

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

THE SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF THE SYRIAN WAR ON
LEBANON

by

LÉA AFEICHE LAYOUN

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for the degree of Master of Arts
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
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
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
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
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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

Léa Afeiche Layoun for

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Title: The Spillover Effects of the Syrian War in Lebanon: Political, Social and Economic Repercussions.

This thesis analyses the case of Lebanon, a country that has suffered the most from the spillover effects of the Syrian War. It aims to elucidate how the political, social and economic repercussions of the Syrian War has shaken Lebanon's internal stability. Was the Lebanese political system strong enough to resist the Syrian impact? How did the social repercussions increase the Lebanese sectarian tensions? Were the Lebanese elites able to take decisions without foreign intervention? How did the economic effects affect the Lebanese demography and the livelihoods of Lebanese?

To answer these questions, in-depth interviews with experts were conducted and publications were perused. Data was analyzed using the qualitative method. Each repercussion was appraised separately. As a result, the study produced several findings. First, the Lebanese power-sharing system, which was intended to regulate the internal conflict, failed to institute sustainable peace. Lebanese politicians were always at odds with one another and unable to agree over public policies. Although the Baabda Declaration clearly stated the nonintervention of Lebanon in Syria's conflict, the Syrian War has generated political struggles. Lebanese politicians were always at odds with one another and unable to agree over public policies. This internal political conflict created a cabinet instability, an interruption of parliamentary and presidential elections, and a deterioration of the Lebanese security conditions with the penetration of terrorist groups into Lebanese border towns. Second, the Syrian War has increased the sectarian agitation between Shia and Sunni communities. In the case of civil wars, members of ethnic groups search for transnational ethnic ties for solidarity. Any event in Syria flared up the conflict in Tripoli: this was confirmed by the Sunni Bab al-Tabbaneh and Alawites Jabal Mohsen neighborhoods clashes. The Sidon armed conflict was, another example. The Syrian War also generated the spread of suicide bombings and political assassinations all over the country. Third, an examination of the pre-2011 demographic and economic Lebanese profiles highlighted that the economic repercussions of civil wars greatly affect neighboring states. Indeed, the flow of the Syrian refugees into Lebanon, weakened the Lebanese economy. The influx of Syrian refugees also perturbed the Lebanese demography.

This study had several implications. First, it clarified that although Lebanon has never interfered nor was involved with the Syrian conflict, it has extremely been affected by its spillover. Second, it suggested recommendations in the hope of a better Lebanon. Finally, the research identified areas of future research that Syrian refugees could provide positive contributions to the Lebanese economy.

Keywords: Spillover Effects, Syrian War, Political Repercussions, Sectarian Tensions, Economic Repercussions, Demography

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ABBREVIATIONS

AUB	American University of Beirut
CDR	Council of Development and Reconstruction
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GOL	Government of Lebanon
ICG	International Crisis Group
ILO	International Labor Organization
IRB	Institutional Review Board
ISF	Internal Security Forces
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
LAF	Lebanese Armed Forces
LBP	Lebanese Pound
LCPS	Lebanese Center for Policy Studies
LCRP	Lebanon Crisis Response Plan
MOF	Ministry of Finance

MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Member of Parliament
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
SAA	Syrian Arab Army
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Trade Organization

GENERAL HISTORIC TIMELINE OF THE PERIOD OF STUDY

1920	Creation of the State of Greater Lebanon
1932	Last Official Census in Lebanon
1943	Unwritten Agreement of the National Pact
1943	End of French Mandate
1943	Lebanese Independence
1948	First Arab Israeli War
1948	Flow of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon
1973	The Yom Kippur Arab Israeli War
1976	Syrian Military Troops entered Lebanon
1975	Beginning of Lebanese Civil War
1989	End of Lebanese Civil War
1989	Taif Agreement
2005	Assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri
2005	Cedar Revolution
2005	Withdrawal of Syrian Troops from Lebanon
2006	July Hezbollah Israeli War
2007	Nahr al-Bared War
2010	Influx of Iraqi Refugees in Lebanon
2012	Influx of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Problem

The conflict in Syria started on the 15th of March 2011, when a group of teenagers from Deraa, a Southwestern Syrian city, were arrested and tortured for scrawling the following graffiti on their school wall: *doctor, your turn is next*, referring to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, “a phrase no doubt learned from watching Egypt’s protests on Al-Jazeera”.¹ As a result, not surprisingly, the teenagers were arrested and tortured. The arrests were followed by peaceful civil demonstrations against the regime and, the situation gradually transformed into an armed rebellion, which eventually escalated to a full scale civil war. What started as a farce, spray can paint on a school wall by teenagers, intensified into political events that tore Syria apart. However, President Assad’s wishful thinking, a belief rooted in the idea that Syria is “not a copy of other countries”² and would be immune from the unrest of the Arab Spring, was wrong.

Syria was not the only country that suffered from the brutal Syrian political conflict. Many countries in the region have also endured the burden of the war. Indeed, between 2011 and 2017, over 5,456,108 displaced Syrians found refuge in neighboring

¹ Christopher Phillips, *The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2016). P. 49.

² Bashar Al-Assad, Syrian President. *Response to the Wave of Protests around Syria*. Speech on March 30, 2011 in Syrian Parliament. People’s Assembly: Damascus.

countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt.³ Even European countries felt the pressure of Syrian refugees and migrants. It has been estimated that 987,571 asylum applications were documented in Europe for Syrian refugees in search for safety and better opportunities.⁴

Lebanon, closely connected to the Syrian conflict, struggled to properly manage the Arab Spring revolutions that swept the region.⁵ Moreover, although the Lebanese Republic did not directly interfere nor was involved in the Syrian conflict, Lebanon has tremendously been affected by its spillover. As the Syrian Civil War became largely regionalized and internationalized, Lebanon became a hostage of the Syrian internal conflict and is currently paying the ultimate price.

1.2. Research Questions

The escalation of violence in Syria had a major spillover effect on Lebanon. The civil war in Syria did not only pull Lebanon into the “maelstrom of the Syrian conflict”⁶ but it also left a negative impact on Lebanon’s political, economic and intercommunal relations. To reveal the consequences of the Syrian conflict in Lebanon, this thesis aims to answer the following research questions:

- What are the major political spillover effects of the Syrian Civil War on Lebanon?

³ Nasser Yassin, *101 Facts & Figures on the Syrian Refugees Crisis* (Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs: American University of Beirut, 2018). P. 20.

⁴ Yassin, *101 Facts & Figures on the Syrian Refugees Crisis*, P. 20.

⁵ Maximilian Felsch and Martin Wählisch, *Lebanon and the Arab Uprising: In the eye of the Hurricane*. (London: Routledge, 2016). P.1.

⁶ Felsch and Wählisch, *Lebanon and the Arab Uprising*, p.1.

- How did the political repercussions influence the Lebanese domestic politics?
- Was the Lebanese political system strong enough to resist the Syrian impact?
- Were the Lebanese politicians able to take decisions without foreign intervention?
- What are the major social spillover effects of the Syrian Civil War on Lebanon?
 - How does sectarianism affect the Lebanese system?
 - How did the social repercussions increase the Lebanese sectarian tensions?
- What are the major economic spillover effects of the Syrian Civil War on Lebanon?
 - How did the economic repercussions affect the livelihoods of Lebanese?
 - Did Lebanese political elites intervene to control the flow of the Syrian refugees on Lebanon and what was their suggestions?

By examining the above questions, this thesis will test the following propositions.

First, that the Syrian civil war increased the likelihood of violence on neighboring states such as Lebanon, and second, transnational alliances, that were elaborated between Lebanese and Syrian similar sectarian groups, have intensified social tensions in Lebanon.

1.3. Thesis Goals and Outline

The majority of Lebanese have suffered from the spillover effects of the Syrian war. To state a few examples, the conflict caused pollution, unemployment, feelings of unsafety, financial anxiety, stress, educational burdens, higher taxes. This thesis will address the major political, social and economic repercussions of the Syrian Civil War in Lebanon. Its main aim is to understand and demonstrate how the effects of the Syrian War has shaken Lebanon's internal stability. The major research question is therefore divided into three parts which address the political, social and economic effects.

Structurally, this thesis is composed of five chapters: chapter one is the current introduction, laying out the main ideas, the research questions and the historical background.

Chapter two reviews the literature that is relevant to this study. The first part of this chapter elaborates a theoretical review on the concept of civil wars and their impact on neighboring countries. It starts by providing a general understanding on civil wars then elaborates how civil wars transmit their impact and affect surrounding nations. The second part of the second chapter then shifts towards Lebanon. By doing so, the chapter reviews: 1) the Lebanese political system from a consociational perspective, technically viewed as a form of power-sharing, highlighting the fact that the consociational government was adopted in Lebanon to regulate internal conflicts, 2) the Lebanese confessional system, which weights the causes of polarization between the various Lebanese groups, and 3) the pre-2011 Lebanon's development challenges and the difference between refugees and human displacement.

Chapter three presents the methodology used to gather the data needed to answer the research questions. The chapter also describes the context in which the study is conducted.

Chapter four reveals the findings produced by the study. The chapter is divided into three distinct parts which are the political, social and economic repercussions of the Syrian Civil War on Lebanon. The first part focuses on the political challenges and analyzes them to measure the gravity of the crisis and how Lebanon has been affected. The second part emphasizes the social tensions and shows how sectarianism became more

violent in the aftermath of the Syrian War. The third part presents the Lebanese demographic and economic profiles in the post-2011 period and focuses on the influx of the refugees which is considered a primary effect of the Syrian War on Lebanon. Finally, this last part assesses how the conflict negatively affected the economy and altered Lebanese demography.

Chapter five is the concluding chapter of this thesis. This chapter retraces and sums up the synthesized information and draws final thoughts based on recommendations in the hopes of a better Lebanon.

1.4. Historical Background

In the aftermath of World War I, Lebanon emerged from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire which lost the war against the allies.⁷ The Ottoman territories in the Middle East were divided among the victorious Allied Powers at the Conference of San Remo, held in Italy, in April, 1920.⁸ As such, the French were given a mandate over Syria and Lebanon. Greater Lebanon was created on the 1st of September, 1920 by the Franco-British colonial powers and the Sykes Picot Agreement.⁹ The new territory which consisted of 10,452 km² comprised Mount Lebanon Mutessarifat and the districts of Tripoli, Sidon and the Beqaa Valley.

⁷ Robert Rabil, *Salafism in Lebanon*. (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2014) p. 59.

⁸ Corrin Varady, *US Foreign Policy and the Multinational Force in Lebanon: Vigorous Self-Defense*. (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017) p. 26.

⁹ Fawwaz Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*. (England: Pluto Press, 2007) p. 75-88.

The creation of the new state provoked antagonistic reactions from the Sunni community, which demanded union with Syria. On the other hand, Christians called for separation from the rest of Syria. Mainly, by splitting off Greater Lebanon from its natural hinterland, the French Mandate established sectarianism in the modern history of Lebanon. Indeed, that territorial expansion enlarged the Muslim population and consequently altered the demographic composition.¹⁰ This change was the basis of the conflict that aroused power struggles among the different religious confessions. It was not until the Maronite-Sunni alliance, under the unwritten agreement of the National Pact of summer 1943 between Maronite President Bechara El Khoury and Sunni Prime Minister Riad Al Solh, that momentary communal conciliation was forged.¹¹ The political power was then distributed along sectarian lines with a 6/5 formula in favor of Christians over Muslims. The leaders of the 1943 agreement considered that the new formula will end “sectarian particularisms”,¹² but was in vain as neither party accept it in full.

Because its relative strength vis-à-vis Lebanon, Syria has always tried to influence Lebanon. “Lebanon has always been in the shadow of Syria”.¹³ At the time when both countries proclaimed their independence, Syria did not accept Lebanon’s sovereignty and has since interfered in and affected Lebanese’s politics. This influence was clearly demonstrated when Syrian military troops entered Lebanon in 1976 at the

¹⁰ Elaine Hagopian, ‘Maronite Hegemony to Maronite Militancy: The Creation and Disintegration of Lebanon’. *Third World Quarterly*. Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Volume 11, Number 4, Ethnicity in World Politics. (October, 1989). P. 102.

¹¹ Robert Rabil, *The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon: The Double Tragedy of Refugees Impacted Host Communities*. (United States of America: Lexington Books, 2016)

¹² Hagopian, *Maronite Hegemony to Maronite Militancy*, p. 104.

¹³ Lina Khatib, *Regional Spillover: Lebanon and the Syrian Conflict*. (Carnegie: Middle Eastern Center, 2014)

request of Lebanese President Suleiman Frangieh.¹⁴ These troops were assigned to act as a deterrent force between the warring parties and the Palestinian factions who came into Lebanon following the defeat of the 1948 Arab Israeli War. Despite the fact that Lebanon benefited from a period of economic growth, the Lebanese Civil War erupted in 1975. The Lebanese Civil War erupted in the wake of regional and domestic political confrontations in addition to the pressures of the stateless Palestinians' problem. Nevertheless, the core issue that inflamed the war was the fact that the leaders of the Maronite, Sunni and Shia's religious communities remained unsatisfied with the sectarian formula of the National Pact.¹⁵ At the end of the Lebanese Civil War in 1989, the Taif Agreement,¹⁶ a compromise among Lebanese conflicting parties, readjusted the old system by agreeing on a new formula that was adopted to put an end to the war.

The Taif Agreement was supplemented with two other subsequent major agreements, which were the Treaty of Brotherhood Coordination and Cooperation signed on May 20, 1991 and the Defense Pact of September 1, 1991. Altogether, they legitimized the Syrian presence and hegemony over Lebanon. In that way, Syria consolidated its tutelage over Lebanon, which lasted approximately 29 years. This tutelage led to total Syrian control of Lebanese political, economic, security, legislative, executive and judicial levels, mainly with the appointment of political elites who were directly manipulated by Damascus for the sole benefit of Syria itself.¹⁷

¹⁴ Casey Addis, *Lebanon: Background and U.S. Relations*. (Pennsylvania: Diane Publishing, 2011). P. 6.

¹⁵ Samir Makdisi and Richard Sadaka, 'The Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990'. *Lecture and Working Paper Series* No 3. (Institute of Financial Economics, American University of Beirut, 2003). P. 9.

¹⁶ Joseph Bahout, *The Unraveling of Lebanon's Taif Agreement: Limits of Sect-Based Power Sharing*. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016). P. 9.

¹⁷ Youssef Bassil, 'Syrian Hegemony over Lebanon After the Lebanese Civil War'. *Journal of Science*. Vol.2, No.3, 2012. (United States: World Science Publisher). Pp. 136-147.

In addition, between the 1950s and the 1970s, Lebanese society was also affected by an increase of emigration of Lebanese Christian from Lebanon against an increase of immigration of a majority of Muslim Palestinian refugees into Lebanon. This flow of migration not only altered the Lebanese socio-demographic structure but also affected the balance of power-sharing agreement.¹⁸ Moreover, the repercussions of the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, in the context of the Cold War, and the tensions that it generated between pro-Arab Nationalists and pro-westerns, added fuel to the fire. These regional and international instabilities, which caused mounting communal tensions to an already divided society, dissatisfied with its domestic political issues, eventually paved the way for the Lebanese Civil War to arise.

The period from 1976 to 2005 was characterized by a phase whereby “the status of Lebanese political leaders from all factions was dependent on good relations with Syrian military officers and with Damascus”.¹⁹ This period ended with a major turning point, that occurred on the 30th of April, 2005 with the withdrawal of the Syrian troops from Lebanon, following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and the upheavals of the Cedar Revolution. In the post-2005 period, as Lebanon began to reclaim its independence and sovereignty, a sharp polarization between religious and sectarian differences divided the Lebanese society into two distinct camps: the March 8 Alliance and the March 14 Alliance.²⁰ The wave of protests, during the Arab Spring

¹⁸ Imad Salameh, *The Government and Politics of Lebanon*. (London: Routledge, 2014) p. 31-35.

¹⁹ Nahla Chahal, ‘Lebanon and Syria: Separation without estrangement?’ Issue 24. Pp. 71-72.

²⁰ Geukjian, Ohannes. *Lebanon after the Syrian Withdrawal: External Intervention, Power-Sharing and Political Instability*. (Oxon: Routledge, 2017)

uprisings in 2010, has further deepened divisions between Lebanese, which completely deteriorated following the Syrian conflict in 2011.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter reviews the literature relevant to the study at hand. It is divided into three distinct parts. The first part will elaborate a theoretical review on the concept of civil wars and their impact on neighboring countries and starts by introducing a brief overview on civil wars. The main aim of this section is to elucidate the theory of how civil wars affect other countries. As such, a definition is provided and some main causes of civil wars are formulated. It will then explain how civil wars transmit their impact and affect neighboring countries. This section will also help the forthcoming chapter to corroborate how the Syrian Civil War has affected Lebanon. In fact, the discourse on civil wars should affirm that the findings of this thesis are relevant and that the Syrian Civil War has unquestionably affected the Lebanese political, social and economic balance. The second part of this chapter shifts towards Lebanon. It will be divided into three different sections. The first section will review the Lebanese political system from a consociational perspective, technically viewed as a form of power sharing. This presentation highlights the fact that consociational government was adopted in Lebanon to regulate internal conflict. The second section will review the Lebanese confessional system. This part weighs the causes of the post-2005 social polarization between the various Lebanese groups. Finally, the last section will review Lebanon's pre-2011 development challenges with an emphasis on the differences between refugees and human displacement. Finally, the third part is a

brief review on the shift in the geopolitical balance in the Middle East and its effects on Lebanon.

2.1. Theoretical Review on Civil Wars

Civil wars have been defined as armed conflicts that involve intra-state conflicts, mostly between the government of a particular state and one or more non-state actors. Generally, non-state actors are violent armed opposition groups or terrorist organizations, within the same state. As such, civil wars differ from inter-state conflicts that involve clashes between two distinct countries. Civil wars cause a great number of civilian and military casualties, especially within the country's boundary. They also cause diseases, famine, significant deterioration of infrastructure and the ecosystem, emigration as well as decreases in social spending and reduction in foreign direct investment.²¹ Recently, it has been noticed that the most type of ongoing armed conflicts which are taking place around the world are civil wars.²²

Civil wars erupt from a variety of longstanding tensions and disagreements. As a matter of fact, the effects of both economic and social or cultural factors are increasingly reported on the probability of inducing civil wars.²³ First, considering the social reasons, some believe that the deadliest and most violent civil wars are the ones that involve

²¹ Paul Collier, V.L. Elliott, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol and Nicholas Sambanis, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (Washington: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003) P. 11.

²² Collier, Elliott, Hegre, Hoeffler, Reynal-Querol and Sambanis, *Breaking the Conflict Trap*, p. 1.

²³ Marta Reynal-Querol, "Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 46, No. 1, February, 2002, P. 30.

religious or ethnic factors.²⁴ Others argue that language as a social cleavage could also generate violence. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the 11th of September, 2001, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair (2014) asserts that “religious difference will fuel this century’s battles”.²⁵ Indeed, many conflicts related to religious problems have emerged. Rebellious organizations such as al-Quaida or Islamic State of Iraq and Syria have confirmed fears of Huntington (1996) “civilization clashes”²⁶ between major world religions.²⁷ Huntington (1996) argued that the wars of the 21st Century would not be fought between countries, but between cultures.

Second, economic factors are also viewed as major sources that cause civil wars. Particularly, since the World War II, instances of civil wars globally multiplied, and peaked in the 1990’s. Most of these conflicts were caused by greed and grievance.²⁸ Issues, such as high inequality, lack of political rights or ethnic and religious divisions in society are explained as severe grievances. For Frances Stewart (2008), these grievances constituted the main cause of rebellion.²⁹ However, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argued that the prime reason of civil wars is related to economic factors. They found that economic variables provide “more explanatory power” than political and social variables, mostly related to

²⁴ Clifford Geertz, “The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States,” in Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States* (New York: Free Press, 1963); Walker Connor, “Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 16 (July 1993). P. 373-389.

²⁵ Tony Blair, “Religious Difference, Not Ideology, Will Fuel This Century’s Epic Battles”, in *The Observer*, January 25, 2014.

²⁶ Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remarking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

²⁷ Nils-Christian Bormann, “Language, Religion, and Ethnic Civil War”, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 1, No. 28, 2015. P.2.

²⁸ Lars-Erik Cederman and Manuel Vogt, ‘Dynamics and Logics of Civil War’, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 61, No.9, May, 2017. P. 6.

²⁹ Frances Stewart, “Horizontal inequalities and conflict: an introduction and some hypotheses”, in Frances Stewart, ed., *Horizontal inequalities and conflict: understanding group violence in multiethnic societies* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

grievance and which have “little explanatory power”.³⁰ In other words, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) found that factors that generate profitable opportunities of rebellion correlated with more instances of conflict than factors leading to grievances.

2.1.1. Civil Wars’ Spillover on Neighboring Countries

Civil wars are not clashes strictly confined to the territory of the affected state. There is another dimension that complicates a civil war and that involves the effects of the conflict on the territories of neighboring states.

Neighboring states not only might sometimes get involved directly with cross borders activities, but they also most of the time suffer from transnational factors. Indeed, civil wars create dynamics that affect neighboring states and increases the risk of violence. For example, unlike post-World War II instances of civil wars, recent civil wars have produced the most massive refugee flows in history. Civil wars could also spillover terrorism to inspire their supporters, weaken governments and worsen sectarianism.

Michael Brown (1996) gives five main reasons why internal conflicts are important. According to Brown (1996), an internal conflict is “widespread; it causes tremendous suffering; it almost always affects and involves neighboring states, thereby undermining regional stability; it often engages the interest of distant powers and international organizations; and efforts to deal with the problems posed by internal conflict are in the process of being reassessed by policymakers at the national level and in regional and

³⁰ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and grievance in civil war”, *Oxford Economic Paper*, Vol. 56, 2004. P. 563.

international organizations”.³¹ Brown (1996) emphasizes that internal conflicts “almost always affects and involves neighboring states, thereby undermining regional stability”.³² He further notes how the sudden flow of large numbers of refugees, whose primary aim is to seek safety and humanitarian assistance, perturbs the stability of other states. Because such states share common borders, they are often considered “innocent victims”.³³ As a result, these states suffer from the implications of other states’ turmoil. In other words, the effects of civil wars are not only felt in the country where the clashes occur but also in neighboring countries.

Brown (1996) adds “the sudden influx of refugees can aggravate ethnic problems and further complicate the picture by changing the domestic balance of power”.³⁴ Indeed, refugees who sought asylum in a neighboring country may compete or fight with local people of a different ethnicity, which may result in violent conflicts. The conflict could escalate especially if there is a minority local group with the same ethnic ties as the refugees’ population, which would endanger the dominance of the majority. Consequently, refugees can pose a security threat to the host country.

Primarily, the influx of refugees can change the ethnic composition of the host state and will develop feelings of discontents among local populations not only towards the refugees but also toward their own government, which authorized them to enter the country. Weiner (1978) argues that the demographical changes that have occurred due to

³¹ Michael Brown, “The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict.” In *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, edited by Michael Brown, (Cambridge: MIT University Press, 1996). P. 3.

³² Brown, *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, p. 3.

³³ Brown, *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, p. 8.

³⁴ Brown, *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, p. 576.

migration increase will stimulate “sons of the soil movements”³⁵, which is a conflict between the original populations of an area and the recent settlers. In this context, migrants and their objective to find a job will form a minority group who will compete with local people known as “the sons of the soil”.³⁶ Clashes and political agitation may arise among migrants and the native-born who begin to view themselves not only as oppressed but also as prioritized in terms of access to the resources of that territory. Thus, these clashes will create anti-foreigner sentiments among the native population. As a matter of fact, immigrants or refugees may also compete for resources other than employment, including housing, land and water, which constitute predominant economic threat.

Furthermore, Davis and Moore (1997) argue that many civil wars involve members of an ethnic group searching for transnational ethnic ties in the name of solidarity. A transnational ethnic alliance exists when two states contain members of the same ethnic group.³⁷ In other words, it is between one group that controls a state and kin who are disadvantaged in a neighboring state. Members of the ethnic groups which is in control will be then concerned with the welfare and condition of the underprivileged ethnic group. This “ethnic affinity” which is driven by a primordial bonding among kith and kin³⁸ may lead to tensions between the two states. These tensions could culminate to ethnic conflicts. As a result, according to Davis and Moore (1997), “transnational ethnic alliances serve as

³⁵ Myron Weiner, *Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978).

³⁶ Weiner, *Sons of the Soil*.

³⁷ David Davis and Will Moore, “Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior”. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No. 1, 1997. P. 172.

³⁸ Davis and Moore, *Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior*, p. 173.

conduits to conflict behavior”.³⁹ Moreover, refugees can also import ideologies which facilitate the spread of conflict. Sometimes, refugees directly challenge the host government or even mobilize opposition, not only in their country of origin but also in the host country.

Economic repercussions of civil wars do not solely impact the nation in turmoil but affect neighboring nations as well. Indeed, Murdock and Sandler (2002) note that “there is apt to be negative spillovers to neighboring nations from disruptions to trade, heightened risk perceptions by would-be investors, severance of input supply lines, collateral damage from nearby battles, and resources spent to assist refugees”.⁴⁰ Murdock and Sandler (2002) state that these repercussions are “spatial transmission of negative externalities”⁴¹, which originates from a civil war-torn nation and impacts its neighbors’ growth. As a matter of fact, these repercussions reduce the “steady-state level of GDP per capita”⁴², the per capita income, both on the conflicted state and its neighbors. By analyzing each and every repercussion, Murdock and Sandler (2002) note how civil wars can affect the growth of neighboring states. As such, they noted that the spillovers have, as they call it, a “country-specific effect”.⁴³ First, nearby civil wars may produce collateral damage to neighboring states from battles close to the border. As a result, neighboring state’s national wealth and infrastructure could be obliterated by the impact of a nearby conflict. Murdock and Sandler (2002) have also estimated that the more the civil war intensifies, the more the collateral

³⁹ Davis and Moore, *Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior*, p. 172.

