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**UNIFIL II:  
Emerging and Evolving European  
Engagement in Lebanon  
and the Middle East**

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### Authors' Note:

This EuroMeSCo report was completed in mid-spring 2008 and therefore does not include analysis of the Doha Agreement between Lebanese sides in May 2008, nor of the imminent Israeli return of the Lebanese side of the border village of Ghajar. This report recognizes that the lead-nation status of the Maritime Task Force off the coast of Lebanon has changed from Germany to Italy, and then to France in September 2008. It also realizes that Spain expects to assume lead-nation status of UNIFIL in early 2009, yet does not provide any further details on these recent developments considering that the same mandate and current obstacles continue to present challenges to peace-keeping in Lebanon.

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is an international peacekeeping force that results from recurrent attempts at intervention on the part of the international community through the monitoring of cease-fires and the peaceful resolution of conflicts around the world. Although also heavily involved in Africa and Asia, peacekeeping operations in the Middle East exemplify the repeated international efforts to provide a buffer force between Arab states and Israel. Indeed, originating in the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in 1948, successive multinational forces have been deployed in Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon to assist in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, by its very own self-definition as an “interim” force, UNIFIL illustrates the predicament of prolonged peacekeeping missions, revealing aspects that could nonetheless serve as a precedent for other scenarios in the region, such as in Palestine.

After the March 1978 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, UNIFIL was deployed following the approval of the US-drafted UN Security Council Resolution 425, which mandated UNIFIL to guarantee the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, to restore international peace and security and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. However, it became clear only a few months later that the Security Council would not provide UNIFIL the backing required to implement its mandate, so the peacekeepers thus concentrated their efforts on assisting the delivery of humanitarian aid to the local population and recording violations of the cease-fire. By 1982, the US-Soviet détente that had enabled Resolution 425 had come to an end, the rise to power of Ronald Reagan in the US and of Ariel Sharon in Israel had increased the threat of military confrontation in the region, the continuing civil war in Lebanon had resulted in the total collapse of state authority, and the consolidation of power of both the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and of Israeli-armed militias in southern Lebanon had led to an inconclusive war of attrition on the ground. UNIFIL was thus neither mandated, nor did it have the capacity, to stop the large-scale 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the subsequent siege of Beirut that was to shape the reality on the ground for the next two decades. While PLO fighters had indeed been expelled from Lebanon, Israel continued to occupy a large area of Lebanese territory, leading to the birth of an increasingly effective and organized native Lebanese resistance force that at first included an array of leftist, nationalist, and Islamist groups. By the 1990s, this resistance to Israeli occupation came to be dominated by Hezbollah, which gained broad national support that peaked when it was widely credited for forcing Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000.

The period between May 2000 and July 2006 was relatively quiet on the Lebanon-Israel border, but many of the root causes of the conflict remained. Israel still held Lebanese prisoners and refused to relinquish territory claimed by Lebanon, such as the Sheba’a Farms, while security concerns in both southern Lebanon and northern Israel remained precarious due to the absence of a just solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. These factors helped maintain Hezbollah’s *raison d’être* for armed resistance and provided an excuse for its cross-border raid on 12 July 2006 with the aim of capturing Israeli soldiers in order to engage in a prisoner swap with Israel. Israel’s reaction to this raid led to 33 days of war between Israel and Hezbollah – the longest war in Israel’s modern history – which resulted in the deaths of 1,200 Lebanese and 43 Israeli civilians, as well as the internal displacement of a million Lebanese and 300,000 Israelis. Henceforth called the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, the massive Israeli response and destruction reaped on Lebanon was unparalleled to previous reprisals for cross-border operations, as was the extent of Hezbollah’s rocket attacks on northern Israel. After a US-written draft resolution was rejected by Lebanon on 6 August, and with the perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of the UN at a low within Lebanon because of its failure to halt the war, the UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 1701 on 11 August, which came into effect on 14 August. Resolution 1701 authorized the creation of a more “robust” UNIFIL in order to allow it to implement its new mandate of supervising the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, while also ensuring the deployment of the Lebanese army and return of effective state authority in southern Lebanon at the expense of non-state militias.

EU Member States played a leading role in contributing to this more “robust” peacekeeping force – which, for the sake of clarity, will be called “UNIFIL II” in this paper. Yet while such an increase in troop levels has contributed to some measure of stability in southern Lebanon, it has so far proved largely irrelevant in addressing the structural issues that remain unresolved: different conceptions of security in Lebanon and Israel, territorial and water claims, weak state authority in Lebanon, repeated Israeli violations of Lebanon’s sovereignty, political stagnancy in the region, and the failure to establish a full cease-fire in southern Lebanon, let alone prevent an arms build-up by both sides along the border. As such, “UNIFIL II” should be viewed as comprising part of a larger regional solution, rather than as a partisan force with the impossible task of disarming Hezbollah, which some ac-

## 1. Executive Summary

tors were hoping it would be. By early 2007, UNIFIL II had returned to the important role of keeping the peace, engaging in social and humanitarian work, recording violations to Resolution 1701, and supporting the Lebanese Army to assert its authority on the ground and protect the residents of southern Lebanon from Israeli threats. Still, the tension surrounding UNIFIL's exact terms of reference and rules of engagement, prompted by the changing political situation, means that the peacekeepers are sometimes subject to the pressure of being used as pawns in a partisan conflict, rather than acting as neutral peacekeepers – which could be dangerous for UNIFIL's own security. Until the matter of its role is clarified, UNIFIL II may prove to be a persistent predicament rather than a positive precedent for peacekeeping in the Middle East.

To avoid such a possibility, this report offers concrete recommendations directed mainly at the EU Member States most heavily involved in UNIFIL II, with the hope of rendering their contribution more effective, avoiding the recurrent pitfalls, and finally reaching the objective of not only a down-sized participation, but also of monitoring the implementation of a viable and just peace that ensures shared human security and mutual economic prosperity for Israel and Lebanon alike.

There has been a long-standing debate on the merits and drawbacks of UNIFIL, the UN “interim” peacekeeping operation established by UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 425 and 426 in the aftermath of Israel’s 1978 invasion of Lebanon. Following the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, this debate intensified as UNIFIL’s original mandate was made more “robust” by UNSC Resolution 1701, which marked a new phase of UN peacekeeping in Lebanon — hence the use of the term “UNIFIL-II” in this paper to distinguish it from the original UNIFIL.<sup>1</sup> While the extent to which this new “robustness” has succeeded in transforming UNIFIL II into a more effective peacekeeping unit is controversial, there is no doubt that it has become a European-led UN operation. Over the past decade, the European Union (EU) has increasingly intervened in conflict and post-conflict situations throughout Europe, Africa and the Middle East. It has also maintained a strong interest in supporting the various strands of the Middle East peace process and pushing for a just and lasting solution to the question of Palestine. Pursuing a ‘soft power’ approach to conflict resolution and peace-building, the EU has however generally been frustrated in this role due to overpowering US influence in the region. UNIFIL II was thus seen by many in the EU as both an opportunity to demonstrate its increased commitment to the region and as a potential test case for intervention in other parts of the Middle East, including Palestine. This report suggests lessons that can be drawn from UNIFIL’s three decade-old “interim” experience that should be considered by the EU as it continues to clarify its emerging role in the Middle East amidst the realities on the ground and the natural constraints of any peace operation.

The first section of this report briefly outlines the evolving concept of peacekeeping/peace operations, particularly in the Middle East, as well as the EU policy towards, and intervention in, the region, as envisioned in EU Pillars I and II and reflected in its ESDP military and civilian missions. The second section considers the case of UNIFIL I and its ambiguous mandate, detailing the political context within which UNSC Resolution 425 was created and the huge challenges it faced from 1978 to 2006. Key problems and positive contributions are then drawn from this experience. The third section examines how and why UNIFIL II was created in the aftermath of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, and shows how one ambiguous mandate was substituted for another amidst talk of enforcement procedures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for increased “robustness”. This section ends with an analysis of the current situation, and exposes how the status quo today is not very different from what it was during the days of UNIFIL I, namely because the political will to resolve the broader Arab-Israeli conflict remains lacking, and because the structural problems and challenges faced by any UN peace operation in southern Lebanon have not improved, and indeed may have worsened. The report concludes with a series of policy recommendations to be considered by the EU as it steps up its engagement efforts, via civilian and military peace operations, in the Middle East.

Peace operations today represent an important component of the international security system, both as major tools for crisis management and as one of the “main activities of the operational dimension of institutions such as the UN, NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and to a lesser extent the European Union (EU).”<sup>2</sup> Indeed, such operations have grown significantly worldwide over the past decade and have become increasingly complex. According to the *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations*, “There are currently a greater number of larger, more robust peace operations underway around the world than ever before. Simultaneously, these operations are typically armed with more ambitious military, policing and political goals than pre-1999 missions.”<sup>3</sup> The scope of such peace operations has changed considerably since their inception in 1948, when the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) — a group of unarmed military observers — was sent by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to supervise a truce between Israel and its neighbors. Since there was no mention of peacekeeping of any sort in the UN Charter, former Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld famously referred to it as a “Chapter Six-and-a-Half” operation. Peacekeeping has since developed within this “grey zone” between pacific settlement of disputes and military enforcement, as conceived in Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter respectively, growing alongside *preventative diplomacy* — the “technique used to forestall the competition of the rival power blocs into conflict situations that were either a result or potential cause of a power vacuum in the Cold War.”<sup>4</sup>

Until the early 1990s, peace operations generally comprised of traditional UN peacekeeping missions deployed after the end of an armed conflict and whose main task was to prevent the fighting from recurring. Such traditional missions operated with the consent of those states involved in the conflict, remained impartial, and lacked the authority to use force except in narrowly-defined cases of self-defense. With the end of the Cold War — which had

## 2. Introduction & Overview

### 2.1. Overview of Peace Operations

<sup>1</sup> It should be made clear here that the UN itself does not use the term “UNIFIL II” in part because it wanted to maintain an image of continuity to the peacekeeping mission in Lebanon. However, the mandate, scope and resources of the mission — not to mention its political context — have in fact changed sufficiently that the authors feel justified to use the term “UNIFIL II” to signify the post-Resolution 1701 mission, for the sake of clarity.

<sup>2</sup> Thierry Tardy, “Introduction”, in Thierry Tardy (ed.), *Peace Operations After 11 September 2001* (London & New York: Frank Cass, 2004), p.1.

<sup>3</sup> Center on International Cooperation (CIC), *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2006: Briefing Paper*, p.1.

<sup>4</sup> Ramesh Thankur, “From Peacekeeping to Peace Operations”, p.1.

resulted in a paralysis within the UNSC, as the Soviet Union and the US effectively blocked the UNSC from intervening in their proxy wars – three major inter-related shifts occurred.

First, the UN explored ways to “enlarge its repertoire of techniques for dealing with conflict.”<sup>5</sup> Henceforth, according to Murrack Goulding, the former UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs, UN action in relation to conflict evolved to include the following categories: *peacemaking*, *peacekeeping*, and *peace-building* – all of which require the consent of the hostile parties – along with *sanctions* and *peace enforcement*, which are coercive and thus do not require such consent, as they would be taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (see Table 1). Peacekeeping operations underwent a further split between more traditional types (such as UNIFIL) and the more complicated and expensive “multifunctional” operations that generally support the implementation of negotiated settlements and require major civilian components (such as election specialists and police units). By 2005, for instance, the number of police deployed worldwide in peace operations had tripled since 1998 to reach 9,500.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Murrack Goulding, *Peacemonger* (London: John Murray, 2002), p.17.

<sup>6</sup> CIC, *Annual Review 2006*, op. cit., p.3.



**Table 1:**  
**Peace Operation Types**

CATEGORY	CHARACTERISTICS	EXAMPLES
1. Peacekeeping		
a) Traditional	Deployed after an armed conflict has been temporarily suspended in order to ensure that fighting does not re-start, by working towards a lasting settlement of the dispute. Actions include monitoring cease-fires, controlling buffer-zones, and verifying compliance with provisional agreements.	Lebanon (UNIFIL); Afghanistan (UNGOMAP); Iran & Iraq (UNIKOM)
b) Preventative	Refers to the deployment of peacekeepers at the request of only one of the parties to a potential conflict and only on that party's territory. This type has been rare.	Macedonia (UNPROFOR)
c) Multifunctional	Denotes peacekeeping operations established to help the parties in conflict implement a negotiated settlement. This task requires a larger, more complex and costly operation than traditional peacekeeping. Rather than simply supervise cease-fires, such operations may also demobilize combatants, supervise local administrations and police forces, establish truth commissions, conduct elections, de-mine, and assist in economic reconstruction. These operations thus require a major civilian component.	Namibia (UNTAG); Angola (UNAVEM II); El Salvador (ONUSAL); Western Sahara (MINURSO); Cambodia (UNTAC)
d) Complex emergency	Occurs when an operation is deployed during an active conflict where no cease-fire agreement exists. A traditional or multifunctional operation may often become an emergency one when the agreement upon which a settlement has been reached falls apart. Its functions are generally humanitarian in nature.	Lebanon (UNIFIL); Bosnia (UNPROFOR); Angola (UNAVEM II)
2. Peace-making	Involves the use of diplomacy to persuade hostile parties to settle a dispute that has led (or could lead) to armed conflict between them. Peacemakers seek to achieve a cease-fire, to then send in peacekeepers, but also push for a comprehensive agreement to end the conflict and to minimize the risk of it breaking out again.	El Salvador (ONUSAL)
3. Peace-building	Denotes longer-term action to consolidate peace by tackling the root causes of a potential or past conflict. Root causes are often domestic, and include human rights, justice and law issues, ethnic discrimination, social and economic policy.	Iraq (UNAMI)
4. Coercion	Usually takes the form of economic and/or arms embargoes imposed by the UNSC.	South Africa; Iraq
5. Peace-enforcement	Since the UN cannot itself wage war, the UNSC may authorize the intervention of a multinational force to achieve a stated objective. Such multinational forces must keep the UNSC informed of their activities and not exceed their mandate.	Korea; Iraq

Source: Based on Goulding, "Peacemonger", pp. 12-21.

