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THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN
DEVELOPING A POLITICAL COMMUNITY IN LEBANON
1943 - 1952

by
Najla W. Atiyah

Submitted in partial fulfillment for the requirements
of the degree of Master of Arts
in the Political Studies & Public Administration Department of
the American University of Beirut

Beirut, Lebanon

June, 1968

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PREFACE

This thesis is an attempt to study the role of leadership in the development of Lebanon as a political community between 1943 and 1952, with a particular emphasis on the role of the President and that of the Prime Minister.

The thesis starts with a general background about the theory of a political community and about the geography, people and history of Lebanon. The general development of Lebanon as a political community between 1920 and 1943 is then discussed. The political interplay between the Christians, the Muslims and the French Mandate as well as the factors for and against integration are described in some detail and evaluated.

The governing of Lebanon between 1943 and 1952 - the structure and function of the ruling class - are then outlined with an emphasis on the role of the ruling class in building a political community. The National Pact, the formula devised by the ruling class for governing Lebanon, has been treated in detail, along with the role of the political leader as a link between the individual and the state. The President's powers, privileges and means for promoting integration with an evaluation of the President's achievement are examined. The politics of Premiership and the role it played in

in promoting integration are also discussed along with an evaluation of the relationship between Bisharah al-Khūri and Riyād al-Sulh and the latter's contribution towards integration.

As a conclusion the thesis deals with Lebanon as a polity in transition. It also deals with the forces that enhance integration and those that impede it. The challenges Lebanon meets today and the prospect and means by which integration can be attained are also outlined.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Two hypotheses are implied in the title of this thesis: a) that Lebanon as a political community, like most political entities, is in the process of development, b) that leadership played a particular role in this respect between 1943 and 1952. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze and ultimately determine the extent of the two implications.

A political community can be defined as a group of people with habitual political relations or communications with one another, within which there are physical and psychological connections which define for the individual an over-all way of life or a distinctive identity and a sense of belonging.¹ Mosca defines such a society as that within which "the individuals who belong to one group are held together by a consciousness of common brotherhood and held apart from other groups by passions and tendencies that are more or less antagonistic and mutually repellent."²

¹Alfred De Grazia, Political Behavior (New York 1962), I, pp. 115-127; and The Elements of Political Science (New York: Knopf, 1952), pp. 103-109.

²Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1939), pp. 71-72.

This is achieved through developing a social mechanism that would "enable a universal morality to curb the expression of individual immorality in a certain number of public and private relationships."¹ For "what matters is the community, not any of its parts seized upon as a sum total of it."²

Myths and formulas, according to Mosca, play a great role in this process,³ although they would contain a large measure of illusion - i.e. a large amount of nonsense mixed in with a certain small amount of verifiable truth.⁴

The measuring scale of this analysis depends on two principles: a) a community's adherence to consensus on certain basic principles,⁵ that is a belief system; b) the existence of "an intimate connection between material realities - economic, social and political conditions - and modes of thought, ideas, norms and values."⁶

¹Ibid., p. 125.

²Renzo Sereno, The Rulers (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 147.

³Sereno also stresses the need for myths. Ibid., p. 109.

⁴Arthur Livingston, Introduction to Mosca's Ruling Class, op. cit., pp. xxx, xxxiii.

⁵Consensus is defined as a basic agreement of the public upon the general method of organizing and conducting the political process or upon what is right and wrong in politics. De Grazia, Elements of Political Science, pp. 103 and 112.

⁶Nadav Safran, Egypt in Search of a Political Community (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 1.

Before an attempt is made to apply the above two maxims and the definitions on Lebanon a brief description of its background - land, history and society - is necessary.

Lebanon is a small coastal strip extending along the shores of the Mediterranean for approximately 100 miles. Its total area is 4,015 square miles. It is mainly a rugged, mountainous territory. The almost impenetrable mountains rendered Lebanon in the past an ideal place for refuge. The heavy rainfall, in comparison with the neighbouring regions,¹ made it possible for it to sustain a large number of people in comparison with the surrounding countries.² Since ancient times Lebanon accommodated various groupings³ and assimilated them.

¹James Hudson, "Physical Geography and Lebanon," paper read in lecture series on Cultural Resources in Lebanon, Beirut College for Women, July 5-29, 1966, pp. 3-4.

²The following statistics demonstrate the density of population in Lebanon in comparison with two other neighboring countries, viz. Jordan and Syria:

| Country | Area (000 sq.km.) | Population 1955 millions | Inhabitants per sq. km. |
|---------|----------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Lebanon | 10 | 1.4 | 137 |
| Jordan | 97 | 1.4 | 15 |
| Syria | 181 | 4.1 | 23 |

Gabriel Almond and James Coleman (eds.), The Politics of The Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 372-373.

³For further details on the background of the groupings, see Kamal Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1965), pp. xii-xxvii.

The location of Lebanon and the smallness of its size exercise great influence on its contemporary political life. The smallness of the country makes it possible for the greatest portion of the population to be involved in the political process. On the other hand as Hourani states: "a small, weak country, lying in an important position, cannot prevent its internal conflicts from becoming the channels through which great powers win influence and pursue their rivalries; by its position and the nature of its population, Lebanon lay open to waves of influence from America, Western Europe, and from the Arab world lying all around."¹

While the history of Lebanon is one of continuing change and tension, a discernible tradition can be observed.

Lebanon's present tradition may be traced to the Arab-Islamic invasion of the 7th Century. This tradition will be divided for the purpose of this paper, into four periods. The first, from the 7th Century to 1860; the second the Mutasarrifiyyah, 1861 to 1915; the third, being the period of the French Mandate, 1920-1943; and the fourth, from independence in 1943 to 1952 (the end of Bisharah al-Khūri's presidency).

¹Albert Hourani, "Lebanon: The Development of a Political Society," Leonard Binder (ed.), Politics in Lebanon (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), pp. 28-29.

Under the Umayyads (661-750) and the Abbasids (750-1258) the Lebanese Mountain continued as heretore to provide refuge for dissidents who either fled the hinterland or willingly sought a haven to practice their religious beliefs. These minorities consisted of two groups: dissident Christians, mainly Maronites, and dissident Muslims, Druze, and Shi'ah who felt insecure in the universal Sunni state. The precarious existence of these dissidents under Sunni hegemony together with their strong feeling of separateness determined the political tradition, which through them became the tradition of Lebanon.

Direct European intervention through the Crusades in the latter part of the 11th Century, brought new influences and new tensions.¹ It led to closer relations between the Maronites and Europe and strengthened local Christian resistance to the Muslim Empire.² The decline of the Crusades at the end of the 13th Century weakened the political role of the Maronites for the next five centuries. Druze feudal lords

¹For details of 1st Crusade invasion of Lebanon see Philip Hitti, Lebanon in History (London: MacMillan & Co., 1962), pp. 283-296; Yusuf Mizher, The General History of Lebanon (in Arabic) (Beirut, n.d.), pp. 199-201.

²Hitti, op. cit., pp. 320-323; Mizher, op. cit., p. 200 and pp. 226-228.

asserted their supremacy internally. They also succeeded in asserting their autonomy under the umbrella of the Islamic empire, a policy which was wholeheartedly supported by the Maronites. Their success in this respect kept Lebanon free from direct political rule by the Muslim Empire.

The boundaries of Lebanon and the degree of its autonomy varied from time to time, depending on the strength of the ruling amīr, the strength of the governors of Damascus, Sidon and Acre, and on the general political condition of the empire as a whole. The amīrs exercised control over a territory, approximately coterminous with the present frontiers of Lebanon.¹

By the end of the 18th Century ascendancy shifted from Druzes to the Christians. Under the autonomous rule of the Assafs (1516-1590), the Ma'ns (1516-1697) particularly Fakhr al-Din (1590-1635) and later the Shihabs (1697-1841) the Christians proved to be a productive and loyal community and were good taxpayers.² They gave their allegiance to the ruling amīr, even when he was in political trouble. This close relationship between them and the amīrs enhanced their

¹For boundaries under Fakhr al-Din, see Hitti, op. cit., pp. 374-375, 381-382; and Mizher, op. cit., pp. 269, 305-317. Under the Shihabs, Hitti, op. cit., pp. 390-391; Mizher, op. cit., pp. 409-413.

²Kamal Salibi analyses reasons behind the growth of Maronite power in op. cit., pp. 12-15.

social, economic and political status and resulted in a gradual shift in power.

This shift was confirmed by the conversion of the Shihabs to Christianity in the latter decades of the 18th Century. It was also strengthened during the occupation of Ibrahim Pasha in the 1830s. For political reasons¹ Ibrahim Pasha promoted political and social reforms. Although the administration of internal affairs in the Lebanese amirate was left to Amir Bashir, Ibrahim's reforms² led to the further improvement of the lot of the Christians. Christians could now dress and ride as they liked and could compete with Muslims in fields that have been their preserve.³

This period also witnessed foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon.⁴ Ottoman, Egyptian and

¹Ibrahim Pasha was opposed in his campaign by the Muslims because he was challenging the Sultan and backed by the Christians. Thus he had to rely on the Christians whose favor he tried to cultivate.

²In the major cities Ibrahim Pasha introduced administrative councils where Christians and Muslims were represented. This was the first time that Christians formally initiated political and administrative decisions. Ibrahim Pasha imposed poll tax on Muslims and lifted the social restrictions imposed previously on Christians.

³A fuller study of this period is available in Rosemarie Said's M.A. thesis, "Lebanon during the rule of Ibrahim Pasha (1832-1840) as seen by British and French Travellers," Department of History, American University of Beirut, 1961.

⁴Salibi, op.cit., pp. 33, 38, 40, 43-47, 53-60, 62-79.

European¹ intervention in an already strained confessional environment, and their manipulation of the various sects for ulterior motives culminated in the civil war of 1860.²

The second period begins with the emergence of Lebanon as a Mutasarrifiyyah in 1861 and ends in 1915 when Ottoman troops occupied Lebanon during World War I. The Statute of the Mutasarrifiyyah formalized the autonomy of Lebanon under the protection of the Six Signatory Powers: Britain, France, Russia, Austria, Prussia and Turkey with Italy joining in 1867. According to the Statute, Lebanon stripped of Beirut, the Biqa', Tripoli and Sidon, was to be ruled by a Mutasarrif appointed by the Sublime Porte from among the Christian subjects of the Sultan outside Lebanon. The appointment was subject to the approval of the Signatory Powers. This arrangement drew Lebanon closer to Europe; it permitted greater European influences in its affairs and accelerated its

¹Yusuf Mizher quotes a statement by a member of the French Parliament (Count de Melville) addressed to members of that House on 15 June 1846, in which he said, (speaking about Lebanon) "Some have expressed their eagerness to establish a Switzerland in the East. I only plead that you don't make it a Poland." Op. cit., p. 605. Longrigg analyses foreign interference during 19th and early 20th Century. Stephen Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon Under French Mandate (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 38-45.

²Longrigg analyses the development of the suspicion among the Lebanese sects. Ibid., p. 20.

westernization. Its administrative and judicial systems were modernized, a police force was established, public works projects were implemented, and the country enjoyed peace, security and prosperity.¹ These circumstances encouraged American and European missionaries to expand their work, resulting in a cultural revival.

The Mutasarrifiyyah with its pro-western disposition as well as its accomplishments fashioned a chauvinistic attitude among the Christians² of which traces are still evident.

The third phase begins with the French occupation of Lebanon³ and Syria in 1918. The settlement of the war by the Allied Supreme Council, meeting at San Remo on 28 April 1920 placed Lebanon under French Mandate. As a mandatory power, France established Greater Lebanon by a decree published by the French High Commissioner on 31 August 1920. The following day the new state, that included the territory of the Mutasarrifiyyah plus the Beirut, Biqa', Tripoli and Sidon regions, was formally proclaimed.

¹For a fuller appraisal of this period, see Salibi, op. cit., pp. 116-118, and Longrigg, op. cit., pp. 22-24.

²Salibi, op. cit., pp. 118-119.

³Longrigg describes attitude of various indigenous sects in Lebanon towards France during the above period. Op. cit., p. 44.

In this act France realized one of the aspirations of her traditional friends the Maronites, and safeguarded her interests in the area.

The proclamation of Greater Lebanon introduced a new set of problems. The reinstated districts being predominantly Sunni Muslims¹ changed the population composition and the rather unified political outlook in Lebanon. In other words "what the country gained in area, ... it lost in cohesion. It lost its internal equilibrium... The Christian overwhelming majority was seriously reduced."² From the beginning the Muslims resented their inclusion in the Lebanese state and their severance from the larger Arab-Islamic community.³ However, this resentment which was based on political, economic and social grounds began to decline later on as a new political community based on common Christian-Islamic interests evolved. The majority of the Christians gave their allegiance to Lebanon under the new

¹For the sectarian demography of these districts, see Ibid., p. 123.

²Hitti, op. cit., p. 490.

³Salibi, op. cit., pp. 169-170, 180; Albert Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, 3rd. impression, 1954), p. 184.

arrangement but retained their separatist attitude from the Arab World. Toward the end of the French Mandate this feeling declined slightly.

This gradual but slow change on both sides¹ pointed to the common grounds on which the two sects could meet. The rapprochement between the two major sects, Maronites and Sunnis, culminated in an agreement reached in 1943. The rapprochement was effected by two distinguished leaders, the Maronite Bisharah al-Khūri, and the Sunni Riyād al-Sulh. Cooperation between the two leaders led to the compromise agreement known as the National Pact and laid the basis for independence^{2,3} in 1943, ushering in the fourth period of Lebanon's history.

¹Kamal Salibi deals with the change of Maronite and Muslim viewpoints in op. cit., pp. 173-174 & 182-183 respectively.

²Favorable international circumstances during World War II such as the weakness of the mandatory power, the favorable disposition of Britain, the U.S. and the USSR, helped the initiators of the National Pact to achieve independence in 1943. The presence in Lebanon of a strong British representative, General Spears, was also helpful. (For further details on assistance rendered by General Spears, see Mary Borden's A Journey Down a Blind Alley (London: Harper & Bros., 1946). Furthermore Lebanon's participation in the United Nations in 1945 as a founding member confirmed its independence and weakened the French mandatory claims.

³For an account of the events that led to independence see Munir Taky-Din, Wiladat Istiqlal (Beirut: Dar el-'Ilm lil-Malayeen, 1953); Borden, op. cit.

Lebanon entered the fourth phase of its history ruled jointly by the two distinguished political leaders, Bisharah al-Khūri¹ and Riyād al-Sulh.² Bisharah al-Khūri continued as President of the Republic until 1952, while Riyād al-Sulh the Prime Minister, was out of office occasionally but continued to be influential until his assassination in 1951.

The problems faced by independent Lebanon were many and immense. The most urgent, however, was fashioning a political community of the heterogeneous elements of the society. The transference of the National Pact from the level of the politicians to the popular level entailed confronting the complex sectarian and feudal structure of Lebanon.³

The following statistics⁴ demonstrate the relative strength of the various sects:

¹Biography attached as Appendix I.

²Biography attached as Appendix II.

³The fact that the ruling class has decided to abide by the Pact facilitated the process. For as Rustow says, "integration fares better where the authoritative functions move... ahead of the political group functions - or in other words, where the political precedes the social transformation." Almond & Coleman (eds.), op. cit., p. 453.

⁴As published in 1956 (last date of official publication of population figures). Adopted from Salibi, op. cit., p. xiv.

| | |
|--|---------|
| Maronites | 423,500 |
| Sunni | 286,000 |
| Shi'ah | 250,500 |
| Greek Orthodox | 149,000 |
| Greek Catholics | 91,000 |
| Druze | 88,000 |
| Minorities (Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholics, Protestants, Jews, and others) | 122,000 |

The Maronites continued after 1920 to be the largest and the most influential sect. The Sunni were the next largest sect and along with other Muslim sects constituted just less than half the population. The presence of this powerful Muslim, predominantly Sunni, community denied the Christians of the monopoly of government. However, neither could manipulate political power to its advantage without exposing the country to serious political difficulties.

Politically, Lebanon was divided into two major groups corresponding with their religious affiliation. Most of the spokesmen and leaders of Christian public opinion wanted to preserve Lebanon's independence within its existing boundaries.¹ Historically they looked to Europe for protection and feared the Muslims of the interior. Independence to them was

¹This is the viewpoint of the Maronites. Other Christian sects like the Greek Orthodox, the Greek Catholics and the Protestants have contributed a little less towards Lebanon's independence.

independence from the interior. Spokesmen of the Muslim community¹ on the other hand wanted Lebanon, or at least the Muslim section of Lebanon, to merge with Syria. They felt they were a homogeneous part of the larger Arab-Muslim World and considered Lebanon an artificial and temporary arrangement. Europe to them was an intruder, and independence was independence from European interference.²

In joining Lebanon the Muslims also felt a threat to their economic interests. Inhabitants of the newly annexed districts believed that their economic prosperity depended on cordial relations with the hinterland and particularly with Syria. The Muslims of Tripoli feared that the breach with Syria and the development of the Beirut harbor would endanger their commercial interests.

Certain sectors of the Christian merchant class who feared separation from their neighbors, and consequently they called for cooperation rather than merger with the Arab world.

¹Reference is to Sunni leaders. The attitude of the Shi'ah leaders was milder for they "derived some benefit from the existence of Lebanon since for the first time they were recognized legally as a separate community, but they too felt the pull of Arab nationalism." Hourani, "Lebanon: the Development of a Political Society," Binder (ed.), p. 25.

²For underlying reasons for this political attitude see Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 63-64.

