AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

BUILDING PEACE THROUGH LIBERAL CONSTRUCTS

by
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A thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
to the Center for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies
of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences
at the American University of Beirut

Beirut, Lebanon
March 2018

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

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

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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

Ahmet Serdar Günaydın for Master of Arts
Major: Middle Eastern Studies

Title: Building Peace Through Liberal Constructs

Peacebuilding activities have been among the most common international actions when contending with conflicts and seeking to establish a durable peace. In this sense, various actors are involved in peacebuilding such as civil society actors, governments, and international organizations. Since peacebuilding activities are held under the patronage of the UN and funded by Western sources, the imposition of liberal values becomes unavoidable in the post-conflict environment. However, imposed liberal principles are not always compatible with the context of the post-conflict environment and, thus, might render civic peace initiatives inefficient.

From this point of view, this study explores the peacebuilding activities of the civil society actors with the case studies of Lebanon and Cyprus. How do civil society actors deal with liberal peacebuilding? How are the critical approaches on liberal peacebuilding reflected in the field? Through these questions, this study puts forward how the three associated concepts – violence, civil society, and youth – function as the liberal components of peacebuilding and, thus, make peacebuilding activities incapable to effectively address the causes of conflicts.

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CHAPTER 1

CIVIC PEACEBUILDING AND THE LIBERAL AGENDA

International initiatives to build sustainable peace in conflict zones have come into prominence after the initiation of the new peace agenda by the United Nations (UN) in 1992. Since then, many international peace missions have been carried out in which state and civil society actors have been a part. Nevertheless, the extent to which these peacebuilding activities have been successful has been a key concern. In this context, peace initiatives in the last two to three decades have demonstrated that the currently followed peace agenda has not given the expected results.[1] While different reasons have been pointed out to explain this, one of the featured critical approaches puts forward the incompatibility of peacebuilding's liberal principles with the varying contexts of the post-conflict environments.[2] Presuming that the imposition of liberal values to the post-conflict environment is the only relief for a sustainable peace is problematic.

While liberal components within peacebuilding are more apparent at the state-level actions, particularly through policy reforms on democracy, market liberalization, and privatization, the reflection of liberalism in peacebuilding at the civil society level is more subtle since the tools of civil society peacebuilding are based on personal interactions. From this point of view, this thesis seeks to reveal the main constituents of liberal

[1] Jasmine-Kim Westendorf, *Why Peace Processes Fail: Negotiating Insecurity After Civil War* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2015), 3.
[2] David Chandler, *Peacebuilding: The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1997-2017* (Springer, 2017), 35-38 ; Roger Mac Ginty, *Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding* (Routledge, 2013), 321-322.

peacebuilding by examining the way civil society actors deal with peacebuilding. Taking the concepts of violence, civil society, and youth as the fundamental components of liberal peacebuilding, this thesis explores how these three concepts indeed serve the interests of Western actors, in contrast to the way Western actors define and reflect them in the international arena.

The research questions developed out of this field of inquiry are as follows:

- How are the concepts of violence, civil society, and youth affiliated with a liberal understanding of peace?
- How do civil society actors deal with liberal peacebuilding in Lebanon and Cyprus?
- How are the critical approaches on liberal peacebuilding reflected in the field?

This thesis argues that through the contemporary perceptions attributed to them, the concepts of violence, civil society, and youth form the main components of liberal peacebuilding. Instead of taking the definitions of these components for granted, they should be viewed with suspect and construed according to the context of the society that conflict takes place. In conclusion, this thesis propounds that peace efforts are more inclined to bring success when actors go out of the dominant peacebuilding frame and initiate actions based on their own needs. Instead of implementing a standardized peace agenda, actors should determine their post-conflict programs, tailored according to the need and cultural values of the people. In specific civil society organizations (CSOs), contextually built programs and methods should be followed, rather than transferring Western-constructed methodologies.

This thesis aims to contribute to the literature of civil society peacebuilding. Although there are notable studies on the role of civil society, relevant case studies are not sufficient. This thesis seeks to contribute to the literature of civil society peacebuilding through the cases in Lebanon and Cyprus, by matching the current critical approach with what is applied in the field.

Thesis Outline

This thesis starts by giving the historical backgrounds of the conflicts in Lebanon and Cyprus, in which case studies are conducted. Accordingly, it touches upon how the violent conflicts continue today in a variety of political and social disputes.

The following chapter examines how civil society actors in Lebanon and Cyprus deal with the phenomenon of peace. Accordingly, a number of CSOs have been interviewed in both societies to give a perspective on how peacebuilding activities are conducted in the field.

In light of the contexts analyzed, Chapter 5 seeks to explore the evolution of a peacebuilding based on the concepts of violence, civil society, and youth. It gives a literary analysis of these concepts and puts forward how they function as the liberal components of peacebuilding and make peacebuilding activities incapable to effectively address the causes of conflicts.

Based on these analyses, the thesis ends by propounding its findings and suggestions as to how to enhance civil society peacebuilding by getting out of the dominant peacebuilding framework taken for granted.

Methodology: Comparing Liberal and Non-Liberal Understandings of Peacebuilding

In this thesis, I seek to discern the different understandings of peacebuilding, through the ways liberal and critical approaches evaluate this notion. To discern the differences, I elaborate on the main liberal components of peacebuilding, concepts of violence, civil society, and youth. In order to see how civil society actors deal with liberal peacebuilding and approach the criticisms toward it, I explore the peacebuilding activities of civil society actors through my case studies in Lebanon and Cyprus. Among variations of peacebuilding definitions, I define peacebuilding in this thesis as follows: Activities that aim to prevent direct and structural violence within the society and promote means to provide a peaceful environment. Because I specifically deal with the peacebuilding work by civil society, I refer to the activities conducted by civil society actors, rather than governmental actions.

From this point of view, I divide my study into two main parts. In the first part, I give a historical background of the conflicts of Lebanon and Cyprus and track how civil society actors in these countries deal with liberal peacebuilding. In the second part, I analyze the literature on peacebuilding and its conceptual constructs and reflect on them to illuminate my research inquiries. In the case studies, my data collection method is based

mainly on the qualitative semi-structured interviews that I conducted with the civil society actors working on the national and community levels. In addition to the interviews, I also utilized the information found on organizations' websites, and from their reports and publications that reflected on their projects and activities. The research is conducted in accordance with the ethical principles indicated under the expedited review criteria of the Institutional Review Board.

When analyzing a matter and seeking to observe its reflections on the ground, it is beneficial to have at least two cases so that the topic can be understood in a more comprehensive manner. Having more than one case study helps us to discern context-based features from the common ones within the collected data. Additionally, having two case studies also provides a comparative perspective, which gives us a broader perspective when analyzing.

I have chosen Lebanon and Cyprus as case studies for a few reasons. First, they host two of the most protracted conflicts of the Mediterranean basin, where the violent conflicts are temporarily frozen, but the political conflicts continue. Thus, these cases demonstrate where peacebuilding work is in high demand.

Second, the two countries share several similar characteristics: They are neighbors in the Eastern Mediterranean region, are approximately the same size, have heterogeneous populations, and encounter similar historical experiences within the same timeframe, such

as being occupied and controlled by outside powers.[3] Besides, both cases can be considered as proxy conflicts where neighbor countries manage the trajectories of the conflicts.

However, while Lebanese conflict stems mainly from its multi-sectarian structure and neighbor disputes, Cypriot conflict is more related to the case of binationalism. In the former, conditions are more suitable for people from different communities to live together or be in interaction. In the latter, the interaction is low since the communities are divided with a physical border. This case increases the importance of bicommunal activities of the CSOs because they create opportunities that bring people together from different communities.

I have pursued an interpretive approach since the goal of this research is to understand the current situation rather than to make general predictions from the findings. Therefore, I acknowledge that the findings generated from this research are relative to the time and context in which the study is conducted, rather than being permanent and universal.

The focus groups in my semi-structured interviews have been the representatives of civil society actors across Lebanon and Cyprus. Accordingly, I had in-person interviews with eight people from seven different organizations, four of them from Lebanon and three from Cyprus. The interviews in Lebanon took place in July 2017, and those in Cyprus took place in September 2017. Although I tailored the questions according to the organization that I interviewed, the main structure of the questions has been the following:

[3] Maria Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, "Cyprus and Lebanon: A Historical Comparative Study in Ethnic Conflict and Outside Interference," *The Cyprus Review; Nicosia* 2, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 97-99.

- How do you view the mission of your organization on behalf of peacebuilding?

- In what forms do you think your activities contribute to peace in your community?

- What are your criticisms regarding the way and methodology that is currently followed to build a more peaceful community?

- How are the youth represented within your organization? Do you think they have a pivotal role in building peace?

- How do you see the peacebuilding activities in your community in general? Do you think they are sufficient and well-organized? How is the collaboration among CSOs?

- What are the agendas of your donors? How does the Western-led funding orient your role and activities?

Based on the CSOs that I interviewed, I observed that people dealing with civil peacebuilding are generally younger in Cyprus. Since the CSOs I contacted in Lebanon were founded before, mostly toward the end of the civil war, and their founders are still leading, this could have reflected on the administrative profile. When it comes to gender balance, most of the managers were men in Lebanon while generally women lead CSOs in Cyprus. This was also reflected in my interviews. After I contacted the CSOs, the five people who reached out to me for interviews in Lebanon were all men. In Cyprus, two of the three interviewees were women.

Delimitations

This thesis focuses on peacebuilding at the civil society level, excluding peacebuilding initiatives by states. The study is more concerned with civil society activities that aim to contribute to peace through direct interaction with people. However, in the second part of the thesis where the components of liberal peacebuilding are analyzed, I refer sporadically to peacebuilding in a more extensive scope.

In the selection of CSOs, I have preferred CSOs that indicate peacebuilding among their main missions. Although CSOs focusing on other fields might again indirectly contribute to peace, I considered CSOs that take peacebuilding at the center more relevant to my research. I ensured that the selection was regionally diversified and selected CSOs that were active and assertive in their fields.

In my case analyses, I preferred to use the term CSO instead of the term NGO. Since some organizations in this area prefer to describe themselves as social initiatives or peace activists, rather than an NGO, I opted for the term CSO because of its more comprehensive scope. However, in some sections of this study, I have used NGO contingent upon its relevance in the literature.

Limitations

In accordance with the limited timeframe, I selected CSOs that somehow made themselves heard with their active work in civil society peacebuilding. I also opted for CSOs that have online visibility. Thus, there might exist other civic organizations that follow a different path on behalf of peace than those CSOs that I selected.

Due to the season and timeframe in which I conducted my interviews, there have been cases where the CSOs that I intended to get in touch with were busy, or the relevant staff were off for vacation. But, this case was exceptional to a few CSOs in the northern part of Cyprus. Similarly, due to the season, I have not been able to directly participate in the activities of the CSOs that I had an interview with. However, since I have personally participated in such activities before this study, I was acquainted with the general organization of these activities and the methodologies followed. Nevertheless, since the focus of this study is more concerned with the perspective of the actors and directors of peacebuilding activities, rather than the participants in the programs, this case did not lead to a remarkable deficiency for the research.

Lastly, although CSOs had their own publications like reports and analyses that reflected on their work, they did mostly lack self-evaluation reports on their activities, particularly qualitative or quantitative assessments based on the feedback from the attendees. This case sometimes rendered the statements of the CSO staff baseless when it came to assessing the impacts of their activities.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS OF PROTRACTED CONFLICTS

2.1. Lebanon: From Civil War to Post-War Violence

When Lebanon gained its independence from French control in 1943, the National Pact laid the foundation of the Lebanese state based on the confessional system. Accordingly, key positions within the state were shared among Christian and Muslim sects, where the President of Lebanon would be a Maronite Catholic, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shia Muslim. Taking the 1932 census as a base, where Christians were considered as constituting 51% of the population, the parliamentary would consist of a ratio of 6:5 in favor of Christians to Muslims according to the National Pact, which was later adjusted to a ratio of 1:1 with the Taif Agreement of 1989.

There has not been any new census after the one in 1932. However, the demography of Lebanon has considerably changed since then, where the population of Muslims increased faster than the Christians.[4] This demographic change was not reflected in the distribution of political powers, causing dissatisfaction with the government structure. By being a 'fragile' state due to its multi-sectarian social structure, the existing order was not

[4] "The Lebanese Demographic Reality," *Lebanese Information Center*, January 14, 2013.

able to hinder the arising sectarian rifts, which caused the 15 year-long civil war (1975-90) that was complex and devastating.

It is not easy to examine the causes and dynamics of the Lebanese civil war. Although a small country, Lebanon officially acknowledge eighteen ethnic and religious sects across its territory.[5] With the impact of neighbor conflicts, the involvement of the foreign actors, and the controversial interests and expectations of Lebanese communities, the situation in Lebanon has been very hard to control. Additionally, the sectarian distinctions and imbalance in terms of socio-economic situations and political powers had kept the tensions high among Muslims and Christians, where the government was not able to address the causes of these issues. One way or another, the long-lasting civil war had erupted, without providing a real benefit to the involved parties at the end. Although the war had ended with the Taif Agreement, the political violence has been perpetual.

In the following, I will handle the background of the Lebanese conflict under two subtitles: the conflict of the civil war and the post-war conflict based on political violence.

The Civil War

The Lebanese civil war has been a bloody and destructive conflict with atrocities, car bombs, and assassinations. Although the numbers of the casualties of the war are not

[5] These are: Alawites, Armenian Catholics, Armenian Orthodox (Gregorians), Assyrians (Nestorians), Chaldean Catholics, Copts, Druze, Evangelicals, Greek Orthodox, Ismailis, Jews, Latin Catholics, Maronite Catholics, Melkite Greek Catholics, Sunnis, Shiites, Syriac Catholics, Syriac Orthodox (Jacobits). "Lebanon International Religious Freedom Report for 2016," *US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor*, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/268856.pdf.

certain, one of the estimations indicates around 150,000 deaths (corresponded to about 5 percent of the population), 800,000 displaced people, and $25 billion worth of physical damage which was more than half of the GDP at the time.[6] All parties were somehow involved in violence, as perpetrator or target, and there were no explicit winners at the end.

The fighters in the civil war included major and minor parties and militias. Although the war started between two groups, the combatant groups proliferated, and allies changed during the war. In the initial stage, on the one side, there were the Christian political parties that included the Kataeb and National Liberal parties. On the other side, there were the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and several Lebanese political parties and groups such as Amal (Shia) and the Progressive Socialist Party (Druze).[7] Beirut was divided into two with a demarcation line named the Green Line; Muslims were dominating the western part of the city, and Christians the eastern part. While some militias included members and fighters from many sects, the most prominent militias were uni-confessional with fighters belonging to a single religious group. During the war, the most intense fights occurred either between factions of the same militia or between rival militias belonging to the same sect to consolidate all the fighters under a unified leadership.[8]

One of the compelling parts of the war was the thriving informal economy that was developed around the militias. Larger militias paid regular salaries to their fighters where a

[6] Astri Suhrke and Mats Berdal, *The Peace In Between: Post-War Violence and Peacebuilding* (Routledge, 2013), 119.
[7] Samir Makdisi and Richard Sadaka, "The Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990," *American University of Beirut, Institute of Financial Economics Lecture and Working Paper Series* (2003 No.3), 15.
[8] Suhrke and Berdal, *The Peace In Between*, 119.

regular soldier received a higher salary than the prevailing minimum wage.[9] Regarding the militias, Are Knudsen and Nasser Yassin, note the following:

> The militias' finances were a combination of protection rackets, looting and robberies, taxation and trading in drugs and contraband. The militias differed in size, personnel and fighters and at the war's end, the approximately 25 militias organized about 50,000 full-time fighters. Despite their wartime exploits, most militias failed to institutionalize their economic and political role and were disbanded after the war. The warlords, however, persisted and the most influential were able to launch illustrious political careers.[10]

To give an overview of the phases of the civil war, the division by Samar Makdisi can be helpful. He divides the civil war into three phases based on some specific developments that characterize them: The first phase as 1975-77, the second phase as 1978-82, and the third phase as 1982-1990.

The first phase included two years of war followed by a year of relative peace where the main combats took place between the Christian parties and the PLO that was supported by some Lebanese political parties. In the second phase of the war, an escalation took place in fighting between the main parties of the conflict where also Israeli and Syrian troops became involved in the war. This phase ended with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. The third phase witnessed the climax of outside intervention; Syrian involvement, Israeli invasion, and the troops sent by the US, Britain, France, and Italy under the peacekeeping mission.[11] The Taif Accords of October 1989 marked the beginning of the end of the civil war. The militias were dissolved and disarmed, except Hezbollah, a

[9] Makdisi and Sadaka, "The Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990," 16.
[10] Suhrke and Berdal, *The Peace In Between*, 120.
[11] Makdisi and Sadaka, "The Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990," 18-24.

distinction it achieved due to its resistance against the continued Israeli occupation in the south.[12] The parliament passed the amnesty law in March 1991 that pardoned all the crimes committed during the war. Although fighting had come to an end, the political conflict perpetuated in the post-war period.

Post-War Violence

Political rifts and assassinations did not stop after the civil war. Indeed, there was a return to the political violence that existed before the civil war. The Taif Agreement was just an updated version of the confessional system established by the 1943 National Pact, which is considered as the main source of the instability in Lebanon.[13] The agreement has been effective in terms of freezing violent conflict. However, it did not solve the root causes of the conflict. Hence, the possibility of a further violence still exists. The abductions and assassinations continued in the post-war period.

The Taif Agreement equalized the number of Muslim and Christian members of the parliament and increased the executive powers of the prime minister. The first post-war parliamentary elections were held in 1992, and Rafic Hariri was elected as the prime minister. However, he was unable to prevent the former militia leaders and warlords from getting government posts. The posts they gained were satisfying and there was no need to

[12] William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East* (Boulder, CO: Routledge, 2008), 546.
[13] Fawwaz Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon* (Pluto Press, 2012), 250-251.

appeal to violence. This case is considered one of the reasons why violence levels were low during this period.[14]

When the civil war ended, the Israeli intervention and Syrian military presence in Lebanon remained main issues that damaged state sovereignty. Also, since Hezbollah was not disbanded like other militias after the civil war, it stood as another power challenging state sovereignty. In 2000, Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon by still holding the Shebaa Farms, a small piece of land on the Lebanon-Israel-Syria border. In February 2005, Rafic Hariri was killed along with 21 others in a massive bomb blast in central Beirut. This attack led to international condemnation and huge public demonstrations. Syria has been accused of the attack where the international pressure and public protests forced Syria to withdraw its military forces in accordance with the UN Resolution 1559. Syria withdrew its troops in late April 2005. However, the Lebanese parliament had already been separated into two blocks as alliances of March 8 and March 14, where the former followed a pro-Syrian line and the latter anti-Syrian and pro-Western. Although Lebanon had gotten rid of the military interventions of its neighbors, stability was not established.

