

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

EXAMINING THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CAUSES OF
THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR: 1975 - 1990

by
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
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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

Farah Abou Harb for

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The origins of the 1975 Lebanese civil war have long been a subject of extensive study by scholars and writers. According to Michael E. Brown's theory on the case of the Lebanese civil war, the political, economic, social, cultural and perceptual structures of the state seem to play a prominent role in triggering the war. From the Ottoman period until 1975, sectarianism played a major role in solidifying communal privileges and demands and in further aggravating the gap between the sectarian communities.

Internally, sectarianism played a role in solidifying communal privileges and demands. Yet, as this research will reveal, there were other factors that caused conflict and played a role in providing conducive conditions for war, particularly in light of the weakening Lebanese state. Additionally, the triggering factors, the role of the elites, bad neighbors and bad neighborhoods played a role in escalating conflict and violence, which is highlighted through the Palestinian factor, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the ideology of pan-Arabism. Externally, the unstable external environment and bad neighbors, including Syria and Israel, played a major role in not only violating Lebanon's sovereignty, but also in meddling in the country's domestic affairs.

The findings of the research showed that the major internal causes of the civil war were: the sectarian dominance, the rigid political institutions, the fragile power-sharing agreements that were unable to regulate and mitigate conflict, the weakness of the state, the different approaches of the political elites towards domestic and regional issues, and external intervention, and the state's incapability in responding to the groups' demands. Brown's theory, to a great extent, proved true in the case of Lebanon.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This chapter begins by introducing the topic of the research and by specifying the scope of the research. This chapter highlights the research question and the structure of the thesis. In addition, this chapter introduces the main theme of the research, which is the Lebanese civil war, and the various internal and external factors that caused the outbreak of violence in 1975.

The origins of the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990) have been a subject of extensive study by scholars and writers. For example, Farid El Khazen's, *The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon 1967-1976*, Theodor Hanf's, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation*, and Fawwaz Traboulsi's, *History of Modern Lebanon*, provided a history of the formation of Lebanon, the 1943 National Pact as a power sharing agreement, and the limitations of the Lebanese political system that eventually failed to meet the internal and external challenges and threats. The focus of these studies has been on whether the war was caused by internal factors, external factors or a mix of both. Some have even gone so far as to describe the conflict as a "war of others".¹ According to the existing literature, the civil war had roots in years of political, social and economic disparities.² The geographic nature of the country subjected it to centuries of conflict, as the mountainous areas attracted minorities from across the region, mainly the Maronites and the Druze, who competed for political ascendancy.

¹ Marie-Joelle Zahar, "Foreign Interventions, Power-Sharing and the Dynamics of Conflict and Coexistence in Lebanon", in *Lebanon after the Cedar Revolution*, ed. Are Knudsen and Michael Kerr (London: Hurst and Company, 2012), 63

² Thereafter, when I mention 'civil war', I will be talking about the 1975-1990 Lebanese civil war.

This research is different from the above mentioned works because it uses Michael Brown's theory on conflict and violence. I elaborate on Brown's theory in Chapter two. It is important to stress that this thesis is not about a history of Lebanon and the internal dynamics of the cycles of violence between the warring parties in the Lebanese civil war. Still, this thesis is not about a history of civil wars. This thesis is about the internal and external causes of the war and the factors and events that triggered violence in 1975. Therefore, this thesis aims to answer the following research question: What were the causes of the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990)? In Chapter two I further emphasize the research question and introduce four proposition or claims that would be explored and tested to support the research question.

Before delving into my research, a momentary clarification is required. The civil war was often described as a conflict between Muslims and Christians. This account however, is false and unwarranted mainly because, as this research will show, the external unstable environment played a major role in shaping conflict in Lebanon. This is not to say that there were no internal causes. Sectarianism did play a key role in the inflammation and continuation of the war, but it was not always the cause. At many stages during the war, there was no clear strict line of inter-sectarian divisions. Georges Corm explained this miscount during the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security's workshops, where he argued that the Lebanese civil war "had a definite class aspect to the crisis, which transcended the sectarian divided". Thus, according to Corm, the war witnessed not only intra-sectarian violence, but violence within each sect as well.³

³ The Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIP) held a series of intensive workshops on the Lebanese war between September 1990 and November 1991.

The sectarian debate over political representation and power, that overshadowed the fifteen years of the war, was at its peak in 1943 during independence from the French mandatory power. The 1943 National Pact (NP), otherwise understood as the unwritten national accord, was promulgated to formalize the Lebanese state. The National Pact allowed Lebanon to proceed to independence at the disdain of some segments of the population. Indeed, certain sections of the Christian Maronites would have preferred to continue under the French Mandate, since the French provided them with protection and certain privileges among a majority of Muslims. On the contrary, most Muslims welcomed the idea of independence as they believed it would take them a step closer towards fulfilling their dream of “Arabization”.⁴ Major political developments in the Middle East influenced the inter-sectarian coexistence in the country because Lebanon’s foreign policy decisions “almost always caused disagreement between the Lebanese and sometimes escalated to open conflict”.⁵

The two decades following independence witnessed an abundance of domestic conflict. In 1975, a fifteen-year civil war broke out, resulting in the death of 150,000 individuals and some 17,000 kidnapped.⁶

The Lebanese civil war was the outcome of several internal and external causes that have long been in the making. The causes of the war were rooted in the political, economic, social, cultural and perceptual structures of the state, while the conducive environment within Lebanon was further aggravated and set into motion by the external triggering effects of the region.

⁴ Theodore Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation* (UK: I.B Tauris & Co Ltd, 1993), 40.

⁵ Deidre Collings, *Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction* (USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), 3.

⁶ Ibid.

Thesis Goal and Outline

The objective of this thesis is to examine and analyze the internal and external causes of the Lebanese civil war. Once again it is important to stress that this thesis is not about civil wars and does not examine the internal dynamics of the Lebanese civil war and its various stages. This research particularly focuses on structural, political, social/economic, and cultural/perceptual causes of conflict.

Structurally, this thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter one that is the introduction presents the main theme and objective of the thesis. It also refers to the research question and the structure of the thesis and provides a short summary of each chapter.

Chapter two, "*Theoretical Framework and Research Methodology*", provides a conceptual framework by referring to Michael E. Brown's theory on the underlying causes of internal conflict. This Chapter provides a justification of choosing Brown's theory and the political, structural, socio-economic, and cultural-perceptual factors associated with it to provide a better understanding of the civil war. While using the theory, I support my argument by referring to internal and external factors and events that contributed to shaping conflict. Chapter two also explains why I thesis use a qualitative methodology.

Chapter three, "*Lebanon's Political System from the Ottoman Period until Independence (1800s – 1943)*", provides a historical background of the modern state of Lebanon and the historical formation and the institutionalization of sectarianism. This Chapter also examines the *qa'imaqamyah* and the *mutasarifiyyah* systems, the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920, the French Mandate, and the declaration of independence in

1943. I argue why the National Pact of 1943 was important in shaping the Lebanese political system. Then, I analyze internal political developments and events within the context of Brown's theory on the political, cultural, economic and structural causes of internal conflict.

Chapter four, "*Internal and External Factors as Causes of Conflict (1943 – 1975)*", examines a number of internal and external challenges that destabilized Lebanon in the pre-war period. For example, I explain and argue how the role of the political elites, the role of external political developments in destabilizing Lebanon, the 1958 crisis, the role of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and state weakness, led to the outbreak of the civil war in 1975. In line with Brown's theory, Chapter four also examines the triggering factors of the war by referring to two significant triggers (i. e. internal events) that caused violence to escalate.

Chapter five that is the conclusion summarizes the arguments and the findings of this research and shows which factors of Brown's theory of internal conflict support the research question.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter provides a discussion of the theoretical framework utilized within this research. I begin by examining the socio-political developments in the pre-war period by using Michael E. Brown's theory on the causes of internal conflict. This thesis is a case study about Lebanon I also discuss the methodology and stress the significance of qualitative research for this thesis. As noted above, the objective of this thesis is to provide a better understanding of the causes of the 1975 civil war.

Discussion of the Theoretical Framework

I would like to clarify why I chose Michael Brown's theory to analyze the causes of the Lebanese civil war. Brown's theory is a standard source in ethnic conflict literature and nationalism. Historical grievances are an important factor to cause conflict. Yet, scholars of ethnic conflict reject the explanation that a single factor can explain internal conflict and violence in a country. Brown's theory was used to explain war and violence in former Yugoslavia between Muslims, Croats and Serbs. Certainly, there were historical grievances between the nations of former Yugoslavia but ancient hatreds, as such, were not a sufficient cause of conflict and violence.⁷ I do not label the Lebanese conflict as ethnic, but I use Brown's theory because most of the factors associated with it do fit the Lebanese context and case. Certainly, sectarianism played a role in solidifying communal

⁷ Michael E. Brown, 'The Causes of Internal Conflict, an Overview', in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-jones and Steven E. Miller (eds.), *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict* (Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 2001), PP. 3-25.

privileges and demands. Yet, as this research will reveal, there were other factors that caused conflict. What follows next is an explanation of Brown's theory. I also refer to other scholars to support my argument on the causes of the Lebanese civil war.


Brown's theory is two-folded. According to Brown, there are four primary underlying factors that make some places more prone to violence than others, i.e. the underlying causes of internal conflict. These causes are divided into structural, political, economic/social, and cultural/perceptual factors. Firstly, structural factors include weak states, intra-state security concerns and ethnic geography. Secondly, political factors are comprised of discriminatory political institutions, exclusionary national ideologies, inter-group politics and elite politics. Thirdly, economic/social factors include economic problems, discriminatory economic systems, and economic development and modernization. Fourthly, cultural/perceptual factors include patterns of cultural discrimination and problematic group histories.⁸

Brown further argued that these causes can be triggered in four different ways: by internal, mass-level factors (i.e. bad domestic problems); by external mass-level factors (i.e. bad neighborhoods); by external, elite-level factors (i.e. bad neighbors); and by internal, elite-level factors (i.e. bad leaders). Table 1.0 below portrays Brown's theory on the causes of internal conflict.⁹

⁸ Michael E. Brown, "The Causes of Internal Conflict: An Overview", in *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*, ed. Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (UK: MIT Press, 2001), 4-5.

⁹ Table 1.0 has been adopted and further modified from Michael E. Brown's original table.

Table 1.0 The Proximate and Underlying Causes of Internal Conflict



I would like to start the discussion by referring to the socio-economic causes of the war. When it comes to “bad domestic problems”, Lebanon is not an exception. From 1946 to 1975, the Lebanese economy witnessed rapid economic growth. According to Samir Makdisi and Richard Sadaka, the Lebanese national economy witnessed a “broad-based expansion in the pre-war period while maintaining relative financial stability”.¹⁰ The authors also argued that the average annual rate of growth from 1950 to 1974 was seven per cent.¹¹ Moreover, they pointed out the increase in educational standards that was evident through the gross school enrollment for the first and second levels at 74 per

¹⁰ Samir Makdisi and Richard Sadaka, *The Lebanese Civil War, 1975- 1990: Lecture and Working Paper Series No.3*(Lebanon: The American University of Beirut, 1983), 13.

¹¹ Ibid.

cent. Lebanon was the hub for trade and enterprise, and by 1969, “non-Arab foreign banks controlled 40 per cent of bank deposits in Lebanon”, while by 1974, that percentage had doubled.¹² However, Makdisi and Sadaka also highlight the presence of disparities of uneven development and the gap between the high and low income population groups. A study performed by Yves Schmeil showed that for the years of 1973 and 1974, 54 per cent of the population were classified as poor or very poor, 25 per cent were classified as middle class, with 21 per cent doing well or very rich.¹³ On a further note, Makdisi and Sadaka emphasized the importance of geographical distribution. These economic changes should be viewed in the context of regional inequalities and their confessional dimensions. For instance, “...the position of the middle class was much more salient in Beirut (dominated by Sunni Muslims and Christians) and the central mountain region (dominated by Christians) than in regions like the south, the Beqa‘a, the northeast, and Akkar in the north (dominated by Shi‘a and Sunni Muslims)...”.¹⁴ Similarly, Joseph Chamie agreed with the aforementioned authors by arguing that there were three fundamental causes to the civil war, which included- but were not limited to- differences in political ideology, the existence of sharp societal cleavages, and the prevalence of significant social, economic and demographic differences among the various religious groups.¹⁵ Authors Samih Farsoun and Walter Carroll amplify Chamie’s argument by

¹² Fawwaz Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon* (UK: Pluto Press, 2007), 156.

¹³ Yves Schmeil, “Sociologie du Systèm Politique Libanais”, in *The Lebanese Civil War, 1975- 1990: Lecture and Working Paper Series*, Makdisi and Sadaka (Lebanon: The American University of Beirut, 1983), 20.

¹⁴ Makdisi and Sadaka, *The Lebanese Civil War, 1975- 1990*, 9.

¹⁵ Joseph Chamie, “The Lebanese Civil War: An Investigation into The Causes”, *World Affairs* 139 (Winter 1976/77): 183.

stating that the socio-economic crisis that intensified in the 1970s had been building momentum since the second half of the 1950s.¹⁶

It is also critical to note that demographic changes had a major effect on the incorporation of sociopolitical inequality between the Muslims and the Christians. According to Theodor Hanf, both communities were stratified and included significant inequalities in education and access to public work. Additionally, class differences were greater among the Muslims who pushed for equal power sharing with the Maronite Christians in regard to economic benefits as well as public representation and participation. Fawwaz Traboulsi added, "...in the 1970s, business was still basically under Christian control".¹⁷ Still, "where there were 105 Christians employers in industry, there were only twenty-one Muslims".¹⁸ Edgar O'Ballance further augmented the Christian (Maronite)-Muslim division by affirming that, "Christian leaders abhorred the idea of sharing power with the Muslims".¹⁹

Concerning political factors, political discrimination was at a peak in 1943. According to the National Pact, the "sectarian formula" distributed power among the three main groups; the Maronites, the Sunnis, and the Shiites. The Maronites had precedence in Lebanese society; 55 per cent of parliamentary seats was allocated to them, the president of the republic was a Maronite (as agreed upon in the unwritten national accord) whose influential prerogatives allowed him to chair the council of ministers, and appoint the prime minister and the cabinet members among other privileges. Makdisi and

¹⁶ Samih Farsoun and Walter Carrol, *Lebanese War: Historical and Social Background* (Bonn: PDW, Progress Dritte Welt, 1976), 6.

¹⁷ Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*, 162.

¹⁸ Latif Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward* (USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 56.

¹⁹ Edgar O'Ballance, *Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-1992* (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), 34.

Sadaka thus emphasized that in the pre-1975 period, the Maronites “emerged as the single most influential religious community”, and that the political system during the pre-war era was a focal point in “foster[ing] corruption, and clientism”.²⁰ Hanf added that a Sunni prime minister “embittered the Maronites without appeasing the Sunnis”.²¹ Still, “...each Lebanese sect sees itself as distinctly different from the other sects and strives to maintain its autonomy and identity”.²²

Concerning structural factors, state weakness is a fundamental notion towards understanding the causes of the civil war. In the years leading up to the conflict, the Lebanese state was in a weak and deteriorating period. Farid El-Khazen argued against this idea by stating that, “the fact that a state is weak does not, however, mean that it should collapse; nor does it mean that the country should be the scene of war”.²³ However, in an interview conducted by Hanf with Sunni figure Mohammed Shukair noted that it was the weakness of the Lebanese state, and its failure in creating equality between the Christians and the Muslims, that eventually led to the civil war. Shukair concluded that “...Lebanon remained a weak state. And because it was weak, it served any outside interest as an arena”.²⁴ Mohammed Ayoub highlighted this nexus by drawing a two-way link between state failure and internal conflict. He explained that this relation was cyclical, where the two phenomenon fed and provided for each other.²⁵ State weakness provided a platform for internal conflict to take place, and the conflict itself failed to allow

²⁰ Makdisi and Sadaka, *The Lebanese Civil War: 1975- 1990*, 10.

²¹ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon*, 92.

²² Chamie, *The Lebanese Civil War: An Investigation into The Causes*, 185.

²³ Farid El-Khazen, *The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon 1967-1976* (UK: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2000), 92.

²⁴ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon*, 375.

²⁵ Mohammed Ayoub, “State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure”, in *Leashing the Dogs of War*, ed. Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson and Pamela Aall (USA: United States Institute of Peace, 2007), 104.

the state to attain and provide security. In Michael Hudson's words, "Lebanon is the only state in the Middle East... virtually to collapse- not just as a regime or government, but as a state".²⁶ Similarly, Deidre Collings highlighted the sectarian system's effect in "...contribut[ing] more to the state's weakness than to its strength". He also highlighted "the rigidity of Lebanon's political organization- its sectarian quotas and its inability to allow for peaceful change- [which] rendered it unstable and contributed to both the war's eruption and continuation".²⁷ This sectarian nature of Lebanese politics reaffirmed that "... Christians, Muslims, Druze and other confessional communities are caught in a perpetual cycle of competition" for resources and power".²⁸ Political elites, motivated primarily by electoral power, had hindered competition from contenders of both inter- and intra- sectarian organizations as well as non-sectarian organizations. This resulted in creating and maintaining a political stalemate where outside competition was constantly blocked. Attachment to leadership positions came from the elites' "desire to gain control over state resources and to maintain patronage networks within their communities and electoral strongholds".²⁹

Several authors, including Barry R. Posen, Fareed El-Khazen, Theodor Hanf, and Youssef M. Choueiri, discussed the critical notions of state weakness and security. Posen coined the term "security dilemma" which presupposed that a state which was weak or weakening could with time give incentives to groups to take necessary measures for physical safety and security.³⁰ However, the issue was that with such measures taken up

²⁶ Michael C. Hudson, *The Precarious Republic* (USA: Westview Press, 1985), xiv

²⁷ Collings, *Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction*, 5.

²⁸ Jeffrey G. Karam, "Beyond Sectarianism: Understanding Lebanese Politics through a Cross-Sectarian Lens", *Crown Center for Middle East Studies* 107(April 2017): 2.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 2-4.

