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AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

SEPARTIST MOVEMENTS IN CATALONIA, CORSICA AND BASQUE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

by
TONY DANIEL MRAD

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at the American University of Beirut

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II

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SEPARTIST MOVEMENTS IN CATALONIA, CORSICA AND
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by
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
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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

Tony Daniel Mrad   for   Master of Arts
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Title: Separatist movements in Catalonia, Corsica, and Basque A comparative study

The objective of this research is to better understand and compare the factors that underline the three concepts: Irredentism, Separatism and Autonomism in order to classify the three regions according to the three concepts. Borrowing from the academic literature on the three nationalist movements, this thesis will identify and compare the major factors that played a role in the nationalist movements in Corsica, Basque, and Catalonia. This thesis holds that each case has different factors which motivate each country to demand Irredentism, Autonomism, and Separatism. These three cases do not fit into one context but they vary in importance. The findings of the thesis show that Catalonia, Corsica, and Basque will not get independence, at least not in the next few years. Although the Catalan and Basque economy is rich, but still the political framework plays a bigger role than its economic resources. On the other hand, Spain and France will not let Catalonia, Corsica, and Basque secede due to their economic resources and its impact on the French and Spanish economy.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

FRANCE AND SPAIN'S POLITICAL SYSTEM: AN OVERVIEW

Many states have come and gone in Europe. This redrew the map of the European continent throughout history. There has been much interest in what happened and is still happening in Catalonia, and other countries, including separatist movements, demonstration, and minority demands. My research topic will draw a comparison between separatists movements' in Catalonia, Corsica, and Basque. In addition, the choice of Catalonia, Corsica, and Basque is an auspicious one. In other words, these three regions are located in Europe and I chose particularly Basque because it is a French and Spanish territory at the same time and Corsica because it is lesser known than the two regions. This topic is timely after years of demonstrations in Catalonia as well as in Corsica after the presidential elections in France and Basque. The objective of this research is to better understand and compare the factors that underline the three concepts: Irredentism, Separatism and Autonomism in order to classify the three regions according to the three concepts. Borrowing from the academic literature on the three nationalist movements, this thesis will identify and compare the major factors that played a role in the nationalist movements in Corsica, Basque, and Catalonia.

First, irredentism means when part of state aims to detach in order to reincorporate into another. Secondly, separatism seeks to reduce the power of the central government in order to transfer the power to the population of the territory in question. Thirdly, autonomism signifies   certain minorities rule themselves within a state.

Moreover, I will tackle the issue if one of them will take independence and why there are strong independence movement such as in Catalonia. Then, I will look into the common traits and differences between Catalonia, Corsica, and Basque secessionist movements and how can these commonalities be used to classify the three secessionist movements into irredentism or secessionism or autonomism?

France is one of the most ethnically and religiously heterogeneous countries in Europe. It struggled with profound divisions driven by inequality and cultural fears. Recently, Marine Le Pen has actively targeted migrants and minorities such as Muslims. Spain also struggled with the same issue. In other words, Spain consists of many autonomous regions such as Catalonia, Galicia, and Valencia. However, the struggle for greater political autonomy has been intensified in recent years. Thus, the purpose of Chapter One is to discuss the Political system of France and Spain with the aim of situating the impact of the political system in these two countries on the minorities' issue. It also includes the most important political institutions that play a key role in dealing with the minorities issue and describes the role of each institution. It contributes to the thesis objective by discussing the complexities of the political system in France and Spain and how it is difficult for the minorities to reach their claims.

1.1 Political System in France

Since the French revolution in 1789, France has experienced numerous regimes such as monarchies, Empires and Republics. However, since 1870, the regime has been continuously

'republican,' its first constitution was promulgated on the 4th of October 1958 and amended in 1962. In other words, the constitution of the Fifth Republic hinges on the principle of separation of powers and distinguishes clearly between the executive and the legislative. The system in France is called a semi-presidential system or a premier-presidential regime or a hybrid system.[1] In other words, the constitution of 1958 as amended by the referendum of October 1962 combined characteristics of the presidential regime like separation of powers and the parliamentary system like the presence of a parliament that exercises executive powers.[2]

Before discussing the legislature, it is essential to describe the executive power which comprises the president of the republic and the Government.

1.1.2 Background

After the fall of Bastille in 1789, the French revolution began with the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in 1791 which is the first republic, but it failed in following year.

The second republic was established after the revolution in 1848 that led to overthrow King Louis-Philippe and lasted until Louis-Napoleon's coup d'état in 1851. The Third Republic was the product of the French defeat of Prussia in 1870.[3] It should be noted that the Third Republic was marked as the longest regime in France because it survived World War

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[1] - Pierce Roy, Choosing the Chief: Presidential Elections in France and the United States, p.4
[2] - Pierce Roy, French politics and Political institutions, p. 65.
[3] - Anne Stevens, the Government and Politics of France, p. 33.

I and France's defeat under Nazi Germany in 1940.[4] Thus, from 1940 until August 1944, the government was a dictatorship, but a resistance movement carried out under the leadership of General De Gaulle.

From 1946 until 1958, it was the reign of the fourth republic, and during 1958 De Gaulle returned to France to build a stronger institution that formulated with his supporters the fifth Republic constitution. In sum, De Gaulle was the first president of modern France and the constitution of the Fifth Republic is the backbone of the present-day political life and governmental activity in France.

1.1.3 The President

The French president is the head of state and head of the executive who is elected by direct universal suffrage which means that he is directly elected by the people of France every five years. Before the constitutional amendment procedure in 1973, the term of office was seven years and in 2000, it was reduced to five years. It is interesting to note that if the president resigns before his term expires or in case of death, the president of the Senate will exercise the functions of presidency[5]. The President of the republic appears as the keystone in the French institutions.

According to the French constitution of the Fifth Republic, "the president determines policy with the aid of his Council of Ministers[6], he appoints the Prime Minister and ministers

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[4] - Martin A. Schian, Politics in France, p.199.
[5] - Pierce Roy, Choosing the Chief: Presidential Elections in France and the United States, p.6.
[6] - https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/does-french-political-system-work-main-parties/

and the members of the Government, he presides over the Council of Ministers and fixes their agenda in agreement with the Prime minister, he is the head of the Armed Forces and he nominates three out of nine Members of the Constitutional Council, including its President"[7]. Nevertheless, "the president of the Republic can pronounce the dissolution of the National Assembly after consultation with the Prime Minister and the Presidents of the two houses."[8]

The current President at the time of writing is Emmanuel Macron, the independent centrist candidate, who has become France's youngest president. He was elected in 2017 after defeating the far-right candidate Marine Le Pen.

1.1.4 The Prime Minister

As discussed previously, the French president chooses a prime minister who will form a government. However, if they do not hold a majority in the National Assembly, the prime minister will be replaced.[9] Typically, Ministers are appointed by the Prime Minister but in France, the president and the prime minister work together to form a government, and the president should approve the appointment of the ministers.[10]

Thus, sharing power between the President and the Prime minister is a particular feature in the political system. He is responsible for national defense and ensures the

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[7] - Constitutional and parliamentary information,p.4

[8] - Constitutional and parliamentary information,p.4

[9] - https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/macron-edouard-philippe-france-prime-minister-appointment-president-a7736886.html

[10] - https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/does-french-political-system-work-main-parties/

implementation of laws. Moreover, the Prime Minister proposes bills and submits them to the Council of State before being considered by the Council of Ministers."[11]

The current Prime Minister is Édouard Philippe. It is worth to mention that he was a supporter and ally of Alain Juppé and he worked for his campaign in the last presidential elections.[12] In other words, it is the first time that a president appointed a prime minister from outside his camp.[13]

1.1.5 Council of Ministers

The Cabinet consists of around 15-16 ministers. The current government consists of 16 ministers. The Cabinet has two main mission: first of all, the ministers are responsible for the supervision of public legal entities.[14] Secondly, the cabinet should implement the governmental policies.

The Council of Ministers is where all the ministers and the general secretary of the government and the general secretary of the president of the republic are in reunion. The prime minister decides the agenda and the president approves it. It comprises three stages: the first stage covers general interests such as bills, ordinances, decrees. The second stage focuses on individual decisions related to the appointment of senior civil servants. The third

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[11] - Constitutional and parliamentary information,p.5.

[12] - Alain Juppé: He was the mayor of Bordeaux and served as prime minister from 1995 to 1997 under President Jacques Chirac. He was one of the candidates for the presidential elections in 2017.

[13] - https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/edouard-philippe-france-prime-minister-who-is-he-emmanuel-macron-a7737301.html

[14] - https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/how-government-works

stage can be a presentation by a minister regarding the state progress of a reform or a speech delivered by the president.[15]

1.1.6 The Parliament

The French Parliament is bicameral which means that it is made up of two legislative Chambers: The National Assembly and the Senate. Each Chamber has its own services. In the following section, we will discuss the role of the Chambers.

1.1.6.1 National Assembly

The national assembly consists of 577 Deputies. The members of parliament are elected by direct universal suffrage for 5 years after the presidential elections.[16] It should be noted that the President of the republic can dissolute the assembly after consultation with the Prime Minister and the Presidents of the two legislative houses. [17]

The French constitution enumerates the subjects on which Parliament may legislate, leaving the remainder to the Government to decide by decree. The functions of the National Assembly include the making of laws (passing a new bill or vote the amendment of an existing law), the controlling of the finances of the State and also a critical role in monitoring the actions of government and the Ministries.[18]

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[15] - ibid
[16] - https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/does-french-political-system-work-main-parties/
[17] - Constitutional and parliamentary information,p.7.
[18] - http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/decouvrir-l-assemblee/role-et-pouvoirs-de-l-assemblee-nationale

1.1.6.2 Senate

The second chamber is the "Sénat" (in French) or Senate. The Senators are chosen by "grand electeurs" in particular the mayors and other locally elected representatives. The senators are elected for 6 years and they are currently 348 senators. [19] It is interesting to mention that the Senate cannot be dissolved and the accord from the Senate is necessary.

The Senate has the right to consider and to vote on all the bills adopted by the National Assembly. However, some Legislations of great importance such as the nuclear strike force, the organization of military tribunals, and the reorganization of local government in Corsica were enacted despite the senatorial dissent. [20] Moreover, the Senate votes on any amendments to the constitution (who needs the three-fifths majority of senators as mentioned in Article 89) and represents local bodies like districts. However, if the two houses disagree on pending legislation, the government can appoint a joint committee to resolve the differences.[21]

1.1.7 The Constitutional Council

The constitutional Council is composed of nine appointed members, three appointed personally by the President, three by the president of the National Assembly and three by the president of the Senate. Each appointed member serves for a non-renewable term of nine years, and one-third of the membership is replaced every three years.[22]

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[19] - https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/does-french-political-system-work-main-parties/
[20] - Schain Martin, French politics in France and political institutions, p. 232.
[21] - IBID, p. 231.
[22] - Stevens Anne, the Government and Politics of France, p.54.

"The Constitutional Council has several important functions: It rules on the regularity of presidential elections. Legislative elections and referendum operations. It must approve the constitutionality of the rules of the two legislative chambers and all organic laws (those affecting the government) before they can go into effect."[23] Furthermore, the role of the constitutional council is to settle the disputes between the parliament and the government.

1.1.8 The Subnational Governments in France

In France, territorial decentralization is "about giving territorial authorities in France separate and defined responsibilities and resources, and providing for the election of representatives by the citizens of those territories."[24]

The decentralized French administration is divided into 101 department (including four overseas departments), the commune with around 36000 municipalities, and 27 regions until the 31st of December 2015. Since 1986, each region has an elected assembly and president as well as a prefect.[25]

As mentioned above, the French administrative system is divided between four main levels: communes, inter-communal structures, departments and regions. The decentralization in France aimed to manage the economy. In other terms, to break the cycle of the central welfare State's mentality. Moreover, it sought to reinvigorate the peripheral regions politically, administratively, and economically, and make local government more effective.

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[23] - Pierce Roy, French politics and Political institutions, p. 80.
[24] - Administrateurs territoriaux, the french experience of decentralization, p.3.
[25] - Schain Martin, **Politics in France,** p.234-235**.**

1.2 Political system in Spain

1.2.1 Background

The death of Francisco Franco, the dictator who ruled Spain, in 1975 was a turning point in Spanish History. After the dictatorial regime, Spain became a democratic country and held its first elections on 15 June 1977. Moreover, a new constitution came into effect by all the main political parties at the time and approved in a referendum on 6 December 1978 by 88% of voters on a turnout of 67%, paving the way to a new democratic political and economic institutions.[26]

As mentioned in the Spanish constitution, the highest ranking state bodies are: The Crown (Corona), Parliament (Cortes Generales), Ombudsman (Defensor del pueblo), Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional), General Council of Judiciary (Consejo Gerneral del Poder Judicial) and the Audit Tribunal (Tribunal de Cuentas).[27] The constitution consolidated the parliamentary monarchy with two Chambers (parliament and Senate) and a quasi-federal system with 17 autonomous communities. In spite of that, the constitution of Spain established the "*Estado integral*" which stating the unity of Spain and granting self-government rights to some regions.[28] In other words, each region has its own Premier, government, parliament and often television and radio stations and economic regulations.

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[26] - William Chislett, **Forty years of democratic Spain: Political, economic, foreign policy and social change,1978-2018,** p.12.

[27] - Michael T. Newton, Peter J. Donaghy, Institutions of modern Spain, p.11.

[28] - Richard Gunther, Jose Ramon Montero and Joan Botella, **Democracy in Modern Spain,** p.50.

The central government controls the foreign policy, trade, defense, and macroeconomic policy. [29]

1-2-2 Monarchy

As indicated in the 1978 constitution, in particular, Article 1.3 "the political form of the state is the parliamentary monarchy."[30] The significance of this is that the Spaniards will elect their democratically representatives in Parliament. In short, the regime in Spain is a parliamentary democracy where the head of state is a hereditary and constitutional monarchy and recognized by the constitution a separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary.

1.2.2.1 Role and functions of the Monarch

The functions of the Monarch are listed in the constitution under article 56. Three important functions are: first of all, "He is the head of state (*Jefe del estado*), supreme representative in the area of international relations."[31] In other words, the king has no power constitutionally to direct foreign affairs, which are the responsibility of the government. Nevertheless, he plays a vital role as the chief representative of the state both in international relation. Thus, the monarch communicates with other countries and their leaders. Another function related to international affairs is to declare war and peace with the accordance of the

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[29] - William Chislett, **Forty years of democratic Spain: Political, economic, foreign policy and social change,1978-2018,** p.31.

[30] - IBID**,** p.35.

[31] - William Chislett, **Forty years of democratic Spain: Political, economic, foreign policy and social change,1978-2018,** p.35.

Cortes. He is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Furthermore, the king has the duty to call elections to Parliament with the approval of the government.[32]

The king can summon and dissolve the Parliament. He has the right to sanction and promulgate laws that have already been approved either by the Parliament or by the Council of Ministries. It should be stressed that the king has no legislative power.[33]

Article 52.1 of the constitution lays down the responsibility of appointing the presidents of the seventeen autonomous communities. [34] Moreover, he is the symbol of the state unity, acknowledged as head of state by all the autonomous communities".[35]

As already showed, Juan Carlos is a constitutional monarch having no reserve powers outside the Constitution.

1.2.3 Parliament

The situation of the parliament before the death of Franco, in particular from 1939 to 1976, Spain was consisted with a one-chamber legislature known as the *Cortes*. But the system changed in October 1976, where the parliament became a bicameral with a Congress of Deputies and a Senate. The term *Cortes* refers to the national Parliament with two houses as mentioned before. In other words, Spain's parliament is consisting of a lower house or Congress and an Upper House or Senate.

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[32] - Michael T. Newton, Peter J. Donaghy, Institutions of modern Spain, p.37.
[33] - William Chislett, **Forty years of democratic Spain: Political, economic, foreign policy and social change,1978-2018,** p.38.
[34] - William Chislett, **Forty years of democratic Spain: Political, economic, foreign policy and social change,1978-2018,** p.38.
[35] - IBID**,** p.35.

It should be noted that the principal duty of the Cortes in 1977 was to draft and approve a new constitution in order to establish an institutional framework for the new regime and decentralizing the state in such a manner in order to satisfy Basque and Catalan nationalist movements.[36]

1.2.3.1 Congress of Deputies

As mentioned in Article 68 of the Constitution, the Congress of deputies compromises a minimum of 300 and a maximum of 400 deputies. At present, the number of deputies is 350.

The elections of deputies are held by universal, free, direct, equal suffrage and both males and females over the age of eighteen can vote.[37] The election of a new Congress must be called after 4 years. The next parliament elections are on the 28th of April 2019.

