

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

WE HAVE BEEN HERE FOR 67 YEARS:  
A STUDY OF PALESTINIANS' PERCEPTIONS  
OF THEIR NATIONAL IDENTITY AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS  
THEIR LANGUAGE IN LEBANON

by  
YASMINE ABDUL MENEEM ABOU TAHA

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for the degree of Master of Arts  
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
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
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## AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

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Title: We Have Been Here for 67 Years: A Study of Palestinians' Perceptions of Their National Identity and Attitudes Towards Their Language in Lebanon

The present study examined how Palestinians in Lebanon identify themselves, their attitudes towards their language, both Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) and the Palestinian Colloquial Arabic (PCA), as an expression of their identity and cultural heritage, and the factors that affect their self-identification, language use and pride in their dialect. Participants were 37 Palestinians who are in daily contact with their Lebanese host society through their work or study. Data were collected through a background questionnaire and a semi-structured interview. Results showed that the majority of participants identified themselves as Palestinian. Some factors played a role in this self-identification, the most prominent among them was educational level. Participants also had positive attitudes towards their dialect; however, they strongly believed that there are other markers of their identity that are just as prominent as their dialect. These markers included identifying as Palestinian, maintaining connections with other Palestinians, having a sense of belonging to Palestine, and maintaining the Palestinian cultural heritage. That is why, they believed that it is not their duty to speak PCA but rather to familiarize themselves with the Palestinian cause, make others aware of it, and preserve their Palestinian roots by transferring them to future generations.

*Keywords:* self-identification, identity, language, language maintenance, language attitudes, national identity, Palestinian national identity.

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# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

Meanwhile the gunfire was continuing, clearly intended to get people moving. We saw families holding their children and lugging big bags, some supporting old parents. Sobbing loudly...Joining the main road leading up the steep slope of the mountain on which their village was built, they were setting off on a “trail of tears” towards the Lebanese border. The most heartrending sight was the cats and dogs, barking and carrying on, trying to follow their masters. I heard a man shout to his dog: “Go back! At least you can stay!” (Srouji, 2004, p. 77)

### **A. The Study**

#### ***1. Purpose and Research Questions***

The purpose of this study is to examine how Palestinians in Lebanon identify themselves, their attitudes towards their language, and the factors that affect both their self-identification and their attitudes. Self-identification is “a conscious part of the self rather than the operation of unperceived automatic mechanisms” (Aoudé, 2001, p. 164). Conscious self-categorization may be difficult for Palestinians, who “struggle with their ethnic/national identity in an attempt to resolve their conceptualisation of self and ‘other’. It is a constant struggle with ebbs and flows” (Aoudé, 2001, p. 165). It is a struggle because Palestinians rewrite their identities based on their new surroundings. Thus, they may develop “hybridity, dual loyalties, and transnational relationships” (Chryssis, 2007, n.p.).

In addition to self-identification, this study examined whether Palestinians believe that their dialect, Palestinian Colloquial Arabic (PCA), is the best expression of their identity and cultural heritage. Furthermore, it sought to understand their perceptions of the role of Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) in shaping their national identity. It focused on the relationship between language and the Palestinian national identity because of the importance of language in nation building (Anderson, 1983; Suleiman, 2003). Elements of nationalism include religion, attachment to the homeland, ethnicity, history, culture, or a combination of these elements. Albert Hourani (1993) argued that language is the most essential basic element of nationalism in the Arab context, “based on the idea that all who spoke the same language constituted a single nation and should form one independent political unit... this became the dominant political idea in the Middle East and superseded or absorbed the others” (pp. 342-343). In addition, Edward Sapir (1921) argued that language is the main element of national consciousness:

The important thing to hold on to is that particular language tends to become the fitting expression of self-conscious nationality and that such a group will construct for itself... a race to which is to be attributed the mystic power of creating a language and a culture as twin expression of a self-consciousness nationality... (p. 39)

The study aimed to answer the following research questions:

- 1) How do Palestinians in daily contact with the Lebanese society identify themselves?

- 2) To what extent do they believe that it is their duty to speak PCA and socialize with other Palestinians in order to maintain their national identity and cultural heritage?
- 3) Do they believe that PCA and/or MSA are the best expressions of their national identity and cultural heritage?
- 4) What are the factors that affect Palestinians' perceptions of their national identity and language?

## ***2. Significance of the Study***

Participants were Palestinians who interact daily with the host society but not those who merely interact with other Palestinians in refugee camps. Other studies have overlooked the former population, which had left a noticeable gap in the literature. This population socializes more intensely with the Lebanese society than that of refugee camps (Lindholm Schulz, 2003). In Lebanon, there are strict policies towards Palestinians; in this sense, it is different than other host Arab countries, which have given some basic rights to their Palestinian refugees. That is why, “[t]he experience of the Palestinians in Lebanon is unparalleled in any other of the various Arab countries. They have been subjected to social, economical and political restrictions, not to mention violence and repression...” (Ghandour, 2001, p. 153). This unparalleled experience is very important to highlight. Many studies have focused on the Palestinian national identity without focusing on Lebanon only (Andrews et al., 2012), and those who have focused on Lebanon exclusively were conducted in refugee camps (Afifi & El-Shareef, 2010; Sayigh, 2012). “Living in different countries, cultures, and settings has produced

particular lifestyles, value systems, and beliefs. Also, such factors as class, economic and legal status, and political affiliation influence every Palestinian's identity" (Hammer, 2005, p. 3). That is why, the Palestinian identity in Lebanon can differ from the one in another host society.

Being in the Lebanese host society might influence Palestinians' self-identification and attitudes towards their language. In the face of this marginalization, Palestinians might lose their dialect, attempt to hide it, or challenge their negative image by speaking their dialect and taking pride in it. Allport (1954) stated that responses to discrimination can be categorized as either intro-punitive or extro-punitive. In the former, individuals respond to discrimination by blaming the self and the in-group, which leads to group disidentification. Extro-punitive responses are associated with increasing identification with one's group and hostility towards the dominant group. This kind of response to discrimination corresponds with the Rejection-Identification model (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999), which "posits that perceived discrimination may lead to increased ingroup identification, which can help maintain psychological well-being in the face of societal devaluation" (Armenta & Hunt, 2009, p. 23). Such complexities may not arise, or they may arise differently, in a strictly Palestinian population in refugee camps, where all the residents are members of the minority group who may not regularly interact with the Lebanese majority group. Therefore, the study's significance is based on its focus on the Palestinian national identity of Palestinians in daily contact with the Lebanese people, either through their universities, workplaces, or neighborhoods.

## **B. Background of the Study**

### ***1. Historical Background***

Palestine has passed through many ebbs and flows. Contrary to popular belief, the Palestinian history does not only include the Nakba, though it is the most prominent chapter of this history, as it has “become the key site of Palestinian collective memory and national identity” (Abu-Lughod & Sa’di, 2007, p. 4). Many factors led to the Nakba, which ultimately made the mandate of Palestine a homeland for Jews. These were the:

...Zionist Congress and the establishment of the World Zionist Organization in 1897; the Balfour Declaration of 1917...; Britain’s occupation of Palestine in World War I; the defeat by the British of the 1936–39 Palestinian Rebellion; World War II and the Holocaust; and finally the 1947 United Nations Resolution on the Partition of Palestine and the 1948 War that came fast on its heels. (Sa’di, 2007, p. 288)

Palestine was ruled by the Ottoman Empire for around 400 years as part of Greater Syria. After the Ottoman Empire was defeated, countries of Greater Syria were placed under French or British mandates by the Supreme Council of the League of Nations. Under the secret Sykes–Picot Agreement (May, 1916), France governed the “Blue Area,” which included Cilicia, Syria and Lebanon, and Britain governed the “Red Area,” which covered parts of Mesopotamia and of Palestine, namely Haifa and Acre. In November 1917, during the First World War, the British government issued the Balfour Declaration, which was sent from the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur James

Balfour, to Lord Rothschild, who was a leader of the Jewish community in Britain. The letter promised the Jewish people a national home in Palestine.

After World War I ended, the League of Nations officially gave Britain the mandate of Palestine in 1922, as the British army was already in the country since 1917. The mandate of Palestine was different from other mandates because the aim was not to provide administrative support which would ultimately lead to an independent country; rather the aim of the mandate was to implement the Balfour Declaration. This declaration supports Zionism, which is a “secular political ideology [founded] by Theodor Herzl (1860-1904)” (Matar, 2011, p. 13). It supports the establishment of the state of Israel in a particular homeland. Although Palestine was not the only option for Zionists to reach their goal, many factors facilitated the occupation of Palestine: “the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the mandate of the League of Nations that placed some Ottoman territories under British rule, the close relations between leading Zionists and members of the British government, and other international and local factors” (Matar, 2011, p. 13). As a result, many Jewish immigrants started coming to Palestine. These immigrants came to be known as *Aliyah*, which refers to the immigration of many Jewish people from different areas in the diaspora to Palestine. This immigration especially increased in 1933, when the Holocaust started. The Holocaust refers to the period between 1933 and 1945, when millions of Jews were killed at the hands of Nazi Germany under the authority of Adolf Hitler.

It was not until May 1948 that the Jews declared an independent State of Israel. These Jews then came to be known as *Yishuv*, meaning settlement in Hebrew. The year



1948 witnessed the Nakba, which describes “the uprooting of people from their homeland, the destruction of the social fabric that bound them for so long, and the frustration of national aspirations” (Abu-Lughod & Sa’ di, 2007, p. 9). The Nakba resulted in the displacement of up to 750000 Palestinians (W. Said, 2001). Some Palestinians were internally displaced, meaning that they were still in their war-torn home country, but they had been displaced from their homes. These Palestinians are legally called “‘present absentees’ as a veneer of legality for the confiscation of their property” (Abu-Lughod & Sa’ di, 2007, p. 16). Other Palestinians are externally displaced (*Felistenio al-Shatat* or *al-Kharij*) as refugees. The *United Nations Relief and Works Agency* (UNRWA) calls them Palestine refugees and describes them as “persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 1 May 1948 and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict” (UNRWA, n.d.). They have come to form a diasporic identity based on their stateless diaspora, which was further expanded by the sequel of the Nakba: Al-Naksa, meaning setback. The Naksa took place during 1967 when Israel occupied in a six-day war against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan what remained of the Palestinian territories.

Despite losing the geographical territory of their homeland, Palestinians “have retained a memory of, a cultural connection with, and a general orientation toward their homelands” (Safran, 2004, p. 10). However, the Nakba still marked an awaiting future of struggle for Palestinians; that is why it “is often reckoned as the beginning of contemporary Palestinian history, a history of catastrophic changes, violent suppression, and refusal to disappear” (Abu-Lughod & Sa’ di, 2007, p. 5). These catastrophic changes

were seen in the struggle of Palestinians to build their lives in numerous host societies, especially Arab countries, which were not necessarily ready to welcome a big influx of refugees. The struggle of Palestinians since 1948 was, and still is, seen in all aspects of life, whether it is on the level of coping with the host society and assimilating with its culture, or establishing proper lives with decent living conditions and jobs, marking what Rosemary Sayigh calls the “continuing Nakba” (Jayyusi, 2007, p. 114).

## ***2. Warfare and the Palestinian Identity***

The state of war did not only impose challenges for Palestinians’ living conditions in the diaspora, but also for their identity. Rashid Khalidi (1997) argued that the Palestinians had not only to fashion and impose their identity and independent political existence in opposition to a European colonial power, but also to match themselves against the growing and powerful Zionist movement, which was motivated by a strong, highly developed, and focused sense of national identification, and which challenged the national rights of the Palestinians in their own homeland, and indeed the very existence of the Palestinians as an entity. (p. 20)

Elias Sanbar (2001), a Palestinian historian, also argued that the warfare challenged the existence of the Palestinians, even resulting in the absence of this people: “[t]hat year [1948], a country and its people disappeared from both maps and dictionaries... ‘The Palestinian people does not exist’, said the new local masters... [a] long absence was beginning” (p. 87). It is true that the Jewish community in Palestine attempted to deny the Palestinian existence. Not only do their acts of violence serve to ethnically cleanse

the country of Palestinians, but also the discourse they use to talk about Palestinians serves to deny their existence, identity, and culture. For example, a well-known Zionist leader, Israel Zangwill, described Jews as “a people without land returning to a land without people” (Pappé, 2007, p. 50). This is what Kimmerling (2003) called *politicide*, which is a “process whose ultimate goal is the dissolution of the Palestinian people’s existence as a legitimate social, political and economic entity” (pp. 3-4). However, the absence that Sanbar referred to is not absolute. According to Khalidi (1997), the “Palestinian identity has evolved over time, its elements have varied, with some eventually disappearing and others newly emerging” (Khalidi, 1997, p. 19). Identity is defined in the face of an “other,” and Palestinian identity has changed because of the many “others” which have occupied the Palestinian territory. These others were “the covetous European powers and the country’s Turkish rulers before World War I, and the British mandatory authorities and other Arab peoples after that” (Khalidi, 1997, p. 154). Palestinians were Arabs who identified with other Arabs in Greater Syria; “[b]inding factors include the use of the same language, the existence of a collective imagination, the claim of a shared history, and the reality of identical social structures” (Sanbar, 2001, p. 88). However, the British ruling of Palestine enriched the common core of Arabism with local variations of the Palestinian identity (Sanbar, 2001, p. 88).

Asim Abou Shaqra, a Palestinian artist, has represented the Palestinian identity as a cactus in his paintings “because of its amazing ability to flower out of death” (Boullata, 2001, p. 76). He used the cactus as a symbol of forced migration when he drew it as “severed from its natural habitation and placed in a flowerpot” (Sa’ di, 2002,

p. 194). Accordingly, the cactus has become a symbol of the Palestinian resistance of the denial of their identity, a symbol of their *sumud* “steadfastness.” In fact, the colloquial Arabic word for cactus, *sabr*, also means patience and perseverance. Thus, the symbol of the cactus has the “ability to reclaim new terrains, to acquire new meanings and representations, and to maintain its powerful presence; and [is adaptable] to the new reality wherein the Palestinians live in scattered communities” (Sa’di, 2002, pp. 194-195). The Palestinian identity is just like a cactus; it is not absent, but rather it is maintaining its presence through a process of reconstruction that is always in the makings as a result of the continuing Nakba.

Gabriel Garcia Marquez argued that individuals “are not born once and for all on the day their mothers give birth to them, but that life obliges them to give birth to themselves” (as cited in Said, 2004, p. 86). This is the case of Palestinians, who often give birth to themselves as a function of their changing circumstances. When Zionists started occupying the land, Palestinianness was mainly associated with a struggle for that land. Accordingly, a “unique national identity [was] predominantly constructed based on an attachment to a territorial homeland whose people are inseparably linked to it by common origin, historical continuity and religion” (Amer, 2012, p. 120). That is mainly because “territory has always been at the core of the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis” (Amer, 2012, p. 120), which is why “territory” is a “defining component of Palestinian national self-perception and struggle” (p. 120). As the state of war extended and Palestinians became protracted refugees, as Hanafi, Chaaban, and Seyfert (2012) called them, the Palestinian national identity was no longer only

revolving around territory. In addition to highlighting territory as an important part of the Palestinian national consciousness, warfare became “a mobilizer of ethnic sentiments and national consciousness, a centralizing force in the life of the community and a provider of myths and memories for future generations” (Smith, 1991, p. 27). Hence, this war led to reinforcing “preexisting elements of identity, sustaining and strengthening a Palestinian sense of self-definition that was already present” (Khalidi, 1997, p. 22).

This sense of self-definition is not free from complexities. Even though the war may have highlighted a sense of collective identity for Palestinians, it simultaneously led to some gaps in this shared identity. The state of war divided the Palestinian population into three groups: Palestinians in the diaspora, Palestinians in Israel, and Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. “They constituted three differentiated sites of collective experience and memory work” (Jayyusi, 2007, p. 109). These three groups of Palestinians can be divided into two: Palestinians inside the Palestinian territories, and those outside the territories. This division illustrates that it is erroneous to perceive the Palestinian identity as a shared identity at all times. Palestinians do share many experiences, perhaps mostly at the identity-highlighting borders (Khalidi, 1997); however, the division among Palestinians inside and outside, and the division among Palestinians who are outside – in different host societies with a different public gaze (Sa’di, 2002, p. 181) – “[deepen] colorings of ‘self-identification’ through different locations, class positions; politics and ideologies. This poses the likelihood of a growing

gap between a shared ‘Palestinianness’ and differing class, regional, political or individual interests” (Sayigh, 2012, p. 13). In fact, Edward Said has written

on the difficulties of formulating a Palestinian narrative in a linear sense... The multiple reasons he has cited include the people’s dispersal, the recurring discontinuities and displacements in their lives, and the lack of a geographic and cultural center over a period of some fifty years. Said has also noted how, due to these factors, alternative means of expression were bound to be invented out of the kind of chaos set in motion by the experience of uprootedness and fragmentation, as no linear narrative entailing classical rules of form or structure can be true to that experience. (Boullata, 2001, p. 68)

### ***3. A Ticking Time Bomb: The Palestinian Presence in Lebanon***

The Palestinian presence in Lebanon proved to be a continuing Nakba for Palestinians because of the way Lebanese authorities treat this population. The host society’s reception of refugees can be categorized into three patterns. The host society can be *digestive*, meaning that it is receptive to minority groups; *repulsive*, meaning that the society is “less receptive, more conservative, sensitive and more aware of the existence of such groups” (Abd-el-Jawad, 2006, p. 69); or it can be *accommodating/tolerant*, meaning that the host society does not “absorb the ethnic groups easily, but [does] not at the same time impose assimilation on them or refuse them” (Abd-el-Jawad, 2006, p. 69). The Lebanese host society fits best into the second category. Chaaban et al. (2010) stated that the “story of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon is one of deep ethno-national divisions, political confrontation and, in the post-

civil war years, ideological controversy” (p. 3). The briefest, most accurate depiction of the condition of Palestinians in Lebanon is provided by Nadine Hassouneh (2015), who stated that this population is “physically included in Lebanon, but practically excluded from it” (p. 312). In contrast to Palestinians in Syria and Jordan, those in Lebanon “remain excluded from key aspects of social, political and economic life in the country...they are barred from owning property or practicing in more than 30 professions, among which all liberal professions” (Chaaban et al., 2010, p. ix). Health and medical care, in addition to social security, are also denied to Palestinians in Lebanon. Perhaps that is why this population refers to itself as “forgotten people” (Chaaban et al., 2010). They are forgotten because they live in miserable conditions and suffer from “on the one hand, the neglect and cruelty of the Lebanese government, and on the other, the staunch refusal of Israel to repatriate them” (Said, 2001, p. 123).

Sayigh (2001) argued that the Lebanese authorities have developed dual policies regarding refugees: “1) a formal demand for their return as a first condition for their negotiations with Israel and 2) an interim policy of pressures encouraging refugee emigration” (Sayigh, 2001, p. 100). Lebanese authorities have three main reasons for opposing the integration of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The first is *economic*. “[T]he country emerging from war is still unable to meet the challenges of creating successful programmes to re-launch its own economy, let alone absorb the Palestinians” (Nasrallah, 1997, p. 350). In other words, the job demand is higher than the supply. Yet, this does not make a good reason for rejecting the Palestinian settlement in the country because if Palestinians were citizen-refugees, a status which would allow them to work,

they would contribute to the Lebanese economy (Chaaban et al., 2010). In addition, the Palestinian presence in Lebanon “imposes virtually no burden on the host country. In fact, refugees have very few alternatives to UNRWA in terms of securing their livelihoods and basic needs” (Chaaban et al., 2010, p. xiv).

The second reason behind Lebanon’s anti-Palestinian stance is *political and historical* in nature. This reason can be attributed to The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which relocated to refugee camps in Beirut after its defeat in the war with Jordan in 1970. Its presence in Lebanon emphasized the Palestinian resistance against Zionism and led to the “re-emergence of distinctly Palestinian nationalist politics in the mid-1960s [which]...played a key role in promoting a collective political and national identity among the exiled Palestinians” (Chaaban et al., 2010, p. 3), especially because the presence of the PLO in the camps created a Palestinian state within the Lebanese state. However, the power of Palestinians was soon shut down. The PLO is said to be the catalyst of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon because of its attacks on Israel. These attacks “drew heavy retaliation and increased the tension between Palestinians and certain sectors of the Lebanese population, who were unsympathetic to the Palestinians’ plight” (Said, 2001, p. 126). Lebanese people felt that they were paying the price for a war that the Palestinians fueled. This directly affected the situation of Palestinians in Lebanon, especially those in refugee camps. For example, in September 16, 1982, the Sabra and Shatila massacres occurred, when Lebanese forces “in less than two days slaughtered anywhere between 460 and 3,000 Palestinians, including women and children” (Kimmerling & Migdal, 2003, p. 270). All



these events ultimately led to the expulsion of the PLO. The Palestinians were no longer as powerful as they were under the protection of the PLO.

The third reason behind Lebanon's rejection of the Palestinian permanent settlement in the country is *demographic*. There are three main religions in Lebanon: Islam, Christianity, and Druze. The naturalization of the majorly Sunni Muslim Palestinians in Lebanon "would further skew the already shaky balance both between Christians and Muslims, and between Sunni and Shia Muslims" (Haddad, 2002, p. 102). However, Nasrallah (1997) argued that "religious guarantees and privileges are not related to numbers but to the overall principle of preserving minority rights in the Middle East" (p. 358). Even though the reasons presented by the Lebanese authorities for rejecting Palestinians may be refuted, they should not be dismissed. Lebanese authorities do believe that the Palestinians are "a ticking time bomb" (Nasrallah, 1997, p. 358) and this alone is enough to hinder the permanent settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon. Yet, it is important to acknowledge that the Lebanese laws towards Palestinians are not the only responsible party for the current situation of Palestinians in the country. "Rather, other factors are equally to blame, such as the decisions taken by the Palestinian leadership, starting with the Gulf war and ending with the Oslo accord" (Nasrallah, 1997, p. 358).

#### ***4. Lebanese Attitudes towards the Palestinian Presence in Lebanon***

Lebanese attitudes towards the Palestinians in Lebanon have always been "reminiscent of the Lebanese civil war period" (Nasrallah, 1997, p. 354). Official positions towards this issue are anti-Palestinian. Addressing the naturalization of

Palestinians in Lebanon, then Prime Minister Rafiq Al-Hariri stated that “[w]e cannot give them Lebanese nationality...if we did so, we feel that we are implementing the plan of Israel” (as cited in Said, 2001, p. 139). In other words, if Palestinians get the right of permanent settlement in Lebanon, this would disregard the Palestinian cause. It is uncertain to what extent this argument is true as Nasrallah (1997) argued that “granting the Palestinians permanent residency, yet giving them the nationality of the autonomous entity, or Palestinian state to be, would not result in their liquidation as Palestinians” (p. 358). This position towards Palestinians is reinforced by the media, which projects images of Palestinian refugee camps as hide-outs for criminals. Sayigh (2001) acknowledged that this is especially seen when a crime is committed by a Palestinian, where the emphasis tends to be on the criminal’s Palestinian nationality, something which is not seen when others in Lebanon commit crimes.

Similar to official positions, Lebanese citizens’ attitudes reveal a negative tone towards the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. These attitudes have been characterized “as ranging between two poles: indifference at one level and negativity at the other, with negativism varying between active hostility and passive dislike” (Zeine, 1994 as cited in Haddad, 2002, p. 102). In 1993, “Al-Safir,” a Lebanese newspaper, conducted a survey asking Lebanese people from a variety of areas and sects about their attitudes towards the naturalization of Palestinian refugees. Results showed that participants are concerned “that the Palestinians, if naturalized, would further complicate Lebanese confessional problems” (Said, 2001, p. 140). Participants also explained that Lebanon is a very small country; its size and its problems hinder it from welcoming a large number

of refugees. It can be concluded that the Palestinian refugee in Lebanon “is cast as a troublemaker and cause of Lebanon’s woes, a fearsome oddity to be managed, quarantined and moved at will” (*Worldwide Refugee Information*, 1999, as cited in Ghandour, 2001, p. 154).

The situation of Palestinians in Lebanon and their negatively perceived image by the government and the public has indeed affected how they identify themselves. It is expected that Palestinians will have two options: either to fit in and identify as Lebanese or as Palestinian-Lebanese, or to take pride in their Palestinian identity. The latter seems to be the case. For example, Rosemary Sayigh (1977a) studied Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and found that Palestinians identify as such, even though they used to identify as Arabs before. She concluded that “[t]he tense relationship with the host society and developments within the Palestinian communities enforced the development of Palestinian national consciousness (Sayigh, 1977a, p. 3). Chaaban et al. (2010) acknowledged that complete assimilation is not something that Palestinians or Lebanese people want; the solution for the status of Palestinians in Lebanon “would be one where ‘citizen-refugees’ enjoy civil and economic rights as well as the right to space and mobility, all the while contributing through their consumption and taxes to the Lebanese economy as a whole” (p. x).

## CHAPTER II

### CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Indeed, if the *modern* ‘problem of identity’ was how to construct an identity and keep it solid and stable, the *postmodern* ‘problem of identity’ is primarily how to avoid fixation and keep the options open...In the case of identity, as in other cases, the catchword of modernity was creation; the catchword of postmodernity is recycling. Or one may say that if ‘media which was the message’ of modernity was the photographic paper (think relentlessly swelling family albums, tracing page by page the slow accretion of irreversible and non-erasable identity-yielding events), the ultimately postmodern medium is the videotape (eminently erasable and re-usable, calculated not to hold anything forever, admitting today’s events solely on condition of effacing yesterday’s ones, oozing the worthy of recording). The main identity-bound anxiety of modern times was the worry about durability; it is the concern with commitment avoidance today. Modernity built in steel and concrete; postmodernity, in biodegradable plastic. (Z. Bauman, 1996, p. 18)

The theoretical framework of the study includes several key concepts. The overarching framework is based on national identity formation and metamorphosis; other key concepts that need to be explained for the purpose of this study relate to diaspora studies, and these are: acculturation, Language Maintenance and Language Shift (LMLS), hybrid identities, transnationalism, and collective memory. Each of these

concepts are the outcome of the diaspora condition of Palestinians, and as such, they will be used to explain the results of the study.

### **A. Identity**

Identity is the unanswerable question of who a person is. Cohen (1974) asked Who has the right to determine who a person is: the person in question, or those with whom the person interacts? In treating the self as socially constituted, social science has denied ‘authorship’ to the individual, seeing identity either as imposed by an other, or as formulated by the individual in relation to an other.

Both views imply the insubstantial nature of selfhood. (p. 73)

This argument highlights important aspects about identity. First, the “other” has an important role to play in socially constructing the identity of a person or a group. Second, it is important to note the juggling of the terms “person,” “self,” and “individual” by Cohen. The fact that there are three terms for the question of identity serves to highlight its complexity. These terms “imply a distinction between ‘personhood’ as a ‘socially constituted’ construct, and ‘selfhood’ as a sense of identity over which the individual can exercise the right of ‘authorship’” (Suleiman, 2006, p. 11). For Cohen, this right is “the substance of ‘me’ of which I am aware” (1974, p. 57). Third, the fact that both views – identity as imposed by the other or as constructed by the person in relation to the other – constitute the nature of identity highlights its flexibility. It is clear that Cohen does not espouse an absolute perspective of identity that views it as a fixed entity.

Similarly, Rosen (2014) argued that “identity is usually treated as a dynamic, non-fixed concept; someone’s identity is subject to constant renewal and might, like the pieces of coloured glass in a kaleidoscope, shift again and again to highlight different aspects” (p. 194). Tabouret-Keller (1997) argued that identity is in fact a network of identities, “reflecting the many commitments, allegiances, loyalties, passions, and hatreds everyone tries to handle in ever-varying compromise strategies. These imply language use to mark group affiliation, to reveal permitted or forbidden boundaries, to exclude or include, etc.” (p. 321). Therefore, identity must not be thought of as “an already accomplished fact... [but rather] as a ‘production,’ which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation” (Hall, 1990, p. 222). This is the origin of the term *identity negotiation* (Sharma, 2014), which “may arise from the learning of social roles through personal experience” (Cote, 1996 as cited in Sharma, 2014, p. 119). Accordingly, the identities of the individual, the group, and the society as a whole always interact with each other and mold each other (Sharma, 2014), hence the term identity negotiation. Paul James (2015) argued that “categorizations about identity...are always full of tensions and contradictions... these contradictions are destructive, but they can also be creative and positive” (p. 175). When they are destructive, they can lead to identity crisis.

### ***1. Self-Concept and Identity Crisis***

Erik Erikson (1968) argued that identity formation is a process by which the individual judges himself in the light of what he perceives to be the way in which others judge him in comparison to themselves

and to a typology significant to them; while he judges their way of judging him in light of how he perceives himself in comparison to them and to types that have become relevant to him. (p. 19)

The first part of this process highlights the *psychological identity*, which “relates to self-image (a person’s mental model of his or herself), self-esteem and individuality” (Sharma, 2014, p. 119). An important part of identity is the awareness of the self, which Erikson calls ego identity. Self-concepts are “mental concepts or ideas of who one is, was and will become” (Sharma, 2014, p. 120). They are thus based on evaluative judgments of the self as they reveal how people describe and evaluate themselves (Sharma, 2014). Yet, self-concepts are complicated. Sharma argued that individuals have many self-concepts, some of which are clearer than others. “People can consider themselves from a number of perspectives – individualistic ‘me’ self, the collectivistic ‘us’ self, the temporally near ‘now’ self, the temporally... ‘future’ self, the immersed ‘mind’s eye’ self and the observer’s ‘eyes of others’ self” (Sharma, 2014, p. 120).

One of the outcomes of the multi-modal nature of identity is an identity crisis, which refers to the “failure to achieve ego identity during adolescence” (as cited in Sharma, 2014, p. 119). It occurs during a stage called “Identity Cohesion versus Role Confusion stage” (Sharma, 2014, p. 119), in which individuals experience physical and sexual maturity, and they become aware of their ideas about themselves and other people’s perceptions of themselves. Thus, they form a “self-image and endure the task of resolving the crisis of [their] basic ego identity” (Sharma, 2014, p. 119). Confusion regarding one’s self-image entails a confusion of one’s social roles.

## **B. National Identity**

National identity is a construct that is affected by the flux of different social and historical frameworks. The first appearance of national identity was in Genesis 10, which mentions how isles were divided into lands, and each land had its family and its tongue. Genesis 11 further highlights how the sons of Noah wanted not only to build a city, but also to “make us a name, lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth” (Gen. 11, p. 4 as cited in Joseph, 2004, p. 95). Therefore, “identity must be constructed for the nation to cohere, for its members to be mutually interdependent and form cities...” (Joseph, 2004, pp. 95-96). However, it is very difficult to define this identity. National identity “lend[s] itself to ‘endless manipulation’, depending on the specific nature of the context in which it is applied” (Suleiman, 2003, p. 17). Smith (1991) acknowledged that national identity is both political and cultural in nature. Studying national identity means focusing on its “ethnic, cultural, territorial, economic and legal-political” (Smith, 1991, p. 15) aspects; in addition to other collective identities – such as class, gender, religion, etc. – which “may overlap or combine with national identity but they rarely succeed in undermining its hold, though they may influence its direction” (Smith, 1991, p. 143). That is why the study of national identity is never limited to one discipline. Political scientists, linguists, sociologists, anthropologists, historians, philologists, and folklorists are equally invested in this field because national identity “is an abstract and multidimensional construct that touches on a wide range of spheres of life and manifests many permutations and combinations” (Smith, 1991, p. 144).



### ***1. Problematizing the Relationship between National Identity and Language***

Language “often takes on extralinguistic characteristics that go far beyond the need to communicate... the language itself comes to be symbolic of the group’s vitality and place in the world” (Padilla, 1999, p. 116); it is thus an “emblem of groupness” (Edwards, 2009, p. 55). Perhaps that is why the relationship between national identity and language has been taken for granted. Le Page and Tabouret-Keller (1985) acknowledged that language “can serve both to create and express identity” (as cited in Rosen, 2014, p. 194). Schneider (2007) argued that speakers choose from a pool of linguistic features in order express “their linguistic and social identities, constantly aligning themselves with other individuals and thereby accommodating their speech behaviour to those they wish to associate and be associated with” (p. 21). Fichte (1968) was also a believer in the relationship between language and national identity; he argued that people “who speak the same language are joined to each other by a multitude of invisible bonds by nature herself...; they understand each other...; they belong together and are by nature one and an inseparable whole” (pp. 190-191).

The relationship between language and national identity is not as clear-cut as the aforementioned scholars argued. Koestler (1976) cited the example of biblical tribes who spoke different languages: “first they spoke Hebrew; in the Babylonian exile, Chaldean; at the time of Jesus, Aramaic; in Alexandria, Greek; in Spain, Arabic, but later Ladino...; and so it goes on” (as cited in Edwards, 2009, p. 205). However, these tribes did preserve their religious identity; thus, “a strong and continuing sense of group identity outlived repeated shifts in communicative language” (Edwards, 2009, p. 205). Similar to Koestler, Max Weber (1948) stated that a community speaking the same

language does not necessarily make up a nation.

The fact remains that “language is but one marker of national identity among a set of markers which may include such attributes as territory, common culture and descent, shared memories and so on” (Suleiman, 2003, pp. 30-31). Thus, even though language does play a significant role in the construction of national identity, “it does so most effectively when allied to other factors which together help create complementary channels of social communication” (Deutsch, 1966 as cited in Suleiman, 2003, p. 31). This hints at the model of cultural core values (Smolicz, 1981), which suggests that every group has cultural values that should be preserved across generations. Language is one of these cultural values; however, it is more significant when combined with other core values that are important to the group, such as religion. In fact, Weissbrod (1983) argued that religion “frequently provide[s] the value system around which groups in general, and nations in particular, [coalesce], and by which their members [identify] themselves” (p. 189). These core values allow social groups to “be identified as distinctive ethnic, religious, scientific or other cultural communities” (Smolicz et al., 1999, p. 105). Yet, the relationship between national identity and other collective identities, such as culture, citizenship, gender, religion, etc. is as problematic as its relationship with language. Each of the aforementioned variables is a collective identity, and collective identities can overlap with each other; they “weave in and out of each other in different ways at different times depending on the salient features of the situation in which a person finds him- or herself” (Suleiman, 2003, p. 5).