In July 2006, the conflicts between Hezbollah and Israeli forces led to a destructive war in Lebanon that lasted 34 days. The war started when Israel launched airstrikes and artillery fire on Lebanon following Hezbollah's cross-border raid that killed Israeli soldiers. The war ended following the ceasefire brokered by UN and left more than a thousand

[14] Suhrke and Berdal, *The Peace In Between*, 122.

civilians killed, over a million people displaced, and the Lebanese civil infrastructure severely damaged.[15]

In May 2008, one of the biggest conflicts arose between the government headed by the Future Movement and Hezbollah along with its political allies. The conflict arose after the government's move to shut down Hezbollah's telecommunication network and remove Beirut Airport's security chief over alleged ties to Hezbollah.[16] This move has been considered illegal by Hezbollah and was reciprocated by Hezbollah-led fighters through seizing control of Beirut's western neighborhoods from Future Movement militiamen. The conflict had left 11 dead and 30 wounded in street battles.[17] The Doha Agreement signed on 21 May 2008 ended the 18-month long political feud and settled the conflict that nearly drove the country to civil war.[18] The agreement gave Hezbollah and its allies the power to veto any cabinet decision.[19]

Consequently, the multi-sectarian structure of Lebanon and the established political system make the country vulnerable to rifts and instability. Further, the involvement of third parties in Lebanese politics, the impacts of the Israeli-Palestinian and Syrian conflicts

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[15] "Why They Died: Civilian Casualties in Lebanon during the 2006 War," Human Rights Watch, September 5, 2007, https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/09/05/why-they-died/civilian-casualties-lebanon-during-2006-war.
[16] "Hezbollah Takes over West Beirut," May 9, 2008, accessed October 17, 2017, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7391600.stm.
[17] Albrecht Schnabel and Rohan Gunaratna, *Wars From Within: Understanding and Managing Insurgent Movements* (World Scientific, 2014), 397.
[18] "Lebanon Leaders Clinch Deal to End Crisis," May 21, 2008, accessed October 17, 2017, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2008/May-21/51789-lebanon-leaders-clinch-deal-to-end-crisis.ashx.
[19] Robert F. Worth and Nada Bakri, "Deal for Lebanese Factions Leaves Hezbollah Stronger," *The New York Times*, May 22, 2008, sec. Middle East, accessed October 17, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/22/world/middleeast/22lebanon.html.

and the high numbers of refugees in Lebanon have all in a way been causes of the conflicts and instability in the country. Accordingly, there is a remarkable continuity of political violence in Lebanon from the 1950s to the present.[20] While peacebuilding efforts at the governmental level contributed somehow to stop the physical violence – the Taif Agreement can be considered the core step of them – these efforts have not been able to eliminate the root causes of the conflict. In this sense, a significant duty falls to civil society actors by conducting efficient peacebuilding activities that can reach out more people.

2.2. Cyprus: Binationalism and Political Deadlock

The elements of ongoing Cypriot conflict dates back to 1960 when the state of Cyprus was established following the withdrawal of British powers. The new state was formed under the guarantor countries, Greece, Turkey, and Britain, through Zurich and London Treaties. In the following years, the state became dysfunctional following the disagreements between Greeks and Turks over the functioning and constitution of the state. In 1963, a civil war broke out on the island, and it was followed by the initiation of a peacemaking process by the UN. In 1974, the junta in Greece undertook a coup on the island that toppled the president of Cyprus, Makarios III. Turkey responded to the coup with a military operation on the northern part of the island, which was taken under control by the Turkish military and left to the Turkish Cypriot people. In 1983, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was founded, but it has not been internationally recognized

[20] Suhrke and Berdal, *The Peace In Between*, 127.

except by Turkey. The peace initiatives for Cyprus up until now have not been successful. Although there is not any violent conflict on the island today, this issue continues to be a big problem for Cypriot society and for Turkish-Greek relations.[21]

One of the precipitating factors behind the conflict has been the foundation of the nationalist guerrilla organization of National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) and the subsequent creation of Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT). EOKA was a Greek Cypriot organization that sought "the liberation of Cyprus from the British yoke" and the achievement of *enosis* (union with Greece) by appealing to a campaign of terror.[22] It was founded in 1955 by Georgios Grivas, a Cyprus-born colonel in the Greek Army. On the other hand, to protect itself from EOKAs actions, Turkish Cypriot paramilitary organization, TMT, was formed in 1957. TMT was initially supporting the British rule against the threat of *enosis* where they later focused on attaining the idea of *taksim*, the partition of the island between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. They believed that *taksim* would be the only solution to the threat of *enosis*, as expressed by the British Prime Minister Macmillan as well.[23]

Based on the London and Zürich Agreements and two further Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee, Cyprus gained its independence on 16 August 1960 as a one unified state consisting of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The political system of the new state was established based on the ratio of the population that consisted of 77 percent Greek Cypriots

[21] Paffenholz, *Civil Society & Peacebuilding*, 182.
[22] Lawrence Durrell, *Bitter Lemons of Cyprus* (Faber & Faber, 2011), 147.
[23] Adel Safty, *The Cyprus Question: Diplomacy and International Law* (iUniverse, 2011), 44.

and 18 percent Turkish Cypriots.[24] Accordingly, the president would be Greek Cypriot and the vice-president Turkish Cypriot where both possessed the right of veto on legislative matters. The Council of Ministers and the House of Representatives were formed with a seven-to-three ratio of the two communities.

Nonetheless, the political system was not a stable one, and disputes started to arise within a short period of time, mainly because of the veto system that led to a lockdown in the decision-making process. The attempts to eliminate the impediments to the functioning of the government, particularly by lifting the veto power acquired by both president and vice-president, failed. During this period, fighting erupted in Nicosia on December 21, 1963, known as Bloody Christmas, and later spread to other parts of the island. In the 1963-64 conflict overall, 364 Turkish Cypriots and 174 Greek Cypriots were killed, and around 18,667-25,000 Turkish Cypriots from 103 different villages fled from their homes.[25]

To settle down the conflict, an interim peacekeeping force, named the Joint Truce Force was formed by Britain, Greece, and Turkey altogether. The Joint Truce Force was replaced by the UN peacekeeping force, UNFICYP, according to the UNSC resolution passed in March 1964. The following years with peacekeeping efforts and intercommunal talks between the two sides on constitutional matters did not lead to a solution.

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[24] The remaining 5 percent were mainly Armenians, Maronites, Latins, and British. "Euromosaic III: Presence of Regional and Minority Language Groups in the New Member States," *Research Center on Multilingualism at the KU Brussel* (July 24, 2012), 18, https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/4dc487cf-3c39-40ac-9b97-c55110263a56.

[25] Pierre Oberling, *The Road to Bellapais: The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus* (Social Science Monographs, 1982), 120.

The year of 1974 witnessed important events that shaped the destiny of the island. Makarios, who has been president in Cyprus since its independence, had been criticized by the Greek junta administration because of not being a supporter of *enosis* anymore. On July 15, 1974, the leading figure of the Greek junta, Dimitrios Ioannidis, gave the order for the coup d'état in Cyprus. Makarios was overthrown by an EOKA member, Nikos Sampson, who could stay in his position just for eight days.

Following the coup d'état, the Turkish government demanded from the Greek military government to withdraw all its officers and dismiss Sampson. However, the Greek junta did not accept that. Turkey asked the British support for operation under the Treaty of Guarantee, but could not get that support. In the end, the Turkish government decided to act unilaterally based on the Treaty of Guarantee and sent its troops to Cyprus on July 20, 1974. Turkish forces agreed to a cease-fire three days after, the same day when the turmoil in Greece brought a civilian government to power in Athens; that also led to the collapse of the Simpson junta.

Formal peace talks took place between the guarantor states following the cease-fire. However, guarantors could not reach a common solution and this led Turkish forces to act posthaste and resume its operation in the northern territories. Turkish forces ended up controlling an area corresponding to 36 percent of the island. This Turkish military move that extended its control to one-third of the island caused international reactions. In the end, a UN Buffer Zone, also called the Green Line, emerged following the ceasefire of August 16, 1974. The line extends 180 km across the island and divides the capital, Nicosia, into

two.[26] The Green Line was impassable until April 2003 when several crossing points were opened between the north and the south. Since 1974, the island has been *de facto* divided between the Greek and Turkish communities along with UN controlled Buffer Zone and the British Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia covering 254 kilometers square land that corresponds to three percent of the island.

In August 1975, an exchange agreement was signed between the community leaders Rauf Denktaş and Glafcos Clerides in Vienna. Accordingly, 196,000 Greek Cypriots in the north were exchanged with 42,000 Turkish Cypriots who lived in the south.[27] Hundreds of Greek and Turkish Cypriots have gone missing.[28]

In 1975, the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was proclaimed unilaterally by the Turkish Cypriots. Negotiations continued in the following years, but no solution was reached. Finally, on November 15, 1983, the northern administration declared their independence under the name of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The unilaterally declared state has only been recognized by Turkey, hence left TRNC dependent on Turkey in most of its affairs. UNSC passed a resolution following the declaration of TRNC, stating that they do not recognize the newly proclaimed state.[29]

From the declaration of TRNC until the present, several peace talks have taken place with the initiations of the UN. The proposed solutions were based on bicommunal

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[26] UNIFICYP, "About the Buffer Zone," accessed October17, 2017, https://unficyp.unmissions.org/about-buffer-zone.
[27] "Euromosaic III," 18.
[28] Sarah Rainsford, "Bones of Cyprus Missing Unearthed," November 21, 2006, accessed October 17, 2017, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6166560.stm.
[29] UN Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) of 18 November 1983, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/541.

and non-aligned federation state. Although both sides agreed upon creation of a federation state, none of the talks have reached a final solution because of various disputes related to matters like demilitarization, the return of displaced persons and related property issues, and the repatriation of Turkish settlers.

The year 2004 marked another important period for the Cyprus dispute. A new plan was prepared with the initiation by Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General at the time, based on negotiations with the leaders of both communities. The Annan Plan offered a united bicommunal state of Cyprus where each community would have its own parliament in addition to a bicameral parliament on the federal level. In the end, the proposed plan was accepted by both leaders and submitted to referenda in both parts of the island on April 24, 2014. The campaigns in favor of the plan were dominant in the north while campaigns in the south were against it. The results of the referenda have been in accordance with the campaigns. The plan was accepted by 65 percent of the Turkish Cypriots but was rejected by 76 percent of the Greek Cypriots. The Annan plan marked the closest point to a peace settlement in the history of the Cyprus dispute where the communities were very near to implement a solution plan.

Another important event of 2004 came a week after the referendum. On May 1, 2004, Cyprus joined the European Union (EU). Accordingly, the whole of Cyprus island is considered to be a member of the EU, while the northern part was *de facto* excluded. The EU accession of Cyprus was criticized by the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey since it

undermined the peace process.[30] The failure of the Annan Plan and the subsequent disputes prevented further peace negotiations for the coming years. The negotiations and tripartite meetings led by the UN that took place between 2008-2012 and the renewed peace talks that took place in 2014 did not give any result. Similarly, the peace initiatives that took place in 2017 ended with disappointment when negotiators failed to reach an agreement. The main dispute that negotiators could not agree upon was whether the 30,000 Turkish troops would stay on the island based on the guarantor rights.[31] The Turkish side asserts that their right as guarantor state must be maintained in order to protect the rights of the Turkish Cypriots while the Greek side emphasizes the abolition of guarantor rights of the third states so that the island can be demilitarized.

From the approaches of the two sides in the recent negotiations, we see that the communities are not very eager to reach a real solution at this point by making compromises. The peace process turned again to a period of stagnation, which does not serve the trajectory and development of the island well. When diplomatic initiatives at the governmental level remain quiescent, it would be harder for civil society actors to initiate actions that can flourish and influence a wider population.

[30] "Erdoğan: Kıbrıs Rum kesimi nasıl AB üyesi oldu," *Hürriyet*, December 1, 2014, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/erdogan-kibris-rum-kesimi-nasil-ab-uyesi-oldu-277766.
[31] "Cyprus Talks Fail to Deliver Deal," *BBC News*, July 7, 2017, sec. Europe, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40530370.

CHAPTER 3

CIVIC PEACE EFFORTS IN LEBANON AND CYPRUS

3.1. Lebanese Peacebuilding and Emphasis on Shared Memory

Mobilization in civil society peacebuilding efforts in Lebanon mostly dates back to the third phase of the Lebanese Civil War, which defined by Samir Makdisi as dating from the Israeli invasion of June 1982 to the implementation of the 1989 Taif Accords that ended the fights in Lebanon.[32] The foundation of CSOs that focus on peacebuilding began in the last years of the civil war and increased during the following two decades. In this chapter, I will give an overview of the peacebuilding activities in Lebanon together with the data that I have collected from CSOs.

Civil Society in Lebanon

During the civil war in Lebanon that lasted from 1975 to 1990, Lebanese civil society gained strength and independence as a result of the collapse of the central authority and the absence of state services. Today, Lebanon possesses one of the most dynamic civil societies in the Arab world.[33] According to the latest data available, there are 8,311

[32] Makdisi and Sadaka "The Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990," 19.
[33] Oussama Safa, "Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation in the Arab World: The Work of Civil Society Organisations in Lebanon and Morocco," (Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2007), 3, http://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Articles/safa_handbook.pdf.

registered CSOs in Lebanon where 62 percent of them are working at the national level, and 38 percent are community-based.[34] CSOs focusing on peacebuilding have started to arise as of the 1990s and are generally funded by international organizations such as the UNDP, EU, and World Bank.[35]

Furthermore, the increase in pro-democracy funding has led to a decline in volunteerism especially since 2005. Most CSOs are clearly established with the main objective of providing employment for the activists themselves. Most of them are established to receive funds from international donors without having proper visions and development programs. Thus, they work under "international organizations' agenda rather than the actual needs of the community."[36] As a result, while those kinds of CSOs are better funded than before, their performance is weaker compared to the late 1990s.[37]

The Liberal Orientation

Lebanese CSOs whose work is issue-based and aim to create a common network for the shared interest among citizens are mostly funded internationally and are in the crosshairs of liberal criticisms. Donors that support peacebuilding projects in Lebanon are

[34] "Mapping Civil Society Organizations in Lebanon," *Civil Society Facility South* (2015), 53, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/lebanon/documents/news/20150416_2_en.pdf.
[35] Tania Haddad, "Analysing State–Civil Society Associations Relationship: The Case of Lebanon," *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, September 16, 2016, 15, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-016-9788-y.
[36] Dima El Hassan, "Lebanon's Civil Society Sector: A Lost Continent," *The Daily Star*, November 27, 2014, accessed February 13, 2017, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Nov-27/279050-lebanons-civil-society-sector-a-lost-continent.ashx.
[37] Martin Kraft et al., *Walking the Line - Strategic Approaches to Peacebuilding in Lebanon*, (Bonn: FriEnt, 2008), 26, http://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/walking-line-strategic-approaches-peacebuilding-lebanon.

almost all Western organizations or governments. This makes sources of funding of civil society projects as a sign of the affiliation with a liberal agenda. It is stated that this is due to the unwillingness of Arab countries to fund such projects because of their lack of belief or importance attributed to the issues of peacebuilding and human rights.[38] Besides, certain sectors in the Arab world consider those kinds of activities as Western and alien to the local culture. Oussama Safa conveys that Scandinavian and German donors have been found the least problematic for conflict resolution projects in general.[39]

Civil society actors do not seem so bothered by this issue. Those civil society actors that I have interviewed say that donors do not affect the content and implementation of their projects. They say that they come up with projects based on the needs of the community as they observe, and not through recommendations from outsiders. Nevertheless, almost all CSOs are scrutinized by their partners and beneficiaries regarding the sources of their funding. A study on Lebanese CSOs came up with the following finding:

> As for strategies, almost all NGOs' representatives stated that funding agencies shape their goals, objectives, and tactics. Donors often become the target audience and key beneficiaries of the NGOs, allocating the money and resources to cater to certain communities, which serve their own interests rather than those who may need it most. The donors' conditioning of NGOs – even those whose main intentions were to serve the greater good – has further deepened the divisiveness in Lebanon.[40]

[38] Fadi Abi Allam, personal interview, July 19, 2017.
[39] Safa, "Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation in the Arab World," 14-15.
[40] Lina Haddad Kreidie and Hussein Itani, "The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in Tackling Sectarianism and Extremism in Lebanon: Track-Two Diplomacy and Good Governance" *Middle East Review of Public Administration (MERPA),* Spring 2016, (2)1, 17.

However, the background of the donors is not mentioned in the aforementioned study, particularly regarding whether they are international donors or not.

As a comprehensive study on CSOs in Lebanon demonstrates, many civil society actors appreciate and need the intervention of international actors in Lebanon. However, there are several CSOs that are critical towards those international actors. Accordingly, the most cited reasons for this critical perception are the following: [41]

- Lack of transparency of certain international organizations and donors related to their strategies, funds, and mechanisms for disbursement of grants.
- Weak follow-up by international organizations and questions regarding their intent to sustain support until results are achieved.
- Growing resentment because many international organizations do not make use of local human resources and supplies to benefit the community.

From another aspect, the role of the international community and funders has also been assessed as crucial in affecting the nature of associations in Lebanon. Accordingly, the increase in the international funders as of the 1980s made it possible for CSOs to flourish free from state interference, by even making them more powerful than the state itself.[42]

Another point that can be related to the Western orientation in peacebuilding rests upon the training of local experts. In the initial phase, most of the peacebuilding CSOs in Lebanon have received training by CSOs in Northern Ireland, a country where

[41] "Mapping Civil Society Organizations in Lebanon," 121.
[42] Tania Haddad, "Analysing State–Civil Society Associations Relationship," 15.

peacebuilding initiatives have been considered successful during and after the Northern Ireland conflict.[43] Based on this training, the skeleton of the peacebuilding activities is created, which leads to a lot of similarities in the way the workshops are conducted. Although it is the local CSOs, in the end, that create their projects and coordinate them, the methodology that is followed in peacebuilding activities rests upon the same ideas of those conducted outside Lebanon. Nevertheless, the interviewed CSOs do not have such concerns and do believe that their activities take into account the culture and customs of their community and bear fruit for a more united peaceful community.

Components of Lebanese Civil Peace

Antoine Messarra points out four pillars on which Lebanese civil peace is based.[44] These are institutions, collective memory, balanced socio-economic development, and foreign relations. State institutions are the main pillars to sustain dialogue and resolve conflicts in a peaceful manner. In this sense, two basic features of the state are essential, which are a state's exclusive monopoly on organized force and exclusive power over foreign affairs.[45] Secondly, collective and shared memory act as a deterrent force that prevents conflicts to reoccur. Drawing lessons from the Lebanese civil war and following a direction according to these lessons are essential in order not to reproduce the painful experiences of the past. In this sense, Messarra mentions the Swiss example where

[43] Information based on the interviews that are cited in the following sections.
[44] Antoine Messarra, personal interview, July 21, 2017.
[45] Antoine Messarra, "The Four Components of Permanent Civil Peace in Lebanon," *The Peace Building in Lebanon,* (Issue 14, December 2016), 3.

collective memory acts as a safeguard against any conflict. Thirdly, socio-economic rights and policies are unifying components that isolate primary affiliations and provide a less polarized public life. Messarra mentions the necessity of promoting socio-economic development and protecting citizens through focusing on the components of the 4M formula, which are *maskan* (house), *madrasa* (school), *mustashfa* (hospital), and *mustahlek* (consumer).[46] Lastly, considering the impact of foreign nations in the conflicts and their resolutions, Lebanon must adopt a culture of caution in its foreign relations. Other means, such as culture, education, and dialogue programs contribute to civil peace only if they proceed from and lead to these stated four pillars.[47]

Furthermore, to give an overview on peacebuilding in Lebanon, Melhem Khalaf, Professor of Law at the University of Saint Joseph, says that the community-based actions like the summer camps that are organized for children from different regions are sowing seeds in the community, and the fruits will be reaped in the future. Since the results of peacebuilding activities cannot be seen immediately and might take generations to reach their goals, our responsibility should be to sow the seed and assist its growth. Khalaf states that we will be able to enjoy the positive outcome of peace work only by establishing positive ways of interaction and preventing roads that lead to violence.[48]

From this point of view, the following section seeks to present how the civil society actors seek to contribute to form a civil peace in Lebanon. To see how civil society

[46] Antoine Messarra and Rabih Kays, "L'effectivité des conventions internationales en droit interne," (Lebanese Foundation for Permanent Civil Peace, 2016), 17.
[47] Messarra, "The Four Components of Permanent Civil Peace in Lebanon," 3.
[48] *تعالى إلي: تجارب في النشاط اللاعنفي في لبنان*,(Forum Civil Peace Service, 2012), DVD.

peacebuilding is practiced in the Lebanese context today, I have interviewed some of the active CSOs that work at the community level. Community-building training and workshops, summer camps, and school visits are among the activities organized.

