

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

THE GREY AREA BETWEEN SUPPORTING SOCIAL CHANGE
AND MOBILIZING: AN APPLICATION OF THE THEORY OF
PLANNED BEHAVIOR TO COLLECTIVE ACTION IN
LEBANON

by

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
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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

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The question of what makes individuals mobilize to achieve social change has long been a subject of interest in the social sciences. While a considerable body of literature is dedicated to exploring the stages of social change, this research aims to bring attention to a commonly neglected stage of collective action: the translation of collective action intentions to active participation.

This thesis builds on mounting evidence suggesting that addressing the gap between intentions and behavior is integral to achieving a comprehensive conceptualization of collective action. The purpose of this research is to help infuse the gap between intentions and behavior in the collective action literature through considering an integrative paradigm that consolidates two traditions in social psychology: The Social Identity of Model of Collective Action (SIMCA) and the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB).

This research was also conducted against the backdrop of the Lebanese “October 17” uprising which primarily aimed to further our understanding of the underlying processes through which previous collective action and structural variables affect future collective action behavior. The current study was administered to a sample of 273 university students in Beirut and investigated their participation in a fictitious student-led movement against the distribution of financial aid according to a sectarian quota at the American University of Beirut.

Our results showed that the integrative model merging SIMCA and TPB accounted for 62% of the variance in collective action intentions and 35% of the variance in collective action behavior. Additionally, previous collective action participation in the October 17 uprising appeared to be the only variable, aside from collective action intentions, that significantly predicted collective action behavior. Finally, our mediation analysis showed that intentions significantly mediated the effect of efficacy and subjective norms on collective action behavior. Generally, we believe our findings further problematize the convergence of collective action intentions with active collective action behavior in the discipline.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

October 17th, 2019 marked the eruption of a monumental popular uprising in Lebanon. The gravity of the synchronous nation-wide protests can primarily be captured through observing the decades of intermittent collective action abeyance that preceded it. Such revolutionary moments that denote a surge of collective action instigate interest in the underlying antecedents to collective action behavior. Specifically, incidents of political (in)action draw attention to prominent gaps in the collective action literature, particularly pertaining to our understanding of individuals' progression towards collective action behavior. As such, instances of collective action interrupting an apparent *dormancy* prompt the following self-evident question: along with structural motivations for collective action participation, what are the social psychological predictors that interfere in the process of actively engaging in collective action behavior? More precisely, what are the variables that systematically influence individuals' active implementation of their collective action intentions?

After a fifteen-year civil war (1975-1990), the need to reform the Lebanese system prompted the establishment of a *provisional* power-sharing model. Dictated by the Taif Accord, the proposed political system entailed reforms that institutionally organized the division of power among religious sects, which primarily involved allocating sectarian quotas to political seats (Bahlawan, 2014). Through the application of a formula that equally distributed power between Muslims and Christians (Makdisi & El-Khalil, 2013),

the confessional ruling system was championed by politico-sectarian leaders as the safeguard of national “mutual coexistence” (Salloukh, 2006).

While this confessional system was originally framed as a short-term solution that the government would gradually abolish (Melhem, 1996), it still dictates state affairs today- thirty years after the end of the civil war. This political model (re)produced a Lebanese state characterized by a failing economy, clientelist networks, political deadlock and an overarching dysfunctional system referred to in the press as “a caricature of poor governance” (Fakih, Makdissi, Marrouch, Tabri & Yazbeck, 2020, p.1).

Prior to October 17, 2019, social movements opposing the governing political coalitions (known as March 8 and March 14 coalitions) remained disproportionately scarce in the Lebanese political scene. This disproportionality becomes especially tangible when juxtaposed against data collected from public opinion polls in the years before 2019. This data clearly reflected public discontent and indicated that the majority of the Lebanese community reported 1) a lack of trust in governmental institutions and political/religious leaders as well as 2) believing that religion is a private matter that should be separated from sociopolitical life (Ceyhun, 2017).

While this period of inaction was interrupted by occasional bursts of collective action- particularly in 2011 and 2015 (Geha, 2019), collective action remained infrequent relative to the high levels of discontent reported by the public (Fakih et al., 2020). This recurrent discrepancy underscores the importance of further investigating the factors that regulate the individuals’ transition from negatively perceiving the status quo to actively participating in collective actions that challenge it.

Wright, Taylor and Fathali (1990) defined collective action as “any time [a group member] is acting as a representative of the group and where the action is directed at improving the condition of the entire group” (p. 995). Although social scientists have greatly contributed to our understanding of collective action motivation (Tarrow, 1998), they have provided insufficient attention to the gap between being motivated to participate in social change movements and active participation (Klandermans, 2004).

Klandermans and Oegema (1987) proposed that participation in social movements involved four steps through which an individual (1) develops sympathy for a particular cause, (2) is targeted by a movement to mobilize, (3) becomes motivated to participate in the movement and (4) finally actively participates in action. While group members commonly perceive injustices, individuals rarely engage in actions that challenge the status quo despite the endurance of their grievances (Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer & Leach, 2004). Although collective action movements aim to mobilize supporters, we know little about the complexities of the transition between stages three and four (Klandermans, 2004). It is through targeting this grey area that we can understand the underlying mechanism through which sympathizers of a certain cause transform to active participants in social change (Oegema & Klandermans, 1994).

In effect, collective action *tendencies* are used as a proxy for collective action *behaviors* in the literature. It follows that the social psychological literature of collective action is heavily lacking in understanding the process of transforming passive supporters to active mobilizers. Unfortunately, the recurrent failure of collective action intentions to translate to behavior is a commonly overlooked factor in such studies.

While research has shown that intentions are adequate predictors of behavior (Webb & Sheeran, 2006), deriving conclusions about collective action participation based on self-reported intentions is unsound on theoretical and empirical grounds. Such generalizations are especially problematic when coupled with neglecting the particularities of the pathway from intentions to behavior. Through focusing on tendencies as a proxy for collective action *behavior*, the study of collective action in social psychology is predominately exploring mobilization potential (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987) rather than actual mobilization.

To address the gap between reported intentions and behavior in collective action, we borrow from the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) (Ajzen, 1985; Ajzen, 1991) in exploring the centrality of attitudes, social norms, and perceived behavioral control in predicting collective action intentions and subsequent behavioral participation. Thus, this research aims integrate two traditions in social psychology- i.e. TPB and the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA) (van Zomeren et al., 2008)- to help infuse the gap between intentions and behavior in the collective action literature. Additionally, we conducted this research in the wake of the Lebanese uprising and we were particularly interested in investigating the underlying processes through which previous collective action and structural variables affect future collective action behavior.

This thesis will first provide an overview of the literature on collective action while highlighting the generally unaddressed discrepancy between collective action intentions and behavior. Furthermore, we will present two social psychological models, SIMCA and TPB, to argue that the literature on TPB offers insights to behavior that can inform our

understanding of collective action behavior. Finally, we will expand on the case of collective action in Lebanon through reporting data collected from a student sample in Beirut, two months after the eruption of the October uprising.

CHAPTER II

THE INTENTION-BEHAVIOR DISRECEPNCY IN COLLECTIVE ACTION

A. Models of Collective Action

The collective action literature in social psychology includes multiple models that delineate pathways to collective action. Klandermans (1984) proposed three motives to collective action: the collective motive (pertaining to the individual's assessment of a collective goal and the expectation that this goal will be realized), the normative motive (pertaining to the individual's perceptions of his/her significant others' evaluation of the collective action) and the reward motive (which captures the costs and benefits of participating in collective action for the individual).

Sturmer and Simon (2004) proposed the dual-pathway model of collective action which encapsulates the cost-benefit pathways mentioned by Klandermans (1984) in addition to a pathway determined by social identification. In this paradigm, Sturmer and Simon (2004) distinguish between a cost-benefit pathway which represents the individual's assessment of extrinsic rewards and a social identity pathway which represents the "group members' inner obligation to act upon internalized norms and goals of the movement" (Bamber, Rees and Seebauer, 2015, p. 157).


B. The Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA)

Van Zomeren et al. (2008) conducted an influential meta-analysis of over 180 studies investigating the predictors of collective action and proposed a Social Identity Model of Collective Action (see *figure 1*). The proposed model included three antecedents to collective action: perceived injustice, social identity, and efficacy. Overall, SIMCA captures the motivations underlying collective action that have been explored in the field over the past decades (Thomas, Zubielevitch, & Sibley, 2020). SIMCA has been tested across different contexts and countries, including South Africa (Cakal, Hewstone, Schwär, & Heath, 2011), Australia (Thomas, Mavor, McGarty, 2012), New Zealand (Thomas et al., 2020), Japan and the Philippines (Ochoa, Manalastas, Deguchi, & Louis, 2019), Turkey (Odağ, Uluğ, & Solak, 2016), and Lebanon (Tabri & Conway, 2011; Adra, Harb, Li & Baumert, 2019).

The role of social identity in the model builds on the Tajfel and Turner's Social Identity Theory (1979) which posits that disadvantaged group members are more likely to identify strongly with their group and ultimately engage in collective action if they perceive hierarchy to be illegitimate and unstable. SIMCA suggests that identity has, both, a direct and an indirect influence on collective action tendencies through promoting feelings of efficacy and perceived injustice. Perceived injustice refers to the subjective perceptions of unfair treatment or outcomes, while perceived efficacy refers to the expectancy that the action will result in desired outcomes (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Additionally, Van Zomeren et al. (2008) proposed that perceived group efficacy is a direct predictor of participation in collective action. In a more recent article, Van Zomeren, Saguy &

Schellhaas (2013) added participative efficacy beliefs to the model suggesting that perceptions that one's personal contribution could influence the outcome would affect their decision to participate in an action. Participative efficacy bridges the constructs of collective efficacy and individual efficacy and has shown statistical significance when added to the model (van Zomeren et al., 2013).

Figure 1 The Social Identity Model of Collective Action



Furthermore, traditional accounts of collective action overlooked the role of emotion in motivating collective action due to its “*transient and irrational nature*” and attributed decisions to engage in collective action to cost-benefit analyses (e.g. Olson, 1968). However, recent research suggests a complementary, rather than competing, relationship between cost-benefit calculations and emotions (Van Zomeren & Spears, 2009). Importantly, the dual pathway model (Van Zomeren et al., 2004) proposes a problem-focused approach to collective action centered around perceived efficacy and an emotion-focused approach centered around group-based anger which is triggered by perceptions of injustice. This account of collective action regards group members as

“passionate economists” (Zomeran, Leach & Spears, 2012) who base their decisions to participate in collective action on: 1) perceptions of efficacy and evaluation of instrumental resources and 2) identity, perceived injustice, and group-based emotions (anger).

C. Intention-Behavior Discrepancy

Traditional models of collective action were criticized for their emphasis on feelings, attitudes, and intentions instead of focusing on actual behavior (Wright, Taylor & Fathali, 1990). More specifically, Rees (2015) argued that efforts to distinguish between intentions and behaviors as two distinct forms of reactions are fundamental to achieving a thorough understanding of collective action behavior.

In a meta-analysis relying on correlation studies (N= 422), Sheeran (2002) revealed a large effect of intentions on behavior (effect size (d) = 1.47). However, in an effort to investigate the causal link between intentions and behavior, Webb and Sheeran (2006) conducted a meta-analysis of 47 experimental studies manipulating intentions which assessed the causal effect of the change in intervention on the behavioral outcome. This review showed that while intentions do predict behavioral outcomes, this association is not stable: medium to large intentional change (d= 0.66) translated into a small to medium behavioral change (d= 0.36). Importantly, the size of this effect was considerably smaller than previous meta-analyses that assessed correlational data (e.g. Sheeran, 2002).

Additionally, Perceived Behavioral Control (PBC) significantly influenced the pathway from intentions to behavior. Ajzen (1991) defined PBC as “perceived ease or

difficulty of performing the behavior [which reflects] past experience as well as anticipated impediments and obstacles” (p.188). In addition to PBC, methodological factors (e.g. time and type of behavioral measure) moderated the relationship between intentions and behavior. Therefore, Web and Sheeran’s (2006) findings suggest that the predictive power of intentions is often dependent on conceptual (e.g. PBC) and methodological moderators (e.g. time).

In his critique of using antecedents of behavior as substitutes to actual behavior, Brown (2012) argued that the behavioral implementation of intentions is primarily influenced by situational factors and is not simply a derivative of attitudes or intentions. Importantly, Brown specified internal negotiations that individuals frequently engage in when their (in)action is inconsistent with their attitudes and intentions. Such justification strategies are context-specific and include a range of techniques, such as overstating logistical restrictions or downplaying the expected effect of one’s behavioral choice. Furthermore, Arbuthnott (2011) highlighted that intentions, particularly in self-report data, is likely to be skewed to reflect social norms rather than portraying *genuine* intentionality to perform an action.

Some researchers have acknowledged the intention-behavior gap and attempted to address the discrepancy by measuring actual behavior instead of behavioral intentions (e.g. Bashir, Wilson, Lockwood, Chasteen, & Alisat, 2014). However, such studies did not sufficiently explore the pathway leading from intention to behavior. Investigating the complexities of this pathway, however, is fundamental for our conceptualization of the behavioral implementation of intentions. In line with Klandermaans and Oegema’s (1987)

stages of collective action participation, Howell (2014) contended that behavioral change is a process and not an event. Thus, while measuring collective action behavior rather than behavioral intentions yields more reliable data, it is important for research to capture behavior as the outcome of an evolving modality rather than a stagnant snapshot. Case in point, research from different disciplines presents data that inform processes of behavioral change, where variables such as knowledge, attitudes, context, and demographics appeared to influence the behavioral implementation of intentions (Ernst, Blood, & Beery, 2017).

