

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

LAND, FOOD AND WATER IN EGYPT:
A HISTORY OF THE AGRARIAN QUESTION AND STATE
POWER IN EGYPT

by
FLORIS TER KUILE

A project
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
to the Department of Political Studies and Public Administration
of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences
at the American University of Beirut

Beirut, Lebanon
June, 2019

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

LAND, FOOD AND WATER IN EGYPT:
A HISTORY OF THE AGRARIAN QUESTION AND STATE
POWER IN EGYPT


by
FLORIS TER KUILE

Approved by:



Dr. Roland Riachi, Visiting Assistant Professor
Department of Political Studies and Public Administration

First Reader



Dr. Tariq Tell, Assistant Professor
Department of Political Studies and Public Administration

Second Reader

Date of project presentation: June 24, 2019

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

THESIS, DISSERTATION, PROJECT RELEASE FORM

Student Name: Floris

ter KUILE

FLORIS

Last

First

Middle

Master's Thesis

Master's Project

Doctoral Dissertation


I authorize the American University of Beirut to: (a) reproduce hard or electronic copies of my thesis, dissertation, or project; (b) include such copies in the archives and digital repositories of the University; and (c) make freely available such copies to third parties for research or educational purposes.

I authorize the American University of Beirut, to: (a) reproduce hard or electronic copies of it; (b) include such copies in the archives and digital repositories of the University; and (c) make freely available such copies to third parties for research or educational purposes after:

One ---- year from the date of submission of my thesis, dissertation, or project.

Two ---- years from the date of submission of my thesis, dissertation, or project.

Three ---- years from the date of submission of my thesis, dissertation, or project.


Signature

06/25/19

Date

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Special thanks are for Dr. Roland Riachi and Dr. Tariq Tell for their excellent help writing and structuring my project paper. I especially have very fond memories of the tutorial session on the agrarian question every Wednesday.

My recognition and gratitude to Juliette Leclerc and Ines Bencheikh without whom the many library sessions I have had, would not have been bearable.

I would further like to thank Michael Avanzato for his help in correcting my English and helping me structure my arguments during our late-night balcony sessions.

Finally, I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to Joy Saade, who has not only supported me throughout this process, but also helped with the administrative details surrounding the project.

AN ABSTRACT OF THE PROJECT OF

Floris ter Kuile

for

Master of Arts

Major: Public Policy and International Affairs

Title: Land, food and water in Egypt: A history of the agrarian question and state power in Egypt

This study provides a historical, social and political context through which one can analyse land reclamation in Egypt. It highlights the importance of this synthesis between ecology, economics, and society when studying the Egyptian state and the elite struggles that take place within Egypt itself. It also takes into account the international dimension and the influence of external economic forces, such as the rise of global capitalism on Egypt's domestic policy.

The study starts by theorising the concept of the state. After an extensive theoretical discussion, this paper argues that the state should be conceptualized along the lines of Bob Jessop's Strategic Relationship Approach with a strong ecological dimension. This paper, therefore, places itself in the tradition of academics such as Alex Loftus, Christian Parenti and to an increasing extent, Bob Jessop himself. Subsequently, this paper argues that by studying the agrarian question, one can analyse agricultural policy in Egypt and put it in its historical, ecological and global context. This paper then analysis Egypt's history through the lens of the Food Regime developed by McMichael and Harriette Friedmann. By incorporating critiques of Bernstein and Araghi the into the food regime analysis, this study widens the scope of a traditional food regime analysis and argues that Egypt's incorporation into the global world system started much earlier, then the conventional food regime analysis.

This study finds that throughout its history, Egypt has had little to no room to maneuver with determining its own domestic policies. There were only two points in history, namely the rule of Mohammed Ali Pasha in the early half of the 19th century and the almost twenty-year rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser starting in 1952 in which Egypt had relative control over its domestic policy. These periods are both marked by mass reductions in poverty and rapid expansion of the domestic industry. However, in both cases, global forces, whether it was the rise of global imperialist expansion or the rise of oil capital from the Gulf, collaborated with domestic elites to reverse the domestic reforms in the interest of capital. This paper concludes by placing land reclamation into this broader context.

CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	V
ABSTRACT.....	VI
Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. STATE THEORY	7
III. THE AGRARIAN QUESTION AND FOOD REGIMES	18
IV. PRE-FOOD REGIME (1700-1882)	24
V. FIRST FOOD REGIME (1882-1952).....	33
VI. SECOND FOOD REGIME (1952- 1973).....	39
VII. THIRD FOOD REGIME (1973 – Current).....	51
VIII. CONCLUSION.....	67
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	72

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

My interest in state theory and subsequently, the agrarian question goes back to earlier research I have done on water policy in Egypt and especially in relation to land reclamation. Land reclamation appeared to me as such an anomaly and, and as so counter-intuitive that I felt the need to study it more in depth. Egypt depends for 98% of its renewable water supply on the Nile. However, with a population of over 100 million, which grows at around 2% a year, Egypt faces increasing pressure on its water resources (Worldometers, 2018). This pressure is further exacerbated by upstream countries, such as Ethiopia and Sudan, who demand a larger share of the Nile's water resources, and by climate change, which reduces the amount of water flowing into the Nile, and ever-increasing water demand for agriculture purposes. Water scarcity is increasingly becoming a problem in Egypt. According to David Adam and Gus Lubin food riots in 2008 and the revolution of 2011 are directly linked to water scarcity and the subsequent rise in water and food prices (Adam, 2008; Lubin, 2011).

One would expect that water scarcity and water security would dominate Egyptian water policy discussions, and to a certain extent, they do. In a recent statement in June, Egypt's Minister of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR), Ezz Eddin Abo Setit, stated that Egypt is suffering from water scarcity and is below the water poverty line (Ahmed, 2018). Furthermore, the UN says that Egypt will face absolute water scarcity by 2025 (Ezz and Arafat, 2015). However, despite the acceptance of the scarcity narrative by its minister, the MALR is still promoting large scale reclamation projects. In December 2015 President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi inaugurated the first 10 thousand feddan (1 feddan = 0.42 ha) of the "1,5 million feddan project" near the City of Farafra. As the project's name suggests, it aims to reclaim 1,5 million feddan of desert lands and convert them to arable lands and urban living space. In addition, the El Reef El Masry company, the private company in charge of this project, says it is just the

first phase of a 4 million feddan reclamation project (El Reef El Mastry, 2018). Interestingly, this project is supported by the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN (FAO) and the development bank of the EU, since it should lead to higher productivity and water savings (Tellioglu and Konandreas, 2017). Furthermore, the SEKEM initiative transformed around 684 hectares of arid land into arable soil and received in 2015 the “Land for Life Award”. The United Nations Convention awards this price to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) to “individuals, groups, institutions and businesses whose work and initiatives have made a significant contribution towards achieving Sustainable Development Goal (SDG)” (UNCCD, 2015).

Thus, on the one hand, the Egyptian state and the international community admit that Egypt is facing water scarcity, but on the other hand, Egypt is reclaiming vast tracks of desert lands with the support of the international community, which will inevitably increase the amount of water used. My first attempt to explain this rather contradictory approach focused on the discourse surrounding water scarcity and water abundance. It was interesting to see how both the discourse of scarcity and abundance were used interchangeably by the ruling elite to justify both land reclamation and the disposition of farmers. However, this approach had clear limits. It was harder to analyse how the different groups that make up the ruling elite reacted to water scarcity in practice and what interests it served. Furthermore, although it was clear that there was an important international dimension to the prevalence of this discourse, it was not clear to what extent international actors shaped the discourse nor was it clear how the relationship between international actors and local elite were shaped. More importantly, it did not answer the fundamental question of why, over the years, billions of dollars have been spent on land reclamation with little to no positive results for Egypt as a whole.

Although an analysis of the discourse surrounding water scarcity and abundance was a good starting point, it brought up more questions than it solved. The aim of this project,

therefore, is to provide a more solid basis for an analysis of land reclamation in the future by providing the historical, social and political context in which it should be seen. Thus, this paper provides the context through which the questions raised above should be analysed in the future. This paper does this in three steps.

First of all, this paper defines the concept of the state and how it functions in theory. By using Bob Jessop's and Timothy Mitchell's approach to state power, I come to a comprehensive understanding of the concept of state and how the state functions and emphasises the importance of political ecology for any fundamental understanding of how society and state function. I follow Jessop's argument that social relations are the underlying foundations of society, and thus the state as well. Just as traditional Marxist theorists, Jessop argues that the state, in the end, works in favour of the dominant class or social groups. However, unlike traditional Marxists, Jessop argues that these different social groups or classes interact differently on a local level. These interactions are shaped by historical precedent but differ widely and can change over time. Therefore, the state is constantly in flux. Although this still sounds highly abstract, Jessop makes it concrete by arguing this via the Strategic Relationship Approach (SRA). The premise of SRA is that it is never the state that acts, but that it is people within the state system, politicians, civil servants, etc. that activate specific powers related to the particular institutions and agencies they operate in. He argues that by conducting state projects these relationships and interactions between different social groups become visible because these are the moments when different social groups represented by elites, institutions and agencies interact (Jessop, 2008). One crucial aspect is lacking from Jessop's analysis is the power of ecology in shaping human interaction. Mitchell tells a compelling story about how the features of technological innovations and the ecological features of coal and oil each shaped human interaction differently (Mitchell, 2002 and 2011).

Furthermore, this paper highlights the work of Alex Loftus, Christian Parenti that place Bob Jessop's SRA within tradition of political ecology.

Secondly, this paper takes one of the fundamental questions raised by the SRA, that of sovereignty. How free were the political elite of Egypt to make their own decisions? Another related, but maybe even more important question is that of temporal sovereignty. Or how free were the political elite of Egypt to make their own decisions over history? How much room to manoeuvre did they have to determine domestic policies? This part thus places land reclamation and Egyptian agricultural policy in general in its historical and worldly context. Doing so requires a theory on agricultural production, that can easily switch between the local and global level and has a historical element. To this end this paper discusses the agrarian question and some aspects of the theoretical debate surrounding this. Key here is the food regime analysis of Harriet Friedmann (1987) and Philip McMichael (1989). The food regime analysis couples the mode of food production to the World-Systems analysis of Wallerstein and the regulation theory. It distinguishes three different food regimes over time. The first food regime or colonial project (1870–1930) organised the world system between the colonised who produced the raw materials need for the industry in the colonizer's home market. The second food regime or 'Development Project' (1950s–70s) was the result of growing tensions between the US and the USSR during the cold war and the establishment of a US empire in postcolonial states. The Third food regime or corporate project (1980's – now), largely deepened the processes of corporatisation and growing transnational supply chains (McMichael, 2013). I subsequently bring in critiques from Araghi (2009), who argues that the food regime analysis should focus more on labour relations since this is the underlining force of food production, and Bernstein (2016), who argues that the agrarian question has become more or less obsolete thanks to globalisation.

The final step is to apply the food regime and the critiques of Araghi and Bernstein, to Egypt and see to what extent they overlap with reality. If the trajectory of Egypt fits perfectly within the framework of the food regime analysis, Egypt has had little to no room for manoeuvre in determining its history. Meaning that global structures have such a large influence on Egypt that class dynamics within Egypt had little choice than to work within those structures. The aim is thus to find differences from the food regime analysis and use Araghi's critique as a guiding principle. Furthermore, by analysing the nature of the agrarian question and thus ask the question how relevant agriculture was with regard to the state in the different food regimes. The nature of land reclamation and agricultural policy as a whole should become more evident.

Although Egypt and the food regime analysis widely show overlap, there are some significant differences. This paper places the incorporation of Egypt into the world food system in the first half of the 19th century, and one could argue even earlier. The food regime analysis dates the start of the first food regime to the year 1880. However, the first and second food regime more or less fit perfectly with the history of Egypt. The third food regime, although it looks like it would fit perfectly too in the case of Egypt, actually shows some significant differences. The argument presented in this paper is that under Nasser unproductive sectors such as the bureaucracy and the military had become large drains on public investment. At the end of Nassers tenure investment in agriculture and manufacturing was decreasing rapidly. At the start of Sadat's rule, this situation became unsustainable. However, thanks to the oil boom from 1973-85 and the subsequent inflow of remittances (numbering in the billions) that were sent from the Gulf to Egypt, the reopening of the Suez Canal, growing tourism industry and foreign aid, Sadat was never forced to make a hard choice. This fundamentally changed the fabric of the Egyptian state into a rentier economy. This enabled the previously opposing classes, such as the rich landlords, the ruling military class and the technocratic class, to merge

and take shared possession of large part of the state's apparatus and the economy. Furthermore, it was these large influxes of rent that completely pushed the agrarian question to the background. In this sense the critique of Bernstein is correct. However, this paper argues that while Bernstein puts this point somewhere in the 90's, in Egypt this took place in the mid 70's.

The following chapter discusses the theoretical debate surrounding the state. The third chapter discusses the theoretical debate surrounding the agrarian question and the food regime analysis and subsequently brings in the critiques of Araghi and Bernstein. The fourth chapter discusses Egypt from 1700 to the start of the first food regime in 1882 and argues that Egypt's integration into the world system started much earlier. The fifth, sixth and seventh chapter discuss Friedmann's and McMichael's food regime analysis in the context of Egypt. The starting dates used of each food regime relate to specific events within Egypt itself. By discussing each food regime in depth and bringing in at the end of each chapter, the critiques of Araghi and Bernstein, this paper aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the agrarian question in Egypt and therefore the functioning of the Egyptian state. ,

CHAPTER II STATE THEORY

Probably one of the best known definitions of the state is given by Max Weber, who names it as an entity that successfully claims the “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber, 1946: 78). He also argues that the legitimate use of force is the founding basis of the state. Another approach, that of *Allgemeine Staatslehre*, focusses more on the features that make up the state. They argue that states have three main features. First, all states control territory. Secondly, the state has an apparatus that makes collectively binding decisions. And thirdly, states have a population that is subject to the state’s authority (Jessop, 2008). Both approaches are useful when comparing state and state institutions but are not useful when asking more practical questions about state functioning. Does, for instance, the state extend to opposition parties or supporting institutions like the church? How do supranational institutions like the UN and the EU fit into this model? To answer these kinds of questions it is essential to revisit the ontology of the state.

A discussion on how the state functions and where its boundaries are is crucial for any serious discussion on land reclamation. Not only because one cannot define the “meaning” of a state’s actions without defining the state first, but also because of the centrality of the state to most theoretical concepts. One view of the state makes that some theoretical approaches are excluded from one’s research (Bartelson, 2001). However, this also means that defining the state is near to impossible. As Weber himself puts it: “there is no activity that the state always performs and none that they never performed” (Weber, 1948: 77-8). What makes the state so hard to define is that it is simultaneously static and physically present, in that it has fixed spatial ramifications, like governmental buildings, borders and related institutions and at the same time highly abstract and fluid because it changes over time and means different things in relation to different concepts. The role of the state in relation to the economy is different than

that of the state towards society. This chapter discusses the debate surrounding state theory in more depth. I argue that by focussing on the source of state power one can give a concrete definition of the state. In the end I suggest that Bob Jessop's conceptualisation of the state, with the addition of Timothy Mitchell's approach which bases state power within ecology, is the most comprehensive way of conceptualising the state and state power.

The institutional approach, practiced by scholars such as Theda Skocpol and Charles Tilly, sees the state as clearly distinct from society and the economy. The state is built on different institutions, like parliament and the military, who are separated from society. Skocpol's work, which mainly focusses on revolution, depicts the state as a prize to be captured by the revolution. (Skocpol, 1979) The strength of this approach is that the state is omnipresent. The state is intertwined with so many aspects of social life that it is impossible to ignore. Charles Tilly puts it rather nicely, "No state no revolution" (Tilly, 2003: 47). However, as is evident in Skocpol's work there are a number of problems with this approach. When it comes to social struggles, the institutions Skocpol sees as part of the state, the military, the bureaucracy, parliament etc., are often the main stages for these struggles. Parliament by its very nature is intertwined with society, since this is where social issues are debated. This means that in theory the boundaries are clear, but in practice become vague and selective.