Regarding the functions of deputies, the Spanish constitution provides a series of duties regarding the Congress of Deputies. Indeed, the Congress authorizes the formation of the Government and it can cause its cessation. It must ratify or reject decree laws adopted by the government. Moreover, it supervises the role of the government. It should be noted that the Congress of Deputies has potentially significant power over the executive because it may vote the prime minister out of office by adopting a motion of censure by absolute majority.[38]

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[36] - Richard Gunther, Jose Ramon Montero and Joan Botella, **Democracy in Modern Spain,** p.92.
[37] - Michael T. Newton, Peter J. Donaghy, Institutions of modern Spain, p.46.
[38] - http://www.senado.es/web/conocersenado/temasclave/funcionessenado/index.html?lang=en

<u>1.2.3.2 Senate</u>

The Senate is called in the constitution 'the chamber of territorial representation' "which claims to represent the interests of the country's newly formed autonomous communities"[39]. Each province elects four senators.

The Senate has 266 members, of whom: 208 are elected by universal suffrage, 4 senators for each of the 47 mainland provinces; 3 senators for each of the largest islands (Gran Canaria, Mallorca and Tenerife); 1 senator for each of the other islands or groups of islands (Ibiza-Formentera, Minorca, Fuerteventura, Gomera, Hierro, Lanzarote and La Palma); 2 senators for Ceuta and 2 for Melilla. However, 51 senators are indirectly elected and 1 senator appointed by each of the 17 Autonomous Communities, and another for every million inhabitants in the constituency.[40]

It is worth to note that the functions of the Senators are the same as the deputies (The functions of deputies are mentioned above) but the power of each house can differ. In other words, the legislative process starts with the Congress and the Senate gives a second reading.

1.2.4 Central government

According to Article 99, the King will propose a prime minister and the two houses vote and if he fails to gain the support of the house, there will be a second ballot and if it fails again, the king will dissolve both houses of parliament.

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[39] - William Chislett, **Forty years of democratic Spain: Political, economic, foreign policy and social change,1978-2018,** p.47.
[40] - http://www.senado.es/web/conocersenado/temasclave/composicionsenadoelecciones/index.html?lang=en

The role of the prime minister is symbolic as the king. He is the symbol and highest representative of the government. According to Article 98 of the constitution, the head of government "directs the activities of the government and coordinates the functions of the other members of the government."[41]

However, the prime minister can appoint and dismiss his ministers. Furthermore, He can propose the dissolution of the Congress and the Senate. Bearing in mind that the powers of the prime minister are limited which means that he needs to consult with the Council of Ministers or to seek the authorization of the Congress. [42]

1.2.5 Regional government and administration

The map of Spain has a semi-federal structure in which the powers of the state are shared with seventeen autonomous communities with its own president, parliament, executive and the high court of justice and its own flag and capital city.[43] It is worth to note that Basque and Catalonia were the first regions to gain autonomy, where they are responsible for matters such as economic, development, education, health, police, culture but other regions have less authority. The autonomous communities have their own legislatures, have the right to drawn up and approve laws, as well as the right to execute and administer them.

1.3 Minorities issue in France

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[41] - William Chislett, **Forty years of democratic Spain: Political, economic, foreign policy and social change,1978-2018,** p.76.
[42] - William Chislett, **Forty years of democratic Spain: Political, economic, foreign policy and social change,1978-2018,** p.77.
[43] - Michael T. Newton, Peter J. Donaghy, Institutions of modern Spain, p.118.

The minorities in France are vulnerable due to many reasons. One of the reasons is that the French law prohibits the collection of any data based on race, ethnicity or religion.[44] Thus, the statistics based on racial or religious discrimination are unknown. Moreover, groups such as Muslims, black French and Roma Population feel that they are discriminated. Despite the lack of statistics, it is difficult to judge the level of discrimination against these groups. However, the French criminal law prohibits public incitement to hatred, but it is important to note that there is a lack of a proper legal system to report and punish hate speech.[45]

In practice, the aftermath of the Paris terrorist attacks of 2015, the government launched a large campaign to monitor hate speech.[46] The government spent around 100m euro on a three-year plan including the fight against the "hatred online." [47]

In 2018, the French president Emmanuel Macron during his speech at the Internet Governance Forum organized by UNESCO in Paris on November 12 supported the idea of fighting hate speech and said that "French investigators will monitor Facebook's policies and tools for stopping posts and photos that attack people on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sexuality or gender".[48] Back in the years 2005, 2006 and 2007, France was wracked by a

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[44] - https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/how-french-law-makes-minorities-invisible-a7416656.html
[45] - https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/how-french-law-makes-minorities-invisible-a7416656.html
[46] - https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/how-french-law-makes-minorities-invisible-a7416656.html
[47] - https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/17/france-launches-major-anti-racism-and-hate-speech-campaign
[48] - https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/11/12/facebook-will-let-french-regulators-study-its-efforts-fight-hate-speech/?utm_term=.685b712fa447

series of violent protests by young immigrants. Indeed the ethnic, religious and linguistic differences in France are salient. Much of the racial tensions caused by immigrants in particular from North Africa. These tensions revolve around the decolonization of Algeria that led to immigrate to France. [49]

Another way to see how France dealt with the minorities issue is that until now France rejected to ratify the European Charter for Regional and Minority languages. In more details words, in 2015, a proposal stated to amend the French Constitution in order to ratify the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages was rejected by 180 senators.[50] The senators opposed the bill because some of them consider that ratifying the Charter will break the unity of the French nation. Moreover, the conservatives said that "having French as "the language of the Republic" and, at the same time, opening the door for the official use of other languages would be a contradiction." [51]

It should be noted that France had signed the European Charter in 1999, but it did not ratified ever since.[52] Moreover, the French National Assembly passed the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens in August 1789. The Declaration recognized that "men are born equal and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions may be based only on common utility…No one should be disturbed for his opinions, even in religion, provided that their

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[49] - Ariane Chebel D'Appolonia, Race, Racism and Anti-discrimination in France, p. 273.
[50] - https://www.nationalia.info/new/10635/french-senate-buries-ratification-of-european-charter-for-regional-and-minority-languages
[51] - https://www.nationalia.info/new/10635/french-senate-buries-ratification-of-european-charter-for-regional-and-minority-languages
[52] - https://www.nationalia.info/new/10635/french-senate-buries-ratification-of-european-charter-for-regional-and-minority-languages

manifestation does not trouble public order as established by law'. [53] Furthermore, in 2013, France's National Assembly approved on a bill to strike out the word "race" from the French legislation (law books).

Another way to combat the discrimination of the minorities, the French president Emmanuel Macron said: "France's biggest companies will be tested in the next three years to see if they discriminate against ethnic minorities as part of government efforts to combat poverty and exclusion."[54]

There is still a huge problem of discrimination against the minorities, in particular, the Muslims. A study done in 2015 by a French academic on behalf of the Montaigne Institute, a think tank, found that a Muslim man was four times less likely to be called for a job interview than a Catholic counterpart.[55] The fact that blacks and Arabs are also being discriminated. According to a study by the Defender of the Rights organization, oung French blacks and Arabs are 20 times more likely to have their identities checked by police than the other groups of the population.[56]

1.4 Minorities issue in Spain

The term "minority" as defined by Francesco Capotorti, Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of

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[53] - Ariane Chebel D'Appolonia, Race, Racism and Anti-discrimination in France, p. 270.

[54] - https://www.thelocal.fr/20180522/macron-set-to-unveil-strategy-to-tackle-marginalised-banlieues

[55] - https://www.thelocal.fr/20180522/macron-set-to-unveil-strategy-to-tackle-marginalised-banlieues

[56] - https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/07/13/frances-dangerous-move-to-remove-race-from-its-constitution/?utm_term=.fe895ed27ce7

Minorities, is: "A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members - being nationals of the State - possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language"[57].

In Spain, the meaning of Pluralism does not exist, it used to describe the democratic character of the country which means that different political parties, not the cultural or ethnic diversity. Spain experienced the cultural pluralism with the coming of Muslims to the Liberian peninsula in 811. Later on, Spain became a social space where the Jewish, Christian and Muslim cultures coexisting peacefully.[58] However, this period ended with the expulsion of Jews and Muslims from Spain by the Catholic monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella on the eve of the sixteenth century in order to eliminate their influence on Spain. There are today five major cultural regions: Galicia, Basque Provinces- Navarre, Catalonia and Andalusia, and four languages: Galician, Basque, Catalan and Spanish.[59] Franco surprised the Catalan and Basque language, culture, history and all else reminiscent of ethnic difference from a hardening Spanish identity.

10.1% of the population in Spain consists of foreign ethnicity such as Ecuadorians, White British, Moroccans and Romanians however 89.9% is of Spanish ethnicity. [60] These

57 - https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/minorities/pages/internationallaw.aspx
58 - https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/ethnic-violence-and-making-pluralist-spain
59 - https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/ethnic-violence-and-making-pluralist-spain
60 - https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/largest-ethnic-minorities-in-spain.html

foreign ethnic minorities came to Spain due to immigration and others have been in the country for several generations. Moreover, the two largest ethnic minority groups are Romanians and Moroccans. In other terms, Romanians came to Spain in search of economic opportunities, to work, but in 2011, the prime minister extended a ban of the free movement of the Romanian people in order to prevent them from coming to Spain for work after the high unemployment rate in the country. Later on, Romanians fled the country by 2012 because of the economic crisis in Spain. [61]

Spain has been a multiethnic society for a long time. Another problem regarding the minorities is the increase of Xenophobia towards immigrants that come from Africa and Central America in an illegal way and living in dreadful conditions. [62]

These immigrants were becoming targets of racist attacks such as the killing of Lucrecia Pre, an immigrant from the Dominican Republic. It should be stressed that the Basque, Catalan and Galician tongues were repressed by Franco after the end of the civil war in 1939.[63]

Another issue concerning the minorities in Spain, they are underrepresented in the Parliament as one percent of deputies are ethnic minorities. [64] For example, the first black deputy was Rita Bosaho and they are not well represented in the Parliament.[65] We should emphasize that the Spanish government does not record statistics on the ethnic and racial background of its

[61] - https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/largest-ethnic-minorities-in-spain.html
[62] - https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/ethnic-violence-and-making-pluralist-spain
[63] - https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/may/04/spain
[64] - https://elpais.com/elpais/2016/02/22/inenglish/1456150941_431026.html
[65] - https://elpais.com/elpais/2016/02/22/inenglish/1456150941_431026.html

population as we saw with France, but it does record the foreign population in Spain which amounts to 4.7 million. [66]

There was no set-up of legislation to guarantee all the rights of minorities. In other words, there is no equality and a non-discrimination law in Spain. In 2011, the Congress proposed a bill but it was paralyzed throughout the Legislature in which the governing party held an absolute majority.[67] Moreover, Spain has a Council for the Elimination of Racial and Ethnic Discrimination but it is not effective and independent and can not do anything (to file complaints or to litigate). As in France, the authorities said that collecting data would be a violation of laws that protect the privacy of personal data. [68] However, the constitution ensures civil rights and equality before the law without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.[69]

The 1996 law recognized immigrants' rights to equality, education and legal advice. It allowed regional governments to provide for the welfare of immigrant children. It established a permanent resident category and formally included family reunification within its framework. [70]

Another report done by the Amnesty International published in 2002, showed the mistreatment of ethnic minorities in Spain. In the report, the cases reported showing the

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[66] - https://minorityrights.org/country/spain/

[67] - https://www.liberties.eu/en/news/racism-not-overcome-spain/7866

[68] - https://www.liberties.eu/en/news/racism-not-overcome-spain/7866

[69] - https://www.refworld.org/docid/4954ce02c.html

[70] - https://www.refworld.org/docid/4954ce02c.html

torture of these ethnic minorities and ill-treatment by state officials. Furthermore, it documented 5 women being raped or sexually assaulted. The children often face abuse, deportation, a lack of protection and legal representation. Even black people were being detained because they are not carrying the identity documents. However, this report was rejected by the Spanish government saying that "The police and Civil Guard confront immigration in a deeply humanitarian way"[71].

The Spanish government tried to deal with the discrimination against the minorities by creating the Spanish Observatory of Racism and Xenophobia. The mission of the Observations is to carry out periodic surveys of the situation of racism and Xenophobia in Spain which means gathering data, expert analysis… The second objective is the establishment of communication networks with international bodies such as the ECRI. The third main role is to promote the principle of equality of treatment for all. The Spanish government passed many laws in order to achieve real equality such as the gender equality law and the law on gender identity that eliminates all discrimination based on sexual orientation.[72]

A More recent study showed that the level of discrimination against the Roma population continues to be a cause for concern, including school segregation, as well as the ethnic profile of minorities and the deficient application of certain linguistic rights.[73]

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[71] - https://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/19/world/amnesty-accuses-spain-of-racism-in-its-treatment-of-immigrants.html

[72] - https://unchronicle.un.org/article/state-led-efforts-eliminating-racial-discrimination-experience-spain

[73] - https://news.un.org/es/story/2019/01/1450012

1.5 The impact of the political system in France and Spain on the minority issue

The political system in France and Spain can play a negative or a positive role in dealing with the minority issue. The aim of this part is to link the political system in France and Spain with the minorities problem.

As mentioned in this Chapter, the political system in Spain is parliamentary monarchy. The monarch, as described in Spain's 1979 constitution is "the head of state, the symbol if its unity and permanence"[74] can play a key role in calming down the tension between the central government and all separatist movements. A poll published by the Spanish newspaper *El Pais*, showed that a large majority of Spaniards want their King Felipe to play a greater role in mediating between political parties on national problems.[75] It should be noted that the King does not intervene in day-to-day politics. After the independence referendum in 2017, he broke the tradition and delivered an emergency speech. As a matter of fact, Monarchs in Spain only give speeches once a year during Christmas.[76]

Regarding the function of Spain's prime minister towards the separatist movements, he can dismantle any regional government such as the Catalonia's, suspend its ministers, dissolve its upstart legislature and take over the regional police.[77]

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[74] - https://www.ft.com/content/2498449c-a8f3-11e7-93c5-648314d2c72c
[75] - https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-king/spaniards-want-new-king-to-play-greater-role-in-politics-poll-idUSKBN0EX0HG20140622
[76] - https://www.ft.com/content/4c45a73e-a815-11e7-ab55-27219df83c97
[77] - https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/a-day-of-fireworks-in-catalonia-both-spanish-and-catalan-parliaments-are-scheduled-to-convene/2017/10/27/09685d34-ba90-11e7-9b93-b97043e57a22_story.html?utm_term=.bf051a38010e

Moreover, the parliament should take the approval of the Senate in order to take such initiative. The orders will be effective immediately after taking the permission from the Senate.

Spain's Senate can use Article 155 of the country's 1979 constitution to allow the central government to takeover a region such as Catalonia. In fact, the former Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy sacked Puigdemont and took over Catalonia's civil service, finances and police with the permission of the Senate.

Furthermore, Spain's Constitutional Court has the power to judge the unilateral assertion of an independence as unconstitutional. To illustrate this, Spain's Constitutional Court has blocked any steps to declare Catalonia's independence.

The Congress of Deputies has the right to approve or reject laws, initiate legislation and have the power to vote the prime minister in or out. Moreover, the 1979 Constitution stressed on the right to autonomy and self-government since regional identity is very strong in Spain. Bearing in mind that the political system in Spain is highly decentralized, the central government still has full sovereignty over Spanish territory. The decentralization system is still a debatable topic for autonomous community in particular for the Basque Country and Catalonia. Many social and political groups in these two countries demand a higher level of political decentralization.

Moving to France, where the political system is semi-presidentialism, a mixed system: presidential and parliamentary at a time. The prerogatives of the head of state and the prime minister were granted by the Constitution. If the prime minister represented the

president's political camp, he would gain control over the governing state. In contrast, if the Prime Minister and the president come from different parties, the latter would have less influence on the policy of the government. Let's take an example to illustrate the situation, Jacque Chirac, a former French present, refused the suggestion of the Prime Minister Lionel Jospin to shorten the working week to 35 hours. Furthermore, President Chirac was against broadening autonomy of the region of Corsica but he couldn't protest because the government has agreed on this matter.[78] In short, for the initiatives of the president to be successful he has to depend on the government's support.

It is also important to note that the Corsican nationalists demand that their language should be official among other claims. These developments would require a constitutional revision. In order to get the approval, the government needs the support of a majority of three fifths of the Congress (Senators and deputies together) or by referendum. [79]

Conclusion

Chapter One discussed the political system in France and Spain and its impact on the minorities issue. A brief description on how France and Spain deal with the minority issue was also included.

