

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

IN THE NAME OF THE FATHER THE SON AND THE HOLY
PARTY, THE CASE OF THE PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY

by
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A thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
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
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
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
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Special thanks my father Ghaleb and uncle Ghazi who made me fall in love with history and politics respectively.

AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

Nour Aridi for

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Title: In the Name of the Father the Son and the Holy Party, the Case of the Progressive Socialist Party

It has been known that the Druze are a minority in the Middle East and in Lebanon and have struggled to retain the political power they once had. After many obstacles, wars and inter-Druze conflicts, came along a young Kamal Jumblat and changed Druze political history in modern Lebanon, if not Lebanese politics as a whole, as well as Jumblat family history

This thesis is a product of research regarding the Druze community's history, with a focus on the Jumblat family and more importantly the Progressive Socialist Party.

This project shows the transition of the party's constitution from being secular working on socialist principles to a sectarian one working to protect the Druze community.

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENT.....	v
ABSTRACT.....	vi
ILLUSTRATIONS.....	ix
TABLES.....	x
Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
I. THE DRUZE, THE EMIRATE, AND MODERN LEBANON	6
II. THE MAKING OF THE PARTY.....	34
A. Events Surrounding the Conception.....	35
1. Regional and International Events.....	35
2. Local Events.....	38
B. Demographics.....	42
III. POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF THE DRUZE IN LEBANON.....	50
A. 1860 and 1943, Struggles to Remember.....	50
1. The war of 1860: first Civil War.....	50
2. 1943: Independence or Curbing?	48
B. The Progressive Socialist Party: Evolution.....	50
1. 1958, the Start of Change.....	50
2. War of the Mountain: the Big Clash.....	58
3. Ta'ef Agreement: Huddle Around the PSP.....	67
4. 1958, 1983 and 1989, the Link.....	71
a. War of 1958.....	71

b.	War of the Mountain.....	73
c.	Ta'ef and the Turbulence.....	74
IV.	Conclusion.....	77
V.	Bibliography.....	81

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 2.1.....	34
Figure 3.1.....	64
Figure 3.2.....	66

TABLES

Table 2.1.....	43
Table 2.2.....	44

INTRODUCTION

The Druze community is a small minority that has been persecuted for a long period of time in history; nonetheless, it has had a rich, influential role in the history of the Lebanese politics. If it were not for Emir Fakhreddin Al Ma'ani II, Lebanon, as it is today, would have probably never existed. The origins of this country go back to the Emirate of Mount Lebanon, which was built by the Druze Emir. Mount Lebanon was prosperous and was ruled by Druze Emirs until power was passed over to the Chehab Sunni Emirs.

People's talk about the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) in Lebanon is evidently and directly connected to the Jumblat family. The Party has been run by a Jumblati since its inception in 1949, and, up until this date, it seems that the Party's rule by a Jumblati will continue on throughout the third generation. Kamal Jumblat, the Jumblati leader, overcame many obstacles during his tenure. As Druze feudal lords, the Jumblat family struggles between moving toward a modern, more accepting political orientation of the Party or enclosing the Party to its particularity as a representative of the Druze community in order to protect this minority that has been always persecuted¹. Being a political superpower that once shared Mount Lebanon with fellow Maronites,

¹ Nga Longva and Roald, *Religious Minorities in the Middle East*. p 248

the Druze formed approximately 50% of what was known as Lebanon. Post-colonial Lebanese demographics changed; Druze numbers decreased to only 6.7% of total Lebanese population facing the large population of Sunni and Shi'i². With this downfall in numbers of the Druze population came the fading political power possessed by the Druze.

Essentially, this relapse in the Druze community necessitates answering the following question: How did the traditional inherited feudal and communal leadership affect Jumblat family's modern political leadership of the PSP?

Consequently, this thesis aims at exploring how the Jumblat family turned its Party from a secular one into a sectarian one. Three major events have been identified as possible catalysts to the changed course of the Party from a party that targets secularization – internal and governmental – to one that conforms with traditional feudality and is Druze dominated. The three events are the Civil War of 1958, the War of the Mountain, which was instigated in 1982, and the Ta'ef accord in 1989.

In order to achieve the goal of thesis, I will use Fawwaz Traboulsi's book, titled "A History of Modern Lebanon," to link Druze's existence and struggles with the ones of the Maronites. Since I have used this source to concentrate on the Maronites, a brief of the relationship between the Druze and the Maronites would serve this paper's

² Richani, *Dilemmas of Democracy and Political Parties in Sectarian Societies: The Case of the Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon 1949-1996*.

progress, as the brief will provide some of the schematics of the Lebanese politics after obtaining Independence from the French.

Also, to study the Druze as a minority group in the Middle East, the book titled “Religious Minorities in the Middle East” written by Anh Nga Longva and Anne Sofie Roald will be used as a guide to the different theories regarding minorities in an area where Sunni Muslims have been a dominant force for more than thousands of years.

Kamal Salibi’s book, titled “The Druze: Realities and Perceptions,” will also add value to this thesis, as it gives an insight into the Druze faith and religious belief and their history and practices. Combined with Yusri Hazran’s writings and Abbas Abou Saleh’s “Modern History of the Mouahidin Druze,” the thesis draws an inclusive picture of Druze history, their traditions, and, most importantly, how they managed to establish themselves as a powerhouse during Ottoman occupation and acquire semi-autonomy along with the Maronites. Both of these books include the history of the Jumblat and Arslan families’ feud in Lebanon and during the Independence.

Fawwaz Traboulsi contributes to the literature, as he delves into the details of the Lebanese conception, which is fundamental to understanding Druze-Maromite political dynamics, how they grew and lived along each other, and, later on, how the Maronites became rulers of Mount Lebanon. With this newly acquired position, the Maronites surpassed their political shrewdness by having most of the privileges in Lebanon after the Lebanese Independence even though they were a minority living within a large Muslim dominated area.

A very important piece incorporated in my study will be Nazih Richani’s “Dilemmas of Democracy and Political Parties in Sectarian Societies: The Case of the Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon 1949-1996.” Richani’s book contains official data collected from the Party’s archives. This data will direct me through Walid and

Kamal Jumblat's policies and will present those policies' effects on the community's leadership. The book not only contains historical facts but also quantitative data to be analyzed. It also provides information to be examined concerning the demographical changes the Party went through in different historical phases since its inception in 1949 until the post-Ta'ef phase.

Edito Creps' research volume books on the PSP and the Jumblat family, "The Jumblat Leadership: From Kamal Jumblat to Walid Jumblat," will provide me with speeches and manifestos presented during different eras of the history. These books are valuable because they present interviews done with highly ranked members in the Party, which would provide understandings into the Party's stand on sectarianism and political affiliation during and after the war.

Marwan George Rowayheb's piece, titled "Walid Jumblat Alliances: The Politics of Adaptation," explains how Walid Jumblat dealt with the heavy burden that had been laid on his shoulder after his father's assassination in 1977. Another piece by Rowayheb, titled "Political Change and the Outbreak of Civil War the Case of Lebanon," completes the former's objective by proving the PSP's will to do everything in its capacity in order to protect the Druze. The end result of Jumblat's fight and compromise show that he would do anything to keep his community's well-being above all else.

This thesis also presents a part of William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton's book, titled "A History of the Modern Middle East." The purpose of this presentation is to display the expansion of the PSP to become a regional entity (mostly because of its leader, Kamal Jumblat). I will examine how this development has affected both, (1) the Druze as a communal sect in Lebanon and the Party's power in Lebanese politics (2) as

well as the regional and international events that occurred during the Party's inception and helped shape its manifesto.

Charles Winslow's book, titled "Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society," is an important addition to my collection since it exposes various aspects of the civil war. The book meticulously addresses many rounds of the war. It also provides a framework, which I will be using in order to discuss the events of the War of the Mountain and the Ta'ef agreement.

CHAPTER I: THE DRUZE, THE EMIRATE, AND MODERN LEBANON

Since its Independence, Lebanon has been a confessional “democracy.” The core constituent of the Lebanese political system is the religious orientation of its citizens. After the proclamation of the state of Greater Lebanon by General Gouraud in 1920, the Druze community represented 6% of the total population. Religious communities’ sizes determined the political representation in the government and the parliament. The National Pact of 1943 emphasized this sectarian political division. This confessional division has deprived the Druze in Mount Lebanon from their privileges, which had previously enabled them to rule the Emirate alongside the Maronites. There is some kind of parallelism between the 1860 civil war and the 1943 pact; in the former example, the Druze failed to transform their military win over their Maronite rivals to a political win. The French interfered in favor of the Maronites and ordered the Ottoman Empire to find a new ruling system³. In the latter example, the prominent Druze figure, Emir Majid Arslan, an Emir coming from a long lineage of Druze notables, fought for Lebanon’s Independence and became known as the ‘hero of the Independence’. He supported the National Pact against the French. His personal guards were considered the national guards, but they appeared empty handed as they had no place in the decision-making processes of the country’s political system. Thus, Emir Majid Arslan’s

³ Hazran, *The Druze Community and the Lebanese State*. p 21

cooperation toward Lebanon's Independence was disregarded. After the Independence was granted, Druze became a minority and lost their privileges. Many of the other Lebanese religious sects deviated from their former feudal lords, who controlled their lives (i.e. Al Assaad family in the South for the Shi'a, Edde family in Keserwane for the Maronites, Salam in Beirut for the Sunni), and replaced them with political party affiliation. Nonetheless, the Druze kept supporting the feudal lords or traditional leaders that have been in power since at least the twentieth century. This begs the question of why the Druze are still attached and attracted to their feudal lords instead of taking the path that many other religious sects have already taken. Druze remained rallied around historical notables and land owners that survived wars and political struggles, the Jumblat and Arslan families, while other sects rallied around new political figures.

There has been an accordance between most of the scholars about the Druze community regarding their solidarity and their willingness to stick together despite their political adversities if a threat from the "outside" arose. Fuad Khuri states that "the Druze see themselves as a community made up of brothers and sisters, which induces in them a strong sense of equality"⁴. Lebanon, which started as the Emirates under Ottoman rule, was ruled by a feudal system⁵. This feudal system was dominated by mainly two sects, the Christians – mostly Maronites – and the Druze. Bernadette Schenk translates the Druze's minority and religious aspect into what she calls a

⁴ Salibi, *The Druze: Realities and Perceptions*. 63

⁵ Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*. 1

‘closed’ community. She explains how conversion into the Druze is not an option as well as marriage from another sect⁶. Through this definition, which most scholars would agree upon, Druze’s interaction with other communities was minimal. Schenk continues describing the Druze community as being accused of isolationism and separatism⁷; this point is not accepted by Druze historians⁸.

Before 1860, competition was between ruling families, regardless of their religious beliefs, and the “Reglement Organique,” created by France and the Ottoman Empire. This changed into religious contest⁹. Therefore, this system, even though it solved an important political problem that occurred and might have stricken again, has come up with a new problem, which is the difficulty for different societies to integrate and interact socially¹⁰. The specificity of the region’s minorities as a whole is their political integration, especially in Syria and Lebanon¹¹; this integration makes conflict arise on two fronts: (1) minority versus majority and (2) minority versus minority. Minorities would fight for their rights against the overwhelming majority while still fighting against each other to get the most advantages that they can against the other minorities and therefore impose their dominance over them. That was the case of the Maronites and Druze in the nineteenth century, which entailed fighting a war against the

⁶ Salibi, *The Druze: Realities and Perceptions*. 79

⁷ Salibi. 79

⁸ Hazran, “Between Authenticity and Alienation.”

⁹ Saadeh, *The Social Structure of Lebanon*. 52-53

¹⁰ Saadeh.

¹¹ Nisan, *Minorities in the Middle East*. 14

Ottoman Empire for their autonomy and existence within an autonomous body while trying to topple each other in order to ensure one's dominance over the other.

The "Reglement Organique" political system clearly showed the political triumph of the Maronites along with the French colonial. They assumed power over the Druze, who were left without any help from the Sunni surroundings due to the Sunni's lack of belief in the Druze Muslim's faith¹². Lebanon's new regime of power sharing, which was based on a council representing the country's main constituents managed by a non-Lebanese Christian 'mutasarraf,'¹³ involved four Maronites, three Druze, two Greek Orthodox, one Greek Catholic, one Sunni, and one Shi'i. This council showed the Christian's superiority between both parties, which, later on, became minorities after the construction of Greater Lebanon. However, this power sharing system prevailed because of its ability to maintain peace between the two historical enemies for more than sixty years until the creation of Greater Lebanon¹⁴. This "Reglement Organique" was the dawn of a new era, where the rulers of the last system became a minority ruled by what was previously a minority in the old system¹⁵. While the military victory of the Druze, in 1860, proved to be a political defeat, the Maronite Church rose, and its power grew stronger. With the abolition of feudalism in the new regime, the Church became

¹² Nga Longva and Roald, *Religious Minorities in the Middle East*. p 248

¹³ Ruler in the new Mutasarrifia system. Saadeh, *The Social Structure of Lebanon*. 53

¹⁴ Hazran, *The Druze Community and the Lebanese State*. p 4

¹⁵ Hazran. p 22

the political refuge to many, shifting political allegiance from noble families to clergy¹⁶. After the end of World War I and the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, the colonial powers, Britain and France, divided the region's territories between each other and drew new borderlines. The conquests of the Allies in the Great War did change the social status of the Druze in Lebanon. However, the conquests could not affect their political elite¹⁷. The creation of Greater Lebanon after the treaty of Versailles according to the Sykes-Picot plan was problematic for both, Christians and Druze. The fabrication of this new state involved adding more sects, which would make Christians and Druze a minority; hence, the Christian versus the Druze contest for survival has become each sect's struggle for its own survival against the surrounding majority of Greater Lebanon¹⁸. The purpose of the state of Great Lebanon for the Maronites was for it to be a home for Christians in the East. Their wish was granted by France with the help of the Maronite Church presided by Patriarch Elias Howayek. However, between the anti-French sentiment expressed between 1918 and 1920 in favor of Arab nationalism¹⁹ and the insistence of the Maronite claim for a state of their own where they can feel safe, France opted to choose the latter course of action. According to Traboulsi, the creation of a Christian homeland for the Christians, as he calls it 'Project Lebanon,' was made a

¹⁶ The two main poles of Lebanese politics became Bkirki and Beit Eddine. Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*. p 45

¹⁷ Hazran, *The Druze Community and the Lebanese State*. 22

¹⁸ Saadeh, *The Social Structure of Lebanon*. 56

¹⁹ Hazran, *The Druze Community and the Lebanese State*. 27

priority to the French²⁰. The negotiations between the French, who had already come to the help of Christian minorities after the war of 1860, were more than successful; as soon as Greater Lebanon was announced in 1920 by General Gouraud, “the Maronites were already established as the highest caste”²¹. Within this time frame, the Druze community was divided into two groups: (1) a majority that calls for integration within the Arab nation while maintaining the community’s particularity and (2) a minority group calling for a Muslim nation revival even in its ‘heterodox’ communities²². Arab nationalists were led by Jumblat, al-Imad, and Arslan families who paid tribute to the Hashemite Prince Faisal when he arrived to Damascus. This marked the beginning of the true French threat of taking over Lebanon²³.