CHAPTER III

THE THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOR


A. Overview of TPB

Proposed by Ajzen (1985; 1991), the Theory of Planned Behavioral (TPB) is a social psychological theoretical model (see *figure 2*) that aims to identify the factors needed to execute an intended behavior (Van Hooft, Born, Taris, & van der Flier, 2006). TPB has been applied to multiple fields within psychology, including health psychology (Godin & Kok, 1996), prosocial behavior (Brayley et al., 2015), and organizational behavioral psychology (Kautonen, van Gelderen & Fink, 2015). Ajzen (1991) identified three predictors of intentions: 1) attitudes- “favorable or unfavorable evaluation or appraisal of the behavior in question,”- 2) subjective norms-“perceived social pressure to perform or not to perform the behavior”- and 3) PBC- “perceived ease or difficulty of performing the behavior [which reflects] past experience as well as anticipated impediments and obstacles” (p.188). Holding positive evaluations towards a given behavior, along with normative societal support for implementing the behavior, and perceiving that the behavior can be easily executed all contribute to increasing the intentions to implement the behavior (Fielding, McDonald, & Louis, 2008). Collectively, these three factors consistently explain 40-49% of the variance in intentions (McEachan, Conner, Taylor, & Lawton, 2011) which consequently influences behavior (Ajzen and Sheikh, 2013). Meta-analyses applying TPB to various behaviors reported that intentions accounted for a range between 23.9% (McEachan et al., 2011) and 28% (Sheeran, 2002) of the variance explained in behaviors.

Contrary to other constructs in the model, as shown in figure 2, perceived behavioral control also has a direct effect on behavior in addition to the effect that is mediated through intentions (Madden, Ellen, & Ajzen, 1992).

Importantly, in situations that require high levels of control to perform the behavior, PBC is also likely to moderate the link between intentions and behavior. According to Webb and Sheeran's (2006) meta-analysis, PBC appeared to moderate the relation between intention and behavior, whereby intentions predicted behavior only when the individual possessed control over implementing that behavior. The extent to which perceived behavioral control powerfully contributes to the model depends on the individual's level of control over performing the behavior: in contexts where there is a higher level of control, the effect of perceived behavioral control is fully mediated by intentions; however, as the level of control over behavior decreases, perceived behavioral control is expected to have a direct effect on behavior in addition to the effect mediated through intentions (Kautonen et al., 2015).

Figure 2 The Theory of Planned Behavior



B. An Extension of the Theory of Planned Behavior

It is commonly reported in the TPB literature that the subjective norms factor is the weakest predictive antecedent of intentions in TPB, suggesting that most of the variation in intentions could be explained through perceived behavioral control and attitudes (Godin & Kok, 1996; Terry & Hogg, 1996). In fact, Ajzen (1991) stated that the majority of studies testing TPB (to date) did not find a significant link between subjective norms and intentions. Furthermore, in a review of 58 studies applying TPB to different health behaviors, Godin and Kok (1996) reported that subjective norms are consistently less likely to achieve significance than the other variables in the model. Additionally, social identity theorists had criticized TPB for inadequately capturing the role of social influence on behavioral intentions, particularly through neglecting processes “whereby people bring their behavior into line with the behavioral expectations of others to the extent that these

specific others are valued and important” (Terry & Hogg, 1996, p.779). Terry & Hogg (1996) reported that norms only showed a significant effect on intentions for individuals who had a high level of identification with the reference group.

1. Social Identity

Following conceptual and empirical criticisms of the subjective norm construct, Terry & Hogg (1996) suggested the reconceptualization of the subjective norms variable in TPB. When an individual’s social identity is integral to their self-conceptualization, the norms of the given group are likely to guide behavior (Fielding et al., 2008). The motivation to attenuate differences between the individual and other in-group members amplifies the need to comply with the behavior and in-group expectations. Hence, group norms will significantly affect intentions only for individuals who identify highly with the reference group (Kelly & Kelly, 1992). Applications of social identity to TPB (Terry and Hogg, 1996; Terry, Hogg and White, 1999; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995) revealed that PBC and attitudes (personal factors) had a stronger effect on intentions when participants had low levels of identification with the group. Thus, this suggests that in addition to being a predictor of collective action, social identity also moderates the relationship between TPB predictors and behavioral intentions.


2. Self-Identity

Self-identity is defined as “salient and enduring aspects of one’s self-perception [...] that guide identity-relevant behaviors (e.g., I think of myself as a ‘green consumer’)” (Rise, Sheeran & Hukkelberg, 2010, p. 1087). Fielding et al (2008) reported that in addition to the

role of social identity in environmental activism, self-identifying as an “environment activist” significantly increased the likelihood of participating in environmental collective action. The authors explained this relationship through the need to reaffirm self-identities (i.e. identifying as an activist) by engaging in role-appropriate behavior (environmental activism), for not behaving consistently with one’s role would result in a state of internal tension (Fielding et al., 2008). Rise et al. (2010) conducted a meta-analysis of 33 studies investigating the role of self-identity in the TPB which showed that self-identity had a medium effect on shaping intentions, and that intentions fully mediated the relationship between self-identity and behavior.

While both group and self-identity are categorized under social identity, they involve independent pathways in predicting behavioral intentions (Rise et al., 2010). For example, when one considers being an activist as a self-identity, meanings, expectations, and activities related to fulfilling the role of “an activist” are made salient, triggering the motivation to engage in behaviors consistent with this role. However, identifying with a group of activists implies acting “on behalf of” the group; hence, implementing a behavior would stem from motivations to act consistently with in-group members. In addition, self-identity is likely to only predict intentions when the individual does not highly identify with the group (Terry et al., 1999). Therefore, both pathways of motivation should be explored when investigating the role of identity in shaping intentions and behavior. More particularly, this suggests that self-identity, along with social identity, should be examined as additional predictors of intentions, while social identity should also be considered as a possible moderator of the relationship between TPB predictors and intentions (*figure 3*).

Figure 3 A Revised Theory of Planned Behavior Model



C. Role of Past Behavior

In a review of the literature on TPB, Ajzen (2011) discussed the role of past behavior in predicting future behavior. This review cites multiple empirical studies that consistently showed a significant effect of previous behavior on future behavior (e.g. Conner & Armitage, 1998; Ouellette & Wood, 1998). Generally, the review finds that the addition of previous behavior to the TPB model significantly increased the explained variance in behavior.

In a study examining the influence of past behavior on future behavior, Bamberg, Ajzen and Schmidt (2003) concluded that past behavior only significantly predicts future behavior when conditions remain the same. To elaborate, Bamberg measured participants' intentions and past behavior prior and post introducing an

intervention that encourages using public transportation. While intentions showed to be a significant predictor of future behavior, both before and after the intervention, past behavior only appeared to be significant before the intervention as it lost its significance in the post condition. Such findings suggest that past behavior is a particularly robust predictor of future behavior as long as the conditions surrounding the behavior remain relatively stable.

CHAPTER IV

INTEGRATING TPB AND COLLECTIVE ACTION

A. Applications of TPB in the Collective Action Literature

Kelly and Breinlinger (1995) suggest that attitudes and subjective norms in TPB are evaluations of the expected (cost-benefit) value of a behavioral outcome where attitudes are assessments of “expectation[s] that group participation would be associated with this outcome” and “the value attached to that outcome.” Similarly, subjective norms encompass the “expected reactions of, first, friends and, second, family to participation [in addition to] the values attached to those reactions” (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995, p. 1435). Individual decisions to participate in collective action is highly dependent on a cost-benefit evaluation of the possible results of the behavior (Olson, 1965), yet SIMCA researchers overlook such attitudinal, normative and behavioral facts and fail to account for them as integral elements for participating in collective action (Bamberg, Rees & Seebauer, 2015).

TPB has been applied in a number of empirical studies exploring collective action behaviors, including feminist activism (Kelly and Bellinger, 1995), environmental activism (Fielding et al., 2008) and unionism (Fiorito, Padavic & Russell, 2018). For example, Kelly and Bellinger (1995) tested TPB constructs in predicting collective action intentions and behaviors as well as exploring the effect of adding a measure of social identification to the TPB model. The study adopted a longitudinal research design where questionnaires measuring TPB constructs and intentions to participate in collective action were

administered to 387 women in Britain who differed in their involvement with feminist movements (34% not at all involved, 33% moderately involved, and 33% highly active) based on hours spent in group-related activities per week (e.g. attending meeting/conferences on women-related issues, contributing to feminist campaigns, attending protests rallying for women's rights, or advocating for a specific feminist issue). Participants were approached a year later and asked about their active involvement in these activities. Results were consistent with TPB hypotheses where each of the TPB motivational antecedents significantly influenced intention; particularly, attitudes had the largest effect on shaping behavioral intentions. Additionally, while participation behaviors were consistently less than reported intentions, there was still a strong association with 54% of the variance in behavior predicted by intentions. The addition of a social identity measure significantly influenced the effect of attitudes and subjective norms on intentions: weak identification was coupled with a stronger effect of attitudes in predicting intentions and a non-significant effect of subjective norms on intentions, whereas a strong identification increased the effect of norms on intentions.

Similarly, Fielding et al. (2008) applied a TPB framework to explore the motivational antecedents to participating in environmental activism. Questionnaires measuring TPB constructs, self-identification as an environmental activist, and intentions to participate in environmental activism were administered to two groups of students: individuals not affiliated with environmental groups (n=96) and others who were members of such groups (n=71). Results supported the predictive power of the revised model of TPB, where the model explained 81% of the variance in activist intentions. Importantly, measures of both

social (“involvement in environmental groups”) and self-identity (describing oneself as “an environmental activist”) significantly predicted intentions.

Bamberg et al. (2015) also investigates the role of TPB constructs in shaping environmental collective action intentions and behaviors. The paper tested the applicability of constructs from the collective action literature- including SIMCA (van Zomeren et al., 2008) and TPB- in predicting environmental activism. The authors conducted three studies on a student sample (N=652), a sample of participants of a local environmentalist movement (N=71), and visitors of a climate protection event (N=88). The constructs included: TPB predictors (collective action intentions, attitudes, subjective norms and PBC), negative emotions, social identity, collective and participative efficacy. All three TPB constructs significantly predicted participation intentions where they collectively explained 68% of the variance in intentions and intentions subsequently explained 47% of the variance in behavior (participation in meetings). In addition, PBC accounted for almost double the variance in intentions than participative efficacy whereas collective efficacy was shown to have an insignificant effect on intentions. Anger at a perceived injustice was also shown to be an insignificant predictor of collective action. The authors therefore recommended applying TPB frameworks in studying environmental collective action due to the high predictive power the model achieved in their research.

B. Integrative Framework: SIMCA AND TPB

Research on the influence of perceived behavioral control, subjective norms, and attitudes on intentions and behaviors reveal the predictive power of the TPB model. In fact, multiple studies (e.g. Kelly and Bellinger, 1995; Bamberg et al., 2015) suggest that the TPB model could bridge the gap between collective action tendencies and participation, which would grant a comprehensive conceptualization of collective action. Therefore, the TPB could be used as a foundation for an integrative theoretical framework that allows for a well-rounded exploration of collective action.

As such, we propose exploring a collective action framework which incorporates SIMCA and TPB (figure 4) in which:

- 1) Constructs from TPB (Self-identity, PBC, subjective norms and attitudes) and SIMCA (social identity, injustice, efficacy and anger) are considered predictors of collective action intentions.
- 2) Social identity moderates the effect of these predictors on intentions¹:
 - a. When social identification is high, the effect of efficacy, perceived injustice, anger and subjective norms on intentions increases.


¹ Social identity frequently appears in the collective action literature as a fundamental antecedent to collective action (e.g. Sturmer and Simon, 2004; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). In addition, social identity was integrated into the TPB literature as a moderator of the effect of collective action predictors. In our model, we originally aimed to test social identity as a moderator. However, given that our sample was substantially high on identity (80% of participants scored above the midpoint), we were unable to test the moderation. Instead, we tested the effect of social identity as an additional predictor of collective action.

b. When social identification is low, the effect of attitudes, self-identity and PBC on intentions increases.

3) Intentions mediate the effect of the predictors on behavior.

4) PBC, in addition to intentions, positively predicts collective action behavior.

Figure 4 The Proposed Integrative Collective Action Framework



CHAPTER V

THE CASE OF LEBANON

A. The Lebanese Confessional System

Bray-Collins (2013) define “confessionalism” (or what is commonly referred to as “sectarianism” in Lebanon) as “the practice of assigning political representation according to confessional identity” (p. 267). The Ta’ef Accord, which set the ground for reconciliation after the Lebanese civil war, dictates an equal balance of administrative and governmental power according to a sectarian quota between Muslims and Christians (5:5 ratio) (Makdisi & El-Khalil, 2013). Since official political representation is distributed according to sect, it is not possible for political participation to take place independently from sectarian identity, rendering the system exclusionary by design, especially for secular citizens or members of non-confessional parties (Bray-Collins, 2013).