Such economic considerations played a decisive role in the formulation of political dispositions among the Christians and collaborated with other factors in the formulation of the National Pact.

The heterogeneity of Lebanon underlies the difficulty involved in the first principle of a political community and that is the community's adherence to a basic belief system. The polarization resulting from the differing loyalties make consensus on national issues difficult.

During the early period of the French Mandate the political polarization was very acute, and probably Greater Lebanon could not have been maintained without French interference. Towards the end of the French Mandate, a budding movement of cooperation between the two groups gained ground. This movement was based on the following: a) yearning for independence among the Christians; b) signs of alienation from France among some Maronites who had until then been its most loyal supporters. This was coupled with a) a growing acceptance of the Lebanese status quo by prominent Muslim leaders and b) growing understanding among Muslims of Christian reservations towards total unity with Syria. These tendencies represented the beginnings of Maronite willingness not to rely on French protection and of Muslim willingness not to strive

for unity with the hinterland. These were the basic principles on which Lebanon's independence was later to be founded.

While these tendencies were few and in part negative,¹ they constituted nevertheless the bases for a common belief system. This was to lead ultimately to the aggregation of particularistic interests and translating them into public policy, or in other words to the development of a distinct social type.²

¹In other words Lebanon remained unintegrated. The following description of an unintegrated society by Gabriel Almond describes the Lebanese situation. An unintegrated society is that in which "even though there may be membership in a political system constituted on the basis of territorial jurisdiction ... kinship, lineage, or village tends to constitute the dominant group membership, and membership in the larger political system tends to be constituent ... rather than individual and direct. Kinship or narrow local affiliations tend to define the most enduring political relationships, the basic units of jurisdiction with claims on loyalty more powerful than general membership in the larger political system. In other words, political socialization tends to be to the particular kinship, lineage, or village group as a subsystem." Almond & Coleman (eds.), op. cit., pp. 29-30.

²Factors that contribute to the development of a social type according to Mosca are "racial affinity - e.g. community of language, of religion, of interests, and the recurring relationships that result from a geographical situation" - and community of history. "Community of history - a life that is lived for centuries in common, with identical or similar experiences, engendering similar moral and intellectual habits, similar passions and memories - often becomes the chief element in the development of a conscious social type." Mosca, op. cit., p. 72. For a fuller treatment of 'social type' see Ibid., pp. 71-80.

These accomplishments are necessary because no political community could exist without the "supposition of a consensus on a minimum of ethical and rational principles."¹

Hence a belief system based on more positive and encompassing principles was to be developed gradually. And as Lebanon's independence was established and as new goals and experiences were shared by the hitherto centrifugal society, this central belief system grew. Such a system is basic for rational existence, and for the justification of this existence.

The plurality of Lebanon's economic existence, a plurality that aggravates political differences, underlies the difficulty involved in the second principle of political community, namely that of the existence of an intimate connection between material realities and modes of thought. This principle shows the need for a correlated and integrated economy as a step towards establishing common modes of thought. Progress in that direction had been taking place between 1920 and 1943 and from then heretofore.

In 1920 the economy of Tripoli was closely dependent on Syria while the economy of the Mountain was independent.

¹Safran, op. cit., p. 1.

It was imperative therefore for the Lebanese government to divert as much as possible of the economy of these regions towards Beirut.¹ This attempt to establish a Lebanese economic unity was basic for building a political community. The relative economic reorientation achieved between 1920 and 1943 has greatly contributed to the willingness of the inhabitants of the reannexed districts to accept Lebanon's independence.

The viability of the Lebanese community therefore depends on the development of a common belief system and on the promotion of material realities conducive to such a system. This requires a delicate course that would attend to the balance of the various interests - economic, religious, feudal-tribal and ultimately to mutual concessions on the part of the various groups in order to promote integration.

This difficult task naturally rests on the ruling class. "Adapting and changing elements of the kinship, religious and economic systems" are typically functions of the political system.² "For only governmental action commands enough power and means to initiate the process, to

¹Towards this end a principal road that connected Tripoli with Beirut was built in the early 1920s. Before that Tripoli's principal road was that which connected it with Homs.

²Almond & Coleman (eds.), op. cit., pp. 5, 7. Mosca, op. cit., pp. 130-134, 145.

carry developmental measures, and to remove basic obstacles that hinder the development process."¹

The importance of this trend warrants the analysis of its development and the role played by the ruling class in this respect.

¹Muhammad Yakan, "Problems of Political Community and Ministerial Programs in Lebanon," paper read at the 5th Conference of the Political Science Association held in Beirut, 22-25 April, 1968, p. 1.

CHAPTER II

THE MAKING OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY

1920-1943

Lebanon took its present form in 1920. The process of its development as a political community should therefore start with that date. Hence this chapter is devoted to the analysis of that development during the mandatory period, 1920-1943. The emphasis will be on the evolution of political norms and common beliefs rather than on the political forms and institutions. However, the influence of the forms and institutions that were superimposed on Lebanon by the mandatory power should not be undermined.

The development of this political community evolved around the three political forces that were at play during this period. These were: a) the Christian communities, particularly the Maronite, b) the Muslim communities, particularly the Sunni, and c) the Mandatory Power, France.

1. The Christian Communities

The Christian communities did not have a consistent and uniform political position. Two factors influenced their behavior - fear of Sunni dominance, and natural

yearning for self-rule.¹

For some Christians, particularly among the Maronites and the Catholic Uniates the advantages of French protection outweighed self rule. A fair number of Greek Orthodox and Muslim minorities shared this position.

Agitation for self-rule was limited to certain elements of the middle and higher classes. Although these had pro-French political inclinations, their disposition was motivated by wider economic interests and by the desire for self-government. Evils of direct French rule particularly of the French administrative bureaucracy strengthened the feeling for independence.

Fear of Sunni dominance drove them towards French protection; yearning for self-rule away from it. The prominence of the one over the other, depended on many variables. This rendered the attitude of the various Christian groups inconsistent, but facilitated in a way the integration process.

¹For a more detailed analysis of the tensions that determined the Christian political attitude, see Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, p. 80; and Leila Meo, Lebanon: Improbable Nation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), p. 62.

The attitude of the Lebanese Administrative Council is a good example of this inconsistency.¹ The Council demonstrated pro-French sentiments since its reinstatement by the French on October 7, 1918. In December 1918 it dispatched a delegation to the Peace Conference to plead for a Greater Lebanon independent from the interior and under French protection. On May 20, 1919, it took a resolution declaring the political and administrative independence of Lebanon in its historical boundaries. As a reaction to Faysal's proclamation of his kingship on March 8, 1920, it held a meeting at B'abda on March 22 and proclaimed the independence of Greater Lebanon under French protection. However, on July 10, 1920 the Council passed a resolution declaring desire for Lebanon's independence to be achieved with the assistance of King Faysal.

Such indecision continued throughout the French Mandate and culminated in the late 1930s in the establishment of two blocs - the National Bloc advocating French protection and the Constitutional Bloc advocating self-rule.² The latter's contribution to the formulation

¹Longrigg reaches a similar conclusion, op.cit., p.76.

²For the basic differences between the two see Salibi, op.cit., pp. 173-174.

of the common bases of agreement between Christians and Muslims was immense.

The Greek Orthodox in general, having no cultural or emotional affinity with France, were more reluctant than the Maronites in accepting French protection. Being also spread out in the Arab Middle East, they were more adjusted to the Arab nationalist idea.¹ Hence many of them sided with the Muslims while the rest fluctuated between the two groups.

This disposition also applies to the other Christian sects such as the Protestants.

2. The Muslim Communities

The dominant political inclination among the Muslim communities was a hostile attitude to France and to Greater Lebanon. French presence was to them the supremacy of a foreign nation that was trying to separate them from their Arab brethren.² Greater Lebanon seemed an artificial imposition on them by France. This negative attitude

¹Hourani attributes this political disposition to the fact "that since the Russian Revolution of 1917 the Greek Orthodox have had no external 'protector' and so have had to understand the necessity of being on good terms with their neighbours." Syria and Lebanon, p. 144.

²The fact that French occupation came in the wake of Turkish decline made it even more detestable as it was a change from Sunni Turks to Christian French.

undoubtedly had its repercussions in deterring the development of a political community.

Spokesmen of this group were also drawn from the upper classes. They generally valued French culture and European assistance but resented French political dominance. Reflecting the opinion of their co-religionists, they did not recognize the Lebanese state as their state and continued to identify themselves with the greater Arab World and with Syria. While they were divided into moderate and extreme groups they were all nevertheless negative toward the new Lebanese political entity.

Only few political leaders accepted to participate in the government. Those who did were not held in high esteem by their community. Those who did not, succeeded in maintaining their position in the eyes of the Sunni masses. Outstanding among the latter were Abdul-Hamid Karami, Salim Salam, Riyād al-Sulh and others.

Gradually a limited cooperation developed but it did not reflect any substantial shift in the political inclinations of the Sunni masses. The aloofness of the majority of Sunni leaders from cooperation with the Mandatory Power created a certain vacuum in the Lebanese political process.

The Shi'ah were in a different position. Some of their leaders cooperated with the authorities much earlier than the Sunnis. The French found in the Shi'i Yusuf al-Zayn¹ the popular leader through whom they hoped to gain Shi'i support.² The attitude of the Shi'ah contributed to the integration process not only through the participation of its leaders but also through promoting indirectly the gradual cooperation of the Sunni.³

The Druzes in Greater Lebanon were too few to play an effective role. Furthermore they did not constitute one bloc. Some opposed the French Mandate;⁴

¹al-Zayn served in the Lebanese Parliament off and on from 1922 until 1943.

²The Shi'ah in general were less resentful of French presence. The great majority lived in rural areas and had little if any national political consciousness. Furthermore the recognition of the Shi'ah as an independent sect, with their own religious courts, by the French allayed the reservations of this sect in spite of the traditional religious bond with the Sunnis.

³The positive attitude of the Shi'ah weakened the Sunni position as it demonstrated that there is no all-Muslim bloc.

⁴Salibi attributes this attitude to the fact that they "tried to assert their political importance in opposition ... [and] ... resented the special favour shown by the French to the Maronites." Modern History of Lebanon, p. 169.

others collaborated with it. Among the latter group sitt (lady) Nazira Jumblat, the widow of a prominent Druze leader, played a major role in allaying the reservations of the Druze and ultimately in promoting a positive attitude towards the French Mandate. This attitude on the part of the Druze had almost the same consequences that the Shi'ah's attitude had on the disposition of the Muslim bloc.

3. The French Mandate

France performed two roles through its mandate over the area. While she posed altruistically as the traditional protector of the Christian minorities in the Middle East, she had in fact her own political and economic interests to promote.¹ She considered Syria as compensation for her losses in the war and regarded Lebanon as a base for influencing the Arab world and for controlling the Eastern Mediterranean. Accordingly the French attempted to secure general acceptance for

¹For further details, see Longrigg, op. cit., pp. 44-45, 73; and Yusuf al-Sawda, Fi Sabil al-Istiqlal (In the Service of Independence) (Beirut: al-Rihani Press, 1967), pp. 200-213, 222-233, 237-258, 266-270.

the mandate,¹ while relying specifically on the Christian elements.

In fulfilling their altruistic role the French lost no time in reconfirming the traditional ties with the Maronites. Captain Coulondre, then Acting Political Advisor for the region, called on the Maronite Patriarch on 23 October 1918 and submitted plans for the future of Lebanon. On 1 September 1920, General Gouroud, the French High Commissioner, at the inauguration ceremony of Great Lebanon, "spoke as a staunch Catholic to Catholics."² The special relations with the Catholics were maintained throughout the mandate period.

Efforts for Developing a Political Community in pre-Independence Period

The need for a strong base for French policy imposed on France the task of maintaining Greater Lebanon as proclaimed in September 1920. This entailed the difficult task of promoting integration in the new heterogeneous state. The

¹France's efforts towards this end are well analyzed in Longrigg, op. cit., in particular pp. 113-118, 143-147, 230-237.

²Ibid., p. 123. For more details about French efforts to win the Maronites see Ibid., pp. 116-117.

integration process had to cater to the various inherent divisive forces and transform the particularistic interests and loyalties into common ones.

Political loyalties in Lebanon vary considerably. Under the French Mandate they were expressed in "schools of thought ... characterized by sharp divergences on the subject of whether Lebanon should exist as an independent state or form part of a larger state, Syrian or otherwise."¹ These loyalties were determined by confessionalism. The political allegiance of Lebanese Sunnis to Syria was basically an identification of their sectarian interests with those of the Sunni community at large. The separatist attitude of the Christians was also an identification of their sectarian interests. These were fear of Sunni dominance and the belief that an independent Lebanon is a better guarantee of their sectarian liberty.

This identification gave the individual a sense of security and a better bargaining position vis-a-vis the other religious groups; furthermore it had the stamp of

¹Labib Zuwiyya-Yamak, "Party Politics in the Lebanese Political System," Leonard Binder (ed.), op. cit., p. 155. For a fuller analysis of these schools of thought see Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 264-267; 133-134 & 184.

past experience on it. Hence the Christians and the Muslims guarded jealously their respective sectarian solidarity on political questions.¹

This sectarian conviction permitted the intervention of religious leaders in the political process and enhanced the exploitive possibilities. The Maronite Church acted as a political party which promoted the interests of the Maronites through church sermons, petitions, and the press. And Muslim notables, because the religious hierarchy is weak in Islam, assumed the role of political leadership, but played that role with the fervor of religiosity.

Feudal and parochial interests also weakened the integration process. Members of Parliament and government officials were mainly representative of these interests and hence their loyalty went to their primary group to the detriment of defining national objectives.²

¹The Christian's political attitude was mainly determined by their concern for their majority status, and the Muslims by their resentfulness to separation from the Sunni majority in the hinterland and their inclusion in Lebanon. A departure from the traditional attitude entailed risking the established power position of each group.

²Gabriel Almond bases his distinction between the behavior of a member of parliament in an integrated society and that in an unintegrated one on whether his loyalty is to the parliamentary norms or to those of his primary group. Op. cit., pp. 23-24.

Traditional rivalry between France and Britain also hindered the integrative process. French support to the Maronites and British support to the Muslims contributed to the aggravation of the schism.

The virtual absence of nation-wide parties that cut across religious and feudal interests¹ was another negative factor. In this ideological vacuum political leadership fell in the hands of religious and feudal spokesmen who had only parochial interests.

Cohesive forces working towards a political community were the French Mandate - through imposing a geographic and political unity and its establishment of a suitable constitution and administration -, the Intellectual Elite, European education and concepts, and the Government as dispenser of benefits.

1. The French Mandate

France played a major role in the promotion of the integrative process. Her first objective was the pacification

¹For background and function of political parties in Lebanon see Michael W. Suleiman, Political Parties in Lebanon (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967); Bashir Aridi, "Parties and Politics in the Lebanese Society" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The American University, Washington, D.C., 1955); Labib Zuwiyya-Yamak, op.cit.; and Salwa Jurdak, "The Evolution of Lebanese Party Politics, 1919-1947" (unpublished Master's thesis, Political Science Department, American University of Beirut, 1947).

of the contending forces.¹ Once that had been attained it turned to the more difficult task of political integration.

The development of a pan-Lebanese loyalty² necessitated a politico-constitutional framework as well as social measures.

The steps towards administrative organization which were taken in 1918 continued throughout the mandate. The first of these steps was the reinstatement of the Lebanese Administrative Council on 7 October 1918. Other measures to establish a political framework followed; and of these the most important was the proclamation of the Constitution³ in May 1926.

The Constitution enhanced integration by laying the foundations of cooperation among the various sects⁴ as the following analysis indicates. Although the allotment of the seats in the Chamber was on confessional basis, each deputy

¹Longrigg, op. cit., p. 122.

²This was particularly difficult as cooperation had to come "from elements some of which, notably the Sunni inhabitants of the districts recently annexed to Lebanon resolutely refused such loyalty." Ibid., pp. 200-201.

³The 1926 Constitution was based on the Constitution of the Third French Republic.

⁴Leila Meo considers the Constitution's stipulation for confessional sharing in government an attempt to obtain the loyalty of the Muslims, op. cit., p. 54.

was elected by members of all the sects of the electoral district and represented the whole population. According to Albert Hourani, "this principle might indeed be regarded as the most important contribution made by the French to the political life of Lebanon. It insured that electoral alliances and programs should cut across communal divisions."¹ Furthermore the very existence of that Chamber enhanced the development of a common political life. It supplied a much needed forum where matters of common interest could be discussed and where members of the various sects vied for each others' support. This aspect was considered by Michel Chiha to be a necessary condition for the development of the will to live in common.²

The Constitution intended the President to be above the communities and therefore a unifier. He was expected to "express the unity of the state; ... to cut across the network of interests - sectarian, family or personal, and his decisions [were expected to be guided by] national interests."³

¹Hourani, "Lebanon: the Development of a Political Society," op. cit., p. 26.

²Michel Chiha, Politique Interieure (Beyrouth: 1964), p. 135.

³Hourani, "Lebanon: the Development of a Political Society," op. cit., p. 26.

The constitution also gave rise to traditions that enhanced integration. While it called for equitable representation of the various sects,¹ it did not set definite ratios. Its flexibility gave rise to the formula of the Maronite-President Sunni-Prime Minister which began in 1937. It encouraged the development of government by coalition. This practice, in which France was experienced, fitted the Lebanese heterogeneous structure. The representation of the various sectarian and political groupings in one entity imposed on them cooperation and consequently the development of common grounds of consensus.