What is worth-mentioning and needs to be carefully examined is the Jumblat leadership. This leadership is an old adversary of the Yazbaki one. The adversary is represented in this example by both Arslan and al-Imad families. This event shows that this community, which has become a minority, has stuck together regardless of its historical feuds and enmity in order to face the upcoming waive of French mandate, revolving around the ‘Project Lebanon.’ The new state, which was declared in 1920, was a drawn-up state, just like most of the states in the Middle East (Syria, Palestine, Iraq, and Jordan)²⁴. It was made to satisfy the needs of Britain and France. This new

²⁰ Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*. 50

²¹ Saadeh, *The Social Structure of Lebanon*. 56

²² Nga Longva and Roald, *Religious Minorities in the Middle East*. 256

²³ Hazran, *The Druze Community and the Lebanese State*. 26

²⁴ Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*. p 81

state of Greater Lebanon comprised the old state of Lebanon – or Mount Lebanon – and the main coastal cities, including Tyr, Sidon, and Tripoli, given that Beirut was already annexed to Mount Lebanon in 1864²⁵. It became clear to Druze notables, after the war of Maysaloun and the defeat of King Faisal, that their only means of survival in the region was through a system of coexistence with the Christians and the French authority²⁶. Even though many of the Druze community joined rebel forces in Wadi Al Taym (Beqaa region) and Syria, many feudal leaders asked their followers to stay clear from any revolutionary action because of its implications and the upheaval it would cause between them and the Christians²⁷. The first break within the Druze ranks was in August 1921 when a member of the Wahab group assassinated Fuad Jumblat, leader of the Jumblat family²⁸. Wahabis were a family that still paid tribute to the Hashemites. Assassinating a major family leader (feudal leader) was a serious threat to the stability of Mount Lebanon as the Jumblat family were, and still are, one of the most popular and politically influential entities within the Druze community in Mount Lebanon. It served as a warning to all other families who, just like the Jumblatis, understood that they had to adapt to the new regime and accept the French domination²⁹.

²⁵ Clyde G. Hess and Bodman, “Confessionalism and Feudality in Lebanese Politics.”

²⁶ Hazran, *The Druze Community and the Lebanese State*. p 27

²⁷ Abbas Abou Saleh, *Modern History of the Mouahidin Druze*, First (Beirut: Arab House for Science, 2013).

²⁸ Hazran, *The Druze Community and the Lebanese State*. p 27

²⁹ Hazran. p 27

These families were mostly former advocates of Arab nationalism, but, due to geopolitical change in the region, they had to shift their stance in order to ensure the community's best interest and secure its survival. The Jumblat family changed their political position, and Nasib Jumblat, who was the leader of the family, called for deeper relations between Lebanon and the French³⁰. Other Druze families stood firm with their pro-Arab nationalist beliefs and started to hunt down what they considered as Druze collaborators (families that accepted French mandate), French officials, and Christians through their armed bands, and the result was, as previously mentioned, the death of Fuad Jumblat³¹. Assassinating Fuad Jumblat, the director of the Chouf region, came as a blow to this historical feudal family as well as a leading political power within the Druze community. The Wahabis were counting on that except that their goals were not achieved; pragmatists kept on collaborating with the French, and the Jumblat family legacy continued with Nazira Jumblat, wife of the belated Fuad, who took many important political decisions³². The realist movement, who dealt with the French authorities, supported the claim for an independent entity, which would be set apart from Syria, but, at the same time, refused isolating themselves economically from the surroundings³³.

³⁰ Hazran. 27

³¹ Hazran. 27

³² Hazran. 27

³³ Abou Saleh, *Modern History of the Mouahidin Druze*.

Not only do the Druze possess a political identity but also a strong adherence to their homeland. They still see Mount Lebanon as the Druze Mountain, considering it to be their own land and their responsibility to protect. This attachment to the land came from their role as protectors of the state of Mount Lebanon and the Syrian shores back in the Mutasarifia ruling system. The Druze lived in the valleys or steep parts of the mountains, where it was hard to raise crops. They assumed their roles as survivors, fighters, and guardians of the state of Mount Lebanon. In fact, they were still able to grow seasonable crops to take care of themselves. The Christians, on the other hand, lived on hill tops, where it was easy to grow year-round crops, involving themselves in trade and craft³⁴. Geographical distribution of both sects was an important factor in the economic development of the Maronites, which made it easier to abandon their feudal lords and to impoverish the Druze who had to stick with their lords in order to survive³⁵. On a religious level, the Druze's identity is best described by what most scholars call *taqiya*. Hazran refers to an article written in 1985 to try and define this policy. It mainly consists of four points: (1) concealment of the Druze religious teachings, (2) "the tendency to adopt the dominant religion of the immediate environment", (3) the obedience to the government no matter its type, and (4) being neutral on any case, but if there is a need, form an alliance with the strongest faction³⁶.

³⁴ Abdel Malak, *History of Feudalism in Lebanon*.

³⁵ Abdel Malak.

³⁶ Hazran, "Between Authenticity and Alienation."

When it comes to the Druze community in Lebanon, there are some misrepresentation of their role; as mentioned above, the Druze have never obeyed any form of government except the French mandate, which was basically obeyed by every sect in Lebanon, and, as revealed later on, they have participated actively in change and reforms in the Lebanese political system.

The Druze leaders were willing to integrate themselves within the institutions of the newly formed Lebanese state, not only out of acceptance to the ideological principles of the state. It was the *fait accompli* of French presence, Maronite (or Christian) dominance, and the crushing of the revolts in Syria and Wadi Al Taym led by Sultan Al Atrash (Druze Arab nationalist leader)³⁷ that led the Druze to take the only choice of integration within the state's institutions. Druze traditional leaders or feudal families took a pragmatic policy, and the two most prominent families, Jumblat and Arslan, asked their fellow Druze rebels to stay away from Mount Lebanon in order to keep the fragile peace reigning since 1864 and to avoid another massacre³⁸.

When it came down to writing Lebanon's and Syria's constitutions under the French mandate, the Druze were represented in the committee and agreed to article 95, which stands still until our present day. The article allows for the representation of every religious sect in all the public institutions³⁹. The French had no objections; in fact,

³⁷ Zamir, *Lebanon's Quest: The Road to Statehood 1926-1939*. 14

³⁸ Hazran, *The Druze Community and the Lebanese State*. 29

³⁹ Abou Saleh, *Modern History of the Mouahidin Druze*.

they did nothing to destabilize the authority of the traditional leadership of the Druze⁴⁰. This attitude calmed the leaders for two decades at least and enabled the Druze to keep on cooperating with the French authorities until 1943. After President Bechara Al Khuri, Riad Al Sulh and three other ministers of the cabinet were taken captive into the fortress of Rachaya. Emir Majid Arslan played a pivotal role in the success of the Lebanese Independence. Being a minister in the cabinet at the time, he was not taken with his fellow members; therefore, Habib Abou Shahla and himself took it upon themselves to claim their government (constituted of the two of them) as the legitimate government of the Lebanese state⁴¹. Arslan's forces clashed with the French in the village of Ain 'Anoub after he had ordered them to mobilize, and it is known that Sa'id Fakhreddine, a Druze, to be the first martyr of the independence⁴². This might be a fairytale story. One might assume that the Lebanese did not establish their Independence that way; instead, Independence was achieved through an international accord between Britain and France that led the French to relinquish its mandatory power over Lebanon and deliver what was promised after World War I, an independent state. However, according to one theory, this could not have occurred without the other. The British influence and pressure would not have been a success if the Lebanese President along with his cabinet and, later on, Emir Majid Arslan did not ask and strive

⁴⁰ Hazran, "Between Authenticity and Alienation."

⁴¹ Abu Salih, *The Role of the Druze in the Region*. 81-82

⁴² Abu Salih. 82

for the Independence even after the French took drastic measure. Domestic and international politics collided together to ensure the complete Independence of Lebanon, which one of its main pillars was a Druze. Arslan became the 'hero of the Independence' and the figure of the Druze in the new regime, which supported the national pact – the unwritten agreement that distributes power between all the Lebanese communities – unequivocally. A new Druze political figure was on the rise; Kamal was the son of Fuad and Nazira Jumblat. The Yazbaki and Jumblati political clash continued. This time, it was between the new young Jumblati leader and Emir Majid Arslan. Jumblat, who was elected into parliament for the first time in 1943, was afraid that this pact would weaken the role of the Druze even more because of this Maronite-Sunni partnership⁴³.

The identity of Lebanon had to be decided: Was it an Arab state, a Muslim state, or a state that was a portal to the West? Suggestions were presented. The two most noticeable suggestions were (1) the return and annexation to Syria or (2) the joining of the fertile crescent, a project launched by Nuri Sa'id by Hashemite ideology, proposing to unify Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and the Eastern part of Jordan into one state and then create an Arab league⁴⁴. The Druze's immediate reaction was that if it had to come to either of those choices, joining Syria would be the obvious choice, for joining the Hashemite Kingdom in Iraq would mean allying with a colonial power just after

⁴³ Hazran, "Between Authenticity and Alienation."

⁴⁴ Abou Saleh, *Modern History of the Mouahidin Druze*.

getting rid of another. In addition to that, they feared that this conglomeration would reignite talks of ‘Small Lebanon’ or the state of Mount Lebanon, where the Maronites would be more powerful than before. Therefore, if it would come to any of these two solutions, taking part in Greater Syria, where the Lebanese are free from any external protection, a target they have acquired after the Independence as well as being part of what they have believed in, an Arab nation, proved to be a perfect fit⁴⁵. Then again, in the 1944 at the Alexandria discussions, there was a regional consensus on Lebanese sovereignty and its alienation from Syria⁴⁶.

From the late 1940s until the late 1950s, the region’s regimes were crumbling one after the other due to a succession of coups. Egypt, Syria, and Iraq fell under new regimes during this time period, all three being the backbone of the Arab nationalism. While in Lebanon, an attempted coup by the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP) was crushed. Party leader Antoun Saadeh was executed without appearing in court. The coup was motivated by opposition of foreign policy President Bechara Al Khuri. The opposition turned toward internal policies and called for reforms against claimed corruption. This movement was led by Druze leader Kamal Jumblat and Camil Chamoun⁴⁷. The rupture between Jumblat and Arslan continued and grew after the former’s accusation to the regime. Arslan served as minister of defense in the first

⁴⁵ Abou Saleh.

⁴⁶ Abu Salih, *The Role of the Druze in the Region*. 88

⁴⁷ Abu Salih. 81

cabinet formed after the Independence because of his alliance with Al Khuri in the parliamentary election of 1943⁴⁸.

Kamal Jumblat declared, on May 1st 1949 in Beirut, the conception of a party, the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). The Druze leader from Mokhtara – Al Shouf – had decided to announce the rise of the Party in Beirut on Labor Day, inserting the word ‘socialist’ within its title. This summarizes the path taken and the cause toward which the leader tends to fight⁴⁹. Kamal Jumblat’s perception of politics changed the course of Druze existence and representation. He insisted on institutionalizing and formed a party, which made the relationship between him and the state a mutual institutional one instead of dealing with the state by the means of traditions, person to institution as Emir Majid Arslan did. As much as the PSP formed a platform for the Druze community to express themselves and regain some of their past glories, Jumblat’s Party and ideology surpassed the Druze community and attracted members of other sects⁵⁰. This openness exposed a new face of the Druze; the *taqiya* social and political system has been changed as well as the traditional personal representation. Kamal Jumblat was still perceived as a leader from the old noble and feudal families of the Emirate, but, at the same time, he also had a modern approach to politics by understanding the state and its institutions.

⁴⁸ Abou Saleh, *Modern History of the Mouahidin Druze*.

⁴⁹ Hazran, *The Druze Community and the Lebanese State*. 56-57

⁵⁰ Hazran, “Between Authenticity and Alienation.”