On the other hand, there is the classic Marxist approach, which sees the non-proletarian state as a tool of the ruling social class. Marx himself saw the state as a consequence of the capitalist mode of production. The state was thus subordinate to the economy, and the state should be studied via its influence on economy. However, he sometimes describes the state as a separate entity. In the *Eighteen Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, Marx argues that "*The army is no longer to maintain the rule of one part of the people over another part of the people. The army is to maintain its own rule, personated by its own dynasty, over French people in general [...] It is to represent the State in antagonism to the society*" (Marx 1858, 465).

Theorists like Miliband do not see this as a problem and argue that the state continues to perform class functions and that the state is based on the interpersonal ties between state officials and economic elites. The economic and the political elite come from the same background and act in the interest of capital (Miliband, 1983). This view of the state is called instrumental Marxism. The state is an instrument in the hands of the ruling elite. One of the main critiques on this view is that it does not allow for any agency of the state itself. Self-regulation or changes in the nature of the state, which runs counter to the interests of the ruling elite are hard to square with the instrumental approach to the state.

Gramsci takes a less rigid approach. He argues that the state is a historical construct. The state is made up out of a union of social forces or a “historical bloc” that dominate society as a whole. These historical blocks are bound together by ideologies and have created institutions that support a certain organisation of the state. Gramsci sees the state and society as a whole is made out of political society (parliament, the military, legislature etc) and civil society (schools, churches, media etc.). These are areas where different ideologies struggle for hegemony and are thus areas of the “passive revolution” or the “war of positions”. The idea is that one can win the hegemony by battling within these institutions with the opposing ideology (Gramsci, 1999). The interesting thing about Gramsci’s approach to the state is that he uses it on different scales. It is both representative of the ruling class, who use it to exert power and it is a more abstract idea that can be used as a location for the war of positions. In this sense, Gramsci differs from Miliband who strictly analyses the state in terms of social relations. Instead, Gramsci sees the state as a historical construct often in the service of the ruling social class and allows for the state to work against ruling class interests, but in itself, the state is not autonomous (Gramsci, 1999).

Where Gramsci is still beholden to the idea that the state is an instrument in the hands of the elite, Poulantzas sees the state as an autonomous form of power with its own interests,

which can also go against the interests of capital. In what is now dubbed the Poulantzas-Miliband debate, Poulantzas argues against Miliband's instrumental approach and argues instead for a structural approach to the state. Poulantzas argues that what he calls the "repressive role of the State", is too limited of an approach. First of all, he argues, that the ruling capitalist class is too diverse and not aware enough of its interests to maintain a controlling and unified block. Secondly, if the state is just a tool of repression, it would inevitably lead to its collapse. A repressive state would in the long-run lead to too much instability, which hinders the reproduction of capital. (Poulantzas, 1969) Instead, the state is a structure that ensures the long-term interests of capital. This means that the state coerces otherwise opposed classes into an alliance with the dominant class.

Poulantzas gives the New Deal as an example. Here the ruling capitalist class bowed to the demands of labourers in fear of a socialist revolution and established institutions such as the minimum wage. Poulantzas thus splits the state into a repressive (government, army, police, tribunals and administration) and coercing part or ideological apparatuses (Church, the political parties, the unions, schools, media, etc.). Poulantzas borrows heavily from Gramsci's, as he himself admits. However, where Gramsci sees these areas as a battleground for hegemony, Poulantzas sees them as crucial parts for the functioning of the capitalist state. In Poulantzas' view, the state mediates the relationships between different social groups and coerces them into alliances, which are (in the long term) favourable to the dominant class. The state's power is thus both relational, it is built on social relations, and selective, it favours certain strategies above others. Student protests, for instance, unless specifically aimed to overthrow the government in a revolutionary sense, make important platforms for the different social groups to form alliances and justify the rule of the dominant class (Poulantzas, 1969).

"The condition of possibility of the existence and functioning of these institutions or ideological apparatuses, under a certain form, is the state repressive apparatus"

itself. If it is true that their role is principally ideological and that the State repressive apparatus does not in general intervene directly in their functioning, it remains no less true that this repressive apparatus is always present behind them, that it defends them and sanctions them, and finally, that their action is determined by the action of the State repressive apparatus itself. The student movement, in France and elsewhere, can testify to this for schools and universities today” (Poulantzas, 1969: 77-78).

Apart from Gramsci, Poulantzas also used a lot of Foucault’s ideas on the state and his later work is to a large extent a commentary on Foucault’s work. As Timothy Mitchell points out, Foucault revolutionised state theory, by arguing that the main source of state power is not its material power, but its disciplinary power. Material power is external, in the case of the nation-state from its sovereignty over the use of force within its territory. Seen from a material power perspective, the state can set the boundaries and regulate society as it sees fit. Disciplinary power, on the other hand, is internal (Mitchell, 2006). It is an intrinsic part of the state organisation and results from advances in technology and methods of control. The state derives its power from this disciplinary power in a process that Foucault calls Bio-politics: the management and control of human life by regimes via the control over knowledge, power, and the processes of subjectivation (Foucault, 2008). Foucault describes a process that started in the 18th century, which made the population an object of study and control. It is precisely these measures that create the idea of separate identifiable institutions, and it is through this dynamic that things such as the economy, civil society and the state become an abstract reality. These measures then become bigger than their total sum. The nation-state, in that sense, is the perfect example. The individual parts that make up the nation-state, such as schooling, borders with checkpoints and passports, do not accumulate to an institution people are willing to die for

(Foucault, 2008). Poulantzas accepts this process of disciplining power but goes beyond Foucault in his explanation of how these disciplinary forces result in the current form of capitalist government and state organisation. Poulantzas argues in what Foucault dubs as a discipline is actually how capitalism organizes the relations of production. The factory, for instance, separates manual labour from the process of mental labour (Poulantzas, 1978).

Whereas Poulantzas sees the state and other institutions as a result of a capitalist mode of production, Mitchell argues that they are the result of a similar process of abstraction. Meaning that the process of discipline described by Foucault, does not occur according to the lines of capitalism, but more by diffuse sources of power that interact with each other.

“The relationship between methods of discipline and government and their stabilization in such forms as the state, I argue, lies in the fact that at the same time as power relations become internal, in Foucault’s terms, and by the same methods, they now take on the specific appearance of external ‘structures.’”
The distinctiveness of the modern state, appearing as an apparatus that stands apart from the rest of the social world, is to be found in this novel structural effect” (Mitchell, 2006: 179-180).

Mitchell brings the idea of the state back to Foucault’s conceptions of knowledge and disciplines of modernity. He argues that the state in the 18th and 19th century as used by Foucault had a completely different relationship with the economy than it has today. Foucault describes how the state defines itself by objectifying the population as an area of control and measurement. Mitchell argues that the relation to the economy of the state, is one in which the state uses the economy to define the population and uses it to try and increase the wellbeing of the population. The economy today has an entirely different meaning as being a “a distinct

sphere of social reality – understood as the self-contained totality of relations of production, distribution, and consumption within a defined geospatial unit” (Mitchell, 2006: 183). The state is now seen as an important part of the economy and one of the only institutions that can influence it directly. Mitchell argues that one can define the state by focussing on concepts such as the state, economy and society and analyse the changing relation to one another. Subsequently one can analyse these changes and the resulting institutions that spring from it. One can now understand why the state and the economy are in practice so hard to separate because their relationship to one another changed over time (Mitchell, 2006).

“Rather than explain the form of the state as the consequence of the disciplinary regime of capitalist production, one can see both the factory regime and the power of the state as aspects of the modern reordering of space, time, and personhood and the production of the new effects of abstraction and subjectivity. It is customary to see the state as an apparatus of power and the factory as one of production. In fact, both are systems of disciplinary power and both are techniques of production. Both produce the effect of an abstraction that stands apart from material reality” (Mitchell, 2006: 181).

Mitchell’s conception of the state is thus highly abstract, and he sees power as diffuse. In his book *Rule of Experts*, he describes a synthesis between new technologies such as government cadastral survey’s. The increasing power of the state, generated from these new technologies, transform the relation of the state with society. Furthermore, these new technologies exclude or negatively affect certain groups. In the case of the cadastral survey’s, it was the small farmers who increasingly became in debt as a consequence of a higher tax burden (Mitchell, 2002). Although, power plays a vital role within his conception of state relation, it is not clear where this power comes from. In his later work, he tries to materialise the source of this power and

places it in an ecological context. In his book *Carbon Democracy*, he describes how the features of oil have shaped the oil-rich countries in the Middle East in comparison with coal powered nations like Britain in the early half of the 20th century. Oil needs a limited amount of well-trained staff to work the oil wells, and oil can be easily transported via pipelines, which require no manpower or via oil tankers from anywhere in the world. Coal needs to be extracted from under the ground by manual labour. The extraction of coal mainly requires a lot of low skilled workers. Coal is subsequently transported via railroad. Importing coal is not really an option since it is too bulky to transport profitably over the oceans. Mitchell argues that the features of coal gave a lot of power to workers who were able to block the flow of coal at a couple of crucial points by striking. Coal miners, who did hard, dangerous work in the mines were therefore highly effective strikers, as were the train machinists, who could turn the country into darkness. Thus, giving the labouring class immense power to demand social reform. Oil on the other hand does not have such features. Oil workers do not have the same amount of solidarity as coal miners used to have and are not as numerous. Furthermore, their strikes are way less effective since oil can be imported from elsewhere. The features of oil thus give significantly less power to the labouring class and their call for social change (Mitchell, 2011). The effect of the features coal and oil have, ripple through on all different levels of society. Power is thus grounded in ecology and not an abstract concept as with Foucault.

Mitchell dismisses the shaping force of the capitalist mode of production and sees ecology as the material source of power, Bob Jessop sees social relations as the underlying foundation of society, just as Poulantzas. However, where Poulantzas argues that capitalism is the structuring force of these relationships, Bob Jessop argues that the organising principle of these social relations is not necessarily the capitalist mode of production. There are many other forms of social organisation possible besides those of capitalist modes of production. On a local level, people's organisational strategies vary widely. The state does however have a

historical context, by which the state grants privileges to some strategies over others (Jessop, 2008). In today's world that is the capitalist mode of production. The state thus works in favour of the dominant social group (or class), but on a local level, many different strategies to mobilise support and influence state policy, can be used. Because social groups constantly form new alliances, long or short-lived, that are structured by historical precedent; the state is constantly in flux. The state is thus both influenced by these social relations and shapes them. In this sense, it is similar to Mitchell's approach to the state. But where Mitchell grounds power in ecology, Jessop argues that power is founded in social relations.

Jessop developed his analysis of the state in what he dubs the Strategic Relationship Approach (SRA). SRA is founded in critical realist (CR) ontology. Developed by Roy Baskar, CR stems from a philosophical perspective that there is an objectual and knowable truth. However, the way we analyse and interpret this truth is governed by social relations. Thus, counter to positive notions that we can derive knowledge from empirical evidence, CR sees these as methods of deducing facts as flawed since the methods used are based on social relations, which also need to be examined. This is similar to the post-modernist notion. However, where post-modernists argue that there is no absolute truth, CR argues that there is. The truth is however "buried" underneath social relations that function at different scales. These scales can be temporal or spatial and often it is a combination of both (Montiel, 2007).

SRA takes CR and applies it to state theory and how states work in practice. As expressed before, SRA sees the state as a construct of social relations. This means that it is not the state that acts, but people within the state system like politicians, civil servants, etc. who activate specific powers related to the particular institutions and agencies they operate in. The behaviour of elites is thus important when analysing the interests that are at play. Furthermore, SRA argues that these interests are most visible when conducting state projects. Because these are the moments when different social groups represented by elites, institutions and agencies

interact. During this process new alliances are formed, which brings stability within the state as a whole.

“In terms of the capitalist type of state, policy is best understood as being moulded around particular hegemonic projects, as expressed mainly by dominant political parties, whose relationship to the dominant regime of accumulation is crucial. Therefore, the nature of the state form, its particular structural and strategic selectivity, problematises its functions” (Kelly, 1999: 111).

What makes SRA such a useful tool in analysing the state is that it is both extremely broad (it requires the inclusion of a lot of different factors), yet highly specific (it allows one to focus on a specific event). By analysing how different social forces within the state, use the state to affect the outcome of certain projects, one can make larger claims about the state’s functioning as a whole. A key concept here is strategic selectivity, “the ways in which the state has a specific, differential impact on the ability of various political forces to pursue particular interests and strategies in specific spatial-temporal contexts” (Jessop, 2002, 40). Or in other words: how do the elites involved with the state projects, justify their actions towards others? How do they obtain political legitimacy and deploy state resources while maximising their interest? SRA argues that this is mostly historically determined and dependent on political legacies. Cohesion between elites is subsequently created and expressed by the construction of narratives around such projects (Jessop, 2008).

The gap between Jessop and Mitchell conceptualisations of the state has been the field of an increasingly vibrant debate between the concepts of the state and ecology. Alex Loftus gives a good overview of this debate (Loftus, 2018). Jessop himself has added to this debate by discussing the compatibility of Poulantzas ideas and political ecology (Jessop, 2017). The main critique posed by these critical political ecologists of Jessop’s conceptualisation of the

state is that; *“the link between territory and value is not much developed. In other words, the insights of environmentally minded Marxist political economy, or political ecology, have not quite linked up with Marxist state theory”* (Parenti, 2015: 831). The argument here is similar to that of Mitchell’s argument in “Society, Economy and the State Effect”; One cannot separate the concepts of economy and state from each other, just as one cannot separate the concepts of ecology and state from each other (Mitchell, 2006). Parenti sums this up by arguing that the state itself is the ultimate landowner (Parenti, 2015).

This paper chooses Jessop approach to the state and rejects that of the notions of a Weberian approach, since the state is not limited to its bureaucracy and Jessops approach in cooperates a critical realist perspective. Furthermore, Jessop’s approach to the state has a much broader understanding of state power and where this power comes from. This is in line with the fact that land reclamation and agriculture is both an ecological, economic and social project. Land reclamation is therefore shaped by the relation between the state, the economy and the environment. To properly analyse land reclamation and agriculture in general, one thus needs a comprehensive theory which encompasses all of these different aspects. The next chapter, therefore, focusses on placing agriculture in Egypt within both a historical, ecological and worldly context by analysing the agrarian question.

CHAPTER III

THE AGRARIAN QUESTION AND FOOD REGIMES

The agrarian question goes back to Marx and other early Marxist theorists like Engels, Kautsky and Lenin. For a good overview of this research and debates surrounding the agrarian question one should read “Surveying the agrarian question (part 1 and 2): current debates and beyond” by A. Haroon Akram-Lodhi and Cristóbal Kay (2010). For Marx the agrarian question was the origin of the capitalist society. Marx describes a process in which the landed capitalist class disposed the peasants from their means of production. By driving the peasants from their land, the landed elite force them onto the labour market in which they had to sell their labour in exchange for a salary. The centrality of rural production to the development of a capitalist economy and how it impacts the agrarian question can be divided into three questions.