The second shift that occurred was the revision of the peacekeeping doctrine and rules of engagement, in line with the realities of conflicts taking place within, as opposed to between, states.<sup>7</sup> Goulding explains that "For a long time the United Nations' peacekeeping doctrine was that coercion cannot be combined with consent-based peacekeeping; they are alternatives and a choice has to be made between them." The new doctrine, therefore, had to:

Provide for situations in which a party's consent has been given in general terms but the peacekeepers could nevertheless expect to encounter armed resistance from some of the party's adherents or, in some states without effective government, from armed bandits with no political agenda. This made

<sup>7</sup> Goulding, *Peacemonger*, op.cit., p.17.

it necessary to change the peacekeepers' rules of engagement and provide them with sufficient firepower to assure military superiority. The essence of the new doctrine is that force is, if necessary, used against armed persons because of what they do, not because of the side they belong to.<sup>8</sup>

In practice, this meant that the UNSC authorized the use of force by multinational forces when it is needed to protect core humanitarian or peacekeeping functions, in such countries as Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone.

The third major shift that occurred in the 1990s was the huge expansion of global military deployment that were no longer exclusively under UN authority, particularly following the deployment of NATO troops during the 1999 Kosovo war. The number of UN peacekeepers dramatically increased by 477% between 1999 and 2005, so much so that the UN missions had more active troops deployed globally than those foreign deployments of any other country except the US.<sup>9</sup> Still, obvious political and logistical constraints inherent in UN missions paved the way for increased intervention by non-UN forces in unstable regions. By the fall of 2006, there were about 72,000 military personnel deployed in UN operations – mostly in Africa (75%) – compared to around 74,000 in non-UN operations (for UN peacekeeping deployment in the Middle East, see Table 2).<sup>10</sup> NATO troops comprised by far the largest contribution of the non-UN personnel (66%), followed by the EU (11%).

**Table 2:**  
**Current UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Middle East**

UN Mission	Strength (as of 11/07)	Appropriation/Budget (2007-2008)	Fatalities
UNTSO	150 military observers 227 civilians	\$62,270,500 (gross)	49
UNDOF	1,062 military 143 civilians	\$41,586,600 (gross)	42
UNIFIL	13,264 military 869 civilian	\$748,204,600 (gross)	268

Source: UNDPKO, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Background Note, 30 November 2007"

While peace operations are still not strictly speaking defined, they generally refer to civilian and military activities aimed at dealing with a crisis or with the consequences of a crisis, at different possible stages (before, during and after). Most peace operations avoid warfare, the principle of impartiality being theoretically paramount to the success of such operations: "The central and primary objective of any peace operation is the promotion of peace, not the defeat of one of the parties involved."<sup>11</sup> However, the shifting nature of warfare since the end of the Cold War, as well as the increasingly security-related foreign policies of the US and EU since September 11, 2001, means that the use of force – or the threat of it – to implement such peace operations has become more common. It is important to note that there is a "one-way barrier" that separates peacekeeping from peace enforcement: "once peacekeepers become peace enforcers, they cannot revert to a peacekeeping mandate."<sup>12</sup> UNIFIL II initially trod this fine line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, a policy that ultimately backfired.

In November 2007, there were 17 UN peacekeeping operations throughout the world, deploying 82,500 uniformed personnel (including police) from 119 contributing countries, at an estimated annual cost of \$7 billion for 2007-2008 (of which \$5.5 billion had been approved).<sup>13</sup> There are also a further 11 UN political or peace-building missions.<sup>14</sup> As one analyst asserts, this massive increase in the annual budget for UN peacekeeping should not necessarily be seen as reflecting the will of the international community to improve peace operations in the wake of failures in the 1990s, but rather as resulting from the "post-9/11 belief that failed states are ideal training, staging, and breeding grounds for international terrorists."<sup>15</sup> While such assumptions are being increasingly challenged, they remain popular within the security policy circles in NATO countries. In this context, there are complaints

8 Ibid.

9 Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2006, op.cit., p. 2. By 2005, the UN missions had deployed 60,200 troops, while the US only 592,000 because of the on-going occupation of Iraq

10 Note that by December 2006, UN military personnel had reached around 80,000, given that UNIFIL II had expanded. See CIC, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007: A Briefing Paper

11 Tardy, "Introduction", op.cit., p.2.

12 Frederick H. Fleitz, *Peacekeeping Fiascos of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions and US Interests* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004), p.9.

13 UN, DPKO, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Background Note, 30 November 2007," <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote010101.pdf>.

14 UN, DPKO, "United Nations Political and Peacebuilding Missions: Background Note, 30 November 2007," <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ppbm.pdf>.

15 Cedric de Conig, "Peace Operations in Africa: the Next Decade," NUPI Working Paper N°721 (2007), p.1.

that a kind of “informal peacekeeping apartheid has come about, whereby most European and American peace operations and offensive forces are deployed in NATO or EU operations in Europe and the Middle East, whilst most UN peace operations troops are contributed by the developing world and deployed in Africa.”<sup>16</sup>

There are currently nine multilateral peace operations in the Middle East, only three of which are UN missions that report to and are supported by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO):

- UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization) in Egypt, Israel, Lebanon and Syria (established in June 1948).
- UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observation Force) in Syria’s Golan Heights (established in June 1974).
- UNIFIL in Lebanon (established in March 1978).
- EUJUST-LEX (EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq) in Iraq (established in July 2005).
- EUPOL-COPPS (EU Police Reform Mission for the Palestinian Territories) in Palestine (established in January 2006).
- EUBAM-Rafah (EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point) in Palestine (established in November 2005).
- NTM-I (NATO Training Mission in Iraq) in Iraq (established in August 2004).
- MFO (Multinational Force and Observers) in Egypt’s Sinai (established in April 1982).
- MNF-I (Multinational Force in Iraq) in Iraq (established in October 2003).

There are three further UN peace-building missions in the Middle East that report to the UN Department for Political Affairs (DPA), namely:<sup>17</sup>

- UNSCO (Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East) in Jerusalem (established in October 1999).
- UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission in Iraq) in Iraq (established in August 2003).
- Office of the UN Special Coordinator of the Secretary General for Lebanon (established in February 2007).

As a result of the UNIFIL II deployment, nearly 80% of UN military personnel operating in the Middle East are now European in origin.<sup>18</sup> This clearly reflects the strategic importance placed by Europe on stability in this region. Due to geographic proximity and common security concerns, the Middle East has become the most important region in EU foreign policy. European engagement in UNIFIL II, led particularly by France, Italy and Spain, is considered by some analysts, such as the Lebanese diplomat and political scientist Ghassan Salameh, as a “European adventure.” Others, such as Joschka Fischer, former German Foreign Minister, referred to the augmented European presence in the region as “crossing the Rubicon”<sup>19</sup> – essentially passing a point of no return. In either case, Member State participation is an irreversible step for the EU in the Mediterranean and the broader Middle East, even as it moves from being a “payer”, through its European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the European Commission, to becoming a “player” on the ground, via the civilian and military missions of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) emanating from the European Council.

## 2.2. Overview of Peace Operations in the Middle East

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p.2.

<sup>17</sup> UN, DPKO, “Political and Peacebuilding Missions.”

<sup>18</sup> CIC, Annual Review 2007.

<sup>19</sup> See Conference Proceedings of Madrid: Fifteen Years Later, Towards Peace in the Middle East, Addressing Concerns and Expectations, Madrid: CITpax, January 2007, available at: [www.toledopax.org](http://www.toledopax.org); and Joschka Fischer, “Europa cruza el Rubicón”, El País, 5 September 2006, p. 13.

### 2.3. Overview of EU Policy towards the Middle East

Relying on a rather ambiguous and contradictory agenda of democracy-promotion, the EU has three main documents that form a strategic umbrella for its emerging strategy in the Middle East. The “European Security Strategy” (December 2003), “Strengthening the EU’s Partnership with the Arab World” (December 2003), and the “Interim Report on an EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East” (March 2004), the last of which was an EU response to the US’s “Broader Middle East and North Africa Agenda” (BMENA).<sup>20</sup> Revolving around the Mediterranean, the EU has chosen to augment security to the demise of democratic apertures. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Palestinian territories, where the EU has followed the US-Israeli-PA Presidency *troika* to undermine the election of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), after the EU had monitored and deemed the elections democratic.

The apparent contradictions, double-standards, and general lack of specificity in EU policy towards the key players in the Middle East have greatly diminished the capacity of the EU Member States to act as a coherent and consistent block, and have stunted the development of an independent and interest-oriented EU policy that could garner increased influence in the region. Although the EU is not yet “a mature foreign and security player”, what is more significant is that “it is not *perceived* as such, neither by the Europeans themselves nor by other countries.”<sup>21</sup> Again, this is particularly poignant in Gaza, where the third party EU monitoring role at the Rafah crossing has been marked by Israeli control and condescension. Indeed, the EU is today largely seen in the Middle East as implementing the US agenda across the region, and at best playing the occasional ‘good cop’ role vis-à-vis the US’ ‘bad cop’ stance. This is true for the two ESDP civilian missions in the Palestinian territories: the EU police reform mission for the Palestinian civil police (EUPOL-COPPS) and the EU border assistance mission for the Rafah crossing point (EUBAM-Rafah), both of which have been largely suspended since the election of Hamas in January 2006. EUPOL-COPPS has recently re-engaged in assisting in the training of Palestinian police, whereas EUBAM-Rafah officially suspended all monitoring activity when Hamas took over Gaza in June 2007. These ESDP missions are exploring other means to engage (EUPOL-COPPS has expanded to include a new “rule of law” branch mandated to help reform the Palestinian judiciary), but have largely been reduced to implementing the US/Israeli military agenda in the West Bank and the Israeli closure policy in the Gaza Strip. A similar trend is perceptible in Afghanistan, which would fall within the Broader Middle East Initiative, where another EU police reform mission was sent in June 2007 to develop and buttress the Afghan police force (EUPOL-Afghanistan). The situation in Iraq is also similar, in that the EU has an active civilian mission in charge of reforming the Iraqi judicial system (EUJUST-LEX), though training occurs outside the country. Across the Middle East then, the EU is providing soft power ESDP support to either the NATO- and/or US-led military hard power.<sup>22</sup>

UNIFIL II differs from these cases in that it is a UN peacekeeping mission, not a civilian or military ESDP mission. During the protracted negotiations leading to the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1701, there was debate in Brussels and in leading European Member States’ capitals about the possibility of deploying an EU mission to Lebanon, but the ESDP apparatus was not deemed sufficiently developed, and key players, such as Hizbullah and Syria, would not have consented to such a sensitive operation. The subsequent Spanish suggestion to deploy an EU civilian border management mission along the Lebanese border with Syria was equally discarded, but within the EU foreign policy framework, France did push for a military ESDP mission in Chad and the Central African Republic in the fall of 2007,<sup>23</sup> both of which occurred after the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, but definitely demonstrative of an emerging and enhanced European role in peacekeeping around the world.

European caution to act in Lebanon was compounded by the inherent political implications and the severe sensitivities of the setting. Germany, for instance, was skeptical about making its first return to the Middle East since World War II, and was not perceived as an impartial actor due to controversial comments made by Chancellor Angela Merkel stating that any force deployed was there to protect Israel. Spain and Italy, along with a more hesitant France, openly mooted to replicate the European reinforcements sent to buttress UNIFIL II in the Gaza Strip. The EU potential to deploy a Battle Group of 1,500-2,000 troops was explored, as was the possibility of deploying EU Member State contingents under the UN flag. This replication of a parallel peacekeeping mission along the eastern Mediterranean coast was part of a five-point Middle East peace plan proposed by the European trio, but the option was not pursued further due to the Israeli monopoly of security in the Palestinian territories. The possibility does however exist (if not by land, then by sea) to replicate – under an overall political framework accepted by the Palestinians and Israelis – the presence of a European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) along the Gaza Strip coast, such as the one included in the Maritime Task Force (MTF) supporting and training the Lebanese Navy for UNIFIL II (see Part 3).

<sup>20</sup> Yezid Sayigh, Security Sector Reform in the Arab Region, Challenges to Developing an Indigenous Agenda, Arab Reform Initiative, Thematic Papers, N° 2, December 2007, p. 7-9.

<sup>21</sup> “Securing the Future: Europe’s Agenda for a More Peaceful Neighbourhood”, Discussion Paper for the Xth Kronberg Talks “Europe and the Middle East”, Bertelsmann Stiftung, January 17-19, 2008, p. 11.

<sup>22</sup> For more on the tensions and cohesions between NATO and ESDP, see Volker Heise, The ESDP and the Transatlantic Relationship, SWP Research Paper 11, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), November 2007.

<sup>23</sup> Council of the European Union, Portuguese Presidency Report on ESDP, Brussels, 11 December 2007, pp. 2-3.

In order to understand the challenges facing UNIFIL II, it is important to clarify the political and security context within which UNIFIL I was operating for three decades in southern Lebanon. The pattern of conflict and reprisal between Israel and the resistance forces in Lebanon – first the PLO, and later the Lebanese Resistance, which came to be dominated by Hizbullah – and the role of the Lebanese State and Armed Forces are remarkably similar, as are the logistical and operational challenges faced by UNIFIL. *A central argument in this report is that any peace operation in Lebanon must be accompanied by a solution to the underlying problems that initially caused the conflict; otherwise it will be doomed to remain “interim”.* This section briefly highlights key events and phases that have shaped this evolving context.

