



AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

THE EFFECT OF INTER-SECTARIAN CONTACT AMONG  
LEBANESE CITIZENS ON COLLECTIVE ACTION  
TENDENCIES FOR A CIVIL STATE

by  
MORTADA ALI AL-AMINE

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
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


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# ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

Mortada Ali Al-Amine

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Title: The Effect of Inter-Sectarian Contact among Lebanese citizens on Collective Action Tendencies for a Civil State.

Over the last decade, there has been a growing debate in social psychology on whether inter-group contact and collective action are compatible models of social change. Research on these two models has led to a recognition of some ‘sedative’ effects that prejudice reduction interventions have on collective action tendencies of disadvantaged groups.

To help address this debate, the present research argues that the effects of inter-group contact on collective action depend on the nature and the context of intergroup relations. As such the current research proposes that in some contexts positive intergroup contact between members of conflicting groups can motivate collective action against a common oppressive system through reducing sectarian in-group bias.

Using an online survey, we collected data from 333 Lebanese citizens from different sects. We tested a moderated mediation model with frequent intergroup contact between friends from different sects as the independent variable, sectarianism as mediator, political partisanship as a moderator, and collective action intentions for a civil state in Lebanon as the dependent variable.

The results confirmed the proposed model by showing a significant indirect effect of frequent positive intergroup contact between Lebanese citizens from different sects on collective action intentions for a civil state through the reduction of sectarianism. This indirect effect was also found to be significantly conditional upon political partisanship such that the relationship between contact and sectarianism was found to be stronger among partisans compared to non-partisans

This study further advances the research on prejudice reduction and collective action models of social change by presenting yet additional evidence of the compatibility of these two models in challenging systems of inequality in particular contexts. Overall, these results indirectly suggest that segregation of regions along sectarian lines is associated with the maintenance of the sectarian political system in Lebanon. As such, creating and protecting opportunities and spaces in which inter-sectarian friendships can

develop could help in reducing sectarian biases and could, on the long-run, eventually feed into collective attempts to challenge the sectarian political system.

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# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

Lebanon is the most religiously diverse country in the Arab world, characterized by the presence of eighteen different religious sects and the fact that no sect constitutes a majority group. Despite its adoption of a political power-sharing system between the sects known as confessionalism, this system has not prevented the country from witnessing several periods of internal armed conflict throughout its modern history which have been framed along sectarian lines. The key to resolving sectarian tensions in the country has long been argued by some to require (among other measures) the abolishment of the confessional political system, that is, the removal of sectarian quotas and the sectarian restrictions allocated to political positions, and the creation of a secular political system. Such demands calling for the overthrow of the sectarian system have been repeatedly echoed in social movements demanding political change, most notably in the recent uprising that erupted in 2019. The current study draws on the social psychological literature on intergroup relations in order to examine some of the factors that may affect Lebanese citizens' collective action tendencies for abolishing sectarian quotas in Lebanon and transitioning into a civil state.

The study of social change in social psychology usually focuses on the improvement of relations between conflicting groups (Dixon, Tropp, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2010). Two psychological models of social change, namely prejudice reduction and collective action, propose different ways of improving intergroup relations (Dixon, Levine, Reicher, & Durrheim, 2012). The first model relies primarily on creating positive intergroup contact between members of conflicting groups in order

to achieve prejudice reduction and therefore a reduction of discrimination and better conditions for conflict resolution. The second model relies on collective action, typically led by the disadvantaged group, which aims to reclaim power from the advantaged group. While these two routes may intuitively seem complementary in decreasing intergroup disparities and achieving equality, the harmony attained through prejudice reduction interventions is considered to maintain inequalities, especially when applied in historically unequal societies- e.g. Blacks and Whites in post-apartheid South Africa as well as Arabs and Israelis (Dixon et al., 2010).

Accordingly, it has been argued that prejudice reduction interventions, have a sedative effect on collective action tendencies among disadvantaged groups (Reicher, 2007). Intergroup contact represents a prejudice reduction intervention that its effects on collective action tendencies have been widely debated in the literature. However, we argue that these sedative effects depend, to a great extent, on the nature and the context of intergroup relations. More specifically, we argue that positive intergroup contact between members of conflicting groups can actually motivate collective action against a common oppressive system through promoting solidarity when: 1) the groups are of relatively equal status or share a history of reciprocal victimization and 2) the conflict is actually fueled or exacerbated by a larger political system or ruling elite.

Hence, the first aim of the present research is to examine whether positive intergroup contact between Lebanese citizens from different sects can, through the reduction of sectarianism, help promote collective action towards a civil state. The second aim was to examine whether the mobilizing effect of positive intergroup contact depends on members' political partisanship. In other words, we propose to investigate if positive inter-sectarian contact among Lebanese citizens can emerge as a positive

predictor of collective action (tendencies) that calls for a civil state in Lebanon. We hypothesize this effect to be mediated by sectarian in-group bias and explore if it is moderated by political partisanship.

In the following literature review, we first introduce our research context by describing the Lebanese sectarian system and the ways in which the sectarian political system has been challenged through collective action with a focus on the October 17 uprising. We then present two social psychological models of social change which have typically been viewed in opposition to each other, namely prejudice reduction through intergroup contact and collective action. We then argue from a contextualist perspective of social change (Dixon & Durrheim, 2016), that in our research context both models can be reconciled for the ultimate aim of reducing intergroup disparities and resolving intergroup conflict. We subsequently discuss the effect of contact on sectarianism, the effect of sectarianism on collective action, and the role of political partisanship in moderating the effects of contact on sectarianism.

## CHAPTER II

### THE LEBANESE CONTEXT

Following its independence in 1943, Lebanon was governed by a power sharing system among its religious communities known as consociational democracy (Makdisi & Khalil, 2013). Under this system, the leaders of the independence movement agreed upon a national pact that entails that the three highest governmental positions were each reserved to one of the three major religious groups in Lebanon. The presidential post was reserved to Christian Maronites, the prime minister to Muslim Sunnis, and the speaker of the parliament to Muslim Shiites (Traboulsi, 2012). The pact also specified a division of parliamentary seats between Christians and Muslims based on a 6:5 ratio in favor of Christians (Makdisi & Khalil, 2013). The primary motive behind implementing a consociational democracy was to maintain a balance of power between the religious communities to reduce conflict and preserve coexistence by requiring political consensus during the decision making process (Lijphart, 1969).

Although this system produced economic growth and domestic stability during the 1950s and 1960s, the eruption of the civil war in 1975 exposed the limits of this system in preserving social order (Traboulsi, 2012). The outbreak of the civil war was caused by a mixture of external (e.g. Israeli-Palestinian conflict) and domestic factors. The domestic factors were largely influenced by the power sharing sectarian system among the Maronites, Sunnis, and Shiites. Muslim political leaders started calling for equal power sharing and migration increased from rural to urban centers causing a rapid growth of poor suburbs due to the uneven development across Lebanese regions and wide income disparities among the Lebanese (Makdisi & Khalil, 2013). This



combination of domestic and external pressures polarized sectarian groups so that political consensus was no longer attainable, state institutions were paralyzed, and an armed conflict ensued between sectarian militias and primarily between Christians and Muslims (Traboulsi, 2012).

Following fifteen years of civil war (1975-1990), external pressures were successful in settling the civil war in Lebanon with the Ta'if accord. The Ta'if accord reaffirmed the sectarian power sharing system by establishing equal representation of Christians and Muslims in the parliament and transferring some of the privileges linked to the Maronite presidential post to the Sunni prime minister's post and the government as a whole, in an attempt to create a greater power balance in governance among the major religious groups (Makdisi & Khalil, 2013). Although the Ta'if agreement included abolishing confessionalism as a national goal, it did not set any timeline for the implementation of this goal (Krayem, 1997). However, according to Traboulsi (2012), political factions have consistently avoided the full implementation of the Ta'if accord for fear that such institutional reform would alter the power balance among the different sectarian-political groups. The author adds that since the abolition of sectarianism is still faced with clear opposition from some Christian political leaders and a tacit opposition from some of the other sectarian leaders, sectarian considerations remain crucial to political life in the country. These sectarian considerations in political life are maintained and reinforced through basing electoral laws on sectarian identities, dividing electoral districts so that each represents a religious community, assigning governmental posts according to sectarian quotas and most importantly giving religious sects exclusive jurisdiction over personal status laws.

In a critical article about the study of sectarianism in Lebanon, Majed (2016) argued that internal conflicts in Lebanon have always been framed and dealt with as problems of power-sharing and sectarian representation. According to the author, all episodes of violent clashes (e.g. civil war, May 2008 violence) were settled by agreements mediated by foreign powers and a reshaping of the balance of power between the sectarian communities (i.e. National Pact, Ta'if accord, Doha agreement). The author contended that each round of internal conflict shifted the salience of sectarianism in Lebanon by strengthening sectarian identities in an oppositional manner such that political polarizations were formed across sectarian lines. For instance, under the Ottoman rule, Mount Lebanon was characterized by a Maronite-Druze division and under greater Lebanon it transformed into a Maronite-Sunni hegemony. Furthermore, the division was reshaped as a conflict between Christians and Muslims during the civil war era and finally it was characterized by a split between Sunni and Shia after the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Al Hariri in 2005 (Majed, 2016).

The assassination of Rafik Al Hariri in 2005 was originally widely blamed on the Syrian regime and led to a popular revolt against the Syrian state's control over Lebanon, leading to the withdrawal of Syrian armed forces. A new political polarization emerged as the country was split between two major political coalitions; the anti-Syrian coalition March 14 consisting mainly (though not exclusively) of Christian, Druze, and Muslim Sunni communities and the pro-Syrian March 8 alliance comprised of a majority of Shias supporting Hezbollah and Amal movement (Harris, 2006), along with other parties representing some sectors of the Sunni, Druze and Christian communities.

While the two political coalitions continue to have contending relations—particularly regarding regional allegiances, the power-sharing model allowed both coalitions to have some control over governmental institutions. To maintain their power, the ruling politico-sectarian parties consistently exploited sectarian identities and intergroup tensions. An essential component of post-war Lebanon is the economic dependency on sectarian parties for services, whereby the ruling class maintains a clientelist relation with their supporters (Cammet, 2011). Such conditions, characterized by high levels of mismanagement and corruption, have led Lebanon to have the third highest debt to GDP ratio in the world and ultimately resulted in an unprecedented economic collapse in the country (Youssef, 2020). This nation-wide collapse resulted in dire economic conditions across sects, where the country has recently witnessed overwhelming inflation rates coupled with an 80% drop in the local currency value, and projected unemployment rates of more than 50% (Information International, 2020).

Having fleshed out the nature of the socioeconomic and political scene in Lebanon, we consider that the relation between the different sects does not easily fall under the advantaged-disadvantaged or dominant-subordinate dichotomy that characterizes most of the intergroup relations studied in the prejudice reduction-collective action literature. None of the sects in Lebanon can necessarily be classified as suffering from a continuously historically disadvantaged status in Lebanon (in terms of having both low social status and low power). This balance has been rendered more evident in light of the recent economic collapse that affected all individuals residing in Lebanon, regardless of sectarian identity. Therefore in the present research we move away from the study of historically advantaged-disadvantaged inter-group conflicts and propose that in contexts where there is conflict between groups of relatively equal

status-a conflict fueled by a political elite- intergroup contact might facilitate collective action that attempts to redress shared inequalities imposed by a political system.

The Lebanese political landscape has never been free of voices demanding major changes in the political system. In fact, according to a 2010 poll by Information International, 58% of the Lebanese people were “in favor of abolishing the confessional system” whereas only 22% were against abolishing confessionalism (Information International, 2010). During the period prior to the civil war and throughout the post-civil war era, Lebanese activists have called for secular reforms. The main demands included the creation of either universal or optional civic personal status laws as well as calling for abolishing of sectarian quotas from governmental posts (Bray-Collins, 2013). However, movements calling for such demands have not succeeded until our day, as they were constantly opposed by counter-movements of sectarian elites and religious figures supported by fractions of the Lebanese society (Bray-Collins, 2013). Over the past decade there have been several grassroots campaigns and protests organized by civil society activists calling for similar demands such as the Lebanese Laïque pride in 2010, the Isqat al Nizam al Ta’ifi (Overthrow the Sectarian System) campaign in 2011, and “al-hirak al-madani” (the Civil Society movement) in 2015 (Bahlawan, 2014; Khneisser, 2018). All these campaigns revolved around the belief that a secular form of governance is necessary for ensuring equal rights for all citizens regardless of sect as well as promoting accountability and social and political stability in the country. These campaigns also tend to blame the ruling political elite across sects for Lebanon’s regressive social, economic and political status quo.

However, all these movements were mostly centralized in Lebanon’s capital Beirut and they were not successful in mobilizing people across all the Lebanese

regions. The uprising that erupted on October 17, 2019 was different. Triggered by exceptional political and economic developments such as the looming devaluation of the Lebanese Lira and newly introduced taxes, the Lebanese had to react to the threats against their livelihoods (Kraidy, 2019). Hundreds of thousands of protesters took to the streets all over Lebanon for several weeks, calling for the ruling political class to leave and for the removal of the existing system/regime. While promising to many at first, the movement has yet to achieve many of its demands and the sectarian political system in Lebanon remains resistant to change.

The protests were generally targeting the Lebanese ruling class as one entity, and repeatedly referred to political party representatives in government as agents of corruption and theft (Bou Khater & Majed, 2020). Importantly, while divisions in the Lebanese political scene were framed along sectarian lines, a re-categorization of intergroup conflict was emphasized in light of the October uprising pitting the supporters of the uprising against the political parties in power. The country was facing an unavoidable reality: the sectarian system that governed Lebanon particularly in the last thirty years cannot be sustained. A necessary change in the Lebanese sectarian regime was perceived as the only path to reform. As such, protesters demanded an end to the existing sectarian regime. Among other demands, there were multiple calls for the abolishment of sectarian quotas from all governmental bodies in addition to the instatement of unified civil status laws to weaken the grip of sectarian institutions over Lebanese citizens' private affairs. Calls for the transition into a civil state were not only restricted to protesters. Many, if not all political parties, voiced the need for such a transition to a civil state, but without showing any concrete intention to implement this.

By the time we launched our data collection, the country had undergone several economic, political, and social calamities that are believed to have changed the country in ways that were unimaginable a year ago. First, the limitations in liquidity of dollars caused banks to gradually impose restrictions on withdrawal of dollars (Youssef, 2020). These restrictions have caused the exchange rate of the Lebanese currency to the dollar to almost double at that time reaching almost 3,000 LBP to the dollar. The currency devaluation was expected to get worse. It has indeed gotten worse and it continues to be expected to worsen at the time of this writing (September 2020). Due to the decreased availability of liquid dollars in the Lebanese market and bank restrictions on withdrawals, the Lebanese depositors had lost over 50% of their savings in the Lebanese banks (Youssef, 2020). In addition to these economic tragedies, the political landscape had also undergone dramatic changes.

After the uprising had successfully forced the government to resign, the goal was to form a new government that is independent of the sectarian ruling factions. Hopes were on such government to mitigate the economic consequences of the crisis, implement necessary reforms, and ultimately set the ground for a transition into a civil state. Such government never saw the light. On the contrary, the ruling factions were successful again in forming a government that was not truly independent of the ruling political parties and thus did not represent the hopes of the protesters. On the social level, and aside from the impact of the aforementioned conditions, Lebanon had recorded its first few cases of the COVID-19 and a wide national lockdown was looming in the near future. The lockdown was enforced two weeks after launching our survey, which coincided with the uprising's loss of momentum. Our survey was launched against the backdrop of these difficult circumstances.

## CHAPTER III

### MODELS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

#### **A. The Prejudice Reduction Model: Contact Hypothesis**

The idea that intergroup prejudice can be reduced via intergroup contact was first proposed by Gordon Allport (1954) in his book *The Nature of Prejudice*, a publication that had a major influence on prejudice research and policy making (Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, Hamberger, & Neins, 2006). The basic premise of the contact hypothesis as proposed by Allport (1954) is that contact or interaction between members of conflicting groups can reduce prejudice between them. Allport (1954) proposed favorable conditions for contact to yield optimal results, such as equal status between the groups, common goals that require intergroup cooperation and institutional support for the intervention. Although many studies that tested the contact hypothesis found that achieving Allport's optimal conditions predicted stronger effects of contact on prejudice, these conditions were not found to be essential for achieving positive results (Pettigrew et al, 2011). Thus even in the absence of Allport's optimal conditions, contact and prejudice reduction were found to be significantly related but to a lesser extent due to a reduced effect size (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) conducted a meta-analysis of 515 studies on intergroup contact theory and found that intergroup contact typically reduces prejudice with a mean effect size of ( $r = -.215$ ). This inverse effect between inter-group contact and prejudice was observed in 94% of these studies and was found to generalize to the entire out-group. Yet it was found that contact effects were greater among majorities compared to minority group members (Pettigrew et al., 2011).

