BRITISH INFLUENCE ON ARAB MILITARY FORCES IN THE
GULF—THE TRUCIAL OMAN SCOUTS

By

Richard H. Barratt

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Approved:

[Signatures]

Professor Yusuf Ibhish
Advisor

Professor Zeine Zeine
Member of Committee

Professor Mahmud Zayid
Member of Committee

Professor Gerald Obermeyer
Member of Committee

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PREFACE

The purpose of this study is to examine the origins and development of the Arab-manned, British-officered Trucial Oman Scouts (TOS), the organization which provided the basis of law and order for the youngest Arab state, The United Arab Emirates.

Numerous changes have taken place in the former Trucial States in the two decades between 1951 and 1971. For the most part these changes would not have been possible without the financial benefits derived from oil. On the other hand, the oil industry could not have developed as rapidly as it did had not the Trucial Oman Scouts been present to establish minimal law and order and to insure the uninterrupted pursuit of the oil companies' activities.

The Trucial Oman Scouts, originally the Trucial Oman Levies (TOL), were the last of a long line of Arab forces which were formed by the British, yet in many ways they were unique. In size the force was extremely small, but by virtue of its local reputation it was able to perform tasks which a larger unit could not have accomplished. The Scouts succeeded in carrying out the decisions arising from the arbitration of tribal disputes with minimal force by virtue of their local availability and high degree of sustained tribal confidence. If these decisions had been put into operation without this basis of trust, much larger forces and much greater
strength would have been required. By the same token, since the Scouts were able to call on the British forces in the Gulf in the event assistance was needed against interference by an outside power, there were many types of operations which would normally occupy a larger force but were of no concern to the TOS.

The force was also unique by virtue of its being strictly a British-commanded Arab force raised for the express purpose of safeguarding British interests in the Trucial States. Other Arab forces with which the British have been concerned were formed for the declared purpose of meeting the political exigency of the Arab leaders concerned. Examples are found in the Arab Army of Emir Faisal during World War I, the Arab Legion of Jordan and the Sultan’s Armed Forces of Muscat and Oman. Some of these forces, such as the Aden Levies, were established as colonial troops. There were still other forces such as the Ras al-Khaima Mobile Defence Force (RAKMDF) and the Abu Dhabi Defence Force (ADDF) which were purely Arab forces and of no direct concern to Great Britain, although their officers were British mercenaries.

Another reason the TOS were successful in their peacekeeping role was that they did not represent any local authority. Because of this they were able to develop their reputation for impartiality with the tribes of the area as well as with the individual shaikhs who ruled the various states. None of the many other military or paramilitary police forces which have been formed in the region has been
TRUCIAL OMAN SCOUTS
able to effect the local scene to the same degree. Although some of these forces are larger than the Scouts, their weakness lies in their parochial loyalties.

The writer first had occasion to become acquainted with the Trucial Oman Scouts in October, 1967, when accompanying the official party of the United States Consul General in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, during a visit to the Trucial States. At the kind invitation of Colonel Pat Ive, Commander of the Trucial Oman Scouts, the writer received formal briefings at Regimental Headquarters, located at that time on the Royal Air Force base at Sharjah. Following this a visit was made to several of the squadrons in the field which provided an opportunity to talk informally with some of the officers and men.

The next visit to the Scouts was for a period of approximately two months in the summer of 1970, this time through the good offices of Colonel H. E. R. Watson who had assumed command from Colonel Ive. During this visit the writer spent about ten days with each of the squadrons in the field, participating with them in patrols and operations. Occasionally, this was in the company of a British officer, more often it was with Arab officers and soldiers. In an effort to update information which had been gathered earlier, the writer paid two more brief visits to the area in December, 1971, and in January, 1972. These visits afforded an opportunity to observe first-hand the events leading up to and immediately following the establishment of the United Arab Emirates.
In scope the study covers the two decades between 1951 and 1971. This period spans the time from the formation of the Trucial Oman Levies to the declaration of independence of the United Arab Emirates, at which time the British Government officially relinquished control of the force to the new federal government.

Chapter I of the study provides a brief historical survey of the British involvement in the area over a period of some 350 years. Considered in this chapter are the foundations of British trading interests in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean which eventually led to the confrontation of the British Government of India with the seafaring tribes of the colorfully-designated Pirate Coast who posed a threat to the free movement of international shipping. Next to be examined is the expansion of British interests in the area based on the discovery of oil in neighboring territories and the resultant clash in the early 1950's with Saudi Arabia over control of the Buraimi Oasis. This problem, which still remains unresolved, is reviewed briefly. The final portion of the chapter is given over to the form which British Government in the Gulf assumed once the decision was made in the late 1940's to become closely involved in the internal affairs of the area. One of the first problems that Britain faced was the need to establish law and order which was the raison d'être for the formation of the Trucial Oman Scouts.

Chapter II is a consideration of the formation and the organizational development of the Trucial Oman Scouts. Following a
brief survey of the basic principals of military organization, the first part of the chapter examines the specific circumstances which led to the establishment of the force. The second portion is concerned with the specific organization of the force at the time the control was transferred to the United Arab Emirates in 1971. Included in this section is a discussion of each of the elements that comprised the force. Also included here is a survey of the divers ethnic groups which compose the membership of the force. This is followed by an account of the historical development of the organizational structure of the force from its formation as the Trucial Oman Levies up to the time it was redesignated the Union Defence Force. The final items which are taken account of in this chapter are the specific tasks that were assigned to the TOS by Her Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and the concept of operations for the accomplishment of those tasks.

Chapter III is addressed exclusively to recruitment and training. The first section of the chapter is concerned with recruiting and considers such matters as the early experiences of the personnel who established the force. Included in this part is a consideration of the image of the individual soldier of the Trucial Oman Scouts. The attributes of the Trucial-States Arab which favored his engagement as a soldier in this type of organization are also examined. The second part of the chapter deals with military training and schooling. Under the heading of military training is an
examination of the development of training facilities and the training programs for enlisted personnel, officers and non-commis-
sioned officers (NCO's) as well as the training of British personnel prior to joining the force. The final part of this section pertains to the various academic opportunities which have been provided by the TOS for the purpose of improving the general educational level of its personnel.

Chapter IV treats the role of the Trucial Oman Scouts in civil affairs. Following a commentary on the evolution of military involvement in civil matters, the remainder of the chapter summarizes the role of the Scouts in various aspects of the local civil environment. Often their contributions appear to be minor; nevertheless, at the given time and place, and for the people concerned, each undertaking was important. The overall effect of the innumerable small services rendered over a period of twenty years was to establish the force's reputation as being more than just a military unit. The people knew the Scouts could be relied upon to provide assistance no matter what the situation might be. By thus establishing their credibility with the local population they were better able to accomplish their primary mission of keeping the peace.

Chapter V briefly views the position of the Trucial Oman Scouts as an instrument of British imperialism. This is followed by an examination of the program for the formation of the Union Defence Force, using the organization of the Trucial Oman Scouts as its
nucleus. Finally, the political and military situation of the United Arab Emirates, as it exists at the time of this writing (May, 1972), is weighed in the light of its effect on the development of the UDF. This chapter closes the current study with the writer's commentary on the potential effectiveness of the Union Defence Force.

Written source material for this study was quite limited and, as a result, heavy reliance was placed upon the few original sources which were available and which provided first-hand accounts of the early days in the Trucial Oman Scouts. In particular, these are Anthony Shepherd's Arabian Adventure, and P. S. Allfree's Warlords of Oman. While their style is both colorful and informal, they have captured the atmosphere which prevailed throughout the career of the TOS. The present writer has checked personally their descriptions and anecdotes and found them to be accurate.

Because of the dearth of written material it has been necessary to rely primarily on field work and personal interviews. It is impossible to single out the many people whose assistance and cooperation have made this study possible. However, the writer especially would like to thank, in addition to the Commanders of the TOS mentioned above, the following individuals: Mr. Ilyas M. Mansur-Bima, Librarian, Arabian Affairs Research Library, ARAMCO, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, whose untiring efforts during the period 9 to 19 January, 1972, enabled the writer to gain access to the original

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CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND

Area Description

Seven political units made up what was formerly known as the Trucial States, now the United Arab Emirates. Their combined area is approximately 32,000 square miles with a total population numbering approximately 180,000.¹ From south to north they are: Abu Dhabi, the largest in area, having some 300 miles of coastline;² Dubai; Sharjah; Ajman; Umm al-Qawain; Ras al-Khaima; and, on the coast of the Gulf of Oman, Fujairah.³

In 1820, at the time of the signing of the general treaty of peace with Great Britain,⁴ there were only five states: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman and Umm al-Qawain. On the death of the Qawasim chief, Shaikh Sultan bin Saqr of Sharjah in 1866, his domains were

¹ These figures are based on the census of 1968, the first and most recent to be held in the area.


³ See Appendix I for list of current rulers at time of this writing.

⁴ See Appendix IIA.
divided up among his four sons. The separate branches of the family were then established at Sharjah, Ras al-Khaima, Dibba, and Kalba, the latter two being located on the Gulf of Oman. Ras al-Khaima has, from time to time, been united with Sharjah, but was given recognition by the British Government as a separate shaikhdom in 1921. In actuality, both Dibba and Kalba were for a long time independent of Sharjah, though they were not formally recognized as such. Kalba eventually gained recognition as an autonomous shaikhdom in 1936 and, at that time, Dibba was considered to be a part of that state. It is now regarded as subject to Sharjah although the shaikh, Saqr ibn Abdulla, has refused to admit to this. In 1951 Shaikh Hamad ibn Said of Kalba was assassinated, thereby terminating the male line of the ruling family. Accordingly, in 1952 Kalba was incorporated into the state of Sharjah. The seventh state, Fujairah, originally under Qawasim rule, successfully asserted its independence of Sharjah in 1901. It was not recognized as a self-governing state by the British Government until 1952 when its ruler, Shaikh Mohammed ibn Hamad, undertook to accept all the treaties and agreements in force between London and the other Trucial States rulers.1

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Dubai, with a population of about 59,000,\(^1\) is the largest town and the main entrepôt port in the Trucial States, having replaced Sharjah in importance in this field. This is due in part to the silting up of the latter's creek, but more specifically to the commercial acumen of its ruler, Shaikh Rashid ibn Said. Significant of this shift in commercial influence was the fact that the headquarters of the Political Agent for the Trucial States was transferred from Sharjah to Dubai in 1954. At that time his former residence became the headquarters of the Trucial Oman Scouts.

Background of British Involvement

For over 350 years Great Britain has had contact with the states of southeast Arabia. During the early portion of this association the British attempted to use their power and influence to make the region safe for seaborne commerce, based primarily on a desire to protect their own trade routes to India. The major problem they faced almost from the beginning, but principally in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, was the suppression of privateering. This was being conducted by the Arabs of the Qawasim tribe, from what was then colorfully known as "the Pirate Coast," and also by English, French, and American corsairs.\(^2\) The other area of

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\(^1\) Figure based on the 1968 census.

major concern for the British was the suppression of slave trading for which, in the early years, Muscat was the center. Great Britain’s exclusive concern with maritime matters did not change until late in the second quarter of the twentieth century. At that time the prospects of oil caused her to adjust her priorities from maintaining peace and tranquility on the high seas to establishing a stable situation on land in order to facilitate exploitation of potential oil finds. In pursuit of this goal the British became actively involved in the protection of the Trucial States from any external interference, while at the same time working towards the orderly development of the natural resources of the region.

In more recent years the British Government sought to guide the Gulf shaikhdoms towards the adoption of modern standards in government and towards the creation of welfare services. This was done in the light of the pending withdrawal of the British presence from the Gulf. The hope was to establish a situation which was stable enough to preclude the area becoming a field of contest among major world powers trying to fill the vacuum left after the British evacuation.

The story of British involvement begins early in the seventeenth century when the English East India Company, seeking to open up trade with Persia, established a factory (khan) near Jask, on the Gulf of Oman, in 1619. At that time the Portuguese enjoyed a monopoly of power in the region, having established themselves there after Vasco de Gama
discovered the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope in November, 1497. They had fortified trading stations (khans) at numerous points along the Gulf coast, and these served as warehouses for both import and export goods. Their major stations were at Hormuz and Muscat. In 1622 the Persians, with English naval support, expelled the Portuguese from Hormuz. In token of appreciation for their participation in this action, the East India Company was given a trading station at Bandar Abbas, on Persian soil, which provided much better egress for English goods into Persia than did their position at Jask. Shortly after the establishment of the English facilities the Dutch also acquired a grant from Shah Abbas to establish a factory at Bandar Abbas. The Portuguese finally withdrew from the ensuing power struggle in the Gulf when they were forced to relinquish their last trading station at Muscat in 1650.

During the greater part of the seventeenth century an intense rivalry existed between the Dutch and the English for trade supremacy in the region, and by the end of that century the Dutch were the predominate commercial power. In 1708 the English regrouped their commercial concerns marking the turning point in the contest for control of the Gulf. During the eighteenth century the Dutch gradually yielded supremacy to the English, abandoning their last fortified

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1 See Thid., pp. 169-170 for a concise account of this commercial regrouping.
settlement on Kharg Island in 1766 after its capture and destruction by Persian tribesmen.

British efforts did not go unchallenged, however, for during the same period the French were also attempting to establish themselves in the Gulf. In 1664 a French East India company was formed, but in the competition against the Dutch they fared no better than the British and by the early part of the eighteenth century the factory which they had at Bandar Abbas had closed. In 1755 a French Residency was established at Basta where a Consul was appointed in 1765. For the remainder of the century this was France's only official representation in the Gulf. There was, however, considerable activity on the part of French agents in the area. Two in particular, a M. Oliver and a M. Bruguière, while traveling in the guise of "naturalists" during the years 1793 to 1796, appeared to have the mission of discovering some area in which the French might be able to establish commercial and political inroads in the Ottoman Empire. Among their recommendations was that France occupy Egypt.\footnote{Tbid., see pp. 189-190.} After this period French efforts in the region diminished, being limited for the most part to harassment of British shipping by warships and privateers operating from bases on the island of Mauritius. This came to an end in December, 1810, when an expeditionary force from India forced
the surrender of Mauritius. Since that time Great Britain has been the predominate western power in the Gulf.\footnote{It should be noted that this power was manifested on the seas for the great majority of this time. Britain’s interests did not turn landward until the 1940’s.}

\section*{Suppression of Piracy\footnote{Piracy is defined in international law as “acts of violence committed on the high seas against persons or property by the crew of a private vessel with the intent to plunder.” (Refer to Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law [New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1952], pp. 124-126). At various times it has been a matter of contention as to whether or not the conduct of the Qawasim tribe was in fact piracy. The argument has been put forth that their actions were those of religious zealots who were carrying on a jihad against the infidels who sailed the Persian Gulf and the adjacent waters of the Gulf of Oman, the Indian Ocean, and as far as the Red Sea and the coast of Africa. While this position cannot be discounted, there is little evidence to substantiate it. Arab craft of neighboring states, as well as other ships of the Qawasim fleet, were as susceptible to attack as were the merchant-men and the men-of-war of Christian or Hindu origin. Nor is there much evidence to indicate that the Arabs of the Gulf were particularly zealous in their faith. A second argument that was offered on behalf of the Qawasim, particularly by the secretary to the Viceroy of India in 1804 and 1805, was that they were simple Arab fishermen who had fallen prey to the fanaticism of the Wahhabis. This position does not, nor did it at the time it was first taken, bear up in the light of factual evidence. It cannot be denied that there was a marked increase in the number of incidents and the degree of their savagery following the establishment of}}

Virtually all of Great Britain’s commitment in the Trucial States stemmed from her original desire to protect her trade routes to India, and this meant the suppression of piracy on the high seas. Freebooters, both English and Arab, had been extremely active in this
part of the world during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and
the East India Company was obliged to go so far as to organize a naval
force to meet the growing threat. Lawlessness by European standards
reached its apogee in the Gulf in the beginning of the nineteenth
century when the sea-faring Arab tribes, notably the Qawasim and the
Bani Yas, were welded together and incited to even greater acts of
piracy against maritime shipping by Wahhabi emissaries who had established
their supremacy over the whole of the Arabian coast from Basra to
Dibba on the Gulf of Oman. Attacks on British ships, both merchant-
men and men-of-war, led to naval expeditions against the malfearants
in 1806, 1809, and finally, in 1819, against their headquarters at
Ras al-Khaima as well as the other ports and harbors along the 150
mile coast stretching southwest from Ras Musandam. On 8 January, 1820,
a General Treaty of Peace was concluded to which all the principal

\[1\] Wahhabi control over the Gulf coast in the latter part of the eighteen-
th century. Most of these were directed initially against native craft.
It was not until 1797 that the first British vessel, the Bassein, was
captured and taken to Ras al-Khaima. Nevertheless, alleged Wahhabi
inspiration cannot be held to account for the depredations committed
by the bellicose Qawasim tribesmen both before and after the Wahhabi
presence in the area. Further, there is little evidence that the
Qawasim were motivated by other than the plunder of shipping which was
easier and more profitable than either fishing or pearl diving. For a
detailed account of Qawasim piracy during the period 1779 to 1820
consult Great Britain, India Office J.G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian
(This reference will hereafter be referred to as "Lorimer"). See also
Wilson, Persian Gulf, ch. xiii.

1 Wilson, Persian Gulf, pp. 261-262.

2 Donald Hawley, The Trucial States. London: George Allen and Unwin,
Ltd., 1970), pp. 27. See also supra, n. 2, p. 7.
shaikhs of what was known as the Pirate Coast adhered.\footnote{See Appendix IIA.}

The treaty, while not denying the signatories the right to carry on war with each other by sea, declared all other aggression at sea to be piratical and unlawful.\footnote{Ibid., Article 2.} To give emphasis to their determination to maintain the peace, a British squadron was stationed at Ras al-Khaima for the purpose of enforcing the treaty. Their failure to do this after the campaign of 1806 was an abetting factor in the deterioration of the situation which eventually led to the 1819 campaign. However, since it was permitted by the terms of the treaty, many transgressions continued to be committed in the name of acknowledged war. Accordingly, in 1835 the shaikhs were persuaded to bind themselves by a maritime truce not to engage under any circumstances in hostilities by sea for a period of six months during the pearl-diving season. The advantages of this agreement were so marked that the shaikhs were easily prevailed upon to renew the truce. They continued to do so for increasing periods until on 4 May, 1853, a Treaty of Peace in Perpetuity was concluded among all the shaikhs of the Trucial Coast, as this area was henceforth called. This treaty established a perpetual maritime truce.\footnote{See Appendix IID.} It was to be watched over and enforced by Great Britain, to whom the signatories were to refer any breach. The implementation of this treaty served
not only to establish the objective of maritime peace in the Gulf, but it was also the foundation on which Britain based her position in the Trucial States up to the time of the establishment of the United Arab Emirates in December of 1971.¹

**Suppression of Slave Trading**

During the nineteenth century England played a leading part in the curtailment of slavery and the slave trade, particularly in eastern Arabia. Britain's predominance and naval strength gave it both the responsibility and the opportunity to proceed against a traffic that was deeply rooted in the culture of the people since pre-Islamic times. For centuries a profitable trade in slaves had been carried on from Africa to India and Arabia. The general treaty of 1820 contained a clause defining the transport of slaves as piracy and therefore forbidden to the signatory powers,² but this prohibition was

¹ "Britain's position in the Persian Gulf stands or falls on the trucial system. Without it there can be no real justification for the maintenance of the special relationship in which the British Government stands towards the maritime principalities. None of the restrictive agreements relating to foreign affairs, the slave trade, the arms traffic, oil concessions and so forth, could be defended if it had not been for the assumption by the British Government of responsibility for keeping the peace at sea..." J.B. Kelly, "The Legal and Historic Basis of the British Position in the Persian Gulf," *St. Antony's Papers*, No. 4 (1958), pp. 139-140.

² See Appendix IIA, Article 9.
little observed. Muscat was the main market for slaves who were imported from the East African territories of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman.

During the period from 1838 to 1839\(^1\) and again in 1847,\(^2\) the shaikhs of the Trucial Coast pledged themselves to prohibit the carriage of slaves on board vessels belonging to them or their subjects. Further, they consented to the detention and search of such vessels and to their confiscation in the case of a violation of the above mentioned pledge. In 1852 agreements on the slave trade were negotiated by Great Britain with both the Turkish and the Persian governments and from then on organized patrols were carried out by British naval vessels in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

**Expansion of British Interests**

Officially, both diplomatic and administrative contacts between the British and the Gulf states were conducted initially through the East India Company until 1858 when the administrative functions were transferred to the Crown. From then until 1873 these contacts were the responsibility of the Bombay Government and were then subsequently assumed by the (British) Government of India. Upon conclusion of the Indian Independence Act of 1947 all responsibilities were shifted to

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\(^1\) See Appendix IIB.

\(^2\) See Appendix IIC.
the Foreign Office in London.

The transfer from company to governmental control in the nineteenth century coincided with a change in the nature of British interests in the area. Hitherto these had been purely commercial and primarily concerned with the Persian trade. The opening of the Suez Canal created a new and shorter line of communication between Britain and her Eastern domains, and the Persian Gulf lay on the flank of this route. Henceforward, it became the principle objective of British policy to see that none of its European rivals secured a point d'appui in the area. During the twentieth century the search for, and the discovery of, oil on the western shore of the Gulf gave British interest new dimensions. She was now led to forming even closer ties and to assuming wider responsibilities in relation to the Gulf states.

England did not have exclusive commercial relationships in the area. The United States in 1833 (and again in 1958) and France in 1844, both signed treaties of amity and commerce with the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. The Netherlands concluded a commercial agreement in 1877. Due, however, to the predominance of British naval power in the area, it was upon Britain that the task evolved for securing those conditions in which trade could flow freely.

In the last decades of the nineteenth century, other European powers began to renew their interests in the area. In 1898 the French sought to secure a coaling station at Bandar Jissah, near Muscat.\(^1\) During this period it was learned that the Russians were actively engaged in seeking a concession to build a railway from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf.\(^2\) At the same time, the Germans sought to make Kuwait the terminus of their projected Berlin-Baghdad Railway.\(^3\) This led Great Britain to secure closer ties between herself and the Gulf states. In agreements concluded with the Trucial States in 1892, the Arab rulers undertook not to "cede, sell, mortgage, or otherwise dispose" of their territories to anyone except the British Government and not to enter into any relationship with a foreign government other than that of Great Britain without British consent.\(^4\) These agreements remained in force until the formation of the United Arab Emirates in December 1971.

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2 See Kazemzadah, Russia and Britain, pp. 217-219.