The first is the problem of accumulation, raised by Preobrazhensky, who tried analysing how agricultural surplus could be used to power industrial growth. The second problem is called the problem of production, which was first raised by Kautsky and Lenin. How does the capitalist mode of production spread through the rural areas and what are its effects on social structures within the rural population? This problem focusses on the influences of capital in the production process and how different forms of agricultural production divided peasants differently along class lines. The third and final is the problem of politics on which Engels wrote a great deal and which focusses on the politicization of the rural population. It examines the effects of political mobilisation and structures that effect and shape political struggles in rural areas. The problems of accumulation, production and politics have been the foundation for an ever-growing body of research.,

One of the approaches to the agrarian question is to place the agrarian question within a world-historic context via the Food regime theory. The term ‘Food regime’ was first used by Harriet Friedmann (1987) and was subsequently developed in cooperation with McMichael

(1989). The food regime concept places food in the middle of the global political-economy and politicizes and historicizes the role agriculture plays and played in shaping the global (capitalist) economy. By comparing specific features from each food regime with one another, it is possible to identify distinct features of each food regime. At first Friedmann and McMichael identified two different food regimes, the first one led by the United Kingdom and the second one by the United States (US), a third food regime was later added. Today McMichael uses the term ‘the Food Regime Project’, since all of these “regimes” are in effect projects in which the interest of capital and hegemonic states aligned to construct a world system (McMichael, 2015).

The first food regime or colonial project (1870–1930) organised the world system between the colonised who produced the raw materials needed for the industry in the colonizers home market. This could be in the form of raw materials such as cotton and rubber or cheap livestock and grains needed to maintain the increasingly urbanised populations and industrialization in the colonizing country. In the colonized countries this resulted in imposing mono-cropping meant for export. The forced reallocation of land and the promotion of large estates was one of the key features of policies imposed on these occupied territories. In the (former) settler colonies, such as the US, South Africa, Canada and Australia, policy mainly focussed on creating an agricultural surplus which could be transported back to Europe. This resulted in large scale expansion and overexploitation of frontier lands, resulting in the mass expulsion and genocidal killings of native inhabitants. However, it were also these settler colonies that used this exported surplus to fuel their own industrialisation and became the motors behind the ever expanding globalisation of trade (McMicheal, 2013).

The second food regime or ‘Development Project’ (1950s–70s) was the result of growing tensions between the US and the USSR during the cold war and the establishment of an US empire in postcolonial states. First, there was the US support for the establishment of

land reform, and redistribution of land to landless peasants in certain countries it supported. These countries could also count on subsidies for large scale agro-industrialisation by promoting the use of pesticides, machinery and fertilizer. This was mainly done to counter rural (often socialist) revolutions that occurred all over the Global South. Secondly, the agricultural surplus generated by the US was transported to the Global South instead of Europe. The surplus was sustained and enlarged with larger subsidies from the state. Europe copied this model of export-led overproduction, supported by national subsidies, which resulted in a dumping war between the European Economic Community and the US. The third feature was the diminishing power of labour in agriculture. Through mechanisation and chemicalisation, capital became an increasingly important factor in the agribusiness leading to the corporatisation of agriculture especially in the global north. Furthermore, global supply chains, for instance in animal feeds, increasingly started to shape the international division of labour around globe (McMicheal, 2013).

The Third food regime or corporate project (1980's – now), largely deepened the processes of corporatisation and growing transnational supply chains. The liberalisation of markets and privatisation of public institutions are at the core of this neoliberal globalisation. One of the key features of this food regime is the spread of neoliberal policies such as the removal of import tariffs and subsidies supportive of the national agricultural sector in the global south. This has resulted in a mass displacement of peasants and small landowners, who without government support were not able to sustain themselves. A second feature is the still further specialisation on export production. Led by the supermarket revolution, cooperatives buy large plots of land (land grabbing) and produce exotic fruits for the western supermarkets or staple foods for animal feeds. Rather than supporting local consumption these products are used as industry inputs or consumed abroad. This has resulted in unsustainable farming

methods in relation to the local ecology with increasing soil degradation as a result (McMichael 2013).

The Food regime theory relies heavily on Wallerstein's conception of world system theory. This gives the food regime theory a historical and global perspective. However, one of the critiques of the world system theory in general is that it is highly rigid. A country's place in the world system, being either peripheral or centre, is more or less set in stone. The second theory on which the food regime is based is the regulation theory. Jessop is one of the main scholars within this field and the SRA has its basis in the regulation theory. The regulation theory argues that transformations in social relations create new forms of economic and non-economic organisation which subsequently become a fixed structure or the mode of reproduction (Jessop, 2008). However, one of the main critiques of this paper is that in the case of Egypt this specific regime of accumulation was not caused by the organisation around food, but by the influx of external rents

There has been a lively debate surrounding the food regime. One of the most constructive criticisms has come from Araghi. Araghi argues that underlying these "regimes" are changing forces of labour relations. He does not disavow the concept of food regime but incorporates the food regime in his analysis. He argues that what McMichael calls the emergence of a global food regime is in fact an enclosure regime "characterized by a structure of forced underconsumption for the surplus populations of the world's hyper urbanized cities" (Araghi, 2009: 118). One obvious advantage Araghi's more labour focussed theory has over the food regime theory, is that it goes further back in history. Instead of three regimes or projects, he distinguishes four periods: 1492-1834, the era of colonial enclosure; 1834-1917 the emergence and dominance of industrial capitalism; 1917-1975 the retreat of laissez-faire liberalism and the establishment of the developmental state; 1973 – onwards: neoliberal globalisation (Araghi, 2009). Apart from the periodisation, Araghi's labour centric approach

overlaps for large parts with the food regime. However, his approach makes it easier to step out of the UK-US centric approach taken by Friedmann and McMichael. Central to his argument is that the period of the emergence of industrial capitalism and neoliberal globalisation are in many ways very similar concerning the relations of labour relations. In both periods there was “a truly global division of labour, as witnessed in the ‘workshop of the world’ project shared by both” (Araghi, 2009: 114).

Bernstein critiques the food regimes in a different way, but just as Araghi sees it as a supplement to his analysis. Bernstein questions if the very premise of the agricultural question is still relevant today. Globalisation has effectively decoupled the need to mobilise surplus agricultural resources to fuel capital accumulation. Instead, global financial capital now provides the surplus needed for industrialisation or accumulation of capital. This has also affected labour relations. Instead of dispossessing peasants and forcing them onto the labour market, which used to be necessary for capital accumulation, technical capacity and access to financial capital has become the main driver of capital accumulation and the allocation of resources. The national labour relations have thus become decoupled from its relations to capital. Capital has spread across the globe in a fragmented way and does not require changes on a national level anymore. Instead capital can pick and choose on a global scale where it locates itself. Its effects have therefore been a lot more localised and fragmented around the globe. With agriculture becoming increasingly insignificant for part of the economy and revenues from farmland becoming lower, the peasants have been transformed into what Bernstein dubs *petty commodity producers*. Peasants today do not solely depend on agriculture for their subsistence, but often have other sources of revenues, such as the renting of farm tools, second jobs or handy craft shops. They thus operate both within and away from the market and there is such a wide variety of such petty commodity producers that it is hard to classify them within a class system. These dynamics do not mean that dispossession of the peasantry does

not happen, it most certainly does. Dispossession has become another tool that can be used for capital accumulation. The main consequence being that it does not have to be structurally applied and therefore can be highly localised (Bernstein, 2014).

Egypt's case is an interesting one. Both from a food regime perspective as from Araghi's and Bernstein's perspective. Historically, Egypt has been heavily influenced by and been part of the British empire. Under Nasser, Egypt played Russia and the US of against each other. And under Sadat Egypt became the biggest recipient of US aid after Israel. Egypt thus fits perfectly within the framework of the food regime analysis. It is there for a good case study to test the merits of the food regime theory and see if the critiques from Bernstein and Araghi are justified. Since, if Egypt indeed fits perfectly within the framework of the food regime this would mean that Egypt has had very little actual room to manoeuvre over the course of its history. Meaning that the global structures have had a disproportioned influence on the Egyptian state. If on the other hand Bernstein's and Araghi's critiques have merit, one can argue that other forces have also played an important role within Egypt's history. However, to fully do this one needs to start with the integration of Egypt into the world food system during the first half of the 19th century.

CHAPTER IV

PRE-FOOD REGIME (1700-1882)

One of the main critiques of the food regime is that the global divisions of labour were shaped before the first food regime started. Starting in 1834 with the Poor Law Amendment Act, Britain started to disenfranchise the peasantry at home and created a global division of labour geared towards its quickly industrialising economy. Via colonisation and other coercive measures, the British empire and its European rivals shaped the global system in a way that benefited industrialisation at home whilst promoting monocropping cash crops which could be used as input for industry abroad, such as cotton, rubber and sugarcane. Egypt seems to be the perfect example of this argument. This research argues that up until 1840 Egypt created its own, relatively autonomous and successful, path to industrialisation by redirecting surpluses in agriculture towards export and industrial growth. However, industrial development halted once Egypt's ambitions clashed with those of European powers, mainly Britain. After 1840 Egypt is increasingly incorporated within the global system dominated by the British empire. Furthermore, there is also a strong argument for Araghi's period of colonial enclosure from 1492-1834. However, here the trade does not focus on the European continent, but on trade between the African continent, Arab peninsula, South Asia and the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman empire is in this case the dominant party.

Far from being an isolated economy, Egypt was heavily involved in the world trading system. Egypt was an important regional producer and export of other goods such as grain, textiles and raw materials for manufacturing, which it mostly sold within the Ottoman empire. Constantinople alone made up a bigger share in trading volume than Europe as a whole (Richards, 1982). Furthermore, In the 17th and 18th century Egypt was at the heart of the world's spice and coffee trade. Egypt was critical to transporting spices from India and coffee from Yemen to Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Although the Europeans muscled the Egyptians out of the spice trade in the late 17th century, the coffee trade was highly profitable until the

second half of the 18th century in which it started to decline gradually due to competition from European nations who opened coffee plantations in the Caribbean. It is estimated that for the most part of the 18th century coffee accounted for 50% of total government revenues, the other 50% coming from agriculture (Richards, 1982: 7). The increased competition with European traders in the second half of the 18th century coincided with turmoil within Egypt itself. The general retreat of the Ottoman Empire, which was facing outward pressure from the Habsburg Empire and Russia on its own, emboldened the ruling Mamluk class to seek autonomy from the Ottoman empire. In the second half of the 18th century, different warring factions controlled different parts of Egypt and in a constantly shifting network of alliances. During this period of turmoil, the irrigation systems were neglected, there was loss of livestock and long-term interruptions of regional trade and local trade. This made the effects of droughts and outbreak of diseases only worse. It was only in the 1790's that some form of stability was established when Murad Bey and Ibrahim Bey controlled the whole of Egypt, until the French invaded in 1798 (Cuno, 1992).

The French invasion reignited tensions between the Mamluks. The conflict was fuelled by the rivalry between France and England who supported opposing Mamluks in the upper and lower regions of Egypt. When the French left in 1805 the Ottomans tried to regain control and named Mohammed Ali, a Pasha, the governor of Egypt. Playing different sides against each other, Mohammed Ali managed to increasingly bring some sense of stability to Egypt. On the first of March 1811, Mohammed Ali invited most of the Mamluk elite to the citadel of Cairo, where they were all assassinated. After a short campaign to round up the remaining Mamluks, Mohammed Ali became the undisputed ruler of Egypt (Cleveland, 2009). It is generally assumed that Mohammed Ali transformed Egypt's economy into a capitalist economy. However, Mohammed Ali's reforms did not fundamentally change the social relations within the Egyptian countryside. There was no mass creation of a landless class, such

as in England. Nor were his reforms revolutionary. Most, such as making new land cadastres and tax collection reform, were already tried and briefly implemented by his predecessor (Richards, 1982).

What made Mohammed Ali's rule stand out most of all was the scale of his reforms. For most Egyptians in rural areas, it was under Mohammed Ali's Rule that they came into direct contact with the state. Tax Farms, areas where designated "nobles" were allowed to collect taxes were abolished, and in its place came a centrally run tax collecting bureaucracy. This system did not completely replace the old system, but instead strengthened the middle class of society, the *shayks* (leaders of villages) who became the bureaucrats. Furthermore, peasants who could not pay their taxes, were forced off their land. Other peasants fled or mutilated themselves to avoid conscription. This vacant land was subsequently given to large landowners, who were deemed more able to pay their taxes (Fahmy, 1997). Other important reforms also mainly benefited the higher levels of society. Mohammed Ali rebuilt and subsequently transformed the irrigation system by funding land reclamation projects and introducing cotton as a cash crop. Most of these reclaimed lands went to large landowners, who were also better placed to cultivate cotton since they had the means to focus on long-term cultivation, which resulted in higher yields. "By the early 1830's cotton and other summer crops (rice, indigo, sugar) were cultivated on 600.000 feddans compared to 250.000 in 1878" (Beinin, 2001). Furthermore, these projects required large amounts of labour and capital. Corvee, another form of taxing peasants in which they were put to work on state projects, supplied the needed labour for these projects. Taxation and foreign borrowing supplied the capital needed. During Mohammed Ali's rule the contours of a class-divided society started to take shape (Cunan, 1992).

The dispossession of peasants and their forced labour was combined with an increasing integration into the global market, mainly represented by export of cotton. This was

a result of Egypt's general reorientation to Europe. Where in previous times the Ottoman Empire was the most important trading partner of Egypt, the European market and the English market in particular became increasingly important during the 19th century. However, Mohammed Ali did not integrate Egypt directly into the global market. Instead, Mohammed Ali supported local industrial development by monopolising trade and putting up import barriers in effect nationalising the Egyptian economy. Although the monopolisation of trade was also mainly a way of collecting taxes, it had the added advantage of being protected from foreign competition. Peasants were forced to sell their products to the state against a relatively low price. The state subsequently sold these products on the urban market for a higher price. The same applied for export products, such as sugar, cotton and wheat. By buying these products at an artificially low price and subsequently selling them on the global market, the state managed to raise significant revenues (Cunan, 1992). As with almost all of Mohammed Ali's reforms these came mainly at the cost of peasants and the poorer urban population, who saw their incomes drop and food prices rise. However, by making the state the main middleman for any product on the Egyptian market, Mohammed Ali was able to provide subsidies to domestic manufacturing and protect these infant industries from foreign competition. This made Egypt one of the early industrialising countries of the 19th century.

In the end, manufacturing employment reached an estimated 260.000 of which between 50.000 and 110.000 worked in mechanised industries. Furthermore, another 80.000 workers, worked in the non-mechanized as cotton weavers and 30.000 as linen weavers (Panza And Williamson, 2015: 83). The magnitude of this achievement cannot be understated. It was precisely during this period that relatively industrialised countries, such as India and Mexico in effect deindustrialised caused by a major influx of cheap industrial goods from England in the first half of the 19th century (Panza and Williamson, 2015). What is even more remarkable is that this industry was mainly focussed on the local market. It is estimated that local

consumption amounted for 80% of local production (Batou, 1993). All in all, one can dub the initial industrialisation of Egypt under Mohammed Ali as successful. This is further underlined by the fact that even after the relatively successful industrialisation during Mohammed Ali's rule, it quickly deteriorated after protections were cut in the 1850's and 60's and English wool became more and more competitive (Batou, 1993).

As noted, both land and tax reforms and the subsequent industrialisation came mainly at the cost of the poorer parts of society. These parts of the population did not roll over willingly. There were many major peasant and workers' revolts throughout Mohammed Ali's rule (Beinin, 2001). Furthermore, most of Mohammed Ali's increases in revenues were spent on expensive military expeditions. In 1812 he took control of Medina, Jeddah and Mecca. In the early 1820's he took control of Sudan for its slaves and gold. Mohammed Ali also intervened at the Sultan's request in the Greek war of independence with initial success crushing the Greek uprising and conquering Crete and Cyprus. It was only after Mohammed Ali's navy was destroyed in the battle of Navarino in 1827 by French and British forces and the blockade of Alexandria in 1828 that his ambitions in Greece were stifled.