In their review of the measures of inter-group contact, Lolliot et al. (2015) indicated that the relationship between contact and intergroup prejudice is strongest when the contact is more intimate. The authors pointed to previous research findings that showed that cross-group friendships, an intimate form of inter-group contact, is more strongly associated with prejudice reduction compared to more general forms of contact such as contact quantity and quality. They considered that cross-group friendship measures are particularly beneficial because they include both contact quantity and contact quality.

Moreover, meta-analytic findings on the effects of cross-group friendship on inter-group attitudes showed significantly stronger negative relationships between measures of cross-group friendships and inter-group prejudice (Davies et al. 2011). Across the different measures of cross-group friendship, the meta-analysis showed that time spent with and self-disclosure to out-group friends had greater associations with prejudicial attitudes. As such, in the current study, we opted for time spent with out-group friends as our main measure of inter-group contact.

## **B. The Collective Action Model**

Prejudice reduction as mentioned earlier is one route to social change, but it is not the only one. Psychologists, political scientists and sociologists among others have long been engaged in another model of social change. This model is guided by the assumption that dominant groups in societies do not easily let go of their privileges but build powerful systems that maintain the hierarchy and status differentials. It is only through the mass mobilization of subordinates and the direct conflict with those in



power that these systems could be dismantled and social justice could be reached (Dixon et al, 2012).

The evidence for the effectiveness of collective action in reducing intergroup disparities and achieving intergroup equality is not mainly rooted in psychological research and laboratory experiments. However, this evidence comes from reviewing numerous historical struggles that many oppressed groups have gone through to achieve basic rights and to put an end to discriminatory systems (Louis, 2009). Struggles to achieve racial equality in modern history such as the civil rights movement in the United States and the abolition of the apartheid in South Africa illustrate how collective action is necessary to achieve progressive social change (Dixon et al., 2012). More recently, the Arab region has also witnessed several uprisings in different countries. The fundamental aim of these movements was to achieve social justice and better economic conditions through toppling down dictatorships and oppressive political systems (Fakhoury 2019).

## CHAPTER IV

### INTERGROUP CONTACT VS. COLLECTIVE ACTION

Research on these two models of social change has led to a recognition of some potentially paradoxical effects that prejudice reduction interventions have on the collective action tendencies of the disadvantaged (Wright, 2001). In a paper discussing these paradoxical effects, Wright and Lubensky (2009) argued that these contradictory effects stem from the different focus of these two models. For instance, they explain that prejudice reduction targets negative intergroup attitudes. They also suggest that understanding why people hold negative attitudes toward outgroup members and finding ways to change them is important in preventing or reducing conflict and discrimination. However, according to the authors, the collective action model takes another route in the study of social change, a route that focuses on how subordinate groups react to their disadvantaged position in society and the action they might engage in to enhance their social status.

Although both models can be considered complementary given their common goal of reducing inter-group disparities and achieving social justice, some researchers have argued that interventions such as intergroup contact which aim at reducing prejudice may have sedative effects on the psychology of the disadvantaged by decreasing the intensity of perceived injustice which consequently reduces their tendencies to partake in collective action that aims at reducing inequalities (Dixon et al., 2012).

Moreover, a careful inspection of the processes and the mechanisms the two models address reveals how their approaches to social change are fundamentally

contradictory (Wright & Lubensky, 2009). Wright and Lubensky (2009) argued that the underlying psychological mechanism required by these two models puts them in direct conflict with each other. First, they focus on different levels of analysis as prejudice reduction research focuses on a micro-level analysis by giving attention to processes within the individual such as emotions, thoughts, and predispositions, whereas studies of collective action usually involve a macro-level analysis through their focus on thoughts and feelings that are considered to reflect the individual's understanding of social hierarchies and structural discrimination. They also add that the two models target different populations. On one hand, collective action research mainly focuses on the psychological processes of members of disadvantaged groups by investigating the factors associated with collective action among those members. On the other hand, prejudice research mostly targets advantaged group members and aims at understanding the reasons for discriminatory behavior and designing interventions for the purpose of decreasing negative attitudes toward the subordinate outgroup.

To draw a clearer picture of how prejudice reduction interventions can undermine collective action tendencies among disadvantaged groups we ought to uncover the contradictions between the psychological processes that reinforce prejudice reduction and those that promote collective action participation. For example, the two models show opposite orientations when it comes to emotions toward the out-group and collective identification. As Wright and Lubensky (2009) argue, prejudice reduction interventions aim at improving intergroup relations by targeting negative emotions toward the outgroup and creating positive characterizations of them. However, negative characterizations of the out-group (e.g. perceived injustice) and resulting negative emotions (i.e. anger) toward the out-group are some of the most important antecedents

of collective action among the disadvantaged (van Zomeren et al., 2008). Furthermore, the prejudice reduction model aims to highlight common identities between conflicting groups, whereas a strong in-group identity is central for achieving social change through collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008).

### **A. The Sedative Effect of Intergroup Contact on Collective Action**

Several studies have found a sedative effect of intergroup contact on collective action tendencies in different contexts among disadvantaged groups. For example, the effect was tested in interracial contexts between Whites and Blacks in South Africa (Dixon et al., 2010a; Cakal, Hewstone, Shwar, & Heath, 2011), in interethnic contexts between Latino Americans and White Americans in the United States (Tausch, Saguy, & Bryson 2015), Palestinians and Israeli settlers in occupied Palestine (Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009), and finally between Lebanese citizens and Syrian refugees in Lebanon (Saab, Harb & Moughalian, 2017).

Cakal et al. (2011) found that among Black South African university students, positive interaction with White South Africans negatively predicted collective action tendencies and support for policies that favor the in-group. Moreover, Tausch et al. (2015) tested the effect of positive inter-group contact on collective action tendencies in the context of relations between Latino and White Americans. The authors found a significant negative relationship between positive contact with White Americans and collective action among Latino Americans. The authors argue that this negative relationship emerged because positive intergroup contact was found to negatively predict two factors that are considered important predictors of collective action, namely identification with the in-group and anger toward injustice by the outgroup.

Furthermore, Saab et al., (2017) sought to examine the link between positive intergroup contact and collective action in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon and particularly between Syrian refugees (disadvantaged group) and Lebanese citizens (advantaged group). They also aimed at extending previous findings by investigating the effect of positive contact on two types of collective action; violent and non-violent. Their results provided further evidence of the negative relationship between positive intergroup contact and collective action tendencies among the disadvantaged. Particularly, positive intergroup contact between Lebanese citizens and Syrian refugees negatively predicted intentions for violent and non-violent collective action among Syrian refugees.

## **B. Intergroup Contact as a Positive Predictor of Collective Action**

Importantly, the emerging research on the paradoxical effects of intergroup contact on collective action is typically conducted in dyadic contexts pitting two groups with a long history of conflict (e.g. Saguy et al., 2009) or with an unbalanced power dynamic (e.g. Cakal et al., 2011) against each other. In such cases, the injustices faced by the subordinate group are perceived to be caused by the dominant group. However, the sedative effects of intergroup contact on collective action may not be generalizable to non-dyadic intergroup contexts. For example, it may be that in contexts where conflict exists between disadvantaged groups or between groups oppressed by the same system, prejudice reduction interventions- such as positive contact- can set grounds for possible solidarity and increased collective action against a common oppressor, rather than against the outgroup. In such cases, we suggest that contact between the groups could have a mobilizing effect against the oppressive system. We presume that in the

context of sectarian relations in Lebanon, positive intergroup contact could have positive effects on collective action intentions against the sectarian political system among the different sects.

Positive intergroup contact could have a mobilizing effect in this case because it may create opportunities for all groups to recognize common or shared experiences of disadvantage caused by the existing political system, which might encourage the realization of common inequality and shared grievances (Dixon et al., 2016). In addition, such realizations might lead individuals to reattribute the cause of their grievances to the political system and those benefiting from it (the entire political elite) rather than to the out-groups. Borrowing from literature on the common in-group identity model (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993), positive intergroup contact is believed to promote identification with the other group under a common identity, thus transforming the participants' perceptions of themselves and others as "us" vs "them" to a more inclusive category "we" (Gaertner et al., 2000). When positive intergroup contact can promote a common in-group identity through the recognition of shared grievances and a common out-group that is seen as the cause for the grievances, intergroup contact can help promote collective action against the oppressive system.

This process of realization of shared grievances and of an out-group causing them can be seen in the case of secular movements in Lebanon. The loss of faith in the ruling elite due to their corruption and indifference to the public interest have led in recent years to a rise of grassroots anti-sectarian movements that have attempted to challenge the sectarian system e.g. Beirut Madinati municipal election campaign and the various groups of Al-Hirak Al-Madani (Khneisser, 2018). It has been argued that

the support these movements garnered is attributed to a shared sense of frustration with the country's situation that transcends sectarian and regional lines (Issa, 2017). The accumulation of these grievances led to the eruption of a popular uprising that attempted to overthrow the regime represented by the sectarian political parties in power.

More recent studies on intergroup contact and collective action have contributed to the debate by focusing on alternative processes through which intergroup contact can promote social change (Dixon et al., 2015; Dixon et al., 2017). Instead of investigating contexts with historically dominant-subordinate groups, they tested the effect of contact between communities that share a history of disadvantage on their collective action intentions to reduce shared inequalities.

For instance, Dixon et al. (2015) explored relations between disadvantaged communities (Indian and Black South African communities, both historically disadvantaged by White South Africans) in Northdale in South Africa. The aim of the study was to investigate the political, social and psychological consequences of the interaction between two disadvantaged communities that were previously segregated but that now live in the same residential neighborhood. More specifically, the authors were interested in testing the effects of intergroup contact with Black South Africans among Indian South Africans on possibilities of political solidarity between both two communities, as they were both victims of multiple discriminatory laws and policies under the apartheid system. The research was conducted at a time when Black African residents were mobilizing against the local municipality and police demanding water and electricity after an attempt by the municipality to cut off "illegal" electricity lines in their community. As such, the collective action measure in this study assessed Indian

South African residents' intentions to participate in actions in solidarity with residents of informal settlements which are predominantly occupied by Black South Africans to improve their living conditions. The findings suggested that greater positive interactions between members of both communities were associated with greater willingness among Indian participants to participate in collective action in solidarity with residents of informal settlements, in addition to increased support for policies designed to enhance the living conditions of Black residents.

Moreover, Dixon et al. (2017) explored how intergroup contact between members of historically disadvantaged communities in India can facilitate political solidarity between them and promote collective action intentions to challenge the inequalities imposed on them. They found that Muslim students (Muslims are a minority in India) who reported more interactions with members of disadvantaged groups were more willing to engage in collective action that tackles inequalities faced by disadvantaged groups in India. This relationship was mediated by increased collective efficacy and acknowledgment of shared grievances between the two groups. Although both studies shed light on the potential for intergroup contact to promote progressive social change efforts, they both had several limitations. First, both studies failed to test how interactions shape the appraisals and behaviors of all the parties involved in the intergroup contact as they only focused on responses of members from one of the disadvantaged groups. Dixon et al., (2015) and Dixon et al., (2017) only surveyed one group out of the two involved in the intergroup contact; Indian South Africans and Indian Muslims respectively. Such limitations restrict conclusions about the effects of intergroup contact between disadvantaged groups on their collective action tendencies as similar findings might not emerge among both groups. More



importantly, prejudicial attitudes between the groups under investigation in both studies were not measured. This limits our conclusions about the role of prejudice in promoting or preventing collective action in contexts similar to sectarian relations in Lebanon, where groups are seen to be in conflict with one another. The present study aims to address these limitations and to explore: a) if positive intergroup contact between groups that appear to be in conflict with each other but that are also oppressed by the same political system, could lead to collective action against this political system, and b) if the effect of intergroup contact on collective action is mediated by reduced in-group bias (sectarianism) and c) if the effect of intergroup contact on Sectarianism is moderated by political partisanship.

## CHAPTER V

### INTERGROUP CONTACT, SECTARIANISM, POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION

#### A. Intergroup Contact and Sectarianism

The geographical distribution of the Lebanese population is largely based on sectarian divisions due to historical factors and to massive displacements that took place during and after the 1975-1990 civil war. Most Lebanese districts are characterized by a majority of residents belonging to a specific sect. For example, most areas in southern Lebanon are populated by a Shia majority, northern Lebanon has a majority of Sunni population, and Mount Lebanon has a Christian majority. Such sectarian geographical division led to the formation of relatively homogenous sectarian populations and social networks in neighborhoods, schools, and universities. This relative absence of largely mixed sectarian communities in Lebanon has led to limited intergroup contact across sects, which is thought to ultimately contribute in maintaining sectarian attitudes (Moaddel et al., 2012).

A large body of research has established that positive inter-group contact is effective in improving intergroup attitudes (Pettigrew et al., 2011). Harb (2010) defines sectarianism as in-group bias based on affiliation with a certain sect and considers it similar to racism. High levels of sectarianism have been found to be associated with prejudice toward other sects between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland (Cairns, Kenworthy, Campbell, & Hewstone, 2006). The effect of positive intergroup contact on sectarian prejudice has been demonstrated across different contexts. Positive intergroup contact between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland was found to be

positively associated with reduced sectarian prejudice between the two groups (Hewstone et al., 2006). This relationship was also demonstrated in Lebanon between different members of different sects, as contact emerged as a positive predictor of more favorable inter-sectarian attitudes for all the religious sects (Shia, Sunni, Christians, and Druze) (Saab, 2007). Therefore, in the present research we predict that positive intergroup contact with members of other religious sects in Lebanon would be associated with lower levels of sectarianism.

## **B. Sectarianism as a Predictor of Collective Action**

Based on data from a World Values Survey conducted in Lebanon in 2008, Moaddel et al. (2012) examined the social correlates of sectarianism among the three major sects in Lebanon; Sunnis, Shias, and Christians. The authors evaluated the extent to which attitudes toward sectarianism are related to inter-confessional trust and support for secular politics. Attitudes toward sectarianism were measured through a single item “Lebanon will be a better place if people treat one another as Lebanese rather than on the basis of their confession,” while support for secular politics was measured using two items; whether “Lebanon would be a better place if religion and politics were separated” and “if it would be good to have a government where Islamic/Christian religious authorities have absolute power” (the question varied depending on the respondent’s religion and was reverse-coded).

Inter-confessional trust among Sunnis, Shiites, and Maronites was found to be low, whereby all groups reported higher levels of trust for members of their own sect compared to members of other sects. In addition, no significant differences were found between Sunnis, Shiites and Maronites on support for secular politics. The authors

concluded that attitudes toward the sectarian system in Lebanon are shaped by the levels of trust between sects, such that low levels of trust lead to more support for the sectarian system. However the authors did not provide any empirical test for that assumption. While the results of this study need to be treated with caution due to the poor measures used, it offers a comparison between Sunnis, Shiites, and Christians on different constructs related to sectarian relations and political attitudes related to secular politics and sectarianism in Lebanon. Although it does not tap into measures of collective action it does address the relationship between sectarian attitudes and support for secular politics which might be understood as an antecedent for engaging in collective action against the confessional system.

In a study investigating the social psychological profiles of the Lebanese youth, Harb (2010) surveyed a nationally representative sample of 1200 Lebanese youths between the ages of 18-25 and found that the overall sample scored above the midpoint (3.78 over 5) on a sectarianism measure and found no differences based on their confession, region, or gender.

In another study that used the same measure of sectarianism on a sample of Lebanese university students, similar results emerged as the sectarianism score was above the midpoint (3.39 over 5) (Kobeissi, 2013). Moreover, Moughalian (2015) found that sectarianism among Lebanese university students was negatively linked to collective action tendencies for abolishing sectarian quotas (as applied to political positions in the parliament, presidency and the ministry), suggesting that interventions that aim at reducing sectarianism can be effective in mobilizing people against the Lebanese confessional system.

We argue that sectarianism would predict collective action intentions that calls for a civil state in Lebanon because individuals high on sectarianism would be driven to promote the interests of their sect by guaranteeing its representation in governmental positions. A secular system on the other hand could be seen to pose a threat to the power allocated to each sect by removing sectarian quotas from governmental positions and de-institutionalizing the role of sectarian identity in political affairs. Thus we contend that sectarian considerations among the Lebanese help in maintaining the current status quo and stand against the establishment of a strong political movement that aims at changing the sectarian system. Consequently, we expect sectarianism to mediate the effect of contact on collective action among both groups.

### **C. Political Partisanship as a Moderator of the effects of Inter-group Contact on Sectarianism**

Since it has been well established that intergroup contact breeds more positive intergroup attitudes, more recent research has begun exploring the role of political ideology in influencing the effects of intergroup contact on prejudice. One line of research has examined if positive intergroup contact may have limited success in reducing prejudice among individuals who hold conservative or hierarchy-enhancing political ideologies (political ideology as a moderator). Most studies have focused on indirect measures of political ideology, namely measures of ideological tendencies: social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), defined as the individual's level of preference for equality between groups, and right wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981), characterized by submission to authorities, conventionalism and authoritarian aggression (Hoskin, Thomas, & McGarty,

2018;Shook, Hopkins, & Koech, 2016; Dhont, Van Heil, & Hewstone, 2014). Note that scoring high on SDO or RWA is linked to support for more conservative or right-wing political parties (Hiel & Mervielde, 2002).