4 See Appendix IIIE.
British Protection Against External Aggression

The British, on their side, have undertaken to protect these states from external interference. This was done implicitly as far as the Trucial States were concerned in the perpetual maritime treaty of 1853,1 and explicitly in the case of the other Gulf states, such as Kuwait and Bahrain, with which England had similar relations. In practice Great Britain has defended the independence of the Gulf states both through diplomatic action and, on occasion, by naval support.

Ottoman claims to hegemony, pressed from time to time, notably after 1870, following their annexation of Hasa, met with resistance. The presence of British ships in adjacent waters checked the threat to Bahrain.2

A more recent example of the use of British naval support for the defense of the political integrity of a Gulf state occurred during the Kuwait-Iraqi crisis of 1961. Alarmed by Iraq's claim that Kuwait was an integral part of her territory, Kuwait appealed to both the Arab League and Great Britain for military assistance on 27 June, 1961. British marines from the commando carrier Bulwark began landing on 1 July. Throughout the initial stages of the operation supplies and support were provided by vessels of the British navy. In addition,

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1 See Appendix IID, Article 3.
within a few days of the landing, two destroyers and one aircraft
carrier, which had been on station in the Mediterranean, had sailed
into the Gulf via the Suez Canal to provide support to forces already
present.¹

Iran has also made claims to territory on the Arab side of the
Gulf. On occasion in the past, notably in Bahrain during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and briefly in Muscat, she
succeeded in imposing her rule. Claims to Bahrain were persistently
asserted until the plebiscite of 1970. At every opportunity Iran
protested the British treaties with the shaikhs; the Treaty of
Jeddah of 1927, which by implication acknowledged Bahrain's independent
status; and the granting of oil concessions by the shaikhs of Bahrain
in 1930 and 1934. The Iranians also refused to acknowledge the
governments of Qatar, the Trucial States, and Muscat and Oman,
although they did not claim sovereignty over them.

Persistent threats to the independence of the coastal states
have come from central Arabia, where the proselytizing zeal of the
Wahhabi movement, founded in the Nejad in the middle of the eighteenth
century, became an instrument of political aggrandizement in the hands
of the Saudis.² In the first decade of the nineteenth century, the

¹ For a more detailed account of forces and equipment employed by the
British in the 1961 operation see Norvell B. DeAtkine, "The Contemporary
and Future Implications of the Impending British Withdrawal from the
Persian Gulf" (unpublished M.A. thesis, American University of Beirut,

² S.B. Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf (2nd ed.;
Wahhabis, having seized the Buraimi Oasis, a group of nine villages at the crossroads of the principal routes into Oman, secured the submission of the maritime tribes along the so-called Pirate Coast and made the oasis the base for repeated incursions into the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman.\(^1\) This pressure was maintained until well into the second half of the century, relieved only by successful Egyptian incursions against the Wahhabis from 1812 to 1818 and from 1837 to 1839, during which they had to relinquish their hold on the oasis.\(^2\) The British did not intervene actively in the land fighting, but through naval and diplomatic activity, demonstrated their concern for the political integrity of the coastal states. In 1866 the Wahhabi Emir, Abdullah, now much weakened, gave the British Resident in the Persian Gulf\(^3\) through an envoy, Muhammad ibn Abdulla\(\_\)al-Mani, a written promise not to "injure or attack the territories of the Arab tribes in alliance with the British Government ... further than receiving the zakah [tribute] that has been customary of old."\(^4\) Three years later the Wahhabi garrison was expelled from the Buraimi Oasis.\(^5\)

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1 Wilson, Persian Gulf, p. 197.


3 Lieutenant Colonel William Pelly.


5 Kelly, Arabian Frontiers, p. 87.
In the early years of the twentieth century the young Saudi Emir Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud recovered all the territories of his ancestors and sought to renew Saudi influence over the Trucial shaikhs. A British remonstrance dissuaded him from visiting them in 1906.1 In the Anglo-Saudi treaty of December, 1915, Ibn Saud undertook to refrain from all aggression on, or interference with, the territory of the coastal states.2 In 1919, a Saudi invasion of Kuwait was checked by British intervention. In the treaty of Jeddah of May, 1927, Ibn Saud, now king of the Hejaz and Nejed, bound himself to “maintain peaceful and friendly relations with the territories of Kuwait and Bahrain and with the shaikhs of Qatar and the Oman coast, who are in special treaty relations with His Britannic Majesty’s Government.”3

Thus the Saudis acknowledged the existence of the coastal states as separate entities; but Saudi pressure did not relax, taking now the form of claims for frontier rectification with Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and Muscat and Oman. Between 1935 and 1937 fruitless negotiations took

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1 See Lorimer, pp. 746-747.


3 Great Britain, Command Papers 2951 (1927), Treaty Series No. 25, as cited by Kelly, Arabian Frontiers, pp. 121-122.
place between Saudi Arabia and the British Government, acting on behalf of the Trucial shaikhs and the shaikh of Qatar. The British took their stand on the frontiers laid down by the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914 fixing inter alia, the southeastern boundaries of the Ottoman Empire. Although the terms of this convention had never been communicated to Ibn Saud, he formally acknowledged himself as subordinate to the Ottoman Government by a treaty of the same year, May, 1914. While they held him bound by this convention, the British were prepared to admit a "reasonable claim" by the Saudis, based on the evidence of effective occupation since 1914, to territory east of

1 The validity of this stand is subject to question as the original Anglo-Turkish Convention setting forth the borders of the Ottoman Empire in southeast Arabia which was drawn up in 1913 was never ratified. The Convention of 1914 established Ottoman boundaries in southwest Arabia, but it did, however, make reference to the limits which were contained in the 1913 instrument. This was accepted by the British as de facto recognition of those frontiers. This interpretation was then extended to embrace the concept that Ibn Saud's recognition of Ottoman suzerainty over Nejed and Hasa on 15 May, 1914, meant tacit acceptance of the boundaries established in the 14 June, 1914, Anglo-Turkish Convention. In point of fact, the convention was actually concluded on 9 March, 1914, before Ibn Saud's commitment, which tends to make the British position rather moot. Consult Great Britain, Memorial, Arbitration Concerning Buraimi and the Common Frontier Between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia, Vol. I (submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 1955), p. 84. This reference will hereafter be referred to as "British Memorial."

2 "During later discussions in 1951, the United Kingdom Government formulated two criteria on the basis of which they considered Ibn Saud could establish acquisition of sovereignty in areas of the disputed territory. These were: (a) the area in question continuously inhabited by a sedentary tribe which had consistently over a period of years and to date acknowledged allegiance to Ibn Saud; (b) in an area regularly used only by a nomadic tribe, if such tribe had consistently over a period of years acknowledged allegiance to King Ibn Saud and not to any other ruler in Oman, and if the area was not regularly used by a nomadic tribe which had not consistently acknowledged King Ibn Saud." Great Britain, Arab States, n. 1, p. 10.
these frontiers, and in the discussions of 1935-1937 they offered to recognize a line reaching, at its furthest point, 53° East.\(^1\) This was rejected by Saudi Arabia, which claimed territory at the base of the Qatar peninsula and to a point approximately 150 miles west of Buraimi. In support of these claims the Saudis cited: (1) the authority they had exercised in the areas claimed for part of the nineteenth century; and (2) the payment of zakat by the tribes, living in these regions, who had been converted to Wahhabi doctrines and acknowledged the spiritual authority of the Saudi ruler.\(^2\)

In 1949, following reports that there might be oil deposits in the Buraimi region, the Saudi Government put forward even more extensive claims to territory on the fringe of Abu Dhabi, including although not specifically naming, the Buraimi Oasis, governance of which was divided between the Sultan of Muscat and Oman and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi. Anglo-Saudi discussions in August of 1951 led to an agreement to a conference of British and Saudi Arabian representatives with those of Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and the other shaikhs concerned. In the meantime, all oil company activity from either side and also the movements of the Trucial Oman Levies was to be restricted

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1 This became known as the "Riyadh Line".

2 The payment of zakat was the major point in the legal arguments put forth by Saudi Arabia concerning the Buraimi Dispute. For further discussions of this point consult Oman and the Southern Shore of the Persian Gulf (Calro; Arabian American Oil Company, 1952), pp. 258-266, and Kelly, Arabian Frontiers, pp. 237-243. The former contains examples taken from "official records" of payment of zakat that were made by the rulers of the Gulf states to the Wahhabi emirs.
to areas outside that which was to be the object of discussion at the conference. The conference was held early in 1952, but adjourned without making any progress or even discussing the Buraimi question.

The Saudis resorted to force. On 31 August, 1952, with about 40 armed followers, Turki ibn Abdullah Ataishan, a Saudi official, arrived in Hamasa, one of the villages under the suzerainty of the Sultan of Muscat. The Government of Great Britain, which had been appealed to by the Trucial shaikhs and the Sultan of Muscat, lodged a protest which was rejected by the Saudi Arabian Government, whose representative sought to subvert the allegiance of the tribes in the area by bribery. A containing force of the Trucial Oman Levies proceeded to the Abu Dhabi part of the oasis, while the Sultan of Muscat, Said ibn Taimur, prepared to expel the intruders from the territory with a force of bedouin tribesmen he was gathering on the Batinah Coast, south of Dibba. He was dissuaded by the British, who had negotiated a holding agreement with Saudi Arabia, under which all forces in the area were to remain in situ pending the resumption of negotiations. The Saudis, while continuing a policy of bribery and subordination, suggested that a plebiscite should be held to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants. They also attempted to have the blockade lifted, which had been imposed on the Saudi force by the British, arguing that it was injuring the inhabitants of the oasis by curtailing their movements. In July, 1954, the two governments agreed to submit the dispute to an arbitration tribunal. In September, 1955,
the tribunal, which included one British and one Saudi Arabian member, along with one member from Cuba and one from Pakistan, under a Belgian Chairman, met in Geneva. At the tribunal, the Agent representing the British Government's case, Sir Hartley Shawcross,\(^1\) produced evidence of Saudi attempts, in violation of the arbitration agreement, to promote a coup d'état in Abu Dhabi; of continuing corruption in the Buraimi area; and even of attempts to embrace members of the tribunal itself.\(^2\) The Saudi member, Shaikh Yusuf Yasin, made no pretense at impartiality. The British member, Sir Reader Bullard, resigned from the tribunal. His example was followed shortly by its president, Dr. de Visscher; and by the member from Cuba, Dr. Dihigo.

Subsequently, forces of the ruler of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, supported by the Trucial Oman Levies, re-occupied Buraimi and the areas to the west of it, and the British Government announced that it would regard the newly established frontier as a modified Riyadh Line. Documents which later fell into British hands fully corroborated their earlier statements and suspicions.

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\(^1\) Under the terms of the arbitration agreement, each party nominated one member to the tribunal. These two members then chose the remaining three, none of whom could be a national of either party concerned. One of these members was then selected as president. Under the terms of international law which govern membership of arbitration tribunals, all members must be legally independent of either party to the dispute, i.e., impartial. On this point see Kelsen, International Law, pp. 377-378. Each party to the dispute was to be represented before the tribunal by an agent. The Agent for Saudi Arabia was Abdul Rahman Azzam. For the complete text of the arbitration agreement of 1954 as cited by Kelly, see Appendix A, Arabian Frontiers, pp. 281-292.

concerning Saudi behavior.¹

Oil and its Impact on British Interests

To the two main objectives of British Gulf policy in the nineteenth century, i.e., the provision of secure conditions for trade, and the prevention of strategic encroachment by other powers into the area, a third was added in the twentieth century: that of insuring that the natural resources of the area did not fall into hostile hands.

This was provided for through a series of diplomatic instruments between the rulers of the Gulf states and the British. The Trucial shaikhs undertook to make the granting of concessions or other monopolies dependent on British consent in the agreements of 1911² regarding pearling, and 1922³ regarding petroleum.

In practice, the control by the British over granting of oil concessions did not confine the exploitation of the natural resources solely to British financial interests. In territories where concessionary rights were subject to British veto, all land concessions were held by subsidiaries of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) in which, in addition to the British and the Anglo-Dutch companies,

¹ Great Britain, Arab States, p. 11.
² See Appendix IIF.
³ See Appendix IIG.
United States and French companies also participated. Concessionary offshore rights off Qatar are held by Shell; off Abu Dhabi and Dubai by a subsidiary of British Petroleum (BP), and the French Compagnie Française de Petroles; and off the other Trucial States by subsidiaries of IPC.

**Economic Condition of the Trucial States**

Economically, the Trucial States are, for the most part, less fortunately placed than the other states contiguous to the Gulf. With the exceptions of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, they have virtually no income from oil except that which is derived from payments for exploratory rights. Until the discovery of oil in Abu Dhabi in September, 1958, the rulers had an annual income estimated at little more that 600,000 Sterling between them.\(^1\) Even under these circumstances, the rulers did make efforts to improve the social conditions of their people. All of them contributed to the hospital in Dubai. The rulers of Dubai and Abu Dhabi began developing police forces, a project which has now been mirrored by each of the other states. In Dubai, the ruler, Shaikh Rashid ibn Said, has provided extensive financial support to a number of municipal projects.

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\(^1\) The actual financial impact of the 1958 discovery was not felt until virtually four years later when the first shipment of oil left Das Island. Continued exploration had, by then, opened up even further productive fields and by 1963 production amounted to 2.29 million long tons, which meant approximately 2.29 million Sterling in payments to Abu Dhabi alone. Hawley, *Trucial States*, pp. 216-217.
The Trucial States have been the recipients of help, not only from Britain, but also from their more affluent Gulf neighbors. Kuwait has provided schools at Sharjah and Ras al-Khaima, and pays for the services of a number of teachers throughout the Trucial States. Both Kuwait and Qatar have in the past provided funds for the dredging of the harbors of both Dubai and Sharjah. Iran built and staffed a clinic in Ajman and a hospital in Dubai. In addition, Iran built and provided funds to staff a large secondary school in Dubai. Since the discovery of oil, or more specifically, since 1966, Abu Dhabi has assumed more and more of the financial burden of the Trucial States and, under the new Federation, will more than likely assume an even greater share.  

British Government in the Gulf

The bonds between Britain and the Gulf states were close; however, unlike the states of the Aden protectorate, they were never claimed as dependencies by the British. It was a policy of the East India Company and the British Government of India to avoid involvement

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1 In July, 1970, the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development was established through which funds are to be provided to assist in projects which have been subject to economic feasibility studies. "The Emirs Unite," Petroleum Press Service, XXXIX (January, 1971), 8. On February 18, 1972, Reuters announced that talks were under way between officials of the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait concerning the hand-over of Kuwait-run schools and hospitals to Union control. Article, "UAE to Control 48 Kuwaiti Run Establishments," The Daily Star, Beirut, 19 February, 1972, p. 3.
in the internal affairs of the Gulf states. Legally, the British Government had no jurisdiction over them; no power to impose any regulations for their peace, order, and good government. According to British sources the shaikhdoms were not protectorates, but enjoyed special status as independent states under British protection. However, since the assumption of responsibility for the external affairs of the shaikhdoms has caused the Government of Great Britain to be held liable for them internationally, the "United Kingdom had increasingly sought in recent years to see that their internal affairs were conducted efficiently and to encourage the adoption of progressive social policies." 

Helping in these policies were several British subjects in the service of the rulers. The Shaikh of Qatar had a British advisor. Sir Charles Belgrave was advisor to the Shaikh of Bahrain between 1926 and

1 "... The status of the Persian Gulf states, with the exception of Muscat, is less well defined than that of the Protectorate shaikhdoms. Official British parlance refers to them as 'independent states in special treaty relations with His Majesty's Government.' This phrase is rather vague and does not offer much of a basis for the proper legal classification of their status..." H. J. Liebesny, "International Relations of Arabia, the Dependent Area", The Middle East Journal, I (April, 1947), 150.

2 Great Britain, Arab States, p. 14. It may be argued that this, in fact, denotes the exercise of more influence than Great Britain cared to admit. It has been pointed out that the same situation existed in the relations of the Government of Great Britain and the Indian states prior to 1947. While most of the governments did have "virtually complete control within their territories, they were, in turn, completely controlled by the British Government and, therefore, they were not sovereign. Both British and Indian courts have so decided." Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1956), p. 295.
1958. The Sultan of Muscat and Oman had a British foreign minister until October, 1958. And on the whole, the British Government made itself available to give technical advice to the rulers of the oil states on the utilization of their surplus revenues.

In 1950 the Government of Great Britain promoted the formation of a British officered Arab force--The Trucial Oman Levies, later known as the Trucial Oman Scouts (TOS)\(^1\)--to maintain peace and good order in the Trucial States. In 1953 the force was expanded from 100 to 500 men. By the 1968 census the force was listed at 1,000. The burden of the upkeep of this force was borne 100 per cent by Great Britain until December of 1971.\(^2\)

In 1952 the British Government sponsored the establishment of a council of rulers to coordinate action on matters of common concern. Much of the economic and social development, and more recently the political machinations that went into the formation of the Union, proceeded under the auspices of the Council of Rulers of the Trucial States. This has met twice a year since 1952. Typical of the topics

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\(^1\) It is a commentary on the effect that this force has had on the culture of the area when one finds that in discussions with members of the ranks, or for that matter with the average "man on the street", the force is referred to as the "tee-on-es". Any other title is not understood, even the proper Arabic.

\(^2\) Reuters reported on 19 March, 1972, that on the agenda of the pending cabinet meeting of the United Arab Emirates was the approval of its first budget, of which the largest portion, 4.41 million dinars for defense, will be spent on "improving and maintaining the 1,600-strong Union Defense Force, formerly known as the Trucial Oman Scouts." "Ministers of UAE will Review Budget with Zaid," The Daily Star, Beirut, 20 March, 1972, p. 2.
that were under consideration by this body were labor laws, anti-
locust measures, travel documents, and licensing.

In 1955, by means of a monetary grant, the United Kingdom
launched the Trucial States Development Scheme with a view towards
making a direct contribution towards economic and social development
of the area. Most of this assistance went towards building elementary
and intermediate schools at Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Buraimi,
Kalba, and Fujairah; to build a trade school in Dubai; and to
launch a teacher-training program. Health projects financed under
the program included dispensaries to provide medical services
throughout the Trucial States, anti-malarial spraying, and a gift of
buildings and equipment to the hospital at Dubai. To increase
productive wealth, an agricultural experimental station and school
were started at Ras al-Khaima, where experiments in growing
vegetables and fruits in saline conditions have been conducted since
1955. Since 1969 successful experiments in breeding purebred cattle
have also been underway.

The British Government relations with the Gulf rulers were handled
through the "Political Resident in the Persian Gulf".\(^1\) The residency
was initially located at Bushire until 1948. It was then moved to
Bahrain, where it remained until the British withdrawal from the Gulf

\(^1\) "The resident's administrative authority also extended to the Kuria
Muria Islands off the southern coast of Muscat, which ceded them to
Britain in 1854. Legally these formed a part of the former Aden
in 1971. Under the Political Resident there were Political Agents stationed at Dubai and Abu Dhabi for the Trucial States, Doha in Qatar, in Bahrain, and at Kuwait. There was also a consul-general at Muscat. These British officials, who are to be distinguished from the British technical advisors mentioned above\(^1\) who are in the service of the rulers, exercised, in addition to their diplomatic and administrative functions, an extra-territorial judicial authority through district courts.

Two types of courts existed in the Trucial States. The ruler's courts, which sat for cases involving the nationals of the individual state concerned, and the British court for the Trucial States, which initially had jurisdiction over all non-Trucial States subjects. Until 1946 the concept of extra-territorial jurisdiction was based strictly on agreement between the rulers and the Government of Great Britain. However, this jurisdiction was formalized in Trucial States Orders in Council of 1946, 1949 and 1950, and then later modified in 1960.\(^2\)

The Political Agent was the judge of the Trucial States court and the assistant Political Agent acted as the assistant judge. Cases

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\(^1\) Supra, pp. 25-26.

\(^2\) Originally the extra-territorial jurisdiction extended over all non-native residents in the Trucial States with the exception of Muslims who were not British subjects. (see Liebsney, "British Jurisdiction," MEJ, p. 322). By the Transfer of Jurisdiction Regulation of 1960, the jurisdiction over the nationals of most Arab and Muslim states was ceded to the rulers. Excepted were the citizens of Commonwealth countries.
heard in these courts could be appealed to Her Britannic Majesty's Chief Court for the Persian Gulf, which was presided over by a professional judge in Bahrain. The next court of appeal was Her Britannic Majesty's Full Court for the Persian Gulf, made up of individuals who had held judicial office or had had at least nine years experience as lawyers. A joint court was established to hear those civil cases which involved individuals who came under separate jurisdiction. This was presided over by the assistant Political Agent and an appointee of the ruler of the state concerned. The appellate court in these cases was a similarly organized tribunal on which the Political Agent and sometimes the ruler of the state would sit. In 1966 the Abu Dhabi Traffic Court was established to handle all traffic cases. This was the result of a dispute between the British Government and the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Shaikh Shakhbut ibn Sultan, over the jurisdiction in two traffic cases on Das Island. Similar courts were then established in the other states, though not because of a conflict over jurisdiction.

A mixture of legal codes was used in a system which was tailored for the situation in the Trucial States. The basis of this system was the penal code and the code of criminal procedures which were used everywhere that Great Britain had extra-territorial jurisdiction. To these were added a code of contracts, certain India acts which were applicable and, for specific subjects, Queen's Regulations were published under Trucial States Orders in
Council. In cases where none of the above was applicable, English
Common Law was the authority.

In 1964 a Jordanian lawyer, Ahmed al-Bitar, was appointed as
legal advisor to the Trucial States. Although he drafted legislation
for the establishment of three separate courts and a penal code, it
was several years before the rulers took any action on them.

In June, 1959, Orders in Council were issued with the object of
separating the judiciary from the executive responsibilities of the
British political representatives. Under this arrangement, the
Political Resident in Bahrain ceased to exercise judicial functions
and all the judges were legally qualified persons. In the Trucial
States it was not possible to divest the Political Agents of their
judicial responsibilities, but the registrar for the courts was a
member of the bar.  

1 These covered such matters as liquor, smuggling, illegal firearms,
etc. It was common practice for the rulers of the various states
to issue parallel decrees in order that application of the law was
uniform for all persons in the area.

2 See al-Baharna, Legal Status, p. 10; Hawley, Trucial States,
pp. 178-181; and Great Britain, Arab States, p. 14.
CHAPTER II
ORGANIZATION

Fundamentals of Military Organization

There are certain fundamentals that apply in military organization regardless of the size of the force or the purpose for which it is established. Basically, an army must be formed in a manner that will make the most efficient use of available arms, equipment and personnel, bearing in mind that the ultimate objective of the organization is success in instances of armed conflict.