⁴⁰ James Murdock and Todd Sandler. ‘Economic Growth, Civil War, and Spatial Spillover’, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 46, No. 1, April, 2002. P. 1.

⁴¹ Murdock and Sandler, *Economic Growth, Civil War, and Spatial Spillover*, p.1.

⁴² Murdock and Sandler, *Economic Growth, Civil War, and Spatial Spillover*, p.2.

⁴³ Murdock and Sandler, *Economic Growth, Civil War, and Spatial Spillover*, p.2.

damage on the surrounding countries will be evident. Second, nearby civil wars may divert foreign direct investment away from neighbor at peace”.⁴⁴ Indeed, investors, whose capital improves the productivity of a country’s economy, will redirect their funds to safer and more stable countries, even away from the unrest region. Third, nearby civil wars may pressurize governments of neighboring countries to expend resources in less productive areas. These additional expenditures, such as securing the borders from terrorist penetrations or illegal arms smugglings, will affect the growth of neighboring country’s economy. The migration flow of large number of refugees may as well impact a country’s economy. As a result, government of neighboring states will have to seek funding to assist and socially sustain the displaced. Finally, civil wars can also impact on neighboring trade and disrupt the import export market exchange of neighboring countries. Exporters and importers may use the country, that is in state of political turmoil as a transit connection with its overland market. As a result, exporters and importers will redirect and reroute their trades.

Finally, Murdock and Sandler (2002) concluded that the “countries most at risk from collateral damages stemming from neighboring civil wars were those with longer contiguous borders with nations in civil conflict”.⁴⁵ They advised that because civil wars could reduce the standards of living, spillovers effects must not be disregarded. Government must, therefore, realize the magnitude of the situation and must accordingly find alternative means to face it.

⁴⁴ Murdock and Sandler, *Economic Growth, Civil War, and Spatial Spillover*, p.7.

⁴⁵ Murdock and Sandler, *Economic Growth, Civil War, and Spatial Spillover*, p.20.

In conclusion, civil wars not only result in the influx of refugees, affect the ethnic compositions of the host country and worsen economic competition, but they also cause the influx of arms, combatants, and ideologies. These issues are conducive to violence and can mobilize opposition directed both at their country of origin as well as at their host country.

2.2. Literature Review on the Lebanese System

This part is divided into three main sections. The first section reviews the Lebanese political system to analyze how the Syrian Civil War affected the Lebanese politics. This section starts by introducing the Lebanese political system from a consociational perspective. It then reverts to the Taif Agreement and describes how this agreement readjusted the old political system. This part of the literature review then concludes by highlighting the weakness of the Lebanese system. The second section reviews the Lebanese sectarian system to analyze how the Syrian Civil War has stirred a rising sectarian dynamic. This section starts with an overview on how sectarianism is embedded in the Lebanese political system. It will also emphasize the Lebanese multi confessional affiliations as well as the pervasiveness of clientelism. It will also go over the emergence of Salafism, a religious movement that has affected Lebanese's security and public life. It then concludes by shedding light on the Sunni-Shia tensions following Prime Minister Hariri's assassination, to elucidate the reasons behind the country's split into two major camps. The last section overviews the pre-2011 Lebanon's development challenges to analyze how the Syrian Civil War has impeded the Lebanese economy. This section also highlights the Lebanese government's standing position in regards to the refugees' status. It also explains

the principle of non-refoulement and the main difference between a refugee and a displaced.

2.2.1. The Lebanese Political System

Going back to the sixteenth century, Thomas Hobbes, one of the founder of modern political philosophy, developed the notion of the social contract. He asserts that as men are reasonable beings, they can escape the State of Nature which is considered unbearably brutish. Accordingly, they create a civil society which is governed by a sovereign who maintains peace and stability.⁴⁶

Lebanese society has adopted the Hobbesian social contract under the unwritten agreement of the 1943 National Pact, which is considered the foundation of the independent Lebanese Republic. This arrangement had a twofold dimension. First, it sought to find a compromise between the Christians and Muslim sects; specifically, between the Maronites and the Sunnis to create an internal political balancing. In 1920, when Greater Lebanon was created, the Sunni population increased by eight times, the Shia population by four times; whereas, the Maronite population grew just by a third.⁴⁷ This arrangement was put together for the purpose of preserving a proportional representation in the country's political institution. It then fixed a ratio of six to five in favor of Christian to Muslim in parliament. Moreover, it assigned the Presidency of Republic to the Maronite sect, the

⁴⁶ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*. In. C.B. MacPherson (Ed.) (London: Penguin Books, 2003).

⁴⁷ Fahim Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon*. (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 1961). P. 16.

office of Premiership to Sunnis and the post of Speaker of Parliament to Shi'as.⁴⁸ However, the main concern of the agreement was not only to resolve the communal conflict that started since the creation of Greater Lebanon, but rather to contain it. Second, the National Pact of 1943 also attempted to find a way to end foreign interference, mainly the French Mandate, and to seek independence.⁴⁹ As such, *al-Mithaq al-Watani* symbolized post-independence confessional politics. Over the years, it turned out to be a fragile one; nevertheless, el-Khazen argued that this pact was a “quintessential”⁵⁰ gentlemen agreement as it marked a “rapprochement process between the political elites”.⁵¹ In other words, el-Khazen insisted that without the National Pact, “the reshaping of Lebanon’s future is impossible”.⁵²

2.2.1.1. Consociationalism in Lebanon

Consociationalism is a democratic model employed in segmented plural societies. It is mainly implemented in countries that have a variety of different segmental groups broken down into social, political, ethnic, linguistic and racial as well as sectarian lines, to maintain political stability and to avoid the outbreak of civil violence.⁵³ As a matter of fact, a consociational form of democracy primarily in developing countries that suffer from

⁴⁸ Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon*, P. 18.

⁴⁹ Farid El-Khazen, *The Communal Pact of National Identities: The Making and Politics of the 1943 National Pact*. (Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies, 1991). P.6.

⁵⁰ El-Khazen, *The Communal Pact of National Identities*, P.5.

⁵¹ El-Khazen, *The Communal Pact of National Identities*, P. 5.

⁵² El-Khazen, *The Communal Pact of National Identities*, P. 68.

⁵³ Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Society: A Comparative Exploration*. (United States: Yale University Press, 1977). P. 1-4.

internal violence is more likely to ensure long-lasting peacefulness.⁵⁴ Lijphart (1969) defines consociationalism as an elite cooperation, particularly, a “government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy”.⁵⁵ Accordingly, Lijphart (1969) notes that the grand coalition cabinet is the most typical consociational solution for a fragmented system. However, instead of using the term grand coalition with its rather narrow connotation, he uses cartel of elites to highlight a universal participation.

Moreover, Lijphart (1969) identifies four main characteristics of consociational democracy. The first and most important characteristic is grand coalition. It is when political leaders represent all significant segments of society, whether it is in the form of a parliamentary cabinet, or in a coalition of the president with other parties in a presidential system. As such, elites from most segments, cooperate for a better representation and to enhance political stability. The mutual veto is a second major characteristic of consociational democracy. It is when all groups have the capacity to stop a decision. It is also a guarantee to protect the rights of minorities. For instance, if one group hinders the process of another group’s decision making, in return, such group will undoubtedly block the former. The third characteristic is proportionality based on the principle of representation and ensures a balance among the different communities. Proportionality also enables groups to have their voice heard in the decision-making process. Finally, the last characteristic is known as segmental autonomy, which gives minority groups the choice to

⁵⁴ Samir Makdisi and Marcus Marktanner, ‘Trapped by Consociationalism: The Case of Lebanon’, *Topics in Middle Eastern and North African Economies*, Volume 11. (Chicago: Middle East Economic Association and Loyola University, September 2009). P. 1.

⁵⁵ Arend Lijphart, ‘Consociational Democracy’, *World Politics*, Volume 21, Number 2, January 1969. Pp. 207-225.

rule themselves within the boundary of the state, where it creates a sense of individuality. This aspect increases the plural character of society.⁵⁶

Salamey (2009) notes that Lebanon's political structure is based on confessionalism, a form of consociationalism, a power-sharing arrangement between its various confessions.⁵⁷ Lebanon is a pluralistic confessional society because its population is divided into eighteen officially recognized sectarian groups. Yet, because its religious identity prevails over its nationalist principles, in order to survive, this system must guarantee a political representation for all these segmented groups. Lijphart (1969) notes that the first characteristic of consociational democracy, the solution of the grand coalition in the Lebanese system was provided by the Lebanese National Pact of 1943.⁵⁸ Indeed, the agreement allocated the position of president to a Christian Maronite, the position of prime minister to a Muslim Sunni and the position of speaker of parliament to a Muslim Shi'ite.⁵⁹ As such, the pact guaranteed the representation of the country's two major religious groups, Christians and Muslims. This principle was reaffirmed in the Taif Agreement. Nevertheless, some of the prerogatives and powers of the President of the Republic were transferred to the Prime Minister.⁶⁰

Moreover, the mutual veto, which is the second characteristic, was embodied in the Lebanese system due to the fact that the two major communities have mutual veto

⁵⁶ Sayran Eliassi, *Consociational democracy as a tool for conflict resolution in plural societies: Power-sharing in Turkey*. (Department of Political Science: Lund University). Pp. 7-9.

⁵⁷ Imad Salameh, 'Failing Consociationalism in Lebanon and Integrative Options'. *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Volume 14, Number 2, Autumn/ Winter 2009.

⁵⁸ Lijphart, *Consociational Democracy*, P. 213.

⁵⁹ Salameh, *Failing Consociationalism in Lebanon and Integrative Options*.

⁶⁰ Riad Al-Khoury, 'The Future of Democracy in Lebanon', *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, Number 12 (October 2006) P. 72.

power. Therefore, any decisions considered detrimental by any community can be voted down.⁶¹ Indeed, each of the key public post, whether the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister or the Speaker of Parliament, has a veto power. This veto power gives each leader, who represents a sectarian group, the opportunity to suspend or totally drop a political decision. However, Salamey (2014) notes that the veto power, of each sectarian leader, hinders the overall governmental system since the political decisions cannot be passed without the full consensus of all parties.⁶²

As far as for the third characteristic known as, proportionality, the representation in parliament was set as a six Christians to five Muslims ratio. However, the Taif Agreement of 1989, reasserted the confessional formula but altered the power-sharing formula to a 50:50 Christian to Muslim.⁶³ Proportionality was even observed in the appointment of public civil servants.

Finally, concerning Lijphart's (1969) last characteristic, the segmental autonomy, is an integral part of the Lebanese constitution, whereby each community, has the right to conduct religious, educational and cultural affairs with no state intervention.⁶⁴ Each sect has the right to deal with its own family law. For instance, issues of divorce, inheritance property division, and even child custody are dealt in accordance to each sect's traditions or laws and attended in each sect's own religious courts. Each sect can also found its own religious school, wide range of social institution or welfare organization and associations.

⁶¹ Imad Harb, 'Lebanon's Confessionalism: Problems and Prospects', *United States Institute of Peace* (March 30, 2006).

⁶² Salamey, *The Government and Politics of Lebanon*, P. 76-77.

⁶³ Harb, *Lebanon's Confessionalism*.

⁶⁴ Geukjian, *Lebanon after the Syrian Withdrawal*, P. 22.

In a nutshell, consociational government was adopted in Lebanon to regulate the internal conflicts in accordance with Hobbes's social contract's goal of society's protection and survival. Political elites are accordingly eligible to cooperate within the diverse political culture to ensure political stability. It is as Lijphart (1999) defines it "a democratic regime that emphasis consensus instead of opposition, that includes rather than excludes"⁶⁵ and seeks that the majority rules instead on just relying on a "bare majority".⁶⁶

2.2.1.2. The Taif Agreement

The Lebanese Constitution, written in 1926, declares Lebanon a free economy, a parliamentary democracy and a secular Arab State. The constitution was further amended after the country's independence in 1943 and considered again through the Taif Agreement.⁶⁷

With the intervention and blessings of Saudi Arabia, the United States, France and Iran, the Taif Agreement in 1989 readjusted the old system and marked the end of the civil war. Bahout (2016) states that the "Taif was much more about reorganization than transformation".⁶⁸ Indeed, Hanf (1993) clearly stipulated the three main guiding principles of the agreement.

The first principle was to create a new balance between Lebanon's political system and its social structure. The second one involved the transfer of jurisdiction from the

⁶⁵ Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). P. 2.

⁶⁶ Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*, P. 2.

⁶⁷ 'Country Cooperation Strategy for WHO and Lebanon 2010-2015', *World Health Organization* (Cairo: WHO Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean, 2010). Pp. 15.

⁶⁸ Bahout, *The Unraveling of Lebanon's Taif Agreement*, p. 9.

Presidency of the Republic to the Council of Ministers. The last one consisted of the concept of parity between Muslims and Christians whether in the parliament, the cabinet or in the higher echelons of civil service, whatever demographic changes that could appear in the future.⁶⁹ Effectively, the President of the Republic, a Maronite Christian, according to the country's power-sharing system, was deprived of many decisive prerogatives such as the nomination of the Prime Minister and other ministers, the dismissal of ministers and the dissolution of Parliament before the end of its term. Indeed, these privileges were given to the Prime Minister after the Taif Agreement, changing the institutional balance in their favor. Moreover, the Taif Agreement modified the confessional balance in Parliament changing the 6:5 formula in favor of Christians in a parity between Christians and Muslims. The same adjustments also followed in regards to the staffing of the state apparatus. In a few words, the Taif Agreement not only brought an end to the Lebanese Civil War but also indicated the end of Christians' political dominance in Lebanon.

The Taif Agreement gave Syria guardianship rights over Lebanon. President Hafez al-Assad's, whose main target was to build his own regional power, signed with the Lebanese President Elias Hrawi on the 22nd of May 1991 the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination, and on the 1st of September 1991, the Pact of Defense and Security. These two treaties gave rights to Syria to manage Lebanese affairs by benefiting both politically and economically. Indeed, Syrian tutelage interfered in all levels of government whether in the executive, legislative, judiciary, administrative or even in security. It even manipulated the 1992, 1996 and 2000 elections to ensure the appointment

⁶⁹ Theodor Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation*. (Michigan: Centre for Lebanese Studies in association with I.B. Tauris, 1993). P. 587.

of pro-Syrian candidates and ensure the continuity of the post-Taif Agreement. As such, it paralyzed consociational democracy and its liberal system of decision-making;⁷⁰ whereby, such paralyses gripping the country was apparent in the Troika system established between President Hrawi, Prime Minister Hariri and Speaker Berri. When the Troika elites were in disagreement over policy issues, they would turn to Syria to solve their problems. Hudson (1999) noted that none of the Troika elites wanted to be controlled by the others and “made it all easier for Syria to play them off against each other”.⁷¹ Over the years, Syria gradually disregarded the provisions of the Taif Agreement, which stipulated the Syrians to withdraw in two years and consolidated its control over Lebanon until the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri in 2005.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia seemingly favored the reengineering of the consociational system in Lebanon. The fact that the Taif shifted the constitutional responsibilities from the presidential position to enhance the influence of the Sunni President of the Council of Minister permitted Saudi Arabia to maintain its influence within the country’s Sunni community.⁷² Actually, under the two governments that he presided from 1992 until 1998 and from 2000 until 2004, Prime Minister Hariri was in charge of the basic financial and economic decision-making through the Council of Development and Reconstruction, the Lebanese Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance. As a matter of fact, it was not only because of Prime Minister Hariri’s effort to attract international investment, but also the large amount of inflows of Saudi money into the Lebanese

⁷⁰ Geukjian, *Lebanon after the Syrian Withdrawal*, P. 51-63.

⁷¹ Michael Hudson, ‘Lebanon after Taif: Another Reform Opportunity Lost?’, *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Volume 21, Number 1, Winter 1999, P. 31.

⁷² Geukjian, *Lebanon, after the Syrian Withdrawal*, P. 40-41.

economy, that Prime Minister Hariri was able to balance the impact of the shaky Lebanese environment.⁷³

2.2.1.3. A Vulnerable System

The Lebanese political structure is represented along religious lines. The first indicator was the 1926 Constitution, which stipulated Lebanon's parliamentary system. At that time, the Lebanese Parliament was controlled by seats administered by a Christian majority and represented by a Muslim minority. This system primarily strengthened the concept of confessional representation in a so called democratic structure. A second evidence was visible in the unwritten agreement of the 1943 National Pact which "formally crystalized the confessional nature of Lebanese politics".⁷⁴ This pact thereby ensured, according to the 1932 census, a parliamentary representation on the basis of a 6:5 ratio in favor of the Christian sect, which constituted a majority. Instead of developing an inter-sectarian set-up, the Lebanese confessional system institutionalized the notion of sectarian division as an integral part of the state structure. That system lasted until 1975 with the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War. A third proof was seen in the Taif Agreement of 1989 that ended the fifteen-year war. It reset the parliamentary ratio between Christians and Muslims to an equal footing and thereby "making official the confessional system which had until this point been an unofficial one".⁷⁵

⁷³ Bianka Speidl, *Lebanese Christians and Shifts in Political Power: from Taif Accords to the Second Lebanon War*. Pázmány Péter Catholic University. P. 88-89.

⁷⁴ Lina Khatib, *Lebanon: Situation Report* (Carnegie: Middle East Center, April 17, 2015).

⁷⁵ Khatib, *Lebanon: Situation Report*.

Accordingly, Lebanon's confessional political system was always based on a rigid sectarian representation. It was the major cause for the weakness of the Lebanese state. Because National identity in Lebanon is associated with sectarian identity, it comes as no surprise that Lebanese politics has been characterized as "the epitome of patron-client relation".⁷⁶ As a result, elites provides services to their clients because the national institutions were too weak to do so.

Moreover, Lebanon's confessional political system was intended primarily to provide a stable system of government to ensure minority rights. Yet, this system resulted in constant instability, war and political deadlock especially in time of crisis. The best example occurred following the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005 and Syria's withdrawal in 2005. The country was then politically dominated by March 14 and March 8 Alliances.

In other words, the 30-year Syrian control of Lebanon was a prime reason that rendered the Lebanese political system vulnerable. Actually, Syria's Assad regime interfered in all Lebanese affairs. The Syrian "occupation" of Lebanon further weakened the role of the institutions and undermined their ability to govern and created space for organized chaos and corrupted the rule of law and governance in the country".⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Jeffrey Karam, 'Beyond Sectarianism: Understanding Lebanese Politics through a Cross-Sectarian Lens', *Crown Center for Middle East Studies*, No. 107, April 2017. P.4.

⁷⁷ Bilal Malaeb, *State fragility in Lebanon: Proximate causes and source of resilience* (University of Oxford and University of Southampton, April 2018). P. 7.

2.2.2. The Lebanese Sectarian System

Any analysis of the Lebanese politics will be incomplete if the role of religion is not taken into consideration as the Lebanese structure reflects the exact religious composition of society. As Hirst (2010) argues “Lebanon is the sectarian state par excellence”.⁷⁸

Indeed, Lebanon is considered one of the world’s few countries that institutionalized a sectarian government system. Although Lebanon is one of the smallest countries, it is an extremely diverse state as it officially recognizes eighteen sectarian groups. Until 1932, there has not been an official census on the relative percentages of the country’s various sects. For instance, the demographic changes, that occurred after the creation of Greater Lebanon, has potentially modified each sect’s political position. However, the latest Beirut-based research firm⁷⁹ estimated that the Lebanese population is made up of 27% of Sunni Muslim, 27% of Shia Muslim, 21% of Maronite Christian, 8% of Greek Orthodox, 5.6% of Druze and 5% of Greek Catholic; whereby, the remaining 6.5% is associated to other smaller Christian’s groups. These proportional percentages recorded as an official codified governmental structure represented each group, whether in the higher level of governmental posts, cabinet seats, legislative seats or public employment posts.

This system, that was put together to ensure political stability and protect minority rights, created continuous and recurrent instability. Sometimes, tensions escalated into wars and often ended up into political deadlocks. As a matter of fact, the Lebanese sectarian

⁷⁸ David Hirst, *Beware of Small States*. (London: Faber & Faber, 2010). Pp. 2.

⁷⁹ ‘Human Rights, and Labor, 2012 Report on International Religious Freedom’, *Bureau of Democracy*, May 20, 2013. <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2012/nea/208400.htm>

system was developed to avert any single group to have ascendancy over the others. Such a system turned out to be weak and created a situation through which political identity and political disputes were unavoidable because they were associated with sectarian lines. Consequently, Lebanese had no choice but to look for a *zaim*, or any traditional elite from their community, as a basic need and identity formation. This situation, not only stimulated the pervasiveness of the patronage system in Lebanon, but also fostered clientelism on religious grounds and opposed looking towards the state or national identity. It is as Salibi (1988) states “the chances of whether Lebanon survives as a country depends on whether or not the Lebanese Republic can break with its history to become truly a commonwealth involving citizens’ rather than community right”.⁸⁰

2.2.2.1. Confessionalism in Lebanon

Lebanon is referred to as an example of a multi-ethnic and poly-religious society in the Middle East. The country comprises six major sects that consist of the Druze, Greek Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Maronite, Sunni and Shia; in addition, to other confessional groups Alawite, Armenian, Assyrian, Chaldean, Copts, Isma’ili, Jews, Latin, Protestant and Syriac.⁸¹ As such, Lebanese are accustomed to identify themselves with their own sect.

Nevertheless, instead of relying on nationalist principles, the state of Lebanon was founded on the basis of confessional ties and kinship. Considering the fact that the 1932 census estimated a Christian majority, the government structure was set in their favor. The

⁸⁰ Kamal Salibi, *The Historical Perspective. in Shehadi, Nadim and Mills, Dana.* (ed), Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus (London: Center for Lebanese Studies and I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 1988), P. 12.

⁸¹ ‘2012 Report on International Religious Freedom’, *Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.*

National Pact reinforced Lebanon's sectarian system. In 1943, Christians had political-economic privileges at the expense of their Muslim counterparts.⁸² As per Calfat's (2018) statement "Lebanon contains one of the last Christian enclaves in the region, and religions coexist through a particular confessional institutional framework".⁸³ By contrast, the post-Taif Agreement enhanced the powers of the Muslim political elites and redistributed the political and bureaucratic power-sharing towards Christian-to-Muslim 50:50 quotas. Over the years, this parliamentary electoral system has strengthened the sense of sectarian identity.

In fact, sectarian quotas are not only assigned for top government positions. Each Lebanese political party is associated to a specific sect with most of their members belonging to the same sect as well. For instance, the Free Patriotic Movement is overwhelmingly made up from the Lebanese Christian community, the Amal Movement from the Lebanese Shia community, the Hezbollah from the Shia Islamic political party, the Future Movement from the predominantly Lebanese Sunni community, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation in Lebanon from the Lebanese Armenian community, the Kataeb Party mainly from Maronite Catholics, the Lebanese Forces mainly from Lebanese Christians adherents and the Lebanese Democratic Party that is mainly constituted from the Lebanese Druze political Party.

In addition, Lebanon faced a serious debate concerning the nature of Lebanese identity before the declaration of its independence in 1943. While Christians imagined an

⁸² Richard Hrair Dekmejian, 'Consociational Democracy in Crisis: The Case of Lebanon', *Comparative Politics*, Vol.10, No.2 (January, 1978). Pp. 251-265.

⁸³ Natalia Calfat, 'The Frailties of Lebanese Democracy: Outcomes and Limits of the Confessional Framework', *Contexto Internacional*, Vol. 40, No. 2, May/August 2018. P. 270.

independent state ruled by Christian representatives under western cultural ties. On the other hand, Muslims envisaged an integration into a Pan-Arab state. Lebanon was then simultaneously influenced by both European Christian and Arab Muslim cultures to the extent that it was described as the place where the East met the West. The 1943 National Pact was the sole solution to renounce these aspirations and let both parties adopt a “neutral” one.⁸⁴

Notwithstanding the fact that Lebanon’s neighboring countries are made up of either Sunni or Shia majority, Lebanon is composed of a mosaic of minorities. Hence, it is difficult to envisage a political system that is not based on sectarian distribution with this myriads of sects in a country where sectarianism is so deeply rooted.

2.2.2.2. *Zuama Clientelism*

The pervasiveness of clientelism and the patronage system in Lebanon can be traced to feudal times. Feudal lord allowed peasants to use their lands in exchange for loyalty, and this carried out during these modern times through *zaims*. A *zaim* is a political elite, described as the “unquestioned leader of a tightly knit community rooted in family, religion or confession”.⁸⁵ In Lebanon, each sect is controlled by a *zaim* whose position is sometimes hereditary. Most often, the *zaim* uses his status to provide protection and patronage, or *wasta*. Since 1975, a new development in Lebanon noted that the rise of elites

⁸⁴ Tom Najem, *Lebanon: The Politics of a Penetrated Society*. (London: Routledge, 2012). P. 12.