The confessional system described in the Ta’ef Accord was framed as a transitional political model which should be gradually eliminated by the state. This system was not viewed as a viable long-term solution for conflict in Lebanon and was acknowledged by some Lebanese politicians to be an obstacle to the establishment of peaceful relations between sects (Melhem, 1996). While the proposition to distribute governmental and administrative power according to a sectarian quota was originally framed as a democratic guarantee for religious coexistence and a fair representation of the different sects, it is currently described as the main source of conflict cycles and political and institutional deadlock within public discourse (Bray-Collins, 2013).

In 2020, thirty years after the end of the civil war and despite the provisional structure of the Ta'ef Accord, the confessional system still regulates the affairs between Lebanese citizens and the state. These affairs include personal status laws where religious communities establish autonomous personal status courts, as per the Lebanese Constitution, which are not subject to international human rights conventions or the Lebanese state (Bray-Collins, 2013). In addition to the personal-status laws, the Lebanese government provides limited services to the general population, which deepens citizens' adherence to confessional political leaders to maintain access to social and economic services.

This set-up demonstrated an evident increase in socioeconomic disparities between classes in Lebanon: between 1974 and 1999, the lower classes have increased from 20 to 60 percent and the middle classes have decreased from 60 to 30 percent (Bray-Collins, 2013). Given that Lebanese citizens have become more dependent on their corresponding confessional leaders for the attainment of basic needs and privileges, the sectarian discourse has generally increased in postwar Lebanon (Hanf, 2003). More recently, the GDP index dramatically plummeted from 10.1% in 2009 to reach 0.2% in 2019, causing dire economic conditions that included unprecedented major currency devaluation, inflation, unemployment and shortages in goods and services (Youssef, 2020).

B. Collective Action against the Confessional System

Public opinion polls suggest that 58% of the Lebanese youth express negative appraisals toward the Lebanese confessional system and aspire to change this system

(Bray-Collins, 2014). More recently, the Lebanese youth has been actively participating in action to introduce change into the Lebanese system in the form of protest and voting behaviors. In the summer of 2015, Lebanese civil society organizations- primarily led by the “You Stink” movement- organized a series of demonstrations in central Beirut to protest against the Lebanese ruling class and call for the abolishment of the confessional system (Kraidy, 2016). While the primary trigger for the demonstrations was the emerging garbage crisis after the country’s main landfill was closed, the demonstrations soon developed to target the Lebanese ruling system.

As for voting behavior, in the 2016 municipal elections, civil society activists and academics founded “Beirut Madinati”, a campaign which was comprised of a coalition of candidates that challenged confessional group leaders in the country. This campaign nearly won against a list containing representatives of nearly all political parties from both March 8 and March 14 blocks. A similar coalition comprised of eleven civil society groups was established for the 2018 parliamentary elections to challenge the Lebanese traditional parties in 9 out 15 districts (Waterschoot, 2018).

In October 2019, and in the wake of the deteriorating economic conditions, thousands of protesters took to the streets to protest the rule of the confessional parties (Youssef, 2020). While the direct trigger for protests was the introduction of new taxes (including a 6\$ tax on internet calls), the uprising was regarded as a reaction to years of accumulating grievances characterized by corruption, pollution, deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, and declining government services (Kraidy, 2019).

Many factors distinguish the “October Uprising” from social movements and protests that preceded it. For one, previous movements were evidently centralized in certain areas, mostly in Beirut. However, within hours of the surge of protests in Beirut on the evening of October 17, protests simultaneously sparked around the entire country, followed by solidarity protests around the world organized by the Lebanese diaspora (Kraidy, 2019). Another characteristic that distinguished the October uprising from previous collective action events in Lebanon, was its bottom-up, leaderless composition (Kraidy, 2019). Echoing previous chants popular in the Arab Spring, protesters called for the toppling of the regime among other overarching demands. The leaderless nature of the uprising allowed for mass mobilizations concerned with socioeconomic grievances, with overt contempt towards the rule of politico-sectarian parties.

CHAPTER VI

CURRENT STUDY

This study involved investigating university students' participation in collective action against a fictitious policy on campus. Students at the American University of Beirut (AUB) were informed that the financial aid office at the university was considering a new policy that adopted a sectarian quota which dictated the distribution of aid to students based on a proportional sectarian formula. Participants were also introduced to a student group that was organizing on campus against the proposed policy. The student group aimed to pressure the administration to immediately annul the sectarian quota policy and replace it with a financial aid policy that distributed aid solely based on merit and need.

A. Aims and Hypotheses

The general aim of this study was to investigate an integrative paradigm of collective action, which focuses on identifying antecedents to collective action intentions and behavior (figure 4). More specifically, our research question addressed whether applying constructs from TPB would increase the predictability of collective action behavior among university students in Lebanon. Additionally, we were also interested in exploring the role of past collective action behavior on future collective action behavior.

To reiterate, this research aimed to investigate 1) the predictive role of TPB and SIMCA predictors on intentions, 2) while considering social identity as a moderator for the

relationship between predictors and intentions and 3) intentions as a mediator between predictors and collective action behavior as well as 4) PBC as an additional direct predictor of behavior (*see figure 4*).

Given that the collective action behavior measured in this study required relatively low levels of control, and in compliance with Webb and Sheeran's (2006) recommendation, we did not test PBC as a potential moderator of the effect of intentions on behavior. Instead, we only tested whether PBC predicts both, collective action intentions as well as collective action behavior.

CHAPTER VII

METHODOLOGY

A. Research Design

This study adopted a cross-sectional survey design. The variables that were measured included: self-identity, social identity, attitudes, subjective norms, injustice, participative efficacy, anger, perceived behavioral control, previous collective action participation, collective action intentions (mediator) and collective action behavior (dependent variable). Measures of collective action behavior consisted of signing a petition, signing up to attend a meeting with movement organizers, signing up to volunteer with the movement, assigning dates and times for participation in meetings/volunteering services, committing to distributing flyers, and pledging to participate in a strike (*see instruments section below for details*).

B. Pilot Study

A pilot study was administered to a sample of fifteen AUB students. The aim of the pilot study was threefold: 1) ensure that the items were easily understood by a student sample, 2) estimate the time it would take participants to complete the survey, and 3) assess the believability of the deception pertaining to both, the fictitious policy and the student group.

C. Population description

After obtaining approval from the Institutional Research Board, 273 participants were recruited for this study from the Psychology 101/201 research pool at the American University of Beirut. All participants were Lebanese and 23.8% percent of them held dual citizenships. The participant pool included students from different classes and majors enrolled in PSYC 101/201. AUB admits students from different socio-economic statuses (while it tends to have an overrepresentation of students from higher socioeconomic classes; see Moughalian, 2015), sects, and political backgrounds which ensured variability in the sample.

D. Procedure

Prior to the data collection stage, the researchers conducted a pilot study which sampled fifteen students from the American University of Beirut. The pilot study involved presenting the (fictitious) Financial Aid proposal to the participants as well as introducing them to the (fictitious) student group representatives who were organizing on campus to pressure the administration to annul the sect-based distribution of financial aid. After the presentation, participants were asked to fill the survey and were debriefed upon its completion. Following the pilot study, all participants reported that the deception was successful, with minor comments regarding the wording of questions. Finally, the time estimated to complete the survey was approximately 15 minutes.

In line with the recommended sample-size-to-parameters formula ($50 + 8m$) proposed by Tabachnik and Fidell (2013) to achieve adequate power, two-hundred and

seventy-three students were recruited. To recruit participants, the PSYC 201/101 research pool coordinator circulated a mass email (Appendix A) to students registered in PSYC 201/101 asking them to participate in a student evaluation of the financial aid office in AUB. Students were not told about the fictitious policy in the email to avoid the spread of false information which could potentially harm the reputation of the university. Students were informed that they would receive a bonus point on their final grade upon agreeing to participate in the study which would take approximately 30 minutes of their time. The research pool coordinator's email also communicated the eligibility criteria for the study, which included that participants had to be Lebanese and at least eighteen years old.

Given that the study involved deception, data collection took place in one session for two reasons: 1) to avoid cross-talk between participants which would put the success of the manipulation at risk and 2) to allow for the debriefing of participants directly after the data collection session to avoid the propagation of false information.

Data collection was conducted in a large auditorium on campus that fit three-hundred students. At the beginning of the study, the investigators asked participants to sit on separate chairs and not interact with each other. Following this, one of the Psychology 201 instructors told participants that a group of students mobilizing on campus reached out to the Psychology department for a chance to discuss a new policy with the students. The instructor reminded the students of the eligibility criteria for the study and asked students who were not Lebanese or under eighteen to leave the auditorium and reach out to their instructor to find out about how he/she can alternatively receive the extra credit. Additionally, the instructor told participants that taking pictures or recording videos was

not allowed until the end of the study and finally introduced the student group representatives. After this, the doors to the auditorium were closed and students were not allowed to enter or leave the room.

A group of confederates which included two men and one woman took the stage and introduced themselves as representatives of a student group that has recently formed called *Students Against Sect-Based Aid*. To minimize potential biases, all confederates were alumni who graduated from AUB three years before the date of the study disguised as current students. The confederates gave a five-minute PowerPoint presentation (*The script and PowerPoint presentation are attached in Appendices B and C, respectively*). First, the confederates stated that the student group formed as a response to a “problematic” policy put forth by the financial aid office at AUB. The confederates explained that the aim of this group was to organize against this policy and replace it with a more just one; however, before beginning their actions it was important for them to talk to students to get a sense of what they think about the policy in order to move forward with their actions accordingly. The confederates then thanked the psychology department for giving them the chance to talk to students about this new policy and why it was important to stand against it.

First, the confederates began by explaining the fictitious sect-based policy. The policy applied a proportional sectarian quota which divided financial aid according to a formula that resembled the sect-based division of parliamentary seats in Lebanon: Christians received 50% of the aid (Maronites (26%), Greek Orthodox (11%), Greek Catholic (6%), Armenian Orthodox (4%), Armenian Catholic (1%), and Protestants (1%))

and Muslims received 50% (Sunni (21%), Shia (21%), Druze (6%), Alawite (2%)) (Diss & Steffen, 2017).

Second, the confederates further explained why this policy violated the core principles of financial aid, as it prioritized sectarian belonging over need and merit in addition to discriminating against students based on their sect which violated the university's secular values. After this, the confederates stated their two main demands: 1) The immediate termination of sectarian quotas from AUB's financial aid policy and 2) Adopting a new financial aid policy where aid is distributed solely based on need and/or merit.

Third, the confederates invited participants to join their movement and included four actions that the participants can be involved in: signing the petition, joining meetings, spreading the word, and participating in a strike.

Finally, the confederates introduced the survey which participants could find under the Psychology 201/101 online learning platform (*Moodle*). The confederates explained that the survey aimed to capture what students thought about the proposed financial aid policy and the group *Students Against Sect-based Aid*, and whether participants were interested in joining the student group to achieve financial aid distribution solely based on need and merit.

After the presentation, participants were directed to fill the online questionnaire using their laptops, tablets, or phones- the online survey was designed to suitably adapt to any of these electronics. To guarantee the containment of the false information propagated

to participants, the co-investigator along with ten graduate students and research assistants were rotating to 1) ensure that participants were only using their electronic devices to complete the survey and 2) to limit communication between participants to prevent a correlation of errors.

First, participants were asked to fill an online consent form (Appendix D). Second, they were provided with a short text reminding them of the fictitious AUB financial aid policy and the fictitious student group calling for the reform of the sectarian quota policy (Appendix E). Third, participants were instructed to answer the provided survey (Appendix F) measuring predictors of collective action (TPB and SIMCA constructs), collective action intentions and collective action behavior. Upon completing the study, participants were provided with a debriefing passage disclosing the true purpose of the study and clearly explaining the fictitious nature of the reported financial aid policy and the student group (Appendix G). Then, participants were asked to sign their names and ID number on an attendance sheet circulated by the graduate students and research assistants. Participants were reassured that their names and ID numbers cannot be possibly linked to their responses. Finally, to ensure that all participants were aware of the deception, the co-investigator verbally described the fictitious nature of the information provided, reiterated the true purpose of the study while explaining the reason for deception, and concluded by thanking participants for their participation.

E. Instruments

1. **Group Membership:** Group identification was adapted from Bamberg et al. (2015). The scale included three items measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Sample items included: “I could belong to a student group that seeks to remove sectarian quotas from AUB’s financial aid policy.” The original study reported Cronbach’s alpha $\alpha = .84$.
2. **AUB Student Identity:** Three items measuring AUB student identity were adapted from Harb (2010). The items were measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Sample items included: “I’m concerned with the welfare of AUB students” and “My identity as an AUB student is important to me.”
3. **Self-identity:** The self-identity scale was adapted from Charng, Piliavin and Callero (1988). The original scale included three items measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The original study reported a Cronbach alpha of $\alpha = .81$. Only two items from the original scale were used for the purpose of this study: “Participating in student activism is an important part of who I am” and “Participating in student activism is something I rarely think about”. An additional measure was designed for the purpose of this study: “I think of myself as a student activist to some extent.”
4. **Sectarianism:** Five measures were adopted from Harb (2010). The items were rated on a 5-point Likert type scale ranging from 1 (strongly

disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Sample items included: “I have a strong connection to my sect” and “I am proud to belong to my sect” and the Cronbach for the scale was 0.85, as reported by Harb (2010).