In what follows, we focus on a stream of research that explored how the effects of contact on prejudice may depend on individuals' SDO and RWA, thus treating these two variables as moderators. There are two competing hypotheses that explain how intergroup contact can reduce prejudice among authoritarian or prejudice prone individuals (Dhont & Van Heil 2009). The first one was highlighted by Allport (1954) who stated that contact cannot always overcome people's ideological beliefs. This translates to a moderation effect of authoritarianism on the relationship between contact and prejudice such that contact would not be as effective in reducing prejudice among high scoring authoritarians or prejudice-prone individuals (Dhont & Van Heil 2009).

The second hypothesis is based on findings from a more recent study by Hodson (2008) that tested the moderating effect of SDO on the relationship between contact and prejudice among inmates in two British prisons. In two cross-sectional studies, Hodson (2008) surveyed two samples constituting 35 and 50 White inmates and measured their SDO levels and frequency of positive contact with black inmates. The author found that positive intergroup contact was more effective in reducing prejudice for high SDO inmates compared to low SDO inmates who had similar experiences. The difference in the effectiveness of intergroup contact can be attributed to the difference in prejudice scores, as those low in SDO already exhibited lower prejudice scores thus contact appeared less effective in reducing their levels of prejudice. Also, due to the small size of both samples and the unique environment they come from, the findings may have limited generalizability to other settings, particularly since previous research has found that

settings where participants have limited choice in engaging in contact (e.g. experimental designs that create the opportunity for contact, school settings) result in larger effects compared to contexts that provide choice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).

Absrock, Christ, Duckitt, and Sibley (2011) argued that RWA and SDO represent different psychological constructs and thus would have differential moderation effects on contact and prejudice. They stated that “SDO is based on the perception of the world as a competitive jungle and expresses a competitive driven motivation for dominance, superiority, and power. People high in SDO are especially prejudiced against groups perceived as socially subordinate and low in status as well as those challenging established social hierarchies” (Absrock et al., 2011, p.479). On the other hand they claimed that “RWA is based on a perception of the world as a dangerous place and expresses the threat-driven motivational goal of maintaining and establishing social order and stability. People high in RWA are especially prejudiced in particular toward groups perceived as disrupting social order, cohesion, stability, and security” (Absrock et al., 2011, p.479). Given the different underlying motivations of SDO and RWA, the authors proposed that the effect of contact on prejudice would differ among individuals high on SDO and RWA (Absrock et al., 2011).

The results of a longitudinal study were in line with the proposed hypotheses. Consistent with previous findings, the results suggested that positive inter-group contact with immigrants among German adults was linked to reduced prejudice only for individuals high in RWA and not for those high on SDO. Drawing on Social Dominance theory (Pratto et al., 1994), the authors argued that the results imply that high SDO individuals did not diverge from their motivation to enhance hierarchies after engaging in contact with immigrants as they continued to use prejudice as a hierarchy legitimizing

myth-an ideology that legitimizes discrimination and enhances inequalities. Thus they conclude that high SDO individuals do not benefit from contact experiences even when they befriend out-group members.

Finally, in a more recent longitudinal study, Hoskin et al. (2018) tested the moderation effect of SDO on the relationship between positive inter-group contact between Australian citizens (advantaged group) and people from developing countries (disadvantaged groups) and the formation of a common opinion based social identity, a common identity that was proposed to increase solidarity based collective action among Australian citizens that aims at reducing global poverty. The authors found that positive intergroup contact between Australian participants and people from developing countries promoted collective action intentions amongst advantaged group members (Australians) through strengthening their social identification as supporters of efforts to reduce global poverty, but only among individuals low on SDO (Hoskin et al. 2018).

In the context of the present research, we take political partisanship as a proxy for political ideology and argue that it should emerge as an important moderator of the relationship between contact and sectarianism. We define partisanship as support for or neutrality<sup>1</sup> to at least one of the six main sectarian Lebanese political parties (seen to be major players in the sectarian political system) and non-partisanship as opposition to all these political parties. The underlying rationale behind this distinction is that sectarian political parties benefit from upholding the sectarian system as it guarantees them monopoly over different kinds of resources which increases people's dependence on them by considering them the main welfare providers (Cammet, 2011). Moreover, we contend

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<sup>1</sup> Initially, we did not intend to treat neutrality as support. However, when transforming our continuous measure of partisanship to a categorical measure we considered neutrality towards one of the political parties the equivalent of support. The rationale is further explained in the method section.



that these political parties contribute to the perpetuation of the sectarian system as evidenced by the absence of any serious decision to change the sectarian quota system (El-Kotob, 2011) and their direct opposition to movements calling for the abolishment of the sectarian system (Hajjar, 2015).


Although some of these parties were very supportive of the Lebanese uprising and engaged in it, they were overall more concerned with maintaining their power in the politico-sectarian system rather than changing it. Therefore, we suggest that support for these political parties signifies a stronger commitment to their political discourses and to the status quo that is characterized by sectarian considerations in social and political life. Conversely, an anti-sectarian or secularist ideology would be more likely to be adopted by those who are unaligned with any of the six political parties. Thus the distinction we make between partisans and non-partisans reflects the likelihood of the adoption of sectarian and anti-sectarian political ideologies.

Among all four sects (Sunnis, Shiites, Christians, and Druze), partisans are considered those who support or are neutral towards at least one of the main ruling political parties. These six parties represent the 8 March alliance (Hezbollah, Amal Movement, and the Free Patriotic Movement) and the 14 March Alliance (Future Movement, Lebanese Forces, and Progressive Socialist Party). These parties are considered the main constituencies of the 8 March and 14 March alliances that ruled the country from 2005 till now. We operationalized partisanship as support or neutrality towards one of these parties because they were all represented in the government that resigned after the October 17 uprising and remain the major parties in power (through their representation in the parliament even if to differing degrees) and their control over various institutions in the country.

## CHAPTER VI

### AIMS AND HYPOTHESES

Figure 1 Conceptual Model



In sum, the current research aims to test the hypothesis that positive inter-group contact (measured as amount of time spent with friends from different sects) between Lebanese citizens from different sects will be positively associated with willingness to participate in collective action that calls for a civil state. This research contributes to one of the popular debates in social psychology: whether intergroup contact and collective action are complementary models for promoting social change. The research aims to move away from investigating these two models in a context of historically advantaged-disadvantaged groups, as we aim to advance the literature by exploring the potential effects of positive intergroup contact between groups that are seemingly in conflict with each other on their intentions to act in solidarity against an oppressive political system. We propose that in such contexts, both models of social change can be reconciled and achieve the necessary antecedent conditions for progressive political change in Lebanon.

To our knowledge, no such research has undertaken this approach in addressing the tensions between intergroup contact and collective action as models of social change.

As depicted in the model (Figure 1) we hypothesize that the relationship between intergroup contact (measured as time spent with friends from different sects) and collective action would be mediated by sectarianism such that intergroup contact would lead to increased collective action intentions through reducing sectarianism. By including sectarianism (measured as in-group bias toward one's sect) as a predictor of collective action intentions and as a mediator of the effect of positive intergroup contact on collective action, we expand on the repertoire of variables that are found to mediate the link between contact and collective action such as efficacy, identity, and shared grievances (Dixon et al., 2017; Hoskin et al., 2018).

To hypothesize the effects of political partisanship, we draw on the literature investigating the role of SDO and RWA in the effect of contact on prejudice. Specifically, we make the case that, because Lebanon's confessional system pits the different parties in an ongoing competition over various kinds of resources, political partisanship might well mimic SDO scores. In other words, we expect that partisanship will operate in similar ways to SDO, making partisans psychologically equivalent to those high in SDO, and we formulate its hypotheses based on that literature. Since the literature presents conflicting findings on the role of political ideology in moderating the effect of contact on prejudice, we propose two competing hypotheses: (1) Positive inter-group contact would be more effective in reducing levels of sectarianism among non-partisans than among partisans (partisanship acts as an inhibitor for the effect of intergroup contact). (2) Positive inter-group contact would be more effective in reducing sectarianism for partisans, because non-partisans would consistently display lower level of sectarianism (partisanship acts as

a facilitator for the effect of intergroup contact). Therefore we expect political partisanship to moderate the relationship between positive intergroup contact and sectarianism, but we test two competing hypotheses about the size of the effect among partisans and non-partisans. In sum, we hypothesize the following:

H1: Frequent intergroup contact between friends from different sects will be associated with lower levels of sectarianism.

H2: Sectarianism will be negatively associated with collective action intention for a civil state

H3: Sectarianism will mediate the relationship between frequent intergroup contact between friends from different sects and collective action.

H4a: Political partisanship would moderate the relationship between frequent intergroup contact among friends from different sect and sectarianism, such that the relationship between contact and sectarianism would become weaker among partisans compared to non-partisans.

H4b: Political partisanship would moderate the relationship between frequent intergroup contact among friends from different sects and sectarianism, such that the relationship between contact and sectarianism would become stronger among partisans compared to non-partisans.

## CHAPTER VII

### METHODOLOGY

#### **A. Participants**

Six hundred forty three individuals participated in the online survey. Of those, only 367 submitted the survey by going through all the survey questions and reaching the debriefing form page<sup>2</sup>. The data collection was conducted between 5/March/2020 and 19/June/2020.

#### **B. Research Design and Procedure**

This study used a cross-sectional online survey design. The predictor variables were time spent with friends from different sects, partisanship, and sectarianism. The outcome variable was collective action intentions for a civil state in Lebanon.

#### **C. Instruments**

The survey included many other scales and questions (see Appendix D for the full questionnaire). In this section, we only explain the instruments that were used for the purpose of this study.

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<sup>2</sup> The total number of participants (643) includes any individual who clicked on the survey link and moved beyond the consent form page. Many of those exited the survey without filling any question, others only answered a small number of the survey questions. We also included on the top of the first page of the survey a note reminding participants of the inclusion criteria: Lebanese citizens who are 18 years or older and currently residing in Lebanon. We also requested anyone who does not fit this criteria to exit the survey. The final sample (367) included those who went through all the survey reaching the debriefing form regardless of how many questions they answered.

### ***1. Cross-group friendship***

Cross-group friendship was measured by asking participants about the time they spend and communicate with friends from four different sects including their own (Shiites, Sunnis, Christians, and Druze). This measure of cross-group friendship was adapted from Turner, Hewstone, Voci (2007). Time spent with friends from different sects included four items on a five-point response scale asking about the time spent with friends from each of the four sects: “How often do you spend time with friends who are Lebanese Sunni?” (1 = All the time, 2 = Quite a lot, 3 = Sometimes, 4 = Occasionally, 5 = Never). We also included an additional answer option “I don’t know” in case participants were ignorant of their friends’ religious sect. For each participant, depending on his/her sect, an aggregate score was calculated by computing the mean of the three items measuring time spent with friends from the other three sects. Therefore, the final score for time spent with friends from different sects combined different items for each participant depending on his/her sect.

### ***2. Sectarianism***

This measure was adopted from Harb (2010). The initial scale consisted of five Likert scale items (1 = Strongly agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Disagree, 5 = Strongly disagree). Examples include “I am proud to belong to my sect” and “Any governing authority needs to take the interests of my sect into consideration”. An additional item adapted from Faour (1998) and Moughalian (2015) was also used, which states: “My sect is superior to all other sects”. This sixth item was added to go beyond assessing positive attitudes towards one's own sect by measuring perceptions of

the superiority and desire for dominance of one's own sect over other sects. The six item scale had high reliability in our sample, Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.92$  (Table 2).

### 3. *Partisanship*

We included two measures of partisanship in our study, a categorical measure and a continuous measure. For the categorical measure, we asked participants to indicate, from a list of 13 Lebanese political parties, which party or parties they support or feel the closest to in terms of their political opinions. The options also included "None" and "Other" (see Appendix D for list of political parties). The continuous measure consisted of six items measuring support for six political ruling parties in Lebanon: Hezbollah, Amal Movement, Future Movement, Free Patriotic Movement, Progressive Socialist Party, and the Lebanese Forces.<sup>3</sup> Each item was a five point scale ranging from 1 to 5 (1 = strongly support, 2 = support, 3 = neutral, 4 = oppose, 5 = strongly oppose). In order to transform the measure of partisanship into a single categorical measure<sup>4</sup>, we created an index score in which non-partisans were participants who stated that they either opposed or strongly opposed all the parties whereas partisans were those who supported, strongly supported or were neutral

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<sup>3</sup> Initially, the continuous measure of partisanship included an additional item measuring support for the Lebanese Phalanges Party. The seven political parties have been the main political actors in the country. However, in recent years, the Lebanese Phalanges Party has been less influential due to their small representation in the parliament and their resignation from the government in 2015 and refusal to take part in the successive governments since then. Therefore, we excluded them from the categorical index score of partisanship.

<sup>4</sup> We did not treat partisanship as a single continuous measure by averaging the scores of participants on all six items because supporting one party does not entail support for other parties. On the contrary, support for one party e.g. Free Patriotic Movement is associated with strong opposition to other parties e.g. the Lebanese Forces. This was further confirmed by performing a factor analysis of the items measuring support for the six political parties that yielded two factors.

toward at least one of the political parties<sup>5</sup>. For our moderator, we used the categorical index measure of partisanship because it clearly defines the difference between partisans and non-partisans. This construct distinguishes between individuals who clearly oppose all the main ruling political (non-partisans) and those who do not (partisans).

#### ***4. Collective action intentions***

This measure consisted of four Likert scale items (1 = Strongly agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Disagree, 5 = Strongly disagree). The items measured intentions to participate in four different non-violent collective action strategies that call for a civil state in Lebanon: signing a petition, participating in a protest, participating in a strike, and joining a group that advocates for that goal. We defined a civil state as a civil non-sectarian state that is primarily based on two elements (1) abolishing sectarian quotas from all political positions in Lebanon and (2) approving civil personal status laws (laws Civil for marriage, divorce, child custody, inheritance).

#### **D. Translation**

The questionnaire was administered strictly in the formal Arabic language. All originally English items were translated to Arabic by two professional translators. We followed a double translation procedure (Grisay, 2003) which included two independent translations from the source language (English) and reconciliation by a third party. More specifically, two professional translators each produced a translated Arabic

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<sup>5</sup> Among partisans, 82 participants (46.6%) indicated support or strong support for at least one political party and 15 participants (8.5%) were neutral towards all political parties. Among non-partisans, 79 participants (44.9%) were neutral towards at least one party and opposed or strongly opposed the others.



version of the questionnaire from the original English version. After that, the two versions were assessed in comparison with each other by the two investigators and the two translators in order to produce a more equivalent Arabic version of the questionnaire.

### ***1. Pilot Study***

After receiving approval from the institutional review board, a pilot study was conducted prior to the main study on a sample of 12 Lebanese individuals from different sectarian backgrounds. The purpose of the pilot study was to ensure that all items were comprehensible and relevant to both males and females and to members of different sects. In addition, the pilot study aimed to specify the time it takes to complete the questionnaire. After participants completed the questionnaire, they were asked to report survey completion time and identify any unclear items as well as items that they experienced difficulties in answering. The participants were also asked to provide advice on ways that the measures could be improved. The majority of participants in the pilot study reported that the questionnaire was long, taking longer than 20 minutes to complete it. As a result the survey was shortened to allow completion within 15 to 20 minutes.

### ***1. Demographic Information***

Demographics included gender, age, sect, family income, marital status, educational background, occupation, residency and number of years lived in Lebanon. All scores were reversed so that higher numbers reflected more time spent with friends from different sects, higher sectarianism, higher social status and political power,

greater support for political parties, and greater intentions to participate in collective action.

## ***2. Main Study***

Participants in the main study were recruited via an online survey hosted on Lime Survey, a statistical survey web application. The link for the online survey was posted on multiple social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter (see Appendix B). In order to ensure that the same person could not complete the survey more than once, participants were only allowed to complete the survey once per device. In addition the length of the survey, which required 20 minutes to complete, restricted attempts of duplication. Participant recruitment involved snowball sampling where the investigators and group of graduate and undergraduate students at AUB who volunteered to assist in the research, sent the survey to people in their social networks through emails and WhatsApp and subsequently asked them to similarly disseminate the survey in their social networks.

## CHAPTER VIII

### RESULTS

#### A. Preliminary Analysis

##### 1. *Missing value analysis*

Out of the total completed 367 surveys, six cases were deleted because the submitted surveys were empty. Moreover, an additional eleven cases were deleted because they did not identify their sect, a demographic measure that is necessary for the main independent variable in the study. Furthermore, an additional seventeen cases were deleted because they had missing values or “I don’t know” responses on all items of at least one of the main scales: time spent with friends from different sects, sectarianism, partisanship, and collective action intentions. Therefore all these cases (34) were excluded from further analysis, and the final sample size was 333.

After deleting these cases, a missing value analysis (MVA) was run to determine the percentage of missing values in the data set. All of the variables had missing values less than 5% of the total sample. Furthermore, Little MCAR’s test was not significant ( $p= 0.065$ ) indicating that the data was missing completely at random. The data missing at random was replaced using the expectation maximization algorithm (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).