Lebanese CSOs in Peacebuilding

a) Lebanese Organization for Studies and Training (LOST)[49]

LOST is a local NGO established in 1997 that works in Lebanon's Baalbek-Hermel region. Assem Chreif, the Vice President of LOST, states that Baalbek-Hermel is a relatively underprivileged area that does not receive the necessary services by local authorities because of being located far from the capital. Although Baalbek-Hermel is a region that consists of people from different sects, mainly Shia, Sunni, and Maronite, the clashes were minimal in this region during the civil war. However, after the assassination of Rafic Hariri in 2005 and the 2006 Israeli War, the sectarian division has been observed in the region where conflict resolution became popular. After establishing a partnership with a German institution, in 2013, LOST has also started to focus on conflict transformation.

In 2009, LOST trainers went to Northern Ireland for a workshop on a comparative study of the conflicts of Lebanon and Northern Ireland, where they were hosted and trained by an NGO who had experience in conflict resolution from the Northern Ireland conflict. After the training, LOST has brought the conflict resolution curriculum used in Northern

[49] Information in this section is gathered from Assem Chreif, personal interview, July 18, 2017.

Ireland to Lebanon, and tailored it according to the needs of Lebanese society, and started workshops on matters like tolerance and respect for others.

The Northern Ireland conflict shows similarity with the Lebanese conflict by being divided into sects, mainly as Protestants and Catholics in the former, and Sunni, Shia, or Christian in the latter. However, the main difference in the Lebanese case is the absence of the walls between sectarian regions, as was the case in Northern Ireland. This case leads to invisible boundaries of segregation in Lebanon. Chreif states that their goal is to lift these psychological barriers that have arisen among villages that are purely Sunni, Shia, or Christian.

After the outbreak of the Syrian war, the focus of LOST's peacebuilding activities shifted from enhancing inter-sectarian relationships to enhancing Lebanese-Syrian relationships, with the aim of preventing the negative perceptions between Lebanese and Syrians, such as labeling each other racist or terrorist. The main reason for this shift rests upon the location and demography of Baalbek-Hermel. The region is located near the Syrian borders and around half of the population in the region consists of Syrian people. In some villages, Syrians outnumber the Lebanese people. As Chreif states, Syrians live in harmony in villages also where sects that they are not affiliated with are dominant.

To sustain social cohesion and peace, LOST prioritizes the principles of being active, accountable, transparent, and apolitical, and it puts emphasis on three missions. Firstly, with the idea that social cohesion is interrelated with local development, LOST focuses on the engagement of Syrians to local development, so they can be more beneficial to society. Secondly, LOST supports setting up local mechanisms like assemblies where

any type of conflict can be discussed and resolved between the two communities. Thirdly, conflict transformation workshops are held for groups of young Lebanese and Syrians separately, consisting of 20-25 people each, on topics like tolerance, solidarity, and mutual respect. Syrians receive training in their camps while Lebanese receive training in the branches of LOST. Once a week, a merging activity is organized where the two groups come together and engage in a social activity, such as a football game. The training lasts twelve weeks.

Based on their monitoring and observations, Chreif states that these communication workshops are working positively and that behavioral changes are observed over the people from both communities. For instance, as he states, cautious behaviors observed in the first weeks do mostly disappear at the later stages. Although it cannot be said that they start to love each other after a duration of twelve weeks of activities, the behavioral change is noteworthy in terms of establishing some sort of solidarity and friendship and creating communication channels between the two communities. They also start to act empathetically to each other. Chreif says that these workshops are conducted throughout the Baalbek-Hermel region by the twelve branches of LOST where similar results have been observed.

Another aim of LOST is to strengthen the regional identity as a supra-identity over the sectarian one in order to unite the people of Baalbek-Hermel that have different sectarian backgrounds. By emphasizing this regional identity, LOST aims to eliminate any tensions that might arise among sects. The founders of LOST are from different sects of the region, and this exhibits the full representation of their community.

Giving unemployment as one of the core reasons for youth's involvement in conflicts, LOST has a unit where they link labor force to the local market. In this sense, they do market assessments and give training on the needed skills to be employed in Baalbek-Hermel. So, they prepare their people to find a job in their region instead of migrating. The education and training programs keep the youth away from the streets, making them less vulnerable to be mobilized by radical groups. Additionally, they give particular importance to youth of their region when it comes to their employment strategy. They have around 600 employers in Baalbek-Hermel where most of them are fresh graduates originally from the region.

LOST has a range of partnerships in Europe and the US. Since they are well known for their activities in their region, they have a trustful relationship with their donors. Chreif states that LOST is knowledgeable about the objectives of their partners. When preparing their projects, they are matching the needs of the local community with offerings of the international NGOs. That's why they do not perceive Western funding as a problem.

b) Permanent Peace Movement (PPM)[50]

Permanent Peace Movement (PPM) is a Lebanese CSO that was founded and started its activities as a university peace group in 1986 when the Lebanese civil war continued. It has initially functioned as a peace group that called for ending violence and conflict. Today, it continues to work for spreading peace culture to prevent conflicts by

[50] Information in this section is gathered from Fadi Abi Allam, personal interview, July 19, 2017.

raising awareness and doing capacity building for institutions, stakeholders, and medium level leaders. Fadi Abi Allam, the co-founder and the president of the PPM, says that their organization works by being aware of the probability of any form of conflict is not low since the existential reasons for the civil war are still socially present.

Allam categorizes PPM's work as knowledge generation, raising awareness, capacity building, networking, advocacy, and lobbying. To raise awareness within the society, they appeal to media, do interviews, and give lectures on peace, dialogue, and solidarity. For capacity building, they work with schools, CSOs, and political parties and organize conflict resolution workshops.[51] Under the category of knowledge generation, they do publications to support a peaceful environment and assist creating songs and documentaries. For instance, one of such documentaries covers the period of 1975 up until the present, seeking to shed light on civil resistance and non-violent activism and the experiences of its protagonists in Lebanon with focusing on the theme of fighting violence with non-violence. Leaders like Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, and Martin Luther King are mentioned as figures that should be taken as models when appealing non-violent activism.[52]

In addition to grassroots activities, they do also engage in international campaigns concerning the state level peacebuilding, such as international campaigns on arms control and the Arms Trade Treaty. Besides, to fight against the production child soldiers, they

[51] PPM has released a manual on the memory of war as a guide to be used on building the path to peace, suggesting lesson plans to be used in workshop and teaching sessions: "Memory to Reconciliation Lesson Plans," *Permanent Peace Movement*, http://fightersforpeace.org/Home/ResourceCenter.

[52] *تعالى إلي: تجارب في النشاط اللاعنفي في لبنان*,(Forum Civil Peace Service, 2012), DVD.

utilize schooling. In this sense, the main target of PPM is youth between the ages of 13 and 18, which is the age group of those who are physically mature and easier to get drawn into fights and conflicts. To fight against the child involvement in armed conflict, PPM pushes the stakeholders to ratify the Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict, which is a protocol signed but not ratified by the Lebanese parliament.[53]

Allam says that they receive positive feedback on their projects where many people that attend the peacebuilding workshop say that they find it beneficial and will look for solutions for the conflicts existing around them. Nevertheless, he also mentions that peace is not something that a few institutions can establish, it is something that everybody should be involved in personally or institutionally. Therefore, the peacebuilding activities should be considered as small shares of contributions within the whole peace effort.

When it comes to challenges, the sustainability of the projects come to the fore. Since the projects are funded for a minimum of six months to a maximum of three years, it generally becomes impossible to maintain the same project when the funding duration is over. This also harms the efficiency of the activities. For instance, the expertise gained by a CSO from a specific project will make them able to maintain the project in a more efficient way. However, when the duration of the project comes to an end, they need to come with a different proposal to get their project funded. On the other hand, the competition for funding is another challenge. Allam says that there are a lot of international NGOs in

[53] Issam Saliba, "Children's Rights: International and National Laws and Practices," (The Law Library of Congress, August 2007), 133.

Lebanon and it makes more difficult for the local NGOs to get funding since international NGOs generally have priority.

Based on the lessons taken from the civil war, Fadi Abi Allam puts forward several points and recommendations that should be followed to sustain peace in Lebanon. Accordingly, he mentions: Understanding the nature of the civil war, thrusting and appealing to the alternative options to violence, researching common values, building partnership with the Ministry of State for Displaced Affairs, changing the profit-loss understanding in the society, focusing on a common destiny, taking lessons from the past and decisions for the future.[54]

Notable points came out in a study done by PPM and Catholic Relief Services where 30 local communities in Lebanon have been interviewed to figure out what factors triggered violence and how the local capacities can contribute to peace. Accordingly, the study found out that the inability of the government to maintain order, widespread availability of weapons, and lack of consequences for those who act against the laws are among the factors that cause increased tensions and violence in Lebanon. Besides, the study also states that current education is not able to change the negative perspectives that exist between ethnic or sectarian groups and that unemployment among youth makes them vulnerable to get involved in criminal actions. In this regard, NGO workers that refuse to get involved in peace work, because they view it as "political," are accused in the report. The study also strongly suggests following the ways that increase connections among

[54] Fadi Abi Allam, "غيض من فيض: تجارب ميدانية في مجال تسوية النزاعات وبناء السلام" *United States Institute of Peace - Regional Facilitators Forum*, 47-51.

people from different groups of identity, such as business, mutual family relationships, and inter-marriage among groups that have historically been in tension.[55]

c) Fighters for Peace (FfP)[56]

Another organization that works for peace in Lebanon is Fighters for Peace (FfP), which was established in 2012 with five ex-combatants and today has reached around 50 ex-combatants from different political, religious, and social backgrounds. It aims to build a sustainable civil peace and a true reconciliation in Lebanon by engaging former combatants, youth, and civil society activists.

The following is from FfP's statement about why they have got together:

> We did not want to see this happen to a new generation of Lebanese youth – we did not want history to repeat itself. We got together and wrote a letter to the youth of today, asking them not to repeat the mistakes of the past – and to realise that in war there are no winners, only losers. Violence only breeds violence, it can never lead to peace. [57]

With this vision, one of their main activities has been the dialogue sessions with the youth of 15-24 years old, who are more eager to carry guns and engage in violence like the ex-combatants. Currently, FfP has reached out around eleven thousand people through 230

[55] "Conflict Resolution through Community-Level Case Studies: Insights from Baalbeck, Beddawi, Minyeh, and Qmatiye," (Catholic Relief Services and Permanent Peace Movement, September 2012).
[56] Information in this section is gathered from Ziad Saab, personal interview, July 25, 2017.
[57] Fighters for Peace, "About Fighters for Peace," accessed September 14, 2017, http://fightersforpeace.org/Home/StoryMission.

dialogue sessions, mostly in secondary schools and universities, where they offered multi-perspective knowledge on the civil war that is not taught in the history books.[58]

Ziad Saab, who is an ex-combatant and the president of Fighters for Peace, says that students are not knowledgeable about the civil war. They have prejudices against people from other sects, mostly because of the worries of their parents. For this reason, they have supported their dialogue sessions with documentary films and plays which are prepared by the youth themselves.

FfP has prepared short documentaries and exhibitions about how they transformed from combatants to peace activists. Besides, FfP has organized summer camps for youth where ex-fighters of Lebanese civil war and fighters of the 2013 Tripoli conflict participated.

Saab points out that the ideas of the politicians and the agendas of political parties should change. Political parties should self-evaluate, admit their role in the civil war, and change themselves accordingly. In this sense, Saab emphasizes the importance of transitional justice by mentioning that forgiveness is not a solution. Since truth is a must for reconciliation, people should speak in front of the courts for the truth to come to light. Otherwise, it would be just ignoring what happened in the past, where hundreds of thousands of people died; and this will not help the future.

> Lebanese youth, who have displayed a knack for inheriting old hatreds and stereotypes, remain the prime engine for today's violence. The violent events have also underscored the sore absence of a genuine memorialisation and reconciliation

[58] Fighters for Peace, "Meet the Ex-Fighters," accessed September 14, 2017, http://fightersforpeace.org/Home/MeetTheExFighters.

process through which the Lebanese remember their past but reconcile for the future.[59]

So, considering the violent events of the post-civil war, Oussama Safa conveys that no lessons seem to be taken from Lebanon's violent past that had gripped the country. To move forward, many Lebanese believe that they must commemorate the war and learn from their recent past that is still very present in people's lives.

3.2. Cypriot Peacebuilding and the Challenge of Bicommunalism

The recently developed civil society in Cyprus is considered weak, politicized, and not fully independent from the state. The number of CSOs in the southern part is estimated to be around 2000 where trade unions, charity organizations, and sports clubs are the fundamental ones. In the northern part, there are around 1200 CSOs where the main actors are trade unions and sports clubs. Most of the CSOs in Cyprus are in the capital Nicosia/Lefkoşa.[60] Except for the period of mass demonstrations regarding the Annan Plan in 2004, the Cypriot civil society has been relatively weak.[61]

Nevertheless, since the early 1990s, the Cypriot civil society has taken a more active role in peacebuilding. In this sense, citizens, citizen networks, scholar-practitioners, CSOs, and labor unions have been the most important actors within peacebuilding

[59] Safa, "Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation in the Arab World," 15-16.
[60] Paffenholz, *Civil Society & Peacebuilding*, 188.
[61] "An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future," (CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for Cyprus – Executive Summary, 2005).

activities.[62] Besides, when we speak particularly on the youth participation in civil society peacebuilding in Cyprus, the following information is worthy of note:

> In both communities the percentage of youths' and youth related organizations exceeds 50 percent (52.3 percent for Turkish Cypriots and 53.1 percent for Greek Cypriots). The picture is positive when we take into account CSOs that specialize in peacebuilding but simultaneously work with youths and their issues. This indicates that youths are an important part of peacebuilding activities in both communities.[63]

In terms of bicommunal relations at the civil society level, business connections come to the fore. There is an efficient interaction of business in Cyprus through chambers of trade and trade unions. Turkish and Greek Cypriot Chambers of Commerce have a great working relationship that seeks to create business between the two communities.[64] Hence, it can be stated that "peace through business" precedes "peace through NGO work" in terms of civil society peacebuilding in Cyprus.

Today, while we can say that bicommunal peacebuilding activities are not at the desired level on the island, projects such as Home for Cooperation, gives hope for more fertile and sustainable peace work. Among tens of active CSOs on peacebuilding, I interviewed three CSOs in person and examined the trajectory of the peacebuilding activities.

a) Home for Cooperation[65]

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[62] Paffenholz, *Civil Society & Peacebuilding*, 191.
[63] Ibid.
[64] "The Role of Business in Peacemaking: Lessons from Cyprus, Northern Ireland, South Africa and the South Caucasus," *The Portland Trust* (August 2013): 12-20.
[65] Information based on my observation and H4Cs website and leaflet, accessed October 3, 2017, http://www.home4cooperation.info.

The Home for Cooperation (H4C) is a cultural center opened in 2011 in Nicosia, Cyprus, in the UN Buffer Zone. The center acts as a social and educational platform and aims to bring people from the two communities together to build a better future in Cyprus. It hosts different NGOs under its platform, all working for peace through bicommunal activities. In order to inspire solidarity and peace, the center hosts a range of bicommunal activities, such as bringing in musicians, artists, and audiences, organizing exhibitions and art galleries, providing classes on art, music, and languages. The center has a small library where you can find books on the Cypriot issue in Greek, Turkish, and English languages. You can see Turkish and Greek Cypriots using the stylishly designed space to come together, study, and socialize while getting their food and drinks from its coffee shop. In this context, H4C represents "a sign of the development of Cypriot civil society in relation to the conflict resolution process."[66]

H4C has attracted a wide range of donors, contributors, and supporters where you can see a list of them on the board at the entrance of the center. Although most of the contributors and supporters, both as individuals and organizations, are from the northern and southern parts of the island, donors are mainly foreign institutions and governments like European Economic Area (EEA) Grants, Norway Grants, Association for Historical Dialogue and Research, UNDP, and the governments of Sweden, Cyprus, and the Netherlands.

[66] Gianfabrizio Ladini, "Peacebuilding, United Nations and Civil Society: The Case of Cyprus," *The Cyprus Review, Vol. 21:2* (Fall 2009), 56.

b) Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD)[67]

The quotation below points out the main reason why SeeD came up as a community initiative. It is important in the sense that, as a starting point, it asks whether more intergroup dialogue is essential, by questioning the impact of peacebuilding programs which is designed based on the limited data from a small number of country experts and consultants. To do so, SeeD engages in peace research by working as a think tank and collaborates with decision makers for the new peacebuilding policies and programs.

> Existing assessment approaches are often challenged when it comes to empirically linking potential drivers of conflict with desired peace outcomes in a way that can help resolve programmatic dilemmas. While conceptual linkages between conflict drivers, programmatic activities and desired outcomes are routinely proposed in everyday peacebuilding practice, these rarely amount to more than untested working hypotheses. As such, lack of evidence-based participatory assessment tools render peace-learning difficult, and hence thwart the impact and effectiveness of peacebuilding and development programmes.[68]

SeeD aims to address the deficits that are found in the assessment process of peacebuilding and comes up with research tools and methods. The Social Cohesion and Reconciliation (SCORE) Index is such a tool designed to examine two main components of peace, which are reconciliation and social cohesion. The gathered data are based on the questionnaires that are administrated by researchers with participants across Cyprus face to face. SCORE Index provides various scores across the districts of Cyprus based on indicators such as trust in institutions, the representativeness of institutions, freedom from

[67] Information in this section is gathered from Anna Koukkides-Procopiou, personal interview, September 4, 2017.
[68] SeeD, "Our Goal," accessed at October 3, 2017, http://www.seedsofpeace.eu/index.php/about-us-1/our-goal.

corruption, and personal and political security. For instance, according to this index, the average score for intergroup contact in 2015 was as low as 2 in the Greek Cypriot population and 2.5 in the Turkish Cypriot population, a score given over 10. However, the scores differ year by year, and currently available for the years 2013-2015.[69]

SeeD is founded by Cypriots, and it consists of people from Turkish and Greek parts of Cyprus, and nationals outside Cyprus. Serving as a semi-academic institution, it promotes the exchange of ideas, seeks to impact policy-making, and carries out policy recommendations. Since SeeD also works outside Cyprus, it makes use of its peacebuilding experiences in the other conflict zones as well.