5. ***Injustice***: An adaptation of Tausch et al.’s (2011) perceived injustice scale was used. The scale included three items that were rated on a 5-point Likert type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Sample items included: “Using sectarian quotas in financial aid is unjust.” and “Using sectarian quotas in financial aid is unfair.” The Cronbach alpha for the four-item scale was $\alpha = .91$ (Tausch et al., 2011).
6. ***Anger***: Two items measuring anger were developed for the purpose of this study. The items were rated on a 5-point Likert type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Items included: “As an AUB student, I feel angry that sectarian quotas are allocated to financial aid distribution in AUB.” and “as an AUB student, the allocation of sectarian quotas to financial aid distribution in AUB makes me furious.”
7. ***Participative Efficacy***: Four items were adapted form van Zomeren et al. (2004) to measure participants’ participative efficacy. The items were rated on a 5-point Likert type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Items included: “I believe that I, as an individual, can contribute to the removal of the sectarian quotas from the financial aid policy in AUB.” and “I believe that I, as an individual, can provide an important contribution so that AUB students can revoke the sectarian

quota policy proposed by AUB's financial aid office" Van Zomeren et al. (2004) reported Cronbach's alpha $\alpha = .94$

8. **Attitude:** A scale measuring attitudes toward participating in collective action against the sectarian quota was adapted from Fielding et al. (2008). Six items were included: "I think that engaging in student action to remove sectarian quotas from AUB's financial aid policy is (bad/good, foolish/wise, harmful/beneficial, unpleasant/pleasant, unsatisfying/satisfying, unfavorable/favorable)". The items were rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (e.g. extremely bad) to 5 (e.g. extremely good). Fielding et al. (2008) reported Cronbach's alpha $\alpha = .90$ in the original study.
9. **Subjective norms:** This scale was adapted from Fielding et al. (2008). The scale included three items measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (e.g. completely disapprove) to 5 (e.g. completely approve). Sample items included: "If I engaged in student action to remove sectarian quotas from AUB's financial aid policy, people who are important to me would". The scale has a Cronbach's $\alpha = .88$.
10. **PBC:** A five-item scale was adapted from Fielding et al (2008). Items were measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (e.g. very difficult) to 5 (e.g. very easy). Sample items included: "How difficult would it be for you to engage in student activism to remove sectarian quotas from AUB's financial aid policy?" and "For me, engaging in student action to

remove sectarian quotas from AUB's financial aid policy is". The original study reported Cronbach's $\alpha = .80$.

11. **Behavioral intentions:** The scale measuring behavioral intentions was adapted from Fielding et al. (2008). The scale had three items which were measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (e.g. Extreme unlikely) to 5 (e.g. Extremely likely). The items showed high reliability in the original study, Cronbach's $\alpha = .80$. One item was dropped due to repetitiveness. Sample items included: "I intend to engage in student action to help remove the sectarian quota policy proposed by AUB's financial aid office." Two additional items were developed for the purpose of the study. The additional items were measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The two items were: "I intend to sign a petition to request the termination of the sectarian quota policy proposed by the financial aid office at AUB." and "I intend to volunteer with the student group (Students Against Sect-Based Aid) to help remove the sectarian quotas from financial aid policy at AUB."

12. **Behavioral Measure:** Six binary behavioral measures were included in the study. First, participants were provided with a petition demanding the removal of sectarian quotas from the financial aid policy and asked if they would like to sign it. Second, participants were asked if they would like to sign up for a meeting with members of the student group. Third, participants were asked if they would like to volunteer with the student

group to assist with tasks (e.g. recruiting members, designing posters). Fourth, participants were asked to select two dates from a calendar to specify when they would be available for the meeting or volunteering services. Fifth, participants were asked if they wanted to receive flyers to help with their distribution on campus. Sixth, participants were asked if they would like to pledge to comply with a university-wide student strike that the student group was planning on Friday December 13, 2019.

13. ***Previous Collective Action Participation***: Three items were used to measure previous collective action participation in the Lebanese uprising which erupted on October 17th, 2019- approximately two months before this study was conducted. The first two binary items included asking participants “Did you participate in any demonstration as part of the October 17th uprising?” and “Did you actively participate in organizing actions as part of the October 17th uprising?”. The third item measured the frequency of previous collective action participation and was rated on a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 (0 days) to 5 (More than 12 days). The item was “How many days have you spent participating in collective action as part of the October 17th uprising?”

14. ***Manipulation Check***: An open-ended question was included at the end of the survey to check if any participants were suspicious of the deception administered in the study. The question included was: “What do you think the purpose of this study is?”.

CHAPTER VIII

RESULTS

A. Participant Exclusion

The sample size for this study was originally two-hundred and seventy-three. However, after participants were debriefed on the true purpose of the study, they were asked if they would like their responses to be deleted from the data. Five participants reported that they would like to revoke their participation from the study and were excluded accordingly. In addition, fifteen participants were also excluded from the sample since they did not complete the survey. As such, the final sample size in this study was two-hundred and fifty-three.

B. Manipulation Check

Towards the end of the survey and before the presentation of the debriefing passage, participants were provided with a manipulation check to ensure that the deception was successful. The open-ended question included was: “What do you think the purpose of this study is?”. The answers were then coded into four main categories: 70% of the participants reported that the study was about the sectarian financial aid policy, 4% reported that the study was about sectarianism, 2% offered opinions on the movement, 2% believed the study was about equality or justice, and 20% of the values was missing. Given that none of the responses involved collective action, social psychological elements, or any insinuation

that the scenario provided in the study was fictitious, none of the participants were excluded from the study.

C. Missing Value Analysis

The overall summary of missing value showed that less than 5% of the total data points was missing. Furthermore, the data seemed to be missing completely at random as Little's MCAR test was not significant, $\chi^2= 1031.11, p= 0.98$. Consequently, we opted for applying listwise exclusion of missing data for all our tests².

D. Outliers

We first identified eleven univariate outliers through examining the z-scores for each variable (z-scores greater than the absolute value of 3.29). We then identified multivariate outliers through computing the Mahalanobis distance by running a linear regression. We first ran the regression using intentions as the outcome variable and then ran the regression again using behavior as the outcome variable. This resulted in the identification of ten multivariate outliers. We then removed six cases that showed to be both, univariate and multivariate outliers; ID_218: $D^2=63.41, p< .001$; ID_71: $D^2=38.06$,

² To confirm that our method of dealing with missing values did not majorly influence our results, we conducted a trial run of hierarchical regression analysis after replacing our missing data using expectation maximization (Appendix H). The results of the imputed data showed no major differences, particularly regarding the model summary (see Table 11 and Table 12). As such, we decided to adhere to listwise exclusion.

$p < .001$; ID_278: $D^2=37.53$, $p < .001$; ID_83: $D^2=36.30$, $p < .001$; ID_35: $D^2=34.99$, $p < .001$; ID_133: $D^2=30.48$, $p < .001$.

E. Demographics

The sample for this study consisted of 66% women ($n = 164$), 31% men ($n = 76$), while one participant identified as “other” and seven participants preferred not to say. The age of participants ranged between eighteen and twenty-four ($M = 18.64$, $SD = 0.97$). Additionally, 36.7% of the participants were Muslim Sunni, 26.2% were Muslim Shiite, 6.5% were Druze, 13.3% were Christian Maronites, 4% were Christian Orthodox, 5% were Christian Catholic and 5.6% belonged to “other” sects- including Christian Protestant, Christian evangelical, Armenian Catholic, and Muslim Alawite. The remaining participants ($n = 6$) declined to report their sect memberships.

Furthermore, we measured socioeconomic status through asking participants to rate their families’ living conditions on a scale ranging from 1 to 10 compared to others in Lebanon, where point 1 represents those with the least money, least education, and worst jobs. Over 70% of the responses ranged between 6 and 8 and the mean socioeconomic status was 6.62 ($SD = 1.53$). Additionally, 38% of participants reported that they benefited from financial aid at AUB ($n = 94$), 47% did not benefit from financial aid (116), 13% were not sure ($n = 33$) and five participants preferred not to say.

F. Descriptive Statistics

We measured participants' financial aid satisfaction through asking them how satisfied they were with financial aid services at AUB, the mean satisfaction was 2.86 ($SD = .95$). Additionally, we also measured previous collective action behavior, particularly regarding the Lebanese October 17th uprising. Here, 68% of participants reported that they had participated in at least one demonstration in the uprising and 25% reported that they took part in organizing actions as part of the uprising. We were also interested in measuring the frequency of participation in the uprising, we asked participants about the number of days in which they protested, ranging from 1 (0 days) to 5 (more than 12 days). The mean for frequency of participation was 2.39 ($SD = 1.16$).

The sample was low on sectarianism as the mean was below the midpoint ($M = 2.71$, $SD = .76$). In addition, scores were generally high for both SIMCA and TPB predictors. High scores were reported for group identification ($M = 4.09$, $SD = .76$), AUB student identity ($M = 4.17$, $SD = .71$), efficacy ($M = 3.8$, $SD = .80$), perceived injustice ($M = 4.49$, $SD = .75$), and Anger ($M = 4.1$, $SD = .80$). As for TPB predictors, the sample was high on self-identity ($M = 3.5$, $SD = .85$), Attitude ($M = 4.21$, $SD = .83$), Subjective Norms ($M = 3.91$, $SD = .80$) and PBC ($M = 3.61$, $SD = .69$).

Participants also reported high intentions to participate in collective action ($M = 3.7$, $SD = .78$), However, as expected, the sample scored relatively lower on collective action behavior ($M = 2.23$, $SD = 1.67$). Interestingly, the distribution of scores of the outcome variable varied according to the behavioral collective action measure. As predicted, signing a petition had the highest participation level, where 84.3% of participants ($n = 209$) signed

the petition, while 13.3% decided not to sign the petition ($n = 33$) and 2.4% of the scores were missing ($n=6$). All other behaviors had only a minority of participants sign up for them. Surprisingly, the second behavior with most participation was confirming participation in a student strike, where 37% of participants ($n = 92$) reported that they are committed to striking on the specified date, 56.9% refused to strike ($n = 141$), and 2.4% of the scores were missing ($n = 6$). Following strike, 34% of participants selected a date and time on a calendar provided to them to schedule a meeting with the student group members or for volunteering services ($n = 86$). Next was distributing flyers, where 23.8% of participants requested to receive flyers for them to distribute on campus ($n = 59$), 66.1% declined to participate in distribution ($n = 164$) and 10% of the scores were missing ($n = 25$). Similarly, 23.4% of participants reported that they would attend a meeting with one of the group representatives to learn more about the movement ($n = 58$), while 76.2% declined the opportunity for a meeting ($n = 189$) and only one score was missing. Finally, volunteering with the movement had the lowest participation levels where only 19.8% of participants signed up to volunteer for preparing posters, managing social media posts, and preparing signs/banners ($n = 49$), 79.8% did not sign up for volunteering services ($n = 198$) and one score was missing.

G. Psychometrics

1. Reliability Analysis

First, we reverse coded the second item in the self-identity scale “Participating in student activism is something I rarely think about” and the third item in the scale measuring

injustice “Using sectarian quotas in financial aid is justified.”. Then, we conducted a reliability analysis on all scales measuring variables included in the model. Table 1 includes the reliability coefficients of all scales; Cronbach’s alpha was greater than 0.8 for all variables except injustice and self-identity.

Accordingly, we dropped the third injustice item and the second item for self-identity; following this, Cronbach’s alpha of the scales increased to .90 and .79, respectively. One point to note is that both of the items dropped were reverse coded, this might be an indication of low concentration or comprehension levels among participants and may point to acquiescence bias. In addition, we believe that the third injustice item may have been a weak measure of injustice; to elaborate, the item may have been understood as a measure of whether or not participants could understand why the administration would adopt a sect-based aid policy rather than whether or not they believed that adopting this policy is just.

Table 1 Reliability Coefficients of scales

Scale	Number of Items	Cronbach’s Alpha
Group Identity	3	.82
AUB Student Identity	3	.73
Self-Identity	3	.67
Self-Identity (corrected)	2	.79
Attitudes	5	.93
Efficacy	4	.94
Perceived Injustice	3	.60
Perceived Injustice (corrected)	2	.90

Anger	2	.86
Sectarianism	5	.87
Subjective Norms	3	.83
PBC	5	.82
Intentions	4	.84

2. Outcome Variable

Our outcome variable included six binary measures of behavior. Participants responded to every behavioral measure separately, 1 indicated collective action behavior present and 0 indicated the absence of collective action behavior. We then computed an aggregate measure of behavior that aggregates the scores of participants on each of the binary behavioral measures. The aggregate variable was calculated according to the following equation: $Behavior_Aggregate = SUM(Behavior1_Petition, Behavior2_Meeting, Behavior3_volunteer, Behavior5_Calendar, Behavior6_Flyers, Behavior7_Strike)$.

Table 2 shows the correlations between the collective action behavioral measures. Interestingly, all collective action behaviors were significantly positively correlated, except for signing a petition and pledging to participate in a strike.

