

"THE EVOLUTION OF LEBANESE PARTY POLITICS: 1919-1947"

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by

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"It is the nature of the Arab temperament to conceive action in spasms rather than on a plan of sustained effort, and the history of any national movement is in a sense a chronicle of vivid outbursts with periods of recovery and preparation between them."

George Antonius,

"The Arab Awakening".

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I. THE INTRODUCTION

A. THE THEORY OF PARTIES & PARTY GOVERNMENT.

Long before Pericles said: "We differ from other States in regarding the man who holds aloof from public life not as quiet but as useless", men were participating in the affairs of government. The state is the Nation considered as a political association, and operating through the government, which is at the same time the instrument and the representative of the Nation.

Today, it is true that not everyone can be a member of the government, but nearly everyone can have a say in the choice of government. Modern political freedom has come to be built on a foundation of personal freedom. Every man's claim to form his own judgment with the aid of his own conscience, needs access to accurate information, freedom of discussion, and freedom of association with his fellowmen. Man being a social animal, the right of association soon became the necessity of self-government - so that modern popular states necessitate the formation of political parties, which have since become an important branch of the government itself.

"An inseparable feature of the Modern State, the party, is, as such, the embodiment of popular sovereignty, which is the principle and 'dynamic' of politics and the state... As an embodiment of popular sovereignty, the party is therefore the expression of the will of the people, the direct instrument through which the community shares in government and at a further step, the government itself, through one form or another."(1)

(1) Tawney, G., "The Theory of Party Government and the American Party System", p. 7.

Similar to the State, the Party differs from it, first, in its constitution, that unlike the State it is a voluntary association based on a contract among a limited number of members; secondly, in its purpose, i.e., that the party aims at the fulfilment of its goals only in the State and through its control; thirdly, that one is a natural collectivity, whereas the other is "artificial", created by man's will and requiring a rational explanation, an ideology, or a platform explaining the basis of its existence. Likewise an interest: individual, class, racial, or regional, is present to insure a closer cohesion. Though not always, this interest is usually less than the national interest.

Along their evolutionary development parties have taken many forms, which have depended to a large extent upon the spirit, the culture and the conditions of the society in which they emerged, and the structure of the state under which they have operated. Once they were tolerated, as under a democratic regime, (1) their problem has been to achieve a "government of the people, by the people, for the people."

B. THE RISE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN LEBANON

"At a moment when Europe's political nationalism is already losing its exclusive authority as the creed of the age, it is entrenching itself in Asia." (2)

(1) "For its successful functioning democracy assumes a society naturally integrated. There must be a pattern of community life with meaning to its people. There must be a core of spiritual values generally conceded to be sound. Within such a social frame of reference freedom of thought can operate. Disagreement can be tolerated since most men feel confident that violent change will not result from new and unorthodox ideas." Herring, "Politics of Democracy", p.47.

(2) Kohn, H., "A History of Nationalism in the East", p. 432.

Here intellectual and political life has been secularized, constitutions drawn up and republics established. Nationalism is ousting dominant religious sentiment and uniting people across religious barriers.

Like European nationalism, Arab national consciousness in Lebanon had its origin in a literary renaissance. It began a century ago with literary societies and political groups recalling the glories of the Arab past and deploring the oppression of Turkish rule. Suppressed by the Turkish authorities, it developed later in British controlled Egypt. Thus between 1847 and 1919, not less than eight societies were established in Syria, some literary and others political, both public and secret.(1)

*The most prominent and largest literary society was the "Syrian Scientific Society", which was organized in 1857 and had 150 members. In it the Arab national movement uttered its first cry in an ode to patriotism by Ibrahim Yazigi.

In 1857, five men educated at the Syrian Protestant College, founded a secret society in Beirut. They were all Christians, and dissolved secretly after issuing various revolutionary placards. The placard dated December 31, 1880, contains the first recorded statement of an Arab political program."(2)

(1) "The story of the Arab National Movement opens in Syria in 1847 with the foundation in Beirut of a modest literary society under American patronage."

Antonius, G., "The Arab Awakening", p. 13. This society worked under the name of the "Society of Arts and Sciences", and had in 1849 fifty members none of whom was Moslem or Druze. Dying in 1852, it was the first organized collective effort to promote knowledge.

(2) The placard contained the following demands:

1. The grant of independence to Syria in union with the Lebanon,
2. The recognition of Arabic as an official language in the country,
3. The removal of censorship, etc.. "This emphasis put upon the community of interests and the political identity of the Lebanon with the rest of Syria was the natural revulsion against the idea of partition and separation, and adopted the plan of an independent

In April 1909, a ban on all the societies founded by non-Turkish racial groups was issued. Between 1909 and 1914, national movements went on both publicly and secretly, only four of which would be briefly mentioned here:-

1. "Al-Muntada al-Adabi", the Literary Club, founded in Constantinople in 1909.
2. "The Ottoman Decentralisation Party", founded in Cairo in 1912.
3. "Al-Qshtaniya", whose chief object was to promote the turning of the Ottoman Empire into a dual monarchy with the Arab provinces as one kingdom.
4. and "Al-Fatat", founded in Paris in 1911, the initiative of which was Moslem, and which worked for the independence of all the Arab countries from Turkish and all other domination. This party will be treated elsewhere in this treatise.

Evolving side by side with these societies and associations, were the fast developing newspapers. The first political newspaper to be published was "The Clarion of Syria" edited by Butros al-Bustani in 1860.(1)

At the same time the development of Western education as by the Syrian Protestant College and the St. Joseph in 1875 had a dual effect. On the one hand, the cultural influence of the West found its chief expression in the adoption of political institutions and organizations and the acquisition of European languages; and on the other hand, it

state embodying the national (as against the sectarian) concept of a political entity," Antonius, "The Arab Awakening", p. 87.
(1) In 1870, "The Shield", a political and scientific journal was published, the motto of which was: Love of our country is an article of faith. In 1893, Hind Naufal founded the first woman's paper, and by 1910 they numbered 15. In Beirut, the daily newspaper, "Nasir", was also edited by a lady.

helped to transfer leadership of national movements from Christian to Moslem hands by its indirect attack on the position of the Arabic language as the instrument of national culture.(1)

In 1908, an anonymous pamphlet appeared in Beirut entitled, "La Question Sociale et Scolaire en Syrie", opposing Turkish influence, and other influences particularly the French, and demanding the development of a native culture;

"We love France, but our affection cannot go so far as to forget ourselves. It is essential in the interests alike of Syria and of France that our countrymen should preserve their national character and their own individuality whilst deriving inspiration from French ideas. We give preference to French culture, for it harmonises better than any other with our mentality and our aspirations. But we will never allow our own national culture to die."(2)

With the common bond of revived Arabic speech, many other movements made their appearance, based on modern national, secularist and social ideas.

"I am convinced," wrote George Malouf, "that progress consists in transforming all governments into lay and secular bodies. It is illogical to deduce everything from religion as is done in the East. It means turning our backs upon progress and blocking the path of our country's future from the outset. All the misfortunes of the East have their origin in religions, and prophets are a scourge."(3)

(1) Arabic was the language of instruction, and in 1875 an Arabic Encyclopedia of all the Sciences was begun by Nasif Yazigi and continued by his sons and brothers. In the same year Yusuf Dibs founded the College de la Sagesse and wrote a History of Syria in 9 vols.

(2) Kohn, p. 271.

(3) Kohn, p. 272.

In this process of Westernization, the penetration of modern liberal thought into Syria came about under French influence, specially through the transmission of the ideas which inspired the French Revolution. (1)

On November 8, 1918, an Anglo-French declaration expressly stated the emancipation of these oppressed people and the establishment of national governments, completely ignoring the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916. It will be remembered that ever since this agreement was concluded until the end of World War I, all the Allied efforts to win over the Arab population to their side were made in the name of King Husain and Arab freedom. The only exception to this was in Lebanon, where Husain's name was never mentioned, and all emphasis in Allied propaganda directed to the people and the different associations was placed upon the concern of France for the welfare of Lebanon. (2)

This brief historical review brings us up to 1919 and the San Remo decisions. Lebanon under the Mandate deserves more comprehensive treatment elsewhere in this treatise. It was my aim in this brief review to point out the fact that even under the most severe despotism, the Arabs and specially the Lebanese have found the means for organizing themselves and for associating one with another, first in the form of purely literary societies, and later in political organizations, openly or otherwise to promote their own national aspirations.

C. THE NATURE & SCOPE OF THIS TREATISE

"Example is of the first importance in politics, because political calculations are so complex that we cannot trust theory if we cannot support it by experience." (3) Many of us have had the privilege to

(1) Ibid, p. 271.

(2) See Antonius, p. 228.

(3) Acton, "Historical Essays and Studies", p. 127.

study Political Science in theory and to trace political parties in their historical development from textbooks or otherwise. Many of us are aware of what can be called political parties in theory, few from practice. As Lebanese we are still new in the development of organized parties; thus we have been in the habit of supporting party principles and coalitions without enrolling as active and responsible members. All along we have been in the throes of strong individualism, it is only recently that we have become conscious of the need for organization and for group cooperation.

To be without a party is to be without principle, and according to the saying of an English statesman, a man who denies party belongs to a party he is ashamed of. In this treatise I have tried to avoid what Lord Acton calls the "temper of party". This has not been very easy, but I have attempted to undertake a scientific political investigation without any subservience to the interests of a party or a cause with the belief that by its very independence this investigation will give the most valuable information on a subject which few people have studied comprehensively.

Thus, I have found it necessary to link this study of party politics, and the attempt at the operation of party government (1), to the specific society and state in which they occurred, Lebanon. It is my object in this thesis to trace the main trends in the evolution of

(1) "The Party System may be regarded as an institution, supplementary to the government, aiding the electorate in the selection of official personnel, and in the determination of public policies, and in the larger task of operating or criticizing the government. In this sense the party may be regarded as a part of the government itself, an extension of officialism, starting out from very definite responsibility for official acts to the less definite responsibility for shaping and guiding the course of public opinion." Merriam and Gosnell, "The American Party System", p. 427.

party politics in Lebanon since 1919. Political movements and political parties whose evolution history traces, did not start out with straight forward aims and with definite means to reach these aims. Their aims, their means and their ends have changed with the passing of time by means of an evolutionary process which is marked by definite traceable trends.

This thesis aims at tracing the definite trend of the methods by which Lebanese parties and movements have changed to meet the new circumstances arising from situations outside their control, and the extent to which along this development they have mirrored public opinion itself and thus won favor to perpetuate themselves, or have influenced public opinion and achieved their aims through its control.

One can safely say that ever since the granting of a constitution to Lebanon in 1926, not a single deputy received his seat in the Chamber by virtue of being a party man.

At the same time very few of the parties (pluralistic) and associations which will be mentioned here, fit in with the conception of political parties but rather seem as different youth movements and organizations sacrificing parts of their programs to political reform, and to an expressed attitude on various problems pertaining to the Arab World. Others, are mere religious organizations, with expressed political views and definite policies.

Hence, it would be preferable to follow in this treatise Burke's definition, that a party is any body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular principles on which they are agreed.

I have seen fit to divide this treatise into two major parts:

I. The first part of this treatise consists in a historical narration

covering 1919-1947, the main political trends and the rise and evolution of parties and their policies on two planes; political parties and organizations proper, as well as parliamentary coalitions and groupings.(1)

II. The second part consists in a comprehensive analysis of four representative parties in Lebanon, in regard to their rise, their principles and aims, their organizations, their policies, and a critical evaluation of each. These parties are -

- (a) The Communist Party, chosen particularly because of its connection with a greater political philosophy and world view, as incorporated in the Idea of the Comintern;
- (b) The Syrian National Party, the first party to originate in Lebanon and to develop a plan and a program which transcend the political frontiers imposed since 1919, and preaching the doctrine of a Greater Geographical Syria;
- (c) The Phalanges Libanaises, as the voice of "integral" Lebanese nationalism, and based on extreme patriotism and faith in the separate existence of Lebanon;
- (d) The Party of National Appeal, because it has developed since the granting of Lebanese independence, and because its constitution was framed at a time when it was no longer necessary to win favour with the Mandated Authorities.

(1) It will be evident that we have avoided in this Treatise, the study of the three Armenian parties: the Armenian Revolutionary Hnshak Party, the Armenian Revolutionary Tashnak Party, and the Armenian Liberal Democrat Party, The Ramgavard. This has been due to the fact that they arose in Turkey between 1890-1892 (except for the last party which arose in 1921) and that they have directed their policy and their ideologies to the welfare of the Armenian people and their future Armenian State. It is true that, as found in Lebanon, these groups express a definite Lebanese policy - but this is only incidental.

II. THE EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT OF PARTIES AND THEIR POLICIES IN LEBANON; 1919-1947

A. 1920-1936:

We have seen that the second half of the 19thC marked despite Abūl Hamīd's repressive policy, the infiltration of the idea of political associations and of public opinion, both of which are Western political concepts as are democracy, responsible government, the party-system and freedom of expression. Likewise we have seen the development of a daily and periodical Arabic press, which has tended to raise the level of political knowledge and understanding and has served as a unifying intellectual force.

Since the San Remo declarations were made public, a feeling of contempt for the Western Powers saw birth, for the decisions of the San Remo Conference taken in April 1920, transgressed the provisions of the League Covenant, a binding instrument on the Allies since the ratification and enforcement of the Treaty of Versailles on January 10, 1920.(1) One can never forget that the Mandates had been assigned not by the League of Nations, but by a body, the Supreme Council, which was composed of representatives of France, Great Britain and Italy, each with special designs of her own on the former possessions of the Ottoman Empire.

Thus one can observe that, twice in 1832 as well as in 1918 a military advance into Southern Syria was met with the active assistance of the Arab inhabitants heralded by promises of political emancipation,

(1) "Both in the selection of the mandatory and in the differentiation made as between Palestine and the rest of the Arab territories, the San Remo Conference had transgressed the stipulations of the Covenant and come to decisions which violated not only the moral but the legal obligations of the Allies."
Antonius, G., "The Arab Awakening", p. 352.

allies aroused by the prospect of liberty, and twice the frustration of those hopes had its roots in the complexities of the European political system". (1)

In all but a fraction of the land, the Mandatory System had to be imposed upon the inhabitants by compulsion. (2) "The fact that the interior of the French mandated territory was actually conquered from an Arab national government, gave the French Mandate an unfortunate start, and Damascus remained the focus of anti-French movement". (3)

Yet in February 1919, when Feisal was received by the Council of Ten at Versailles advocating a federation of all Arab territories, the Paris Comité Central Syrien, led by Shuckri Ganem and George Samné demanded the total separation of Syria from the Hejaz and French protection for the new State.

In the same month, when the need for secrecy no longer existed, the Committee of Al-Fatat, (4) declared its existence and that it will function openly under the name of the "Arab Independence Party", the Independentists. Its membership increased and its popularity spread over Iraq, Syria and Palestine. Elections were held and an Assembly known as the "General Syrian Congress" was created. The resolutions they passed, and which will be here quoted, measure the chasm between real Arab aspirations and the Allied designs then manifesting themselves in Paris; (5)

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- (1) Ibid, p. 27 ff.
 - (2) This tallies with the Report of the King-Grane Commission of Inquiry sent by the U.S. government in 1919!... that the majority of the population (save the Maronites and the Zionists domiciled, which form a small percentage of the total population) would have preferred no Mandatory System, or as a second choice a single mandate for the whole of "Syria" under a Power other than France.
 - (3) Toynbee, "Survey of History", 1925, vol. 1, p. 389.
 - (4) For information about "Al-Fatat" consult earlier analysis.
 - (5) In 1920, a Constitution of the Kingdom of Damascus was promulgated though it was never put into effect as the Kingdom ceased to exist in April 1920.

"We the undersigned members of the General Syrian Congress provided with credentials and authorizations by the inhabitants of our various districts, Moslems, Christians, and Jews, have agreed upon following statement of the desires of the people of the country who have elected us to present them to the American Section of the International Commission:

1. We ask absolutely complete political independence for Syria within these boundaries: the Taurus System on the North; Hafeh and a line running from Al-Juf to the south of the Syrian and the Hejazian line to Akaba on the south; the Suphrates and Kabur rivers and a line extending east of Aby^U Kamal to the east of Al-Juf on the east; and the Mediterranean on the West.
2. We ask that the government of this Syrian country should be a democratic civil constitutional monarchy on broad decentralization principles, safe-guarding the rights of minorities, and that the King be Emir Feisal who carried on a glorious struggle in the cause of our liberation and merited our full confidence and entire reliance.
3. Considering the fact that the Arabs inhabiting the Syrian area are not naturally less gifted than other more advanced races and that they are by no means less developed than the Bulgarians, Serbians, Greeks and Roumanians at the beginning of their independence, we protest against Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, placing us among the nations in their middle stage of development which stand in need of a mandatory power.
4. In the event of the rejection of the peace conference of this just protest for certain considerations that we may not understand. We, relying on the declaration of President Wilson that his object in waging war was to put an end to the ambition of conquest and colon-

ization, can only regard the mandate mentioned in the Covenant of the League of Nations as equivalent to the rendering of economical and technical assistance that does not prejudice our complete independence. And desiring that our country should not fall prey to colonization, and believing that the American nation is farthest from any thought of colonization, and has no political ambition in our country, we will seek the technical and economic assistance from the United States of America, provided that such assistance does not exceed twenty years.

5. In the event of America not finding herself in a position to accept our desire for assistance, we will seek this assistance from Grt. Britain, also provided that such assistance does not infringe the complete independence and unity of our country, and that the duration of such assistance does not exceed that mentioned in the previous article.
6. We do not acknowledge any right claimed by the French Government in any part whatever of our Syrian country and refuse that she should assist us or have a hand in our country under any circumstances and in any place.
7. We oppose the pretensions of the Zionists to create a Jewish commonwealth in the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine, and oppose Zionist migration to any part of our country; for we do not acknowledge their title, but consider them a grave peril to our people from the national, economic and political points of view. Our Jewish compatriots shall enjoy our common rights and assume the common responsibilities.
8. We ask that there should be no separation of the southern part of Syria known as Palestine, nor of the littoral part western zone,

which includes Lebanon, from the Syrian country. We desire that the unity of the country should be guaranteed.

9. We ask complete independence for emancipated Mesopotamia and that there should be no economical barriers between the two countries". (1)

Also in 1919, the Administrative Council of Lebanon, which had twice asked for a French Mandate passed a resolution in November of that same year vigorously demanding redress from French military administration. On July 10, 7 out of its 12 members demanded independence for Lebanon and an alliance with Syria. They were all arrested, (2) and on September 1, the "state" of Greater Lebanon was created. According to Mr. Toynbee, this territorial aggrandizement is of doubtful advantage to Lebanon. By swelling non-Maronite and non-Christian elements in the population they greatly aggravated the already complicated problem of self-government on a basis of communal representation and created a formidable impediment to that entente between these two Syrian communities: the Maronites and the Sunnis. (3)

Since the establishment of the Mandate System many political organizations have developed, prominent among which are first, The Palestine Arab Congress, organized on Dec. 12, 1920, and the Syrio-Palestinian Congress organized in August 1921 at Geneva - a comprehensive body including the first and many other associations as well as representatives of Lebanese colonies and exiles abroad.

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- (1) From the First Publication of the King-Crane Report on the Near East, Editor and Publisher, N.Y., Dec. 2, 1922, p.7 - quoted in Kohn p.288-9 and in Antonius, appendix g, p. 440.
- (2) King Husain protested against the arrest and court martial of the members of this Lebanese Administrative Council. However the League of Nations still recognized Syria as enemy territory and did not interfere. (Wright, "Mandates under the League of Nations" p.109). The exiles were permitted to return in 1922. However the members of the succeeding council were interned in Corsica.
- (3) Toynbee, p. 356. In August 1920, 121,879 Sunnis were annexed to Lebanon and separated from Syria.

Their grievances were partly political and partly administrative:

1. the division of the country into two mandated territories and half a dozen states,
2. the frontiers and political regimes in these states, the French policy of "dividing and ruling" (1)
3. the failure to promote native trade and commerce, that the Mandatory government did nothing to increase the prosperity of the country,
4. the introduction of the depreciated French currency, and other monetary regulations,
5. the use of the French language officially in courts and educational institutions,
6. the suppression of civil liberties: (a) deportations, (b) internments, (c) press censorship, (d) restrictions upon freedom of association.
7. grievances against the choice and control of administrative personnel - the fact that gifted French officials stay at home and do not serve their country abroad and in the colonies and mandates, (2) etc...

The Arab nationalists have continued to regard the Mandatory System as but another name for older forms of imperial control. The Syrio-Palestinian Congress wrote to the 6th Assembly of the League of Nations:

"The Mandate System imposed on our countries cannot achieve the praise-worthy ends aimed at by the League of Nations. In practice and owing chiefly to the way in which it is applied, the Mandate has only led to their political and economic retrogression. In

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- (1) See the Manifesto of the Beirut Central group of the Lebanese National Party, Jan. 19, 1923.
 - (2) In May 1923, 200 Lebanese citizens petitioned the French government declaring that under the administration of the French Governor of Lebanon, Commandant Trabaud, public funds were squandered, elections tampered with, the police corrupt, etc... They demanded an inquiry commission. This demand was not complied with, but the Commandant was recalled.

its essence it is a system of colonization pure and simple, instead of being a means of helping these countries towards the attainment of the dearest of their aspirations, complete independence." (1)

In the words "complete independence" lies the key to the political history of both Syria and Lebanon under the Mandate. Therefore it is not surprising that the parties and organizations which sprang up following the establishment of the French Mandate over Syria and Lebanon consecrated their programs and activities completely to its attainment, treating other issues as secondary in importance. This manifested itself in the absence of a long term social and economic policy. There is no evidence that any party or association was undertaking at this period any profound and realistic investigation of the country's social and economic problems, problems which were then aggravated by the sudden transition from a feudal to a more modern system of economy with the introduction of greater Western influences, the factory system of production, the breakdown of the strong feudal ties, etc..