France also attempted the promotion of social integration by decree, although these were often opposed by the intransigent sects. A decree, published on 27 March 1925, abolishing confessional allotment of seats in the Chamber (and the two-stage election) had to be repealed under local pressure from Christians and Muslims.² In May 1926 a decree by the High Commissioner to "withdraw all personal status questions from the confessional ... courts ... was the subject of protest by all Christian Patriarchs, and the

¹See Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 182-184, for the reaction of the various Lebanese groups to the consecration of sectarianism in the Constitution as basis of political life.

²Longrigg, op. cit., p. 150.

Muslim dignitaries. A month later its application was wisely 'postponed'".¹

Sectarian opposition to secular and national reforms shows the traditional identification of the Lebanese with his religious group and the difficult hurdles that have to be overcome before a viable political community is instituted.

Evaluation of France's Contribution

France's positive contribution was in shaping Lebanese politics in the formative twenty years. "The rickety structure could be said to have been stuck together in the earlier years by the glue of French garrisons and the adhesive of French administrators."² Her contribution to the creation of a pan-Lebanese loyalty was also significant. In addition to the norms established by the Constitution, the fact that France held Lebanon together gave the Lebanese sects time to develop common interests under French protection.

Living under French Mandate brought changes in the attitude of Christians and Muslims and particularly among the latter. In the beginning the Muslims took a negative

¹Ibid., p. 175.

²J.C. Hurewitz, "Lebanese Democracy in Its International Setting," Leonard Binder (ed.), op. cit., p. 224.

political attitude towards the French. At the end of World War I they owed allegiance to King Faysal. The departure of King Faysal in 1920 intensified rather than diminished their hostility to France. In 1922 the Muslims boycotted the elections. Later elections to Parliament, the formulation of the Constitution,¹ the treaty negotiations of 1936 were all occasions of protest and agitation on their part. Their vehement opposition to the establishment of a Lebanese administration was due to the fact that they saw in that a consecration of the resented status quo.²

In spite of the above manifestations change in the attitude of the Muslims came about gradually. This change became evident when a few of their leaders began to participate in the governmental process. Willingness to assume political offices on behalf of the Muslims was influenced by the lapse of time, by the realization that the French

¹The Constitution in particular evoked apprehension because it legitimized the new frontiers of Greater Lebanon. Spokesmen of the dissatisfied Muslims held that Lebanese boundaries should be fixed on the basis of local self-determination. For further details about the Muslims reaction to the Constitution see Longrigg, op. cit., p. 170.

²Ibid., pp. 200-201. The Muslims' negative attitude reached its climax in the Conference of the Coast, held January 10, 1936, which demanded that the disputed districts be reannexed to Syria.

Mandate was a fait accompli, and perhaps by the conviction that a leader is more effective if he is in the sarayah. The other two factors were the feeling of the Muslims that their persistence on a negative attitude is causing an incurable rift between them and the Christians, and the feeling that the reannexation by Syria of the disputed districts would make of Lebanon a homogeneous unity which might endanger by its separate-ness the Muslim Arab hinterland.^{1,2}

Cooperation started with Shaykh Muhammad al-Jisr's³ acceptance to hold governmental office. In the presidential election of 1932 Shaykh Muhammad was one of the leading

¹The pan-Arab movement in Syria encouraged, if not initiated, this attitude. Longrigg says that representatives of this movement expressed to the Maronite Patriarch their willingness to give up their demand for the reannexation of the disputed districts if Lebanon would repudiate French Mandate. Op. cit., pp. 206-207.

²Mention must also be made of the efforts of the mandatory power to bring about a change in the Muslim attitude. Salibi says, "it was mainly to allay Moslem opposition in the country that the French in 1926 proposed the candidature of Charles Dabbās to the presidency. To Lebanon's Moslems Dabbās, a Greek Orthodox, was far more acceptable as Head of State than any Maronite leader." The Modern History of Lebanon, p. 170.

³Shaykh Muhammad was a Sunni religious leader from Tripoli. In 1926 he was appointed a member of the Lebanese Senate (the Senate was incorporated with the Parliament on 18 October 1927) and in 1929 a member of the Parliament. As a Speaker of the House from 1927 to 1932 he played a major role and gave the Mandate the appearance of Sunni backing.

candidates. By that time al-Jisr and other Sunni leaders expressed eagerness to participate in the political process and even demanded the Presidency.¹

The suspension of the Constitution on May 9, 1932 deprived the Muslims of the opportunity of winning the Presidency, but did not impede their participation in the government process. "Under the provisional regime, the formula of a Maronite President² of the Republic balanced by a Sunni President of the Council was attempted for the first time."³ Between January 30, 1934 and January 30, 1936 the formula proved workable; and when the Constitution was restored on January 5, 1937, this formula was followed. In that year Khayr-al-Din al-Ahdab became Prime Minister. Since that year the virtually unbroken line of Sunni Prime Ministers began. This signified the continuous political cooperation of the Sunni and also set the future pattern.

¹These leaders felt that the Presidency should be the preserve of the larger communities, i.e. the Maronites and the Sunni. "Khairredine Ahdab stated the principle clearly: 'we demand the Presidency for the Muslims (meaning Sunni Muslims) or for the Maronites, to the exclusion of the minorities!'" Pierre Rondot, "The Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy," Binder (ed.), op. cit., p. 136.

²The first Maronite President was elected in 1934.

³Rondot, op. cit., p. 136.

Thus the Maronite-President Sunni-Prime Minister tradition evolved and became the foundation of future political cooperation.

Later the Shi'ah established their claim to the chairmanship of the Chamber which insured the cooperation of this sect.

The change in the attitude of the Maronites came as negative reaction to the French Mandate.¹ Obviously the French Mandate started by favoring the Maronites. Direct contact however between the French and the Maronites as rulers and ruled placed the traditional friendship under a severe test and exposed the French Mandate to criticism by the heretofore loyal Maronites. This has been aggravated by the lack of tact on the part of French bureaucrats particularly by the attitude of some High Commissioners.

This dissatisfaction for political, economic and social reasons was accelerated by several events. In 1925 Emile Eddeh objected to the appointment of a Frenchman as Governor. Eddeh's objections led to a change in the attitude of the Muslims towards him. Some Muslim notables like Umar

¹Patriarch Houayek is quoted to have said in 1920 that France is like fire good for warming one's self from far but burns when she is near, Sa'ib Salam, al-'Ousbu' al-'Arabi (The Arab Week) (in Arabic), 6 November 1967, No. 439.

Bayhum and Umar Da'ouk backed him^{1,2} in this stand, particularly after the violent French reaction³ to Eddeh's objections.

The harmful effects of the anti-clerical policy of General Sarrail (High Commissioner 1924-1925) and that of Mr. Cayla (Governor of Lebanon 1925-1926) to the Franco-Maronite friendship cannot be underestimated. Sarrail represented the secular policy of the ruling French government at the time, but the application of this secular policy in a confessional-oriented society like Lebanon proved disastrous.⁴

¹For further details see Iskandar al-Riyashi, Qabl wa Ba'd (Before and After) (Beirut: al-Hayat Press, 1953), pp. 42-43; and Leila Meo, op. cit., p. 68.

²Maronites' alienation from France can also be traced to July 1920 when members of the Lebanese Administrative Council (among them the brother of the Maronite Patriarch) were stopped while on their way to Damascus to seek the assistance of King Faysal against France. This incident however was not wholly a reaction to French policy but partly to the uncertainty of the political situation.

³The Parliament was suspended and Cayla was confirmed in his post as Governor.

⁴Riyashi, op. cit., pp. 45-46 and Rou'asa' Lubnan kama 'Ariftahum (The Presidents of Lebanon as I have known them) (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Tijari, 1961), pp. 32-33; also Longrigg, op. cit., pp. 148-154.

In 1935 de Martel's (High Commissioner 1933-1939) policy alienated even the Maronite Patriarch, the traditional friend of France. This ultimately led to a remarkable rapprochement between the Arab nationalist politicians of Damascus and Lebanon like Riyād al-Sulh, Shukri al-Quwatly, Jamil Mardam, Lutfi Haffar on the one hand and the Patriarch on the other.¹ Longrigg attributes the Patriarch's attitude "in part [to] irritation with French policy in general - its refusal of true independence, its infinite range of interference, its failure to combat the economic crisis or to reduce taxes -, in part upon a pronounced mutual antipathy between himself and M. de Martel, and in part also upon a specific bone of contention, the Tobacco Monopoly. The decision to restore the latter system in an amended form, in supersession of the banderole method of securing tobacco revenues, was taken by the Common Interest late in 1930."²

These events were the early manifestations of the gradual Maronite alienation from France which culminated in the independent policy of the Constitutional Bloc in 1943. Hence day-to-day confrontation between the rulers and ruled

¹For further details see, Ibid., pp. 206-207; and al-Riyashi, Qabl wa Ba'd (Before and After), p. 136.

²Longrigg, op. cit., p. 206.

promoted indirectly the cooperation between the Maronites and the Muslims and strengthened the feeling of community.¹

2. The Intellectual Elite

The intellectual elite, influenced by European ideas - nationalism, secularism, progress -, served the Lebanese national goal. Two movements can be discerned in the early part of the 20th Century; one sponsored by Yusuf al-Sawda, the other by Michel Chiha. Both spoke of a Greater Lebanon belonging to all its inhabitants, and helped in forming national attitudes and loyalties.

Yusuf al-Sawda was the first to define the basic concepts on which Greater Lebanon was to be based. His activities in this regard date back to 1908. Apprehension over Lebanon's integration in the Ottoman Empire and the annulment of its privileges in 1908 resulted in the establishment of al-Ittihad al-Lubnani in Egypt in 1909.² Al-Ittihad's position evolved from calling for a special position for

¹This it did through demonstrating that the sources of irritation and threats are common among people of the same state. For an interesting analysis of this process see Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 297-298.

²Prominent members besides Yusuf al-Sawda in al-Ittihad were: Iskandar Ammoun, Antun al-Jumayyil, Jibra'il Takla, Dāud Barakat, Habib Ghanem, Muhammad Talhouk, Bulous Mas'ad, Habib Antonius and others. Yusuf al-Sawda, op.cit., pp. 25-26.

Lebanon within the Ottoman Empire to calling for complete independence. After World War I al-Ittihad's strife for independence continued to be waged by Lebanese living in Egypt in spite of the conflicting interests of Great Britain, France,¹ and Sharif Husain.

In 1922 al-Sawda founded in Lebanon Hizb al-Muhafizin (Conservative Party) to promote national Lebanese interests. On 18 March 1938 these interests were formulated in a National Pact that called for:

1. a fully independent Lebanon in its 1920 boundaries and a national government;
2. promoting good relations among the Lebanese;
3. regulating Lebanon's relationships with the Arab countries in an organization that would safeguard Lebanon's independence and that of the other Arab states;
4. safeguarding equality among the Lebanese on basis of justice and qualifications;
5. considering the Arabic language as the only official language.

¹al-Sawda clarifies a generally accepted impression that Greater Lebanon was created to meet Lebanese wishes which agreed with French designs. He firmly states that Greater Lebanon was established reluctantly by the French after repeated requests by Lebanese spokesmen. For further details see al-Sawda, op. cit., pp. 68-100, 106-278.

The above was signed by representatives of the various Lebanese sects and groupings.¹

Like al-Sawda, Michel Chiha was an ardent Lebanese patriot with perhaps greater insight into Lebanon's affairs. The maintenance of the traditional relations between the various religious groups was the underlying principle of his political thinking. That, to him, was imperative for the survival of Lebanon. Lebanon, he said, "est un pays de minorite confessionnelle associees. Tout les minorite doivent y trouver leur place et obtenir leur droits. C'est la raison d'etre de ce pays et c'est son originalite."²

Chiha was a key figure in the formulation of the Lebanese Constitution. Through it he laid the foundations of Lebanon's modern political life. He also continued to influence the Lebanese political scene through his friendship

¹Outstanding among the signatories are: Dr. Salim Idriss, Dr. Nassib Barbir, Rafiq Barraaj, Dr. Elias Ba'qlini, Salah Beyhum, Abdullah al-Hajj, Yusuf al-Houayek, Jamil al-Khazin, Dr. Elias el-Khoury, Habib Rubeiz, Dr. Toufic Ibrahim Rizq, Dr. Malih Sinno, Dr. Ahmad Shami, Najib as-Sayegh, Taki-Din-as-Sulh, Mohammad Abdul-Qadir Tabbarah, Afif at-Tibi, Dr. Elias 'Ad, 'Adel Ussayran, Zuhair Ussayran, Toufic Yusuf 'Awad, Benassi 'Aql, Michel 'Aql, Mulhim Gharaz-ed-Din, Dr. Qaranuh, Hassan al-Ladki, Nasri Ma'louf, Muhammad Umar Munaymneh, Dr. Muhammad Khayr al-Noueiri, Anis Naja. Yusuf al-Sawda, "Bayn al-Wataniyah wal Ta'ifiyah" (Between Nationalism and Confessionalism) al-Hikmah (Beirut, 5th year, No. 9, July 1956), p. 4.

²Chiha, op. cit., p. 44.

with Bisharah al-Khūri, and through his copious writings in Le Jour. Hence it can be said that he set the pattern for the Christians' disposition towards the Muslims and towards independence.

3. European Education and Concepts

The attempt of the intellectual elite to promote a political community in Lebanon coincided with the spread of education, particularly French education. Education brought about nationalist symbols and ideologies although these were only superficially held. Expressions such as 'cooperation among the sects', 'national solidarity', and the like were repeated by daily papers and spokesmen of public opinion. With repetition the meaningfulness of these slogans grew gradually.

European ideas also influenced the development of political institutions and of political parties. The Popular Syrian Party,¹ and the paramilitary organizations of the Kata'ib² and the Najjadeh³ which appeared in the

¹For further details on the origin and role of the Popular Syrian Party see Suleiman, op. cit., pp. 91-119; and Longrigg, op. cit., pp. 225-226.

²See Suleiman, op. cit., pp. 232-249 and Longrigg, op.cit., p. 226.

³Suleiman, op. cit., pp. 201-213.

1930s were imitations of European patterns. These were also suitable means for disseminating further European political norms.¹ The Kata'ib and the Najjadeh, founded in 1936 and 1937 respectively were initially sport movements like the then popular youth organizations in Europe. al-Kata'ib's sphere of action was restricted to the Maronite community and the Najjadeh to the Muslim community. However, by introducing ideological norms they transformed at least outwardly the sectarian division to a seeming ideological division. Furthermore, the Kata'ib contributed to Lebanon's political integration through its opposition to the Mandate. As such al-Kata'ib became a symbol of the formal Christian opposition which drew Christians and Muslims closer together towards the end of the Mandate.

The Syrian Popular Party was founded in 1932 by Antun Saadeh as an ideological party that conceived geographical Syria as its sphere of action. As a secular party it stressed the distinctive characteristics of the 'Syrian' social type and emphasized national interests at the expense

¹Lebanese political parties however did not function like European parties. Because of the country's socio-political structure they "could not compete for power in the western sense. They criticize, guide, inform (as well as misinform), and maintain a forum of free public discussion." Suleiman, op. cit., pp. xv-xvi.

of the sectarian. Thus the party narrowed the gap between the various communities, and helped enhance social integration in Lebanon.

The growth of the city of Beirut contributed to political community. While the population continued to think "in terms of a sharp opposition of 'Muslims and Christians'" ... there were certain tendencies towards unity. The increasing number of the middle class and "the ways in which they earned their living led them to form associations and personal ties which took no heed of religious differences."¹

This tendency led to the development of norms that are less divisive and less emotionally charged than the sectarian norms.

4. Government as Dispenser of Benefits

Another cementing factor was the role of the government as a dispenser of benefits. As the major employer, the government, in the words of Iskandar al-Riyashi, "opened, like emigration to America, unexpected opportunities for

¹Hourani, "Lebanon: the Development of a Political Society," op. cit., p. 27.

wealth and glory."¹ And since government positions were held in high esteem by the populace, it was possible for the government to rally to its support hitherto dissatisfied elements. The increase in the number of those who had vested interests in the state - i.e. members of the ruling class and the administrative staff - enabled the government to strengthen its base of support.

With all the above factors at play, at the end of the French Mandate, polarization was reduced. Dissident movements were absorbed, although of course not fully nor effectively, but a modicum base of national existence had been provided. It was a base in which the Mandatory Power played a decisive role by providing the political framework for national action. It is in the independence period, however and in the first formative decade of the independence that the effort at political community building was made.

¹al-Riyashi, Qabl wa Ba'd (Before and After), p. 53.

CHAPTER III

THE GOVERNING OF LEBANON

1943-1952

The governing of Lebanon during 1943-1952 will be discussed in this chapter with special emphasis on the basic factors that contributed to the development of a political community. This entails an analysis of the ruling class: its background and main function, particularly that of formulating a consensus among the ruling elite. An evaluation of the National Pact formula is also attempted.

The Ruling Class

A ruling class is an organized minority that "performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings."¹ Its members are usually "distinguished from the mass of the governed by qualities that give them a certain material, intellectual or even moral superiority; or else they are the heirs of individuals who possessed such qualities. In other words, members of a ruling minority regularly have

¹Mosca, op. cit., p. 50.

some attributes, real or apparent, which is highly esteemed and very influential in the society in which they live."^{1,2}

Furthermore this class is usually bound by a variety of common interests. In Lebanon this class represents conflicting sectarian and economic³ interests but these interests are usually subdued⁴ and a modus operandi is achieved. One of the main incentives in this reconciliation is the common interest of the ruling class to perpetuate its political power.⁵

The ruling class in Lebanon can be classified into the following five categories:⁶ politicians, religious leaders, wealthy businessmen, top administrators and some intellectuals drawn into the government by cooptation.