Unlike large portions of its population, official Lebanon has long tried to remain out of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It participated only symbolically in the war of 1948, while during the Arab defeat of 1967 the Lebanese army “contented itself with defending the foreign embassies and the headquarters of British and American oil companies in Beirut from an angry population.”<sup>24</sup> Still, the creation of Israel and the subsequent Arab-Israeli wars inexorably drew Lebanon into the conflict, with two major problems ultimately having direct implications for UNIFIL’s deployment in southern Lebanon. First, the forced expulsion of Palestinians from their land, beginning in 1948, created a massive refugee crisis that came to organically link Lebanon’s stability with the fate of Palestinian self-determination. Both Lebanon and the Palestinians have long maintained the right of return for all refugees to their homeland, as per international law and UN resolutions. In 2005, there were 4.4 million registered Palestinian refugees, the majority of whom remain distributed among the 58 recognized UN camps – as well as the surrounding cities, towns and villages – in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and Gaza.<sup>25</sup> Most of the refugees that reached Lebanon (now officially numbering over 400,000) were placed in 16 UN camps (now reduced to 12, with four having been destroyed over the years) under dire conditions and devoid of any civil and social rights.<sup>26</sup>

The second major repercussion that is relevant to this paper is the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) stronghold in southern Lebanon during the 1970s. The PLO, which served as an umbrella organization consisting of eight guerrilla groups led by Yassir Arafat’s *Fatah*, was created in 1964 with the objective of liberating Palestine and achieving self-determination for the Palestinians. But since the PLO had no native territory on which to operate, it was in reality a “liberation movement of exiles”<sup>27</sup> that depended on the patronage of its hosts to gain some measure of self-rule, even in the refugee camps. Following the PLO’s violent eviction from Jordan in 1970 – and the severe curtailment of its activities in Syria, with the rise of President Hafiz al-Assad that same year – the PLO moved towards a consolidation of its military and political presence in southern Lebanon, under the terms of the 1969 Arab League-sponsored ‘Cairo Agreement.’ Under this deal, the PLO recognized Lebanon’s “sovereignty and security” and pledged to coordinate its activities with the Lebanese Army. In return, the PLO gained “official recognition of the legitimacy of the Palestinian armed presence, freedom of movement in the Arqub district in the south, and the establishment of autonomous institutions in the refugee camps.”<sup>28</sup> Southern Lebanon would thereafter become the main stage of war between the PLO and Israel for over a decade.

The Lebanese civil war and breakdown of the state after 1975 led to a political vacuum in southern Lebanon, in which a direct confrontation emerged between Israel and its Lebanese proxies on one side, and the “Joint Forces” of the PLO and progressive Lebanese National Movement on the other. By 1977, right-wing militias supported by Israel had launched a series of offensives with the goal of forming a contiguous zone along the Lebanon-Israel border, but this was rebuffed by the Joint Forces. The “two-year” war (as the first phase of the Lebanese civil war is called) had ended with the US-backed (and Israeli approved) deployment of the Arab Deterrent Forces (ADF), a peacekeeping force comprising, for the most part, Syrian soldiers. The ADF, however, was not authorized to cross several Israeli-imposed ‘red lines’, such as deploying south of Sidon or use of its air force.<sup>29</sup> With the rise to power of the Likud party, Israel continued to harden its position towards the PLO, even after having secured a major political victory by getting Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to visit Jerusalem in May 1977. Indeed, Sadat’s policy of breaking away from the Arab fold and making a separate peace with Israel was interpreted by Palestinian leaders as a direct attack on the centrality of the PLO in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel also stepped up its cross-border raids on Lebanon, which culminated in the shelling of the Lebanese village of Azziyeh, during which over 200 civilians were killed.<sup>30</sup>

### 3. UNIFIL I (1978-2006): Political Context & Lessons Learned

#### 3.1. The Arab-Israeli Wars and Lebanon: Palestinian Refugees and the PLO

#### 3.2. Israel’s 1978 Invasion of Lebanon and the Creation of UNIFIL I

24 Fawwaz Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), p.152.

25 According to the UN, refugees are “persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, who lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict.” This definition also covers descendants of persons who became refugees in 1948. See UNRWA, “Who is a Palestine Refugee?”, <http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/whois.html>.

26 UNRWA, “Lebanon Refugee Camp Profiles”, <http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/lebanon.html>.

27 Edward Said, *The Question of Palestine* (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), p.134.

28 Rex Brynen, “PLO Policy in Lebanon: Legacies and Lessons” in *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Winter 1989), pp. 50-1. See also text of Cairo Agreement, available at: [http://www.lebanonwire.com/prominent/historic\\_documents/1969\\_cairo\\_agreement.asp](http://www.lebanonwire.com/prominent/historic_documents/1969_cairo_agreement.asp).

29 Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2000), p.344.

On 11 March 1978, Palestinian gunmen carried out an operation that originated in Lebanese territory inside Israel, leaving over 30 civilians killed. Israel's response came on 14-15 March, when it launched its first major invasion of Lebanon, occupying an area that reached as far as the Qasmiyeh bridge on the outskirts of Tyre and that resulted in the deaths of as many as 2,000 people, mostly civilians.<sup>31</sup> Lebanon strongly protested to the UNSC that such an attack was a “naked aggression against the Lebanese territory,” stating that “Lebanon is not responsible for the presence of Palestinian bases in Southern Lebanon.”<sup>32</sup> The Lebanese government was convinced that Israel was using this invasion as a pretext to (a) satisfy its long-standing desire to occupy the water-rich areas of southern Lebanon (the fact that it dubbed this “Operation Litani” may thus not seem a coincidence); and (b) to impose a permanent ‘buffer zone’ patrolled by its main Lebanese proxy militia, the South Lebanon Army (SLA).<sup>33</sup>

The UNSC convened on 17 March to deliberate on a US recommendation to end the war and establish a peacekeeping mission. Two days later, UNSC Resolution 425 and 426 were adopted by a vote of 12 to 2 (the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia abstained), with China not participating. Resolution 425 “called upon Israel to immediately cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory.”<sup>34</sup> It also decided to “immediately establish under its authority a United Nations interim force for southern Lebanon” with the purpose of:

- Confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces;
- Restoring international peace and security; and
- Assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.

Israel officially accepted the ceasefire on 21 March, after its forces had completed their march towards the Litani River in a bid to get the proposed peacekeeping force deployed as far north as possible.<sup>35</sup> However, Israel criticized Resolution 425 as “inadequate and sorely lacking” because it did not explicitly ban “terrorists” from returning to southern Lebanon. The PLO too had major reservations about the resolution, mainly because it did not condemn Israeli aggression and “terrorism” strongly enough, and because the resolution only addressed a “derivative” issue, rather than deal with the core problem: the question of Palestine and the right of return of Palestinian refugees to their homes.<sup>36</sup>

Resolution 426 approved the UN Secretary General's report on the implementation of UNSC resolution 425 and authorized the deployment of a 4,000-strong UNIFIL force – commanded by the UNTSO Chief of Staff Major-General E.A. Erksine and with troops largely borrowed from UNTSO and UNEF operations – for an initial period of six months, at a cost of about \$68 million.<sup>37</sup> By mid-April 1978, UNIFIL numbered around 2,500 troops from France, Nepal, Norway, Sweden, Iran and Canada; and by early May, there were already over 3,100 ground troops (Senegalese and Nigerian units had joined the others) and a further 836 international personnel dealing with logistics.<sup>38</sup> After Resolution 427 of May 3 had authorized an increase in this number to 6,000 troops, further Iranian, Irish, Fijian and Nigerian battalions arrived in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL's terms of reference included stipulations to “use its best efforts to prevent the recurrence of fighting and to ensure that its area of operation is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind.”<sup>39</sup> Moreover, the peacekeeping units could “not use force except in self-defense” and were required to maintain “complete impartiality.” The SG report also made it clear that there were three pre-conditions for UNIFIL to be effective: “Firstly, it must have at all times the full confidence and backing of the Security Council. Secondly, it must operate with the full cooperation of all the parties concerned. Thirdly, it must be able to function as an integrated and efficient military unit.”<sup>40</sup>

While Lebanon welcomed the UN peacekeepers, the more radical factions within the PLO urged Yassir Arafat to reject any ceasefire. However, Arafat's pragmatism prevailed (as did Syrian pressure) and the PLO officially accepted both the ceasefire and the UNIFIL presence on 28 March, and soon pledged to facilitate UNIFIL's task by not attacking Israel from southern Lebanon. Israel eventually did withdraw its troops from Lebanon on 13 June, but rather than handing over key positions near the border to UNIFIL as was required, it authorized the South Lebanon Army (SLA), under Sa'ad Haddad, to take control of a 10km “Free Lebanon” zone within which the SLA were the “de facto” force (DFF). While the relationship between UNIFIL and the PLO remained tense over the ensuing years, it is the DFF that accounted for the bulk of attacks against UNIFIL in southern Lebanon.<sup>41</sup>

30 Rex Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990). 31 Robert Fisk, *Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1990), p.124; and Noam Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians* (Cambridge, MA: Southend Press, 1999), p.192.

32 Ghasan Tuani, *Peacekeeping in Lebanon: the Facts, the Documents* (New York: William Belcher Group, 1979), pp.4-5.

33 *Ibid.*

34 UN Security Council Resolution 425, S/RES/425 (19 March 1978), in Tuani, *Peacekeeping in Lebanon*, p.19. For online access to full text of Resolutions 425 and 426, see The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/unres.htm>.

35 See, for instance, Rex Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).

36 UNSC, “Provisional verbatim record of the two thousand and seventy-fourth meeting”, S/PV.2074 (19 March 1978) in Tuani, *Peacekeeping in Lebanon*.

37 UNSC, “Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978)”, S/12611 (19 March 1978) in Tuani, *Peacekeeping in Lebanon*, pp. 127-129.

38 UNSC, “Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon”, S/12620/Add.3 (17 April 1978); and UNSC, “Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon”, S/12620/Add.4 (5 May 1978).

39 UNSC, S/12611, op.cit.

40 *Ibid.*

41 Brynen, op. cit.

UNIFIL established its force headquarters in the southern Lebanese town of Naqoura, near the border with Israel. However, its civilian employees and a few of its officers lived in Israel, which meant that each morning for many years they had to seek permission from the Israeli army and SLA to make their way to Naqoura. UNIFIL troops and officers, on the other hand, resided in southern Lebanese villages south of the Litani River. By the fall of 1978, the UNIFIL battalions were distributed along three sectors (western, central, and eastern) as follows<sup>42</sup>:

**Table 3:**  
**UNIFIL Deployment (September 1978)**

Battalion Country of Origin	Sector Location in South Lebanon	Headquarters	Troop Numbers
Senegal	Northern part of western sector	Marakah	634
Fiji	Southern part of western sector	Qana	500
Nigeria	Northern part of central/western sector	Tayr Zibna	673
France	Southern part of the central/western sector	Haris	644
Iran	Northern part of central/western sector	Qallawiyah	599
Ireland	Southern part of central/eastern sector	Tibnin	661
Nepal	Western part of the eastern sector	Blate	642
Norway	Eastern part of eastern sector	Ebel Es-Saqi	706

Source: based on UNSC, S/12845 (13 September 1978).

Tensions across the Lebanese-Israel border continued despite UNIFIL's presence, leading to UN Resolution 501 that authorized a further increase of UNIFIL to 7,000 troops. Even though the PLO had succeeded in curbing cross-border operations, in line with a 1981 cease-fire with Israel, Israel considered that the threat remained given that the PLO had consolidated its grip on influence in southern Lebanon. With the Likud party's restoration to power following Israel's 1981 elections, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon moved to implement his "Grand Design" for the Middle East. This plan included the annexation of Golan Heights, officially annexed by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin on December 14, 1981, the removal of the Palestinian threat from southern Lebanon, as well as the elimination of the PLO as a significant military and diplomatic player.<sup>43</sup>

On 6 June 1982 – in response to an assassination attempt on its Ambassador in London by a small terrorist group led by Abu Nidal, who had been condemned to death by the PLO itself – Israel launched a massive invasion of Lebanon, destroying Palestinian refugee camps along the way and reaching Beirut within days. The long siege on Beirut, where the remaining PLO fighters and its allies pitched their last line of defense, lasted until mid-August, when the PLO finally agreed to a US-mediated plan to evacuate its forces from Lebanon. Israel's plan seemed to have worked: a multinational force (MNF), composed of US, French, British and Italian troops, arrived on 12 August to oversee the agreement; the pro-Israeli candidate Bashir Gemayal was elected president of Lebanon eleven days later; and Arafat left Lebanon at the end of August. All in all, Lebanese authorities reported that an estimated 19,000 people had been killed and 30,000 wounded during the invasion, while the Israeli military reported 368 deaths and over 2,000 wounded.<sup>44</sup>

The UN responded to the invasion by issuing a series of UNSC Resolutions. On 5 June, Resolution 508 called for an end to all military activities, and the following day, Resolution 509 demanded "that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally" to the Lebanese border. However, on 8 June, the US vetoed a Spanish-drafted resolution condemning Israel's non-compliance with resolutions 508 and 509.

### 3.3. Israel's 1982 Invasion and the Birth of the Lebanese Resistance

42 UNSC, "Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (for the period 19 March to 13 September 1978)," S/12845 (13 September, 1978).

43 See Don Peretz, "Israel's Historical Foreign Policy in Lebanon" in Deirdre Collings (ed.), *Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), p. 116; and Itamar Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon, 1970-1983* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 132-3.

44 Ibrahim Abu-Lughod and Eqbal Ahmad, "The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon: the casualties" in *The Invasion of Lebanon, Race & Class* (Volume XXIV, Spring 1983, No 4), pp. 340-2.

On 18 June 1982, UNSC Resolution 511 authorized an extension of UNIFIL's mandate for a further two months pending further review. According to their rules of engagement, UNIFIL troops were authorized to halt the Israeli army's advances. The reality, of course, was that UNIFIL was not sufficiently equipped or politically supported by the Security Council to do much more than observe and record Israel's activities. Some units did summon the courage to try and stop the Israeli advance, but soon gave up as it became clear that this was not a limited operation.

