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THE DONOR-NGO RELATIONSHIP AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE: MONITORING AND EVALUATION IN THE SYRIAN REFUGEE RESPONSE IN LEBANON

by
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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

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Humanitarian aid funding has reached record highs. DAC donors are the leading supporters of humanitarian relief efforts but a growing number of non-DAC donors contribute substantial sums to humanitarian crises as well. The research provides analysis of the humanitarian funding mobilized for the Syrian refugee response in Lebanon in order to gain a better understanding of which donors are funding response efforts, how much, and where the funding is channeled. Governments are the primary funders of humanitarian assistance and NGOs a primary recipient of this funding. Spurred by New Public Management (NPM), a paradigm shift in public administration, which promotes the role of non-state actors and emphasizes results, donors have adopted performance measurement techniques within the humanitarian sector. Scrutiny over how funding is spent means that donors require NGOs to demonstrate the effectiveness of their interventions. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is a mechanism enabling NGOs to demonstrate results, to be held accountable to donors and beneficiaries as well as provide an opportunity for organizational learning and improvement. An analysis of how M&E is incorporated into refugee response plans and the M&E tools being utilized is provided. Employing the principal-agent theory, this research examines the donor-NGO relationship and how it shapes the M&E practices of NGOs active in the Syrian refugee response in Lebanon by presenting the perspectives of both donors and NGOs. Major findings indicate that M&E is both an external and internal function and considered to be of primary importance in project implementation. Adoption of results-based management (RBM) among donors reveals a focus on project outcomes and impact yet resources available to NGOs for M&E are limited and measurement of higher-level results remains a challenge.

KEY TERMS: Humanitarian Assistance • DAC Donors • Non-DAC Donors • NGOs • Monitoring and Evaluation • Accountability • Organizational Learning • Refugee Response

Out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made.

Immanuel Kant

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ACRONYMS

3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan
ALNAP Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CERF Central Emergency Response Fund
EC European Commission
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DFID UK Department for International Development
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
FTS Financial Tracking Sheet
GoL Government of Lebanon
HAP Humanitarian Accountability Partnership – International
HRC High Relief Commission
IATA International Aid Transparency Initiative
ICRC International Committee for the Red Cross
ITS Informal Tent Settlements
LCRP Lebanon Crisis Response Plan
LFA Logical Framework Approach
LRRD Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
M&E Monitoring & Evaluation
MCA Multi-purpose Cash Assistance
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
MoPH Ministry of Public Health
MoE Ministry of Education
MoSA Ministry of Social Affairs
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NRC Norwegian Refugee Council
NPM New Public Management
OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA Overseas Development Assistance
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PRL Palestine Refugees from Lebanon
PRS Palestine Refugees from Syria
CIP Community Impact Project
QIP Quick Impact Projects
RBM Results-Based Management
RC/HC Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator
RTE Real-Time Evaluation
SDC Social Development Center
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SNGO Southern Non-Governmental Organization
ToC Theory of Change
UN United Nations

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
VASyR Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees
WASH Water Sanitation & Hygiene
WB World Bank
WFP World Food Program
WHO World Health Organization
WHS World Humanitarian Summit
UAE United Arab Emirates
UN United Nations
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
USAID United States Agency for International Development

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The international humanitarian aid system exists to fill gaps. Its *raison d'être* is to provide rapid relief in order to save lives immediately and to mitigate the suffering of affected populations through the provision of humanitarian assistance where national and local actors are unable or unwilling to meet their basic needs. Indeed, governments themselves may be the perpetrators of oppression or violence against their own populations. Humanitarian action discourse often professes a moral imperative to act, a responsibility to protect and to provide assistance in accordance with the principles of neutrality, impartiality, humanity, and independence.

Conflict is the primary source of humanitarian needs (OCHA 2018). The year 2016 marked the highest number ever of displaced persons. An estimated 65 million persons are displaced either internally or outside their countries as a result of violence or persecution (Development Initiatives 2017a, 17). Not only is the number of displaced increasing, but so too is their duration of displacement: refugees were displaced an average of nine years in the 1980s compared with an average of twenty years by the mid-2000s (Loescher and Milner in Crawford et al. 2015, 5). "We seem to have become unable to make peace in the world and the conflicts are likely to be very protracted conflicts," affecting lower and middle-income countries, stated the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi at a recent discussion addressing youth in crises situations (Grandi 2018). As prolonged crises become more commonplace, the provision of humanitarian assistance to meet the basic

needs of the displaced is strained and donors struggle to keep apace with the growing

demand.

Humanitarian assistance relies on voluntary contributions. Since the end of the Cold

War the volume of international humanitarian aid has grown substantially. In 1990,

humanitarian aid totaled USD 2.1 billion; in 2000, USD 5.9 billion was spent on aid; and in

2016 donors funded a record USD 27.3 billion in humanitarian aid (Macrae et al. 2002;

Development Initiatives 2017a, 28). Nearly 75 percent of the aid in 2016 came from

governments and EU institutions (Development Initiatives 2017a, 28), which continually

provide the bulk of funding to humanitarian emergencies. As a proportion of overall foreign

aid, humanitarian funding has climbed from 5 percent in 1989 (Macrae 2002, 11) to

approximately 15 percent in 2016 (OCHA 2018, 13). Development Assistance Committee

(DAC) donors, a group of 30 primarily Western industrialized countries, provide the

majority of humanitarian assistance. Non-DAC donors, including Gulf States, also

contribute substantial sums toward relief efforts. Despite record funding numbers, funding

appeals continually fall short, and donor fatigue is a problem plaguing international

humanitarian response efforts as the world confronts growing numbers of people in need

and competing humanitarian crises. The 2017 UN-coordinated appeal was only 54 percent

funded (OCHA 2017), compared with 60 percent in 2016 and 55 percent in 2015

(Development Initiatives 2017a, 28).

Humanitarian assistance is not only about *how much* money is spent, but also *how*

funds are spent. Donors require aid recipients to demonstrate tangible results and the

impact-the long term or sustained changes produced by a program after activities have

ended (Rossi et al. 2004)-of their interventions on affected populations. Both donors and

the public want assurances that the resources they provide are utilized in the best possible way and they want to see results. Noble actions alone are insufficient to justify aid, which does not always achieve its goals and can lead to unintended or even negative consequences.

Non-governmental organizations are crucial actors within the international humanitarian landscape and significant recipients of aid. Between 2010 and 2015, NGOs represented the largest recipients of direct contributions to emergencies after the United Nations (UN) (ALNAP 2015, 40; Development initiatives 2017a, 71). While the UN receives the most aid, national and international NGOs deliver the vast majority of humanitarian assistance (OCHA-IASC 2015). Smaller and less bureaucratic than governments and well positioned for service delivery, NGOs are a preferred mechanism for the provision of humanitarian assistance. Yet, a sharpened focus on NGO performance, particularly on results, is demanded of them. Donors have considerable leverage over NGOs, requiring them to provide performance information in order to scrutinize their work as well as exerting financial leverage through specific contractual agreements (Macrae et al. 2002), which includes the implementation of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) practices and a focus on results.

Monitoring and evaluation is one mechanism utilized to determine if NGOs are actually achieving what they set out to achieve. It is also a means to learn, to improve service delivery and to meet the diverse needs of key stakeholders, thereby demonstrating accountability to those who rely on it most. On a basic level, M&E is the process of gathering data and determining whether a project has achieved its goal. It is an essential component of any intervention and helps demonstrate to an organization itself, donors,

beneficiaries and communities the outcome of a project. Through the practice of M&E, NGOs are able to take the lessons learned from previous projects and apply them to future work so that they do better, a critical function when striving to meet populations in dire need of humanitarian assistance. Monitoring and evaluation is an integral component of project management and the overall health of an NGO. There exists a rising relevance of and need for M&E practices among NGOs as a critical management tool in the face of increasing demands.

The Syrian crisis is the defining refugee crisis of our time. The absence of a political solution to the war in Syria has led to a massive exodus into neighboring countries. More than five million refugees have fled Syria, an estimated 1.5 of which are in Lebanon, a country among the top refugee hosting countries in the world; in 2016, Lebanon hosted the third largest refugee population in the world behind Turkey and Jordan (ALNAP 2017, 18). A total of USD 6.075 billion has been spent on the Syrian refugee response in Lebanon (UN 2018, 10). The majority of Syrian refugee households (75 percent) live below the poverty line (US$ 3.84 per person per day) among which, more than half live in extreme poverty (UNICEF et al. 2017, 60). The lack of an initial policy to the refugee crisis meant that the burden rested with municipalities and national non-state actors to support refugees. A coordinated UN lead response began in 2012. Myriad humanitarian actors, including national and international NGOs, are currently active in the provision of humanitarian assistance as well as more long-term interventions.

A. Purpose & Research Questions

The goal of this research is to provide an overview of humanitarian assistance, and to better understand what spawned the demand for scrutinizing humanitarian aid, a multi-billion dollar industry, which has led to more donor M&E requirements and NGO M&E practices. Monitoring and evaluation within the context of the Syrian refugee response in Lebanon is examined through the UN-led refugee response plans and the requirements of donors and practices of NGOs active in the response. There is much emphasis on the importance of M&E in academic and humanitarian response literature. The case study aims to determine to what extent M&E is operationalized on the ground in Lebanon and whether it is deemed to be an effective tool.

The core research question this thesis asks is: *What is the nature of the donor-NGO relationship as shaped through M&E requirements and practices?* The secondary research question is: *How do DAC and non-DAC donors and their recipient NGOs utilize M&E in the Syrian refugee response?*

B. Methodology

In order to answer the research questions a mixed method approach is utilized to collect and analyze primary and secondary data. AUB's Institutional Review Board approved the research. Secondary data includes, but is not limited to, evaluations on the Syrian refugee response in Lebanon as well as sector-specific evaluations, M&E tools utilized by actors in the refugee response in Lebanon, and reports on the allocation of humanitarian aid. The UNHCR data portal for the Syria Regional Refugee Response for Lebanon served as a leading source of the secondary data.

Primary data was collected during semi-structured interviews with donor and NGO representatives. A series of open-ended questions for donors and NGOs (Appendix I) were designed to better understand M&E practices and their utility to the donor and NGO. Open-ended questions offered the participants the flexibility to speak about M&E topics in broad terms as well as provide specific and descriptive insights on their experiences which, combined, elicited qualitative textual data. Additional questions were asked to clarify and/or further explore interviewee responses.

Informal discussions with evaluation consultants and professionals in the fields of development and humanitarian assistance further shed light on the refugee response and the use of M&E among donors and NGOs. The professionals have conducted external evaluations of NGO projects in the refugee response as well as worked for private companies and NGOs active in the refugee response offering a unique and beneficial perspective on M&E, separate from the donor/NGO perspective. An informal discussion was held with a UN M&E specialist overseeing M&E coordination in the refugee response.

A desk review of literature on the UNHCR data portal for Lebanon included evaluation reports on behalf of NGOs involved in the response, sector log frames, assessments and other M&E tools utilized by actors in the response. The goal of the review was to analyze the state of M&E in the humanitarian response to the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon, with particular consideration given to the response plan documents. A content analysis was conducted of regional response plans and the Lebanon country-specific response plans from 2012 to the current 2017-2020 plan. The content analysis reveals how concepts within the response have evolved over time.

Quantitative data collection methods were employed in order to analyze donor

financial contributions and recipient organizations on the OCHA Financial Tracking Sheet

(FTS) website, an open source website which provides records of all reported financial

contributions for humanitarian assistance globally, including Lebanon.

OCHA's primary reporting platform for humanitarian assistance is the FTS, a

comprehensive dataset of international humanitarian donors and recipients. The FTS was

utilized to analyze donor and recipient humanitarian funding for the Syria refugee response

in Lebanon between 2012 and 2017. There is no universal obligation to report international

or domestic humanitarian assistance; the FTS provides information submitted voluntarily

and therefore does not necessarily represent all humanitarian aid provided for the Syrian

refugee response in Lebanon. Open source data files were downloaded on the OCHA FTS

website and analyzed using SPSS.

Methodological triangulation of primary and secondary data was used in effort to

mitigate bias and answer questions in a more comprehensive manner thereby allowing for

an enhanced understanding of the research topic.

C. Thesis Structure

Chapter two provides an overview of the evolution of humanitarian assistance, aid

architecture, and a description of who is funding humanitarian emergencies and how much.

The financial support of DAC and non-DAC donors is considered in terms of the quantity,

reporting, and channels of aid. Contributions to costly and complex crises from a wider

variety of donors is growing with more money being spent than ever before, yet needs too

are growing as crises become more prolonged. NGOs as humanitarian actors responding to

these crises and the need for M&E practices are examined as well as the advent of New Public Management (NPM) within the public sector and its influence on NGOs and M&E.

Chapter three provides a conceptual framework which employs the principal-agent theory to the donor (principal) and NGO (agent) relationship in order to better understand contractual agreements. NGOs are accountable to affected populations (downward) and to donors (upward) and donors are accountable to citizens whose tax dollars are being spent on humanitarian assistance. A contract between donors and NGOs helps donors (governments) to ensure their tax dollars are spent prudently and progress on results is reported, including through M&E practices. A description of NGOs as actors in the delivery of aid, and their need to demonstrate accountability through the concepts of M&E is provided. Moreover, M&E also provides opportunities for organizational learning so that mistakes are not repeated and improvements are made in project performance.

Chapter four focuses on the case of Lebanon. The chapter begins with an overview of the refugee crisis in Lebanon followed by analysis of the funding for the refugee response in Lebanon from 2012 to 2017. DAC and non-DAC donor contributions are reported, as well as the recipients of this aid, including NGOs. The remainder of the chapter is dedicated to a review of how M&E is incorporated into the response plans crafted to date as well as M&E tools being utilized by response partners. Analysis of the Regional Refugee Response Plans (3RP) for 2012, 2013, and 2014 is conducted, as well as the transition to the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) for 2015-2016 and 2017-2020 with a focus on how M&E is described within the response plans. The more recent response plans highlight both humanitarian assistance as well as the need for more long-term development interventions. These interventions are designed to overlap and complement one another,

result in better meeting the needs of the refugees and host community members. Monitoring and evaluation assessments and reports are described as well as various M&E tools utilized in the response.

Chapter five is dedicated to findings and discussion from interviews with donors and NGOs revealing the trends of M&E implementation, distinguishing characteristics among donors and their recipients, and other significant findings.

CHAPTER II

EVOLUTION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND NGO MONITORING AND EVALUATION

This chapter provides a definition of humanitarian assistance followed by an overview of humanitarianism. Donor motivations for funding humanitarian assistance are considered. Although DAC donors represent the largest contributors of humanitarian assistance, non-DAC donors, including Gulf States, provide substantial contributions. A discussion of the role of each donor type to humanitarian assistance is provided, followed by the rise of NGOs as actors in the humanitarian aid system, the need for M&E within NGOs, and how the need is tied to New Public Management (NPM), an approach to public administration which focuses on managerialism, rather than administering, and an emphasis on results.

A. Humanitarian Assistance: Definition and Defining Characteristics

Humanitarian action consists of humanitarian assistance, protection and advocacy (IASC 2010). According to OCHA, humanitarian assistance is aid that is "designed to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population" (OCHA-IASC 2015). Humanitarian assistance is intended to be short-term and is governed by the principles[1] of

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[1] The term humanity refers to all people; human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. Neutrality means that a humanitarian organization may not side with any party and is of particular importance during times of conflict. Impartiality means that aid is provided upon need regardless of nationality, race, religion, gender, or political opinion. Independence requires that assistance is not influenced by parties engaging in conflict and that it is autonomous from political, economic, military or other objectives that an actor

humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence-codified in the Geneva Conventions as international law-to ensure that the provision of aid is based upon need only, and allocated with no distinction of religion, race, or ethnicity (Rysaback-Smith 2015). Adherence to these principles distinguishes the provision of humanitarian assistance from the actions and objectives of other actors and renders it to be apolitical (Barnett 2011, 2). Aid should thus be provided irrespective of face or place, and regardless of state objectives; it is an act of charity and show of solidarity with the individuals in need.

Whereas development aid is often broad in scope, long-term and aims to improve socioeconomic conditions by addressing systemic issues such as poverty through direct engagement with governments and state institutions, humanitarian assistance focuses on life-saving service provision and may or may not closely involve the government in which a crisis unfolds (Bennett 2015, 11). Humanitarian assistance does not strive to transform the root causes of a crisis but rather provide for the needs of the afflicted through rapid relief operations "on the ground" and can therefore be seen as treating the symptoms of crisis-affected people rather than resolving the problems of a humanitarian crisis. "Humanitarian action is reactive, conducted by agents with limited power, in places where political responsibility is compromised, practical challenges are immense and need and suffering are great" (Davis 2007, 2).

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may hold in relation to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented (Slim 1997)(IASC 2010).

[2] The ICRC was highly criticized for its failure to condemn German concentration camps, which it gained access to and provided services in during WWII. Because the Geneva Conventions, which the ICRC promotes the observance of, did not pertain to civilians being persecuted by their own governments, the ICRC was not mandated to protect persecuted

The relationship between humanitarian assistance and development has become more intertwined as policy makers and aid actors endeavor to better meet the holistic needs of people (Mosel and Levine 2014), particularly in protracted crises-instances when a substantial population is vulnerable to "death, disease, or disruption of their livelihoods" over an extended period of time (Bennett 2015, 6). Over 80 percent of refugee crises last longer than a decade (Crawford et al 2015, 1), demonstrating the need to link short-term relief measures with more long-term development programs. Response efforts integrating both humanitarian and development needs are evident in the current refugee response in Lebanon, discussed in chapter four, in which different emergency/relief and development interventions are applied simultaneously on behalf of both refugees and the host population.

B. History of Humanitarianism

Humanitarianism is a global, centuries old practice. Historically, religious beliefs reflected in the Islamic tradition of *zakat*, one of the Five Pillars of Islam, and the Christian concept of charity informed humanitarian action (Davey et al 2013, 5). Enlightenment processes in the 18th century are credited with creating forces of compassion through awareness of suffering, a moral obligation to help those in need, and a belief in the ability to make a difference (Barnett 2011, 25; Ryfman 2007, 23-4). In the Western world, the term 'humanitarianism' came into use in the early 1800s and was characterized as assistance across borders, having transcendental significance, and designed to protect and progress humanity. To be called a humanitarian during this time was not a compliment, it carried a derisive connotation, a combination of "bleeding heart liberal and moralizer," and

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the notion that humanitarians were dictating to others how to live their lives (Barnett 2011, 10, 20).

Barnett (2011) divides humanitarianism into three distinct stages: imperial humanitarianism, from the early 1800s until World War II; neo-humanitarianism from World War II through the end of the Cold War; and liberal humanitarianism, from the end of the Cold War through today. Through each passing phase, more protection is afforded to populations and an increasing governance of humanitarianism exists, rendering it more "public, hierarchical and institutionalized" (p. 29). During imperial humanitarianism a Eurocentric notion of international community inspired by Christian values spread. During neo-humanitarianism world superpowers utilized humanitarian interests to serve their own self-interests and new forms of global governance emerged. Distinguishing features of the liberal humanitarian age are international security promoting liberal peace, a pronounced human rights discourse, and humanitarian actors which expanded their work to post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding as well as acting as tools of the State to promote their political objectives.

Beginning in the 1800s, colonial practices "served as a laboratory" for humanitarian action through famine relief, health care, and cash assistance for indigenous populations (Davey et al. 2013, 6). A series of wars and natural disasters in the 19th and 20th centuries prompted humanitarian action not only from states but newly created humanitarian aid organizations. One of the most notable instances of transnational humanitarian assistance began with the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)[2] in 1863,

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[2] The ICRC was highly criticized for its failure to condemn German concentration camps, which it gained access to and provided services in during WWII. Because the Geneva

which focused on providing relief to victims of war. The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement expanded through national affiliates across the globe, and now provide relief during times of war and peace. The Save the Children Fund, created in the aftermath of WWI to help starving children, and whose services have expanded over the years (Davey et al 2013, 8), is an international non-governmental organization, although not defined as such at the time, dating back to the beginning of modern humanitarianism. Britain's Oxfam was established in 1942 in response to the famine in Nazi-occupied Greece and distinguished itself from other aid organizations by its willingness to also serve Germans (Barnett 2011 117-8), thus embracing the principle of impartiality to justify its service provision to all those it deemed in need. Although these organizations were created as the result of the European war experience, an international humanitarian system now exists which responds to natural disaster, conflict, supporting the displaced, and other contexts of human suffering.

The formation of the League of Nations after WWI became the first international organization tasked with maintaining world peace. The United Nations, created in 1945 in the aftermath of WW II, continued this effort and led to the establishment of numerous UN entities currently active in humanitarian relief including the UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF and WHO. In addition to institutional establishments, normative changes were implemented including the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights which defined the economic, social and political rights of individuals, establishing a precedent for international intervention during times of conflict and justification for the provision of humanitarian aid

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Conventions, which the ICRC promotes the observance of, did not pertain to civilians being persecuted by their own governments, the ICRC was not mandated to protect persecuted peoples such as Jews, gypsies, and homosexuals (Davey et al. 2013, 9).

(Rysaback-Smith 2015, 6-7). The UN adopted additional Geneva Conventions a year later extending protections to civilian populations thereby strengthening international humanitarian law.

During the post-WWII era and the decolonization process, humanitarian assistance began to shift from Europe to less developed countries, including post-colonial governments in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The proliferation of global NGOs, which began after WWII but has expanded exponentially since the 1980s, contributed to the provision of humanitarian assistance. Nearly 200 NGOs were created between 1945 and 1949, primarily in the United States (Barnett 2011, 112). "NGOs expanded as a non-state or petty sovereign power within the liminal space between the West, the Soviet bloc and independent Third World states emerging from colonization" (Duffield in Davey et al. 2013, 11). As of 2014, 4,278 humanitarian organizations operated as humanitarian aid providers, the majority of which are local and national NGOs (ALNAP 2015, p. 38). Viewed as less corrupt and more cost-effective than governments, better positioned to serve vulnerable populations, and more nimble and innovative than the UN, NGOs occupy a prominent role in humanitarian response initiatives (Al Noor 2003, 813; Chege 1999, 6).