¹Ibid., p. 53.

²See also Sereno, op. cit., pp. 4-6.

³For example the merchants are for free enterprise while the industrialists are for protection.

⁴Rustow analyses means of subduing differences of interests within ruling classes in the Near East, Almond and Coleman (eds.), op. cit., p. 432.

⁵This is true of all rulers. See Sereno, op. cit., pp. 5, 6 and 31.

⁶As this analysis is confined to 1943-1952 the military are not considered members of the ruling class. Their decisive political role, as is well known, started after 1958.

The Politicians

The politicians stand in the vanguard and handle the government partly by their own right as politicians and partly as the channel through which sectarian and business interests are represented. The intensity of these interests and the persistence of primordial ties have limited the number of politicians to a handful of leading families. Thus political leadership or za'amah as known in Lebanon is a feudal institution which lingers on although feudalism has declined. Competition among these families to reaffirm their prestige and power constitutes the main political activity in Lebanon.

Although most Lebanese politicians belong to prominent families, differences in their background can be discerned. Khalaf classifies them under three categories: "feudal", "administrative" and "urban".¹

a. Feudal

By feudal is meant those families who were big landowners in the past and consequently wielded political influence. This group has been the largest but their number is declining. Among these are the Arslans, the

¹Samir Khalaf, "Primordial Ties and Politics in Lebanon," (Mimeographed to be published in Middle Eastern Studies (London School of Economics)), p. 4.

Jumblatts and the Shihabs in the Shuf; the As'ads and the Zayns in the South; the Hamadehs in Baalbek; the Mir'ibs in Akkar; and the Khazins in Kisrwan.

The continuing influence of some of these feudal families has been due, not only to the influence of their feudal background, but to their relative adaptation to changes in the Lebanese society. Some of them have acquired modern traits as means for augmenting their political power while retaining the traditionally established feudal-peasant relationship. Kamal Jumblatt¹ is a case in point. Others have used economic benefits accruing from feudally obtained political positions to strengthen their position.

b. Administrative

"Administrative" zu'ama are those who have established their positions because of the prestige connected with holding a high administrative post. Many of these are descendants of feudal families who had been assimilated in the administration of the Mutesarrifiyyah or of the French Mandate. The gradual erosion of the political supremacy of feudal families did not put an end to their influence. Many of them became members of the new

¹Kamal Jumblatt founded the Socialist Lebanese Party in 1949.

administrative bureaucracy. With their bureaucratic and legal skills they built their political power and social prestige. The most outstanding of these are the Khūris of the Shuf; the Khalils of Tyre; the Salams, Beyhums and Da'ouks of Beirut; the Karamis of Tripoli; the Eddehs of Jubayl and the Taqlas of Mount Lebanon.

c. Urban

The "urban" zu'ama had a different social background. This group is composed mostly of wealthy businessmen and political activists. "Being less of a landowner, (the urban za'im) has to be more of a politician",¹ This is due to the following factors:

1. The clientele of the urban za'im is more politically minded than the peasants.
2. The urban za'im has less control over the economic life of his clientele.
3. Economic relations in the cities are much more manifold and changeable.²

Thus, "the za'im of the cities needs political slogans to cement his clientele and to extend his influence beyond the restricted circle of people who

¹Arnold Hottinger, "Zu'ama in Historical Perspective," Binder (ed.), op. cit., p. 96.

²Ibid.

are directly dependent upon him."¹ Representative of this type of za'amah are Abdul Hamid Karami of Tripoli and Riyad al-Sulh.

Religious Leaders

In view of Lebanon's confessional history, religious leaders play a prominent role in the political process. The fact that confessional groupings manifest political behavior similar to that of political parties, renders the leaders of these confessions actual political leaders.

The role of these leaders however varied according to the social and political background of each sect. The Maronites, for example, consider themselves a religious-political community.² They are also "unique among the Christians of the Arabic speaking world in that they are the only one of the many sects who can be considered a compact minority."³ Furthermore they are more experienced

¹Ibid.

²Iliya Harik says, "whether we read Ibn al-Qila'i of the sixteenth century or Nqula Mrad of the nineteenth, the same idea recurs. The Maronites, in their views, are considered a religious-political community, distinct from both the Muslims of Syria and the non-Maronite Christians." "The Maronite Church and Political Change in Lebanon," Binder (ed.), op. cit., p. 39

³Noel Spencer, "The Role of the Maronite Patriarchate" (unpublished M.A. Thesis, Department of Arab Studies, American University of Beirut, Beirut, 1963), p. 104.

in pressure politics than other sects.¹ This led to the establishment of the tradition of a strong political role for their clergy in general and for their Patriarch in particular.²

This power, which varied from time to time, continues until today. During the early period of independence the Maronite Patriarch supervised with care the political interests of the Maronites³ and was, as he still is, considered to be a power behind the scene in electing the President of

¹The several decades of sectarian competition for power between them and the Druze has sharpened the Maronites' means in this respect.

²For a historical background of the political role of the Maronite Patriarch, see Harik, op. cit., and Spencer, op. cit. Harik refers the strong role of the Maronite Patriarch to the traditional weakness of Maronite feudal lords, p. 47. Spencer relates the power of the Patriarch with "the intensity of [the Maronites'] fear for their very existence as a separate entity." p. vi.

Harik relates the following interesting incident that indicates the Patriarch's intervention in politics since the 18th Century. He says that at the time of the Napoleonic invasion "Patriarch Tiyyan gave orders to a Maronite shaykh to lead Maronite men to aid Napoleon at Acre; although the Amir of the country had adopted a policy of neutrality with regard to Napoleon and the Ottoman Wali." p. 50.

³The Maronite clergy as a whole were considered the spokesmen of their sect. An anonymous pamphlet entitled 'Lebanon, the Christian National Home', distributed in 1945 in both English and Arabic versions was attributed to one of the Maronite bishops. The pamphlet was "written in the form of an open letter to the United Nations Organization, [and] fairly represents the extreme Maronite position, by whose adherents it was obviously composed." Spencer, op. cit., p. 106.

the Republic, in the making of cabinets and in the appointment of administrative officers.

The other Christian sects, surpassed in number by the Maronites in Lebanon and scattered throughout the Arab Middle East, were less conscious of their separateness. Many of them, adjusted to the Arab nationalist idea, have less political fears from the Arab world than the Maronites. Consequently their religious leaders play a minor political role.

As to the Muslim sects, they are in general inexperienced in competitive confessional politics.¹ Furthermore, their negative political attitude during the early period of their inclusion in Lebanon deprived them of establishing the tradition of their religious leaders' acting as a pressure group in politics. Their active participation after independence however has led to the collaboration of religious leaders and laymen to act as the spokesmen of their sect.² A Higher Muslim Council composed of Muslim notables

¹Islam has been a polity and a religion at the same time. Religious leaders in the Muslim state have been a part of the government officialdom and not an outside pressure group.

²This in no way meant a weaker emphasis on religious tones. "In 1953 a Moslem pamphlet was published anonymously and in English. Entitled 'Moslem Lebanon Today', it lists first among its several conclusions, 'The Maronite sect of Lebanon and some of the other Christian groups in our country do not feel or sympathise with the Arab national spirit, but on the contrary are prepared to fight it in every possible way and to impose by force their Christian civilization on all of

had assumed this role along with the Mufti. The Mufti has been gaining in political influence, but his role remains less influential than that of the Maronite Patriarch.

As to the Shi'ah, their spokesmen, like their community, played a minor political role. Under the French Mandate the sect gained in power and continued to do so after independence. But the political role of the religious leader was not developed because of the relative strength of feudalism within the Shi'ah.

Among the Druze the role of the religious leader as the spokesman of his sect was never developed because of the traditional strength of the Druze feudal lords. Furthermore the loss of their prominence as a political community in 1920 deterred the possibility of the development of such a role.¹

Influential Businessmen

Businessmen play a major political role in Lebanon.²

the Lebanon and to violently separate Lebanon from the rest of the Arab World ... This threat should be a warning to us to organise ourselves for resistance, using every legal means at our disposal, otherwise we will face the same fate as the Arabs of Palestine." Spencer, op. cit., p. 106.

¹After 1920 the Sunnis outnumbered the Druze and thus they posed as the other major faction in Lebanon.

²Samir Khalaf says, "in a service-biased economy, where the mercantile spirit still thrives and material and pecuniary values are highly coveted, it is the manipulators of men and money who seem the most privileged in society." "The Growing Pains of Arab Intellectuals," Diogenes (Mario Casalini Ltd., Italy, Summer 1966, No. 54), p. 68.

However, they participate in the government process on individual personal basis not as an organized party. The business group is composed mainly of bankers, merchants and few industrialists. Their participation has been both direct and indirect. A good number of the members of parliaments and cabinets under al-Khūri's regime were businessmen¹ or lawyers² who served as a channel through which business interests operate.

The influence of this group had grown gradually through its coalition with political feudalism.³ Through this coalition which was used by the businessmen as a convenient means, many a rich merchant gained direct access to political power. This he did through paying a sum of money

¹Outstanding among these were Henri Pharaon (banker and real estate owner), Butrus al-Khūri (a wealthy businessman), Yusuf Istfan (a major shareholder in the Lebanese Cement Company) and others.

²Yusuf Salem represented the Beirut Water Company, Habib Abi Shahla represented Tapline and other rich families. Camille Sham'un, Hamid Frangieh and Emile Lahhoud were outstanding lawyers who represented various business firms and wealthy businessmen.

³Albert Hourani refers this coalition to the fact that "many of the merchants are Christians or Jews and therefore frightened of coming into conflict with important vested interests; many are bound by family ties to the landowners, and not conscious of a difference of interests from them," Syria and Lebanon, p. 92.

for a feudal lord to be included on his electoral list.¹

Business political success was at the expense of the feudal politicians. The increase in the influence of the businessmen is relative to the economic decline of the feudal class and its economic dependence on the businessmen.

Top Administrators

Top administrators who share in decision making are members of the ruling class. As members of this class their role is determined by "the basic geographic, economic, social and cultural dimensions of a state."² Their main function is to "create a working political consensus on measures to be carried out,"³ where the politicians supply the general formula.

¹This confirms Mosca's maxim that "wealth produces political power just as political power has been producing wealth," op. cit., p. 57.

Mosca also says, "the rich invariably have a considerably shorter road to travel than the poor, to say nothing of the fact that the stretch of road that the rich are spared is often the roughest and most difficult." Ibid., p. 58.

²George Grassmuck and Kamal Salibi, A Manual of Lebanese Administration (Public Administration Department, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Catholic Press, 1955), p. 1.

³Norton Long, "Power and Administration," Francis Rourke (ed.), Bureaucratic Power in National Politics (Boston: Little Browne & Co., 1965), p. 17.

Their success in this respect depends on the power they can exercise and on their efficiency. Their power position, as is the case in all administrations, is due to the following factors:

- a. that they are well placed in the chain of command.¹ They initiate orders or transmit them according to their disposition.
- b. that they possess a superior knowledge of their departments and its work. This technical competence "of necessity gives them a rightful policy initiative. In addition, they have or develop a shrewd understanding of the politically feasible in the group structure within which they work."² With this knowledge they can pose as 'experts' in the face of the 'dilettente' politicians.³
- c. that "they represent the institutionalized embodiment of policy, an enduring organization

¹Ibid., p. 15.

²Ibid., p. 17.

³Max Weber, "Essay on Bureaucracy," Francis Rourke (ed.), Ibid., p. 11. Weber makes one exception to the administrator's superior technical knowledge - that of the expert's in the sphere of private economic interests.

actually or potentially capable of mobilizing power behind policy."¹

- d. that they serve as "a major channel of representation"² for political, business and/or sectarian interests. Although this renders them dependent to a certain extent on the diverse groups that sustain them yet they retain their own share in leadership.³

As to their background a study on the subject has revealed the following:⁴

¹Long, op. cit., p. 17.

²Ibid., p. 18.

³Long says that in the United States administrators are powerful in this capacity as channels "to such an extent that Congress rightly feels the competition of a rival," Ibid., p. 18. J. Leiper Freeman also considers them as a pressure group in their own right. "Bureaucracy in Pressure Politics," Francis Rourke (ed.), Ibid.

⁴Material in this section has been taken mainly from a research conducted by Professor Elie Salem, findings of which were published in al-Dawlat and al-Inma' (The State and the Development) under the title Dawr al-Idara al-'Ama wal-Inma' (The Role of Public Administration in Development), Beirut, 1966. See also Adnan Iskandar, Bureaucracy in Lebanon (Beirut: Department of Political Studies and Public Administration, American University of Beirut, Beirut, 1964) and Salem's paper on "Administration" read in the lecture series on Cultural Resources in Lebanon given at Beirut College for Women, July 5-29, 1966.

Most of the top administrators are bilingual and highly educated, but their education is mainly legal.¹ Their age group is in the late forties.² As to their performance they can be divided into two groups - a minority of responsible creative group and a majority of traditional officials who are not devoted to nor enthusiastic about their work. Furthermore the top official "exercizes a sort of domination, of despotism, that is, he assumes the air of a superior human being in dealing with the citizen!"³

Primordial ties have their due effect on the loyalties of the top administrators.⁴ However once established in the

¹This shows the preponderance of the graduates of Universite Saint Joseph which has a Law school. Munir Bashshur, "Athar al-Ta'lim al-'Ali fil Tatawur al-Siyasi fi Lubnan," (The Effect of Higher Education on Political Development in Lebanon), paper read at 5th Conference of the Political Science Association, Beirut, 22-25 April 1968, pp. 16-17, and Salem, "Administration," op. cit., p.19.

²Salem does not think that age is indicative of experience, nor does he recognize any credit for long experience, "for the experience of 20 years is nothing but a year's experience repeated 20 times," The Role of Public Administration in Development, op. cit., p. 37.

³Ibid., p. 46.

⁴This is due to the fact that "both political and administrative officials are elected or appointed at every level with due and open regard for their religious affiliation. Thus this affiliation becomes a basic determinant of a citizen's eligibility for a particular office." Grassmuck and Salibi, op. cit., p. 2. Salem also remarks that the top administrator is usually "a strong member of a family and a religious community and owes allegiance to these two, at times to the detriment of the larger whole." "Administration," op. cit., p. 22.

However in the questionnaire conducted by Salem top officials denied that their social position, fortune, religious

government organization they develop some sort of loyalty to the system.

It must be admitted however that Lebanon's administrators function without a definition of their function. This was particularly true between 1943-1952.¹

Intellectual Elite

The term 'intellectual elite' as used here includes "all those who create, carry and apply culture."² This

or political position were taken into consideration in their appointment nor that they accept pressure from others. Salem concludes from this denial that the top officials share the duality of the Lebanese character. Khatchadourian analyses this duality in "The Face and the Mask," op.cit.

For a fuller analysis of the effect of confessionalism on Administration, see Halim Fayyad, "The Effects of Sectarianism on the Lebanese Administration" (unpublished Master's thesis, Department of Public Administration, American University of Beirut, 1956) and Ralph E. Crow's "Confessionalism, Public Administration and Efficiency in Lebanon," Binder (ed.), op.cit.

¹Grassmuck and Salibi, op.cit., p. 15.

²"In this sense then a university graduate, by virtue of his higher education alone, need not pass for an intellectual. Only if he partakes in the process of creating, diffusing or applying culture, will he become one." Khalaf, "The Growing Pains of Arab Intellectuals," op.cit., p. 61.

A strict definition of an intellectual as that who creates culture, i.e. the "so-called 'searching, detached, yet concerned'" (Ibid., p. 60) intellectual does not apply in this respect.

group includes scholars, writers, artists, the serious journalists, political and social commentators.¹

The main task of this group is the reconciliation of the "traditional and rational elements in society"² and hence the development of consensus. However, the influence of primordial loyalties³ and of the multiple educational system have somewhat impeded this. Higher education was limited to the two foreign universities,⁴ the American University of Beirut and the French Universite Saint Joseph.⁵

¹Ibid., p. 61.

²Ibid., p. 60.

³The Lebanese intellectual like the Lebanese people adheres to the traditional loyalties. He "appears to derive greater satisfaction and security from his kinship and communal ties than from his participation in an intellectual career. At least his association with traditional circles is still sociologically more meaningful for him, and he remains partly if not totally attached to non-intellectual pursuit." Ibid., p. 66.

Hisham Nashabi also says, "the Lebanese intellectual, whether Maronite or other, finds himself clearly antiseccularist; and this not on the grounds of a pure intellectual consideration, but in view of the immediate advantages he is apt to derive from this antiseccularist position." "The Problems of the Lebanese Intellectual Today," Binder (ed.), op. cit., p. 260.

⁴The two other universities, the Lebanese University and the Arab University of Beirut, were established later - the first in 1953, the second in 1960.

⁵American University of Beirut and Universite Saint Joseph were established in 1866 and 1875 respectively. The first was sponsored by Protestant missionaries, the latter by Jesuit.

By catering for one section of the Lebanese population more than the other,¹ the two western universities contributed to Lebanon's pluralism.² This indirectly safeguarded the country's compromise spirit.³

¹The Christians' affinity with the West made them readier to accept and assimilate western education. Hence the service of the two western universities was more or less concentrated in the Christian sector. This is more true of Universite Saint Joseph where the ratio of Christians in its student body is 85% compared with 55% at The American University of Beirut. Munir Bashshur, "The Role of Two Western Universities in the National Life of Lebanon and the Middle East," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Education, University of Chicago, March 1964), pp. 310-311; and "The Effect of Higher Education on Political Development in Lebanon," op. cit., pp. 7-8.