Chapter Two will examine theories which come under the idea of minorities and regime reactions, in particular, the causes that lead to irredentism, autonomism and

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[78] - Madej Malgorzata, COHABITATION: THE PARLIAMENTARY ASPECT OF THE FRENCH SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM, p.196.
[79] - https://www.lci.fr/politique/inscrire-la-corse-dans-la-constitution-francaise-quels-sont-les-enjeux-2076715.html

separatism. Assumptions derived from group theory will be constructed and then tested on

Catalonia, Corsica, and Basque regions in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 2

THEORATICAL FRAMEWORK

Chapter one highlighted the major political institutions that played an important role in the political system in Spain and France and their impact on minorities issues. Chapter two will examine theories which cover the relationship between minorities and regimes. To be specific, these theories analyze the implications and causes of irredentism, autonomism, and separatism. Group theory will be delineated, and based on the cases of Corsica, Basque, and Catalonia, different results will be provided. The aim of this research is to better understand and compare the factors that underline the three concepts: irredentism, separatism and autonomism and applying them on the three regions.

2.1 Concepts

There is no scholarly consensus over what irredentism, separatism and autonomism denote. According to Naomi Chazan, the term irredentism is "derived from the Italian *irredenta*-unredeemed. The concept was first used to refer to the Italian movement to annex Italian-speaking areas under Austrian and Swiss rule during the nineteenth century"[80]. Chazan considers that Irredentism is different from separatism but closely related to it.

However, Donald L. Horowitz considers that Secessions and irredentism "are neighbors and sometimes are alternatives to each other".[81] He defines Secession as "an

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[80] - Chazan Naomi, Irredentism and international politics(1991), p.1
[81] - Ibid, p.9

attempt by an ethnic group claiming a homeland to withdraw with its territory from the authority of a larger state of which it is a part."[82] In contrast, Irredentism is "a movement by members of an ethnic group in one state to retrieve ethnically kindred people and their territory across borders".[83]

The meaning of Secession encompasses attempts to carve out a separate state and internationally recognized. Furthermore, Irredentism comprehends two subtypes: First, "the attempt to detach land and people from one state in order to incorporate them in another one as in Somalia's recurrent irredenta against Ethiopia or the attempt to detach land and people divided among more than one state in order to incorporate them in a single new state". [84] For instance the Kurds who are now living in four countries: Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey. In short, Irredentism and Secession are two distinct concepts, but sometimes alternatives to each other. The first is to withdraw from one state and merge with another state, the second phenomena is about subtracting it alone.

Moreover, Autonomy is different from the two previous concepts. According to Patrick Cuninghame, autonomy "is derived from ancient Greek *autonomos* meaning "someone who lives according to their own law".[85] In other words, under an autonomous system, the minorities enjoy self-rule from executive, legislative, judicial and cultural in order to protect their language, traditions. John Loughlin defines the notion of autonomy as "self-rule".

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[82] - Ibid, p.10.
[83] -Ibid, p.10.
[84] - Chazan Naomi, Irredentism and international politics (1991), p.10.
[85] - Cuninghame Patrick, Autonomism as a global social movement (2010), p.454.

As a matter of fact, Cuninghame, Susan Henders, Maria Ackren and Par M.Olausson, argue that autonomy is not independence but "it cannot do away with interdependence"[86]. This means that autonomous territories are within a state-wide government where the minorities share common rights with the citizens of this country despite their rights.

Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff differentiate between two types of autonomy. First, territorial autonomy which means "a population living in a certain territory is granted an autonomous status regardless of whether the individuals living on this territory belong to one or another ethnic group"[87]. Secondly, non-territorial autonomy which means that "the autonomous entity is defined in personal terms, that is, a particular ethnic group is granted autonomy rights and all its members can enjoy these rights, regardless of where they live on the territory of their host-state"[88].

It should be noted that Horowitz intends to show that withdrawing from a state draws attention more than withdrawing from a state and reincorporating in another state. In addition, the victory of secessionist movements requires external aid in order to win the war and create the new secessionist state. However, with or without aid it doesn't hinder secessionist movements. Moreover, the wealthy region is prone to secessionists. As a matter of fact, secession is more preferred than irredentism. [89] It should be mentioned, that this part of literature review will address the question of classification of each country.

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[86] - Henders Susan, Territoriality, Asymmetry, and Autonomy (2010), p.12
[87] - Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff, autonomy, self-governance and conflict resolution (2014), p.13.
[88] - Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff, autonomy, self-governance and conflict resolution (2014), p.15.
[89] - Chazan Naomi, Irredentism and international politics, (1991), p.11.

In this regard, Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff argue that autonomy can tackle the self-determination and secessionist claims. Moreover, some states have used autonomy as a tool to maintain territorial autonomy. Clearly, by 1991, the governments of the member states of the European Community (EC) backed autonomy as a means of addressing minority issues and ethnic conflict.

Some scholars such as Markus Kornprobst, and David Carment, see that Irredentism is not only a problem that can lead to an armed conflict but also any type of conflict. However, Donald Rotchild, Caroline Hartzell, and Matthew Hoddie, conclude that territorial autonomy can lead to stability. In other words, territorial autonomy can tackle the issue of groups who seek independence in order to protect the identity of each group.

David Carment offers three types of conflicts having an international dimension by testing 5 propositions:

The first type is irredentist such as the Arab and Israeli conflict. States are the main actor in irredentist conflict. Moreover, external states play an important role in such type of conflict as the United States meddling in Arab and Israeli conflict is due to the ethnicity factor that motivates them. [90]

The second type is the secessionist conflict that causes an interstate conflict in order to gain ethnic groups their independence. This conflict leads to involve a third party states such as the involvement of India in the Bangladesh- Pakistan conflict in 1971.

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[90] - David Carment, The international dimensions of ethnic conflict: concepts, indicators, and theory, (1993), p.139.

The Third type is ethnic conflicts between colonial powers and nationalist groups (between an ethnic group and a colonial power) which lead to interstate conflict. For example, the conflict between Indonesian nationalists and the Dutch in 1957 over West Irian.

Other scholars endeavor to define and differentiate between irredentism and separatism, like Saideman and Ayres argue that many variables differentiate irredentism from secessionism. First, dominant kin nearby by testing various hypotheses using the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset. A group whose kin dominate in a neighbouring state is more prone to favor irredentism but doesn't demotivate another group from pursuing its independence. Second, group concentration. The concentrated group is more likely to choose the secession option. Third, rebellion is important for secessionism and can be a significant factor to secede. Whereas, Allen Buchanan defines secession as "the right to secede is to reject the state's own conception of what its borders are"[91]. Unlike revolution, the aim of secession is not to overthrow the current government but to "restrict the jurisdiction of the state in question so as not to include her own group and the territory it occupies"[92].

2.2 Violence in different types of separatism

Scholars such as David Carment focus on the level of violence caused by secession or irredentism conflicts. As stated earlier, the three types of ethnic conflicts vary in levels

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[91] - Buchanan Allen, A theory of secession, (1991), p. 326.
[92] - Ibid, p. 326.

of violence. This variation depends on two factors: First, the degree of affect and instrumental-laden group behavior and the level of subsequent mobilization of ethnic groups. Second, the presence of policies of denial encompassed by the use of force and are significant in secessionist conflicts. [93] Carment argued that ethnic conflicts are prone to be more prolonged and more violent than non-ethnic conflicts. Besides, anti-colonial and secessionist ethnic conflicts are militarily weaker than irredentist conflicts but the latter is more violent. [94]

In sum, David Carment deduce that ethnic conflicts involve higher levels of violence than secessionist and irredentist conflicts show higher frequencies of high violence than both anti-colonial and non-ethnic conflicts. The problem with this conclusion is that ethnic conflicts do not have an effective conflict management.

2.3 Types of claims

Before explaining the origins of irredentist claims, Markus Kornprobst defines irredentist claims as "claims of legal right to the territory of status quo states, aimed at retrieving what a claimant state regards as its ancestral homeland and/or its co-nationals"[95].

Naomi Chazan and Patrice Mc.Mahon's work made an important contribution to the way irredentist claims are studied. As documented by Patrice Mc.Mahon, there are three

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[93] - David Carment, The international dimensions of ethnic conflict: concepts, indicators, and theory,(1993), p.139.
[94] - Ibid, p.140.
[95] - Markus Kornprobst, Dejustification and dispute settlement: Irredentism in European Politics,(2007), p.460.

types of irredentist claims: First, passive irredentist claims: expressions of interest by individuals within a territory in one country controlled by another state, without implicit or explicit demands to alter the territorial status quo. Second, active or serious irredentist claims: consistent expressions of interest by state elites in a territory controlled by another state, including explicit demands to alter the territorial status quo. Third, Irredentist foreign policy crisis: consistent claims that are intensified either by national statements, policy changes, shifts in international support, or direct military activities that lead elites within the irredentist state and another state or states to believe that there is a basis to fundamental values and military hostilities are imminent.

While Chazan shed lights on two types of Irredentist claims: The first is a situation where an ethnic group is a majority in the state and make irredentist claims and in adjacent state there is a minority. In this situation, irredentism concerns the demand made by a government in order to annex territories they occupy across the border or the demands made by the people involved, that they get reunited with their kin across the border. For example, the Greeks in Albania and Turkey or the Croats in Austria and Yugoslavia. It should take into account that not every border dispute is irredentist. In other words, the Argentinian claim on the Falkland cannot be called irredentist because the islands do not encompass an Argentinian population.

The second type of irredentist claim is in which the ethnic group is a minority in two or more countries such as the Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran and seek union with one of the countries or to create an independent statehood.

Marc Weller and Stefan Wloff note 6 nature of ethnic claims: Self-determination, internal and external, Linguistic, religious and/or cultural rights, access to a host-state or host-nation or to kin-state. When a state institution denies an ethnic group access to the resources, that can led to threats and the most extreme can be ethnic cleansing and genocide.

However, the autonomist movement's claims are "modification of the political and administrative structures of nation-states, sometimes they contain nationalist currents which seek to use them to gain full independence"[96] according to Loughlin; for example, the Scottish national party adopted such a strategy.

2.4 **Causes of separatist movements**

2.4.1 Irredentism

The literature on irredentism focuses on the conditions and motives that led sub-national groups to secede the country or facilitate the implementation of such a decision. These assumptions selected fall in three broad categories: economic, social, and political.

In their work *Irredentism and Minorities in the Middle East and The Macedonian Syndrome: an historical model of international relations and political development*, Jacob Landau and Myron Weiner state that the political factor, in particular the regime type, plays a powerful role in irredentism. Jacob M. Landau examines the irredentist movements in different countries such as the case of Somalia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Iraq, etc. Irredentism

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[96] - Loughlin, John, Regional autonomy and state paradigm shifts in Western Europe, (2000), p.12.

is aimed "at redeeming for the homeland territories which an ethnic ally or culturally connected group inhabits or has inhabited in history."[97]Although Landau tries to link the regime's type to irredentism, he does conclude that the regime character is not always an indicator of irredentist. He demonstrates with examples that totalitarian states are more prone to seek irredentism while the liberal democratic regime is more prone to leave this option to opposition groups. Thus, the authoritarian governments are not less flexible than democratic governments regarding the irredentist situation. The Middle East is one of the areas where irredentism flourished due to the ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities. It is worth to note that in many cases, ethnic minorities who seek autonomy, are considered by majorities as a preparatory act for separation or irredentism, and it has affected the internal (minority and majority) and external (neighboring states) relationships.[98] The most salient examples regarding irredentist sentiments are the campaign of Somalia's government to annex what it called a Somali-inhabited territories in Ethiopia and Kenya, Pakistan's irredentist claims on India's part in Kashmir, and Libya's on neighboring regions in northern Chad.[99] It should be noted that Pan-ideologies are included as an irredentist component such as the Pan-Arabism, which is the Ba'th movement ideology.[100] Landau talks about religious irredentism. The Iraq-Iran war is a prime example where Iran is the largest Shi'ite state that appeals to a very large Shi'ite minority which is Iraq.

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[97] - Landau, Jacob, **Irredentism and Minorities in the Middle East,** p.242
[98] - Landau, Jacob, **Irredentism and Minorities in the Middle East,** p.243
[99] - Landau, Jacob, **Irredentism and Minorities in the Middle East,** p.244.
[100] - Landau, Jacob, **Irredentism and Minorities in the Middle East,** p.245.

Weiner shed lights on the relationship between the political regime types and the irredentist objectives. In other terms, when the irredentist objectives are given priority over the public policies, the internal power structure of the country is likely to develop in such a way as to favor those advocating order and unity at home and militancy abroad.[101] Such groups generally include the military, the monarchy or some single leader with dictatorial tendencies.

Myron Weiner adds to another theoretical understanding of irredentism. He considers that the elite should play a major role in the irredentist demand. Moreover, the irredentist demand may not be serious if the irredentist state, who seeks irredentism, is weak and very small and the anti-irredentist state is large and powerful.[102]

Many works have carried out a theory based on this assumption. Donald Horowitz's theory of irredentism states that the economic resource is one of the main motives for the irredentist movement which it considered as a third factor. Irredentist movements are routinely interpreted as driven by resource competition, self-interested elites and / or economic deprivation, amongst others. As Horowitz stated that "it is generally more attractive to be retrieved by a rich rather than a poor neighbor[103]."

2.4.2 Autonomy

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[101] - Weiner, Myron, The Macedonian Syndrome: An historical model of international relations and political development, p. 676.
[102] - Ibid, p.669.
[103] - Horowitz, Donald, **Ethnic Groups in Conflict,** p.286.

The next issue treated by theorists is the suppositions to autonomy mobilization. Theoretically, there is no doubt that there are many situations that may tend to call for the establishment of autonomy. Authors such as Ruth Lapidoth consider that autonomy is a valid solution to cater for the demands of minorities. Lapidoth states that autonomy is more strongly demanded and granted for indigenous population that seek autonomy, which means "those which having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of societies now prevailing in those territories or in parts of them[104]."

M. Svante Cornell attempts to show in his study that autonomy is neither a way to manage a conflict nor a necessary cause of conflict. He mentions a number of factors such as leadership, mass media, and state institutions. As mentioned above, leadership plays a crucial role in increasing the likelihood of politicians and to promote ethnic mobilization to further their own ambitions especially in regions where the titular ethnic group is the demographic majority.[105] Cornell emphasizes the role of mass media by saying that the government authorities use television, radio stations, and newspapers to influence the attitude of the population through news coverage by using propaganda in order to speed up the process of ethnic mobilization.[106]

The underlying desire of separation for some regions can have negative effects. Cornell shed lights on the reasons that central government are reluctant to grant autonomy

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[104] - Lapidoth Ruth, Autonomy: Flexible solutions to ethnic conflicts, p.16.
[105] - Svante E. Cornell, Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian conflicts in theoretical perspective, p.255.
[106] - IBID, P.255.

for regions: to begin with, acceding to demands for autonomy may be the first step toward secession of the region. Secondly, granting territorial autonomy to one region may be considered as a discrimination against other groups. Lastly, autonomy increases the risk of intervention by a foreign state affiliated with the specific minority population.[107]

2.4.3 Secession

Existing research focus on why some ethnically distinct regions fight to secede while others are quite content to remain part of the same country. Many factors such as economic, social, political are a powerful key to secession. Bearing in mind, secession is "the formal withdrawal from an established, internationally recognized state by a constituent unit to create a new sovereign state[108]."

Some theories of secession have considered the economic issue, in particular, the high-income regions lead countries to secede. A region pays more in taxes than it receives in expenditures is more likely to secede if those demands are not met. In contrast, regions that receive more in expenditures than they pay in taxes, are likely a poor ground for secessionism because to become independent would mean to lose subsidies.[109] It might be useful to give a concrete example of a case that is not linked to natural resources but sought secessionist movements which is Eritrea, the wealthiest region of Ethiopia due to the Italian colonists who established industries there. Eritrea was considered as a federation in 1951, but later on,

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[107] - Svante E. Cornell, Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian conflicts in theoretical perspective, p. 246.
[108] - Viva Ona Bartkus, The Dynamic of Secession, p.3.
[109] - Ibid, p.310.

the Eritrea independence movement was formed in order to become independent. With the support of a large diaspora, it became an independent country in 1993.[110] It should be noted that the Gross Domestic Product per capita in Eritrea was last recorded at 1411.16 US dollars in 2011.[111]

Within a growing body of research on the economic causes of secessionist movements, one of the important findings done by Michael Ross, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler is that natural resources play an essential role in this type of conflict. Natural resources include oil and hard-rock minerals such as coltan, diamonds, gold, and other gemstones.[112] Michael Ross and others such as Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler's theories hinge on resource wealth that can tend to encourage secessionist movements to occur through a third mechanism by giving people who live in resource-rich areas an economic incentive to establish a separate state.[113] The case of Acehnese in Indonesia offers a good illustration. They are ethnically different from the rest of Indonesians and had the highest rates of economic growth of any province in Indonesia in 1970. Moreover, a secessionist movement known as GAM (Geraken Aceh Merdeka) was formed in Aceh in 1976 due to the large natural gas facility that was bargaining its operations. The argument of this movement was if they will become independent, the Acehnese would be wealthy like the citizens of Brunei (country rich in oil[114].)