Many things can be said about Kamal Jumblat and his political affiliation or decisions, but no one can deny the fact that he is a reformer when it comes to the Druze community's politics. He changed the perception of this community toward Lebanon and politics as a whole. The Party was 'new' in a sense that the word 'progressive' stood against the 'stagnant' confessional state as Hazran calls it⁵¹. Chamoun and Jumblat organized strikes against the monopoly of French companies over the most common services and needs of the population as well as trade⁵². The opposition movement grew and was led by Camil Chamoun, Kamal Jumblat, Raymond, and Pierre Edde, the Phalange and Najjada Parties, as well as the SSNP and the Communist Party (LCP). Together, they formed a strong coalition called Patriotic Social Front (PSF)⁵³. The movement was inclusive; it covered most parties except, of course, the government and its allies. It was the first time that the Phalange Party and Camil Chamoun allied themselves with the left wing, including the Communist Party. This PSF adopted a large-scale program of political reforms against the monopoly policies of the Khuri regime, and it was inspired by Jumblat's Party⁵⁴. Jumblat arose from a traditional Druze leader to become a modern national leader and reformer because of his election as its secretary-general⁵⁵. On the other hand, the traditional Yazbaki-Jumblati feud was reignited through Emir Majid Arslan's quasi-permanent alliance to the Khuri regime.

⁵¹ Hazran.

⁵² Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*. 125

⁵³ Traboulsi. 125

⁵⁴ Traboulsi. 125

⁵⁵ Hazran, *The Druze Community and the Lebanese State*. 64

This alliance was best depicted by the Arslan's presence in most of the cabinets formed during the President's term⁵⁶ while Jumblat was sitting on the other side, opposing and organizing protests with the PSF against the government and the President.

The 1952 military coup in Egypt that ousted the monarchy brought to Jumblat's attention the fact that by mobilizing mass popular marches against the current administration, the regime could fall⁵⁷. Khury's growing opposition and the pressure coming from the people in the streets and protests – most notable one in Deir Al Qamar in Shouf that gathered 25,000 people according to Lebanese sources⁵⁸ – forced the first president of the Lebanese Republic to resign, and Camil Chamoun was elected few days later in his stead.

The election of Chamoun came as a natural and unanimous decision. There was no talk of anybody else to lead the country other than the man who fought against corruption and against presidential authoritarianism and claimed the demands of the people. In his inauguration speech, newly elected President Camil Chamoun promised to keep Lebanon uninvolved in regional and international disagreements in order to keep Lebanon safe, and he promised 'modesty and asceticism,' as Traboulsi labels it⁵⁹. President Chamoun's administration had to deal with the influx of three non-Lebanese populations into Lebanese territories: Armenians, Syrians, and Palestinians⁶⁰. The issue

⁵⁶ Abou Saleh, *Modern History of the Mouahidin Druze*.

⁵⁷ Hazran, "Between Authenticity and Alienation."

⁵⁸ Hazran, *The Druze Community and the Lebanese State*. 65

⁵⁹ Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*. 130

⁶⁰ Saadeh, *The Social Structure of Lebanon*. 66

of Palestine had always been the hardest subject that any administration had to deal with. It was the fine line that separated reinforcing the regime and total opposition coming from Arab nationalist. Chamoun's answer to this issue was to give Christian Palestinians the Lebanese nationality in order to change the country's demographics in his favor while most of the Muslim part was distributed in camps around major cities, such as Beirut, Tripoli, Saida, and Tyr. As for the Syrian population, they were mostly part of the middle class. They fled the country after the Ba'athist coup of 1955. The Armenians were mostly craftsmen, and they specialized in every field possible at a time when the country was short of such labor force⁶¹. Chamoun's promises toward the PSF were unfulfilled, and Jumblat's front was left with no option but to stir its political agenda toward a socialist one and to take the same stance as the one it had for President Al Khuri. The front led by Jumblat opposed the new regime⁶² and returned to the anti-Maronite-Sunni partnership⁶³. Jumblat, who was identified by one Western reporter as the mainspring of the 1952 'revolution,' was left out of the government with none of the previously agreed upon reforms ratified by the government⁶⁴. To add insult to injury, the Chamoun administration approached the Yazbaki-Druze clan⁶⁵ in order to limit the powers of Jumblat in the Druze community as well as in the nation as a whole. Kamal Jumblat posed a true problem to any regime, and Chamoun was smart enough to know

⁶¹ Saadeh. 66

⁶² Abou Saleh, *Modern History of the Mouahidin Druze*.

⁶³ Hazran, *The Druze Community and the Lebanese State*. 81

⁶⁴ Hazran, "Between Authenticity and Alienation."

⁶⁵ Hazran.

that since he was a firsthand witness when allied with Jumblat during the take down of Khury's regime. The new National Socialist Front (NSF) was formed barely a year after Chamoun's election. The Front demanded the same reforms that the old ones did, including secularization of the state, reinstatement of public freedom, amendment of the work law, and social health and security to everyone, to name a few⁶⁶. Chamoun changed the electoral law for the 1952 parliamentary elections in a way that, he says, would change the traditional figure and bring quality instead of quantity⁶⁷. The strife between Jumblat's clan and Chamoun reached its apogee before 1958, of course, in 1955. When Chamoun declared his support to the Baghdad Pact, an Anglo-American design pact for the region to contain the region from any communist, Soviet interference⁶⁸, adhering to the Eisenhower doctrine. Up until 1957, Jumblat and the NSF believed that the system could be brought down by peaceful means. The trigger point for the change of opinion was Jumblat's loss in the 1957 parliamentary elections⁶⁹. It was the first time since the birth of the Lebanese Republic that there was no Jumblati member in the parliament⁷⁰. Jumblat even tried to win the Christian votes by being pragmatic and by signing a joint covenant with the Palangists of Pierre Gemayel, which meant that he would revive the 'Christian option.' This showed his

⁶⁶ Abou Saleh, *Modern History of the Mouahidin Druze*.

⁶⁷ Hazran, *The Druze Community and the Lebanese State*. 81

⁶⁸ Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*. 131

⁶⁹ Hazran, "Between Authenticity and Alienation."

⁷⁰ Hazran.

political opportunism⁷¹. No matter how revolutionary Jumblat was or how many exploits had been achieved, he had to settle and to return to the policy of *taqiya* in order to preserve his seat in the parliament. Losing the elections in 1957 was humiliating to Jumblat as well as other Muslim notables who also lost their positions because of Chamoun's effort to do so. By doing so, the President created an aura of enmity between him and the opposition because he broke the sacred rule of consensus⁷². Chamoun's opposition grew not only between the Muslim population but also between a portion of Christians, including Maronite Patriarch Ma'uchi⁷³. The Church opposed the executive power of the Lebanese state for the first time.

Jumblat and Jamal Abdel Nasser shared the same socialist ideology. By 1958, the creation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) had a major impact on Chamoun's presidency and the opposition's stance; Patriarch Ma'uchi welcomed it along with the NSF⁷⁴. This large force of acceptance towards the UAR initiated some fears from within the Chamoun camp of demands by the opposition of joining the newly formed Nasserite state⁷⁵. The whole Muslim population was in a state of euphoria after the formation of the UAR, which brought up a feeling of Arab nationalism⁷⁶. The war of 1958, the first civil war, was not a result of the formation of the UAR, of course, but all the internal

⁷¹ Hazran, *The Druze Community and the Lebanese State*. 82

⁷² Abu Salih, *The Role of the Druze in the Region*. 114

⁷³ Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*. 133

⁷⁴ Abou Saleh, *Modern History of the Mouahidin Druze*.

⁷⁵ Abou Saleh.

⁷⁶ Hazran, *The Druze Community and the Lebanese State*. 90

factors combined and a Nasserite state on Lebanon's doorsteps would frighten the Chamoun camp, which would therefore call for arms. Jumblat's camp were frustrated because they have suffered enough from the President's policies. Having a nearby ally, such the UAR, was the best opportunity to strike at the regime organize a coup⁷⁷.

Back to internal Druze politics, the community was now divided into three factions: The two historical rivals, Yazbaki and Jumblati, and a third neutral force, led by former member of parliament Bahij Taqi El Din along with businessman Najib Salha. While the two historical opponents fought against each other, one backed by Chamoun's government and the other leading the opposition, the third party joined the 'Third Front.' This Front was a neutral political entity and played the role of mediating between the government and the opposition⁷⁸. By that time, Camil Chamoun's term in office was nearing its expiration date. This was comforting for the opposition who sought by any means possible to destabilize his position. Chamoun proposed a constitutional amendment to keep himself as president. His proposition infuriated the opposition. Jumblat alongside the 'Third Front' warned about meddling with the constitution and how dangerous it would be for Lebanon's political arena. They went on to remind the population of the experience they lived with President Bechara Al Khury's constitutional amendment⁷⁹.

⁷⁷ Hazran. p 90

⁷⁸ Hazran. p 91

⁷⁹ Abou Saleh, *Modern History of the Mouahidin Druze*.

On May 8th 1958, the first Lebanese civil war broke out. Many factors caused this upsurge; as I mentioned, on the regional level, the formation of the UAR was one of the catalysts as well as Chamoun Western-oriented policies, which went against his promise and the vision of the NSF. As for the core problems, the most prominent issue was Chamoun staying in power, and the negligence that the opposition, mostly from the Muslim community⁸⁰, had suffered under his term. The middle class within the Christian populace grew significantly; whereas, poverty was more focused within the Muslims of the opposition. All the local and regional factors combined with the cold war sparked a war, which on one side was led by Chamoun and on the other by Jumblat. Two months of fighting were enough for the opposition to control most of Lebanon's territories with army taking a 'stand still' position. This neutral position was chosen because of the insurgency's large scale, which the army could not control⁸¹ also perhaps to avoid any separatist movement within the army. On July 17th, the British-backed monarchy in Iraq fell, and pro-Arab nationalism strong man Abdel Karim Qasim came to power, dissolving the Western Baghdad Pact. The events of Baghdad stirred many worries in Chamoun's weakened position. The pact was an essential part for his Western oriented foreign policy. However, being involved with the USA by the means of the Eisenhower Doctrine, Chamoun called for his Western allies in order to help his

⁸⁰ Abu Salih, *The Role of the Druze in the Region*. 144

⁸¹ Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*. 135

regime stay alive⁸². Armed with his 6th fleet, special envoy Robert Murphy held meetings with political leaders – from both opposition and Chamoun government – that led to a settlement. The settlement stated that Chamoun would finish his term in office but still issue a statement that he would not run for reelection and would nominate for presidency General Fouad Chehab's, leader of the Lebanese Army.

After being elected, President Chehab dedicated the first two years of his mandate to reinstate national cohesion between different parties in order to avoid any disturbance, such as the ones of 1958. His ultimate target was to reach a 'State of Independence' as Traboulsi quotes⁸³. Chehab's first act was to turn toward Nasser, president of the UAR, and end Chamoun's isolationist policy from his neighboring state and Western-oriented foreign dogma⁸⁴. After Chehab's rise to power, a wide protest against the state's policy toward the Druze community erupted. However, this time, the protest was not limited to Jumblat's supporters; it went beyond, making it a real State-Druze issue. It was not a state facing a certain party or front. It was the state facing a socially dissatisfied core⁸⁵. This movement is an example of how, under duress, the Druze community came together and united as one irrespective of political differences. During the 1960s and especially during Chehab's time in office, Kamal Jumblat's power grew on a national, regional, and international level. On the national level, Chehab was forced to keep

⁸² Traboulsi. 133-135

⁸³ Traboulsi. 139

⁸⁴ Traboulsi. 139

⁸⁵ Hazran, *The Druze Community and the Lebanese State*.121

Jumblat close and inside the government to control any anti-establishment moves he might provoke. On the regional level, Jumblat became a very close ally of Nasser and called for Arab nationalism and anti-imperialist policies⁸⁶. Internationally, Jumblat was granted presiding of the delegation sent to the People's Republic of China and, later on, in 1972, was awarded the 'Lenin Peace Prize' by the Soviet Union. The Yazbakis were sidelined because of Jumblat's rise to power. When it came to the State-Druze relations, it was mostly Jumblat that took the stage and expressed Druze demands even though not all of them were aligned with him, politically⁸⁷. On the other hand, according to Hazran, Jumblat saw his integration in the state as an opportunity to increase his ideology and his popularity within circles outside of the Druze⁸⁸. At the end of what has become to be known as the Chehabi era, which to most Lebanese people was the greatest period in terms of political rejuvenation, Charles Helou was elected President. Helou, subsequently, fell in the trap of being in the middle of the 'political war' between both popular parties, Gemayel and Jumblat⁸⁹. Gemayel was the leader of the Phalange Party, one that has attracted many (mostly Christians) followers even before the Independence was established. Helou was a Chehabist and believed in the Chehabi ideology as well as the Constitutional Bloc of Bechara Al Khuri. His term was hard to handle, especially with all the regional turmoil, including the 1967 war with Israel, Palestinian wave of

⁸⁶ Hazran. 131

⁸⁷ Hazran. 139

⁸⁸ Hazran, "Between Authenticity and Alienation."

⁸⁹ Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*. 145

refugees, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization's (PLO) activities in South Lebanon. Helou dealt with the latter problem by signing the Cairo agreement, which ultimately led to detrimental effects on Lebanese internal politics. His term was also hard because of local political tensions growing between Pierre Gemayel, head of the Phalange Party, and Kamal Jumblat and the rise to power of the Deuxième Bureau in the Lebanese Army (led by a Maronite general), which was basically an intelligence agency that spread into every institution in the government to the point that its commander would sit in any important decision-making meetings⁹⁰. During Helou's first years in office, Jumblat was represented in the government directly or through a member of his party. However, since 1965, he decided to distance himself from the system and return to his original camp as a mediator on behalf of the popular-national camp⁹¹. In all this, Kamal Jumblat and the Druze were taking the stance of backing the Sunni masses and Jamal Abdel Nasser and his Arab nationalistic project⁹². Backing Nasser also meant calling for the Palestinian cause and the right of the Palestinians to fight back for their homeland and act freely against Israel⁹³. Yazbaki-Jumblati feud arose again in 1965 after the convention of Btekhmay in 1965. On that day, Jumblat rallied peasants and workers to protest against the government's policy toward the distribution of the apple production⁹⁴, talking about the imperialist Western economy

⁹⁰ Traboulsi. 147

⁹¹ Hazran, *The Druze Community and the Lebanese State*. 137

⁹² Hazran.