In more recent years advances and transformations of communication including the television, the 24-hour news cycle, the Internet and social media bring immediate attention to disasters and conflict happening across the globe. Visual representation of refugees, for example, provides justification for government humanitarian intervention via images of human suffering (Nyers 2006, p.14). In addition to governments, the "democratization of information and communication" have allowed new actors to emerge in an area once reserved for states (Brauman et al. 2004, 406-7). A "loosely connected 'system,' with links

on the level of finances, operations, personnel and values" (ALNAP in Davey et al 2013, 1) now exists comprised not only of states, but of international agencies and NGOs.

C. Humanitarian Aid Motivations

Humanitarian assistance conjures up altruistic and charitable connotations, conveying the perception that sanctity of human life and the need to preserve it supersedes all else. Yet, need outstrips supply and other factors influence the provision of humanitarian aid. While humanitarian aid provision based on need alone is a noble sentiment, it is by no means a reality. According to Human Rights Watch, in 1999 donor governments gave USD 207 per person in Kosovo compared with USD 16 per person in Sierra Leone and USD 8 per person in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Oxley 2001); Afghanistan received its highest per capita aid during the Cold War but after Russian withdrawal in 1989, humanitarian aid was cut dramatically despite needs (Curtis 2001, 4). Both values and interests drive aid distribution decisions and therefore reflect the differentiation in humanitarian aid allocation which is not always proportionate to a crisis. "Even humanitarianism, an institution that believes in equal human rights and universal humanity, imprints specific values and meanings onto different lives and bodies" (Mognieh 2015, 5). Curtis (2001) contends that humanitarian aid is an essential component of donors' strategy to "transform conflicts, decrease violence and set the stage for liberal development" (p. 3).

Myriad motivations inform humanitarian assistance allocation during times of crisis: domestic concerns including political considerations, economic justifications, media exposure, as well as the actions of allies and adversaries. According to Porter (2002), foreign policy objectives, historical relationships with a country or region, geographic

proximity to a crisis, optimism that a conflict may soon be resolved, spending at the end of

the financial year, and prolonged media coverage all impact donor funding decisions.

Fielding (2013) analyzes humanitarian aid allocation factors among the United States (US),

United Kingdom (UK) and European Commission (EC), all DAC donors, and finds that

bilateral humanitarian aid is dependent upon trade with the recipient country; donors do not

quickly respond to new disasters; and US and EC emergency aid allocation is influenced by

the UK's decision to do so, demonstrating a "follower effect" on the part of the US and EC.

El Taraboulsi-McCarthy (2017) find that Saudi Arabia, a significant non-DAC donor,

provides humanitarian aid to enhance its image in light of the suppression of its Shia

population, its bombing campaign in Yemen and its severed ties with Qatar, all of which

cause domestic and regional instability. Saudi's humanitarian aid serves as both a political

and humanitarian tool. Narang (2016) contends that humanitarian assistance allocation

during conflict is based more on humanitarian need (demand-side factors) than strategic

concerns (supply-side factors) but in post-conflict settings strategic concerns are just as

important, if not more so, than humanitarian concerns in aid allocation. The extent of media

coverage, or the 'CNN effect', also influences the volume of humanitarian relief in

emergency situations (Olsen, et. al. 2003). According to Smith (2011), regional proximity,

language, history (including colonial ties), and culture are all factors influencing

humanitarian aid allocation. Thus the provision of emergency aid is based not merely on

recipient need-the principle of impartiality-but a range of factors from donors' political and

economic interests to the portrayal of a crisis (or lack of) in the media.

　　　According to officials with international and Syrian organizations operating in

Lebanon, humanitarian funding for the Syria response is highly politicized, and acts as a

"money machine" where winning contracts has overshadowed coherent coordination efforts

(Mansour 2017, 8). "The work on Syria is very political. Every donor government has its

different agenda, position, views and priorities," remarked one senior donor government

official (*ibid*). According to Mitri (2014), the actors active in the refugee response are the

same actors that have operated in Lebanon since its civil war, although the nature of the

responses have differed according to the crisis. These actors include Saudi Arabia, Kuwait

and Iran, as well as the US and Western donors, UN agencies and international and national

NGOs (p. 9).

D. DAC and Non-DAC Donors

The thirty members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the

development branch of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

(OECD),[3] consisting primarily of wealthy, Western, industrialized aid donors, have

historically dominated debates about the direction and principles of aid. Humanitarian aid is

thus often conceived of as an instrument of Western governments and the United Nations.

Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), the OECD term designated as foreign aid, is

defined as the "promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing

countries as its main objective," at least one quarter of which must be a grant (OECD

website). It is financing in the form of loans, grants or technical assistance distributed to

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[3] Created in 1960 with 20 members, with an additional 15 countries joining since its inception, the OECD consists of advanced economies committed to a market economy and democracy. Members primarily represent the developed industrial economies of Europe, North America and Japan as well as some central European countries, Mexico and South Korea. There are a number of partner countries that participate in bodies within the OECD but are not members themselves (OECD website).

developing countries and multilateral organizations. The definition excludes all forms of military aid, antiterrorism activities, as well as most peacekeeping expenditures. Humanitarian assistance, referred to as "humanitarian aid" by DAC, is one sector within ODA;[4] subsectors of humanitarian aid include emergency response, reconstruction relief and rehabilitation and disaster prevention and preparedness. Emergency response, categorized as "material relief assistance and services" and "emergency food aid," represents the largest subsector of humanitarian aid distributed between 2005 and 2015 (OECD website). Financial support for refugees, including money allocated to refugees within DAC countries, is considered to be part of ODA. In 2016, nearly 11 percent of ODA was spent on hosting refugees inside donor countries. That is, DAC countries are spending substantial amounts of ODA domestically on refugee populations they are now hosting. Because DAC allows donor countries to count ODA on refugee expenses for one year (OECD countries have been allowed to do this since 1992), some donor countries are now the biggest recipients of their own aid. Germany, Austria, Greece and Italy used more than 20 percent of their ODA domestically on refugee costs while others such as Australia, Japan, and Korea spent no ODA on domestic refugee costs (OECD 2017).

Between 1990 and 2000 humanitarian assistance nearly tripled from USD 2 billion to USD 5.9 billion (Macrae 2002, 15). In 1989 humanitarian aid represented 5.8 percent of ODA compared with 10.5 percent in 2000, despite a 12 percent drop in overall foreign aid flows during this time period (Randel and German in Macrae 2002, 15). Humanitarian aid accounted for 13 percent of ODA in 2016 and over the course of the last decade has

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[4] In addition to humanitarian aid, ODA sectors include social infrastructure and services; economic infrastructure and services; production sectors; multi-sector; program assistance; action relating to debt; and unallocated/unspecified (OECD website).

accounted for approximately 11 percent of ODA (Development Initiatives 2017b, 35). Thus

the volume of humanitarian assistance as a proportion of ODA has increased over the

course of the past few decades. Figure 1 shows the rise in humanitarian assistance from

2000 to 2014. In the past several years, instability in Yemen, Iraq, and South Sudan has

driven overall humanitarian assistance spending up as well as humanitarian assistance in

Syria (*ibid)*. Concomitantly, Middle East and North African countries have increased their

contributions by 500 percent between 2011 and 2015 to USD 2.4 billion (El Taraboulsi-

McCarthy 2017, 1).

Figure 2.1 Humanitarian Assistance 2000 – 2014 (in millions)

Source: Development Initiatives Data Hub based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and UN CERF.

Historically, DAC donors are the largest contributors of humanitarian assistance. A

small number of donors have typically provided the bulk of relief aid. Among the 20 largest

contributors of humanitarian assistance in 2016, 17 were DAC donors (Development

Initiatives 2017b, 45). Their funding is channeled across the world through bilateral

(government to government) and multilateral aid (government to intergovernmental institutions).[5] The United States, EU institutions, and other European nations typically provide the largest volume of ODA. Between 2000 to 2015, the largest DAC donors were the United States with nearly a quarter of ODA, followed by the United Kingdom and the EU which both provided 10 percent followed by Germany and France (Development Initiatives Data Hub 2017). Measured in real terms-correcting for inflation and currency fluctuations-ODA has doubled since 2000. The OECD reports that ODA in 2016 reached a record high-USD 142.6 billion-an increase of 8.9 percent from 2015 (Development Initiatives 2017b, 45).

While DAC donors contribute substantial sums of humanitarian assistance they do not monopolize all funding. Non-DAC donors, also referred to as "non-traditional," "emerging," "new" or "non-Western" represent a diverse range of countries active in international humanitarian response. The labels appropriated to non-DAC donors understate the impact which these countries make to humanitarian action and ignore the fact that many states have a history of aid provision. The BRICS, Gulf States, OECD members not part of DAC (there are five), including Turkey and Mexico, all represent donors outside the "club" of the more recognized DAC donors. Non-DAC donors provide for a far more geographic, economic, and culturally diverse humanitarian aid landscape.

Based on the UN OCHA Financial Tracking Sheet (FTS), between 2000 and 2010 the amount of humanitarian assistance from non-DAC donors increased by over 600 percent, from USD 34.7 million to USD 622.5 million (Smith 2011, 7). Between 2006 and

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[5] Official multilateral aid assistance is considered to be less unpredicatable than bilateral humanitarian aid because it is unearmarked funding that tends to change less over time (Kellet 2010, 12).

2015, non-DAC government donors tripled in their reporting of humanitarian assistance, representing approximately 12 percent of all humanitarian assistance (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy2017, 1). Saudi Arabia consistently accounts for a significant portion of non-DAC humanitarian aid as does the United Arab Emirates (UAE). While it is not possible to determine if this represents an increase in humanitarian aid contributions or if donors are merely reporting more of their contributions, the funding levels reveal the substantial contributions to humanitarian assistance by non-DAC donors. According to the 2017 Global Humanitarian Assistance report (Development Initiatives 2017b), Turkey, a non-DAC member, was the second largest government contributor to humanitarian assistance in 2016 with contributions totaling USD 6 billion (compared with USD 6.3 billion by the US). Nearly all of Turkey's assistance stayed within Turkey, however, in order to support the country's more than three million Syrian refugees. The two other non-DAC governments in the top 20 contributors of humanitarian assistance in 2016 are Saudi Arabia (USD 395 million) and the UAE (USD 717 million). As a proportion of gross national income (GNI), the UAE is the second largest contributor in 2016 after Turkey. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar are also among the top 20 largest contributors to humanitarian aid in 2016 as a percentage of GNI (*ibid*). Thus several non-DAC donors represent both significant and generous humanitarian aid donors.

An increasing number of humanitarian aid donors are responding to crises. The crisis in Bosnia in the 1994 yielded aid from 16 government donors. Nearly a decade later, 72 donor governments pledged support to the crisis in Iraq (Harmer and Cotterrell, 2005, 7). A 2005 report on the diversity of donorship of humanitarian aid found that in any given year non-DAC donors represent 12 percent of official humanitarian financing (*Ibid*, 5).

These donors tend to concentrate the majority of their financing on a select number of crises, often within their region. Recent significant contributions by non-DAC donors include the 2010 Haiti earthquake emergency response where 8 of the 10 largest government contributions were from non-DAC donors, including the top two-Saudi Arabia (USD 50 million) and Brazil (USD 18 million) (Smith 2011, 3). In response to the 2005 Indian Ocean tsunami, 92 countries pledged support (Harmer and Cotterrell, 2005, 7), far exceeding the 30 DAC donor members. In 2010 China was one of the largest humanitarian aid donors, but in 2008 the country had an earthquake and was the largest recipient of non-DAC donor humanitarian aid (Smith 2011, 17). In recent years, governments in the Middle East and North Africa have the largest percentage increase in humanitarian aid, with the majority of aid coming from the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar (El Taraboulsi-McCarthy 2017, 1).

As the need for humanitarian assistance around the world surges, including in Arab countries, humanitarian aid from non-DAC donors is increasingly important. The contributions from non-DAC donors demonstrate that humanitarian aid is no longer the sole realm of wealthy, Western, industrialized nations but an initiative embraced by governments big and small, rich and poor, democratic and undemocratic alike.

E. Aid Reporting

DAC members use a precise definition of aid, reporting mechanisms are in place and the aid information is published on the OECD website. Among non-DAC donors,

however, aid is defined in diverse ways and their contributions are not always made public. A broader understanding of humanitarian assistance and development assistance exists, and economic investments are sometimes labeled as "humanitarian" (Harmer and Martin 2010, 1; Smith 2011, 9). Moreover, various ministries and budgets provide humanitarian aid and consolidated country level reports on aid activities are not consistently produced (Harmer and Martin 2010, 15). China, for example, is well known for not disclosing its aid (Copper 2016). However, reporting from non-DAC donors to the OECD is increasing: 20 non-DAC donors report aggregate ODA to the OECD voluntarily, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE, while the quality of reporting by BRICS has also improved (Smith 2011, 5).

Increased attention on tracking aid allocation has led to international efforts to centralize reporting mechanisms and enhance aid transparency in recent years so that aid allocation is better understood and publicly accessible. The International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATA) launched in 2008 released transparency standards, which development actors pledged to report on. IATA provides a common, open format for donors (governments, philanthropic foundations and civil society organizations) to utilize in reporting of both development and humanitarian aid. UN OCHA's Financial Tracking Sheet (FTS), established in 1993, publishes humanitarian aid contributions from donors to recipients across the globe, and is the source of aid contributions in the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon, discussed in chapter four. While the systems do not incorporate all aid given (reporting is voluntary) the tracking mechanisms aim to enhance transparency and accountability.

F. Funding Channels

According to the 2017 Global Humanitarian Assistance report, in 2015 multilateral organizations, primarily the UN, received nearly half (46 percent) of all humanitarian assistance, over half of which (59 percent) was provided by governments. DAC donors were much more likely to fund multilateral organizations than non-DAC donors, contributing 61 percent of humanitarian funding to multilateral organizations, compared with 34 percent of non-DAC donors, a substantial decline from the 59 percent non-DAC donors provided to multilateral organizations the year before. The decrease of Gulf state contributions to the UN is attributed to the decline from non-DAC donors. Non-DAC donors believe the state plays a significant role in coordinating humanitarian response and thus often allocate funds bilaterally. Moreover, bilateral humanitarian aid is seen as a way to maximize the visibility of aid (Harmer and Martin 2010, 8).

The majority of NGO funding in 2016 went to international NGOs, which received 85 percent of the assistance channeled directly to NGOs, compared with 1.4 percent of national NGOs, 0.3 percent of internationally affiliated NGOs and 0.2 percent of local NGOs (Development Initiatives 2017. 73).[6] As a percentage of overall humanitarian assistance, local and national NGOs received just 0.3 percent of reported humanitarian assistance[7] (*ibid* 74). While initial donor-recipient transactions are tracked there is a dearth

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[6] "Southern international NGOs" and "undefined" represent the two other categorizations of NGOs.

[7] Recent efforts to increase funding from international to national and local entities are underway. The Grand Bargain, an outcome of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, commits donors and aid organizations (currently 22 donors and 31 organizations are signatories) to increase contributions to national and local responders to 25 percent of all humanitarian funding by 2020 (Agenda for Humanity website). The Charter for Change, also generated out of discussions held at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, includes

of comprehensive data on subsequent transactions. Humanitarian aid is not typically funded directly from donor to recipient, but goes through one or more implementing partners on the ground. For example, recipients of aid such as the UN, may work in partnership and fund international NGOs, which in turn partner with and fund local NGOs. Therefore, the volume of aid to national and local NGOs, for example, is most likely higher as international actors often partner with implementing partners on the ground. The above funding channel data to NGOs from the Global Humanitarian Assistance report is obtained from the OCHA FTS and therefore represents only reported funding. Thus more funding is allotted to all humanitarian actors but the volume of this aid remains unknown.

G. NGOs as Humanitarian Assistance Actors

The humanitarian system has grown into a multi-billion dollar industry and evolved to incorporate a range of actors with various missions and agendas. Local, national and international non-governmental organizations play crucial roles in humanitarian response, particularly when governments are unwilling or unable to respond to crises. NGOs deliver the bulk of humanitarian assistance (OCHA-IASC 2015, 8). Viewed as more efficient and cost-effective than governments in service provision (Edwards and Hulme 1996, 961), held in high esteem by the public[8] (Ryfman 2007, 27-28), less hierarchical and bureaucratic than

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eight commitments geared toward increasing international NGO support to southern-based NGOs (29 international NGOS and 150 National and local organizations from 43 countries are signatories) (Charter 4 Change website). And the Urban Crisis Charter (65 institutions are signatories) commits to four principles to cope with humanitarian crises, including prioritizing local leadership (Global Alliance for Urban Crises website).
[8] In 2002, 36,000 people in 47 countries on 6 continents were surveyed. NGOs ranked second (behind the armed forces) among institutions "to operate in the best interest of society"; in 2006, a study conducted among 37,572 people in 33 countries viewed NGOs to have the most favorable impact on the world economy (Ryfman 2007, 27-28).

the government and more generous than the free-market (Korten and Brett in Ramalingam et al. 2009, 32) NGOs are primary recipients of humanitarian aid. NGOs, also referred to as the 'voluntary' or 'third' sector, are small, flexible and quick to respond to crises, as opposed to the larger and more bureaucratic UN system. Local and national NGOs are often already active in communities that may be affected by a crisis thus their expertise and understanding of the context in a crisis situation makes them well positioned to rapidly respond.

NGOs represent a powerful force in humanitarian action and are a critical component of civil societies; they are value-driven entities, concerned with delivering a service that is inadequately being met by the private or public sector. These shortcomings of the state and private sector are the source of NGO legitimacy (Fernando and Heston 1997, 11). NGOs seek to help, and often target minorities or marginalized groups such as women, the elderly and disabled, rural community members, and the poor whose plight has been neglected or ignored. Donors consider NGOs to be better positioned to serve these vulnerable populations, and crucial players in democratization processes (Ebrahim 2003, 813).

The number of NGOs worldwide has proliferated over the past few decades, providing a range of services to the public, including during times of crisis. The end of the Cold War and subsequent humanitarian emergencies provided fertile ground for the rise of the NGO (HopGood 2008, 105). An estimated 4,278 humanitarian NGOs operate around the world, 3,495 (81 percent) of which are national NGOs (ALNAP 2015, 38). Approximately 200 NGOs were active in the response to the Rwandan Genocide in 1994; roughly 250 were active in Kosovo in 1999; around 180 NGOs responded to the tsunami in

Indonesia in 2004; and nearly 900 NGOs registered with the UN in the 2010 Haiti

earthquake response (Barnett 2011, 3). These numbers exclude the Red Cross/Red Crescent

societies as well as private voluntary organizations. In addition to responding to natural

disaster and conflict, NGOs have proven instrumental in advocating international causes:

NGOs exerted significant pressure on governments to ratify the International Treaty to Ban

Landmines in the 1990s and the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the International

Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), a coalition of NGOs across 100 countries

working to ban nuclear weapons.

While NGOs have been instrumental in providing relief during humanitarian crises

there are also instances of unintended consequences[9] and catastrophic occurrences during

response operations. An estimated 50,000 Rwandan refugees fleeing genocide died from

cholera in the first month of the response due in part to humanitarian aid workers' lack of

preparedness in hygiene and health practices (Jansury et al 2015, 3-4). The Joint Evaluation

of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, an independent investigation of the response found

"Whilst many NGOs performed impressively, providing a high quality of care and services,

a number performed in an unprofessional and irresponsible manner that resulted not only in

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[9] Examples include the famine in Somalia in the early 1990s. Food aid went to factions
controlling ports, airfields and other transit points rather than to civilians (Seybolt 1996).
Critics of food aid provided to Sudan contend that the aid allowed indigenous food to be
exported, thereby raising government capital used to purchase weapons (*ibid*). During the
Biafra War, considered to be a watershed moment in humanitarian assistance, Oxfam and
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) opposed Western and Muslim countries backing the
Nigerian government and instead supported Biafra rebels. The ICRC, the NGO leading
negotiations with the Nigerian government to permit aid into the famine-stricken Biafra
region, grew exasperated waiting for Nigerian government approval to deliver aid and
eventually did so without it. In response, the Nigerian government shot down an ICRC
plane bringing in humanitarian aid and four of its staff members were murdered during an
attack on a camp (Barnett 2011, 137-8).

duplication of wasted resources but may also have contributed to an unnecessary loss of life. The poor response effort by some was a watershed moment in humanitarian action. The need for NGOs to improve their performance is now widely recognized" (Relief and Rehabilitation Network 1996, 23). According to Barnett (2015), NGO failings are not limited to operations in Rwanda but can be made about the humanitarian sector in every large-scale response (p. 213).

There is now a sharpened focus on NGO performance; being well intentioned and busy is not good enough. "The ascription of INGOs as the 'magic bullet' for solving global issues often carries very little evidence to support it" (Yu and McLaughlin 2013, 24). In some instances, NGOs have inflated their claims to legitimacy while publicized scandals have resulted in a loss of NGO credibility (Ebrahim 2003, 813). NGOs must demonstrate that they are improving the lives of those they serve. While demonstrating results may seem straight forward, in practice there are numerous challenges: NGOs can have lofty goals not easily quantifiable; measuring social change such as improved wellbeing or enhanced quality of life is difficult, particularly in complex environments; a lack of baseline data prior to initiatives may not exist, thereby making it difficult to measure progress; and project success can depend upon interpretation of data and what information is (and is not) measured. Donors are placing an increased focus on professionalization within the humanitarian sector through enhanced monitoring and evaluation practices.

H. Monitoring and Evaluation

Past humanitarian failures, donor demand for evidence of impact, the increase in volume of humanitarian aid, and internal demand within an organization to demonstrate

results and effectiveness all contribute to an emphasis on measuring performance.