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[110] - Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, The political Economy of Secession, p. 21.
[111] - https://tradingeconomics.com/eritrea/gdp-per-capita-ppp
[112] - Michael Ross, the natural resource curse: how wealth can make you poor, p.17.
[113] - Ibid, p.27.
[114] - Michael Ross, the natural resource curse: how wealth can make you poor, p.28.

In the same vein, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler stressed on natural resources as pivotal factor in the secessionist movement because it will allow the rebel groups to finance their activities during the conflict.[115] For retrospect, the attempt of Biafra to secede from Nigeria because it was known to be rich in oil failed. [116]Another reason that can escalate the situation is the primary commodity exports.

Ted Robert Gurr speaks of demonstration effect as a key role for separation. This means that "a region is more likely to secede if neighboring regions have seceded in the past or have previously taken important steps on the road to secession. These prior acts provide both inspiration and practical examples"[117].

Other existing research on ethnic conflicts tends to explain in which cases a region choose secession. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler explain that secessionist movements are more likely to happen when the small proportion of the male population has secondary education. In other words, it is easier for politicians to exaggerate the value of geographic identity with a natural resource endowment if the populations are uneducated.[118] Thus, a lack of education might also make it easier for politicians to appeal to romantic notions of belonging to a common community based on ethnicity and religion.[119] In simple terms, high levels of natural resource endowments and low levels of education appear to be the characteristics that lead to a high risk of a secessionist movement.[120]

[115] - Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, The political Economy of Secession, p. 12.
[116] - Ibid, p.17.
[117] - Hale Henry, The Parade of Sovereignties: testing theories of Secession in the Soviet Setting, p.36.
[118] - Ibid, p.14.
[119] - Ibid, p.14.
[120] - Ibid, p.15.

Several studies adopt different reasons behind the secession. Crawford Young finds that separation might appear as a good solution for cultural pluralism and security dilemmas. In other terms, "if one or more group believe that ethnic security cannot be assured within the existing state or that their linguistic or religious aspirations cannot be satisfied, that what could be simpler than creating a territorial base which can endowed with sovereignty."[121]

Viva Ona Bartkus puts forward another proposition for seeking secession. It is the size of the territory that can play a powerful role to seek secession. She argues that, historically, their small size had excluded numerous distinct communities from achieving economic and social progress. Bartkus believes that larger countries offer more significant benefits and without sufficient resources, they have been unable to provide their members with social programs. Such distinct communities have often benefited from government subsidies for social initiatives. For example, the Swiss Federal government has heavily subsidized the preservation of the Romansch language and community. [122]

Many works have focused on the causes that led to choose between separatism and irredentism. Stephan M. Saideman, and William Ayres examine the causes that ethnic groups decided to choose between irredentism and secession mainly between the 1980's and 1990's by testing 15 hypotheses. First of all, they considered that a small group cannot be irredentist or secessionist because of the probability of success linked to the size of a group.

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[121] - Young Crawford, the Politics of cultural pluralism, p.460.
[122] - Viva Ona Bartkus, The Dynamic of Secession, p.44

Secondly, the ethnic kin's influence. In other words, groups whose kin control an adjacent state are more prone to irredentist. However, groups whose kin do not dominate an adjacent state could favor the secessionism.[123]

Thirdly, ethnic conflict can be contagious. That means, conflict in a nearby state may cause other conflicts and increase the desire to pursue the option of irredentism and secession.

Fourthly, ethnic security dilemmas. Ethnic groups who feel secure, their desires of secession or irredentism are less than the desires of ethnic groups who feel insecure because either the latter have less control over the government or another group threaten their political, economic status.

Fifthly, the end of empire. Due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the states within the union are more prone to be irredentist or secessionist.

Overall, the two authors try to determine factors that ethnic groups seek to secede. Their findings suggest that group concentration, separatist kin, regional conflict and degree of conflict with the state, make secessionist more likely. Furthermore, Saideman and Ayres consider that irredentism and secessionism have some common things but they are not an alternative to each other.

Nonetheless, Buchanan puts forth four arguments to justify secession: First of all, the argument from consent. In other words, consensus is necessary for political obligation. Secondly, the right of self-determination or nationalist argument. It means "that every

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[123] - Saideman Stephan and Ayres William, Determining the causes of Irredentism: Logit Analyses of Minorities at risk data from the 1980's ad 1990's, (2000), p.2.

people is entitled to its own state"[124]. Last but not least, the argument from certificatory justice. To put it in the simplest terms: a region has the right to secede if it was unjustly incorporated into the larger unit from which its members wish to secede. Fourthly, the argument from discriminatory redistribution. To be clear, when a state inflict taxes or regulatory policies or economic programs that work to the disadvantage of that group while benefiting others. [125]

In addition, Allen Buchanan, points out four arguments to justify forcibly resisting secession: Firstly, the self-defense argument. In other words, secession may be forcibly resisted if it is incompatible with the continued existence of the remaining state as an independent state. For instance, if Quebec will secede from Canada, what remains from Canada cannot survive either economically or militarily. Secondly, the soft paternalist argument which means that minority group cannot transmit their traditions to other generations because the current state does not respect the individual civil and political rights of minorities. Thirdly, the strategic bargaining argument means "in conditions in which the majority views secession by a group G as a prohibitive cost, G's threat to secede can in effect serve as a veto. G can use the threat of secession to ensure that the majority's will does not prevail, even when the majority's decision would respect constitutional limits". The last argument is the argument from anarchy. What that means, if secession is permitted, there will be no end to it. In other words, if a large group will secede, another small group will secede.

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[124] - Buchanan Allen, A theory of secession,(1991), p. 328.
[125] - Ibid, p. 330.

2.5 Explanatory typology

The typology table will offer a way to combine quantitative data and variables. It is a result of an arrangement process. To be clear, the following table provides an overview of the various types of nationalism developed from the findings of our literature review. The types are arranged according to their characteristics and allocated with case examples. It should be noted that this table will evolve through my research.

Types of nationalism	Characteristics	Examples
Irredentism	Movement by members of an ethnic group in one state to retrieve ethnically kindred people and their territory across borders.	Serbia under Milosevic calling for integration of all Serb-inhabited areas of former Yugoslavia into a greater Serbia (1990s)
Separatism	An ethnic group claiming a homeland to withdraw with its territory from the authority of a larger state of which it is a part.	The State of Katanga declared independence in 1960 from the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Autonomism	A minority enjoy self-rule from executive, legislative, judicial and cultural in order to protect their language and traditions.	Catalonia- Corsica- Madeira in Portugal

2.6 Methodology

To write the thesis, I will address these propositions and provide evidence. First of all, Corsica will remain under the French government. Catalonia and Basque will remain

under the Spanish government and gain more autonomy due to constitutional obstacles. In other terms, I argue that the three regions cannot gain independence.

Secondly, the argument to justify forcibly resisting secession of the three regions will be the self-defense argument. In other words, France and Spain won't let them secede due to the economic resources of these regions and the implication of the secession on other countries.

Furthermore, in order to get an exhaustive understanding of the factors that allow an irredentist movement to achieve its goals by using secondary data, I will analyze the conditions that will allow them to do. Moreover, I will classify these 3 regions into irredentism, secessionism and autonomism.

In order to make analytic progress, secondary data and content analysis are the best way to collect information by way of reviewing articles from Spanish newspapers such as *EL Pais, el Mundo, La Razon, ABC, El Periodico, La Vanguardia* and French newspapers such as Le Monde, Le Figaro, Liberation, Le Parisien, Les Echos, Corse matin… and other previous data studies that I will collect will be from scholarly books. In order to ensure data accuracy, I collect data from reputable organization such as the National institute for statistics and economic studies (INSEE) among others. Speeches delivered for example by Spain's King Felipe VI, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez and others are also used in order to provide descriptions of particular events. This data will help in developing a historical background of events, actions and outcomes concerning the separatist movements.

In short, this thesis will produce new knowledge by providing new comparison between the three regions. This topic will develop the research on two regions that are not well researched like Corsica and Basque. It is important to stress that until recently, no one tried to compare between these regions. Understanding the actions held in Corsica for example provides an insight into one of the less studied cases in the world. What is clear is that I seek at presenting an analytical framework for understanding the secessionist process in these regions. Furthermore, the main purpose of this thesis is to fill the lacuna of time by providing a detailed historical account from the first day of independent claims started until 2019. This study will be examined from a new perspective which is the comparison between these three regions.

2.7 Limitation

The challenges that exist are the credibility of the sources of information in the article. In other words, I made sure that I took articles with credible and official sources. Awareness of those whose voice may be marginalized also plays a key challenge. In other words, I will find the marginalized people, particularly who support the independence of Catalonia, Basque, and Corsica. Other limitation is the difficulty to get recent data. Sometimes, I had to translate from Spanish or French to English.

Conclusion

Chapter two demonstrated what is needed to have a successful secession, autonomy, and an irredentism process. Political, economic and other factors were discussed. This chapter, first introduced the reader to the two components of analysis that led the national group to choose irredentism which are: regime type and economic resource. Secondly, it outlined the three components of analysis that tend to call for the establishment of autonomy which are: rights of indigenous peoples, leadership, and mass media. Lastly, it presented the six components of analysis that drive to secession which are: the high-income regions, rich-resource areas, demonstration effect, the level of education, security and the size of territory. These components of analysis will be used to scrutinize the secession, irredentist and autonomist claim in the three cases: Catalonia (in Spain), Corsica (France) and Basque (France and Spain).

Chapter three will shed light on the historical background, the economic situation, and the culture of the three regions: Catalonia, Corsica, and Basque.

CHAPTER 3

OVERVIEW OF THE THREE REGIONS

Chapter 3 aims to provide an overview of politics, and socio-economic trends in Catalonia, Corsica, and Basque based on secondary data and graphs from official Institutes of statistics such as the "INSEE" which collects data on the French economy and society, and "Eustat" that develops official statistical information of the Basque country and others statistical organization. It will highlight the most important pillars in politics, economy, and culture in these three regions. Chapter 3 contributes to the thesis' objective by contextualizing the background of the three regions and helping to understand how different, distinctive, and strong they are. The aim of this thesis is to better understand and compare the factors that lead the three concepts: Irredentism, Separatism, and Autonomism and applying them on the three regions, Catalonia, Corsica, and Basque.

3.1 Catalonia

3.1.1 Politics

Catalonia is an old region; it existed as a defined region since the 9th century and became more powerful as a military and commercial empire during the 12th century because of the marriage of Ramon Berenguer IV the Count of Barcelona and the Princess of Aragon Peronella which created the Crown of Aragon.[126]

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[126] - Christos Anastasios Tzagkas, the Internal Conflict in Spain: The case of Catalonia, p. 59.

This Crown was a part of a confederation of Kingdoms including eastern Spain, southern Italy and parts of the Mediterranean. The Independent Kingdom remained until the 15h century when King Ferdinand of Aragon married Isabel of Castile. The two Kingdoms united to form the Spanish state.[127] In the 17th century, Spanish King Felipe IV wanted more centralized policy, but Catalan opposed it, and the war erupted against the King. During the 18th and 19th century, Spanish was imposed as the official language of Spain and the economy of Catalonia flourished, particularly the industrial and commercial sectors, as well as in art and literature.[128] Their political institutions hence gained a relative autonomy.[129]

Catalonia is a roughly triangular region in north-east Spain[130]. It is separated by the Pyrenean Mountains in the South of France as it outlined in the map below. Catalonia encompasses three major regions: Girona, Tarragona, and Lleida. The surface area is about 32.108 km^2 .

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[127] - Christos Anastasios Tzagkas, the Internal Conflict in Spain: The case of Catalonia, p. 59.

[128] - Christos Anastasios Tzagkas, the Internal Conflict in Spain: The case of Catalonia, p. 59.

[129] - Christos Anastasios Tzagkas, the Internal Conflict in Spain: The case of Catalonia, p. 59.

[130] - https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20345071

3.1.2 Economy

Economic factors also have been used as a motive to the nationalist movement. Catalonia is one of the wealthiest regions in Spain and the European Union due to many causes: tourism, export, conference hub amongst others. The Catalan economy has grown, and the GDP in 2016 reached 3.5%.[131] Figures above from recent months also mention that good results.   Moving to the GDP growth per sector, the growth is visible across all sectors with the exception of the service sector.[132] The agriculture sector in particular, in farming and in fisheries, also grew since 2014, however it shows a slight decrease in 2018 as per the table below. Another major part of Catalonia's economy is the manufacturing industry. The industrial GDP grew since 2014 in order to reach in 2018 45.889 million of euros. It is interesting to mention that Catalonia is one of the big consumers of natural resources such as natural gas, and oil which creates a very competitive industrial sector.

Gross Domestic Product. 2014-2018 By sectors. At current prices					
	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
GDP	206,668	215,726	224,687	234,680	242,313
Gross value added	190,608	198,388	206,462	215,229	221,702
Agriculture	1,916	1,850	1,944	2,319	2,196
Industry	39,021	41,670	43,101	45,202	45,889
Manufacturing industry	32,991	34,768	36,443	38,488	39,150
Construction	9,054	9,492	10,283	11,163	11,863
Services	140,617	145,377	151,134	156,545	161,755
Trade, transport and accomodation	49,478	51,061	54,026	55,774	56,983
Real state, professional and other activities	63,403	65,314	67,344	69,990	73,242
Public adm., education, health and social services	27,736	29,002	29,764	30,781	31,530
Net taxes on products	16,060	17,337	18,225	19,452	20,611

Units: Milions of euros (Base 2010).
Source: Idescat. Annual economic accounts in Catalonia.

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[131] - Government of Catalonia, 2016 Annual Report, p.21.
[132] - Government of Catalonia , 2016 Annual Report, p. 28.

In the labor market, the unemployment rate in Catalonia saw a sharp decrease as it outlined in the graph below; in 2013 in unemployment reached 24.25%, in 2018, the unemployment rate in Catalonia was at 11.39 percent.[133] The decrease of unemployment in Catalonia is due to economic performance after the episode of political instability

© Statista 2019

The population of Catalonia increased and in just ten years it rose by more than 20%.[134] In 2017, Catalonia accounted 10 percent of the overall Spanish population as it is mentioned below. WThe growth of population in Catalonia is due to the number of foreigners who immigrate in Catalonia.

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[133] - https://www.statista.com/statistics/456113/unemployment-rate-in-catalonia/
[134] - Government of Catalonia, 2016 Annual Report, p.5.

Population: Spain and Catalonia (2017)

Spain	46,528,966
Catalonia	7,441,176

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, data as at 1 July 2017.

According to the Catalonia Statistical Institute (Idescat), the poverty rate in Catalonia in 2010 affected 19.9% of Catalonia's population. Compared to Spain where the poverty rate stood at 20,7% according to the Spanish National Statistics Institute.[135] Recently, in 2017, the risk of poverty rate in Catalonia was at 20% as mentioned by the Catalan Statistics Institute (Idescat).[136]

3.1.3 Culture

There is a distinct Catalan Culture separated from that of Spain. The Catalan language is for example is different from Spanish which is one of the main drivers of the nationalist movement. As the former president of Catalonia's government said "The case of Catalonia is peculiar: we have our own language, and culture, we are a nation without a state.''[137] The statute of Autonomy of Catalonia includes the bilingualism (Spanish and

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[135] - http://www.gencat.cat/benestarsocialifamilia/publica/dixit/num73/english/risk-poverty-affects-199-catalan-population.htm
[136] - http://www.catalannews.com/society-science/item/risk-of-poverty-rate-in-2017-up-to-20
[137] - Manuel Castells, The power of identity, p.46.

Catalan) as Catalonia's own language. [138] Catalan is the common language used at

school.[139] There are many universities in Catalonia like the University of Barcelona,

Autonomous University of Barcelona, Polytechnic University of Catalonia among others.

Catalonia has its own flag named *"La Senyera"* which consists of four red stripes which

represent the four Spanish Autonomous Communities of Catalonia: Valencia, the Balearic

Islands, Aragón and the city of Alghero in Sardinia on a golden background. Another flag is

the *"L'estelada"*. It consists of yellow and red bars and a five –pointed star in a triangle

which means in English a starred flag, however it is an unofficial flag. The political

movement uses this flag as a symbol of support to Catalonia's independence from Spain. [140]

La Senyera

L'estelada

Catalonia celebrates its national day on September 11th which is called the "Diada"

nowadays. On this day, Catalonia lost its freedom and institutions after the defeat in the war

of Succession in 1714. Moving to Catalan Cuisine, they are famous for the *pa*

ambtomàquet or bread rubbed with tomato and topped with olive oil and salt. Festivals

became synonymous to Catalan Culture such as the *castell* which was recognized by

UNESCO World Heritage. *Castell* is a festival where the people form human towers, up to

[138] - Manuel Castells, The power of identity, p. 49.
[139] - https://web.gencat.cat/en/temes/catalunya/coneixer/cultura-llengua/#bloc2
[140] - https://web.gencat.cat/en/temes/catalunya/coneixer/cultura-llengua/#bloc3

ten people high by interlocking hands and shoulders. Catalonia represents an artistic country, with many renowned artists such as the architect Antoni Gaudi, and painters like Salvador Dalí, and Pablo Picasso.