²"The two universities, which represent respectively a culmination of the two separate systems of foreign education, played a major role in [the educational fragmentation] process. Since one uses French and the other uses English, and since one embodies the Jesuit French and the other Protestant-American philosophy, the elite formation process, as affected by these two universities, became fragmented. The common grounds for mutual understanding and rapport between the graduates of the two universities were largely absent." Bashshur, "The Role of Two Western Universities," p. 311.

³In this respect Bashshur says, "The Catholics by virtue of their training at Universite Saint Joseph might have pushed the country into separatism, Christianity, and closer attachment to France. This would have put Lebanon completely against its Arab neighbors, isolated it, and probably put an end to its independence. The American University of Beirut helps prevents such an outcome by cutting across various religious segments of Lebanese society and bringing with the University Arabs from outside Lebanon." Ibid., p. 317.

In the latter respect AUB's contribution surpasses that of USJ. By virtue of the composition of its student body AUB acted as an integrative¹ and stabilizing force.²

As to the contribution of individual Lebanese intellectuals, some of them, in spite of their diverse backgrounds, did advocate a synthesis between the two divergent political viewpoints. Michel Chiha, Charles Helou and Ghassan Tweini are an example of this group. In the articles published by the first two in the daily Le Jour, particularly during the early period of independence, they tried to theorize the political attitude of the ruling class at the time, particularly that of Bisharah al-Khūri. By so doing they supplied some sort of 'philosophy' or 'ideology' which was effective in winning some Francophile elements to the independence policy. Ghassan Tweini pursued this task in the latter part

¹AUB "keeps the avenue of interaction open among the various segments of the Lebanese population as well as between Lebanon, on the one hand, and the other Arab countries, on the other. .../In this way/ it is acting in the best tradition of Lebanese society as a pluralistic society based on compromise." Ibid., p. 318.

²The stabilizing effect of AUB is due to the fact that it "exercises a major influence in the field of commerce and free enterprise. While contributing to the prosperity of the country AUB, perhaps, prevents a concentration of power in government positions by effectively contributing to the creation of a more fluid power structure of entrepreneurs and businessmen." Ibid., p. 324.

of al-Khūri's regime but he did that in the name of the Lebanese middle class.

On the other hand there were some spokesmen who articulated the political interests of their own sect. Outstanding among these were Muhiyi-al-Din al-Nusuli, of the daily Beirut paper and George Naccache of the daily L'Orient. However, both gradually moved to a compromise position. Later several other journalists and moulders of public opinion followed. This gradual shift attests to the intellectuals' sense of responsibility and their awareness of the political realities of Lebanon.

In this respect the role of the Lebanese 'Cenacle'¹ cannot be overlooked. Lecturers from its forum ranged from one extreme to the other; from Charles Corm and George Naccache to Muhammad Zaki Naccache and Muhiyi-al-Din al-Nusuli. By presenting a forum on which divergent viewpoints were expressed - the Cenacle enhanced the development of a synthetic attitude. It also gave the opportunity to the lecturers to attempt a definition of common Lebanese interests²

¹Founded in 1947.

²In lectures such as "Ta'mir al-Bayt al-Lubnani" (Building the Lebanese Home) by Muhiyi-al-Din al-Nusuli, Salim Haydar, Charles Helou, Muhadarat al-Nadwa (The Lectures of the Cenacle), vol. 1948, pp. 94-107; vol. 1949, pp. 14-34; and vol. 1950, pp. 2-19 respectively; and "al-Muwatin al-Wa'i" (The Enlightened Citizen) by Muhammad Baalbaki, Ibid., vol. 1951, pp. 2-21.

and to promote pride in and respect for Lebanon's history.¹ Addressing an enlightened public also imposed on the lecturers a compromising tone.²

The intellectuals therefore were pace-setters in defining the bases of common understanding. This role in the political sphere however was not as effective. Few intellectuals were coopted³ to serve in the government but their dependence on the politicians who coopted them qualified their impact. However, in certain instances they set a good example for the politicians.⁴

¹Some of these lectures were on Amir Bashir by Fuad Haddad, on Shukri Ghanem by Salim Mubarak, on Gibran by Rushdi Ma'louf, Ibid., Vol. 1948, pp. 64-91, 102-124, and 304-313, respectively.

²In his lecture on Ta'mir al-Bayt al-Lubnani (Building the Lebanese Home) an extremist like al-Nusuli spoke about al-Bayt al-Lubnani as that "bayt (home) which I loved above all." Ibid., Vol. 1948, p. 94.

³Khalaf says, "intellectuals have not been too readily admitted into the ranks of the body politic. When they are, it is normally not on the merit of their intellectual prowess. Rather, when they have been adopted or sponsored by some traditional political figure." "The Growing Pains of Arab Intellectuals," op. cit., p. 70.

⁴Charles Helou resigned from the Ministry of Interior in 1947 because some followers of the Prime Minister were not arrested although they were being sued.

Main Function of the Ruling Class

The main function of the ruling class is to maintain the country together. What the ruling class did in this early period of independence is that it tried to reconcile the conflicting groupings and to reflect their consensus. The government represented the consensus of communities that were not eager to relinquish their confessional claims and securities. Hence the government was in effect an administrative and adjudicative body. Drastic measures to change the Lebanese society were not envisaged at the time.¹ This reconciliation was pursued through two means: a) devising a new formula for governing Lebanon;² b) bridging the gap between the state and the individual.

a. Devising a New Formula

The formula had to answer Lebanon's basic needs. It had to surmount the weak cementing factors in the

¹Malcolm Kerr describes the role of Lebanese governments by saying, "governments are not made to create public policy, nor to choose between clear cut alternatives entailing the triumph of one set of demands over another, but to reflect faithfully and adjust the competing interests of various groups." "Political Decision Making in a Confessional Democracy," Binder (ed.), op. cit., p. 190. Michel Chiha also describes the situation with intuition saying, "politiquement, le Liban n'est pas un pays a coups de tete et a coups d'Etat. C'est un pays que la tradition doit defendre contre la force." Op. cit., p. 236.

²This formula was devised in 1942 before its two major authors, Bishārah al-Khūri and Riyād al-Sulh, were in power. Thus it can be described as a vehicle for these two leaders to attain power.

Lebanese society and the dominance of primordial ties and regulate the relationship among the various groupings and ultimately promote the moulding of a common type.¹

Furthermore, the formula, better known as the National Pact, by formalizing the means of cooperation among the sects, signified the readiness of the Lebanese society for independence.

Bisharah al-Khūri and Riyād al-Sulh and few other politicians² played a major role in the formulation of this Pact. The events of 1943 placed those proponents of 'independence' policy at the helm of the state but it was Bisharah al-Khūri and Riyād al Sulh who dominated the politics of Lebanon during the period 1943-1952.

¹This confirms Mosca's theory of interdependence between formula and social type. For Mosca poses the question, "Does the type create the formula or the formula the type? Mosca answers quite soundly with a theory of interdependence: The type partly creates the formula in that the latter is usually a dogma put forward by some seer or prophet ... in response to certain 'demands' of the given era. Once the formula exists and is accepted, it helps powerfully in moulding the type by formulating maxims and precepts to which individuals more or less necessarily and successfully conform." Arthur Livingston, Introduction to Mosca's The Ruling Class, op. cit., p. xxx.

²Namely Abdul Hamid Karami, Sa'ib Salam, Sabri Hamadeh, Majid Arslan, Henri Pharaon, Habib Abi Shahla, Adel Ussayran, Hamid Frangieh, Camille Sham'un, Salim Taqla, Michel Chiha, and Ahmad al-'Asa'd.

The National Pact

The Pact is a contractual agreement between the two major groups whose political orientation and frames of reference are basically different. This agreement signified the formal recognition by both sides of the existence of common grounds on which they can meet. These grounds encompassed foreign as well as internal matters.

In the foreign sphere, each side, one being pro-western the other pro-Arab, was to forego its political inclinations in the same ratio that the other side would. This signified an acceptance of a new policy by the two contracting groups. A policy that can be summarized as follows:

- a. The Christians discarded the idea of an isolated Lebanon under foreign protection and accepted an independent and sovereign Lebanon within the Arab World.
- b. The Muslims discarded the idea of uniting Lebanon with the rest of the Arab World and abandoned the call for the merger of the disputed districts and/or of Lebanon with Syria.

Internally the National Pact specified the right of the Muslims and of the Christians to share in the government

process. A tacit agreement insured that henceforth the President of the Republic would be a Maronite and the Prime Minister a Sunni. The number of seats in Parliament was divided among the two major groups in the ratio of 6 Christians to 5 Muslims. While this agreement was to safeguard the rights of the various sects, it was also intended to end narrow confessionalism by furnishing the bases of cooperation. This was a major step in Lebanon's development as a political community and a turning point in its history that has sustained Lebanon's unity since 1943.

The National Pact was not a document formally adhered to by the representatives of the two groups. It was in part an oral understanding and in part the substance of Riyād al-Sulh's ministerial statement of 8 November 1943¹ and of Bisharah al-Khūri's speeches that followed.

¹Pertinent parts of Riyād al-Sulh's statement are the following:

"For Lebanon is a nation with an Arab face, that selects what is good and useful in western civilization.
...

"Our brothers in the Arab World do not wish Lebanon to be anything except what her proud sons want her to be. We do not want her to be a foothold for imperialism; they do not want her to be a path leading imperialism to them. We and they, therefore, want her an independent sovereign and free nation." George Dib, "Selections from Riyād al-Sulh's Speech in the Lebanese Assembly", (October 1943), The Middle East Forum, January 1959, p. 7.

Appraisal of the National Pact

Primarily the National Pact was a political formula for governing the country; a formula that regulates the cooperation of the various Lebanese groups. Some critics of the Pact raised it to the level of a doctrine. Others saw in it a transitory negative concept, while some others conceived of it as a viable compromise.

Those who regard the Pact as a doctrine consider it as an event that marks a transition from emotions and prejudices to rationality. A rationality that is guided by the spirit of "avoiding excesses and believing in reason and democracy as the way to the settlement of differences."¹ Furthermore, they hold that the Pact, in spite of its confessional bases, has a secular facet in that it ventured to define the common non-religious grounds on which all Lebanese can meet. This attempt was to establish a national identity in order "to fill the national vacuum in which the state was superimposed after World War I."² Thus the Pact to them is a practical and realistic political formula or rather a

¹Hassan Saab, "The Rationalist School in Lebanese Politics," Binder (ed.), op. cit., p. 278. Saab, however, does not view the National Pact as a doctrine.

²Khalaf, "Primordial Ties and Politics in Lebanon," p. 21.

doctrine based on reason, mutual consent and reciprocal interests.¹

On the other hand, the Pact is bitterly criticized for its negative aspects. Spokesmen of this group insist that the Pact does not designate the positive bases on which a political community can be established. In commenting about the Pact, George Naccache, perhaps the severest critic in the 1940s, says, "Ni Occident, ni Arabisation: c'est sur un double refus que la Chretiente et l'Islam on conclu leur alliance."² The Pact, according to him, has designated an alliance based on what each half of the country refused. "Mais ce que les deux moities veulent en commun, c'est qu'on ne voit pas.." Consequently, "Le Liban qu'on nous a fait est une patrie composee de deux cinquieme colonnes."³

¹A prominent spokesman of this school is Kamal Hajj who elaborated his theory in his book Falsafat al-Mithaq al-Watani (The Philosophy of the National Pact) (Beirut: Matba't al-Rihbaniyah al-Lubnaniyah, 1961), and tried to raise the National Pact to the level of a doctrine based on philosophical foundations. The National Pact, he said, by defining the common grounds on which Muslims and Christians can meet, has supplied the basis of Lebanese nationalism. This basis is the coexistence between the two religious factions. Hence any basic change in the sectarian demography of the country would undermine this distinctive nationalism. In other words sectarianism has been treated as a constructive factor.

²George Naccache, "Deux Negations ne font pas une Nation," L'Orient (Beirut, No. 6691, Mars 10, 1949), p. 1.

³Ibid.

Basically Naccache considers "la folie est d'avoir eleve un compromis a la hauteur d'une doctrine d'Etat - d'avoir traite l'accident comme une chose stable - d'avoir cru, enfin, que deux 'Non' pouvaient, en politique, produire un 'Oui'." In other words, "Le Liban, par peur d'etre simplement ce qu'il est, et a force de ne vouloir etre ni ceci ni cela, s'apperçoit qu'il risque maintenant de n'etre plus rien du tout....."

After this elaborate argument Naccache concludes by saying that "Un etat n'est pas la somme de deux impuissances - et deux negation ne feront jamais une Nation."¹

The third school regards the Pact as a practical political formula that regulates the cooperation of the various Lebanese groups on confessional bases. It is neither a doctrine nor a negative concept. It is a "pragmatic modus operandi"² that immobilized religious differences in the hope of avoiding "the emotional confessional upsurges associated with them."³ In fact the Pact did not signify an abandonment of the confessional bases of the state; it rather meant their consecration. But this consecration was accompanied

¹Ibid.

²Khalaf, "Primordial Ties and Politics in Lebanon," p. 21.

³Ibid.

by subjecting confessionalism to reason.¹ On this basis the Pact can be considered "a cross breed of rational and traditional elements."²

The persistence of confessionalism, in spite of the remarkable achievements of the Pact, i.e. its subjection of emotion to reason, is due to the fact that loyalty to one's religious group is too deeply entrenched among the Lebanese. Neither the architects of the Pact nor the core of political leaders behind them could disregard their confessional loyalties and that of their followers.

In spite of its traditional traits, the Pact is considered by this group as a step towards the development of a political community in Lebanon but a community that is based more on stability and equilibrium than on unity and homogeneity. For through the immobilization of religious differences and the safeguarding of the interests of religious

¹In this vein Muhammad Yakan says, "Thus, by calling for Lebanon's separate, sovereign, and independent existence, the Covenant laid the foundations for an indivisible, integrated and an independent homeland. But, by calling for equitable representation of communities in public offices, it consecrated the division of the Lebanese society into diverse communities and consecrated the voluntary and equal association of Christians and Muslims in the state." "Problems of Political Community and Ministerial Programs in Lebanon, 1943-1964", op. cit., p. 5.

²Khalaf, "Primordial Ties and Politics in Lebanon," p. 21.

groups, there was a regulation of the political interplay of those groups. The Pact promoted a sort of political balance and "guaranteed a semblance of democracy and freedom of expression."¹

The Pact as a working formula

While the Pact furnished the basic grounds for political cooperation,² it has however produced only a fragile unity. All parties spoke of a Lebanese nation and of cooperation and equality among the sects, but each imputed a different meaning to its words. A good number of the two

¹Ibid.

²Kamal Salibi describes the consequences of implementing the Pact as follows: "Lebanon developed firm relations with the neighbouring Arab States, pan-Arab unity ceased to be a serious issue among the Moslems. Arab nationalism remained important; the Lebanese Government, however, found no difficulty in coming to terms with it by adopting a mildly Arab nationalist regional policy. Meanwhile significant and necessary concessions were made to the Lebanese Moslems. In the various offices of government such Sunnites and Shi'ites as were qualified received appointment reducing the disproportionate number of Christians in public service. The Army Command and the Directorate-General of Security, key positions where the safety of Lebanon was concerned, were by agreement reserved for Christians; otherwise no one was barred from appointment to public office for confessional reasons. Lebanon's Moslems, for the moment at least, appeared to be generally contented. With an effective leader in the person of Riyād al-Sulh heading the government, they felt confident that their interests would receive adequate attention and that no policy would be formulated without their approval." The Modern History of Lebanon, p. 192.

contracting religious groups, Christians and Muslims, interpreted the Pact as a formalization each of his own original viewpoint. For some Maronites Lebanon was still essentially a Maronite national home; for some other Christians Lebanon was either a Christian refuge or as conceived by some educated Greek Orthodox leaders a secular state.¹ To many Muslims Lebanon remained an expedient to be tolerated until a better Arab arrangement is secured. These concepts expressed themselves in different nationalist movements with "Lebanese", "Syrian" or "Arab" leaning. Behind these movements lie the religious loyalties which continued to be the fundamental reality in Lebanon.² The politicians, however, almost all, paid verbal respect to the Pact.

Thus it was evident that the Pact has furnished a contractual unity, a balance of power, not a national identity or integration per se. The issue of national identity was deliberately avoided.

In this doctrinal vacuum politicians in power interpreted the Pact as a means to share in the pie. And to a large extent they manipulated the political system to their personal advantage, thus permitting the centrifugal

¹As conceived by the Syrian Popular Party and the Ba'th Party whose founders are both Greek Orthodox.

²Hourani, "Lebanon: The Development of a Political Community," Binder (ed.), op. cit., p. 28.

forces to endure. This lack of a national loyalty shows the lack of civility in the Lebanese society. "The Lebanese society revolves around an empty center," and as long as it does Lebanese politics shall lack a core.¹

However the National Pact, by laying the bases of cooperation among the sects, has presented an opportunity for the development of a political community and of national political leadership.

b. Bridging the Gap Between the Individual and the State

Bridging the gap between the state and the individual has been the other major factor through which the ruling class has promoted integration. This task being the basis of the politicians' political prominence was handled primarily by them. The religious leaders also participate in it by virtue of the services they render to their followings.

Arnold Hottinger treats the role of the Lebanese politician, to whom he refers as the za'im, in this respect very aptly.² He defines the Lebanese politician or za'im as "a political leader who possesses the support of a locally

¹Edward Shils, "The Prospect for Lebanese Civility," Binder (ed.), op. cit., p. 2.