Monitoring and evaluation is a primary mechanism used to gauge NGO performance; it is

utilized by NGOs and donors to track, understand and assess an NGO's work. The

importance of M&E and the supply of "relevant, accurate and timely information to ensure

satisfactory results for a variety of stakeholders is recognized and generally considered a

high priority" (Crawford 2004, 82). Terms such as 'impact,' 'performance,' and 'results'

are prevalent in M&E literature as are more participatory approaches to M&E (Mebrahtu

2002, 502). The transformation in public management, described in more detail in the

following section, has contributed to a growth in impact assessment (Meuller-Hirth 2012),

which focuses on not just project implementation and the completion of activities but

whether projects have brought about their desired effect to the target population. The

increased emphasis on results has spawned a growth in project evaluations by donors,

independent agencies, academics and NGOs themselves. On the most basic level, M&E

aims to determine what works well and what does not work well so that organizations do

more of the former and less of the latter and, ultimately, improve humanitarian assistance

and the impact of their aid. M&E is a mechanism which helps organizations determine how

to do better. Moreover, it aims to ensure accountability towards funders and taxpayers, the

primary source of financing humanitarian action, and provides opportunities for feedback

and learning for management (Holvoet and Rombouts 2008, 579) and for the organization

as a whole. Monitoring and evaluation are two distinct practices yet are inextricably linked.

In 2003 the administrator to USAID told NGOs "if you cannot measure results, if

you cannot show what you've done, other partners will be found. Why is that? Doing good

is not enough?" (Hoffman et al. 2004, 5). The extent to which this statement is accurate

may be contested, but the comment is a testament to donor interest in results. This interest

emerged from the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s and the New Public Management

(NPM) approach to running the public sector. NPM principles include a sharp focus on

results-based management and a reliance on non-state actors to perform public services.

These practices were initially adopted in development assistance and then in the

humanitarian sector as humanitarian funding began to increase, state reliance on

humanitarian agencies grew, and humanitarianism became a part of security goals (Barnett

2014, 215). Major DAC donors including the Development Fund for International

Development (DFID), US Agency for International Development (USAID) as well as

European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) have adopted

performance management, or results-based management (RBM) approaches for monitoring

performance and impact (Hoffman et al. 2004, 12) as well as a number of UN agencies.

Key features of results-based management include the consistent use of objectives and

indicators; participation of stakeholders; focus on the service recipient; and concern for

quality and performance (*ibid*). Additionally, they focus on higher-level outcomes of

project interventions. While traditional M&E focuses on the monitoring and evaluation of

inputs, activities, and outputs, project components which an organization has direct control

over, results-based M&E utilizes the traditional approach but also assesses the outcomes

and impact, also referred to as results, of programming or projects (Imas and Rist 2009).

Outcome and impact are aspects of projects in which organizations have less control over

and in which attribution is more difficult to prove. Figure 2 represents the steps in project

implementation and corresponding results, expressed in the form of a logic framework.

The majority of funding dispersed to NGOs is on a project level basis. That is,

donors fund certain projects of various durations and, therefore, project evaluation is the

most prevalent form of evaluation conducted in development work and humanitarian

assistance. The logical framework approach (LFA) has been the dominant form of program

design, monitoring and evaluation for more than two decades after first being adopted by

USAID in the 1970s (Prinsen and Nijhof 2014, 235). The LFA is intended to be a

participatory form of program planning involving a range of stakeholders to form a

consensus on a project, summarized in a logical framework (Bakewell and Garbutt 2005,

3). The logical framework is a matrix that summarizes the approach to a project. It is an

integrated way to link project objectives (from activities and outputs to outcomes and the

overall goal), which are laid out vertically, to progress against objectives (through

indicators and means of verification), which are laid out horizontally. An example of a log

frame is provided in Appendix II**.** The log frame is a project design tool against which

progress is measured and is often required by donors when submitting proposals and

utilized to mark project progress. Log frames feed into results-based management, where

project phases are laid out, including higher level results, with corresponding targets in the

form of indicators, and how indicators will be measured.

Although the log frame has been utilized for decades, its shortcomings, including an

overly rigid approach to project implementation, have resulted in a new approach to project

design and implementation in the form of Theory of Change (ToC). A precise definition of

ToC does not exist, but its promotion of detailing assumptions, pathways of change and

better conceptualizing more long-term outcomes are feted, particularly among northern

NGOs (Prinsen and Nijhof 2014). While many organizations view the ToC as a variant of

the LFA, indeed its beginnings derive partially from program theory just as the LFA, it is also viewed as an "ongoing process of reflection" and a "thinking-action approach" (Stein and Valters 2012, 4-5). From an M&E perspective, ToC conveys "expected processes and outcomes" which are reviewed over time, enabling NGOs to determine how they are affecting change and to revise their ToC as necessary (*ibid)*. Both LFA and ToC represent an approach to project design, monitoring and evaluation but almost always represent a document as well which acts as a tool for tracking and assessing project implementation. And both are internally utilized and externally imposed by donors.

While a greater focus on aid recipients and results is indeed beneficial the M&E movement is not without criticism. Specific staff capacities and skills are needed to meet donor requirements (Mueller-Hirth 2012, 662); there is increased pressure to achieve donor-defined performance measures at the expense of other organizational needs (Stoddard 2003, 3; Hoffman et al 2004, 13) a focus on discrete, short-term accomplishments rather than more long-term processes and monitoring and evaluation systems which satisfy donor rather than inform internal NGO decision making (Ebrahim 2005, 65); an overly conservative, rather than innovative, approach within the humanitarian sector is pursued if results cannot be guaranteed and a neglect of hard to measure interventions, such as protection (Hoffman et al 2004, 13); M&E processes are viewed as a means of 'control' and 'judgment' over staff (Mebrahtu 2002, 505); and an overly technocratic approach to M&E (Holvoet and Rombouts 2008).

Figure 2.2 Logic Framework

Source: Binnendijk in Imas Morris and Rist, 2009, p. 110.

I. New Public Management (NPM)

Contracts between governments and non-profit and for-profit entities in advanced industrialized countries increased as political pressures to reduce the role of the state led to non-state actors becoming more engaged in public service provision and a new public administration paradigm emerged-New Public Management (NPM). NPM represents a shift in government from administration to management. NPM advocates a minimalist state infused with private sector practices where the market best addresses socioeconomic growth rather than the state. The principles of decentralization, results measurement, and a market-based approach put forth in the early 1980s and incorporated by the UK and the US

under Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan as well as other industrialized, primarily

Western European nations-OECD countries- became a part of the NPM paradigm.

According to Hood (1991), NPM's rise to prominence coincides with government aims to

lower government spending, a shift to privatization in service provision, the automation in

the production and distribution of pubic services and the development of an international

agenda, particularly in areas of public management, policy design, decision-making and

inter-governmental cooperation. NPM adopts private sector administrative practices and

applies them to the public sector. While these links existed previously, NPM exemplifies a

"radical" approach to a more entrepreneurial state (Power 1997, 43). New staffing

procedures, smaller numbers of civil servants, and a sharper focus on management and

performance encapsulates NPM (Heinrich 2012), representing a sharp rebuke of traditional

public administration deemed to be poorly managed, costly, and ineffective. The goal of

NPM is that a more responsive, accountable, and stronger performing government prevails,

one in which private sector management techniques and organizational structure of the

public sector would result in better use of public resources.

Non-state actors feature prominently in NPM and are viewed as effective and

efficient partners of the state in service provision, leading to their proliferation and receipt

of public funding. Between 1980 and the early 1990s, the number of NGOs in OECD

countries jumped from 1,600 to nearly 3,000 and a simultaneous doubling in spending

(CIVICUS in Ramalingam et al. 2009, 32). NGO participation in the delivery of public

goods, previously the sole domain of the state, led to government scrutiny over their work;

the growth in civil society has been accompanied by an increase in accountability and

performance (Ramalingam et al 2009, 30). This premise also featured in international

development strategies. Once the government moved back into favor in the late 1990s, the

"rehabilitated, strategic state" emerged (Brinkerhoff 2008, 989), OECD states began

promoting the concept of "good governance" which encapsulates "citizens, civil society,

and the private sector in ways that enable socioeconomic progress but also are

characterized by accountability, transparency, responsiveness, participation and equity"

(*ibid*, 987). International donors have adopted development management performance

measurement as a model for allocating and analyzing aid (*ibid*). The Millennium

Development Goals (MDGs) and subsequent Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

represent international development management, which advocate results and aim to

improve performance within the public sector and reduce poverty. The Paris Declaration on

Aid Effectiveness established in 2005 and put forth by OECD DAC countries, obligates

international development aid donors and recipients to operate according to five principles:

ownership; alignment; harmonization; results; and mutual accountability. The Paris

Declaration strives to ensure that international aid is effectively utilized to advance the

MDGs. The MDGs, SDGs and Paris Declaration all rely on performance indicators - "a

variable which allows the verification of changes in the development intervention or shows

results relative to what was planned" to demonstrate achievement (OECD in Imas and Rist

2009). These indicators are targets which are measured nationally and against which

progress is determined. M&E provides accountability and contributes to the result-oriented

national modalities these initiatives represent (Mueller-Hirth 2012, 651). According to

Brinkerhoff (2008), it is the "donor agenda" of NPM and good governance which dictate

development management. While the SDGs and Paris Agreement are recent examples of

interventions specific to development and spearheaded by governments, donors have

adopted performance metrics in humanitarian assistance. NGOs have responded by adopting these metrics imposed by donors as well as creating their own standards for regulation and oversight (Marshall and Suarez 2014).

A key feature of NPM is the focus on outcomes rather than inputs and a simultaneous shift toward assessment and measurement. The NPM approach is a core feature of aid agencies, often manifesting in results-based management. The rise of NPM coincided with "reform and reformulation" in development aid (World Bank in Ramalingam et al., 2009, 27) and was adopted by donor agencies in OECD countries. The faith in RBM, initially constructed under NPM to remedy government failures, led to the application of principles such as strengthening management and measurement, impact-orientation, and accountability, within the field of international development and subsequently humanitarian assistance, allowing for "objective, neutral and technical judgment" (Raimondo 2016, 18) of interventions. The adoption of the logical framework, a blueprint for both development and humanitarian interventions and a donor requirement, originated with the United States Department of Defense before being adopted by USAID. The dominance of the log frame can be viewed as an instrument of control by donor agencies over aid recipients. In 2001, Britain's DFID altered its guidelines for funding, stating "*Since the logframe is an integral element of the Business Case, all newly approved projects regardless of project value must also now contain a logframe*" (DFID in Prinsen and Nijhof 2015, 235). A review of RBM among donor agencies reveals that although the goal is to review higher-level results, donor emphasis on activities and outputs, project elements which NGOs can directly control, remains (Ramalingam et al., 2009, 42). Yet,

despite these issues they remain strategies of projects within humanitarian assistance and

development.

CHAPTER III

Conceptual Framework for Understanding Donor Monitoring and Evaluation Requirements and NGO Monitoring and Evaluation Practices

This chapter explores the relationship between donors and NGOs through the lens of the principal-agent theory. In the context of a humanitarian crisis, contracts between donors and NGOs exist with the goal of creating value for an external beneficiary; the goal is to save lives and mitigate suffering of those affected by crises. The beneficiaries are distinct from the two parties in the principal-agent relationship, the donor and the NGO, although NGOs purport to represent the interests of affected populations by advocating on their behalf and/or providing them with services. In order to ensure NGOs perform as expected, funds are utilized in the intended way and moral hazards are mitigated, donors impose controls, including M&E requirements. Because donors' ability to monitor the NGO is limited, controls are put in place. NGOs are held accountable to their donors via financial audits as well as reporting on the progress of their activities. But being held to account to donors is not enough; NGOs must also be accountable to those they offer succor to, including in crises situations, when it is needed most.

The concepts of monitoring and evaluation, two functions required by donors, are laid out as well as accountability and learning. Reputation is also considered as a factor in donor allocation of resources. Monitoring and evaluation is a central mechanism of accountability and learning. Indeed, the four terms are now often considered as a whole within organizations; NGO units responsible for M&E are commonly referred to as monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning (MEAL) units. Monitoring and

evaluation for accountability consists of upward accountability to donors, downward accountability to beneficiaries as well as inward accountability to an NGO itself. M&E for learning includes incorporating beneficiary perspectives and evaluation results, as well as the experiences of NGO staff. The functions and need for each concept are provided.

A. Donor-NGO Relationship

States have largely withdrawn from service delivery of humanitarian assistance and are now donors to humanitarian aid agencies, including NGOs. "States no longer steer, they row" (Stein 2008, 127) and have taken on an "enabler role" with the advent of New Public Management (Smith 2007, 595) and its focus on managerialism and performance measurement. A principal-agent relationship exists whereby states (principals) are funding NGOs (agents), regulating and monitoring NGO actions, and demanding professionalization and accountability in NGO service delivery (*Ibid,* 128). As the principal, states finance the agent to serve their goals and objectives. As agents, NGOs must carry out agreed-upon services and provide feedback on their performance to donors who judge this information. Information provided to donors is one factor influencing donor decision-making and can enhance the confidence of stakeholders in terms of project implementation and the organization as a whole (Lee in Zainon et al. 2011, 172).

B. Principal-Agent Theory

Principal-agent theory derives from contract theory within the field of economics. It is utilized to understand the challenges between principals who employ agents to perform a task. An inherent tension exists because principals and agents have different preferences, goals and motivations (Carman 2010, 257). While the principal exercises its authority over

an agent, it lacks information about the agent and the "asymmetric information" becomes a source of contention in the relationship (Mas-Colell in Ruachhaus 2009, 873). In order to overcome these challenges the two parties enter into a contractual relationship, which includes an incentive structure, with the expectation that the agent will choose options desired by the principal (Moe 1984, 756). Because agents may distort their abilities in order to successfully enter into a contract (adverse selection) and not maintain or achieve an agreed-upon level of effort (moral hazard) monitoring and accounting systems and performance information are required (Carman 2010, 257). "The design of an efficient incentive structure is thus bound up with the development of monitoring systems as well as mechanisms for inducing the agent to reveal as much of his privately held information as possible" (Moe 1984, 756). The framework represents the complexities within a hierarchical relationship, the advantages and disadvantages of each party, and why monitoring and performance measurement is utilized as a means to mitigate "agency problems."

As NGOs became more engaged in carrying out public services, even introducing services where none existed previously, contracting relationships emerged, including in humanitarian relief. Government-NGO contracts have unique features not found in other contracting including complex service provision, results which may be unclear or challenged, limited user feedback as an indicator of performance, and a lack of NGO investment in capital infrastructure due to cash-flow shortages (Smith 2007, 596). The government utilizes contracts as a mechanism to regulate government spending, to ensure NGOs are utilizing funds as intended and progress on results is reported. The principal-agent relationship can be employed as a means to better understand the formalization of

contracts that define relations between government and NGOs and the need for monitoring

and evaluating performance in order to justify public expenditures, thereby holding NGOs

to account; public funding becomes contingent upon achievement of specific performance

measures.

The impetus for the devolution of public services to NGOs is to improve service

delivery and reduce costs. Reasons why an NGO may enter into a contract include the

desire to fulfill a social mission, to sustain itself financially, and for recognition by the

government (Abramson 1999, 20). Because governments and NGOs are driven by

divergent motivations, an inherent challenge exists within the principal-agent relationship.

Different "communities" of people who share a mutual interest in a particular cause or

problem establish NGOs (Smith 2007, 597). As such, NGOs are often primarily concerned

with being responsive to their target community whereas governments must adopt equitable

and fair standards in order to determine the allocation of a finite amount of public funding

(*ibid*). According to Edwards and Hulme (1996) once a contract is introduced the "value

base" of the donor-NGO relationship changes whereby NGO legitimacy derives from a

contract, rather than values or volunteerism, which more closely resembles a private sector

operator (p. 967).

Included in contracts are administrative costs and performance indicators upon

which service provision may be monitored and evaluated (Abramson 1999). Generally, the

higher the demands for M&E, the higher the administrative costs. Abramson maintains that

in the case of performance-based contracts a greater degree of risk and administrative

burden lies with the agent as it must reach agreed upon performance indicators and monitor

and maintain its information (p. 23-24). A 2016 report conducted by the Norwegian

Refugee Council (NRC) on institutional donor conditionalities found that NGOs are encouraged to provide humanitarian assistance in high-risk areas but assume the most financial risk, not all donors cover administrative and support costs, and various reporting formats exist for project documentation (NRC 2016). As a result of competitive bidding for humanitarian assistance in Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the wake of the Rwandan Genocide, international actors on the ground did not vociferously protest the diversion of aid to militants and war criminals lest they disrupt the flow of aid relief pouring in. More than 200 aid agencies were competing for over USD 1 billion in short-term relief contracts, provided primarily by the UNHCR; an "aid agency supermarket" existed where securing and renewing contracts consumed organizations (Cooley and Ron 2002). In the instance of Goma, some NGOs' value-driven approach to humanitarian aid was usurped by greed; a big, fat feeding frenzy erupted, an opportunity for NGOs to obtain funding and publicity. Short-term contracting, competitive bidding, a phenomenon deemed healthy under NPM, and NGO mission creep can all have adverse effects on the provision of humanitarian assistance. Principals and agents both want programming to have a positive impact on target populations. An awareness of areas of convergence and divergence is necessary so that NGOs can fulfill their missions and maintain financial sustainability and government donors can serve a need while controlling costs. Donor concerns with performance and accountability and NGO fidelity to independence must be addressed.

C. Conceptualizing Monitoring

The UNDP defines monitoring as an "ongoing process by which stakeholders obtain regular feedback on the progress being made towards achieving their goals and objectives"

(UNDP 2009, 8); the World Bank defines monitoring as "a continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing development intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds" (World Bank Group 2016, par. 1); USAID defines monitoring in terms of a program or intervention as " the collection of routine data that measure progress toward achieving program objectives" (Frankel and Gage 2007, 3). The definitions all vary but indicate frequency ('ongoing' and 'continuing'), who is responsible/benefits ('management' and 'stakeholders'), what progress is measured against ('goals' and 'objectives') and, in the case of the World Bank, what data is collected ('specified indicators'). While the World Bank definition specifies development as the type of intervention, the practice of monitoring is needed during humanitarian responses as well. As organizations attempt to gain feedback from affected populations to inform programing, measure progress toward interventions including at the outcome levels, assess value for money, and rely on remote monitoring in complex situations, the demand for monitoring will continue to grow (Warner 2017, 6).

According to Warner (2017), during humanitarian action, myriad purposes of monitoring exist including tracking implementation according to the project plan in order to make corrections or larger adjustments as necessary; accountability to stakeholders-affected population, partners, different levels of management, donors, and donor tax payers-by showing what a project has (or has not) achieved via reports to donors or headquarters, information sharing with the target population as well as collecting their views and opinions; organizational learning through the accumulation of lessons learned from

individual projects; and better understanding organizational results and organizational objectives, goals, and impact thereby determining whether strategies within an organization are being obtained (p. 16-17). These purposes indicate that the practice of monitoring is to inform both project level implementation and organizational decision-making, with the impact on the target population and other stakeholder considerations featuring prominently.

De Kool and Van Buuren (2004) question whether monitoring is functional or merely fashionable but conclude that monitoring information encourages communication and learning, thereby facilitating "mutual sense making" (p.191). Monitoring is an integral part of daily management, an internal, long-term process conducted throughout the life of a project. Deciding *which* data to measure, *how* to measure it, *who* is responsible for collecting and analyzing the data, and *how* the data will be used are all important decisions in the monitoring process. Ideally, all of these decisions should be made during the project design phase and incorporated into a monitoring and evaluation plan. By tracking and analyzing progress, NGOs can determine if current practices should continue unchanged or if adjustments are necessary in order to achieve project goals. By highlighting strengths and areas in need of improvement, monitoring informs strategy and decision-making.

Although monitoring typically receives significantly less attention, analysis, and discussion than evaluation, monitoring should not be overlooked; it is an important function of project implementation and determines whether NGOs deliver services to the target population. According to Clarke (2011), monitoring is considered to be a "value free" activity, as it is concerned with counting, tracking and collecting data, and does not question the logic behind a particular intervention or program (p. 6). While monitoring is an important function, alone it is insufficient. Monitoring does not determine relevance of an

intervention, causality or sustainability. It is evaluation which provides insight into these vital factors of project implementation.

D. Conceptualizing Evaluation

There is no one widely accepted definition of evaluation; academics and practitioners have put forth numerous definitions of evaluation, containing different components, such as the function, purpose, or methods of evaluation (Shaw et al. 2006, 1). Many definitions include judgment of the merit or worth of the subject of the evaluation, thereby distinguishing evaluation from monitoring or research activities (Imas and Rist 2009, 8). Patton defines program evaluation as "the systematic collection of information about the activities, characteristics, and outcomes of programs for use by specific people to reduce uncertainties, improve effectiveness, and make decisions with regard to what those programs are doing and affecting" (Patton 1986, 14.) Patton's definition is intended to be applied to a wide variety of purposes and to ensure utility.

Trochim describes program evaluation as " a *profession* that uses *formal methodologies* to *provide useful empirical evidence* about *public utilities* (such as programs, products, performance) *in decision-making contexts* that are inherently *political* and involve multiple often-conflicting *stakeholders*, where *resources* are seldom sufficient, and where *time-pressures* are salient [emphasis in the original]" (Trochim in Mertens and Wilson 2012, 5). Trochim's definition describes some of the challenges in conducting evaluation, including the environment in which an evaluation takes place-a salient dynamic in humanitarian response.

The OECD's DAC defines evaluation as the "systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed project, program or policy, its design, implementation and results. [It is] the process of determining the worth or significance of an activity, policy, or program (OECD 2010, 21-22). According to DAC, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability are all criteria to be considered when conducting an evaluation.[10] These criteria are being adopted by many in the evaluation practices in the Syrian response, as will be discussed later on in chapter five.

According to Stufflebeam and Shinkfield (1985) "the most important purpose of evaluation is not to prove but to improve" (p. 151). Myriad purposes for evaluation exist, including to provide oversight and compliance, contribute to organizational improvement, ensure accountability and transparency, promote dialogue and cooperation among key stakeholders and building and sharing knowledge (Imas and Rist 2009, 11-12). Weiss (1998) identifies four different uses of evaluation: "instrumental use" for decision-making where an evaluator understands the programs and its complexities and effectively communicates results; "conceptual use" by local project people who may gain insights and new ideas and use these in instrumental ways; to mobilize and bolster support for staff already aware of the changes necessary to improve programs which the evaluation revealed; and influence on other institutions and events as a result of an evaluation's contribution to accumulation of knowledge.