3.2 Corsica

3.2.1 Politics

Corsica is a French region split into two departments: *Corse-du-Sud* (South Corsica) and *Haute-Corse* (Upper-Corsica) as it is outlined in the map below. The capital of the Corsica is Ajaccio, the biggest city in the region and also the capital of the department Corse-du-Sud. The second biggest city is Bastia - the capital of the department Haute-Corse (Upper-Corsica).[141]

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[141] - Marek Kołodziejski, Economic, social and territorial situation of the Islands of Corsica and Sardina, p. 30.

Corsica has been part of the Republic of Genoa in what is today Italy for around 500 years and has been part of the French territory for around 200 years. The Pisans[142] invaded Corsica and established a stronghold in the 11th century. Then, the Genoese defeated the Pisans after a sea battle in 1284 and remained there until the 18th century.[143] At the beginning of the 1730s, Corsica wanted to lose domination from Genoa (Italy) which led to the independence of this island under the leadership of Pasquale Paoli.[144] Paoli is considered the father of the nation in contemporary nationalist imagery between 1755 and

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[142] - Pisans or Pisa: It was a powerful republic in the 9th to 11th centuries. In 1284, it crushed by Genoa. Today, Pisa is a city in west Italy.

[143] - Robert Veel, Sardina and Corsica from the Stone Age to Napoleon, p.4.

[144] - Jean-Bernard Adrey, Discourse and Struggle in Minority Language Policy Formation: Corsican Language Policy in the EU Context of Governance, p. 147.

1769. During these 14 years, the Corsican started to develop its own political and judicial institutional structures, flag, currency, university, national anthem, etc. However, the independence was short-lived due to the French invasion in 1769. Corsica became, after the armed upheaval of 1816, a department of France.[145] Today, Corsica is an administrative "region" of France with a political status. It is interesting to mention that until the 20th, Corsica is usually considered more as a mountainous area than an island where most of the people lived in the inner valleys for protection from invaders coming from the sea.[146]

3.2.2 Economy

Historically, the economy of Corsica was based on cattle breeding, the development of agriculture and viticulture, increasing the pastoral activity, and the agricultural techniques.[147] Corsica did not experience the technological innovations until the early nineteenth century. Corsica has experienced a decay in its economic situation during the beginning of the twentieth century because it depended on public source of income and suffered from adequate economic structures.[148] However, the state launched a plan called "*Action Régional*" in 1957, in particular, to develop agriculture (viticulture), and tourism, in order to regenerate the economy of the island.

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[145] - Jean-Bernard Adrey Discourse and Struggle in Minority Language Policy Formation: Corsican Language Policy in the EU Context of Governance, p. 147.

[146] - F. Mouillot, G. Paradis, M.-C. Andrei-Ruiz, and A. Quilichini, **Corsica**, p.17.

[147] - Jean-Bernard Adrey Discourse and Struggle in Minority Language Policy Formation: Corsican Language Policy in the EU Context of Governance, p. 147.

[148] - Jean-Bernard Adrey Discourse and Struggle in Minority Language Policy Formation: Corsican Language Policy in the EU Context of Governance, p. 148.

Corsica had for a long time one of the French lowest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. During the first decade of the XXI century, the GDP grew and the economy performed well.[149] The economic situation in Corsica relies on fragile foundation. In 2014, Corsica's gross domestic product (GDP) was 8.59M€.[150] In 2016, the GDP is 9.097M€[151]. The economy of Corsica hinges on the tertiary sector which constitutes 83% of the GDP. Tourism is one of the key factors for the economy of Corsica because of the island's weather and the mountains make it more popular among the tourists. The construction sector and industrial sector represents 11% of GDP as for the food industry, it represents 6% of the island's income.[152]

The unemployment rate is decreasing as it shown in the graph below to reach 9% in 2018. In 2014, the unemployment rate reached 11.2% due to the harsh economic situation in Corsica.

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[149] - Economic, social and territorial situation of the Islands of Corsica and Sardina, p. 34.
[150] - https://www.lepoint.fr/societe/portrait-de-la-corse-economique-et-sociale-02-01-2018-2183543_23.php
[151] - https://www.adec.corsica/Corsica-Statistica_r30.html
[152] - Economic, social and territorial situation of the Islands of Corsica and Sardina, p. 30.

Unemployment rate

Notes : données trimestrielles CVS. Les données du dernier trimestre affiché sont provisoires.
Source : Insee, taux de chômage au sens du BIT et taux de chômage localisé.

Corsica suffers from a high poverty rate. On the island, 19.8% of the population live in a household whose income is below the poverty line as it outlined in the map below.[153] One of the main causes is that consumer prices are much higher on the island than on the mainland.[154] Montpellier is considered also one the poorest region in France. Rennes and Nantes are the lesser poor region in France.

[153] - https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2019/01/04/en-corse-le-mal-larve-de-la-pauvrete_5404991_3224.html
[154] - https://www.lesechos.fr/2018/02/la-corse-un-territoire-pauvre-en-mal-de-developpement-economique-983676

Poverty rate in France

Rate (%)
19,2% or more
From 14.3 to less than 19.2
From 13.1 to less than 14.3
Less than 13.1

Source: INSEE

(*) Champ : ménages fiscaux (hors ménages en communauté et sans abri) dont le revenu déclaré est positif ou nul.

The island's demography has been constantly growing for the last decade. It was 316,578 in 2012 and it grew to reach 330,354 inhabitants in 2016. It should be mentioned that the population in Corsica between 2014 and 2016 has experienced the most significant growth compared to other regions in France as it is noted in the map below (+1,9%). In 2018, it reached roughly 337,796.

Source Insee : Recensement 2014 et estimation de la population 1er janvier 2016 – Traitement Corsistat

3.2.3 Culture

Corsica is an island with a unique identity and tradition. The language of Corsica was Italian until 1859, and it was substituted by French. "*Corsu"* or Corsican language is the language in Corsica now and it's the most widely spoken language on the Island after French. Moreover, Corsica has its own university which is *Università di Corsica Pasquale Paoli* (Pascal Paoli University of Corsica) where courses are given in *Corsu.*

The Corsican Flag known as the Moor's head, adopted by the General of the Nation Pasquale di Paoli, shows a head wrapped in a bandana to symbolize the new freedom of the Corsican people on a white background [155] which was official during the independence from Genoa. This flag dates back to the battle of Alcoraz in 1096 where the Moors were defeated by King Peter I of Aragon.

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[155] - https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/14/corsican-nationalists-win-historic-victory-in-french-elections

Moving to the cuisine, which is what distinguishes Corsica from mainland France. There, seafood and river fish like trout are very popular. Corsica is well known for its cheeses *brocciu* (similar to ricotta). Other characteristics among their culture are the red and white Corsican wines (*VinuCorsu*).[156] Corsica has produced a number of known artists such as Canta U PopuluCorsu (band), Patrick Fiori (singer), Jean-Paul Poletti (singer), Robin Renucci (comedian), Tino Rossi (singer), Baptiste Giabiconi (model/singer) and others.[157]

3.1 Basque

3.3.1 Politics

The Basque Country is in northern Spain, straddles the border between France and Spain. The Spanish part of the Basque country encompasses four provinces as it mentioned in the map below: Vizcaya, Alava, Guipúzcoa, and Navarra but the administrative region of Basque Country consists only the first three. It is an autonomous community that enjoys a

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[156] - Corsica, p. 7.
[157] - Corsica, p. 7.

high level of self-government in education, taxation, health, and security.[158] However, the French Basque Country consists of three provinces: Labourd, Basse-Navarre and Soule. It does not have its own administrative unit and it is not an official region. In fact, after the French Revolution, it was incorporated in the French department of Pyrénées Atlantiques, together with the Bearn region. It should be noted that today, most of Iparralde's society and political parties demand a separate administrative region –Département du Pays Basque– limited to the French Basque Country.[159]

The Basque Country provinces were incorporated into the Spanish Kingdom in 1512 after resisting foreign invasions like the Romans, the Visigoths, and the Moors.[160] The Spanish Government controlled Basque Country and granted them a degree of autonomy for the next centuries. The Basque governed themselves under local Basque law and customs

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158 - Maite Martínez-Granado, Patxi Greño and Mercedes Oleaga, Basque Country self-evaluation report, p.7.
159 - The Basque Government, The Basque Country Insight into its culture, history, society and institutions, p.8.
160 - Lindsay Murphy, EU Membership and an independent Basque State, p.337

known as *fueros* in exchange for political loyalty to the Spanish monarchy.[161] In 1876, the

Basque country was completely integrated into the kingdom of Spain and stripped of its

fueros.[162]

3.3.3 Economy

The Basque Economy was based on agriculture, crafts, fishing, and trade and now it

hinges on industry mainly "iron and steel, metal processing, shipbuilding, shipping, capital

goods, machine-tooling, chemical industry, paper mills, the auxiliary automotive industry

and rubber, among others"[163]. Services are very important for the Basque economy as trade,

accommodation, and food services are important sources for the Basque community. The

size of the Basque economy represents 6.1% of the Spanish GDP in 2010. [164] The GDP of

the Basque country increased 2.4% in the fourth quarter of 2018 in comparison with the

previous year as is it mentioned in the table below. The Basque economy is based on the

manufacturing sector mainly the production of basic metals and elaborated metal products.

It is one of the most significant focal points of industry in Spain. However, the production

of beverage, food, chemical products and textile sectors in Basque is lower than the rest of

Spain. [165]

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[161] - Lindsay Murphy, EU Membership and an independent Basque State,p.337
[162] - Lindsay Murphy, EU Membership and an independent Basque State, p.337
[163] - The Basque Government, The Basque Country Insight into its culture, history, society and institutions, p.34.
[164] - Maite Martínez-Granado, Patxi Greño and Mercedes Oleaga, Basque Country self-evaluation report, p.7.
[165] - Maite Martínez-Granado, Patxi Greño and Mercedes Oleaga, Basque Country self-evaluation report, p.7.

GDP m/p. Supply. Chain volume indexes. Year-on-year variation rates. Basque Country. %

	2017	2018	2017	2018			
			IV	I	II	III	IV
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND FISHING	6,8	2,3	-2,7	-3,0	0,8	-4,6	17,1
INDUSTRY AND ENERGY	3,1	2,1	3,5	3,7	3,1	1,9	-0,2
Manufacturing industry	3,2	2,2	3,4	3,9	3,1	2,0	-0,1
CONSTRUCTION	3,8	4,3	4,0	2,7	4,1	4,8	5,6
SERVICES	2,7	2,9	2,7	3,1	2,8	2,7	2,9
Trade, accommodation & food services and transport	4,0	2,8	3,6	3,1	2,7	2,5	3,0
Public administration, education, health and social services	2,2	2,4	2,4	2,9	2,3	2,1	2,2
Other services	2,2	3,1	2,3	3,1	3,0	3,2	3,1
GROSS ADDED VALUE at basic prices	2,9	2,8	2,9	3,1	2,9	2,6	2,4
NET TAXES ON PRODUCTS	2,8	2,7	3,3	3,1	2,8	2,6	2,5
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT at market prices	**2,9**	**2,8**	**3,0**	**3,1**	**2,9**	**2,6**	**2,4**

Data corrected for seasonal and calendar effects
Source: Eustat. Quarterly accounts

The rate of poverty rate is lower compared to other countries as it is mentioned in the graph below. It decreased in 2016 to 8% according to Erostat. The risk of poverty rate in Spain and Germany are higher than the rate in Basque. It is worth to mention that the poverty rate in Basque is lower than in other regions of Spain because it is a hub for major aeronautic and energy industries.[166]

Source: Eurostat. Compiled by authors.

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[166] - https://www.orkestra.deusto.es/competitiveness-basque-country/2018/final-outcomes.php

The Table below will show a comparative analysis of the demography of the Basque Country. The population of Basque Country since 2014 is growing slightly untill the last data in 2018 was 2.180.449[167] compared to 2017 which was 2,164,066 in 2017[168]

The Basque Country- Date	Total
2018	2.180.449
2017	2,164,066
2016	2.171.886
2015	2.173.210
2014	2.172.877

Furthermore, the unemployment in Basque in 2019 decreased from 11.3% to 10.2% and the number of empoyed people increased as it showed in the table below.[169]

Unemployment	2019	2018
Unemployed population	106.2 thousand	107.3 thousand
Male	49.2 thousand	55.0 thousand
Female	57.0 thousand	52,2 thousand

[167] - http://en.eustat.eus/elementos/ele0013900/Population_of_the_Basque_Country_by_place_of_birth_accor ding_to_province_and_sex/tbl0013997_i.html
[168] - Orkestra-Basque Institute of Competitiveness of Deusto Foundation, Basque Country Competitiveness Report 2018, p.41.
[169] - Eustat.,

3.3.3 Culture

The Basque culture is unique in spite of the influence of two powerful cultures, the Spanish and the French. The Basque community has its own language which is Euskara. It is one of the oldest languages in Europe and it is classified as Indo-European.[170] The Basque flag is called the Ikurriña as the national flag which consists of a green diagonal cross, a white vertical cross and red background as mentioned in the picture below. The red background means the coat of arms of *Bizkaia* (Biscay in English)[171], the green cross of St Andrew and the white cross was taken from the one super imposed over the oak in this same coat of arms.[172]

The *Pays-Bas* (Basque Country in English) has its own art. During the Renaissance many Basque sculptors flourished, such as Juan Anchieta, Francisco Durrio, Jorge Oteiza

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[170] - Maria-Jose Azurmendi, NekaneLarrañaga and JokinApalategi, Bilingualism, identity, and citizenship in the Basque Country, p.37.

[171] - Bizakaia or Biscay in English: is a province of

[172] - http://www.basquecountry.eus/t32-2286/en/contenidos/informacion/himo_ikurrina/en_461/simbolos_i.html

and others.[173] There are many examples of famous Basque painters like Darío de Regoyos, Ignacio Zuloaga, Aurelio Arteta among others. In addition to that, dancing is one of the popular traditions among Basques. There are two types of dance: saut basque and pas de Basque. The most well-known dances are: "Aurresku: danced in honor of special guests. • Mutildantza: an all-male dance from the BaztánValley. Mascaradasuletina: from Zuberoa, this dance received its name from its Carnivalesque features."[174] It is interesting to mention that the Basque dance needs so much energy as asserted by Voltaire in his book "*ContesPhilosophoques*" that the Basques are "the people who live, or rather jump, in the foothills of the Pyrenees".[175]

The Basque Country has its own TV channels, architectural style, and University. The Basque Country homes are built with white-washed thick stone walls and painted half-timbering and shitters. Their TV station called Euskal Telebista or ETB with five TV channels and five radio stations.[176] Basque Country has also its university called *Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea* OR University of the Basque Country.

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[173] -The Basque Government, The Basque Country Insight into its culture, history, society and institutions, p.47.

[174] - The Basque Government, The Basque Country Insight into its culture, history, society and institutions, p.60.

[175] - The Basque Government, The Basque Country Insight into its culture, history, society and institutions, p.60.

[176] - https://www.eitb.eus/en/

Conclusion

Chapter three explained the reasons why the Catalan, Basque and Corsican nationalist movements are strong by discussing the history, the economy and the culture of each region. The political, and economic history as well as the culture played a key role in the development of the identity of these three regions. As mentioned before, Catalonia is wealthiest in Spain. It has its own history and identity and a different cultural landscape. In the same vein, Corsican culture has a significant role in increasing separatist's sentiment despite its weak economy. The Basque country is a wealthy region, and well known for its successful industrial transformation. Chapter four will examine the demands of the nationalist movements and the reactions of the Spanish and French government towards their demands.

CHAPTER 4

CATALONIA, CORSICA, AND BASQUE: THE DEMANDS AND DIFFERENT GOVERNMENT RESPONSES

The aim of this chapter is to examine the rise of the nationalist movements, their demands and how the French and Spanish governments responded to the demands of the populations and political parties in Corsica, Basque, and Catalonia based on secondary sources in particular articles from Spanish, French, and English newspapers. Chapter three contributes to the thesis objective by contextualizing the three separatist movements in these countries. The aim of this thesis is to better understand and compare the factors that lead the three concepts: irredentism, separatism and autonomism and applying them on the three regions, Catalonia, Corsica, and Basque.