It must be clearly understood that political parties and the more orderly organization of public opinion are of recent introduction. Hence, it was agreed that the problem of political independence was uppermost, because this was the most positive means of insuring common unanimity among numerous factions torn up with communal and sectarian differences.

(1) Wright, p. 93. Petitions to the League have been most numerous from Syria and Palestine, where they proceed from organized groups. The Syrian Committee in Cairo has sent numerous petitions voicing the claims of the Arab Nationalists of Syria and Lebanon. It is true that Syrian petitions came from outside Syria, this is not due to the fact that dissatisfaction was not so great in the territory, but that it would have been embarrassing if not dangerous for Arab nationalists to criticize the administration at a period of political unrest and agitation. However, it is true to say that the Syrian delegates were refused a hearing at the 8th session of the Permanent Mandates Commission at Rome.

The Syrian insurrection of 1925-26 was not in any way anticipated by the Mandatory's reports on Syria. The multiplicity of sects (1), the breach in trade conditions, and the original unpopularity of France among the Moslems and the Druzes were underlying factors of this revolt. Even the Mandates' Commission found the French administration was not without blame, especially for its frequent territorial changes of the "states" within the mandated area, for the neglect of an earlier agreement with the Jebel Druze, and for the precipitancy in reform and the tactlessness of General Sarrail under whose administration the revolt broke out. (2)

The French believed that the raid of Sultan el-Atrash on Damascus in 1925 had been made in collusion with certain elements in Damascus, the Bakri family and the "People's Party", a nationalist organization of intellectuals. They arrested six members of its executive committee, but its president Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar escaped to Jebel el-Druze. About the second week of September a "National Syrian Government" was declared while in refuge. At the same time Sultan al-Atrash issued a proclamation summoning all the Syrians to fight for:

"the complete independence of Arabic Syria, one and indivisible, sea coast and interior; the institution of a national government and the free election of a constituent assembly for the framing of an organic law; the evacuation of the foreign army of occupation, and the creation of a national army for the maintenance of security; and the application of the principles of the French

(1) "In a population of only 2 1/2 million in the territory Mandated to France, there were no fewer than 18 different religious creeds more or less mutually antagonistic". - from the Report of the Permanent Mandates Commission, Feb. 16 - March 6, 1926.

(2) Wright, p. 577-578.

Revolution and the Rights of Man." (1)

On Dec. 21, 1925, M. de Jovenel ordered elections in the Alawi and Syrian states. On Dec. 23, the leaders of the Syrian People's Party who had been in enforced residence at Arwad were released and accepted to cooperate with the new government on condition that:

1. the Alawi and Jebel Druse states should be incorporated in the Syrian state on a basis of decentralisation, that four of the districts which had been annexed to the Lebanon when the Greater Lebanon was created should be restored to Syria - (Hasbaya, Rashaya, Marjayun, Baalbeck),
2. that in the other districts which had been annexed to the Lebanon on the same date elections should be held and the destiny of each district be determined by its elected representatives,
3. that the relations between Syria and France should be regulated by treaty,
4. that Syria should be administered to membership in the League of Nations,
5. that Syrian territory should be gradually evacuated by the French forces,
6. that the victims of the revolt should receive compensation,
7. that the currency should be reformed,
8. that the judicial system should be unified,
9. that there should be a general amnesty,
10. and that the Syrian government should be completely independent in the field of internal administration." (2)

(1) Toynebee, p. 426. Undoubtedly this proclamation bears the influence of Shahbandar and of western nationalism.

(2) Ibid., p. 43?

These conditions were rejected and a provisional head of state was appointed: Damad Ahmed Nami Bey.

In January 1926, elections were held in pursuance of the Arrete of Dec. 21, 1925, and the People's Party produced a boycott at Hama and Hamah of the polls. These were placed under martial law, certain notables including several released from Arwad were sent back. (1) The political situation deteriorated causing a greater delay in the fulfillment of the Mandate Charter for Syria and Lebanon which provides for the framing of an organic law within three years of the initial beginning of the Mandate.

In Lebanon, the Representative Council drew up a constitution in 1925, providing an elected President, by convention a Christian, a representative ministry, an elected Chamber, a nominated Senate (later combined into one Chamber, 2/3 elected, 1/3 nominated.) Modified in 1927, and 1929, it was suspended in 1932. Immediately after the proclamation of the Lebanese Republic on the 24th of May 1926, there was founded in Lebanon a party of Syrian Federation. Thus the second marked feature which characterizes our tedious narration, is the predominant wish of the majority (at least at this stage of our political evolution) for unity with Syria, if not complete at least partially by the return to the old pre-1920 frontiers - a unity based on a common opposition to the French and their policy.

Perhaps the statement of General Sarrail, which appeared in "Le Temps" on Nov. 1, 1925 sums up the existing situation in Lebanon and Syria:

"That France exported to Syria already distracted by indigenous feuds, the political and religious differences, that have so

(1) The leaders of the newly fashioned Communist Party were also arrested and its activities checked at their start.

long characterized her own life."

We have already seen that following the Syrian insurrection, the French authorities attempted to create a change of policy both in Syria and Lebanon, so that by 1928, the situation improved with the development of self-governing constitutions in both Lebanon and Syria. In 1929, in only four of the communities, Iraq, Transjordan, Lebanon and Syria, were there governments distinct from that of the Mandatory - but even in these areas the native governments lacked complete control of internal affairs and had almost no control of foreign affairs. (1)

This was the lull during which the French vested interests (2) hoped to regulate the well-functioning of the Mandate in Syria and Lebanon; first, to maintain France as a Mediterranean power like Britain and Italy; second, as a protection for the maritime and air routes to the Far East; third, in defence of the oil pipe-line Kirkuk-Tripoli (a policy achieved through coordinated Franco-British agreement); and lastly to retain their control in Morocco, for fear that a harmful policy here would have its repercussions in the Arabic speaking Moslem population of Morocco.

"France pursued a policy opposing and weakening the growing tide of Arab nationalism with its claim for complete independence; and strengthening the traditionally or potentially Francophil elements: the Christians, the Alewis, the Kurds etc.; and specially strengthening the Lebanon vis a vis the interior." (3)

(1) Wright, p. 397-398.

(2) It would be remembered that French vested interests owned 23 3/4% of the share capital of the Iraq Petrol Co., and that France got from 1/3-1/2 of her total oil supply from Iraq through Haifa and later through Tripoli - this aside from interest in the Jazira oil, and other vested interests - and that France had paid by official estimate of 1936, 4,848 m.fr. for military and civil expenditures.

(3) Hourani, A., "Syria and Lebanon", p. 167.

In 1934, the Haut Commissariat reestablished in Lebanon a small Chamber. However, Lebanese political life during that period was deeply affected by the struggle for equality or superiority between a number of small communities, none of which was strong or big enough to dominate the political scene. The result was that sectarian loyalties and jealousies were strengthened and communal differences came to be respected and recognized despite Articles 7 and 12 of the Constitution which say that all Lebanese citizens are equal before the law, enjoying the same rights and duties, and that they are equally admissible to public offices - so that in the end communities came to be represented in public offices and even in the Ministries.

Whatever sense of solidarity, or of a corporate consciousness still prevailing from the sanjaq administration came to be completely lacking under the rule of the Mandatory. This sense of solidarity had been based upon a common way of life and a common tradition of autonomy. Perhaps our greatest misfortune is the fact that when this corporate consciousness was lost, the differences of opinion about the best way to recreate it did not embody themselves in organized parties.

"The parties which dominated elections and the life of the Chamber were scarcely more than loose alliances of prominent politicians, based upon personal common interest rather than common doctrine. They were so organized so as to include representatives of all the leading sects. Most important of them were the Unionist group led by Emile Bde, and the Constitutionalists of whom the leading member was Bishara al-Khuri.

The main division between these two groups was the personal rivalry of their leaders - yet the former was more intransigent in its belief in Lebanese independence, and less disposed to

establish close relations with Syria and other Arab countries than the latter." (1)

We have seen that under the administration of General Gouraud, General Weygand, and General Sarrail, political parties of a rudimentary form existed and demonstrated before the elections, but I must stress here the fact that whenever it was desired to present formal criticism of the Mandatory authority to the French Government, it was always the custom for the leading men to meet for the single purpose of signing complaints, and dispersing afterwards - heads of powerful families who helped shape public opinion in an endeavour to protect their own interests.

From the national point of view, this system had its advantages. It made it more difficult for the Mandatory Authority to select and punish those who took the initiative in drawing up protests, since they were generally reluctant to discipline a large number of notables at one time. Nevertheless, this system by strengthening the individualistic factor, served as a substitute for well organized and capable parties - so that Lebanon waited until the early nineteen thirties for the formation of a crop of new and vigorous youth organizations and political associations modeled on their western counterparts, and ready to appeal to the youth and to win favor with the new generations.

"The early 1930's saw the development of a number of political parties with a special appeal to the educated youth of the towns - differentiated in their doctrines and aims, they were alike in that they endeavoured to establish a degree of organization and cohesion which older parties had not for the most part possessed;

(1) Hourani, p. 185.

alike, too in that they tried to base their activities not upon gusts of feeling or some immediate objective, but upon systematic and reasoned doctrines (expressing and attempting to direct the spirit of the youth: a restless youth, discontented both with its foreign masters and with its own older generation, conscious of talents and ideas and cramped by lack of opportunity, drawn simultaneously towards and away from the West, eager and suspicious, hasty and thoughtful.) Even when they took a paramilitary form, this does not mean that they were fascist, they were merely endeavouring to satisfy certain human needs which in more fortunate countries are satisfied by days of national celebration, military service, and voluntary organizations." (1)

Among these groups and parties are:

1. The Communist Party - a consequence of the fast developing class consciousness of the proletariat whether industrial or agricultural, which ignores national boundaries and has nothing to gain from national policies. Having been prematurely thwarted in its activities during the late 1920's, it was allowed to refunction after 1929.
2. The Syrian National Party, which first saw the light in 1932 at Beirut, and where its propagator Mr. A. Saade was teaching a course in German, and getting into contact with the interested youth and staff of the American University of Beirut.
3. The Lebanese Nationalist party - the Phalanges Libanaises, which has tried to remain independent of government and politicians ^{aiming} to arouse a consciousness of the separate existence of Lebanon. As a movement it dates with Nov. 21, 1936.

(1) Hourani, p. 196.

4. and the "Hajjadah", a Moslem Pan-Arab organization, which emerged on Nov. 10, 1937.

These parties would be dealt with in greater detail elsewhere in this treatise. It will suffice at this junction to point out the fact that they arose at a time when fascism and communism were entrenching themselves in Europe, and that they undoubtedly portray their colorings in some of their aspects, in so far as they were affected by these totalitarian world views.

Perhaps one of the most important Arab Nationalist youth organizations was the League of National Action, which tried to weld into a unity Arab youth regardless of their respective countries. Its program was formulated at a Congress held in Kernaal Lebanon in 1933, and flourished for some years after that in the Syrian towns; e.g. Homs, Hamah, Aleppo, etc. Its Lebanese program sets down the following principles:

1. That the League is mainly a national, constructive and cultural party,
2. that it regards Lebanon in its present geographical existence as an independent Arab country.
3. The League regards the whole Lebanese people as fellow citizens with no differentiation between them save those based on natural gifts, character, knowledge and fruitful national actions.
4. The League, a national institution, does not recognize the existence in Lebanon of a majority or of a minority, because it does not stand on any religious, sectarian or patriarchal basis but regards the Lebanese as one cohesive people, regardless of their religious beliefs. As Lebanese endowed with a pure Arab national consciousness, it is no longer necessary to regard them as either Moslem or Christian. Any other view applied to the Lebanese would be regarded by

the League as unworthy of the 20th C standards of knowledge and belittling of the Lebanese themselves.

5. The League works for the raising of the social standard of living in the village, fighting against illiteracy by means of night schools where education is conducted by the League members.
6. The League is to diffuse the pure national idea on a scientific basis among the Lebanese, the Arab culture, as well as Latin and Anglo-Saxon and other world cultures moulding them nationally and imprinting them with Arab nationalism.
7. The League works to make out of Lebanon the golden link in the chain of Arab countries, which would all form eventually one unified nation.
8. The League works for the establishment of a just financial system, to enable Lebanon to flourish as a summer and winter resort, and which would stimulate work in agriculture and industry.
9. The League works for the encouragement of nationally manufactured goods, and its members are asked to help in consuming these goods.
10. The League denies the right of religious dignitaries to interfere in politics.
11. The League equally regards both man and woman as the basis of the national revival - and is itself made up of members belonging to both sexes. (1)

Its slogans have been: order and organization, obedience, patience and sacrifice. Never very important in the other Arab countries, it suffered a severe blow by the death in Syria of its first president - Abdul Razzak ad-Dandashi.

Thus the common tradition of Asia which stresses the fact that

(1) Consult "Al-Mahar", No. 1616, for the Arabic text of this program.

movements are made more often by individual men rather than organized societies, and that hence there is a tendency for the creation by the outstanding individual to disintegrate at his death, is seen to apply perfectly to this movement.

The activities of this League were curtailed during the war, and it was only in 1944, that a slight revival in its activities came to be noticeable. One of its principles was to hold aloof from established governments and leaders. In this it differed from the National Youth, an off-shoot of the National Bloc of Syria, a paramilitary organization which came into prominence in 1935-36. Open to members of all religions - it was a fair representative of all the religious communities, particularly the Maronites, who were educated under the Jesuits.

Not radically different in its program from the League of National action, much of its strength was wasted in conflict with it. (1)

B. 1936-1939:

The year 1935-36 saw the arrival of the Syrian Delegation to Paris, where negotiations for a Franco-Syrian treaty culminated in success, and where the draft treaty itself was initialled. In Lebanon under the leadership of Mr. Emile Bde, who was then the President of the Lebanese Republic, similar negotiations were conducted, and the Franco-Lebanese treaty was initialled in November of the same year. News of this treaty was heartily welcomed by the Maronites and the Francophil elements in the Lebanon but bitterly opposed by the Sunnis who lost all hope of reunion with Syria.

In January 1937, the constitution of 1926 was restored in the Lebanon, and Khair Ed-Din Al-Ahdab charged with forming a new ministry.

(1) This is particularly true of the period dating 1937-38, and numerous League pamphlets testify to the extent of their quarrel with the National Youth.

This period, more than any other in the political strife of Lebanon, is marked by a continued domination of sectarian issues. During the same year a new electoral law providing for a larger and newer Chamber was passed replacing the old Chamber and its obsolete method of elections.

November 1937, saw the emergence of a new Pan-Arab youth organization - the "Najjadah" - a national organization aiming at the liberation of the country from all ignorance, exploitation and colonization. (1) Its motto being: "The land of the Arabs is for the Arabs" (2). Its aim was to combine the youth and unify their ranks; to arouse in them a national consciousness; to habituate them to obedience, discipline and sacrifice; to instill in them an athletic spirit and to direct all their forces to the raising of Lebanon's prestige, and to link Lebanon in a union with the other Arab countries (3), for Lebanon has the same duties and rights as all the other Arab countries (4).

Articles 6 and 7 of the Najjadah Basic Principles expressly state that this organization acts for the common good and is above parties forbidding any of its members from participating in the national elections, even in their personal capacities before resigning from its obligations.

Members have to pledge:

- To fulfill their duties towards God and the Fatherland,
- To be always ready to help the needy, and
- To obey the orders of their superiors and the law of the "Najjadah". (5)

A more critical analysis of this organization would be undertaken elsewhere in the evaluation of the Lebanese National party, the Phalanges Libanaises.

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- (1) See Article 1 of the "Najjadah" Charter.
 - (2) Ibid, Art. 2.
 - (3) The Najjadah: Its Basic Principles, 1937, Art. 4
 - (4) Ibid, Art. 5
 - (5) The Najjadah: Its Basic Principles, 1937, Art. 10.

At the same time, i.e. in Nov. 1937, a new Chamber was elected and was only remarkable for the bitterness and complexity of its internal dissensions. As a consequence there developed a loss of interest and faith in the constitutional system as applied in Lebanon. It was not only that the then popular parties and parliamentary leaders - Unionist and Constitutionalist - ceased to have even a limited hold on public opinion, but that the Lebanese themselves saw the uselessness of having a costly parliament in existence, staffed by feudal landlords and eminent lawyers, wasting their time in oratory and petty quarrels and exhibiting a marked loss of interest in the country's welfare.

At the same time a movement of discontent with sectarianism was strengthened - the Phalanges Libanaises was supported, as well as the Syrian National Party, with its doctrine of the total separation of church and state.

A third consequence was the complacent opinion of the Arab nationalists who regarded the failure of the constitutional system as sufficient proof of the instability of Lebanese independence, and its need for support from the other Arab countries.

However, I think it would be interesting to note here that the Syrian experiment in national government which was initiated in 1936, was also a failure, mainly because of the Turkish claims on Alexandretta; the growth of separatist movements in Latakia, Jazira and Jebel el-Druze; the failure of the French government to ratify the treaty; the unrest caused by the Palestine disturbances; the administrative failure of the National government, and the growth of internal oppositions led by Shahbandar and later Quwatly. It would be wrong to think that these forces did not have strong repercussions on the political life of Lebanon - however, an analysis of their effects would lead us far

beyond the scope of this treatise.

During 1939-1940 a joint proclamation of the political Arab organizations in Lebanon was issued by:

The National Committee

The League of National Action

The Arab National Party

The Syrian National Party

The National Arab Party

The Najjadah

The Arab Union Committee (1)

All 7 agreed on the following demands:

1. The formation of an independent Arab Syrian nation including Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan and all the other Arab provinces partitioned from Syria after World War I.
2. To recognize the Arab Syrian nation, as a complete indivisible unity.
3. That in so far as the majority of the Lebanese people favor a unity with Syria - it is neither just nor right to allow Lebanon to lead an independent political, economic and military life.
4. The formation of an Arab federation, including all the neighbouring Arab countries on the basis of one unified domestic and foreign policy, providing for each country a separate administrative regime.
5. To reinstitute the Arab claims to Palestine, and to wage a common war against Zionism in all the other Arab countries. (2)

(1) The fact that the above 7 parties and organizations reached an agreement on the enumerated resolutions, helps a great deal in eliminating whatever minor differences persist in their basic principles and aims.

(2) See The Proclamation of the Arab Political Organizations in Lebanon, 1939-1940.

About the same time, in May 1939, a general conference of all the anti-fascist organizations was held in Beirut. Prominent among its representatives were the Communist parties and their different sub-committees.

The ensuing political crisis in Lebanon, came to an end in 1939 with the suspension of the constitution.

C. 1939-1943:

The year 1939 not only saw the abrogation of the constitution and the dissolution of the Lebanese Chamber, but the beginning of a total world war whose effects were too far reaching and of vast importance to both the Syrian and the Lebanese people.

Primarily linked to the fate of France, the effect of the French capitulation and the French withdrawal from the League of Nations on April 18, 1941, vastly affected the Mandate over Syria and Lebanon and were the sparks which prompted the nationalist aspirations for freedom.

General Dentz conceded after many disturbances and allowed Mr. Alfred Naccache to head a new ministry in the Lebanon. At the same time the attempt to seize control in Iraq in 1941 under Rashid Ali al-Gailani, in the name of Pan-Arab nationalism, and the failure of this coup, caused a wave of doubt and self criticism over all the nationalist ranks in the Arab countries, particularly in Syria and Lebanon, who were then both under Vichy French control.

The Allied occupation of Syria and Lebanon was preceded by a Free French proclamation, which was issued by General Catroux on June 8, 1941, and addressed to the Syrians and the Lebanese people, declaring their independence:

"At the moment when the forces of Free France, united to the forces of

the British Empire her ally, are entering your territory, I declare that I assume the powers, the responsibilities and the duties of the Representative of "La France au Levant". This in the name of Free France which identifies itself with the traditional and real France and in the name of her Chief, General de Gaulle.

In this capacity I come to put an end to the regime of the Mandate and to proclaim you free and independent. You will therefore, be from hence-forward sovereign and independent peoples and you will be able either to form yourselves into separate states or to unite into a single state..." (1)

On September 28, 1941, Syrian independence was granted, and through a proclamation issued by General Catroux on Nov. 26, 1941, Lebanese independence under President Alfred Naccache came to be officially recognized. This proclamation received a lukewarm reception from the Beirut press, mainly

- (a) because it repudiated all probable union with Syria, a possibility proclaimed on June 8, and quoted in the original text above;
- (b) the second objection centered around the following provision of the proclamation:

"In recognizing your independence, France is only inspired by its traditional friendship for Lebanon, its tutelary mission in this country during the course of centuries and the privileged situation which it has thus acquired." (2)

and that any future treaty with the Lebanon would be based on the 1936 treaty and its provisions;

(1) For the remainder of this proclamation, see, "The Near East". Harris Foundation Lectures, 1942, Appendix, p. EEE.
(2) Ibid, p. 231

(c) the third objection was to the following provision:

"France considers that the State of Lebanon, from a political and territorial point of view, constitutes an indivisible unit, the integrity of which must be preserved from any attack." (1) that no change in the Syrian and Lebanese frontiers would be ever undertaken.

