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THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ENGLAND UNDER PITT
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The Foreign Policy of England under Pitt

Before narrating the events of English and Continental history under Pitt's administration, it may be well to attempt to give a brief estimate of his administration, his foreign policy; and indicate the limits of Pitt as a foreign minister.

William Pitt, the second son of the Earl of Chatham, was the foremost man in England for over twenty years, and the most conspicuous figure in Europe until the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte. This explains the fact that, although he never personally conducted foreign affairs, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, he exerted such an influence on the conduct of them, that it justifies the title of this thesis. It is an exceedingly difficult task to summarize Pitt's foreign policy. In fact one is almost forced to the conclusion that he had none, or that it was a policy capable of infinite variations. It is by remembering that Pitt's main work, the work for which he was preeminently fitted by hereditary and training, was in internal affairs, that we get the keynote of his foreign policy. It was a policy of peace, and peace at almost—but not quite—any cost. It was peace which would give Pitt a chance to carry out his financial, electoral, and Irish reforms; which would allow England to go on developing her manufactures, and expanding her commerce. It was peace which had given, and would continue to give England the dominant position in Europe; which would enable her to dictate to Austria and Russia in the matters of the Polish and Turkish partitions. Pitt realized the value of peace, and strove valiently to maintain it; and when he did fight it was because he saw that peace was not longer possible. Pitt did not engage in war with France because he hated France, or the revolution, but simply to bring about such a condition of
affairs as would make peace again possible.

This interpretation of his policy explains to some extent the early weakness of England in continental affairs. She did not want to bring about such relations with France, even while at war with her, as would make France the irreconcilable enemy of England. It was only when Pitt realized the irreconcilable nature of the contest that England began to put forth her best efforts, and in the end was the inspiration to all Europe, by her example of courage and pertinacity.

From 1783 to the Outbreak of War with Revolutionary France

When Pitt, in 1783, became First Commissioner of the Treasury and Prime Minister, the continental position of England was insignificant. She had just terminated the War of Independence by the Treaty of Versailles, a war in which France, Spain, and the United Provinces had taken arms against her, and Russia and the Scandinavian countries had joined in an armed neutrality. Austria was in close alliance with Russia, and Russia could not be counted on. In addition her finances were in disorder, and Ireland was a source of weakness. It was Pitt's opportunity to settle the financial disorder, to improve the relations with Ireland, and to bring England to a position of authority in the Councils of Europe.

Pitt chose as his Foreign Secretary the Marquis of Carmarthen, afterwards Duke of Leeds. Carmarthen's political creed was based on distrust of France, and it was his desire to break up that alliance, formed in 1766, between Austria and France. He tried in vain to form alliances between England and "austria, or England
and Russia, and, to gain this end, offered terms humiliating to England. Pitt did not see in France the menace which Carmarthen saw. In his earlier years he paid little attention to foreign affairs, but did express his profound conviction that it was necessary to avoid any entanglements which would involve England in a new war. The objects which Pitt had mainly at heart were peace, retrenchment, and reform.

Denmark was the first country to change its attitude toward England. It is not necessary to go into the details. Suffice it to say, that, thru the clever diplomacy of Hugh Elliot, English influence became predominant. The friendship of Denmark being secure, Carmarthen turned his attention to Russia and Austria. If nothing could be gained from them, he would then turn to Berlin. An alliance with Berlin and Copenhagen might, however, seriously offend both Imperial Courts. Joseph II., in his characteristically reckless way, came to the rescue by an attack on the liberties of Holland and Belgium.

A secret alliance between Russia and Austria had been formed in May, 1781. Austria guaranteed to Russia the possession of European Russia, and of her dominions in Poland, as well as the maintenance of Poland in the position of 1773; and in return Austria received the guarantee of her dominions. In case of a Russo-Turkish war Joseph swore himself to join Russia in three months with the army and navy of troops. It was an alliance primarily against Turkey, but also directed against Prussia. Thus fortified Joseph turned his attention to the Barrier and the Scheldt. By the Treaty of Treccthe Dutch occupied seven Belgian fortresses with 14,000 men at the cost of Belgium; while the closing of the Scheldt was secured by the Treaty of Münster.
in 1648. Joseph began by raising all the barrier fortresses, maintaining, however, the defences of Luxemburg, Ostend, and the citadel of Antwerp. In Nov., 1783, he demanded the restitution of the frontier between Belgium and Holland on the lines of 1648, the demolition of the Dutch fortresses of the Scheldt, and the surrender of Maestricht.

France supported Holland against the Emperor, but when war became imminent offered her mediation. Irritation on both sides led to an outburst of hostilities; Prussia opposed the Emperor, and an European war seemed imminent. The Dutch army, however, was in no condition for war, nor was the Austrian army sufficiently well equipped or large enough to invade the flooded provinces. War was averted by an armistice which resulted in the Treaty of Fontainebleau, signed on November 2, 1785. The Scheldt remained closed, and the Emperor gave up his claim to Maestricht on the receipt of ten millions of florins.