Table 2 Pearson's Intercorrelations Matrix of Collective Action Behavior

<i>Scale</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>
1. Petition	1					
2. Meeting	.18**	1				
3. Volunteer	.16**	.26*	1			
4. Calendar	.17**	.64**	.57**	1		
5. Flyers	.18**	.26**	.37**	.26**	1	

6. Strike .12 .23** .22** .22** .24** 1

3. Factor Analysis

We conducted a factor analysis with principal component extraction and oblimin rotation on the 9 items measuring identity. Since our three measures of identity (Group Identification, Self-Identity and AUB Student Identity) were conceptually related, we decided to use oblimin rotation technique which allowed items to correlate with each other. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant ($p < 0.001$) and Kaiser-Meyer Olkin value was greater than 0.6 (KMO= 0.786).

The results indicated that the items loaded on three components which explained a cumulative 70.43% of the variance. Importantly, self-identity and social identity, which target distinct identity processes, appeared to comprise different components as their respective items loaded on two separate factors.

The pattern matrix showing the factor loadings is included in table 3. Items from the social identity and self-identity scale loaded fully on their corresponding components. However, the first item in the AUB student identity scale appeared to load on the first component, along with group identification items. Given that the reliability analysis on the individual AUB student identity scale revealed a Cronbach alpha greater than .70, and since AUB student identity is not included in our main statistical analysis, we deemed these results acceptable.

Table 3 **Identification Pattern Matrix**

	Component		
	1	2	3
Group Membership 2	.93		
Group Membership 1	.85		

Group Membership 3	.80	
AUB Student Identity 1	.55	
AUB Student Identity 3		-.93
AUB Student Identity 2		-.84
Self-Identity 3		.81
Self-Identity 2		.72
Self-Identity 1		.72

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations.

H. Normality

To evaluate the skewness of the distribution, we calculated z-skewness through dividing skewness by the standard error for skewness (see Table 13 in Appendix I). Only six of our variables were normally distributed, including: Self-identity, efficacy, sectarianism, PBC and intentions. All of the other variables were negatively skewed. Importantly, AUB student identity (z-skewness= -6.13), injustice (z-skewness= -9.37), and attitude (z-skewness= -7.37) appear to be particularly skewed, with corresponding z-skewness coefficients less than -3.29. Hence, the following results should be regarded with caution, particularly for these variables.

I. Zero-Order Correlations

We assessed correlations between predictors of collective action. The zero-order correlation matrix (see table 4) did not show values above 0.8, which indicated that the assumption of the absence of multicollinear data was met. All TPB and SIMCA predictors were significantly positively correlated with each other and with intentions. To elaborate,

participants who scored highly on TPB predictors, were more likely to report higher scores on SIMCA predictors and to have a stronger intention to participate in collective action.

As predicted, sectarianism was negatively correlated with all variables and was significantly negatively correlated to group identification ($r = -.24, p < .001$), efficacy ($r = -.19, p < .001$), injustice ($r = -.29, p < .001$), anger ($r = -.25, p < .001$), subjective norms ($r = -.231, p < .001$), PBC ($r = -.23, p < .001$), intentions ($r = -.22, p < .001$), previous collective action participation ($r = -.22, p < .001$), and collective action behavior ($r = -.15, p < .005$).

Previous collective action which was measured through reported participation in the Lebanese uprising and was significantly positively correlated to all variables except AUB student identity ($r = .10$) and perceived injustice ($r = .10$). The strongest correlate of previous collective action was collective action intentions, with a moderate correlation ($r = .31, p < .001$).

While collective action intentions significantly correlated with all predictors, the highest correlate to intentions was efficacy with medium-to-large correlation ($r = .61, p < .001$), followed by group identification ($r = .55, p < .001$). Finally, collective action behavior was significantly correlated with all variables (only negatively correlated with sectarianism). It was most strongly correlated with intentions, with a medium-to-large correlation of $r = .52 (p < .001)$.

Table 4 **Zero-Order Correlation Matrix**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1. Group ID	1												
2. AUB-ID	.46**	1											
3. SelfID	.45**	.42*	1										
4. Attitude	.58**	.39*	.36*	1									
5. Efficacy	.52**	.30*	.53*	.46*	1								
6. Injustice	.52**	.25*	.22*	.52*	.37**	1							
7. Anger	.56**	.24*	.37*	.50*	.46**	.62**	1						
8. Sectarian	-	-.08	-.06	-.08	-	-	-	1					
9. Norms	.24**	.53**	.25*	.38*	.51*	.51**	.36**	.54**	-	1			
10. PBC	.41**	.29*	.35*	.34*	.52**	.27**	.34**	-	.23**	.50**	1		
11. Intent	.55**	.23*	.51*	.44*	.66**	.35**	.52**	-	.22**	.61**	.52*	1	
12. Pre-CA	.25**	.10	.30*	.18*	.26**	.11	.25**	-	.22**	.24*	.31*	1	
13. Behavior	.30**	.10	.31*	.19*	.42**	.13	.30*	-.15*	.34**	.36*	.52*	.34**	1

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

J. Main Analysis

Our main analysis involved two overarching components, the first component comprised a series of hierarchical regressions and the second involved a mediation analysis.

We ran three hierarchical regressions: 1) the first regression aimed to investigate the effect of SIMCA and TPB predictors on collective action intentions after controlling for socioeconomic status, financial aid status, financial aid satisfaction, CA participation in Lebanese uprising, CA organizing participation in uprising, and the frequency of CA participation in the uprising; 2) the second regression aimed to investigate the effect of SIMCA and TPB predictors on collective action behavior after entering control variables; 3) the third regression aimed to investigate the effect of TPB predictors- after entering SIMCA predictors- first on collective action intentions and second on collective action behavior. Following this, we conducted a mediation analysis using Hayes's PROCESS model to investigate the indirect effect of TPB and SIMCA predictors on collective action behavior mediated through collective action intentions.

1. Hierarchical Multiple Regression

To test the effects of TPB and SIMCA predictors on collective action, we conducted a hierarchical multiple regression analysis. We ran the regression twice, once with collective action intentions as the outcome variable, and a second time with collective action behavior as the outcome and intentions as an additional predictor of collective action behavior.

a. Outcome Variable: Intentions

For the first model, independent variables were entered in two stages. First, we entered collective action intentions as the dependent variable and the following control variables: socioeconomic status, financial aid status, financial aid satisfaction, CA participation in Lebanese uprising, CA organizing participation in uprising, and the

frequency of CA participation in the uprising. Second, we entered sectarianism, as well as SIMCA (anger, perceived injustice, efficacy, group identification and AUB student identity) and TPB predictors (PBC, subjective norms, attitude, and self-identity).

The results of the first stage (*see table 5*) indicated that the variance accounted for by the first six independent variables entered was R squared= .13 (adjusted R squared = 0.10), which was significantly different from zero ($F(6, 204)= 5.16, p<.001$). Frequency of previous participation in the Lebanese uprising was the only statistically significant predictor of future collective action intentions, $\beta = .29, p= 0.002$.

The results of the second stage indicated that the change in variance accounted for by the additional (TPB and SIMCA) predictors was R square change= .61, which was significantly different from zero ($F(10, 194)= 24.83, p<.001$). The total variance explained by the full model was R-squared= .61 (Adjusted R-squared= .58), indicating that the full model explained 61.9% of the variance in intentions. The results showed that Group identification ($\beta = .12, p= 0.061$), AUB student identification ($\beta = -.11, p= 0.042$), self-identity ($\beta = .13, p= 0.021$), efficacy ($\beta = .32, p<0.001$), subjective norms ($\beta = .23, p<0.001$) and PBC ($\beta = .11, p= 0.039$) significantly predicted collective action intentions. The regression parameters are displayed in Table 6.

Table 5 Model Summary: Predictors of Collective Action Intentions

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.36	.13	.10	.74	.13	5.16	6	204	.000

2 .78 .61 .58 .50 .48 24.83 10 194 .000

Table 6 Regression Parameters: Collective Action Intentions

		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	
		B	Standard Error	β	t
Model					
1	(Constant)	3.50	.51		6.86**
	Socioeconomic Status	-.004	.03	-.007	-.10
	FAID Status	-.07	.07	-.06	-1.00
	FAID Satisfaction	.07	.05	.09	1.40
	Previous CA_1	.07	.15	.04	.50
	Previous CA_2	-.22	.13	-.12	-1.73
	Frequency CA	.19	.06	.29	3.18**
2	(Constant)	.43	.50		.85
	Socioeconomic Status	-.02	.02	-.04	-1.06
	FAID Status	-.07	.05	-.06	-1.32
	FAID Satisfaction	.05	.03	.06	1.40
	Previous CA_1	.02	.10	.01	.21
	Previous CA_2	.00	.09	.00	.00
	Frequency CA	.04	.04	.06	.99
	Group ID	.12	.06	.12	1.88
	AUB ID	-.12	.05	-.11	-2.05*
	Self ID	.12	.05	.13	2.32*
	Attitude	.01	.05	.01	.20
	Efficacy	.31	.06	.32	5.11**

Injustice	-.03	.06	-.03	-.47
Anger	.09	.06	.09	1.41
Sectarianism	-.01	.04	-.02	-.42
Subjective Norms	.23	.06	.23	3.66**
PBC	.13	.06	.11	2.07*

b. Outcome Variable: Behavior

For the second model, collective action behavior was included as the outcome variable and independent variables were entered in three stages. The first two stages included the same independent variables as the ones entered in the first model above where stage one involved entering the control variables and stage two included sectarianism as well as TPB and SIMCA predictors. An additional third stage was added where collective actions intentions was entered as a predictor of collective action behavior.

The results (*see table 7*) of the first stage indicated that the variance accounted for by the first six independent variables entered was R squared= .14 (adjusted R squared = 0.11), which was significantly different from zero ($F(6, 204)= 5.58, p<.001$). Consistent with the results of model 1, frequency of previous participation in the Lebanese uprising was also the only statistically significant predictor of collective action behavior, $\beta = .35, p< 0.001$.

The results of the second stage indicated that the change in variance accounted for by the additional predictors was significant R square change= .16, ($F(10, 194)= 4.60, p<.001$). The total variance explained by the full model was R-squared= .24 (Adjusted R-squared= .16). The results showed that efficacy ($\beta = .25, p= 0.003$), PBC ($\beta = .15, p=$

0.043), and frequency of previous collective action participation ($\beta = .22$, $p = 0.012$) significantly predicted collective action behavior.

The results of the third stage indicated that the change in variance accounted for by adding intentions as an additional independent variable was R square change = .05, which was significant ($F(1, 193) = 14.91$, $p < .001$). The total variance explained by the full model was R-squared = .35 (Adjusted R-squared = .29). The results showed that intentions ($\beta = .36$, $p < 0.001$) significantly positively predicted collective action behavior. Frequency of previous collective action participation ($\beta = .20$, $p = 0.021$) was the only additional variable that significantly predicted collective action behavior in the final model. The regression parameters are displayed in Table 8.

Table 7 Model Summary: **Predictors of Collective Action Behavior**

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.37 ^a	.14	.11	1.53	.14	5.58	6	204	.000
2	.55 ^b	.30	.24	1.41	.16	4.60	10	194	.000
3	.59 ^c	.35	.29	1.36	.05	14.91	1	193	.000

Table 8 **Regression Parameters: Collective Action Behavior**

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	
	B	Standard Error	β	t
1	(Constant)	1.34		1.28

	Socioeconomic Status	-.03	.07	-.03	-.51
	FAID Status	.13	.15	.05	.83
	FAID Satisfaction	.01	.11	.006	.09
	Previous CA_1	.32	.30	.09	1.05
	Previous CA_2	-.43	.26	-.11	-1.60
	Frequency CA	.49	.12	.35	3.94**
2	(Constant)	-1.30	1.41		-.92
	Socioeconomic Status	-.05	.06	-.04	-.79
	FAID Status	.15	.14	.06	1.05
	FAID Satisfaction	-.04	.10	-.02	-.39
	Previous CA_1	.21	.29	.06	.73
	Previous CA_2	-.15	.26	-.04	-.58
	Frequency CA	.31	.12	.22	2.53*
	Group ID	.15	.19	.07	.79
	AUB ID	-.17	.16	-.07	-1.07
	Self ID	.09	.15	.05	.63
	Attitude	-.13	.16	-.06	-.81
	Efficacy	.51	.17	.25	2.96*
	Injustice	-.23	.18	-.11	-1.30
	Anger	.16	.18	.08	.91
	Sectarianism	-.04	.11	-.02	-.40
	Subjective Norms	.14	.17	.07	.83
	PBC	.36	.17	.15	2.03*
3	(Constant)	-1.62	1.36		-1.19
	Socioeconomic Status	-.03	.06	-.03	-.53
	FAID Status	.20	.14	.08	1.45
	FAID Satisfaction	-.08	.10	-.04	-.79

Previous CA_1	.20	.28	.05	.70
Previous CA_2	-.15	.25	-.04	-.60
Frequency CA	.27	.11	.20	2.33*
Group ID	.05	.18	.02	.29
AUB ID	-.08	.16	-.03	-.53
Self ID	.00	.14	.001	.01
Attitude	-.14	.15	-.07	-.90
Efficacy	.27	.17	.13	1.54
Injustice	-.21	.17	-.10	-1.22
Anger	.09	.17	.04	.54
Sectarianism	-.03	.11	-.02	-.30
Subjective Norms	-.02	.17	-.01	-.14
PBC	.26	.17	.11	1.51
Intent	.74	.19	.36	3.86**

c. Comparing SIMCA and TPB

We ran another hierarchical regression to further investigate whether adding TPB predictors to collective action models would have a significant effect, over and above SIMCA predictors. We first entered collective action intentions as the dependent variable, while independent variables were entered in two stages (*see table 9*): First, we entered four SIMCA predictors (social identity, anger, injustice and efficacy). Second, we entered four TPB predictors (self-identity, subjective norms, attitudes and PBC).