³⁰ Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict", *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* 35(Spring 1993): 31.

by a group, another group would feel threatened and would in turn take similar steps to protect itself from the threatening group. Thus, a security dilemma was created. Simply put in the words of Posen, “what one does to enhance one’s own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure”.³¹ Choueiri stated that, “a perennial problem of Lebanese society is the weakness of the state and its inability to acquire legitimacy from all or most of its citizens”. The Maronites wanted “a Lebanese state... They wanted a Lebanon that accorded with their views”.³² According to Hanf, the Maronite’s argument revolved around security. Would Greater Lebanon or Mount Lebanon be more “Maronite reliable”?³³

Brown attributed internally-driven elite-triggered violence to “bad leaders”. In the case of Lebanon, this connotation referred to the elites or militia leaders (*za’ama*) that emerged during the civil war with aspirations in attaining political advancement through their sectarian parties. This relation was conceptualized by Tamirace Fakhoury as “elite-mass” politics.³⁴ Those elites or party leaders were also referred to as political entrepreneurs, warlords, or war elites, and were those individuals who were loyal to their confessional origin rather than the state. Their primary loyalty was to their party or group and not to the state. It is also critical to note that intra-group conflicts also took place, as parties fought among themselves for resources and leadership positions. David Lake and Donald Rothchild noted that the critical and strategic actions carried out by the

³¹ Posen, *The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict*, 35.

³² Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon*, 271.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Tamirace Fakhoury-Muhlbacher, *Democracy and Power Sharing in Stormy Weather: The Case of Lebanon*, (Germany: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009), 128.

entrepreneurs might polarize society and further propel the conflict.³⁵ Chamie defended this argument by stating that the “ossified nature” of the political leaders was a feature which undoubtedly “contributed to and helped perpetuate the conflict.”³⁶ A large part of the clashes that occurred in 1973 had nothing to do with the Palestinian cause, but with the political system itself. The parties were aware of that, but they masked the reality by scapegoating the PLO.³⁷ In the words of Collings, “... the warlords employed sectarian-based violence to compel Lebanese civilians to take refuge, both psychologically and physically, in sectarian ghettos that were “protected” by same-sect militias. In this way, militia leaders appropriated the mantle of legitimacy through the appearance of popular support”.³⁸

According to Brown, “... one could argue [that the externally-driven mass-triggered factor (i.e. bad neighborhoods)] was the spark that ignited the civil war in Lebanon in 1975”.³⁹ This notion of bad neighborhoods referred to demographic changes that occurred due to the migration of individuals and violence among nations in the region. The Lebanese case was explained by the resettlement of Palestinian refugees from Jordan to Lebanon in 1970. The Cairo agreement of 1969 granted the Palestinian organizations the right of free movement and political activity on Lebanese territory. It further allowed them to have armed units in refugee camps and to set observation posts in the border zone in the South with Israel.⁴⁰ They were also tasked with maintaining

³⁵ David Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict”, *International Security* 21(Fall 1996): 70.

³⁶ Chamie, *The Lebanese Civil War: An Investigation into The Causes*, 187.

³⁷ YouTube, “The War of Lebanon Episode 2”, YouTube Web Site, 41:56, <https://goo.gl/kYQAfg> (accessed February 19,2019).

³⁸ Collings, *Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction*, 2.

³⁹ Brown, *The Causes of Internal Conflict: An Overview*, 16.

⁴⁰ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon*, 167.

discipline and by not interfering in Lebanese affairs. The Cairo agreement's essence however, was tampered. The PLO had begun to perform acts of aggression, as it "frequently erected roadblocks and controlled people and vehicles, molesting, detaining or kidnapping Lebanese...".⁴¹ Unease started to rise among the Christian community which was initially weary regarding the Cairo agreement. According to the interviewee, Nazir Najarian, "from a Christian perspective, the acts of the PLO threatened their physical security and safety".⁴² As stated by Hanf, "if the state could not guarantee the safety of its citizens, they [the Christians] would have to take matters into their own hands".⁴³ Yet, some Christians like Bishop Gregor Haddad did not see in the Palestinians an internal threat, and stressed the importance of Christian support to the Palestinians on humanitarian grounds.⁴⁴ According to Haddad, "Palestine and Lebanon are of the same environment, and Palestinian refugees are suffering, and their cause is a just cause."⁴⁵ However, O'Ballance asserted that the Palestinians and their involvement in Lebanese politics were the two main problems facing the Lebanese government.⁴⁶ Chamie argued that the immigration of about 400,000 Palestinian refugees from 1970-1975 and their guerrilla movement in Lebanon constituted what the traditionalists (such as the Phalange Party and the National Liberal Party) viewed as a "state within a state" and spawned the ground for conflict⁴⁷. Additionally, the Arab-Israeli conflict was a significant external

⁴¹ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon*, 167.

⁴² Nazir Najarian, interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, April 18, 2019.

⁴³ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon*, 299.

⁴⁴ El-Khazen, *The Breakdown of the State of Lebanon 1967-1976*, 150.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ O'Ballance, *Civil War in Lebanon*, 64.

⁴⁷ See Chamie, *The Lebanese Civil War*, 190; Right wing traditionalists were known as the Front of Lebanese Forces: The Phalange Party, National Liberal Party, Zghorta Liberation Army, Guards of the Cedars, and Maronite Monastic Order. The opposition was composed of the Lebanese progressives (Christians and Muslims), traditionally minded Muslim people and the Palestinians.

factor in the Lebanese conflict. According to Hanf, “any significant change in the overall status [of the Arab-Israeli conflict] greatly affected the relationship between the Lebanese and the Palestinians”. Also, “Lebanon was gradually turned into the battlefield of the Arab-Israeli conflict”.⁴⁸

The Palestinian factor aside, the Lebanese groups competed and fought against each other for dominance. As Hanf noted, “what started primarily as a surrogate war over Palestine has become a conflict over coexistence between various Lebanese groups as well”.⁴⁹ Therefore, and in accordance with Brown’s theory, the Palestinian case can be viewed as both a triggering and a proximate cause of the war. El Khazen stressed the impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the Lebanese civil war. According to El-Khazen, Lebanon contained something that had strong reverberations on the Arab-Israeli conflict: the PLO. There was no doubt that the Palestinian presence in Lebanon had agitated the political system. Had the Palestinians not been given the right to bear arms, perhaps their impact on internal Lebanese politics could have been different. Nonetheless, the strategic location of Lebanon provided the Palestinians with an optimal battlefield against the Israelis.⁵⁰ In the words of Henry Kissinger, “As it had attempted in Jordan, the Palestinian movement wrecked the delicate balance of Lebanon’s stability.”⁵¹

As Brown stated, externally-driven and elite-triggered (bad neighbors) conflict became one of the main factors that caused violence in Lebanon. This was portrayed through the meddling of Syria and Israel in Lebanon’s internal affairs. Rola El-Husseini stated that Syria has always had an important influence in Lebanon which grew

⁴⁸ Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon*, 5.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ El-Khazen, *The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon 1967-1976*, 396.

⁵¹ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal* (USA: Simon & Schuster, 1999),1022.

exponentially after 1975.⁵² She further mentioned Naomi Weinberger's description of Syrian intervention in three types: early attempt at mediation, escalation to indirect intervention as well as direct military intervention.⁵³ She clarified that Syria's intervention was not aimed at supporting any group or providing any sort of affiliation, but was targeted at ensuring the preservation and expansion of Syrian influence.⁵⁴ After the 1st of June 1976, the Syrian army advanced into several Lebanese regions: Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, the Palestinian strongholds between Litani and Awali rivers, as well as the foothills of Mount Hermon. Michael Johnson insisted that the Syrian involvement in the civil war "... had done much to prolong the warfare at different times since 1975".⁵⁵ The majority of the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), agreed upon by the Arab League in October 1976 as a peacekeeping mission to Lebanon, was composed of Syrian troops. Therefore, Syria strategically managed to keep its hand on Lebanese matters long after the end of the war in 1990.

On a similar note, Israeli invasions of Lebanon, in 1978 and 1982 had severe consequences on the sovereignty and unity of the state. Israel developed contacts with Lebanese Maronite politicians since the mid-1970s- specifically with Bachir Gemayel, whose purpose was to "encourage Israel to intervene against the Syrian garrison forces in Lebanon".⁵⁶ Records retained by the Lebanese army "... show that there were one or two

⁵² Rola El-Husseini, *Pax Syriana: Elite Politics in Postwar Lebanon* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2012), 130.

⁵³ See Naomi Weinberger in El-Husseini, *Pax Syriana: Elite Politics in Postwar Lebanon*, 200.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Michael Johnson, *All Honourable Men: The Social Origins of War in Lebanon* (London: Center for Lebanese Studies, 2001), 250.

⁵⁶ Jonathan Spyer, "Israel and Lebanon: Problematic Proximity", in *Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis*, ed. Barry Rubin (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 199.

Israeli violations of Lebanese territory every day between 1968 and 1974” and “by 1975, there was an average of seventeen territorial violations.⁵⁷ Israel’s undeclared alliance and support to the Maronites and its constant incursions and air raid on South Lebanon “...exacerbated the intercommunal tension and contributed to an escalation in the conflict”.⁵⁸ Even before the war erupted, in October 1974, “Israel declared its intention to organize regular patrols and roadblocks on Lebanese soil to prevent infiltration across the border”.⁵⁹

Research Question

The existing literature views the civil war as a culmination of years of political and socioeconomic struggle with clear elements of external intervention. That said, this thesis attempts to answer the following research question, and aims to prove the following propositions:

RQ1: What were the causes of the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990)?

P1: If the political system is not fair, and if the interests of some groups are served while others are trampled, conflict is more likely.

P2: If the external environment is unstable, internal agreements to share power may collapse, hence conflict is more likely.

P3: If institutions are weak or incompetent, instability often prevails, hence conflict is more likely.

P4: If socio-economic conditions deteriorate, publics become more receptive to scapegoating, hence conflict is more likely.

⁵⁷ Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward*, 61.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁵⁹ Dilip Hero, *Lebanon: Fire and Embers: A History of the Lebanese Civil War* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993), 17.

Many authors are still in disagreement about the fundamental causes of the civil war and whether the war could have been avoided in spite of the regional imbalances. To answer the above research question and hypotheses, I will use the Lebanese civil war as a case study to test the applicability Michael Brown's theory on the causes of internal conflict.

Research Methodology

In order to get an exhaustive understanding of the plethora of the arguments on the causes of the Lebanese civil war, I will address the four propositions to answer the research question. I will use primary and secondary data to examine the conditions that prevailed before 1975 and analyze how these conditions triggered the war. By analyzing its historical background, I provide a better understanding of the socio-political and economic context within which the war occurred. This will allow me to answer the research question and test the validity of the propositions.

I use qualitative methodology because it fits better to the nature of my research. My research method is two-folded. Evidently qualitative research, which is widely used in political science, enables researchers to study social and cultural phenomena. Certainly, there are many types of qualitative research methods. For example, there are the case studies, ethnography, grounded theory and the interview.⁶⁰ I begin by collecting secondary data from previous literature that examined the internal and regional imbalances in the pre-civil war period. These sources include books, journal articles, and newspapers to find out the internal and external challenges that Lebanon faced. Then I will proceed to sort these challenges into structural, political, economic/social, and/or

⁶⁰ See Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln, *Handbook of Qualitative Research* (California: SAGE Publications, 1994).

cultural/perceptual factors. The end goal is to test Michael Brown's theory by using Lebanon as a case study.

Concerning primary sources, they include semi-structured open-ended interviews in order to penetrate deep into the world of the interviewees. I will conduct interviews with historians, academicians and public figures whose expertise on the civil war is noteworthy. The chosen interviewees were prominent figures and well-informed in the community. Based on their expertise, they shared and provided valuable information in the relevant area of my research. My questions tackled the political, social, structural and economic causes of the civil war. In addition, my questions focused on how external events in the region affected Lebanese internal politics and contributed to the rise of sectarian tensions. I interviewed professors from Lebanese universities, who have previously written about the causes and political effects of the civil war, and those who studied the history of Lebanon. I follow ethical standards while conducting the interviews. Therefore, according to the desire of some of my interviewees, I will respect and preserve their anonymity.

The interviews will be composed of a series of open-ended questions that pertain to the historical environment of Lebanon, and to the internal and regional imbalances that took place in the years preceding the war and their effects on igniting and extending the conflict. I will support my arguments by using data collected from the interviews.

This research has been approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the American University of Beirut. A consent form was also prepared and approved by the IRB.

CHAPTER III

LEBANON'S POLITICAL SYSTEM FROM THE OTTOMAN PERIOD UNTIL INDEPENDENCE (1800S – 1943)

Chapter three examines the historical background of the modern state of Lebanon. I begin by providing an overview of the demographic distribution of the Lebanese communities, particularly the geographic areas from 1523 to 1943. I also discuss the historical formation and the institutionalization of sectarianism and how it shaped inter-communal relations and the distribution of economic, social and political privileges to the Lebanese sects. I further highlight the discriminatory arrangements that hindered unity between the people and undermined the formation of a national identity. I then proceed to discuss the qa'imama and the mutasarrifiyya systems, the erection of greater Lebanon and the declaration of independence in 1943. Within this context, I argue how the National Pact of 1943 shaped the Lebanese political system. I analyze these events within the context of Brown's theory on the political, cultural, economic and structural causes of internal conflict. I will also apply Brown's theory to different historical stages that Lebanon experienced.

Historization and Institutionalization of Sectarianism

Modern Lebanon has long been the focus of regional and international powers. Strategically nestled between the Mediterranean, Central Asia and India, Lebanon has been viewed as a key geographical element for trade routes and the movement of populations for centuries. It was conquered by the Egyptians, Assyrians, Hittites, Persians, and Macedonians before becoming a Roman territory and subsequently a Byzantine domain. Part of ancient Syria, Lebanon fell to the Arabs in 633 CE and later to the

Ottomans after defeating the Egyptian Mamluks in 1516. This remained the case until the French took over after the end of the first world war (WWI) in 1918.

Maronites, an independent Eastern sect, first made their appearance in Mount Lebanon in the late tenth and eleventh centuries after emigrating from Syria. They initially settled down in Qannubin valley, a northern part of Mount Lebanon, which served as the seat of the Maronite Patriarchate. With time, the Maronites spread across the mountainous regions including the Druze-dominated areas. The Druze, an Islamic splinter sect, appeared in Lebanon in the eleventh century and established themselves in the southern regions of Mount Lebanon. This mountainous area was also a refuge to a mixed population of Greek Orthodox, Catholics and Shiite communities. Therefore, as I will discuss below, it is reasonable to assume that with time, the communities would begin to develop and assert their own political, cultural and social privileges as well as their sectarian identity within the system.

The history of violence and the problematic group histories between the communities supports Brown's argument on the cultural factors of the causes of internal conflict. Brown argued that groups might possess "legitimate grievances" over crimes committed against one another in the past.⁶¹ An overview of the historical events that took place between the major sects further supports the theory.

From Ottoman rule until independence, major Lebanese sects were in constant conflict over power and authority. For example, violence broke out between the Druze and the Maronites in 1860, and civil wars occurred in 1958 and 1975 between the Lebanese. Under Ottoman rule, Mount Lebanon was run according to the *iqta'* system, or *iltizam*. This system was considered semi-feudal and not a pure feudal system as

⁶¹ Brown, *The Causes of Internal Conflict: An Overview*, 12.

understood in the European sense of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. As a political system, *iqta'* was similar to feudalism though the “political system in which authority was distributed among a number of autonomous hereditary aristocratic chiefs subordinate in certain political respects to a common overlord”.⁶² Iliya Harik argued that the essential characteristic of feudalism, “a pluralist system in which political subordination among lords is conjoined with political supremacy within the lord's particular domain”, was lacking within the Ottoman empire. Fawwaz Traboulsi explained the *iqta'* system (*iltizam*) as the rationing of tax-farming rights to ethnic or tribal groups under the control of the Ottoman *walis* (governors). Traboulsi also notes that the holders of the *iqta'*, the *muqata'ji* families, were provided with “varying degrees of autonomy” as long as they delivered their share of tributes and taxes to the High Porte.⁶³

The application of this system within Mount Lebanon was correlated with a series of divisions and conflicts. Primarily, the social division of labor was based on the *millet* system which conforms to a “two-tier hierarchy” between the higher Muslim community and the lower non-Muslim minority people of the pact of protection.⁶⁴ This distinction implied that the Christians and Jews could only enjoy freedom of religious belief and expression if they paid the protection tax, the *jizya*. The Christians and Jews were also prohibited from any administrative work and instead had to specialize in commerce,

⁶² Iliya Harik, “The Iqtā System in Lebanon: A Comparative Political View”, *Middle East Journal* 19(Autumn 1965): 406

⁶³ Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*, 3

⁶⁴ Fawwaz Traboulsi 2007 and Philip Hitti 1965: The ‘pact of protection’ refers to the protection offered by Muslim governments to ‘people of the book’, i.e. Christians and Jews.

finance and handicrafts. This division would later be “largely responsible for transforming social and political conflicts into sectarian conflicts”.⁶⁵

Using Brown’s theory on socio-economic factors, nineteenth century Lebanon showed that there was an evident social gap between the Muslims and the non-Muslims. The former was allowed to freely express their religious beliefs whereas the latter did so under certain conditions set by the Ottoman authorities. The people of Mount Lebanon were not equal; they were either born as commoners (*‘amma*) or as noble, i.e. a *shaykh*, a *muqaddam*, or an *amir*. The Christian and Jewish communities were mainly constituted by the commoners and the peasants.⁶⁶ The Muslims on the other hand were bestowed with ranking orders (*manasib*) by the ruling emir, the Wali or the Sultan himself. They were also the primary holders of the *iqta’*, and controlled the political and judiciary systems, collected taxes over land, and were tax exempted. This system was institutionalized under the rule of Sultan Salim and remained until the latter part of the nineteenth century. This unfair distribution of resources set a wide socio-economic gap between the Muslims and the non-Muslims.⁶⁷

Mount Lebanon continued to enjoy its autonomy as long as its inhabitants paid tribute to the Sultan. At that time, the Sultan’s main focus was on the security threats from Persia and Egypt. Thus Mount Lebanon did not pose a threat to the Sultan’s authority. Amir Fakhr el-Deen al-Ma’ni (also known as Fakhr al-Deen II) was bestowed by Sultan Salim with the title of “Sultan of the Mountain”, and the remaining areas of Lebanon and Syria were under the rule of different *walis*. Despite their autonomous status, the people

⁶⁵ Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*, 5.