Along the same line was the scheme for the exchange of Belgium for Bavaria. The Elector of Bavaria was agreeable, Catherine of Russia gave her consent, and France was wavering. Frederick the Great was strongly opposed, and his opposition, culminating in the Rhentenbund, of which England became a member in the person of George III., decided France. With Russia alone supporting Austria, the plan was not feasible, and the Emperor reluctantly abandoned it.

Two days after the Treaty of Fontainebleau was signed, a treaty of alliance between France and the provinces was concluded at the same place. It was a defensive alliance, and a treaty of commerce combined, and was considered a great blow to England. One result of the closer relations thus established between France
and the provinces was a commercial treaty between France and England. In the Treaty of Versailles provisions had been made for a commission to draw up arrangements between the two nations, but the English ministry had not been very keen to put them into effect. In order to exert pressure on England the French government issued, in July, 1785, several edicts against the importation of English manufactures into France. Pitt believed it dangerous to wait longer, and in 1786 the treaty of commerce was ratified. Pitt would have been willing to see Free Trade the basis of the treaty, but the prejudices of George III. and the other ministers prevented, and the principle of reciprocity was substituted. Besides the mutual lowering of duties, a reciprocal and complete liberty of navigation and commerce between the two countries was established. It is possible that the economic advantage might have remained with England, but certainly the higher consideration of somewhat diminishing the national hatred was present in Pitt's mind.

The affairs in Holland again became more prominent. French influence was on the increase and supported the provincial estates in their attempts to oust the Stadtholder, and substitute a republican form of government. England was pledged to assist the Prince of Orange, but was not prepared for war. Just at this point came the death of Frederick the Great, who was succeeded by his nephew, the brother of the Princess of Orange. The new king was reported by the English ambassador as being much attached to England, and desirous of marrying his daughter to the Prince of Wales. His accession meant, therefore, no change in Prussian policy. But England had to settle on some line of action. Some members of the Cabinet were for intervention, but
Fitt was more cautious, believing it necessary to be prepared for war before doing anything. Eventually pecuniary assistance was granted to the Stadtholder. The plan was for the prince, aided by these subsidies, to put himself at the head of his army and reassert his position by force of arms. At this point an insult to the Princess of Orange resulted in the immediate interference of Prussia. The French were pledged to defend the Dutch patriots, if attacked, but England could not allow the Stadtholder to be crushed. Pitt wrote to Paris to inform the Court of Versailles that it must abandon its plan of extending French influence by changing the constitution of the provinces; that the Stadtholder must be maintained, and that if France would not agree to this, the matter would have to be settled by war. A European war might well have been the result, but the rapid advance of Brunswick at the head of the Prussian army averted it. Six days after the Prussians had crossed the Meuse the Prince of Orange entered the Hague and was invested with every privilege which had been taken from him. France immediately backed down; all warlike demonstrations ceased, and she issued a statement that she had never had any intention of intervention. A triple alliance between England, Holland and Prussia was then concluded. It guaranteed the hereditary Stadtholderate in the House of Orange, and established a defensive alliance between England and Prussia for the maintenance of the territorial and political independence of Holland.

Thus by 1786 Pitt had secured a position for England. Disregarding the advice of Carmarthen he had welded the three countries together into a solid union, a guarantee of peace. For some time they gave the law to Europe. They prevented Denmark
from assisting Russia in her war against Sweden, and gave tranquillity to the North. The efforts of England were used successfully at Reichenbach to nip in the bud an internecine strife between Prussia and Austria. The Triple Alliance made peace between Austria and the Porte at Vistova, between Russia and the Porte at Jassy; it secured the Belgian Netherlands to Austria; it enabled England to speak with force and dignity to Spain in the dispute about Nootka Sound. It tended to calm the discord of Europe, to curb the ambition of some Powers, and the revolutionary movements of others; but it was powerless to conjure the terrible doom which hung over the devoted head of France. The whole course of its influence bears the impress of the serene and majestic mind of Pitt.