On Dec. 26 and 27th, King George VI congratulated both the Syrian and the Lebanese Presidents on the acquisition of their political independence, and the road was opened for the exchange of political representatives.

In Syria the failure to hold elections and to restore the constitutional government led to general discontent and the revival of the "National Bloc", which strongly demanded the restoration of the 1936-39 Chamber, or free elections. Its primary spokesman was Shukri el-Quwatly. At the same time there was in both Syria and Lebanon a revival and rapid growth in the size and influence of the socialist and communist movement, not particularly owing to the spread of Marxism as to a snatch at any hope of change, at the betterment of the hopeless economic problems facing the country - of ravitaillement, the wheat supply, excessive inflation, etc. (2)

In March 1943 provisional governments were established in both Syria and Lebanon to make arrangements for the coming elections - headed by Ata Al-Ayubi and Dr. Ayyub Tabit, who was later replaced in the Lebanon by Mr. Petro Trad.

The general elections for the first completely elected Lebanese Chamber were held in August 1943. It will suffice if we only quote

(1) Ibid, p. 232

(2) This spread of the communist movement, coincided with the sweeping Russian victories on the European battlefield against the Axis Powers.

here the program of the National Bloc headed by Eddah, and set down by George Akle on August 9, 1943:

1. The complete independence of Lebanon.
2. Following a favourable policy to the United Nations our faithful allies.
3. The development of amicable relations with the neighbouring countries, on the basis of a reciprocal respect to the total sovereignty of each
4. That democratic Lebanon,
 - a) should continue to respect the religious creeds, and to represent them proportionally in government,
 - b) to insure the perfect equality of the individual's political and civil rights,
 - c) to allocate public offices in accordance with merit and skill, and to represent justly the different elements in the civil service.
5. The reform of the administrative system and the extension of local autonomy.
6. To popularize youth education in the Lebanon and to propagate a distinctly national culture.
7. To insure health protection and the prevention of disease.
8. To encourage, agriculture, trade, industry and tourism.
9. To carry out general irrigation schemes.
10. General social reforms: the institution of first aid and social welfare stations, labor reforms, etc.
11. The guarantee of all the rights and privileges of Lebanese immigrants.
12. To unite all the Lebanese regardless of their creeds into a cohesive unity based on a common national sentiment for their Lebanese Fatherland. (1)

(1) For an Arabic text of this program, see: Abella, R., "The Evolution of Governmental Systems in the Lebanon since the Mandate", Beirut, 1943, p. 95.

It is evident from a perusal of the different programs, that the differences between the candidates was largely personal, and any conflict of principles was of minor importance. The extreme supporters of Lebanese independence were headed by Edeh and the Unionists, and the moderate advocates of autonomy headed by Bishara el-Khuri and the Arab nationalists.

On September 21, Mr. Bishara el-Khuri was elected President, and Riad el-Solh entrusted with the formation of the new ministry, as the leader of Arab nationalism and an old associate of Quwatly and the independentist group, the successor of Al-Fatat.

The general elections held in 1943 marked a new change in the political life of Lebanon, a trend which is characterized by three new factors, which can be easily deduced from the actions of the new Chamber and the Ministry which emanated from it:

1. The fact that the politically conscious Lebanese people expressed an open desire for the extension of autonomy and clearly indicated their intolerance of any large-scale foreign interference in their domestic affairs as under the French Mandate.
2. The desire of an increasing number of the people to end the connection with France altogether, categorically divided into two main groups:
 - a) Those who believed at this stage that Great Britain was in a more favourable position to replace France.
 - b) And those who believed that protection should be done away with once and for all, and that the fate of Lebanon depended to a greater extent upon the goodwill of its neighbours than upon any foreign control - and that hence Lebanon's policy must be directed towards the conciliation of its neighbours, as the most practical means for

gaining its security.

3. The fact that Greater Lebanon has been accepted by the same extreme Arab nationalists who had bitterly agitated before against it. This strange phenomena can be explained in part as owing to the fact that Greater Lebanon is predominantly Moslem and is as a consequence less separatist than smaller Lebanon with its Christian majority - and that it provides the possibility for the development of non sectarian Arab nationalism.

All these and many other problems can be easily deduced from the national press (1) and its treatment of the Franco-Lebanese crisis which culminated in the November disturbances and which gained for Lebanon a greater degree of self-government. One must remember that aside from the limitations made necessary by war, the independent government of Lebanon was also limited in other respects, notable among which are:-

1. The limitations on the Legislative power, by the French Delegate-General, who legislated by decree and through the reservations in the Constitution.
2. The Administrative Services were under the supervision of the Delegate General and administered in the upper ranks by a French staff - i.e.
 - a) The Common Interests
 - b) The Troupes Speciaux
 - c) The Surete Generale
 - d) The control of the Bedouins
 - e) Press Censorship, etc..

(1) For greater details consult the collection of newspaper clippings and articles on the Nov. 1943 crisis, kept at the record room in the A.U.B. Library at Beirut.

3. Further restrictions were evident in the influence of the administrative and technical French advisors, and the officers of the *Troupes Speciaux* (intelligence officers) who among other things controlled the supervision of the frontiers..

Hence it is not surprising to find that when Riad el-Solh attempted to revise the constitution matters would come to a headstart, leading to the arrest of the National Government on Nov. 11, 1943, and culminating in an 11 day strike. It will suffice to point out here that the antagonistic French Attitude was largely determined by the obvious development of closer relationship between the Levant states and Great Britain - a movement which seems to have gained impetus in proportion to the decline of the French influence here, the extension of British rule over all the integral parts of the Arab world, and the strongly binding ties of the movement for Arab unity. (1)

We will have occasion to refer elsewhere to the effects on Lebanese politics of this declining French power.

D. 1943-1947:

We have already noted the general features in the movement for political independence and freedom in Lebanon. The following part of our treatise would be consecrated to the analysis of the effects caused by the national struggle for liberation on the general trend of public opinion; the change in the general policy of the political organizations and parties; and the general innovations which have had to be made by these movements in an attempt to adapt themselves to our new independent status - an era successfully inaugurated with the revision of our Constitution and the alteration of our national flag.

(1) See H^ourani, "Syria and Lebanon" - p. 290.

January 1, 1944, found General Catroux willing to transfer the Common Interest Services to the national governments of Syria and Lebanon. Within the next two months, a final agreement about the rest of the points under discussion was arrived at - so that the end of 1944 the only important attribute not transferred was the control of the local levies the "troupes speciaux".

In September 1944, the United States officially recognized the independence of Syria and Lebanon. (1) Thus supported in their national struggle, both Syria and Lebanon failed to endorse the Lyttelton - de Gaulle agreement of 1941 about the French privileges and pre-eminent position here.

At this time a number of political organizations developed in response to the challenge generated by our first independent national government. Based on broad democratic principles, all agreed that the problem of political independence was of secondary importance now; that it was no longer necessary to reconcile themselves to the presence of a Mandated Authority; but that a greater part of their programs should be given up to the analysis of the existing political, social and economic situation and to express a definite consciousness of the necessity for reform. This objective reform would be the first step towards the actual realization of internal as well as external independence.

Prominent among these organizations, was the Greek Orthodox movement of the "Ghassassinah", (2) which aimed at the unification of all the Lebanese national youth, in order to insure better understanding among them and to preserve their national culture and customs. It sought

(1) The USSR granted official recognition to the independent status of Lebanon and Syria in July of the same year.

(2) Similar movements were: "Al-Nahda" centered around Ahmed Al-Asad, and the Shia organization "Al-Taji" centered around Rashid Baydun.

to realize this aim through the propagation of athletic and scouting expeditions, tournaments, etc. which it thought, would train and discipline the youth and insure harmony and obedience, paving the way for greater individual and group responsibility in public relations.

As an organization the "Ghasassinah" aimed at the preservation of the spiritual and materialistic existence of Lebanon, the result of our special heritage and acquired through historical evolution. (1) Its slogan has been: Faith, Order, and Action. (2)

1944, also marks the spread of communism in Lebanon and Syria, a unity sufficient to neutralize the centrifugal force of sectarianism. This movement was adopted and supported by those who had come to believe that nationalism was unable to provide a stable government in the countries torn up with internal divisions and obstacles of all kinds.

At the same time, i.e., during 1943-1944, "The National Bloc" emerged in Lebanon headed by Michele Pharaon, and with Salim Sâris as vice-President. Prominent among its members were Habib Rubeiz and Dr. George Hanna, a communist sympathizer. Never very prominent, it has survived on the political scene, conducting numerous campaigns, and remaining fairly insignificant.

A considerable development in the movement for Arab unity took place when the Arab League was established at the Alexandria Conference, September - October 1944, and later in Cairo, 1945. The Protocol issued at the end of the Alexandria Conference contained a special appendix guaranteeing the independence of Lebanon within its present frontiers on condition that the Lebanese Government would continue to

(1) The Ghasassinah: Basic Internal Code, 1944, Article 1

(2) Ibid, Article 2.

pursue a policy of independence similar to the one adopted on 1943.

From that day on the Arab states achieved full equality in the world community by joining the United Nations. In February 1945, Syria and Lebanon declared war on Germany and Japan and in April they signed the Declaration of the United Nations, thus becoming entitled to attend the San Francisco Conference which was held in 1945.

In 1945-1946 agreement was finally reached on the withdrawal of British and French troops from Lebanon, whose independence thus became complete. It must be stressed here that this does not necessarily mean that the deeper problems which affect the internal structure of Lebanon and its relation with the outside world, have all been done away with, but that on the contrary these issues have all come to be the starting point for the development of various political attitudes and views on Lebanon, and have been embodied in the basic principles of more than one party.

We have seen elsewhere that from the last peace settlement to 1941 France controlled Syria and Lebanon as a Mandatory Power. After the declaration of Syrian and Lebanese independence in 1941, the Mandate came to an end, though technically it remained in force until the entry of Syria and Lebanon into the United Nations Organization in April 1945. One must remember that from its beginning until 1943, the Lebanese Republic was held together by the control and constant intervention of France. The collapse of France in 1940 - introduced a new foreign power with which the Arab East has since had to contend - and that is Russia. Traditionally connected to the Greek Orthodox elements in the population, it had been forcibly cut off in 1917, and remained up till now isolated from this contact. At this stage of the political development of Lebanese politics, foreign representatives were exchanged, and the communist

movement reached its apex in development.

The Lebanese problem now that our independence has been recognized, and no possible change in our frontiers is expected, is the problem of governmental structure. That so long as government is to be organized on a sectarian basis the relation between the communities is liable to be strained.

I can see no way out of this dilemma at the present moment, except by working for its improvement along two main lines: First, the development of a sense of Lebanese unity and a consciousness of the place of Lebanon as a part of the Arab World; and second, the lack of all interference and stirrings in the Lebanese political life on the part of interested states.

In the words of Mr. Albert Hourani:

"Communism alone has the universality of extension, the supernatural source and sanction which can override human distinctions and hold together diverse communities in a common task.

Short of a communist revolution in the Arab lands, there does not seem any possibility of creating a supra-national state in the Middle East." (1)

It would be interesting to note here that the crop of new parties which arose at this time in Lebanon, have all attempted indirectly to solve these problems. Prominent among these parties are: The Party of National Appeal (2), The Lebanese Christian Socialist Party, and the Party of Republican Union.

On March 21, 1946, Mr. Ilyas Harfouche, G. Tabet and Dr. T. Rizk presented a formal demand for the formal recognition of a new party, "The Lebanese Christian Socialist Party", to be centered in Beirut. This

(1) Hourani, "Minorities in the Arab World", p. 120

(2) This party is dealt with elsewhere in this treatise.

party aimed at the defence of Lebanon's independence, and the raising of the Lebanese social and economic levels, preserving at the same time the amicable relations with the democratic countries participating in the United Nations Organization. (1)

Their program included both a domestic and a foreign policy affirming the separate existence of Lebanon and defining its relation with the rest of the Arab countries within the framework of the Arab League. Their domestic program consisted of general democratic and liberal reforms, such as: the demand for the granting of political status to women, unemployment insurance, old age pensions, health insurance, etc. However a careful analysis of their rather lengthy program reveals no clue to the socialist coloring suggested in the name of the party. (2) Aside from this published program, and a few press comments, I have been unable to trace any further development in this party. This can be explained as owing in part to the "Christian" adjective stressed in the name of the party, and which was bound to receive a lukewarm reception from certain elements in the Lebanese population. In fact this unpopularity has forced the party to alter its name. (3)

Before taking into consideration the Party of Republican Union, we must first study the rise of the Committee of National Liberation in May 1947. The special circumstances of the times, i.e., the May 25th 1947 elections in Beirut, (4) forced it to become an opposition party

- (1) "The rivalry of social classes is breeding a growth in social democratic and communistic movements and the spread of other parties which propose far reaching social reforms" - Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, p. 227.
- (2) The Program of the Lebanese Christian Socialist Party, March 21, 1946, Beirut.
- (3) Consult the editorial of Al-Hadith, No. 2418, March 16, 1948.
- (4) A public opinion survey, which a representative sample of the Lebanese population answered resulted in having only 13 % of the people remembering the date of the 1943 elections, while a 100% retained the date of the 1947 elections.
(Action-September 28-29, 1947.)

under the leadership of Abed-el-Hamid Karami. In its Manifesto it resolved:

1. "To confirm the decisions it had taken on June 29, 1947, to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, and to hold new elections under a neutral government.
2. To introduce radical reforms, which would save Lebanon from certain dangers to which it is exposed, e.g.:
 - a) the total separation and the guarantee of the integral independence of the Lebanese judicial system.
 - b) To assure the respect of public authority, of civil servants, and of governmental laws and decrees.
 - c) To revise the laws dictated by the Mandated authority, and which limit public freedom and the public liberties. That these codes are no longer compatible with our conception of democracy or with Lebanon's obligations, obligations incurred since its admission to the U.N.O. (freedom of opinion, freedom of association, freedom of the press.)
 - d) The revision by statute of the administrative system. The amelioration of the conditions of teachers, etc.
 - e) The creation of a public accounting department, and of rigid inspection of all public departments.
 - f) The establishment of compulsory gratuitous education.
3. The formulation of a five year construction plan - including irrigation, hydraulic schemes, etc..
 - a) The reduction of the high cost of living ..
 - b) The establishment of a customs union with the countries and member states of the Arab League.
 - c) Planned exports and imports, to control the national economy. The

use of foreign exchange to import necessities first, etc..

4. To hold a general congress on the 14th of Sept. 1947" (1)

Since then two new demands appeared in the party decree issued on October 28, 1947 (2):

1. The formation of a neutral government comprising eminent Lebanese personalities, to supervise the new elections.
2. As well as the formation of a responsible committee charged with the revision of the constitution and the electoral law.

It is apparent from the above provisions, that this party voiced the general public discontent, with the May 25th elections, as well as with the governmental structure, the system of elections, and the fraud which was stealthily conducted. Similar criticisms of the government's stand and undemocratic interference were expressed by all the Lebanese parties, youth organizations and ladies' clubs. (3) Since then, the opposition party has had to attend to more important problems, the Palestine problem, the monetary agreements with France and Syria, etc..

More so than during the last elections, the month of May 1947, saw extensive party rallies, speeches, the formulation of programs, the issuing of party placards, etc. It cannot be easily determined whether the unavowed governmental interference had as much to do in denying adequate representation to the major parties and opposition lists in the Chamber, as their virtual weakness, their lack of cohesion and unity,

(1) A translation of the Manifesto issued by the Opposition on August 26, 1947, from the texts that appeared in "Le Soir" Aug. 27, 1947, and "Beirut", August 28, 1947.

(2) "Beirut", October 28, 1947.

(3) Consult the party resolutions, press clippings etc. on the 1947 elections kept at the record room of the A.U.B. Main Library.

and the interplay of rival personal interests etc. One result of these elections was that it became ridiculous to accept as valid the inflated membership figures quoted by the Lebanese parties and their spokesmen in determining their strength.

On January 18, 1948, a plenary session of the Party of Republican Union was held in Beirut at the house of its President, Mr. Nehme Tabet. The program of this party originated for the specific purpose of enlightening the Lebanese people on their basic national problems and of confining and directing their capacities to the service of their nation. Thus in order to represent the general will of the Lebanese people it is necessary:

1. To understand clearly the actual Lebanese problem and the mission of the Lebanese State,
2. To formulate a practical plan which would insure the organization of the people's capacities and their direction into the desired channels for the realization of the Lebanese problem,
3. The execution of this practical plan and program, and the realization of its aims - this is the task which confronts this party in the practical field." (1)

Thus motivated, the party aim is -

"to inspire a popular revival aiming at the realization of an all inclusive reform, embracing all the different aspects of Lebanese life; and to the institution of the Lebanese State on rules and principles of justice and of social, political and economic efficiency, with the purpose of continuing the progressive mission of the Lebanese people." (2)

(1) "The Party of Republican Union" - A speech delivered by Nehme Tabet on January 18, 1948, p. 18.

(2) The Program of the Party as Agreed Upon by the Preparatory Committee on August 30, 1947, p. 2.

In its program, the party sets down definite principles:

A. Social Aspect (1)

"The Lebanese form a socially unified body enjoying equally the same civil and political rights."

This principle refutes the sectarian creed of our age, and is the basis for humanitarian justice and the equality of rights and privileges.

B. Political Aspect (2)

"The political organization of the Lebanese State is republican, democratic and secular."

C. Economic Aspect (3)

"The economic organization of the Lebanese State is to be socialist cooperative in structure, moderate in outlook, unionist in organization, benefitting from the experiences of similar unionist organizations and what these entail of accurate classification of the trades and of economic interests, as well as of their just representation and of their possible reform.

Agricultural wealth, tourism and their subsidiary productive industries, as well as economic relations with immigrants abroad will be the basis for the National Lebanese Economy."

Thus Lebanon would benefit from human experience in economic organization, and we will rely on our natural resources, exploiting them to satisfy our economic necessities and to raise the Lebanese standard of living.

The party stands for socialist cooperation because socialism:-

1. realizes the right of state control of all economic activity, to abolish the exploitation of the community by one person or one industrial concern;

(1) The Program of the Party of Republican Union, p. 2

(2) Ibid., p. 4

(3) Ibid., p. 6

2. Socialism realizes the necessity of reforming financial social and administrative elements in production: Labor, land and capital;

3. And because socialism realizes the necessity for the partial control of private property as a safeguard against persecution.

This economic structure is adopted by the party because it realizes social justice without accepting the program of any particular socialist party or socialist regime as existing in any known country.

D. Educational Aspect (1)

"The educational regime in Lebanon should be inspired by the responsible deep and comprehensive appreciation of the importance of this primary duty of the state in moulding society in a way that will indicate its historical and cultural values.

This regime is to be deduced from the actual role of Lebanon as bearing a cultural liberating mission; and inspired from classical culture, as Lebanon has been one of its founders, and from the Arabic tradition, of which Lebanon has been an original representative, and a protector throughout the ages."

It is with this party that we shall end our historical narration on the rise and evolution of party politics in Lebanon since 1919, finding it necessary to ignore the political developments which have occurred since the rise of this party, as these fall in time beyond the scope of this treatise.

(1) Ibid., p. 13.

III. AN ANALYSIS OF FOUR REPRESENTATIVE LEBANESE PARTIES

A. THE COMMUNIST PARTY

1. Rise of

The communist party in its unified form originated in 1925, following the Syrian insurrection of that same year, and actually participating in that revolt. Its leaders were imprisoned and then exiled to Irwad and the desert. In 1929 the party reemerged and became active on the political scene until the Decree No. 285 was issued on the 29th of September under the Mandated authorities dissolving it. Since then the Communist party has been working secretly or otherwise, partly tolerated and partly opposed.

2. Party Principles and Aims

Any analysis of the Lebanese Communist Party or of its Syrian counterpart must by necessity begin with the analysis of questions such as the following: How far is the position of the Arab world similar to that of backward pre-1914 Russia in its relation to the rest of the capitalist world? Does the Communist Party stand for revolution and the extension of the socialist principles into the Arab world? How has its attitude been affected by the dissolution of the third Communist International and what was its relation to it before its dissolution?

A careful glance at the above problems which have to be diligently solved, automatically brings into focus a far more important problem - mainly - the extent to which the Lebanese Communist Party received its inspiration from the general Marxian theory and its modification by the Russian communists, and wherein does it diverge from the trend thus imposed on it?

It would be remembered that from Marx the communists have learned that capitalism is neither eternal nor unchangeable, that once it has fulfilled its function as a link in the historical change of world development - i.e. the development of productive power, the breakdown of feudal relations and the socialization of work - it would generate the social forces creating socialism; monopoly, trade unions and crisis; that capitalism provides its own grave diggers.

The division of property and labor would develop "class consciousness" of a conflict of interests and force the "proletariat" to class war. Dialectical materialism applied to capitalism regards it as a link in a chain, the motive force of this change being a contradiction inherent in the capitalist system. This contradiction presupposes capitalists and workers, owners of the means of production, and labor power. Conflict between these two takes the form of political antagonism. The workers would seize the capital and work it for themselves. This would bring about the end of the capitalist system, but not the end of the system of capitalism. State capitalism would replace private ownership.