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[10] *Relevance* is described as the extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient, and donor. *Effectiveness* is described as a measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives. *Efficiency* measures the outputs –qualitative and quantitative—in relation to the inputs. *Impact* is the positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. *Sustainability* is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn (OECD 2018).

Scriven creates a dichotomy between formative and summative evaluations. Formative evaluations are carried out during the life of a project to support improvement and identify project strengths and weaknesses. Summative evaluation is conducted to gauge effectiveness or impact which determines whether an intervention continues or ceases (Clarke 2011, 8). Both types of evaluation may be needed at different points in the project cycle. Imas and Rist (2009) identify 18 different evaluation approaches from participatory approaches, which incorporate stakeholders into the evaluation process, to cluster evaluations, where a "cluster" of interventions which share a common mission, strategy and target population are evaluated, to goal-based evaluation, which focuses on the achievement of stated outcomes. Critiques of the goal-based approach are that there is too much concentration on economical and technical aspects at the expense of social and human aspects, that negative or unintended consequences are overlooked as well as achievement of less explicit goals (p.185). On the other end of the spectrum, goal-free evaluations gather data on project effectiveness by focusing on more than just stated goals and objectives. Evaluation aids in answering questions arising from interventions such as: What are the impacts of an intervention? Who is benefitting from an intervention? Is the intervention working as planned? And, are there differences in intervention performance across locations? (*ibid*, 12).

Regardless of the approach to an evaluation, of primary importance is the context in which an evaluation is carried out. Humanitarian assistance strives to save lives and mitigate suffering, unlike development aid which aims to bring about positive change, often by alleviating poverty and promoting growth and livelihoods. Because humanitarian assistance aims to avert negative effects, such as famine or the outbreak of disease,

evaluating these relief services can be challenging. While the goal of relief is to save lives, measuring the number of people who did not die as a result of an intervention does not sufficiently capture humanitarian assistance achievements. Moreover, aid workers may even consider monitoring and evaluation to be of secondary importance when saving lives and mitigating suffering is the goal. Monitoring and evaluation is not always taken into account in the formulation of humanitarian interventions but are "added on" at the end of a project (Hallam in Frerks and Hilhorst 2002, 4). Moreover, Bruderlein and Bakkak (2009) find that despite the rhetoric about donor demand for accountability and the resultant development of elaborative evaluation systems, evaluations conducted by major humanitarian international NGOs do not measure the impact of their work; are driven by donor demand; are "irrelevant" for organizational learning; burdensome for staff; and do not reveal the influence of INGOs in humanitarian action. Yet, M&E is still considered to be an integral component of project implementation, learning and accountability.

In effort to adapt to the challenges of crises and the fluid situations on the ground, Real-Time Evaluation (RTE) is employed during the early phases of a crisis. Designed to assess crises situations and to make evaluative judgments in limited time (Cosgrave et al. 2009, 8), findings from RTEs are intended to be used immediately and inform decision-making. RTEs have been utilized during the crisis in Darfur (IASC 2006) as a result of claims that the humanitarian response was extremely poor as well as during the Syrian refugee response (UNHCR 2013) in Jordan, Lebanon and Northern Iraq. Various tools have been developed and initiatives launched by humanitarian actors to improve evaluation in times of crisis. For example, the Emergency Capacity Building Project developed the *Impact Measurement and Accountability Emergencies: Good Enough Guide* (CARE

International, et al. 2006) developed by seven NGOs which takes the elements of accountability and impact measurement, defined as measuring the changes taking place as the result of an emergency project, into account in an emergency response. The guide is designed for field workers and acknowledges that adopting a quick and simple approach to an emergency response is not easy and as a result offers "simple and practical" solutions which incorporate "downward" accountability into the design.

E. Accountability

The interest and focus on accountability stems from the increasing reliance on NGOs to carry out services, including humanitarian action, instances of wrongdoing or poor performance, skepticism about NGO effectiveness and concerns over efficiency. Perhaps most disturbingly, NGOs are also considered to indirectly prolong conflict. While NGOs are accountable to donors, donors are held accountable to taxpayers; donors must demonstrate that taxpayer money is spent prudently. Accountability between stakeholders and donors is a key link in the accountability chain, where donors must see evidence that their investments in NGOs are well spent. Edwards and Hulme (1996) define accountability as "the means by which individuals and organizations report to a recognized authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for their actions" (p. 967). Instances of NGO accountability to donors have focused on rules, processes and procedures but primarily focus on performance and results (Carman 2010, 257). The notion of accountability means that one is responsible not only for the actions they are obligated to perform, but also for the outcome of those actions and the need to answer. According to Davis (2007) "accountability is not inherently a good thing, but simply a characteristic in hierarchical

power relations, whereby those responsible for an action report on their actions to those they are responsible to" (p. 2). The power to hold to account-through delegated responsibilities and financing and subsequent rewarding or penalizing-is necessary for accountability to exist; an agent must give an account of its actions-through information-to the principal. Accountability always means there is the potential for negative evaluation and sanction or positive results (Wenar 2006, 6), which can lead to a cessation of funding or the potential for the continuation of funding depending on the principal's interpretation of NGO performance. Those with power delegate responsibilities and can demand information and make decisions. According to Stein (2008) the crux of accountability asks: To whom am I accountable? For what? How is my performance monitored or measured? What are the consequences if expectations are not met? (p. 125).

Because principals and agents have fundamentally different objectives, interests, and motivations accountability mechanisms are a necessary function of the principal-agent relationship in order to mitigate risk (Carman 2010, 257). The principal lacks trust in the agent and therefore these mechanisms are necessary for the relationship to function. Donors have various tools at their disposal to verify NGO accountability: audits determine financial compliance, monitoring is done through visits to project sites and regular reporting, and internal and external evaluations aim to measure performance and outcomes. Accountability is thus marked by an "external" component in terms of meeting set standards (Chisolm in Ebrahim 2003, 814) of funders and an "internal" dimension where an organization is motivated by its obligation to its own actions and mission (Fry in Ebrahim 2003, 814). A balance must be struck between satisfying donor requirements, which may be deemed onerous and time consuming, and an NGO maintaining fidelity to its mission, and

project goals. This may prove even more challenging in instances where NGOs do not have diversified portfolios and are heavily reliant on particular donors. In this instance, upward accountability can trump all else and NGOs may act as donor subcontractors rather than independent entities (Bruderlein and Dakka 2009, 20).

Where NGOs and donors do have similar goals, such as during humanitarian crisis when relieving suffering is of the utmost importance, there may be a divergence in how to accomplish these goals. An inherent tension exists between an NGO's operational freedom and donor control over its resources, which can stymie an NGO's ability to innovate and potentially improve crisis-affected populations; if the success of a humanitarian intervention is not guaranteed, NGOs may be reluctant to implement an intervention as it does not represent value-for-money, or efficient use of donor funds. NGOs must demonstrate "upward" accountability to their donors, trustees and host governments, but also "downward" accountability to the populations they target, as well as toward partners, staff and supporters (Edwards and Hulme 1996, 967). A more intent focus on the recipients of humanitarian assistance as a way to improve services has led to more participative methodologies, contextual programming, and listening and response mechanisms to crisis affected populations (Davis 2007, 8). These attempts aim to ensure "downward" accountability so that the rights and dignity of crisis-affected people are upheld. "A considerable proportion of humanitarian resources are consumed by the effort to make humanitarian strategies satisfy the utility of donors and operational agencies…while barely any effort is made to verify the relevance and logic of humanitarian strategies with the subject population" (Stockton in Davis 2007, 11) said the head of Humanitarian Accountability Partnership-International (HAP-I), an organization which worked to

improve accountability to crisis-affected populations. Thus this focus on aid recipients gaining a sense of agency and NGOs invoking systematic inclusion is intended to better fulfill the needs of those in crisis.

While accountability is extolled and embraced within the humanitarian sector as a means to improve humanitarian assistance it is not without scrutiny. Ebrahim (2005) argues that too much accountability can hinder an NGO's achievement of its mission. Bruderlein and Dakka (2009) question the accountability mechanisms which NGOs implement because they do not address overall organizational accountability and instead focus on projects. Although NGOs must report to donors on the delivery of goods and services (through contractual agreements), they are not required to report on accountability toward the outcome of an NGO's mission, method of work, strategic decision-making, or other organizational behavior. Moreover they contend that evaluations conducted to determine the impact of programming are driven by donor interests and are not utilized to improve decision-making or program design. Furthermore, many factors determine NGO priorities, not merely successful service delivery. "Organizations are not judged by the delivery of their services but by the extent of their growth and recognition in the public opinion – meaning money and resources," remarked a member of HAP-I (Bruderlein and Dakka 2009, 14). According to Davis (2007), even in instances where accountability is emphasized, "Success and failure is in the eye of the beholder-and therefore, by definition, so is accountability" (p. 2).

F. Reputation

Because multiple factors influence the donor-NGO relationship, including donor concern with spending and the reputation of both parties, accountability may be of secondary importance. Indeed the current scandal surrounding Oxfam and the exploitation of Haitian women in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, a catastrophic failure of protection, has resulted in its temporary withdrawal of bidding for DFID funding, one of its largest donors, until the organization can demonstrate sufficient ethical standards to the donor (Smout 2018). The donor has not terminated the aid relationship but is demanding requirements be met in effort to ensure the criminal behavior does not happen again. This circumstance highlights Ebrahim's (2003) contention that a resource "interdependence" exists whereby NGOs rely on donors for funding and donors depend upon NGOs for their reputation (p. 814). Oxfam's sterling reputation is damaged and DFID will no longer support the organization unless it takes immediate steps to improve ethical standards. When an organization is committing a crime, quality service delivery is no longer of paramount concern, but this circumstance does demonstrate the importance of reputation as well as the NGO's need to be held to account to the donor.

The reputation of NGOs is a factor in donor decision-making. "It is almost impossible to achieve the level of monitoring of individual projects that would actually be needed to be completely knowledgeable of how they are operating" (Gibson et al., 2005, 72) hence donors rely on the reputation of NGOs when responding to emergencies. One third of humanitarian expenditures in 2013 came from "the big five" NGOs: MSF, Oxfam, Save the Children, World Vision and International Rescue Committee (ALNAP 2015, 40) demonstrating that despite the large number of NGOs, both internationally and nationally, a handful of NGOs receive substantial quantities of funding and dominate the field of NGOs.

Monitoring and evaluation contributes to donor information and may impact donor decision-making, but the reputation of an organization also affects principal-agent decision-making. Gent et al. (2014) maintain that an NGO's desire be seen as a reputable organization in the eyes of the donor can result in the "myopic behavior" of NGOs (p. 2) such as the focus on short-term, attributable results; NGOs suffer from a "reputation trap" in which they are compelled to focus on small goals unrelated to their mission. The authors contend that accountability and transparency alone cannot address this shortcoming.

G. Learning

Shortcomings and achievements within organizations provide opportunities for learning. Organizational learning requires a willingness to question, reflect, and challenge one's practices. It is a process of both individual and collective learning, within and between organizations (Prange 1999, 23). Argyris and Schon define learning as a process "by which organizational members detect errors or anomalies and correct them by restructuring organizational theory-in-use" (Argyris and Schon in Prange 1999, 28). According to this definition, it is a mistake or a rare occurrence which provides the opportunity for learning; it is imperative not only to recognize mistakes but also to make concerted efforts to ensure they do not happen again. Levitt and March deem organizations to be learning when "encoding inferences from history into routine behavior" (Levitt and March in Prange 1999, 28). In this sense, lessons learned from previous experiences inform quotidian organizational practices. Both definitions presume learning will lead to improvement.

Organizations are effective and can learn when they detect and correct their mistakes (Argyris in Bloch and Borges 2002, 462). In short, identifying and correcting errors, and improving upon existing practices allow organizations to operate better. According to Argyris and Schon learning takes place on two levels – single loop and double loop. Single loop is concerned with effectiveness and "how best to achieve existing goals and objectives, keeping organizational performances with the range specified by existing values and norms." Actions are modified so that the gap between expected and actual results is closed. Single loop learning is an error and correction process. Double loop learning is "inquiry through which organizational values and norms are modified" (Argyris and Schon in Ebrahim 2005, p. 67). Double loop learning attempts to address the underlying causes of a problem by questioning organizational assumptions and norms, and may result in modified policies or objectives. Both types of learning involve behavior change but single loop learning results in small fixes at the operational level and double loop learning is approached from a strategic level and results in a more dramatic change affecting the organization as a whole.

While evaluation is a tool for determining impact and effectiveness it is also a mechanism for learning. Employing systematic methods of incorporating evaluation information back into decision-making can lead to improved behavioral change. While these shifts may evolve over time, as learning is a "continuous process of growth and improvement" (Torres and Preskill 2001, 388) it can be a vital source of information and promote dialogue, reflection and decision-making. Ebrahim (2005) contends that learning is viewed through a positivist and normative lens "in which filtering and processing of stimuli is seen as an objective and empirical process, learning processes are frequently subject to a

series of social and institutional processes that are interpretative, symbolic and power

laden" (p.67). An example of this is the critique that evaluations are primarily conducted

for goal-attainment purposes, i.e. they measure project performance and whether targets

were achieved. Moreover, they are often intended for external consumption, notably

donors. And even in instances where evaluations are born from the desire of an

organization to improve learning, organization's can learn wrong, or utilize information

that is not necessarily the best to improve performance. Notwithstanding these

shortcomings, evaluations are considered a vital opportunity for NGOs to learn, in a

context-specific environment, which approaches to the problems they aim to mitigate are

effective.

      Figure 3 below offers a conceptualization of the principal-agent theory. In this

example the donor "hires" the NGO to provide humanitarian assistance. The NGO is

demonstrating accountability both "upward" toward the donor and "downward" toward

refugees and the host community who provide feedback to the NGO. Monitoring and

evaluation is communicated via reporting, including on M&E, to the donor in effort to

mitigate the inherent asymmetric information between the donor and NGO.

Figure 3.1 Principal-Agent Theory Conceptualization

Source: Adapted from Kaplan Knowledge Bank, Agency Theory, 2012

CHAPTER IV

SYRIAN REFUGEE RESPONSE IN LEBANON AND MONITORING AND EVALUATION

This chapter provides a brief overview of the refugee response in Lebanon followed by analysis of the funding for the response from 2012 to 2017 based upon the OCHA FTS. The remainder of the chapter examines how M&E is incorporated into the refugee response plans and the M&E tools being utilized by actors in response efforts.

A. Background

Lebanon is no stranger to hosting displaced populations. The country has hosted a substantial Palestine refugee population[11] since 1948, half a million Lebanese remained internally displaced at the end of the country's civil war, nearly one million were displaced during the 2006 War while other Israeli invasions and attacks in 1978, 1982 and 1996 caused further displacement (IDMC 2004; 2006). Approximately 50,000 Iraqi refugees fled to Lebanon following the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Leenders 2009). Currently, there are an estimated 1.5 million refugees in Lebanon[12], representing approximately a quarter of the

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[11] UNRWA maintains the population of Palestine refugees in Lebanon attending UNRWA schools and vocational centers, receiving health care services and food assistance to be 259,000 while the number of Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA is nearly 470,000, although not all registered Palestinians reside within Lebanon. A recent government census put the number of Palestine refugees at 174,422 *(*Yan 2018).

[12] The scale of this population would be equivalent to the United States receiving nearly 81.9 million refugees, all within the span of a few years. Or the equivalent of Europe receiving 128 million refugees. (At the time of research the population of the United States is 327,156,000, thus 25 percent of the US populations is 81,539,000 ((US Census Bureau);

population, nearly one million of which are registered by UNHCR. Lebanon is the third

highest refugee hosting country in the world (UNHCR 2018) and hosts the most refugees in

the world in proportion to its population. Syrian refugees are spread out across the country,

with the highest concentrations in the border areas of the Bekaa and Akkar as well as

Beirut. Children (under the age of 18) represent over a quarter (28 percent) of refugees

(UNCHR website) and nearly a fifth of households are headed by females (VASyR 2017,

4).

Syrian refugees are not formally recognized as such by the Government of Lebanon

(GoL). The fact that Syrians fled to Lebanon due to civil war did not matter; their entry and

provision of their stay was based on Lebanon's 1962 Law Regulating the Entry and Stay of

Foreigners in Lebanon and their Exit from the Country (Law of Entry and Exit). In official

government documents and communications the term *nazih*, or "displaced person" was

used in reference to Syrians rather than *laji* "refugee" (Saghieh & Frangieh, 2014

December 30). The Lebanese Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) states that the GoL refers to

individuals fleeing Syria after March 2011 as "temporarily displaced persons" (LCRP 2018,

4). The lack of formal acknowledgement of Syrian refugees in Lebanon in the initial phase

of the response, or the 'disastrous policy of no policy' (Mufti 2014) did not draw criticism;

in fact, in the early stages of displacement Lebanon received praise from human rights

organizations and UNHCR for its open borders and non-encampment policy (Janmyr,

2016).

as of January 2017 the population of the European Union is approximately 511,800,000,
thus 25 percent of the EU population is 127,950,000 (Eurostat website)).

Like the majority of other Middle East states, Lebanon is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol, the formal structures codifying refugee protection under international law. The rights outlined in the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol include the principle of *non-refoulement*, prohibiting a refugee or asylum seeker to return from where they fled if they face persecution. Additional rights outlined include the provision of basic services including basic assistance, the right to work, education, identity papers, and freedom of religion and non-discrimination. The Lebanese central government's lack of response in terms of both policy and provision of assistance[13] meant that local authorities, civil society organizations, local NGOs, and eventually international agencies were the most active in responding to the refugee influx. These response actors also featured prominently in response to the country's 2006 War (Mac Ginty and Hamieh 2010). In analyzing Lebanon's early response to the refugee influx, Mourad (2017) states, "In lieu of a state retreat and emergence of a 'UN surrogate state' as has been seen with previous refugee movements in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East, the response to the Syrian refugee influx has been characterized primarily by its decentralization and ambiguity" (p. 4).

In December 2012 the government drafted a strategy to grapple with the Syrian refugee population by divvying up responsibilities among the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Education, and the Higher Relief Council. The plan was

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[13] Initially, the central government's role was to obtain funding for the crisis (El Mufti 2014). This is similar to the approach the central government assumed in the wake of the 2006 War. One of the primary roles of the central government in post-war reconstruction consisted of raising money through the donor conferences, receiving funding from bilateral and multilateral foreign aid and doling out compensations and registering national and international NGOs (Mac Ginty 2007, 462-3).

never adopted and due to political obstacles, namely the resignation of the prime minister and a delay in forming a cabinet, left other actors to fill the void. Meanwhile, the Directorate General of Urban Planning (DGUP) and Council of Development and Reconstruction, the two entities tasked with planning and development projects, remained inactive without a national strategy in place (Boustani et al. 2014).

Beginning in 2013, Palestinian refugees from Syria were denied entry; in February 2014, the government closed 18 unofficial border crossings previously utilized; in June 2014 authorities declared that only Syrians fleeing conflict areas along the Syria-Lebanon border could enter; and in October 2014 the government adopted the "Policy on Syrian Displacement" which outlined a series of restrictions designed to decrease the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and dissuade new arrivals. The UNHCR was no longer permitted to register new refugees, a new set of categories for arrivals was established, and onerous and costly residency renewal regulations implemented. Syrian nationals also had to sign pledges not to work, resulting in even more reliance on humanitarian assistance (Mansour 2017, 6).

Entering its eighth year, the conflict in Syria continues to rage and is the theater for myriad external actors in pursuit of naked self-interests. In a speech before the UN General Assembly in September 2017, Lebanese President Michel Aoun declared that 85 percent of Syrian territories are state controlled, and the topic of displaced Syrians returning to their homeland is "urgent" due to terrorists taking shelter among refugees. According to Aoun, refugees have increased the population by half, and have resulted in severe overcrowding, increased crime and a deteriorating economic situation (General Assembly 2017). His statements reflect security concerns, refugees as the source for what ails the country, host-

country fatigue, the belief that the war in Syria is nearly over and that the return of Syrians is imminent.

B. Current Conditions

According to the 2017 Vulnerable Assessment of Syrian Refugees (VASyR), only a quarter of refugees aged 15 and above have valid residency, and only 19 percent of households hold valid residencies for all household members, exacerbating existing risks and challenges including the ability to access work, school and healthcare. Households are spending less yet their level of poverty continues to worsen. In 2017, three-quarters of refugee households were living below the poverty line (USD 3.84 per person per day), compared with half of refugees in 2014, while per capita monthly expenditure decreased to USD 98 compared from USD 138 during the same time period. Debt has ballooned to 87 percent of households, an average of USD 798 per household, compared with 75 percent of households in 2013 with an average debt of USD 600, although half of those in debt owed USD 200 or less. Families incur debt to meet their basic needs, purchasing food and covering health and rental expenses. Yet, food insecurity among households was 91 percent in 2017, 20 percent higher than in 2013. Cash assistance is a vital source of income for refugees. WFP's food assistance (in the form of e-voucher bank cards) supported more than 690,000 refugees in 2017, the primary source of income for over a quarter of refugee households. Additionally, over 45,000 households benefitted from multi-purpose cash assistance.

School enrollment has shown signs of improvement: 70 percent of children aged 6 to 14 were enrolled in school, compared with 52 percent the previous year. Negative coping

strategies have also decreased and access to water sources and drinking water improved. While advancements have been made in some areas, the time of displacement has become more prolonged, refugee vulnerabilities continue, and host-community fatigue sets in. Hundreds of refugees have willingly returned to Syria (*The Daily Star* 2018), however, the majority remains and will continue to rely on assistance to help meet their basic needs.

C. Funding

Syria is one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world with billions of dollars in aid channeled to Syria and neighboring host countries. A series of conferences have been held in the Arab region and Europe in effort to raise new funding and meet the immediate and more long-term needs of displaced Syrians. A total of seven donor conferences – Brussels (2017), London (2016), Dead Sea Forum (2015), Berlin Conference (2014), and three pledging conferences in Kuwait (2013, 2014, 2015) – were held to secure funding for Syria as well as neighboring refugee hosting countries – Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt. Kuwait has also hosted nine top donors' meetings in support of the humanitarian response. Another donor conference in Brussels is scheduled for April 2018, dubbed Brussels II, designed to review current humanitarian needs and progress on commitments made at the 2017 Brussels Conference, and request additional funds.