In her interview, Anna Koukkides-Procopiou, who is a researcher at SeeD, started by saying that the bicommunal activities on the island that have taken place since 1992 have not affected most of the population, mainly due to the fact that the outreach has been minimal. She suggests engaging with people living outside the capital Nicosia in order to increase the impact of peacebuilding activities across the island.

SeeD is among those organizations working under H4C, located in the buffer zone of Nicosia. Koukkides reminds that the word "buffer zone" is called "dead zone" in Greek language and asks whether they as an organization are alienated from the society by being in the "dead zone." The main reason why H4C is in the buffer zone is that this area functions as a neutral zone accessible to both communities.

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[69] "Social Cohesion and Reconciliation (SCORE) Index Executive Report on Cyprus 2015 findings," accessed October 3, 2017, http://www.scoreforpeace.org/files/year/exec_sum/29/SCORE%202015%20Executive%20Brief%20ENGLISH.pdf.

Under the project, "Security Dialogue Initiative," launched by SeeD with its international partners Interpeace and the Berghof Foundation, a new security architecture has been proposed to shed lights on the ways to overcome the impasse on security regarding the Cyprus issue.[70] In this proposal, "endogenous resilience" is a concept indicates that Cypriot society can only resist the causes of conflict through resilience, that is the "capacities that are already embedded within individuals, communities and societies and the relationships among them," as opposed to capacities that are 'built' or cultivated.[71] The resilience concept is based on the idea that a settlement on the island can be sustained "only if a united federal Cyprus develops its own internal capacities to deal with stressors and threats." Accordingly, two points are recommended: First, the creation of a civic loyalty to the federal state and its institutions, rather than just ethnic loyalty to one's community, and, second, international support to ensure the viability of a settlement in this transition period.[72]

Nonetheless, Koukkides mentions that it is important to discern that Turkish and Greek Cypriots are historically two different communities. In order to go further and sustain peace, the communities should accept their differences, instead of pretending that they are same. Terms of equality and sameness should not be confused with each other in this sense.

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[70] "Building Bridges for Sustainable Peace," *Interpeace Annual Report 2016*, accessed October 3, 2017, http://www.interpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/2016-Annual-Report.pdf.
[71] "Assessing Resilience for Peace: A Guidance Note," *Interpeace* (April 2016), 22.
[72] "Innovative security approach informs Cyprus Peace Talks," *Interpeace*, June 29, 2017, accessed October 3, 2017, http://www.interpeace.org/2017/06/innovative-security-approach.

Regarding the deficits of the current process, Mrs. Koukkides mentions the following matters:

- Interaction with grassroots is not as much as it should be. The engagement is more with the foreign stakeholders.

- There is a resistance to the idea of peacebuilding and solution-oriented efforts toward the Cypriot problem. Indifference among youth is high.

- Bicommunal cooperation is low. One of the main reasons behind this is related to the legality issue. For instance, formal cooperation between universities in the north and south is difficult because those in the north are not considered legal by the south. Another reason is that people do not want to leave their comfort zones since bicommunal activities might create some problems for them.

- Lack of honesty at the state-level when talking about a solution for peace.

c) NGO Support Center (NGO-SC)[73]

The NGO Support Centre is a CSO that aims to aid in the development and strengthening of civil society in Cyprus since its establishment in 1999. It provides expertise in the fields of active citizenship, peace and reconciliation, intercultural dialogue, and human rights education. The center is located in the southern part of Nicosia.

[73] Information in this section is gathered from Marilena Kyriakou, personal interview, September 4, 2017.

Marilena Kyriakou, the Project Administrator at NGO-SC, considers civil society peacebuilding vital in the sense that it is perpetual. Even when the peace negotiations stop or reach a deadlock, peacebuilding activities continue at the community level. That's why NGO-SC gives importance on capacity building seminars for NGOs in both communities. However, Kyriakou finds it interesting that the majority of the participants in the last seminar about intercultural dialogue were foreigners living in Cyprus that work on intercultural dialogue. So, the real target was missing.

When it comes to the obstacles in Cypriot peacebuilding, Kyriakou complains about the discrepancy between policymakers and grassroots. The community-level and state-level peace initiatives go in their own way, so the CSOs could not have an impact on negotiations because of this discrepancy and the lack of a mechanism for communication between the two levels. Secondly, another problem that hinders the peace work to be efficient is related to the education system. Since peace activities are not included in the education curriculum, they can just be conducted outside school hours. This hinders peace activities from reaching the youth in general.

d) Association for Historical Dialogue & Research (AHDR)[74]

AHDR is founded in 2003 by a group of history teachers, professors, and activists. Loizos Loukaidis, Educational Programs Officer at AHDR, says that AHDR appeals to

[74] Information in this section is gathered from Loizos Loukaidis, personal interview, September 6, 2017.

history education through dialogue to foster social coherence on the island. The center is located in the buffer zone and works under H4C.

AHDR's two main activities are history and peace education. They are sensitive to history teaching, hence, do not usually touch upon the history of the events of conflict that might create tension between the communities. As a better method, to bring people together, they prefer topics such as gender, history of education, architecture, and fashion.

Another significance of history teaching provided by AHDR is that it touches upon the topics that are not covered in the schools. For instance, as Loukaidis conveys, no one touches upon the history of missing people in Cyprus objectively, generally neglects the missing people on the other part of the island. Similarly, Ottoman history of Cyprus is not taught in the south. So AHDR seeks to teach these parts of the history as well.

Although the need for updating the current education system and curriculum especially in history teaching has usually been brought up through different means, revision of the curriculum and history textbooks have not been prioritized by the Cypriot authorities, a matter which was included in the Annan Plan as well. Huge numbers of the society are dissatisfied with the status quo and consider ethnic nationalism to be one of the major causes of the conflict.[75] This indicates that the majority no longer view nationalism as a viable option for the future of their island. However, current schoolbooks in both parts of the island contain provocative elements inciting ethnic nationalism.[76]

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[75] Maria Hadjipavlou, "The Cyprus Conflict: Root Causes and Implications for Peacebuilding," *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 44, no. 3, (2007): 349–365.
[76] Yiannis Papadakis, *History Education in Divided Cyprus: A Comparison of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Schoolbooks on the "History of Cyprus,"* PRIO Report 2/2008, 5-15.

The center in the buffer zone serves as a meeting point for the youth. Many people get the opportunity to meet with people from the other side of the island for the first time in their life. The workshops and other activities are usually held in English, where sometimes translations into Turkish and Greek are provided when necessary. However, all the publications are published in the three languages: Greek, Turkish, and English.

The main obstacle in the buffer zone is to reach people from all districts of Cyprus. There is a "centralization of the bicommunal activities" in the buffer zone, as Loukaidis refers. He believes that taking the activities outside the buffer zone makes them more efficient. For this reason, AHDR gives most of their peace and history seminars in public schools across Cyprus. Sometimes, they face issues in reaching out to the schools, particularly when the school administrators are conservative. However, since their aim is to reach out to more people, Loukaidis says "if we want a change, we need to reach out to those who are thinking differently from us." Besides, keeping in mind that it is easier for youth to engage in radical groups than in dialogue, AHDR takes youth as the main target group.

Another obstacle that Loukaidis touches upon is the resistance shown by different groups of people, such as resistance from the educational circles. For examples, ministries and teachers usually act in a conservative manner. This case creates difficulties for new peace initiatives. Resistance from parties and churches on anything progressive also cause problems for bicommunal initiatives.

An Overall Assessment

Bicommunal activities are the basis for peace initiatives in Cyprus. Considering the overall success and positive impacts of the bicommunal activities, and the positive feelings that are expressed by the participants, the consensus of the civil society actors is that the activities have a positive contribution to the peace process.[77] However, some disadvantages have been mentioned as well. For instance, bicommunal training conducted by foreign trainers is held in English. This makes people who do not know English ineligible to be part of the event, so eliminates a big part of the communities. Even those who know English to a certain level might not be eligible to express their feelings in a foreign language. This leads to an inability to fully express their feelings during such activities.[78]

Nonetheless, while there are a lot of peacebuilding activities taking place in Cyprus, the real impact of these activities on the bigger peace process is questionable. Although many workshops are held in Cyprus to raise skilled people in conflict management techniques, such seminars cannot go beyond hosting a small elite of activists.[79]

A case study that evaluated the impacts of peacebuilding work in Cyprus demonstrated that the peace initiative programs conducted at many levels do not automatically contribute to peace. Accordingly, although many peace programs have been effective in contributing to peace at the state-level by addressing the key factors of the

[77] Canan Oztoprak, "The Experience of Bi-Communal Contacts Through the Eyes of a Turkish Cypriot: Facts and Fictions," Paper presented at the conference "The Role of Citizen Peacebuilding in Conflict Transformation," University of California, Irvine, June 1-4, 2000.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Ladini, "Peacebuilding, United Nations and Civil Society," 52.

conflict, they were not effective in addressing the driving forces of the conflict, and hence, had little on the overall situation. The case study adds the following:

> Often, programs that had powerful impacts on participants' attitudes and relationships did not lead to activity or changes that to affect a broader constituency of people, and programs working at the elite or grassroots levels were often not linked. Good programs had impact on the local situation, only to see this undermined by national regional developments. In addition, experience showed that peace programs were not linked to each other in ways that improved joint effectiveness, and efforts at coordination did not necessarily result in synergies and increased effectiveness.[80]

Despite the vagueness in measuring the success of civil society peacebuilding, some recommendations have been made to increase the effectiveness of the Cypriot civil society and their peacebuilding work. Accordingly, Direnç Kanol suggests that civil society should shift their focus in four areas. First, they should shift their focus of work from advocacy and intergroup social cohesion to in-group socialization. Secondly, they should focus more on work-related activities than peace talk-related activities. Thirdly, they should seek to attract the interest of the society in a peacebuilding process in a broader way, particularly through utilizing media tools. Lastly, to increase the efficiency of the work, CSOs should act in a more coordinated way when conducting their activities.[81]

Another issue regarding peace projects in Cyprus is related to the absence of institutionalization of the peacebuilding work. This situation prevents the peace initiatives from taking a stable form.

> The main weakness of civil society peacebuilding in Cyprus seems to be the absence of visible structures for bi-communal initiatives. Conflict management workshops did actually take place, NGOs have increased in number on both sides of the buffer zone, and international funding programmes have financed hundreds of

[80] Hadjipavlou and Kanol, "The Impacts of Peacebuilding Work on the Cyprus Conflict," 3.
[81] Direnç Kanol, "Civil Society's Role in Peace-Building: Relevance of the Cypriot Case," *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* Vol 9, No 1, (2010): 43-44.

> projects. All these efforts, however, followed a case-by-case logic which, until now, has not produced any institutionalisation of peacebuilding aims in a social movement able to collect and coordinate single actors' initiatives and multiply the visibility and effectiveness of their peace claims.[82]

In line with emerging peacebuilding ideas and their structuring within the international community, the involvement of Cypriot civil society in peacebuilding efforts has received more attention and funding from the UN than other international organizations since the 1990s. From 1998 to 2005 the UN focused on funding projects of common interest for Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots with the Bi-Communal Development Programme, where around 300 organizations and 220 projects benefited from the program.[83] Besides, funders have played a great role in determining the matters on which peacebuilding projects should focus. For instance, following the 2004 Annan Plan referendums, donors shifted focus from issues of dialogue, rapprochement and federalism to civil society strengthening, sustainable development, environment, education, and youth.[84]

Regarding the Western origin of the funds, those CSOs that I interviewed shared similar kinds of thoughts. Since they believe in and work for peacebuilding as the funders of their projects, they do not see any problem with the current sources of the funds. Koukkides from SeeD mentioned that research findings and conclusions are by no means affected by the donors where academic freedom and professional integrity are safeguarded by the donors with whom they are working. Loukaidis from AHDR said that since their agenda is compatible with the donors, they do not shape their vision according to the

[82] Ladini, "Peacebuilding, United Nations and Civil Society," 53.
[83] Ibid., 51.
[84] Hadjipavlou and Kanol, "The Impacts of Peacebuilding Work on the Cyprus Conflict," 22.

donors. Kyriakou from NGO-SC stated that private companies might be problematic as donors since they might have some requests. However, she stated that because UNs core values are based on human rights, UN-funded projects do not pose any conflict of interests for them.

CHAPTER 4

EVOLUTION OF A PEACEBUILDING BASED ON LIBERAL CONSTRUCTS

To understand how peacebuilding functions today and what makes it insufficient to sustain peace in most of the societies it takes place, the liberal components of peacebuilding should be explored. Firstly, because peacebuilding is defined and framed based on its function as a responder to violence, what we understand from the concept of violence has prime importance. While it is claimed that peacebuilding should take place when the violence is de-escalated (usually following a peacekeeping mission), such a gradation analysis is problematic in the sense that it approaches violence as a technical concept that has explicit starting and ending points. Secondly, since a vital role is attributed to civil society as the fundamental actor of peacebuilding, how the notion of civil society is understood and how its actors function against violence and conflict determine the liberal and non-liberal framework of peacebuilding. Thirdly, with a rising central role attributed to youth following its transformation as a category of violent actors to peace builders, criticisms emerged indicating how the category of youth indeed serves the interests of elite together with its overpromotion in the contemporary era. From this point of view, by analyzing the associated approaches in the literature, this chapter seeks to illuminate why these three concepts – violence, civil society, and youth – function as the liberal components of peacebuilding and, thus, make peacebuilding activities incapable to effectively address the causes of conflicts.

4.1. Understanding Violence

Peacebuilding is one of the methods that seeks to respond to violence and hinder it. Thus, before discussing peacebuilding itself, it is important to comprehend how the concept of violence is approached in the literature and how it is perceived by peacebuilding actors. The sources on peacebuilding rarely give attention to this concept; as though there was universal consensus on the definition and understanding of it. Thus, I find it important to ponder the concept of violence, particularly to see the liberal connotations and functions that this term started to possess in the modern era. Rather than a descriptive approach, I'm going beyond in this chapter and analyzing some scholars' reflections who are critical of the concept.

Critical Assessments on the Violence Concept

In his reflections on violence, Talal Asad conveys Steven Pinker's idea that the modern world has proportionally become far less violent (more civilized) than at any time in history.[85] Accordingly, he explores the paradoxes in the modern liberal order where violence can be used in the name of humanitarianism to subdue violence. He also questions how the use of any degree of violence is justified in the name of humanitarianism and the sovereign state when the "collective ongoingness" is seen to be threatened. In this sense,

[85] Steven Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature* (New York, 2011).

acts of violence or "organized" violence have been considered as the means for pacification and security.[86]

However, who has the responsibility to protect and secure peace? In other words, who has the right to use violence in a legitimate way? The ambiguity and the complexity of the language of law makes it possible for states and the international community to behave in coercive manners legally. Asad refers to this situation as the violence of sovereignty and asks why the imminence of massive state violence does not provoke horror as the violence committed by other actors. Accordingly, he conveys why moderns find the unrestrained killing by murderers and barbarians shocking:

> Moderns believe that unlike barbarians and savages, civilized fighters act within a legal-moral framework; the law of war is a crucial way of restraining killing, in manner and in number. Barbarians do not have such a framework. Not only do they not have external rules to restrain them, they have no conception of redemption (or secular regret) after having killed.[87]

This case is reflected by the rationalist structuralist school of thought, where violence is viewed as a legitimate response to injustice and social inequality. In this school of thought, war is considered just, as long as it is aimed at "ending the other more subtle war of poverty and exploitation."[88]

Talal Asad takes the issue further and views the sacredness attributed to the Leviathan state as grounds for a nuclear war. In this sense, a state's claim of eternal life

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[86] Talal Asad, "Reflections on Violence, Law, and Humanitarianism," *Critical Inquiry* 41 (Winter 2015): 405, https://doi.org/10.1086/679081.
[87] Ibid., 412.
[88] Paul Richards, *No peace, no war: an anthropology of contemporary armed conflicts*, (Oxford: Ohio University Press, 2005), 78.

makes it entitled to defend itself by any possible means, even by waging or threatening to wage a nuclear war during which many lives could be lost.[89] This causes the paradoxical modern understanding of sovereignty and leads us to question the problematic relationship between violence and legitimacy.

Even when we go beyond the notion of state sovereignty and accept the international community (that again consists of "sovereign" states) as the only authority that legitimates war (violence), then we have to deal with other issues, like whether "humanitarianism" for intervention can actually be applied or not. For instance, this law was applied strictly in Kosovo – even without seeking authorization of the UN Security Council (UNSC) – and in Libya. In other countries like Rwanda and Bosnia, the international community's approach was more indifferent; as was also the case in the recently observed Syrian conflict.

Regarding the relativism of the concept of violence, Steven Salaita ironically says that "Arabs never have good reason to commit violence and are thus irrational, while Americans would never be irrational enough to commit violence without good reason." He links this case with the fact that all Arab violence is terrorism according to the Western media.

> Why, for example, are American commentators so certain that Hizbullah is a terrorist organization but withhold that designation from, say, American soldiers who commit atrocities (Abu Ghraib, Haditha) or Israeli settlers in the West Bank, who squat on stolen land and organize mobs to murder Palestinian civilians?[90]

[89] Asad, "Reflections on Violence, Law, and Humanitarianism," 421.
[90] Steven Salaita, *The Uncultured Wars: Arabs, Muslims and the Poverty of Liberal Thought: New Essays* (Zed Books, 2008), 7.

The answer to this question relies again on the modern understanding that violence has undertaken. While violence that is not demanded by the West is attributed to non-state actors, and thus considered as illegitimate, violence that is supported or not sought to be prevented is mostly committed by the states.

Johan Galtung takes the issue beyond the notion of state and puts forward the concept of "cultural violence" which he defines as aspects of culture that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence. He exemplifies cultural violence by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science. As an example, he asks why is murder on behalf of the country considered acceptable while murder on behalf of oneself is considered wrong. Accordingly, he says that violence studies deal with two issues: the use of violence and the legitimization of the use of violence. He argues that cultural violence makes direct and structural violence look right, thus renders violence acceptable in society.[91] States and societies appeal to cultural violence to legitimize their use of any kind of violence. All wars and killings in wars are somehow legitimized by states and people in the name of defending a nation, religion or ideology, etc. This case renders the limits of violence and our understandings of it ambiguous. It also makes the way in which we should deal with violence and conflicts appear to be ambiguous. Thus, it creates a more troublesome field in conflict and peace research.