Although the Sultan had promised Mohammed Ali control over Syria in exchange for his help in Greece, he did not lift a finger to assist Mohammed Ali to take control. Mohammed Ali therefore started the conquest of Syria, Lebanon, Adana and a major part of the Arabian Peninsula by himself in 1832-40. At the same time British ambitions in the region became bigger and clashed with those of Mohammed Ali. The British supported every revolt in the 1830's against the Egyptians, backing uprisings in Syria, Sudan and Saudi Arabia. They tried, via the Bata-Liman trade agreement in 1838 with the Ottoman empire, to break up the monopoly system in Egypt with very limited success. Furthermore, they supported an Ottoman attempt in 1839 to regain control over Syria from the Egyptians. This resulted in a spectacular

defeat and the complete destruction of the Ottoman army and with Mohammed Ali in the perfect position for filling his ambition to build a new Empire on the ruins of Ottoman empire.

It was at this point that a quadruple alliance of Britain-Russia- Prussia and Austria-Hungary came together to resolve the “Egyptian Question”. They offered Mohammed Ali the hereditary viceroy of Egypt if he gave up his lands in Syria and Saudi Arabia. After Mohammed Ali initially refused the British attacked Saida and Beirut and blocked the port of Alexandria (Batou, 1993). Especially the blockade of Alexandria was a potent weapon since 22% of government revenue depended on the monopoly system, that for an important part depended on exports from the port of Alexandria (Cuno, 2001: 161). In the subsequent negotiations Mohammed Ali was forced to disband his army, breakdown the monopoly system and give up the conquered territories in Syria and the Arab peninsula.

The European, mainly British intervention not only broke international ambitions of Mohammed Ali. It also broke his authority at home. The power of the state was significantly reduced by the breakup of the monopolies and the opening of the Egyptian market to foreign exports. Searching for extra revenues to pay for his military adventures, and unwilling to give up Egypt’s national monopoly system, Mohammed Ali resorted to giving more lands as *Uhdas* or care/responsibility lands to foreign “investors” (Greek, Syrians and Europeans mainly French and British), local notables and government officials. The *Uhdas* were in many respects similar to tax farming with two major differences. First of all, since the *muta ’ahhids*, the people who ran the *Uhdas*, had to cough up much more taxes set by the government. Therefore, their main focus was on maximizing profit and producing products the government desired. This led to an increase in cash crops, mainly cotton. Thus, creating even more dependency on the export for revenues. Second, the peasants that worked these lands were increasingly wage labours. Although sharecropping was used, peasants were increasingly forced to sell their lands, because they could not pay the high tax rates that were required of them. Mohammed Ali also

enlarged the personal estates of the members of ruling family known as *Jifliks*. These lands accounted at the end of his rule for one seventh of cultivated land (Cuno, 2001). Large landholdings thus started to grow quickly during the end of Mohammed Ali's rule and the economy became increasingly export depended.

After Mohammed Ali's rule in 1848 ended, this trend continued. Cotton cultivation on large farms became ever more important for government revenue. The industries created under Mohammed Ali, was neglected and more or less disappeared in the 1850's and 60's. Furthermore, it was during this period that private property became established by law. This meant a significant rise in the power of the large landholders in respect to Egypt's rulers. These rulers became much more dependent on the support of the landed elite than of the army, as was the case during Mohammed Ali's rule. This shift was instigated when Mohammed Ali disbanded his army in 1840 and was strengthened over time by the implementation of new land laws in 1848 and 1859, which more or less guaranteed private property rights (Cuno, 2001). This is in line with wider trends of enclosure in Europe and the colonies of the European empires (Araghi, 2009). This power shift also meant that investments in irrigation, drainage and transportation, mainly came to benefit the landholding class. This further widened the income gap between the large landowners and the small peasants. Other advantages, such as longer time horizons, access to better lands and most importantly access to (forced) labour power, all gave the large landowners a significant advantage over smaller peasants. Cotton produced on the large landowners' estates sold at a significant premium thanks to its higher quality and it is estimated that production of cotton was 50-75 percent higher (Richards, 1982: 34). The state's role was thus increasingly in the support of capital.

Mohammed Ali's successors Sa'id and Abbas I had much less room to manoeuvre. Mohammed Ali's industrialization and modern army were largely paid for by squeezing the peasantry. When Sa'id and Abbas came to power the peasantry was largely squeezed

(Richards, 1982). It was only during the rule of Isma'el, who profited from a dramatic increase in the price of cotton revenue thanks to the American Civil War, that reforms were taken up again. Isma'el established around 40 state owned enterprises by 1873, constructed the Suez Canal and dramatically increased the amount of railway tracks in both Egypt and Sudan. Since the boom in cotton revenue was only temporarily, Isma'el had to borrow huge amounts of money. He borrowed heavily to construct the Suez Canal and the railways, but it was mostly a ruinous war with Ethiopia that bankrupted the Egyptian state in 1876 (Beinin, 2001). Egypt was forced to accept indirect rule by the British empire. When a massive rebellion in 1882 (The Urbani revolt), fuelled by social changes that took place in the previous 80 years, threatened to overthrow the monarchy, the British stepped in, put down the revolt and took direct control over Egypt.

In short, the economic and social changes that Egypt went through from 1800 to 1882 were incredible. Cultivated land more than doubled in this period. The population grew, although at a slightly slower pace to 7 million and farm output increased nearly six-fold (Richards, 1982). While these changes certainly benefited large landowners, this shift came at the expense of the peasantry. The peasants were forced to join the army, construct the irrigation canals and other infrastructure works as part of Corvee and had to cough up most of the tax increases. "At the end of 1888 1% of the landholders held more than 40% of large estates over fifty feddans. At the other pole of land distribution, over 80% of landowners held only 20% of land on small holdings" (Richards, 1982: 39). At the start of what McMichael and Friedmann call the first food regime, Egypt was thus incorporated into the world food system. However, a fully capitalist mode of production never materialised. Rather, Egypt became a hybrid system with both capitalistic and feudal aspects. Peasants both produced for the market and for themselves, shared cropping and wage labouring were both widely used and often peasants combined the two. Although there was a growing number of wage labours, industrialisation

was still in its infancy. At the beginning of British rule, the agrarian question still had to be solved.

What this chapter clearly shows is the centrality of agriculture to state formation. Not only has the nature of the crop grown significantly affected the relationship between the peasantry and the ruling elite, but it has also been agriculture that has determined the relationship of Egypt with the international community as a whole. From an SRA perspective, the case of Egypt clearly shows the dependents of the rural elite on global capital. The realignment of elite relations after the death of Mohammed Ali Pasha was mainly to the benefit of and shaped by global capitalist relations. This realignment set the stage for the start of the so-called first food regime in Egypt.

CHAPTER V FIRST FOOD REGIME (1882-1952)

England more or less took full control over the Egyptian economy in 1876. Their main focus was to make sure that Egypt repaid its debts. “Surprisingly” the British saw the development of Egypt’s agricultural production as the key to the debt repayment by Egypt. The British focussed on revitalising cotton production after it hit a slump when the US started to produce cotton again. Not only did this go down well with the landowning elite in Egypt, it also had the added bonus that it provided cheap inputs for England’s textile industry. Cotton expanded from 18 percent of the cultivated land area to 27 percent in 1908. The export of cotton products grew from 75 percent in 1880-84 of total exports to 92 percent in 1913 (Beinin, 2001: 72). At first the British were successful in increasing productivity and output. By promoting large-scale irrigation projects and dam construction in the Nile basin, the British managed for the first time in history to regulate the flow of the Nile. The limited control over the Nile enabled the landowning elite to significantly enlarge their estates via irrigation projects. Furthermore, it also significantly reduced the cost to control the peasants since they were depending on the landowning elite for their water (Mitchell, 1991). However, the high dependency on one crop resulted in another economic bust when the market for cotton collapsed during the Great depression. In the long run decreasing land yields as a result of monocropping and salination made that Egypt’s economy grew less than 0.5% annually between 1900 and 1950 (Hansen, 1991: 3).

It is fair to say that the British changed relatively little of the already existing social relations in Egypt. Trends that already existed before 1882 were strengthened. The British collaborated with the large landlords, like the Pashas had increasingly done since the treaty of 1840, which forced Mohammed Ali to restructure his economy around agricultural exports. Furthermore, by securing a hereditary viceroy of Egypt, the Pashas were more concerned with

domestic policy. Especially before the First World War, Britain continued the policy of increasing land yields and the amount of cultivable land via land reclamation and irrigation projects. However, there were some significant changes. Instead of using the surplus generated by the export of cotton and other goods like sugar, to finance industrialisation, the surpluses were used to pay back Egypt's outstanding debt. Furthermore, although the British invested in irrigation projects that mostly benefited the small peasants, they neglected to invest the needed amount in drainage systems. Increased salination of land because of bad drainage, became a widespread problem for Egyptian peasants with lower yields as a result. In total around 5% of GDP was invested into agriculture and industry during the British mandate (Hansen, 1991: 70-71). This is relatively low in comparison with other countries. Finally, by lifting almost all import and export restrictions and cutting most government subsidies the economy came increasingly in the hands of foreign investors. A trend that started under Isma'el, but expanded exponentially under British rule (Beinin and Lockman, 1988).

Foreign investment really took off after in the late 1890s and was mainly aimed at buying land, which was subsequently used to produce cotton and other cash crops, housing and various forms of construction in the quickly expanding cities. Only a limited amount was invested in industry and transport. This meant that rent rates on land between 1882-1907 increased with 150 percent, mostly after 1900. In comparison food prices rose with 80 percent during this period. Wages over this period were mostly stagnant and real income decreased significantly (Beinin and Lockman, 1988). In response to ever growing income inequality, peasants and labourers started to organise and an increasing sense of nationalism was taking hold. The British responded with repression and hard measures. For instance, the Denshawai incident in 1906, a relatively minor affair, but the extreme response of the British became a rallying cry of Egyptian nationalist. Furthermore, labourers around the country started to organise. Although the number of workers in Egypt was low since there was a lack of factory

jobs, the first large scale unions started to appear around this time. Manual Trades Workers Union, Workers of the Egyptian State Railways, the tram companies of Cairo and Alexandria, the Suez Canal Company and the tobacco rolling companies all organised themselves (Beinin and Lockman, 1988). It was however, during the First World War and the forced conscription of over 1,5 million Egyptians in the labour corps, that anger against British rule became wide spread. Furthermore, by confiscating large portions of the harvest for the war effort food staple prices more than doubled (Beinin, 2001).

Rising nationalism, anger over rising food prices and a wide spread feeling of disillusion with British rule, subsequently resulted in the 1919 revolution. Although the leadership of the Wafd party was largely made up by large landowners, it created a populist/nationalist image of itself and was the main driver of the revolt. The revolt lasted for two months and engulfed the whole country, with large protests and strikes in both the countryside and the cities. The British managed to put down the revolt with much bloodshed and exiled the leader of the Wafd party, Saad Zaghlul. However, after the “Milner mission”, which was set up by the British to assess what went wrong and concluded that maintaining the protectorate of Egyptian was unsustainable, Britain recognised Egypt’s independence on 22 February 1922. Zaghlul became the first prime minister of Egypt in 1923 under a constitutional monarchy. Although Egypt was officially independent, Britain was still heavily present and dictated policy to a large extent. It maintained a large military presence in the Suez region, remained in control over Sudan and was responsible for the protection of foreign interests in Egypt. Furthermore, it is important to note that although the 1919 uprising was supported by the peasant population, it were the large landowners who organised it. They allowed and encouraged the peasants to participate. Furthermore, the large landowners collaborated with the urban working class as long as they did not support land reform and other forms of social justice that would affect the large landowners. Once in power the Wafd party smashed the

Communist party after it organised strikes in 1924 and subsequently broke up other labour unions that did not follow the nationalist line (Beinin, 2001). Thus, although there was change in political leadership, the revolution did not change the social relations within Egypt itself.

The growing inequality between small peasants and large landowners kept increasing during the interwar period. Although this was in line with what had taken place since 1800, it was the first period that the living conditions of peasants worsened significantly. There were a couple of reasons for this. The first one was falling crop yields. This was mainly due to salination as a result of bad drainage systems. This disproportionately affected smaller farmers since they lived on the less productive plots of land. Fertilizer and other technological inventions were introduced, but these again disproportionately favoured the large landowners. Furthermore, fertilizer was not as effective as investment in drainage systems in improving yields. Large landowners were able to facilitate these systems themselves, small peasants on the other hand needed the help of the government. And although steps were taken in the 1930's to improve the drainage systems throughout the country, this was too little too late (Richards, 1982). Secondly, small landowners had no access to bank loans or other forms of credit. Instead they turned to local merchants and other money lenders who charged interest rates of over one hundred percent. Although the practice of predatory money lending was nothing new, the prices that were seen during the interwar period were. Mainly because of a quickly growing population and an increasing scarcity of available land, rents skyrocketed. Rents during this period absorbed around 75 percent of a farmer's income (Abdel-Fadil, 1975: 4). Finally, large scale land speculation increased the prices of land in general without increasing productivity. This was both a symptom related to rent raises and the growing population. Because it was so profitable to rent land to other peasants, large land owners bought up large plots of land creating a class of mostly absentee landowners. The number of renters in 1900 made up around 1.7

percent of total land under cultivation in 1952 this had increased to 75 percent (Ansari, 1986: 75).

“In 1952, the very big landowners (owning over 200 feddans), represented less than 0.1 percent of the total number landowners, and possessed about 20 percent of the cultivated land; large and medium-sized landowners (over 5 feddans), together possessed about 65 percent of the cultivated land. At the other end of the spectrum, only about 35% of the total cultivable land was owned by the great majority of landowners (i.e. 94.4%)” (Abdel-Fadil, 1975:3).

There was also a dramatic increase in the landless households. In 1939 53 percent of the population solely depended on wage labour. By 1950 this had increased to 60 percent of the rural population (Abdel-Fadil, 1975: 6). A large portion of these landless households moved to the city in search for work. This resulted that cities like Cairo and Alexandria doubled in size between 1917 and 1947, a rate three times as high as the national growth rate (Beinin, 2001; 118). In response to growing unrest, the government also started to promote industry via some trade barriers. As stated before, the government provided subsidies for local financing. The Misr bank, established in 1920, provided loans in an attempt to lower the dominance of foreign capital and subsequently funded many industries such as the Misr spinning and weaving company. These industries received government support and were successful in producing high quality goods and selling them to the local market. However, the working conditions were appalling. Since there was such an immense overcapacity of cheap labour, the labourers had relatively little power (Beinin, 2001). The state also provided some modest fertilizer subsidies (Richards, 1982). However, these changes were cosmetic in comparison with the speed at which the labour force grew and other structural problems in the economy. For instance, during

the great depression, in which cotton prices dropped with 75 percent the government saved the big landlords via the *taswiyya* (settlement law). By assuming their debts, the government was able to lower the interest rates and restructure their debts. Of course, such arrangements could not be made for small and medium sized peasants, who were bankrupted by the thousands and had to join the labour force.

By 1952 growing unrest in both the urban and rural areas came to a head with the overthrow of King Farouk. The food regime analysis and SRA provides a convincing examination of the structural lines along which elites organised. One can clearly see that the Wafd party continued the country's class structures set during British imperial rule. The fact that the 1919 revolution did invoke a more dramatic British response, was both a sign of British weakness and of the Wafd party's complacency. The Wafd party did not fundamentally challenge British imperial power or its economic interests. The hybrid system that existed at the start of British rule was kept in place. This meant that by 1952 the agrarian question remained unsolved.

CHAPTER VI SECOND FOOD REGIME (1952- 1973)

Abdel-Fadil argues that by 1952 Egypt was at cross roads. The agrarian question had been transformed “into one of extreme inequality in the distribution of landownership and growing rural poverty” (Abdel-Fadil, 1975: 116). When in 1952 the Free officers Movement led by Gamal Abdel Nasser managed to depose King Farouk in a coup d’état, they faced the question of how to transform a largely rural and backward economy into an advanced economy. Nasser’s answer was to create a home market for industrial products by elevating rural poverty, creating work with large state led projects, and provide the infrastructure needed for industrialisation. This chapter argues that although the agrarian question was largely solved at the end of Nasser’s rule, there were still some fundamental problems that needed to be addressed. Furthermore, by not completely eliminating the rich farmers Nasser set stage for a reversal of his policies after his death in 1970.