⁸⁵ Sandra Mackey, *Lebanon: A House Divided* (W. W. Norton & Company, July 17, 2006).

emerged from street leaders. As such, leaders enjoy power by “virtue of sheer military force, individual charisma, or even direct descent from *zuama* families”.⁸⁶

Undeniably, in 1988, President Michel Aoun emerged as an elite leader by virtue of sheer military force. On the 14th of March 1989, General Aoun declared the War of Liberation against Syrian forces, he was idealized by many Lebanese followers. His popularity among people even the youth was legendary. Popular sit-ins, in Baabda’s presidential palace, were initiated to support General Aoun’s ideology and to advocate a sovereign, free and independent Lebanon. Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah was considered the ideal and most charismatic politician in Lebanon by the Shia community, with an eloquent ease to switch from classical Arabic to modern slang. As for Saad Hariri, he managed his father’s business in Saudi Arabia when he started his political life after Prime Minister Rafic Hariri was assassinated in 2005. He was perceived at that time as the unquestioned leader of Lebanon’s Sunni community. Others, like Ehdn Maronite Frangieh family, Bikfaya Maronite Gemayel family and Chouf Druze Jumblatt family belonged to old dynasties. These families constitute the same sectarian elites and are still part of today’s ruling coalition.

Lebanon is a weak state unable to provide many services to its citizens, who became extremely reliant on their politicians. Unfortunately, people depend on sectarian groups, instead of their government, in determining political allegiances, not only because

⁸⁶ John Rolland, *Lebanon: Current Issues and Background* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2003). Pp. 70.

the Lebanese political system in and of itself takes advantage of sectarian identifications,⁸⁷ but also because political elites use kinship and sect to strengthen their patron-client relations. As such, all political parties then compete to place their people in their administration. Political elites might also intervene on behalf of their clients to facilitate access to state services. As a result, politicians act as *connectors* between the state and the citizens. In return, citizens are expected to bestow their recognition during elections. Sometimes political elites even use the contribution of foreign funding to meet local needs. In fact, Saudi aid has been a conduit for Prime Minister Hariri's electorate, while it is widely believed that Iranian money help Hezbollah's supporters.

2.2.2.3. Salafism in Lebanon

Salafism is an ultra-conservative movement within Sunni Islam, it evolved in the eighteenth's century in Saudi Arabia. Salafism advocates a return to the traditions of the *salaf*, which designate the "pious forefathers."⁸⁸ *Al-salaf al-salih* represented the first three generations of Muslims: first, the generation of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad and his companions the *Sahabah*; second, their successors the *Tabi'un*; third, the *Taba Tabi'in* in the followers of the successors.⁸⁹

The main doctrine of Salafism is based on the way to organize the contemporary world by following the way of the pious ancestors. Nevertheless, Salafism has not attracted

⁸⁷ Nisreen Salti and Jad Chaaban. 'The Role of Sectarianism in the Allocation of Public Expenditure in Postware Lebanon', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.42, Issue 4, November, 2010. Pp. 637-655.

⁸⁸ Rabil, *Salafism in Lebanon*, p. 2.

⁸⁹ Rabil, *Salafism in Lebanon*, p. 2-3.

much attention until the horrific attacks of September 11, 2011.⁹⁰ Since then, the United States decided to launch a Global War on Terrorism against radical Islamists.

After Lebanon's Independence in 1943, Islamic activism located in the city of Tripoli, North Lebanon, favored this area to gain ground and to impose their radical views. While the movement began to rise among Lebanese Sunni Muslims, it was matched by a swift fall in the aftermath of a violent military attack. Such attacks took place during the Lebanese Civil War, waged by the Syrian regime of President Hafez al-Assad and its Lebanese allies. This ferocious military attack, that came with the insurgency of the Muslim Brotherhood, was crushed by Syrian security forces in the 1982 Hama massacre. The 1982 massacre is recorded as the bloodiest attack by an Arab ruler against his citizens.⁹¹ The inhabitants of Tripoli, mainly the neighborhood of Bab al-Tabbaneh, a populous and impoverish area in Tripoli, did not forget the Hama massacre and the continuous oppression and persecution of the Syrian intelligence, majority of which became "a hub for Salafists".⁹²

After the Hama Massacre, many Syrian Islamists moved away to Northern Lebanon. They were sheltered by Al-Tawhid, a Tripoli-based Sunni Islamic group that emerged in the early 1980's. During the Lebanese Civil War, ranging from year 1982 to 1985, Tripoli suffered from intense attacks pitting Al-Tawhid against the Syrian army.

⁹⁰ Quintan Wiktorowicz, 'The New Global Threat: Transnational Salafis and Jihad', *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 8, No. 4, July 2nd 2007. Pp. 18-19.

⁹¹ Jason Rodrigues, '1982: Syria's President Hafez al-Assad crushes rebellion in Hama' in *The Guardian* (August 1st 2011).

⁹² Rabil, *Salafism in Lebanon*, pp. 8-9.

Moreover, another event triggered violence in 1986. This violence occurred when Syrian forces massacred Sunni residents of Bab al-Tabbaneh with the help of the Arab Democratic Party, an Alawite group led by Ali Eid.⁹³ Indeed, Assad's regime kept on repressing Islamists even in Lebanon. Syrian security services and their Lebanese allies along with Tripoli Alawite minority persecuted a large number of Islamist activists.⁹⁴ Thus, at the time, Sunni Islamists considered themselves pioneers of resistance against the regime of President Hafez al-Assad.

In parallel to the Syrian massacres in 1986, there were other major regional events since the 1970's that also influenced the city of Tripoli. Particularly, the expulsion of Palestine Liberation Organization from Jordan and its transfer to Lebanon. The 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the rise of leftist currents, Syrian and Iranian Islamist movements contributed in shaping the political landscape of a city already in full bubbling.⁹⁵

The assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri revived the hostilities between Sunni and Alawite communities in the northern region of Lebanon. In fact, after the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, the Islamists who fled Tripoli during the Syrian prosecution returned to avenge their deceased families. Basically, they were a part of groups of Islamists-Salafists whose predominant target was to lead anti-Syrian and anti-Hezbollah movements in Tripoli. Since most of them were linked to al-Qaeda and other radical organizations, many have turned into Salafist-jihadist against the Alawi Syrian regime. Indeed, Lebanon witnessed a hundred and five days of clashes between the Salafi-Jihadi

⁹³ International Crisis Group, 'Nouvelle crise, vieux démons au Liban : les leçons oubliées de Bab Tebbaneh/ Jabal Mohsen'. *Middle East Report*, Number 29, October 14, 2010. P. 6.

⁹⁴ International Crisis Group, *A Precarious Balancing Act*, P.3.

⁹⁵ International Crisis Group, *Nouvelle crise, vieux démons au Liban*, P. 4.

organization Fatah al-Islam, and the Lebanese Armed Forces in the UNRWA Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr al-Bared near Tripoli during the summer of 2007. The war resulted in the defeat of the terrorist cell and the demolition of the camp.⁹⁶ There were also other Salafi-Jihadi organizations that have tried to infiltrate Beirut and other regions. A good example was Jund al-Sham, another terrorist Salafi-Jihadi network, who cooperated with factions of Fatah, Hamas and Asbat al-Ansar of Ain al-Hilwah Palestinian camp, to destabilize Lebanon.⁹⁷

As a matter of fact, the Islamist's goal was to establish a de facto Sunni enclave in the north.⁹⁸ Their basic aim was to feel free and unchecked in developing military capabilities and in affirming their authority in Tripoli. These objectives were intended to challenge Hezbollah who ran political and socioeconomic affairs in *al-Dahhiyeh al-Janubiyeh*, a predominantly Shia suburb South of Beirut, summing up a famous Islamist saying in Tripoli that the northern suburbs to oppose the southern suburbs.

Furthermore, other internal and regional incentives also promoted the mushrooming of Salafi jihadi cells. Indeed, the perceived loss of Iraq's political power that fell in the hands of Shiite rule and Iranian influence, led to growing fear within Sunni communities that felt threatened by an expanding Shiite axis.⁹⁹ Likewise, the socio-economic problems in the North of Lebanon and the feeling of abandonment by Beirut's politicians worsened the Northern Sunni's sense of insecurity.

⁹⁶ Bilal Saab, 'Lebanon at Risk from Salafi-Jihadi Terrorist Cells', *CTC SENTINEL*, Volume 3, Issue 2, February 2010. Pp. 8-11.

⁹⁷ Saab, *Lebanon at Risk from Salafi-Jihadi Terrorist Cells*, Pp. 8-11.

⁹⁸ International Crisis Group, *A Precarious Balancing Act*, P.5.

⁹⁹ International Crisis Group, *A Precarious Balancing Act*, P.3.

2.2.2.4. Post-2005 Sectarian Tensions

According to Bahout (2014), in 2005, following the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and the Cedar Revolution, a visible Sunni-Shia cleavage was formed, which split the country into two distinct camps. On February 14, 2005, Lebanon witnessed a political earthquake that triggered the biggest demonstration in the country's history. On the 8th of March 2005, a coalition was led by Hezbollah and Amal Shia's community. Michel Aoun signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah on the 6th of February 2006, hence, rallying the Free Patriotic Movement with March 8th's Alliance. The March 8 Alliance was largely supported by Iran. In fact, the March 8 Alliance insisted on being a Syrian ally and firmly accused Israel for the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. On the other side, the March 14 Alliance was created, mainly represented by the Sunni Future Movement, the Lebanese Forces, the Kataeb party and the Progressive Socialist Party. The March 14 Alliance was largely supported by the United States and Saudi Arabia.¹⁰⁰

Inevitably, the March 14 Alliance accused the Syrian regime for being the main collaborator in Prime Minister Hariri's assassination. There was widespread doubt by the March 14 Alliance that an attack of that magnitude would not have been possible without the knowledge and the approval of Syrian intelligence services, known as the

¹⁰⁰ Bahout, *Lebanon at the Brink*, pp.1-8.

mukhabarat.¹⁰¹ Even though a lot of efforts were involved for a national reconciliation, the situation was clearly defined and framed as a Sunni-Shia conflict.¹⁰²

It was noted that the root of the Sunni-Shia cleavage originated in the 1989 Taif Agreement under the Syrian tutelage, which occurred when the political hegemony was transferred from the Christian Maronite to the “duopoly of Sunni and Shia leadership”¹⁰³. Nonetheless, after Prime Minister’s Hariri assassination, the sectarian discourse increased between the Shia and the Sunni communities. Despite the fact that tensions had existed in the past, it remained dormant until 2005, the year that witnessed the starting point of an ever-growing polarization opposing Sunnis and Shiites in Lebanon.

The tensions intensified specifically when comparing the relations with the Syrian regime through a confessional lens. In fact, it was widely thought that the Syrian era was negative to Sunnis, who were oppressed and weakened for the benefit of the Shiites.¹⁰⁴ According to many Lebanese Sunnis, late Prime Minister Rafic Hariri had a “humiliating”¹⁰⁵ past relationships with the Syrian regime. Syria’s Alawite regime had made relations uneasy with its own Sunni majority community reflected also in Lebanon. Such relations were apparent in Tripoli, supporters for Alawite communities were far more privileged than the Sunnis. By contrast, the Shiite community greatly profited from the

¹⁰¹ International Crisis Group, ‘Syria After Lebanon, Lebanon After Syria’, *Middle East Report* Number 39, April 12, 2005. P. 9.

¹⁰² Rima Majed, *The Shifting Sands of Sectarianism in Lebanon*. (Global Dialogue, Magazine of the International Sociological Association, 2016).

¹⁰³ Bahout, *Lebanon at the Brink*, p. 2.

¹⁰⁴ International Crisis Group, ‘Lebanon’s Politics: The Sunni Community and Hariri’s Future Current’, *Middle East Report*, Number 96, May 26, 2010. P. 6.

¹⁰⁵ International Crisis Group, *Lebanon’s Politics*, P. 6.

Syrian regime. Syrian presence in Lebanon, not only permitted Hezbollah to protect their armed status, but also to continue their struggle against Israel.¹⁰⁶

In consequence, these tensions created fear between the two sects. First, Sunnis in Beirut rallied among Hariri's son Saad who became their new de facto leader.¹⁰⁷ Second, as Salafism reemerged, the Future Movement, the Lebanese political movement led by Prime Minister Saad Hariri, that has a different ideology than the latter, opted to align with Salafi leaders and organizations. Organizations notably as Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya fight against the hostilities of the Syrian regime and the Shiite community.¹⁰⁸

Finally, on one side, the Sunni community joined the "moderate axis" an alignment with the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority.¹⁰⁹ On the other side, Hezbollah joined the "resistance front", which is an alignment that included Syria, Iran and Hamas.¹¹⁰ As a result, the perceived growing Sunni extremism was seen as an existential threat for Shiites. The growing fear that Syria's withdrawal in 2005 could hasten the end of their armed status pushed Hezbollah to takeover central Beirut on May 2008,¹¹¹ camps were set out for weeks. This incident paralyzed Beirut city and left deep scars on the Sunni community.

¹⁰⁶ International Crisis Group, *Lebanon's Politics*, P. 6.

¹⁰⁷ International Crisis Group, *Lebanon's Politics*, P. 5.

¹⁰⁸ International Crisis Group, *Lebanon's Politics*, P. 25.

¹⁰⁹ International Crisis Group, *Lebanon's Politics*, P. 9.

¹¹⁰ International Crisis Group, *Lebanon's Politics*, P. 9.

¹¹¹ International Crisis Group, *Lebanon's Politics*, P. 10.

2.2.3. Pre-2011 Lebanese Developing Challenges

This section highlights the developing challenges of Lebanon in the period that precedes the impact of the Syrian Civil War. First, it presents Lebanon's demographic profile and appraises its national diversity. Second, it overviews the Lebanese economy from 1989, the year that marked the end of the Lebanese Civil War, until 2011. This section is crucial because it explains the reasons of Lebanon's fragile economy. Moreover, as this section highlights the demographic and economic records before 2011, it was inevitable because it helps to understand in the forthcoming chapter how the Syrian Civil War further worsened the Lebanese economy. It also emphasizes Lebanese government's standing position regarding the refugees' status, and also explains the principle of non-refoulement and the main difference between refugees and human displacement.

2.2.3.1. Demography

The total number of the Lebanese population in 2010 was approximately estimated to 4,341,000 people.¹¹² It is widely known that there was no other census than the one of 1932, under the French mandate, which provided a precise sectarian distribution of the population. As a matter of fact, since Lebanon's Independence in 1943 until the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975, both communities, Christians and Muslims were represented in parliament at a 6:5 ratio. Since that time, the Lebanese president was a Maronite Christian. As such, these two privileges ensured Christian political pre-eminence.

¹¹² 'Lebanon-Population', *Country economy.com 2010*
<https://countryeconomy.com/demography/population/lebanon?year=2010>

Over the years, the Lebanese demography started to change because Muslim fertility rates are much higher than the Christian ones.¹¹³ Consequently, the Muslim community constituted, a larger percentage of the population. Tensions emerged as the Muslim community claimed for a wider representation in the government. These tensions were one of the main reasons that caused the eruption of the Lebanese Civil War. Therefore, since 1932, all demographic data are unofficial and based on surveys and statistics mostly done by several Lebanese ministries or United Nations Agencies.

In addition to the Lebanese population, there are a substantial number of foreigners from Arab countries mainly from Palestine, Iraq and Syria. First, UNRWA's statistics in 2010 estimated that there were roughly between 260,000 and 280,000 registered Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon. They are the descendants of the flow of the 425,000 Palestinians refugees that first entered Lebanon from the 1948 Arab Israeli War.¹¹⁴ Second, according to UNHCR statistics, there were around 7, 884 registered Iraqi refugees by the end of September 2010.¹¹⁵ On 2006, Iraqi refugees left Iraq and entered Lebanon because of the height of violence in Iraq as a result of the 2003 United States invasion. Indeed, both Palestinian and Iraqi refugees live in camps in poor and overcrowded conditions. They are not accorded legal rights as the rest of the Lebanese population. For instance, they are not allowed to attend public schools or own properties. Moreover, they are not allowed to work in certain professions such as engineers, doctors or

¹¹³ Speidl, *Lebanese Christians and Shifts in Political Power*, P. 85.

¹¹⁴ Jad Chaaban, Hala Ghattas, Rima Habib, Sari Hanafi, Nadine Sahyoun, Nisreen Salti, Karin Seyfert, and Nadia Naamani, 'Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon'. *Report published by the American University of Beirut and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East*, 2010.

¹¹⁵ 'Iraq and Vulnerable Iraqis in the Syrian Arab Republic, Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt. Middle East and North Africa: Iraq', *UNICEF Report*, 2011.

lawyers. Third, there is also a large number of Syrian workers who mostly work in the field of construction. In the 1990s, their numbers in Lebanon exceeded the 1.4 million¹¹⁶ but dramatically dropped to 400,000 in 2005,¹¹⁷ following the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and the withdrawal of Syrian troops. Finally, the past years have also seen an influx of migrant domestic and semi-skilled workers mainly from African and South East Asian Countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka. They primarily enter Lebanon as workers to search for employment. In 2010, the estimated number of migrant domestic workers was at 117,941,¹¹⁸ regardless of their nationality and the validity of their work permits. However, there are no precise figures on migrant workers in Lebanon due to the fact that many work without official documents.¹¹⁹ In conclusion, although Lebanon's demographic diversity is considered as a national resource, it has sometimes posed challenges to national unity.

2.2.3.2. Economy

When the Lebanese Civil War ended in 1989, the country faced a thirteen-year economic reconstruction program. In other words, it involved an infrastructure rebuilding

¹¹⁶ Gary Gambill, 'Syrian Workers in Lebanon: The Other Occupation', *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*, February 2001.

¹¹⁷ Fabrice Balanche, 'Les travailleurs Syriens au Liban ou la complémentarité de deux systèmes d'oppression', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Mars 2007.

¹¹⁸ Kathleen Hamill, *Trafficking of Migrant Domestic Workers in Lebanon: A Legal Analysis*. European Union Assistance, Lebanese Center for Human Rights, Coordination Committee of the Organizations for Voluntary Service, Kafa (enough) Violence & Exploitation, the permanent Peace Movement, (March 2011). Pp. 24.

¹¹⁹ Michael Young, *Migrant Workers in Lebanon*. Lebanon NGO Forum, (1999). <http://www.Inf.org.lb/migrationnetwork/mig1.html>

national process called “Horizon 2000”¹²⁰ and was initiated by late Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. The Horizon 2000’s reconstruction plan was intended to spend around US \$18 billion on public and social infrastructure over a period of 13 years, from 1995 to 2007.¹²¹ As such, the postwar Lebanese period passed into four main economic phases.¹²² As a Lebanese businessman, who earned his fortune in the Saudi Arabian construction industry, Prime Minister Hariri tried to attract investors from the rich Arab oil producing countries.

The first phase was a postwar reconstruction boom. It lasted from 1992 until 1998 and was labelled the “growth cycle” stage.¹²³ It aimed to rebuild and renovate the capital, Beirut Central District, which included prestigious projects such as the rebuilding of the Grand Sérail and many other heavily damaged monumental buildings. By doing so, Prime Minister Hariri was forced to reduce tax rates to attract and encourage foreign investment. Inevitably, the first postwar reconstruction phase led to serious budgetary restraints which limited investment in Lebanon social infrastructure and a total dependence on indirect taxation. The gap between rich and poor greatly increased. Nonetheless, with time, the government started to face serious challenges because the funding of the reconstruction was mainly financed by domestic banks. As a result, the public debt rose from US \$2 billion in 1992, to US \$15 billion in 1998 and culminated to US \$38 billion in 2004.¹²⁴ An important factor that also jeopardized the situation was Syrian hegemony over Lebanon. The Labor Treaty, signed in October 1991 between Lebanon and Syrian, was disregarded. This treaty

¹²⁰ Ghassan Dibeh, *The political economy of postwar reconstruction in Lebanon*. (Helsinki: The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2005). P.1.

¹²¹ Dibeh, *The political economy of postwar reconstruction in Lebanon*, P.3.

¹²² Dibeh, *The political economy of postwar reconstruction in Lebanon*, P.2.

¹²³ Dibeh, *The political economy of postwar reconstruction in Lebanon*, P.2.

¹²⁴ Hassan Sherry, *Post-war Lebanon and the influence of international financial institutions: “A Merchant Republic”*. *Civil Society Knowledge Center*. (Lebanon Support, 2014).

consisted on special regulations of overland travel between the two countries. Therefore, the construction of Lebanon could be regarded as boosting the Syrian economy. It was estimated that around US \$4.7 billion were transferred, on a yearly, basis from Lebanon to Syria and this money was passed untaxed.¹²⁵

The second phase, from 1998 until 2000, consisted of a stabilization period which aimed at finding solutions to stop the growth of public deficit and debt. However, the plans were never implemented and the economic crisis deepened, because there was a significant loss in confidence on the part of investors.¹²⁶

The third stage, from 2001 until 2003, faced a further worsening of the situation. The economic crisis turned from “a cyclical crisis to a more structural crisis”.¹²⁷ Unfortunately, it was clear that the reconstruction program was considered to be over. Fundamentally, this crisis was affected by a period of political crisis, a continuous power struggle between the President of Republic Emile Lahoud and Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. This situation impeded the proper functioning of state institution, which resulted to the total collapse of the Lebanese economy.

Finally, the last stage consisted of many attempts by the Lebanese government to contain the inflated national debt. In fact, many programs were considered and aimed to decrease government expenditures, to increase revenue collections, to privatize state enterprises and to implement major financial reforms.¹²⁸ Moreover, international donors were targeted through International conferences, such as Paris I held in February 23, 2001,

¹²⁵ Bassil, *Syrian Hegemony over Lebanon After the Lebanese Civil War*, P. 139.

¹²⁶ Dibeh, *The political economy of postwar reconstruction in Lebanon*, P.2.

¹²⁷ Dibeh, *The political economy of postwar reconstruction in Lebanon*, P.2.

¹²⁸ ‘Country Cooperation Strategy for WHO and Lebanon 2010-2015’, *World Health Organization*, P. 17.

Paris II Conference in November 23, 2002, Stockholm Conference in August 31, 2006 and Paris III Conference in January 25, 2007.¹²⁹ These conferences focused to find a way to help the Lebanese government to manage its debt and rebuild its economy through international aid. In parallel, some of these conferences addressed political issues, to strengthen the Lebanese state so that it can fully exercise its sovereignty over its entire territory, a measure that could improve the Lebanese economy.

Nonetheless, despite all efforts to readjust the economy, since 2005, Lebanon faced a period of political disturbance that started with the assassination of late Prime Minister Hariri on February 2005, the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War, the 2010 Arab Spring protests and the mounting Lebanese sectarian tensions. All these events hindered the development of the Lebanon's fragile economy. For example, the July 2006 war, which was waged by Israel on Lebanon, caused an estimated US \$1 billion damage to infrastructure.¹³⁰ It damaged various sectors in the country: the industrial sector, which includes the country's largest dairy farms in the Bekaa, electricity transformers and small and medium private sector's enterprises, suffered most material damage.

2.2.4. Lebanese Government's Position regarding Refugees

The Lebanese Republic, one of the fifty-one founding members of the United Nations, signed the UN Conference on International Organization on the 24th of October

¹²⁹ 'International conference on Lebanon's reconstruction: The international community's economic aid for Lebanon', *Government of France*, January 24, 2007. <https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/international-conference-lebanons-reconstruction-international-communitys-economic>

¹³⁰ Ragy Darwish, Nadim Farajalla and Rania Masri, 'The 2006 war and its inter-temporal economic impact on agriculture in Lebanon', *Disasters*, Volume 33, Issue 4 July 27 (2009).

1945.¹³¹ The Lebanese Constitution clearly states, in section B of its preamble, that “Lebanon is also a founding and active member of the United Nations Organization and abides by its covenants and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Government shall embody these principles in all fields and areas without exception”.¹³² As a result, Lebanon, according to Article Two of Chapter One of the United Nations’ Charter, must “fulfill in good faith the obligations”¹³³ assumed by the United Nations’ principles in accordance to the Charter.

While Lebanon has signed the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it neither ratified the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, nor its 1967 Protocol, which safeguards the fundamental rights of refugees and regulates their status in countries of asylum. In fact, the Convention and its protocol were promulgated to protect refugees and ensure that they are granted “basic humanitarian treatment”.¹³⁴

As a matter of fact, Lebanon has never enacted any national law that addresses the status of refugees. The refugee status in Lebanon is only determined by the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between the Lebanese Government and the UNHCR, which was signed on September 2003. The MOU provides the “issuing of temporary residence permits to asylum seekers”.¹³⁵ The temporary residence for asylum

¹³¹ Kathleen Kuiper, *The Britannica Guide to Theories and Ideas That Changed the Modern World*. (New York: Britannica Educational Publishing, 2010). P. 346.

¹³² ‘Implementation of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees Implementation of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees EC/SCP/54’, *UNHCR*, July 7, 1989. www.unhcr.org/excom/scip/3ae68cbe4/implementation-1951-convention-1967-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html

¹³³ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*. (San Francisco, 1945). P. 3.

¹³⁴ The Lebanese Constitution. Part one, Preamble B. Promulgated May 23, 1926 With its amendments 1995.

¹³⁵ ‘Country Operations Plan: Lebanon’, *UNHCR*, 2004, P.1.

seekers is limited to a three months' period and could be extended to another six or ten months, "allowing UNHCR to find a durable solution for the refugee".¹³⁶ Hence, since the legal status of refugees is unclear, the UNHCR published in 2010 a report that clearly revealed that "refugees enjoy few, if any, legal rights in Lebanon".¹³⁷

By the same token, non-refoulement is a fundamental principle of international law that protects a refugee from a forced repatriation by a State into a territory where he "would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion".¹³⁸ This principle is a customary law and binding to all states, although Lebanon has not signed the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.¹³⁹

Accordingly, Syrian refugees cannot be forced to return back to Syria without guarantees that ensure their safety and stability. The UNHCR's official position proclaims that there are no safe zones presently in Syria and the Syrian regime has still not delineated a clear plan to manage potential safe zones. The discourse of Lebanese politicians towards Syrian refugees drastically change during the 2018 parliamentary elections, stating that refugees are the main cause of unemployment and instability in the country and calling the

¹³⁶ 'Country Operations Plan', UNHCR, P.1.