Jacob Mundy points out important criticisms on the current understanding of violence and international conflict management. He states that the managerialism that is

[91] Johan Galtung, "Cultural Violence," *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no. 3 (August 1, 1990): 291, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343390027003005.

derived from an apolitical understanding of the world evades questions of power, geography, and history. Thus, this managerialism does not reduce violence, rather makes it worse, where its putative success arises out of the catastrophes that it inadvertently helped to create.[92] According to Mundy, the initial problem with the mainstream approach to conflicts lays in the linear way that conflicts produce scientific studies which in turn produce recommendations that then produce strategies of management. Instead, the elements of conflict, science, and management should be treated as dialectically interactive and ultimately co-constitutive.[93]

The failure of today's neoliberal strategies of conflict management can be seen ostensibly in the case of Algerian violence, or the case of ambivalent nonintervention, as Mundy names it. The new humanitarianism of the 1990s had de-humanitarianized Algeria's violence and determined it to be unworthy of international humanitarian action to protect civilians from being slaughtered. In other words, the invented traditions of neoliberal conflict management strategies, like the new humanitarianism approach, are planned to validate and legitimize the "postconflict environment." In this sense, from South Africa to Morocco to Rwanda, the reconciliation process has functioned largely as a way of establishing a political order that profoundly remains unjust.[94] Through reconciliation commissions, transitional justice has transformed post-conflict justice into a "morality play that has obfuscated history and power in the name of neoliberal peacebuilding."[95]

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[92] Jacob Mundy, *Imaginative Geographies of Algerian Violence: Conflict Science, Conflict Management, Antipolitics*, (Stanford University Press, 2015), 9.
[93] Ibid., 11.
[94] Ibid., 25.
[95] Ibid., 165.

Nevertheless, while current frameworks for understanding and managing violence and post-conflict environment mentioned above are indicated as neoliberal, Mundy states that they should not necessarily be viewed as neoliberal anymore. Accordingly, biopolitics and securitization have overtaken neoliberalism as the hegemonic project of state administration and global governance, and neoliberalism had a great role in the articulation of this new system:

> These operations of power, along with their antipolitical imaginations and effects, seem to be working within the globalizing sovereignty that Hardt and Negri call *empire*. The driving force behind today's imperialism is exclusively neither state power nor economic power, neither US hegemony nor the totalization of capitalism. Today's regime of global rule is instead *biopolitical* insofar as it has gone beyond the modernist project of securing states to the postmodernist project of securing human welfare, if not life in general.[96]

The incapability of conflict science and management on affecting today's conflicts rests mainly upon the fact that "contemporary understandings of late warfare, and efforts to manage it are embedded within a globalizing regime of antipolitical knowledge and power that neither the science nor management of mass violence is able to recognize, account for, or affect."[97] However, despite this antipolitical understanding in conflict management, there is a common agreement on the decline in violence worldwide, which is not easy to explain why. Today is considered much more peaceful than before when compared with the wars and violence that occurred in the past, particularly in terms of casualties.[98]

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[96] Ibid., 28.
[97] Ibid., 168.
[98] Max Roser, "War and Peace," Published online at OurWorldInData.org, 2016, accessed September 19, 2017, https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace.

Violence and Intercommunal Relations

The main rationale behind peacebuilding is to prevent the elements of the uprising of possible conflicts and violence through supporting interpersonal and intercommunal relations and engagement in a peaceful manner. Within the peace literature, there is a commonly held view that any robust engagement promotes peace within societies that are divided because of their different sects or ethnicities. Absence or weakness of engagement in those societies opens space for ethnic violence.[99] In this sense, communally integrated lives and belief systems have often been regarded as a source of tension and conflict rather than peace.[100]

To better understand the impact of engagements within a society, Ashutosh Varshney divides these engagements into two, as organized (associational forms of engagement, formal) and quotidian (everyday forms of engagement, informal). Based on his studies in Muslim and Hindu neighborhoods in India, he argues that interethnic and associational forms of engagement turn out to be stronger than everyday engagement. When there is a rise in associational networks that cut across ethnic boundaries, it becomes harder for politicians to polarize communities.[101]

Another point that Varshney mentions is the failure of the existing literature in distinguishing concepts of ethnic violence and ethnic conflict. He says that conflicts over

[99] Ashutosh Varshney, "Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond," *World Politics, Vol. 53, No. 3* (Apr., 2001), 363. By ethnic, I refer to the racial and linguistic identity. For a more inclusive definition of ethnic, see Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 41-54. His definition covers all ascriptive group identities such as race, religion, language, tribe, and caste.
[100] Ibid., 388.
[101] Ibid., 363.

factors like identity, policies, and resources are normal in an ethnically plural society that allows free expression of political demands. But, these conflicts may not necessarily lead to violence. Therefore, ethnic peace should be conceptualized as an absence of violence, not as an absence of conflict. What indicates the difference between the two concepts depends on whether the mobilization or conflict is waged through institutionalized channels.

> The real issue is whether ethnic conflict is violent or waged via the polity's institutionalized channels. If ethnic protest takes an institutionalized form – in parliaments, in assemblies, in bureaucratic corridors, and as nonviolent mobilization on the streets – it is conflict but not violence. Such institutionalized conflict must be distinguished from a situation in which protest takes violent forms, rioting breaks out on the streets, and in its most extreme form civil war ensues or pogroms are initiated against some ethnic groups with the complicity of state authorities.[102]

Nevertheless, while the scope of peacebuilding depends on what you aim to take out of it, such as negative or positive peace,[103] the general acceptance lies on eliminating the means that might stimulate any conflicts to arise. In this sense, whether ethnic peace should refer to the absence of conflict, is a contentious issue. However, since all peacebuilding effort is somehow based on social engagement, organized or quotidian, the quality of these efforts and their impact on preventing violence should be further empirically studied. We should keep in mind that it is not yet possible to come up with proper and coherent generalizations based on the studies that have been conducted on this matter so far, especially due to the scarcity of such studies and challenges in assessing the quality and impact of peacebuilding activities.[104]

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[102] Ibid., 366.
[103] Positive and negative peace are terms coined by Johan Galtung. While negative peace refers to the "absence of organized collective violence," positive peace is, in addition to the absence of violent conflict, the preservation of the communal values such as justice, cooperation, and pluralism. Johan Galtung, *Theories of Peace: A Synthetic Approach to Peace Thinking*, (International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1967).
[104] Varshney, "Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society," 379.

Since most of the civil society activities such as camps and workshops correspond to the quotidian aspect of social engagement, they are less prone to create resilient peace. For these kinds of efforts to be more successful and sustainable, they should be supported by ancillary mechanisms that can transform these efforts to the associational form of engagement.

Those CSOs that are interviewed as case studies handle the notion of violence from a different aspect. With the understanding that violence only breeds violence and that it can never lead to peace, they put emphasis on non-violent activism and mention the importance of taking lessons from the history in order to see that violence does not bring any benefit to the people.

> Violence is a reaction to fear. So, we must work together to eliminate that fear. Deriving from the determination to build confidence and construct bridges between people, we come to realize that violence is useless and unacceptable. Violence abolishes all love and positive thoughts.[105]

From this perspective, CSOs seek to read the notion of violence through the notion of non-violence. In order not to escalate the conflict, violence should be fought by non-violent activism. This idea has been the starting point of most of the CSOs prior to their establishment. On the other hand, we should keep in mind that putting much stress on non-violence brings the danger of putting justice and retaliation on the back burner as it happened following the Lebanese civil war. Since violence is being used as a tool to counter injustices in cases where states are not able to provide justice, the absence of violence in a society does not necessarily indicate that peace and justice are satisfied. For

[105] *تعالى إلي: تجارب في النشاط اللاعنفي في لبنان*,(Forum Civil Peace Service, 2012), DVD.

instance, while the amnesty law passed following the Lebanese civil war functioned as a pacifying tool for the physical violence, it did not solve the conflict itself, thus left political violence ongoing. In that case, while an amnesty law might stop one aspect of violence, it can bring out other aspects of violence. Therefore, the notion of violence should be considered with its all aspects. More importantly, what more matters is how the community engaged in violence perceives the notion of violence.

4.2. Peacebuilding and the Emergent Critical Approach

According to the study by Institute for Economics and Peace, violence costs 12.6 percent of world's gross domestic product. Many countries spend more money and effort to respond to conflict than to prevent it.[106] This creates one of the grounds which the idea of peacebuilding and conflict prevention is based on: to prevent conflict before it emerges (again) by eliminating its driving causes.[107]

Peace research as a normative and interdisciplinary policy-oriented academic field was established in the late 1950s and early 1960s where related academic journals were founded that gave momentum to the debate over peacebuilding.[108] However, peacebuilding as a term was brought into the literature on peace by Johan Galtung in 1975 with his essay "Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding." In this

[106] "Global Peace Index 2017 Report," *The Institute for Economics and Peace*, 3.
[107] "Peace-Building Can Be Powerful Deterrent to Conflict, Security Council Told," accessed December 19, 2017, http://www.un.org/press/en/2001/SC7007.doc.htm.
[108] Thania Paffenholz, *Civil Society & Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), 44.

essay, Johan Galtung suggests peacebuilding as an associative approach that stresses cooperative action. He points out the necessity of finding structures that remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur.[109]

Peacebuilding is a broad term that refers to the actions in the process of achieving peace.[110] Although the term peacebuilding was in use in peace studies, it has become widespread after the release of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's landmark report *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992. In this report, Boutros-Ghali introduces four concepts: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and what he calls "post-conflict peacebuilding." Boutros-Ghali distinguishes these interrelated concepts by defining preventive diplomacy as the way of resolving disputes before violence breaks out, and peacemaking and peacekeeping as the means to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. Accordingly, if successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peacebuilding, which he defines as "the action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."[111]

However, the 1992 UN report presents a narrow definition of peacebuilding by focusing on stabilizing negative peace. With the perception at that time that most past conflicts were proxy conflicts of the cold war, there was a higher hope for a peaceful world with the end of the cold war. However, this optimism came to an end with the wars in

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[109] Johan Galtung, "Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding," in *Peace, War and Defense: Essays in Peace Research; Vol. 2*, ed. Johan Galtung (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1976): 298.
[110] Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization* (SAGE Publications, 1996), 271.
[111] An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111, June 17, 1992, para. 21.

Somalia, Yugoslavia, and Rwanda in the following years. Thus, a reconceptualization of peacebuilding was made with a supplement to *An Agenda for Peace* in 1995 where peacebuilding as a concept acquired a broader meaning that covered elements of negative and positive peace.[112]

John Paul Lederach, one of the key scholars in peace research, has aimed to broaden the term peacebuilding by setting up a wider framework for building peace. In his book published in 1997, he defines peacebuilding as a broad concept that "encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships."[113] One of his key contributions to the field is his understanding of *conflict transformation*. Instead of the term "resolution," he proposes to use "transformation" for the process of managing conflicts. He views conflict as a natural part of human experience and relationships and sees it as a life-giving opportunity to grow, rather than as a threat. Accordingly, this transformational approach views peace as centered and rooted in the quality of relationships where the main goal of the approach is to build a constructive change out of the energy created by the conflict.[114]

The elaborations of peacebuilding within international relations theories like realism, idealism, structuralism, and poststructuralism do not give an explicit theoretical framework to comprehend the elements of peacebuilding and the role it plays. However,

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[112] Paffenholz, *Civil Society & Peacebuilding*, 45-46.
[113] John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1997), x.
[114] John Paul Lederach, *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation: Clear Articulation of the Guiding Principles by a Pioneer in the Field* (Good Books, 2003), 14.

some specific schools of thought on peacebuilding give a clearer perspective on its framework. Paffenholz has identified these schools under five categories by also considering the previous classifications presented by Spurk and Richmond. Accordingly, *the conflict management school* focuses on those in power, so aims to end conflicts through diplomatic initiatives and negotiated settlements. The school was criticized for often ignoring the facilitation by internal and external actors by focusing solely on the top leadership of the conflicting parties. *The conflict resolution school* focuses on rebuilding relationships at the interpersonal level by working with grassroots and civil society actors, and benefits from tools such as conflict resolution workshops. It was criticized for being a part of the liberal peace toolkit and by the assumption that building relationships at the grassroots level does not mean that it will spread to the national level and end the conflict. *The complementary school* tries to find a balance between the conflict management and conflict resolution schools by saying that conflict resolution approach is more appropriate when conflict is in the early escalation phase where conflict management is relevant when the conflict escalates. The main criticism of this school is that it does not address the issue of coordination by avoiding the fact that different levels of interventions can take place at the same time. *The conflict transformation school* recognizes the existence of irresolvable conflicts and hence uses the term "transformation" instead of "resolution." In this sense, John Paul Lederach has proposed to build long-term infrastructure for peacebuilding by empowering the midlevel individuals and groups which are assumed to influence peacebuilding at the macro and grassroots levels. This approach has been criticized as lacking a power analysis as well as placing the focus on middle level actors which might

not work in all societies.[115] *The alternative discourse* places emphasis on the fact that the peacebuilding discourse is trapped in the dominant discourse of liberalism where only liberal peace is accepted as a model. Peacebuilding schools are considered as power tools that attempt to discipline and normalize. This approach numbers among the critical approaches mentioned following. One of its main critiques is that while it criticizes the notion of liberal peace, it is not able to put forward an alternative model.[116]

After the failure of creating sustainable peace with the peace operations of the 1990s, sustained debate has emerged in academic and policy circles around the value and validity of the 'liberal peace' approach to international intervention. Tadjbakhsh and Richmond have broken down the diverse critical approaches into a typology consisting of at least five key types:

> *Communitarian critiques* – problematizing liberal assumptions of universal values; *social constructivist critiques* – arguing that liberal peace approaches are too technical and depoliticised, ignoring the role of values and identity; *critical international theory approaches* – highlighting the hegemonic power relations and interests involved in international interventionist missions; *post-modern frameworks* – which deconstruct the liberal assumptions of universalising progress towards a single form of modernity, the technocratic frameworks of liberal rationality, and the inscriptions of hegemonic forms of sovereignty; and *post-colonial critiques* – which challenge the divisions between the global and the local, focus on local context, and highlight the hybrid nature and outcomes of interventionist practices.[117]

In this regard, Roland Paris argues that we need to go beyond the liberal peace debate by pointing out that there is no viable and attractive alternative approach to liberal

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[115] A. B. Fetherston, "Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: A Reconsideration of Theoretical Frameworks," *International Peacekeeping* 7, no. 1 (March 1, 2000): 207, https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310008413825.
[116] Paffenholz, *Civil Society & Peacebuilding*, 51-56.
[117] Campbell Susanna et al., *A Liberal Peace?: The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding* (Zed Books, 2011), 1-2.

peace. Oliver Richmond suggests that the alternative to liberal peace should be the 'post-liberal peace' which is characterized by a recognition and respect for difference. Roger Mac Ginty, who proposes the concept of hybridity as an alternative, says that the main challenge for alternative forms of peace is that they usually are regarded as illegitimate or deviant.[118]

The critical approaches are developed based on the assumption that the peacebuilding record has been disappointing since the end of cold war. It is argued that liberal peacebuilding produces destabilizing side effects and that post-conflict operations have so far produced more harm than good. From this point of view, the new generation of peacebuilding efforts has been criticized for "shortcomings in implementing its liberal goals, for ignoring the societal and human consequences on the ground and for being a top-down, Western, external intervention."[119] Moreover, others have taken the discussion further and claimed that liberal peacebuilding is prone to be destructive and illegitimate by portraying these initiatives as a form of "Western or liberal imperialism that seeks to exploit or subjugate the societies hosting the missions."[120]

In this sense, Roland Paris takes a stand against these kinds of negations, by also warning at the same time against the 'rosy pro-liberalization' rhetoric that has been

[118] Ibid., 160, 215, 226. Hybrid refers to a state of affairs in which liberal and illiberal norms, institutions, and actors co-exist. It refers to the idea that local actors, norms, and institutions are much more varied and can be liberal, illiberal, or a combination of both and involve a wide range of actors, including warlords, local chiefs, community groups, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Roberto Belloni, "Hybrid Peace Governance: Its Emergence and Significance," *Global Governance* 18, no. 1 (2012): 21–38, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23104298.
[119] Hanna Leonardsson and Gustav Rudd, "The 'local Turn' in Peacebuilding: A Literature Review of Effective and Emancipatory Local Peacebuilding," *Third World Quarterly* 36, no. 5 (May 4, 2015): 825–39, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1029905.
[120] Susanna et al., *A Liberal Peace?*, 31.

dominating the peacebuilding discourse. He is critiquing the liberal critiques by saying that they are exaggerated, misdirected, unwarranted, and imprudent. He puts stress on that critical theory per se does not imply that liberal peacebuilding should be fully rejected. Accordingly, his claim is that despite the flaws of peace initiations implemented since 1990s, they have done more good than harm and embraced the people under conflicts in one way or another.[121]

From this point of view, when we look at the critical literature in general and its offers to peace efforts, we can see that the emphasis rests on restraining the role of external actors and increasing the role of grassroots and local actors. However, issues like to what degree should external actors interfere in peacebuilding and how reliable are the local actors in building peace who have been parts of the conflict, are contested. In the same vein, the danger of romanticizing traditional or indigenous practices has been pointed out as well.[122]

Another issue is about the values on which the community should be built in the post-conflict environment. The examples of failure in the recent history of peace missions harmed the alleged universalist assumptions of liberal values and demonstrated that liberal peacebuilding is not suitable for all cases. Should a 'good governance,' which is based on a political system where democracy and free markets are the core elements, be the primary target of peace initiatives to build a sustainable peace? Literature that criticizes liberal

[121] Ibid., 32.
[122] Ibid., 164.

standards and views them as the tools of interventionists still fails to offer a complete alternative. This point renders the critical approaches immature.