²Arnold Hottinger, "Zu'ama' in Historical Perspective," Binder (ed.), op. cit., pp. 85-105.

circumscribed community and who retains this support by fostering or appearing to foster the interests of as many as possible from amongst his clientele."¹ The za'im is therefore basically a dispenser of benefits. Several factors have determined his role as such. The most important are: a) the individual's inability to obtain his rights directly from the government and b) his economic dependence on the za'im. The main function of the za'im therefore is to act as a link between his client on one hand and the government and other sources of benefits on the other in order to safeguard the two services. The necessity of the two services, particularly the first, makes the za'im indispensable for the individual who has "little direct means of communication with a government viewed by many as alien, if not inimical,"² Through him favors and rights are channeled from the government. These are usually intervening on behalf of his clients in the bureaucratic and judicial processes and for securing jobs for the unemployed. The economic factor is of primary importance in the continuation of this pattern of relationship. The unskilled client needs a political protector to earn a living. Thus political loyalty is traded for economic

¹Ibid., p. 85.

²Ibid., p. 91.

advantages. Clients give their loyalty in return for favors dispensed and/or in anticipation of future ones.

These services are usually reserved for members of the leaders' sect or province. The political leader is usually from the same religious community as his client group. He is expected to be his sect's spokesman and defender of its interests. Sectarian interests, however, are not completely predominant. Many a leader needs and enjoys the loyalty of clients from sects other than his own. Several other factors converge to temper the leaders' attitude in this respect. Outstanding among these are: the existence of rival leaderships within each confession, which often compete for the loyalty of sects other than their own; the interconfessional electoral slate; and interdependence in Parliament.

The za'im, however, is not useful only to his clients whether members of his sect or province, but to the government as well. For the government the za'im is necessary because he serves as the link through which the government reaches the people and obtain commitments from them via his person. The za'im also acts as a political stabilizer through adjudicating and reconciling tribal and communal conflicts thus minimizing social and political conflict among the citizens.

In general the za'im can be described as an accomplished politician rather than a national statesman,¹ but his role in promoting integration was immense.

The ruling class, therefore, particularly the politicians, the businessmen, the top administrators and the intellectuals, have contributed to the development of a political community. The major contribution however was that of the politicians. It was they primarily who devised the National Pact which became the bases of the development process; and they also bridged the gap between the individual and the state through acting as a link between the two. In the two endeavors, particularly in the first, the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister supplied the leadership.

¹Mosca makes the following distinction between the politician and the statesman: "the former being the man who is skilled in the mere art of obtaining power and holding it, whereas the latter is the man who knows how to manipulate the blind instincts of the human masses in the direction of conformity with the laws of man's social nature." Introduction by Arthur Livingston, op. cit., p. xxii.

CHAPTER IV

PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE PROBLEM OF NATION-BUILDING

"The regime was my regime. I was neither accustomed to deny my duties nor to refrain from them. The Presidency was mine in its scarce honey and its abundant bitterness."¹

Role of the President

The Presidency is the focus of Lebanese politics.² Its basic task is the preservation and development of national integration. This task is of particular importance in a pluralistic polity plagued by acute centrifugal tendencies. In 1943, however, the immediate concern of the Lebanese Presidency was securing and safeguarding national independence. National integration was not at the time an end in itself but a necessary means for consolidating national independence.

¹Bisharah al-Khūri, Haqa'iq Lubnaniyyah (Lebanese Truths) (Beirut: Manshurāt 'Awraq Lubnaniyyah, 1961), III, p. 483.

²Hani Bazzi, "The Lebanese Executive, 1943-1963" (unpublished Master's thesis, Department of Political Studies and Public Administration, American University of Beirut, 1964). For its historical background see Nafhat Nasr, "The Presidency of Lebanon, 1585-1943" (unpublished Master's thesis, Department of Political Studies and Public Administration, American University of Beirut, 1961).

Integration was to start at the "essential point of holding the country's normal and superlative disunity under control."¹ The withdrawal of the French as the force that held the country together imposed on Bisharah al-Khūri the task of directing "Lebanon's suspicions and rivalries away from utter self-contradiction," and bringing about unity among sects "warped by old memories and emotions into habitual non-cooperation."² He also had to develop the framework of an independent state. The Constitution had to be amended, the administration to be expanded and the army to be built.

Before an analysis of al-Khūri's method in promoting a political community is attempted, a brief review of the President's powers will be enlightening.

Powers and Privileges of the President

The legacy of the French Mandate helped al-Khūri to consolidate his presidential powers. The Constitution of 1926 has assigned sweeping power to the President.³ In

¹George Britt, "Lebanon's Popular Revolution," The Middle East Journal (VII, No. 1, 1953), p. 1.

²Ibid., pp. 1 & 2.

³The French felt that a strong presidency is the best means for controlling the state. Through controlling the selection of the President they were assured of state control.

1943 the powers of the French High Commissioner devolved on the President, in addition to those assigned by the Constitution. These combined made the President "one of the most powerful chief executives in any parliamentary democracy."¹

The main constitutional powers are: a) appointing and dismissing the Prime Minister and the cabinet (Art. 53); b) dissolving the Parliament (Art. 55); c) promulgating "urgent" and "double urgent" legislation by decree (Art. 58); and e) vetoing bills (Art. 27).

The above powers² allowed the President to play a major role in Lebanese politics. However, peculiarities of the Lebanese political system enhanced the position of the executive further and made his role more overwhelming.

Such peculiarities as the ideological vacuum, the virtual absence of political parties, the pervasiveness of sectarianism and the lack of unity among the feudal

¹C.G. Hess & H.L. Bodman, "Confessionalism and Feudality in Lebanese Politics", The Middle East Journal (VIII, No. 1, 1954), p. 23.

²See Kerr, op. cit., pp. 203-209 for more details about the President's powers.

political leaders, the weakness of the Parliament,¹ and the dependence of the cabinet² enhanced the power of the President. The President's constitutional power to dissolve the Parliament, together with his influence over parliamentary elections made the Parliament a tool of the President rather than a check on his power. The weak Parliament produced an equally weak cabinet subservient to the President. The President usually saw to it that the Parliament never withheld confidence from a cabinet that enjoyed his confidence. He dismissed a Prime Minister or put pressure on him to resign whenever he wished. Thus the Parliament and cabinet became in practice subordinate

¹For causes of parliamentary weakness see Ralph Crow, "The Legislative Role of Parliament in the Lebanese Political System," (December, 1967), pp. 27-30 (Mimeographed); Charles Rizq, Le Regime Politique Libanais (Published Ph.D. dissertation, Faculte de Droit et des Sciences Economiques, Universite de Paris, 1964), pp. 29-33, 142-146. For a general appraisal of Parliament's role see Crow, op. cit.; and Samia Bikhazi, "The Lebanese Chamber of Deputies" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of Political Studies and Public Administration, American University of Beirut, Beirut, 1962). See also Munir Sa'adeh, "The Fifth Legislative Assembly 1943-1944" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of Political Studies and Public Administration, American University of Beirut, Beirut, 1945).

²Elie Salem, "Cabinet Politics," The Middle East Journal (Autumn 1967), pp. 488-489. Rizq, op. cit., pp. 157-161; Isam Na'man, "The Office of Prime Minister in Lebanon" (unpublished M.A. Thesis, Department of Political Studies and Public Administration, American University of Beirut, Beirut, 1965), pp. 23-45, 69-85.

to the President although in theory both President and cabinet are responsible to the Parliament.

The President as nation-builder

An examination of al-Khūri's role as nation builder reveals that the accomplished politician coexisted with the statesman. He worked earnestly for developing consensus on certain basic Lebanese issues, at the same time he pursued his work as a politician interested in perpetuating his power.

In pursuing both the public and the personal goals, al-Khūri resorted to two means: a) distribution of the rod of power, b) direct contact with the people.

a. Distribution of rod of power

This was used as means to satisfy the strong feudal-tribal and sectarian groups in the Lebanese society. The primary tools for this distribution were the Parliament and the Cabinet. A secondary tool was the expansion of the Administration to recruit the maximum number of Lebanese aspirants to public office.

The Parliament and the Cabinet

The President's main instruments in the distribution of the rod of power are the Parliament and

the Cabinet. Together they serve three purposes. They are an instrument of national consensus;¹ a means for providing the President with political power and a protective buffer for the President.

As an instrument of national consensus the Parliament and the Cabinet are the means through which the various sects are represented. With Lebanon's policy based on confessionalism the participation of religious groups, other than that of the President, gives the President's policy a national character.

On the executive level the Sunni Prime Minister represents the Sunni Muslims. Other sects - Shi'ah, Druze, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics and others - are represented by ministers. Thus the importance of the ministers and the Prime Minister, in particular, extends beyond their formal capacity as ministers to that of representing their religious groups. Relationship between the President and the Prime Minister is

¹For Parliament in this role see Crow, "The Legislative Role of Parliament in the Lebanese Political System", pp. 30-31; Kerr, op. cit., pp. 200-203; for cabinet, Salem, "Cabinet Politics", op. cit., pp. 489, 491; "Administration", op. cit., pp. 5-6; and Kerr, op. cit., pp. 192-200. For both Parliament and Cabinet see Pierre Rondot, "The Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy", Binder (ed.), op. cit., pp. 132-134.

to be preceded by consultations. These consultations however are a mere formal procedure.¹ Deadlock and rivalry among the politicians and particularly among the candidates for the Premiership² contribute further to the President's freedom of action.³

Dismissing a cabinet called for nothing more than to wait for the accumulation of rivalries to undermine the government in power. But the President often accelerated the process whenever he felt it necessary. His reasons usually are: a) to broaden the base of his support through inviting new faces to govern, b) to get rid of a bothersome cabinet. A cabinet with conflicts becomes a source of annoyance to the President. Rarely does he mitigate cabinet change because of parliamentary pressure.

¹These consultations usually include all members of Parliament and some political and religious leaders outside the formal structure. The deputies take various attitudes. Some name a Premier, others oppose a certain candidate, while some others leave the decision to the President. Salem, "Cabinet Politics", op. cit., p. 492.

²President al-Khūri states in his memoirs that in the cabinet consultation in 1946 the seven Sunni personalities consulted each suggested himself for the Premiership. Op. cit., II, p. 237.

³This freedom however is limited by pressure from members of his family, the Maronite Patriarch, the Sunni Mufti, the National Front and other effective centers of power. al-Khūri, ibid., p. 124.

The duration of the cabinet term, however, does not depend only on the President's will. Informally it is affected by political forces and developments in Lebanon and in the Arab World.

Another reason behind al-Khūri's ability to manipulate politicians was that he was generous in rewarding them. As a popular leader himself he was aware of the demands of patronage. He knew the secrets of the Lebanese political system - he understood that each politician had clients to serve and debts to repay. This was an asset during the early period of his regime, but became a liability later as this policy of distributing favors to clients led to corruption.

The expansion of the administrative apparatus¹ was another means for strengthening the President's position and hastening the process of centralization and national integration. His control over administration strengthened his bargaining power vis-a-vis the local power centers and promoted his role as a focal point in Lebanese politics.²

¹Total government expenditure rose from LL 12,504,500 in 1942 to LL 89,450,000 in 1951. Grassmuck and Salibi, op. cit., p. 16. This increase was mainly to cover salaries.

²"The president exercises directly and through his staff considerable influence over the administration. Often a call from the presidential residence can affect policy, speed a transaction, delay or arrest it as the situation may be." Salem, "Administration", op. cit., p. 3.

The expansion of administration, the manipulation of the politicians as well as dispensing benefits to them enabled the President to create a presidential party loyal to him personally.¹ This party played a major role in promoting integration in the absence of political orientation towards the Lebanese state. Lebanon at the time was an uneasy federation of semi-independent notables; and satisfying these traditional chiefs was imperative for securing Lebanon's viability.

b. Direct Contact with People

Another means used by Bisharah al-Khūri for building national integration was the establishment of a direct connection with the various Lebanese groups.² This necessitated by-passing the local leaders and establishing a direct relationship with the Lebanese population.³

¹Michel Abou Jawdeh analyses with intuition presidential parties in Lebanon - their structure, role and fate after expiration of the President's term. See "Hizbiyat al-Rou'asa'", (The Presidential Parties), al-Nahar (No. 9973, May 12, 1968).

²This he did in several ways, most important of which is that he tried to appeal directly to the various groups. Often he quoted verses from the Gospel and the Kor'an in the same speech. al-Khūri, op. cit., III, p. 386.

³This was the primary motivation in the tour he made in the Lebanese districts in 1945. The reasons he cites for the tour are that he wanted to be directly acquainted with the Lebanese people and their needs without middle men; and to convey to them the message of the new regime (i.e. independence and National Pact), a message that he admits was not understood by some Lebanese due to the pressure of time. The tour was very effective particularly as it covered districts never visited by a ruler before. Ibid., II, p. 160.

al-Khūri was successful in establishing this relationship, although he did not possess all the attributes of a charismatic leader. Short in stature and not very impressive in appearance, he had however keen intelligence, a sharp memory of names and faces and an unequalled understanding of the average Lebanese. This gave him a commanding presence among those who knew him well. He was also capable of impressing his listeners.

His method in addressing people was effective; he addressed them in a simple and direct manner, often identifying himself with them.¹ He also maintained an equilibrium in outlook in dealing with the two major sects² expressing thanks and appreciation to both equally. Through this direct relationship, established in the tour he made to Lebanese districts in 1945 and on other occasions, he tried to explain national unity to the Lebanese. This national unity however was cooperation between the

¹In a speech in Kisrwan al-Khūri said, "I am like you, a son of the village. I have studied under the church oak tree, lifted the 'kayme', participated in the 'tarbi'' of the church bell (two Lebanese traditions). How could I then risk those memories and disown the Lebanese traditions." Few days later he addressed people in the Grand Mosque in Beirut and stressed the importance of the Palestine problem. Ibid., III, pp. 112, 113 respectively.

²Bisharah al-Khūri, Majmou'at Khotab (A Collection of Speeches) (Harissa, Lebanon: al-Matba'ah al-Boulsiyeh, 1951), p. 119.

two major factions. Aware of the centrifugal forces in the Lebanese society, he stressed the attainment of a "unity of ranks (tawhid al-sufuf) between the two groups of the nation and the maintenance of an equilibrium."¹

His concept of national unity therefore acknowledged sectarian and feudal influences, but he used the sectarian base as an avenue for the elaboration of the greater concept of Lebanon - the nation. He did that by addressing each community in the language it understood in order to promote its confidence in the regime. To the Christians he spoke in terms that would abate their fears of Arab unity;² to the Muslims he emphasized Lebanon's role in the Arab World and the Palestine problem³ to invoke their allegiance.

At the same time he tried to reconcile the differences by trying to impart to one religious group the fears and

¹al-Khūri, Lebanese Truths, II, p. 118.

²When he spoke in a Maronite village he addressed the people primarily as Maronites. In Bsharri he tried to appease those who were concerned about Lebanon's independence. Also in an attempt to appease the Maronites al-Khūri admits that he attached great importance to the recognition of the Papal See to the independence of Lebanon (which was achieved April 18, 1946). He also gave due importance to the satisfaction of Muslim elements.

³Such occasions were his speeches in Sunni strongholds such as Tripoli and on the occasions of the Prophet's birthday.

reservations of the other group in an attempt to create common understanding. In this vein he addressed the inhabitants of Tripoli saying, "there is a Christian faction that looks upon this cooperation (i.e. cooperation with the Arab countries) as a future threat, and it is divided into two groups. The first is made up of people who are genuinely afraid, and whose dread must be remedied. These, however, have started to sense the benefits of the new regime, and they have our respect - with them we can cooperate in working for the nation's well-being. The other group, which, I hope is small, and in which intrigue is active, has tried to exude its venom and we find it impossible to come to an understanding with it unless God directs them to the right path."¹

al-Khūri also tried to contain the political influence of the various sects. He "discouraged Sunni-Shi'ah political cooperation believing that the establishment of an all-Muslim bloc would be a menace to the (equilibrium of the) Lebanese state."²

Efforts were also made to win the support of the feudal lords. Recognizing their influence al-Khūri tried

¹al-Khūri, Collection of Speeches, p. 28.

²al-Riyashi, Before and After, p. 158.

to appease them. Thus he spoke of them as a necessary auxiliary in the Lebanese political system. In Sidon he called for collaboration among the zu'ana 'the effective weapons' (siham masnunah) for the independence movement.¹ In Taibeh where Ahmad al-'Asa'd was the host, he addressed the public saying, "I recommend to those present to refrain from the error that the Christians had committed by doing away with za'amah."² In Ba'lбак he recommended retaining the 'honorable families'.³

The above approach by al-Khūri shows an understanding of the political realities of Lebanon. This understanding enabled him to manipulate men and situations for promoting common feelings among the Lebanese. He also contributed immensely to the promotion of integration through introducing slogans, symbols and myths. Towards this end al-Khūri repeated many new expressions which became later popular slogans. Some of these were: national unity, brotherhood among the Lebanese, justice and equality among members of the various sects, neutrality in foreign affairs and the like. He also tried to build respect for certain symbols

¹al-Khuri, Lebanese Truths, II, p. 171.

²Ibid., p. 173 and A Collection of Speeches, p. 70.