##### 2. *Psychometrics*

###### a. Factor analyses

Separate exploratory factor analyses was performed on the sectarianism and collective action intentions scales using the principal component extraction method (PCA) with an Oblimin rotation without specifying the number of factors. Time spent

with friends from different sects, was not included in the factor analysis, because the items used to calculate its aggregate average score were different depending on the sect of the participant. In general, there were no issues of multicollinearity or singularity, none of the correlations in the matrix were above 0.80. Moreover, Bartlett's test of sphericity was significant for all scales which means that correlations between the items of the scales were sufficiently large for Principle Component Analysis (PCA). Furthermore, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) values were well above the minimum criterion .50 (Fields, 2013), indicating that the sample size is well adequate for factor analysis. The analysis extracted a single factor for each variable with an eigenvalue above Kaiser's criterion of 1 (Fields, 2013). Table 1 shows a summary of the factor analysis diagnostics and results.

Table 1 *FA Criteria of Scales*

Scale	Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	KMO	% of Variance Explained
Sectarianism	$\chi^2(15)=1406.178, p<.001$	0.866	70.34
Collective action	$\chi^2(6)=764.366, p<.001$	0.817	74.46

b. Reliability analysis

Reliability analyses was conducted for all scales. Prior to the analysis, all items were reverse coded so that higher numbers would represent higher scores on the construct. Cronbach's alpha for all scales is represented in Table 2.

Table 2 *Reliability Coefficients of Scales per Sample*

Scale	Number of Items	Cronbach's $\alpha$
Sectarianism	6	0.91
Collective action	4	0.86

c. Outliers

After conducting the reliability analysis, items representing a single construct were averaged together to create separate scales. Univariate outliers were inspected through obtaining z scores for all non-categorical variables (time spent with friends, sectarianism, and collective action) and through inspection of the boxplots. Univariate outliers were defined as those crossing the mark of  $|3.29|$  as this represents the standard deviation marker where scores are said to be too far from the mean to be acceptable (Field, 2013). Four cases had a score greater than  $|3.29|$  on collective action intentions for civil state. No other univariate outliers were detected. Cases were not deleted before the inspection of multivariate outliers.

To check for multivariate outliers, Mahalanobis distance values were saved by running a regression with gender as DV and time spent with friends, sectarianism, partisanship, collective action, age, and sect as predictors. According to the chi square table (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2013) the critical value of the chi squared test for 6 variables at a  $p < .001$  significance level is  $\chi^2 = 22.46$ . After computing the probability of Mahalanobis distances, we found that there was only one case below 0.001. Further inspection of cook's distance showed that none of the values exceed 1.00 indicating that none of these cases had undue influence on regression coefficients. Accordingly these cases were not deleted.

### **3. Normality tests**

To test for normality of the variables, we inspected the Z-skewness and Z-kurtosis of all the variables (see Table 3). Significant skewness and Kurtosis were concluded if the Z scores exceeded  $|3.29|$ . No significant deviation from normality was detected among the predictors. However the Z-score values for the DV

(collective action) was greater than |3.29|. Since the DV is not necessarily expected to be normally distributed, no transformations were conducted (Hayes, 2015).

Table 3 *Skewness and Kurtosis Scores*

Variable	Skewness	Std. Error of Skewness	z-Skewness	Kurtosis	Std. Error of Kurtosis	z-Kurtosis
Number of friends	-0.08	0.13	-0.59	-0.86	0.27	-3.23
Time spent with friends	-0.36	0.13	-2.71	-0.33	0.27	-1.26
Sectarianism	0.339	0.13	2.53	-0.78	0.27	-2.95
Collective action	-1.07	0.134	-7.99	1.34	0.27	5.02

## B. Sample Descriptives

The final sample included 333 Lebanese participants and was predominantly female with 214 female participants (64.3%) and 119 males (35.7%). The average age of the sample was 33.44 years old ( $SD = 13.33$ ) ranging from 18 to 72 years with 28 years as the median age. In terms of marital status, of the total sample, 196 (58.9%) were single, 116 (34.8%) were married, 15 (4.5%) were divorced, and 5 (1.5%) were widowed. This indicates that the majority of the sample are youthful since most are single and below the age of 30 years (55.8%).

The sectarian distribution was as follows: 139 Shiites (41.7%), 94 Sunnis (28.2%), 38 Maronites (11.4%), 30 Druze (9%), 21 Orthodox (6.3%), 6 Catholic (1.8%), 2 protestants (0.6%), 1 Armenian Orthodox (0.3%), 1 Armenian Catholic (0.3%), and one indicating that he removed his sect from official records (originally Shiite) (0.3%).<sup>6</sup> In the absence of census information in the country, it is difficult to

<sup>6</sup> Lebanese citizens have their sects indicated on their individual civil registry record (Ikhraj Qaid). The process to eliminate the sect from one's record poses legal and bureaucratic complications and entails repercussions on some civic rights (e.g. participating in elections, holding public office positions). While this process remains uncommon, some individuals managed to remove their sect from their official records despite its implications on their civic rights.

assess the representativeness of this sample, since the last official census having taken place in 1932 (Diss & Steffen, 2017). A recent demographic report published by Information International (2018) suggested that Sunnis, Shias and Christians each constitute about a third of the population [Shiites (31.6%), Sunnis (31.3%), Christians (30.6%), and Druze (5.3%)]. Accordingly, one could conclude our sample has an over-representation of Shiites (41.7%) and Druze (9%), and an under-representation of Sunnis (28.2%) and Christians (20.7%).

Overall, the sample was highly educated as 95.5% of the sample reached university level education whereas only 3.6% indicated secondary education as their highest level and 0.9% had vocational education. In terms of family income, 122 (36.6%) respondents indicated that the family's income covers their needs and they save from it, 140 (42%) indicated that the income covers their needs and they do not save from it whereas 45 (13.5%) indicated that their family income does not cover their needs. These numbers indicate that the majority of our sample has enough income to cover their needs. According to a recent report by Information International (2020), due to the economic crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, the unemployment rate in Lebanon has passed the 30% mark and is expected to rise to 65% by the end of the year. In comparison to the rest of the population, our sample might be of a higher economic and social class given that a very high percentage of the participants had a university level education. In terms of years lived in Lebanon, 237 respondents (71.2%) indicated that they lived all their lives in Lebanon, and 94 (28.2%) indicated that they lived one or more years abroad. Finally, the majority of our sample were residents of Mount Lebanon (38.7%) and Beirut (38.1%) districts while the rest were distributed across all the other six districts (see Table 4).

Table 4 *Residency and Official Districts*

	Residency district		Official district	
	N	Percentage	N	Percentage
Akkar	2	0.6	9	2.7
Baalback-Hermel	2	0.6	7	2.1
Beirut	127	38.1	67	20.1
Bekaa	7	2.1	20	6
Mount Lebanon	129	38.7	78	23.4
Nabatieh	16	4.8	58	17.4
North	17	5.1	30	9
South	33	9.9	61	18.3

In terms of political support, 12.6% (N = 42) of the participants indicated support for the 8 March alliance and 7.2% (N = 24) indicated support for 14 March alliance whereas 79.3% (N = 264) did not support either of the alliances. The high percentage of opposition towards the two major political alliances in Lebanon can be interpreted in various ways. First, it might indicate that the sample predominantly represents a political view that is influenced by the October 17 uprising particularly in its rejection of the traditional political alliances. This may be related to the sampling technique that was adopted. The snowball sampling mostly occurred in networks that tend to be more secular and opposed to the ruling sectarian parties. Second, this result might instead indicate that the March 8<sup>th</sup> and March 14<sup>th</sup> alliances are no longer relevant in Lebanese politics, even for partisans, as they were more politically relevant in the period after the assassination of ex-prime minister Rafik El-Hariri.

Moreover, the categorical measure of partisanship showed that around half of the sample 171 (51.4 %) did not support any political party while support among the rest of the participants was distributed among 14 political parties (see Table 5). Among those who indicated support for a party and among the major political parties in power,



Hezbollah had the highest support (11.4%), followed by the Free Patriotic Movement (5.7%), and Amal Movement (4.5%). Nevertheless, the highest support was for “Mouwatinoun wa Mouwatinat fi Dawla” party (20.4%) and considerable support was given to the Lebanese Communist Party (7.2%). Note that the latter two parties have not been part of any government in Lebanon’s recent history and were involved in the October 17 uprising. The high rate of support to these parties can also be attributable to the snowball sampling technique that was followed. The distribution of political support in our sample suggest that there has been an oversampling from certain networks and social circles that support parties that are vocal in their opposition to the ruling political parties and the sectarian political system as a whole.

*Table 5 Support for Political Parties: Categorical Measure*

	N*	Percentage
Amal Movement	15	4.5
Marada Party	8	2.4
Free Patriotic Movement	19	5.7
Future Movement	9	2.7
Hezbollah	38	11.4
Islamic group	1	0.3
Lebanese Communist Party	24	7.2
Lebanese Forces	8	2.4
Phalanges Party	7	2.1
Popular Nasserist Party	4	1.2
Progressive Socialist Party	2	0.6
Syrian Social Nationalist Party	7	2.1
Mowatinoun wa Mowatinat fi Dawla	68	20.4
National Bloc	2	0.6
None of the parties	171	51.4

\*Participants can indicate support for more than one party

Partisanship was also assessed using a continuous measure of support for the main six ruling political parties in Lebanon. Out of these six parties, on average, Hezbollah was the least opposed with a mean of 2.04/5, whereas the mean support for

all other parties was approximately the same as it ranged between 1.57 for the Amal Movement and 1.75 for the Lebanese forces (see table 6). After transforming the six continuous measures of partisanship into a single categorical measure (as described in the method section) the sample was almost divided equally between partisans 176 (52.9 %) and non-partisans 157 (47.1%).

*Table 6 Means and Standard Deviations for Support for Six Political Parties*

	Mean (SD)
Hezbollah	2.04 (1.24)
Lebanese Forces	1.75 (0.95)
Progressive Socialist Party	1.70 (0.88)
Future Movement	1.69 (0.89)
Free Patriotic Movement	1.68 (1.02)
Amal Movement	1.57 (0.93)

*Table 7 Means and Standard Deviations for Support for Six Political Parties Among Partisans*

	Mean (SD)
Hezbollah	2.76 (1.29)
Lebanese Forces	2.18 (1.06)
Progressive Socialist Party	2.14 (0.96)
Future Movement	2.12 (0.99)
Free Patriotic Movement	2.16 (1.18)
Amal Movement	1.97 (1.09)

*Table 8 Means and Standard Deviations for Support for Six Political Parties Among Non-partisans*

	Mean (SD)
Hezbollah	1.23 (0.42)
Lebanese Forces	1.27 (0.45)
Progressive Socialist Party	1.20 (0.40)
Future Movement	1.21 (0.41)

Free Patriotic Movement	1.15 (0.36)
Amal Movement	1.13 (0.33)

---

Compared to other studies (Harb, 2010; Moughalian, 2015; Badaan, Richa, & Jost, 2020), this sample was relatively low on sectarianism as the sectarianism score was below the midpoint ( $M= 2.36, SD= 1.01$ ) and high on collective action tendencies for a civil state ( $M= 4.05, SD= 0.90$ ) (above the midpoint). The low level of sectarianism and high level of collective action tendencies in the sample could be due to the context in which the data was collected i.e. the October 17 uprising and the large representation of the supporters of the uprising in the sample. One of the main demands of the uprising as previously explained was changing the sectarian system (Bou Khater & Majed, 2020). The sample was also relatively high on cross-group friendship measures such as time spent with friends from different sects (5 point scale) ( $M= 3.60, SD= 0.93$ ). This indicates that, on average, participants spent some to much of their time with friends that belong to different sects.

*Table 9 General Sample Descriptives*

	N	Mean (SD)
Time spent with friends	333	3.59 (.93)
Sectarianism	333	2.36 (1.01)
Collective action	333	4.05 (.90)

Inspection of the correlation matrix (Table 10) of the variables included in the model revealed a significant medium to large negative correlation between time spent with friends from different sects and sectarianism ( $r= -0.42, p<0.001$ ). Time spent with friends from different sects also had a medium positive correlation with collective action intentions for a civil state ( $r= 0.36, p<0.001$ ). A significant negative medium to

strong correlation also emerged between sectarianism and collective action intentions ( $r = -0.48, p < 0.001$ ). The correlation matrix is also provided for partisans and non-partisans in Tables 11 and 12.

Table 10 *General Inter-correlation Matrix*

	Time spent with friends	Sectarianism	Partisanship	Collective action
Time spent with friends	1			
Sectarianism	-.415**	1		
Partisanship	-.286**	.449**	1	
Collective action	.353**	-.483**	-.356**	1

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 11 *Correlations: Non partisan*

	Time spent with friends	Sectarianism	Collective action
Time spent with friends	1		
Sectarianism	-.212**	1	
Collective action	.298**	-.327**	1

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).


Table 12 *Correlations: Partisans*

	Time spent with friends	Sectarianism	Collective action
Time spent with friends	1		
Sectarianism	-.416**	1	
Collective action	.268**	-.425**	1

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

### C. Main Analysis

Figure 2 Statistical model



In order to test the effects of time spent with friends from different sects on collective action intentions through sectarianism amongst partisans and non-partisans, we conducted tests of moderated mediation using Hayes (2013) Process Model 8 with 10000 bootstrap samples. We tested a moderated mediation model of whether partisanship moderates the effect of time spent with friends on the mediator sectarianism as well as the direct effect of time spent with friends on collective action intentions after controlling for sect of participant. In other words we tested the direct and indirect effects of time spent with friends on collective action intentions and whether these are moderated by partisanship. The model is represented in conceptual form in Figure 1, and in the form of a path diagram in Figure 2. We included sect as a covariate (U). The covariate is not depicted in the conceptual model (Figure 1) nor the statistical model (Figure 2). We included sect as a covariate because a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed significant differences between the four sects (Shiites, Sunnis, Christians, and Druze) on the main outcome variable (collective action intentions)  $F(3,329) = 2.89, p < 0.05$ . Given the unequal sample sizes of the sects in our

sample, we conducted the Dunnett's C test for post hoc comparisons of collective action intentions among the four sects. The test revealed that Druze participants, on average, were significantly more inclined toward collective action for a civil state ( $M = 4.39$ ) compared to Shiites ( $M = 3.94$ ),  $p < 0.05$ . In order to include sect as a covariate in our model, we created three dummy variables for Sunnis, Christians, and Druze and treated Shiites as the baseline group.

We used the Process Macro by Andrew F. Hayes specifying model number 8 which depicts mediation of the effect of X (time spent with friends) on Y (collective action intentions) through M (sectarianism) with both the direct and indirect effects of X moderated by W (partisanship) (Hayes, 2015). According to Hayes (2015), an indirect effect in such a model is the product of the effect of X on M and the effect of M on Y controlling for X, and the direct effect is the effect of X on Y controlling for M. Both of these effects are moderated by W and are conditional upon it (Hayes, 2015). However, according to Hayes (2015), it is not enough to inspect interaction effects. The interaction effect presents only an estimation of the moderation of the effect of X on M by W. In order to establish whether the indirect effect depends on the moderator, we need to conduct a formal test of moderated mediation to examine the relationship between the moderator and the size of the indirect effect. This relationship is quantified by the index of moderated mediation. "The index of moderated mediation is a direct quantification of the linear association between the indirect effect and the putative moderator of that effect (Hayes, 2015, p. 3)."

Following Hayes's (2015) recommendation, we used the bootstrap confidence intervals using the percentile method for the index of moderated mediation based on 10,000 bootstrap samples. The extremities of the 95% confidence interval represent the

two values of the index in the distribution of k values (in this case 10,000) that define the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the distribution. According to Hayes (2015) if the confidence interval includes zero, then there would be no definitive evidence for the moderation of the mediation. However, if the confidence interval does not include zero, then we can infer that a significant moderated mediation effect exists.

Table 13 *Model Coefficients for the Conditional Process Model*

		Sectarianism (M)					Collective action intentions (Y)			
		Coe ff.	SE	P	95% CI		Coe ff.	SE	P	95% CI
Time spent with friends (X)	a	-	0.0	<.0	-.390, -	c	0.20	0.0	<.0	.046,
	1	0.27	8	1	.063	1		8	5	.345
Sectarianism (M)	b					b	-.32	0.0	<.0	-.420, -
								5	01	.223
Partisanship (W)	a	1.57	0.4	<.0	.776,	c	.08	.37	.82	-.648,
	2		0	01	2.361	2				.816
X * W	a	-	0.1	<.0	-.431, -	c	-.10	.10	.32	-.287,
	3	0.22	1	5	.011	3				.095
Constant		2.62	.33	<.0	1.965,		4.15	0.3	<.0	3.502,
				01	3.278			3	01	4.795
		$R^2 = .3120$					$R^2 = .2951$			
		$F(6, 326) = 24.64 p < .001$					$F(7, 325) = 19.43 p < .001$			

The resulting model coefficients, standard errors, confidence intervals, p-values and model summary information for the process model can be found in table 13. As can be seen in the table, the direct effect of time spent with friends from other sects on collective action intentions (c1) (while controlling for the moderator and the mediator, partisanship and sectarianism) was positive and significant ( $b = 0.20$ , 95% CI = 0.05 to 0.35,  $p < .05$ ). The moderation effect of partisanship on the direct effect of time spent with friends on collective action is represented in the interaction term c3. The interaction effect between time spent with friends and partisanship on collective action was not


significant ( $b = -0.10$ , 95% CI = -0.29 to 0.10,  $p = .32$ ). Thus, the direct effect of time spent with friends on collective action intentions does not depend on partisanship.