A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report states that no amount of foreigners' technical support can substitute for local capacity because these supports tend to impede progress due to their overwhelming impulse to deliver functional expertise.[123] Mac Ginty considers this report as a sign of optimism as the UN recognizes its positionality and allows deviation from the technocratic path.[124] However, while UNDP stresses restoring national capacities and local ownership in situations of fragility and conflict, it also emphasizes the necessity of monitoring and partnership between local and UN entities in order to prevent the local capacity to digress from the UN agenda. Thus, the stress on 'local' does not necessarily bring in the needs or expectations of the 'local,' but it can be viewed as an alternative way of sustaining the liberal agenda in the post-conflict environment. For instance, it is stated from this perspective that the UN has been viewed in the Arab world as a hostile entity with a political, security, and development agenda that represents Western interest.[125]

A study on the Lebanese case asserts that liberal interventions are likely to have illiberal outcomes. Accordingly, Marie-Joëlle Zahar argues that the illiberal outcomes that Lebanese politics deplore today are partly due to the Western liberal intervention that took shape in 2004 with UNSC Resolution 1559. From the elements that are usually associated

[123] "Governance for Peace: Securing the Social Contract," UNDP Report (2012), 43.
[124] Roger Mac Ginty, "Routine Peace: Technocracy and Peacebuilding," *Cooperation and Conflict* 47, no. 3 (August 22, 2012): 287–308, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836712444825.
[125] Karim Makdisi and Vijay Prashad, *Land of Blue Helmets: The United Nations and the Arab World* (Univ of California Press, 2016), 11.

with a liberal intervention, Zahar mentions examples such as holding perpetrators accountable, dealing forcefully with illiberal forces and spoilers, and fostering democratic politics. As Zahar argues, contrary to the Syrian intervention that stabilized Lebanon, Western intervention has harmed Lebanon's internal stability where neither intervention has sought to "strengthen national harmony or to help the Lebanese build a sense of common belonging and identity."[126]

Furthermore, when the topic is narrowed down to the role of civil society actors in building peace, other issues of the liberal approach are encountered. For instance, in his critical inquiry to the field, Nikolas Kosmatopoulos remarks the case of conflict resolution workshops which he refers to them as the flagship techniques of peace expertise. He uses the term "workshopping of peace" to refer to the idea that issues of past and future violence can be effectively addressed within "secluded spaces" of conflict resolution workshops and questions "how conflict resolution has historically evolved from a single tool among many of the antiwar movements in the late 1980s to a professional field in its own right by the end of the 2000s."[127]

Besides, to enhance the influence of international peace efforts, Kosmatopoulos notes the main problems in the field and offers notable solutions through a thorough research agenda. Accordingly, he notes that global peace governance does not embrace external scientific research and lacks a historical background in its widespread practices. To

[126] Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver P. Richmond, *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding* (United Nations University Press, 2009), 303.
[127] Nikolas Kosmatopoulos, "The Birth of the Workshop: Technomorals, Peace Expertise, and the Care of the Self in the Middle East," Public Culture 26, no. 3 74 (September 21, 2014): 533.

overcome these issues, junior researchers should be involved in peace governance, an empirically grounded and historically informed research agenda should be set, and qualitative fieldwork should be undertaken.[128]

An Inquiry for Alternative Approach

Although critics of liberal peacebuilding emphasize the need for alternative approaches that are not liberal-oriented, they have not been able to present a realistic alternative. In the end, either they embrace other variants or 'softer' versions of liberal peacebuilding, or they favor terminating peacebuilding work altogether.[129] Those who argue in favor of strengthening the local without or with minimal international intervention think of a locally constructed peace environment based again on liberal principles. Roland Paris initiates the idea that although the current liberal approach does not offer a functional way towards peace, alternative approaches so far are not suggesting a more reliable one. So, he ends with the suggestions to reform and develop the current liberal framework instead.[130]

Since liberalism and internationally supported liberal peacebuilding are state-centric, an alternative way of community building has not yet been possible.[131] Although great praise has pointed to the role of civil society in building peace, civil society's impact

[128] Nikolas Kosmatopoulos, "Pacifying Lebanon - Towards a Research Agenda on Global Peace Governance," Filmed 7 May 2012 at the American University of Beirut. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BiHL_acXd1M.
[129] Susanna et al., *A Liberal Peace?*, 159.
[130] Ibid., 167-168.
[131] Ibid., 215.

has been marginal. The international community has placed the state at the center in building the post-conflict environment. Through economic reforms and development programs imposed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, state-centrism has been the preferred way for the international community to control the post-conflict environment and impose liberal principles. As a result, other organizations or movements that work out of this framework have been internationally marginalized or considered illegitimate. Those non-state actors involved in violent fighting and are against the agendas of liberal actors have been labeled as terrorist organizations. As a result, countering liberalism in a 'liberal' manner and leading to an alternative way of community building has not been possible.

In this context, Roger Mac Ginty is seeking to exhibit an alternative approach by giving an example from the Lebanese case. This example illuminates how a possible alternative of peacebuilding is prone to be considered undesirable and illegal. Accordingly, Mac Ginty states that Hezbollah, the Shiite political and militant organization, can be considered as resistance to the liberal way of building peace and a provider of an alternative. It has its own infrastructures and provides public services where the state is not able to offer them. After the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war, it followed its own reconstruction project called *Waad*, where it sought to empower the local residents and rebuild the southern suburbs of Beirut, Dahieh, the neighborhood where Hezbollah is dominant. The project had a total budget of 400 million dollars and was arguably funded mostly by Iran.[132]

[132] "Hezbollah Spends Millions to Rebuild Beirut Stronghold," Dawn.com, March 29, 2009, http://www.dawn.com/news/822061.

In comparison with its liberal counterparts in Lebanon, the *Waad* initiative has completed its reconstructions more quickly.[133] However, because of being undertaken by Hezbollah, the US State Department designated the *Waad* project under Executive Order that includes the US list of groups and individuals that are linked to terrorism.[134]

In the end, the reconstruction after the war has been conducted by an amalgam of funding from liberal and non-liberal peacebuilding projects. Roger Mac Ginty refers this case to a hybrid form of reconstruction and a rough form of conflict management, a hybridity that comes from the interaction in which both the liberal and non-liberal actors can create or impose their versions of peacebuilding projects.[135] However, the coherence and stability of such hybridity are questionable in the sense that it does not offer a certain framework.

4.3. Civil Society and Peacebuilding

Being a concept of Western origin, putting forward a universal definition of civil society is hard. In this sense, the applicability of this term to the non-Western world is contested. For instance, Hasan Hanafi states that civil society is far from being realized in

[133] Zainab Yaghi, "Beirut's Southern Suburbs Rise from the Ashes of War," Al-Monitor, May 11, 2012, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/business/2012/05/270-buildings-for-400-million-th.html.
[134] "Executive Order 13224," U.S. Department of State, accessed October 25, 2017, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/122570.htm.
[135] Richmond and Mitchell, *Hybrid Forms of Peace*, 212, 223.

most of the Muslim world. However, he argues that most of its key features may be found in Islamic ethical theory.[136]

By deriving a definition based on the modern understanding of the term, Van Rooy defines civil society as "the population of groups formed for collective purposes primarily outside of the State and marketplace."[137] In this sense, CSOs may cover a wide range of institutions and groups such as charities, trade unions, and cooperatives. Although non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are sometimes discussed interchangeably as CSOs, the thesis considers them as a part of the category of CSOs, since NGOs are distinguished from organizations like trade unions and professional associations, which are considered among CSOs. Since the term NGO is more commonly used in the literature, particularly when the field of peacebuilding is referred to, I will use the term NGO for this section.

In this section, I seek to explore how civil society has been a liberal construct of peacebuilding through NGOs. I touch upon the criticisms on how NGOs are dependent constructs that carry Western agendas, and I compare them with the stance of the civil society actors interviewed.

NGOs as the Actors of Peace Industry

The construction of civil society in peacebuilding has been based on the liberal understanding of peacebuilding. The creation of liberal markets is considered as the guarantor of peace, an assumption dating back to Kant (1795), and supported by a great

[136] Simone Chambers and Will Kymlicka, *Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society* (Princeton University Press, 2002), 172.
[137] Alison van Rooy, *Civil Society and the Aid Industry* (Routledge, 2013), 30.

number of academic work since then.[138] So, the peace that is constructed on liberal values is believed to be a sustainable and universal peace that could be applicable to any territory.

However, when the recent experiences in peacebuilding history are considered, it can be said that it is still unclear whether civil society can contribute to peace in the manner that liberal peacebuilding claims.[139] While many NGOs in the 1990s were formed based on concepts like peacebuilding, humanitarianism, and human rights, these concepts are controversial in the way they are interpreted. Even when it comes to the nature of NGOs, there is little agreement in the relevant literature.[140] It is argued that many NGOs feel that their involvement in peacebuilding is not sufficiently effective or meaningful.[141]

The literature on peacebuilding that specifies the role of civil society is new developed mainly because "civil society" has emerged from a marginal actor status in peacebuilding during the cold war.[142] Scholars that have worked on civil society peacebuilding in recent years sought to develop new perspectives on the understanding of civil society peacebuilding.[143] Despite the recent remarkable growth of civil society peacebuilding with some specific achievements, the underlying reasoning for civil society's peacebuilding role largely remains unclear. There are many critical findings regarding the

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[138] Ginty, *Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding*, 348.
[139] Ibid., 349.
[140] Oliver P. Richmond and Henry F. Carey, *Subcontracting Peace: The Challenges of the NGO Peacebuilding* (Ashgate, 2005), 21.
[141] Ibid., 19.
[142] Paffenholz, *Civil Society & Peacebuilding*, 60.
[143] Luc Reychler, Julianne Funk Deckard, and Kevin HR Villanueva, *Building Sustainable Futures: Enacting Peace and Development* (Universidad de Deusto, 2009); Ryerson Christie, *Peacebuilding and NGOs: State-Civil Society Interactions* (Routledge, 2013); Camilla Orjuela, "Building Peace in Sri Lanka: A Role for Civil Society?" Journal of Peace Research 40, no. 2 (March 1, 2003): 195–212; Mathijs van Leeuwen, *Partners in Peace: Discourses and Practices of Civil-Society Peacebuilding* (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2009).

effectiveness of civil society actors' peace work. In this sense, what is missing, is a "coherent and more systematic picture as to what exactly civil society actors can actually contribute to peacebuilding and what main supporting and limiting factors exist."[144]

The involvement of NGOs in peacebuilding rose in the 1980s and 1990s, together with the increase in international funding. Although the role of NGOs in peace work has mostly been praised, criticism regarding their efficiency has been a key issue in the recent literature. Accordingly, two streams can be mentioned on the role and impact of NGOs, one arguing that NGOs can be effective if they are controlled and monitored by intergovernmental institutions, where the other side states that NGOs form a global civil society that transcends state controls. While the former puts forward a weaker sight of NGOs that are inadequate in comparison to the states, the latter envisions a stronger civil society of NGOs that are essential in constructing a liberal pace in post-conflict environments.[145]

From a positive aspect, we can say that non-governmental organizations have greater flexibility than national governments and are not so restricted as governmental institutions by bureaucratic issues and diplomatic protocols. In this sense, they can speak louder in certain circumstances and do more objective and comprehensive research on issues related to peace. They can come up with new ideas based on their work, and suggest

[144] Paffenholz, *Civil Society & Peacebuilding*, 60.
[145] Richmond and Carey, *Subcontracting Peace*, 21.

new ways of action for the state and the community through methods like advocacy and by giving people opportunity for involvement.[146]

Oliver Richmond states that NGOs have made a huge difference to complex peace processes by their independent interventions at the grassroots level and their cooperation with other multilateral interventions at the socio-political and developmental levels. Through a consensus on elements like building liberal peace institutions, free market economies, and political democratization, NGOs are considered to be a part of "the external governance of post-conflict zones."[147] From this point of view, NGOs bypass state sovereignty in one respect, thus, provide wider civil legitimization by constructing a civil notion of liberal peace.[148]

> NGOs have become important in the canon of the liberal peace, and owing to their unique access, legitimacy, and flexibility, have become a vital tool for states and international organizations and institutions in the construction of that peace. They can respond quickly, are not bureaucratically crippled, cannot coerce and therefore are widely respected... They can fulfill roles and tasks which states and their liberal organizations simply cannot achieve.[149]

However, existence of a strong civil society can also bring forth problems in the state-civil society relationship. It is stated that a strong civil society and vibrant NGO sector "has the potential to hinder, rather than enhance, civic nationalism and, thus, to create a weak state."[150] Accordingly, the experiences of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and

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[146] Keith Suter, "Peace Organizations, Non-Governmental," in *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict (Second Edition)*, ed. Lester Kurtz (Oxford: Academic Press, 2008): 1516, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780123739858001288.
[147] Richmond and Carey, *Subcontracting Peace*, 19-20.
[148] Ibid., 22-23.
[149] Ibid., 24.
[150] Julie Mertus and Tazreena Sajjad, "When Civil Society Promotion Fails State-Building" in *Subcontracting Peace: The Challenges of the NGO Peacebuilding*, ed. Oliver P. Richmond and Henry F. Carey (Ashgate, 2005), 119.

Afghanistan have been regarded as failures in terms of civil society building, where NGOs failed to support, even sometimes undercut, state capacity and autonomy. To overcome this problem along with those mentioned above, one suggestion has been that international community should guard against the creation of dependency relationships and stop imposing foreign priorities, Western models, and outsider norms.[151]

Béatrice Pouligny points out the interventions of outsiders on civil society actors and remarks that outsiders tend to forget the particularities within the societies. Accordingly, she says that this case causes many counter-effects in the way international actors seek to empower local people.

> Local civil societies, through monitoring and lobbying activities, may push the local state into fulfilling its responsibility for implementing the rule of law. They are often seen to carry the best hopes for a genuine democratic counterweight to the power-brokers, economic exploiters and warlords who tend to predominate in conflict-ridden weak or failed states, and may even capture the electoral processes. More pragmatically, outsiders often try to identify 'civil society' against a 'failed' state, to play NGOs, intellectuals, women, religious groups or 'elders' against 'warlords', 'low politics' against 'high politics'.[152]

Thus, in addition to the view that many CSOs play a pivotal role, particularly in areas like humanitarian assistance and post-war reconstruction, there have also been cases where voluntary organizations foment intergroup violence. As Anna Jarstad argues, this was the case during the Lebanese civil war in 1975-1989.[153] In this direction, given that civil society can have negative and positive implications for post-conflict transitions, more

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[151] Mertus and Sajjad, "When Civil Society Promotion Fails State-Building," 126.
[152] Béatrice Pouligny, "Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Ambiguities of International Programmes Aimed at Building 'New' Societies," *Security Dialogue* 36, no. 4 (December 1, 2005): 495–510, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010605060448.
[153] Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk, *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding* (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 31.

studies today question how "civil society might even have been a force for violence rather than peaceful democratization."[154]

According to David Chandler, the focus upon civil society aims to make society more vulnerable to external policy intervention. Although civil society enables difference and inequality to be articulated and explained, it also enables a much more interventionist policy paradigm through a framework of cultural division, "while reinforcing and reinstitutionalizing international hierarchies of power and evading responsibility for policy outcomes."[155]

Ryerson Christie divides the critical literature on civil society into two. Accordingly, the majority of the literature that critically examines roles and impacts of NGOs on Southern states does not seek to discard NGOs. He argues that the majority of literature provides a friendly critique to make the sector more effective in democratization and development. Besides, Christie mentions a secondary body of critical literature which challenges the viability of NGOs and the international organizations that are at the heart of the "modern rescue industry." However, Christie states that since the critiques just seek to privilege local forms of civil society as a solution, they are not able to undermine the assumptions of liberal civil society-centric approaches.[156]

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[154] Arnim Langer and Graham K. Brown, *Building Sustainable Peace: Timing and Sequencing of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding* (Oxford University Press, 2016), 111-112.
[155] David Chandler, "Race, Culture and Civil Society: Peacebuilding Discourse and the Understanding of Difference," *Security Dialogue* 41, no. 4 (August 1, 2010): 369–90, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010610374314.
[156] Christie, *Peacebuilding and NGOs*, 51.

Although more than two decades have passed since the NGOs flourished, the capabilities of NGOs in resolving issues surrounding instability and underdevelopment have still not been proven.

> NGOs may not be representative of civil society, nor do they necessarily act in ways that are likely to achieve the presumed benefits of providing for a vibrant civil society. Indeed, in some instances NGOs may actually erode local forms of civil society as resources are moved into formal associational forms that echo Northern development agencies.[157]

As Christie puts forward, on the contrary to what the liberal peacebuilding literature expects from NGOs, such as alleviating sources of conflict, NGOs "can complicate local politics, exacerbate some forms of conflict and introduce new areas of contestation."[158]

Issue of Funding

One of the common criticisms of NGOs is about their dependency on external funding and issues of autonomy. While NGOs in developed countries generally receive official funding from the state in which they operate, NGOs in the Global South are more dependent on foreign sources of funding, that is to say, funding from foreign states and institutions, or international organizations.[159]

It is stated that while the aim of civil society building is to strengthen the social contract between society and the state, the strategies to attain it usually focus on "the

[157] Ibid., 65.
[158] Ibid.
[159] Kim D. Reimann, "Up to No Good? Recent Critics and Critiques of NGOs," in *Subcontracting Peace: The Challenges of the NGO Peacebuilding,* ed. Oliver P. Richmond and Henry F. Carey (Ashgate, 2005), 43.

financial contract between local and international NGOs."[160] Accordingly, donor governments damage the independent structure of the NGOs, by making them act as a dependent functional substitute within the neoliberal paradigm:

> The donor community weakens civil society organizations (CSOs) that have veritable ties to society and respond to local societal needs. Donors also create a dislocated new civil society, which is technical and specialized in mandate, neoliberal in outlook, urbanized and middle class in composition, and which responds to the goals of the international community rather than of the society in question.[161]

Furthermore, a fundamental critique is that the funding for civil society has been concentrated on national and international NGOs, rather than other civil society actors, such as trade unions, that have a broader membership base, by considering that NGOs are less independent from governments than other civil society actors. Besides, as they are financed by external mandates, NGOs are accused of acting like small businesses or commercial consulting firms.[162]

From this point of view, critics state that official funding makes NGOs less concerned with the interests of the grassroots, making them more concerned with the interests of their donors. To get the funding, NGOs need to adjust their activities according to the requirements of the funders. Along with this dependency issue, foreign sponsorship constitutes a dilemma for NGO policy and action.[163]

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[160] Mathijs van Leeuwen and Willemijn Verkoren, "Complexities and Challenges for Civil Society Building in Post-Conflict Settings," *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 7, no. 1 (May 1, 2012): 86, https://doi.org/10.1080/15423166.2012.719353.
[161] Raffaele Marchetti and Nathalie Tocci, "Conflict Society: Understanding the Role of Civil Society in Conflict," *Global Change, Peace & Security* 21, no. 2 (June 1, 2009): 204–5, https://doi.org/10.1080/14781150902872091.
[162] Paffenholz, *Civil Society & Peacebuilding*, 17.
[163] Richmond and Carey, *Subcontracting Peace*, 237.

Particularly, the Southern NGOs that promote democracy and human rights in developing countries are accused of serving Western cultural imperialism since they are dependent on foreign sources of funding.[164] Some negative points stated about NGO financing are: [165]

- Perception that NGOs are serving Western interests
- Donors' demand for instant result and cost maximization
- Intense pressure on NGOs by the donors that make them compromise their neutrality (e.g., pressure faced by the NGOs in Iraq to support US policy)
- Decrease in quality and creativity due to dependence on Western models
- Competitiveness for funds and less cooperation among NGOs

In their book, Empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri take the issue further and consider NGOs as "some of the most powerful pacific weapons of the new world order," which demonstrate the new order as a peaceful biopolitical context while the world order is shaped in the name of moral intervention. Authors link this with the assertions on NGOs that they serve global capitalist projects.[166]

> Some critics assert that NGOs, since they are outside and often in conflict with state power, are compatible with and serve the neoliberal project of global capital. While global capital attacks the powers of the nation-state from above, they argue, the NGOs function as a 'parallel strategy from below' and present the 'community face' of neoliberalism.[167]

This assumption generalizes NGOs as outside forces that are in conflict with the state. This is problematic in the sense that it ignores NGOs that follow an independent program and

[164] Kim D. Reimann, "Up to No Good?" 44.
[165] Richmond and Carey, *Subcontracting Peace*, 240-241.
[166] Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Harvard University Press, 2001), 36-37.
[167] Ibid., 312-313.

are not affiliated with the liberal agenda. However, this assumption can be noteworthy when it is specified to the Western NGOs working at the international level.

Monotony of Civil Society Peacebuilding

> *"Liberal peacebuilding entails a particular ambition to transform conflict-torn societies into model liberal democratic states in such a way that secures access for international capital and maintains Western political influence."*[168]

To understand the evolution of today's peacebuilding activities, it is important to go back to the contact hypothesis that was proposed by Gordon W. Allport in 1954. Allport argues that conflicts can be alleviated through interpersonal and intergroup communications that will reduce prejudices between the parties to the dispute. The theory was formed initially as a solution to racial prejudice in the United States. It was further developed by Herbert Kelman's assumptions on "the social psychological aspects of international conflicts, the humanistic approach to mediation and Roger Fisher's 'win-win' theory of negotiations."[169]

> Prejudice (unless deeply rooted in the character structure of the individual) may be reduced by equal status contact between majority and minority groups in the pursuit of common goals. The effect is greatly enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by institutional supports (i.e., by law, custom or local atmosphere), and provided it is of a sort that leads to the perception of common interests and common humanity between members of the two groups.[170]

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[168] Langer and Brown, *Building Sustainable Peace*, 116.
[169] Maria Hadjipavlou and Bülent Kanol, "The Impacts of Peacebuilding Work on the Cyprus Conflict," *CDA Collaborative Learning Projects* (February 2008), 14.
[170] Gordon Willard Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1954), 281.