For three years, UNIFIL remained behind Israeli occupation lines, with its role "limited to providing protection and humanitarian assistance to the local population to the extent possible".<sup>45</sup> Israel's invasion and its reluctance to depart from Lebanon after the PLO had evacuated, led to growing resentment among the Lebanese and the unraveling of Sharon's "Grand Design." Bashir Gemayal was assassinated before taking office, a 1983 'peace' treaty – perceived by most Lebanese as a capitulation agreement – was officially abandoned, and a national resistance movement composed of secular, nationalist and Islamic groups was becoming increasingly effective against Israeli forces in Lebanon. In February 1985, Hizbullah published its "Open Letter" proclaiming the emergence and objectives of its military wing, the Islamic Resistance.<sup>46</sup> This letter essentially asserted that resistance was a "main and fundamental priority" for Hizbullah, but equally that "no *jihad* movement could separate itself from complementary political work that builds on the fruits of resistance."<sup>47</sup> By then, and under sustained pressure, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) were carrying out a partial withdrawal to what was termed the "security zone," which extended from the Blue Line to the Litani River and was manned by both the IDF and the SLA militia. Israel had abandoned large urban cities such as Sidon, Tyre, and Nabatieh, but still occupied around 1,100 square kilometers of land, representing 55% of South Lebanon and 11% of Lebanon's total area.<sup>48</sup>

### 3.4. The 1990s: Israeli Incursions and the Development of "Rules of the Game"

By 1991, the civil war in Lebanon had ended with the implementation of the Saudi and Arab League-mediated Ta'if Accords, negotiated on 22 October 1989. These Accords called for the dissolution of militias and the collection of their arms in such a way as to incorporate many of the former militia members into the Lebanese Army (which had split during the war). The security plan's ultimate aim under Ta'if was thus to allow the state to "extend its authority over all the territory of Lebanon by means of its own forces," with a caveat that allowed Syrian forces to "assist the legitimate Lebanese forces" in this task.<sup>49</sup> The role of the Lebanese Army was also made explicit: "the fundamental task of the armed forces is to defend the homeland," and, as such, it must be "unified, prepared and trained in order that they may be able to shoulder their national responsibilities in confronting Israeli aggression." The Accord called for "privileged relations" with Syria, and close cooperation between Lebanon and Syria "in all areas," particularly in security matters. With regard to UNSC Resolution 425, Ta'if called for its immediate implementation and the withdrawal of Israeli occupation troops, as well as the adherence to the armistice line of 1949. In the meantime:

All necessary steps will be taken to liberate Lebanese territory from Israeli occupation, spread state sovereignty over all the territories, and deploy the Lebanese army in the border area adjacent to Israel; and making efforts to reinforce the presence of the UN forces in South Lebanon to ensure the Israeli withdrawal and to provide the opportunity for the return of security and stability to the border area.<sup>50</sup>

Israel, however, prolonged its occupation throughout the 1990s, despite its clearly decreasing value, as it assumed that unilateral withdrawal would simply encourage armed resistance in both Lebanon and Palestine. It launched major incursions into Lebanon during 1993 ("Operation Accountability") and 1996 ("Operation Grapes of Wrath"), aiming to drive Hizbullah out of southern Lebanon and create inter-sectarian tension within Lebanon as hundreds of civilians were killed and thousands of mostly Shia'a residents were forced to find shelter in Beirut and surrounding towns. UNIFIL had now been reduced to 4,500 troops and could only watch and record such events, including the attack on the Fijian Battalion Headquarters of UNIFIL in the village of Qana during "Operation Grapes of Wrath", in which 107 civilians who had taken refuge there were killed.

Rather than deterring Hizbullah's capacity to strike against Israel, the 1993 and 1996 incursions actually strengthened inter-sectarian solidarity against Israel and compelled the international community to react once again by helping to negotiate a "Document of Understanding" between Israel and Hizbullah on 27 April 1996.<sup>51</sup> The Israel-Lebanon Monitor-

45 UNIFIL, "Background", <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/background.html>.

46 The text of the "Open Letter" is available in Augustus Richard Norton, *Amal and the Shia'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), pp. 167-187.

47 Naim Qassem, *Hizbullah: The Story from Within* (London: Saqi, 2005), p. 98. Sheikh Naim Qassem was a founding member of Hizbullah and currently has served as its Deputy Secretary General since 1991.

48 *Ibid.*, p. 95.

49 Ta'if text is available online at <http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/lebanon/taif.htm>. See also Joseph Mailla, "The Ta'if Accord: An Evaluation" in Deirdre Collings (ed.), *Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), p. 36.

50 Ta'if Accord, Part III.



ing Group (ILMG) – including the participation of the US, France, Israel, Lebanon and Syria – emerged as a mechanism to issue restraint declarations for violations of the “April Understanding”.<sup>52</sup> This important document established what were to become the “rules of the game” between Israel and the Lebanese resistance groups. These rules primarily included prohibiting the belligerent parties from targeting civilians and firing from civilian areas. In acknowledgement of the drastic decrease in civilian casualties between 1996 and 2000, the ILMG was seen as “a relative success” when it was dissolved with Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from South Lebanon.<sup>53</sup>

In late May 2000, the IDF completed their withdrawal from most of southern Lebanon because the cost of occupation had simply become too high. What had begun as a unilateral decision to withdraw, with the intention of retaining the SLA’s hegemony in the area, turned into a Hizbullah rout as the SLA quickly disintegrated. Israel had not coordinated its intentions with UNIFIL, which as a result could not effectively act as a buffer between the re-treating Israeli forces and the Lebanese returning to their villages. The Lebanese State was totally unprepared for the Israeli withdrawal and had no plans formulated to secure its authority in the region. Moreover, lacking any adequate security coordination measures with UNIFIL and the Lebanese Army, the IDF left a vacuum that was rapidly filled by Hizbullah, as later occurred with the void left following Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip in August/September 2005, which was filled by Hamas. The lack of security coordination, as well as the unwillingness to relinquish all occupied Lebanese and Palestinian territory, proved a persistent source of frustration for both the Lebanese and Palestinians, and was fundamentally counterproductive for Israel and its purported peace efforts with its neighbors.<sup>54</sup>

On the Lebanese-Israeli track, the UN officially certified that Israel had finally complied with the terms of Resolution 425, but Lebanon promptly rejected this, pointing to Israel’s continued occupation of the Sheba’a Farms area, as well as a number of villages near the border. This dispute over the continuing validity of Resolution 425 meant that UNIFIL would remain on the ground in southern Lebanon until the issue was resolved. It also gave Hizbullah a continued *raison d’être* to maintain its arms active. After proclaiming victory from the southern town of Bint Jbeil on 26 May 2000, Hizbullah leader Sayyed Hassan Nassrallah insisted that the armed resistance against Israel would continue until all Lebanese territory – including Sheba’a farms – was liberated and all Lebanese prisoners returned to their homes.<sup>55</sup> While Nassrallah made it clear that Hizbullah had no intention of replacing the Lebanese State, he would later add a third condition for giving up Hizbullah’s arms: the development of a viable national security strategy that would effectively protect southern Lebanon from Israeli incursions and reprisals. This move has broad popular support among the population of southern Lebanon who prefer to rely on Hizbullah for their security, rather than on the respected but ineffective army, or the international community with its unfulfilled commitments.

By 2004, the regional situation had shifted significantly as a result of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its bellicose attitude towards Iran and Syria (as well as Hizbullah and Hamas). France and the US sponsored the short but divisive UNSC Resolution 1559, which contained two paragraphs: one calling on Syria to withdraw from Lebanon, and the other for the disbanding of all remaining “militias”. The latter was of course challenging both Hizbullah’s armed presence, as well as its status as the prime national resistance movement. On 14 February 2005, former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was assassinated by a car bomb in downtown Beirut. This prompted mass demonstrations against Syria – which had been widely implicated in the bombing despite a lack of evidence – forcing it to postpone its own plans for departure because of unprecedented international pressure, especially UNSC Resolution 1559. Syria subsequently withdrew all its military personnel and equipment from Lebanon in April 2005. Since Hariri’s assassination, there have been 14 other assassinations (up to January 2008), and the country has been paralyzed by a split between two camps: the ruling “March 14” coalition that is backed by the West and includes Prime Minister Fouad Siniora; and the opposition “March 8” grouping that includes Hizbullah and General Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) as its most prominent representatives.<sup>56</sup>

The internal split, coupled with the partisan role played by the US and other Western backers of March 14, has had a profound impact on the perception of the UN itself. The July 2006 war has exasperated this tension. The rising role of Sunni extremist groups in Lebanon, including Al-Qaeda affiliated ones, amidst the internal turmoil has been an important development. The battle between the Lebanese Army and Fath El Islam militants in Nahr

### 3.5. Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000: Liberation and the Dispute over Resolution 425

### 3.6. Crisis in Lebanon and UN Involvement in Lebanon’s Internal Affairs (2004-2007)

<sup>51</sup> Elizabeth Picard, *Lebanon: A Shattered Country* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 2002), p.183.

<sup>52</sup> The “April Understanding” emerged as a gentleman’s agreement, but remained unsigned, perhaps due in large part to the possible backlash an official imprimatur could accrue, such as occurred with the discredited and inconclusive peace treaty signed by Amine Gemayel with Israel on 17 May 1983.

<sup>53</sup> “Old Games, New Rules: Conflict on the Israel-Lebanon Border”, ICG Middle East Report N° 7, 18 November 2002, pp. 5-6; for a brief description of ILMG during the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, see Adir Gurion Waldman, “Lebanon’s force for good”, *International Herald Tribune*, 2 August 2006; for a more detailed Israeli perspective of the ILMG, see Adir Gurion Waldman, *Arbitrating Armed Conflict: Decisions of the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group* (JurisNet, 2003); and for a US assessment, see Adam Frey, “The Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group: An Operational Review”, (Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 1997).

El Bared was fierce, and led to a re-appraisal of the strength of such groups. One of their proclaimed objectives was to attack UNIFIL forces and challenge Hizbullah's monopoly on confrontation with Israel.

### 3.7. Lessons Learned: Positive Points & Challenges

UNIFIL I arrived in southern Lebanon as an “interim” force, and yet it has remained deployed for nearly three decades. It was handed three tasks under UNSC resolution 425: namely, to confirm the withdrawal of all Israeli troops from Lebanon; to restore international peace and security; and to assist the Lebanese government in extending its effective authority in southern Lebanon. By these criteria, its success was limited. Yet it was established under conditions where the key parties to the conflict were at war, an overall political framework was absent, and precious little meaningful support was provided from the SC itself. Essentially, there was no ‘peace’ to keep, and instead it was about managing a low-level conflict that occasionally exploded. This left UNIFIL with the challenge of figuring out, on the ground, its own way to diffuse tension, provide impartial information, as well as support, and to gain the trust of the local population amongst whom they operated. It was in this latter area that they found their greatest success, which remains to this day unheralded amidst occasional dismissive references that UNIFIL I somehow “failed” or was not sufficiently “robust”. In short, UNIFIL I did not fail, but rather it was let down by the UNSC, on the one hand, and the major parties to the conflict, on the other. As Brian Urquhart, former Under-Secretary General of the UN, explains:

[UNIFIL's] mandate looked all right on paper, but it had little to do with the grim realities of the situation. The government of Lebanon was powerless in the area; the government of Israel was resentful of the new peacekeeping force and not really disposed to cooperate with it, while other armed groups in the area, including the PLO, had their own agendas and ideas. Having launched UNIFIL, the members of the Security Council, both individually and collectively, were extraordinarily restrained about providing strong and outspoken support for their new offspring. The crushing burden of performing an extraordinarily difficult and hazardous task therefore fell mainly on the commander and the officers and men of UNIFIL.<sup>57</sup>

This section summarizes a number of UNIFIL's positive contributions, as well as key challenges faced by the force.

#### UNIFIL I: Positive Points

- In the early years of its intervention, many civilians who had opted to remain in their village in the South needed UNIFIL to survive. Although UNIFIL had no budget for humanitarian efforts, it managed to offer an incredible array of services. With its own resources, it repaired schools and cleared mines and cluster bomblets, all using its own troops and without any external assistance. It provided outstanding medical services, to the extent of sending helicopters to evacuate civilian patients and having them treated in Israeli hospitals when security concerns made it impossible to transport patients to Beirut. Some of UNIFIL's contingents – the Norwegians and Finns – even mobilized their own national resources to assist in South Lebanon.
- UNIFIL became one with the land: it provided compassion and assistance to people who had long been ignored by the Lebanese State and the international community, helping them rebuild their lives, and aided South Lebanon to become a relatively secure region, and most significantly, without conflict amongst the local populace. The locals reciprocated in kind. For instance, the people not only welcomed UNIFIL personnel to their homes and workplaces, but they also provided UNIFIL with information on potential threats against the force and at times even intervened with hostile elements to thwart any potential attacks against the UN troops. Furthermore, UNIFIL I quickly learned that the only reliable intelligence on irregular forces roaming the South could be obtained from local villagers. The major problem faced was the location of the headquarters in the occupied village of Naqoura. Nobody from outside the zone could access it. But this was eventually solved by establishing a logistics base in Tyre, with a press office to service the local media. This office became the hub of information pouring in from the villagers, merchants and, most usefully, from taxi and service drivers plying the roads of South Lebanon.

<sup>54</sup> See CIPax, Third Party Intervention in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, From Mediator to Monitor, Middle East Special Report N° 2, Madrid: CIPax, Winter 2008.

<sup>55</sup> Sayyed Hassan Nassrallah, “Victory” in Nicholas Noe (ed.), Voice of Hizbullah: the Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nassrallah, pp. 232-243.

<sup>56</sup> It should be noted that this paper was drafted before the seminal events in Lebanon during May 2008, when the Hizbullah-led opposition militias overran the March 14 militias in Beirut, and a national unity government was finally formed after the main national and regional players met in Doha to reach a national accord to end the conflict. Despite these agreements, however, tension remains.

<sup>57</sup> Brian Urquhart, “Foreword” in Bjorn Skogmo, UNIFIL: International Peacekeeping in Lebanon, 1978-1988 (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), p. viii.