4-1 Catalonia

4.1.1 The rise of Catalan Nationalism

The tensions between Catalan Nationalism and the Spanish state have escalated since Franco's dictatorship. Catalonia enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy[177], but it was abolished under Franco's dictatorship because he desired to restore a unitary state and impose a single national identity. Catalonia restored its autonomous government and

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[177] - Montserrat Guibernau, Secessionism in Catalonia: After Democracy, p. 373.

sectioned a new Statute of Autonomy in areas such as education and healthcare after

Spain's democratic transition in the mid-1970s.[178]

4.1.2 The Catalan's Demands

The demands of the Catalans are divided between those who favor secession and those

who want to maintain unity.[179] The two main political parties in Catalonia's government,

Together for Catalonia and Catalan Republican Left, have different visions. The first wants

independence and while the latter continues to push for a "negotiating table."[180] Other parties

in Catalonia also have different demands. Some parties argue that it is for the Catalan people

to decide its preferred form of government, either within or outside Spain. The political

parties who are in favor of the Catalans "right to decide" were Convergence and Union (CIU),

Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC), Initiative for Catalonia Greens (ICV), the independence

paladins of Solidaritat Catalana (SCI) and Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP). [181] Secondly,

other political parties such as Catalunya Sí que es Pot (CSQP) and Socialists' Party of

Catalonia (PSC) support autonomy and self-determination. One political party is against the

independence, which is CPP (Catalan Patitudo Popular). Some also demand fiscal autonomy,

the right for Catalonia to collect its own taxes.[182]

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[178] - Montserrat Guibernau, Secessionism in Catalonia: After Democracy, p. 373.
[179] - https://www.dw.com/en/spain-pm-faces-protests-after-concessions-to-catalan-separatists/a-47421246
[180] - https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/09/12/inenglish/1536745355_054062.html
[181] - Marti David, the 2012 Catalan Elections: the first step towards Independence, p.510.
[182] - https://www.thelocal.es/20180430/analysis-why-catalan-and-basque-separatists-are-going-different-ways

Moving to Catalans, many polls throughout the years show changing views of Catalans and increasing support for an independent state. Back in 2007, the support for independence was 15 percent.[183] Furthermore, in September 2011, many Catalans demonstrated under the slogan "Catalonia, new state of Europe" in Barcelona on Catalonia's national day, demanding independence.[184] The percentage of Catalans who support independence has increased in 2012. According to a research done by White and Brin-Aguerre in JP Morgan research, the percentage increased in 2012 to 30 percent from 13.5 percent in 2007. Last poll done in July 2018 showed 46.7 percent of Catalans saying they wanted an independent state while 44.9 percent said the opposite.[185]

4.1.3 The Spanish View

In Spain, achieving the Catalan demands is a revolutionary task since it will meet the opposition of the Spanish government. The regime's response made it clear that it will not tolerate any attempt that puts in question the unity of Spain. [186] Mariano Rajoy, the former prime minister of Spain, launched many repressive measures such as confiscating ballot boxes, closing websites, deploying thousands of police officers and arresting Catalan civil servants in September 2017 to stop the Catalan independence referendum.[187] The

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[183] - https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2012-10-15/to-keep-catalonia-in-spain-should-allow-a-vote-to-secede

[184] - Marti David, The 2012 Catalan Elections: the first step towards Independence, p.509.

[185] - https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-politics-catalonia/catalan-separatists-pack-barcelona-to-demand-split-from-spain-idUSKCN1LQ2GM

[187] - https://newrepublic.com/article/153069/spanish-democracy-goes-trial

organizers of the Catalonian independence like the former Catalan vice-president Oriol

Junqueras and former Catalan parliamentary speaker Carme Forcadell and others were tried

by Spain's Supreme Court on charges of rebellion and sedition.[188] In sum, people who

defied the Spanish state in a way considered unlawful referendum on September 2017 were

held accountable. Moreover, the Spanish riot police dealt with the referendum with

violence. They targeted "the voting stations, smashed windows and doors, dragging some

voters away and beating others"[189]. Furthermore, the Madrid government dictated that of

Barcelona and Catalan leaders were imprisoned or driven into exile, such as Carles

Puigdemont who was blocked by the state from returning to the country and called new

elections in December, which served only to confirm the profound split in the Catalan

society.[190] The reaction of the right-wing movement led by Mariano Rajoy was decisive on

no intention of sanctioning any form of referendum on secession because it is

unconstitutional and illegitimate and it will not enter into any negotiations whose aim

would be to give Catalonia more power within the Spanish state.[191]

The current Spain Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez dealt with the issue more

diplomatically after he granted Catalan separatists future talks over the issue of splitting

from Spain. [192] It should be noted that Sanchez promised the Catalans to open talk with the

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[188] - https://newrepublic.com/article/153069/spanish-democracy-goes-trial
[189] - https://newrepublic.com/article/153069/spanish-democracy-goes-trial
[190] - https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/world/europe/spain-catalonia-carles-puigdemont-extradition.html
[191] - Kathryn Crameri, Do Catalans have the right to decide session legitimacy and democracy in twenty first century? P.423.
[192] - https://www.dw.com/en/spain-pm-faces-protests-after-concessions-to-catalan-separatists/a-47421246

president of the current Catalan government Quim Torra because he wants their support for the budget vote.[193]

It is important to shed light on the response of the Spanish government towards the Catalan demands before Mariano Rajoy. Back in 2010, the Spanish Constitutional Court struck down fourteen articles from the 2006 Statute of Autonomy and declared non-constitutional according to the Spanish High Court of Justice. The articles removed were the following:

"(1) The Spanish Constitution acknowledges the existence of a single Spanish nation within Spain. The sentence accepts the use of the term 'nation' applied to Catalonians legitimate only if this is interpreted as void of juridical value. The term ought to be strictly employed in an ideological, historical or cultural context. The sentence emphasizes quite a few times the 'indissoluble unity of Spain' as stated in the Constitution.

(2) The expression 'national symbols' employed in the 2006 Statute of Autonomy is to be interpreted as 'symbols of a nationality', so that there is no contradiction with the symbols of the Spanish nation, the only ones to be properly considered as 'national'.

(3) It is deemed unconstitutional to confer a preferential status to the Catalan language within the Catalan Public Administration. Catalan is confirmed in its status as a preferential language in the Catalan education system. Students have the duty and the right to be fully competent—to speak and write—in Catalan as well as Castilian (Spanish) after completing their compulsory education.

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[193] - https://www.dw.com/en/spain-pm-faces-protests-after-concessions-to-catalan-separatists/a-47421246

(4) The duty to be competent in Catalan in Catalonia is not considered as having the same meaning/importance/legal status as the duty to be competent in Castilian (Spanish) included in the Spanish Constitution.

(5) The verdict rejects the attempt of the 2006 Statute of Autonomy to protect matters already devolved to the Catalan autonomous government from the constant legislation of the Spanish state concerning these areas. The state appeals to the need to guarantee uniformity within the state to justify its measures.

(6) The 2006 Statute sought to eliminate the Catalan economic deficit generated by the endemic imbalance between Catalan contributions to Spanish coffers and state funding received by Catalonia. To avoid that, the Statute demanded that Catalonia's contribution to the so-called 'solidarity fund' should be made conditional on a similar fiscal effort being made by other AACC. With this measure, Catalonia was trying to avoid that an AACC in need of a high percentage of funds from the 'solidarity fund' could afford to lower its taxes as an electoral strategy, while the other AACC had to pay for its needs. This has been deemed non constitutional.

(7) According to the 2006 Statute the Catalan government could set up its own taxes at local level. This has been deemed non-constitutional.

(8) The 2006 Statute established that the state's investment in Catalonia should be on a level with the percentage of Catalan GDP in relation to the overall Spanish GDP. The Spanish Constitutional Court accepts this, if and only if, 'it does not entail an "economic privilege"' for Catalonia and remains without 'binding effect for the State'.

(9) The following articles of the 2006 Statute of Autonomy were also deemed unconstitutional: Articles setting up a Catalan Council of Justice; establishing the

exclusivity of the Catalan Ombudsman concerning the Catalan Administration; and the

status and role of the president of the Catalan High Court of Justice, as the representative of

the judicial power in Catalonia nominated by the King."[194] In sum, the articles removed

were related to symbolic recognition of Catalan identity, policy autonomy, and fiscal

arrangements.

4.2 Corsica

4.2.1 The rise of the Corsican Nationalist movement

The island of Corsica is located in the Mediterranean Sea approximately 100 miles

(160 km) south of France and 50 miles (80km) west of Italy.[195] It is known to many as the

birthplace of the France Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte.[196] The root of Corsica's struggle for

self-determination and sovereignty dates back to the Greek empire's colonization of the

island and its successive foreign occupation by the Romans, Pisa, and the Italian city-state

Genoa. In 1755, Corsica gained independence for the first time under the leadership of

Pascal Paoli after expelling the Genoese from the Island.[197] However, this situation did not

last long. France violently annexed Corsica after fourteen years of political independence.

Multiple nationalist groups emerged such as the ''Fronte di Liberazione Nazionale di a

Corsica'' (FLNC) which played a key role in opposing the French government's policies.

Corsican nationalism started after World War I, and since the 1970s, there have been flare-

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[194] - Montserrat Guibernau, Secessionism in Catalonia: After Democracy, 381-382.
[195] - Encyclopedia of Nationalism, p. 99.
[196] - Encyclopedia of Nationalism, p. 99.
[197] - Andreas Hoffbauer, Competing Claims: When Do Corsican Nationalists Gain Foreign News Coverage?, p.626.

ups of political violence in Corsica carried out by groups supporting the independence movement such as ten thousand bombings targeting symbolic sites, and assassinations of state officials, mayors, and police officers.[198] The level of nationalist violence in Corsica and abroad culminated on February 6 1998, when the Prefect Claud Erignca, the highest-ranked representative of the French government on the island was assassinated by Evan Colonna.[199] Despite that, the level of violence escalated until 2014 when the nationalists laid down their arms.[200]

4.2.2 *The Corsicans Demands*

The Corsicans demands split between those who are seeking autonomy and those who are seeking full independence.[201] Since 1960s, Corsica's Nationalist Movement sought greater autonomy for the island. Other groups such as the National Liberation Front of Corsica demanded independence since 1976 with a campaign of bombings and assassinations.

Furthermore, the political parties in the Corsican government in particular Femu a Corsica (Let's Make Corsica) and pro-independence Corsica Libera (Free Corsica) won by 45.36 percent in the last regional elections in December 2017 and came to power promising greater autonomy.[202] Their demands included amnesty for prisoners jailed for separatist

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[198] - https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/17/world/europe/catalonia-independence-europe.html

[199] - Andreas Hoffbauer, Competing Claims: When Do Corsican Nationalists Gain Foreign News Coverage?, p.626.

[200] - https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/01/world/europe/corsica-catalonia-independence.html

[201] - https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-corsica/corsicas-nationalists-press-for-autonomy-talks-after-local-vote-idUSKBN1DY1UN

[202] - https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/world/fears-of-return-to-violence-haunt-corsica-as-macron-visits-11405436

violence, expanded use of the Corsican language and measures to keep wealthy

mainlanders out of the local property market.[203] In other words, Corsicans wants to put

restrictions on the right to buy property for people who have been residents on Corsica for

less than five years.[204] Another political party in the Corsican government that seeks more

autonomy is Pè a Corsica.[205] It should be mentioned that the alliance of Femu a Corsica

(Let's build Corsica) and Jean-Guy Talamnoi's pro-independence Corsica libera (Free

Corsica) stated that they are seeking more autonomy not immediate independence.

However, the possibility of an independent state of Corsica is not completely ruled out by

the nationalist.[206]

It should be noted that Jean-Guy Talamoni, the President of the Corsican

government confirmed to radio "France inter" that "there will not be, during this decade,

any moves toward full independence."[207] Moreover, Giles Simeoni said to Europ 1 radio

station that "The separatists today have presented themselves as committed to an

exclusively democratic framework and say that it is the Corsicans who will decide. If the

Corsicans do not want independence, there will be no independence."[208] Corsicans

demands are clear; they call for more autonomy as it shown in the last demonstration,

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[203] - https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/world/fears-of-return-to-violence-haunt-corsica-as-macron-visits-11405436

[204] - https://www.dw.com/en/corsica-nationalist-march-draws-thousands/a-42445430

[205] - https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2017/oct/27/beyond-catalonia-pro-independence-movements-in-europe-map

[206] - https://www.france24.com/en/20171205-nationalists-assembly-elections-pe-corsica-autonomy-not-independence-france

[207] - https://www.france24.com/en/20171205-nationalists-assembly-elections-pe-corsica-autonomy-not-independence-france

[208] - https://www.france24.com/en/20171205-nationalists-assembly-elections-pe-corsica-autonomy-not-independence-france

ahead of a visit by President Emmanuel Macron, where Corsicans demonstrated calling for more autonomy.[209]

4.2.3 The French view

Historically, the French government responded to the Corsican demands with repression and unwillingness of the Government to accept their demands and acknowledge their language. The first step in the recognition of a Corsican distinctiveness enacted the *statut particulier* in March 1998 by the Mitterrand that recognized some degree of the cultural specificity of Corsica.[210]

France has never been able to accept a notion of Corsican people, but recently it accepts that Corsica is culturally different from it.[211] In late 1999, the French government in particular the former socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin decided to grant Corsica limited devolution within fiscal, economic, and linguistic areas by issuing a process called "Matignon Proposal."[212] The aim of the process was to damp up nationalist demands without jeopardizing the sovereignty and unity of the French nation by increasing the Corsican cultural and political self-determination.[213] The first phase of the process was to be completed by 2002, allowing Corsica autonomous regulatory power. Moreover, in 2004, the island will enjoy more self-determination, and the Corsican parliament will be able to

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[209] - https://www.dw.com/en/corsica-nationalist-march-draws-thousands/a-42445430

[210] - Patrick Hossay, Recognizing Corsica: Recognizing Corsica: The drama of recognition in nationalist mobilization, p.415.

[211] - Janne Bleeg Jensen, *Matignon sets limits to culture*, p. 70.

[212] - Patrick Hossay, Recognizing Corsica: Recognizing Corsica: The drama of recognition in nationalist mobilization, p.423.

[213] - Janne Bleeg Jensen, *Matignon sets limits to culture* p. 69.

independently amend French laws concerning infrastructure, tourism, sport, economy and schools. However, it was rejected by the Constitutional Council because it was dominated by right political parties.[214] Jean-Pierre Chevènement, a former prime minister, also opposed the project because it endangers the sovereignty of France.[215] Thus, the "Matignon Proposal" was not implemented because it required significant legislative work.[216]

Many times Paris said that it is open to dialogue and to change its relationship with Corsica but many ministers have rejected the most symbolic demands such as the "language" question.[217]It should be mentioned that it is not the first time the French government rejects the demands of the Corsicans. Manuel Vals, a former prime minister, has rejected before the Corsican language demand to become a "co-official" status alongside French.[218] He insisted during a speech to the Corsican Assembly that: "The Republic has only one official language, French, because it is used by everyone."[219] Moreover, he rejected the nationalist demands for the creation of a favorable "resident" status for locals on the island and for an amnesty for "political prisoners."[220] In recent years, the French government and President

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[214] - Patrick Hossay, Recognizing Corsica: Recognizing Corsica: The drama of recognition in nationalist mobilization, p.425.
[215] - https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2000/09/cors-s05.html
[216] - https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/after-scottish-referendum-corsican-contagion/
[217] - https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-corsica-simeoni/talk-or-risk-violence-corsican-nationalist-tells-macron-idUSKBN1FM0OG
[218] -https://www.thelocal.fr/20160705/france-rejects-corsicas-demands-over-language-status
[219] - https://www.thelocal.fr/20160705/france-rejects-corsicas-demands-over-language-status
[220] - https://www.thelocal.fr/20160705/france-rejects-corsicas-demands-over-language-status

Emmanuel Macron dealt with the Corsican demands. He promised more decentralized powers and a significant role for the Corsican language.[221]

France has always opposed full independence, but it has granted greater autonomy to Corsica than any other regions and Paris invested strongly in its infrastructure.[222] Macron offered to add an article on Corsica to the French constitution in order to recognize it[223] but he will not give too much autonomy to Corsica because it will encourage other separatists in France to demand similar measures.[224] The attempt that the French government will make is to include a specific article about Corsica in the Constitution as the interior ministry Jacqueline Gourault said after a meeting with separatists in Ajaccio.[225]

On the 4th of April 2019, Macron re-insists that he will mention Corsica in the Constitution. However, at the same time, Macron rejected other demands as equal status for the French and Corsican languages and amnesty for political prisoners' jailed for pro-independence violence[226] In the meantime, President Macron expressed regret at the assassination of the highest state representative on the Island Claude Erignac who was gunned down in 1998.[227] He added that he is ready to open a new page with Corsica "I want everyone in the [French]