⁶⁶ See Traboulsi 2007 (*amma* also includes rich farmers, merchants, artisans and manufacturers).

⁶⁷ Philip Hitti, *Short History of Lebanon* (London: Macmillan, 1965) 96-103

of Mount Lebanon revolted against the Empire and aspired to establish independence. Fakhr al-Deen II led several revolts against the Ottomans and was often aided by the ruling Medici Grand duke of Tuscany and Pope Gregory XIII.⁶⁸ Therefore, the amir was able to achieve independence for a short period of time in the seventeenth century, before being defeated and executed in 1635. This desire of independence would recur in the future. Fakhr al-Deen II's political control over the mountain brought great economic benefits to the population. He introduced silk production and exported it to Italian city-states. He also encouraged Christian peasants (mainly Maronites) to settle within the Druze areas of the mountain to assist them in silk production and agricultural occupations "considered unworthy by the majority of the Druze".⁶⁹

The first major change in nineteenth century Lebanon was during the reign of Amir Bashir Shihab II (the 'Red Emir') from 1788 to 1840. Shihab's history dealt with external powers such as Mohamad Ali Pasha of Egypt and the European Christians. In 1810, Shihab allied with the Ottomans to fight the Wahabis of Najd. In 1821, he allied with the *wali* of Sidon against Damascus' *wali*. However, in 1831 Shihab sided with Mohamad Ali against the Porte in seizing and annexing Syria. Until 1840, Lebanon remained under Egyptian rule. The Druze contested this rule and revolted in 1838. Being fearful of the Christians joining the uprising, the Egyptians used the Maronites and armed them against the rebellion. This rebellion was "the first time [when] the inhabitants of the Lebanese territories confronted each other on a sectarian basis".⁷⁰ The Egyptian rule further alienated wider areas of the population and enforced heavy taxation and forced labor and military conscription. In 1840, the Lebanese united together against the

⁶⁸ Ibid., 100.

⁶⁹ Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*, 8.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 12.

Egyptians “to restore their independence or die”.⁷¹ In October of that year, Ottoman, British and Austrian troops landed in Jounieh and ended Egyptian rule in Syria. Amir Bashir surrendered himself and was exiled to Malta. This marked the end of the emirate age.

The 1800s saw major changes in Mount Lebanon. The Maronites began immigrating into the Southern Druze farming areas and had dominated “at least one third of all the lands”.⁷² The Patriarchal See also moved to Bkirki in the Mountains; an act of the extension of the power of the church. The Maronites also maintained a close link with the Holy See and profited from Western education, immigration into the New World, and trade with Europe. Influenced by French ideals, the Maronites then began to seek independence in a Christian Lebanon.⁷³ Concurrently, the coastal area of Beirut was witnessing a commercial boom by the “European diplomatic and commercial interests... [who] made [Beirut] the center of their activities after the 1840s”.⁷⁴

In 1841, a “sectarian massacre” erupted between the Druze and the Maronites in Mount Lebanon.⁷⁵ This civil war was allegedly sparked by a hunting accident, but its roots were planted under Bashir II’s reign with the migration of Christians into the Druze-dominated strongholds. Bashir’s mobilization of the Maronites against the Druzes’ revolt further aggravated the schism between the two sects. The end of the civil war saw the fall of the *muqa’taji* system and the establishment of the two *qa’imaqamiyas*. Mount Lebanon

⁷¹ Hitti, *Short History of Lebanon*, 184-189 and Albert Hourani, *Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, (USA: University of California Press, 1981), 131.

⁷² Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*, 22.


⁷³ Hourani, *Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, 140.

⁷⁴ Leila Fawwaz, “The Changing Balance of Forces Between Beirut and Damascus in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries”, *Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée* 55-56 (1990): 209.

⁷⁵ Farsoun and Carrol, *Lebanese War: Historical and Social Background*, 5.

was divided into two separate Christian and Druze districts, *qa'imaqams*. Each district had a sectarian majority but was nonetheless mixed, as shown in Figure 1. The two major cantons of the *qa'imaqamiya*, the northern district under the Maronite ruler, and the southern district under the Druze ruler. This system not only divided the mountain into two administrative regions, but further exacerbated Lebanon's struggle over its identity and the issue of problematic group histories.⁷⁶

Figure 1.0: Traditional Location of Lebanese Communities



Source: Winslow (1996, 32)

⁷⁶ Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*, 24.

The following years were dominated by a series of conflicts. In 1858, intra-communal conflict took place between the Maronite peasants and their Maronite landlords. This was also known as the peasant revolt. Two years later, in 1860, the Maronite peasants rebelled against the Druze feudal lords in the North. This was a clear example of a class struggle which turned into a religious war between the Maronites and the Druze, and resulted in the death of 12,000 people.⁷⁷ During the aftermath of the conflict, the Ottoman Sultanate acknowledged that the *qa'imaqamiya* system was failing, and that a new political order was needed in order to re-establish authority and power over the mountain. Major European powers, notably France, Britain, Prussia, Austria-Hungary and Russia intervened (with the participation of Fu'ad Pasha) and decided on a new political arrangement associated with a power sharing system.

The *qa'imaqamiya* system was replaced by the *mutasarrifiyyah* system that was called the '*Règlement organique*' (Organic Law), the first attempt at power-sharing.⁷⁸ This implied that the two major cantons of the *qa'imaqamiya* were to be united into a single mountain province ruled by a non-Arab Ottoman Christian governor approved by the intervening foreign powers. The governor elected an administrative council (AC), proportionally representing the major sects of the country, to assist him in his duties.⁷⁹ The AC was originally composed of four Maronite members, three Druzes, two Greek Orthodox, one Greek Catholic, one Shiite Muslim, and one Sunni Muslim.⁸⁰ The

⁷⁷ Hourani, *Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, 150.

⁷⁸ Marie-Joelle Zahar, "Power Sharing in Lebanon: Foreign Protectors, Domestic peace, and Democratic Failure", in *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars*, ed. Philip Roeder and Donald Rothchild, (New York: Cornell university Press, 2005), 221

⁷⁹ The AC later became the Parliament in 1943.

⁸⁰ Engin Arkarli, "The Administrative Council on Mount Lebanon", in *Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus*, ed. Nadim Shehadi and Dana Haffar Mills (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1988), 80.

participation of the communities in the AC demonstrated how sectarianism was being institutionalized and embedded in the Lebanese political system. The *mutasarrifiyah*, which remained until the end of WWI, firmly “introduced the principle of confessional representation to the political culture of Mount Lebanon” through the active support of France.⁸¹

The mountain was no longer dominated by the Druze, and the loss of their hegemony ended in the “institutionalization of the sectarian system of political representation”, what is also understood as the “legalization of sectarian political representation in Mount Lebanon”.⁸² Therefore, what might have begun as a class dispute between landowners and peasants had ultimately acquired a sectarian nature.

The struggle for power and authority in Lebanon bears witness to centuries of inter-communal conflict in the mountain. The recognition and institutionalization of sectarianism in the political culture of the mountain contributed to communal differences between the sects. For several years, power structure alternated between Maronites and the Druze, and the power distribution among them “became a zero-sum game: what the Maronites gained, the Druze saw as their direct losses”.⁸³ The shifting balance of power over time to the Maronites, was due to historical changes of a demographic, economic and political nature.⁸⁴ The Maronites were increasing in number, as well as in social and economic power. Concurrently, the church played a major role in consolidating the Maronites’ communal and political consciousness. Their political consciousness was highlighted through the recognition of the asymmetrical power distribution in the

⁸¹ Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward*, 22.

⁸² Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*, 24.

⁸³ Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward*, 20.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 30.

centuries of living in the mountain. The Maronites acknowledged that they had the upper hand in Lebanon, yet also understood that they remained a large minority within the Arab region. However, with the support and patronage of the French, the Maronites were able to attain the apex of their communal power and effectively dominate the Lebanese political order during the French mandate and afterwards until 1975.⁸⁵ The Maronites considered themselves as the original founders and inhabitants of Lebanon, and with the institutionalization of sectarianism, their political and identity consciousness became more evident. Marc Voss explained identity consciousness in the framework of cultural understanding. According to Voss, “a community or a state, have the ability to see themselves as a permanent entity, in a fundamental sense retaining an identity that is not destroyed with the passage of time and evolving external forces”.⁸⁶ Identity consciousness played a role in providing a group of people with unity and a frame of reference, a cultural identity, and a set of values and norms to identify with in times of change and in times of internal or external threats. Due to their long history in the Mountain, their nationalist character and their political determination, the Maronite identity was obviated in their quest towards a sovereign Lebanon separate from Syria. These shared values and characteristics were assets maintained by the Maronites in protecting and preserving their identity. Mordechai Nisan added that language is another major characteristic of identity but not its definitive principle. Indeed, the Maronites “felt no true solidarity with the Arab world” despite adopting the Arabic language.⁸⁷

The French Mandate and Independence

⁸⁵ Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward*, 22.

⁸⁶ Marc. T. Voss, *A Concise Theory of Action Consciousness* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) 107.

⁸⁷ Mordechai Nisan, *Politics and War in Lebanon: Unraveling the Enigma* (USA: Transaction Publishers, 2015) 16.

To better understand the divergent views of the Muslims and Christians regarding their national identity, it is important to take a closer look on how the French mandatory authorities divided power among the communities, and the effect of this policy on the future of Lebanon.

The *mutasarrifiyya* system ended with the fall of the Ottoman empire in 1918 after WWI. Part of the territories that were under Ottoman rule were divided among the European powers. In a secret agreement between the British, Sir Mark Sykes, and the French diplomat, François Georges-Picot, Greater Syria and Iraq were divided into British and French spheres of influence. In April 1920, at the San Remo conference, France was given a mandate of Lebanon, which was formally ratified by the League of Nations in 1922.⁸⁸ On September 1, 1920, General Henri Gourad declared the establishment of the State of Greater Lebanon, *Le Grand Liban*, under French mandate and drew the borders of the modern state. The territorial additions included the coastal towns of Tripoli, Beirut, Saida (Sidon) and Sur (Tyre), and the districts of the Biqa' in the east and Jebel Amel in the South.⁸⁹ In 1926, Lebanon was declared a constitutional republic. Under Article 95 of the constitution, sectarian representation was guaranteed.

The Lebanese Christians, specifically the Maronites, were the only group in favor of belonging to an independent state under French rule, since they were "...the most natural and reliable allies of the French...".⁹⁰ They perceived the mandate as a gain in political influence over the region, and as a protector that would allow them to advance their socio-economic and political interests. While the Maronites were the primary

⁸⁸ Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict*, 40.

⁸⁹ Albert Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon* (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), 129.

⁹⁰ Hanf, *Coexistence*, 113.

supporters and advocates of French rule, the Muslims, particularly the Sunnis, were against it, fearing the diminishing of their political status. Compared to the Maronites, the Sunni community was disadvantaged. The new Lebanon meant something different to each community. The Muslims saw it as a backward step towards their plan of a united Arab world. The Christians on the other hand, regarded the new state as a guarantor of their interests. The interviewee Najarian reiterated that the Shiite “didn’t have a communal consciousness in Jabal Amel. Thus 1920 didn’t mean much to them”.⁹¹ According to David and Audrey Smock, the state was created by the Mandatory Powers in order to consolidate French power within the region and to secure Lebanon’s “economic viability”, in return for Maronite allegiance.⁹²

In Greater Syria, Sunnis represented 58% of the population, and the Muslims as a whole totaled to 76%. During Ottoman rule, the Sunnis were never part of the mountain and considered themselves citizens of the Caliphate.⁹³ They had a dominant status, a main role in state affairs, and strong access to government resources. French policy was therefore focused on strengthening the Maronite community whose “corporate spirit and separatist feelings... were deliberately fostered and were made the basis of the political divisions of the Mandated territories”.⁹⁴ This political strategy rested on maintaining its status as a Mediterranean power by positioning the Maronites at the pivotal axis of the political system. The mandatory power’s policies in greater Lebanon were aimed at linking Christian and French interests by favoring the Maronites in “playing upon their

⁹¹ Nazir Najarian, interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, April 18, 2019.

⁹² David Smock and Audrey Smock, *The Politics of Pluralism: A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana* (NY: Cornell university Press, 1967), 33.

⁹³ Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon*, 126-127.

⁹⁴ Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon*, 65.

fears of Muslim prosecution”.⁹⁵ These policies failed to create a trustful and cooperative atmosphere between the Christians and Muslims, and established divergent attitudes concerning French rule. The reality of the discriminatory political system thus supports the first proposition that assumes that if the political system is not fair, and if the interests of some groups are served while others are trampled, conflict is more likely.

The sectarian system, that was initially introduced under Ottoman rule, was maintained by the French. This was highlighted and ratified by the constitution of 1926 which “formally reflected the reality of confessional divisions”.⁹⁶ Even though the constitution stated that criminal matters were to be sorted by a secular judicial model of the French, all matters pertaining to personal status and family laws were dealt with by the respective religious laws. The constitution further implicitly determined that only a Maronite would hold the office of the Presidency, just as the *mutassarifiyya* was always held by a Christian governor. Greater Lebanon was modelled on a democratic French system, with a Chamber of Deputies which elected the Maronite President and a Council of ministers headed by the Sunni Prime Minister. Nonetheless, final authority was solely exercised by the French High Commissioner.

The mandatory authority maintained a closed political system by “rigidifying the boundaries of the communal groups...and establishing differential access to the political hierarchy... and also promoted intra-communal loyalties and identities”.⁹⁷ Moreover, there was a discriminatory and inadequate system of resource distribution between the groups that failed to “placate contradictory communal demands”.⁹⁸ There also was a

⁹⁵ Ibid, 69.

⁹⁶ Nisan, *Politics and War in Lebanon*, 9.

⁹⁷ Abul-Husn, *The Lebanese Conflict*, 58.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

“...relative dominance of the Christian community that controlled major aspects of the national economy”.⁹⁹ Makdisi and El-Khalili argued that,

Domestic political calls by Muslim political leaders for a more equal power sharing between the Christian and Muslim communities (with their implicit economic benefits to the latter community) which the Maronites tended to circumvent, fearing the political implications of even a limited loss of constitutional power. Additional domestic strains emanated from uneven development among the various regions and wide disparities in income distribution¹⁰⁰

However, as El-Khalili noted, an economic boom was evident upon the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920. With the territorial additions of the new state, the Beqa’a valley was able to compensate the communities' agricultural needs. The presence of the port of Beirut further improved the financial and physical structure of Lebanon. Moreover, new technologies were introduced to both, the agriculture and manufacturing sectors.¹⁰¹

By the “splitting off Greater Lebanon from its natural hinterland, the French not only confirmed the financial and commercial hegemony of Beirut over the Mountain, but also strengthened a pattern of economic activity in which agriculture and industry had become subordinated to banking and trade”.¹⁰² The country’s sectarian setup was marked by the then relative dominance of the Christians. Muslims hardly benefitted from the economic boom that Lebanon witnessed. The prevailing inequality thus had a “clear confessional coloring” and contributed to Muslim grievances.¹⁰³ For example, the

⁹⁹ Samir Makdisi and Yousef El-Khalili, *Lebanon: The Legacy of Sectarian Consociationalism and the Transition to a Fully Fledged Democracy Working Paper Series No.14*(Lebanon: The American University of Beirut, 2013), 7.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁰¹ Makdisi and El-Khalili, *Lebanon: The Legacy of Sectarian Consociationalism*, 10.

¹⁰² Roger Owen, *Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon, 1920-1975* (London: Ithica Press, 1976), 74.

¹⁰³ Samir Makdisi, Fadia Kiwan and Marcus Marktanner, “Lebanon: The Constrained Democracy and its National impact”, in Ibrahim Elbadawi and Samir Makdisi (eds.), *Democracy in the Arab World: Explaining the Deficit* (London: Routledge, 2011), 115-140.

position of the middle class was much more prominent in Beirut (dominated by Sunni Muslims and Christians) and the central mountain region (dominated by Christians) than in regions like the south, the Beqa'a, the northeast, and Akkar in the north (dominated by Shi'a and Sunni Muslims) where large land-holdings and class distinctions were common.¹⁰⁴ The above discussed socio-economic gaps and the inability of the system to bring improvements, support the fourth proposition that assumes if socio-economic conditions deteriorate, publics become more receptive to scapegoating, hence, conflict is more likely.

Tom Najem argued that in spite of the sectarian arrangements engineered by the French, "realities in Lebanon effectively ensured that the state would never have a functional separation of the religious and political spheres".¹⁰⁵ Yet, as emphasized by one of the interviewees, "the state of Lebanon was secular".¹⁰⁶ A secular state was never in the minds of the elites in power who were "unwilling to risk the loss of control".¹⁰⁷ Concerning group belonging since Ottoman rule, "citizens defined themselves according to their religion and sect [and] the religious leadership of these communities represented them at the seat of power ...".¹⁰⁸ This system of identification withstood the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and has remained effective in Lebanon today.

By providing the Maronites with primary loyalty, the mandatory power "ensure[ed] that the citizens would never fully embrace a collective identity as simply

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 117.

¹⁰⁵ Tom Najem, *Lebanon: The Politics of a Penetrated Society* (London: Routledge, 2012) 9.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with consultant, April 19, 2019.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ David McDowall, *Lebanon, A Conflict of Minorities* (London: Minority Rights Group, 1983), 7.

Lebanese, or participate in the political system as if sectarian divisions did not matter”.¹⁰⁹ Thus the Lebanese regarded themselves as “Sunni-Lebanese” or “Maronite-Lebanese” and not just Lebanese citizens. Indeed, the state of Lebanon was built around citizens who primarily identified with their sects rather than with the nation. That said, the lack of a common national ideology, as a political factor, divided the Lebanese rather than uniting them.

The discriminatory and rigid political system was further strengthened in 1932, when the French commissioner Henri Ponsot intervened and blocked the Muslim Sheikh Mohamed el-Jisr from being elected as President. In order to avoid sectarian tensions and confrontation, the French then suspended the constitution. World War Two (WWII) had drastic effects on France after its occupation by Germany. Therefore, the Lebanese leaders took advantage of the war and began preparing themselves for self-rule. In 1943, the leaders of the Maronite and Sunni communities came together and agreed on a new power-sharing system known as the National Pact (NP) that ultimately created the independent state of Lebanon on November 22, 1943. In Michael Kerr’s words, the NP, as a power-sharing agreement, “commends the sharing of power between communities, as well as the division of power and the competition for power. It commends coalition as a considered way of doing things, but not as a substitute for the division of power or the competition for power”.¹¹⁰ Nawaf Salam emphasized the rigidity of the political system by stating that Lebanese politics exists only as a competition for “office privileges and benefits”.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Michael Kerr, *Imposing Power-Sharing: Conflict and coexistence in Northern Ireland and Lebanon* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2006), xx.