The results of the first model (SIMCA only) showed that the variance accounted for by the predictors was significant $R\text{-squared} = .53$ ($R\text{-squared adjusted} = .52$), $(F(4, 212) =$

61.6, $P < 0.001$). Results indicated that group identification ($\beta = .19$, $p = 0.002$), anger ($\beta = .24$, $p < 0.001$), and efficacy ($\beta = .47$, $p < 0.001$) significantly predicted collective action intentions.

There was a significant R-square change for the second model (R square change = 0.62), with $F(4, 208) = 7.99$ and $p < 0.001$. The total variance explained by the model with the additional TPB predictors was R square = .59 (R square adjusted = .58). Efficacy ($\beta = .32$, $p < 0.001$) and group identification ($\beta = .13$, $p = 0.035$) but not anger, remained significant predictors of intentions. In addition, subjective norms ($\beta = .24$, $p < 0.001$) and self-identity ($\beta = .12$, $p = 0.026$) were additional significant predictors while PBC was marginally significant ($\beta = .10$, $p = 0.053$).

Table 9 Model Summary: Comparing SIMCA and TPB Predictors of Intentions

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.73 ^a	.53	.52	.54	.53	61.66	4	212	.000
2	.77 ^b	.59	.58	.51	.06	7.99	4	208	.000

We also ran the same hierarchical regression while inputting collective action behavior as the dependent variable (see table 10). The SIMCA model was significant (adjusted R square = .21), $F(4, 212) = 15.40$, $p < 0.001$, while the R-square change after entering TPB predictors was not significant with R-square change = 0.03, $F(4, 208) = 2.21$. Interestingly, however, the only significant predictors of behavior in the full model were both, PBC ($\beta = .17$, $p = 0.05$) and efficacy ($\beta = .17$, $p = 0.003$).

Table 10 Model Summary: Comparing SIMCA and TPB Predictors of Behavior

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.47 ^a	.22	.21	1.45	.22	15.40	4	212	.000
2	.50 ^b	.25	.22	1.43	.03	2.21	4	208	.069

2. Mediation analysis

We conducted a mediation analysis using Hayes' PROCESS Macro to test whether intentions mediated the effect of TPB and SIMCA predictors on behavior. One problem we faced was that the PROCESS Macro allows for only one independent variable to be entered into the model at a time, while the model we were interested in testing included several predictors. However, according to Hayes (2013), it is possible to enter other independent variables as covariates if the model being tested did not include a moderator.

While we originally reported in our hypotheses that we predicted that Social Identity would moderate the pathway from predictors to intentions, we were not able to test the moderation in this study since group identification was severely skewed (80% of the scores were above the midpoint). As such and given that we were using PROCESS to strictly test a mediation, the condition required to enter multiple independent variables into the model was met.

Therefore, we decided to run our mediation analysis with one independent variable and the rest as covariates. To get the indirect effects of the independent variables on the outcome variable, we ran our analysis nine times, each time with a different predictor

entered as the independent variable, while keeping behavior as the dependent variable and intentions as the mediator.


The indirect effect of the IVs was tested using nonparametric bootstrapping. For each variable, we examined the upper and lower bound of the 95% confidence interval, to check if zero fell between the interval (see figure 5). The indirect effects of PBC (IE= .099; 95% CI [-.008, .24]), self-identity (IE= .089; 95% CI [-.008, .22]), attitude (IE= -.011; 95% CI [-.15, .10]), group identity (IE= .08; 95% CI [-.03, .26]), injustice perception (IE= -.034; 95% CI [-.14, .06]), and anger (IE= .11; 95% CI [-.01, .24]) were insignificant.

However, only subjective norms (IE= .19; 95% CI [.06, .38]) and efficacy (IE= .26; 95% CI [.10, .48]) had positive and significant indirect effects. This indicates that the mediation was only significant for subjective norms and efficacy, so intentions only mediated the relationship between both predictors, subjective norms and efficacy, and collective action behavior.

Interestingly, previous collective action participation also had a significant direct effect on collective action behavior (DE= .24; 95% CI [.07, .41]), while the indirect effect, mediated through intentions was insignificant. All of our other TPB and SIMCA predictors had insignificant direct effects.

Figure 5 Statistical model entering SIMCA and TPB predictors as IVs³

³ Solid paths were significant; dashed paths were insignificant.



*p < .05

**p < .001

CHAPTER IX

DISCUSSION

This research project aimed to build on mounting evidence suggesting a clear discrepancy between intentions and behavior, particularly pertaining to collective action. In addition to this discrepancy being evident in the social psychological literature (Webb and Sheeran, 2006; Oegema & Klandermans, 1994; Ernst et al., 2017), it is also striking in natural settings where, more often than not, discontent reported by group members does not translate into active participation in social change efforts (e.g. Fakhri et al., 2020).

As such, our main research purpose was to further explore this discrepancy through adopting an integrative approach to collective action which consolidates two paradigms devoted to understanding 1) the social psychology of collective action (SIMCA) and 2) the social psychology of implementing behavior (TPB). Our secondary purpose in this study was to also look into collective action behavior under conditions of heightened societal collective action. Given that our data was collected at a time when collective action in Lebanon was at its peak, we believe that this research also holds potential insights to the transference of collective action from one context to another. More specifically, we were particularly interested in exploring the predictive role of past participation in the Lebanese popular uprising to future collective action.

We believe that it is because of the turbulent political context surrounding our study, as well as possible sampling biases, that our participants' responses on collective action predictors and intentions were generally above the midpoint. There were two main

complications that emerged because of normality violations. First, in addition to being a predictor of collective action, social identity was referred to in the TPB literature as a possible moderator for the link between TPB predictors and collective action intentions. However, because the distribution of the data on group identification was clearly skewed (80% of the scores were above the midpoint) we were not able to adequately test social identity as a moderator in our model. Instead, we only included it as an additional predictor of collective action.

Second, as previously mentioned in the results, the skewness levels of injustice, attitudes and student identity were particularly concerning. Thus, it is important to take this into consideration when interpreting the results of these variables, especially since both injustice and attitudes failed to reach significance in predicting collective action intentions. However, and more consistent with previous studies (Terry and Hogg, 1996; Terry, Hogg and White, 1999; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995), it is possible that attitudes did not have a significant effect on intentions because participants scored high on social identity in this study. To elaborate, Kelly and Breinlinger (1995) suggested that high social identification would strengthen the effect of subjective norms on intentions while PBC and attitudes were more likely to have a weaker effect on intentions when social identification is high. In effect, since we originally expected that the predictors would behave differently depending on the level of social identification, our study provides insight onto how TPB and SIMCA constructs predict collective action for a sample that is high on social identity. Consequently, it appears that our findings are in line with the TPB literature where

subjective norms significantly predicted collective action intentions and intentions significantly mediated the link between subjective norms and collective action behavior.

A. Predictors of Intentions

In line with our initial hypotheses, along with previous collective action participation, self-identity, subjective norms, and PBC had a significant positive effect on intentions. As for SIMCA predictors, social identification and efficacy significantly predicted collective action intentions. The predictive power of the integrated model was very impressive where SIMCA and TPB predictors accounted for over 60% of the variance in collective action intentions. This finding is relatively higher than the percentage of explained variance included in the TPB literature (e.g. 40-49% reported by McEachan et al. (2011)).

Contrary to our predictions, however, anger did not predict intentions. Importantly, when we ran SIMCA predictors first without TPB predictors in our hierarchical multiple regression analysis, anger successfully met significance levels ($\beta = .242, p < 0.001$). This suggests that the variance explained by anger may have been accounted for by TPB predictors, possibly through attitude items which partly covered the “unpleasantness” and “dissatisfaction” caused by the proposed financial aid policy. As previously mentioned, attitudes and injustice both failed to reach significance possibly due to their high skewness levels. As previously mentioned, and in line with Kelly and Breinlinger’s (1995) work, we also believe that attitudes appeared to be an insignificant predictor of collective action since our sample was high on social identification.

Importantly, the hierarchical regression indicated that the variance explained by the model significantly increased after entering TPB predictors. This suggests that self-identity, PBC, and subjective norms capture antecedents to collective action intentions that are not integrated into the social identity model of collective action. It follows that future models of collective action should consider adding constructs that account for such social psychological processes to increase the predictive power of the models.

B. Predictors of Behavior

As we originally predicted, and in line with TPB literature, the results showed that intentions consistently predicted behavior, where higher reported collective action intentions yielded higher collective action behavior. However, also consistent with the intention-behavior discrepancy literature (Webb & Sheeran, 2006), after calculating effect sizes, we inferred that a large intentional change (Cohen's $f^2 = 0.62$) translated to a small to medium behavioral change (Cohen's $f^2 = 0.14$). This important finding corroborates the main purpose of our study which is to emphasize the need to acknowledge and address the intention-behavior gap in collective action.

Interestingly, our hierarchical multiple regression showed that, before entering intentions to the model, there were three additional significant predictors of intentions: efficacy, PBC and frequency of previous collective action participation. We believe that this finding is important because it stresses the role of collective action antecedents that comprise a behavioral component. As such, we believe that the predictive power of collective action models could possibly improve through adding social psychological constructs that hold behavioral attributes, including previous collective action behavior or

assessments (e.g. potential contribution and the level of control over behavior) of future target behaviors.

It is also important to note that after entering intentions to the regression model, frequency of previous collective action was the only additional predictor of collective action behavior. This finding is possibly linked to two competing explanations: 1) future collective action behavior can be predicted by previous participation in collective action, or 2) the effect of previous participation was due to the similarities between the scenario presented in the study and the context of the Lebanese uprising. However, we believe that the two explanations are possibly complementary where previous collective action participation can particularly predict future collective action behavior depending on the relevance and timeliness of the previous behavior.

In addition, while our comparative regression analysis between a model with SIMCA predictors and a full model that also incorporates TPB predictors showed a significant increase in variance explained in intentions, the R-squared change was not significant when behavior was entered as the dependent variable. This suggests that adding TPB constructs to models of collective action would substantially increase the predictive power of such models regarding collective action intentions. However, our findings showed that this does not apply to collective action behavior. This finding potentially highlights the need for a paradigm shift in the discipline that conceptually discriminates between antecedent motivations for collective action intentions and behavior. We believe that if the pathway to collective action intentions was the same as the pathway to collective action behavior, then we would have seen similar results across our two hierarchical regressions.

Since we found diverging effects, we strongly believe that more efforts should be directed to specifically investigating predictors to collective action behavior. Our results suggest that a starting point to this endeavor should likely focus on antecedents to collective action that encapsulate a behavioral component (e.g. frequency of previous participation).

C. Mediation Analysis

The results of the mediation analysis revealed that intentions only significantly mediated the path from subjective norms and efficacy to behavior, in addition to PBC which was approaching significance. Furthermore, previous collective action behavior was the only independent variable to have a significant direct effect on behavior, while its indirect effect mediated through intentions was insignificant.

This is a surprising finding since it is inconsistent with the TPB model where intentions steadily act as mediator between collective action antecedents and collective action behavior. However, in line with our previous recommendations, we believe that such findings are indicators of the need to reconceptualize collective action as a process with distinct stages that require unique antecedents (see Klandermaans & Oegma, 1987). To elaborate, we believe that our overall statistical analysis suggests that while the paradigm that integrates TPB and SIMCA yields very impressive R-squared for predicting collective action intentions, such results do not generalize to behavior. It follows that our findings further problematize the persistent convergence of collective action tendencies and behavior in the literature.

CHAPTER X

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

This research holds multiple limitations that should be considered when reviewing the results. The most pressing limitation is the nature of behavioral collective action measures that we used in this study. Data for this research had to be collected in one session which added constraints on the kind of collective action permissible for participants.

This limitation had several implications that might affect the generalizability of our results. First, the behavioral measures included in this study required little effort, including signing petitions and signing up for participation in the movement. We know from previous research and observations in natural settings that participation in collective action often holds many obstacles, whether logistical or structural. Thus, our research could not capture the role of such obstacles, pertaining to both, their influence on the antecedents of collective action and their direct effect on collective action intentions and behavior.

Second, because our behavioral outcome measures did not require high commitment or effort, our data does not inform us about the role of collective action antecedent in situations where collective action engagement requires more commitment and presents higher costs. Case in point, TPB suggests that PBC has different effects on intentions and behavior depending on the type of behavior, where PBC is more likely to account for change in behavior when the target behavior requires high levels of control. It follows that one of the possible explanations for why PBC failed to significantly predict behavior in our

study could be because the types of behavior included in our study required low levels of effort and control.

This limitation is also recurrent in the collective action literature, where more often than not, studies include collective action behavioral measures that do not pose high costs or require major effort (e.g. signing petitions). Therefore, it is important for future studies to consider such implications in their research design to establish conditions that resemble collective action contexts in natural settings (e.g. collective action under repressive contexts; Ayanian & Tausch, 2016).