Additional spring conferences include two conferences held in March and April 2018. The Rome II conference held 15 March 2018 raised funds for the country's army and security forces. The Paris IV conference, dubbed the "Cedre Conference," held on 7 April resulted in pledges totaling more than USD 11 billion in soft loans and grants. The conference aimed at strengthening Lebanon's economy and infrastructure, including

securing funding for more than 200 projects in transport, water, sanitation, electricity and telecommunications sectors. Around 60 percent of the expected funding will come from the IMF Compensatory Financing Facility (Azar 2018).

The state of aid provision in the Lebanon crisis response is severely underfunded. Since 2012, the appeals have been funded an average of 48 percent (LCRP 2018, 10). In Lebanon, overall funding contributions from 2011 to 2017 total USD 6.075 billion (*ibid*). As part of the LCRP, USD 2.68 billion is requested in 2018 for humanitarian assistance and investments in public services, infrastructure and the economy.

Based on analysis of OCHA FTS documented contributions from 2012 through 2017, a total of USD 6,225, 888, 777 has been reported through the refugee response plan. Funding is divided into three categories: paid contribution, commitment and pledge.[14] Analysis of funding reveals that the majority of funding pledged by donors has been distributed: 89 percent of contributions have been paid, compared with 11 percent in commitments and pledges. The following analysis of donor and recipient contributions are not disaggregated according to funding category due to the fact that the majority of funding

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[14] Contribution is defined as the payment or transfer of funds or in-kind goods from the donor towards the appealing agency. Commitment is defined as the creation of a contractual obligation regarding funding between the donor and appealing agency. A pledge is a non-binding announcement of an intended contribution or allocation by the donor. The recipient organization and response plan or project is not necessarily specified. A commitment almost always takes the form of a signed contract. This is the crucial stage of humanitarian funding: agencies cannot spend money and implement before a funding commitment is made. As soon as a commitment is reported to FTS against a pledge, the amount in the pledge column is reduced accordingly. FTS tables therefore show the 'outstanding' (not 'total original') pledge amount. The information is reported to OCHA FTS directly by donors and agencies and may or may not include verbal commitments made at pledging conferences (OCHA FTS).

has in fact been paid (98 percent of non-DAC donor funding, 88 percent of DAC donor funding, and 98 percent of non-government donor funding, categorized as "other").

DAC donor contributions made up over three quarters of all contributions (80 percent) compared with 16 percent from non-government donors, such as the UN, and 4 percent from non-DAC donors. Table 1 provides an overview of the donor contributions. The top DAC contributors are the US, European Commission, Germany and the United Kingdom. These four donors account for 68 percent of all funding toward the response.

A total of 20 non-DAC donors have contributed to the refugee response. Among the top non-DAC donors are Gulf States, which make up 94 percent of all non-DAC donor contributions. Kuwait far surpasses all non-DAC donors and alone contributed 72 percent of all non-DAC contributions with USD 181 million. The next closest donor is Qatar, which contributed USD 28.4 million, followed by Saudi Arabia with USD 16.8 million and the UAE with USD 9.7 million. Russia contributed USD 6.5 million and China USD 4 million, the two largest non-Gulf, non-DAC donors.

Table 4.1 Donor Contributions

Donors	Amount	Percent	# of contributions	Percent	Mean Contribution
DAC	4,961,377,465	80	1189	67	4,172,731
Non-DAC	251,036,505	4	116	7	2,164,107
Other	1,013,474,807	16	469	26	2,160,927
Total	**6,255,888,777**	100	1774	100	3,509,520

Source: Own. Based off of OCHA FTS data from 2012 to 2017 as of February 2018.

The top recipient of all aid is the UN with 82 percent of funding followed by international NGOs with 15 percent of all funding. National NGOs received just .3 percent of all funding. A higher percentage of non-DAC donor funding was directed to the UN (89 percent) compared with DAC donor funding (83 percent). INGOs received 15 percent of DAC donor funding compared with just .6 percent of non-DAC funding. Table 2 below provides an overview of donor-recipient funding.

Table 4.2 Recipient - Donor Profile

Recipient	Amount	% Overall Funding	Donor Contribution	Percent
UN	5,114,770,909	82	DAC	66
			Non-DAC	89
			Other	75
INGO	951,841,034	15	DAC	12
			Non-DAC	0
			Other	3
FBO*	102,552,970	2	DAC	1
			Non-DAC	0
			Other	4
NGO	18,286,903	.3	DAC	.1
			Non-DAC	0
			Other	1
RCRC**	13,009,624	.2	DAC	.1
			Non-DAC	.1
			Other	0

Source: Own. Based off of OCHA FTS data from 2012 to 2017 as of February 2018.
Note: Not reflected are donations contributed to unspecified recipients and government entities, representing 0.5% of overall funding.

* Faith-based Organization
** Red Cross Red Crescent Movement

While donor fatigue as the refugee crisis becomes more prolonged is a concern, the OCHA FTS reflects a continued increase in funding since the start of the crisis although appeals continue to be underfunded. Table 3 below provides the value of contributions by year.

Table 4.3 Donor Funding by Year (in millions)

Donor	Year						Total
	2012	**2013**	**2014**	**2015**	**2016**	**2017**	**Total**
DAC	75.1 (57%)	682.7 (78%)	712.1 (78%)	940 (81%)	935.9 (77%)	1,615.6 (84%)	4,961.4 (80%)
Non-DAC	18.6 (14%)	84.5 (10%)	64.3 (7%)	56.6 (5%)	13.9 (1%)	13.1 (1%)	251 (4%)
Other	38.6 (29%)	104.9 (12%)	134.4 (15%)	170.2 (15%)	263.8 (22%)	301.6 (16%)	1,013.5 (16%)
Total	**132.3**	**872.1**	**910.8**	**1,167**	**1,213.6**	**1,930.3**	**6,225.9**

Source: Own. Based off of OCHA FTS data from 2012 to 2017 as of February 2018.

D. Monitoring and Evaluation in the Syrian Refugee Response in Lebanon

UN-led regional response plans were first devised in early 2012 on an annual basis with updates after six months. The 2014 regional response plan is the first to emphasize a resilience-based approach[15], with a continued focus on humanitarian needs but also support

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[15] The concept of resilience came to prominence under the UK Department for International Aid (DFID) as a way to link short-term humanitarian and long-term development objectives and activities (Bennett 2015, 8-9). The EU has also adopted the approach, which it views as a complimentary initiative among humanitarian and development actors across activities and time based on their relative advantages (*Ibid* 17). Considered to be in vogue within the development community, *resilience*, along with *sustainability* and *self-reliance* are terms increasingly linked with refugees (Gabiam 2016, 383). Viewed by some as lacking meaning, or a way to secure funding (OECD in Bennett 2015, 9) the transformational concept of resilience has yet to be realized in practice (Bennett 2015, 9). Within the context of Lebanon, donors' whole-hearted embrace of resilience has been critiqued for diminishing the role of Lebanese authorities, particularly the need for reforms and

to local communities and authorities by humanitarian and development actors (UN 2014, 15). Beginning in 2015 response plans extended to a two-year time frame and resilience was further incorporated into the response, where humanitarian responses combined with a development approach to strengthening the resilience of individuals, households, communities and institutions, representing a "paradigmatic shift" (Rabil 2016, 47) in how the UN responds to refugees and host communities in need. How M&E is incorporated and the context in which it is used in the response plans is laid out, followed by a review of how M&E is being implemented in the response through assessments and evaluations as well as the use of specific M&E tools.

1. 2012-2014 Regional Response Plans and M&E

Refugee response plans initially developed to respond to the immediate needs of refugees in the region, including Lebanon, and then evolved to take into account host community needs as the stream of refugees continued to grow. Beginning in March 2012 the UNHCR-led Regional Response Plan (RRP) was implemented to address the growing number of refugees in neighboring host countries. Each country crafted its own response plan in coordination with host governments, UN agencies and NGOs for some 98,000 Syrian refugees in the region at the time. Each country approach is combined into one regional response plan, reflected in one regional response document per year. Revisions made during the year took into account the growing number of refugees and corresponding funding requirements. The 2012 RRP aimed to "ensure the protection and assistance needs

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perpetuating government deadlock, while praising the country for its resilience in the face of the tremendous stress the country is under ignores the central government's bungled response to the refugee crisis (Geha 2016).

of Syrian refugees are met" through the end of the year (UN 2012, 5). Three regional objectives of the plan are presented. Objective one ensures Syrians fleeing have access to neighboring territories, can seek asylum and receive protection, including from *refoulement*. Objective two ensures the basic needs of refugees including, in Lebanon, the provision of: food vouchers, non-food items, or cash/voucher assistance, healthcare and education, and quick impact projects (QIPs) designed to provide short-term employment opportunities and make improvements in local communities. Objective three is to undertake contingency measures for a mass influx of refugees (*ibid* 10).

Activities under the plan for Lebanon include the registration and documentation of arrivals by the UNHCR and responding to protection concerns e.g. separated children or isolated elderly; the provision of health, education, shelter, food and non-food items and water sanitation and hygiene (WASH); and community-development activities and QIPs in poor areas with high numbers of refugees. A total of six sectors required financial support: protection; food; basic needs and essential services (includes shelter, domestic items, sufficient drinking water); education; health; and operations management support. Coordination with MoSA to operate out of Social Development Centers (SDCs), local NGOs to operate out of community centers, and working with the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) are deemed necessary to better respond.

Monitoring and evaluation is given short shrift in the 2012 response plan. In the section dedicated to the Lebanon response, the term *monitoring* is referenced as an activity for monitoring border areas and arrival trends, and detention monitoring as well as one reference to strengthening monitoring tools and mechanisms as a means to help build capacity for child protection interventions. Monitoring distributions of basic domestic items

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is referenced and, within the food sector, monitoring the food market price, and monitoring "project implementation and impact" (*ibid* 70). Evaluation is mentioned only five times in the entire 106 page regional response, including in reference to re-evaluating the needs of cash assistance recipients after a period of three months (*ibid* 19). Only once is the term utilized within the Lebanon response section in reference to the protection of children. Evaluation is to be undertaken by a "multidisciplinary team" to identify children in need of specific psychological assistance in the North (*ibid* 66).

The term *stabilization* is referenced twice but not within the Lebanon country response, and *impact* 17 times although typically it is found within the term Quick Impact Projects. In the Lebanon response, impact is mentioned in terms of QIPs, when calling for a "focus on deliverables and impact" as programs expand (*ibid* 54), and regularly updating an impact assessment within the protection sector related to support for local authorities and local organizations (*ibid* 68). *Resilience* is mentioned three times within the protection sector in terms of child resilience programs and workshops (*ibid* 66).

The 2013 RRP target population, consisting of two six month plans, expanded to include not just Syrian refugees but Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS), Lebanese returnees from Syria and Lebanese host community members. An inclusive approach was adopted which "does not dissociate refugees from their new environment, the response takes into consideration all those affected by the refugee influx, from third country nationals and refugees of other origins leaving Syria to vulnerable members of host communities" (UN 2013, 4). The regional plan also expanded to Egypt and some limited funding for EU States such as Greece and Cyprus. The strategic objectives remain unchanged from the previous year. Priorities in all country responses aimed to "include

registration and outreach; strengthened (and, whenever possible, community-based) protection responses, particularly in child protection and the response to sexual and gender-based violence; as well as basic assistance to urban refugees" (*ibid* 8).

The Lebanon plan highlights a shift from in-kind donations, some non-food items and shelter, to direct cash assistance. "This not only reduces logistical costs, it empowers refugees to meet their basic needs in dignity, and will prove particularly useful at times when aid agencies may be unable to access certain areas" (*ibid* 46). Non-food items would still be delivered to new arrivals as well as to refugees residing in communities, which cannot meet needs. Additional expanded approaches include the inclusion of PRS as well as outreach so that the refugees with protection and assistance needs dispersed across the country can be identified and informed of available assistance and there is an overall improved targeting of assistance (*ibid)*. Coordination efforts with MoSA, the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MoEHE), Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the High Relief Commission (HRC), an entity formed to work in close cooperation with the UNHCR are heralded as "receptive" and "active" in their partnership with humanitarian organizations and in their assistance toward refugees (*ibid*).

The 2013 plan acknowledges the need to work with organizations outside the UN-led humanitarian response structure, including organizations receiving funding from Gulf countries and engaging Gulf countries themselves, which have supported education, non-food items and other essentials, so that duplication of services is avoided and more gaps are covered as needed (*ibid* 46, 54).

Monitoring and evaluation is emphasized in much the same manner as the 2012 response although it is mentioned at the outset of the Lebanon response that "sector

coordination will continue as before but be reinforced through needs assessment, mapping, information sharing, and tracking progress against planned targets" (*ibid* 46). Activities to be monitored include arrival trends, cash-based assistance, protection concerns and establishment of a monitoring system for people in detention. Monitoring systems within information management is also referenced as a means to improve coordination of information and analysis and response, e.g. learning who is doing what and where (3Ws), mapping, and assistance tracking. The term *evaluation* is mentioned only three times within the entire regional response plan and only within the Jordan response. There is no mention of evaluation within the Lebanon country response plan.

Resilience is mentioned in terms of children benefiting from psychosocial development and resilience in public schools, capacity building of NGO staff in "child resilience," (*ibid* 60) "economic resilience" as a topic of discussion in focus groups (within the protection sector) (*ibid* 61). Again, *impact* is referenced in terms of QIPs and community impact projects (CIPs), the impact of the cash program on local markets, the protection impact of refugee children enrolled in school, and a collaborative approach among agencies to achieve the most impact with limited financial resources (*ibid* 54).

The 2014 regional response plan, or RRP6, was an annual plan targeting 4.1 million refugees, and host community members. Life-saving measures, vulnerabilities, and capacity building comprised categories of assistance, for which USD 4.2 billion in financial requirements was necessary. Response strategies were developed in effort to ensure "cost-efficiency, impact, and effectiveness as well as accountability towards refugees and donors" (UN 2014, 7). The Lebanon country component planned for 1.5 million refugees, 1.5 million affected Lebanese as well as PRS and PRL. The Lebanon appeal totaled USD

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1.8 billion with another USD 245 million requested by the government. The sectors expanded from six to eight with the addition of social cohesion and livelihood, and WASH. UNHCR and MoSA prepared the appeal in collaboration with 11 agencies, 54 national and international partners and refugees and host communities.

A monitoring and evaluation section was added to the regional response, stressing harmonization of assessments and interventions, joint monitoring as well as strategy development to mitigate aid dependence. Feedback mechanisms as well as evaluations contribute to decision-making processes (UN 2014, 43). An evaluation of the RRP process as well as a mid-year review of RRP6 was intended to inform strategy and revisions would be make accordingly. The Lebanon response focuses more on monitoring than evaluation. Monitoring is referenced across five sectors as a basic function within the protection, food security, health, basic needs, and WASH sectors. Individual and community level monitoring to better address protection risks (*ibid* 15), intensified monitoring to ensure those in need of food assistance receive it, follow up and monitoring of refugees and vulnerable Lebanese receiving health care services (*ibid* 49), post-distribution monitoring to overcome distribution duplication (*ibid* 68), and monitoring WASH activities are all mentioned. Moreover, a monitoring and evaluation system for programs with a substantial cash component is to be established (*ibid* 70). The term *evaluation* is mentioned only two times, once in reference to the M&E system for cash programs and the need to evaluate impact of NFI assistance (*ibid* 68).

The term *impact* is referenced throughout the Lebanon response, although often in terms of the impact of the crisis on Syrian refugees, the host population, children, rental markets, the economy, etc. The need to continually evaluate impact of NFI assistance, as

mentioned above, the need for "high impact" communal projects, as opposed to short-term interventions such as water trucking (*ibid* 86), as well as in reference to the government's National Stabilisation Roadmap, the GoL's recommended interventions to address the impact of the refugee crisis on the country's economy and livelihood opportunities with support of the World Bank and the UN. The roadmap includes four tracks of interventions three of which involve impact: 1) "rapid immediate impact;" 2) "short to medium term delivery and impact;" and 3) "longer-term delivery and impact" (*ibid* 5). The 2014 response plan supports interventions corresponding with the track one interventions. *Resilience* is mentioned in terms of building the resilience of children and their caregivers through psychosocial support (*ibid* 16), as in the previous Lebanese response plan, but it is also used to describe the third form of assistance in the regional response-capacity building/resilience. The term *stabilization* is mentioned in reference to the 2013 National Stabilization Roadmap. Although the term itself is not pervasive in Lebanon's response, stabilization priorities are outlined such as strengthening public health systems, the rehabilitation of schools, enhancing capacity of Social Development Centres, mitigating tensions in host communities and supporting WASH and waste management needs.

2. Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) and M&E

The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) is part of the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP). Launched in December 2014 with a two-year time frame (2015-2016), it is the first multi-year response. The plan represents an "innovative approach that effectively harnesses the capacities, knowledge and resources of humanitarian and development partners to create a durable and multi-faceted resilience-based response to the

Syria crisis" (UNDP website). The plan added the term *resilience* to the title, defined as the ability to endure and recover from "shocks and stresses" and to work with state actors at the national and local levels to obtain "transformational" change and sustainability in human development (UNDP 2015, ix). While the term was utilized in the previous plans it is emphasized more so in the two year plans. According to the 2015-2016 LCRP, the OECD hosted a workshop in September 2014, which prompted integrating resilience strategies into the LCRP (LCRP 2015-2016, 45).

The LCRP is part of the GoL's Crisis Cell, the highest national authority for international partners supporting the crisis response. The Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) along with the UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) oversees the government response in coordination with Crisis Cell Ministries and UN agencies, namely the UNHCR and UNDP.

The 2015-2016 plan targets the same population as the 2014 plan: Lebanese poor, Syrian refugees, and both Palestine from Syria (PRS) and Palestine refugees in Lebanon (PRL). Education, shelter, healthcare, winter help and emergency income are the humanitarian assistance initiatives geared toward mitigating human suffering (LCRP 2015-2016, 10), while efforts to invest in communities included contracts with local businesses for food aid and rehabilitation of health and education facilities. This phase of the response engaged with MoSA and the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) and partnerships with the government to expand service provision, including Reaching All Children in Lebanon through Education (RACE), an effort to enroll 400,000 Lebanese and Syrian children in school. The Activity Info reporting system was rolled out to harmonize data collection.

a. <u>2015-2016 LCRP and M&E</u>

    The 2015-2016 LCRP targeted 2.2 million highly vulnerable individuals, primarily

refugees, for humanitarian assistance and up to 2.9 million individuals in poor areas

through three response areas: humanitarian assistance and protection for Syrians and the

poorest Lebanese; strengthening capacity of national and local service delivery systems to

improve public services; and reinforcing economic, social, environmental and social

stability through livelihood opportunities and confidence building measures. "Stabilization,

in the context of the LCRP, means strengthening national capacities to address long-term

poverty and social tensions while also meeting humanitarian needs" (LCRP 2015-2016, 4).

A total of nine sectors now comprised part of the response plan: Protection; food security;

basic assistance; education; health; livelihoods; shelter; WASH; and social cohesion.

    Monitoring is first referenced generally in terms of monitoring progress toward

targets and response partners reporting on Activity Info, a database whereby a standard set

of indicators agreed upon between the government and response partners are reported

against. Further reference to monitoring tools is their expansion to incorporate government,

donors, and civil society activities is one component of an initiative to establish a joint

information and analysis platform supporting the government (p. 33). Additionally,

building adolescent and youth-focused monitoring and analysis tools from which to draw

baseline data as part of an effort to inform youth initiatives (*ibid* 23). In effort to ensure

gender mainstreaming, women and girls, men and boys will be consulted from the design,

implementation and monitoring of programs (*ibid* 27). A Response Monitoring section lays

out monitoring activities for the first phase of the LCRP. In addition to reporting on

Activity Info, inter-sectoral working groups, monthly, quarterly and annual sector reports

and mid-year consultations are all monitoring mechanisms through which progress on LCRP interventions is reported (p. 29). The term *monitoring* is used in two outcome indicators, one for the education and one for health sectors. Education outcome three is: strengthening national education systems, policies and monitoring. Health outcome four is: strengthen youth health promotion and monitoring through the school health program. In terms of monitoring during implementation, references to monitoring are strengthening community-based prevention and monitoring for women and children at risk of violence, abuse or exploitation (*ibid* 22), water quality monitoring within the WASH sector (*ibid* 22), and strengthening capacity of community members to monitor their conditions and "articulate needs" (*ibid* 22).

Evaluation is scantily referenced in the 2015-2016 LCRP. Phase I of the LCRP includes three commitments, one of which is to identify options to improve targeting and cost-efficiency delivery approaches based on better evidence and partnerships. In order to achieve the goal, surveys and evaluations of vulnerabilities in priority communities will be undertaken, opportunities for private partnerships identified and an evaluation of how LCRP stabilization programs can "capitalize on a monetized humanitarian response to generate benefits for Lebanese economic and social systems" (*ibid* 33). The term *evaluation* is used only in reference to expanding private sector partnerships (*ibid* 24), while "monitoring and evaluation systems" is referenced as a tool which will work toward a joint information and analysis platform in support of the government (*ibid* 33).

The term *resilience* is mentioned a few times only in reference to building equal access to and quality of sustainable public services (*ibid* 24), building the resilience of boys and girls (*ibid* 29) and as a strategic priority-promoting resilience through strengthening

national delivery systems to expand access to and quality of basic public services (*ibid* 47). In contrast, the term *stabilization* is mentioned repeatedly and forms part of the conceptual framework for the response. The term is defined as "strengthening national capacities to address long-term poverty and social tensions while also meeting humanitarian needs" (*ibid* 4).