## C. A Review of Related Terminology

### 1. Nation

Simone Weil (1987) argued that “[t]o be rooted is perhaps the most important and least recognized need of the human soul” (p. 41). Therefore, human beings need to have an intimate connection with their nation (Malkki, 1992). Hobsbawm (1990) and Gellner (1983) emphasized “the element of artifact, invention and social engineering which enters into the making of nations” (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 10). In fact, Gellner (1983) argued that it is a myth to believe that nation is a “natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent... political destiny” (pp. 48-49). This is against the primordial or perennial approach, which views nation as a natural phenomenon. Gellner’s view is *constructivist*; it “claims that nations are not anything real, objective, or indispensable; they are only ‘constructs,’ contingent and artificial, deliberately created by various elites” (Walicki, 1998, p. 611).

Smith (1991) defined a nation as “a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members [original emphasis removed]” (p. 14). This *objective* definition is too rigid, as it assumes that each nation has the same, clearly outlined elements. Because this is not the case, the “subjective factor of consciousness is the ultimate factor which eventually decides the issue of national identity” (Krejčí and Velímský, 1981, pp. 44-45). In other words, if a people will themselves to be a nation, then they make up a nation. The problem with this approach is that the role of national consciousness in nation formation “reduces national identification as an act of self-ascription to the option of belonging to a single nation or

nationality, when...identity is both compositionally complex and historically variable” (Suleiman, 2003, p. 21). Gellner (1983) argued that “[i]f we define nations as groups which *will* themselves to persist as communities, the definition-net we have cast into the sea will bring forth too rich a catch” (p. 53). Will is “an *a posteriori* rationalization in the study of nationalism rather than as one of its predictive concepts” (Suleiman, 2003, p. 22).

Because of the problems associated with the objective and subjective definitions of nation, the *ethno-symbolic* approach was proposed (Armstrong, 1982; Barth, 1969). Friedrich Meinecke (1908), a German historian, suggested two different formulations of nation. He introduced the terms *Kulturnation*, a cultural community, and *Staatsnation*, a political community. The first three features of Smiths’ definition of nation – “1. an historic territory, or homeland; 2. common myths and historical memories; 3. a common, mass public culture” (Smith, 1991, p. 14) – are aspects of *Kulturnation*, and the last two features of national identity – “4. common legal rights and duties for all members; 5. a common economy with territorial mobility for members” (Smith, 1991, p. 14) – are aspects of the *Staatsnation*. The difference between both types is a difference between national identity and citizenship; the former is “exclusionary and could be inequality generating” (Oommen, 1997, p. 35), while the latter is “inclusionary and equality oriented” (Oommen, 1997, p. 35).

*Staatsnation* and its citizens represent the western model of a nation, in which “[h]istoric territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality of members, and common civic culture and ideology” (Smith, 1991, p. 11) are the main elements of

nation. This western model mainly describes a civic or political nation – a state. On the other hand, Kulturnation represents the non-Western model of a nation, in which “[g]enealogy and presumed descent ties, popular mobilization, vernacular languages, [and] customs and traditions” (p. 12) are the main elements of nation. The non-western model of nation thus describes a cultural and ethnic nation. Such a nation comprises *ethnies*, the French word for ethnic groups, which are “named human populations with shared ancestry, myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity” (Guibernau, 2004, p. 126). By focusing on symbols as part of the cultural aspect of nation, the ethno-symbolic approach draws boundaries between different groups; thus, it highlights the interdependence between groups and boundaries. Therefore, even symbols play a role in emphasizing the “us/them” binary. Such symbols include food, dress, traditions, ceremonies, and most importantly, language; “socially constructed symbols of this type play an important role in maintaining the internal cohesion of the group and in guarding its identity” (Suleiman, 2003, p. 23).

#### a. Nation as an Imagined Community

Benedict Anderson (1983) first coined the concept of “Imagined Communities.” He argued that nation is imagined because its members do not meet each other, “yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion...the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (pp. 6-7). This echoes Ernest Renan’s definition of nation: “‘a daily plebiscite’; its existence depends on a shared belief that its members belong together, and a shared wish to continue their life in

common” (as cited in Miller, 1995, p. 23). Anderson proposed the term “Imagined Communities” because of the role of print capitalism, in which language plays a major role. In particular, the vernacular took over the print media, and this led to the formation of a common, intelligible discourse between members of a community. This intelligibility led to a common or shared national identity among people who do not know or speak to each other. Therefore, the print media “...provided the novel and the technical means for ‘re-presenting’ the kind of imagined community that is the nation” (Anderson, 1983, p. 25).

## ***2. Nationalism***

Nationalism can be defined as “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’” (Smith, 1991, p. 73). According to Smith (1991), nationalism can signify the process of nation formation, a sense of belonging to the nation, language as a symbol of nation, cultural aspects of nation, and political activism to attain national goals and aspirations. Smith argued that nationalism fulfills numerous functions, which include “its defence of minority cultures; its rescue of ‘lost’ histories and [cultures]; its resolution of ‘identity crisis’; its legitimation of community and social solidarity; its inspiration to resist tyranny; [and] its ideal of popular sovereignty and collective mobilization” (Smith, 1991, p. 18).

### **a. Ernest Gellner’s Theory of Nationalism**

Ernest Gellner (1983) argued that nationalism “sometimes takes preexisting cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates

preexisting cultures” (Gellner, 1983, pp. 48-49). He defined nationalism as “... primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (p. 1). However, even though nationalism has a political connotation, it is linked to ethnicity, as Gellner stated that “ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones” (1983, p. 1). Hence, he viewed nationalism as “the establishment of an anonymous impersonal society, with mutually sustainable atomised individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind, ... sustained by folk cultures reproduced locally and idiosyncratically by the micro-groups themselves” (p. 57). Gellner’s definition of nationalism is similar to Anderson’s perspective. “Both stress that nations are ideological constructions seeking to forge a link between (self- defined) cultural group and state...” (Eriksen, 2010, p. 119). Thus, both scholars stress the link between ethnicity and the state. “A nation-state, therefore, is a state dominated by an ethnic group, whose markers of identity (such as language or religion) are frequently embedded in its official symbolism and legislation” (Eriksen, 2010, p. 119).

### **3. *Ethnicity***

The root of the word “ethnicity” is *ethnos*, the Greek word for heathen or pagan (Williams, 1976, p. 119). Ethnicity has been defined in several ways. At one extreme, ethnicity “has a ‘primordial’ quality. It exists in nature, outside time. It is one of the ‘givens’ of human existence” (Smith, 1991, p. 20). At the other extreme, ethnicity is defined as situational. “Belonging to an ethnic group is a matter of attitudes, perceptions and sentiments that are necessarily fleeting and mutable, varying with the particular situation of the subject” (Smith, 1991, p. 20). Between these two extremes – the

primordial and the situational – there is another approach to defining ethnicity which stresses its historical, cultural and symbolic attributes. “An ethnic group is a type of cultural collectivity, one that emphasizes the role of myths of descent and historical memories, and that is recognized by one or more cultural differences like religion, customs, language or institutions” (Smith, 1991, p. 20).

#### **D. Same Root but Different Routes: Diaspora Studies**

Vertovec and Peach (1997) argued that the term diaspora describes “any population which is considered “‘deterritorialised’ or ‘transnational’ – that is, which has originated in a land other than which it currently resides, and whose social, economic and political networks cross the borders of nation states or... span the globe” (p. 277). In Greek, diaspora is derived from “the verb speiro (to sow) and the preposition dia (over)” (Cohen, 1997, p. xi). It combines the term dia, which means throughout, with the term spora, which means spread (Peters, 1999, p. 23). Based on its Greek derivatives, diaspora can be defined as “an abrupt but natural process, the fruitful scattering away of seeds from the parent body that both dispersed and reproduced the organism” (Tölölyan, 1996, p. 10). This definition of diaspora shows both dispersion – dia – and stability – sowing the seeds; in other words, it captures the “diasporic experience and the nature of being, existing and becoming” (Hassouneh, 2015, p. 59). This dual nature of diaspora thus highlights its negative aspect of social exclusion and discrimination, and its positive aspect of identifying with the group’s historical background and cultural heritage (Vertovec & Cohen, 1999). That is why, diaspora identities are defined as “constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew,



through transformation and difference” (Hall, 1990, p. 235). This is what makes “loss and hope...a defining tension” (Clifford, 1994, p. 312) of diaspora.

Diaspora has several traits. First, it comprises a special kind of social relationships, which are formed as a result of particular historical ties. These ties “were created by migration, the maintenance of a collective identity, an ethnic myth of common origin, a continuation of ties with the homeland and an incapacity to be accepted in a ‘host society’...” (Vertovec & Cohen, 1999, p. xviii). Diaspora is also characterized by a “tension of political orientations” (p. xviii). These orientations inevitably emerge because of different loyalties to various home and host countries. Economic strategies are also a trait of diaspora. Kotkin (1992) argued that a sense of collective identity among members of a group on a large-scale can contribute to their success in the global economy (Vertovec & Cohen, 1999). Fourth, diaspora is based on “awareness of multi-locality” (Vertovec & Cohen, 1999, p. xviii). This awareness stimulates the need to have a collective identity, to be linked with one’s group in different countries. Similar to the imagined nation, diaspora is characterized by imagination. Hall (1990) argued that diaspora leads to “imposing an imaginary coherence on the experience of dispersal and fragmentation...” (p. 235). Based on these traits, it can be concluded that diaspora is “characterized by a three-way relationship between (a) globally dispersed yet collectively self-identified ethnic groups, (b) the territorial states and contexts where such groups reside, and (c) the homeland states and contexts whence they or their forebears came” (Vertovec and Cohen, 1999, p. xviii).

### ***1. Acculturation***

Zhang (2008) asserts that a common task for immigrants “is to reconcile the cultural conflicts between their home culture and host culture” (p. 12). On the one hand, they feel the need to maintain their connection to their ethnic and cultural roots; on the other hand, they feel the pressure from the host society to assimilate. The latter falls within Berry’s (2001) acculturation typology. According to Berry (2001), there are two forms of acculturation attitudes: the extent to which individuals want to have contact with members of out-groups and the degree to which individuals want to maintain their heritage culture. These two issues produce four acculturation strategies: (a) integration, which represents an interest in maintaining the heritage culture while also being involved in other cultures; (b) assimilation, which represents being involved with other cultures but not with the heritage culture; (c) separation, which is the involvement with one’s heritage culture but not with other cultures; and (d) marginalization, which is the rejection of both the heritage culture and the host one (Berry, 2001).

These four strategies are not only linked to immigrants but also to the host society. For immigrants, any of the four strategies is in fact the result of deliberation regarding their “expectations concerning better economic and political opportunities, and the extent to which those expectations are met” (Sheffer, 2003, p. 78). In many cases, host societies refrain from opening the chance for assimilation of minorities; “frightened by the extent of international migration and their inability to construct a stable, pluralist, social order, many states have turned away from the idea of assimilating or integrating their ethnic minorities” (Cohen, 1996, p. 507). Cohen asserted that minorities themselves might not want to fully assimilate because of their

connections to their past, connections made much easier now with globalization, which means that “ties with a homeland can be preserved or even reinvented” (Cohen, 1996, p. 507).

## ***2. Language Maintenance and Language Shift***

Ying (1995) argued that acculturation occurs on the level of three domains: the linguistic, cultural, and the social domains. Zhang (2008) argued that each of these domains interacts with language maintenance. In the language domain, language maintenance interacts with language attitudes; in the cultural domain, it interacts with cultural identity; and in the last domain, language maintenance interacts with social networks. Language forms what Fishman (1980) called “a peculiarly sensitive web of intimacy and mutuality” (p. 87). Weinreich (1974) used the term “language loyalty” to describe the intimate function of language; he defined language loyalty as a “principle in the name of which people will rally themselves and their fellow speakers consciously and explicitly to resist change in...their language” (p. 99). Fishman (1981) reiterated Weinreich’s words by stating that language loyalty is based on the attempt of a group to preserve their ethnic identity in the face of the dominance of the majority language.

One of the most important ways to preserve ethnic identity is to maintain the ethnic language. The term language maintenance was first coined by Joshua Fishman. It is defined as “the continuing use of a language in the face of competition from a regionally and socially powerful or numerically stronger language” (Mesthrie, 1999, p. 42). Accordingly, language shift is when a minority group shifts from using its language to using the dominant language because of pressure of assimilation from the majority

group. It is important to note that shift does not equate loss. Clyne (1997a) defined language shift as “switching partially or wholly to the use of another language” (p. 309). Similarly, Fase, Jaspaert, and Kroon (1992) acknowledged that “[s]hift is to do with a reduction in use of a language among a language group” (Jebejian, 2007, p. 36). This describes a language which is potentially endangered (Janse, 2003). Unlike language shift, language loss is particular to the individual and has to do with the reduction in the language proficiency for that individual.

Language “marks the ‘at-homeness’ of a people threatened by cultural homogenization” (Safran, 1999, p. 80) from the host society. Zanden (1990) argued that maintaining the home language is psychologically important for immigrants. For example, immigrants can feel that they are wanted within their ethnic group if they maintain their language. This feeling is especially important for their emotional well-being if they are rejected by the host society. However, this benefit of language maintenance is two-fold. If the native language is maintained, the host society may not react positively to this phenomenon. This is “related to the hostile attitude of the host society toward the immigrant minority. In these cases, it might be considered safer to conceal the native language in public and only speak it within the community” (Hammer, 2005, p. 172). In fact, Bourhis, Moise, Perreault, and Senecal (1997) argued that the shift of language and identity partially depends on the attitudes of the majority, which do not concern language alone; dominant groups “enact ties of language to identity, to aesthetics, to morality, and to epistemology. Through such linkages, they underpin not only linguistic form and use but also the very notion of the person and the

social group” (Lasagabaster, 2008, pp. 69-70).

This shows that one factor in language maintenance or shift is based on whether the use of ethnic language is advantageous (or disadvantageous) to speakers. This is the social network approach to language maintenance, which assumes that “there is a dialectic relationship between speakers’ linguistic behaviors and interpersonal relations; that is, speakers’ language use is influenced and shaped by the types of social contacts they have...” (Li, 1994 as cited in Zhang, 2008, p. 26). The extent to which immigrants succeed in adapting to their new social networks in the host society contributes to language maintenance or shift. This is the basis of the term *language ecology*, which is defined as “the study of interactions between a language and its environment, the true environment of a language being the society that uses it as one of its codes” (Jebejian, 2010, p. 456).

In his study of the contact between German and English, Kloss (1966) identified some factors that promote language maintenance or shift, such as linguistic enclaves, societal insulation, educational level of immigrants, similarity to the majority group in terms of language and culture, and attitudes of the majority group towards the language and culture of the minority group. Other factors range between “geography, indigenusness, cultural or group membership, religion, sex, age, social status, occupation, and rural versus urban residence” (Jebejian, 2010, p. 456). In addition to demographic factors, language contact is a significant factor in LMLS. It includes “duration of contact, frequency of contact and pressures of contact with an/other language/s derived from economic, administrative, cultural, political, military,

historical, religious, or demographic sources” (Jebejian, 2010, p. 456). Fishman (1971) proposed three kinds of factors that affect LMLS: “psychological, social, and cultural factors and their relationship with stability or change in habitual language use, behavior towards language in the contact setting, and habitual language use at different times and under conditions of intergroup contact” (Jebejian, 2010, p. 456). Bilingualism, lexical borrowing, and code-switching are other factors that affect LMLS. Nevertheless, how they affect it remains unclear. These factors can lead to language shift. However, they can also lead to language maintenance. For example, “some minority language speakers will be more motivated to maintain and use their languages if they prove to be useful in increasing their employability, since, in some cases, certain jobs are reserved for bilingual speakers only” (Jebejian, 2010, p. 457).

Another important factor in LMLS is the attitudes and ideologies of speakers towards their group and their language. Language ideology is defined as “sets of beliefs about language articulated by users as a rationalization or justification of perceived language structure and use” (Silverstein, 1979, p. 193). Ruiz (1984) stated that language attitudes can be classified based on whether immigrants perceive their language as a problem, right, or as a resource. “The different language attitudes are rooted in different underlying language ideologies, cultural goals and social goals” (Hornberger, 1991, as cited in Zhang, 2008, p. 21). If speakers allocate a high value for their group, it is more likely that they will maintain their language in an effort to maintain their cultural identity. “The basic assumption here is that speakers who perceive their own group vitality to be high have more positive attitudes about the use of their own group

language than those who perceive it to be low” (Liebkind, 1999, p. 145). This hints at ethnolinguistic vitality.

#### a. Ethnolinguistic Vitality

The concept of ethnolinguistic vitality was proposed by Giles, Bourhis and Taylor (1977); it is defined as “that which makes a group likely to behave as a distinctive and active collective entity in intergroup situations” (p. 308). The vitality of an ethnolinguistic group is based on “social, cultural and educational factors that define the continued existence and prosperity of a language in heterogeneous communities” (Shaaban and Ghaith, 2002, p. 558). Group distinctiveness is affected by three main factors. The first is the *status* of the group’s language in society and in the educational field. The status of a language is not related to the language itself but to the contexts in which it is used. Most importantly, the status is related to “the political, socio-historical, economic and social prestige of its speakers” (Shaaban & Ghaith, 2002, p. 558). Sasse (1992) believed that the attitudes of speakers towards their language “reflect and reinforce language prestige, which is based...on socio-economic settings but is related to other factors like political power of the speakers, attitudes of majority institutions, literary traditions, and so on” (Jebejian, 2007, p. 47).

The second factor in ethnolinguistic vitality is the *institutional support* for the use of this language in different domains such as in the government and media. Crystal (2000) acknowledged that the institutional support a language has can lead to either maintenance or shift. He stated that “if people believe, rightly or wrongly, that it is their ancestral language which has kept them down, or that they were held back from social

advancement by an inability to speak the dominant language well” (Jebejian, 2007, p. 48), then language shift towards the dominant language is likely to occur. Crystal argued that the majority language is important to the minority group because “it facilitates outward movement from the indigenous community; there are new horizons which members of the community wish to reach towards, new standards of living to be achieved, and a new quality of life to be pursued” (Jebejian, 2007, p. 52). Similarly, Al-Khatib and Al-Ali (2010) argued that “the social and economic necessity of using the official or majority language of the host country, and the lack of opportunities for using the mother tongue, may lead to a loss of ability in the latter” (Al-Kahtib & Al-Ali, 2010, p. 7). However, Crystal asserted that even though the minority language may not grant the minority group access to some domains in the host society, such as commerce, it is still important for the members of the in-group because its role is “to express the identity of the speakers as members of their community, foster family ties, maintain social relationships, and preserve historical links giving people a sense of their pedigree” (Jebejian, 2007, p. 52).

The third factor in ethnolinguistic vitality is the *demographic characteristics* of the speakers of that language. “The demographic variables are the language users’ proportional representation in the heterogeneous society, their geographic spread and distribution and their continued residence in the land” (Shaaban & Ghaith, 2002, p. 559). Therefore, if a language has institutional support and its speakers are powerful in the society in which they reside, the language and the identity of the speakers can be maintained.



What matters more than the ethnolinguistic vitality of a language is the subjective ethnolinguistic vitality. The above discussion mainly focused on objective ethnolinguistic vitality – the facts or data related to the language and its users. “Subjective vitality... refers to the perceptions of group members of the language vitality of their group in relation to outgroups” (Shaaban & Ghaith, 2002, p. 560). It is this perception that mainly leads to the maintenance (or shift) of a language. For example, if a group feels that their language is threatened, their fear of ethnic cleansing because of this threat can lead them to preserve their original language or dialect (Abushihab and Al-Sheikh-Hussein, 2015). This is the case of minority language maintenance, which is “an attempt to resist the cultural power of languages that are spoken by a majority of the population, and/or languages that are, for some reason, socially dominant” (Gibbons & Ramirez, 2004, p. 4).

Gudykunst and Gumb's (1989) argued that there are many subjective factors that make a group want to maintain their language. These factors include the perceived high ethnolinguistic vitality of the group; the importance of the language as a reflection of collective identity; the difference between the group and the outsiders; lack of identification with categories other than language; importance of linguistic boundaries; and a perceived higher status for individuals in their ethnic group as opposed to other social groups (Liebkind, 1999). These factors support Baker's (1988) assertion that one of the most important factors leading to language maintenance is the attitudes of the speakers. These attitudes are an ingredient in what Schiffman (1996) called *linguistic cultures*, which are “the set of behaviors, assumptions, cultural forms, prejudices, folk

belief systems, attitudes, stereotypes, ways of thinking about language, and religious-historical circumstances associated with a particular language” (p. 5). Myers-Scotton (1992) believed that these cultures decide the fate of a language. For example, Crystal (2000) acknowledged that language maintenance occurs when “speakers take pride in their language, enjoy listening to others using it well, use it themselves whenever they can and provide occasions when the language can be heard” (as cited in Jebejian, 2007, p. 47).

Language maintenance and shift are also related to generation. It can be extremely difficult to pass on the native language or dialect to younger generations, “as life in a host country requires that one master that country’s language and seldom affords one the opportunity to learn one’s parents’ language” (Hammer, 2005, p. 172). Typically, a native language or dialect is used at heritage language programs or at home, which “often means that children develop a domestic variety of the minority language, [but] the lack of a place for it outside the home and community may mean that the children have little opportunity to develop aspects of the language that relate to more complex and more public uses” (Gibbons & Ramirez, 2004, p. 4).

### ***3. Hybrid Identities***

In 1998, UNESCO posed the following question: “how do multiple cultures co-exist in an interactive world where multi-cultural alliances are more important than identification with particular culture?” (Jebejian, 2007, p. 56). The key to this question is hybridity, which implies that “instead of a linear perspective where endorsement of one culture necessitates rejection of the other, a two-culture matrix or even a

multidimensional typology of acculturation may be more valid to characterize the experiences of the new immigrants...” (Zhang, 2008, p. 13). Hall (1990) argued that the “diaspora experience... is defined not by essence or purity, but by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of identity which lives with and through, not despite, difference; by hybridity” (p. 235). Therefore, diaspora people are “both hybrid and heterogeneous” (Fadda-Corney, 2009, p. 167); they are “historical formations in process... [which] change over time and respond to different political and social contexts in which their members find themselves” (Werbner, 2000, p. 5). Boyarin and Boyarin (1993) argued that “diasporic cultural identity teaches us that cultures are not preserved by being protected from ‘mixing’ but probably can only continue to exist as a product of such mixing. Cultures, as well as identities, are constantly being remade” (p. 721). People are naturally familiar with one culture and one home – theirs. However, diasporas are familiar with two cultures and two homes; “this plurality of vision gives rise to an awareness of simultaneous dimensions, an awareness that – to borrow a phrase from music – is contrapuntal” (Said, 2000, p. 148). This means that hybridity implies “a series of notes flowing over, around and through one another, where two or more voices or notes can be heard simultaneously” (Mason, 2007, p. 274).

Because Palestinians have been living different experiences in various host societies, hybrid identities might form. Yehudai (2004) asserted that “immigration may lead not to the loss of ethnic cultural identity, but rather to its reappearance under a new guise and conditions” (p. 193). The result of this reappearance is what Gloria Anzaldua (1987) called *the new mestiza*, “who copes by developing a tolerance for contradictions,

juggling cultures, and operating in a pluralistic mode” (Landau, 1999 as cited in Jebejian, 2007, p. 56). This is what Du Bois (1903) called *double consciousness* or a *sense of two-ness*. Because of this double affiliation, the concept of hybridity “problematizes boundaries, although it does not erase them. As such, hybridity always implies an unsettling of identities” (Ang, 2003, p. 8). This unsettling of identities problematizes national identity for Palestinians in different host countries.

The experiences of Palestinians in the diaspora differ across different host societies. In a host society that bestows on Palestinians important human and civil rights, Palestinians lead decent lives; in a host society that views Palestinians as a marginalized people and thus deprives them of their basic rights, Palestinians experience poverty and constant discrimination. These different experiences can indeed influence how Palestinians identify themselves, and whether they do develop hybrid identities towards Palestine and their host society. Palestinians in either of these cases can develop hybrid identities: the first is because they have become active members of the society and the second is because they are perhaps trying to fit in. According to Iyall Smith (2008), if diasporic populations are attempting to fit in their host society, they might adopt a hybrid identity. However, if they choose to stick to their identity, then the chances of adopting a hybrid identity become minute. Lavie and Swedenburg (1996) argued that adopting hybrid identities by minority groups can help them see that there are some similarities with the host culture, while not overlooking the differences between the latter and the homeland. “This recognition can cause minority groups to forge temporary alliances in order to be heard” (Hammer, 2005, p. 57).

#### ***4. Transnationalism***

The alliances of diaspora people are many. James Clifford (1994) noted that “diasporic cultural forms can never... be exclusively nationalist [as] they are deployed in transnational networks built from multiple attachments” (p. 307). Transnationalism is a feature of the lives of many people in the diaspora. The term diaspora entails “a cross-border, unbounded condition... [and]... a globalized condition of identities in constant motion” (Lindholm Schulz, 2003, p. 10). Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc (1994) defined transnationalism as “the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (p. 7). That is why, transmigrants come to have “fluid and multiple identities grounded both in their society of origin and in the host societies” (Glick Schiller et al., 1992, p. 11). Werbner (2000) argued that migrants have “dual orientation” or what Bruneau (2010) called “double affiliation,” which constitutes “a minority that organizes and struggles for equality while maintaining transnational connections and loyalties to the original homeland” (Peteet, 2007, p. 631). This state of “in-betweenness” reveals just how much the identities of immigrants are both local and global; “[t]hey are networks of transnational identifications encompassing ‘imagined’ and ‘encountered’ communities” (Brah, 1996, p. 192). Therefore, “the meaning of ‘home’ for transnational migrants is likely to be complex and multi-dimensional” (Al-Ali and Koser, 2002, p. 8). As Chryssis (2007) argued, these migrants may have “a bipolar conceptualization of ‘belonging’” (Chryssis, 2007, n.p.).

Lindholm Schulz (2003) asserted that transnational lives affect processes of identification because of “cross-border activities” (Lindholm Schulz, 2003, p. 191). The

internet is one of the most important platforms for cross-border activities. It allows for the construction of a shared identity, which is crucial for sustaining communities comprised of immigrants. This communication “play[s] a key role in this process as [it furthers] the retention or reawakening of identities and imagined homelands” (Kissau & Hunger, 2010, p. 246). Georgiou (2002) emphasized the importance of the internet as a platform “to discover and rediscover this shared imagination and commonality; it has taken even further the potentials for developing diasporic cultures of mediated, transnational and partly free from state control communication” (p. 3). The many discussions that can take place through internet platforms – “forums, email, online chat, weblogs, private homepages, ethno-portals, etc.” (Kissau & Hunger, 2010, p. 247) – allow a certain degree of visibility among dispersed people (Georgiou, 2002, p. 2). Because many Palestinians do not have passports, their *real* mobility can be very difficult. However, their *virtual* mobility is possible. “New technologies ... make movement and communication between large distances possible with much greater frequency, speed and regularity and in greater numbers” (Mazzucato, 2010, p. 207). Therefore, a defining feature of transnationalism is simultaneity (Mazzucato, 2010).

There is a certain degree of transnationalism among Palestinians. Lindholm Schulz (2003) asserted that Palestinians are characterized by “the juxtaposition of experiences of moving/ wandering and being stranded/imprisoned at the same time...there is...a tale to be told of transnationalism and globalism” (p. 225). A survey done by the Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee Centre, Shaml, in 1995 showed that transnationalism is present especially among Palestinians inside the Palestinian

territories, as opposed to those inside the areas occupied by Israel. Regarding the right of return, this shows that a transnational form of return is more likely than an actual return. Many Palestinians have kinship ties outside Palestine and their relatives send them aid. Accordingly, transnationalism is seen through social and economic ties between Palestinians in the Palestinian territories and their relatives abroad. That is why, these Palestinians have contributed “to the reshaping and emergence of new economic networks” (Hanafi, 2003, p. 165). Palestinians have other forms of transnational networks: “familial networks that sometimes include a family council, village clubs ..., national and nationalistic-religious networks...” (Hanafi, 2003, p. 165). Transnational networks are also seen in marriage patterns among Palestinians. Endogamous marriage, “i.e. marriage within the same lineage, sect, community, group, village, or neighbourhood” (Hanafi, 2007, p. 14) takes place between family members in different countries. “This allows many unexpected groups to join the family” (Hanafi, 2007, p. 15). Familial kinship ties, however, may not be an indicator of transnationalism. Aoudé (2001) stated that transnationalism comprises certain activities, but connections between diasporic communities may not be one of them. He asserted that transnationalism specifically depicts migrants who move across borders “but does not encompass the interconnections... a term that is more specific than ‘transnationalism’ and which defines such connections [is] ‘Diasporic interconnections’ ... and this may also include connections with the homeland” (p. 164).

### ***5. Collective Memory***

In addition to maintaining alliances with their identity and homeland, diaspora people sustain their relationship with their past and cultural heritage through collective memory. Friedrich Nietzsche argued that unlike animals whose genetic systems allow their survival, human beings “must find a means by which to maintain their nature consistently through generations” (Assmann, 1995, p. 126). Therefore, the “specific character that a person derives from belonging to a distinct society and culture is not seen to maintain itself for generations as a result of phylogenetic evolution, but rather as a result of socialization and customs” (Assmann, 1995, p. 125). That is why, culture is not innate but rather learned from “parents, surroundings and friends through enculturation” (Sharma, 2014, p. 122). This process of enculturation is based on cultural memory, which is “a collective concept for all knowledge that directs behavior and experience in the interactive framework of a society and one that obtains through generations in repeated societal practice” (Assmann, 1995, p. 126). Philosopher and sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (1950) was the first to propose the concept of collective memory, through which “a sense of our identity is perpetuated” (Halbwachs, 1992, p. 47). Halbwachs compared collective memory to the stones found in Roman houses. These stones “have been used as materials in very ancient buildings: their antiquity cannot be established by their form or their appearance but only by the fact that they still show the effaced vestiges of old characters...” (p. 47). Nora (1989) argued that every group feels “the need to go in search of its own origins and identity” (p. 15), and that is why collective memory, which represents the vestiges of the past, is extremely important for any group.



Cultural memory has important characteristics. First, it is collective. It “preserves the store of knowledge from which a group derives an awareness of its unity and peculiarity” (Assmann, 1995, p. 130). This awareness of group cohesion leads to the awareness of what Nietzsche called “constitution of horizons,” which highlights the difference between members of the in-group and those of the out-group (Assmann, 1995). That is why; cultural or collective memory and its transmission throughout generations of the in-group emphasize what Hans Mol called the “need for identity” (Assmann, 1995, p. 130). The second characteristic of cultural memory is that it is always reconstructed. Nora (1989) argued that memory is not about origins but rather about births. This memory “relates its knowledge to an actual and contemporary situation” (Assmann, 1995, p. 130). That is why cultural identity exists both in the archival mode and in the actual mode, “whereby each contemporary context puts the objectivized meaning into its own perspective, giving it its own relevance” (Assmann, 1995, p. 130). In other words, memory is “subject to reinterpretation and reconsideration on the basis of new information, beliefs, experiences, and the unpredictable whims of our minds” (Davis, 2011, p. 27). Third, cultural memory is reflexive. It is “practice-reflexive” (Assmann, 1995, p. 132), in that all practices of the group are perceived and interpreted in terms of this group’s proverbs, rituals, and what Bourdieu called ethno-theories. Cultural memory is also “self-reflexive” (p. 132) because it refers back to itself in order “to explain, distinguish, reinterpret, criticize, censure, control, surpass, and receive hypoleptically” (p. 132). This memory also reflects the image of the group (Assmann, 1995, p. 132).

It is important to note that memory is different from history. Nora (1989) argued that memory “remains in permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived” (p. 8). History “is the reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer” (p. 8). It is an image of the past, while memory connects the past to the present. History is based on analyzing and criticizing past events, while memory is based on “recollections that may be out of focus or telescopic, global or detached, particular or symbolic-responsive to each avenue of conveyance or phenomenal screen, to every censorship or projection” (p. 8). Memory is specific to the group that it unifies; Halbwachs argued that “there are as many memories as there are groups, ...memory is by nature multiple and yet specific; collective, plural, and yet individual” (Nora, 1989, p. 9). History is simultaneously to everyone and to no one. Memory is rooted in concrete images and symbols; history “binds itself strictly to temporal continuities, to progressions and to relations between things” (p. 9). Yet, there is a fundamental relationship between memory and history; Nora summed up this relationship by saying that the “quest for memory is the search for one’s history” (p. 13) and that “it is memory that dictates while history writes” (p. 21).

Even within memory itself, there is a distinction between its different kinds. According to Nora (1989), there are three different kinds of memory: archive-memory, duty-memory, and distance-memory. *Archive-memory* relies on traces and images of the past. It is archival because it represents a “gigantic and breathtaking storehouse of a

material stock of what it would be impossible for us to remember, an unlimited repertoire of what might need to be recalled” (Nora, 1989, p. 13). *Duty-memory* is based on passing the memory of the past from the public to the individual, who has to carry the responsibility of remembering the power of group cohesion (Nora, 1989). Therefore, every member of the in-group has the obligation “to remember and to protect the trappings of identity; when memory is no longer everywhere, it will not be anywhere unless one takes the responsibility to recapture it through individual means” (p. 16). For memory to be everywhere, individuals, especially those who actually experienced a specific event – such as the trauma of the Nakba – have to become “memory-individuals, as if an inner voice were to tell each Corsican ‘You must be Corsican’ and each Breton ‘You must be Breton’” (Nora, 1989, p. 16). In other words, to be Palestinian, people have to remember that they are as such. People thus feel obliged to preserve the group’s memory and identity, to “collect remains, testimonies, documents, images, speeches, any visible signs of what has been, as if this burgeoning dossier were to be called upon to furnish some proof to who knows what tribunal of history” (Nora, 1989, pp. 13-14). The third kind of memory is *distance-memory*. This memory exists because “our relation to the past...is something entirely different from what we would expect from a memory: no longer a retrospective continuity but the illumination of discontinuity” (Nora, 1989, p. 16). The past is a place far away, and memory serves to show a group how far it has come away from its past (Nora, 1989).

Collective memory is a natural aspect of the experience of diaspora people, who “must bring previous understandings to their lived experience in order to interpret it”

(Davis, 2011, p. 139). For Palestinians, collective memory is based on their traumatic experiences of “loss, dislocation, suffering, return, and idealized imagery of Palestine” (Melendy, 2014, p. 4). In fact, grief is part of what Casey (2004) called public memory. Shared grief “adds a layer to the individual’s grief, the putatively private sphere of feeling and remembrance, which can enhance its sharpness, its associated sense of the tragic, and the potentiality for continued remembrance through its entry into a public register” (Jayyusi, 2007, p. 111). When it enters the public realm, grief becomes not only associated with collective or public memory but also with the identity of the bereaved. “It is this which shifts the sense of loss from the level of personal grief to that of collective trauma” (Jayyusi, 2007, p. 111).