Furthermore, time spent with friends had a significant negative effect on sectarianism (a<sub>1</sub>) ( $b = -0.27$ , 95% CI = -0.39 to -0.06,  $p < .01$ ) indicating that more time spent with friends from different sects is associated with lower sectarianism. Moreover, sectarianism was found to have a significant negative effect on collective action intentions (b) ( $b = -0.32$ , 95% CI = -0.42 to -0.22,  $p < .001$ ) indicating that lower levels of sectarianism are associated with greater intentions to participate in collective action for a civil state.

Evidence for the moderation of the effect of time spent with friends on sectarianism by partisanship can be seen in the product term (a<sub>3</sub>) in table 13. The test of moderation was significant, indicating that the effect of time spent with friends on sectarianism was dependent on partisanship ( $b = -0.22$ , 95% CI = -0.43 to -0.01,  $p < .05$ ). More specifically, the effect of time spent with friends on sectarianism was stronger for partisans ( $b = -0.45$ , 95% CI = -0.58 to -0.31,  $p < .001$ ) than for non-partisans ( $b = -0.23$ , 95% CI = -0.39 to -0.06,  $p < .01$ ). To visualize this interaction effect, we plotted the two-way interaction effect of time spent with friends and partisanship on sectarianism. Examination of the interaction plot (figure 3) showed that as time spent with friends from different sects increased, sectarianism decreased for both partisans and non-partisans. This effect appeared to be stronger among partisans as the slope was steeper compared to non-partisans. However, sectarianism among non-partisans remained lower at all levels of the predictor.



Figure 3 The two way interaction of time spent with friends and partisanship on sectarianism



In order to examine whether the indirect effect of  $X$  (time spent with friends) on  $Y$  (collective action intentions) through  $M$  (sectarianism) depends on  $W$  (partisanship), we generated using the PROCESS Macro a bootstrap confidence interval for the index of moderated mediation. The index of moderated mediation was significantly different from zero since the 95% confidence intervals did not include zero ( $b = 0.07$ , 95% CI = 0.002 to 0.15). This indicates that the indirect effect of time spent with friends on collective action intentions through sectarianism is moderated by partisanship. More specifically, we found a significant positive indirect effect of time spent with friends on collective action through sectarianism among partisans and non-partisans. This effect was stronger for partisans ( $b = 0.14$ , 95% CI = 0.08 to 0.22) compared to non-partisans ( $b = 0.07$ , 95% CI = 0.02 to 0.14). Accordingly, we conclude that spending time with friends from different sects is associated with stronger collective action intentions for a civil state in Lebanon through the reduction of sectarian in-group bias among both partisans and non-partisans. This indirect effect is stronger for partisans compared to

non-partisans, as time spent with friends from different sects was associated with a greater decrease in partisans' sectarianism. However, compared to partisans, non-partisans demonstrate lower levels of sectarianism and higher collective action intentions across all levels of the predictor.

## CHAPTER IX

### DISCUSSION

#### **A. Review of Results**

This study examined the effect of frequent intergroup contact between friends from different sects on intentions of collective action for establishing a civil state in Lebanon. Specifically, the study aimed at investigating whether this relationship is mediated by sectarianism. In addition, the study explored whether the effect of intergroup contact on sectarianism is moderated by political partisanship. As discussed earlier, research on models of social change have suggested an incompatibility between prejudice reduction and collective action models of social change (Van Zomeren, 2018). To elaborate, previous findings proposed that prejudice reduction interventions can have negative impacts such as maintaining systems of inequality. The literature suggested that positive intergroup contact between advantaged and disadvantaged groups reduces disadvantaged group members' motivations to challenge the status quo (Wright & Lubensky, 2009).

We argued that most of these studies are typically conducted in dyadic contexts pitting groups with a long history of conflict (e.g. Saguy et al., 2009) or with unbalanced power dynamics (e.g. Cakal et al., 2011). By contrast, we aimed to examine whether prejudice reduction and collective action models can be compatible in achieving social change (1) when they are examined between groups of relatively equal status and (2) where the conflict between them is actually fueled or exacerbated by a larger political system or ruling elite. In the context of a popular uprising that aimed to challenge a sectarian political system that has pushed the country into an unprecedented

economic crisis, we tested whether frequent intergroup contact between friends from different sects in Lebanon might motivate Lebanese citizens to engage in collective action that calls for a civil state.

Our first hypothesis was that frequent intergroup contact, measured as time spent with friends from different sects, will be associated with lower levels of sectarianism across the whole sample. Our findings confirmed this hypothesis where more time spent with friends from different sects was associated with lower levels of sectarianism. This finding was in line with previous research on the ability of intergroup contact in reducing prejudice between conflicting groups (Pettigrew et al, 2011).

Perhaps the medium to large negative correlation found between frequent contact between friends from different sects and sectarianism can be attributed to the measure of time spent with friends. First, Pettigrew et al. (2011) pointed to the potency of cross-group friendship measures in reducing prejudice. Second, in their meta-analysis of studies that employed cross-group friendship measures as predictors of attitudes, Davies et al. (2011) found that time spent with friends and self-disclosure to friends resulted in significantly stronger associations with attitudes compared to other friendship measures. According to the authors, time spent with friends yields larger effect sizes because it implies a certain level of engagement on behalf of the outgroup. In other words, the construct of time spent with friends indicates a behavioral investment that members of both groups are engaging in. Furthermore, spending time with friends is more likely to occur in active friendships (Davies et al., 2011). According to Davies et al. (2011) inactive friendships might have a reduced impact on intergroup attitudes because of the slower development of concern and empathy between cross-group friends.

Given that our study was conducted against the backdrop of a popular uprising in the country, it is important to highlight that the data collection was conducted in a context characterized by a popular rejection of sectarianism- both at the individual and structural levels. The level of sectarianism in our study was remarkably lower compared to other studies that were conducted with nationally representative samples prior to the uprising (e.g. Harb, 2010 with a youth sample; Badaan et al., 2020 with a nationally representative sample from 2016). However, our sample was not representative, which undermines comparisons with studies that used nationally representative samples.

In addition, among our sample, sectarianism negatively predicted collective action intentions confirming our second hypothesis. This means that lower bias toward one's sect is associated with greater motivation for participation in collective action for a civil state in Lebanon. This finding is in line with previous research investigating the link between sectarianism and support for the Lebanese confessional system. For instance, Moughalian (2015) found that lower levels of sectarianism among university students predicted collective action intentions to abolish sectarian quotas in governmental positions. In addition, in recently published study, Badaan et al., (2020) found a significant association between sectarianism and justification of the Lebanese sectarian system.

Our results also showed a medium to large positive correlation between frequent inter-group contact and collective action intentions. In addition, our model also confirmed a significant positive direct effect of contact on collective action intentions. That is, the more time Lebanese citizens spent with their friends from different sects the more they were motivated to participate in future action calling for a civil state in Lebanon. This finding is in line with other research findings that found a positive

association between positive contact among historically disadvantaged groups in South Africa (Dixon et al., 2015) and India (Dixon et al., 2017) and solidarity based collective action intentions. These findings show that prejudice reduction and collective action models can be compatible in achieving social change when tested between groups that do not fall into the classic dominant/subordinate categories.

Additionally, our study sheds light on the potential social psychological process that may explain the relationship between intergroup contact and collective action. We hypothesized that sectarianism will mediate the relationship between frequent intergroup contact between friends from different sects and collective action. The results confirmed our third hypothesis by showing that the relationship between intergroup contact and collective action is mediated by the reduction in sectarianism. To elaborate, spending time with friends from different sects was associated with lower levels of sectarianism among participants. This reduction in sectarianism was also associated with increased intentions to partake in different types of collective actions demanding a transition to a civil state.

We tested two competing hypotheses about the role of political partisanship in moderating the effect of frequent intergroup contact on sectarianism. Both hypotheses predicted that political partisanship will emerge as a significant moderator however they differed in whether political partisanship inhibits or facilitates the effect of contact on sectarianism. H4a stated that the relationship between contact and sectarianism would become weaker among partisans compared to non-partisans (buffering effect of political partisanship). Conversely, H4b stated that the relationship between contact and sectarianism would become stronger among partisans compared to non-partisans (facilitating effect of political partisanship).

The findings supported the latter hypothesis (H4b). On one hand, political partisanship emerged as a significant moderator of the relationship between frequent intergroup contact and sectarianism. On the other hand, the effect of contact on sectarianism was stronger for partisans compared to non-partisans. Among partisans, more time spent with friends from different sects was associated with a greater decrease in sectarianism levels. However, levels of sectarianism were overall higher for partisans compared to non-partisans.

Perhaps the difference in the effectiveness of intergroup contact is dependent on the initial levels of sectarianism among partisans and non-partisans. For non-partisans, intergroup contact appeared less effective because they already had low levels of sectarianism. However, since partisans exhibited higher levels of sectarianism, they had more to gain from the intergroup contact experience. This interpretation echoes Hudson's (2008) finding which showed that contact was more effective in reducing racism for inmates high on SDO compared to those low on SDO. Such congruence in the results corroborates our conceptualization of political partisanship in that it mimics SDO scores.

## **B. Limitations Practical Implications, and Future Direction**

Our study had several limitations. First, we used snowball sampling as our main sampling procedure. This procedure enabled a networking effect that impacted the diversity and representativeness of our sample. As we mentioned in the methods section, the investigators along with a group of research assistants disseminated the survey in their social networks. Given that the majority of those were educated, young, had positive attitudes toward the uprising, and were politically unaffiliated, we had a

larger representation of participants with those characteristics. Future research should adopt sampling strategies that do not include network effects, so that the collected data would not be biased by the characteristics of the researchers.

Second, the sample bias had an impact on our political partisanship construct. Although we tried to disseminate the survey in groups and networks that are known to be supportive of the ruling parties, we were not able to collect enough responses from partisans. In order to mitigate this limitation, we operationalized political partisanship as support or neutrality towards any of the six main ruling parties in the country. Moreover, the networking effect also resulted in an unequal and unrepresentative distribution of sects in our study. Initially, we intended to test our model separately for each sect. However, the low sample size of the sub-groups did not allow us to have enough power to test the model per sect. As such, we resorted to testing the model on the whole sample without conducting subgroup analyses.

Third, we originally conceptualized our measure of political partisanship as a proxy measure for political ideology and linked it to measures of ideological tendencies such as SDO and RWA. More specifically, we assumed that political partisanship would mimic SDO scores such that partisans would be higher on SDO compared to non-partisans and we drew our hypotheses based on this association. Although our results echo those of SDO's moderating effect on the link between intergroup contact and racism (Hudson, 2008), our study does not provide empirical evidence on the link between SDO and political partisanship. More critically, although political partisanship in Lebanon can be motivated by political ideologies such as right wing nationalist ideologies, pan Arabism, and anti-imperialism, it remains mostly determined by sectarian group membership. Therefore our measure of political partisanship qualifies



more as a measure of political group membership rather than political ideology, which further blurs the link we drew between political partisanship and SDO. Future research should therefore test the link between the two and also use other measures of political ideology.

Fourth, the cross-sectional design of the study does not allow us to draw causal inferences about the relationships between our variables. For instance, some research (Herek & Capitanio, 1996) has suggested other explanations for the relationship between contact and prejudice, namely that prejudiced individuals avoid contact with out-groups. Nonetheless, a meta-analysis that included both longitudinal and cross-sectional studies examining this association has shown that the path from contact to prejudice was generally found to be much stronger than the reverse path (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). The path from collective action intentions to lower sectarianism could also be plausible. Individuals might demand a civil state in Lebanon regardless of their sectarianism levels, but that intention could later lead to lower levels of sectarianism. Also, participation in collective action against the political system could be a behavior that lead to attitudinal changes, namely, reduced sectarian in-group bias.

Fifth, we were not able to assess the internal consistency for the measure of time spent with friends from different sects. The measure was calculated by averaging the scores of three items measuring time spent with friends from three different sects. Thus, for each sect, the final aggregate score was based on different items. It would have only been possible to assess the internal consistency of the measure for each sect. Since we did not conduct sub-group analysis, we used the measure without assessing its internal reliability. To address the limitation in the measure of time spent with friends from different sects, future studies can either increase the sample size to be able to conduct

sub-group analysis, or use a measure in which its items are the same for all participants. For example, the measure could ask about time spent with friends from different sects across different contexts such as university, neighborhood and work.

Sixth, it is important to note that this study was conducted in a context of heightened intentions for change. Although data was collected during a national lockdown enforced as part of the COVID-19 precautionary regulations, the factors that preceded the eruption of the uprising were still relevant. Due to that context, the sample exhibited very high intentions to engage in collective action that aims to change a system that many believed had caused the economic crisis. Therefore, the results of our study should be interpreted in light of this context and may not be generalizable to contexts with political and economic stability.

In addition, our measure of collective action intentions of a civil state in Lebanon also had some limitations. First, this measure was negatively skewed in our sample. The high willingness to partake in different forms of collective action might be due to the low investment required by the behavioral measures we included. Most of our participants had already participated in at least one form of collective action during the uprising and had witnessed a wide range of both violent and non-violent forms of mobilization and dissent. Indicating an intention to sign a petition, participate in a protest, join a strike, or join a group that advocates for a civil state in Lebanon might have seemed to require low effort and little cost compared to behaviors participants had previously engaged in or at least witnessed in the context of the uprising. As such, the measure can be improved through increasing the perceived effort and the cost associated with partaking in the collective action behavior. This can be done through specifying a longer time frame for behavioral engagement such as participating in

protests until demands are achieved. The measure could also include specific behavioral aspects that would require absence from work or university for a set period of time such as blocking roads, occupying spaces, or long-term strike.

Finally, our working definition of civil state might have also biased responses on the collective action intention measure. In Lebanon, and particularly during the uprising, there have been different political conceptions of a civil state. Our definition of civil state included only two characteristics. (1) The abolishment of sectarian quotas from governmental positions and (2) the instatement of unified personal civil status laws. This definition is only one of different notions that the Lebanese hold concerning the civil state. For example, whether the personal civil status laws are mandatory or voluntary represent one major point of contention. Also, many have argued that, in line with the Ta'if accord, the abolishment of sectarian quotas from governmental posts should be followed by the creation of a senate that ensures the representation of sects. Such disagreement on the notion of a civil state might have influenced participants' reported intentions to engage in collective action under our conceptualization of a civil state. If we had provided more details in our definition of civil state, the sample might have reported lower collective action intentions.

In sum, our research suggests that future theorizations about the compatibility of prejudice reduction and collective action models of social change should take the context of the intergroup conflict being examined into account. Research on these two models have found varying results depending on several factors including but not limited to: the power dynamics between the conflicting groups (Saguy et al., 2009), the source of the injustice, the dynamics of the intergroup contact experience (Becker et al., 2013; Droogendyk et al., 2016), and the ultimate aim of the collective action (Dixon et

al., 2017). Variations in these factors could alter the association between prejudice reduction and collective action.

The practical implications of this study are mainly concerned with the role of inter-sectarian contact in challenging the sectarian political system in Lebanon. While taking into account that our data is cross-sectional our results show that one way to challenge the sectarian system would be through increasing opportunities of inter-sectarian contact specifically those in which friendships can develop. We previously mentioned how Lebanon is geographically divided along sectarian lines, a division that predominantly limits interactions in the community to people of the same sect with the exception of more diversified areas such as the capital, Beirut. Still, even in such areas with greater sectarian diversity, imagined sectarian fault lines remain present across neighborhoods. The ruling elite benefit from maintaining such divisions as they reinforce sectarian belonging through blurring the lines between communal and sectarian relations, in a way that one's community becomes his/her sect. Our results shed light on the mechanism through which the political system can be empowered through segregating communities along sectarian lines because there would be less opportunities for inter-sectarian friendships to emerge, less opportunities for sectarianism to reduce, and consequently limited prospects of transitioning into a civil state. Of course, friendships take time to emerge and therefore they cannot constitute an immediate facilitating factor for the emergence of revolutionary anti-sectarian collective action. Instead, our study illustrates how inter-sectarian friendships and bonds can potentially be associated with long-term effects on anti-sectarian collective action. Naturally, there remains many other psychological, social, economic, and political

dimensions that need to be taken into account to understand more fully the predictors of anti-sectarian collective actions.

Relatedly, this study focused only on one narrow framework of prejudice reduction model as a social change model, namely the contact hypothesis. Other useful frameworks to understand anti-sectarian collective action involve social categorization and specifically the common in-group identity model (Gaertner et al, 1993). Processes such as re-categorization and crossed categorizations would have been particularly beneficial in explaining shifts in sectarian or secular, partisan, and national identities.