The reader would doubtless regard as the communist ideal, that social condition in which the state had been eliminated or had "withered away", for it would no longer be necessary to protect the existing social order under the capitalist stage of development, a principle institution of which is private property. With the abolition of private property and the nationalisation of the means of production, the profit motive would diminish in importance and the perfect relation of the individual human being to society would be established, "to every man according to his need; from every man according to his capacity". (1)

(1) I have relied for the above discussion and explanation of the Marxian-Leninist philosophy on my Economic theory lecture notes.

At the same time the Marxian materialist conception of history is adopted and the basis to what Marx calls the ideological superstructure which stands on the political, the economic system of production, and the economic factors of production. The Lebanese Communists affirm that even though they are materialist in outlook, they do not disregard the influence and effect of ideas - "We believe that once an idea spreads and diffuses among a people it becomes an important material force."

The above is a brief summary of what the Communist Party regards as basic assumptions. However in its national policy the unified Communist party (1), has developed from a party of social revolution to a democratic party of social reform. Identifying in principle liberalism and socialism, it is characterized by a national democratic policy based on its "National Charter", which came into operation on Dec. 31, 1943 - Jan. 2, 1944. Not the realization of a pure socialist order and the abolition of the class struggle; nor a change away from capitalist economy and the bourgeois state, but a "national liberation and a democratic evolution" (2).

Thus the Lebanese and Syrian Communist Parties do not seek to abolish private property and replace it by the public ownership of the means of production, of the nationalisation of banks and public utilities etc., they analyze the present circumstances of the country which hinder the abolition of the exploitation of man by man, and insist on the merely humane view of restricting and limiting this exploitation.

"The problem in the Arab world is not one of realizing equality

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- (1) The Communist Party split up into two separate entities, the Lebanese and Syrian Communist Parties proper in 1944 as a consequence of the independence of these two countries and following the 1943-44 Congress held in Beirut.
- (2) Bekdash, K., "The National, Social and Economic Aims of the Communist Party", May 25, 1945., p. 8.

as implied by the order and discipline of socialism, since the Arab world is not at the stage where it is fighting to establish socialism, but at the stage where it is seeking to liberate itself nationally from the yoke of imperialism and foreign exploitation. It is attempting to institute a democratic regime similar to the ones in operation in France, England and America. Hence it is the task of the Arab communists to campaign for national liberation and for the principles which have come down in the world following the French Revolution, the principles of liberty and freedom, of brotherhood and equality, before trying to build a socialist order." (1)

At this point even though the Communist spokesman says: "It is true we are a revolutionary party, meaning that we advocate a revolution in our life and our environment, yet this revolution that faces our country is not a socialist revolution, but a national democratic one" (2) - one must not forget that the first country to establish the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and to organize a soviet republic, was one of the most backward of European countries. Perhaps it is precisely this contradiction between the backwardness of Russia and the other capitalist countries which helped bring about the revolution of 1917.

Thus we arrive at the conclusion that the Lebanese Communist Party had discarded its revolutionary aim, long before the third international was officially dissolved.

"The dissolution of the third international would give the nationalist Syrian and Lebanese movements centering around the Communist party

(1) "Sabout Al-Sha'b", 1938, No. ?

(2) Bekdash, "The Communist Party in the Fight for National Sovereignty and Independence", 1944, p. 73.

a new impetus, and absolve the party from other implied connections with a greater international movement. It means the complete independence of the communist party in its national sphere, a fact which is liable to gain for it new adherents, persons who often hesitated before agreeing to all the party creeds owing to the connection of this organization with the third international." (1)

The liberal policy followed by the Lebanese Communist Party is based on the decisions taken at the National Congress of the Communist Party in Syria and Lebanon Dec. 31, 1943-Jan. 2, 1944, and embodied in its National Charter. This Charter depends on four main principles:

- "A. That the most important problem facing our country is the problem of independence and of national liberation;
- B. That our countries, Lebanon and Syria, form a part of the Arab East;
- C. That our people are in need of exercising the political, legal and constitutional rights, as well as the democratic liberties, to complete their cultural and national education;
- D. That our country is in need of national economic and social reforms, which agree in the main with our degree of evolutionary development." (2)

Hence the party's National Charter can be divided into four component parts: (3)

- 1. The problem of independence and of complete national liberation:
 - a) "A liberation from every foreign exploitation and authority,
 - b) Complete independence and liberty in deciding our own fate and

(1) See Decree issued by the Communist Party, May 27, 1943.
(2) Bekdash, K., "The Communist P. in its Struggle for Independence and National Sov.", 1944, p. 63.
(3) See the decisions of the National Congress of the Communist Party in Syria and Lebanon, 1944, p. 9-14.

our economic and political relations with the Great Powers, in accordance with the principles of peace, equality and brotherhood among men - which will form the basis for our future world,

c) The establishment of national sovereignty over all activities and institutions in our country".

2. The problem of Arab cooperation and of Arab unity:

The "will" to independence and full liberty will serve as the unifying force of the Arab people, who are at the same time united by a common language, a common economic and historical heritage, geographical proximity, etc..

3. Political Liberties and Democratic Rights: (the political regime - freedom of association etc..)

- a) "A real democratic republican regime,
- b) The equality of all Lebanese regardless of their religious beliefs, and the promotion of brotherhood and cooperation among them.
- c) The guarantee of all public and private liberties, e.g.: freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, of the press and of publication, freedom of association and of union, freedom of worship, etc..
- d) The reorganization of administrative and judicial authorities in a true democratic spirit, the institution of justice and cooperation in common service."

4. National and Economic Reforms:

- a) The extension of national sovereignty and authority over the financial, industrial, commercial, civil and foreign adm.,
- b) The protection of the public health; health insurance,
- c) Protection against poverty, ignorance, raising of the status of women, health protection to expectant mothers, and their babies,
- d) The raising of the standards of production, the promotion of

commerce, the development of agriculture, the protection of infant industries, the encouragement of tourism, and the guarantee of better communications,

- e) Protection of juvenile workers,
- f) Unemployment insurance.
- g) The promulgation of a Labor Code to protect the workers and to safeguard their rights, and to promote better relations between them and their employers,
- h) The liberation of the Lebanese farmer from ignorance, poverty and general backwardness,
- i) A general rise in the standard of employees in the free trades,
- j) Justice in taxation to shift the burden of taxation away from the small merchants and producers.

A brief survey of the above classified articles of the National Charter, is sufficient to stress the communists' aim for liberty and freeism, through what was once called the "menshivik" compromise of trust in democratic persuasion and parliamentary votes. This the Lebanese communists explain by pointing out the fact that the struggle for liberty takes a different form in every part of the world. The party slogan here has been; a free nation and a happy people. Hence as weak and exploited countries, the Arab nations which have been left behind along the struggle for evolutionary development in industry, in the race for armaments, etc..., can only defend their national existence and work for their ideals of liberation and progress, when imperialism is done away with.

The Communist Party then affirms the fact that as compatriots of the Lebanese and the Syrians they had become enemies of the Mandate, and looked upon it as the disguised means by which one race can be

exploited by another, stressing the fact that when the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations back in 1934, it agreed to all the principles embodied in the League Covenant with the exception of those articles pertaining to the Mandate. That their national policy did not start with the dissolution of the third international, because these internationals arose in defence of the national liberties, both of nations and of communities, the unifying agents of the working class.

That socialism in theory advocates the unification of the people not their separation - primarily because it believes in a unity based on real equality - a unity based on the discriminate wish of the people concerned, and based on confidence and mutual respect for a firm brotherhood.

The decisions of the Second Congress of the Third International in 1920, expressly states, that foreign control retards the social development of backward countries and that the first step towards revolution in colonies, etc., must be the destruction of foreign capitalism. Hence the communists believe that they are right in having firmly stood against foreign intervention and exploitation, fighting for national self gov't in Syria and Lebanon. That nationalism is not a new feature in their policy, but that it has always been the means through which they attacked the imperialist position at its core. (1)

Thus, the main problems discussed at the conferences and press interviews of Khalel Bekdash and Farjallah el Helu, on their trip to London and Paris in 1947 were:

1. The British imperialist policy, military occupation, and other new aspects of this policy,

(1) Consult: Bekdash, K., "Our National Problems", 1945, as well as Bekdash, K., "Communism and Nationalism", August 1944.

2. The new imperialist policy of the USA, and its economic infiltration,
3. The Turkish policy, and the way it has backed Anglo-American policy,
4. That the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon and Syria serves as a bulwark in defence of world peace, specially in the Middle East,
5. That the different unifying projects: the Greater Syria Scheme the Iraqi-Transjordanian alliances, Iraqi-Turkish treaties, etc. - are the instruments of imperialist policy, directed and imposed from London and Washington, backed by Zionism and directed against the Soviet Union, and will all end by destroying the independence of Lebanon and Syria.
6. That the Palestine problem is a problem of independence and the desire for liberty, not a Zionist imperialist problem supported by British and American Imperialism. That it aims at the political not the humanitarian benefits of Jewish immigration.
7. Arab unity and brotherhood are based on popular cooperation for the establishment of democracy and independence, and the evacuation of all foreign troops - that even if the Arab League does not always reflect this it is because some of its representative governments are still under British and American imperialist exploitation, and do not represent the popular national will.
8. That trade unions and workers' associations in the Arab world represent a democratic movement backed by the awakened educated nationalists, progressive in its demands for democracy, independence and evacuation, to establish peace and world cooperation on a common basis of brotherhood and equality.

Other Arab demands which they presented and which won the approval of leftist and communist circles were:

1. The protection of Syrian and Lebanese independence and their republican forms of government,

2. The Syrian right to Alexandretta.
3. An attack of imperialist unifying projects: the Greater Syria Scheme, eastern coalitions and blocs, etc..
4. The abolition of the Mandate in Palestine and the declaration of its independence; the evacuation of troops and the establishment of a democratic government, the rejection of every partition scheme, the control of immigration, the rejection of the establishment of any Jewish nation in Palestine or in any part of it.
5. The support of the Egyptians in their struggle for independence in Sudan and Egypt, of British evacuation, and for the unification of the Nile Valley.
6. The support of the Iraqians in their struggle for independence and British evacuation and in the fight for democracy, to rid themselves from their "harsh" treaty.
7. The support of the people of Transjordan and of all the Arab nations for independence, the evacuation of foreign troops to establish democracy and abolish feudal dictatorships.
8. The fight against American economic infiltration in Saudi Arabia, and other attempts at spreading politically and economically all over the Arab world. (1)

8. Organization:

Communists all over the world naturally tend to arrive at similar conclusions. This is owing in part to the fact that they deduce their principles and aims from the same source, mainly the general Marxian theory and its successful communist interpretation, as well as to the

(1) Witness the Declaration issued by the Lebanese Communist Party against the Tapline in 1947.

rigidity and similarity of their party organizations, and their strong adherence to the "party line".

The relation of the communist Party to its members is a relation of authority which allows for no flexibility as to the party's doctrinal position and stand. As a party it has developed a comprehensive propaganda aimed at the rest of the population.

Aside from the satellite committees, associations, unions and congresses, which the Lebanese Communist Party controls, it bases its organization on the "cell", the function of which is to grow. Likewise it relies on yearly party congresses, in which leadership is exercised, and the "party line" imparted. Such congresses are best described as "ratification rallies" which can say "yes" to what the Party Central Executive Committee decrees. Like the Russian Communist Party it is composed of a secretariat, an "orgbureau", an administrative council, and what can be best called, a "politbureau" made up of the top party members.

It would be tedious to discuss at greater length, the technical organization involved at this context, and which is mostly inspired by the Russian Communist Party.

4. Policy:

It is not for a party to call for upheaval in Lebanon, or to be in itself revolutionary in respect to the nation and the national institutions, if it aims at the fulfillment of any of its party reform principles. Any such attempt at revolutionary reform would be the pretext for foreign interference. Therefore it is essential for any political party to study the present conditions and work to fulfill its program from within these limits.

Thus since the 29th of September 1929, and except for a temporary

dissolution in 1939 under the administration of Mr. Puaux, the French High Commissioner, the Communist Party has been working for the complete independence of Syria and Lebanon, (1) as well as the rest of the Arab world.

Back in 1932, and before the military court in Beirut, the communists confessed to their political activities, and openly declared that they were working for complete independence and the abolition of foreign exploitation. Likewise they participated in 1932, 1933 and 1934, in the Damascus disturbances for the same reason.

In 1936, when the fifty day strike occurred in Damascus, Farajallah el-Hilu was arrested. The cause for that agitation was the Franco-Syrian treaty of 1936. Since then the communists have been trying to put its stipulations into effect.

During the November 1943 crisis in Lebanon, the Communists participated, (a) in street fightings, (b) in the National Lebanese Congress and (c) by issuing a party declaration defining the national problem, which was broadcast in both Moscow, London and Washington. (2)

Thus we arrive at the conclusion that the predominant phase in the present Arab Communist movement is the struggle for national liberation and the establishment of national sovereignty, rather than the solution of the class struggle and the social evils which have arisen as a consequence of the failures of the capitalist system of production. Along this struggle the communists have been true to their "menshevik"

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- (1) Following the recent Palestine disturbances, which were preceded by the U.N.O. partition vote, the old 1929 decree dissolving the party was revived, and the Communist headquarters were closed in Lebanon on January 9, 1948. "Beirut", Jan. 9, 1948.
 - (2) Bekdash, K., "The Communist Party in its Struggle for Independence and National Sovereignty", 1944, Thech. on the development of Communist policy in Lebanon, p. 55 ff.

compromise. Thus the party spokesman says:

"La vraie garantie de l'indépendance et de l'intégrité du Liban ne peut provenir d'aucune puissance étrangère. Elle est avant tout dans l'union de tous les Libanais pour leur liberté, et dans la consolidation des liens de fraternité et de confiance réciproques avec la Syrie et tous les pays Arabes." (1)

5. Evaluation:

In our earlier analysis we arrived at the conclusion that the Communist Party in Lebanon has been true in its policy to its struggle for national liberation and the establishment of national sovereignty. Thus we have seen that it has temporarily put aside its revolutionary aim and adopted a liberal democratic policy. It is our aim in this chapter to stress the fact that this measure was adopted by expediency and that it cannot be anything else but temporary.

It is useless to believe that once this phase has passed, the communists would supervise the establishment of private capitalism, or that they would be true to the national independence, and allow a democratic regime to function without foreign interference. (2) In theory communism advocates the unification of the people not their separation, hence it is impossible for the Arab countries to survive as free and independent nations, free from foreign economic and political interference.

What is to guarantee that the disintegration of the community, the failure of leadership and the over diversity of representation,

(1) Bekdash, K., "Communism and Nationalism", p. 7, Aug. 3, 1944.

(2) See the problems raised by Mr. G. Tuweiny and Farajallah el-Hilu in "Al-Nahar", Nos. 3782, 3785, 3786, dating Jan. 14, 17 and 18, 1948.

would not all pave the way for a single party dictatorship, a means to the end of establishing a common unity?

So far the Communist Party has sought to mirror the national interest, a common interest, on the question of national liberation. What is to guarantee that it would not turn at this stage to serve the distinct interest of one class, or one faction of the population? What is to guarantee that it would not receive instructions from a wider international communist movement?

It is only after raising such questions that we can objectively analyze the Lebanese Communist Movement, and the threats which it may bring to our peace-loving Lebanon, a liberal democratic country, which stands at least in theory for freedom of association, of the press and of opinion.

The precondition of party government is that both the parties and the government should tolerate each other. Lebanon has found it necessary at this stage to put a stop to the activities of the Communist Party here. This party has profited for some time past from the liberty that democratic Lebanon has provided it with. Now the danger which the democracies in general and Lebanon in particular have come up against, is that - "totalitarian parties are inclusive of all the interests of the Nation and control all the aspects of its political life in accordance with a definite doctrine, with a definite infringement on personal life; they are equally and by the same fact, exclusive of any other party in the state where they operate, because they claim to be the holders and embodiment of the absolute truth and good of the society and that cannot be divisible, moreover, any other party will be nothing but error and evil." (1)

(1) Tuweiny, G., "The Theory of Party Government and the American Party System". 1946, p. 11.

How can this be averted? Should the Communist parties be allowed to function freely in the democratic countries so as to stimulate governmental reform, or should they be banned and forcibly driven to work underground and to serve as the refuge of the oppressed classes, and would they then set to bring about revolution, and a change in the social order?

One must not forget that aside from its unique feature, that the Lebanese Communist Party, was incorporated in the Idea of the Comintern; it included a large membership of Armenians, a factor which has undoubtedly tended to make its policy totally independent of any Arab nationalist coloring.

This policy explains in part the hostility which Communist movements received, particularly this year, in most of the Arab countries, and state-members of the Arab League.

B. THE SYRIAN NATIONAL PARTY (1)

1. Rise of

The Syrian National Party emerged in the year 1932 at the American University of Beirut, where Mr. Antun Saadeh was teaching a special course, German, and where he came into contact with interested students and teachers.

2. Party Principles & Aims

Any study of the essential party principles must by necessity begin with a brief analysis of the concepts which stand at the basis of a full understanding of these principles. These affirm the existence of a Syrian nation and a Syrian fatherland.

(1) Notice change of name at a later stage.

A nation is defined as a community of people living in a specific country and having definite spiritual materialistic forces, which they have acquired through evolution and by contact with this country and which tend to differentiate them from other similar groupings. (1)

In other words, a nation, is made up of different smaller communities which are large or small in number, forming in the final combined form, a unity, and instilling in its members one certain mental attitude, one creed, etc.. a force which unifies these members with binding cords and tends to eliminate what differentiating forces persist. (2)

The Party concludes that geographical Syria is bounded in the North by the Taurus mountains, the desert of Sinai in the South, the "Syrian Sea" in the East, and the desert in the West, (3) a geographical area inhabited by a people since the late Stone Age.

Now even though Syria was composed of different communal elements such as the Canaanites (of whom are the Phoenicians) the Aramaics, the Hittites, etc.. which all seem at first glance independent one of another, economically, socially and politically - yet all these communities form a single unit, a single society, participating in one unique mode of life imposed on it by the environment and the surroundings both of which have tended to create the Syrian fatherland.

To participate and live within this boundary imposes on these communities certain common characteristics and traits which in sum tend to lessen whatever communal differentiation there persists.

It is argued that no Syrian nation can exist on principle as the elements making it up into a whole have never been combined into one

(1) Saadeh, A., "The Rise of Nations", Book 1, p. 178.

(2) Ibid, p. 148.

(3) Note modification set to boundaries at a later stage.

national unit composed of all the component parts in such a manner so as to form a Syrian nation state as such. (1)

The party creed answers that a Nation is not merely a national political unity - political unity is only one required characteristic which at all times must be preceded by national feeling. Thus, according to Professor Hitti (2) "Bilad el-Sham" has witnessed two epochs during which it was independent, unified, completely sovereign over itself as well as the world around it. First during the Seleucid period which dates with the Alexandrian conquest (333 B.C.) at the hand of Alexander's general Seleucus, and secondly, the Omayyad period, dating with the rule of that dazzling Arab personality "Mo'awia ben Abi-Sifian" during the middle of the 7th C. A.D. During the first period Antioch was the capital of Syria, or rather of the Syrian empire which included Cilicia, Armenia and Iraq, and extended to Egypt, the land of the Pharo^s in the South; Damascus was its capital during the second period.

Ever since the Arab conquest in the 7th C A.D., the Arab factor has played an important role in the development of the Syrian national consciousness and an Arab coloring has been adopted to replace the old Aramaic inheritance. Customs and culture were drastically affected when the Moslem faith was ushered in. However, throughout the subsequent ages, the Syrians have preserved their peculiar Syrian characteristics, the criteria which differentiate them from all others, so that what the Syrians acquired from the conquering Arabs has been in

(1) Toynbee says in the "Survey of History" 1925, p. 348: "Since the dawn of history in the fourth millenium B.C., there was no record of a political frontier which had embraced the whole of Syria and nothing but Syria in a single sovereign state."

(2) Hitti, P., "Syria and the Syrians in History", p. 76.

the main, the Arabic language, the Moslem faith, and whatever these two entailed.

In summary the Syrians are considered by the party as a nation. And as a nation they stand unique, tied to the Arab world yet at the same time completely independent and self-sufficing.

Principles and Aims: "The national social awakening in Syria does not find it preferable to give up its right to life in order to insure lasting peace. At the same time it refuses to give up the struggle and allow the nation to submit to the events of history."(1)

Hence the Syrian National Party aims "at the creation of a movement which will realize its principles and revivify the nation, at the establishment of an organization which will lead to the complete independence of the Syrian Nation, to the affirmation of its sovereignty, the protection of its interests and the raising of its standard of living, and the endeavour for the formation of an Arab front."(2)

(A) The Fundamental Principles:(3)

(1) Syria is for the Syrians and the Syrians are a complete nation.

(2) The Syrian cause is a national cause which stands by itself completely independent of any other cause.

(The millions of peasants, workers, professionals, merchants and industrialists who constitute the Syrian nation have a will and interest in life which must remain their concern collectively, and of none other.)

(3) The Syrian Cause is the Cause of the Syrian Nation and of its homeland.

(4) The Syrian Nation is the ethnic unity of Syrian people which has developed through long history beginning before the era of recorded history.

(1) Al-Jumhour, July 12, 1937.

(2) Maluf, P., "The Principles and Aims of the Syrian Nat. Party" p. 18.

(3) Ibid, p. 1-11.

(This principle is not at all incompatible with the fact that the Syrian Nation is one of the nations of the Arab world or that it is one of the Arab nations, just as there is no incompatibility between the assertion that Syria is an Arab nation and the assertion that it is a complete nation, having the full right of absolute sovereignty over itself and its country, and having consequently a national cause standing by itself and completely independent of any other cause..)