Nasser was able to grab power during a highly turbulent time. Problems were brewing since the 1940’s when successive crises had followed one another and undermined the regime. The forced cooperation with the English during the Second World War heavily damaged any nationalist credentials the king or the Wafd party enjoyed. The Wafd party had lost its rural basis because it was seen mainly as representing the urban elite. Rural population increasingly supported the Muslim Brotherhood and in the urban centres the Communist Party gained political footing. The disastrous war against the Zionists in 1948 further undermined any legitimacy the king had. The Free Officers thus came to power during turbulent times, in which all the main factions were bickering amongst themselves and with each other. This meant that even though the Officers did not have a large popular basis to fall back on, their military power allowed them to seize power. Not having a political basis meant that the Free Officers were

mainly focussed on improving the economic position of the country as a whole via industrialisation, without challenging the social structures too much (Osman, 2010).

The initial land reforms in 1952 and 1961 instigated by Nasser's government were successful in redistributing a significant amount of land to small owners with 5 feddans or less and landless peasants, raising the living standards of those that received land significantly. Furthermore, the land reforms put a ceiling on the rents of farmland and managed to bring land prices down. The lands that were redistributed were mainly seized from the "largest" land owners (owners with more than 200 feddans), who controlled around 20% of agricultural land whilst only making up 0.1 percent of owners of all peasants (21.000 owners in total). However, the "large" ownerships (more than 50 feddans) changed very little in 1965 (Anderson, 2009). This meant that "although Land Reform succeeded in liquidating the small group of urban absentee landowners, rural elites were able to maintain traditionally-held lands within kinship networks, along with political and social capital" (Anderson, 2009a: 115). The landless peasants did not benefit from the redistribution of land. Most of the redistributed land went to peasants that already worked on the estates. Although this did not address the problem of the landless peasants, it did sustain productivity levels. The land reforms thus mainly benefited the middle class of peasant and did not affect the rich peasants in a political sense. "The power in rural areas shifted from the landed aristocracy and the cotton mercantile rural elite (cotton merchants and village brokers), the group of rich and middle peasants emerged as a new rural elite with dominant political and economic power in the new agrarian system" (Abdel-Fadil, 1975: 121).

Many argue that the reforms did not go far enough. However, one can also argue that this was inherent to a regime lacking a popular basis. Furthermore, it is debatable whether a complete redistribution of land would have eliminated the problem of landless peasants. The complete redistribution of land to the one million landless, would result into farms with the

size of 2.9 feddan, which is below the three feddans needed for subsistence (Richards, 1982: 180). This would subsequently have resulted in a drop of productivity. These landless peasants were not accustomed to making crop decisions, such as when and what to plant and how to take care of soil and crops. Instead, they performed labour at the behest of whoever hired them.

Furthermore, the initial reforms did redistribute some lands to the landless peasants, whose share of the population dropped from 44% in 1952 to 28% in 1965 (Abdel-Fadil, 1975: 44). However, due to high population growth, the number of landless peasants would increase to its pre-reform level at the end of the 1970's (Richards, 1982). The long-term positive effect of more drastic land reform is thus in doubt, and the state neither had the resources, the political capital or the political ideology to implement such radical changes. Instead, it focussed on the one ideological feature to create a top-down (military) structure with heavily increased state power, while keeping a lot of the original structures of power in place.

To generate long-lasting economic growth, the state wanted to use the surplus extracted from agriculture and use it to fund industrialisation. Doing this required the state, on the one hand, to take control over agriculture and on the other hand to balance between providing products for local consumption and exports for generating revenue. The Egyptian state came up with a structure that was similar to previous land systems and even incorporated some of the monopoly ideas of Mohammed Ali. The state, in effect, replaced the large landowners by government cooperatives to control agricultural production. These were in many respects similar to the large estates of the Pasha. For instance, cooperatives specified crop rotation and distributed supplies such as fertilizer and pesticides. They also took over the maintenance of irrigation and drainage. Peasants that did not comply could be disowned. This is comparable to the functions of the large estates in 19th and the first half of the 20th century. The cooperatives were first only applied to peasants that acquired land via the land reform and in 1963 were extended to all farmland. The government forced the cooperatives to sell their

products at below market prices, by capping the price of certain products, such as cotton, wheat and lentils. This again shows similarities to Ali's state monopoly system. To coordinate these cooperatives, the state relied heavily on the rich peasants, who thereby enlarged their political clout. Furthermore, by monopolising certain industries, such as fertilizer, machinery and pesticides, the government created a system by which it could exert control over farmers and also subsidised them when needed.

Although the initial shock of the land reform of 1952 did have some impact, the large landowners clawed back control in the 60's and 70's. For instance, although there were strict restrictions on land, the large landowners managed to circumvent these. Individuals were not allowed to hold more than 50 feddans and that of a family was not to exceed 100 feddans. However, large landowners signed holdings in the name of family members or trusted tenants and received the loans paid on the plots of lands. It was also not uncommon, although individual holdings within the family would not exceed 50 feddans, the family as a whole had more than 500 feddans. Strategic marriages and the use of extended family enabled the survival of the large landowners. Often these families were direct descendants of the large landowning families from before the 1952 revolution. Furthermore, although rent controls were successful in taming the worst excesses, the set rents by the government were often ignored. Tenants would often pay more, sometimes the double of the official amount. There was little small farmers could do about these practices. Large landowners served both as loan providers, providers of land (by renting) and as the main managers of the cooperatives. The state did not do much to challenge the form or functioning of the cooperatives. Parties that could have had a stake in challenging these relations like the communist party were excluded from high government jobs and from supervising these cooperatives. So, after an initial loss in power in 1952 the large landowning families regained their position over time in the 60's and 70's (Ansari, 1987).

Thus, on policy and social level, the Nasser regime was not revolutionary and to a large extent copied old structures and policies. The old patterns of patronage stayed in place. What did change was the perception of the state. Under the Pasha's and king's rule the state was represented by the monarchy and the state was intertwined with the ruling class. The Pasha/king was the biggest landholder of all the large landowners. The state could thus rule via a system that was set up and controlled by landowners, the Free Officers could not. The Free Officers needed a strong state, "independent" from society. Nasser created this image of a strong Egyptian state by first of all taking control of agriculture as described above. Secondly, Nasser tried to create an image of an independent Egypt on the international stage. Before 1952 the Egyptian state was seen as a hybrid extension of British colonial rule. Nasser largely tried to stay clear of the two big powers, the USSR and the US, arguing for a third way. However, domestic ambitions and rising tensions within the region, especially because of the Israel-Palestine conflict forced his hand. By conducting a major arms deal with Czechoslovakia in 1955, which broke the monopoly on weapon trade of the US, Britain and France in the Middle-East, the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and successfully resisting the subsequent invasion of Israel, France and England in 1956, Nasser created the image of an independent Egypt that was able to stand up against three superpowers (Cleveland, 2009). The third and final way was by creating large and highly visible state-run projects. Two of such projects stand out, the Aswan High Dam and large-scale land reclamation.

The decision to pursue the construction of the Aswan High Dam was in itself not majorly controversial. With technology advancing and Egypt still depended on the seasonal floods of the Nile, there was a general view that building capacity for summer storage of water, would greatly increase farm yields. This is especially relevant as most of Egypt's cash crops are summer crops. Furthermore, control over the Nile river would mean no more destructive flooding during high rainfall and no more devastating droughts with low rainfall. The

productivity gains from such a project would significantly advance agricultural output. However, how such a project should take shape was highly contested. The British alternative of storing water in a couple of big lakes in Sudan and Ethiopia seemed implausible even during the time of colonisation. Another option, several smaller dams along the Nile, such as in Iraq, was also a possibility. The ecological impact of this plan would most likely have been less than the third alternative, The Aswan High Dam. The Aswan High Dam, capable of storing three Nile floods, fits perfectly within the political interests of the Free Officers. It instantly became a symbol of Nasser's regime and is symbolic of the government's structure as a whole (Molle et al., 2009). A large centrally run project that distributes water to the whole of Egypt is in many ways similar to a military structure.

Furthermore, such mega-projects have a clear symbolic value and have the aim of enhancing national pride. The idea of dominance over nature and the visibility of technological advancement, are critical to the understanding that these mega dam structures are symbolic for countries entering the modern era. The Aswan High Dam can be compared to the "hydraulic mission" of the Soviet Union, symbolised by the Kuibyshev Dam or the US Hoover Dam (idem).

Besides its obvious economic benefits, the international political context of the Aswan High Dam is crucial and symbolic for understanding the further dynamics of agriculture in Egypt. Both the US and the Soviet Union had offered Nasser to help with the construction of the Aswan High Dam. The US saw Nasser's nationalism as a useful tool against Communism. But relations had been deteriorating since the 1955 raid of Israel, which forced Nasser to become more aggressive towards Israel. In what later became known as Ike's Gamble, US President Eisenhower (often referred to as Ike) chose the side of Nasser during the Suez crisis. However, the subsequent conditions of further US support for the Aswan High Dam, Egypt making peace with Israel, were unacceptable for the Egyptian population. Instead Egypt turned

to the Soviet Union, who provided the loan and technical support for the dam without any of the constraints put up by the US. However, it was during this time that the USAID program Food for Peace was set up (PL480), with the initial bulk of shipments going to Egypt. Between 1955 and 1964 wheat imports in Egypt increased from 0.1 percent in 1955 to 18.6 percent in 1964 (Bush, 2007 and Burns, 1985: 174). This program would become incredibly important to Egypt in the future. It is also important to realise that Nasser never became part of the Soviet bloc. Egypt and the Soviet Union had friendly relationships and Nasser used some socialist policies. However, he actively hunted down communists, especially in Syria during the Arab Socialist Union and never went further with his agrarian reforms by collectivising farming. Instead, Nasser choose the third way and played the US and Soviet Union off against each other. Receiving food aid from one side and technical support from the other. The construction of the Aswan High Dam started in 1960 and finished in 1970. Two months after its completion, Nasser died.

The Aswan High Dam gave the Egyptian state full control over the Nile within her borders and made a massive expansion of land reclamation possible. Although the Aswan High Dam was still under construction, land reclamation became an increasingly important part of agricultural policy under Nasser. With the initial progress made in land redistribution coming to a hold, the Egyptian state looked for other ways to create patronage networks and to keep the support of the rural middle class. Both driven by a hydraulic mission, like the Soviet Union, in which Egypt aimed to become food self-sufficient and an inability to further redistribute land without challenging its own power base, the regime turned to the desert for more land. Nasser launched, in April 1961, the Tahrir Project and multiple other smaller projects in the Western Delta with the aim to reclaim around 1 million hectares of arable land. However, by the end of 1970 only 380.000 ha had been reclaimed against incredibly high cost (Alary et al, 2018). Although official sources put the cost of land reclamation at 150 Egyptian

pounds (L.E.) per feddan, the real cost would probably be between 400-1000 L.E. per feddan. This in comparison to installing drainage for around L.E. 50 per feddan (Richards, 1982: 197). The land reclamation effort took up most of the agricultural budget at the time, but did not result in higher yields. Instead, most of the investments ended up in the pockets of those who were well placed to profit from land speculation and contracting opportunities. In this respect, although Nasser tried to improve the drainage system, he made the same mistake as the British, by not investing enough in drainage improvements, with similar consequences for crop yields in the long run (Richards, 1982).

With the increasing control over water resources an important shift in cropping took shape. Although cotton remained the main cash crop during the 60's and 70's, the revenues generated by the export of cotton declined and caused a deficit. Synthetic fibres that were produced in the west, dampened demand significantly. Instead large farmers started to cultivate higher yielding fruit trees and flowers. Mainly due to ever decreasing transit times and the packaging revolution the export of fruits to western supermarkets became a lucrative business (McMichael, 2012). The cultivation of fruit trees and flowers was especially profitable because they fell outside the group of goods that were regulated by the state. Large farmers had the amount of land, capital and access to finance such ventures. Fruit cultivation increased from 131.00 feddans in 1960 to 244.000 in 1970 (Abdel-Fadil, 1975: 41). Another shift took place amongst small farmers. Instead of growing self-sufficient crops such as wheat and barley, a switch to high-water consuming cash crops, mainly rice and sugarcane, became increasingly important for small farmers (Abdel-Fadil, 1975). These trends all point to the incorporation of the second food regime and deeper integration of Egypt into the global market. This is further underlined by the expansion of Berseem cultivation. Berseem is a winter crop that traditionally grows in Egypt since ancient times and is mainly used as animal fodder. However, it also serves as a basic component of sustainable farming, since it replenishes the soil. The increase in

Berseem production was combined with an increase in livestock and a large increase in the consumption of meat. The cultivation of berseem and the subsequent development of livestock was heavily subsidized by the government, which dedicated large tracks of reclaimed lands to berseem production (Richards, 1982).

The large-scale projects also fit into an increasing role of the state in shaping labour relations. The aim of the state was to transform the countryside into a local market to which it could sell industrial products. This meant breaking the hybrid system of feudal capitalist relations. By creating supporting industries such as the fertiliser industry and the manufacturing of tractors, the government aimed to create alternatives to rural servitude. Employment in manufacturing in the period 1960-1970 grew with around 300.000 new jobs (Abdel-Fadil, 1980: 7). The large irrigation projects and the construction of the Aswan High Dam provided temporary work for the poorest of the landless peasants, the *tarahil* labourers. In the period of 1960-1970 around 400.000 people found work in construction on the Aswan High Dam and related reclamation projects (Abdel-Fadil, 1975:). However, especially for the *tarahil* labour relations did not fundamentally change. *Tarahil* workers were recruited for temporary work of 4-8 weeks, mainly focussed on the maintenance of irrigation systems and other public infrastructure. To bridge the income gap between two projects, the workers often borrowed from the agencies that recruited them, who therefore had almost feudal control over them. The *tarahil* existence was mainly due to a lack of opportunity in both the city and the countryside. This lack of opportunity was partly due to the stalled creation of a home market after an initial promising start (Abdel-Fadil, 1975). Although new industries such as the tractor industry and fertilizer industry created new jobs, this was not enough to provide work for the 1.5 million people who moved to the cities looking for jobs. This meant that the increase in population in cities was four times higher than the rate of job creation (Abdel-Fadil, 1980: 24).

Unable to create the rapid industrialisation needed to keep up with job seekers, the government increasingly started to take control of the private sector. In 1962 the state passed a law making it 51% owner in most Egyptian companies within a variety of sectors. This was the start of an increasing intermingling between on the one side the ruling military class and on the other side the urban middle class from which they derived most of their political support. The increased involvement was combined with a massive expansion of other unproductive sectors such as the army and bureaucracy. In the period of 1962-1970 the Egyptian bureaucracy almost doubled in size, with the number of employees rising from 770.000 to 1.3 million (Abdel-Fadil, 1980: 10). However, unemployment within the cities, especially amongst the urban poor was still growing at a high pace. Large parts of these unemployed found work in the informal sector, where they did work that was sporadic and underpaid. Although the unemployment rate was officially around 7.6 percent of the population in Cairo, the level of unemployment must have been much higher. In other words, “migration from rural to urban areas may merely have transformed rural into urban unemployment” (Abdel-Fadil, 1980: 24).