[221] - https://www.dailysabah.com/europe/2019/04/01/france-launches-terror-probe-over-bombs-found-at-corsica-tax-offices
[222] - https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/17/world/europe/catalonia-independence-europe.html
[223] - https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/world/fears-of-return-to-violence-haunt-corsica-as-macron-visits-11405436
[224] - https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/world/fears-of-return-to-violence-haunt-corsica-as-macron-visits-11405436
[225] -https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/926007/emmanuel-macron-sop-corsica-independence-french-consitution
[226] - https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/926007/emmanuel-macron-sop-corsica-independence-french-consitution
[227] - https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2019/04/04/emmanuel-macron-les-corses-meritent-mieux-que-des-guerres-de-tranchees-et-de-position_5445909_823448.html

Republic to be able to claim their identity, their specificity. But if this specificity is to be

the Republic's enemy, then it's an error, and I cannot accept it."[228]

4.3 Basque

4.3.1 The Basque nationalism

Today, as mentioned in Chapter three, the Basque country is located between two

separate geographic areas: Spain and France. The areas within Spain compromised the four

Basque Provinces which are Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, Alava, and Navarre which have their

own administrative structures.[229] The area within France is the Aquitaine region.[230]

Basque's country has its own language which is Euskara, a pre-Indo-European language,

and does not have any relation with another European Tongue.[231]

The rise of the Basque nationalism dates back to the middle of the 19th century.[232] In 1959,

an armed nationalist movement became prominent which is ETA *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*

(Basque Homeland and Freedom). The aim of ETA was to establish an independent

socialist Basque state and to free political prisoners and the demands for self-

determination[233]. ETA launched many military actions such as the assassination of Prime

Minister Luis Carrero Blanco, and their armed activity intensified the following years like

attacking a popular shopping center in Barcelona on June 19, 1987, thousands of acts of

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[228] - https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2019/04/04/emmanuel-macron-les-corses-meritent-mieux-que-des-guerres-de-tranchees-et-de-position_5445909_823448.html
[229] - Robert Clark, Language and politics in Spain and France provinces, p.86.
[230] - Idioga Espiau Gorka, The Basque Conflict: New Ideas and Prospects for peace, p. 2.
[231] - https://jacobinmag.com/2018/08/basque-eta-spain
[232] - Encyclopedia of Nationalism, p. 43
[233] - https://jacobinmag.com/2018/08/basque-eta-spain

kidnapping, arson and blackmail. In 2011, the armed struggle came to an end and ETA announced an indefinite ceasefire publicly and a decommissioning of its arms stocks in 2017.[234]

4.3.2 The Basque demands

The conflict in the Basque Country is a political conflict in which the Basque seeks to defend the right to decide freely about its future and the right to self-determination. Opinion polls show that the residents in Basque Country oppose the right for independence. A recent poll in June 2018 from the University of Deusto in the Basque city of Bilbao found that just 14 percent of respondents wanted independence, and just 17 percent only felt Basque and not Spanish.[235] The reason why the Basque residents oppose independence is that some of them think that separatism has a long, painful, and bloody history in Basque Country (ETA who killed politicians, police officers and civilians).[236] It should be noted that according to the more recent poll in the Basque Government in December 2018 the population that declares itself against the separation of Spain increases four points so far and stands at 37 percent.[237]

As it was mentioned before, ETA as a national liberation movement, aimed to create an independent socialist Basque state[238]. In other words, it supports the separatist demands. A significant Basque community seeks to have the right to decide its own political future. In

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234 - https://jacobinmag.com/2018/08/basque-eta-spain
235 - https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44431122
236 - https://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-spain-basques-20180613-story.html
237 - https://elpais.com/politica/2018/12/05/actualidad/1544014101_754076.html
238 - https://jacobinmag.com/2018/08/basque-eta-spain

the Basque parliament, the political parties, in particular, the Basque nationalist party (PNV) and Eh Bildu (Basque Country Unite) support the right to self-determination and call for bilateral relations with the Spanish state.[239]

Recently, the unilateral independence from Spain in not viable as said Andoni Ortuzar, the president of the Basque Nationalist party, which is the dominant political force in the region and a supporter for a referendum drive: "We have to construct the country for everyone, including for those who feel Spanish"[240]. Moreover, the people in Basque are satisfied in the current level of autonomy but they want more. Andoni Ortuzar favors independence but he believes that "the only realistic goal for Basque Country in the short term is greater control of local institutions such as the courts."[241] In the same vein, the PNV political party proposed last year to link the Spanish regions to the French Basque Country and the neighboring region of Navarre and to formally be acknowledged.[242] Some social movements like the Gure Esku Dago (Basque for 'It's In Our Hands') demands the Basque country to be given a "right to decide" its future relations with Madrid. Oiarbide, the spokesperson of this movement, said: "We want to decide on whether we want an independent, federal, or confederal state, or any other type of relationship."[243]

[239] - https://jacobinmag.com/2018/08/basque-eta-spain
[240] - https://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-spain-basques-20180613-story.html
[241] - https://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-spain-basques-20180613-story.html
[242] - https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/basques-watch-catalan-independence-bid-with-caution-1.3499324
[243] - https://euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/142109

4.3.3 The Spanish and French view

After the death of the Dictator Franco in 1975, the Basque country received a series of benefits. The most important was the 1979 statute of autonomy, which led the Spanish government to recognize the existence of the Basque identity. Moreover, the statute grant Basque Country a taxation system where it collects its own taxes and determines how much to send back to the central Spanish government.[244] The Basque region has more autonomy than the other 16 regions in Spain with its own police force, education system, language and a special financial relationship with Madrid.[245]

Back in December 2004, the Basque parliament asserted its own right to self-determination and included the possibility of secession. However, the Spanish parliament dismissed the proposal without discussion.[246] There is no conflict between the Basque and Spanish government, but the latter considers that ETA is a terrorist organization. However, France considered the conflict as a Spanish security problem related to terrorism. [247] In 2007 Abertzale Left presented two proposals that call for autonomy for the four provinces of the western territory – the Basque Autonomous Community and Navarre; the latter for the three continental provinces – Lapurdi, Lower Navarre and Zuberoa. Both proposals were accepted de facto administrative autonomy within Spain and France, but until now these proposals have been rejected by the two countries.[248]

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[244] - https://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-spain-basques-20180613-story.html
[245] - https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44431122
[246] - https://jacobinmag.com/2018/08/basque-eta-spain
[247] -Julen Zabalo and OierImez, The EU and the Basque Conflict, p.35.
[248] - Julen Zabalo and Oierlmez, The EU and the Basque Conflict, p.36.

The new demand of Basque community is to free Eta's prisoners after being jailed by The Spanish and French governments. Recently, when Pedro Sanchez became Prime Minister after Rajoy's resignation, he declared that the Spanish government would work to bring ETA prisoners to the Basque region in order for them to become closer to their families.[249] As it was mentioned, the Spanish parliament played a role in the negotiation with ETA to put an end to the violence.

Conclusion

Chapter four offered a brief introduction to the rise of Catalan, Corsican and Basque nationalism. Then, it examined the demands of the three regions and investigated the response of the Spanish and French System. The demands of Catalonia are split into two: secession or the right to decide their future and the release the Catalan leaders from prison. Through this Chapter, the Spanish government's response to the Catalan people and the use of the Spanish constitution as a tool to oppress the demands of the Catalans were discussed. The demands of Corsica are clear: autonomy regarding language, control over economic development and to free the political prisoners who were sentenced for the assassination of government officer Préfet Claude Erignac in 1998. They look to seek separatism at a later stage. France opposes the demands of Corsica, but they are ready to reopen dialogue. The Basque community is also divided along two competing visions: those who want the right to decide their relationship with Spain and those who want to secede, in addition to the release of ETA prisoners. The central government opposes their demands. Chapter five will

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[249] - https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/25106/after-eta-the-dream-of-a-basque-state-lives-on

analyze the different factors that lead each region to choose between irredentism,

separatism, and autonomy.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS

In connection with the objective of the thesis that seeks to better understand and compare the factors that lead to the three concepts: irredentism, separatism and autonomism and applying them on the three regions, Catalonia, Corsica, and Basque, Chapter 5 will analyze and point out the different factors that led these regions to choose between the different concepts through various theoretical frameworks. The final part in this chapter will aim at comparing the three cases. This chapter relates to the research question from the perspective of assessing why the separatist sentiment in these regions is strong or weak by understanding the factors that lead to secession.

5.1 Analysis

In order to assess and compare between the three regions: Catalonia, Corsica, and Basque, first of all, the degree of violence in these three countries will be assessed. David Carment examines the level of violence in secession or irredentist conflicts. He posits the variation of the level of violence depending on the presence of policies of denial encompassed by the use of force. It may be true in the case of the Basque and Corsica. As mentioned in the previous chapters, the Basque country and Corsica experienced a degree of violence in order to reach their claims because of the oppression of the Spanish and French government towards their demands. In Basque, the rise of ETA *Euskadi Ta*

Askatasuna, or Basque Fatherland and Liberty as an armed nationalist movement led to many military actions. Moreover, in Corsica, there was the FLNC (National Liberation Front of Corsica), a militant group that aimed to establish an independent state on the Island of Corsica. However, Carment argued that the ethnic conflicts are prone to be more prolonged and more violent than non-ethnic conflict but as it was shown in the previous chapters that the ETA survived 35 years since the rise in 1976 and FLNC emerged in 1959 and laid down its arms in 2014 (around 55 years). Thus, the two armed movement remained a long time contrary to what Carment argued.

The demands of Catalans, Corsicans, and Basques changed throughout the years as mentioned in the previous chapters. It increased with the recent calls to release the nationalist prisoners in Catalonia, Basque, and Corsica. Naomi Chazan and Patrice Mc. Mahon's theory will be used to illustrate and test the three different cases. The demands of the three regions imply a negative relationship with the three types of theories by Patric Mc. Mahon. In other words, Mc. Mahon examines three types of irredentist claims: passive irredentist claims, active or serious irredentist claims and irredentist foreign policy. Thus, the demands of the three regions are implicit in contrast of what Mc. Mahon deduced. In the same vein, Chazan posits two types of Irredentist claims: The first is a situation where an ethnic group is a majority in the state and make irredentist claims and in the adjacent state there is a minority. Secondly, the ethnic group is a minority in two or more countries such as the Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran and seek union with one of the countries or to create an independent statehood. These two assumptions are inapplicable to the Catalonia and Corsica case because a major part of Catalans are living in Catalonia and same for the

Corsicans. It is interesting to mention that the Corsicans live in Marseille which is considered the largest Corsican town. In contrast, the second type of claim posited by Chazan can be applicable to the Basque Case. As observed before, the Basque community is located in two parts: in northern Spain and part of France. Some of the political parties in the Basque government claimed to merge the two parts of Basque in one country.

The theory of Marc Weller and Stefan Wloff shows a relationship with the Catalan, Corsican, and Basque demands. They noted six nature of ethnic claims: Self-determination, internal and external, linguistic, religious and/or cultural rights, access to a host-state or host-nation or to kin-state. The Catalan demands recognition of their culture and linguistic. Corsica also claims the linguistic demand, in particular, their language to be official. The Basque country demands cultural rights and more self-determination. John Loughlin's theory will be more applicable to three cases at the same time because Catalonia, Corsica, and Basque claimed to modify in the short term their political and administrative structures.

Jacob Landau concludes that the regime's character play a role in irredentism. The totalitarian states are more prone to seek irredentism and the liberal democratic regime is more prone to leave this option to oppositions groups. This assumption will not be applicable to the three case studies. Catalonia, Basque and Corsica are located in two countries: France and Spain. As mentioned previously, France and Spain are liberal democracies but while France is semi-presidential republic, Spain is a constitutional monarchy. Despite the type of the regime, the Catalan, Basque, and Corsica cannot choose irredentism or autonomism and secessionism. It is against the Spanish constitution to run any referendum or to choose their future without the approval of the central government.

Jacob Landau and Myron Weiner assert that ethnic minorities who seek autonomy are considered by majorities as a preparatory act for separation and it will affect the internal and external relationship. It is clear that in Corsica, this assumption will be true in that case because Corsicans demand more autonomy for the short term but for the long term they can seek secession as Jean-Guy Talamoni's, pro-independence Corsica libera (Free Corsica), said in an interview with Radio Inter. Moving to the relationship between the French government and Corsica,as shown before, it is a weak one. It opposed many Corsican proposals before but recently with the French president Emmanuel Macron, he is ready to reopen dialogue with the Corsicans. Internationally, the EU indirectly refuses to step in and support the separatist claims[250] because as European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker said in a speech in Luxembourg in October 2018 "If we allow Catalonia — though it's not our business — to separate itself from Spain, others will do the same… "I wouldn't like to have a European Union which consists of 98 states in 15 years' time[251]." Internationally also, in the case of Catalonia, the EU steadfastlyis in support of Spain against the Catalan demands.

Myron Weiner's assumption, as a result, remains applicable to the Basque Case only. He considers that the irredentist demand may not be serious if the irredentist state, who seeks irredentism, is weak and very small and the anti-irredentist state is large and

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[250] - https://www.politico.eu/article/catalan-chill-for-european-separatist-movements-aland-islands-south-tyrol/
[251] - https://www.politico.eu/article/catalan-chill-for-european-separatist-movements-aland-islands-south-tyrol/

powerful. In other terms, Basque country is a small country in northern Spain and part in France.

The surface area of Basque country in Spain and France is around 20664 km^2 (the BAC 7,234 km^2 , Navarre 10392km^2 , and Iparralde 3039 km^2). [252] The population of the Basque country lastly in 2018 was 2.180.449[253] as it shown in the table below. The population of all of Spain is *46,432,313* as of Friday, April 19, 2019. Thus, the Basque community represents a small population compared to Spain. It should be noted that Basque country is not powerful as we have deduced from the previous chapters. It enjoyed autonomy under Spain and does not have to do anything without the approval of the central government. The irredentist demands of Basque to merge the part of France is not serious according to Weiner's assumption.

| | Basque Country | | |
	Total	Males	Females
2018	2.180.449	1.057.944	1.122.505
2017	2.175.819	1.056.378	1.119.441
2016	2.171.886	1.055.541	1.116.345
2015	2.173.210	1.056.881	1.116.329
2014	2.172.877	1.057.455	1.115.422
2013	2.178.949	1.061.844	1.117.105
2012	2.181.590	1.064.377	1.117.213
2011	2.174.033	1.061.336	1.112.697
2010	2.169.038	1.059.741	1.109.297
2009	2.162.944	1.057.431	1.105.513
2008	2.147.754	1.049.680	1.098.074
2007	2.130.996	1.040.659	1.090.337
2006	2.115.383	1.033.400	1.081.983
2005	2.104.396	1.028.179	1.076.217
2004	2.095.014	1.023.506	1.071.508
2003	2.089.950	1.020.775	1.069.175
2002	2.085.058	1.018.799	1.066.259
2001	2.079.210	1.015.970	1.063.240
2000	2.079.228	1.016.098	1.063.130

Date November 15, 2018

Source: Eustat. Demographic indicators (1976-2009) and Municipal inhabitants statistics (2010-2018)

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[252] - Mercedes Niño-Murcia, Jason Rothman, Bilingualism and Identity: Spanish at the Crossroads with Other Languages, p.36

[253] -
http://en.eustat.eus/elementos/ele0011400/Estimated_population_up_to_1_January_of_the__Basque_Country_by_province_and_sex/tbl0011431_i.html

The Donald Horwit'z theory of irredentism states that the economic resource is one of the main motives for the irredentist movement, will be used to illustrate and test the Basque Case. The GDP of the Basque Country as it mentioned in the graphs below posted an increase of 2.4% in the fourth quarter of 2018 compared to with a grew by 2.6% in 2018. Thus, the Basque country is rich in economic resources, as a result, this theory is applicable to the Basque Case.

Year-on-year variation rates of the GDP. (%)
Corrected for seasonal and calendar effects

☑ ■ Basque Country   ☑ ■ State   ☑ ■ European Union-28   ☑ ■ Euro Zone-19   ☑ □ USA

Source: Eustat. Quarterly accounts

As previously noted, there was a split between the demands of the Catalans, Corsicans, and Basque. Some of them claimed for more autonomy. The Lapidoth's assumption which is that autonomy is more granted and demanded for those having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies is applicable for the three cases. To begin with, the Catalans were invaded by romans, Castilians. The Basque country also was invaded by Castilian. As outlined in the previous chapters, Corsicans were invaded by Genoa before becoming an independent state but later on it was annexed by the French.

The role of leadership as Cornell stated play a significant role in increasing the likelihood of politicians and to promote ethnic mobilization to further their own ambitions. This assumption will be used to illustrate and test on Catalonia's case. To begin with, the former Catalonia leader Carles puigdemont who was ousted by the central government after the illegal referendum held in 2017. The current Catalan leader Quim Torra has said that he will stay at his post until the return of Puigdemont to Barcelona. There is no clear goal for Torra. It should be mentioned that Torra was a more radical pro-independence than Puigdemont and his separatist views were hinge on culture and language while Puigdemont focused more on social issue.