¹³⁷ António Guterres, 'Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights' Compilation Report', *Universal Periodic Review* (The Republic of Lebanon, April 2010) P. 2.

¹³⁸ 'The Principle of Non-Refoulement as a Norm of Customary International Law', *UNHCR*, Response to the Questions Posed to UNHCR by the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany in Cases 2 BvR 1938/93, 2 BvR 1953/93, 2BvR 1954/93, (January 1994).
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/437b6db64.html>

¹³⁹ 'The Principle of Non-Refoulement as a Norm of Customary International Law', *UNHCR*.

International Community for their immediate return to Syria.¹⁴⁰ Despite the fact that, at the present moment, some refugees return voluntarily, the return of refugees is being pushed forward until conditions in Syria guarantee their safety and dignity.

Interviewee Former Minister Marwan Charbel persisted that there is a particular nuance between a displaced and a refugee¹⁴¹. First, he insisted on calling Syrians *displaced* persons rather than refugees مهاجرين أو نازحين. Basically, Syrian have fled their country, towns and homes because of a civil war which was an armed conflict between the pro-Assad regime from one side and the anti-Assad regime from the other side. Second, Interviewee Former Minister Charbel also insisted on calling Palestinians *refugees* لاجئين rather than displaced. By and large, Palestinians were expelled from their country, towns and homes because Palestine, was invaded by Israel. In other words, Palestinians either fled or have been driven from their homes in the area that became recognized by the International community, in 1948, as the state of Israel. As a result, Palestinians were stateless with a problem of national identity.

In parallel to former Minister Marwan Charbel's nuance referring to the Syrian refugees, acting Lebanon's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriation Gebran Bassil does not accept Syrians as "refugees".¹⁴² Since 2017, acting Foreign Minister Bassil has been trying to take steps in quickening the return of Syrian civilians who crossed the border, since the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War. He never refers to them as Syrian

¹⁴⁰ Carmen Geha and Joumana Talhouk, *Politics and the Plight of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon* (American University of Beirut, August, 2018). P. 2.

¹⁴¹ Charbel, Marwan, Interview by Léa Afeiche Layoun, 26 November 2018, Hazmieh.

¹⁴² Joyce Karam, 'Gebran Bassil: Lebanon does not accept Syrians as 'refugees'' in *The National*, September 25, 2018.

refugees but describes them as “migrants” or “displaced”.¹⁴³ His argument was that Lebanon, as this thesis previously mentioned, is not a signatory to the Convention related to the Status of Refugees and, as such, the Lebanese government is not required to grant them refugee status.

Moreover, he urges the need of their repatriation and treats refugees as an “existential threat”¹⁴⁴ because their number became equivalent to the quarter of Lebanon’s population. He reminded that the survival of the Lebanese political system necessitates an equilibrated sectarian representation, as clearly stipulated in the Lebanese Constitution. Therefore, he does not agree with the International Community and the UNHCR, both of whose officials believe that it is not yet the appropriate time for their safe return. Acting Foreign Minister Bassil asserted that not only displaced Syrians must by no means feel unperturbed to return back to Syria, but they must also not be discouraged to do so, adding that the return of refugees is a slow and gradual process. At the beginning, the Lebanese General Security prepares lists of Syrian civilians to be repatriated. These lists must then be processed and approved by Syrian security and government officials. The return of refugees will be carried out through different categories. For instance, some are economic migrants, other might be political. Nevertheless, many Syrians are still concerned over security risks related to arbitrary detentions or forced military conscription by the Syrian army.¹⁴⁵

Surprisingly, in June 2018, acting Foreign Minister Bassil froze the renewal of UNHCR staff residency permits as an “intimidation tactic”¹⁴⁶ accusing UNHCR for

¹⁴³ Karam, *Gebran Bassil*.

¹⁴⁴ Karam, *Gebran Bassil*.

¹⁴⁵ Kareem Chehayeb, ‘The Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon’ in *Executive*, December 17, 2018.

¹⁴⁶ Chehayeb, *The Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon*.

spreading fear among Syrian refugees and thus impeding their return to Syria. Despite other Lebanese ministers condemning acting Foreign Minister Bassil's unilateral determination, his decision will be maintained until a new cabinet will be formed. On the other hand, UNHCR retorted that they neither oppose nor discourage Syrian refugees from returning to their homeland on the basis of their own decision and informed decisions.¹⁴⁷

2.3. Regional Balance of Power

Jordanian King Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein foresaw since 2004 a dramatic shift in the geopolitical balance between Shiite and Sunni Muslims in the Middle East. He had warned that a new Crescent of Shiite hegemony is spreading from Iraq, Iran, Syria and Lebanon and could not only alternate the balance of power between the two Islamic sects, but also poses challenges to the United States and its allies.¹⁴⁸ At that time, his concept was not taken into account and was considered surrealist. However, it has been noticed during the past few years that pro-Iran politicians have dominated the Iraqi government. Indeed, the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the establishment of a sectarian political system have offered the Shiites, a long oppressed majority under the regime of the Baathist dictator, broad prerogatives. Yet, the policy of discrimination against Sunnis led by Nouri el-Maliki, Shiite and pro-Iranian Iraqi prime minister, from 2006 till 2014, has been the

¹⁴⁷ Chehayeb, *The Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon*.

¹⁴⁸ Robin Wright and Peter Baker, 'Iraq, Jordan See Threat to Election from Iran' in *Washington Post* December 8, 2004.

cause of the outbreak of a sectarian war, the repercussions of which are still visible today, especially with the birth of the radical Sunni Islamic State group.¹⁴⁹

At the same time, the popular revolt in Syria, unleashed in 2011, quickly turned into a communal conflict between the regime of Bashar al-Assad, an Alawite, considered as a branch of Shi'ism, whom represents 15% of the Syrian population, and the Sunni majority, a large part of which has become more radical over the months. At that time, Tehran mobilized tens of thousands of Shiite militiamen from not only Iran, but also from Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon to defend the Alawite regime, turning the revolt from oppression into a new community conflict. Moreover, "Iranian special units have moved to Syria to quell the revolution and extend its control over Syria".¹⁵⁰ Indeed, Hezbollah portrayed the Syrian opposition a Wahhabi-Zionist conspiracy¹⁵¹ and vowed to fight against them. The scope of Hezbollah's intervention proves how important is the Assad regime to Iran and any miscalculation could hinder the pro-Teheran balance of power. The context is as Gause (2014) labels it "the new Middle East cold war".¹⁵²

¹⁴⁹ Srinjoy Bose, 'Shia and Iranian Ascendance. Sunni and American Perceptions', *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Research Paper*, 2007. P. 2-4.

¹⁵⁰ Moussaoui Abdalhamid, 'Iran and the Syrian Crisis', *Journal of US-China Public Administration*, Vol. 14, No. 3, March 2017. P. 139.

¹⁵¹ Anne Barnard, 'Car Bombing Injures Dozens in Hezbollah Section of Beirut' in *The New York Times*, July 9, 2013.

¹⁵² Gregory Gause III, *Beyond Sectarianism: The Middle East Cold War*. (Washington: The Bookings Institutions, July, 2014).

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Every study in social science has a definite method that allows the researcher “to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon or phenomena of interest”.¹⁵³ As such researchers should follow a predefined plan to ensure that their findings are valid and relevant. This could be done through quantitative or qualitative approaches, both of which can be applicable in a research study.¹⁵⁴

To appraise the spillover effects of the Syrian Civil War on Lebanon, this thesis will tackle the political, social and economic repercussions on Lebanon since the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, each in a distinct part. Predominantly, the qualitative method was applied to gather the substantial data and to answer the research questions.

This chapter reviews the methodology employed for this thesis. It is divided into three sections. The first section explains the research methodology employed for this study. The second section of this chapter describes the process of data collection, while the last section presents the only limitation of this thesis.

¹⁵³ Ken Kelly and Scott Maxwell. ‘Sample Size Planning with Applications to Multiple Regression’. In *The Sage Handbook of Social Research Methods*, ed. Alasuutari, Pertti, Bichman, Leonard and Brannen, Julia (Sage Publications, 2008). P. 166.

¹⁵⁴ Alan Bryman, ‘The End of the Paradigm Wars?’ In *The Sage Handbook of Social Research Method*, ed. Alasuutari, Pertti, Bichman, Leonard and Brannen, Julia (Sage Publications, 2008). Pp. 13-25.

3.1. Research Methodology

The qualitative research method was adopted to analyze and answer the research subject of this thesis which is the spillover of the Syrian Civil War on Lebanon. This thesis will tackle the political, social and economic repercussions on Lebanon since its outbreak in 2011. Each repercussion will be examined in a separate part. Predominantly, the qualitative research method, which is widely used in political science, enable researchers to study social and cultural oriented phenomena. A qualitative research focuses on the interpretation of phenomena in their natural settings to make sense in terms of the meanings people bring to these settings.¹⁵⁵ There are many types of qualitative research methods. For example, action research is associated with the investigation on changes,¹⁵⁶ the case studies examine a case to understand an issue to an existing or new theoretical concept,¹⁵⁷ ethnography involves exploring the nature of phenomena and working with unstructured data, while analyzing data through the interpretation of meanings attributed by research respondents.¹⁵⁸ Grounded theory uses a prescribed set of procedures for analyzing data and constructing theoretical model from them,¹⁵⁹ and finally content analysis is a detailed examination of the contents of a particular material for identifying patterns or themes.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁵ Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln. *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. Thousands Oaks (California: Sage Publications, 1994).

¹⁵⁶ J. Barton Cunningham. *Action Research and Organizational Development*. (Westport: Prager, 1993).

¹⁵⁷ Robert Yin. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 2nd ed. Thousands Oaks (California: Sage Publications, 1994).

¹⁵⁸ Paul Atkinson and Martyn Hammersley. 'Ethnography and Participant Observation'. In Kenzin & Lincoln eds. *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, Thousands Oaks (California: Sage Publications, 1994). Pp. 248-261.

¹⁵⁹ Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss. *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research* (New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 1967).

¹⁶⁰ Klaus Krippendorff. *Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology*. (United States of America: Sage, 2013).

For this research, the action change research was used. First, in order to understand how the Syrian Civil War affected the Lebanese domestic politics, an overview of the overall Lebanese political system was inevitable. Second, to understand how the Syrian Civil War increased the sectarian violence, an overview on how sectarianism is enshrined in the Lebanese political system was also conducted. Finally, to understand how the Syrian Civil War regressed the Lebanese economy, an overview on the Lebanese demographic and economic profiles that precedes 2011 was reviewed.

3.2. Data Collection

The process of gathering information for the research project, widely known as data collection, is an important step in every research project. The data that was used for this study was gathered from diverse sources such as examining documents and conducting interviews. The data collection steps for this study are described below.

3.2.1. Documents and Records

Documents represent an important source of information as they provide deeper understanding on data that researchers cannot directly perceive.¹⁶¹ For this thesis, a variety of documents were used such as textbooks, scholarly articles, UNDP, UNHCR and UNICEF reports and reports written by International Crisis Group (ICG).

¹⁶¹ Michael Quinn Patton. *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Method*. 4th ed. (United States of America: Sage, 2015).

Accordingly, this thesis was able to describe, in brief, Lebanon's historical background and the relationship between Syria and Lebanon before 2011, and to overview the literature on the Lebanese consociational and sectarian systems to argue whether or not these systems were sustainable in the face of the Syrian War. The thesis was also able to provide relevant data regarding the Lebanese government's position concerning the refugees issue. The thesis was able to expand its scope of study, without getting into minor details, and to cover topics such as Salafism and its infiltration in Lebanon or for instance the pervasiveness of clientelism. The issue of Salafism was necessary to explain the impact of extremism on the inter-sectarian tensions that occasionally escalated to violent events.

The thesis also used documents such as online newspaper archival sources specifically *Al Jazeera*, *The New York Times*, *The Daily Star*, *The Guardian*, *BBC News*, *Reuters* and the *Washington Post*, mainly published from 2012 until today. These online sources enabled the elaboration of a table, in Appendix Seven, showing the numerous violent events and suicide bombings that escalated sectarian tensions and destabilized Lebanon. Searching in the newspapers enabled the thesis to differentiate the viewpoints and opinions of the conflicting parties.

3.2.2. Semi-Structured Interviews

Personal interviews were the main source of data for this research. Interviews should contain understandable and answerable questions. They should also be designed to help the researcher to gather data to answer the research questions. This thesis employed

semi-structured interviews where the interviewees could easily express themselves using their own word, instead of pre-defined close-ended questions.

The recruitment strategy was based on a phone invitation. A consent form was also prepared. It was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the American University of Beirut (AUB). The respondents consent to participate by signing a copy of this consent form which was presented at the beginning of each interview. A copy of the invitation script and the consent form in English and in Arabic are found in Appendix One, Appendix Two, Appendix Three and Appendix Four. The interview, which was purely conducted on a voluntary basis, lasted approximately an hour.

Interviewing elites is significant because elites are considered to be “influential, prominent and well-informed in the community”.¹⁶² Elites, on the basis of their expertise, can share and provide valuable information in the area relevant to the research. As a result, the best way to analyze the effects of the impact of the Syrian War on Lebanon is to explore the views, experience and beliefs of experts. An interview was conducted with the retired Lebanese Brigadier General Marwan Charbel. His experience, to the position he held as Minister of Interior and Municipalities between 2011 and 2013, would provide a detailed description of the effects of the war and answer the research questions. Another interview was also conducted with the Mayor of Deir Ammar Khaled Ibrahim Dheiby. He shared valuable information as his town tremendously suffered from the outcome of the flow of Syrian refugees.

¹⁶² Catherine Marshal, *Data Collection Method: Chapter 4 of Designing qualitative research*. (California: Sage, 2006). P. 105.

The interview questionnaire consisted of nine questions. A copy of the English version interview questionnaire can be seen in Appendix Five and a copy of the Arabic version interview questionnaire can be viewed in Appendix Six. The questions tackled the political, social and economic repercussions of the Syrian War in Lebanon. These questions sought to identify how the repercussions of the Syrian War affected the Lebanese domestic politics, increased the sectarian violence and regressed the Lebanese economy.

3.3. The Limitation of the Research

The specification of a study's limitations can be "useful for understanding the importance of the weaknesses of the specific research, placing the study in context, and attributing a credibility level to it".¹⁶³ This is the main reason why every research study should explore its limitations. This study only faced one limitation. Most of the participants did not want to elaborate much on both the political and social repercussions of the Syrian Civil War on Lebanon. Most of them preferred to address the economic repercussions.

¹⁶³ Stephane Brutus, Hermene Aguinis and Ulrich Wassmer, 'Self –Reported Limitations and Future Directions in Scholarly Reports: Analysis and Recommendations'. *Journal of Management*, Vol. 39, No.1, 2012. P. 49.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH FINDINGS

This chapter presents and analyses the findings generated by this study. It is divided into three main sections. The first section tackles the political repercussions of the Syrian Civil War on Lebanon. It addresses the first three research questions: 1) how did the political repercussions influence the Lebanese domestic politics, 2) was the Lebanese political system strong enough to resist the Syrian impact, and 3) were the Lebanese politicians able to take decisions without foreign intervention? The second section tackles the social repercussions of the Syrian Civil War on Lebanon. It addresses the fourth and fifth research questions: 4) how does sectarianism affect the Lebanese system, and 5) how did the social repercussions increase the Lebanese sectarian tensions? The third section tackles the economic repercussions of the Syrian Civil War on Lebanon and addresses the sixth and seventh research questions: 6) how did the economic repercussions affect the livelihoods of Lebanese and 7) did the Lebanese political elites intervene to control the flow of the Syrian refugees on Lebanon and what was their suggestions? By predominantly focusing on the political challenges, on the social tensions and on the demography, the data used to answer these questions will elucidate how the Syrian War has significantly affected the Lebanese domestic politics, increased the sectarian violence in Lebanon, and weakened the Lebanese economy and complicated its politics.

4.1. The Major Political Spillover Effects

The following section of this thesis will present and analyze the major political repercussions of the Syrian Civil War on Lebanon. Indeed, it will study how the Syrian War has significantly influenced the Lebanese domestic politics. First, the Syrian War caused instability in the cabinet following the resignation of the government headed by Prime Minister Najib Mikati in 2013. Second, the Syrian War also prompted the interruption of parliamentary and presidential elections that further paralyzed the political system. Finally, the Syrian conflict generated feelings of insecurity, especially because of the large amounts of arms shipments, the infiltration of terrorists groups and the military retaliation facing such actions. Moreover, by relating the literature review to the political repercussion, this thesis will deduce the degree of vulnerability of the Lebanese system and will also elaborate how intra-elite relations recurrently bring Lebanon to a veritable political standstill. Thus, this section will also assert the theory that civil wars, generally, transmit their impact and affect neighboring countries.

4.1.1. Cabinet Instability

Since the conflict began, Lebanon has been profoundly impacted by the Syrian Civil War. A first major spillover effect of this war occurred in 2013 with the resignation of the Lebanese Cabinet leaving approximately a ten month political vacuum because of

Hezbollah's involvement in the war.¹⁶⁴ Prime Minister Najib Mikati resigned on the 22nd of March, 2013 of his "30-strong cabinet"¹⁶⁵ when, ostensibly, the latter could not undertake a decision regarding the extension of Major General Ashraf Rifi, the Internal Security Forces' (ISF) Chief, and make-up a commission that would supervise the June 2013 elections. At that time, Hezbollah members, who enjoyed the full support of eighteen ministers,¹⁶⁶ constituted a majority who refused to endorse the extension of Rifi's term, considering him as an anti-Syrian politician. However, the March 14 Alliance was in favor for his reappointment as they considered him the remaining link to fulfill the ISF's chief position after the assassination of the Intelligence General Wissam al-Hassan who was "a key pillar"¹⁶⁷ in terms of security and intelligence of the Sunni Community. General Al-Hassan was the former head of security for late Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and the head of ISF's Information Branch until his assassination, on October 19, 2012. His assassination represented for March 14 Alliance "a substantial blow",¹⁶⁸ "a political earthquake".¹⁶⁹ Nevertheless, Hezbollah distrusted him because of Hariri's case. Hezbollah claimed that "he fabricated evidence and relied on false witness testimony".¹⁷⁰

Ultimately, the conflict in Syria prompted sectarian tensions in Beirut where "Lebanese politicians who were at odds with one another expressed disagreement over

¹⁶⁴ Khatib, *Regional Spillover*.

¹⁶⁵ Martin Chulov, 'Lebanon's Government Collapses as Miqati Cabinet Resigns' in *The Guardian*, March 22, 2013.

¹⁶⁶ International Crisis Group, 'A Precarious Balancing Act: Lebanon and the Syrian Conflict', Middle East Report, Number 132, November 22, 2012. P. 24.

¹⁶⁷ International Crisis Group, *A Precarious Balancing Act*, P. 21.

¹⁶⁸ International Crisis Group, *A Precarious Balancing Act*, P. 22.

¹⁶⁹ International Crisis Group, *A Precarious Balancing Act*, P. 22.

¹⁷⁰ International Crisis Group, *A Precarious Balancing Act*, P. 22.

public policy”.¹⁷¹ The Future Movement requested that Prime Minister Najib Mikati resigns as he was not able, in the party’s opinion, to maintain the country’s security. They also considered him “a cover for Hezbollah’s and Iran’s project”.¹⁷² On the other hand, for Hezbollah, “preserving the government in the current regional environment is a vital interest”.¹⁷³ Indeed, Hezbollah noted that the reason for General Al-Hassan’s assassination was principally to “topple this regime and bring in a new one that will actively support the Syrian opposition and that will pull Lebanon in the orbit of Gulf Arab states and the US, whose goal is to topple Assad”.¹⁷⁴ Hence, As Sunnis felt increasingly avid for retaliation, Shiites were frightened from a growing regional isolation. The interviewee, Former Minister Marwan Charbel,¹⁷⁵ noted that the government headed by Prime Minister Mikati was mostly composed of March 8 partisans, while former Prime Minister Hariri’s supporters were not represented. Prime Minister Mikati had to resign and could not minimize the impact of the Syrian war on Lebanon as he was not able to pressure the conflicting parties to reach an agreement due to outside interferences. Indeed, Lebanon was still at the mercy of external interference. Since Lebanon was created, external interference has hindered its decisions. Therefore, politicians’ major agreements are always influenced by powerful external patrons. In August 2012, few months before his resignation, Prime Minister Mikati issued a statement emphasizing that “the Cabinet work is not a priority

¹⁷¹ Geukjian, *Lebanon after the Syrian Withdrawal*, p. 182.

¹⁷² International Crisis Group, *A Precarious Balancing Act*, P. 23.

¹⁷³ International Crisis Group, *A Precarious Balancing Act*, P. 24.

¹⁷⁴ International Crisis Group, *A Precarious Balancing Act*, P. 24.

¹⁷⁵ Charbel, Marwan, retired Lebanese brigadier general and former minister of interior and municipalities between 2011 and 2013. Interview by Léa Afeiche Layoun, 26 November 2018, Hazmieh. Hand written notes. American University of Beirut, Beirut.

compared to what the country is witnessing when it comes to exposure to the Syrian crisis and attempts to transfer it to Lebanon. The country is in great danger”.¹⁷⁶

As a result of foreign patrons pressuring Lebanese elites, it was not until the 15th of February, 2014 that a new interim cabinet was formed, a compromise to secure Lebanese borders and deescalate the sectarian tensions. During that time, the Lebanese state was paralyzed and compared to an empty shell, where, “almost all its institutions and power centers are in limbo”.¹⁷⁷

4.1.2. Interruption of Parliamentary and Presidential Elections

As the Syrian conflict escalated, Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed pro-Syrian party, concerned with the growing power and influence of the extremist groups, backed the forces of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. On the other side, the Future Movement, the Saudi-backed and anti-Assad regime, supported the Syrian opposition. Once again, Lebanon became deeply deadlocked. Consequently, the Lebanese Parliament voted on November 5, 2014, for the extension of its own mandate until 2017, citing security concerns linked to the civil war in Syria. Such an act was unconstitutional because the then parliamentarians were elected on June 2009. Therefore, it was the second postponement of the parliamentary elections as voting should have taken place on June 2013. These actions led to popular

¹⁷⁶ ‘What is Driving Lebanon’s Sectarian Clashes’ in *Al Jazeera*, August 25, 2012.

¹⁷⁷ Joseph Bahout, ‘Lebanon at the Brink: The Impact of the Syrian Civil War’, *Middle East Brief*, No. 76 (January 2014). Pp. 5.

discontent where “Downtown Beirut, where the parliament is located, was locked down by security forces for the vote and protesters hurled tomatoes and eggs at police”.¹⁷⁸

Furthermore, during the period between 2014 and 2016, the Lebanese Parliament was unable to elect a president due to disagreements and an inability to reach a consensus over the country’s policy regarding Syria, including how to deal with Hezbollah’s intervention in the Syrian Civil War. President Michel Suleiman left the presidential office leaving behind a political vacuum and calling the Lebanese to stay out of other countries issues. In one of President Michel Suleiman’s last speeches, he proclaimed that “preserving national unity forces us not to interfere in the issues of the neighbor, no matter how dear that neighbor is”.¹⁷⁹ It was not until the election of President Michel Aoun on October 31st, 2016 that the electoral gridlock ended. Indeed, over a two-and-a-half-year period, the Lebanese parliament gathered forty-five times and was, unfortunately, unable to reach the required quorum for the presidential elections.¹⁸⁰

4.1.3. Terrorism and LAF Retaliation

With the eruption of the Syrian Civil War and the deteriorating security conditions which came with it, the poorly demarcated Lebanese-Syrian borders caused the penetration of fighters and terrorist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL or

¹⁷⁸ Oliver Holmes, ‘Lebanese Parliament Extends Own Term till 2017 Amid Protesters’ in *Reuters*. (November 2014).

¹⁷⁹ Ben Hubbard, “Lebanon’s Political Standoff Leaves Leadership Vacancy” in *The New York Times*. (May 24, 2014).

¹⁸⁰ Mona Alami, ‘Lebanon’s Deadlock is Over, but don’t Hold Your Breath for Reforms’ in *Middle East-Eye*. (November 7, 2016).

Daesh) from towns bordering Syria,¹⁸¹ in addition to weapons smuggling and attacks against Lebanese towns along the frontier.

Early June 2014, a joint legion of Jabhat al-Nusra Front and ISIL belligerent militants invaded the town of Arsal, a Northeast Lebanese town. A growing fear of insecurity and concern about the country's stability was labeled by former Prime Minister Saad Hariri as an "existential threat".¹⁸² The political elites then decided to agree that the effects of the Syrian War should "not only be controlled but also reversed"¹⁸³; therefore, they supported the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to protect Lebanon from the overall security risks. Always perceived as a "consensual quasi-police body, loved and respected by rank-and-file Lebanese",¹⁸⁴ the Lebanese Armed Forces' new mission was to focus on the war on terror, tracking and fighting the Jihadi Takfiris. As a matter of fact, the main target of the LAF was to regain control of territories that were increasingly under the control of terrorists who were spilling over from Syria.¹⁸⁵ At the beginning of Arsal's War, the Lebanese soldiers were vigilant in dealing with Islamists and Syrian dissidents. They were aware that arresting one of them would stimulate the escalation of a new wave of violence.¹⁸⁶ Indeed, Geukjian (2017) explains that the most important and brutal effect of the Syrian War was the battle of Arsal on August 2, 2014. Anti-Assad rebels from, Al-Nusra, fiercely attacked LAF checkpoints and a police station as well. The battle really

¹⁸¹ Mona Alami, 'Hezbollah's Military and Political Victory in Arsal' in *The Atlantic Council*. (August 9, 2017).