Additionally, Webb and Sheeran (2006) highlighted that the duration between reporting intentions and performing the behavior significantly affects the implementation of behavior. In other words, individuals are more likely to implement their behavioral intentions when the time interval between their reported intentions and behavioral opportunity is short. In the case of this research, and given that the adopted research design was cross-sectional, participants were asked to report their collective action intentions and directly after, they were given the opportunity to implement their intentions. This setup could have possibly interfered with the overall translation of intentions to behavior, ultimately exaggerating the effect size of intentions on behavior. Therefore, we should be wary of generalizing this data to collective action to natural settings where there is typically a long interval between one's behavioral intention and the opportunity to actively participate in the target behavior.

Furthermore, another limitation involved the artificial set-up of our study which prevented organic discussions from taking place among participants and between

participants and the confederates. To elaborate, in natural settings, it is likely that discussions between individuals would arise upon receiving news that might warrant collective action. However, our study could not capture how such discussions might impact individuals' collective action intentions and behavior.

Finally, although none of the responses to the manipulation check we administered insinuated suspicion as to the true purpose of the study, it is important to highlight that 20% of the responses were missing. We believe this could be because the format of the question was open-ended, and it was placed towards the end of the survey. However, results should be examined with caution in light of this missing data.

To address these limitations, future research should consider adopting longitudinal designs that offer a more realistic execution of collective action. Such design would allow for the behavioral opportunity to be presented at a more realistic time interval and to require higher levels of effort and commitment. More specifically, given that collective action participation is often context-specific and often requires particular conditions and predictors, different streams of research can manipulate the effort required to implement the target behavior. Such data would provide insight regarding the influence of different structural and social psychological motivations to collective action participation.

Furthermore, the results of this study should also be interpreted against the backdrop of heightened collective action levels that were present at the time of data collection. The data collection took place two months after the October uprising. For the first few weeks after October 17th, strategies of civil disobedience were adopted by protesters which included roadblocks and ultimately led to the closures of schools and businesses. Consequently,

there was a disturbance to the daily lives of our participant pool, particularly since classes had been suspended after the surge of protests and only resumed around two weeks before our data collection session.

However, we believe that this could also be a potential advantage of our research, particularly regarding the process through which collective action and general states of dissent can spill over to other forms of collective action participation in different contexts. Importantly, our results revealed that participation in the uprising was the only direct predictor of collective action behavior aside from intentions. This can also be insightful for streams of research concerned with structural motivations for collective action and the effect of previous collective action on future participation.

Finally, but not less importantly, more research should be devoted to understanding structural, institutional, and contextual motivations as well as obstacles to collective action participation. Not only is such knowledge fundamental for a comprehensive understanding of collective action behavior, but it also holds major implications on strategies adopted by grassroots movements and social change actors.

CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSION

Our research concluded that common motivations for collective action present in the literature seem to adequately, and even impressively, predict collective action intentions. However, it is important for the study of collective action to capture the convoluted nature of collective action behavior that requires different prerequisites at different stages. Consequently, more research should be devoted to investigating the underlying motivations for supporters of collective action to become active participants.

One take-away message from this research is that it is necessary to study collective action as a multi-stage process, with each stage demanding specific antecedents. Our results further problematize the convergence of the collective action intentions formation stage (mobilization potential) with the active participation/mobilization stage in the discipline. We believe that while the social psychological literature has remarkably furthered our understanding of antecedent pathways to collective action intentions formation, it is still heavily lacking regarding collective action behavior.

Furthermore, our research also highlights the influence of previous collective action on future behavior. This finding provides interesting insights regarding how the relevance and timeliness of previous participation can possibly influence its predictive power on a future target behavior. Therefore, we also recommend that future academic efforts become increasingly devoted to structural and contextual motivations of collective action

participation, for they are potentially central for a comprehensive understanding of collective action behavior.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE STUDY

Opportunity to Gain Bonus Point on Final Course Grade

Dear Students,

You are invited to participate in a student evaluation of financial aid policies at AUB in return for credit on your final course grade. The evaluation will take place at 6 p.m. on Wednesday December 4th before the Quiz Night in Bathish Auditorium, West Hall. The session will involve attending a brief presentation and completing a questionnaire. The evaluation will take about 20 minutes to complete. Participation is completely voluntary and anonymous. Refusal to participate or deciding to withdraw from the evaluation session will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled and will NOT affect your relationship with AUB.

Please contact Charles Harb at ch17@aub.edu.lb or Ghina Abi-Ghannam at gga16@mail.aub.edu if you have any questions.

Our only requirement is that you be LEBANESE aged 18 years or above, and enrolled in PSYC 101/201.

To thank you for your participation, you will receive one credit point on your final PSYC 101/201 grade.

PLEASE BE THERE ON TIME. THE EVALUATION WILL START AT 6 P.M. SHARP!

KINDLY MAKE SURE TO GET YOUR LAPTOPS/TABLETS WITH YOU!

Should you decide not to participate or should you not be eligible to participate (e.g. if you're not Lebanese or you're below 18 years of age), you can choose to write a brief report on an article from a psychological journal to receive credit equivalent to 1% point added to your overall average in the course PSYC 101/201. Please contact Dr. May Awaida (mawaida@aub.edu.lb) to learn more about this option.

APPENDIX B: SCRIPT

Before Presentation:

We are representatives from a student movement that has recently formed called Students Against Sect-Based Aid. There is a new policy that was introduced by the AUB financial aid office that we think is problematic, but before we begin our actions we are trying to get a sense of what AUB students think about this issue so we decide on the next steps collectively. We asked the psychology department to help us with this and Dr. Charles Harb and May Awaida have agreed to give us the space to talk to you, to explain the new financial aid policy and why we stand against it, and to hopefully motivate you to join us and stand with us against what we believe is a discriminatory and unfair policy. We will now give a brief presentation to explain what the proposed policy is and what how we are thinking of fighting it. After this, you will be asked to answer a short survey that is completely anonymous which you will find on moodle and then you will have the opportunity to join our collective and contribute to fighting this policy.

After PowerPoint Presentation:

Please open Moodle and start the survey which should take 15-20 minutes. Keep in mind that you cannot leave the room nor talk to each other until everyone submits. Please do not open anything your electronic devices other than the survey. We would really appreciate it if you refrain from using your phones until the end of the survey, unless you don't have laptops/tablets. You will receive credit at the end of the survey through writing your name on an exit sheet being passed around by research assistants.

Debriefing:

The information offered about AUB's financial aid sectarian quota as well as the student movement targeting it was strictly fabricated for the purpose of this study. As such, the petition and sign-up sheet were all designed for the purpose of the study. This study investigates the transformation of collective action intentions into behaviors; thus, the primary reason for deception was to receive natural or realistic information from you regarding whether or not you would participate in collective action.

To receive your credit, you must sign your name, ID number, section number and instructor's name on the exit sheet being rotated by the investigators. Your name and ID number will be stored in a separate data file from your responses to the survey, so it cannot be used to link your responses to your identity.

APPENDIX C: STUDENT GROUP'S PRESENTATION



**STUDENTS AGAINST
SECT-BASED AID**

**Student Evaluation of the
Financial Aid Office in AUB**

Students for a Merit and Need based Aid Policy



**STUDENTS AGAINST
SECT-BASED AID**


We are a group of students from different majors,
unaffiliated with any club on campus

We decided to organize under a campaign called **“Students
Against Sect-Based Aid”**

Our aim is to reform the financial aid policy at AUB


AUB Financial Aid Proposal

Total Aid Distribution




AUB Financial Aid Policy

Christian Distribution




AUB Financial Aid Policy

Muslim Distribution



Total Financial Aid Distribution by Sect



What does this mean?

Violating principles of financial aid



"Assisting qualified students who could not otherwise meet the cost of tuition"

Violating AUB's non-sectarian values



AUB is required to secure education for students regardless of religious or sectarian backgrounds

Discriminating based on sect



Qualified students who need aid are not being granted financial aid because of their sectarian backgrounds

Our Demands

The **immediate termination** of sectarian quotas from AUB's financial aid policy

1

Adopting a new financial aid policy where aid is distributed based on **need** and **merit** only.

2

How you can help!

1



Sign our petition

2



Join our meetings

3



Spread the word

4



Strike!



This Survey:

- What do students think about this proposed policy?
- What do students think about our group?
- Would you help us establish a merit and need-based financial aid policy?

STUDENTS AGAINST SECT-BASED AID

JOIN US TO STAND AGAINST THE SECTARIANIZATION OF FINANCIAL AID!	JOIN OUR MEETINGS	SIGN THE PETITION
	GET READY TO ESCALATE	SPREAD THE WORD

LET'S WORK TOGETHER FOR A NEED AND MERIT BASED AID POLICY!

APPENDIX D: CONSENT FORM

STUDENT EVALUATION OF FINANCIAL AID POLICIES AT AUB

CONSENT FORM

Thank you for your interest in this evaluation.

Please read this information carefully before deciding to take part in this evaluation. If you agree to participate, you will be asked to click "Next" at the bottom of the page.

What is the evaluation about?

This is a student evaluation of the Sectarian Quota Policy proposed by AUB's Financial Aid Office. This study will sample 300 AUB students.

Who can participate?

You can participate if you are a Lebanese student aged 18 years or above and enrolled in PSYC 201/101.

Explanation of Procedures

Students participating in this evaluation consist of AUB students recruited from the Psychology 101/201 participant pool through a mass email sent by the Psychology 101/201 pool coordinator. As a participant, you will have to read this informed consent form and carefully consider your participation. All students who wish to partake in the evaluation will have the option to download and save a copy of this consent form. Upon consenting to participate in the evaluation, you will be asked to complete an anonymous and confidential questionnaire that will take about 20 minutes. You will be asked about different issues including your attitudes and feelings towards the sectarian quota policy proposed by AUB's financial aid office, how you perceive your identity, your ability to affect change, and your attitude towards collective action.

Are there any benefits in my taking part?

You will contribute to a greater understanding of the student body's perception of the sectarian quota policy proposed by the financial aid office.

Are there any risks involved?

No conceivable risks above those associated with everyday living are involved, although the possibility of some unforeseeable risks exists.

Will my participation be confidential?

If you have any questions about the evaluation before beginning or at any time after participating you may contact Dr. Charles Harb at ch17@aub.edu.lb or Ghina Abi-Ghannam at gga16@mail.aub.edu

Although we have described the general nature of the tasks that you will be asked to perform, more information regarding the study will be provided after you complete the study.

Consent

By clicking “Next” on the button below, I certify that I am at least 18 years and that I have read and understood the information about this study. In consenting, I understand that my legal rights are not affected. I also understand that data collected as part of this research will be kept confidential and that published results will maintain that confidentiality. I finally understand that if I have any questions about my rights as a participant in this research, or if I feel that I have been placed at risk, I may contact the AUB Social & Behavioral Sciences Institutional review Board (SBSIRB) at AUB: 01- 350 000 ext. 5445 or 5454 or irb@aub.edu.lb.

If you accept the above statements and you are willing to participate, please click “Next”. By continuing you indicate your consent to participate in the study.

This survey is anonymous.

The record of your survey responses does not contain any identifying information about you, unless a specific survey question explicitly asked for it.

If you used an identifying token to access this survey, please rest assured that this token will not be stored together with your responses. It is managed in a separate database and will only be updated to indicate whether you did (or did not) complete this survey. There is no way of matching identification tokens with survey responses

APPENDIX E: MESSAGE TO PARTICIPANTS

Important Message

Please Read Carefully!

The proposed **Sectarian Quota Policy** by the **AUB Financial Aid Office**:

As you may know by now, the Financial Aid Office at AUB is adopting a *sectarian quota policy* in the allocation of student financial aid. This policy dictates that financial aid at AUB gets distributed according to a proportional sectarian formula where a specific percentage of financial aid is allocated to each sect within the student body.

The AUB administration has justified this policy by claiming that it allows a balanced distribution of financial aid to students from different sects, supposedly to prevent having one specific sect from receiving more financial aid than others. However, several members of the AUB community have found this policy to be alarming, for they believe that financial aid should be distributed solely on the basis of *need and merit*, regardless of sectarian or other discriminatory criteria, and in line with the principles and values of AUB.

Students Against Sect-Based Aid:

Because of these changes to the Financial Aid Policy, a group of AUB students from across campus have assembled to denounce this new policy and to request that the AUB Upper Administration revokes the Financial Aid Office's new policy and returns to the merit and need based policy.

This student group believes that distributing aid according to sect is a clear violation of the basic principles of financial aid which is to provide support to students who need it and who deserve it, not to students just because they belong to one sect or another. They believe that the sectarian quota policy proposed by the Financial Aid Office is against AUB values, what the university stands for, and the basic principles of meritocracy.

Proposal:

This group aims to pressure the AUB Upper Administration to revoke the sectarian quota policy proposed by the Financial Aid Office and replace it with a system that grants financial aid solely based on the need and merit of students. This group believes that AUB students should come together to reject these sect based quotas and are proposing two actions to make their voices heard by the AUB Upper Administration: 1) circulate a *petition* reiterating their belief in merit and need based decision in line with AUB values and principles and 2) initiate an *on-the-ground awareness campaign* on campus.

This group is calling upon you to join the movement by signing the petition and/or volunteer to help with the campaign.