The expansion of the public sector had financial consequences. In the same period of 1962-1970 public expenses doubled. This expansion was not matched by a similar increase in economic growth. Growth during this period was a disappointing 4 percent annually (Johnson, 1972: 8). Furthermore, a ruinous war in Yemen in which Egypt actively took part in 1963 drained even more resources. However, it was the six-day war against Israel in 1967 that completely devastated the Egyptian economy. The 1967 War closed of the Suez Canal, further restricted foreign aid (mainly US) to Egypt and cut increasingly important revenues from oil in the Sinai. Nasser, eager to rebuild the army to its former strength, reallocated most of the country’s resources to rebuild the army. From 1967 until 1970 Nasser pushed through liberalising reforms by easing ownership rules, making major cuts to the state’s economic investment, increasing taxation and cutting subsidies. The loss in revenues were somewhat

dampened by increased financial aid from the USSR and the Gulf states, but these could not make up for the loss of Western aid, let alone the loss of revenues from the Suez Canal and Saudi oil. The deficit on the currency account increased with 86 percent, from 202 million dollars in 59-66 to 375 million dollars in 67-72 (Amin, 1995: 7). Nasser's death in 1970 thus came at a time when Egypt was becoming increasingly dependent on foreign financing and its industrialisation push came to a definitive hold. In this sense the defeat of 1967 resembles that of Mohammed Ali Pasha in 1840. Just as after 1840 the state definitively lost control over the economy, and market forces increasingly took hold. Although Nasser's rule started out with some promising reform and real tangible improvements in the standard of living of many Egyptians, his changes started to lose momentum. At the end of his rule, initial improvements were being reversed. Economic growth could not keep up with the rapidly growing population of Egypt. War and wasteful government spending forced Nasser to set Egypt on the path to the liberalisation of the economy.

There has been a lot of debate on the exact impact of Nasser's reforms on the agrarian question. Abdel-Fadil argues that by breaking the power of the large landlords, Nasser also broke the transitional model of production between feudalism and capitalism that had dominated Egypt's rural society since Mohammed Ali. From an SRA perspective, the transformation organised by Nasser caused a realignment and reorganisation of elite relations, but as the debate between Abdel-Fadil and Byers, shows did not fundamentally change elite organisation. Abdel-Fadil argues that by 1970 "in most of the Egyptian countryside, the characteristically feudal bonds of servitude had been eliminated and the close system of natural production had been replaced by production for the market, the dominant relations of production were not strictly capitalist in character" (Abdel-Fadil, 1975: 116). A key point in Abdel-Fadil's analysis is that the rich peasants started to obstruct further reforms in the 60's. However, he argues that the government, by and large, was successful in its effort to prevent

this. Byers, on the other hand, argues the opposite. Byers argues, using data provided by Abdel-Fadil, that for an important part of the population, this was not the case. He argues that for instance, the *tarahil* labourers are still very much part of a pre-capitalist mode of production. The *tarahil* were in many cases similar to what Bernstein's would call petty commodity producers. Furthermore, by reinvesting large amounts of capital back into agriculture via subsidies, the actual surplus that was reallocated from agriculture to industry was too low for industrialisation to take off. In Byers' eyes the realised growth in manufacturing was not enough to completely transform the Egyptian economy (Byers, 1977)

Whether the agrarian question was solved or not, agriculture had undoubtedly been transformed. Under Nasser the agrarian question was mainly focussed on resolving large scale inequality and by reducing inequality constructing a home market for industrial production. At the end of Nasser's rule, the initial progress of the reforms had come to a hold. Furthermore, the main question was not what we do with the landless peasants, but what do we do with the jobless urban dwellers. In that respect there was a significant change from an SRA perspective. A new elite, based in the city started to establish itself more forcefully and was in many instances opposed to the rural elite. This elite struggle lies at the heart of Egypt's third food regime.

CHAPTER VII

THIRD FOOD REGIME (1973 – Current)

The death of Nasser in 1970 triggered a power struggle within the ruling class. On the one hand there were the supporters of state capitalism, mainly the ruling military class and the technocratic arm of government. On the other hand, there was an alliance between rural elite and urban businessmen who wanted to greatly reduce the influence of the state on the economy and advocated a bigger reliance on the market and concessions to foreign capital (Abdel-Fadil, 1980). The state capitalists saw agriculture as a key market for industrial development, whilst the rural and urban elite saw it as a possible area which could be used for export led growth. Building on Nasser's reforms after 1967 and forced by the state of Egypt's finances, Sadat's *Al-infitah* or opening up of the economy, at first promoted liberal reforms. However, his reforms came to a grinding halt in 1977 after major riots broke out across the country. Instead of resolving the agrarian question once and for all, Sadat backed down and created a hybrid system in which small peasants largely lived separated from the market, whilst large landowners produced for the global market. He was able to do this because agriculture and manufacturing had become peripheral parts of the economy. A large influx of foreign capital in the 70's consisting of foreign aid, oil revenues, remittances, tourism and the Suez Canal, made the agrarian question obsolete. Egypt's economy was transformed into a rentier economy in which productive sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing did not play an important role anymore.

When Sadat came to power after Nasser's death, the Egyptian state was facing financial collapse. The closing of the Suez Canal after the 1967 war, the loss of tourism and oil revenues from the Sinai hit the Egyptian state severely. Nasser could rely on grants provided by the Soviet Union and the Gulf states to make up for this loss. Sadat, on the other hand, had to rely increasingly on loans, increasing the state's deficit. On top of that Egypt's main export

crop, cotton, was being replaced by synthetics in the West. This led to a further drop in foreign reserves in Egypt. By 1975 external debt had increased to 6.3 billion dollars compared to 1.8 billion dollars in 1970. (Amin, 1995: 7) Liberalisation only worsened the debt problem. Although Egyptian exports did increase with the lifting of trade restrictions, imports increased much more rapidly. During the period of 1970-1975 exports increased by 240%, whilst imports increased with 350%. The drop in the value of cotton was exacerbated by the price hike in wheat, which increased 4.5 times during 1970-1975 (idem: 8). Although Egypt had become a net importer of wheat around the mid 1950's, this was never a balance of payments issue. However, the relative decline of the value of cotton made that imports became increasingly costly. The import of grain was mainly due to rapid population growth, but also a result of a decline in agricultural productivity. It was also during this period that the lack of investment in proper drainage started to hit. The resulting salination in combination with a general reduction in agricultural investment meant a significant drop in agricultural productivity. Output of grain did not increase during the 60's and even declined during the first half of the 70's with 5 percent (Scobio, 1981). In this respect one can view the 1973 war with Israel, as a last attempt to save Egypt from financial collapse.

The relative success of the 1973 war gave Sadat the political capital to implement *Al-Infatih* or opening up. *Infatih* was more a political realignment than an economic one. As stated before, liberal reforms were already being implemented under Nasser. However, were Nasser's reforms being mainly in service of the military and the fight against Israel, Sadat wanted to make peace with Israel and stop Egypt's military adventurism. Furthermore, *Infatih* was also aimed at breaking with the Soviet Union and gaining the support of the US. When the US quit sending aid to Egypt after 1967 Soviet support was insufficient to make up the difference. Sadat reckoned that US support would surpass that of the Soviet Union (Osman, 2010). This stance of de-escalation with Israel garnered some positive results. In 1975 the Suez Canal was

reopened bringing in much needed foreign reserves. Furthermore, the US restarted its PL480 program, shipping large quantities of wheat to Egypt. Between 1975-1984 around 10.7 billion dollars in loans and grants were provided to Egypt. Furthermore, foreign direct investment, mostly in the petroleum industry, totalled around 1 billion over the same period. Military aid accounted for another 4.8 billion dollars in grants and loans (Weinbaum, 1985: 120). However, to get these loans Sadat was forced to implement further liberal reforms. The laws Sadat passed during *Infitah* came to benefit urban elite, who profited from their positions in the bureaucracy to access capital. The reforms came mostly at the cost of the middle and lower ranks of the bureaucracy (Bush, 1999). The rising tensions eventually exploded in January 1977 when Sadat announced cuts to bread and fuel subsidies on the behest of the IMF. The so-called *Bread Riots* spread across multiple major cities in Egypt. The heavy-handed approach of the army left 70 people dead. The protests eventually died down when Sadat reversed the subsidy cuts (Frerichs, 2016). The *bread riots* were the end of Sadat's push for liberalisation and can be seen as the end of the *Infitah* and a stop to the retraction of the role of the state within the economy.

The connection between his failed attempts at liberalising the economy and Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977 and the subsequent Camp David accords of 1978 is clear. The temporary relief of an increase in aid helped Egypt balance its books. However, there were other significant factors that helped to forgo further liberalisation. Around 1977 the Egyptian regime started to profit from a massive inflow of additional external revenues. A dramatic rise of the oil price increased the revenues of oil 9.2 times from 1977 to 1981 to 1.5 billion dollars. At the same time remittances from the Gulf states, who thanks to the price of oil, started to accumulate immense amounts of wealth, increased four times to 4 billion dollars during the same period (Amin, 1995: 11).

Furthermore, former army bases in the Sinai such as Sharm Al-Sheikh and Noeibah were transformed into pristine beach resorts. Tourism rose to 1.5 million visitors around 1985

and income from tourism had more than doubled to around 800 million dollars (Steiner, 2006: 166). To put these numbers in perspective, income from Egypt's agricultural exports, including cotton, did not earn more than 600 million dollars in 1983 (Fahmy, 2010: 200).

However, these major gains in revenue, did not result in lower debts or investments aimed at productivity. On the contrary, the governments direct investment in productive sectors such as agriculture and industry only increased mildly. Instead, the bulk of investment went into the petroleum industry, the Suez Canal, the financial industry, housing and infrastructure. Furthermore, in the years following the Camp David Accords, the military budget increased with 20% annually. All in all, debt increased dramatically during Sadat's tenure. From 1970 until Sadat's assassination in 1981 debt rose six-fold from 5 billion dollar to 30 billion in 1981. This meant that the cost of servicing debt still accounted for 25% out of the budget in 1981, whilst exports had grown tenfold during Sadat's tenure (Amin, 1995: 12-13).

Although the economy of Egypt had grown rapidly during Sadat's tenure especially after 1977, the finances of the state were in no better shape than at the beginning of his tenure. Furthermore, the importance of productive sectors such as agriculture and industry to the economy had shifted to other industries such as the petroleum industry and housing. Since the 70's until today labour remittances have been by far the most important source of foreign exchange for Egypt. Remittances account for 30% of foreign exchange reserves of Egypt on a year by year basis since the second half of the 80's (Amin, 1995: 46). Only in recent years with the find of new large gas fields, the importance of remittances declined somewhat in respect to the economy as a whole. However, it is important to realise that the four largest sources of revenue: oil and gas, the Suez Canal, tourism and remittances are all linked to the price of oil. The Suez Canal depends heavily on oil shipments to Europe for its revenues. The tourism industry consists for a large part of tourists from the Gulf. Remittances mainly came from oil producing countries like Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. When the price of oil dropped

dramatically in 1985 to its pre-1973 levels the impact of this on the Egyptian economy was devastating. Furthermore, the Egyptian state had little to no control over these sources of revenue, meaning policies have little to no effect, since all these sources of revenue are mostly demand driven. For instance, whether Egypt increases its oil output, prices and revenues are mainly depending on global demand. There is also little a government can do, bar from some political manoeuvres, to increase revenues from remittances. Global and regional politics therefor have an exacerbate impact on Egypt's economy. Due to the Iraq war, the demand for labour in Iraq increased dramatically. Even though Syria had a large surplus of labour and was next door to Iraq, the political relation between the Baath party in Syria and Iraq was so bad that Iraq opted for Egyptian labour instead (Kienle, 1990). The same effect holds for tourism. The perceived stability of the region and in Egypt itself greatly effects tourism numbers. Political shock and shocks in demand for oil, thus have a large effect on the Egyptian economy, something that has been proven over and over again by booms and bust in the Egyptian economy since 1973.

Domestically, the dominance of these new industries shifted investment from agriculture and manufacturing to other areas such as housing, petroleum, tourism and services. This was true for public, foreign and private investment, and aid. Especially in agriculture, which was for 94 percent of its investment depending on government spending before *Infitah*, investment dropped from around 25 percent of total investment by the government in the 1950's to 5.3 percent in 1981 and 6.7 percent in 1991 (Amin, 1995: 76). In the period 1974-85 export as a whole quadrupled. In 1974 agriculture accounted for 47 percent of the export values by 1985 this had dropped to around 10 percent. This was largely due to the rise in the export of oil, but also to a drop in the value of cotton and a lack of replacements. In contrast, although imports tripled over the period of 74-85, the share of agricultural imports remained around 25 percent of total imports. This meant that over the period of 1974-85 that the trade deficit on

agricultural commodities rose from around 10 percent in 1974 to around 40 percent in 85 even reaching 47 percent in 80/81. The agrarian deficit amounted to an annual trade deficit of around 2.5 billion (idem: 70). The agrarian deficit consisted and consists until today for an important part of grain and flour imports. Egypt has consistently ranked amongst the top three importers of grain and flour around the globe since 1974, mainly from the US. This was partly because agricultural expansion could not keep up with both economic and population growth. However, as Mitchell and Bush point out, it was also largely due to a change in diet. “Consumption of corn, barley and sorghum fell from 53 percent in 1966 to 6 percent in 1988” (Bush, 1999:27). This change is partly down to an increase in wealth, but also the wheatification of the diet. Between 1972-1982 the Egyptian economy grew with 8 percent annually (Richards, 1982). However, the large influx of food aid, also depressed market prices for wheat and other foodstuffs. Food and fuel subsidies took up around one-third or 7 billion dollars of the government’s budget in 1984. The government was able to sustain this policy because the US supplied food assistance provided wheat at a major discount. However, food assistance depressed prices for farmers, who were left with a net 30 percent loss on traditional low yield food staples (Weinbaum, 1986: 123).

Thus, instead of increasing wheat production, which only grew mildly, large tracks of land were converted to animal husbandry. Poultry, meat and dairy production increased. To support this, the berseem cultivation expanded, for use as animal fodder (Mitchell, 1995; Bush, 1999). The shift to animal products was further supported by US aid. It is estimated that up to 90 percent of food aid was in non- edible grains, mainly animal fodder (Bush, 1999: 27). There is another reason for changes in cropping patterns. Rising rents made it unsustainable for farmers to continue producing low yield crops. Although rents were officially capped by the government, these caps were increasingly flaunted. With the influx of rents from remittances, a rapidly growing population, increasing urbanisation especially around Cairo, speculation on

land was rife. Especially land close to urban area's increased in value, mainly because of the prospect of building houses. Urban sprawl amounted to 50.000 feddan or 0.45 percent of agricultural land annually. This number is even higher when one counts soil degradation from brickmaking and related industries.

“The average price of 1 hectare in the USA was US\$800 in 1970 and the daily agricultural wage rate was approximately US\$12. Contrast these rates with Egypt's price of land and labour at the equivalent US\$1,500 per hectare and US\$0.5 per daily worker in the same year. There is an exceedingly wide variation in the ratios of factor prices: land is 66.6 times that of wage rates in the USA, while it is 3,000 times that of daily wage rates in Egypt. The variation has even widened in Egypt since the 1970s reaching 4,100 times the daily wage in 1975–80 and 4,375 times in 1997–98” (El-Ghonemy, 2007: 65).

This meant that high yield crops such as fruit and vegetable, which increased in cultivation with 30 percent and 40 percent respectively in the period of 1974-1985, were becoming more and more important for farmers to sustain an income. As noted earlier, poultry and animal husbandry were another of the few profitable options for farmers (Amin, 1995: 66).

The low yields from the agricultural sector did not necessarily push people from their farms. Instead many increasingly created additional forms of income. The 1981-1982 census found that in 69 percent of the small land holdings under 1 feddans, the men permanently worked the land (Springborg, 1990: 31). Although this number was higher in farms of larger sizes, around 25 percent of the men had additional jobs. These jobs fluctuated from low level government jobs, other forms of labour, trade, craftsmanship and employment in a foreign country. This did not mean that small farmers did not lose land. Land loss due to salination and

land degradation was overwhelmingly concentrated on small farmers. Especially, the very small farmers with land of less than 1 feddan saw the amount of land they hold reduced from 919.900 to 399.400 feddans in the period of 1977-1982 (Springborg 1990). Furthermore, Sadat's land reforms made it easier to purchase land and lifted some restriction on farm sizes. Especially in the newly reclaimed lands restriction on farm size were lifted. In the same period large farmers expanded their holdings by around 800.000 feddans. A large part of this increase was due to the allocation of reclaimed land.