¹⁸² Hariri: Terrorism "Existential Threat" to Lebanon' in *the Daily Star*, August 8, 2014.

¹⁸³ Rabil, *The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon*, p.7.

¹⁸⁴ Bahout, *Lebanon at the Brink*, p. 5.

¹⁸⁵ Filippo Dionigi, *The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon: State Fragility and Social Resilience*. (LSE Middle East Center, February, 2016). P. 15.

¹⁸⁶ International Crisis Group, *A Precarious Balancing Act*, P. 5.

began when the LAF took into custody a Syrian rebel commander, Imad Ahmad Jomaa. The LAF, who stayed determined to block any terrorist infiltration into Lebanese territory, was cautious not to implicate Hezbollah in the battle as to not inflame the sectarian tensions.¹⁸⁷

4.1.4. An Analysis of the Political Repercussions

The literature review, discussed in the previous chapter, referred to Michael Brown's theory on how civil wars affect other countries. Brown (1996) mainly emphasized that internal conflicts almost always involve and exert influence on neighboring states and perturbs their stability. Brown (1996) even noted that when such states share common borders, neighboring countries are most of the time the "innocent victims".¹⁸⁸ This theory corroborates how the Syrian Civil War has also disturbed Lebanon's stability. In fact, by evaluating, the previously analyzed political repercussions of the Syrian War, which led to a cabinet instability, the interruption of parliamentary and presidential elections and the deterioration of the Lebanese security conditions, the Syrian War has unquestionably affected the Lebanese domestic politics.

Thereby, the first research question of this thesis has been answered. The political repercussions have extremely influenced the Lebanese domestic politics. Indeed, the Syrian War has provoked political deadlock and stalemate, especially when elites kept postponing the holding of both parliamentary and presidential elections. The paralysis of the political

¹⁸⁷ Geukjian, *Lebanon after the Syrian Withdrawal*, p. 238.

¹⁸⁸ Brown, *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, p. 8.

system further deteriorated the state's institutions, sectarianized the public sphere and extended the corruption in the whole country. That situation not only harmed the well-being of the Lebanese population but also led to a long term instability. The overall situation was "strikingly parallel to the period preceding the 1975-90 war"¹⁸⁹. In a few words, the Taif Agreement became outdated. The balancing act between Christians and Muslims; Sunnis and Shiites is no longer workable as "the nature of the political structure has remained static even as everything beneath and around it underwent wholesale transformation".¹⁹⁰

The literature review conducted on the political repercussions of the Syrian War, as discussed in the previous chapter, clearly evaluates the Lebanese political system. The main problem of the state of Lebanon is that it has never been able to solve its political problems independently without external interference. That lack of independence in its political decision-making was much apparent during the years of the Syrian occupation of Lebanon and even after its withdrawal. In fact, the Syrian regime to date has still the ability to influence Lebanese politics. Thereby, the second research question of this thesis has been answered. The Lebanese political system is not strong enough to resist the Syrian impact. Indeed, the consociational government, that was adopted in Lebanon to regulate the internal conflicts, failed to institute sustainable peace especially during the Syrian crisis and following the Hezbollah's participation in the Syrian War in 2013. As the Lebanese government tried to dissociate itself from the Syrian conflict, the mounting sectarian

¹⁸⁹ Bahout, *Lebanon at the Brink*, p. 5.

¹⁹⁰ International Crisis Group, *A Precarious Balancing Act*, P. 1.

tensions has increased political instability. It seems that the Lebanese political system is “in unspoken turmoil”.¹⁹¹

Effectively, on June 11, 2012, the March 14 Alliance pressured the Lebanese government to issue the Baabda Declaration, which officially stated the nonintervention of Lebanon in Syria’s conflicted. In June 2012, the Baabda Declaration was presented during the National Dialogue framework meetings of the country’s political elite. According to former President Michel Sleiman, the Baabda Declaration was signed by the antagonist factions to stop Lebanese groups from fighting in Syria. He tried to restore communal harmony among major parties by explaining that the declaration is adopted to have a “neutralization policy” and not a “disassociation policy”¹⁹² in which no factions would participate in the Syrian conflict in order to avoid any repercussion on Lebanese domestic scene. As all groups were asked not to get involved in any regional or international tensions,¹⁹³ consequently, the Lebanese-Syrian borders had to be controlled. Effectively, the Baabda Declaration placed Lebanon’s national interest over sectarian desires to avoid tensions in the country and such a declaration could have raised hopes towards building national identity. However, concurrently, Hezbollah sent its troops to Syria to combat the rebels and support President Assad, claiming to secure Lebanon’s frontiers from terrorists’ smuggling. On their part, the March 14 Alliance accused Hezbollah of breaching and violating the Baabda Agreement.

¹⁹¹ Geukjian, *Lebanon after the Syrian Withdrawal*, p. 194.

¹⁹² ‘Sleiman says Baabda Declaration was not Disassociation Policy’ in *The Daily Star*, December 6, 2015.

¹⁹³ Dionigi, *The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon*, P. 10.

As a matter of fact, the Syrian Civil War amplified the political fragmentation between the different sects in Lebanon, especially between the Sunni and Shia sects. This cleavage has found its root since the 1989 Taif Agreement through the checks-and-balances prerogatives between the Sunni Prime Minister and the Shia Speaker of Parliament. However, that cleavage further intensified in 2005 with the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and the split of the country between two main camps: the anti-Syrian March 14 Alliance as opposed to the pro-Syrian March 8 Alliance.

Moreover, there was a political struggle between the Sunni and the Shia elites and their external patrons in a race of who can administer and dominate post-Syria's Lebanese affairs, a domestic confrontation overlapped with a geopolitical contest between Iran and Syria versus the US and Saudi Arabia.¹⁹⁴ This political struggle particularly created a political vacuum, mainly because of the resignation of Lebanese cabinet and the suspension of parliamentary and presidential elections. Thereby, the third research question of this thesis has been answered. Lebanese politicians were not able to take decisions without foreign intervention. The most relevant example, that denotes how Lebanon was caught between Iran and Saudi Arabia as regional tensions, was on November 4, 2017 when Prime Minister Saad Hariri was broadcasted, live from Riyadh, the capital of the kingdom.¹⁹⁵ Prime Minister Saad Hariri, who was complaining mostly against Hezbollah and Iran, was pressured by Saudi Arabia to resign. Hariri also blamed Iran for interfering in Arab affairs. His move came out of a blue as was apparently coerced to do so. The motive behind his live resignation action was definitely an attack on Iran and Hezbollah.

¹⁹⁴ Bassel Salloukh, 'The Arab Uprisings and the Geopolitics of the Middle East', *The International Spectator* Vol. 48, no. 2, June 2013. Pp. 32-46.

¹⁹⁵ 'Video: Grim Hariri stands in queue to salute Saudi King' in *Press TV*, November 12, 2017.

Indeed, Hezbollah's decision to participate in the war at the side of the Syrian regime was to enable President Assad to restore his control over the entire country and to forestall the collapse on an essential ally-patron, Iran. Moreover, the scope of the military intervention has also shown that Iran and Hezbollah's geopolitical interest is, not only to protect Syria, which is an essential ally, but also to stop the ramification of a Salafi-Jihadi's takeover of the Assad regime. These extremists groups were planning to "vivisection the region".¹⁹⁶ On the other side, Hezbollah's political opponents, the Future Movement, which portrayed Hezbollah as a "state within a state",¹⁹⁷ have been overly reliant on the US and Saudi Arabia as external patrons to support the Syrian opposition in order to topple the regime of President Bashar al-Assad.

4.2. The Major Social Spillover Effects

The following section of this thesis will primarily present and analyze the major social repercussions of the Syrian Civil War on Lebanon and it will elaborate how the Syrian War has significantly increased the sectarian tensions. At first, the Syrian War has amplified the sectarian polarization which resulted in deadly clashes in Tripoli between the Bab al-Tabbaneh and Jabal Mohsen neighborhoods. Secondly, the Syrian War caused mounting escalation in Sidon with a two-days armed conflict. Finally, the spillover effect of the Syrian War on Lebanon has generated the spread of suicide bombings and political assassination in all over the country. A summarized table, allocated in Appendix Seven,

¹⁹⁶ Salloukh, Bassel. The Syrian War: Spillover Effects on Lebanon. Middle East Policy, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, Spring 2017.

¹⁹⁷ Phillip Manyok, *State within a State: How Hezbollah Programs are challenging the Lebanese Government Legitimacy*, October 19, 2011.

displays the numerous terrorist attacks, which comprehensively targeted all Lebanese. Moreover, by relating the literature review to the social repercussions, this thesis will deduce how sectarianism is deeply rooted into the Lebanese system and will also explain on how events, such as the emergence of Salafism and the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri has intensified the sectarian conflict. Thus, this section will also assert the theory that civil wars, generally, transmit their impact and affect neighboring states.

4.2.1. Bab al-Tabbaneh and Jabal Mohsen Conflict

The conflict in Syria not only created polarization between the Lebanese groups, but also escalated the sectarian tensions. For instance, the conflict that arose in the city of Tripoli, between the Sunni “religiopolitical”¹⁹⁸ Pro-Syrian opposition residents of Bab al-Tabbaneh, which has closed ties with Saudi Arabia, and the Alawite pro-Assad, residents of Jabal Mohsen’s hilltop, resulted in a mini civil war.

As the fighting escalated with rocket-propelled grenades, automatic rifles, sniper fire, suicide-bombing and assassination resulting in many human casualties, the army was deployed to set up a buffer zone between the two sides. According to Member of Parliament (MP) Mustafa Alloush “it is actually an attempt to make of Tripoli a zone of terrorism. It also aims at striking Lebanon’s northern area which has welcomed and helped out the Syrian displaced”.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁸ Rabil, *Salafism in Lebanon*, p. 219.

¹⁹⁹ ‘Clashes resume in Tripoli, several wounded’ in *Al-Akhbar*, May 16, 2012.

In addition, deadly clashes broke out in Tripoli again following the arrest of Shadi-al Mawlawi²⁰⁰ on May 14, 2012. Shadi-al Mawlawi, an avid Lebanese Salafi supporter of the Syrian revolution against Assad, was accused of maintaining ties to jihadi-leaning terrorist groups.²⁰¹ Violent clashes broke out between Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tabbaneh neighborhoods. Even though, Shadi-al Mawlawi was released due to political pressure, on March 2013, he was charged with other Salafists for committing terrorist act and smuggling weapons between Lebanon and Syria.²⁰² Absurdly, the Lebanese government, in order to re-stabilize the conditions in Tripoli, negotiated with the terrorists.

Since the breakup of the Syrian Civil War, the spillover effect expanded beyond Syria to destabilize Lebanon, especially with the escalation of the sectarian tensions in Northern Lebanon that caused terrorist attacks and civilians deaths. It also added another “layer to the conflict”.²⁰³ Islamists of Bab al-Tabbaneh fought Alawites “as a way to both back Syrian opponents and settle scores with Damascus and its Jabal Mohsen allies”.²⁰⁴ Indeed, the slogan “Jabal Mohsen in exchange of Homs” spread among residents of Bab al-Tabbaneh as a kind of revenge against the hostilities of the Syrian regime against the latter. In contrast, residents of Jabal Mohsen vigorously supported Assad’s regime because they perceived his fall as an existential threat to their community. According to Jabal Mohsen’s inhabitants “the Syrian regime is the protector of minorities in the Middle East”.²⁰⁵ As

²⁰⁰ ‘Arrest Warrant Issued for Mawlawi as Video of His Arrest is Released’ in *Naharnet*, May 14, 2012.

²⁰¹ International Crisis Group, *A Precarious Balancing Act*, P.4.

²⁰² Rabil, *Salafism in Lebanon*, Pp. 217-219.

²⁰³ International Crisis Group, *A Precarious Balancing Act*, P.7.

²⁰⁴ International Crisis Group, *A Precarious Balancing Act*, P.7.

²⁰⁵ International Crisis Group, *A Precarious Balancing Act*, P.7.

such, fighting between the two neighborhood became more brutal, and the events in Syria unfolded and escalated the risks of a bloodier conflict which was inevitable.

4.2.2. The Sidon Armed Conflict

Another major spillover effect of the Syrian Civil War on Lebanon was the two days armed conflict of Sidon June 2013.²⁰⁶ Sidon is known as the South Governorate capital of Lebanon. The clashes started when Salafi Sheikh Ahmad al-Assir called his followers to protest against Hezbollah's participation on the side of the Syrian Army (SAA) in Al-Qusayr's offensive.

On May 2013, Iran and Hezbollah intervened with their massive military power in the Syrian War by assisting support to the SAA; shifting the battle in favor of the Assad's regime.²⁰⁷ Hezbollah's justification for their involvement in the Syrian conflict was twofold. First, the 2012 intervention was related to the defense of Shia-populated villages inside Syria. The second justification stated that it was the necessity of protecting religious sites from possible attacks by Islamist Militia fighters.²⁰⁸ Indeed, Hezbollah had strongly protected Sayyidah Zaynab sanctuary in Damascus. As such, Hezbollah's intervention can be seen as a Shia regional power fighting with the Syrian government against extremist groups who are exclusively radical Sunnis.²⁰⁹ The seventeen days' assault in the Syrian

²⁰⁶ Erika Solomon, 'Army win in Lebanon's Sidon has set sectarian "trap": Sunnis say' in *Reuters*. (June 25, 2013).

²⁰⁷ Rabil, *Salafism in Lebanon*, p. 223.

²⁰⁸ Armenak Tokmajyan, 'Hezbollah's Military Intervention in Syria: political choice or religious obligation?', *Approaching Religion*, Vol. 4, No. 2, December 2014. P. 108.

²⁰⁹ Tokmajyan, *Hezbollah's Military Intervention in Syria*, p. 110.

town of Al-Qusayr restored the control of strategic areas being held under the rebels' jurisdiction for more than a year. Hezbollah's battle was clearly planned with tactical operations, granting them quick gains and a swift victory even though they suffered high casualties.²¹⁰ Hezbollah's fighters, the majority of which are members of the party special forces units adopted a verbal code system for use over unencrypted radio communication.²¹¹ The battle of Qusayr demonstrated a direct involvement of Hezbollah in the Syrian conflict. By doing so, Hezbollah became "a target of the Sunni world, especially the Salafists".²¹²

At first, the Al-Assir phenomenon started between the years 2011-2013. Its primary goal was to support the Future Movement and contest the March 8 Alliance, mainly Hezbollah.²¹³ Sheikh Ahmad al-Assir, the controversial Salafist Imam of Bilal bin Rabah Mosque in Abra known as one of the wealthiest neighborhood of Sidon, called his followers to support the rebellion in Syria. According to him, his Sunni brothers in al-Qusayr were oppressed by a Hezbollah-Iranian's threat.²¹⁴ He then issued a *fatwa* calling all Sunnis to wage jihad in Syria. The tensions culminated on the 23rd of June 2013, which became known as the Battle of Abra. The supporters of Al-Assir attacked by surprise Lebanese army checkpoint which triggered the retaliation of the LAF to heavy street fighting.²¹⁵ They targeted the LAF accusing it not only of complicating the infiltration of

²¹⁰ Nicholas Blanford, 'The Battle for Qusayr: How the Syrian Regime and Hizb Allah Tipped the Balance', *Syria Special Issue*, Volume 6, Issue 8 (August 2013).

²¹¹ Nicholas Blanford, *Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah's Thirty-Year Struggle Against Israel* (New York: Random House, 2011). Pp.342.

²¹² Rabil, *Salafism in Lebanon*, p, 223.

²¹³ Désirée Rizk, Manon Glase, Léa Yammine, Bernadette Daou and Marie-Noëlle AbiYaghi. *Conflict Analysis Digest*. (Lebanon: Lebanon Support in partnership with UNDP, May 2015). Pp. 22.

²¹⁴ Rabil, *Salafism in Lebanon*, p. 225-226.

²¹⁵ 'Lebanon: The Battle of Abra' in *Al Jazeera*, May 24, 2017.

Salafi groups into Lebanon and hindering its military operations along the Syrian-Lebanese borders with the help of Hezbollah.²¹⁶ Once more, “the political leaders of all sects rallied around the army, calling it an attack on the one institution seen to be above Lebanon’s chronic sectarianism”.²¹⁷

The Battle of Abra clearly reveals that Lebanon is a state with sharp sectarian division. Its circumstances culminated and led to extreme violence in Lebanon. Such a battle also highlights how quickly the sectarian balance in Lebanon can be shaken by the unstable environment in Syria.

4.2.3. Spread of Suicide Bombings and Political Assassinations

An additional spillover effect of the Syrian Civil War on Lebanon was the spread of suicide bombings in addition to political assassinations, from 2012 until 2018, in Beirut and throughout Lebanon. These terrorist attacks targeted both camps, March 8 and March 14, respectively, in the attempt to “gradually pulling Lebanon into the maelstrom of the Syrian conflict”.²¹⁸

Table 1, allocated in Appendix Seven, reflects forty-two terrorist attacks reported from May 2012 until the 14th of January 2018, in a chronological order. It started with the first spillover effects, mainly the clashes between Bab al-Tabbaneh and Jabal Mohsen neighborhoods, until the latest attack, which was an attempted assassination in 2018. The

²¹⁶ Salloukh, *The Syrian War*.

²¹⁷ Solomon, *Army win in Lebanon’s Sidon has set sectarian “trap”*.

²¹⁸ Felsch and Wählisch, *Lebanon and the Arab Uprisings*, p.1.

tensions in Tripoli occurred mainly between pro- and anti-Syrian militants. This table also displays how frequent the attacks were. As recorded, in 2012, there was just only one attack. In 2013, there were seven. The year 2014 registered the highest number of strikes, seventeen strikes. In 2015, the number of hits decreased to eight. The year 2016, there were seven strikes. Fortunately, in 2017 there was not even single attack. However, only one strike has been registered in 2018.

This indicator elucidates the hypothesis that an unstable external or regional environment considerably affects Lebanon. Clearly, the conflict in Syria was continuously mounting from 2012 until 2015. The crisis climaxed in 2016 reaching an unprecedented level, a red line. At that time the crisis was largely internationalized with the intervention of regional actors and superpowers which launched a large military intervention. As the crisis in Syria was inflaming, its repercussions in Lebanon was intensifying. Indeed, the instances of assassinations and car bombings were recurrent and more frequent. Nevertheless, starting 2017, the conflict in Syria started to be contained. The Syrian army recaptured many strategic and influential cities that were seized by the Syrian rebels during the war. In 2018, Syrian opposition fighters were evacuated from Easter Ghouta, South Syria, to Idlib, North Syria.²¹⁹ This forced deportation in Syria is, most probably, paving the way for separation. As a result, the repercussions of the Syrian war in Lebanon started to lessen. The instances of assassination and car bombings became inconsiderable. As a matter of fact, the year 2017 did not register a single strike, whereas, the year 2018 just reported an attempted assassination.

²¹⁹ Martin Chulov, 'Syrian rebels and families begin exile from besieged Ghouta' in *the Guardian*, March 22, 2018.

Moreover, the table also displays the targets of the attack, with the Sunni community, officials and their followers, being most targeted. Indeed, the most dramatic assassination targeted the top security official Brigadier General Wissam al-Hassan, who was considered as one of few remaining strongmen within the Sunni community.²²⁰ His assassination not only sparked violence in Tripoli, but also in Beirut, Mount Lebanon, the Bekaa and the Southern city of Sidon.²²¹ The feeling of communal belongings resembles the knock-on effects of tribal conflict, where, when a member of a tribe is killed, the whole tribe does not rest until it takes revenge.²²²

Second, the Shia community was also largely targeted, either on Hezbollah's officials or Hezbollah Iranian's supporters. The Iranian Embassy as well as its cultural center were hit twice. The leading figure and senior commander of the Lebanese Shia Hezbollah militant group, Hassan al-Laqqis was assassinated. Al-Laqqis was reputedly an expert in weapons manufacturing and was close to Hezbollah leader Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah.

Third, in 2014, terrorists penetrated from towns bordering Syria into Lebanon. As a result, the Lebanese Army Forces intervened to protect the country against the insurgency of these rebels. Since 2014, Lebanese soldiers, police officers, army checkpoints, army posts, army patrols and police stations were predominantly targeted.

²²⁰ International Crisis Group, *A Precarious Balancing Act*, P.15.

²²¹ International Crisis Group, *A Precarious Balancing Act*, P.8.

²²² International Crisis Group, *A Precarious Balancing Act*, P.8.

The table also allocates the places of the attacks. It mainly indicates how the conflict started in Tripoli, hitting the capital and quickly spread through Lebanon. It also reached remote areas, such as Aarsal, Khraibeh, Al Ain and even the borders. As a matter of fact, the location of the attack allows to understand the part that is being aimed. For instance, when attacks reached Hareit Hreik, Bir el Abed or Bourj el-Barajneh it definitely targeted the Hezbollah's Shia community. Likewise, when an attack strikes in Tripoli, Verdun, Sidon or Beirut Central District it targeted the Sunni's Community.

Finally, the last indicator in the table shows the type of attack. The range of violence varies from attempted assassination to battles involving military interventions. However, clashes, car bombs and suicide bombers are all violent acts and instances of murders and killings which destabilized Lebanon's security and wellbeing.

4.2.4. An Analysis of the Social Repercussions

The literature review on the social repercussions, discussed in the previous chapter, brings to light how deep sectarianism is anchored into the Lebanese system. Therefore, the fourth research question of the thesis has been answered. Sectarianism has affected the Lebanese system. First, starting by the principle that the Lebanese political framework is purely confessional, the Lebanese government model completely divides political power along religious lines. Second, Lebanese citizens, whose identity cards inscribes their religious groups since birth, thoroughly identify themselves according to their confessional belonging. Moreover, as Wilkins (1978) argues, Lebanon suffers from an

identity crisis as a result of Lebanese's loyalty to its sects and its *zaim* instead of being loyal to its nation. The state is challenged by "substate and suprastate identities",²²³ making Lebanon vulnerable and incapable to make a strong foreign policy. Each sect, having different foreign agenda, allies with an outside patron to achieve its goal and get leverage, kept the external powers in struggle for their geopolitical advantage. Indeed, the dependence of the Lebanese leaders on external patrons was apparent during the Syrian crisis. The Sunnis joined the bandwagon with Western-allied Arab states, while the Shia joined the Iranian Syrian alliance bandwagon.

As a matter of fact, the Syrian War has created a "sectarian shadow" over Lebanon.²²⁴ At first, Prime Minister Hariri's assassination followed by the Cedar Revolution generated a major turning point. The Sunni community reassessed its historical support of Arabism with Syria and became the main catalyst that led to the Syrian withdrawal.²²⁵ The 2011 Syria's turmoil added fuel to the mounting fire between Sunni-Shia sectarian tensions, as Lebanese took sides in the Syrian Civil War. Hezbollah, supporters of the Syrian regime, believe that president Bashar al-Assad's victory will not only guarantee their strategic military interests but also constitute an assertion of Iran's political dominance in Lebanon. On the other side, the Sunni community, particularly the extremists, supporters of the Syrian rebels, believe the demise of the Assad regime will present an opportunity to counter Hezbollah's growing influence in Lebanon.

²²³ Henrietta Wilkins, *The making of Lebanese foreign policy: Understanding the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli war*. (New York: Routledge, 2013). P.24.

²²⁴ Jeremy Bowen, 'Syrian conflict's sectarian shadow over Lebanon' in *BBC News* (June 20, 2013).

²²⁵ Michael Kerr and Are Knudsen, *Lebanon: After the Cedar Revolution*. (United Kingdom: Hurst & Company, 2012). P.11.

The literature review, discussed in the previous chapter, referred to Davis and Moore's (1997) theory, which argues that many civil wars involve members of an ethnic group searching for transnational ethnic ties for solidarity. A transnational ethnic alliance exists when two states contain members of the same ethnic group.²²⁶ Members of an ethnic groups will then be concerned with the welfare of other members of the ethnic group. This "ethnic affinity" is driven by a primordial bonding among kith and kin.²²⁷ According to Davis and Moore (1997), transnational ethnic alliances serve as conduits to conflict behavior. Thereby, the fifth research question of this thesis has been answered. The social repercussions increased the Lebanese sectarian tensions. In fact, Salem notes "Lebanon's political alignments dangerously mirror the pro- and anti-Assad battle lines inside Syria".²²⁸ According to Rabil (2014), when the uprising in Syria started against Bashar al-Assad regime, the Lebanese city of Tripoli became the center for refugees and demonstrators. As a result, Syrian rebels, who travelled to Lebanon, fought and attacked their opponents on Lebanese soil.²²⁹ This movement resulted in sectarian conflict in the cities of Tripoli and Sidon, in addition to political assassinations, car and suicide bombings in the capital Beirut which later scattered all over Lebanon. In Tripoli, the tensions broke out between the Sunni residents of Bab al-Tabbaneh and the Alawite residents of Jabal Mohsen. The Sidon armed conflict appeared because of many events.