⁹³ Al Khazen, *The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967-1976*. 133

⁹⁴ Hazran, *The Druze Community and the Lebanese State*. 137

and calling for socialism as the sole economical system that would be fit for Lebanon⁹⁵. As a direct response, the Yazbakis (Arslan and Salha mainly), backed by their Christian allies rallied in Naba'a Al Safa in the Shouf, which is known to be a Jumblati region, launched speeches refusing exported ideologies. They went further as to have discussions with the US Ambassador to inform him of the seriousness of the situation in Lebanon when it comes to socialist ideologies⁹⁶. The feud could not stand for long as Jumblat was way stronger than all the Yazbaki families combined; they were weakened to the point that in order to retain their seat in the parliament, the Arslans had to ally themselves with Jumblat in the 1972 election⁹⁷.

On April 13th 1975, the most commonly used date for the start of the second civil war, fights erupted in Ain Al Remmaneh, engaging on one side partisans of Pierre Gemayel's Phalange Party and what is reported to be PLO fighters on the other side. What was a political war of words transformed, and this spark ignited a war, which destabilized Lebanon and the Druze community gravely. During this period, Jumblat carried on with enthusiasm for Arab nationalism and refused to return to the Maronite-Sunni domination, more precisely Maronite domination. He took it upon himself and his allies, which were mainly formed of leftists in the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) and Muslim parties, to fight the Christian 'tyrants' tripartite in the Lebanese Front (LF)

⁹⁵ Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*. 148

⁹⁶ Hazran, *The Druze Community and the Lebanese State*. 138

⁹⁷ Hazran, "Between Authenticity and Alienation."

formed by Franjieh, Gemayel, and Chamoun⁹⁸. Jumblat's LNM forces dominated, and, by 1976, eighty percent of Lebanon's territory was within his grasp, having been helped by the PLO⁹⁹. The LF called for the help of the new Assad regime in Syria to protect them. After reaching a ceasefire agreement in 1976 and after the assassination of *al mou'alleh* as Kamal Jumblat, the leader of the LNM, was called, the war resurged again. His assassination caused a bloody reaction from his Druze partisans, going on a killing spree in villages. Jumblat's assassination was a blow for the LNM, the Arab Nationalist Project, and the Druze community as a whole. As a reformer leader, he changed the status of this community. Despite the Druze's numerical inferiority, he showed superiority in political and tactical decisions. The leader was gone and with him the dreams of many members of the community fearing the void. As any traditional family would do, the concept of inheritance was applied, and his son Walid was sworn into "leader of Druze" as claimed by the Sheikh giving him the symbol of leadership, a cloak. He, later on, passed his legacy to his son, Taymour, through a keffiyeh symbol of Arab nationalism. Walid Jumblat managed to keep the Druze community's presence in the sense that the state perceived this community post-war in the same manner as it perceived it pre-war. His political statements are turning points to many policy makers, in Lebanon or on the regional level. He might not be the revolutionary that his dad was,

⁹⁸ Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*. 193

⁹⁹ Traboulsi. 200

but they both had the same path in the Druze community – dominating, powerful, and rebellious – which gave the Druze more credit in modern Lebanese history.

This historical overview is not dedicated to narrate a certain story focusing on one community rather than extracting the importance of its political values. Lebanon's history, just as any country of the Middle East, contains a part of feudalism and traditional political leadership in a time where this type of political system has been outdated and considered backwards even by a traditional leader, such as Kamal Jumblat¹⁰⁰. The focus on Jumblat and his policies was a mere demonstration of his anti-feudalistic pro-modern aimed vision. Feudalism, in Lebanon, has been an essential part of Lebanon's history, and it still is. However, it took other forms. While the historical enemies of the Druze, the Maronites, have moved on from their traditional leadership through the Church or political parties; feudalism exists through politics in what is called political feudalism. Christians, in general, live now just like they did in Chamoun's and Gemayel's times during the golden ages. This feudalism still stands nowadays within all the Christian political parties with the help of foreign influence, the USA or France, depending on the era. While on the Sunni front, traditional families were eradicated during the 1975 war, and Rafic Hariri with his generous money spending formed a kind of monetary feudalism, where the Sunni populace followed and admired him for his charisma and his ability to provide services through his economical

¹⁰⁰ Traboulsi. 171

riches. Those actions, even though they have decreased, live on with his son, also depending on external backing, such as Saudi Arabia, in particular, and the Gulf countries, in general. The Lebanese Shi'a were one of the most forgotten and underprivileged communities in Lebanon. Their rise started with Imam Moussa Al Sadr in Amal movement, boosted after the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, and is now most powerful and embodied by Hezbollah in his religious kind of feudalism. The Druze, embraced their specificity as a minority, and, in order to preserve themselves, having no external backing, they decided to stick with their traditional leaders, the Yazbakis or the Jumblatis.

CHAPTER II: THE MAKING OF THE PARTY

The Middle East, post-World War II, was subject to many political changes. Just like after the first World War, which changed the geographical map of the region, the second was definitive in terms of political affiliation. During the late 1940s, the 1950s, and the 1960s, the Middle East was known for the rise of Arab nationalism. Taking many forms and ideologies, Arab nationalism across the Middle East was not an agreed upon belief, and this created a cold war between different factions, such as Iraq, Syria, and Egypt¹⁰¹

It was in 1949 that Kamal Jumblat along Abdullah Al-Aleily, Fouad Rizk, Albert Adeb, George Hanna, and Fareed Jubran founded a new political party named the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). These men founded the Party, which was inspired by the socialist leftist ideology. Kamal Jumblat studied law in France and was influenced during his studies by such beliefs.¹⁰²

By 1949, Israel was created and recognized as a sovereign state. The “Nakba” of 1948 caught the attention of all the Arabs and played a major role in the rise of Arab nationalism in the few years to come. Many




Fig 2.1: The figure above shows the martyr of the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese national movement, the great teacher Kamal Jumblat.

¹⁰¹ Valbjørn and Bank, *The New Arab Cold War: Rediscovering The Arab Dimension of Middle East Regional politics*.

¹⁰² الاشتراكي التقدمي الحزب ماهية، "جنبلاط"،

parties mushroomed, taking the opportunity of helping and protecting the Palestinian people. Among those parties was the PSP, which believed in the Palestinian cause and the right of Palestinians to have a sovereign state.

A. Events Surrounding the conception:

1. Regional and International Events

The second World War was the most devastating war ever in the history of mankind in terms of casualties and material and economical damage. Every part of the world got affected by this war and by its outcome in a way or another. The Middle East and Lebanon got their share of damage. World War II produced the longest global standoff in which the “oppressive capitalist” faced “Soviet authoritarianism” until 1989. Each party of this conflict tried to form a bloc to fight the other, which created tensions not only between states but also within states. Left-wing communist parties opposed their right-wing capitalist counterparts.

The Middle East was tolerably affected by this wave of violence. Just like any other part of the world, states had a decision to make. Impartiality was difficult, and every state had to pick a side¹⁰³. Lebanon was the sole Arab democratic state with diverse political parties whose core beliefs range from the far right to the far left. The country’s electoral multi-party-political system, its economic system, including private banking, and its lack of government interference in individual investments encouraged Arab

¹⁰³ Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*. 273

entrepreneurs to invest in this small country. Entrepreneurs sought Lebanon as their land of investment because of the bounds imposed by their respective conservative states.¹⁰⁴

The Naqba affected Lebanese economy in a fairly positive way; Beirut's port became the main source of export for Arab products into the West after Arab companies boycotted Israel and refused to recognize it as a sovereign state.¹⁰⁵ On the other hand, Lebanese industry fell apart, mostly from many sectors that worked directly with Palestinian merchants (pottery, tanneries, and shoemaking). These industries were mainly centered in Southern Lebanon, but soon the working force moved either toward Beirut or immigrated¹⁰⁶. Jumblat's nationalism got the better out of him, and, even though he was content for Lebanon's economical boost, he still called for Arabism and for fighting for the lost land in Palestine.

A day after Ben-Gurion announced the independence of the state of Israel, armies of Arab countries were on high alert, and so they invaded Israel. A coalition of Lebanese, Syrian, Egyptian, and Jordanian forces waged a single strike and gained territories previously controlled by Israel. However, that was held for only seven months. Israel's counterattack and inter-Arab quarrels gave the lost territories of Palestine back.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ Cleveland and Bunton. 333

¹⁰⁵ Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*. 114

¹⁰⁶ Traboulsi. 114

¹⁰⁷ Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*. 268

Regional and international politics took a drastic turn after World War II. International and regional organizations started to build themselves. The League of Nations' concept was upheld in the United Nations; NATO and the Arab League were born. The question of joining the Arab league created more tensions between Muslims and Christians¹⁰⁸. Lebanon's Independence was built around the National Pact, which states that Muslims would let go of their demands for Arab unity with Syria, and the Christians would drop their unequivocal alliance with the Western one.¹⁰⁹ The National Pact defined the sectarian distribution of governmental positions in parliament as well as in the government. Mentioning Arab unity in Lebanon was more than just dangerous. It would spur high tensions, especially from Christians who would fear for their existence, as they form a minority in a vast Muslim dominated Arab world¹¹⁰. However, the Arab League Project was one of the lesser evils. Between this Project and the Hashemite Project of annexing Lebanon and Syria into one nation, President Bechara Al-Khury along with Prime Minister Riyad Al-Solh chose to join the Arab League.¹¹¹

In 1952, three years after Jumblat announced founding the PSP, a group of military officers, called "The Free Officers," plotted and executed a coup in Egypt, which changed geopolitics in the Middle East for half a century. Taking the control of Cairo, they exiled King Faruq and established the Revolutionary Command Council

¹⁰⁸ Edito Creps International, *The Jumblat Leadership: From Kamal Jumblat to Walid Jumblat..* vol 1, 37

¹⁰⁹ Edito Creps International. vol 1, 36

¹¹⁰ Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon.* 111

¹¹¹ Traboulsi. 112

(RCC) as a governing body for the country before appointing General Mohammad Naguib as prime minister¹¹². Jamal Abdel Nasser, the most prominent figure of these officers, took power in Egypt and sought to unite Arab states under Egyptian leadership¹¹³, which also developed fear in the Christian community. Christians worried for their existence in this land, especially after having accepted the terms of the National Pact. Nasser's ideas were furthered by uniting with Syria forming the United Arab Republic. The Egyptian president was an inspiration to Jumblat in his political discourse especially after his fallout with Lebanese president Camil Chamoun; "Jumblatt became an important figure in Lebanese politics ... and welcomed Pan-Arabism"¹¹⁴.

2. Local Events

Locally, Lebanon was facing a series of troublesome political events. The Independence and especially the national pact of 1943, which gave political power to Maronites and Sunni Muslims and robbed the Druze of this power, contradicted the Party's principles as well as Jumblat's. Political analysts from the right see that Jumblat's and the PSP's attempt to change Lebanon's political system comes with an agenda, a desire to become president¹¹⁵. While counterparts from the other side of the

¹¹² Hahn, "Crisis and Crossfire: The US and the Middle East Since 1945." 40

¹¹³ Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, "The Foreign Policy of Egypt." 97

¹¹⁴ Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*. 334

¹¹⁵ al-Khazen, "Kamal Jumblatt, Uncrowned Druze Prince of the Left."

aisle say that the Party's political ideology, which is reaching a secular non-sectarian state, is based on the fact of Jumblat's belief in real socialism¹¹⁶.

The National Pact was contested by many factions, not only the PSP. Georges Naccache, editor and founder of L'Orient newspaper, attacked the Pact. However, his attack was based on sectarian foundations, stating that the agreement shows each side's vision of Lebanon but not the common perception of it¹¹⁷. The Church also refused the Pact; Monseigneur Ignace Mubarak alongside other Christian Maronite nationalists considered it "a historical regression" and worked to restore the idea of Lebanon being a homeland for the Christians¹¹⁸. The Syrian Social National Party (SSNP) was also part of the opposition, an opposition that was closer to the one presented by the PSP.

Antoun Saade's SSNP opposition to the national pact as well as the PSP's were from different perspectives. Saade, a more experienced politician than Jumblat, took his opposition to its full extent. He was willing to accept Lebanon on political and religious basis but not on a nationalistic one. Saade believed in Syrio-Lebanese unity¹¹⁹; therefore, for him, this pact meant the alienation of Lebanon. On July 1st 1949, after seeking asylum in Syria, the SSNP's leader called for popular uprising. Armed groups from the party tried to take control of government outposts in Bekaa as well as Shouf regions in order to get into the capital. The rebellion was quashed within 72 hours. The

¹¹⁶ Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*. 147

¹¹⁷ Ziadeh, *Sectarianism and Intercommunal Nation-Building in Lebanon*. 122

¹¹⁸ Ziadeh. 122

¹¹⁹ Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*. 115

Syrian government lifted its protection for Saade, and he was delivered to Lebanese authorities on July 6th.

The SSNP's coup occurred just a few months after the birth of the PSP. The newly established party supported the coup; "The coup that occurred and which the party led morally, betrayed many of us and made us think that we can take advantage of this popular uprising"¹²⁰.