In addition to emphasizing the shared experience of grief, collective memory preserves what Khalidi called the internal map of Palestine. Memory then becomes the daily archive of the image and history of Palestine. Abunimah (1998) reiterated Khalidi’s assertion and claimed that “Palestine exists because Palestinians have chosen to remember it” (p. 4). Therefore, the Palestinian national history “as acknowledged, recorded, written, preserved, enshrined, and transmitted, is palpably embedded in the work of memory, and in the instigation, production and co-location of narratives” (Jayyusi, 2007, p. 117).

Palestinians’ collective memory is not only a way to preserve their past and their homeland, but also an important part of the Palestinian national identity. In fact, “[t]he potency of remembrance... is believed to be at the core of Palestinian refugee identity” (Matar, 2011, p. 60). Bruneau (2010) asserted that for identity to be maintained in exile,

migrants should have an “exceptional symbolic and ‘iconographic’ capital that enables them to reproduce and then overcome the obstacle of the – often considerable – distance that separates their communities” (p. 48). This capital can be maintained through shared memory. In a sense, the collective memory of Palestine, its past, and its symbolic capital are the only available reminiscence of Palestine to younger generations. Hammer (2005) asserted that this memory educates younger generations about Palestine; most importantly, it provides “the missing pieces in the picture depicted by schools and curricula under Israeli occupation and for the longest time presenting a history bereft of Palestinian elements” (p. 43). The power of collective memory in maintaining identity also comes from its emphasis on otherness or an “us/them” binary. In other words, collective memory allows a minority to “survive being absorbed or smothered by the historical traditions of the majority” (Davis, 2011, p. 132). Therefore, collective memory is especially important for migrants in host societies.

Yet, collective memory is very complex. Vertovec and Cohen (1999) argued that diaspora results in a “collective memory about another place and time and create[s] new maps... Yet these collective memories and ‘new maps’ do not always serve to consolidate identities. Rather, the ‘fractured memories’ ... may produce a multiplicity of histories, ‘communities’ and selves” (Vertovec & Cohen, 1999, p. xxviii). Sa’di (2002) acknowledged that life stories that are narrated by individuals do not make a national narrative which can be realized and shared by all members of the group, unless these life stories are part of what Pierre Nora (1989) called “sites of memory.” Nora argued that “*lieux de memoire* only exist because of their capacity for metamorphosis,

an endless recycling of their meaning and an unpredictable proliferation of their ramifications” (p. 19). One of the sites of Palestinian memory is the Nakba, which “connects all Palestinians to a specific point in time that has become for them an ‘eternal present’” (Sa’di, 2002, p. 177). However, the trauma that Palestinians suffered is itself different among Palestinians. Hanafi (2009) stated that for some Palestinians, the trauma is a “historical one related to the *Nakba*” (p. 176), and for others, it is “a structural one related to the harsh living conditions and institutional discrimination in the Arab host countries (such as Lebanon and Egypt)” (p. 176). Based on this distinction, Hanafi argued that “the omnipresence of the past in the daily life of the Palestinian refugees” (p. 176) is far from unique. Thus, attention should be paid to the “heterogeneity of Palestinian society around the world” (Hanafi, 2009, p. 177).

This hints at the relationship between collective memory and individual memory. Connerton (1989) argued that memory is “an act of transfer” (p. 39). Abu-Lughod and Sa’di (2007) argued that “[s]tories heard and rumors circulated mix with stories based on personal experience—that is the nature of memory of public and shared events” (p. 23). An individual has memory of what s/he suffered in the past; an individual also shares some common memories with other individuals of the in-group. “Collective memory, thus, is the ability of any citizen of a nation to view himself in the eyes of another fellow citizen, regardless of the differences that may divide them, and through which a group of people have access to past events that have been reconstructed and narrated to them” (Hanafi, 2009, p. 181). Memory first starts in a group – a family, a nation, etc. – in which accounts of the past are constantly remembered and narrated.

Individual memories are created based on these narrated collective memories. “This makes the task of historiography very difficult – of distilling elements of individual memory from those that are heavily influenced by the national meta-narrative” (Hanafi, 2009, p. 181). Accordingly, any differences in terms of gender, class, or religion can be ignored.

#### **E. Conclusion: The Metamorphosis of Identities in the Diaspora**

Identity is never fixed; rather it is always changing as a function of different experiences, contexts, people, and attitudes. Similarly, national identity is constantly being molded in new environments and with different people; it is a process that can continue throughout life. The question “who am I?” might be problematic to immigrants. The case of Palestinians can depict the complexities of this question, whose answer may always change as there are several factors that can complicate the Palestinian identity, such as hybridity, acculturation, host society and its attitudes towards immigrants, transnationalism, and collective memory. These factors can trigger different consequences, which are mainly seen in identity maintenance, shift, or hybrid identities.

## CHAPTER III

### REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The Palestinian national identity, being continuously challenged and molded by different historical and socio-political contexts, has been studied extensively (Abushihab & Al-Sheikh Hussein, 2015; Andrews et al., 2012; Aoudé, 2001; Bitar, 2009; Chryssis, 2007; Hall, 1990; Hammer, 2005; Hanafi, 2003; Khalidi, 1997; Lindholm Schulz, 2003; Makkawi, 2004; Mavroudi, 2007; Pérez, 2011; Sayigh, 2012). This review of literature will mainly focus on empirical studies that have been conducted on Palestinians in different parts of the diaspora, as well as on studies of language maintenance and shift of other diaspora people.

#### **A. Palestinian Self-Identification in the Diaspora**

Palestinian self-identification can get affected by different experiences and contexts. One of the places to which Palestinians have fled is Athens, Greece. Mavroudi (2007) examined how first- and second-generation Palestinians in Athens construct their identity. Results showed that “perceptions of injustice and suffering often form part of what it means to be Palestinian” (p. 398). One of the second-generation participants felt that he is Palestinian when he met other Palestinians and Greeks who supported the Palestinian cause. For this interviewee, being Palestinian is a dynamic yet complicated process, as he always has “to make sense of what being Palestinian means (and will mean) to himself and his Greek-Palestinian children” (p. 393). Another participant also referred to the injustice that Palestinians suffer from: “there is this obsession when you don’t have a country, when you can’t go back and when you feel that you and your



family had something that was taken away from you” (p. 398) which unites Palestinians and reinforces their national identity. However, they know that “learning to be Palestinian in the diaspora involves accepting that, despite the need for order, relationships to the homeland as well as notions of home and belonging are often problematic, fractured and disjointed” (p. 400).

In addition to constructing their own identity, participants felt that part of being Palestinian is to construct their children’s national identity “as a way of ensuring the continuation and survival of Palestinian national identity and connections to the homeland in diaspora” (p. 401). However, this teaching is not a simple process for parents who are themselves always negotiating what it means to be Palestinian; this process of teaching “is conducted in relation to cross-border connections and (dis)connections, Greek contexts, the mass media, as well as their own feelings of politicization and commitment to political unity and the cause” (p. 403). In addition, there isn’t a state-sponsored educational system that teaches them about Palestine, and thus, these children have to “decide and choose to be Palestinian as a result of their interactions with non-Palestinians at school, their upbringing and the cross-border connections and (dis)connections they have with Palestine and the wider Middle East” (p. 404).

## **B. National Identity of Young Generation Palestinians**

In addition to Palestinians in Greece, attention has been paid to those in other parts of the diaspora, with special focus on the young generation. Andrews et al. (2012) conducted a survey of self-identification and social ties among 4000 Palestinians

between the ages of 15 and 19 in Mandate Palestine (West Bank, Gaza Strip and Israel), Jerusalem, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. The focus of the study was on this age group because this population “will dictate the nation’s future identity” (p. 11). In addition, young Palestinians in Israel follow an Israeli educational system. The latter promotes what is called “Siyasat Al Tajhil,” which is “a policy of making Palestinians ignorant of their history, identity, culture and collective rights” (p. 8). The researchers asked: “if different Palestinian groups have existed for so many decades in different political, socio-economic and cultural environments, in isolation from each other, what can we say about Palestinian national identity, and movement, today?” (Andrews et al., 2012, p. 8). This broad research question neither specifies the audience intended to participate in this study nor does it show the places where this study will take place. For example, it is not clear whether participants live in refugee camps, and if so, in which refugee camps they reside. These may be important factors which play a role in the self-identification of Palestinians.

Inside Palestine, the results highlighted the salience of the Palestinian/Arab identity of participants. Some Palestinian citizens of Israel identified themselves as Palestinians who have an Israeli citizenship. The researchers argued that “[i]dentifying oneself in this way has two components: the primary identity for these youth is their ‘Palestinian-ness’. The Israeli identification is clearly marked and framed in legal terms: citizenship” (p. 15). Identifying as Arabs and Arab-Israelis were the second and third highest responses. The researchers argued that these forms of identification are associated with Israeli views, which identify “Arab” as a nationality in and of itself as a

way to erase the Palestinian national identity. For participants in the West Bank and Jerusalem, results showed that 82% and 75% of the participants identified themselves as Palestinians. In Gaza, even though 67% identified themselves as Palestinians, 23% said that they are Gazans. While it is not clear whether there were options for the question of how young Palestinians from Gaza self-identify, which would have clarified whether “Gazan” was an available option, the researchers do state that the surveys “took into account the different realities, histories, and experiences respondents in each area have” (p. 11). Palestinians identified as Gazans as a result of the isolation of Gaza for a decade, “...the political isolation of Hamas, as well as the trauma of the Israeli 2008-2009 military attack on the Gaza Strip...” (p. 28). All participants in Palestine valued social ties with other Palestinians.

Participants outside Palestine differed in their self-identification. In Jordan, they identified themselves as Palestinian-Jordanian. The second and third highest responses were “Palestinian with Jordanian ID” and “Palestinian.” In Lebanon and Syria, 60% and 71% respectively identified themselves as Palestinians. Regarding Lebanon, the researchers argued that the majority of refugees live in refugee camps with limited access to the Lebanese population in contrast to those in Syria. In addition, most Palestinian refugees in Lebanon do not have citizenship and live in bad conditions. “It is because of this treatment that we see a majority of those surveyed ... self-identifying as Palestinian” (p. 35). Thus, increased discrimination led to increased group identification (Allport, 1954; Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999). Yet, around 25% of participants still identified themselves as either Lebanese or Palestinian-Lebanese,

which prompted Andrews et al. to call for more research to explain this result.

Regarding Syria, even though 21% identified themselves as Palestinian-Syrian, the majority still identified as Palestinians because “the Syrian government did not seek to interfere or impose Syrian identity on Palestinians, and thus allowed Palestinian political and national discourse to develop in relative independence to other countries in the region” (p. 39). Even though the study does not attempt to make comparisons between the countries studied, it is interesting to highlight how different policies and social conditions in Syria and Lebanon brought about similar results regarding self-identification.

Similar to Andrews et al., Makkawi’s (2004) study focused on young Palestinians in Israel. Makkawi solicited qualitative data about self-identification and other factors that may affect it for student activists in universities of Israel. His study was based on three main theories. The first theory, ego identity, helps explain the activists’ development of a sense of personal as well as group identity. Erikson (1968) believed that during adolescence, human beings are faced with a central question of self-identification: “who am I?” This question can either lead to identity crisis or to identity achievement. He proposed two aspects of ego identity: inner-focused and outer-focused. The former “...is the person’s recognition of his or her self-sameness and continuity over time” (Makkawi, 2004, p. 23), and the latter “... is the individual’s recognition of, and identification with, the ideals and essential patterns of his or her culture” (p. 23). This emphasizes the social or collective aspect of identity, which relates to the Social Identity Theory proposed by Tajfel (1977). He argued that “any

society which contains power, status, prestige and social group differentials (and they all do), places each of us in a number of social categories which become an integral part of our self-definition” (p. 66). An individual’s social identity depends on his/her self-identification within a larger social category such as gender, race or nation. That is why, it can be defined as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1981, p. 255). This membership does not require face-to-face interaction because it is largely based on a psychological feeling of an “us/them” binary (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Relevant to this binary is the theory of Group Relative Deprivation, which was first introduced by Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star and Williams (1949); it is defined as “the actor’s perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities” (Gurr, 1970, p. 24). Accordingly, people “rebel against their condition not when they are deprived in an absolute sense but when they ‘feel’ deprived relative to some comparison persons or groups” (Guimond & Dube-Simard, 1983, p. 526).

Makkawi focused on the role of Israeli curriculum in the Palestinian students’ national awareness. He argued that Israelis “exploit formal education in order to repress national awareness among Palestinian students” (p. 26). This can affect their perceptions of their national identity. Palestinian organizations were established to maintain students’ “national and cultural identity as part of the Palestinian people within the parameters of their social and political reality” (p. 28). Makkawi collected data through field notes from observation and interviews about participants’ membership in

these organizations, activities, commitment, self-identification, and their attitudes towards activism. There were 35 participants, 24 males and 11 females; their ages ranged between 20 and 26 years.

Results showed that participants identified themselves as Arab-Palestinians; others added that they have an Israeli ID. The Arabic language is essential to this identification because it is part of the activists' culture and history. Participants demonstrated a case of group relative deprivation, which was seen on the level of "the repression of their national identity and culture through their formal education" (p. 42). They were frustrated because they were forced to study the Jewish, rather than the Palestinian, history. That is why, participants identified with their political party and its agenda. This party allowed them to strengthen their ties with their national identity and to express their thoughts concerning the Palestinian cause. Makkawi argued that activism at this age is very important for psychological development and construction of one's ego identity. It is also significant because it allows Palestinians to socialize with each other.

Rosemary Sayigh (2012) also focused on the self-identification of young Palestinian adults who live in Bourj al-Barajneh refugee camp in Beirut, Lebanon. Her study aimed to answer questions about the Palestinians' situation in the diaspora vis-à-vis identity and how young Palestinians view their identity. Results showed that Palestinian youth identified as Palestinians. When presented with case scenarios by Sayigh, such as having to identify themselves to university administration, Lebanese policemen, or a potential employer, Palestinian youth did not hesitate to always identify

as Palestinians from Bourj al-Barajneh camp. Sayigh asked them whether they would change their accents when surrounded by Lebanese people. They stated that they would never speak Lebanese under any circumstances; they asserted that changing their dialect and using the Lebanese one means abandoning Palestine. Thus, their dialect is a reflection of their Palestinian roots and of their attachment to these roots.

### **C. Palestinian National Identity and Language**

Abushihab and Al-Sheikh Hussein (2015) and Bitar (2009) focused on the Palestinian national identity in relation to language. The former conducted a study to examine the attitudes of participants towards their dialect and whether they maintain it. The method of data collection was conducting interviews with 50 participants who live in Irbid refugee camp in Jordan and originate from Al-Tira, Haifa. They included first and second generation Palestinians; their ages ranged between 15 and above 70 years. Results showed that all participants have positive attitudes towards the Palestinian dialect, which reflects their identity. However, there are some differences between participants. First generation Palestinians were keen to maintain their dialect, and encouraged younger generations to do so. In addition, they used the dialect because it was a symbol, not only of their identity, but also of their right to return to their homeland. Contrary to this population, 25 out of the 38 second generation Palestinians do not use the Tirawi dialect. Rather, they use the Jordanian dialect or Urban (Madani) dialect because of their daily contact with Jordanians in the public sphere. This shows that the daily interaction with the host society can affect Palestinians' language use. Despite the generational differences in language use, all participants shared a

preservation of some aspects of their cultural heritage, such as traditional foods.

Similar to the above study in its focus on language in relation to the Palestinian national identity, Bitar (2009) studied the Palestinians' use of language and its role in reflecting their identity and culture. His argument was that language is the main reflection of the group identity of Palestinians in the diaspora. His main research question was about the role of PCA in maintaining the Palestinian cultural heritage and identity in the diaspora. The method of data collection was a semi-structured interview that was disseminated online via emails to 39 Palestinians dispersed over the United States, United Kingdom, Jordan, Kuwait, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates and Palestine.

Results showed that Palestinians give a high value to their language. Out of the 39 participants, 28 Palestinians stated that the Palestinian dialect is the most important reflection of their identity. Similar results were reached regarding maintaining cultural heritage through language. This is very important because “the attitude of the speaker is one of the most prominent factors that leads to maintain a language” (Baker, 1988 as cited in Abushihab & Al-Sheikh Hussein, 2015, p. 17). Participants also stated that it is important for them to pass the Palestinian dialect to the upcoming generations because it is through language that they learn about the history of Palestine. With all that pride in their dialect, participants acknowledged that it is difficult to maintain it because they are surrounded by people who do not speak it.



#### **D. Other Factors Affecting Palestinian National Identity**

The Palestinian national identity has also been studied by Pérez (2011) and Chryssis (2007). The two studies focused on religion, internal marriage, and naming practices, in addition to some of the abovementioned factors, which can affect national identity. Pérez focused on the expression of ethnic, religious, and national identity of Palestinians in Jordan. Particularly, he focused on Palestinians' identification based on Pan-Arabism<sup>1</sup> and religion, both of which are common between Palestinians and Jordanians. Pérez argued that religion as a form of identification for Palestinians in Jordan is important. Jordan is a context in which Palestinian nationalism is restricted; Palestinians "... are at once included as citizens and excluded as nationals" (p. 4). Citizenship is an important factor that other studies did not take into consideration, especially in Jordan, which "... is the only Arab State to offer its citizenship to Palestinian refugees" (Pérez, 2011, p. 2). In addition to religion and Pan-Arabism, Pérez argued that displacement and exile are important factors in highlighting the Palestinian national identity.

Pérez conducted his study on Palestinian refugees living in refugee camps in Amman, Jordan. The research questions asked Palestinians about their nationalism, homeland, and the Palestinian cause, what they mean to them, and whether the surroundings in Amman affect the (dis)connection of Palestinians to these three

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<sup>1</sup> "According to Rashid Khalidi, Arab nationalism is the idea that Arabs are a people linked by special bonds of language and history (and many would add religion), and that their political organization should in some way reflect this reality" (as cited in Pérez, 2011, p. 25).

concepts. The methods of data collection were participant observation and interviews. Participants were selected according to one of three criteria. They had to be registered refugees and citizens of Jordan, non-registered refugees and citizens of Jordan, or registered refugees and non-citizens of Jordan.

Results showed that Palestinians identified themselves as refugees. This shows that they reinforced their shared characteristics "... that, on one hand, located all Palestinians within a common narrative of displacement that tied them to Palestine and, on the other hand, created a key sense of 'difference' through which Palestinians could disidentify as 'Jordanian'" (p. 149). Participants who are Jordanian citizens stated that despite their citizenship, they are Palestinian at heart. They "...thus disidentified with their Jordanian status as citizens in order to assert a particular ethno identification as Palestinians" (p. 230). However, within their identification as refugees, there were divisions. Participants distinguished between camp refugees and city refugees. Camp refugees are called *masākīn* (poor/unfortunate ones) while city refugees are characterized by better socio-economic status. In addition, participants were either refugees of 1948 – *lāji'* – or refugees of 1967 – *nāzih*. Accordingly, the experience of displacement affected Palestinians' self-identification. Participants only identified with Jordanians as Arabs and Muslims. This "... resolved the questions of (1) who they were in Jordan (ethnic Arab Muslim Palestinians), (2) what they were in Jordan (guests), and (3) where they truly belonged (in Palestine)" (p. 230).

Like Pérez, Chryssis (2007) focused on important factors that other studies ignored. Her study took place in Massachusetts (MA). The main argument of the study

was that the Palestinian identity is not only based on the homeland, "...for it is the maintenance and transmission of Palestinian cultural beliefs and values that shape Palestinian diasporic identity and thus preserve the community's aspirations towards statehood" (p. 2). Therefore, the purpose of the study was to examine whether aspects of the Palestinian culture were maintained. The research questions of the study asked about the association between participants and their homeland, their ties with their family, their maintenance of their cultural heritage, their association between their culture and that of the host society, their awareness of the Palestinian cause, and whether their perception of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict affects who they elect in MA. Chrystis conducted interviews with 26 participants who were chosen through snowball sampling. Out of the 26 participants, 13 were born in the US; the other 13 were born in the Middle East, seven of whom were born in Palestine. Their ages ranged from 17 to 73. All participants belonged to middle or upper classes; they were educated and proficient in English. Also, they were American citizens except for two green card holders.

Most of the participants maintained their Palestinian identity through religious practices at the mosque or through organizations that promote social justice. Through these organizations, many parties, fundraisers, Palestinian dances, etc. are done as activities which highlight the Palestinian identity and reflect a lively image of Palestine. These activities also allow Palestinians in MA to experience their culture and serve as the main platform to meet other Palestinians with similar experiences. The mosques are also very important because they give the Palestinian community a sense of security and religious belonging.

The Arabic language is another way for maintaining the Palestinian culture. In the mosque, Arabic is spoken. Also, participants born in Palestine always speak Arabic with their children at home, along with English. Some participants even travel to the Middle East once a year to remind their children that they are Arabs. Moreover, internal marriage allows for the maintenance of the Arabic language. Those who married non-Arabs struggle to transmit the Arabic language to their children. Yet, they make sure that they are committed to the Palestinian cause, and they even talk to their foreign spouses about it. All participants married into non-Arab families made a traditional wedding in the Middle East. Some spouses were forced by their in-laws to convert to Islam for them to be accepted into the Arab families.

The identity of US-born participants is much more complex than those who were born in the Middle East. The main problem is that in the US, they are known as Palestinian. In Palestine, they are perceived as American. These participants struggle with the fact that as Palestinian-Americans, they want to fit in; yet, they do not want to lose their sense of belonging to Palestine. Perhaps, that is why they always identify themselves as Palestinian; some of them even gave their children Arabic names. This shows that naming practices are related to Palestinians' desire to maintain aspects of their culture. Participants also cook Palestinian food. The attachment to Palestine is even seen in voting practices as participants make their voting decisions based on the candidate's stance towards the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis.

### **E. Preserving National Identity through Naming Practices**

Chryssis (2007) was the only study that briefly discussed naming practices of Palestinians in the US. However, naming practices have been studied in relation to other immigrants. Many scholars highlighted the fact that names are a part of cultural practices (Alford, 1988; Goodenough, 1965; Lieberson & Bell, 1992; Rymes, 1996; Stahl, 1992; Su & Telles, 2007). As Rymes (1996) acknowledged, “[n]aming is not an arbitrary labeling action” (as cited in Kim & Lee, 2011, p. 211) but a “meaningful action . . . situated in a [particular] context” (Miller & Goodnow, 1995, p. 6). For immigrants, naming is “an important cultural decision” (Sue & Telles, 2007 as cited in Becker, 2009, p. 202). Becker argued that it is important “to study the emotional identification of immigrants not only in terms of their identity, but also to use a more concrete behavioural indicator. A good indicator in this respect could be the naming practices of immigrant parents” (p. 202). That is because names “can be a powerful sociological indicator of sociocultural assimilation in that they can be used to quantify the competing influences of two cultures” (p. 1384). That is why, first names reflect the identity parents “want for their child” (p. 202).

In her study on the naming practices of Turkish immigrants in Germany, Becker (2009) examined whether Turkish parents opted for a Turkish name, a German one, or a name that is common in both societies. To determine whether the name of the child of the Turkish immigrant parent was a common German name, “it was hypothetically asked if children with a particular first name would be interpreted as being of foreign origin by their teachers and peers at school on the basis of their first name” (Becker, 2009, p. 211). Results showed that the “vast majority (82.5 percent) of the Turkish

parents have chosen a first name for their child that is common only in Turkey, but not in Germany (ethnic name) and thereby represents a separated emotional identification” (p. 212). Only 4% of participants chose a German name, and 12.5% chose a name that is common in both cultures (p. 211). A few names reflect marginalization, i.e. they were neither German nor Turkish. Becker (2009) attributed this to marriage between a Turkish parent and a non-Turkish one. Religion also affects naming practices; if the parents are religious, they are less likely to give their children German names. However, a long period of residence in Germany may mean that children are more likely to be given German names.

More specifically, Becker found that “girls are given first names that are common in both countries three times more often than are boys, while they are less frequently given ethnic names” (p. 221). Becker theorized that parents may want to maintain their traditional background through the male child. In fact, many scholars found that boys are usually given traditional names while girls are usually given modern, more fashionable names (Lieberson and Bell, 1992; Lieberson, 2000; Rossi, 1965). Another explanation is that “[i]f parents assume that an ethnic name could potentially elicit discrimination and if parents especially want to protect their daughters, this could lead to more assimilation with regard to girls’ first names” (Becker, 2009, p. 222).

Studies on naming practices have also focused on naming children after relatives (Rossi, 1965). “It was found that boys and first-born children are more likely to be named after kin than are girls and later-born children” (Becker, 2009, p. 207). Males are

given such names because “men are the symbolic carriers of the temporal continuity of the family” (Rossi, 1965, p. 503) while women “play the more crucial role in family and kin activities” (p. 503). In other words, it is the son “who is important for the social prestige and perpetuation of the family name” (p. 504).

#### **F. Language Maintenance and Shift: Palestinians and Other Diaspora People**

Because language maintenance or shift is an essential part of acculturation and a potential outcome of the diaspora, it is important to briefly discuss a few studies that have focused on language maintenance in the context of diaspora and immigration, in which typically a feud between a minority and a majority language takes place.

Amara (2006) examined the role of the Arabic language in the state of Israel from a sociolinguistic point of view, taking into consideration the socio-political context and its influence on the Arabic language. Israel is known for its monolingual ideology. However, as Spolsky and Shohamy (1999a) argued, Israel is in fact a multilingual state, in which Arabic functions as an official language spoken by Palestinians in Israel. Yet, Amara argued that Arabic and Hebrew in Israel should not be treated as any minority-majority language situation. Attention should be paid to the “changing political situation [which] brought about the decline of the role of Arabic and its vitality in the public sphere in Israel” (p. 1). Typically, Arabic is spoken by both Palestinians and Jews, and it is mainly used at home. Hebrew, on the other hand, is used in the public sphere such as in businesses, government, and school. Because of this reality, Amara asked whether the Palestinian minority in Israel will maintain their language, and to what extent. He relied on the framework of ethnolinguistic vitality, which argues that “the greater the

vitality possessed by ethnolinguistic groups, the more they will be able to preserve their collective social identity and maintain their native language in various domains of life” (Amara, 2006, p. 3).

The first factor in the framework relates to the social and economic status of the group, along with the status of their language. In Israel, Palestinians are a minority group of a low socio-economic status. Because the Israelis took the private agricultural lands of Palestinian peasants, the latter “became paid workers in Jewish-owned agriculture or industry. Over time, Palestinians in Israel became dependent on the Jewish majority that dominated the economy and the array of national opportunities” (Rosenfeld, 1978 as cited in Amara, 2006, p. 3). Regarding the status of the language, Baker (1993) argued that “[w]hen a majority language is seen as giving higher social status and more political power, a shift towards the majority language may occur” (p. 52). The Arabic language is affected by the fact that Palestinians in Israel are always in contact with the Hebrew language and the Jewish culture, thus resulting in bilingualism and biculturalism. In addition, family patterns have changed as a result of the change in the type of work. Palestinians used to be peasants and had tightknit family communities as seen in their extended families. However, as they joined the labor market, nuclear families became more common. These changes in the type of work also transformed class differences. Consequently, the extended families who were a minority in the past because of the low socio-economic status are “starting today to compete for control of the local centers of power” (Al-Haj, 1996, p. 21). Patterns of identification have also changed for Palestinians, who previously identified with the village and their extended



families, and now came to identify themselves on the national level as Palestinians and Arabs (Amara, 2006). They perceive their Arabic language as one of the most important markers of their Palestinian and Pan-Arab identity. Amara concluded that based on status factors, which include the low status of Arabic in the public sphere and the economic dependence of Palestinians on Israelis, Arabic has a “low-to-medium level of vitality” (p. 5).

Another factor in ethnolinguistic vitality is demographic variables, which include “the number of speakers of a certain language within a particular area, the geographic distribution of a language minority group, and the number of mixed inter-language marriages” (Amara, 2006, p. 5). Regarding the *number of speakers*, Palestinians in Israel are a minority. However, that does not mean that speakers of Arabic in Israel are a minority, as many Mizrahi Jews speak it. Regarding the factor of *geographic distribution*, the majority of Palestinians live in Arab towns, while only a few of them live in mixed towns, in which Palestinians live in separate neighborhoods, which implies that Arabic is the main language used in the community. Nevertheless, Hebrew is still used widely by these Palestinians, especially those who study in Jewish schools, in which Hebrew is the language of instruction (Amara, 2006). Regarding *mixed inter-language marriages*, Arraf (2003) explained that in Israel, such a marriage is the exception, as endogamous marriages usually take place. Based on these factors, Amara concluded that Arabic is said to have a medium-to-high vitality. “Arabic is the language of the home, the language of the community..., and it is passed on from one generation to another” (p. 6).

The third factor in ethnolinguistic vitality is institutional support. On the national level, Arabic has no value in the Israeli state and laws, while Hebrew is used in different sectors of public life. “The main significance of the status of Arabic in Israel lies, then, not in its relation to society as a whole, but in the extent to which it protects the internal life of the minority” (p. 6). Many Palestinians use Arabic side by side with Hebrew in order to participate in the public life in Israel. On the religious level, Hebrew is not used at all; rather, Classical Arabic is used in mosques and languages such as Greek and Latin are used in churches (Amara, 2006). Arabic is also used in the media, especially because of the establishment of new Arabic channels on the television and the radio. Similarly, Arabic, especially Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), is preserved in education because the Israeli State allows Palestinians to speak in Arabic in school. The institutional support for Arabic thus shows that it is used in all institutions, but in some, Hebrew is used along with Arabic. Amara concluded that Arabic has a medium level of vitality. The ethnolinguistic vitality framework leads Amara to conclude that overall, the Arabic language is still maintained by Palestinians in Israel, citing the decision to allow Palestinians to use Arabic in schools as the most important contributor to this maintenance.

Al-Khatib and Al-Ali (2010) also focused on language maintenance by examining the linguistic situation of Kurds in Jordan. They examined the factors that lead to either language maintenance or shift. They hypothesized that the linguistic situation is that of language and cultural shift into the Jordanian (majority) community. Regarding the factors that can affect the linguistic situation, the researchers

hypothesized that “intermarriage, demographic concentration, and religion, among other sociodemographic factors, play a crucial role in the process [of language maintenance or shift]” (Al-Khatib & Al-Ali, 2010, p. 11). Data were collected through the use of questionnaire, structured interview, and observations of 100 subjects. All participants are Jordanian Kurds who have been in Jordan since the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. Their ages ranged between 14 and above 60 years.

Results showed that there was a language shift from Kurdish to Arabic. The majority of participants could not read, write, or speak in Kurdish; however, almost all the participants could read, write and speak in Arabic. This may be because the Kurdish language does not have any institutional support. In addition, because Kurds do not have strong kinship ties and live with other Jordanians in different areas, they do not often find anyone who can speak the Kurdish language with them.

Regarding their attitudes towards Arabic and Kurdish, participants stated that Arabic is more important and useful to them in terms of communicating and expressing their feelings. Yet, the majority of participants insisted that it is important to speak Kurdish because it reflects their identity. Those who speak Kurdish were proud of this fact because for them, speaking their native language meant preserving their identity and culture. The majority of participants (76%) were emotionally attached to their language, which shows positive attitudes towards the Kurdish language and culture. Despite this positive attitude, Kurdish was not very much used at home and among the Kurdish community, and 40% of participants were strongly embarrassed because they don't speak Kurdish. The use of Kurdish was especially declining across generations;

older generations speak Kurdish more frequently than young and middle-age groups. The researchers anticipated that the Kurdish language can be lost in the next few generations. Education also played a role in LMLS, as participants who had limited schooling maintained their language more than those who were moderately and highly educated. The researchers attributed this result to the type of occupation that participants have in accordance to their level of education. Participants with limited schooling “by virtue of the type of jobs they hold, neither have access to the social life in the country nor are given the opportunity, unlike their educated counterparts, to have daily contact with the majority community” (p. 25).

Al-Khatib and Al-Ali also examined the process of acculturation of Kurds into the Jordanian society. Regarding marriage, the majority of participants (95%) stated that they encourage marrying other Jordanians. On the level of naming practices, around half of the participants stated that they would give their children Arabic names; the other half either reported naming Kurdish names or Kurdish-Arabic names. The process of acculturation also seemed to have a strong effect on the self-identification of Kurds. Many participants stated that they introduce themselves as Jordanian; some introduce themselves as Jordanian but with Kurdish origins. A few participants identify as Kurdish. This shows that “the Kurds of Jordan appear to define themselves on the basis of cultural similarities with the larger majority group. They tend to affiliate more consciously with certain aspects of the majority speech community” (p. 27). The researchers attributed this result to religion. The majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims,

and the same applies for Jordanians. Because both communities share the same religion, there is no harm in sharing the same language and culture.

The study discussed above showed that despite the positive attitudes towards Kurdish, the language was still not maintained. In fact, Tannenbaum and Berkovich (2005) found that positive attitudes towards the ancestral language do not lead to the desire of learning it in order to maintain it. They examined the linguistic patterns of immigrant adolescents who came from the former USSR to Israel. Linguistic patterns “consist of proficiency in various linguistic skills in Russian (L1) and Hebrew (L2), self definition of language as a mother tongue, willingness to maintain L1, and attitudes toward L1” (p. 294). All participants were more proficient in their L2 than L1; however, there were gender differences regarding proficiency in both languages, as girls reported higher proficiency in Russian than in Hebrew. Despite their lack of proficiency in their L1, participants had positive attitudes towards it. Yet, they did not necessarily have the desire to learn it. This led the researchers to conclude that positive attitudes towards the L1 may not play a role in its maintenance.

## **G. Conclusion**

The above review of empirical studies focused on populations in the diaspora and some of the challenges they face, mainly on the level of identity and language maintenance. The first part showed that even though Palestinians are suffering from a continuing Nakba, they have managed to maintain their identity despite not maintaining their language. The following parts showed some factors that play a role in constantly molding the Palestinian identity, such as language, immigrant generation, religion,

citizenship, internal marriage and naming practices. However, studies about other populations contributed to factors that have not been examined regarding the Palestinian diaspora, such as education and occupation (Al-Khatib & Al-Ali, 2010). That is why, it is important to explore whether new factors that have not been studied before play a role in Palestinians' perceptions of their national identity and language.