APPENDIX F: QUESTIONNAIRE

Identity

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree

Group Membership

1. I could belong to a student group that seeks to remove sectarian quotas from AUB's financial aid policy	1	2	3	4	5
2. I would feel strong ties to members of a student group that seeks to remove sectarian quotas from AUB's financial aid policy	1	2	3	4	5
3. Being a member of a student group that seeks to remove sectarian quotas would be an important part of my self-image	1	2	3	4	5

AUB Student Identity

4. I'm concerned with the welfare of AUB students	1	2	3	4	5
5. My identity as an AUB student is important to me	1	2	3	4	5
6. I feel a strong belonging to the AUB community	1	2	3	4	5

Self-Identity

7. Participating in student activism is an important part of who I am	1	2	3	4	5
8. Participating in student activism is something I rarely think about	1	2	3	4	5

9. I think of myself as a student activist to some extent	1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---	---

Please use the 5-point scale to indicate your answers to the following questions

Attitudes

10. I think that engaging in student action to annul sectarian quotas from AUB's financial aid policy is
- | | |
|------------------------|----------------------|
| Extremely Bad | Extremely Good |
| 1 | 5 |
| Extremely Foolish | Extremely Wise |
| 1 | 5 |
| Extremely Unpleasant | Extremely Pleasant |
| 1 | 5 |
| Extremely Unsatisfying | Extremely Satisfying |
| 1 | 5 |
| Extremely Unfavorable | Extremely Favorable |
| 1 | 5 |

Please use the 5-point scale to indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with these statements

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree

Participative Efficacy

11. I believe that I, as an individual, can contribute to the removal of sectarian quotas from AUB's financial aid policy	1	2	3	4	5
12. I believe that I, as an individual, can provide an important contribution so that AUB students can revoke the sectarian quota policy proposed by the Financial Aid Office	1	2	3	4	5

13. I believe that I, as an individual, can provide a significant contribution so that AUB students can revoke the sectarian quotas from financial aid policy in AUB	1	2	3	4	5
14. I believe that I, as an individual, can contribute meaningfully so that AUB students can achieve their common goal of removing sectarian quotas from AUB's financial aid policy	1	2	3	4	5

Injustice

15. Using sectarian quotas in financial aid is unjust.	1	2	3	4	5
16. Using sectarian quotas in financial aid is unfair.	1	2	3	4	5
17. Using sectarian quotas in financial aid is justified.	1	2	3	4	5

Anger

18. As an AUB student, I feel angry that sectarian quotas are allocated to financial aid distribution in AUB.	1	2	3	4	5
19. As an AUB student, the allocation of sectarian quotas to financial aid distribution in AUB makes me furious.	1	2	3	4	5

Sectarianism

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree

20. I am proud to belong to my sect.	1	2	3	4	5
21. My sect can serve Lebanon better than any other sect.	1	2	3	4	5
22. Any governing authority needs to take the interests of my sect into consideration.	1	2	3	4	5
23. I have a strong connection to my sect.	1	2	3	4	5
24. My sect should have a larger proportion/quota of government.	1	2	3	4	5

Please use the 5-point scale to indicate your answers to the following questions

Subjective norms

25. If I engaged in student action to remove sectarian quotas from AUB's financial aid

policy, people who important ne would

Completely disapprove Disapprove Neither disapprove nor approve Approve Completely approve

26. Most people who are important to me think that engaging in student activism to remove sectarian quotas from AUB's financial aid policy is

completely undesirable Undesirable Neither undesirable nor desirable Desirable Completely desirable

27. Most people who are important to me would think that _____ engage in student action to remove sectarian quotas from AUB's financial aid policy

should not 2 3 4 I should

Perceived Behavioral Control

28. For me, engaging in student action to remove sectarian quotas from AUB's financial aid policy is

Very difficult Difficult Neither difficult nor easy Easy Very Easy

29. How difficult would it be for you to engage in student action to remove sectarian quotas from AUB's financial aid policy?


Very difficult Difficult Neither difficult nor easy Easy Very Easy

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree

30. If I wanted to, I could easily engage in student action to remove sectarian quotas from AUB's financial aid policy	1	2	3	4	5
31. I have control over whether I engage in student action to remove sectarian quotas from AUB's financial aid policy	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="checkbox"/> 32. It is <input type="checkbox"/> y up to <input type="checkbox"/> whether <input type="checkbox"/> engage in student action to remove sectarian quotas from AUB's financial aid policy	1	2	3	4	5

Behavioral Intentions

33. I intend to engage in student action to help remove the sectarian quota policy proposed by AUB's financial aid office



Do you intend to engage in student action to remove the sectarian quota policy proposed by AUB's financial aid office?

Definitely do not intend to Do not intend to Neutral Intend to Definitely intend to

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree

34. I intend to sign a petition to request the termination of the sectarian quota policy proposed by the financial aid office at AUB.	1	2	3	4	5
35. I intend to volunteer with the student group (Students for a Merit and Need based Aid Policy) to help remove the sectarian quotas from financial aid policy at AUB	1	2	3	4	5

The following is the petition propagated by Students for a Merit and Need based Aid Policy:

To President Khoury, Provost Harajli and the Board of Deans,

As students of the American University of Beirut from different departments and clubs, it has come to our knowledge that the financial aid office has adopted a sectarian quota policy for the distribution of financial aid to AUB students.

Therefore, we are filing this petition to denounce this policy, as it violates the basic principle of financial aid and the values of the university, which should comply with AUB’s slogan, “*So that they may have life, and have it more abundantly.*” The policy acts against AUB’s standards, which bind it to securing education for students regardless of their religious or sectarian backgrounds. Furthermore, the policy encourages sectarianism among students, which contradicts the university’s values of openness and tolerance.

Above all, it is necessary to abide by the fundamental principle of financial aid, which is the allocation of financial support solely based on need and merit in order to assist “qualified students who could not otherwise meet the cost of tuition”, as stated by the Office of Financial Aid on the official AUB website. Thus, it is clear to us that applying sectarian quotas may lead to the deprivation of some eligible students from financial support simply because they belong to a specific sect.

As such, we call upon the AUB administration to immediately stop the sectarian quota policy proposed by the Financial Aid Office and to adopt a policy that ensures financial aid is provided to students based on need and merit only.

36. Would you like to sign this petition?

Choose one of the following answers

- Yes, I want to sign this petition

No, I do not want to sign this petition

37. This group is also looking for student volunteers to help with the campaign. Kindly tick the boxes below to sign up for any of the following tasks. Please tick the box only if you are absolutely certain that you will be doing that action.

Check all that apply

- Attend an informative meeting with one of the group's organizers to learn more about the movement
- Sign up as a volunteer for at least one of the following tasks: preparing posters, managing social media posts, preparing signs/banners
- I do not want to be involved with this movement

38. If you ticked at least one of the first two boxes, please select the date when you will be available for meeting/volunteering

First option

Date in the format: dd.mm.yyyy

CALENDAR ATTACHED

Format: dd.mm.yyyy

Second option

Date in the format: dd.mm.yyyy

SECOND CALENDAR ATTACHED

Format: dd.mm.yyyy

Want to help spread the word? Tick the box below to distribute **flyers** on campus to AUB students (including friends, classmates, members of student clubs, etc.). The flyers will include a description of the group's demands as well as a call for university students to join the campaign.



39. Choose one of the following answers

- Yes, I want to distribute flyers
- No

40. Students Against Sect-Based Aid are planning a strike on Friday December 13, 2019 to pressure the administration to comply with their demand. Please indicate below if you are certain that you would participate in this strike

Choose one of the following answers

- Yes I am certain that I will participate in this strike
- No I do not want to participate in this strike

Demographic Information

41. Gender:

Choose one of the following answers

- Male
- Female
- Other

42. Age: ____ years

43. Nationality:

Choose one of the following answers

- Lebanese
- Dual citizenship
- Other:

44. Kindly choose the sect you belong to according to your official records

Choose one of the following answers

- Christian Orthodox
- Christian Catholic
- Christian Maronite
- Druze
- Muslim Shi'a
- Muslim Sunni
- Other:

45. How many years have you lived in Lebanon? ____ years

46.

Please think about where your family stands in comparison to others in Lebanon, in terms of socioeconomic status. Point 10 represents those with the most money, highest education, and best jobs; Point 1 represents those with the least money, least education, and worst jobs. Please choose the number that best represents where your family is compared to others in Lebanon.

1(lowest)	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10(highest)

47. Do you benefit from financial aid at AUB?

- Yes
- No
- Not sure

48. How satisfied are you with the services of the financial aid office at AUB?

1	2	3	4	5
Extremely not satisfied	Not satisfied	Neutral	Satisfied	Extremely satisfied

49. Did you participate in any demonstration as part of the October 17th uprising?

Choose one of the following answers

- Yes
- No

50. Did you actively participate in organizing actions as part of the October 17th uprising?

Choose one of the following answers

- Yes
- No

51. How many days have you spent participating in collective action as part of the October 17th uprising?

0	1 to 3	4 to 7	8 to 11	More than 12
<input type="radio"/>				

Manipulation check

52. What do you think the purpose of this study is?

APPENDIX E: DEBRIEFING FORM

If you are interested in learning about the outcomes of the study (note that individual results cannot be provided) please contact Dr. Charles Harb (telephone: 01350000 Ext. 4371). If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, or to report a complaint, you may call: IRB, AUB: 01-350000 Ext. 5445 or 5454. Please make sure to save the contact information, either by taking a screenshot or by copying them to another document, if you wish to contact the researcher or the IRB.

This study investigates the social psychological factors that predict collective action.

Particularly, this research aims to identify the main factors that help transform intentions to participate in collective action into concrete collective action behavior.

This study is part of a Masters student's thesis project. The research investigates the role of identity, emotions, attitudes, norms, efficacy and perceived behavioral control on collective action intentions and behaviors.

Note that the information offered about AUB's financial aid sectarian quota as well as the student movement targeting it was strictly fabricated for the purpose of this study. As such, the petition and sign-up sheet were all designed for the purpose of the study. This study investigates the transformation of collective action intentions into behaviors; thus, the primary reason for deception was to receive natural or realistic information from you regarding whether or not you would participate in collective action.

IMPORTANT: To receive your credit, you must sign your name and ID number on the exit sheet being rotated by the investigators. Your name and ID number will be stored in a separate data file from your responses to the survey, so it cannot be used to link your responses to your identity.

A summary of this research project, and of its results once completed, are available upon request. To request a summary, please feel free to contact Dr. Charles Harb (ch17@aub.edu.lb). Finally, if you have questions about your rights as a participant in this research project, or if you feel that you have been placed at risk, then you may contact the AUB Social & Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board (SBSIRB) at AUB: 01- 350 000 ext. 5445 or 5454 or irb@aub.edu.lb.

Having read about the true purpose of the study and if you give your consent to use your responses in the study, select the button below to submit and exit the survey

Choose one of the following answers

- Submit and press "Next" to finish

If you do not wish for your data to be used, select this option for information on how to withdraw from the study

If you do not wish for your data to be used, your responses will be deleted from the dataset and will not be included in the study. Withdrawal from the study will involve no loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled, nor will it affect your relationship with AUB, your instructor or your grades. Therefore, if you decide to withdraw from the study, you will still earn course credit.

Please remember that your data is strictly confidential and anonymous and your responses cannot be linked to you through any personal identifiers.

The purpose of this study is to outline the predictors of collective action and the variables dictating the translation of collective action intentions to behavior. In order to achieve conditions that resemble the circumstances available in natural settings, the true purpose of the research was concealed from you considering that knowing the study is on collective action behavior would possibly influence participants' responses and behavior.

The primary reason for using deception in this study is to create a simulation of a real-life collective action call. In order to ensure the validity of this study, it was necessary for participants to believe that there is a real call for action that concerns their ingroup (AUB students). Therefore, you were told that you are participating in an evaluation of the financial aid policy and not a study on collective action in order to guarantee the sincerity of your responses.

Kindly state below whether you still want your data to be deleted

Choose one of the following answers

- No, I want my data to be used in this study
- Yes, I want my data to be deleted

**APPENDIX H: HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION FOR DATA
AFTER EXPECTATION MAXIMIZATION**

Table 11 Model Summary for Replaced Data (Intentions)

Model Summary: Intentions

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.36	.13	.11	.74	.13	5.97	6	232	.000
2	.78	.61	.58	.50	.48	28.0	10	222	.000

Table 12 Model Summary for Replaced Data (Behavior)

Model Summary: Behavior

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.34	.12	.09	1.46	.12	5.31	6	232	.000
2	.55	.30	.25	1.32	.18	5.97	10	222	.000
3	.60	.36	.32	1.26	.06	21.62	1	221	.000

APPENDIX I: NORMALITY

Table 13 **Skewness Scores**

Variable	Skewness		
	Statistic	Std. Error	Z-skewness
Group_ID	-.73	.15	-4.63
AUB_ID	-.96	.15	-6.13
Self-Identity	-.11	.15	-.72
Attitude	-1.15	.15	-7.37
Efficacy	-1.27	.15	-1.73
Inj_rev	-1.49	.15	-9.37
Anger	-.47	.16	-2.96
Sectarianism	-.08	.15	-.54
SubNorms	-.56	.15	-3.62
PBC	-.12	.15	.78
Intent	-.28	.15	-1.81
Behavior	-.65	.15	4.2