- UNIFIL was sensitive to local sentiments. Local leaders and notables were always invited to parades and other ceremonies. Visiting dignitaries from troop-contributing countries were encouraged to visit local notables. During Ramadan, UNIFIL even banned its troops from eating and smoking in public. Troops were only allowed to sunbathe in designated locations, not visible to the public. When it snowed in Arkoub, it was the Norwegians who opened the roads. UNIFIL was the only fire brigade in the region, always fully responsive. When the South did not receive fuel supplies, UNIFIL quietly replenished gasoline in the pumps providing villages with water. One village in the occupied zone borrowed a UNIFIL generator every oil harvest time in order to press the olives. The front-line between the occupied area and the rest of the country boasted the most productive agricultural lands, yet these could not be cultivated because the SLA militiamen had a nasty habit of firing on farmers. All UNIFIL battalions thus began to send out patrols, which became known as Harvest Patrols, to protect the farmers.
- UNIFIL was set up at a time when there was no state authority in the South. To survive and continue with its mission without becoming drawn into the conflict, UNIFIL had to set up channels of communication with irregular groups. Although the headquarters did not want UNIFIL to deal with any group except the PLO on the one side, and Israel on the other, it quickly became clear that marginalizing and ignoring the other relevant groups with heavy arms and rather ill-disciplined cadres was dangerously misguided. UNIFIL made excellent use of well-trained, sometimes linguist, professional officers provided by UNTSO as military observers under the operational control of UNIFIL. These officers, especially those from the US, France, Australia and New Zealand, were able to establish and maintain correct and workable relations with all the groups in the South, even with Major Haddad's notoriously ill-disciplined militiamen. No doubt it was this excellent liaison work that transformed the massive Shiite grassroots movement Amal into a fully dedicated UNIFIL supporter and ally.
- When Hizbullah first appeared in the South in 1983, it was virulently anti-West, anti-foreigner and anti-UNIFIL. This soon blossomed into armed clashes, especially with the French, who left Lebanon post haste. Never mind the lack of support from UN headquarters, even in Beirut there was no one to guide and assist UNIFIL in its contacts with these highly emotional, heavily armed and non-talkative new faces in the South. Despite initial opposition from New York and Israel, after long and tedious work, UNIFIL was able to establish some contact with Hizbullah leaders in South Lebanon and eventually bring the conflict under some degree of control.

### UNIFIL I: Challenges

There were also numerous problems that UNIFIL had to face from the outset, on the level of the UNSC and the UN Secretariat, and also as regards organization within UNIFIL itself:

- The UNSC created an ambiguous mandate that could not realistically be achieved given (a) that little political pressure was exerted on Israel, over two decades of occupation, in a bid to compel its withdrawal from Lebanese territory; and (b) the absence of any breakthroughs in the overall political settlement that would have allowed, and empowered, the Lebanese State to effectively extend its authority into southern Lebanon.
- The UN Secretariat, which had originally opposed the creation of UNIFIL due to the ongoing civil war and total absence of state authority in the area where the peacekeepers were to be deployed, provided limited guidance to its peacekeepers on the ground. Similarly to the UNSC, there was little to no debate on how UNIFIL was to be supported, nor was sufficient consideration given to what conditions the peacekeeping force might face on the ground.
- At the UNIFIL level, because the troop-contributing countries were not adequately warned of the dangers involved when operating in southern Lebanon and were thus unprepared for the inevitable challenges posed by abundant irregular forces, UNIFIL was not in a position to attempt any moves that might lead to confrontation. The location of the headquarters and of several symbolic outposts in the occupied zone, coupled with UNIFIL's inability to control supply routes to some of these isolated units, made it a hostage. As occurs within most multinational commands, UNIFIL

suffered from wide divergences of opinion between its contingents. There was no unity of purpose or of approach to problems, as a result of differences in national interests, political outlooks, military doctrines, linguistic ability and equipment.

- UNIFIL's military and political staff constantly sought to wean the force away from the Israeli suppliers of its logistical needs. But in this respect, UNIFIL's civilian administrative staff proved to be an almost insurmountable barrier. These people lived in Israel, where doing business was safe and easy. By strictly conforming to the letter of UN rules and regulations, they caused a permanent embarrassment to the force when asked by the Lebanese why it was buying its supplies from Israel. Even the support of key political officials in New York was unable to change the situation. This was, however, true; UNIFIL did not have unfettered, safe access at its disposal, even to Beirut, given that the roads were under the control of irregular forces up until the Ta'if Accord.
- Since UNIFIL is by its own mandate an "interim" peacekeeping mission, the question of temporality is unavoidable. For three decades, UNIFIL was present in southern Lebanon, providing assistance to the Lebanese, coordinating with the Israeli Defense Forces, and monitoring the cease-fire. During this time, UNIFIL was unable to impede successive Israeli invasions, nor was it mandated to do so; but more importantly, due to a lack of mechanisms to denounce and reprimand mutual violations, UNIFIL lost a large degree of its legitimacy. Moreover, the longer the time without political movement – towards internal Lebanese conflict resolution, as well as external Israeli military occupation and Syrian interference – UNIFIL will continue being prone to the whims of the parties in conflict, as happened once again when UNIFIL became 'caught in middle', acting as a rather bland buffer, during the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War.

The period between May 2000 and July 2006 was, generally speaking, deceptively calm along the Blue Line. Effectively, although the ILMG had disbanded, the general terms negotiated between Israel and Hizbullah under the April 1996 Agreement, continued to apply. During this period, the border was “quieter than it had been for the past thirty years”, with only one Israeli civilian killed – victim of falling anti-aircraft rounds that had been fired at Israeli jets violating Lebanese airspace – and about a dozen Katyusha rockets fired across the border into Israel, though none having been attributed to Hizbullah.<sup>58</sup> By the time of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, UNIFIL troops had been reduced to their lowest number since 1978, down to a skeleton force of only around 2,000, amidst talk of the force being altogether disbanded. Behind the scenes, however, no further progress as regards the larger political dispute meant that Hizbullah continued to stockpile weapons and reinforce its positions in southern Lebanon, amidst fears that Israel would launch further incursions. Hizbullah’s main demands encompassed the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the remaining occupied Lebanese lands, including Sheba’a farms, and the release of Lebanese prisoners long-held in Israeli jails. For its part, the IDF was “chomping at the bit for a chance to settle scores with Hizbullah”, after its withdrawal from Lebanon under “unrelenting pressure” from a very effective resistance movement.<sup>59</sup> Israel wanted to reassert its military supremacy in the area, lest Hizbullah’s model of resistance be replicated in other Arab lands under Israeli occupation, especially in Palestine, and in the process also prevent the possibility of rocket fire into northern Israel.<sup>60</sup>

On the morning of 12 July 2006, a Hizbullah unit crossed the Blue Line and attacked an Israeli army patrol near the border, capturing two Israeli soldiers and killing three others.<sup>61</sup> The captured soldiers were brought into Lebanon, and a heavy exchange of fire ensued between Hizbullah and Israel across the entire length of the Blue Line.<sup>62</sup> Israel’s armed forces targeted, in these initial exchanges, not just Hizbullah positions, but also a number of roads and bridges in southern Lebanon, and at least one Israeli tank and platoon crossed into Lebanon in an attempt to rescue the captured soldiers, but resulting instead in the deaths of a further five Israeli soldiers.<sup>63</sup> Israel’s army chief of staff, Dan Halutz, warned that Israel would “turn back the clock in Lebanon by 20 years” if its soldiers were not released, but Hizbullah clearly stated that it would only return the Israeli prisoners through “indirect negotiations”, which led to the “trade” of Lebanese prisoners detained by Israel during its two decade occupation of southern Lebanon.<sup>64</sup> Hizbullah had, in fact, succeeded in a similar endeavor in early 2004, when Germany brokered a “historic prisoner swap” involving two dozen Lebanese and Arabs held in Israeli prisons, in return for one captured Israeli army reserve officer and the dead bodies of three other soldiers.<sup>65</sup>

By the afternoon of 12 July, the Lebanese government had officially requested that UNIFIL broker a ceasefire.<sup>66</sup> Israel, however, rejected this and declared that Hizbullah’s actions constituted an “act of war” by the government of Lebanon and, as such, “Lebanon is responsible and Lebanon will bear the consequences of its actions”.<sup>67</sup> On 13 July, Israel bombed Beirut’s International Airport and imposed a total land, sea and air blockade on Lebanon. It had by then also greatly expanded its scope of attack to include civilian areas and infrastructure throughout Lebanon, including Beirut, while Hizbullah was firing rockets into civilian areas in northern Israel. By 14 July, Israel’s declared aims had gone beyond the mere return of its captured soldiers and now sought the total elimination of Hizbullah and implementation of UNSC Resolution 1559. IDF Brigadier General Ido Nehustan echoed Prime Minister Olmert’s stance in stating: “We know that it’s going to be a long and continuous operation, but it’s very clear: we need to put Hizbullah out of business. Our aim is to change the situation in which a terrorist organization operates from within a sovereign territory”.<sup>68</sup> The tone had now been set: Israel pounded Lebanon, especially the South of the country and southern suburbs of Beirut, while Hizbullah absorbed these aerial attacks, fought to repulse Israeli land advances, and launched missile strikes on northern Israel.

This war (or to be more precise, this phase of the war) ended 34 days later, on 14 August, with the entering into effect of UNSC Resolution 1701, which aimed at the “cessation of hostilities” in anticipation of a permanent cease-fire between Hizbullah and Israel. By then, nearly 1,200 Lebanese had been killed and over 4,000 wounded – the vast majority civilians, and about a third of these children. Moreover, around one million people in Lebanon had been displaced by the war, 15,000 homes were destroyed, and the infrastructure throughout the country was severely damaged.<sup>69</sup> 43 Israeli civilians and 117 Israeli soldiers had been killed, around 300,000 Israeli civilians were displaced, and thousands of homes were damaged in northern Israel.<sup>70</sup>

## 4. UNIFIL II (2007 present): Precedent or Predicament?

### 4.1. Political Context: The 2006 Israel-Lebanon War

<sup>58</sup> Augustus Richard Norton, “The Peacekeeping Challenge in Lebanon,” *The MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies* (Vol. 6, September 2006), p. 77.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>60</sup> See Stuart Reigeluth, “Hezbollah: un modelo de resistencia para Hamás”, *Foreign Policy Spanish edition*, 6 August 2006: <http://www.fp-es.org>

<sup>61</sup> UN Security Council, “Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,” S/2006/560 (21 July 2006), p.1: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/No6/437/22/IMG/No643722.pdf?OpenElement>.

<sup>62</sup> See Karim Makdissi, “Israel’s War on Lebanon: Reflections on the International Law of Force,” *The MIT Electronic Journal of the Middle East Studies* (Vol. 6, Summer 2006), pp. 9-26. [http://web.mit.edu/cis/www/mitejmes/issues/200610/MITEJMES\\_Vol\\_6\\_Summer.pdf](http://web.mit.edu/cis/www/mitejmes/issues/200610/MITEJMES_Vol_6_Summer.pdf).

<sup>63</sup> UNSC, S/2006/560, op.cit.

<sup>64</sup> Chris McGreal, “Capture of soldiers was ‘act of war’ says Israel,” *The Guardian*, 13 July 2006.

<sup>65</sup> CNN, “Israel, Hizbullah swap prisoners,” 29 January 2004: <http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/01/29/prisoner.exchange/index.html>.

<sup>66</sup> UN SC Report (21 July).

<sup>67</sup> Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “PM Olmert: Lebanon is responsible and will bear the consequences,” 12 July: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2006/PM+Olmert++Lebanon+is+responsible+and+will+bear+the+consequences+12-Jul-2006.htm>.

<sup>68</sup> McCarthy, op. cit.

<sup>69</sup> Republic of Lebanon, Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Higher Relief Council, <http://www.lebanonundersiege.gov.lb>. This information was retrieved on 30 August 2006.

<sup>70</sup> Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Hizbullah attacks northern Israel and Israel’s response,” 12 July 2006: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terrorism+from+Lebanon+Hizbullah/Hizbullah+attack+in+northern+Israel+and+Israel+response+12-Jul-2006.htm#background>.

## 4.2. The Draft of UNSC Resolution 1701 and the Creation of UNIFIL II

UNSC Resolution 1701 established a new mandate for UNIFIL, but its protracted negotiation explains why it took several months to reach an acceptable status quo on the ground. In essence, 1701 still contained remnants of the controversial US-drafted text that had circulated a week before, and which had threatened to turn UNIFIL II into a *peace enforcement* operation under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Such a mandate, if passed, would surely have led to disaster for UNIFIL troops, who could hardly be expected to accomplish what the Israeli armed forces had failed to do during the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War: disarm Hizbullah and provide security for Israel.

### Draft Resolution of 5 August 2006

On 5 August 2006, the US and France tabled a UNSC draft resolution that was strangely out of line with the reality on the ground. Israel's aerial blitzing of southern Lebanon – explicitly modeled on the tactics used by NATO during the 1999 Kosovo War – created a humanitarian disaster among the civilian population and also an environmental disaster,<sup>71</sup> yet had failed to stop Hizbullah from launching strikes into northern Israel. Indeed, Israel's ground force assault was met with fierce resistance, even in the border towns, and as such, Hizbullah was gaining the upper hand. Lebanon quickly rejected this draft resolution, yet it is important to briefly consider it, as this draft reflected the intentions of both Israel and the US at the time, and left many residents of southern Lebanon deeply suspicious and resentful of all UN activities henceforth. The draft resolution proposed the following:<sup>72</sup>

- Full “cessation of hostilities, based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hizbullah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations”;
- Extension of the “control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory”;
- Full implementation of UNSC Resolution 1559, including the disarming of all armed groups in Lebanon;
- Unconditional release of Israeli prisoners, while “encouraging the efforts aimed at resolving the issue of Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel”;
- Re-opening of Lebanon's airport and ports only for “verifiably and purely civilian purposes,” as opposed to an immediate lifting of the blockade;
- Deployment of an “international force” under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to help implement a “long term solution”;
- UNIFIL is to monitor the implementation of this resolution and to extend its assistance “to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the safe return of displaced persons”.