Of these varied aspects of international history we can discuss in detail two only; the dispute about the Nootka Sound, and the outbreak of the war with Revolutionary France. Nootka Sound is a harbour on the west coast of Vancouver Island. There was some question as to priority of claim between the English and the Spanish, and two English ships found there by the Spaniards were seized and their crews imprisoned. The crews were later released on the ground of their presumptive ignorance of the Spanish rights, and the friendly relations existing between England and Spain, but a request was made in Feb. 1760 by the Spanish ambassador that the men be punished in order to deter others. Pitt took up the matter himself, and refused to discuss the subject until the vessels had been restored and an adequate atonement made for the injury to Great Britain. Spain began to prepare for war, and a war with Spain might be serious. In 1766 had been signed the Faute de Famille, an offensive and
defensive alliance between the two branches of the Bourbon houses, and the Court of Madrid called on the Court of Versailles to make good its agreement. It seemed at first that the national assembly might change the form of the alliance, but still carry out the terms. Alarmed at this, Pitt sent two men, William Augustus Milles, and Hugh Elliot, both friends of Mirabeau, to use their personal influence to induce the National Assembly to annul the Family Compact. Very little is known of the details of their mission, but it was entirely successful. Even before that Spain had come to the conclusion that her finances were in too great disorder, and the hope of allies too slight, to allow her to engage in war. On October 28, the Nootka Convention was signed, by which England secured, and Spain retained, the rights of commerce, navigation, and settlement on the Pacific coast above San Francisco. Each nation was to have free access to the establishments of the other in those regions.

The Treaty of Jassy, which ended the war between Russia and Turkey, seemed to fulfill Pitt's aspirations for the settlement of Europe. A little over thirty years of age, the young Minister could look with pride on a pacified Europe and a dominant England, which no one could now say was overshadowed by the preponderance of France. As Macaulay tells us, the man whose name, if he had died in 1792, would have been associated with peace, with freedom and philanthropy, with temperate reform, with mild and constitutional administration, lived to associate his name with arbitrary government, with harsh laws harshly executed, and with wars, the most costly and most sanguinary up to the present time. All this rose from the war with revolutionary France, which was declared against England by the French on Feb. 1, 1793, and whi
lasted, with a short break, till 1815.

The policy of England had been to preserve a strict neutrality, and for that reason she knew nothing of the Declaration of Pillartz, refused in 1793 to join a coalition against France, and recognised the Constitution of 1791. In 1792 she showed her good faith by reducing her armaments by land and sea. The Marquis de Chauvelin, Ambassador to England, had instructions to preserve the neutrality of England, and to secure, if possible, her friendship. "As was to keep her out of any coalition, to propose a continuation of the Commercial Treaty of 1786, and to secure a large loan, in return for which the island of Tobago was to be offered. Thus for the English and French governments had about the same objects in view.

After the tenth of August, the aspect of affairs changed. The imprisonment of Louis greatly alarmed the government, and it decided to recall Lord Cowper, the Ambassador of Great Britain to the Court of Versailles; but at the same time the government indicated that it would maintain its position of neutrality. In criticising the action of the government in breaking off diplomatic relations, it must be remembered that at this time there was no government in France. The Executive Council was only provisional; the King was only provisionally suspended from his functions; the Legislative Assembly was on the point of dissolution, and the National Convention was not yet summoned. Whether Great Britain might not have opened diplomatic relations with the republic, properly constituted, is another question, but it is doubtful if she would have kept her ambassador there in any case, after the September massacres. The next question which arose was, naturally, as to whether Chauvelin should be recalled from
London. His reasons for not asking permission to present his letters of recall was the fear that the King should refuse to receive him, and thus the rupture would be brought about which he and his employers were most anxious to avoid.

From this time on events moved rapidly. Military successes gave France and Belgium to the French. Chevrelin, who had avoided going to court for fear that he should be badly received, now asked for credentials as Minister of the Republic. He wrote to Lebrun that the time had come to treat openly with England, and asked for definite instructions. He also reminded him that the least attack on Holland must necessarily mean war with England.

Two acts of the French formed the strongest grievances on the English side, and are generally considered the causes of the war: the decree of November 13, and the opening of the Scheldt to navigation. The decree of November 13, was passed in great haste, and probably went beyond the intention of those who proposed it. The decree ran as follows: "The National Convention declares in the name of the French nation that she will accord fraternity and aid to all peoples who wish to recover their liberty, and charges the Executive to give the necessary orders to the generals in order that they may bear aid to those people and defend citizens who have been, or who are likely to be, persecuted for the sake of liberty." The opening of the Scheldt was defended on the part of the French because the Scheldt had its source in France, and because its closure was but a remnant of feudalism, to which the French nation could not submit. That treaty with the Dutch bound the English to protect the Dutch possessions from attack or from the threat of attack, but
the Dutch did not protest, nor did they call on England for assistance. Moreover England had agreed to allow Joseph II. to open the Scheldt if he would give up his alliance with France.

Yet at this time the French were not anxious to force war with England; their main object was to get the English government to recognize the Republic. Maret, afterwards the trusted servant of Napoleon, was in England, and had interviews with William Smith, a liberal member of Parliament, and with Pitt himself. From the reports of these we learn that at the beginning of December peace was quite possible; that it was evidently desired by Pitt; that the burning quest on was the invasion of Holland; and that other matters might have been satisfactorily arranged.