## CHAPTER IV

### METHODOLOGY

#### **A. Purpose and Research Questions**

The purpose of this study was to investigate the perceptions and attitudes of Palestinians in Lebanon towards their national identity and towards their language as an expression of their identity and cultural heritage. The study aimed to answer the following research questions: (1) How do Palestinians in daily contact with the Lebanese society identify themselves? (2) To what extent do they believe that it is their duty to speak PCA and socialize with other Palestinians in order to maintain their national identity and cultural heritage? (3) Do they believe that PCA and/or MSA are the best expressions of their national identity and cultural heritage? (4) What are the factors that affect Palestinians' perceptions of their national identity and language?

#### **B. Participants**

This study focused on Palestinians in Lebanon who study or work in the country's schools and businesses, through which they are in daily contact with members of their Lebanese host society. Those who live and work in refugee camps only could not participate because they are mostly in contact with other Palestinians at the camp. Participants were recruited through snowball sampling because this was the only sampling method that allowed access to the dispersed Palestinian population outside the refugee camps. Other sampling procedures could not be employed because a list of Palestinians living in Lebanon may be available only with Palestinian organizations; however, the activity of these organizations mainly involves populations in refugee

camps. This study recruited 37 participants with a diverse set of characteristics. Among the participants, there were 18 males (51%) and 19 females (49%); the participants were divided into three immigrant generations: 8 first-generation (21.62%), 18 second-generation (48.65%), and 11 third-generation (29.73%).

## **C. Instrument**

### ***1. Background Questionnaire***

Participants were given a questionnaire in English or Arabic (Appendices B and C). The questionnaire mainly elicited demographic information about participants, such as sex, age, birthplace, place of origin in Palestine, place of residence in Lebanon, residence in a refugee camp (if any), other residence abroad, citizenship(s), duration of stay in Lebanon, immigrant generation, and socio-economic status. These factors were inspired by those of previous studies (Abushihab & Al Sheikh Hussein, 2015; Andrews et al., 2012; Bitar, 2009; Chaaban et al., 2010; Pérez, 2011; Sayigh, 2012). The questionnaire also asked participants about their educational level, occupation, marital status, nationality of spouse, and number of children. Internal or external marriage, which means marrying a Palestinian or a non-Palestinian partner, may affect the extent to which Palestinians in the diaspora maintain their cultural heritage (Chryssis, 2007). The last section in the questionnaire was about participants' language use, which is related to foreign language proficiency, proficiency in PCA and the Lebanese dialect, and the dialect spoken with immediate family members, friends, and neighbors. The section also asked participants to provide the first names of their immediate family



members to examine whether naming practices correlate with perceptions of national identity (Al-Khatib & Al-Ali, 2010; Becker, 2009).

## ***2. Semi-Structured Interview***

The main instrument for data collection is semi-structured interview, also available in English and Arabic (Appendices D and E). The interview consisted of 26 questions which were divided into six parts. The first part of the interview asked participants to tell a narrative about Palestine and Palestinian foods in Arabic. The second part of the interview asked them to explain their self-identification and their attitudes towards Palestine and the Palestinians. The third section, relationship to others, was about participants' sympathy with the Syrian refugees in Lebanon and the problems they are facing. The fourth section elicited data about participants' pride in their dialect and their attitudes towards PCA and MSA as an affirmation of identity and expression of cultural heritage, based on previous studies (Bitar, 2009; Chryssis, 2007). Attitudes towards PCA were collected because they can lead to the maintenance (or lack thereof) of this dialect (Baker, 1988). The fifth section, marriage, asked participants who are married to a Palestinian partner whether that was a conscious choice. Non-married participants were asked whether they wish to marry a Palestinian or a non-Palestinian partner and whether they would speak to their children about Palestine. The sixth and last section collected data about participants' valuing of social ties among Palestinians, which was shown to correlate with preservation of national identity (Chryssis, 2007).

#### **D. Procedure**

This study was approved from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of AUB. Data collection spanned between May 16 and June 7, 2016. Because the study involved snowball sampling, which is a method that “yields a study sample through referrals made among people who share or know of others who possess some characteristics that are of research interest” (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981, p. 141), flyers were distributed among a few Palestinians so they can help recruit other participants. The flyer was available in English and Arabic (Appendices F and G); it explained the topic of the research, eligibility criteria, and what will be required from participants. In addition, the contact information of the principal investigator, the co-investigator, and the IRB were made available in case potential participants have any questions or concerns. Subjects were asked to contact the co-investigator via email or phone if they or any one they know were interested in participating in the study. The eligibility criteria were that participants should be Palestinian in origin regardless of the nationality they currently hold; residents in Lebanon and have lived for some time in this country; in contact with the Lebanese host society; and between the ages of 18 and 85 years.

Subjects who were interested in participating in the study were given an information sheet before data collection. The information sheet, which was available in English and Arabic (Appendices H and I), explained that the study is about Palestinian national identity and language, and it described what subjects will be asked to do as potential participants. In addition, the sheet explained that the researcher would like to record the interview so that all the information they provide can be analyzed. Subjects were assured that their confidentiality will be maintained, as only the investigators and

the IRB may have access to the records. Whenever the subject agreed to participate, s/he were given the questionnaire and then interviewed. Participants were required to talk in Arabic only in the first section of the interview, which was analyzed in terms of language use. For the remaining interview, participants were free to use Arabic or English in their responses. Filling the questionnaire and answering the interview questions took an average of 30 minutes for participants.

After doing both procedures, participants were given a debriefing form, also available in English and Arabic (Appendices J and K). It thanked subjects for participating in the study and explained the true purpose of the research, which is about their perceptions and attitudes towards their national identity and language as an expression of this identity and cultural heritage. This was not revealed to them before data collection because it may have triggered them to change their responses. The debriefing form assured participants that even though they had already taken part in the study, they could withdraw their participation after they had known the true purpose of the study. If they decided to withdraw, the questionnaire will be shredded and the recorded interview will be deleted. Participants who decided to participate in the study after reading the debriefing form were given a written informed consent form, also available in English and Arabic (Appendices L and M), which they were asked to sign based on their consent to take part in the study.

## **E. Data Analysis**

### ***1. Statistical Analysis***

The data provided by the questionnaire was first analyzed quantitatively in terms of descriptive statistics. This data was then coded to be statistically analyzed through International Business Machines (IBM) Statistical Package for the Social Science (SPSS), version 24. The purpose of this analysis was to first examine the factors that affect language maintenance, which was studied based on the first part of the interview, and to answer the fourth research question, which is about the factors that affect Palestinians' self-identification and pride in their language. Pearson Chi-square test and non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test were used to investigate bivariate associations with each one of the three binary outcomes – language maintenance, self-identification, and pride in language – for categorical and continuous variables respectively. Frequency distribution and p-values were reported. Significance was considered at p less than 0.05.

### ***2. Qualitative Analysis***

Information from the interview was analyzed qualitatively, mainly through discourse analysis of participants' (transcribed) responses. All participants spoke in Arabic throughout the entire interview; accordingly, their responses were translated into English. The first section of the interview was analyzed in terms of language use. The researcher referred to the book *Colloquial Palestinian Arabic: An Introduction to the Spoken Dialect* by Nasser Isleem (2010) to determine whether the participants' dialect is PCA. The second part of the interview examined participants' self-identification and explanations for identifying as such. This section answered the first research question

about how Palestinians self-identify. The researcher referred to the questionnaire to examine whether there are factors that affected Palestinians' self-identification. The third section of the interview was analyzed in terms of whether participants are compassionate with other Syrian refugees living in Lebanon. Their responses were categorized as either sympathetic or unsympathetic. The fourth section was analyzed in terms of participants' attitudes towards their language; particularly, the researcher examined whether they are proud of their dialect and whether they believe that it is their duty to speak it. They were also asked about their attitudes towards PCA and MSA. The questionnaire was also referred to in order to examine whether any factor affected participants' pride in their dialect. The analysis of the fourth section answered part of the second research question, namely whether participants believe that they should speak PCA, and the third research question about their perceptions of PCA and MSA. The fifth and sixth sections answered part of the second research question, as they addressed whether participants have positive attitudes towards their national identity, and whether this is related to their efforts to establish social ties with other Palestinians. What is meant by positive attitudes in this case is that if participants attempt to meet other Palestinians, marry a Palestinian or at least someone who feels strongly towards Palestinians, impart everything they know about Palestine, including bits and pieces of the dialect, to younger generations, and if they themselves try to maintain their dialect, then it means that they have positive attitudes towards their national identity, which they are trying to preserve in different ways.

## CHAPTER V

### RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This study examined how Palestinians in Lebanon identify themselves, their attitudes towards their national identity and towards their language, and the factors that affect their self-identification, language use, and their pride in their dialect. This chapter will present the results of this study; it is organized into five major parts according to the themes of the results: Self-Identification, Place and Nation, Relationship to Others, Language Matters, and Preserving National Identity.

#### A. Participants' Characteristics

Appendix A shows the characteristics of each participant. This section will report frequency distributions of participants' characteristics.

##### 1. Demographic Characteristics

Table 1 shows the demographic characteristics of participants.

Table 1

##### *Demographic Characteristics of Participants*

Characteristics	Categories within Characteristics	Total
<b>Demographic Information</b>		
Sex	Male	18 (49%)
	Female	19 (51%)
Birth place	Lebanon	22 (59%)
	Palestine	8 (22%)
	Other	7 (19%)
Place of Origin	North of Palestine	26 (72%)
	South (West and East) of Palestine	10 (28%)

Immigrant Generation	1 <sup>st</sup> Generation	8 (21.62%)
	2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation	18 (48.65%)
	3 <sup>rd</sup> Generation	11 (29.73%)
<b>Residence</b>		
Residence in Lebanon	Beirut	25 (68%)
	Outside Beirut	12 (32%)
Duration of Stay in Lebanon	(Number of Years)	(Ranged between 4 and 68 years)
Residence Abroad	No	28 (76%)
	Yes	9 (24%)
<b>Citizenship</b>		
Lebanese Passport	No	24 (65%)
	Yes	13 (35%)
Palestinian Passport	No	15 (41%)
	Yes	22 (59%)
<b>SES</b>		
Annual Family Income	Average or above average	25 (68%)
	Below Average	12 (32%)
Social Class	Middle to Upper Class	27 (73%)
	Lower (Working) Class	10 (27%)

Some characteristics need to be elaborated on. Regarding birthplace, the two main birthplaces of participants are Palestine and Lebanon; a few of them were born in Kuwait, Dubai, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United States. Participants are from a variety of origins in Palestine. For the purposes of statistical analysis, the origins were lumped as either from North of Palestine or from South of Palestine. Most of the participants are from North of Palestine, which includes Haifa, Nazareth, Acre – including Dayr Al-Qassi and Az-Zeeb – and Galilee Region – including Tiberias or *Tabariyyah*, Sa'sa', Safed, Safourieh, and Nahf. Few participants are from the East and West of Palestine; the east includes Jerusalem and the west includes Gaza and Jaffa. Only one participant did not specify his place of origin in the questionnaire.

Regarding residence in Lebanon, the majority of participants live in Beirut, with eight of them living inside refugee camps, which include Mar Elias, Shatila, and Burj Al-Barajneh. A few participants live outside Beirut in Tyre, Al-Chouf, and Saida. It should be noted that this is one of the limitations of this study, i.e. the study recruited only 37 participants, most of whom live in Beirut, which does not represent the Palestinians in Lebanon, as Palestinians in Beirut may be different from those in other areas in Lebanon, with various lifestyles and socioeconomic statuses, which can affect perceptions of identity and language. A study on a larger scale with more participants might get more interesting insights on Palestinians living in different areas in Lebanon.

The duration of stay in Lebanon ranged between 4 and 68 years. Many participants (86%) have lived in Lebanon for the greater part of their lives, 16 of whom (53%) have lived their whole lives in Lebanon, and 22% have been living in this country since 1948. Duration of stay was taken into consideration because it reveals the years of contact between Palestinians and their host and the effect of this contact on the Palestinian national identity and dialect maintenance.

## ***2. Education and Occupation***

Table 2 shows the location of the school that participants attended, their educational levels, and their occupations.

Table 2

### ***Educational Levels and Occupations of Participants***

	<b>Total</b>
<b>School Attended</b>	
School in Lebanon	21 (81%)
School Abroad	5 (19%)
<b>Educational Level</b>	
University Level	22 (59%)



School Level	15 (41%)
<b>Occupation</b>	
Office Work	15 (41%)
Non-Office Work	9 (24%)
Other	13 (35%)

As the table shows, the majority of participants attended schools in Lebanon.

The table only cites the locations of schools attended by 26 participants. The remaining 11 participants did not identify the school they attended in the questionnaire. Many participants had university-level education; this includes PhD, Masters, Bachelor, Undergraduate, and university-level, which implies participants who enrolled in university but dropped out. School-level education includes baccalaureate, high school, brevet, intermediate, and elementary school level. Because of the few participants belonging to each level, they were lumped into university- and school-level education as seen in the table.

Participants had two kinds of jobs. Some jobs were office-work, which include: X-ray machine operator; lab medicine manager; medical lab technician; engineer; university professor; insurance consultant; business partner; employee; inspector; public relations assistant, internship coordinator, and social media manager; and research assistant. Non-office jobs include: chef; peasant; laundry owner; bookstore owner; organizer of pilgrimage services for Palestinians; retail shop owner; electrician; and aluminum specialist. Other participants were either students, housewives, or unemployed. Jobs were categorized as such based on the results of Al-Khatib and Al-Ali (2010).

### 3. Marriage

Table 3 shows the marital status of the participants. Those who are married were asked to provide the nationality of their spouses in the questionnaire.

Table 3  
*Marital Status of Participants*

	<b>Total</b>
Single	13 (35%)
Palestinian Spouse	16 (43%)
Lebanese or Syrian Spouse	8 (22%)

Based on the questionnaire, it was revealed that 19 participants (51%) are married, 13 (35%) are single, one is divorced and four are widowed. Eight of the married participants are married to Palestinian spouses (42%), six to Lebanese spouses (32%), four to Palestinian spouses but with a Lebanese ID (21%), and one is married to a Syrian spouse. All four widows were married to Palestinians, except for one whose late husband had a Lebanese ID. The divorced participant was married to a Lebanese spouse. For statistical analysis, participants were lumped based on their marital status as either married or single. The nationality of spouses of married participants, including the widowed or divorced, was taken into consideration as a factor in self-identification, language maintenance, and attitudes towards language.

### 4. Language Use

Table 4 shows the language habits of participants.

Table 4  
*Participants' Language Use*

	<b>Total</b>
Foreign Language	
No	5 (14%)
Yes	32 (86%)
Using PCA with Family Members	
No	11 (30%)

Yes	26 (70%)
<hr/>	
Using PCA with Friends or Neighbors	
<hr/>	
No	24 (65%)
Yes	13 (35%)

Participants were asked to provide the foreign languages they know how to speak in the questionnaire. Out of the 32 participants who speak a foreign language, 31 speak English, three of whom also speak Italian, Spanish, and French. Only one participant speaks French only. The table also shows the number of participants who reported speaking PCA with at least one family member, and those who reported speaking PCA outside home with friends or neighbors.

### **B. Self-Identification**

Results showed that 24 participants (65%) identified themselves as Palestinian, 7 as hybrid, and 2 as Lebanese; 2 participants stated that their identification is situation-dependent, and 2 seemed to be still exploring multiple identities. Participants who identified themselves as Palestinian were proud of their identity. Words such as “I have the honor to be Palestinian” (participant 2) show just how much it is rewarding to identify as such. One third-generation female participant stated that “I feel that because they took our land away from us, I intend to show them that we still do exist...” (participant 32). Some participants even identified themselves with their village origin; for example, one first-generation man identified himself as “Palestinian from 1948 from Al Sha’ab Village in Acre” (participant 14). Other participants were keen to identify not only as Palestinian, but also as sufferers. One first-generation participant stated that “with all my dignity and pride, I say that I am a Palestinian who has suffered from injustice because I was expelled from my country. Palestine is my homeland and those

who have no homeland have no identity” (participant 7). Lindholm Schulz (2003) believes that “Palestinian identity has been formed out of loss, yearning and the joint cause of waiting” (p. 120). Thus, for participant 7 it is not only important to identify as Palestinian, but it is crucial to explain what being Palestinian means: suffering and expulsion from his land.

The above results support Article 4 of the Palestinian National Charter (1968) which stated that “[t]he Zionist occupation and the dispersal of the Palestinian Arab people, through the disasters which befell them, do not make them lose their Palestinian identity” (1968). These results are in line with those of Sayigh (2012), who found that Palestinian youth in Burj El Barajneh camp in Lebanon proudly identified themselves as Palestinian. She noticed that “[t]he term ‘Palestinian’ is the first young adults from Bourj’ would use when asked by a stranger ‘Who are you?’” (p. 19). Some participants in this study also showed agency in their identity, as they consciously identified as such as a resistance to the threat of erasure of the Palestinian identity by Zionists who not only took “our land away from us” (participant 32) but also asserted that Palestine is a “land without a people.” Self-identification as Palestinian shows that the people “still do exist” (participant 32). This is also evident in the fact that some first-generation participants identified with their village, which they have not seen in decades. Dorai (2002) argued that the Palestinian identity “is based primarily on two elements: the village of origin and family networks” (p. 92). That is because the village of origin expresses the Palestinian identity and cultural heritage; in addition, family ties were

very strong in the village. Because villages were lost, they “came to symbolize the lost territory and became a central part of the diasporic consciousness” (Dorai, 2002, p. 92).

### ***1. Hybrid Identities***

Seven participants identified as having a dual identity: Palestinian and another identity, whether on the legal level, i.e. Palestinian with a Lebanese ID; the religious level, i.e. Palestinian-Muslim; or the Pan-Arab level, i.e. Palestinian and Arab. One participant identified as Palestinian and Arab because he “cannot be separated from [his] Arab background” (participant 1). In addition, identifying with religion was necessary because, as some participants argued, at the end of the day, everyone will die, so religion is important. Regarding dual national identities, two participants identified themselves as “half-Palestinian and half-Iraqi” (participant 3) and “Palestinian-Jordanian” (participant 28), with the former on account of an Iraqi parent and the latter on account of a Jordanian ID, and the fact that she has lived there for some time. This participant stated that even though she does identify with Jordan, “I also feel like I need to say Palestinian because I want to maintain my origin” (participant 28). Interestingly, none of the participants identified as Palestinian-Lebanese, acknowledging a sense of belonging to both their homeland and their host society.

The above results showed that some participants “harbor a number of crosscutting identities” (Khalidi & Riskedahl, 2010, p. 5). For the few participants who identified with two national identities, it seems that their identities are “not assimilated or altered independently, but instead elements of cultures are incorporated to create a new hybrid culture” (Iyall Smith, 2008, p. 3). In fact, both of these cases highlight that

self-identification was not related to citizenship, but rather to a sense of belonging to another national identity that is just as meaningful for participants. Regarding participants who identified with religion or Pan-Arabism, these results correspond to those found by Makkawi (2004), whose participants identified themselves as Palestinian with Israeli ID, and some participants also identified as Palestinian and Arab.

Identifying with religion was important in Chryssis's (2007) study, whose participants went to mosques in the US not only to maintain their Muslim identity but also their Arab and Palestinian one, as the mosques allowed them to socialize with other Arabs and Palestinians and to maintain their Arabic language. The results concerning self-identification with religion are also in line with Weissbrod's (1983) observation that "[r]eligion frequently provide[s] the value system around which groups in general, and nations in particular, [coalesce], and by which their members [identify] themselves" (p. 189).

## ***2. Situation-Dependent Self-Identification***

Two participants acknowledged that how they identify themselves depends on the situation they are in and the people they are with. They explained that if they were with Lebanese people, they would not identify themselves as Palestinian unless their interlocutors already know them as Palestinian or guess that they are as such from their family names. This contrasts to other participants who proudly identified as Palestinian, with one first-generation even stating that he would declare his identity in front of anybody.

Many scholars viewed the self as a social construction (McLaughlin & Heath, 1993; Miller & Mangelsdorf, 2005; Varenne & McDermott, 1999; Walsh, 2002). Hall (2011) argued that identity “is dynamic and responsive to contextual conditions” (p. 33). In other words, identity is “the situated outcome of a rhetorical and interpretive process in which interactants make situationally motivated selections from socially constituted repertoires of identificational and affiliational resources and craft these semiotic resources into identity claims for presentation to others” (R. Bauman, 2000, p. 1). This hints at Giddens’s (1984) theory of structuration, which is “the process of creating and being created by our social structures” (Hall, 2011, p. 35). The identities of these participants are also relevant to “the identities of the other participants” (Hall, 2011, p. 33). When individuals enter a communicative event, they usually enter “with particular constellations of historically laden social identities” (Hall, 2011, p. 34). The fact that participants stressed that they would not identify as Palestinian when they are with Lebanese people may highlight their awareness of the negative image associated with Palestinians in Lebanon, based on which they avoid identifying as Palestinian.

### ***3. Exploring Identities***

Another two participants felt that they are still exploring multiple identities without necessarily being committed to one, which corresponds with the constructivist nature of identity. One participant stated that

This is the hardest question ever asked to me...I don’t know how to identify myself. Sometimes I feel that I belong to the Lebanese people, but some events happen and it reminds you that you are not one of them. At the same time, I feel

that I am Palestinian. I am from Palestine, my grandparents were in Palestine, but I never went there and I don't have a Palestinian ID. So I am very confused, I haven't found myself yet. (participant 30)

Similarly, another participant stated that “our situation is confusing because my mother is American and my father is Palestinian, and we have Lebanese citizenship... so it is not clear how I identify myself because I don't necessarily fit into any of the boxes” (participant 37). Wong Fillmore (1996) argued that “it is not an easy task for immigrant[s] to identify themselves with either their heritage identity or the dominant society identity” (as cited in Park, 2013, p. 47). It seems that these two participants are under the impression that they should have one identity; however, it can be said that they have multiple identities which they are aware of. They said that they are confused or that they “don't fit into any of the boxes” because it seems that they believe that unless they have one identity, e.g. Palestinian, then they are confused. In other words, they expect that they should fit into one box. However, as the conceptual framework shows in chapter 2, identity is not static but rather flexible, so it is possible to have multiple identities and explore them rather than have one identity.

#### ***4. Factors Affecting Self-Identification***

Table 5 shows the factors that affected self-identification.

Table 5

*Statistically Significant Factors in Self-identification*

		Total	Self- Identification as Palestinian	Identification as Other	p-value
<b>Citizenship</b>					
Lebanese	No	24 (65%)	20 (83%)	4 (17%)	
Passport	Yes	13 (35%)	4 (31%)	9 (69%)	.001*



Palestinian Passport	No	15 (41%)	5 (33%)	10 (67%)	.001*
	Yes	22 (59%)	19 (86%)	3 (14%)	
<b>Education</b>					
Educational Level	University Level	22 (59%)	11 (50%)	11 (50%)	.022*
	School Level	15 (41%)	13 (87%)	2 (13%)	
<b>Language Use</b>					
Using PCA with Friends or Neighbors	No	24 (65%)	12 (50%)	12 (50%)	.010*
	Yes	13 (35%)	12 (92%)	1 (8%)	

\*significant at  $p < 0.05$

Appendix N includes the entire table, which shows the statistical analysis of all the characteristics of participants in relation to self-identification. The above table shows only the factors which were statistically significant in self-identification. Statistical analysis showed that the following factors were not statistically significant: sex, birthplace, place of origin, immigrant generation, residence in Lebanon, duration of stay in Lebanon, residence abroad, annual family income, social class, school attended, occupation, nationality of spouse, language spoken during the interview, foreign language, using PCA with family members, and pride in dialect. The statistically significant factors are: citizenship, educational level, and using PCA with friends or neighbors. It should be noted that because the study recruited only 37 participants, the participant pool is too small to come up with statistically significant results; a larger sample is usually needed for statistical analysis. This marks another limitation of this study as a consequence of the small sample size.

The table shows that among participants with a Lebanese ID card, only 31% identified as Palestinian, while among participants with a Palestinian ID card, 86% identified as Palestinian. Khalidi and Riskedahl (2010) argued that Palestinians who

have another citizenship “often have conflicted relationships to their official documents. Their identity cards are not fully representative of their identity. One might say that their *hawiyyah* (identity) is misaligned with their *hawiyyeh* (colloquial for identity card)” (p. 5). This was not the case for the participants in this study.

The table also showed that among participants with a university-level education, 50% identified as Palestinian, while among those with a school-level education, 87% identified as such. According to Nekby, Rödin, and Özcan (2007), “education is an important vehicle for adapting to the host country with potentially vital consequences for future social mobility” (p. 6). Similar findings were reported by Nekby et al. (2007) in their study on immigrant students in Sweden; participants with higher educational levels were more integrated and less marginalized than those with lower levels of education.

The majority of participants who speak PCA with friends or neighbors also identified as Palestinian. Thus, identifying as Palestinian to other people may correlate with speaking the language associated with their national identity. As one participant stated, “presenting myself as Palestinian in front of others drives me to speak Palestinian” (participant 4).

## **C. Place and Nation**

### ***1. Home Country***

Results showed that 26 participants (70%) identified Palestine as their home country with two of them stating that they also feel a connection and a responsibility towards Lebanon. Among these participants, one first-generation Palestinian identified

his village as his homeland; he recalled when he was able to see his village from the borders between Lebanon and Palestine but felt sad “once I realized that an Israeli is enjoying my village and I am just looking at it from far away” (participant 7). That is why, another first-generation participant insisted that “we should preserve the name of our villages, if not, then we are abandoning Palestine” (participant 8). Three participants identified their home country as Palestine and another country in which they lived such as Lebanon, Iraq, Italy, Saudi Arabia, or Cuba. Three other participants identified only Palestine and Lebanon as their home countries and four participants identified only Lebanon as their home country. For one participant, Qatar is her home country as it is where her parents live.

Other participants were keen to mention that “Palestine will always be my country” (participant 1) “without any doubt” (participant 4). However, some of them stated that they could not deny “what Lebanon [has] done for me. I was born here and I have lived here my whole life” (participant 1). Yet, despite the gratitude they feel towards Lebanon, some participants still identified Palestine as their homeland because “the main orientation is towards the mother homeland...” (participant 4). Unlike those participants, one second-generation Palestinian who lives in Burj El-Barajneh, felt that he does not owe Lebanon anything; he acknowledged that “Lebanon is nothing for me, I view myself as a visitor here” (participant 9). Rather, he perceived both Palestine and Cuba, a country where he lived, studied, worked, and married, as his home countries.

Participants who identified Palestine and other countries as their homeland had similar feelings as the above participants. The other countries were once host countries

for these participants, who acknowledged that Palestine is their home country because they are Palestinian, but they don't know Palestine; "I never went there, and that's why I don't really have a strong sense of belonging. I don't know its roads or anything. That is why; ...I have a strong sense of belonging to Saudi Arabia and Beirut" (participant 5). In fact, not knowing Palestine and not visiting it makes it a dream or an abstraction for one participant. That is why, another participant felt that her homeland "is any emotional connection that I have that is of value to me, whether it is roots or love for the country, its nature, its people" (participant 3).

The above results correspond to Brah's (1996) acknowledgement that diaspora entails a "multi-placedness of home" (p. 194). In other words, "the concept of diaspora refers to multi-locationality within and across territorial, cultural and psychic boundaries" (p. 194). For many of the participants, Palestine is a given; it is their home country and always will be. However, their belonging to Lebanon is based on two elements: (1) their life-long stay in it and (2) their gratitude towards it. Their feelings of belonging to countries in which they have lived could be explained by the fact that "[w]hen exile and scattering are as long-lasting as in the Palestinian case 'local' attachments and interests are likely to develop, especially in the absence of a state" (Sayigh, 2012, p. 14). Thus, it can be said that "the 'home' of the 'homeland' and the 'home' of lived reality are lived concurrently by Palestinian exiles in Lebanon and are central to their feelings of belonging and notions of identity" (Fincham, 2010, p. 70).

## ***2. Palestinians Forming One Nation***

Forming a Palestinian nation is important. Sayigh (2012) argued that

Palestinians occupy an ambiguous situation in world politics, recognized as a 'people' with a right to partial membership in the United Nations, and conceded a 'national authority' without sovereignty or independence. If their struggle is to continue, and include refugee rights to repatriation, it must depend on subjective feelings of 'commonality' and 'sameness' rather than international recognition...In their case a diaspora-wide sense of national belonging is an essential element in a struggle for recognition waged against more powerful antagonists. (p. 13)

Despite the importance of being a nation, 17 participants (46%) did not believe that Palestinians make up one nation, while 13 (35%) responded in the affirmative. One of these participants stated that she views this issue "as a spectrum of people with a common value but reflecting it in different ways and translating their values in different ways" (participant 3). Thus, while this shows a common faith in Palestinian nationalism, translations of that faith differ among Palestinians. The remaining 7 participants (19%) did not seem to be sure regarding this issue, with 3 of them believing that there are some things that bring Palestinians together and other things that separate them. For these participants, Palestinians are not united; what they have in common are the problems they face in different host societies (participant 2); otherwise, "there is nothing emotional that connects Palestinians together" (participant 11). This is in line with one participant's claim that Palestinians do not make up one nation because they are in the diaspora; accordingly, "the Palestinian from Chile is different from the one in Egypt or Lebanon or in Syria" (participant 16). In other words, "the physical separation

led to the division of Palestinians” (participant 17). Perhaps for this reason, one participant acknowledged that only Palestinians living in Palestine are one nation, as they are emotionally and nationally connected. The fact that he addressed Palestinians inside Palestine and those outside of it already highlights that Palestinians do not make up one nation. For other participants, the fact that “we don’t know each other” (participant 26) shows that Palestinians are not one nation. Anderson (1983) claimed that even though people may not know each other, they make up imagined communities because of their imagined communion. Yet, for this reason, this participant did not believe in one nation. In addition to the physical separation, participants may have been affected by the internal state in Palestine, where the Palestinian authority is divided into two main political parties: *Fatah* rules the Palestinian National Authority while *Hamas* governs Gaza, and there is an ongoing tension between both groups.

For other participants, Palestinians make up one nation because there is still “a Palestinian nerve [that] attracts everybody” (participant 1). This participant highlighted that every time something happens in Palestine, Palestinians all over the diaspora organize events and protests. In fact, many participants emphasized that Palestinians have some kind of orientation towards their homeland and towards each other. Some participants stated that when they meet Palestinians, they feel very comfortable talking with them. In addition, they acknowledged that when Palestinians meet abroad, they always help each other out. Thus, there is always a bond between Palestinians.

The responses of participants showed how much the issue of Palestinians forming one nation is contradictory. Many of them believed that Palestinians cannot be

one nation as they are dispersed in different host countries. Thus, “adaptation to different hosts has produced a layer of regional specificity that colors their shared ‘Palestinianness’. Regionalism weakens national unity to the degree that it allows separate interests to crystallize” (Sayigh, 2012, p. 18). In fact, Sayigh (2012) argued that

While a century of struggle against imperialist-colonialist negation has produced a strong sense of ‘Palestinianness’, we must be careful not to exaggerate the political effects of a unity of sentiment based in a suppressed national identity...Diasporas are not likely to produce political, social, or cultural homogeneity even when a sense of shared origin is strong... (p. 14)

### **3. *Optimism: To Return or not to Return***

Similar to the responses regarding whether Palestinians make up one nation, the responses regarding the desire to return varied. Out of 37 participants, 28 (76%) stated that they want to return to Palestine. One first-generation participant even perceived Lebanon not as a place to stay “but rather [as] a place to pass through so we can return to our country – *mamar wa laisa maqar*” (participant 36). However, 3 participants did not want to return to Palestine; another 3 stated that they are not sure whether they want to return; and still 3 others stated they would like to visit Palestine but not live in it. In fact, one second-generation participant once visited Palestine; however, her experience was different from what she expected. She found that it is very difficult to live there; “it is very different from the idea of what really constitutes Palestine. So I’m not sure if I can go back” (participant 11). Perhaps her expectation of what Palestine is like from the narratives she heard from her parents contrasted with the reality of what Palestine has

become, which can explain her disappointment over her experience of return. Another participant considered return a theoretical issue, but once it becomes a practical one, many things need to be considered because return is “not a simple switch on/off thing. It will need a lot of resources to actually move from this state that we are in in terms of apartheid” (participant 3). Once there is a solid system, return would be a possibility.

The fact that the majority of participants wanted to return was unsurprising, as return is very crucial to Palestinians. Emile Habibi (1985), a Palestinian author, described the desire to return as optimism, “implying a blend of pessimism in the short term and optimism in the long run...it is not Palestine in itself but facts of not being at home which are missed” (Lindholm Schulz, 2003, p. 206). Fischbach (2003) noticed that a wall in Balata refugee camp in West Bank had written on it a slogan that read: “One Choice—to Return or to Die” (p. 365). Turki (1977) explained that Palestinians cannot abandon the right of return:

To reject the Return is to rip up the tree on which [Palestinian] history and *raison d'être* grow. The Return is the rock on which our nation in exile is founded and the social homeostatis that had cemented our people together in their encapsulated world. The passion for the Return is an expression of our identity... It is as if the ultimate Palestinian question were: I want to Return, therefore I am.... [It is] pure and simply, Palestinian selfhood. (p. 68)

It is in this spirit that Lebanon was not perceived by the participants as a homeland; it was just a “place of waiting” (Dumper, 2007, p. 4). This is what Mary Douglas (1966) called “‘matter out of place’ and needing to be put back into place” (as cited in Dumper,



2007, p. 4). Allan (2014) explained that first-generation Palestinians want to return in physical terms. For first-generation participants, return is based on a nostalgia of a place that they have experienced losing. In fact, nostalgia is “from the Greek nostos, to return home, and algia, a painful feeling” (Spitzer, 1999, p. 90). Hammer (2005) argued that “[t]here is a strong correlation between being prevented from visiting one’s homeland and the intensity of the longing for return” (p. 21). Perhaps because the first-generation actually saw Palestine and were not allowed to return to it, their desire to return has intensified. It is not surprising that one Israeli author, Danny Rubinstein (1991), noted that “every people in the world lives in a place, except the Palestinians. The place lives in them” (p. 7). For the younger generation, return may not be as easy a decision. The participant who returned shows how much her expectation of Palestine did not meet reality, which was found by Hammer (2005), whose participants, young returnees, felt that “the country is less idealized, but still not a familiar place to return to” (p. 115). Hammer (2005) acknowledged that even if return is allowed, many Palestinians would not return to settle in Palestine.