Initiatives to strengthen accountability include staff trainings on humanitarian accountability, mainstreaming accountability into national and sub-national planning processes and M&E framework and raising awareness of beneficiaries on how to access authorities (*ibid* 28). Furthermore, an initiative to prevent and respond to Sexual Abuse and Exploitation (SEA) in line with the government's National Technical Task Force to end violence against women provides accountability to beneficiaries (*ibid* 28). Overall, leadership and accountability for the LCRP lies with the GoL, the UN RC/HC in collaboration with the Crisis Cell ministries and lead UN agencies (*ibid* 28).

b. <u>2017-2020 LCRP and M&E</u>

The 2017-2020 LCRP represents the first "medium-term" strategy between the GoL and international and local actors to deliver "humanitarian and stabilization" interventions to 2.8 million people: 1.03 million vulnerable Lebanese; 1.5 million Syrian refugees; 31,502 Palestinians from Syria; and 277, 985 Palestine refugees in Lebanon. The plan was developed under the leadership of MoSA in collaboration with the UN, national and international NGOs and donors. The LCRP consists of four strategic objectives: the protection of displaced Syrians, vulnerable Lebanese and Palestine refugees; the provision of immediate assistance to vulnerable populations; strengthening the capacity of national

and local service delivery systems to expand access to and quality of basic public services; and reinforcement of Lebanon's economic, social and environmental stability. While emphasizing humanitarian assistance the strategy also seeks to progress towards "longer-term development strategies." Additionally, the LCRP focuses on aid coordination in order to promote "tracking, accountability as well as objective monitoring and evaluation" (UN 2017, 9).

More than 175 national and international NGOs, academic institutions, foundations, UN entities, Red Cross and others are listed as partners in the updated 2018 version of the 2017-2010 LCRP. A total of 10 sectors are funded. A total of USD 2.75 billion was requested for 2017 and USD 2.68 billion for 2018. Basic assistance represents the largest funding requirement at 21 percent, followed by food security and agriculture (18 percent), education (14 percent), health (11 percent) and water (10 percent).

Monitoring and evaluation as well as accountability are stressed at the outset of the LCRP in the forward as well as among its core principles and commitments. Among the five key priorities for improving the LCRP are, number one, "strengthening current tracking, monitoring mechanisms" and two "improving transparency and accountability" (*ibid* 4). LCRP partner accountability towards affected populations, or "downward" accountability, is stressed through feedback mechanisms including visits with vulnerable communities on the "needs, targets, and effectiveness of LCRP interventions" as well as other opportunities for host community members and refugees to ask questions and provide input into strategy discussions (*ibid* 24). Indicators and measurement methodologies within each sector are devised and an inter-sector M&E framework is being developed against which impact can be measured. Overall, six impact statements exist across the four

strategic objectives of the LCRP. Causal relationships linking impacts with outcomes are explained in sector strategies, which guide independent evaluations of partner interventions.

A section of the response dedicated to M&E explains that M&E is considered to be "critical" for the effectiveness and accountability of the response (*ibid*, 26). Development of an M&E framework is discussed to measure progress in "implementation, ensuring transparency and facilitating strategic and programmatic adjustments" (*ibid).* The coordination and structure of M&E is laid out: at the sectoral level, response partner reporting via Activity Info is provided to sectoral steering committees which will provide monitoring and progress reports; at the inter-sectoral level, an inter-sectoral working group is responsible for monitoring progress across the LCRP against sector outcomes; and the LCRP steering committee will periodically review progress to inform strategy and decision-making (*ibid)*.

In addition to partner updates via Activity Info, other forms of monitoring include Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM) of cash assistance to families to confirm the money is spent at least partially toward critical needs (*ibid* 37). Monitoring and evaluation is particularly stressed in cash programming. "Targeting, monitoring, evaluation, and research represent key aspects of a full and efficient cash assistance programme implementation" (*ibid*). The term "impact monitoring" is used to describe findings that show improved sense of security and relationship with their host community among recipients of multi-purpose cash. Other sectors highlighting monitoring of interventions include the education sector where continual monitoring visits to schools will be made to ensure teachers adhere to national performance standards (*ibid* 51); strengthening the livelihoods M&E framework to ensure it is tracking its impact on job creation (*ibid* 105)

and monitoring support to SMEs; protection monitoring visits to assess protection concerns in vulnerable communities (*ibid* 124); monitoring and analysis of social tensions by security cells (*ibid* 148); and a monitoring effort to track changes in water needs and use patterns in informal settlements (*ibid* 161).

The implementation of evaluation is not stressed in the 2017-2020 response plan other than mentioning evaluation more broadly in terms of strengthening M&E in order to improve overall response efforts. The plan does reference evaluations conducted by response partners, demonstrating that findings from evaluations do inform strategy but evaluation is not specifically built into response interventions.

In the 2017-2020 LCRP the term *resilience* is much more pervasive. It is used in terms of the "long-term resilience" of the country's vulnerable communities (*ibid* 11), the lack of resilience of the country's electricity sector (*ibid* 62), the need to improve the resilience of the agricultural sector (*ibid* 82), the necessity of food assistance in order to improve resilience programming (*ibid* 84), resilience-focused assistance (p. 89), and increasing economic resilience (*ibid* 122). The term is utilized in one outcome indicator for the shelter sector: enhance the resilience of displaced vulnerable people in temporary structures (*ibid,* 160.). The term *impact* is mentioned only in terms of the affect of the refugee crisis on various aspects of Lebanon and the population.

Overall, not until the 2017-2020 response plan is M&E prioritized and considered to be a valuable tool toward improving refugee response efforts. Within the current response plan, monitoring is emphasized while evaluation, like previous response plans, is not specifically mentioned as an activity within sectors. While response partners are engaged in M&E, as the remaining sections within the chapter describe, as well as chapter five, it has

not been incorporated into the response plans, with the exception of the current four-year plan.

3. M&E Tools and Practices

A range of M&E documents and tools are now being utilized within the refugee response. For example, a guide to designing good and smart indicators for the response is available on the Inter-agency portal. Each sector has a glossary and reporting guide of their respective response plans and log frames which "aims to guide partners in their M&E and reporting so as to promote harmonization of monitoring and evaluation between partners and standardization of the reporting into Activity Info" (Inter-Agency Coordination 2018). In early 2017 an Inter-Sector meeting dedicated to M&E and the 2017-2020 LCRP was held with the purpose of developing an M&E framework and discussing options to improve existing tools and systems and receiving stakeholder input to strengthen "higher level" analysis (outcome/impact/stabilization level). Allowing for more qualitative indicators, unifying tools, and the need for regular evaluations were all part of the feedback (Inter-Agency 2017). Additional M&E practices and documentation are outlined below.

a. Assessments

An Inter-Agency Coordination's Assessment Registry accessed through the UNHCR Syria 3RP data portal lists 150 assessments conducted between the end of 2013 through February 2017. Analysis reveals that among the most prevalent sectors included in assessments are protection (28 percent), shelter (20 percent), health (18 percent) and education (15 percent). Another 15 sectors are represented in the assessments as well as a group which does not fall within any one particular sector, such as an assessment on at risk

youth, the impact of refugees on host communities, and the annual VASyR surveys. The VASyR surveys provide a comprehensive overview of the Syrian refugee community in Lebanon and are an essential tool for shaping planning decisions and project design for the response (UN interviewee 2018). While all VASyR's conducted thus far have only focused on Syrian refugees, a more comprehensive VASyR which incorporates the vulnerable Lebanese population is being considered and may be utilized in 2019 (*ibid)*, which would aid in assessing vulnerability among the whole population. As part of the mid-year review of the LCRP, the utilization of cash, which represents 40 percent of LCRP funds, may be evaluated (*ibid)*. A third party monitoring system of all cash assistance was established by DFID, EU, and WFP have established a single agency structure to deliver cash (*ibid)*. Impact evaluations on the effect of cash assistance will be conducted, either as part of VASyR or separately.

b. Log Frames

Each of the 10 sectors has developed a log frame which list activities, outputs, and outcomes as well as the budget dedicated to each initiative. Budgets have been disaggregated into "humanitarian" and "stabilization" categories expressed as percentages within each output. For instance, in the Basic Assistance sector Output 1.1 is "multipurpose cash assistance grants to the most socio-economically vulnerable households provided" – 82 percent of the funding for this initiative is considered to be "humanitarian" while 12 percent is considered "stabilization." Within the Livelihoods sector, Output 2.1 "technical support to vulnerable people in marketable skills provided" is considered to be 25 percent humanitarian and 75 percent stabilization. According to budget analysis of the 2018 LCRP

and proposed budgets within the log frames, the Basic Assistance sector accounts for a

quarter of all funding, a sector in which "humanitarian" interventions far surpasses

"stabilization" interventions.[16] Whereas in the Livelihoods sector, which accounts for 10

percent of the 2018 budget, interventions are considered to be 89 percent dedicated to

"stabilization."

During quarter one of 2017, the beginning of the current LCRP, consultants were

hired to help further strengthen the M&E plan. A theory of change was developed and

defined along with six impact indicators, or goals, and how best to achieve them.[17] A

results chain was developed so that sector outcomes were better linked to the impacts of the

response, a connection that was lacking in the previous LCRP (UN interviewee 2018).

Measurements for interventions continue to be tested within sector working groups.

c. M&E Reports

As the largest refugee crisis since World War II, a slew of policy papers, reports and

assessments exist as well as evaluations, although evaluations of individual NGO projects

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[16] The 2018 Food sector log frame is not available on the UNHCR data portal (nor upon request by the researcher). The 2017 Food sector log frame and budget was used in lieu of 2018.

[17] The six impact indicators of the LCRP are: Impact 1: Displaced persons from Syria and vulnerable populations live in a safe protective environment. Impact 2: Immediate humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable populations are met. Impact 3: Vulnerable populations have equitable access to basic services (health, education, water, energy, solid waste, shelter and social protection) through national (public and private) systems. Impact 4: Mitigated deterioration in the economic condition of vulnerable populations. Impact 5: Social stability is strengthened in Lebanon. Impact 6: Mitigated environmental impact of the Syrian crisis, to avoid further degradation of the natural eco-system and ensure its long-term sustainability (LCRP 2018, p. 27-30).

often go unpublished (Awada 2016). Websites including the UN operated "Syria Regional Refugee Response Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal" as well as the "Syria Evaluation Portal for Coordinated Accountability and Lessons Learning" provide published documentation on the response. Lessons from findings are often intended to inform future response initiatives.

In May and June of 2013, the UNHCR conducted a Real-Time Evaluation of its response to the Syrian refugee emergency in Jordan, Lebanon and Northern Iraq. The evaluation focused on protection needs and gaps in humanitarian assistance. Region-wide strategic priorities identified in the evaluation include the need to bring development actors into the emergency response fold in order to enhance support to host communities so that socio-economic and political pressures exacerbated by the refugee influx are alleviated. The evaluation contends that the "traditional humanitarian response" (at the time the Refugee Response Plan 5 (RRP5)) is not satisfactory to respond to the crisis and that a strategy to engage development actors, government donors and the UN, NGOs and think tanks as well as host governments is necessary in order to support interventions which target the host community. Infrastructural support, strengthening of public services, and promotion of livelihoods are referenced as components of a more long-term strategy. In discussing inter-agency coordination efforts, the evaluation notes that "non-traditional partners" such as Islamic organizations receiving funding from Gulf States and other sources have substantially contributed to the response and that efforts should be made to coordinate with them as it is "difficult to ensure consistency of standards and equitable coverage in terms of assistance" (UNHCR 2013b, 8).

Specific to Lebanon, challenges cited include reaching government consensus regarding decision-making on refugee issues due to political reasons, the dispersal of refugees across more than 1,000 municipalities and disseminating information, prohibitive residency fees and health care costs, shelter concerns, confusion over leadership between the UNHCR and the Humanitarian Coordinator (within OCHA, the head of the emergency response). There is no reference to monitoring and evaluation within the evaluation related to Lebanon. A response report was released by the UNCHR later on in the year outlining response recommendations per country. Identified priority areas in the response overall include more coordinated and streamlined monitoring mechanisms as well as an increase in the quantity and quality of data collected to extend protection coverage as well as target assistance to the most needy (*ibid* 4). Shelter, WASH, health and education are identified as priority needs and refugees also indicated employment and income-generating opportunities were necessary to avoid debt and destitution (*ibid* 5).

A mapping and meta-analysis of 163 reports covering three refugee-hosting countries, including Lebanon, provides a systematic assessment of the studies, with a particular focus on protection, as it is intended to inform the launch of the European Union's Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) (Zetter et al. 2014). Economic impacts on refugees and their livelihoods are in line with findings from annual VASyR findings conducted in Lebanon: the income-expenditure gap is increasing, there are concerns over the cost of living, food security, and debt. There is an increasing dependency on humanitarian assistance and negative coping strategies are being deployed. Micro and macro-economic impacts on host community members and the country are largely negative

and have affected the living standards of host populations despite the opportunity for short-term development.

Studies on specific interventions in Lebanon include assessments on the impact of cash assistance on children in Lebanon, specifically in terms of child outcomes and child protection (Foster 2015) on behalf of Save the Children and the Lebanon Cash Consortium (LCC)[18] as well as an assessment on behalf of Oxfam of a short-term cash-for-rent project in the North (Turnbull 2014). The former finds that families receiving cash are more likely to enroll children in school and their attendance is more consistent; affects of multi-purpose cash assistance (MCA) on child labor remain unknown; and the inadequate amount of MCA assistance likely has a minimal effect on shelter or negative coping strategies. In the latter project, Oxfam in coordination with a local NGO, distributed two consecutive cash transfers for USD 150 each to 780 vulnerable families. Funding was also utilized to set up monitoring, evaluation and accountability systems for the project. The project was deemed to be relevant, and funding did achieve its goal of "significantly contributing" to meeting cash-for-rent needs. Although the shelters of recipient families were not assessed the majority of shelters "likely" did not meet Sphere standards. That is, the PDM of the cash measured the effectiveness of the cash transfer and cash usage, but not the quality of accommodation and the overall impact of the cash on more long-term shelter prospects and financial security remains unknown.

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[18] The Lebanese Cash Consortium (LCC) is made up of six INGOs with the goal of providing socio-economically vulnerable Syrian refugees with multi-purpose cash assistance (MCA). A proxy-means test (PMT) is utilized to determine vulnerability and identify eligible households.

In terms of the international response to the refugee crisis in Lebanon, there has been a growing emphasis on monitoring and evaluation, as evidenced by the language of the latest LCRP, the existence of monitoring and evaluation tools such as log frames across sectors, and the discussion of M&E in Inter-sectoral meetings. There is a need to determine ways of adequately measuring more long-term effects of interventions, the introduction of newer humanitarian assistance interventions such as cash assistance, and the links between humanitarian assistance and development work. While the majority of funding still goes to humanitarian interventions, more stabilization-oriented sectors such as livelihoods will most likely continue to grow as the crisis becomes more protracted. The livelihoods sector already has more funding in 2018 than it did all of last year (UN interviewee 2018). Moreover, both donors and MoSA have a desire to assess the impact of the response (*ibid)*. While much literature is dedicated to the importance of measuring humanitarian interventions, and the response in Lebanon has developed its M&E as the crisis has lengthened, the following chapter explores the role of M&E practices in the response among NGOs and donors.

CHAPTER V

PERSPECTIVES AND INSIGHTS ON MONITORING AND EVALUATION FROM THE FIELD

A total of seven in person semi-structured interviews were held: three with national NGOs, two with international NGOs, and two donor agencies-one UN, one Gulf INGO-working on the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon. Each interviewee received an invitation script as well as a consent form in advance of the interviews. Each interview was transcribed. Afterward, each interviewee received an electronic transcript of their interview via email by the researcher. All interviewee responses are anonymised. Job titles of interviewees are M&E officer, M&E coordinator, or program coordinator. Monitoring and evaluation coordinators were interviewed at two international NGOs. Program coordinators were interviewed at two national NGOs as well as a former program manager at a national NGO, which at the time of the program manager's work (2013-2016), was receiving funds from primarily non-DAC donors. An M&E officer and an M&E coordinator represent the two donor interviewees. All job titles are assigned general position titles not unique to any one organization. Some departments responsible for monitoring and evaluation have unique titles. All departments are assigned the general title of monitoring and evaluation department to avoid recognition.

A purposive sampling method was employed when selecting candidates to be interviewed. The donors and NGOs represented are prominent actors within the response effort. With the exception of one donor and one national NGO, all have a history of working in Lebanon although their activities have expanded since the crisis began. The

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sampling method was intended to be time-effective and represent a range of interventions

being utilized in the refugee response. All donors and NGOs are listed in the OCHA FTS.

An inductive coding style was employed for analysis of all transcripts in order to allow

interviewees' concepts, meanings, and viewpoints to emerge revealing both themes and

more organization-specific issues and concerns.

Informal discussions on M&E issues were held with M&E specialists in Lebanon,

including independent consultants and a UN monitoring and evaluation coordinator.

Discussions with M&E consultants offered insights into different donor M&E requirements

and strategies as well as NGO M&E practices based on the specialist's employment as

external consultants conducting evaluations on behalf of various NGOs.

Limitations include difficulty in engaging directly with government donors. As a

result, a UN and an INGO Gulf donor both active in the refugee response in Lebanon were

interviewed. The nonprobability purposive sampling technique, combined with the small

number of interviewees, means that the M&E trends identified are indicative of the trends

of the donor and NGO populations in the refugee response in Lebanon but cannot be

generalized. The international NGO interviewees were M&E coordinators, thus they may

have overemphasized the roll of M&E within their respective organizations, compared with

program coordinators interviewed at national NGOs whose work is not confined to M&E

responsibilities.

The following section reveals findings from semi-structured interviews with donor

and NGO representatives. They are organized according to themes based on the coding of

data. Appendix III provides background information on each organization represented in

the findings. The ways in which the principal-agent relationship affects M&E practices is

discussed. Findings reveal salient issues pertaining to accountability, learning and reputation as well as some of the challenges NGOs face both on a regular basis and intermittently in their support for Syrian refugees and host community members.

A. Principal-Agent Relationship

All NGOs interviewed indicate that their M&E practices are a function of both external and internal needs. Donor requirements are deemed to be reasonable, with all NGOs agreeing that the UN had the most M&E requirements and private donors the least, demonstrating that donor characteristics vary depending upon the type of principal. The M&E coordinator of one international INGO (INGO 1) indicated that the need for M&E is driven by an ethical duty, in order to respectfully serve project beneficiaries. This perspective reflects the internal dimension of accountability where practices are motivated by a sense of responsibility through the individual as well as the organizational mission. Moreover, data collection practices of INGO 1 and one national NGO (NGO 2), both of which specialize in primary health care although also have programming in other sectors, are primarily dictated by the organization itself. This suggests that for some sectors, such as primary health care, data collection and measurement of interventions are seen as a fairly straightforward endeavor with established forms of measurement and general acceptance of what constitutes a good outcome.

Both an international NGO (INGO 2), which provides interventions in the protection and WASH sectors as well as livelihoods, governance and advocacy, and NGO 2 have only recently formally established M&E practices, INGO 2 through an M&E department and NGO 2 through the use of M&E officers embedded within programs. The

shift suggests that the organizations see the need for this function in their planning, implementation, and evaluation of interventions. The extent to which donor demand influenced the organizational change within each NGO is unknown but both interviewees acknowledged that donors do influence their M&E practices, and in the case of NGO 2, donors were cited as a factor for the use of M&E officers. While principal demand for M&E is stressed in M&E literature, the fact that the M&E practices have only recently (within the past two years) been adopted within the organizational structure of these two NGOs (through the establishment of a M&E unit within the INGO 2 and positions dedicated exclusively to M&E within the NGO 2), both of which have been in operation for decades, indicates that principal pressure has not been so great that it dictates the agent's organizational development.

In the case of the national NGO receiving primarily non-DAC funding (NGO 3), donor M&E demands did not exist other than basic reporting requirements and visual representation of activities, yet the program coordinator was responsible for establishing a program quality department, for the purposes of M&E and learning. As a direct result of the establishment of the department, specific staff were tasked with monitoring duties, demonstrating an internal rather than external motivation for adopting M&E practices.

Both donors interviewed have adopted a results-based management (RBM) performance approach. Discussions with NGOs reveal that donors are initiating these practices at the project level only, rather than an institutional or program level, perhaps because funding is done at the project level only. The Gulf INGO donor (donor 2) explicitly stated that OECD-DAC evaluation criteria have been adopted, while the other referenced OECD-DAC evaluation criteria when describing its evaluation criteria, without explicitly

mentioning DAC by name. INGO 2's M&E coordinator indicated that all external evaluators responding to the NGO's requests for evaluation reference the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria while the INGO 1 M&E coordinator also indicated external evaluators reference these criteria. Thus these five evaluation criteria-relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability – have become *de rigeur* for NGO project evaluations. A principal governing instrument is being institutionalized and universalized, however, it is important to note that for the international NGOs interviewed, it is the NGOs themselves which are responsible for hiring external evaluators; they issue the call for the evaluation, develop evaluation requirements, which do include donor evaluation criteria, but which also include the INGO's evaluation criteria. Principals are informing although not dictating the external evaluations for the agents, agents not only have a voice but maintain control over the evaluation process, from the drafting of criteria to the hiring of evaluators. Thus while these OECD DAC criteria are being institutionalized and govern evaluations to an extent, including the evaluation practices of the Gulf INGO donor, it is not to the detriment of the agent. Moreover, according to one M&E specialist consulted, OECD DAC criteria, when broken down, is essentially asking three basic questions: Did we do the right thing (relevance)? Did it work (effectiveness)? And did it make a difference (impact)? These questions should be considered in project evaluation design regardless of whether they are a part of OECD DAC criteria or not.

A transformation in the conceptualization of M&E is being driven by the agent's desire to determine the effect of ongoing interventions. "*Embedded*" forms of evaluation are blurring the lines between monitoring and evaluation, traditionally considered to be two separate functions. Both the national and international NGOs indicated they are performing

evaluation functions throughout the duration of an intervention, not just at the midway or

end point of an evaluation. Moreover, it is information gleaned from these practices which

are deemed most beneficial to NGOs and guide learning. This form of internal evaluation is

helpful because, according to NGO staff, it is the organization itself that knows best its

programming and knows what it should be measuring, although instances in which

measurement is challenging do exist and are further described in the challenges section.