The nucleus of the military system is the infantryman. His mission is to close with and overcome the enemy and to establish physical control of the ground. Around this single entity the rest of the organization is apportioned. Support elements must be organized to handle the heavier, complex, crew-served weapons, which assist the infantryman in the accomplishment of his mission. Finally, a service organization must be developed to provide for the needs of the combat segments in the field. The degree to which each of these separate divisions is developed is indicative of the
level of modernization that an army has achieved.\footnote{A primitive type force will be organized along lines which place almost total resource concentration into the individual combatant, giving some consideration to combat support and almost none to service support. Newly developed "guerrilla" armies are typical of this type of force. A "modern" force will provide the maximum in support for the individual rifleman, not only in the form of ground support weapons, both direct and indirect fire, but also by tactical and strategic air support and even mechanized transport to carry him to the battle site.}

The basic unit of a military organization is the smallest combat team capable of meeting the usual situations of infantry combat by coordinated effort. The size of the unit must be limited to that which is within the capability of a single man to control without the use of artificial means of communication. The development of the remainder of the combat division is then a matter of assembling a combination of these units to form an organization capable of meeting the requirements for which it was established.

Support components are organized along the same lines, but in this case the smallest integrant is usually the team required to operate successfully a single support weapon, be it a machine gun, an artillery field piece, a tank or an airplane. These teams are then combined into a larger structure for the purpose of providing effective, easily controlled, and flexible support to the infantry.

Constitution of the service sections follows the same principle, i.e., small teams grouped successively into larger ones.
Dependent upon the organization's degree of sophistication, the size of the service element will be at least comparable to, and usually larger than, the two combat segments combined.

The final element to be considered is command and control. This is essential to every military organization and yet, in the final analysis, it consists of a single man. Each unit and each group of units must have a leader or a "commander" who must assume total responsibility for the aggregate. In every case, be it the small team or the army as a whole, there can be only one man whose authority is final. When this principle is ignored, the efficiency of the entire mechanism is jeopardized.

The criterion for any successful military organization lies in its flexibility: the speed and efficiency with which it responds to the will of the commander.¹

A comparison has been made between military organization and the human body:

...The commander is the brain and the combat forces are the muscles. The muscles are nourished to provide the strength, and they have been trained and exercised in the work they have to do. The brain knows the condition of each muscle and what it is capable of doing. When the time for action has arrived, the brain sends its orders to each muscle as to just what it must do to accomplish the desired

purpose... The senses of the body correspond to the intelligence system of the army, the stomach is the supply system, the nerves are the communications system for the orders and information.1

Military Background--The Situation Before the Trucial Oman Scouts

From the beginning, tribal conflict dominated Britain's relations with the Trucial Coast and was, in fact, the basis of England's ever-deepening involvement with the shaikhdoms.2 While the treaty of 1820 led to the eventual resolution of the problem of maritime warfare and piracy, it did nothing to stem the tide of land warfare. Since Great Britain's concern with the area was limited to the protection of her sea routes it was a point of policy to remain uninvolved in the internal affairs of the various states. As a result, tribal wars continued to be waged uncurbed. This situation existed until well after the turn of the century.

The ability of seven separate sovereign states to exist in a relatively small geographical area was due in part to the various treaty conditions imposed by Britain. It was not until 1908, however,

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2 See supra, pp. 7-10, for the discussion of piracy and England's desire to secure her lines of communications with India.
that British interest in the area began to awaken. In that year oil was discovered in Persia, placing the Gulf in an entirely new perspective. By the 1930s attention was turned to Arabia, and in 1937 concessions were granted on the Trucial Coast to an associate company of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). It was not until after World War II, which had caused a temporary halt to exploration, that England's interest in the progress of the oil companies in the area caused her to become far more involved in the internal affairs of the shaikhdoms than had hitherto been the case.¹

In 1932 Great Britain and Sharjah entered into a civil air agreement by which landing facilities were established for Imperial Airways, later to become British Overseas Air Corporation (BOAC). Later, in 1937, similar agreements were completed with Dubai, whereby Imperial Airways established landing facilities on the Dubai creek for its flying boats. Almost simultaneously troubles broke out between Dubai and Sharjah. Eventually, war erupted in 1940, threatening the safe utilization of the landing sites. It was the extremely difficult task of the Political Agent in Bahrain, under whose jurisdiction the Trucial States fell, to sort out the conflict and try to bring about a peaceful solution. This provided the first indication that a change in British policy in the area was needed. The developing situation has been described by Sir William Luce,

¹ Hawley, Trucial States, p. 173.
former Political Resident on Bahrain, in the foreword to Hawley's book:

By a strange twist of history it was only after the British withdrawal in 1947 from India, where our imperial interests had been the sole reason for the growth of our long connection with the Trucial Coast, that a new interest---oil---began to draw us into that closer involvement with the landward and internal affairs of the Trucial States which our forebearers has so studiously avoided. This small neglected appendage of a mighty empire was to witness the last flicker of the imperial instinct as well as the quickening of the twentieth century conscience. . .1

One of the main elements of this "quickening" of Britain's conscience was the slave trade which was being carried on through the Trucial States. Slaves were being brought from Africa and Baluchistan and transited through the Trucial States enroute to Arabia. This proved to be a point of developing public concern on the home front as well as a source of embarrassment on the international scene as Britain, based on the control that she exercised over their external affairs, was held more and more responsible for the internal affairs of the shaikhdoms as well. Matters continued to worsen proportionately with increasing incidents of abduction into slavery in the interior.

Inland travel on the part of anyone was a matter that required an armed body guard. It was not an uncommon thing for the British political representatives and oil exploration teams to be shot at by

1 Ibid., p. 7.
Bedouins, and armed gangs often held up vehicles moving along the few roads and tracks that existed. The unstable internal situation that existed in the Trucial States, exemplified by the war which was waged between Sharjah and Dubai from 1945 to 1948, merely served to compound the general mood of lawlessness.

Treaty limitations greatly restricted Great Britain's ability to deal with the deteriorating situation. The circumstances whereby England gave her guarantee of protection from external forces was based on her maritime control of the area. The original concept was that she would provide support against foreign aggression along the coasts. Landward protection of frontiers, on the other hand, required the use of land forces as did any hope of curtailing the burgeoning slave trade or the protection of travelers.

As an initial step towards more intense involvement, and hence control, in the internal affairs of the Trucial States a fresh condition was laid down for the British Government's recognition of new rulers—the requirement to accept the advice of the Political Agent. With the increased significance of the role of Political Agent it then became necessary to provide the means by which to

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1 See Appendix IID.

2 Hawley goes on to state: "... in practice this was never pressed to its logical conclusion, and the Political Agents never progressed from genuine advice to enforcement of Britain's will in internal matters..." Trucial States, p. 173.
enforce his authority when needed. The ability to call on the Arab
soldiers of the Aden Levies proved to be at best a makeshift
solution that was far from being either responsive or reliable. Thus
the Trucial Oman Levies were formed to provide the Political Agent
with his own ready means of preventing the parties from fighting
among themselves.

Mission of the Trucial Oman Levies

At the time of their formation the mission of the Trucial
Oman Levies was to "put down slavery, prevent gun-running, and
escort the British Political Officers."\(^1\) Over the years this
mission statement has evolved to reflect the internal security
aspects of their role in the simple statement, "The major role of
the TOS is to keep the peace throughout the Trucial States. . ."\(^2\)

Organization
Composition of the Units

In December, 1971, the combat structure of the Trucial Oman
Scouts was five rifle squadrons and a support squadron under a single
regimental headquarters.\(^3\)

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2 Trucial Oman Scouts Handbook (Mu'askar al-Murqaab, al-Heira: Scout
3 See Appendix III, Organizational chart of the Trucial Oman Scouts.
The rifle squadrons were divided into three combat troops, two of which were designated as "light" signifying the vehicular assignment of four Land Rovers. The third troop was designated as "heavy" due to its equipage of one Land Rover and one 3-ton Bedford truck. In addition to the commander and his second-in-command, the headquarters troop was comprised of administration, signal, maintenance and medical sections. The combat troops were further divided into three sections. These constituted the smallest combat teams in the organization. Over and above the basic rifle, the armament of the squadron consisted of support weapons in the form of light machine guns, 3-inch mortars, and 3.5-inch rocket launchers. The average strength of a rifle squadron was 4 officers and 100 to 140 other ranks.

A support group provided general combat support for the rifle squadrons. It was comprised of a machine gun and a reconnaissance troop, a mortar troop, and an administration detachment. The designation of the machine-gun and reconnaissance troop was a misnomer, indicating the desired potential of the unit rather than its actual capability. It was divided into two sections, each of which was equipped with two general purpose machine guns. There was no reconnaissance section as such. The mortar troop was divided into three sections, each of which was equipped with two 81-millimeter
mortars. The administrative detachment provided the same services as the headquarters section of the rifle squadrons.

The service organization which supplies the needs of the combat elements is a considerably more complex establishment that was generally known as the Murqaab Garrison. This included Headquarters Squadron, Signal Squadron, Transport Squadron, Quartermaster, Scouts Stores Organization, Medical Squadron, Work Shops, Work Services Organization, Training Squadron and Depot, and Educational Unit and Boys School.

Headquarters Squadron supplied service support to the regimental headquarters. It also housed the following sections: regimental band; regimental police; cooks unit; transit wing; and the regimental stables. The stables were formerly an organization of some importance, being responsible for handling mules and camels that were used for patrolling. The extension of the road network in the Trucial States increased the ability to put wheeled vehicles to more extensive and economic use and consequently has eliminated the requirement for four-footed transportation. As a result, the

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1 So designated for Mu'askar al-Murqaab, the headquarters for the Trucial Oman Scouts, located at al-Heira, approximately five kilometers northeast of Sharjah. See Appendix III.

2 This unit is responsible primarily for handling those recruits in transit from the coastal area to the training depot. Only on an incidental basis does it handle the personnel in Murqaab area enroute to and from their own squadrons.
stables came to be used primarily for the maintenance of the regimental horses, used only for ceremonial and recreational purposes.

Signal Squadron had a three-fold mission and was structured accordingly. Its first mission was to maintain and operate an external radio net, which linked TOS headquarters with Headquarters, British Forces Gulf, located in Bahrain. The second mission was to maintain and operate the internal continuous wave (CW) net, which linked the outstations with TOS headquarters. The third mission was the operation of a signals training center, which was located with the Training Depot, operating coincidentally with, but not as a part of the Training Squadron. To meet their first requirement, the squadron was heavily staffed with British non-commissioned officers. These were gradually phased out, however, when the final decision was made by the British Government to withdraw all forces from the Gulf, eliminating the requirement for an external net. Within a few months of the time that the internal communications net was established, it was run almost entirely by non-British personnel. It was the operation of this net that generated the requirement for a signal training program that was eventually to become the Signals Training Center.¹

¹ See infra, pp. 94-97.
The Transportation Squadron provided for the mechanical means of transportation that are used by the Scouts. This consisted of Land Rovers, 3-ton Bedford trucks, water bowsers, Dodge Power Wagons, and two motorized Arab dhows used for sea-borne patrol. This unit also provided a vehicle control center to monitor programmed travel over the less-well-prepared routes in the hinterland. All units were required to notify the Headquarters in al-Heira as well as the appropriate outstation of the exact time of departure for each vehicle or convoy. The estimated time of arrival at its destination was computed, based on the known travel time for each route. Upon arrival, both the dispatching unit and headquarters were notified. If the vehicle was overdue, ground or air search parties, or both, were organized.

The Quartermaster was responsible for the level of government-issued supplies throughout the regiment. Working in close cooperation with the Quartermaster was the Scouts Stores Organization. This unit was responsible for local procurement of all supplies used by the regiment.

The Medical Squadron provided routine medical care for the soldiers of the Trucial Oman Scouts. Its fixed installations included the medical reception station (hospital) at Mu'askar al-Murqaab and a medical center at Manama, approximately fifty miles to the south of Ras al-Khaima. The hospital facility at Murqaab contained a men's ward of twenty beds, which could be comfortabyly expanded to a thirty-bed
ward in emergencies; a standing ten-bed isolation ward; an outpatient clinic; a fully equipped medical laboratory facility; a minor surgery capability; and a training school for male nurses. The medical center at Manama was of limited capacity and open only to the soldiers of the TOS. It functioned primarily as a rest center and sanitorium for tuberculosis cases. The medical unit is staffed by sixty-one personnel, of which four were British: a doctor, an administrative warrant officer, a pharmacist, and a senior registered nurse. The remaining fifty-seven staff members were Arab who received the majority of their training indigenously. Among these are the men who will assume the pharmacist and the registered nurse positions on the senior staff. Individuals who demonstrate potential aptitudes above the norm are selected for advanced training. For example, the Arab senior staff non-commissioned officer is also the regimental dentist.

1 See infra, pp. 97-99. The surgery capability provides emergency service only and is no longer considered necessary for a facility of this nature. Captain D.J. Carragher, M.B., B.Ch., RAMC, private interview held at TOS Hospital, Mu'askar al-Murqaab, al-Heira, 20 January, 1972.

2 The author was given a complete tour of the hospital facilities at Murqaab on 20 January, 1972, conducted by Staff Sergeant Abbas Mohammed, the Arab NCO who was programmed to assume the senior registered nurse's position. During the course of the tour the occasion arose to meet the Arab NCO who was scheduled to assume the position of pharmacist. At the time of the visit, the incumbent British pharmacist was a patient in the hospital and was totally reliant for care on the personnel for whose training he was responsible.

3 See infra, p. 98.
Two units which are commonly confused because of the similarity of their designations are the Work Shops and the Work Services Organization. The Work Shops provided the maintenance capability of the force, covering all items from vehicles to weapons and the canvas accoutrements of the soldiers. The Work Services Organization provided maintenance of the buildings and grounds of the headquarters and, on occasion, the outstations.

The Education Unit managed educational matters for all ranks of the Trucial Oman Scouts, covering subjects from basic reading and writing to study material for officers preparing to sit for their advancement examinations. The Boys' School, which came under the auspices of the Education Unit, was a six-year elementary school for boys between the ages of 11 and 17.¹

The Training Squadron was responsible for the basic and advanced individual training within the regiment, as well as the annual small arms qualification requirements for all personnel. When originally established, the squadron was heavily staffed with British non-commissioned officers. These were gradually phased out as Arab personnel became qualified as instructors. By the time Great Britain's control of the Scouts was relinquished, there was only one British NCO serving as a supervisor with the Training Squadron. Specialized and

¹ See infra, pp. 88-94.
technical training was provided by technical teams from British Forces, Gulf, upon request from TOS Headquarters.¹

Command and Control

The command position in the Trucial Oman Scouts called for a full colonel of the British Army, seconded from his parent regiment. The deputy commander was a lieutenant colonel, also on secondment. Although the commander was the final authority in all matters, it was necessary to divide the responsibilities for the organization between the commander and his deputy. This system was the only practical means of controlling a unit of regimental size.

Immediately under the commander was the principal staff, whose activities were supervised by the deputy commander in the role of chief-of-staff. These staff sections consisted of: operations, intelligence, personnel operations, records, pay and finance. These elements were expected to be responsive to the commander's desires and to assist him in the effective employment of the combat units of the regiment. The functioning of the Murqaab garrison was the responsibility of the deputy commander. His primary mission was to insure that the myriad of administrative organizations were responsive

¹ See infra, pp. 77-78.
to the requirements placed upon them by the commander, staff, and combat elements.

At the squadron level all commanders were also seconded British officers with the exception of Headquarters Squadron, which was commanded by an Arab major. There was a concerted effort in the last few years towards the Arabization of the command structure. At the time that control of the force was relinquished, the goal was to replace British officers with Arab officers to the level of the squadron second-in-command.

Personnel

In December, 1971, the strength of the Trucial Oman Scouts numbered 50 officers and approximately 1,500 enlisted ranks, all of whom were volunteers.

Of the officers' corps, 39 were British serving officers who were on secondment from their parent regiments. The normal length of secondment for an officer was eighteen months. Upon completion of his first nine months the officer was granted three months home leave, which was not considered a part of his original commitment. As an incentive to volunteer, the officer received an increase of 50 per cent of his basic pay for the duration of his tour. At the end of the first nine months an officer was given the option to volunteer for a second tour. Should he elect to do so, he received an increase of 60 per cent of his basic pay upon completion of the original tour. In
the case of junior officers there was the added incentive of possibly receiving a temporary promotion from the grade of lieutenant to captain and from captain to major.

British non-commissioned officers enjoyed the same tour of duty, additional pay benefits, and language training as the officers. The program of Arabization at this level moved more rapidly than at the officer level, and the number of British non-commissioned officers was minimal at the time the force was transferred to Arab control.

All non-British enlisted personnel volunteered to serve for three years. A principal feature of the enlisted ranks in general was their non-Trucial Coast characteristic. Based on the most recent figures available,\(^1\) approximately 50 per cent of the enlisted strength of the Trucial Oman Scouts was non-Arabic speaking by origin. Of a total strength of some 1,500 men, approximately 500 came from Dhofar, the region to the southwest of Oman.\(^2\) Nominally under the sovereignty of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, the Dhofaris speak their own language, which is separate and distinct from Arabic, although Arabic is spoken as their second language. The second largest ethnic

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\(^1\) These figures are from a formal briefing which took place in October 1967, at Headquarters, TCS, then located on the RAF base at Sharjah. Subsequent checks to try and update the figures resulted in the confirmation that they were "generally correct." Exact strength figures are considered to be privileged military information.

\(^2\) This figure may be considerably reduced due to recent desertions by Dhofaris, who have elected to return home to fight with the Dhofar Liberation Front.
group in the ranks of the Trucial Oman Scouts were the Baluch. Their origins lay in southeastern Iran and they numbered approximately 270. Their native language is closely related to Farsi and Pushto, neither of which is akin to Arabic. Like the Dhofaris, Arabic is a second language to them; however, they seem to be limited to "Jaish Arabic."¹ This lack of facility with the language has made the Baluch, to a greater extent than any other group, an alien mercenary element within the Scouts. The largest native Arab group are from the Bani Kaab tribe, numbering approximately 225 enlisted men. Although this tribe is native to the area, their tribal allegiance is to the Sultan of Muscat and Oman and not to any of the seven rulers of the various Trucial States. These three elements: the Dhofaris, the Baluch, and the Bani Kaab constituted two-thirds of the enlisted strength of the Trucial Oman Scouts. The remaining one-third is a combination of Adenis, Persians, Indians, Pakistanis, Omanis, Muscatis, and Trucial Omanis. The non-arab personnel were generally concentrated in the headquarters, either at regimental or squadron level, while

¹ This is the term applied to the dialect of pidgin Arabic used among the non-Arabic speaking members of the force.
the bulk of the combat troops was made up of the local Arabs.¹

Historical Development

Once the decision had been made to raise a levy force in the Trucial States events began to move rapidly. Authority to establish the force was set forth in Article 82(3) (h) of the Trucial States

¹ A former rifle squadron commander provides the following description of the personnel situation in his unit: "My squadron [B] was a mixture of races as well as tribes, of colours as well as of languages. There were Adenese, light skinned and intelligent above average, but who were still slightly under suspicion, for it had been an Adenese squadron which had mutinied and murdered an officer at Buraimi in 1955 [see infra, p. 52.] There was a Somali fitter, coal-black with tight curly hair, a foot taller than any of the other men, with an engaging smile and an incredible capacity for work. There were Baluchis, an unpredictable, moody lot, who were inclined to pick up the worst aspects of a civilization, so they went in for flashy clothes, and assumed a bogus superiority over the genuine Arabs. They spoke their own language, which was closer to Urdu than Arabic, and were mainly employed as drivers. There were Dhofaris, from distant Dhofar down in the south-east corner of Muscat. Some were extremely handsome, some completely wild with gigantic heads of fuzzy hair. They, too, spoke their own language... and were extremely talkative and argumentative. They were also the most clannish of all, and kept to themselves. There were some half-Persians, including the senior Mulazim, a Kuwaiti or two and the odd Pakistani. But the great bulk of the Squadron came from the Trucial States and most of these from the Buraimi area." Shepherd, Arabian Adventure, pp. 124-125.
Order in Council, dated 8 December 1950.\textsuperscript{1} Based on this authority, Regulation Number 1 of 1961 was the Trucial Oman Levies Regulation.\textsuperscript{2}

In conjunction with this regulation, and under the authority of Article 12,\textsuperscript{3} the Rules of Discipline for the Trucial Oman Levies were published that same year.\textsuperscript{4} Major Hankin-Turvin, along with two Jordanian officers and thirty-two enlisted ranks, was seconded from the Arab Legion and brought to the Trucial States to establish the new force. Additional personnel were recruited locally and

\textsuperscript{1} Article 82(3)(h) reads as follows:
"82-(l) The Political Resident shall have the power to make regulations (to be called King's Regulations) for the peace, order, and good government of the persons to whom this order applies...

\textsuperscript{2} 'Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (l) of the Article, the Political Resident may make regulations for the following purposes (that is to say):


\textsuperscript{4} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 241-243.

\textsuperscript{5} "The Political Resident may, with the approval of the Secretary of State, prescribe rules for the discipline of the members of the Force and for the trial and punishment of any offences against discipline. Any punishment duly awarded in accordance with these rules shall have the force of law and if any sentence is awarded it shall be lawful to detain the convicted person in accordance with the said sentence." \textit{Ibid.}, p. 242.

\textsuperscript{4} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 245-246.
headquarters were established at Sharjah. Although the force was quite small, comprised of some sixty Arab soldiers, it was able to fulfill its initial task, which was "to provide a degree of security and safety to those resident or travelling in the country for which Her Majesty's Government was responsible."1 Concerning the effect the new force had in the area, it was said that "their influence was felt immediately. By the end of 1951, the Political Resident was able to report that no cases of abduction into slavery had occurred during that year, and that the decrease in highway robbery was marked."2

In 1952 the need for expansion of the force became obvious. The impact of oil and the granting of concessions to companies in areas where boundaries were at best poorly defined and, more commonly, completely undefined, inevitably led to a clash of interests. This was first felt in the Buraimi Oasis, where conflict developed between Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat and Oman on the other. On 31 August, 1952, a Saudi force of forty soldiers under Turki ibn Abdullah ibn Atishan occupied the village of Hamasa, which was under the suzerainty of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. The immediate reaction of the Sultan was to introduce a force to drive the intruders

1 TGS Handbook, p. 9.
2 Hawley, Trucial States, p. 174.
out. The parties concerned were, however, dissuaded from this course of action by the British Government, who counseled for arbitration instead. The issue then became the subject of lengthy diplomatic proceedings while Her Majesty’s Government quietly began to increase the strength of the Trucial Oman Levies. The initial attempt to expand rapidly the force with Adenis was a failure, ending in a mutiny, which cost the lives of two British officers and a Jordanian regimental sergeant-major. The Adenis were quickly rounded up and sent to Muscat for imprisonment while increased recruitment took place among the local tribes in the oasis.