Events moved rapidly towards war, however. Maret said, in a fit of despair, "Peace is out of the question. We have 300,000 men in arms. We must make this march as far as their legs will carry them, or they will return and cut our throats." Efforts were still made, and there was a possibility of diplomatic relations being resumed with France. On December 27, the explanations of the French government relative to the decree of November 19, were presented. Chauvelin said that, by the decree of November 19, the National Convention never meant that the Republic should espouse the quarrels of a few seditionists persons, or should endeavour to excite disturbances in any neutral or friendly country. The decree was only applicable to those people, who, after having acquired their liberty by conquest, may have demanded the fraternity and the assistance of the Republic by the solemn and unequivocal expression of the general will. France would undertake not to attack Holland so long as she should confine herself within the
limits of an exact neutrality. The opening of the Scheldt could not with any justice be made a casus belli.

The answer of Pitt is characteristic. 'England cannot consider such an explanation as satisfactory, but must look upon it as a fresh avowal of those dispositions which she sees with so just an uneasiness and jealousy. With regard to the Scheldt, France can have no right to annul existing stipulations, unless she have also the right to set aside equally the other treaties between all Powers of Europe, and all the other rights of England and her allies. She can have no pretence to interfere in the question of opening the Scheldt, unless she were the sovereign of the Low Countries, or had the right to dictate laws to Europe. England will never consent that France shall arrogate the power of annulling at her pleasure, and under the pretence of a pretended natural right, of which she makes herself the only judge, the political system of Europe, established by solemn treaties and guaranteed by the consent of all the Powers. This government, adhering to the maxims which it has followed for more than a century will never see with indifference that France shall make herself, either directly or indirectly, the sovereign of the Low Countries, or general arbiter of the rights and liberties of Europe. If France is really desirous of maintaining peace and friendship with England, she must show herself disposed to renounce her views of aggression and aggression, and to confine herself within her own territory without insulting other governments, without disturbing their tranquility, without violating their rights.'

On January 23, the news of the execution of the king arrived in London. On the following day Chauvelin was peremptorily hidden by an Order in Council to leave the kingdom. Had England
waited a little longer this would have been unnecessary, for Chauvelin had been summoned to Paris and was appointed in his stead. Maret, not knowing what effect the dismissal of Chauvelin might have in France, resolved not to demand an interview with Pitt until fresh instructions arrived from Paris. He told Males, however, that France would relinquish the Scheldt in a manner satisfactory to England, would give up Nice and Meinz, renounce the Belgian provinces, and find a method which would release Savoy from being any longer a part of French territory; she would also withdraw her troops from Belgium, and consent to a general peace, provided that the powers would, in part, defray the expenses of the war. In the meantime Chauvelin reached Paris, and his report decided the vacillating Committee. On February 1, war was declared by the French against England and Holland.

It is now necessary to consider the development of public opinion in England from the outbreak of the Revolution to the time of the declaration of the war. In general, it is safe to say that England as a whole welcomed the Revolution. She had her own Revolution of 1688, the "glorious revolution," and saw in the turbulence of France an effort similarly directed. Fox declared that the storming of the Bastile was the grandest achievement in history. Burke, however, from the very first denounced the revolution as subversive of religion, morality, and all that makes governments safe and sens. Pitt was inclined to agree with Burke rather than with Fox, but held that his business was to govern England rather than denounce France, and he contented himself with hoping that the disorders in France, by weakening that country for a long time, would make the preservation of peace easier. Within the walls of parliament Burke stood alone. Pitt counselled his
rather to praise the English constitution than rail at the French.
Yet opinion was slowly drifting to his side. Business and
commercial men were angry at the sudden disturbance of order.
This was a time of political content, social well-being, economic
progress and religious revival in England. The mass of men failed
absolutely to see that all these elements of popular prosperity
and content were lacking in France; and every incident in the
struggle between the French and the King widened the breach of
feeling. The "Constitutional Clubs" in England quickened the
reaction. The court, the nobility, the gentry, the clergy, the
manufacturers, the merchants, in short, nineteen twentieths of
those who had good roofs over their heads, and good coats on
their backs, became eager and intolerant Anti-Jacobins.