In the case of NGO 3, the NGO receiving funding from primarily non-DAC donors,

the principal-agent relationship is perhaps the least hierarchical. While the principal-agent

relationship is characterized by the principal exercising authority over the agent, and the

two parties having divergent goals and motivations, the donor's rapid response to NGO 3's

request for immediate financing in an emergency situation in 2014, described in more detail

under the accountability section, illustrates that differing goals do not necessarily hold true

in a humanitarian crisis where both parties have the ability to immediately assist the

affected population. This is arguably how humanitarian assistance should operate: an

organization on the ground familiar with the context is able to respond immediately during

a crisis, without delay. In this instance, the lack of rigorous requirements by the Gulf donor

can be viewed as enabling the agent, and principal, to be accountable to beneficiaries.

While the outcome of the intervention is unknown e.g. whether donor funds achieved

results and funds were used efficiently, the organization is motivated to serve those affected

by the crisis and the donor feels obligated to respond. In this instance, both the principal

and the agent facilitated "downward" accountability. Moreover, personal connections with

Gulf donors are essential to securing and seeking funding. For instance, the program

coordinator indicated that when submitting a proposal, NGO representatives fly to the

donor country and submit a hardcopy of the proposal in person to the donor. Awareness

that a donor has funds available for certain types of interventions is communicated through

personal communication, rather than a public announcement. The personal relations,

coupled with the lack of donor requirements, including M&E, indicate that the principal-

agent relationship does not necessarily reflect the Gulf donor and NGO relationship in the

provision of humanitarian assistance. Yet, the M&E coordinator with the Gulf INGO

(donor 2) interviewed for this research has adopted RBM and M&E requirements typically

associated with DAC donors, demonstrating that, at least among secular Gulf donors, M&E

is a priority.

Principal resources allocated to M&E are being spent primarily on external

evaluations. Principals are demanding M&E but not providing substantial financial support

for it. This predicament concerned the national NGO dedicated to education (NGO 1) the

most. This organization is also the most recently established NGO, created in the wake of

the Syrian refugee crisis. Anywhere from one to five percent of project budgets are

allocated to M&E within all NGOs. The monitoring system which the principal demands

and relies upon in order to obtain information is not being sufficiently supported according

to the agents, thereby limiting the production of quality information available to not only

the principal but, perhaps most importantly, the agent itself.

B. M&E Requirements and Practices

Both the UN donor and Gulf INGO donor recently adopted the RBM approach to

M&E. Prior to the adoption of RBM "*We never heard about Theory of Change (ToC)*

*before, never heard about causality analysi*s" explained the UN M&E officer. How a

project is measured and indicators utilized to measure them have changed. A focus on project impact, the *sine qua non* of RBM, rather than completion of activities now informs their approach to M&E. The Gulf INGO M&E coordinator explained that RBM means that there is a focus on outcomes and impacts often through predetermined targets by the use of indicators. For example, for educational programming, nine indicators have been adopted from UNESCO which are utilized to measure project impact. Partners must utilize at least one of these indicators in their projects. According to the M&E coordinator, the adoption of RBM is seen as being advantageous to both the implementing partner as well as the donor because it allows for the measurement of the project at a higher level – the outcome and impact – to better determine the results of project implementation. Donor requirements include M&E plans, log frames, project development of a theory of change, evaluations and reporting requirements, including via Activity Info for the UN donor.

The UN donor's M&E tools became "*really robust*" by the end of 2014 and early 2015. Data collection and monitoring requirements for its approximately 60 partners include monthly reporting on quantitative indicators via Activity Info as well as quarterly reports; full-time field officers in project areas regularly monitoring project activities; and, beginning in 2013, the use of third party field officers trained by the donor are utilized primarily to collect quantitative data the donor does not have time to collect. No major distinctions in data quality between international and national NGO partners exist.

The UN donor did not begin conducting evaluations until 2016, despite starting response efforts in 2012. Evaluations are summative and conducted by third party evaluators. The Gulf INGO donor has adopted OECD-DAC evaluation criteria, and stated the UN does the same, indicating that the donor is following trends adopted by the UN, not

necessarily by government donors. The Gulf INGO donor conducts both external and internal evaluations, and both formative and summative evaluations are conducted depending on project duration.

Both national and international NGO representatives interviewed indicated that donor M&E requirements are reasonable and explained that M&E is an important function within their organizations. The M&E coordinator for INGO 1 declared that "the whole organizational attitude is toward prioritizing M&E practices." M&E practices are considered to be a meaningful practice and vital within the organization. INGO 2, which provides WASH and protection activities as well as livelihoods, advocacy and good governance interventions only created an M&E department within the last two years. Historically M&E has not been prioritized, however, an organizational shift has taken place in that an M&E unit was created and the M&E coordinator now reviews all proposal budgets and is present in program strategy meetings.

According to INGO 1, American donors often have extensive guidelines, specific tools and framing of indicators which need to be abided. The organization's indicators should be in line with the donor's indicator bank. Some European donors require a ToC, a very explicit project design, and indicators must be SMART – specific, measureable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound. The only distinction between donors (American and European) is the level of involvement in the design phase. According to the M&E coordinator of INGO 2, which is part of a confederation, Scandinavian and some European governments are known to be fairly more flexible in terms of M&E requirements while other European donors, less so.

Among the three national NGOs, M&E practices varied. For two NGOs receiving funding from primarily Western donors, and whose funding scheme is outlined in Appendix V, monitoring is done regularly. "*It is embedded,*" replied the program coordinator of NGO 1. "*Everything that happens is followed up by data.*" For the program coordinator, M&E is a means of keeping apprised of what is happening on the ground, tracking progress and lessening the possibility that activities are not implemented. The NGO 2 health program coordinator indicated that "*you cannot be very creative*" in terms of health programming. The program coordinator sees monitoring of health interventions as straight forward and "*well defined.*" NGO 2 began using M&E officers, embedded within program departments, not operating as a separate unit, approximately a year and a half ago after discussions with donors and internally in effort to focus more on quality of programming. NGO 2 has operated for over two decades in Lebanon, thus the incorporation of M&E officers is a new organizational development, just as it is for INGO 2. For a national NGO which received only non-DAC funding (NGO 3), primarily from Gulf donors, donor M&E requirements were non-existent. In terms of reporting, Gulf donors were concerned first and foremost with number of beneficiaries reached, which may partially explain a preference for distributions, although Gulf donors support a range of sectors, not just basic assistance. NGO 3's monitoring activities included site visits where pictures were taken to document progress and shared with donors. "*If you are working with Gulf donors, you need a media department. This is the first thing you learn,*" replied the former program coordinator. Visual representations of projects, including images and sleek videos, were provided to the donor as well as quarterly reports.

For all NGOs, M&E practices are a function of both internal practices and donor demand. "*I wouldn't call it 'internal demand' but internal regulation, or what is standard practice for us*," replied INGO 1 M&E coordinator, "*We function according to our minimum standards of practice.*" For INGO 2, the NGO which more recently established an M&E unit, internal demand derives from the coordinator him/herself. "*We [the M&E team] decide what we want to do and we can push program/project managers for what we want.*" For NGO 2, internal demand derived from the necessity to see the impact of project interventions while NGO 1 sees it as a necessary function for interventions to operate according to plan, a way to be vigilant, and maintaining quality programming.

Among both donors, the recent adoption of RBM has shifted focus to project results and higher level measurements. The transition to RBM is viewed as a positive development and a means to better capture project results. M&E requirements among Gulf donors were non-existent for one NGO, yet the Gulf INGO donor has adopted rigorous M&E practices, demonstrating that some Gulf donors do prioritize M&E. Both internal and external factors influence NGO practices and consider M&E a necessary function for project implementation, among national and international NGOs alike.

C. (Re) Conceptualizing M&E

During the course of interviews terms such as "*micro evaluation*" and "*micro impact*" were used. According to one M&E coordinator, the organization practices a form of "*micro evaluation*" where evaluation is ongoing. "*It is not just indicator counting, it is to make sure of micro impact.*" This terminology reveals that traditional concepts of M&E do not capture what is being practiced. Typically, the concept of monitoring entails an ongoing

process used to track achievement toward objectives, whereas evaluation happens at a distinct period in time, such as the mid point of a project (formative evaluation), or at project end (summative evaluation); they are considered to be two different enterprises because they serve two different purposes. Terms such as "*embedded evaluation*" used by an M&E coordinator, as well as the term "*impact monitoring*" in the 2017-2020 LCRP in reference to findings on multi-purpose cash recipients, demonstrate that terms are being used interchangeably in reference to monitoring and evaluation. Impact, for example, traditionally means the affect a project has on a population, compared to no project at all. An impact evaluation would capture this concept upon project completion, not necessarily measure it throughout the course of a project. As referenced in chapter four, the National Stabilisation Roadmap, the GoL's intervention to support the economy and livelihoods opportunity with support from the World Bank and the UN, has three tracks which include "immediate impact," and "short to medium term delivery and impact," and the LCRP indicates that its interventions work toward supporting track one, "immediate impact." These concepts are embraced not only by some NGOs on the ground but also among those involved in drafting response plans. While evaluation is often associated with learning and an opportunity to reflect on findings and potentially inform future practices, largely internal functions, here it is described as an ongoing process, not a function that takes place at specific times within the life of a project. Whereas monitoring is being described as not only a means of measuring lower-level project stages e.g. activities and outputs, but also results, forms of higher level project measurement. In these instances monitoring and evaluation are not considered to be disparate functions but rather intertwined.

D. Accountability

Accountability was not emphasized during discussions with either donor. This is not to presume that accountability has no use nor is not an important component of their approach to M&E but the term was referenced only once by the Gulf INGO donor in terms of the new I-Monitor software system it is implementing with partners, allowing for real-time project information to be added and analyzed as a means to promote accountability.

Among NGOs one of the most glaring instances of "downward" accountability is INGO 1's accountability strategy. The document emanates from the organization's headquarters but has been adopted to fit the context of its interventions within Lebanon. It is described as an "essential tool" for project implementation. "*We have budgeted for accountability,*" said the M&E coordinator. A designated focal point for accountability exists and established mechanisms are in place for beneficiary feedback including a hotline, focus groups and community consultations which aim to ensure that whoever receives a service is afforded the opportunity to provide feedback.

A remarkable feature highlighted by NGO 3, the national NGO receiving funding from non-DAC donors, is a donor's willingness and capability to respond immediately in emergency situations. For instance, the former program coordinator indicated that after the Arsal crisis in 2014, the organization called a Gulf donor and secured a verbal agreement that USD 100,000 would be provided and the organization should therefore respond to needs immediately. The donor also promised to secure additional funding by the end of the day. The former program coordinator indicated that with the Western NGO he is currently working, which is receiving funds from primarily Western donors, this does not happen. When program coordinator cited an instance when the international NGO did try and

respond to an immediate crisis it took up to a month for a particular Western donor to respond, and ultimately it was too late and the donor did not provide the requested support. In this instance, the agent is concerned with responding to the immediate needs brought upon by the fighting in Arsal, and being accountable to the population it is there to serve.

Downward accountability initiatives regularly occur with both NGO 1 and NGO 2. Regular in-person meetings with parents and school staff as well as with students provide feedback and complaints mechanisms for NGO 1. Patient exit interviews, satisfaction of service surveys, and focus groups all inform NGO 2 of beneficiary perceptions. Additionally, NGO 1 holds meetings with teachers and NGO 2 with their own medical staff, demonstrating inward accountability to the organization's staff members, who provide feedback which informs decision-making. Sometimes the results of internal health staff interviews for NGO 2 enable the organization to better meet the needs of beneficiaries. For instance, doctors in some areas explained that they cannot provide lab tests despite the need. The increase in demand for this service due to the refugee influx resulted in the NGO approaching the donor and requesting additional funds for this service. The donor was immediately responsive and did not push back, to the surprise of the program coordinator, and the health center was then able to provide an additional service and better meet population needs as a result of more donor funding. The NGO demonstrated the needs of the population, and the donor responded accordingly. It leveraged inward accountability mechanisms, feedback from doctors who indicated the need for additional services not currently being provided by the NGO, based upon patient needs, representing downward accountability, to obtain additional resources from the donor. Input from the bottom of the accountability chain to the top informed decision-making. The donor-NGO contract was

updated to reflect the service expansion. The program coordinator credits the long-standing relationship with the donor as the reason this request was accepted with no resistance. In this instance the NGO's reputation with the donor helped to secure additional funds and better serve refugees and the host community. This instance demonstrates that both reputation and accountability can influence principal actions.

Because of the funding structure of INGO 2 and its receipt of funding directly from citizens through specific appeals, there is direct accountability to the general public. Here the agent is assuming the same accountability as a principal typically does toward its citizenry. Because the organization has a high number of staff with research backgrounds this has an impact on M&E processes in that the organization is not as preoccupied with accountability. The coordinator indicated there is less M&E "policing" than some other INGOs primarily involved in service delivery. More qualitative M&E methods are employed rather than just the use of "tools and practical results." This approach reveals that the background of INGO staff can inform organizational practices as well as the fact that the organization is engaged not only in direct service delivery but more participatory interventions such as advocacy and governance. As such, an organization may not emphasize "downward" accountability to the extent that other, more service-oriented NGOs do.

Among donors the concept of accountability was not stressed. Overall, "downward" accountability mechanisms were cited by nearly all NGOs, with the exception of INGO 2, and form an integral part of their M&E practices demonstrating that organizations engaged in direct implementation may consider "downward" accountability to be of primary importance compared with organizations whose mandates are broader.

E. Reputation

The importance of reputation was brought up by three of the five NGOs interviewed. NGO 1 recounted an instance where the NGO was requested by the donor to participate in a new project and so made arrangements with another local actor accordingly, however, the project was delayed and eventually canceled by the donor. NGO 1 was never provided with an explanation from the donor. As a result of the delay and eventual cancellation NGO 1 was seen in a negative light, and worried for their reputation, which they have "*worked long and hard to develop*." "*Their staff doesn't face the community member*," replied the program coordinator in reference to the donor. This issue highlights the fact that NGOs rely on their reputation as a source of legitimacy within the community, and that accountability to other NGOs as well as to beneficiaries within the community is a factor in NGO behavior and reputation affects how an organization operates.

NGO 2 indicated that it was able to approach a donor and request additional funding because of the strong relationship it has with its donors, which have continually funded its programming for years. Because the NGO has a good reputation with its donors, it was able to expand upon its provision of services within its health sector. INGO 1 also cited its reputation with long-standing donors when discussing donor M&E requirements and donor demands. In the instances highlighted, reputation is a concern on the part of the NGO, for both NGOs which have a history of operating in Lebanon as well as the NGO established in more recently in direct response to the refugee influx.

F. Evaluation and Learning

  Evaluations provide both the principal and agent opportunities to learn. In the case of an external project evaluation conducted for NGO 1, the program coordinator indicated that several discrepancies were found with evaluation results due in part to the evaluator's calculation for progress which did not match the NGO's, nor the academic institution's, nor the Gulf donor. What constitutes a good outcome is hard to determine when measures of progress are not agreed upon. Moreover the evaluator's professional background was not considered a good match for the subject of the evaluation according to both the program coordinator and the academic institution's project manager. Part of the problem stemmed from the fact that approximately only three candidates responded to the job announcement, none of which seemed very well suited to carry out the evaluation, however, it was the donor, not the academic institution nor NGO 1 responsible for the hiring. The academic institution's procurement office advertised the position although it is unknown on what platform. For the most part the evaluation did not offer any revelatory findings to the project manager of the academic institution. The terms of reference (ToR) for the evaluation, crafted by the Gulf donor, a process which the project manager indicated he/she preferred, included OECD-DAC criteria, three phases of the evaluation where the evaluator must deliver an inception report, data collection and analysis and final report, with each submission to the Gulf donor being reviewed by the M&E coordinator. Despite the oversight and evaluation criteria by the principal, the "learning and dissemination meeting" held upon completion of the evaluation between the donor, external evaluator, academic institution and NGO 1 revealed the overall dissatisfaction with the evaluation report. The evaluator did in fact have many findings, however the quantitative data did not reflect what

had been recorded in the narrative reports. Moreover, the evaluator did not spend much time working with the NGO 1 program coordinator, although he did meet with the project manager of the academic institution. The project manager seemed to indicate that because this was an external evaluator, the evaluator maintained regular communication with the donor but less so with the academic institution and NGO 1 program coordinator and that this may have been by design, to ensure the independence of the evaluator. As a result, the evaluation did not contribute to the internal function of organizational learning, nor did it unearth information revelatory to NGO 1 or the academic institution.

By virtue of the donor, which is the Gulf INGO donor interviewed for this research, partnering with the academic institution myriad professionals contributed to project implementation: architects designed classrooms; the education and nutrition departments trained school teachers; food safety specialists trained local women in food preparation for students; and the engineering department contributed to vocational skills curriculum. Based on discussions with the donor, academic institution and national NGO it is evident that all three bring different expertise to the project. Yet the evaluation process yielded few quality results for any of the principals or agents, in no small part because of the ill fit between the project and the evaluator. The academic institution's procurement office may have not advertised the position on the typical job posting websites utilized by humanitarian actors, thereby narrowing the chances that a qualified evaluator would view the announcement and apply. And despite the controls and donor evaluation criteria an unsatisfactory outcome resulted.

Yet, the donor must consider how the background of a project manager from an academic institution may differ from that of a humanitarian NGO. Where M&E tools are

provided, support must be provided by the donor to their implementing partner so that staff is comfortable with what is being measured, how it is being measured and how this relates to project goals. At project start, when the donor first provided the log frame to the project manager to be filled in the document was not easily understood. *"Honestly, it looked like Chinese to me,"* said the project manager. This is a common complaint among NGO staff and does not represent a challenge unique to academic institutions. Currently, the donor and academic institution have regularly discussed the M&E plan including the indicators, which after two years of implementation better reflect project goals and progress. The project manager considers the M&E capabilities of the implementing partner to be strong. Data collection is reviewed quarterly at the time of narrative reporting. According to the implementing partner, monitoring is being done but remains hindered by a lack of funding for M&E positions and relevant M&E software.

"Most of the time we do not tend to concentrate on the evaluation results, which is a fallback," stated the NGO 1 program coordinator. Thus despite the poor evaluation results the findings may not have necessarily informed future decision-making. The organization has adopted M&E techniques used by third party evaluators to evaluate projects themselves. For instance, the NGO used one evaluation tool to collect baseline data and the tool will again be used to collect mid-term and end of project data collection. The data will inform the internal evaluation the organization will conduct at project end. The coordinator cited time as a challenge to overcome in these data collection efforts but he/she does believe the tool is valuable in assessing progress. However, the process of data collection and analysis is done through Excel, not the software system utilized by the donor, something the coordinator would like to have.

NGO 2 indicated that external evaluations provide learning opportunities and there are several instances in which approaches were altered as a result of learning from evaluations. Thus despite NGO 2 conducting primary healthcare interventions for decades, evaluations do still inform interventions. According to INGO 1 M&E coordinator, "*evaluations are not like a big present that you unwrap and you don't know what is inside.*" The majority of the time project evaluations have informed decision-making and learning. According to the INGO 1 M&E coordinator, it is his/her responsibility to ensure that findings are taken into account in the future. Moreover, the coordinator is more interested in evaluation methodology and what is going to be measured rather than the findings themselves. The coordinator went on to explain that a mixed methodology is preferred, with certain data collection techniques and survey designs employed, including a representative sample. This illustrates the importance of the internal function of organizational learning, and the emphasis on evaluation methodology reveals that *how* the evaluator plans to measure outcomes is of the utmost importance, more so than the results themselves according to this M&E coordinator.

For INGO 2 M&E is easiest to conduct when there is a defined population, such as within informal tent settlements (ITS). Attribution is easier, it is easier to survey, to obtain a representative sample and this is true regardless of whether activities are humanitarian or development-oriented. Yet, most refugees reside outside ITS, making M&E more challenging. For INGO 2 external evaluations "*have not done much to advance organizational learning.*" Nearly all external evaluators applying to the organization's evaluation advertisements employ the OECD DAC criteria. While the criteria is intended to help guide the evaluation, a smaller number of research questions that pinpoint toward

specific impacts are deemed to be more informative, according to the coordinator.

Moreover, the short-term allotted to evaluations mitigates the effectiveness of the analysis.

Rather, internal evaluations are considered to be more beneficial because the organization

knows what it wants and can collect what it wants on an ongoing basis.

The learning that is taking place according to NGO representatives as a result of

evaluation is what Argyris and Schon refer to as "single loop" learning, which is concerned

with effectiveness and achievement of objectives. Because evaluations are conducted only

at the project level, there may never be "double loop" learning, where organizational values

and norms are modified, but rather a series of adjustments which affect change at the

project level, only.

G. Humanitarian-Development Nexus

The distinction between humanitarian versus development interventions has not

heavily impacted any of the NGOs' M&E practices. For both national NGOs their project

durations are typically one to two years and this has not changed as the nature of the

response has incorporated more development interventions. The NGO 1 program

coordinator did note that trends for funding have been changing from basic necessities and

other NFIs to education and vocational training but the organization has always maintained

its focus on education, its mission, and does not feel competition from other NGOs for this

reason. The NGOs vocational training component was part of its project design and is not a

result of donor demand.

NGO 2 has been requested to cease operating its mobile medical units, a

humanitarian intervention it started as a result of the refugee influx, because of concerns

that it is creating dependence. However, the program coordinator maintains that the need is still high and it does not intend to halt its programming. Moreover, when a public health concern arose the same actor that requested the NGO to cease its intervention asked it to be the first responder utilizing the same intervention it was told to halt. Neither program coordinator foresaw a change in the types of interventions it would provide in the future. However, outside of its health sector, NGO 2 has expanded its programming to provide more development-related interventions.

For INGO 2 the relationship it has with its implementing partners is somewhat different when comparing humanitarian assistance with development interventions: partners conducting humanitarian work focus on service delivery whereas with development interventions support for partners has more to do with building their capacity, including in M&E. For example, the organization delivers trainings or ensures there is budget for trainings and helps to build log frames, and monitoring plans, and INGO 2 project managers also help to manage their partner's work.