Along with an increase in strength came an advance in status. Prior to this time the Levies had been a responsibility of the Foreign Office by whom they were paid and officered. Now they came under the War Office for direction, were officered by Regular Army officers on secondment, and the burden of payment was shared equally by both departments.

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1 A rather colorful description of this build-up has been provided by P.S. Allfree, a former rifle squadron commander in the Levies: "Gangs of discharged soldiers from Aden were dug out of the back streets and freighted up to Sharjah; first one, and then another British Army Officer found himself sent to the same place,... the Adenese ex-soldiers were enlisted into the Trucial Oman Levies, placed under the command of the dismayed officers, and packed off to besiege Turki bin Ataishan." *Warlords of Oman* (New York: Curtis Books, 1967), p. 11.

2 This arrangement continued until the transfer of control in 1971, with both departments sharing equally the per annum cost of approximately two million Sterling.
When arbitration efforts over the Buraimi Oasis ended in failure, it was decided that the only course of action which remained was to re-occupy the area by force. The Saudi Government was informed of this decision by the British chargé d'affaires to Saudi Arabia on 26 October, 1955. That same day the Saudis in Hamasa, supported by Ubaid bin Juma and loyal members of the Bani Kaab tribe from the north of Buraimi, resisted in vain the assault of the Levies, and the Oasis returned to the control of the original claimants.

The next major change to take place was in March, 1956. Queen's Regulation Number One of 1956, redesignated the force as the Trucial Oman Scouts. More important, Article 3 of this amendment expanded the mission to include the defense of the Trucial States against external aggression as well as the maintenance of internal security.¹ The force was redeployed from the positions established to meet the Buraimi situation to a configuration that would enable them...

¹ The specific wording of the article is: "The Trucial Oman Levies Regulation 1951 (King's Regulation No. 1 of 1951), shall further be amended as follows:-
"Article 2 to read:
"(1) The Force may be employed in any part of the territory of the Trucial States-
 "(a) for the maintenance of peace and good order in the Trucial States,
 "(b) in providing an escort for British Political Representatives.
 "(2) The Political Resident shall have the power to require members of the force to proceed and serve outside the limits of the Trucial States Order, 1956." Great Britain, Her Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, The Persian Gulf Gazette, sup. 12, Vol. III (1 April, 1956), "The Trucial Oman Levies (Amendment) Regulation 1956", p. 35.
to protect the oil company that was then operating in Abu Dhabi territory against possible incursions from the west. The establishment was increased from three to five rifle squadrons and the number of British Officers was almost doubled.\footnote{1}

In 1957 tensions developed between the states of Ras al-Khaima and Fujairah, again resulting from an unresolved border dispute. Apprehension over the potential disruption that this could cause in the peaceful development of the area led to the posting of the first squadron of the Scouts to the northeastern territory.

In July of the same year the Sultan of Muscat and Oman appealed to Great Britain for help in the civil war that had been developing in his country and with which his forces were no longer able to cope. The Scouts, as a part of a composite British force under

\footnote{1 TOS Handbook, p. 9. Allfree provides the following somewhat facetious sketch of this period: "... the Trucial Oman Levies had undergone a face-lifting. They had changed their uniform for a start. No longer did their officers swoop around the country-side in whatever they fancied or had left; now they adorned themselves with a flourishing red head-cloth with bobbing tassels like so many Clubbs Pashas. Nor did they now call themselves Levies. In an effort to recruit what they hoped would be 'the right type' of officer, the authorities had rechristened them Trucial Oman Scouts. What the precise psychological significance of this change might be, only an advertising man could say; but to do the planners justice, it was now noticeably richer in what was presumably the 'right type'. And the biggest change was at the top. Eric Johnson [commander from 1954 to 1957] had gone and a ferociously-mustachioed, carnivorous-looking man called Stewart Carter [commander from 1957 to 1961] had taken over. I have seen no more romantic figure than Stewart Carter, his head and shoulders wrapped in a flaming red head-scarf, moustaches at the high port, crouched fanatically over the steering-wheel of a stripped down Land Rover. I am sure that the time had come for the Trucial Omans to be weaned of Eric Johnson's nursing and to be brought up on the stronger meat of a man like Stewart Carter; and under him they certainly looked more and more military every day..." Warlords, pp. 60-61.}
the command of Brigadier J. A. R. Robertson, were sent to Oman to assist. By the end of August they had seen action on and around Jebel Akhdar and has assisted in the reimposition of the Sultan's authority everywhere in the area with the exception of the summit of Jebel Akhdar. It was from this stronghold that the rebel force waged an ever-increasing guerrilla war against the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF) and the detachment of Scouts, which had gone to their assistance. This dissidence developed in intensity throughout the remainder of 1957 and into 1958. During this same period the Scouts continued to operate within the Trucial States seeking to prevent inter-tribal conflicts and to discourage gun-running. It was during 1957 that the Training Center was established at Manama.

During December, 1958, and January, 1959, the Scouts were engaged once more in operations against the Omani guerrilla forces, again in cooperation with the Sultan's Armed Forces and, for the first time, with the Special Air Service (SAS). Tactically, the operation was a success in that the summit of Jebel Akhdar was seized and occupied, and the rebel forces were dispersed. From a strategic point of view, the operation was a failure in that the three leaders, Imam Ghalib ibn Ali, his brother Talib, and the paramount shaikh of the Bani Riyam tribe, Suliman bin Himyar, were allowed to escape to Saudi Arabia.
In April of 1959 the Sultan's Armed Forces took over the Scouts' Commitment to maintain a squadron at Ibra. The Scouts' activities outside the borders of the Trucial States were then limited to sending patrols into northern Oman. This final requirement was terminated in February, 1961.

In May, 1959, a shooting war broke out between the tribesmen of Ras al-Khaima and Fujairah in the hill area north of Masafi. The TOS was moved into the area to put a stop to the fighting. Since that time there has been a squadron permanently stationed at Masafi.

In July of the same year Trucial States Order in Council, 1959, was published which superseded Trucial States Order in Council 1950.¹ The new order reiterated the authority of the Political Resident to maintain the force and the extension of his authority over any member of that force, i.e. it reconfirmed the fact that the force was an arm of the British Government.²

The Desert Regiment was formed in August, 1960. It consisted of two squadrons under a mobile regimental headquarters. The headquarters was established at Idhen, north of Manama, while the two squadrons, D and X, were located at Ghail and Khatt respectively. A

¹ See supra, p. 50.

three-inch mortar troop was organized at Masafi as well. The concept of a separate desert regiment proved to be cumbersome in both command and administration. As a result, the regiment was disbanded in September of 1961 and a new establishment for the Scouts was written.

The new establishment reduced the number of the headquarters and simplified command, control, and administration. The number of squadrons was fixed at five, maintaining both D and X Squadrons from the desert-regiment concept. While the number of squadrons was limited, their strengths were considerably increased. A support group was formed and the administrative services were reorganized into the new establishment in October, 1961. With the exception of a few modifications, this was the establishment under which the Trucial Oman Scouts were to operate until the time of assignment to the United Arab Emirates.¹

In 1965 an amendment was made to the Rules of Discipline to include the new establishment and to provide for the introduction of more advanced equipment.² In 1969 Trucial States Order, 1959, was amended to extend inter alia British jurisdiction over members of the force operating outside the limits of the Trucial States. This

¹ TOS Handbook, p. 10.
move reinforced the extra-territorial part that the TOS were now
legally in a position to play in the southeast portion of the
Arabian Peninsula.\(^1\) In July, 1970, a regulation was enacted which
granted authority to the Trucial Oman Scouts to stop and search
vessels on the high seas in an effort to control illegal immigration.\(^2\)

One source has effectively summarized the impact of the force
as follows:

... In another age a solution to any problem might have
been found by one ruler quietly exterminating the rest,
but today this would be regarded as a threat to \(\text{world}
peace and in any case the Trucial Oman Scouts are there
to prevent it...\(^3\)

1 Article 8 of the amendment states: "The following paragraph shall
be added to Article 25 of the Principal Order:-
"(6) Where a person who is a member of a \(\text{levy force referred to in}
Article 8 (1) (ii) is accused of an offence alleged to have been
committed when he was outside the Trucial States in the course of
service with that \(\text{levy force, such a person may be tried and}
punished under this Order as if the offence had been committed
within the Trucial States. In this paragraph an offence means
any act or omission which would be an offence if done in the
Trucial States," Great Britain, Her Majesty's Political Resident

2 Article 12 of the regulation reads: "Any police officer or member
of the Trucial Oman Scouts or any other person duly authorized by
the Political Agent may stop and search and ship to which the
powers under the Orders extend and which he has reason to believe
is carrying a person or persons who have committed or are attempting
to commit an offence against this Regulation and may arrest any
such person and require the ship to enter port in the Trucial
States." Great Britain, Her Majesty's Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf, The Persian Gulf Gazette, Vol. XVIII (15 October,
1970), "The Trucial States Control of Illegal Immigration Regulation

3 Peter Mansfield, "A Special Report from the Gulf," Middle East
Tasks of the Trucial Oman Scouts

On 5 October, 1967, the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, issued a directive in which he set forth the tasks of the Trucial Oman Scouts as follows:

a. To assist in the maintenance of good order and security in the Trucial States and to protect the Trucial States from armed incursion, hostile infiltration and subversion.

b. To gather all manner of intelligence relevant to the maintenance of the security of the Trucial States; and by liaison with the Sultan's Armed Forces in Muscat and Oman, with the Abu Dhabi Defence Force, and with local police forces, to exchange with them intelligence on the area which is of mutual concern. Priorities and special intelligence targets will be laid down from time to time by the JIG [Joint Intelligence Group] (Gulf) or by LIGs [Local Intelligence Committees] Dubai and Abu Dhabi.

c. To prevent and detect criminal offences by any person in those parts of the Trucial States in which the Force is authorized to operate, in the exercise of the powers conferred by King's Regulation No. 1 of 1951. (Note: Detection and prevention of ordinary criminal activities are primarily the responsibility of the local police forces, with whom all ranks are to cooperate when required. Members of the Scouts have, however, under articles 4 and 7 of King's Regulation No. 1 of 1951, powers of arrest and search in certain circumstances. These powers are not to be exercised without the specific authority of the Political Agent or ruler concerned unless an officer is satisfied that the urgency of the situation demands it. When any person is arrested in the exercise of these powers, instructions for his disposal are to be sought in accordance with article 6 of King's Regulation 1951).

d. To cooperate and maintain liaison with British naval, army, and air forces in the area and with the Abu Dhabi Defence Force.

e. When so required, to provide an escort for British Political representatives traveling in the Trucial States.
f. To assist the Civil Power in natural disasters.

g. To advise the Political Agents, Dubai and Abu Dhabi, on military and security matters, and to coordinate any action decided upon with any police and local security forces involved.

Concepts of Operation

Territorial Organization

In order to meet the requirements of the tasks that were placed upon them, territorial as well as unit organization was required. Although the zones of operational responsibility have varied throughout the history of the Scouts, the concept of organization remained the same. Centralization was maintained at the command and control level by keeping the Headquarters, Headquarters Squadron, and the administrative and support elements at fixed locations. In December, 1971, there were four permanent outstations through which the rifle squadrons were rotated at six-month intervals, generally moving on or about 1 April and 1 September. At the time of the handover, the geographical configuration of the Scouts was as follows:

Al-Heira (Mu'askar al-Murqaab):--Headquarters, Trucial Oman Scouts, Headquarters Squadron, Signal Squadron, Medical Unit and Hospital, Workshops, Supply and Transport elements, Education Unit, Boys' School, and one rifle squadron.

1 TOS Handbook, p. 11.
Ham Ham (approximately 13 kilometers south of Ras al-Khaima):—one rifle squadron.

Manama (approximately 44 kilometers south of Ham Ham):—Training Squadron and depot, Support Squadron, one rifle squadron.¹

Masafi (12 kilometers southeast of Manama in the Omani mountains):—one rifle squadron.

Buraimi Oasis (Fort Jahili):—one rifle squadron.

A typical rotational pattern for the rifle squadrons would be: A Squadron from Masafi to Buraimi; B Squadron from Buraimi to Sharjah; C Squadron from Sharjah to Ham Ham; X Squadron from Ham Ham to Manama; D Squadron from Manama to Masafi.² The position of X Squadron in this pattern varied every two years because the squadron and its commanding officer were precluded from serving at Buraimi on order of Shaikh Zaid of Abu Dhabi. The areas of operational responsibility are shown on the map at Appendix VI.

Operational Philosophy

The operational philosophy of the Trucial Oman Scouts was extremely simple, and classical for a force of this nature. It may be summed up in the words: "Use the smallest force possible to accomplish the mission."³ This concept is not new, but rather it

¹ The rifle squadron, as a rotating element, occupies a separate base camp from the Training Depot.

² See diagram at Appendix V.

³ As stated in the TOS Handbook, "The major role of the TOS is to keep the peace throughout the Trucial States. This is accomplished by continual patrolling by small units added on a program co-ordinated by Force Headquarters. . . ." p. 10.
is one that has been developed over the years, based on the experience of various commanders at all levels. The British have found that this is the best, if not the only, method of operation since they first began to try and regiment Arab forces during World War I. They found that the character and temperament of the Arab dictated this form of tactics over any other. In the words of Lawrence:

> In mass they were not formidable since they had no corporate spirit, nor discipline, nor mutual confidence. The smaller the unit the better its performance. A thousand were a mob, ineffective against a company of Turks; but three or four Arabs in their hills would stop a dozen Turks. . . .

Of the Arab's capability to be moulded into the semblance of a soldier along the lines of Western thinking he said, "they were too free-minded to endure command or to fight in a team." Glubb, who was engaged to establish a much earlier Arab force, having much the same mission as the TOS, had the following to say with reference to the character of the Arab as a soldier:

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2. Ibid., p. 104.

3. "... He came to Trans-Jordan with the status of second-in-command of the Arab Legion and commissioned to organize a desert force of bedouins, whose primary task would be to stop all intertribal raiding ..." Benjamin Shwadran, *Jordan, A State of Tension* (New York: Council for Middle East Affairs Press, 1959), p. 177.
... his passion is glory—his own personal glory. Such being his ambition, he will admire the romantic heroes of Arab history and legend and the great raiders of his own day and tribe. But he will be bitterly jealous of his rivals and contemporaries, who may outshine him in prowess. The keys to his character are thirst for praise and pre-eminence, hero worship, boasting and jealousy of rivals ... 1

These same basic sentiments (which were not necessarily criticisms) were echoed to the author during interviews with officers and NCO's of the Trucial Oman Scouts. 2

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CHAPTER III
RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING

Background

General

In the final analysis, the effectiveness of the individual fighting man in combat is the principal goal of the military. For this reason training is the preponderant concern at all levels of command. It is the objective of military training to teach the soldier what to expect in battle and how to react under fire. Through proper training, the individual develops confidence in both himself and his leaders.¹

Early Systems of Recruitment and Training

During the time the force was in its early stages of development, the method of recruitment was haphazard and hardly conducive to the maintenance of good order and discipline within the unit. The rapid materialization of the Buraimi dispute into a situation that required an immediate military presence offered little recourse but to rely on former members of a similar force, in this

case the Aden Levies.\footnote{Allfree has provided a graphic commentary on the quality of the men that were recruited during this period: "These soldiers had unmistakeable advantages. They were trained men, needing only uniforms and weapons to be ready for the field. The emergency made them welcome. However, they had defects, which became more and more apparent—with at least one tragic consequence—and these defects ultimately outweighed their advantages and we got rid of them. For one thing, they had in many cases been discharged from the Aden forces dishonourably and had learnt no more honour in the alleys and bazaars where they lurked until enticed out into the open air by the generous offer of re-enlistment in Sharjah. Not to put too fine a point on it, there was more than a fair share of criminals. For one thing, they had not the slightest interest in whether Turki or the Sultan or the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi lived or died, and they owed allegiance whatever to the Political Agent. They were mercenaries pure and simple, and a mercenary has only one purpose in taking up arms—to get what he can out of it." \textit{Warlords}, p. 11. See also \textit{supra}, n. 1, p. 52.} Eventual mutiny among these mercenaries left two officers and a non-commissioned officer dead, and a third officer badly wounded. This incident ended with the deportation of the Adenis, which in turn led to increased local recruiting to offset the resultant manpower drain. This meant acceptance of the added administrative burdens of establishing a recruiting program and of training personnel.

While these matters will always require constant attention and effort in any military or para-military force, their magnitude is affected by many factors. The size of the force, its mission, the manpower resources upon which it is able to draw, and the inherent capabilities of the individuals as soldiers are but a few of these factors. In the case of the Trucial Oman Scouts, these factors do not create any appreciable task of either recruiting or training. On the other hand, the basic importance of both of these aspects
gives them a prominent place in any study of this nature.

The Character of the Individual Soldier

In attempting to select the stereotype of the individual soldier of the Trucial Oman Scouts, one is faced with a particularly complex problem. The membership of the organization was not made up of any single tribe or, for that matter, even of any single ethnic or language group. It is this great intermixture of individuals which also makes it extremely difficult to develop an objective evaluation of the soldier which can be applied to all members of the force.

In the realm of public opinion, the Scouts commanded respect and admiration. Through the years since their inception their reputation for fair dealing, impartiality, and devotion to duty made the soldier of the Trucial Oman Scouts a welcome figure throughout the Trucial States. The degree of security that he represented to

1 A description of the diversity of personnel in a single rifle squadron was provided by Shepherd in the account of his service with the Scouts. See supra, n. 1, p. 49.

2 Whereas a large percentage of the force strength may have been made up of non-Arab ethnic groups, the predominance of Trucial States Arabs in the combat elements justifies classifying the Trucial Oman Scouts as an "Arab force." See supra, pp. 47-49.
the area was always deeply appreciated.¹

The general nature of the Arab soldier was such that a genuine fondness and affection for them existed on the part of their British officers and NCO's. Certain traits inevitably grated on the disciplinarian's spirit, yet, for the most part, the men of the British Army selected to serve in this area were able to accept most of these with a philosophical attitude. It is a credit to their adaptability that they were able to develop as efficient a force as possible by the judicious capitalization on those traits which make the Arab an ideal soldier for an environment such as that of the Trucial States.

The force recruited both the settled and the desert Arab. This provided the British command structure of the TOS the challenge of a wide spectrum of characteristics with which to deal. Common to both the urban and nomadic groups are the traditional Arab characteristics of hospitality, politeness, and simplicity. Both groups have the traits of quiescence, timelessness, tenacity, and obstinace; however, the bedouin tends to reflect these to a greater extent than his settled cousin. In the matter of physical endurance,

¹ Hawley, Trucial States, pp. 174-175. One member of the Western community in the area summed up the general opinion of the force with the simple statement that "they don't make them any tougher or finer than the Trucial Oman Scouts." Captian D. K. Johns, Berthing Master, Das Island, Abu Dhabi, unsolicited comments during a discussion at Doha International Airport, Qatar, 19 January, 1972.
the bedouin takes the lead; yet, with few exceptions, neither of these groups was found to have the necessary stamina to meet the physical requirements that were placed upon them by the British. In considering service with a military force of this nature, the bedouin enjoys additional attributes that his counterparts of the settled areas don't share. Dominant among these are:

1. Natural acclimation to a fluid or mobile situation.
2. Possession of an inherent knowledge of the terrain.
3. Has a limited need for heavy logistical support.
4. Tends generally to have had more exposure to weapons.
5. Tends to be individually self-reliant.
6. Is physically capable of standing privation under field conditions.
7. Possesses a native understanding of the people of the country.

There are two characteristics which are detrimental to the bedouin when he is placed in a westernized military organization. The first of these is his almost total lack of discipline. The second is his general lack of formal education caused principally by the nature of his life pattern. Lack of education often meant that, while a bedouin might be a better field soldier and possess innate leadership potential, the man from the urban areas was usually the one to be promoted to leadership positions. The deciding factor was inevitably the difference in education between the two.¹

¹ Lieutenant Colonel Neild, private interview, 9 February, 1972.
Another trait which divides the two groups is the impatience of the desert Arab when there is nothing to hold his attention. He seems to have an inbred restlessness in time of battle; attack or retreat, but never defend.¹ In this respect, the settled Arabs, based on what is probably an instinctive impulse to protect immovable possessions, are of a better temperament for holding a position.²

The two traits which are most irreconcilable to military existence by western standards are the lack of discipline and the lack of concern for the importance of time. In western circles these are generally regarded as rudimentary to military life. It is a commentary on the flexibility of the martial minds of the British that they were able to adapt themselves to the total lack of these elements and in spite of them developed the force into

¹ Sir Alec Kirkbride in commenting on this point has said, "...When I was a very young officer newly attached to the Arab Army, an old beduin with whom I was on friendly terms said, 'My son, when leading Arabs, always remember that they must be moving one way or the other; either forward or backward.'" A Crackle of Thorns (London: John Murray [Publishers, Ltd., 1956), p. 74.

² It has been noted that in recognition of these diverse traits the Arab Legion of Jordan maintained a separate regiment of each group. They would use the tactic of having the desert tribesmen attack a position and then follow up by bringing in the settled men to hold and defend. Ibid., p. 75.
an effective unit.¹

Tribal and ethnic affiliations which normally play such a strong role in the lives of the Arabs in this part of the world was totally ignored or deliberately suppressed in the Trucial Oman Scouts. At the time that a man signed on for duty he was advised that until his tour was complete, his loyalties belonged first to the force. All personnel received equal treatment, and the only consideration which was given to background affiliations was to insure that no deliberate effort was made towards maintaining tribal unity in the squadrons.² The one exception to this policy occurred

1 Allfree provides the following anecdote: "This Bohemian trait [Arab timelessness] was most marked when the soldiers went on home leave. If the timing of a half-hour's drill was likely to vary by one hundred percent, so too—with more upsetting results for the company's administration—was a fortnight's home leave. I would instruct the men to begin their leave like an umpire counting the over at cricket. With a packet or bag full of fourteen stones, one of which was to be discarded each day; but even this scheme was a prey to human fallibility, especially when the soldier had a hole in his pocket... on the whole they took no advantage of this: they were just as likely to return three days early as three days late and there was a general averaging-out over a period." Warlords, p. 41. The term "lack of discipline" should not be misconstrued to mean that the Arab soldier is habitually a disciplinary problem in the sense of misconduct. Quite the opposite appears to be the case. Illustrative of this is the following commentary by Shepherd: "... It was a rare thing to find a man brought up on a disciplinary charge, but there would be a stream of men [during orders at the end of the duty day] asking for leave. Leave to get married—leave to get unmarried—sick fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers—camels that had strayed—houses that had fallen down. Each case had to be carefully investigated, because one of the men's chief amusements was putting one over on the 'sahib', and they thought it a great joke if they were found out." Arabian Adventure, p. 127.