¹¹¹ Nawaf Salam, *The Taif Agreement: A Critical Re-examination* (Dar An-Nahar: Beirut, 2003), 31.

The NP was an unwritten and informal arrangement, similar to the practices adopted during the mandate. The pact dealt with two main contentious issues: the sectarian distribution of power within the country, and foreign policy.¹¹² A profound issue that faced the NP was the contested nature of the Lebanese national identity. The pact was "... a clear attempt to construct a national identity by promoting loyalty to the country as a whole".¹¹³ However, Hanf argued that the pact "politically, socially and culturally institutionalized the segregation and autonomy of the different religious communities".¹¹⁴

Although the pact was never written, it was acknowledged as the governing rule in Lebanese politics until the breakout of the civil war in 1975. The first president of the independent state was Maronite Bechara El-Khoury was accompanied with the Sunni Prime Minister, Riad Al-Solh. In his inaugural speech, President El-Khoury asserted that the National Pact was "the fusion of two ideologies" and not merely a settlement between the sects. He further stressed that through mutual understanding, the pact would be able to transform the country into one nation.¹¹⁵

The NP was a compromise between the Maronites, who still opted for an independent Lebanon with strong ties to France, and the Muslims (mainly Sunnis) who aimed for a Lebanon united within the Arab world. The notables, parliamentarians and *zu'ama* (leaders) of both communities had rendered concessions. The trade-off was based

¹¹² Hanf, *Coexistence*, 113.

¹¹³ Robert Milne, *Politics in Ethnically Bipolar States: Guyana, Malaysia, Fiji* (USA: University of British Columbia Press, 1981), 125.

¹¹⁴ Hanf, *Coexistence*, 73.

¹¹⁵ Bechara El-Khoury, *Haqaiq Lubnaniyyah*, (Beirut: Al-Dar Al-Lubnaniyyah Lil-nachr Al-Jamai'ay, 1961), 251.

on the assumption that the communities would abandon their demands in favor of an independent and sovereign state. However, despite the communities' agreement on power-sharing, they "continued to disagree over the country's identity", and "drew outsiders into domestic politics to redress internal inequalities or to counter perceived threats from one another".¹¹⁶

The NP intended to distribute political positions according to the 1932 census, which regarded the Christians as the majority group. Therefore, the Presidency was to be allocated to the Maronites, the Prime Minister to the Sunnis, and the Speaker of the House to the Shiite. The Parliament, the civil service, the army and the rest of the government positions were to be divided between the Christians and the Muslims in a six to five ratio.¹¹⁷ In practice, "executive power rested on accommodations made between the interests of the president and the interests of the prime minister".¹¹⁸ This sectarian power division or "virtual partnership" that was engineered by the NP, would become unworkable prior to 1975 due to the internal demographic imbalance and the instability of the external environment. As argued by Michael Kerr, the 1932 census as well as the agreed upon six to five ration were disproportionate and inflexible. Kerr further stresses that the lack of a new census created a stalemate within the political system of the country, and consequently provoked the outbreak of an internal conflict.¹¹⁹

By observing its political system, Lebanon appeared to be similar to a Western-style liberal democracy. It had a free press, an independent judiciary, individuals had the

¹¹⁶ Michael Johnson, Michael, *All Honourable Men: The Social Origins of War in Lebanon* (Oxford: L.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001), 123.

¹¹⁷ Hanf, *Coexistence*, 77.

¹¹⁸ Hanf, *Coexistence*, 156.

¹¹⁹ Kerr, *Imposing Power-Sharing*, xxviii.

right to express their political views, elections were regularly held, and it also had a president, a prime minister and a cabinet. The only unique characteristic Lebanon possessed, that differentiated it from other liberal system, was "...the ingrained [sectarianism] that existed at every level of political life.¹²⁰ It should be noted that there are other countries that enjoyed a democratic liberal lifestyle regardless of their religious or ethnic cleavages, such as Canada and Switzerland. Lebanon however, was incapable of separating sectarian belonging from political life and the building of the state.

According to Najem, the NP was a strong attempt at unifying the Lebanese under one identity, but it was weak nonetheless. The pact developed a "rigid and pervasive [sectarian] system".¹²¹ Brown's theory of discriminatory political institutions is evident as a structural cause of conflict. The NP contributed to developing a patron-client relationship which continues to be the very essence of Lebanese politics today. The political elites, or the *zu'amas* of the communities refused to give up their 'seat at the table', and were incapable of satisfying the interests of their communities. The elites' refusal "to incorporate emerging groups into their cartels undermined the political system from within".¹²² El-Husseini highlighted the attachments of elites to power and authority, and shed light on the importance of personal interests towards the elites. She further argued that the breakdown of the political system was partially a result of the rigid mentalities of the elites and their inability to "abandon some of their privileges in concession to other communities". Also, the refusal of the elites to confront rising

¹²⁰ Tom Najem, *Lebanon, Politics of a Penetrated Society*, 14.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² E-Husseini, *Pax Syriana*, 11.

ideological, socioeconomic and political challenges further aggravated the schism between elite personal interests and that of the country's.¹²³

It could be argued that patron-client relationships were not necessarily bad. Yet this relationship could generate negative consequences if not monitored and restricted, as the case of Lebanon. Evidently, in Lebanon, “traditional power was deeply rooted in patron-client relationship” and “conflict regulation broke down when one of the... communities operated ... to get more than a relative advantage”.¹²⁴

The pre-war economy “experienced a relatively rapid and broad-based expansion... accompanied by relative financial stability”.¹²⁵ However, this economic development was disproportionate and uneven since it favored the political and business elites. The lopsidedness of the expansion was due to the “sectarian, familial and clientelist” nature of the political system.¹²⁶

The unfairness of the political system and the frustrated expectations of some Lebanese groups once again support the first proposition that assumes if the political system is not fair, and if the interest of some groups are served while others are trampled, conflict is more likely. The next chapter will provide a detailed analysis of the internal and external factors that caused the civil war.

¹²³ Ibid., 12

¹²⁴ Kerr, *Imposing Power-Sharing*, 32.

¹²⁵ Samir Makdisi and Ibrahim Elbadawi, “Lebanon: The Constrained Democracy and its National impact”, in Ibrahim Elbadawi and Samir Makdisi (eds.), *Democracy in the Arab World: Explaining the Deficit* (London: Routledge, 2011), 117.

¹²⁶ Makdisi and Elbadawi, *Lebanon: The Constrained Democracy and its National Impact*, 117.

CHAPTER IV INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS AS CAUSES OF CONFLICT (1943-1975)

This chapter examines a number of internal and external challenges that destabilized Lebanon in the pre-war period. For example, I explain and argue how the role of the political elites, the role of external political developments in destabilizing Lebanon, the 1958 crisis, the role of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and state weakness, led to the outbreak of the civil war in 1975. I begin by pinpointing the weakness and the fragility of the National Pact within an unstable regional environment. I also discuss the effect of external interventions on the domestic affairs of Lebanon, including the Syrian and Israeli interventions. I further discuss the political approach of certain political elites towards Lebanese internal matters. Chapter four also examines the triggering factors of the war by referring to two significant triggers (i.e. internal events) that caused violence to escalate. I finally highlight socio-economic factors and the weakness of the state and its inability to monopolize power and protect its citizens. I correlate these arguments to Brown's theory on the causes of internal conflict.

Internal Factors of Conflict

In the Lebanese consociational system, sects were to be fairly represented and decision making was to be made by consensus so that no sect would be able to threaten the privileges and interests of another sect. The power sharing agreement of 1943 known as the National Pact, collapsed with the outbreak of the civil war in 1975 "in the face of

internal and external strains”.¹²⁷ The National Pact was a power-sharing agreement between the Lebanese communities that dealt with two main issues: Lebanese foreign policy and the distribution of power between the major Lebanese communities. By the late 1960s, “cracks began to emerge in the National Pact, [as] Lebanon was influenced by regional instability”.¹²⁸ According to Najarian, “the NP, in order to survive, needed a power balance between the Lebanese communities and an external stable environment. However, the Palestinian issue caused internal and external instability. The NP was also challenged by regional instability such as the Arab coups in Syria, Egypt and Iraq”.¹²⁹

According to Michael Kerr, in order for a power sharing arrangement to succeed, a balance needs to exist between a stable internal and external environment, and a strong bond between the internal and external elites.¹³⁰ However, in the case of Lebanon, the elites were incapable of successfully confronting the new challenges that arose in the region. In reference to Brown’s theory, the external factors included the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon, the Cairo agreement, and Jamal Abdel Nasser’s ideology of pan-Arabism. It is vital to note that from 1949 onwards, all the conflicts that took place in Lebanon or in the Middle East, occurred simultaneously within the context of the cold war. The Arab world at that time was divided into two: those who supported the West and were against the spread of the communist ideology, and the rest who supported Nasser’s call for Arab unity.

¹²⁷ Tamirace Fakhoury Mühlbacher, *Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather: The Case of Lebanon* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009), 126.

¹²⁸ *Lebanon: The Persistence of Sectarian Conflict, Religion and Conflict Case Study* (Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, 2013), 5.

¹²⁹ Nazir Najarian, interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, April 18, 2019.

¹³⁰ When mentioning elites within Lebanon, I mean the [local] party leaders who emerged during the pre-war period. They can also be called “zu’ama” or “war elites”.

In respect to Kerr, the stability of the system ideally should have depended on internal consensus, which was weak in Lebanon. Internally, elites were unable to address the rift between the Rightists or the Christians and the Leftists or the Muslims.¹³¹ Elite discord had mainly resulted from “the breakdown of the Sunni-Maromite coalition, the strong schism between the Radical left and the Maronite front, and the volatile Sunni-Left and Shiite-Left coalitions”.¹³² The failure of elite cooperation further fragmented any possible unity between the communities. As Fakhoury wittingly noted, Lebanon’s political fragility is due to the absence of “internalized democratic rules and lack of elite habituation”. Therefore, since 1943, the frailty of cooperative elite strategies in times of crisis, has left Lebanon disintegrated and highly susceptible to external intervention.¹³³

In other words, political elites in the pre-war period did not aim to promote national cohesiveness as much as they focused on dividing the privileges, or the spoils of the system between themselves. It is important to understand that the primary loyalty of the political elites was to their sect rather than the state. They each had their own political agenda which aimed at promoting their personal interests through their parties. During the pre-war period, these political parties had “often been limited to their use as propaganda machines for individual political actors”.¹³⁴ Therefore Brown’s theory of elite politics was a political cause in provoking internal conflict, and is supported in the case of Lebanon.

¹³¹ Right wing traditionalists were known as the Front of Lebanese Forces: The Phalange Party, National Liberal Party, Zghorta Liberation Army, Guards of the Cedars, and Maronite Monastic Order. The opposition was composed of the Lebanese progressives (Christians and Muslims), traditionally minded Muslim people and the Palestinians.

¹³² Mühlbacher, *Democracy and Power-Sharing*, 128

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 126.

¹³⁴ El-Husseini, *Pax Syriana*, 38.

The pre war period was pre-occupied with feelings of superiority and threats between the Christian and Muslim communities who held several objections against the elitist political system. There remained continuous “pressures for adjusting the distribution of power as manifested in administrative appointments, the allocation of public-works funds, and ultimately the National Pact itself”.¹³⁵ The Lebanese communities felt threatened, as they were faced with a state “which was incapable or unwilling to defend them against violence by one another and unable to provide them with guarantees that it would not pose a threat to them”.¹³⁶ In 1953, the *Hay'at al-Watania*, an organization of Sunni notables, “led a movement to gain greater of administrative appointments for the Sunnites”.¹³⁷ The Kata'eb along with the Nida al-Qawmi group (mainly composed of Sunnis) called for an inter-confessional congress to end the sectarian rivalry.¹³⁸ In an attempt to stabilize the growing tensions between the communities, President Camille Chamoun affirmed that mixing politics and religion would mean the end of an independent Lebanon.¹³⁹

Inter-elite rivalries support Brown's theory on the domestic causes of internal conflict and stress the role of bad leaders whose orientation revolved around their personal outlook and not of the interest of their parties.

A significant example to mention is the resurgence of the Shiite community which became conscious of its political and socio-economic rights, and of its identity. Until 1960, the Shiite mainly lived in two regions of Lebanon: The Beqa' and Jabal Amel in the South. The Shiite cleric, Musa al-Sadr, who would play a major role in promoting

¹³⁵ Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, 91.

¹³⁶ Zahar, *Foreign Interventions*, 70

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 90.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

Shiite demands from the system, left Iran for Lebanon in late 1959. Sadr was a charismatic leader, who played a significant role in politically and socially awakening the Shiite community. His ideology was based on inter-sectarian cooperation and tolerance. He often met with the Maronite Patriarch, collaborated with progressive Christian groups and spoke in churches. Sadr was “able to politically mobilize the Shiite masses by orienting their socioeconomic aspirations along the lines of sectarian identity”.¹⁴⁰ In 1967, Sadr succeeded in obtaining parliamentary approval for the establishment of the Supreme Shiite Council. Prior to 1967, the Shiite community members were subjected to the Sunni Islamic courts. For Sadr, the council “was a way to put an end to the discrimination suffered by the Shiite community and to give his community an official voice to express its political and social demands”.¹⁴¹ According to one of my interviewees, “in 1974, Sadr created the Movement of the Deprived (or Disinherited) (*Harakat al-Mahroomeen*) with Greek Catholic bishop Grégoire Haddad. The Movement included diverse people, not from a single sect but from all denominations and other prominent figures from different sects... Sadr’s rhetoric and discourse was pan-Lebanese and non-sectarian”.¹⁴² Even though the movement was targeted towards the under-represented and politically and socially disadvantaged Shiite, it sought social justice for all the deprived members of the Lebanese society.¹⁴³ Sadr’s intention was not to “sweep away the Lebanese system, but to win for his community an adequate say in it”.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁰ Zahar, *Foreign Interventions*, 142.

¹⁴¹ Hanf, *Coexistence*, 150.

¹⁴² El-Husseini, *Pax Syriana*, 74.

¹⁴³ Judith Harik, *Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism* (London: I.B Tauris & Co., 2004), 30.

¹⁴⁴ Hanf, *Coexistence*, 128.

In his analysis of the Lebanese state in the pre-war period, Michael Hudson predicted the inevitable outcome of a Lebanese sectarian conflict. According to Hudson, the weakness of Lebanese democracy was in its political system. The system was founded on convenience rather than conviction; in other words, the sects would only adopt whatever they deemed best for their own interests. Hudson further highlighted the historical role of external actors who regarded Lebanon as a strategically fertile land for intervention. According to Hudson, “the most powerful actors in [Lebanon’s] domestic politics live outside its borders”.¹⁴⁵

Each foreign actor successfully subdued the Lebanese leaders and communities with “sentimental, educational, religious or simply monetary inducements”.¹⁴⁶ Lebanon’s “disagreements over [its] identity and its foreign policy orientation increased its vulnerability to regional and international conflicts”.¹⁴⁷ Lebanon’s political system has been influenced by Palestine, Israel and Syria. The Arab-Israeli conflict, Israeli and Syrian intervention in Lebanon as well as Nasser’s ideology of Pan-Arabism had a destabilizing effect on the Lebanese state.

In Mary-Joelle Zahar’s perspective, Lebanon did not only “suffer the reverberations of regional events, [it] sometimes provoked and invited foreign intervention into its domestic affairs”.¹⁴⁸ This was evident in 1976, when the Syrians responded to the request “of then-President of the Republic Suleiman Frangieh to assist the pro-status quo forces which were facing the prospect of defeat at the hands of anti-status quo forces (mostly

¹⁴⁵ Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, 94.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Zahar, *Foreign Interventions*, 65

¹⁴⁸ Zahar, *Foreign Interventions*, 66

Muslims). In the late 1970s, Christian politicians looked to Israel for military assistance and political support”.¹⁴⁹

A critical outlook towards the understanding of external intervention in Lebanon is Hudson’s view on foreign propaganda in advocating Arab unity. According to Hudson, once Nasser spoke through the radio, pro-Nasser Lebanese citizens would rally against their government. The citizens were predisposed and “particularly receptive to the voices of Cairo and Damascus”.¹⁵⁰ Should Nasser’s speeches “have critical words for a Lebanese politician or government, there would be immediate repercussions”.¹⁵¹

To better understand the political nature of the war, it is important to take a closer look at some of the notable political elites and political parties to demonstrate how they approached social, economic and political issues.

The Kata’eb’s Approach

The *Kata’eb*, or Hizb al-Kata’eb al-Lubnaniya as it was often referred to in Arabic, was created in 1936 by Pierre Gemayel who was inspired by the “discipline, order, purpose and national zeal” of the Germans.¹⁵² The Kata’eb saw themselves “as the protectors of the Lebanese nation and, in particular, of the ostensibly civilizing influence of the Western culture in the region. They understood Lebanon as a nation with a purpose, and they often invoked the Christian imagery to explicate this idea”.¹⁵³ In Ghassan Hage’s words, “The spirituality and the mission embodied in Lebanese civilization are essentially Christian... in a... sense as being the objectification of a Christian spirit without which

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Hudson, *Prekarious Republic*, 80.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 95.

¹⁵² El-Husseini, *Pax Syriana*, 40.