²²⁶ David Davis and Will Moore, "Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior". *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No. 1, 1997. P. 172.

²²⁷ Davis and Moore, *Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior*, p. 173.

²²⁸ Paul Salem, *Can Lebanon Survive the Syrian Crisis?* (Beirut: Carnegie Middle East Center, December, 2012). P.3.

²²⁹ Rabil, *Salafism in Lebanon*.

Events such as the rise of Salafism in Lebanon, the Hezbollah participation in the war alongside the Syrian army in Al-Qusayr offensive and the support of some Lebanese Sunni politicians together with Salafi leaders to the Syrian rebels. Interviewee, former Minister Marwan Charbel stated, that there were some countries that sought to arouse instability and sectarian problems in Lebanon especially when the Syrian war started.²³⁰ These countries, who aimed to change the Lebanese regime, which was not amended in their benefit under the Taif Agreement, supported Ahmad al-Assir, whose task was to flare up the tensions between the two conflicting Sunni and Shias Islamic sects.

During the Battle of Abra, the former Minister of Interior and Municipalities, Marwan Charbel, played an important role in soothing the clashes. Indeed, these violent confrontations were considered the deadliest repercussions of the Syrian conflict. The Sidon clashes could have generated into a civil war between Sunnis and Shias especially that Ain al-Hilweh, the largest Palestinian refugee camp, located nearby. In these two instances, the bloodshed in Syria transformed the Lebanese sectarian struggle “from a ‘political’ one to an increasingly and notably more ‘religious’ conflict”.²³¹

In conclusion, as perceived in table of Appendix Seven, the major spillover effect of the Syrian war on Lebanon was also the spread of car and suicide bombings as well as political assassinations. It started first in the capital Beirut then spread all over Lebanon, even in the remotest areas. This table displays the date, the location, the target and the type of attack. First, the violent unrest that started mainly on May 2012, sharply increased and became more frequent during years 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016 and decreased to not a

²³⁰ Charbel, Marwan, Interview by Léa Afeiche Layoun, 26 November 2018, Hazmieh.

²³¹ Bahout, *Lebanon at the Brink*, p.4.

single hit in 2017. In 2018, a single attempted assassination was recorded. Second, the spillover attacks erupted at first in Beirut with the assassination of late Brigadier General Wissam al-Hassan and spread over Lebanon with frequent attacks in Beirut suburbs mainly in Haret Hreik, reaching the remotest areas of Aarsal. Third, there were three major targets in these attacks. The first was the assassination of Brigadier General Wissam Al- Hassan and Mohamad Chatah of the Sunni's community. Al-Hassan was the head of the Internal Security Forces' Information Branch and a key pillar in the investigations surrounding Rafic Hariri's assassination. The second target was the Hezbollah's Shia community with the assassination of Hassan Al-Laqqis, and the death of many innocent Shia civilians.

Finally, since 2014, the Lebanese Armed Forces were targeted by terrorists during Aarsal's invasion. Terrorists aimed at military checkpoints and killing Lebanese soldiers. Such attacks were opposed by the Lebanese Armed Forces with a counter attack to regain the Lebanese territory.

4.3. The Major Economic Spillover Effects

The following section of this chapter will primarily present and analyze the major economic repercussions of the Syrian Civil War on Lebanon. Undeniably, the flow of Syrian refugees is the principal and the most direct effect of the Syrian War on Lebanon. First, this rising tide of refugees has contributed to drastic changes in the Lebanese demography. Second, this influx of Syrians not only regressed the Lebanese economy, but also complicated and paralyzed its politics with sectarian tensions. Moreover, by relating

the literature review to the economic repercussions, this thesis will deduce that although Lebanon never ratified the 1951 United Nation convention nor its 1967 Protocol, the Lebanese government, which welcomed the Syrian displaced, is currently requesting their imperative repatriation. Thus, this section will also assert the theory that civil wars, generally, transmit their impact and affect neighboring countries.

4.3.1. The Demographical Change with the Flow of Syrian Refugees

Nowhere has the influx of Syrian refugees caused more economic drawbacks than in Lebanon, as it is the main destination for refugee flows for many reasons. The geographical motive is the prime reason that explains that Lebanon would not long remain unaffected by the Syrian conflict. As Lebanon is bordered in its Northern and Eastern sides with Syria, the two countries share 365 kilometers, un-demarcate and largely porous borders. In addition, the two countries share extremely close communal ties. Indeed, the cultural purpose is an evident reason that explains the influx of the Syrian refugees into Lebanon, as the two countries share the same Arabic language. Finally, a humanitarian reason was also discernible. As a matter of fact, the open border policy adopted by the Lebanese government between 2011 and 2014, makes Lebanon the most generous hosting country, as it opened their arms to the fleeing Syrians. As of October 2016, the Lebanese Government estimated that the country has welcomed 1.5 million Syrians who have fled the conflict in Syria.²³² Of the 1.5 million, 80 % of refugees consist of women and

²³²‘Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020’, *Government of Lebanon and the United Nations*, January 2017, P. 8.

children. Moreover, 1.017 million of them are legally registered as refugees in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. An approximately one million refugees are not yet registered.²³³

Refugees have altered Lebanon's demography, whereas, their total number became equivalent to about the quarter of the Lebanese population. In 2018, "one person out of three in Lebanon is a displaced Syrian".²³⁴ Consequently, the urban densification has increased by one-third with a population density expanding from 400 to 520 persons per square kilometer.²³⁵

First, the table below indicates the increase in the total number of the population in Lebanon from 2005 up to 2018.²³⁶ In other words, these figures demonstrate the sudden and considerable increase of population in Lebanon since 2005 and the fact that it continues to grow until now. Indeed, these figures explain how the flow of Syrian refugees that entered the country increased the Lebanese population density. Second, this table also is an indicator that could explain the cross-border dynamics.²³⁷ Over time, the more the Syrian conflict worsened, the more the influx of refugees seeking refuge in Lebanon increased. According to the facts and numbers revealed by UNHCR Lebanon's office, by December 2011 nearly 5,000 Syrians were registered. However, when attacks in Homs intensified, the number jumped to 29,000. Thus, the more the conflict escalated in Syria, the more the number of Syrian refugees crossing the Lebanese borders, increased.

²³³ 'Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020', *Government of Lebanon and the United Nations*, P.8.

²³⁴ 'Syrian refugees' impact on Lebanese labor market' in *The Daily Star*, June 29, 2018.

²³⁵ 'Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015-2016', *Government of Lebanon and the United Nations*, December 15, 2015. P. 16.

²³⁶ 'Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division', *Worldometer Lebanon*, 2018.

<https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/lebanon-population/>

²³⁷ International Crisis Group, *A Precarious Balancing Act*, P. 1.

Figure 2: The Evolution of the Lebanese Population from 2005 until 2018.

Year	# Population in Lebanon
2005	3,986,852
2010	4,337,141
2015	5,851,479
2016	6,006,668
2017	6,082,357
2018	6,093,509

Actually, Deir Ammar, a Northern Lebanese town, has witnessed a sudden population increase. Interviewee, Khaled Ibrahim Dheiby, the mayor of Deir Ammar, explained that his town has a total area of about 9 million square meters with an approximate population that did not exceed the 15,000 people in 2001. Since 2012, the 6,000 Syrians refugees who moved into Deir Ammar represent approximately the 1/3 of its total population.²³⁸ By and large, the Syrian refugees represent a significant number in comparison with the total area of the town. After six years, their number has increased because of the high birth rate among Syrian refugee, whose number has roughly reached half of Deir Ammar's total population.

It has been considered, according to the UNHCR and Lebanese government's statistics, that 40,000 Syrian child were born in Lebanon in 2016 in comparison with 71,000 child born from Lebanese parents of the same year.²³⁹

²³⁸ Dheiby, Khaled Ibrahim, mayor of Deir Ammar. Interview by Léa Afeiche Layoun, 17 November 2018, Deir Ammar. Hand written notes. American University of Beirut, Beirut.

²³⁹ Tania Karas, *For Refugees in Lebanon, Giving Birth Comes at a High Price. Refugees Deeply*. July 7, 2017. <https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/articles/2017/07/07/for-refugees-in-lebanon-giving-birth-comes-at-a-high-price>

These statistics are alarming as Lebanon host the most elevated number of refugees per capita in the world. Interviewee Former Minister Marwan Charbel stated that the Lebanese have constant worries based on their long troubled history with refugees and their explosive nature that could at any time, disrupt the fragile demographic Lebanese sectarian balance.²⁴⁰ Indeed, since 2012, more than 25,000 Syrian child refugees, who are yearly born in Lebanon, lack official documentation as they are not legally registered with the Lebanese authorities. Inevitably, in a few years, interviewee former minister Charbel noted that these newborns will face problem with identity issues *مكتوم القيد*.²⁴¹

The literature review, in the previous chapter, referred to Weiner's (1978) theory that the influx of refugees can change the ethnic composition of the host state. That change will develop feelings of discontent amongst local people, not only towards the refugees but also toward their own government because they authorized them to enter the country. Weiner (1978) argues that the demographical changes, that has occurred due to migration, will increase nativist sentiment among local populations. The influx of refugees will stimulate "sons of the soil movements".²⁴² The main issue is that any change in the near future within the Lebanese demography could cause a sectarian dysfunction. The Taif Agreement has strongly stipulated the power-sharing formula between Christians and Muslims, as well as the political and administrative representation of each sectarian group. This issue is sensitive, because regardless of any demographic change with time, nothing can guarantee the durability of such an agreement, especially that the Lebanese system is

²⁴⁰ Charbel, Marwan, Interview by Léa Afeiche Layoun, 26 November 2018, Hazmieh.

²⁴¹ Charbel, Marwan, Interview by Léa Afeiche Layoun, 26 November 2018, Hazmieh.

²⁴² Myron Weiner, *Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978).

purely based on sectarianism. As a matter of fact, the question of demographical change was the main reason for the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War back in 1975.

4.3.2. The Economic Deterioration


The Syrian War has created additional economic strains on the already overstretched Lebanese economy. These economic burdens have generally not only worsened and expanded Lebanese public debt, but also decreased job opportunities to Lebanese nationals.

The Lebanese economy has predominantly suffered the burden of the flow of refugees. Many plans have been proposed to provide humanitarian assistance to protect vulnerable people. Other plans were also initiated to invest in Lebanon's infrastructure, economy and public institutions. For instance, the numerous Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) were initiated by both the Lebanese Government and the United Nations, other plans were proposed from the international community, non-governmental organizations, financial resources and even the civil society. However, all these efforts and initiatives, to mitigate the impact of the Syrian war and help the Lebanese economy to straighten the overall refugee population, caused huge financial costs on Lebanon. According to a report of the World Bank (2015), these costs went up to approximately US \$4.5 billion per year.²⁴³

²⁴³ Salloukh, *The Syrian War*, p. 62.

Lebanon's gross public debt reached, according to Ministry of Finance (2018), US \$80.39 billion in the first month of 2018.²⁴⁴ The below chart shows the rising rate of the gross public debt in US \$-billion from 2011 up until 2018. These figures indicate how the flow of refugees impacted the Lebanese economy by considerably increasing the public debt. It also indicates its continuous growth since 2011 until the present day. Indeed, these figures also explain how the Syrian War has negatively affected the country and has further tumbled the growth of the Lebanese economy. Unfortunately, the position of Lebanon with the rest of the world has worsened since 2015.

Figure 3: Gross of the Lebanese Public Debt in US\$ Billion from 2011 until 2018.




Moreover, other indicators reveal that the Lebanese economy is further tumbling. The literature review referred to Murdock and Sandler's (2002) theory of the civil war repercussions on neighboring states. They both argued that one of the many theoretical causes for civil wars is that it affects the well-being of steady-states. They noted that civil wars usually suffer from the loss of material and human resources. As a result, civil wars

²⁴⁴ Rouba Chbeir, 'Gross Public Debt in Lebanon Hit \$80B in January 2018', *Economic Digest*, March 19, 2018.

have negative influences on the “steady-state level of GDP per capita,”²⁴⁵ the per capita income, both on the disturbed state and on its neighbors. As Lebanon has a service oriented economy, it mainly relies on tourism and the banking sector. The effect of the Syrian refugee influx and the spread of suicide bombings in Lebanon have aggravated the security conditions, which resulted in impairing the major drivers of the economy such as trade, banking and tourism. This situation destabilized Lebanon. The below chart shows the changing rate of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in % from 2010 up till 2018. These figures obviously indicate how the flow of refugees impacted on the Lebanese economy by considerably decreasing Lebanon GDP Annual Growth Rate.²⁴⁶ In fact, the GDP has continuously decreased from 10% in 2010 to 1.97% in 2014. It sharply decreased to 0.24% in 2015. It increased again in 2016 to 1.74 %. It slightly decreased again to 1.5% in 2017 and to 1% in 2018.

Figure 4: Growth Rate of GDP from 2010 until 2018.



²⁴⁵ Murdock and Sandler, *Economic Growth, Civil War, and Spatial Spillover*, p.2.

²⁴⁶ Lebanon: Growth rate of the real gross domestic product (GDP) from 2012 to 2022', *Statista*, 2018. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/455249/gross-domestic-product-gdp-growth-rate-in-lebanon/>

In addition to previous indicators which reveal that the Lebanese economy is further tumbling, the International Monetary Fund warns that Lebanon needs “an immediate and substantial fiscal adjustment”.²⁴⁷ Lebanon’s Central Bank Governor Riad Salame argues that banks in Lebanon have been offering the highest interest in a decade for short-term deposits of foreign currency in order to keep dollars in the country. It is a sign that Lebanon need to maintain monetary stability. Although the Central Bank has more than US \$44 billion²⁴⁸ in assets, not including gold, which covers more than two years of imports, it has been borrowing much of its foreign currency from commercial banks. In return, the Central Bank offers commercial banks high returns on short-term loans. As a result, the economy must develop higher growth in order for the Central Bank to settle back its payments.

Furthermore, the influx of the Syrian refugees has also decreased job opportunities for Lebanese nationals. Since 2011, the unemployment rate among Lebanese has almost doubled. Precisely, one person out of five is unemployed. The International Labor Organization (ILO) has estimated that the unemployment rate, from 1990 until 2010, was at an average of 9%, which means that around 138,000 persons were unemployed in Lebanon. However, when the flow of refugees struck Lebanon, the country’s unemployment rate reached 20%,²⁴⁹ in a short period of time. As a result, the crisis has increased the ratio of poverty among Lebanese and has widened the inequality gap. It is mostly unskilled young Lebanese that has suffered the most from the effect of the low cost Syrian workers.²⁵⁰ In

²⁴⁷ Natasha Turak, “Lebanon’s central bank chief calls for political haste as country approaches an economic crisis” in *CNBC*, September 10, 2018.

²⁴⁸ Turak, *Lebanon’s central bank chief calls for political haste as country approaches an economic crisis*.

²⁴⁹ ‘Syrian refugees’ impact on Lebanese labor market’, *Research Department of BLOMINVEST BANK*.

²⁵⁰ Elias Al-Araj, ‘How the Syrian left its mark on Lebanon’s Economy?’ *Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East*. May 13, 2016.

this context, since 2011, World Bank (2008) estimates revealed that the number of Lebanese who live under Lebanon's lowest poverty line with less than US \$2.4 per day is 336,000.²⁵¹

In 1993, a bilateral agreement was signed between Lebanon and Syria for Economic and Social Cooperation. This agreement clearly stipulated that nationals in both countries are granted the right to work.²⁵² Therefore, registered Syrian are allowed to work anywhere in Lebanon. Even since the Syrian crisis started, under the open door policy, Syrian refugees were still allowed to work. However, on December 17, 2014, the Lebanese Minister of Labor Sejaan Azzi issued the Decree 197, which restricted the work of Syrians in the agricultural, construction and cleaning services. As such, Lebanese nationals were protected in their place of work.²⁵³ Nevertheless, Syrian workers did not abide by the new law and still work in the service sector, in trade and in manufacturing works.

Lebanon needs the Syrian workforce especially in construction and some fields of work that the Lebanese citizens do not agree to work in. However, Syrian refugees, largely composed of unskilled labors, are major competitors to Lebanese unskilled labors in the fields of services, trade and manufacturing works. In fact, the minimum wage in Lebanon is defined by the lowest amount a Lebanese can earn for his work.²⁵⁴ It was set as of January 2nd, 2012 to 675,000 LBP per month, which is equivalent to US \$450. However, as Syrian refugees still receive humanitarian aid, they have less expenses than the Lebanese. Indeed,

²⁵¹ 'Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015-2016', *United Nations*, 2014. P. 13.

²⁵² Lorenza Errighi and Jörn Griesse, *The Syrian Refugee Crisis: Labour Market Implications in Jordan and Lebanon*. (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, May 2016). P.11.

²⁵³ 'Syrian refugees' impact on Lebanese labor market', *Research Department of BLOMINVEST BANK*

²⁵⁴ 'World Minimum Wage Rates 2018', Lebanon Minimum Wage. <https://www.minimum-wage.org/international/lebanon>

displaced Syrians are exempted from taxes, rental, insurance and school fees. As a result, Syrians have the possibility to work with a lower wage than the one set for a Lebanese worker. For instance, because Syrians can work for a lower wage, many fast-food Lebanese employers substituted Lebanese workers for Syrians ones, in order to maximize their profit.²⁵⁵ Consequently, many unskilled Lebanese workers lose their jobs and become unemployed.

Likewise, Syrians are not only pushing Lebanese out of their businesses but they are further straining the market. As a matter of fact, as the Lebanese economy is based on the service sector, whose major subsectors are market services, tourism, education and commerce, it accounted in 2017 almost 76.03% of the country's GDP.²⁵⁶ Recently, many Syrians have begun to set up shops, such as mini markets, barber shops, small restaurants and vegetables shops. They are thus competing with Lebanese who own the same businesses, which could potentially lead to more tension.

4.3.3. An Analysis of the Economic Repercussions

The above section illustrates how Lebanon, an already small and weak state, is permanently facing troubles, such as political and national unity challenges, the burden of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees, a sluggish economic performance. Nevertheless, since 2012, a flow of displaced Syrians has severely worsened its situation. By comparing data related

²⁵⁵ Rabih Banat, 'The Impact of Syrian Immigration Shock on Wages in the Lebanese Fast-Food Labor Market', *European Scientific Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 34, December 2014. P. 107.

²⁵⁶ 'Lebanon: Share of economic sectors in the gross domestic product (GDP) from 2007 to 2017', *Statista*. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/455263/share-of-economic-sectors-in-the-gdp-in-lebanon/>

to Lebanon's demographic profile before and after the impact of the Syrian war, as well as economic indicators such as unemployment's rates, gross domestic product and annual gross public debt before and after the influx of Syrian refugees on Lebanon, it is clearly evident that the current Lebanese economy is far from healthy.

First, it is important to bear in mind that political elites are mainly responsible for the repercussions of the flow of the Syrian refugees into Lebanon. The Lebanese government has kept an open borders policy with no regulations implemented between the Lebanese and Syrian borders until 2014. This period of time was best described as a "policy of no-policy".²⁵⁷ It allowed more than 1.5 million Syrians to enter the country. This void of laws and policies is attributed to Lebanon's inability to take a firm and united stand towards the Syrian conflict which long left its institutions in political deadlock.

The seventh research question of this thesis has been answered. The political elites did not control adequately the flow of the Syrian refugees. Indeed, according to interviewee former Minister Marwan Charbel since the beginning of the crisis, the Lebanese government did not know how to control and manage the flow of the displaced Syrians, because politicians were at odds with each other and were politically divided into two groups, each driven by its respective view towards the Syrian regime.²⁵⁸ The March 14 Alliance wanted to protect and warmly welcomed the displaced Syrians. The March 14 Alliance sympathized with the Syrian refugees and express solidarity because Syrian refugees were against the regime of Al-Assad. This solidarity was apparent in the Northern

²⁵⁷ Karim El-Mufti, *Official Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon, the Disastrous policy of No-Policy*, January 10, 2014.

²⁵⁸ Charbel, Marwan, Interview by Léa Afeiche Layoun, 26 November 2018, Hazmieh.

Lebanon regions, as Islamists sheltered and protected Syrians who crossed the border, breaking with their sense of isolation and reconnecting with their “communal depth”.²⁵⁹ Contrarily, the March 8 Alliance, did not want to help the displaced Syrians because these latter were against the regime of Al-Assad.

Moreover, interviewee Former Minister Charbel noted that as the flow of Syrian refugees was growing, politicians fail to agree on an appropriate and organized shelter to settle them.²⁶⁰ The March 8 Alliance have argued that if Syrians remain concentrated in tents, they could end up like the Palestinians refugees and will not return back home. The greatest fear is that the situation of the Syrian displaced will be similar to that of the Palestinian refugees, and that their temporary presence will become permanent. As a result, Hezbollah and its March 8 Alliance allies tried to stop the Future Movement and the Islamist parties from supporting the opposition refugees. Hezbollah refused for Lebanon to become “a corridor or a base for foreign meddling in Syria”.²⁶¹ By fear that the situation will become “uncontrollable and unmanageable”,²⁶² they rejected the establishment of refugee camps in Lebanon. In contrast, the March 14 Alliance categorically refused to build refugees camps and let refugees in tents although they welcomed the displaced to live among them. As a result, Syrian refugees were scattered around the country. According to UNHCR statistics, 56% of registered refugees reside in the North, 41% in the Bekaa and 3% in Beirut and the South. Most live with Lebanese host families.²⁶³ Nonetheless, interviewee Former Minister Charbel estimated that there are also around 2,000 to 3,000

²⁵⁹ International Crisis Group, *A Precarious Balancing Act*, P. 4.

²⁶⁰ Charbel, Marwan, Interview by Léa Afeiche Layoun, 26 November 2018, Hazmieh.

²⁶¹ International Crisis Group, *A Precarious Balancing Act*, P. 16.

²⁶² International Crisis Group, *A Precarious Balancing Act*, P. 16.

²⁶³ International Crisis Group, *A Precarious Balancing Act*, P. 2.

Syrian tents between the Beqaa Valley and the Northern regions along bordering towns.²⁶⁴ These tents were either provided by the UNHCR or brought by Syrians themselves. The majority of refugees living there are women, children and elderly men or cannot work.

The governments of Jordan²⁶⁵ and Turkey²⁶⁶ have as well opened their borders to Syrians who sought safety. Yet, unlike Lebanon, Turkey has actually organized the flow of refugees by building settlements in the form of camps and relief assistance centers and by imposing various measures and restrictions for security concerns. Likewise, Jordan established three main camps to make safety checks through long procedures before allowing refugees to enter their territory. In fact, interviewee Former Minister Charbel argued that the Lebanese situation is rather different than the one in Turkey.²⁶⁷ The Lebanese government did not receive any financial compensation from any country yet. Actually, humanitarian aid has dwindled as International Organizations are limiting their funds. On the other hand, Lebanon lacks financial resources to assist the displaced. By the way, Turkey opened its borders and urged refugees to leave, *turning a blind eye* to the wave of migration headed toward the European continent. It was only when the European Union released around 3 billion Euro that Turkey closed back its borders.²⁶⁸ The only positive comeback that Lebanon receive from surviving the fate of Syrian refugees is the

²⁶⁴ Charbel, Marwan, Interview by Léa Afeiche Layoun, 26 November 2018, Hazmieh.

²⁶⁵ Kamel Dorai, 'Conflict and Migration in the Middle East: Syrian Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon' in *E-International Relations* (September 4, 2018)

²⁶⁶ Soner Caqaptay and Maya Yalkin, 'Syrian Refugees in Turkey' in *The Washington Institute* (August 22, 2018).

²⁶⁷ Charbel, Marwan, Interview by Léa Afeiche Layoun, 26 November 2018, Hazmieh.

²⁶⁸ Jacopo Barigazzi, 'March 2nd, 2016. EU approves €3 billion payment to Turkey' in *POLITICO*.

fact that the European and American governments have advocated the Lebanese parties to find a solution without resorting to violent and aggressive means.

At the present time, the flow of refugees and the related economic repercussions crippling Lebanon, led to further elite fragmentation. All Lebanese parties, irrespective of their sectarian belonging, both March 14 and March 8 alliances, contest the presence of the Syrian displaced. They have both acknowledged that their presence not only has deteriorated the Lebanese economy but also was a disaster to Lebanon. Their disagreements, at the beginning of the Syrian crisis, trapped Lebanon and deteriorated its economy. Currently, both parties suffer the impact of their mismanagement and disagreement. The March 14 Alliance is regretful and even frustrated because refugees are taking over their businesses, mostly the ones living in Akkar and Tripoli. Interviewee former Minister Charbel insisted that if Lebanese politicians have agreed since the beginning to settle the refugees into camps without letting them widespread in all Lebanon, the effects would have been less striking, especially that the war has long lasted and the refugees will not return to their land before a revitalized peace agreement.²⁶⁹

In fact, interviewee Khaled Ibrahim Dheiby whose town, Deir Ammar, has terribly suffered from the sudden impact of a large flow of refugees, has firmly forbidden that refugees settle camps in his town.²⁷⁰ For security reasons and to monitor them closely, he allowed them to live in nearby buildings and mingle with the natives of his town. He claims that it is unwise and unsafe to let such a large number of people to reside concentrated in one single place. Many refugees tried to set up tents in abandoned lands but he strongly

²⁶⁹ Charbel, Marwan, Interview by Léa Afeiche Layoun, 26 November 2018, Hazmieh.