Jumblat's anti-sectarian ideas were hard to promote, especially within the Druze community, with which, according to Al Khazen, there was a clear gap of education.¹²¹ The feudal lord's educational background was more developed than any member of his community. Attending one of the best schools in Lebanon in Antoura then moving to France to study law, a disparity between his level of thinking and his community's level was evident. The Druze were mostly rural and had little access to higher education, which makes their abilities to understand developed concepts introduced by Jumblat hard to grasp. Jumblat attempted to branch out to other communities through socialism. His ideology was inspired by his Western education, where he studied different philosophers, such as "Ghandi, Father Teilhard de Chardin, Bergson, Alexei Kareil, the Count Dunois..."¹²². Kamal Jumblat's education combined with regional and international events surrounding Lebanon made his policies lean more and more toward

¹²⁰ Jumblat, "Presidential Bulletin Report."

¹²¹ al-Khazen, "Kamal Jumblatt, Uncrowned Druze Prince of the Left."

¹²² Edito Creps International, *The Jumblat Leadership: From Kamal Jumblat to Walid Jumblat*. vol 4

socialism and the Soviet Union. Jumblat thought of every detail in establishing the PSP. When asked about the meaning of the flag, his answer was very detailed. Each part of the flag was carefully studied and had a meaning and relationship to Jumblat's philosophy. "The red circle around the globe represents the future where freedom will cover the whole universe, this is the way of true progress. The blue globe represents a world of spiritual clarity and transparency, where the non-materialistic leads the materialistic to a supreme goal: equality between people – shown in a white triangle with equal joints – in work (the pickaxe) and intellect (the pen)"¹²³.

After multiple accusations of corruption and abuse of power circling around president Bechara Al Khoury, Kamal Jumblat's leftist party PSP reconciled with Camil Chamoun, a prominent leader of the right, in order to oust the president. The opposition to President Khoury did not only include these two major political players. It was also an agglomeration of different political parties and factions; however, it was led by these two influential parties. The PSP-Chamoun alliance was fruitful. Al Khoury announced his resignation in 1952 before finishing his second term¹²⁴. For Jumblat, it was the beginning of a long fight for freedom and social equality based on alliances made according to his blend of beliefs stretching from socialism to Pan-Arabism and the Palestinian cause¹²⁵.

¹²³ Khalil, *With Kamal Jumblat: Testimony and History and Philosophical Approach*. 27

¹²⁴ Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*. 126

¹²⁵ al-Khazen, "Kamal Jumblatt, Uncrowned Druze Prince of the Left."

Even though the PSP was not founded as a party based on the chieftain system, it quickly transformed into one. Jumblat, in spite of his many discussions and theories about sectarianism, became the Party's uncontested leader not only because of his charismatic speeches but also because of his wit, education, and, most importantly, his feudal stature¹²⁶. Therefore, it became normal to assimilate the PSP's decision to Kamal Jumblat's.

The PSP's approach to Lebanese politics attracted some Christians and Muslims; however, the majority remained Druze¹²⁷. Nonetheless, according to Al Khazen, the PSP was not a modern political party. It was also not like other parties with nationwide disciplined membership. The party was just a "loose coalition of deputies" that are mostly from the Shouf district¹²⁸.

B. Demographics

According to statistics made in 1932 by the French, the Druze moved down the scale from being contesting for the biggest religious community in Lebanon to fifth after the annexation of other provinces and the declaration of Greater Lebanon¹²⁹. The size of the Druze community was reflected in their political representation since then. By 1932, they formed 6.82% of the population¹³⁰. The once mighty and ruling community had now limited access to control and became overwhelmed by other bigger communities.

¹²⁶ al-Khazen.

¹²⁷ Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered*. 188

¹²⁸ al-Khazen, "Kamal Jumblatt, Uncrowned Druze Prince of the Left."

¹²⁹ Rowayheb, "Walid Jumblat and Political Alliances."

¹³⁰ Ziadeh, *Sectarianism and Intercommunal Nation-Building in Lebanon*. 92

Nazih Richani asserts that the founding fathers of the PSP were leftists, who were genuinely interested in progressive social and democratic secular change¹³¹. Most of the founders were middle class Christians believing in socialism or Marxism.

Name	Religion	Place & Date of Birth	Profession	Class Origin
Kamal Jumblat	Druze	Mokhtara, 1917	Lawyer	Feudal
Abdullah Al-Aleily	Sunni	Beirut, 1914	Sheik/Linguist	Upper Middle
Fouad Rizk	Greek Catholic	Mashghara, 1900	Lawyer	Upper Middle
Albert Adeeb	Maronite	Mexico, 1908	Publisher	Middle
George Hanna	Christian Orthodox	Shweifaf, N.A.	Physician	Lower Middle
Fareed Jubran	Catholic	Cyprus, 1912	Accountant	Lower Middle

Table 2.1: PSP founders¹³²

¹³¹ Nazih Richani, *Dilemmas of Democracy and Political Parties in Sectarian Societies: The Case of the Progressive Socialist Party*. 37

¹³² Nazih Richani. Table taken after the author interviewed Abdallah Al-Aleily. 37

The table shows that four out of the six ideologues that initiated the birth of the party were non-Druze. Three of those six did not have privileged lives. They belonged to Middle classes. The table also shows that most of the members, if not all, since Mr. Hanna's date of birth is not confirmed, are young, the oldest being at the age of 49 when the party was founded, and its future leader was only 32 years old.

Historical political rivalry between Maronites and Druze figures did not cease after 1943. In order for them to weaken the Druze, the Maronites supported second-rank politicians to rise against the Druze (mostly Kamal Jumblat and the PSP). However, given Kamal Jumblat's socialist approach to politics and the Party's principles, the Maronites attitude toward solving their problem would prove counter-productive as most of Druze would join Jumblat's camp instead. The policy of divide and conquer failed; instead, Maronites and Druze were united¹³³.

Year	Christians %	Druze %	Shiite %	Sunni %	Missing Cases	Total Number
1949	56.33	38.61	0.31	4.75	2	318
1950	19.47	68.90	4.71	6.92	4	1,956
1951	15.90	74.48	6.10	3.52	3	1,053
1952	20.52	26.52	11.88	26.87	109	4,426
1953	24.81	34.36	20.07	20.76	27	1,756
1954	31.07	10.72	42.89	15.32	1	458
1955	20.16	22.58	53.76	3.49	5	377

¹³³ Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered*. 189

1956	24.11	24.55	44.64	6.70	0	224
1957	10.00	78.75	1.25	10.00	1	0
1958	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0	0

Table 2.2: PSP Membership Distribution by Sect: 1949-1958¹³⁴

The diversity in the Party's membership in 1949 reflected the Party's leadership in terms of sects. 56.33% of members were Christians, not the exact number but still constituted the majority. Because of the leader's feudal status and background, 38.61% were Druze. The problems are clear when it comes to Muslim Sunni and Shi'i representation, 4.75% and 0.31% respectively¹³⁵. In less than a year, the Party grew exponentially, jumping from 318 to 1,956 members. In 1950, the party quickly transformed demographically and was overcome by a large Druze entity (68.90%)¹³⁶. It was a matter of time before this leap sectarian influx would occur. However, changes in sectarian distribution and their numbers along the years leading to 1958 suggest that people adhering to this party were doing so believing in social equality rather than confessional beliefs. As Druze percentage dropped in 1952, the total number of members rose at a higher rate. The number of Muslims (Druze, Sunni, and Shiites) was

¹³⁴ Nazih Richani, *Dilemmas of Democracy and Political Parties in Sectarian Societies: The Case of the Progressive Socialist Party*. Numbers taken from PSP's official records. 70

¹³⁵ Nazih Richani, 70

¹³⁶ Nazih Richani, 70

on the rise during 1952 following the Arab nationalism wave, which had started and had these communities as a support system¹³⁷.

Year 1952 marked the year of alliance against president Al Khoury and the rise of Abdel Nasser. The year showed a rise in membership in all sects. Christians aligned themselves with the PSP after his rapprochement with Chamoun, Shi'i and Sunni Muslims joined the party for its Pan-Arab socialist beliefs, and the Druze continued to join for mainly three reasons: (1) Allegiance to feudal lord, (2) Arab nationalism, and (3) opposition to Al Khoury's presidency¹³⁸. All these developments made Jumblat's party grow in numbers. The Druze community was one that was bound by cohesion and "avoidance of contact with members of other groups"¹³⁹; in that sense, it showed a lack of civic interaction with other communities and kept its faith as secretive as it could. However, that did not stop them from being integrated in one party with other communities for a higher cause led by "the teacher" Kamal Jumblat.

What is also striking as an important figure is the gradual decline in number of members post-1952. Camil Chamoun's fallout with the PSP made members of the Party realize that it has become hard to reach high ranked offices if they were to continue their stay in the Party. In the 1957 elections, the PSP suffered a heavy political defeat; for the first time, none of the Jumblat family was represented in a position of power.

¹³⁷ Nazih Richani, 71

¹³⁸ Nazih Richani, *Dilemmas of Democracy and Political Parties in Sectarian Societies: The Case of the Progressive Socialist Party*. 69

¹³⁹ Khashan, *Inside the Lebanese Confessional Mind*.

Kamal Jumblat lost in the parliamentary election. The impact of this loss is clear; the total number of members was less than 100¹⁴⁰. In 1958, there was a data scratch because of the civil war, which went across sects. Ideologies and social classes were put aside and sectarianism started to grow in people's minds and attitudes. This instigated the change in the course of the Party. In that period of time, approximately half of the party's members were from Mount Lebanon, especially pre-1952 given the Jumblat-Chamoun alliance.¹⁴¹

The war of 1958 was more than just a civil war. It was an opposition to an "abuse of power" as Kamal Jumblat said. It was a turning point for the Party because recruiting numbers for the Party, after that incident, dropped drastically. The party was unable to act and enroll members as it once did during its first days. Reaching a low of 0 recruits in 1958 and negligibly fluctuating in the Chehabi years. The war of 1958 was a fight for "Zaamah" (traditional leadership) of the Shouf region between Jumblat and Chamoun. Al Khazen says¹⁴² the result of those incidents was Maronites of Mount Lebanon, previously aligned with Jumblat, following their religious instincts and leaving the party.

Kamal Jumblat's opposition alliance gained control over most of Lebanon's territory. The opposition to Chamoun came also from his own sect not just from

¹⁴⁰ Nazih Richani, *Dilemmas of Democracy and Political Parties in Sectarian Societies: The Case of the Progressive Socialist Party*. 73

¹⁴¹ Nazih Richani. 72

¹⁴² Al Khazen, *The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967-1976*. 22

Muslims. The demand for his resignation came from different communities, yet Chamoun was still convinced that his “Western-style democracy” was the solution for Lebanon’s salvation¹⁴³. The crisis ended by an American sponsored deal which would bring president Fouad Shehab to power¹⁴⁴.

During the Chehabi years, Kamal Jumblat and the PSP had limited power because the President learned from his predecessor’s mistakes and kept a relatively good relationship with Nasser, refused favoritism, and used both conflicting parties (Jumblat’s and Chamoun-Gemayel coalition) to get his reforms underway using the *laissez-faire* policy¹⁴⁵, whereby the government does not intervene in the economic affairs of individuals. Jumblat turned his opposition to Chehab’s policies by forming a coalition of different political parties and leftist movements: The Front of Progressive Parties and National Figures, which included members, such as the Communist Party, the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, and Maarouf Saad (head of the Nasserite Movement)¹⁴⁶. Party affiliation was less important now and so was data about membership. Nevertheless, the party still had some kind of resurgence in membership – 695 Druze, 455 Shi’i, 215 Sunni, and 106 Christians. Again because of Jumblat feudal title, the majority of the members were Druze with Shi’i Muslims coming in second

¹⁴³ Cobban, *The Making of Modern Lebanon*. 88

¹⁴⁴ Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*. 138

¹⁴⁵ Cobban, *The Making of Modern Lebanon*. 91

¹⁴⁶ Nazih Richani, *Dilemmas of Democracy and Political Parties in Sectarian Societies: The Case of the Progressive Socialist Party*. 80

because of their detrimental living conditions, which led them to the belief in the socialist ideology of the party¹⁴⁷.

¹⁴⁷ Nazih Richani. 81-82

CHAPTER III: POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF THE DRUZE IN LEBANON

The Druze have always been an essential part of Lebanon's history; it was because of Emir Fakhreddin Al Ma'ani. The moment that the Emirate of Mount Lebanon was founded, and as history progressed, the idea of having an independent Lebanese state became a reality through constituting the Republic of Lebanon, which was previously known and proclaimed by the French during their mandate as the state of Greater Lebanon¹⁴⁸. In the context of this exposé, I find that two major historical events affected the Druze community's position in Lebanese modern history: (1) the war of 1860 and (2) Lebanon's Independence in 1943. Both events had a major impact on the Druze community's progress and led to the formation of PSP and Kamal Jumblat's ideology.

A. 1860 and 1943, Struggles to Remember:

1. The War of 1860: first Civil War

Lebanon has had few years of peace since it has come to be. From the days of the Emirate, political quarrel has always shadowed this state, quarrels such as Fakhreddin's war against the Ottomans and then the internal struggles to decide who the succession after the end of the Ma'an dynasty. Nonetheless, the war of 1860 was one of the biggest confrontations at the time. The war started as a series of skirmishes in

¹⁴⁸ Fawaz Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*. 75

different villages rather than a widespread conflict in all Mount Lebanon¹⁴⁹. However, according to Winslow, weapons were being distributed since 1859 in both Druze and Christian camps¹⁵⁰, meaning that the two parties were preparing for the inevitable. Winslow continues and says that there were big disparities between the two fighting factions: The Druzes were united, showing no sign of internal squabble, and the Christians were divided into blocs each led by a certain bishop, “muleteers, and leftover Shihabs”¹⁵¹.