## **D. Relationship to Others**

### ***1. Relationship with Syrians***

The majority of participants (27 participants; 75%) stated that they are very sorry for what is happening to the Syrians. A few participants were very frustrated at the negative image associated with Syrians in Lebanon. One third-generation Palestinian who has worked with Syrians voiced his anger over the beggars in Lebanon who pretend to be Syrians. The participant acknowledged that “I have worked with Syrians,

and I saw that those who are needy would never ask for anything unless there is someone in [their] family who is dying and he needs help urgently” (participant 6). In addition, the participant acknowledged that he is sympathetic towards Syrians because “they are carrying a part of the burden which we have carried, they are stopped at borders too, they hear the curses that we once heard” (participant 6). Other participants were sad for Syrians because of their displacement; one first-generation participant stated that he is sympathetic “because displacement is not easy at all. Those who leave their home become insecure” (participant 14). This shows the pain that this Palestinian is feeling mainly because he had been in the shoes of Syrians. In fact, many participants compared between the Syrian and the Palestinian wars, 16 of whom felt that the two cases are similar while 4 felt that the cases are different because they believed that the Syrian crisis was not caused by an external enemy like the case of Palestinians.

Participants whose attitudes ranged between unsympathetic and worried felt that Syrians are affecting the job opportunities available for Palestinians, which are already scarce. Other participants were more sympathetic towards Palestinian-Syrians because “they are just starting to suffer what we are suffering” (participant 2). Palestinians in Syria get many of their rights, unlike those in Lebanon, and that is why, when coming to Lebanon, they get “surprised by the indecent living conditions that we suffer from” (participant 2). In addition, Palestinian-Syrians do not have a government like the case of Syrians: “Syrian people have a government who adopts them and cares for them. But the Palestinian-Syrian has to prepare papers for his stay in Lebanon, and there are many expenses, and he can’t do this and he can’t do that” (participant 2). Furthermore,

Palestinian-Syrians are more unfortunate than Syrians because “once the war ends, [the latter] can go back to their country, but we cannot go back to our country” (participant 7). Thus, some participants drew an “us/them” boundary between Syrians (them) and Palestinian-Syrians (us).

This dichotomy between “us” and “them” was articulated by another participant who, despite being sympathetic towards Syrians, expressed her concern that

the work that we have been doing over the last 67 years was lost when Syrians came... They are not to blame, but we lost because the Palestinian cause in terms of numbers became a small part in the face of one million and 500 thousand Syrians, so I think that’s where the balance is difficult. How can we still speak of the cause, which is still very much a cause, to a government which is already seeing [it] as a catastrophe but they are not seeing it in the face of the bigger catastrophe? (participant 37)

Fabra-Mata et al. (2015) acknowledged that “the [Palestinian] refugee issue is only one (albeit an extremely large) challenge that Lebanon faces due to the conflict in Syria” (p. 4). Thus, some participants are worried about their status as Palestinians in Lebanon at a time when the country has its focus on the Syrian crisis.

The concern regarding the Syrian presence in Lebanon is related to Jacques Derrida’s concept of “hostipitality,” which links *hospitality* and *hostility*; hospitality is “parasitized by its opposite, ‘hostility’, the undesirable guest which it harbours as the self-contradiction within its own body” (Derrida, 2000, p. 3). Therefore, hostipitality depicts that welcoming is conditional; “to offer welcome is always already to have the

power to delimit the space or place that is being offered to the Other” (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2015, n.p.). That is why, Derrida argued that “perhaps no one welcomed is ever completely welcome” (p. 6). In his observation in Shatila camp, Klein (2014) noticed that the “intersection of...two marginalized refugee populations has produced new material struggles and conflicts of identity” (Klein, 2014, n.p.). Syrians are “trespassing on [Palestinians’] turf” (Klein, 2014, n.p.). They are overcrowding the camps and taking aid that is originally allocated for Palestinians. Klein argued that “shared material burdens, such as diminished living space and depleted supplies, can fuel rivalries between social groups” (n.p.). In addition, new hierarches emerged in these camps: there are Palestinians, Palestinian-Syrians, and Syrians, who are all perceived to be discriminated against. Although many of the participants in this study were not refugee camp residents, the unsympathetic attitudes of some is related to the same idea of Klein – they too drew boundaries between Palestinian-Syrians and Syrians. However, participants in this study are not the host. They are not Lebanese, and most of them are not refugee camp residents who are hosting Syrians. Rather, they are Palestinians who live in their own houses in Lebanese neighborhoods; yet, by making claims about Syrians and the consequences of their presence in Lebanon, for example by highlighting that they are taking jobs away from Palestinians, participants in this study are acting as if they are the host.

## ***2. Relationship with Lebanese People***

22 participants (59%) were aware of the negative image in Lebanese minds of Palestinians, especially because of their experiences. Some participants recalled that they met Lebanese Christians, in particular Maronites; the latter were surprised to learn that they are Palestinian *and educated*, as if this is an oxymoron; they seemed to associate Palestinians with “beards and weapons” (participant 1); accordingly, Lebanese people felt that “not even the way I look shows that I am Palestinian” (participant 2). These participants highlighted that Lebanese people had a stereotypical image of what Palestinians looked like. That is why, one participant stated that he usually tells some Lebanese people who perceive Palestinians negatively that “the Palestinian is not only the one you see in a refugee camp. The Palestinian is someone who was able to leave the camps and build his life. So I try to change this image of Palestinians” (participant 5). That is why, another participant felt that some Lebanese people “talk about Palestinians in a discriminatory way without awareness” (participant 11). Some participants even argued that some groups of Lebanese people who hate each other can become one hand against Palestinians. As one participant stated, “in Lebanon Palestinians are liked by Sunni Muslims when the latter are threatened or attacked by Shia Muslims. But when you ask Sunni Muslims to hire you, they will refuse” (participant 6). Other participants spoke of experiences when they felt unwanted in their neighborhoods. One participant recalled that in Sidon “we used to hear people telling us that...we should thank God that they are welcoming us in their city. That is why; sometimes I used to conceal my Palestinian identity” (participant 33). Thus, “Lebanese people think that Palestinians shouldn’t stay in Lebanon” (participant 31). These

experiences reflect one participant's acknowledgement that "the Lebanese identity itself is based on hatred towards Palestinians" (participant 11). This anti-Palestinian attitude was attributed by some participants to the civil war in Lebanon, in which the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was heavily involved between 1975 and 1982. One participant acknowledged that he, as a Palestinian, is still paying the price of the civil war (participant 4), but at the same time, Lebanon has "paid the highest price for the Palestinian cause" (participant 16). That is why, "Palestinians have a critical situation here in Lebanon...we were part of the war" (participant 6).

The remaining 15 participants (41%) did not draw any generalizations regarding Lebanese attitudes towards Palestinians. Some participants stated that "there are good people and bad people" (participant 7), because while some Lebanese people discriminate against Palestinians, others support them. One first-generation Palestinian even remembered when some Lebanese people, especially in the south, welcomed Palestinians when they left Palestine and offered them refuge when there were massacres in refugee camps. Because of this spectrum of Lebanese attitudes towards Palestinians in Lebanon, one participant stated that Lebanon is a "schizophrenic society" (participant 37) as some people have positive attitudes towards Palestinians and others have negative ones. For this participant, there is a discourse that incites fear in both Palestinians and Lebanese people. She acknowledged that Lebanese taxi drivers would not drop her near refugee camps but at the same time, Palestinian parents in refugee camps would not even allow their children to go to Hamra Street because they might be attacked or get "exposed to extreme discrimination" (participant 37). That is

why, “we have to find the dialogue or the discourse that makes people see the similarities and not the differences” (participant 37).

The above responses showed the generalizations that Lebanese people make about Palestinians. However, they also revealed that Palestinians make generalizations in their perceptions of their relationship with Lebanese people. In many places in Lebanon, Palestinians live, work, and marry among the Lebanese. The participants’ awareness of their negative image in Lebanese minds may have to do with the socioeconomic status of these participants and the environments in which they live. Their encounters with Lebanese people revealed that there is a stereotypical image of Palestinians in Lebanese minds. Eriksen (2010) acknowledged that in Copperbelt, Zambia,

[w]hen two individuals met for the first time, the first information they would gather about one another would be their ethnic membership. When this fact was established they would know roughly how to behave towards each other... The members of each group had particular notions about the vices and virtues of the others, and these notions were articulated and dramatized.... When such notions become part and parcel of the ‘cultural knowledge’ of a group and thus regularly and more or less predictably guide their relationships with others, we may describe them as ethnic stereotypes. (p. 28)

The above encounters highlight how much Lebanese people were guided by a specific ethnic stereotype. Stereotypes are usually “held by dominated groups as well as by dominating ones, and they are widespread in societies with significant power

differences as well as in societies where there is a rough power equilibrium between ethnic groups” (p. 29). For some Lebanese people, stereotypes help them “divide the social world into kinds of people, and they provide simple criteria for such a classification” (Eriksen, 2010, pp. 29-30). Thus, they “serve to justify thinking that ‘I am an X and not a Y’... stereotypes imply...the superiority of one’s own group” (Eriksen, 2010, p. 30). It can be said that some Lebanese people have xenophobia; “[x]enophobic reactions include fear of both migration and migrants as well as the belief that migrants bring with them culture and practices that challenge and threaten the fabric of the destination nation’s traditional way of life” (Cohen & Sirkeci, 2011, p. 1). This xenophobia may be rooted in economic, demographic, and racial attributes. The participants talked about their encounters not with any Lebanese people, but Maronites in particular. Maronites saw the Palestinians, who are mostly Muslims, as triggering the demographic balance in Lebanon. Sunni Muslims in Beirut even had trouble accepting other Lebanese people from the countryside; accordingly, Palestinians would not be treated differently. Therefore, the encounter with a specific religious group of Lebanese people can affect how Palestinians may be perceived and treated by this group.

Sfeir (2010) acknowledged that the xenophobia in Lebanon has become so widespread as to constitute an element of the Lebanese identity. She argued that “the refugee became...an essential element in the formation of Lebanese national identity because he or she reflected the anti-Lebanese identity” (p. 19). Because of the refugees, “the fragile Lebanese identity redefined itself in the context of the aftermath of 1948...as absolutely distinct from the Palestinian one” (Sfeir, 2010, p. 19). As a result, “Palestinians



[became] cast in the role of unwanted outsiders” (p. 29). That is why, some participants had experiences of being unwanted in some of the areas they live in.

It can be concluded that both Lebanese people and Palestinians “have built their identity on fear” (Sfeir, 2010, p. 31). Some Lebanese people perceive Palestinians negatively, and Palestinians are wary of this treatment. It cannot be denied that the civil war (1975-1990) that took place in Lebanon had a major role to play in the tensions between both groups, who are still paying the price of this war. As Allan (2014) acknowledged, in Lebanon, “Palestinians have been at once witnesses, perpetrators, and victims” (p. 11). Perhaps that is why, some participants believed that the treatment they get from their host can be attributed to the war.

#### **E. Language Matters**

The first part of the interview asked participants to tell a narrative about Palestine in order to examine the dialect they speak. It is important to note two points in this regard. First, participants were asked to rate their knowledge of PCA and the Lebanese dialect in the questionnaire. However, because language choice is in many cases unconscious, the researcher wanted to hear participants actually speak in Arabic without making this explicit to participants so that they don’t change their dialect. Second, the researcher’s conclusion of what dialect the participants speak can in no way be conclusive because not only is language use unconscious but it is also context- and interlocutor-dependent. Accordingly, it cannot be determined from the small text that the participants uttered what dialect they speak in general. This marks another limitation of the study. A study that focuses on language maintenance and that observes

participants in a natural setting and over a long period of time can get more accurate results regarding the extent to which Palestinians are maintaining their dialect. This aspect was not feasible for this study.

### **1. Brief Description of Palestinian Arabic**

Palestinian Arabic is a dialect of South Levantine Arabic – *Al-lahja al-Shamiah*. Generally speaking, it has three sub-groups: *urban* (madani), *rural* (fallahi), and *Bedouin* (badawi). One variation among the three subgroups is the pronunciation of the /q/ phoneme as /ʔ/ in the urban dialect, /k/ in the rural dialect, and /g/ in the Bedouin dialect. Palestinians who speak the rural dialect can also use [tʃ] instead of /k/. For example, instead of saying [ki:f] (how), they might say [tʃif]. Other characteristics of the Palestinian dialect include the rare use of imāla in a sentence. For example, Palestinians usually pronounce the word “rain” as [ʃita] whereas Lebanese people pronounce it with imāla as [ʃite] or [ʃiti].

### **2. Participants’ Language Use**

During the interview, 19 participants (51%) spoke PCA while 16 participants (43%) spoke Lebanese; only two code-switched between the two dialects. The most notable characteristic of the speech of those who spoke PCA was the lack of imālah in words such as *aklāt* (foods), which is pronounced with imālah as *akleit* in Lebanese. The speech of most participants corresponded to the Palestinian urban (madani) dialect, which is very close to other northern Levantine dialects, such as Lebanese. However, the eight first-generation Palestinians had distinctive features of the fallahi dialect. Some of these distinctive features include pronouncing the letter “ض” (symbol: d<sup>ʕ</sup>,

which is pronounced as an emphatic d) as “ظ” (symbol: z<sup>h</sup>, which is pronounced as an emphatic z). According to Isleem (2010), this is characteristic of Palestinian villages. Another feature was the use of /g/ instead of /q/ in words such as *baqder* (بقدر) “I can,” which was pronounced as *bagdar* by a first-generation female participant. First generation participants also used the Palestinian form of negation. In Palestinian Arabic, negation is used through the [ʃ] suffix at the end of the verb, such as *ma kanf* (ما كنتش), as in there wasn’t...).

### **3. Language Maintenance**

In this section, language maintenance refers to the extent to which the Palestinian dialect was used. It is important to note that because participants were not observed over a long period of time, it is not possible to reach a definitive conclusion regarding whether the Palestinian dialect was maintained. As Gibbons and Ramirez (2004) argued, maintenance of minority languages “is not a simple yes–no polar issue...A more nuanced understanding of minority language maintenance and shift requires the examination of the degree of acquisition of various elements of proficiency, including spoken language, basic literacy skills, grammar and high register” (p. 1). However, it is worth examining what language the participants spoke along with their characteristics, which can be important factors in language maintenance, as the latter “is neither an isolated process nor exists in absolute terms. Rather it influences and is influenced by the various factors that immigrant families encounter in their acculturation process in the host country” (Zhang, 2008, p. 3). That is why; the characteristics of participants were analyzed to determine whether they are statistically

significant factors in language maintenance. Table 6 shows the results of this statistical analysis.

Table 6  
*Statistically Significant Factors in Language Maintenance*

		Total	PCA	Other	p-value
<b>Demographic Information</b>					
Birthplace	Lebanon	22 (59%)	7 (32%)	15 (68%)	.004*
	Palestine	8 (22%)	8 (100%)	0 (0%)	
	Other	7 (19%)	4 (57%)	3 (43%)	
Immigrant Generation	1 <sup>st</sup> Generation	8 (21.62%)	8 (100%)	0 (0%)	.000*
	2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation	18 (48.65%)	10 (56%)	8 (44%)	
	3 <sup>rd</sup> Generation	11 (29.73%)	1 (9%)	10 (91%)	
<b>Residence</b>					
Duration of Stay in Lebanon	(Number of Years)				.008*
<b>SES</b>					
Annual Family Income	Average or above average	25 (68%)	10 (40%)	15 (60%)	.046*
	Below Average	12 (32%)	9 (75%)	3 (25%)	
<b>Education</b>					
Educational Level	University Level	22 (59%)	8 (36%)	14 (64%)	.027*
	School Level	15 (41%)	11 (73%)	4 (27%)	
Occupation	Office Work	15 (41%)	5 (33%)	10 (67%)	.028*
	Non-Office Work	9 (24%)	8 (89%)	1 (11%)	
	Other	13 (35%)	6 (46%)	7 (54%)	
<b>Marital Status</b>					
Single or Married/Nationality of Spouse	Single	13 (35%)	4 (31%)	9 (69%)	.000*
	Palestinian Spouse	16 (43%)	14 (87.5%)	2 (12.5%)	
	Lebanese or Syrian Spouse	8 (22%)	1 (12.5%)	7 (87.5%)	
<b>Language Use</b>					
Using PCA with Family Members	No	11 (30%)	2 (18%)	9 (82%)	.009*
	Yes	26 (70%)	17 (65%)	9 (35%)	
Using PCA with Friends or Neighbors	No	24 (65%)	6 (25%)	18 (75%)	.000*
	Yes	13 (35%)	13 (100%)	0 (0%)	
Pride in Dialect	No	14 (38%)	4 (29%)	10 (71%)	.031*
	Yes	23 (62%)	15 (65%)	8 (35%)	

\*significant at  $p < 0.05$

Appendix O includes the entire table, which shows the statistical analysis of all the characteristics of participants in relation to language maintenance. The above table

shows only the factors which were statistically significant in language maintenance. The following factors were shown to be not significant: sex, place of origin, place of residence in Lebanon, residence abroad, citizenship, social class, school attended, and foreign language. As mentioned in the section about self-identification, it should be emphasized that the participant pool is too small to come up with statistically significant results.

#### ***4. Statistically Significant Factors in Language Maintenance***

##### **a. Immigrant Generation**

Results showed that maintenance of PCA reached 100% among first-generation participants, 56% among second-generation participants, and 9% among third-generation participants. Research showed that “language shift is a much more common phenomenon among immigrant children than language maintenance” (Fishman 1966; Portes & Rumbaut 2001 as cited in Zhang, 2008, p. 1). That is because younger generations “may be more integrated into the host societies...” (Hammer, 2005, p. 18). That is why, language maintenance “is generally described as a three-generation process” (Fishman 1966; Veltman 1983 as cited in Zhang, 2008, p. 10). One model that can explain this result is the assimilation model, which “implies pronounced generational effects; first-generation families are expected to be patently distinct, second-generation ones less so, and so forth” (Gratton et al., 2007, p. 2). This is in line with the three-generation model of language shift, which was proposed by Fishman (1972) and Veltman (1983), in which “the immigrant generation continues to speak their native language; the second generation becomes bilingual...; [and] the third

generation learns only [the dominant language]” (Ortman & Stevens, 2008, p. 3). Thus, knowledge of the native language by the third-generation becomes “fragmentary at best” (Alba & Nee, 2003, p. 219). Even though this model is in line with the results of this study, it applies more to situations where the native and host languages are quite different, which is not the case between PCA and Lebanese, both of which belong to the Eastern Mediterranean dialect of Arabic that is distinct from North African, Gulf, or Egyptian varieties.

Another theory that can explain this shift across immigrant generations is “intergroup social dependency,” which was proposed by Fishman (1989). He argued that language shift may occur because the immigrant group will soon have to use the dominant language of the host society for survival. Eventually, the dominant language starts to be used at home; “what begins as the language of social and economic mobility ends, within three generations or so, as the language of the crib as well” (p. 206).

#### b. Marriage: Nationality of Spouse

Among the 24 married participants, 87.5% of them with a Palestinian spouse spoke PCA while only 12.5% of those married to a Lebanese spouse spoke PCA. This could mean that marrying a Palestinian and speaking PCA with them can maintain the language at home, while marrying a Lebanese spouse may indirectly lead to speaking Lebanese regularly at home. This is in line with the results of Chryssis (2007), who found that Palestinians in the US marry other Palestinians to preserve their national identity and Arabic language.

### c. Using PCA with Others

Using PCA with family members and friends or neighbors was also statistically significant in maintaining PCA. Out of the 26 participants who speak PCA with at least one family member, 17 (65%) spoke PCA during the interview. However, what is interesting is that nine participants (35%) speak PCA with at least one family member even though they did not speak PCA during the interview. This may suggest that they are maintaining PCA by speaking it at home. However, it also raises the question that the behavior belies the self-perception. Regarding language use with friends or neighbors, all 13 participants who stated that they speak PCA with friends or neighbors also spoke it during the interview, suggesting that they do not change their dialect when they are interacting with others outside their immediate environment.

### d. Birthplace

Birthplace was also an important factor in language maintenance. All first-generation participants who were born in Palestine spoke PCA, while 32% of those who were born in Lebanon spoke it. Participants were asked about birthplace based on Bitar's (2009) study, in which he argued that "the relationship between location and language is important in terms of issues of competency and attitude" (p. 58). Because first-generation Palestinians are still attached to Palestine, they are attached to its language and still speak PCA after 68 years of displacement.

### e. Duration of Stay in Lebanon

Some of the factors that can affect language maintenance are the "duration of contact, frequency of contact and pressures of contact with an/other language/s derived from economic, administrative, cultural, political, military, historical, religious, or

demographic sources” (Jebejian, 2010, p. 456). Among the 32 participants who have lived in Lebanon for the majority of their lives, those who spoke PCA (56%) are more than those who spoke Lebanese (44%). Thus, even though for some participants the duration of contact was very lengthy, language maintenance still took place.

#### f. Annual Family Income

The table showed that annual family income was inversely related to language maintenance. 40% of participants with a higher annual family income spoke PCA while 75% of those with a lower family income spoke it. Sun (1999) argued that among the factors that are related to language maintenance is Socioeconomic Status (SES). This relationship is based on the extent to which the use of the native language is advantageous to the minority group. For example, in her study of the linguistic situation of Arabic in Palestine, Kittaneh (2009) found that even though Palestinians had positive attitudes towards Arabic for affective reasons, they also had positive attitudes towards Hebrew because of its prestige and socio-economic benefits. In their study on the linguistic situation among Armenians, Vietnamese, and Mexican families in the US, Phinney, Romero, Nava, and Huang (2001) found that those with a higher socio-economic status did not exert much effort to maintain their language.

#### g. Educational Level and Job Type

Among participants with a university-level education, only 36% spoke PCA while 73% of those with a school level education spoke PCA. In addition, only 33% of those with office work spoke PCA while 89% with non-office work spoke PCA. This finding is in line with the finding of Al-Khatib and Al-Ali (2010) that among the Kurds



of Jordan, “the limited schooling group of respondents is more loyal to their language (Kurdish) than both the highly educated and the moderately educated groups” (p. 25). The researchers explained this result by stating that those with limited schooling, “by virtue of the type of jobs they hold, neither have access to the social life in the country nor are given the opportunity, unlike their educated counterparts, to have daily contact with the majority community” (p. 25). In addition, it may be the case that low-level job holders do not feel the need to shift to Lebanese because it does not have any return for them.

#### h. Pride in Dialect

Unsurprisingly, many of the participants who were proud of their dialect also used PCA during the interview. Accordingly, because they have a positive attitude towards it and are proud of it, they use it. This is unlike the results found by Tannenbaum and Berkovich (2005), who showed that the pride of immigrant adolescents coming from the USSR to Israel in their L1 does not necessarily lead to speaking and maintaining it. Interestingly, the majority (71%) of those who stated that they were not proud of their dialect do not speak PCA, suggesting that they are not proud of their Lebanese dialect.

#### ***5. Participants’ Beliefs Regarding Language Maintenance***

In addition to examining their language use, participants were asked how they maintain their language. Some participants stated that they maintain it by speaking it with other Palestinians, particularly family members. However, there are some participants who acknowledged that they may not be able to maintain their dialect for a

variety of reasons. One participant stated that “our generation cannot really maintain the dialect because only older people speak it” (participant 2). Other participants argued that maintaining their dialect is difficult because they are surrounded by the Lebanese dialect. Gibbons and Ramirez (2004) acknowledged that the family allows “children [to] develop a domestic variety of the minority language, [however] the lack of a place for it outside the home and community may mean that the children have little opportunity to develop aspects of the language” (p. 4). Yet, their frequent use of the more dominant language in public spaces “may lack an intimate or domestic register” (p. 4).

Despite their awareness of the hindrances to language maintenance, the majority of participants (78%) acknowledged that they would like other Palestinians in Lebanon to maintain their dialect. One participant argued that “this maintaining is something stronger than you imagine...it’s very hard to deny and to fake your language or identity” (participant 4). Similarly, another participant wondered “if we didn’t maintain the dialect, who will? So I guess we are supposed to maintain it, it is not necessary that we speak perfect PCA all the time, but we can try to speak it” (participant 30). In fact, trying to speak at least a few words in PCA is important for one participant who hates it “when someone changes his dialect...I know how to speak Lebanese but it is not nice to deny your identity” (participant 6). Yet, some participants felt differently, as one participant stated that “if [Palestinians] were talking to Lebanese people, it is better for them to speak Lebanese” (participant 19). Other participants acknowledged that language maintenance is not important as “there are Palestinians living outside refugee

camps and they speak Lebanese, but this does not really mean that they do not have a national sense of belonging... but they...had to fit into [the Lebanese] environment” (participant 12).

Participants were asked whether they would attempt to transfer the dialect to their children. Some of them did not believe that language is what should be transferred to their children but rather their knowledge about Palestine. One participant stated that

If my son chose to speak the language of the Gulf, then I don't mind. It's not that if we forget the language, we lose Palestine. This is not the equation. I think that if we forget Palestine, we will lose Palestine. For us, the third generation, we live with the first generation, but our sons won't live this experience and...they won't listen to narratives from their first-generation grandmother, because she would be my mother who was born in Lebanon. It's a critical point; this is where we have to make efforts...to teach our children about Palestine, the mission is not easy, but at this level, I think Palestinians somehow succeeded in that because they know how to teach their children about Palestine...

(participant 4)

This reflects one participant's acknowledgement that it is important for his children not to speak Palestinian but rather to “know that they are Palestinian” (participant 5). This challenges the close link between language and identity that the literature has posited (Fichte, 1968; Padilla, 1999; Schneider, 2007; Tabouret-Keller, 1985).

Yet, many participants (78%) admitted that they want their children to preserve their mother language. In language maintenance, there is a phase called “resurgence.”

Abd-el-Jawad (2006) found that in the case of Circassian language in Jordan, “many Circassians... express a wish that their children speak the language” (p. 62). This is also true of the heritage language learners in the US, among them are many Arabs in Michigan and Ohio.

## **6. Attitudes towards PCA**

“Language maintenance is a multifaceted concept. It may refer to the actual use of a minority language as well as to immigrants’ attitudes towards it...” (Tannenbaum, 2003 as cited in Tannenbaum & Berkovich, 2005, p. 291). That is why, participants were asked about their attitudes towards their dialect.

### a. Pride in Dialect

Asked whether they are proud of their dialect, 14 participants (38%), 10 of whom spoke Lebanese while four spoke PCA, responded in the negative. For some of these participants, it was not a matter of pride as much as it was a matter of comfort in speaking their tongue. As one PCA speaker articulated:

Do I identify with being Palestinian? Yes I do, and speaking the dialect translates into that. I enjoy the fact that I speak differently from others, I don’t mind it; I think it’s important to have that. If you mean that I need to lower down my dialect because I am surrounded by a certain group, then no. It’s not a sense of pride; it’s just comfortable speaking with my own dialect in a non-Palestinian community. (participant 3)

On the other hand, 23 participants (62%), 15 of whom spoke PCA, stated that they are proud of their dialect. One of the Lebanese speakers was proud of her “distorted

Palestinian dialect” (participant 31); that is why, some Lebanese speakers wanted to learn the Palestinian dialect “properly because it is nice to speak the dialect of your homeland” (participant 2). Those who were proud of their Palestinian spoken dialect were also proud that they are Palestinian. For them, because they are Palestinian, they should speak their dialect. One participant expressed that “I really get annoyed when people other than Lebanese speak the Lebanese dialect” (participant 11). That is why, one participant made a conscious decision to speak PCA and avoid speaking Lebanese:

I’ve been [told] that I was born here and I’ve lived here, and yet I still speak Palestinian. I am proud of being Palestinian and of choosing to...speak Palestinian. It’s not hard at all to speak Lebanese for me..., but why [should I speak it]? I am Palestinian, I fight for my identity and language is a big part of my identity. (participant 4)

Being proud of their dialect and fighting for it corresponds to what Dorian (1999) claimed about groups who speak a minority language: “[t]he more subjugation they have experienced, the more determined they may be to keep to themselves what is left of their own culture, including their language” (p. 26). In fact, one participant stated that “the treatment that we get from [the host society] attracts us be more Palestinian – it is a reaction” (participant 26). That is why, this participant fights for his identity and language. Yet, one PCA speaker also speaks a few Lebanese words because this shows that “I have my identity but at the same time I am trying to fit in” (participant 28).

#### b. Factors Affecting Pride in Dialect

Table 7

*Statistically Significant Factors in Pride in Dialect*

		Total	Proud	Not Proud	p-value
<b>Demographic Information</b>					
Birthplace	Lebanon	22 (59%)	10 (45%)	12 (55%)	.021*
	Palestine	8 (22%)	8 (100%)	0 (0%)	
	Other	7 (19%)	5 (71%)	2 (29%)	
Immigrant Generation	1 <sup>st</sup> Generation	8 (21.62%)	8 (100%)	0 (0%)	.043*
	2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation	18 (48.65%)	9 (50%)	9 (50%)	
	3 <sup>rd</sup> Generation	11 (29.73%)	6 (55%)	5 (45%)	
<b>Language Use</b>					
Using PCA with Family Members	No	11 (30%)	4 (36%)	7 (64%)	.035*
	Yes	26 (70%)	19 (73%)	7 (27%)	
Using PCA with Friends or Neighbors	No	24 (65%)	11 (46%)	13 (54%)	.005*
	Yes	13 (35%)	12 (92%)	1 (8%)	

\*significant at  $p < 0.05$

Appendix P includes the entire table, which shows the statistical analysis of all the characteristics of participants in relation to pride in dialect. The above table shows only the factors which were statistically significant. Statistical analysis showed that the following factors were not statistically significant: sex, place of origin, place of residence in Lebanon, duration of stay in Lebanon, residence abroad, citizenship, annual family income, social class, school attended, educational level, occupation, nationality of spouse, and foreign language. Regarding the statistically significant factors, birthplace and immigrant generation were important, as all first-generation participants who were born in Palestine were proud of their dialect. This pride decreases across generations: 9 out of the 18 second-generation participants (50%) and 6 out of the 11 third-generation participants (55%) were proud of their dialect. This decrease should not be taken as a negative result; only one third-generation participant spoke PCA during the interview and others did not. The fact that 45% of third-generation participants are not proud of their dialect means that they are not proud of the Lebanese dialect that they

use. Not surprisingly, 73% of participants who use PCA with family members were also proud of this dialect; and 92% of those who use PCA with friends or neighbors were proud of PCA, thus using it with others outside home.

### ***7. The Need to Hide the Palestinian Dialect***

Participants were asked whether they may need to hide their Palestinian dialect in certain situations such as a job interview. Out of the 19 participants who spoke PCA, 16 (84%) stated that they would not change their Palestinian dialect in any context. One participant even stated that he would immediately tell his potential employer that he is Palestinian “so if you want to hire me do so, otherwise don’t point out that I am Palestinian later and make issues about it” (participant 1). Because of these “issues,” one participant, a university professor, acknowledged that even though she herself would not change her dialect, she understands “why some people wouldn’t speak PCA because they don’t have the option. For me, I have the option not to work somewhere that would judge me on that basis...” (participant 37).

Perhaps that is why, three Palestinian speakers stated that they would change their dialect in a job interview, especially if they feel that it “can affect [their] job prospects” (participant 17). They stated that if they are applying to a Lebanese company, they would change their Palestinian dialect. Yet, these participants realized that even if they change their dialect, “you will reach a place where you get accepted and then they ask you for your ID, which would reveal that you are Palestinian; and this actually happened with me” (participant 30). Turki (1975-6) acknowledged that Palestinians adapt “their inner sense of Palestinianness to the socio-economically

appropriate; concealing, burying or blocking the true expression of the self” (p. 84). This is what is called speech mobility, “whereby speakers select from their repertoire according to perceptions of situational constraints and demands” (Edwards, 2009, p. 27). Thus, speech variation occurs because of “one’s assessment of the social context and of what is or is not ‘appropriate’” (Edwards, 2009, p. 27).

## ***8. Expressions of Palestinianness through Language***

### **a. Being Palestinian, Speaking Palestinian**

Participants were asked whether it is necessary to speak Palestinian in order to be Palestinian. A few participants believed that it is necessary because “there are political goals to repress our identity...” (participant 9). However, the majority of participants (31 participants; 84%) stated that it is not necessary to speak PCA. The main argument was that “if you don’t speak Palestinian, it does not mean that you are less Palestinian, and if you do speak Palestinian, this does not mean that you are more Palestinian” (participant 3). Other markers of Palestinianness include: (1) identifying as Palestinian (participant 33); (2) “having a sense of belonging and a sense that you want to advocate for a cause or go out of your way to make a statement” (participant 37); (3) sympathizing with other Palestinians and “providing them with the services that I can offer as an activist” (participant 2); (4) participating in “everything related to the memory of the Nakba...[and in] everything that symbolizes the Palestinian cause and the right of return” (participant 2); (5) participating in protests and “encourag[ing] my kids to do so” (participant 2); (6) being Palestinian in “blood, mind, and education” (participant 7); (7) knowing and being passionate “about your origin and



[acknowledging] where and how it is developed over time, and what role you can do to help with the Palestinian situation” (participant 28); (8) keeping “the Palestinian cause...alive within us” (participant 31); and (9) maintaining the Palestinian cultural heritage (participant 36).

**b. Expressing the Palestinian Identity through PCA and MSA**

Participants were also asked whether PCA and MSA are the best expression of their Palestinian roots, which corresponds to the third research question. Twenty-three participants (62%), 13 of whom spoke PCA during the interview, perceived PCA as the best expression of their roots. For one of these participants, “the dialect should not be forgotten. Everything was forgotten; they also want to make us forget the dialect?!” (participant 12) Other participants felt that the dialect is the only reflection of their identity: “How else could I come to express myself as a Palestinian, through wearing Keffiyeh or national clothing? But I don’t really wear that, [and] we don’t have many events. So for me it’s language” (participant 28). Articulating these words, one participant stated that “there is nothing else that shows that I am Palestinian, especially because I do not have a Palestinian ID card. So sometimes I have to intentionally speak PCA to show that I am Palestinian” (participant 33).

The other 14 participants (38%) believed that PCA may not be the best expression of their identity. Among the identity markers that the participants mentioned are the following: (1) cooking Palestinian foods; (2) preparing campaigns that aim at making people aware of the Palestinian cause through highlighting that “Palestine is ours and not theirs” (participant 29); (3) knowing more about the history of Palestine;

(4) setting up discussion groups which can suggest possible solutions to the problems faced by Palestinians in refugee camps; (5) displaying visual symbols such as “a tattoo I draw on my arm or a necklace I wear ...” (participant 4); (6) maintaining a sense of belonging to Palestine; and (7) maintaining connections and solidarity with the Palestinian community, especially in the camps, which “are the basis for the bond among Palestinians. If there are no camps, there is no Palestine...The houses in refugee camps are themselves a marker of Palestinianness” (participant 1). One participant argued that even though the dialect may show that she is Palestinian, she believes that

one’s ideas are a better marker that he is Palestinian. When someone is stateless, or in my case, I have two nationalities [American-Jordanian] but I do not have a sense of belonging to any of them, I feel that this marks the Palestinian identity more than the dialect itself. (participant 11)

Said (1999) argued that language is important “in the Palestinian context given that the territorial foundation of Palestinian culture is absent and only language can function as the ground for the cohesion of Palestinians, both in the diaspora and in the homeland” (as cited in Bitar, 2011, p. 57). That is why, for Al-Husri, “[l]anguage is more valuable than territory” (as cited in Suleiman, 1994, pp. 13-14). Because of the importance of language, many participants perceived it as the best expression of their roots. Similar to these results, Bitar found that 71.79% of his participants perceived PCA as the most important affirmation of their identity. However, for some participants in this study, language is not necessarily the *best* or the *only* expression of their identity. Therefore, language is “one of an almost infinite

variety of potential identity markers, it is easily replaced by other markers that are just as effective” (Dorian, 1999, p. 31).