² Major M. Budd, private interview, 14 December, 1971.
when X squadron was being formed as the *jesbel*, or mountain, squadron in the short-lived Desert Regiment. At that time the idea of specialized units for specialized operations dictated the consolidation of the Dhofaris, who were native mountain men. It was anticipated that by doing so the need for specialized training and conditioning could be eliminated. When the idea of the Desert Regiment was set aside, the proportion of the Dhofaris in X Squadron dropped accordingly, although it was always higher than any of the other units. In the year immediately preceding the turn-over of the Scouts to the United Arab Emirates, the Dhofari element diminished. This was apparently due to an increasing nationalistic awareness brought on by the escalation of the civil way in Dhofar. While exact figures were not available, nor was there an inclination to discuss the matter with the writer, the information was proffered that the rate of desertions to the Dhofari Liberation Front was quite high and that their numbers included officers. This development came as somewhat of a blow to a number of British officers, especially those who have considerable service in the Scouts, who felt that they shared a mutual trust and friendship with the Dhofari element.

1 See *supra*, p. 56.
2 Major Ken Wilson, Commanding Officer, X Squadron, Trucial Oman Scouts, private interview conducted at Ham Ham, Ras al-Khaima, 21 January 1972.
3 Lieutenant Colonel Nield, private interview, 9 February 1972.
In a mixture of peoples such as were found in the Scouts there was always the possibility of conflict developing between minority groups, e.g., between Indian and Pakistani members of the force. Here too, loyalties to the force seem to take precedence over any others. During visits to the TOS in December of 1971 and January, 1972 the writer had occasion to discuss the recent Indian-Pakistani war with members of these two ethnic groups. They expressed the attitude that they were too far removed in both time and distance to allow the situation to interfere in their personal lives and careers with the Scouts.

Recruitment

Recruiting in the Trucial Oman Scouts is not a complicated operation. Personnel recruited into the ranks of the TOS can

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1 Major E. Pickup, Signals Officer, Trucial Oman Scouts, private interview conducted at Mu'askar al'Murqaab, 14 December, 1971.

2 During the period that Colonel Stewart Carter commanded the Trucial Oman Scouts he delighted in dashing about the countryside, visiting the various units and stopping to chat with anyone and everyone that he chanced to meet on the way. It often happened that an individual would make a profound impression on the Colonel and he would immediately recruit him into the Scouts. He would give the individual a signed note saying that the man was personally approved by the Colonel for entrance into the force. Nine times out of ten the man would have no interest in a life in the army, but rather than throw the paper away he would either sell or give it away. As a result, the personnel section would often have a wizened ancient appear for induction and, being loath to turn him
be divided into two categories, those drawn from internal sources and those from external sources. Recruits from internal sources are those individuals who were brought into the force through the Boys' School. Remaining personnel were external source recruits. Personnel entering the service with the Trucial Oman Scouts enjoyed a unique situation among soldiers in that they undertook no pledge of fidelity to anyone. Until the establishment of the

away because he bore a personal handwritten invitation from the commander, he was generally signed on. Anecdote provided by Major K. Wilson during interview on 21 January, 1972. That same day the writer had occasion to observe first hand the personal level of recruiting. While visiting the Khatt Plain to the south of Ham Ham with Major Wilson, an area that first appeared to be completely devoid of people, we were hailed down by a goatherd. After the normal exchange of affinities the goatherder identified himself as a former member of the Scouts, giving his squadron and service number. He stated that the times were not particularly good for herding goats and since he was tired of that pastime he would like to return to the Scouts. After a few more minutes of careful discussion, the Major, told the man to report to the squadron base at Ham Ham in a month's time. Having learned from Colonel Carter's mistakes, he was certain that he had the man's full name and his tribe before we drove on.

1 See infra, pp. 88-93 , for detailed discussion of the TOS Boys School.

2 Allfree says of this situation: "...Although their officers—by this time—were serving officers of the British Army, and the force was paid and supplied by the Foreign Office, the men owed no allegiance at all to the British Crown—unlike, for example Gurkhas or colonial troops. They owed no allegiance to anybody—and they took no oath; so their legal position was obscure and the legal foundation for my authority over them was not the firmest. There was in being a document setting out the rules and regulations of the force and expressing disapproval, for example of 'conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline'; but it is most unlikely that any of the soldiers had much idea of its existence, let alone its significance. On the whole, the relationship between officer and man was a personal one, and when that broke down there was little left..." Warlords, p.35.
police and the defense forces of Abu Dhabi, the Buraimi Oasis area was one of the principal sources for recruits coming into the Scouts. The main reason for this was the support that Shaikh Zaid, then Wali of Buraimi, put into this effort. Another major source was the Beni Kaab tribe from the foothills and wadis of the Omani mountains, north of Buraimi. While these people were nominally subjects of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, they preferred service in the Scouts to service in the Sultan's Armed Forces. Their motivation for this was twofold: first, the area of operations for the Scouts was near their villages; and second, and perhaps the dominant factor, the pay was better.¹

While a certain amount of glamour and prestige was attached to being a member of the Trucial Oman Scouts, this was not the principal motivating factor for enlistment. The primary reason that men joined the force was the money. The pay was both good and dependable. At the time the force was formed pay had to be high to be competitive with the oil companies. Later the competition was with the oil-rich Shaikhs in the area who had begun to form their own armed forces and who had some degree of sovereign claim on potential recruits.

Prerequisites for personnel enlisting in the Scouts were stringent only from the medical standpoint. The only examination

¹ Shepherd, Arabian Adventure, pp. 125-126.
required was a medical examination which attempted to determine two things: first, that the man met the minimum age requirement of seventeen years; and second, that he was free from any latent or inherent disease or any other physical disability.¹

The normal tour of duty for a recruit was three years. At the end of that period he was given the option to extend his service, but was under no obligation to do so. Further, he incurred no obligation upon completion of service, as is the usual case with most western military forces. The reason for this lies partially in the inability to enforce such a requirement should it exist, and partially in the lack of any need for such a requirement.

A spirit of military tradition does not exist to any noticeable extent. Soldiers were motivated to extend their enlistment by the money and by the security of a steady, well-paying job. In discussions held with soldiers whose time in the service exceeded ten years, the writer found no more expression of esprit de corps than among the recruits that were interviewed. One example of this was Private Ahmed Siti. He had served with the Trucial Oman Scouts for over fourteen years. His family was originally from Baluchistan, but his father lived in Muscat, and Ahmed himself was born in Sharjah, where he has lived all his life.² He entered the service

² Even in this case Arabic was still a second language.
via the Boys' School. Although he has one son he saw no reason for him to follow in his foot-steps in the Scouts. At the time of the interview the boy was too old for acceptance into the Boys' School and too young for enlistment into the Scouts.\(^1\)

Military Training and Schools

Types of Training

In any type of military organization training may be divided into three parts: individual, unit, and specialized training. In the Trucial Oman Scouts the concentration was on individual training. Unit training was accomplished by means of practical exercises through participation in actual operations and patrols. Specialized training may be further divided into two types. The first is that which prepares the individual for some technical field, such as crew-served weapons, communications, administration, medical or even driving. In the TOS this level training was usually reserved for men who had completed their first three-year tour. The second type of specialized training is that which is devoted to

\(^1\) Private Ahmed Siti, Driver, Transportation Squadron, Trucial Oman Scouts, private interview, Ajman, United Arab Emirates, 15 December, 1971.
particular combat operations such as mountain or desert fighting. The decision to eliminate the once-proposed Desert Regiment is an indication that this form of specialization is not a valid requirement in the TOS.

Training Center¹

"These schools [for recruits] then perform a very important function. They serve to form new soldiers from persons who have not passed through that excellent sieve of . . . combatant life . . . "²

The Training Center of the Trucial Oman Scouts was established in 1957 at Manama by Captain K. Wilson. It was situated at the foot of the Omani mountains at the mouth of Wadi al-Sufsuf. The land on which it was located was a small enclave belonging to the Shaikh of Ajman. The site was selected over others for its relatively more favorable climate. Initially, the center was heavily staffed by British personnel, both officer and non-commissioned officer. Courses were established for recruits, Arab non-commissioned officer, and officer candidates. By the time of the

¹ A large portion of the following material was acquired during interviews with the following individuals: Major P. S. ff Thompson, Operations Officer, TOS, Mu'askar al-Murqab, 14 December, 1971; Captain Ubaid Ali, Second-in-Command, X Squadron, TOS, Manama, Ajman, 27 July, 1970; Captain K. L. Steel, Administrative Officer Training Squadron, TOS, Jumaira, Dubai, 23 January, 1972; and Sergeant-Major Salim Abaid, Sergeant-Major, Training Squadron, TOS, Jumaira, Dubai, 23 January, 1972.

turn-over in 1971 the cadre of the Training Center had been formed into a training squadron with a British commander, a British administrative officer, and two British non-commissioned officers in a supervisory position. The second-in-command and the training officers were all Arab, as were all the non-commissioned officer instructors and the squadron sergeant-major.

The recruit training course was a compact package designed to prepare the soldier for his position in the force. The stated aim of the course was the production of "men who are fit, smart, skilled in the use of field craft and personal weapons...and who have the ability to use these skills in minor tactics." The duration of the course was nine weeks. Each week was divided into thirty-six periods of forty minutes each for a total of twenty-four hours of formal instruction time per week or 216 hours of formal instruction per nine-week course. These figures do not include time which was devoted to night training, nor to the extra periods of training that might be added at the discretion of the commander.

Of the total of 324 formal periods of instruction, seventy-one were apportioned to drill and ceremonies. 115 periods were


2 Whereas ten of these periods appear on the block schedule as rehearsals for parades, an additional twelve periods which are not so programmed are also anticipated as necessary "informal" training. Ibid., p. 7.
assigned to individual weapons. The allocation of the remaining periods was fifty to physical training, thirty-one to field crafts, twenty-three to tactics, nine for administrative-type lectures, and seven for inspections. The remaining eighteen periods were given over to practical exercise and comprised the majority of the scheduled time for the eight week of training.¹

Under this program a sample training day for a recruit section in the first week of training might read as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0700-0740</td>
<td>Drill 1-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0750-0830</td>
<td>Drill 4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0840-0910</td>
<td>Breakfast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0920-1000</td>
<td>Physical training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1010-1050</td>
<td>Rifle, period 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100-1140</td>
<td>Rifle, period 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1150-1230</td>
<td>Sub-machinegun, period 1²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ In actuality the eighteen periods reflected in the block syllabus of recruit training represented only one-sixth of the time that was devoted to this exercise. The full time programmed was seventy-two hours. Ibid.

² Great Britain, Trucial Oman Scouts, "Training Program for Week Ending 28 January, 1972" (Unpublished training chart, Training Squadron, 22 January, 1972), p. 1. Whereas only seven forty minute periods are here reflected, it should be noted that in the first two blocks a total of five periods of drill instruction are covered. In the drill syllabus, these periods included instruction on: 1---attention, stand at ease and formation of three ranks; 2 and 3---dressing and getting on parade; 4—open and close order; and 5—marching and halting in quick time. Great Britain, Training Syllabus, p. 1. Prior to the establishment of the Training Center at Manama, training was a matter of individual squadron responsibility. The climate at the various squadron sites was generally extremely unpleasant and was the single factor that dictated the training schedule. Shepherd provides the following account:
An interesting feature of training in the Trucial Oman Scouts was the lack of excessive repetition of the material presented to the troops. There were three basic reasons for this. First, classes were small enough to preclude distraction of the student. Secondly, should a student experience difficulty with the material which was presented to him, he received immediate attention, which usually rectified the problem. The third reason was that a soldier in the Scouts applied what he was taught almost immediately upon finishing formal training. Once a soldier completed basic training and joined his squadron, his formal training was virtually ended. Military service then became a series of patrols and operations in which he applied what he learned in the first weeks.

The general consensus among British Officers was that Arabs from this area of the Arabian Peninsula were no more difficult to train than was the average British soldier. In some cases they were

"The squadron worked from 6 a.m. until 10 a.m. That may not sound like a lot to those who are more used to hours from nine to five, but by ten o'clock, officers and men alike were exhausted. As the summer days passed slowly by, physical effort became more and more unpleasant. Even to plan the following day's activities in the cool of the evening became a form of self torture. The heat controlled all our lives and we lived in the hand of the sun.

"The day started with either a period of P.T. [physical training] or drill, as the sun came streaking over the Oman hills like a personal enemy. At this time of day one perspired considerably and half an hour was as long as the men could stand. Then followed less active periods on the rifle range or instruction by the Mulazims under the shade of a convenient acacia. By ten o'clock there would be no protection from the sun, and the men would disappear into their mud oven rooms, where they lay motionless, dressed only in their wazras, until their mid-day meal." Arabian Adventure, pp. 122-123.
easier to train, due basically to differences in their attitudes. For example, because of the inherent respect for his rifle, it was a rare incident when a dirty weapon was found among Arab troops at any time; and it was unheard of during an inspection.

The single major training problem was illiteracy. The Arab from the desert was by nature a better soldier than the Arab from the settled areas. On the other hand, the settled Arabs had access to formal education. The result of this was that leadership positions most often went to men who were not necessarily the best soldiers.¹

The problem of illiteracy also provided the mixed blessing of limiting the amount of published material which was required. This meant that all learning had to be accomplished virtually by rote, with the recruit relying solely upon his memory. This method of instruction is not without merit when applied to men whose memories have been sharpened by years of practice. This also limited the amount of repetition in training that was required. On the other hand, it also meant that all learning had to be taught from the book directly to the soldier with no possibility of his gleaning a broader base of knowledge through his own outside study of the various manuals and books which would have otherwise been available to him.

¹ Lieutenant Colonel Niels, private interview, 9 February, 1972.
Religion posed few if any problems in the area of training. While there are conflicting commentaries as to the degree of devoutness of the inhabitants of this part of the Arab world, it would be folly to take too seriously the report that,

... When Ramadan, the Moslem month of fasting, comes, nowhere is the tenet of Islam observed more strictly than in the Trucial Oman ...  

It was the opinion of troop leaders that religion posed less of a problem for the western officer in the Trucial Oman Scouts than anywhere else in the Arab world. 

Officers' Training

British officers.

The single special training requirement for British officers prior to assuming their duties with the Trucial Oman Scouts was attendance at an Arabic language course. Currently, the course is


2 Shepherd relates that while he found the sheikhs to be very religious and strict in their Islamic practices, the degree to which the people adhered to them declined as one "descended the social ladder." This descent apparently reached the bottom with the soldiers, who actually sought excuses to avoid their religious duties. Arabian Adventure, pp. 160-161. One is further inclined to give more favorable consideration to the Koranic commentary which says, "... the bedouins are worse in infidelity and hypocrisy and are more apt not to know the limits which God revealed to His Messenger ..." The Koran, 9:97. Translation is the writer's.

3 A large portion of the material used in the following two sections was provided by Major M. Budd, Intelligence Officer, TOS during interviews held at various times between October, 1967, and April, 1972.
conducted at the British Army School of Education at Beaconsfield near London. There are two courses of different lengths, one six weeks in duration and one three months. The majority of the officers who joined the TOS attended the shorter course.

The concentration of the courses was on the spoken dialect of the area, commonly referred to as "Gulf Arabic". No time was given to either reading or writing. Because of the low literacy rate among the soldiers, the actual requirement for the written language was not such that it would have justified the additional time necessary to teach it. Further, to learn written Arabic would necessitate teaching Arabic grammar and the use of a standard form of Arabic. This was not essential in the TOS and could possibly have worked to the detriment of the officers concerned. This proved to be a point of frustration for the junior officers, primarily from a personal standpoint. If the officer seriously wished to pursue his language studies once he had joined the unit, courses were made available to him through the Force Education Officer. As an aid to British officers in training at Beaconsfield, the Scouts provided one of their Arab officers to the school on a six-month basis as an instructor cum liaison officer. This gave all parties concerned an opportunity to acquire valuable language practice.

Officers were expected to be able to use the language upon joining the unit. The language of command and administration below regimental level was Arabic. It was spoken in the squadron messes
and on the parade grounds. Operations orders at squadron level were issued in Arabic. Because of the high level of illiteracy the great majority of all transactions were carried out verbally.

Officers did not receive specialized training for a particular position. The secondment list specifying those positions that were available presumed that an officer had acquired the necessary training required during the normal course of his military service.

Those officers who might have studied Arabic previously in a school which was established in Aden, or who had served in Aden before, were not required to take the Beaconsfield course. The same applied to officer personnel who had previously served on secondment with the Sultan's Armed Forces.

**Arab officers.**

Until such time as a form of cadet corps could be established, Arab officer candidates were selected from the ranks on the basis of outstanding performance as soldiers and displayed leadership ability. These individuals were appointed as second lieutenants by the commanding officer of the Trucial Oman Scouts. They were referred to as the "Qay'id's Commissioned Officers." From this group the most promising were selected for advanced training in England. This training included an English language course of four to six months
duration at Beaconsfield and a small unit leader's course at Mons. The average length of this training was seven months. Upon completion of these courses the officers were awarded a Queen's Commission and returned to duty with the Scouts, where their rank was considered equivalent to corresponding British officer rank.

In more recent years the same system was generally followed except for the commander's commissions. This was gradually eliminated as the immediate requirement for officers was satisfied and the more systematic procedures could be implemented. Candidates were observed for an extended period of time by the TOS staff. Final determination of the individual's appointment as an officer was based on the results of these observations and his appearance before a selection board. Those personnel showing the greatest leadership potential were elected to attend the junior leaders' course at Mons, England. The remainder attended the platoon commanders' course in Jordan.

The history of Lieutenant Ali Said is typical of the career development of an Arab officer. He arrived in the Trucial States from Dhofar in 1959 when he was about seven years old. His brother was a soldier in the TOS and Ali lived with him. That same year he was "put on the rolls" of the Training Squadron as a coffee-boy cum mascot, his "salary" being paid out of pocket by the squadron commander, Captain Ken Wilson. At that time he spoke only
Dhofari. During the next few years, under the tutelage of Captain Wilson, he learned both Arabic and English. He was eventually admitted to the Boys' School at around the age of eleven.\footnote{1} After experiencing some initial trouble he settled down to academic pursuits, receiving encouragement and assistance from Wilson. Upon graduation from Boys' School, he was selected to attend the Junior Officers' Training Course at Mons in the United Kingdom, and the prerequisite English course at Beaconsfield. The writer first met Lieutenant Said in the summer of 1970 after he had just returned from his training tour. Since that time he has been back to Beaconsfield as an Arabic instructor and liaison officer for the Scouts. At the time of the writer's last conversation with him,\footnote{2} Lieutenant Said was expecting to return to England for additional training in anticipation of assuming command of the proposed armored car squadron due to be established under the new Union Defence Force. In this ambition he is supported by his paladin, now

\footnote{1}{As is the case with most people in this region, age is an unknown factor. Final determination of this is left up to the medical officer, who freely admits that there is no absolute way of discerning the exact age of an individual. In as much as someone has to make the determination of age, the doctor's conjecture on the subject is as good as any. It is generally conceded by all parties concerned that Said was under age at the time of his entry into the Boys' School.}

\footnote{2}{22 January, 1972.}
Major Wilson. Should Said go for this training, he will be the first Arab officer of the former Trucial Oman Scouts to attend a course in England, other than the junior leaders' course at Mons.

Non-commissioned Officers Training

**British non-commissioned officers.**

There was no universal requirement for British NCO's assigned to the TOS to have language training. This was due to the fact that only a limited number of them actually occupied positions in which they were in constant contact with Arab soldiers. Like the officers, no special position training was required, as selection for secondment presupposed job knowledge acquired in the normal course of military service.

**Arab non-commissioned officers.**

A parallel can be found between the officers and the non-commissioned officers training. Promotion to NCO positions was based on the demonstrated capability of the individual as a leader.

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1 Lieutenant Ali Said, Troop Officer, X Squadron, TOS, private interview held at Ham Ham, Ras al-Khaima, 21 January, 1972.

2 See supra, n. 3, p. 82.
At the time that the turn-over of control took place a number of the non-commissioned officers of the TOS had either attended the Boys' School or had studied in the force's adult education program. Leadership and NCO courses were taught in the Training Squadron, rather than in the United Kingdom. There was no requirement to learn English, and the courses were arranged to accommodate those personnel who might not be literate. An essential part of the NCO training in the TOS was practical experience.

Boys' School

The primary purpose of the Boys' School was to provide a steady flow of personnel with a basic education into the ranks of the Trucial Oman Scouts. It was anticipated that graduates from this institution would provide officer and non-commissioned officer candidates for the Scouts, creating a core of educated career personnel in the force.

Students were selected on the basis of open application, with priority being given to the sons of men serving in the Scouts. Some consideration was given to the sons of immediate members of the ruling families of the Trucial States, but they were subject to

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1 A major portion of the following material was acquired during private interview with Mr. Omar Nisnas, Headmaster, TOS Boys' School and Captain A.C. Milway, Force Education Officer, TOS, held at the Boys' School, 20 January, 1972.
competing for the positions like any other boy.\footnote{In spite of this priority it did not prove to be a matter of great significance. There appeared to be no tradition of familial participation in the Scouts or, for that matter in any other similar force in the area. During the entire period of time that the force was under British control there was no pressure from any ruling family for any special consideration, either for attendance at the Boys' School or for membership in the force itself.} For an average of twenty openings that were available each year there was an average of 200 applicants. The age limits for boys attending the school were from eleven to seventeen.\footnote{See supra, n. 1 , p. 86.} There was little flexibility in this. A boy could enter the school only at the age of eleven in the sixth form, and he must graduate from the first form by age seventeen. There was no allowance for a boy to enter the system in other than the sixth form or any other age than eleven. Applicants were carefully screened by a selection board to insure there being little chance that a student would fail to complete his schooling. By strictly adhering to this system the Scouts achieved a degree of assurance as to the level of education of their members.

The school system was based on the British grammar school model. In December, 1971, the student body numbered ninety students, divided almost evenly through the six classes. The faculty consisted of the headmaster who was Palestinian and ten teachers, eight Palestinians, one Jordanian, and one from Sharjah. In addition, there were two military staff members of the school. Both
had the rank of corporal and had agreed to serve directly under the headmaster. Personnel filling these positions were volunteers: both family men with extensive service in the TOS. Prior to assignment to these positions the men are carefully screened to insure the impeccability of their character. Their primary duties were to assist the headmaster in the conduct of military training and to act as proctors in the boys' barracks. The headmaster was responsible to a board of governors\(^1\) for all matters pertaining to the school, with the exception of military training. This was the responsibility of the Force Education Officer and the regimental Operations Officer.