Pitt laboured hard to maintain peace; the designs of Russia
and Austria on Poland and on Turkey seemed to him infinitely
more dangerous than the possibility of French aggression. But
Burke resolved to make peace impossible, and his "Reflections on
the French Revolution" went a long way towards doing. In the
spring of 1792 Pitt congratulated the Parliament on the prospect
of long and profound peace, and up to the execution of the king
he was sanguine as to his ability to maintain his position of
neutrality. But to restrain the passions of either the Eng-
lish or the French was beyond his power. Pitt, as the most
prominent man in England, seemed to lead on his followers, but
in truth he was pushed on by them, and had he not yielded he
would have been thrust out of their way.
The campaign of 1793 opened successfully for the allies. Austrian, Prussian, and Imperial troops held the north and east borders; Spanish and Sardinian troops were massed in the south. Internal revolts in La Vendée, Marseilles, Lyons, and elsewhere weakened France. The battle of Neerwinden compelled Dumouriez to withdraw from the Netherlands. The English contingent of 10,000 men, under the Duke of York, so strengthened the allies that they might have marched on Paris and crushed the Revolution. This drastic measure didn't suit Prussia and Austria. In 1793 occurred the second Partition of Poland, which they felt would be impossible to maintain if a strong monarchy were restored in France to take its natural place in Europe and to accept the alliance which Pitt would have offered it. A much better plan was to wait a bit; crush the revolution after it had come completely wrecked France; hence the armies were frettered away on the Rhine and in the Netherlands, while France was preparing for the conflict.

All France needed was time. The internal revolts were put down mercilessly, but effectively. The army was reorganised, and revived. It is true that Toulon was taken by Hood, and the Mediterranean fleet lost, but the city was soon recaptured by Napoleon. In the latter part of the year 1793 and in the year 1794 France began to make herself felt. The battle of Fleurus gave her the master of the Netherlands; and Spain and Prussia withdrew their armies. The subsidies of England alone kept Austria and Sardinia in the field. By 1795 Holland was lost, and the expedition of the Duke of York, thinned out by disease and hardships, embarked for Eng-
land. The only bright spot in England's military enterprises was a naval victory. At the outbreak of war the two navies had been on an even par, but the desertion of Toulon cost France most of the Mediterranean fleet. But the Channel fleet was still intact, and it was this fleet which Lord Howe encountered off Brest in 1794 in the battle which is known by the name of the day on which it was fought—the "First of June". The French finally took refuge in Brest after the loss of seven ships and about three thousand men. Nevertheless, by 1795 France had made herself supreme in Europe; and this supremacy was recognised in the Treaty of Basle.

But if Pitt's influence in continental affairs had been ineffective, his influence in England had been more pronounced than ever. The reaction against the French revolution had led to a panic in England among the upper classes. They believed that similar uprisings were due any moment, and Pitt shared their views. In fact it was this sense of social danger in England which partially reconciled Pitt to the war. To avoid any such untoward event, Pitt and his colleagues went to extremes. The Habeas Corpus act was suspended, a rigorous bill against Seditious Meetings was enacted, the scope of the Statute of Treasons was widened. More strict measures were taken in Scotland, where a number of forgotten and unrescinded medieval laws were resharpened for the emergency. The panic did not last long, however, and the failure of juries to find guilty showed that the public did not take it very seriously.

The establishment of the Directory in 1795 seemed to Pitt to give some hope for peace. It meant the end of the Jacobin propaganda; and thus removed Pitt's chief motive for war. Pitt
was, in fact, heartily sick of the war. In the first place
the army was small, ill equipped, and the lack of military
experience among the soldiers was only equalled by the incap-
acity of the generals. Pitt had been the paymaster of the
coalition. During the three years of war eighty million
pounds had been added to the debt—more than the whole Am-
erican war cost—and loans for twenty-five millions more had
been voted. Pitt was primarily an internal minister, and
one of his proudest achievements had been the reestablish-
ment of financial order and the reduction of taxes. Now
the finances were more muddled than ever, and taxes were
mounting to unprecedented heights. Then too Pitt was not
insensible to the good effects of the French Revolution.
There was, however, little change in public opinion. The old
national hatred had been revived with all its virulence, and
England was ready to fight France till the bitter end. Public
opinion indeed went hotly with Burke in his denunciation of
all purpose of relaxing England's hostility against the revolu-
tion, a denunciation which was embodied in his "Letters on a
Regicide Peace," the last outcry of that fanaticism which had
done so much to plunge the world in blood.

But the chief factor in his desire for peace was a well-
founded fear of trouble in Ireland. Irish independence was but
a name; the government was corrupt, and in the hands of a few
families. The Catholics and Dissenters had no share, direct
or indirect, in the government, and there seemed little like-
lelihood that they could obtain any. At the time of the French
Revolution French opinion had predicted that England would join
them. When England maintained her position of neutrality, and
later joined in the coalition against them, the feeling gave place to one of intense irritation. France began to think that England was in as bad a state as France before the Revolution; that there was another example of a corrupt aristocracy holding down the multitude. Hence, in persuasion of her policy of spreading revolutionary doctrines, she sent agitators to various parts of the British domains. In England the efforts were fruitless; but in India and Ireland they fell on fertile soil. At this period the French motive was different, for they were actuated by a hatred of England as the most persistent member of the coalition, but the method was about the same. Pitt perceived the danger, and believing it to be largely due to economic pressure, tried hard to put thru a bill for Free Trade between England and Ireland. It failed owing to the factional ignorance of the Irish landowners. Pitt's hopes for parliamentary reform, for the political Emancipation of Catholics and Dissenters were also doomed to failure, and the United Irishmen of the North drifted into projects of insurrection and a correspondence with France.