¹⁵³ El-Husseini, *Pax Syriana*, 42.

there would be no civilization”.¹⁵⁴ During the civil war, Bashir Gemayel, the wartime militia leader of the Kata’eb, “saw force as the only effective way to establish power”.¹⁵⁵ Gemayel was clear in his speeches in rejecting “any possibility of cross-confessional collaboration; he was an advocate for a Christian state” and claimed that the Lebanese National Pact of 1943 was “dead, buried, and [had] a big stone on its tomb so that it does not resurrect”.¹⁵⁶

The Kata’eb had a distinctive view of a Christian Lebanon. Gemayel acquired US support and pursued amicable relations with Israel. During the civil war, “Bashir visited the United States [in 1981] with a vision: he wanted Lebanon to be a bastion of Western influence in the Middle East and to have the same ‘special’ relationship with the United States that was enjoyed by Israel”.¹⁵⁷ Gemayel, who sought external support, was likely to have received funding and training for his militia from the Israelis.¹⁵⁸ Among the Maronites, Gemayel became known as “the Savior”, through his speeches and opinions which were perceived as “teachings”.¹⁵⁹

Camille Chamoun’s Approach

Another important figure was President Camille Chamoun whose term was challenged by internal, regional and international pressures. The 1958 crisis was the major event during Chamoun’s term. The tension between the Maronite Christians and the Muslims was escalating as Chamoun sided with the West and associated himself with the

¹⁵⁴ Ghassan Hage, “Religious Fundamentalism as a Political Strategy: The Evolution of the Lebanese Forces’ Religious Discourse During the Lebanese Civil War”, *Critique of Anthropology* 12 (1992): 30.

¹⁵⁵ Joseph Abou Khalil, *Qissat al-mawarina fi al-harb*, 115.

¹⁵⁶ El-Husseini, *Pax Syriana*, 43 and Abou Khalil, *Qissat al-mawarina*, 120.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ El-Husseini, *Pax Syriana*, 44.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 45.

Baghdad Pact, which posed a threat to Nasser and his pan-Arab ideology. Bassem el-Jisr, an author and Journalist, stated: “when the opposition went to meet with Abdel Nasser in Egypt, Nasser reassured Prime Minister Rachid Karame regarding Lebanon’s security and unity. Abdel Nasser spoke directly to Karame and said: Lebanon’s national unity has priority over Arab unity, because if Lebanon’s national unity falls apart, you would be hurting yourselves and Arabism”.¹⁶⁰ Al-Jisr’s view coincided with an authored interview conducted with Daoud el-Sayegh who also emphasized Nasser’s political role in safeguarding Lebanon’s stability. According to el-Sayegh, “if Nasser had still been alive, he would not have let the war happen”.¹⁶¹

Chamoun had a pro-Western stance and a desire to consolidate presidential powers. Amidst the expansion of Arabism, Chamoun re-allied Lebanon with Western powers by embracing the Eisenhower Doctrine which stated that the United States would “add strength and assure independence to the free nations of the Mid East”.¹⁶² Chamoun’s policy contradicted the essence of the National Pact, and antagonized many Muslims in the country. He sought reelection through a constitutional amendment by “organiz[ing] support directly from the Maronite community, bypassing not only Muslim elites, but also other Christian leaders”.¹⁶³ Chamoun’s strategy generated an “anti-Chamoun” opposition composed of diverse Muslim factions as well as some Christian leaders. The parliamentary elections of 1957 took place amongst communal tensions. During that year, conflict also occurred in Egypt against the trilateral powers, France, Britain and Israel, as Abdel Nasser decided to nationalize the Suez Canal.

¹⁶⁰ YouTube, “The War of Lebanon Episode 2”, YouTube Web Site, 28:00, <https://goo.gl/kYQAfg> (accessed February 1, 2019).

¹⁶¹ Daoud el-Sayegh, Personal interview by author, Beirut, Lebanon, April 20, 2019

¹⁶² The “Eisenhower Doctrine” on the Middle East, Washington D.C., January 5, 1957.

¹⁶³ El-Husseini, *Pax Syriana*, 130.

Iraq's 14 July Revolution in 1958 and the toppling of the pro-Western government of King Faisal alerted Chamoun. President Chamoun faced an insurgency from the majority of the Muslim communities who were categorically against his policies. The insurgency threatened not only Chamoun, but the Lebanese fragile political system as well. On July 15, 1958, the first application of the Eisenhower doctrine occurred when US Marines landed on the Ramlet El-Baida beach in Beirut upon Chamoun's request. As expected, the "peacekeeping" operation, known as Operation Blue Bat, was met with mixed reactions.¹⁶⁴ The Maronites welcomed the move, while the Muslims remained suspicious. Eisenhower clarified the US intervention in Lebanon by saying, "some might wonder if this is an intervention in [Lebanon's] internal affairs. The answer is no. We intervened based on the urgent request of the Lebanese government".¹⁶⁵ However, in lieu of the regional balances, and of Nasser's wave of Pan-Arabism, it was clear that the US was going to intervene in the region. The US ended up using Lebanon as a pretext in order to prevent the "communizing of the Middle East" by the Soviet Union.¹⁶⁶ The 1958 crisis lasted a few months and ended with the election of Fouad Chehab as the new President of Lebanon.

Fouad Chehab's Approach

President Fouad Chehab played a significant role in attempting to build the state. Chehab was convinced that in order to reduce sectarianism and confessional belonging, national identity should be strengthened. That was only possible through a strong state apparatus. Therefore, Chehab worked on providing the citizens with the rights and needs that they deserved. He established the Central Bank of Lebanon, the Civil Service

¹⁶⁴ Najem, *Lebanon*, 23.

¹⁶⁵ Eisenhower Doctrine, 2.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

Council, and the National Social Security Fund (NSSF). At the international level, Chehab worked on maintaining strong ties with the Western world while preserving Lebanon's Arab identity through its participation in the Arab league. He refused to partake in regional conflicts and aimed at encouraging solidarity and brotherhood amongst Arab countries. The most striking event of Chehab's term was his meeting with Nasser in a tent that was set up on the Lebanese-Syrian border. The location of the meeting was important because Chehab wanted to demonstrate Lebanese neutrality and sovereignty. The meeting was successful. Chehab assured Nasser that Lebanon would not take an anti-Arab position and would maintain good relations with all Arab countries. In return, Nasser assured Chehab that Lebanon's sovereignty, freedom and independence would be respected at all times. Nasser "helped disperse the fears of Lebanese Christians and reduce the tensions between the communities".¹⁶⁷

Kamal Jumblat's Approach

Kamal Jumblat belonged to a feudal family. He was the founder of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) in 1949. Jumblat was "more responsible than any other politician for the rise of an indigenous left-wing reform spirit in Lebanese politics".¹⁶⁸ He was "determined to struggle for harmony and morality in the Lebanese life and to destroy politics based on constantly shifting private interests".¹⁶⁹ The PSP's economic policy may be summed up in the slogan, "bread and labor in justice and liberty". Its social policies relied upon Henri Bergson's definition: a community of voluntary obedience to an elite of innately superior intelligence and virtue. PSP stood for a "new democracy", which advocated for political, administrative, social and economic reforms. It further called for

¹⁶⁷ Hanf, *Coexistence*, 120.

¹⁶⁸ Hudson, *Precarious Republic*, 185.

¹⁶⁹ Hudson, *Precarious Republic*, 186

the intellectual development of the Lebanese people and the for the abolishment of political sectarianism.¹⁷⁰

Jumblat sought to achieve a new order in Lebanon through a philosophical ideology based on the ideals of brotherhood, solidarity and equality. He was an important figure in the Lebanese political scene for several reasons. In his own peculiar way, Jumblat forced the political elites to consider a utopian philosophy for the country's reconciliation. Even though Jumblat was publicly ridiculed, he remains to be viewed as "the only authentically Lebanese reformer".¹⁷¹ Jumblat described himself as having a "dual personality, representing simultaneously the antagonistic forces of tradition and modernity, of old values and new techniques".¹⁷²

External Factors of Conflict

An external factor that destabilized Lebanon was the Palestinian issue. Lebanon's strategic location made it impossible to avoid entanglement in regional conflicts. Moreover, the weakness of the inter-sect political system made the country more prone to outside influence on its domestic affairs. Two important time frames should be emphasized: First, before 1967, the dominant figure in the Arab world was Jamal Abdel Nasser. Second, after 1967, the dominant figure was Yasser Arafat, the leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).¹⁷³ The Arab-Israeli conflict and its repercussion on Lebanon, specifically the armed presence of the PLO in the country was a destabilizing factor. Even though Fateh leader Abu Iyad affirmed that the Palestinians

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 189.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 186.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Chairman of the PLO from 1969 until 2004 was Yasser Arafat, nicknamed Abou Ammar.

“[had] no intention of taking any power from the Lebanese authorities or even interfering in their internal affairs”, he also stated that “the way to Jerusalem is over the Lebanon Mountains and through Jounieh”.¹⁷⁴

In 1948, after the first wave of expulsion of the Palestinians from Israel, Palestinian camps began to develop in Lebanon. The Cairo agreement of 1969 granted the Palestinians “the right of autonomous administrative control over their refugee camps in Lebanon”.¹⁷⁵ In other words, it justified their right to bear arms. In an address to the Palestinian delegation in 1973, Prime Minister Riad el-Solh commented on the fragile essence of the Cairo agreement. According to el-Solh, the 1969 political context within which the agreement was decided was dissimilar to that of 1973. In 1969, the agreement was responsible to organize the activities of the Palestinian Resistance and the *Feda'iyoun* in Lebanon. However, the pact was broken when the sovereignty and security of Lebanon were tampered with during the conflicts that occurred against the PLO.¹⁷⁶

The agreement tasked the Palestinians not to intervene in Lebanese internal matters. However, the agreement’s principles were short-lived as the PLO “frequently erected roadblocks and controlled people and vehicles, molesting detainees or kidnapping Lebanese...”.¹⁷⁷ The agreement further provided the Palestinians with the right of free movement and allowed them to set observation posts in the southern border zone with Israel. Therefore, Lebanon faced another dilemma, “to suppress the commandos meant incurring the anger of Arabs inside and outside Lebanon, who believed the raids were

¹⁷⁴ Hanf, *Coexistence*, 145.

¹⁷⁵ Kail C. Ellis, “The Regional Struggle for Lebanon” in *Lebanon’s Second Republic: Prospects for the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Kail C. Ellis (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002), 29.

¹⁷⁶ Hanf, *Coexistence*, 208-209.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 167.

normally and politically justified; not to suppress them invited Israeli retaliation”.¹⁷⁸ The Palestinian presence on Lebanese territory was of a contested nature. On the one hand, the Christians were weary of Israeli attacks against the state and thus wanted to halt the PLO’s cross border attacks, while many Muslim leaders, “who were relying on the PLO to help extract Christian concessions on political reform, were either unable or unwilling to control its actions”.¹⁷⁹ Lebanon began paying the political cost of having the PLO operate from its territories. For example, on December 28, 1968, Israel struck Beirut International Airport and destroyed a dozen of planes.

In 1970, to prevent the Palestinians from seizing the country and toppling the government, the Jordanian Monarch, King Hussein, ordered his army to “crush” the Palestinian *fidai’youn*. Two years later in 1972, the PLO moved its headquarters to Lebanon. The PLO operated freely without regard to Lebanese laws as if it had created its ‘state-within-a-state’. The following year, the Palestinian armed presence led to unprecedented troubles. In Fouad Chehab’s words, “It is now too late to control the Palestinians’ activities. Lebanon should now provide the Palestinian *fidai’youn* with the treatment of an inviting state to its ally”.¹⁸⁰ In 1973, the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis raged, and consequently, South Lebanon was invaded by the Israelis.

During 1973, Israeli forces violated Lebanese sovereignty by attacking different regions of Beirut and killing three important PLO leaders: Kamal Nasser, Kamal Odwan and Abou Youssef El Najam.¹⁸¹ They also blasted several Palestinian operation centres

¹⁷⁸ Hudson, *Precairous Republic*, 99.

¹⁷⁹ Kerr, *Power-Sharing*, 143.

¹⁸⁰ YouTube, “The War of Lebanon Episode 2”, YouTube Web Site, 43:00, <https://goo.gl/kYQAfg> (accessed March 10, 2019).

¹⁸¹ Harald Vocke, *The Lebanese War: Its Origins and Political Dimensions* (St. Martin’s Press, 1978), 37.

and Arafat's main office. As chaos ensued, Lebanon fell into an abyss, as both intra-Lebanese conflicts and Lebanese-Palestinian conflicts escalated. At this point, "it was no longer clear whether calls for political changes stemmed from pure domestic issues or whether grievances had found with the Palestinian crisis a means of relief".¹⁸²

In May, the situation aggravated as the Lebanese army clashed with the *fidai'youn*. It was now crucial for President Franjeh to take a posture. Indeed, he asserted, "we can't assume protection for the Palestinians. Those who want to fight Israel should take care of themselves by themselves".¹⁸³ Karim Pakradouni affirmed Franjeh's position by claiming that "President Franjeh called a meeting with myself and former President Chamoun and told us word by word- I am obliged under Arab pressure to stop the Lebanese army. I know the consequences of my actions. After today, there will be no more a Lebanese Army to count on. Count on yourselves".¹⁸⁴ In order to demonstrate state power and control and subordinate the Palestinians, President Franjeh ordered the army to attack the PLO. The PLO was seen as a destabilizing factor in the Lebanese system. Franjeh wanted to demonstrate state power and control.

Mohammad el-Mashnouq criticized the 1973 conflicts by arguing that, "there was a big part of 1973 that had nothing to do with the Palestinians, but with those who would have the upper hand in Lebanon. There was an undeniable feeling of injustice and deprivation

¹⁸² See Enver Khoury, *The Crisis in the Lebanese System: Confessionalism and Chaos* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1976), 78.

¹⁸³ YouTube, "The War of Lebanon Episode 2", YouTube Web Site, 40:00, <https://goo.gl/kYQAfg> (accessed March 19, 2019).

¹⁸⁴ Khoury, *The Crisis in the Lebanese System*, 114

towards the system. So the Palestinian issue created an excuse for the Lebanese to use in concealing the reality of their activities”.¹⁸⁵

In line with Brown’s theory, the Palestinians can be regarded as a bad neighborhood. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict not only created domestic disorder, but also put Lebanon face-to-face with an external threat. Lebanon and Israel had been “in a technical state of war since 1948”.¹⁸⁶ Israelis believed that Lebanon would act benevolently towards them, whereas in reality, both Muslim and Christian Lebanese viewed Israel as illegitimate. Hudson wrote that Israel “appears to have aggravated Lebanon’s problem of maintaining a domestically acceptable balance in its relationships with the other Arab states and with the Great Powers”.¹⁸⁷

The Palestinians, Syria, and Israel influenced Lebanon’s political system and destabilized the country. It is out of the scope of this thesis to discuss the dynamics of the war or the events that occurred after 1975. However, it is critical to give a brief overview on the Syrian and Israeli interventions in Lebanon. According to Brown’s theory, Syria and Israel, “the bad neighbors”, had a major role in provoking the Lebanese civil war.

Initially, Syria intervened in Lebanese affairs between 1969 and 1973 through *Al-Sa’iqa*, “a Syrian-financed and supported Palestinian militia, [which] acted to extend Syrian influence in Lebanon”.¹⁸⁸ In 1973, “Syria sided with the Palestinians and closed the Lebanese-Syrian border to pressure the Lebanese government into containing the conflict”.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Hudson, *Prekarious Republic*, 98.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., 100.

¹⁸⁸ Zahar, *Power Sharing in Lebanon*, 231

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

However, on June 1, 1976, Syria intervened against the Palestinians and protected the Christians. In October, Syria's actions were sanctioned by an Arab summit that took place in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The summit took a decision to create an Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), a peacekeeping body of 30,000 troops, that would restore peace and security in Lebanon.¹⁹⁰ The ADF was primarily composed of Syrian troops, and its actions were "determined solely by Syria".¹⁹¹ The Syrian government sought to militarily stabilize the Lebanese situation by "contributing heavily to the ADF" in order to "avoid a partition of Lebanon that could further weaken the Arab world in its conflict with Israel".¹⁹² In the mid 1980s, Syria had attempted to consolidate its position in the Beqaa by "providing arms to the Lebanese groups that opposed the government... Syria also tried to gain control of the Palestinian movement and drove Yasir Arafat's PLO out of the Beqaa and Tripoli".¹⁹³ In Syria's viewpoint, "Lebanon was to remain weak, and above all, was not allowed outside support...".¹⁹⁴ Syria wanted to use the Palestinian card in Lebanon in order to maintain its influence on Lebanese domestic politics and Arab politics in general.

Similarly, Israel had both indirect and direct interference in the Lebanese civil war. Indirectly, Israel "increased its military and political involvement with the Lebanese forces... It also allowed recruits from the Maronite militias to be sent to Israel for training and then used as surrogates in the battle against Palestinian guerillas".¹⁹⁵ Directly, Israel invaded Lebanon in 1978 and in 1982. In 1978, Israel occupied Southern Lebanon with intentions to hold primary access to the waters of the Litani river. The United Nations

¹⁹⁰ Ellis, *The Regional Struggle for Lebanon*, 32.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Zahar, *Power Sharing in Lebanon*, 237

¹⁹³ Zahar, *Power Sharing in Lebanon*, 235.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 234.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

Security Council (UNSC) adapted Resolution 425 which called for the “withdrawal of the Israeli forces and the restoration of the authority of the Lebanese state”.¹⁹⁶ The Security Council also created the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to oversee and confirm the withdrawal of the Israelis from Lebanon. The Israeli forces withdrew in June 1979 but remained within the “security zone”, that was created by Israel, until May 2000. In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon and occupied Beirut for three months. During that period, the Israeli forces entered the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Shatila, and massacred several hundred Palestinians.¹⁹⁷

The above explanation supports the second proposition that assumes, if the external environment is unstable, internal agreements to share power may collapse, hence conflict is more likely.

Socio-Economic Factor

The correlation between socio-economic conditions and the civil war is weak as argued by Tamirace Fakhoury. According to Fakhoury, socio-economic factors did not impede the consolidation of consociational democracy nor was it responsible for the state’s collapse in 1975.¹⁹⁸ Despite Lebanon’s “mismanagement of resources, and [its] misdistribution among communities, the socio-economic condition... was not a decisive factor for the 1975 breakdown in the Lebanese case”.¹⁹⁹ First, Fakhoury argued that there was no direct link between democracy and economic factors. Scott Mainwaring noted that “economic conditions were dismal, and if they were determining factors, few of the

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 233.

¹⁹⁷ Hanf, *Coexistence*, 196.