It is important for future research to identify the mechanisms through which contact affects collective action, particularly at the level of identities. Identifying such mechanisms would allow us to understand how inter-group contact shapes social categorization and in turn determine the social identities that can promote collective action in a specific context. These mechanisms can be understood through social categorization strategies such as re-categorization, de-categorization, crossed categorization and integration (Paluck & Green, 2009). Studies that adopt the re-categorization techniques aim to examine the process that motivates individuals that belong to conflicting groups to think of themselves as part of one group (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2009). For example, instead of thinking of themselves as members of religious sects, Lebanese individuals can be encouraged to think of themselves as citizens of the same nation that share similar grievances and aspirations. It is likely that crossed categorization (Paluck & Green, 2009), which enables members of opposing groups to be aware of their membership in a common third group, can lead members of different sects to unite under a common identity based on social class or citizenry against the political elite. This form of social categorization could be the most likely to prompt

revolutionary collective action against the sectarian system. It is therefore important to investigate the role of crossed categorization in prompting revolutionary collective action in similar contexts.

In this regard, if cross-category identities can encourage mobilization against the sectarian system, it is important to question how crucial intergroup contact is on its own for the creation of such cross-category identities. It is possible, for example, that the mere awareness of shared grievances may be sufficient for the emergence of such cross-category identities and for people to unite against the system as they did in the October 17<sup>th</sup> revolution despite the sectarian groups being geographically segregated and opportunities for contact being potentially limited for many. It is also possible, however, that a stronger opposition emerges against the system when the two groups have already developed stronger bonds and solid social networks, e.g. through intergroup contact. .

Regarding the Lebanese context, the perception of the conflict as strictly sectarian in nature overshadows many of the structural factors that maintained the political system. Instead of framing the conflict as purely sectarian, researchers should aim to explore group differences based on geographical and socio-economic factors rather than focusing purely on sectarian identities. Our research falls short in addressing such intersections as well as other structural factors that seem to govern and determine Lebanese citizens' relationship with each other, their sects, and political parties. Instead, we strictly investigate sectarianism and intentions to challenge the political system based on interpersonal relationships between members of different sects.

Besides the general research approach, future studies could improve some of the measures used in our study. For instance, instead of measuring intergroup contact as

time spent with friends, contact could also be assessed through the opportunities of contact that participants have had and by measuring extended and indirect contact through social media platforms and traditional media outlets. Measuring opportunity for contact adds an extra nuance that enables us to distinguish between whether participants' intergroup contact experiences or the lack thereof are intentional or due to external factors. In this day and age, social media and television news represent important outlets that grant individuals expansive exposure to people from various cultural, social, and political backgrounds. Evidently, social media played a key role in the proliferation of popular uprisings such as those of the Arab Spring (Gerbaudo, 2012) and more recent social movements such as Black Lives Matter (Mundt, Ross, & Burnett, 2018). Future studies could look into the role of indirect and extended contact in promoting solidarity and engagement in collective action. In addition, future studies could include behavioral measures of sectarianism rather than attitudinal ones. It might be possible that the Lebanese people do not consider themselves sectarian and thus score low on attitudinal measures of sectarianism while engaging in both implicit and explicit forms of sectarian behavior.

Finally, although our results show that sectarianism mediates the relationship between contact and collective action, future studies can test other variables that could explain this relationship. The Lebanese citizens did not only demand the fall of the regime because they felt less sectarian, but it was also because their livelihoods and future in the country was threatened. Furthermore, the solidarity between the citizens across different regions in Lebanon cannot be only understood through positive emotions toward other sects but it can also be explained through their realization of their shared grievances, common fate, and that only through their unity would they be

able to enforce change. Therefore, future studies should investigate factors that have been found to predict collective action such as social identity, shared grievances, and efficacy (Van Zomeren et al., 2008) as potential mediators of the relationship between contact and collective action.



## CHAPTER X

### CONCLUSION

In summary, this study tested the compatibility of prejudice reduction and collective action models of social change in a novel context. While most research has traditionally investigated prejudice reduction and collective action models of social change between groups with a long history of conflict and unbalanced power dynamics, the present study explored these models in a context is characterized by groups that do not fall into the classical dominant/subordinate distinction and a conflict among them that is fueled by an unjust political system and a ruling elite. In particular, we examined whether frequent intergroup contact between friends from different sects in Lebanon would lead to greater collective action intentions for a civil state in Lebanon. In addition, the study tested whether this relationship would be mediated by sectarianism and moderated by political partisanship. First, the results showed a significant positive relationship between intergroup contact measured as time spent with friends from different sects and collective action intentions. Second the study also found that more contact with friends from different sects was associated with lower levels of sectarianism. Third, sectarianism was found to be a significant mediator of the effect of intergroup contact on collective action intentions. And finally, the relationship between intergroup contact and sectarianism was significantly moderated by political partisanship such that partisans exhibited a larger reduction in sectarianism compared to non-partisans. Therefore, the study shows that prejudice reduction and collective action can be compatible in achieving social change depending on the context they are tested in.

## END NOTE

This research project has undergone several changes due to the circumstances that occurred in the past year. We state these in the present thesis because we deem it interesting to document examples of the difficulties encountered when conducting social and political psychological research in politically unstable and challenging settings such as Lebanon, in addition to the difficulties brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic. The main proposal of this research was submitted during February 2019. The initial aim of the research was to address the debate about the compatibility of collective action and prejudice reduction models of social change in the Lebanese context. At that time Lebanon was witnessing a period of relative political and social stability. It was only a year after the parliamentary elections and almost a month after the formation of a new government that represented all the main political parties. During that period, the Lebanese social and political landscape was characterized by a lack of political engagement and oppositional social movements. We had originally aimed to test the same model among Sunnis and Shiites only due to the framing of the sectarian conflict in Lebanon's recent past. We restricted our field data collection to two main regions in Beirut, Tarik Al Jdideh and the Southern Suburb; two areas that are mostly populated by Sunnis and Shiites respectively and known to be the strongholds of the two most powerful Sunni and Shiite political parties, Future Movement and Hezbollah respectively.

Our data collection was delayed for two months due to the push back we received from gatekeepers of the areas we wanted to collect data in, specifically in Beirut's southern Suburb. After receiving preliminary approval from the gatekeepers,

we collected data in the southern suburb October 14 and 15 2019, two days prior to the eruption of the October 17 uprising.

The first three days of the uprising were exceptionally chaotic, all roads in Beirut were closed by burning tires and dumpsters and all stores were closed. People were either in their houses or on the street protesting. Under such circumstances, the data collection had to be put on hold until the situation would go back to normal. However, things escalated at a very fast pace as the country entered an unprecedented economic crisis and the demonstrations did not stop. Almost a month into the uprising, we realized that the data collection had to be completely stopped for two reasons. First, the major changes in the political and social scene had to be addressed in our study. Second the data that we had already collected was not enough to test our model (we barely had any data from Shiites and data from Sunnis was less than 100 participants). Therefore, we decided to rethink our study to fit the context of the uprising. Consequently, the questionnaire was updated and we resorted to online data collection instead of on the field paper-based surveys. This update in the study required a resubmission to the institutional review board.

After getting the approval we launched the survey on the 5th of March 2020. At that time, a new government had formed after the resignation of the previous one under the pressure of the uprising. Although the uprising had lost most of its momentum on the ground, protest and feelings of anger toward the system were still part of Lebanon's daily life. Two weeks after we launched our survey, a nationwide lockdown was enforced in order to counter the spread of the COVID-19. That decision represented another setback to our data collection. Although the survey remained open and online, we could not maintain the same rate of disseminating the survey during the early stages

of the lockdown due to the disruptions it caused. Due to the pandemic and the length of the survey we were not able to collect the number of responses that we had initially hoped for. Eventually we decided to stop the data collection after almost three months and a half on June 19th 2020.

## APPENDIX A

### Consent form Arabic

موافقة على المشاركة في دراسة عبر الإنترنت

### دراسة عن المواقف والآراء الاجتماعية لشريحة من اللبنانيين

نودّ أن ندعوك للمشاركة في دراسة أعدت في الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت للدكتورة ريم صعب ومرضى الأمين في كلية العلوم والآداب. تهدف هذه الدراسة إلى لبحث المواقف الاجتماعية والسياسية لشريحة من اللبنانيين بما يتعلق بالعلاقات الاجتماعية فيما بينهم، وآرائهم تجاه النظام السياسي اللبناني وبعض مواقفهم تجاه إنتفاضة 17 تشرين الأول.

الإجراءات:

هذه الرسالة تدعوك إلى:

1. قراءة استبيان الموافقة لمعرفة إذا ما كنت مهتمًا(ة) بالمشاركة في الدراسة.
2. أن تأخذ/ي بعين الاعتبار المعلومات التالية:
  - المشاركة في هذه الدراسة اختيارية وطوعية.
  - ستستغرق مشاركتك حوالي 15 دقيقة تقريبًا.
  - سيتم جمع وتحليل المعلومات التي تقدمها/تقدمينها في الاستبيان فقط. لن يتمكن فريق البحث من معرفة اسمك أو معلومات الاتصال بك
  - سيتم نشر نتائج الدراسة في أطروحة ماجستير متوفرة ورقياً ورقمياً في مكتبة الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت.
  - للمشاركة في هذه الدراسة، **يجب أن تكون (بن) قادر(ة) على إكمال الاستبيان بمفردك وأن تكون (بن) مواطن(ة) لبناني(ة) عمرك 18 سنة أو أكثر.**
  - سيتم التواصل مع المشتركين عبر إرسال بريد إلكتروني يدعو للمشاركة في الاستبيان.

الفوائد المحتملة للأفراد أو المجتمع:

لا يوجد فوائد مباشرة لمشاركتك في هذه الدراسة، لكن المشاركة ستساعد الباحثين في الوصول إلى فهم أعمق للعلاقات بين اللبنانيين ومواقفهم الاجتماعية والسياسية، بالإضافة إلى تعزيز فهمنا للعوامل التي تلعب دوراً مهماً في إحداث تغييرات إجتماعية.

المخاطر والأضرار المحتملة على الأفراد أو المجتمع:

لا يوجد مخاطر محتملة غير تلك المرتبطة بالحياة اليومية.

الخصوصية والسرية:

سوف تبقى مشاركتك في هذه الدراسة مجهولة وسريّة لأقصى حدّ ممكن. ستقوم لجنة المراجعات في الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت بمراقبة السجلات ويمكن أن تدقّق بها من دون مخالفة الخصوصية والسرية.

المشاركة والانسحاب من المشاركة:

مشاركتك في هذا الاستبيان اختيارية وطوعية تمامًا. يمكنك سحب موافقتك على المشاركة في أي وقت دون أي تفسير ودون أي عقوبة. قرارك بالمشاركة أو عدم المشاركة في هذه الدراسة لن يؤثر على علاقتك الحالية أو المستقبلية مع الجامعة أو مستشفى الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت.

في حال كنت تريد أي معلومات أو توضيحات إضافية، يمكنك التواصل مع:

الدكتورة ريم صعب

أستاذة مساعدة في الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت

البريد الإلكتروني: [rs147@aub.edu.lb](mailto:rs147@aub.edu.lb)

الهاتف: 0135000 (الرقم الداخلي: 3835)

مرتضى الأمين

طالب ماجستير في قسم علم النفس في الجامعة  
الأميريكية في بيروت

البريد الإلكتروني: [maa233@mail.aub.edu](mailto:maa233@mail.aub.edu)

الهاتف: 71-164015

إذا كنت قد قرأت إستمارة الموافقة وأجبت على جميع تساؤلاتك، يمكنك الوصول إلى الإستمارة من خلال الضغط على الرابط التالي.

هذه الإستمارة الإلكترونية مصممة عبر برنامج لايم سيرفاي (Lime Survey).

أيضاً، إذا كنت تعرف (بين) أشخاصاً آخرين قد يهتمون بالمشاركة في هذه الدراسة، نرجو منك إرسال هذا البريد لهم، وشكراً!!

في حال وجود ملاحظات حول أخلاقيات الدراسة أو حقوقك كمشارك(ة)، يمكنك التواصل مع لجنة الأخلاقيات في الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت على البريد الإلكتروني [irb@aub.edu.lb](mailto:irb@aub.edu.lb) أو من خلال الهاتف على 01 350000 (رقم داخلي: 5445).

APPENDIX B  
Advertisement for the Study

1. Email Announcement for Snowball Sampling

Consent to participate in an Online Research Study

This notice is for an AUB-IRB Approved Research Study

for Dr. Rim Saab and Mortada Al-Amine at AUB.

\*It is not an Official Message from AUB\*

You are invited to participate in a research study about the social and political attitudes of Lebanese citizens. The purpose of this study is to investigate the social relations between Lebanese citizens, their perception of the Lebanese political system and attitudes toward various aspects of the October 17 uprising. This study is conducted by Dr. Rim Saab and Mortada Al-Amine, Faculty of Arts and Sciences at the American University of Beirut.

**PROCEDURES**

This message invites you to:

1. Read the consent document and consider whether you want to be involved in the study.

And to note:

- *Participation is completely voluntary.*
- *Completing the questionnaire will take around 15 minutes.*
- *Only the data you provide in the questionnaire will be collected and analyzed. The research team will not have access to your name or contact details.*
- *The results of the survey will be published in Master's thesis available in printed form and electronically from AUB libraries.*
- *You are eligible for participating in this study if you are a Lebanese citizen, able to complete the survey on your own, and you are 18 years old or more..*
- *This study will sample 400 Lebanese citizens from different Lebanese regions.*
- *Participants will be recruited through two different strategies; they will either be approached by the research team to fill out a paper based survey or they will be sent an email inviting them to fill out an online survey.*

**POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO SUBJECTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY**

You will not receive payment for participation in this study.

**The results of the study will enhance our understanding of factors that play a significant role in bringing about social change**

#### **POTENTIAL RISKS TO SUBJECTS AND/OR SOCIETY**

**No conceivable risks above those associated with everyday living are involved**

#### **CONFIDENTIALITY**

**The collected data will remain confidential *and anonymous*.**

**Records will be monitored and may be audited by the IRB while assuring confidentiality.**

#### **PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL**

**If you voluntarily consent to take part in this study, you can change your mind and withdraw at any time without consequences of any kind.**

**Refusal to participate or withdrawal from the study will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled, and neither will it affect their relationship with their organization and AUB/AUBMC.**

#### **QUESTIONS ABOUT THE STUDY**

If you have any questions about the study, you can contact the research team at:

**Dr. Rim Saab, Assistant Professor of Psychology**  
Department of Psychology, American University of Beirut  
[rs147@aub.edu.lb](mailto:rs147@aub.edu.lb)  
01-350000 Ext. 4367

**Mortada Al-Amine, Graduate Student in General Psychology**  
Department of Psychology, American University of Beirut  
[maa233@mail.aub.edu](mailto:maa233@mail.aub.edu)  
+961 71164015

#### **ACCESS TO THE SURVEY**

**If after reading the consent document and having your questions answered, you voluntarily agree to take part in the study; you can access the survey by clicking on the following link. The survey is hosted on lime survey.**

**Also, if you know other individuals who might be interested in this survey, please forward this email to them!**



## CONCERNS OR QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS

If you have concerns about the study or questions about your rights as a participant, you can contact the **AUB IRB Office**:

[irb@aub.edu.lb](mailto:irb@aub.edu.lb)

01-350000 Ext. 5454/5445

### 2. Social Media Post: English

We invite you to participate in an online survey for a research study called “social and political attitudes Lebanese citizens.” We would be very grateful if you could participate.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the social relations between Lebanese citizens, their perception of the Lebanese political system and attitudes toward various aspects of the October 17 uprising. The survey will take about 15 to 20 minutes to complete. If you participate in this study, you will be asked to respond to some questionnaires. You are eligible for participating in this study if you are a Lebanese citizen, able to complete the survey on your own, and you are 18 years old or more. A link to the survey is provided below. Your participation incurs no costs and there are no monetary incentives. There are no risks and no direct benefits associated with participation in this study. However, the potential benefit is that participation in the study will enhance our understanding of factors that play a significant role in bringing about social change in Lebanon.

If you have any questions before participating, you can contact Dr. Rim Saab at [rs147@aub.edu.lb](mailto:rs147@aub.edu.lb); telephone: 01350000 Ext. 4367

If you have any complaints, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, you can contact IRB at AUB: 01- 350 000 ext. 5445 or 5454 or [irb@aub.edu.lb](mailto:irb@aub.edu.lb). If after reading the consent document and having your questions answered, you voluntarily agree to take part in the study; you can access the survey by clicking on the following link. The survey is hosted on lime survey.

Also, if you know other individuals who might be interested in this survey, please share it with them!