In order to understand the war of 1860, one should look back at the rule of Emir Bashir Chehab II. It was during his reign that the community went from a dominant powerful one to a weak and disturbed one. According to Hazran, the Druze’s social, political, and economic hegemony crash was caused by many factors, some self-inflicted and other relate local and regional developments¹⁵². “The exhausting competition between Druze feudal families for power and prestige; the depletion of the Druze population as a result of emigration to the Hūrān; the emergence of new economic patterns and increasing international involvement in Lebanese affairs” said Hazran¹⁵³. Another factor also is the change in the demographic status quo; the Nineteenth Century marked the beginning of the rise in numbers of Maronites in Mount

¹⁴⁹ Leila Tarazi Fawwaz, *An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860*. 47

¹⁵⁰ Charles Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society*. 38

¹⁵¹ Charles Winslow. 38

¹⁵² Yusri Hazran, “Between Authenticity and Alienation: The Druzes and Lebanon’s History,”

¹⁵³ Yusri Hazran

Lebanon while the Druze remained at 37.33% of the total population¹⁵⁴. First, under Chehabi rule, Druze sheikhs' numbers rose, and the sheikhs joined two confronting clans, which are still present today, the Yazbakis and Jumblatis¹⁵⁵. This conflict between the two big clans weakened the community as a whole. Second, Christian emigration from Syria to Mount Lebanon and their infiltration of Druze dominated areas weakened the latter's numbers, as indicated previously¹⁵⁶. Third, great powers, such as France, Great Britain, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire, as well as regional powers, such as Egypt's interventions and alliances, each with a different sect for its own agenda, affected the ego of every fighting party¹⁵⁷. Western superpowers forced the Ottoman Empire to change the political system in Mount Lebanon into one called the *Règlement Organique*, whereby more power was given to Maronites¹⁵⁸. The winds of change had hit Mount Lebanon and the Druze hard.

Leila Tarazi Fawwaz poses a very interesting point, where she assimilates the start of sectarianism in Mount Lebanon after the death of Sheikh Bashir Jumblat. After he came out victorious in his war against the Yazbakis, Jumblat was seen as a contender

¹⁵⁴ Dana Haffar Mills and Nadim Shehade, *Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus*. 34

¹⁵⁵ Abbas Halabi, *Les Druzes: Vivre avec l'Avenir*. 74

¹⁵⁶ Dana Haffar Mills and Nadim Shehade, *Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus*. 34

¹⁵⁷ Dana Haffar Mills and Nadim Shehade. 36

¹⁵⁸ Yusri Hazran, "Between Authenticity and Alienation: The Druzes and Lebanon's History".

to take Chehab's place as Emir of Mount Lebanon. A striking blow struck the Druze and Lebanese politics after Bashir II Chehab killed Bashir Jumblat¹⁵⁹.

Attacks and counterattacks were occurring all across Mount Lebanon even spreading through to Zahle, which was outside the Emirs domain, Jezzine, Bkassine, Keserwan, Chouf, and the coastal plains next to Baabda and Hazmieh. In each of these locations a decisive war erupted. All these wars led to one result, which entailed the Druze overcoming their enemies and winning the battles but losing the war. The war that I am referring to is their political influence and power. Hazran describes this situation in a perfect way, "Ironically, the crushing political blow came a short time after the Druze had achieved a decisive military victory against the Maronites in 1860"¹⁶⁰. The war on all fronts did not consider the sanctity of religious sanctuaries. Convents near Deir Al Qamar were attacked, Father Athanius Naoum was killed in his sleep¹⁶¹, the war was open, and people only understood the language of blood and religion.

2. 1943: Independence or Curbing?

To put some context, Lebanon's Independence was not only the product of Lebanese unity. Such unity would have never got the better of a strong French military

¹⁵⁹ Tarazi Fawwaz, *An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860*. 19

¹⁶⁰ Yusri Hazran, "Between Authenticity and Alienation: The Druzes and Lebanon's History,"

¹⁶¹ Tarazi Fawwaz, *An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860*. 47

and political global influence. It was a mixture of both, international intervention and local consensus, that favored Lebanon's Independence¹⁶². Local consensus was based on the social, non-written agreement called the National Pact, which relieved Christians and Muslims to a certain degree in order for them to live together in a stable country. The Pact consisted of declaring Lebanon as an independent (to satisfy the Christians) Arab (to satisfy the Muslims) state. Meaning that, the Muslims would accept being a separate country from any other state while Christians would admit that Lebanon is Arab and would not force Western-like policies¹⁶³.

According to Bassem Rai, Druze in Lebanon were opposed to French mandate and preferred to be annexed back to Syria because of their Pan-Arab political strategy¹⁶⁴. However, Rai continues, that the state of Greater Lebanon in 1920, based on "religious pluralism while maintaining the identity of each community"¹⁶⁵. As I previously mentioned, the Druze have historically been divided into two main clans, the Yazbakis, supporters of the Arslan family, and the Jumblatis who follow the leadership of the Jumblat family. These two clans, even though met on some political points, were mainly fierce political rivals in Mount Lebanon. This rivalry did not fade away after 1920. The clans were still political enemies, each having a different perception of

¹⁶² Yusri Hazran, "Lebanon's Revolutionary Era: Kamal Junblat, The Druze Community and the Lebanon State, 1949 to 1977".

¹⁶³ Charles Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society*. 80

¹⁶⁴ Bassem Rai, *Le Pacte Nationale de 1943 et la Genèse de l'Identité et de la Démocratie Libanaises*. 72

¹⁶⁵ Rai, *Le Pacte Nationale de 1943 et la Genèse de l'Identité et de la Démocratie Libanaises*. Citation translated from original French language in reference. 73

Lebanon. This brings the discussion to 1943; Emir Majid Arslan is known to be one of the “heroes of Independence” as they call them. Arslan agreed with Bechara Al-Khuri and his Prime Minister Riyad Al- Sulh on the matter of the National Pact since he was an ally of the Khury’s Constitutional Bloc. On the opposite side was the young Kamal Jumblat, coming fresh into politics, taking over “the family business” after his uncle. Elected for the first time to parliament in 1943, Kamal Jumblat did not share the hero’s views on the National Pact¹⁶⁶. Hazran affirms that, even though Jumblat did not support the National Pact, he was not against the Sulh government but was still fearful of the Druze’s position after this Sunni-Maronite agreement¹⁶⁷. Kamal Jumblat wrote “People lied to themselves in this country, even about the 1943 National Pact and Lebanon’s independence. There was a lie at the root of it all, and violence was bound to ensue”¹⁶⁸. Rai says that, for Kamal Jumblat, Druze’s caution is based on the understanding of refusal of any deal done by political compromise that lies as an external element and would not make Lebanon a strong state and would not expose its history and its historic values¹⁶⁹. Jumblat’s view on the National Pact is a “result of existential and geographical necessity.” He sees it as a deal that was necessary to hold a fragile community such as Lebanon’s¹⁷⁰.

¹⁶⁶ Yusri Hazran, “Lebanon’s Revolutionary Era: Kamal Junblat, The Druze Community and the Lebanon State, 1949 to 1977”.

¹⁶⁷ Hazran.

¹⁶⁸ Kamal Jumblat, *I Speak for Lebanon*.

¹⁶⁹ Rai, *Le Pacte Nationale de 1943 et la Genèse de l’Identité et de la Démocratie Libanaises*. 75.

¹⁷⁰ Jumblat, *I Speak for Lebanon*.

B. The Progressive Socialist Party: Evolution

1. 1958, the Start of the Change:

One challenging complication that Kamal Jumblat faced and was considered to be most important is the first civil war of modern Lebanon in 1958. Fawaz Traboulsi explains how the Chamoun regime worked; according to him, it was an authoritarian regime, backed by USA with an uncompromising ideology. He quotes Georges Naccache saying, “if you are not a Sham’unist, that means you are a traitor or Syro-Bolshevik”¹⁷¹. Adhering to this definition, every person who was not with the Chamoun regime was a threat to the Pan-Arabism because of the “Syro” terminology as well as a threat to freedom and democracy. The use of this term was smart because it lured the USA even more to back Chamoun; Pan-Arabism would mean Nasserite domination in the region while Bolshevism ensured US’s backing since they adopted the policy of containment.

The death of the prominent journalist Nassib Al-Matni, a Maronite journalist who was aligned with the anti-Chamoun current along with the President’s refusal to deny speculations about his will to renew his presidential tenure¹⁷², sparked a series of strikes by the opposition. An alliance that was previously loose had now more reason to be united after Al-Matni’s death, as they called for a general strike and for Chamoun’s

¹⁷¹ Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*. 135

¹⁷² Traboulsi. 135

resignation¹⁷³. In addition to being a critic of the Chamoun regime, Al-Matni called for strong ties with the newly formed United Arab Republic, a state composed of Syria and Egypt with Abdel Nasser at its helm¹⁷⁴. The events of 1958 were not only violent armed clashes in Beirut but also the “rebellion” as Caroline Attié calls it spread to the “Bekaa, Tripoli, and the Shuf”¹⁷⁵. These clashes were more of a civil war even if it were for a brief period of time. According to Charles Winslow, opposition to Chamoun was civil, but it was Jumblat and the PSP’s will to take Beirut militarily and to remove the President by force¹⁷⁶. Winslow says that “This was the Druze militia under the leadership of Kamal Jumblat whose clan was nominally attached to his Progressive Socialist Party (PSP).” Talks about religious and feudal clans had already started during this war. As mentioned previously, Nazih Richani’s data showed that, in 1958, Druze membership in the PSP was up to 78% while the membership of other sects dropped drastically¹⁷⁷. According to the PSP’s records, the Party did not survive the sectarian divisions as seventeen members were purged, most of whom were Christians. Those members held high ranked positions in the Party and were expelled because of their political position¹⁷⁸. Attié says that Chamoun’s opposition wanted to review or change the National Pact of 1943 “and thereby challenge the position held by Lebanon’s

¹⁷³ Attié, *Struggles in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s*. 164

¹⁷⁴ Charles Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society*. 112

¹⁷⁵ Caroline Attié, *Struggles in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s*. 185

¹⁷⁶ Charles Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society*. 114

¹⁷⁷ Nazih Richani, *Dilemmas of Democracy and Political Parties in Sectarian Societies: The Case of the Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon 1949-1996*. 70

¹⁷⁸ Richani.

Christians since 1860...”¹⁷⁹, and Al-Khazen claims that the war was a direct attack against Christian policies¹⁸⁰. Since 1958, there has been a change of dialect when referring to the PSP. There is some insinuation to civil strife, demanding equality between all Lebanese from different sects as Traboulsi mentions¹⁸¹; however, after this mention, there was a change in the Druze’s, Kamal Jumblat’s, and PSP’s position toward Christian Chamoun.

2. *War of the Mountain: The Big Clash*

The War of the Mountain was a crucial and a deadly conflict during the fifteen years of civil war. It was special in the type of territory and geographical area it covered as well as the parties involved in it. Politics shaped around it was different than the ones in previous years, and it was a turning point in Lebanese history and politics for the years to come¹⁸². A brief build-up to this clash would serve best to understand the players involved and how the clash was different than the wars that preceded it, hence understand the PSP’s stance.

On June 6th 1982, a new armed player came to the battleground, Israel. After its first invasion of the Lebanese territory in 1978 by forming an alliance with Lebanese

¹⁷⁹ Attié, *Struggles in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s*. 192

¹⁸⁰ Farid al-Khazen, “Kamal Jumblatt, Uncrowned Druze Prince of the Left,”

¹⁸¹ Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*. 134

¹⁸² Traboulsi.135

Christians¹⁸³, Israel forced its way deeper into the Lebanese territory, taking advantage of the parties' squabbles and went on to occupy the first Arab capital (other than Jerusalem)¹⁸⁴. Israel's invasion did not only crush the PLO bases in West Beirut but also did the same to Syrian forces in Lebanon, making them an enemy to fight on Lebanese territory¹⁸⁵. Beirut was under Israeli occupation to build a new and a stronger government that would be able to resist Syrian interventions¹⁸⁶. According to Israel, Bashir Gemayel, leader of the ruthless Lebanese Forces militia, would be a perfect fit for the position of Lebanese president, given his popularity in the Christian public and his growing force¹⁸⁷. Gemayel's election was a win not only for the Lebanese Forces and Israel but also for Lebanese Christians. Christians perceived this win as a step closer to winning the civil war and imposing themselves, having the upper hand over the Muslim counterparts. Gemayel, even though refused to make Lebanon a country for Christians, rather wanted it to be a country for Christians and Muslims, rejected the idea of Lebanon being an Arab state, a pillar of the National Pact of 1943¹⁸⁸. After his election, Gemayel called for the Lebanese Independence and requested that all foreign troops on the Lebanese soil leave the country immediately even though Walid Jumblat named him 'candidate of the Israeli Tanks'¹⁸⁹. His demands did not resonate well with

¹⁸³ Sune Haugbolle, *War and Memory in Lebanon*. 54

¹⁸⁴ William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*. 386

¹⁸⁵ Haugbolle, *War and Memory in Lebanon*.54

¹⁸⁶ Haugbolle. 54

¹⁸⁷ William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*. 387

¹⁸⁸ Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*. 222

¹⁸⁹ Traboulsi. 221

neither Israel's nor Syria's government, and, less than a month after his election as president, Gemayel was assassinated in an explosion in Beirut.¹⁹⁰

Makram Rabah draws a connection in perception between Bashir Gemayel's rise to power and his alliance with Israel to Emir Bashir II and his alliance with Egyptian leader, Ibrahim Pasha in the 19th century, which brought down Druze feudal supremacy in the Mountain¹⁹¹. Gemayel's Lebanese Forces militiamen, aided by Israeli forces, took over the Mountain by force. The Mountain was predominantly composed of Christians according to Picard; however, the war from 1975 until 1982 had not invaded the Mountain because of the security provided by PSP militiamen¹⁹². This was the start of the war of the mountain, a war which was initiated by an elected president, using his militia before being sworn in, aided by foreign Israeli troops facing PSP militiamen who, in turn, were aided by the Syrian army, PLO, and other leftist, anti-Gemayel militias.