Regarding MSA, 23 participants (62%) did not believe that MSA expresses their Palestinian roots, with 10 of them stating that it only expresses their Arab roots. Around 8% of participants were not sure about this. For 11 participants (30%) MSA does express their Palestinian roots. One first-generation participant acknowledged that this is because in the village, Palestinians speak the rural dialect, but “in the city, Palestinians speak MSA” (participant 8), and that is why, MSA is relevant to the Palestinian roots. For other participants, MSA is important for Palestinians because they “are originally Arabs” (participant 35). Two participants acknowledged that MSA expresses their identity because it is very close to PCA. Bitar’s (2009) participants also “asserted that the Palestinian dialect is closest to [MSA]...” (p. 64).

### c. Maintaining the Palestinian Cultural Heritage through PCA and MSA

Twenty-three participants (62%) agreed that maintaining PCA is important for maintaining the Palestinian cultural heritage. One of these participants argued that because this is the case, “we should really transfer this dialect to younger generations... even if some day they kick us out of the camp, we have to keep speaking the dialect, like Armenians who only use the Armenian language when speaking with each other” (participant 1). Another participant acknowledged that “there are lots of poems, songs, folklore and music which use the Palestinian dialect, so if we use any other dialect in our folklore, we abandon the Palestinian cultural heritage” (participant 9). In fact, Al-Husri acknowledged that “language constitutes a holding tank in which a people’s

heritage, history, literary works, poetry, music and songs, and folklore are maintained and passed down from the older to the younger generations” (as cited in Suleiman, 1994, pp. 13-14). However, as one participant stated, “we as the third generation don’t really know that much about the Palestinian culture. I know some foods and some narratives from my grandmother, so what I still have is the dialect” (participant 33). However, six participants stated that even though PCA is important for maintaining the cultural heritage, they stated that there are other ways that Palestinians can maintain it, such as paying attention “to literature, artwork, and history” (participant 17). Other six participants did not believe that PCA plays any role in maintaining the Palestinian cultural heritage. One of them stated that “there are people abroad who are Palestinian in origin and who do not speak PCA, but they preserve their cultural heritage more than those who speak PCA” (participant 19). Perhaps that is why, the remaining two participants were not sure about the relationship between PCA and the Palestinian cultural heritage.

Regarding MSA, 14 participants (38%) did not believe that there is any relationship between MSA and the Palestinian cultural heritage while 17 participants (46%) stated that MSA is important for this purpose. One of the participants acknowledged that “Palestinians are stronger in MSA than the Lebanese, so MSA may be related to Palestinians...” (participant 33). However, the remaining participants acknowledged that, just like PCA, MSA is just one element of the cultural heritage.

## **F. Preserving National Identity**

### ***1. Narrative Memory: A “Socially Tailored Image” of Palestinians***

We live by stories, we also live in them. One way or another we are living the stories planted in us early or along the way, or we are also living the stories we planted—knowingly or unknowingly—in ourselves. We live stories that either give our lives meaning or negate it with meaninglessness. If we change the stories we live by, quite possibly we change our lives. (Okri, 1998, p. 46)

In his poem, “We Travel Like Other People,” Mahmoud Darwish (1984) stated that Palestinians have a *country of words* as they lack an official state; this country of words “and narratives may allow Palestinians to continue feeling Palestinian in diaspora” (Mavroudi, 2007, p. 397). Many studies examined the degree to which immigrants and refugees maintain their connection to their homeland by preserving their identity, collective memory, cultural heritage, and language in their host society (Burrell, 2006; Danforth & van Boeschoten, 2012; Fortier, 2000; Hervieu-Leger, 2000;). This is because a sense of belonging among community members

is nestled within a collective understanding of a common past, and collective memories can be defined as identity narratives which merge ‘actual’ and ‘mythical’ past events with the aim of inscribing the group in a historical and spatial trajectory. As such, collective memories delineate the ‘when’, the ‘who’ and the ‘where’ of the group as it is consolidated and reproduced over time...

(Lacroix & Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2013, p. 685)

This corresponds to the psychology of action, which was suggested by French psychiatrist Pierre Janet (1919/1925). He argued that “[m]emory is an action:

essentially, it is the action of telling a story” (Janet, 1925, p. 661). Janet described this active form of memory as “narrative memory,” which is “a socially tailored image of the community” (Lacroix & Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2013, p. 685). He believed that when individuals have traumatic experiences, they continue the action of memory, “which began when the [trauma] happened; and they exhaust themselves in these everlasting recommencements” (Janet, 1925, p. 663). This is called melancholia (Freud, 1991 [1917], p. 253); “the loss that may trigger the melancholia is not necessarily a death, or total loss, but something like the loss of one’s country” (Bresheeth, 2007, p. 162). Through narratives, the loss of Palestine “continues, gets fixated, cannot be mourned and done with, as in the case of death. The loss of one’s country *never ends*” (p. 162).

That is why, perhaps the most interesting of the narratives were told by first-generation participants who witnessed the Nakba. Some participants even had visual symbols of their national identity. For example, in one first-generation participant’s house in Burj El Barajneh camp, a map of Palestine was hung (Appendix Q), and above the door of the kitchen, a key of the participant’s childhood house in Palestine was hung (Appendix R). The participant stated that “we took our keys and fed our chickens and left because we thought we were returning” (participant 7). According to another first-generation participant, “we heard that we have to leave the country for about two weeks until things get better. But they conspired against us and sold the country” (participant 36). One of the participants stated that he was given the key to his father’s house by his uncle. This participant understood the message behind his inheritance of the key: “It is true that we have been living in this country for a long time, but Palestine remains our

country” (participant 14). The keys of the childhood houses of Palestinians are perhaps their only trace of home. Lindholm Schulz (2003) stated that an “important symbol linking Palestinians with their past and their hoped-for future is the keys to their former homes. Many refugees have kept their keys as a symbol of the hope of return” (p. 205). Not only do they keep their keys, but Palestinians also give them to the younger generation. Lindholm Schulz (2003) stated that “[a]s the first generation came to realise that maybe they were not going back after all, then it was the children who would come home” (p. 205).

The narratives told by first-generation participants were characterized by a deep sense of lamentation of the lost land and the dark present and future. Participant 7 lamented the days when he “used to live in...dignity” and when he had “many lands.” But since 1948, “we have been living in extremely difficult conditions because of the injustice. Animals live better than us in this camp, where the sun doesn’t reach the houses” (participant 7). He lamented the past and the present by reciting a verse of a poem by Iraqi poet Kazem Ismail El-Kate<sup>2</sup> entitled (اللي مضيع ذهب), meaning “that who lost gold”). This verse mainly focuses on the pain of immigration. It can be translated as: “if gold is lost, it can eventually be found in the gold market and if a lover is lost, s/he will eventually be forgotten, but if a homeland is lost, where will it be found?”

It seems that participant 7 is producing “the past through a dynamic engagement with the present” (Matar, 2011, p. 9). In her book, Matar (2011) noted that narratives

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اللي مضيع ذهب.. بسوگ الذهب يلگاه<sup>2</sup>  
واللي يفارگ محب .. يمكن سنة وينساه  
بس البضيع وطن .. وين الوطن يلگاه

highlighted that the “Palestinian sense of displacement was not the result of one specific event, but an ongoing process, continuing into the present” (p. 12). Participant 7 highlighted this continuing state of the Nakba, as he did not only talk about what happened in 1948, but also about what is still happening as a result of the Nakba. Matar (2011) stated that “praise and memory of the lost paradise from which Palestinians were expelled, lamentation of the present and depiction of the imagined return... have become the foundations for...collective memories that have shaped Palestinian popular and nationalist discourses” (p. 25).

#### a. Narratives Passed on to the Younger Generation

The (Israeli) occupation (of Palestine) has created generations of Palestinians who are strangers to Palestine, generations who are familiar with every alleyway of their places of exile, but who are ignorant of their homeland [...] These generations are condemned to love an unseen lover, a distant, difficult lover separated from them by guards and fences and sleek terror. The [Israeli] occupation has transformed us from the sons of Palestine into the sons of the idea of Palestine. (Al-Barghouti, 1998, pp.60-61)

The younger generation was also asked about the narratives they heard from their grandparents or from other first-generation Palestinians. Most of them recalled the displacement experiences as told by their grandparents. In his study on Algerian Harkis<sup>3</sup> in France, Crapanzano (2011) found that the wound of displacement is passed on to

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<sup>3</sup> “Harki” is from the adjective in Arabic *harka*, which means war party. It refers to “an Algerian and his immediate family who sided with the French during the war of independence and served as an auxiliary... in the French army” (Crapanzano, 2011, p. xi).



younger generation who did not experience the trauma. This is what has been described as “post-memory” (Hirsch, 2008). Post-memory “describes the relationship of the second generation to powerful, often traumatic, experiences that preceded their births but that were nevertheless transmitted to them so deeply as to seem to constitute memories in their own right” (p. 103). Hirsch (2001) described post-memory as a “retrospective witnessing by adoption” (p. 10); “[i]t is a question of adopting the traumatic experiences—and thus also the memories—of others as experiences one might oneself have had, and of inscribing them into one’s own life story” (pp.10-11). Hoffman (2004) described the carriers of the post-memory as the “hinge-generation” (Hoffman, 2004, p. xv). The term hinge is interesting; it is as if memory – or post-memory – connects “the past and the present, the story of the father and the story of the son” (Hirsch, 1992-1993, p. 8).

## ***2. Marriage***

In this study, all eight first-generation participants were married to Palestinians, who they got to know in Palestine. Only one first-generation man has never been married. Out of the remaining 29 participants, 25 (86%) stated that they do (or did) not make an effort to marry Palestinians. Some of these participants acknowledged that even though they don’t mind the nationality of the spouse, they do have an important criterion for any partner: s/he has “to be among the 50% who are with the cause” (participant 37), or s/he has “to identify with Palestinians in any way” (participant 28). One participant stated that she married her Palestinian husband by chance; however, she was raised on the saying that those who marry from outside their group will suffer.

The remaining four participants acknowledged that they wanted to marry a Palestinian. One participant recalled that when he first met his future wife, she identified herself as Lebanese to him; however, once he knew her family name, he was certain that she is Palestinian. “Then I asked her why she denies her Palestinian origin. She said that once [people] know that you are Palestinian, they get annoyed” (participant 16). This participant’s desire to marry a Palestinian partner was because he has always heard people blaming Lebanese men who marry Palestinian women; the blame especially comes from people of Beirut “who cannot stand us” (participant 16). Because of this hatred, he felt that it is his duty to marry “someone from my own country” (participant 16). He also wanted to marry a Palestinian because she would know more about traditions.

Internal marriage, or marrying a Palestinian, can maintain a strong sense of a Palestinian national identity among the family (Chryssis, 2007). However, as Hammer (2005) argued, “exile has changed patterns in choosing a spouse” (p. 211). Palestinians living in a tightly-knit Palestinian community such as a refugee camp might marry from this community. However, for Palestinians who live outside refugee camps, “there are more possibilities to meet people outside the traditional social circle” (pp. 211-212). Yet, marrying into a Lebanese family may prove problematic for Palestinians. As the participant discussed above claimed, people may blame Lebanese men who marry Palestinians. Klaus (2003) argued that “a widespread inability of middle-class Palestinians to prove themselves respectable became an issue in attempted intermarriage with Lebanese” (p. 168). She acknowledged that although there are some Palestinians

and Lebanese people with similar confessional backgrounds, Palestinians do “not display an equally prominent *local* range of reputation” (p. 168). In some cases, Palestinian women who marry into Lebanese families are perceived as “aspiring arrivistes” (Klaus, 2003, p. 168). In the interviews she conducted with Palestinian women in Lebanon, Klaus found that these women “admitted to great difficulties becoming accepted into their husband’s families at the beginning. They all felt stigmatized as not belonging to one of the well-known Beirut Sunni families” (p. 170). Klaus concluded that “[t]he acceptance of Palestinians as in-laws thus depended on whether they were seen as people with whom one shared similar interests and characteristics or as strangers with obscure origins and alien habits” (p. 168). Because of these problems, some participants in this study prefer to marry Palestinians. Doing so can also ensure that the children will know more about the Palestinian culture than they would if they had a Lebanese parent. Cainkar (1990) argued that “most immigrant Palestinian men think Palestinian-American women are ... unable adequately to pass on Palestinian culture and language to their children” (p. 59). For this participant, a Lebanese wife would not transfer knowledge about Palestine to the children and that is why he wished to marry a Palestinian.

#### a. Narratives of Continuity

Participants were also asked whether they speak (or would speak) to their children about Palestine. All participants except for one stated that they (would) do so. Some participants tell their children about Palestine because of their curiosity about “why we are here and why we cannot return” (participant 12). For some participants, it

is their role as Palestinians to tell their children about Palestine because it is “above all... a humane issue” (participant 3) and “it is part of our identity and I think it is important to maintain your identity, and that is not to lose your roots and to respect them” (participant 3). One of the participants talked about how his friends in Shatila camp put the Palestinian flag on their babies; kids in the camp also hold knives, but while this is seen as a sign of terrorism by outsiders, the message is actually “that [children] will always carry on with the resistance. This is a symbol that has been inherited” (participant 6). Because this participant lives in Shatila camp, he grew up learning about Palestine not only at home, but also at school, where he was told to ask his parents about his origin in Palestine and the characteristics of the place they came from. At school, this participant recalled that every morning, “there was a statement that we swore by that basically said that Palestine is our country and that we will not forget it” (participant 6).

Other participants were concerned about their children growing up as non-Palestinians. One female participant who is married to a Lebanese man stated that she is going through a dilemma because she knows that her children will be Lebanese like their father “but they need to be on my side. But I would tell them about Palestine, and I would make sure that they speak my dialect” (participant 32). Another participant stated that even though she talks to her son about Palestine, he “does not have a sense of belonging to any country because he has lived here and there” (participant 19).

Transferring narratives about Palestine to the younger generation is very common among Palestinians. Hanafi (2009) stated that Palestinians started talking to

their children about Palestine and about their displacement experiences because of many factors, such as the screening of programs based on Palestinian narratives. More importantly, “the oral history is seen by many Palestinian refugees as a response to Zionist narratives and has mirrored and counteracted the efforts of Zionists” (Hanafi, 2009, p. 179). This has been reflected by one of the first-generation participants who kept insisting that what happened with Palestine is a “conspiracy” (participant 8) by Zionists and Arabs. That is why, preserving narratives and passing them to younger generations establish “the legitimacy of claims” (Hanafi, 2009, pp. 179-180) and highlight “memory as resistance” (Jayyusi, 2007, p. 116) and “*collective agency*” (p. 116).

Because of this, some participants acknowledged that it is their role to teach their children about Palestine. Mavroudi (2007) argued that teachings on Palestine by Palestinians parents are based on their “constructions of what it means to be Palestinian in diaspora...and the fact that they have chosen to see themselves as Palestinian, even when they may never have visited Palestine” (p. 397). The participants have chosen to be Palestinian, and part of this identity is to transfer the roots to the upcoming generation, especially because the family is a “weighty institution in creating a Palestinian identity in exile and in restoring a Palestinian community” (Sayigh, 1977a as cited Lindholm Schulz, 2003, p. 172).

The results also showed that with one participant, it was not only the family that helped in preserving and reinforcing his Palestinian identity, but also his school. Schools “are charged with the production and reproduction of the nation” (Fincham,

2010, p. 146). Even though this participant studied in an UNRWA school, which “has to use the curricula and textbooks of the countries/territories where it operates” (Fincham, 2010, p. 147), in this case the Lebanese curriculum, his teachers still taught him about Palestine. Fincham argued that “motivated UNRWA teachers can still theoretically take it upon themselves to teach their students about Palestine and being Palestinian in an unofficial capacity” (p. 148).

Yet, despite the efforts to transfer the narratives, results showed that a few participants were concerned for their children. A female participant feared that her future children will be Lebanese like their father. However, Hammer (2005) argued that even though in the Arab world “the national identity of the father determines that of the child” (p. 17), this does not mean that children of Palestinian mothers are not properly Palestinian; “the experience of the Palestinian people has created an awareness of national identity that connects children of Palestinian mothers to Palestine, even though they are, according to the laws in these Arab countries, not Palestinian” (Hammer, 2005, p. 17). That is why, this participant insisted that she will make sure to teach her children about Palestine and tell them that they are Palestinian. Yet, one mother voiced her concern about her child’s ambiguity regarding his identity and his sense of belonging. Mavroudi (2007) found that the younger generation “like their parents...often feel torn between the need to maintain strategic constructions of more idealized and homogenized versions of Palestinian national identity and their own feelings of ambivalence and in-between-ness” (p. 404). Thus, there is much possibility that the younger generation will still feel ambivalent. However, as Mavroudi (2007) argued,

“that ambivalence and ‘in-between-ness’ [do] not necessarily lead to political apathy or disunity, but...feelings of disillusionment and hope, attachment and detachment to the homeland, all form part of the negotiations about being Palestinian in diaspora” (p. 408).

### **3. Social Ties**

Tölölyan (1996) argued that “[d]iasporan communities care about maintaining communication with each other...” (p. 14). 13 participants (35%) stated that they make efforts to socialize with other Palestinians in order to strengthen their sense of national identity. Most of the young participants meet other Palestinians through joining Palestinian clubs in their universities. These clubs allow them to help other refugees, introduce the Palestinian culture to them through activities such as dabke and cooking Palestinian dishes, introduce the “Palestinian body in [the university], Beirut and in Lebanon in a good picture” (participant 4), and to organize events that highlight the current events inside Palestine. One participant stated that his club organizes such events even though the university administration is against this; they do not “even allow us to wear a Keffiyeh” (participant 6). Other participants try to work with other Palestinians in the camps; one participant stated how she got this kind of job but had to hide from her parents the nature of her work and tell them that she will have an office job because her parents wanted to distance her from Palestinians. Others go to protests related to the Palestinian cause or the status of Palestinians in their host society “so [they] can feel that [they] exist” (participant 35) or that they have a voice. Only four participants (11%) stated that rather than meeting other Palestinians, they prefer to go to

cultural events which educate them about Palestine. The remaining 20 participants (54%) did not make efforts to socialize with other Palestinians. While some did not value these social ties, others acknowledged that they do not need to make such efforts as they are already surrounded by many Palestinians.

#### ***4. Naming Practices***

##### ***a. Male Names***

Overall, there were 66 male names in the study, but because there were names that were repeated, the total number of different names is 47. Out of the 47 names, 15 (32%) were religious names. For example, *Muhammad* appeared 11 times, along with *Ahmad* and *Mahmoud*, which are variants of the same name. *Mustafa* is a name associated with these because it describes the Prophet – the “chosen one.” *Ali*, *Hassan*, and *Hussein* were also present, and they are associated with Ali ibn Abi Talib and his sons, Hasan ibn Ali and Husayn ibn Ali, the Prophet’s grandchildren. Some names are associated with the names of other prophets such as Youssef (Joseph), Ishaq (Isaac), and Ibrahim. There were also names such as Abdul Razzak and Abdul Kader, which combine Abd (servant) with one of the 99 names of God. For example, the former name means the servant of the “Ever Providing.” Arafa was also present and it is associated with Mount Arafat in Mecca. The remaining 32 names (68%) were mainly neutral, as they were adjectives in Arabic. Examples are *Maher* (skilled), *Kareem* (generous), *Bassam* (smiling), *Said* (happy), *Jamal* (beauty), *Adel* (fair), *Achraf* (honorable), *Khaled* (eternal), *Saleh* (pious), etc.



### b. Female Names

Overall, there were 100 female names in the study, but because there were names that were repeated, the total number of different names is 82. Out of the 82 names, 11 (13%) were religious names. Some of them were associated with the Prophet: *Fatima*, after the name of his daughter; *Khadijeh*, after Khadija bint Khuwaylid, his first wife; *Amina*, after Aminah bint Wahb, his mother; and *Halima*, which is associated with *Halimah al-Sa'diyah*, his foster mother. Other religious names were *Iman* (faith), associated with the six articles of Islamic faith – *arkān al-īmān*; *Dou'a*, meaning prayer to God; *Ayah*, meaning a phrase from Qur'an; *Kawthar*, associated with Sūrat al-Kawthar in the Qur'an; and *Mariam*, the Arabic name of Mary, the mother of Jesus or Isa ibn Maryam. The remaining 71 names (87%) were mainly neutral, as they denoted an adjective in Arabic. Examples are *Ghada* (graceful or charming), *Amal* (hope), *Nawal* (gift), *Rouwaida* (gentle), *Katbeh* (writer), etc.

It is important to note that with four participants, the researcher noticed that one name was repeated twice, once with a grandparent and once with a grandchild. This was an observation made by other scholars (Becker, 2009; Kim & Lee, 2011; Rossi, 1965). Participant 7 has a sister and a grandmother named Fatme; and participants 12, 17, and 31 have a brother and a grandfather with the same name. In three of these four cases, the brother – the male child – was named after the grandfather. However, it was not mentioned whether the brother is the eldest child or the first-born male into the family.

Both male and female names reveal that Palestinians are focusing on either religious names or neutral ones. The fact that parents were focusing on qualities of children, such as graceful, beautiful, or successful, shows that there is an intention of

using names that would not necessarily reveal any quality of identity besides gender and religion in some cases. Perhaps, because they fear discrimination based on first names, they opt for neutral names that conceal national identity.

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study was to examine how Palestinians identify themselves, their attitudes towards their language, and the factors that impact their self-identification and their pride in their dialect.

Many studies have examined Palestinian self-identification (Afifi and El-Shareef, 2010; Andrews et al., 2012; Pérez, 2011; Sayigh, 2012). However, these studies mainly took place in a Palestinian refugee camp. This study aimed at examining the identity of Palestinians outside the camps who are in daily contact with their Lebanese host society, which is known for its discriminatory policies and rather negative attitudes towards Palestinians (Haddad, 2002; Nasrallah, 1997; Sfeir, 2010). Fuller-Rowell, Ong, and Phinney (2013) found a significant relationship between identification and perceived discrimination from the host society; their study found that Latino students in the US with a weak sense of national identity were affected by perceived discrimination, unlike those with a strong sense of national identity. Branscombe et al. (1999) also studied this relationship and concluded that “because social rejection activates a person’s need to belong, experiences of discrimination may lead to increases in ethnic identity” (as cited in Fuller-Rowell et al., 2013, p. 407). That is what makes it interesting to study the Palestinian national identity in the context of Lebanon.

While this study was about the relationship between the Palestinian national identity and language, the researcher found that the study was counter-intuitive

regarding this relationship. Before this study was carried out, the idea that bound it was that there can be a relationship between language and identity, especially for Palestinians, who, as a result of the diaspora, can only find language as a way to express their identity in the absence of a territorial foundation for cultural heritage (Said, 1999). The participants in this study, however, changed current thinking in the field of language and identity. Participants stated that there is more to identity markers than language. Even though many of them perceived language as the best expression of their identity, some of them were aware of other identity markers that were more important to them, such as identifying as Palestinian. Thus, language is one among many identity markers that are meaningful for the participants. Therefore, it can be concluded that the relationship between language and identity should not be taken for granted.

Because of their belief in self-identification as Palestinian as a marker of their national identity, 65% of participants identified themselves as Palestinian and 19% as Palestinian along with another identity, such as Jordanian. Other participants could not identify themselves, either because their self-identification depends on where and with whom they are or because they are still exploring multiple identities without being committed to one (Marcia, 1966). Answering part of the fourth research question, the statistically significant factors in self-identification were citizenship, educational level, and using PCA with friends or neighbors.

Because a major part of this study was about language attitudes, participants' language use was examined when they were asked to tell a narrative about Palestine. Results showed that 51% spoke PCA during the interview while 43% spoke Lebanese;

6% code-switched between the two dialects. The statistically significant factors in language maintenance were birthplace, immigrant generation, duration of stay in Lebanon, annual family income, educational level, occupation, nationality of spouse, the use of PCA with family members and with friends or neighbors, and pride in dialect. Immigrant generation, nationality of spouse, and using PCA with friends or neighbors were the most significant factors with a p-value of .000.

Results also showed that 62% of participants were proud of their dialect. Other participants were not proud of their dialect, mainly because the majority of them (71%) spoke Lebanese. Answering the second part of the fourth research question, the statistically significant factors in participants' pride in their dialect were birthplace, immigrant generation, and using PCA with family members and with friends or neighbors.

The second research question was about the extent to which participants think it is their duty to speak PCA. The majority (84%) did not believe so. Rather, markers of their Palestinian identity included identifying as such, making themselves aware of the Palestinian cause, and making others aware of it, especially the future generation. They believed that they should make joint efforts to spread knowledge about Palestine and a good image of Palestinians through meeting other Palestinians, perhaps in events or university clubs. However, 86% of them stated that efforts at social ties should not reach marriage, as they do not mind whether they marry Palestinians or not. They do, however, have criteria for marriage, as their partners have to support the Palestinian cause.

Results corresponding to the third research question showed that while participants believe that PCA can express their local Palestinian identity and play a role in maintaining a distinct cultural heritage, MSA cannot fulfill these roles because it is common among all Arabs; that is why, it only expresses their Arab identity. Yet, some participants were keen to mention that PCA is just one marker of their identity, with other markers being similar to the ones mentioned above, namely familiarizing themselves with the Palestinian culture and maintaining connections to other Palestinians and a sense of belonging to Palestine.

Because of their strong belief in different markers of identity in addition to language, participants preserved their national identity through many ways, the most prominent of which was through narratives and collective memories about Palestine. First-generation participants told many narratives about their displacement and showed their lamentation over their lost land. They were also keen to display many visual symbols at their houses, such as the key to their childhood houses in Palestine. Even though younger generations did not experience this displacement, they insisted that their role as Palestinians is to carry their knowledge about Palestine to the upcoming generation (Mavroudi, 2007). For them, there was one simple equation: “if we forget Palestine, we will lose Palestine” (participant 4), and that is why, they highlighted knowledge about and belonging to Palestine as a marker of identity alongside language.

Based on the findings of the study, it can be concluded that participants are still very much attached to Palestine, even though 29 of the 37 participants have never seen it. Self-identification of the majority of the participants as Palestinian, efforts to

maintain connections with their roots, and their awareness of the different markers of their identity show that they will never forget Palestine and will make sure that this will still be the case with future generations.

Even though the findings of this study gave many insights regarding Palestinians' perceptions of their identity and language, there remain some limitations as mentioned throughout the study. There were only 37 participants in this study and the majority of whom lived in Beirut. A study on a larger scale with more participants might get more interesting insights on Palestinians living in different areas in Lebanon. Also, a larger sample size can yield more accurate results regarding statistical analysis, as the sample size in this study is too small to come up with statistically significant results. In addition, results regarding language maintenance need to be supported by a more specific study that focuses only on this purpose and that observes participants in a natural setting and over a long period of time. This aspect was not feasible for this study.

Although this study attempted to compare its results with those of similar studies in refugee camps, it would be interesting to do this same study on refugee camp populations in Lebanon and compare the results with the current ones. This can further examine whether the factor of living outside refugee camps and being in daily contact with the host society can affect perceptions of identity and language. It should be noted that the results of this study are specific to Palestinians in Lebanon and cannot be generalized to Palestinians in other countries, mainly because the latter may lead different lifestyles that can shape their own perceptions of their identity and language.

The points raised above show that more research should be done to tackle them. However, this study has contributed to studies on the Palestinian national identity in Lebanon by focusing on the dispersed Palestinian population outside refugee camps who live, work, and study side by side with members of their Lebanese host society.



## APPENDIX A

### PARTICIPANTS' CHARACTERISTICS

#	Sex	Age	Born in	From	Residence in Lebanon	Residence Abroad	Citizenship	Duration of Stay in Lebanon
1	M	53	Lebanon	N/A	Mar Elias Refugee Camp	No	Palestinian	53 years
2	F	40	Lebanon	Dayr al-Qassi	Mar Elias Refugee Camp	No	Palestinian	40 years
3	F	44	Kuwait	Gaza	Beirut	Jordan, England, Italy, and Greece	Lebanese and Iraqi	Since 1992
4	M	24	Lebanon	Tiberias	Tyre, South	No	Palestinian	24 years
5	M	22	Dubai	Az-Zeeb	Beirut	Jeddah-Dubai	Lebanese	4 years
6	M	26	Lebanon	Jaffa	Shatila Refugee Camp	No	Palestinian	26 years
7	M	85	Palestine	Sa'sa'	Burj El Barajneh	No	Palestinian	Since 1948
8	M	85	Palestine	Nahf	Burj El Barajneh	No	Palestinian	Since 1948
9	M	60	Lebanon	Sa'sa'	Burj El Barajneh	Cuba (for studying), Libya (for work)	Palestinian	Since 1995
10	F	72	Palestine	Safed	Burj El Barajneh	No	Palestinian	Since 1948
11	F	46	Saudi Arabia	Jerusalem	Beirut	USA, Saudi Arabia	USA, Jordanian	10 years
12	M	49	Lebanon	Haifa	Jadra - Al-Chouf	No	Palestinian	49 years
13	M	79	Palestine	Acre	Beirut	No	Lebanese	Since 1948

14	M	68	Palestine	Acre	Beirut	No	Palestinian	68 years
15	M	85	Palestine	Jaffa	Beirut	No	Palestinian	Since 1948
16	M	54	Lebanon	Acre	Beirut	No	Palestinian	54 years
17	F	25	Lebanon	Haifa	Beirut	No	Lebanese	25 years
18	F	59	Beirut	Acre	Beirut	No	Lebanese	Since 1968
19	F	46	Lebanon	Haifa	Beirut	Saudi Arabia	Lebanese	20 years
20	M	57	Kuwait	Acre	Beirut	Saudi Arabia	Lebanese	28 years
21	F	50	Lebanon	Haifa	Beirut	No	Lebanese	50 years
22	M	43	Lebanon	Nazareth	Ouzai	Libya (27 years)	Palestinian	16 years
23	F	26	Beirut	Acre	Bourj Al Barajneh (Not in Camp)	No	Palestinian	26 years
24	M	44	Lebanon	Haifa	Beirut	No	Lebanese	44 years
25	F	71	Palestine	Haifa	Beirut	Saudi Arabia (7 years)	Lebanese	60 years
26	M	57	Lebanon	Acre	Beirut	No	Palestinian	57 years
27	F	20	Lebanon	Safourieh	Saida	No	Palestinian	20 years
28	F	20	Qatar	Jerusalem	Beirut	No	Jordanian	4 years
29	F	22	Lebanon	Safed	Barbir	No	Palestinian	20 years
30	F	23	Lebanon	Jaffa	Beirut	No	Palestinian	23 years
31	F	25	Lebanon	Jaffa	Beirut	No	Palestinian - Tunisian	25 years
32	F	23	USA	Jaffa	Verdun	Saudi Arabia-Qatar	American-Palestinian	7 years
33	F	23	USA	Acre	Saida	No	American + Lebanese	18 years
34	M	21	Lebanon	Gaza	Mar Elias Refugee Camp	No	Palestinian	21 years
35	M	51	Lebanon	Jaffa	Beirut	No	Palestinian	51 years

36	F	75	Palestine	Haifa	Beirut	No	Lebanese	Since 1948
37	F	50	Lebanon	Acre	Beirut	No	Lebanese + American	37 years

Continued

#	Immigrant Generation	Family Income	Social Class	School Attended	Educational Level	Occupation
1	2nd	Below Average	Working Class	N/A	College-Level	X-Ray Machine Operator
2	2nd	Below Average	Working Class	UNRWA	Brevet	Activist and Chef
3	2nd	Average	Middle Class	AUB, Imperial College Amman Baccalaureate School	Grade 12, GCE, A Levels - BS and MPH	Lab Medicine Management
4	3rd	Above average	Middle Class	AUB, Al-Aqsa Secondary School	BS	Medical Lab Technician
5	3rd	Well below Average	Middle Class	Dar Al Fakher School	BA	Unemployed
6	3rd	Above average	Working Class	Al-Jaleel High school	Undergraduate	Student
7	1st	Below Average	Middle Class	N/A	Grade 4	Peasant
8	1st	Below Average	Middle Class	N/A	Grade 6	Peasant
9	2nd	Below Average	Working Class	UNRWA and Amlieh (intermediate)	University -Level	Engineer
10	1st	Below Average	Middle Class	N/A	Certifica	Housewife
11	2nd	Above Average	Middle Class	Schools in Saudi Arabia and USA	PhD	University Professor
12	2nd	Average	Working Class	N/A	Grade 9	Laundry Owner

13	1st	Below Average	Middle Class	Makassed	Intermediate	Bookstore Owner
14	1st	Average	Middle Class	N/A	Baccalaureate - Vocational	Hotel Management - Pilgrimage Services to Palestinians
15	1st	Average	Middle Class	N/A	Grade 6	Business Owner
16	2nd	Below Average	Working Class	Vocational School	First-year University Education	Electrician
17	2nd	Average	Middle Class	Hariri High school II	Bachelor of Engineering	Software Engineer
18	2nd	Average	Middle Class	Makassed	BS - Economics	Housewife
19	2nd	Below Average	Middle Class	Ahlia	High School	Housewife
20	2nd	Below Average	Middle Class	International College	BA (AUB)	Insurance Consultant
21	2nd	Average	Middle Class	Rawdah High School	BS	Business Partner
22	2nd	Average	Working Class	School in Libya	High School	Employee
23	3rd	Well below Average	Working Class	Anwar School	Intermediate	Employee
24	2nd	Above average	Middle Class	Rawdah High School	BS	Business Partner
25	1st	Above average	Middle Class	Makassed	Sixth Grade	Housewife
26	2nd	Average	Working Class	N/A	Baccalaureate	Inspector
27	3rd	Average	Middle Class	Makassed Islamic High School - Saida	Undergraduate	Public Relations Assistant - Internship Coordinator - Social Media Manager