This principle cannot be interpreted to make the Jews equal to the Syrians in their rights and claims, or to include them in the connotation of the Syrian Nation. It is a dangerous settlement which can never be assimilated. It consists of a people which has mixed with many other peoples and thus has come to be in itself a heterogeneous mixture having strange stagnant beliefs and aims essentially incompatible with the Syrian ideals.

The Circassians, Armenians, Kurds and Assyrians belong to that type of settlement which can become Syrian in the full sense of the word, once they accept Syrian Nationalism.)

(5) The Syrian country is that geographic formation in which the Syrian nation was formed. It has geographic boundaries rendering Syria a country distinctly separate and independent from any other country. It extends from the Taurus Range in the North to the Suez Canal in the South including the Sinai peninsula and the Gulf of Akaba, and from the Syrian Sea in the West to the Desert in the East until its junction with the Tigris (new modification).

(6) The Syrian Nation is one Social community.

(7) The Syrian National Movement seeks its inspiration in the talents and genius of the Syrian Nation and its national and political history.

(8) Syria's interest is above all interests.

(b) The Reform Principles (1)

(1) Separation between Church and State.

(Where rights and interests are the rights and interests of a religious group there can be no realization for those national rights and interests which are common to all the children of the one nation. And without the unity of interests and of rights there can be no unity of duties and no unified national will.)

(2) Prohibition of the clergy from interference in political and judicial matters of national concern.

(3) Removal of barriers among the different sects.

(National unity cannot be realized except by the removal of all causes of dissension. And the socio-legal barriers between the sects and denominations of the same nation obstruct the realization of a material spiritual national unity.)

(4) The abolition of feudalism, the organization of national economy on the basis of production, the security of the rights of labor, and the protection of the interests of the nation and of the State.

(5) Preparation of a strong army which will have an effective role in defending the country and in determining national destiny.

(National rights are not asserted in the struggle of nations except to the extent to which they are supported by power in the nation. For power, is the decisive factor in the assertion or denial of national right.)

3. Party Discipline and Organization:

"The organization of the National Syrian Party is neither a hitlerite

(1) Ibid, p. 12-18.

nor a fascist organization. It is a Syrian organization, a unique genuine creation, the characteristic of our people."(1)

It affirms the fact that the country is now passing through a crisis and that the need for leadership and the need to make the people aware of their responsibilities and capable of respecting this leadership, all tend to promote the "dictatorship" characteristic.

"The only legal authority which should be obeyed and respected is that independent authority which is based on the general will itself, a will made to express itself without interference of any kind." (2)

Article 8 of the party constitution states that: "every party member has the right to give his opinion in private as well as in public meetings on all that concerns the community and society." He also has the right to give his opinion on the party political and economic plans to the responsible authorities, and to get into contact personally or by writing with the higher authorities and the leader.

An analysis of such administrative decrees as administrative decree No. 4 etc. which deals with the establishment of councils and committees, portrays a responsible democracy based on individual consciousness and group responsibility.

The party organization and regime is a centralized hierarchical organization based on the belief that true democracy is a responsible and conscious democracy valuing the meaning of liberty, recognizing the importance of duty, discipline and power, for these are the party slogans.

Of the centralized hierarchical organization I shall satisfy the

(1) Political Party Program. Address of Leader, June 1, 1935.

(2) Tabet, N., "The Answer of the National Party to the Communist P." p. 18.

reader with a visual graph of the party regime, and setting down only a few words about the unique position of the leader:

The Centralized Hierarchical Organization of the Syrian National Party:

The Zaim - (or Leader)

The Supreme Council

The President of the Supreme Council

The Council of Commissars -

The President of the Council
of Commissars

The Secretary

The Interior
Information
Culture
Finance
Economy

(Al-Munafathiah) - Province

Executive General

The Executive Committee

(Al-Mudiriah) - District

The Director

Directory Commission.

The Leader:

The National Syrian Party was organized on the basis of a covenant between the propagator of its doctrines and those accepting his appeal, an agreement that he will be the leader of the party during his lifetime, and that those professing agreement with his views and principles will be members of the party defending its creed and supporting him in all his legislative, administrative and constitutional capacities.

The leader, Antun Saadeh, therefore swears -

"I, Antun Saadeh, swear by my faith, my belief, and my being that I will give myself up to my nation and fatherland, Syria, working for their realization and progress; and that I will treasure the principles I have formulated and which have come to create the National Syrian Party, as well as the aims and ideals of the party; and that I will use my authority, power and their prerogatives for the welfare of the party and the realization of its aim; and that I will not use the authority of leadership save for the national purpose and the welfare of

the nation - on all this I swear, Antun Saadeh." (1)

The authority of the leader is based on the fact that he is the commander-in-chief of the party forces, and the source of the legislative as well as executive authorities.(2) It must be remembered that the concentration of power in the leader is only in his capacity of founder and master - that the party emanates from him personally. Once unable to resume his duties, his successor, the president of the party Supreme Council, can never have the same prerogatives. He will be the executive but all legislative authority will be restricted to the Supreme Council.(3)

In conclusion the party realizes that discipline and order are two necessary elements of reform, and that they alone are capable of realizing the party aim. It adopted the centralized hierarchical organization because it creates the cohesion necessary to face internal as well as external attack, relying at the same time on elections, freedom of opinion, criticism, democratic voting, etc.. as the means of counterbalancing the danger and threat of dictatorship, which goes hand in hand with centralized party authority.

Politically, this movement acts as the bulwark which defends independence, not as the favoured grant of certain foreign powers, but true independence - a sovereignty which is not only *de jure* but *de facto* - an authority which determines alone the fate of the nation and the country, and is the expression of the general will of the people. It regards independence not as an end in itself, but as the means of attaining national progress and engulfing the whole internal social life. /

(1) The Party Constitution; Introduction, p. 2.

(2) *Ibid.*, Art. 4

(3) *Ibid.*, Art. 11 and 12.

Saadah is not
against class strife

Socially, the party considers the nation as a social unity. Hence it attacks all disintegrating forces such as religious sectarianism, class strife etc. and proposes the separation of church and state, the prohibition of the clergy from interference in political and judicial questions, etc..

tribal
affiliations

Economically, the party has been aware of the depression of national industry, agriculture and commerce, and has traced this depression to its original causes, the unbalanced distribution of the profits of production, the exploitation of foreign capital, foreign monopoly grants, feudalism, etc.. It has come to believe that the right to exploit the national wealth, is the right of the nation alone, and that all these national resources must be used to the end of raising the standard of living and the betterment of national welfare; that the anarchy resulting from private enterprise must be replaced by a consciously planned economy under state guidance; and that the state must promote social legislation in all its aspects to insure a more equal distribution of wealth.

Culturally, it seeks to promote education as the requisite for the development of individual capacities, not aiming at simple schooling but extending beyond the political sphere through parties, broadcasts, lectures, cinemas, newspapers, cultural clubs, conferences, etc.(1)

4. Policy

(A) Syrian Nationalism & Arab Nationalism

"Under the Mandate there has been an attempt to create national movements, in which minorities can participate as well as the majority.

(1) Sayegh, F., "The National Awakening - Aims, Organiz., Criticism"
A speech delivered on August 26, 1945.

Thus in Syria and in Lebanon there grew up a "Syrian National Party" whose doctrines were the unity of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-jordan - the distinctiveness of Greater Syria from the other Arab speaking countries, and the equal membership of all its inhabitants (except the Zionists) in the national community."(1) First in developing a plan and a program which transcend the political frontiers imposed since 1919, and to preach the doctrine of a greater geographical Syria, this party believed -

"That Syria is one of the Arab Nations, and indeed the nation most qualified to lead the Arab World, as is proved decisively by the Syrian Revival.. We shall never relinquish our position in the Arab world nor our mission to the Arab world. But we want before everything else to be strong in ourselves in order to convey our mission. Syria must be strong in its own national movement before it can undertake the realization of its greater task."(2)

Thus it is evident that the party does not seek to restrict itself to dealing with a political form, but to realize ultimate nationhood in Syria. Geographically it looks upon Syria as -

"that geographical formation in which the Syrian nation was formed. It has geographic boundaries rendering Syria a country distinctly separate and independent from any other country. It extends from the Taurus Range in the North to the Suez Canal in the South including the Sinai peninsula and the Gulf of Akaba, and from the Syrian Sea in the West to the Desert in the East until its junction with the Tigris."(3)

Stressing the indivisible unity of Syrian nationalism as distinct from general Arab nationalism, it follows that the party found it necessary

(1) Hourani, A., "Minorities in the Arab World", p. 38.

(2) Maluf, F., "The Principles and Aims of the National Syrian Party", p. 19.

(3) Ibid, p. 8. Note change of frontiers at a latter date.

to formulate a distinct policy on the Lebanese, Palestine, Alexandretta and other problems pertaining to Syrian and Arab unification. At the same time a complementary part to the political aims of the party was the realization of an Arab Front, grouping all the Arab nations. This front would become a strong barrier in the way of foreign imperialistic ambitions and a power of considerable weight in deciding major political questions.

The Party never intended to restrict its mission to Syria alone, (1) but to carry it into the other Arab countries by way of cultural activities and exchange of opinions, not by way of the destruction of these Arab nationalities nor of imposition of the party principles on them. Hence, the party is in favor of following the road of conferences, and alliances as the practical means by which cooperation of the Arab nations and the formation of an Arab Front can be secured.

It must be remembered that in the speech delivered by Antun Saadeh upon his return to Lebanon in March, 1947 he says: "If there is in the Arab world a real genuine Arab spirit, it is in the spirit exhibited by the Social Nationalist Party." As to the Arab League he asks: "What is this Arab League which represents the Arab world today. Is it the idea of the Arab utopianists who believe in an Arab empire and an Arab national unity, or is it the fulfillment of what your party has been asking for - the foundation of an Arab Front of all the Arab nations to stand in the face of foreign imperialistic exploitation; a power having sufficient authority to decide on political policy, and is the positive tool for the realization of the will of these nations." (2)

(1) "Al-Nahar", No. 7, January 1937.

(2) The Pubt. of the Propaganda Section (from The Speech of the Leader upon his Return to Lebanon), No.2, vol.3, July 15, 1947 - p.12.

With this short analysis of the position of the party in relation to the Arab world, we next ask the question what of the Greater Syria Scheme which was proposed by King Abdallah of Transjordan (then Amir Abdallah) in its concrete form on April 8, 1943 under the title - "La Nation du Grande (?) Syrie et de la federation Arabe" addressed to "Ahl el Sham, nomads and other wise, from the Gulf of Akaba to the Mediterranean Sea, up to the upper Euphrates."

Amir Abdallah revived his scheme when the question of Arab unity was raised during the Second World War by Rifa't Nahhas Pasha in 1943. Fearing the formation of an Arab federation of all the countries he wished to include in his scheme, he sent his emissary the Prime Minister of Transjordan, to these conferences. This he followed by a Memoranda raised to the British authorities including two independent projects - one for Syrian unity, and the other for Syrian federation.

With the signing of the Alexandria Protocol in 1944, and following the Cairo agreement of March 1945, the Arab League was formed and Amir Abdallah's campaign confined itself to the diffusion of a popular appeal of declarations and decrees issued at regular intervals and all tending to agitate public opinion in Damascus and elsewhere.

In the main the Scheme aims at the formation of a union or federation of the Syrian Republic (excluding Cilicia and Alexandretta) and the Kingdom of Transjordan and Palestine (excluding the Jewish area enjoying self-government) and Lebanon (regardless of its wish at least the four provinces added to it since 1919) under the authority of King Abdullah as a constitutional monarch (unless the people wish otherwise by plebiscite.)

The ^{S.} National Party analyzing this scheme from all its angles refused it completely because it endangered the independence and sovereignty of

the above mentioned countries specially Syria and Lebanon, who have been officially recognized as two independent republics by the other nations, and admitted on this basis to the United Nations Organization. One must not forget that Transjordan is bound to her treaties and pledges for 25 years, hence it cannot be regarded as completely independent and sovereign nor would it be right to tie other nations to her under these circumstances, for it would be forcing them a step backward in their political and national status.

Hence the National Party proposes in its positive program:

(1) That it is necessary to work towards the realization of sovereignty in all the countries so far dependent in fact on other nations and interests -

- a. To free Transjordan from all the bonds that tie her and make her independence a farce,
- b. the saving of Palestine from the two sided exploitation to which it is subjected, and from any future dangers it may be submitted to,
- c. the saving of Cilicia and Alexandretta and their return to their Mother nation.

(2) As to the two independent countries, the Republics of Lebanon, and Syria, it is the duty of their subjects to defend their liberty and independence from all foreign aggression, and to preserve this factual independence.

(3) As to those countries either independent or working for their independence, it is the duty of their subjects to help fight the social evils embodied deep in their communities, institutions and spirit and endangering their progress and development; as well as to build a new environment based on new principles and granting more liberties to rid their countries from all the dangerous remains of older systems now

incompatible with the new methods of life and authority, which act to hinder popular rule and national life.

(4) It is necessary for these countries to fit their foreign and economic policies as well as their cultural, social and progressive developments into one unified system.

(5) It is necessary for these countries to cooperate and work together with the other Arab countries inside the "Arab League" so as to insure the development of this institution into a worthy power and authority, controlling the Arab world and its development as well as protecting the independence and safety of each of its member states.

(6) It is important for these countries to continue in their participation in the U.N.O. and other international conferences and committees, to affirm their international status, as well as to promote lasting peace.(1)

(B) Attitude to Lebanon

It remains for me to define the party attitude to Lebanon and its separate existence:

In his famous defense, Antun Saadeh said on January 24, 1936 - "I have been accused of destroying the geographical unity of this land, so that I find myself obliged to say scientifically not emotionally, that the breakdown of our geographical unity and the destruction of the sacredness of our land were completed at San Remo, Sevres, and Lausanne."

As to the political aspect of the party's aim, the party, from the interior point of view considers that the Lebanese question has arisen because of justifications which were acceptable when the concept of the state was still a religious concept. But that the prin-

(1) The National Party

Sayegh, F., "The Greater Syria Scheme", Dec. 6, 1946.

ciples of the Syrian National Party have established the national social-legal basis for statehood. By the realization of these principles of the Syrian National Party, those justifications for the separation of Lebanon are removed.(1)

The National Syrian Party has been accused of working for the destruction of the Lebanese entity. Is this true?

"Indeed, we have been accused of working for the destruction of the Lebanese entity, but the accusation has never been proved. The truth is that we are no enemies to Lebanese entity. Ours is not a party that calls for an irresponsible political unity, as called for by some pseudo-leaders for ultra-national, claimed to be national reasons; it is one that aims foremost at national unity. Political unity is not our business primarily, but the nations'. In Lebanon, we are taking active measures, along the lines of Lebanese entity, for the success and prosperity of the Lebanese people, though our belief that geographical Syria forms a social and economic unity remains unshaken. Lebanese entity, ever since it was recognized, has been the entity of all the Lebanese of whom we are a part. Consequently it is the duty of all the Lebanese to exercise their civil rights within the said entity, and we are a part of the Lebanese people who have the right to exercise our civil privileges for the good of the people."

How can the Party reconcile its national belief in respect to the Lebanese entity?

"Our national belief is of a social character, Lebanese entity of a political; we do not mix between the two. As the creation of the Lebanese entity was necessitated by certain political circumstances and

(1) Maluf, "Principles and Aims of the Syrian National Party", p. 20.

ends, the question remains exclusively political, and should never replace the national case. Consequently they greatly err and misunderstand the case of the Party, who believe that the National Party was organized with no other purpose than to call for Syrian unity. Similarly they mis-represent the aims of the Party and aim at propagating unhealthy information, who frighten the Lebanese extremists by maintaining that the Party calls for the annexation of Lebanon to present Syria. The Party aims neither at annexation nor at separation. It works for national unity, for substituting national for religious bases, and for cancellation of the principles of sectarian government. Thus the 'people' should all be Syrian nationalists, not a Moslem majority and a Christian minority, as some men try to convince the people is the inevitable result of the principles of the Syrian National Party.

The Syrian National Party has not emerged to fulfill the dreams of those who seek in the immediate political unity for aims disguised in the shape of the national welfare, nor to uphold the continuation of a certain state of affairs, out of which a group of people benefit. It has emerged in order to work for developing the conditions of society and to unify the various beliefs - the national belief, which alone can guarantee the destruction of personal theories and the unification of sentiments and outlooks.

Of what use is an immediate political unity if it is not based on national unity? Can any national political unity be imagined when the nation remains divided into several religious communities, conflicting in ends, contradictory in aims?

We are more of a national renaissance, than a political Party, and our policy is dictated to us by our national outlook."(1)

(1) For the original Arabic text, consult, "An Interview with the Saïm", Al-Nahar, ? , 1936.

"What do the Lebanese want out of their separate existence? That in it there should be light and that all around it there should be darkness? If there should be light in Lebanon, it must be right that it should extend all over geographical Syria.

Can we be satisfied to have light in Lebanon and not allow all the other members of our nation to share it? No, this is true Lebanese existence, and it represents faithfully what is buried in the Lebanese spirit of nobleness etc.. All else is false and represents Lebanon but poorly, failing to mirror true public opinion."(1)

(C) The Palestine Problem

En s'ine An open letter was published by the Zaim in a Damascus newspaper in answer to Lloyd George's speech at a Zionist convention, ever since then the party has been opposing the partition scheme and formulating a distinct policy based on the view: "That Palestine is a living part of a complete fatherland, and that no partition of one nation and one people, the Syrian people, can be carried through."(2)

In 1932, in an address given by A. Saadeh at the inauguration of the Palestinian Students Association at the American University of Beirut, attention was brought to the two dangers threatening Syria - the Palestine problem in the South, and the Turkish threat to the Syrian frontiers in the North.

Likewise in 1936, the leader dealt with this same problem, and uttered a saying which has since been quoted by Faris el-Khoury at the Parliamentary Arab Conference held in Egypt in 1938 - "That the Balfour Declaration is a political not a legal declaration, and that the Jews

(1) A. Saadeh, An Address presented upon his return to Lebanon in May, 1947.

(2) The Publication of the Propaganda Section. The National Party, Sept. 18, 1947, p. 8 ff.

have neither a public nor a private claim to Palestine."

Since then the party has been sending out appeals to support its policy at every major crisis in the development of the Palestine Problem. Thus on July 14, 1937 a party memo to the League of Nations and other Interested Nations was issued.(1)

This memo appeared in answer to the Report submitted by the Royal Commission on Palestine in that same year, and which proposed at that time the establishment of a Jewish and an Arab state independent and side by side, with a British Mandated area extending between them. The Syrian National Party after analyzing this scheme from all its angles, concluded that its realization would naturally obstruct the right of the Syrian people to a part of their fatherland, over which part they alone are sovereign. Hence any such partition scheme was automatically liable to be rejected.

On the 21 of September 1945, the Arab Front held a meeting at Jaffa to define its attitude on the Palestine Problem. At this convention Nehme Tabet the then president of the party Supreme Council was present, accompanied by Mr. Fayez Sayegh in capacity of advisor. On this occasion Mr. Sayegh edited a pamphlet which was patronized by the party political bureau, clarifying the party attitude on the Palestine Problem.(2)

In this pamphlet Mr. Sayegh distinguishes between the "Jewish Problem" and the "Palestine Problem", and points out that the Jewish problem can have no concern for us once we reject the thesis that it can only be solved when a Jewish Home is instituted in Palestine.

(1) Ibid, Sept. 18, 1947., p. 8 ff.

(2) The National Party Political Bureau, The Palestine Problem, Sept. 21, 1945, p.5 ff. Mr. Nehme Tabet could not attend the Convention - sent his note to the Arab Front.

After analyzing the Zionist claims which he believes are based on three principles: (1) a semi historical argument of the Jewish connection with Palestine, (2) the "emotional" - that the persecution received by the Jews everywhere will end only when a Jewish home is instituted for them, and (3) the political - i.e. the Balfour declaration which inherently contradicts the McMahon correspondence carried on with King Hussein, he speaks in the name of the party asking for:

(1) The abandonment of the institution of a National Jewish Home in Palestine.

a. Jewish immigration and citizenship.

- 1) the prohibition of legal Jewish immigration
- 2) formal prohibition of illegal immigration
- 3) the facilitation of Jewish emigration from Palestine
- 4) the prohibition of citizenship grants to Jews

b. Land and establishments -

- 1) to forbid the sale and transfer of land to the Jews in all Palestine without exception,
- 2) diligent control against illegal transfer of property to the Jews.
- 3) the prohibition of license grants to Jewish establishments whether economic or otherwise, or the establishment of new colonies in Palestine.

c. Employment and language -

- 1) the employment of civil servants in equal ratios in the upper governmental departments.
- 2) the abolition of Hebrew as an official language in Palestine.

d) Armed forces -

- 1) the demobilization of Jewish private forces, and colony police

2) the search for and confiscation of all arms by the Mandatory Power which serves to create a threat to public peace and the safety of the nation.

(II) Means for the granting of Self Government to the Palestinian People.

- a. The declaration of independence in Palestine
- b. The development of self government in Palestine on a liberal democratic basis.
- c. The gradual allowance for a plebiscite to be conducted to determine the will of the people for a future annexation to Syria
- d. The dissolution of old pledges and treaties.

(III) The Gradual disintegration of the Jewish National Home.