³Ibid., p. 104.

such as Independence Day, the Lebanese Flag, the Martyrs Day.¹

Furthermore he tried to impart to his listeners a basic political code. This he did through stressing faith in Lebanon² and that independence is inseparable from the internal unity of the Lebanese.³

al-Khūri dramatized the struggle of the Lebanese even exaggerating the sufferings of the government in exile, the unity of the people and their strife in the face of French forces.⁴ He did that intentionally to

¹Salem, "al-Inma' al-Siyasi" (The Political Development), al-Mafahim al-Hadithah Lil-Inma' Fi Lubnan (The Modern Concepts of Development in Lebanon) (Beirut: Manshurat Nadwat al-Dirasat al-Inma'iyah, 1966), p. 55.

²The following is an example of the oaths he repeated: "On this historic day, we joyfully renew our faith in Lebanon. We believe in Him who created it in an image of everlasting beauty. We believe in its sky, its earth, its waters, in its rocks, its snows and its cedars. We believe in its beauty, but above all we believe in its men, at home and abroad. We believe that God's hand is guiding Lebanon in carrying out its historic mission - a mission of learning and culture, a mission of peace, of endeavor, nationalism and sacrifice." al-Khuri, A Collection of Speeches, p. 142.

³The independence regime he repeated saying was a miracle that changed the attitude of the representative of both sects. The Maronite President has become more concerned about Muslim affairs than the Sunni Prime Minister and vice-versa. Obviously he pointed out to the disruptive effects of partisanship and sectarianism on the desired unity. Ibid., pp. 28, 125, 127.

⁴An example of al-Khūri's statements to the Lebanese in this respect is the following: "The agonies and tribulations you have borne, and that you have endured along with your President have now been transformed into actual realities and bright prospects." Ibid., p. 133.

develop the type of political mythology that is essential for nations on the eve of independence and to popularize responsibility towards independence and diffuse the spirit of achievement.

He also transformed religious festivals into national occasions by introducing new practices and rituals. The iftar dinners during Ramadan are cases in point. The participation of one sect in the festivals of another were to symbolize the spirit of unity that he wanted to pervade the new and independent Lebanon.

In celebrating the President's election day (21 September),¹ he sought to provide another political denominator of national import and beyond sectarian reproach.

To deepen Lebanon's independence al-Khūri related it to the past by bringing into Lebanon the remains of

¹In a country like Lebanon where the governor enjoys great personal respect the emphasis President al-Khūri put on his role as a symbol is in order. The President's role as a symbol gained ground gradually, for as he rightly admitted in his address in Tripoli in October 1945 "the greatest proof of that is what we have seen in this town, which did not applaud or acclaim a President other than this one in whom it sees a symbol of an independent Arab Lebanese Republic." Ibid., p. 26.

For analysis of loyalty and respect enjoyed by political leaders in the Middle East, see Haig Khatchadourian, "The Face and the Mask", The Middle East Forum (XXXVII, No. 2, 1961), pp. 15-18.

Amir Bashir II from Turkey with the requisite plumb and by restoring the great monuments of the Lebanese past such as the Beit-al-Din Palace. He also encouraged folklore and introduced it in official dinners.

Realizing that a modern nation must reduce the barriers between its classes and regions he attempted to do so by initiating new socio-economic projects in the relatively underdeveloped rural sections and promised greater effort for their development through tourism and other economic devices. In this vein he said, "it is not permissible, under any circumstances to limit the benefits to the cities alone. The peasant should also be taken care of and provided with all living and work facilities in his village. If we accomplish this we would have given him his right to live for he is the most worthy and has the greatest right to the fruits of his labors... [For] the people of the provinces have the same consideration and regard [that urban people enjoy] from us."¹

He also addressed himself to the improvement of educational standards of the various confessions and localities. The spread of education, he said, would

¹al-Khuri, A Collection of Speeches, p. 37.

permit the underprivileged sects to participate more fully in the affairs of the government and would put an end to religious fanaticism.¹ Proper education, he believed, was the surest means to this integration because "reforming the spirit and the mind and preparing the individual for the sacrifices which are incumbent on him for the benefit of the whole is more important than reforming decrees and statements."² Young Lebanese, he thought, should be brought up to know that "their history was great and beautiful in as much as they understood and loved each other, and that throughout history they have made their happiness or their misfortune; and there is nothing to protect them except their will to live together, a will that springs from mutual respect for the religious doctrines and the freedoms that are dear to them."³

al-Khūri also stressed economic sufficiency as basis for political independence. The "consolidation of internal independence he said is contingent on

¹Ibid., pp. 29, 46.

²Ibid., p. 105.

³Ibid., p. 240.

two factors: economic independence and prosperity in rural areas before the urban."¹

He also expressed a new interest in attracting the Lebanese emigrants back to Lebanon. He gave official dinners in their honor and called on them to help Lebanon in its economy.

From the above analysis it is evident that al-Khūri's contribution to the promotion of integration was immense. Through his maintenance of the national order - i.e. preserving a political balance of power between leading groups and personalities - and his initiation of new slogans and traditions he laid the foundations of this vital process. His establishment of the atmosphere conducive to integration greatly enhanced Lebanon's opportunity to develop the common belief system it so badly needs.

¹Ibid., p. 72.

CHAPTER V

THE POLITICS OF PREMIERSHIP

The role of the premiership in Lebanon is different from that in other countries. The Prime Minister is not important as a political figure only but as a representative of the Sunni community. As created by the Constitution of 1926 the position was limited in power and importance. In 1937 the practice of the Sunni Prime Minister bestowed a new importance on the position, but this did not signify a change in the attitude of the majority of the Sunnis.

After independence the Sunnis accepted participation in running the government and began to regard the Prime Minister as their representative in government and as partner of the President in ruling the country. The Premiership became a symbol of consensus and an effective means of integration. This change in the role of the premiership was fundamental for the viability of the independence regime.

However, the Prime Minister is more limited in his nation-building capacity than the President because he depends on the President for his tenure in office. The average duration of a cabinet is less than a year, while the President is assured of a six-year tenure. The Prime Minister must

cater to the President and to Parliament to keep his post and must submit in all major policy issues to the President who actually presides over the cabinet when important matters are being discussed.¹

The fact that there are no less than a dozen Sunni leaders who are potential prime ministers has weakened the Prime Minister and permitted the President to dominate the politics of Premiership. Rivalry, arising from personal ambition rather than from ideological differences, led to a disorganized competition among the leading Sunni personalities. This disorganization was evident in their occasional change of their political platforms. The political platform depended on whether the incumbent is a Prime Minister at the time or not. Whenever the Sunni notable was a Prime Minister he pursued a positive policy complying with the wishes of the President whose favor he needed; whenever he was out of government he pursued a negative policy advocating extreme political stands and criticizing even certain measures he may have taken while he was previously a Prime Minister. This he did to strengthen himself within his community and through it to enhance his bargaining power vis-a-vis the President.

To strengthen his position the Prime Minister often assumes the post of Minister of Interior or of Finance. The

¹See Salem, "Cabinet Politics"; op. cit., p. 489.

extensive powers of these ministries allow him to increase his influence.¹ His influence is also multiplied by his association with the President. As a symbol of the Sunni cooperation he receives special deference from the President which gives him more influence than is specifically enumerated in the Constitution.

The Premiership contributes to integration on two levels.

a. As a Tempering Force Within the Sunni Community

The primary contribution of the Premiership to integration is that it acts as a tempering force on the Sunni's political viewpoints and attitudes. Its official position forces it to take a moderate attitude in presenting the community's interests. Extreme viewpoints within the community are often used as means of pressure on the President but they were never adopted

¹This, however, remains short of satisfying the spokesmen of the Sunni community including some Prime Ministers. There were repeated demands by Abdul-Hamid Karami in 1945, by Abdullah al-Yafi in 1951 and by Sami al-Sulh in 1952 that the Constitution be amended for the redistribution of power in a more equitable manner. Resentment is also evident in many statements made by Sunni spokesmen. Sami al-Sulh states in his memoirs that the Prime Minister and the cabinet are mere instruments in the hands of the President for public show. The Prime Minister must submit to the President and his entourage and the cabinet decisions are taken only through direct or indirect command of the President, who is the 'actual ruler'. Sami al-Sulh, Muthakarāt Sami Beg al-Sulh (Memoirs of Sami Bey al-Sulh) (Beirut: Maktabat al-Fikr al-'Arabi, 1960), pp. 311, 317 & 320.

as official policy by Prime Ministers. In doing this the Premiership disseminates the necessity for and the advantages of cooperation with the Christians.

b. As a Pressure Force in the Government

Secondly, the Premiership, being representative of the Sunni sect, acts as a pressure force in the government. In the Lebanese political process the President-Prime Minister relationship functions as a system of checks and balances; each of the two representing his community's viewpoint but the necessity of cooperation makes it impossible for any one sect's viewpoint to prevail. Furthermore, the need to cooperate with a Sunni Prime Minister with influence within his sect guards the President against adopting a policy that is not acceptable to the Muslims.¹ Cooperation meant interdependence; and interdependence dictated decisions based on compromise. Thus the Premiership contributes to integration through acting as a check on possible Christian extreme attitudes.

Through its double role as a pacifying factor within

¹The Presidents in general and Bisharah al-Khūri in particular took into consideration the Prime Minister's obligations to his community. The only exception was Camille Sham'un's pro-western policy which his Prime Minister Sami al-Sulh accepted at the time but which led to his rejection by his community and rebellion.

the Sunni community and as a pressure force in the government, the Premiership was instrumental in obtaining popular Sunni approval for the Lebanese state and government. This approval signified by participation in government made the solution of certain sensitive issues¹ possible.

In addition to the Prime Minister's efforts other factors promoted a cooperative disposition among the Sunni. The Sunni were becoming gradually aware of the privileged status their community has gained in Lebanon. They posed as the spokesmen of the Muslim group which amounts to about half the population, while they (the Sunni) are only about 18% of the Lebanese population.² As such they came to enjoy a role greater than their numerical ratio.

The personal bases of political leadership within the Sunni sect also facilitated their cooperation. While the personal basis of leadership is true of other sects in Lebanon, it is particularly strong among the Sunni.

¹Lebanon's disengagement from the various Arab unitary schemes; the ending of the customs partnership and economic unity with Syria are examples of the issues that have been resolved.

²According to the statistics published in 1956, see Crow, "The Legislative Role of Parliament in the Lebanese Political System", op. cit., p. 4.

The economic dependence of the majority of the Sunni on their leaders rendered the individual dependent on his leader; and this dependence allowed the leader to exercise flexibility in his relations with the President and permitted him to compromise, within a certain framework, without losing face.

Sunni contribution to integration stems also from their urban background. Although city dwellers continued to think of themselves, perhaps more strongly than villagers, as members of a religious community, daily contact with members of other sects at the economic and social levels was unavoidable. This contact together with the growth of the educated middle class promoted a feeling of interdependence and encouraged political cooperation.¹

These factors facilitated the Premiership's promotion of integration, but much was left to be achieved. The Premiership remained basically a symbol of Sunni cooperation necessary for the viability of the polarized body politic.²

¹Hourani, "Lebanon: The Development of a Political Society," Binder (ed.), op. cit., p. 27.

²The reluctance of leading Sunni figures to assume the Premiership became a vote of non-confidence in the government and even in the Lebanese state by the Sunni

Relationship between Bisharah al-Khūri and Riyād al-Sulh

The relationship between al-Khūri and al-Sulh was a unique partnership in the history of Lebanon. It was the first time that representatives of the two major sects in Lebanon, who were "approximate equals in terms of skill and prestige",¹ agreed on certain political principles that could serve as basis for national consensus.

Riyad al-Sulh was the most outstanding Sunni personality at the time. He represented the Muslims viewpoint and was able to influence it. He imposed himself as the obvious Prime Minister. Thus he hardly needed to draw the President's attention or to obtain his favor. Furthermore he had nation-wide influence.

His success in imparting his views was determined primarily by his personal characteristics. He was tactful,²

community. Denial of confidence by almost half the population lead either to the break-up of the regime or to internal trouble. The first alternative happened in 1952 when Bisharah al-Khūri failed to form a cabinet and had to resign consequently; the second in 1958.

¹Kerr, op. cit., p. 205.

²He rarely failed to thank a critic before he answered back. His answers were usually a reinterpretation of the critic's attack in milder tones and repeated that he accepted criticism but did not fear it. Minutes of the Lebanese Parliament, Vol. 1946-47, pp. 214 & 229; Vol. 1947-48, pp. 77, 79, 639, 935; Vol. 1948-49, pp. 26, 68.

His tact was also evident in his statement that independence was not an act of defiance against France and in his

charming and courageous. His courage was evident in his willingness to assume full responsibility for what he did and what the President of the Republic, the ministers or government officials, did or were accused of doing.¹ This assumption of full responsibility enhanced his role and made him, to a certain extent, a focus of Lebanese politics.²

Another characteristic of his method was witty frankness³ which confounded friends and foes.

Furthermore he enjoyed a keen political sense and was a statesman with deep insight into Lebanese problems.

praise of some Frenchmen like Catroux. Vol. 1943-44, pp. 69; and 68, 78 respectively.

He even called on the Opposition saying, "it is incumbent upon the Opposition, with its members who enjoy a high status and respectable positions, to say what it wishes and ask for what it desires." Vol. 1947-48, p. 197.

Whenever his integrity was in question he attacked back bitterly with sarcasm.

¹For his defense of Ministers and government employees see Ibid., Vol. 1946-47, pp. 297-298; Vol. 1947-48, pp. 283, 337, 340, 399; Vol. 1949-50, p. 55.

²Other Prime Ministers failed to fill this role. al-Sulh was successful in this respect because of his own popularity and of his maintenance of good relations with the President.

³An example of such statements is the following: speaking in December 1943 he said, "they have talked about my Lebanism as the product of six weeks. But these six weeks have been rife with the greatest events in the history of Lebanon." Ibid., Vol. 1943-44, p. 68.

He cooperated in the service of the state even when out of office¹ and showed only a polite reserved dissatisfaction.² At the same time he enjoyed great prestige and had a decisive role in appointing and dismissing cabinets and in the designation of the other Premier.³

These characteristics gave him an uncontested popularity and respect in Lebanon and in the Arab World. Before al-Khūri's election to the Presidency they worked together for the achievement of independence and agreed on the National Pact. After the election al-Sulh was named the first Prime Minister. Cooperation between the two was necessary for the realization of their hopes.

Riyād al-Sulh's political attitude represents a synthesis in Lebanese politics. The following statement by him represents his disposition in this respect - "my opinion and that of my brethren was to build together a spiritual structure which would include all people, and that was my plan. I have said and still say that I shall work as long as I live

¹He accepted membership in the delegation headed by Hamid Frangieh, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, to negotiate evacuation in 1946. Also he accepted Ministry without portfolio in proposed cabinet in May 1946. al-Khūri, Lebanese Truths, II, pp. 209, 240 respectively.

²Ibid., II, p. 149.

³Ibid., III, p. 338.

towards making Lebanon a spiritual home for all the Lebanese, and all others so that its emigrant can feel about it what its resident feels."¹

Charles Malik described this disposition of al-Sulh by saying, "the ultimate conclusion that Riyād al-Sulh arrived at in his positive political thinking was that the prerequisite for the contemporary Lebanese concept is the adoption of the Arab concept - and the operative prerequisite for the Arab concept in Lebanon is the adoption of the Lebanese concept truly, faithfully and without reservation... [And] Riyād al-Sulh brought his idea into being in Lebanon shaping it to suit the demands of the time and the place."²

Another aspect of al-Sulh's synthetic attitude is his maintenance of good relations with the Christian President³

¹Minutes of the Lebanese Parliament, Vol. 1947-48, p.908.

²Charles Malik, "In the Memorial held on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the death of the leader Riyād al-Sulh", Al-Jarida, 18 July 1956.

³Few of his statements about the Presidency and President are the following: "The Presidency of the Republic is a sanctified office and it is the duty of every one of us to revere it. ... I have been in many countries and I have seen many Presidents and many Princes, and of them all our President is the most honorable." Minutes of the Lebanese Parliament, Vol. 1943-44, p. 422.

Also in answer to a deputy who criticized the President for having received members of the Opposition, al-Sulh said, "it is not only the President's right but also his duty to receive or summon whomever he may wish, when he so desires in this country. For the President is for everyone equally, and he is not ours alone. It is therefore beneficial that every Lebanese have full faith in him and believe that he can give them all equally justice and fairness." Ibid., Vol.1947-48, p.197.

and with the Christian community in general,¹ while he posed as the Muslim's spokesman. His public statements were addressed to Christians and Muslims alike as citizens of Lebanon. He reassured the Christians that Lebanon's independence is final² and the Muslims that Lebanon is Arab in character. He also emphasized the role of the Arab countries³ in obtaining Lebanon's independence.

al-Sulh's harmonious relationship with President al-Khūri was also an important factor in cementing the nation. During the early period of al-Khūri's regime this relationship was particularly harmonious. al-Khūri repeatedly expressed his respect and preference for Riyād al-Sulh, and Riyād al-Sulh on the other hand did the same.

¹The journalists he gathered around him to propagate his views were mainly Christian. Noted among these were Sa'id Frayha of Dar al-Sayyad and Hanna Ghushn of al-Diyar.

²These reassurances recurred in his ministerial statements and parliamentary discussions. *Ibid.*, Vol. 1943-44, pp. 140, 631, 709, 710; Vol. 1946-47, pp. 77-78, 120 and 201. However, he admitted, that "to keep announcing that [Lebanon's independence is final] will only prove that we have no confidence in ourselves." *Ibid.*, Vol. 1946-47, p. 78.

al-Sulh's contribution in this respect was not limited only to verbal statements. His role in obtaining the special clause concerning Lebanon in the Protocol of the Arab League cannot be overlooked.