Under the terms of this draft resolution, UNIFIL was thus to be confined to solely a monitoring and humanitarian role, while a NATO-supported “international force” would deal with the task of disarming Hizbullah, implementing UNSC Resolution 1559, and guaranteeing security for Israel along the Blue Line.

### Resolution 1701 and the creation of UNIFIL II

UNSC Resolution 1701 was unanimously passed on 12 August 2006, 32 days after the war had begun. The fact that the UNSC had waited so long before securing a resolution – in order to satisfy the geopolitical demands of the US, which had publicly backed Israel to finish the job at hand of defeating Hizbullah – greatly affected the UN's credibility and claim of impartiality in Lebanon and the Arab region. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan recognized this when describing how “profoundly disappointed” he was that a ceasefire resolution had been delayed for so long, while civilians “suffered such terrible, unnecessary pain and loss”.<sup>73</sup> The consequences, Annan recognized, were that “this inability to act sooner has badly shaken the world's faith in its [the UN's] authority and integrity”.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>71</sup> See Lebanon, Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment, United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), January 2007: [http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP\\_Lebanon.pdf](http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_Lebanon.pdf)

<sup>72</sup> See the full text of this draft resolution, “Text: Draft UN Lebanon resolution” (5 August 2006): [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/5249488.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5249488.stm).

<sup>73</sup> UN Security Council, SC/8808, 5511th Meeting, “Security Council Calls for End to Hostilities Between Hizbullah, Israel, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1701 (2006)” <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc888808.doc.htm>.

<sup>74</sup> UN Security Council, 5511th Meeting, “Security Council Calls for End to Hostilities between Hizbullah, Israel, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1701 (2006),” SC/8808 (11 August 2006).

While Resolution 1701 was still seen by many analysts as favoring Israel, it was ultimately accepted by all parties to the conflict as a compromise deal that was urgently needed in light of the humanitarian disaster and Israel's military failure on the battlefield.<sup>75</sup> The resolution had removed the most controversial references to peace enforcement measures under Chapter VII and retreated from the idea of an "international force" that was distinct from UNIFIL (see Box 1). However, it remained vague in key passages and left a number of 'Trojan horses' that implied the embedding of Chapter VII intentions into the revised text – an important factor that contributed to a tense stand-off during the initial post-war phase.<sup>76</sup> For instance, in Resolution 1701's final pre-ambular paragraph, the following was inserted: "determining that the situation in Lebanon constitutes a threat to international peace and security." This language is derived directly from Chapter VII logic, and not that of Chapter VI, which is concerned with the "Pacific settlement of disputes."

Resolution 1701 clearly envisions that the long-term solution to this conflict rests on the need to disarm "all armed groups", in keeping with Resolution 1559 (previously rejected by Hizbullah), to establish a buffer zone free of any "armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the government," and also a de facto arms embargo on Lebanon, except for those authorized by the government itself. In other words, Israel and the US are openly interpreting this resolution as a de facto enforcement mechanism for 1559. Moreover, Resolution 1701 requires that all states agree to an arms embargo, as well as to the prohibition of any 'technical training or assistance' save that authorized by the Lebanese government. This is clearly intended to attempt at severing links between Hizbullah and Iran and Syria. Interestingly, there is no mention of any arms restrictions on Israel.

With regard to UNIFIL, Resolution 1701 set the terms of reference for an expanded UNIFIL force, which was authorized to monitor the cease fire, accompany the Lebanese Army in its deployment in the South, and to assist in humanitarian issues and in the return of displaced people – all this in addition to its original terms under 425 and 426. UNIFIL is present to support the Lebanese government "in securing borders and other entry points to prevent arms or related material from entering Lebanon." More cryptically, the resolution authorizes UNIFIL to take "all necessary action" to ensure that the areas under its mandate are not used for "hostile activities." This may result in UNIFIL being urged to confront Hizbullah or other armed groups in southern Lebanon. It is a potentially dangerous indication, and will place UNIFIL staff in danger of being seen as the enemy.

75 See, for instance, Muriel Asseburg, "UN Resolution 1701, UNIFIL 2, and the 'New Greater Middle East Project': A German Perspective" in UN Resolution 1701: Horizons and Challenges (Beirut: Cultural Movement-Antelias & Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, February 2007), p.69.

76 Karim Makdissi, "The Flaws in the UN Resolution" in Counterpunch (14 August, 2006), <http://rmf.net/makdissio8142006.html>.

**Box 1: Excerpts of UNSC Resolution 1701**

**2.** Upon full cessation of hostilities, *calls upon* the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL, as authorized by paragraph 11, to deploy their forces together throughout the South and *calls upon* the Government of Israel, as that deployment begins, to withdraw all of its forces from southern Lebanon in parallel (...);

**8.** *Calls for* Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution based on the following principles and elements:

- full respect for the Blue Line by both parties;
- security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment, between the Blue Line and the Litani river, of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL, as authorized in paragraph 11, deployed in this area;
- full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), which require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State;
- no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its Government;
- no sales or supply of arms and related material to Lebanon, except as authorized by its Government;
- provision to the United Nations of all remaining maps of landmines in Lebanon in Israel's possession;

**11.** *Decides*, in order to supplement and enhance the force in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operations, to authorize an increase in the force strength of UNIFIL to a maximum of 15,000 troops, and that the force shall, in addition to carrying out its mandate under resolutions 425 and 426 (1978): (a) Monitor the cessation of hostilities; (b) Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, and as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon, as provided in paragraph 2; (c) Coordinate its activities related to paragraph 11 (b) with the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel; (d) Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons; (e) Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment of the area, as referred to in paragraph 8; (f) Assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request, to implement paragraph 14;

**12.** Acting in support of a request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it in exercising its authority throughout the territory, *authorizes* UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;

**14.** *Calls upon* the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points, to prevent the entry into Lebanon, without its consent, of arms or related material, and *requests* UNIFIL, as authorized in paragraph 11, to assist the Government of Lebanon at its request;



## Ground Troops

In the midst of the war, the UNSC passed Resolution 1697 on 31 July 2006 and exceptionally extended UNIFIL's mandate, for one month only, pending further negotiations. Resolution 1701 subsequently authorized a further one year extension to the UNIFIL mandate until 31 August 2007. UNIFIL personnel emerged from their shelters immediately after the cessation of hostilities on the morning of 14 August 2006, and began intensive patrolling throughout its area of operations and in the "Tyre pocket" up to the Litani River. It also resumed air patrols along the Blue Line. Significantly, UNIFIL force commander Major-General Pellegrini convened a tripartite meeting with his counterparts from the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), represented by Major-General Shehaitly, and the Israeli Defense Force, represented by Major-General Dekel – the first such meeting in over a decade – to coordinate deployment and withdrawal plans. These tripartite meetings have been held several times since, and are an important forum for communication between the various official parties. A 'hotline' was also established between the UNIFIL force commander and the IDF to report Blue Line violations and any other emergency issues that may arise, while a similar mechanism was established with the LAF, both in Tyre and in the Defense Ministry headquarters. This tripartite dialogue has allowed UNIFIL to diffuse tensions that inevitably arise, to discuss all violations of Resolution 1701 and to work towards formalizing the Blue Line itself – which also helps to build trust among the conflicting players.<sup>77</sup>

Meanwhile, plans were underway to increase the number of UNIFIL troops from 2,000 to a maximum of 15,000, as stipulated by Resolution 1701. This deployment was envisioned over three phases. The first phase – spanning from mid-August to mid-October 2006 – involved a rapid response deployment to stabilize the security situation in southern Lebanon, oversee Israel's withdrawal and support the LAF's concomitant deployment. Battalions from France, Italy, and Spain arrived by 15 September, joining Ghanaian and Indian contingents already in place to create a 5,000 strong force. Further logistical and support units were added, including the deployment of a UH1 helicopter. By the end of this phase, Israel had withdrawn from most of southern Lebanon and had lifted its siege of the Lebanese coast, following the deployment of an interim Maritime Task Force consisting mainly of Italian vessels. The second phase of UNIFIL deployment involved the entry of four mechanized infantry battalions from France, Indonesia, Italy and Nepal, as well as one infantry unit each from Malaysia and Qatar, and various other support units (including those specialized in de-mining) from countries as distant as China and the Dominican Republic. By the end of November 2006, UNIFIL numbered around 10,500; and by December, this had risen to 11,500 ground troops, 1,750 naval personnel, and 51 military observers from UNTSO, which – with the deployment of four LAF brigades in southern Lebanon – was finally "deemed sufficient to execute the mandate".<sup>78</sup>

The third phase of UNIFIL's deployment concentrated on improving relations with local authorities and the local population.<sup>79</sup> The arrival of "robust" UNIFIL II units coincided with growing suspicions among most southern Lebanese that these troops were merely tools of a larger US-led initiative to advance Israel's aims during the war to disarm the Resistance via a peace enforcement operation. Whereas UNIFIL I had, by and large, enjoyed the trust and respect of the local population, the first UNIFIL II troops – particularly those from the Spanish and French contingents – appeared overly militant and disrespectful to the locals. As such, during January and February 2007, UNIFIL focused on forging better relations with the local political leadership and municipalities, which of course included Hizbullah members. The move proved successful, as these initiatives were reciprocated and trust was slowly gained. This trust, however, was predicated on UNIFIL sticking to the narrow interpretation of Resolution 1701 and not adopting a pro-active stance towards the disarmament of Hizbullah units. Next, UNIFIL stepped up its civilian operations in order to win the good will of the local population in whose areas they were serving. These programs proved quite challenging during the first few months of 2007 – many residents of Bint Jbeil and other areas refused to engage with UNIFIL in a meaningful way – largely due to the residual mistrust and unwise statements made by Western leaders, such as German Chancellor Merkel's infamous proclamation that UNIFIL was there to defend Israel. Nonetheless, within a few months, UNIFIL had established open channels of communication with the local population as it enhanced the civilian component of its operations, both for its own public relations purposes and for strategic reasons rooted in a realization that its security would be greatly enhanced by such activities. Since May 2007, UNIFIL has attained a *modus vivendi* with the locals by moving away from overt peace enforcement type activities towards, ironically, a more UNIFIL I-style grassroots focus. Whereas stone-throwing at UNIFIL II units by the local population was a regular, even daily occurrence during the initial period of its deployment, after May 2007, such demonstrations of anger towards UNIFIL had been largely eradicated, with perhaps only one or two such incidents a month by the end of 2007. The

## 4.3. Deployment and Effectiveness of UNIFIL II

77 Information based, in part, on an interview with the Director of Political and Civil Affairs in UNIFIL, held in Beirut on 20 October 2007.

78 UNSC, "Letter Dated 1 December 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council," S/2006/933 (1 December 2006).

79 Information on UNIFIL-local population relations based, in part, on the interview with the Director of Political and Civil Affairs in UNIFIL, *op. cit.*; and an interview with the Senior Political Affairs Officer in UNIFIL, Beirut, 17 October 2007.

European contingent of UNIFIL units, initially composed of battle-hardened military troops, was slowly but surely rotated and replaced by trained peacekeeping units – a move that certainly contributed to better relations.


UNSC Resolution 1773 (24 August 2007) added one more year to UNIFIL's mandate, which was extended until the end of August 2008. UNIFIL now maintains over 60 positions, as well as a series of checkpoints and observation posts, and conducts around 400 vehicle, foot and air patrols over any 24-hour period (both day and night) throughout its area of operations, in both rural and urban areas. These operate in addition to the LAF's four brigades and a separate artillery regiment, which together carry out 60 patrols over a 24-hour period and maintain more than 100 checkpoints.<sup>80</sup> Overall, as of the end of November 2007, UNIFIL maintained 13,264 military personnel and some 304 international civilian staff drawn from 27 countries, together with 583 local civilian staff. Its approved budget during 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008 was of \$748.20 million.<sup>81</sup> In terms of budget dispensed on civilian projects, UNIFIL itself has set aside \$500,000 a year for quick impact projects (generally approved by the UN in the aftermath of a crisis, such as the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War), which are projects limited both in scope (must be implemented within three months) and budget (up to \$20,000 per project), and that benefit the community as a whole. However, various lead UNIFIL national contingents (particularly those of the EU Member States) contribute additional funds (outwith the UNIFIL budget) through civilian-military coordination (CIMIC) procedures.<sup>82</sup> Such budgets have increased in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the Spanish UNIFIL unit in June 2007, as it was felt that UNIFIL troops needed to establish better relations with the local population for security reasons.

80 UNSC, "Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006)," 29 October 2007.

81 UNIFIL, "Facts and Figures," <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/facts.html>.

82 Interviews with the Director of Political and Civil Affairs in UNIFIL and Senior Political Affairs Officer in UNIFIL, *op.cit.*; for more on Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC), see paper presented at the 2008 European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Joint Sessions of Workshops in Rennes, France, April 2008, and at the 2008 Conference "The EU in International Affairs", Brussels, Belgium, 24-26 April 2008, by Chiara Ruffa, "Imagining War and Keeping Peace? European Military Cultures in a non-ESDP Peacekeeping Operation: the Case of UNIFIL", available at: [http://www.ies.be/files/repo/conference2008/EUinIA\\_VIII\\_2\\_Ruffa.pdf](http://www.ies.be/files/repo/conference2008/EUinIA_VIII_2_Ruffa.pdf)

**Map 1:**  
**UNIFIL II Deployment (March 2008)**



Source: Map No. 4144 Rev. 19, United Nations, March 2008: <http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/unifil.pdf>

#### 4.4. The Maritime Task Force (MTF)

For the first time in UN history, a Maritime Task Force (MTF) was deployed alongside national ground troop contingents. Italy commenced the MTF in early fall 2006. Soon thereafter, Germany assumed the lead of the maritime force, with a fleet of four large vessels and an approximate crew of 800 personnel, for over a year, including all of 2007. Italy resumed lead-nation status in February 2008, introducing and incorporating the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) element, created in 1995 by Spain, Portugal, Italy and France. The MTF relieved Israel of its proclaimed security responsibility to prevent the smuggling of arms.<sup>83</sup>

Operating off the Mediterranean coast of Lebanon, MTF navigates some 5,000 square nautical miles, compared to the 300 square miles monitored by UNIFIL ground troops. Despite early coordination difficulties, and suspicions amongst the local population that its presence was serving Israeli interests, MTF has ultimately succeeded in gaining Lebanese support by ending the Israeli sea embargo of Lebanon and projecting a sense of professionalism and impartiality. Moreover, MTF training activities for Lebanese Navy personnel and the procurement of adequate equipment began in December 2006.