Carrying out the policy of divide and conquer, the Israelis incited both parties against each other and led them both to make arms deals without restrictions¹⁹³. Richani says that this policy was applied to get the best possible deal from its presence in

¹⁹⁰ Charles Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society*. 235

¹⁹¹ Makram G Rabah, "Conflict on Mount Lebanon: Collective Memory and the War of the Mountain".

¹⁹² Elizabeth Picard and Franklin Philip, *Lebanon a Shattered Country*. A debatable point mentioned by Picard since a reaction to the death of Kamal Jumblat was killing Christians in nearby villages in Shouf District. 127

¹⁹³ Dima de Clerck, "Guerre, Rupture et Frontière Identitaire Dans Le Sud Du Mont-Liban: Les Relations Revisitées Entre Druzes et Chrétiens de La Montagne,".

Lebanon; it needed the Druze's support for a peace treaty, which would give Israel considerable interests in the region¹⁹⁴. Applying and managing this policy did nothing but build up to a big bang in September 1983.

After Kamal Jumblat's assassination in 1977, his son Walid, 28 years old, took over as party president and feudal chief of the Jumblati bloc. Walid did not have the same philosophy and ideology of his father. Rabah says that the Druze leader education in the American University of Beirut – “hub of Arab Nationalism and anti-Lebanese establishment ideas” – directed Walid's political views toward more revolutionary ideologies¹⁹⁵. PSP records mentioned in Richani's study show that, after the death of his father, (Walid) Jumblat officially and publicly defied his father's secular policy, relying mostly on the Druze and trying to increase the community's membership in the party¹⁹⁶.

His reliance on his own community came in handy in 1982 as most Druze rallied around each other and mostly around him, “overshadowing his contenders Arislan Druze faction”¹⁹⁷. Kamal Jumblat's assassination was an opportunity for the Arslans (Yazbakis) to overcome their Jumblati historic rivals as well as the PSP¹⁹⁸. For the sake of saving his party, up until 1982, Walid Jumblat relied on two factors: (1)

¹⁹⁴ Richani, *Dilemmas of Democracy and Political Parties in Sectarian Societies: The Case of the Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon 1949-1996*. 100

¹⁹⁵ Makram G Rabah, “Conflict on Mount Lebanon: Collective Memory and the War of the Mountain”

¹⁹⁶ Richani, *Dilemmas of Democracy and Political Parties in Sectarian Societies: The Case of the Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon 1949-1996*. 99

¹⁹⁷ Richani.

¹⁹⁸ Marwan G. Rowayheb, “Walid Jumblat and Political Alliances: The Politics of Adaptation”.

internal constitution of the Party by trying to recruit as much Druze members as possible, as previously mentioned and (2) external alliance with the PLO due to his belief in the Palestinian cause, as Rowayheb indicates¹⁹⁹.

At the beginning of 1982, there was a misconception that peace in Lebanon was obstructed by Israel²⁰⁰. As much as this theory was and still is the dream of Arab nationalists, Lebanon's situation at that time was different, as I have proved in my previous depiction of the political and war scenario. Bashir Gemayel did not live to oversee the war of the mountain. Christian unity enforced by his charisma and brutality was shattered after his death, as his lieutenants waged wars against one another in order to claim control over the Lebanese Forces²⁰¹.

Israeli presence in Lebanon ended by an American sponsored deal between Lebanon and Israel; it was called the withdrawal agreement. The agreement stipulates that Lebanon signs a peace treaty with Israel, and, in return, Israel evacuates Lebanese territories. Given the PSP's stance on Israeli occupation of Palestine, the Party refused the agreement alongside other prominent political figures, such as former president Sleiman Frangieh²⁰²; instead, they believed in resistance and made an alliance to make

¹⁹⁹ Marwan G. Rowayheb

²⁰⁰ Charles Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society*. 229

²⁰¹ Picard and Philip, *Lebanon a Shattered Country*. 137

²⁰² Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society*. 243

“a counter-offensive under the banner of the National Salvation Front (NSF) to re-establish the equilibrium disrupted by the Israeli invasion”²⁰³.

In order to force President Amin Gemayel to sign the peace treaty, Israel astute but destructive policy was to withdraw its troops deployed in Mount Lebanon. In September 1983, the War of the Mountain reached a new high with the Phalange Party and the Lebanese army making an offensive attack on Druze villages. The fight was the fiercest and deadliest of all the war. With a series of attacks in Shouf and Aley districts, massacres were committed in more than 27 villages. Approximately 20,000 displaced Christians took refuge in Deir El Qamar, where they were under siege until December of that same year²⁰⁴. Israel’s withdrawal from both Shouf and Aley was essential for the PSP to regain control over the territory it had in 1982. De Clerck lists the war’s devastating casualties up until 1983, from the Christian’s side up to 160,000 displaced citizens, 2,700 “disappeared”, 1,155 dead civilians, and 368 dead Lebanese Forces militiamen. As from the other party, 207 and 324 dead civilian and militiamen respectively²⁰⁵. Rowayheb insists that the Party’s victory would not have been possible

²⁰³ Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*. 230

²⁰⁴ de Clerck, “Guerre, Rupture et Frontière Identitaire Dans Le Sud Du Mont-Liban: Les Relations Revisitées Entre Druzes et Chrétiens de La Montagne.”

²⁰⁵ de Clerck.

had it not been for the help of Syria – providing arms logistics – and the few Palestinian militias who left after the withdrawal of the PLO in 1982²⁰⁶.




Fig 3.1: Comparative Military Positions in Province of Mount Lebanon pre-Israeli invasion and post-Israeli withdrawal²⁰⁷

The importance of this conflict as a turning point to the rest of the war and the Ta'ef agreement comes from the small mountainous geographical area it covered and the parties that fought against each other. It shaped the politics of Lebanon in the 1990s and the drafting of the Ta'ef Accord. Changes, within Mount Lebanon's population on both psychological and demographical level, created fear in the Christian bloc and superiority in the Druze bloc. The War of the Mountain was exceptional in many

²⁰⁶ Marwan G. Rowayheb, "Walid Jumblat and Political Alliances: The Politics of Adaptation"

²⁰⁷ Judith P. Harik, "Change and Continuity Among the Lebanese Druze Community: The Civil Administration of the Mountains, 1983-1990,"

aspects, including the fighting parties, political interventions, and events surrounding it; however, the most important aspect is that this war marked the first clash between Druze and Christians since the war of 1860. It is true that Walid Jumblat started recruiting Druze members to the Party and turning the Party from a secular one toward a more communal one; nonetheless, it was still the War of the Mountain that marked the Party's change of course. Winning the war and building the Civil Administration was the moment the PSP took a significant turn toward a new communal policy. After the war, counts showed that 50,000 Druze and 150,000 citizens were displaced from their home villages between 1983 and 1985²⁰⁸, which created a demographical disparity between the two communities and a historical change. Druze domination in both, Aley and Shouf regions, allowed the victor Walid Jumblat to impose himself and the Party as the new leaders of his community²⁰⁹. Jumblat's theory about the War of the Mountain was that it was a "revenge" against Maronite expansionism, especially capturing Beit El Dine palace, as he has said in his speeches²¹⁰. According to Jumblat, this event was the reversal of roles of the "three Bashirs:" Bachir Gemayel, seeing himself as Emir Bashir Shehab II, who killed Bashir Jumblat in 1825 and gave power to the Christians in the Emirate of Mount Lebanon²¹¹.

²⁰⁸ Judith P. Harik, "Change and Continuity Among the Lebanese Druze Community: The Civil Administration of the Mountains, 1983-1990," Harik..

²⁰⁹ Harik

²¹⁰ Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*. 237

²¹¹ Traboulsi. 237

The War of the Mountain, its aftermath, and the creation of the Civil Administration of the Mountain (CAOM) were the reasons for the Druzes community to rally around the PSP as their main source of political power²¹². Gemayel central government's lack of attention to the regions of Mount Lebanon that were regained by the PSP forced the party to form its own government.




Fig 3.2: Organization of the PSP after the War of the Mountain²¹³

²¹² Harik, "Change and Continuity Among the Lebanese Druze Community: The Civil Administration of the Mountains, 1983-1990."

²¹³ Harik.

As the diagram shows, as President, just like any other party, the PSP had its own militia that can be considered as the government's army. The CAOM included the different parts of any government that provided the basic needs to its people (water and electricity, among others). The president would form the head of state while the politburo and party control would look like council of ministries. Walid Jumblat was accused of forming his own canton by building this system of governance. Nevertheless, Jumblat encouraged the central state to take an example of the CAOM as it represented the perfect example of a decentralized state²¹⁴.

3. Ta'ef Agreement, Huddle Around the PSP:

Nearing to an end, Amine Gemayel's presidency was becoming an issue. The national assembly had to be convened in order to elect a new president, but any chance of that happening was ruined. Fighting Christian factions went against each other deciding on who to elect. Ex-president Suleiman Franjeh nominated himself, but a big debacle occurred between him and Samir Geagea's Lebanese Forces²¹⁵. This political brawl led the appointment of General Michel Aoun as a Prime Minister, defying the National Pact of 1943. The Sunnis, feeling betrayed, took matters into their own hand to reinstate Salim Al Hoss, a former prime minister who had resigned. Al Hoss withdrew his resignation and resumed his post as prime minister. Lebanon was now living under

²¹⁴ Harik.

²¹⁵ O'Ballance, *Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-92*. 185

the rule of two governments, one Maronite with a Bashir-like complex and another Muslim one, demanding its historic and traditional rights. According to Rowayheb, Walid Jumblat's position during this turmoil was still a belief in the Arab cause, stating that "Jumblat stated then that 'soon we will defeat the enemies of the Arab nation and raise the Arab flag over the Lebanese Presidential Palace in Baabda.'"²¹⁶.

Aoun's target was just like Bashir Gemayel's. He wanted to get rid of militias and unite Christian forces. He launched, therefore, a war against the Lebanese Forces soon after he was appointed. Within three years (Aoun was exiled in 1991), General Aoun waged wars against all the fighting factions under the pretexts of national liberation and national unity²¹⁷. The General waged the war in 1989 against Syria to liberate Lebanon from Syrian occupation. When it came down to its relation to the PSP, the Party took part in this war siding with the Syrian army. It was in the battle of Souk Al Ghareb that the PSP's and Aoun's armies clashed. On August 10th 1989, the Party's artillery started shelling the region controlled by the Christian Prime Minister, and this lasted for three days²¹⁸. After those three days came a Syrian PSP led Druze assault. Two outposts were captured but lost soon after. The war was a killing machine without any progress for Aoun or the PSP²¹⁹. According to an interview made with former

²¹⁶ Rowayheb, "Walid Jumblat and Political Alliances."

²¹⁷ Picard and Philip, *Lebanon a Shattered Country*. 139

²¹⁸ O'Ballance, *Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-92*. 193

²¹⁹ O'Ballance. 193

member of parliament, Mr. Ghazi Al Aridi, the battle of Souk Al Ghareb was a bridge that hastened, gathering all the members of parliament (from 1972 elections) in the city of Ta'ef in Saudi Arabia²²⁰. Mr. Aridi continues saying that the PSP was not represented in that meeting; therefore, the dreams that they sought in 1975 under the command of Kamal Jumblat were not fulfilled. As a result of that, Lebanon took a turn into a more sectarian path²²¹. Mr. Aridi finishes by saying that, as a result of sectarian division and misrepresentation, the PSP got less than the minimum rights after all the sacrifices it made for the Lebanon²²².

The importance of the war of Souk Al Gharb's outcome affected the PSP. The Party's inability to achieve ground breaking victory, like in the War of the Mountain, gave it less credibility as a powerhouse in Lebanese politics. Add to that, the Party represented a community that is 6.7% of the Lebanese population, a very small minority in a country of minorities. Given its peripheral role in the Ta'ef, the PSP had to convince the Druze community of the importance the agreement, and how it could be beneficial²²³. The Party's political stance in 1990, after agreeing and signing the accord, was one that was controversial. Achieving unity with Syria, a Pan-Arab ideology of the 1950s²²⁴, was not a really bad idea, and the Party "will surrender its weapons only to

²²⁰ Edito Creps International, *The Jumblat Leadership: From Kamal Jumblat to Walid Jumblat*. vol 10, 71

²²¹ Edito Creps International, *The Jumblat Leadership: From Kamal Jumblat to Walid Jumblat*. vol 10, 73

²²² Edito Creps International. vol 10, 73

²²³ el-Husseini, *Pax Syriana: Elite Politics in Postwar Lebanon*.

²²⁴ Rowayheb, "Walid Jumblat and Political Alliances."