The discontent led to the formation of secret societies such as the "Defenders" and "Peep o'Day Boys", which spread panic among the landed classes. The Protestant landlords banded together and by terror and blood held them down. Ireland was seething with revolt and discontent; a hatred of tyranny and outrage. Under these circumstances the Protestants looked on all concession as sheer madness. The project of complete Catholic Emancipation of 1794, brought forth by the Viceroy of Ireland, aroused a storm of protest from the
Orangemen, who threatened to revolt; the members of the Cabinet were opposed to reform, and Pitt, carried away by these forces, appointed Lord Camden, a man opposed to all change or concessions to Catholics, as Viceroy of Ireland. From that time the United Irishmen became revolutionary, and sent one of its leaders, Wolfe Tone, to France to seek aid. The Directory welcomed the offers of the United Irishmen. They were anxious to draw off the revolutionary enthusiasm to channels of foreign conquest, as well as to strike a blow at England, and an army of 20,000 men under General Hoche was promised. Pitt probably knew of these negotiations. In October, 1796, Lord Melville was sent to Paris to negotiate peace on terms of mutual restitution. These terms would undoubtedly have been rejected, but there was a possibility of peace. The victories of Napoleon in Italy, however, decided the Directory, and Melville's proposals were rejected.

The expedition was arranged for December, 1796. Spain was driven to declare war on England, and the Spanish, Dutch, and French fleets were to be united. The Toulon fleet was to join the other fleets at Brest, but on the way was forced, by an English squadron, to seek refuge in the Fort l'Orient. On December 17, however, Hoche managed to elude the English fleet, and with forty ships and 25,000 men sailed for England. Again a storm came to the rescue of England; the armada was dispersed at sea, and only some of its vessels reached Bantry Bay, out of which they were driven by the storm before a landing could be effected. Hoche himself returned without having seen any of his companions.

Nevertheless the French did not abandon the project, and
were encouraged in it by the victories of 1797, culminating in
the Treaty of Campo-Formio. Once more the Dutch, Spanish, and
French fleets were to be united, and it was necessary for the
English to watch Cadiz and the Scheldt, as well as Toulon and
Brest. If the French and Spanish fleets could effect a junc-
tion they could command the Channel, while the Dutch fleet could
convey the army to Ireland. To prevent this, Admiral Sir John
Jervis, on February 18, attacked the Spanish fleet off Cape
Vincent. Although the Spanish fleet was superior in numbers—
twenty-seven to fifteen—it was forced to take refuge in Cadiz
with a loss of four of its finest vessels. The plans of the
government were, however, nearly upset by an unexpected and rather
serious mutiny in the fleet. At one time the Dutch were block-
aded by only one vessel. Fortunately the grievances of the
sailors were settled before any crisis arose.

Although the Spanish fleet could no longer be counted on,
the French hoped by the union of the French and Dutch fleets to
be able to effect a landing. In attempting to effect this
junction, the Dutch fleet fell in with a superior English fleet
off Camperdown, and was completely destroyed. This defeat
rendered the attempt on Ireland impossible; but in Ireland it
served to drive the patriots to despair. Fortunately for Eng-
land there was lack of complete harmony. The Catholics were
alienated by the French treatment of the clergy, and demanded
a national rising. The Protestants continued to hope for aid
from France, but as a concession to the Catholics fixed the
spring of 1798 as the date of a national revolt. France again
promised aid, but the passions which had been stirred up were
too violent to wait for its arrival. The arrest of the chief
leaders broke the plans of the insurgents, but on May 23, the Catholic peasantry rose in revolt. Religious passion gave rise to massacres of Protestants. The Ulster Protestants and the Catholic gentry held aloof, and the rising was suppressed by English soldiers. A few weeks after, the long expected aid arrived from France. There were only eight hundred, but had they arrived at the critical time they would have formed the nucleus of a most formidable revolt. As it was, the country received them most apathetically, and the peace finally surrendered to the English after a strenuous attempt to stir up things.

France's attempts to ruin England by taking away the supremacy of the seas and by an invasion of England thru Ireland had broken down, but there remained a third hope. This scheme was to bring about a rising against English rule in Hindostan, a project which Napoleon widened into a plan of all but worldwide conquest. The conquest of Egypt was preliminary and proved as easy as Napoleon had expected; the French troops rapidly conquered the country and pushed on up the Nile. As soon as Napoleon arrived in Egypt no swift news of his arrival and promises of help to India. All chance of success rested, however, on his ability to maintain communications with France. The battle of Aboukir Bay, in which Nelson destroyed the French fleet, doomed the expedition to failure, but the scheme was not as hopeless as the result would seem to indicate. It aroused much anxiety in England and in India. In India the danger of a native insurrection was soon allayed by the energetic action of Lord Wellesley, who besieged the capital of the leader, and killed the leader himself.