³This was also repeated in his ministerial statements and in the parliamentary discussions. *Ibid.*, Vol. 1943-44, pp. 67, 79, 140; Vol. 1947-48, pp. 483, 485 and 1009.

Both, however, exercised their powers with great tact. al-Khūri used to consult al-Sulh on any issue he deemed important and vice versa.

al-Sulh also pursued propagating integration in other means. He, like al-Khūri, closely connected the unity of ranks with the achievement of independence, the latter being the outcome of the first.¹ He also exaggerated and reiterated the role of the population in the achievement of both.²

His main target of attack in this respect was sectarianism.³

¹See Ibid., Vol. 1943-44, pp. 69, 76, 140, 635, 710; Vol. 1944-45, pp. 12, 270, 354; Vol. 1946-47, p. 387; and Vol. 1949-50, pp. 108, 473.

²Ibid., Vol. 1943-44, pp. 67-68. In this vein he said, "a nation's existence and independence depends on the faith of its sons. For the patriotic hearts are a nation's best bulwark, and are more capable of guarding it and keeping it than the most powerful material weapons. Our first principle in organizing this independence must therefore be to infuse the love of Lebanon into the hearts of its people." Ministerial Statement, 7 October 1943, Minutes of Parliament, Vol. 1943-44, p. 12.

He also said, "every individual in this beloved nation is responsible to cherish independence, and national sovereignty, each according to his capabilities." Minutes of Parliament, Vol. 1947-48, p. 908.

³In this vein he said, "nations cannot be built on sectarianism but on nationalism," because "a small nation like Lebanon can achieve more through its unity than through its army and its weapons." And "no nation can prosper nor be established except on the basis of non-sectarianism." Ibid., Vol. 1946-47, p. 16; Vol. 1948-49, p. 8 and 366 respectively. See also Ministerial Statement of 7 October 1943, Vol. 1943-44, pp. 12-13 and that of 11 July 1944, p. 549.

To propagate this viewpoint further he fell on Lebanon's history and gave Amir Fakhr-ed-Din and Amir Bashir as examples of non-sectarian policy. Ibid., Vol. 1943-44, p. 709.

To him this was the main menace to promoting a political community in Lebanon and consequently he suggested its cancellation.¹ However, he admitted that this step must be preceded by a just and equitable treatment to the various sects in order to dispel their reservations.

Disparity among the various regions in Lebanon, he admitted, is another threat to integration. This he thought must be bridged through planning the development of the country as a whole not that of each region separately.² For "a nation is not truly a nation if all its parts are not sound."³

The main means he conceived as capable to counter the inherent divisive forces was education. "For the school," he said, "is the finest soil for growing virtues, and for sowing the seeds of goodness in the people's souls."⁴ Through which "we wish to raise a unified generation, with united

¹Ibid., p. 448.

²In defending the construction of roads in the region of Mount Lebanon he said, "we must ... take into consideration that it is deprived of all resources and many facilities and its only source of revenue is its roads... [At the same time] it is the government's duty not to deprive the other regions of its care and attention." Ibid., Vol. 1946-47, p. 492. See also Ibid., p. 554; and Vol. 1949-50, p. 453.

³Ibid., Vol. 1947-48, p. 77.

⁴Ministerial Statement, 11 July 1944, Ibid., Vol. 1943-44, p. 549.

objectives, feelings, and patriotism."¹ These objectives he thought must be realized through the proposed Lebanese university.²

Another means that he resorted to was disseminating his viewpoints through journalism. For this purpose he gathered around himself a group of journalists to whom he extended favors generously.

With all these efforts Riyād al-Sulh can be considered a pioneer among the Muslims in promoting a political community in Lebanon. His outstanding and unique contribution is evident in the internal crises Lebanon faced after his death.

¹Ibid., p. 13.

²Ibid., Vol. 1949-50, p. 380.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Lebanon, as evident from the above description, is a polity in transition.¹ As a transitional society it reflects at the same time both traditional and modern characteristics. These characteristics are evident in the society at large and in the government as well. In other words, "we can attribute to Lebanon all the characteristics of the progressive society provided we precede each one with the word 'quasi'. We can say, for instance, that the Lebanese society is 'quasi-responsible' and the Lebanese individual a 'quasi-citizen'; we can refer to the administrative set-up as being 'quasi-legislative' and the employee as being 'quasi-serviceable'. And Lebanon can be considered progressive both culturally and economically, but is underdeveloped politically."²

The reason behind this is that primordial loyalties coexist with modern norms, the traditional often permeating

¹Lebanon is not unique in this respect. "All political systems are 'mixed' systems in the cultural sense. There are no 'all-modern' cultures and structures, in the sense of rationality, and no all primitive ones, in the sense of traditionality." Almond and Coleman, Op. cit., p. 11.

²Salem, "The Political Development", Op. cit., p. 49.

the modern. Confessionalism, for example, has remained deep rooted in the political system despite the modernity of the political framework and the growing tendency of the Lebanese society to accept modern norms. Thus while overt confessionalism was frowned upon - its endorsement was politically unfashionable and the general feeling came to be that it is anti-national and the source of corruption,¹ 'silent' confessionalism was still adhered to. It continued in a subtle form. The Lebanese and Arab nationalisms seemed outwardly like modern ideologies,² but basically they were determined by confessional reflections.³

¹Not all observers though hold this viewpoint. C.G. Hess and H.L. Bodman shrewdly remark that "it may be seriously questioned whether confessionalism is at the root of corruption. ... Many of the facts for which confessionalism is blamed may be attributed to the historical lack of a moral and social basis for democracy which has led to favoritism, sudden enrichment and other corruptions." Op. cit., p. 29.

²The Lebanese in general have been noted for their unserious attitude towards ideologies. This has been due primarily to the strength of primordial ties in the Lebanese society as a whole. The Maronites and Sunnis, in particular, have been the least inclined to join ideological parties because the Lebanese political custom favors them. Members of other sects join ideological parties in larger numbers. For further details on the subject see Bashir Aridi, Op. cit.

³The two currents disagreed on the basic issue of whether to accept the framework of the local system as permanent bases for political action or not. Lebanese nationalism, adhered to by a majority of Christians, advocated the maintenance of the status quo, while Arab nationalism, adhered to by a majority of Muslims, advocated basic changes in this respect. With this viewpoint Arab nationalism "made it difficult for Lebanese Muslim leaders or their clients to accept the framework

Another aspect of the society's transitional stage has been the change in the class structure. The middle class has been growing due to education and emigration. Education liberated the poorer classes and promoted them to a higher stratum in society. Emigration also, through newly acquired wealth, did the same. The growth of the middle class had reflections on the political order.¹ Its members, having increased in number, came to play a greater role in the policy formation either through penetration to the ruling class or through the articulation of new demands.

This role, although greater, is not yet very influential. Members of the middle class who managed to penetrate

of the local system, while correspondingly it sharpened Christian sensitivities." Kerr, op.cit., p. 209.

Kerr also believes that the coexistence of the two trends has resulted in an "endemic schizophrenia" that rose and fell in intensity in accordance with developments in the neighbouring states, especially in Syria. This endemic schizophrenia permeates all levels of the Lebanese political system. At critical times it almost resulted in a paralysis of the government process. The Lebanese equilibrium, however, proved capable to cater for this tendency, but not strong enough to uproot it. Hence a fragile situation continued, a situation that evinced a complexity of modern and traditional tendencies. Ibid., p. 209.

¹Another political effect of emigration besides the growth of the middle class, has been the diversion of rebellious elements out of Lebanon. Emigration has been the main alternative to rebellion for the improvement of one's lot in life. Fuad Khuri, "The Changing Class Structure in Lebanon," (unpublished paper - will appear in the 1968 Autumn issue of the Middle East Journal, The Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C.).

to the ruling class were mainly businessmen and the few educated persons recruited by cooptation. The businessmen failed to introduce basic changes as they assumed in no time the predominant traditional outlook of the politicians identifying their interests with theirs. The educated few had to compromise with the centers of power that coopted them, and also had a very limited effect as a pressure group. The ruling class therefore is in a transitional stage as far as its background is concerned. The change in outlook has been slower than that of the background.

The government also reveals this transitional stage in its structure. Salem describes its manifestation in the cabinet as follows: "reflecting the 'transitional' character of the Lebanese Cabinet is its combination of traditional and modern elements. It is common for the Cabinet to include members with Ph.D. degrees and members with only a secondary education, and no specialization; members in their late sixties and members in their early thirties; members that are radical and progressive and members that are conservative and traditional."¹ The government's composition and outlook therefore have been factors in slowing down the process of transition.

Another factor in slowing down this process is obviously

¹Salem, "Administration," op. cit., p. 8.

the pluralism of the Lebanese society. This pluralism, however, while it has impeded the country's development as a political community in a way, it has resulted in a compromise approach to Lebanese politics which contributed and would contribute further in future to its promotion. The presence of various religious and feudal groupings in one polity necessitated common understanding and a balance among them. In other words the mixture dictated a middle course - it was neither possible to rely completely on the West nor fall fully on Muslim political heritage.¹ For Lebanon as Michel Chiha says, "vit politiquement et socialement d'un equilibre de confessions et de civilization."²

Furthermore this compromise permitted a peculiar democracy³ that kept the country going in the absence of a strong

¹Salibi says, "had Lebanon been a predominantly Muslim country, it might not have been much different from the rest of the Middle East. Had it been predominantly Christian, it would have certainly looked more European; but it is possible that it would not have preserved its liberal character." "The Personality of Lebanon in Relation to the Modern World," op. cit., p. 268.

²Chiha, op. cit., p. 268.

³This peculiar democracy "is not the rule of the demos, but simply the distribution of guarantees to the recognized factions coexisting in the country of the means to defend their minimum interests. Since in principle this covers everyone, and since the system provides a reasonably open opportunity for participation by all who desire it, democracy is not necessarily an unwarranted term." Kerr, op. cit., p. 188.

and mature feeling of national unity. This gave the various factions more time to develop common interests. The free interplay of the various factions, safeguarded by the established equilibrium,¹ also promoted some sort of responsibility of each faction towards the other.

Hence some progress has been made towards the promotion of a feeling of community. This was particularly the contribution of the ruling class during the first decade of independence. Through their continued cooperation on the basis of the established equilibrium and their initiation of new symbols and slogans, they demonstrated that cooperation among the sects is possible and to Lebanon's advantage. They also gave the Lebanese communities more time to develop common interests as an independent nation.

The achievement, however, was not sufficient.² The inherent centrifugal forces continued to be effective.

¹The maintenance of this equilibrium, however, has been expensive. Fear of upsetting the fragile Lebanese balance has led the government to preoccupation with the lesser issues at the expense of the major ones. An emphasis on major issues it was feared may lead to a change of the status quo and thus entail "an implicit or explicit condemnation of the fundamental institutions of the Lebanese political system." Leonard Binder, "Political Change in Lebanon," Binder (ed.), op. cit., p. 288.

²In 1956 Charles Malik described integration as a pressing future goal. See his article, "In the Memorial held on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the death of the leader Riyād al-Sulh," op. cit.

Furthermore, the significance of the common symbols introduced by the ruling class during the early period of independence failed to assert themselves fully in the Lebanese society.¹

In addition the existing political system is facing new challenges that have been growing lately. Change in society has been at different rates in the various sectors of the Lebanese population. The numerical ratio of the sects, their interests, their economic achievements have been growing at different ratios. This gave rise to new pressures and demands. Hence the need for a new formula that would accelerate Lebanon's development as a political community² is becoming pressing. This scheme "presupposes:

First: The presence of a government that is cognizant of the responsibilities of modern rule.³

Second: The presence of political parties that are representative of the intellectual currents in the nation

¹For an appraisal of the continuing weakness of common symbols and its reflection on Lebanese politics, see the editorial in al-Jarida, "Lughat al-Suwar" (The Language of Pictures), No. 4738, 17 May 1968, p. 1.

²In the first stage this formula must cater to the changing conditions without exposing the established equilibrium to a disastrous end.

³"Rule should be thought of as a constant task of directing, guiding and reassuring the led ones." Sereno, op. cit., p. 152. This is of great importance in Lebanon where the 'guidance' towards integration is imperative for the country's viability.

and which serve as a means to attain governmental status.

Third: The presence of a popular base capable of participating in the political field.

Fourth: The presence of governmental and non-governmental institutions that work towards raising society. Political development also needs a governing group that is capable of bearing the following burdens:

1. Establishing internal security and defending the nation against outside aggression. These two provisions, particularly the second one, demand that the group be well aware of the international political situation and of the diplomacy of deliverance.
2. Presenting the political slogan in such a way as to ensure the intellectual elite with the people's support and their enthusiasm for the development policy in both the internal and external fields.
3. Incorporating all sectarian, linguistic and local factions into a unified political and national unity, through the use of political slogans capable of integrating the parts into general political wholes.
4. Organizing and distributing the government

institutions between the central hierarchy and the local, taking into consideration the power of the local administrative organs. ...

5. Peaceful (if possible) liquidation of the old economic systems which slow down political and administrative development, like old property ownership for example, and feudal political power.
6. Encouraging modern institutes and artistic skills which the industrial national state needs.
7. Mobilizing all national facilities in order to increase economic production, to improve the educational program, and to refine the spirit of civilization among all citizens."¹

Furthermore economic prosperity and political quiescence in the Middle East contribute to the process through safeguarding the peaceful functioning of the Lebanese system.²

The above conditions would enhance confidence in the Lebanese system and promote the norms and symbols of

¹Salem, "The Political Development," op. cit., pp. 50-52.

²Shils, "The Prospect for Lebanese Civility," Binder (ed.), op. cit., pp. 10-11.

a political community. Once these are developed, the sense of membership in the Lebanese society would grow among the Lebanese irrespective of their sects and factions. This would lead to the "development [of Lebanon] from its current equilibrium of commercial interests into a genuinely democratic system."¹

¹Ibid., p. 11.

APPENDIX I

PROFILE OF BISHARAH AL-KHŪRI

Bisharah al-Khūri was born on 10 August 1890 in Beirut. His father was the head of the Arab Section in the Mutesarrifiyyah in B'abda. He was raised in an atmosphere of Lebanese politics and received disciplined and religious education, including three years in Paris where he completed his legal studies. al-Khūri was well versed in Arabic culture, which proved later to be a political asset for him. During World War I, when the Mutesarrifiyyah was occupied by the Turks, he lived in Cairo in voluntary exile. After the war he returned to Lebanon and worked as a trainee in Emile Eddeh's office. In 1920 he was appointed as secretary-general of the Lebanese Government. After that he occupied several government posts among them that of Minister of Interior in 1926, until he became Prime Minister in 1927. Throughout this period he enjoyed the backing of both the French and the Jesuits missionaries.¹

al-Khūri was married in 1922 to Laure Chiha, sister of Michel Chiha. This marriage admitted him to the higher Beirut society and connected him with thriving and ambitious business circles - Michel Chiha, banker and thinker, Henri

¹al-Riyachi, Before and After, p. 127.

Pharaon, prominent Catholic wealthy man, the Kettanehs, the Shucairs, the Fattals and other prominent business and financial figures.

Rivalry between him and Emile Eddeh motivated many of his political activities. The greater favoritism shown to Emile Eddeh by the French drew him away later from the French administration.

In 1943 he was elected a member of Parliament on 6 September and on 21 September the Parliament elected him President.¹ He was the 1st President of independent Lebanon.

His popularity started to decline after the 'forged' elections of 1947. The new constitutional provision promulgated in 1948 to permit his reelection further reduced his popularity. In September 1952 he resigned under strong popular pressure.

¹Bisharah al-Khūri was elected as a compromise President. Emile Eddeh and Camille Sham'un were the other two candidates; the first backed by the French, the latter by the British.

APPENDIX II

PROFILE OF RIYĀD AL-SULH

Riyād al-Sulh was born in 1894 in Beirut to an influential family. His father, Rida Bey al-Sulh, was Beirut's representative in the Ottoman Parliament and later Minister of Interior in King Faysal's government. Riyād al-Sulh attended Shaykh Ahmad Abbas School in Beirut, then the Jesuit University. Later he studied law in Constantinople, where he was active in the Arab nationalist secret societies.

al-Sulh was an ardent Arab nationalist who spent most of his lifetime struggling for the full independence of the Arab countries.

In 1915 he was tried by the military court in Aley and was sentenced to death. A sentence that was changed to life exile because of Riyād's minor age. After the Turkish defeat at the end of World War I he was elected as head of the government of Sidon but was later dismissed by the French.

After the decisive battle of Maysalun in 1920, Riyād al-Sulh left for Egypt and from there to Europe. In Europe he spent four active years between Geneva and

Paris. In Paris he established strong relations with the French liberals and presented the case of the Arab World to them.

In 1924 he returned to his country for a short period as he had to leave shortly after the troubles of 1925. In 1928 he returned from Europe and settled in Beirut except for a short period of exile in Kameshly, Syria, in 1935. In 1936 he took part in the treaty negotiations and continued his work for the independence of his country until the end of the French Mandate. In 1943 he emerged as the co-author of the National Pact and a hero of independence.

Riyād al-Sulh was Premier during the nine years of al-Khūrī's regime, for a total period of six years and three months. He headed eight cabinets out of the 16 regular ones under al-Khūrī's presidency. As a Prime Minister he set the pattern of this office's role¹ and prerogatives.

¹His ministerial statements were a model for later statements. Salem, Introduction to Ministerial Statements (unpublished collection of ministerial statements from independence until the end of General Shihab's regime, n.d.), p. 7.

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