Cornell stressed on the role of mass media. In other terms, the central government uses radio stations and newspapers to affect the attitude of the population. This theory is applicable to the Catalan case. The Spanish media were bias by covering the Catalan independent movement. For example, *El Pais* newspaper which is located in Madrid covered the referendum by emphasizing on the strength of the central government. In this

example below, it can conclude the significant role and powerful of the Spanish

government against the Catalan government. Another example from *El pais* newspaper

where they make the Catalan president incompetent because he fooled by prankster.

However, two channels were clear pro-independence bias, taking the position of Catalonian

President Carles Puigdemont are: TV3 and 3/24,[254]

Radio show tricks PM into prank call with phony Catalan leader

MAIOL ROGER | 21/01/2016 - 13:54 CET
Pranksters "just as surprised" as Rajoy at how easily the Carles Puigdemont imitator got through and secured a future meeting

Spain stronger than ever against Catalan separatism, says PM

JAVIER CASQUEIRO / ANABEL DÍEZ | 11/01/2016 - 12:26 CET
Mariano Rajoy seeks to send message of unity after new regional premier is sworn in in Catalonia, but has yet to secure enough support to form a government of his own in Madrid

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[254] - https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/listeningpost/2017/10/spain-media-spin-catalonia-171008112952501.html

M. Svante Cornell as other scholars points out that autonomy can have many
implications on the government. In other terms, acceding to demands of autonomy may be
the first step toward secession. That was clear in the Corsican and the Catalan case.
Furthermore, granting autonomy to one region may be considered as a discrimination
against other groups. The Basque case illustrates this assumption where it claimed more
autonomy once Catalonia demands for independence.

Michael Ross, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler find that natural resources play a key
role in secessionism by using it as a tool to finance the secessionist movement activities.
This assumption is applicable on the three cease studies. The Basque country is rich in
natural resources such as mines, steel, and coal. It should be noted that Basque country was
exposed to the industrial revolution much earlier than other regions of Spain because it is
close to England. [255] As it mentioned in the table below, the industrial production index of
the metal products, rubber, plastic and other non-metallic mineral products are high.

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[255] - https://www.npr.org/2012/10/25/163629203/while-spain-struggles-the-basque-region-shines

	Index
GENERAL INDEX	108,9
MINING AND QUARRYING	50,1
Mining and quarrying	50,1
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY	112,1
Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products	105,7
Textile industry, garments, leather & shoes	86,6
Manufacture of wood and paper products, and printing	111,6
Coke and refined petroleum	99,3
Chemical industry	97,4
Manufacture of pharmaceutical products	141,0
Rubber, plastic and other non-metallic mineral products	93,0
Metallurgy and metal products	110,8
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products	149,9
Manufacture of electrical equipment	81,2
fabricacion de maquinaria y equipo n.e.c	135,9
Manufacture of transport material	126,3
Furniture; other industries; repair and installation	131,2

Source: Eustat. Industrial production index

However, Corsica and Catalonia are also considered rich in natural resource. In Catalonia, the production of the industrial sectors, the metal products have a high index as it outlined in the table below. Moving to Corsica where it has an amount of natural resources like silver, copper, marble, and wood but is not counts as main resource for its economy. It should be noted that Corsica is very rich in natural water resources.

Industrial Production Index (IPI). By large industrial sectors Catalonia. February, 2019 (p)	
	Index
General index (IPI)	**106.2**
Energy	99.0
Industrial products	107.2
consumer goods	105.5
consumer durables	117.4
consumer non-durables	105.0
equipment goods	114.2
structural metal products and transport material	114.3
machinery and others	114.0
intermediate goods	104.4
non metallic, energy or chemical minerals	99.2
other intermediate goods	107.3

Source: Idescat and INE

Ted Gurr mentioned that demonstration in particular in neighboring regions who want to secede also can play a crucial role in secessionism. This assumption will be used to test the case of Catalonia where they intensified their calls for a referendum after Britain voted to leave the European Union and Scotland also voted for independence. Jordi Sanchez, president of the Catalan National Assembly, a pro-independence organization, tweeted: *"While Scotland prepares to discuss a second*

referendum with the EU, we should say without fear that the time for our referendum has also arrived.".[256]

As Crawford Young finds that one of the factors behind the secession is the security dilemmas. In other terms, if the linguistic or religious of the minorities cannot be assured within the exciting state, it will lead to secession. This assumption cannot be applicable to the three regions as mentioned in the previous chapters, the three regions do enjoy their linguistic rights. To begin with, after Spain restored its democracy in 1978, Catalonia retook control over their health systems and education.[257] The Corsican language is taught in schools and universities. However, the French government refused to co-official the Corsican language alongside French. In Basque Country, their language is co-official with the Spanish.

Vina Ona Bartkus stressed on the size of the country as a powerful role to seek secession as Myron Weiner stated before. This assumption can applicable on the Catalonia and Basque country. Catalonia has a surface area of 32,107 square kilometers compared to Spain as a country.[258] Corsica surface area is 8700km^2 [259]. The surface of the Spanish Basque Country part and French is 41.500 km².[260] Thus, according to Bartkus, Corsica is

[256] - https://www.thelocal.es/20160625/brexit-fresh-calls-for-catalan-referendum-on-independence-from-spain

[257] - https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-catalan/catalan-language-revival-fuels-backlash-in-spain-idUSKBN0FJ2E920140714

[258] - http://catalonia.com/catalonia-barcelona/catalonia-barcelona/Catalonia-facts-figures.jsp

[259] - Elisabeth Gallard, Insee, Paul Lheureux, Quatre territoires de comparaison pour la Corse Îles Baléares, Sardaigne, Sicile et Crête, p.5

[260] - http://iledefrance-international.fr/?q=pays/pays-bas

a small country compared to Catalonia and Basque country and cannot seek secession due to the size of its territory.

Another important factor that plays a key role in secession is how much the country pays taxes. The region which pays more taxes than it receives in expenditure is more prone to secede. This assumption will be used to illustrate and test the Catalonia case. Each year, Catalonia pay taxes to Madrid about 10 billion euro (12 billion dollars) more than it gets back.[261] In 2014, paid about $11.8 billion more to Spain's govrnment.[262] In contrast, Basque country has its own tax system where it collects its own taxes and decide how to spend the money. Nevertheless, the secondary education also play a key role in secessionism. In Spain, a significant number of Spanish are not enrolled in secondary education. [263] The education system in Catalonia includes Infant education, Primary education, Compulsory Secondary Education (ESO), and Baccalaureate.[264] A high number of Catalans (72.4%) compared to Spain (68.5%) has completed secondary education as it mentioned in the table below. The Corsicans who have not completed secondary is normal. According to National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies the number of students aged 15 or over, who are out of school, is 134 981 compared to the number of population in Corsica (339,178).[265]

[261] - https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-politics-catalonia-tax/from-new-tax-office-catalonia-hopes-to-grab-billions-from-madrid-idUSKCN1BW10A
[262] - https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/09/30/catalonia-independence-referendum-spain/?utm_term=.55a84828b2d5
[263] - OECD, Catalonia: Spain, p.5.
[264] - Catalonia Government, The educational system in Catalonia, p.1.
[265] - https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/2011101?geo=DEP-2B#figure-6-2

5.2 Comparison

Needless to say, all European separatist movements do not fit into a single model. Therefore, there is a clear pattern to see the unique context of each case. For this reason, in the previous chapters, an overview of the separatist movements in Catalonia, Corsica, and Basque was given. Thus, these three cases do not fit into one context but they vary in importance. First of all, Catalonia and Corsica have an important economic base. On the other hand, Corsica's economy is relatively weak compared to other regions in France. There is no consensus on the demands in the three regions in particular in Catalonia. The Catalan government is split between those who want independence and those who want to choose their future. In Corsica and Basque, they want more autonomy. In portraying the difference between the three regions, the degree of violence amongst them is different. Catalonia does not use violence to reach its demands. However, Corsica and Basque experienced the violence by the rise of the two armed organization: Eta and FLNC. The three regions had felt close since the 19th century when nationalism movements first appeared. Catalonia and Basque are industrial centers in contrast of Corsica which the economy based on tourism and agriculture. Another key difference is Basque collects its own taxes and decides for itself how to spend the money. Without doubt the three regions face the hardest 'route' to reach their demands. The surface area also is an obvious factor that hampers the route for Corsica to reach its demands. It is the smallest region compared to Catalonia and Basque. Even its population is the smallest among the three. The character of the leader plays a crucial role in the relationship between the regional and central government. As outlined before, the former Catalan leader was more radical in dealing with the central government than the

current one. The similarities between the three regions is their colonial historical background. Catalonia, Corsica, and Basque were exposed to different invaders.

Basque is a good example of one of the regions that might follow quickly if Catalan take independence or more autonomy because it will motivate the minorities to reclaim their rights.

5.3 Typology Table

In the table below, a typology table will offer a way to combine the date deduced from previous chapters. It is a result of arrangement process. To be clear, the following table will provide an overview of the various factors that lead to separatism in the three regions.

Conclusion

This chapter aimed to analyze each of the factors that motivate Catalonia, Corsica and Basque to secede. The significant role of economic resources (natural resources) is one of the factors that motivate Catalonia and Basque and discrimination amongst regions, like in Catalonia where the region pays more taxes than the other. The regime type also is a key role in secession. The three regions were oppressed by the local government. Demanding more autonomy will increase the likelihood of secession such as Catalonia once the United Kingdom claimed to secede from Europe. The size of the state is important. Corsica represents the smallest region compared to the two others. The colonial background is a factor that leads to demand more autonomy. The three countries were exposed to colonialism. Leadership, and mass media have a crucial role in the secessionist movement, in particular in Catalonia. The demonstration in other countries help in increasing the secessionist sentiment. For example, demonstrations in Catalonia can contribute to increase the demands of other regions within Spain or elsewhere. Lastly, security dilemma is one of the factors that push for secession where the governments do not let the minorities enjoy their rights.

6.CONCLUSION

Scholars have written about the rise of the nationalist movements and have indicated the factors that lead to each one. This thesis began with a search to find assumptions that enabled to investigate the growth, and roots of Catalan, Corsican and Basque nationalism. Political, economic, and cultural factors have shaped the identity of each country. To begin with, historically, Catalan identity was affected by the political factors since the death of Franco. Catalonia experienced levels of autonomy after Spain's transition to democracy. Economic history also plays a vital role in the development of Catalan identity. Catalonia is a prosperous region in Spain, in particular, its industry, trade, and tourism. Needless to say, the cultural effect also strengthens the nationalist movement. Secondly, in the case of Corsica, just like Catalonia, political, economic, and cultural factors led to form a nationalist movement there. Politically, Corsica was a Genoese colony until the 18th century before the annexation by the French republic. Corsica gained autonomy under the French government. Moving to its economy which is considered poor in comparison to the Basque, and Catalonia, The regions' income hinges on tourism and agriculture. Its culture also played a crucial role in shaping its identity. They have their own languages, own art, and own cuisine among others that differentiate them. Thirdly, the Basque country also has its political issue, in particular the rise of an armed movement called ETA which led to hurdle the relationship with the Spanish Government. Basque's economy is rich in industrial sectors and its own language and culture.

However, there is a change and split in the nationalist demands, in particular among the political parties in each government. It started as demands for independence from one part and the other wants more autonomy or to decide their own future. A long, and continuous persecution by the French and Spanish government was witnessed towards the three nationalist movements which provided a foundation of Catalan, Corsican, and Basque nationalism. In the same vein, the Spanish, and the French government were unwilling to negotiate with them, however recently the two governments showed willingness to reopen dialogue with them.

Returning to the original point discussed in the introduction, I do not believe Catalonia, Corsica, and Basque will realize independence, at least not in the next few years. Although the Catalan and Basque economy is rich, but still the political framework plays a bigger role than its resources. On the other hand, Spain and France will not Catalonia, Corsica, and Basque to secede due to their economic resources and its impact on the French and Spanish economy.

This thesis holds that each case has different factors that motivate each country to demand Irredentism, Autonomism, and Separatism. In addition to the political, economic, and cultural factors, the different factors that were tested in this thesis were the regime character, which plays a role in irredentism, the degree of autonomy which is considered as a step to secession in the future such as in the three regions, and the third factor is the size of the region. Corsica is a small region as a surface area compared to Catalonia, and Basque. The fourth factor is the economic resources where Catalonia and Basque enjoy growing economy. The fifth factor is linked to the historical background: pre-invasion and

pre-colonial. The three regions experienced the invasion. The sixth factor is the leadership

that help in promoting ethnic mobilization to further the nationalist demands. In Catalonia,

the role of leadership is important in order to deal with the central government. The seventh

factor is the role of mass media that help the government in affecting the attitude of the

population. In Catalonia, *El Pais* played that role by issuing articles with misleading titles.

The eighth factor is natural resources that play a crucial role in secession. Catalonia and

Basque represent two rich countries in natural resource. Last but not least, the

demonstration in neighboring state help to increase the secessionist sentiment, such as the

case of Catalonia. The security dilemmas such as the linguistic of the minorities cannot be

assured is one of the factors that help in secession. For instance, Corsica does not enjoy its

linguistic rights. The amount of paid taxes also increase the likelihood of secession.

Needless to say, Catalonia pay more taxes to Madrid government. Lastly, secondary

education is a factor that help in secession.

In a comparative perspective between the three regions: the similarities are that the three

demand more autonomy but each one has a different historical background with a different

culture. It should be noted that there is no consensus on the demands. The violence in the

Basque country and Corsica differentiate them from Catalonia. The economic resources are

a feature of Catalonia and the Basque since Corsica is the weakest economy in France and

depends heavily on tourism.

Catalan, Corsican, and Basque's question for independence leave one with many questions

about the future. The rise of the extreme right in Europe will affect the separatist

movements especially in Catalonia where the demands are still fresh. Far-right parties in Europe have made key electoral gains. In Germany, for the first time, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AFD) which is an anti-euro party entered the federal parliament in 2017. In Sweden, the Sweden Democrats party who made a significant win in the 2018 general election has its roots also in neo-Nazism. Going back to the two countries that we examined in the thesis, in France, the rise of far-right known by National Front led by Marine Le Pen rose after the defeat in the presidential election in May 2017. In Spain, the far-right party is expected to win a significant number of seats in the upcoming elections on April 28, 2019. However, what differentiates the Vox political party with other far-right political parties in Europe is that the latter have focused on the opposition of the immigration issue, but Vox political party is focused on the opposition of pro-independence movement in Catalonia and a recentralization of the state which lead to the abolishment of autonomous regions. It should be noted that this party relies on two basic ideas: Unity of Spain, and freedom which means the free market, the freedom of Spaniards, among others. Thus, the rise of the far-right political party will affect the separatist movement's ambitions by oppressing their demands further. However, the rise of the extreme right in Europe will lead to increase the nationalist demands and to demonstrations, following the government's oppression.

Regarding the Basque Country, as it was mentioned in this research, a cease-fire was accepted and is still in effect. Moreover, fiscal privileges for the country are significantly more than Catalonia. This can help to understand why the Basque country still maintains the truce. However, there is no guarantee that this situation will continue.

Corsica, the two current nationalist parties Femu a Corsica, led by Gilles Simeoni (which prefers autonomy) and Corsica Libera of Jean-Guy Talamoni (which prefers independence) – take control of the Corsican Assembly. Emmanuel Macron, the French president still oppose the independence and affirm France's unity. Since 2014, the armed movement called National Liberation Front of Corsica declared a ceasefire. However, the violence could return to Corsica. In fact, in March 2019, six homes were bombed but no injuries on the day Macron's visit were announced. Recently, in April 2019, bombs were found at public buildings. Furthermore, Gilles Simeoni has declared in the past that violence could erupt again on the island if it did not grant the autonomy. Thus, this will affect the economy of Corsica because it hinges on tourism as its main sector. (Impact of climate change on Agriculture)

Another challenge that will face Corsica is Climate change. As it outlined in the thesis, Corsica's economy is based on the tourism and its rich water resources. Climate change will have repercussions on Corsica's forecast. In other terms, the forecasts will witness an annual decrease and on the groundwater recharge from precipitation which will result in increasing of water resources, in particular, in summer. These modifications will affect Corsica's economy because it based on tourism and the island's weather makes it known among tourists. In the coming years, the question of separatism remains a crucial challenge for Europe. The rise of the extreme right in Europe might calm and ignite at the same time the nationalist demands.

In sum this thesis points to the probability of the future of nationalist movement in Europe, in particular, Catalonia, Corsica, and Basque. This study sets out to identify which factors

were driving demands for secession or autonomy in these countries. The framework itself

must be regarded as novel in so far because it provides a new comparison between these

three regions. Moreover, this thesis filled the lacuna of time by providing the latest data.

With this my study aims to contribute to the wider social scientific field of secessionism

and minority nationalism.

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