Meantime England was bestirring herself to form a new
Coalition. The attack of the French on the Swiss republic, and the establishment of the Helvetic republic in its place, with the subsequent monetary exactions, opened the eyes of the peoples to the true character of the Directory. This resentment of the peoples was backed by the renewed hostilities of the kings, particularly roused by the establishment of the Roman republic in 1796, the enforced French garrisons in Sardinia, and like activities. Russia, moreover, was ready to play a part in it, for she feared that France, if allowed to become too powerful, would revive Poland and bar the way to Constantinople. Hence a close alliance between England and Austria was formed, and Russian troops were hurried to the west. England's part was not insignificant. As usual she was to furnish subsidies, and to do this she imposed an income tax of 10% on all incomes over £200. In order to effect peace at home, Pitt projected the union with Ireland, finally arranged in June 1800, which brought with it one of his earlier schemes, free trade between England and Ireland.

At first the Second Coalition was successful; the French had to evacuate Southern Italy and Lombardy, and their position in Switzerland was vigorously assailed. But an attempt, backed by 12,000 English soldiers, to wrest Holland from France, failed. The news of these defeats reached Napoleon in Egypt, after his vain attempt to besiege Acre, and sent him posthaste to France, where he succeeded in overthrowing the Directory and establishing the Consulate, with himself as First Consul. His influence was soon felt. France recovered her losses in the battles of Marengo and Hohenlinden, forcing Austria to sue for peace at Lunéville. Austria's perseverance was, nevertheless, due to
English subsidies

From 1801 to the death of Pitt

The Treaty of Lunéville marks the end of the period of revolutionary propaganda. Napoleon from this time on was looking forward to world supremacy, but with every year of war on the continent such a supremacy became more distant. The victories of France were gains for England. The steady growth of industry, the steady increase of her carrying fleet, the increase in number and wealth of her colonies all bear witness to this. England, therefore, was the only obstacle in the persuerse of such a project, and the struggle with Britain was henceforth to be the task of his life.

For England herself, the event which accompanied the Treaty of Lunéville, the sudden withdrawal of William Pitt from office which took place in the very month of the treaty, was hardly less significant. The event which caused it, the project of Catholic Emancipation for Ireland, does not concern us, except as it shows Pitt in his real rôle, that of an internal minister. Pitt's hold on the country was not shaken, even by his retirement from official position. That brings us to the question, how did he maintain his position, what was the secret of his dominance?

The brief sketch of the war given above shows no great victories for England. Pitt was in fact, as a military administrator, a drivel. The military resources at his command were unlimited; Parliament was more ready to grant him men and money than he was to ask it, but the fact is, that, after eight years of war, after a vast destruction of life, after an expenditure of wealth far exceeding the expenditure of the American
war, of the Seven Years' War, of the war of the Austrian Succession, and of the war of the Spanish Succession, united, the English army, under Pitt, was the laughing-stock of Europe. It could not boast of one single brilliant exploit. It had never shown itself on the Continent but to be beaten, chased, forced to re-embark or forced to capitulate. To take some sugar island in the West Indies, to scatter some mob of half-naked Irish peasants, such were the most splendid victories won by the British troops under Pitt's auspices. The British navy no mismanagement could ruin. But during a long period whatever mismanagement could do was done. The Earl of Chatham, without a single qualification for the position, was made First Lord of the Admiralty, and was kept in that position during two years of a war in which the very existence of the state depended on the efficiency of the fleet. Fortunately he was succeeded by George Earl Spencer, an able administrator, and to him it was owing that a long and gloomy succession of days of fasting was interrupted, twice in the short space of eleven months, by days of thanksgiving for great victories.

Pitt's strength lay in the fact that he was the reflection of the people. It was the oneness of Pitt's temper with the temper of the men he ruled that made him sympathize, in spite of the alarm of the court, with the first movements of the revolution in France, and deal fairly, if coldly, with its aftercourse. It was this that gave him strength to hold out so long against the struggle with it. As time went on, and the temper of the people changed, they looked to see in him, not the reformer, the liberal leader, but the son of Chatham, the heir of his father's courage and faith in England, and they found it. "If some great misfortune, a pitched battle lost by the allies, the annexation
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hostility to her designs on Constantinople, a hostility which had formed one of the main reasons for his endeavors to maintain peace at the opening of the revolutionary period, and was assured that France would not oppose her. With this material it was easy to form an opposition to England, and in October, 1800, Russia proclaimed an armed neutrality, seized two hundred English vessels in her harbors and sequestered all English goods found in the empire. Denmark and Sweden followed suit, and thus the Neutral League of the North was formed. It was a fine combination, and promised much, but the well-founded suspicion that France intended to use the allied fleets in her designs on England led to the siege of Copenhagen in April, 1801. This was followed by the murder of Paul by nobles, irritated by the prevention of the sale of the produce of their estates. The Confederation of the North was destroyed, and a Convention concluded between England, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark settling the questions of right of search and contraband of war.