Administratively, the students and staff of the school were carried on the rolls of Headquarters Squadron which was responsible for all documentation. The exceptions to this were matters pertaining to leave, pay, and sick call. All supplies were drawn directly from the Quartermaster, and the Force Education Officer was responsible for all military equipment which was issued to the school. The school uniform was a miniaturized version of the TOS.

\(^1\) The board was composed of the British Political Agent, Dubai, the commander of the Trucial Oman Scouts, the Headmaster, and the Force Education Officer.
uniform with some modifications. In matters of discipline, minor offenses were dealt with summarily by the headmaster. Serious offenses were passed through the Force Education Officer to the commanding officer of Headquarters Squadron. In those cases handled by the Headmaster, the boys had the right of appeal to the commanding officer, Headquarters Squadron. Medical examinations were given to each student every year by the Force Medical Officer. In the event of desertion of a student, no effort was made to return him to the school. The feeling was that since there were sufficient candidates to fill each position many times over, attempting to hold a student who had no desire to be in the school would be a waste of time and energy for all parties concerned. In addition, experience proved that to keep a discontented boy in the school only served to foment trouble among other boys. To eliminate family protests that the school was taking away potential family labor and a source of income by wasting a boy in non-productive schooling, each boy received a salary that was raised

1 Khaki shirts were issued in lieu of the blue-gray Scouts shirt and for boys in the first three forms khaki shorts were worn in lieu of long khaki trousers. Students also wore the shemagh, egal, and the Trucial Oman Scouts enlisted cap badge. For the smaller boys a problem existed due to the diversity in size between the boy and the standard issue shemagh. The solution was to cut the shemagh in half, but even this proved to be too big for some of the boys.
annually on a graduated scale. The average pay per student was 160.00 QDR\(^1\) per month.

The school year consisted of three terms: the autumn term extending from the end of September to the end of December; the spring term from the beginning of January through March; and the summer term from the beginning of April to the end of June. Classes met six days a week, from Saturday to Thursday in accordance with the following schedule:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0630</td>
<td>Reveille</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0700-0745</td>
<td>PT(^2)-military training and games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0800</td>
<td>Breakfast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0830-1245</td>
<td>School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300-1330</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1330-1500</td>
<td>Rest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500-1615</td>
<td>Games/Sports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1630-1700</td>
<td>Tea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800-1945</td>
<td>School preparation, indoor sports, hobbies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lights out(^3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The academic portion of the day was composed of five forty-five minute periods of instruction, covering the following subjects: Arabic, drawing, English, history, mathematics, religion, science and social science. Of the two languages, English received the greater

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1. Qatar-Dubai Riyal.

2. Physical training.

emphasis in the first two years, while Arabic was taught exclusively in the last two years. History and drawing were subjects also exclusive to the last two years. These classes also had two free periods each per week.¹

There was no provision for graduates from the Boys' School to go on for higher education and there is no record of any boy having done degree work at university level. Advanced training was available only in the sense that there were forty places reserved for TOS Boys' School graduates in the technical school in Sharjah. Students had a service obligation of three years with the Scouts immediately upon completion of schooling unless they were selected to attend the technical school.

Technical School

Although it was heavily supported by the Trucial Oman Scouts through their students, the Technical School of Sharjah is an independent institution established under the auspices of the Trucial States Development Council initially with a British headmaster.

Currently the school is being operated by Jordanian personnel. The Scouts maintain a constant level of forty students in the school at all times and assume all financial responsibility for them. The activities and progress of these students was monitored by the headmaster of the TOS Boys' School and by the Force Education Officer. The courses were from three to four years in length, depending upon the subject, and covered various technical and administrative fields. Graduates from this school were a source of personnel in fields that required technical training, such as quartermaster, signal, workshops, and communications. Administrative positions, such as clerks and finance technicians, were also filled from this same source. Technical-school graduates who were sponsored by the Trucial Oman Scouts had a three-year service obligation upon the completion of their schooling.¹

Signals School²

When the Training Center was formed at Manama in 1957, a signals school was established and co-located with the center by

¹ Captain A. G. Milway, Force Education Officer, Trucial Oman Scouts, private interview held at the Boys' School, 20 January, 1972.

² A large portion of the following material was acquired during interviews with Major H. R. Williams, Signals Officer, TOS, RAF Base, Sharjah, October, 1967 and Major E. Pickup, Signals Officer, TOS, Mu'askar al-Murqaab, 19 January, 1972.
Captain Anthony Shepherd, who was, at the time, the Staff Signals Officer. The purpose of the school was to meet the very pressing demand for signalers to operate the internal communications net between regimental headquarters and the squadrons.

As originally established, the signalers course was seven months in duration. The original student body was drawn from the boys' squadron\(^1\) and a number of volunteers who came mainly from among the regimental cooks.\(^2\) Because of the complexity of signal training, the British found it necessary to rely on the more educated and experienced Adenis, rather than the average Trucial States bedouin. At the outset the staff of the school consisted of the Force Signals Officer and the signals staff sergeant, who had been promoted to mulazim. The latter individual was Adeni with a considerable amount of military service behind him, and with a good grasp of the English language as well. He was eventually to become the commander of the signal school.

By giving additional training to the three best signalers from the first class and making them assistant instructors, the school

\(^1\) Comprised of boys under the age of sixteen.

\(^2\) Shepherd has wryly commented that these men joined the school on the dual incentive of: (1) being sick of looking at khubs and (2) the attraction of the incentive pay. Arabian Adventure, p. 59.
eventually was able to conduct three classes at the same time. Under this system it was possible to shorten the course from seven months to four.\(^1\) This was the standard course time when the control of the force was transferred to the UAE in December of 1971.

The communications system that was used was a standard British military continuous wave (CW) wireless system with Morse key. This has the advantages of having basically a simple equipment inventory which is durable and which does not require extensive technical training or background to maintain it. This combined with its excellent range capabilities, which could otherwise be achieved only with the most sophisticated voice equipment, made it ideal for use by the Scouts. Signaler recruits were taught the standard Morse code and the English letters that the various arrangements of dots and dashes represented. The average signaler was usually illiterate in his own language, let alone English, and would not have any idea what the words which he was transcribing meant. Nevertheless, at the end of sixteen weeks of training the average rate for a signaler was eighteen words per minute, both sending and receiving, and many exceeded this. On more than one occasion, during joint exercises with British forces, British Army signalers had to request their TOS counterparts to slow down.

\(^1\) Ibid., p. 60.
their transmission speed.\textsuperscript{1}

Medical Schooling\textsuperscript{2}

The male nurses' School was an established part of the hospital organization of the Trucial Oman Scouts. As such, it occupied classroom facilities in the hospital at Mu'askar al-Murqaab. Its primary purpose was to provide trained nursing personnel for the force. Students were drawn from the most promising volunteers, and on occasion they entered medical training directly from the Boys' School. The faculty was comprised of two TOS trained non-commissioned officers of the Trucial Oman Scouts. Student strength varied from three to five per class.

The male nurses' training course was divided into three phases, each of six months duration, for a total in-house training period of eighteen months. In addition to the classroom instruction, students gained practical experience by serving on the wards under the supervision of experienced personnel. The graduates of the

\textsuperscript{1} Major E. Pickup, Staff Signals Officer, Trucial Oman Scouts, private interview held at Mu'askar al-Murqaab, al-Heira, 22 January, 1972.

\textsuperscript{2} A major portion of the following material was acquired during interviews with Staff Sergeant Abbas Mohammed, Senior Staff NCO, TOS hospital, and Captain D. J. Carragher, Force Medical Officer, TOS, at the Medical Reception Station, Mu'askar al-Murqaab, 20 January, 1972.
school received advanced training with the British Army at medical facilities located in Sharjah or Bahrain. On-going training for all personnel took place in the local state-run hospitals, in particular the al-Maktum hospital in Dubai.

The only other course that was taught at the TOS hospital was a stretcher bearers course. This was three weeks in duration and was conducted semi-annually. Students were selected from each of the squadrons by their squadron commanders. Included in this course was minor first aid training. It was a one-time-only attendance course for the student with no follow-on or refresher training.

Besides the schooling which was an integral part of the TOS system, some advanced training for qualified medical personnel was also available, generally through the British army, but also through local state hospitals. By this system the Scouts were able to staff their x-ray laboratory, medical laboratory, operating room, pharmacy, and out-patient clinic. Through this method the Scouts gained their dental capability. The Arab senior staff NCO spent six months in training at the dental facility of British Forces Sharjah, after which he returned to the TOS to handle the majority of the cases that came to the hospital.1 As a result of extensive

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1 While his capabilities were limited to temporary fillings or, as was more often the case, the pulling of teeth, the writer was assured by the Force Medical Officer that he was both efficient and relatively painless as a dentist and that so far no complaints had been received about his treatments. Captain D. J. Carragher, private interview, 20 January, 1972.
and careful training, of the sixty-one members of the medical staff of the Trucial Oman Scouts, only four were British when the turnover took place. Two of these positions will become "Arabized" upon completion of the incumbents' current tours.¹

**Adult Education Programs²**

The curriculum of the adult education program offered by the force education section consisted of: an alphabet course; a basic reading and writing course; and an Arabic literacy course. The immediate targets of this program were: first, those soldiers who had been identified as potential non-commissioned officers, and second, those non-commissioned officers who were potential candidates for the platoon commanders' course in Jordan. The long range objective of the program was "to achieve Arabic literacy for all Arab ranks in the force."³

Courses were conducted in facilities located in Mu'askar al-Murqaab at el-Heira and at the Training Center in Manama. The

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¹ These are the positions of the pharmacist and the senior registered nurse.

² See supra, n. 1, p. 98.

annual schedule at each of the two sites was as follows:

- two alphabet courses
- three basic reading courses
- two certificate (Arabic literacy) courses
- two recruits' alphabet courses (conducted at the Manama center only)

The adult education center at al-Heira, co-located with the Boys' School, supported all personnel based at Sharjah, al-Heira, al-Ayn, and Ham Ham. The center at Manama provided for training Squadron personnel, Support Squadron, and the rifle squadrons at Manama and Masafi. Students at the al-Heira center were under the commander of Headquarters Squadron for discipline and administration, and under the Force Education Officer for all other matters. Those at the Manama center came under the commander of the Training Squadron for all matters.

The titles are not indicative of the full magnitude of the courses, and tend to understate the essence of them. For example, the alphabet course was more a basic reading and writing class. According to its syllabus, it was designed to "enable the student to read and write fully-vowelled simple words and sentences in Arabic script."\(^1\)

The basic reading and writing course had as its goal "to enable the student to read, write, and understand simple passages

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in the later stages of the course without full vowelling," and to "teach the four rules of arithmetic in the Arabic script." The reading portion of the course involved more complex sentences than those covered in the alphabet course with a gradual phasing out of the vowelling in the latter stages. By the end of the course the student was expected to be able to read simple passages from newspapers and magazines. The writing portion consisted of the construction of more complex sentences than were previously taught. In addition, the student learned basic grammatical rules. By the end of the course students were expected to write simple military reports and orders, as well as personal letters. Additional content of the course consisted of comprehension of simple orders, reports, and articles from magazines and newspapers, dictation, and the four rules of arithmetic.¹

The Arabic literacy course was comprised of three parts: Arabic language, arithmetic, and social studies. In the Arabic language portion of the course the student was taught to read and understand all forms of simple unwelved Arabic and the use of training manuals. He developed the ability to: write a detailed military report, read and understand military orders, and to read and

¹ Ibid., Annex B, p.1. The "four rules of arithmetic" referred to in the syllabus means the rules for addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division.
understand more difficult articles from newspapers and magazines, including simple technical articles taken from military publications. He was also taught both formal and informal letter writing. In arithmetic the student was faced with more difficult problems involving the four rules that he encountered in the course on basic reading and writing. He was also taught fractions and accounting. In the area of social studies the student was taught the geography of the Trucial States and the history of the area since the middle of the 19th century.\footnote{A precedent for developing the education level of an indigenous Arab military force is to be found in Egypt in the 1870's. John Luter provides the following description of the Egyptian Army under the American chief-of-staff, General Charles Pomeroy Stone, during that period: "... The value of education ... had been downgraded. More than a third of the officers could neither read nor write, and in the rank and file, perhaps no more than one man in 10 could read or write his name. ... By late summer of 1870 ... the Khadive, at Stone's urging, had issued an order forbidding the promotion of anyone in the Army, even to the lowest non-commissioned rank, unless he could read and write. "With education thus made respectable again, Stone said in his account, the whole army became a school for an hour and a half each day, the prestige of educated officers grew and by 1873 fully 75 percent of the army's rank and file could not only read and write but also had some knowledge of arithmetic and the geography of Africa. A special school was set up in 1873 to train non-commissioned officers with the result that drill became uniform throughout the army. And this was followed, again at Stone's suggestion, by the creation in each division of the army of a school for soldiers' sons, who, the Khadive decreed, were to have the right to be educated at public expense between the ages of 8 and 16." "Stone of Egypt," \textit{ARAMCO World}, January-February, 1972, pp. 17-18.} The stated objective of the course was to "improve the fluency and comprehension of the students so that they will
be able to read, write, and understand any form of printed Arabic without difficulty. To extend the student's knowledge of arithmetic to fractions and simple accounts.¹

Over and above these courses, the Force Education Officer organized formal English language classes on an "as needed" basis. These studies were required for all personnel selected to attend courses in Great Britain. These were designed to support a further program of instruction in English provided at the Army School of Education, Beaconsfield.

Continuation training was carried out by means of libraries and the provision of reading materials. A central library was established at al-Heira with a branch at Manama. While the goal was to stock these facilities with suitable books and magazines in Arabic, when the writer visited the central library in January, 1972, the books were predominately English. This was due to the fact that the Scouts "inherited" a large amount of reading material from individuals and the libraries of the British Troops, Sharjah, at the time of their withdrawal from the Gulf. Suitable Arabic magazines were to be provided by the Force Education Officer on site to the rifle squadrons at

Buraimi, Masafi, and Ham Ham.¹

Adult education requirements for British personnel were handled on an individual basis in coordination with the Force Education Officer. Activities in this area were almost totally absent.²

¹ Ibid., p. 2.
CHAPTER IV
THE ROLE OF THE TRUCIAL OMAN SCOUTS
IN CIVIL AFFAIRS

Background of Military Involvement in
Civil Affairs

Since World War II there has been an increasing world-wide
tendency for the military to become involved in civil activities.
This was brought on in part by the extensive social and political
disruption which was caused by that war. In order to capitalize on
the military victory it was necessary for the Allies to re-establish
some form of normality to the societies concerned.

In recent years the interrelationship of the military and
civilian circles has been given added emphasis by the glamorization
of guerrilla organizations. With the upsurge of irregular warfare
there has been a dramatic meshing of civilian and military roles.
Such terms as "peoples liberation army" and "popular front for the
liberation of . . . " have become a part of the everyday language
of the general public.

In the Middle East this concept has found expression in the
various militant branches of the Palestinian liberation movement
which have, in turn, drawn heavily from the works of both Mao Tse-tung
and Che Guevara for their philosophies of civil-military
interrelationships.\(^1\) For example, part II of "The Political, Organizational and Military Report of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine," dated February, 1969,\(^2\) contains the following statement:

The revolutionary member is the one who establishes the best relations with the people around, looks for any opportunity to serve them and is a source of awakening and help to the people around him. It is incontestable that a member who harms the masses or lives in isolation from them cannot claim to be a revolutionary.\(^3\)

The major role of the masses in the overall scheme of the Palestinian movement was expressed in an article entitled "The Political Struggle," which appeared in the weekly bulletin Al-Fateh in July and August, 1969. The article said, in part:

\[ \ldots \text{Their [the people's] will has been the historical justification for the creation of Al-Fateh with its actions and methods that express its belief in the people as the main force capable of attaining victory, and call for the people's participation in a revolutionary war in order to attain their objectives.}^4 \]


\(^{2}\) Much of this report subsequently appeared in a series of four articles under the general title "Military Strategy of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine," Al-Hadaf (Beirut), 28 November; 5, 12, 19 December, 1970.


\(^{4}\) Ibid., p. 112.
Article 9 of the Palestinian National Charter, resulting from the decisions of the National Congress of the Palestine Liberation Organization held in July, 1968, states simply:

... The Palestinian Arab people assert their absolute determination and firm resolution to continue their armed struggle and to work for an armed popular revolution for the liberation of their country and their return to it. ...1

The importance of military-civilian relations has also been recognized by regular armed forces. In the introduction to the United States Army's Special Forces manual it is stated that,

Guerrillas depend heavily upon the support of the local civil population for the success of their operations. ... They act as the moral force behind the guerrillas. In fact, the success of a guerrilla movement is largely determined by the civilian population's will to resist and to support such a movement. ...2

On a conventional plane, a separate branch of the army was formed in 1957 to deal strictly with civilian affairs.3

As an Arab force drawing the major portion of its combatants from a cultural background which places heavy emphasis on the interrelationship of individuals,4 it was only natural that civil...

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3 Civil Affairs Branch, like the U.S. Army Rangers [commandos], is a component of the army reserves, although their training and employment is under the supervision of the regular army. Neither of these elements has an active role in the peacetime army. On the other hand, both have seen extensive service in the Vietnam conflict.

relations would be a salient feature of the daily operations of the Trucial Oman Scouts. Endeavours in this area took the form of numerous small-scale daily actions over a period of twenty years. While the activities may appear to be minor in themselves, their impact must be considered in the light of the fact that they took place in an environment where government concern for the welfare of the people was heretofore virtually unknown. To attempt to examine them in detail is beyond the scope of the present study and for this reason only the highlights will be touched on here.

Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is the one factor which stands out above all others when one evaluates the contributions of the Trucial Oman Scouts in the sphere of civil relations. In their daily efforts to maintain an environment in which progress could thrive the TOS accomplished more than could normally be expected of a force of its size. Prior to 1951, the Trucial Coast of the twentieth century differed little from what it had been in the centuries past. The coastal region which was in contact with the outside world through its seafaring population was only slightly more advanced than the areas in the hinterland. The shaikhs who nominally held suzerainty over vast expanses of territory in fact had little authority beyond the limits of
their coastal capitals. The interior was "little more than a battle field for warring tribes, a haven for brigands and a profitable hunting ground for slave traders."¹ This was the situation that faced the British Government when the decision was made to become more deeply involved in the area.

While the Trucial Oman Scouts were in fact an instrument of British policy in the area, to the population in general they represented impartial political authority which brought with it peace and stability. Because of this, to the average inhabitant of the Trucial States, it mattered very little whose agents they actually were. It was understood by the community that the TOS did not represent the local shaikh in whose territory they were operating at a given time, and because of this a decision which was made by the Scouts concerning an altercation was generally acceptable to all parties concerned. The party in whose favor the decision was made was content, and the party against whom the decision had gone had the face-saving outlet of being able to say that, had it not been for outside interference, the losers would surely have won the contest by virtue of their prowess. At the same time they were not required to prove this since the Scouts had both the weapons and the

force to preclude any serious objection that might be made to their decisions. ¹

One of many examples of this peacekeeping role involved the internal frontiers of the Trucial States. Early in the 1950's the British Government recognized the need to try to settle the numerous boundaries which were in contention among the various states. This was necessary not only for the maintenance of the peace but also to resolve disputes over the granting of oil concessions. In 1955 the rulers each agreed to abide by the Political Agent's decision concerning these borders, based on a survey to be made by Mr. Julian F. Walker. Of the thirty-six cases which he considered he was able to finalize twenty. Nine remained completely unsettled, and for the remaining seven he was able to make only partial settlements. Not all of these decisions were completely satisfactory to the parties concerned. As a result the TOS was given the mission to patrol these borders in order to preclude their violation. Had it not been for the Scouts' almost constant presence along the unsettled boundaries they undoubtedly would have erupted into tribal clashes, and there was the strong possibility that those boundaries which were settled would have erupted as well.

¹ It was a matter of considerable pride among the officers of the TOS that the Scouts were able to accomplish their mission without bloodshed.
Involvement in Local Politics

The Scouts were formed to meet the needs of British economic and political interests, having, at the time they were formed, the requirement of both protecting the British political representative to the area and providing him with the means of establishing and maintaining a stable situation which would be favorable to British interests. Under these circumstances TOS involvement in the local political scene was inevitable. The degree of this involvement is exemplified by the deposition of Shaikh Shakhbut ibn Sultan of Abu Dhabi in 1966.

In the early 1960's there were several instances of disagreement between Abu Dhabi's ruler, Shaikh Shakhbut, and the British concerning legal jurisdiction over foreign nationals. In particular there were two cases involving traffic accidents on Das Island, one of which entailed a charge of manslaughter. The next instance of discord followed the initial exportation of oil in 1962. When the original oil concessions were drawn up in 1953, Abu Dhabi's royalties were to be $1.5 per cent of each ton of oil that was exported, an agreement that apparently was fully understood by Shaikh Shakhbut. However, by the time that oil was first discovered in commercial quantities¹

¹ 15,000 barrels per day.
in Abu Dhahi, a new model concession had been introduced into the Gulf based on the fifty-fifty principle. Shakhbut steadfastly refused to consider this in spite of the efforts of both the British Government and the oil companies concerned and even though the terms would be substantially more favorable to Abu Dhahi. It is probable that his refusal to accept the new concession was based on his failure to understand the concept. Finally, in September 1965, he was persuaded to accept the terms, and Abu Dhahi's share of the profits were raised from the original eight cents to approximately seventy-five cents per barrel. This was not the end of the frustrations to be experienced by the British at the hands of Shaikh Shakhbut. Although oil money had been coming into Abu Dhahi since 1962, little had been done to follow through on development schemes which were initiated at that time. It is thought that Shakhbut was unable to cope with the sudden changes that oil wealth was bringing to his shaikhdom, and, therefore, he began to procrastinate on the introduction of new measures. Whatever his motives, they proved to be a hindrance to the progress of the area. Accordingly, in August of 1966, by decision of a "family council," Shaikh Shakhbut was deposed

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1 The concept whereby the profits to the host country would be 50 per cent of the sale price of the oil at the point of export less the cost of production and transport of the crude to the point of export and a marketing allowance.