Syria since we do not trust the Lebanese state”. Walid Jumblat and the PSP’s alliances, after the war, were questionable but justified by doing what suits Jumblat’s and the community’s interests²²⁵. The best example would be his alliance with Syria, who, in the final period of the civil war, had become an enemy of Christian Lebanese Forces and General Michel Aoun and his followers. Simultaneously, he trod carefully with Christians in order to rebuild the relations between Druze and Christians because of the War of the Mountain²²⁶. These policies allowed him to gain popularity in the Druze community, overtake his historic Yazbaki political and feudal rivals, as well as restore some confidence in other communities²²⁷. After political changes in Syria, mostly death of Hafez Al Assad and replacing Syria’s coordinator with Lebanon, Jumblat and the PSP felt the danger looming around the community; therefore, he turned on his old allies and start criticizing them and shifting positions until Lebanon’s second “Independence” in 2005²²⁸. Rowayheb points out that Jumblat accepted the terms of the Ta’ef agreement in terms of surrendering the PSP’s militia arms and opted from 1990 to a new phase of protecting the Druze community. His new technique was less violent and relied on political maneuvers and different series of alliances that were sometimes contradicting²²⁹. The author continues saying that, as opposed to his father’s technique used in 1958 and 1975, his alliances served him and protected the Party, therefore

²²⁵ el-Husseini, *Pax Syriana: Elite Politics in Postwar Lebanon*.

²²⁶ Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society*. 288

²²⁷ el-Husseini, *Pax Syriana: Elite Politics in Postwar Lebanon*.

²²⁸ Rowayheb, “Walid Jumblat and Political Alliances.”

²²⁹ Rowayheb, “Political Change and the Outbreak of Civil War The Case of Lebanon.”

becoming his community for 18 years. The clashes of May 8th 2008 sent a clear message to politicians across Lebanon. The PSP did not get rid of all its weapons, and the Party kept them to protect the Druze when clashes moved towards Chouf and Aley mountains, where Druze population is most concentrated²³⁰. However, after being pushed into the corner and surrounded by Hezbollah fighters in Clemenceau, Jumblat realized that this fight was bigger than him and that the Druze would lose facing a massive force, such as Hezbollah. A compromise was reached, and Jumblat asserted that a fight with Hezbollah was not in the Party's nor the community's best interest²³¹.

4. 1958, 1983, and 1989, the Link

a. War of 1958:

The three events are separated into two groups. The first contains the civil war of 1958 when Kamal Jumblat was still at the helm of the party and leader of the left in the fight against Chamoun. The second group includes both, the War of the Mountain of 1983 and the Ta'ef agreement in 1989, which, during both terms, Walid Jumblat was leading the Party.

The events of 1958 affected the transformation of the Party in a way that instigated the Druze's feeling of belonging to the Party. A large group of the

²³⁰ Rowayheb.

²³¹ Rowayheb.

community identified themselves with it not only because of its socialist or Pan-Arab beliefs but also because of its leader, Kamal Jumblat. Jumblat was far from being a traditional man, believing and fighting for social equality. His fight for secularization of the state conflicts facts, which prove that the war was severe enough to lead people by their communal or feudal association instincts. The data mentioned by Richani show that, in 1958, Party communal distribution shifted. Numbers show that the war casted out approximately all non-Druze communities from the Party, leaving Kamal Jumblat a leader of a Druze-oriented party and other leftist movements. Therefore, to answer my question, the change that started in the Party during the days of Kamal Jumblat was due to external factors rather than Party decisions. Jumblat's double identity as a traditional feudal leader and a modern politician in the form of a secular party leader were confusing the people of his community. Just like Al Khazen said, there was a large gap between Jumblat and his base of supporters when it came to culture, academia, and philosophy²³². The Druze community, at the time, did not have access to advanced schooling or universities. Therefore, when Jumblat was exposed to different cultures during his studies, he widened his reasoning while the community stagnated and depended on him to be the brains behind their every move.

It is not easy to juggle between two opposite identities. However, Jumblat succeeded in doing so to some extent. He was able to build a Party that was open to

²³² al-Khazen, "Kamal Jumblatt, Uncrowned Druze Prince of the Left."

people from different communities, to call for social equality, and to be the leader of leftist and Pan-Arab movements. At the same time, he was still the head of the Jumblat family, and he gave it back its former glory if not increase its domination over the Druze community. However, in a state of eighteen religious sects, the Druze population has found it hard to adapt to Kamal Jumblat secular belief, and, at the first sign of trouble, the members of the community followed the footsteps of the leader. The big division between Yazbakis and Jumblatis that had spread into state alliances made the PSP's communal drive go against Kamal Jumblat's will. As I mentioned previously, the Yazbaki clan led by Arslan was backed by Camil Chamoun's government, a Maronite government. The Jumblati clan was fighting against it, and, since the clan was led by Kamal Jumblat, the family and PSP leader, the two points had to meet somewhere. This was the start of sectarianism in the Party. Therefore, when the war started in 1958, the Party was overtaken by Druze members, all of which were believers in traditional leadership and in fighting against both, Yazbakis and their supporter, Camil Chamoun.

b. War of the Mountain

When Kamal Jumblat was assassinated in 1977, the immediate reaction was to follow the traditional Druze instinct of passing the leadership of both, the PSP and the family, to his son. The War of the Mountain between the PSP and the Lebanese Forces and Lebanese army is what I consider a turning point for two reasons.

To begin with, it was the first real test for the PSP's new leader Walid Jumblat to prove himself as a worthy heir. Filling the shoes of Kamal Jumblat was not an easy task, perhaps the hardest in all of Lebanon's civil war history. Juggling between modern

and traditional was still an issue for Walid Jumblat. He had to prove his worth for both, the Jumblati clan followers as well as the leftist groups who used to support his father.

The second reason why it is a turning point in the Party's political/communal tendency is the Party's triumph over its opponents. The battle won was branded as a win for the Druze. As opposed to the events of 1958, authors, such as Caroline Attié and Fawaz Traboulsi, considered that if the war was won, the left would have been victorious. Circumstances have now changed, and, in 1983, the PSP meant Druze, if not all the Druze community, then a fairly large part of the community. Winning the war of the mountain gave Jumblat authority as well as legitimacy over the territory he regained or took from his opponents.

One could argue that the death of Kamal Jumblat was the instigating factor of change in the Party. However, as a matter of the fact, the War of the Mountain was the point where the intentions and future vision of Walid Jumblat concerning the Party became clear. I see recruitment after his father's death as a reaction and a way to impose himself as a major Lebanese political figure. However, winning the war and installing the CAOM showed consistency and determination in terms of political approach to what role the Party should play in the years to come. In the eyes of Walid Jumblat, the Party was now a protector of the Druze community in Lebanon and an organization that takes charge of their needs and existence.

c. Ta'ef and the Turbulence

The Ta'ef agreement came at a confusing time for the Party. After having proven itself during the war as a major political actor, in 1989, the PSP had hopes of improved representation in official positions for the Druze community. However, the meeting in the city of Ta'ef involved the remaining members of parliament who were elected in the 1972 general elections.

The PSP was, therefore, misrepresented. Walid Jumblat was not present to directly oversee and control the future of his Party, therefore his community. Since Walid Jumblat had cast his Yazbaki opponents aside, the Druze's position was now shaking with no proper representation in Ta'ef. A new plot had presented itself; it was a time of peace but with different parameters than the ones that existed back in the days of Kamal Jumblat. Walid Jumblat was now faced with a new challenge to show how well he could handle the responsibility of the Party in times of peace.

The Ta'ef agreement put an end to the civil war but started a new sectarian political era in Lebanon. Changed by the war, Lebanese politics stopped being representative of left-wing and right-wing or any political debacle in standard democracies. It turned the country into fragmented sects, which had to coexist with each other. The difference now is that every sect is represented by a certain party. Also, instead of having a struggle of classes, Lebanon was living in a confessional struggle.

Jumblat's policies were no different than the ones he took during the war. Of course, he surrendered his militia's weapons and did not base his decisions on violence, but the political loss of the Party endured in the Ta'ef strengthened his vision of the party as a representative and a protector of the Druze in Lebanon. The new political composition of Lebanon post-Ta'ef encouraged Jumblat to pursue what he had already started, and his political discourse, since 1989, was solely focused on how to protect the Druze. From being Syria's ally until 1998 then switching sides and starting a revolution against them allowed Jumblat to be one of the strongest leaders of the March 14 movement in 2005; Jumblat also forced Syria's army to retreat from Lebanon. Another political hop that Jumblat took was his opposition to Hezbollah in 2008, where he stood firm and exposed the weapons he retained after the end of the war. His opposition ended

the moment he felt that the Party was militarily too strong to fight. Thus, for the sake of keeping the Druze community safe, he declared a truce and put an end to the fight.

CONCLUSION:

Being a minority in the Middle East, the Druze certainly asserted themselves as a unique community through their actions. Other than leading revolutions in Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon during Ottoman rule, the Druze have asserted their position as key players in the Lebanese political scene. First, the Druze Emir Fakhreddine Al Ma'ani created the semi-autonomous state of Mount Lebanon, after that Emir Majid Arslan was one of the pillars of Lebanon's Independence from France, and finally the PSP was an essential constituent of the Lebanese politics. Since the PSP was founded in 1949, it has most recently been a leading force in facing the Syrian regime and the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005.

A combination of intellectual and philosophical studies and international and local political events affected the political manifesto of the Party. Kamal Jumblat's law studies in France took the PSP toward a socialist leftist orientation. Palestinian Naqba of 1948 and proclamation of the state of Israel fueled this leftist course; Kamal Jumblat and the PSP insisted on being fierce advocates of the Palestinian cause. The United States' quick recognition of the state of Israel gave the PSP more reason to antagonize the West and call it an imperial force that supports oppressive states.

As a new political party, established after Lebanon's Independence, the PSP adopted the views of its leader Kamal Jumblat, aiming to be a secular party inclusive to all sects in Lebanon and fighting for the rights of the people instead of working for certain confessions. The Party overcame the first obstacle with success. President Bechara Al Khuri was forced to resign; all this occurred with the help of popular personalities and parties from the right-wing. Numbers show that the Party was diverse during that time, and recruitment was coming from all sects at approximately an equal percentage. The

Lebanese people looked up to the PSP as a party that has the interest of all the Lebanese population not just portions of it. In 1952, members' numbers showed that, even though the party was led by a Druze feudal lord, confessional distribution within the party was to a certain level equal between the five biggest Lebanese communities. The total number of members was at its highest during this year, which, I believe, was caused by the opposition to the Khuri regime. Membership dropped in numbers the following year after the change in the regime with Camil Chamoun as president. However, percentages of the five religions were still close, meaning that the party was still working toward its purpose of non-confessionalism.

Total number of members continued to plummet after 1953, reaching a low of less than a hundred in 1957. One theory is that the opposition to the Chamoun regime and the President's persecution of the PSP and leftist parties were the cause of the Party's descent. This decline in popularity revealed itself in the 1957 elections, where Kamal Jumblat, the party leader, lost his seat in the parliament. Another theory would be that the elections were designed in order for the Chamoun camp to win, but it still did not mean that people were trying to steer away from the PSP to protect themselves.

The war of 1958 changed the Lebanese political play. Sectarianism introduced itself as a new powerful force. Even though Kamal Jumblat did not want his party to turn into a Druze party, it had become clear that, after 1958, fear of joining the PSP surmounted non-Druze members and lowered the Christian and Muslim (non-Druze) recruitment rate. After the death of his father in 1977, Walid Jumblat anticipated the future. In order to strengthen his position as a leader of the PSP and the Druze community, Jumblat focused on recruiting new members of his community. His gamble paid off in the War of the Mountain, where his militia (constituted mainly of Druze) won the battle; he imposed himself as a new powerful political player in Lebanon. Therefore, the turning

point of the Party's sectarianism was not pondered in 1977; rather, it was in 1983 after the end of the War of the Mountain. Another factor that determines how this event was relevant was the installation of the CAOM. Druze, all across the Chouf and Aley region, felt safe because they believed that they were protected in a separate state. As for the final turning point in the Party's religious orientation, it came in the Ta'ef agreement in 1989. The Party was not well-represented in this agreement. As a result, the Druze community that had rallied around the PSP came out with broken dreams. There could be a similarity between the events of 1860 and the Ta'ef agreement. In both events, the Druze imposed themselves as a superior military force but ultimately lost their political one.

After Ta'ef, Walid Jumblat did what his ancestors used to do, bandwagon with the strongest force in order to keep the Druze community safe. His policies were a success as the Party continues to be a major force with a large political influence on many Druze in Lebanon and Syria.

Both, Kamal and Walid Jumblat, are exceptional political characters who, even though come from a traditional feudal heritage, managed to lead and preserve a political party, each with respect to his own time. Both figures of a minority community in Lebanon managed to be stronger than other parties and movements that represent major communities and the region. Kamal Jumblat led the fight of the left and Pan-Arab nationalism in Lebanon. His son represented the fierce opposition to Christian oppression, as he called it, and then led the opposition to the Syrian rule in Lebanon. Both of them knew how to give the party the size and influence it deserves, which was bigger than the community by itself.

One theory of the success of Walid Jumblat could be that power was bestowed upon him overnight. Therefore, since time was not a privilege, he had to adapt quickly and retrace his father's steps. Another theory is that Walid Jumblat's success is due to his

failures, meaning that, since 1977 until 1989, Lebanon was in a state of war, and the new Druze leader had time to make mistakes as much as possible in order to learn. The result would be twelve years of experience in erring and recalculating, a privilege that was not provided for his father.

What is interesting to study and examine in the future is the term of Taymour Jumblat, Walid's son. The Jumblati leadership of the PSP is soon to be in the hand of a third generation. Taymour has already been handed the traditional Jumblati seat in the parliament and is expected to be handed the Party's leadership in the future. Therefore, with Taymour having time to think of policies on how to run the Party and take care of the community, the questions posed are the following: Would Taymour be able to adapt by making mistakes? Or would Taymour rely on his father for support?

It would be interesting to observe also the difference of management between a leader who called for secularization, a second who relied on his sect in order to preserve his party and keep his sect strong, and the third whose management is still unclear.

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