In the statement above, four conditions have been put forward by Allport for the contact theory: equal group, status within the situation, common goals, intergroup cooperation and authority support. This social-psychological approach created the base of peacebuilding means like conflict resolution workshops.[171] Nevertheless, although dialogues and workshops have been conducted for more than thirty years in the name of peacebuilding, the results have not been examined systematically, and their contributions to peacebuilding could not be empirically demonstrated. Moreover, the ineffectiveness of such dialogue activities has been observed, for instance, when peace dialogues in Sri Lanka, the Balkans, Cyprus, Israel-Palestine did not produce the desired impact.[172]

From this point of view, despite the optimism and hope on the peacebuilding activities like dialogs, workshops, peace camps and other similar interactions, the intended impact has not been observed in most of the societies with conflict. Various arguments and implications have been put forward to explain the reasons behind the alleged ineffectiveness.

Initially, peace is not a universal concept that can be "transposed identically between contexts of conflicts."[173] Peacebuilding activities should be tailored according to the context of the conflict and society. It is stated that local actors perceive interventions in the name of peace as neo-colonial strategies, hence, peacebuilding activities have often

[171] Thomas F. Pettigrew, "Intergroup Contact Theory," *Annual Review of Psychology* 49, no. 1 (February 1, 1998): 66, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.49.1.65.
[172] Ginty, *Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding*, 38.
[173] Oliver P. Richmond and Audra Mitchell, *Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to Post-Liberalism* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 1.

provoked uneasy hybrids and resistance. Moreover, ethnic and national divisions have been exacerbated by the implementation of liberal peace projects by reinforcing inert versions of territorial sovereignty.[174]

The socio-psychological approach assumes that peace can be achieved based on shared human values. However, this approach is criticized because of its underestimation of the fundamental distinctions among societies like those who are more eager and compatible to liberal democracies and those who are based on different rooted orders of tribal or religious frameworks.[175] Liberal democracy might not be suitable for all communities, so the communities should choose their own form of the system.[176]

> Indeed, democracy and the market are arguably adversarial or even conflictual forces – taken for granted in stable Western democracies but not necessarily suitable for volatile societies that do not enjoy stable institutions. Peacebuilding activities are thus not neutral in their normative orientation or impact.[177]

From this point of view, Edward Newman questions the existence of an international architecture of peacebuilding with a coherent doctrine, by addressing the concerns about the legitimacy, sustainability and the inclusivity of peacebuilding projects. In this context, the appropriateness and effectiveness of promoting market economics and liberal democracy in conflict-prone and volatile societies are contested.

> The tenets of liberal peacebuilding – liberal democracy, liberal human rights, market values, the integration of societies into globalization and the centralized secular state – are not necessarily universal (or universally applicable) values. The perceived absence of 'local ownership', and insufficient consultation with local

[174] Ibid., 3.
[175] Ginty, *Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding*, 36.
[176] Bhikhu Parekh, "The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy" in *Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West*, ed. David Held (Stanford University Press, 1993), 175.
[177] Ginty, *Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding*, 322.

stakeholders, have led some observers to question the legitimacy of peacebuilding operations.[178]

Kosmatopoulos states that the society today has become the target of intervention by peace experts whose techniques and practices are set to create a civil or "civilized" society from an "uncivil" society that has to be trained in order to become civil. For the case in Lebanon, Kosmatopoulos puts forward the impact of civil society peacebuilding as following: "what we have is a shift from a political civil society, with strong demands for justice, that would then regard peace as the outcome of this process toward a rather paralyzed 'uncivil society' that came to accept training in peace and forget anything that has to do with justice."[179] In this sense, the functions of peacebuilding tools should be evaluated multidimensionally, and its negative aspects should not be overlooked.

Another question about peacebuilding activities is related to their impact on attitude change and whether the expected impacts can disseminate to the macro-level of society from the selected groups that participate in these activities. The arguments which say the impacts can disseminate to a wider part of the community are based on enthusiasm rather than a critical inquiry based on the evidence. However, although it is not easy to prove the real impacts as argued in the contact theory, related assertions cannot be refuted due to the lack of counter-hypotheses.[180]

Another limitation regarding the conflict resolution workshops is related to the self-selection of the participants. It is claimed that volunteers for such frameworks are

[178] Ibid., 321-322.
[179] Kosmatopoulos, "The Birth of the Workshop," 536.
[180] Ginty, *Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding*, 38.

"predisposed towards communication with and positive images of 'the other' from the beginning, while others without these views are not interested in, and are generally not invited to participate in these frameworks."[181]

Until now, the examples in the peacebuilding history have demonstrated that a common liberal perspective on peace is not sufficient to halt conflict and provide sustainable peace within societies. Imposition of the liberal peace complicates the conflicts and produces even poorer results in terms of conflict transformation.[182] Therefore, to manage the conflicts, a more modest agenda that includes rigorous evaluation methodologies should be followed.[183] Besides, the reconciliation and the ways for a solution must come from below, and not from the top as it happened in the Dayton case in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As it is stated regarding today's conflicts, "it is people, and their relationships, not treaties, that will count."[184]

As the last point to mention, from a conflict resolution approach, the fundamental aim of postwar peace operations is not to secure Western norms, but to empower indigenous capacity. In this direction, transformationist critique points out several matters considering the peacebuilding operations in the past, such as greater emphasis on the bottom-up initiatives rather than top-down through empowering indigenous grassroots participation, emphasis on the social-psychological dimension of the conflict, and insistence on greater cultural sensitivity. Although a peace that is built on the ground needs

[181] Ibid., 47.
[182] Richards, *No Peace, No War*, 19.
[183] Ginty, *Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding*, 49.
[184] Richards, *No Peace, No War*, 75.

to reflect the needs and interests of local populations rather than those of the international community, as Mark Hoffman mentions, "there is a need to engage creatively and dynamically with local dynamics without falling into the trap of romanticizing the local or entrenching existing structures of violence and inequality."[185]

Looking into the activities of the interviewed CSOs in general, while LOST, FfP, NGO-SC, and AHDR are more inclined to organize seminars, workshops, and camps on peace education, PPM and Seed focus more on research and publications on peace. Different from the others, LOST also provides vocational training to get people skilled in certain areas and employed.

The activities gather people from different sects and nations together, hence, follow the method suggested in Allport's contact theory. Since the feedbacks of the participants in these activities have been positive so far, this has encouraged the continuity of implementing this methodology. Participants are being motivated to contribute to peace after gaining new perspectives through the educational seminars. Besides, seminars and publications on common history that aim to take lessons from the past conflict meet a significant deficit particularly for children, who do not know their recent past since they are not taught this part of their history, or are taught in a partial way.

On the other hand, as noted by Ashutosh Varshney, if the everyday forms of engagement (quotidian networks), like the activities held by CSOs, are not supported by associational forms of engagement (organized networks) such as business associations,

[185] Oliver Ramsbotham, Hugh Miall, and Tom Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* (Polity, 2011), 227.

trade unions, NGOs, and clubs, these activities will not be able to promote a robust peace. Therefore, CSOs should guide and support participants to transform their quotidian networks to organized ones.

In my research, I observed that the organization LOST which operates in a specific region of Lebanon and mostly in rural areas, is better able engage with the community. This is mainly because it searches for solutions related to the issues of its own community, not for a third party. In this organization, people dealing with peacebuilding and development initiatives are all from the region in which they operate, and they represent the demographic structure of their region. The activities of LOST operate in a follow-up circle where the workshops and training provided aim to create new employment in the region. In this way, this working mechanism goes beyond the dominant version of peacebuilding explored in this thesis.

4.4. Youth: Between Violence and Peace

Youth has been given a significant place within civil society peacebuilding. However, the reason behind the central role attributed to youth in peacebuilding is contested. In this section, I seek to inquire the transformation of the category of youth from actors of violence to peace builders and reveal how youth has become a liberal construct of peacebuilding.

Youth and Violence

As an example of the youth tendency to violence, Ibrahim Abdullah uses the term "lumpen youth" to refer to those young people who are inclined to be part of violence. He defines lumpen as the "largely unemployed and unemployable youth, mostly male, who live by their wits or who have one foot in what is generally referred to as the informal or the underground economy. They are prone to criminal behaviour, petty theft, drugs, drunkenness and gross indiscipline."[186]

Based on empirical evidence, it is claimed that countries affected by armed conflicts are inclined to "fragile security situations, bad governance, organized crime, social and economic inequalities, poverty, and political instability that provide favorable conditions for radicalization and extremist groups to attract, motivate, and mobilize young people."[187] Since it is the young people who have been attributed a central role in engaging in violence, youth has also gained attention as actors able to counter violent extremism. It is claimed that recruitment of youth into violent extremism could be prevented by developing preventive mechanisms such as engaging young people that are inclined to radicalization and extremism. There are examples where promoting local agencies in monitoring the indicators of radicalization has prevented young people from being recruited into violent extremism.[188] It is therefore important to increase the political will to work with local young people to reduce violent extremism.

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[186] Ibrahim Abdullah, "Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 36, no. 2 (1998): 207-8.
[187] D. B. Subedi, "Early Warning and Response for Preventing Radicalization and Violent Extremism," *Peace Review* 29, no. 2 (April 3, 2017): 137, https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2017.1308185.
[188] Ibid., 139

Besides, youth responses to the crisis are not necessarily violent.[189] Most young people do not engage in violence.[190]

> Youth represent promise – not peril. While some young people do commit heinous acts of violence, the overwhelming majority yearn for peace, especially in conflict situations. Many of those who commit violence are victimized by depraved adults who abuse youthful innocence. Over and over we see young people bearing the brunt of violent extremism. Violent extremists deliberately target youth for exercising their human rights.[191]

Besides, while factors like deprivation, marginalization, and social-political disconnection are considered as the primary triggers for youth participation in the conflict, it is also noted that the motivations for youth participation in conflict overlap with those of adults and children.[192]

In the reports that are attributed above, we see an emphasis on education and employment as two important factors that can prevent young people from engaging in violent conflicts. It is stated that failures in the educational system and a dearth of employment opportunities lead to the alienation of young people that results in youth violence.[193] In this sense, large youth cohorts, or "youth bulges," are considered among the main factors that make countries more susceptible to political violence.[194] Moreover,

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[189] "Youth and Violent Conflict," 15.
[190] Arab Human Development Report (AHDR), "2016: Youth and the Prospects for Human Development in a Changing Reality," (UNDP, 2016), 143.
[191] "Secretary-General's Remarks at Open Debate on the Role of Youth in Countering Violent Extremism and Promoting Peace [as Delivered]," accessed September 19, 2017, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2015-04-23/secretary-generals-remarks-open-debate-role-youth-countering-violent.
[192] A. Özerdem and S. Podder, *Youth in Conflict and Peacebuilding: Mobilization, Reintegration and Reconciliation* (Springer, 2015), 25.
[193] "Youth and Violent Conflict," 20.
[194] However, we should keep in mind that many countries with youth bulges have not recently suffered violence and are relatively stable (e.g., Malawi, Zambia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Benin, and Nicaragua). "Practice Note," 10.

studies also show that particularly young men who are unemployed, uprooted, and with few opportunities for positive engagement represent a ready pool of recruits for groups seeking to perpetuate violence.[195] These studies have been the main motives behind the programs on youth education and employment that are initiated by international organizations to hinder youth extremism.

Transformation of the Category of Youth

While defining the notion of the youth, the UNDP says, "Youth is a problematic and ambivalent term. While age is the most straightforward criterion for defining youth, it is not necessarily the most significant one. Social and cultural considerations play an important role in defining the meaning of youth."[196] In this regard, we see that youth as an age group is defined differently depending on the society. For instance, while Lebanon's 2012 youth policy prefers to define youth as people aged 15-29 years old, a report on youth policy in Cyprus defines youth in Cyprus as people aged 10-29. On the other hand, the UN Resolution 2250 (2015) on youth representation defines youth as persons aged 18-29 years old.[197] I find it more useful to refer youth to the period between childhood and adulthood, with varying upper and lower age limits.

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[195] Celina Del Felice and Andria Wisler, "The Unexplored Power and Potential of Youth as Peace-builders," *Journal of Peace Conflict & Development* 11 (November 2007): 10-11.
[196] "Youth and Violent Conflict: Society and Development in Crisis?," UNDP Report (2006), 56, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/youth-and-violent-conflict-society-and-development-crisis.
[197] "The Document of the Youth Policy in Lebanon," Youth Forum for Youth Policy (2012), 4, http://www.youthpolicy.org/national/Lebanon_2012_National_Youth_Policy.pdf ; "Country Sheet on Youth Policy in Cyprus," Report by the European Commission and the Council of Europe (2010), 2, http://www.youthpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/library/2010_Cyrpus_Youth_Policy_Briefing_Eng.pdf ;

As Alpaslan Özerdem mentions, youth as a conceptual category is frequently othered in the discourse on conflict. Young people are seen as potentially dangerous subjects and often associated with criminal and political violence. On the one hand, youth are also viewed as vulnerable and powerless actors who need protection. Thus, the definition of youth has vacillated between the two extremes of 'infantilizing' and 'demonizing.' Nevertheless, in the recent literature on youth in post-conflict societies, the thinking about youth has shifted. The recent literature acknowledges the importance of "making the connection between youth and peacebuilding for transforming a predominantly negative discourse on the role of youths in societies recovering from conflict."[198] In this direction, an important step has recently been taken by UN Security Council through the UN Resolution 2250 (2015) underscoring the positive contributions that the young people can make on behalf of peacebuilding. This resolution, urging member states to increase youth representation at all levels of decision-making, is a significant recent step related to youth participation in peace processes. Although its actual impact remains to be seen, it is nonetheless significant that the UN Security Council has paid such particular attention to this topic, which has been historically neglected.[199]

"Security Council, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2250 (2015), Urges Member States to Increase Representation of Youth in Decision-Making at All Levels," accessed November 10, 2016, http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12149.doc.htm.

[198] Alpaslan Özerdem, "The Role of Youth in Peacebuilding: Challenges and Opportunities," *Sustainable Security*, October 26, 2016, https://sustainablesecurity.org/2016/10/26/the-role-of-youth-in-peacebuilding-challenges-and-opportunities.

[199] "Security Council, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2250 (2015)."

Many of the recent works on youth as peacebuilding actors are published or supported by the UN institutions.[200] In these works, there is an emphasis on the link between youth, education, and peacebuilding where young people are viewed as "important drivers and agents of change in the development of their societies."[201] One work mentions the rationale behind supporting youth to promote peace as follows: "Although there is limited research on the situation of youth in post-conflict situations, there is evidence to suggest that youth can and do play a variety of different, shifting roles in these contexts… Thus, engaging young people positively and giving them a stake in their societies during the transition period after violent conflict is important for long-term peace and security."[202]

On the other hand, the critical literature on youth has also recently come to the fore. Mayssoun Sukarieh and Stuart Tannock's book, *Youth Rising?: The Politics of Youth in the Global Economy*,[203] argues that youth is used as a universalist substitute for other social categories, such as religion, race, and nationality. Through depoliticizing youth, the real differences based on ideologies and political interests are concealed. Thus, youth has been a useful tool to publicize social changes and put new agendas into practices.

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[200] Anja Hopma and Lynne Sergean, *Planning Education with and for Youth* (UNESCO. IIPE, 2015), http://repositorio.minedu.gob.pe/handle/123456789/3585 ;
"Guiding Principles on Young People's Participation in Peacebuilding," *Search for Common Ground*, April 22, 2014, https://www.sfcg.org/guidingprinciples ;
"Practice Note: Young People's Participation in Peacebuilding," *UNDP*, accessed February 10, 2017, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/practice-note--young-people-s-participation-in-peacebuilding.html.

[201] "Practice Note," 13.

[202] Ibid.

[203] Mayssoun Sukarieh and Stuart Tannock, *Youth Rising?: The Politics of Youth in the Global Economy* (Routledge, 2014).

While academic and political interests over youth are still in high demand, the reasons behind this should be studied further. For a more fertile work, studies should refrain from marginalizing youth through radicalization or depicting it as a possible violent category or romanticizing it by loading it with over-expectations.

Advertising Youth

In recent decades, with the considerable rise in the focus on youth, the period referred to the youth has been extended. Inquiring why the focus on youth and youth programs have considerably risen and why the transition to adulthood has been more challenging reveal the other side of the coin.

Youth has been a central theme in violent and peace-related matters. They have been perceived as "lacking knowledge and experience, less than rational, in need of protection, and sometimes, also, potentially dangerous."[204] Therefore, how to deal with the issues regarding the role of youth in violence and peace is a challenging matter. UNDP's report on the issue emphasizes the lack of attention to young people's positive contributions to society.

> While it is often pointed out that youth should not be regarded as merely a negative force, this comment frequently appears to be an add-on, or an a priori disclaimer… Young people are sometimes urged to be peacemakers, but they are seldom mentioned in responses to conflict through governance and political measures.[205]

[204] Ginty, *Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding*, 296.
[205] "Youth and Violent Conflict," 18, 33.

To eliminate the negative view and connotation on youth, studies that associate youth with peacebuilding have recently increased.[206] It is believed that as youth are considered most likely to commit violent actions, they can likewise be influential in stimulating a peaceful environment. Accordingly, like other fields, the reputation of youth keeps an important space in peacebuilding as well. Most of the training and workshops are labeled with the central theme of youth. However, does this youth promotion have a real response in today's peacebuilding, or is it just a part of the liberal logic?

The current focus on youth has indeed served the interests of the elite.[207] Like in other aspects of liberal peacebuilding, capacity building programs targeting youth, such as youth development and conflict resolution training, are potentially subject to dynamics of orientalism and neo-imperialism.[208] Given that youth is the most influential social category for changes, these development programs can be regarded as a part of the mechanism that takes this social category under control. It is important to keep in mind that all these youth programs on development and peacebuilding universally cover the same liberal agenda. Values tied to identity, like religious or cultural values, are not emphasized. Seeking to unify communities by ignoring identity values can be seen as the central factor behind the inefficiency of youth programs on peacebuilding.

> If youth as a social category has grown and become increasingly central to contemporary social, political, intellectual and economic activity, this is partly because the social category of youth has become more useful, productive and sensible for a growing number of organizations, agendas and ideologies around the world.[209]

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[206] Ginty, *Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding*, 297.
[207] Sukarieh and Tannock, *Youth Rising?*, x.
[208] Ginty, *Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding*, 297.
[209] Sukarieh and Tannock, *Youth Rising?*, 16.

Over the past decade, it has been very difficult to get funding for your projects unless you framed the projects as being about youth or tailored to the theme of youth. Likewise, it is interesting that in several countries in Africa, such as Kenya and Uganda, national publics have been discussing whether citizens of age 50 or even 60 should be considered as youth.[210] These examples clearly illuminate how liberal institutions and donors made the youth the main beneficiary of their policies. As Sukarieh and Tannock mention, this embrace of youth has been driven by an elite project that targets "to promote and sell neoliberal ideology and agendas, while displacing other categories of identity."[211]

This embrace of youth had a notable impact on the labor market as well. It broadened the possibilities of employers to utilize young people, particularly through internship or trainingship programs which are mostly unpaid. Rather than describing people who are minimum wage workers in their 20s as a member of the working class, they are delineated as youth who are part of subtly-designed programs labeled with phrases such as leadership, development, and dynamism. The increase in the upper limit for youth, mainly in conjunction with the factors like the rise of education duration, hence availed the rentier class by paving the way for a large resource of cheap labor.