The M&E coordinator indicated that it is project duration that presents a challenge, not the classification of a humanitarian or development project as such. For example a one-year humanitarian assistance project versus a one-year development project both "*feel rushed.*" Moreover, impact evaluations are required more for long-term programming. Donors ask for impact but are not funding it. When an impact evaluation was conducted the donor looked at the impact of a project within three months of the completion of the project, which the INGO 2 M&E coordinator felt could not be measured within the time frame, as it is a more long-term effect. The M&E coordinator distinguished between

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immediate impact, such as the personal impact on a recipient's life, such as finding a job, versus more long-term impact, such as measuring dignity. INGO 2 had two projects considered to be humanitarian within the WASH and protection sectors, compared with 10 falling under development focusing on governance and advocacy, indicating that is focusing on more long-term strategies through interventions. For INGO 1, the challenge is measuring impact even in two-year timeframes. Although there is more time to implement interventions with development type programming, measurement in terms of impact is not easier. INGO 1 is affected by the transition to development interventions in that strategic or sustainable goals include working with communities and the government more. Regardless of the type of intervention, humanitarian or development, measurement problems persist for international NGOs, while the interventions for national NGOs have not altered since they began responding to the refugee influx.

Two NGOs indicated that obtaining funding has become more challenging and one mentioned more money is available for development-oriented interventions. INGO 2, which has primarily development projects, indicated that there is more competition for development interventions because of the considerable number of private sector entities engaged in development interventions. This competition is therefore seen as a challenge in terms of garnering more funding for the organization. Indeed the more actors involved in development-related initiatives the less dominance NGOs, particularly international NGOs, may have. From an M&E perspective, however, the distinctions between humanitarian and development have not greatly impacted NGO practices.

H. M&E Challenges: Resources, Responsibilities, and Measurement

For both national NGOs funded primarily by Western donors the lack of funding for

M&E functions is problematic. The biggest challenge facing NGO 1 is not having

dedicated M&E staff due to a lack of donor funding. One of the donors for NGO 1 is an

academic institution funded by the Gulf donor interviewed for this research. The researcher

spoke with all three actors. The Gulf donor's M&E coordinator stressed that capacity

building for "implementing partners" (the academic institution) as well as "secondary

partners" (including NGO 1) is part of the donor's mission, yet the only donor funding

dedicated to M&E for NGO 1 supported an external evaluation. The lack of funding for

M&E with the exception of an external evaluation demonstrates that while the principal

demands M&E, it is not providing enough financial support to meet the needs of the agent.

The example also demonstrates that a multi-level principal-agent theory exists. The Gulf

INGO donor maintains a contract with the academic institution, only, as it does not want to

assume financial risks by directly working with a national actor. The academic institution

maintains a contract with the Gulf donor as well as NGO 1. Yet, the Gulf INGO has a

decision in the local partner the academic institution chooses and also provides the budget

for the academic institution's implementing partner, the donor's "secondary partner." Thus

all funding for NGO 1, including for M&E, originates not with its direct donor, the

academic institution, but with the Gulf donor, which also dictates M&E requirements for

both its implementing and secondary partners. This relationship is depicted in Figure 4. The

Gulf donor has chosen the academic institution as its implementing partner because of the

myriad resources at its disposal by virtue of being a university as well as to mitigate the

financial risks of directly partnering with a local NGO. Despite the lack of financial

support, not only from the Gulf donor but from other donors as well, NGO 1 created an

M&E position for one of its staff members previously dedicated to data collection within a

school.

Figure 4. Gulf Donor Funding Structure and Funding for Lebanon Refugee Response

Beyond human resource challenges, there is a lack of data collection tools. For

NGO 1, data collection and analysis capabilities are hampered due to the exclusive use of

Excel as a data collection tool. The Gulf donor had lauded its adoption of a new software

system which allows its implementing partner, the academic institution, to provide real-

time information which can be analyzed in various formats. The I-Monitor system web-

based system will enhance data quality assurance, data collection and will improve M&E

and project implementation. While the tool may facilitate data collection between the

principal and agent, in the this case the Gulf donor and academic institution, it will not

directly assist the Gulf donor's "secondary partner," NGO 1, which continues to use data

collection tools it deems to be insufficient for its operations. The Gulf donor had stressed

that building capacity of its partners, both the implementing and secondary partner, is part

of the donor's mission and something it aims to contribute to in every intervention, yet in

the data collection aspect of M&E for the secondary partner this is not the case. However,

the project manager for the academic institution has indicated that the Gulf donor M&E coordinator is supportive and knowledgeable in terms of the academic institution's M&E implementation, particularly in what to measure and how, and values the contributions the M&E coordinator makes to ensure project quality.

More financial support for tablets as well as software systems which allow more data analysis to be conducted were mentioned by other NGOs. Interestingly, INGO 2, the NGO whose work is dedicated to not only WASH and protection interventions but advocacy and governance as well, indicated that M&E can be used as a marketing tool in the principal-agent relationship in order to leverage more funds from the principal for activities the agent deems necessary. Moreover, INGO 2 noted that support for M&E is not only the responsibility of the donor but also the organization itself. The INGO 2 M&E coordinator indicated that perhaps only one percent of project budgets are dedicated to M&E, well below the average of three to five percent, and that this is not just a reflection of the donor not funding M&E but also represents a deficiency within the organization to support M&E functions. Thus the agent should not be relying solely on the principal to finance initiatives deemed important to individual projects and the organization as a whole, but the agent itself should take responsibility for interventions important to its operations.

Concerns with measurement and M&E affected both national and international NGOs. NGO 1 indicated that measuring concepts such as awareness raising and the knowledge gained as a result is a challenge. To the program coordinator, this is something that is tracked over time. This challenge represents a more sophisticated approach to measuring awareness raising. Often times an organization may base its awareness raising effectiveness according to pre and post-test scores, only. If knowledge is gained, reflected

as the percentage change in pre and post-test scores, the intervention may be deemed a success. The program coordinator's approach to awareness raising demonstrates that a simple measurement tool alone does not capture awareness raising, nor does more information gained. The program coordinator expects that once beneficiaries are informed on a certain topic, their outlooks and behaviors may be expected to change accordingly, although behavior change is a challenging endeavor and one that will not necessarily happen as a result of a single intervention alone. But the conundrum demonstrates that the organization continues to grapple with the optimal way to measure interventions.

INGO 2 indicated that measuring change is a challenge. It is not necessarily the sector which poses a problem but the type of intervention being measured. For instance with the WASH sector, standards exist whether they are SPHERE standards or standards specific to donors, with quantitative, reliable measurements such as water distribution. However, if one is trying to measure WASH advocacy projects then capturing change is a challenge. Within advocacy, the organization is still trying to determine what incremental change looks like. "*Attribution is touch and go*," said the M&E coordinator. In effort to overcome challenges with donors within the governance sector, the NGO has set "*flexible expectations*" with the donors where a pool of indicators exists where advances will be made but it is unclear exactly what the outcome will be. Monitoring of governance includes follow up on newly-created capacity building systems, and the number of national and international entities which the organizations it partners with have been approached by. In this instance, the principal-agent relationship is less rigid in terms of declaring what change is expected as a result of a governance intervention. The M&E coordinator views measurement as a responsibility of the NGO itself. "*We simply do not know what questions*

to ask. Even as M&E we do not know what questions to ask. I should know what I'm asking and I should be required to come up with methodologies. Even if it is a donor-driven evaluation, we should be accountable for the proper set of questions in a very structured way."

In addition to the technical aspects of M&E, INGO 2 highlighted the perception among some program staff that if there is an M&E-related function within their project, then it is considered to be the responsibility of the M&E department, rather than a responsibility the program staff themselves should take on. The sentiment highlights the idea that "*embedding*" M&E is an organizational process that can take time and may not necessarily be embraced by all, particularly if they do not see the value of M&E, or consider it to be of secondary importance to other, more pressing priorities.

I. Synthesizing Remarks

For the donors and NGOs interviewed for this study M&E is viewed as a mechanism to provide better services to Syrian refugees and Lebanese host community members. Yet, donors set aside resources for external evaluations but little else for M&E functions. According to NGOs, the need for M&E is driven both by donors and internally, with the exception of the national NGO funded by non-DAC donors, where M&E requirements were nil. The principal-agent theory, through which the donor-NGO relationship is analyzed, reveals that the M&E demands required by DAC donors are not considered onerous by the NGO. Among the international NGOs, it is considered the NGO's responsibility to provide quality services, and the M&E coordinators' job specifically, to ensure that M&E is prioritized within the organization. Overall, NGOs do

feel they operate with independence and cited instances where both DAC and non-DAC donors were responsive to their needs, including in M&E practices. The binary principal-agent relationship is seen to be more complex and multi-leveled in the case of donor 2, its implementing partner (the academic institution) and the donor's "secondary partner" (NGO 1), although the donor's influence over M&E practices dictates NGO 1's M&E requirements despite having a more indirect relationship with the organization. Challenges with M&E do persist, some of which stem from lack of donor support, such as the financing of M&E positions, while external evaluations, funded by donors and utilized as a means to determine project performance, including effectiveness, are considered helpful and a learning opportunity but are deemed to be less useful than internal evaluation practices. In one instance, neither the donor nor the two partners on the ground were satisfied with the evaluation results. The NGO's established, long-term relationships with donors were cited by an international and national NGO, both of which received funding from Western donors, as advantageous, including as a means to request additional funding. According to the national NGO receiving funds from primarily non-DAC, Gulf donors, personal relations drive donor-NGO relations.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Analysis of the refugee response plans over the past six years reveal that M&E has not been prioritized, with the exception of the current four year plan which indicates that in order to improve the plan, better monitoring mechanisms as well as accountability should be adhered to. M&E is deemed to be "critical" for effectiveness and accountability. Yet, evaluation alone is hardly mentioned within the latest plan. The plans also reveal both humanitarian assistance and development/stabilization interventions geared to address more than just the immediate, basic needs of refugees and host community needs through interventions intended to have a longer-lasting impact. While a shift to more development-oriented interventions is part of the response strategy, the majority of funding is supporting food and basic assistance. The NGOs interviewed indicate that their M&E practices have largely not been affected by this transition, although M&E strategies by one international NGO with its local implementing partners does differ depending on whether interventions are more humanitarian or development-oriented. Moreover, it is not the sector which presents challenges to M&E practices, but the duration of the intervention and what is being measured. The shorter the intervention, the more challenging M&E becomes as measuring impact, what both donors now prioritize by virtue of adopting RBM, is more challenging. Recent response plan documents have emphasized the role of M&E in the response effort and M&E practices of LCRP partners have begun to strengthen. An M&E framework is currently being devised where none existed previously. Sector log frames lay out intervention activities and results to be achieved. Monitoring and evaluation practices

among NGOs have been practiced despite the lack of acknowledgement of M&E within response plans but a more coordinated effort seems to now be in place in terms of M&E practices.

Driving M&E is the need for accountability and learning. Accountability is surely a worthy endeavor to pursue but is not without challenges and enhanced service provision alone is not a panacea for crisis-affected populations. Humanitarian assistance is complicated and is provided in complex environments. If a state does not take responsibility for its refugee population and afford them protection, enhanced service provision may only account for a marginal difference in their everyday lives. And NGOs should not be held to account for a state's failure to act, although many do advocate on behalf of crisis-affect populations. In fact, the large presence of NGOs providing services may influence a government's decision not to pursue more proactive measures toward assisting a refugee population. Moreover, needs may be beyond what humanitarian actors can provide, either because funding is insufficient and/or a crisis is too consuming. During a humanitarian crisis, beneficiaries do not shop around for the best services, they take what they are given. Incorporating beneficiary perspectives takes time, effort and money. Donors are often not in an area of operation and therefore rely on NGO accounts only to determine effectiveness; for the most part, donors do not engage directly with beneficiaries. Even when information provided to a donor on project implementation is entirely or nearly accurate and implemented as planned, if a project itself is not designed well or is not necessarily what is most needed, then "downward" accountability is not being fully realized. Whereas NGO accountability to donors is necessary as NGOs cannot operate

without funding. Beneficiaries have no real power over the NGOs providing them services; they may judge them negatively but do not have the power to reward or penalize.

Learning is crucial not only to NGOs but also to affected populations. While mistakes are important to remedy, there should also be a conscious effort to improve upon existing practices. That is, it is not necessary for a mistake to be made in order for a learning opportunity to present itself. In an emergency situation, however, where distribution of humanitarian assistance is of the utmost importance, learning may not be prioritized. Even in more long-term development interventions, learning can be challenging: overcoming staff and organizational barriers and then improving operational procedures can be a complicated and/or lengthy process. Moreover, what works in one context may very well not work in another. However, having feedback and complaint mechanisms in place for affected populations provides real-time information which NGOs can reflect upon and adjust services as necessary. This provides an opportunity for learning as well as downward accountability. While assistance in an emergency context or prolonged crisis situation is almost always never enough, efforts to do better must be undertaken. Lessons learned meetings among staff, focus group discussions among the target population, and individual interviews all represent learning opportunities. The unpredictable and fluid situation in which NGOs provide humanitarian assistance means that perfect information is unattainable.

Donors responding to the refugee crisis in Lebanon include DAC and non-DAC donors, both of whom have historically contributed to Lebanon in the wake of war. According to OCHA FTS analysis, DAC donors are by far the primary providers of refugee response funding, providing 80 percent of direct contributions. However, this does not

represent all funding, and non-DAC donor contributions may be substantially larger. While funding in prolonged crises becomes a challenge, the volume provided to the refugee response in Lebanon continues to rise. How long this level of assistance will be maintained, however, is unknown. As the refuge response continues to lengthen, donors may be more reluctant to support initiatives such as shelter, a form of basic assistance which has been provided since the beginning of the crisis, despite the persistent need. And no matter how much assistance is provided, it will undoubtedly not be enough, demonstrating the limits of a humanitarian response funded largely by government donors incapable of negotiating a political solution to the conflict.

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APPENDIX I

INTERVIEW GUIDE

Interviews with donor representatives will be based on the below questions:
1. What is your understanding of monitoring and evaluation (M&E)?
2. What M&E criteria does your organization require partner NGOs active in the Syrian refugee response in Lebanon to provide?
3. How have partner NGOs responded to the organization's requests for data collection?
4. How does your organization work to support partner NGO M&E practices, e.g. capacity building, technical support, etc.?
5. What are the greatest challenges of NGO M&E practices in the context of the Syrian refugee response and what recommendations can you provide to overcome these challenges?
6. Has your organization's M&E strategy adapted as the Syrian refugee response has evolved from providing short-term basic assistance in order to meet the immediate needs of Syrian refugees to more long-term interventions which also target the needs of host communities?
7. How does your organization utilize NGO M&E information to determine NGO project effectiveness as well as overall aid effectiveness?
8. Do international agreements aimed at improving aid effectiveness such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness influence how the donor determines aid effectiveness?

Interviews with NGO representatives will be based on the below questions:
1. What is your understanding of monitoring and evaluation (M&E)?
2. Are the M&E practices which your organization conducts driven by internal demand or a function of donor demand? Both?
3. Are M&E practices generally a priority within your organization or is your organization more concerned with other functions e.g. focus on service delivery, securing donor funding, etc.?
4. Do you find evaluations undertaken of your projects an accurate measuring of determining project effectiveness?
5. Have evaluations undertaken of your projects informed decision-making and/or organizational learning?
6. What do you consider to be the biggest challenges in gathering quality data?
7. In what ways do you feel donor support can help strengthen your M&E practices?
8. Do you consider donor M&E requirements to be reasonable? Why or why not?
9. Have your projects changed as the Syrian refugee response in Lebanon has expanded from a focus on the provision of the immediate needs of refugees to include more long-term interventions targeting the needs of host communities? If so, have your M&E practices also changed? How?
10. In what ways do you incorporate beneficiary perspectives in data collection?

APPENDIX II

TYPICAL LOGICAL FRAMEWORK FORMAT

Narrative summary	Objectively verifiable indicators	Means of verification	Assumptions
Goal – the overall aim to which the project is expected to contribute	Measures (direct or indirect) to show the project's contribution to the goal	Sources of information and methods used to show fulfillment of goal	Important events, conditions or decisions beyond the project's control necessary for maintaining the progress towards the goal
Outcomes (or objectives) – the new situation which the projects is aiming to bring about	Measures (direct or indirect) to show what progress is being made towards reaching the objectives	Sources of information and methods used to show progress against objectives	Important events, conditions or decisions beyond the project's control, which are necessary if achieving the objectives is going to contribute towards the overall goal
Outputs – the results which should be within the control of the project management	Measures (direct or indirect) to show if project outputs are being delivered	Sources of information and methods used to show delivery of outputs	Important events, conditions or decisions beyond the project's control, which are necessary if producing the outputs is going to help achieve the objectives
Activities – the things which have to be done by the project to produce the outputs	Measures (direct or indirect) to show if project outputs are being delivered	Sources of information and methods used to show that activities have been completed	Important events, conditions or decisions beyond the project's control, which are necessary if completing activities will produce the required outputs
Inputs	Resources – type and level of resources needed for the project Finance – overall budget Time – Planned start and end date		

Source: Mikkelsen in Bakewell and Garbutt 2005, 3.

Appendix III

M&E IN LEBANON RESPONSE PLAN

Year	Response Plan	# of Sectors	Key Features	M&E	Descriptions
2012	Syria Regional Response Plan	6	Ensure basic needs and protection of Syrian refugees met	*Monitoring* - border areas; arrival trends; detention; distributions; Food sector - food prices and "project implementation and impact" *Evaluation* - Appears once within the Protection sector to identify children in need	*Stabilization* - Not mentioned *Resilience* - Protection sector - child resilience programs/training *Impact* - QIP, Protection sector, impact assessment
2013			Expanded to include PRS, Lebanese returnees, and host community members Shift to cash-based assistance Engaging Gulf States	*Monitoring* - Same as 2012 and cash-based assistance, est. monitoring systems within information management *Evaluation* - Not mentioned	*Stabilization* - Not mentioned *Resilience* - children benefiting from psychosocial development and *resilience* in public schools; capacity building in *resilience* *Impact* - same as 2012 and *impact* of cash assistance on local markets

2014		8	First plan to emphasize resilience-based approach (Third form of assistance - capacity building/*resilience*)	M&E section added stressing harmonization of assessments and interventions and joint monitoring *Monitoring* - referenced across 5 sectors incl. increased monitoring to ensure food assistance to those in need, post-distribution monitoring to limit duplication *Evaluation* - referenced twice: M&E system for cash program; evaluate impact of cash assistance	*Stabilization* - described in terms of priorities - strengthening public health system, rehabilitation of schools, mitigating tensions in host communities, supporting waste management and 2013 National Stabilization Roadmap *Resilience* - building *resilience* through psychosocial support *Impact* - NFI assistance, "high impact" communal projects, but mostly in reference to *impact* of crisis on Lebanon
2015 - 2016	LCRP (Part of 3RP)	9	Two year time frame humanitarian and development partners to create "*resilience based response*"	Activity Info reporting system rolled out Response Monitoring section (addresses reporting on intervention progress) *Monitoring* - *monitoring* and analysis tools to gather baseline data; referenced in outcome indicators for health + education sectors; comm. members *monitor* their conditions and "articulate needs" *Evaluation* - referenced in terms of "M&E systems" as tools toward joint information and analysis platform to support government	*Stabilization* - *Mentioned throughout* *Resilience* - Mentioned few times only: promoting *resilience* through strengthening national delivery systems to expand access to and quality of basic public services, building *resilience* of children *Impact* - Mostly in reference to *impact* of crisis on Lebanon *Accountability* - mentioned in terms of strengthening *accountability*, mainstreaming *accountability* into national planning processes and the M&E framework

| 2017 - 2020 | | | 10 | First medium-term strategy to deliver humanitarian and stabilization interventions | M&E stressed at outset of plan
Designated M&E section
First key priority is "strengthening current tracking, monitoring mechanisms"
Monitoring - PDM and "impact *monitoring"* of cash assistance; *monitoring* schools, social tensions, water usage and protection *monitoring* visits
Evaluation - not built into response interventions; reference to evaluations conducted by response partners which inform strategy | *Resilience* - pervasive and used in one outcome indicator
Impact - Same as 2015-2016 response
Accountability - Second key priority of response plan is "improving transparency and accountability" |

APPENDIX IV

DONOR/NGO BACKGROUND

A program coordinator from a national NGO specializing in education was interviewed. Additional sectors the NGO operates in include protection and livelihoods. The NGO was established in 2013 as a direct result of the refugee crisis. The program coordinator contributes to all aspects of programming. The NGO is referred to as NGO 1 within the Findings section.

A health program coordinator from a national NGO specializing in primary health care services was interviewed. The NGO, established during the country's civil war, works in several other sectors but the responses for this research primarily pertain to the organization's health programming. The NGO is referred to as NGO 2. The funding structure for NGO 1 and NGO 2 is provided in Appendix V.

A former program coordinator from a national NGO in interventions including shelter, relief (e.g. non-food items), health, and livelihoods was interviewed. The NGO consisted of a group of existing NGOs coming together to respond to the Syrian refugee crisis, and the organizations eventually merged into one NGO. The NGO is referred to as NGO 3 and at the time the program coordinator worked for the NGO, from 2013-2016, the organization was primarily receiving funding from non-DAC donors, specifically Gulf donors.

An M&E coordinator with an international NGO providing primary health care, mental health and gender-based violence (falls under the protection sector) interventions was interviewed. The NGO primarily operates through direct implementation and has operated within Lebanon since the 2006 War. The INGO is referred to as INGO 1.

An M&E coordinator with an international NGO providing WASH and protection interventions as well as governance and advocacy was interviewed. It is a confederation and different confederations have operated within Lebanon at different times. The organization has many staff with research backgrounds, thus distinguishing it from other INGOs. The INGO is referred to as INGO 2.

Donor 1 is a multilateral organization which supports a range of interventions through both international and national implementing partners. The M&E department has 16 staff within its M&E department, although in 2011 was operating with only one or two M&E staff. The donor is referred to as donor 1.

Donor 2 is a Gulf INGO operating as an NGO and directly implementing interventions within the Gulf country but functioning as a donor outside its home country. The M&E coordinator is couched within a department also responsible for advocacy, research and other organizational functions. The donor is referred to as donor 2.

APPENDIX V

NATIONAL NGO FUNDING CHANNELS

NGO 1

NGO 2