“The 1982 census identifies 195,000 and 650,000 feddans held in landholdings of 50-100 and above 100 feddans, respectively. Virtually all of the larger holdings and most of these in the 50-100 feddan category would be located in the newly reclaimed areas. Of all this land, 292,000 feddans are held by some 3,600 individuals, while the remaining 553,000 feddans are held by companies, cooperative societies, or by various governmental instrumentalities” (Springborg, 1990b: 454).

Thus, initial land reform had stagnated in the 60's during Nasser tenure and were now actively being reversed under Sadat. Furthermore, there was a growth in public private partnerships, which further diverted investment from the old lands to the new lands. Although investment in agriculture was already at a record low of around 8 percent of government spending, some 85 percent of this investment was invested in drainage in newly reclaimed land (Amin, 1995: 74). This mainly benefited the large landholders. Furthermore, companies that were established were often a combination between private and public sector, blurring the line between public and private interests. It were often well-connected individuals, like army officials, high ranking civil servants and wealthy urban merchants, that created these companies. This was the

beginning of a new agrarian class, which was via its connections much more integrated into the global system. Although the number and impact of such companies at this point was still small, their importance would grow significantly in time. In many ways the investors in these companies were comparable to the absentee landowners. They had their base of operations in the city, mainly produced high yield export crops and based their power on their connections with the government (Springborg, 1990). All in all, this was a dramatic departure from Nasser. Although Nasser was not unfamiliar with political favouritism, government and private interests were to a large extent sharply defined.

The drop in agricultural investment, combined with decline in the share of small landowners, meant a significant drop in agricultural employment. Although the drop in agricultural employment was matched by a growth in services in the labour force, which increased from 30 to 45 percent of employment, overall job destruction was higher than job creation. Thus, although Egypt experienced a period of 8 percent growth annually during 1974-1985, Open unemployment grew from 4.3 percent in 1976 to 11 percent in 1986. The private sector did not create a significant amount of new jobs. Informal employment was estimated to exceed 2.9 million people in 1985 and rose to 4.8 million in 1990, whilst non-agricultural private sector employment accounted for 170.000 jobs in 1985 (Farah, 2009: 40-41). One explanation for this is Egypt's growth in capital used per worker which was around 7.18 percent annually in the period of 1977-1989 (Farah, 2009:41). Whilst South Korea and China relied on vast amounts of cheap labour and relatively low input of capital to generate industrial growth, Egypt's economy became more capital intensive, not using its vast amount of cheap labour. One of the key moments here was the bread riots of 1977. This definitively shifted government policy from developing the conditions for increased private investment, to subsidies for employment in the public sector. As a result, the open market policies of Egypt only increased imports and were not matched by an increase in foreign investment or a rise in exports in the

productive sectors. Thus, instead of an export led economy, Egypt was transformed into a rentier economy that neglected its productive industries such as agriculture and manufacturing. Investment in manufacturing dropped from 40 percent of total investment in 1967-1973 to 19 percent in 1981-1991. In short Egypt became a “relatively open economy that was quickly de-industrialising” (Farah, 2009: 40).

This structure in which remittances and revenues from oil, the Suez Canal and tourism were allocated to speculative and unproductive sectors of the economy, made Egypt extremely dependent on oil and the global market. This became painfully clear in 1986 when the price of oil crashed. Egypt almost directly fell into a payment crisis. Although the drop in oil revenues and subsequent drop in remittances were important factors, they were not solely responsible for the crisis. Both Sadat and Mubarak had borrowed heavily to finance increased military and infrastructural spending against 12 percent interest rates. In 1985 Egypt had to pay 5.5 billion alone to service its debts or more than half of the total value of exports. Unable to service its debt obligations, Egypt was forced to turn to the IMF. In exchange for loans, some initial reforms were taken. Mubarak, fearful of what happened in 1977, only reluctantly implemented some subsidy cuts. However, these cuts still had some major consequences. For instance, initial cuts to fertilizer impacted small farmers particularly hard. Subsidies on fertilizer enabled small peasants to maintain the fertility of their fields, since the sediments of the Nile were blocked by the Aswan High Dam and were thus key to their subsistence (Warner, 2013). However, the reforms that had to be implemented were not focussed on reforming the economy, nor were the size of the loans enough to allow for a sizable policy change. Egypt continued to run a deficit and its economy continued to weaken during this period.

Thus, when in 1990/1991 the gulf crisis hit, Egypt was at the point of financial collapse. The war in Iraq and Kuwait, together with Saudi the largest sources of foreign remittances, caused over a million workers to return back to Egypt. This was the final straw

(Farah, 2009: 42). However, the US, several European and other Western countries, some Gulf states, the IMF and the World Bank provided a massive amount of aid and debt relief under the name of the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP). The total debt relief was around 23.7 billion dollars between 1990 and 1994. External debt fell to around 50 percent to 24 billion dollars (Amin, 1995: 17-18). However, in exchange for this massive debt relief the Egyptian government more or less gave up its right to dictate its own policies. ERSAP had three aims. Raising productivity and rural income via neo-liberal policies, reduce the trading deficit by focussing on export led growth and raising private and foreign investment in the economy by cutting regulation and privatising state firms.

The rise in productivity was supposed to come from a return of market forces to the Egyptian economy. By cutting subsidies and abolishing the system of fixed prices, the ERSAP hoped the economy would refocus on goods where Egypt had a competitive advantage in. In 1992 Law 96 was passed. This law abolished the right of the sons of tenants to inherit the land and renting contracts. Furthermore, landowners could now end these contracts unilaterally and these contracts only lasted for a year. The price of rents was left to the market and tenants who could not pay the dramatic increases in rents could now be forcefully removed (Bush, 1999: 46). Other reforms mainly focussed on bringing farm prices up to international levels, further removal of farmer subsidies and the lifting of import and export restrictions imposed by the government. The reforms thus aimed at removing government interference and refocus on agriculture in which Egypt had a competitive advantage, such as berseem, wheat, fruits and vegetables (Nassar and Mansour, 2003: 142-143). It was foreseen, by the World Bank and IMF, that small farmers would bear the brunt of the cost of liberalisation. However, these were seen as necessarily evils. Furthermore, the IMF argued by moving labour from rural areas to the cities, would lower labour cost in the cities and attract industrial development (Bush, 2007).

In some respects, the reforms had some initial success. Yields in rice, wheat, sugar cane and maize raised between 20 and 50 percent. As a consequence, the cultivation of these crops grew also significantly, mostly at the expense of cotton. Especially wheat benefited from the reforms. Both the amount of land cultivated with wheat and the yields of wheat per feddan increased over the period 1990-2000. The amount of wheat grown and investment by the government in research into better seeds and higher yield varieties of wheat, increased yields with 44 percent. Self-sufficiency in wheat production rose with 30 percent to 54 percent in 1998 (Nassar and Mansour, 2003: 144).

However, as Mitchell pointed out the growth in rice, wheat and sugar cane are not high yield export crops but are instead inelastic crops that are in effect still dependent on high regulation. Sugar cane for instance was the only industry that was not liberalised, and the production of rice heavily depended on the fact that water was provided at almost no cost by the government. The rise in the production of these crops was both a result of under reporting when government-set quotas were still in place and the result of a retreat from the market by small farmers (Mitchell, 1998). The main staple of their diet was bread, which was produced from locally grown wheat. The cutting of the subsidies on flour and the subsequent price hikes, increased the incentives to grow more wheat for local consumption. Furthermore, sugar cane produce grew. This had more to do with the way it was produced than with market forces. Small farmers often provided “free” labour in exchange for the left-over sugar cane leaves, which they used for fodder for their cows. Thus, instead of producing for the market many small farmers retreated from it and became more self-sufficient (idem, 1998). The rise in the production of wheat, rice and sugar cane was thus not a result of liberal reforms, but rather of its failures. Small farmers invested in these inelastic crops to shield themselves from market forces and the production of sugar cane relied heavily on this self-subsistence economy for free labour. Another area in which this return to self-sufficiency became apparent was in

mechanisation. Whereas throughout the history of Egypt mechanisation in agriculture has always increased, it now dropped. With subsidies for fuel and mechanical equipment being cut, farmers switched back to cows to plough their fields and camels to transport sugar cane (Idem: 24-25).

The increasing self-reliance of small farmers was however undermined by changes in tenant laws. This resulted in rent rises of up to 400% and also dramatically reduced the rights of small landowners who were unable to hold on to their land (Bush, 2007: 1606). Cuts to subsidies on fuel and food, increased the cost of living. The average cost of living in rural areas tripled in the period from 1990-200. Furthermore, cuts to input subsidies on for instance fertilizer and pesticides, further undermined the revenues of small farmers. A combination of these factors, and especially the raise in rent which increased more than the raise in productivity crop yields, brought back inequality in land distribution to pre-Nasser levels (Nassar and Mansour, 2003: 151).

“Before the 1952 agrarian reform law 0.1% of landowners owned 20% of the cultivated area. In 2000 0.05% of holders accounted for 11% of the total landholding area. At the start of the new millennium there were fewer than four million land holders and a million landless fellahin plus family members. More than half of landholders (55%) farm five feddan or less. The dominance of smallholders hides significant inequalities in land holding—5% of landholders have 5 – 10 feddan but 2281 holders have land sizes in excess of 100 feddan, amounting almost a million feddan from the total of roughly nine million cultivable feddans in the old lands” (Bush, 2007, pp. 1612).

The increasing inequality in land distribution combined with a re-emergence of the old landowning class. Descendants of landowners who lost their land during the Nasser era, started successfully to pursue the return of their land via the courts. If local tenants did not want to leave willingly, the local police or hired thugs came in and attacked them (Bush, 2007).

The re-emergence of the old landlord class came in combination with the definitive establishment of a new well-connected capitalist class who were able to profit most from the large-scale privatisation of public companies. However, far from liberalising the economy these companies remained monopolies within their sectors, raking in large profits. Connections with government officials became crucial for obtaining these lucrative monopolies or contracts in general. Industries like cement, food and beverage and telecommunication were bought at prices way below market value and often with low interest loans provided by the government which in some cases were not paid back (Farah, 2009). Furthermore, almost all of the new elite joined the National Democratic Party, the main ruling party. This further reduced the separation between the private sector and the public sector. From the mid 80's. An increasing number of parliamentarians came from the private sector. During the election of 2005 77 members of the new parliament were from the private sector. Ministries, instead of being run by technocrats, were increasingly run by the magnates of the related sectors (Idem). So here again liberalization did not have the effect of promoting market forces, rather, it was a transfer of wealth from the public to private hands and an increased intermingling between the private and public sector, profiting the well-connected elite.

Another group that emerged with the influx of foreign aid and the opening up of the economy was that of foreign, mainly Gulf-based, agricultural companies. Gulf companies started to buy large plots of land in Egypt with highly favourable tax incentives. The Gulf countries were and are looking for food security and are buying large plots of land in the Nile basin in what is dubbed the global land grab. These companies aim to produce food export it

to the Gulf states (McMichael, 2013). This process of land for aid continues until today. The food crisis of 2008, the subsequent financial crisis and the revolution in 2011, which brought down President Hosni Mubarak's regime, have all put strains on Egyptian finances. A reduction in tourism income, the deterioration of the security in Egypt, with growing instability at its borders and an IS insurgency in the Sinai, have further stretched Egypt's finances. Egypt is currently fully dependent on the financial support from Gulf states, who provide it with liquidity in exchange for land deals (Verhoeven, 2016). These Gulf companies are an important link on which Mubarak and Sisi came to rely for political support from Gulf state.

The lower and middle-income Egyptians mainly bore the consequences of these liberal reforms. One area which suffered greatly from the liberal reforms was employment. In the period from 1993-2003 197 state companies were privatised. To make these companies more attractive for investment, the government fired large amounts of factory workers. Although firing employees from state services was prohibited by law, the state shrank its payroll massively. The state effectively reduced its share of employment with 25%, by sending people on long unpaid leave, forcing employees into early pension and not hiring new employees (Rawdan, 2003: 114-115). This general reduction in public employment was not matched by an increase in private employment. In total around 800.000 people joined the workforce each year (El Sayed El-Naggar, 2009: 42). Growth in employment opportunities only increased mildly with around 370,000 jobs per year of which most were in agriculture (Rawdan, 2003: 116) The effect was growing unemployment. Although official figures put unemployment in 2008 around 10 percent, real unemployment was probably more around 26.3 percent and this rate was three times higher in the age group between 15-29 years old, especially for new graduates, because of the lack of any high-skilled job opportunities. This problem is so big that higher education is a negative investment (El Sayed El-Naggar, 2009: 42).

At the heart of the failed liberalisation program are thus a couple of misconceptions. First of all, as Bush and Amin both pointed out, the problem was not too much government intervention in the 70's and 80's, but actually the opposite, the general neglect of agriculture by the government. Government involvement was focussed on the wrong areas of agricultural policy, such as price controls and subsidy regimes. Furthermore, the government had the tendency to invest large amounts of money in land reclamation projects instead of maintaining and upgrading irrigation and drainage systems in old lands. This was the case during the British mandate, Nasser and Sadat, but has only increased under Mubarak. Secondly, in the case of Egypt, the idea of export-led growth is fundamentally flawed. Export-led growth would only have substantial positive effects on the Egyptian economy if the country had been able to triple its agricultural exports, since this would eliminate the agricultural trade deficit. This increase could only have been reached if export of crops like cotton and horticulture increased dramatically. This would have not only diminished the amount of locally grown wheat, raising imports, but it would also completely have dismissed the global context of agricultural trade. The US subsidise its cotton farmers, whilst Europe does the same for its horticulture. Egyptian exports would thus only have a limited amount of space to grow (Bush, 1999). Furthermore, export-led growth in Egypt is oblivious to the effects oil and remittances have on the economy. The export of oil and labour increases the demand for Egypt's currency, making other export products less competitive. Export-led growth fuelled by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) only exacerbates this problem, since it also increases the demand for the Egyptian currency. In this respect FDI is a double-edged sword, cutting on both the demand and supply side of Egypt's economy. This dynamic is further discussed in an upcoming paper by Roland Riachi and Giuliano Martiniello (2019). Finally, liberalising the economy does not work in a rentier state. The process of reproduction is based on networks of patronage and inter-elite ties not on competitive advantages.

The role agriculture plays within the Egyptian economy has fundamentally changed after Sadat came to power. However, this was not because of global capital as Bernstein suggests, but from the income of rents from sources such as remittances, the Suez Canal and oil revenues. This new capital made it possible for Sadat to both appease the ruling army and the technocratic class together with the rich farmers and business class. These classes became increasingly intermingled by the mid 80's. Thus, although Egypt aligns perfectly with the trends of the global food regime, I would argue that this trend is not related to food, although food aid was a significant part of these rents that transformed the Egyptian economy. Oil dependency and dependence on remittances played a more significant role. Thus, where the food regime argues that food aid and the supermarket revolution changed the reproduction process in Egypt, this paper argues that it was the influx of rents that changed the labour relations and reproduction process. Agriculture became a peripheral part of the economy and can thus be separated from the Egyptian economy as a whole. This means, on the one hand, a retreat from the market by the small peasants and an entirely market-driven economy by the large peasants. The effects of rents on the process of reproduction transformed Egypt into a rentier state, which uses agriculture as a tool for the elite who can freely operate to maximise their own gains.

From an SRA perspective, a similar shift has taken place. First, there was a clear consolidation within Egypt itself within elite networks. During Sadat the urban largely mercantile and technocratic elite started to merge with the rural landowning elite. Under Mubarak, these alliances started to become much more internationally orientated. Direct links with Gulf capital became crucial for the survival of the Egyptian regime. In that sense, Egypt is again back where it started at the start of the first food regime.