### 3. Social Media Post: Arabic

ندعوكم للمشاركة في إستمارة إلكترونية لدراسة بعنوان "المواقف السياسيّة والإجتماعية للمواطنين اللبنانيين". سنكون ممتنين جداً لمشاركتكم. تهدف هذه الدراسة إلى البحث في العوامل النفسية والإجتماعية المتعلقة بالمواقف والآراء الإجتماعيّة والسياسية لشريحة من اللبنانيين بالإضافة إلى دراسة العلاقات فيما بينهم وبعض مواقفهم تجاه إنتفاضة 17 تشرين الأوّل. ستسغرق مشاركتك حوالي 15 دقيقة تقريباً.

للمشاركة في هذه الدراسة، **يجب أن تكون (ين) قادرة (ة) على إكمال الاستبيان بمفردك وأن تكون (ين) مواطن (ة) لبناني (ة) عمرك 18 سنة أو أكثر.** إذا قبلتم بالمشاركة في هذه الدراسة سنطلب منكم الإجابة على سلسلة من الأسئلة. الرابط الخاص بالإستمارة متوفر في الأسفل. مشاركتك لا تتضمن أي تكاليف أو حوافز مالية. لا يوجد أي مخاطر أو فوائد مباشرة للمشاركة في هذه الدراسة، ل لكن المشاركة ستساعد الباحثين في الوصول إلى فهم أعمق للعلاقات بين اللبنانيين ومواقفهم الإجتماعية والسياسية، بالإضافة إلى تعزيز فهمنا للعوامل التي تلعب دوراً مهماً في إحداث تغيرات إجتماعية. إذا كان لديكم أي سؤال قبل المشاركة، يمكنكم التواصل مع الدكتورة ريم صعب من خلال البريد الإلكتروني: [rs147@aub.edu.lb](mailto:rs147@aub.edu.lb) أو على الهاتف: 01350000 (الرقم الداخلي: 4367). في حال وجود ملاحظات حول أخلاقيات الدراسة أو حقوقك كمشارك/ة، يمكنك التواصل مع لجنة المراجعات في الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت على البريد الإلكتروني [irb@aub.edu.lb](mailto:irb@aub.edu.lb) أو من خلال الهاتف على 01 350000 (رقم داخلي: 5445).

إذا كنت قد قرأت إستمارة الموافقة وأجبت على جميع تساؤلاتك، يمكنك الوصول إلى الإستمارة من خلال الضغط على الرابط التالي.

هذه الإستمارة الإلكترونية مصممة عبر برنامج لايم سيرفاي (Lime Survey).

أيضاً، إذا كنت تعرف/ين أشخاصاً آخرين قد يهتمون بالمشاركة في هذه الدراسة، نرجو منك إرسال هذا البريد لهم، وشكراً!!

## APPENDIX C

### DEBRIEFING FORM

#### 1. Debriefing Form: English

If you are interested in learning about the outcomes of the study (note that individual results cannot be provided) please contact Dr. Rim Saab (telephone: 01350000 Ext. 4367). If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, or to report a complaint, you may call: IRB, AUB: 01-350000 Ext. 5445 or 5454 Please make sure to save the contact information, if you wish to contact the researcher or the IRB. This study examines the relation between a sample of Lebanese citizens, their perceptions of other sects in Lebanon as well as their attitudes toward the Lebanese political system, particularly the application of sectarian quotas in governmental positions and absence of civil laws regarding personal status affairs. In addition, the study investigates the social psychological factors that predicts attitudes toward the October 17 uprising. This study is part of a Masters student's thesis project. The research investigates how the relationship an individual has with individuals from other sects and his/her attitudes toward them is related to a wide range of political and social attitudes and perceptions. A summary of this research project, and of its results once completed, will be available upon request. To request a summary, please feel free to contact Dr. Rim Saab (rs147@aub.edu.lb). Finally, if you have questions about your rights as a participant in this research project, or if you feel that you have been placed at risk, then you may contact the AUB Social & Behavioral Sciences Institutional review Board (SBSIRB) at AUB: 01- 350 000 ext. 5445 or 5454 or [irb@aub.edu.lb](mailto:irb@aub.edu.lb).

#### 2. Debriefing Form: Arabic

شكرًا لمشاركتك في هذه الدراسة

إذا كنت مهتم(ة) في معرفة نتائج هذه الدراسة، يمكنك التواصل مع الدكتورة ريم صعب من خلال البريد الإلكتروني: [rs147@aub.edu.lb](mailto:rs147@aub.edu.lb) أو على الهاتف: 01350000 (الرقم الداخلي: 4367). تبحث هذه الدراسة في العلاقة بين اللبنانيين بمختلف طوائفهم وبعض آرائهم الاجتماعية والسياسية، بالإضافة إلى مواقفهم تجاه بعضهم البعض ومواقفهم تجاه النظام السياسي اللبناني وتحديدًا بما يتعلق بتخصيص حصص طائفية في المناصب السياسية وغياب قوانين مدنية لإدارة الأحوال الشخصية. تهدف هذه الدراسة أيضًا إلى دراسة العوامل النفسية والاجتماعية اللبنانيين المتعلقة بالمواقف تجاه إنتفاضة 17 تشرين الأول. هذه الدراسة هي جزء من أطروحة ماجستير. تهدف الدراسة إلى البحث في علاقة الشخص بأفراد ينتمون إلى طوائف مختلفة وتأثيرها على مواقفهم السياسية والاجتماعية وإستعدادهم للمشاركة في تحركات جماعية تهدف لإلغاء نظام المحاصصة الطائفية بالإضافة إلى المطالبة بإقامة دولة مدنية لا طائفية في لبنان. يمكنك طلب ملخص عن هذه الدراسة ونتائجها فور انتهائها. لطلب الملخص، يمكنك التواصل مع الدكتورة ريم صعب من خلال البريد الإلكتروني: [rs147@aub.edu.lb](mailto:rs147@aub.edu.lb) أو على الهاتف: 01350000 (الرقم الداخلي: 4367). بالختم، في حال وجود ملاحظات حول أخلاقيات الدراسة أو حقوقك كمشارك(ة)، يمكنك التواصل مع لجنة الأخلاقيات في الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت على البريد الإلكتروني [irb@aub.edu.lb](mailto:irb@aub.edu.lb) أو من خلال الهاتف على 01 350000 (رقم داخلي: 5445)

## APPENDIX D

### INSTRUMENTS

#### 1. Instruments: English (only those used in this study)

1. How often do you spend time with friends who are Lebanese Shia?	Never	Occasionally	sometimes	Quite a lot	All the time
2. How often do you spend time with friends who are Lebanese Sunni?	Never	Occasionally	sometimes	Quite a lot	All the time
3. How often do you spend time with friends who are Lebanese Christians	Never	Occasionally	sometimes	Quite a lot	All the time
4. How often do you spend time with friends who are Lebanese Druze	Never	Occasionally	sometimes	Quite a lot	All the time

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

I am proud to belong to my sect.	1	2	3	4	5
My sect can serve Lebanon better than any other sect.	1	2	3	4	5
Any governing authority needs to take the interests of my sect into consideration.	1	2	3	4	5
I have a strong connection to my sect.	1	2	3	4	5
My sect should have a larger proportion/quota of government.	1	2	3	4	5
My sect is superior to all other sects	1	2	3	4	5

In the following question, we would like to know about which political party you support. By support we do not necessarily mean that you are a member of that party; we are interested in which party you feel closest to in your political opinions.

- Amal Movement
- El Marada
- Free Patriotic Movement
- Future Movement
- Hezbollah
- Islamic group
- Lebanese Communist Party
- Lebanese Forces
- Lebanese Phalange Party

- Popular Nasserite Organization
- Progressive Socialist Party
- Syrian Social Nationalist Party
- Sabaa Party
- Mouwatinoun wa Mouwatinat fi Dawla
- None
- Other \_\_\_\_\_

To what extent do you support or oppose the following political parties?

1	2	3	4	5	
Strongly oppose	oppose	Neutral	Support	Strongly support	
1. Hezbollah	1	2	3	4	5
2. Amal Movement	1	2	3	4	5
3. Future Movement	1	2	3	4	5
4. Free Patriotic Movement	1	2	3	4	5
5. The Lebanese Forces	1	2	3	4	5
6. The Lebanese Phalanges Party	1	2	3	4	5
7. Progressive Socialist party	1	2	3	4	5

**We are interested in the following question to the extent of your willingness, to participate in peaceful movements within the framework of the current uprising to demand the establishment of a civil, non-sectarian state based on two elements: (1) abolishing sectarian quotas from all political positions in Lebanon and (2) approving civil personal status laws (laws Civil for marriage, divorce, child custody, inheritance).**

**I am ready to participate in the following activities with the aim of establishing a civil, non-sectarian state ...**

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. Signing a petition	1	2	3	4	5
2. Participating in a peaceful protest	1	2	3	4	5
3. Go on a strike	1	2	3	4	5
4. Join a group that advocates for that goal	1	2	3	4	5

Demographic Information:

**What is your gender?**

- Male
- Female

**Age:** \_\_\_\_\_

**What is the highest level of education you completed?**

- Primary/Elementary school (e.g. Brevet)
- Secondary School (i.e. Baccalaureate)
- Bachelor's Degree
- Master's Degree
- Advanced Graduate work or Ph.D.
- Vocational or Technical Diploma
- Other (please specify)

**Marital status:**

- Single
- Married
- Divorced
- Widow

**What is your religious sect (based on what is written on your official documents: the extract of civil registry (Ikhraj Kaid)):**

- Muslim Sunni
- Muslim Shia
- Maronite
- Orthodox
- Catholic
- Druze
- Other (please specify): \_\_\_\_\_

**Which of these statements best describes your family income?**

- The family income covers our expenses well, and we can save from it
- Family income covers the expenses of our needs and we can't save from it
- Household income does not cover the expenses of our needs and we have difficulties in covering them
- I don't know

What is your current residence area?

- Governorate
  - Beirut Governorate
  - Mount Lebanon Governorate.
  - North Lebanon Governorate.
  - Governorate of South Lebanon.
  - Bekaa governorate.
  - Nabatieh Governorate.
  - Governorate of Baalbek Hermel.
  - Akkar governorate
- Locality/city/village\_\_\_\_\_

Where are you originally from?

- Governorate
  - Beirut Governorate
  - Mount Lebanon Governorate.
  - North Lebanon Governorate.
  - Governorate of South Lebanon.
  - Bekaa governorate.
  - Nabatieh Governorate.
  - Governorate of Baalbek Hermel.
  - Akkar governorate
- Locality/city/village\_\_\_\_\_

## 2. Instruments: Arabic (full survey)

الرجاء الإجابة على جميع الأسئلة والفئات ضمن السؤال الواحد وذلك وفقاً للإجابة التي تعكس بشكل أفضل قناعاتك ومبادئك. الرجاء قراءة كل سؤال بدقة وشكراً لتعاونكم.

1. تجد (ين) أدناه عدد من الأسئلة التي تتعلق بهويتك الشخصية والاجتماعية. الرجاء تحديد درجة موافقتك على كل الفئات المذكورة ادناه. إذا كنت تشعر (ين) بأن هناك فئة مهمة جداً بالنسبة إليك وغير مذكورة في الجدول، الرجاء تحديدها بجانب فئة "غيره".  
لدي ارتباط وثيق جداً ب...

أوافق بشدة	أوافق	حيادي	أعارض	أعارض بشدة	
1	2	3	4	5	عائلتي/أهلي
1	2	3	4	5	أصدقائي
1	2	3	4	5	حزبي السياسي
1	2	3	4	5	منطقة سكني
1	2	3	4	5	مدينتي/بلدي
1	2	3	4	5	طائفتي
1	2	3	4	5	لبنان
1	2	3	4	5	العالم العربي
1	2	3	4	5	غيره، حدّد:

2. الرجاء اختيار الجواب الأقرب إليك فيما يلي:

لا ينطبق علي	أبداً	إلى حدٍ بسيط	إلى حدٍ ما	إلى حدٍ كبير	إلى حدٍ كبير جداً	
	5	4	3	2	1	1. إلى أي حد كانت مدرستك مختلطة طائفياً؟
	5	4	3	2	1	2. إلى أي حد (كانت) جامعتك مختلطة طائفياً؟
	5	4	3	2	1	3. إلى أي حد نطاق عملك الحالي مختلط طائفياً؟
	5	4	3	2	1	4. إلى أي حد محيطك السكني الحالي مختلط طائفياً؟

مجموعة الأسئلة التالية متعلقة بعدد أصدقائك المنتمين إلى طوائف مختلفة، والوتيرة التي تتواصل (ين) فيها معهم.

يرجى الانتباه إلى أن مصطلح "طائفتك" في الأسئلة التالية يشير إلى طائفتك المذكورة في أوراقك الرسمية كإخراج القيد:

لا أعلم	75-100%	50-75%	50%	25-50%	0-25%	
	5	4	3	2	1	1. ما هي نسبة أصدقائك اللبنانيين الذين ينتمون إلى نفس دينك؟
	5	4	3	2	1	2. ما هي نسبة أصدقائك اللبنانيين الذين ينتمون إلى نفس طائفتك؟



4.

ولا صديق	واحد إلى ثلاثة	من ثلاثة إلى عشرة	أكثر من عشرة	لا أعلم
1	2	3	4	
1	2	3	4	
1	2	3	4	
1	2	3	4	

1. كم عدد أصدقائك اللبنانيين السنة؟  
2. كم عدد أصدقائك اللبنانيين الشيعة؟  
3. كم عدد أصدقائك اللبنانيين المسيحيين؟  
4. كم عدد أصدقائك اللبنانيين الدروز؟

5.

في أغلب الأحيان	مرات عديدة	أحياناً	نادراً	أبداً	لا أعلم
1	2	3	4	5	

1. ما هي الوتيرة التي تتواصل(ين) فيها مع أصدقاء لبنانيين من طوائف مختلفة (أي تتحدث(ين) او تمضي(ن) وقت معهم):

6. ما هي الوتيرة التي تتواصل(ين) فيها مع أصدقاء من طوائف مختلفة (أي تتحدث(ين) او تمضي(ن) وقت معهم):

في أغلب الأحيان	مرات عديدة	أحياناً	نادراً	أبداً	لا أعلم
1	2	3	4	5	
1	2	3	4	5	
1	2	3	4	5	
1	2	3	4	5	

1. أصدقاء لبنانيين سنة  
2. أصدقاء لبنانيين شيعة  
3. أصدقاء لبنانيين مسيحيين  
4. أصدقاء لبنانيين دروز

7.

نعم	لا	لا أعلم
1	2	

3. هل لديك اقرباء من طوائف مختلفة عنك؟

تجد(ين) ادناه عدد من الاسئلة المتعلقة بالدين والطوائف ونظرتك لبعض المجموعات الدينية في لبنان  
8. الرجاء تحديد درجة موافقتك أو عدم موافقتك على كل من العبارات التالية:

أوافق بشدة	أوافق	حيادي	أعارض	أعارض بشدة
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5

1. اعتبر نفسي شخصاً متديناً  
2. الدين يمنحني الكثير من الأمان في حياتي  
3. تؤثر ديانتني على الطريقة التي اتصرف بها في حياتي اليومية  
4. اشعر ان هنالك عدة اشياء في الحياة اهم من الدين

يرجى الانتباه إلى أن مصطلح "طائفتي" في الأسئلة التالية يشير إلى طائفتك المذكورة في أوراقك الرسمية كإخراج القيد:

9. الرجاء تحديد درجة موافقتك أو عدم موافقتك على كل من العبارات التالية:

أوافق بشدة	أوافق	حيادي	أعارض بشدة	أعارض
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5

10. يعتقد بعض الناس أنّ هناك تفاوتاً في النفوذ السياسي للطوائف في لبنان. قد يكون رأيك مختلفاً، ولكن إن أمكنك تصنيف المجموعات التالية بحسب نظرة محيطك إليها، فكيف تصنفها/تصنيفها؟

نفوذ سياسي قوي				نفوذ سياسي ضعيف	لا أعلم
1	2	3	4	5	
1	2	3	4	5	
1	2	3	4	5	
1	2	3	4	5	
1	2	3	4	5	
1	2	3	4	5	

11. يعتقد بعض الناس أنّ هناك تفاوتاً في المكانة الاجتماعية للطوائف في لبنان. قد يكون رأيك مختلفاً، ولكن إن أمكنك تصنيف المجموعات التالية بحسب نظرة محيطك إليها، فكيف تصنفها/تصنيفها؟

مكانة اجتماعية عالية				مكانة اجتماعية متدنية	لا أعلم
1	2	3	4	5	
1	2	3	4	5	
1	2	3	4	5	
1	2	3	4	5	
1	2	3	4	5	
1	2	3	4	5	

12. إلى أي مدى تعتبر(ين) المواصفات التالية مهمة عند اختيارك من تتزوج/تتزوجين؟ ان يكون/تكون الشريك(ة) من نفس

أهتم إلى حد كبير جداً	أهتم إلى حد كبير	أهتم إلى حد ما	أهتم إلى حد بسيط	لا أهتم أبداً
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5

13. في حال قررت الانتقال الى مسكن جديد، إلى أي مدى ستهمك الأمور التالية في منطقتك السكنية؟

لا أهتم أبداً	أهتم إلى حد بسيط	أهتم إلى حد ما	أهتم إلى حد كبير	أهتم إلى حد كبير جداً	
5	4	3	2	1	1. أن يكون سكان المنطقة من نفس طبقتك الإجتماعية
5	4	3	2	1	2. أن يكون معظم سكان المنطقة من نفس طائفتك
5	4	3	2	1	3. أن يكون معظم سكان المنطقة من نفس دينك

تجد (ين) ادناه مجموعة من الأسئلة المتعلقة بأرائك تجاه بعض المواضيع السياسية والاقتصادية  
14. ما مدى اهتمامك بالأمور التالية؟

لا أهتم أبداً	أهتم إلى حد بسيط	أهتم إلى حد ما	أهتم إلى حد كبير	أهتم إلى حد كبير جداً	
5	4	3	2	1	1. السياسة المحلية
5	4	3	2	1	2. السياسة الإقليمية والدولية

15. إلى أي حد تتفق (ين) بالمؤسسات التالية

إلى حد كبير جداً	إلى حد كبير	إلى حد ما	إلى حد بسيط	أبداً	
1	2	3	4	5	1. القضاء اللبناني
1	2	3	4	5	2. قوى الأمن الداخلي
1	2	3	4	5	3. الجيش اللبناني
1	2	3	4	5	4. البنك المركزي
1	2	3	4	5	5. المصارف

16. كيف تصف وضعك الإقتصادي....