28	2nd	Above average	Upper Class	Qatar International School	Undergraduate	Student
29	3rd	Average	Middle Class	Rawdah High School	Masters	Unemployed
30	3rd	Average	Middle Class	Galilee Secondary School	MPH	Unemployed
31	3rd	Average	Middle Class	Rawdah High School	Masters	Student
32	3rd	High	Upper Class	City International School	Masters	Student
33	3rd	Above average	Middle Class	AUB	Masters	Research Assistant
34	3rd	Above Average	Middle Class	Makassed	Undergraduate	Student
35	2nd	Average	Working Class	N/A	Elementary School	Aluminum Specialist
36	1st	Average	Middle Class	N/A	Brevet	Housewife
37	2nd	Above Average	Middle Class	International College	PhD	University Professor

Continued

#	Marital Status	Nationality of Spouse	# Kids	Foreign Languages	Knowledge of PCA and Lebanese	Code-mixing
1	Married	Palestinian	1	English (medium)	PCA: Very good Lebanese: Poor	Yes
2	Married	Palestinian	4	N/A	PCA: Fair Lebanese: Very good	Yes
3	Single	N/A	N/A	English, Spanish, Italian	PCA: Very good Lebanese: Fair	Yes
4	Single	N/A	N/A	English	PCA: Fair Lebanese: Fair	Yes
5	Single	N/A	N/A	English	PCA: Very good Lebanese: Very good	Yes
6	Single	N/A	N/A	English	PCA: Very good Lebanese: Very good	Yes

7	Married	Palestinian	7	No	PCA: Very good Lebanese: Poor	No
8	Married- Widower	Palestinian	3	English (medium)	PCA: Very good Lebanese: Poor	No
9	Married	Palestinian	4	English and Spanish	PCA: Very good Lebanese: Fair	No
10	Married	Palestinian	7	English (medium)	PCA: Very good Lebanese: Poor	No
11	Married	Lebanese (Palestinian in origin)	0	English	PCA: Very good Lebanese: Fair	No
12	Married	Palestinian	3	N/A	PCA: Very good Lebanese: Poor	No
13	Married	Lebanese	6	English	PCA: Poor Lebanese: Very good	Yes
14	Married	Palestinian	6	English	PCA: Very good Lebanese: Poor	No
15	Single	N/A	N/A	English	PCA: Very good Lebanese: Poor	No
16	Married	Lebanese (Palestinian in origin)	2	English	Very good in both	Yes
17	Single	N/A	N/A	English and French	PCA: Poor Lebanese: Very good	No
18	Married- Widow	Lebanese (Palestinian in origin)	2	English	Very good in both	Yes
19	Married	Lebanese (Palestinian in origin)	1	English	Very good in both	Yes
20	Married	Lebanese (Palestinian in origin)	1	English	Very good in both	Yes
21	Married	Lebanese	N/A	English	PCA: Fair Lebanese: Very good	Yes
22	Married	Lebanese	1	N/A	PCA: Fair Lebanese: Very good	Yes
23	Married	Lebanese	3	N/A	PCA: Fair Lebanese: Very good	No
24	Married	Lebanese	3	English	PCA: Fair Lebanese: Very good	Yes
25	Married- Widow	Palestinian	5	French (medium)	PCA: Very good Lebanese: Poor	No

26	Married	Syrian	2	English (medium)	PCA: Fair Lebanese: Fair	Yes
27	Single	N/A	N/A	English	PCA: Fair Lebanese Dialect: Very good	Yes
28	Single	N/A	N/A	English	PCA: Very good Lebanese: Fair	Yes
29	Single	N/A	N/A	English	PCA: Fair Lebanese Dialect: Very good	Yes
30	Single	N/A	N/A	English	Very good in both	Yes
31	Single	N/A	N/A	English	PCA: Poor Lebanese: Very good	No
32	Married	Lebanese	0	English	PCA: Very good Lebanese: Fair	Yes
33	Single	N/A	N/A	English	PCA: Fair Lebanese Dialect: Fair	Yes
34	Single	N/A	N/A	English	PCA: Fair Lebanese: Fair	Yes
35	Married	Palestinian	4	English (beginner)	PCA: Very good Lebanese: Fair	No
36	Married-Widow	Palestinian	3	English (medium)	PCA: Very good Lebanese Dialect: Fair	Yes
37	Single (Divorced)	Lebanese	3	English	PCA: Very good Lebanese Dialect: Very good	Yes

Continued

#	Language Use with Family Members	Friends and Neighbors
1	<b>F:</b> Ahmad- PCA <b>M:</b> Ghada- PCA <b>S:</b> N/A <b>B:</b> N/A <b>GM and GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> PCA <b>N:</b> PCA
2	<b>F:</b> Maher - Lebanese <b>M:</b> N/A <b>S:</b> Insaf and Yusra - Lebanese <b>B:</b> N/A <b>GM and GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> Mix <b>N:</b> Mix
3	<b>F:</b> Mortada - Arabic + English <b>M:</b> Inaam - PCA <b>S:</b> Nada and Noura - Arabic + English	<b>F:</b> Arabic+ English <b>N:</b> Arabic

	<b>B:</b> Hashim - Arabic + English <b>GM and GF:</b> N/A	
<b>4</b>	<b>F:</b> Ibrahim- PCA <b>M:</b> Amal - PCA <b>S:</b> Ruba - PCA <b>B:</b> Ahmad and Ashraf - PCA <b>GM:</b> Zahra- PCA <b>GF:</b> Mohammad - PCA	<b>F:</b> PCA- sometimes Lebanese <b>N:</b> PCA- sometimes Lebanese
<b>5</b>	<b>F:</b> Hassan - English + PCA <b>M:</b> Fadwa- PCA <b>S:</b> Farah- English + Arabic <b>B:</b> Bachir and Khaled- English + Arabic <b>GM and GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> PCA- English + Arabic <b>N:</b> English + Arabic
<b>6</b>	<b>F:</b> Bassam- PCA <b>M:</b> Fawzeyeh - PCA <b>S:</b> Fatima - PCA <b>B:</b> Saleh - PCA <b>GM and GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> PCA <b>N:</b> PCA
<b>7</b>	<b>F:</b> Hussein- PCA <b>M:</b> Halime - PCA <b>S:</b> Suheila, Mariam, and Fatme - PCA <b>B:</b> Naef - PCA <b>GM:</b> Fatme and Ammoun <b>GF:</b> Ali and Abd Al Mo'ti	<b>F:</b> PCA <b>N:</b> PCA
<b>8</b>	<b>F:</b> Ali- PCA <b>M:</b> Zahia - PCA <b>S:</b> Hana and Safieh- PCA <b>B:</b> Mohammad, Mahmoud, and Youssef - PCA <b>GM and GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> PCA <b>N:</b> PCA
<b>9</b>	<b>F:</b> Mohammad- PCA <b>M:</b> Najieh - PCA <b>S:</b> Mona, Aida, and Ibtissam- PCA <b>B:</b> Nasser, Khaled, and Jamal - PCA <b>GM and GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> PCA <b>N:</b> PCA
<b>10</b>	<b>F:</b> Mohammad- PCA <b>M:</b> Ghazaleh - PCA <b>S:</b> Zahra and Sobhie- PCA <b>B:</b> Ali - PCA <b>GM and GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> PCA <b>N:</b> PCA
<b>11</b>	<b>F:</b> N/A <b>M:</b> Nawal - PCA <b>S:</b> N/A <b>B:</b> N/A - PCA <b>GM and GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> PCA <b>N:</b> PCA



12	<b>F:</b> Ahmad- PCA <b>M:</b> Fatme - PCA <b>S:</b> Abir- PCA <b>B:</b> Hassan, Haitham, and Wissam- PCA <b>GM:</b> Latife and Sara <b>GF:</b> Hassan and Mohammad	<b>F:</b> PCA <b>N:</b> PCA
13	<b>F:</b> Ahmad - Lebanese <b>M:</b> Rouwaida - Lebanese <b>S:</b> Samiha and Fawzieh - Lebanese <b>B:</b> N/A <b>GM and GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> Lebanese <b>N:</b> Lebanese
14	<b>F:</b> Mahmoud- PCA <b>M:</b> Fedieh - PCA <b>S:</b> Fatme and Sobhie- PCA <b>B:</b> Mohammad- PCA <b>GM and GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> PCA <b>N:</b> PCA
15	<b>F:</b> Ali - PCA <b>M:</b> Katbeh - PCA <b>S:</b> Awatef- PCA <b>B:</b> Darwish- PCA <b>GM and GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> PCA <b>N:</b> PCA
16	<b>F:</b> Tawfiq - PCA <b>M:</b> Malakeh - Syrian (Mother is Syrian) <b>S:</b> Samira - PCA and Lebanese <b>B:</b> Sami and Wissam - PCA and Lebanese <b>GM:</b> Khadijeh - PCA <b>GF:</b> Tamara - Syrian	<b>F:</b> PCA, Lebanese, and Syrian <b>N:</b> PCA and Lebanese
17	<b>F:</b> Abdul Razzak - Lebanese + English <b>M:</b> Mona - Lebanese+ English <b>S:</b> N/A <b>B:</b> Youssef - Lebanese+ English <b>GM:</b> Tamam and Kamleh - Lebanese <b>GF:</b> Ahmad and Youssef	<b>F:</b> Lebanese + English <b>N:</b> Lebanese
18	<b>F:</b> Ahmad - PCA <b>M:</b> Kamleh - PCA <b>S:</b> Maha and Nada- PCA <b>B:</b> Mohammad, Mahmoud, Marwan, and Mazen- PCA <b>GM and GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> Lebanese <b>N:</b> Lebanese
19	<b>F:</b> Abdul Kader - PCA <b>M:</b> Siham - PCA <b>S:</b> Badia, Bouran, and Bare'a- PCA <b>B:</b> Badih and Ibrahim- PCA <b>GM and GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> Lebanese <b>N:</b> Lebanese

20	<b>F:</b> Ahmad - PCA <b>M:</b> Kamleh - PCA <b>S:</b> Maha, Mona, and Nada- PCA <b>B:</b> Mohammad, Marwan, and Mazen- PCA <b>GM and GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> Lebanese <b>N:</b> Lebanese
21	<b>F:</b> Said - Lebanese <b>M:</b> Fikrieh - Lebanese <b>S:</b> Mirvat, Lina, and Mirna - Lebanese <b>B:</b> Walid - Lebanese <b>Grandmother:</b> Tamam <b>Grandfather:</b> Youssef	<b>F:</b> Lebanese <b>N:</b> Lebanese
22	<b>F:</b> Tawfik - Libyan <b>M:</b> Mahasen - Lebanese <b>S:</b> Samah, Itab, Ismat, Iman, and Dou'a - Lebanese <b>B:</b> Issam, Aboudi, and Rabih - Lebanese <b>GM and GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> Lebanese <b>N:</b> Lebanese
23	<b>F:</b> Khalil - Lebanese <b>M:</b> Nawal - Lebanese <b>S:</b> Maha, Fatme, and Malak - Lebanese <b>B:</b> Ibrahim and Mohammad - Lebanese <b>GM:</b> Montaha <b>GF:</b> Ali	<b>F:</b> Mix <b>N:</b> Lebanese
24	<b>F:</b> Said - PCA <b>M:</b> Fikrieh - PCA <b>S:</b> Mirvat, Mona, Lina, and Mirna- PCA <b>B:</b> N/A <b>GM and GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> Lebanese <b>N:</b> Lebanese
25	<b>F:</b> Youssef- PCA <b>M:</b> Tamam - PCA <b>S:</b> N/A <b>B:</b> Abdul Razzak - PCA <b>GM and GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> PCA <b>N:</b> PCA
26	<b>F:</b> Hussein- Mix <b>M:</b> Issam - Mix <b>S:</b> Fatme and Halime - Mix <b>B:</b> N/A <b>GM and GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> Mix <b>N:</b> Mix
27	<b>F:</b> Ahmad - N/A <b>M:</b> Maysaa - P&L <b>S:</b> N/A <b>B:</b> Saeed-Mazen-Jad - N/A <b>GM:</b> Alia - PCA <b>GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> P&L <b>N:</b> Lebanese

28	<b>F:</b> Wael - Arabic <b>M:</b> Sahar - Arabic <b>S:</b> N/A <b>B:</b> Ziad - English (mostly) <b>GM:</b> Kawthar + Ne'mati - Arabic <b>GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> English <b>N:</b> English
29	<b>F:</b> Mohammed - P&L <b>M:</b> Sobhieh - P&L <b>S:</b> N/A <b>B:</b> Abdallah - P&L <b>GM and GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> Lebanese <b>N:</b> Lebanese
30	<b>F:</b> Mohammad - PCA <b>M:</b> Nohad - PCA <b>S:</b> Ghina - Lebanese <b>B:</b> Ayman and Karim - PCA <b>GM and GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> P&L <b>N:</b> P&L
31	<b>F:</b> Ibrahim- PCA <b>M:</b> Amira - PCA <b>S:</b> Rania, Rola, and Linda - PCA <b>B:</b> Ishaq - PCA <b>GM:</b> Samiha and Malakeh - PCA <b>GF:</b> Ishaq and Arafa - PCA	<b>F:</b> Lebanese <b>N:</b> Lebanese
32	<b>F:</b> Jamal - English + PCA <b>M:</b> Samira - PCA <b>S:</b> Sarah, Rana, and Ayah- English + PCA <b>B:</b> Ahmad - English +PCA <b>GM:</b> Enaam - PCA <b>GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> English <b>N:</b> English
33	<b>F:</b> Mahmoud - PCA <b>M:</b> Soumaya- PCA <b>S:</b> Baraa + Lebanese <b>B:</b> Mohammad - Lebanese + PCA <b>GM:</b> Amina - PCA <b>GF:</b> Youssef - PCA	<b>F:</b> Mix <b>N:</b> Mix
34	<b>F:</b> Walid- PCA <b>M:</b> Nazha - PCA <b>S:</b> Haneen, Nisreen, and Hiba - PCA <b>B:</b> N/A <b>GM and GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> Mix <b>N:</b> Mix
35	<b>F:</b> Naji- PCA <b>M:</b> Shifa- PCA <b>S:</b> Bahieh, Najieh, Jamileh, and Nadia - PCA <b>B:</b> Mohammad - PCA <b>GM and GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> PCA <b>N:</b> PCA

36	<b>F:</b> Abdallah- PCA <b>M:</b> Sobhieh- PCA <b>S:</b> N/A <b>B:</b> Mahmoud, Ahmad, and Moustafa - PCA <b>GM and GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> PCA <b>N:</b> PCA
37	<b>F:</b> Adel - English + PCA <b>M:</b> Lerry - English <b>S:</b> N/A <b>B:</b> Walid - English <b>GM and GF:</b> N/A	<b>F:</b> Lebanese <b>N:</b> Lebanese

## APPENDIX B

### QUESTIONNAIRE IN ENGLISH

**Dear reader:** This questionnaire is part of a research project I am conducting on the Palestinian national identity and its relation to language. The study will be submitted as a thesis to the Department of English at the American University of Beirut (AUB) in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the M.A. degree in English Language. I appreciate your taking time to fill this questionnaire and to participate in the interview that will be conducted thereafter.

Thank you in advance.

**Yasmine Abou Taha**

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#### Demographic Information

1. Sex
  - Male
  - Female
2. Age: \_\_\_\_\_
3. Country in which you were born: \_\_\_\_\_
4. Place of origin in Palestine: \_\_\_\_\_
5. Place of Residence in Lebanon: \_\_\_\_\_
6. Do you live in a refugee camp?
  - Yes. Please specify which camp you live in: \_\_\_\_\_
  - No
7. Other residence abroad: \_\_\_\_\_
8. Citizenship(s): \_\_\_\_\_
9. How long have you lived in Lebanon? \_\_\_\_\_
10. What generation of Palestinians are you? \_\_\_\_\_
11. Estimated annual family income:
  - High

- Above average
- Average
- Below average
- Well below average

12. In terms of general social classes, would you consider yourself to be a member of the:

- Upper class
- Middle class
- Working class

### **Education and Occupation**

13. School attended: \_\_\_\_\_

14. Educational Level: \_\_\_\_\_

15. Occupation: \_\_\_\_\_

### **Marital Status**

16. Marital Status:

- Single
- Married

17. Nationality of Spouse: \_\_\_\_\_

18. Number of Children: \_\_\_\_\_

### **Language Use**

19. Foreign Language(s) (Please specify all the foreign languages you speak):

\_\_\_\_\_

20. How do you consider your knowledge of

Palestinian Dialect:    Very good                  Fair                  Poor

Lebanese Dialect:    Very good                  Fair                  Poor

21. Do you code-mix (i.e. mix two or more dialects in your speech) between the Palestinian and the Lebanese Dialects?

- Yes
- No

22. Language/Dialect use with different family members:

In this section, please fill the names of each of the family members provided, along with the language used with them.

<b>Family Member</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Language Used</b>
• Father:	_____	_____
• Mother:	_____	_____
• Brother(s):	_____ _____ _____	_____
• Sister(s):	_____ _____ _____	_____
• Grandmother(s):	_____	_____
• Grandfather(s):	_____	_____

23. Language/Dialect use with:

- Friends: \_\_\_\_\_
- Neighbors: \_\_\_\_\_

Thank you

## APPENDIX C

### QUESTIONNAIRE IN ARABIC

#### استبيان

#### عزيزي القاريء:

ان هذا الاستبيان هو جزء من البحث الذي اقوم به عن الهوية الوطنية الفلسطينية و علاقتها باللغة. ستقدم الدراسة على شكل أطروحة لدائرة اللغة الأنكليزية في الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت، و ذلك موافقاً لمتطلبات الحصول على درجة الماجستير باللغة الأنكليزية. أقدّر تخصيص بعض من وقتك لتعبئة هذا الاستبيان و لمشاركتك في المقابلة التي سأجريها معك لاحقاً. و لك الشكر مسبقاً.

ياسمين ابو طه

#### معلومات ديموغرافية

1. الجنس:

- ذكر
- انثى

2. العمر: \_\_\_\_\_

3. البلد الذي ولدت فيه: \_\_\_\_\_

4. مسقط الرأس في فلسطين: \_\_\_\_\_

5. مكان السكن في لبنان: \_\_\_\_\_

6. هل تسكن في مخيم للاجئين؟

- نعم. يرجى تحديد اي مخيم تسكن فيه: \_\_\_\_\_
- كلا

7. اقامة اخرى في الخارج: \_\_\_\_\_

8. الجنسية: \_\_\_\_\_

9. منذ متى و انت تعيش في لبنان؟ \_\_\_\_\_



10. الى اي جيل من المهاجرين الفلسطينيين تنتمي؟ \_\_\_\_\_

11. دخل الأسرة السنوي المقدر:

- عالي
- فوق المتوسط
- متوسط
- تحت المتوسط
- اقل من المتوسط بكثير

12. من حيث الطبقات الاجتماعية العامة، هل تعتبر نفسك عضوا من:

- الطبقة العليا
- الطبقة الوسطى
- الطبقة العاملة

#### التعليم و المهنة

13. المدرسة: \_\_\_\_\_

14. المستوى التعليمي: \_\_\_\_\_

15. المهنة: \_\_\_\_\_

#### الحالة الاجتماعية

16. الحالة الاجتماعية

- أعزب
- متاهل

17. جنسية الزوج/ة: \_\_\_\_\_

18. عدد الاولاد: \_\_\_\_\_

#### اللغة

19. اللغات الأجنبية (يرجى تحديد كل اللغات الأجنبية التي تتكلمها):

			20. كيف تعتبر معرفتك في
اللهجة الفلسطينية:	جيد جدا	وسط	ضعيف
اللهجة اللبنانية:	جيد جدا	وسط	ضعيف

21. هل تخط بين اللهجتين الفلسطينية و اللبنانية؟

- نعم
- كلا

22. اللغة او اللهجة التي تتحدثها مع مختلف افراد عائلتك:

في هذا القسم، يرجى ملء أسماء كل أفراد الأسرة المقدمة، جنبا إلى جنب مع اللغة المستخدمة مع كلٍ منهم.

اللغة المستخدمة	الأسم	فرد من العائلة الوالد:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	الوالدة:
_____	_____	الأخ (او الأخوان):
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	الأخت (او الأخوات):
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	الجددة (او الجدات):
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	الجد (او الأجداد):

23. اللغة او اللهجة التي تتحدثها مع:

• الأصحاب: \_\_\_\_\_

• الجيران: \_\_\_\_\_

شكرا

## APPENDIX D

### INTERVIEW QUESTIONS IN ENGLISH

#### **Narrative**

1. For first-generation Palestinians:
  - What are the folktales that you usually tell your grandchildren about Palestine?
  - Can you tell me the recipe of a Palestinian traditional food that you like?
2. For younger generations (second, third, and/or fourth generation Palestinians):
  - What folktales did your parents/grandparents tell you about Palestine?
  - Do you know any traditional Palestinian food?

#### **Self-Identification and Attitudes towards Palestine**

3. How do you identify yourself? Why do you identify yourself as such?
4. What country do you identify as your home?
5. Palestinians today live all over the world. Are they all one nation?
6. Would you return to Palestine if you had the choice?

#### **Relationship to Others**

7. What are the issues that concern you, i.e. issues from our everyday world?
8. What do you think about the Syrian problem today and the problems that Syrian refugees are facing?
9. What do you think about the presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon?

#### **Language Use and Perception of National Identity**

10. What dialect do you speak?
11. How do people perceive your dialect?
  - In your opinion, what is the view that Lebanese people hold about the Palestinians in Lebanon? Why do you think this is so?
12. Do you feel proud of the dialect you speak? Why?
13. Is it necessary to speak Palestinian to be Palestinian?
14. Do you think that PCA is the best expression of your Palestinian roots? If not, what is the best expression of your Palestinian roots?
  - Do you think that MSA is the best expression of your Palestinians roots?
15. Do you think that PCA is important in marinating the Palestinian cultural heritage?
  - Do you think that MSA is important in marinating the Palestinian cultural heritage?
16. Can you distinguish between PCA and the Lebanese dialect?
17. [If you speak PCA] Do you feel you need to hide your dialect in certain situations such as job interviews? Why?

#### **Marriage**

18. If you are married to a Palestinian, did you make an effort to do so? Or was it by chance? If you did make an effort, why did you want to marry a Palestinian? If you have children, do you tell them about Palestine?

19. If you are not married, would you want to marry a Palestinian or a non-Palestinian? Why?

20. Would you speak to your children about Palestine?

21. Would you prefer your children to marry a Palestinian partner? Why?

**Language Maintenance and Social Ties**

22. Do you make an effort to meet other Palestinians and talk to them, for example in clubs or organizations?

23. Do you tell your non-Palestinian friends that you are Palestinian?

24. How do you maintain your dialect? And what factors make it difficult to do so?

25. Would you like Palestinians in Lebanon to maintain their language?

26. Do you attempt to transfer/impart your dialect to the younger generation? Why?

## APPENDIX E

### INTERVIEW QUESTIONS IN ARABIC

#### أسئلة المقابلة

#### السرد

1. للجيل الأول من اللاجئين الفلسطينيين:
  - ما هي الحكايات الشعبية الفلسطينية التي تسردها عادةً على أحفادك؟
  - هل يمكنك ان تعطيني وصفة لأكلة فلسطينية تقليدية تحبها؟
2. للأجيال الشابة (الجيل الثاني، الثالث، أو حتى الرابع من اللاجئين الفلسطينيين):
  - ما هي الحكايات الشعبية الفلسطينية التي سمعتها من اباؤك او اجدادك؟
  - هل تعرف اي أكلة فلسطينية تقليدية؟

#### تحديد الهوية الذاتية والمواقف تجاه فلسطين

3. كيف تعرف عن نفسك؟ لماذا تعرف عن نفسك على هذا النحو؟
4. اي بلد تعتبرها بلدك الأم؟
5. الفلسطينيون يعيشون اليوم في جميع أنحاء العالم. هل يشكلون أمة واحدة؟
6. اذا كان لديك الخيار، هل تعود الى فلسطين؟

#### العلاقة مع الآخرين

7. ما هي القضايا التي تهتمك، اي قضايا من العالم حولنا؟
8. ما رايك في الازمة السورية و المشاكل التي يواجهها اللاجئين السوريين؟
9. ما رايك في وجود اللاجئين السوريين في لبنان؟

#### اللغة و ادراك الهوية الوطنية

10. اي لهجة تتحدثها؟
11. كيف ينظر الناس الى لهجتك؟
  - في رايك الخاص، كيف ينظر اللبنانيون الى الفلسطينيين في لبنان؟ لماذا تظن كذلك؟
12. هل تشعر بالفخر تجاه اللهجة التي تتحدثها؟ لماذا؟
13. هل من الضروري على المرء التكلم باللهجة الفلسطينية من اجل ان يكون فلسطينياً؟
14. هل تعتقد بأن اللهجة الفلسطينية هي افضل تعبير عن جذورك الفلسطينية؟ اذا لم تكن كذلك، ما هو افضل تعبير عن جذورك الفلسطينية؟
  - هل تعتقد بأن اللغة العربية الفصحى هي افضل تعبير عن جذورك الفلسطينية؟
15. هل تعتقد بأن اللهجة الفلسطينية تلعب دور مهم في الحفاظ على التراث الثقافي الفلسطيني؟
  - هل تعتقد بأن اللغة العربية الفصحى تلعب دور مهم في الحفاظ على التراث الثقافي الفلسطيني؟
16. هل يمكنك ان تميز بين اللهجة الفلسطينية و اللهجة اللبنانية؟

17. اذا كنت تتحدث اللهجة الفلسطينية، هل تشعر بالحاجة الى إخفاء تلك اللهجة في حالات معينة مثل المقابلات الوظيفية؟ لماذا؟

### الزواج

18. اذا كنت متزوج/ة من فلسطيني/ة، هل بذلت جهدا للقيام بذلك ام كان ذلك بالصدفة؟ اذا بذلت جهدا بالزواج من فلسطيني/ة، لماذا اردت ذلك؟ اذا كان لديك اولاد، هل تحدثهم عن فلسطين؟

19. اذا لم تكن متزوجا، هل تود الزواج من فلسطيني/ة او من غير فلسطيني/ة؟ لماذا؟

20. هل تود التحدث لأولادك عن فلسطين؟

21. هل تفضل لأولادك ان يتزوجوا من فلسطيني/ة؟

### الحفاظ على اللغة و الروابط الاجتماعية

22. هل تبذل جهدا للالتقاء بفلسطينيين آخرين و التحدث معهم، على سبيل المثال في النوادي أو المنظمات؟

23. هل تصرح لأصدقائك غير الفلسطينيين بأنك فلسطيني؟

24. كيف تحافظ على لهجتك؟ و ما هي العوامل التي تصعب عليك القيام بذلك؟

25. هل ترغب من الفلسطينيين في لبنان الحفاظ على لغتهم؟

26. هل تحاول نقل اللهجة الفلسطينية لجيل الشباب؟ لماذا؟

## APPENDIX F

### FLYER IN ENGLISH

# Participants Needed for Research Study

**Topic:** Palestinian national identity and its relationship to language

**Researchers:**

- Principal Investigator: Dr. Kassim Shaaban (Professor of English, Thesis Advisor)
- Co-investigator: Yasmine Abou Taha (Graduate Student)



**The Study:** This study is about the Palestinian national identity and its relation to Palestinian Colloquial Arabic (PCA). It will be submitted as a thesis to the Department of English at the American University of Beirut (AUB) in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Degree of Masters in English Language.

**Eligibility Criteria:**

Participants must be:

- Palestinian in origin. This does not necessarily require a Palestinian ID. Participants can be holders of any nationality; they must only be originally Palestinian.
- Current residents of any area in Lebanon, and have lived the majority of their lives in Lebanon.
- In daily contact with the Lebanese society through working or studying in the country's businesses and colleges. Participants can be living in refugee camps, but they have to be going out of these camps daily to work or study. Therefore, Palestinians who live, work, and/or interact with other Palestinians in refugee camps only are not eligible to participate in this study.
- Between the ages of 18 and 85.

**What will be Required from Participants:**

If you agree to participate, you will be asked to fill out a background questionnaire that will ask you about some background information such as age, place of residence, annual family income, education and marital status. After you fill it out, you will be



interviewed individually by the co-investigator. Both the questionnaire and the interview should take about a minimum of 20 minutes of your time, based on how much you would like to discuss your experiences.

---

If you would like to participate in the study, kindly contact Yasmine Abou Taha:  
[yaa19@aub.edu.lb](mailto:yaa19@aub.edu.lb) / [yasmineaboutaha@gmail.com](mailto:yasmineaboutaha@gmail.com) / 71-435030

If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please contact the primary investigator or the co-investigator.

- Dr. Kassim Shaaban: [shaaban@aub.edu.lb](mailto:shaaban@aub.edu.lb) / 01-350000, extension: 4144
- Yasmine Abou Taha

You can also contact the IRB of AUB if you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about the research; questions about your rights; to obtain information; or to offer input.

- IRB Office:
  - Email: [irb@aub.edu.lb](mailto:irb@aub.edu.lb)
  - Telephone Number: 01-350000 – 5445 / Fax: 000961 1 738025

## APPENDIX G

### FLYER IN ARABIC

#### نشرة اعلانية

مطلوب مشتركين لدراسة بحثية

الموضوع: الهوية الوطنية الفلسطينية و علاقتها باللغة

#### الباحثين:

- الباحث الرئيسي: د. قاسم شعبان (استاذ اللغة الأنكليزية، مستشار الأطروحة)
- الباحث المشارك: ياسمين ابو طه (طالبة دراسات عليا)



الدراسة: ان هذه الدراسة هي حول الهوية الوطنية الفلسطينية و علاقتها باللهجة الفلسطينية العامية. ستقدم الدراسة على شكل أطروحة لدائرة اللغة الأنكليزية في الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت، و ذلك موافقاً لمتطلبات الحصول على درجة الماجستير باللغة الأنكليزية.

#### معايير الأهلية للمشاركة في الدراسة:

يجب ان يكون المشاركون:

- فلسطيني الأصل. هذا لا يتطلب بالضرورة حمل هوية فلسطينية. يمكن للمشاركين ان يكونوا حاملي اي جنسية لكن من المهم ان يكونوا فلسطيني الأصل.
- سكان حاليين في اي منطقة في لبنان، و ان يكونوا قد عاشوا معظم حياتهم في لبنان.
- في اتصال يومي مع المجتمع اللبناني من خلال العمل او الدراسة في الأعمال التجارية و الكليات في لبنان. من الممكن ان يكون المشاركون سكان مخيمات اللاجئين في لبنان، لكن عليهم ان يخرجوا من هذه المخيمات يوميا لقصد العمل او الدراسة. وبالتالي، فإن الفلسطينيين الذين يعيشون ويعملون و يتفاعلون مع فلسطينيين اخرين في المخيمات فقط ليسوا مؤهلين للمشاركة في هذه الدراسة.
- بين 18 و 85 عاما.

#### ما سيكون مطلوباً من المشاركين:

إذا وافقت على المشاركة في الدراسة، سوف يطلب منك ملء استبيان من شأنه ان يسألك عن بعض المعلومات الخفية عنك، مثل العمر و مكان الإقامة و دخل الأسرة السنوي و التعليم و الحالة الاجتماعية. بعد تعبئة الاستبيان، سيتم مقابلتك بشكل فردي من قبل الباحث المشارك. ينبغي على

الأستبيان و المقابلة ان يستغرقوا حوالي ما لا يقل عن 20 دقيقة من وقتك، هذا يتوقف على مدى رغبتك لمناقشة خبراتك.

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إذا كنت ترغب بالمشاركة في الدراسة، الرجاء الاتصال بياسمين ابو طه:

[yaa19@aub.edu.lb](mailto:yaa19@aub.edu.lb) / [yasmineaboutaha@gmail.com](mailto:yasmineaboutaha@gmail.com) / 71-435030  
إذا كان لديك أي أسئلة أو استفسارات حول البحث، الرجاء الأتصال بالباحث الرئيسي او بالباحث المشارك.

- د. قاسم شعبان: 4144, extension: 01-350000, [shaaban@aub.edu.lb](mailto:shaaban@aub.edu.lb)
- ياسمين ابو طه

يمكنك ايضا الاتصال **بلجنة الاخلاقيات (IRB)** للجامعة الأميركية في بيروت إذا كان لديك أي أسئلة او مخاوف، او شكاوى حول البحث؛ أسئلة عن حقوقك؛ للحصول على معلومات؛ أو لتقديم المقترحات.

- مكتب مجلس المراجعة المؤسسية:

- البريد الإلكتروني: [irb@aub.edu.lb](mailto:irb@aub.edu.lb)
- رقم الهاتف: 5445 – 01-350000 / فاكس: 000961 1 738025

## APPENDIX H

### INFORMATION SHEET IN ENGLISH

Principal Investigator: Dr. Kassim Shaaban

Co-Investigator: Yasmine Abou Taha

Hello. My name is Yasmine Abou Taha. I am a graduate student in the Department of English at the American University of Beirut (AUB). I would like to ask you whether you approve of participating in a research study about the Palestinian national identity and its relationship to language. This study is part of a research project that will be submitted as a thesis to the Department of English at AUB in partial fulfillment of the requirements of a Degree of Masters in English Language.

You will be asked to fill out a background questionnaire. After filling the questionnaire, you will be interviewed by me. I would like to tape record this interview so as to make sure that I remember accurately all the information you provide. I will keep the recording in my laptop, which will be locked with a password. The data will only be used by the investigators. Please note that the record of the interviews will be monitored and may be audited by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at AUB. Not any indicators of your personal information, such as name, age, or address, will be in these recorded responses. Confidentiality is thus assured. Note that if you accept to participate, you will be asked to do both the questionnaire and the interview; you cannot do one procedure but not the other.

Your participation should take a minimum of 20 minutes, depending on how much you would like to discuss your experiences. Please understand your participation is entirely on a voluntary basis. Kindly note that if you refuse to participate in the study, there will not be any penalty entitled to you, and your relation to AUB will not be affected in any way.

The results of the study will be reported in the form of a thesis. I may report these results in articles that might be published, as well as in academic presentations.

Your individual privacy and confidentiality of the information you provide will be maintained in all published and written data analysis resulting from the study. Personal information from the questionnaire will only be accessed by the investigators. Recorded responses from the interviews will be transcribed and then discussed and analyzed by me. The IRB may need to have access to these records; however, these records do not disclose your identity as a participant.

If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact the primary investigator or the co-investigator.