¹⁹⁸ Fakhoury, *Democracy and Power Sharing*, 130.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 132.

new democracies would've survived this long".²⁰⁰ Despite strong economic inequity, certain regions such as Latin America and Southern Europe successfully democratized. Therefore, economic inequities can be remedied by "deliberate political action" and by a "strong commitment" to consociationalism.²⁰¹ Fakhoury further pointed out that despite the presence of socio-economic disparities between the Lebanese communities, consociational democracy had emerged and persisted for three decades before its failure in 1975. More precisely, "the ills associated with Lebanon's socio-economic development since independence... did not suddenly emerge in the mid-1970s".²⁰² After 1960, socio-economic disparities were declining.²⁰³ As Fakhoury noted, even though socio-economic equality was never achieved, evidence exists that shows a decrease between the Christian-Muslim educational and commercial gap. Since 1960, a substantial growth in the standards of living has been noted. Also, income declining income discrepancies have been noticeable since 1974.²⁰⁴

Although an obvious socio-economic gap was present between the communities, it was not a key factor in instigating the fifteen-year civil war. Therefore, Brown's theory on the socio-economic causes of internal conflict and the third proposition that assumes if institutions are weak or incompetent, instability often prevails, hence conflict is more likely, do not strictly apply to the case of Lebanon.

²⁰⁰ See Scott Mainwaring, *Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation*, 311.

²⁰¹ Arend Lijhpart, "Power-Sharing in South Africa", *Comparative Politics* 19 No. (April 1987): 365.

²⁰² El-Khazen, *Breakdown*, 260.

²⁰³ Fakhoury, *Democracy and Power Sharing*, 130 and Hanf, *Coexistence*, 145.

²⁰⁴ See Fakhoury, *Democracy and Power Sharing*, 145. Statistical findings are reproduced and adapted by el-Khazen in his work, the *Breakdown*, 59-68.

State Weakness

Shifting to structural factors as causes of conflict, it is important to stress the role of state weakness. As mentioned in chapter two, sectarian loyalty had primacy over state allegiance. The Lebanese state has been weak since its inception; weak in fostering a unified national identity, weak in its rigid political system, and weak in consolidating power against external influence and internal threats. As Marie-Joelle Zahar noted, “Lebanon’s sectarian system ... contributed to making it a weak state”, and “state weakness prevents the state from fulfilling its dual role to deter and assure”.²⁰⁵ As a weak state, Lebanon had no deterrent capabilities since it was unable to prevent sub-state groups from using violence during the war. Lebanon was also unable to assure that the militias would “comply with the tiles of the game- that no other group would take advantage of them nor... can it assure aggrieved groups that it does not constitute a threat to them”.²⁰⁶ Moreover, Zahar elaborated by asserting that when the state weakens, and when it fails to deter and assure, groups take it on themselves to protect themselves by all necessary means. This was exactly what happened in Lebanon in 1975. Groups have one of two options “as they seek to acquire the means to protect themselves against perceived threats: build up their military strength or enter into alliances with stronger powers that can protect them. Therein lies the behavior of the main Lebanese protagonists before... Lebanon’s civil war”.²⁰⁷ Zahar also highlighted the debilitating role played by foreign interveners in weakening the state. Through their need to constantly re-adapt political rules and decisions, foreign powers hampered the institutionalization of Lebanese politics to fit their strategic interests. The aftermath of such actions weakened the state and its

²⁰⁵ Zahar, *Foreign Interventions*, 67.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Zahar, *Foreign Interventions*, 67-68.

ability in monopolizing power and authority, which further undermined the state's role in deterring and assuring.²⁰⁸

Zahar's argument was further supported by Barry Posen's security dilemma mentioned in chapter one. According to Posen, the "security dilemma"²⁰⁹ presupposed that a weak state can incentivize groups to take their own necessary measures for physical safety and security. However, the main problem is that when one group arms and protects itself, other groups will simultaneously feel threatened and will in turn take similar steps to protect themselves from the rest. As Posen noted, "what one does to enhance one's own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure".²¹⁰

According to El-Khazen, Lebanon's breakdown was characterized by three phases. Phase one, the erosion and eventual loss of power; phase two, the political paralysis and power vacuum; and phase three, the collapse of state institutions and the eruption of violence.²¹¹ Since independence and until the eruption of the civil war in 1975, Lebanon passed through numerous phases of conflicts. However, it also witnessed short periods of stability and was able to enjoy relative peaceful sectarian relations. Analyzing the political history of Lebanon, state weakness appears evident. Sunni figure Mohammad Shukair argued that it was the weakness of the Lebanese state and its failure in creating equality between the Christians and the Muslims, that eventually led to the war.²¹² Due to its weakness, Lebanon was a fertile ground for external powers to intervene and promote their own interests. According to Hanf, "Lebanon [was] a weak state, and

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Posen, *The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict*, 31.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 35.

²¹¹ El-Khazen, *Breakdown of the State of Lebanon*, 6.

²¹² See Hanf, *Coexistence*, 375.

because of its weakness, it served any outside interest as an arena”.²¹³ Ghassan Tuéni suggested that “the reality of the sovereignty [in Lebanon] is itself a function of external coercive forces and their interests”.²¹⁴ Lebanon was born weak in 1943 and continued to weaken as state building was hindered by the sectarian elites who preferred to establish “personal rule” rather than “rule by the institutions”.²¹⁵ In 1975, the breakdown of the state led to civil war. Mohammad Ayoub drew a clear relationship between state failure and internal conflict. According to Ayoub, the relationship between these two phenomenon is cyclical. State failure provided an opportunity for internal conflict to escalate into violence.²¹⁶ The above discussion showed that Lebanon’s institutionalized sectarian system of 1943 was weak and “contributed more to the state’s weakness than to its strength”.²¹⁷

In accordance to Michael Brown, state weakness is a fundamental factor of the structural causes of internal conflict. In the case of Lebanon, a constant dilemma was “the weakness of the state and its inability to acquire legitimacy from all or most of its citizens”.²¹⁸ The state was unable to unite its citizens under one national identity. Yet, the citizens themselves did not demonstrate loyalty to state institutions and government. According to Hudson, the weak sectarian state was the problem and the only solution was the creation of strong central state institutions. He argued that the absence of strong

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ See Kerr, *Imposing Power-Sharing*, 32.

²¹⁵ Interview with public figure, April 20, 2019.

²¹⁶ Mohammad Ayoub, “State Breaking, State Making and State Failure”, in *Leasing the Dogs of War*, eds. Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson and Pamela Aall (Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 100.

²¹⁷ Collings, *Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction*, 54.

²¹⁸ Yousef M. Choueiri, *Arab Nationalism: A History* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 250.

national institutions precluded the state from confronting socio-economic and political challenges.²¹⁹

According to El-Khazen, the argument associated with state weakness as a cause of conflict, did apply to Lebanon. However, state weakness was not a strong reason to state failure. He argues that the weakness of a state does not necessitate its collapse. Moreover, the nature of the Lebanese political system was not a sufficient cause in explaining the failure of the state. El-Khazen further argued that even though the Lebanese state witnessed inter-sectarian opposition and conflicts such as 1958, such events were ephemeral. He drew a resemblance between the problems faced by Lebanon to those of several other third world countries. According to El-Khazen, Lebanon's problems were only unique in their "nature and scope of externally-generated problems originating mainly from its regional order- specifically the Arab state system and post-1967 PLO".²²⁰

Therefore, El-Khazen places primary responsibility of the Lebanese civil war on the destructive regional system: Arafat's leadership of the PLO, the Ba'hist regimes in Iraq and Syria, and Libya's Qaddafi. It was only during this period that "Lebanon's destabilization began".²²¹ As stated by Zahar, "foreign intervention has a lasting and detrimental impact on the 'rules of the game' and the pervasiveness of [sectarianism]".²²² El-Khazen's argument strongly supports Brown's theory on the role played by external factors in internal conflict. However, it is undeniable that domestic causes also played a role in destabilizing the state. The NP itself was weak in its formation. As discussed in chapter two, the NP as a power-sharing agreement was not sustainable. The nature of the

²¹⁹ Kerr, *Power-Sharing*, 18-19.

²²⁰ El-Khazen, *Breakdown*, 197.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, 10.

²²² Zahar, 64-65.

NP “and its confessional party system prevented a syncretistic Lebanese national identity from ever developing”.²²³ As stated by an interviewee,” the state was never ‘built’, because the politicians did not want to build it. He added that “the NP was a short-term solution that brought certain political elites to power. Lebanon has always been and will remain a country ruled by elites and not by institutions”.²²⁴

The weakened state was unable to provide security and maintain sovereignty. To demonstrate the inability of the state to deter and assure, I demonstrate and emphasize how the Phalange responded to the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, and the infamous clash at Ain Rummaneh on 13 April, 1975. I also mention the February fisherman’s dispute that destabilized the country. I finally correlate these incidents to support the triggering factors in Brown’s theory on the internal causes of conflict.

Since its inception, Lebanon has remained a weak and vulnerable state. Lebanon’s weakness has been linked to its inability to satisfy communal demands, its inability to provide security, its failure at handling foreign intervention, and to the elites’ personal interest. Najem argued that, “the weakness of the state was primarily a result of the *zu’ama’s* desire to protect heir own dominance of the system. They did not want to allow the emergence of a strong state that could exert influence in their traditional spheres of influence, interfere in their activities or rival their ability to supply patronage to their constituents”.²²⁵ According to Zahar, the weakness of the state lies in the society’s “lacking consensus on fundamentals, including the identity of the country and the fairness

²²³ Kerr, *Power-sharing*, 138.

²²⁴ Interview with public figure, April 23, 2019.

²²⁵ Najem, *Lebanon*, 31.

of representation and distribution”.²²⁶ Lebanon’s weak capabilities in managing and controlling foreign intervention made it vulnerable to a lasting and detrimental conflict. As argued in chapter four, Lebanon was unable to satisfy the socio-economic demands of its citizens. There were increasingly “ardent demands for the redistribution of political power by groups that perceived themselves as under-represented in the context of the exiting decision-making process”.²²⁷

As Dilip Hiro noted, “ the inbuilt conservatism of the system inhibited the rise of modern politics based on broad socio-economic interests which transcend narrow sectarian and communal concerns”.²²⁸ As the “internal security situation deteriorated... private militias grew larger and stronger”.²²⁹ This supports Posen’s argument of the security dilemma mentioned in chapter four, when one group takes certain private protective measures, other groups will feel threatened and will in turn take similar steps to protect themselves. In this case, as was evident with Lebanon, the state lost its monopolizing power over security and the groups took protective measures into their own hands.

Moreover, Lebanon was weak and incapable of controlling its borders and protecting its sovereignty. This was evident with the presence of armed Palestinians who used Southern Lebanon as a battlefield to fight against Israel. The Palestinian armed existence posed an internal security threat to Lebanon. As previously mentioned in chapter two, the Cairo agreement granted the Palestinians the freedom of movement and the right to bear arms as long as they did not violate Lebanese laws and complied with

²²⁶ Zahar, *Power Sharing*, 64

²²⁷ Najem, *Lebanon*, 29.

²²⁸ Dilip Hiro, *Lebanon: Fire and Embers: A History of the Lebanese Civil War* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,1993), 6.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, 17.

the decisions of the state. However, the essence of the agreement was tampered. The Palestinians often set up roadblocks and observation posts and kidnapped Lebanese individuals. The Palestinian presence further widened the divide between the communities as it “went on reinforcing [its] bases in Lebanon by shoring up their fighters and supplies”.²³⁰ The right-wing Christians of Gemeyal had “sharpened their attacks against [Palestinian] intruders and foreigners, accusing them of subverting the Lebanese system”.²³¹ In contrast, the Lebanese Muslims regarded providing refuge to displaced Palestinians as a religious duty. And as an integral part of the ‘Arab face’ of Lebanon as agreed by the 1943 National Pact.

Najem highlighted the weakness of the state in handling the Palestinian issue by comparing it to Jordan. According to Najem, Jordan had a higher Palestinian population, the state was divided over the PLO’s presence, but was still able “to carry through the policy [of expelling the PLO] in spite of internal opposition and protest from other Arab states”.²³² The key difference between Lebanon and Jordan was that “the Jordanian state and the Jordanian military were reasonably strong and stayed internally united during the crisis”.²³³ As stated by Najem, “a state with a stronger coercive and internal security capabilities would have been in a better position to take action against the PLO and to resist internal and external pressures regarding the Palestinian issue.”²³⁴

As argued in chapters two and three, Lebanon was strongly affected in the 1950s and 1960s by Nasser’s ideology of Pan-Arabism. Lebanon was a divided society between

²³⁰ Ibid., 14.

²³¹ Ibid., 10.

²³² Najem, *Lebanon*, 3.

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Ibid., 31

“those predominantly Muslim, who supported pan-Arabism; and those, predominantly Christian, who supported a pro-Western Lebanon”.²³⁵ Pan-Arabism as a nationalistic ideology “undermined [Lebanese] public confidence in the workability of [the national pact], and sectarian mistrust superseding class interest, was a reason for conflict”.²³⁶

The Triggering Factors of the War

As previously mentioned, Brown’s theory of internal conflict states that there are four main factors which make a country more vulnerable to violence. These include structural factors, political factors, social/economic factors and cultural/perceptual factors. I argued how these factors have weakened Lebanon and made it highly vulnerable to external intervention. Brown also highlighted the proximate causes of internal conflict through internal and external elite mass triggers. In line with Brown’s argument, two significant domestic events occurred in 1975 that triggered the civil war: the fishermen’s dispute in Sidon and the Ain Rummaneh incident in Beirut.

In February of 1975, anti-state protests were organized and led by a Shiite politician Maarouf Saad, who mobilized Sidon’s unionized fishermen, against the conceding of fishing rights to Proteine, a company chaired by President Camille Chamoun. The fishermen’s concerns were based on the ground that Proteine would “deprive them of their living by industrializing fishing”.²³⁷ The Lebanese army was asked by Prime Minister Solh to control the situation and prevent escalation. Nonetheless, on the 20th of February, clashes occurred between the army and the soldiers and persisted for five days. About one hundred Palestinian militiamen from the Ain Helweh refugee camp

²³⁵ Najem, *Lebanon*, 29.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ O’ballance, *Civil War*, 4.

also joined the fishermen's protests. The result was the death of six soldiers and at least eighteen civilians, and the death of Maarouf Saad.²³⁸ By the beginning of March, the army withdrew from the sight as the disturbances subsided. On the 9th of March, Solh announced that his government would "enter into discussions with the Sidon fishermen to ensure [that] they received their just demands, to bring them into a welfare scheme and to help them establish a cooperative venture".²³⁹

Concerning the second triggering event, the clash of Ain Rummaneh, there exists several conflicting versions. On 13 April 1975, Pierre Gemayel, then leader of the Phalange party (Falange or Katae'b) was present at the consecration of a new church in Ain Rummaneh. Gemayel's men were outside, "diverting traffic away from the front of the church, when a vehicle carrying half a dozen of Palestinian militiamen, firing their rifles into the air... came on to the scene".²⁴⁰ Confrontations occurred between the Phalange and the Palestinians, resulting in the death of the Palestinian driver and three Phalangists. After a short period, a bus carrying Palestinians passed in front of the church. Further clashes occurred, resulting in the death of fourteen Palestinians. According to a PLO spokesman, "the bus had contained only families, returning to the nearby Tel Zaatar Palestinian refugee camp. It had been fired on from the vicinity of the church, killing 27 men, women and children and wounding others".²⁴¹ Harald Vocke commented on this incident by clarifying that, "it is not known to which Palestinian organization the men who killed the four Christians in front of the church... belonged. It is also not known

²³⁸ O'ballance, *Civil War*, 5.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 1

²⁴¹ Ibid.

whether all the Christian militiamen who shot the bus load of armed Palestinians belonged to the Kata'eb party.²⁴²

Both incidents were the spark that ignited the civil war. However, we should emphasize that there was a conducive internal and external environment that facilitated the escalation of conflict and violence. In line with Brown's theory, the fisherman's dispute and the Ain Rummaneh incident are considered the triggering causes of conflict.

²⁴² Vocke, *The Lebanese War*, 39.

CHAPTER V CONCLUSION

This thesis argued that the Lebanese civil war was not caused by a single factor. Indeed, a number of internal and external causes shaped conflict in the 1950s, 1960s, and in the first half of the 1970s. To explain and analyze the different factors that contributed to conflict and violence, I used Brown's theory on the underlying causes of conflict. I fully explained Brown's theory in chapter two, which presented the theoretical framework and the methodology of the research. In chapter three, which dealt with Lebanon's political system from the Ottoman period until independence (1800s-1943), and in chapter four, which discussed the internal and external factors as causes of conflict (1943-1975), this thesis has stressed that, although sectarianism shaped the conflict, it was not a sufficient cause in triggering violence.

Therefore, to provide a better understanding and a different explanation from the existing literature on the Lebanese civil war, I used Brown's theory and I argued that structural, political, economic, social, cultural and perceptual factors played a role in providing conducive conditions, particularly in light of the weakening Lebanese state, to increase sectarian tensions and escalate conflict. This thesis also argued that an unstable external environment and bad neighbors, including Syria and Israel, played a major role in not only violating Lebanon's sovereignty, but also in meddling in the country's domestic affairs. This was attested through the example of the Israeli invasions of Lebanon in 1978 and 1982, and the Syrian government's policy to send *Al-Sa'iq* to Lebanon support the PLO. The Lebanese state, since its creation, was weak and was unable to deter the external threats and provide security and physical safety to its citizens.

As a matter of fact, the state was unable to defend its Northern and Southern borders from external intervention.

The objective of this thesis was to examine the research question, “what were the causes of the Lebanese civil war: 1975-1990?” This thesis met its objective by applying testing Brown’s theory on the structural, political, social, economic and cultural factors of conflict. It also supported Brown’s theory by testing the four propositions, in chapters three and four, that made conflict more likely.

I also examined the triggering factors, the role of the elites, bad neighbors and bad neighborhoods that played a role in escalating conflict and violence. For example, this is highlighted through the Palestinian factor, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the ideology of pan-Arabism. The findings of the research showed that the major internal causes of the civil war were: the sectarian dominance, the rigid political institutions, the fragile power-sharing agreements that were unable to regulate and mitigate conflict, the weakness of the state, the different approaches of the political elites towards domestic and regional issues, and external intervention, and the state’s incapability in responding to the groups’ demands. Brown’s theory, to a great extent, proved true in the case of Lebanon. However, it is important to note that even though the socio-economic factor was evident in Lebanon, it was nonetheless not sufficient and strong enough to trigger the war.