²⁷⁰ Dheiby, Khaled Ibrahim, Interview by Léa Afeiche Layoun, 17 November 2018, Deir Ammar.

forbad them. He assigned a team to collect data as the address and the number of person in every single refugee family residing in his town. He saved the findings and shared them to the security service for statistics and safety reasons.

Second, the increasing influx of Syrian displaced has led to additional burden in the country. A priori, interviewee Former Minister Marwan Charbel discerns three categories of Syrians in Lebanon.²⁷¹ First, there were Syrians who were already living in Lebanon before the Syrians war. They work in the agricultural sector and in the construction and constitute around 400,000 laborers. When the Syrian war started, they brought their family in Lebanon for security and protection. The second category of Syrians included the wealthy Syrians, who are investors and have assets. When they escaped the Syrian War, they were the ones who rented houses or hotels in Lebanon. Finally, there are the underprivileged Syrians, the ones that left their homes and properties behind, currently living in tents or in neighborhoods with poor-quality housing. Interviewee Former Minister Charbel then assumed that if each one of the 1.5 million Syrian refugee, currently living in Lebanon eats just one loaf of bread; the government is then feeding and supporting 1.5 million Syrians instead of sustaining its Lebanese citizens.²⁷² Likewise, since 2012, Syrians freely consume electrical power, water; thereby, increasing governmental depth to more than US \$7 billion.

The sixth research question of this thesis has been answered. Indeed, the huge influx of Syrian refugees has associated increases in the cost of living which dramatically affected the livelihoods of Lebanese communities. Interviewee Mayor Dheiby described how the

²⁷¹ Charbel, Marwan, Interview by Léa Afeiche Layoun, 26 November 2018, Hazmieh.

²⁷² Charbel, Marwan, Interview by Léa Afeiche Layoun, 26 November 2018, Hazmieh.

sudden flow of refugees has created a waste crisis in Deir Ammar.²⁷³ For such a small town, one dump is almost enough to satisfy the need of the population with a once per day waste collection. However, after 2011, the town needed two additional dumps with a three times per day waste collection. The streets of the town became choked with filth because of the rapid deterioration in the levels of sanitation. Syrian refugees have more waste than the natives of the town mainly because they receive food aid wrapped in carton box and plastic bags from International organizations. Such organizations are UNDP, UNHCR, USAID and NRC. That waste crisis created a burden to the municipality which had to spend additional charges for a clean-up strategy. In addition to the waste crisis, the town suffered from problems with the sewage system. As a result, the municipality incurred additional charges to expand the sewage system in Deir Ammar. Likewise, the municipality increased the power plant as the system became weak to bear the surplus of consumption. Finally, interviewee mayor Dheiby added that Syrian refugees introduced a new phenomenon in Deir Ammar, which affected its townspeople. Syrians have a habit to overwhelm the streets and to use motorbikes for transportation.²⁷⁴ Before 2011, there were very few motorbikes, 10 to 20 at the utmost, circulating in the town. However, after 2011, Deir Ammar streets were choked with an influx of more than two hundred Syrian motorbikes as almost every single Syrian refugee family owns a motorbike. The mayor voiced concern with the safety and security of Syrian refugees when seeing a family of six persons simultaneously riding on a single motorbike.

²⁷³ Dheiby, Khaled Ibrahim, Interview by Léa Afeiche Layoun, 17 November 2018, Deir Ammar.

²⁷⁴ Dheiby, Khaled Ibrahim, Interview by Léa Afeiche Layoun, 17 November 2018, Deir Ammar.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter considers the implications of the findings generated by this research. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part addresses how the spillover of the Syrian Civil War has significantly and negatively affected the political, social and economic balance of Lebanon. In doing so, this part answers the research questions posed in Chapter One. The second part discusses recommendations in the hope of a better Lebanon. The third part identifies areas of future research.

5.1. Conclusions

It has been nearly eight years since the Syrian Civil War started in Syria. A peaceful uprising, which grew out of popular discontent with the Syrian government headed by President Bashar al-Assad, turned into a full scale civil war. Lebanon, because of its geographical proximity, its cultural ties and its open border policy, was the most exposed state among all surrounding countries that has suffered the spillover effects of the conflict. Undoubtedly, the foremost and most direct impact on Lebanon was the flow of refugees, mostly constituted of elderly women and children, desperately seeking a safer environment and humanitarian assistance. The Lebanese government welcomed the Syrians refugees,

although the state of Lebanon never ratified the 1951 United Nation convention nor its 1967 Protocol that protects refugees' rights.

As it was mentioned in Chapter One, this thesis divides the research questions into three distinct parts which include the political, social and economic repercussions. Each repercussion was thoroughly and separately analyzed. As a matter of fact, this thesis has demonstrated how the Syrian Civil War negatively impacted the Lebanese domestic politics, increased the sectarian violence in the country and regressed its economic prospects.

5.1.1. Political Disputes

The answer to the first research question affirms that the political repercussions of the Syrian Civil War influenced the Lebanese domestic politics. By referring to Michael Brown's theory (1996) on how civil wars affect neighboring states, Lebanon was one of the "innocent victims".²⁷⁵ Politically, Lebanon has suffered from cabinet instability, the interruption of parliamentary and presidential elections, and the deterioration of its security conditions. First, the Syrian Civil War caused political deadlock as politicians could not agree among themselves over major public policies. Prime Minister Najib Mikati resigned on March 22, 2013. He could not minimize the impact of the Syrian War and was incapable of pressuring the conflicting parties to reach an agreement. The situation created a cabinet instability, which lasted eleven months. Second, the Syrian War created also an interruption

²⁷⁵ Brown, *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, p. 8.

of parliamentary and presidential elections. The tensions between Lebanese political leaders culminated as the Syrian War escalated. From one side, Hezbollah backed up the Syrian regime, while, the Future Movement supported the Syrian rebels. Accordingly, the Lebanese elites were unable to reach a consensus over the country's policy regarding Syria and consequently they were unable to elect a president. Finally, the Syrian War worsened the security conditions in Lebanon. Terrorists penetrated Lebanese towns along the frontier promptly necessitating the intervention of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

The answer of the second research question asserts that the Lebanese system was not strong enough to resist the Syrian impact. Lebanon has a vulnerable system. The main cause lies in the Lebanese political structure which has been always been represented along a rigid sectarian representation since it the 1926 Constitution. Another cause also exists in the Lebanese political system, which is characterized as the epitome of patron-client relation".²⁷⁶ Elites provide services to Lebanese citizens because the Lebanese national institutions are weak and unable to provide such services. Finally, the 30-year of Syrian occupation where the Syrian regime interfered in all Lebanese affairs further weakened the Lebanese institutions and corrupted its governance. As a result, the consociational system, which was intended to regulate the internal conflict failed to institute sustainable peace, especially during the Syrian Crisis and following the Hezbollah's participation in the Syrian War in 2013. Although the Baabda Declaration was adopted to request the nonintervention of all Lebanese parties in Syria's conflict, Hezbollah sent its troops to

²⁷⁶ Jeffrey Karam, 'Beyond Sectarianism: Understanding Lebanese Politics through a Cross-Sectarian Lens', *Crown Center for Middle East Studies*, No. 107, April 2017. P.4.

support President's Assad's regime, pleading that by doing so, the party is not only combatting terrorism but also securing Lebanon as well.

The answer of the third research question confirms that the Lebanese politicians were unable to take decisions without foreign intervention. The political fragmentation especially between the Sunni and the Shia sects in Lebanon has its root since the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005. The country was split between two main camps. On one side, the March 14 Alliance was anti-Syrian, while March 8 Alliance was pro-Syrian. The Syrian Civil War further amplified this political fragmentation. Referring to the Jordanian King, who foresaw a dramatic shift in the geopolitical balance between Shiite and Sunni Muslim in the Middle East, there was a political struggle between the Sunni and the Shia elites and their external patrons in a race of who can administer and dominate post-Syria's Lebanese affairs. A domestic confrontation overlapped with a geopolitical contest between Iran and Syria versus the United States and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, Lebanese politicians were unable to take decisions without their foreign patrons. As a result, the parliamentary and the presidential elections were suspended and the Lebanese cabinet resigned with an eleven months' political vacuum.

5.1.2. Social Tensions

The answer of the fourth research question asserts that sectarianism has very much affected the Lebanese system. Since the creation of Greater Lebanon, sectarianism is deeply rooted into the Lebanese system. The 1989 Taif Agreement, which ended the fifteen years

Lebanese Civil War, officially recognized “the confessional system which had until this point been an unofficial one.”²⁷⁷ Over the years, many events increased the sectarian tensions. Such events as the emergence of Salafism and its infiltration into Lebanon, especially in the afterwards of the Hama massacres. Moreover, several pacts, which were signed between the State of Syria and Lebanon, not only allowed Syrian interference in every aspects of the Lebanese affairs but also amplified the sectarian tensions. At that time, Sunnis felt less privileged than their Shia counterparts. Unfortunately, the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri has intensified the sectarian conflict, with a real Sunni-Shia cleavage divided Lebanon into two distinct camps. Nevertheless, it was the Syrian war that has significantly increased the communal tensions which culminated into sectarian violence and clashes.

The answer of the fifth research question affirms that the social repercussions of the Syrian Civil War has increased the Lebanese sectarian tensions. First, a major repercussion of the Syrian War was the conflict between Bab al- Tabbaneh and Jabal Mohsen neighborhoods which culminated into a mini civil war and resulted in the intervention of the LAF. Bab al-Tabbaneh’s neighborhood, whose majority belongs to the Sunni community, supported the Syrian rebels; whereas, Jabal Mohsen’s neighborhood, mostly Alawites, backed President Assad’s regime. Any event at that time, that occurred in Syria or Lebanon, such as the arrest of prominent Salafi supporters, increased the tensions and flared up the conflict in Lebanon. Another spillover effect of the Syrian War that increased the sectarian tensions, was the Sidon conflict. The clashes in Abra started when Sheikh

²⁷⁷ Khatib, *Lebanon: Situation Report*.

Ahmad al-Assir called his followers to protest against Hezbollah's participation on the side of the Syrian army in Al-Qusayr's offensive. The events in Abra exactly mirrored what happened in Syria. Hezbollah has assisted the Syrian Army and shifted the battle in their favor, thereby threatening the control of takfiri jihadists over Syria. Once again, the Sidon clashes, as the conflict in Tripoli, culminated into a real war-zone, which urged the intervention of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Finally, the Syrian War caused the spread of suicide bombings and the political assassination in Lebanon. The attacks targeted the two conflicting parties, mainly the Sunni and the Shia communities. It was noted, according to Appendix Seventh, that whenever the Syrian crisis escalated, the assassination and the suicide bombings, in Lebanon, were more frequent. In contrast, as the Syrian crisis, began to be contained, the spread of bombing in all over Lebanon lessened. Thus, these social tensions have altogether proven how the Syrian Civil War has increased the likelihood of violence on neighboring states as in Lebanon.

In addition, the social repercussions of the Syrian Civil War on Lebanon have proved that transnational alliances elaborated between Lebanese and Syrian similar sectarian groups have intensified social tensions in Lebanon. By referring to Davis and Moore's theory (1997), many civil wars involve members of an ethnic group searching transnational ethnic ties for solidarity, Lebanese Sunnis residents of Bab al-Tebbaneh supported their Syrian Sunni counterparts in Syria; whereas, Lebanese Alawite residents of Jabal Mohsen supported their Syrian Alawite counterparts. Indeed, slogans such as "Jabal Mohsen in exchange of Homs" spread among residents of Bab al-Tebbaneh as a kind of revenge against the hostilities of the Syrian regime against the latter. In a contrast, residents

of Jabal Mohsen vigorously supported Assad's regime because they perceived his fall as an existential threat to their community. According to Jabal Mohsen's inhabitants "the Syrian regime is the protector of minorities in the Middle East".²⁷⁸ As such, fighting between the two neighborhoods became brutal. As the events in Syria unfolded and escalated the risks of a bloodier conflict was inevitable.

5.1.3. Economic Deterioration

The Syrian Civil War created additional burdens to an already overstretched Lebanese economy. First, the sudden inflow of the Syrian refugees, whose total number became equivalent to about the quarter of the Lebanese population, has effectively contributed to drastic changes in the Lebanese demography. Indeed, every Lebanese town has witnessed a sudden population increase, particularly the town of Deir Ammar. According to interviewee Mayor Dheiby, the Syrian refugees who entered Deir Ammar represented the 1/3 of its total population.²⁷⁹ Besides, the demographical increase was also affected by the high level of birth rates among Syrian refugees, whose number really multiplied within the past seven years in Lebanon.

Brown (1996) adds that "the sudden influx of refugees can aggravate ethnic problems and further complicate the picture by changing the domestic balance of power".²⁸⁰ Indeed, the demographical change constitutes a sensitive issue, among Lebanese, as it could, in the near future, cause a sectarian dysfunction with any change in

²⁷⁸ International Crisis Group, *A Precarious Balancing Act*, P.7.

²⁷⁹ Dheiby, Khaled Ibrahim, Interview by Léa Afeiche Layoun, 17 November 2018, Deir Ammar.

²⁸⁰ Brown, *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, p. 576.

the sectarian representation. The question of demographical change was the main reason for the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War, back in 1975. Because the influx of Syrian refugees could cause a sectarian imbalance, since 2017, acting Foreign Minister Bassil has tried to take steps in quickening the return of Syrian civilians who crossed the border, since the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War. As a matter of fact, he never refers to them as Syrian refugees but describes them as “migrants” or “displaced”.²⁸¹

Second, economic repercussions of civil wars do not solely impact the nation in turmoil but affect neighboring nations as well. Indeed, Murdock and Sandler (2002) note that “there is apt to be negative spillovers to neighboring nations from disruptions to trade, heightened risk perceptions by would-be investors, severance of input supply lines, collateral damage from nearby battles, and resources spent to assist refugees”.²⁸² Indeed, the Lebanese economy has suffered from the negative impact of the Syrian war on the Lebanese trade, notably from a “direct effect”²⁸³ as demands from Lebanese goods to Syrian markets declined. It also suffered from a “transit effect”²⁸⁴, owing the fact that, Syria is the sole overland connection with the Arab World for Lebanon and since war made transportation to become harder to traverse through Syria. Lebanese exporters were then obliged to re-direct their trades by the seaway, mainly through the Port of Beirut. Moreover, the Syrian Civil War has diverted foreign direct investment away from Lebanon. Usually, Lebanon presents a favorable investment environment for foreign direct

²⁸¹ Karam, *Gebran Bassil*.

²⁸² James Murdock and Todd Sandler. ‘Economic Growth, Civil War, and Spatial Spillover’, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 46, No. 1, April, 2002. P. 1.

²⁸³ Massimiliano Calì, Wissam Harake, Fadi Hassan and Clemens Struck, ‘The Impact of the Syrian Conflict on Lebanese Trade’, *A World Bank Report*, April 2015. P.8.

²⁸⁴ Calì, Harake, Hassan and Struck, *The Impact of the Syrian Conflict on Lebanese Trade*, P.8.

investments. As a result of the Syrian War, Lebanon currently experiences its lowest level of foreign investment in years. The economic repercussions of the Syrian War have reduced the per capita income. Furthermore, the Syrian Civil War has engendered collateral damages on Lebanon. Indeed, the Syrian War not only cause a great number of civilian casualties, but also caused significant deterioration of infrastructure. There was a growing fear of insecurity when terrorists such as Jabhat al-Nusra Front and ISIL belligerent invaded the town of Arsal. The political elites decided that the Lebanese Armed Forces should intervene. Geukjian (2017) explains that the most important and brutal effect of the Syrian War was the battle of Arsal. The Tripoli and the Sidon clashes as well as the instances of political assassination and suicide bombings that targeted the whole country also caused many deaths and the destruction of infrastructure. Finally, the refugee crisis caused Lebanon to spend additional to assist refugees. It has been reported that in 2016, US \$105 million was invested to improve service delivery of energy and water in communities hosting Syrian refugees in Lebanon.²⁸⁵

In addition, Murdock and Sandler (2002) add that the Civil War repercussions reduce the “steady-state level of GDP per capita”²⁸⁶. In 2018, it has been estimated that at 152%, Lebanon's nominal debt to GDP is the third-highest in the world.²⁸⁷ Despite the several plans that were initiated to redress the economy in Lebanon, Lebanon’s gross public debt and the growth rate of GDP revealed that the Lebanese economy further tumbled. The detailed economic profiles between the period that preceded the Syrian conflict and after its impact, in the previous chapter, corroborates the economic inflation.

²⁸⁵ Yassin, *101 Facts & Figures on the Syrian Refugees Crisis*, P. 105.

²⁸⁶ Murdock and Sandler, *Economic Growth, Civil War, and Spatial Spillover*, p.2.

²⁸⁷ Turak, *Lebanon’s central bank chief calls for political haste as country approaches an economic crisis*.

The answer of the sixth research question asserts that the economic repercussions has affected the livelihood of Lebanese. Although Decree 197, which aimed to protect Lebanese nationals in their place of work, clearly restricted the work of Syrians refugees in agricultural, construction and cleaning services, Syrian workers did not abide by it. Furthermore, Syrian refugees not only receive humanitarian aid, but also they have less expenses than Lebanese nationals. Therefore, they work at a lower income than the Lebanese minimum wage. Consequently, many unskilled Lebanese lost their jobs and became unemployed. It is important to mention, that the unorganized flow of Syrian refugees, that first entered Lebanon, resulted in their uncontrollable propagation in all over the country. All Lebanese, irrespective of their sectarian belonging, are contesting, at the present moment, the Syrian refugees' presence which took over their businesses and deteriorated the overall Lebanese economy.

The answer of the seventh research question affirms that the political elites did not control adequately the flow of the Syrian refugees. Indeed, according to interviewee former Minister Marwan Charbel, since the beginning of the crisis, the Lebanese government did not know how to control and manage the flow of the displaced Syrians, because politicians were at odds with each other and were politically divided into two groups, each driven by its respective view towards the Syrian regime.²⁸⁸ March 14 Alliance wanted to protect and warmly welcomed the displaced Syrians. March 14 Alliance sympathized with the Syrian refugees and express solidarity as they stood against the regime of Al-Assad. This solidarity was very much apparent in the northern Lebanon regions as Islamists sheltered

²⁸⁸ Charbel, Marwan, Interview by Léa Afeiche Layoun, 26 November 2018, Hazmieh.

and protected Syrians who crossed the border, thereby breaking their sense of isolation and reconnecting with their “communal depth”.²⁸⁹ On the contrary, March 8 Alliance did not want to help the displaced Syrians because these latter were against the regime of Al-Assad.

5.2. Recommendations in the Hope of a Better Lebanon

Paris IV conference is a hope that must come true. The Paris IV is an International conference where the Lebanese government seek funding, around US \$17 billion, for a long term National Infrastructure Investment Program. That conference, which was not been held yet, was named Cèdre, by the French President Emmanuel Macron.

The program was set into three main phases of four years each, altogether over a time span of around 12 years. The program has planned many projects that will chiefly enhance the infrastructural sector which lacks, at the moment, potential resources. As a matter of fact, these projects will enhance the transportation sector, the electrical and water supply services, a wastewater treatment as well as a distribution network. In order for the transportation projects to come true, a large amount will also be invested in land expropriation.²⁹⁰

Although the Lebanese economy is a service-oriented economy, it’s main growth sector is based on banking and tourism. Yet, the Lebanese economy managed to survive despite the Lebanese Civil War, at a time when tourism could not play a major role.

²⁸⁹ International Crisis Group, *A Precarious Balancing Act*, P. 4.

²⁹⁰ Abdallah Hayek, *Is Lebanon Ready for CEDAR Conference?* April 2018. P.1-8.

Basically, the Lebanese economy survived because Lebanon is one of the largest remittance-receiving countries worldwide. During the past years, Lebanese banks have improved their global networks as well as their services in order to target Lebanese Diaspora and expatriates, all over the world.

At the present time, the Lebanese economy has completely deteriorated because of the Syrian Civil War and needs to be boosted by international donors and foreign investors. Since 1993, the Lebanese government has asked for long term loans for the implementation of Horizon 2000's reconstruction plan. Elites also tried to target International donors during International Conferences such as Paris I, Paris II, Stockholm and Paris III. But, nothing never materialized.

Lebanon's Central Bank Governor Riad Salame argued that for CEDRE investment program to be launched and implemented, the international donors require "visibility"²⁹¹. In other words, the Lebanese government must reestablish trust with potentials international donors. Governor Riad Salame recommends that politicians must form a government where political harmony must be restored among communal groups. He advised progress in economic transparency to meet the country's need for better infrastructure, investment, and private sector job creation. He noted that "fiscal reforms are important in order to ensure the sustainability of Lebanon, and these reforms cannot be made by the central bank. They are made by the government."²⁹²

²⁹¹ Turak, *Lebanon's central bank chief calls for political haste as country approaches an economic crisis.*

²⁹² Turak, *Lebanon's central bank chief calls for political haste as country approaches an economic crisis.*

It must be noted that Lebanese elites must be serious in recovering their economy, because according to analysts' expectations it seems that GDP in Syria is presumed to be US \$58 billion by the end of this quarter.

5.3. Future Research

This thesis has only analyzed the negative repercussions of the Syrian Civil War on Lebanon. Nevertheless, there may be positive contributions of Syrian refugees that may support the Lebanese economy. Usually, Lebanese do not like to refer to them, despite relevant data. This part could be useful for future research. Indeed, it has been estimated that 80% of Syrians refugees living in Lebanon pay rent for housing.²⁹³ Apparently, in 2016, refugees have spent US \$378 million as a total amount for renting purposes. Moreover, 7% of Syrian refugee households even cover the costs of their accommodation.²⁹⁴ In general, these fees that are accumulated, for example, from the renting of garages, shops, and apartments, which generate new revenue for Lebanon's real estate market, could help bolster the Lebanese economy.

Additionally, another positive contribution could be the financial prompt by international donors. Since 2012, US \$965.5 million has been directly injected into the Lebanese economy by the World Food Programme (WFP) through cash based interventions.²⁹⁵ As a matter of fact, the WFP collaborates with the UNRWA to provide humanitarian assistance and essential services to Syrian refugees and other vulnerable

²⁹³ Yassin, *101 Facts & Figures on the Syrian Refugees Crisis*, P. 96.

²⁹⁴ Yassin, *101 Facts & Figures on the Syrian Refugees Crisis*, P. 96.

²⁹⁵ Yassin, *101 Facts & Figures on the Syrian Refugees Crisis*, P. 97.

communities as well. Accordingly, refugees can purchase food from any WFP-contracted stores across Lebanon through electronic food vouchers.²⁹⁶ As such, refugees are considered valuable consumers and are contributing in enhancing the Lebanese economy.

In conclusion, this thesis highlighted the negative repercussions of the flow of the Syrian refugees into Lebanon. Indeed, the thesis has analyzed and demonstrated how the Syrian refugees produced political deadlocks, increased sectarian tensions, depreciated the economy, altered the demography, affected the monetary stability, fluctuated the public debt, decreased job opportunities, increased the cost of living, charged additional expenses, and aggravated the security conditions.

²⁹⁶ Yassin, *101 Facts & Figures on the Syrian Refugees Crisis*, P. 97.

APPENDIX ONE
ENGLISH RECRUITMENT SCRIPT



**AUB Social & Behavioral Sciences
INVITATION SCRIPT**

Invitation to Participate in a Research Study

This notice is for an AUB-IRB Approved Research Study

for Dr. _____ Ohannes Geukjian _____ at AUB.

(og01@aub.edu.lb)

It is not an Official Message from AUB

I am inviting you to participate in a research study about the political, sectarian and economic repercussions of the Syrian Civil War on Lebanon.

You will be asked to participate in an interview to give your opinion and your feedback on that matter.

You are invited because I am targeting experts whose opinion are sought because their direct experience makes them a reliable source of information.

The estimated time to complete this survey is approximately an hour.

The interview will be conducted at your office for us to have a secure and private place at the time and day that best suits you.

Please kindly read the consent form and consider whether you want to be involved in the study.

If you have any questions about this study, you may contact the research person (Léa Afeiche Layoun, AUB graduate student, phone number: 009613802306, email:

lina01@mail.aub.edu).

APPENDIX TWO

ARABIC RECRUITMENT SCRIPT



الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت العلوم الاجتماعية والسلوكية
نص الدعوة

دعوة للمشاركة في دراسة بحثية

هذا إشعار لدراسة بحثية معتمدة من الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت – مجلس المراجعة المؤسسية

من أجل الدكتور اوهانس جوكجيان في الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت.

(og01@aub.edu.lb)

* إنها ليست رسالة رسمية من الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت*

أدعوكم للمشاركة في دراسة بحثية حول التداخات السياسية والطائفية والاقتصادية للحرب الأهلية السورية على لبنان.

سيطلب منكم المشاركة في مقابلة لإبداء رأيكم وتعليقاتكم حول هذا الأمر.

أنتم مدعوون لأنني أستهدف الخبراء الذين خبرتهم المباشرة تجعلهم مصدرًا موثوقًا للمعلومات.

الوقت المقدر لإكمال هذا الاستطلاع هو ساعة واحدة تقريبًا.

ستجري هذه المقابلة في مكتبكم من أجل أن نحصل على مكان آمن وخاص في الوقت المناسب لكم.

أطلب منكم قراءة نموذج الموافقة على المقابلة والنظر فيما إذا كنتم ترغبون أن تشاركوا في هذه الدراسة.

إذا كان لديكم أي سؤال حول هذه الدراسة، يمكنكم الاتصال بشخص البحث (ليا عفيش ليون، طالبة دراسات عليا في

الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت، رقم الهاتف: 009613802306، البريد الإلكتروني: lna01@mail.aub.edu).