Likewise on the 19th of March 1946, Mr. Sayegh submitted to the Anglo-American Inquiry Committee on Palestine, a memoranda prepared by him on behalf of the "National Party". In it he discusses the right approach to the Palestine Problem -

"The traditional conception of the Palestine Problem as a dilemma with which the Promising Authorities are confronted, due to their simultaneous declaration of contradictory and irreconcilable promises, must be exchanged for the alternative view of the Problem as an injustice which the Palestinians have been made to suffer through the introduction, into their country of an alien people, ambitious enough to look upon this country as their own, and to seek to transform it into a national home wherein they will be not only the numerical majority, but the ruling power of the state as well.."(1)

(1) The National Party. Note on the Palestine Problem submitted to the Anglo-American Inquiry Comm. March 18, 1946, p.4.

that "if the Palestine Problem is looked upon as a national problem involving the fate of a nation rather than the pledges of a foreign power; if the said problem is distinguished from the Jewish Problem, and its solution is separated from the settlement of the latter; and if the solution is sought in the direction of justice rather than in the direction of formal stability resting upon unjust foundations - only then will the Palestine Problem be really understood and your efforts to find a solution for it prove fruitful." (1)

The pamphlet goes on to say that a thorough acquaintance with the history of Palestine reveals that the country is socially and economically a part of a wider social unity, a fraction of a national community, and that the Palestine Problem goes side by side with the creation of Palestine as a political entity following the first World War. In conclusion it offers the party proposals for the just settlement of this problem: (2)

"(1) The abandonment of the Balfour Declaration and all the obligations it involves. Such abandonment will necessarily involve -

- a. the cessation of Jewish immigration into Palestine, and the combatting of illegal immigration relentlessly;
- b. the facilitation, for all Jews desirous of leaving the country, to depart without any governmental difficulties or any impediments by Zionist organizations;
- c. the prevention of all transfers or sales of land or property directly or indirectly, to the Jews, all over Palestine.

(2) The recognition of the independence of Palestine and the facilitation of the establishment of a democratic system of self-rule."

(1) Ibid, p. 6.

(2) Ibid, p. 12.

On the second of November 1947, the party leader issued a message to the social nationalists, and the Syrian Nation, summarizing the party attitude on the Palestine Problem. In this message the leader analyzes the Balfour Declaration, and its historical effects on the Syrian people, enumerating the different partitions Syria was subjected to following the Franco-British occupation at the end of World War I, and the measures taken by the party to combat the Jewish threat to Palestine.

In conclusion he declares - "the Syrian nation alone is capable of exercising its natural and legal right to Palestine and it alone can determine its fate."(1)

Hence, it follows that if international agreements are to determine the fate of Palestine, this would be an infringement on the sovereignty of the Syrian nation and of its internal freedom. Likewise any measures taken by the Arab League must comply with the wishes of the Syrian people, for it has no power to check their sovereignty.

This message concludes with a call for the removal of political barriers over all of "Syria", and a call to eliminate all religious strife among the internal factions and sects.

The recent international developments which have occurred since the partition scheme of Palestine was finally adopted on Nov. 30th 1947 by the U.N.O., was the cause for a new proclamation issued by the party on Dec. 1, 1947. In it the leader states that the party is in a state of war for the cause of Palestine but that actual war itself must begin when the ^{Peoples} people who have been declaring their preparedness for war say the decisive word. If, for financial, economic and

(1) The Leaders Message to the Party Members and the Syrian Nation Concerning the Party attitude on the Palestine Problem, Nov. 2, 1947, p. 7.

political reasons their threats have been an insincere camouflage, the party would then act in direct response to the will of the people and direct its policy to the end of serving the general will.

(D) The Party Attitude to the Question of Alexandretta and Antioch

The Alexandretta Question was raised on December 8, 1936, by the Turkish Government to the Council of the League of Nations and placed on its agenda. As the National Syrian Party believes in Syria as a nation, one and indivisible, any such attempt by the Mandatory Power to sanction the division of Syria, and to champion the cause of the Turkish Government would by necessity lead to discord. Thus on December 14, 1937 (1) the party issued a proclamation defining its attitude towards the Alexandretta Question, blocking the attempted annexation of this province to Turkey and offering to furnish the required volunteers to help defend the Northern Syrian frontiers against any aggression.

At the same time a Memorandum to the League of Nations and Other Interested Countries was issued, clarifying and emphasizing the party attitude on this question. It denied the existence of any rightful Turkish claim to this Syrian Sanjaq, which finally paid by being annexed to Turkey.

5. Evaluation:

Any living movement is liable to evolutionary change. Likewise a living political party must by necessity pass through different stages along its general development. Elsewhere we have traced the main chapters in the broad policy of the Syrian National Party. In this critical evaluation we shall attempt to analyze the evolutionary trend of its

(1) The Publication of the Propaganda Section, The National Party, August 15, 1947, pp8 ff.

party creed. Hence, I have seen fit to divide a continuous historical narrative into 5 main periods. Under these main periods we shall study the extent to which the party has along its general development been true to its ideals, its aims and its principles.

(1) The first period dates with the middle of 1933 and ends with 1935. This period marks the secret formation of the party in Beirut.

(2) The second period dates with 1935 - and marks the formal emergence of this movement in the form of a political party, and ends in 1938 with the departure of Antun Saadeh, the Leader. During 1936 the party accomplished two things:-

- a. a formal request to the League to end the Mandate, and
- b. another urging the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian treaty, which when carried through failed to fulfill the demands of the party.

While the Leader was imprisoned, the development of French policy, created two new problems;

- a. The Question of Alexandretta
- b. and the Problem of Palestine.

(3) The third period dates with 1938. During this period the party worked underground until May 1944, when a formal license authorized it to function under a new name, the "National Party".

(4) The fourth period dates with 1944 and ends in March 1947. It saw the beginning of an attempted reorganization of the party, both internally and externally under the leadership of the President of the Supreme Council, Nehme Tabet. It is a period marked by strong political activity, of party rallies, and the publication of many party pamphlets, as well as the reediting of the party paper, "Al-Nahda". It ends with the return of A. Saadeh in March 1947.

(5) The fifth period dates with the return of the Leader, and ends in October 1947; it saw the formal emergence of this movement, under a new name, and with a definite change of policy - "The Syrian Social Nationalist Party". This period saw the withdrawal of staunch party supporters - perhaps it is too early to clearly determine the effects of this split up. Since October, the party has continued to function on the political scene, under its new name.

According to Mr. F. Sayegh, the social political movement inaugurated under this "new" party, is fully totalitarian in nature, comprising a complete philosophy of life, a comprehensive outlook on the world, an art, etc.. Thus in his opinion, October 27, 1947, marks a definite break away from the old "Syrian National Party", and the idea that the principles making up the Party Constitution were fixed and unchangeable(1)

The change in the Leader which drove him to believe in the necessity for the adoption of a totalitarian party philosophy, and the task of the formulation of such a philosophy, which would become an integral part of the party principles and of the party creed - is traced back to the request of Mr. F. Maluf, who found it necessary to withdraw from the party upon his conversion to Catholicism. (2)

Now even though A. Saadeh foresaw the oncoming change - (and this Mr. Sayegh traces from many quoted passages) - he did not wish to raise the issue upon his return to Beirut in March 1947. One must remember that upon his return to Beirut, A. Saadeh found it necessary to cope

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- (1) Consult the Leader's Defence, "Saout Al-Ahrar", January 24, 1936, also, The Publication of the Party Information Bureau, No. 5, vol. 3, Aug. 31, 1947, p. 9. Also the words of the Leader in the famous 1938 speech - "We have contracted to realize through the Syrian National Party a very important aim, mainly to create an independent state based on firm principles." Ibid., No.4, vol.3, Aug. 15, p. 9.
- (2) Sayegh, F., "Where To ?" - A Critical Analysis of the Position of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party on Freedom of Religion and of Thought, p. 46.

with two unforeseen emergencies: (a) the warrant for his arrest, and (b) the withdrawal of Nehme Tabet from the party, and the split up that this entailed.

On October 27, 1947, the fourth edition of the "Party Principles and Aims" as explained by the Zaim was issued under a new name - "The Teachings of the Social Syrian National Party", and was made the official party reference to the explanation of its principles and aims. Aside from revising the name of the party, this edition carried drastic changes:

(1) First, in the new limitations denoting the geographical boundaries of the "Syrian Nation", which were now revised to include Iraq and Cyprus.

(2) It omitted the analysis of the party plan connected with the existing "political systems", i.e., "the nature of the existing governmental forms in geographical Syria."

(3) Third, in the adoption of a totalitarian philosophy -

- a. The first edition of the "Basic Principles and Aims of the Syrian National Party" read - "... the national revival involves the ultimate realization of nationhood in Syria.." (1)
- b. It now reads, "... the national revival involves the foundation of the idea of nationalism and the realization of ultimate nationhood in Syria etc.. and the creation of new customs based on our new philosophy of life, and our social nationalist creed... the basic and reform principles of the Social Syrian National Party create a totalitarian philosophy, a completely comprehensive

(1) The Basic Principles and Aims of the Syrian National Party, The First edition, p. 25.

outlook..."(1)

(4) In the 7th principles the word "cultural" was added, that the Syrian National revival no longer relied on the Syrian political and national history for inspiration, but on the "cultural history of the Syrian Nation in political nationalism." and that, "the Social Syrian National Party cannot generate a Syrian revival except through a genuinely independent, Syrian spiritual force".(2)

(5) The following words were added to the 8th principle - "Syria represents our social personality, our creeds and our ideal life, as well as our general philosophy of life, of the universe as well as of art."(3)

According to Mr. Sayegh, this sudden unconstitutional change, aside from absolving the party member from his given pledge,(4) raises a number of new issues:-

1) The adoption of such a totalitarian philosophy, entails the automatic collusion of the party creed with the member who professes a philosophy of his own.

2) Such a totalitarian conception refutes the general Syrian heritage which being based on variation and differentiation in climate,

(1) The Teachings of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, 4th Edit.p.46. As for this new philosophy - "Today, the world is in need of a new philosophy, a philosophy capable of saving it from the strife and ignorance of earlier philosophies. This new philosophy is a philosophy of unified action, unifying all the human forces - it is the philosophy offered by your movement and your revival.... It is no longer possible to explain human evolution in accordance with either a spiritual or a materialistic creed. Our thesis is that human progress is based on both a spiritual and a materialist foundation, and that progressive humanity looks to this principle in the realization of its own future."

(2) The Publication of the Party Information Bureau - No.1, vol.3, p. 1.
The Basic Principles & Aims of the Syrian National Party, 4th Edit.
p. 26.

(3) Ibid, p. 29.

(4) See the organization of this party and the contractual basis of agreement between the Leader and the member rallying to his appeal.

in habits, in religions, etc., cannot allow a general uniformity in faith and in belief. Hence this totalitarian philosophy cannot be regarded as totally Syrian in origin, but as related to Plato's totalitarian conceptions, as well as to those of the Catholic Church and of Marx.

3) Religion is by necessity a part of man's philosophy of life, and of his conception of the universe. Would this uniformity entail the eventual adoption of one unified religious creed? Today, the different religious creeds cooperate and work through the party for the realization of similar ends, imposed on them through the acceptance of the „Social (Syrian) National“ principles. How can the party refuse the cooperation of people professing different philosophies of life, and accept members belonging to the different sects, when both the former and the latter, entail a belief in a variety of conceptions of life, of the universe, of art, etc....?

4) What is to guarantee that once A. Saadeh assumes sovereign authority in the State, he would not abolish the principle which stands for the total separation of church and state, or any other principle for that matter? What is to prevent him from calling any new religion which he arrives at, the new state religion? What is to guarantee that he will not favor the Communist system of economic organization, and change the party's social economic principles to make them compatible with communism?(1)

Likewise, many other issues, can be raised in similar contexts. However the issues we have raised in the above analysis, mark a definite

(1) Exact references to this argument, are to be found in - Sayegh, P., "Where to?" A Critical Analysis of the Position of The Syrian Social Nationalist Party on Freedom of Religion and of Thought, p. 82 ff.

trend in the development of a dictatorial basis of leadership. In the analysis of the party organization we have repeatedly stressed that the party creed denied any association of the discipline of its organization with European fascism, a party dictatorship which throttles the democratic spirit. As a party it refused to be connected with any foreign power, and remembered that during its lifetime it saw persecution under the Mandate, under the authority of Vichy, Free France, as well as the English Occupation Command. Why hasn't the democratic machine, clearly provided for in the Constitution, been allowed to operate and to bring in this unconstitutional change in the party? Here is the crucial point, which few can fathom.

It is important to note here that even though this party was a secret society, it began to work openly since 1935. It has grown in importance and in size, despite the many obstacles which it has had to solve: the hostility of the Mandated authorities, the opposition of the Arab nationalists, and the general belief that it was a fascist organization. The fact that it survived this last obstacle tends to prove its lack of affiliation to any such movement.

At this stage, we ask the question - is this movement reverting to type? Must all the movements which arose in Lebanon since the early 1930's be fascist in coloring?

According to Mr. Hourani - "This movement has been able to hold its own, owing to many factors:

- 1) It made a more determined effort than any other organization to think out the whole nationalist problem in all its aspects, and to formulate a program in the light of clear and valid principles;

- 2) It was rigidly organized on the membership principle - with a hierarchy, a logical division of functions and a strict discipline.

3) Finally, its leader was a man of courage, decision and powerful intellect."(1)

Are these same factors which helped it get a tenacious hold on life, going to develop out of all reasonable proportion and see it turn into a deadly weapon in the midst of our passive society?

When this movement first developed, it aimed at the discovery of the dormant forces in the nation and in the spirit of the citizens, to arouse them to action, and to create an active revival which would spread from the party to the rest of the people and which would put an end to their idle passiveness.

"In you is a dormant force, the power of life, if you had acted, had you served, you would have changed the general current of history."(2)

Since then, the "party" has become a tangible political force. Developing under the Mandate, it helped to create a single social unity, a single common will.(3) It is as a consequence of this development that we have had to analyze this movement and regard it as a "political party". In so far as this party has formulated special principles expressing its domestic, social and economic interests on a common rather than on an individual political national basis; in so far as it has introduced genuine national institutions to replace the traditional religious, feudal, patriarchal and tribal institutions,(4) it has brought into the realm of our political life organization and the idea of national unity, to form the basis to our struggle for national liberation.

(1) Hourani, A., "Syria and Lebanon", p. 197.

(2) The Publication of the Party Information Bureau, No. 7, vol. 3, Sept. 30, 1947, p. 15.

(3) Ibid, p. 12-13.

(4) Ibid, p. 4.

[The merits of this movement lie in the fact that it sought from its initial start to replace, religious, tribal, and patriarchal consciousness, with a "national consciousness"; to unify the predominant separatist tendencies and to promote cooperation.] Thus it has sought to eliminate the struggle and strife which result from extreme individualism and class antagonism under capitalism, and from a "dictatorship in the name of the proletariat" under communism.

One must not forget that it introduced the following basic ideas:

- 1) That Syria is for the Syrians and the Syrians are a complete Nation.
- 2) The Syrian Nation is one social community.
- 3) Syria's interests are above all interests.
- 4) The abolition of feudalism, the organization of national economy on the basis of production, the security of the rights of labor, and the protection of the interests of the Nation and of the State.(1)

These came as a direct answer to the general beliefs embodied in the charters and principles of more than one party:

- 1) That there is no Syrian Nation
- 2) That Syria is a small country incapable of facing an enemy or of living an independent political life.
- 3) The absolute neglect of the country's internal social organization.
- 4) That religion lies at the basis of the state.
- 5) The recognition of the rights of eminent religious dignitaries to interfere in political, administrative and judicial affairs.
- 6) A general differential submission to the "will" of the foreign powers.
- 7) The failure to negotiate the means of establishing a greater equality in the standard of living.
- 8) That individual interests are the basis for every interest.(2)

(1) See the Basic and Reform Principles of the Syrian National Party.

(2) The Publication of the Party Information Bureau, No. 9, vol. 3, Oct. 31, 1947, p. 10.

C. THE PHALANGES LIBANAISES

In 1944 the Service for National Education of the Phalanges Libanaises issued a pamphlet on the fly-leaf of which appeared the following statement:

"In the strife of political agitations which maintain on the national scene a few actors always the same, amidst suspicious opportunism, profit seeking last hour converts, clans and parties, family and sectarian interests - is found the compact and well-ordered group of national militants, integral and disinterested, the Phalanges Libanaises. Their most certain merit is that since the beginning of their activity, they have adopted one line of conduct, which has been revealed as the best and least compromising.."

Who are the Phalanges Libanaises, and how true is this statement?

1. Rise of:

In the autumn of 1936, Pierre Gemayel sent out an invitation to his friends for the formation of a youth organization, a training center, with the purpose of serving Lebanon and securing its independence on the basis of virility, principle, and self-respect. This invitation met with instant approval and the youth of Lebanon flocked in response to it. As it began to spread, it has had to be guided cautiously.

As a movement, the Phalanges Libanaises dates with the 21 of Nov. 1936, yet even before the end of its first year, on Wed. Nov. 17, 1937, the Arrêté No. 1472 was issued disbanding this athletic training center and the organization's headquarters were closed by a police force. On Sunday the 21 of Nov., the Phalangistes flocked to the Place des Cannons in Beirut protesting against this injustice, shots were fired, and wounds inflicted. The authorities retaliated by arresting 100 Phalangistes with their leader.

Out of this strife the Phalanges Libanaises emerged strongly consolidated in the face of its enemies and continued its work amidst an atmosphere charged with threats and warnings which up to March 1942 amounted to at least 7 in no.

On April 3, 1941, the headquarters of the Phalanges Libanaises were closed for the second time following its instigation of a full strike in Beirut in protest against the Ravitaillement. The situation remained tense until the end of May when the authorities threatened the organization's President and 35 other members with exile to Tadmur as a consequence of their severe attack on the Mandated authorities.

In like manner during the November 1943 crisis in Lebanon, Pierre Gemayel and 23 phalangistes were arrested and released after the release of the President of the Republic and his colleagues. Their headquarters were requisitioned.(1)

On the 27th of Nov. 1943, the Republican Decree No. 126 was issued officially recognizing this organization as a consequence of its patriotic support and service for Lebanon.

2. Aims, Principles and General Outlook:

The Phalanges Libanaises was organized to be the instrument for securing Lebanese independence and for acting as the bulwark in defence of Lebanese existence.

"It is a patriotic youth organization. Its aim is essentially national: the formation of a Lebanese nation, conscious of its duties and its rights in an independent and sovereign state. To this effect it attempts:-

a) To form citizens having national ideals.

(1) On Nov. 22, 1943, the Phalanges Libanaises as well as the Najjadeh assumed command of the popular reaction in defence of Lebanese pride, its right to existence and its independence following the arrest of the people's representatives. Refer to L'Action No.96, Dec.12, 1943.

- b) To prepare the youth to perform their civil obligations in harmony with the ideas of the fatherland and the family.
- c) To instill in them the spirit of sacrifice discipline and cooperation.
- d) To develop fraternity.
- e) To diffuse among its adherents the sentiment of honour, of duty and of loyalty.
- f) And to mould their character and accustom them to tolerance and to absolute respect for the liberties of others.(1)

"The Phalanges Libanaises as a pure Lebanese national institution, reveals no confessional or racial characteristics:

- a) They are essentially disinterested,
- b) they extend all over geographical Lebanon, and appeal to all the Lebanese of Lebanon, whether in the home country or abroad,
- c) they dissociate themselves from all clan politics, personal politics, etc.,
- d) they intervene in all the affairs pertaining to the national order through their chief, who is their official spokesman, and following decisions and written orders,
- e) they attack all anti-national doctrines tending to the actual destruction of Lebanon,
- f) they stand for ordered and well disciplined democracy, and consider it as an ideal towards which it is convenient to aspire, and for which the spirit and the character would progressively be formed,
- g) **they beliefs** will be maintained and will advance in the face of everything because of justice, likewise, it is the notion of justice which dictates to them a line of conduct to be adopted for the solution of the social problem.

(1) Statuts, Article 1, July 1, 1938.

b) they stand for the perpetuation of the good Lebanese traditions and for the principle of progress in the other domains, progress achieved by reforms rigorously demanded and strictly applied."(1)

Their slogans are: God, Fatherland and family.(2) (Dieu, Patrie et Famille).

As a movement of doctrine and action, the Phalanges Libanaises serves Lebanon through education and national politics, yet at the same time it has struggled to remain outside the party strife. "We are not the men of a party and we hate the spirit of parties,"(3) believing itself above parties and personalities. Its most sacred aim is the arrival in Lebanon at independence, an independence based on firm foundations, and safeguarding all rights. Its principles of action are faith, discipline, disinterestedness, courage and perseverance.

The existence of the Lebanese nation having as its mission the accomplishment of culture and tolerance is a fact that they have been given as their mission to maintain, defend and reinforce.

As a movement, the Phalanges Libanaises is progressive. It is a national organization aiming to create a Lebanese nation having unified interests and ideals, a Lebanon, sovereign and independent, safe and happy. Hence it participates in every national constructive action reflecting on Lebanon and the Lebanese people with progress, and the good of all.

"For the better to attain their national aim, the Phalanges Libanaises works for the development of Lebanese economy and for the amelioration of the workers' social conditions. It seeks in the end to inspire the youth with the love and spirit of sportsmanship."(4)

(1) Statuts, Article 4.

(2) Statuts, Article 5.

(3) Action, Dec.3, 1939. For further reference consult the section on Policy and Evaluation.