Once again, it is useful to stress that the sectarian system was not a primary cause of the civil war. However, the rigidity of the system and its inability to incorporate non-traditional sectarian elites, who were eager to capture positions in the government and state institutions, strongly weakened communal relations and destabilized the internal political environment. According to Roger Owen, the sectarian system broke down in the

face of external threats such as the “appearance of growing economic and social inequality...Palestinian militias...and repeated Israeli invasions”.²⁴³

The Lebanese civil war ended in 1990 with “no victor [and] no vanquished”. The warring parties met at the negotiations table in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia, and initiated a new period of peace, culminated in a new power-sharing agreement for Lebanon. However, even with the Tai’f agreement, an external destabilizing element remained present, mainly because of the Arab-Israeli conflict, in addition to Israel and Syria’s disrespect of Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Ta’if, which was the result of Syrian, American and Saudi consensus, ended the war but did not bring sustainable peace and did not build the state. Accordingly, the parliamentary seats were divided according to a five to five ratio between the Christians and the Muslims. Sharing power with the Christians and enjoying equal political rights, have been a major demand by the Muslim community in Lebanon.

Even today in 2019, twenty-nine years after the end of the war, its legacy is still in the minds of the Lebanese. The state remains weak and divided along sectarian divisions; external patrons are still pursuing their personal interests through the elites; and the geopolitics of the region remains unstable. Israel still threatens Lebanon despite the deployment of additional UNIFIL troops and the Lebanese Army to Southern Lebanon after 2006. Under external and internal pressures, Syrian troops withdrew in 2005 after the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. In 2006, Lebanon witnessed instability as a result of the Hezbollah-Israel war. In 2007, an institutional vacuum occurred when Lebanon was unable to elect a president until 2008. A similar vacuum recurred from 2014 until 2016.

²⁴³ Roger Owens, *Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon* (USA: Ithica Press, 1976), 34.

Today's government still faces a number of contested issues including a common national identity, a sound socio-economic policy, economic development, lack of political consensus on foreign policy towards neighbors, and an equal distribution of economic resources in the country. The causes of the 1975 civil war were not fully addressed by the consecutive Lebanese governments. Also, the Lebanese groups continue to seek external patrons to support their internal demands, and fulfill personal interests. Therefore, the recurrence of another civil war seems likely.

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Application for Exemption from IRB Review

***For Projects Involving Human Participants in Research
Assigned for Course Credit and/or AUB graduate theses where
research will be carried out by AUB Undergraduate and/or
Graduate Students***

To expedite the review and approval process of research involving human participants when the research project is intended to meet course requirements or thesis requirements, especially where time to conduct the research may be limited, the IRB suggests that Faculty advisors urge students to develop research protocols that will be eligible for Exempt Status, and therefore exempt from IRB review and oversight. This form, which is a modification of the *Application for Exemption from IRB Review and Oversight Form* should be completed by students who intend to conduct projects or theses in part-fulfillment of program requirements. An AUB faculty member (typically the course instructor making the research project assignment or the thesis advisor) is required to serve as the responsible Principal Investigator for any student-conducted project. The Principal Investigator, must review the Application, ensure that it is complete and signed with an original signature (*stamped signatures are not permitted by the IRB*). When the PI has determined that the Application fulfills the criteria of exempt status, applications **should be submitted** to the IRB office for review. **Completed applications** that fulfill the criteria for exempt status are anticipated to be reviewed and approved by the IRB within 8 calendar days from the submission date. Incomplete applications will be returned to the applicant. The PI has primary responsibility for the ethical conduct of any research study conducted by a student that involves human research subjects.

An application is considered complete if it includes at minimum:

- Completed application form
- Research proposal (*please refer to Appendix I for guidance*)
- Informed consent documentation
- Recruitment material *
- Data Collection form*
- CITI Certification for the PI and each co-investigator/student

The PI and Student Investigator(s) are urged to review:

- Guidance to identify if research projects need IRB Approval (*Appendix II*)
- The "*Tips for Student-Conducted Research Projects*" before submitting this Application or any application for IRB review. (*Appendix III*)

CITI Certification:

AUB requires all researchers involving human participants in research to complete the appropriate CITI training program. Attach copy(ies) of CITI certification to this application. Absence of CITI certification is an Incomplete Application submitted without CITI certification will be returned to the PI without being reviewed. **NB. Students need only to take the CITI module designed specifically for them, which takes less than an hour to complete.** All CITI modules can be accessed at <https://www.citiprogram.org/Default.asp> (log on using your AUB user name and password).

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* If applicable

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Check the box corresponding to the eligibility for Exemption category which best describes the proposed research:

(1) Research conducted in established or commonly accepted educational settings, involving normal educational practices, such as (i) research on regular and special education instructional strategies, or (ii) research on the effectiveness of or the comparison among instructional techniques, curricula, or classroom management methods.

[Such studies are not exempt if they involve other than normal education practices conducted in accepted settings such as elementary, secondary, or post-secondary schools, including colleges and universities. Evaluation of new instructional strategies or use of randomization to different instructional methods is not exempt because it exceeds normal practice. Any studies that involve deception of participants or withholding of information that would normally be disclosed to participants are not exempt. Studies that involve manipulation of exercise activities or intense exercise do not qualify for Exempt Status].

(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior, unless: (i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation.

[Such studies are not exempt if they involve collection of participant identifiers and if disclosure to unauthorized persons could harm the participant in any way. Survey research that collects data on sensitive and private aspects of a participant's behavior, such as sexual preferences, substance abuse, and illegal conduct is not exempt if the data are linked to individual participants. Surveys that contain invasive questions that may cause a subject to experience emotional distress or discomfort when answering them are not exempt, even if the survey technically qualifies as exempt because it does not contain participant identifiers. Research studies that include psychologically invasive procedures such as detailed personality inventories or psychiatric diagnostic interviews or inventories are not exempt. Exemption 2 does not apply to children if the research involves surveys or interviews; Exemption 2 does not apply to the observation of public behavior of children when the investigator is a participant in the activities being observed].

(3) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures, or observation of public behavior that is not exempt under paragraph (2) of this section, if:

(i) The human subjects are elected or appointed public officials or candidates for public office; or
(ii) federal statute(s) require(s) without exception that the confidentiality of the personally identifiable information will be maintained throughout the research and thereafter.

(4) Research involving the collection or study of existing data, documents, records, pathological specimens, or diagnostic specimens, if these sources are publicly available or if the information is recorded by the investigator in such a manner that subjects cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects.

[Existing means that the research materials are already on the shelf or archived when the research is proposed; e.g., blood samples are already taken from patients or subjects for other clinical or research purposes.

[Such studies are eligible for exemption only if they do not involve collection of direct or indirect identifiers (demographic information that can be linked to individuals). Research studies that involve use of codes that link individuals to direct or indirect identifiers are not exempt. Any study that involves the collection of prospective information, however minimum, and however low-risk is ineligible for consideration of exemption. Any research involving access to medical records, student information

records or other confidential AUB databases or institutional records is not eligible for Exempt determination, even if confidentiality is protected].

(5) Research and demonstration projects which are conducted by or subject to the approval of department or agency heads, and which are designed to study, evaluate, or otherwise examine: (i) Public benefit or service programs; (ii) procedures for obtaining benefits or services under those programs; (iii) possible changes in or alternatives to those programs or procedures; or (iv) possible changes in methods or levels of payment for benefits or services under those programs.

[Such studies are not exempt if they involve vulnerable individuals, such as those who are cognitively impaired].

(6) Taste and food quality evaluation and consumer acceptance studies, (i) if wholesome foods without additives are consumed or (ii) if a food is consumed that contains a food ingredient at or below the level and for a use found to be safe, or agricultural chemical or environmental contaminant at or below the level found to be safe, by the Food and Drug Administration or approved by the Environmental Protection Agency or the Food Safety and Inspection Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

[Such studies are not exempt if they involve intake of foods that risk indigestion or vitamin deficiency. Studies that involve consumption of alcohol; vitamins; supplements, especially protein powder, creatine, glucosamine chondroitin sulfate, are not exempt].

NB. Please note the following important information:

1. The determination that a research study meets the requirements for Exempt status is based solely on the written information provided in the application. Any amendment to a research project that the IRB has determined to be Exempt (recruitment of participants, changes in the consent process, amendments to or addition to research instruments etcetera) may cause the research to become non-exempt and subject to IRB review and oversight. Any proposed modification to an Exempt study must be re-submitted to the IRB office for review. Depending on the extent of the change an Expedited or Full Committee review, may be required. The responsible Principal Investigator should be aware of these requirements and advise student researchers accordingly.
2. A research study that has been determined by the IRB to be Exempt does not require continuing reviews or a final study report.

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Name

Signature

Date

HIBA KHDOR



05/04/2019


I hereby certify that the information provided in this application is complete and accurate.

Department Chairperson:

HIBA KHDOR



~~Chairperson~~ (or Designee) of the IRB:



April 17, 2019

APPENDIX-I

Research/Study Design

Please submit a research proposal of not more than two pages using the following headings as a guide.

1. Research/study question or hypothesis
2. Recruitment of research participants [Provide a thorough description of your informed consent process, a script of consent information if oral consent is required. You can use verbal scripts, online scripts, emails, etc but these must be submitted. Voluntary participation must explain ability to discontinue participation, skipping of inappropriate or sensitive questions, etc. See Tips for Student-conducted Research Projects Subject to IRB Review and Approval for suggestions for Consent/recruitment.]
3. Protection of participants' privacy and data confidentiality [Exempt studies may have identifiers but be sure to explain how participants will be informed about protection of privacy, confidentiality, etc.]
4. Research method/procedure [You may submit samples of stimuli – e.g. simple pictures, lists of words etc. For open-ended interviews you can give a list of topic questions and explain the direction you want to pursue. It is helpful to address what topics you do not wish to pursue – especially if sensitive information may arise.]
3. Data analysis and disposition of data collected (including any audio or video recordings) at the end of the study.
4. Preparation of report and intentions regarding dissemination of findings

APPENDIX- II

Does my project need IRB Approval?

Yes. If it meets the federal definition of research and involves human research subjects.

Is my project research?

Does your project meet the following definition of research? (45 CFR 46.102(d)

"... a systematic investigation, including research development, testing and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge ..."

Yes No

If yes, does your project involve human research subjects?

That is, living individuals about whom you will obtain data through intervention or interaction, or identifiable private information.

Yes No

If you have answered **yes**, to **both questions** your project will require IRB approval **unless** it falls into one or more of the six exempt categories listed above.

Can any projects be conducted without IRB approval?

Yes. Many health care projects can proceed without IRB involvement because they are concerned with quality improvement rather than with research. Unless a quality improvement process is intended to achieve a research purpose, it does not need IRB approval or oversight.

Which quality improvement activities do not require IRB involvement?

Normally a practice improvement project or collection of patient or provider data for non-research clinical or administrative purposes does not require IRB involvement. Examples of such projects include:

- Using information from a data base to forecast service utilization
- Investigating the causes, frequency and resolution of medication error rates
- Monitoring safety standards and procedures
- Introducing an improved protocol for assessing a category of patients
- Measuring and reporting provider performance data for clinical, practical, or administrative purposes
- Introducing methods to improve communication among providers
- Strengthening teamwork in clinical units
- Analyzing pre-existing data stripped of individual patient identifiers
(whether or not the activity involves research)

Are there any quality improvement activities that do require IRB approval and oversight?

Yes. If a project involves introducing an untested clinical intervention for purposes that include not only improving quality but also collecting information about patient outcomes for the purposes of establishing scientific evidence to determine how well the intervention achieves its intended results, it will require IRB approval and oversight, unless it is exempt.

Does the intention to publish mean that a quality improvement project must have prior IRB approval?

No. The intent to publish is an insufficient criterion for determining whether a quality improvement project involves research. If in doubt seek advice from an IRB Officer.

APPENDIX- III

Tips for Student-conducted Research Projects Subject to AUB IRB Review and Approval

1. Do not begin a research project involving human participants without IRB approval including written notification of determination of Exempt Status from the IRB office. You cannot begin recruitment, consent, collecting data, etc. until your Exempt determination or IRB approval is received. Submission of materials for review is NOT sufficient – you must wait for approval.
2. Research projects which are eligible for Exempt Status are not exempt from the ethical principles which guide responsible conduct of research involving human participants. Exempt projects still must adhere to ethical principles such as voluntary participation of human participants, an informed consent process and fair and non-discriminatory recruitment of human participants.
3. Exempt projects which propose to recruit healthy adult volunteers and collect non-sensitive information without personal identifiers, such as through anonymous recruitment and anonymous (no identifiers other than generic demographic information) surveys are likely to receive the quickest and most efficient Exempt review.
4. Suggestions for Exempt research
Consent/recruitment script elements:
 - Identify yourself as AUB student and explain why you are doing the study. Use a style of language that is simple and clear, explains the research to your potential participants. Participants must be informed that the project is for research purposes.
 - Participants must be told what they will be asked to do if they agree to participate, how long it will take, and how you will protect their confidentiality (or, if participants are anonymous, how you will assure anonymity.) Include information about audio or video taping as applicable.
 - Participants must be told that their participation is voluntary; they can refuse to answer questions that they do not wish to answer, and stop participation at any time. Participants should be told that they can withdraw at any time without penalty or repercussion.
 - Provide a means for participants to contact the investigator(s) if they have questions or concerns about the research. Make it clear that you are identified with AUB.
5. Faculty who assign students research projects for course credit that will involve human participants are urged to have an IRB administrative staff member (or IRB member from their department or school) present a class session about How to Prepare and Complete an Application for IRB Approval including an Application for Exempt Determination. Such sessions can involve review of the basics of the ethical principles described in the Belmont Report, suggestions for informed consent processes, including oral consent, preparation of consent scripts, recruitment strategies, etc. Such a session is designed to expedite the IRB

review and approval process and minimize the efforts required for the PI, the student-investigator and the IRB office and IRB members to review and approval student-conducted research projects involving human participants. Faculty should contact the IRB office to arrange such a presentation early in the course to allow time for review, approval and conduct of the research project.

6. The IRB welcomes opportunities to work with faculty and student-investigators to expedite the application preparation, review and approval process. PIs are encouraged to ask questions during the application preparation; IRB administrators are available for personal consultation on any part of the IRB review process.
7. Do not make changes in a research design, subject recruitment, consent process or data analysis/retention without prior IRB approval. If you need to make a change to any part of your approved research materials (e.g. increase the number of subjects, change recruitment methods, alter the survey questions/instrument, revise consent forms/oral scripts, etc.) you must submit an amendment for IRB prior review and approval. Your project may or may not be eligible for Exempt review (even if it qualified originally for Exempt status). Contact the AUB IRB office for instructions for how to submit an Amendment or modification to previously Exempt or Approved project.
8. All Principal Investigators, co-investigators, research assistants, research coordinators, nurses, students, residents, fellows, statisticians and other personnel who plan to conduct research studies involving human participants must complete the designated web-based courses Offered by the Collaborative Institutions Training Initiatives [CITI] Program. The required courses are available at the CITI web-site:
<https://www.citiprogram.org/Default.asp>. Students should complete the Student Module on the responsible conduct of research. Remember to attach a signed and dated copy(ies) of CITI certificate(s) to the Application, confirming that all required appropriate modules have been completed by all named research project personnel.

Research proposal attendant to application for IRB review exemption

Farah Abou Harb

April 16, 2019

Research proposal abstract

My thesis will clarify that there were several factors that ignited the civil war, yet stating all of them would not be possible. I will focus on the internal and external interventions that took place, by highlighting the importance of the external factors. Moreover, my observations will be based on political, structural, economic and cultural factors. I will assert that internal/domestic conflict was present in Lebanon, but certain external factors pushed it into war. Several factors that were kindling up made Lebanon more predisposed to conflict and led to the initiation of the civil war. These included internal factors of political instability and economic problems as well as external factors of state interventions. The weakness of the Lebanese state was an undeniable factor that paved the way for the war. My thesis thus aims to explore the different elements of internal and external interventions and their effect on initiating and pushing through the war. I will also consider violence and whether violence itself is measurable.

My thesis will use Michael Brown's theory which presents four main arguments on the factors that make a country more predisposed to violence than others- these are: structural factors, political factors, economic/social factors and cultural/perceptual factors.

Structural factors are weak states, intra-state security concerns, and ethnic geography. *Political factors* on the other hand include discriminatory political institutions, exclusionary national ideologies, inter-group politics and elite politics. The *economic/social* factors however, revolve around economic problems, discriminatory economic systems, economic development and modernization. And lastly, the *cultural/perceptual* factors are driven by patterns of cultural discrimination and problematic group histories.

Moreover, he divides the four factors into a matrix of triggers, categorized into elite-level or mass-level factors driven internally or externally.

I will be applying this theory to the Lebanese civil war by undertaking and dissecting each factor analytically.

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Participant recruitment

The study's target population is restricted to academicians, writer and journalists who have written or taught the Lebanese civil war. Religious affiliation will not be a condition for eligibility to be interviewed. On the contrary, I will be meeting with individuals from different cultures, social background and religions. Furthermore, no recruitment material or communication in the recruitment process will stipulate any sectarian affiliation as a condition for participation. This should include a variety of age ranges and occupational backgrounds.

I will be interviewing approximately 10 participants who will be contacted through word of mouth. These individuals are restricted to academicians, writers and journalists who have extensively written about the war.

I will first contact academicians since their emails are available to the public. I will then continue through the method of snow balling. After finalizing each interview, I will ask each of the interviewees to identify experts in the field that can be interviewed. I will provide the participants with my business card and will ask them if they can pass it to the identified person.

I will be contacting individuals at NGOs, such as Act for the Disappeared. I will contact members of their advisory board, particularly Carmen Abou Jaoude and Berengere Pineau. Before each interview, participants will be given time to read the attached (Arabic or English) informed consent document. Interviews will only proceed once assent (via signature on the informed consent document) of the participant is given. Notes on interview responses will only be taken if the participant approves to such on the same informed consent document. Interview subjects, according to the informed consent document, will be allowed to skip any questions for any reason or revoke their consent at any time and for any reason. All interviewee's emails and those of the NGO are publically available.