- Kassim Shaaban: [shaaban@aub.edu.lb](mailto:shaaban@aub.edu.lb) / Phone: 01-350000, extension: 4144
- Yasmine Abou Taha: [yaa19@aub.edu.lb](mailto:yaa19@aub.edu.lb) / [yasmineaboutaha@gmail.com](mailto:yasmineaboutaha@gmail.com) / 71-435030

You can also contact the IRB of AUB if you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about the research; questions about your rights; to obtain information; or to offer input.

- IRB Office:
  - Email: [irb@aub.edu.lb](mailto:irb@aub.edu.lb)
  - Telephone Number: 01-350000 – 5445 / Fax: 000961 1 738025

## APPENDIX I

### INFOMRATION SHEET IN ARABIC

#### ورقة المعلومات

الباحث الرئيسي: د. قاسم شعبان  
الباحث المشارك: ياسمين ابو طه

مرحباً اسمي ياسمين ابو طه. انا طالبة دراسات عليا في دائرة اللغة الأنكليزية في الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت. اود ان أسألك ما إذا كنت توافق على المشاركة في دراسة بحثية حول الهوية الوطنية الفلسطينية وعلاقتها باللغة. ان هذه الدراسة هي جزء من بحث سيقدم على شكل أطروحة لدائرة اللغة الأنكليزية في الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت، و ذلك موافقاً لمتطلبات الحصول على درجة الماجستير باللغة الأنكليزية.

سيطلب منك ملء استبيان من شأنه ان يسألك عن بعض المعلومات الخلفية عنك. بعد ذلك، سوف اقوم بمقابلة معك. اود ان اسجل المقابلة و ذلك للتأكد من انني اتذكر بدقة كل المعلومات التي ستقدمها. سأحفظ التسجيل على الكمبيوتر المحمول الخاص بي و الذي سوف يكون مؤمناً بكلمة سر. المعلومات التي ستقدمها ستستخدم من قبل الباحثين فقط. يرجى الملاحظة بأن المقابلات المسجلة سيتم رصدها من قبل لجنة الاخلاقيات (IRB) للجامعة الأميركية في بيروت و يمكن ان تقوم هذه اللجنة بتدقيقها. لن تظهر اي معلومات شخصية عنك، مثل الأسم او العمر او مكان الإقامة، في التسجيلات. لذلك، ان الدراسة ستحافظ على السرية التامة في ما يخص المعلومات التي ستقدمها. يرجى الملاحظة انه اذا وافقت على المشاركة في الدراسة، سوف يطلب منك ان تملء الاستبيان و تجري المقابلة؛ ليس بإمكانك ان تقوم باجراء واحد دون الآخر.

يجب أن تستغرق مشاركتك ما لا يقل عن 20 دقيقة، هذا يتوقف على مدى رغبتك لمناقشة خبراتك. يرجى الفهم ان مشاركتك مبنية على اساس طوعي. بما ان هذه الرسالة للموافقة على المشاركة في الدراسة قد اعطيت لك بعد مشاركتك، لديك الحق بأن تعبر ما إذا كنت تريد المعلومات التي قدمتها ان يتم تضمينها في الدراسة. اذا لم تكن تريد ذلك، سوف احذف كل المعلومات التي قدمتها امامك و لن استخدمها في الدراسة وفقاً لذلك. يرجى الملاحظة أنك إذا رفضت المشاركة في الدراسة، لن يكون هناك أي عقوبة جزاء عليك، و علاقتك في الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت لن تتأثر بأي شكل من الأشكال.

سيتم مناقشة و تحليل نتائج هذه الدراسة في اطروحة. من الممكن ان استخدم هذه النتائج في المقالات التي يمكن نشرها، و كذلك في العروض الأكاديمية.

سيتم المحافظة على خصوصيتك الفردية وسرية المعلومات التي تقدمها في كل تحليل للمعلومات المنشورة والمكتوبة الناتجة عن الدراسة. ان الباحثين هم فقط اللذين سيطلعون على المعلومات الشخصية التي ستقدمها من خلال الأستبيان. سيتم تدوين الردود المسجلة من المقابلات ومن ثم مناقشتها وتحليلها على يد الباحث المشارك؛ قد تحتاج لجنة الاخلاقيات (IRB) للاطلاع على هذه التسجيلات. مع ذلك، فان هذه التسجيلات لا تكشف عن هويتك كمشارك.

سيتم توزيع نسخة من هذه الاستمارة لكل مشارك، و لدى المشارك حرية قبول أو رفض المشاركة في الدراسة بعد معرفته بالغرض منها.

إذا كان لديك أي أسئلة أو استفسارات حول البحث، لا تتردد في الاتصال بالباحث الرئيسي او بالباحث المشارك.

• د. قاسم شعبان: 4144, extension: 01-350000 / [shaaban@aub.edu.lb](mailto:shaaban@aub.edu.lb)

• ياسمين ابو طه:

[yaa19@aub.edu.lb](mailto:yaa19@aub.edu.lb) / [yasmineaboutaha@gmail.com](mailto:yasmineaboutaha@gmail.com) / 71-435030

يمكنك ايضا الاتصال بلجنة الاخلاقيات (IRB) للجامعة الأميركية في بيروت إذا كان لديك أي أسئلة او مخاوف، او شكاوى حول البحث؛ أسئلة عن حقوقك؛ للحصول على معلومات؛ أو لتقديم المقترحات.

• مكتب مجلس المراجعة المؤسسية:

○ البريد الإلكتروني: [irb@aub.edu.lb](mailto:irb@aub.edu.lb)

○ رقم الهاتف: 5445 – 01-350000 / فاكس: 000961 1 738025

## APPENDIX J

### DEBRIEFING FORM IN ENGLISH

**Project Title:** We Have Been Here for 67 Years: A Study of Palestinians' Perceptions of their National Identity and Attitudes towards their Language in Lebanon

**Principal Investigator:** Dr. Kassim Shaaban  
Department of English at AUB  
Email: [shaaban@aub.edu.lb](mailto:shaaban@aub.edu.lb)  
Phone: 01-350000, extension: 4144

**Co-Investigator:** Yasmine Abou Taha  
Department of English at AUB  
Email: [yaa19@aub.edu.lb](mailto:yaa19@aub.edu.lb) /  
[yasmineaboutaha@gmail.com](mailto:yasmineaboutaha@gmail.com)  
Mobile Number: 71-435030

Thank you for participating in this study. In order to get the information we were looking for, we withheld information about some aspects of the study. Now that data collection is over, I will describe the study to you, answer any of your questions, and provide you with the opportunity to make a decision on whether you would like to have your data included in the study.

#### **What the study is really about**

The purpose of this study is to investigate the perceptions and attitudes of Palestinians in Lebanon towards their national identity and dialect, Palestinian Colloquial Arabic (PCA), as an expression of this identity and their cultural heritage. It will examine how Palestinians identify themselves and what factors affect this self-identification. Furthermore, it will seek to understand their perceptions of the role of their dialect and Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) in shaping their national identity. This purpose was not revealed to you before this stage because your awareness of it might have influenced you to change your responses, which can negatively affect the results of the study. I truly apologize for this deceptive, but necessary, approach.

#### **Taking part is voluntary**

Although you have already completed the questionnaire and the interview, your involvement in the study is still voluntary, and you may choose to withdraw the data you provided prior to debriefing without penalty. Withdrawing your participation will not adversely affect your relationship with the American University of Beirut or the researchers.

#### **Privacy/Confidentiality**

If you agree to allow us to use your data, we will keep the questionnaire data in a locked closet in the office of the principal investigator. The data will only be used by the investigators. Please note that the records of the interviews will be monitored and audited by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at AUB. Kindly note that



confidentiality of records will be maintained. Not any indicators of your personal information, such as name, age, or address, will be in these recorded responses. If you have questions later, or would like to know about the results of the study, you may contact Dr. Kassim Shaaban or Yasmine Abou Taha via their emails or phone numbers.

If you have any questions or concerns regarding your rights as a subject in this study, you may contact the Institutional Review Board (IRB) via email at [irb@aub.edu.lb](mailto:irb@aub.edu.lb) or via phone at 01-350000 – 5445 / Fax: 000961 1 738025.

## APPENDIX K

### DEBRIEFING FORM IN ARABIC

#### استمارة تقديم ملخص

**عنوان المشروع:** نقيم هنا منذ 67 عاما: دراسة عن إدراك الفلسطينيين في لبنان لهويتهم الوطنية ومواقفهم تجاه لغتهم

**الباحث الرئيسي:** د. قاسم شعبان  
دائرة اللغة الأنكليزية في الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت  
البريد الإلكتروني: [shaaban@aub.edu.lb](mailto:shaaban@aub.edu.lb)  
رقم الهاتف: 4144 / extension: 01-350000

**الباحث المشارك:** ياسمين ابو طه  
دائرة اللغة الأنكليزية في الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت  
البريد الإلكتروني: / [yaa19@aub.edu.lb](mailto:yaa19@aub.edu.lb)  
[yasmineaboutaha@gmail.com](mailto:yasmineaboutaha@gmail.com)  
رقم الهاتف الخليوي: 70-435030

شكرا لك على المشاركة في هذه الدراسة. من اجل الحصول على المعلومات التي نبحث عنها، اضطررنا الى حجب معلومات عن بعض جوانب الدراسة. بما ان جمع البيانات قد انتهى، سأشرح لك عن الدراسة، وسأجيب على اي من اسئلتك وسأمنحك الفرصة لاتخاذ قرار بشأن ما إذا كنت ترغب في تشميل بياناتك الخاصة في الدراسة.

#### ما هو حقا موضوع الدراسة

ان الغرض من هذا البحث هو دراسة إدراك الفلسطينيين في لبنان لهويتهم الوطنية ومواقفهم تجاه لهجتهم العامية كتعبير عن هذه الهوية والتراث الثقافي الفلسطيني. ستبحث الدراسة في كيفية تعريف الفلسطينيين لأنفسهم وستنظر الى العوامل التي تؤثر في هذا التعريف الذاتي. بالإضافة إلى ذلك، سوف تسعى هذه الدراسة إلى فهم إدراك الفلسطينيين لدور لهجتهم واللغة العربية الفصحى في تشكيل هويتهم الوطنية. لم يتم الكشف عن هذا الغرض لك قبل هذه المرحلة لأن علمك به قد يؤثر في تغيير اجاباتك، الشيء الذي يمكن بدوره ان يؤثر سلبا على نتائج الدراسة. انني اعتذر بشدة على اتباع هذه الطريقة الخادعة لكن هذا كان من الضروري.

#### المشاركة امر طوعي

على الرغم من أنك انجزت ملئ الاستبيان والمقابلة، فان مشاركتك في الدراسة تبقى طوعية، ويمكنك ان تختار ما إذا كنت تريد سحب البيانات التي قدمتها قبل تقديم ملخص الدراسة من دون اي

عقوبة. ان سحب مشاركتك لن يؤثر سلبا على على علاقتك بالجامعة الاميركية في بيروت او بالباحثين.

### الخصوصية/ السرية

إذا كنت توافق على السماح لنا باستخدام البيانات الخاصة بك، سنحتفظ ببيانات الاستبيان في خزانة مغلقة في مكتب المحقق الرئيسي. سيتم الوصول الى البيانات المسجلة من المقابلة من قبل الباحث المشارك فقط. المعلومات التي ستقدمها ستستخدم من قبل الباحثين فقط. يرجى الملاحظة بأن المقابلات المسجلة سيتم رصدها و تدقيقها من قبل لجنة الاخلاقيات (IRB) للجامعة الأميركية في بيروت. يرجى العلم بان سرية السجلات سيتم المحافظة عليها . لن تظهر اي معلومات شخصية عنك، مثل الأسم او العمر او مكان الإقامة، في التسجيلات.

إذا كان لديك اسئلة في وقت لاحق، او تريد ان تعرف نتائج الدراسة، يمكنك الاتصال بالدكتور قاسم شعبان او ياسمين ابو طه عبر البريد الالكتروني او الهاتف.

إذا كان لديك اي اسئلة او استفسارات بخصوص حقوقك كمشارك في الدراسة، يمكنك الاتصال بلجنة الاخلاقيات عبر البريد الالكتروني على [irb@aub.edu.lb](mailto:irb@aub.edu.lb) او عبر الهاتف على 350000-

Fax: 00961 1 738025 / 01

## APPENDIX L

### INFORMED CONSENT FORM IN ENGLISH

We Have Been Here for 67 Years: A Study of Palestinians' Perceptions of their National Identity and Attitudes towards their Language in Lebanon

Principal Investigator: Dr. Kassim Shaaban

Co-Investigator: Yasmine Abou Taha

Hello. My name is Yasmine Abou Taha. I am a graduate student in the Department of English at the American University of Beirut (AUB). I would like to ask you whether you approve of participating in a research study about the Palestinian national identity and its relationship to language. This study is part of a research project that will be submitted as a thesis to the Department of English at AUB in partial fulfillment of the requirements of a Degree of Masters in English Language.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the perceptions and attitudes of Palestinians in Lebanon towards their national identity and dialect, Palestinian Colloquial Arabic (PCA), as an expression of this identity and their cultural heritage. It will examine how Palestinians identify themselves and what factors affect this self-identification. Furthermore, it will seek to understand their perceptions of the role of their dialect and Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) in shaping their national identity. This purpose was not revealed to you before this stage because your awareness of it might have influenced you to change your responses, which can negatively affect the results of the study. I truly apologize for this deceptive, but necessary, approach.

I will keep the recordings of the interview responses in my laptop, which will be locked with a password. The data will only be used by the investigators. Please note that the records of the interviews will be monitored and audited by the Institutional Review Board (IRB)<sup>4</sup> at AUB. Kindly note that confidentiality of records will be maintained. Not any indicators of your personal information, such as name, age, or address, will be in these recorded responses. Confidentiality is thus assured. Note that if you accept to participate, you will be asked to do both the questionnaire and the interview; you cannot do one procedure but not the other.

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<sup>4</sup>The primary mission of the IRB is to protect the rights, welfare and privacy of all individuals participating in biomedical, social, and behavioral research activities, including field or off-site research, as conducted by AUB faculty, staff and students.

The IRB conducts reviews of proposed research studies employing an assessment process that determines that the methodology used is consistent with sound research design and that the risk to participants/subjects is minimized. The IRB also provides interpretive assistance and support to the research community (IRB page on AUB website).

Please understand your participation is entirely on a voluntary basis. Because this informed consent letter is given to you after you filled out the background questionnaire and underwent an interview, you have the right to tell me whether you want the data you provided to be included in the study. If not, I will delete all your data in front of you and will not use it in the study accordingly. Kindly note that if you refuse to participate in the study, there will not be any penalty entitled to you, and your relation to AUB will not be affected in any way.

The data I will get from your participation will allow me to discuss and analyze whether the Palestinians' perceptions of their national identity and their attitudes towards their language have been affected by being away from their homeland. The results from this study will highlight to the Palestinian community in Lebanon whether their perceptions and attitudes have been affected by the diaspora, and what factors have led to this influence. The results of the study will be reported in the form of a thesis. I may report these results in articles that might be published, as well as in academic presentations.

Your individual privacy and confidentiality of the information you provide will be maintained in all published and written data analysis resulting from the study. Personal information from the questionnaire will only be accessed by the investigators. Recorded responses from the interviews will be transcribed and then discussed and analyzed by me. The IRB may need to have access to these records; however, these records do not disclose your identity as a participant.

Every subject will be provided with a copy of the informed consent letter, and is free to accept or refuse participating in the study upon being informed of its purpose.

If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact the primary investigator or the co-investigator

- Kassim Shaaban: [shaaban@aub.edu.lb](mailto:shaaban@aub.edu.lb) / 01-350000, extension: 4144
- Yasmine Abou Taha: [yaa19@aub.edu.lb](mailto:yaa19@aub.edu.lb) / [yasmineaboutaha@gmail.com](mailto:yasmineaboutaha@gmail.com) / 71-435030

You can also contact the IRB of AUB if you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about the research; questions about your rights; to obtain information; or to offer input.

- IRB Office:
  - Email: [irb@aub.edu.lb](mailto:irb@aub.edu.lb)
  - Telephone Number: 01-350000 – 5445 / Fax: 000961 1 738025

### **Signature of the Subject**

#### **Consent to Participate in the Study**

Are you interested in participating in this study?

- Yes

- No

**Consent to Quote from Interview**

I may wish to quote from this interview either in the presentations or articles resulting from this work.

- Yes
- No

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Time: \_\_\_\_\_

**Signature of the Witness (in case the subject is illiterate or visually impaired)**

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Time: \_\_\_\_\_

**Signature of the Interviewer**

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Time: \_\_\_\_\_

## APPENDIX M

### INFORMED CONSENT FORM IN ARABIC

#### استمارة الموافقة المستنيرة

نقيم هنا منذ 67 عاما: دراسة عن ادراك الفلسطينيين في لبنان لهويتهم الوطنية و مواقفهم تجاه لغتهم

الباحث الرئيسي: د. قاسم شعبان  
الباحث المشارك: ياسمين ابو طه

مرحبا. اسمي ياسمين ابو طه. انا طالبة دراسات عليا في دائرة اللغة الانكليزية في الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت. اود ان أسألك ما إذا كنت توافق على المشاركة في دراسة بحثية حول الهوية الوطنية الفلسطينية وعلاقتها باللغة. ان هذه الدراسة هي جزء من بحث سيقدم على شكل أطروحة لدائرة اللغة الانكليزية في الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت، و ذلك موافقاً لمتطلبات الحصول على درجة الماجستير باللغة الانكليزية.

ان الغرض من هذا البحث هو دراسة ادراك الفلسطينيين في لبنان لهويتهم الوطنية و مواقفهم تجاه لهجتهم العامية كتعبير عن هذه الهوية والتراث الثقافي الفلسطيني. ستبحث الدراسة في كيفية تعريف الفلسطينيين لأنفسهم و ستنظر الى العوامل التي تؤثر في هذا التعريف الذاتي. بالإضافة إلى ذلك، سوف تسعى هذه الدراسة إلى فهم ادراك الفلسطينيين لدور لهجتهم و اللغة العربية الفصحى في تشكيل هويتهم الوطنية. لم يتم الكشف عن هذا الغرض لك قبل هذه المرحلة لأنك علمك به قد يؤثر في تغيير اجاباتك، الشيء الذي بدوره يمكن ان يؤثر سلبا على نتائج الدراسة. انني اعتذر بشدة على اتباع هذه الطريقة الخادعة لكن هذا كان من الضروري.

سأحفظ تسجيلات اجوبة المقابلة على الكمبيوتر المحمول الخاص بي و الذي سوف يكون مؤمنا بكلمة سر. المعلومات التي ستقدمها ستستخدم من قبل الباحثين فقط. يرجى الملاحظة بأن المقابلات المسجلة سيتم رصدها و تدقيقها من قبل لجنة الاخلاقيات (IRB)<sup>5</sup> للجامعة الأميركية في بيروت يرجى العلم بان سرية السجلات سيتم المحافظة عليها.

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ان المهمة الأساسية لمجلس المراجعة المؤسسية هي حماية حقوق ورفاهية وخصوصية كل الأفراد المشاركين في أنشطة البحوث الطبية الحيوية والاجتماعية والسلوكية، بما في ذلك البحوث في الحقول، التي تجريها أعضاء هيئة التدريس والموظفين والطلاب في الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت.  
ان مجلس المراجعة المؤسسية يراجع الدراسات المقترحة من خلال اتباع عملية تقييم من شأنها ان تحدد ان المنهجية المستخدمة تتفق مع تصميم البحث و ان تقلل المخاطر التي يتعرض لها المشاركون. و كذلك يوفر مجلس المراجعة المؤسسية

. لن تظهر اي معلومات شخصية عنك، مثل الاسم او العمر او مكان الإقامة، في التسجيلات. لذلك، ان الدراسة ستحافظ على السرية التامة في ما يخص المعلومات التي ستقدمها. يرجى الملاحظة انه اذا وافقت على المشاركة في الدراسة، سوف يطلب منك ان تملء الاستبيان و تجري المقابلة؛ ليس بإمكانك ان تقوم باجراء واحد دون الآخر.

يرجى الفهم ان مشاركتك مبنية على اساس طوعي. بما ان هذه الرسالة للموافقة على المشاركة في الدراسة قد اعطيت لك بعد مشاركتك، لديك الحق بأن تعبر ما إذا كنت تريد المعلومات التي قدمتها ان يتم تضمينها في الدراسة. اذا لم تكن تريد ذلك، سوف احذف كل المعلومات التي قدمتها امامك و لن استخدمها في الدراسة وفقا لذلك. يرجى الملاحظة أنك إذا رفضت المشاركة في الدراسة، لن يكون هناك أي عقوبة جزاء عليك، و علاقتك في الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت لن تتأثر بأي شكل من الأشكال.

ان المعلومات التي سأحصل عليها من مشاركتك ستسمح لي بمناقشة و تحليل مدى تأثير ادراك الفلسطينيين لهويتهم الوطنية و موقفهم تجاه لغتهم ببعدهم عن وطنهم. ستسلط نتائج هذه الدراسة الضوء على مدى تأثير الأدراك و المواقف بشتات الفلسطينيين، و العوامل التي ادت الى هذا التأثير. سيتم مناقشة و تحليل نتائج هذه الدراسة في اطروحة. من الممكن ان استخدم هذه النتائج في المقالات التي يمكن نشرها، و كذلك في العروض الأكاديمية.

سيتم المحافظة على خصوصيتك الفردية وسرية المعلومات التي تقدمها في كل تحليل للمعلومات المنشورة والمكتوبة الناتجة عن الدراسة. ان الباحثين هم فقط اللذين سيطلعون على المعلومات الشخصية التي ستقدمها من خلال الاستبيان. سيتم تدوين الردود المسجلة من المقابلات ومن ثم مناقشتها وتحليلها على يد الباحث المشارك؛ قد تحتاج لجنة الاخلاقيات (IRB) للاطلاع على هذه التسجيلات. مع ذلك، فان هذه التسجيلات لا تكشف عن هويتك كمشارك.

سيتم توزيع نسخة من هذه الاستمارة لكل مشارك، و لدى المشارك حرية قبول أو رفض المشاركة في الدراسة بعد معرفته بالغرض منها.

إذا كان لديك أي أسئلة أو استفسارات حول البحث، لا تتردد في الاتصال بالباحث الرئيسي او بالباحث المشارك.

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المساعدة التفسيرية والدعم للمجتمع العلمي (صفحة مجلس المراجعة المؤسسية على الموقع الإلكتروني للجامعة الأميركية في بيروت).



يمكنك ايضا الاتصال لجنة الاخلاقيات (IRB) للجامعة الأميركية في بيروت إذا كان لديك أي أسئلة او مخاوف، او شكوى حول البحث؛ أسئلة عن حقوقك؛ للحصول على معلومات؛ أو لتقديم المقترحات.

• مكتب مجلس المراجعة المؤسسية:

○ البريد الإلكتروني: [irb@aub.edu.lb](mailto:irb@aub.edu.lb)

○ رقم الهاتف: 5445 – 01-350000 / فاكس: 000961 1 738025

**توقيع المشارك**

**الموافقة على المشاركة في الدراسة**

هل انت مهتم بالمشاركة في هذه الدراسة؟

• نعم

• كلا

**الموافقة على اقتباس الأقوال من المقابلة**

قد أود أن أقتبس من هذه المقابلة سواء في العروض أو المواد الناتجة عن هذا العمل.

• نعم

• كلا

التوقيع:

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التاريخ:

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الوقت:

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**توقيع الشاهد (في حال كان المشارك أمّي او مكفوف)**

التوقيع:

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التاريخ:

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الوقت:

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**توقيع المقابل**

التوقيع:

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التاريخ:

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الوقت:

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## APPENDIX N

### FACTORS AFFECTING SELF-IDENTIFICATION

		Total	Identification as Palestinian	Identification as Other	p- value
<b>Demographic Characteristics</b>					
Sex	Male	18 (49%)	12 (67%)	6 (33%)	.823
	Female	19(51%)	12 (63%)	7 (37%)	
Birth place	Lebanon	22 (59%)	15 (68%)	7 (32%)	.051
	Palestine	8 (22%)	7 (88%)	1 (13%)	
	Other	7 (19%)	2 (29%)	5 (71%)	
Place of Origin	North of Palestine	26 (72%)	17 (65%)	9 (35%)	.792
	South (West and East) of Palestine	10 (28%)	7 (70%)	3 (30%)	
Immigrant Generation	1 <sup>st</sup> Generation	8 (21.62%)	7 (88%)	1 (13%)	.146
	2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation	18 (48.65%)	9 (50%)	9 (50%)	
	3 <sup>rd</sup> Generation	11 (29.73%)	8 (73%)	3 (27%)	
<b>Residence</b>					
Residence in Lebanon	Beirut	25 (68%)	14 (56%)	11 (44%)	.103
	Outside Beirut	12 (32%)	10 (83%)	2 (17%)	
Duration of Stay in Lebanon	(Number of Years)				.224
Residence Abroad	No	28 (76%)	19 (68%)	9 (32%)	.501
	Yes	9 (24%)	5 (56%)	4 (44%)	
<b>Citizenship</b>					
Lebanese Passport	No	24 (65%)	20 (83%)	4 (17%)	.001*
	Yes	13 (35%)	4 (31%)	9 (69%)	
Palestinian Passport	No	15 (41%)	5 (33%)	10 (67%)	.001*
	Yes	22 (59%)	19 (86%)	3 (14%)	
<b>SES</b>					
Annual Family Income	Average or above average	25 (68%)	18 (72%)	7 (28%)	.189
	Below Average	12 (32%)	6 (50%)	6 (50%)	

Social Class	Middle to Upper Class	27 (73%)	16 (59%)	11 (41%)	.241
	Lower (Working) Class	10 (27%)	8 (80%)	2 (20%)	
<b>Education</b>					
School Attended	School in Lebanon	21 (81%)	13 (62%)	8 (38%)	.373
	School Abroad	5 (19%)	2 (40%)	3 (60%)	
Education Level	University Level	22 (59%)	11 (50%)	11 (50%)	.022*
	School Level	15 (41%)	13 (87%)	2 (13%)	
Occupation	Office Work	15 (41%)	8 (53%)	7 (47%)	.440
	Non-Office Work	9 (24%)	7 (78%)	2 (22%)	
	Other	13 (35%)	9 (69%)	4 (31%)	
<b>Marital Status</b>					
Single or Married/Nationality of Spouse	Single	13 (35%)	7 (54%)	6 (46%)	.488
	Palestinian Spouse	16 (43%)	12 (75%)	4 (25%)	
	Lebanese or Syrian Spouse	8 (22%)	5 (63%)	3 (38%)	
<b>Language Use</b>					
Language Spoken in the Interview	PCA	19 (51%)	12 (63%)	7 (37%)	.823
	Other	18 (49%)	12 (67%)	6 (33%)	
Foreign Language	No	5 (14%)	5 (100%)	0 (0%)	.077
	Yes	32 (86%)	19 (59%)	13 (41%)	
Using PCA with Family Members	No	11 (30%)	7 (64%)	4 (36%)	.919
	Yes	26 (70%)	17 (65%)	9 (35%)	
Using PCA with Friends or Neighbors	No	24 (65%)	12 (50%)	12 (50%)	.010*
	Yes	13 (35%)	12 (92%)	1 (8%)	
Pride in Dialect	No	14 (38%)	7 (50%)	7 (50%)	.139
	Yes	23 (62%)	17 (74%)	6 (26%)	

## APPENDIX O

### FACTORS AFFECTING LANGUAGE MAINTENANCE

		Total	PCA	Other	p-value
<b>Demographic Information</b>					
Sex	Male	18 (49%)	12 (67%)	6 (33%)	.070
	Female	19(51%)	7 (37%)	12 (63%)	
	Lebanon	22 (59%)	7 (32%)	15 (68%)	
Birth place	Palestine	8 (22%)	8 (100%)	0 (0%)	.004*
	Other	7 (19%)	4 (57%)	3 (43%)	
Place of Origin	North of Palestine	26 (72%)	12 (46%)	14 (54%)	.457
	South (West and East) of Palestine	10 (28%)	6 (60%)	4 (40%)	
Immigrant Generation	1 <sup>st</sup> Generation	8 (21.62%)	8 (100%)	0 (0%)	.000*
	2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation	18 (48.65%)	10 (56%)	8 (44%)	
	3 <sup>rd</sup> Generation	11 (29.73%)	1 (9%)	10 (91%)	
<b>Residence</b>					
Residence in Lebanon	Beirut	25 (68%)	12 (48%)	13 (52%)	.556
	Outside Beirut	12 (32%)	7 (58%)	5 (42%)	
Duration of Stay in Lebanon	(Number of Years)				.008*
Residence Abroad	No	28 (76%)	13 (46%)	15 (54%)	.291
	Yes	9 (24%)	6 (67%)	3 (33%)	
<b>Citizenship</b>					
Lebanese Passport	No	24 (65%)	13 (54%)	11 (46%)	.642
	Yes	13 (35%)	6 (46%)	7 (54%)	
Palestinian Passport	No	15 (41%)	8 (53%)	7 (47%)	.842
	Yes	22 (59%)	11 (50%)	11 (50%)	
<b>SES</b>					
Annual Family Income	Average or above average	25 (68%)	10 (40%)	15 (60%)	.046*
	Below Average	12 (32%)	9 (75%)	3 (25%)	

Social Class	Middle to Upper Class	27 (73%)	13 (48%)	14 (52%)	.522
	Lower (Working) Class	10 (27%)	6 (60%)	4 (40%)	
<b>Education</b>					
School Attended	School in Lebanon	21 (81%)	7 (33%)	14 (67%)	.271
	School Abroad	5 (19%)	3 (60%)	2 (40%)	
Education Level	University Level	22 (59%)	8 (36%)	14 (64%)	.027*
	School Level	15 (41%)	11 (73%)	4 (27%)	
Occupation	Office Work	15 (41%)	5 (33%)	10 (67%)	.028*
	Non-Office Work	9 (24%)	8 (89%)	1 (11%)	
	Other (Student, unemployed, or housewife)	13 (35%)	6 (46%)	7 (54%)	
<b>Marital Status</b>					
Single or Married/Nationality of Spouse	Single	13 (35%)	4 (31%)	9 (69%)	.000*
	Palestinian Spouse	16 (43%)	14 (88%)	2 (13%)	
	Lebanese or Syrian Spouse	8 (22%)	1 (13%)	7 (88%)	
<b>Language Use</b>					
Foreign Language	No	5 (14%)	2 (40%)	3 (60%)	.585
	Yes	32 (86%)	17 (53%)	15 (47%)	
Using PCA with Family Members	No	11 (30%)	2 (18%)	9 (82%)	.009*
	Yes	26 (70%)	17 (65%)	9 (35%)	
Using PCA with Friends or Neighbors	No	24 (65%)	6 (25%)	18 (75%)	.000*
	Yes	13 (35%)	13 (100%)	0 (0%)	
Pride in Dialect	No	14 (38%)	4 (29%)	10 (71%)	.031*
	Yes	23 (62%)	15 (65%)	8 (35%)	

## APPENDIX P

### FACTORS AFFECTING PRIDE IN DIALECT

		Total	Proud	Not Proud	p-value
<b>Demographic Information</b>					
Sex	Male	18 (49%)	13 (72%)	5 (28%)	.219
	Female	19(51%)	10 (53%)	9 (47%)	
	Lebanon	22 (59%)	10 (45%)	12 (55%)	
Birth place	Palestine	8 (22%)	8 (100%)	0 (0%)	.021*
	Other	7 (19%)	5 (71%)	2 (29%)	
Place of Origin	North of Palestine	26 (72%)	14 (54%)	12 (46%)	.149
	South (West and East) of Palestine	10 (28%)	8 (80%)	2 (20%)	
Immigrant Generation	1 <sup>st</sup> Generation	8 (21.62%)	8 (100%)	0 (0%)	.043*
	2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation	18 (48.65%)	9 (50%)	9 (50%)	
	3 <sup>rd</sup> Generation	11 (29.73%)	6 (55%)	5 (45%)	
<b>Residence</b>					
Residence in Lebanon	Beirut	25 (68%)	15 (60%)	10 (40%)	.695
	Outside Beirut	12 (32%)	8 (67%)	4 (33%)	
Duration of Stay in Lebanon	(Number of Years)				.344
Residence Abroad	No	28 (76%)	16 (57%)	12 (43%)	.267
	Yes	9 (24%)	7 (78%)	2 (22%)	
<b>Citizenship</b>					
Lebanese Passport	No	24 (65%)	17 (71%)	7 (29%)	.139
	Yes	13 (35%)	6 (46%)	7 (54%)	
Palestinian Passport	No	15 (41%)	8 (53%)	7 (47%)	.361
	Yes	22 (59%)	15 (68%)	7 (32%)	
<b>SES</b>					
Annual Family Income	Average or above average	25 (68%)	14 (56%)	11 (44%)	.265
	Below Average	12 (32%)	9 (75%)	3 (25%)	

Social Class	Middle to Upper Class	27 (73%)	17 (63%)	10 (37%)	.869
	Lower (Working) Class	10 (27%)	6 (60%)	4 (40%)	
<b>Education</b>					
School Attended	School in Lebanon	21 (81%)	11 (52%)	10 (48%)	.261
	School Abroad	5 (19%)	4 (80%)	1 (20%)	
Education Level	University Level	22 (59%)	12 (55%)	10 (45%)	.247
	School Level	15 (41%)	11 (73%)	4 (27%)	
Occupation	Office Work	15 (41%)	6 (40%)	9 (60%)	.072
	Non-Office Work	9 (24%)	7 (78%)	2 (22%)	
	Other (Student, unemployed, or housewife)	13 (35%)	10 (77%)	3 (23%)	
<b>Marital Status</b>					
Single or Married/Nationality of Spouse	Single	13 (35%)	7 (54%)	6 (46%)	.085
	Palestinian Spouse	16 (43%)	13 (81%)	3 (19%)	
	Lebanese or Syrian Spouse	8 (22%)	3 (37.5%)	5 (62.5%)	
<b>Language Use</b>					
Foreign Language	No	5 (14%)	3 (60%)	2 (40%)	.915
	Yes	32 (86%)	20 (63%)	12 (38%)	
Using PCA with Family Members	No	11 (30%)	4 (36%)	7 (64%)	.035*
	Yes	26 (70%)	19 (73%)	7 (27%)	
Using PCA with Friends or Neighbors	No	24 (65%)	11 (46%)	13 (54%)	.005*
	Yes	13 (35%)	12 (92%)	1 (8%)	



## APPENDIX Q

### A MAP OF PALESTINE IN THE HOUSE OF ONE PARTICIPANT



APPENDIX R

KEY OF A PARTICIPANT'S HOUSE IN PALESTINE



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