Due to the novelty of a UN naval force, MTF was confronted with a lack of pre-established UN maritime operation procedures. This meant that such procedures had to be created in close collaboration with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), as well as with the Israeli and Syrian Navies. Logistically operating out of Limassol, Cyprus, MTF has had no official contact with the Syrian Navy, which remains highly inactive. Since MTF was launched, the German contingent has enjoyed open communication channels with the Israeli Navy, but has been confronted with consistent challenges from the Israeli Air Force (IAF), experiencing recurrent over-flight violations.

Ironically, Israeli violations of UNSC Resolution 1701 helped establish early-warning procedures. The German contingent demonstrated a high degree of military vigilantism, and used standard international frequency to issue warning signals to the IAF. After five precarious incidents, the IAF reduced its over-flights of the MTF area of operations, and now generally restricts aerial training to the international open air space. Although a five-mile code of contact was established with MTF, well beyond the usual testing period for peace-keeping forces, the IAF still infringes upon Lebanon's sovereign airspace, often breaking the sound barrier in low-altitude passes and using drones for collection of intelligence. The Israeli Navy also maintains ships stationed inside a triangle delineated by buoys and out of bounds to Lebanese or international vessels, and has in the past opened fire on Lebanese fishing boats deemed too close to the maritime border.

Within the MTF Area of Maritime Operations (AMO), primary MTF activities consist of diverting and – with the permission of the Lebanese authorities – inspecting suspect ships. Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) also involve hailing and warning measures, which are carried out in tandem with familiarizing and training the Lebanese Navy officers during operation, in accordance with the motto “train as you operate”. An important facet of these measures is that of the approximately 10,000 vessels hailed for inspection in 2007 alone, only around 40 were considered seriously suspect (though none contained weapons), and MTF personnel did not board a single one. This means that the Lebanese Navy carries out all inspections, thus permitting the MTF to maintain a high degree of neutrality, and by extension, a credibility respected by all parties.

Germany also contributed two vessels from the Bremen sea police to strengthen the Lebanese naval capacity, namely *Bremen 2* and *Bremen 9*, renamed “AMCHIT” and “NAQOURA” respectively. Due to their out of date appearance in the Beirut port, it is more likely that these vessels were tokens of short-term German support, rather than a move to seriously improve the Lebanese Navy in the long-term. The Bremen boats operate under Lebanese “ownership” and with German guidance within the inner zone along the coast; the larger German frigates navigate in the outer zone. Also note-worthy: the United Arab Emirates (UAE) made a contribution of 10 new rapid patrol boats, more of which will be needed to consolidate the efficient land-sea coordination envisioned by the coastal radar system.

Given that Germany planned to downsize to only a Troop Contributing Country (TCC) to MTF, other countries, such as Turkey and the Netherlands, were considered to take the lead.<sup>84</sup> The Turkish option would have proven problematic due to the historical implications of Ottoman occupation, but also logistically: as Limassol (Greek Cyprus) serves as a naval base for MTF, a Turkish lead would have inevitably caused political complications. Turkey now contributes one frigate to MTF and uses the Turkish port of Mersin in consideration of these sensitivities. As Italy reacquired lead-nation status of MTF, the principle of bilateral German assistance to the Lebanese Coastal Radar Organization has continued. And for purposes of

<sup>83</sup> See UNIFIL Press Release, “UNIFIL Maritime Task Force Changes Command”, 29 February 2008, PIO/032e, available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/pr109e.pdf>

<sup>84</sup> Germany relinquished its leadership role of MTF in February 2008, and was replaced by the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR), whose main members would rotate leadership each six months. Italy thus assumed command in late February 2008, followed by France, which took over in early September 2008, during which time UNIFIL's MTF comprised naval units from Belgium (1 ship), France (2 ships), Germany (3 ships), Greece (2 ships), Italy (1 ship), Spain (1 ship), and Turkey (1 ship). Such a deployment of EUROMARFOR forces could be replicated along the Mediterranean coast of Gaza, i.e. to allow the re-opening of Gaza's ports.

continuity, German preparatory training and in situ monitoring should persist until Lebanon acquires full “ownership” capacity.

A considerable MTF presence should be maintained within the UNIFIL framework to act as a deterrent or buffer force between the conflicting parties. However, MTF needs fewer large ships, and more small vessels, which would be faster and thus facilitate maritime manoeuvres. Ideally and eventually, these rapid patrol boats would and should be operated by the Lebanese Navy, endowed with the sovereign capacity to stop, inspect and detain suspect ships. In order to acquire such patrol boats, Lebanon needs serious contributions from the international community. Particularly after the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War and the 2007 Nahr al-Bared hostilities, Lebanon simply cannot fund such an upgrade of its naval forces. Lebanon does not aspire to have a full-fledged navy per se, but does require new patrol ships if it hopes to carry out rapid relays between coast and sea, in coordination with the coastal radar system, to secure its sea border and effectively control its territorial waters.<sup>85</sup>

### **Bilateral Support**

While European support for Lebanon, including its security, is expressed within the framework of UNIFIL, Member State engagement also takes the form of less-heralded, but potentially important, bilateral agreements with the Government of Lebanon. Germany, for instance, has taken the lead in establishing such bilateral agreements by supporting two projects: the Coastal Radar Organization (CRO) and a “pilot project” for Lebanese border management (see Box 2). The CRO is comprised of a chain of seven radar stations along the coast of Lebanon. Three of these stations are older and are therefore being refurbished with new equipment and facilities; the four other are new installations. The radar system was handed over to the Lebanese authorities in February 2008. Due to the bilateral nature of the CRO, only Germany is training Lebanese officers, with training being carried out in Germany and then implemented in Lebanon. The aim of the CRO is to create and consolidate this chain of radar stations to enable coverage of the entire Mediterranean coast of Lebanon. An advanced and developed radar system will permit Lebanese authorities to detect vessels in their territorial waters, to coordinate positions, communicate information, and issue warning signals. This system of detection and possible inspection was buttressed by the UAE contribution of 10 new patrol boats, allowing rapid sorties from coast to sea for inspections and, if need be, detention. Similar to the low-profile German assistance to the Lebanese border management, the ultimate goal of German engagement here is to provide initial training and follow-up exercises, eventually transferring the principle of “command-and-control” to full Lebanese ownership.

<sup>85</sup> This information is based on an official visit aboard the German Bayern with Admiral Hans Christian Luther, then Commander of the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force, off the coast of Lebanon on 12 October 2007; as well as interviews in Beirut, Lebanon, with the First Secretary of the German Embassy, on 10 October 2007, and in Berlin, Germany, with representatives from the Federal Ministry of Defence, on 14 September 2007.

**Box 2: German Support for Lebanese Border Management**

On 25 August 2006, Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora requested support to enhance Lebanese border management in an official letter to German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The German Foreign Ministry responded on 7 September 2006 by sending an initial team of ten federal police (5) and customs officers (5) to assess – via a field study – the seaports, airport and land crossing points. Like UNIFIL II, the resulting German Border Police Mission in northern Lebanon is based on UNSC Resolution 1701, which includes clauses for securing borders and interdicting arms smuggling; but this “pilot project” emanates from a bilateral understanding between Lebanon and Germany. A subsequent UN field mission – the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT) – also visited Lebanon from 27 May to 15 June 2007 to assess Lebanon’s borders and to follow-up on UNSC Resolution 1701.<sup>86</sup>

The German pilot project activities are restricted to a 24 by 44 km section of Lebanon, north of Tripoli, and aim to secure Lebanon’s official “green” border with Syria. Along the 100 km northern and north-eastern border with Syria, the pilot project assists in equipping and training around 800 Lebanese border police to operate four border crossings: namely, from west to east, 1) Ar-Rida, 2) Abu Diyeh, 3) Bukayyah, and 4) Qa’a, as well as to monitor the border from key observation points. Mobile units, comprising of two vehicles with four personnel each, will also cover the northern hinterland of Lebanon.

Funded by Great Britain and assisted by a British expert, a Common Operation Centre has been created to build a common border force, including all four Lebanese security branches: the Internal Security Forces (ISF), which are to be the civil police and have received some 30 vehicles from Canada and 20 from Great Britain; the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), to patrol the “green” border; the General Security Forces, to monitor border immigration; and Customs, to inspect the entry of goods. Denmark sent two police experts and pledged 700,000 € to refurbish Camp Aramar near Tripoli, where training of the Lebanese border police began in October 2007. The United States acts as a “silent” partner in assisting with basic communication material, such as radios, as well as vehicles for the ISF within Beirut proper.

In accordance with the “integrated border management” concept, the pilot project thus aims to restructure and institutionalize a cohesive Lebanese civil police border force. To foster better coordination, cooperation and communication, training in IT networks was delivered, and scanners and visa check devices were introduced at Beirut airport and at border crossings. Though not part of the northern sector, Germany also provided and installed, at the main eastern Lebanese border with Syria, known as the Masna’a crossing, a container scanner that is meant to facilitate economic trade.<sup>87</sup>

In the preparation and implementation phases of procuring equipment and training personnel, the German pilot project appears to be laying the groundwork for another European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) mission in the Middle East. This option, however, is not politically viable in the absence of internal Lebanese consensus and Syrian consent. As such, it should be reconsidered, particularly in light of the disastrous precedent set by EUBAM-Rafah in the Gaza Strip. The suspension of the ESDP monitoring mission seriously undermined the EU’s legitimacy to act as a neutral third party: forbidden by Israel to be operational at the Rafah crossing, the EU monitors are essentially perceived as implementing Israel’s closure policy, which has severely worsened the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. An ESDP mission along Lebanon’s land border would irrevocably be perceived as implementing steps to pressurise and isolate Hizbullah and Syria, with equally negative foreseeable results for EU impartiality.

<sup>86</sup> See “Report of the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team” (LIBAT), UN Security Council, S/2007/382, 26 June 2007, available at: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Lebanon%20S2007%20382.pdf>

<sup>87</sup> This information is largely based on interviews with German diplomats in Berlin and Beirut, with members of the German Project Office Federal Police / Customs in Lebanon, and with the German Ministry of the Interior, international border police cooperation section, conducted in September/October 2007. For a more comprehensive and detailed account of German efforts, bilateral and multilateral, in Lebanon, see Timur Göksel, Hans Bastian Hauck, Karim Makdisi, and Stuart Reigeluth, “Germany’s Contribution to Lebanese Sovereignty, The Maritime Task Force, Coastal Radar System and Border Pilot Project”, DGAP Standpunkt, Berlin, January 2008; translated into Spanish and republished as “La contribución alemana a la soberanía libanesa” with the Centro de Estudios de Oriente Medio (CEMO) of the Fundación Promoción Social de la Cultura (FPSC), Madrid, January 2008. And for an argument against deploying an ESDP mission hastily along the Lebanese-Syrian border, see Stuart Reigeluth, “EU monitoring is not the best option”, The Daily Star, Lebanon, 6 December 2007.

Following the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, UNIFIL II was made more “robust” by UNSC Resolution 1701 in a bid to ensure the “cessation of hostilities” between IDF and Hizbullah. National EU Member State contributions increased substantially as a result, but this did not necessarily improve the efficiency of UNIFIL II. The participation of more countries actually rendered coordination and communication more difficult. The deployment of a Maritime Task Force (MTF), the first in UN history, effectively ended the Israeli naval siege of Lebanon and remains relatively discreet in its operations. Although Israeli violations of the MTF Area of Operations have decreased, the Israeli Air Force still violates Lebanese sovereignty on a regular basis, and Israel has abducted Lebanese shepherds from within Lebanon proper for short interrogations. Meanwhile, Hizbullah has largely rebuilt its military capabilities, including north of the Litani River (where it expects the next Israeli invasion to come from). There have also been two isolated Katyusha rocket attacks launched from southern Lebanon across the border. UNIFIL II has also suffered attacks from al-Qaeda-oriented elements that are increasingly exploiting Lebanon’s instability and the lack of effective state control, particularly in northern Lebanon and within some Palestinian refugee camps. Ironically, rather than ensuring the Lebanese State’s monopoly on arms, as was called for by UNSC Resolution 1701, UNIFIL II has increasingly come to rely on Hizbullah (and the local population in southern Lebanon) for its security and intelligence. UNIFIL II’s presence has succeeded in helping to thwart the resumption of hostilities between conflicting parties, yet without sufficient political action to resolve the internal or external issues affecting Lebanon, UNIFIL II may persist as an indefinite “interim” mission, especially given that the UNSC, the EU, and the US continue to neglect the larger political framework needed to resolve the outstanding conflict. Leading EU Member States have the potential to provide positive closure to the conflict, particularly in light of the EU’s emerging and evolving role in the Middle East (although the EU’s policy in Palestine has eroded its standing in the region – an issue that must be addressed accordingly). This, however, requires greater political will, to both influence the US agenda in the region and erase the perception of double-standards that most Lebanese and Arabs feel has become an organic part of EU (and US) policy.

**Conclusion 1:** *UNIFIL is not a solution, but a conflict management tool that serves as a means to an end.* This is the greatest lesson learned from UNIFIL I, and the reason this UN “interim” peacekeeping force is still in operation three decades after its initial deployment. The remaining outstanding include: Israel’s continued occupation of Lebanese lands, the violation of Lebanese sovereignty (mostly via regular over-flights) and ongoing security threat to Lebanon; the permanent demarcation of the Blue Line; the settlement of the Palestinian refugee issue; and the restoration of effective Lebanese State authority throughout southern Lebanon, ensuring that the LAF has a monopoly over the use of weapons. While the UN in general, UNIFIL, and various EU Member States are dealing with certain aspects of this conflict (such as mediating the exchange of prisoners, or demarcating the Blue Line), there remains a generalised lack of political will, particularly to pressurise Israel towards reaching a final settlement to the conflict.

