. "Aden Charade," *New Statesman*, Vol. 71, No. 1837 (May 27, 1966), 761.
- Maslov, K. "Colonialist Aggression in South Arabia," *New Times (Moscow)*, No. 20 (May 19, 1964), 12-13.
- Monroe, Elizabeth. "Kuwayt and Aden: A Contrast in British Policies," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Winter 1964), 63-74.
- Morris, James. "Sundown at Aden," *Manchester Guardian*, Vol. 94, No. 13 (March 31, 1966), 5.
- Mosher, Lawrence. "Nasser's Drive for South Arabia," *The Reporter*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (February 1967), 24-27.
- O'Ballance, E. "Yemen-Shadow Over Aden," *The Army Quarterly and Defense Journal*, Vol. 77, No. 1 (October 1958), 51-57.
- Rawlings, E. H. "The Importance of Aden," *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 195 (April 1959), 241-243.
- "Remnants of Empire," *The New Republic*, Vol. 150, No. 24 (June 13, 1964), 5-6.
- Sergeant, R. B. "What's Wrong in the Aden Protectorate," *Spectator*, Vol. 195, No. 6629 (July 15, 1955), 90-91.
- Smith, Peter Duval. "The Phoney Federation," *New Statesman*, Vol. 64, No. 1644 (September 14, 1962), 307-308.
- Sorensen, R. W. "Why Aden Matters," *Venture*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (March 1962), reviewed in extracted form, page number in volume not shown.

- "Special Committee of 24: Question of Aden," UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. 1, No. 1 (May 1964), 21-29.
- Steel, Antony. "Yemen and Aden," Atlas, Vol. 5, No. 3 (March 1963), 165.
- The Arab World (Beirut), 1955-1967.
- The Daily Star (Beirut), Vol. 16 (September-December 1967).
- The Economist, Vols. 174-225 (1955-1967).
- The Mizan Newsletter, Central Asian Research Center with St. Anthony's College (Oxford), Soviet Affairs Study Group, Vols. 1-8 (1959-1966).
- "The Refugee Sheiks," The New Statesman and Nation, Vol. 53, No. 1351 (February 2, 1957), 123.
- The Times (London), 1954-1967.
- Toynbee, Arnold. "Britain and the Arabs: The Need for a New Start," International Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 4 (October 1964), 638-646.
- "Trouble in Aden," The New Republic, Vol. 138, No. 18 (May 5, 1958), 7.
- Watt, D. C. "Labor Relations and Trades Unionism in Aden, 1952-1960," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Autumn 1962), 443-456.
- _____. "The Arabian Peninsula in British Strategy," Military Review, Vol. 41, No. 2 (February 1961), 37-43.
- "Why Are We in Aden?" New Statesman, Vol. 57, No. 1730 (May 8, 1964), 709.
- "Will Britain's Loss Be Nasser's Gain?" US News and World Report, Vol. 60, No. 13 (March 28, 1966), 91-93.