(4) Statuts, Article 2.

As to the problem of social reforms, the Chief of the Phalanges Libanaises said in 1940: "And as to the situation of the petit bourgeois, what have they done to find him a solution? As to the social law projects, must they still lie in the bottom of some drawer? What have they done for the delinquent child?"

The Phalanges Libanaises has stood in opposition to all half-hearted measures, and sought to agitate for complete and new social legislation extending over all social cases and over all the fields of workers' activities, pointing out that the workers as a class make up the bulk of the Lebanese people.(1)

seeking to render justice to the Lebanese worker it asks for:

- a) The allocation of sufficient salaries, both for the worker himself and for his family's needs;
- b) sufficient compensation for the worker as a security against unemployment, accident, ill-health, etc., the money to come from a special assistance budget;
- c) general social insurance;
- d) the protection of the workers by means of comprehensive factory laws;
- e) adequate legislation to define the relationship of the employees to their employers, and vice versa;
- f) a social policy insuring better hygienic conditions and a system of public education.(2)

All these measures tend to insure for the worker a happy life of dignity and honesty in a national order based on mutual cooperation and the elimination of class struggle.

(1) Action, March 24, 1940.

(2) Action, May 13, 1944, and also Tract issued May 1, 1944.

As to education, private and official, the Phalanges Libanaises feel that it must be directed in accordance with the national interest, and that neutrality is inadmissible.

In respect to the political regime, they insist on:

- a) The allocation of responsibility;
- b) honesty of administration;
- c) the abandonment of all petty politics, and partisan struggles;
- d) a national policy aiming at the national revival of the country in agriculture, industry and commerce;
- e) no self-interest;
- f) only fidelity;
- g) only courage;

all in the service of Lebanon and the public good."(1)

Likewise capable and responsible leaders, men of integrity, who inspire confidence, who are conscientious and are powerful within limits, all ready to serve, this is what Lebanon is in need of. At the same time the Phalanges Libanaises regards as essential the development of order and dignity which we find amiss in Lebanon, and the formulation of a policy based on the national welfare.(2)

In his declaration of July 18, 1944, the Chef, Pierre Gemayel says:

"Aujourd'hui, voici les directives qui contrôlent notre action:

- (1) La constitution de 1926, même avec ses modifications récentes, s'est révélée malencontreuse et inadéquate. Son échec se confirme de jour en jour, et ses pénibles et tristes effets sont les mêmes aujourd'hui comme durant le mandat. Des causes identiques produisent des effets identiques. Puisque le résultat est mauvais,

(1) See Tract issued on June 19, 1939.

(2) Action, January 14, 1940.

attaquons-nous à la cause. C'est là le seul remède.

(2) Il est prématuré - et malhabile - de proposer aujourd'hui un projet détaillé d'une nouvelle constitution. Ceci ne doit se faire qu'à la veille de la convocation d'une Assemblée Constituante. Le régime actuel est une création du mandat. Aux Libanais incombe le droit et le devoir d'en choisir un autre plus conforme à l'intérêt national.

(3) Quant à nous, Phalangistes, notre prise de position de 1936 demeure inchangée: Nous sommes pour un régime d'autorité, de probité et de compétence dont la forme et les modalités seront proclamées en temps opportun."

In conclusion the Phalanges Libanaises offers a picture of a utopian Lebanon, a refuge against persecution and slavery, and specially intolerance, refusing vehemently every theocratic basis adopted in the neighboring countries and their constitutions. It asks for a secular constitution, refusing to accept any law, neither Christian nor Moslem. It believes that these are the characteristics which differentiate Lebanon from other Middle Eastern countries, and that its complete independence from the East as from the West, is but the condition necessary for its existence.

"Nous estimons que la diplomatie ne peut pas être discutée sur la place publique, ni dans les enceintes religieuses, et que les groupements politiques eux-mêmes devraient faire preuve d'un peu plus de pudeur quand ils traitent, dans leurs programmes, de politique étrangère.

En liant dogmatiquement le sort de sa Patrie à celui d'un autre pays on a tout l'air d'avoir deux patries au lieu d'une. Le Liban est dès lors lésé dans le droit exclusif qu'il a au culte de ses enfants. Du culte de deux patries à la fois à la trahison, en cas de

conflit d'intérêts, il n'y a qu'un pas.

Nous n'avons a priori de préférence pour personne. Nous ne prononçons d'exclusive a l'égard d'aucune amitié, ni d'aucun système de nature à asseoir la sécurité du Liban en tant qu'Etat complètement indépendant et pleinement souverain."(1)

3. The Party Organization:

The party hierarchy consists of a chief, (a president) a secretary general, and an unofficial cabinet consisting of 12 departmental heads, presiding over such departments as the political, the economic, emigration, propaganda, social welfare, student welfare, etc..

Internally the Phalanges Libanaises divides Lebanon into six provinces:

- | | |
|---------------------|----------|
| 1) Keserwan | 4) Bek's |
| 2) Northern Lebanon | 5) Shouf |
| 3) Southern Lebanon | 6) Metn |

Each of these districts is later subdivided into:

- | | |
|-------------|-------------|
| 1) Province | 4) Division |
| 2) Country | 5) Cell. |
| 3) District | |

Since the movement originated, Pierre Gemayel has been officially elected as the Chief of the party every three years in accordance with their constitutional laws. He is elected by the 12 departmental heads who in turn are appointed and dismissed by him. They have always seen fit to elect him because they have been influenced by him and his personality, and because as experts in their own special fields they would prefer to have one perpetual chief, who is at once consciously aware of

(1) Action, May 20, 1944.

his responsibilities, and who is the real and honorary executive and spokesman of the party.

Like the President of the U.S.A., the Chef of the Phalanges Libanaises is the sovereign executive, and meets with his "unofficial cabinet" every Tuesday in Beirut to debate and to discuss. But like his American counterpart he is not obliged to follow their advice. This cabinet has to be sworn in before taking office.

There are two new departments worth mentioning briefly: the party police force, and the party reform council.

The party police consists of two main divisions:

- 1) police escort for the Chef,
- 2) and a local police force in the country.

These have three main functions:

- a) security,
- b) traffic,
- c) information.

They are directed from Beirut and keep official records in which their orders are strictly documented as well as other daily events.

The party reform council is an official organ which decides on disciplinary measures in accordance with a strictly adhered to code. "Obey and Help" - this is the secret of the Phalanges and of their victory.(1)

The two main party strongholds are Beirut and Mt. Lebanon. In social composition, the number of farmers lead in the rural district, whereas the "salarist" leads in Beirut, where also the liberal arts are represented by a large number of lawyers and doctors.(2)

(1) Action, Nov. 21, 1939. See also the official party publications on "General Organization and Disciplinary Code" - Nov. 21, 1942, as well as on "The Organization of the Phalanges" March 15, 1945.

(2) The "salarist" is a term coined by Keynes to denote those members of the middle class who are higher up on the social scale than the proletariat and who are employed at a salary. Thus they would belong to that class of people otherwise called the lower middle class.

4. Policy:

As a movement the Phalanges Libanaises is of Lebanon and for Lebanon alone. Its cornerstones are the stability of principles, sacrifice and firmness for the spreading of national pride and the forming of a strong bias in favour of Lebanon. It only seeks the prosperity of Lebanon under full independence - complete liberty and total sovereignty - and aims at the public national welfare. It throws overboard all formulae irreconcilable with independence: unity (administrative and financial), union, federation, confederation, etc..

"Cette idée pour laquelle nous vivons et pour laquelle nous mourrons, cette idée que nous voulons, que nous ferons générale: réaliser pour notre Liban un destin magnifique. Le rendre libre, prospère, heureux. Et pour y arriver nous parlerons sans crainte comme nous agissons sans peur".(1)

Whatever fate holds, Lebanon must exist.(2) Lebanon stands against nobody. It belongs to us all. Lebanon is a spiritual entity, which is well established on firm solid earth, rich with its 60 times secular culture, strong in its aspirations working for whatever the uncertain future holds.(3) Hence whatever Lebanon has for enemies, we have also as our enemies.(4)

"We have proved to the whole world the purity of our aim. We have triumphed over all false accusations, by our actions and by our tenacious hold on life. We have unified our ranks, we have animated the national spirit, and we have put into evidence and into the first place the Lebanese sentiment. We have thought as Lebanese, we have lived as

(1) Le mot du Chef, Action, Nov. 21, 1939.

(2) Manchette d'Action, Aug. 11, 1940.

(3) Action, Nov. 21, 1940.

(4) Action, Dec. 8, 1940.

Lebanese, and we have agitated for the Lebanon. Now we look into the dark and obscure future.. Our hand is in the hand of God in the service of Lebanon."(1)

"Le Liban est une réalité physique et historique. Réalité physique, il est doté de frontières nettement dessinées et de ressources variées qui lui donnent, malgré son petit territoire, unité et prospérité naturelles. L'unité libanaise est indivisible, toutes les régions du Liban étant également indispensables à son bien être et à son développement.

Réalité historique, le Liban moderne, reprenant la succession de l'antique Phénicie, s'est constamment imposé depuis six siècles à l'attention du monde."(2)

"We have said and we repeat that Lebanon is an actual geographical and historical reality which we must preserve and reinforce by all possible means."(3) In this sense Lebanon is a political, historical and geographical entity, and we cannot admit the existence of any theory or any natural policy which defies this fundamental principle.(4)

The Lebanese people in their new awakening recognize the fact that it is the duty and the privilege of the Lebanese youth to work for the public welfare. Only then can every Lebanese acquire equally the same rights and duties. Lebanon has never been the refuge of a single sect regardless of another, it has always been the home of everyone who has believed in the Lebanese mission and worked for its realization in an environment based on self respect, liberty and love.

"La réalité libanaise a été assurée par la recherche et la défense méthodiques et constantes, au cours de six siècles, de l'indépendance

(1) Le Chef, Action, Nov. 21, 1941.

(2) Action, April 25, 1943.

(3) Action, Nov. 1, 1943.

(4) Action, Feb. 8, 1944.

totale dans l'intégrité territoriale. A cet effort de tous les jours entrepris par la principauté libanaise, la masse du peuple a participé d'une manière continue.... Après 1860, une légion de volontaires s'est chargée d'affirmer sous tous les cieux l'Idée libanaise.

On a long passé d'efforts, de sacrifices et de dévouement, qui est à l'origine de la réalité libanaise, est la définition même de la Nation.

On a également écrit que la Nation est un groupement qui se perpétue historiquement, unifié par une idée qui est une volonté d'existence. La continuité qui apparaît d'une façon éclatante dans l'Histoire du Liban est l'expression de la volonté perpétuelle d'existence de notre Peuple.

La continuité libanaise, dont nous participons à notre tour, est par conséquent notre raison d'être, car elle fait de nous une Nation. Cette raison d'être est pareille, sinon supérieure, à celle de toute autre nation libre, grande ou petite.

Le maintien, la défense, et le renforcement de cette réalité qui s'appelle la Nation Libanaise, voilà notre dogme fondamental."(1)

When the idea of independence in the Orient was still unknown, Lebanon was independent. Lebanon was free. Lebanon held its head high. It spread in the two worlds a message of liberation and independence.(2) Our historical evolution, our standard of national civilization, as well as the principles of the Atlantic Charter, all combine to sanction our right to complete liberty with other nations.(3)

"The independence of a nation or country must be a continual creation, the constant affirmation of a perpetual will to be and to exist... It requires the submission to rigorous discipline. To us is

(1) Action, April 25, 1943.

(2) Declaration du Chef, Action, Sept. 7, 1941.

(3) Action, April 25, and Nov. 1, 1943.

the duty of making out of Lebanon a living fatherland, as well as a durable one."(1)

In the name of the 22,000 (2) phalangistes belonging to all the classes of society and representing with their sympathizers effectively and entirely the public opinion of the country, the Phalanges Libanaises claims the safeguarding of the national dignity; independence in all the activities of the will.(3)

The complete independence of Lebanon, over which unchallenged unanimity prevails, signifies that all over the branches of our national activity, we must be able to direct in all sovereignty our distinct national destiny.(4)

The independence which we want for our country, and for which we are ready to shed our blood, is a total independence. We will never accept tutelage, no matter from where it comes, from the East or from the West.(5)

It follows that the Phalanges Libanaises regards all combinations working against Lebanon with distrust, e.g.:

"Nous rejetons la théorie d'une Syrie Géographique en tant qu'elle dénierait la réalité physique du Liban. Cette théorie, oeuvre d'orientalistes au service de des politiques d'impérialisme, ne repose sur aucun fondement historique. 'Les montagnes, les fleuves, a dit Renan, tantôt séparent, tantôt réunissent.'(6)

Nous rejetons la théorie d'une nation arab qui engloberait le peuple libanais. Le fait que nous constituons nous-mêmes une Nation

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- (1) Manifeste lancé Nov. 7, 1936 on the formation of the Phalanges Libanaises.
(2) This was the figure given out in 1944. The official up to date figure on the number of adherents is 42,000.
(3) Tract distribué le 19 Juin 1939.
(4) Action, Feb. 8, 1944.
(5) Action, May 20, 1944.
(6) See Action Nos. 126-127 for the attack of the Phalanges Libanaises

Libanaise est, par définition, incompatible avec une pareille théorie.(1)

La communauté de langue est un élément de rapprochement, mais ne saurait constituer une nation. C'est ce qu'atteste l'Histoire de la Suisse, des pays Anglo-Saxons, des pays de l'Amérique du Sud et des pays Arabes eux-mêmes."(2)

To comment once more on the stand of the Phalanges Libanaises in response to the threatening mass of formulae which have tended to submerge Lebanon and to destroy its identity, I quote the following confession of faith followed by Oliviera Salazar, the celebrated Portuguese reformer and which appeared in the "Action" on March 30th and May 30th 1943:

"Nous ne discutons pas la Patrie, c'est à dire la Nation dans son intégrité territoriale et morale, dans sa pleine indépendance, sans sa vocation historique. Il en existe de plus puissantes, de plus riches, peut être de plus belles; mais celle-ci est la nôtre, et jamais fils au coeur bien né n'a désiré être l'enfant d'une autre mère. Laissons aux philosophes et aux historiens le développement de certaines rêveries relatives à la possibilité de constituer d'autres agglomérations de peuples, ou même ayant trait aux avantages matériels d'autres combinaisons que l'histoire n'a pas créés ou qu'elle a défaits."

This does not mean that Lebanon must refuse to cooperate with its Arab neighbors as well as with other foreign nations, but that any such cooperation or contact must affirm its right to complete sovereignty.

On the other hand the stress on complete and total independence

against the pamphlets issued in August 1944 by factions interested in greater Syrian unity and a greater Arab unity.

(1) On the 12th of Oct. 1944 following the conclusion of the Alexandria Protocol, Pierre Gemayel interviewed the President of the Lebanese Republic and enquired after the measures adopted to insure the separate existence of Lebanon and its possible participation in the Arab League. (Action No. 134).

(2) Action, April 25, 1943.

and sovereignty, affirms the fact that the Phalanges Libanaises never accepted the Mandate nor its application. But that it has repeatedly appealed to the Mandated authorities to fulfill the national aspirations and to grant Lebanon its independence.(1)

"France-Lebanese collaboration must not be based on hypocrisy and bad faith. To be real and efficient, this collaboration must be allowed to develop in an atmosphere of complete good faith, of charity and loyalty, and in protecting and respecting the dignity of each."(2) A stop must be put to that shameful and degrading comedy which has lasted nearly 20 years.(3)

"A la duperie d'un pouvoir national annihilé nous voulons voir les responsabilités établies, les directives précisées, le Chef désigné... La dualité des pouvoirs, avec une imprécision et une confusion voulue dans la répartition des droits, a été la cause du malaise politique intérieur dans ce pays. Telle qu'elle a été pratiquée jusqu'à ce jour, elle est une insulte au sentiment national."(4)

"Vous savez mieux que personne ce que le mandat nous a ravi. Nous ne voulons plus essayer. Nous ne voulons compter que sur nous-mêmes."(5)

"Nos conclusions sont les suivantes:

- (1) En vertu de l'article 1er de la charte du Mandat, celui-ci aurait dû prendre fin aussitôt après l'élaboration d'un statut organique, en l'espèce de la Constitution Libanaise du 25 Mai, 1926.

(1) See Action dating No. 30, and that dating March 13, 1941 for open request for Lebanese independence and liberation. Likewise the protest of Pierre Gemayel and the Lebanese Ministry to the statement of M. de Gaulle on Aug. 3, 1942 in reference to "mandated Lebanon", when Lebanon had been independent for ten months prior to that.

(2) Letter of the Chief to the H.C.F., June 19, 1939.

(3) Le Chef, Action, Dec. 31, 1939.

(4) Action, Dec. 31, 1939.

(5) Declaration du Chef au "Revue du Liban", Sept. 1941.

- (2) En tout état de cause, avec la faillite de la Société des Nations et le développement de la guerre que ladite Société n'a pu empêcher, le mandat confié au gouvernement de la République Française a juridiquement pris fin.
- (3) La rupture du mandat a délié l'indépendance et la souveraineté du Liban.
- (4) La proclamation du 26 Nov. 1941 et les reconnaissances qu'il ont suivies ont admis expressément cette indépendance et cette souveraineté."(1)

"The powerful Mandatory created for the two countries, (Lebanon and Syria) the "common-interest" services. This community was realized to further their political ends, since it facilitated the establishment of a "super government", a dictatorship, which is the Haut Commissariat, (common to Syria also) and which came to be the real government of the country. Thus political unity coincided with economic unity, and Lebanon was to lose in effect its separate personality.(2) This must not be allowed to occur."(3)

5. Evaluation:

Born under the French Mandate, the Phalanges Libanaises has had to develop in its early life under the direction of French policy, a policy based on the traditional connection between the French government, the Maronites and other Uniates; and the habitual assumption of most French politicians that the Sunni Moslems and Arab nationalists who are

(1) Action, April 1, 1943.

(2) Refer to Action No. 82, for the protest of the Phalanges Libanaises against the decision of General Catroux on March 18, 1943 to apply the policy of the Mandate and what it entails to restrict the local authorities and to limit their actions.

(3) Action, Feb. 8, 1944.

the majority are hostile to France. This assumption was largely based on the 1920 episode during which France found it necessary to impose herself on the Arab national government in the interior, and the belief that Arab nationalism was a British instrument, the means to the extension of British influence over Syria and Lebanon.

Thus separatist feelings were fostered, and the people came to regard the Maronites in Lebanon with suspicion for having sided with the French and profited from their presence, and for having been used probably without their consent, as a pretext for continuous French interference.

The fact that the party strongholds were situated in the Lebanese mountain district and its predominantly Maronite majority served to cause grave suspicion of this movement, and to have it commonly described as pro-French in policy. Unable to procure the necessary information to refute or to confirm this charge, I shall systematically evaluate this movement, basing my argument on the facts that we have treated elsewhere in this treatise.

To what extent can one say that the Phalanges Libanaises has been pro-French in policy during its lifetime, and to what can we attribute such a confirmed policy?

One must remember that Article 1 of the "Statuts des Phalanges Libanaises", issued on July 1, 1938, reads:

"Les Phalanges Libanaises sont une organisation de jeunesse patriotique.

Leur but est essentiellement national, elles tachent de former une Nation Libanaise, consciente de ses devoirs et des ses droits, dans un Etat independant et souverain, avec l'alliance et l'amitié de la France(1)

(1) This underlined statement has been blacked out from subsequent editions of the Statute, following the recognition of Lebanese independence.

However, a careful analysis of this organization's history reveals the fact that it has never been content with the false aura of safety created by the Mandate, but that it has repeatedly appealed to the Mandated authorities to fulfill the national aspirations and to grant Lebanon its independence. At the same time ever since its initial start it has sought to defend the existence of Lebanon.

To what extent has the Phalanges Libanaises been a Christian movement fostered both by the French and the Jesuits? Facts as to the extent of the cooperation between the Phalanges and the French authorities are nearly impossible to get hold of. Yet it is commonly believed that during the bye-elections in 1944-45, the French compelled their employees to vote for the Phalanges candidate, Ilyas Nababi, and paid some of the campaign expenses. Likewise it is often repeated that when the Phalanges applied for the installation of a telephone apparatus at their headquarters in Beirut, the French authorities supplied them with four telephone instruments instead of the one originally asked for. Similar favourable treatment is reported to have been given the "Action", the party newspaper, during the severe paper rationing, and that its excess paper supply was openly sold in the black market.

On the other hand one must not forget -

- a) The fact that this organization was twice dissolved under the Mandated authorities;
- b) that numerous Party declarations publicly denouncing the Mandatory authorities and their policy, were openly circulated;
- c) and the positive existence of an entente with the Najjadah, the Moslem Pan-Arab movement, on almost all the major political issues, and that they conducted in common both the strike against the Ravitaillement in Beirut, and the national protest during the November, 1943 crisis.

Thus despite the close relationship between the Phalanges Libanaises and the French authorities, this does not mean that this organization was a tool in the hands of the Mandatory, the means through which this authority arrived at its ends. However, owing to the fact that most of the Phalangistes received their education at the hands of the French Jesuits and in French schools, it is not surprising to find them seeing eye to eye with the French on many subjects. If they show a close resemblance to the French thinking and the French way of getting things done, this is due to their French educational training and was probably more so at the beginning of their career, than after 1948.