Participant privacy and confidentiality

Identifying information (including names) used in the recruitment process will not be attached to interview notes. Immediately following each interview, all identifying information used in the recruitment process will be disposed of. Any identifiers which may incidentally come up in the interview will not be included in interview notes. As such, no identifying information can be attached to the interview notes or the use of note excerpts in my thesis. After the

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conclusion of the project, all notes will be discarded. All of this information will be presented to the participant in the informed consent document.

Interviews will not be audio-recorded.

Research procedure

Interviews will address what they consider are the main causes of the Lebanese civil war. Particular attention will be given to the regional imbalances and to the effect of external intervention. The interview will remain on the topic of the causes of the war, and will *not* ask the participant to discuss any personal experiences, including personal experiences related to the war.

The interviews will be semi-structured open-ended and will discuss the following questions:

- 1.) What were the internal and external causes to the 1975 Lebanese civil war?
 - a. What were the structural causes?
 - b. What were the political causes?
 - c. What were the Economic causes?
 - d. What were the cultural causes?
- 2.) How did the external region affect or influence the war?
- 3.) Could the war have been avoided?
- 4.) Did the political leaders at that time have a role in stopping the war?
- 5.) To what extent did the Arab-Israeli conflict affect the war?
- 6.) Did the confessional/sectarian nature of the country affect the war?
- 7.) Was the war expected?

1. ما هي الأسباب الداخلية والخارجية للحرب الأهلية اللبنانية عام 1975؟

ا. ما هي الأسباب الهيكلية؟

ب. ما هي الأسباب السياسية؟

ج. ما هي الأسباب الاقتصادية؟

د. ما هي الأسباب الثقافية؟

2. كيف أثرت المنطقة الخارجية على الحرب أو أثرت عليها؟

3. هل يمكن تجنب الحرب؟

4. هل كان للزعماء السياسيين في ذلك الوقت دور في وقف الحرب؟

5. إلى أي مدى أثر الصراع العربي الإسرائيلي على الحرب؟

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(.6 هل الطبيعة المذهبية / الطائفية للبلاد تؤثر على الحرب؟

(.7 هل كانت الحرب متوقعة؟

Disposition of data

Notes will not include any identifying information. Immediately after each interview, notes will be reviewed to make sure no identifying information was accidentally included. These notes will be kept under lock in my home. Discourse analysis techniques will be applied to the interview notes and excerpts of those notes and aggregate data may be included in the final thesis text. All notes will be destroyed after completion of the thesis. All identifying information used to contact actual or prospective participants during the recruitment process will be destroyed immediately following each participant's interview.

Dissemination of findings

The data will be used only to fulfill my MA thesis requirements. The aggregate data included in my thesis will be seen only by my thesis committee members and those who choose to access the printed copy of my thesis held in Jafet Library.

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الباحثة: فرح أبو حرب

قسم العلوم السياسية و الإدارة العامة
الجامعة الامريكية في بيروت

وثيقة الموافقة

نتمنى منك المشاركة في بحث اكايمي و نرجو منك ان تقرأ المعلومات التالية و الاستفسار عند الحاجة.

- أ. وصف المشروع
1. في هذا البحث، سوف يُطلب منك المشاركة في مقابلة لكي تبدي
 2. الوقت المقدر للمقابلة هو ٣٠ دقيقة تقريباً.
 3. يتم العمل على هذا البحث لإنهاء متطلبات شهادة الماجستير. سوف يُوضع هذا البحث في مكتبة يافت في الجامعة الامريكية.
 4. ان الأجوبة المتعلقة بهذه المقابلة ستكون مجهولة المصدر مع عدم قدرة التعريف عن هوية المشارك. الملاحظات المتعلقة بالمقابلة لن تشمل معلوماتك الشخصية. المعلومات المجهولة المصدر سوف تعطى لأعضاء الفريق المشارك في البحث بالإضافة الى لجنة الماجستير. اما المعلومات المجهولة المصدر يمكن استعمالها في الاطروحة.

- ب. سلوب طلب المشاركة
- ت. سأجري مقابلات مع ما يقرب من ١٠ مشاركين سيتم الاتصال بهم من خلال كلمة شفوية. يقتصر هؤلاء الأفراد على الأكاديميين والكتاب والصحفيين الذين كتبوا بشكل مكثف عن الحرب.
- قبل كل مقابلة ، سيتم منح المشاركين وقتاً لقرأة وثيقة الموافقة المستنيرة (العربية أو الإنجليزية) المرفقة. لن يتم إجراء المقابلات إلا بعد إعطاء الموافقة (عبر التوقيع على وثيقة الموافقة المستنيرة) للمشارك. لن يتم تدوين الملاحظات على ردود المقابلة إلا إذا وافق المشارك على ذلك في وثيقة الموافقة المستنيرة ذاتها. سيتم السماح لمواضيع المقابلة ، وفقاً لوثيقة الموافقة المستنيرة ، بتخطي أي أسئلة لأي سبب أو إبطال موافقتها في أي وقت ولأي سبب. سيتم دعوة المشاركين من خلال دعوة عبر البريد الإلكتروني يتم إرسالها إلى عناوين البريد الإلكتروني المتاحة لهم بشكل عام

- ث.
- ج. السكان المستهدفون في الدراسة هم أي ناج أو مشارك أو فرد عاش في لبنان خلال الحرب الأهلية التي دارت رحاها بين عامي ١٩٧٥ و ١٩٩٠ وشهد تطوره. الانتماء الديني لن يكون شرطاً لإجراء مقابلات مع الأهلية. على العكس من ذلك ، سألتقي بأفراد من ثقافات مختلفة وخلفيات اجتماعية وديانات. علاوة على ذلك ، لن تنص مواد التوظيف أو التواصل في عملية التوظيف على أي انتماء طائفي كشرط للمشاركة. يجب أن يشمل ذلك مجموعة متنوعة من الفئات العمرية والخلفيات المهنية.

ح. المخاطر و الفوائد

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المشاركة في هذا البحث لا تضمن أي مخاطر جسدية او عاطفية اكثر من المخاطر العادية في الحياة اليومية. يحق لك الانسحاب من الموافقة او المشاركة في أي وقت و لأي سبب. قرار الانسحاب لن يؤدي الي أي عقوبة او عدم تحقيق الضمانات من الجامعة الامريكية في بيروت.

لن تحقق أي منافع شخصية من المشاركة في البحث. المشاركة يمكن ان تساهم في علم الطائفية في لبنان و علاقتها مع جيوسياسية الشرق الاوسط.

خ. السرية

لأجل الحفاظ على سرية هويتك إن معلوماتك الشخصية لن تكون مرفقة مع الملاحظات المتعلقة بالمقابلة و من اجل الحفاظ على الخصوصية إن جميع المعلومات المستنتجة و المحللة و المنشورة ستكون مجهولة المصدر. سنحذف كل معلوماتك للاتصال بعد انتهاء المقابلة. سيتم نشر البيانات بشكل إجمالي دون الإشارة إلى أسماء المشاركين أو وظائفهم أو أي معلومات قد تحدد هويتهم. سيتم نشر البيانات بشكل إجمالي دون الإشارة إلى أسماء المشاركين أو وظائفهم أو أي معلومات قد تحدد هويتهم الامتناع عن ذكر أي معلومات حساسة أو أي معلومات قد تحدد حوادث أو أفراد معينين

سيتم تخزين نسخ ورقية من البيانات التي تم جمعها تحت القفل والمفتاح في مكتب الباحث الرئيسي ، وسوف تكون متاحة فقط لفريق البحث

لن يتم توفير أي مصاريف نقل للمشاركين الذين يظهرون حتى مقابلتهم في الجامعة الأمريكية في بيروت

د. للاتصال

يمكنك طرح أي سؤال عند الحاجة. للاتصال لمزيد من الاستفسار يرجى الاتصال بفرح أبو حرب رقم الهاتف: 71/582173 او عنوان البريد الإلكتروني: faa56@mail.aub.edu في حال يوجد لديك أسئلة عن حقوقك كمشارك في هذا البحث تستطيع ان تتصل بالعنوان التالي في الجامعة الامريكية:

Human Research Protection Program Institutional Review Board
American University of Beirut
P.O. Box 11-0236 / Human Research Protection Program
Riad El-Solh / Beirut 1107 2020
Lebanon
Phone: +961-1-340460 / 5454 or 5455
Email: irb@aub.edu.lb

ذ. حقوق موضوع البحث

مشاركتك هي عبارة عن تطوع و رفضك المشاركة لن يؤدي الى أي عقوبة. لديك حق انهاء المشاركة في أي وقت دون التعرض للعقوبة. لديك حق عدم الإجابة عن أي سؤال إن شئت و يمكنك الحصول عن نسخة من هذه الوثيقة عند الحاجة.

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ر. تدوين الملاحظات

نود ان ندون ملاحظات من هذه المقابلة لتسهيل إمكانية الرجوع الى المعلومات الممنوحة لنا. الملاحظات المتعلقة بالمقابلة لن تشمل معلوماتك الشخصية. سيتم حفظ الملاحظات في درج مقفل. ستتم مشاركة الملاحظات مع الحفاظ على السرية التامة لهوية المشارك. عدم موافقتك على تدوين الملاحظات لا يلغي مشاركتك في المقابلة.

ز. تخزين الملاحظات

سوف يتم تخزين الملاحظات المتعلقة بالمقابلة في درج مقفل في بيت الباحث ماثيو كرونين مع الامتناع عن نسخها بشكل الكتروني وعلى ان لن يتم حفظ اي معلومات أخرى غير التي تم منحها من المشارك وهي مجهولة المصدر. لا يحق لغير أعضاء لجنة الماجستير بطلب الاطلاع على هذه المعلومات. بعد استخراج المعلومات الأساسية من الملاحظات وتجميعها في الاطروحة سيتم حذف الملاحظات.

هل لديك أي أسئلة عن المعلومات اعلاه؟

هل توافق بملء بارادتك بان تشارك في هذا البحث؟

هل توافق بملء بارادتك بتدوين الملاحظات لجواباتك في المقابلة؟

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التوقيع على هذه الوثيقة يؤكد إنك قرأت معلومات البحث و الاجراءات المتعلقة به و الموافقة على المشاركة بعماد الاجراءات التالية:

التاريخ: _____

الموافقة على المشاركة: _____

الموافقة على تدوين الملاحظات: _____

الموافقة على استعمال الملاحظات من المقابلة في مشروعى الماجستير: _____

توقيع الباحث: _____

التاريخ: _____

اسم الباحث: _____

التوقع: _____

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Student Investigator: Farah Abou Harb

Political Studies & Public Administration Department

The American University of Beirut

Consent Document

We are asking you to participate in a research study. Please read the information below and feel free to ask any questions that you may have.

A. Project Description

1. In this study, you will be asked to participate in an interview about your opinions on the causes of the Lebanese civil war of 1975, and the effect of the regional imbalances on igniting the war.
2. The estimated time to complete this interview is approximately 30 minutes.
3. The research is being conducted to fulfill the requirements of my MA degree. The study will be held within AUB's Jafet Memorial Library.
4. Interview responses will be anonymized such that no personal identifiers will be attached to the interview data. All of your personal & contact information will be destroyed upon completion of the interview. Any personal identification information that is given incidentally in interview responses will not be included in interview notes. Anonymized interview data may be shared between members of the research team, my MA thesis committee, or included in the thesis text.

B. Participant recruitment

I will be interviewing approximately 10 participants who will be contacted through word of mouth. These individuals are restricted to academicians, writers and journalists who have extensively written about the war.

Before each interview, participants will be given time to read the attached (Arabic or English) informed consent document. Interviews will only proceed once assent (via signature on the informed consent document) of the participant is given. Notes on interview responses will only be taken if the participant approves to such on the same informed consent document. Interview subjects, according to the informed consent document, will be allowed to skip any questions for any reason or revoke their

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consent at any time and for any reason. Participants will be invited through an email invitation to their publically available email addresses.

The study's target population is any survivor, participant or individual who lived in Lebanon during the 1975-1990 civil war and witnessed its evolvment. Religious affiliation will not be a condition for eligibility to be interviewed. On the contrary, I will be meeting with individuals from different cultures, social background and religions. Furthermore, no recruitment material or communication in the recruitment process will stipulate any sectarian affiliation as a condition for participation. This should include a variety of age ranges and occupational backgrounds.

C. Risks and Benefits

Your participation in this study does not involve any physical risk or emotional risk to you beyond the risks of daily life. You have the right to withdraw your consent or discontinue participation at any time for any reason. Your decision to withdraw will not involve any penalty or loss of benefits to which you may be entitled at The American University of Beirut.

There are no particular benefits to you personally from participating in the research study. Your participation may help us to better understand how sectarian in Lebanon relates to regional geopolitics.

D. Confidentiality

Your name or other identifiers will not be attached to your answers in the interview notes so that your confidentiality can be maintained. Your privacy will be ensured in that all data resulting from this study will be analyzed, written, and published in anonymity. Research team members will not maintain any of your contact information after the completion of the interview.

Refrain from stating any sensitive information or any information that may identify specific incidents/individuals.

Confirm that data will be published in aggregate with no reference to participants' names or job positions or any information that may identify their identity

Hard copies of the collected data will be stored under lock and key in the PI's office and will only be accessible to the research team

Refusal or withdrawal from the study will involve no loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled nor will it affect your relationship with AUB.

No transportation expenses will be provided for participants showing up for their interviews at AUB.

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E. Contact Information

1. If you have questions, you are free to ask them now. If you have questions later, you may contact me, Farah Abou Harb – Telephone: 71/582 173 or Email: faa56@mail.aub.edu.

2. If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this research, you can contact the following office at AUB:

Human Research Protection Program Institutional Review Board
American University of Beirut

P.O. Box 11-0236 / Human Research Protection Program

Riad El-Solh / Beirut 1107 2020

Lebanon

Phone: +961-1-340460 / 5454 or 5455

Email: irb@aub.edu.lb

F. Subjects' rights

Your participation is voluntary and refusal to participate does not involve any penalty. You may discontinue participation at any time without penalty. You may skip answering any question during the interview just by saying "skip." A copy of this consent document is available to you for your records if you so choose.

G. Permission to Take Notes the Interview:

We would like take notes on the interview to facilitate easy reference to the answers you provide. I will keep these notes in a locked file drawer. Only note excerpts (anonymized and free of any identifiers) or aggregate data will be shared. You may still participate in the interview if you do not want notes to be taken.

H. Data storage:

The interview notes will be kept under lock in the home of the student researcher, Farah Abou Harb. No other data will be collected beyond these notes. The physical notes will not be digitized. Only members of the Master's committee can request access to these notes as needed. After anonymized excerpts and aggregated data are incorporated into the final thesis text, interview notes will be destroyed. Data will be published in aggregate with no reference to the participants' name or job positions or any information that may identify their identity

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Do you have any questions about the above information?

Do you voluntarily consent to take part in this study?

Before we begin the interview, do you also voluntarily consent to notes being taken on your interview responses?

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Signing below affirms that you have read the above description of this study and procedures, and agree to participate according to the above procedures and principles:

Participant consent signatures:

Date: _____

Consent to participate: _____

Consent to taking notes: _____

Consent to use of interview notes (without identifiers) in MA Thesis work:

Researcher signature:

Date: _____

Researcher name: _____

Signature: _____

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AUB Social & Behavioral Sciences INVITATION SCRIPT

Invitation to Participate in a Research Study

This notice is for an AUB-IRB Approved Research Study

for Dr. Ohannes Geukjian at AUB

and AUB master's student, Farah Abou Harb

AUB, PSPA Department

It is not an Official Message from AUB

I am inviting you to participate in a research study titled "Examining Internal and External causes of the Lebanese Civil War: 1975-1990".

You will be asked to participate in an interview to give your opinion about the major causes that led to the civil war. These include but are not limited to external intervention, the instability of the region surrounding Lebanon and to the weakness of the state.

You are invited because we are targeting academicians, journalists and writers who have written or taught the periods surrounding the Lebanese civil war. You are eligible for this study if you are either an academician, a journalist or a writer who have produced wither written or oral work on the Lebanese civil war.

The estimated time to complete the interview is 30 minutes.

Interviews will be conducted face to face in AUB's Jafet Memorial Library

Please read the consent form and consider whether you want to be involved in the study.

If you have any questions about this research study, you may contact the investigator/research team: Ohannes Geukjian at og01@aub.edu.lb or Farah Abou Harb, 71-582173 or at faa56@mail.aub.edu.

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الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت
العلوم الاجتماعية والسلوكية
برنامج الدعوة

هذا الإشعار مخصص لدراسة بحثية معتمدة من AUB-IRB

للدكتور او هانس جيوكجيان في الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت
وفرّح أبو حرب ، طالب ماجستير في الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت
قسم الدراسات السياسية والإدارة العامة
* ليست رسالة رسمية من الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت *

أدعوكم للمشاركة في دراسة بحثية بعنوان "دراسة الأسباب الداخلية والخارجية للحرب الأهلية اللبنانية: 1975-1990".

سيطلب منك المشاركة في مقابلة لإعطاء رأيك حول الأسباب الرئيسية التي أدت إلى الحرب الأهلية. ويشمل ذلك على سبيل المثال لا الحصر التدخل الخارجي وعدم استقرار المنطقة المحيطة بلبنان وضعف الدولة.

أنت مدعو لأننا نستهدف الأكاديميين والصحفيين والكتاب الذين كتبوا أو علموا الفترات المحيطة بالحرب الأهلية اللبنانية. أنت مؤهل لهذه الدراسة إذا كنت أكاديميًا أو صحفيًا أو كاتبًا أنتج أعمالًا مكتوبة أو شفوية حول الحرب الأهلية اللبنانية.

الوقت المقدر لاستكمال المقابلة هو 30 دقيقة.

سيتم إجراء المقابلات وجهاً لوجه في مكتبة جافيت التذكارية في الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت.

يرجى قراءة نموذج الموافقة والنظر فيما إذا كنت ترغب في المشاركة في الدراسة.

إذا كانت لديك أي أسئلة حول هذه الدراسة البحثية ، فيمكنك الاتصال بفريق البحث / الباحث: Ohannes Geukjian
71-582173 أو فرّح أبو حرب (og01@aub.edu.lb) ،faa56@mail.aub.edu

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