The way young people are embraced today leads to the marginalization of youth as well. We can see that many countries have created particular ministries for youth, and international organizations have established diverse simulated youth councils under their organization. While these kinds of actions symbolize the importance ascribed to youth, they

[210] Rijk van Dijk et al., "Introduction: Ideologies of Youth," *Africa Development* 36, no. 3–4 (January 1, 2011): 1.
[211] Sukarieh and Tannock, *Youth Rising?*, 8.

also isolate young people from the real versions of these structures, temporize them with these newly structured entities, and alienate them from the essential fields and issues of politics and economics. In this sense, the bodies that are established specifically for youth function as tools to mollify youth and take them under control, so that they do not appeal to other means (e.g., revolts) to seek rights.

On the other hand, it is also worth mentioning that the asserted positive role that young people play in society is not something proven and it cannot be easily evaluated. Those claims that emphasize the positive contributions that the young people can play lack sufficient case studies. For instance, in his study on young Israeli and Palestinian people, Philip Hammack reveals that the contact-theory based conflict resolution programs are prone to the production of the conflict rather than transformation of it due to the way they approach identity and culture.[212] Besides, some of those CSOs that I interviewed in my case studies, despite stating the importance of youth in peacebuilding, did not attribute to a distinct impact that youth had in the field.

Although the interviewed CSOs have a central focus on youth as the main target group of their activities, the way they deal with youth differs. In this sense, LOST follows an employment strategy on youth. They provide youth vocational training so they can gain the sufficient skills in the areas where labor is needed. Besides, it also employs young people within its branches around the region.

[212] Phillip L. Hammack, *Narrative and the Politics of Identity: The Cultural Psychology of Israeli and Palestinian Youth* (Oxford University Press, 2010), 261.

FfP brings youth together with the ex-combatants in order to raise the awareness of young generation about the mistakes made in the past. To prevent the new generation from engaging in violence, peace camps are organized in which events of experience sharing take place. In this way, the target group of the activities is not restricted to youth, where both youth and adults utilize the events in order to contribute to peace further.

So, the ways the interviewed CSOs approach youth demonstrate a more useful form of contributing to peace than promoting youth with vain advertorial programs. Since the risk of engaging in violence is applicable for both categories, youth and adults, a collaboration between generations with common actions will give more constructive outcomes in the way of sustaining peace rather than relying solely on the youth.

CHAPTER 5

ASSESSMENT AND IMPLICATIONS: GOING BEYOND THE LIBERAL FRAMEWORK

Given that societies possess different contexts that shape their expectations for post-conflict community building, efforts to apply a uniform peacebuilding are prone to backlash, as the recent history has shown through different examples in Africa and the Balkans.[213] Therefore, it is important to embrace the demands coming from the people themselves where peace builders are open to different ways of community building rather than transferring the dominant version of peacebuilding. On the other hand, initiatives that do not follow the Western peace agenda bear the risk of being considered as marginal and illegitimate, and this prevents alternative approaches to emerge.

In order to comprehend how liberal peacebuilding is constructed, its main components should be critically elaborated. In this sense, this thesis explored the concepts of violence, civil society, and youth as the main components of liberal peacebuilding. How is the use of violence justified in the name of humanitarianism and the sovereign state? Are NGOs important peace builders or actors that serve the liberal project of global capital? Why is youth designated as a violent category and, at the same time, a dynamic category that is increasingly promoted? This thesis has addressed these questions to give a broader picture on the trajectory of the peace sector.

[213] Tobias Debiel, Thomas Held, and Ulrich Schneckener, *Peacebuilding in Crisis: Rethinking Paradigms and Practices of Transnational Cooperation* (Routledge, 2016), 47.

Initially, since peacebuilding is defined as a response to violence, the understanding of violence shapes the framework of the peacebuilding actions. In the dominant peace discourse, peacebuilding starts following the end of violence. This sharp distinction is one of the reasons that make the concept violence one of the liberal constructs of today's understanding of peacebuilding. Besides, while the Western view of violence justifies the violence committed by Western actors in the name of humanitarianism, the violence committed by non-Western actors are accused of being actions of terrorism. This case constitutes the other aspect regarding why the dominant understanding of violence is considered as a liberal construct in this thesis.

Secondly, through the organizations of civil society, and specifically NGOs, the notion of civil society has been reformulated in the way that the measures to sustain peace has been downsized. Accordingly, CSOs started to work in favor of peace through specific tools of peacebuilding that are based on standardized expertise that generally ignore the local characteristics of the conflict and society. Besides, because most of the CSOs are dependent on Western funding for their actions and somehow embrace the values and methods that are offered to them by their funders, the concept of civil society is rendered as another liberal construct of peacebuilding.

Thirdly, the rising role attributed to youth in the contemporary era is another critical point that should be examined in order to understand how the concept of youth has become one of the main liberal constructs of peacebuilding. Accordingly, the dominant discourse that was once viewed youth merely as the actors of violence transformed its focus and started to promote youth as peace builders. In this sense, the transformation of the category

of youth and its broad promotion made youth to serve as a universalist substitute for other social categories, such as religion, race, and nationality. Thus, a useful category of a depoliticized youth has been formed in order to promote the interests and ideologies of the elites.

Furthermore, to see how civil society actors deal with peacebuilding and where they stand in response to the liberal constructs of peacebuilding, I have examined the cases in Lebanon and Cyprus. Through interviewing several CSOs, I reached some conclusions and implications to adjust and improve the efficiency of the civil society peacebuilding activities. Based on the developments of the conflicts in the two societies, similarities and differences come into view on how civic peace actors handle their peacebuilding activities.

While the violent conflicts have ended in Lebanon and Cyprus, a political settlement has been reached in the former, but not in the latter. In this sense, with the 1989 Taif Agreement, although not a stable one, a more balanced political system that aimed to stop the violence was established. In the Cypriot case, despite a lot of attempts of peace negotiations, any settlements have not been reached since the outbreak of the conflicts. For the Lebanese case, it is claimed that, in addition to external support peace, the point that caused the end of the war was the internal parties' realization that the benefits of the peace agreement exceeded those of the status quo. However, in Cyprus, the results of the 2004 referendum exhibited that the benefits of the Annan Plan were mainly realized by the

Turkish Cypriot community while most of the Greek Cypriots were unconvinced that they would also benefit.[214]

The structure of history books and history teaching are among the common points mentioned as one of the main factors triggering conflict. In Lebanon, the civil war era is avoided in history teaching as an indicator of neutrality and to prevent any disputes from emerging. About this issue, the civil society actors pointed out that ignoring the history will only result in incapability of taking lessons from the past. If the new generation does not learn their past and take lessons from it, what will keep them away from experiencing the same fate with their ancestors in terms of violence? Antoine Messarra puts emphasis on collective and shared memory as a safeguard and deterrent force that prevents conflicts to reoccur. Oussama Safa asserts that Lebanese youth remain the prime engine for today's violence since they have displayed a knack for inheriting old stereotypes and hatreds.

In Cyprus, the case is different regarding history teaching. Since it is a separated society with *de facto* borders, education curriculum is wholly different in each context. History is thought from a Turkish perspective in the north and Greek perspective in the south. For instance, communities do not touch upon the history of missing people from the other part of Cyprus. Similarly, Ottoman history of Cyprus is not taught in the south. Nonetheless, revision of curriculum and history textbooks have not been prioritized by the

[214] Samar El-Masri, "Power Sharing and Social Transformation: Approaches to Ethnic Conflict Resolution in Lebanon, Cyprus, and Switzerland" (PhD diss., University of Western Ontario, 2004), 161.

Cypriot authorities, which was a matter the Annan Plan covered. Current schoolbooks in both communities contain provocative elements inciting ethnic nationalism.[215]

One of my core findings regarding the efficiency of peacebuilding activities is that CSOs focusing on their own communities, rather than targeting the whole nation or seeking to bring peace to a third community, are more able to penetrate influentially into the people and raise awareness with its activities. I saw this when I visited LOST, a CSO that works only on a specific region of Lebanon. Since the organization was built by the people of that region, they knew the area better, were more engaged with people, and determined and structured in their work. For this reason, Henry Carey conveys that, to ensure that the funds are not wasted, local CSOs should be preferred for funding since they have a better idea regarding what is needed for the community.[216]

This point was also mentioned by the CSOs working in the Cyprus buffer zone. Being located in the capital becomes a handicap when it comes to reaching out to people in the other districts. The "centralization of the bicommunal activities" in the buffer zone also results in low bicommunal cooperation between the Cypriot CSOs, thus, decreases the impact of peacebuilding work. Although it is yet possible to organize activities outside the place the center is located, those activities do not become sustainable mainly due to difficulties in organization and follow-up. On the other hand, when a CSO is far from the capital, then the organization is prone to some deficiencies, such as having fewer opportunities for public service, funding, and infrastructural benefits.

[215] Papadakis, *History Education in Divided Cyprus*, 5-15.
[216] Richmond and Carey, *Subcontracting Peace*, 237.

When it comes to the issue of funding, it seems that the CSOs interviewed do not hesitate over Western funds as the academicians with critical approaches do. Since the founders of the CSOs, in general, favor liberal principles, they do not face any conflict with their Western donors. Opportunities for non-Western funding on peacebuilding projects are very few and it is the UN-affiliated funding and projects that dominate the field. Therefore, there are not many alternative sources of funding for civil society actors. On the other hand, the UN-funded projects face issues of sustainability since these projects are funded for a maximum of two or three years, but generally, they are funded for a shorter period. After that, CSOs need to come up with another new project to get funding. In this sense, the competition for funding creates another problem for the civic organizations.

When talking about the impact of civil society peacebuilding, we should also keep in mind that the impact is not something concrete that can easily be evaluated. Many practitioners experience the difficulty of measuring the effectiveness of civil-society peacebuilding.[217] From this point of view, it is stated that "lack of evidence-based participatory assessment tools render peace-learning difficult, and hence thwart the impact and effectiveness of peacebuilding and development programmes."[218] Thus, real impacts of peacebuilding tools such as conflict resolution workshops as argued in the contact theory are ambivalent. In what way do they affect people's behavior? If there is a behavioral change, is it a permanent change or temporary change limited to the period of the activity? Since most of the peace programs are held separately and not linked to each other, another

[217] Leeuwen, *Partners in Peace*, 6.
[218] SeeD, "Our Goal," accessed at November 26, 2017, http://www.seedsofpeace.eu/index.php/about-us-1/our-goal.

barrier arises in the way of figuring out the joint effects of the activities and how they can be improved.

Nevertheless, civil society practitioners generally agree that peacebuilding activities should be considered as small shares of contributions within peace efforts. Since the results of peacebuilding activities cannot be seen immediately and might take generations to reach their goals, the responsibility of civic peace builders should be to sow the seeds of peace and assist its growth.

In conclusion, while this thesis explores the role of civil society in peacebuilding from a critical perspective, its analysis and findings seek to contribute to the peace literature and practitioners through shedding light on some of the material and ideological impediments in the peace industry. The recommendations in this thesis aim to contribute to the further research and civil society work in peacebuilding. More assessments on civil society work are essential for improvement in the impact of peacebuilding activities. For an efficient peacebuilding, further research is anticipated from researchers and practitioners, particularly on actors that follow a different path and method from the dominant version of peacebuilding.

APPENDIX

1. List of Interviews

1- Assem Chreif (Vice President of the Lebanese Organization for Studies and Training), interviewed by Ahmet Serdar Günaydın, Baalbek, Lebanon, July 18, 2017, personal interview.
2- Fadi Abi Allam (President of the Permanent Peace Movement), interviewed by Ahmet Serdar Günaydın, Beirut, Lebanon, July 19, 2017, personal interview.
3- Antoine Messarra (Professor, Member of Lebanese Constitutional Council, Founding Member of the Lebanese Foundation for Permanent Civil Peace), interviewed by Ahmet Serdar Günaydın, Beirut, Lebanon, July 21, 2017, personal interview.
4- Ziad Saab (President of the Fighters for Peace), interviewed by Ahmet Serdar Günaydın, Beirut, Lebanon, July 25, 2017, personal interview.
5- Rabih Kays (Lawyer, Program Director at the Lebanese Foundation for Permanent Civil Peace), interviewed by Ahmet Serdar Günaydın, Beirut, Lebanon, July 27, 2017, personal interview.
6- Anna Koukkides-Procopiou (Researcher at Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development), interviewed by Ahmet Serdar Günaydın, Nicosia, Cyprus, September 4, 2017, personal interview.
7- Marilena Kyriakou (Project Administrator at NGO Support Center), interviewed by Ahmet Serdar Günaydın, Nicosia, Cyprus, September 4, 2017, personal interview.
8- Loizos Loukaidis (Educational Programs Officer at Association for Historical Dialogue & Research), interviewed by Ahmet Serdar Günaydın, Nicosia, Cyprus, September 6, 2017, personal interview.

2. Excerpts from Interviews

Assem Chreif, Lebanese Organization for Studies and Training, July 18, 2017:

- What are the obstacles in front of building peace in Lebanon?
- We haven't reconciled yet about the past. After the civil war, Lebanese didn't take the decision that they need to live together. So, we didn't pass through the phases of reconciliation, trauma healing, and other steps of peacebuilding. The sectarian division in 2005, the Israeli war over Lebanon in 2006, and the violent clashes in 2008, all hindered the creation of a friendly environment for the Lebanese people to communicate and interact in order to find out a solution and get out of the crisis. We still talk about the incidence happened in the civil war where we were fighting with each other. And, we even talk about these fights with a proud attitude. We haven't reached the level where we can live together in a peaceful community. We haven't agreed on leaving the past behind. This is affecting our future and present behavior.

Fadi Abi Allam, Permanent Peace Movement, July 19, 2017:

- What are the motivations behind your involvement in peacebuilding?
- We think that the roots and the causes of the war still exist. The consequences of the war may later be the reason for a new war, like in the case where the consequences of the World War I have been the causes of World War II. There is always a doubt about the future that the war will repeat again. This case led us to start working on promoting peaceful means and conflict resolution at all level, something that is not possible to do during the war where the only language is the language of arms and violence. So, we understood that we should work on raising awareness and capacity building for institutions. In this sense, engaging with schools, municipalities, political parties, and stakeholders and providing them the language of peace is very important for dialogue and reconciliation. If there is a certain problem and we have to fight, then we should choose the means of non-violence.

Antoine Messarra, Lebanese Foundation for Permanent Civil Peace, July 21, 2017:

- On the historiography of Lebanon…
- Scientific historiography of Lebanese conflict involves ideologic refusal of realities by the historians. There are two types of nation-building. First of them is the nation-building by force through a central authority that extends its power on all the periphery. And there is another version of nation-building system, which is by compromise, by accommodation, and by politics of negotiation. The dominant culture of nation-building is the first type. When the author, Arend Lijphart, wrote a book on Netherlands, titled the Politics of Accommodation, many politicians in the US ironically asked whether the book was about astronomy because it is the culture of nation-building by central authority that is dominant. For this reason, many historians don't understand the nation-building of countries like Switzerland, Belgium, Austria, Lebanon, and North Ireland. Although nation-building by central authority might be a more efficient type, sometimes you do not have another alternative than building the nation through accommodation. That's why Lebanon is built upon politics of compromise and accommodation. If you are in a case of impasse where a victory cannot be reached by any of the parties and where the cost is very high, then you are obliged to the second type of nation-building. Although the Cypriot problem can also be related to this case, the difference is that one of the communities constitutes around 80 percent of the population, which makes them a majority. However, in Lebanon, all the groups are minority. This is where historians face problems. Historians are not accustomed to studying this kind of nation-building.

Ziad Saab, Fighters for Peace, July 25, 2017:

- About how ex-fighters can contribute to peace…
- Those ex-fighters who criticize their roles in the civil war, they can also contribute to peace. For this to happen, they need to accept that all have been done (in terms of violence), did not lead us to anywhere. For example, I can now work in favor of peace with

ex-combatants that I was an enemy with during the war. We give sessions to youth to show a direct example of how we can work together, without the need of fighting, although we have different opinions. We also tell them that if we (as ex-combatants) had met during the civil war, we might have killed each other… For a change, we need to admit that we were wrong. You need to tell the new generation that you were wrong during the civil war. Otherwise you will encourage youth to make another war.

Rabih Kays, Lebanese Foundation for Permanent Civil Peace, July 27, 2017:

- What was the importance of Cyprus for the first meetings on civil society peacebuilding?
- We started our meetings in Cyprus. Because there was the civil war that time, in the 1980s, and it was hard for the people from the rural areas to come to Beirut since it was divided as east and west. So, the direction has been Cyprus, where some people took airport, and others the Jounieh harbor to reach Cyprus. For some people, it was the first time where Muslims and Christians met each other.

- How does your organization contribute to peace in Lebanon?
- We do projects to spread the culture of peace and civil initiatives. We organize round-table meetings and workshops and do research about civil peace. Getting positive feedbacks encourage us to continue our work.

Anna Koukkides-Procopiou, Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development, September 4, 2017:

- About the concept of "endogenous resilience" when building peace…
- I think it is worthwhile to check the concept of "endogenous resilience" that we have been working on. What we are saying is that whatever kind of agreement is reached (at the state-level), there is always the second level of work that needs to be done or should be done which is basically at the society level. We should ask whether there is an endogenous resilience. Will communities be able to resist the causes of conflict? In respect to what is going on at the negotiation level, there should be work done to make sure that we have resilience as people, civil society, institutions, etc. So, if there is a possibility for any problem to occur at the present or in the near future, these problems or shocks can be absorbed by society (if there is endogenous resilience).

Marilena Kyriakou, NGO Support Center, September 4, 2017:

- Do the peacebuilding activities contribute to the peace on the island? Are there any challenges?
- They definitely contribute. The peace activities help the participants to understand the Cyprus dispute through a different lens. On the other hand, we are working at two different levels. We have the higher level in which negotiations take place, where leaders of the two communities are basically discussing the core fabric of the Cyprus constitution and what it means to have a united island. And we have the community groups that are working for the public on issues like raising awareness and mutual understanding in order to create a

better climate for reunification and living together. Unfortunately, those two levels are not working together. So, there is a lot of discrepancy between them. While it is the community level that tries to bring the people together, those people do not usually get the opportunity to have a say about their visions for the island.

Loizos Loukaidis, Association for Historical Dialogue & Research, September 6, 2017:

- How does your organization contribute to the peace in Cyprus?
- …In addition to doing workshops and suggesting policy changes on educational matters, we produce supplementary educational materials such as booklets that teachers and students can use in their classrooms to explore different issues about the history of Cyprus. For example, we have the history of common gains for children. We teach the Ottoman history in Cyprus which is something that is not taught in the south. Or, the history of missing people which is something that is not touched upon by anyone. When it is touched upon, it excludes the losses of the other side. So, what we are trying to do is provide educational opportunities to educators from both sides to explore their history.

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