أفضل بكثير	أفضل	على المعدل	أسوأ	أسوأ بكثير	
1	2	3	4	5	1. مقارنة بالوضع الإقتصادي لباقي النلس في لبنان
1	2	3	4	5	2. مقارنة بوضعك الإقتصادي قبل سنة

17.

أفضل بكثير	أفضل	مثل وضعي الحالي	أسوأ	أسوأ بكثير	
1	2	3	4	5	1. كيف ترى وضعك الاقتصادي بعد سنة من الآن

18.

أوافق بشدة	أوافق	حيادي	أعارض	أعارض بشدة
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5

1. إن الفروقات الاقتصادية في مجتمعنا أكثرها ناتجة عن سياسات إقتصادية غير عادلة

2. ليس من العدل أن يكون هناك نظام إقتصادي ينتج الثروة المفرطة لبعض الناس والفقير المدقع للبعض الآخر.

3. يحتاج مجتمعنا إلى إعادة هيكلة جذرية لتقليص الفروقات الواسعة في المداخيل بين الناس

4. يجب على الميسورين في مجتمعنا دفع ضرائب أعلى للدولة نسبة لذوي الدخل المحدود

19.

أوافق بشدة	أوافق	حيادي	أعارض	أعارض بشدة
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5

1. إن المواطنين العاديين في لبنان يعانون من مشاكل معيشية متشابهة مهما كانت طوائفهم

2. إن جميع الزعماء اللبنانيين متورطون في الفساد السياسي والإداري في مؤسسات الدولة مهما كانت طوائفهم

3. إن الأزمة الاقتصادية الحالية ناتجة عن فساد الطبقة الحاكمة بكل مكوناتها

20. أعتقد أن التمثيل السياسي في البرلمان يجب ان يعتمد على:

أوافق بشدة	أوافق	حيادي	أعارض	أعارض بشدة
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5

1. حصص/كوتة مناطقيّة

2. تمثيل نسبي للأحزاب السياسيّة المشتركة في الانتخابات

3. حصص/كوتة طائفية

4. حصص/كوتة نسائية

21. في حال تم إلغاء الحصص الطائفية من النظام البرلماني، برأيك، كيف سيتأثر التمثيل السياسي لطائفتك؟ يرجى ملء الفراغ بالجواب الأنسب لك:

يزيد كثيراً	يزيد	لن يزيد او يقل	يقل	يقل كثيراً	لا أعلم
1	2	3	4	5	6

أعتقد أن إلغاء الحصص الطائفية من النظام البرلماني اللبناني سوف \_\_\_\_\_ من التمثيل السياسي الحالي لطائفتي

**22. يرجى الانتباه إلى أن مصطلح "مناصب سياسية" في الأسئلة التالية يشير إلى المناصب السياسية في البرلمان والحكومة ورئاسة الجمهورية.**

أوافق بشدة	أوافق	حيادي	أعارض	أعارض بشدة
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5

**23.**

أوافق بشدة	أوافق	حيادي	أعارض	أعارض بشدة
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5

**24. إن نظام الحكم الأنسب للبنان هو...**

أؤيد بشدة	أؤيد	حيادي	أعارض	أعارض بشدة
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5

**25.**

أوافق بشدة	أوافق	حيادي	أعارض	أعارض بشدة
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5

في ما يلي، نحن مهتمون بآرائك اتجاه بعض الأحزاب السياسية في لبنان

26. في السؤال التالي، نود أن نعرف أي من الأحزاب السياسية تناصر (ين). المناصرة لا تعني بالضرورة أن تكون (ي) عضواً في الحزب، نحن مهتمون بالحزب الأقرب لتوجهاتك السياسية. ضع دائرة حول الخيارات الأنسب لك.

1. تيار المستقبل  
2. حزب الله  
3. حركة أمل  
4. تيار المردة  
5. التيار الوطني الحر  
6. الجماعة الإسلامية  
7. الحزب التقدمي الاشتراكي  
8. حزب سبعة  
9. الحزب السوري القومي الاجتماعي  
10. الحزب الشيوعي اللبناني  
11. حزب القوات اللبنانية  
12. حزب الكتائب اللبنانية

○ لا احد ○ مواطنون ومواطنات في دولة ○ غيره، حدد

27. أي من التحالفات السياسية تدعم أو تعتبرها أقرب إلى توجهاتك السياسية؟

○ 8 آذار ○ 14 آذار ○ لا أحد

28. إلى أي حد تؤيد (ين) أو تعارض (ين) الأحزاب السياسية التالية؟

أعترض بشدة	أعترض	حيادي	أؤيد	أؤيد بشدة	
5	4	3	2	1	1. تيار المستقبل
5	4	3	2	1	2. حزب الله
5	4	3	2	1	3. حركة أمل
5	4	3	2	1	4. التيار الوطني الحر
5	4	3	2	1	5. حزب القوات اللبنانية
5	4	3	2	1	6. حزب الكتائب
5	4	3	2	1	7. الحزب التقدمي الإشتراكي

الأكثرية	البعض	لا	
			29. 1. هل لديك اقرباء يدعمون احد الأحزاب السياسية الموجودة في السلطة؟
			2. هل لديك اقرباء على علاقة وثيقة مع نواب أو وزراء حاليين أو سابقين؟

30. يرجى تحديد إذا ما استفدت أنت أو أسرتك في السنوات القليلة الماضية من دعم حزب سياسي لبناني للحصول على...

لا	نعم	
		1. مساعدة في إيجاد عمل
		2. مساعدة مالية
		3. مساعدة للتعلم (منح دراسية)

		4. خدمات صحية
		5. مساعدات غذائية
		6. مساعدات في قضايا قانونية

31. يعتقد بعض الناس أن هناك تفاوتاً في النفوذ السياسي للأحزاب السياسية في لبنان. برأيك، ما مدى نفوذ كل من هذه الأحزاب في سياسة البلد؟

لا أعلم	نفوذ سياسي ضعيف				نفوذ سياسي قوي	
	5	4	3	2	1	1. تيار المستقبل
	5	4	3	2	1	2. حزب الله
	5	4	3	2	1	3. حركة أمل
	5	4	3	2	1	4. التيار الوطني الحر
	5	4	3	2	1	5. حزب القوات اللبنانية
	5	4	3	2	1	6. حزب الكتائب
	5	4	3	2	1	7. الحزب التقدمي الإشتراكي

في ما يلي، نحن مهتمون بأراءك تجاه الإنتفاضة الحالية ومدى مشاركتك فيها

لا أعلم	حيادي	اعارض	أؤيد	
4	3	2	1	32. ما هو موقفك الحالي من الإنتفاضة في لبنان

33. ما مدى تأييدك للإجراءات السياسية التالية في لبنان:

أؤيد بشدة	أؤيد	حيادي	أعارض	أعارض بشدة	
1	2	3	4	5	1. حكومة تكنوقراط مستقلين عن المنظومة السياسية الحاكمة
1	2	3	4	5	2. التحضير لإنتخابات نيابية مبكرة
1	2	3	4	5	3. إجراء إنتخابات خارج القيد الطانفي
1	2	3	4	5	4. تحقيق استقلالية القضاء
1	2	3	4	5	5. محاسبة جميع السياسيين الفاسدين
1	2	3	4	5	6. إسترداد الأموال المنهوبة

34. هل تؤيد (بن) شعار "كلن يعني كلن"؟

- نعم  
○ لا

35. فيما يخص شعار "كلن يعني كلن"، برأيك، هل يجب استثناء أحد الشخصيات التالية؟

- نبيه بري
- السيد حسن نصرالله
- سعد الحريري
- وليد جنبلاط
- سمير جعجع
- ميشال عون
- جبران باسيل
- سامي الجميل
- لا أحد

36.

إلى حدّ كبير جداً	إلى حدّ كبير	إلى حدّ ما	إلى حدّ بسيط	أبداً
1	2	3	4	5
1. لدي استعداد للمشاركة في تحركات سلمية ضمن إطار الانتفاضة الحالية				
1	2	3	4	5
2. أو من بإمكانية اللبنانيين تحقيق مطالب الانتفاضة من خلال تحركات جماعية				

37. نحن مهتمون في السؤال التالي بدرجة استعدادك، للمشاركة في تحركات سلمية ضمن إطار الانتفاضة الحالية للمطالبة بإلغاء نظام المحاصصة الطائفية من جميع المناصب السياسية في لبنان.

لدي استعداد للمشاركة في النشاطات التالية بهدف إلغاء نظام المحاصصة الطائفية من جميع المناصب السياسية في لبنان...

أوافق بشدة	أوافق	حيادي	أعارض	أعارض بشدة
1	2	3	4	5
1. التوقيع على عريضة				
1	2	3	4	5
2. المشاركة في مظاهرة سلمية				
1	2	3	4	5
3. المشاركة في إضراب عام				
1	2	3	4	5
4. الانضمام إلى مجموعة تعمل على تحقيق هذا الهدف				

38. نحن مهتمون في السؤال التالي بدرجة استعدادك، للمشاركة في تحركات سلمية ضمن إطار الانتفاضة الحالية للمطالبة بإنشاء دولة مدنية لا طائفية تركز على عنصرين: (1) إلغاء نظام المحاصصة الطائفية من جميع المناصب السياسية في لبنان و (2) إقرار قوانين أحوال شخصية مدنية (قوانين مدنية للزواج، الطلاق، حضنة الأطفال، الميراث).

لدي استعداد للمشاركة في النشاطات التالية بهدف إنشاء دولة مدنية لا طائفية في لبنان...

أوافق بشدة	أوافق	حيادي	أعارض	أعارض بشدة
1	2	3	4	5
1. التوقيع على عريضة				
1	2	3	4	5
2. المشاركة في مظاهرة سلمية				
1	2	3	4	5
3. المشاركة في إضراب عام				



5	4	3	2	1	4. الانضمام إلى مجموعة تعمل على تحقيق هذا الهدف
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39. هل سبق أن شاركت ما قبل 17 تشرين أول 2019 في النشاطات التالية؟

لا	نعم	
		1. شاركت في أحد أشكال الحراك الجماعي (مثلاً وقعت على عريضة أو شاركت في مظاهرة) لإزالة نظام المحاصصة الطائفي من المناصب السياسية في لبنان
		2. شاركت في أحد أشكال الحراك الجماعي (مثلاً وقعت على عريضة أو شاركت في مظاهرة) التي تطالب بقوانين أحوال شخصية مدنية في لبنان (قوانين مدنية للزواج، الطلاق، حضنة الأطفال، الميراث)

40. هل شاركت في أي من المظاهرات في الإنتفاضة ابتداءً من 17 تشرين أول 2019؟

- نعم
- لا

شارك باستمرار حتى اليوم حتى لو بوتيرة مختلفة	فقط في الأسابيع الأولى	فقط في الأيام القليلة الأولى	لم اشرك ابداً	41
4	3	2	1	1. ما هي الوتيرة التي شاركت فيها بالمظاهرات

42. الرجاء تحديد شكل مشاركتك بالانتفاضة، يمكنك إختيار أكثر من إجابة

- مشاركة في مظاهرات
- مشاركة في اضرابات
- التنظيم مع مجموعات، احزاب، أو نقابات
- المشاركة في محاضرات ونقاشات في الساحات
- الدعم من خلال وسائل التواصل الإجتماعي
- قطع طرقات
- التظاهر امام مرافق عامة،بيوت سياسيين
- التظاهر امام مصرف لبنان المركزي
- التظاهر امام المصارف الخاصة
- المساهمة في مساعدات للمشاركين في المظاهرات (طعام، تبرعات مالية...)
- الامتناع عن دفع ضرائب

43. هل تنتمي إلى مجموعة سياسية معينة مشاركة في الانتفاضة؟

- نعم
- لا

44. هل تنتمي إلى حزب سياسي مشارك في الانتفاضة؟

- نعم
- لا

45. هل قمت بالتصويت في الانتخابات النيابية في أيار 2018؟

- نعم
- لا

46. إن كان جوابك نعم، هل قمت بالتصويت للائحة جميع مرشحيها من المستقلين أو المجتمع المدني؟

- نعم
- لا

غيره، حدّد \_\_\_\_\_

47. الرجاء تحديد مدة إقامتك في لبنان

- طوال حياتي
- عشت لسنة أو أكثر في الخارج

48. هل عشت في لبنان طوال السنوات الخمس الماضية؟

- نعم
- لا

49. الجنس:

- ذكر
- أنثى

50. العمر: \_\_\_\_\_

51. المستوى التعليمي:

- ابتدائي وما دون
- مهني
- ثانوي
- دراسات عليا
- تكميلي
- جامعي

52. حدد طبيعة عملك الحالي (يمكنك اختيار أكثر من إجابة):

- أعمل (حدد أدناه)
- في القطاع الخاص
- في القطاع العام
- عمل حر
- لا أعمل (حدد أدناه)
- ربة منزل
- عاطل(ة) عن العمل
- متقاعد(ة)
- طالب(ة)
- غيره، حدّد \_\_\_\_\_

53. أيّ من هذه العبارات أقرب لوصف دخّل أسرتك؟

- دخل الأسرة يغطّي نفقات احتياجاتنا بشكلٍ جيّد، ونستطيع أن نوفّر منه
- دخل الأسرة يغطّي نفقات احتياجاتنا ولا نوفّر منه
- دخل الأسرة لا يغطّي نفقات احتياجاتنا ونواجه صعوباتٍ في تغطيتها
- لا أعرف

54. ما هي طائفتك (بحسب إخراج القيد) ؟
- السنة ○ الشيعة ○ الروم الأرثوذكس ○ طائفة اخرى، حدّد \_\_\_\_\_
- الموارنة ○ الدروز ○ الروم الكاثوليك

55. هل تشعر (ين) بالإنتماء إلى طائفة غير طائفتك المسجلة في إخراج القيد؟

- أشعر بالإنتماء إلى طائفتي المسجلة في إخراج القيد
- أشعر بالإنتماء إلى طائفة غير طائفتي المسجلة في إخراج القيد، حدّد \_\_\_\_\_
- لا أشعر بالإنتماء إلى أي طائفة

56. هل غيرت (ي) طائفتك أو شطبتها من إخراج القيد؟

- لا
- نعم، شطبتها
- نعم، غيرتها (كانت طائفتي من قبل \_\_\_\_\_)

57. هل ينتمي أهلك إلى نفس الطائفة؟

- نعم
- لا، حدّد الطائفتين
- الأب
- الأم

58. الوضع الإجتماعي:

- عازب(ة) ○ متزوج(ة) ○ مطلق(ة) ○ أرمل(ة)

59. في حال كنت متزوج(ة)، هل تنتمي انت وزوجك/زوجتك إلى نفس الطائفة؟

- نعم
- لا، حدّد الطائفتين \_\_\_\_\_

<p>61. ما هي منطقة نفوسك المحافظة</p> <p>○ المحافظة</p> <p>○ محافظة بيروت</p> <p>○ محافظة جبل لبنان.</p> <p>○ محافظة لبنان الشمالي.</p> <p>○ محافظة لبنان الجنوبي.</p> <p>○ محافظة البقاع.</p> <p>○ محافظة النبطية.</p> <p>○ محافظة بعلبك الهرمل.</p> <p>○ محافظة عكار</p> <p>○ المحلّة/المدينة/القرية _____</p>	<p>60. ما هي منطقة سكنك الحالية؟ المحافظة</p> <p>○ المحافظة</p> <p>○ محافظة بيروت</p> <p>○ محافظة جبل لبنان.</p> <p>○ محافظة لبنان الشمالي.</p> <p>○ محافظة لبنان الجنوبي.</p> <p>○ محافظة البقاع.</p> <p>○ محافظة النبطية.</p> <p>○ محافظة بعلبك الهرمل.</p> <p>○ محافظة عكار</p> <p>○ المحلّة/المدينة/القرية _____</p>
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