2 Hawley, Trucial States, p. 212.
and his brother, Shaikh Zaid ibn Sultan, became ruler of Abu Dhabi.

How much of a role the British played in this is not a matter of public record. Some inferences may be drawn from the fact that it was a bloodless coup due primarily to the presence of a squadron of the Trucial Oman Scouts which surrounded the palace. Furthermore, it was an Arab officer of the Scouts who entered the palace and informed Shakhbut that he had been deposed and was to be exiled. The same officer then escorted him on to a waiting RAF aircraft and accompanied him as far as Bahrain Island.¹

**Contribution to the Local Economy**

Prior to the discovery of oil in commercial quantities the economy of the Trucial States was dependent on two principle elements: pearling and trade. Date gardening and the animal husbandry of the bedouins could also be considered as a part of the area's traditional economy, although these were not significant on an international level.

At the time the Trucial Oman Levies were formed in 1951 the pearl industry, which had been the anchor of the local economy, had

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¹ A longtime resident of the area commented to the writer that he felt the British Government has since had some cause to regret this move. Shaikh Zaid not only has proven to be as stubborn as Shakhbut in his defiance of any manipulation, but he has the added quality of being a capable ruler.
declined sharply and only a small minority of the men and boats of the Trucial Coast were still engaged in this pursuit. While trade continued to be a major coastal occupation, the movement of goods to and from the interior continued to be conducted by camel caravan which was both slow and hazardous.

With the establishment of the Levies a new source of employment was introduced into the region. At the outset the Levies were the largest single employer of manpower in the area, coming, as they did, before the oil companies and even before the Trucial States Development Scheme was fully under way. This was not limited to those personnel who were engaged as soldiers. Direct employment was provided for men in the construction of new camps and later for the continuing maintenance of them. Numerous services, such as laundry and tailoring, engaged locally-hired personnel. In addition to those who were directly engaged by the force, there were many people who benefited indirectly. Invariably settlements would develop in the vicinity of the new camps to provide goods and services for the leisure time of the soldiers.

In another economic area the force was a source of both inexpensive second-hand vehicles and spare parts. In the early days of the force older vehicles which were still in good condition were sold at a fraction of their original cost. This provided merchants
these routes made to the local economy in the movement of goods and services between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman and into the hinterland.

**Contribution to the Local Education**

Regardless of the fact that the needs of the service were the motivating factor behind the establishment of their educational facilities, the contributions of the Trucial Oman Scouts in this field cannot be overlooked. The opportunities which were provided, both in the form of adult-education courses and in practical schooling through on-the-job training, went far towards making the soldier of the TOS a good candidate for employment upon his discharge.¹ This education covered a variety of skills which extended from truck driving to nursing, and which has proven to be a source of skilled labor for both the community and the other military and police forces in the area.

As there was no form of retirement benefits or anything that resembled a retirement program, there has been little or nothing in the way of records maintained on men who left the service.² Because

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² One man who lost an arm in a bomb accident while serving with the TOS receives a pension.
of this, there has been no means of evaluating how much use is actually being made of TOS learned skills outside the force.

During the course of conversations with individual soldiers there was little concern voiced about finding employment when they left the service. They felt confident there was a ready market for their skills anyplace in the Gulf. One felt so sure of this that he had already decided to quit the force and leave the area should the new federation fail to meet his expectations. During his fourteen years in the Scouts he had learned to be both a driver and a mechanic and, based on the experience of his friends, he was confident that he could get a job anyplace.¹

What benefit is derived by the bedouin from army-taught skills is impossible to tell. In general, those who have applied themselves to learning new skills are those who have elected to make a career of the army and are still engaged in that occupation, either with the TOS or with one of the other Trucial States forces. Those who have left the force to return to their tribes are seldom heard from again. Occasionally, one of these men will become bored with herding goats or camels or tending his garden, and he will reappear to reenlist.²

¹ Private Ahmed Siti to the writer, 15 December, 1971. Most soldiers liked to cite instances of their friends’ successes outside the force as a virtual guaranty that they would fare as well. They gave no consideration to the fact that employment situations change with the passing of time. For example, taxis are no longer the lucrative business they once were as the area is now saturated with taxi drivers.

² See supra, n. 2, p. 72.
There is little way of determining how much of value officers will gain from the comparatively more extensive training they have received as a result of their service with the force. In the short period between the inception of the unit and the time it was converted to union control there has not been an instance of an officer leaving the service for civilian life.

Medical Assistance

Medical aid was the most evident contribution of the Trucial Oman Scouts to the civilian community. During their early years the Scouts provided the only mobile medical assistance in the Trucial States. As late as 1961 the TOS facility was one of only three hospitals in the area. Since then a number of hospitals and clinics have been built, with which the Scouts have maintained close and mutually-beneficial contact. The most notable and the oldest of the local facilities is the Al-Maktum Hospital in Dubai. It is here that much of the on-going training for the TOS medical staff is carried out.

The majority of the civilian cases that were seen at the TOS establishment were handled through a specially-established outpatient clinic. The clinic was open each morning, six days a week and would
take emergency cases at any time.\textsuperscript{1} The most serious cases were
seen by the Force Medical Officer during the first visit and as
often thereafter as was deemed necessary. Many of the cases were
of such a nature that they could be handled by the clinic staff
alone, based on their experience, without having to refer them to
the doctor.

All treatment was free of charge. In the case of prescribed
drugs these, too, were dispensed without cost to the patient. Male
patients who required hospitalization were admitted to the ward of
the TOS hospital. Again, all care and treatment, to include three
meals a day, were free of charge.

Other medical aid was rendered to the community in time of
civil disaster or emergency. For example, in 1962 the TOS medical
staff vaccinated some 25,000 civilians against smallpox. The latest
instance of this type of help was during the height of the cholera

\textsuperscript{1} Of the numerous maladies among the civilian patients who were seen
at the TOS hospital the three major ones were, in order of pre-
valence, eye diseases, followed closely by skin diseases and then
tuberculosis. The major problem which faced the staff was that
rarely did patients present themselves for treatment based on
symptoms. By the time they appeared at the hospital the case was
usually fully developed. While this made the diagnostic aspects
easy for the staff, it meant that the work required to effect a
cure was many times more difficult. The Force Medical Officer,
Captain D.J. Carragher, has commented that one must bear two
things in mind when practicing medicine in the Trucial States.
First, that medicine must be adapted to local conditions and
secondly, one must strive to make the individual adapt to his
disease.
threat in August of 1970. TOS medical personnel inoculated 15,000 persons in a mass immunization program which was conducted jointly with local medical teams.

Still another area where the Scouts were able to provide essential medical assistance was in the transportation of the sick. TOS vehicles were readily available for this mission at any time. In addition, there were many instances when Royal Air Force helicopters were called in by the Scouts to provide rapid medical evacuation of the sick from the remote parts of the hinterland.

Money to support the civilian assistance program was provided by the British Government in the annual budget of the TOS. The medical portion of the 1971 budget was approximately 22,000 Sterling. Of this, 16,000 was a subsidy from the British Government for the express purpose of providing drugs for the medical treatment of the civil population of the Trucial States.

During 1971 there were 5,000 new cases seen at the outpatient clinic at Mu'askar al-Murqaab alone. This figure does not include patients who had been treated previously for other ailments or patients who had to make recurring visits. It also does not include those people treated by the TOS medical personnel at the outstations of whom no record is kept.1

1 Captain D.J. Carragher to writer, 20 January, 1972.
Contribution to Local Agriculture

In an indirect way the Scouts have assisted in the agricultural development of the entire region. It was a former TOS officer, Robin Huntingdon, who first recognized the agricultural potential of Ras al-Khaima while serving there in the TOS. After he left the army he returned in 1956 to establish the agricultural-trials station at Dīgdāga. In spite of a great deal of skepticism on the part of British government officials and the local rulers, the project proved to be a success. By the time Huntingdon left in 1961, a wide variety of fruits and vegetables had been added to the list of traditional crops. The agricultural foundations he laid were sound as evidenced by the fact that during the period 1960 to 1961 the area under effective cultivation on the Trucial Coast had doubled from approximately 3,000 to about 6,000 acres.¹

Today the agricultural-trials station is under Arab directorship with a British agricultural advisor. The station consists of a three-year agricultural school, a veterinary clinic, a farm implement maintenance facility, and an agricultural supply outlet. Under the auspices of the Dīgdāga station are the outstations at Kalba and Maliha which are

¹ Ajjaj, "Social Development," p. 78.
conducting experiments on crop growing in their respective areas.\footnote{The impressive list of crops that have proven successful so far includes alfalfa, wheat, various grasses, tobacco, castor beans, melons, tomatoes, onions, radishes, garlic, pepper, okra, pumpkin, gourd, beans, cabbage, califlower, lettuce, beets, turnips, carrots, cantaloupe, aubergine, cucumber, and sweet pepper. Far and away the most successful of these crops is alfalfa. Fields currently under cultivation produce nineteen crops a year for three years before they must be plowed under and replanted. Fruits which have been tested and proven viable are mango, almond, guava, figs, grapes, bananas, paw-paw and various citrus fruits. Experiments are also being conducted with raising cattle and poultry. Robert McKay, Agricultural Advisor, Digdaga Trials Station, interview held at the trials station, 22 January, 1972.}

Direct assistance by the TOS in the agricultural field has taken place during times of natural calamity such as locust plagues. Under these circumstances they have provided manpower, but more important, they have provided organization and control, for insect-extinction operations.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Twenty years ago the states of the Trucial Coast were virtually unknown outside the Gulf. The pearling industry, which at one time brought a degree of international notice to the area, was all but extinct by the early 1950's. Trade, the only other mainstay to the economy, was limited chiefly to what could be carried by coastal dhows.\(^1\) A few of these differed from their predecessors of centuries past by the addition of a diesel engine, but these were the exception rather than the rule. The entire area could be considered to have been backward, possibly even poverty stricken, but this would be valid only by applying standards which would be totally unreasonable for the time and the place. While the social structure was dramatically divided between the "haves" and the "have nots," with virtually no middle class, the distinction between the two was not very great.\(^2\) With a total lack of social services being

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\(^1\) The term "dhow" is a word that is applied by the British to any of a wide variety of native craft in the Gulf. It is a term, however, so long obsolete that it is no longer understood by the Arabs of the region. It was originally applied to the Gulf equivalent of a frigate-class warship. For an excellent discussion of native vessels in the Gulf see Alan Villiers, "Some Aspects of the Arab Dhow Trade," in Cultural Depth and Diversity, Vol. I of Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East, ed. by Louise E. Sweet (2 vols.; Garden City, New York: Natural History Press for the American Museum of Natural History, 1970), pp. 155-172.

universal, illiteracy and disease were common to ruler and ruled alike.

The ruling class of the region held sovereignty over people, not territory, with tribal loyalties and law being the existing form of government. The concept of nation-states was unheard of. Armed conflict between and within tribes was a normal form of social intercourse. Factionalism evolved from territorial disputes, dynastic feuds and often simply the aversion of one ruler for another. Law and order according to western standards did not exist on the interior, while on the coast the British made a token effort to maintain the peace and to protect the coastal regions from external interference. This was done to meet treaty obligations, some of which had been made over 100 years previously, but principally to protect their maritime interests in the area.

In the late 1940's Britain's concern assumed new proportions with the prospects of oil finds which might be comparable to those in neighboring states. In 1948 Richard Bird, a former Political Officer on Bahrain, attempted to convince local tribes in the Buraimi area to permit the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) to search for oil. His efforts met with limited success.\(^1\) The problems which he encountered

\(^1\) This is remarkable from the standpoint that the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Shaikh Shakhbut ibn Sultan, had granted a concession as early as 1939 to Petroleum Concessions Limited (PCL), owned by the same group which owned IPC. Bird's lack of success serves to point out how little control the coastal rulers actually had over their nominal domains in the interior.
served to alert the British Government to the fact that a new policy would have to be adopted for the area if it wished to pursue its oil ventures in the southern Gulf region. As was seen in chapter one, the result was a real involvement on the part of Great Britain in the internal affairs of the Trucial States. A principal element of this involvement was the establishment of the Trucial Oman Scouts, the organization to which this study is devoted.

In the twenty years that have elapsed since 1951 remarkable advances have been made which culminated in December, 1971, with the declaration of independence of the United Arab Emirates. Since then almost daily strides have been taken to bring the UAE into position as a viable member of the international community of nations, to include application for membership in the United Nations and the Arab League. The most recent steps have included the decision to issue new currency\(^1\) and the establishment of diplomatic missions, the first of which was inaugurated on 25 April, 1972.\(^2\)

\[^1\] This will replace the Bahraini dinar and the Qatar-Dubai riyal, both of which are currently in use in the country. See "UAE to Have New Currency," The Daily Star (Beirut), 14 April, 1972, p. 2.

\[^2\] Ambassador Said Ahmed Gabbash became the first fully-accredited diplomatic representative of the UAE when he presented his credentials to President Sulaiman Franjieh of Lebanon. See "1st UAE Envoy Presents Credentials to President," The Daily Star (Beirut), 26 April, 1972, p.5.
This dramatic transformation is frank testimony to the power of oil wealth and the changes which can be brought about by its judicious use. Yet, for all the benefits which oil has brought to the area, these changes could not have been effected in so short a time had it not been for the foundation of an environment of public order. This was absolutely essential to the process of evolution from seven separate and independent states into the youngest of the Arab nations. Writing at the mid-point of the two decades under study, Ajjaj summarized the situation when he said:

Even the lives of those who still prefer to roam the sands—and despite development and the flight of many young men the great majority of the bedouin are still wholly or semi-nomadic—are not wholly unaffected by modern innovations. There are as yet no cadillacs parked outside goat-hair tents, as in Kuwait, but a few own landrovers, especially those near the coast, and the traditional leather sandal is slowly giving way to the imported Japanese rubber "flip-flops." Watches have become almost as much a sign of manhood to the bedouin as the rifle and the dagger—and considerably more useful, with the passing of brigandage and raiding. In fact peace and the absence of fear were without question the major developments during the past few years. For the bedouin, that is; the towns people have moved into another world altogether.1

It has been the objective of this study to examine the institution which provided the basis of peace and security presently enjoyed by the United Arab Emirates. The approach was a review, by means of an historical sketch, of the British involvement in the

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1 Ajjaj, "Social Development," p. 80. Italics are added.
southern Gulf region leading to the formation of the Trucial Oman Scouts. The study of the unit itself was addressed to its organization and historical development, recruiting techniques and training programs. Finally, an outline of the Scouts' role in civil affairs was considered. Account was taken of the civil, as opposed to operational, activities because it was due to the establishment of viable civic relations that the TOS were able to accomplish their peacekeeping mission, even in extremely adverse situations, without resorting to bloodshed. The vast majority of their operations involved the use of a minimum force, often a single man. At the time the unit became the Union Defence Force (UDF) it had been over ten years since force had been resorted to in the settlement of tribal disputes. The comparatively minute size of the organization belies the impact which it had on the area and the sound foundation which it provided for the new nation's continued security.

Xenophobists have decried the force as an implement of British imperialism. In point of fact, the TOS were more than a mere implement, they were virtually the sole representative of British authority in the Trucial States. Everywhere else in the Empire masses of individuals and organizations were involved in the actual machinery of imperialistic government. These included political advisors, doctors, engineers, agricultural experts and so forth,
ad infinitum. In the Trucial States the Scouts did it all with the possible exception of political representation. This was especially true in the early years. In spite of the self-seeking British objectives for which the unit was formed, its efforts were equally advantageous to local interests. It must be noted that xenophobia was not a predominate trait in the Trucial States. The British were not considered a colonial power locally and, for all the control they did wield in both internal and external affairs, the British in general and the Trucial Oman Scouts in particular, were regarded with trust and respect by the people and rulers alike.¹

What the future of Union security will be is a matter for speculation. With autonomy, problems of national security will assume a new magnitude. The present program for the federation's army is based on a study which was made by General Sir John Willoughby who was appointed advisor to the proposed union force in December,

¹ In discussing this matter with a cross-section of the local population, the present writer discovered two major points with regard to local attitudes concerning the British presence. First, they were responsible for a large amount of money being fed directly into the local economy, as opposed to oil revenues which filtered down to the population through the government. Second, the British represented impartial justice in the settlement of inter-tribal and inter-state disputes, and efficient security against external interference. The rulers added a third point: the British represented a degree of governmental efficiency which was not available locally and for which the shaikhs were willing to pay. The writer was informed by a person who was present at the time that, upon learning of the British decision to withdraw from the Gulf, Shaikh Zaid called for the Political Agent, A. T. Lamb, and informed him that, if it was simply a question of money, he (Zaid) would pay the cost of continued British presence.
1968. Using the former Trucial Oman Scouts as the nucleus of a new army, plans call for a second regiment, an air wing of Hawker Hunter jet fighter aircraft, and a small sea wing.

Not the least of the problems which are challenging the development of the defense institution is the fact that there still remains an underlying current of the internal enmity and distrust which were the hallmarks of the area in the not-too-distant past. The mutual misgivings upon which the federation was being built could be observed as early as 1968. On 20 October of that year the shaikhs met at Doha, and agreed to the concept of a unified army. At the same time each shaikh retained the right to maintain his own army if he could afford to do so. The result was, as David Ledger has so aptly said, "the military, police and general defence picture is the most complicated of all."\(^1\)

The Abu Dhabi Defence Force (ADDF) is by far the largest in the Union, estimated to be about five times the size of the UDF, and includes both an air and a sea wing. The ADDF is armed with highly-sophisticated equipment which includes missiles, jet fighter aircraft, and helicopters. In addition, Abu Dhabi has a powerful police force which is under the personal control of Shaikh Zaid. Dubai began raising an army in the later part of 1971. This is backed by an

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extremely fine para-military police force whose establishment is also being increased. Sharjah, which has no income from oil and only a pittance from trade, has an established 500-man police force and, in January, 1972, began to raise an army as well. Ras al-Khaima's Mobile Defence Force (RAKMDF) was established in 1969. Having approximately 500 men on its rolls, it is augmented by a like number of police and is equipped with the latest model, British armored cars. Presently, Ajman and Umm al-Qawain each has a para-military police force. In December, 1971, Ajman approached the UDF for the loan of officers and NCO's to assist in raising an army in that shaikhdom. Fujairah also has an established para-military force, although it is thought that in the event of an actual confrontation the ruler, Shaikh Mohammed ibn Hamad al-Sharqi, would rely on the mountain tribesmen as opposed to his conventional force. ¹

Since January, 1972, negotiations have been underway to try to convince the rulers concerned to place the ADDF, the Dubai Defence Force (DDF), and the RAKMDF under the Union Defence Force. So far these efforts have met with little success, and it is unlikely that they will in the foreseeable future. This situation has placed the UDF in a position which is, in many ways, an untenable one. As the defense force for the Union it no longer enjoys the position of neutrality that was held by the Trucial Oman Scouts. It now represents

¹ Ibid.
a local government, one which is far from being the strongest political power in the area. Should an occasion arise which would necessitate intervention in an internal altercation in which Abu Dhabi was one of the protagonists, the UDF would find itself faced with a force superior in both numbers and weapons. On the other hand, none of the numerous police or military forces presently in existence could possibly achieve the same results as the TOS simply because each represents a local ruler and therefore would never be accepted as an impartial arbitrator.

All of this presupposes a continuation of the old rivalries which existed before the federation was declared. As has been seen above, a mutual distrust is prevalent throughout the new state. The many problems which normally attend the attainment of statehood are thus compounded in the case of the United Arab Emirates. Long-time residents in the Gulf agree that one of the major problems facing the new federation is the redistribution of political power from the autocratic tribal systems which have heretofore existed, to a more bureaucratic system, without falling prey to potential revolutionary tendencies among the newly-emerging educated class. Closely linked with the political problem is the economic and social issue of distribution of the oil wealth without completely disrupting the structure of the traditional society. These problems are further complicated by the fact that, regardless of all the elements of
government which have been established, actual power still rests in the hands of two men, Shaikh Zaid ibn Sultan of Abu Dhabi and Shaikh Rashid ibn Said of Dubai.\footnote{Shaikh Zaid is now the President of the federation and Shaikh Rashid is the Vice President.} Rashid is generally acknowledged as the better ruler of the two, but Zaid, who is also capable, has more money. Between the two an animosity exists which was noted by Thesiger as early as 1948.\footnote{Thesiger, Arabian Sands, p. 265.} Under these circumstances, the future of a unified defense force can be only a matter of conjecture.

It is beyond the scope of this study to attempt to forecast the type of military institution that eventually will be established in the UAE. The purpose has been, rather, to examine the organization which was responsible for the peace and stability which promoted the development of that nation. At the time of this writing (May, 1972) the prospects of the force as drawn up by Willoughby in 1969\footnote{See supra, p. 129.} ever becoming an accomplished fact seem quite tenuous, and the likelihood of such a force being truly effective is equally problematical. It is the writer's contention that, whatever configuration the security force of the UAE finally assumes, it was provided with a solid foundation by the Trucial Oman Scouts. The superstructure remains to be constructed on that foundation, and the solidarity of the state's defense organization will be dependent on the strength and capabilities of the autonomous government of the United Arab Emirates.
EPISODE

In Chapter II detailed consideration was given to the evolution of the organization of the TOS. Of the numerous events which affected the organization, the withdrawal of Great Britain from the Gulf undoubtedly had the greatest impact, initiating, as it did, an entire new era in the force's history. At the time this study was prepared the Trucial Oman Scouts had already been redesignated as the Union Defence Force, and programmed expansion was underway which far exceeded anything that had been envisioned in the past. New badges and insignia of rank were being designed, as were new regimental colors. On the surface the force gives all the appearances of having moved smoothly and efficiently into its new status; even the seconded British officers who have remained with the unit no longer refer to "HMG" when they speak of "my government."

Yet, in the back of the minds of many of the officers, Arab and British, especially those who have been with the force almost since its inception, there is a question as to whether or not the tradition of the Trucial Oman Scouts has actually passed into history along with the unit designation. When viewed critically, the atmosphere which prevails currently in the United Arab Emirates is not one that bodes well for the future of this last vestige of British imperialism in the area.

1 Her Majesty's Government.
There are, however, lessons to be gained from the experience of the Trucial Oman Scouts.

The first of these is the fact that, even in a tradition-bound society such as that found in the southeast corner of the Arabian Peninsula, it is possible to override tribal and regional differences and induce peoples of mutually hostile groups to work together for the common good.\(^1\) As was indicated in Chapter II, the British gave no consideration whatever to tribal affiliations when they organized the force, except to insure that no single squadron had a concentration of any given tribal group. Thus, traditional enemies found themselves thrown together in a mutually strange social environment. Once it became clear that all were to be treated as equals, the men willingly accepted their new situation and temporarily transferred tribal loyalties to the TOS. The responsibility lay with the British officers to insure that absolute impartiality was always observed.