It was quite apparent to Napoleon that he must have time in which to prepare, and that peace was therefore necessary. The time was particularly propitious for peace. Egypt and Malta had been evacuated by the French, and the English people were most desirous of peace, for, in spite of the steady increase in wealth, the taxes were felt by all to be an almost intolerable burden. The English government was quite willing to husband its resources if Napoleon wanted to do the same. Out of this grew the treaty of Amiens. England of course could not presume to dictate in Europe, all she demanded was that France should withdraw from Southern Italy and leave the various republics she had set up. In exchange for a guarantee to pers-
form this the English government recognized the French government, restored all the colonies they had lost, save Ceylon and Trinidad, acknowledged the Ionian Islands as free republic, and engaged to restore Malta within three months to its old masters the Knights of St. John.

For a time there was a reversal of feeling in England towards France. The new French ambassador was greeted on his arrival with boundless enthusiasm, and thousands of Englishmen went to the continent to see France and above all Napoleon. Addington, the new prime minister, who had been regarded as rather weak material, for a time basked in the sun of popular approval. Careful observers, however, did not see in the state of affairs any basis for optimism; to them Napoleon remained the vulgar conqueror, simply biding his time for another attack on England. And in fact events soon showed that Napoleon had not changed his attitude. The pledges made at Amiens were openly disregarded. Piedmont and Ferra were annexed to France; the other republics were made dependent. The protests of England against this breach of treaty were met by a demand that all the French refugees in England be expelled, and that England immediately surrender Malta. This latter England refused to do until some guarantee could be obtained that it would not fall into the hands of France, and serve once more as a naval base for French designs on British possessions. The shipyards of France and Spain were working at top speed; naval stores were being prepared; seamen trained. It was all too apparent that peace was as advantageous to France as it was dangerous to England. The Spanish fleet was still powerful, and it might be possible for the
Spanish fleet, united with the French fleet which was being prepared, to dispute the command of the seas with England. England saw the dangers of delay, and anticipated Napoleon's plans by declaring war in May, 1803.

The popularity of Addington was shortlived. The nation distrusted his abilities, even his own colleagues distrusted him, and the renewal of the war made his resignation imperative. To the English nation Pitt seemed the only man who could weather the storm, and he was recalled to office. Broken in health, with weak support in the Cabinet, nevertheless his hold on the nation was as firm as ever.

Napoleon's plan was to invade England itself, and with this in mind he established a huge camp at Boulogne, where he trained men in embarking and disembarking from flatboats. He realized, nevertheless, the impossibility of a crossing in the face of English men-of-war, and made plans whereby part of the English fleet was to be decoyed to the West Indies, while the Spanish and French fleets united and convoyed the troops to England. Had his plan worked he would have undoubtedly conquered England, but fortune favored England once more.

The powers of Europe became alarmed at the threatened preponderance of France, especially as the designs of France on England were but part of the policy of aggression pursued since the treaty of Lunéville. Pitt's offer of subsidies removed all hesitation; and Russia, Austria, and Sweden joined in the third coalition, an attempt to wrest Italy and the Low Countries from France. This meant that armies of France had work elsewhere, and should the crossing be successful, the danger was not so great. Meantime Napoleon waited for the
armament to assemble in the Channel. The French and Spanish fleets, under Admiral Villeneuve, drew Nelson to the West Indies, and then returned to join the French fleet at Brest. Nelson, returning at full speed, fell in with them off Cape Trafalgar on the 21st of October, 1805. The French and Spanish fleets were annihilated, and from that time the supremacy of England at sea remained unquestioned; and the danger of an invasion was past. Even before the defeat at Trafalgar Napoleon had abandoned the attempt to invade England and swung round on his continental enemies. The capitulation at Ulm, and the victory over the Austrian and Russian forces at Austerlitz again forced them to a humiliating peace.

During this time Pitt was unable to conceal the decay of his health, and the constant anguish which gnawed at his heart. The peculiar look which he wore during the last months of his life was called by Talbotforce, the "Austerlitz" look. The news of Trafalgar seemed for a time to revive him. "England has saved herself by her courage; she will save Europe by her example," said Pitt, in what were destined to be his last words. But his renewed spirit was but momentary, and on the morning of the 23d of January, 1806, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the day on which he first took his seat in Parliament, he died.