CHAPTER VIII CONCLUSION

This paper aims to provide a strong basis for further analysis into land reclamation in Egypt. It first tries to provide a theoretical analysis of the state on which one can build a conception of how the Egyptian state functions. Secondly, it tries to analyse topics by focussing on the agrarian question in Egypt. Additionally, the paper reviews how Egypt's history fits within the food regime analysis. By doing this, the paper aims to determine how much room to manoeuvre Egypt has had through the course of its history. Thus, trying to find what should be at the core of a possible solution for Egypt's fundamentally flawed agricultural policy.

Throughout its history, Egypt has had a significant amount of interference from foreign powers. Whether by military or economic means, Egypt has known long periods in which it was not in charge of its own laws. Furthermore, Egypt has been the centre point of some of the world's most crucial political events. Two in particular stand out. The first was the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of European powers. Although Egypt managed to hold its own during the war, it was the destruction of its fleet by the British that made the country vulnerable to manipulation by foreign powers.

Furthermore, this defeat resulted in the dismantling of the monopoly system, and the subsequent decline of Egypt's industry. This put a stop to the ambitions of what at that time can be described as one of the most industrialised countries in the world. Egypt's subsequent integration into the global food market transformed its economy into one which was completely reliant on the growth of cotton. At the start of the first food regime, Egypt's was indeed one of the countries in the periphery producing raw materials for the factories in England.

The second one was the oil boom after 1973 and the rise of Gulf capital. The impact of this oil boom on Egypt was twofold. First, it resolved the agrarian question in the sense that a surplus generated from agriculture was no longer needed to spur industrial growth. During Nasser's tenure initial reforms were successful but arguably did not go far enough. The regime was too weak, and the rich peasants managed to stop further erosion of their status. Sadat tried

to open up the economy, this clashed with the ruling elite. However, the influx of rent meant that institutions such as the army and the bureaucracy could be bought off. Secondly, the influx of rent increased the power of capital over labour. The exodus of labourers to foreign countries provided the Egyptian state with a resolution for the lack of job growth and provided the struggling small peasantry with extra sources of income. This completely changed the process of reproduction within the Egyptian economy. Small peasants retreated from the market, which created space for the rich peasants and business elite to cash in as soon as controls on rent were lifted. One could argue that throughout its history, Egypt has very little room to manoeuvre. In retrospect it had two opportunities where history could have gone differently.

What this rather limited amount of room to tell us about land reclamation and how does this paper relate to the first question in this essay: Why does Egypt continue an agricultural policy that is unsustainable and damaging to agricultural policy as a whole? As this paper shows land reclamation has been central to state formation in Egypt and has an important international dimension. This paper provides an analysis of how to look at land reclamation and provides part of the answer to how and why the Egyptian state, with support of the International community, continues its unsustainable land reclamation policy. This paper argues that there are a couple of fundamental misconceptions at the heart of land reclamation and on the Egyptian agricultural policy as a whole. The first one is the difference between too much government interference and the wrong kind of government interference. This paper shows that throughout its history land reclamation has been an investment into the already prosperous classes as opposed to much more fundamental investment in matters as improved irrigation and the maintenance of drainage systems. Secondly, the focus on export-led growth is fundamentally flawed both from a Marxist perspective as from a neo-liberal perspective. Possible solution to the problems in agriculture thus have more to do with changing the

workings of the Egyptian state itself and the state's relation to the global economic system than any type of technical solution presented by international institutions.

How does the framework presented in this paper compare to the reality of land reclamation in Egypt? Sims argues that there were three phases of land reclamation. In the 60's, reclamation projects mainly focussed on reclaiming arable land close to the Nile delta and the resettlement of farmers and soldiers in these areas. In the 70's projects focussed on settling parts of the urban population in the desert. Whole new cities and industrial areas were created to that end. In the 90's desert reclamation projects exploded in scope and ambition. Two examples are the Toshka project and the Northern Sinai Agricultural Development Project, both aimed to transform whole deserts into new liveable valleys, with a large population and a combined total of over a million hectares of new arable land. Most of these projects have yielded little results against astronomically high costs (Sims, 2015).

This paper clearly shows that elite struggles fit perfectly within this pattern of land reclamation. Land reclamation in the 60's can be seen as an attempt by Nasser to circumvent rich farmers and create new lands which he could distribute to the peasantry. Land reclamation in the 70's is in line with a high urbanisation rate, growth and speculation in the housing market. Furthermore, it is in this area of the economy where one sees the first cooperation between the bureaucratic elite with rich peasants and businessmen. Land reclamation in the 90's took place after the economy had collapsed and Mubarak, in exchange for loans, further liberalised the economy. However, private investments in the productive sectors were disappointingly low. The same was the case for the Toshka project. Extremely generous tax-breaks were given to private investors who were willing to invest in the Toshka project. But, apart from a 100,000-acre plot sold to Saudi Prince al-Walid Ibn Talal al-Abdulaziz at \$127mn in 1998, the project did not attract any other major investors (Warner, 2012).

Apart from the importance of elite struggles and global economic structures, this paper has also highlighted the importance of ecology within a mainly social and economic analysis. The centrality of the Nile in shaping Egypt's social and economic relations has been one of the main arguments presented in this paper. Throughout Egypt's history, its many different governments have tried to expand arable land in desert areas. This has diverted significant sums of money, which could have been invested in improving the drainage system and fight re desertification. Money spent on land reclamation, mainly benefited the large landowners, while actively diverting funds from small farmers. This pattern of empowering large landowners at the cost of small farmers is also visible during the construction of the High Aswan dam. The building of the High Aswan dam, although a political success, has been one of the main enablers for the push of neo-liberal reforms since it gave the complete state control over water resources.

In conclusion, this paper has provided the historical, social and political context in which land reclamation should be analysed. Furthermore, it has highlighted the importance of this synthesis between ecology, economics, and society when analysing the Egyptian state and the elite struggles that take place within Egypt itself. The international dimension and the influence of external economic forces, such as the rise of global capitalism have also been discussed in this context. All in all, this paper provides a clear and solid foundation for further research into land reclamation in Egypt.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abdel-Fadil, Mahmoud. *Development, Income Distribution, and Social Change in Rural Egypt, 1952-1970: A Study in the Political Economy of Agrarian Transition*. Vol. 45 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
- . *The Political Economy of Nasserism: A Study in Employment and Income Distribution Policies in Urban Egypt, 1952-72*. Vol. 52. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
- Adam, David. “Food Price Rises Threaten Global Security - UN.” *The Guardian*, April 9, 2008, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2008/apr/09/food.unitednations>.
- Ahmed, Sara. “Egypt Water Scarcity Dangerous and Below Level of Poverty.” *Egyptian Streets*, June 28, 2018.
- Amin, Galal A. *Egypt’s Economic Predicament: A Study in the Interaction of External Pressure, Political Folly, and Social Tension in Egypt, 1960-1990*. Vol. 51. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995.
- Anderson, Kyle J. “Land Reform: The Invented Tradition of Social Revolution in Egypt.” University of Michigan, 2009.
- Ansari, Hamied. “Egypt, the Stalled Society.” Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986.
- Araghi, Farshad. “The Invisible Hand and the Visible Foot: Peasants, Dispossession and Globalization.” In *Peasants and Globalization: Political Economy, Agrarian Transformation and Development*, edited by A. Haroon Akram-Lodhi and Cristóbal Kay, 111–47, 2012.
- Bartelson, Jens. *The Critique of the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Batou, Jean. “Nineteenth-Century Attempted Escapes from the Periphery: The Cases of Egypt and Paraguay.” *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 16, no. 3 (1993): 279–318.
- Beinin, Joel. *Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

- Beinin, Joel, and Zachary Lockman. *Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, Islam, and the Egyptian Working Class, 1882 - 1954*. Princeton Studies on the Near East. London: Tauris, 1988.
- Bernstein, Henry. "Agrarian Political Economy and Modern World Capitalism: The Contributions of Food Regime Analysis." *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 43, no. 3 (May 3, 2016): 611–47.
- . *Class Dynamics of Agrarian Change*. Sterling: Stylus Publishing, 2010.
- . "Food Sovereignty via the 'Peasant Way': A Sceptical View." *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 41, no. 6 (November 2, 2014): 1031–63.
- Burns, William Joseph. "Economic Aid and American Policy toward Egypt, 1955-1981." Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985.
- Bush, Ray. *Economic Crisis and the Politics of Reform in Egypt*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1999.
- . "Politics, Power and Poverty: Twenty Years of Agricultural Reform and Market Liberalisation in Egypt." *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 8 (December 1, 2007): 1599–1615.
- Byres, T. J. "Agrarian Transition and the Agrarian Question." *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 4, no. 3 (April 1977): 258–74.
- Cleveland, William L., and Martin P. Bunton. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. 4th ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 2009.
- Cuno, Kenneth M. *The Pasha's Peasants: Land, Society, and Economy in Lower Egypt, 1740-1858*. Vol. 27. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- El reef El Masry. "About Company." El reef El Masry. Accessed November 23, 2018. <http://www.elreefelmasry.com/about>.
- El-Ghonemy, M. Riad. *The Crisis of Rural Poverty and Hunger: An Essay on the Complementarity between Market- and Government-Led Land Reform for Its Resolution*. Routledge, 2007.

- El-Sayed El-Naggar, Ahmad. "Economic Policy: From State Control to Decay and Corruption." In *Egypt: The Moment of Change*, edited by Rabab El-Mahdi and Philip Marfleet. London: Zed Books, 2009.
- Ezz, Mohamed, and Nada Arafat. "'We Woke up in a Desert' – the Water Crisis Taking Hold across Egypt." *The Guardian*, August 4, 2015.
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/04/egypt-water-crisis-intensifies-scarcity>.
- Fahmy, Khaled. *All the Pasha's Men*. American University in Cairo Press, 1997.
- Farah, Nadia Ramsis. *Egypt's Political Economy: Power Relations in Development*. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2009.
- Frerichs, Sabine. "Egypt's Neoliberal Reforms and the Moral Economy of Bread: Sadat, Mubarak, Morsi." *Review of Radical Political Economics* 48, no. 4 (September 14, 2015): 610–32.
- Friedmann, Harriet. "The Family Farm and the International Food Regimes." In *Peasants and Peasant Societies: Selected Readings*, edited by T. Shanin, 247–58. London: Blackwell, 1987.
- Friedmann, Harriet, and Philip McMichael. "Agriculture and the State System: The Rise and Decline of National Agricultures, 1870 to the Present." *Sociologia Ruralis* 29, no. 2 (1989): 93–117.
- Foucault, Michel, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
- Gramsci, Antonio. *Antonio Gramsci*. London, UK: ElecBook, the Electric Book Co., 1999.
- Hansen, Bent. *Egypt and Turkey*. Oxford: Oxford University Press for World Bank, 1991.
- Jessop, Bob. *State Power: A Strategic-Relational Approach*. Book, Whole. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2008.
- Kienle, Eberhard. *Ba'th v. Ba'th: The Conflict between Syria and Iraq, 1968-1989*. London: I.B. Tauris, 1990.

- Loftus, Alex. "Political Ecology II: Whither the State?" *Progress in Human Geography*, September 30, 2018, 1–11.
- Lubin, Gus. "Non-Political Bread Riots Are Breaking Out In Egypt, Killing Three." *Business Insider*, February 2011. <https://www.businessinsider.com/egypt-bread-riot-2011-2>.
- Marx, Karl. "The Rule of the Pretorians." marxengels public archive, 1858. <http://marxengels.public-archive.net/en/ME1047en.html>.
- McMichael, Philip. "A Comment on Henry Bernstein's Way with Peasants, and Food Sovereignty." *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 42, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 193–204.
- . *Food Regimes and Agrarian Questions*. Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2013.
- Miliband, Ralph. *Class Power and State Power*. London: Verso, 1983.
- Mitchell, Timothy. *Colonising Egypt: With a New Preface*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
- . "The Market Place." In *Directions of Change in Rural Egypt*, edited by Nicholas S. Hopkins and Kirsten Westergaard. American University in Cairo Press, 1998.
- . *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.
- . "Society, Economy, and the State Effect." In *The Anthropology of the State: A Reader*, edited by Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta, 169–86. Blackwell Readers in Anthropology 9. Malden: Blackwell Pub, 2006.
- . *Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil*. London: Verso, 2011.
- Molle, François, and Peter P Mollinga. "Hydraulic Bureaucracies and the Hydraulic Mission: Flows of Water, Flows of Power" 2, no. 3 (2009): 22.
- Montiel, Héctor. "Critical Realism and the Strategic-Relational Approach." *Journal of Critical Realism* 6, no. 1 (February 12, 2007): 84–110. <https://doi.org/10.1558/jocr.2007.v6i1.84>.

- Nasser, Saad, and Mahmoud Mansour. "Agriculture: An Assessment of Past Performance and the Task Ahead." In *Egypt in the Twenty First Century: Challenges for Development*, edited by Mohamad Riad El Ghonemy, 2:141–59. London: Routledge, 2003.
- Osman, Tarek. *Egypt on the Brink: From Nasser to Mubarak*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010.
- Panza, Laura, and Jeffrey G. Williamson. "Did Muhammad Ali Foster Industrialization in Early Nineteenth-Century Egypt?" *The Economic History Review* 68, no. 1 (2015): 79–100.
- Parenti, Christian. "The 2013 ANTIPODE AAG Lecture The Environment Making State: Territory, Nature, and Value." *Antipode* 47, no. 4 (2015): 829–48.
- Poulantzas, Nicolas. "The Problem of the Capitalist State," *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*. London: NLB, 1978.
- Radwan, Samir. "Full Employment: The Challenge in the Twenty-First Century." In *Egypt in the Twenty First Century: Challenges for Development*, edited by Mohamad Riad El Ghonemy, 2:111–40. London: Routledge, 2003.
- Riachi, Roland and Giuliano Martiniello. "Manufactured scarcity: Middle East and North African in historical and global food regimes." forthcoming (2019).
- Richards, Alan. *Egypt's Agricultural Development, 1800-1980: Technical and Social Change*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1982.
- Scobie, Grant M. "Government Policy and Food Import: The Case of Wheat in Egypt." Research Report. International Food Policy Research Institute, December 1981.
- Skocpol, Theda. *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- Springborg, Robert. "Agrarian Bourgeoisie, Semiproletarians, and the Egyptian State: Lessons for Liberalization." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 22, no. 04 (November 1990): 447–72.

- b. “Rolling Back Egypt’s Agrarian Reform.” *Middle East Report*, no. 166 (September 1990): 28–38.
- Steiner, Christian. *Tourism, Poverty Reduction and the Political Economy: Egyptian Perspectives on Tourism’s Economic Benefits in a Semi-Rentier State*. Vol. 3, 2006.
- Tilly, Charles. *The Politics of Collective Violence*. Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- UNCCD. “2015 Land for Life Award Winners.” UNCCD. Accessed November 23, 2018. <https://www.unccd.int/2015-land-life-award-winners>.
- Warner, Jeroen. “The Toshka Mirage in the Egyptian Desert – River Diversion as Political Diversion.” *Environmental Science & Policy*, SI: Environmental and Developmental Discourses: Technical knowledge, discursive spaces and politics, 30 (June 1, 2013): 102–12.
- Verhoeven, Harry. “The Gulf states in the political economy of the Nile Basin: a historical overview.” In *Land and Hydropolitics in the Nile River Basin*, ed. Emil Sandström, Anders Jägerskog and Terje Oestigaard. London: Routledge, 2016.
- Weber, Max. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. Translated by Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.
- Weinbaum, Marvin G. “Dependent Development and U.S. Economic Aid to Egypt.” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 18, no. 2 (1986): 119–34.
- Worldometers. “Egypt Population (2018).” Accessed November 20, 2018. <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/egypt-population/>.