APPENDIX THREE

ENGLISH CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEW

The Political, Sectarian and Economic Repercussion of the Syrian Civil War on Lebanon
Principal Investigator: Dr. Ohannes Geukjian
Political Science and Public Administration Department
American University of Beirut

My name is Léa Afeiche Layoun and I am a researcher in the Political Science and Public Administration Department at the American University of Beirut. I am here to conduct a study that will look at the political, sectarian and economic repercussions of the Syrian Civil War on Lebanon.

Before we begin, I would like to take a minute to explain why I am inviting you to participate and what I will be doing with the information you provide to me. Please stop me at any time if you have any questions. After I've told you a bit more about my project, you can decide whether or not you would like to participate.

I am doing this study as part of writing my thesis for my Master Degree in the Political Science and Public Administration Department at the American University of Beirut. I will be conducting two in-depth interviews with experts in order to make my study more plausible. Actually, I am targeting experts whose opinion are sought because their direct experience makes them a reliable source of information. This collected information will be used in published research as well as in academic presentations.

As I intend to conduct my interview with two experts, I will be searching their phone numbers in the yellow pages of the Lebanese Business Directory. My recruitment strategy; therefore, will be based on a phone invitation. During the phone conversation I will not only ask my interviewer to choose the day and time that best suits him but also to kindly meet at his office in order for us to have a secure and private place.

Participation should take about an hour. Participation is on a purely voluntary basis. You will be asked to answer approximately nine questions. If you do not wish to answer any particular question in the interview, you may skip the question by either not answering the question asked or saying "skip" during the interview. All data collected are treated as confidential information. Your name or any identifiers are not included in my research analysis without your explicit permission. Data will be monitored and may be audited by the IRB while assuring confidentiality. Results will be published in aggregate with no reference to any information that may identify your position. All records and data will be kept in a locked drawer and on a password protected computer of the Principal Investigator

which I will only have access to. Five years after the end of the research study, the taped interviews will be destroyed.

If at any time and for any reason, you would prefer not to answer any questions, please feel free not to. If at any time you would like to stop participating, please tell me. We can take a break, stop or stop altogether. You will not be penalized in any way for deciding to stop participation at any time. Furthermore, I would like to remind you that your refusal or withdrawal from the study will involve no loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled nor will it affect your relationship with AUB or AUBMC. I would like also to reassure you that this study does not involve risks beyond those encountered in daily life.

The benefits which may reasonably be expected to result from this study is providing you a voice to clarify an opinion on this particular topic. There is no monetary compensation as payment for your participation if you decide to complete this interview.

I would like to tape record this interview so as to make sure that I remember accurately all the information you provide. You may still participate in the interview even if you do not want to be taped and instead I will be taking hand written notes.

If you have questions, you are free to ask them now. If you have questions later, you may contact me Léa Afeiche Layoun, telephone: 03 802306, or email lna01@mail.aub.edu.

If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this research, you can contact the following office at American University of Beirut:

Human Research Protection Program
Institutional Review Board
American University of Beirut
ACC Building 3rd Floor Room 3094
Phone: 01- 350 000
Email: irb@aub.edu.lb

If you agree to have your name used, please sign below to confirm your choices:

Date of participation: _____

Consent for participation: _____

Consent for taping of interview: _____

Consent for quoting from interview: _____

Consent to use your name in publication: _____

Researcher's Consent: _____

You will be given a copy of this consent form with your signatures.

APPENDIX FOUR

ARABIC CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEW

موافقة على المقابلة وتسجيلها

التداعيات السياسية والطائفية والاقتصادية للحرب الأهلية السورية على لبنان

الباحث الرئيسي: الدكتور او هانس جوكجيان

قسم العلوم السياسية والإدارة العامة

الجامعة الأمريكية في بيروت

اسمي ليا غيش ليون وأنا باحثة في قسم العلوم السياسية والإدارة العامة بالجامعة الأمريكية في بيروت. أنا هنا لأقوم بإجراء دراسة سنتشهد التداعيات السياسية والطائفية والاقتصادية للحرب الأهلية السورية على لبنان.

قبل أن نبدأ، أود أن أستغرق دقيقة لأشرح لماذا أدعوكم لمشاركتكم وما سأفعله بالمعلومات التي تزودوني بها. يرجى توقي في أي وقت إذا كان لديكم أي أسئلة. بعد أن أبلغتكم عن مشروع، يمكنكم تحديد ما إذا كنتم ترغبون في المشاركة أم لا.

أقوم بهذه الدراسة كجزء من كتابة أطروحتي للحصول على الماجستير في قسم العلوم السياسية والإدارة العامة بالجامعة الأمريكية في بيروت. سوف أقوم بإجراء مقابلتين مع خبراء لجعل دراستي أكثر جدارة. في الواقع، أنا أستهدف الخبراء الذين خبرتهم المباشرة تجعلهم مصدرًا موثوقًا للمعلومات. سيتم استخدام هذه المعلومات التي تم جمعها في البحوث المنشورة وكذلك في العروض الأكاديمية.

بما أنني أنوي إجراء مقابلة مع خبيرين، سأبحث عن أرقام هواتفهم في الصفحات الصفراء في دليل الأعمال اللبناني. استراتيجيتي في التوظيف لذلك، سيتم بناء على دعوة هاتفية.

مشاركتكم سوف تستغرق حوالي الساعة. سيطلب منكم الإجابة عن تسعة أسئلة تقريباً. إذا كنتم لا ترغبون في الإجابة عن أي سؤال محدد في المقابلة، يمكنكم تخطي السؤال إما عن طريق عدم الإجابة على السؤال المطروح أو قول "تخطي" أثناء المقابلة. يتم التعامل مع جميع البيانات التي يتم جمعها على أنها معلومات سرية. لا يتم تضمين اسمكم أو أي معرفات في تحليل البحث دون الحصول على إذن منكم. سيتم مراقبة البيانات ويمكن مراجعتها من قبل IRB مع ضمان السرية. سيتم نشر النتائج بشكل إجمالي مع عدم الإشارة إلى أي معلومات قد تحدد موقعكم. سيتم أيضاً الاحتفاظ بجميع السجلات والبيانات في درج مقفل وعلى جهاز كمبيوتر محمي بكلمة مرور من الباحث الرئيسي والذي لا يمكن لأحد إلا لي الوصول إليه. بعد خمس سنوات على نهاية هذه الدراسة، سيتم حذف هذه المقابلة المسجلة.

إذا كنتم في أي وقت ولأي سبب، لا تريدون الإجابة عن أي سؤال، فلا تترددون في عدم الإجابة. إذا كنتم ترغبون في أي وقت في التوقف عن المشاركة، فالرجاء إخباري بذلك. يمكننا أخذ استراحة أو التوقف تماماً. لن تتم معاقتكم بأي شكل من الأشكال عند اتخاذ قرار بوقف المشاركة في أي وقت. أود أن أذكركم مجدداً بأن رفضكم أو انسحابكم من

الدراسة لن تؤثر على علاقتكم مع الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت أو مستشفى الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت. وأود أيضا أن أؤكد لكم أن هذه الدراسة لا تتطوي على مخاطر تتجاوز تلك التي نوجهها في الحياة اليومية.

مشاركتم في هذه المقابلة سوف توفر لكم صوت لتوضيح رأيكم حول هذا الموضوع بالتحديد. لا يوجد أي تعويض مالي مقابل مشاركتكم إذا قررتكم إكمال هذه المقابلة.

أرغب في تسجيل هذه المقابلة من أجل التأكد من أنني سوف أتذكر بدقة جميع المعلومات التي سوف تقدمونها. لا يزال بإمكانكم المشاركة في المقابلة إذا كنتم لا تريدون أن يتم تسجيلها وبدلاً من ذلك سوف أتناول ملاحظات مكتوبة بخط اليد.

إذا كانت لديكم أية أسئلة، فلكم الإمكانية في طرحها الآن. إذا كان لديكم أسئلة أخرى في وقت لاحق، يمكنكم الاتصال بي ليا غفيش ليون، على هاتف الخاص: 03802306 أو البريد الإلكتروني lna01@mail.aub.edu

إذا كان لديكم أية أسئلة حول حقوقكم في مشاركتكم في هذا البحث، يمكنكم الاتصال بالمكتب التالي في الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت:

برنامج حماية البحوث

Institutional Review Board

الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت

مبنى ACC - الطابق الثالث: غرفة 3094

الهاتف: 01350000

البريد الإلكتروني: irb@aub.edu.lb

إذا كنت توافقون على استخدام اسمكم، فيرجى توقيع أدناه.

تاريخ مشاركتكم: _____

الموافقة على مشاركتكم: _____

الموافقة على تسجيل مقابلتكم: _____

الموافقة على استخدام معلومات مقابلتكم: _____

الموافقة على استخدام اسمكم في النشر: _____

الموافقة الباحثة: _____

ستحصلون على نسخة من نموذج موافقتكم هذا مع توقيعاتكم.

APPENDIX FIVE

ENGLISH INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. What are the political repercussions of the Syrian Civil war on Lebanon?
2. What are the main challenges that faces Lebanon?
3. Do you think that Prime Minister Mikati could have minimized the impact of the Syrian war on Lebanon, by putting more pressure on both conflicting parties to reach an agreement instead of resigning?
4. What are the social repercussions of the Syrian Civil war on Lebanon?
5. How do you explain the mounting sectarian escalation that resulted in the violence in Tripoli between Bab el Tebaneh and Jabal Mohsen neighborhoods?
6. How about the two days armed conflict in Sidon, is it a major social repercussion of the Syrian Civil War on Lebanon?
7. What are the economic repercussions of the Syrian Civil war on Lebanon?
8. Do you think that the main reason of the flow of refugees which was scattered all over Lebanon and not on the borderline, like in Turkey, was because politicians were at odds with one another?
9. How did the demographical changes affect Lebanon?

APPENDIX SIX

ARABIC INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

- ١- ما هي التداعيات السياسية للحرب الأهلية السورية على لبنان؟
- ٢- ما هي التحديات الرئيسية التي تواجه لبنان؟
- ٣- هل تعتقدون أن الرئيس ميقاتي كان بإمكانه تخفيض التأثير الحرب السورية على لبنان بالضغط على الطرفين المتنازعين للتوصل إلى اتفاق بدلاً من استقالته؟
- ٤- ما هي التداعيات الطائفية للحرب الأهلية السورية على لبنان؟
- ٥- كيف تفسرون التصاعد الطائفي المتصاعد الذي أدى إلى العنف في طرابلس بين سكان باب التبانة وجبل محسن؟
- ٦- ماذا عن النزاع المسلح الذي استمر يومين في صيدا والتفجيرات على المساجد، هل هو انعكاس طائفي للحرب الأهلية السورية في لبنان؟
- ٧- ما هي التداعيات الاقتصادية للحرب الأهلية السورية على لبنان؟
- ٨- هل تعتقدون أن السبب الرئيسي لتدفق اللاجئين المنتشر في جميع أنحاء لبنان وليس على الخط الحدودي، كما هو الحال في تركيا، كان لأن السياسيين كانوا على خلاف مع بعضهم البعض؟
- ٩- كيف أثرت التغيرات الديموغرافية على لبنان؟

APPENDIX SEVEN

TERRORIST ATTACKS IN LEBANON

Figure 1: Table showing the Spread of Political Assassinations and Suicide Bombings all over Lebanon

Date	Area	Target	Attack Type
May 2012 to Dec. 2015	Bab al-Tabbaneh neighborhood and Jabal Mohsen hilltop, Tripoli ²⁹⁷	Sunni-Alawite Tensions	Civil Clashes (machine guns and grenades)
Oct. 19, 2012	Achrafieh, Beirut	Wissam al-Hassan ²⁹⁸ (Head of ISF Intelligence)	Car Bomb
Jun. 23-25, 2013 ²⁹⁹	Abra, Sidon	Sunni-Shia Tensions	Battle (LAF intervention)
Jul. 9, 2013 ³⁰⁰	Bir el Abed, South Beirut	Hezbollah	Car Bomb
Aug. 15, 2013 ³⁰¹	Beirut	Hezbollah	Car Bomb
Aug. 23, 2013 ³⁰²	Al-Taqwa and Al-Salam Mosques, Tripoli	Lebanese Sunni Community	Car Bomb
Nov. 19, 2013 ³⁰³	Iranian Embassy Jnah, Beirut	Iran	Suicide Bomber and Car Bomb

²⁹⁷ Tom Hands, Maria Sebas, Rola Saleh, Manar Hammoud, Léa Yammine, Miriam Younes, and Marie-Noëlle AbiYaghi, *The conflict context in Tripoli: Chronic neglect, increased poverty & leadership crisis*. (Lebanon Support: Conflict Analysis Report, September 2016).

²⁹⁸ Wyre Davies, 'Beirut blast kills intelligence chief Wissam al-Hassan' in *BBC News*, October 19, 2012. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20008827>

²⁹⁹ Tamer Almisshal, 'Lebanon: The Battle of Abra' in *Al-Jazeera World*, May 24, 2017.

<https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/aljazeera/world/2017/05/lebanon-battle-abra-170522063407084.html>

³⁰⁰ Laila Bassam & Mariam Karouny, 'Over 50 hurt as car bomb hits Hezbollah Beirut stronghold' in *Reuters*, July 9, 2013. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-explosion/over-50-hurt-as-car-bomb-hits-hezbollah-beirut-stronghold-idUSBRE96807Z20130709?NewsWatchCanada.ca>

³⁰¹ 'Beirut car bomb rips through Hezbollah stronghold' in *The Guardian*, August 15, 2013

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/15/beirut-car-bomb-hezbollah-stronghold>

³⁰² Yolande Knell, 'Lebanese city of Tripoli rocked by deadly explosions' in *BBC News*, August 23, 2013.

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23811328>

³⁰³ Leila Bassam and Erika Solomon, 'Suicide bombings kills 23 near Iran embassy in Beirut' in *Reuters*, November 19, 2013. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-blast/suicide-bombings-kill-23-near-iran-embassy-in-beirut-idUSBRE9AI08G20131119>

Dec. 4, 2013 ³⁰⁴	Southeast Beirut	Hassan al-Laqqis (Hezbollah Militant)	Assassination by two gunmen
Dec. 27, 2013 ³⁰⁵	Beirut Central District	Mohamad Chatah (former March 14 Minister)	Car Bomb and Assassination
Jan. 2, 2014 ³⁰⁶	Haret Hreik, Southern Beirut	Shia Hezbollah	Car Bomb
Jan. 16, 2014 ³⁰⁷	Hermel, Northeastern Lebanon	Shia Community	Car Bomb
Jan. 21, 2014 ³⁰⁸	Haret Hreik, Southern Beirut	Hezbollah	Suicide Bombing
Feb. 1, 2014 ³⁰⁹	Hermel Town, Northern Bekaa Valley	Hezbollah	Suicide Car Bomber
Feb. 3, 2014 ³¹⁰	Choueifat, Southern Beirut	Hezbollah	Suicide Bomber
Feb. 19, 2014 ³¹¹	Iranian Cultural Center, Southern Beirut	Iran	Two Suicide Bombers
Feb. 22, 2014 ³¹²	Hermel Town, Northern Bekaa Valley	Army Post	Suicide Car Bombing
Mar. 29, 2014 ³¹³	Northeastern town of	Lebanese Soldiers	Suicide Car

³⁰⁴ Laila Bassam and Dominic Evans, 'Hezbollah says commander killed in Beirut, blames Israel' in *Reuters*, December 4, 2013. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-hezbollah-killing/hezbollah-says-commander-killed-in-beirut-blames-israel-idUSBRE9B306S20131204>

³⁰⁵ Max Fisher, 'The final, ominous tweets of Mohamad Chatah, Lebanese politician killed in car bomb' in *The Washington Post*, December 27, 2013. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/12/27/the-final-ominous-tweets-of-mohamad-chatah-lebanese-politician-killed-in-car-bomb/?utm_term=.3f861fc4b992

³⁰⁶ Abby Ohlheiser, 'Five Reported Dead After Second Explosion in a Week hits Beirut' in *The Atlantic*, January 2, 2014. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/01/casualties-feared-after-second-explosion-week-hits-beirut/356634/>

³⁰⁷ 'Car bomb blasts Lebanese town near Syria border' in *The Guardian*, January 16, 2014. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/16/car-bomb-blasts-lebanese-town-hermel-syria>

³⁰⁸ Leila Bassam, 'Suicide bombing kills four in Hezbollah area of south Beirut' in *Reuters*, January 21, 2014. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-blast-idUSBREA0K0BS20140121>

³⁰⁹ Stephen Kalin, 'Suicide bomber kills three in Lebanese Hezbollah stronghold' in *Reuters*, February 1, 2014. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-bomb-idUSBREA100FX20140201>

³¹⁰ Leila Bassam, 'Suicide bomb attack hits passenger van in south Beirut' in *Reuters*, February 3, 2014. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-lebanon-explosion-idUSBREA120YE20140203?feedName=worldNews>

³¹¹ Leila Bassam and Alexander Dziadosz, 'Suicide bombers target Iranian center in Beirut' in *Reuters*, February 19, 2014. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-blast-casualties-idUSBREA1I0PQ20140219>

³¹² Tom Perry, 'Suicide bomber kills three in Lebanon: Security sources' in *Reuters*, February 23, 2014. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-blast/suicide-bomber-kills-three-in-lebanon-security-sources-idUSBREA1L0U620140223>

³¹³ Angus MacSwan, 'Car bomb kills three soldiers in attack on Lebanese army checkpoint' in *Reuters*, March 29, 2014. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-violence/car-bomb-kills-three-soldiers-in-attack-on-lebanese-army-checkpoint-idUSBREA2S0I720140329>

	Arsal Baalbek District		Bomb
Jun. 20, 2014 ³¹⁴	Dahr al Baidar, Mount Lebanon	Police Officer	Suicide Bomber
Jun. 24, 2014 ³¹⁵	Beirut	Military Checkpoint	Suicide Bomber
Aug. 2-4, 2014 ³¹⁶	Arsal, Baalbek District	Police Station	Military (LAF Intervention)
Aug. 6, 2014 ³¹⁷	Tripoli	Army Checkpoint	Homemade Bomb
Sep. 19, 2014 ³¹⁸	Arsal, Baalbek District	Lebanese Soldiers	Bomb
Sep. 20, 2014 ³¹⁹	Village of Khraibeh, Bekaa Valley	Hezbollah checkpoint	Suicide Car Bomb
Oct. 24-28, 2014 ³²⁰	Dhour Muhammara, Bhannine and Minieh, Tripoli	Army Patrol	Clashes (LAF Intervention)
Nov. 14, 2014 ³²¹	Arsal, Baalbek District	Lebanese Soldiers	Bomb
Dec. 3, 2014 ³²²	Arsal, Baalbek District	Lebanese Soldiers	Bomb
Jan. 10, 2015 ³²³	Jabal Mohsen, Tripoli	Alawite Civilians	Double Suicide Bombings
Jan. 26, 2015 ³²⁴	Zgharta, Tripoli	Ghassan Ajaj (ISF)	Assassination

³¹⁴ Zeina Karam, 'Suicide bomber targets police checkpoint in Lebanon' in *CTV News*, June 20, 2014. <https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/suicide-bomber-targets-police-checkpoint-in-lebanon-1.1878292>

³¹⁵ Carine Torbey, 'Beirut suicide car bomb: Lebanon's capital shaken' in *BBC News*, June 24, 2014. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27990202>

³¹⁶ Y R and M T, 'Army Retakes Posts in Arsal, says 10 Troops Killed as 'Humanitarian Truce' Reportedly Reached' by *Naharnet Newsdesk*, August 3, 2014. <http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/141658>

³¹⁷ Tom Perry, 'Bomb goes off in Lebanon's Tripoli, kills one' in *Reuters*, August 6, 2014. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-security-arsal-casualties/bomb-goes-off-in-lebanons-tripoli-kills-one-idUSKBN0G629Z20140806>

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³¹⁹ Laila Bassam, 'Bomb explodes at Hezbollah checkpoint in eastern Lebanon' in *Reuters*, September 20, 2014. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-security/bomb-explodes-at-hezbollah-checkpoint-in-eastern-lebanon-idUSKBN0HFOLT20140920>

³²⁰ 'Army arrests 83 in north Lebanon hunt for militants' in *The Daily Star*, October 28, 2014. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Oct-28/275606-residents-return-to-tripoli-as-lebanese-army-pursues-gunmen.ashx>

³²¹ 'Army ambushed after bomb wounds 3 soldiers in Arsal' in *The Daily Star*, November 14, 2014. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Article.aspx?id=277609&link=News/Lebanon-News/2014/Nov-14/277609-bomb-wounds-two-lebanese-soldiers-in-arsal.ashx>

³²² Tom Heneghan, 'Lebanese soldier killed while dismantling bomb near Syria' in *Reuters*, December 3, 2014. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-security-blast/lebanese-soldier-killed-while-dismantling-bomb-near-syria-idUSKCN0JH0VS20141203>

³²³ Nazih Siddiq, 'Suicide attack at Lebanese café kills at least seven' in *Reuters*, January 10, 2015. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-attack/suicide-attack-at-lebanese-cafe-kills-at-least-seven-idUSKBN0KJ0ML20150110>

		Intelligence Officer)	by a gunman
Mar. 2, 2015 ³²⁵	Northern Lebanon	Bader Eid (Brother of Alawite leader)	Assassination
Oct. 5, 2015 ³²⁶	Syrian-Lebanese Borders	Hezbollah fighters	Bomb
Nov. 5, 2015 ³²⁷	Eastern town of Arsal	Qalamoun Muslim Scholars Committee	Bomb
Nov. 6, 2015 ³²⁸	Arsal	Lebanese Soldiers	Bomb
Nov. 12, 2015 ³²⁹	Bourj el-Barajneh, Beirut	Shia Civilians	Suicide Attacks
Dec. 5, 2015 ³³⁰	Deir Ammar, Tripoli	Military	Suicide Bomber
Mar. 24, 2016 ³³¹	Arsal	Lebanese Soldier	Roadside Bomb
Apr. 12, 2016 ³³²	Palestinian Camp in South Lebanon	Fathi Zaydan	Assassination
Jun. 12, 2016 ³³³	Verdun, Beirut	Blom Bank	Bomb
Jun. 27, 2016 ³³⁴	Al Qaa, Northeastern Lebanon	Christian Village	Two Series of Suicide Bombings
Aug. 15, 2016 ³³⁵	Eastern Village of Arsal	Lebanese Soldier	Bomb

³²⁴ G K and Y R, 'ISF Intelligence Officer Gunned Down in Zgharta as Army Seizes Bomb' in *Naharnet Newsdesk*. <http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/164708>

³²⁵ 'Lebanese Army detains suspect in Bader Eid killing' in *The Daily Star*, March 4, 2015. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Mar-04/289584-lebanese-army-detains-suspect-in-eid-killing.ashx>

³²⁶ Tom Perry, 'Bomb in Lebanon targets bus heading to Syria, no casualties' in *Reuters*, October 5, 2015. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-lebanon-blast/bomb-in-lebanon-targets-bus-heading-to-syria-no-casualties-idUSKCNORZOWE20151005>

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³²⁸ 'Lebanese army soldiers wounded in Arsal bombing' in *An-Nahar*, November 6, 2015. <https://en.annahar.com/article/281687-lebanese-army-soldiers-wounded-in-arsal-bombing>

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³³⁰ Antoine Amrieh, 'Suicide bomber kills self, family in north Lebanon army raid' in *The Daily Star*, December 5, 2015. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Dec-05/326046-suicide-bomber-detonates-self-after-army-raids-his-home-in-north-lebanon-several-casualties-security.ashx>

³³¹ 'Soldier killed, 3 Wounded in Arsal Roadside Bombing' in *Naharnet*, March 24, 2016. <http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/205422>

³³² Edmond Sassine, 'Report: Will Zaydan's assassination stir unrest in Ain el-Helweh camp?' in *LBC*, April 12, 2016. <https://www.lbcgroup.tv/news/d/news-bulletin-reports/259724/report-will-zaydans-assassination-stir-unrest-in-a/en>

³³³ Mohamed Azakir, 'Bomb blast in central Beirut aimed at bank minister' in *Reuters*, June 12, 2016. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-lebanon/bomb-blast-in-central-beirut-aimed-at-bank-minister-idUSKCN0YYOUK>

³³⁴ Doreen Abi Raad, 'Suicide bombers hit predominantly Christian Lebanese village near border' in *CNS News*, June 28, 2016. <http://www.catholicnews.com/services/englishnews/2016/suicide-bombers-hit-predominantly-christian-lebanese-village-near-border.cfm>

Aug. 31, 2016 ³³⁶	Zahle	Civilians	Bomb
Dec. 28, 2016 ³³⁷	Al Ain, Northeastern Lebanon	Deputy Mayor of Al Ain	Small explosion
Jan. 14, 2018 ³³⁸	Southern City of Saida	Mohammad Hamdan (Hamas Official)	Attempted Assassination

³³⁵ ‘Lebanese Army rounds up dozens after roadside bomb wounds 5 soldiers’ in *The Daily Star*, August 15, 2016. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2016/Aug-15/367244-roadside-bomb-explodes-at-army-post-near-arsal-entrance-casualties-reported-local-media.ashx>

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³³⁷ ‘Lebanon: Deputy Mayor Killed in Al-Ain Bomb Attack’ in *Al Manar*, December 28, 2016. <https://www.english.almanar.com.lb/148069>

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