#### Recommendations:

- *The EU should support the evolution from a “cessation of hostilities”, as stated in Resolution 1701, to a full-scale cease-fire.* This is particularly true given Israel’s desire to re-establish the deterrent capabilities it lost during the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, which would suggest an incentive for Israel to initiate another invasion of Lebanon, especially seeing as it continues to perceive Hizbullah – by virtue of its very existence as a resistance force – as a threat to its security.
- *The EU should support a UN-led over-arching political solution to the conflict that addresses the grievances of all parties* (including those of the Palestinian refugees). This means maintaining open communication channels with all parties to the conflict, and pressuring the various parties to make concessions. The absence of such a general solution will leave UNIFIL troops and staff stranded once again in no-man’s land amidst a conflict that may go on for many years to come.

**Conclusion 2:** EU Member States, particularly France, Italy, and Spain, play a leading role in UNIFIL II. The European commitment should not, and indeed cannot, falter now. Nonetheless, *EU Member States should consider downsizing their national contingents.* While EU troops are essential for deterrence purposes, because of the political clout they enjoy internationally, such deterrence only works as long as the parties to the conflict find that the current truce works to their advantage. EU troops have unfortunately also become high-profile targets for jihadist groups now operating with impunity in Lebanon, as the attack on Spanish and Irish units demonstrated. Moreover, the perception that EU national authorities have engaged in local politics in a biased fashion over the past two years, has

## 5. Conclusion & Policy Recommendations

increased the security risk for UNIFIL contingents through no fault of their own command or troops. These conditions have prompted EU troops within UNIFIL to over-emphasize the issue of force protection, to the detriment of the overall mission.

#### Recommendations:

- *EU contingents within UNIFIL should be reduced.* Downsizing would lower their profile and make their targeting more difficult, but will not diminish the political clout of the overall force. However, downsizing should not be mistaken for reduced political commitment, and support for both the LAF and local civil society institutions should in fact be augmented.
- *EU national authorities should coordinate more closely with their UNIFIL counterparts when intervening in the local politics of Lebanon.* This is in order to ensure that the security of UNIFIL troops is not compromised by foreign policy statements or blunders (such as Chancellor Merkel's statement following the initial deployment of UNIFIL II).

**Conclusion 3:** The presence of 27 contributing member states to UNIFIL may seem like an ideal 'rainbow' operation, but it seriously hampers practical coordination and communication. It is wishful thinking on the part of the UN to recruit troops from all over the world without taking into consideration the differences in quality, equipment, training, and suitability of these troops for a complicated mission such as UNIFIL. Local forces and people on the ground are aware of such perceptions of this mission and of divergent national interests, and are adept at playing them off against each other. Some contingents are not seen as anything more than social workers helping out with projects to win the "hearts and minds" of the people, while the more professional contingents with a NATO background are perceived as more aggressive and less responsive to the local population because these troops operate by the book and are not willing to depart from the military standards. UNIFIL should therefore consider reducing the total number of contributing nations, while continuing to build relations with local authorities and residents of southern Lebanon.

#### Recommendations:

- *UNIFIL should reduce the overall number of contingents, which makes the command, control and mission perception weak.* A more compact UNIFIL, with fewer flags, will be much more respected and efficient.
- *UNIFIL should operate with the consent of the effective authorities on the ground.* It should thus enhance contacts with the local authorities, including Hizbullah.
- *The UN should increase UNIFIL's budget for activities with civilian and humanitarian objectives.* There should be efficient coordination under the UNIFIL leadership for all such civilian operations, including those developed bilaterally by EU Member States.

**Conclusion 4:** Germany's role as lead-nation of the Maritime Task Force (MTF) was positive overall. Based on the MTF experience, Germany is now in a positive position to influence future maritime operations, under the UN banner or any other supra-national organization. Training of the Lebanese Navy has progressed, while the MTF has set about its mission without great fanfare or negative publicity (that is, after its initial deployment, when it was seen in a negative light by locals). Such training and capacity-building must continue until Lebanon acquires the capacity to control its sovereign territorial waters against all threats. The Lebanese Navy must be perceived by all Lebanese to be impartial in local disputes. The end of Germany's lead-nation role should not affect its bilateral agreements with Lebanon, namely the consolidation of the coastal radar system and the northern border pilot project.

#### Recommendations:

- *The MTF should be maintained, operating on the basis of a rotating EU Member State leadership.* The MTF serves to deter Israeli incursions into Lebanese territorial seas and hinders potential, if limited, arms smuggling operations into Lebanon.
- *The UN and EU should provide more material, primarily in the form of high-speed boats, to the Lebanese Navy in order to effectuate proper land-sea sorties.* However, care should be taken not to appear to politicize the LAF or its Navy, as this could have severe repercussions.



- *An ESDP border management mission should not deploy hastily along the Lebanese-Syrian border as this will increase tensions with Syria and lead to more security problems for UNIFIL. Precaution is urged, even if consent from all relevant parties, including Syria and Hizbullah, is granted, and the highest level of coordination and communication must be implemented to ensure cohesiveness between each side of the border.*

**Conclusion 5:** *The lessons learnt from both UNIFIL and UNIFIL II should be processed before any further large-scale EU intervention into the Middle East, particularly in Palestine, is considered. Any ESDP mission, or EU-supported UN peace operation, should have realistic objectives that help advance conflict management between the conflicting sides, in parallel to general initiatives aimed at solving the underlying political problems. If this does not occur, then all such operations will either become permanently “interim”, such as UNIFIL, or face an embarrassed suspension right when they are most needed, as happened with the EUBAM-Rafah. For instance, based on the MTF experience along the Lebanese coast, EU Member States may consider replicating the deployment of a European-led naval force, such as EUROMARFOR, along the 40km coast of the Gaza Strip. However, if such an operation is deployed out with a political settlement including all the de facto forces, including Hamas, then it will probably be perceived as a blockade that serves the interests of the Israeli occupation forces.*

**Recommendations:**

- *EU troops should not be deployed to Palestine unless this action is reliably perceived as impartial and is implemented in parallel to an effective advancement of the broad political agenda. Considering the climate of partition that currently pervades the Arab region, any such intervention will be perceived as political, rather than technical in nature.*

## 6. Annexes

### 6.1. UNSC Resolutions 425-426

#### UN SC Resolution 425 – 19 March 1978

*The Security Council,*

*Taking note* of the letters from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon and from the Permanent Representative of Israel,

*Having heard* the statement of the Permanent Representatives of Lebanon and Israel,

*Gravely concerned* at the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and its consequences to the maintenance of international peace,

*Convinced* that the present situation impedes the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East,

1. *Calls* for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;
2. *Calls upon* Israel immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory;
3. *Decides*, in the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon, to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for Southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area, the Force to be composed of personnel drawn from Member States;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council within twenty-four hours on the implementation of the present resolution.

#### UNSC RESOLUTION 426 – 19 March 1978

*The Security Council,*

1. *Approves* the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978), contained in document S/12611 of 19 March 1978;
2. *Decides* that the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon shall be established in accordance with the above-mentioned report for an initial period of six months, and that it shall continue in operation thereafter, if required, provided the Security Council decides this.

### 6.2. August 5 UNSC Draft Resolution + UNSC Resolution 1701

#### DRAFT UNSC RESOLUTION – 5 August 2006

The Security Council,

PP1. Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 520 (1982), 1559 (2004), 1655 (2006) and 1680 (2006), as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statements of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21), of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36), of 4 May 2005 (S/PRST/2005/17), of 23 January 2006 (S/PRST/2006/3), and of 30 July 2006 (S/PRST/2006/35),

PP2. Expressing its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel since Hizbollah's attack on Israel on 12 July 2006, which has already caused hundreds of deaths and injuries on both sides, extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons,

PP3. Emphasizing the need for an end of violence, but at the same time emphasizing the need to address urgently the causes that have given rise to the current crisis, including by the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers,

PP4. Mindful of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners and encouraging the efforts aimed at settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel,

OP1. Calls for a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations;

OP2. Reiterates its strong support for full respect for the Blue Line;

OP3. Also reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders, as contemplated by the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949;

OP4. Calls on the international community to take immediate steps to extend its financial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including through facilitating the safe return of displaced persons and, under the authority of the Government of Lebanon, reopening airports and harbours for verifiably and purely civilian purposes, and calls on it also to consider further assistance in the future to contribute to the reconstruction and development of Lebanon;

OP5. Emphasizes the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise its full sovereignty and authority;

OP6. Calls for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution based on the following principles and elements:

- strict respect by all parties for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Israel and Lebanon;
- full respect for the Blue Line by both parties;
- delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including in the Shebaa farms area;
- security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Lebanese armed and security forces and of UN mandated international forces deployed in this area;
- full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006) that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of July 27, 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese state;
- deployment of an international force in Lebanon, consistent with paragraph 10 below;
- establishment of an international embargo on the sale or supply of arms and related material to Lebanon except as authorized by its government;
- elimination of foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its government;
- provision to the United Nations of remaining maps of land mines in Lebanon in Israel's possession;

OP7. Invites the Secretary General to support efforts to secure agreements in principle from the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel to the principles and elements for a long-term solution as set forth in paragraph 6 above;

OP8. Requests the Secretary General to develop, in liaison with key international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including disarmament, and for delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa farms, and to present those proposals to the Security Council within thirty days;

OP9. Calls on all parties to cooperate during this period with the Security Council and to refrain from any action contrary to paragraph 1 above that might adversely affect the search

for a long-term solution, humanitarian access to civilian populations, or the safe return of displaced persons, and requests the Secretary General to keep the Council informed in this regard;

OP10. Expresses its intention, upon confirmation to the Security Council that the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel have agreed in principle to the principles and elements for a long-term solution as set forth in paragraph 6 above, and subject to their approval, to authorize in a further resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter the deployment of a UN mandated international force to support the Lebanese armed forces and government in providing a secure environment and contribute to the implementation of a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution;

OP11. Requests UNIFIL, upon cessation of hostilities, to monitor its implementation and to extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the safe return of displaced persons;

OP12. Calls upon the Government of Lebanon to ensure arms or related material are not imported into Lebanon without its consent and requests UNIFIL, conditions permitting, to assist the Government of Lebanon at its request;

OP13. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within one week on the implementation of this resolution and to provide any relevant information in light of the Council's intention to adopt, consistent with paragraph 10 above, a further resolution;

OP14. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

#### **UNSC Resolution 1701 - 11 August 2006**

*The Security Council,*

1. *Calls for* a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations;

2. Upon full cessation of hostilities, *calls upon* the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL, as authorized by paragraph 11, to deploy their forces together throughout the South and *calls upon* the Government of Israel, as that deployment begins, to withdraw all of its forces from southern Lebanon in parallel;

3. *Emphasizes* the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon;

4. *Reiterates* its strong support for full respect for the Blue Line;

5. *Also reiterates* its strong support, as recalled in all its previous relevant resolutions, for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders, as contemplated by the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949;

6. *Calls on* the international community to take immediate steps to extend its financial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including through facilitating the safe return of displaced persons and, under the authority of the Government of Lebanon, reopening airports and harbours, consistent with paragraphs 14 and 15, and *calls on* it also to consider further assistance in the future to contribute to the reconstruction and development of Lebanon;

7. *Affirms* that all parties are responsible for ensuring that no action is taken contrary to paragraph 1 that might adversely affect the search for a long-term solution, humanitarian access to civilian populations, including safe passage for humanitarian convoys, or the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons, and calls on all parties to comply with this responsibility and to cooperate with the Security Council;

8. *Calls for* Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long term solution based on the following principles and elements:

- full respect for the Blue Line by both parties;
- security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL, as authorized in paragraph 11, deployed in this area;
- full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State;
- no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its Government;
- no sales or supply of arms and related material to Lebanon except as authorized by its Government;
- provision to the United Nations of all remaining maps of landmines in Lebanon in Israel's possession;

9. *Invites* the Secretary-General to support efforts to secure as soon as possible agreements in principle from the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel to the principles and elements for a long-term solution as set forth in paragraph 8, and *expresses* its intention to be actively involved;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to develop, in liaison with relevant international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including disarmament, and for delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa farms area, and to present to the Security Council those proposals within thirty days;

11. *Decides*, in order to supplement and enhance the force in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operations, to authorize an increase in the force strength of UNIFIL to a maximum of 15,000 troops, and that the force shall, in addition to carrying out its mandate under resolutions 425 and 426 (1978):

- (a) Monitor the cessation of hostilities;
- (b) Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon as provided in paragraph 2;
- (c) Coordinate its activities related to paragraph 11 (b) with the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel;
- (d) Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons;
- (e) Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment of the area as referred to in paragraph 8;
- (f) Assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request, to implement paragraph 14;

12. Acting in support of a request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory, *authorizes* UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General urgently to put in place measures to ensure UNIFIL is able to carry out the functions envisaged in this resolution, *urges* Member States to consider making appropriate contributions to UNIFIL and to respond positively to requests for assistance from the Force, and *expresses* its strong appreciation to those who have contributed to UNIFIL in the past;

14. *Calls upon* the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related material and requests UNIFIL, as authorized in paragraph 11, to assist the Government of Lebanon at its request;

15. *Decides* further that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft:

(a) The sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related material of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories; and

(b) The provision to any entity or individual in Lebanon of any technical training or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items listed in subparagraph (a) above; except that these prohibitions shall not apply to arms, related material, training or assistance authorized by the Government of Lebanon or by UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11;

16. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2007, and *expresses* its intention to consider in a later resolution further enhancements to the mandate and other steps to contribute to the implementation of a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution;

17. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council within one week on the implementation of this resolution and subsequently on a regular basis;

18. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973 and 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003;

19. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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