On the other hand, one cannot deny that the interest of both parties coincided on the major issues. That both believed in the necessity for the separate existence of Lebanon, a closed geographical entity excluding the idea of an Arab Federation, a Greater Syria, etc... The French because they wished to retain a hold over Lebanon, to protect their vested interests, and to fulfill their traditional mission. The Phalanges Libanaises, because as the pure Lebanese national party and the spokesman of the Christian view as opposed to the Sunni Moslem view, etc., it felt more strongly the need for complete autonomy in defence against submission to the control of a greater Arab unity, other parts of which would be less advanced than itself.

One must not forget that even though the Phalanges Libanaises often repeated that they were not the men of a party, and that hence they were neither interested in parties nor in party politics, they officially entered the political arena in March 1948 during the bye elections, and nominated as their candidate, Ilyas Rababi, in opposition to Philip Tackla, and strove to get the seat previously occupied by Salim Tackla. Ilyas Rababi lost in the bye elections when the

majority of the non-Christian electors voted against him.

It must be stressed here that even though the Phalanges Libanaises was established one year before the Najjadah, and that hence it cannot be rightly called the Christian answer to the Sunni Moslem viewpoint, it has received strong backing as is evident in its increasing membership, and it has had to alter its policy to meet the exigencies of the times - thus gaining a new impetus and seems to be fulfilling a major part in clarifying one of the main political attitudes prevailing in the country of Lebanon.(1) This attitude it has inherited from our not too distant past when our mountain range was the refuge of all the persecuted minorities of this part of the world, and during which a strong individualist tradition was fostered.

It would be interesting to cite in conclusion some of the social reforms carried out by the Phalanges Libanaises:

- a) The institution of a dispensary
- b) Night schools
- c) A Draft Labor Code (partially adopted by the Government in 1946)
- d) Immigrant relations
- e) The use of l'Action in constructive criticism of the government's policy, etc..

C. THE PARTY OF NATIONAL APPEAL

1. Rise of:

This party was officially born on April 15, 1944, when Camille Chamoun, the Minister of the Interior, issued license No. 531, granting

(1) Refer to the Conclusion for a greater analysis of the major political attitudes on Lebanon, and the part that each of the parties has played in developing such attitudes.

it official recognition in confirmation with Decree No. 6, Sept. 25, 1943, and the 6th article of the law of associations.

2. Party Principles and Aims:

The Party of National Appeal seeks to safeguard the national sovereignty and independence of Lebanon, as well as to expound the Arab movement and to promote its diffusion inside the Lebanese frontiers in the hope that it will form the basis of Lebanese national policy.(1)

Articles 4 and 5 concern themselves with the spread of political, administrative, social and economic, as well as educational reforms in conjunction with articles 2 and 3.

As a people's party, this association is consultant as to creed and organization. At the same time it is cooperative in the sense that it demands the cooperation of all its members under all circumstances in a fruitful brotherhood.

The party creed points out the fact that under a social-political regime similar to the one in operation at present in Lebanon, no governmental regime is capable or ready to assume ultimate responsibility and authority backed by a unified public opinion and receiving the full support of the majority of the people.

For years the Lebanese people have lived under the rule of a changing unstable authority, lacking respect and inspiring no confidence. At the same time the people have had no measure of self defence, uncooperative and individualistic they have failed to promote capable national leadership, a safeguard to their liberty. Hence government and civil servants have been regarded with suspicion, and authority has lost its prestige.

(1) The Party of National Appeal - Basic Principles - ap. 15, 1944, Art. 1-3.

Under the protection of foreign powers, it is understandable that Lebanon never found this organized national leadership, but that on the contrary the natural divisions were augmented, and factions brought to collide one with another. But now that Lebanon has won its independence, it has been forced to rely on a conscious and organized public opinion in its progressive and reformatory programs, for neither the people, nor parliamentary organizations, nor the government, can reform themselves alone and progress without a corresponding development in the other bodies.

Thus only political parties which serve to educate the people and to promote a consciously organized public opinion through parliamentary channels and into government programs and activity, can coordinate in their programs the reform of all three bodies.

The Party of National Appeal, organized under full Lebanese independence is better adapted in its program and organization to present national circumstances, than other coalitions and groupings which organized at an earlier date have had to comply diplomatically with the policy of the mandated authorities. As a movement this party works at home and abroad for Lebanon and for the Arab cause. It is not a military fascist organization, but leaves youth development in an independent country to the schools, clubs, etc., and later on in life to the national army, which it deems essential, be it based on a voluntary basis or on compulsory military training.

This national army it regards as an essential institution having sufficient power to safeguard Lebanese sovereignty from the need or the excuse for the interference of foreign armies, from threats of attack. It would also act as a school for national education, a training center

for nationalism.(1)

The Party of National Appeal is not only a party of principle and faith, of discipline and authority, but a combination of the two, a means to an end. In its creed it recognizes the necessity for the existence of a separate Lebanese entity, unified and independent, nationally sovereign within its present boundaries which have been officially agreed upon in 1943. At the same time it recognizes the fact that Lebanon is an Arab country in its characteristics, ideals and destiny, and that there must be no conflict between these two aspects.

The Arab movement in itself is a living reality, explained and viewed by the Arabs in different ways in accordance with their respective ages, environments, and ideals - hence there is little agreement as to the best means of attaining its end or of enforcing its ideas. The party creed believes that the time has come for the Arabs to define the terms and ideals of the Arab movement and the best means for their achievement.

The Lebanese nation was served faithfully by the Arabic language, the means by which its ideas and existence were expressed. It is the duty of the party to popularize its knowledge, simplify it, and promote Arabic publications, etc..

At the same time, the party regards Lebanese independence as deficient in theory and practice, it is these deficiencies which have to be remedied. The Lebanese electoral law and parliamentary organization which were instituted by authorities working against the national welfare, have persisted in time and prove at the present to be incompatible

(1) For further knowledge on this subject consult "Al-Diar", No. 742, Nov. 1945, as well as Kathim Solh: "The Party of National Appeal: Its Principles, Aims and Plans", Jan. 1, 1945.

with the evolutionary progress of our nation. These deficiencies and faults are evident in the form of ministerial responsibility to the President of the Republic and the Chamber of Deputies, in the religious representation in cabinet as well as in the Chamber and in the municipal and national electoral laws.

As a party this organization defends all the liberties, and works for the establishment of education, culture, freedom in the choice of work, freedom of opinion even though it becomes critical of the national deficiencies. That it is not fair to allow a struggle between Lebanese economic classes to take place similar to the one which arose in the West as a result of laissez-faire and the extreme exercise of man's accumulative nature. That these faults of the present social economic order can be ameliorated by the struggle against poverty, ignorance, disease, exploitation and unemployment.

Thus social legislation for the old, the maimed, the ill, the children and the unemployed; the protection of the rights of labor and the limitation of the rights of capital; the increased equality in the distribution of wealth and of national production; an enlightened tariff policy, custom duties, taxation on income and inheritance; the encouragement of national exploitation of our resources and key industries - are all conducive to this amelioration.(1)

Throughout there is the evident desire to establish woman's equality of status with man in accordance with the party creed. That the limits of a woman's rights and duties must be her personal ambition and capacity regardless of her sex - but that the room for developing her natural capacities and in which she best performs her duties

(1) The information appearing on the preceding pgs. is derived from an analysis of the "Basic Code" of the Party of National Appeal, as well as from "An Appeal to the Public" by Kathim Solh the ex-president of the party, which was printed in Al-Diar, No. 742, Jan. 17, 1945.

is in bringing up a family in accordance with love, virtue, knowledge and patriotism.

Since the issuing of this first communiqué and of the original basic principles, the party has at intervals sent out pamphlets and other communications explaining its attitude to the Palestine problem, the military evacuation of Lebanon, the Franco-Lebanese negotiations, (1) the Arab League, the elections of May, 1947, etc.. In all this literature there is no fundamental change of opinion, nor any worthy contribution to our narrative.

In the Report issued by the Party of National Appeal on its second yearly conference, October 31, 1947, certain general resolutions were passed on draft decrees of:

(a) A fundamental constitutional order for Lebanon -

- 1) Lebanon as a democratic republic is an Arab nation, independent and completely sovereign, an indivisible unity.
- 2) The limitation of executive responsibility to the President of the Republic, and the definition of the executive's relation with the legislative and judicial authorities.
- 3) The abolition of sectarian representation from the constitution, laws and institutions.

(b) A draft electoral law -

- 1) That elections should be conducted on the basis of clearly defined constituencies, and that to each constituency there should be a single deputy.

(1) On May 31, 1945, a party declaration to the Lebanese government asked for the rejection of any partial solution of the Franco-Lebanese question, or of any postponement of negotiations, and that peaceful negotiations fail, diplomatic relations with France should be severed and the question raised to the Arab League. In conclusion the party pledged its support of the government in such policies and was willing to have its members volunteer for the national army in case of need.

- 2) That the official statistics as to the number of persons residing in that constituency should be the guiding principle to determine the size of each constituency.
- 3) The abolition of religious representation from the electoral law.
- 4) Judicial supervision of elections.
- 5) The recognition of woman's political status in the same capacity as man's.

(c) A draft economic program -

- 1) The increase of national production
- 2) The exploitation of all unused natural resources in the country.
- 3) National control of the issuing bank.
- 4) The collection of sufficient capital for the development of power plants in the Lebanon and the plan for greater industrial production.
- 5) The amendment of the taxation system, and the tariff policy.
- 6) The increase of exportation, insuring at the same time a balance of international trade.
- 7) To insure social justice.

(d) A draft educational program -

- 1) A free public education system, with obligatory elementary schooling.
- 2) To make the study of arabic obligatory, and to leave the study of any one foreign language a matter of choice to the student.
- 3) Education in an atmosphere of arabic culture, the study of the basic arabic problems and nationalism in the light of historical facts and of human civilization.
- 4) The need for more responsible and capable teachers, and to insure for the teachers higher standards of living through better

wages.(1)

3. Organization:

This party is parliamentary in structure, a limited democratic movement in which responsible authorities are checked and counter checked, in which elections are openly held, and members supervised during their tenure of office; and in which responsibility is strictly allocated.

As a party it is composed of a president, party representatives and regular members. The regular members aged 19 and above, meeting in an open assembly elect the president by means of a majority vote. The representatives are staunch party supporters appointed by the president in capacity of advisors and counselors, and make up the president's "private cabinet". If two-thirds the members of this committee agree on any point at issue, they can veto the president's resolutions.(2)

4. Policy:

Ever since its initial start, this movement has opposed sectarianism and regional particularism. It never worked for religious factions, nor did it recognize the political rights of religious institutions. It positively attacked the authority of class and tribal organizations on the nation and the national mentality. This general policy is easily deducible from the many party publications, and the problems that these deal with.

Comparatively in its infancy, it has sought to enlighten the general public opinion on the major political events of our times - e.g.,

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- (1) For the original arabic text of these resolutions, consult the decree of the Party of National Appeal on its second yearly conference, issued in October, 1947.
- (2) The Party of National Appeal: Its Basic Code, April 15, 1944 Section 3, articles 10-15.

the evacuation of foreign troops from Syria and Lebanon, international agreements and conferences, the problems confronting the Arab League, The Palestine Problem, etc.. Stressing its nationalist tendencies, and its belief in Lebanese autonomy, it attacked the recent 1947 elections, and demanded the dissolution of the Chamber.

Still in its infancy, it is in process of revising and completing its basic code and principles.

5. Evaluation:

The total membership of this movement is estimated at over 2,000 supporters. These are representative of nearly all the Lebanese geographical regions and religious creeds. Together they work for the propagation and the realization of the party ideals and principles.

The points of strength of this party are first, that it arose at a time when Lebanon was virtually independent, and that it has since sought to stress Lebanese autonomy and to formulate a positive program, demanding open reform, and relying on experts for this task. Secondly, this party is unique in having its members represented at nearly every Lebanese Legation abroad.(1)

Aside from having a controlling interest in six Lebanese newspapers, it manages the Arab Cultural Club in Beirut, and supports the "National Youth".

I do not think that its mission is easy to accomplish, for it entails a general public "education", and an overwhelming reorganization. However, once this mission is accomplished, order and a responsible

(1) Lebanon's ambassador to Iraq, Mr. Kathim el-Solb, was the first president of the party. Likewise, the party of National Appeal was the only party invited to send its representatives with the president of the Lebanese Republic upon an official visit to Iraq in 1947.

authority would rule supreme.

If to every party a philosophy, a culture, a definite set of principles are necessary to form a nucleus around which a strong movement is to be built, this party stands supreme in having evolved a purely nationalist creed, which has seen no virtual change of policy for the last four years.

IV. C O N C L U S I O N

An Analysis of the political forces which have shaped the trend of public opinion and thus the destiny of the Middle East and particularly of Lebanon, reveals the potent strength of nationalism. This growth of nationalism has paralleled the decline of religion as a political force, and the recognition that choice of religion is a matter for the individual conscience.

Along its development Arab Nationalism has been stimulated by opposition to the imperialism of Turkey and later to the imperialism of the Great Powers of Europe. Even in Syria nationalist opposition cannot be truthfully called anti-French only.(1) At the present stage of its development it has achieved solidarity to oppose Zionism.

This relationship of imperialism to nationalism may be one of opposition, of supplementation or of sublimation. If we consider the leading United Nations in the third stage, i.e., that when the continual struggle for complete autonomy is self-defeating, the nations achieve a maturity in which the inevitable lack of self-sufficiency is remedied not by conquest but by cooperation; it becomes evident that the Axis Powers were in the second stage, and that the Middle East is still in the first stage of development.

In our country, "the Lebanese movement has been stimulated by the creation of an independent Lebanese Republic by the French, and by the dominant element inside the Republic of a feeling of difference from or even hostility to the Arab inhabitants of the hinterland. Yet

(1) Aside from the declining Imperialism of Turkey, the Middle East has had to cope with the still rising imperialism of Britain, France and Russia - but no longer of Germany and Italy.

Lebanon cannot economically and spiritually be cut off from the interior."(1)

Thus we have seen that during the early years of the Mandate political movements and organizations in the Lebanon, attempted to put aside the question of their autonomy, and to concentrate with the Syrians on achieving their political independence, in an endeavour to arrive at equality with the Western states.

This trend towards political independence, went side by side with the desire for unity fostered by Arab Nationalism, and which is outwardly expressed today by the existence of the Arab League. Together, both trends accentuated the need for economic and social industrialization and westernization, so that we have found the early 1930's ushering in a new crop of parties based on definite doctrines and moderate, long-term social and economic reforms.

As politically conceived, there are five main views of Lebanon:

"1) There are some who regard Lebanon as an integral part of Arab Asia, with no essential social or political difference from other parts and no special mission or purpose. They want Lebanon to be wholly absorbed into a Syrian or an Arab State, with no autonomy but special provisions for the personal status and religious education of the minorities, such as exist in the other Arab regions.

2) Others admit that Lebanon's past history has given it a character of its own and created a gap between it and the other Arab regions. But they deny that the distinctive character of Lebanon confers upon it special duties or a mission; they regard the special characteristics as no more than historical relics which will disappear sooner or later. They are willing to grant a certain degree of Lebanese autonomy or even

(1) Hourani, A., "Minorities in the Arab World", p. 37.

complete independence, but only as a temporary expedient, with the object of allaying the fears of the minorities, and gradually persuading them to accept complete union with a Syrian or Arab state.

3) Others again regard Lebanon as primarily a place of refuge where persecuted minorities can live in peace. They want therefore to be wholly separate from the hinterland, and do not care what form of government exists so long as it is strong enough to protect them.

4) Another idea is of Lebanon as a Mediterranean Christian country: not the Western edge of the Arabic Moslem world, but the Eastern edge of Western Christendom. It is in no essential sense a part of the Arab World, but its people constitute a separate nation. It should therefore be an independent state with its face turned towards Europe.

5) There are others who try to extract and combine the elements of truth in all these views. They admit that Lebanon is an Arab country by character and by destiny; but they believe that its special traditions confer upon it a special destiny in the Arab world; as a center of Arab Christian life, as a gateway to the West and as a place where adherents of different religions can meet on absolutely equal terms."⁽¹⁾

The first view is generally held by Sunni Moslems; the second, by Moslem Arab nationalists and the Christians believing in lay nationalism; the third, by all the minorities, and specially the older generations; the fourth, by the Maronites; and the last, by the Christians who want to remain fully Christian, yet are Arab nationalists.

As expressed in the different political programs, these views entail, first, the question of the frontiers of Lebanon - that those who have wished to preserve Lebanon as a separate entity, wish at the

(1) Hourani, A., p. 73.

same time to preserve the 1920 frontiers; secondly, these same people wish to see independent Lebanon under the protection of a Western Power, probably Great Britain or the U.S.A., not France; thirdly, some of those who recognize the independence of Lebanon wish to see it associating more closely with Syria and the other Arab countries on an equal footing, as a province of a Syrian or an Arab state; fourthly, there are those who wish to see Lebanon member state in either a Syrian or an Arab federation, a more binding and a stronger unity than the one achieved by the Arab League.

Our second major conclusion, is that all along we have stressed the fact that Lebanese political parties in respect to lack of organization, vagueness of programs, willingness to compromise and the indiscipline of their members, differ from political groups elsewhere. That most of these groupings are only of local importance, having a high birthrate and a high death rate as well. Thus they can be best described as masses of men without any important leaders.

This lack of able leadership can be explained in part as owing to the execution of the cream in 1916 by Jemal Pasha under the Ottoman rule; the starvation and the ensuing migration of the Lebanese population; (1) and the lack of a strong governmental opposition to train the masses in governmental procedure and to furnish capable leadership.

(1) The following table which is based on official 1943 statistics, and appeared in "Beirut", June 28, 1947, visualizes the heavy toll suffered through migration:-

<u>Sect</u>	<u>No. of Inhabitants</u>	<u>No. of Emigrants</u>	<u>Total</u>
Naronites	318,201	91,276	409,477
Sunnis	225,594	4,913	230,507
Shiis	200,698	9,567	210,065
Orthodox	106,658	38,655	140,313
Druze	71,711	4,863	76,574
Catholics	61,956	13,272	75,228
Arm. Orth.	58,007	66	58,073
Minorities	41,596	2,159	43,755
Total	1,084,421	169,571	1,243,992

If we accept Walter Bagehot's thesis, that the comparative successfulness of England as a nation, was owing in large part to their stupidity, we would find that Lebanon needs good leaders, yes; but the good leaders would not have good followers, if the majority of these followers had determined to think everything out for themselves, if the Lebanese retain their strong individualistic tendencies.

Likewise, we have repeatedly stressed the multiplicity of parties in our previous analysis. This has been due in large extent, to -

- 1) the sectarian creed of our age. That the Middle East has been the cradle of three world religions, and that hence it is only natural that the differences in formulating "systems" for these religions would embody themselves in organized sects, and hence into organized parties representing the political interests of these sects.
- 2) That both the geographical structure of Lebanon and the poor communications have tended to preserve localism and particularism and to foster separatist feelings, which embodied themselves in rival associations leading to a lack of social and political unity and cohesion.
- 3) That with feudalism there has survived local respect of eminent citizens, "lords", in the different regions, a feeling of subservience to the interests and the "will" of local notables, and of supporting them in their political ventures.
- 4) That public opinion is largely shaped by the heads of powerful families in an endeavour to protect their own interests, thus family and clan politics survive and breed factions holding diverse opinions, etc..

The effects produced by the existence of a multiplicity of parties are primarily: the instability of government, the insufficiency of public-spirited leadership, the fact that every government is a government of compromise, etc.. This has all tended to accentuate the

individualist tendencies of the Lebanese and to make them suspicious of the many rising parties, which they found out were mostly centered around personal interests, and which were ready to exploit their own country and to serve foreign masters. Thus sectarian divisions alone have fostered at least six prominent youth organizations, each holding a different view, and which constantly interfere in the functioning of local and national politics. Similar associations were promoted for personal gain, tending to agitate for specific purposes, and compromising with their ideals at every step. Thus we have seen that most party programs were insincere and that party rivalry was devoid of principle.

Earlier in this treatise, we stressed the methods through which the idea of political associations, of democracy, responsible government, the party system of government, freedom of expression, etc., and other Western political concepts infiltrated into the East. These brought with them a new problem, which assumed in Syria and Lebanon a change in the whole aspect of life: the decay of the old, and the challenge of the new. It is a change from a static community ruled by custom to a dynamic society governed by positive laws, and a conception of the national welfare.

Whatever instability of policy we have traced; whatever lack of solidarity and unity we have stressed; whatever apathy and degeneration we have come up against - all prove that it takes time to learn the art of constructing and managing a modern government, and to respond successfully to the Western political challenge.

The achievement of France was to bring into Syria and Lebanon the essential conditions, which made possible the transition from a medieval to a modern society. No one can deny that law and order were somewhat

firmly established under French protection.

Today, Lebanon is passing through a transitory stage. In order to meet successfully the challenge of westernization it asks for equality in the community of nations. A pre-requisite of this equality is the successful operation of self-government. This entails the right of association and of the well functioning of the party-system, in order to mediate between the electorate and the Legislative, as well as between the executive and the Legislative.

So far, our national policies, and the control of their realization, are in the hands of temporary parliamentary groupings and associations, which are formed around a nucleus of events, and which lack a definite "party line", or platform.

Our governmental machinery does not provide the adequate means of expressing and realizing the general will. As they stand today, none of our national parties embody popular sovereignty by participating in the government, or by the shaping of the national policy and the control of its realization.

It is in this aspect that the Lebanese political system is inadequate, and all political reform must start by realistically and practically meeting this challenge.

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