A second lesson which can be derived from the Trucial Oman Scouts is that two apparently divergent cultures, such as those of the British and the Trucial States Arabs, can be commingled successfully to produce a viable social institution which is capable

\(^1\) The trend of overcoming those traditions which tend to slow the forward movement of a society can be seen elsewhere in the Arab world. This is one of the significant effects of the Palestinian resistance movement, especially as concerns the role of women. See Kadi, *Documents*, pp. 72-73.
of affecting the surrounding human environment well beyond the limits for which it was established. The Trucial Oman Scouts are an example of the successful mixing of Arab and British traditions. To Arab practicality\(^1\) and the inherent ability to operate in the local climatic conditions,\(^2\) was added British military know-how and organizational efficiency, producing a regional military force which had no equal in the area.

In addition to these two lessons there is an experiment underway, the results of which are yet to be seen. It revolves around the question of "Arabization." Given a firm organizational and administrative base, can a force such as the Trucial Oman Scouts be Arabized and still maintain its vitality?

During the writer’s last visit to the organization in January, 1972, there were already marked signs of a decline in both efficiency and morale among Arab and British personnel alike. This is to be expected in any military unit following a major organizational change. One cannot immediately interpret a lowering of morale as

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1 This is exemplified in the adoption of the traditional Arab headdress as part of the TOS uniform.

2 Experiments have been carried out in the Gulf concerning the feasibility of moving unacclimated troops into the area for the conduct of operations. These were accomplished by means of both annual joint-training exercises, and actual combat operations, such as the Jebel Akhdar campaign in 1959 and the Kuwait landing in 1961. These bore out the fact that, while foreign soldiers introduced into the area from a temperate zone could operate in the Gulf climate, only the best trained and conditioned among them could maintain a sustained level of effective performance. The only unit the British had of this caliber were the Special Air Service (SAS), which is an elite and relatively small organization. See DeAtkine, "Implications," pp. 319-325.
the first indications of the failure of Arabization.\footnote{In terms of command indicators, a continued downward trend in morale over an extended period of time would, in fact, become an indication that the system had failed.} Those British officers and NCO's who are still with the force have only the highest regard for the Arab personnel who will eventually assume those positions currently occupied by Englishmen. Regarding the formation of a new regiment, the British acknowledge that there are more than sufficient well-qualified junior officers to fill the squadron positions. The area which is of concern is the eventual Arabization of the senior command and staff positions.\footnote{Currently scheduled to be completed by the end of 1974.} Currently there is no one available who has had the essential staff college experience, nor is there anyone among the senior Arab officers with a sufficient educational background to be able to attend a staff officers course.

While it would appear that the only prospects for the force's continued viability is to maintain foreign officers in the key military positions, it would be folly to assume that this means any program for Arabization is doomed to failure. Experience has proven that this need not be the case. Since the abrupt dismissal of Glubb Pasha in March, 1956, Jordan's Arab Legion has had no foreign officers in its ranks. This force also experienced an initial
drop in efficiency and morale, but the foundations which were laid by the British proved to be solid and today the Arab Legion is acknowledged by military observers as the finest of the present-day Arab armies. Negotiations are currently underway between Jordan and the United Arab Emirates to obtain increased support from the Arab Legion in the field of military training for the UDF.

The force will continue to receive British support and encouragement through the federation government for as long as it is needed or desired by the United Arab Emirates. This support will undoubtedly be in the form of technical training teams, training courses in Great Britain, and advisory personnel in certain specialized fields. It is also possible that officers will continue to be seconded to the force for an indefinite period of time until the senior-officer problem mentioned above can be resolved. The British withdrawal from the Gulf should not be misinterpreted as meaning a termination of British interests in the area. Commercial interests alone are sufficient to warrant Britain's willing cooperation to insure a successful future for the Union Defence Force. On the other hand, it must be remembered that even an expanded force based on the Willoughby plan will still be comparatively small and its capabilities will not be any greater than those of the Trucial Oman Scouts. Unless dramatic changes take place, the UDF will continue to be adequate for

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with a means to transport their goods and services inland, which they could not otherwise have afforded. Completely worn-out or broken-down vehicles provided a ready source of inexpensive, if not free, spare parts with which to maintain the budding commercial fleet.

It was in the area of peace and stability that the Scouts made their greatest contribution to the local economy. One writer has said,

... Law and order, prerequisites to economic advance in any country, were provided by the British when in 1951 they raised a local levy force to put an end to brigandage and slave-raiding which were then still rife ...

Once a degree of security had been established and travel in the area was made safe, the Scouts provided additional impetus to the flow of economic progress by assisting in the opening of new roads. In 1960 roads were made passable for motor vehicles from Masafi to Fujairah through Wadi Hamm, and from Masafi to Dibba through Wadi Shimal. In 1970 the writer had occasion to travel on both these roads with a patrol of the Trucial Oman Scouts. The amount of truck and Land Rover traffic on them attested to the substantial contribution

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1 Ajaj, "Social Development," p. 76.

2 At the time the writer visited the area the British Army Corps of Engineers was completing a full-scale macadam highway which followed the Wadi Hamm track of the TOS.
the role of maintaining law and order within the federation. On any other level of confrontation it is far too small to withstand big-power pressures. Two potential contenders for supremacy in the Gulf are Iran and India, both with large, well-equipped, and well-trained armed forces. Against these the UDF would not have a chance, for it was neither designed nor equipped to meet a challenge of this nature.

It is the writer's conviction that militarily, the Union Defence Force has Arab personnel who are basically qualified to carry on the standards established by the former Trucial Oman Scouts. Although additional officer training, especially on the senior levels, is still required, the British have left as sound a foundation as that of the Arab Legion. The ability of the force to realize its potential is dependent primarily on a favorable political atmosphere. As seen in Chapter V, that atmosphere does not exist at the present time.
## APPENDIX I

**RULES OF THE TRUCIAL STATES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Ruler</th>
<th>Year of Ascendancy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abu Dhabi</td>
<td>Shaikh Zaid ibn Sultan&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dubai</td>
<td>Shaikh Rashid ibn Said&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharjah</td>
<td>Shaikh Sultan ibn Mohammed&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajman</td>
<td>Shaikh Rashid ibn Humaid&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umm al-Qawain</td>
<td>Shaikh Ahmed ibn Rashid, MBE&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ras al-Khaima</td>
<td>Shaikh Saqr ibn Mohammed&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujairah</td>
<td>Shaikh Mohammed ibn Hamad&lt;sup&gt;6&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1952</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Of the Al bu Falah section of the Bani Yas tribe.
2. Of the Al bu Falasah section of the Bani Yas tribe.
3. Of the Qawasim tribe.
4. Of the Na'im tribe.
5. Of the Mualla (sometimes called the Al Ali) tribe.
6. Of the Al Sharqui tribe.
APPENDIX II.

AGREEMENTS, ENGAGEMENTS, TREATIES.
AND UNDERTAKINGS:

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<th>Description</th>
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APPENDIX IIA

GENERAL TREATY OF PEACE, 8 January, 1820

"In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate!

"Praise be to God, who hath ordained peace to be a blessing to his creatures. There is established a lasting peace between the British Government and the Arab tribes, who are parties to this contract, on the following conditions:

"ARTICLE 1

"There shall be a cessation of plunder and piracy by land and sea on the part of the Arabs, who are parties to this contract, for ever.

"ARTICLE 2

"If any individual of the people of the Arabs contracting shall attack any that pass by land or sea of any nation whatsoever, in the way of plunder and piracy and not of acknowledged war, he shall be accounted an enemy of all mankind and shall be held to have forfeited both life and goods. An acknowledged war is that which is proclaimed, avowed, and ordered by government against government; and the killing of men and taking of goods without proclamation, avowal, and the order of a government, is plunder and piracy.

"ARTICLE 3

"The friendly (literally 'the pacificated') Arabs shall carry by land and sea a red flag, with or without letters in it, at their option, and this shall be in a border of white, the breadth of the white in the border being equal to the breadth of the red, as represented in the margin (the whole forming the flag known in the British Navy by the title of white pierced red), this shall be the flag of the friendly Arabs, and they shall use it and no other.

1 Aitchison, pp. 245-249.
"ARTICLE 4

"The pacificated tribes shall all of them continue in their former relations, with the exception that they shall be at peace with the British Government, and shall not fight with each other, and the flag shall be a symbol of this only and of nothing further.

"ARTICLE 5

"The vessels of the friendly Arabs shall all of them have in their possession a paper (Register) signed with the signature of their Chief, in which shall be the name of the vessel, its length, its breadth, and how many Karabs it holds. And they shall also have in their possession another writing (Fort Clearance) signed with the signature of their Chief, in which shall be the name of the owner, the name of the Nacodah, the number of men, the number of arms, from whence sailed, at what time, and to what port bound. And if a British or other vessel meet them, they shall produce the Register and the Clearance.

"ARTICLE 6

"The friendly Arabs, if they choose, shall send an envoy to the British Residency in the Persian Gulf with the necessary accompaniments, and he shall remain there for the transaction of their business with the Residency; and the British Government, if it chooses, shall send an envoy to them in like manner; and the envoy shall add his signature to the signature of the Chief in the paper (Register) of their vessels, which contains the length of the vessel, its breadth, and tonnage; the signature of the envoy to be renewed every year. Also all such envoys shall be at the expense of their own party.

"ARTICLE 7

"If any tribe, or others, shall not desist from plunder and piracy, the friendly Arabs shall act against them according to their ability and circumstances, and an arrangement for this purpose shall take place between the friendly Arabs and the British at the time when such plunder and piracy shall occur.

"ARTICLE 8

"The putting men to death after they have given up their arms is an act of piracy and not of acknowledged war; and if any tribe shall put to death any persons, either Muhammadans or others, after they have given up their arms, such tribe shall be held to have broken the peace; and the friendly Arabs shall act against them
in conjunction with the British, and, God willing, the war against them shall not cease until the surrender of those who performed the act and of those who ordered it.

"ARTICLE: 9

"The carrying off of slaves, men, women, or children from the coasts of Africa or elsewhere, and the transporting them in vessels, is plunder and piracy, and the friendly Arabs shall do nothing of this nature.

"ARTICLE: 10.

"The vessels of the friendly Arabs, bearing their flag above described, shall enter into all the British ports and into the ports of the allies of the British so far as they shall be able to effect; and they shall buy and sell therein, and if any shall attack them the British Government shall take notice of it.

"ARTICLE: 11.

"These conditions aforesaid shall be common to all tribes and persons, who shall hereafter adhere thereto in the same manner as to those who adhere to them at the time present.

End of the Articles.

"Issued at Ras-ool-Kheima, in triplicate, at midday, on Saturday, the twenty-second of the month of Rabee-ul-Awal, in the year of the Hegira one thousand two hundred and thirty-five, corresponding to the eighth of January one thousand eight hundred and twenty, and signed by the contracting parties at the places and times under written."
APPENDIX IIB

AGREEMENTS OF 1838-1839

Agreement Entered into by Shaikh Sultan bin Saqr
at Sharjah on 17 April, 1838

"In the event of vessels connected with my ports, or belonging to my subjects coming under the suspicion of being employed in the carrying off (literally stealing) and embarkation of slaves, men, women, or children, I, Sultan bin Suggur, Sheikh of the Joasme tribe, do hereby agree to their being detained and searched, whenever and wherever they may be fallen in with on the seas, by the cruisers of the British Government; and further that upon its being ascertained that the crews have carried off (literally "stolen") and embarked slaves their vessels shall be liable to seizure and confiscation by the aforesaid cruisers.

"Sealed by Sultan Bin Sugur"

Agreement Entered into by Shaikh Sultan bin Saqr
off Ras al-Khalma on 3 July, 1839

"I, Sultan bin Suggur, Shaikh of the Joasme Tribe, do hereby declare that I bind and pledge myself to the British Government in the following engagements:--

"Article 1

"That the Government cruisers, whenever they may meet any vessel belonging to myself or my subjects beyond direct line drawn from Cape Dalgado, passing two degrees seaward of the Island of Socorta, and ending at cape Guadel, and shall suspect that such

1 Aitchison, pp. 249-250.
2 Similar agreements were signed by Shaikh Rashid bin Hamid of Ajman, Shaikh Maktum bin Buti of Dubai and Shaikh Khalifa bin Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi. Ibid., p. 249.
3 Similar agreements were entered into by Sheikh Khalifa bin Shakhbut on 1 July, 1839, and by Shaikh Maktum of Dubai and Shaikh Abdulla bin Rashid of Umm al-Qawain on 2 July, 1839. Ibid., p. 250.
vessel is engaged in slave trade, the said cruizers are permitted to detain and search it.

"Article 2

"Should it on examination be proved that any vessel belonging to myself or my subjects is carrying slaves, whether men, women or children, for sale beyond the aforesaid line then the government cruizers shall seize and confiscate such vessel and her cargo. But if the aforesaid vessel shall pass beyond the aforesaid line owing to stress of weather, or other case of necessity not under control, then she shall not be seized.

"Article 3

"As the selling of males and females, whether grown up or young, who are 'Hoor' or free, is contrary to the Mahomedan religion, and whereas the Soomale tribe is included in the 'Hoor' or free, I, Sultan bin Suggur do hereby agree that the sale of males and females, whether young or old, of the Soomale tribe, shall be considered as piracy, and that after four months from this date all those of my people convicted of being concerned in such an act shall be punished the same as pirates.

"Seal of Sultan Bin Suggur"
APPENDIX II C

ENGAGEMENT OF 1847

"It having been intimated to me by Major Hennell, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, that certain conventions have lately been entered into by His Highness the Imam of Muscat and other powers with the British Government for the purpose of preventing the exportation of slaves from the African coast and elsewhere, and it having, moreover, been explained to me that, in order to the full attainment of the objects contemplated by the aforesaid conventions, the concurrence and cooperation of the Chiefs of the several ports, situated on the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf are required, accordingly I, Sheikh Sultan bin Saggur, Chief of the Joasme tribe, with a view to strengthen the bonds of friendship existing between me and the British Government, do hereby engage to prohibit the exportation of slaves from the coasts of Africa and elsewhere on board of my vessels and those belonging to my subjects or dependants; such prohibitions to take effect from the 1st day of Mohurrum AH 1264 (or December 10, AD 1847).

"And I do further consent that whenever the cruisers of the British Government fall in with any of my vessels, or those belonging to my subjects or dependants, suspected of being engaged in slave trade, they may detain and search them, and in case of their finding that any of the vessels aforesaid have violated this engagement, by the exportation of slaves from the coasts of Africa, or elsewhere, upon any pretext whatever, they (the government cruisers) shall seize and confiscate the same.

"Dated this 14th day of Jemmadee-ool-Awul A.H. 1265, or 30th day of April A.D. 1847.

"Sheikh Sultan Bin Saggur"

1 Aitchison, pp. 251-252.

2 Identical engagements were entered into by the other rulers as follows: Sheikh Maktum of Dubai, 30 April, 1847; Sheikh Abdul Aziz of Ajman, 1 May, 1847; Sheikh Abdullah bin Rashid of Umm al-Qawain, 1 May, 1847; Sheikh Said bin Tahnun of Abu Dhabi, 3 May, 1847.
APPENDIX IID

PERPETUAL MARITIME TRUCE OF 4 MAY, 1853

"We, whose seals are hereunto affixed, Sheikh bin Suggur, Chief of Rass-oal-Kheimah, Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon, Chief of Aboo Dheebsee, Sheikh Saeed bin Butye, Chief of Debay, Sheikh Hamid bin Rasheed, Chief of Ajman, Sheikh Abdoola bin Rashed, Chief of Umm-oal-Kinweyn, having experienced for a series of years the benefits and advantages resulting from a maritime truce contracted amongst ourselves under the mediation of the Resident in the Persian Gulf and renewed from time to time up to the present period, and being fully impressed, therefore, with a sense of the evil consequence formerly arising, from the prosecution of our feuds at sea, whereby our subjects and dependants were prevented from carrying on the pearl fishery in security, and were exposed to interruption and molestation when passing on their lawful occasions, accordingly, we, as aforesaid have determined, for ourselves, our heirs and successors, to conclude together a lasting and inviolable peace from this time forth in perpetuity and do hereby agree to bind ourselves down to observe the following conditions:

"ARTICLE 1

"That from this date, viz., 25th Rujjub 1289, 4th May 1853, and hereafter, there shall be a complete cessation of hostilities at sea between our respective subjects and dependants, and a perfect maritime truce shall endure between ourselves and between our successors, respectively, for evermore.

"ARTICLE 2

"That in the event (which God forbid) of any of our subjects or dependants committing an act of aggression at sea upon the lives or property of those of any of the parties to this agreement, we will immediately punish the assailants and proceed to afford full redress upon the same being brought to our notice.

1 Aitchison, pp. 252-253.
"ARTICLE 3

"That in the event of an act of aggression being committed at sea by any of those who are subscribers with us to this engagement upon any of our subjects or dependants, we will not proceed immediately to retaliate, but will inform the British Resident or the Commodore at Bassidore, who will forthwith take the necessary steps for obtaining reparation for the injury inflicted, provided that its occurrence can be satisfactorily proved.

"We further agree that the maintenance of the peace now concluded amongst us shall be watched over by the British Government, who will take steps to ensure at all times the due observance of the above Articles, and God of this is the best witness and guarantee."
APPENDIX III

EXCLUSIVE AGREEMENTS OF 1892

"I, Zaeed bin Khalifah, Chief of Abu Dhabi, in the presence of Lieutenant-Colonel A.C. Talbot, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, do hereby solemnly bind myself and agree, on behalf of myself, my heirs and successors to the following conditions, viz.:--

"1st.--That I will on no account enter into any agreement or correspondence with any Power other than the British Government.

"2nd.--That without the assent of the British Government I will not consent to the residence within my territory of the agent of any other Government.

"3rd.--That I will on no account, cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part of my territory, save to the British Government.

"Dated Abu Dhabi, 6th March 1892, corresponding to 5th Shaaban 1309 Hijri.

"SIGNATURE OF ZAEED BIN KHALIFA, CHIEF OF ABU DHABI

A. C. Talbot, Lieut.-Col.,
Resident in the Persian Gulf

"LANSDOWNE,
"Viceroy and Governor-General of India

"Ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India at Simla on the twelfth day of May 1892.

"H. M. DURAND,
"Secretary to the Govt. of India,
"Foreign Dept.

"(The agreements signed by the other Trucial Shaikhs, viz., the Chiefs of Dabai, Ajman, Sharjah, Ras-ul-Khima and Umm-ul-Gawain, the first three dated 7 and the last two 8 March 1892, are identical in form.)"

1 Aitchison, pp. 256-57.
APPENDIX IIF

AGREEMENTS OF 1911


"Your esteemed letter, dated the 23rd Rajab, has been received through Khan Bahadur Abdul Latif, British Agent, and I was pleased for it as it gave us the good news of your welfare. All what you had stated and hinted were understood by your friend.

"As regards what you hinted that we undoubtedly remembered the warning issued to us by you through Khan Bahadur Abdul Latif that we should not bind ourselves; this has been duly understood by us and, God willing, no opposition will be seen on our part. You had also stated about the Greek merchant who had travelled in the Gulf years ago (and pointed out) that he should not obtain from us an entry in any of the mines (pearl beds) which belong to us. It is obvious and certain that we have no object in matters which have not been regulated by custom from the first and which have not been habitual to those who were before us. As you know, the soul will not tolerate such (a matter) and you should have no doubt (about this). Please note this and do not discontinue your good news from us for ever and whatever you may require will be satisfied as soon as it is intimated.

"Similar letters were received from the Shaikhs of Sharjah, Ajman, Dubai, Umm al Qawain and Ras al Khaima."

---

1 As cited by Hawley, Trucial States, pp. 321-322.
APPENDIX III

UNDEARTAKINGS OF 1922

Undertaking by the Shaikh of Sharjah
Regarding Oil


"After Compliments--
"My object in writing this letter of friendship is to convey my compliments to you and to enquire after your health.

"Secondly, let it not be hidden from you that I write this letter with my free will and give undertaking to Your Honour that if it is hoped that an oil mine will be found in my territory I will not give a concession for it to foreigners except to the person appointed by the High British Government.

"This is what was necessary to be stated.

"NOTE.--A similar undertaking was given by the Chief of Ras-al-Khaima, on the 22nd February 1922."

Undertaking by the Shaikh of Dubai
Regarding Oil


"After Compliments--
"Let it not be hidden from you that we agree, if oil is expected to be found in our territory, not to grant any concession in this connection to any one except to the person appointed by the High British Government.

"NOTE.--Undertakings similar in substance to the above were given by the following Shaikhs on the dates mentioned:--

"Shaikh of Abu Dhabi. . . . . 3 May 1922.
"Shaikh of Ajman . . . . . 4 May 1922.
"Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain. . . . 8 May 1922."

1 Aitchison, p. 261.
APPENDIX III

ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGRAM OF THE TRUCIAL OMAN SCOUTS

1 See supra, pp. 38-46.

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APPENDIX IV

LIST OF COMMANDERS OF THE TRUCIAL OMAN SCOUTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date Assumed Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major Hankin-Turvin (founder)¹</td>
<td>1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel P. Martin</td>
<td>1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel E. Johnson²</td>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel S. L. Carter</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel H. J. Bartholomew</td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel P. deButts</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel P. Ive</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel H. E. R. Watson³</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ The force was formed as the Trucial Oman Levies.

² During Colonel Johnson's tenure the force was redesignated the Trucial Oman Scouts (1956).

³ During Colonel Watson's tenure the force was redesignated the Union Defence Force (1971)
APPENDIX V

SQUADRON ROTATION DIAGRAM

1

Ham Ham

C Squadron

X Squadron

Manama

D Squadron

Masafi

Sharjah

B Squadron

A Squadron

Buraimi

---

1 See supra, p. 61.

2 X Squadron was banned from Abu Dhabi territory. As a result, every two years its position in the rotational scheme would change in relation to the other squadrons.
Weapons Training

Recruit Training—Drill
TOS Desert Patrol—Fort Jahili, Buraimi

TOS Pay Parade
Adult Education Class

Male Nurses' Class
Lieutenant Ali Said

Digdaga Agricultural Trials Station, Ras al-Khaima

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Captain D. J. Carragher, Forces Medical Officer, Trucial Oman Scouts, 20 January, 1972.

Colonel Pat Ive, former Commander, Trucial Oman Scouts, October, 1967.


Senior Staff Sergeant Abbas Mohammed, Senior Medical NCO, Trucial Oman Scouts, 20 January, 1972.


Staff Sergeant Abdulla Sadik, Medical Instructor, Trucial Oman Scouts, 20 January, 1972.


Lieutenant Tarah Salih, Troop Officer, X Squadron, Trucial Oman Scouts, 22 January, 1972.


